

地上軍隊ハ駐軍間等ニ於テ宿營ヲ行フ航空部隊ニ在リテモ亦集中地等ニ於テハ宿營ヲ行フモノトス
宿營法ニハ舍營、露營、村落露營ノ三種アリ
舍營ハ通常家屋内ニ宿營スルモノニシテ露營ハ之ニ反ス又舍營、露營ヲ混用スルモノヲ村落露營ト
稱ス

六、宿營ノ爲ノ勤務員

宿營間各舍(露)營區ニ舍(露)營司令官、舍(露)營日直將校、及巡察將校(下士官)等ノ勤務員ヲ置ク
舍(露)營司令官ハ舍(露)營區内ノ配宿、内務及警戒ニ關スル事項ヲ統轄スルモノトス之ガ爲舍(露)
營命令ニ於テ示スベキ事項概ネ左ノ如シ

各部隊ノ舍(露)營地區

舍(露)營日直將校及巡察將校(下士官)

舍(露)營衛兵、要スレバ直轄ノ對空監視哨、對空射擊部隊等ノ兵力、差出區分及配置

戰備ノ度

各種警報ニ際シ取ルベキ特別處置

高級指揮官及舍(露)營司令官ノ位置

要スレバ警急集合場及之ニ到ル道路

前項ノ外要スレバ連絡、衛生、防火、瓦斯防護、日課時限、防護其ノ他住民ニ關スル事項等ニ就

作三三四

三

キ所要ノ規定ヲ爲ストス

舍(露)營日直將校ハ舍(露)營司令官ノ命ヲ受ケ舍(露)營衛兵及同司令官直轄ノ對空監視哨、對空射
擊部隊等ヲ指揮シ且内務及警戒ニ關スル舍(露)營司令官ノ指示ヲ部隊日直將校(下士官)ニ傳ヘ同司
令官ノ業務ヲ補佐スルモノトス
巡察將校(下士官)ハ舍(露)營司令官ノ命ヲ受ケ内務及警戒ニ關シ舍(露)營區内ノ警視ニ任ズルモノ
トス

作一四四

四

各部隊(大隊、戰隊ニ準ズル部隊以上トス)ハ部隊日直將校(下士官)及部隊衛兵ヲ置ク

第二款 給 養

一、要 旨

航空地區司令官ハ其ノ航空地區内ニ在ル飛行部隊並ニ航空情報、航空通信、保安、航測及氣象部隊
等ノ給養ヲ擔任スルモノトス之ガ爲各飛行場大隊ヲシテ給養ヲ擔任セシムベキ部隊及期間、給養、
給養諸品補所給ノ要領等ニ關シ要ノ事項ヲ定ムルモノトス

作網四三

二、飛行場大隊長

飛行場大隊長ハ航空作戰ノ特性ニ鑑ミ常ニ飛行場ニ所要ノ糧食ヲ集積シ給養施設ヲ完備シ給養準備
ヲ周到ナラシムルト共ニ積極的ニ關係部隊ト連絡シ以テ給養實施ヲ圓滑適切ナラシムルヲ要ス此ノ

際特ニ飛行部隊指揮官トノ連繫ヲ緊密ニシテ部隊ノ活動狀況ヲ考慮シ空中勤務者ニ對シ所要ノ特種糧食ヲ支給若クハ加給シ其ノ保健ニ資スルコト緊要ナリ

航操一五

三、地方物資及勞力並ニ地方工業機關ノ蒐集利用

地方物資及勞力並ニ地方工業機關ノ蒐集又ハ利用ニ方リテハ航空軍司令官ハ上級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ關係地上兵團ト協定シ之ガ實施ヲ統制スルモノトス狀況ニ依リ飛行師團長又ハ航空地區司令官ニ地域、工場等ヲ配當シテ之ヲ統制セシムルコトアリ

作網四三

第二節 衛 生

第一款 要 則

一、衛生勤務ハ航空部隊就中飛行部隊ノ戰力ヲ維持增強スル爲極メテ緊要ナリ故ニ航空部隊ハ常ニ衛生勤務ヲ確實良好ナラシメ特ニ空中勤務者ノ體力ノ保持増進、適性伸張、航空疲勞ノ解消及防止等

航操一六

ニ關シ萬般ノ施策ヲ講ズルヲ要ス極寒及酷暑時並ニ瘴癘ノ地方ニ於テ特ニ然リ

空中勤務者ノ體力ノ保持増進ノ爲ニハ休宿及給養ヲ作戰地ノ特性及戰闘ノ狀況ニ適應セシムルト共ニ酸素吸入器、航空腹帶、特種藥物等ノ使用ヲ適切ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

航操一六

二、衛生勤務ニ於テハ保健、防疫、傷病者ノ收療及後送、敵ノ科(化)學戰ニ對スル、衛生業務、衛生

ニ關スル情報収集、衛生材料ノ補給等ヲ行フモノトス

三、保健ノ目的ヲ達センガ爲ニハ將兵ノ體力、氣力ヲ增強シ特ニ持久力ヲ増進シ得ル如ク衛生ニ關スル諸般ノ指導及施設ニ遺憾ナカラシムルコト緊要ナリ

四、傳染病ハ未然ニ其ノ發生ヲ防止スルコト緊要ナリ之ガ爲防疫ニ關スル軍紀ノ振作及教育ノ徹底ヲ圖リ關係情報ヲ收集シ必要ナル防疫施設ヲ完備スルヲ要ス一度傳染病發生セバ如何ナル場合ニ於テモ速カニ隔離、消毒、檢索、診療等ノ處置ヲ講ジ續發傳播ヲ防遏セザルベカラズ

一地ニ駐止シアル際ニハ絶エズ地方住民ノ衛生状態ニ注意シ其ノ衛生施設、衛生思想ノ向上ヲ圖リ調(物資)ノ檢査ヲ嚴ニスルヲ要ス之ガ爲要スレバ軍隊指導ノ下ニ地方官憲等ヲ以テ衛生委員ヲ編成セシムルヲ可トス

五、傷病者ノ收療及後送ニ方リテハ速カニ傷病者ニ對シ適切ナル處置ヲ施シ成ルベク戰場ニ於テ治癒回復セシメ以テ軍隊ノ戰闘力減耗ヲ防止スルコト緊要ナリ

六、敵ノ行フ科(化)學戰ニ對シテハ之ニ關スル情報収集、防護及收療ニ關シ遺憾ナカラシムルト共ニ衛生設施ヲ整へ特ニ檢知及衛生的鑑査ヲ行フヲ要ス

七、原隊ニ復歸スル治癒患者ハ所屬部隊等ノ受領者若クハ兵站地區司令部等ニ引繼ギ爾後ノ行動ヲ確實ナラシムルヲ要ス又患者ニ屬スル兵器、被服等ハ現地治癒見込患者ニ必要ナルモノヲ除キ師團兵器部、關係補給廠又ハ兵站地區司令部等ニ引繼ギ之ガ處理ヲ的確ナラシムルヲ要ス

第二款 衛生機關

一、隊屬人員及材料

隊附軍醫ハ隊長ノ命ヲ受ケ關係諸官ト密ニ連繫シ部隊ノ衛生勤務ニ關シ計畫、調査、指導及之ガ實施ニ任ズ

軍醫ヲ有セザル部隊ニ在リテハ前項ノ勤務ヲ最寄部隊ニ依託ス

二、地上師團衛生機關

患者收容隊ハ戰鬪ニ際シ第一線ニ進出シテ傷者ノ收容及後送ヲ行フヲ以テ主要ナル任務トス

衛生隊ハ所要ニ應ジ野戰病院、患者療養所等ヲ開設シ戰場ニ於ケル治療ヲ行フヲ以テ主要ナル任務トス

防疫給水部ハ師團ノ防疫、防疫給水等ニ任ズ

三、兵站衛生機關

兵站衛生隊ハ衛生隊ト交代シ或ハ之ヲ増援シテ其ノ推進ニ任ジ或ハ後方ニ開設シテ後送セラレタル

患者竝ニ兵站管區内ニ於ケル患者ヲ收療シ其ノ戰地回復ヲ圖ルヲ以テ主要ナル任務トス之ガ爲適宜

ノ地ニ兵站病院、患者療養所、患者集合所ヲ開設シ又兵站主地等ニハ傳染病院其ノ他ノ特殊病院ヲ設置スルコトアリ

患者輸送隊ハ主トシテ衛生隊ヨリノ患者後送ニ任ズ

野戰防疫給水部隊ハ防疫、防毒、防疫給水等ニ任ズ

四、衛生機關ノ位置ノ標示

患者集合所、野戰病院、兵站病院等ノ位置ニハ赤十字旗ト國旗トヲ併セ植立シ夜間ハ更ニ赤十字燈ヲ

掲ゲテ標示ス然レドモ之ガ爲我ガ軍ノ配備等ヲ敵ニ暴露セザルヲ要ス戰線ニ近キモノニ在リテ特ニ然

第三款 航空基地内ニ於ケル衛生勤務

一、要旨

戰鬪間航空基地ニ於ケル航空部隊ノ衛生勤務ハ高級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ主トシテ航空地區部隊之ヲ

擔任スルモノトス

地上軍隊トノ關係ハ止級指揮官ヨリ之ヲ律セラルルヲ通常トス

二、飛行場ニ於ケル勤務

航空地區司令官ハ飛行場毎ニ隊附衛生部員及衛生材料其ノ他所要ノ人員及器材ヲ以テ繙帶所ヲ開設

シ飛行部隊衛生機關ト協力シ傷病患者ノ收療ニ任ゼシムルト共ニ要スレバ飛行地區ニ近ク救護所ヲ

開設シ機上傷者ノ救急處置ヲ迅速ナラシムルモノトス

同一飛行場ニ數箇ノ部隊位置スル場合ニ於テハ上級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ各部隊ノ衛生機關其ノ他所
要ノ人員及器材ヲ以テ合同繙帶所又ハ合同救護所ヲ開設スルヲ利トスルコトアリ

航操一六
四

三、繙帶所ノ位置及設備

繙帶所ノ位置決定竝ニ之ガ設備ニ方リテハ常ニ空中攻撃ヲ顧慮スルト共ニ航空部隊ノ兵力、使用期
間ノ長短、飛行場ノ状態等ヲ考慮シ勉メテ其ノ施設ヲ完備スルコト緊要ナリ此ノ際季節ニ應ジ排水、
防寒、防暑、害蟲豫防特ニ防蚊等ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス瓦斯防護ニ便ナル位置ニ選定シ且集團
防護ノ處置ヲ講ズルコト緊要ナリ

航操一六
五

合同繙帶所、救護所及合同救護所ノ位置決定竝ニ之ガ設備ハ前項ニ準ズルモノトス

四、患者ノ治療

航空部隊ノ輕傷病患者ハ繙帶所ニ於テ治療セシムルヲ本旨トシ重傷病患者ハ適宜最寄野戰衛生機關
ニ送致スルモノトス

五、航空治療班、患者空輸班、航空保健所

戰鬪間航空高級指揮官ハ要スレバ所要ノ衛生部員、衛生材料及輸送機ヲ以テ航空治療班又ハ患者空
輸班ヲ編制シ傷病患者ノ迅速ナル收療ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

作綱四四
四

戰鬪長期ニ互ル場合ニ於テハ航空高級指揮官ハ適宜航空保健所ヲ設ケ飛行部隊戦力ノ維持増強ニ勉
ムルコト緊要ナリ

作綱四四
四

G-2 SECTION
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
TOKYO, JAPAN

DATE 20 November 1945

Extract Form - USSBS Study of
Japanese Intelligence Activities

Source of Extract: ^{Army} **Japanese Aviator's Handbook (Translation)**

Date of Extract: **March, 1944**

EXTRACT: P. 21

III. INTELLIGENCE.

A. Introduction.

- #25. Air Force during combat will collect pertinent intelligence concerning enemy situation, weather, technique, etc., necessary for the prosecution of the war. Intelligence must be distributed quickly so as to be of use. Collection of intelligence concerning changes in enemy air forces situation is especially useful.
- #26. Main methods of collecting intelligence are: reconnaissance, observation of enemy situation, weather data, and spy reports. Since these are closely inter-related, cooperation is essential. It is especially important to use scientific methods.
- #27. Intelligence concerning enemy situation, weather, etc., collected by individual units in combat will be used in addition to that collected by regular intelligence agencies.

P. 22

- #28. As soon as an intelligence report is disseminated, or as soon as several reports are examined together, such details as various intelligence items, war situation, and feasibility of communication are considered and decided upon.
- #29. In order to make a quick and accurate intelligence and dispatch, it is important to maintain and to put into operation the communication facilities, and also utilize all communication measures. Moreover, it is important to utilize photography and other scientific measures.
- # 30. On utilizing the intelligence, the origin, the period of data and the method of assembling information must be made clear. It is essential to determine the truth and the value of the intelligence. While one must be careful to consider this information scientifically, he must, at the same time, observe minutely the small matters because this is the key to intelligence.

Article No. 1.

- #31. The duty of reconnaissance is principally that of the reconnaissance unit. However, each unit must carry out its own reconnaissance necessary for battle.

Reconnaissance depends on inspection, photography, and radio equipment, etc., or the utilization of all these means.

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EXTRACT: **Intelligence.**

- #32. In reconnaissance, one must consider the purpose, kind of target, and the progress of the battle, thereby take advantage of the time and the method. It is important to take the enemy by surprise as much as possible and to achieve quickly the purpose. However, depending on the situation, it is important to plan the removal of enemy defense and to carry out the reconnaissance.
- #33. In reconnaissance, it is extremely important to endeavor to compare the past situation with the present, and especially, to make clear any such changes.
- #34. Detailed reconnaissance at night is very difficult. However, by utilizing the information obtained in the day time, one can carry out reconnaissance at night. It is vital to note the changes in the enemy situation and endeavor to learn the enemy plan.

In night reconnaissance, it is important to make minute preparations, to utilize radio equipment, and to not be caught off guard by the enemy.

Article 2 - Observation of enemy situation

- #35. The purpose of observing the enemy is principally to observe the enemy movements and to search out their actions. Every unit, especially the air unit, must not lose the opportunity and use the resulting information, while at the same time make provisions for reconnaissance and defense.
- #36. Enemy situation observation depends on look-outs or spotters, radar, air reconnaissance, balloon look-outs, etc.
- #37. In observing the enemy situation, it is very difficult to differentiate between friend and foe, and because of this reason, it is important that all air unit commanders and under must obey all regulations on plane recognition, air operations, etc. At the same time, it is important to report movements at that time to related intelligence units.
- #38. Air reconnaissance and balloon look-outs decreases the battle strength, so one must endeavor not to utilize these means unless necessary and be careful of the reconnaissance plans secret.
- #39. When the reconnaissance planes and balloon lookouts discover an enemy, they will, without any special order, make the movements of the enemy clear by approaching him.

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Article #3 - Meteorology.

- #40. Meteorology possesses a vital relationship to the operation of the flying unit in the air corps and the detailed study and its utilization is fundamental to the demonstrative achievement of the air corps. The commanders in the air unit commanding officers will possess sufficient knowledge of meteorology and guarantee liaison with meteorological units established in the vicinity. It is necessary for the meteorological units to cooperate positively with the air units so that there will be no regrets in the use and in the detailed study of meteorology.
- #41. The Air Corps will communicate with the related meteorological units and it will speedily make clear any special characteristics related to meteorological statistical data as a basis. It is necessary to assemble the meteorological data essential to the immediate battle operation (duty-training) and to carry out the battle operation without any regret.
- #42. In utilizing the meteorological intelligence, it is necessary for the air corps unit commander to make duty the fundamental basis, to consider the unit situation and to execute the appropriate meteorological judgement. When it is necessary, he must reconnoiter the meteorological condition of the air routes and of the target vicinity needed in order to attack. Accordingly, it is necessary to forecast carefully the change in the event the meteorological situation is not satisfactory and to utilize advantageously the meteorology of the place.
- #43. The air corps (planes) will report even without order the meteorological situation observed during flight and notify the related meteorological units.

軍令陸第二號

航空兵操典

綱領、總則
及第一部

March '44

Aviator's Handbook

昭和十九年三月
陸軍省印刷

朕航空兵操典ヲ改定シ之ガ施行ヲ命ズ

御名 御璽

昭和十九年三月十六日

陸軍大臣 東條英機

軍令陸第二號

航空兵操典

勅語

朕戦争ノ經驗ト最近ニ於ケル軍事ノ進運ト
ニ鑑ミ茲ニ航空兵操典ヲ改定ス益々研鑽應
用其ノ宜シキヲ得以テ改定ノ本色ヲ發揮セ
ンコトヲ勉メヨ

航空兵操典

綱領、總則及第一部

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航空兵操典

綱領、總則
及第一部

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航空兵操典

綱領、總則
及第一部

綱領

第一 軍ノ主トスル所ハ戦闘ナリ故ニ百事皆戦闘ヲ以テ基準トスベシ而シテ戦闘一般ノ目的ハ敵ヲ壓倒殲滅シテ迅速ニ戦捷ヲ獲得スルニ在リ

第二 戦捷ノ要ハ有形無形ノ各種戦闘要素ヲ綜合シテ敵ニ優ル威力ヲ要點ニ集中發揮セシムルニ在リ
訓練精到ニシテ必勝ノ信念堅ク軍紀至嚴ニシテ攻撃精神充溢セル軍隊ハ能ク物質的威力ヲ凌駕シテ戦捷ヲ完ウシ

得ルモノトス

第三 必勝ノ信念ハ主トシテ軍ノ光輝アル歴史ニ根源シ周到ナル訓練ヲ以テ之ヲ培養シ卓越ナル指揮統帥ヲ以テ之ヲ充實ス

赫々タル傳統ヲ有スル國軍ハ愈々忠君愛國ノ精神ヲ砥礪シ益々訓練ノ精熟ヲ重ネ戰鬪慘烈ノ極所ニ至ルモ上下相信倚シ毅然トシテ必勝ノ確信ヲ持セザルベカラズ

第四 軍紀ハ軍隊ノ命脈ナリ戰場到ル處境遇ヲ異ニシ且諸種ノ任務ヲ有スル全軍ヲシテ上將帥ヨリ下一兵ニ至ル迄脈絡一貫克ク一定ノ方針ニ從ヒ衆心一致ノ行動ニ就カシメ得ルモノ即チ軍紀ニシテ其ノ弛張ハ實ニ軍ノ運命ヲ

左右スルモノナリ而シテ軍紀ノ要素ハ服従ニ在リ故ニ全軍ノ將兵ヲシテ身命ヲ君國ニ獻ゲ至誠上長ニ服従シ其ノ命令ヲ確守スルヲ以テ第二ノ天性ト成サシムルヲ要ス

第五 凡ソ兵戰ノ事タル獨斷ヲ要スルモノ頗ル多シ而シテ獨斷ハ其ノ精神ニ於テハ決シテ服従ト相反スルモノニアラズ常ニ上官ノ意圖ヲ明察シ大局ヲ判斷シテ狀況ノ變化ニ應ジ自ラ其ノ目的ヲ達シ得ベキ最良ノ方法ヲ選ビ以テ機宜ヲ制セザルベカラズ

第六 軍隊ハ常ニ攻撃精神充溢シ志氣旺盛ナラザルベカラズ

攻撃精神ハ忠君愛國ノ至誠ヨリ發スル軍人精神ノ精華ニ

シテ鞏固ナル軍隊志氣ノ表徴ナリ戰技及特技之ニ依リテ精ヲ致シ教練之ニ依リテ光ヲ放チ戰鬥之ニ依リテ勝ヲ奏ス蓋シ勝敗ノ數ハ必ズシモ兵力ノ多寡ニ依ラズ精練ニシテ且攻撃精神ニ富メル軍隊ハ克ク寡ヲ以テ衆ヲ破ルコトヲ得ルモノナレバナリ

第七 協同一致ハ戰鬥ノ目的ヲ達スル爲極メテ重要ナリ兵種ヲ論ゼズ上下ヲ問ハズ戮力協心全軍一體ノ實ヲ擧ゲ始メテ戰鬥ノ成果ヲ期シ得ベク全般ノ情勢ヲ考察シ各々其ノ職責ヲ重ンジ一意任務ノ遂行ニ努力スルハ即チ協同一致ノ趣旨ニ合スルモノナリ

第八 戰鬥ハ輓近著シク複雑鞏強ノ性質ヲ帶ビ且資材ノ

シテ鞏固ナル軍隊志氣ノ表徴ナリ戰技及特技之ニ依リテ精ヲ致シ教練之ニ依リテ光ヲ放チ戰鬥之ニ依リテ勝ヲ奏ス蓋シ勝敗ノ數ハ必ズシモ兵力ノ多寡ニ依ラズ精練ニシテ且攻撃精神ニ富メル軍隊ハ克ク寡ヲ以テ衆ヲ破ルコトヲ得ルモノナレバナリ

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第八 戰鬥ハ輓近著シク複雑鞏強ノ性質ヲ帶ビ且資材ノ

充實、補給ノ圓滑ハ必ズシモ常ニ之ヲ望ムベカラズ故ニ
軍隊ハ堅忍不拔克ク困苦缺乏ニ堪ヘ難局ヲ打開シ戰捷ノ
一途ニ邁進スルヲ要ス

第九 敵ノ意表ニ出ヅルハ機ヲ制シ勝ヲ得ルノ要道ナリ
故ニ旺盛ナル企圖心ト追隨ヲ許サザル創意ト神速ナル機
動トヲ以テ敵ニ臨ミ常ニ主動ノ位置ニ立チ全軍相戒メテ
嚴ニ我が軍ノ企圖ヲ祕匿シ困難ナル地形及天候ヲモ克服
シ疾風迅雷敵ヲシテ之ニ對應スルノ策ナカラシムルコト
緊要ナリ

第十 指揮官ハ軍隊指揮ノ中樞ニシテ又團結ノ核心ナリ
故ニ常時熾烈ナル責任觀念及鞏固ナル意志ヲ以テ其ノ職

責ヲ遂行スルト共ニ高邁ナル徳性ヲ備ヘ部下ト苦樂ヲ俱ニシ率先躬行軍隊ノ儀表トシテ其ノ尊信ヲ受ケ劍電彈雨ノ間ニ立チ勇猛沈著部下ヲシテ仰ギテ富嶽ノ重キヲ感ゼシメザルベカラズ

爲サザルト遲疑スルトハ指揮官ノ最モ戒ムベキ所トス是此ノ兩者ノ軍隊ヲ危殆ニ陥ラシムルコト其ノ方法ヲ誤ルヨリモ更ニ甚ダシキモノアレバナリ

第十一 航空戦力ノ消長ハ作戰ノ成否ヲ決シ戦局ノ歸趨ヲ定ム

航空兵ノ本領ハ作戰ノ終始ヲ通ジ偉大ナル機動力ト獨特ノ戦闘威力トヲ最高度ニ發揮シ制空權ヲ獲得シテ全軍戰

捷ノ根基ヲ確立スルニ在リ

航空兵ハ剛膽ニシテ周到、慧敏ニシテ沈著、機ニ臨ミ克ク果敢斷行シ強靱不屈其ノ本領ヲ完ウスベシ

第十二 戦闘ニ於テハ百事簡單ニシテ且精練ナルモノ能ク成功ヲ期シ得ベシ典令ハ此ノ趣旨ニ基キ軍隊訓練上主要ナル原則、法則及制式ヲ示スモノニシテ之ガ運用ノ妙ハ一ニ其ノ人ニ存ス固ヨリ妄リニ典則ニ乖クベカラズ又之ニ拘泥シテ實效ヲ誤ルベカラズ宜シク工夫ヲ積ミ創意ニ勉メ以テ千差萬別ノ狀況ニ處シ之ヲ活用スベシ

總則

- 第一 本操典ハ航空部隊ノ戰鬥(勤務)及教育訓練ニ關シ一般ニ準據スベキ事項ヲ示スモノトス
- 本操典ハ綱領、總則、第一部及第二部ヨリ成ル
- 第二 航空部隊ハ本操典ニ基キ訓練ノ精到ヲ期スベシ特ニ戰鬥ノ經驗ニ鑑ミ將來ノ變化ヲ洞察シ克ク本操典ヲ活用シ指揮統帥、戰法、戰技、特技等ニ於テ常ニ敵ニ優越シ百戰必勝ヲ期セザルベカラズ
- 第三 本操典實施ノ爲特ニ規定スルヲ要スル事項ハ陸軍航空總監之ヲ陸軍大臣、參謀總長及教育總監ト協議決定スルモノトス

第一部

第一篇 戰鬥指揮ノ要則

第一 航空戦力發揮ノ途ハ攻勢ニ在リ而シテ攻勢ハ自主積極的ナルヲ要ス故ニ指揮官以下任ニ當ルヤ常ニ積極主動攻勢ヲ以テ之ヲ完遂スベシ

第二 航空戦力ハ各分科部隊戦力ノ有機的統合ニ依リ始メテ其ノ威力ヲ發揮ス故ニ各分科部隊ノ指揮及戰鬥(勤務)ハ是ヲ以テ其ノ基^{モト}トセザルベカラズ

第三 各分科部隊ノ戦力ヲ統合發揮センガ爲ニハ上級指揮官ハ特ニ各部隊ノ任務ヲ明確ニシ一意之ニ邁進セシムルト共ニ各部隊ハ各其ノ特性ヲ遺憾ナク發揮シ且相互ニ理解及信頼スルコト緊要ナリ

第四 航空戦力ハ戦機ニ投ジ所望ノ目標ニ集中發揮セシムルヲ要ス之ガ爲指揮官ハ常ニ組織的ニ情報ヲ收集スルト共ニ科學的ニ之ヲ判斷シ慧眼克ク

戰機ヲ看破シ特ニ其ノ指揮ヲ雋敏ナラシムルヲ要ス

第五 航空部隊ハ常ニ正奇兼ネ戰ヒ最大戰果ノ獲得ヲ期スルヲ要ス寡ヲ以テ衆ヲ撃タントスル場合ニ於テ特ニ然リ之ガ爲常ニ戰法ノ硬直ニ陥ルヲ戒メ之ガ活用ヲ誤ラザルト共ニ飛行部隊ノ機動力ヲ遺憾ナク發揮シ極度ニ夜暗及氣象ヲ克服利用スルコト緊要ナリ

第六 飛行部隊ノ機動力ヲ遺憾ナク發揮センガ爲ニハ航進能力ニ卓越セシムルト共ニ航空基地(飛行場)機能ノ完整ニ勉メ且兵器整備ノ完璧及補給ノ圓滑ヲ期スルヲ要ス

第七 戰闘間指揮官ハ敵ノ戰法、兵器、訓練ノ度等ヲ明カニシ我が裝備兵器ノ性能ヲ極度ニ發揮セシムルト共ニ戰訓ニ基キ常ニ敵ニ先行スル如ク戰法ニ創意ヲ加ヘ進ンテ兵器性能ノ改善進歩ヲ圖リ且此等ニ即應スル訓練ヲ重ネ部下部隊ヲシテ常ニ必勝ノ確信ヲ堅持セシムルヲ要ス

第八 航空作戰ニ於テハ戰況ハ常ニ深刻苛烈ニシテ變轉極リナク特ニ飛行

部隊ニ於テハ人員ノ損傷、兵器ノ損耗等瞬時ニ多發スルヲ通常トス故ニ指揮官以下旺盛ナル責任觀念ト滿々タル闘志トヲ以テ其ノ任ニ當リ不利ナル環境及困難ナル狀況ヲ克服打開シ飽ク迄所期ノ目的ヲ貫徹セザルベカラズ

第九 戰闘間指揮官ハ上級指揮官ノ企圖ニ基キ戰闘經過ヲ豫察シ勉メテ計畫的ニ兵器就中飛行機ノ整備及所要資材ノ補給ヲ實施シ我が戦力ノ維持増強ニ勉ムルヲ要ス

第十 航空基地(飛行場)ハ航空部隊ノ居城ニシテ戦力ノ培養並ニ之ガ發揮ノ根據タリ故ニ指揮官以下豫メ之ガ機能ノ完整ニ勉ムルト共ニ手段ヲ盡クシテ之ヲ補備増強シ特ニ防空及掩護施設ヲ完備シ空地ヨリスル敵ノ攻撃ヲ破摧シ我が損害ヲ防止スルヲ要ス

第十一 戰闘間ニ於ケル指揮官ノ位置ハ指揮及各部隊ノ協同ニ重大ナル關係ヲ有シ部下部隊ノ志氣ニ影響ヲ及スコト極メテ大ナリ故ニ指揮官ハ任務及狀況ニ應ジ其ノ位置選定ヲ適切ナラシメ常ニ陣頭ニ挺身シ身ヲ以テ部隊

ヲ指揮スルヲ要ス戦闘慘烈ノ極所ニ於テ特ニ然リ

第十二 飛行部隊指揮官ハ出勤ニ方リ空中指揮ニ任ズルヲ本則トス
空中指揮ニ方リテハ特ニ周到ナル思慮ト迅速ナル決斷トヲ以テ果敢斷行ス
ルコト緊要ナリ之ガ爲豫メ自己ノ企圖ヲ明示シ戦闘指揮ニ關スル準備ノ完
整ニ勉メ部下部隊ヲシテ變化急激經過迅速ナル空中狀況ニ即應シ克ク意圖
ノ如ク戦闘セシムルヲ要ス

第十三 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ絶エズ全般ノ狀況ヲ明カニシ部下部隊ヲ確
實ニ掌握スルト共ニ特ニ其ノ指揮ヲ篤敏ニシ常ニ準備ヲ先前ニ及シ部下
隊ヲシテ克ク意圖ノ如ク戦闘(勤務)ヲ遂行セシムルヲ要ス

第十四 航空部隊ノ指揮ニ方リテハ豫メ準備ヲ命ジ又ハ先ヅ命令ノ要旨ヲ
下達スル等準備ニ餘裕アラシムルト共ニ特ニ其ノ命令ヲ簡潔ニシ之ガ下達
ヲ迅速確實ナラシムルヲ要ス
命令ノ下達ヲ迅速確實ナラシムル爲ニハ通信施設ヲ完整スルノ外機ニ臨ミ

極メテ簡單ナル略號等ニ依リ命令ヲ傳達シ得ル如ク豫メ所要ノ事項ヲ規定
シ置クコト緊要ナリ

第十五 戦闘間各部隊ハ適時戦闘要報ヲ提出シ特ニ簡明的確ニ部隊ノ状態
及爾後ノ企圖ヲ上級指揮官ニ報告スルト共ニ必要ナル事項ヲ關係部隊ニ通
報シ機ニ投ズル戦闘指揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス
航空部隊ニ於ケル戦闘要報ハ分科及戰況ニ應ジ報告ノ手段方法及内容ヲ適
切ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第二篇 通信連絡

第十六 通信ハ航空部隊指揮ノ命脈ニシテ戰力發揮ノ爲必須ノ要素ナリ而シテ航空部隊ニ於ケル通信ハ廣汎ナル地域ニ互ル航空通信關係部隊ノ有機的結合ト緊密ナル協同連繫トニ依リ始メテ其ノ完キヲ期シ得ベク之ガ實施ニ方リテハ特ニ戰機ニ投ゼザルベカラズ故ニ指揮官ハ航空通信關係部隊ノ性能ニ通曉シ通信ニ關スル指揮ヲ適切ニシ其ノ勤務ヲ的確ニ律スルト共ニ各部隊ハ特ニ通信軍紀ヲ嚴正ニシ通信技能ニ精熟シ兵器ノ整備ヲ完全ナラシメ以テ其ノ機能ヲ極度ニ發揮スルヲ要ス

第十七 航空空中通信網ハ在空中ノ飛行機相互間並ニ之ト對空關係通信部隊トノ間ニ構成シ特ニ戰機ニ投ズル急襲的通信實施ニ依リ飛行部隊ノ戰術指揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第十八 航空地上通信網ハ所望ノ通信容量ヲ確保シ得ル如ク有線及無線ヲ

併用シ或ハ此等ヲ獨立シテ構成スルモノトス
航空地上通信網ハ其ノ用途ニ依リ勉メテ飛行部隊指揮用ト一般勤務用トニ
區分スルコト緊要ナリ

第十九 通信ハ天然人爲ノ障礙ニ依リ杜絶スルノ虞多シ故ニ指揮官ハ通信
器材ノ整備ヲ完カラシムルト共ニ通信網ノ構成ニ方リテハ特ニ之ガ掩護ニ
遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス又狀況之ヲ許ス限リ主通信ノ外副通信ヲ準備スル
コト緊要ナリ

第二十 通信連絡ノ圓滑及通信防衛ノ完璧ヲ期センガ爲ニハ指揮官ハ高級
指揮官ノ定ムル連絡規定ニ所要ノ事項ヲ補足シテ之ヲ部下部隊ニ徹底セシ
ムルト共ニ嚴ニ其ノ實行ヲ監督シ以テ通信勤務ヲ確實ナラシムルヲ要ス

第二十一 通信連絡ノ實施ニ方リテハ信務ヲ確立スルヲ要ス之ガ爲指揮官
ハ常ニ通信ノ現況ヲ明カニシ勉メテ電文ヲ簡潔ニシ電報種類ノ選擇ヲ適切
ナラシムルト共ニ電報ノ發信ヲ節減スルヲ要ス

第二十二 通信網及通信實施ノ狀態就中通信容量ノ變化竝ニ通信ノ内容ハ
我が企圖、兵力、配置、行動等ヲ諜知スル爲有力ナル資料ナリ故ニ指揮官
以下通信技能ノ精熟、信務ノ適正及防諜觀念ノ徹底ヲ期スルノ外特ニ通信
軍紀ヲ嚴正ニシ通信管制ヲ適切ニシ以テ通信防衛ノ完璧ヲ期スルコト緊要
ナリ

第二十三 通信管制ノ適正ヲ期センガ爲ニハ電波管制ヲ適切ニシ適時電波
ノ輻射ヲ禁止又ハ制限シ敵ノ窃信及方向探知ヲ困難ナラシムルト共ニ通信
ヲ制限シ以テ我が企圖及行動ヲ秘匿スルコト緊要ナリ此ノ際徒ラニ通信防
衛ニ腐心シテ通信狀態ニ不自然ナル狀況ヲ呈シ又ハ通信連絡ノ圓滑ヲ害セ
ザルノ著意ヲ必要トス

第二十四 敵ハ我が通信ヲ妨害シ又ハ陽信、偽信等ヲ實施シテ通信攻勢ヲ
企圖スルコトアリ故ニ指揮官以下周到ナル準備ト適切ナル手段トニ依リ之
ニ對應シ敵ヲシテ乗ズルノ罅隙ナカラシムルヲ要ス

敵ノ通信攻勢ニ對シテハ勉メテ之ヲ逆用スルノ著意ヲ必要トス

第三篇 情報

通則

第二十五 戦闘間航空部隊ハ適時適切ニ敵情、氣象、技術等ニ關スル情報ヲ收集シ戦闘指導ニ資スルヲ要ス之ガ爲特ニ連續且組織的ニ情報ヲ收集スルト共ニ其ノ成果又ハ資料ノ報告及通報ヲ迅速ニシ之ガ利用ニ遺憾ナカラシムルコト緊要ナリ變化急激ナル敵航空狀況ニ關スル情報ノ收集及之ガ利用ニ於テ特ニ然リ

第二十六 情報収集ノ主要ナル手段ハ搜索、敵情監視、氣象及諜報勤務トス而シテ此等ハ相互ニ緊密ナル關係ヲ有スルヲ以テ情報収集ニ方リテハ其ノ特性ヲ考慮シ長短相補ハシメ之ガ完璧ヲ期スルヲ要ス

情報収集ニ方リテハ特ニ科學的手段ヲ活用スルコト緊要ナリ

第二十七 情報収集ニ方リテハ情報機關ニ依ルモノノ外戦闘間各部隊ノ得

タル敵情、氣象等ニ關スル情報ノ活用ニ勉ムルコト緊要ナリ

第二十八 情報ノ報告及通報ニ方リ一情報毎ニ速報スベキヤ或ハ數情報ヲ綜合審査シテ行フベキヤハ狀況特ニ情報ノ種類、戰況、通信連絡ノ便否等ヲ考慮シテ決定シ克ク戰機ニ投ジ之ガ活用ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス此ノ際判決ト共ニ其ノ理由ヲ簡明ニ報告スルノ著意ヲ必要トス

第二十九 情報ノ報告及通報ヲ迅速的確ナラシムル爲ニハ通信施設ヲ完整スルト共ニ各種通信連絡手段ヲ活用シ且寫眞其ノ他科學的手段ヲ利用スルコト緊要ナリ

第三十 情報ノ利用ニ方リテハ常ニ其ノ出所、收集ノ時機及方法等ヲ明カニシ的確ナル審査ニ依リ其ノ眞否、價值等ヲ判定スルヲ要ス此ノ際特ニ科學的ニ考察スルト共ニ一見些末ナル事項ト雖モ重大ナル情報ノ端緒トナルコトアルニ注意スルヲ要ス

第一章 搜索

第三十一 搜索ハ主トシテ偵察隊ノ任ズル所ナリト雖モ各部隊モ亦自ラ戰鬪ノ爲ニ必要ナル搜索ヲ實施スルモノトス

搜索ハ視察、寫眞、電波兵器等ニ依リ或ハ此等ヲ併用スルモノトス

第三十二 搜索ニ方リテハ目的、目標ノ種類、戰況等ニ鑑ミ其ノ時機及方法ヲ適切ニシ爲シ得ル限り敵ノ意表ニ出デ速カニ其ノ目的ヲ達成スルコト緊要ナリ然レドモ狀況之ヲ要スレバ斷乎敵ノ妨害ヲ排除シテ搜索ヲ強行スルノ覺悟アルヲ要ス

第三十三 搜索ニ方リテハ勉メテ過去ニ於ケル狀況ト比較シ特ニ其ノ變化ヲ明カナラシムルノ著意緊要ナリ

第三十四 夜間ハ細部ニ互ル搜索困難ナリト雖モ晝間ニ於ケル搜索ニ連繫シテ適時搜索ヲ實施シ夜間ニ於ケル敵情ノ變化ヲ明カニシ敵ノ企圖看破ニ

勉ムルコト緊要ナリ
 夜間ニ於ケル搜索ニ方リテハ特ニ準備ヲ周到ナラシムルト共ニ電波兵器ノ
 活用ニ勉メ且敵ニ欺騙セラレザルコト緊要ナリ

第二章 敵情監視

第三十五 敵情監視ノ目的ハ主トシテ敵ノ行動ヲ監視又ハ素出シ各部隊特
 ニ飛行部隊ヲシテ機ヲ失セズ其ノ成果ヲ利用セシムルト共ニ搜索及警備ノ
 補助タラシムルニ在リ

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第三章 氣象

第四十 氣象ハ航空部隊就中飛行部隊ノ行動ニ密接ナル關係ヲ有シ之ガ克
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 象ニ關スル十分ナル識能ヲ具備シ常ニ附近ニ位置スル氣象部隊トノ連絡ヲ
 確保シ又氣象部隊ハ常ニ飛行部隊ニ對シ積極的ニ協力シ氣象ノ克服利用ニ
 遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第四十一 航空部隊ハ關係氣象機關ト連繫シ氣象ノ統計的觀察ニ基キ速カ
 ニ作戰地一般ノ氣象ニ關スル特性ヲ明カナラシムルト共ニ適時戰闘(勤務)

實施ノ爲必要ナル氣象資料ヲ收集シ以テ戦闘(勤務)ノ實施ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第四十二 氣象情報ノ利用ニ方リテハ飛行部隊指揮官ハ任務ヲ基礎トシ部隊ノ状態ヲ考慮シ自ラ適切ナル氣象判斷ヲ實施スルヲ要ス之ガ爲所要ニ應ジ攻撃ノ爲必要ナル航路上及目標附近ノ氣象狀況ヲ搜索スルト共ニ縦ヒ氣象狀況不良ナル場合ニ於テモ克ク其ノ變化ヲ豫察シテ之ヲ克服利用シ或ハ局地ニ於ケル氣象ヲ巧ニ利用スルノ著意ヲ必要トス

第四十三 飛行部隊(機)ハ別命ナク行動間ニ於ケル氣象狀況ヲ報告スルト共ニ關係氣象部隊ニ通報スルモノトス

第四篇 機動及展開

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第四十四 航空部隊ハ集中、展開、飛行場變換等ノ爲屢、機動ヲ實施スルモノトス

第四十五 機動及展開ニ方リテハ我が企圖ヲ秘匿シテ所命ノ兵力ヲ所命ノ時機及地點ニ移動シ速カニ戦闘準備ヲ完整スルヲ要ス

航空部隊ノ機動ハ特ニ輕捷ナルヲ要ス

第四十六 機動及展開ハ高級指揮官ノ計畫ニ基キ實施スルヲ通常トス之ガ爲指揮官ハ彼我ノ航空狀況、部下部隊ノ状態、使用シ得ベキ輸送機關、機動距離、航路又ハ航空路ノ状態、航空基地(飛行場)ノ配置及其ノ状態、交通網ノ狀況、氣象、季節等ヲ考慮シ之ガ實行ノ爲其ノ細部ヲ計畫スルモノトス

第四十七 機動ノ爲ニハ其ノ準備及實施ニ方リ特ニ企圖ノ秘匿ニ勉ムルト共ニ常ニ對敵即應ノ態勢ヲ以テシ克ク狀況ノ變化ニ應ジ得ルヲ要ス

第四十八 機動ニ方リ我が企圖ヲ秘匿スル爲ニハ空中機動ニ在リテハ機動ノ時機、航路ノ選定、通信管制等ヲ適切ニシ地上(水上又ハ海上)機動ニ在リテハ特ニ防諜ヲ嚴ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第四十九 指揮官ハ上級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ部下部隊ノ狀態特ニ裝備兵器ノ狀況ヲ考慮シ機動開始ニ先ダチ勉メテ之ヲ整備シ機動實施ヲ整齊ナラシムルト共ニ直後ニ於ケル戦闘ニ支障ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第五十 機動ニ方リテハ上級指揮官ノ企圖ニ基キ關係輸送機關トノ連繫ヲ緊密ナラシムルト共ニ豫メ中間及到着飛行場ニ於ケル準備ヲ完整シ整齊迅速ニ機動ヲ完了スルヲ要ス之ガ爲指揮官ハ機動開始ニ先ダチ豫メ所要ノ人員ヲ中間及到着飛行場ニ派遣シテ所要ノ準備ヲ整ヘシムルト共ニ要スレバ適時自ラ到着飛行場ニ先行シ上級指揮官ノ企圖ニ基キ爾後ノ戦闘準備ヲ指

導スルコト緊要ナリ

第五十一 飛行部隊ノ機動ニ方リテハ輸送飛行部隊、滑空飛行部隊等ヲ配屬又ハ協力セシメラルルヲ通常トスルモ各部隊ハ爲シ得レバ所屬飛行機ヲ活用シ機動ヲ輕捷ナラシムルモノトス而シテ一部地上(水上又ハ海上)機動ノ止ムヲ得ザル場合ニ於テモ指揮機關、空中勤務者、所要ノ地上勤務者等ハ手段ヲ盡クシテ空中機動ニ依ラシムルヲ要ス

第五十二 地上勤務部隊ノ機動ニ方リテハ任務、利用スベキ輸送機關ノ狀態等ニ依リ其ノ要領ヲ異ニスルモ主力ハ地上(水上又ハ海上)機動ニ依ルヲ通常トス

第一章 空中機動

第五十三 空中機動ニ方リテハ特ニ其ノ目的、部隊ノ大小、戰況、氣象、機動距離等ヲ考慮シ全力同時ニ又ハ小部隊毎ニ逐次ニ機動スルモノトス

第五十四 空中機動ニ方リテハ特ニ指揮掌握ヲ確實ナラシムルト共ニ機動間ニ於ケル事故機ノ絶滅ニ勉メ手段ヲ盡クシテ所命ノ時機迄ニ機動ヲ完了スルヲ要ス之ガ爲小部隊毎ニ逐次ニ機動スル場合ニ於テハ指揮官ハ先頭部隊ヲ直率シ有力ナル將校ヲシテ後方部隊ヲ指揮セシメ、同時ニ機動スル場合ニ於テモ亦右ニ準ジテ處置シ事故機ノ推進ニ任ゼシムルコト緊要ナリ

第五十五 空中機動ニ方リテハ勉メテ躍進距離ヲ大ナラシムルヲ要ス之ガ爲氣象判斷及航路ノ選定ヲ適切ニシ爲シ得ル限り一舉ニ所望ノ距離ヲ躍進スルコト緊要ナリ

中間飛行場ノ使用ニ方リテハ飛行場ノ状態ニ應ジ豫メ整備及給油ノ援助ニ關シ關係部隊ト緊密ニ連絡シ死節時ヲ減少スルノ處置ヲ講ズルコト緊要ナリ

第五十六 空中機動ニ方リ中間飛行場ヲ使用スル場合ニ於テハ上級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ中間飛行場ニ於ケル飛行場勤務、休宿、給養、衛生等ニ關シ

飛行場司令官又ハ飛行場司令ノ區處ヲ受クルモノトス

第五十七 空中機動ハ晝夜ヲ通ジテ之ヲ實施シ特ニ企圖秘匿上夜間ヲ利用スルコト緊要ナリ之ガ爲保安機關ノ活用ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第五十八 空中機動ニ方リテハ飛行機及滑空機ノ搭載量ヲ考慮シ過搭載トナラザル如ク注意スルト共ニ機動間ニ於ケル對敵即應ノ戰備ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第五十九 地上勤務部隊等ノ空中機動ニ方リテハ上級指揮官ハ輸送間之ニ任ズル輸送飛行部隊(機長)ト被輸送部隊トノ指揮關係ヲ明確ナラシムルヲ要ス

第二章 地上(水上又ハ海上)機動

第六十 鐵道又ハ船舶若クハ舟艇ニ依ル地上(水上又ハ海上)機動ニ方リテハ各部隊ハ關係機關トノ連絡ヲ緊密ナラシムルト共ニ輸送間特ニ輸送軍紀

ヲ嚴正ニシ之ガ實施ヲ整齊確實ナラシムルヲ要ス

第六十一 鐵道(船舶又ハ舟艇)輸送ヲ要スル部隊ハ機ヲ失セズ輸送請求書ヲ關係機關ニ提出シ關係機關ヲシテ輸送計畫ノ策定及輸送ノ實施ニ遺憾ナカラシムルコト緊要ナリ此ノ際正確ナル輸送數量ノ算定困難ナル場合ニ於テモ航空作戰ノ特性竝ニ編制裝備ノ特質ニ鑑ミ先ヅ速カニ其ノ概要ヲ通報シ關係機關ヲシテ勉メテ準備ニ餘裕アラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第六十二 自動車ニ依ル地上機動ニ方リテハ特ニ道路ノ景況、輸送兵力、季節、氣象等ヲ考慮シ豫メ道路偵察ヲ實施スルト共ニ要スレバ警戒、道路補修等ノ處置ヲ講ズルコト緊要ナリ

第六十三 自動車ニ依ル地上機動ニ方リテハ直通輸送ニ依ルヲ通常トシ自動車部隊ト被輸送部隊トノ指揮關係ヲ明確ナラシムルヲ要ス

第六十四 地上(水上又ハ海上)機動ニ方リテハ輸送機關ノ種類及狀態、戰況、輸送途中ニ於ケル敵ノ各種妨害等ヲ考慮シ輸送順序、搭載區分特ニ搭

載人員及器材ノ編合等ヲ適切ニシ其ノ損害ヲ局限スルト共ニ爾後ニ於ケル任務遂行ニ支障ナカラシムルヲ要ス

機動間各部隊ハ自ら手段ヲ盡クシテ各種ノ障礙ヲ排除シ所命ノ時機迄ニ機動ヲ完了スルヲ要ス

第三章 展開

第六十五 航空部隊ノ展開ハ先ヅ地上勤務部隊ヲ展開シ所要ノ戰鬥準備ヲ整ヘタル後飛行部隊ヲ展開セシメラルルヲ通常トス之ガ爲地上勤務部隊展開ヲ命ゼラルルヤ任務ニ基キ速カニ展開地ニ於ケル準備就中航空基地(飛行場)機能ヲ完整シ隨時飛行部隊ノ要求ニ即應シ得ルノ態勢ヲ整フルヲ要ス

第六十六 航空基地(飛行場)機能ヲ完整センガ爲ニハ特ニ通信施設ヲ完整シ航空用資材ヲ集積シ對空警備ヲ嚴ナラシムルト共ニ飛行場勤務ヲ確立ス

ルコト緊要ナリ

第六十七 展開ニ方リ飛行部隊指揮官ハ速カニ關係地上勤務部隊指揮官ト會同シ自己ノ企圖及行動豫定ヲ通報スルト共ニ空地協同上必要ナル件ニ關シ勉メテ具體的ニ要求シ爾後ニ於ケル協同ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス此ノ際地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ特ニ積極的ニ飛行部隊ニ協力シ其ノ戰鬪遂行ヲ容易ナラシムルヲ要ス

第六十八 地上勤務部隊二箇以上ノ飛行場ニ展開スル場合ニ於テハ指揮官ハ任務、敵情、飛行場使用ノ目的及期間、飛行場間ノ距離、交通及通信施設等ヲ考慮シ特ニ各飛行場ニ配置スベキ部隊ノ兵力及編組ヲ適切ナラシメ勤務ノ遂行ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第六十九 展開ニ方リ飛行部隊ハ克ク根據及機動飛行場ヲ活用シ其ノ戦力ヲ遺憾ナク發揮スルヲ要ス此ノ際特ニ關係部隊ト緊密ナル連繫ヲ保持シ部隊ノ行動就中出動ヲ整齊圓滑ナラシムルト共ニ敵ノ攻撃ニ依ル損害ヲ防止

シ得ル如ク準備スルコト緊要ナリ

第七十 飛行部隊他ノ飛行部隊ト同一飛行場ヲ共同使用スル場合ニ於テハ特ニ飛行場勤務ヲ的確ニシ飛行場ノ使用ニ規律アラシムルヲ要ス

第五篇 進攻

第七十一 進攻ハ航空戦力發揮ノ要道ニシテ敵ヲ壓倒撃滅スル最良ノ手段ナリ故ニ航空部隊ハ進攻ニ依リ其ノ戦力ヲ遺憾ナク發揮スルヲ要ス

第七十二 進攻ノ要ハ飛行部隊ノ輕捷偉大ナル機動力ヲ發揮シテ敵地ニ進出シ所望ノ時機所望ノ目標ニ對シ獨特ノ戰鬥威力ヲ發揮シテ敵ヲ壓倒撃滅スルニ在リ

第七十三 進攻ハ戦機ニ投ジ勉メテ敵ノ意表ニ出ゾルヲ要ス之ガ爲攻撃時機ノ選定ヲ適切ニシ常ニ其ノ準備ノ完整ニ勉メ且手段ヲ盡クシテ我が企圖ヲ秘匿スルコト緊要ナリ然レドモ準備ニ藉口シテ行動鈍重ニ陥リ或ハ企圖秘匿ニ專念シテ戦機ヲ逸スルガ如キハ嚴ニ之ヲ戒メザルベカラズ

第七十四 進攻ニ方リテハ或ハ拂曉攻撃ノ爲夜暗ヲ利用シ企圖ヲ秘匿シテ航進シ或ハ攻撃後夜暗ヲ利用シテ敵ノ追尾ヲ避ケ或ハ夜暗又ハ不良ナル氣

象狀況ニ乗ジテ敵ヲ奇襲スル等特ニ夜暗及氣象ノ利用ニ著意スルヲ要ス
第七十五 企圖秘匿ノ爲ニハ夜暗及氣象ヲ利用スルノ外通信管制ヲ適切ニシ且敵ノ各種情報機關ニ對シ我ガ航路及高度ノ選定ヲ適切ナラシムルト共ニ進ンデ之ヲ妨害又ハ欺騙スルノ著意ヲ必要トス

第七十六 進攻ハ狀況ニ應ジ分科飛行部隊獨力又ハ他分科飛行部隊ト協同ノ下ニ實施スルモノトス而シテ協同進攻ニ方リテハ高級指揮官ノ部署ニ基キ或ハ協同シテ攻撃ヲ實施シ或ハ相互ニ他分科飛行部隊ノ攻撃ニ協力スルモノトス此ノ際特ニ事前ニ於ケル協定ヲ周到且具體的ナラシムルト共ニ克ク相互ノ意志ヲ疏通シ統合戦力ノ發揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第七十七 各分科飛行部隊就中戰闘隊ト爆(襲)撃隊トノ協同進攻ハ其ノ實施適切ナルトキハ特ニ戰果ヲ大ナラシムルコトヲ得飛行場攻撃ニ於テ特ニ然リ

協同進攻ニ方リテハ各部隊ハ各、任務ニ基キ進ンデ他部隊ノ戰闘ヲ容易ナ

ラシムル如ク特ニ精神的協同ノ實ヲ擧グルヲ要ス

第七十八 進攻ニ方リテハ任務ニ基キ狀況特ニ攻撃ノ目的、目標ノ種類、敵情、我ガ兵力、氣象、明暗ノ度等ヲ考慮シ同時又ハ波狀攻撃ヲ實施スルモノトス

同時攻撃ハ戦力ヲ統合シ一擧ニ所望ノ戰果ヲ收メ得波狀攻撃ハ敵ヲシテ對應ノ處置ヲ困難ナラシムルト共ニ所望ノ時間我ガ戦力ヲ繼續シテ發揮シ得ルノ利アリ

同時攻撃ヲ實施スル場合ニ於テハ特ニ各部隊ノ攻撃時刻、攻撃要領等ヲ統制シ又波狀攻撃ヲ實施スル場合ニ於テハ特ニ各波ノ兵力及編組、攻撃間隔、攻撃要領等ヲ適切ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

攻撃要領ハ分科ニ應ジ攻撃ノ目的、攻撃時機、目標ノ種類及狀態等ヲ考慮シ攻撃法、攻撃方式、攻撃高度、攻撃方向等ヲ定ムルモノトス

第七十九 準備ノ完整ハ出動ヲ輕捷ナラシムルノ基礎ナリ故ニ指揮官ハ絶

エズ狀況ヲ判斷シ機ヲ失セズ我が企圖、出發時刻、裝備等ヲ示シ部下部隊ヲシテ準備ヲ周到ニシ命令一下直チニ所命ノ行動ヲ開始シ得シムルヲ要ス夜間進攻ヲ企圖スル場合ニ於テ特ニ然リ

第八十 進攻準備ニ方リテハ飛行部隊ハ分科ニ應ジ特ニ其ノ順序及方法ヲ狀況ニ適應セシムルコト緊要ナリ而シテ進攻準備間ニ於テハ敵機ノ來襲ヲ顧慮シ之ガ對應處置ト進攻準備トノ節調ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第八十一 進攻準備ノ整否及遲速ハ地上勤務部隊ノ活動ニ待ツ所極メテ大ナリ兵器ノ整備ニ關シ特ニ然リ之ガ爲地上勤務部隊ハ關係飛行部隊指揮官ト連絡シ機ヲ失セズ兵器ノ整備竝ニ燃料、彈藥、酸素等ノ補給ヲ實施スルト共ニ氣象、通信及保安勤務ニ關スル準備ヲ整フルヲ要ス

第八十二 夜暗ヲ利用スル進攻ヲ企圖スル場合ニ於テハ飛行部隊ハ豫メ出發、夜間航進、攻撃實施等ニ關スル準備ニ遺憾ナカラシムルト共ニ地上勤務部隊ハ航法施設、飛行場ノ照明設備等ヲ完備シテ飛行部隊ノ行動ヲ容易

ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第八十三 特種ノ攻撃ヲ企圖スル場合ニ於テハ豫メ攻撃法、資材ノ取扱等ヲ訓練シ且所要資材ノ準備ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス此ノ際特ニ企圖ノ秘匿ニ注意スルト共ニ要スレバ部隊ヲ指定シテ所要ノ訓練ヲ實施セシムルコト緊要ナリ

第八十四 地上部隊ノ作戰ニ協力スル場合ニ於テハ手段ヲ盡クシテ地上ノ戰況、地形等ヲ明カニシ要スレバ直接地上部隊ト連絡シ得ル如ク準備スルコト緊要ナリ

直協任務ニ服スル飛行部隊指揮官ハ勉メテ關係地上部隊指揮官ト豫メ會同シ各、知得セル敵情、地形、部下部隊ノ狀態等ヲ具體的ニ通報シ地上部隊ノ企圖ニ基キ空地協同ニ關シ左記事項中所要ノ件ニ就キ上級指揮官ノ協定ヲ補足スルモノトス

戰闘各期ニ於ケル直協要領

指揮官ノ位置及相互ノ連絡法

彼我飛行機ノ識別及戰線標示ニ關スル事項

使用地圖、空中寫眞ノ利用、目標(地點)ノ番(符)號等ニ關スル事項

目標及地點ノ指示法

地上部隊ニ屬スル偵察隊トノ協同ニ關スル事項

情報交換ニ關スル事項等

第八十五 直協要領ハ我ガ兵力、戰況、協力スベキ地上部隊等ニ依リ異ナルモ協定ニ方リ特ニ直協ノ爲戰力指向ノ目的及重點、協力關係等其ノ要綱ヲ明カニシ勉メテ飛行部隊ノ戰闘威力ヲ主動的ニ運用スルヲ要ス

第八十六 飛行部隊ノ出動命令ハ分科、部隊ノ任務、指揮ノ要領等ニ依リ異ナルモ自己ノ企圖、出發、航進、要スレバ攻撃部署、歸還、關係アル他部隊ノ行動等ニ關シ所要ノ事項ヲ命令スルモノトス

攻撃部署ハ分科及指揮ノ要領ニ應ジ我ガ企圖、敵ノ機種及兵力又ハ目標ノ

狀態、彼我ノ態勢、氣象就中視程ノ良否等ヲ考慮シ攻撃目標ノ配當、攻撃法、攻撃方式、攻撃方向等ヲ定ムルモノトス而シテ空中指揮ニ任ズル場合ニ於テハ要スレバ攻撃部署中攻撃目標、攻撃法、攻撃方式等ヲ豫定トシテ示シ置クモノトス

第八十七 飛行部隊ノ出動命令ハ特ニ之ヲ簡潔ニシ且下達ヲ迅速ニシ以テ整齊輕捷ニ出動シ得シムルヲ要ス狀況ニ依リ各部隊ニ出發ノミヲ命ジ爾後空中ニ於テ逐次所要ノ事項ヲ命ズルコトアリ

第八十八 出發ノ整齊圓滑ニシテ輕捷ナルハ任務達成ノ第一歩ナリ故ニ出發ニ方リ指揮官ハ狀況特ニ飛行場ノ狀態、出動兵力、氣象、明暗ノ度等ヲ考慮シ發進、地上滑走、離陸、空中集合、出發時ニ於ケル飛行場上空ノ掩護等ニ關シ所要ノ事項ヲ補備シ航空空地部隊ノ有機的活動ノ下整齊トシテ各部隊ヲ出發セシムルヲ要ス

地上滑走及離陸ヲ整齊圓滑ナラシムル爲狀況ニ依リ飛行場司令ハ出發掛、

誘導掛等ヲ設ケテ之ガ規整ニ任ゼシムルコトアリ夜間及視程短小ナル場合ニ於ケル出動ニ於テ特ニ然リ

第八十九 空中指揮ニ任ズル場合ニ於テハ指揮官ハ航進間判明セル狀況ニ基キ機ヲ失セズ攻撃部署ヲ決定シ攻撃ヲ下令ス

豫メ攻撃部署ノ豫定ヲ示シアル場合ニ於テモ攻撃下令ニ方リ其ノ要項及攻撃後ノ行動等ニ關シ的確ニ命令スルコト緊要ナリ

第九十 空中戦闘ニ方リテハ特ニ鞏固ナル團結ヲ保持シ指揮官以下變化急激ナル狀況ニ處シ慧眼克ク戰機ヲ看破シ戰鬥威力ヲ所望ノ目標ニ集中發揮スルヲ要ス此ノ際分科ニ應ジ戰鬥ノ要領ヲ異ニスルモ戰鬥隊ハ先制ヲ確保シテ態勢ノ優越ヲ必占シ爆(襲)撃隊ハ愈々鞏固ナル團結ヲ堅持シテ熾烈ナル火力ト適切ナル機動トニ依リ克ク戰鬥ノ目的ヲ達成セザルベカラズ
空中戦闘ニ方リテハ分科ノ如何ヲ論ゼズ眼克ク敵ニ先ンジテ敵ヲ發見スルハ攻撃奏功ノ第一歩タルヲ銘肝スルヲ要ス

第九十一 進攻ニ方リテハ指揮官以下人員ノ損傷、兵器ノ損耗等幾多苛烈困難ナル狀況ヲ現出スルヲ通常トス此ノ間ニ處シ克ク所期ノ目的ヲ貫徹シ得ルモノ一ニ懸リテ指揮官以下ノ旺盛ナル闘志ト斃レテ尙止マザルノ攻撃精神トニ存ス故ニ戰鬥間縱ヒ指揮官ヲ失ヒ又ハ多數ノ缺機ヲ生ズルニ至ルモ各部隊ハ益々團結ヲ鞏固ニシ愈々攻撃精神ヲ發揮シ手段ヲ盡クシテ一意任務ニ邁進セザルベカラズ

第九十二 飛行部隊指揮官ハ出動ニ方リ飛行場ニ殘留スル上級先任者ニ對シ殘留スル部隊ノ指揮ヲ命ズルモノトス

殘留スル部隊ノ指揮官ハ出動部隊ニ對スル情報ノ傳達、防空、次期出動準備、内務ノ指導等ニ遺憾ナカラシムルト共ニ出動セル飛行部隊指揮官飛行場司令ナルトキハ別命ナク之ガ勤務ヲ代行スルモノトス

第九十三 地上指揮ニ任ズル場合ニ於テハ指揮官ハ攻撃部署ニ基キ特ニ基準トナルベキ部隊ヲ定メテ協同ノ關係ヲ律スルト共ニ部隊ノ出動間絶エズ

其ノ行動ヲ明カナラシメ要スレバ部隊出動後判明セル狀況ヲ通報シ勉メテ
意圖ノ如ク戦闘ヲ指導スルモノトス此ノ際特ニ企圖ノ秘匿ニ注意スルト共
ニ部下部隊ニ對シ大イニ獨斷活用ノ餘地ヲ與フルコト緊要ナリ

第九十四 飛行部隊ノ出動間地上勤務部隊ハ夫々任務ニ基キ或ハ通信、情
報及航測勤務ニ任ジテ飛行部隊ニ協力シ或ハ飛行部隊歸還後ニ於ケル整備
及補給準備ヲ完整シ或ハ航空基地（飛行場）ニ於ケル警備ヲ愈々嚴ナラシム
ル等克ク空地一體ノ實ヲ發揮スルヲ要ス

第九十五 敵ハ我が歸還ニ方リ往々追尾攻撃ヲ企圖スルコトアリ故ニ飛行
部隊指揮官以下攻撃終了後ト雖モ警戒ニ罅隙ナカラシムルト共ニ若シ敵ノ
追尾ヲ知得セル場合ニ於テハ機ヲ失セズ其ノ狀況ヲ各部隊ニ通報シ或ハ歸
還飛行場ヲ變更セシメ或ハ某空域ニ待機セシムルト共ニ所要ノ部隊ヲシテ
之ヲ攻撃セシムル等收容若クハ著陸掩護ノ處置ヲ講ジ敵ヲシテ乗ゼシメザ
ルコト緊要ナリ

第九十六 歸還ノ整齊ナルハ次期戦力發揮ノ根基ナリ故ニ飛行部隊ハ豫メ
定メラレタル所ニ基キ離離著ナク著陸ヲ實施シ機ヲ失セズ飛行機ヲ分散
配置スルト共ニ地上勤務部隊ハ速カニ整備及補給ヲ完了シ次期出動ノ準備
ヲ完整スルヲ要ス

第六篇 邀撃

第九十七 邀撃ノ要ハ來襲スル敵機ヲ確實ニ捕捉シ我が準備セル空域ニ邀ヘテ之ヲ撃滅スルニ在リ

邀撃ノ爲ニハ特ニ電波兵器ヲ活用スルヲ要ス
第九十八 邀撃ハ動モスレバ受動ニ陥リ徒ラニ我が戦力ヲ損耗スルノ弊ニ陥リ易シ故ニ各部隊ハ任務ニ基キ全般ノ戦況及部隊ノ状態ニ適應スル如ク戦備ノ度ヲ定メ戦闘ニ方リテハ積極主動攻撃ヲ斷行シテ飽ク迄其ノ目的ヲ達成スルト共ニ苟モ邀撃ニ墮シ進攻氣勢ヲ銷磨スルガ如キハ嚴ニ之ヲ戒メザルベカラズ

第九十九 邀撃ハ主トシテ戦闘隊ノ任ズル所ナリト雖モ其ノ他ノ部隊モ亦之ニ任ズルコトアリ
各部隊ハ任務ニ基キ狀況特ニ進攻企圖、進攻準備進捗ノ狀況及敵情ニ應ジ

或ハ全力ヲ以テ或ハ一部若クハ進攻ニ任ゼザル兵力等ヲ以テ遼撃スルモノトス

防空ヲ主任務トスル戦闘隊ニ在リテハ主トシテ遼撃ニ依リ其ノ任務ヲ達成スルモノトス

第百 遼撃戦闘ノ爲ニハ任務ニ基キ戦闘計畫ヲ定メ豫メ所要ノ事項ヲ部下部隊ニ徹底シ以テ戦闘實施ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

戦闘計畫ニ於テハ特ニ豫想スル敵ノ來襲狀況ニ應ズル戦闘部署、情報、通信等ニ關シ所要ノ事項ヲ定ムルモノトス

第百一 遼撃ノ爲ノ戦闘部署ハ分科及部隊ノ任務ニ依リ異ナルモ遼撃ニ任ズル部隊ヲシテ敵機ノ來襲狀況ニ應ジ機ヲ失セズ所望ノ方面ニ兵力ヲ集中指向シ確實ニ之ヲ捕捉シ得ル如ク出動兵力、警戒又ハ戦闘配置、戦闘空域、夜間戦闘ノ爲ノ戦闘及待機空域、各部隊相互ノ協同、空地連絡等ニ關シ所要ノ事項ヲ定ムルモノトス

第百二 遼撃ノ爲ニハ特ニ戦闘準備ヲ周到ニシ敵ノ奇襲ヲ豫防スルト共ニ勉メテ遠距離ニ敵ヲ發見シテ絶エズ其ノ航進狀況ヲ明カニシ我が豫期ヲ以テ敵ノ不期ニ乗ズル如ク戦闘ヲ指導スルヲ要ス之ガ爲情報及氣象機關、地上防空部隊等トノ連絡ヲ緊密ニシ機ヲ失セズ情報ヲ入手スルノ手段ヲ講ズルト共ニ特ニ統計的ニ敵ノ行動ヲ觀察シテ速カニ其ノ企圖及慣用戦法ヲ看破スルコト緊要ナリ

第百三 敵機ノ來襲ヲ察知セバ飛行部隊指揮官ハ速カニ其ノ狀況ヲ部下部隊ニ通報スルト共ニ豫メ定ムル所ニ基キ機ヲ失セズ出動ヲ下令シ各部隊ヲシテ直チニ戦闘部署ニ就カシムルモノトス此ノ際各部隊ハ飛行機警報又ハ空襲警報ニ依リ機ヲ失セズ獨斷出動シ戦闘部署ニ就クノ著意緊要ナリ

第百四 遼撃戦闘ニ方リテハ特ニ其ノ戦闘指揮ヲ適切ニシ勉メテ我が戦力ヲ集結發揮シ爲シ得ル限り敵機ノ企圖達成ニ先ダチ之ヲ撃墜スルヲ要ス敵ノ戦爆連合部隊ニ對シテハ手段ヲ盡クシテ其ノ爆撃隊ノ撃滅ニ勉ムルヲ

要ス

第二百五 敵機ノ退避ニ方リテハ邀撃ニ任ズル部隊ハ任務ニ支障ナキ限り之ヲ窮追シ手段ヲ盡クシテ撃滅スルヲ要ス

第二百六 邀撃ノ爲ニハ特ニ地上防空部隊トノ連繫ヲ緊密ニシ或ハ戦闘空域ヲ区分シ或ハ同一空域ニ於テ同時ニ又ハ時機ヲ区分シテ戦闘セシムル等相互ノ協同ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第二百七 邀撃ノ爲ニハ特ニ飛行場勤務ヲ的確ニシ飛行部隊ノ急遽出動ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス夜間ニ於テ特ニ然リ之ガ爲戦闘計畫ニ基キ要スレバ各部隊ノ離陸方向、離陸順序等ヲ規定シ置クト共ニ特ニ地上勤務部隊ハ積極的ニ飛行部隊ノ出動ヲ援助スルヲ要ス

第二百八 邀撃ニ關シテハ本篇ニ據ルノ外第五篇ヲ準用スルモノトス

第七篇 警備

第二百九 航空基地(飛行場)警備ノ主眼ハ空地ヨリスル敵ノ攻撃ニ對シ航空基地内ニ於ケル飛行場、重要施設等ヲ掩蔽シ航空基地ノ機能ヲ確保スルニ在リ之ガ爲警備部隊指揮官ハ敵情、住民ノ動靜、航空基地(飛行場)ノ位置、友軍地上部隊トノ關係等ヲ考慮シ警備部署ヲ適切ナラシムルト共ニ搜索、敵情監視、諜者ノ索出、情報収集等ノ處置ヲ講ジ敵ノ企圖ヲ事前ニ察知シテ之ガ對應處置ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第二百十 航空基地(飛行場)ノ警備ハ主トシテ警備部隊ノ任ズル所ナリト雖モ戦闘ニ方リテハ其ノ他ノ部隊モ亦之ニ協力スルモノトス各部隊ハ所要ニ應ジ自ラ直接警備ノ處置ヲ講ズルモノトス

第二百十一 航空基地(飛行場)警備ノ爲警備部隊指揮官ハ上級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ部隊ノ展開ニ伴ヒ速カニ警備ニ關スル規定ヲ定メ豫メ之ヲ部下部隊

ニ徹底スルト共ニ關係部隊ニ通報シ警備ノ完璧ヲ期スルヲ要ス
警備規定ハ狀況ニ應ジ左記事項中所要ノ件ヲ定ムルモノトス

警備ノ擔任區分及其ノ指揮關係

對空、地上及對瓦斯警備ノ要領

戰備ノ度

警報ニ應ズル處置

彼我飛行機ノ識別法

防諜、防火、燈火管制

飛行場附近ニ在ル他部隊トノ連絡等

警備規定ヲ定ムルニ方リテハ關係飛行部隊指揮官ト連絡シ特ニ飛行場勤務
トノ關係ヲ緊密ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第一百十二 警備部隊指揮官ハ特ニ警備ノ重點ヲ定メ部下部隊ニ警備ノ擔任
區分ヲ示シ對空及地上ノ警備ニ任ゼシムルト共ニ所要ノ兵力ヲ豫備トシテ

直轄スルモノトス此ノ際警備部隊指揮官ハ航空基地(飛行場)ニ位置スル關
係部隊指揮官ト連絡シ其ノ直接警備スベキ兵器及施設又ハ地域ヲ詳知シ要
スレバ警備ノ擔任、援助等ニ關シ協定スルコト緊要ナリ

第一百十三 對空警備ノ爲ニハ敵機ノ來襲方向、掩護スベキ資材又ハ施設、
其ノ配置等ヲ考慮シ所要ノ地點ニ對空監視哨ヲ配置シ且地上防空部隊ノ配
置及對空射擊部隊ヲ定メ所在飛行部隊ノ邀擊戰鬥ト緊密ニ連繫セシムルモ
ノトス

第一百十四 地上警備ノ爲ニハ掩護スベキ資材又ハ施設、其ノ配置、敵ニ關
スル顧慮ノ大小等ヲ考慮シ警備ノ重點、警備地區、火點及陣地ノ位置、警
備部隊ノ配置等ヲ定ムルモノトス

第一百十五 對瓦斯警備ノ爲ニハ防護ノ重點ヲ定メ之ニ應ズル瓦斯警戒、防
護資材ノ配當、各部隊ノ防護擔任區分、瓦斯ノ標示及記號等ヲ定ムルモノ
トス

第一百十六 航空基地(飛行場)ノ警備ニ方リテハ爲シ得ル限り各種掩體ヲ構築シ防火、偽裝、遮蔽等ノ施設ヲ施スト共ニ常ニ戰備ヲ整ヘ四圍ノ情勢ヲ明カニシ且住民ニ對スル宣撫、懷柔、威嚇等ノ行使ヲ適切ニシ以テ警備ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第一百十七 航空基地(飛行場)附近ニハ敵諜者ノ潛入スルコト多シ故ニ警備部隊指揮官ハ要スレバ保安地區ヲ設ケ憲兵、地上部隊等ト緊密ニ連繫シ或ハ當該保安地區内ニ於ケル住民ニ退去ヲ命ジ或ハ居住證明ヲ與ヘテ諜者トノ區別ヲ明カニシ或ハ保安地區周邊ノ道路ヲ閉塞シ又ハ交通ヲ制限スル等防諜ニ遺憾ナカラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第一百十八 警備ニ方リテハ動モスレバ警戒ニ狎レ志氣ノ弛緩ヲ來シ易シ故ニ指揮官ハ常ニ部下ノ掌握ヲ確實ニシ其ノ志氣ヲ振作スルト共ニ機會ヲ設ケテ警備ニ關スル訓練ヲ實施シ之ガ完備ヲ期スルヲ要ス

第一百十九 敵ノ來襲ヲ察知シタル場合ニ於テハ警備部隊指揮官ハ機ヲ失セ

ズ之ヲ上級指揮官ニ報告スルト共ニ關係部隊ニ通報シ豫メ定ムル所ニ基キ速カニ部下部隊ヲシテ戰備ヲ整ヘシムルヲ要ス

第一百二十 敵機ノ來襲ニ際シテハ警備部隊指揮官ハ豫メ定ムル所ニ基キ又ハ臨機部下部隊ヲ部署シ速カニ敵機ノ擊墜ニ勉ムルト共ニ損害ノ減少ヲ圖リ瓦斯防護、防火、救護等ニ遺憾ナカラシメ滑走路等ヲ破壊セラレタル場合ニ於テハ飛行場司令ニ連絡シテ之ヲ標示スルト共ニ速カニ修復ニ勉ムルヲ要ス此ノ際飛行部隊指揮官ハ機ヲ失セズ部下部隊ヲシテ警備部隊ノ戰鬥ニ協力セシムルコト緊要ナリ

第一百二十一 空中挺進部隊ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合ニ於テハ警備部隊指揮官ハ降下又ハ著陸前ニ之ガ擊墜ニ勉ムルト共ニ降下セル部隊ニ對シテハ豫メ定ムル所ニ基キ又ハ臨機部下部隊ヲ部署シ速カニ攻撃部隊ヲ派遣シ其ノ集結ニ先ダチ各個ニ擊滅スルヲ要ス又著陸セル部隊ニ對シテハ其ノ著陸直後ノ混亂ニ乘ジ之ヲ擊滅スルコト緊要ナリ

第二百二十二 地上ヨリスル敵ノ攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合ニ於テハ警備部隊指揮官ハ豫メ定ムル所ニ基キ又ハ臨機部下部隊ヲ部署シ且關係部隊ト緊密ニ協同シテ敵ノ撃滅ニ任ズルト共ニ飛行機、重要資材及施設ノ安全ヲ圖ルヲ要ス

飛行場危険ニ陥リタル場合ニ於テハ指揮官以下身ヲ以テ飛行機、重要資材及施設ヲ掩護スルヲ要ス

第二百二十三 瓦斯攻撃ヲ受ケタル場合ニ於テハ警備部隊指揮官ハ速カニ汚毒ノ状況ヲ搜索シテ瓦斯效力ヲ判断シ要スレバ汚毒セル地域ノ標示、消(除)毒等ノ處置ヲ講ズルモノトス此ノ際先ヅ速カニ飛行部隊ノ出動ニ支障ナカラシムル如ク處置スルコト緊要ナリ

第八篇 飛行場勤務

第二百二十四 飛行場勤務ノ目的ハ飛行場ノ使用ニ規律アラシメ其ノ機能ヲ遺憾ナク發揮セシムルニ在リ故ニ飛行場勤務ニ任ズル機關ハ特ニ勤務ヲ嚴正ナラシムルト共ニ各部隊ハ克ク其ノ統制ニ服シ之ガ目的達成ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第二百二十五 飛行場勤務ノ爲各飛行場ニ飛行場司令、飛行場日直將校及所要ノ飛行場勤務班ヲ置ク

飛行場司令ハ飛行場日直將校ヲ兼ヌルコトヲ得

第二百二十六 高級指揮官ヨリ特ニ命ゼラレザル場合ニ於テハ當該飛行場ヲ根據トスル高級先任ノ飛行部隊指揮官、飛行部隊ノ在ラザル飛行場ニ於テハ高級先任ノ地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ飛行場司令トス

第二百二十七 飛行場司令ハ飛行場ノ使用就中飛行場内一般ノ配置、飛行實

施等ニ關スル事項ヲ統制ス之ガ爲高級指揮官ノ定ムル所ニ基キ飛行場規定ヲ増補スルト共ニ飛行場及其ノ附近ニ位置スル情報、通信及航測部隊等ノ通信施設ノ配置、線路ノ構成立ニ此等部隊ノ通信勤務ニ關シ所要ノ事項ヲ統制スルモノトス此ノ際特ニ各部隊ノ任務及特性ヲ考慮スルコト緊要ナリ」航空路上ノ飛行場ニ於テハ通常飛行場司令官飛行場司令ノ勤務ヲ併セ行フモノトス

第二百二十八 飛行場司令ノ飛行場規定ニ關シ増補スベキ事項概ネ左ノ如シ

飛行場内一般ノ配置ニ關スル事項

飛行部隊ノ配置及諸施設ノ配當

飛行場内地區ノ區分、標識及照明

飛行地區内ノ交通統制

飛行實施ニ關スル事項

飛行場及其ノ附近ニ於ケル飛行要領

彼我識別ノ爲ノ飛行要領

空地連絡ニ關スル事項

警報ノ傳達ニ關スル事項

保安施設ノ利用ニ關スル事項

飛行場ノ保護ニ關スル事項等

第二百二十九 飛行場司令ハ克ク飛行場規定ヲ各部隊ニ徹底セシメ嚴ニ之ガ履行ヲ監督スルモノトス而シテ飛行場使用ノ經驗ニ鑑ミ要スレバ機ヲ失セズ飛行場規定ニ所要ノ補綴修正ヲ加フルコト緊要ナリ又飛行場司令ハ常ニ飛行場ノ整備擔任部隊ト連絡シ之ガ整備ノ完備ヲ期スルヲ要ス

第三百三十 飛行場司令ハ飛行場勤務實施ノ爲勤務員及器材ノ差出、服務期間、服務要領等ヲ定ムルモノトス

第三百三十一 飛行場日直將校ハ通常當該飛行場ヲ使用スル飛行部隊ヨリ差出スモノトス

飛行場日直將校ハ飛行場司令ノ命ヲ受ケ飛行場勤務班ヲ指揮シ飛行場司令ノ業務ヲ輔佐スルモノトス

第三百三十二 飛行場勤務班ノ人員及器材ハ當該飛行場ヲ使用スル飛行部隊若クハ地上勤務部隊ヨリ差出スモノトス

飛行場勤務班ハ飛行場日直將校ノ指揮ヲ受ケ夫々飛行實施ニ關スル規整、飛行場ノ標識及照明、空地連絡、臨機飛來スル飛行部隊(機)ニ對スル協力等ニ任ズルモノトス

第三百三十三 飛行場勤務ニ任ズル機關ハ飛行場内ノ明瞭ナル地點ニ位置シ且之ヲ標示シテ各部隊ノ連絡ヲ容易ナラシムルモノトス

第三百三十四 新ニ到着シ又ハ臨機飛來セル飛行部隊(機)ハ機ヲ失セズ飛行場司令ニ届告シ飛行場ノ使用、部隊(機)ノ配置、飛行實施等ニ關シ其ノ指示ヲ受クルモノトス

第九篇 飛行場ノ設定及整備

第三百三十五 飛行場ハ航空基地構成ノ根幹ニシテ之ガ施設ノ完備ハ飛行部隊戰力發揮ノ爲緊要缺クベカラザル要件ナリ

飛行場ノ設定及整備ハ主トシテ飛行場設定部隊ノ任ズル所ナリト雖モ其ノ他ノ部隊モ亦之ニ任ズルコトアリ

飛行場ノ設定及整備ニ方リテハ戰機ニ投ジ速カニ之ヲ完整スルト共ニ爾後其ノ機能ノ維持増強ヲ圖リ以テ飛行部隊ノ戰力發揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

地上部隊ニ於テ飛行場ノ設定及整備ヲ實施スル場合ニ於テハ航空部隊ハ爲シ得ル限り之ヲ援助スルヲ要ス

第三百三十六 戰闘間各部隊ハ戰闘ノ推移ヲ豫察シ地圖、寫眞、情報等ニ基キ進ンデ空地ヨリ飛行場適地ヲ偵察シ上級指揮官ノ航空基地(飛行場)設定

計畫ノ策定ニ資スルヲ要ス狀況ニ依リ各部隊ハ高級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ空中挺進部隊又ハ第一線地上部隊ニ肩接シテ飛行場候補地ヲ占領シ之ガ設定ニ著手スルヲ要スルコトアリ

飛行場候補地ノ偵察ニ方リテハ航空基地ノ構成ヲ考慮シ附近ノ地形、交通、氣象、休宿施設、設定資材及作業力ノ蒐集等諸般ノ事項ニ互リ綿密ニ實施スルコト緊要ナリ

第三百三十七 戦闘間飛行場ヲ新設シ又ハ敵ノ飛行場ヲ占領シテ之ヲ利用セシムルガ爲ニハ敵情、航空基地ノ構成、飛行場使用ノ目的及時期、地形、氣象等ヲ考慮シ速カニ先ヅ飛行地區ヲ整備シ次デ防空及警備施設、附屬設備等ヲ施設シ爾後餘裕ヲ得ルニ從ヒ逐次此等ヲ擴張又ハ増強スルモノトス狀況ニ依リ先ヅ防空及警備施設、附屬設備等ヲ整備シタル後飛行地區ニ及スコトアリ

占領セル敵飛行場ノ使用ニ方リテハ特ニ地雷、陷穽等ノ有無ヲ踏査スルト

共ニ速カニ各種障礙物及散亂セル爆彈ノ破片等ヲ除去スルコト緊要ナリ

第三百三十八 附屬設備ハ主トシテ空中ヨリスル敵ノ各種攻撃ニ對シ人員、兵器、燃料、彈藥等ノ損害特ニ飛行機、燃料等ノ炎上及爆風ニ依ル毀壞ヲ局限シ得ル如ク極力分散配置スルト共ニ爲シ得ル限り掩體ヲ構築シ或ハ地下ニ掩蔽シ且對瓦斯施設ヲ完整シ置クコト緊要ナリ

第三百三十九 掩體ノ構築ニ方リテハ地形地物ヲ利用シテ不規ニ分散シ掩護ヲ良好ナラシムルト共ニ偽裝、遮蔽等ニ注意シ以テ敵ノ攻撃ヲ困難ナラシムルヲ要ス

第四百十 飛行場補修ノ爲ニハ豫メ飛行場記録、兵要地誌等ニ依リ飛行場ニ關スル調査研究ヲ周到ナラシムルト共ニ常ニ補修用材料トシテ土のう、煉瓦屑、礫石、木材等ヲ準備シ置クコト緊要ナリ

第四百十一 飛行場ヲ新設又ハ占領シタル場合ニ於テハ各部隊ハ速カニ飛行場記録ヲ高級指揮官ニ提出スルト共ニ關係飛行部隊ニ通報スルモノトス

既設飛行場ノ状態ニ變化アリタル場合ニ於テモ亦前項ニ準ズルモノトス
飛行場記録ニ記載スベキ事項概ネ左ノ如シ

飛行場ノ番(符)號時トシテ地名

飛行地區ノ幅員及土質

附屬設備ニ關スル事項

指揮及連絡施設

格納庫、倉庫及工場ノ状態

休宿及給水設備ノ状態

飛行場附近ノ地形特ニ著明ナル地物

地形地物ノ關係位置

擴張ノ能否

障碍物ノ状態

天文、氣象ノ交感及季節ノ影響

防空及警備施設ニ關スル事項

交通、通信及保安施設ニ關スル事項

飛行場ノ秘匿及偽裝ニ關スル事項

資材ノ集積及補給ニ關スル事項

休宿、給養及衛生ニ關スル事項

利用シ得ベキ工場、動力及衛生施設、物資、勞力等

第十篇 補給及修理

第四百十二 戰闘遂行ノ爲必要ナル航空用資材ハ所要量著大ニシテ且複雑多岐ニ互リ之ガ補給ハ常ニ必ズシモ容易ナラザルヲ通常トス故ニ指揮官ハ不斷ノ努力ヲ拂ヒ航空用資材ノ圓滑ナル補給ヲ期スルト共ニ之ガ愛護節用及自隊修理ニ勉メ以テ飛行部隊ノ戦力發揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第四百十三 航空部隊ニ於ケル航空用資材ノ補給及修理ハ關係機關ノ緊密ナル協同連繫ニ依リ始メテ其ノ完キヲ期シ得ルモノトス故ニ補給及修理機關ノ指揮官ハ業務ノ實施ニ方リ常ニ上下左右ノ連絡ヲ緊密ニシ相互積極的ニ協力スルコト緊要ナリ而シテ一般兵器及資材、糧食、衛生材料等ノ補給ニ關シテハ地上軍兵站機關トノ連繫ヲ緊密ナラシムルヲ要ス

第四百十四 補給及修理ノ主眼ハ飛行部隊ノ要求ヲ充足スルニ在リ故ニ補給及修理機關ノ指揮官ハ補給及修理ニ關スル詳細ナル計畫ヲ定メ其ノ實施

ヲシテ部隊ノ需要ニ即應セシムルト共ニ常ニ狀況ノ變化ニ應ジ得ルノ準備ヲ整ヘアルヲ要ス之ガ爲指揮官ハ進ンテ關係部隊就中飛行部隊ノ實情ニ親炙シ其ノ狀況ヲ明カナラシムルト共ニ狀況ニ應ジ適時計畫ヲ補綴修正シ之ガ適正ヲ期スルコト緊要ナリ

第四百十五 飛行部隊指揮官ハ戦闘ノ爲必要ナル補給業務ニ關シ關係地上勤務部隊ヲ區處スルモノトス
地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ通常擔任セル地區内ニ位置スル飛行部隊戦闘遂行ノ爲必要ナル補給及輸送ニ任ズルモノトス

第四百十六 地上勤務部隊ハ關係飛行部隊ノ航空用資材消費ノ狀況ニ鑑ミ絶エズ上級指揮官ニ連絡シ飛行場ニ於ケル基準保有量ノ保有ニ勉ムルヲ要ス

第四百十七 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ集積航空用資材ノ保管及掩護ヲ確實ニシ其ノ狀況ヲ適時上級指揮官ニ報告スルト共ニ關係飛行部隊指揮官ニ通報

スルモノトス

第四百十八 航空兵器ノ整備及修理ハ飛行部隊戦力發揮ノ基礎ナリ故ニ飛行部隊指揮官ハ上級指揮官ノ企圖ニ基キ戰況ノ推移ヲ豫察シ之ニ適應スル如ク豫メ綿密ナル計畫ヲ定メ關係航空修理機關ト連繫シ航空兵器ノ整備及修理ノ完璧ヲ期スルモノトス

第四百十九 修理ヲ必要トスル飛行機ヲ生ジタル場合ニ於テハ指揮官ハ其ノ狀況ヲ速カニ上級指揮官ニ報告スルト共ニ自隊ニ於テ修理シ得ベキヤ否ヤヲ決定シ要スレバ關係修理機關ト協力シテ速カニ修理ヲ完成スルヲ要スル修理ヲ必要トスル飛行機ニシテ飛行シ得ルモノハ部隊自ラ之ヲ關係修理機關ニ空中輸送シ自隊裝備定數内ノ完備機ヲ受領スルヲ通常トス

第十一篇 休宿及給養並ニ衛生

第一章 休宿及給養

第五百十 戦闘間ニ於ケル航空部隊ハ其ノ形態ニ於テ駐軍態勢ニ在リト雖モ戦闘(勤務)ハ晝夜ニ互リ且長期ニ及ブコト多ク加之航空基地ハ絶エズ空地ヨリスル敵ノ攻撃目標タリ故ニ航空部隊ハ戦闘間常ニ對敵觀念ヲ旺盛ニシ志氣ノ振作ニ勉メ以テ警備ヲ至嚴ナラシムルト共ニ休宿及給養ヲ適切ニシ長期ニ互ル戦闘(勤務)ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第五百十一 戦闘間ニ於ケル航空部隊ノ休宿ハ各部隊ノ本務ニ應ジ戦闘(勤務)ノ狀況ヲ考慮シ部隊毎ニ之ヲ律スルモノトス

第五百十二 戦闘間航空部隊ハ航空基地内ニ於テ戦闘態勢ヲ以テ休宿スルモノトス而シテ各部隊ハ任務ニ應ジ所要ノ人員ヲ飛行場ニ休宿セシメ警備及戦闘準備ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス

第二百五十三 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ高級指揮官ノ命令ニ基キ戰闘間ニ於ケル各部隊ノ任務ヲ考慮シ航空基地内ニ其ノ休宿地ヲ選定シ休宿設備ヲ整フルモノトス之ガ爲各部隊ノ任務、戰況、航空基地施設、住民地等ノ許ス限リ家屋ヲ利用セシメ所要ニ應ジ廠舎、幕舎等ヲ建設スルモノトス而シテ休宿設備ハ戰闘並ニ飛行場ニ於ケル各種勤務ニ支障ナキ限リ勉メテ飛行地區ヨリ離隔セシメ且分散遮蔽シテ設備スルヲ要ス

第二百五十四 戰闘間航空部隊休宿ノ爲ニハ當該飛行場ニ在ル地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ舍(露)營司令官ニ準ジ各部隊ニ休宿地區ヲ配當シ飛行部隊指揮官等ト協定シ休宿ノ爲ノ内務、警備等ニ關スル事項ヲ定メ之ヲ統轄スルモノトス

第二百五十五 戰闘間ニ於ケル航空部隊休宿地ノ警戒ハ地上勤務部隊ヲ以テスル航空基地警備一般ノ配置ニ依リ其ノ目的ヲ達成スルヲ本旨トシ狀況ニ依リ休宿地直接警戒ノ爲衛兵等ヲ配置スルコトアリ而シテ該衛兵ハ休宿部

隊ノ人員ヲ以テ編成スルヲ通常トスルモ狀況ニ依リ其ノ他ノ部隊ヨリ所要ノ人員ヲ差出サシムルコトアリ

第二百五十六 戰闘間航空部隊ハ休宿ノ爲ノ勤務員ヲ設ケザルヲ通常トス時トシテ舍(露)營司令官以下宿營ノ爲ノ勤務員ヲ設クルコトアリ

第二百五十七 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ擔任セル地區内ニ在ル給養機關ヲ有セザル航空部隊ノ給養ヲ擔任スルモノトス之ガ爲部下部隊ニ給養ヲ擔任スベキ部隊及期間並ニ給養及給養諸品補給ノ要領等ヲ示スモノトス

第二百五十八 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ航空作戰ノ特性ニ鑑ミ常ニ飛行場ニ所要ノ糧食ヲ集積シ給養施設ヲ完備シ給養準備ヲ周到ナラシムルト共ニ積極的ニ關係部隊ト連絡シ以テ給養實施ヲ圓滑適切ナラシムルヲ要ス此ノ際特ニ飛行部隊指揮官トノ連繫ヲ緊密ニシ部隊ノ活動狀況ヲ考慮シ空中勤務者ニ對シ所要ノ特種糧食ヲ支給若クハ加給シ其ノ保健ニ資スルコト緊要ナリ

第二百五十九 地方物資及勞力並ニ地方工業機關ノ蒐集又ハ利用ニ方リテハ

地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ高級指揮官ノ統制ニ基キ關係地上部隊ト協定シ之方
實施ヲ圓滑ナラシムルヲ要ス

第二章 衛生

第六十 衛生勤務ハ航空部隊就中飛行部隊ノ戦力ヲ維持増強スル爲極メ
テ緊要ナリ故ニ航空部隊ハ常ニ衛生勤務ヲ確實良好ナラシメ特ニ空中勤務
者ノ體力ノ保持増進、適性ノ伸張、航空疲勞ノ解消及防止等ニ關シ萬般ノ
施策ヲ講ズルヲ要ス極寒及酷暑時並ニ瘴癘ノ地方ニ於テ特ニ然リ

第六十一 空中勤務者ノ體力ノ保持増進ノ爲ニハ休宿及給養ヲ作戰地ノ
特性及戰闘ノ狀況ニ適應セシムルト共ニ酸素吸入器、航空腹帶、特種藥物
等ノ使用ヲ適切ナラシムルコト緊要ナリ

第六十二 戰闘間航空基地ニ於ケル航空部隊ノ衛生勤務ハ高級指揮官ノ
命令ニ基キ主トシテ地上勤務部隊之ヲ擔任スルモノトス

第六十三 地上勤務部隊指揮官ハ飛行場毎ニ隊附衛生部員及衛生材料其
ノ他所要ノ人員及器材ヲ以テ繙帶所ヲ開設シ飛行部隊衛生機關ト協力シ傷
病患者ノ收療ニ任ゼシムルト共ニ要スレバ飛行地區ニ近ク救護所ヲ開設シ
機上傷者ノ救急處置ヲ迅速ナラシムルモノトス

第六十四 同一飛行場ニ數箇ノ部隊位置スル場合ニ於テハ上級指揮官ノ
命令ニ基キ各部隊ノ衛生機關其ノ他所要ノ人員及器材ヲ以テ合同繙帶所又
ハ合同救護所ヲ開設スルヲ利トスルコトアリ

第六十五 繙帶所ノ位置決定並ニ之ガ設備ニ方リテハ常ニ敵ノ空中攻撃
ヲ顧慮スルト共ニ航空部隊ノ兵力、使用期間ノ長短、飛行場ノ狀態等ヲ考
慮シ勉メテ其ノ施設ヲ完備スルコト緊要ナリ此ノ際季節ニ應ジ排水、防寒、
防暑、害蟲豫防特ニ防蚊等ニ遺憾ナカラシムルヲ要ス又瓦斯防護ニ便ナル
位置ニ選定シ且集團防護ノ處置ヲ講ズルコト緊要ナリ
合同繙帶所、救護所及合同救護所ノ位置決定並ニ之ガ設備ハ前項ニ準ズル

モノトス

第六十六 航空部隊ノ輕傷病患者ハ繃帶所ニ於テ治療セシムルヲ本旨トシ重傷病患者ハ適宜最寄野戰衛生機關ニ送致スルモノトス

第十二篇 戦闘間ニ於ケル將兵ノ心得

通則

第六十七 戦争ニ於ケル航空ノ地位愈々重ク軍ノ航空部隊ニ期待スル所極メテ大ナリ故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ自己ノ責務ヲ自覺シ謙虚自省一意其ノ任務ニ邁進シ以テ負托ノ重キニ對フベシ

第六十八 航空部隊將兵ハ指揮官ノ膝下ヲ離レ各種ノ任務ニ服スルコト多シ故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ特ニ軍紀ヲ嚴正ニシ進ンデ指揮官ノ掌握下ニ入ルノ風尙ヲ確立スベシ

第六十九 航空ノ戦闘ハ深刻苛烈ニシテ戦闘間各種ノ障碍又ハ幾多ノ困難ニ遭遇スルヲ通常トス故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ常ニ強靱不屈自ラ之ヲ克服打開シ其ノ任務ヲ完遂スベシ

第七十 航空戦力ノ消長ハ將兵ノ有スル各種技能ノ優劣ニ懸ルコト極メ

テ大ナリ故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ絶エズ自己ノ戦技及特技ヲ鍊磨シ常ニ敵ニ優越スベシ

第七十一 航空戦力ハ空地兩勤務ノ統合ニ依リ其ノ完キヲ期シ得ベク空中勤務ニ依リ其ノ眞價ヲ發揮ス故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ空地兩勤務者相信ジ相授ケ眞ニ渾然一體トナリ航空戦力ヲ最高度ニ發揮スベシ

第七十二 航空部隊ハ極度ニ科學ヲ活用セザルベカラズ故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ精神要素ノ涵養及修練ニ勉ムルト共ニ常ニ科學的知識ノ吸收ニ勉メ科學的ニ事ヲ處スルノ氣風ヲ養成スベシ

第七十三 航空用資材ハ複雑多岐ニシテ且精巧ナリ故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ之ガ性能ニ通曉スルト共ニ整備ニ精熟シ其ノ性能ヲ遺憾ナク發揮スベシ

第七十四 航空用資材ハ其ノ所要量著大ニシテ之ガ補給ハ容易ナラザルヲ通常トス故ニ航空部隊將兵ハ常ニ之ガ愛護節用ニ勉メ一彈一滴ト雖モ忽セニセズ常ニ其ノ最大威力ヲ發揮スベシ

第一章 空中勤務者

第七十五 空中勤務者ハ事ヲ謀ルヤ綿密周到任ニ當ルヤ冷靜沈著果敢斷行シ其ノ任務ヲ完遂スベシ

第七十六 空中勤務者ハ躬行ヲ慎ミ保健ニ留意シ身邊ヲ整理シテ心氣常ニ明朗ナルベシ

第七十七 空中勤務者ハ飛行機ヲ尊重愛護シ其ノ性能ニ通曉シテ操法理ニ適ヒ極度ニ其ノ性能ヲ發揮スベシ

第七十八 空中勤務者ハ飛行軍紀ヲ嚴正ニシ事故ノ絶滅ヲ期スベシ

第七十九 空中勤務者ハ特ニ廉恥ヲ重ンジ機長指揮ノ下一心一體トナリ死生榮辱ヲ俱ニスベシ

第八十 空中勤務者ハ飛行場ノ状態ヲ明カニシ飛行場規定ヲ嚴守スベシ

第八十一 出勤前空中勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、任務ヲ正シク理解シ確實ニ復唱ス
- 二、彼我及氣象ニ關シ最新ノ狀況ヲ明カニス
- 三、兵器、裝備品及携行品ヲ點檢ス
- 四、時計ヲ規正シ時間ヲ嚴守ス
- 五、機祕密ノ保持ニ留意ス

第百八十二 航進間空中勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、索敵警戒ヲ嚴ニス
- 二、指揮官機ニ注意ス
- 三、時々自己ノ位置ヲ標定ス
- 四、所定ノ隊形ヲ保持ス
- 五、不要電波ノ輻射ヲ戒ム

第百八十三 空中戦闘間空中勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、冷靜沈著

- 二、一機ニ執ラハレズ他ノ敵機ニ注意ス
- 三、一撃必墜ヲ期ス
- 四、小成ニ安ンゼズ更ニ戰果ヲ擴張ス
- 五、拔駈ノ功名ヲ戒メ部隊戦闘ニ徹ス

第百八十四 歸還ニ方リ空中勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、著陸スル迄索敵警戒ヲ續行ス
- 二、飛行場ノ状態特ニ標識ニ注意ス
- 三、慎重整齊ニ著陸ス
- 四、報告ハ功ヲ誇ラズ簡明的確ニス
- 五、速カニ次期出動準備ヲ完整ス

第百八十五 變ニ臨ミ空中勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、先ゾ一呼吸ノ後計器等ヲ視テ故障ノ箇所ヲ確ム
- 二、友軍戰線内ヘノ著陸ニ勉ム

- 三、飛行機ノ掩護、指揮官ヘノ連絡及負傷者ノ應急處置
- 四、敵地ニ於テハ先ヅ機祕密兵器及書類等ヲ處置ス
- 五、敵地ニ於テ手段ナキトキハ潔ク愛機ト運命ヲ俱ニシ斷ジテ虜囚ノ辱ヲ受ケズ

第二章 地上勤務者

第百八十六 地上勤務者ハ專ヲ謀ルヤ周到著實任ニ當ルヤ積極進取其ノ任務ヲ完遂スベシ

第百八十七 地上勤務者ハ兵器ヲ尊重愛護シ之ガ整備ヲ完全ニシ飛行部隊ノ戦力發揮ニ遺憾ナカラシムベシ

第百八十八 地上勤務者ハ全能ヲ傾ケテ航空基地ノ機能ヲ整備シ特ニ對敵觀念ヲ旺盛ニスベシ

第百八十九 地上勤務者ハ勤務間特ニ報告ヲ勵行スベシ

第百九十 飛行場ニ於ケル地上勤務者ノ一般ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、飛行部隊戦力發揮ヲ第一義トス
- 二、飛行場ハ常ニ清淨ニシ補修ヲ怠ラズ
- 三、時ハ戦力ナリ時刻ヲ嚴守ス
- 四、相互緊密ニ連絡ス
- 五、常ニ準備ヲ先行完整ス

第百九十一 對空戦闘ニ方リ地上勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

- 一、對空警戒ヲ嚴ニシ常ニ對空戦闘準備ヲ完整ス
- 二、冷靜沈著豫メ備フル所ニ從ヒ整齊迅速ニ行動ス
- 三、敵機ノ襲撃ヲ第一トシ身ノ安全ヲ第二トス
- 四、兵器、資材及施設ノ掩護又ハ消火ニ挺身シ損害ヲ局限ス
- 五、瓦斯空襲ニ對シテハ怖レズ侮ラズ

第百九十二 地上戦闘間地上勤務者ノ特ニ心得ベキ事項左ノ如シ

戦闘間ニ於ケル將兵ノ心得 地上勤務者

八六

- 一、戦友相勵マシ最後ノ一人トナルモ尙奮戦ス
- 二、負傷スルモ自ラ應急處置ヲ施シ戦闘ニ堪ヘザルニ至ルモ後退セズ
- 三、所屬部隊ヲ離ルルハ特ニ命ゼラレタル場合ニ限ル
- 四、志氣ヲ旺盛ニシ自己ノ苦痛ヲ訴ヘズ
- 五、敵ノ宣傳ニ惑ハサレズ

航空兵操典

綱領、總則終
及第一部

U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Washington 25, D. C.

B-7

16 January 1945

NOTE: The following is the translation of a document submitted by the Japanese Government in response to a request made by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.

THE CURRICULUM OF THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

1. Class A Officer Trainee

The subjects taught are chiefly those of higher military sciences. The objective is to complete the knowledge of the principles by practical application. The following subjects are completed within two years.

Major Subjects

1) Strategy and Tactics

Naval strategy, tactics and their applications

2) Operations

Administration connected with operations

3) Military history

Research in historical facts to be used as examples--

the issue, reasons, various results and battle experience of various campaigns.

4) Military Administration

Preparedness and the fundamental theory of organization of various military institutions; the present system and its operation; facts concerning the administration of military affairs and the preparedness of all countries.

(JAP INTEL SURF REF ITEM B-7)

Minor Subjects

5) Ordnance

Naval machinery, the efficiency, use, and construction of various kinds of ordnance; their advantages and disadvantages.

6) Navigation

Meteorology, coastal bearings, compass correction, methods of determining course and other facts necessary for navigation.

7) Military geography

Naval and military geography, health conditions and products of points and zones of operation; other elements necessary for military use.

8) Army tactics

Army tactics, operations, and operation plans, in general.

9) Fortifications and topography

The placement, organization, and composition of fortifications; the elements of surveying.

10) Transportation

Land routes, sea lanes, railroads, bridging, electrical communication, air routes, signalling, etc.

11) Hygiene

The hygiene of ships, marching, barracks, etc.; hospital ships.

12) Law

Facts to be known about public law, international law, naval criminal law, codes of criminal procedure, etc.

13) History

Naval history; facts which should become historical precedents, to be applied mainly at sea. Diplomatic history; precedents in

diplomatic history and recent diplomatic history.

14) Statistics

The elements of military statistics.

15) Languages

One or two of the following: English, French, German, Russian, Chinese.

16) Aside from the above, other sciences necessary for military affairs.

2. Specialist Officer Trainees

The objective is to teach chiefly those subjects concerning higher military sciences, and the candidates receive an education in which they cover the subject matter of a Class A officer in one year.

3. Engineering Officer Trainees

Higher scientific training connected with military mechanical engineering and electrical engineering, the chief consideration being to complete their knowledge by practical application. The aim is to learn necessary facts about duties connected with military administration and military science. The following subject matter is completed in two years.

1) Military Mechanical Engineering

Explanation and application of the various fundamental principles of steam engines, the construction and theory of military engines, and the design of military engines.

2) Military Electrical Engineering

Explanation and application of various fundamental principles of electric power; construction and theory of electric power equipment; design of electric machinery.

- 3) Administration
Fundamental principles of administration of repair shops and economy of repair; operation, adjustment and control of military machinery and military electrical equipment.
- 4) Military history
The role of machinery in military history.
- 5) Science of shipbuilding
Theory and construction of naval ships.
- 6) Study of raw materials
The production, efficiency, and evaluation of fuel and military raw materials; fundamental principles of industrial metallurgy.
- 7) Practical dynamics
Strength of construction materials, hydraulics, mechanical dynamics.
- 8) Military administration and military science
Duties in military administration and military science.
- 9) Ordnance
Duties concerning ordnance.
- 10) Ordinary courses of education.
Mathematics, dynamics, physics.
- 11) Statistics
The elements of statistics.
- 12) Law
Elements of Constitutional, Navy Criminal Law; criminal codes of procedure.
- 13) Languages
One or two from the following: English, French, German.

4. Students following elective courses

Students who so desire or who are appointed are taught subjects during a period of from one to four years in the Navy War College, the Imperial Universities, and the Foreign Language School. The aim is to encourage self study and research in the subjects deemed necessary for the Navy.

The division of the subject matter is roughly as follows:

- Guns
- Torpedoes
- Mines
- Navigation instruments

- Echo-ranging gear
- Optical equipment
- Aircraft equipment
- Trajectory

- Wireless communication
- Measurement
- Weather
- Hydrographic weather

- High altitude weather
- Airplane fuselages
- Airplane engines
- Airplane materials

- Marine engines
- Internal combustion engines
- Electricity
- Batteries

- Mechanical engineering
- Electrical engineering
- Physics
- Theoretical chemistry

- Applied Chemistry
- Shipbuilding
- Law
- Economics
- Labor problems
- Plant Administration
- Military administration
- Education

統計學ノ大要

由法學

憲法、海軍刑法及治罪法ノ大要

由語學

英、佛、獨ノ内一或ハ二

四選科學生

指決定又ハ志望ニ從ヒ海軍ニ必要ナル學科ヲ研究自修セシムルヲ主旨トシテ
海軍大學校、帝國大學又ハ外國語學校ニ於テ一箇年乃至四箇年間ニ學術ヲ習
得セシム

而シテ學科別ハ概ネ左ノ通ナリ

砲臺兵器、魚雷兵器、機雷兵器、航海兵器、
 音響兵器、光學兵器、航空兵器、彈道、
 無線通信、測量、氣象、海洋氣象、
 高層氣象、航空機體、航空發動機、航空材料、
 船用機關、内火機關、電氣、電池、
 機械工學、電氣工學、物理、純正化學、
 應用化學、造船、法制、經濟、
 勞働問題、工場經理、車需經理、教育、
 語學

(三) 管理法
電力學諸原理ノ解説應用、電力兵器ノ理論及構造、電機計畫

(四) 戰史
軍用機關及軍用電氣ノ整理操縦、機關要務、工業經濟及工場管理法大要

(五) 戰史中機關ニ關スル事項

(五) 造船學

艦船ノ構造及理論

(六) 材料學

需品材料燃料ノ生産、性能並鑑識、製造冶金學ノ大要

(七) 應用力學

機械力學、水力學、材料及構造ノ強弱

(八) 軍政學及兵術

軍政學及兵術ニ關シ職務上須知ノ事項

(九) 兵器學

兵器ニ關シ職務上須知ノ事項

(十) 普通學

數學、力學、物理學

(出) 統計學

外交史

外交史上ノ教訓及近時外交史

田統計學

軍事統計學ノ大要

田語學

英、佛、獨、露、支語等ノ内一或ハ二

由其ノ他軍事上必要ナル學術

三 特修學生

主トシテ高等兵學ニ關スル學術ヲ習得セシムルヲ目的トシ一箇年間ニ甲種學生履修科目ニ準ジタル教育ヲ施ス

三 機關學生

軍用機關術及電氣術ニ關スル高等ノ學術ヲ教授シ之ガ活用ニ習熟セシムルヲ主眼トシ併セテ軍政學及兵術ニ關シ職務上須知ノ事項ヲ教授スルヲ目的トシ二箇年間ニ左ノ科目ヲ履修セシム

(一) 軍用機關學

熱機關ニ關スル諸原理ノ解説應用、軍用機關ノ理論及構造、軍用機關計畫

(二) 軍用電氣學

Naval War College Curriculum

海軍大學校ノ課程

一、甲種學生

主トシテ高等兵學ニ關スル學術ヲ習得セシメ且之ガ活用ニ熟セシムルヲ目的トシ二箇年間ニ左ノ科目ヲ履修セシム

本科

(一) 戰略、戰術

海軍戰略、戰術及其ノ應用

(二) 戰務

作戰ニ關スル要務

(三) 戰史

鑑例トナスベキ史實ノ研究、諸戰役ノ勝敗、原因、結果及戰訓

(四) 軍政學

武備、軍事諸機關組織ノ原理、現制及其ノ運轉、其ノ他軍事行政ニ關スル事項及各國ノ武備

補科

(五) 兵器學

艦船機關、諸兵器ノ構造用法効力及其ノ得失ニ關スル事項

(六) 航海學

氣象、海岸測量、羅針修正法、針路法其ノ他航海必要ナル事項

(七) 兵要地學
戰略地域及地點ニ於ケル海陸地理、衛生、物資其ノ他用兵上須知ノ諸要素

(八) 陸軍戰術

陸軍戰術、戰務及作戰計畫ノ一般

(九) 築城及地形學

要塞ノ配置、編制、素質、海岸要塞攻守ニ關スル事項及陸地測量法ノ大要

(十) 交通學

道路、水路、鐵道、橋梁、電氣通信、航空、信號等ニ關スル事項

(十一) 衛生學

艦船、行軍、宿營等ノ衛生及病院船ニ關スル事項

(十二) 法學

國法、國際法、海軍刑法、治罪法等ニ關スル須知ノ事項

(十三) 歷史

海軍史

主トシテ海上ニ於ケル史的教訓トナルベキ事項

ALLIED TRANSLATOR AND INTERPRETER SECTION
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

NOTE: Translation of a document on special service organizations requested by G-2.

INFORMATION REGARDING SPECIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATION (TOKOMU KIKAN)
(Issued by the War Ministry)

Part One

Summary of Intelligence Service in Manchuria

NOTE: There existed in the KWANTUNG Army at the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War no such organizations which might be called special service organizations. Such organizations in the past were called Intelligence Service Bureaus.

A. General duties

Chiefly, the general duties were collecting intelligence materials (excluding the collection of intelligence material through wireless) and carrying on propaganda work.

B. Organization

(See ANNEX No 1)

(JAP INTEL SUPPL REF ITEM B-8)

DIVISIONS	DUTIES	PERSONNEL
Hdq at HARBIN ()	1. Supervise general affairs. 2. Collection and consolidation of intelligence material.	50 - officers and non-commissioned officers. 150 - civil officials.
HAILAR () MUTANCHIANG ()		20 - officers and non-commissioned officers. 50 - civil officials.
CHIENTAO () CHINING () ANTUNG () CHIAMUSZU () HEIHO () SANHO () HINGAN () ABAGA () MUKDEN () DAIREN ()	Propaganda and collection of intelligence material in their respective areas.	15 - officers and non-commissioned officers. 30 - civil officials.

C. Orders given to the Intelligence Service Bureau of the KWANTUNG Army.

Although there was an order from Grand Imperial Headquarters to the KWANTUNG Army regarding strict observation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact, the nature of the order presented to the Intelligence Service Bureau by the KWANTUNG Army is uncertain. However, it is presumed that the KWANTUNG Army also gave the above orders to the Intelligence Service Bureau.

Part Two

Outline of Special Service Organizations in the CHINA AREA

A. Duties of the special service organizations and those duties later abolished:

1. The special service organizations established at the outbreak of the CHINA Incident were charged with the supervision, aid and revival of the peace preservation organs immediately following Japanese occupation. They were simultaneously charged with the collection of intelligence materials. They also participated in services related to economic activities which were directly concerned with the army. Therefore, it could be said that these organizations had a connection with part of the administration but did not possess either judicial or police authority.

2. Following the establishment of the administrative body of the NANKING government and the hastening of independence, the duties of these special service organizations became markedly limited in areas previously under Japanese administration.

3. In this way, the duties of the special service organizations were diminished. Under the directive, "Basic Policies Toward China", issued by the Japanese government in 1942, whereby the Japanese Army completely withdrew from all participation in Chinese administration, and whereby the utmost respect was given to Chinese self-administration, the special service organizations were completely eliminated from all CHINA at the beginning of 1943. Therefore, there existed no special service organizations in CHINA from the early part of 1943.

B. The special service organizations of the Japanese forces in CHINA as of the first half of 1945 are as listed in ANNEX No. 2.

C. The duties of the various organizations mentioned in the attached ANNEX No 3 are as follows:

1. District Liaison Bureau. (Intelligence Service Bureau at the Mongolian border).

The special service organizations designated in part one will be eliminated and reconverted into liaison offices. Their duties have been designated as (1) primarily to gather information and (2) to conduct mutual liaison duty with the Chinese and the Japanese in matters pertinent to the operation of troops and guard duty. In other words, they are intended to gather information and to serve at the same time as liaison between the Commanding General of the Japanese Army (commander of division or independent brigade and above) and the Chinese. (The Japanese Army Forces will avoid direct contact with the Chinese by utilizing the facilities of the liaison office in all cases. The liaison office acts in the capacity of spokesman so that mutual understanding can obtain.) These offices serve to eliminate friction and misunderstanding between the Japanese Army Forces and the Chinese and to remove the need for direct participation in the matter of military administration.

WANA. Date 4-17

In that purpose, direct attachment of the liaison offices to divisions and independent brigades has been avoided, and they have been placed under direct Army control. On the other hand, in view of the need for closer unity among divisions and brigades, the staff-members of the divisions and independent brigades have been employed in the liaison bodies.

2. Shanghai Army Bureau

In view of the complexity of the SHINGHAI situation and the absolute emphasis placed upon operation and guard by the Army Forces, a central bureau for liaison and information work in outlying districts was established at the close of 1942 in SHANGHAI under direct jurisdiction of Supreme Imperial Headquarters.

3. Administration

The central bureau in "2" above was charged with the task of initiating administration measures directly pertinent to matters of lesser troop operations and guard on the heels of a new occupation which came as a military operation. On this occasion, the imposition of military rule was as restrained as possible, and emergency matters were disposed of in a simple manner. With the restitution of Chinese administration, the army withdrew its hand and transferred administration entirely to the Chinese organizations.

4. Japanese Embassy

With complete abolition of special services, Japan's part in liaison work pertinent to its own administration as well as China's administration, was taken up by the Japanese Embassy which acted as the forward organization of the Greater East Asia Ministry.

Part Three


Liaison Organs in the Southern Regions

There are no so-called special service organizations in the southern regions, however, our liaison organization in the Provisional Independent Indian Government (SUIRA CHANDRA BOSE) is comparable. It is attached to the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army and in functioning under order of the central authorities. Although the Allied Supreme Headquarter has requested information regarding its organization and functions, it has no actual designation. Its general outline is presented in ANNEX No 3.

The matter of liaison and support in the administration (diplomatic) of the Provisional Independent Indian Government was assumed from December 1944 by the Japanese Foreign Ministry which dispatched a diplomatic representative.

ANNEX No 1


Crude example:



indicated inter-relations

indicates relations of command
(disposition)

DISPOSITION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE BUREAU IN MANCHURIA



NOTE: There exist a close relation between the Intelligence Service Bureaus and the army units in this area.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION AND DUTIES OF THE LIAISON ORGAN


General Duties:

1. To maintain liaison with and render administrative assistance to the Provisional Independent Indian Government.
2. To maintain liaison with and render military assistance to the Indian National Army.
3. To assemble and collate general intelligence.

		DIVISIONS	DUTIES	PERSONNEL (High-ranking officials only)
D E P A R T M E N T H E A D Q U A R T E R A B R U A T I O N S		Operations Section	Plans and Operations. Principal foreign diplomatic negotiations; composition personnel.	Chief of Staff 6 Officers
		Administrative Section	Personnel Affairs General Affairs	3 Officers
		Intelligence Section	Assembling, collating, codifying and examining information.	4 Officers. 4 civil officials.
		Military Affairs Section	Maintaining liaison and rendering military assistance to Indian National Army.	25 Officers.
		Government Affairs Section	Maintaining liaison with and rendering administrative assistance to Provisional Government.	3 Officers. 7 civil officials.
		Ordnance and Material Section	Supervision and transportation of ordnance and material and supplies.	2 Officers
		Military Medical Affairs Sec.	Liaison with and medical assistance to Indian National Army.	2 Officers
		Finance Section	Financial Affairs	3 Officers
		MALAY Branch Bureau	Liaison with and assistance in military and administrative affairs to BASOKU ()	15 Officers. 6 civil officials.
	THAILAND Branch Bureau	Liaison with and rendering military and administrative assistance to THAILAND.	3 Officers 2 civil officials.	
	SAIGON Office	Liaison with and assistance to Indonesian Administrative and Military Affairs in French INDO-CHINA.	2 Officers 4 civil officials.	
TOTAL				App 90

Note: Only the approx. number of the ranking officials are listed.

TABLE OF ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL ORGANS OF JAPANESE ARMY IN CHINA AS OF THE FIRST HALF OF 1945



軍務發第七一六號

特別勤務機關ニ関スル資料送附ノ件

昭和二十年十月二十一日

陸軍省軍務局長

有未機關長殿

「マニワ」大佐ヨリ貴機關宛要求ニ係ル首題ノ件別紙ノ通送附スル
ニ付「マ」司令部ニ交附相成度

追而國際法違反ノ犯罪ヲ容認（又ハ委任）スル特別勤務機關又ハ
司令部ハ日本軍内ニハ存在セザルニ付申添フ

特別勤務機關ニ関スル資料

陸軍省

第一、滿洲ニ於ケル情報部ノ概況

(註) 關東軍ニハ大東亞戰勃發當時特務機關ノ名稱ノモ
ナシ、從來、特務機關ハ情報部ト呼稱シアリ

一、一般任務

主トシテ情報收集(無線ニ依ル情報收集ヲ除ク)宣傳等ノ實施

ニ任ズ

二、組織(別紙要圖参照)

區分	任務	要員
本部	一、全般業務ノ統轄 二、情報ノ收集整理	將校下士官 文官 約一五〇
支部	主トシテ當該方面 情報收集及宣傳	將校下士官 文官 約一五〇
部		文官 約三〇

三、關東軍ノ情報部ニ與ヘタル命令

大本營ヨリ關東軍ニ付シテハ對ソ中立關係ヲ嚴守スヘキ趣旨

ノ命令アリタルモ関東軍カ情報部ニ対シ如何ナル命令ヲ與ヘタルヤ
ハ不明ナリ然レトモ関東軍トシテモ右趣旨ノ命令ヲ與ヘタルモ
ト判断ス

滿洲之情報部配置圖

別紙

凡例




隸屬關係ヲ示ス



指揮(區處)關係ヲ示ス

備考
情報部ト現地各軍トハ協同關係ニ在リ
◎張家口



第三、南方方面ニ於ケル連絡機關ノ概況

南方方面ニ於テハ所謂特務機關ナルモノ存在セサル之ニ類スルモノヲ求ムレハ自由印度假政府（スパス・チヤンドラ・ボース）ニ對スル我カ方連絡機關ヲ唯一ノモノトセシ

該機關ハ中央ノ指示スル所ニ從ヒ南方軍總司令官ニ屬シテ其ノ任ニ服シアリタリ而シテ當方ニハ聯合軍總司令部ノ要求スル之カ組織及任務ニ關スル命令無キマ其ノ概要ヲ述フレハ別紙ノ如シ

尚自由印度假政府ノ政務（外交）ノ連絡及援助ニ關シテハ一九四四年十二月以降外務省之ヲ擔當シテ外交代表ヲ派遣シアリ

別紙

連絡機關、組織任務概要表

- 一般任務
- 一、自由印度獨立假政府 = 對スル連絡及政務援助
 - 二、印度國民軍 = 對スル連絡並ニ軍事援助
 - 三、一般情報收集

考 備	計	長		機											
		所 張 出 部 支	部	本											
人員、概數、卜、高等官、記、又	約 九 〇 名	西貢出張所	泰 支 部	馬 來 支 部	經 理 班	軍 事 班	兵 器 支 材 班	政 務 班	軍 事 班	情 報 班	副 官 部	參 謀 部	區 分 (配 置)	任 務	要 員 (高 等)
		佛印 = 於ケル印度人關係 政務及軍事、連絡援助	泰ニ於ケル軍事及政務連絡並援助	馬來 = 於ケル軍事及政務 連絡並ニ援助	經理業務	印度國民軍、醫務連絡援助	兵器、資材、補給、管理輸送	假政府卜、連絡並ニ援助業務	印度國民軍卜、連絡並ニ援助業務	情報、收集、整理、審查	人事功績業務、一般庶務	企劃、實施指導 主要對外折衝、編成、人事	企劃、實施指導 主要對外折衝、編成、人事	將校約四名 文官約四名	將校約三名
		文官約四名	將校約二名	將校約三名	文官約二名	將校約五名	文官約六名	將校約二名	將校約二名	將校約二名	文官約七名	將校約二名	將校約二名	將校約二名	將校約二名

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
G-2, Japanese Intelligence Section
Tokyo, Japan

RESTRICTED

5 December 1945

REPORT ON JAPANESE NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SUBMITTED
20 NOVEMBER 1945 BY CAPTAIN OMAE, TOSHIKAZU, IJN,
JAPANESE NAVAL GENERAL STAFF.

This report was submitted in response to a written request, dated 6 November 1945, from the Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2. It is reproduced here in question and answer form.

THE WRITTEN REPORT FOLLOWS:

A. ORGANIZATION

Q. 1. What was the organization of Navy Intelligence? Include charts and tables showing organization and command relationships.

A. Table of organization is attached as Annex A.

Q. 2. To what extent were Naval Intelligence activities integrated with those of the Army? With government agencies? With Army Air Forces? With Naval Air Forces?

A. Army intelligence, including Air Intelligence, was usually available, but much of this information became available too late for use. All the reports concerning the Navy which were obtained from the army units during an operation were always sent to us. No information from any other government intelligence bureau was used for operations. Operational intelligence from the naval air units were put to the best use. (The above concerns only the extent to which operational intelligence was used.)

Q. 3. How many intelligence personnel were assigned each unit afloat? Officers? Enlisted?

A. In every important fleet there was stationed an Intelligence Staff Officer (a commander or lieutenant commander, and, in general, this was just an additional duty for a staff communications officer); under his supervision a communications intelligence group was organized (which ordinarily consisted of a chief, who was a lieutenant commander or lieutenant), 2 reserve officers, and several non-commissioned officers. A fleet below a division (sentai), however, was not generally equipped with such a group.

Q. 4. Describe in detail the organization of intelligence in the Naval Air Arm?

A. A Base Air Fleet was equipped with a communications intelligence group, almost the same as the more important fleets. Air Units below a base air division (sentai) were provided with certain personnel from a group, but a special communications intelligence group was not attached.

B. OPERATION - NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

Q. 1. Describe in detail the duties of Intelligence Officers, both Staff and in units afloat, including, in the Air Arm, briefing and interrogation of pilots, escape and evasion, technical intelligence, etc.

(JAP INTEL SUPP REF ITEM B.9)

RESTRICTED

- A. An intelligence staff officer combined and organized all intelligence data in order to estimate the situation.-----The intelligence officer of every ship (generally, by Captain's order, the Communications Officer held this post as additional duty) performed this duty, but of course he was inferior to a staff officer in his ability as a Communications Officer.-----
An air staff officer or an air officer made it a rule to discover and explain the situation of the arrival and departure of each plane or air unit, but he must maintain close liaison with an intelligence staff officer or intelligence officer.
- Q. 2. What were your sources of information? List in order of importance and reliability?

Information Channels

- A. (1) Search and reconnaissance by units during operations and reports collected by units in operation.
(2) Information directly collected by central intelligence facilities.
(3) Reports from officers resident in foreign countries.
(4) Information from communications sources.

The above mentioned information was combined and arranged in the 3rd Department of the Naval General Staff.

Other Information Sources

- (1) Statistical research of past experiences.
(2) Examination and analysis of public broadcasting in every part of the world.
(3) Documents and letters from enemy ships, airplanes, bodies of war dead and others.
(4) Prisoners of War.
(5) Material from Army and various information sources connected with the Navy.
(6) Informations from communications sources
(a) Variation in volume of traffic according to the statistical investigation.
(b) Change and deviation of cryptographic signs and symbols.
(c) Radar and R.D.F.

Evaluation of Information

Confirmed information was, of course, the most reliable, but each separate piece of information had to be examined carefully. The degree of reliability was as follows:

- (1) Enemy documents and letters.
(2) Combined statements of prisoners (the statement of individual prisoners must be confirmed carefully by other sources)
(3) Information from communications.
(4) Reports from public broadcasts and officers residing in foreign countries (these were often doubtful and had to be compared and judged.)
(5) Reports by units engaged in operations (these were exaggerated after the middle of 1942, and their judgment caused much trouble.)

(My standards of evaluation were as follows: In cases of attacks on shipping, I took into consideration the type of target, the amount and weight of shells expended, the general attack situation and the reliability of the witnesses.

My evaluation of damage or losses sustained by shipping was ordinarily in the neighborhood of 50% of reported damage, or losses. My evaluation for losses reported in the case of airplanes was 50% (when the total reported shot down was 10 or below) 33 1/3% for losses estimated from 10 to 50 and 25% for 50 planes or above. In my opinion, even after these deductions, the reports were still exaggerated.)

- (6) Information from army sources was generally exaggerated, and, particularly, reports of results were quite unreliable. If they were not examined carefully, they might prove quite misleading.

Disposal of Information

- (1) After deciphering a message, the officer sent the important messages, without making a clean copy, to his seniors concerned.
- (2) When clean copies of general information were made, they were distributed to those who were interested, with such related information as necessary.
- (3) When it was necessary to disseminate intelligence, the staff officer was required to send his dispatch for investigation, together with correlated information, to the chief of staff and his highest senior.
- (4) Disseminated intelligence was arranged and kept by a communications staff officer and communication officer.
- (5) At specified intervals or according to the quantity of information, combined intelligence studies were always made.

Distribution of Information

Dissemination of information for the navy at large was handled by the 3rd department of the Naval General Staff. Ship units were serviced by local fleet headquarters.

The 1st department of the Naval General Staff might also transmit such information connected with important operations.

Regarding distribution of important information, the 1st department and 2nd department of the Naval General Staff consulted with each other beforehand, but only in urgent cases, was there mutual exchange.

Estimate of Situation

- (1) Our judgments were based upon a statistical research of past experience together with various other intelligence and estimates of damage, loss, and the possibility of repairs. In addition, communications intelligence sources supplied us with valuable data concerning damage, loss, and repair. BAMS statistical research was also very useful in the estimation of army strength.
- (2) American losses were assessed after the careful examination of reports from individual attacking units.
- (3) American operational and strategic planning was studied in the light of investigation of all sources and materials outlined above. In addition, the following factors were considered: the world situation, America's preparations for the operation, the development of the war situation, the influence of astronomical and meteorological phenomena, the character of the American commanders, the personnel participating in the conferences prior to the operation, time, the speeches and actions of important Americans.

U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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Accordingly, by observing the preliminary actions of American units, for example, submarine activity, air recon, agents landed by submarines and so on, we could estimate the operational objective; on the basis of readiness for combat and the concentration of military units, we could determine the time of the operation and, in general, estimate the enemy plans. We based our judgment on the above method, always weighing the additional available intelligence data from communications sources.

Q. 6. What was the procedure used in extracting information from:

(1) U.S. Prisoners of War? — Answer unknown.

(2) Captured documents? — Answer: these were examined by the Central Bureau. Important matters were reported at once, and afterwards they were carefully examined and distributed as ordinary information.

(3) Natives — Answer unknown.

Q. 7. To what extent did German intelligence on Allied or U.S. Air Forces and equipment aid the Japanese? Was any other German intelligence useful to you?

A. It is said that German technical reports were used to good advantage but details are unknown.

Q. 8. What provision was made for analyzing captured equipment, including crashed aircraft? How was such information used? How was it disseminated?

A. If important material, necessary to the coming operation or fighting was discovered, the unit which discovered it was required to inform every activity concerned. According to the provisions of the Central Department orders regarding the disposal of the material, we always had it removed and examined by specialists. On such investigations, the Central Department made a report and submitted it to military units, government offices, government factories and so on.

Q. 9. Did you gain any useful intelligence through capture of any U.S. mail? From letters or diaries taken from bodies of U.S. officers or men or from Prisoners of War?

A. We have never heard about any case in which we obtained material from American mail, nor have we ever heard of any case in which letters and diaries were obtained from planes shot down. Many official documents, however, were obtained from sources other than these.

Q. 10. Describe sources of information in arriving at the Japanese estimate of U.S. order of battle and enclose copy of estimate as of December 1941 and also estimate as of 1 August 1945.

A. Information which these estimates were originally based upon no longer exist. (Situation estimate for 1 June 1945 was, however, loaned to USSBS Japanese Intelligence Section).

C. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONS PERFORMED ABOARD FLEET UNITS.

Q. 1. Large Combat Aircraft Carriers (CV)

(a) What were the sources of information which provided data used in briefing pilots prior to attacks on land targets, combattant and merchant ship targets? Describe type, volume and usefulness of the information received from each source.

- (b) Who did the briefing of pilots?
 - (c) How was information secured from pilots on completion of an attack mission. Who interrogated them?
 - (d) Describe procedure in evaluating and disseminating information received from pilots on completion of an attack mission.
 - (e) Provide copies of all report forms used by aircraft carrier air groups for the reporting of post-attack information.
 - (f) Were ship or air group personnel assigned on a full time basis exclusively to intelligence duties? On a part time basis? Describe their duties, qualifications, training and usefulness.
- A.
- (a) In case of group attack, necessary orders were given according to aerial photographs taken beforehand and available maps were distributed. In case of attacking battleships or merchant ships, our formation of plans was determined by available reconnaissance reports. The composition of enemy forces was determined by judging all reports available which America had made public.
 - (b) Staff Air Officer or Air Officer.
 - (c) Same as (b)
 - (d) After examining the report of every one of the flight personnel and checking it for contradictory and unlikely statements, the Staff Air Officer or Air Officer estimated its merits and informed the departments concerned of its important points.
 - (e) No standard type of report form was used.
 - (f) A designated officer was engaged in arrangement of reports and making records as an important additional duty, but the qualifications and training for these duties are not known.

Q. 2. Small Carriers (CVE)

- (a) Provide information (a) through (f) requested in par 1 above with respect to small carriers.
- A.
- (a) Small carriers did not differ from large carriers in respect to questions (a) through (f) of par 1.

Q. 3. Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers:

- (a) Were officers assigned to full, or part time intelligence duties aboard:
 - (1) Battleships
 - (2) Cruisers
 - (3) Destroyers

If so, what were their qualifications, training and duties?

- (b) What were the sources of information used for:
 - (1) Current operational purposes
 - (2) For long term planning

Aboard

- (a) Battleships
- (b) Cruisers
- (c) Destroyers

(c) Describe the operation of the Communication Intelligence Unit aboard Battleships, Cruisers, Destroyers with regard to Number and training of personnel (officer and enlisted men) assigned, sources of information, volume and reliability of information, method of dissemination of information.

A. (a) All of these kinds of ships were equipped with intelligence officers who had this as additional duty similar to the case of the aircraft carrier, but we have never heard details as to their qualifications and training.

(b) There were the following intelligence sources:


(1) The objective of the immediate operation was clearly shown in operational orders of the higher commands.

(2) Long term planning

No information was obtained by battle-ships, cruisers or destroyers except those which were so instructed by the orders of the Imperial Headquarters and combined Fleet.

(c) A radio intelligence group was not assigned to ordinary ships because of the shortage of personnel. A communications officer was usually made responsible for the making up and submitting of reports. No special personnel were assigned to this duty, and no particular training was given to officers exercising this function. Radio communications themselves were handled by a special duty group and other communications units. No reliable material was available in respect to the amount or reliability of radio intelligence information.

Means of submission of reports:



D. FLEET STAFF INTELLIGENCE

Q. 1. For each echelon of command in the Fleet from Fleet Headquarters down to but not including individual ship units, please provide the following information:

(a) Intelligence functions

(b) Who performed these functions.

(c) How many officers and men were assigned to full and/or part time intelligence duties with Fleet Staffs in each echelon of Command?

(d) What special training did they receive and where were they trained?

(e) What were their sources of information? Describe each as to usefulness and reliability.

(f) What was the nature of the reporting system for dissemination of information regarding:

- (1) Current operational information
- (2) Reports of engagements with Allied Forces.

The officers responsible for the collection and dissemination of intelligence were either staff intelligence officers, or staff communications officers (who were assigned intelligence functions as additional duty). Such officers were attached to the headquarters of the Combined Fleet, Area Fleets and Air Fleets.

Esxcepting for the training program for higher course students of the Naval Communications School, no particular training was given, even to officers of the regular navy. The special knowledge concerning intelligence was acquired by the officers themselves from available materials. Reserve officers were given a basic training course of four (4) months at the Naval Communications School. Petty Officers and non-rated men were put through a six (6) months ordinary course and a six (6) months higher course in addition to their ordinary training period. These courses were given at the YOKOSUKA Naval Communications School.

The number of officers and men assigned a Fleet Headquarters intelligence group is shown below:

Fleet Level Intelligence Organization

Tactical Assignment	Staff Intel- ligence Off.	Officers Reserve O.	Special Duty Officer and Warrant O.	Non-com- missioned Petty O's and men
Combined Fleet Headquarters	1 (specia- list)	3	1	35
Southwestern Area Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)	15	15	270
Note: specialists devote themselves to this single assignment				
Middle Pacific Area Fleet Hqs	1 (additional)	10	10	250
Southeastern Area Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)	10	3	170
China Areas Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)	10	5	150
Northeastern Area Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)	8	3	100
Air Fleet Headquar- ters	1 (additional)	3	2	35
Other Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)	2	1	15
Air Attack Force Headquarters	1 (additional)	2	1	15
Surface Escort Fleet Headquarters	1 (additional)		1	15

Remarks: The number of this list shows the standard complement; this temporarily increased or decreased according to the operation.

Sources of intelligence used by the personnel included radio intelligence material supplied by special duty groups and by individual communications units, together with additional material obtained by various other types of intelligence channels for reference.

The degree of reliability of intelligence was impossible to estimate but generally speaking, reliability was assessed at about 60%.

As for the dissemination of available information regarding current operations, the TOKYO Communications Unit were responsible for broadcasting important operational intelligence and combat reports concerning the entire ocean areas to the whole Navy, while the local communications units were responsible for broadcasting items concerning their own localities to their own local units. Every headquarters was responsible for submitting combined intelligence to the units under its command.

E. ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTI AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, METHODS AND ANTI AIRCRAFT GUN POSITIONS.

- Q. 1. What information was given aviators regarding U.S. anti-aircraft weapons and methods, and locating anti-aircraft gun positions?
- Q. 2. How was this information secured?
- Q. 3. Were personnel assigned on full or part time basis to the task of collecting and analyzing data on U.S. anti-aircraft weapons and their location?
- Q. 4. Enclose available manuals, charts, or documents used in this work.
- A. 1. Information was made available to aviators by means of aerial photographs and studies of previous experience showing density and effectiveness of gun fire.
- A. 2. This information was secured by aerial photographic reconnaissance and records of past reconnaissance and attacks. No mathematical calculations were made as to density of gun fire according to course or altitude.
- A. 3. No personnel were assigned particularly for this purpose.
- A. 4. No materials were supplied.

F. EFFECTIVENESS

- Q. 1. How successful and accurate was the Naval Intelligence organization in making periodic estimates of:
 - (a) Allied and U.S. Air Strength?
 - (b) Location and composition of U.S. Naval Forces and Ground Forces?
 - (c) U.S. capabilities?
 - (d) U.S. intentions?
- A. (a) The approximate strength of American and Allied Air Power in the Pacific was judged by the published reports of airplane production and the allotment ratio for the Pacific Coast areas.

The base air power was estimated by the potential capacity of individual air bases. Number of carrier and sea plane tender based aircraft was estimated by the capacity of the ships. We found from experience in operations that our estimates were not greatly off the mark.

- (b) Information regarding the operational ability of the American Army was obtained through our general knowledge of America's war policy. Our senior personnel felt that the overall strategy of the American army was to reduce casualties as much as possible in so far as tactical situation permitted. These plans had been evaluated almost entirely correctly since the Solomons operation. Large troop movements were generally known beforehand, as were amphibious landings, with the exception of the surprise landing at Guadalcanal. For example, we had made preparations based on our belief that Iwo Jima would be attacked about January and Okinawa about March.

Situation and Organization of U. S. Naval and Ground Strength

According to information published, the estimation of newly built ships was clarified and added to the power already possessed. Thus we estimated the total strength. The present strength was estimated when the actual loss was subtracted from the total strength according to combat reports.

Estimates necessary to operations were provided as follows:

ESTIMATES OF U.S. NAVAL STRENGTH AS OF FIRST PART OF MAY 1945

Main Surface Forces.				
	End of May	End of June	End of July	End of August
Aircraft Carriers	<u>13</u> 26	<u>20</u> 27	<u>25</u> 28	<u>26</u> 28
Escort Carriers	<u>58</u> 75	<u>64</u> 80	<u>70</u> 85	<u>74</u> 89
Battleships	<u>20</u> 21	<u>21</u> 22	<u>23</u> 23	<u>24</u> 24
Cruisers	<u>16</u> 49	<u>25</u> 56	<u>35</u> 64	<u>36</u> 64
Destroyers	<u>209</u> 289	<u>228</u> 308	<u>244</u> 324	<u>254</u> 331

1. This chart is based on the figures announced by America at the end of April and as further affected by "TEN" operations. The denominator indicates ships on hand and numerator the ships available for use against JAPAN.
2. In regard to ships believed damaged or sunk the most pessimistic view was taken and aircraft carriers were considered only badly damaged while escort carriers were considered as half being sunk and half as being damaged.
3. In regard to badly damaged ships it was considered that half could be made ready for action in two to three months and half in from three to four months.
4. It was considered that the new carrier ANTIETAM would be ready for action at the end of June, the TARAWA at the end of July and the BOXER at the end of August. The SARATOGA and RANGER were believed to be used for training and not included.
5. In the figures for ships on hand, vessels loaned to BRITAIN and ships lost before the OKINAWA operation are included.

ESTIMATES OF U. S. ARMED STRENGTH

Classification	End of April	End of May	End of June	End of July	End of August
A Infantry Division	$\frac{43}{90}$	$\frac{44}{90}$	$\frac{44}{90}$	$\frac{53}{90}$	$\frac{70}{90}$
R Armored Division	$\frac{4}{22}$	$\frac{4}{22}$	$\frac{5}{22}$	$\frac{7}{22}$	$\frac{10}{22}$
M Air Transport Division	$\frac{2}{10}$	$\frac{2}{10}$	$\frac{2}{10}$	$\frac{3}{10}$	$\frac{4}{10}$
Cavalry Division	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
Total	$\frac{50}{134}$	$\frac{51}{134}$	$\frac{52}{134}$	$\frac{64}{134}$	$\frac{85}{134}$
Marine Division	$\frac{5}{10}$	$\frac{6}{10}$	$\frac{7}{10}$	$\frac{7}{10}$	$\frac{3}{10}$
Total	$\frac{57}{144}$	$\frac{59}{144}$	$\frac{61}{144}$	$\frac{71}{144}$	$\frac{95}{144}$

1. This list was made according to the following supposition:

(a) After May, every month 2 divisions were sent by reinforcement from America to the operation against Japan.

(b) Out of 60 divisions on the European front, about half were sent at present for the same purpose.

The No. of times and order	Strength number of Divisions	Departure from Europe (Date)	Arrival at Philippines Area (date)	The completion of Operation
1	About 10	Middle and end of May	Till the end of July	End of August
2	About 20	June	Till the end of August	End of Sept

Note: The necessary amount of equipment for the transferred strength and necessary munitions for the operation were sent to the Philippines directly from American Homeland.

2. In the strength at the end of every month, the denominator shows the whole strength possessed, while the numerator shows the strength allotted to the operation against Japan.

ESTIMATES OF U.S. AND ALLIED AIR STRENGTH (PACIFIC AREA) AS OF MAY 45

REGIONS		End of May	End of June	End of July	End of August	End of September
Northern Part	Alaska	400	400	400	400	400
	Alcutian-Is	300	300	300	300	300
Middle Pacific	Ellise, Gil- bert & Samoa Areas	300	150	150	150	150
	Marshall Is	200	200	300	200	200
	Marianna Is	850	1000	1000	1000	1000
	Palilieu)	250	250	250	250	250
	Ulithye)	275	500	500	500	500
	Iwo Jima	800	800	900	1200	1500
	Transport Planes	200	200	200	200	200
Philippines	1850	2150	3100	4100	5100	
Southwestern Islands	240	500	600	650	870	
New Gui- nea and Austra- lian Areas	East New Guinea	400	300	300	300	300
	West New Guinea	750	600	600	600	600
	Australia	250	250	250	250	250
South Pacific	Solomon Is	200	200	200	200	200
	New Caledonia) and Espiritu) Santo)	300	300	300	300	300
	Fiji	100	100	100	100	100
	New Zealand	100	100	100	100	100
India and Burma Areas	1000	1000	1500	2000	2000	
China	American Air Unit	700	700	700	800	800
	American and Chinese Combined Unit	150	150	150	150	150
Transport Airplanes Between India and China	400	400	400	400	400	
Fleet Air Power	3500	3600	3700	3800	3800	
TOTAL	13515	14150	16000	17850	19370	

Remarks: A portion of Allied air power from the European theatre was expected in the Pacific by the end of July.

SECRET

ESTIMATE OF ALLIED AIRCRAFT EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE IN FINAL BATTLE FOR JAPAN

Area Date	Marianna Islands	Iwo Jima	Southwestern Islands	Philippines Area
End of May	B-29 x 650 B-24 x 50 PB4Y x 20 fc x 80 Shipborne Planes x 100	B-29 x 40 (Forced landing) P-51 x 200 P-61 x 25 Others x 10	P-47) x 100 P-51) Shipborne planes x 100 PV x 20 Unidenti- fied x 40	(P-47 P-61 fc(P-51 F6F x 900 (P-38 F4U B-24 x 450 PB4Y x 100 PV x 50 B-25 x 200 A-20 x 100 Others x 50
	Total: 800	Total: 275	Total: 240	Total: 1850
End of June	B-29 x 700 Others the same as above	B-29 x 50 B-24 x 150 P-51 x 250 P-61 x 30 Others x 10	P-47) P-51) x 250 P-61) Shipborne aircraft x 100 B-24 x 50 PV x 20 Unidenti- fied x 40	fc x 1000 fb x 1100 (B-29 x 150 in- cluded) Others x 50
	Total: 850	Total: 500	Total: 460	Total: 2150
End of July	B-29 x 850 Others the same as above	The same as above	P-47) P-51) x 300 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 150 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40	fc x 2000 fb x 600 (B-29 x 300, in- cluded B-17, B-24 increased 70. except those items same as above.) Others x 50
	Total: 1000		Total: 600	Total: 2150
End of August	The same as above	The same as above, B-24 may take place of B-29	P-47) P-51) x 300 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 200 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40	fc x 2000 fb x 2000 (B-29 x 400 in- cluded, others the same as above) Others x 100
			Total: 650	Total: 4100
End of September	The same as above	The same as above	P-47) P-51) x 400 P-61) Shipborne planes x 100 B-24 x 300 PV x 30 Unidenti- fied x 40	fc x 2500 fb x 2000 (B-29 x 500 in- cluded others the same as above Others X 100
			Total: 870	Total: 5100

G. AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHY AND RECONNAISSANCE

Q. 1. To what extent did the Japanese Navy rely on photographic intelligence?

2. Comment on its effectiveness.
3. Describe the method of securing and disseminating photographic intelligence.
4. How many squadrons were engaged exclusively in this work?
5. How many planes were assigned to such squadrons?
6. Comment on Japanese aerial reconnaissance stating number of aircraft engaged in this work, its effectiveness, method of exchange of information between aircraft and their bases. Enclose copies of Search Sector plans for each stage of the War (each campaign).
7. Describe the procedure followed in taking action on sightings reported by reconnaissance aircraft.

- A. 1. The Japanese Navy tried to make the best possible use of photographic intelligence, but could not carry the program out effectively because of the general failure of aerial fighting power and a bad custom of making light of reconnaissance before the war.
2. Until the middle of 1943, effective and successful use was made of reconnaissance, but afterwards results were very poor, owing to the shortage of trained observer personnel.
3. The reconnaissance plane group always took photographs and processed them, distributing copies to the units concerned. The Southeastern Area Fleet was equipped with a photographic section about August 1943.
4. A reconnaissance plane group was attached to each air group. A fleet, accompanied by aircraft tenders, was equipped with about 30 reconnaissance planes.
5. A reconnaissance air group normally consisted of "SAIUN" (Myrt) for operations. 32 planes were planned as complement, but in practice the number was usually much smaller.
6. At the outbreak of the war the Imperial Navy, for a comparatively long time, used land type attack planes, Type 97 (Kate), and large flying boats (Emily) together with seaplanes based on the large warships, and carrier planes. It was found, however, that the performance of these types was poor, which led to the development of specialized reconnaissance planes of high performance. Carrier reconnaissance planes and "SAIUN" (Myrt) for land based use were developed. The "SAIUNS" (Myrts) were at first attached to the First Air Fleet and had been highly esteemed since the Mariannas operation. The quota for "SAIUN" (Myrt) planes was filled only by April 1945, but the planes' actual maintenance record, at the time of the Okinawa operation, was very poor, only 8 out of 32 planes on the average standing up through the continued operations. It may be said from the outbreak of the war until its termination the Imperial Navy was suffering from a shortage of reconnaissance planes.

"SAIUN" (Myrt) could maintain almost the same speed as enemy fighters at a height of 5,000 meters, but maintenance was poor.

A Type 2 large flying boat (Emily), Type 1 land attack plane, (SHIDEN—George) and Type 100 (SHITEI) were used to compensate for the shortage of the SAIUN (Myrt) type and a Type 2 flying boat (Emily) and Type 1 land attack plane (Betty) were equipped with radar. Considering their performance, they proved useful as night reconnaissance planes.

"SHIDEN" (George) owing to a lack of communications facilities and Type 100 (SHITEI), owing to its weakness as an overwater plane, were chiefly used for close distance reconnaissance.

7. Regarding communications, reconnaissance planes exchanged information with its base and with Centra Hqs by radio. After a sighting the reconnaissance plane would make the following reports:

- (a) First report -- type of enemy forces, position and time.
- (b) Second report -- warships by types, number, formation, course, speed and weather.

At night friendly forces are often guided by dropping parachute flares or transmitting on long wave circuits.

The radius of the various types of reconnaissance planes used were as follows:

(1) SAIUN (Myrt)	550	nautical miles
(2) Type 2 large flying boat (Emily)	800	" "
(3) Type 1 land attack plane (Betty)	650	" "
(4) Type 2 KANTEI (warships recon plane)	350	" "
(5) SHIDEN George)	200	" "
(6) Type 100 SHITEI	350	" "

H. GENERAL

- Q. 1. What were the outstanding accomplishments of Japanese Naval Intelligence immediately prior to and during the war?
2. At what stage or stages of the War do you consider Japanese Naval Intelligence was most effective? i.e. Aleutians? Solomons? Bismarck Sea? New Guinea? Marshalls? Mariannas? Phillipines? Iwo-Okinawa? etc? At what time or times was it poorest? Reasons?

- A. 1. The Japanese Naval Intelligence organization contributed greatly to the Japanese War effort by effective work based upon materials on hand and developed.

As there were no secret Japanese organizations in Allied or neutral countries it was impossible to render greater services.


Serious obstacles often stood in the way of carrying out intelligence functions as a result of weaknesses in operational intelligence organization as well as in reconnaissance activities.

2. We cannot tell exactly which was the most effective period of Japanese Intelligence functions. Reconnaissance activity, however, was most effective in the opening phases of the war and contributed to the overall contribution of intelligence.

ANNEX A:

I. ORGANIZATION

Flow Chart--Japanese Naval Intelligence



Key:
 - - - - - Denoting Intelligence Relation
 _____ Intelligence Channel
 = = = = = Combined Intelligence Channels