

YOKOYAMA, YUI (2281)

10

(66)

SECRET

NAME: YOKOYAMA, Yui.

PRESENT STATUS: Confined in Sugamo Prison.

SUMMARY OF INFORMATION:

One of the most mysterious figures in the whole field of Japanese pre-war intrigue; member of the Kempei Tai; on intimate terms with many high Japanese Government officials; never had visible means of support, yet spent money lavishly; persons close to him speak with awe of his influence and power among military, political and governmental officials; believed to be the "master spy"; took part in conspiracy against China in the 1930's; friendly with Stahmer, Ex-Premier HIROTA, et al; self-styled "civilian diplomat"; member, Genyosha (Black Ocean Society); founder, Civilian Information Bureau.

REMARKS:

Positive information now in hand is not conclusive that SUBJECT is a Class A suspect. However, his pre-war intrigue and close association with high officials of government, politics and military should not be overlooked until it is fully determined the extent and reasons behind his activities. No recommendations regarding the final disposition of SUBJECT have been received from CIS/G-2, FEC.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SUBJECT be retained in custody as a Class A war criminal suspect for further investigation.

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SECRET

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**GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND**

**CHECK SHEET**

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No:

Subject: Unindicted Major War Crimes Suspect

Note  
No.

From: SGS

To: Chief, Legal Section,  
SCAP

Date: 1 Apr 1947


1

1. Reference is made to checknote from Chief of Staff to Chief, Legal Section, SCAP, dated 1 April 1947, subject: "Unindicted Major War Crimes Suspects."

2. Attached is petition on behalf of Yokoyama Yui which was presented by his Legal Counsellor.

3. It is desired the Legal Section review the case of Yokoyama Yui and submit recommendation to the Chief of Staff at the earliest practicable date.

Incl

L.A.D. 

Unindicted Major War Crimes Suspect

SGS

Chief, Legal Section,  
SCAP

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100 Nakaharacho, Isogoku,  
Yokohama,  
25 March 1947.

To the Authorities Concerned,  
General Headquarters,  
For the Allied Powers,  
Tokyo.

PETITION  
For War-Criminal Suspect  
YOKOYAMA YUI  
By His Legal Counsellor  
OKAI TOSHIRO

Dear Sirs:

The post-bellum Japan is found freely tossed and shaken up, driven into ceaseless struggles, by the abhorrent influence of communism, with every dangerous possibility of eventually being turned into a terribly despotic country of totalitarianism. The Japanese are ever thinking of nothing but struggling. They are under the misimpression as if to struggle were to be democratically free. There is nothing to be wondered at, in these circumstances, that they should be falling easy preys to communism.

The prevailing condition in Korea and China reminds us of the necessity of at least Japan standing immune to such influences, if the United States of America would win success in its efforts for establishment of the peaceful world of nations in line with its Christianity. To the realization of American grand ideals, nothing can be more essential than the real democratization of Japan. In view of the present condition of Korea and China, Japan ought to be the last bulwark against such a noxious influence. In other words, Japan stands now on the parting way of totalitarianism and Christianity.

The United States cannot be idle even a moment. In Western Europe, the time-honoured British influence is fast crumbling, and America is obliged in consequence to take over the British duties for protection of freedom and independence in that part of the world. Japan should not then be depending too much on America at this moment. She ought at least to strive to accomplish her democratization unaided as far as possible and thus to minimize the anxiety of America and the world in general.

In so doing, however, Japan finds one drawback to face, and that, of a most serious nature, too, namely, the poverty of proper characters equal to the task. As was more than once mentioned by this petitioner in his past representations, General Douglas MacArthur had an occasion, during the latest war, to make a most truthful remark, that he had no need of fearing the Japanese leaders. In fact Japan has well-nigh passed the 2nd year since the dawn of her new era, but she still remains without any reliable

leaders among her people. The General himself must have seen that neither the Liberal nor the Progressive Party has any worthy leaders. These Parties are believed to form the most moderate and mean political influence in Japan, responsible for the real democratization of the country against communism, and yet such is their actual condition. We should not be surprised, then, if Japan finds her democratization anything but an easy task.

As a matter of fact, almost all those posing themselves as leaders are selfish, soft-headed and incompetent. They have got no brains solid enough to conceive of anything amounting to a masterpiece. Even if they do conceive one, they fail to put it into effect. They do not know the importance of studying how to bring their plan into force, thus leaving it little better than the castle in the air. Japan's cancer is the incompetency of her politicians. This is no question of Japan alone but that of all the world. Japan's political circles are literally full of such incompetents, and offer in consequence a fertile soil for communistic rampancy.

The only exceptional existence among the Japanese politicians is Yokoyama, whose talents are heaven-given as those of Gladstone. Not only that, these talents he combines with a genius for collecting information, which has, as the writer has often pointed out, so much to do with one's brain-activities. He is so well acquainted with the national and international conditions that he might fairly be regarded as the eyes of the world.

It is now the common sense of all that "Japanese Communists are subsidized by Soviets". But that much information could never serve any practical ends. It must be more precise and practical to be of any use as information. In the case of Yokoyama, such information will be penetrated so as to pull out who got what amount of money from what Soviet agent, and that how and where. Such precise information he would gain direct from the very person who engaged in such traffic. As with that sort of affairs, so with any other matters. This is why he is the unique newsman. But such a knack it is not for everybody to possess. Few others could equal him in the matter. He is never wanting in the proper network of information, whereas he plans and acts quick as thought with his unrivalled foresight and insight. Thus it is that whatever he proposes he accomplishes sure as fate, be it a matter of intelligence or politics.

In fighting Communism, Yokoyama would in that way grasp the total picture of communists' activities in Japan and work out his ingenious plan of forestalling their close operations. This serene feat neither the Conservatives nor the Socialists can show, and the consequence is the perpetual commotion of the country under conflicting political influences. What is worse still, the gen-

eral public here are misregarding such a restless state of affairs as homogeneous with democracy and freedom.

It is a serious matter, indeed, that Japan was defeated in the latest war, but a matter of infinitely greater gravity is the growing possibility of its getting defeated in the thought-campaign. Certainly shuddering would be the aftermath, once Japan that still stands geopolitically and historically in a senior's position among the Asiatics, were to yield under the pressure of totalitarianism.

With an overwhelming population struggling for livelihood in a territory so narrow, Japan is most freely open to communistic invasion. One of the shortcuts to realization of such a world peace as America aspires to establish in the interest of all, must, under the above circumstances, be sought in the earliest possible release of Yokoyama, an idealistic realist, with Christian faith, who knows how to deal with Communists here and how to play political game as a living, actual matter. Japan lacks competent leaders so entirely now that but for his participation, its democratization might, if attained at all, turn out flimsy.

With the line of production falling, and tendency of inflation rising, the situation in Japan is fraught with every possibility of graver outburst. It is with these circumstances as background that the forthcoming general election is to be performed. Not only that, but the people at large, the very electors, are, as a matter of truth, little acquainted with the real meaning of freedom and democracy. All these circumstantial features cannot be but offer the Communists and Totalitarians a golden opportunity for their activities, open and otherwise, with every advantage and confidence. The danger of whole Japan being pulled about at the mercy of Communist candidates in the election comes not so much from their numerical strength - their number must be minor - as from their well-trained election speeches. It would be but a slip from the consequent confusion of national thought to the reestablishment, in whatever form it may be, of despotism. Against all such dreadful possibilities, none of the Japanese politicians of the present day have got any card to show. They do not know how to stalemate their opponents. Thus it is that just the scene upon which Yokoyama should make his appearance.

Before bringing this petition to a close, the writer begs to call your attention to a most unfortunate episode at Yokoyama's home, which, from a personal point of view, forms an additional condition that renders the present appeal at once urgent and imperative. I mean to refer to the hopeless condition of Yokoyama's younger sister who, after several months' confinement for illness, has now been diagnosed as suffering from an advanced cancer, and as not expected to live. Her name is Owari and her age is 49 years. She has been living at her elder brother's (Yokoyama's) home for years past, helping and helped by each other. He regarded her as if she were his daughter, and she held him in affectionate esteem as, if he were her father. And since his imprisonment she has never been well, but has been fast losing her vitality until recently

when she took to bed at last. She is waiting at home her turn of surgical operation at Juzen Hospital in Yokohama.

According to the Doctors, her cancer is so far advanced that she is not to live whether she undergoes operation or not. Her days are now numbered. If she enters hospital, she can never return home alive. Cancer being regarded in Japan as a fatal disease, the Japanese custom is to keep it secret from its patient. In the case of Yokoyama's sister, not only herself but her brother at Sugamo are not informed what her disease is. Such being the actual situation, if Yokoyama can hold out the hope for your mercy of release, the earlier he is made to return home, the more gratefully satisfied will be not only the poor brother and sister, but all their family people, their friends and acquaintances. Their unanimous hearty prayer naturally is that Yokoyama may be released, if at all, in time just for rendering his little service to Japan before it is thrown in complete chaos beyond all hopes, and for seeing the last of his dear sister still alive at his home where they shared residence for years, and this in that very room facing their favourite beautiful garden, instead of at the cold hospital bed or after she has breathed her last. Otherwise, any notice of his release might be received with less delight and much disappointment, like a masterpiece lacking the last crowning stroke of finishing touch. It is most sincerely hoped that Yokoyama may be set free, if at all, at this supremacy of his home-life, so that he may get the notice with extreme gratitude and special gratification. A delicious dinner might be more deliciously appreciated if served when the stomach is empty. If mercy is to be given at all, it had better be given at the right moment when it may be received with the greatest delight. Americans are known to like pleasing others. In Japan, those who do not smoke themselves seldom carry cigarettes with them but in America, as I understand, even the non-smokers will carry cigarettes with them to serve others when opportunity offers. This kindness of Americans is common, but hard for other peoples to follow into practice.

Yokoyama always talks of the present realities of the world as confrontation between the two camps of Christianity and Communism. Being an incarnation of peace cause and the past-master of information about the world's general trend, Yokoyama is convinced that there is no way for Japan to live but depending on and cooperating with the United States, and that otherwise there can be found no surest way to the real peace of the world.

Through your special clemency and benevolence it is sincerely petitioned under these circumstances that his release may be effected so that his farewell meeting with his sister may be made at his own home, and his poor sister may breathe her last with gratitude and gratification for meeting her brother in time,-- and what is more important still,-- so that all people knowing or not knowing him, may be delighted at his release in time for his participation in Japan's national democratization and in establishment of the global peace.



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With sincerest entreaty for his release, and that, at this  
supreme moment of his country and his home, to crown your stroke  
of real divine mercy, I remain,

Most obediently yours,

Toshiro Okai,  
Attorney-at-law for Yokoyama Yui.

Isogomachi, Kanagawa-ken,  
August 6, '46.

His Excellency,  
Gen. Douglas MacArthur,  
Supreme Commander, For  
Allied Powers, Tokyo.

Your Excellency:

Being well acquainted with Yui Yokoyama, now in Sugamo Prison, as a war criminal suspect, I beg most humbly to take this opportunity of venturing to tender to Your Excellency a petition in the shape of the enclosed Representation, in the presumptuous, yet nevertheless sincere hope, that he may be released in the near future, through Your Excellency's benevolence, provided his examinations conducted during the past 7 months, reveal no sign of any grave offence.

I do not pretend to any precise knowledge about what he did but I can, without the least exaggeration and impropriety, assure Your Excellency that I do know what he meant in doing what he did. In the representation in question, therefore, an attempt has been made to give something of a character sketch about the suspect, so as to throw a proper light on his personality and thus to furnish to Your Excellency's competent, judicial authorities a most practical and referential information that might make a solid basis for comprehending what he did.

With sincere apologies for trespassing on Your Excellency's valuable time, and with highest respects, I have the honour to remain,

Your Excellency's obedient servant,

Toshiro Okai

100, Nakamura-machi, Isogo-ku,  
YOKOHAMA,  
August 26th, 1946.

His Excellency,  
Gen. D. MacArthur,  
Supreme Commander,  
For Allied Powers,  
TOKYO.

Your Excellency:

In a humble petition which this humble servant took the liberty of tendering to Your Excellency under date of August 6th, 1946, on behalf of Yui Yokoyama, a war criminal suspect now in Sugamo Prison, an attempt was made, as one of his intimate friends, to give a character sketch of the prisoner.

And it is hoped the Representation served, as it was intended, to add to the basic information required by Your Excellency's competent authorities concerned, for formulating their final conclusions on the nature and significance of what the prisoner said and did, - conclusions indeed, at once fair and true. For one's words and even deeds might deceive observers, but one's character does not and cannot, as it most perceivably forms one's own very being and faith.

What is no less eloquent than character is a rational combination of facts.

Yokoyama was detained in the Metropolitan Police Office during a period of some 8 months from January 18th to August 20th in 1945 on a charge of having been attempting to prevent the prosecution of the Japanese authorities' warring policy. He was released right after the Japanese surrender on the ground that "there was no more need of detaining him".

Yokoyama is well known among his friends and acquaintances for his theory and policy advocating Sino-Japanese friendship. This was why he succeeded in bringing the Tsinan Affair to a speedy and satisfactory settlement as he accompanied Tokonami in 1929 as far as Nanking in quest of a happy agreement over that problem which the then Tanaka Cabinet failed to solve after its assiduous struggles of more than half a year.

His political conviction for upholding which nothing he daunted, was, as it always is, that there was no sporting chance for Japan in the Pacific War so long as the country continued its hostilities with China, and that but for Japan's remaining at war with China, that deplorable Pacific War itself could never have broken out at all.

In October 1942, when Yokoyama presented a Noh Dance in Tokyo, to introduce this peculiar Japanese play to foreign residents, he expressed his regret, without the least hesitation, to the Axis-Power representatives at the hostile condition in existence, and attributing it to inadequacy of mutual understanding among

nations, emphasized his anxiety for contributing his bit towards foreign cultural understanding of Japan through the proposed performance.

While interned in the Metropolitan Police Office because of his "suspected peace policy" Yokoyama instead of trying to fawn upon the authorities to get himself released as early as possible, had the courage of definitely stating, in his representation addressed to the then Justice Minister Dr. Matsusaka, from his prison, that all the endeavours he made since June 1943 for Soviet-Japanese understanding were by no means for facilitating Japan's war prosecution towards the favourable development of the hostilities, but solely for the sake of the world peace. I am sure that Your Excellency will readily see that such as what Yokoyama did is not what every other Japanese could do.

Putting even the above scanty facts together, there can be one and only one conclusion, that Yokoyama not only advocated a peace policy but pluckily fought for it, because he was against war, particularly against the Pacific War.

As was emphasized in my character sketch in the preceding Representation, Yokoyama is a man of peace and faith, and what is more, he was the only Japanese, for aught I know who attempted to practice that very policy and faith. This was of course no easy task. For to develop any peace move in a country where the whole nation is thrown into the crucible of hostilities, would require an art. Herein lies in a nutshell what he cudgelled his brain and what laid him open to misunderstandings alike by his own country and by foreign authorities.

During the wartime, the people here were divided into two groups, one clinging to the military leaders and blindly following them, and the other though longing for peace kept standing by as onlookers for lack of faith. This is why Japan plunged into the recent fatal hostilities and precipitated the whole nation into the present piteous plight at the more than meaningless sacrifice of international welfare.

Real war-criminals can thus be found in plenty among the upper classes advocating or pretending to advocate peace but placing themselves in either of the above-mentioned groups for want of faith and courage, unlike - and this is a big UNLIKE, too, - in the case of Yokoyama.

My constant regret is that I could not think of throwing away my own business to help Yokoyama in his adventurous struggles for peace during the wartime, - struggles which he kept up to the last, unaided and misunderstood.

Yokoyama might have seconded the recent war and cooperated for its prosecution, if he had been a man of no faith. But such a hypothesis as that would be no more practical and possible than assuming the rising of the sun in the west.

It is my sincere hope and trust, under the circumstances, that Your Excellency will be good enough to cause the authorities concerned to take due steps for an early release of the prisoner in appreciation of his character, and in sympathy with his peace struggles so faithfully maintained in disregard of his personal safety.

My petition is not only for his release, but for utilization of his future services after release in the cause of international peace and welfare. In view of his "Napoleonic energy and Gladstone's intellect" as Professor J. Bird had an occasion to remark in recommendation of Yokoyama, and in consideration of "much that he has done" as Mr. G. Madden, former Vice-President of the American Association of Tokyo emphasized in recommending him, "towards cementing the very cordial relationship between the United States and Japan". Yokoyama not only has such energies and intellect as thus recommended by his foreign friends, but combines them with a moral courage of peerless magnitude emanating from faith to the strength of which his wartime activities bear a most eloquent witness.

It need hardly be pointed out, that to employ the service of the faithless, in the establishment of peace would prove as risky as building up a temple on sand.

With humble apologies for trespassing on Your Excellency's valuable time for a second time with this sort of petty petition, and hoping that this second appeal may make the point in the preceding representation clearer and more appreciative, I have the honour to remain,

Your Excellency's humblest servant,

TOSHIRO OKAI

## YOKOYAMA YUI

The War Criminal Suspect, Yokoyama Yui, hails from Fukuoka Prefecture. From his youth upward to date, he has never neglected reading books and personal culture. He has never so much as touched one single book of utilitarianism or of machiavellism, always loving Japanese and foreign sages' books on truth, or else works on popular welfare and state administration. Thus he has realized Confucian benevolence, Christian love and Buddhistic mercy. The only thing he is in awe of is the Providence, the God. He fears nothing else in the world. As for that military clique leader Tojo, Yokoyama instead of loving him, hated him like poison. Attributing all to heaven's blessing, he makes it his life work to return it to heaven.

Most Japanese are opportunists. They lack faith. They would fawn upon the military men when the military clique is in power; would go over to the Communists, once they come out to the fore, and would side with the Conservatives, when Conservatism is found still surviving as an influence. The majority of even those Japanese who call themselves now "democrats" or "liberals" have, in reality, nothing amounting to faith.

It was mainly because Japan was full of such faithless opportunists that the country started the recent senseless war, unable to stride along the Great Way of Peace, and even dragged the hopeless hostilities until that doom-end of August 15, last.

Yokoyama who reveres Heaven is a man of peace to the core. Because peace is the Providential will and Divine intent. It means nothing but an embodiment of this conviction in him, that he accompanied Tokonami to China in 1928, and brought the Tsinan Affair to a peaceful solution, thereby laying the corner-stone for Sino-Japanese understanding. But in disregard of all these latent efforts of his, the Japanese militarists committed wrongs against China. The result was the outbreak of the so-called Manchuria and China incidents.

He was always well aware of the strength and greatness of America. He knows only too well the material and spiritual superiority of the United States. Few Japanese have more penetrative knowledge about America than himself. It was only natural that, after the outbreak of the hostilities, he had always been watching for a chance of Japan's making peace. As a Japanese, of course, he was anxious, in doing so, to seek peace in such a way as to keep Japan on an international status of at least the third rate Power, instead of on the almost statusless status as at present. This sort of desire and effort is not unjustifiable, since whoever might feel and do otherwise can be no other than the faithless and nomadic. Nothing like real peace would come out of any cooperation by foreign Powers with such characterless people.

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If the above-like endeavours, as Japanese, were wrong, not one single person in the upper and leading classes in this land could be free from indictment as war criminals. As a matter of fact, Yokoyama fought for the sake of peace. All the while, the majority of elder statesmen and prominent officials of the State stood idly aloof, like unconcerned onlookers, gazing from day to day at the terrible yet meaningless sacrifices of senseless war, for all the official right and duty, and even chance they had of voicing for peace. Surely they must be no less personages than war criminals and human foes.

No judgment of one's conduct can be more calamitously misleading than what is superficial. To fail to see the whole forest because of looking at one local, particular tree therein, is certainly no way to get at the truth of anything.

For instance, it is a fact that the atomic bomb plays a terrible havoc with human life and is apparently to blame from the standpoint of humanism. But was it not this very bomb that saved the Japanese as well as all the world from the possible aggradizement of the meaningless sacrifices and disasters which might have befallen Japanese and the Allied Powers alike, had the Japanese leaders been allowed further continuance of their fatal game of war. To blame the atomic bomb by looking at its disastrous power would be no more tenable than looking at the scatheless surgical operation and regarding it as a stain to humanity.

In examining the conduct of Yokoyama, gross errors are apt to occur unless a detached view is taken from a high and general standpoint, instead of confining vision to what is only partial and particular. Such a kind of errors Japan is particularly liable to commit. Her present miserable plight into which she has dragged herself, only at the expense of the general world's welfare, is from nothing but such a national fault.

Our confidence is that quite safe from this sort of danger is America that has such a high level of faith as to resort to the apparently inhuman atomic bombing, if for the sake of the real world peace. Japanese are apt to look at the form of anything and not at its quality. Their spiritualism is in the case of the majority no better than a lip-devotion. Even their Court examinations are no exception to the rule. This is as is known to all quite different in the case of the United States.

It is the present petitioner's sincere desire that His Excellency's prosecution officers would sternly look into his features and get at the very being of himself inside. Just turn him around on their test board, and see for themselves what notes of sound they can hear. Form might deceive men, but the note of sounds cannot. Then they would surely see how peace-loving Yokoyama is, what a plucky champion of peace he is. There may be more or less local counter-streams near the coast so to say, but the greater body of that broad river of Yokoyama will be found steadily and perpetually streaming into the deep sea of peace. Mercy and benevolence is what constitutes his very being.

Whatever

Whatever local or extreme part of his conduct may be noted will surely be found well permeated with that benevolent character. Never spare his examinations so that his realities may be found.

Informations from witnesses and other reporters might be against his interest. This, however, is after all traducement or else misjudgment. Anything could be more probable, indeed, if such a man as of Yokoyama's own peaceful character and conviction about the American superiority could ever blindly follow the lead of chauvinistic military clique. Whatever he did he did it for the sake of suspending hostilities and of bringing about peace as early as possible.

Politics is none of idealism but realism. Aggressive or not, once war is started in the name of a country, any mere cry for peace would be of no avail. It required positive preparations to begin with, for bringing about peace. If Yokoyama laid himself open to possibilities of misunderstanding by the foreign authorities, that must have been such preparatory efforts. As in the past, so will it be in the future.

But "preparations" are after all nothing more nor less than preparations. Such preparatory endeavours designated for early restoration of peace, were naturally made from the standpoint of the Japanese. He could have no more done otherwise, than he could resign from being a Japanese. Nor could it be deniable that any administrative system for Japan that might be woven out in cooperation with such statesmen as to forget their being Japanese nationals, would prove no less failure than the Japanese administration in Chosen, Formosa and China. For nothing would be more impossible for them than to grasp the real popular hearts.

It is true, Yokoyama did spend a pretty good sum of money. But the money did come to him, after all, from his great faith that Heaven furnishes necessary wherewithals always to those striving for realization of the Providential will. Whoever gave him any money and insists at this moment as if he were cheated out of the money is only looking at things with scales in his eyes. For the sake of the world peace, money ought to be freely spent.

During the wartime, Japan had not one wise leader. As it was, so it is. There will certainly be something nobler than mercy, and greater than wisdom, in releasing Yokoyama, a man of really genuine peace and unusual faith, who does truly know the world situation and the Japanese popular trends. With the aid of such a man as Yokoyama, the attainment of the Allied Powers' occupation end would be ensured with all the brighter success.

Yokoyama's work in the latter half of his life was to get in contact with men of faith and talents Japanese and foreign alike, so as to acquaint himself with the general international conditions. He used to criticize the Japanese as the "country men" of the world. The marvellous discrepancy of the national

power



power between Japan and western nations which most Japanese came to know for the first time through defeat was nothing but what he had long known only too well.

Disappointed with the ignorance of Japanese leaders, and ever anxious for a chance of his longing peace, he naturally took particular interest in intercouring with representative foreigners. Every part of his word and conduct during such intercourse confesses his peaceful principles and aspiration. Only a little insight into his life and character would enable anyone to see this through without the least difficulty.

If he had anything to do with the military authorities, that was by no means for sharing their aggressive designs in the Orient. This is apparent to any thinker. As whoever knows the vastness of the Pacific expanse could never think of swimming it over, so it could not have occurred to Yokoyama with all his knowledge about America to do anything against the United States or its Allied Powers, in concert with the military clique here. He knows impossibility from possibility. And impossibility exists not only in the physical world but in the mental world as well.

If Yokoyama is badly reputed among some Japanese leaders it cannot be because he worked against those foreign Powers fighting Japan, but because he was espoused to their peace cause. It is no less than a chauvinistic criticism subsisting on feudalistic misconception that lays a blame on anyone for his peaceful internationalism as if he were a traitor. His bad reputation then, is only a positive proof that he was, as he is, a friend of the world and champion of peace. The very fact that instead of being caught by the Japanese authorities, he should as at present be imprisoned by the Allied Armies come for judgment for the sake of peace, is certainly a miserable irony of fate and chronicles the greatest loss to the cause of the world peace.

If he showed any "bold" kindness to foreign friends or prisoners of war here, that was solely out of his merciful personality. The fact, as I actually observed on more than one occasion hitherto, is that the moment he happens to find even a stranger in distress, he would not fail to extend his helping hand. That is done without the slightest moment's hesitation. He takes no time to look at the distressed person's features, or appearance, no time to weigh the result or calculate the effect of his sympathetic conduct. It is literally a minute's deed, just as the sunlight would dart into the closed room to shed its warm beam upon all, the moment the door is open. This gives a glimpse of what kind of man Yokoyama is, and offers an eloquent explanation as to why he has so many foreign friends, who are always ready to recommend him with real love and gratitude.

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Representation on Yokoyama  
By Mr. Toshiro Okai,  
Attorney-at-Law.

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(Translated Copy)

This world is God's creation, as is firmly believed by the mankind. Nothing can be plainer, then, than the fact that slaughter or warfare is a revolt against "God that is love."

The suspected war-criminal Yokoyama Yui is of a personality embodying the very love of Christ, benevolence of Confucius and mercy of Buddha,-- a person born to fit in to a T with the divine voice and will. If he takes an extraordinary interest in the classical culture of the Occident as well as of the Orient, it is solely because of that character of his.

Day in and day out, he runs his eyes through classics to learn divine will and to listen to Heavenly revelation. He combines his above-mentioned personality with rare assiduity in taking in such a relishable sort of mental nutriment, making the best of all his available time. This is why his whole being is classic itself, why he is an incarnation of God's love itself. Few people in the East and West are found more definitely comprehending than Yokoyama the unfathomable depth of classical culture, fundamental spirit of the Universe, and the Voice of Heaven. This rare accomplishment of his finds expression in the slightest bit of his word and deed.

This guiding principle of the prisoner is deep-rooted and ever growing broader and farther through a series of practical application. As Yokoyama first met his senior and superior, the late Mr. Mitsuru Toyama, coming up to Tokyo in the summer of his 17th year (1899), the latter made remark that influenced the young visitor so much that it went to form the staff of his future Continental Policy to which he still clings. The remark was to the effect that "there's nothing in this life that sincerity fails to move. The very policy of Saigo Takamori, that great man of modern Japan, was to shake hands with Korea and China in sincerity." His Continental policy should thus be fundamentally different from the Continental policy as upheld by the military.

It was because he did act up to that policy, that Yokoyama could bring in December, 1928 to a satisfactory solution that bristling question of Chinese Boycott which the then Tanaka Ministry could not settle after its 6-month struggles. On that occasion Yokoyama who as Vice-Plenipotentiary accompanied the then Third Party President, Mr. Takejiro Tokonami, dwelt on the necessity of Sino-Japanese friendship with such sincerity that Gen. Chiang Kai-Shek agreed to terminate the boycott move, placing full confidence in Japan's military evacuation from Shangtung thus settling the long-pending thorny problem in less than a couple of hours.

The Japanese military leaders, however, disregarded the above agreement with China on the principle of friendship, and in less than 3 years after the dissolution of the above Tsinan Affair (1931), effected military advance into Manchuria. The consequence was the outburst of the Manchurian Incident and the subsequent China Incident -- all of which combined, as Yokoyama predicted, to develop into the

latest

latest, most deplorable Pacific War. Since then his hatred of militarism became pronouncedly positive.

His innate peace policy, which is over consolidated by his classical study for communication with the divine, was constantly practicalized by his careful storage of international knowledge which he always pursued with professional zeal. He was, therefore, impressed to the core with the American strength and formidableness. The military leaders of Japan could not settle even the China Incident after more than 4 years' strugglings, he used to observe, when how could they hope to defeat America? It was their protracted fighting with China as if to no end, that they gradually found themselves impelled into the recent war with America.

All that having been his conviction, Yokoyama employed his utmost efforts for checking the outbreak of the Pacific War wherein he firmly believed there was not so much as a sporting chance for Japan. To his great regret, however, the peace advocates of this country could do practically nothing but studying only the pleasure of the military. Yokoyama alone was the only fighter for peace. Thus it was that the war did come off in spite of himself.

However, he was not the man to lose heart at such a failure. He is none of peace advocates content with a lip-service only. The international peace and the coexistents' coprosperity being his avowed faith, he must be doing something for peace under all circumstances. This is just where a definite line forms itself to distinguish a man of faith from that of nonfaith.

Thus he was at work for peace as early as February 1942, when all Japan was in intoxication over "victories." It was only too natural that such efforts as he made met with nothing but scorn and glare from both Government and people. This means that he is the only man not guilty of war-crime, all the rest being war criminals in a strict sense though in varying degrees.

In August 1942, when Japanese forces were obliged to withdraw from Guadal Canar, Yokoyama was gloomy, remarking: "what was coming has at last come; things came to pass exactly as I foreboded."

In the autumn of the same year, Yokoyama gave a public performance of Noh Dance, known as the pinnacle of Japan's classical art, inviting Japanese and foreigners of celebrity as guests, among the latter being the representatives of the then Allies of Japan and of the neutral countries. On that occasion Yokoyama distributed among the foreign guests his greetings printed in English, French and German. In those days any and every peace-advocate in this country used to encourage warring enthusiasm by paying compliments to the military for their "victorious" activities. But Yokoyama in his greetings referred not a syllable to such a side, but on the contrary, observed in something like the following strain:

"The present

"The present deplorable hostilities transcending human conception would not have broken out, had the Americans and the Britishers had proper comprehension of the historical culture of the Japanese nation. The predominant cause of the war was lack of such comprehension for which Japanese should share the responsibility because of their failure to make positive efforts for that purpose. This is why I have made the present attempt at this eleventh hour."

Thus that performance he planned was an event to prevent war, to suppress war. In those days, the Japanese authorities having been busily engaged in promoting war-mindedness of the people, he was in every danger of being arrested by the Japanese authorities. By no means less offensive was his conduct in question to Germany and Italy in the Axis Camp. For such allied Powers had been long preparing for establishment of the new order in the world, and when preparations were well nigh over through concentration of their State administration towards the end of the war, started their premeditated hostilities in the European theatre, and did not forget to get Japan in due course of time into the Pacific War.

To express, therefore, one's regret, as Yokoyama did at the outburst of the war, to the face of the leading class representatives of those Axis Powers, was tantamount to a total negation of German and Italian intents and actions, and therefore to the greatest possible disgrace that could ever be given them in bold defiance of the spirit of mutual respects as Allies.

Such an expression indeed before Japanese and their Axis Allies, who must and could without least restraint and reservation have encouraged each other, would have been a plain impossibility except, by one so entirely devoted to the peace cause, and so exceptionally faithful to the voice of conscience as he was and is. Certainly he must thus be regarded as well prepared to make himself a de facto martyr of the peace cause, inasmuch as he could without least hesitation commit himself to so bold a statement as might have had no word to offer in defence of himself even if apprehended by the Japanese authorities or protested by the Axis Powers as purposely putting a curb to their war-prosecution.

Yokoyama was detained until right after the termination of the war, in the Metropolitan Police Office from January, 1945, because of his attempt to work out German-Soviet reconciliation and, through it, the rehabilitation of a general world peace, which not a little annoyed the then Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and the military leaders. In fact he was the only Japanese politician of reputation that suffered so much and so long from the authorities' persecution, ever trying to act against the country's warring policy without seeking refuge abroad like the cowardish advocate of peace.

In the summer of 1943, Yokoyama acted to bring about a Soviet-Japanese understanding. Explaining its object, he stated in his written representation presented to the authorities that the attempt was "by no means for causing a turn of the war-situation in favour

of Japan

of Japan, but only for bringing about the world peace." That in so saying he was only telling the truth could be readily accepted by whoever notes that the very statement was made not only to no other than the authorities then prosecuting the war with all zeal, but from his very prison where he was in a position to please, and not to offend, the authorities so as to get himself released as early as possible.

Few Japanese were so well informed as Yokoyama, and in the summer 1943 he was too well aware that the war-situation was already hopeless to Japan, and therefore that Japan had no chance of getting the better hand even with such an ideal advantage as the Pearl Harbour attack, had no prospect of turning the table in its favour, even though any understanding could be worked out with Soviets for itself. For all his imprisoned condition; for all his personal wish to get release, therefore, his own faith could not permit himself to lie and state that his attempt at the Soviet-Japanese understanding was to lead Japan into victory.

In August, 1944, he started endeavours toward the German-Soviet reconciliation through the German Ambassador here, and while driving for that end, he was put under arrest in January, 1945. All through his activities for Soviet-Japanese and German-Soviet peace, his one leading idea was peace-restoration for the world peoples. He knew of course that peace being a matter of the most practical, a mere cry for it would never bring it forth, that to succeed in dealing with foreign people for the sake of diplomacy would mean just to succeed in dealing with people at home; and therefore that before realizing peace Japan should be brought into such a position as would enable itself to make peace without putting to too serious a disappointment the people who would never remain acquiesced in any prodigiously disgraceful peace.

His point of particular anxiety was in fact the possible literal elimination of Japan deprived of even the last bit of the Anglo-American credit as a party to peace negotiations, unless this country gained at least a stand favourable to some extent for proposing peace. Peace is none of dreams but a matter of reality. It should be approached, therefore, always from the practical side. As a practical politician that he was, what he did in those days in quest of peace was accordingly quite right and necessary.

The authorities in the Japanese Foreign Office reconciled themselves as early as Nov. 27, 1943, it is understood, to the inevitability of peace-making, that is, ever since the Cairo Declaration was issued, as they regarded it fair and moderate in the disinterested light of the then prevalent general situation.

The above fact was more than once broadcast in Japan following the Imperial address to the people in radio on August 15, 1945, but since then not a single word has ever been referred to that fact,

either

either in radio or in the press,-- presumably because it was the authorities' secret of secrets which they made public only by mistake.

Be that as it may there is every reason to believe that the Japanese authorities had long before the Cairo Declaration been peace-minded, and all the more so since the Declaration. The fact was that, ever ready to seek shelter in safe places specially prepared for themselves against the time of the worst, the authorities had no real intention of carrying on their fight, but only pretended as if determined to fight to the last man. They simply deceived their people by means of their exciting but empty slogan: the "total sacrifice of Japanese lives" while continuing their meaningless, hand to mouth fightings.

If Japan had had one statesmanlike statesman, the calamitous result of the recent Pacific War would certainly have been reduced to less than one-third. To take up what is nearest and latest as an instance, the destruction of 2,500,000 dwelling houses and the death of half a million people in Japan proper under bombs and bomb-fires, must be regarded as the very work of the Japanese statesmen. For such losses occurred only after their loss of fighting-will. This is no figurative representation of affairs, but a serious and tremendous offence of murder and arson pure and simple, in the strict sense and terms of Japan's own criminal code. That much alone constitutes the greatest crime ever known in the human history. So far as is concerned their responsibility for the whole tragedies and destructions, registered by the Pacific War because of their indolence and delinquency, no severest term could express the blame that they deserve.

If they had any real intention to fight the war out, some extenuation might be made, but, as it was, their fighting was maintained only by inertia, and all the while they kept themselves in the safety zone. Their war-crime is, therefore, inexpressibly grave. One perfect wonder is that even now no one takes up that question of the responsibility for the hostilities from that angle. Not a single elder-statesman of the country did refer to that even after the Cairo Declaration. This is plain from the Diary of Marquis Kido published in the Military Tribunal trial, now in progress here, and goes to attest to the marked absence of one real statesman in this country,-- a fact that buries a barbed arrow of regret in the Japanese heart.

The Japanese authorities used to talk of the decisive battle against the possible landing operations of the American forces against the Mainland of the country. Even the laymen, however, could have seen the futurity of such a decisive battle on the part of Japan. The Americans had to carry Saipan and Locchoo at whatever cost, because such occupation was deemed imperatively necessary as a means to attain their ultimate object of Japanese occupation. But Japan's mainland being the scene of their intended

last

last operations, they would surely have sought the destruction by zero attacks of the resisting power that might be found surviving there, before carrying out their landing operations.

The American Commanders would not have been such fools as to force their landing operations, while there was left any power of resistance in the mainland here. If carrying out their landing, surely the Americans would have done so after, but not before, having reduced Japan into the status of non-resistance.

The authorities' theory of a decisive battle against landing operations was the most peurile and crude, born of their ignorance, and a fraudulent means they resorted to for the necessitated maintenance, for face-saving, of their hopeless war by placing the people under misimpressions as though thereby the final victory could be secured.

The writer committed himself to an expression of such views in those days. But none of the elder-statesmen uttered a word in that way. Those statesmen included such an authority of tactics as Admiral Kantaro Suzuki. Even civilian elder-statesmen ought to have had the power to see the real war-situation and world tendency. If they had not had it, they should have sought it as elder-statesmen. They could not plead their ignorance or indifference on the ground that they were out of the Government Office. For it is their very duty to voice their honest views in time of national emergencies. They have no other business.

Other high officials of the Government, pressmen, Dietmen, and the like men of the public all had the right of voice, but remained passive all the while meaningless tragedies were enacted at different points of the battle fields in the Pacific War as though wanting to test how long they could tolerate others' miseries. With their hearts so devilish and their activities so vicious, such men should indeed be made to top the war criminals.

At that time each Japanese may have been critical of the authorities' way of prosecuting the war at least in the secret chamber of the heart, but the freedom of speech was in those days so strongly suppressed that their individual voices could not have been bound into a power forcible enough to move the State. They were not in a position to grasp any real state of the war situation in those days as were the elder-statesmen and powerful politicians. The latter alone were thus in a position to rise to the occasion. But Yokoyama was the only politician, who stood against the war from start to finish, and who, upon the outbreak of the war, was the first to start a move for its termination, grappling with all difficulties for the purpose all the time since.

The only

The only regret was that in a country like Japan, where public positions weigh heavier than practical abilities, Yokoyama who was no more than a humble politician out of the Government office and a diplomatic expert only behind the scene, could not exercise any power of real consequence. Compared with elder-statesmen, he was to begin with more subject to restriction of the freedom of speech. With him it was necessary to feign such a conduct as to please and satisfy the military men, if he were to contribute to realization of peace, which was his ultimate objective.

He had to act, for the sake of peace, within the range of not offending the military authorities, and often with a pretention even, as though catering to their own policy and interest. This was why Yokoyama used to quote the dictum of the late Count Mutsu, the great diplomat of modern Japan, namely, "In diplomacy, difficulty lies not so much in dealing with foreign peoples as in dealing with home people." If such was the experience of the Count who was in such a high position of the Government, the difficulty Yokoyama had to grapple with as a mere diplomat against the Japanese military influence that was so peerlessly powerful in the history of Japan, might well be imagined.

In spite of all the cares and prudence, wherewith he pursued under the above circumstances, his plan of a peace campaign, it was not long before Yokoyama made himself the practical enemy of the then Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and military leaders, with the result that he was long detained in the Metropolitan Police Office until the hostilities were terminated.

Let it be repeated, before proceeding further with Yokoyama's peace drive, that peace is a matter that could never be realized through mere aspiration after it or through relishing its dream. Its realization calls for a positive action towards it. It would be far safer to think of peace and cry for "unconditional surrender" in the bottom of one's heart unnoticed by the authorities. Nothing indeed is easier than that. But that way could not bring forth peace if in a hundred years.

As things, however, stand now, those Japanese who could never deviate from such a nominal and easy way of peace-moves, are found on the foreground of post-bellum Japan as "democratic peace-promoters". But war-criminals should in reality be found in no others than such a set of people because they were, if peace advocates, unable to go either beyond thinking of peace in mind or dream only, or above offending the military elements through lack of resourcefulness.

As noted before, Yokoyama was opposed to the Pacific War as "hopeless" for Japan from the outset when the nation seemed carrying all before her because of her prepared operations. After the summer of 1943, therefore, when Japan's navy was reduced to de facto nothing, and her airforces were fast losing their power -- the main weapons in the Pacific War were no other than warships and aeroplanes -- nothing was farther from Yokoyama's mind than the possibility of Japan's conqurance over America and Britain, even if she succeeded in winning Soviet's understanding and in realizing German-Soviet reconciliation.

if only



If only properly informed of the actual war situation, any one could have thought the same as Yokoyama. It would not have, for seeing that much, required the insight of Yokoyama, man of the international community, who used to criticize the Japanese as the "countrymen of the world" and also used to laugh at the Japanese military leaders for their fatal self-concept and ignorance about the broad gap existing in the national power of America and Japan.

Only he held that Japan might recover her position to some slight extent, when she might seize the opportunity for proposing peace which America and Britain might accept so as not to crush Japan's position all in all. The Japanese military authorities maintaining the meaningless war only for saving their face would be relieved and thus peace might be realized with a complete concord at home and abroad. This was in fact his idea. But such he could not disclose to everybody in those days, unless he was a derailed man. Even though he was acting according to the above idea not only without disclosing it to anybody, but pretending to turn the war in Japan's favour as his ultimate end, yet he was thrown into jail. Had he professed himself therefore as at work for the sake of peace, he might have suffered heavier punishment. -- might have been assassinated even.

He would not have cared of course about assassination since the fact was that his peace policy emanating from his personality as well as classical virtues, he used to talk of "sacrifice" as the surest and ultimate means of settling difficulties, and of being ready to sacrifice his life if for the sake of human peace and welfare. Only his premature death would render his plan of peace little better than a passing dream. He found himself under the circumstances in need of keeping his step with authorities at least in appearance.

From what has thus far been stated, it will be realized that with Yokoyama's own strategical design alone can any peace plan be worked out under such circumstances, as he was placed in, and that he was in name and fact the only and real peace advocate among the people of this country. The rest of the people in any responsible position were all those who either remained silent and idle on-lookers on the multitudinous slaughter, or who were driving in the direction opposite to peace for ignorance or delinquency, while crying for peace all the time. They might be regarded, as such, as war-criminals, but not Yokoyama, who was the only peace promoter in the truest sense of the term.

Some people might ask the writer whether it is not his dogmatic conclusion to assert as in the above that peace could never be promoted in those days of Japan by those wearing their peace policy on their faces. The doubt will be readily dissolved when the national circumstance is taken into consideration. In

those

those days of war, peace could only be thought at heart, and by no means talked of unless seeking shelter abroad as political refugees.

Whoever talked of peace would be branded a war-objector and arrested by the gendarmes right away as a "traitor," no more humiliating name than which Japanese could get. Peace could not be talked even *tete a tete* between any two intimate friends. Even wives and sons could not be taken into confidence. For no Japanese would like to be regarded by their wives and sons as "traitors," --it was the penetrated national idea that to oppose to war would be to betray the fatherland. They could not talk of peace, therefore, without being prepared for total loss of credit in their character; for practical denial of humanity; or for complete destruction of home-life. Seeing is believing. In those days not a single word of "peace" was found in newspapers, magazines, and in any other forms of writings for the public. The writer assures you cannot find out the word even now for love or money, in such printed matters of those days.

Peace talk was an absolute taboo. Even in the Elder Statesmen's assembly, there was not one who could dare to say the word. In short there was neither the smallest room for public opinion to arise, nor a single statesman to endeavour, to put an end to the terrible tragedies aggrandizing on account of that taboo. Thus it was that the Allied Forces took the task upon themselves by throwing down atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Peace movement was such an impossibility in Japan during the wartime, that until 200,000 people were blasted by atomic bombs, there could not arise the slightest shadow of a peace-move, with all the tremendous tragedies in progress day and night all over the broad latitude of the Pacific. By ordinary means, under the circumstances, any peace movement was out of the question. This necessitated a peace drive to be carried on if at all in camouflage. The very fact that atomic bombs were the only medium for bringing about peace attests to its practical impossibility in those days of this country by any ordinary means.

In other words, there was not a single Japanese who thought Japan could win the recent war, since about the time of the Cairo Declaration. People were all aware that if things were allowed to take their own course, Japan would get literally annihilated, but found no other way left for them but following the authorities now that the latter were addressing all the people to be prepared to make themselves the national martyrs.

Such having been the case, Japan's Bell of Peace inside the people was on the point of ringing at the slightest touch. But Japan's national Bell of Peace was so hard coated that it required

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the atomic bomb force of strike. There was no Japanese statesman who would dare to touch the Bell, until America took pity and acted with the bomb.

The failure of the Japanese Peace Bell to go ringing for all its condition ready to ring, must be ascribed to the incompetency of the Japanese statesmen, and to Japan's peculiar national polity at the same time. Japanese history is full of reconciliations and even surrenders in civil wars.

In a losing battle, Japanese warriors are known to have often offered their heads to their juvenile enemies in favour of the latter, saying: "Even if I beheaded you that could not serve to turn the losing battle into a gaining battle. If I must lose my life in this defeated battle at all, I would rather have my head taken off by you and thus contribute to your honour."

With their national character so ingenuous, Japanese warriors would easily surrender when they find themselves hopelessly defeated, so as to avoid useless sacrifice of lives. This is known as the traditional way of the so-called Bushido. But that was true only with civil wars. In a war with foreign countries, Japan has hitherto had not a single instance of surrender. In the estimation of the Japanese proud of their "Imperial Throne of one unbroken lineage" from time immemorial, to surrender to any alien people spells national ruin. Such being the firmly implanted Japanese ideology, the people's inner-most voice for peace however determined could never get so much magnified as to be audible around. Thus the situation needed, for its rectification, either a true statesman-like statesman, or else such as the atomic bomb.

At such a juncture of the country, Yokoyama was the only statesman unnoticed. He was well aware that any clumsy attempt to strike the Bell of Peace would only make the situation worse, and delay the advent of peace in proportion. He was accordingly preparing for his own ingenious activities among the peoples at home and abroad in an attempt to ring the Bell of Peace with proper effects, when he was arrested by the Metropolitan Police Board in January 1945. My firmest belief is that had he not been apprehended at that time, the termination of the hostilities would have been brought about quite earlier than Aug. 15th in that year, and with proportionately less calamitous destructions. Not to believe so would be as much as believing him to be the very "country man of the world" he used to laugh at who prized his individual life more than the public welfare, the peace of the whole mankind. But he might as well be so believed as the sun to rise in the west. No belief could be more absurd even from what has thus far been observed of him and his character.

Had he not been interned, many might have been wiser obtaining from him better information about the then prevalent general

situation

situation of the world, actual status of the hostile developments and the peace-longing upper class atmosphere of this country. I have from my days of school-studentship been disappointed with the words and deeds of the so-called Elder Statesmen and even politicians of public distinction who were coward hypocrites and could find the only respectable one in Yokoyama. I would therefore surely have been closely cooperating with him in his peace drive, had he but been free. To think of all the above facts, I cannot but deplore Yokoyama's internment so long as 8 months preceding the termination of the war as an irrevocable loss to the world's cause of peace. If he had not been detained, the number of the world-war sufferers would certainly have been reduced by a tremendously broad margin, and he might have made himself known to the world as an angel of peace.

The Japanese Government committed so serious a blunder in the past, as the above observation indicates but who can tell if the Allied Powers are not going to foot in the same step of Japan? My experience counsels me to bow always to the conviction that recognition and comprehension of any affair could never be too penetrative. No ever mountainous, quantity could be measured always perfectly even by a mere child, if time and labour be allowed, but so far as quality is concerned there is no knowing it to the bottom. This is why politics require a really great philosopher for control. If not erroring in any other points, misweighing of quality as by seeing on the left what is on the right side; regarding a specific medicine as a poisonous dose; or appraising a jewel as a mere trash, would frustrate the whole work.

Old Japan's political and judicial administrations were full of errors of that sort. I am well-acquainted with Japanese prosecution and court work, and was always of opinion that during the recent wartime, Japanese Prosecutors and Court Judges were making their utmost for nothing but leading the country into disorder, corruption and defeat. Because they would never really think of punishing those really deserving punishment, but would never fail to punish those whose conduct seemed an offence in form only but without the real cause for punishment, or those whose conduct ought to be encouraged rather than suppressed in the existing condition of the country.

Such an error might be found in America as well you might say. Such a powerful country as America, however, could not fall from such errors, but in a weak and small country like Japan, any wrong done on the part of prosecutors and judges easily leads the State into disorder and even national ruin, thereby frustrating eventually even the Allied Powers' efforts for proper attainment of their Japanese occupation end.

The statement thus far set forth makes it clear I believe, why Yokoyama ought to be set free at the earliest possible date. But I am going to proceed a step further and point out additional reason why he should be released, at this moment, for the sake of the world peace and for the accomplishment of the Allied

Power.

Powers' occupation aim.

I have always taken interest in the State administration and popular welfare, and have accordingly been always looking for a really respectable man of excellent talents and sincere faith in the truest sense of the terms. I have often met Elder Statesmen and officials of public celebrity who are reported in the press as men of real loyalty and faith, and as often experienced disappointments, all of them being found little better than men of formalities and of no true faith. I always thought, with a deep regret, that men of such a type as to be loyal and faithful only in appearance it was that might undermine the national existence, and even with a deeper regret still, the principle-less sycophantic war of press reports as no less contributors to the national downfall, when what sort of men such celebrated officials are could readily be seen through in a single personal interview.

It was while I was thinking that Japan thus had not one real statesman to be depended upon, that I heard of Gen. Mac Arthur's remarks to my profound impression that "Japan's soldiers at the front might be feared but that the military men in the Japanese Headquarters need not be feared."

I thought no other words could make a truer expression. It was at such a time that I found a really ideal personage in Yokoyama. I thought him to be the only person able to stand all the strain of the historians' criticism. This I am professing with every knowledge of the fact that he ~~did~~ <sup>was</sup> convicted four times in his life. The first and second convictions occurred in his twenties, that is, more than 40 years ago — when for obtaining political funds he resorted to a little bold measure in Hokkaido as young politicians of those days used to do and suffer with pride. It was because of that personal experience, however, that he could determine to make it a turning point in his life and to make himself a greater man. In this instance, too, we find him distinctively different from the ordinary men who, in the same circumstances might have got disheartened and gone to the worse.

The third case was the conviction he gladly suffered as a substitute of his boss, Fusanosuke Kuhara. This chivalrous spirit of sacrifice on his part was seen through and appreciated by the Court authorities, who passed a sentence on him with a reprieve. The last case was prosecution for a breach of the Election-Law in 1942, when a general election was held.

On the occasion Yokoyama in defiance of the Tojo Ministry's policy of recognizing only the candidates recommended by the Yokusan-kai (the Imperial Rule Assistance Society or the defacto Government Party) placed a candidate running on a neutral platform by furnishing him with a campaigning fund to a more

or less excess, and was prosecuted; but in appreciation of Yokoyama's personality and policy so fair and upright, the prosecutors themselves claimed no heavier penalty than fines, and the judge passed an exceptionally light sentence as suggested by them, although he was a person with previous convictions. His true personal merit is thus found asserting itself even in such an instance.

Yokoyama is always obedient to the will of Providence. Pointing to Heaven he would remark to everybody: "The necessary wherewithal spontaneously finds its way into the pocket of whoever serves the cause of goodness in sincerity." He has a strong aversion to human calculation, and would say: "If you think of cultivating land, you will too soon find its limits, but if you turn to Heaven, you will find it limitless."--This theory of his is in thorough concord with what Christ says --  
"Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?"  
-St. Mathew, VI-30.

"Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, wherewith shall we be clothed? - Do.-31.

"(For after all these things do the Gentiles seek;) for your heavenly Father knoweth that we have need of all these things. - Do.-32.

"But seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness; and all these things shall be added to you."  
-Do. -33.

The money that came into his hand in that way he would "return to Heaven" by spending it effectively in the interests of the State and the Public, or donating it to anyone, Japanese or foreign, in destitution. When thanked by the helped, he would cut them short and say that he could but thank them for a chance given by them for repaying to Heaven what he owed, and that if they would express their gratitude, they would do well to thank Heaven.

"Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steel. - St. Mathew, VI.-19.

"But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through and steal." - Do. - 20.

Christ is known to have further said: "Ask, and it shall be given you."

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"If we then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven, give good things to them that ask him? -Do.-11.

"Therefore all things whatsoever we would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets." - Do.-12.

Yokoyama is a man who thus believes in, even embodies, and practices, the truth of Christianity that "when with God, man gets, without limits, whatever he needs". In America there are apparently many, among them being Mr. Henry Ford, the Automobile-King, who are in such a stage of cultural attainment. In old Japan, however, where materialism is dominant, and spiritualism exists, if at all, only on the lips, even those to whom Bible is familiar, would talk of it as being a fable and a utilitarian's superstition. It was not the military leaders alone but the whole country of Japan that indulged in the materialistic idea that things could never be gained but by marauding. And its necessary sequel was the outburst of the Manchuria Incident, China Incident, and even the latest Pacific War. There may be some Japanese not publicly well-known, who practiced spiritualism to the letter, during the war time last, but among the celebrated, Yokoyama was the only spiritualist in name and fact.

Even at this moment of postwar self-awakening, Japan remains under the shameful misimpression that democracy justifies "struggling after scanty goods". This is ever so far from the real idea of American democracy that "all material possessions come from God as a reflection of spiritual wealth." Such a scene of life-or-death strugglings after scanty goods is nothing but a de facto extension of the Pacific War which was started and carried on with the theory that it was just the international democracy and right for the "have-nots" to maraud the "have" countries. Nothing can be more dangerous, for what should they do when they fail to get what they want through struggles after insufficient goods inside their own land?

Many who have money to invest used to remark that whenever they sat tete a tete with Yokoyama, they could not but feel like giving their money away to him. Yokoyama on the other hand would often tell them the philosophical truth in something like the following terms: "You do not know how to spend money, and therefore are sure to go to the Hell when with money about you, but you would really go to the Paradise if you were to place your money at my disposal." His friends capitalists would readily be persuaded. Any amount of money that comes to him in that way is, as he believes, in conformity with divine will, and therefore nothing but the divine gifts.

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None of grafters would, therefore, approach Yokoyama. Among his daily numerous visitors, there was not a single person whose conversation touched on grafting. This was generally regarded as a wonder. Yokoyama's money always being nothing but divine gifts, there was no possibility of any money coming into his pocket from any military authorities who never knew God. For realization of the world peace, for coprosperity in coexistence all over the world alike, he tried to guide the military leaders with every care not to be found out by the latter, but he has never for a moment had any part or part in the ambitious activities of the military men who were espoused to the materialistic principle of international looting. This is why he has not a single instance in which he got even a penny from the military or other authorities — although there were seemingly not a few of them who got money from him as a private help. This fact must already be in your knowledge through your examinations thus far made of him and his case and accounts for the fact that even after the complete downfall of the military following the termination of the hostilities. Yokoyama never suffered, in appearance, from want of wherewithal.

"It was after all the Heavenly will duly done as I often had an occasion to forebode, that Japan did come to the present pass. This was the very moment for Japan, to be up and doing with determination to make the greatest possible contribution to the world peace, in accordance with the Buddhistic and other religious and classical spirits."

It was while he was willingly preparing for activities with the above view, that he was ordered to Sugamo Prison. Such a study of his money; of its incoming route, and the way of its disbursement, will bring to light the fact that every move and turn of his conduct before and during the war, was for nothing but the peace-cause. That he had been interned for so long as 8 months preceding the showdown of the hostilities last, while engaged, with heaven-given funds, in well planned activities for the sake of the world peace, was really a serious pity, let it be repeated, and gave a great disappointment to those who furnished him with their money and wanted to go to the Paradise.

What is a New Japan as it is? It is little different from the old Japan — only minus military men and plus increased labour influence. There is nothing to distinguish it from those days of old Japan prosecuting an aggressive war in quest of nothing but goods and in oblivion of God. It is under the circumstances to be most sincerely prayed that as the only one among the capable Japanese, who really knows God, the authorities of the General Headquarters may be generous enough to release him for his timely activities.

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The writer finds it in place here about to make a brief reference, for caution's sake, to the Tripartite Pact of the Axis Powers. This Pact was designated, as it seems, against America and Britain. As a matter of fact it formed one of the primary factors that drove Japan into the latest Pacific War. Such a pact, therefore, Yokoyama, who was absolutely opposed to warfare since the Manchuria Incident, could not have supported. It is true he hated Germans and liked Americans and Britishers — so much so that his children were all given education after the fashion of the English speaking nations. But his opposition to the Tripartite Pact was never from such an individual sentiment of liking or disliking, but, as was noted before, from a higher and nobler cause of peace.

He may have had an intimate intercourse indeed with some representatives of Nazis, but the truth could easily be seen through from what has so far been set forth: He was only trying as much unnoticed as possible to pull his strings in all such association towards realization of peace for the general world. He took every possible care in that delicate work and yet it was not long before the then German Ambassador to Tokyo, Stahmer, began to smell the rat, and secretly reported to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu. This it was that kindled the fuze for his arrest and confinement for the 8 months previous to restoration of peace. His foreign intercourse was not confined to the Nazis, and no wonder, since it was his business to be and act as a man of international community.

His name may be found in the list of the membership of such a rightish political group as Genrosha and Kokurūkai. I know not what their real activities were, but if they were for aggressive wars, Yokoyama must have utilized his membership for so leading them as not to make themselves the countrymen of the world, as can be plainly seen from his cherished principles. Or what is more probable, because Yokoyama was a man of Asiaticism, such organizations, by misrecognizing the true meaning of his Asiaticism, had the presumptuousness of including his name in their membership without his formal knowledge. The purpose itself may have been the same, but the means of its attainment was contrastively different.

If he had been such a man as to pursue the aggressive policy in concert with the military clique, he would have surely amassed colossal fortunes in view of his wisdom and energies. As it was, he has never had little more than his homestead. To put it more precisely, his family, with its master from home so long, is in difficulty of living. It is a fact that he has a fine, spacious residence so situated as to command a fine view of Mt. Fuji. But that he needs not

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for his luxurious living, but for securing inspirations and heavenly revelations, that is, for carrying out what he believes to be his heaven-ordained mission. For all the gaiety marking his association with men of prominence, Japanese and foreign, his own individual diet was strictly moderate. This is why he can go on, taking no longer sleep than 3 to 4 hours. Whenever queried whencesoever spring his untiring energy, promptly comes the following out of his lips as he points toward the Heaven:

"When the idea of money and fame is in his mind, man is apt to get weak, and cannot sleep off his fatigue, but when he lives, as I do, in conformity with the Providential will, his mind will always be free of worries. This is how I can work on at this advanced age."

In the above remarks, too, he may be found at his truest and barest being. He is one plain yet noble product of Heavenly artistic work. — an existence diametrically opposite to that of anything like a war-criminal. To act for and only for the peace of the world is the only course necessarily formed for himself from his own being that seeks to be ever consistent with and obedient to the Voice of Providence. To act otherwise, or to take any other course is a psychological impossibility to him — an impossibility as absolute as the physical impossibility of swimming over the Pacific Ocean. This is a point of paramount importance to be noted, in an attempt to get at the truth and reality.

The pitiable plight of present Japan is what has been brought about, after all, by its failure to grasp the true and the real, in the matter of not only legal prosecution and court judgment, but general administration, always content, as it was, with what is formal and on surface. The true war criminals are as before pointed out still at large, and the only Knight of Peace is still at Sugamo. For the sake of General MacArthur's fame, for the sake of the Supreme Commander's continued and complete success in his Japanese administration, it is proved that the above raised point may receive due attention of the authorities.

Let the writer repeat, for the fact could never be too much emphasized, that it was because Japan was full of hypocrite that the country carried on such a meaningless war at the expense of all the peoples on earth. Yokoyama was the only man of character in the truest sense of the term, who could stare straight at his conscience, and who could stand before God, without the least uneasiness.

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What cannot be overrepeated is the gravely criminal nature of that delinquent attitude with which Japan's upper class leaders looked over unconcernedly the multitudinous slaughter in the Pacific in pursuance of the entirely meaningless hostilities, even after its navy was practically annihilated. The Japanese of that very category are in name and fact war-criminals who were all oblivious of God. Japan confined Yokoyama until the war was over, the only peace-worker and believer in peace to the marrow, who was listening to the Providential revelations as he strolled about his residential garden in meditation by the mornings and evenings. It was only too natural that Japan was forsaken by God. Japan's present misery comes not necessarily of the poverty of material civilization only, but of its oblivion of the heaven and God. Without unlearning that, all Japan is still desperate after goods, attributing all to its low level of material civilization.

According to Yokoyama, all that pitiful state of affairs in Japan is "due to the wrong educational policy of the past 70 years, a policy that attached too much importance to formalism; that neglected proper religious education; and that threw classics and Providence into utter oblivion; a policy in short that encouraged a selfish theory of seeking advance or promotion at the cost of others in defiance of the divine will and rule which permits prosperities, only where all may fall in line and form one harmonious group."

The earlier he is released the better it will be for all. The writer is his legal counsellor, but my present appeal for his release is by no means for his individual benefit, but for the peace of the world that God created.

There is one more thing of no less importance that ought to be pointed out in this connection in regard to the country's internal condition. To intern a person on the part of the authorities while prosecuting the war makes it plain even to the child that their motive thereof lay in the pursuance of the hostilities. This is as much as to say that such authorities lay themselves open to charges as war-criminals. They might, therefore, insist, whenever occasion requires, that Yokoyama was no peace mover. However, their arrest of Yokoyama for internment while the war was in progress ~~per~~ bears an eloquent witness to the fact that he is a most transparent peace advocate. The superintending authorities are requested not to be misled by their sophistry.

Last of all, a short reference may be made to his relation with Soviets. What put an end to the Japanese statesmen's

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continued perpetration of war crime was the atomic bomb. But Soviets' declaration to participate in the war against Japan must be taken as an additional factor. Yokoyama's plan was to bring the hostilities to a close before things came to such a pass. He used to observe that Soviets and Japan ought to be ever in friendship even from the stand point of political geography, since their friendly relation is what God wills.

If he took any particular interest in Soviet conditions and news thereof, that was as is clear from the above by no means with malice to the Soviets, but for promotion of mutual understandings by removing the Soviets' possible misimpressions about Japan of which he was afraid. It was just on his line of business, therefore, to do so as an objector to the war, and as a man of international community.

In fact to work out a peaceful understanding with Soviets was always what hung uppermost in his mind in the interest of the general peace. This can be readily admitted by whoever has been following what the writer has thus far stated. Nothing can be more absurd than imagining such a man of peace cause as Yokoyama to have had in contemplation anything like hostilities with Soviets. He declares with every confidence that he is in a position to be regarded by Soviets with gratitude if at all. "Whatever I did and said about Soviets was for nothing but the realization of the Soviet-Japanese understanding and for the general world peace through it."

Thus he was, as he is, the first and foremost promoter of peace in Japan, who is neither an opportunist nor a fence-sitter, but a literally heart and soul martyr of peace for the mankind. One paradoxical wonder is the fact that with all his own devotion to and faith in the world peace, Yokoyama could remain unapprehended until January, 1945. This wonder, however, hardly survives the recollection of the afore-emphasized fact that "he might have gladly accepted monetary gifts from peace advocates, but that he did never get even a farthing from the military whom he wanted to control for his own purpose and policy of peace."

There is another fact that solves the above puzzling point with greater positiveness. What can that be at all? General Tojo, the boss of the militarists, was looking at Yokoyama askance from before the latest war advanced very far. This is plain from the fact that he was at length interned notwithstanding the misbelief that obtained in some section of the observers that Yokoyama could remain free because of his intimate intercourse with the military circles.

The fact was that Yokoyama had under his thumb some of the military police officers from those in responsible positions downwards. They defended Yokoyama as far as possible as military cooperator, whenever an order was received from the General for his arrest. This is what I had in mind when I stated before in this Representation that Yokoyama

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was trying to work out his "studied plan" to realize his policy of peace-reestablishment, instead of remaining content with revolving the peace cause upon the mind only.

If he had been a cooperator with the military leaders; and executor of war; a man of aggressive policies, or a man who would and could resort to wrong measures even, if necessary for attaining his object, that is, if he had not been a man not to fear God, then he might have received money from the military party, but could have never been in need of trying to pack the latter.

Japan is now as you see on the verge of collapse from chaotic confusion, because the country is full of those opportunists who have their "world peace" theory on their lips only, without either solid faith to stand upon, or practical knowledge about means of operation. With Japan, however little influential once thrown in confusion, political or economic, the whole world could never enjoy real peace intact, nor could the attainment of the Allied Powers' occupation object be ensured.

The writer is firmly convinced that in order to be true to the real cause of the world peace, this is high time for the superintendent authorities here to make the best of Yokoyama who is the harbinger of peace and who is so well acquainted with the domestic condition of the country. The writer, too, is one anxiously interested in politics, domestic and international, and as such and as such only has a deep concern about Yokoyama's release at this juncture. To me the private interest of Yokoyama is nothing as it is so to himself as well.

If you should find any points raised in this Representation open to doubts, or criticisms, the writer is willingly prepared to present himself for necessary explanations upon notice. If Yokoyama were an obstructor of the world peace, the writer would be the first to appeal to you for his "life-long detention." With that much faith it is, that the writer has prepared this Representation to tender to you, my most respected Prosecutors in the General Headquarters for the Allied Powers.

-THE END-

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
 AND  
 UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

ROUTING SLIP

FROM: SGS DATE: 1 Apr 1947

- TO:
- |                           |                     |
|---------------------------|---------------------|
| Commander-in-Chief _____  | Ordnance _____      |
| Aide-de-Camp _____        | Prov Marshal _____  |
| Chief of Staff _____      | Pub Relations _____ |
| Deputy C of S AFPAC _____ | Quartermaster _____ |
| Deputy C of S SCAP _____  | Signal _____        |
| Secy, General Staff _____ | Sp Services _____   |
| G-1 _____                 | Transp _____        |
| G-2 _____                 |                     |
| G-3 _____                 | Civ Comm _____      |
| G-4 _____                 | Civ I&E _____       |
| Adjutant General _____    | Civ Int _____       |
| Antiaircraft _____        | Civ Prop Cust _____ |
| Cent Purch _____          | Civ Transp _____    |
| Chaplain _____            | Diplomatic _____    |
| Chemical _____            | E&S _____           |
| Civ Personnel _____       | Gen Acct'g _____    |
| Engineer _____            | Gen Proc _____      |
| Fiscal _____              | Government _____    |
| Hq Comdt _____            | Int'l Pros _____    |
| I&E _____                 | Legal <u>✓✓</u>     |
| Inspector General _____   | Nat Resources _____ |
| Judge Advocate _____      | Public H&W _____    |
| Medical _____             | Stat & Rpts _____   |

- FOR:
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|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| Approval _____             | Note and Return _____ |
| Comment or _____           | Dist'n Desired _____  |
| Concurrence _____          | Signature _____       |
| Information _____          | Dispatch _____        |
| Initials _____             | Attachment of _____   |
| Issuance of Orders _____   | Reference _____       |
| Necessary Action <u>✓✓</u> | File _____            |

FOR MAJ. KING

*[Signature]*

LEGAL SECTION

ROUTING SLIP

FROM: Law DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

CHIEF SEC. <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	TO:
EX. O. _____	DOC. ANAL. _____
ADM. O. _____	SUPPLY _____
PROS. DIV. _____	BRITISH _____
INVS. DIV. _____	AUSTRALIAN _____
APPREHENSION _____	CANADIAN _____
LAW DIV. _____	NEW ZEALAND _____
LIAISON _____	DUTCH _____
P.R.O. _____	CHINESE _____
RECORDS & FILES BR. _____	PERSONNEL O. _____
PHOTOSTAT _____	
COM-MARIANAS _____	

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FOR:

Signature _____	ACTION _____
Information _____	Note & Return _____
Initials _____	Dispatch _____
Comment & _____	File _____
Concurrence _____	

*this is one of the 1 A's  
that you requested information  
for*

OK

Date: 11 April, 1947

Report of Investigation Division, Legal Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Inv. Div. No. 2281	CRD No.	Report by: BURTON R. PATTERSON Major, A.C., 0478161
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Title: Yui YOKOYAMA

Synopsis of facts:

Subject 65 years old. Born FUKUOKA. Has past criminal record. Follower of Mitsuru TOYAMA. Member of Civil Intelligence Bureau. Spy for Tokyo (Military Police) Gendarmerie. Associate of STAHLER. Friend of Chandra BOSE. Exchanged information with VARGAS and French news service. Arrested as International spy by Jap Prosecution Bureau before conclusion of war. Released for lack of evidence. Apprehension requested per CIS Memo dated 1 December, 1945. Interned SUGAMO Prison 15 January, 1946. Retention in custody recommended pending further investigation.

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DETAILS

At Tokyo:

This investigation is predicated upon verbal instructions of the Secretary of the General Staff, GHQ, SCAP.

This individual's apprehension was requested per CIS Memo dated 1 December, 1945 and he was interned at SUGAMO Prison on 15 January, 1946.

On 3 April, 1947, a check was made of the files of the IPS, and the following information pertinent to Yui YOKOYAMA was disclosed:

The following report was obtained from the files of CIS on 10 December, 1945:

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
Office of the Chief of Counter-Intelligence

Source: Japan Industry and Economics --- 4 December, 1945  
SUBJECT: Yui YOKOYAMA

Distribution:

- 1 Pres. Div.
- 1 CRD
- 1 Col. Carpenter ✓
- 1 IPS
- 4 Inv. Div. (File 2281)
- 1 Fukuoka Office
- 1 Major B. R. Patterson

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Possessed unknown powers among the upper class

Among the 59 war criminals taken into custody, YOKOYAMA, Yui (64 yrs. old), is not generally known. He comes from Fukuoka-ken but is presently residing at Chigasaki, Kanagawa-ken. The extent of his power is a source of mystery when his past record of four convictions is taken into account.

He was a subordinate of TOYAMA, Mitsuru, and joined the GENYOSHA and was a close friend of HIROTA, Koki. He established the Civilian Information Bureau and called himself a "civilian diplomat". As a spy of Tokyo Military Police Force, he collaborated with the Rightist faction and possessed mysterious powers among the higher military, political and governmental officials of the time.

Right after the outbreak of the war, he associated with STAHRER, German Ambassador to Japan, and gave the latter various detailed diplomatic and administrative information of Japan. After the retreat of the German Army from Stalingrad, he devoted himself to the Russo-German peace negotiations.

He was also a close friend of Chandra BOSE and exchanged important information with VARGAS, Philippine Ambassador to Japan, and also with the employees of the ARVAUS News Service of France.

Right before the conclusion of the war, he was arrested as an international spy by the Prosecution Bureau but was released later due to lack of evidence. (Ref: 175-3)

Case #175-5, Re: Yui YOKOYAMA, reads as follows:

On 4 December, 1945, CIS files reflect the following information on personnel indicted as war criminals and ordered apprehended 3 December, 1945:

Has never had any regular above-suspicion business but who none-the-less moved in widely different circles before and during the war, maintaining quarters in the Imperial Hotel and entertaining lavishly Nazi and neutral diplomats. He acted at one time as publicity agent for Manchurian Heavy Industries Co. Ltd., later in the same capacity for Fusanosuke KUHARA. At another time he had "headquarters" in the Sanno Hotel, frequented by the notorious Seigo NAKANO (late leader of the Fascist TOHOKAI). He apparently had close contact with the Black Dragon Society, as he was the man who in 1941 arranged a meeting with Mitsuru TOYAMA for visiting Chilean diplomats. Close relationship with the German Nazi group and with the KEMPEI is indicated by the fact that he was frequently seen with such people as HANKE, KINDERMANN, MEISINGER and men known to be connected with the Military Police. He had some sort of connection with the SORGE Spy Case as he is known to have requested a special interview with MEISINGER on the subject.

YOKOYAMA should be apprehended because of his close relationship with the Kempei Tai suggesting that he might be an agent, and because of his associations with ultra-nationalists and Nazis. (Ref: 175-5)

CIC Report, dated 7 January, 1946, re: Yui YOKOYAMA, reads as follows:

A check on the 80th CIC files reflects the following information on subject. (The 80th CIC Unit was redesignated and is now the 25th CIC Unit):

PRISON RECORD:

1911 - 3 years for illegal purchase of government forest land.

- 1924 - 2 years; charge, fraud. While secretary to Yuskie OZAKI, well known politician, YOKOYAMA unlawfully procured 70 tons of rice.
- 1936 - 2 years for breach of faith. Subject failed to repay 500,000 yen loan from Meiji GINKO.
- 1937 - Violated voting law. Subject bought and sold votes for a member of the lower house.
- 1945 - Arrested on three charges: (a) Selling information to Germans. (b) Accepting bribes from SHITOTSUMATSU (HITOTSUMATSU) Masaji, President of Tokyo Oil Co. (c) Black marketing.

Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Police files.

A check with the ASAHI SHIMBUN "Morgue" disclosed a news story on YOKOYAMA's personal history which in translation appears as follows:

"YOKOYAMA is 65 years old. Was born in Fukuoka Prefecture. Had four criminal offenses in the past. As a fellower of TOYAMA, Mitsuru, he entered the "GENYO" Society (non-parliamentary party). He spent his youth as a backstreet gang leader. Has committed fraud and embezzlement, one of his famous crimes being in the Taisho Era when he secretly sold government lumber at Hokkaido. Sentenced three years. In 1942, he was caught committing some kind of illegal act involving the General Elections. Through the "GENYO" Society, he became an intimate friend of HIROTA, Koki. Was a member of the Civil Intelligence Bureau, in which position he won the confidence of political and diplomatic circles. YOKOYAMA also worked as a spy for the Tokyo (Military Police) Gendarmerie. He did a spectacular job with the Rightist party during the war.

"He had an intimate association with a German named KLIMITZ. Had an interview with Dr. STAHRER, the German Ambassador to Japan. YOKOYAMA was thoroughly a German tool. He obtained full information on Japanese government circles. Through the "HIKARI" (Shine) Southern Army Counter Intelligence Organ, he became acquainted with Chandra BOSE. YOKOYAMA brought in correspondence from VARGAS (Philippines) and ABAS (France) exchanging this for other information."

At this time, ATIS and CIS files reflect nothing on YOKOYAMA. All other existing sources have been exhausted. (Ref: 175-6)

IPS Memorandum, dated 18 January, 1946, states that Yui YOKOYAMA was assigned to Group B, and reads as follows:

"The following person, assigned to Group B for interrogation and consideration, has been placed in custody: YOKOYAMA, Yui - Confined Sugamo Prison, 15 January, 1946" (Ref: 175-6)

IPS Memorandum, dated 24 January, 1946, reads as follows:

"A review of File No. 175 reflects that it contains information which may be of interest to members of Group "C".

"This information is forwarded for such action as may be deemed appropriate." (Ref: 175-9)

IPS Division Memorandum, dated 1 March, 1946, states that the following named persons conducted investigations for the Japanese Government on Yui YOKOYAMA. They were all members of the Special Police of the Foreign Sections: Saburo NAKANO, Giseku KUROYANAGI, Taiji YAMAZAKI. This memorandum also stated that one Takezo MATSUMOTO, a professor at Meiji Imperial University, is reported to be a friend of YOKOYAMA and may be in possession of information regarding him. (Ref: 175-12).

On 26 February, 1946, the following statement was made by Yui YOKOYAMA in which he explains the source of his incomes:

In 1914, that was during the Okuma Cabinet, I held an important post because of my relationship with the Justice Minister, OZAKI. Taking the opportunity of the general election which was held at that time, I received from Kinjiro KADA, a business man whom I had been on intimate terms for a long time, the sum of ¥ three million. Out of the ¥ three million, I used ¥ two million for election expenses and other political purposes, and the remaining ¥ one million I kept for myself to be used for political purposes which I needed for the next ten or so years of my political career and also for my living expenses.

Business man Kinjiro KADA was affiliated with various sorts of enterprises and was especially keen on the rice stock market, being an influential character in that world. In 1914, the price of rice was very low and a "koku" of rice was only nine yen. It was extremely difficult for the farmers to maintain their living on such prices of rice, and in the Hokuriku District there occurred a rice riot caused by the farmers.

The Okuma Cabinet decided on the policy of raising the price of rice to fourteen yen per "koku", a measure that was necessary for the actual welfare for the farmers and also to serve as an election counter-move which was announced just prior to the general election. Kinjiro KADA, who was fully informed through me about this before the announcement was made, reaped huge profits by utilizing his long years of experience and the powerful organs that were in his control. It was for this reason that he donated to me the aforementioned ¥ three million.

In 1928, during the Tanaka Cabinet, when I organized the new party headed by Takejiro TOKONAMI, I received ¥ five million from Gokichi MATSUMOTO who was then a secretary to Prince SAIONJI and also a member of the Peerage.

Of the five million yen, I used three million in the organization of the new party and the general election and also to pay for expenses in the China trip. The remaining two million yen was set aside to be used for my political career and others which I have spent until today.

My friendship with Gokichi MATSUMOTO began in the latter part of the Meiji period and our close friendship has been kept up in our public and private life.

After the close of the special Diet which occurred just after the general election, he (MATSUMOTO) visited me as the messenger of Premier TANAKA. In reply, I called upon the Premier at his official residence and arranged the plan of establishing the new party headed by TOKONAMI.

The following day, MATSUMOTO called upon me again and we went over the details together regarding the organization of the new party, and it was at that time that MATSUMOTO promised to supply all the necessary funds and would be given to me directly. Since I found it necessary to know exactly the source of those funds from the standpoint of TOKONAMI, I asked about this to MATSUMOTO in which he replied that the funds, of course, will not be supplied by the government but from a wealthy Taiwanese by the name of LING whom MATSUMOTO is on intimate terms. After several months, I was introduced to the manager of the LING household, which I, in return, introduced this manager to TOKONAMI. (Ref: 175-13)

A statement was made by YOKOYAMA in which he explains his membership in the GENYOSHA and his efforts to further the peaceful relations of Japan, Korea and China. In this statement, subject stated that at the age of 13 he first became interested and took a more or less active part in the GENYOSHA which was founded in 1870 by Mr. TOYAMA and his associates. The purpose of this organization, according to YOKOYAMA's interpretation, was to promote patriotic enterprises befitting the new era.

YOKOYAMA stated that the biggest internal event in the early part of Meiji which shook the foundation of the Empire, was the civil war of 1877, that broke out as the result of Takamori SAIGO's so-called "Korea must be conquered" argument and his subsequent resignation as senior state councillor. Mr. TOYAMA was 18 years of age when SAIGO resigned in 1872.

In 1899 when YOKOYAMA was 17, he stated that he indulged in big talk concerning national politics and world affairs. According to TOYAMA, Mr. SAIGO's policy was not the conquest of Korea but friendship with Korea. He stated: "If we are sincere we can become brothers with Korea and with China too. If Japan, Korea and China become brothers, peace in the Orient can be secured."

In reference to this policy, YOKOYAMA states: "Acting on the above mentioned creed and policy, I sponsored the organization of a new political party with Mr. TOKONAMI as its head in August 1928. Mr. TOKONAMI was the most popular figure in political circles at that time and I also succeeded in settling within a day the Shantung Expedition problem and the consequent Chiang-Kai-Shek Government's anti-Japanese boycott, for which settlement the Tanaka Cabinet had spent six months without any prospects of success in sight."

YOKOYAMA further stated that his diplomatic views and policy always tended to disagree with those of the authorities, especially so during the recent war, with the result that they even held him in custody for about seven months. The Manchurian Incident occurred two years and eight months after his return to Japan from Nanking. Soon after the out-break of this fatal event, he made public an essay entitled "Where Are the Japanese Going To?" wherein he emphasized that the Manchurian Incident would develop into a Sino-Japanese war and then finally into a world war. (Ref: 175-14)

Following are incidents of Yui YOKOYAMA extracted from an interview with Special Police (Jap) Agent who investigated subject:

4 March 1946

1. Prison Records: (Report Halloran SA 1/7/46. File #175)
  - (a) 1911 - 3 yrs. illegal purchase of government forest land.
  - (b) 1924 - 2 years fraud (unlawful procurement 70 tons of rice).
  - (c) 1936 - 2 years breach of faith (failure to repay ¥ 500,000 loan from Meiji GINKO.
  - (d) 1937 - Violation of voting law in buying and selling votes for a member of the lower house. (No disposition given).
  - (e) 1945 - Three charges: (1) Selling information to Germans; (2) Accepting bribes from Masaji SHITOTSUMATSU (SHITOTSUMATSU), Pres. of Tokyo Oil Co., and (3) Black marketing. (No disposition given).
2. Police Investigations: (Interview with NAKANŌ, Saburo, by Mr. Hyde - 1/28/46):
  - (a) 1940 - By Kempai-Tai on theory subject was a spy; dropped because of pressure by some staff officer.

- Following is a list of individuals who have shown the slightest suspicion of being a spy:
- (b) 1942 - By one KAJI, police inspector; dropped because it would involve members of Special Higher Police. (Reason for investigation not given.)
  - (c) Oct. 1943-Jan. 1944. By one YAMAZAKI on theory subject was spy because of relations with foreigners and extravagant living; dropped because of pressure from higher police officials.
3. Arrested as an international spy prior to Japan's defeat but released because the more subject's affairs were probed, the more notable Japanese were involved in his acts. (Mainichi Shimbun newspaper 12/4/45).
  4. Loan of ¥ 3,000,000 in 1914 from KADA, Kinjiro. At this time subject was secretary to OZAKI, Justice Minister. Loan reported for political purposes and election expenses; ¥ 2,000,000 used for latter. Basis of loan tip-off given by subject to KADA on Government's intention to subsidize rice purchases (Statement of subject 2/26/46).
  5. Loan of ¥ 5,000,000 from Gokichi MATSUMOTO, in 1928, for organization of new party headed by Takejire TOKONAMI. ¥ 3,000,000 used for organization. These funds supplied by a wealthy Taiwanese named LING. (Statement of subject 2/26/46).
  6. Subject claimed to have received ¥ 300,000 in 1941; ¥ 500,000 in 1942 and between ¥ 600,000 and ¥ 700,000 in 1943-44 from SHITOTSUMATSU (HITOTSUMATSU), Masaji, in return of saving SHITOTSUMATSU (HITOTSUMATSU) from bankruptcy. This incident related to 2 (c). (Interview with NAKANO, Saburo, by Mr. Hyde, 1/28/46).
  7. 1942 caught committing some illegal act involving the General Elections. This may tie-up with 2(b). (Report Halloran SA, 1/7/46 - File #175)
  8. Member of Civil Intelligence Bureau winning confidence of political and diplomatic circles; time unknown. (Halloran's report).
  9. Spy for the Tokyo (Military Police) Gendamerie - time unknown (Halloran's report.)
  10. Established the Public Information Bureau and received an audience by the Emperor "as a spokesman of the people." Time unknown. (Mainichi Shimbun newspaper 12/4/45).
  11. Planned to negotiate peace between Russia and Germany following Germany's withdrawal from Stalingrad (Newspaper article 12/4/45).
  12. Believed to have been mixed up with black market operations with the Taiwan Sugar Co. (Interview NAKANO, Saburo, by Mr. Hyde 1/28/46).
  13. Maintained suite at Imperial Hotel with lavish entertainment of Italian, German, Turkish and Finnish diplomats; time unknown. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
  14. Lavish entertainment of Japanese officials, i.e., Home Ministry, Foreign Ministry, police and Kempei-Tai. Time unknown (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
  15. Set up organization called Civil Intelligence Bureau (Minkan Johobu). Time unknown. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
  16. Believed subject worked occasionally for the Kempei-Tai and noted as an undercover agent. Time unknown (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)

Following is a list of individuals who have shown the slightest connection with YOKOYAMA. This list was extracted from IPS File 175-15, and dated 4 March, 1946. Reference stated that undoubtedly many of the individuals herein listed have been interrogated. The list is incomplete and will have to be supplemented as new names appear.

1. ARAKI, Sadao - Subject presented him with whiskey and sugar; confined to Sugamo Prison (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
2. IKEDA, Hiroshi - Member Black Dragon (File #226)
3. KADA, Kinjiro - Loaned subject ¥ 3,000,000 in 1914. (Subject's statement 2/26/46) - Ref: 175-13
4. KAJI (Fnu) - Police inspector of Gaiji-Ka; investigated Subject in 1942; now reported in Manchuria (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
5. KANAHARA, Shinchiro - Member Black Dragon (File #226)
6. KLIMLIZ - German entertained by subject at Imperial Hotel. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
7. HIROTA, Keki - Member "Genyo" (Genyosha Society); Ex-Premier; an intimate friend of subject; confined to Sugamo Prison. (Halloran S.A. Report 1/7/46, File #175).
8. KOWATARI, Shin - Member Black Dragon (File #226)
9. KUHARA; Brother-in-law of AYOKAWA, President of Manchoukuo Heavy Industries Corp. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
10. KUHARA, Funanosuke - very closely attached to subject in business dealings; not confined but directive ordered apprehension by 11/17/45
11. KUROYANAGI (or KUROYAMA) Gisaku - worked under NAKANO and investigated the subject; believed to be in Tokyo. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
12. KUZUO, Yoshihisa - President of Kokuryu-Kai (Black Dragon) Confined to Sugamo Prison (File #226).
13. Manager of LING household. See subject's statement 2/26/46 - Ref: 175-13.
14. MATSUMOTO, Gokichi - secretary to Prince SAIONJI and loaned subject ¥ 5,000,000 for Tokonami's party use; close friend of subject in public and private life. (Subject's statement 2/26/46) Ref: 175-13
15. MATSUMOTO, Takezo: - professor at Meiji Imperial University and head of Nisei League. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
16. NAKANO, Saburo: - Former member Special Higher Police (Gaiji-Ka). Has been interviewed by Hyde, 1/28/46.
17. OBARA or (OHARA), Noashi - member of House of Peers; Former Minister of Justice (OKADA Cabinet 1934-46); subject was his secretary (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46).
18. OBATA, Toratoro: - Member Black Dragon (File #226)
19. OGATA, Taketura: Vice President of Genyosha; not confined directive ordered apprehension 12/6/45.
20. OZAKI - Justice Minister 1914; subject was his secretary (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
21. SAICHI, Iwao - Member Black Dragon (File #226)

22. SAKAI, Rokusuke; member Black Dragon (File #226)
23. SAWADA, Kiniko - wife former vice-minister of Foreign Affairs supplied subject with information (Newspaper clipping Mainichi Shimbun 4/12/45).
24. SHINDO, Kazuma: - President GENYOSHA; confined to Sugamo Prison (File #177)
25. SHITOTSUMATSU (HITOTSUMATSU) Masagi- 1940-44 gave subject \$1,400,000 (See Incident #6) (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
26. SHORIKI, Matsutaro - Newspaper publisher; confined to Sugamo Prison; interrogated by Horwitz and Hauxhurst 1/21/46. In interrogation said he feared the GENYOSHA. Might be well to see if SHORIKI knows subject (File #181)
27. STAHRER or (STAMER) - German Ambassador to Japan; entertained by subject at Imperial Hotel (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46 and Halloran S.A. Report 1/7/47, File #175)
28. SUGIYAMA, Harris: - member radio broadcasting station; supplied subject with information (Newspaper clipping 4/12/45)
29. SUZUKI, Ichero: - Member Black Dragon (File #226)
30. TAIWAN Sugar Co. - Subject reported mixed up in black market with same (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
31. TOKONAMI, Takejiro - Subject in 1928 organized a new party headed by this individual. (Subject's statement 2/26/46) Ref: 175-13.
32. YAMAZAKI, Taiji - Assisted NAKANO; investigated subject Oct. 1943 - Jan. 1944; reported to be in Tokyo. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
33. YASUNO, Majer - Majer of Kempei-Tai; through him subject worked as undercover agent. (NAKANO's interview 1/28/46)
34. YOSHIDA, Masuse - Member of Black Dragon (File #226)

(Reference for above information: IPS File 175-15)

Statement was made by Yui YOKOYAMA on 27 February, 1946 in relation to the rise of military control in Japan in which he discusses the role of Home Ministry Secret Police. In this lengthy statement, YOKOYAMA describes several outstanding incidents which occurred during that period. First, the so-called "March Incident", which became the fatal factor of bringing Japan into her present fate, was planned to be executed on the 20th of that month following the assassination of Premier HAMAGUCHI at the end of the preceding year. These were followed by the assassination of Premier INUKAI in the "May 15th Incident", then on the 26th February of the following year, the "February 26th Incident." The prevalence of this so-called terrorism threw the people into a depth of fear.

It was YOKOYAMA's opinion in regard to the foregoing incidents that there was a great deal of dissatisfaction and discontent of this prevailing situation of the country especially against party government.

YOKOYAMA stated that the persons who participated in the execution of this terrorism were not only the military officers but also civilians comprising rightist thinkers and many young men who believed in direct action.

YOKOYAMA goes on to describe organization, appointments, etc. during this period. He also describes how the militarists strengthened their "Fortress of Suppression" of the people with the bureaucrats of the Home Ministry as its vanguard, but during the war they went further by abusing the power of the military police to the greatest extent. In other words, terrorism was "legalized." (Reference: 175-16)

In a statement made by YOKOYAMA dated 3 March, 1946, he explains his role in preserving the TANAKA Cabinet (1927-1929) during the crucial troop-boycott phase of early Sino-Japanese relations. YOKOYAMA stated that soon after announcing an extremely firm China policy, the TANAKA Cabinet dispatched the Fifth Division of HIROSHIMA to the Shantung Province and in a very short moment took possession of the railway line between Tsingtao and Tsinanfu and occupied the capital of the province, Tsinanfu. This is when the economic boycott of Japan began. He further describes the general election carried out by the TANAKA Cabinet. At this time, YOKOYAMA called upon Premier TANAKA at his official Foreign Minister's residence and YOKOYAMA was asked if there wasn't some plan on which he could be of help to TANAKA. In this conversation which lasted over three hours, YOKOYAMA stated that he was opposed to the firm diplomatic policy taken against China by the present cabinet and suggested that a new party composed of over thirty representative members be organized.

The new party, centered around TOKONAMI, announced its establishment on August 1, 1928. The proclamation was written by YOKOYAMA, and the words in the head paragraph reading, "Both Japan and China sit in the same boat, destined to live and prosper mutually", formed the backbone of the China policy.

YOKOYAMA stated that after the new party was formed, he made a trip to Nanking and with only one negotiation immediately settled the pending question which stopped the boycott.

YOKOYAMA stated that his closest connection with the TANAKA Cabinet was in the aforementioned case but he never meddled much in internal political affairs.

The TANAKA Cabinet safely carried through the Diet session held between the latter days of 1928 to March of the following year with the assistance of the TOKONAMI Party, but in the end of July resigned en masse. (Ref: 175-17)

Following is a list of informants who had contacts with Yui YOKOYAMA:

1. Father Hildebrand, missionary in Tokyo area. Met subject by chance in 1943, and was offered taxi ride to missionary; did not know subject by name at that time, but impressed by fact subject made driver go over roads which heretofore all drivers had refused to do. Subsequently subject tendered large sums of money to Informant for his missionary, which was refused. Informant then came to know subject by reputation, subject being seen in streets of Tokyo with high Kempei-Tai officials. Although subject unknown to common man, he was regarded with awe and suspicion in high circles. Example of power was removal of discharged Japanese chauffeur from Swiss Compound in matter of hours after Foreign Office had been unable to do the same. Believes subject high in Black Dragon and he is not to be trusted. Madam FAVRE-BRANDT, daughter of first Swiss Minister, who was born in Japan and imprisoned by Japanese despite her neutral standing believes subject could furnish confidential list of persons believed to be enemies of a liberal, democratic Japan.



2. Robert Guillard, French journalist. Subject went to Versailles in Prince SAIONJI's suite and at that time apparently a liberal, but later switched to the extreme right. While subject at Same Hotel the late NAKANO, Seigo (leader of the Fascist TOHOKIA) was a frequent visitor. In 1942 subject sent a Miss TATSUKE, Tasuke, to the French Embassy on position unknown (this woman a dangerous Kempei agent and responsible for arrest of Mrs. MEIJI, nee YAMADA, Kiku, a Swiss woman who had written an anti-Japanese book; Mrs. MEIJI, half French and half Japanese). Informant, on morning after first party with subject, went to his rooms at Imperial Hotel. A plainclothes man attempted to bar his entrance but barging in, informant saw HANDE, a D.N.B. Correspondent, apparently operating a teletype and HARRISS as typist (HARRISS was subsequently succeeded by KINDERMAN as subject's secretary). Never saw the teletype thereafter. On two other visits without warning saw Madame SAWADA who evidenced embarrassment on being found there. During the war, subject made a point of doing small favors for foreign missions, such as rations, etc., and once or twice a year gave elaborate theatre parties for different diplomatic missions. Subject appears to be a power in the Right Wing Groups of Japan and close connection with the Black Dragon. However, on different talks with subject, never able to draw him out fully on questions of Japanese politics. Subject boasted he was strong enough to overthrow the Japanese Government. Subject has wide source of information, for example, knew Mrs. MacArthur most attractive because her Japanese hair girl told subject (this in October 1945).

3. Dr. Earl Kinderman, German. Had been employed part time as interpreter by subject. Subject had interview with Col. MEISINGER regarding SORGE Case but reached no understanding (SORGE, German National and intimate friend of OTT, German Ambassador, executed by Japanese as a Russian spy.) Subject never acted in official capacity but was influential in diplomatic circles and worked behind the scene.

4. Col. E. S. Meisinger, German Army. Had appointment with subject regarding SORGE Case. Subject reluctant or unable to assist in release of SORGE. Subject told informant he was not connected with the Government, but worked only behind the scenes and was instrumental in making top appointments when Cabinet officials were removed and replaced. Informant states subject a definite power in diplomatic circles as attendance to his functions was a "must." Believes, but cannot substantiate, subject was a high official in the Black Dragon.

#### The Report (Harst S.A.)

"It cannot be too strongly pointed out that subject's tremendous power even now makes extremely precarious the position of any person who may be known by him to have given any adverse information about subject. It is the opinion of this agent that this report should be given the greatest possible protection against any possible compromise, if we value the lives of our informants." (11/5/45)

#### LEADS

1. Interview Robert GUILLARD
2. Check with Subject - the SORGE Case.
3. Interview, if possible, Madam FAVRE-BRANDT.
4. Interview Tasuke TATSUKE
5. Check subject regarding Swiss chauffeur incident.
6. If possible, interview Col. Meisinger.

(Reference for above information: IPS File 175-18)

On 8 March, 1946, at Sugamo Prison, Heinrich STAMER, German Ambassador  
Medical Report of Yui YOKOYAMA, dated 11 March, 1946, states that subject was examined on 20 December, 1945 and found to be physically able to withstand incarceration in Sugamo Prison. (Ref: 175-19)

An interview with Mr. TOYOHARA, President of the Tokyo Bar Association, on 8 March, 1946, at the Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan, by Messrs. O'Neill and Parkinson, with Mr. Kanase as Interpreter, revealed that Mr. TOYOHARA did not know YOKOYAMA. When asked "Did you ever hear of lavish parties being given during the war years by any individual at the Imperial Hotel?", TOYOHARA stated he heard rumors of the military spending huge sums in entertainment at the geisha houses and this met with resentment by the general public. He further stated he had no recollection of lavish parties being given at the hotel. However, SATO, now in the Justice Ministry, should have a full knowledge of these affairs. (Ref: 175-20)

Following is a list of intimate friends of Sugiyama HARRISS, German-Japanese social secretary of YOKOYAMA as revealed by CIC files:

Summation of file 80-H-3 at 80th C.I.C., relating to Sugiyama HARRISS, formerly social secretary of Subject (See #28 original individual list)

1. The file shows a wide range of interrogations involving approximately 10 to 15 individuals. Except for background of HARRISS nothing much of importance is developed; also, extensive interrogation concerning subject but nothing definite. HARRISS reported to have shown up in Delhi around September 1943 in British uniform but got out before apprehended. The British not much concerned as to his entry but concerned as to his exit and this concern unanswered. HARRISS born in Japan of German father, Japanese mother - a Japanese citizen but associated almost exclusively with the foreign set.

2. MARIA PROHASKA, #38 Bluff, Yokohama near American cemetery. Reported present girl friend of HARRISS. Stated: HARRISS pro-Japanese. She worked for subject 15 months (44-45) and subject had abundant supply of money, source unknown (willing witness).

3. Miss IRENE LORD, Marounouchi Hotel, Tokyo, or Karuizawa. Worked for subject for two weeks typing names of guests. Described subject as a political boss, getting people out of police trouble. Knows HARRISS very well. (Willing witness).

4. HARRISS. Introduced to subject by BIRD, an English professor. Taught subject's children English in '43 ('34); took position of social secretary to subject. Subject spent large sums of money and did not seem to be getting anything out of it. HARRISS worked for Ford Motor and Radio Tokyo; associated with foreign set (evidently spent his entire income - had made debts which he was unable to pay). Detained from 1/19/45 to 5/2/45 by Japanese police and released because of lack of information. Also Japanese police unable to obtain information from him concerning subject.

5. GEORGE WEED. Office New Kaijo Building. HARRISS reported agent of KEMPEI-TAI as indicated by check on WEED's Japanese papers after telling HARRISS of the same. However, WEED spent a week trying to tie up the connection but was unsuccessful.

6. MISS LOUISE ANDRES, Italian National, presently employed in 80th C.I.C. Unit. Knows HARRISS; has been interrogated fully by Lt. ACKLEY regarding the subject and she knows nothing except the general hearsay. Her association with HARRISS was on a casual social basis. (Ref: 175-21)

On 8 March, 1946, at Sugamo Prison, Heinrich STAEMER, German Ambassador to Japan, was interrogated. STAEMER stated he met YOKOYAMA in 1943 at a large theater party given by subject, but knows nothing of his background. He stated that subject was in close connections with the Russian Embassy and tried to get a contact with all embassies and legations. STAEMER stated that he did not know, nor did he ever hear whom YOKOYAMA was working for but it was his opinion that subject was a secret agent of the Japanese Government. STAEMER said the only reason he received YOKOYAMA at all was because he appeared very often with the Foreign Minister HIROTA, who was a very famous man and quite a good man. (Ref: 244-36).

Mrs. Tatsuko TATSUKE was interrogated on 11 March, 1946, by Mr. Kenneth N. Parkinson, interrogator, in an effort to disclose any information she may have pertaining to Yui YOKOYAMA. Her statement, in substance, reads as follows:

Date and Time: 11 March, 1946. 1600-2100 hours.  
Place : Dai Ichi Hotel, Tokyo, Japan.  
Present : Mrs. Tatsuko TATSUKE  
Mr. Kenneth N. Parkinson, Interrogator  
MATSUDA, Interpreter

Tokyo Address of Mrs. TATSUKE: Mrs. Tatsuko TATSUKE  
c/o Hajime MAYSUMIYA  
Shiba Ku, Takanawa, Kita Machi, #48

Employee of the Foreign Office (Ministry)

Born in Japan - went to France at the age of four and returned to Japan at eighteen - then studied Japanese - married and divorced, have one daughter-home in Karuisawa, Nagano Prefecture.

Worked with Foreign Office since 1931, on and off. Because of her knowledge of French, did translations and listened to French language broadcasts, etc.; broadcasted propaganda in French.

During the years 1941 - 1945, she worked under TAJIRI in the Information Section of the Foreign Section. Being with the office for many years, she knew most of the personnel in Protocol and Information Sections of the Foreign Office.

How she became connected with YOKOYAMA:-

Some time in 1941 Mrs. TATSUKE, who was on good terms with the Kempei Tai was approached by the Kempei Tai, referring that Mr. YOKOYAMA was looking for her. The fact is YOKOYAMA was looking for someone who knew the French people in Japan and one who could speak French. Up to this time, she never did know YOKOYAMA (except that a friend whom she made acquaintance back in France, Mr. Shiro YAMANOUGH, had mentioned to her that an influential man with a civil information office wanted a person who knew the French circles, and he thought that she was the right person). YAMANOUGH formerly had been with the Foreign Office and in France. At this time he was with the Railway Ministry in Japan. Later learned that YOKOYAMA paid 1200 yen to YAMANOUGH for introducing her to him. She went to see Mr. YOKOYAMA at his office in the Imperial Hotel. YOKOYAMA was very polite and nice. He detailed his business was a civilian information bureau, and so needed someone with French connections to introduce him to the French diplomats. She heard tall tales by Mr. YOKOYAMA, how powerful he was in government circles and was personally acquainted with the leaders, including TOJO. He offered that she would be paid well from time to time also. Greatly impressed, she consented to do her part, to introduce her French friends, act as interpreter, and take part in parties and theater entertainments which Mr. YOKOYAMA gave. She was an old friend of Mr. YOKOYAMA to all. She worked in the Foreign Office and saw Mr. YOKOYAMA two or three times a month besides the occasions when she took part

in parties and entertaining of French guests. This continued for eight months, and throughout this period she received about 1300 yen as gifts and spending money. She was always curious and could not understand Mr. YOKOYAMA. He spent a lot of money for parties and other entertaining. A great many people visited his office at the Imperial Hotel - Kempei officials (Majors and lower), police department men, private friends, foreigners, etc. but noticed that no representative leader or man of the government ever visited the place. She believed that he, YOKOYAMA, if truthfully had influence over the leaders of the day, did visit them himself. She had no specific instructions to carry out except to talk to the French friends (Vicky), and get their opinions on various phases of the French situation back in Europe and French-Indo China. France at that time was at its ebb, with the Germans in Africa (before the Allied invasion of Africa). Then Mr. YOKOYAMA's interest in the French waned, and she also did not see YOKOYAMA at all.

Concerning her part at the Foreign Office, she did not report any information to YOKOYAMA, nor was she asked for any.

**Kempei Tai connections:** - Prior to 1941, after the China Incident the Kempei Tai had great power and control over activities of the civilians. She, having foreigners (French) as friends, was always under suspicion and check quizzed on what expired, etc. She finally made sort of a deal with the Kempei Tai that she would report anything she saw of subversive activity or suspicious of her friends to the Kempei Tai, and got along rather well. She also found out, after acquaintance with YOKOYAMA, that the Kempei Tai personnel were being bribed and working for YOKOYAMA.

**Friends of YOKOYAMA at the Foreign Office:** -

**TOMODO** (Chief Secretary of Foreign Office) - Heard YOKOYAMA mention his name quite often - was supposed to be a good friend and good influence.

**YOKOTA** (Foreign Secretary, Protocol Section) - Investigator and examiner - very good friend of YOKOYAMA - believes worked with YOKOYAMA in black market deals (sugar, whiskey, etc., that were to be rationed to foreign diplomatic circles were sidetracked) - to YOKOYAMA and others were made possible by this man. Being a good friend of herself, she cautioned him about the mysterious YOKOYAMA but he just said that he was all right and could take care of himself. She also remembers that when YOKOYAMA's Case came up in 1945, YOKOTA was not even involved.

**Counsel SAIDA** - also of Protocol Section.

**HAGIWARA** - Protocol Section Chief

Knew that Koki HIROTA's name was always used by YOKOYAMA. It was reported that HIROTA received 20,000 yen annually for the use of his name by YOKOYAMA.

**Bribed Kempei Tai Officials** - various field and company rank officers.

Remembers story that YOKOYAMA presented General ARAKI great quantities of meat but was refused. When he tried again for the second time, ARAKI accepted.

At the Swiss Legation, KANEDA was a very good follower of YOKOYAMA.

YOKOYAMA had a Geisha girl friend at Shimbashi (also her friend). Later YOKOYAMA paid her bond and had her for his girl friend, lived by herself.

YOKOYAMA talked about KUHARA, a wealthy man and one who would always give him funds when he needed them. She recalls him saying that KUHARA can't refuse anything I ask, as I have done great favors for him in the past. She learned that once YOKOYAMA took a rap for KUHARA but does not know the details.

She thinks that YOKOYAMA was also connected in some way with the AYUKAWA interests. Whenever people were looking for a job, he would offer to give a hand if the person would like to work for "Nissan" Company run by AYUKAWA (AIKAWA).

Madame SAWADA (daughter of IWASAKI - millionaire and MITSUBISHI tycoon), frequented YOKOYAMA's office, and they were good friends. She thinks some of the money YOKOYAMA spent came from this source.

YOKOYAMA boasted that his power was so great that he could even replace TOJO from his post if he felt like it.

Talking on the situation, when the militarists (KONOYE and TOJO were in power), she thinks that there was a bigger man than the above two who had power and control over everybody. She believes that the big boss politically was and still is today Takio IZAWA, member of the House of Peers. Although considered the leader of leaders, nobody even would mention his name for fear that something may happen. He had a lot of men working for him. Also is known as the real leader of the Black Dragon Society. Even today in local activities or election matters people always seek his advice. His nod alone did formally put men in government office. (But he is still at large). (Ref: 175-22)

Following is an analysis of Document 796, handwritten draft of platform for new party sponsored by YOKOYAMA in 1928 in which he urges cooperation with China:

Doc. No. 796

15 March, 1946

Title and Nature of Document: Handwritten Drafts for the Declaration of a proposed New Political Party.

Date: 1 August, 1928

Location of Original: Document Division

Source of Original: YOKOYAMA through Mr. Parkinson.

Persons implicated: YOKOYAMA, Yui

Crimes to which document applicable: Instigation to aggressive warfare.

Summary of Relevant Points (With Page References)

This declaration propounds the idea of a China-Japan Co-Prosperity sphere, vis. that both countries are "in the same boat" geographically, racially, economically and from the viewpoint of defense was opposed to the idea of imperialism.

Blaming the existing parties for opportunism, lack of principle and of a long range view, this declaration urges education of the people (thought control), gold embargo, etc. (Ref: 175-23)

Document No. 795

Title and Nature of Document: Envelope containing letters from Keikichiro TAGAWA to Yui YOKOYAMA.

Date: 29 August, 1928 - 17 February, 1929

Source of Original: YOKOYAMA through Mr. Parkinson

Persons Implicated: YOKOYAMA, Yui; TAGAWA, Keikichiro

Crimes to which document applicable: Instigation to aggressive warfare.

Summary of Relevant Points

These letters were written at the time when TOKONAMI, TOKOYAMA and TAGAWA planned to form a new, third party in opposition to the two important parties of that time, Minseito and Seiyukai. The envelope contains the following letters:

- (1) Shanghai, 29 August, 1928: Contains report on interview with WANG-CHENG-TING on Chinese-Japanese relations and further travel plans to Hanking and Tsingtao.
- (2) Shanghai, 3 September, 1928: Reports on another interview with WANG-CHENG-TING who blames the Tainan Incident and the sending of troops to Shangtung on TANAKA.
- (3) Dairen, 15 September, 1928: Report on such matters as financial circles in Manchuria, Manchurian Railroads, currency, etc.
- (4) Tokyo, 10 November, 1928: Opinions of TAGAWA re: recruiting of members of the new party from among the Minseitō Party and neutrals and re: China problem.
- (5) Shanghai, 31 December, 1928: Re: Reasons for proposed establishment of a TOKONAMI Cabinet.
- (6) and (7) dated Tokyo 7th and 17th February, 1928, respectively, re: Land taxes.  
(Reference: 175-24)

Following is an analysis of Document 797 regarding plan by YOKOYAMA for cultivation of Chinese cottons:

Document No. 797

15 March, 1946

Title and Nature of Document: Typewritten report entitled "Cotton Cultivation Project in China."

Date: Undated

Source of Original: YOKOYAMA, Yui, through Mr. Parkinson.

Persons Implicated: YOKOYAMA (?)

Crimes to which Document applicable: Aggressive warfare

Summary of Relevant Points:

This document contains a plan for using barren lands of China for cultivation of cotton. Reference to the importance of raw materials for military strength, diplomatic bargaining power and economic warfare is made in the preface. (Ref: 175-25)

Following is an analysis of Document 798, letter of YOKOYAMA to TOKONAMI regarding new political party:

Document No. 798

Title and Nature of Document: Letter from YOKOYAMA to TOKONAMI

Date: 28 March, 1928

Source of Original: YOKOYAMA through Mr. Parkinson

Persons Implicated: YOKOYAMA, Yui; TOKONAMI, Takejiro.

Crimes to which Document applicable: Instigation of aggressive warfare.

Summary of Relevant Points:

This letter urges TOKONAMI to accept leadership of a new party to be founded and assures him of the following of 30 of his disciples.

In the attached envelope are lists of names and government offices which were apparently to be given to these persons in case a TOKONAMI Government realized. (Ref: 175-26)

A report by Mr. Parkinson, dated 19 March, 1946, regarding the chain of authority incident to the arrest and interrogation of prisoners of war and the responsible authority for carrying out of any sentence that might have been issued, does not mention Yui YOKOYAMA or show that he had any connection with treatment of POWs. (Ref: 175-27)

In the following summary of an interrogation of Yui YOKOYAMA, subject's connections with HIROTA, Mrs. SAWADA, KUHARA and IZAWA are revealed:

On money connections with HIROTA: Have not received any money from HIROTA. YOKOYAMA himself loaned HIROTA instead.

Once in 1941 (when HIROTA's father passed away and he made a trip back to Fukuoka) and again in 1942 (HIROTA made a trip to Thailand then).

The above two times totalled about 8,000 yen but it was all returned at a later date.

HIROTA was an intimate friend from boyhood days. Were friends through to the present time. During the war saw him quite often and he being one of the leading old time statesmen, listened to his many advices.

His connections with Mrs. SAWADA: Because of his interest in Niseis, he was introduced to Madame SAWADA by MATSUMOTO, Takizo, president of the Nisei Association of Japan. Madame SAWADA was one of the backers of the Nisei Assn. As he understands it, she spent large amounts of money for the cause. Madame SAWADA is the daughter of a millionaire connected with the Mitsubishi Zaibatsu. MATSUMOTO was professor of English at a school and a follower of YOKOYAMA.

Mr. SAWADA, as far as he knows, had no particular position or job. Do not know him personally nor have met him. Although Madame SAWADA visited him on several occasions, he had never gone to her home.

Asked what part he played in using Nisei for Propaganda purposes and getting information - Mr. YOKOYAMA replied: "I have never used Niseis for propaganda nor had any connections along this charge. Of course, I knew MATSUMOTO and other Nisei boys at the radio broadcasting station who may have done propaganda work. Some of these people were his personal friends. Mr. YOKOYAMA's interest being international fellowship, he was interested in foreigners and Niseis. He sent his oldest son to an American school instead of a Japanese. He sent his two daughters to English Mission School (at Yokohama). He wants to make clear that he is not such a base individual to use English speaking people to work for a cause he himself was against.

Accusing him of having a part in furnishing or influencing Niseis to do propaganda and information work for the foreign office is ridiculous.

To the questions: "Did you know you are making a liar of HIROTA" he replied: "I do not know what HIROTA has said, but I have no connections with the foreign office or did any work under their supervision."

On Mrs. Kikuda YAMADA's Case: Did not know Mrs. YAMADA at all except as a writer and foreigner's wife. He was approached by Mrs. SAWADA for aid to help Mrs. YAMADA from detention. She was being held at Yokohama as a spy suspect. After hearing the details from Mrs. SAWADA and convinced that she was innocent, he consented to see what could be done. Studying the circumstances, she was being detained by the Foreign Section of the Yokohama Police under care of Investigator OURA. He was introduced to OURA through one of OURA's good friends and YOKOHAMA official, Mr. MOGI. Then talking on the case, he learned that they did not have anything particular on the woman. YOKOYAMA argued that she should be released as he was quite certain that this case may develop into an international trouble as Mrs. YAMADA was a Swiss National and wife of a Swiss artist. His point on neutral Switzerland had some affect and very shortly after this, the woman was released. Mrs. YAMADA came to thank him and they became friends. No other influence or pressure was used in the story.

Mr. YOKOYAMA explained that he had helped many others in tight pinches but at no instance did he apply pressure through upper circles for he had none. His several successes were because he jabbed at the right place. In the YAMADA case the influential person was Madame SAWADA so to speak. She had lots of friends in upper circles in offices who could look into the matter and order a release if it was possible - but in Japan this is quite impossible - what starts at lower quarters goes up the line - and it isn't a policy to drop any case if real Japanese laws and methods of investigation were just absolute. YOKOYAMA's method was to catch the right man in charge and lay down good reasons - (nothing else.)

Spending money and helping others was one way to keep out of trouble and be on the right side - besides gaining results many times. He always found a way to approach people - with personal influence only - did not have higher-ups to do the job for him.

Why STAHLER accepted his invitation to attend YOKOYAMA's affairs: When STAHLER is said to have called on the Foreign Office to consult on the matter?

Since STAHLER was not personally acquainted he probably called on the Foreign Office where there were friends of YOKOYAMA's to inquire. Friends in the Protocol Section knew YOKOYAMA quite well.

To the question: "Why he had often frequented the Russian Embassy - at any time and without trouble", he replied: "It is not true. I have not visited the Russian Embassy at all except once a year when invited on November 7 which is USSR Day. Did not attend in 1945."

Connection with KUHARA: Became acquainted with KUHARA back in 1928 during the Tanaka Regime. TANAKA and KUHARA coming from the same Yamaguchi Prefecture were friends. KUHARA financed TANAKA. He was Communications Minister and the big boss of the Seiyukai Party at that time. At all times, KUHARA was looking to become the leader in government affairs - expected to replace TANAKA as Prime Minister - had close connection in those days as YOKOYAMA worked with the Seiyukai Party up to 1931. After the 1,000,000 yen KUHARA note case - both followed separate paths. Had no connection at all from that incident politically. In the 2.2.6 Event in 1936, YOKOYAMA claims there was no connection between he and KUHARA.

KUHARA connection and charges concerning his part in the 2.2.6 Event:

KUHARA although out of political power was still striving for the lead with the Seiyukai followers. Although he was not connected with the young officer elements who took part in the uprising, he knew before the incident what was coming up through one of his men, a civilian (Seiyukai party man) who served as Lobbyist at the House of Peers. This young man being an associate with the young officers learned of their plans and reported same to KUHARA. He stayed at KUHARA's residence at the time the incident took place and KUHARA not only harbored him but gave him money to go into hiding as his life was in danger. When this was learned, KUHARA was implicated as a suspect.

Why others say that YOKOYAMA had an upper hand on KUHARA then? To this YOKOYAMA answered that at first they were good friends and he did his best to help him. KUHARA is a brilliant man and respected but his ideas were with TANAKA - radical and wrong. His policies always lead to war but YOKOYAMA's advice and help got KUHARA out of mistakes. KUHARA had a high esteem of YOKOYAMA for those early days. As KUHARA's policies were belligerent and lead to bad results (especially with China - and also his failure as a Moscow Mission representative), YOKOYAMA got away from him and followed or believed in peaceful moves. YOKOYAMA attributes the fall of KUHARA to his radical ways - and YOKOYAMA's power if he can claim it was because he was a pacifist and worked for peace - the peoples way.



IZAWA, Takie's name was put to questions Mr. YOKOYAMA is not an acquaintance of IZAWA but detests him. Claims that he is the real typical plutocrat. IZAWA though holds no office - is the man behind the scene. He always had a man in key government position. Ex-Home Ministers Fumio GOTO and Shigeo ODAGHI were his followers in home affairs.

In the TOJO Cabinet he played a splendid part. YOKOYAMA cannot understand why he is not under arrest. Also why Lt. General Akira NUTO is also at large. General NUTO and another General Kenryo SATO who are the two militarists who were the main leaders in influencing TOJO. (Ref: 175-28)

A statement was made by Yui YOKOYAMA on 20 March, 1946 in which he discusses in detail his monetary expenditures during war years. In this particular statement, YOKOYAMA describes the various sources of his income from 1928 to 1944. He also lists his many expenditures for this same period. The sources of income were made in the form of donations. Two known sources are from (1) Geichi MATSUMOTO which was received in the year 1928, and (2) Masaji HITOTSUMATSU (SHITOTSUMATSU) who started his contributions or donations to YOKOYAMA in 1939 and continued until 1944.

For about seven months, from 18 Jan. 1945 to August 21, 1945, YOKOYAMA was detained at the Foreign Affairs Section of the Special Service Department of the Metropolitan Police Force. At the same time, HITOTSUMATSU (SHITOTSUMATSU) was similarly detained for about one month. This occurred about the middle of March. They were both detained in regards to their money transactions. YOKOYAMA and HITOTSUMATSU both prepared precise calculations and submitted them to the officials in charge. According to YOKOYAMA's story, not only the amounts of expenditures but also dates coincided. The official in charge of the examination was Police Inspector KUROYANAGI and the chief in charge was Police Inspector Saburo NAKANO. The records of this particular investigation were taken by one Prosecutor AMORI or OMORI. (Ref: 175-29)

Following are notes from a discussion by Mr. Parkinson with Miss TATSUKE, former Kempei agent, dated 19 March, 1946, regarding Yui YOKOYAMA's part in the SORGE Case and in the removal of Rumanian Ambassador BAGURESCO.

Further notes from discussion with former Kempei agent, Miss TATSUKE, Tasuko, at an interview at Room 456, Dai Ite Hotel, 18 March, at night, stated that Mr. TOMADA, the Chief Cabinet Foreign Office Minister, was an alleged friend of YOKOYAMA, Yui. She further stated that TOKKO Division of Kempei-Tai was that unit which terrorized the civilian and foreign personnel during the war and that she saw no change in its conduct in 1945 over 1944. She further stated that the name of the secret society more terroristic than the Black Dragon is as follows: KOKURIYUKAI and believes that TOJO was one of its chief members.

She stated that in reference to the SORGE Case, that SORGE, a German, was in the Russian Service as a spy and that he was constantly observed by Kempei Tai, as well as the civil police, and was arrested by Kempei-Tai; that German Ambassador OTT was much incensed and, seeing SORGE in jail, instructed him to say nothing. Thereafter, OTT went to TOJO seeking the release of SORGE without result and that, thereafter, SORGE talked and was ultimately, along with two Japanese, tried, convicted and executed as a spy over the pretext of the German Ambassador and the German head of the Gestapo in Japan. (For further discussion of this subject, see notes taken at interrogation of Yokoyama, 19 March - Ref: 175-31). (References: 175-30)

An interrogation by Yui YOKOYAMA, dated 19 March, 1946, discloses the following information:

Mr. YOKOYAMA admits gathering information during the war for the Foreign, Greater East Asia, and Home Ministries besides for politicians, police department and the Kempei Tai. He claims that he never in any way or sense sold this information for money, and that it was used for his own personal ideas. Furthermore, he claims to have had no deal with anyone foreign or national in furnishing information, nor did he receive any money for information or protection of any person or organization. Short wave information was gathered from the Foreign Office (Political Affairs Section) from Tatsuo FUKAI and from Masayuki HARADA of the Greater East Asia Ministry.

YOKOTA of the Protocol Section of the Foreign Office had nothing to do with radio information except to help arrange contact with foreigners, according to YOKOYAMA's statement.

YOKOYAMA claims that MINKAN JOHO BU is a name given for his activities by the police department in 1945, and was never used by himself. The meaning of MINKAN JOHO BU is "Unofficial Information Bureau."

YOKOYAMA further claims that he, together with HIROTA, worked on a plan to release all POWs in the Malay Area unconditionally, and had used Col. KAWAMURA of the Kempei Tai Headquarters to deal with the military leaders of the General Staff, but the plan failed.

To the Question: Did you know that HIROTA says: "YOKOYAMA was an espionage agent for foreigners and at the same time worked for the army?", subject answered: "I don't know what HIROTA says about him but I think I had a perfect understanding with HIROTA. We worked together on many problems and I think he is a great leader with broad ideas. (Mr. YOKOYAMA wanted to know if the interrogator heard this direct from HIROTA himself.)"

In this same statement made on 19 March, 1946, YOKOYAMA discusses his part in the removal of Rumanian Ambassador BAGURESCO, and in the SORGE Case.

He states that he, knowing the Minister as a man of bad conduct made a move to oust him. Using Col. Aiso KAWAMURA of the Kempei Tai Headquarters (a friend and influential man among General Staff officers) he succeeded. One day before leaving YOKOYAMA gave an elaborate farewell party for the departing ex-minister. The ex-minister thanked YOKOYAMA for the send off and was never aware of the part YOKOYAMA played towards having him removed.

YOKOYAMA states he had little to do with the SORGE Case. Col. MAESINGER, German Embassy 1st Secretary and Head of the German Gestapo in Japan approached YOKOYAMA to help SORGE who was found guilty of underground committee activities. The idea was to see if something could be done to lighten the charges. YOKOYAMA looked into the matter and visited the head prosecution of the Tokyo local court who was Saburo KANAZAWA but nothing could be done as the case was too strong against SORGE.

To the Question: Does YOKOYAMA know that SORGE was not executed but freed by some means?, subject replied: "Yes, SORGE and I were executed for sure." He stated that the information he had was from an actual witness who saw the execution.

Mr. YOKOYAMA states he did hear rumors and stories on the treatment of American fliers in the spring of 1945. This, however, was after release from detention (Jan. to Aug. 1945). He recalled one incident which happened after peace was declared. That was the execution of a flier captured near Tachikawa. YOKOYAMA states that before authorities could protect him, he was mobbed and killed by civilians. (Ref: 175-31).

The International Prosecution Section requested that the Japanese Government be directed to ascertain the present whereabouts of Masagi HITOTSU-MATSU, a prominent business man in Tokyo, for the purpose of being interrogated. (Ref: 175-32)

On 26 March, 1946, Yui YOKOYAMA was interrogated regarding his relations with VARGAS. YOKOYAMA states his association with VARGAS, the Philippine Ambassador, came about through one Kasuma NAKAYAMA, a Mainland Nisei, who was employed by the Greater East Asia Ministry's Southern Affairs Bureau. With the establishment of the New Philippine Embassy, NAKAYAMA was transferred as interpreter and secretary of the Embassy. He was a student and follower of YOKOYAMA. After being introduced to VARGAS, YOKOYAMA became quite intimate in relations. His interest was to get information through Philippine sources (war news and also general reactionary opinions). In addition, YOKOYAMA sent Takizo MATSUMOTO, Professor at the Meiji University, as special envoy (March 1944 to July 1944) to get good, first hand information from the Philippines on what they thought of Japan. YOKOYAMA states that all information gathered was for making plans for a peace move as he knew from the start that Japan was fighting a fruitless war.

YOKOYAMA was informed that all his statements and sayings are very broad although logical. Still, it sounds fantastic because of his heavy spending and influence. It was pointed out that his connections were many but not made very clear. Some statements point at his being an agent of the Foreign and War Offices, his participation in propaganda work for Japan, his various mysterious relations with foreigners and embassies, his Nisei connections to imbus ultra-nationalistic indoctrination student associations, etc. When asked why people talk about his gathering information, reporting information direct to the Foreign Office, using Kempei Tai to further his purposes and reports to War Ministry, and comment on his huge expenses being paid by the Japanese Government, Mr. YOKOYAMA answered: "I did not receive a single penny from the Government. It is true, I spent money but it was my own money - all of it - I paid Kempei Tai personnel for information and help - and I did pay out money to others also. I can't understand why anyone accuses me of receiving money when I did the paying. YOKOYAMA never at any time stooped that low to betray or work underhanded. I will die (commit suicide) in the way a Japanese expects if I am guilty of any such charges."

YOKOYAMA requested that all persons who made statements and charges against him be brought before him to prove those charges. He claims most of the false accusations came from former police investigators and secret service operators or agents who were against him, and states that these same persons were ordered out of office by SCAP, because of their corrupt activities during the war, therefore, they are very unreliable information. He further charged that Mr. Parkinson fails to understand him fundamentally. His desire is to have all statements scrutinized and thoroughly weighed. When asked whether he would stand as witness on any point if necessary during the forthcoming trials, he answered that he would to the fullest extent. He further stated that he would work and serve for the Allied cause in any capacity (no compensation is necessary). He had actually been working for this day to come - for an international democratized Japan. (Reference: 175-37)

On 21 March, 1946, Yui YOKOYAMA was again interrogated. During this interrogation, he discussed rumors heard about mistreatment of downed Allied fliers. He states that during the months of 1945 when the raids over Japan were severe, he was detained by the Metropolitan Police so all of the rumors were heard after his release in August. During this interrogation, YOKOYAMA explains his connection with AZUMA, a wealthy lumberman who "loaned" him 300,000 yen. He also gave a brief description of his relations with Argentine Minister Montenegro. (Reference: 175-38).

A report on the status of IPS investigation of YOKOYAMA was made by Mr. Parkinson on 21 March, 1946 and reads in part as follows:

The following conclusions have been reached:

- (a) That, the above subject is not suitable for inclusion as a major war criminal in this trial and there is extreme doubt that he would be a suitable subject at any subsequent trial.
- (b) It is quite possible that this individual may be suitable as a witness on certain phases of the conspiracy charges.

The subject is represented and appears to be a man of considerable knowledge and great courage and, furthermore, appears to be anxious to assist the prosecution wherever possible. It is believed that if his testimony should be desired on any phase in which he is informed that insofar as his willingness or knowledge is concerned, he might be safely used. In this connection, however, he appears definitely to have been an information broker necessitating caution in his movements and the use of information perhaps resulting in the above charges against him. Whether or not his reputation is such as to enable him to stand up under cross-examination is a matter of considerable doubt.

He unquestionably knows HIROTA and some others as well or better than anyone in Japan. He is one of the chief men in GENYOSHA Society made up principally of men from the same locality among them being HIROTA. (Ref: 175-39)

On 16 March, 1946, YOKOYAMA made a statement in which he discussed at great length the behind-the-scenes influence of IZAWA, Takio, present Privy Councillor. He also discussed TOJO's characteristic snap decisions and their consequences. (Ref: 175-40)

An interview with Seizaburo TANAKA on March 26, 27, and 28 indicates that YOKOYAMA was a very minor peddler of information with no high connections. TANAKA further gives a long list of friends, acquaintances and part-time employees of YOKOYAMA. (Ref: 175-42).

On 29 March, 1946, YOKOYAMA made a statement concerning the political activities of KUHARA, SAIONJI and ARAKI from 1932 to 1936. (Ref. 175-45). In addition, he also made a statement concerning the activities of KUHARA in Manchuria just previous to the assassination of Chang Tso-Lin. (Ref:175-46)

In a statement made on 22 March, 1946, YOKOYAMA explains the formation of the TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI (Imperial Rule Assistance Association) by Prince KONOYE. He stated that because the TAISEI YOKUSAN KAI collected elements from various quarters at the time of its organization, it became a quite different thing from what KONOYE had deliberately planned. Instead of naturally exhibiting its multifold characters, it turned out to be completely powerless owing to the rivalries and strifes among the internal elements comprising the association. (Ref: 175-48)

On 3 April, YOKOYAMA made a statement concerning the political ambitions and activities of UGAKI, War Minister in the HAMAGUCHI Cabinet. YOKOYAMA describes UGAKI as a character easily prevailed upon by others. (Ref: 175-49)

A check of IPS Files #175-54 through 175-68 shows that YOKOYAMA was well acquainted with the military and political higher-ups in regards to the establishment of various ministries, political affairs, policy and influence. He knows persons involved, but at the same time makes no admissions against himself. Summary of evidence extracted from Files 175-54 through 175-68 are as follows:

Summary of evidence: TOJO begged HIRANUMA to take Ministry of Greater East Asiatic Affairs but HIRANUMA refused and recommended ARAKI who accepted. (Ref: 175-54)

Summary of evidence: Although opposed to TOJO, ISHIHARA cooperated with him in Manchuria. (Ref: 175-55).

Summary of evidence: In 1931 ARAKI's status with the Army was so powerful that he was able to dictate new cabinet after the assassinations of 1931. (Ref: 175-56)

Summary of evidence: The military police, controlled by TOJO, wielded astonishing power over the political world. (Ref: 175-57)

Summary of evidence: OKAWA involved in 15 May 1932 Incident. (Ref: 175-58)

Summary of evidence: HASHIMOTO one of original Executive Members of IRAA (Imperial Rule Assistance Association). (Ref: 175-59)

Summary of evidence: SUGIYAMA and NAGANO held positions as Chiefs of General Staff of Army & Navy (planning) during war. (Ref: 175-60)

Summary of evidence: HIROTA member of GENYOSHA. (Ref: 175-61)

Summary of evidence: KONOYE forced to side with HIRANUMA because of SORGE Case. (Ref: 175-62)

Summary of evidence: HIROTA made trip to Thailand in 1942 (Ref: 175-63)

Summary of evidence: MUTO and SATO influence TOJO (Ref: 175-64)

Summary of evidence: No admissions by subject against himself (Ref: 175-65)

Summary of evidence: No statements by subject against defendants made by other defendants (Ref: 175-66)

Summary of evidence: Incorporates all above statements of evidentiary facts. (Ref: 175-67)

Summary of evidence: Summarized parts played by KOIDO, SUZUKI, HASHIMOTO and MAZAKI in 15 May Incident. (Ref: 175-68)

Memorandum from Central Liaison Office, Imperial Japanese Government, dated 18 April, 1946, listed the addresses of HITOTSUMATSU and FUKUYA as follows:

Masaji HITOTSUMATSU: 191, Sugano, Ichikawa City, Chiba Prefecture.

Shunichi FUKUYA: 200, Yoyogi, San-ya-cho, Shibuya-ku, Tokyo Metropolis. (He frequently stays at his native place, namely, Asa Nariai, Ichinomiya-mura, Kagawa-gun, Kagawa Prefecture).

(IPS Reference: 175-69)

An anonymous letter against Yui YOKOYAMA, addressed to the International Military Tribunal, was received about 16 May, 1946. This letter accuses subject of being an agent for the Kempei Tai, of being purchasing agent for the War Department, and of attempting to swing Spanish support of Axis through military attache of the Spanish Embassy in Tokyo. The writer states YOKOYAMA was an ultra-nationalist propagandist. (Ref: 175-72).

References 175-76 and 175-77 are petitions by Toshiro OKAI, addressed to General Douglas MacArthur, for release of Yui YOKOYAMA and for utilization of his future services after release in the cause of international peace and welfare. In addition to these references, another petition for the release of YOKOYAMA was dated 5 October, 1946. This includes a long eulogy of the subject obviously self-written but signed by OKAI, his attorney.

A check of CIS Files was made on 11 April, 1947. The information contained in these files was the same as that in IPS File 175.

#### CONCLUSION

1. Subject is probably the most mysterious figure in the whole field of Japanese pre-war intrigue. With no means of regular employment, he managed to entertain lavishly Axis and neutral diplomats. Although often under investigation by the Kempei Tai, he is alleged to have worked for them. He is supposed to have had close relations with many nationalistic societies.
2. There are conflicting opinions as to the importance of the role of "master spy" which subject is alleged to have played. Persons close to him have been interrogated and some have painted him as a nefarious character while others speak with awe of his influence and power among military, political and governmental officials.
3. There is, however, sufficient evidence in his file to warrant acceptance of the truth of a statement that he did play some part in the conspiracy against China in the 30's.
4. There are indications that subject was intimate with German and Spanish diplomats and that he may have attempted to swing Spanish support of the Axis; therefore, he would possibly fall under the count of the indictment concerning German-Japanese collaboration.
5. Through the device of giving large theater parties to which he invited prominent foreigners, subject attempted to foster an understanding of Japan's traditional military spirit and her pre-ordained position as the ruler of Asia. At these parties, subject disseminated copies of his own theories on nationalism. It is felt that investigation might uncover evidence to indict him under the count of the indictment pertaining to the preparation of public opinion for war.
6. The source of funds used by subject has never been clearly established and should be further investigated. Subject admits receiving "loans" totaling three million yen from 1914 to 1928 and states that this money was what he lived on up to the present time. These "loans" were received for his efforts in political campaigns. There is nothing in the files to prove he ever received funds from the Government or military officials.
7. Subject has prison record of five arrests. He was last arrested as an international spy in 1945 but the case was dropped for lack of evidence. Some of his previous arrests never resulted in convictions as the investigations were called off from above. Reasons for these unfinished investigations should be determined. Three of his arrests resulted in convictions.

8. IPS Case File No. 175 reveals that the investigation of Yui YOKOYAMA was conducted by Mr. Parkinson, attorney. This was in the nature of a special assignment. The file reveals that the investigation reached a certain point and then suddenly stopped. Presumably, this was due to the fact that YOKOYAMA was being used as a valuable source of information at that time. The investigation was not conducted by the IPS Investigation Division but they assigned one investigator to help Mr. Parkinson. Subject has never been thoroughly investigated.

9. In regards to an interview with one Saburo NAKANO by Mr. Hyde, dated 1/28/46, refer to pages 5 through 8 of this report. Although this particular interview is mentioned no less than nineteen times, it is contained nowhere in the files. A search for same was made of various other files, but with no success. The two persons mentioned, namely, Mr. Hyde and Mr. Parkinson, are not available at this time.

**RECOMMENDATIONS:**

It is recommended that Yui YOKOYAMA remain in custody and a thorough investigation be conducted to determine whether he should be tried or released.

UNDEVELOPED LEADS

The Tokyo Office -- At Tokyo -- Will re-interrogate Saburo NAKANO and set out any additional investigative leads developed by this interrogation.

**P E N D I N G**

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC  
Yokoyama, Yui.

一、會見者ハ昭和十六年十二月七日ノ日及ビ昭和廿年九月二日ノ日ニハ如何ナル職業ヲニシテ女ハリテ井タルカ。答、無職ノ業ナシ。

二、會見者ノ氏名、横山 雄侍

三、會見者ガ本名ノ外使用スル氏名及ビ有名ナル名前ヲ記入セヨ。答、ナシ。

四、生年月日、明治十六年一月七日生。

五、出生地、福岡縣糟屋郡勢門村大字乙大四百三十七番地

六、身長、一三一ポンド。  
七、体重、六〇、一インチ。

八、傷痕、目印、不具ノ有無。答、ナシ。

九、現住地、渠鴨拘置所。

十、住居地、神奈川縣高座郡茅ヶ丘町東海岸八八一番地。



十一、身分証明ノ様式ト番号。  
答、ナシ。

十二、會見者が捕ハレタル時ノ例、ソレト同時ニソノ  
譯、犯案ヲ犯シタルコトガアルカ。

答、昭和十七年十一月、選考手置及ニテ四討金貳  
千円ヲ云後サル。

昭和廿年一月十八日、何等ノ理由モナク、時ノ敬言  
視廳特高課ニ拘引サレ、八月廿日釋放サル。  
十三、會見者ノ現在マデノ最高階級。  
答、ナシ。

十四、會見者ノ業務ノ年代記録、會見者が  
(B) 昭和六年一月一日ヨリ現在マデノ職務ヲ記入  
セヨ。前記記入ノ時、政府力軍機ノ役目ヲ記  
入ノ時ハ、記入者ノ地位ヲ忘レズニ記入セヨ。

答、全生涯ヲ通ジテ此中ニ政界ノ裏面ニテ活動シ  
續ケタルガ故ニ、業務表カト名付クベキモノナク、隨  
テマタ何等ノ役目、地位ヲ占メタルコトナシ。

十五、會見者が翼賛會及ビ地方會、東支支部  
(C) 會及ビ大日本政治會ノ會員及ビ創立者、組織

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者デアウタラ記入セヨ。ソノ外各団体支部組合及ビ特  
別ノ事務ノ編纂系ヲタテテ記入セヨ。

答、十二。

十六、党組合、協会、兄弟商會、會、學子會、協會ノ  
(c) 學子會、政治ノ學子會、軍ノ學子會、愛國ノ學子會、  
博士ノ學子會、教養ノ學子會、名譽ノ學子會、運  
動ノ學子會等ノ會ニテアウタカヲ記入セヨ。何  
事モ前記ノコトガ秘密デモ明記セヨ。

答、玄洋社員。

十七、會見者ノ家族中前記ノ部及ビコレニ関係シテ  
(c) 職務ニ委ハツタリ、マタソノ地位及ビ直接權利  
者又ハ間接權利者ガ井タカ、井タラバ氏名、現任  
部、籍、勤務先名、役柄ヲ記入セヨ。

答、十二。

十八、會費ノ外寄附(金或土地)ヲ自發的ニ力又ハ内訖ニ  
(c) 各關係組合ニ送リテ記入セヨ。ソノ外國民カラ  
カ上長カラカ自發的或ハ強制的ニ寄附シタカ。

答、十二。

十九、會見者ハ前記關係組合カラ、階級、位、勲章、  
(c)

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UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

賞状又ハ各是等ヲ授ハラスルコトガ凡カ。若シアスハ  
各是等ヲ授ハラスル理由、年月日ヲ詳細ニ記入セヨ。  
答、ナシ。

二十、令見者ハB、C、ノ各等ヲ例外トシテ、令見者が昭和  
和六年一月一日カラ軍関係、警備隊等(四木島)、法  
安、公安、刑事等ニ関係スルコトガ凡カ。前記  
ノ年月日、関係令ノ名、又タ関係令ノ最上  
階級、ソレ等又ケル年月日役目。  
答、ナシ。

二十一、昭和六年一月一日カラ令見者が編輯(照名ト  
(E) 編輯者名) 演説(聴衆者人名) 関係  
令カラ頼マレテ送後及ビ編輯等シタナラ  
ソノ令名ヲ記入セヨ。若シ送後及ビ編輯  
等セ又場合ハソノ通リ記入セヨ。  
答、ナシ。

二十二、令見者ハEノ各等ヲ例外トシテ昭和六年  
一月一日ヨリ職務トシテソレガ日本国内又ハ国  
外テ團結監理者及ビ支那人、組合名、役目、  
令見者。  
答、ナシ。