

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO #234

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C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO.

INTERROGATION NO. 443

PLACE: Tokyo (Meiji Bldg.)

DATE: 21 Nov. 1945

DIVISION OF ORIGIN: Morale

SUBJECT: Radio Monitoring and Popular Morale.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Mr. Sukehide Kabayama, Publicity Bureau of the Foreign
Office in charge of Radio Monitoring (short wave).

Where interviewed: Room 748, Meiji Bldg.

Interrogator: D. B. Truman

Interpreter: None required.

Allied Officers Present:-----

SUMMARY:

1. Short-wave monitoring of English language quite complete. Some Japanese shows from U. S. covered. Operating difficulties.
2. Reporting service rather than analysis, although latter unsuccessfully proposed, Files in G. H. Q.
3. Use of reports by Navy, Army, Board of Information, Justice Ministry, Home Ministry, Finance Ministry.
4. Army and Navy monitoring systems less extensive.
5. Changes in popular morale during the war.
6. Propaganda errors by the government.
7. Changes in morale among government officials.
8. Problems of the present government.
9. Personal experiences in the raids.

Distant relative of Count Kabayama. Law course at Tokyo Imperial University, completed 1933. Post-graduate study in international law 1933-35. Entered Foreign Service 1935. England 1935-38, including one year at Birmingham for study. April 1938-1940 in Rome. Tokyo, summer 1940 to date. Mr. Kabayama organized the first monitoring work in the Foreign Office in 1940 and has remained with it. Shortly he will assume other duties, as the monitoring work will be turned over to a private enterprise. An intelligent, cooperative respondent, who feels his "duty", as he puts it, is to answer our questions with frankness. He speaks good English.

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Mr. Sukehide Kabayama was interviewed by Mr. David Truman in the conference room of the Meiji Building on 21 November, 1945, at 1400 hours. (T. means Truman and K. means Mr. Kabayama).

T. You were in charge of the radio monitoring service?

K. That is right.

T. Did you start right in with the radio monitoring, or was that something that developed later?

K. A friend of mine and I started the work in 1940. We started on a very small scale, but gradually it grew up.

T. I understand that you had quite an elaborate set up?

K. We had all sorts of difficulties. During the war I was more or less concentrated by effort in monitoring work. I was kind of an advisor to the Chief of the Information Section.

T. I wonder if it wouldn't be interesting to talk about the monitoring service. I worked in the American monitoring service for a year; I know something of that angle but I would be interested to have you just tell us about how you had it set up, how it worked, and what you did?

K. It is a long story. We started the work in the middle of 1940, and, of course, didn't expect the coming of war at that time. It goes back to 1926 and 1927 when I was a student. I was an amateur radioman and found it very interesting. While in Europe I had a shortwave radio set with me and tried to get American stations and also Japanese stations. I came to the conclusion that it was the quickest means of getting information. Much quicker than newspapers by 12 to 24 hours. Thought it was good for collection of information in the foreign office. I gave that advice to the Chief of the information Department, Mr. Suma. He is now a Japanese Ambassador in Madrid. The problem was the receiving set and people who would be able to tackle this difficult job. There were no experienced men in Japan and we decided to train them to begin with. A friend of mine, born in Japan but who spent most of his time in the United States was consulted with and said he would take the job. He became the centre of this organization and decided to get as many American born Japanese, so-called second generation, the number went up to between 40 and 50 monitors.

T. Did that man who did your training for you stay with you through the war?

K. Oh yes, he is still here.

T. His name?

K. His name is Toshikatsu Hodaira. We concentrated on getting English news. We thought it was the quickest.

T. The English news from the United States?

K. No, from everywhere.

T. How wide a coverage did you have?

K. The radio stations we used to get almost everyday was San Francisco, Chungking, Australia, London, Ankara, etc.

T. Limited it to the English Language?

K. Well, we started the Japanese later. Just during the training of people. We found the broadcasts in Japanese language were translations from the English news.

T. Did you attempt to take down the Japanese?

K. We did some of them.

- T. What kind of reception difficulty did you have? Was the reception a serious problem?
- K. We started our work in the compound of the Foreign Office, a place burned out during the war. In the central part of Tokyo the local disturbances were so bad we missed at least one or two important broadcasts everyday. We anticipated the coming of the bombings and decided to move it out to the suburb and the reception was greatly improved. We were able to put up longer antennas and they helped us a great deal.
- T. Did you monitor the broadcasts from Saipan?
- K. Yes, we did.
- T. You mean the medium range?
- K. No, we were not able to. Started jamming it. In and around Tokyo impossible to listen to that. They say in some parts of Japan they were able to get Saipan on medium wave.
- T. What agency was responsible for the jamming of that?
- K. The Department of Communication, they were responsible for it.
- T. Did they also control your output, your broadcasts?
- K. The outgoing broadcasts, yes. As to the propaganda policy and the contents of the broadcast, the cabinet board of information.
- T. I wonder if you can tell me whom I might talk to over there that had something to do with contents of the broadcasts going out? The spokesman of the Japanese Government of the Board of Information.
- K. That post was occupied by Mr. Igushi. At present he is Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Liaisons Office.
- T. Did you have anything to do with domestic transmission of the Radio Tokyo?
- K. No, I don't think so. We were from the Foreign Office and worked on over-seas broadcasts.
- T. I wonder if you have any suggestions about whom I might talk to in connection with domestic broadcasts.
- K. At present that bureau has been dissolved. It was handled by the second section of the Board of Information. The third section was for handling the over-seas affairs. The second section handled the domestic home affairs.
- T. Did you have many technical difficulties?
- K. There were many technical difficulties but we were able to get enough repairs and spare parts for our work and there was not any serious technical difficulties.
- T. Did the persons who monitored the broadcast, do the transcribing?
- K. Yes, that is right.
- T. Was your service primarily a reporting service?
- K. Yes, a reporting service. Just supplied the information.
- T. Did you do anything in the way of analysis, such as attempting to analyze the purpose of the broadcasts?
- K. That is the thing we suggested, but as far as I know nobody did it in a serious way. In listening to the foreign broadcasts we felt the necessity of that kind of organization and so we made some sample copies and suggested to the foreign office that the work should be done by somebody, but it was not done.

- T. I don't suppose you have a sample copy?
K. I am afraid not.
- T. Can you tell me what happened to the material after it was taken from the air and transcribed and put in report form?
K. During the first period to the end of last year the monitor just typed them out on stencil paper and had them printed and they were distributed. We found it very difficult because the amount became so great and the consumption of paper and everything became so great. Also complaints came from the readers as it was very difficult to find out the subjects or the things they wanted to know. We trained some people for editing. They started editing this year, and the volume of work was reduced by one third.
- T. Could you make copies of both the early type and the later type of report available to us?
K. Yes, of course. We had to talk with Lt. Col. Bartlett. He is in CIC at the Dai Ichi Building. It was about one month ago and I think I gave all my material and files to him, from 1941 to the end of the war.
- T. What sort of training was given to the people who were editing the broadcasts? What were they supposed to do?
K. There wasn't any training schools or that kind of thing, but we selected a few senior monitors that had the longest experience and for one or two months taught them what kind of things were most important subjects or items. Such as the conflict between the central government and the communists in China, the Russian attitude toward the United States and all that kind of thing. We trained them so that they would promptly pick up the most important subjects from the international point of view.
- T. Did you give them any week by week or day by day written statements for the things to look for currently?
K. Yes, we did do that, and also weekly instructions and asked them to bring us sample copies.
- T. Does Col. Bartlett have the instructions?
K. No, not the instructions. They were just written on a piece of paper, they were not permanent.
- T. How was your material used?
K. We got about, it varies, I think on the average about 60-80 copies, and about one-half were used in Foreign Office another one-half distributed to several places. I gave the list to Col. Bartlett. Twelve, or, well around one dozen were distributed to the ministries of the Navy and Army, and the Board of Information, Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Finance. Several of the higher officials were allowed to have personal copies.
- T. I wonder, would you have any way of knowing what was done with this material after it reached these places? Say for instance, the Board of Information?
K. They used it as a source of material for newspapers. They were not allowed to listen. Of course they intercepted morse code messages. Domei did that, but the shortwave was quicker than morse code. Supplied the information to the newspapers. I think they were used by the commentators on broadcasts, also.

- T. Both for shortwave transmission and domestic?
K. Yes.
- T. Did the Army and Navy use the material?
K. I think they were also running their propaganda bureau. Japanese domestic and foreign broadcasts.
- T. Did the Army and Navy use Radio Tokyo facilities for broadcasting?
K. Yes, they had at certain times.
- T. I remember we used to have military spokesmen we used to listen to which seemed to be under Army control and sometimes it was quite different from the civilian commentators?
K. The Army used the zero hour, Tokyo Rose.
- T. Did the Navy also have it's own?
K. No, not any special time, but from time to time sent certain commentators or some specialists for overseas broadcasts. I think they used to broadcast once or twice a week.
- T. Somewhat like the Army?
K. Yes, only not so effective.
- T. How was it used in the Home Affairs Ministry?
K. Used it for secret information to the head of prefectural governors.
- T. What did the governors do with them?
K. They used it to trace source of rumors. The Japanese version and American version varied quite a lot. In that kind of circumstances if the police got some rumor which was on the same line as American propaganda, they could detect the source must have come from shortwave. Black listening. In that sort of case they knew the information was coming from American stations.
- T. I am very much interested in that. The version of the American broadcast verbatim. Was it the exact American broadcast, or was it in general the trend?
K. It was just the general trend.
- T. Was it very full?
K. I don't know.
- T. I wonder what measures, if any, they took to make sure that the people, the ones that handled the documents, would read the right hand column rather than the left? Any tendency to believe that the American version was more accurate than the Japanese version?
K. I think the battle of Saipan in the summer of last year, I think most of the Japanese who were only listening to the Japanese version believed in the Japanese propaganda. But after Saipan, they began to feel suspicious in what the Government in general said. Gradually the government and also the military lost their prestige.
- T. I wonder if the availability of these two various documents in the hands of the local police had anything to do with that?
K. That I don't know. I think the attitude of the general people was, until the end of 1943, about that time, the people, if we tell them the fact is such and such, for instance, if we tell them that Germany was beaten

or the Japanese Navy reduced to such and such, the people would simply laugh.

T. You mean that that kind of statement was disbelieved here among the people?

K. Among the ordinary people.

T. Was there any consideration given to giving the information more accurately?

K. I didn't mean that. Going back to the question if a policeman gets these two sets of information he would be just an ordinary people. He wouldn't believe American propaganda but through that propaganda could catch a few rumor mongers.

T. What did he do after Saipan, as a member of the ordinary people he must have become suspicious?

K. After Saipan that kind of material would have, it must have helped to lose confidence in this war and also it must have helped the morale go down. That is why the Japanese government was very anxious for Japanese not to listen to broadcasts.

T. It was listened to I gather?

K. Oh yes.

T. Was yours the only governmental monitoring operations? Were there others?

K. As a matter of fact the Navy and Army had small units. Any information they received was rather inaccurate.

T. Did they attempt verbatim transcriptions?

K. No, just notes. They were just interested in military affairs not foreign affairs, economic or propaganda. I suppose they had that kind of monitoring or listening posts in order to train the crews they sent out to the front to Singapore, Phillipines, Saipan, for Army and Navy on board certain ships. A training division.

T. Was it used? Did the Army and Navy use your information?

K. Yes, mostly.

T. Was it again strictly military news they were interested in, from you?

K. We gave them a print of it. They were not interested in general affairs, only in military affairs.

T. The Domei operation was just in code?

K. Yes, that is what I understand.

T. Any other thing that would be interesting to us?

K. (long silence)

T. What were the obstacles that you mentioned to establishment of a systematic analysis?

K. Well, perhaps we haven't got the right person with a good understanding of that kind of thing. For analysis and for digesting of that kind of thing. I think we need a man with talent, a man with a 6th sense, so to say. I must confess that that kind of people,--as you know the Board of Information was established in 1940, 1½ years before war. You understand the operation of the establishing of that board was encouraged by the Army. It was the Army's intention to establish that special board and give strict instructions to the press and radio so they would be able to carry on military news movement in Japan and finally bring them to war. Of course it was based on the totalitarian idea. Of course the foreign office was reluctant to it. When the board was established and the foreign office was asked to send out the people to work there

the foreign office did not send out the first class men. That is my interpretation, so the people who worked in the Board of Information during the war were second or third class people who hadn't had the experience in propaganda information working the foreign office. Some were just beginners. They had to learn the character to their work to begin with, what should be done and what not. They hadn't the time to step forward and build up something, on it. After 1½ years they were dismissed and other new people come in.

- T. Were there frequent changes of personnel?
- K. Yes, rather. I think that kind of problem of Personnel was what prevented the Board from starting any good work which they should have undertaken during the war. In other words they were just stooges for the Army and Navy, distated to do so, and do not say this and do not say that.
- T. The Foreign Office didn't have then, any direct access to the out-going radio?
- K. From the set-up of the Board of Information they had the right but they failed to use it in the Proper way, because the people who were handling it were not the personnel with ability. It is rather difficult to explain, but perhaps you understand what I mean. I must confess that when talking with Col. Bartlett he asked me the same questions, that if we were monitoring we should have done analysis, etc. That is what we felt, but actually that kind of thing was not carried out in a systematic way during the war. It is amazing, it is unbelievable, but that is what happened. That is why, I believe, Japan lost the war.
- T. I should think that some fairly extraordinary measures must have been taken to prevent the spread of the information which you people received when monitoring? You were in possession of information which most Japanese people were not permitted to know?
- K. That was another difficulty, but I think our people were very loyal and there were no special cases about that, No instances of leaking of secret information, to that kind of thing, not from our office. There were several occasions like that by people who read the printed papers and talked about it in public or to other people.
- T. You were forbidden to talk to newspaper people and your friends?
- K. No, I could not do that.
- T. There was no difficulty making sure that your people didn't talk?
- K. We gave them frequent warnings just like you gave warnings to the people engaged in the atomic bomb project.
- T. I wonder, as you were in a particularly interesting position during the war, it seems to me you had access to the best information, both from within Japan and outside. From that experience I wonder if you could give us some idea of how morale among the people in Japan changed from the beginning of the war on?
- K. Well I left that at the beginning of the war, about 4 years ago, the people, especially the people on the street were not informed about the real cause of the war. I think that was the biggest mistake the Government committed. Perhaps, as you know, exactly 4 years ago 3 weeks before the outbreak of the war, even in those days when times between the United States and Japan were very grave, people were not allowed to attend anti-American or anti British meetings. They were oppressed, no meetings at all, no public meetings. The newspapers were not allowed to

print in big letters what was going on between the United States and Japan, and how the American demands were difficult and all that kind of thing. The war came on 8 December 1941 very abruptly, to most of the people. They had the hope it would be avoided in some way. That is the way the Board of Information or Government gave it to the radio and people.

T: What was their explanation of the cause of the war?

K: Of course it was written in the Emperor's rescript and all that kind of thing. It came so suddenly that the mind of the people was not ready to digest it. The war fell from the blue, they were not ready to get warmed up, from the very beginning especially the older people who experienced the Sino-Japanese war and the Russo-Japanese war. At that time people used to have very strong anti-Russian feelings. People hoped that we would be able to avoid this war in some way or another, such as sending Ambassador KURIHARA to America to save Japan from war.

T: What was the reason why the preparation in the months before the war, from a propaganda point of view, why was it not more open and effective? What prevented the Government from interesting the people more in the war prior to the outbreak?

K: That is the thing I cannot understand. Probably might be one school of thought that belonged to the foreign office. After severe first blow to America and Great Britain, Japan might be able to stop the war, and I think some people in the foreign office strongly suggested it because they know Japan could not stand a long war, the shorter the better. If the first attack was successful, after occupation of Singapore and Philippines, would propose some sort of peace and bring the war to an end.

T: Your idea is that because they held that view they didn't want enthusiasm built up too high?

K: Yes, that is right.

T: What happened with this surprise, what happened after that? To the people, their feelings?

K: I think that the Japanese victories were rather dazzling. They surpassed the expectations of most of the people, even the Army and Navy. People in the streets were overjoyed at the success and they forgot all other things, and the propaganda of the Army and Navy was that Japan had liberated those places and wanted to reconstruct this greater East Asia and establish the idea of states in those districts. I think the people started to believe it.

T: How long did that feeling last?

K: I think it lasted until the battle of the Coral Sea, 1942, in the fall.

T: What was the feeling then?

K: From Guadalcanal the people began to feel that we have to do something about this war. Up to that time, of course there were lots of restrictions to daily living, but the people took the war rather easy. After that they began to feel that we have to work, even the people in offices began to feel that they have to go to the factories and help the military, they felt that they wanted to.

T: How long did that kind of feeling last?

K: I think until the fall of Saipan. But they say, especially my mother, who is about 65 years old and remembers the Russian-Japanese war, she always told me that the feelings of the people, the morale of the people is much lower in this war than in any previous war. I think that is true. The Gov't refused to disclose the real reason of the war, especially from the point of view of the foreign office. They would not disclose the real reason to the people.

- T. I would be very interested to hear you tell me of what you mean as the real reason for the war, what the foreign office should have told the people?
- K. The details of the diplomatic manipulations. That is the most important thing for the foreign office. The people who were running the office were afraid of putting responsibility on certain people in doing this. They didn't want to accept the responsibility. It might have hurt Prince KONOYE.
- T. Your idea is if they had made public all the negotiations that the war would have been accepted more readily by the people.
- K. I think so. The people did not know that Japan proposed to the United States that Japan was willing to withdraw from China. Then people would realize that Japan went as far as that, but the United States said no. I think that is a very strong argument.
- T. What do you think should have been disclosed besides the Japanese offer to withdraw troops from China?
- K. Probably that, perhaps the effort of the Japanese government to maintain peace. I think that the Japanese government should have told the people that the Japanese government did say that.
- T. You said that the feelings of the people were that they wanted to help with the war, that they should do something, that this attitude lasted until Saipan, from then on what?
- K. From then on the people lost confidence in the army in the Government, in almost everything, and I think the reason for that was the distribution of food. Of course, the food problem had come up from 1942 on, it has been very serious to most of the people. The factory workers-even the office workers-who should be at the factory 6 days a week were gone 2 days or 3 days in a week just to buy food and going back to their country homes to get extra food, or travelling to the next prefecture or some place where friends or relatives were living, to get food.
- T. You think it was more important than the military events, after the fall of Saipan?
- K. Of course the fall of Saipan and the bombing by B-29s had their effect, but that is why the people could not concentrate their efforts.
- T. How early do you think most people thought the war was lost?
- K. Well, can't say exactly, but common sense from the people was there might be a chance until the fall of Saipan. After Saipan most people thought there was none. The Government put up very strong propaganda that the battle of Saipan is final step of this war and the Army and Navy are doing their utmost to win this battle. The result was just the opposite. From Saipan the battle of the Philippines and also Okinawa. In those cases the same kind of propaganda, but results were the reverse. The morale or belief in the minds of the people, their faith became weaker and weaker.
- T. What effects would you say the air raids had on morale? Was the morale, was there still considerable faith in the possibility of victory until the raids came?
- K. I don't think so. Before the raids came the people's minds were rather suspicious. During period of 6 months from Saipan to the beginning of the raids some doubts and suspicions were formulated in the minds of people not only to final victory, but to what the government said and did.

T. They felt the government was not doing enough to solve their problems?

K. Yes, that is right. Not only in military affairs, but in matters of daily living. People began to distrust the government.

T. In what respect, particularly, was that felt?

K. For instance in daily living, food bonds, etc. Especially the farmers were reluctant to listen to what the government said. Refused to sell rice and other products. They were asked to sell as much as possible to win victory, but hoarding had started almost everywhere.

T. You mentioned war bonds. Was there difficulty in that period in selling war bonds?

K. I should think so.

T. So far as morale was concerned, you would feel that the raids had very marked effect because morale was so low?

K. I don't say they were not effective, but during that 6 months period, the attitude of the people had entirely changed and when the bombing started the people were ready to accept any kind of oppression or attack. Until Saipan, even if attack had come from the air, people had enough power and strength to repulse it, but during this 6 months period they lost all confidence in the government. When things came from the air they thought they were beaten. I personally think that 6 months was very important. There was no bombing from the air, but still the after effects of Saipan and the counter effect of Japanese government propaganda.

T. When do you think that the people felt the raids more as a national disaster, thought of it in terms of the country and war, or individual danger?

K. I think it was the latter. Until the first bombing came the people in Tokyo and other cities were trained by police to extinguish fire in this way or that. When the actual bombing came it failed to work because the scale was much greater than expected. The second reason was that the people were not ready to fight the fire, but merely were afraid. They didn't want to fight the fire. The worst case was on the 8th of March, the first big one.

T. You were in a rather special position, occupying a position of considerable importance in the government. Looking at yourself and the group around you, in these same terms, how did that group's feelings differ through-out the war from the ordinary people?

K. I think most of the well informed people, Government officials especially those in the foreign office who had a chance to see and have the broader views, those people began to feel as I told you before they were the people who suggested the early peace but when it did not come out and they realized that the Japanese Army was going to wage all or nothing war-began to feel it was lost.

T. How early did that group feel that peace at any price was the only way out?

K. I think they struggled, not politically, but in their minds, in 1942. It did not materialize, and at the end of that year, Guadalcanal, from that time they began to feel they had to seek for peace. I understand that the present foreign minister, Mr. Yoshida, was one of the vanguard of that kind of thinking.

T. Did you yourself feel at the beginning, or at the outbreak of the war, that it was possible for a Japanese victory to occur?

K. I thought there might be a possibility.

T. You would include yourself in the group who felt it must be a short war?

K. Yes, that is what I felt.

T. One of the periods that I am most interested in is that one which you described as having begun as early as Guadalcanal, the political efforts that were made to achieve peace. They were much more effective from April of this year until August. I wonder what you can tell me about the details of the kind of activity?

K. Of course that did not come to the surface. It was not best to speak in public on that topic in those days. Only a few people, especially the older ones, were talking about the possibility of peace in those days. Perhaps Prince Konoye and the present foreign minister Mr. Yoshida and Mr. Kite, Lord Privy Seal, etc. These people were the center of that kind of view point, not politically, but having thoughts of seeking peace.

T. Just when and how did the transition from talking about it in a group of informed leaders to a more effective or more direct political action to achieve the end happen?

K. I can't tell that. I was not connected with it directly, but I suppose it came sometime early this year. Especially when Germany began to show weakness and hopelessness then people in Japan began to realize that Japan could not carry on this war single handed. That they must find a way out.

T. That would seem to you as the principal obstacle to securing the peace? During this war?

K. The main obstacle must have been the Army. The Navy had lost lots of ships, and knew their weakness, but the Army had their forces almost intact, especially on the continent in China and Manchuria. They were hoping that Russia would not enter this war. That was their only hope. Through that channel those people tried to act for peace. Starting in Russia and asking for interviews through them.

T. Did the Army agree to that?

K. Well, finally I understand they did agree to it. But in spite of the Japanese Government's approach to the Russians, they hesitated and did not show any sign of "yes" or "no" and some people here hoped they would get "no" from Russia and would force the Japanese Army to accept the peace terms; as even the Army had no confidence to fight Russia.

T. You have talked about the problems which the Government of that day was not solving for the people, what would you consider the most important problems of the present Government? What are the ones that must be solved and what must be done?

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K. I think it goes without saying; the problem of food.

T. What other problems?

K. If the food problem could be solved, then I think all other problems would automatically be solved. For instance I gather from newspapers and from the attitude of Allied forces and American public opinion that the people on the streets are not interested in politics. They want food and enough food. For that single problem they are striving everyday. For that purpose they go out to the country to get food and buy some. That is why trains are so crowded. Unless you give them certain amount of food and let them have normal or even sub-normal living, there would be a new political move. It might be coming from the professional politicians now, but not from people on the streets and in the country.

T. If the food problem is not solved fairly soon what do you think will be the political consequences?

K. There might be some riots. They might attempt the assassination of the Prime Minister or the Minister of Agriculture in the cabinet. If that kind of riots or disturbances take place in one district of Japan it might spread to other places. The result would be very bad.

T. What areas of Japan would you list as being most dangerous in that regard?

K. I think the northern part of Japan, Honshu, as the food supply is lowest there. Harvest is very poor and they have to get supplies of food from other districts. But at the same time that kind of danger is great in big towns.

T. What political changes do you expect will occur in the next few months?

K. They say, I am not quite sure, the present cabinet will last until the coming election. They say that is the only way out because before the election a change in the government is just meaningless, and even the change of the government will bring just another government of the same type. Just meaningless. So the present there are a lot of big problems. The government is going to force the landlords to give up their estates. In the cabinet, I understand there are two of the members that are opposed to that, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Home Affairs. In yesterday's cabinet meeting, I understand that the plan was not approved because of the opposition of those two men. The Minister of Agriculture is very much disappointed and might resign. If he resigns, then it might shake the very foundations of the cabinet.

T. What kind of Government would you hope to see come in after the Diet Elections?

K. Of course it all depends on what kind of people come out for the election. As far as I know the so-called Democratic Government would be rather difficult because after the present election more than one half of the members of the House of Representatives would be older members. That is what I am afraid of. If so, the cabinet members would be elected from the heads of the older political parties. It is the same old fellows.

T. Do you think that that group is capable of solving some of these problems, such as food?

K. I am afraid not.

T. Why?

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- K. Because they are so much interested in and so closely connected with the people who have something. At present if Japan wants to survive we need a very drastic method. I don't think they are capable of it.
- T. Tell me about some of your own personal experiences in the bombings?
- K. My house was not burned. There were only about 50 houses left in our street. Nearly all were burned down. Some of my friends and relatives were burned out.
- T. What part of the city do you live in?
- K. Western suburb of Tokyo. It was May 23rd that our district was burned out. The B-29 was the main force that brought Japan's Defeat. Except for the B-29 there was no power to approach the Japanese mainland. Because of the B-29 the factories were forced to disperse to the country. We spent a lot of energy and power for that and still were not able to do it.
- T. You think that without the B-29 raids that the war would have continued for some little time?
- K. I should think so, and most of the people would have been willing to see the Americans land on the Japanese mainland.
- T. It wouldn't have changed the end of the war necessarily, but would have postponed it?
- K. Yes. During the last stages of the war you started in broadcasting the names of the cities to be bombed, it was very effective. Of course, the small planes from Iwo Jima, the P-51's etc, did some harm but they were not very effective and the people were not very much afraid of them. But the night raids of the B-29 were something.
- T. Had you any experience at all with raids based on the carriers?
- K. They were concentrated on air fields and factories and not in cities.

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