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acceptable to both. This then would be a "formal" document. Because of the great importance these "suggestions" have attained, together with the replies, Dr. Graham was determined that the GOC should at least make a formal record of them. Evidently suspicious that this was an attempt to make the Christmas "suggestions" an official document of the GOC with the resulting possibility of the Dutch being placed in the position of having refused a GOC request, Dr. Van Zeeland went into considerable detail before giving his assent. It was evident that Dr. Graham would have to proceed with utmost tact in handling the Belgian delegate.

Dr. Graham suggested that the Chairman of the week for the week past (Dr. Van Zeeland) draw up an historical resume of what occurred during that week, designating clearly what was formal and what was informal, and transmit the whole to the Security Council for study. He wanted to make certain that the "informal meeting aboard the Dutch ship, "Wilhelm Ruis" of the GOC "Big Three" with the Dutch Ministers be included, and that his own remarks at that time be made a part of the record. These remarks, he hastily wrote down on paper and handed it to Dr. Van Zeeland, said: "I stand by Annex 1 and Annex 2 and will be willing to stand by them before all the world."

Dr. Van Zeeland said he would draw up such a resume.

Then Mr. Critchley of Australia said he desired to call the meeting's attention to a communication from the prime minister of the Republic dated 21 December protesting the uninterrupted activities of the Dutch in establishing independent political states out of areas conquered by the use of force in defiance of the Security Council's cease fire orders and requesting that the matter be brought before the attention of the Security Council. It was said by the GOC secretary that the letter had been referred to the Dutch for reply. This reply had not been made by the Dutch, except for an acknowledgement. In the meantime, the GOC had told the Republicans that it did not feel that its good offices extended to the transmission of protests to the Security Council.

Mr. Critchley was in disagreement with the attitude that the matter should not be reported to the Security Council, and in concise, emphatic terms stated that as he saw it, the Netherlands certainly was taking advantage of gains accruing to them purely as a result of their successful violation of the Security Council's orders to cease using force, and also of the practice of the Netherlands of by-passing the "Renville" discussions. "I believe", he said, "that this body must take action and that the matter must be called to the attention of the Security Council as soon as possible."

Dr. Graham then said: "I stood before on my convictions that all activities of military and political nature must cease, I stand on them now and I will stand on them in the future."

At this the Belgian delegate somewhat heatedly asserted that he considered it "unfair" to discuss these matters at this time, when informal replies which had been invited by the GOC actually were in the hands of one or the other of the disputants for their consideration and report to the GOC.

Mr. Critchley persisted, saying: "I think I would agree with Dr. Van Zeeland's point, except that things are moving too fast and everything is being made more difficult by the Dutch activities. I find it difficult to understand how the Dutch can say they agree with the principles of the Linggadjati Agreement and at the same time move energetically to create independent political states out of territory taken by police action."

Dr. Graham said that the Christmas "suggestions" called for a cessation of these activities.

Dr. Van Zeeland immediately turned this back upon Dr. Graham by saying that it was GOC intention that the suggestions be considered as a balanced, integrated whole (Dr. Graham's strong contention) and that accordingly, Dr. Graham would have to give as much attention to the body of the suggestions as to the Annexes. In the body, it was said that as soon as agreement had been reached by both parties, then all conditions would go into immediate effect, including the cessation of political activities pending further discussions. With the rejection of the document as a whole by the Dutch, no agreement had been reached, therefore, no immediate implementation could be undertaken and accordingly the Dutch were not guilty of bad faith or improper actions. "I stand on that!" he said emphatically.

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Mr. Critchley said that he could understand that, but here was a situation in which the Dutch refused to agree, and were at the same time making agreement impossible.

Dr. Van Zeeland: "I must object to these points being discussed now. They are entirely out of order when the GOC does not have in hand the replies which it has invited from the parties."

The Belgian declined to discuss the matter further, and agreed to support a motion calling upon the Netherlands for a quick reply to the Republican charges. American and Australian delegates agreed.

Mr. Critchley then said he would like to know something of what would be the attitude of the GOC within the next few days in case (a) the Republicans agreed to the Dutch ultimatum (b) the Republicans rejected the Dutch ultimatum.

Dr. Graham agreed that such forward thinking was advisable.

Mr. Critchley then said that there was little hope for agreement on the Christmas "suggestions". However, both parties had been able to accept the GOC truce plan of 3 December (See LOG 7 December, pg. 103) and that accordingly steps should be taken to ascertain if these plans could not be put into effect. (Note: These plans actually were the GOC version of the Military Advisors' original recommendations for the early implementation of a cease fire. This, in turn was based upon the U.S. Group's recommendations reported under the LOG of 2 November and included in the final draft as "Phase 1". Later the GOC altered this Phase 1 to include some highly controversial matters. This was done against the advice of the Military, which was fearful that inclusion of controversial matter would cause the whole program to bog down. This is exactly what occurred. See LOG, 2 December, and Military Group's Restatement, 3 December. The complexity of the question involving the exchange of prisoners -- included by the GOC -- is reviewed in the LOG for 17 December, page 130.

Again Dr. Van Zeeland found himself unable to go along with his colleagues. He said: "I think the proposal is entirely out of time. I cannot accept it and will not speak until I see what are the developments I have alluded to before."

Finding Dr. Van Zeeland immovable in these matters, the chair turned to the matter of the Madura reports. Mr. Brandis reported that he hoped to have the report ready within 24 hours, but he reminded the GOC that the Dutch authorities had not yet answered the questionnaire put to it. (See LOG 14 and 16 December). Dr. Graham said he would see Gen. Spoor about the matter in the very near future.

The meeting was adjourned.

Graham-Spoor-Myers Meeting: The matter of the questionnaire concerning the Madura survey appeared to have been settled during this meeting, when Gen. Spoor came aboard the "Renville" for a conference with Dr. Graham and Col. Myers. The latter had been endeavoring for some time to get these two together. It was his belief that only benefit would spring from a frank discussion between two men of keen minds and broad outlooks. This proved to be the case. General Spoor again mentioned his "plan" (reported in the LOG of 22 December) and agreed to give it to Col. Myers in the Dutch if he could not get interpreter service on it soon. He then said that there was a letter in route Col. Myers explaining the questionnaire matter. He was sure it would be satisfactory.

Messages to Washington and GHQ: Dr. Graham again questioned Col. Myers as to whether General MacArthur had been particularly advised concerning the situation here. Col. Myers reiterated that GHQ was being informed in detail through the LOG. But he then said that he had a signal which he proposed to file immediately. He showed it to Dr. Graham. The latter said that it reflected the true situation. Col. Myers turned it over to Capt. Tyree for transmission.

Capt. Tyree of the "Renville" then confidentially told Col. Myers that he felt compelled to file a signal to his chief (Admiral Cook) indicating his own observations. Independently he had arrived at conclusions which the Military Group had listed. Capt. Tyree's message said in substance that it appeared to him that while the Dutch were observing all the amenities of suave diplomatic exchange, they were, in fact, ignoring both the GOC and the "Renville" to a considerable extent which he considered was an insult to the U.S. They were holding at least some of their most important meetings elsewhere. He stressed that a crisis was at hand.

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In support of the "Renville" captain's stand, the following communique was issued officially by the Dutch and released to the press:

"This morning at 1000 hours a meeting took place between the Netherlands Ministers and the Lt. Governor-General on the one side and the representatives of the under-mentioned political units and organizations on the other side. The latter representatives had already consulted together yesterday, the outcome of which consultation is embodied in two resolutions.

"These resolutions read as follows:

- I. The conference of representatives of:
1. The Negara Indonesia Timoer
  2. The Federation of Self-Governments of Kalimantan Timur
  3. The Dewan Dayak Besar
  4. The Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat
  5. The Daerah Bangka
  6. The Daerah Riouw
  7. The Negara Sumatra Timur
  8. The Komite Daerah Istimewa Sumatra Selatan
  9. The Komite for the preparation of the Negara Djawa Barat
  10. Komite Indonesia Serikat

meeting on 3rd January 1948 at Djakarta;  
has the honor to present the following resolution to the Netherlands government:

The Conference most urgently suggests that immediate steps be taken for

1. the formation of an interim Government for the preparation of the Sovereign United States of Indonesia;
2. the arrangement of the right of the Interim Government to have a say in the employment of the military forces in Indonesia as a government organization for the maintenance of safety in the interior;
3. the revision of the Netherlands Constitution.

Copies of this resolution will be presented to:

1. the Netherland Indies Government
2. the Committee of Good Offices
3. the Government of the Republic of Indonesia at Djocja
4. the Netherlands parliament.

II. The Conference of Representatives of:

1. the Negara Indonesia Timur
2. the Federation of Self-governments of Kalimantan Timur
3. the Dewan Dayak Besar
4. the Daerah Istimewa Kalimantan Barat
5. the Daerah Bangka
6. the Daerah Riouw
7. the Negara Sumatra Timur
8. the Komite Daerah Istimewa Sumatra Selatan
9. the Komite for the preparation of the Negara Djawa Barat
10. Madura
11. Komite Indonesia Serikat

brings to the notice of the Government of the Republic Indonesia the resolution presented to the Netherlands Government, copy of which is appended hereto, and invites the Government of the Republic of Indonesia to join the Sovereign United States of Indonesia.

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Djakarta, 3rd Jan. 1948

After ample discussion and elucidation of the decisions laid down in the resolutions, the Netherlands Prime Minister, who presided today's meeting, approved of the gist of the first resolution. He also expressed his expectation that the second resolution will be able to contribute considerably to the solution of the difficulties with the Republic and to a satisfactory result of the work of the Committee of Good Offices.

Starting from this assumption the implementation of point 1 of the first resolution will be commenced immediately by the Lt. Governor General together with several territories and groups, and with representatives of the minorities.

As will be generally known a revision of the Constitution is in course of preparation in the Netherlands."

Madura Field Survey Party Meeting: This meeting was unable to produce its report owing to the inability of the Belgian Observers to agree with either the Brandis draft (LOG December) or the independent American reports (Annex 1 of LOG, Period 14 to 27 December). Because these maneuvers have come to typify the relationships between the Belgians and other members of the GOC and its committees, it is believed advisable to report this meeting in some detail. The minutes follow:

"The representatives examined the notes taken by the Secretary of the Observation Team at Soerabaya and Madura during the meetings it held between themselves and the Dutch civil and military authorities.

Mr. Brandis suggested that, if any corrections should be made of these notes, the representatives should submit them to the Secretary.

Mr. Vanderstichelen (Belgium) believed that the inclusion of the remark made by Captain Kampinga to the effect that, he could convert Chandra Hassan to be pro-Dutch in two weeks time, might indicate that the Dutch are exercising a certain pressure on Chandra Hassan which fact had not been ascertained. However, he did not object to include it in.

The representatives examined both the United States-Australian joint report and Mr. Vanderstichelen's personal paper on the Madura enquiry; the latter later withdrew his paper. Mr. Brandis said he would agree on certain points mentioned in Mr. Vanderstichelen's paper, but there were other points which he did not think the Observation Team should go into as regards the standpoint of the Security Council's resolution. Mr. Vanderstichelen replied that according to the Committee of Good Offices letter to the parties, the enquiry would be conducted for the purpose of acquainting itself with the general situation. Mr. Brandis agreed with Mr. Vanderstichelen on this point; however, he mentioned that as far as the Madura case was concerned the Republican Government had also requested for an investigation of the violations of the cease fire. As it had been previously agreed to by the Committee of Good Offices this matter was also to be investigated.

Mr. Vanderstichelen believed that, compared with Mr. Brandis' draft report submitted at the first meeting upon the team's return from Madura, the United States-Australia draft report was more acceptable to the Belgian delegation in order to draw up an unanimous report.

Commander Chesterman suggested that Mr. Vanderstichelen present his views on those points in the joint United States-Australian report on which he could not agree.

Mr. Vanderstichelen expressed his regret that right from the beginning the Belgian delegation had been kept out by the United States and Australian delegations in the drafting of a report. Mr. Brandis said he could not agree to this statement and reminded Mr. Vanderstichelen that at the first meeting he had been given a copy of the United States draft report and had requested time to study it. At the second meeting, Mr. Vanderstichelen stated that he could not agree on those points beyond the first two paragraphs of the United States draft report. On the other hand, the Australian delegation was ready to accept this report in its entirety. Consequently, it was decided during the second meeting that there should be a separate Belgian report and a joint United States-Australian report. Mr. Vanderstichelen accepted that explanation.

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The representatives agreed that, as a matter of procedure, in the future all documents would be submitted to the Secretary who would then circulate them to each representative."

6 January, TuesdayI. The LOG

- 0700 hrs. : Alert.  
 0900 hrs. : Second meeting, Madura Field Survey Party to try to produce unanimous report. Col. Elliott and Major Strayhorn for the U.S.  
 1000 hrs. : Brief conference, Capt. Tyree of "Renville" and Lt. Col. Ind concerning message sent to Admiral Cook on crisis here.  
 1000 hrs. : Meeting, GOC and advisors, to further discuss "formalizing" the records in connection with "informal" documents, and to deal with some phases of Madura Group report. Col. Myers, Capt. McCallum, Col. Elliott, Major Strayhorn for the U.S.  
 Noon : Conference, Dr. Graham, Mr. Brandis, Mr. Scott, Mr. Ogburn, Col. Myers concerning framing of emergency message to State Department.  
 Noon : Submission by Col. Mollohan of report dealing with transportation in the U.S. C-47 of certain biologicals between Jogjakarta and Batavia.  
 Afternoon : Continuous informal discussions and preparation of reports.

II NARRATIVE SECTIONSecond Madura Group Meeting:

An impasse appears to be developing between the Australian-American section of the Madura Field Survey Party and the Belgians. Although they have not revealed their report up to this time, the Belgians have indicated that they cannot agree with the Brandis report. This report is a tentative consensus, except for the Belgians. Mr. Brandis' efforts to find points of agreement so far have failed and the meeting today ended in an atmosphere of hostility.

Dr. Graham's Parting Visit with the Dutch Ministers:

Determined to salvage something of the GOC hopes for a Dutch agreement to some plan which would lead to an eventual settlement of basic differences between the Dutch and Indonesians, Dr. Graham is known to have drawn up in the rough a series of "principles" which he showed to the Dutch ministers last night on the eve of their departure. (The four dignitaries left today by air for Holland.)

Dr. Graham, it is thought, was not acting entirely on his own, and likely had shown his list of "principles" to both Judge Kirby and to Dr. Van Zeeland, prior to revealing it to the Dutch at a farewell meeting last night. The exact nature of the list is not known to the Army group at this time. However, it is known that the ministers appeared to have been won over to the suggestion contained therein to the extent of agreeing to bring them up for consideration at the Hague.

Dr. Graham immediately cabled his report to the State Department. He hoped that these suggestions might be favorably received in Washington to the extent of eliciting a State Department backing for his efforts to win over the Dutch to complete acceptance.

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Tyree-Ind Meeting: This meeting was for the purpose of reviewing messages sent by the Military and Capt. Tyree to determine the exact extent of agreement. Capt. Tyree explained that he was not in the position of observer, but had felt obligated to notify proper naval authority that there existed a reasonable doubt as to whether "Renville" was being utilized by the Dutch to the extent the United States had hoped and had a right to exact. The Captain was apprehensive that should the press seize upon the manner in which the "Renville" was being by-passed by the Dutch, there would be a public outcry which would reflect unfavorably on the Navy for maintaining the expensive set-up in the face of polite but definite ignoring by one of the parties. He privately agreed with the contents of the message sent to Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army and to G-2 GHQ by Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Dixon the previous afternoon. (Note: Filed 1400 hours Batavia time)

GOC Meeting: This was called in an attempt to further bring the records of the GOC up to date and to agree upon how "informal" documents should be recorded. Reference is made to the meeting of 1000 hours, Monday, 5 January, aboard the "Renville", inasmuch as this session was almost a repetition of that unsatisfactory meeting. Again Dr. Van Zeeland, the Belgian delegate to GOC, grew histrionic, this time to the extent of seeming to become quite inarticulate with anger that Dr. Graham and Mr. Critchley again would bring up the matter of discussing GOC attitudes to the reactions of the disputing parties to the Christmas Truce "suggestions" when these reactions were being studied at the moment in Jogjakarta. It finally was agreed that both parties would be notified that the GOC was proposing to enter the "informal" documents bearing on this vital subject on the official record of the GOC, but that before it did so, both parties should indicate their suggestions for any corrections of the minutes and relevant papers. The fact that important business has been effected during unscheduled "meetings" at places other than in the "Renville" has contributed to an unsatisfactory state of the records. One of these meetings occurred between the chief GOC delegates and the Holland Ministers aboard a Dutch ship, "Wilhelm Ruis" on Saturday, 27 December. On the other hand, an informal meeting of importance had occurred at the residence of Dr. Gani, Republican vice premier (now absent) at a later date. A third meeting occurred New Year's Day at the Palace with Dutch ministers and local leaders. Minutes for all of these will be drawn up and submitted to the parties concerned for correction, then will be incorporated within the official record of the GOC. Dr. Van Zeeland became very emphatic that GOC strike out any mention of a meeting occurring 3 January between representatives of the Republic and representatives of the Netherlands to consider the tentative Republican truce draft. His claim was that the meeting was not authorized and no recognition could be made of it. He carried his point.

The failure of the Madura Group's second meeting to produce a joint report was discussed. The Belgians suggested that they confer with their military and civil observers on the matter to see if a common report could not be reached. This was agreed to.

Dr. Graham reported that Gen. Spoor appeared ready to answer the questions put to him three weeks ago by the Madura Group and By Col. Myers. Dr. Graham suggested that the Military Group again go over the questionnaires to determine exactly what they wanted answered. So much time has elapsed on this matter that the report now has doubtful value, and accordingly, it was decided that the GOC would receive any answers Gen. Spoor might have ready and was willing to provide, otherwise, the GOC would not press for them at all.

Graham Message to State Department: Frankly disturbed by the adamant stand taken by the Dutch, Dr. Graham called his civil advisors and Col. Myers into consultation at noon to decide upon the draft of an emergency message to the State Department. In substance he said:

a. the collapse of the Republic was imminent in the face of further political strangulation by the Dutch and the strong possibility of renewed military action.

b. the Republicans almost certainly now stood to lose much more than they had signed away in the Linggardjati Agreement.

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c. such a critical future as now seemed assured was almost certain to force the hands of the moderates in Jogjakarta with the result that regardless of the kind of agreement that might be reached on the "Renville" within the next few days upon the return of delegates from the Republican Capital, violence and "scorched earth" advocated by the militants was almost sure to increase rather than stop.

d. the corner into which the Republicans had been forced would be looked upon in many parts of the world as a virtual betrayal of the Republicans by the GOC and particularly by the United States in its pivotal position in the GOC. Criticism of the U.S. could be expected to be severe and of the Dutch to be so severe as to jeopardize even their just claims in the dispute. Accordingly, all stood to lose in one serious way or another unless the hand of the Republican government was not forced so drastically.

e. Dr. Graham therefore strongly urged State Department to give immediate support to his plan to try to get Dutch agreement to a softening and to at least a partial agreement to Annex 2 of the Christmas suggestions. This would involve guaranteeing the continuance of the Republic as an independent state in the UNI scheme, but subject to Crown dispensations as might be agreed upon along the general terms of the Lingardati document.

Transport of Biologicals: Because it has been pretty well established that certain Dutch political interests (headed by Jhr. Van Vredenburg) have sought to prejudice the Dutch military, the Dutch ministers and even other members of the GOC against the United States Group, extra care is taken in the matter of air transportation of personnel and material between Jogjakarta and Dutch territory. For purposes of the record, a report on the request for the movement of certain biologicals is made here by Col. Mollohan acting for Col. Myers:

Memo for: Col. Myers

Batavia, 3 January

Subject: Transmission of certain medical supplies from Batavia to Jogjakarta via U.S. Military Observers Group Airplane.

1. On the evening of 2 January, 1948, Dr. Sutomo, Republic of Indonesia Medical service, Jogjakarta, came to Col. Mollohan with a request for assistance in securing authority to send parcels of smallpox vaccine and dysentery-cholera-typhoid vaccine from the Institute Pasteur in Klaten to Batavia via the U. S. Military aircraft as it makes its shuttle runs. He further asked to send parcels of drugs, mainly penicillin and sulfa-drugs and arsenicals from Batavia to Jogjakarta. He stated no parcel would weigh more than 30 lbs. and most would be much smaller. Dr. Sutomo requested that the parcels be sent from Indonesian Red Cross, Jogjakarta to Indonesian Red Cross, Batavia, and vice versa. He was told that it would probably be impossible to get approval to send the materials through the channels requested as the Dutch authorities would object to direct traffic between Indonesian organizations in the two cities as there would be no neutral control of contents, but that an effort would be made to secure permission for the transactions using the International Red Cross, Batavia, as the Regulating Agency.

2. On 3 January, 1948, a conference was held in the office of Dr. Leutenegger, Batavia head of International Red Cross, between Col. Mollohan and officials of the IRC. It was agreed that the IRC would be the regulating agency provided all packages going in both directions were delivered to the IRC addressed to the Indonesian Red Cross in the city of destination through the IRC, Batavia, and bearing a manifest of contents on the outside signed by a responsible doctor or official. This to be subject to the approval of Prof. Van Wulfften-Palthe, Director and Coordinator of Medical Affairs, NEI Government.

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3. At a conference at 1200 hours, 3 January, between Prof. Palthe and Dr. Van Tricht of the Medical Coordinator's Office and Col. Mollohan approval of the plan was granted by Prof. Wulfften-Palthe.

4. Late in the afternoon the scheme was explained to Col. Myers and he gave verbal approval for the pilot of the plane to accept and transmit the parcels. The method of transmittal was explained to Dr. Sutomo the evening of 3 January with emphasis on following the approved plan to the letter. The first parcel of drugs, properly listed and marked, departed from Batavia to Jogjakarta 4 January 1948.

/s/ C. S. Mollohan  
Col., M.C.

7 January, WednesdayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.  
0705 hrs. : Departure, American C-47 for Jogjakarta. Nine passengers and small amount of approved freight.  
Morning : Informal meetings, evaluations of developments and preparation of reports, including preliminary meeting of Krawang Field Survey Party. (Note: this party had been returning to Batavia nightly during the inquiry)  
1400 hrs. : Return of both American and Australian C-47 airplanes with members of the Indonesian delegations including Amir Sjerifuddin.  
1600 hrs. : Closed meeting, the GOC and ranking Indonesian delegates aboard "Renville" reference Indonesian reactions to Dutch ultimatum.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Krawang Survey: This investigation appears to have been conducted in an efficient manner, with seeming unanimity among the three-power delegates as to findings. It is not expected that these findings will be pleasing to the Dutch. Work has been started on drafting a report.

Afternoon Meetings on "Renville": At the request of senior members of the GOC, the meetings in "Renville" upon the return of ranking Indonesian delegates from Jogjakarta, all advisors refrained from coming aboard ship. This was done because the prime minister had requested absolute confidence in these critical sessions. It is known that the discussions were to (a) determine whether the Republicans could accept the Christmas Truce message even if the Dutch demands for elimination of Annex 2 were to be considered seriously by the GOC, but provided the GOC put up alternative suggestions to the Dutch for the substitution of Annex 2 details without sacrificing basic principles (b) the part the Republic might be agreeable to playing in an interim government plan for a United States of Indonesia as being actively promoted by the Dutch, and which they apparently will be able to put into effect regardless of the GOC.

It is known that the Republicans are not completely against participating in the latter plan, if it is a last resort, but provided only that a neutral third party such as the GOC supervise and advise.

8 January, ThursdayI. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.  
Morning : Informal reports and preparation of reports.  
0930 hrs. : Third Meeting of Madura Field Survey Group to try to arrive at agreement on drawing up of final report.  
Afternoon : Informal conferences and preparation of reports.  
1600 hrs. : Receipt by GOC of answers to questionnaire submitted to Dutch reference Madura Field Survey (see Narrative section).  
2000 hrs. : Meeting, Dr. Graham, Mr. Brandis, Lt. Col. Ind reference arrangements for concentrating Republican leaders for important conferences.



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2100 hrs. : Same, but with Premier Amir Sjarifuddin added.

## II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Madura Group Meeting: Present: For Australia - Mr. Moore, Commander Chesterman, Sqdn. Ldr. Kroll; For Belgium - Mr. Vanderstichelen, Mr. Van den Block, Capt. Paul Symins; For the U.S. - Capt. McCallum, Colonels Elliott and Mollohan and Mr. Brandis.

Although it had been clearly understood by all at the meeting of the previous day that the Belgians would be prepared to submit a minority report in view of their inability to agree with the report found acceptable by the U. S. and Australian delegations, the Belgians did not come prepared with their report. Accordingly, little was again accomplished except to draw up and agree on the historical resume of the Madura survey. This will serve as the covering letter of the two reports when the Belgians announce that they are ready to submit theirs. Modification of the "Brandis" report of this survey, included in the LOG for December, has been ready for some days awaiting the pleasure of the Belgians.

Questionnaire "Answers": The history of the "answers" to the questionnaires submitted to the Dutch military authorities has become almost as complicated as the whole Madura Survey. The latest development brought forth a typical result. Dr. Graham asked General Spoor about the matter of the delayed answers 5 January. The General said he had understood that the civil authorities were handling the matter. The civil authorities in turn said they understood the matter had been dropped. Both promised action. Today "answers" were sent via courier by Gen. Spoor to the GOC. They proved to be answers to a segment of the "Elliott" questionnaire-guide for Madura Survey parties when interviewing unit commanders. They were not answers either to the main questionnaire submitted to the commanding general at Soerabaya (and later referred by him to General Spoor) or to the questionnaire submitted by Col. Myers to Gen. Spoor at approximately the same time in Batavia. Dr. Graham has indicated that he does not plan to press the matter further as the usefulness to the GOC of the answers even if they were to be made in full now would be slight.

Conference Arrangement Meetings: The GOC ranking delegates and leading Republican authorities including Amir Sjarifuddin held meetings in private aboard "Renville" during the day. It was asked that only this small group participate in hopes that the Republicans would speak freely during these critical times. In consequence, it was decided that all ranking Republicans should be concentrated for final decisive meetings to be held as soon as this concentration could be effected. These meetings would be for the purpose of considering the Dutch "ultimatum" and prepare a final answer to it.

It was Dr. Graham's hope that "Renville" could be made available in Republican waters for the purpose. The bring Mr. Sjarir and Mohammed Hata from Singapore and Sumatran territory respectively, it was proposed to utilize the American C-47. This aircraft would make the run to Singapore early Friday morning remaining there overnight for a pre-weather run into Pakenbarroe on Saturday, then fly to Batavia. The next morning the passengers would be flown to Jogjakarta. In the meantime, the Australian C-47 would have transported the remainder of the delegates from Batavia to Jogjakarta.

Dr. Graham had to abandon plans to use the "Renville" owing to a promise made to the press two months ago that whenever "Renville" put to sea, the press would be represented. It was the request of Sjarifuddin that the meetings be absolutely confidential. Accordingly, the presence of pressmen would be considered a breach. This meant the "Renville" could not be used.

Amir Sjarifuddin and Mr. Ali Salim, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were to accompany the American plane on the Singapore-Sumatra run. Lt. Col. Ind was placed in charge by Col. Myers, who decided to remain in Batavia close to the GOC during days when far reaching decisions were being worked up.

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9 January, Friday

I. The LOG

0530 hrs. : Alert.

0830 hrs. : Meeting, Batavia airport, Amir Sjarifuddin, Dr. Graham and Lt. Col. Ind with Dutch Liaison Officers, reference refusal of Dutch government to permit Sjarir or M. Hata to remain in Batavia. The GOC was to contact the Dutch and in the meantime flight plans would be made for a run directly from Sumatra to Jogjakarta if possible.

1000 hrs. : Meeting, the GOC and advisors concerning the manner of reporting to the Security Council and the report of the Madura Field Survey Party. For the U.S., Col. Myers, Major Strayhorn, and Messers Graham, Brandis, Abbey, Ogburn and Scott.

1035 hrs. : Arrival, C-47, Kallang Airport, Singapore.

1400 hrs. : Conference, Lt. Col. Ind and Major Hoey reference "cover" of the NEI. front and the impending visit of a Typographical Unit from Clark Field to assist in the air mapping of the NEI.

Evening : Informal discussions among members of the U.S. Group.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Dutch Refusals on Indonesian Leaders: The plan to bring the Indonesian Leaders, Sjahrir and Hatta to Batavia via the U.S. C-47 received a set-back when the Dutch government notified the GOC it would not permit or extend diplomatic hospitality to these men. Dr. Graham was to see the Palace officials to endeavor to effect a reconsideration of this attitude in case the C-47 could not make its Sumatra pick-up of Dr. Hatta and return to Jogjakarta the same day. Extremely unfavorable weather conditions prevail in these latitudes at this time of year after noon and an inland flight is almost certain to meet with closed-in conditions. However, the C-47 took off with the intention to overnight at Singapore and make the run to Pakenbarroe early Friday to pick up Dr. Hatta and then, if possible, run direct to Jogjakarta.

GOC Morning Meeting: At this time a number of items on the agenda were disposed of. First, Mr. Abbey reported that the Special Committees had agreed that parties for general field observations would not be recommended at this time, pending the return from Jogjakarta of GOC and Indonesian officials to consider final answers to Dutch ultimatum demands.

Mr. Brandis reported on the status of the answers to the Madura Group's questionnaire. (See LOG 6 January) Reference Madura, the Belgians, who have not been able to submit their report as yet, mentioned their intention to revisit certain Madura areas should the GOC approve, this to be done before finalizing their report. This was received unfavorably by the Americans and Australians, who pointed out (a) that the Madura survey had already extended itself and its reporting period over an unreasonably long time (b) that at the time the party was in Madura, explicit questions concerning the identical areas and interviews the Belgians now proposed to make had been brought up and rejected. This suggestion trailed off when the Belgians were not able to present a well-organized request. It was suggested by Mr. Critchley of Australia that the Austro-American observers exchange their reports with the dissenting Belgians and each group study the other's reports to note points of difference and to question or comment thereon. Then the reports would be taken back by the original groups and questions would be answered. Thus points of difference would have to be defended or dropped. This was agreed to and meetings of the Madura Groups were arranged.

Mr. Brandis now asked that he be relieved as chairman. He said that the press of other work demanded all his full attention. While it is true that Mr. Brandis is to be returned to Washington soon and much clean-up work awaits him, he also believed that relationships with the Belgians would be improved if he withdrew from the Madura group. This probably is true. In fairness to the Belgians however, it should be said that the Madura survey never had been well organized under GOC direction. No use was made of the U.S. Observer Group's experience in these matters, such as its insistence on directives, and report forms etc. Col. Myers had protested that the Madura Group had not appeared to be well organized and this has proved true. Reluctantly the GOC agreed to relieve Mr.

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Brandis and named Mr. Abbey in his place.

Dr. Graham once more introduced his request that the GOC consider its course of action should the two parties be unable to accept the Christmas Truce message. Hitherto, Dr. Van Zeeland had dramatically refused to consider such a course of action until the answers had been received, studied and either adopted or dropped. Now, however, he supported the idea that a drafting committee submit a list of "principles". This list would include both broad principles which the GOC would suggest for adoption by both parties. In effect, this set of principles would be a last-minute expression carefully designed to bring out only those things upon which there was a chance of quick bi-lateral agreement, and yet be sufficiently comprehensive to embrace a wide range of strong points which the GOC could justly champion before the world. The drafting committee was to present a document in the very near future.

10 January, Saturday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert, Batavia.  
 0445 hrs. : Alert, Singapore.  
 0645 hrs. : Departure, C-47, Kallang Airport, Singapore, for Pakenbarroe. Passengers included Amir Sjarifuddin, Ali Salim and Dr. Sjahrir. (Departure - delayed, account, weather.)  
 0900 hrs. : Meeting, Madura Group, Mr. Abbey, Chairman, to consider final reports.  
 0950 hrs. : Put-down, Pakenbarroe.  
 1209 hrs. : Take off, Pakenbarroe for Bukittinggi (Ft. de Kock)  
 1310 hrs. : Arrival Bukittinggi.  
 1600 hrs. : Meeting, GOC and advisors, Hotel des Indes, to discuss a more formal draft of Dr. Graham's "principles". Col. Myers and Major Strayhorn.  
 1511 hrs. : Take-off from Bukittinggi for Singapore. (All routes east and south weathered in)  
 1721 hrs. : Arrival, Singapore.  
 Evening : Informal meetings and notification of acceptance of Dr. Graham's "principles" by the Dutch central government.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Singapore Departure: Forecasts of unfavorable flying conditions delayed the Singapore take-off for half an hour. These forecasts were fulfilled over Sumatra when weathered-in conditions were encountered the whole way to Pakenbarroe and over the airstrip, which at best is grass-covered and without radio beacon or radio contact. Over an hour was lost circling the location of the airstrip. It finally was decided by Pilot Lt. Chapman to go down through. A perfect landing was made.

Dr. Hatta Not at Pakenbarroe: Dr. Sjarifuddin was distressed upon landing to be informed that the Vice President had not arrived from Ft. De Kock and that it was unlikely that he would, since 120 kilometers of road had been inundated in floods or covered by landslides. (severe flood conditions were noted from the air over Malaya and Sumatra). The prime minister called conferences. He was most reluctant to go on to Jogjakarta without the vice president. However, he was informed that every moment's delay lessened the chances of being able to reach the Republican capital at all, as weather conditions were worsening. The chances were considered to be less than 50-50. He had the alternate, then, of (a) going to a Dutch airport such as Batavia, with Dr. Sjahrir and risking his arrest, or (b) returning to Singapore for an early-morning run to Jogjakarta. He unhesitatingly adopted the latter. However, with that decision, it was agreed that departure should be delayed until noon in case of some word from Dr. Hatta. This proved to be a wise delay, for word came that there was a chance that the C-47 might be able to land at Bukittinggi, since weather had improved somewhat and the field was considered sound enough to support the aircraft. Bukittinggi was advised to mark the field carefully. In the meantime Dr. Sjarifuddin went into the

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flooded village of Pakenbarroe and made a speech. There was tremendous enthusiasm. (Note: the condition of the people has worsened as far as textiles are concerned. The floods have brought suffering and disease, but food seems plentiful. The Republican "transportation" system hardly exists any more and all vehicles were in deplorable state.)

Take-off between storms was achieved.

The landing at unknown Bukittinggi airstrip - a short, grass field surrounded with high hills - was made expertly despite mud and spume. Again tremendous enthusiasms greeted the prime minister and a political rally was held in the crowded city. (Here the people appeared to be well off, prosperous and enthusiastic; there were numerous fair cars). By the time it was possible to pull the officials away from the noisy crowds, all possibility of running south or east had disappeared. Storms were on every hand except to the north-east. The run-out was made in this direction. A Dutch airfield station, Padang, refused to provide weather data until an adamant message was sent explaining that the C-47 was a United Nations plane and that in any event, a U.S. Air Force plane was entitled to data as provided for by international regulations. After some delay, the station complied. The run to Singapore was turbulent and an exceptionally hazardous landing was made with roughness. Accomodation was secured and all warned to protect Dr. Hatta's presence from the press, as considerable Dutch irritation had been noted in the Saturday morning press in reply to interviews published after our arrival with Dr. Sjarifuddin the previous day. No U.S. officer or man allowed himself to be interviewed on Friday; the comments all were of Indonesian origin. (Note: Dr. Sjarifuddin is known to have had a long conference with the British Foreign Office representatives Friday afternoon).

Late at night messages were received from Batavia advising that the plane would return to Batavia the next day instead of running to Jogjakarta and would pick up GOC delegates for Jogjakarta. A departure for 0500 hours was requested in these messages. This was found to be impossible as Kallang would not clear on account of bad surrounding weather until at least 0600 hours.

The highest credit is due the aircrew for their performances during a day of exhausting and hazardous flying.

Madura Group Meeting: Under Mr. Abbey's chairmanship, the Madura Group was able to make some progress along the lines suggested by Mr. Critchley the day before. Each group will study the other group's report and where differences of opinion are noted, they will be listed and the opposite group will be required to defend its statements or drop them. The chairman called for the submission of reports by noon of this date. The American report was ready. It is essentially the same as the "Brandis" report submitted in the LOG earlier and amplified in Annex 1 of the LOG for the period 14-27 December. The Belgian report has been made ready in draft form. It will be presented, or extracted, with its points of difference when the Austro-American group has studied it and submitted its list of question for Belgian answers (likely early next week).

GOC 1600 Hours Meeting: This meeting was primarily to make more formal the "principles" list outlined by Dr. Graham to the Dutch ministers on the evening of 5 January (See LOG, 6 January) and to receive, if possible, a report from Messers Scott and Ogburn who were discussing the list with Jhr. Vredenburg and Dr. Van Mook at the Palace.

(Note: it is known that Dr. Graham had received encouragement from the State Department on his appeal of 6 January that the Department back him up in his attempts to win adoption of the principles outlined in this list. The encouragement was conditioned on the Dutch acceptance, it being indicated that if the Dutch approved, the U.S. policy would embrace these principles and announcement thereof would be forthcoming.)

It was agreed that this list should receive the official title of: "Principles for the Negotiations Toward a Political Settlement."

Evening Informal Meetings: It was learned during the course of the evening that the Dutch had accepted the "Principles". It was further disclosed to Col. Myers during a brief talk with GOC representatives that instructions to this effect had come from the Hague. Van Vredenburg was obviously considerably upset by the Hague action, which had taken the matter out of his hands.

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It now is believed that this set of principles may become the new pivot upon which negotiations may be carried on, and that the extremely critical period through which the situation has been passing may be considerably eased. The GOC promised an early release of the document to include certain curtailments included in the final draft.

11 January, Sunday

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert, Batavia.  
 0445 hrs. : Alert, Singapore.  
 0600 hrs. : Take off Kallang, for Batavia.  
 0957 hrs. : Arrival Batavia.  
 1040 hrs. : Take off - Batavia, Jogjakarta; nine passengers added, including Dr. Graham, Messers Scott and Ogburn and Lt. Col. Dixon. (Note: the Australian Dakota and Beechcraft have been conveying Indonesian delegates back to the capital.)  
 Afternoon : Krawang Field Survey Report Logged and extracted.  
 Afternoon : Reception of GOC document of "Principles".

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

C-47 Flight: Arrival at Batavia was delayed by poor flying conditions. A collision with another C-47 circling the airport in clouds was narrowly averted by the alert American crew. The Dutch eased their strict control at the airfield and allowed the delegates and their Batavian supports to mingle for 15 minutes while the plane was being reconditioned for the onward flight in poor weather. Refuelling was delayed until the return trip, when Semarang was to be contacted. The aircraft must be grounded for three days now as it is over its 50-hour inspection requirement.

Lt. Chapman's Retention: A signal has been received from CONGEN, TEAF ordering Lt. Chapman's retention here until the completion of the mission. The signal cited a request from the Secretary of State.

"Principles" Document: The Graham "principles" formally adopted by the GOC and agreed to by the Dutch appears below:

SIX PRINCIPLES FOR THE NEGOTIATIONS TOWARDS A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
 ADOPTED BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS FIFTY-EIGHTH MEETING ON 10 JANUARY

The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that the following principles, among others, form a basis for the negotiations towards a political settlement:

1. Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until, after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Prior to the termination of such stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands may confer appropriate rights, duties, and responsibilities on a provisional federal government of the territories of the future United States of Indonesia. The United States of Indonesia, when created, will be a sovereign and independent State in equal partnership with the Kingdom of the Netherlands in a Netherlands-Indonesian Union at the head of which shall be the King of the Netherlands. The status of the Republic of Indonesia will be that of a state within the United States of Indonesia.
2. In any provisional federal government created prior to the ratification of the constitution of the future United States of Indonesia, all states will be offered fair representation.

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3. Prior to the dissolution of the Committee of Good offices, either party may request that the services of the Committee be continued to assist in adjusting differences between the parties which relate to the political agreement and which may arise during the interim period. The other party will interpose no objection to such a request; this request would be brought to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations by the Government of the Netherlands.
4. Within a period of not less than six months or more than one year from the signing of this agreement, a plebescite will be held to determine whether the populations of the various territories of Java, Madura and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indonesia or of another state within the United States of Indonesia, such plebescite to be conducted under observation by the Committee of Good Offices should either party, in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 3 above, request the services of the Committee in this capacity. The parties may agree that another method for ascertaining the will of the populations may be employed in place of a plebescite.
5. Following the delineation of the states in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 4 above, a constitutional convention will be convened, through democratic procedures, to draft a constitution for the United States of Indonesia. The representation of the various states in the convention will be in proportion to their populations.
6. Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object.

Krawang Field Survey Report: This party, largely organized under Lt. Col. Dixon's direction, has been able to perform and report in a manner that contrasted sharply with the Madura Survey Group. The unanimous report, in the preparation of which the Belgian delegate was active and co-operative, has been extracted for this LOG. It will be found as Annex II of this LOG.

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The Log

Period: 28 Dec., 1947-- 11 Jan., 1948 Incl.

ANNEX 1

"Good Offices Committee  
Interim Report  
to  
The Security Council"

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S/AC.10/79  
31 December 1947  
Original: English

SECURITY COUNCIL  
COMMITTEE OF GOOD OFFICES ON THE INDONESIAN QUESTION  
INTERIM REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

1. The United Nations Security Council's Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question was established, pursuant to a resolution of the Security Council of 25 August 1947, to assist in the pacific settlement of the dispute between the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. At an informal meeting of the Committee convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations at Lake Success on 8 October, at which were present the Honourable Dr. Herbert Evatt, representing Australia, the Honourable Mr. Paul van Zeeland, representative of Belgium, and the Honourable Dr. Frank P. Graham, representative of the United States of America, it was decided that the Committee should proceed with its Secretariat, as quickly as arrangements could be completed, to Sydney, Australia, to meet with the Honourable Mr. Justice Kirby and organize its future work. The Committee, thereafter, assembled in Sydney on 19 October. At its first official meeting held on 20 October, it was agreed that the members of the Committee would not represent either of the contending parties, but act as a Committee in the spirit of the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. It was also decided that the chairmanship of the Committee would be held in turn by the three members, each holding office for one week.
2. The Committee held three official meetings in Sydney and decided, after the receipt of invitations from the Prime Ministers of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, to proceed to Indonesia as quickly as transportation arrangements could be completed in order to acquaint itself with the situation on the spot and meet with the parties as an essential preliminary to the commencement of its duties. While in Sydney, the Committee adopted the practice of holding informal meetings frequently in order to study the problem and discuss possible methods of approach to a settlement of the dispute. Leaving Sydney on 25 October, the Committee arrived in Batavia on 27 October and immediately thereafter met separately with the two parties.
3. First among the problems that faced the Committee was the determination of a site mutually agreeable to the parties for the holding of political discussions. As indicated by the Committee's cablegram of 1 December, this problem was solved by the parties accepting the suggestion of the Committee, which made on the request of the parties after they had failed to agree on a mutually acceptable site. After exploring several possible sites with the parties, the Committee suggested as a last resort that political discussions be held on board a public ship of the United States. The parties are now meeting with the Committee on board the U.S.S. Renville in Java waters.
4. Soon after its arrival in Java, the Committee found it necessary to state to the parties its views on its responsibilities under the terms of the resolutions of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question and its procedure for assisting the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia in the pacific settlement of the dispute.



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5. As regards its responsibilities under the terms of the Security Council's resolutions, the Committee conveyed its views formally to the parties in a document dated 19 November, the substance of which had been conveyed informally on 7 November, to the Committee representing the Netherlands Government. In that document the Committee stated that it would render all assistance possible to the parties in reaching a political settlement. In that connection, the Committee would assume any and every task devolving upon it as the result of agreements or requests made by the parties from time to time. Nothing the Committee might do would bind either party, except under circumstances where two conditions were fulfilled, namely (1) that both parties asked the Committee to make recommendations, and (2) that both parties stated in advance that they would regard such recommendations as binding. However, under the terms of paragraph 4 of the Security Council's resolution of 1 November on the Indonesian Question, the Committee considered itself directed by the Council to offer its assistance to the parties, in the absence of any direct agreement between the parties, in reaching agreement or an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, without awaiting a request by either party that the Committee offer such assistance.

6. Far from conceiving its assistance as having a binding character, the Committee considered that its duties could be fulfilled only through agreement between the parties themselves. The Committee stated, however, that, should the parties reject the Committee's assistance, the Committee's responsibility to the Security Council would be acquitted by reporting to the Security Council.

7. In reply to a question put to the Committee by the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia regarding its procedure for assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute, the Committee stated the following on 30 October:

"(1) The Committee of Good Offices on the Indonesian Question considers it, as among its first duties, to take note of all the wishes of the parties and also to take note of any suggestions either party would wish to make.

(2) The Committee desires to make it clear that it is ready, for its part, to make suggestions to the parties, if and when the Committee is requested to do so by the parties. In particular, the Committee would be prepared if and when so requested by the parties, to offer its suggestions to the parties on appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment, as well as on such basic matters as are related to procedures for the settlement and terms of settlement.

(3) As regards the question raised by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia at the meeting of the Committee with the Republican Government relating to the choice of a suitable place for conducting discussions on substantive matters, the Committee desires to make clear that it is ready to offer its suggestions, if so requested by the parties.

(4) Finally, the Committee desires to emphasize that it will welcome and consider any suggestions made at any stage by either party, and will be ready to use its good offices to secure the best consideration of such suggestions as may be made."

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8. On 31 October, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated the agreement of his Committee with the interpretation of the functions of the Committee of Good Offices as stated by it in its reply to a question put to it by the delegation of the Republic Of Indonesia (see paragraph 7 above). On 8 November, the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government stated that his committee was very willing to receive suggestions from the Committee of Good Offices on questions of procedure. He stated further that, with regard to "a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement" which the Committee might be prepared to suggest upon being requested to do so by the parties, it would seem to the Netherlands committee to be premature to discuss that matter at that point. That did not mean that the Netherlands committee rejected the idea. The Chairman of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, in a memorandum to the Committee dated 6 November, stated that the Republic of Indonesia undertook to carry out all the resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the settlement of the dispute between the Government of the Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia. He further expressed the satisfaction of his delegation with the attitude taken by the Committee of Good Offices and drew the attention of the Committee to the following question put to the Committee earlier by the Indonesian delegation and the Committee's reply to it. The Indonesian delegation asked whether the Committee did not think that it should look to a common basis to be suggested to the Dutch authorities in order to make further talks possible. To this the Committee replied that it could probably best assist the parties if it were invited by both to make suggestions as regards (1) a meeting place, (2) procedures or methods of adjustment, and (3) a basis of settlement or possible terms of settlement. The Indonesian delegation accordingly invited the Committee to take such steps as would render possible and accelerate negotiations and guarantee their smooth progress.

9. The Committee and the parties to the dispute agreed that every effort should be made to bring about as soon as possible a suitable atmosphere in Indonesia in order to increase the chances of a political settlement. To this end, both the parties submitted their respective suggestions.

10. The suggestions of the Committee representing the Netherlands Government dated 1 November, were as follows:

- "1. Both parties have stated that it is imperative to create an atmosphere in which discussions can be held which may lead to a peaceful settlement of the present conflict.
2. In order to create this atmosphere - and thus to enable fruitful discussions to be held in a spirit of goodwill - this Committee considers it essential that the following conditions be fulfilled:
  - a. the cessation of inimical action - with the inclusion of deeds of violence to persons and property, acts of destruction, sabotage;
  - b. the cessation of threats directed towards persons and property of such as are not on the side of the Republic, as well as of their relatives;
  - c. the cessation of incitement to the actions referred to sub.a. and b.

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3. In the opinion of this committee the following measures should be taken in the near future, as a first step that may lead to the fulfillment of the aforesaid conditions.

The parties undertake to present to the Committee of Good Offices as from.....:

- a. the texts of all broadcasts intended for the public, transmitted by the wireless stations;
- b. at least two copies of all press publications."

11. The suggestions of the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia, dated 4 November, were as follows:

"To end all hostile actions or incitements to activities which contravene the purposes of the resolution of the Security Council dated 1 November 1947, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that, apart from military measures, the following measures should be considered and effectively put into operation:

- a. All activities directly or indirectly aimed at separatism are to cease.
- b. All measures directly or indirectly taken by the Netherlands to suppress all forms of pro-Republican activities and expression, such as the singing of the national anthem "Indonesia Raya", the hoisting of the red and white flag, the use of the red and white badge, the "Merdeka" salute, etc., are to cease.
- c. Communications between Republican and Dutch-occupied territories and territories isolated by the Dutch occupation, as well as communications with the foreign countries, are to be restored and remain unhampered.
- d. Republican officials and adherents detained by the Netherlands authorities are to be released.
- e. Officials and adherents of the Republic not willing to work for the Dutch Government are not to be arrested nor subjected to any form of pressure.
- f. The Dutch Government should return the goods and the money belonging to the Republic of Indonesia, their officials and adherents.
- g. Republican central and branch offices, schools and other institutions are to be opened and allowed to continue their activities freely. Related functions, for instance the circulation of money, the provision of material required for work and the daily necessities of life are to be allowed to function freely.
- h. The Dutch Government are to abolish all measures and remove such pressures as hamper the circulation of Republican money, and they are to put an end to forcible methods of bringing into circulation Dutch money in Dutch occupied territories.
- i. The Dutch Government are to cease all forms of propaganda and other efforts which may be regarded as being in the nature of incitement against or insults to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

12. In accordance with the terms of the resolution of the Security Council on the Indonesian Question dated 1 November, the Committee prepared to discharge the additional responsibilities placed on it for assisting the parties to reach agreement on an arrangement which would ensure the observance of the cease-fire resolution, after it had become obvious that the parties concerned could not agree to consult with each other

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directly as to the means to be employed to give effect to the Council's cease fire resolution. Pending an agreement between the parties, the Committee called the attention of the parties to the necessity of ceasing any activities, or incitement to activities, which contravened that resolution, and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and property.

13. In a memorandum to the Committee dated 4 November, the delegation of the Republic of Indonesia stated its preparedness to comply with the Council's resolution of 1 November. Following are excerpts from its memorandum:

"(1) The Indonesian delegation, on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, herewith expresses its preparedness to abide by the above-mentioned resolution of the Security Council, wishes to call attention to the fact that the Government of the Republic, for its part, has made sufficient efforts to take the necessary measures to implement the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 1 August 1947 calling upon the parties to cease hostilities; however, relations between the parties, as the consequence of the Netherlands military action did not permit the establishment of a contact for negotiations.

(2) Holding the Security Council's resolution of 1 November 1947 in high esteem, the Indonesian delegation believes that in the present circumstances the most effective means of implementing the resolution calling upon the parties to cease hostilities would be to arrange for negotiations between the parties concerned, guided and actively assisted by the Committee of Good Offices, which would also supervise the execution of the agreement reached.

(3) To that end each part should create a Special Committee whose exclusive duty will be to work for the implementation of the resolution calling for a cessation of hostilities to the extent of the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947. It is most desirable that on both sides this Committee has high level authority in order to arrive at quick decisions.

(4) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia has therefore established a Special Committee for the purpose described above.....

(5) The Government of the Republic of Indonesia is of the opinion that this Committee should forthwith embark on its duties and function at the same time as, but independently of, the Indonesian delegation to the Committee of Good Offices.

Further, it is the intention of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia that this Committee should plan its own work independently of the work of the Indonesian delegation, so that no time is lost and a solution may be found as quickly as possible."

14. Similar views were conveyed by the Chairman of the committee representing the Netherlands Government, in a memorandum that he submitted informally to the Committee of Good Offices on 9 November and which was placed on record with the Committee on 28 November. The Netherlands committee's memorandum read as follows:

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(1) "We gladly accept the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices in reaching an agreement on an arrangement which will assure the observance of the cease-fire resolution.

(2) We are furthermore willing to take into consideration suggestions the Committee might be willing to make in this connections.

(3) The Netherlands Government is prepared to start discussions immediately in order to obtain a better observance of the cease fire resolution than has been possible hitherto, the more so as we are convinced that, unless this resolution is observed to a reasonable extent, discussions on substance, that is to say on political questions, will be of no avail.

(4) We are willing to start these discussions with the Committee of Good Offices and also with the Republican authorities.

(5) Details will have to be worked out, for instance concerning the question where these discussions will take place.

(6) We believe that it would be best to instruct experts to work out these details. We are prepared to appoint these experts forthwith.

(7) I would finally like to point out that discussions of a political nature should as a rule be excluded from the discussions regarding the implementation of the cease-fire resolution."

15. The Committee decided that its primary duties, namely, assisting in the pacific settlement of the dispute and assisting the parties to reach on an agreement which would ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution, could best be discharged by getting the parties to meet with each other to carry on political discussions as well as discussions leading to the implementation of the Council's resolution of 1 November. It was considered opinion of the Committee that the discussions by the parties concerning implementation of the resolutions regarding the cease fire and the discussions looking towards a political settlement has a bearing on each other. It was further the opinion of the Committee that both discussions should be undertaken with all possible speed, as any measure of agreement reached in either discussion would facilitate the reaching of agreement in the other. It was believed that any insistence that either discussion should have reached a specified stage of agreement before the other discussion was undertaken might easily result in stalemate as to both. Therefore, while the Committee continued its preparations for holding the political discussions between the parties on board the U.S.S. Renville as soon as she arrived, the Committee arranged with the parties that they appoint Special Committees for the implementation of the Council's resolution on 1 November. On 12 November, the Committee appointed six representatives two from the delegation of each member of the Committee, to assist the Special Committee of the parties. Three of the six representatives of the Committee comprise senior military officers attached to delegations of the representatives on the Committee.

CHAPTER IIWORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE'S ESTABLISHED TO IMPLEMENT  
THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S RESOLUTION OF 1 NOVEMBER 1947

16. The Special Committees held their first meeting in Batavia on 14 November, electing a civilian representative of the United States delegation as permanent Chairman. After both Special Committees had asked that the Committee of Good Offices make suggestions on the implementation of the Security Council's resolution on 1 November, the representatives of the Committee, on 15 November, submitted eight suggestions. These suggestions were revised through informal discussions with both Special Committees and re-submitted as follows:

- a. To refrain from broadcasts or any form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians;
- b. To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing, except weekly publications of lists of individuals (giving names, number and home address) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action;
- c. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the cease fire orders to be issued in identical terms by both parties;
- d. In order to maintain the military status quo, existing military positions will not be altered in any area from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon;
- e. Not to engage in any hostile military, naval or air activities including air reconnaissance or air patrolling against or over the areas occupied by the other party, or to engage in naval activities against or over areas controlled by the other party;
- f. To prohibit sabotage, intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including the destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end;
- g. To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussion with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party;
- h. Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices."

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17. The Special Committee also requested the Committee to initiate a series of radio-broadcasts to the inhabitants of Indonesia concerning the tasks and functions of the Committee. In compliance with this request, the three representatives on the Committee have broadcast from Radio-Jogjakarta and Radio-Batavia, to explain the Committee's views on the situation and to make an appeal that killing and destruction cease at once.

18. At the third meeting on 23 November held at Kalioerang, near Jogjakarta, the Special Committees were able to agree in principle to paragraphs a, b, f, g, and h of the Committee's initial suggestions. Both Special Committees considered that final agreement on all points depended on agreement on para. d, and the Committee's representatives asked each Special Committee to submit a memorandum setting forth its views on this point. The Committee's representatives also submitted further suggestions which were of a military nature and called for agreement on the following points:

"a. The established of a demarcation line;

At this stage; the Committee is not yet in a position to offer suggestions; it has been informed of the views expressed by the military assistants on 10 November 1947, namely, that the opinion expressed by the military assistants on 2 October 1947 should be made to conform to the resolution of 1 November 1947. In addition to other reasons the express reference made by them to the resolution of the Security Council of 1 November 1947 makes it necessary to come to a clear interpretation of the will of the Council as expressed in that resolution. Such an interpretation can best be made by the Committee of Good Offices with the help of the verbatim records of the meetings of the Security Council. In the meantime, considering that the rights and claims of either party could not possibly be prejudiced, modified or jeopardized, it is hoped that the parties will forthwith take steps to come to agreement on any practical solution which might meet their views.

b. The determination of a demilitarized zone;

This demilitarized zone should be created between the positions of the two forces along the line. It is suggested the width of the zone not exceed ten (10) km.

It is to be understood that movement of troops of either party which may have to move from the zone in order to demilitarize it may move with arms, equipment and all other warlike stores. It is further to be understood that troops of either party in isolated positions not in the demilitarized zone will be repatriated likewise.

c. The period of time granted to each party to evacuate the area agreed upon, the means of carrying out this evacuation, and provision for the observation of these activities by the military assistants.

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- d. Provision for the observation and reporting by the military assistants of conditions prevailing in the demilitarized zone;
- e. Arrangements for civil administration in evacuated areas;
- f. Provision for the improvement of communications and transportation between the territories occupied by the parties;
- g. Provision to allow reciprocal economic intercourse at fixed points through the demarcation line."

19. The Netherlands Special Committee, in its memorandum on para d dated 28 November, expressed its opinion that the only way to settle the problem was, a) to declare the "stand fast" order applicable only to the forward areas where there were indeed "opposing forces"; b) to evacuate to Republican territory all those Republican fighting groups which were still in the areas occupied by Netherlands forces; c) to restrict the patrolling activity of the posts of both parties in the "forward areas" to one kilometre in the direction of known posts of the opposing party, with the proviso that this restriction could be maintained only for short successive periods (14 days at most), subject to renewal. The Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic, in its memorandum dated 1 December, stated its agreement to the text of para. d, as submitted by the Committee's representatives.

20. At the fourth meeting held in Batavia on 2 December, the Committee's representatives presented the following redraft of para. d which included a clarification drawn up by the Committee's military representatives:

"d. In order to maintain the military status quo in Java, Sumatra and Madura, existing military positions will not be altered in any areas from their present locations (in any direction) unless mutually agreed to by the two parties, such agreement to be expressed with particularity in writing at least twenty-four hours before the beginning of the alteration agreed upon; present patrolling activities to be continued but restricted to one (1) kilometre."

The new text was not discussed at this meeting and both Special Committees agreed that discussion of the further suggestions of the Committee would not be worth while until agreement had been reached on para d.

21. At the fifth meeting held in Batavia on 3 December the Netherlands Special Committee pointed out that the redraft of para. d omitted any reference to forward positions and did not limit the restriction on patrolling activities to these forward positions. The new text was therefore unacceptable to the Netherlands Special committee because the police duties of the Netherlands Army made it impossible to restrict patrolling activities of all troops to the mere tactical protection of their own encampments. At this same meeting the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the redraft of para d. The Republican Special Committee stated that it could not accept the view of the Netherlands Special Committee that



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the stand fast order should apply to the "forward positions" and that such an interpretation would mean that the Security Council's resolution would not be applicable to thousands of Republican troops and officials in vast territories of Java, Sumatra and Madura.

22. When it appeared that an impasse had been reached, the Committee instructed its representatives, on 3 December, to forward to both Special Committees a new plan, the adoption of which the Committee considered would bring about a speedy and effective truce. It was explained that the adoption of this plan was only of a provisional nature and would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties. The new plan read as follows:

"1. That each party would present a map to the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices on which it defines the demilitarized zones that it submits should divide Netherlands-occupied and Republican-occupied areas.

2. That each party should present arguments to the representatives of the Committee in support of its contention that the demilitarized zones should be established as claimed by it.

3. That each party, in addressing its arguments and making its submissions to the representatives of the Committee should have regard to the following factors:

- (a) the military positions of the various elements of both forces as at 4 August 1947;
- (b) the welfare of local population;
- (c) the administrative areas in existence as at 4 August and 20 November in or near to the demilitarized zones suggested by both parties;
- (d) the geographical and topographical features of the proposed demilitarized zones and surrounding districts;
- (e) the fact that zones in different areas may vary in width when the matters in (b), (c) and (d) above are taken into account.

4. That the parties should be at liberty to present their arguments and submissions partly by writing and partly orally, and that the written documents in support of a party's arguments and submissions should be delivered without delay to the representatives of the Committee and to the other party; and that the oral arguments and submissions be made to the representatives of the Committee in the presence and hearing of the duly designated representatives of the other party.

5. That in the event the parties do not agree, the representatives of the Committee should propose to the parties delimitations of the demilitarized zones which the parties would be asked to accept.

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6. That the representatives of the Committee, in arriving at these proposals, should carefully consider the arguments and submissions of the parties having regard to the matters set out in paragraph 3 above.
7. That on the parties agreeing to this plan, each party should have its troops stand fast and cease fire in their present positions.
8. That the matters agreed upon at that date by the parties through their Special Committees should be incorporated in this agreement and put into immediate effect.
9. That the parties should agree that as soon as the demilitarized zones mentioned above are accepted by the parties:
- (a) there should be an immediate resumption of normal trade and intercourse between the demilitarized zones, all Netherlands-occupied areas, and all Republican-occupied areas; and as far as practicable the parties should endeavour to facilitate such trade and intercourse;
  - (b) all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, should under supervision of military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zone.
10. That the representatives of the Committee should further make suggestions concerning the methods of control of, and maintenance of law and order in, the demilitarized zones."
23. By letter dated 6 December, the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic accepted the new plan. At the sixth meeting held on board the U.S.S. Renville on 9 December, the Netherlands Special Committee stated its willingness to proceed at full speed with the discussion of the new plan, which it believed contained valuable ideas, based on common sense and on which agreement could be reached, provided always that the present suspicions were allayed. Believing that considerable time would be needed to implement the plan, even if it were agreed to in principle, the Netherlands Special Committee suggested that the military and civilian aspects of the problem be separated and proposed to put into effect immediately the following points of the Committee's initial suggestions as revised (see paragraph 16): f, a, c, (changing the words following "compliance" to read "with provisions sub 1 and 2"), h, b, and g. The Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee had agreed in principle to all the Committee's initial suggestions (see paragraph 16) and that the Republican Special Committee was also ready to accept the new plan (see paragraph 22).
24. On 10 December, following a request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting, the military representatives of the Committee of Good Offices met with the Netherlands military representatives, and on 12 December received from them a memorandum containing specific questions concerning the new plan. On the basis of these questions the Committee's representatives on 16 December submitted to both Special Committees the following explanatory annex:

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"Paragraph I - A demilitarized zone is defined for the purposes set forth in the plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce as a zone from which all personnel of all military units, together with their arms and equipment, have been withdrawn.

The term military units does not apply to civil police. Suggestions as to the control, type and armament of police charged with the maintenance of law and order in the demilitarized zones would be submitted by the Committee of Good Offices if requested by the parties, as indicated in paragraph 10 of the new plan.

Paragraph 3 (a) - The positions of the troops of the two parties on 20 November 1947 is not a factor to be taken into account by the two parties in their submissions to the Committee of Good Offices with regard to the delineation of demilitarized zones.

Paragraph 3 (b) - Welfare refers not only to law and order but to living conditions of the population. The welfare of the local population is a term to be given a common-sense definition.

Paragraph 4 - It is recognized that each party, in making its submissions and advancing its arguments before the Special Committee of the other party in connection with the delimitation of a demilitarized zone, will necessarily take into account considerations of military security. The Committee of Good Offices will consider verifying in the field, within the limitations of its available personnel, the data supplied by the parties if the parties so desire.

Paragraph 7 - 'Present positions' means the positions of troops in any area of Java, Sumatra and Madura. This paragraph has for its intention the cessation of all troop movements of a hostile nature calculated to gain a military objective. It is not the intention of this paragraph to preclude the movements of troops for purposes of military administration or supply or the operations of civil police forces in the maintenance of law and order within the territories occupied.

Paragraph 9 (a) - It is recognized that many technical problems are involved in the resumption of normal trade and intercourse among the various areas and that these problems would require solution by agreement between the parties with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, if requested.

Paragraph 9 (b) - This paragraph applies to both parties. The question of whether the withdrawal of the troops of only one party or of both would be required could only be answered following the determination of the location of the demilitarized zones."

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25. In a letter dated 14 December, the Head of the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic stated that the Republican Special Committee could not accept as a separate plan the proposal made at the sixth meeting by the Netherlands Special Committee. He pointed out that the suggestions contained in the ~~Neth~~ Netherlands proposal were automatically provided for if both parties accepted the Committee's new plan and that these measures if detached from the other measures outlined in the Committee's plan, could not effect a general cease hostilities.

26. At the seventh meeting on 18 December, the Head of the Netherlands Special Committee stated that until the facts were established with respect to the **pockets** of resistance, the existence of which the Republic claimed and the Netherlands denied, his Government was of the opinion that it was useless to carry on the cease fire discussions. On the instructions of his Prime Minister, he formally requested the Committee to investigate these pockets immediately. He considered that the proposal made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the sixth meeting concerning the immediate implementation of those points in the Committee's initial suggestions upon which agreement had been reached in principle would have constituted an important improvement on the present unsatisfactory situation, and he requested the Committee of Good Offices to sponsor this proposal.

27. On 21 December the Committee received a memorandum from the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic concerning the request made by the Netherlands Special Committee at the seventh meeting for an investigation of the pockets of resistance. This memorandum pointed out that the Republican Special Committee had repeatedly suggested that it would be better for the outcome of such investigations if a general cease fire and stand fast order were issued first. If, however, the Committee insisted on this investigation, the Republic would ask that it be consulted on the locations to be visited and given the guarantee that the situation of Republican troops and officials in these locations would not be aggravated. In the meantime, discussions of the Committee's new plan should proceed.

28. On 21 and 23 December the Committee received memoranda from the Special Committees of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic setting forth in detail their views on the Committee plan for achieving a speedy and effective truce. These memoranda are attached to this report as Annexes I and II.

29. The Committee, on being requested by the parties, offered its suggestions through its representatives with the Special Committees with regard to requests of the parties for investigations into allegations of violations of the Council's cease fire resolution. The Committee's statement of its policy issued on 29 November to the parties read as follows:

"1. The Committee of Good Offices is of the opinion that requests for investigation into allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution should primarily and, as a rule, come from either or both of the Special Committees of the parties concerned;

2. The Chairman of the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices with the two Special Committees will nevertheless possess discretion to take up allegations of violations of the cease fire resolution on his own initiative with either or both of the Special Committees;

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3. In the investigation of such allegations, the representatives of the Committee should be given the right to insist on all facts being made available to them by both parties;
4. The representatives of the Committee and their military assistants should have the right to make observations in the territories of both parties;
5. The parties should cooperate with each other, under the auspices of the representatives of the Committee, in works of rescue and in carrying out other humanitarian activities;
6. In the case of situations which might lead to a violation of the cease fire resolution, it is the opinion of the Committee that neither the Committee nor its representatives should be expected to receive information under conditions which bind them to silence. It is clear that the work of the Committee and its representatives in connection with the implementation of the cease fire resolution should be carried on with the full cooperation of both parties and that this cooperation will be possible only if both parties have available to them all the information available to the Committee and its representatives;
7. In order to discharge properly its functions, the Committee is of the opinion that the parties should agree to inform the Committee or its representatives fully and promptly on any situation which either party may consider as necessitating the movement of elements of its armed forces beyond their present advance positions, and that the advice should be given prior to any such movement."

CHAPTER III

## OTHER PHASES OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK

30. On 28 November the Republic of Indonesia submitted a memorandum on the economic situation in the Republic (see Annex III). The Committee transmitted this memorandum to the other party and on 13 December received a reply from the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation enclosing copies of a report drawn up by competent authorities of the Netherlands Indies Governemtn. On 22 December the Committee received a further letter from the Netherlands delegation concerning this memorandum of the Republic. These letters are given in Annex IV of this report.

31. In a letter addressed to both parties on 11 December 1947, the Committee stated that its limited staff resources had prevented it from studying conditions on the spot as fully as it would have liked and that the Committee now hoped to be able to spare some of the assistants of each delegation to acquaint themselves with conditions in Java, Sumatra and Madura, and to report to the Committee. It was explained that the Committee intended to ask its assistants to arrange for observation and inquiries into the specific situations which the parties called to the attention of the Committee, but because of the limitations of the Committee's staff, it might be possible to meet the parties' requests only in some specially selected cases. The Committee invited representatives from each of the parties to accompany its assistants. Pursuant to the policy stated in this letter, the Committee sent an observation team to the island of Madura on 15 December, where it was alleged by the Republic that the Netherlands troops had by hostile action taken over almost the entire area of the island after 4 August. Since the Chairman of the Netherlands delegation informed the Committee that the Government of the Netherlands Indies was of the opinion that the visit of Republican representatives to territories where the maintenance of law and order was ensured by civil and military authorities of the Netherlands Indies could not be admitted, as long as the campaign of intimidation and provocation conducted by the Republican Government continued, the Committee's assistants were not accompanied by representatives of either party. However both parties submitted lists of persons on the island of Madura whom they considered would be of assistance to the Committee's team. The Committee is awaiting the report of its observation team and contemplate sending similar teams to other places in Java and Sumatra.

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Authority 795006  
By W NARA Date 11/25/11

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The Log

Period: 28 Dec., 1947--11Jan., 1948 Incl

ANNEX 2

"KRAWANG FIELD SURVEY PARTY  
UNANIMOUS REPORT"

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## INTRODUCTION.

On 26-December-1947, the Good Offices Committee at its fiftieth meeting, instructed that an investigation be made of the KRAWANG area as requested by the Special Committee of the Indonesian Republic. This Observation Team conducted preliminary meetings and inquiries in Batavia, and on 5 and 6 January, 1948, visited the Krawang area and interviewed both Dutch and Indonesians.

SECTION I  
GENERAL CONDITIONS IN THE AREA

The Krawang area is located about 70 kms. by road, almost due east of Batavia. Civil Administration in the area has followed the same pattern as before World War II despite the Japanese Occupation, the Republican Administration and the Dutch "police action". The area is particularly fertile and noted for the fine quality rice it produces. It is connected with Batavia by a main road (in bad repair) and a railway line.

The population is composed of peasants with a very small sprinkling of Chinese merchants. The land is owned by the government and is on perpetual lease to the peasants who own outright all that is produced from the land. Education is primitive and due to the unsettled conditions at the present time, almost non-existent in the area. Rawahgedeh, the focal point of the investigation is considered a probably headquarters for the underground movement in that area.

SECTION II  
BACKGROUND OF INCIDENTS IN THE AREA

Following the Japanese capitulation, the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed its independence and organized an army known as the TRI. However, many separate groups within the Republic organized separate "irregular" forces and created a situation that after the Linggadjati Agreement, became so delicate that a National Army of Indonesia was formed by the Republic, the TNI, and these "irregular" forces were given an opportunity to join. In the Krawang area some of these "irregulars" did not wish to cooperate and the TNI carried out suppressive actions that disarmed most of them and broke up their control of the area. However the area remained administratively unstable.

The Dutch, then, by their "police action" dispersed the Republican military and civil control of the area and for the following two months the area was extremely quiet. Two months prior to the incident investigated, lawlessness increased and appeared to be caused by an underground movement inspired by the Republic, as well as by individual bands of looters.

The Observation Team investigated Dutch reports of "gang" activities and atrocities in and near Rawahgedeh linking them with this loosely organized underground movement.



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## SECTION III

## THE RAWAHGEDEH INCIDENT -- 9 DECEMBER 1947

On the night of 8-9 December 1947, a force of approximately 90 men from the 3rd Infantry Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Infantry Brigade, of the 7 December Division, divided into three (3) groups, all under the command of Major Wynen, moved from Krawang to the vicinity of Rawahgedeh, and after surrounding it on the North, East and South sides, attacked the village at 0530 on 9 December 1947. The Dutch claim to have been fired on first. The attack ceased at 1300 on 9 December 1947. Netherlands troops employed used mortars, automatic rifles, sub-machine guns, rifles, etc. No casualties were suffered by the Dutch, who stated that they killed 150 Indonesians and wounded 4. The village Mohammedan priest estimated the number killed by the Dutch as 433. Both Dutch and Indonesians stated that no women, children or old men were killed or wounded.

No weapons (firearms of any kind) were found on Indonesians, either dead, wounded or prisoners. A total of 15 Indonesians prisoners were turned over to the Dutch. Commanded at the conclusion of the action. One Indonesian witness stated that he saw 7 Indonesians interrogated and then shot by a Netherlands soldier. The Dutch Commander stated that out of 12-13 men turned over to him by one of his sergeants, 4 were shot after being interrogated, because they were Indonesian soldiers, and supposedly pointed out to him by a spy in his employ who stated that he had been maltreated by these men. The Dutch Commander then turned the remaining 8 Indonesian prisoners over to his Commanding Officer and stated that they were later released.

CONFIDENTIALSECTION IVFINDINGS

The Observation Team, having considered all statements and documents placed before it and after having visited on two occasions the area concerned, submits the following findings:

1. Restlessness has been, at least since August 1945, a characteristic of this area which is situated approximately 55 km. east of Batavia in an agricultural area which produces the best rice quality grown in Java.
2. Early in 1947, the Republican Government attempted to restore central control by disarming "irregular" forces, but achieved only limited success.
3. Immediately following the Netherlands "police action", Republican military and civilian control appeared to have completely disintegrated.
4. A loosely organized underground movement is now operating.
5. This underground movement aims to isolate the people by "removing" loerachs of dessas and terrorizing other Indonesians sympathetic to Netherlands control, and to render motorized patrolling ineffective by road obstructions, demolitions, etc.
6. Rawahgedeh appears to have been a probable headquarters for this underground movement. The Loerah of Rawahgedeh, who disappeared since the action seems to have taken an active part in these activities.
7. The standard of living in Rawahgedeh is most primitive by Western standards and must be considered as an important factor influencing the condition of this area.
8. The action taken by the Netherlands Army was deliberate and ruthless as evidenced by the following:
  - a. There were no Dutch casualties, either killed or wounded.
  - b. The Netherlands Army authorities reported 150 Indonesians killed and only 4 wounded.
  - c. Women, children and old men were waved aside and in this manner separated from those to be killed.
  - d. Not one weapon (firearm) was found on Indonesian prisoners or casualties (either dead or wounded).

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- e. A force of Indonesians armed with 40/60 rifles and one automatic weapon was reported by Dutch authorities as the resisting force. This force, according to Major Wynen, opened fire on his party when it was approaching the village. An Indonesian who had been maltreated and held prisoner in Rawahgedeh by this Indonesian group reported a force of approximately 100 men armed with three rifles, twenty pistols, knives and hand grenades, assembled in the vicinity of the Loerah's home at Rawahgedeh on the evening prior to the action. He also reported that after firing two shots (immediately after the Dutch mortar fire) this group fled.
- f. No medical facilities were left in the village for treatment of Indonesians possibly wounded and in hiding.
- g. Four Indonesian soldiers were interrogated and ordered to be shot by the Commander of Netherlands troops after their being properly delivered to him by one of the sergeants in his command.
- h. According to a statement by an Indonesian, seven Indonesian soldiers (TRI ?) were shot at Djamantri by a Netherlands soldier with an automatic weapon. Major Wynen and his sergeant deny this statement.

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Authority 795006  
By W NARA Date 11/25/11

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

00341

Batavia, Java.  
13 December, 1947.

Subject: The LOG, U.S. Military and Observer Group,  
Period 30 November - 13 December, Inclusive.

To : A.C. of S. G-2, GHQ , FEC.

1. Submitted herewith is the Log of the Observer Group on tdy Batavia, for the period 30 November - 13 December inclusive.
2. The original and one copy are enclosed.
3. Miss Margaret Pierce of the Consulate staff, Batavia, is acting as courier as far as Manila. She has instructions to deliver the envelope to Lt. Col. McLennon for forwarding to G-2, GHQ.
4. The Log will speak for itself as to the employment of the U.S. Military Group during the critical two weeks under consideration. Everyone has been very busy, but the whole effort continues to be embarrassed by a lack of stenographic help. Several typists have been used at different intervals during the past two weeks, but one only could be had for more than a couple of days at a time.

*C.S. Myers*  
C.S. Myers,  
Colonel, GSC.  
Senior Member.

enclosures: As indicated.

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CONFIDENTIAL30 November, SundayI. The LOG

0730 hrs. : Alert.  
 0745 hrs. : Departure of Lt. Col. Feallock for Tokio via Singapore and Hong Kong. (Commercial aircraft.)  
 1000 hrs. : Grounding of U.S. C-47 at Batavia. Estimated time out of commission owing to need for engine replacement, five days.  
 Afternoon : Recreation.  
 2000 hrs. : Informal meeting of Col. Myers and members of his Group to review attitudes and consider plans for the coming week when the Transport "Renville" would be expected at Batavia.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Lt. Col. Feallock: Through arrangements completed by the Dutch Good Offices Commission Liaison Office, Lt. Col. Feallock was provided with a seat on Dutch KLM plane to Singapore, where he was expected to transfer to Cathay Pacific to Hong Kong, and thence to Tokio via Phillipine Air Lines. He carried with him the original and one copy of the LOG for the period 21 November - 29 November inclusive, addressed to G-2, GHQ for General Willoughby. Lt. Col. Feallock's release was in accordance with a request from 5th Air Force that he be relieved and a relay of that message by CINCFE (see LOG 25 November).

C-47 Non-Flying Status: The port engine of the Group's C-47 had run up approximately 850 hours, when a ground test revealed serious faults in two cylinders. In the opinion of Lt. Chapman and Lt. White, the engine could not be operated further. It was decided to try to make arrangements with KLM for a replacement, as the airplane is in almost constant demand for transport of personnel and materials in connection with the "Talks". The airplane was scheduled to carry GOC and other officials to Jogjakarta Sunday and Monday, but the heavy trips were cancelled, inasmuch as the Australian C-47 was also out of commission owing to need for an engine change. The Beechcraft <sup>US Navy</sup> was furnished to take Dr. Graham to Jogjakarta in order to permit him to make his radio broadcast scheduled for Sunday evening.

Sunday Evening Talk: Opinion on the talk broadcast by Dr. Graham from Radio Jogjakarta at 2000 hours was slightly divided, as far as the Military and Naval Group was concerned. Members were united in stating that it was a great improvement over the speech delivered by Dr. Van Zeeland two weeks previously. However, there were expressions of disappointment that Dr. Graham had found himself unable to "put teeth" into it. Capt. McCallum of the Navy, while holding an opinion of that type, also said he understood how Dr. Graham had to "lay his foundations" first, and added that he believed it was an appropriate speech for this time. The Group then went into a review of developments thus far and considered plans for the forthcoming week. It was outlined by Col. Myers that apparently the GOC was settled on its plan of presenting for discussion all of Phase III before having obtained agreement on Phase I. The Group reviewed its attitude on this matter, and complete unanimity was had. A suggestion brought by Lt. Col. Dixon, strongly seconded by Col. Myers and agreed to by all others provided for a "restatement" of the U.S. Group's convictions in the matter and the presentation of this restatement to Dr. Graham was planned through Col. Myers at the earliest practicable date.

1 December, MondayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Study of proposed restatement of U.S. Group's convictions.  
 Afternoon : Preparation of restatement.  
 1930 hrs. : Informal discussion of same with U.S. Military Group and Capt. McCallum, followed by greeting of Republican Col. Simatupang.  
 2000 hrs. : Return of Col. Mollohan from Bandoeng inspections.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION:

Restatement: The need for a restatement of the U.S. Military Group's attitude became more obvious as the time neared for the proposed "substantive" talks

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scheduled to begin during the week. Members of the U.S. Group were <sup>surprised</sup> concerned at the GOC intention to disregard the recommendations of not only the U.S. Group, but of the Senior Military Group's Combined Report of Recommendations (See LOG, 1 November, 2 November and 8 and 9 November). It was the concensus that every day of delay on implementation of the Resolution of 1 November worked to the advantage of the Dutch, and the deterioration of the Republicans. The insertion of the complicated controversial features of Phase 11 would insure the need for long, involved discussions, all of which would be rendered more strained as casualties and sabotage acts were continued and propaganda went unchecked through failure to implement Phase 1 first. Later in the evening, Col. Simatupang of the Republican Army General Staff paid a call. He indicated that the Republican Contact Committee was prepared to accept Phase 1 in its fundamentals, and likely would do so at the meeting scheduled for Tuesday and Wednesday.

2 December, TuesdayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 0800 hrs. : Meeting, full Military and Naval Group with Col. Myers to discuss the Restatement Letter and prepare for meeting with Dr. Graham.  
 0900 hrs. : Meeting, whole Military and Observer Group with Dr. Graham and his assistants, Scott, Ogburn, Brandis and Mr. Abbey.  
 1000 hrs. : Meeting, Combined Contact Committees, Col. Myers representing U.S. Military Group, to discuss definitions and implementation of Phase 1.  
 1500 hrs. : Arrival, U.S.N.T. "Renville" at Tanjoeng Priok.  
 2000 hrs. : Informal meeting, U.S. Military and Naval Group, to review day's meetings.  
 2100 hrs. : Meeting, Good Offices Committee and U.S. Military Observers to discuss definitions and suggestions for implementation of Phase 11. Colonels Myers, and Elliott and Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind for the U.S. Observers.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Graham Meeting: This meeting was opened by Dr. Graham's reading of an outline prepared by Mr. Justice Kirby of Australia for the implementation of such features of Phase 11 as the establishment of lines of demarcation and demilitarized zones. The American Military Group remained silent, as this was not in line with their recommendations. With Dr. Graham's permission then Col. Myers read the U.S. Observer Group's "Restatement". Dr. Graham's reply was surprising in that he said it was his distinct understanding from Australian sources, and from his own assistants -- Mr. Ogburn particularly -- that the acceptance of Phase 1 by the Military Contact Committees was not anticipated, and, in fact, its rejection was assured by the Republicans. This was at such variance with the actual record (See LOG, 19 November, first paragraph under NARRATIVE SECTION) that the source of Mr. Ogburn's statements was challenged. It then developed that it was not an official statement made by Republicans, but Mr. Ogburn's conclusions after informal discussions with some members of the Republican delegation. However, Major Campbell, the Australian military delegate, also seemed to hold the opinion that Phase 1 could not be acceptable until details of the lines of demarcation and demilitarized zones had been settled. In this he was joined by Mr. Abbey and Mr. Scott. Apparently this had been the basis for Mr. Abbey's decision to reveal Phase 11 at Kaleiorang before Phase 1 had been agreed upon. Col. Myers stated that that was exactly the Dutch strategy, and that in yielding to the Dutch request for revelation of Phase 11, prematurely, the Dutch had been given the advantage they sought and now were provided with endless material for ~~the~~ stalling purposes if they chose to use it that way. Lt. Col. Dixon declared that the assumption that Paragraph "d" of Phase 1 (dealing with hold-fast and troop movements) could not be implemented without bringing in the whole of Phase 11 was "a falacy which was responsible for much confused thinking". Again he explained that the Military Group's strategy in providing Phase 1 was merely to bring everything to a complete halt first, then discuss ways of unravelling complicated withdrawals, re-occupations, exchange of prisoners and so on. Mr. Scott was not impressed and reiterated that in his opinion, the two phases were too interrelated to be considered separately. Col. Myers then reminded the meeting that it now was

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doubly important that the Observers "Restatement" be entered officially in the minutes. The meeting was adjourned to permit attendance of some delegates at the Contact Committee meetings to follow.

Contact Committee Meeting: This meeting, which lasted two hours, accomplished very little except to reveal the correctness of the U.S. Group's apprehensions reference the undesirability of introducing the complicated questions of Phase 11. The exchanges between the contending parties quite lost sight of Phase 1 and dealt almost exclusively with detailed involvements of Phase 11. It was evident, too that even in the matter of basic definitions, discussed at such length at various times throughout November, the parties were not in agreement as full seriousness of Phase 11 factors became increasingly evident to both sides. The meeting was adjourned without notable progress.

"Renville": The U.S.N.T. "Renville" dropped anchor at Tanjoeng Priok during the afternoon. Immediate preparations were made to establish a communications net involving the ship, Batavia and Jogjakarta. It would be three days before the net would be operative, it was thought.

G.O.C. Night Meeting: Among other points taken up at this meeting was the advisability of G.O.C. conducting its own investigation into the deaths of 46 Republican prisoners on a Dutch railway train. (See LOG, 29 November). In view of the fact that three investigations were proceeding, including one of a neutral organization (International Red Cross) the G.O.C. decided not to investigate, but to ask for full information.

The request of the Republicans and the invitation of the Dutch that G.O.C. send an observer group to Madura was acted upon. A mixed group of civilian and military observers will go as soon as air transport can be arranged and personnel released from other duties. Col. Elliott likely will represent the American Group, and he probably will be accompanied by Lt. Col. Buckner.

This meeting then concerned itself with definitions of terms used in the Security Council's Resolution of 1 November, and with the Glossary of terms as submitted by the U.S. Group (LOG, 20 November) and approved by the entire Military delegation, including Col. Servais of Belgium. The record of Col. Servais is one of constant shifting, as has been repeatedly mentioned in this LOG (see 20 and 26 November). It was not surprising, therefore, when the Belgian delegation, Col. Servais and Dr. Van Sicklen principally, once more reversed its position and insisted on the presentation of its own definitions for the terms "hostile action", "occupied territory" and "controlled territory". Definitions drawn up by Col. Servais were admitted by him to have no other basis for authority than his own ideas and convictions approved by Mr. Van Sicklen, Belgian head. He said that he was not exactly out of agreement with the definitions as submitted by the U.S. and Australian military, but that he could not see that they either went far enough or were strictly applicable to the Dutch-Indonesian picture. He therefore would have to reject acceptance of the three definitions under discussion. His claims on "occupied" and "controlled" were very closely inter-related. He said that a country was said to be occupied and controlled when the occupying force possibly controlled lines of communication and transportation, regardless of the existence of enemy resistance groups in areas between these spearheads. All attempts to evaluate further and secure agreement on these two terms were futile, although Col. Servais finally accepted the U.S.-Australian concept of "hostile action". It was emphasized by the chairman, Mr. Kirby, of Australia, that the military group had approved previously and that the G.O.C. had accepted the whole of the Glossary officially, but in the interests of attempting to secure complete harmony, the discussions with the Belgians were encouraged.

The meeting had to be adjourned because of lateness without taking up the matter of implementation of Phase 11.

3 December, WednesdayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.

0900 hrs. : Informal meeting, Good Offices Committee and Military Observers to continue discussions of adjourned meeting of 2 December. Colonels Elliott, Myers and Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind for the U.S. Observer Group.

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3 December - continued:

1000 hrs. : Formal meeting of Combined Contact Committees: Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Ind for U.S. Observer Group. This was to discuss acceptance of Phase 1.  
1500 hrs. : Submission to Dr. Graham by Col. Myers of U.S. Military and Naval Observers' "Restatement".

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

G.O.C. Meeting: With the resumption of the discussions on definitions, the patience of even the Australian chairman, Mr. Kirby, obviously was tried by the Belgian delegates. This was particularly true when Col. Servais exhibited still another of his reversals and now refused to accept the definition of "hostile action", which the evening before he said he was prepared to take. The hour was taken up by efforts to reconcile the Belgian views with those of Col. Myers representing the Americans, and Major Campbell representing the Australians. Myers and Campbell were in agreement. Dr. Graham stated that in his opinion, the Belgian concepts were quite acceptable where a state of war actually existed, and therefore might have had close application prior to the Cease Fire Order, but that the U.S. and Australian definitions were applicable to the situation since that time. However, this meeting had to be adjourned without agreement to permit the military observers to attend Contact Committee talks.

Contact Committee Talks: This was another formal full meeting of the Combined Contact Committee and was for the purpose of endeavoring to secure agreement to the acceptance of Phase 1. Speaking for the Dutch, General D. C. Duurman Van Vreeden, Chief of Staff, read a lengthy statement of which the substance was that:

- a. The Republican Army had ceased to exist as a military force and that accordingly the Dutch forces were responsible for the maintenance of law and order.
- b. Republican bands now lived off the country to the detriment of the population.
- c. The Dutch considered that they were acting entirely correctly in "mopping up" since the Security Council's resolution for stand-fast applied only to forward units.

Therefore, he said, his delegation regretfully would have to decline to accept that part of Phase 1 which limited patrolling to 1 kilometer in the direction of known Republican forces, because the Dutch forces could not maintain law and order and protect the people against stragglers foraging for food.

In reply, the Republicans said that they were prepared to accept the G.O.C. recommendations on this paragraph. However, Col. Simatupang in outlining the Republican Military Group's attitude said that the Dutch General's statement had not touched on vital matters particularly the Dutch justification of further military action in the face of the Security Council's 1 November Resolution. He said: "My delegation does not believe that the intentions or the actions of the Dutch have been influenced at all by the Resolutions, either of 4 August or 1 November."

He declined to accept the Dutch assertion that on any certain date the Republican Army had "ceased to exist" as a military force, and stated that it still was a military unit capable of carrying out orders.

With reference to "living off the country", he said it was understandable how "a foreigner" would have such a concept, but that nevertheless it was an incorrect concept, since the Indonesian troops were living off the products "of their own land among their own people".

He asked for definitions of "occupied" and "controlled" territories.

He said that if the Dutch idea that "stand-fast" applied only to forward units "then the whole Security Council Resolution becomes meaningless".

The Chairman, Mr. Abbey, declined to press for understanding and ruled that the two statements would be submitted to the G.O.C.

The Dutch asked that before the meeting closed, their invitation that G.O.C. send observers to Madura be acted upon with energy and without delay. At the same time, the Dutch expressed dissatisfaction with delays in the progress of Contact Committee acceptances. Mr. Abbey acknowledged but adjourned the meeting.



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"Restatement Submission": Emphasizing that he and his group wanted only to be constructive and helpful, Col. Myers tendered to Dr. Graham the U.S. Group's "Restatement". He said that the Group as a whole considered it a duty to again bring Dr. Graham's attention to the Group convictions. Dr. Graham assured Col. Myers that the Group's motives never had been questioned and that only frank, honest presentations like this one could be constructive. The "Restatement" letter is as follows:

TO: Dr. Frank Graham

SUBJECT: Restatement of the U.S. Military and Naval Group's Recommendations for the Implementation of the Cease Fire Order and its Reactions to the Developments to Date.

1. In reply to your Memorandum of 1 November, 1947 to Col. Myers, Subject: "Means of Implementing the Cease Fire Order," the American Military and Naval Observers prepared a draft (Enclosure A) of recommendations. These were presented to you 2 November. The provisions of this draft were formulated prior to the publication of the Security Council's Resolution of 1 November. The following were the basic principles which governed the preparation of this draft:

(a) First, that it is highly improbable that a line of demarcation, creation of a neutral corridor, and any withdrawal of troops could be effected without a delay which would permit continuance of the current military situation.

(b) Second, that the logical approach appeared to be a plan which would utilize the apparent good will of both sides. This plan would call for the maintenance of the military status quo in an effort to decrease casualties at once, while political and further military discussions were being carried on concurrently.

(c) Third, that the military situation is of secondary importance compared to the vital necessity for securing political harmony.

2. The above-mentioned draft was modified to conform with the Security Council's resolution of 1 November, as it was then interpreted, and presented to the U. S. Consul General 7 November. This modification involved no change in the original principles listed in Paragraph 1.

3. On 10 November, the senior Military Observers of the Consular Commission approved in general the American draft as Phase 1, and the establishment of demarcation lines and a demilitarized zone as Phase 11 of the over-all plan for implementing the 1 November Resolution. The American Military Group considered this plan to be satisfactory, because it retained the basic principles outlined in Paragraph 1 above, it being distinctly understood that Phase 1 would be implemented and executed prior to starting negotiations on the provisions of Phase 11.

4. During the meeting of the Cease Fire Committee at Kalioerang, Phase 11 was introduced without (a) having the approval of all of the provisions of Phase 1, and (b) establishing an effective date for the execution of the provisions which had been accepted. The introduction of Phase 11 was objected to by Col. Myers on the grounds that such action would sabotage the aims embodied in Phase 1 by causing undue delay in taking definite steps to curb military incidents, decrease casualties and in fact defeat its purpose entirely. Such a delay will also permit the Dutch forces time to occupy all territory to the Van Mook Line.

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5. As negotiations have developed it has become evident that there is no generally accepted interpretation by the two parties of the 1 November Resolution. Because of this fact the American Military Observers believe that (1) it is the duty of the G.O.C. to present a clear and undisputable interpretation in order that responsibility for military provocations may be properly assigned and to discern what military withdrawals if any are to be carried out, and (2) in the event the G.O.C. cannot arrive at such an interpretation we believe that the American delegation of the G.O.C. should formulate the interpretation, obtain approval of the Secretary of State, and submit it to both parties.

6. Further, the U.S. Military Group is of the opinion that if negotiations are to collapse, this should not happen until every effort has been made to obtain agreement on both military and political levels. The evidence obtained as the result of careful and patient negotiations is necessary in order that the United States can formulate a definite policy regarding the situation and be in position to play a dominant role should the case be reopened by the Security Council.

7. The U.S. Military Group believes that the following three steps in the order named are necessary to reinstate the principles originally outlined in Paragraph one, and should be accomplished in the order named:

(a) Obtain an agreement on Phase 1 as quickly as possible, set up the necessary machinery for putting it in operation, and make it effective immediately.

(b) Announce the G.O.C., or if none available, the American interpretation of the 1 November resolution.

(c) Initiate negotiations to determine a line of demarcation and establish a demilitarized zone.

8. It is desired to emphasize that the U.S. Military and Naval Observers arrived at the conclusions set forth in their original report to you on the subject of recommendations for implementation of the Cease Fire Order after careful study based upon their field observations and upon principles of military concepts. The Report was unanimous. The Group has reviewed its original statement several times, and has found no reason to alter it. In view of latest developments, including what appeared to be the intention of the Good Offices Committee to seek agreement on Phase 11 before securing agreement on Phase 1, this Group again reviewed its decisions and recommendations. Since again it was found that the original beliefs seemed most applicable to the situation, it is believed advisable to submit to you this "restatement".

Signed -- C. S. Myers  
Col., GSC  
Senior Member

Definitions dilemma: Dr. Graham then reviewed with Col. Myers privately the matter of the deadlock among the Military Group on definitions, with particular reference to Col. Servais' attitude. It was agreed that Col. Myers was to do his best to secure Col. Servais' agreement to accept Paragraph 1 of the Hague Conventions' basic definition of "Military Occupation". He told Col. Myers not to press agreements on other definitions for the time being and to leave it to the G.O.C. to try to steer the Belgians into a course that would at least permit of some forward movement by the time "substantive" talks were to begin on shipboard.

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4 December, Thursday

I. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 0845 hrs. : Meeting, Col. Myers, Lt. Colonels Ind and Dixon with Col. Servais and Major Campbell (Australia).  
 0930 hrs. : Informal meeting, G.O.C. and Military Seniors, Col. Myers and Lt. Colonels Ind and Dixon for the U.S. Group.  
 Afternoon and evening: Col. Myers' informal meeting with numerous members of G.O.C., his own group and Col. Simatupang of the Indonesian delegates on suggestions made by G.O.C. for simplifying agreements on the acceptance of Phase 1. Others of U.S. Group concerned with preparation of records and surveys.  
 1930 hrs. : Receipt unnumbered 2 December relay from CINCFE reference retention of Lt. Col. Feallock.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Servais Meeting: Following instruction, Col. Myers exerted patient pressure upon Col. Servais to try to break the definitions deadlock. While the Belgian reiterated his stand that he wanted to qualify his acceptance of the definition of "military occupation" by stating that it was "inadequate" and could serve only as a basis, he did agree to the acceptance of the Hague definition. Thus unanimity on this troublesome point was achieved. However, it was seen that Major Campbell would not be able to accept the expansions which Col. Servais wanted to propose, on the basis that they applied to a situation involving an actual state of war, and since the Cease Fire Order, there was no right on anyone's part to accept a state of war as existing in Indonesia.

G.O.C. Meeting: Under the chairmanship of Mr. Kirby, the informal meeting of G.O.C. and advisors got under way. Unanimous agreement was voiced by the American, Belgian and Australian military seniors to accept the definition of "military occupation" as being: "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised." The G.O.C. recorded the agreement and accepted the definition in its turn. Col. Servais then was invited to read his amplifying statement. To permit holding an executive session for the close study of all accepted definitions, and, if time allowed, to study Col. Servais' suggested expansions, the G.O.C. chairman then excused all but the Good Offices Committee itself.

Survey Presentation: Because it was believed that a carefully prepared example-problem involving the elements of the Indonesian situation might serve best to test the application of all definitions, both those officially accepted and those expansions proposed by the Belgians, the U.S. Military Group met to plan the most effective manner of drawing up such a presentation, complete with theoretical sketches, maps, etc., Lt. Colonels Dixon and Buckner and Major Neal were instructed to proceed. (Col. Elliott was standing by for G.O.C. clearance to go to Madura. See LOG 2 December.)

"Netherlands Standpoint": In view of the U.S. Group's insistence that the implementation of the Cease Fire Order be concurrent with political negotiations, the statement of an official Netherlands spokesman quoted in a press release of this date is interesting. He says: "The Netherlands Contact Commission...has always favored the standpoint that it does not expect results of political discussions before the Cease Fire arrangements works satisfactory in practice...." This same spokesman, however, touches on a vital point of difference when he claims that as soon as the Security Council's Resolution appeared, "totally in accordance with this, the Police Action was stopped." (It has been the observation and conviction of the American Observer Group that it was stopped neither in lateral movement to mop up, nor in forward movement to occupy the Van Mook Line, established long after the Council's original order.)

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Feallock Message: A relayed message was received this date from CINCFE stating that Lt. Col. Feallock would be retained on TDY as long as needed inasmuch as no replacement was available. A message will be sent indicating that he departed Sunday, 30 November, in accordance with State Department unnumbered 22 November Lovett to Livengood for Myers, relay from FEAF relay from CINCFE requesting that his return to FEAF be effected if at all possible.

5 December, FridayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Preparation of "problem" and of LOG.  
 1800 hrs. : Reception, U.S. Naval Liaison Officer for U.S.N.T Renville personnel.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

The Talks: With talks scheduled to begin as soon as communications were established between the "Renville", Jogjakarta and Batavia, the G.O.C. was entirely occupied in preparations of agenda and other matters of an administrative type. The Military Observers were not called upon, and devoted themselves to the preparation of the survey mentioned previously and the LOG, thus "clearing the decks" in case G.O.C. made extensive demands upon it as talks were launched.

6 December, SaturdayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Review of "problem" draft.  
 Afternoon : Recreation

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

The Talks: Hopes that the talks could be initiated on board the ship Saturday had to be dropped because of the need for further work to put the communications net into operation, and because not all of the delegates could arrive in time. Provided all arrangements are completed, it is planned that they will start Sunday. In the meantime, the G.O.C. has been very occupied with preparations.

C-47: The American C-47 has been grounded since 24 November owing to the necessity of an engine change and the fact that the aircraft requires a slightly different model engine than possessed by KLM here. This means that the engine has to be "built up" and all accessories adjusted to fit the different model. It is not anticipated that the plane can be ready for test hop before 7 or 8 December. The Australian C-47 and the Beechcraft are trying to absorb the double load of transporting delegates to Batavia for the "substantive" talks. The plane's failure comes at a bad time. It was surprising news to Col. Myers that the port engine had more than 850 hours flying time on it, because he was distinctly assured at Clark Field by the Thirteenth Air Force staff officers that the plane had good engines and was capable of performing the requirements that might be made on it. That an engine nearing it's thousand-hour mark was considered "suitable" for a prolonged mission more than thousands of miles from any American base maintenance unit is considered to be only one further indication of the unsatisfactory preparation given by Thirteenth Air Force to the compliance with the order to provide the Mission with a suitable aircraft. (See LOG for first 10 days.)

7 December, SundayI. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Recreation.  
 Noon : Dinner, Col. Myers with Dr. Graham. Col. Myers again raised the point of being kept informed and Dr. Graham promised to send Mr. Brandis.

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1530 hrs. : Informal presentation on U.S.N.T. "Renville" of Prime Minister Sjarifuddin to ranking Dutch delegates, this being the first time such a meeting had occurred since the outbreak of hostilities last July.

1800 hrs. : Meeting: Col. Myers and Mr. Brandis to bring Col. Myers up to date on the preparations of the G.O.C. for the guidance of the talks on the ship, now scheduled for Monday, 8 December.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Brandis Conference: In the evening meeting Colonel Myers had with Mr. Brandis, the latter presented an outline of the G.O.C.'s tentative program which it hoped to present to the opposing sides when the "Substantive" talks had been launched aboard ship. This likely would occur about Tuesday, inasmuch as Monday would be devoted to the ceremonies of inaugurating the Plenary sessions. It was believed by the G.O.C. he said, that if the Dutch and Indonesian ranking delegates could be induced to accept the suggestions, a speedy indication of the progress that might be expected in coming weeks would emerge.

The suggestions were as follows:

1. That each party should present a map to the Representatives of the Committee of Good Offices on which it defines the demilitarized zones that it submits should divide Netherlands occupied and Republican occupied areas.
2. That each party should present arguments to the representatives of the Committee in support of its contention that the demilitarized zones should be established as claimed by it.
3. That each party, in addressing its arguments and making its submissions to the representatives of the Committee should have regard to the following factors:
  - (a) the military <sup>5</sup>positions of the various elements of both forces as of 4 August 1947;
  - (b) the welfare of local populations;
  - (c) the administrative areas in existence as at 4 August and 20 November in or near to the demilitarized zones suggested by both parties;
  - (d) the geographical and topographical features of the proposed demilitarized zones and surrounding districts;
  - (e) the fact that zones in different areas may vary in width when the matters in (b), (c), and (d) above are taken into account.
4. That the parties should be at liberty to present their arguments and submissions partly by writing and partly orally, and that the written documents in support of a party's arguments and submissions should be delivered without delay to the representatives of the Committee and to the other party; and that the oral arguments and submissions be made to the representatives of the Committee in the presence and hearing of the duly designated representatives of the other party.
5. That in the event the parties do not agree the representatives of the Committee should propose to the parties delimitations of the demilitarized zones which the parties would be asked to accept.
6. That the representatives of the Committee, in arriving at these proposals, should carefully consider the arguments and submissions of the parties having regard to the matters set out in paragraph (3) above.

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7. That on the parties agreeing to this plan, each party should have its troops stand fast and cease fire in their present positions.
8. That the matters agreed upon at that date by the parties through their Special Committees should be incorporated in this agreement and put into immediate effect.
9. That the parties should agree that as soon as the demilitarized zones mentioned above are accepted by the parties:
- (a) there should be an immediate resumption of normal trade and intercourse between the demilitarized zones, all Netherlands occupied areas, and all Republican occupied areas; and as far as practicable the parties should endeavor to facilitate such trade and intercourse;
  - (b) all forces of each party in any area accepted as a demilitarized zone or in any area on the other party's side of a demilitarized zone, should under supervision of military assistants of the Committee of Good Offices and with arms and warlike equipment move peacefully to the territory on the party's own side of the demilitarized zone.
10. That the representatives of the Committee should further make suggestions concerning the method of control of, and maintenance of law and order in, the demilitarized zones.

\* \* \* \*

Col. Myers reserved comment, although it appeared to him that the suggestions had a sound basis and a fair possibility of success.

8 December, MondayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.  
 0830 hrs. : Brief preliminary talks among members of Col. Myers' Group reference the forthcoming ship talks.  
 0920 hrs. : Departure Batavia for Tandjong Priok.  
 1000 hrs. : Arrival U.S.N.T. "Renville".  
 1020 hrs. : Opening of Plenary Session.  
 1132 hrs. : Adjournment of Plenary Session.  
 Noon : Brief talk, Col. Myers and Mr. Abbey.  
 Afternoon : Talks among members of Col. Myers' Group and preparation of reports.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

The Plenary Session: Arrangements for the launching of "Substantive" talks were well founded by U.S.N.T. "Renville". The G.O.C. delegates faced forward. On the port side were the Dutch and opposite were the Indonesians, with interpreters, facing aft. The raised platform, actually the No. 2 hatch cover, also accommodated senior military advisors and civilian advisors, with some honored guests.

Mr. T. G. Narayanan, India, Secretary of the G.O.C. opened the meeting and turned it over to the chairman of the week, Mr. Raymond Herremans of Belgium. Having arrived from Belgium only a week ago to replace Dr. Van Zeeland during the latter's temporary absence at the Hague, he attempted no review, but reminded both that it was up to them to arrive at an agreement.

Dr. Graham warned all that the G.O.C. could provide no miracles, but he expressed complete faith that miracles could and would eventuate from the determination of the human spirit to succeed in a high mission; such a mission was the one they were now committed to.

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Mr. Kirby said that the whole key was cooperation.

Raden Abdulkadir Widjojoamtodjo, chairman of the Netherlands delegation, expressed their hope for a fruitful session and thanked the United States for making the "Renville" available.

Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin of the Republic was considerably more barbed in his remarks. He said that the patience of the Republicans was at a strained point and that the talks so far had produced distressingly little in the way of progress. He said they had waited thirty-eight days but were not yet rewarded. Nevertheless, he was prepared to put everything in the scales at this time and eliminate the evils rampant in the country at the present time.

Judge Kirby to be absent: To permit him to consult with the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Justice Kirby of the G.O.C. has announced his intention to return briefly to Australia. His place will be taken by Mr. Thomas K. Critchley, senior civilian advisor to the Australian G.O.C. delegation. It is felt by the United States Group that it is unfortunate that this absence is necessary at this critical time.

Republican Charges: On the eve of the Plenary sessions, the Republican Newspaper, "Berita Indonesia" of Batavia accuses the Dutch of attempting any type of delaying action until January, when Australia's membership in the Security Council terminates. The paper reiterates an earlier claim that the Dutch are massing military strength to take Jogjakarta.

Confidential Statement by Col. Simatupang: In a highly confidential conversation with Col. Myers, the Republican Colonel Simatupang of the General Staff and member of the Republican military contact committee let it be known that his government did not expect much to come out of the talks because they were well aware of the stubbornness of the Dutch. He said, however, that his people still clung to the hope that the influence of the United States would prove great enough to overcome Dutch opposition and result in definite favorable agreements for the Republic. Lacking this, the Colonel said bluntly that there would be nothing left for the Republic to do but seek the aid of Russia. He followed this by stating that although Russia's assistance would be sought, there could be no conversion of his people to communism because, if for no other reason, their deep-rooted religious convictions preclude the acceptance of communistic doctrines.

Talk with Mr. Abbey: Col. Myers' talk with Mr. Abbey was to try to secure from the latter some understanding for a somewhat stronger attitude by him in his capacity as chairman of the Contact Committees. They agreed that Mr. Abbey was handicapped by the fact that this chairmanship was purely an off-shoot of the Good Offices Committee policy of offering help, and not arbitration. Col. Myers nevertheless was able to impress him with the need for a firmer attitude, particularly with reference to the rather rough way in which the Dutch delegates tried to ride over meetings. Mr. Abbey believed he could stiffen his attitude.

9 December, Tuesday:

I. The LOG

0700hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Informal talks among members of U.S. Military Group and review of test problem presentation.  
 Afternoon : Preparation of reports. (Col. Myers stood by for call from Dr. Graham, as second Plenary session was scheduled at 1600 hours).  
 1900 hrs. : Report to Col. Myers by Secretariat interpreter of proceedings at Second Plenary session.  
 1300 hrs. : U.S. Group's C-47 test completed and airplane declared on flying status.

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Problem Presentation: As has been indicated in the LOG for the previous week, it was believed expedient to attempt to convince the Belgian senior military advisor of the need for segregating the military from the political aspects of the Indonesian dispute, as it was believed that confusing these factors was the basis of at least a part of his paradoxical attitude. The following paper-problem was drawn up and will be presented. It is proposed that the military seniors of each of the United States, the Australian and the Belgian delegations will be asked to submit an answer. It is as follows:

Subject: Military Aspects of the Dutch-Indonesian Dispute

1. On 21 July the N.E.I. Government ordered their forces to initiate a "Police Action" against the Indonesian Republic to end the "intolerable situation" that then existed. On 1 August the Security Council of the U.N.O. after much deliberation issued a resolution designed to bring a halt to further hostilities. On 1 November the Security Council took further action and called upon both parties to cease hostilities and to settle their differences by negotiation in accordance with 1 August resolution and offered its good offices to assist if such were desired.
2. A virtual impasse has now developed within the Committee of Good Offices by inability to arrive at a purely military concept of certain of the military terms used in the 1 November resolution. This paper is designed to separate the military considerations from those of the political.
3. The attached situation map, representing no particular territory in Indonesia, is only a schematic diagram which approximates conditions that now exist or have existed in the military aspects of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute.
4. For purposes of clarification suppose the attached diagram represents a military Divisional effort and its three brigades have reached points A, B, and C, with Colonels "A", "B" and "C" commanding the respective brigades. On a certain date, you, as a brigade commander, receive an order from the Division Commander as follows: (1 November Resolution) "The Security Council, having received and taken note of the Consular Report of October 14, indicating that the Council's resolution of August 1 on the cessation of hostilities has not been fully effective;
  - "having taken note that according to the report no attempt has been made by either party to come to agreement with each other regarding the means of giving effect to that resolution;
  - "calls upon the parties concerned forthwith to consult with each other either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices regarding the means to be employed in order to give effect to the cease fire resolution and, pending agreement, to cease any activities or incitement to activities contravening that resolution and to take appropriate measures for safeguarding life and properties;
  - "requests the Committee of Good Offices to assist the parties in reaching agreement on an arrangement which will ensure the observance of the cease fire resolution;
  - "requests the Consular Commission with its military assistants to make its services available to the Good Offices Committee;
  - "advises the parties concerned, the Committee of Good Offices and the Consular Commission that its resolution of August 1 should be interpreted as meaning that the use of armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control on territory not occupied by it on August 4 is inconsistent with the Council's resolution of August 1.

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"Should it appear that some withdrawals of armed forces be necessary, the Council invites the parties to conclude between them as soon as possible the agreement referred to in the resolution of August 25."

According to this order would you be entitled to seize more territory?

5. If you were the Indonesian commander at points D, E, or F, would you be entitled to attack the lines of communication to points A, B, and C?

6. Before the answer of "yes" or "no" is given to the above question the following additional clarification of this particular situation is given; actually the order from the Resolution of 1 November as quoted above did not go directly to the commanders in the field in that form. It was interpreted by the respective governments in light of the situation that existed at that time. This letter does not presuppose that that interpretation was either right or wrong. To reiterate for purpose of emphasis and to segregate the military aspects from the political your answer will be based on the premise that the order of the 1 November Resolution was received by you as a brigade commander.

\* \* \* \* \*

The Airplane: Final alterations for adapting the slightly different model engine to the Group's C-47 were completed this morning and test hops made about noon. Examination of the sumps, etc., following the flight, indicated a satisfactory condition. The plane was pronounced airworthy and will be put to use after consulting the needs of the Good Offices group. KLM declines to accept the old engine in return, as the model is one they no longer use. The pilot has sent an appropriate information signal to CG, Thirteenth Air Force, requesting instructions. The alternate is to compensate the KLM organization in outright purchase of the engine, or to fly one of acceptable model down in a U.S. Military aircraft, picking up our old engine for return to Clark Field. Approximately \$4,000 is involved. If a military aircraft is to be flown down, request has been made that a Finance Officer be detailed for payment of all personnel. Lt. Col. Brown of the Philrycom Finance Office was not advised by Philrycom when he was detailed last month that there were (a) enlisted personnel requiring pay, (b) Marine Corps officers needing pay. The unsatisfactory expedient of officers loaning enlisted men maintenance money has had to be resorted to. Shortages are developing again.

Plenary Session: It was believed advisable that the Second Plenary session be restricted to political delegates only in the hope that freedom of discussion would prevail and trend indications emerge. Accordingly, Col. Myers representing the American Military Group was asked to hold himself on call. The official interpreter later reported to him. He said that the atmosphere was one of crisp businesslike intentions this time. There were discussions on the agenda, and the agenda was adopted. However, hardly was this done when the Dutch proposed to introduce an "important" statement. The Indonesians, fearing a Dutch attempt to throw the meeting into confusion, objected on the grounds that there had been no previous notice by the Dutch. After considerable discussion, the chairman (Belgium) ruled that notice would have to be given. This was done and the statement is to be made 10 December. Col. Myers will be present for this meeting, as well as at least one other of the U.S. Group.

10 December, Wednesday

I. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 0830 hrs. : Depart Batavia for Ship.  
 0930 hrs. : Plenary Session, G.O.C. and all delegates and senior military advisors. Col. Myers representing U.S. Group, Col. Elliott, Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind in attendance. Meeting until 1315 hours.  
 1430 hrs. : Informal talks, Col. Myers and Mr. Abbey and Col. Servais, mainly concerning need for meeting with Dutch Military Contact Committee.  
 1730-1830 hrs. : Meeting, Col. Myers, Chairman of Senior military advisors and Dutch Military Contact Committee. Present: for Dutch -- Gen. Major D.C.B.

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van Vreeden, Rear Admiral Salm, Colonel Drost, Lt. Colonels Santoso, Pereira and Capt. de Loo, with Dr. Koets; for Australia -- Brigadier Neylan, newly arrived senior Australian advisor, and Comdr. Chesterman; for Belgium -- Col. Servais; for the U.S. -- Col. Myers, Col. Elliott and Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind. This was to give Dutch opportunity to ask questions concerning the G.O.C. suggestions for implementing a truce with least delay.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Plenary Session: The lengthy Plenary session dealt with matters procedure for about half of the time, then the Dutch requested permission to read their "statement", the presentation of which had been objected to the previous day by the Indonesians. The statement was read in Dutch, no official English translation being provided. The reply by the Indonesians likewise was in Indonesian. Both sides were given until 2000 hours to get in an official translation. Attempts by the Australian GOC delegate, Mr. Critchley, to make suggestions relative to a future course of action on a vital subject touched upon by the Dutch in their statement were met with the Dutch assertion that his interpretation had been "inadequate". Obviously, the meeting was in the dark until translations were available for all, and accordingly, was adjourned after providing for special meetings later in the day and on the next day. Included in those for the day was a request by the Dutch Military Contact Committee that they meet with the Senior Military advisors. Mr. Abbey requested that Col. Myers call such a meeting. Col. Myers said he could not agree to a meeting without a specific understanding of its intent, since he believed it exceedingly unwise to be a party to a one-sided meeting after the senior group had repeatedly made its recommendations known to the GOC and should remain a neutral body. When it was said that the meeting would be composed only of military men and would be concerned with questions on the proposed course of action being advanced by the GOC, he consented.

Military Meeting: The first stipulation Col. Myers had made was violated by the Dutch with Dr. Koetz, Dutch civil director of the cabinet of the Governor General, came in and took a place at the table. Col. Myers immediately telephoned for a senior advisor of the GOC to be present, and he was told that one would come at once. None did. Col. Myers decided to go ahead and emphasized upon opening the meeting that its purpose was to enable the Dutch delegates to ask questions concerning the GOC recommendations for hastening conditions which would make possible an early and effective truce. He emphasized too, that his group would make no attempt to answer the questions, but would refer them to the GOC. This was agreed to.

Gen. Van Vreeden then put a number of questions. First he wanted a definition of "demarcation line". Next he asked, "What is meant by 'the welfare of the local population'?"

Next he took up the paragraph dealing with the providing of both sides with maps and other data to show exact positions and strengths, etc., of military positions. He said his group had "strong objections" to providing this if the other side was to see it, as last year's experiences were unfortunate in that the Republicans were said to have made use of the Dutch maps to shell Dutch positions after talks had collapsed.

Col. Myers said: "We assure you that from a military standpoint, we as military men, certainly can understand your reluctance to turn over highly confidential information of this type. Yet I feel that I must point out that if we don't even attempt to carry out to the best of our ability, and even if certain faith and confidences are lacking at this time, the hopes and requests of those trying to be of help, it is doubtful if we ever can get close enough to get a solution. My only comment is this: if there is another way around this, let's go that way, but if there isn't, it appears to me that we've got to take a chance somewhere along the line. I shall explain your stand to the GOC to the best of my ability."

Col. Elliott then asked the Dutch if they would object provided the information were to be considered confidential by GOC and its military advisors.

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Commander Chesterman suggested striking out the words which would call for the information being made available to opposite military numbers in the contending parties.

The Dutch then agreed to supply maps which would show positions on 4 August and "present" positions (20 November).

General van Vreeden then asked: "When military positions are referred to, does this mean front line positions only, or all military positions?"

He also said: "With regard to Paragraph 9 concerning the movements of troops out of areas declared demilitarized, difficulties can be anticipated unless we have a strict definition of "demilitarized zone". As we see it, so far it affects only Republicans, but it could affect us, depending on that definition.

Dr. Koetz said it was very important from a civil standpoint as to whether "welfare of local populations" meant only law and order, or matters of supply and maintenance as well. He then mentioned in gloomy terms the complexity of the questions of currency adjustment should it be agreed that "economic intercourse" be agreed to. He wanted to bring this up, he said, so the Dutch wouldn't be charged with being obstructionists later when the hard problem had to be met.

Col. Elliott wanted to know whether his experts had a plan or were they expecting the GOC to provide a solution. Dr. Koetz said his experts had gone into it. Then he wanted to know from GOC from a civil standpoint what would be the police aspects in a "demilitarized zone".

Col. Myers invited further questions. There was none. He gave his assurance that he would represent their questions to GOC to the best of his ability, and adjourned the meeting.

11 December, ThursdayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.

0800 hrs. : Received GHQ signal reference return of Lt. Col. Feallock, indicating return not authorized and requesting information, etc.

0830 hrs. : Received Signal A 3194 AUMDA 7 B for Lt. Chapman, pilot of C-47 requesting return of Lt. Chapman by end of December to permit sailing for States 4 January.

0930 hrs. : Meeting of Good Offices Committee with civil and military advisors and Indonesian Technical Committee. Informal, to attempt to find basis for opening specific negotiations. For the U.S. Group, Col. Myers, Capt. McCallum and Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind. Meeting lasted until 1230 hours.

Afternoon : Informal talks with numerous members of G.O.C. and various special committees.

1645--1920 hrs. : Meeting, G.O.C. with Civil and Military Advisors of Dutch Technical Committee headed by Raden Abdulkadir, Jhr. van Vredenburg, and Dr. Koets. For the U.S. military, Colonels Myers and Elliott, Captain McCallum, and Lt. Colonels Ind, Dixon and Buckner. The subject was the same as that of the Indonesian meeting at 0930 hours.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Feallock Message: This message indicated that the return of Col. Feallock was (a) in violation of GHQ secret relay through State Department dated 22 November asking for "consideration and/or concurrence" of the FEAF request for Feallock's return, that (b) G-2, GHQ had not been advised of our action because our reply had gone directly to FEAF, that (c) all messages hereafter would be directed to G-2 direct and that (d) Lt. Col. Feallock was being ordered back to Batavia for duty about 17 December. It was indicated that the re-appearance of this officer at GHQ had caused official embarrassment. The message is being studied for answer. However, for purposes of the record, it can be stated at this time that (a) Col. Myers considered that the message of 22 November was in such terms that unless he had the most urgent reasons for retaining Feallock, he should plan to release him in time to comply with the deadline mentioned; (b) he felt that "concurrence" implied that he had the

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authority to comply if his judgement so dictated; (c) it was found that owing to temporary discontinuance of KLM service to Manila, Feallock would have to depart via Singapore and that he should go at once because of uncertainty of bookings; (d) the GHQ message of 2 December reaching Col. Myers on the third stating that Feallock would be retained until completion of mission because of lack of qualified replacement, actually was delivered in Batavia four days after Feallock's departure. GHQ was then so advised by radio. The action to release him was taken only after consultation among the Group under Col. Myers. It was agreed that there could be a re-shuffling of duties and that the remaining personnel could absorb Feallock's work. It further considered that an officer of his technical qualifications now was no longer absolutely necessary to the mission. It is regretted that GHQ circles were embarrassed by this action. The GHQ message of 8 December coming in the clear through Dutch channels, has in turn caused some embarrassment on this end. This Group had no alternative but to reply through State Department channels as the message of 22 November was a relay through State Department and was classified "Secret." The Consulate here is not authorized to transmit to Tokio except through Washington, Mr. Livengood has explained, and Dutch channels seldom can be used without embarrassment.

Lt. Chapman Message: The message to Lt. Chapman actually was in reply to a message sent by him personally asking for instructions relative to compensation on the engine received from KLM (See LOG page 107). However, CG, 13th Air Force, Clark Field, also stated that Lt. Chapman had missed his scheduled sailing date to the mainland at the conclusion of his overseas tour and now would be required to meet a date of 4 January, 1948. Lt. Chapman is being instructed that all messages hereafter will originate with Col Myers.

G.O.C.--Technical Committee Meeting with Indonesian Delegation: This meeting was under the chairmanship of Mr. Herreman, the Belgian chairman of the G.O.C. for the week. At the conclusion of the session, it was privately agreed among U.S. delegates that he had performed in an outstanding manner and that definite forward movement had been achieved.

He first stressed the need for finding some common ground upon which a start could be made. He suggested that this might be a discussion of the Ling-adjadi Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the L.A.) and said: "We are not here to judge, nor to arbitrate. We simply ask you to give us your opinions, to express your feelings, as to the reasons why this Agreement failed to provide a solution."

The Indonesian group agreed, and at the chairman's request, Prime Minister Sjarifuddin explained that the foundation stones upon which L.A. was built were four in number, namely: that there was a Republic and a Republican Territory; that this Republican government had de facto recognition; that this Republican government had established relationships with the Dutch and with other parts of Indonesia. This, he said, although contained in L.A. had been lost sight of, and now was quite "wiped out of the picture," yet the Republicans had to insist that a consideration thereof form the basis of any discussion toward a solution.

The chair acknowledged and suggested that the conversation be based upon a query: "Why should not the L.A. be implemented?" and take up the points one by one.

This was agreed upon. (The matter is presented in some detail because it is believed that this actually might be seen in the light of history and the efforts of all concerned, including the Military Group, to constitute the first forward step toward a truce, and eventual solution).

Mr. Sjarifuddin then said that the question throughout was one of interpretation; the interpretation that apparently had been arrived at in joint conferences and so entered in the minutes initialled by both sides was not the one which the Dutch maintained after they had returned from a consultation with the home government in Holland. It was this altered interpretation which the Dutch then based their actions upon without further reference to Republican convictions that caused the initial drift apart, he claimed. Specifically, he stated that:

- a. Recognition of the de facto rights of the Republican government included

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recognition of administrative areas within Java, Sumatra, and Madura. But, he claimed, when the time came, the Dutch declined to hand over certain islands adjacent to each of these places and had not altered that stand.

b. The Dutch had taken steps to establish the separate state of East Indonesia without consultation with the Republic. This was regarded by the Republican government as a serious breach of the L.A. The situation was made more acute when similar steps were taken by the Dutch in East Borneo and East Sumatra.

c. The Republicans asked for consultations on these matters and on the important matter of the control of and other points concerning the internal police force. But it was seen that the two governments were wide apart on fundamental matters of interpretation of the L.A.

d. Article 16 thereof said that Holland would reduce the number of Dutch troops in the N.E.I. This did not occur.

e. Article 17 provided for arbitration, but the Dutch were unwilling to arbitrate matters concerning territory and police matters.

After some further discussion, the Chairman suggested that a few typical points of difference might be touched upon with an effort at understanding the Republican stand. He started with the Republican interpretation of the phrase "de facto" recognition. The Republicans maintained that this gave them the right to exercise sovereign powers, such as the establishment of foreign relations (trade and commerce for instance). Until the U.S.I. became a sovereign body in fact, the Chairman forwarded the point that he could see a debateable point there, as interpretation by international law experts might well favor the Dutch view, as there is in law a difference of opinion as to whether the recognition of the existence of de facto authority implies the recognition of the right to exercise it. The Republicans obviously thought it did; the Dutch, he said, obviously did not. Thus, a solid point of difference was established, he indicated, and would be the subject of the same type of meeting with the Dutch later on to verify the point; then remedial suggestions could be made.

Dr. Graham, in an effort to further plumb the Republican mind asked whether in their opinion an established state within the proposed United States of Indonesia could, if it desired, send out its own diplomatic representatives, or would it have to do so through the U.S.I. ("States Rights" parallel). The Republicans said that the state would have to operate through the U.S.I. Likewise they said that if the state wanted to send out a trade representative, it would have to do so in the name of the U.S.I.

This brought out the whole question as to how a territory became a member of the U.S.I. under the L.A.

According to L.A., territories were to have the right to determine by democratic process whether they wished membership. But there obviously was a point here as to whether all areas within the orbits of Java, Sumatra, and Madura, for instance, were assumed to be members and then could vote later to secede, or whether they were considered to be free and independent until they had voted to come in. The Republicans seemed to think that all territories were included until they had voted to secede, and then their vote of secession would be referred to the remaining states of the U.S.I. It appeared that this point is neither clearly stated in L.A. nor clearly understood and will require careful study and steering by G.O.C. Such cardinal points of confusion are considered to be productive of just such a situation as now exists.

Much territory having been covered with frank exchanges all around, it was decided to adjourn. The G.O.C. asked that it be understood by everyone that utmost care would be taken to insure the secrecy of the discussions in order that neither side would be constrained and that identical questions might be asked both sides without benefit of preparation by either side for answers. The Republicans also agreed to make available to the G.O.C. the minutes of the conferences that had preceded the drawing up of the L.A.

G.O.C.--Dutch Meeting: As has been indicated, this meeting was held for the purpose of endeavoring to establish a common ground upon which "Substantive" talks might be based. The subject would be the same, and the questions asked the delegation would be similar to those which had been presented at the G.O.C.--Indonesian meeting of 0930 hours. The Chairman, Mr. Herreman, so explained. He said that he would like to ask two main questions:

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- a. Why was not the Linggadjadi Agreement implemented?  
 b. Does the Dutch authority still consider the L.A. to form the basis of a solution?

Monkheer van Vredenburg said he would call on Dr. Koets to answer the first question in detail, as a tracing of the history would be necessary. As to the second, he said that: "Nothing has been changed. On 21 July last our attitude was clearly stated. It has been restated since, more elaborately, perhaps, but in the same line. The principles underlying the L.A. were most carefully studied by us and they will form the basis of a forthcoming statement. We want to draft the text of that statement so that we can stick to it absolutely. If that statement is desired now, we can cable the Hague for instructions, provided, certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are: that the rights of minorities will prevail, and, that all shall be on a basis of equality between the Netherlands and Indonesia."

The chairman then asked: "Am I right--the Netherlands Government still adheres to the principles of the L.A. but does not now believe that that Agreement is now binding as there have been some developments in the political and military picture which affect it?"

Jhr. van Vredenburg reiterated that "nothing had been changed." He said that the fact of the police action was not an indication that they believed anything had been fundamentally changed as far as they were concerned. "Before taking that action," he said, "the Netherlands appealed to two foreign governments for their good offices. I shall not name them. The first was approached 3 June and the second 6 June. I was concerned in this and therefore speak of it first hand. We explained that the situation was becoming very serious, and that some sections were actually threatened with starvation in consequence of the continued hostile acts of the Republicans. We said that we might have to take 'limited action' but that we were determined to implement the political aspects of the L.A. in the areas in which we might have to take such action." He offered to ask the Hague for permission to reveal the names of the governments concerned, but the chairman said the G.O.C. was glad to accept his word, as the G.O.C. is really interested in the status of the L.A. as of today.

Dr. Koets then delivered a long historical discourse, which, at the request of his delegation chairman, was in Dutch.

Since he touched upon some points dealt with by the Republicans in the morning meeting, the translated main points are given below:

a. With regard to foreign relations: "If not in the L.A., at least in correspondence with the Republicans, it was agreed that during the formative period of the U.S. of Indonesia, the Netherlands would be responsible for the foreign relations of the U.S.I. However, immediate steps were taken to prepare personnel of Indonesia, including the Republic, for key positions concerning foreign relations. These were not unimportant posts. In most instances they were the number two position; and sometimes the number one. Despite this, the Republic consistently tried to establish its own foreign relations in flat contradiction of the agreements expressed in the correspondence."

b. The Republicans through their acts were said to have repeatedly "brought into danger all attempts to establish an economic unity" for the rehabilitation of the country and despite the danger to the population.

c. With regard to Article 15 of the L.A., which dealt with the question of complete sovereignty of the U.N.I., Dr. Koets said that it was agreed that an interim political structure would be necessary as a transitional device, and that proposals had been made by the Netherlands. Among these was that the power of the Governor General was to be passed over to a Federal Council on which the Indonesians "would be strongly represented." The Governor General actually was to share his power with this group, he said. "In this and other connections, the Republicans never ceased to claim a larger share, or larger part, than any other part of the proposed U.N.I. or any other part of Indonesia as it existed," Dr. Koets explained.

Even so, discussions were continued, he said, until 25 March when the Agreement was signed. On this date, as on every day preceding it, acts of violence were committed by the Republicans. They continued to be committed without a decrease, he claimed, and with the knowledge, and at least in certain

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instances with the authority of Jogjakarta. After repeated appeals by the Netherlands, the Republican Government agreed to try to break the food blockade for the good of seriously affected populations. "But nothing was changed," he said. "Security in the interior became less and less. In July, a final meeting was called and proposals made. One concerned the establishment of a joint police force. This force would be composed of at least 50 percent Indonesians and would be only supplemental to the local police forces. It would come into action only at the request of local authorities who might find their own resources inadequate, and then, only with the consent of the Federal Council of which the Republic was a part.

Last minute appeals were made of Amir Sjarifuddin, he said, and apparently better times were in sight ( these last appeals were made on 10 July). "But absolutely nothing came of it except a more intolerable situation," he added. "You ask me why the L.A. was not implemented. I believe I may have indicated."

At this time there was some informal chatter in French among delegates and until a translation was made, it was not realized that Jhr. van Vredenburg had made some strong statements, among which was: "When we make a statement or an agreement, we are prepared to fulfill it. It is not so with the Republic. They ask for more than they expect to get, then being glad to get as much as they do. They want to bargain. We feel that they are doing this now."

The Chairman said: "People differ. Perhaps the Republicans do like to bargain. It is not the first instance of bargaining in the Far East. On the other hand, maybe they consider the attitude of the Dutch to be -- shall we say -- somewhat rigid?"

Jhr. van Vredenburg then said: "I can appreciate that as a United Nations body you are considering that this is only a two-party matter. We must emphasize that such is not the case. I must reiterate, the principles of the L.A. still are valid for us and we stand ready to implement them, but -- and let me repeat this -- for the whole of Indonesia. This dispute does not concern two parties only."

By that time, 1910 hours, darkness had set in and the delegates were thoroughly weary. The meeting was adjourned until 0830 hours Monday, 15 December.

12 December, FridayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Administrative detail and preparation of reports.  
 1330 hrs. : Emergency G.O.C. meeting in "Renville" to try to persuade Dutch not to broadcast contentious statement, Major Neal covering for U.S. Military Observers (this officer and Lt. Col. Dixon also carried on informal talks with various delegates -- see Narrative Section).  
 1530 hrs. : Message to GHQ reference release of Lt. Col. Feallock filed with Consulate.  
 Evening : Informal reception of new French military observers by Col Myers.  
 2030 hrs. : Receipt by Col. Myers of the Dutch statement of questions reference G.O.C. suggestions for implementing truce. Note: this paper was promised by the Dutch not later than morning of 11 December (See L)G 10 Dec.).

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Emergency Meeting: This meeting was called in an endeavor to persuade Jhe. van Vredenburg not to broadcast and publish a statement which he declared was necessary in view of a statement given to the press by Jogjakarta the night before. The Jogjakarta statement is as follows:

JOGKARTA, December 11 -- According to Jogjakarta radio the Republican Information Ministry has issued the following statement in connection with the cease fire discussions between the Dutch and Indonesian special committees:  
 "The cease fire discussions are also held on board the "Renville." From this it can be concluded that they are brought in line with the atmosphere

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of the political negotiations. There are no signs however that a speedy agreement will be reached. The course of the cease fire discussions is still unsatisfactory as the Dutch side has rejected the proposals of the Committee of Good Offices. On the contrary the Dutch are aware that the Indonesian side is in agreement with these proposals. This attitude is to be regretted as the whole world is looking forward to arriving at a speedy friendly atmosphere between the Dutch and Indonesians."

Present at the meeting were Dr. Graham for the United States and Mr. Critchley for Australia. It was decided to go ahead even in the absence of Mr. Herremans of Belgium, the chairman for the week. Also present were Mr. Abbey and Messers Scott, Ogburn and Collins. Covering for the U.S. Military Group was Major Neal. It was decided that Mr. Abbey should contact Jhr. van Vredenburg and ask him to refrain from releasing the statement as the G.O.C. considered that it would be very unwise and would embarrass the efforts of the G.O.C. He was told to say that the Republicans realized the mistake they had made in releasing their statement. If the Dutch would agree to refrain, the G.O.C. would agree to ask the Republicans to retract, or would issue their own communique to try to set right erroneous impressions created by the Republican statement.

To this Jhr. van Vredenburg replied that it was mandatory that an immediate reply to the Republican statement be made by him. He said he would be glad to abstain thereafter, provided the Republicans did not issue further provocative statements. Further appeals to him were futile. The statement was to be released for publication 13 December.

Interesting Informal Statements: While engaged in informal visits among delegates on the "Renville," some interesting and highly pertinent information was advanced by a G.O.C. adviser. The circle included Capt. McCallum, Lt. Col. Dixon, and Major Neal of the Observer Group, Capt. Tyree of the "Renville" and Mr. Scott of Dr. Graham's organization.

Mr. Scott referred to Jhr. van Vredenburg's remarks of the previous day reference his appeal to the capitols of the two countries for good offices (See LOG, 11 December, meeting of G.O.C. and Dutch Technical Committee) in implementing the L.A. before the situation became so acute as to force the Dutch to take some kind of police action. (The two countries, it was learned, were U.S.A. and England). Mr. Scott said that Dr. van Vredenburg's remarks implied (a) that the United States condoned the police action (b) that the United States did nothing after receiving the information. Mr. Scott claimed that both implications were incorrect. Actually, he said, the United States appealed to the Hague to refrain from hostilities, and to prolong the life of the negotiations, issued an "aide memoir" offering economic assistance if an agreement could be worked out. This "aide memoir" was followed by a U.S. offer of good offices.

Lt. Col. Dixon asked: "Wasn't this offer dated after the police action?"

Mr. Scott replied that it was, Lt. Col Dixon then asked: "Don't you believe that our good offices should have been offered at the time asked for by the Dutch?"

Mr. Scott said: "Yes, but at that time sufficient information was not available to substantiate U.S. intervention."

Lt. Col. Dixon: "Mr. Scott, I was present in the N.E.I. from March until May of 1947 and on my return to Washington I reported factual conditions and recommended U.S. intervention. A paper was prepared to that effect for the Chief of the Intelligence Division to the State Department. Did you see that paper, or were you aware of the position taken by the War Department Intelligence Division?"

Mr. Scott said that he did not remember reading such a paper, or discussing with anyone the views of the War Department.



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0600 hrs. : Alert.

0830 hrs. : Filed with Consulate message to Lt. Col. McLennon for relay to General Willoughby for further relay to C.G. 13th A.F. Clark Field reference status our C-47 and request that Lt. Chapman's overseas tour be extended with his consent.

0930 hrs. : Meeting of G.O.C. and advisers. For the U.S. Military Group: Colonels Myers and Elliott, Capt. McCallum, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal (others concerned in preparation of reports).

1600--1730 hrs. : Informal meeting G.O.C. and Jhr. van Vredenbruch, Dr. Sjarifuddin and a limited group of advisers including Colonels Myers and Elliott and Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal for the U.S. to discuss the proposed field inspection of Madura.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Van Vredenburch Statement: The contentious statement which Jhr. van Vredenburch refused to withhold from the press yesterday was published in full in the morning papers. It was given as a communique from the N.E.I. Government Information Service. In view of its severe tone, and the effect it may have on the whole course of the Talks, it is reproduced here for the record. (Note: attention is called to the fact that the "questions" referred to in the second paragraph were not submitted to Col. Myers in writing -- as promised by the Dutch for a.m. 11 December -- until late last evening, 12 December.)

"THE CEASE FIRE DISCUSSIONS

BATAVIA, December 12 -- The NEI Government Information Service tonight published a communique giving the real course of events regarding the latest cease fire negotiations on board the "Renville."

The Communique starts:

In connection with the fact that the republican ministry of information has published the perfectly incorrect news that the Netherlands have rejected the latest suggestions of the Committee of Good Offices for the cease fire the following information regarding the real course of events can be given:

The Netherlands military experts have asked the military experts of the Committee of Good Offices for an elucidation concerning some items. The answer to these questions put on the Netherlands side has not yet been received.

Meanwhile the president of the Netherlands technical Committee suggested at the meeting of 9th December a plan which could be carried into effect immediately.

The introduction to the Dutch plan says among others

that, as regards the various resolutions of the Security Council, due attention must not only be paid to their terms, but also and more particularly to the motives from which they originated;

that there would seem to be no doubt but that the Security Council's prime object was to re-establish peaceful conditions in Java, Sumatra, and Madura;

that the Republican government expressly declared, again on 25th November 1947 "that we shall do everything possible to carry out the wishes of the Security Council," and so on;

that, if the Republican Government genuinely wishes to observe the Security Council's resolution, it must be assumed that it disapproves of deeds against life and property committed by troops under its authority and wishes to see these put a stop to;

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that the losses to Indonesian economy since the Japanese capitulation are already far heavier than the damage sustained during the Japanese occupation.

Based upon these considerations the Netherlands special Committee proposed some time ago that:

1. the demarcation lines at present existing in fact be laid down as provisional demarcation lines;
2. the stand-fast immediately be proclaimed to the troops facing each other along the demarcation lines;
3. all republican fighting groups still in areas occupied by the Netherlands troops be evacuated to Republican territory;
4. The patrolling of the posts of either party in the forward area be restricted.

However, this proved unacceptable to the Republican government. The Netherlands Special Committee has therefore modified its proposals, on the assumption that such troops, or rather remnants of republican troops, as may still remain in Netherlands controlled territory are of scant military value. That this assumption is correct, is shown by a casualty list of Dutch forces during two weeks, and the reasons causing these casualties (annex I).

The communique says that economic destruction is extremely serious. This is borne out by the information contained in the annexes I to VII. All these documents are dated after November 1st. They present nevertheless an impressive list of activities contrary to the purpose of the Security Council's resolution of that date, i.e. the restoration of peaceful conditions.

It should be recalled that this sort of thing has been going on ever since a "truce" was signed on October 14, 1946, and since the signing of the Linggardjati Agreement on March 25th of this year.

How can one have faith in the outcome of political discussions if all these subversive activities go on, and while the gravest suspicion exists that the acts of violence and other activities are not only being condoned but fostered and provoked by the Republican government, the communique asks. The Republican government -- should they so desire -- could allay these suspicions. The Netherlands Special Committee left it to the Committee of Good Offices to state whether the Republican government, having accepted the resolution of November 1, is not in duty bound to do so.

If the Republican government accept the resolutions without reservations, they should act accordingly. They should then not only refrain from inciting its soldiers and followers to sabotage etc, but they should also do everything in their power to see to it that an end be put to these abominable activities.

The communique says one broadcast by Mr. Sjarifuddin calling upon his followers to stop the silent fight against unarmed civilians which would do more to create confidence, than all the fine words addressed to the world at large. The Netherlands Special Committee wishes to state that it is willing to go full speed ahead with the discussions of the latest suggestions made by the Committee of Good Offices. It believes that they contain very valuable ideas, that they are based on common sense and that agreement on them could be reached, provided always that the Republican government offers deeds, not words, and that the present suspicions be allayed. Proof on which these suspicions are based had been submitted to the Committee of Good Offices, which is welcome to investigate this information and decide for themselves whether the doubts and hesitations of the Netherlands government are well founded.

The Netherlands Special Committee hopes for a clear cut answer. Let it be either yes or no. If the answer is in the affirmative the following could be agreed to and put into effect immediately.

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Let it be either yes or no. If the answer is in the affirmative the following could be agreed to and put into effect immediately.

The Netherlands proposals cover the points on which a "meeting of minds" was reached recently in the meetings of the Special Committees for the cease fire implementation at Kaliurang near Jogjakarta. These points are:

1. To prohibit sabotage intimidation and reprisal and other activities of a similar nature against individuals, groups of individuals, and property, including destruction of property of any kind and by whomsoever owned, and to utilize every means at their command to this end;
2. To refrain from broadcasts or any other form of propaganda aimed at provoking or disturbing troops and civilians;
3. To initiate broadcasts and institute other measures to inform all troops and civilians of the delicate situation and the necessity for strict compliance with the provisions sub 1 and 2;
4. Full opportunity for observation by military and civil assistants made available to the Committee of Good Offices;

5. In this agreement could also be incorporated the other points on which a meeting of minds has been reached, i.e.

To cease immediately the publication of a daily operational communique or any other information about military operations unless by prior mutual agreement in writing except weekly publication of lists of individuals (giving names, numbers and home addresses) who have been killed or have died as a result of injuries received in action;

To accept the principle of the release of prisoners by each party and to commence discussions with a view to the most rapid and convenient implementation thereof, the release in principle to be without regard to the number of prisoners held by either party.

Both parties would then have achieved something positive."

Seven annexes composed of supporting statistics were attached to the communique and had been presented to the Committee of Good Offices. They will be included in the official report of the mission, but are not reproduced here as they are not considered to be of sufficient importance.

G.O.C. Meeting (morning): Present for this meeting were all of the members of the G.O.C. and the Military and the political advisors, and Mr. Glenn Abbey.

Mr. Critchley asked Mr. Abbey to report on the approach he had made to Jhr. van Vredenburg to refrain from publishing the speech mentioned in yesterday's log. This was done apparently to everybody's satisfaction.

Dr. Graham asked Col. Myers why the G.O.C. had not received the questionnaire from the Dutch regarding definitions contained in the G.O.C. suggestions for implementing a quick truce. Col. Myers explained that Dr. Koets had failed to keep his promise to deliver them to Col. Myers at the time he had stipulated. After considerable effort on Col. Myers part he had only received them the previous evening too late to deliver to the G.O.C. (See LOG). Col. Myers also added that he regretted the statement that the Dutch had published in reply to the Indonesian statement of the day before and suggested that much more important things remained for the attention of the meetings. A copy of the questionnaire was turned over to the Secretariat for documentation and reproduction.

Mr. Harremans said that he would privately take up with the Dutch the reasons why it had been considered inadvisable to print the statement.

A letter was received from the Dutch concerning the proposed trip to Madura by members of the Committee, and opened at this meeting. It suggested that the trip be made on Monday the 14th of December. Also an important point made in the letter was that the Dutch could not permit any Indonesian represent-

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ation in the group. The reason was that there was no similar facility or arrangements whereby the Dutch were permitted to make an investigation in Republican held territory. Dr. Graham said that he would not force the issue and this was no time for a show down on such a minor point. All agreed. He also pointed out that it was possible to make a more thorough investigation if there were no Indonesians along.

Mr. Harremans stated that the Indonesians must be informed of the contents of the letter and if they desired they could reply but it was certainly not mandatory on their part.

Col. Servais (Belgium) reported that two French Officers had reported and were ready to go to work.

It was decided that another meeting would be held at 1600 this afternoon to discuss details of the Madura trip with Jhr. van Vredenburg and Dr. Sjarifuddin and only the G.O.C.

Document S/AC 10 Conf 1/13 was then produced (See LOG 23 Nov.) and Mr. Narayanan the Secretary read the pertinent parts thereof, Mr. Harremans said that these points represent those which have already been agreed upon by both parties. Mr. Critchley said that is correct but that they had never been put into effect. The question was asked of Mr. Glenn Abbey if he thought that the agreed upon portions could be placed into effect without waiting for an agreement on the whole. Mr. Abbey is to ascertain at the next meeting with the Indonesians.

The next item on the agenda was the interpretation of the 1 November resolution. The main point of disagreement appears to be the definition of the terms "Territory Occupied" and "Territory Controlled."

Dr. Graham recommended that the meeting be adjourned in order that the G.O.C. could meet and bring Mr. Harremans abreast of the developments to date before the problem was discussed at a meeting.

G.O.C. Meeting (afternoon): An informal meeting between the G.O.C., Jhr. van Vredenburg, Dr. Sjarifuddin, and some of the political and military advisors. This meeting was called to discuss the proposed trip to Madura and just what was involved in the contemplated investigation. The investigation was requested by the Dutch, and was originally scheduled for Friday 13 December. As originally planned each party was to send a member in the delegation to ascertain and report the facts and conclusions to the G.O.C. Mr. Harremans stated that the Netherlands had rejected the idea that the Republic send a delegate owing to the fact that the N.E.I. Government was not permitted to send delegations into Republican held areas.

Jhr. van Vredenburg stated that he was under the impression that this meeting was to be only attended by the G.O.C. he, and Dr. Sjarifuddin, but since the other persons were already present they could remain, but in the future he would expect that only the people designated would attend. He also requested that the meeting be put on record and that a summary record be published so there was no possibility of misinterpretation by any interested party.

Van Vredenburg presented to the Secretariat a military report on Madura and said that an economic report had been prepared but only in Dutch and the translation would not be ready until Monday evening. He said that he would be required to insist that no Indonesians were included on the Madura trip. Mr. Harremans said that as van Vredenburg had been instructed by his government he could not be expected to alter the decision. Van Vredenburg said that the group going could expect all of the considerations possible under the circumstances and every possible assistance would be placed at their disposal.

Dr. Graham said that speaking academically he could see value in both sides being represented on such an inspection trip. Mr. Critchley agreed with Dr. Graham and said that as a matter of principle at least both sides could furnish interpreters.

Mr. Harremans said that he had another plan that might possibly work whereby neither party was represented in the group and interpreters might be selected on Madura. Everybody agreed to this plan. Van Vredenburg said that

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if any thing out of order was found by the group that an immediate report should be made to the Committee. Another idea was introduced by Dr. Sjarifuddin who said that the people on Madura should be instructed by the Republican Government that the group was coming so that they would be contacted. Van Vredenburg said that he could not agree to this, but if Dr. Sjarifuddin wanted to prepare a letter to the Committee with a list of people he suggests should be contacted and interviewed that would be all right as long as he wasn't informed of this

Dr. Sjariffudin agreed to prepare a letter of this type and the group going to Madura would carry it with them.

It was agreed that the Dutch would supply air, water, and road transportation. The group is to leave at 0700 hours, Monday and there will be about 11 people included. Mr. Brandis said that he thought that they would stay from three to five days or as long as necessary.

Mr. Critchley wanted to know if the policy of prohibiting Indonesian representatives from accompanying the G.O.C. on any future investigations would still obtain as long as intimidation and provocative acts continued. Van Vredenburg said that they were preparing a letter now which would answer this question.

It was agreed upon that the fact that an investigation was being made would be published but any results that were published would be at the discretion of the G.O.C.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
 FAR EAST COMMAND  
 MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SECTION, GENERAL STAFF

Batavia, Java, NEI  
 27 Dec. 1947.

Subject : The Log, U.S. Military and Naval Observer  
 Group With Good Offices Committee,  
 Period 14 December- 27 December, inclusive.

To : General Willoughby, A.C. of S. G-2.

1. Transmitted herewith is the last installment of the Log of the Military and Observer Group, covering the period 14 December - 27 December inclusive.
2. The original and one carbon copy are enclosed.
3. The Log is accompanied by two Annexes, as follows:  
 Annex I, Personal Reports of Madura  
 Field Survey Party Personnel  
 (Col. Elliott and Lt. Col. Buckner)  
 Annex II Good Offices Committee Document  
 S/AC.10/75-- Revised "Truce" Plan.
4. It is desired to state that owing to the heavy demands made upon all personnel of the Observer Group, this report must be forwarded without a close reading of the final preparation, either for corrected content or for typographical errors. Careful reading will be accorded at the first opportunity. Should gross errors be discovered, attention will be called to them.
5. The documents are being forwarded by officer courier to Manila, for relay to Tokio. The regular KLM service is being used by Capt. Hough of the WAC, as no military planes are scheduled.
6. The crisis which has been predicted in earlier reports is now at hand; the reaction of the contending parties to the GOC proposals is awaited anxiously. In the meantime, the Military Group will enter at once upon field inspections as requested by the GOC.

P.S. As the aussies say: "we are  
 flat out" no xmas, no nothing but  
 Enclosures: As stated. work and lots

*C.S. Myers*  
 C.S. Myers,  
 Colonel, GSC 00292  
 Senior Member.

of it but we are determined. Best regards to all. Hope  
 someday to be through here and return with you

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CONFIDENTIAL14 December, SundayI. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.

0745 hrs. : Departure, KLM plane for Manila. Miss Margaret Pierce of the U.S. Consul General's Office, Batavia, acting as courier for original and one copy of LOG covering period 30 November - 13 December inclusive, directed to A.C. of S. G-2 Philrycom for relay to A.C. of S. G-2, GHQ, FEC, Tokio.

Morning and afternoon: Recreation.

1930 hrs. : Meeting: Col. Myers with Messers Brandis and Scott of Dr. Graham's organization and with Colonels Elliott and Mollohan and Lt. Col. Buckner relative to course of action in connection with field inspections on Madura.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION.

Madura Meeting: With agreement by the GOC to send a survey group to the Island of Madura, it was believed by Col. Myers and GOC representatives that a meeting should be held to review the situation and to decide on a plan of action. The possibility that NEI authorities were attempting to provide a well-set stage for the observers to study was considered. Accordingly, it was decided to draw up a list of proposals and questions.

Mr. Brandis of Dr. Graham's office presented a study, and on the basis of that, the list was prepared by Col. Elliott. The Brandis statement is as follows:

I. "The general object of the projected trip is to secure factual information in order that persons other than those making the inquiry may have an opportunity to draw their own conclusions from the report. In general, this means that simple questions calling only for facts are better than questions calling for opinions. While questions calling for opinions may be appropriate after facts have been secured to the extent possible from the particular witness, it is not believed that the GOC group should concentrate primarily on opinion questions such as: 'Would you rather be governed by the Netherlands or the Republic of Indonesia?'

"In the first place, it must be borne in mind that conclusions based upon answers to questions of this type are of doubtful value unless the questions have been asked of an adequate, scientifically selected sample of the population. In the second place, it must be remembered that the Dutch contend that they also are working for an independent Indonesia, though they say it should not be dominated by the present leadership of the Republic. Therefore, a question such as the example given above would be open to attack as not presenting the true issue.

"On the other hand, a question attempting to present an issue along the line of the Dutch contention is likely to be so abstract as to be meaningless to the average resident of Madura. It could not be presented in terms of a choice between the Republic on the one hand and on the other hand, autonomous status for Madura within an independent United States of Indonesia. Further, it could not be presented in terms of personalities unless; (1) Soekarno or some other Republican personality is really well known among the people of Madura; and, (2) there is some other personality also well known in Madura who would, in the minds of the people, personify the idea of freedom within the USI but outside the Republic.

"In other words, it is suggested that any attempt to concentrate on this type of question will result in a considerable waste of time and energy. Under the conditions existing in Madura, nothing very definitive will be learned about the will of the people unless and until an impartial plebiscite or its equivalent is conducted after an adequate period of preparation. This task is obviously beyond the capacity of the present group.

II. "It is believed that the factual questions to be asked should be selected against the background of the following analysis:

"The three final questions possibly involved are:

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- (a) Has there been a violation of the Security Council Resolution of August 1st as that Resolution is interpreted by the Resolution of November 1st? (It must be borne in mind that the incidents complained of in Madura occurred after the Resolution of November 1.)
- (b) If so, what reasons lead to or induced the violations?
- (c) Are these reasons sufficient to justify the action taken?

"It may not be possible for the group going to Madura to ascertain facts from which final answers to these questions may be given. Nevertheless, the attempt must be made. To supply the basic facts necessary for answers to these questions, it must be ascertained:

- (1) What measures, if any, involving the use of military force were carried out by the Dutch? (To be obtained primarily from Dutch military sources.)
- (2) What are the reasons given by the Dutch for taking these measures? (To be obtained primarily from Dutch military and civil authorities.)
- (3) What factual basis existed to support these reasons? (It should be noted here again that it is not the province of the group going to Madura to get final answers to the three ultimate questions mentioned above. Therefore, the group's primary mission here is not to decide whether a particular reason is a sound reason for the course of action adopted. It is sufficient to ascertain that the reason is advanced and whether it finds factual support.)
- (4) Have reasons differing from those advanced by the Dutch ~~have~~ been advanced by others and if so, is there factual basis for such reasons?
- (5) What military opposition, if any, was encountered by the Dutch during and since the movements of which the Republic has complained? (To be obtained from official representatives of the Dutch military, from observation, from questioning of local residents or any other available source.)
- (6) What steps, if any, have been taken by the Dutch since the initiation of these movements which tend to confirm, or seem to render it doubtful, that the movements were undertaken for the reasons assigned? (This, at the minimum, requires that Dutch military and civil officials be interviewed to ascertain precisely the nature of their present activities and plans.)

III. "The following suggestions supplement the above:

1. In connection with inquiry into the actual movements of the Dutch troops, it will of course be desirable to see the orders issued by the Madura command, to secure precise information as to the forces used and their exact movements and to secure reasonable precise information as to movements of Dutch troops, if any, currently in progress or projected. It is also recommended in this



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connection that Col. Myers make arrangements to secure from General Spoor the orders issued from GHQ which lead to the movements complained of by the Republic, together with orders issued since by GHQ.

2. (a) In connection with the reasons for the movement assigned by the Dutch and the seeking of factual confirmation therefore, the following are obvious possibilities.

- (1) That there was disorder in the eastern end of Madura. (This should be checked by actual observation, and by inquiries of local residents and officials. It might be particularly helpful if former Republican officials could be located.)
- (2) That the population of eastern Madura was starving, in need of clothing and in need of medicine. (This should be checked by observation, by interviewing doctors, Intercross officials or other officials in charge of distributions, and local residents. Sources of supply and methods of distribution should be ascertained.)
- (3) That the Republican civil administration requested the Dutch to take action. (This should be inquired into, at the minimum, by interviewing the Resident and other former Republican officials if they can be located. Particular attention should be paid to the communications, if any, existing between Madura and Jogjakarta; and if such communications were poor or non-existent, then the attempts, if any, made by the Republican officials on Madura to improve the situation.)
- (4) That Madura is too small an administrative area to be divided. (This is obviously a matter of judgement and the facts bearing on it are primarily those to be obtained from a map.)
- (5) That the Van Mook Line never applied on Madura and that the entire island was already "patrolling territory". (This should be checked primarily with Dutch military authorities who should be requested to document their answers and furnish complete information as to actual patrolling in eastern Madura between August 4th and the initiation of the movements now complained of by the Republic. They should also be requested to furnish an explanation as to why the map of Madura already furnished to Lt. Col. Buckner shows the Van Mook Line across Madura and makes no mention of patrolling territory.)

2. (b) "It is recommended in this connection that in addition to inquiries to be made in Madura, Col. Myers should request from General Spoor a statement of the reasons for the movements in question. If he replies that he was directed to initiate these movements by civil authorities, he should be asked to name these authorities. It is recommended that the GOC should then call upon them for their reasons. If the explanation should be given that there was no Van Mook Line in Madura and that the whole island was already patrolling territory, then the same questions should be asked of General Spoor as will be asked in Madura if the recommendations of the preceding paragraph are followed.

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3. "In connection with reasons for the movement advanced by others than the Dutch, it is noted that the Republican memo directing the attention of the GOC to the Madura situation states:

'However, it is now clear that the Dutch have used military aggression to occupy East Madura and are turning the food situation into a political weapon.'

This is equivalent to charging that the real motive of the Dutch was to extend their control over Republican territory under the guise of humanitarian motives. Insofar as facts may be ascertained which bear on this charge, it seems probable that they will be ascertained through lines of inquiry already suggested. If the facts as to the actual military movements, the actual food situation at the time of such movements, the subsequent distribution of food and the source of such food supplies are all ascertained, the problem becomes primarily one of assessment of motives. It may well be in this connection that should it be decided that a desire to alleviate a shortage of food was one of the primary reasons for the Dutch movement, there will still remain a question as to whether the food situation justified movement without consultation with either the other party to the dispute or the GOC. The answer to this question is again beyond the province of the group going to Madura.

4. "In connection with the ascertainment of facts as to subsequent conduct which may or may not be consistent with the reasons for the movement advanced by the Dutch, it is suggested, without attempting to rule out other possible lines of inquiry, that the background, origin and current status of the movement for an autonomous Madura should be a subject of inquiry. The questions as to this should be addressed to the widest possible number of people, both official and non-official. It is only here that questions calling for opinions may be of any major importance and even here, to a considerable extent, they are subject to limitations pointed out at the beginning of this memo."

\* \* \* \* \*

The Elliott <sup>suggested</sup> questionnaire <sup>as a guide,</sup> appears below:

GROUP I: To be asked of Dutch Unit Commanders

1. What was your troop strength as of 1 November, 1947?
2. How were they deployed?
3. What patrolling were you performing?
4. Were Indonesian forces active in your area?
5. How many raids have your troops had against them?
6. How often did these occur?
7. When was the last encounter?
8. What was your troop strength of 10 November, 1947?
9. What additional supplies, armament and troops did you receive for this movement?
10. What were your orders for the movement?  
(If in writing, obtain copies.)
11. How many prisoners did you capture between 15 October and the date of the movement into East Madura?
12. From their interrogation, what was learned as to the conditions in East Madura?
13. About how many natives infiltrated from East Madura areas, during the above period?
14. What was their general condition?
15. What did they have to say relative to conditions in the areas they came from?
16. What was your own troop casualty during the above period? (Obtain official record if available.)
17. What was your troop casualty from 11 November, 1947 to the present? (Obtain official record if available.)

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18. How much ammunition did you expend during this period?
19. Did you meet with opposition? If so, where? How long did the engagement last?
  - (a) What were your casualties?
  - (b) What do you estimate the hostile strength to have been?
  - (c) What do you estimate their casualties at?

## GROUP II: To be asked of Divisional Headquarters and the Territory of Madura Troop Commander.

1. Why were your troops moved into East Madura?
2. Have you documentary evidence to prove your contentions?
3. Was the normal troop compliment on Madura reinforced by other troops for this movement? If so, how many and where?
4. Have you the situation maps of 1 November, 10 November and as of now? (Obtain copies.)
5. What were your total casualties in Madura between 15 October and 10 November?
6. What were your total casualties in Madura between 10 November and the present?
7. What military operations have been conducted in Madura in the last two weeks?
8. What future military operations do you contemplate?
9. How many troops do you plan to leave on Madura?
10. When do you expect to make this change?
11. How do you plan to deploy these troops, after all military opposition ceases?
12. Was there a "Van Mook Line" on Madura?
13. Why was it not adhered to?
14. What were the limits of reconnaissance prior to 10 November 1947?

## GROUP III: To be asked of Madurese Officials.

1. Did you request Dutch troop protection? If so, why? If not, why not?
2. Do you know of any acts of violence prior to the arrival of Dutch forces? If so, where? Can you take me there?
3. How were the Indonesian troops supplied and fed?
4. What was the native reaction to supplying troops with food?
5. Was there adequate food for all?
6. Was native co-operation under the Republican Regime willing or by intimidation?
7. How is it now?
8. Compare conditions under the Republican Regime to those at present/.
9. As an official, do you find it easier to perform your job now under the Dutch, or was it easier under the Republic?
10. Was law and order more peaceful under the Republic, or now, under the Dutch?
11. What was the clothing situation under the Republic?
12. What is it now?
13. How were medical supplies and medical treatment under the Republic?
14. How are they now?
15. How many people died during the Republican Regime?
16. Has the death rate increased or decreased since Dutch Occupation?
17. Has business and trade increased or decreased since Dutch Occupation? To what extent?

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18. Did you see any fighting when the Dutch troops moved in? If so, where? How big was it? Estimate the Republican strength.
19. Are Dutch troops still advancing? If so, where?
20. How did you get messages to and from Jogjakarta? How often?
21. How often did you get food, clothing and medical supplies from the Republic?
22. What money did you use under the Republic?
23. What money do you use now?
24. How was the Republican money redeemed?
25. What was the police force under the Republican Regime?
26. What is it now?
27. Are there more people moving on the roads and in the markets now, or were there more under the Republican regime?
28. About how many children attended school under the Republican regime?
29. How many attend now?
30. In general, would you say that the people were happier under the Republican regime than now, under the Dutch? Explain reasons.

## GROUP IV: Questions to be asked of natives.

1. How do you feel?
2. How often do you get rice to eat?
3. Do you get more to eat now?
4. Did you get any new clothes?
5. Do you go to the market more, now?
6. Before the Dutch came, was your food taken away from you?
7. Was your house or farm burned?
8. Did you have to move out for soldiers?
9. Did you shelter or feed soldiers?
10. Did the Republicans give you medicine?
11. Do you get any medicine now?
12. Are any of your family or friends sick?
13. When was this building, etc., destroyed? Who did it?
14. Are you more free now?
15. Did you want the Dutch to come? When did you get this desire, and where from?
16. Do you want them to stay? If so, how long?
17. Did you see any fighting? Where and when?
18. Did you see anyone killed? If so, who killed them?
19. Do you want your independence?
20. How do you want it?

## GROUP V: To be asked of Republican designated individuals.

1. What were your contacts with Jogjakarta?
2. How often did you get messages from Jogjakarta? How did you get them? (If by radio, where were they located, type strength, etc.)
3. Did you ask the Dutch to come in?
4. Who did ask the Dutch to come in?
5. In this respect, what are your political views?
6. How did the Republican army behave itself?
7. How did it sustain itself?
8. What did the natives think of it?
9. Were there any acts of terror?
10. How about robbery - was there much of it?

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11. Were many of the natives sick?
12. Is the sick rate better or worse now?
13. How often did you get rice?
14. How often do you get it now?
15. Why do you think the Dutch came in?
16. What do you think the people want?
17. What do you think is the best for them? Why?

\* \* \* \* \*

Col. Myers then said to Messers Brandis and Scott: "The list of questions prepared by Col. Elliott appears to me to be sound. However, I suggest that the list be submitted to Dr. Graham, or even to the GOC for approval, and then copies could be made for the use of the entire delegation of Belgians and Australians as well as the Americans."

To this Mr. Brandis replied that there was not sufficient time, and that Dr. Graham relied on him to use his good judgement in any case and had put him in charge. The American group would use the questionnaire, in any event, he said.

15 December, MondayI. The LOG

- 0600 hrs. : Alert.
- 0707 hrs. : Take off, American C-47 for Jogjakarta and Soerabaya with Republican delegates and the Madura Military Observer Groups. (See Narrative Section for Passenger Manifest.
- 0830 hrs. : Meeting: "Renville", GOC and Dutch delegates. Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal for the U.S. Military Group. To discuss the application of the Lingardjati Agreement.
- 1130 hrs. : Meeting of the GOC to discuss definitions. Same U.S. personnel.
- 1335 hrs. : Meeting of Senior Military Advisors to draw up definitions and interpretations of phrases in the GOC suggestions for implementing a quick truce agreement. (See LOG for 10 December). This meeting was interrupted by another meeting of the GOC to discuss interpretations of the Security Council's 1 November Resolution, but was resumed at 1345 hours.
- Evening: Informal talks among delegates and work on reports.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

C-47 Flight: The airplane carried 18 persons on the take-off. Three of these were to go to Jogjakarta, after which the aircraft was to go to Soerabaya and return to Batavia. The Passenger Manifest is as follows:

Australian Delegation

- |                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| 1. Robert Moore         | - Assistant Australian Representative. |
| 2. Commander Chesterman | - Military Assistant.                  |
| 3. Sqdr. Ldr. Kroll     | - " "                                  |
| 4. Mr. Choa             | - Stenographer, Australian Consulate.  |

Belgium Delegation

- |                         |                             |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Mr. Vander Stichelen | - Consul General in Batavia |
| 2. Mr. Vanden Blockt    | - Vice Consul in Batavia    |
| 3. Capt. Symons         | - Military Assistant.       |

U. S. Delegation

- |                          |   |
|--------------------------|---|
| 1. Henry P. Brandis, Jr. | - Special Assistant U.S. Representative |
| 2. Col. Elliott          | - Military Assistant                    |
| 3. Col. Mollohan         | - " "                                   |
| 4. Capt. McCallum        | - " "                                   |
| 5. Lt. Col. Buckner      | - " "                                   |
| 6. J. C. Baumgardner     | - CPO, 2/c - Stenographer.              |

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1. Mr. C. C. Fau

Republican Delegation

1. Lt. Col. Boestomi \* All to Jogjakarta.
2. Mr. Pringgodigdo
3. Dr. Sarwono

Interpreter

1. Mr. Ku Kuan Hai

0830 hrs. Meeting: Dr. Graham was chairman, and will continue so for the rest of the week. The chairman stated that it was understood that the Dutch had declared that they were still bound by the articles of the Linggardjati Agreement. In explanation of this, Jonkheer Van Vredenburg stated that not only should the text of the agreement be taken into consideration but it was necessary to consider its annexes, correspondence between the two parties, and the elucidation of the Agreement by the Netherlands Commission General, as presented to the Netherlands States General, as well as pertinent ministerial speeches made in the Netherlands parliament. Van Vredenburg said that the Dutch considered themselves bound by the Linggardjati Agreement only as elucidated in the above mentioned documents.

The rest of the meeting reviewed material presented in the afternoon meeting of 11 December. (See LOG).

The Committee said that it would give the Netherlands at least 24 hours in advance a list of points and questions that would be asked of the Dutch delegates at the next meeting in order that the Dutch would have sufficient time to prepare and have available the answers to these questions. They agreed to discuss articles 2-5 of the Linggardjati Agreement at the next meeting. The meeting was adjourned at 1045 hours.

At this time, Dr. Van Vredenburg protested at the presence at "closed meeting" of the military advisors. Obviously he was striking at the U.S. Group. However, Dr. Graham sidestepped the issue, later telling Col. Myers that he had done right to sit in as matters of military import constantly were being raised.

1130 hours Meeting: This meeting was held to render an interpretation of the Security Council Resolution of 1 November. The interpretation had been delayed because of a disagreement on certain military definitions such as, "hostile action", "occupied", "controlled", and "territory occupied". The definitions had since been agreed on unanimously by the military assistants, (See "Servais Meeting", LOG, page 101 and "GOC Night Meeting", page 97.) and the U.S. delegation now wished to submit the proposed interpretation of these definitions. Dr. Graham said that if the definitions were not acceptable to Dr. Van Zeeland, the Australian and U.S. delegations would have the right to re-introduce their military definitions and it might be necessary to refer the entire matter to the Security Council.

Mr. Harremans said that since there had been so much delay already that a few more days would not seriously hamper the intent of the resolution, and that the delay so far had not been his fault, that he would tentatively accept the conclusions with the right to reserve final approval by Dr. Van Zeeland. This was acceptable to all.

Several other matters of purely GOC business were discussed. Mr. Harremans informed the committee that he had received a letter from the Indonesian Delegation giving a list of names of people for the Madura GOC group to contact and the members of the group had each received a copy, prior to their departure.

Mr. Critchley said, if he understood correctly, neither of the parties were to furnish interpreters from here to accompany the group. Dr. Graham said that was the way he understood it. Mr. Harremans thought that the point had been left open, but that if the Dutch did send an interpreter the group could select a republican interpreter in Madura. (Note: the Dutch supplied an interpreter. See Passenger list, 15 December.) The meeting was adjourned at 1515 hours.

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Military Advisors' Meeting: At 1345 the Senior Military Advisors, including Col. Myers, Brig. Neylon, Col. Servais, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal met in the "Renville" to discuss the definition of certain military terms in the GOC suggestions for a truce, as requested by the Dutch. (See LOG, 10 December). At 1400 the meeting was recessed until 1515 hours in order to have the meeting with the Good Offices concluded. At 1515 hours the meeting was continued and Lt. Col. Ind joined. After some discussions, the answers to be handed to the Committee of Good Offices were agreed upon. It was decided that the answers would be presented by Col. Myers in the morning at a meeting with the GOC before that committee met with the Indonesian Delegation.

The communication is as follows:

Paragraph 1 - A demilitarized zone is defined for the purposes set forth in S/AC.10/CONF.1/9 as a zone from which all personnel of all military units, together with their arms and equipment, have been withdrawn.

The term military units does not apply to civil police. Suggestions as to the control, type and armament of police charged with the maintenance of law and order in the demilitarized zones would be submitted by the Committee of Good Offices if requested by the parties, as indicated in paragraph 10 of S/AC.10/CONF.1/9.

Paragraph 3 (a) - The positions of the troops of the two parties on 20 November 1947 is not a factor to be taken into account by the two parties in their submissions to the Committee of Good Offices with regard to the delineation of demilitarized zones.

Paragraph 3 (b) - Welfare refers not only to law and order but to living conditions of the population.

Paragraph 4 - It is recommended that the phrase "and to the other party" be stricken out.

Paragraph 7 - "Present positions" means the positions of troops in any area of Java, Sumatra and Madura. This paragraph has for its intention the cessation of all troop movements of a hostile nature calculated to gain a military objective. It is not the intention of this paragraph to preclude the movements of troops for purposes of military administration or supply or the operations of civil police forces in the maintenance of law and order within the territories occupied.

Paragraph 9 (a) - It is recognized that many technical problems are involved in the resumption of normal trade and intercourse among the various areas and that these problems would require solution by agreement between the parties with the assistance of the Committee of Good Offices, if requested.

Paragraph 9 (b) - This paragraph applies to both parties. The question of whether the withdrawal of the troops of only one party or of both would be required could only be answered following the determination of the location of the demilitarized zones.

16 December, Tuesday

I. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.

0830 hrs. : Meeting, "Renville" - GOC to discuss a petition of the Dutch for permission to release to the press an answer to the Republican economic "white paper" of 28 November (See LOG, that date). Also to receive the report of the Military Advisors, Lt. Col. Dixon, Major Neal and Col. Myers.

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1015 hrs. : GOC Meeting with Indonesian Delegates on the Linggadjati Agreement. No particular military aspects. Col. Myers, Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind and Major Neal covering.

1400 hrs. : Meeting, Col. Myers and Dr. Graham to suggest that Gen. Spoor be approached to obtain further information on the Madura operations.

1830 hrs. : Meeting with General Spoor. Col. Myers, Brig. Neylan and Col. Servais, to present questionnaire.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Presentation of Military Advisors' Report: Col. Myers made available to the GOC the report drawn up by the Advisors the previous afternoon. He pointed out that the report represented the unanimous result after detailed discussions among the three principal military advisors as well as the junior members. It was therefore something of a surprise when Dr. Graham listened readily to the suggestions of Mr. Ogburn that certain changes be made. Particularly with reference to the phrase "welfare of the local population", the GOC adopted Mr. Ogburn's suggestion that a "common sense" application would be better. (Later Lt. Col. Dixon suggested that the implication was that the GOC had not used "common sense" in framing the sentence in the first place and that the Dutch had not used "common sense" in questioning it!) The GOC decided against deleting the phrase most objectionable to the Dutch, i.e., "and to the other party" with reference to making military information available to the GOC and to the other party to facilitate a discussion of where to establish a demilitarized zone. It finally was decided to say that information would be supplied by each side "insofar as conditions of military security will allow". This was considered unsatisfactory by Col. Myers. He so stated. He further questioned Mr. Ogburn's capabilities to make sound judgements on purely military matters. He said that it was not sound from a military standpoint to expect hostile forces to be willing to furnish secret and confidential military information to GOC without a guarantee that it would be withheld from the opposing forces.

1015 hours Meeting: This meeting was between the GOC and the Indonesian Delegation. It concerned the Linggadjati Agreement. Although no matters of military nature came up, the meeting was covered by Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal and Lt. Col. Ind covered part.

General Spoor Meeting: In consequence of instructions issued by the GOC following Col. Myers' representations for approval to question Gen. Spoor on matters of the Madura Operations, a meeting with the General was arranged for 1830 hrs. A formal letter communicating the questions (approved by the GOC) was not ready by the time of the meeting, and Col. Myers asked General Spoor for permission to read from his rough notes. The General expressed approval of the questions and gave answers orally, discussing each at length. Col. Myers then asked the General if he would confirm his oral answers in writing. The General agreed to do so, saying that the paper would be ready by the following morning. At this time, Lt. Col. Ind arrived with the formal letter. Col. Myers showed it to Col. Servais of Belgium and Brigadier Neylan of Australia in turn. Both approved. Then Col. Myers gave it to Gen. Spoor. He said that he understood and that he had no objections to the questions and would submit written answers as agreed. The GOC letter appears here:

Batavia, Java, NEI  
16 December 1947

To : Lt. General S.H. Spoor  
Commander-in-Chief  
Netherlands Forces in NEI

Subject: Information Concerning Madura  
Operations Subsequent to 4  
August, 1947; Request for:



CONFIDENTIALSpoor Letter Continued:

1. In order to further inform itself relative to the Madura situation, the Committee of Good Offices has instructed the senior Military Advisors to obtain information in addition to that likely to be secured by the field observer group now on Madura.
2. Accordingly, the senior Advisors, composed of Colonel Myers for the United States of America, Brigadier Neylan for Australia and Colonel Servais for Belgium propose to call upon you.
3. Questions reviewed and approved by the Committee of Good Offices will be asked. However, the senior Advisors are authorized to ask additional questions based upon the list, depending upon the answers accorded.
4. The questions are as follows:
  - a. What were the primary reasons for the undertaking of operations in Madura subsequent to 4 August 1947?
  - b. Were you acting under the orders of higher authority in implementing operations in Madura subsequent to 4 August, and if so, whose? Was the initiation of operations entirely a matter beyond your control?
  - c. The Committee of Good Offices desires a copy of the orders which you issued to your command in this connection. Can this be complied with?
  - d. What was the nature of the information and intelligence, and what was its source (civil, military, etc) upon which these operations were justified and based?
  - e. According to Good Offices Committee S/AC.10/63, official Netherlands authorities announce the capture of Lt. Colonel Chandra Hasson of the Republican Forces. In this connection:
    1. Where is Lt. Col. Chandra Hasson now?
    2. Will permission be granted to interview him immediately?

Signed:

C.S. Myers,  
Colonel, GSC,  
United States Army  
Chairman.

Enclosures: None.

\* \* \* \*

17 December, WednesdayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.

0900 hrs. : Special meeting called by General Spoor to acquaint the Military Advisors with developments in connection with the questionnaire and to reverse his position of the previous evening. Present: Col. Myers, Brig. Neylan and Col. Servais.

1000 hrs. : Meeting: Col. Myers with Dr. Graham to report on Gen. Spoor's reversed attitude.

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1110 hrs. : Report to the GOC by Brig. Neylan of results of the Spoor meetings and to tender the Advisors' questionnaire for the record.

Afternoon : Informal talks while the Dutch delegation went in toto to airport to welcome the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Louis Beel.

1900 hrs. : Reception; Indian Consul General Raghaven, Col. Myers, Lt. Colonels Dixon and Ind attending. Informal visits with ranking politicians of both sides.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Spoor Meeting: At 0800 hours, Col. Myers received an urgent phone call from the Dutch Liaison Office asking if he and the other senior members of the Advisor group would present themselves at his headquarters at 0900 hours for a special meeting. Upon their arrival, Gen. Spoor said that he was compelled to acquaint them with developments which had occurred subsequent to their departure the previous evening. In consequence of these developments he was worried and upset. He asked whether Col. Myers knew that a separate questionnaire had been presented to the commander of the "A" Division at Soerabaya by members of the Madura Field Survey Party. Col. Myers replied that he knew of the existence of a questionnaire composed of queries prepared by his own officers after a careful study (See LOG, 24 December). These, he said, had been drawn up to act as a guide for his officers as much as anything else. He could not, of course, know whether this was the same list the General now had reference to. General Spoor said he rather doubted that it was the same. He said that one of his subordinate commanders from "A" Division had arrived from Soerabaya the previous evening shortly after the departure of Col. Myers and party. This officer, Capt. Horn, presented General Spoor with a list of 23 questions from the Madura Field Party, some of which the General said were "nothing less than insulting", and that he was convinced had been Republican-inspired in an attempt to either mislead grossly or create friction.

Without being shown the list the General referred to, the Advisors were unable to identify this latest questionnaire. However, Colonel Myers reiterated that there was absolutely nothing in the list prepared originally by the American Group which could be, or was designed to be insulting, misleading or productive of anything but the elucidation of straightforward information desired by the Committee of Good Offices. Col. Myers did get a hint, however, that the offending list was not identical with the list prepared by Col. Elliott when General Spoor somewhat impatiently referred to two incidents (a bombing incident and the "Kangeon Affair") which had not been covered for questioning in the Elliott list. Apparently these two references were considered to be particularly offensive as well as irrelevant.

General Spoor said that he had consulted with the Lieutenant Governor General, Dr. Van Mook and Jonkheer Van Vredenburg and it "had been decided" that he was not to make any answers whatsoever. This decision also included, he said, the answers he had contemplated making to the questionnaire given to him the previous evening by Col. Myers.

At this time Col. Myers asked him if he had now considered that particular questionnaire to be offensive. General Spoor said he did not, but that he disagreed with the idea of trying to "work the thing from both ends" simultaneously. Determined to get it into the record, since there were two Dutch stenographers taking verbatim notes, Colonel Myers said: "General, I'd like to retrace our steps somewhat. Do you remember when Lt. Col. Ind brought the finished letter with the questions to us last night, that I read it, then passed it to Colonel Servais and Brig. Neylan, who verified the queries? Both approved of what they had read. Then I gave it to you. You read it and said that you understood and repeated that you had no particular objections and would answer them in writing in the morning."

The General <sup>replied</sup> that <sup>that</sup> was correct, but that he now was under orders to answer nothing in view of the development that he now was reporting.

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(Note: This is mentioned because of the surprising report of the "minutes" of this meeting subsequently issued by the General's secretariat from the stenographic notes, to be reported in LOG of next date).

Since it was obvious that nothing further could be expected from this meeting, the Advisors took their departure.

Graham Meeting: Col. Myers immediately went to make an informal report of the matter to Dr. Graham. The American GOC delegate was satisfied that the Advisors had done the right thing and that not much else could be done until the return of the Madura Field Survey Party. This was anticipated for 19 December. Then they would be questioned to determine the origin of the questionnaire that had been so disturbing to the Dutch. The possibility that the questions had in fact been inspired by Republicans who had been carried to Jogjakarta in the U.S. C-47 along with the Madura Group en-route Sourabaya was not overlooked. However, it also was brought out that possibly even the fair questions being put by the Field Survey party were embarrassing to the Dutch politicians and that they had seized upon this pretext to express indignation and consequently decline further cooperation. Dr. Graham said he would not allow his group to be made the "goat" in the matter, and suggested a stand-by pending the return of the Madura group. Brigadier Neylan's report was made to the GOC at 1100 hours. The decision to await the arrival of the Madura team was confirmed and made a matter of record.

The GOC tabled a report of the Netherlands Special Committee at this time, which concerned matters relating to the GOC suggestion for implementing a quick truce. The Netherlands particularly dealt with the paragraph concerning an exchange of prisoners. The Military Advisors had not been in favor of including this paragraph in the GOC suggestions as it was feared that complexities with regard to it would delay an acceptance of a relatively simple program for halting casualties. It is reiterated here that the Military Group, particularly the Americans, have tried consistently to keep before the GOC the advisability of driving straight to a target of securing agreement on matters sufficiently simple to enable the initiation of steps designed purely to halt the shooting and sabotage, and as soon as that was achieved to proceed with the consideration of more complicated steps. However, the insistence of groups other than the Military to include complicated questions in the Cease Fire agenda has done exactly what was anticipated by the Military -- provided too many knotty problems for immediate settlement. Consequently, the casualties continue to mount and property is being destroyed every 24-hour period. The atmosphere of good will, so carefully sought by the Military through its simple recommendations, is noticeably, even increasingly lacking, and it is desired to go on record at this point with the statement that it would not be surprising if a deadlock would develop in the whole of the Talks because of the fundamental failure to secure agreement on a Cease Fire.

The complexity of the prisoner question is seen in the following communication from the Dutch Special Committee (Note: Attention is particularly called to the last paragraph with reference to the reiteration just mentioned in the paragraph next above:)

"The Netherlands Special Committee is of the opinion that in the discussions concerning paragraph (g) of the initial suggestions submitted by the representatives of the Committee of Good Offices the following groups of persons should be considered with a view to obtaining their release;

1. "Interned members of forces, which term on our side is taken to include all persons belonging to units of the Netherlands and Netherlands Indies Land Sea and Air forces who are detained by Republican organizations.

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2. "Political prisoners. On the part of the Netherlands this term is taken to include all those who on the grounds of professed or imputed pro-Netherlands leanings have been imprisoned, interned, taken into protective custody or have otherwise had their liberty of action curtailed. Also to be considered for release are those who have been sentenced or arrested on charges of assisting the enemy (so-called kaki tangan moosoh or kaki tangan Nica) or of being in possession of Netherlands Indies money.

"As political prisoners should further be considered all those who have unwillingly been removed from the Netherlands controlled territory by force or threats or in any other way, and who are now being detained by any Republican organization or being prevented from returning to the above-mentioned territory in any manner whatsoever.

3. "Other civil detainees. This term is taken to include all those in Republican areas or in the hands of any Republican organization or group who desire to move to Netherlands controlled territories but are being prevented from doing so by internment, protection custody or any other form of compulsion or intimidation whatsoever, directly or indirectly, in so far as these persons are not already included among the political prisoners.

"The Netherlands Special Committee wish to add to the above that the effectuation of what is agreed with respect to the release of prisoners, is, of course, also dependent on the actual termination of hostilities, including acts of violence, intimidation, terrorization, sabotage, sedition and similar activities."

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Dr. Beel's Visit: The press of both sides has been very active accusing, denying and speculating on the arrival here of the Dutch Prime Minister, Dr. Louis Beel. He repeatedly had asserted to the press that his is a purely "business trip". This would-be blind fools no one. It is expected by the Military that his presence here will mean a stiffening of the Dutch attitude all around, and a sharp upturn in the Dutch propaganda for, and actions to achieve, a United States of Indonesia, without further consideration of the Indonesian question on a purely Netherlands-Republic basis. The ground has already been laid in the press.

It is believed that the situation here will be nearing a political crisis within the next week.

It is the concensus of the U.S. Military Observer Group that the political situation has been deteriorating and that this deterioration is observable at an increasing rate.

Dutch Reply to Republican Economic Survey (called by us "White Paper".)  
In the log of 27 November, the Republican "white paper" was reported. Comments followed. But the formal rebuttal by the Dutch was not made until today. Their petition to the GOC for permission to publish was carefully considered by the GOC. In spite of the undesirability of further "fighting it out in the press", the GOC decided it was bound to give permission. (Actually, it is quite certain that the Dutch would have published without permission.)

To give the Dutch side of this complicated question, it has been decided to include it in this history despite its length. It is as follows:

Dutch Reply: The Netherlands government has handed to the United Nations Committee of Good Offices its reply to the Republican government's economic memorandum of November 25. (See Log, 25 November.) Here are extracts from the reply:

"It has been stated that the Republican government's request to receive economic support is founded entirely and solely on humanitarian grounds.

Viewed in the light of actual facts, the correctness of this assumption would, however, seem open to doubt. For, these facts bring one to the conclusion that the Republican government is on the one hand trying to obstruct and retard by its request the negotiations to be held and, on the other, it is endeavouring to strengthen its economic position with the object of developing its resistance to the pacifying measures applied on the part of the Netherlands.

The request submitted by the Republican government to receive economic aid concerns the following three subjects:

- A. The application of measures to promote equitable distribution of food and consumer goods in all parts of Java, Sumatra and Madura.
- B. The speedy resumption of normal trade relations between the territories of the "Republic" and the other parts of Indonesia.
- C. The allowance of free trade relations with parts of the "Republic" cut off by "force".

Each of these subjects will be dealt with in the following with reference to the actual facts.

"Before the police action only parts of Java and Sumatra with a large rice deficit were under Netherlands control. As it was an imperative necessity that sufficient rice- the staple food of the Indonesian- should become available, the NEI government repeatedly called upon the Republican government, which at that time controlled the rice surplus areas in West and East Java, to supply rice for the Indonesian population of areas under Netherlands control.

These negotiations relating to the supply of rice by the Republican government led- in the first instance- to an agreement according to which the Republican government was to deliver daily between 11 and 20 railway trucks of rice- for the population of Batavia- to the Allied Military Administration, up to a total of at least 20,000 tons of rice.

On their part the NEI Department of Economic Affairs (the Nigieo) was to supply to the Republican government 39,000 yards of textiles and various other commodities.

Although the Netherlands Indies government anticipated this arrangement, for instance by the allocation of textiles, this agreement was not honoured by the Republican government.

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The Republican government, which was repeatedly urged to fulfill the obligations it had undertaken, pleaded that it was not able to lay hands on sufficient rice in the interior.

Approximately at the same time- i.e. early in April of 1946- Mr. Soetan Sjahrir, the then Premier of the "Republic", undertook to supply 500,000 tons of rice or 700,000 of gabah (unhusked rice) to India, however. As it was known that there was a grave shortage of rice in the areas under Netherlands control, this promise in itself was not only directed against us, but was also highly detrimental to the whole of Indonesia.

The propagandistic nature of this promise is evident from the fact that such a large quantity of rice was offered to India, obviously with the intention of impressing upon foreign countries that there was an abundance of food in Republican areas- in particular in Java. This policy is even more evident if it is remembered that Dr. Gani, the Republican Minister of Economic Affairs, some months later published at Malang pessimistic figures of the Java and Madura food crops, for the purposes of home propaganda and with the object of refusing to supply rice and/or any other food to the Netherlands controlled areas.

The Republican government finally promised to cooperate but again, however, none of the Republican promises were kept. On the contrary the Republican Army (Tentara Repoebluk Indonesia, which later became the Tentara Nasional Indonesia), instituted a food blockade directed against the areas under Netherlands control.

In October, 1946, the rice situation was once more brought up for consideration with the Republican government. With the assistance of Mr. M. R. Wright, then belonging to the staff of the British Special Commissioner (Singapore), an agreement was again reached after arduous negotiations.

As before, however, these promises were never fulfilled. The blockade imposed by the TRI was tightened; thus in Sumatra, Medan and Padang, for instance, were so completely cut off from the country behind that, unless the Netherlands authorities had taken the precaution of importing rice from other countries, there would have been a serious famine.

After the signing of the Lingardjati agreement the problem of the supply of rice was at once raised by the competent Netherlands authorities, who trusted that the republican government would now be willing to cooperate. But the Republican government wished first and foremost- apparently for political reasons- to fulfill on all points its rice contract with India, regardless of the needs of Indonesia itself.

In the latter part of May, 1947, the NEI government at least seemed to be successful. In connection with the negotiations on the lifting of the Australian shipping ban the Republican Minister of Food, Dr. Soerdasono, said he was prepared at once to deliver 70,000 tons of rice- in exchange for part of the goods waiting in Australia to be shipped to Indonesia- to the NEI government, for the areas under its control. This, again, was a promise that was never effectuated.

After the police action several important rice centres of Java were brought under Netherlands control.

Before the war (1942), these rice centres yielded a

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surplus of about 450,000 tons of rice per annum. An excess of this magnitude was not expected for 1947, as it was known that under Republican management the rice crops greatly diminished.

Though the outlook when the West and East Java rice-producing country was brought under Netherlands control was none too favourable, it deteriorated as a result of the arson, terrorization, etc., organized, or at least encouraged, by the Republican government during and after the police action.

To this end the bands- operating under instructions from Djocja- concentrated on the food stocks and rice hulling mills. Before the police action, 59 rice-hulling mills were destroyed or damaged and after the action 177.

Accordingly, in the interests of the Indonesian people and disregarding the high expenditure of foreign exchange involved, the NEI government exerted every effort to buy rice obtained on IEFC allocation to other countries. Although after great trouble it has succeeded in obtaining at high prices a few small shipments of rice in the Philippines, the USA and Brazil, the total quantity received will be barely sufficient to maintain the target ration of 200 grammes per day per head until the next harvest in May-August 1948.

Apart from the fact that there is no reason to assume that the Republican areas have a greater need of rice than those under Netherlands control, it will be apparant from the above that- also as a result of Republican action- it is at present impossible to help out the Republicans by supplying rice from Netherlands- held areas. The International Emergency Food Council will not be able to give this assistance either.

As long as the Republican government continues to encourage its policy of terrorization and intimidation, the development of normal trade relations between the various districts of Java and Sumatra must be considered out of the question.

Moreover such traffic would provide an opportunity to the Republicans of conveying extremist elements to the Netherlands controlled areas in order to increase the economic resistance of the roving bands operating in these areas.

In the interests of the various groups of the population, the NEI government is bound not to take any risks of this nature.

In elucidation of the regulations of January 1947 regarding commercial traffic by sea- regulations which the Republican government, with complete disregard for the actual facts, has repeatedly attempted to represent as an economic blockade- it seems advisable to outline the situation as it had developed in Indonesia before the war.

The interinsular goods traffic in Indonesia and the goods traffic between Indonesia and foreign countries were subject to various restrictions.

The aim of these regulations was to bring about a system which made it possible in the interests of the community to impose restrictions on the commercial intercourse between the various islands of the Indian Archipelago, the purpose of exchange control being in the interests of purchases necessary to the community, to make the best possible use, through an exchange fund,

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of currencies obtained in foreign countries by the export of goods.

Postwar conditions of scarcity of commodities and acute shortages of foreign exchange were used by the Republican government apparently for political reasons by conveying, to the detriment of the inhabitants of certain localities, scarce products to other parts of the NEI, and by exporting commodities to foreign countries which were urgently needed in the country itself. This may be illustrated by the considerable Republican exports of rice, sugar, coconut oil and copra, all articles which were needed by the Indonesian community.

This illegal trade, which is counter to the interests of the community, moreover misused the circumstances that long after the Japanese occupation considerable quantities of arms and ammunition were stored in various places in the NEI, by supplying arms and other articles of this nature to other districts, where these articles in conjunction with the infiltration of Republican fighting groups increased public insecurity.

In this connection, we may point to military infiltrations in Bali, Celebes, South and East Borneo. In addition, the TRI regularly planned raids on Bali from Banjowangi.

Adjacent foreign countries, which in many cases insufficiently controlled their exports, unfortunately added to the impairment of public security by the import, in exchange for commodities exported by the Republicans, of military and semi-military articles.

Finally, it should be pointed out that a state of economic disorganization existed in the NEI, after the Japanese occupation, because many owners of Western concerns and plantations had been expelled from their properties by the Japanese and the majority interned, these owners being unable to return after the Japanese surrender owing to the unsettled conditions prevailing at the time. As a result large quantities of plantation products have accumulated in the interior, whence they could be removed easily by unauthorized traders.

In spite of numerous protests from the NEI government, the Republican government has not only countenanced this illicit trade but even encouraged it, so that vast quantities of these products were smuggled to foreign countries where, as a rule, they were sold far below their real value. This had seriously injured the exchange position at the expense of the entire population who received inadequate supplies in exchange for valuable Indonesian products. Moreover these imported supplies mostly consisted of commodities which were either unfit for use or not of primary importance.

In order to put a stop to these intolerable conditions, the NEI government, after several earnest but vain attempts to arrive at a solution in consultation with the Republican government, on 28th January, 1947, put into operation a complete import, export and transport system.

In order to interfere as little as possible with the commercial relations between the Republican and foreign countries, a regulation was issued by the director of Economic Affairs, on the same date as the above mentioned measures, stating that, insofar as Republican controlled areas were concerned, in deviation

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from the regulations affecting foreign exchange, the export of all goods, with the exception of estate products and goods destined for industrial rehabilitation, was permitted.

It should be remarked that this general permission involved a considerable loss to Indonesia of foreign exchange.

Meanwhile the Republican government maintained the food blockade by land, while furthermore Republican publications which fell into the hands of Netherlands authorities show that before the police action the Republican government also attempted to prevent, with all the means at its disposal, the transportation of rice by sea to Netherlands controlled area.

The note goes on to say that even after the Linggardjati agreement had been concluded, the Republican government stipulated that it would only request the Australian government, or at least the "Union" concerned, to lift the "ban", when beforehand the regulations of 28 January 1947 had been withdrawn.

An agreement was later made to the effect that immediately after the ban had been lifted, goods ready for shipment in Australia would be conveyed to Indonesia. Part of the goods would be unloaded at a Republican port in exchange for an equivalent quantity of rice to be delivered by the Republican government.

On 31st May, 1947, Dr. Soedarsono offered 70,000 tons of rice in exchange but no further developments took place. Already in June, 1947, at the Sobsi congress at Malang, the Republican government urged the reinstatement of the "ban". Immediately after the police action, the Republican government even declared in an official message to Australia that it was not desirous to have the goods in question shipped, this in spite of the fact that the NEI government in its notes of 20th and 22nd July, 1947, had expressly undertaken fully to honour the agreement of 24th May, 1947.

At the earliest possible moment after the police action, the NEI government mitigated the measures by once again allowing shipping to proceed to certain regions where the population came to feel detrimental effects of these measures, though a mild system of control continued to be imposed."

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0630 hrs. : Alert.

0900 hrs. : Meeting, GOC and Dutch Delegation for discussion of further portions of the Lingajati Agreement. Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal covered.

1000 hrs. : Meeting, Col. Six of General Spoor's Information Bureau and Lt. Col. Ind re: minutes of the General's meeting with the Military senior advisors the previous morning.

1600 hrs. : Meeting, the GOC representatives and the Dutch Special committee, particularly the military members thereof. Chief of the Dutch, Jonkheer B. Van Vredenburg, and supporting him, Admiral Zalm and General Van Vreden. For the U.S. Group: Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon, Lt. Col. Ind and Major Neal. This was to discuss the GOC proposals for implementation of a truce and to hear a statement by Dr. Van Vredenburg re: refusal of the Dutch to withdraw troops.

Evening : Preparation of reports.

Evening : Submission of GOC Request for use of C-47 next day and also receipt of report by Pilot, Lt. Chapman of incident at Soerabaya.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

GOC Meeting: The morning meeting aboard the "Renville" was purely political in its aspects. However, since military angles may develop, coverage has been a matter of policy. This has imposed a heavy load on the American military personnel and may have to be altered. As these political meetings continue, it is increasingly apparent that the Dutch and the Indonesian delegations hold almost diametrically opposite views on nearly every important clause of the LA. It is difficult to see how they both signed it in good faith, but perhaps it was thought best to sign something in the hopes that problems could be resolved subsequently. This, it is believed was a false premise, inasmuch as implementation insured a clashing of interests. How the GOC can reveal points of similar thinking as a basis for subsequent agreement on a sound foundation is not clear at this time.

Colonel Six: It required no little persuasion on Lt. Col. Ind's part to obtain a draft of the "minutes" of the meeting held the previous morning between General Spoor and the senior military advisors. Col. Myers had made the request as it was assumed that the touchiness of the Dutch in the matter of the questionnaires and the subsequent refusal of General Spoor to answer might have repercussions. Col. Myers was anxious to be able to report in detail to the GOC should that be called for, and at any rate, to have a full record for the LOG. Col. Six finally agreed, after first stating that no transcription had been made. Unwittingly a second secretary said that a transcription had just been finished. He immediately countered by saying that it was merely a tentative work-draft and that he would have to correct it. Attention is invited to this report (which is included below) and the LOG of 17 November. The "minutes" from the Dutch headquarters are as follows:

Minutes of the Conference, held at the Office of the C.-in-C. Netherlands Forces NEI on December 17th 1947 at 0930 hours.

Present: Lt. Gen. S. H. Spoor, C.-in-C. Neth. Forces NEI. Maj. Gen. D. C. Buurman Van Vreeden, Chief of Staff; Brigadier Neylan, Head of the Australian Mil. Mission; Colonel Meyers, Head of the U.S. Mission; Colonel Servais, Head of the Belgium Mission; Lt. Col. Jhr. Mr. P. Th. Six, attached to the C.-in-C.

General Spoor opened the meeting with a brief summary of the conversation he had had with Brigadier Neylan, Colonel Myers and Colonel Servais about the Madura affair on Tuesday night, 16th December 1947. On this conference Colonel Myers asked General Spoor some more background information about the military

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activities in Madura. The answers were satisfactory to the Colonel. During that conference Col. Myers informed General Spoor that he had put a few questions in writing and asked for a written answer on these questions. General Spoor objected to two points of the questionnaire, i.e.,

- (a) the interrogation of Chandra Hassan, because the General did not want to break in the routine-interrogation which was executed by Dutch intelligence officers, and
- (b) if he had acted in Madura on his own or on higher authority, whereupon General Spoor made the remark: "what kind of an army the Colonel thought he had"

Afterwards General Spoor had learned that in the meantime a questionnaire, containing 23 questions had been handed over by the field observers group on Madura to the GOC A-Div. at Soerabaya in the morning of the 16th December 1947. No reply was given by the GOC to any of these questions until further instructions from Batavia HQ would have been received.

Colonel Myers stated that he did not know anything about this last questionnaire.

Thereafter General Spoor read a few of the questions, one of which reads as follows: "What were the circumstances, of the sinking of the S.S. Kangean on July 4th 1946 between Java and Madura?" General Spoor explained that this event had taken place about 18 months ago, when the military situation in the Indies was still under control of General Mansergh, Commander of the British Forces in the NEI, and was fully investigated on his request.

Other questions were e.g., if it was true that the Netherlands Forces bombed Besuki (a place situated in an area entirely different from Madura), what military operations were conducted in the last two weeks in Madura, and what future military operations were contemplated.

All these matters, the General continued, do not belong to the concern of the Committee of Good Offices and for this reason the General objected to give any answers to these inappropriate questions.

Colonel Myers could appreciate, that under these circumstances and at this stage no reply would be given by the Netherlands Military authorities to both questionnaires.

General Spoor pointed out that if and when the Committee of Good Offices wants to receive information or background on special matters, he is fully willing to give them, under condition that the questions are reasonable and put in a decent way. But the General stressed on the point, that the procedure of sending separately two different questionnaires, one to himself and the other to a subordinate commander at the same time was absolutely unacceptable, because thus the impression is made of the use of methods which are only customary at the interrogation of criminals or suspects. Because nobody of the GOC can have any personal knowledge of the Kangean affair or the so-called bombing of Besuki these questions are undoubtedly inspired by the Republic.

General Spoor concluded, that in consultation with the Lt. Governor General and the Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation, the entire matter will be taken over by the latter, who in his turn will raise the subject in a formal meeting on board of the Renville.

Batavia, 18th December 1947

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Special Committee Meeting: At this meeting, the Dutch put the GOC squarely and deliberately "on the spot". It has been the strategy at all times of Dr. Van Vredenburg to put the GOC and its committees on the defensive. A man of unusual ability to organize material and argument and a quick shifter as the exigencies of the situation develop, Dr. Van Vredenburg became politely but cuttingly aggressive. He (a) accused the GOC of dilatoriness in declining to act on Dutch suggestions for a detailed field inspection of certain military areas to determine the existence or non-existence (as the Dutch claim) of the much-debated "pockets of resistance" and (b) announced that in the alleged absence of responsible heads in Jogjakarta, who would or were able to put an end to terrorists activities in the inland areas, his government was forced to decline to withdraw any troops whatsoever. This, he said, was forced on the Dutch in the interests of maintaining law and order and the security and welfare of the local population. He did not state in so many words that this decision was a direct rejection of the terms of the Security Council's 1 November order. He did say that it was in consequence of his conference with the Dutch prime minister, Dr. Beel. (By his own repeated statements, Dr. Beel said he was in the NEI on a purely "business trip" -- he specifically had let it be said that his visit was not connected, either "directly or indirectly" (ANETA, 18 Dec.) with the discussions in progress in the "Renville" adding that the Netherlands had its own representatives there for that purpose.)

Dr. Van Vredenburg declared that unless and until the GOC sent observers into the field who would be able to inform the GOC fully on the matter of the "alleged" pockets of resistance, his government considered further talks on the subject of implementing a peace useless, and he did "not propose to carry the point further."

He did, however, add as a part of his official statement, that his government would appreciate a statement from the GOC as to why it had declined to accept the Netherlands proposals for such a field survey. His government, he said "wants to know who is responsible that so far, no investigations have been carried out, although not once, but several times, such a request has been made."

He then wanted to know why the GOC had not officially accepted the Netherlands suggestions that a part, at least, of the GOC suggestions for implementing a truce be put into effect at once. He added that he suspected that it was out of deference to Republican objections, even though it was plain to him that these objections had for their purpose only the delaying of any kind of settlement because, he said, in their hearts, the Republicans knew that they either did not want to, or could not control the terrorists. Among other things, he said, the Netherlands had asked the Republicans to answer some explicit questions in this regard and not only had the Republicans declined to act upon the Netherlands suggestion that at least a few of the GOC suggestions be implemented, but they had ignored the questions altogether.

The Netherlands principal delegate then said that in view of this situation and the continued violence throughout the land, his government had decided that under no circumstances would it consider any withdrawals of troops from the regions within the Van Mook Line.

The Republican delegation accepted this blast with dignity, but with intense feeling. Rather than attempt a detailed rebuttal, Dr. Leimena, the chairman of the delegation asked the chair for permission to await a translation and convey the same to his superiors. Then he touched upon the previous Dutch proposals that a part of the GOC plan for implementing a truce be implemented, pointing out, that in doing so he might be rebutting a portion of the van Vredenburg statement. The chair agreed.

Dr. Leimena asserted that it was the Republican conviction that the Dutch proposal to implement only a part of the GOC suggestions clearly indicated to the Republicans that the Dutch were unwilling to accept any proposal unless it grossly favored them. He denied that the Republicans had declined the GOC suggestions, and, on the contrary, wanted the record referred to to show that they had, in fact, accepted the whole suggestion. They had opposed and would continue to oppose the acceptance of only those portions which the Dutch considered were useful to themselves.

The speaker reiterated that the Republicans stood ready to try to implement

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the whole of the GOC suggestions as they stood, but they could not continue to haggle on every sentence as he said the Dutch were doing, and thus surround the whole thing with a maze of conditions, each one of which was a complicated problem in itself.

On this highly unsatisfactory note the meeting was adjourned, with an explanation by the chair that the views of both parties, together with the Dutch demands upon GOC, would be transmitted to GOC without delay.

C-47 Trip: The GOC made a request for the use of the U.S. C-47 for a trip to Jogjakarta and Soerabaya. Shortly before this, the details of an unpleasant incident involving the U.S. crew at the Soerabaya airport on the previous trip (see LOG, 15 December) began to come out. Pilot Lt. Chapman was asked to submit a full statement. As a result, it was decided that the plane would not move hereafter without an explicit and detailed request in writing from the GOC, approved by Col. Myers. This was done. The passenger manifest for the trip approved for Friday, 19 December, follows:

List of Passengers from BATAVIA to JOGJAKARTA on 19 December 1947

Lt. Gen. Oerip	Chief of Staff, TNI
Maj. Gen. Kartasamita	TNI
Lt.j.g. R.E. Dewey, USN	Communications Officer, USS Renville
Dr. Saksouo	Advisor, Indonesian Delegation
Mr. Zainal Abidin	Advisor, Indonesian Delegation
Dr. Asmason	Senior Official Ministry Economic Affairs
Mr. Sasmita	Assistant Secy., Special Committee
Mr. M. Maramis	Secretarial Staff Indonesian Delegation
	Correspondents.
H. Wilmar	International news
Gairndaluju	Hindu Press
Lim Keng Hor	Malayan Press
K. Tohing	Berita Indonesia

List of Passengers from SOERABAYA to BATAVIA on 19 December 1947Australian Delegation:

Mr. Robert Moore	Assistant to Australian Representative
Squadron Leader Kroll	Military Assistant
Commander C.S. Chesterman	Military Assistant
Mr. Choa	Stenographer, Australian Consulate

Belgian Delegation:

Mr. P. van der Stichelen	Consul General in Batavia
Mr. Van der Bloekt	Vice Consul in Batavia
Capt. Paul Symons	Military Assistant

United States Delegation:

Mr. Henry Brandis Jr.	Special Assistant to U.S. Representative
Col. George Elliott	Military Assistant
Capt. D. McCallum, USN	Military Assistant
Col. C.C. Mollohan	Military Assistant
Lt. Col. J. Buckner	Military Assistant
J. L. Bumgardner Y2	USN Stenographer

Secretariat

Mr. C. L. Fan	
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Interpreter

Mr. Ku Kuan Hai	
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Possible Additional Passengers:

Dr. Sukandar	Former Regent of Modjokarto
Dr. Indrakumuma	Former Govt. Advisor in Modjokarto
Col. van der Wyk	Brigade C.O. - Madura

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The Chapman Statement: Lt. Chapman's statement concerning the Soerabaya incident is reproduced here as follows:

## MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Incident Involving USAF C47 9915 at Soerabaya

TO: Colonel Myers

THROUGH Lieutenant Colonel Ind

At 0700 on 15 December, 1947, USAF C47 9915 departed Kemajoran Airfield for a trip to Jogjakarta, Soerabaya and then returned to Batavia.

Upon arrival at Soerabaya, my passenger list included a team of fifteen members of the Good Offices Committee, whose destination was Soerabaya, one United States Naval Lieutenant, whose destination was Batavia, and two Indonesian representatives, who had unloaded at Jogjakarta and whose destination was also Batavia.

While my aircraft was being refueled, I was informed in a rather brusque manner by a Dutch Naval Air Force Lieutenant Commander that my two Indonesian passengers must remain inside the aircraft or be taken into immediate custody. Thereafter three armed guards took positions around the door of the aircraft.

My aircraft was on the ground approximately forty-five minutes, during which time the Indonesian passengers were forced to remain inside - a rather uncomfortable experience due to the extreme heat of the passenger compartment.

Upon departure, an outgoing clearance was very courteously made up for me by the enlisted personnel in the Perak Field Operations Office. Taking their work for granted I signed the clearance without checking it, an error on my part, and boarded the airplane preparatory to departure.

Upon requesting the customary taxi and takeoff instructions from the control tower via radio, I was told to shut off my engines and report to operations. I requested the reason for the delay, informing the tower that I had a valid clearance signed by the Base Operations Officer. Once more I was told to shut off my engines and report to Base Operations, no reason being given.

As I left the aircraft a fire truck was driven directly in front of it and was parked as a blockade to prevent the plane from being taxied. There had been no intention on our part to taxi the airplane without the permission of the tower to do so.

At Base Operations I was told in a very discourteous manner, by the same Dutch Naval Air Force Lieutenant Commander, that my clearance was incorrect. I checked the clearance and found that the Dutch Enlisted Personnel, in making it up, had failed to list my three passengers - the U.S. Naval Lieutenant and the two Indonesian Representatives. Since I had signed the clearance I was technically responsible for the error. However, such errors occur very frequently in normal air operations, and are normally rectified via radio between the aircraft and the control tower.

The discourteous manner of the Dutch Officer was, in my opinion, quite unnecessary, and was something which I, as an officer, have not previously encountered.

I corrected the mistake by requesting my old clearance from the operations personnel (this clearance had been issued at Jogjakarta, and had been turned in to operations upon arrival at Perak Field, Soerabaya) and copying the three names they had missed onto the new form.

I requested, and received, the name of the Dutch Naval Air Force Lieutenant Commander - Lieutenant Commander Best.

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Departure was accomplished without further incident.

WILLIAM E CHAPMAN  
1ST LT USAF  
A/C USAF C47 9915

The statement was to be submitted to Dr. Graham by Col. Myers for advice and suggestions.

19, December, FridayI. The LOG

0630 hrs. : Alert.  
0716 hrs. : Take-off, C-47, Jogjakarta and Soerabaya - return Batavia.  
0900 hrs. : Meeting, "Renville", the GOC and the Dutch delegation for further study of the Linggadjati Agreement. Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal for the U.S. Military.  
1417 hrs. : Landing, Batavia, C-47, from Soerabaya with returning Madoera Field Survey Party.  
1315 hrs. : Meeting, "Renville" the GOC to receive a report from Mr. Abbey re: Dutch request for investigation of "pockets of resistance". Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon and Major Neal for the U.S.  
1930 hrs. : Reception by Premier Amir Sjarifuddin of the Republic for GOC, Advisors and political friends.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

C-47 Trip: The itinerary of the C-47 was carefully outlined as indicated in the LOG of yesterday. The trip was made in exact accordance with orders of which the pilot carried copies. With reference to the "incident" which caused embarrassment at Sourabaya airport (See LOG of yesterday) Dr. Graham upon receiving Col. Myer's report, including Lt. Chapman's statement, said that the matter must be called to the attention of high Dutch military authorities, as he had no intention of permitting either one side or the other becoming lax in their appreciations of the favors that were being granted to them by the GOC and the U.S. Military Group. It was agreed, therefore, that Col. Myers would present the pilot's statement to General Spoor for appropriate action. Col. Myers sought an appointment with the General. However, it was not to be held until a report had been received from the incoming Madoera Group, when it was believed that the whole matter of the questionnaires and the Dutch refusal to answer them might be reviewed with the General.

Morning Meeting in "Renville": This meeting comprised a review in great detail of various parts of the Linggadjati agreement. It was prefaced, however, by a significant remark by Jhr. Van Vredenburg to the effect that his delegation, while not opposed to a review of this sort, was of the opinion that it would produce nothing of value in a workable solution to the Indonesian problem in its present form. He stated that while, as he had said before, the Dutch felt obliged to carry out the "program, policy and principles" of the L.A., his government "no longer considers that the Linggadjati Agreement is binding". This statement in itself was found difficult of interpretation. The GOC decided to proceed with its "line-by-line" examination of the Agreement. At the conclusion of a long session in which the Dutch answered questions put by the GOC, one of the GOC members said in an aside: "It is beyond me to see how they can make it so complicated!" He expressed the private views of his colleagues.

Afternoon meeting: This meeting was indeterminate in its results. Essentially it was called to consider the Netherland's refusal to discuss the establishment of a truce until the GOC had investigated the existence or non-existence of the so-called "pockets of resistance". (Note: In a highly confidential private conversation one of the Indonesian staff officers well-placed

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in the Republican Army scheme admitted to Lt. Col. Dixon that these "pockets" did not now in fact exist; Dutch mopping-up activities had reduced them to the state of independent guerilla groups who had to rely on their own mobility for survival). The GOC members were unable to agree whether to investigate the "pockets". Their one point of agreement concerned the forwarding to both sides of a request that such parts of the GOC plan for implementing a truce that both sides had found agreeable be put into immediate effect. How this can be done in the face of the Dutch rejection of further discussions until the "pockets" are investigated is not clear. Mr. Critchley of Australia was of the opinion that if the committee's truce plan were to be put into effect without further complicating discussions, there would be no need to investigate "pockets" as these would disappear with the implementing of the plan (one paragraph provides for a return to their own territories of troops which have been cut off in consequence of military actions.) The meeting then dealt at some length with the question as to whether both sides had asked for an investigation. It was said by Mr. Abbey that the Republicans had not formally so requested, but they had accepted the truce plan in principle. It was feared that if pockets as such were not found to exist, the Netherlands would feel free to act with force again against roving bands. In this, the lately-returned Dr. Van Zeeland of Belgium was at odds, declaring that any interpretation of the 1 November Resolution which permitted killing to go on in any name was not to be thought of or condoned by the GOC. As stated, the meeting was adjourned on the decision to ask both sides to agree to the immediate implementation of all truce recommendations which were agreeable to both parties. The GOC was to refer the Field Survey Proposal to GOC sub-committees for study.

C-47 Shuttle Service: One other point, not connected with the basic discussion was considered by this meeting. It was a request by the Republicans that a shuttle service between Batavia and Jogjakarta be established on a twice-a-week basis, beginning Monday, 22 December. Since the Australian plane still is absent in Australia, the service would have to be carried on by the American plane. (Note: This later was agreed to by Col. Myers.) The plane appears to be in good flying condition since the engine change but will require several new instruments soon. Radio inquiries to Clark Field for instructions reference the disposal of the old engine and compensation to KLM for the new one have no brought any answer.

Madura Party's Return: Formal reports by the personnel of the Madura Field Survey Party are being prepared. The comprehensive report will be submitted to the GOC by Mr. Brandis, the GOC representative. However, the U. S. Military Group will make its own to Col. Myers. Early interviews with U. S. members brought out that:

- a. there had been Republican soldiers in the eastern area of Madura on 10 November, just prior to the last Dutch push (See LOG, 10 November) and that they are no longer contactable, apparently having been driven off the island.
- b. the Field Survey Party arrived several weeks after the Dutch had taken over; the population either now was amenable to the Dutch, or would not talk.
- c. some local officials, distressed and discouraged by the severity of the medical problem and the shortage of clothing, had in fact asked the Dutch to come in and take over.
- d. the public health and welfare situation has improved slightly since the Dutch took over, but the textile situation is shockingly deficient.

20 December, SaturdayI. The LOG

- 0700 hrs. : Alert.  
 1100 hrs. : Meeting: GOC Representatives and Senior Military Advisors concerning the possibility of field survey parties as requested by the Dutch to investigate "pockets of resistance".  
 Afternoon : Informal visits and preparation of reports.



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Morning Meeting: After listening to GOC sub-committee representatives discuss for some time the matter of the Dutch request for military teams to investigate the existence of "pockets", without being able to agree among themselves as to (a) the advisability of the undertaking in the first place, (b) its real purposes, or (c) the manner of conducting it should such a program be adopted, Col. Myers thought it best to withdraw until such time as the group had agreed upon a recommendation of political policy for the main GOC body's consideration. He therefore excused himself, saying that he would be on call for advice on the military aspects if wanted. In informal conversation with Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Ind said that the Dutch request had highly paradoxical angles: the Dutch were in effect asking for expert observers to report on the thoroughness with which the Dutch forces had liquidated Republican military forces since the Cease Fire order of the Security Council had called upon both sides to stop all military activities of a hostile nature. Col. Myers replied that it was merely another indication of the fact that so much emphasis was being placed on talks concerning details and conditions that all sight appeared to have been lost of the simple fundamentals called for in the Cease Fire orders of 4 August and 1 November.

Dr. Beel's Broadcasts: The Dutch Prime Minister continues to make speeches and broadcasts in which he frankly departs from the previously announced "business" aspects of his trip and goes into the heart of the political picture. In fact, his speeches now take on an ominous tone. He warns the Indonesians that his talk is in fact a "last appeal" to them to renounce thoughts of violence in connection with political strivings. He adds that he is sure that wise Indonesians will no longer find it advisable to follow false political prophets of the "irresponsible" kind in Jogjakarta. He does not specify what action the Dutch will take against those who may not agree with the Dutch view on the matter, but leaves no doubt in the imagination; they do not intend to be hindered by outside parties.

Republican Protests: The Republican government has officially protested to the Security Council that the Dutch consolidation of the West Sumatra and East Borneo separatist movements while the substantive talks for an over-all settlement are in progress on the "Renville". That the Dutch are continuing at an accelerated pace to form political entities throughout the NEI without reference to the Republican government has been reported previously in the LOG (see 17, December). The pattern is clear to observers here and the political activity has steadily mounted. The Dutch maintain, of course, that this all is within the framework of the Linggadjati Agreement and that they are morally bound to implement its clauses (while at the same time reminding the GOC that they do not consider the LA "binding". -- See "Morning Meeting", LOG, 19 December.)

Netherlands Memorandum: Late in the day it was learned that the Dutch had sent to the GOC a very important "Memorandum". The exact contents were not known generally, but it was officially understood that among other points, the Dutch would insist that for all discussion purposes in the future concerning a possible "truce" plan, the line of demarcation would have to be exactly that of the Van Mook Line established late in August, nearly three weeks after the Cease Fire Order. Thus the Dutch have adhered to their original plans in nearly all respects. Informal visits with Republicans repeatedly have indicated that Jogjakarta could not accept the Van Mook Line now any more than it ever has been able to accept it.

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21 December, Sunday.

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.  
Morning : Informal meetings and preparation of Madura and main Log reports.  
Afternoon : Recreation.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION:

General Statement: From informal conversations held with various members of the GOC and the other military advisers, it is apparent that the situation here has reached something of an impasse' owing principally to the Dutch "ultimatum" issued by Jhr. van Vredenburg 18 December. (See LOG for details; he said (a) the NEI government was not willing to carry discussions further without a GOC investigation to determine the existence of "pockets of resistance, and (b) the Dutch would decline to consider withdrawal of troops from any Van Mock Line area as long as the present Republican government was in power). Several meetings scheduled for hearing by the GOC main body are undergoing postponement or cancellation. Unofficial statements blame the complexity of questions now before the Committee as the reason for the rejection of further questions. It is the concensus among the adviser and observer groups that a fundamental statement of policy will have to be forthcoming from the GOC before specific considerations can be entertained again.

C-47 Shuttle Service: The passenger manifest for the first of the shuttle flights between Batavia and Jogjakarta requested of Col. Myers by the GOC will occur 22 December. An indorsement accompanies each manifest indicating that no changes therein are authorized; thus the plane crew is protected against pressures being brought by either side for extemporaneous arrangements. The manifest is as follows:

1 From BATAVIA to DJOKJAKARTA:

- a Mr. MOH NATSIR.....Deputy member Indon Del
- b Dr. HARMANI.....Advisor Indon Del
- c Mr. ATING.....Advisor Indon Del
- d WILLIAMS.....ETM 2nd class (RENVILLE)

2 From DJOKJAKARTA to BATAVIA:

- a Dr. DJUANDA.....Deputy member Indon Del
- b Dr. SUKIMAN.....Chairman Masjceemi party
- c Dr. HALIM.....Advisor Indon Del
- d Dr. KUSUMAATMADJA.....Advisor Indon Del
- e Mr. MARDJAN.....Advisor Indon Del
- f Mr. MARAMIS.....Secr Indon Del
- g Dr. SUNARIO.....Secr Indon Del
- h Dr. PRINGGODIGDO.....Advisor Indon Del
- i Major HARJONO,,,,,,Member Indon Spec Comm
- j HOUGH.....Seaman 1st class (RENVILLE)

22 December, Monday:

I. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.  
0655 hrs. : Take-off, C-47 for Jogjakarta.  
0900 hrs. : Conference, Gen. Speer and Col. Myers. This meeting was asked for in the hopes that Col. Myers would be able to sound Gen. Speer on his (a) private convictions on the whole picture, (b) reactions to recent events, (c) reactions to political pressures, and (d) any other point that might assist the GOC in its difficult problem. This meeting lasted most of the morning.

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Afternoon : Informal meetings aboard the "Renville" and a meeting at 1500 hours of the Madura Field Survey Party to consider reports.

Evening : Reception at the Palace for Prime Minister Beel and other ranking Dutch political figures. Col. Myers and Lt. Col. Dixon.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION.

Spoor Meeting: It was hoped that in this confidential meeting between Gen. Spoor and Col. Myers, it would be possible to break down formal military barriers and achieve a close understanding based largely on the friendship between the two men. In fact, it was Gen. Spoor's own request that the meeting be completely frank and man-to-man. It is believed that this was achieved. The General reviewed his troublesome role of bringing effective organization out of a raw army in a strange and chaotic land, particularly when he was confronted with many professional jealousies among his brother officers over whose heads he had been rapidly promoted. However, he reiterated that he believed a reasonable degree of success had been achieved and that his troops were not only well disciplined but imbued with the spirit of being helpful in the Indies and not productive of trouble with the Indonesian population. He therefore had to reject Republican claims of bad behavior and even atrocities committed by his soldiers.

The General said that it had been his firm hope, and still was, that Holland and the United States would join hands in a workable plan. This plan, he emphasized would have to be based on the all-important realization that independence for Indonesia was an absolute inevitability. He stressed, however, that this could not be accomplished with as much speed as some elements in Jogjakarta considered possible and necessary, because the Indonesians were not capable of assuming political responsibilities of the crushing proportions that would accrue to any organization attempting to guide Indonesia. It was his firm conviction, expressed forcefully to Col. Myers, that such a state would come about under Dutch sponsorship, instruction and responsibility, but not so long as irresponsible elements were tolerated and even groomed in Jogjakarta. The Dutch had assumed responsibility for law and order, and were morally and legally bound to discharge this responsibility, he said.

The General traced with expressions of regret the results of the activities of international groups sent to Indonesia to make surveys and find solutions. He disregarded most of these efforts as being largely lip service, stating flatly that most delegates were more interested in personal accommodations, pleasure, golf, and parties than in application to serious work or any attempt to get into the field under rough conditions to determine the actual picture. He said the Dutch had been quite disillusioned by these superficial attitudes and activities, even including most members of the lately constituted Consular Commission. He asserted, however, that the attitude, interest, and activity of the U.S. Military group was a reassuring exception. He regretted, however, the late appearance of the U.S. Group here.

Speaking with great candor, Gen. Spoor recalled to Col. Myers his disagreements with Dutch political leaders during the war years in Australia, he had particular reference to Dr. van Mook. He said there was unity, cohesion, and cooperation between himself and the Lieutenant Governor General now, despite the fact that the political leaders had not seen fit to adopt--up to this time at least--Gen. Spoor's own plan for the political, social, educational and economic rehabilitation of Indonesia. In this connection, he said he would provide Col. Myers with an English translation of the plan he had drawn up. He reminded Col. Myers that of course as a military man he would carry out the policies of the justly constituted political authorities regardless of his plans or, for that matter, his convictions.

The General declared that his personal desire was to see the emergence of a real democratic plan under Dutch sponsorship, concurred in by the United States government and put into effect with U/S. approval at the earliest possible time. Privately it was his ambition to be selected by the Netherlands government for assignment to Washington as the Dutch Military representative to assist in the implementation of such a plan as assistance might be required, but in any event to be assigned to Washington for duty, especially with G-2.

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Madura Field Party Meeting: In cooperative effort, the U.S. members of the Madura Field Survey Party worked up reports for submission (a) to Mr. Brandis if desired (b) to Col. Myers. The former were to be ready for the meeting at 1500 hours this date aboard "Renville". The latter would be briefed for the LOG, and then would be incorporated in full in personal reports to be submitted at the conclusion of the Mission's work here. After consulting both the U.S. and Australian observers, Br. Brandis had drawn up what he believed to be a representative report for the consideration of the Field Survey Party with the intention of seeking approval for its submission to the GOC as the official opinion of the Survey Group. According to Mr. Brandis this report had been typed only half an hour before the meeting at 1500 hours. As it happened, he later explained, he encountered the Australian delegation just before the meeting, and gave them a copy. It was thus that the Australians came to the conference table with copies in their hands. The Belgians, in contrast, received their copy at the table. Almost at once Mr. van der Strichlen, Belgian Consul General, objected, declaring that he had not been afforded an opportunity to study the report, but adding that it was plain to him that he would be unable to agree with it in any event. Mr. Brandis immediately agreed that he should have time to make a study. The Belgian added quite frankly that he was sympathetic with the Dutch move in Madura on the basis that the population had desperately needed assistance and now were getting it. It was hoped, Mr. Brandis said, that a unanimous report would be possible, but if not, then the Belgian group was free, of course, to submit a minority report. That this would be the Belgian course, there seemed to be little doubt. The Brandis report, which has full approval of Col. Elliott and Col. Mollohan and Lt. Col. Buckner follows:

"1. From the Memorandum to the Netherlands Delegation on the Development of the Military Situation in Madura since 4th August 1947, submitted by the Netherlands Delegation to the Committee of Good Offices on December 1947, the following facts appear:

- a. At midnight August 4th, Netherlands forces "had occupied" three towns: Bangkalan, Pamekasan, and Tjamplong.
  - b. By a series of moves, culminating with the occupation of Pakong in early October, Netherlands forces "brought the Regencies of Bangkalan and Pamekasan of the Residence of Madocera completely under Netherlands control."
  - c. In November "it was decided.....to quell for good the center of resistance in Soemenep and also to bring the rest of the island under Netherlands control."
  - d. Between November 9th and December 1st this decision was carried into effect.
2. It is apparent from these statements of the Netherlands Delegation:
- a. That the decision carried into effect in November involved an extension of Netherlands control.
  - b. That it also involved hostile action, since it involved quelling a centre of resistance.
3. The facts found by the Observation Team sent to Madura by the Committee of Good Offices support the conclusions stated in paragraph 2. The Team finds that, while no serious fighting occurred in connection with the Dutch advance from Pamekasan to Soemenep, there was some military opposition to the advance: (1) by sniper activity; (2) by destruction of bridges; (3) by digging of anti-tank ditches; and (4) by destruction or attempted destruction of buildings believed to be of possible use to the Dutch forces.
4. Note is taken of the fact that the Memorandum of the Netherlands Delegation states: "The area--as subsequently described in the announcement by the Lieutenant Governor-General on 29th August 1947--was declared to be Netherlands occupied territory, but with the reservation that the areas outside it were to be patrolled by Netherlands forces in the event that any activity whatsoever should be developed from that area on the part of the Republicans, with the object of impeding the restoration of order, law and security and/or endangering the safety of the Netherlands posts."

However, as indicated above, the remainder of the Memorandum clearly indicates that Sumenep Regency was not, on November 9th, under control of the

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Netherlands forces. Further, the Observation Team finds as facts that, on November 9th there was a functioning Republican civil administration in the Regency of Sumenep, that there were organized units of the Republican Army in the Regence, and that until November 9th the Sumenep Regency was under the control of the Republic of Indonesia.

5. It follows from the above that, beginning on November 9th, Netherlands forces, by hostile action, extended their control over territory not occupied by such forces on August 4th. Therefore, within the meaning of the Security Council's Resolution of November 1, the Netherlands occupation of Sumenep Regency was inconsistent with the Security Council's Resolution of August 1.

6. The reasons assigned by the Netherlands Memorandum for the decision to take control of Sumenep Regency are as follows:

- a. "Positive reports....concerning extensive preparations for the destruction of objects of vital economic importance to the whole of Indonesia (a salt-block plant) and salt stocks in the district of Soemenep, which, if carried into effect, would seriously endanger the salt position of the whole population."
- b. "In order to put an end to further Republican attempts effectively to impede the restoration of law, order and security," with a specific reference being made to attacks upon Pamekasan being directed from Sumenep.
- c. "At the earnest request of the population and its leaders."

7. With reference to the fear of destruction of the salt-block plant, the Observation Team finds:

- a. That the plant was, in fact, prepared for destruction.
- b. That no evidence whatever was obtained that Republican forces in Madura destroyed any property of importance, other than bridges, prior to the time Dutch forces actually moved upon the area in which the property was located. There was virtually unanimous agreement among the numerous people questioned about this that destruction was not resorted to until the Dutch were moving in.
- c. Dutch officers stated that the Dutch had counter-agents stationed in the salt-block plant who could have prevented its destruction.
- d. In fact no actual effort was made to destroy the plant, despite the preparations.

8. With reference to putting an end to attempts to impede restoration of law and order, the Observation Team finds:

- a. That there is little evidence of serious disorder in Republican territory in Madura prior to the beginning of the police action.
- b. That, while there were undoubtedly instances of lawlessness, murder and robbery in Republican territory following the beginning of the police action: (1) to some extent these are attributable to the severe strain thrown upon the Republican administration by the police action itself; and (2) there is still little evidence of serious disorder, even then, in zones removed from the areas of contact between the opposing troops.
- c. If there were continuing attacks upon Dutch troops, these must be considered in the light of the showing in the Netherlands Memorandum that, between August 4th and early October, Netherlands control was extended from three towns to the entire Regencies of Bangkalan and Pamekasan.

9. With reference to the requests made by the population and its leaders, the Observation Team received no first-hand evidence that any official under the Republican Government or any recognized leader of the people requested the Dutch to occupy Sumenep Regency. Only one witness interviewed stated that he had made a request--a merchant who made his request in May 1946, before the Dutch had occupied any part of Madura. This must be taken in the light of the fact that the Observation Team expressly requested of a Dutch Liaison Officer accompanying it in Sumenep, that witnesses to substantiate the making of such requests be produced.

10. With reference to the situation as to clothing and food in Sumenep Regency under the Republican administration, the Observation Team finds:

- a. The shortage of textiles was extremely acute.

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- b. The shortage of food was serious, though there was no evidence of actual deaths from starvation. Had the food shortage continued for any great length of time, serious consequences for the population might have ensued.
- c. The basic cause of the food shortage is the fact that Madura is dependent upon East Java to supply its food deficit. The Republic's inability to maintain the necessary supply was undoubtedly due in part to its own internal difficulties of administration and transport. However, in recent months, it was also due in part to the disruptive influence of the police action, both in Madura and Java.
- d. It seems very doubtful that the textile and food situation, taken alone, would justify military occupation of an area in which there was a functioning Republican administration. Since on November 9th the Committee of Good Offices was already in Batavia, it seems that the situation might have been brought to the attention of the Committee in the hope that the parties, with the assistance of the Committee, might have worked out non-military measures for relief of the population."

G-47 Trip: The American plane made the round-trip without incident. However, it now is disclosed that at least two instruments on the aircraft are becoming faulty, namely, the gyro compass and the bank and turn indicator. A message has been dispatched to CG 13th Air Force, Clark Field, attention A-3 reporting this matter and requesting immediate forwarding via KLM of the two pieces. They are not available here.

GOC Developments: There is every indication that the GOC will make strenuous efforts to break the deadlock that has developed. A report is due to Security Council soon. It is believed the GOC will press energetically for a truce agreement before the end of the year.

23 December, Tuesday:

I. The LOG.

0700 hrs. : Alert.  
 Morning : Informal conference and preparation of reports.  
 Afternoon : Same.

III. NARRATIVE SECTION

Krawang Incident: An occurrence that may develop into an embarrassment for the Dutch has made its appearance in the public press. Announced from Jogjakarta was a statement to the effect that some 300 civilians had been killed and 200 others wounded when the Dutch took action in the Krawang area about 40 miles from Batavia. The incident, said the Republicans, occurred early in December in a series of violent offensives by the Dutch. The details were gory enough to suit the sensational press, and radiocasters in several countries picked it up, including India and Australia. Today the Dutch published a statement declaring that the action had been taken against "Republican gangs" which they alleged had been terrorizing the neighborhood with increasing violence until 9 December, when the Dutch began clean-up actions. The Dutch official statement said that of these "gangs" a total of "a hundred and fifty of them were liquidated." The Dutch say that the population has rejoiced in the Dutch action. The Dutch claim not to have destroyed any property except when such property might have obstructed a lane of fire.

General Situation: The GOC is stymied at the moment, largely because of the Dutch "ultimatums." However, the GOC is holding closed meetings repeatedly and it is possible that there will be action immediately after Christmas.

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0600 hrs. : Alert.  
 0711 hrs. : Take off, C-47 for Jogjakarta with full load.  
 1200 hrs. : Special meeting, informal, GOC and advisors to consider a draft of a truce plan. Col. Myers, Lt. Colonels Ind and Dixon for the U.S. Military Group. Meeting lasted until 1350 hrs.  
 1230 hrs. : C-47 returned from Jogjakarta (4 passengers).

II. NARRATIVE SECTION:

GOC Meeting: This meeting was surprise to the Military Assistants, and to many others associated in advisory capacities. It was called to consider the draft of a document intended for presentation to the two contending parties at the earliest possible moment. The draft of this document had been drawn up by the Australian delegation, basically, but it was obvious that both the Belgian and American delegates knew of the contents and in general were in agreement.

Col. Myers was presented with a copy of the draft upon his arrival at the meeting, called for 1200 hours. He at once pointed out that without a moment to study the paper, he could be of very limited assistance in offering suggestions, should they be asked of him. However, ~~with~~ ~~was~~ ~~clear~~ that the senior GOC members intended to push the document through with utmost haste consistent with the need for considering suggestions that might be made by Belgium.

The Military observers were amazed to note that the document was a truce plan which frankly sought to establish a line of demarcation and accompanying demilitarized zone along the Van Mook Line, or very close to it. This, in effect constituted a recognition of the Van Mook Line, which never had been accepted by the Republicans on the basis that (a) it had been a purely unilateral proclamation (b) it had been established weeks after the 4 August Cease Fire order, and had been possible only through violation of that order, specifically through the use of hostile actions against Republican forces.

Since this was a GOC meeting, even if it was informal, Col. Myers would have been out of order to have entered a protest. He considered it inadvisable, anyway, inasmuch as this was a political policy matter. He did, however, indicate to his associates that he would have a private word with Dr. Graham later.

Dr. van Zeeland, the senior GOC delegate from Belgium, argued in favor of not only using the Van Mook line as the demarcation line, but wanted the line so referred to. This, he said, would eliminate chances for confusion and pleas of ignorance.

Col. Myers was asked his opinion.

He asserted that in military practice it had been proved fallacious not once but many times to take an arbitrary line without reference to such natural terrain features as rivers and ridges, and that he most strongly advised consideration of these features in establishing such a line, while at the same time being careful not to divide peoples of similar political and administrative grouping.

The Belgian said that the demilitarized zone would be some kilometers in width, and therefore, he felt that the objection would be taken care of.

Brigadier Neylan of Australia said he would be in strictest agreement with Col. Myers if the GOC were concerned with the establishment of permanent political frontiers, but for the sake of a temporary demilitarized zone, he felt that the Belgian plan would work.

It was also said that in all likelihood, the Military Observers would be called upon to make field inspections in areas where arbitrary establishment of the line would create trouble and hardship. Col. Myers again pointed out that if the GOC were to reserve the right to adjust the line wherever it considers it necessary, it would have something of a bargaining point for use with both sides if needed.

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Dr. van Zeeland then said that he considered the agreement on the line a matter of immediate necessity, without reference to future field surveys, and Mr. Critchley of Australia agreed that this was the first step to get action; adjustments could come later, he said.

The use of the Van Mook line as the line of demarcation was accepted.

The delicate matter of the police force for the demilitarized zone then came up. Dr. vanZeeland made a speech to the effect that there was neither the personnel nor the equipment to provide an international police force over a zone extending hundreds of miles throughout the main islands and ten kilometers in width. He led carefully to his point, which was to make use of a quickly constituted civil police force to be headed by Dutch and Indonesian senior officers, these in turn to appeal to representatives of GOC on the spot in case of disagreement.

To the surprise of the military, the meeting did not settle this point-- a point on which the Linggadjati Agreement had broken down months ago. It was said that the GOC secretariat would prepare a revised draft to be ready for presentation to a general meeting of the GOC early in the evening.

Note: It later was learned that Dr. Graham's personal assistants, Scott and Ogburn, had been preparing an "American version" of this scheme, but that they had not had it ready. Accordingly, attempts were made to get this one ready for the night meeting.

Myers-Brandis: Unable to get to Dr. Graham, who had an immediate appointment, Col. Myers met briefly with Mr. Brandis late in the afternoon. He said he felt compelled to express the feelings of both himself and his associates to the effect that the new proposal would appear to be an abandonment of principles to the complete disadvantage of the side that had conceded everything so far, and to the complete advantage of the side that had practiced obstructionist tactics the whole way and had conceded absolutely nothing. Col. Myers declared that he would rather see the Americans go down in straight defeat than take action which would have all the earmarks of a surrender of principles. There was, he said, no "hold" upon the Dutch at all and that the only point in the whole thing that made any request on them was the clause asking for cessation of "separatist" political activities pending the truce.

Mr. Brandis listened sympathetically, appeared to be uneasy, and said he would communicate these expressions to the American GOC Group.

Whether in consequence of this talk, or for other reasons, the American GOC group decided not to try to present a draft that day and a meeting proposed for 1900 hours Christmas Eve was cancelled. It was learned that the American plan would call for plebecites in Sumatra, Java, and Madura.

25 December, Christmas Day.I. The LOG.

1700 hrs. : Alert.

1000 hrs.-1300 hrs. : Meeting main GOC body and Military Advisors. For the U.S. Lt. Colonels Dixon, Buckner, and Ind and Maj. Neal. Chairman, Mr. Critchley, Australia. To consider revised drafts of the GOC truce plan of the previous day.

1400 hrs. : Christmas dinner, U.S.S. "Renville."

1700 hrs. : Private meeting, Col. Myers and Col. Simatupang.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION.

GOC Main Meeting: Although it was not produced for the examination of the general assembly, the American draft of the truce plan obviously had been submitted to the principal GOC delegates prior to this meeting, and there was an evident plan to incorporate some of its ideas into the main draft which had been considered in the noon meeting of the previous day.

The determination of the GOC to railroad this matter through without obstructive comment was evident from the first moment, when the chair called for a formal vote of adoption. The affirmative vote was unanimous.



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Then, in reverse of the usual parliamentary procedure, the chairman called for sentence-by-sentence review of the document to offer delegates a chance to make suggestions for changes.

Immediately the Belgian (Dr. van Zeeland) made a lengthy, careful speech in which he suggested that in the interests of a clear understanding the Committee redraft the document to include verbatim passages from recent Dutch communications concerning the GOC's earlier suggestions for a truce. He argued that at no time had GOC officially recognized or referred to points brought up by the Dutch and that unless they did so, opportunity might be afforded the Dutch for further delaying action while these points were brought to the discussion table. Apparently it was not enough for him merely to acknowledge receipt of the communications; he wished them to be conned with the idea of adopting some of the suggestions verbatim.

Mr. Critchley opposed on the basis that communications had been received from both sides; to include only one would compromise the Committee's neutrality. He said that among other points, the Dutch had wanted to police the demilitarized zone themselves although with personnel of reduced armament to be agreed to by both sides, and this, he said would wipe out the idea of a demilitarized zone.

The Belgian delegate insisted that the Dutch only had the personnel or the equipment, and that GOC had to take a realistic view of the situation; the Republicans, he asserted, neither had the personnel nor the equipment. He wanted to see the Dutch plan adopted in toto.

Brookes of Australia said he believed the Dutch plan would have to be altered to include Republican police.

Col. Dixon was asked whether he believed it was a good idea to include the Dutch paper only, or both. He replied that he approved the reference to both.

The meeting seemed reasonably well agreed on the adoption of the truce plan in general. Annex 1 (not available at this writing) actually was an implementation section. It was, in most respects, a basic inclusion of the old Phase 1 drawn up weeks ago by the senior Military Advisors.

The meeting wanted to avoid the use of the "Van Mook Line." It was agreed that they would, instead, refer to it as a line established by proclamation of the Netherlands government 29 August.

This brought up the old question of what constituted "forward position," "occupied territory," etc. It was thought that as far as central West Java was concerned, Military Observer teams would have to be called out to establish actual points.

Again the delicate question of policing the proposed demilitarized zone came up. Lt. Col. Dixon pointed out that the idea of a joint police force "almost had worked" back in early 1947 when only the two parties were concerned; he thought it might work under GOC supervision now. Dr. Graham agreed with him, as did Mr. Critchley. The former said it was essential to possible success that all points of the police force be settled without delay, otherwise he feared another breakdown.

The Belgian delegate objected to Col. Dixon's proposal because, he said, it saddled the GOC with responsibility for police enforcement.

Mr. Critchley declared that sooner or later the GOC had to face up to that matter, and it might as well be now.

The meeting was adjourned upon notification that the secretariat would prepare the final, revised draft for informal presentation on Friday to the Dutch and Indonesians. Dr. Graham reminded all, that while the presentation would be informal, the GOC had formally, and officially adopted the document and that it now represented their views. (Note: the document, to be reproduced here as soon as the final form is available. Both parties are warned in the document that the GOC must send a full report to the Security Council before the end of the year and makes the pointed suggestion that the report be allowed to include an expression of acceptance of the GOC truce by both sides).

Myers-Graham: In an informal meeting with Dr. Graham later in the day, Col. Myers ~~expressed his eagerness to cooperate but invited attention to~~ expressed his eagerness to cooperate but invited attention to the Dutch alertness to any opportunity to pin a technicality upon the Americans or the GOC in general. Through the use of the Van Mook Line in the truce plan,

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It is frankly believed by the American Military Group that Dr. Grhaam went into action with a concentrated attack which made it plain to all that utter failure faced the GOC unless it called the Dutch bluff completely, and that a report of failure must be filed with the Security Council forthwith unless all agreed that the time had come to "get hard."

Dr. Graham pressed Col. Myers and his organization for emergency arrangements to contact the key Republican figures in Jogjakarta. This was done by 2300 hours and the U.S. Navy Beechcraft was set for a 0700 hours take-off 27 December.

The New Truce proposal complete with its own Annexes appears as Annex 11 of this report.

27 December, Saturday.

I. The LOG

0600 hrs. : Alert.

0700 hrs. : Take-off, Beechcraft, Dr. Graham and Col. Myers, for Jogjakarta.

0900 hrs. : Arrival Jogjakarata.

0930-1200 hrs. : Conferences, Republican President Soekarno, Prime Minister Sjarifuddin and others.

1230 hrs. : Take off for Batavia.

1430 hrs. : Arrival Batavia.

Afternoon and Evening : Informal conferences and preparation of reports.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION

Jogjakarta Conference: While Dr. Graham conferred with Prime Minister Sjarifuddin, President Soekarno and Col. Myers held his talk with Dr. Leimena, the chairman of the Indonesian Delegation to GOC, and with Col. Simatupang. Dr. Leimena, a highly respected Christian Gentleman of the Republic, clung to his faith that American would bring ultimate good out of the situation and said he would "go along" with the new plan regardless of some points thereina that he considered hard for the Republic to accept. He stated that he would battle hard to bring people in line. The Army man, Simatupang, was frankly pessimistic and was fearful that the Dutch would find a pretext for resorting to renewed force within six weeks. He said if this could be prevented he would feel differently. President Soekarno and Amir Sjariffuddin expressed themselves as being willing to make the try, but all strongly emphasized that their faith was conditioned upon the moral backing if not actual supervision of the United States. Dr. Graham was careful to explain that he had no right or authority to commit the United States, but that he knew that America was morally back of this agreement and that the United Nations organization would back it to the limit once it was signed. With these assurances, but with added pleas for United States participation in the ultimate supervision of the implementation, the Indonesian leaders said they were prepared to sign when called upon.

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he pointed out that the GOC was in effect giving official recognition to a unilateral line established by force after the UN Cease Fire order of 4 August. Dr. Graham said that he recognized that fact but was confident that the main principles for which we were in unity fighting for were preserved in this comprehensive plan.

26 December, Friday:

I. The LOG

0700 hrs. : Alert.

1025 hrs. : Meeting formal, GOC, to consider a report to the Security Council and other matters, including Col. Myers' report on Gen. Spoor's reaction to the questionnaires put to the Dutch re the Madura Field Survey Party. Col. Myers, Lt. Col. Dixon and Maj. Neal.

Afternoon : Submission of Madura Field Party Personal reports to Col. Myers (American reports).

Evening : Series of meetings, Dr. Graham and Col. Myers and members of his Group to make emergency arrangements for a trip to Jogjakarta to contact key Republican personnel and to be of other assistance in the release of the new plan for the consideration of the parties and to the press.

II. NARRATIVE SECTION.

Morning Meeting: Mr. Critchley of Australia was chairman of the meeting. It was called to enable the GOC to deal with a number of matters that had been held up while GOC groups were drafting the new truce proposals. It was also made known that a final draft would be forthcoming at once and that it would contain an additional annex of vital importance. The reaction of the parties to this would constitute the theme of a report to the Security Council. It was decided that the report to the S. C. would have to await this reaction.

At this time it was decided that the Military Observers would be asked to investigate alleged atrocities committed by both sides, one in the Krawang area near Batavia, and the other in the Bandjoeas area in Central Java. Col. Myers agreed to do this but asked (1) for a written GOC directive (2) freedom to ask questions with a reasonable assurance that the parties would cooperate in giving answers (3) a reduction in the size of the parties as compared to the cumbersome Madura group.. It was so agreed. by GOC.

At this time Col. Myers reported on the unproductive questionnaires reference the Madura expedition and said that a written directive ought to eliminate some of this trouble.

Dr. Graham then reported on the "incident" involving the C-47 at Sourabaya airport (See LOG 18 December). He absolved the American crew completely and reminded the assembly that the U.S. plane had been offered only to save the Dutch the necessity for furnishing air transport at a time when they were hard pressed.

Madura Field Party Reports: The personal reports of the American personnel making the Madura Field Survey are included in this report as Annex 1 and Annex II.

New GOC Truce Plan: The early evening and night meetings in which Dr. Graham and Col. Myers were closely concerned followed disclosure of a new GOC Truce plan which surprised observers with its seeming reversal of front. As a matter of fact, this document made adamant demands upon the Dutch in contrast to the earlier drafts reported in the Log for 24 and 25 December. Among other key points, the new plan called for wholesale retirements by the Dutch to the positions of 20 July, 1947, within 90 days after the plan is signed. The document calls for return to Indonesian control of civil administration in areas which have been taken over by the Dutch recently, and for plebiscites and for supervision in the interim by United Nations.

It was stated to Col. Myers by Dr. Graham that not only had Dr. van Zeeland of Belgium and his associates agreed to the new plan, but emphasized that they would back it to the limit and without thought of compromise. The Australians staged that their attitude was clear and they, too, meant no deviation.

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By CJ NARA Date 11/25/11

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THE LOG

14 DEC.- 27 DEC.

MAIN ANNEX

I

(Madura Reports)

A. Col. ELLIOTT

B. Lt. Col. BUCKNER