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






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THE
REBELLION RECORD:

A Diary of American Events.

WITH

DOCUMENTS, NARRATIVES, ILLUSTRATIVE INCIDENTS,
POETRY, ETC.

EDITED BY

FRANK MOORE,
AUTHOR OF "DIARY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION."

ELEVENTH VOLUME.

WITH FOURTEEN PORTRAITS ON STEEL, AND VARIOUS MAPS AND DIAGRAMS.

NEW YORK :
D. VAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY.
1868.



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REBELLION RECORD.

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DOCUMENTS AND NARRATIVES.

Doc. 1.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL BURNSIDE.

New York, November 12, 1862.

To the Adjutant-General U. S. A., Washington,
D. C.:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Army of the Potomac during the time it was under my command:

On the seventh day of November, 1862, General Buckingham arrived at my headquarters at Orleans, Virginia, with the following order and letter:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, November 8, 1862. }

General Orders No. 182:

By direction of the President of the United States it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-General Burnside take the command of that army.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, November 8, 1862. }

Major-General Burnside, Commanding, etc.:

GENERAL: Immediately on assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, you will report the position of your troops and what you purpose doing with them.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

After some consultation, it was decided that General Buckingham and myself should proceed to the headquarters of General McClellan, then at Rectortown, when the order relieving General McClellan was delivered to him, after which it was decided that the orders which had already been issued by General McClellan, directing the movements of the army for concentration near Warrenton, with a view to accumu-

lating supplies, and for other purposes, should be carried out, and that he should remain in command of the army until we reached Warrenton.

It was understood that the army was then moving as near as possible under certain general instructions contained in a letter from the President to General McClellan, a copy of which was sent to me under cover of the following letter:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
WASHINGTON, November 11, 1862. }

Major-General Burnside, Commanding, etc.:

GENERAL: Your despatch of the seventh was received last evening at nine o'clock. I telegraphed to you this morning to arrange a meeting for to-morrow. I hope to hear from you to-night.

I enclose you herewith a copy of a letter from the President to General McClellan, dated the thirteenth of last month. I wish you to carefully consider the President's views as contained in that letter, so that we may talk it over understandingly to-morrow.

General Meigs and General Haupt will accompany me.

Yours, truly,
H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

On the ninth day of November, General McClellan issued an order relinquishing the command of the army; after which an order was issued from my headquarters assuming command.

The position of the different corps of the army was as follows:

First, Second, and Fifth corps, near Warrenton.
Sixth corps, at New Baltimore.

Ninth corps, with Stoneman's and Whipple's divisions, on both sides of the river, in the neighborhood of Waterloo.

Eleventh corps, at Gainesville, New Baltimore, and the Gap.

Pleasanton at Jefferson and Amisville, with advance on Hazel River.

Bayard at Rappahannock Station and neighborhood.

Slocum was still at Harper's Ferry and Fayetteville.

There were no pontoons with the moving army at this time, and our supplies had run very low.

It will be observed that directions were given in the order from General Halleck to me, dated November fifth, to report at once a plan for the future operations of the army; which was done. This plan had been fully matured and was at the time understood to be in accordance with the views of most of the prominent general officers in command. It had been written out and was sent to Washington, by Major E. M. Neill, on the tenth of November, and delivered to General E. W. Cullum, Chief of Staff, the following day; after which General Halleck telegraphed me that he thought he would meet me at Warrenton on the next day (the twelfth), which he did, accompanied by Generals Meigs and Haupt.

During that night and the next morning we had long consultations. General Halleck was strongly in favor of continuing the movements of the army in the direction of Culpepper and Gordonsville, and my own plan was as strongly adhered to by me. He declined to take the responsibility of issuing an order, but said that the whole matter would be left to the decision of the President; and if the President approved my plan I was to move the main army to Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, and there cross the Rappahannock on pontoon bridges, which were to be sent from Washington.

In my interview with General Halleck, I represented to him that soon after commencing the movement in the direction of Fredericksburg, my telegraphic communication with Washington would be broken, and that I relied upon him to see that such parts of my plan as required action in Washington would be carried out. He told me that everything required by me would receive his attention, and that he would at once order by telegraph the pontoon trains spoken of in my plan, and would, upon his return to Washington, see that they were promptly forwarded.

After his return, he sent me the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1862.

Major-General A. E. Burnside, Commanding Army of the Potomac:

The President has just assented to your plan. He thinks it will succeed if you move rapidly, otherwise not.

H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.

This despatch was received at my headquarters at Warrenton at eleven o'clock on the morning of the fourteenth instant, and I at once issued orders for the different commands to move in accordance with the above-mentioned plan.

The remark in this despatch, indicating the great necessity for the speedy movement of the troops, was entirely in accordance with my own views, as the season was so far advanced that I

looked for but little time in which to move the army effectively.

General Sumner's grand division started at daylight on the morning of the fifteenth, and the grand divisions of Generals Franklin and Hooker, together with the cavalry, started on the sixteenth. General Sumner's advance reached Falmouth on the seventeenth.

General Franklin concentrated his command at Stafford Court-House, and General Hooker his in the vicinity of Hartwood. The cavalry was in the rear and covering the fords of the Rappahannock. The plan submitted by me on the ninth of November will explain fully the reasons for these movements. It contemplated, however, the prompt starting of pontoons from Washington. I supposed this would be attended to; but, feeling anxious to know something definite in regard to them before telegraphic communication with Washington should be interrupted, I directed Lieutenant Comstock, my Chief-Engineer, on the morning of the fourteenth, to ask General Woodbury, by telegraph, if the pontoons were ready to move. Not receiving an immediate reply, I directed him to telegraph to General Woodbury a second time, urging him to forward the trains promptly. To this second despatch he received the following answer on the morning of the fifteenth:

WASHINGTON, November 14, 1862.

LIEUTENANT COMSTOCK: I have received your two telegrams to-day. Captain Spaulding has arrived, and thirty-six pontoons have arrived. Forty men are expected in the morning. Captain Spaulding received Captain Duane's order of the sixth on the afternoon of the twelfth. Our pontoon train can be got ready to start on Sunday or Monday morning (November sixteenth or seventeenth), depending somewhat upon the Quartermaster's Department. General Halleck is not inclined to send another train by land, but will allow it, probably, if General Burnside insists. A second train can be sent by water to Aquia Creek, and from thence transported by the teams which carry the first.

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General.

This was my first information of delay; but the statement that thirty-six pontoons had arrived and forty more were expected next morning, connected with the statement that the first train (which would have been ample for our purposes) would start on the sixteenth or seventeenth, was deemed sufficient to authorize me in continuing the movements of the troops, as the pontoons would have arrived in very good time had they started as promised, although not so soon as I had expected.

After the telegraphic communication between my headquarters and Washington was broken, General Woodbury sent in the following despatches, which reached me by orderlies after my arrival at Falmouth:

HEADQUARTERS ENG. REG., WASHINGTON, D. C. }
November 17, 1862—7 P. M. }

Lieutenant Comstock, Engineer, General Burnside's Headquarters, A. of P.:

Major Spaulding has not been able to get off to-day. He expects to start at ten A. M. to-morrow. I will telegraph when he leaves.

H. BOWERS,
A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS ENG. REG., WASHINGTON, D. C. }
November 18, 1862. }

Lieutenant Comstock, or in his absence, Chief of General Burnside's Staff:

Major Spaulding has been delayed in obtaining harness, teamsters, etc., for two hundred and seventy new horses. He expects to start to-night.

D. P. WOODBURY,
Brigadier-General, Volunteers.

On the nineteenth General Hooker's grand division was at Hartwood, and a portion of the cavalry occupied positions above him, opposite the fords, where they could cross upon the receipt of the necessary orders.

It was my intention, and I so informed General Halleck, to cross some of the cavalry, and, possibly, a small force of light infantry and artillery, over the fords of the Rappahannock and Rapidan, with a view to moving rapidly upon Fredericksburg and holding the south bank of the river while bridges were being laid; but the above telegrams, announcing still further delay in the arrival of means to cross the main army, decided me in the already half formed determination not to risk sending a portion of the command on the opposite side of the river until I had the means for crossing the main body. Subsequent events proved the wisdom of this course, by showing that none of these fords are reliable for the passage of large bodies of troops without the use of temporary bridges; and the pontoons did not arrive until the twenty-fifth.

It is possible that the cavalry with some light infantry could have crossed both rivers and moved down to Fredericksburg, on the south side, but before the pontoons arrived, enabling the entire army to cross; this force would have been called on to resist an attack from the greater portion of General Lee's army.

General Sumner, on arriving at Falmouth on the seventeenth, suggested crossing a portion of his force over the fords at that place with a view to taking Fredericksburg; but from information in my possession as to the condition of the ford, I decided that it was impracticable to cross large bodies of troops at that place. It was afterward ascertained that they could not have crossed.

On my arrival at Falmouth on the seventeenth, I despatched to General Halleck's Chief of Staff a report which explained the movements of troops up to that date, and who stated the fact of the non-arrival of the pontoon trains.

These pontoon trains and supplies, which were expected to meet us on our arrival at Falmouth, could have been readily moved overland in time for our purposes in perfect safety, as they would all the time have been between our army and the Potomac River, and had they started from Washington at the promised time they would have certainly reached Stafford Court House as soon as the advance of General Franklin's grand division, and from that point they could have been forwarded by his teams to Falmouth, if the teams from Washington had needed rest.

On the twenty-second not hearing from these trains, I sent a report to General Halleck. It appeared afterward that no supplies had been started overland as suggested in my plan of operations; and the pontoon train did not leave Washington until the afternoon of the nineteenth—two days after the arrival of the advance of the army at Falmouth, and five days after the arrival of the pontoons in Washington from the Upper Potomac.

From the report of Colonel Spaulding, who had charge of the pontoons, and from other sources of information, I learned that the order of the sixth of November, from Captain Duane, of the Staff of General McClellan, to move from Berlin to Washington with his train, was not received by Colonel Spaulding until the twelfth instant; that he then at once gave the necessary directions for carrying out the order, after which he proceeded to Washington, arriving there at half-past ten P. M., on the thirteenth, and reported to General Woodbury, at his residence in the city, the same night, and was requested to call at the General's office the next morning, the fourteenth. Colonel Spaulding called upon General Woodbury at the hour appointed on the morning of the fourteenth, and was requested by the General to wait until he called upon General Halleck. In about one hour General Woodbury returned and directed Colonel Spaulding to put his pontoon material in depot at the brigade shops on the Anacostia River, near Washington, as fast as it arrived from Berlin, and go into camp there with his men. The Colonel considered this as countermanding his order to make up the overland pontoon train, and knowing that General McClellan had been relieved after the order had been issued, inferred that the plan for the campaign had been changed with the change of commanders, and that the land train was not required.

He visited General Woodbury's office again on the morning of the fifteenth; did not find him in, but was informed that he had gone to see General Halleck; but while waiting for his return was told that a despatch had been received from Lieutenant Comstock, my Chief Engineer, wishing to know if he (Colonel Spaulding), with his pontoon train, had been heard from. After some time General Woodbury came in, and in the course of conversation repeated the order to put the pontoon trains in

depot as fast as they arrived. It should be remembered that this was on the fifteenth; one pontoon train, which would have been sufficient for our purposes, having arrived in Washington on the evening of the fourteenth. The second train arrived the day after the interview. Later on this day (the fifteenth) or the day after, General Woodbury directed Colonel Spaulding to make up two trains in rafts to go by water, and to organize the necessary transportation for forty pontoons by land.

Due diligence was, no doubt, made by Colonel Spaulding in prosecuting his work, but he was not impressed with the importance of speed; neither was he empowered with any special authority that would hasten the issuing of the necessary transportation.

The pontoons which started for Belle Plain on raft, arrived there on the eighteenth, but no wagons for their transportation from that place were sent with them, nor was any intimation given to Colonel Spaulding that any would be needed; neither, to his knowledge, had any information of that kind been given to General Woodbury. Had this information been given to Colonel Spaulding, the necessary wagons could have been placed on the rafts and floated to Belle Plain, from which point the pontoons could have been hauled to Falmouth by teams from the army before the enemy had accumulated sufficient force to resist the crossing. This was not, however, the method by which it was expected the pontoons would arrive in time to cross the river before the enemy could concentrate to prevent it.

After arranging for these trains to go by water, Colonel Spaulding proceeded at once to make up the overland train, but was not enabled to start with it until the afternoon of the nineteenth. On this day it commenced raining, in consequence of which the roads became very bad. Great exertions were made by Colonel S. to push his train forward, but, before his arrival at the Ocoquan, he decided to raft his boats when he reached that river and have them towed to Belle Plain, for which purpose he sent an officer back for a steamer to meet him at the mouth of the river. The animals were sent overland. He arrived at Belle Plain with his pontoons on the twenty-fourth, and by the night of the twenty-fifth he was encamped near general headquarters.

By this time the enemy had concentrated a large force on the opposite side of the river, so that it became necessary to make arrangements to cross in the face of a vigilant and formidable force. These arrangements were not completed until about the tenth of December. In the meantime the troops were stationed with a view to accumulating supplies and getting in readiness for the movement.

I omitted to say that on the nineteenth instant I received through Colonel Richmond, my Assistant Adjutant-General, a communication from General Hooker, suggesting the crossing of a

force at the fords above Falmouth. This letter appears in his (General Hooker's) report.

I determined to make preparations to cross the river at Snicker's Neck, about fourteen miles below Fredericksburg, and if the movements of the enemy favored the crossing at that point, to avail myself of such preparations; otherwise, to adopt such a course as his movements rendered necessary.

The ground of this movement was favorable for crossing, but our preparations attracted the attention of the enemy, after which he made formidable arrangements to meet us at this place.

The necessary orders, both written and verbal, had been given for the troops to be in readiness to move, with the requisite amount of ammunition and supplies. Before issuing final orders, I concluded that the enemy would be more surprised by a crossing at or near Fredericksburg, where we were making no preparations, than by a crossing at "Snicker's Neck," and I determined to make the attempt at the former place.

It was decided to throw four or five pontoon bridges across the river. Two at a point near the "Lacey House," opposite the upper part of the town; one near the steamboat landing at the lower part of the town, and one about a mile below, and if there were pontoons sufficient, two at the latter point.

Final orders were now given to the commanders of the three grand divisions to concentrate their troops near the places for the proposed bridges; to the Chief Engineer to make arrangements to throw the bridges; to the Chief Quartermaster to have the trains of the army in such positions as not to impede the movements of the troops, and at the same time to be in readiness, in case of success, to follow their separate commands with supplies of subsistence stores, forage, and ammunition; to the Chief of Artillery to post his batteries so as to cover the working parties, while they were constructing the bridges, and the army while crossing.

In speaking of the movements of the troops, I shall as nearly as possible confine myself to the movements of the grand divisions, and must refer to the reports of the Commanders for more detailed statements.

The right grand division (General Sumner) was directed to concentrate near the upper and middle bridges; the left grand division (General Franklin) near the bridges below the town; the centre grand division (General Hooker) near to and in rear of General Sumner.

These arrangements were made with a view to throwing the bridges on the morning of the eleventh of December. The enemy held possession of the City of Fredericksburg, and the crest or ridge running from a point on the river just above Falmouth to the Massaponax, some four miles below. This ridge was in rear of the city, forming an angle with the Rappahan-

nock. Between the ridge and the river there is a plain, narrow at the point where Fredericksburg stands, but widening out as it approaches the Massaponax. On the north side of the river the high bluffs gave us good opportunities for placing the batteries which were to command the town and the plains upon which our troops were to move.

Had it been determined to cross at "Snicker's Neck" I should have endeavored, in case of success, to have moved in the direction of Guinness Station with a view of interrupting the enemy's communications, and forcing him to fight outside his intrenchments. When this intention was abandoned, in consequence of the heavy concentration of the enemy at or near Snicker's Neck, and it had been decided to cross at or near the town, I hoped to be able to seize some point on the enemy's line near the Massaponax, and thereby separate his forces on the river below, from those occupying the crest or ridge in rear of the town.

In speaking of this crest or ridge I shall speak of it as occupied by the enemy; and shall call the point near the Massaponax the *right* of the crest; and that on the river, and in rear of and above the town, the *left*; and in speaking of our forces, it will be remembered that General Sumner's command was *our* extreme right, and General Franklin's command was on the extreme left.

During the night of the tenth the bridge material was taken to the proper points on the river, and soon after three o'clock in the morning of the eleventh, the working parties commenced throwing the bridges, protected by infantry placed under cover of the banks, and by artillery on the bluffs above. One of the lower bridges for General Franklin's command was completed by 10:30 A. M., without serious trouble, and afterwards a second bridge was constructed at the same point. The upper bridge near the Lacey House and the middle bridge near the steamboat landing were about two-thirds built at six A. M., when the enemy opened upon the working parties with musketry, with such severity as to cause them to leave the work. Our artillery was unable to silence this fire, the fog being so dense as to make accurate firing impossible. Frequent attempts were made to continue the work, but to no purpose.

About noon the fog cleared away, and we were able with our artillery to check the fire of the enemy. After consultation with Generals Hunt and Woodbury, I decided to resume the work on the bridges, and gave directions in accordance with a suggestion of General Hunt to send men over in pontoons to the other shore as rapidly as possible to drive the enemy from his position on the opposite bank. This work was most gallantly performed by Colonel Hill brigade, the Seventh Michigan, Nineteenth and Twentieth Massachusetts, at the upper bridges, and by the Eighty-ninth New York at the middle bridges, and the enemy were soon driven from their positions. The throwing of the

bridges was resumed, and they were soon afterwards finished.

No more difficult feat has been performed during the war, than the throwing of the bridges in the face of the enemy, by these brave men, and I take pleasure in referring to the reports of General Woodbury and Lieutenant Comstock for a more detailed account of this gallant work.

It was now near nightfall; one brigade of Franklin's division crossed over the south side, drove the enemy's pickets from the houses near the bridge-head, and Howard's division, together with a brigade from the Ninth corps, both of General Sumner's command, crossed over on the upper and middle bridges, and, after some sharp skirmishing, occupied the town before daylight on the morning of the twelfth.

During this day (the twelfth) Sumner's and Franklin's commands crossed over and took position on the south bank, and General Hooker's grand division was held in readiness to support either the right or left, or to press the enemy in case the other commands succeeded in moving him.

The line as now established was as follows: Second corps held the centre and right of the town; Ninth corps was on the left of the Second corps, and connected with General Franklin's right at Deep Run, the whole of this force being nearly parallel to the river. The Sixth corps was formed on the left of the Ninth corps, nearly parallel with the Old Richmond road, and the First corps on the left of the Sixth, nearly at right angles with it, its left resting on the river. The plain below the town is interrupted by hedges and ditches to a considerable extent, which gives good covering to an enemy, making it difficult to manoeuvre upon.

The Old Richmond road spoken of above, runs from the town in a line nearly parallel with the river, to a point near the Massaponax, where it turns to the south and passes near the right of the crest or ridge which runs in rear of the town, and was then occupied by the enemy in force. In order to pass down this road, it was necessary to occupy the extreme right of this crest, which was designated on the map then in use by the army as "*Hamikon's*."

By night of the twelfth the troops were all in position, and I visited the different commands, with a view to determining as to future movements. The delay in laying the bridges had rendered some change in the plan of attack necessary, and the orders already issued were to be superseded by new ones. It was after midnight when I returned from visiting the different commands, and before daylight of the thirteenth I prepared the following orders:

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
December 13—5:55 A. M.

Major-General Franklin, commanding Left Grand Division, Army of the Potomac:
General Hardie will carry this despatch to you, and remain with you during the day. The

General commanding directs that you keep your command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column, of a division or more, to be moved from General Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection with the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding those two heights, with the heights near Captain Hamilton's, will, he hopes, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. I make these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of General Hancock's divisions are in your rear, at the bridges, and will remain there as supports.

Copies of instructions given to Generals Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly, very soon.

You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once, as soon as the fog lifts.

The watchword, which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be "Scott." I have the honor to be, General,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JNO. G. PARKE,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 18, 1862—6 A. M.

*Major-General E. V. Sumner, commanding
Right Grand Division, Army of the Potomac:*

The General commanding directs that you extend the left of your command to Deep River, connecting with General Franklin, extending your right as far as your judgment may dictate. He also directs that you push a column of a division or more along the plank and telegraph roads, with a view to seizing the heights in the rear of the town. The latter movement should be well covered by skirmishers, and supported so as to keep its line of retreat open. Copy of instructions given to General Franklin will be sent to you very soon; you will please await them at your present headquarters, where he (the General commanding) will meet you. Great care should be taken to prevent a collision of our own forces during the fog. The watchword for the day will be "Scott." The column for a movement up the telegraph and plank roads will be got in readiness to move, but will not move until the General commanding communicates with you.

I have the honor to be,

General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN G. PARKE,
Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
December 18, 1862—7 A. M.

*Major-General Joseph Hooker, commanding
Center Division, Army of the Potomac:*

The General commanding directs that you place General Butterfield's corps and Whipple's division in position to cross at a moment's notice at the three upper bridges, in support of the other troops over the river; and the two remaining divisions of General Stoneman's corps in readiness to cross at the lower ford in support of General Franklin. The General commanding will meet you at headquarters (Phillip's House) very soon. Copies of instructions to General Sumner and General Franklin will be sent to you.

I have the honor to be,

General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JNO. G. PARKE,
Chief of Staff.

It should be mentioned, that on the evening of the twelfth I ordered General Stoneman, with two divisions of his corps, to a point near the lower bridges, as supports for General Franklin.

The forces now under the command of General Franklin consisted of about sixty thousand men, as shown by the morning reports, and was composed as follows:

Sixth corps.....	24,000 men.
First corps.....	18,500 men.
Third corps—two divisions ...	10,000 men.
Ninth corps—Burns' division .	4,000 men.
Bayard's cavalry.....	3,500 men.

General Sumner had about twenty-seven thousand men, comprising his own grand division, except Burns' division of the Ninth corps.

General Hooker's command was about twenty-six thousand strong, two of General Stoneman's divisions having reported to General Franklin.

Positive information had reached me that the enemy had built a new road in rear of the bridge or crest from near Hamilton's to the telegraph road, along which road they communicated from one part of their line to another. I decided, if possible, to seize a point on this road near Hamilton's which would not only divide the enemy's forces by breaking their line, but would place our forces in position to enable us to move in rear of the crest, and either force its evacuation or the capitulation of the forces occupying it.

It was my intention, in case this point had been gained, to push Generals Sumner and Hooker against the left of the crest, and prevent at least the removal of the artillery of the enemy, in case they attempted a retreat. The above orders were prepared in accordance with these views.

It will be seen that General Franklin was directed to seize, if possible, the heights near Captain Hamilton's, and to send at once a column of attack for that purpose, composed of

a division at least, in the lead, well supported, and to keep his whole command in readiness to move down the Old Richmond road. The object of this order is clear.

It was necessary to seize the heights in order to enable the remainder of his force to move down the Old Richmond road, with a view of getting in rear of the enemy's line on the crest. He was ordered to seize these heights, *if possible*, and to do *it at once*. I sent him a copy of the order to General Sumner, in which it will be seen that I direct General Sumner's column not to move until he received orders from me; while he (General Franklin) was ordered to move *at once*. The movements were not intended to be simultaneous. In fact, I did not intend to move General Sumner until I learned that Franklin was about to gain the heights near Hamilton's, which I then supposed he was entirely able to do. I sent the order to General Franklin by General James A. Hardie, a member of my staff. It reached him at 7:30 A. M. I cannot possibly give a more intelligent account of the movements of General Franklin's command that day, than by copying into this report the despatches of General Hardie, which are as follows:

December 13, 7:40 A. M.

General Meade's division is to make the movement from our left, but it is just reported that the enemy's skirmishers are advancing, indicating an attack upon our position on the left.

9 A. M.

General Meade just moved out; Doubleday supports him; Meade's skirmishers, however, engaged at once with enemy's skirmishers. Battery opening on Meade, probably from position on Old Richmond road.

9:40 A. M.

Two batteries playing on Reynolds' advance, in rear of his first line, cause him to desist the advance. They are on the Bowlin Green road, near the river. They must be silenced before he can advance. Heavy firing in our front.

11 A. M.

Meade advanced half a mile, and holds on infantry of enemy in woods in front of extreme left; also in front of Howe; no loss so far of great importance. General Vinton badly, but not dangerously wounded.

LATER.

Reynolds has been forced to develop his whole line—an attack of some force of enemy's troops on our left seems probable, as far as can now be judged. Stoneman has been directed to cross one division to support our left. Report of cavalry pickets from the other side of the river, that the enemy's troops were moving down the river on this side during the latter part of the night. Howe's pickets reported movements in their front, same direction. Still they have a strong force well posted with batteries here.

12 M.

Birney's division is now getting into position. That done, Reynolds will order Meade to advance. Batteries over the river are to shell the enemy's position in the woods in front of Reynolds' left. He thinks the effect will be to promote Meade's advance. A column of the enemy's infantry is passing along the crest of the hills from right to left, as we look at it.

12:56 P. M.

General Meade's line is advancing in the direction you prescribed this morning.

1 P. M.

Enemy opened a battery on Reynolds, enfilading Meade. Reynolds has opened all his batteries on it. No report yet. Reynolds hotly engaged at this moment. Will report in a few moments again.

1:15 P. M.

Heavy engagement of infantry where battery is. Meade is assaulting the hill; will report again in a few moments.

1:26 P. M.

Meade is in the woods in his front; seems to be able to hold on. Reynolds will push Gibbon in, if necessary. The battery and woods referred to must be near Hamilton's house. The infantry firing is prolonged and quite heavy. Things look well enough: men in fine spirits.

1:40 P. M.

Meade having carried a portion of the enemy's position in the woods, we have three hundred prisoners. Enemy's batteries on extreme left retired. Tough work. Men fight well. Gibbon has advanced to Meade's right. Men fight well, driving the enemy. Meade has suffered severely. Doubleday to Meade's left—not engaged.

2:15 P. M.

Gibbon and Meade driven back from the wood. Newton gone forward. Jackson's corps of the enemy attacks on the left. General Gibbon slightly wounded. General Bayard mortally wounded by a shell. Things do not look so well on Reynolds' front; still we'll have new troops in soon.

2:26 P. M.

Despatch received. Franklin will do his best. New troops gone in. Will report soon again.

3 P. M.

Reynolds seems to be holding his own. Things look better somewhat.

3:40 P. M.

Gibbon's and Meade's divisions are badly used up, and I fear another advance on the enemy on our left cannot be made this afternoon. Doubleday's division will replace Meade's as soon as it can be collected, and, if it be done in time, of course another attack will be made. The enemy are in force in the woods, on our left towards Hamilton's, and are threatening the safety of that portion of our line. They seem to have de-

tached a portion of their force to our front, where Howe and Brooks are now engaged. Brooks has some prisoners, and is down to the railroad. Just as soon as the left is safe our forces here will be prepared for a front attack. But it may be too late this afternoon. Indeed, we are engaged in front anyhow. Notwithstanding the unpleasant items I relate, the morale of the troops generally is good.

4:30 p. m.

The enemy is still in force on our left and front, an attack on our batteries in front has been repulsed; a new attack has been opened on our left, but the left is safe, though it is too late to advance either to the left or front.

From these despatches it will be seen that one of the smallest divisions of the command, General Meade's, led the attack; at nine o'clock it moved with Doubleday's division in support; at eleven o'clock it had been moved a half mile, and halted without serious loss. One of Stoneman's divisions ordered across (at twelve o'clock this division was getting into position) at 12:05 p. m. General Meade's line was advancing in the direction I prescribed in my *first* order to General Franklin. At one o'clock p. m. the enemy opened a battery, enfilading Meade; at 1:15 infantry was heavily engaged, and Meade assaulted the hill; at 1:25 he carried the woods in his front, and seemed able to hold his ground, and Gibbon would support, if necessary; at 1:40 our men drove the enemy, and Gibbon advanced to Meade's right; at 2:15 both Gibbon and Meade were driven back from the wood; at 2:25 Franklin did his best; at three p. m. things looked better, and at 3:40 Gibbon's and Meade's divisions were badly used up, and unimportant fighting was going on in front of Howe's and Brooks' divisions.

From General Meade's report, it seems that he had great difficulty in getting his command into position to assault the hill. The time occupied for that purpose was from nine a. m. till 1:15 p. m. In consequence of the smallness of his division, and the absence of immediate and available supports, he was forced to make frequent halts for the purpose of protecting his flanks and silencing the enemy's artillery; but once in position, his division moved forward with the utmost gallantry.

He broke the enemy's line, captured many prisoners and colors, crossed the road that ran in rear of the crest, and established himself at the desired point on the crest; and had he been able to hold it, our forces would have had free passage to the rear of the enemy's line along the crest. The supports which the orders contemplated were not with him, and he found himself across the enemy's line with flanks unprotected. He despatched staff officers to Generals Gibbon and Birney, urging them to advance to his right and left in support of his flanks; but, before the arrival of these divisions, he was forced to withdraw from his advanced position with his line broken. These two divisions met his

division as it was retreating, and, by their gallant fighting, aided materially in its safe withdrawal.

An unsuccessful effort was made to re-form the division, after which it was marched to the rear and held in reserve. General Meade and his troops deserve great credit for the skill and heroism displayed on this occasion; their brave efforts deserved better success, which doubtless would have attended them had he been "well supported."

No further attempt was made to carry this point in the west. Stoneman's two divisions (Birney's and Sickles') were conspicuous in their successful resistance of the enemy when he endeavored to take advantage of the disorganization attending the retreat from our extreme advance of Meade's division. I beg to refer to the report of General Stoneman for a correct understanding of the movement of these two divisions. General Doubleday's division performed good service in resisting the attack of the enemy on our extreme left. The accompanying report of General Reynolds will give more in detail the work of General Meade's, Doubleday's, and Gibbon's troops.

The Sixth corps, the strongest and one of the most reliable in the army, commanded by General W. F. Smith, was not seriously engaged in any attack during the day, as is stated in his report. Neither was the division of General Bemis, of the Ninth corps, which was under the command of General Franklin at that time.

The report of General Franklin will give the movements of the left grand division more in detail, including the cavalry division of Brigadier-General Bayard.

It may be well to state that at 10:30 a. m. I sent Captain P. M. Lydig, of my staff, to General Franklin, to ascertain the condition of affairs in his front, as I was anxiously expecting to hear that the hill near Hamilton's had been carried. Captain Lydig's written statement is as follows:

I joined General Franklin in a grove of trees in the centre of his command. I was informed by him that Meade was very hotly engaged, and that his men were by that time pretty generally engaged. He also added, I think, that Birney had orders to support them. I then inquired if any of General Smith's corps were engaged, and was told that they were not. I returned to headquarters, passing Captain Cutts, who arrived as I left General Franklin, and reported the information to General Burnside, who seemed at the time annoyed at the smallness of the force engaged, and expressed his surprise that none of General Smith's troops had been put into the fight. It was about 12:30 o'clock when I arrived with my report at headquarters.

P. M. LYDIG,
Captain, and A. D. C.

I next sent Captain Cutts with an order to General Franklin to advance his right and front. Captain Cutts states in his note book that he carried the order to General Franklin, and the

General said to him that it was impossible to advance; upon which he returned to me to show why General Franklin thought it was impossible to advance. When he communicated the reply to me, he says that my reply was, "But he (General Franklin) must advance." I then sent Captain Goddard to General Franklin with an order, which the following statement will explain:

"I was sent on the day of the battle of Fredericksburg to General Franklin, on the left, with this order from General Burnside: 'Tell General Franklin, with my compliments, that I wish him to make a vigorous attack with his whole force. Our right is hard pressed.' This order was given me about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, and I delivered it to General Franklin in the presence of General Hardie, before 2:30 o'clock.

R. H. I. GODDARD,
Captain, and A. D. G.

I had before this sent to General Franklin an order by telegraph, directing him to make an attack upon the heights immediately in his front.

General Sumner's corps was held in position until after eleven o'clock, in the hope that Franklin would make such an impression upon the enemy as would enable him (Sumner) to carry the enemy's line near the telegraph and plank roads. Feeling the importance of haste, I now directed General Sumner to commence his attack. He had already issued his orders, but had, in accordance with my instructions, directed his troops to be held in readiness for the attack, but not to move without further orders from him. The enemy was strongly posted along the crest in his front, covered by rifle-pits and batteries, which gave him a commanding sweep of the ground over which our troops had to pass. I supposed, when I ordered General Sumner to attack, that General Franklin's attack on the left would have been made before General Sumner's men would be engaged, and would have caused the enemy to weaken his forces in front of General Sumner, and I therefore hoped to break through their lines at this point. It subsequently appeared that this attack had not been made at the time General Sumner moved, and, when it was finally made, proved to be in such small force as to have had no permanent effect upon the enemy's line.

General Sumner's order directed the troops of General Combs' corps to commence the attack: French's division led, supported by Hancock, and finally by Howard. Two divisions of Wilcox's corps (Sturgis' and Getty's) participated in the attack. Never did men fight more persistently than this brave, grand division of General Sumner. The officers and men seemed to be inspired with the lofty courage and determined spirit of their noble commander; but the position was too strong for them. I beg to refer to the report of General Sumner for a more extended account of the working of his command, and the cavalry division under General Pleasanton.

At 1:30 P. M. I ordered General Hooker to

support General Sumner with his command; soon after receiving the order, he (General H.) sent an Aide-de-Camp to me with a statement that he did not think the attack would be successful. I directed him to make the assault. Some time afterward General Hooker came to me in person with the same statement. I reiterated my order, which he then proceeded to obey.

The afternoon was now well advanced. General Franklin before this had been positively ordered to attack with his whole force, and I hoped before sundown to have broken through the enemy's line. This order was not carried out. At four P. M. General Humphreys was directed to attack, General Sykes' division moving in support of Humphreys' right. All these men fought with determined courage, but without success. General Humphreys was conspicuous for his gallantry throughout the action.

Our forces had been repulsed at all points, and it was necessary to look upon the day's work as a failure. It is not pleasant to dwell upon these results even at this distance of time, and I have, therefore, been thus brief in my statement of them.

From the night of the thirteenth until the night of the fifteenth, our men held their positions. Something was done in the way of intrenching, and some angry skirmishing and annoying artillery firing was indulged in the meantime.

I directed preparations to be made for another attack on the morning of the fourteenth, but, for reasons not necessary to mention here, I countermanded the order.

On the night of the fifteenth I decided to remove the army to the north side of the river, and the work was accomplished without loss of men or material. The reports of the grand division commanders give the details of this movement. My Aide-de-Camp, Major William Cutting, remained on the south side until the last of the troops passed over, and reported to me at daylight that the bridges were being taken up. The grand divisions returned to their respective positions.

On the seventeenth of December I made a report to General Halleck. I refer to this because it was understood by many that it was written at the suggestion of the President or Secretary of War. Such is not the fact. It was written at my headquarters, without consultation with anybody outside of my own personal staff, and is correct in all particulars.

Immediately after the engagement on the thirteenth I sent Major William Goddard with despatches to Washington, and on the following morning forwarded others by Colonel Lloyd Aspinwall, requesting them both to give to the authorities at Washington verbal information of what had transpired.

Preparations were at once commenced to refit the army, and I decided to make another movement against the enemy. On the twenty-sixth of December I ordered three days' cooked

rations, with ten days' supply in the wagons, together with a supply of forage, beef cattle, ammunition, and other stores, and for the entire army to be ready to move at twelve hours' notice. It is not worth while to give the details of this intended movement. It will be enough to say that the cavalry had already started upon it, and the necessary orders were prepared for all the forces, when I received from the President a despatch in the following words :

"I have good reasons for saying that you must not make a general movement without first letting me know of it."

I at once countermanded the order and proceeded to Washington, and was told by the President that some General officers of my command had represented to him that the army was not in condition to move, and he was induced by their statement to telegraph me as he did.

Soon after this I made the fourth attempt, which was to cross at the fords above Fal-mouth, and moved the entire command for that purpose ; but owing to a severe storm, which rendered the roads almost impassable, together with other obstacles, I was forced to return the army to its old position.

Many difficulties had presented themselves to me in the exercise of the command of this army. I was the first officer to take charge of it after its first commander had been relieved ; I had not been identified with the Peninsular campaign, and was unacquainted with a large portion of its officers. The season was very far advanced, which rendered all military movements precarious. The army had not been paid for several months, which caused great dissatisfaction among the soldiers and their friends at home, and increased the number of desertions to a fearful extent, and, in short, there was much gloom and dependency throughout the entire command.

When to this is added the fact that there was a lack of confidence on the part of many of the officers in my ability to handle the army, it does not seem so strange that success did not attend my efforts. I made four distinct attempts between the ninth day of November, 1862, and the twenty-fifth day of January, 1863. The first failed for want of pontoons ; the second was the battle of Fredericksburg ; the third was stopped by the President ; and the fourth was defeated by the elements and other causes.

After the last attempt to move, I was, on the twenty-fifth day of January, 1863, relieved of the command of the Army of the Potomac.

I am not disposed to complain of my lack of success in the exercise of the command, and in view of the glorious results which have since attended the movements of this gallant army, I am quite willing to believe that my removal was for the best.

The courage and heroism displayed by the army at the battle of Fredericksburg has not been excelled during the war, and the memories of the brave officers and men who fell on that

field will ever be cherished and honored by a grateful country.

To the staff officers of my headquarters and to those gentlemen who so kindly volunteered their services for the day, I am indebted for their cheerful and hearty co-operation and assistance. The great numbers which necessarily composed the staff render it impossible to individualize, and for fear of doing injustice by making improper distinctions, I must content myself with simply thanking them in a body.

The list of casualties, as shown by the reports of the grand division commanders, were as given below. I would state that a large proportion of the wounds were slight, not requiring hospital attention, and many reported as missing proved to be stragglers, and returned to their respective commands :

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.
RIGHT GRAND DIVISION.			
Second Corps.....	390	2,903	540
Ninth Corps.....	101	1,030	197
Total.....	491	3,933	737
LEFT GRAND DIVISION.			
First Corps.....	323	2,368	598
Sixth Corps.....	50	339	65
Total.....	373	2,697	663
CENTRE GRAND DIVISION.			
Fifth Corps.....	192	1,684	564
Third Corps.....	124	714	191
Total.....	316	2,398	755
RECAPITULATION.			
Right Grand Division.....	491	3,933	737
Left Grand Division.....	373	2,697	663
Centre Grand Division.....	316	2,398	755
Total.....	1,180	9,028	2,145

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
A. E. BURNSIDE,
Late Major-General.

Doc. 2.

THE RED RIVER DAM.

Early in the month of March, 1864, a military expedition, comprising both branches of the service, set out on what was known as the Red River campaign. The army which took part in

* See Documents, pp. 79 and 306, volume 6, Rebellion Record.

the movement was commanded by Major-General N. P. Banks; the navy by Rear-Admiral D. D. Porter. The disastrous battle of Sabine Cross Roads, fought April eighth, compelled the abandonment of the object of the expedition, which was the capture of Shreveport, and the army and navy fell back to Grand Ecore. Nothing now remained to be done but to take measures for relieving the squadron from the critical position in which it was placed by reason of the low water in the Red River. There was strong ground for apprehending that all the vessels under Admiral Porter's command, comprising some of the most effective iron-clads of the Mississippi fleet, would have to be destroyed to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. The capture or destruction of the squadron, with some two millions of dollars, would involve the blockade of the Red River, and great inconvenience to the army, if not its destruction, and would also for a time give the rebels control of the Mississippi.

After the gunboats succeeded in passing over the bar near Grand Ecore, the army moved from there to Alexandria, having on the way several severe skirmishes with the enemy, and a battle at Monett's Bluffs, on Cane River. On the arrival of the fleet at the falls near Alexandria, which are about a mile in length, filled with rugged rocks, it was discovered that the water had fallen so low that it would be impossible for the vessels to pass them. This difficulty had been anticipated by many officers of the army, who were acquainted with the treacherous character of Red River navigation, before our return to Grand Ecore, and the idea had been suggested of rescuing the squadron by means of a dam. Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, of Wisconsin, who had had much experience on the rivers of the North-west, and was familiar with the difficulties of swell-water navigation, consulted with Major-General William B. Franklin, commanding the Nineteenth army corps, on whose staff he was at the time, and submitted to him the plan of a tree-dam. No action was, however, taken until the arrival of the forces at Alexandria, when the matter was placed before General Banks, and the proposed plan explained in detail by Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey. The General entered fully into the project, with perfect confidence in its practicability, and Major-General David Hunter, who was then at Alexandria, on a mission from the Lieutenant-General of the army, suggested that, although he had little confidence in its feasibility, he nevertheless thought the experiment had better be tried, inasmuch as General Franklin, an engineer, recommended it. The Admiral had no faith in its success. As he expressed it in his own way: "If *damming* would get the fleet over, it would have been afloat long before."

On the morning of April thirtieth the work was begun by Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, who was aided by several staff officers, and details of nearly three thousand men, consisting chiefly

of regiments from the Western States. There were also employed in the construction of this great work some two hundred army wagons and about a thousand horses, mules, and oxen. Several hundred hardy lumbermen belonging to a regiment from Maine, were employed on the right, or north bank in felling trees, while an equal number were engaged in hauling them to the river bank. Flat-boats were constructed on which stone was brought from above, after being quarried, and the work was begun at the foot of the falls by running out a tree-dam made from the heavy timber and stone, crosstied with the trunks of other large trees, and strengthened in every way which Yankee ingenuity could devise. This dam extended out into the river a distance of about three hundred feet. Four large navy coal barges were then filled with stone and brick and sunk at the end of the dam. From the left, or south bank—there being no timber there—a series of heavy cribs were constructed from material obtained by demolishing some old mills and barns, while the brick, iron, and stone required to sink them and hold them in their place, were procured by tearing down two large sugar houses, and by taking up a quantity of railroad iron, buried in the vicinity of Alexandria. In this work several colored regiments were employed, while the white troops carried forward the work on the other side of the river, both details working day and night.

The width of the Red River at the lower end of the falls, the point where the dam was constructed, is seven hundred and fifty-eight feet, and the depth of the water from four to six feet, the current running about ten miles an hour. Night and day the work was carried on without cessation, the men working willingly and cheerfully, although many were compelled to stand up to their waists in water during the damp and chilly nights, and under a burning sun by day, and notwithstanding very many had no faith in the success of the great undertaking. The scene presented in the vicinity of the dam was novel and interesting. Oak, elm, and pine trees, whose gigantic growth dated from the days of the daring De Soto, were falling to the ground under the blows of the stalwart pioneers of Maine, bearing with them in their fall trees of lesser growth; mules and oxen were dragging the trees, denuded of their branches, to the river's bank; wagons heavily loaded were moving in every direction; flat-boats carrying stone were floating with the current, while others were being drawn up the stream in the manner of canal boats. Meanwhile hundreds of men were at work at each end of the dam, moving heavy logs to the outer end of the tree-dam, throwing in brushwood and branches of trees to make it tight; wheeling brick out to the cribs, carrying bars of railway iron to the barges, and in various other ways contributing to the completion of the work, while on each bank of the river were to be seen thousands of spectators, consisting of officers of both services, groups

of sailors, soldiers, camp-followers, and citizens of Alexandria, all eagerly watching our progress and discussing the chances of success.

At night the scene was even more striking and picturesque: The fires burning on both banks of the river and at different points on the dam; the thousand swarthy figures at work on land and water passing to and fro; the campfires of the army which surrounded us on every side; the loud commands of the officers superintending the work; the noisy shouts of the teamsters; the sound of the falling trees, and roaring of the rushing water, formed in its *lout ensemble* one of the most impressive scenes we ever witnessed. Mingled with these sounds we often heard as we passed on our rounds among the men, the sweet strains of "Annie Laurie," or the martial notes of the "Battle Cry of Freedom," while at the other end of the dam, among the dusky members of the *Corps d'Afrique*, the popular refrain of "John Brown's body lies a mouldering in the ground," and some of those peculiar and plaintive plantation melodies of the South, would greet us as we pursued our way. It was while on duty one night, when such a scene as we have attempted to describe presented itself to the looker-on, that a silvery-headed contraband, who had just come into our lines, approached us, and throwing up both his hands in perfect amazement, exclaimed: "Well, 'fore God, what won't de Yankees do next!"

Passing on our rounds one morning about three o'clock, a colored soldier caused considerable delay by carelessly allowing his wheelbarrow load of brick, which were being used in the cribs, to run off the long track or gangway, thereby detaining for a few moments a line of thirty or forty African citizens, following behind. "Hit dat fifty-dollar nigga in de head wid a brick!" "Git dat wheelbarrer out ob de way!" "What doin' dar, nigga?" "Kick dat blind child into de ribber!" "Smath dat black man ober de shin!" "Now den, you be quick dar, mighty quick!" "What de debbel de matter wid dat nigga?" "Mis'ble nigga, don't you knows you'se working for your sculp? De rebels git you, you is done gone sure!" Such were a few of the utterances of which his sable fellow-laborers delivered themselves, while the Captain of the squad assailed the culprit with certain pithy expressions not proper to be recorded. Feeling considerable sympathy for the subject of this deluge of abuse, we kindly inquired if he was tired. "Oh! Lordy, yassa, massa Cunnel, I'se werry tired toten brick. It's a heap harder dan picken cotton."

During the construction of the dam, daily and almost constant skirmishing was carried on with the enemy, who were around us in strong force, and not only anticipated the capture of Admiral Porter's entire fleet, but made it their boast that the army would be forced to surrender to General Kirby Smith. The dam they looked upon as a huge joke, and the salutation with which Union prisoners, whom the chances of war threw into their hands, were met, was:

"Well, Yank, how's the dam?" Even the rebel prisoners whom we captured during its construction could not avoid chaffing their captors by the question: "How's your big dam progressing?" The ridicule was not, however, confined to the camp of the enemy or to the rebel citizens of Alexandria. We think we can safely assert that, until the work progressed for a week, not ten per cent. of the officers and seamen of the navy had the slightest faith in our saving their fleet. Indeed, we cannot now remember any officer, with the single exception of Volunteer Lieutenant Langthorne, of the Mound City, who, from the inauguration of the work, believed it would be the means of saving the squadron. The percentage of unbelievers in the army was much less. Perhaps one-half had faith in its ultimate success. With many the building of the dam was an endless subject of mirth, and numberless were the witticisms to which it gave birth. But the projector paid no attention to their jeers or jokes, nor did he ever for a moment lose heart or hope, but worked on manfully.

On the morning of the eighth of May the water had risen sufficiently on the upper falls to allow three of the iron-clads to cross and proceed down to within a short distance of the dam. In another day it would undoubtedly have been sufficiently high to enable all the other vessels of the fleet to pass the upper falls. Unfortunately, at five o'clock on the morning of the ninth, the pressure of the water became so great that it swept away two of the large coal barges that were sunk at the end of the dam near the centre of the river. When the accident was observed, the Admiral rode to the point where the upper vessels were anchored and ordered the *Lexington* to pass the upper falls, if possible, and immediately attempt to go through the opening in the dam, along which the water was rushing as fiercely as over the rapids at Niagara. The *Lexington* succeeded in getting over the falls and then steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was dashing so furiously that it seemed as if certain destruction would be her fate. Ten thousand spectators breathlessly awaited the result. She entered the gap with a full head of steam; passed down the roaring, rushing torrent; made several spasmodic rolls; hung for a moment, with a harsh, grating sound, on the rocks below; was then swept into deep water, and rounded to by the bank of the river. Such a cheer arose from that vast multitude of sailors and soldiers, when the noble vessel was seen in safety below the falls, as we had never heard before, and certainly have not heard since. Then all eyes were turned above the dam again, when another iron-clad was to be seen approaching. She did not fare as well as the *Lexington*, being considerably injured in the passage; but the other two passed through without any accident. It was perhaps a fortunate circumstance that a portion of the dam was carried away in the manner that it was, as

the two barges that were forced out by the terrific pressure of the water swung round against some dangerous rocks, making a cushion for the vessels, and doubtless preventing, as afterwards appeared, the certain destruction of a portion of the fleet.

General Banks, in a communication addressed to the Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War, says: "The water has been raised upon the dam for a mile and a quarter, about seven feet, with a fall below the dam of about six feet, making in all a fall of about thirteen feet, above and below the falls. The pressure of the water at its completion was terrific. I went over the work at eleven o'clock on the evening of the eighth, with one of my staff officers, and felt that the pressure of the water was so great that it could not stand. I rode immediately to the point above where the fleet was anchored to ascertain if possible if they were ready to follow the three boats that had already passed the rapids. I reached the fleet about twelve o'clock, midnight. Scarcely a man or light was to be seen. It was perfectly apparent that the boats were not in a condition to take advantage of the completion of the dam; and feeling that it could not stand another day, I wrote a note to Admiral Porter at one o'clock on the morning of the ninth, which was delivered in person at two o'clock A. M., by Colonel J. G. Wilson, stating my belief as to the condition of the dam and fleet, and asking that measures should be taken to put the boats in condition to move over the rapids at the earliest possible moment in the morning. My apprehensions were fully verified. A little after five o'clock on the morning of the ninth, I saw myself a material part of the dam swept away. The three boats that had passed the rapids the afternoon before were able to pass below through the opening which the waters had made. Only one of the vessels above the falls, the Lexington, was ready to move when the dam gave way, and that came down after the break, and passed the dam safely, with all the vessels that were below the rapids. Had the others been ready to move, all would have passed the rapids and the dam safely on Monday."

The army, not in the least disheartened, immediately commenced the reconstruction of the dam, but not to close the breach, that being left substantially as it was. The question originally was, whether we should make one dam at the foot of the falls, with an opening for the ships to pass through, with wing-dams above, thus dividing the pressure, or trust all to one principal structure. The dam had been carried away because the whole body of water had been stopped at one point, leaving no passage for the escape of any portion of it; Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, therefore, determined to leave the gap of about seventy feet, caused by the carrying away of the two barges, and construct a series of wing-dams on the upper falls in accordance with his original plan, thus turning all the water into one narrow

channel. Several of these were built on each side of the river, thereby increasing the depth one foot two inches, and enabling all the fleet to pass the upper falls. This was accomplished in three days and nights, the wing-dams being constructed in the same manner as the tree-dam on the north side of the lower falls, and on the fourth day the work was completed on the main dam, by which the depth of water was increased five feet four and a half inches—a depth sufficient to enable the largest iron-clads to cross. On the afternoon of the twelfth, three of the gunboats, their hatches battened down and every precaution taken to guard against accident, safely passed the dam. Early the following morning the remaining five passed in succession, amid the cheers of the assembled thousands. By three o'clock that day the vessels were coaled; the guns and ammunition, which had been removed to lighten the vessels, replaced; the pontoon bridge at Alexandria laid down to facilitate operations on the dam, taken up; and the whole fleet, with their convoy of army transports, were steaming down the river, while the troops moved forward on the river road to cover and protect them from the attacks of the enemy. A few hours later, after the rearguard had left Alexandria, the enemy took possession of the town, and, with rueful and elongated countenances, gazed sadly upon the work of a Northern army, whereby a fleet worth several millions of dollars, with a magnificent armament of powerful guns, which they had looked upon as their certain prize, had been rescued.

As the Admiral says in his report to the Secretary of the Navy: "This is, without doubt, the best engineering feat ever performed. Under the best circumstances a private company would not have completed the work under one year, and to an ordinary mind the whole thing would have appeared an utter impossibility. I do not believe that there ever was a case where such difficulties were overcome in so short a space of time, and without any previous preparation." The Colonel of the Fifteenth regiment Maine volunteers testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in January, 1865, "that it was a very common thing among the lumbermen of Maine to build such dams, and that he had one hundred and fifty men in his regiment who could build just such a dam," a statement which we presume must be taken *cum grano salis*.

The construction of the Red River dam was almost exclusively the work of the army. But little aid or encouragement was rendered by the navy, except by Volunteer Lieutenant Langthorne, commanding the Mound City, who assisted in setting the heavy cribs and coal barges. The soldiers labored zealously night and day, in and out of the water, from the thirtieth of April to the twelfth of May inclusive, when the passage of the boats below the upper falls was completed. The dam still remains intact as we left it, and bids fair, if undisturbed, to stand a hun-

dred years—an imperishable monument of American energy, ingenuity, and skill. The opening made by the flood, and through which the fleet passed, is sometimes, but rarely, used, by steamers descending the stream, the Red River *voyageurs* generally preferring a safer channel which has been made by the river washing away about seventy feet of the left or south bank near Alexandria.

Non est ad astra mollis a terris via. For the successful execution of this great work Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, the Wisconsin farmer, was promoted to the rank of Brigadier-General of volunteers, and received the thanks of Congress; while the officers of the Mississippi squadron testified their high appreciation of his inestimable services to them and the country, by presenting him with an elegant sword and a purse of three thousand dollars, which was transmitted to him with a highly complimentary letter from Admiral Porter.

The officers and regiments who had the honor of assisting Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, and to whom he expresses in his report his deep sense of obligation, are as follows:

Colonel James Grant Wilson, of General Banks' staff; Colonel Charles C. Dwight, Inspector-General Nineteenth army corps; Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. Kinsey, One Hundred and Sixty-first regiment New York volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel N. B. Pearsall, Ninety-seventh U. S. C. I.; Major Teutelle, of General Franklin's staff; Captains Harden, Harper, and Morison, of Ninety-seventh regiment U. S. C. I.; Captain Stein, Sixteenth regiment Ohio volunteers; Lieutenant Williamson, of General Franklin's staff; the Pioneer corps of the Thirteenth army corps; Twenty-ninth regiment Maine volunteers; Twenty-third and Twenty-ninth Wisconsin volunteers; Seventy-seventh and One Hundred and Thirtieth Illinois volunteers; Nineteenth Kentucky and Twenty-third Ohio volunteers; Twenty-fourth Iowa and Twenty-seventh Indiana volunteers; Ninety-seventh and Ninety-ninth U. S. C. I.

Doc. 3.

BATTLE OF CLOYD'S MOUNTAIN, VA.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT

CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, }
May 22, 1864.

B. R. Cowen, Adjutant-General, Ohio:

GENERAL: You have doubtless ere this been informed with reference to the operations of this division. I will, however, feeling sure that anything from the old Kanawha division will be of interest to you, add a short epitome of our operations for the past three weeks.

Our forces, consisting of three brigades of infantry, under command of Colonels Hays, White, and Sickels, and two battalions of artillery, left for Fayette on the twenty-eighth of April. The whole command moved from Fay-

ette on the third of May. About three miles this side of Princeton, our advance guard, under my command, drove in a squad of the enemy's cavalry. Our advance exchanged shots with them every day until we reached Shannen's, which is about seven miles from Dublin, when we were informed that the enemy was in position with the intention of disputing the crossing of Cloyd's Net. General Crook ordered Colonel White's with a portion of Colonel Sickels' brigade, to move across the mountain and through the woods in order to flank the enemy. The remainder of the command was directed to move by the road. General Crook and staff accompanied Colonel White to examine the enemy's position. The route we took to the top of the mountain was exceedingly difficult; steep, and rocky, but from the top we obtained a view of the enemy's position which amply repaid the toil. We found them posted upon the slope of a hill under the edge of a wood, and in a position strong by nature and fortified by rail breastworks. We discovered nine pieces of artillery, apparently waiting impatiently for action. While reconnoitring, a large body of rebel troops, afterward found to be from Morgan's command, moved up and formed a line in rear of the first line of the enemy.

General Crook having satisfied himself, turned to Colonel White, handing him his glass, and at the same time said: "The enemy is in force and in a strong position. They may whip, but I guess not." The remark, uttered so coolly and quietly, as he was giving Colonel White his last instructions, made us all confident of victory.

The colonel was directed to move along the crest of the mountain and turn the enemy's right. The portion of the Third brigade with Colonel White was sent to join our column, which was moving over the mountain by the road. As soon as our troops moving up in front were discovered, the enemy opened with artillery, and, though it was served with fearful accuracy, our loss from shells was very trifling. As fast as the column moved up the road it was formed in line of battle in the wood, in order to be concealed from the enemy, and thus to prevent excessive loss from his shells. The First brigade, Colonel Hays, was formed in two lines of battle—the Twenty-third Ohio being in the first, and the Thirty-sixth Ohio and a portion of the Thirty-fourth Ohio in the second—and was to charge the enemy's right and centre as soon as Colonel White should commence the action on our left. The Third brigade, Colonel Sickels, was formed on the right of the First, and one regiment of the brigade was sent to gain the enemy's rear, on his extreme left. Our troops were formed in the woods, just beyond rifle range, and in order to move upon the enemy's line must charge across an open field of some fifty rods, then wade a brook, knee-deep, before reaching the foot of the hill upon which the enemy was posted.

While these movements were being made,

under General Crook's personal supervision, amid a terribly severe fire of shells Colonel White moved up, opened the fight just at the moment the order was given for the First and Second brigades to charge, the General himself leading the men. I wish I could describe the action at this moment. The crash of the musketry was terrific, the roar of the artillery deafening. The charge itself was never surpassed in gallantry, and though moving up under a fearful fire, hardly a man flinched. The enemy fought desperately, but not for a single moment was the result doubtful. The enemy gave way utterly routed. The Twelfth Ohio and the Ninth Virginia, of Colonel White's brigade, and the Twenty-third Ohio, of Colonel Hays' command, lost fearfully. The Ninth Virginia, Colonel Duval, took two pieces of artillery, charging over the intrenchments, fighting the rebels hand-to-hand till they fled. The regiment left one hundred and eighty-seven, out of four hundred and fifty, on the battle-field dead or wounded. The Twenty-third Ohio lost one hundred and eight men, and the Twelfth Ohio eighty-seven men. We pursued the enemy about two miles, when we were met by a body of fresh troops from Morgan, but they were routed in a short time and fled in confusion.

We remained over night at Dublin Depot, and the next day fought with artillery across the New River at the railroad bridge. We again drove the enemy from the field, burned the bridge, and also the bridge at Central Station. We destroyed a large amount of quartermaster and ordnance stores. The battle, which is called the battle of Cloyd's Net, was fought on the ninth of May. I escaped without a scratch, though under the heaviest fire. Captain Hunter, Lieutenant Seaman, of the Twenty-third Ohio, Captain Channel, of the Twelfth Ohio, Captain Clark, of the Ninety-first Ohio, Captain Wetzel and Lieutenant Jenkins, of the Ninth Virginia, and Colonel Wolworth, of the Fourth Pennsylvania, are among the killed. Captain Williams, of the Twelfth Ohio, was severely wounded, and I fear will not recover.

We captured three hundred prisoners. General Jenkins, Lieutenant-Colonels Smith (son of Extra Billy) and Lynches are among the number.

After burning the New River bridge, we crossed the river to Blacksburg, and marching through the counties of Pulaski, Montgomery, Monroe, and Greenbriar, reached Meadow Bluff on the nineteenth of May. In crossing Peter's Hill we captured a train of thirty wagons and a piece of artillery from Jackson, and had he not been very good on the run, would have caught his entire command. Our loss in the battle at Cloyd Net was at least five hundred, and the enemy must have lost at least a third more, in addition to prisoners. We captured six pieces of artillery on the trip, three of which we brought away with us.

Very respectfully,

R.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL CROOK'S COMMAND,
MEADOW BLUFF, WEST VA., MAY 26.

This division of the army having returned from its recent expedition and encamped at this place, I was enabled to join it last evening, and to learn, through the kindness of General Crook and the officers of his command, all the particulars of their recent journey into Dixie, and of the success they met there.

First, as to the present condition of the army. It is encamped—one brigade being in Lewisburg, on Meadow Bluffs, fifteen miles north-west of the former place, while the men and horses are resting from the exhausting work of the past three or four weeks.

The whole command bear the marks of their long march through a mountainous country, with but little supplies. Indeed, at one time the rations were exhausted, and for several days they were forced to live upon the country. As soon as thoroughly rested and supplied, we are promised another expedition whose results I hope to report from my own knowledge. You will better appreciate the importance of the expedition, when told that its object is the destruction of the Newbern bridge, which has been attempted several times each campaign of the war, and every time has failed. To General George Crook was left the honor of succeeding where all others before him had failed.

On the second of May, the General and command left the Kanawha valley, to destroy the line of communication over the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad.

The column moved towards the railroad by way of Fayette and Princeton—White, to protect its right; General Averill, with a strong mounted force, marched by Logan Court House, intending to strike at Saltville, a branch railroad, and to destroy it and the main line to Dublin depot; this latter is the railroad station for the town of Newbern.

To deceive the enemy as to the route, General Crook sent the Fifth Virginia infantry, Colonel A. A. Tomlinson, with Lieutenant Blazer's scouts, on the Lewisburg road; so effectually was this done, that all rebel forces were withdrawn from the Princeton road, and no opposition was met until in the vicinity of Princeton, a small company of cavalry, after a skirmish with our advance, fled precipitately toward Rocky Gap. We entered Princeton May sixth.

So completely were the rebels deceived as to our line of march, that on the evening of the fifth McCausland's brigade had left Princeton for Lewisburg, leaving their tents standing, and the tools with which they had erected a strong fortification. These we destroyed and marched during the next two days to Shannon's bridge, on the north-western slope of Walker's or Cloyd's Mountain, where Colonel J. Holey, Seventh Virginia cavalry, with four hundred mounted men, joined the force. During these

two days straggling bands of guerillas fired occasional shots at the column, doing no damage.

Here the General was informed that the enemy were holding the summit of the mountain; and on the morning of the ninth, with the Second brigade, Colonel C. B. White, and two regiments of the third, he ascended the mountain to the left of the road, but found the enemy posted on a wooded spur of the mountain about three-fourths of a mile distant, and opposite to and commanding a point where the road debouched from the mountain. The Second brigade was sent to the left to turn the enemy's right flank, while, with the two regiments, the General joined the main body, by this time descending the slope of the mountain. The enemy all this time kept up a perpetual discharge of artillery whenever our men appeared. The Second brigade having many sharp, wooded ridges and deep gulleys to cross, was very much delayed when getting into position. The First brigade was then sent to the left of the road to form in the edge of the wood and support the right of the Second, while the Third formed on the right of the First. As soon as the Second brigade had fairly engaged the enemy, the other two brigades were ordered to charge. The hill was thickly wooded, steep, and was encircled by a stream of water from two to three feet deep, and was approached through a beautiful meadow five or six hundred yards in width. Across this the First and Third charged through a most galling fire of musketry and artillery. For a moment a part of the Third was thrown into confusion, but they soon rallied and came up in good style. On this meadow the gallant Colonel Wolworth fell.

At the foot of the slope the men plunged through the muddy creek, and crossed where they were under shelter from the enemy's fire. A moment's pause, and once more on hard up the ridge, in places ascending at an angle of sixty degrees, under the same withering fire. At the crest of the bridge the men rushed forward over the enemy's breastworks, the enemy bravely remaining and contesting every inch, the artillery men attempting to retreat when our line was within ten paces. Heaps of their dead lay behind their works, mostly shot in the head. Finally the enemy wavered and gave way before the impetuosity of our men, who followed them as fast as their jaded and worn-out condition would permit. Colonel Oley, with his four hundred cavalry men from different regiments, and horses—almost broken down—was ordered in pursuit, and did all that could be possibly done under such circumstances. "Had I but one thousand effective cavalry," says General Crook, "none of the enemy could have escaped." Two pieces of artillery and a great number of small arms were captured on the field. Moving on toward Dublin, we encountered some five hundred or one thousand of Morgan's men, who had just arrived on the cars from Saltville; these were soon driven to a rapid flight after their comrades. At Dublin

depot we found no enemy, all had fled to the New River bridge.

In the Cloyd's Mountain battle the enemy numbered from four to seven thousand, under the command of General A. G. Jenkins. A rebel Captain, mortally wounded and prisoner, stated that their force outnumbered ours. The prisoners taken were from fourteen different regiments. We buried over two hundred of their dead, and captured two hundred and thirty prisoners, besides the wounded. General A. G. Jenkins and Lieutenant-Colonel Smith fell into our hands, and were paroled to report at Charleston as soon as capable of removal.

Our loss in killed was one hundred and seven; wounded, five hundred; missing, twenty. Most of the latter straggled back to the hospital. Owing to the lack of transportation, it was found necessary to leave two hundred of the most seriously wounded in a hospital near the battle-field, with whom ample supplies and medical attendance were left. Colonel Woolworth, of the Fourth Pennsylvania reserves, fell while leading his men across the meadow. The Ninth Virginia, Colonel J. H. Duvall, lost one-third of its number in killed and wounded while in the same charge.

At Dublin a great amount of rations and cavalry equipments of all kinds fell into our hands, and here the General saw despatches from Richmond stating that Grant had been repulsed and was retreating, with which deceit their leaders had hoped to bolster up the weakened spirits of their men.

On the morning of the tenth the advance reached New River bridge, and found the rebels drawn up in line on the opposite side, having evacuated their works and burned the carriages of two siege guns. After an artillery duel of two hours, they retreated, when the bridge and public property in the vicinity were destroyed. Our loss here was one killed and ten wounded.

On the morning of the eleventh, fifty prisoners arrived from General Averill, with the report that he had been able to reach Saltville, but would strike the railroad at Wytheville. General Crook moved to Blacksburg on this day, and that night heard by courier from General Averill that he had met a large force and could not reach Wytheville, but would be at Dublin that night. Orders were sent to him to destroy the railroad moving towards Lynchburg, which was done for five miles, as far as Christiansburg. Averill rejoined Crook at Union.

Crossing the New River at Pepper's Ferry, the command started for Union through a drenching rain. At the crossing of the road from the Narrows of New River, we met Mudwall Jackson, with fifteen hundred men, who fled toward the Narrows, leaving knapsacks, camp and garrison equipage, etc., in our hands. Owing to the impassable condition of the roads—the mud being hub deep—and the worn out and almost starved condition of the mules, it was found

necessary to destroy part of the loads. The General regards the bringing through of the train with such slight loss as one of the most remarkable features of the expedition, and as reflecting great credit on the Quartermaster's department. On Peter's Mountain a cannon and eight or ten wagons and ambulances, abandoned by Jackson, were taken. Nine days were occupied in coming from Blacksburg to Union, which, were it not for the rains, could have been done in four. On arriving here many of the men were barefoot, and the whole command was entirely out of provisions and had been subsisting for several days on the country.

Such was the expedition—as far as I have been able to learn from the reports of the commanders engaged. It was completely successful in its object, and that was no small one. The supplies destroyed, the line of communications broken, over which troops could be, and have been, hurried either way, to succor either Lee or Johnston; the rebel General Jenkins killed, whose name has been a tower of strength to the cause in West Virginia; the armies broken up and scattered—all unite to render this no small link in the great chain of disasters binding our foe. From its success we augur still greater success for the second, which we hope soon to start. Rest and rations are rapidly restoring the men to their usual vigor and elasticity. Reinforcements have already joined us, and already we feel the flush of certain victory.

The following is a summary of killed and wounded, furnished by Dr. E. M. Kellogg, Chief Division Medical Director of General Crook's command:

List of Casualties.

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.
FIRST BRIGADE.		
Twenty-third Ohio.....	21	78
Thirty-sixth Ohio.....	4	19
Thirty-fourth Ohio.....	3	28
SECOND BRIGADE.		
Ninety-first Ohio.....	2	25
Fifth Virginia.....	45	126
Twelfth Ohio.....	9	69
Fourteenth Virginia.....	13	52
THIRD BRIGADE.		
Third Pennsylvania Reserves.....	3	37
Fourth ".....	6	33
Eleventh Virginia.....	1	14
Fifteenth Virginia.....	1	18
RECAPITULATION.		
Total casualties in First Brigade.....	28	118
" " Second Brigade.....	67	286
" " Third Brigade.....	11	102

Grand Total.

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSED.
Infantry.....	109	505	..
Artillery.....	..	8	..
Cavalry.....	17	72	84

Doc. 4.

THE YAZOO EXPEDITION.

GENERAL McARTHUR'S OPERATIONS.

Vicksburg, May 27, 1864.

The following is an account of General McArthur's late expedition into the Yazoo country. The forces of which this little army are composed consists of about two thousand infantry, five hundred and fifty cavalry, and eight pieces of artillery. They left Vicksburg on the morning of the fourth of May, and took up the line of march for Yazoo City, distant by the land route about seventy-five miles. The men were in excellent spirits and only too glad to exchange the march, with a fair prospect of a fight, for the irksome, monotonous duties of camp. The main objects of this movement were to draw in this direction the attention of the detached bodies of rebels in the north part of the State, and prevent a combination which would hazard our armies in Tennessee, Kentucky, or Georgia.

Part of the marine brigade was to co-operate with the expedition by river, and on the arrival of our forces at Mechanicsburg on the sixth, the marine cavalry boats were found at Sartartia. The former is a small town situated about four miles directly back from the latter. The command moved on, and next day encountered the enemy strongly posted near Benton. The troops were speedily brought up and placed in position, and a brief skirmish put the rebels to flight, but the nature of the country is such, that a retreating force by the use of artillery can annoy or delay their pursuers very easily, and this they were bold enough to do. Taking advantageous positions, and placing a gun or two in a battery, they could compel a delay to deploy and advance in line, and when closely pressed they would hurry on with their guns, leaving tired "infants" far behind. The rebels were found to be Colonel Mayberry's brigade of mounted infantry, with four pieces of artillery.

The fight here was principally with artillery, and the loss was slight. Pursuit was continued six miles, when the men were recalled, and encamped near Benton. Meanwhile, from despatches captured, General McArthur learned that General Wirt Adams was on his way from Canton to cross the Big Black and join Mayberry with three thousand more men that night.

Confident of his ability to contend with the entire rebel force thus concentrated, General McArthur, with his characteristic imperturbability, awaited to give Adams the chance to cross if he chose at the point he had designated, about twenty-two miles from Benton. General McArthur had taken the very wise precaution to send into Yazoo City—which the marine portion of the expedition were now occupying—a portion of his train, so as not to be encumbered therewith in his movements, preferring, unlike some commanders of expeditions, to use infantry to support his advance cavalry force.

On the twelfth, General McArthur started his little army eastward, in the direction of Vaughan, distant eighteen miles, determined if the enemy were there, as reported, to make them fight or run. He had gone but a few miles when he came upon the rebels in force, fully displayed upon carefully chosen ground, and apparently determined to resist his march.

He immediately drew up his men and offered battle. For a short time the contest was sharp, but a flank movement skilfully managed and a successful advance of a section of artillery which opened on them an enfilade unexpectedly, threw them into confusion followed by a hasty retreat. Again they were pursued and a running fight—if the toilsome march of infantry after mounted men can be called running—was kept up all the way to Vaughan. Vaughan is a station on the Mississippi Central Railroad, distant thirty miles from Yazoo City. The railroad crosses the Big Black at a point four miles from Vaughan. That night the troops were camped at the station, and the next day engaged in the destruction of the depot and a portion of the track and most of the tressel work at the crossing. Brigadier-General Ellet had meantime arrived at Yazoo City with some more troops, and assumed direction of affairs there. Skirmishing was frequent, even near the city, and a detachment of marine cavalry, on its way out to communicate with General McArthur's command, after following over the route of the fighting, from Benton to Vaughan, had nearly reached the latter place, late at night, when a body of rebels were found picketing the road at a place where it forks, and they were compelled to return. After causing the destruction of the railroad, and being satisfied of the fact that Adams would not fight him, General McArthur moved leisurely back, and arrived in this city on the fifteenth. This part of the Mississippi Central Railroad had been once destroyed before by our army, and was just rebuilt at great cost and labor, and was designed by the rebels to transport supplies from the rich region of the Yazoo, through to the interior, for the use of their army.

This city has suffered but little from the ravages of war, though it has been temporarily occupied by Federal troops three different times, and there has been a severe street fight, marks of shots being plainly visible in many places. Its citizens are, for the most part, females, wives

or widows, or sweethearts of rebel officers and soldiers, and hence they are thoroughly rebel. There is great destitution throughout this whole region. None of the staple groceries are to be found, even in the houses of the most wealthy. Corn meal, and a wretched quality at that, with garden vegetables and milk, constitute the most extravagant bill of fare the country will afford. All articles of dress are sold at fabulous prices, and the poor are truly in a wretched condition. Every kind of business is entirely suspended, and what little energy is left in the people is concentrated upon the raising of grain; but the negroes having mostly left, there will not be more produced than will be needed for home consumption.

Large numbers of refugees and deserters from the rebel army have come in, some having their families with them, appealing for help to get away. In some instances three deserters have lived for fifteen months in the nearest swamp to their homes, and have been hunted for repeatedly by the scouts and conscript parties with bloodhounds. They desire to take the oath of allegiance, and go where they can live as loyal citizens of the United States undisturbed. Said one who had been a conscript and escaped after three months: "Sir, I have long looked for this day; I will take the oath of allegiance and once more become a loyal citizen of the United States, that good old government for which my grandfather fought seven years, and for whose enemies I never did, and never will, fire a gun." Several prisoners fell into our hands, and a few were lost during the marches and fights. A flag of truce was sent out to the rebels in the hope of effecting an exchange, but Adams declined.

May 20.

The expedition has returned to Vicksburg, marching through in three days. No enemy appeared during the march. Adams has retired with his whole command across the Big Black, seeking a safer place than the vicinity of McArthur to carry on his military operations. This accounts for his declining the exchange. He wished to keep his movements secret till his command were safely across, and the Big Black between himself and McArthur. The expedition is an entire success, and reflects great credit upon the officers who planned and executed it. The men held up during the long fatiguing march remarkably well, and came into Vicksburg in the same high spirits in which they left.

Doc. 5.

MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS' ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI, }
ST. LOUIS, MO., April 29, 1864. }

General Orders, No. 65:

It having come to the knowledge of the commanding General that combinations exist in the city of St. Louis, having for their object to prevent journeymen mechanics, apprentices, and

laborers from working in manufacturing establishments, except on terms prescribed to the proprietors thereof, by parties not interested therein, which terms have no relation to the matter of wages to be paid to employees, but to the internal management of such establishments; and it appearing that, in consequence of such combinations, and the practices of those concerned in them, the operations of some establishments where articles are produced which are required for use in the navigation of the Western waters, and in the military, naval, and transport service of the United States, have been broken up, and the production of such articles stopped or suspended, the following order is promulgated, and any violation thereof will be punished as a military offence:

First.—No person shall, directly or indirectly, attempt to deter or prevent any other person from working on such terms as he may agree upon, in any manufacturing establishment where any article is ordinarily made which may be required for use in the navigation of the Western waters, or in the military, naval, or transport service of the United States.

Second.—No person shall watch around or hang about any such establishment for the purpose of annoying the employees thereof, or learning who are employed therein.

Third.—No association or combination shall be formed or continue, or meeting held, having for its object to prescribe to the proprietor of any such establishment whom they shall employ therein, or how they shall conduct the operations thereof.

Fourth.—All employees in such establishments will be protected by military authority against all attempts by any person to interfere with or annoy them in work, in consequence of their being engaged in it.

Fifth.—The proprietors of every such establishment in the county of St. Louis will forthwith transmit to the office of the Provost-Marshal-General the names of all persons who have, since the fifteenth day of March, 1864, left their employ to engage in any such combination or association as that above referred to, or have been induced to leave by the operations of any such combination or association, or by the individual effort of any one concerned therein. The place of residence of such persons, so far as known, will be stated, together with a list by name of all who have taken an active part in any combination or effort to control the conduct of any such establishment, or to prevent persons from working therein.

Sixth.—The Post-Commander, Colonel J. H. Baker, Tenth Minnesota volunteers, is charged, under the direction of the District-Commander, with the execution of this order. All persons applying for the aid of the military forces in this connection will report direct to Colonel Baker.

Seventh.—In putting down this attack upon private rights and the military powers of the nation, by organizations led by bad men, the

General commanding confidently relies upon the support and aid of the city authorities, and all right-minded men.

By command of

Major-General ROSECRANS.

O. D. GREENE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.
FRANK ENO,
A. A. G.

Doc. 6.

THE LADIES' NATIONAL COVENANT.

On the second day of May, 1864, a society of women was formed at Washington, D. C., whose object was to abolish the use of foreign silks, satins, laces, indeed the whole family of millinery and feminine adornments, with a view to keep the gold in the country. The Rev. Dr. McMurdy and Miss Lizzie M. Baker were made Secretaries of the meeting, and the objects briefly stated.

Mrs. Senator Lane then moved the appointment of a committee of seven to prepare an address to the women of America, and report a constitution for the proposed organization, which was unanimously adopted. The President appointed Mrs. Senator Lane, of Indiana; Mrs. Ann S. Stephens, New York; Mrs. Senator Wilson, Massachusetts; Mrs. Loan, of Missouri; Mrs. Pike, of Maine; Mrs. S. A. Douglas; Mrs. Ingersoll, of the district.

Mrs. Spaulding, of Ohio, moved the appointment of a committee of five to nominate officers for the society. Adopted. Mrs. Spaulding, of Ohio; Mrs. Woodbridge, of Vermont; Mrs. Hughes, of Indiana; Mrs. Choate, of the district, and Mrs. Morris, of the navy, were appointed.

The Committee on the Constitution reported the following:

Articles of Association.

ARTICLE I.—OF THE NAME AND OBJECT.

SEC. 1. The name of this association shall be "The Ladies' National Covenant."

SEC. 2. The object shall be to unite the women of the country in the earnest resolution to purchase no imported articles of apparel where American can possibly be substituted, during the continuance of the war.

ARTICLE II.—OF THE OFFICERS.

SEC. 1.—The officers of the National Covenant shall be a President, Vice-President, Corresponding and Recording Secretaries, and an Advisory and Organizing Committee of two from each State and Territory within Federal lines.

SEC. 2. The President shall preside at the meeting of the Covenant, and at the meetings of the Executive Committee. She shall provide for all vacancies in the offices.

SEC. 3. The Vice-President, in the absence or death of the President, shall act in her place. She shall be a member of the Executive Com-

mittee, and shall assist the President in her duties at her request.

Sec. 4. The Corresponding Secretaries shall enlist the press in behalf of the object of the Covenant, and correspond with ladies and societies in various parts of the country, in promotion of the purposes of the organization.

The number of Corresponding Secretaries shall be ten, which number may be augmented at the pleasure of the Executive Committee.

Sec. 5. The Recording Secretaries shall preserve an official record of the names and places of residence pledged to the Covenant, and perform such other duties as are implied in the nature of their office.

The number of Recording Secretaries shall be two, and this number may be increased at the pleasure of the President.

Sec. 6. The Advisory and Organizing Committee shall consist of two from each State and territory within Federal lines, which number may be indefinitely increased, by the two members from the State or territory, by appointments, at their pleasure, of persons within said State or territory, for the purposes of this association, in the said State or territory. This organizing committee shall report monthly, as far practicable, to the President of the National Covenant, the number of persons pledged in their respective States to the covenant, and make such suggestion as they may deem expedient to perfect the success of this society.

Sec. 7. The executive committee shall consist of the President, Vice-President, and Corresponding and Recording Secretaries. This committee shall transact all business necessary to the purposes of the league. Said committee shall meet at their pleasure, and adopt any by-laws for their government not inconsistent with the object of the National Covenant.

Sec. 8. The time and place of the meetings of the National Covenant shall be determined by the President, with the advice and consent of the Executive Committee.

ART. III.—OF THE PLEDGE OR COVENANT.

The pledge or covenant shall be as follows: "For three years, or for the war, we pledge ourselves to each other and the country to purchase no imported article of apparel."

On motion of Mrs. Loan, the constitution was adopted.

On motion of Mrs. Nininger, of Oregon, the address was unanimously adopted, and its universal publication asked.

The Committee on Nominations made their report, which, on motion of Mrs. Hatch, of Washington, D. C., was unanimously adopted, and the officers elected as follows:

Officers:

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

President—Mrs. General James Taylor.

Vice-President—Mrs. Stephen A. Douglas.

Recording Secretaries—Miss Rebecca Gillis, Miss Virginia Smith.

Corresponding Secretaries—Mrs. M. Morris, Mrs. B. B. French, Mrs. S. Bowen, Mrs. H. C. Ingersoll, Mrs. Z. C. Robbins, Mrs. Professor Henry, Mrs. Chittenden, Mrs. Captain Kidden, Miss Williams, Miss Matilda Bates.

Address to the Women of America:

In the capital of our country we have this day organized a central society for the suppression of extravagance, the diminution of foreign imports and the practice of economy in all our social relations. To this society we have given the name of "The Ladies' National Covenant." Its object is a good and generous one, which should inspire a spirit of patriotism worthy of women who are the glory of a great nation. For this society we have an example and precedent at once august and encouraging.

In 1770 the women of Massachusetts, actuated by the same impulse that inspires us, assembled in the city of Boston, as we have met here, and resolved to serve the country by an effort of self-sacrifice far greater than we are called upon to make.

On the ninth of February, three hundred matrons, each the mistress of a household, met as we do now, and signed a pledge to abstain from the use of tea, the greatest luxury of the time, and the very life of all the social gatherings for which our New England ancestors were so famous. Three days later, twice that number of blooming young girls met in the same place and signed like pledges; from that brave assemblage of women non-importation societies sprang up, that produced an effect upon the mother country almost equal to that created by the success of our revolutionary armies. During all the terrors of the war these noble women held firmly to their pledges, and by their earnestness awoke the sympathy and co-operation of every sister colony in the land. The spirit thus aroused extended itself to imported goods of all kinds, and every hearthstone was turned into an independent manufactory. Thus it was that the flax-wheel, the hatchel, and the hand-loom became sublime instruments of freedom in the hands of American women. The house-mothers of '76 not only kept their pledge of non-importation, but with their own hands wrought from the raw material the garments which clothed themselves, their husbands, and children. The pledge which they took, and kept so faithfully, evoked not only great self-sacrifice, but hard, hard toil, such as the women of the present day scarcely dream of. Had they not endured and labored while their husbands fought, we should have had no mighty Union to pray and struggle for now.

We, the women of '64, have the same object to attain and the same duties to perform which were so nobly accomplished by the women of '76. Shall we not follow their example, and take up, cheerfully, the lesser burdens that the welfare of our country demands? They gave up the very comforts of life without a murmur;

can we refuse when a sacrifice of feminine vanity is alone required? Can we hesitate to yield up luxuries that are so unbecoming when the very earth trembles under our feet from the tread of armed men going down to battle, and almost every roof throughout the land shelters some mother lamenting the son who has fallen gloriously with his face to the foe, or a widow whose husband lies buried so deeply among the masses of slain heroes, that she will never learn where to seek for his grave!

When the wife of a great prince, whose husband was absent at the siege of Troy, was urged by her friends to put on her royal robes and be cheerful, she answered: "My husband is under the walls of Troy; shall I adorn my hair while he wears a helmet? Shall I dress in new robes while he carries arms? No! my raiment shall be like his hard labors, and in sadness will I pass the time of this mournful war." Patriotism is beautiful in all eyes, and was shared alike by the lady of classic story and the mother of the Revolution, clad in her homespun dress, and steadily performing more than household duties. Compare the spirit of these women with the reckless extravagance which has marked the duration of this terrible struggle for the Union, and the contrast is indeed humiliating. Still, the women of America are not unworthy of their ancestors. Thoughtless they may be, and luxuriously extravagant from long habits of prosperity, but cruel and unjust never! Appeal to their reason and gentle feelings, and the women of this day will prove themselves capable of as noble deeds as ever marked the struggles of the Revolution. Convince them of the evils their thoughtlessness is producing, and the remedy is certain.

It has not yet been sufficiently impressed upon them that the encouragement of extravagant importations is injurious to the public good. To impress this vital truth upon the women of the Union, we have entered into this solemn covenant, not only lending ourselves to a general system of economy in our persons, but holding it as a duty to impress upon others how unwomanly it is to make outward display a paramount subject of thought, when the nation is in the throes of a rebellion such as the world never saw. Gathered here in the centre of the nation, a handful of women, intent on a single object, anxious only for the good of the country, we appeal to the patriotism and intelligence of our sister women throughout the length and breadth of the land. Let it be well understood, that every ounce of gold that goes from the country detracts from the pay of the soldier who is fighting for our salvation, and diminishes the wages of our sister women, who toil for their bread, into a miserable pittance that scarcely suffices to keep them from starvation. The precious metal that flows from this country to Europe for the luxuries we do not need increases the price of gold here, depreciates the value of our national currency, and helps to sweep the necessaries of life beyond the reach of the working man.

It is a painful truth, for which we shall yet learn to blush, that the importations of the most expensive goods manufactured in Europe have been far greater during the war than at any time in the history of our country. The importations last week at the New York Custom House alone amounted to five millions of dollars; and all that week—which will yet find its ignoble record in history—the streets of Washington were blocked up with weary soldiers, marching through mud, rain, or dust, down to the Army of the Potomac, which now lies with bated courage waiting for the carnival of death which is almost flinging its crimson shadow over us.

For the good of our country and the honor of our sex, let us redeem ourselves from this reproach of wanton extravagance. Let us prove by cheerful retrenchment that the women of the country are not so wedded to luxurious self-indulgence that they cannot fill a glorious page in the history of this war, and yet retain all that is retiring and beautiful in womanhood. In all humane works they have proved themselves charitable, kind, and munificent. Let these comprehend that self-abnegation will accomplish more than works of charity, and they will not be less earnest to sacrifice than they have been to act. It must not be said of us that we have been willing to give up our husbands, sons, and brothers to fight or die for the Union, and yet refuse to renounce our laces, silks, velvets, and diamonds. That thought would cover us with shame before the nations of the earth. No; our women of the Union only lack knowledge of the means by which they can prove themselves true helpmates of the heroes who are fighting our battles. Impress it upon them that in discouraging excessive importations, and adopting goods manufactured at home, they keep gold in the country, reduce the rates of exchange, and establish confidence in the Government, and they will prove how far patriotism can rise above feminine vanity in the hearts of American women.

In order to invoke this spirit of self-sacrifice, it is important that the great object of the covenant we have made should be broadly circulated and thoroughly understood. It discourages profligate expenditures of any kind, recommends the use of domestic fabrics wherever they can be substituted for those of foreign make, and advises simplicity of attire, both as a matter of policy and good taste. It asks the great sisterhood of American women to aid in this reform before it is too late.

Thank God! science has given us the means of reaching thousands on thousands in a single hour. While we make this covenant, the thought that thrills our hearts may tremble in fire along the telegraph, and awake kindred inspiration throughout the entire land. By every means of communication in our power, let us urge the necessity of prompt action. In every town and village throughout the Union, some woman who loves her country is implored to establish an auxiliary society, and forward the names of the

ladies invited to act for the State in which her duty lies. We ask simultaneous action, earnest work, and generous self-sacrifice, at the hands of sister women. With their ardent help, a work will be accomplished so important in its results that the woman who shares in it may, hereafter, leave the emblem of our object as the richest jewel that she can leave to posterity.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.

To the Editor of the Boston Transcript:

In view of the high price of gold, the women of America desire to form an association for the practice of economy in dress and living, upon the broad basis of love of country. The premium on gold, we are told, is an evidence of the Government's want of money, or, in other words, of the demand being greater than the supply. To meet this deficiency the Government must increase the national debt, an expedient which, if persisted in, threatens to cause a depreciation of the currency, and tends towards national bankruptcy. The only efficient, permanent remedy for this state of things is, we are told, taxation. The country is reputed able and willing to pay a tax of three or four hundred millions, but Congress hesitates to impose such a tax from the fear of the Government becoming unpopular at home and abroad. In this state of affairs, with a Government daily out of pocket, and a Congress hesitating to tax, cannot the women of the country do a great good in an unpretending way? The first step seems to be, if we wish to diminish the demand for gold, to find out what becomes of it. We are told that it is partly hoarded by the "rich and poor," "the timid and disloyal;" partly consumed in the manufacture of plate, articles of ornament; partly in the payment of duties; but mainly sent out of the country in payment of the excess of our imports over our exports. Of these foreign imports some forty millions must be set down to woman's account; she consuming the main part of the silks and jewelry and all the laces, embroideries, flowers, etc. Five-sixths of the gross imports are said to be paid for in corn, wheat, cotton, etc., leaving an excess of about fifty millions to be paid for in gold. Cannot so earnest an appeal be made to the conscience and practical wisdom of the women of America, as to induce them cheerfully to forego the purchase of a large portion of these foreign commodities, so as to help bring gold down at par? Here is a plain, homely duty required to be done by some one, from the pure motive of love of country, and to the end of bringing the balance of trade in our favor, sustaining the national credit, and triumphantly ending the war. Are we strong enough to do it? It is very weak and not wholly just to reply: "Men consume as much and more of foreign luxuries, in the way of tobacco, wine, and spirits, as we do." It is unworthy of a woman to give so poor a reason for the neglect of a duty as to say that the obligation is equally

binding upon some one else, who fails to perform it. Let us rather joyfully sacrifice our taste and convenience in a cause so glorious as our country's welfare, and wish that it was as easy to know what were good to do for one's country as it is to do it. Two plans are proposed. One is to make an earnest appeal to the conscience upon the duty of simple and sober living, but to leave the individual to make the practical application of the principle to her own expenditure. The other is to specify certain foreign commodities, the disuse of which will involve the least practical inconvenience, and which the association shall be pledged "to do without" during the war. That plan is the best which will insure the greatest and most permanent reduction in the amount of imports. The same plan proposes that the association shall voluntarily pledge itself to forego *buying* during the war, web-velvets and plushes, satins, white and black thread laces, foreign embroideries, foreign artificial flowers and feathers, ermine, camel's hair shawls, French hats, bonnets, caps, and head-dresses, silk and velvet cloaks, sacks and mantillas, diamonds and other jewelry, bronzes, ormolu, and fancy ornamental goods, *foreign silks of all descriptions*; to give up trimming the skirts of dresses, and to abolish champagne from entertainments. This movement originates in no spirit of asceticism; a spirit which looks upon beautiful and expensive dress at any time as necessarily a mark of frivolity or self-indulgence. Dress has a claim to rank as a fine art, and, if low in the scale, it is still a round in the ladder by which humanity is helped up to higher things. Neither do we charge any one class of the community with excessive expenditure. Extravagance is a relative term, and thousands of families, no doubt, who consume the most expensive of these luxuries, can honestly pay for them, and at the same time give munificently to the support of the war. Still less would we sneer at any set of men or women whose uncounted wealth takes to itself such dazzling wings. We expect a wholesome degree of ridicule, and to be asked once a day, "Are we to dress in bed-sacks?" To such we reply, that bed-sacks are not so bad after all on Newport beach, and that there are eyes in which a delaine or alpaca dress, unostentatiously worn from love of country, has a lustre which the Lyons looms fail to give to their costliest fabrics.

We ask thoughtful women to give their opinion as to which of the two plans suggested is the most practical and practicable, to suggest changes in, or additions to, the list of prohibited articles, or any general intelligent criticism. D.

To the Editor of the Washington Chronicle:

I am glad to see you leading off in advocating ladies' leagues. Persevere; do not give up so good a work. I do not wish to say anything disparaging of our women, but indeed I should think vastly more of them if they would show

that they think more of the country than of dress. I am old enough to have had a mother who was a young woman during the Revolutionary war; and I have heard her, many a time, describe how the women then took a pride in wearing dresses manufactured wholly by themselves or in their families, and how it was considered discreditable for any one to appear in a dress made of any foreign fabric. Let this spirit animate the women of the North as it does the women of the South, to their credit be it spoken, and I am very sure we shall regard them with ten-fold admiration, and our brave soldiers in the field will feel more like fighting, and will fight with more ardor. I know some silly, unpatriotic women, have sneered at this idea of dressing plainly, and have declared that they would dress just as much as they pleased, and wear just as costly silks as they could afford to buy, in spite of all such leagues. But let it be once understood that *respectable* ladies are to be known by the plainness of their attire, and the work will be done. The women can do more to stop excessive and ruinous importations than all the tariffs Congress can manufacture.

SENEX.

From the Washington Union.

A female, signing herself "Senex," has a communication in this morning's *Chronicle* relative to the idea of ladies dressing plainly. She and all other ladies have a right to dress as they please; but she has no right to force their fashions down the throats of those who are not inclined to dress as they want. A linsey-woolsey gown would be no discredit to any one, and those who desire to wear quarter calicoes have a perfect right to do so; but if a lady dresses in two-dollar silk, her character must not be impugned. This lady, "Senex," in winding up her effusion, says: "But let be once understood that *respectable* ladies are to be known by the plainness of their attire, and the work will be done." She takes very broad ground relative to *respectability*, and we presume that if she gave out that females must wear breeches, they would not be considered *respectable* if they did not at once coincide with her. Her doctrines are like the abolitionist's—no one is loyal but a negro-worshipper.

From the New York Commercial Advertiser.

There is a movement on foot in this city among thoughtful and patriotic women, to quietly but resolutely reduce the consumption of imported goods and other luxuries, and to check the extravagant and wasteful expenditure which is so rampant in these days, and which has overlaid that sweet simplicity supposed to be characteristic of the good old days, when Knickerbocker and New England kitchens were ordinary features in every-day life.

A meeting attended by ladies from the most influential circles in society, has already been held, and another will be called for an early day, when a liberal representation of the ladies of New York is expected. It is felt that in the

midst of a calamitous war, the prevalent luxury and extravagance the idle round of pleasure and gaiety, are inconsistent with the claims of duty to the country, and that the sufferings and sacrifice of a million of armed men drawn from the homes of the people, demand something like a response from the general public. There is a patriotism, too, profound enough to be willing to imitate the example of our fathers, who under so great privations fought the war of the Revolution. The women of the land are to be commended for this effort to raise economy to the level of a practical virtue, and the men will most assuredly welcome any reform that they may thus initiate, if for no other reason than that they will have smaller bills to pay.

Washington Correspondence of the Detroit Tribune.

Washington ladies, as you will probably see by the papers, are making an effort at retrenchment in the way of dress, to prevent the ruinous importation of goods, which so enhances the price of gold and embarrasses the Government. It is very well that they have thought of it even at this late hour. All winter they have been dragging the price of the soldier's life along our pavements, till, weary with that disgusting process, they invented a system of pulleys to be worn under the dress, by which the skirt could be elevated at will; but, finding that this is too troublesome, they have recently resorted to hooking it up. Every day ladies, I suppose they are ladies, may be seen on the avenue with heavy silk skirts richly trimmed, made from a quarter to a half yard too long for the wearer, and the surplus hooked up at each seam, giving a most ridiculous, baggy appearance to the costume; and the heavy, unwieldy mass over the swaying hoops adds anything but grace to the motions of the walker. It is very appropriate that such ladies should begin to think of curtailing.

However, I must say, that from what I have heard of the splendor of former seasons here, the extravagance of the past winter has been very moderate in comparison. It has been sneeringly spoken of by some as due to the influx of Northern commonplace people, who did not understand the arts and elegances of dress as practiced by the aristocratic Southerners under democratic rule. Be that as it may, there is room for improvement in simplicity and economy even now. They are going to organize a Ladies' Union League, to bind themselves for three years or during the war, not to buy or use imported goods where it is possible to substitute those of domestic manufacture. I think the gentlemen ought to be bound over to good behavior in this matter, too. Their fine broadcloths and brandies certainly have some effect on importations.

From the Philadelphia Daily News.

Whilst every one is complaining of the high cost of living and the speculation in gold, the

ladies of Washington are adopting practical measures, with a view to remedy at least a portion of the evil. On Monday last, as we learn from the *Star*, nearly three hundred of the most prominent ladies of the city assembled in Dr. Sunderland's church, and formed a society, the object of which is to check the importation and consumption of foreign goods. A constitution was adopted, and the society was named the "Covenant." The constitution, which is to be signed by each member, contains the following pledge: "For three years or the war we pledge ourselves to purchase no foreign article or apparel when American articles can possibly be substituted." This is a good pledge, but might be made better. It will do, however, as a beginning; and if the men and women in all parts of the country will but act on the principle involved in it, much good will be accomplished. Economy should be the watchword in such times as these. There is no family that cannot reduce the consumption of goods now purchased for its use at least one-third, and this with entire regard to the health and comfort of all. Ignore the butterman when he demands an exorbitant price for it; reduce the supply of milk; substitute something else for coffee; live on plain food, and discard all luxuries; stop off one fire in the winter; watch the cook, that he or she does not waste; and in a thousand other ways pursue a system of strict and careful economy, and much, very much, will be done towards breaking down the conspirators who are robbing the people and the Government.

Doc. 7.

ENGAGEMENT ON FOUR-MILE CREEK, VA.

COMMANDER E. T. NICHOLS'S REPORT.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MENDOTA, }
 JAMES RIVER, July 3, 1864. }

*Acting Rear-Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding
 N. A. B. Squadron, James River:*

ADMIRAL: I have the honor to make report of the following proceedings in and about Four-Mile Creek within the past few days: At about seven o'clock A. M., on the thirty-first ultimo, the enemy opened fire on the United States steamer Hunchback, Lieutenant Fyffe commanding, with a battery of five guns, located on Four-Mile Creek, about two thousand yards from the river. Lieutenant Fyffe immediately returned the fire, and kept it up for some time, when the battery was apparently silenced. During the engagement the Hunchback was struck once in port wheel-house, but no damage done. About noon the monitor Saugus, Commander Calhoun, came down and took position and opened fire. The battery fired only two or three shots at the Saugus, but opened rapidly and spitefully whenever any wooden vessels showed in front. A number of vessels were fired on in this manner in the course of the day, notwithstanding the presence of the Saugus, but only one was struck

—an army tug, of which the chief engineer was severely wounded. On the morning of the first instant, in company with the Agawam, this vessel took position to bring a cross-fire on the position of the battery, and both vessels opened without eliciting any reply, neither could any one be seen in the neighborhood. After firing about twenty shell I ceased, and there has been no demonstration in this vicinity since. On the afternoon of the first information was received from a French resident that the enemy had moved some of their guns further down the river, with a view to annoying passing vessels, and to shell the camp of General Foster, below Four-Mile Creek. I therefore directed Lieutenant Fyffe to proceed down the river, below Tilghman's wharf, and if the enemy were about, to remain there. About seven o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Fyffe fired again, which was immediately responded to by the rebels, their shell bursting in the neighborhood of General Foster's camp. Their fire soon ceased, and it was ascertained by Lieutenant Fyffe the next morning that one of his shells fell among the rebels, whereupon they abandoned one of their guns and did not return for it until after ten P. M. Since then everything has been quiet about here.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

ED. T. NICHOLS,
 Commander, United States Navy.

JULY 9, 1864.

The engagement and movements referred to in this report of Commander Nichols were in pursuance of immediate instructions from me.

S. P. LEE,

Acting Rear-Admiral, commanding N. A. B. Squadron.

Doc. 8.

SHERMAN IN GEORGIA.

TUNWELL HILL, GEORGIA,
 Thursday Afternoon, May 12, 1864. }

General Sherman's grand campaign has reached that point where great events may be looked for at any moment. It is two weeks to-day since he left Nashville, his army then stretching from Decatur to beyond Knoxville, occupying the same lines held during the winter. His arrival at Chattanooga gave every division of the army a mysterious impulse, and, at the moment that Thomas gathered his legions into hand for an active movement, the corps on the flanks showed signs of life, and, by rapid strides, converged towards the centre of operations. Veteran regiments poured in from the North. Outlying detachments were thrown together, and troops guarding important points were reduced to exact fighting weight. In less than ten days a tremendous concentration of troops has taken place, and to-day an immense army—a larger number of effective men than moved upon Corinth, after the battle of Shiloh—is in position

within gunshot of the enemy. The preparations for decisive fighting have been weighty and conclusive. Not an ounce of baggage is carried by the trains. Tents have been discarded, and the ammunition and supply trains are the only ones which have not shrunk to a shadow of their former selves.

Johnston has been occupying a position of immense natural strength, covering Dalton and Atlanta, and presuming the latter place to be the objective point of the campaign, the first aggressive movement promises, and has been found to be, one of great difficulty—one which peculiarly requires delicacy of judgment, combined with vigor of execution. Sherman has the absolute confidence of his men; he is a thorough soldier, a subtle strategist, and a fearless fighter. He will make the campaign a decisive one.

Tuesday, May 3,

was principally passed in concentrating the Fourth army corps, Major-General Howard, which was stretched along the railroad, the left resting at Cleveland, and the right at Ooltawah, ten miles below.

Camps were broken at noon; and amidst the wildest enthusiasm of the troops at the prospect of the opening of the spring campaign, the line of march was taken with the object of centering at Catoosa Springs, three miles north-east of Ringgold.

Wednesday, May 4.

Reveille at five in the morning, just as night is lifting her dark mantle from the earth, and the glimmer of morning is seen in the east. The soldier turns over, rubs his eyes open, crawls from under his blanket, is quickly upon his feet, blowing into life the smouldering embers—the remnant of the previous evening's fire. A few moments later, bright fires burn all around us, the coffee-pots are brought out, filled by canteens, and while the water is warming, the fires are deserted for the creek near by, where the soldiers take their morning's ablutions. Red Clay is left in the rear, and a slow and tedious march is made, with roads blocked up by cavalry upon Catoosa Springs, which was reached about two o'clock in the afternoon. A line of battle was at once formed, with the left (Newton's division) resting near Burke's Mill, three miles east of the Springs, and the right (Wood's division) joining Baird's division of the Fourteenth corps, which had been thrown forward to Catoosa Platform, south of Hooker's Gap. Stanley's division formed the centre. Fortifications of a temporary kind were at once thrown up, heavy lines of pickets thrown out in front, while General Edward McCook's cavalry division guarded our left flank, and General Kilpatrick's our right.

I must not neglect to mention that, as we moved down from Red Clay to Catoosa Springs, a portion of General McCook's division of cavalry took the lead and had a few slight skirmishes with the enemy, driving them from our front upon their reserve. Several of the enemy

were killed and wounded. Our loss was one man killed.

Thursday and Friday, May 5 and 6.

The army, or at least the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twenty-third corps, which had arrived at advanced positions, remained in its position of Wednesday, awaiting the arrival of General Hooker's and General McPherson's corps, who marched around to our right, preparatory to a flank movement upon the enemy's left, for the purpose of turning it.

General Sherman arrived at the front to-day, and in company with other general officers, rode along the lines, minutely inspecting the country, and familiarizing himself with the position of his command. This morning at an early hour, a small force advanced upon the enemy, who, in small force, held Bald Knob, a small hill about a mile south of Catoosa Platform, and drove them from it without the loss of a man on either side.

This morning Morgan's brigade of Davis' division were on picket, when a squad of rebels, mounted, came up within three hundred yards of our pickets, and called out, "Will you exchange coffee for tobacco?" "Yes," was the reply, "Fort Pillow, d—n you," as the pickets leveled their guns and discharged a volley into them, wounding one man. The rebels not liking leaden coffee retreated, exclaiming as they ran, "Are you niggers or white men, to treat us that way?"

Saturday, May 7.

At five o'clock in the morning the Fourth corps encamped on the hills about Catoosa Springs, moved east, Stanley taking the lead, followed by Generals Newton and Wood, arriving at Lee's House in the valley to the north-west of Rocky Face Ridge. Newton's division halted in line of battle. Stanley, with his invincible division, moved forward about a mile further, on the left of Tunnel Hill, and throwing out a heavy skirmish line, the right of which rested at the base of Tunnel Hill Ridge, where it joined General Davis' skirmishers, under Colonel Dan McCook, whose brigade was on the extreme left of the line of the Fourteenth corps. The left rested on the base of Rocky Face Ridge. It was General Howard's intention to throw Wood's division in on the right centre to support General Stanley, but the enemy presented so weak a front that Stanley was able to accomplish all that was expected—the turning of the enemy's left flank by a movement along Tunnel Hill range to the hill immediately in front of the town.

At ten o'clock the enemy, about three hundred strong, comprising artillery and dismounted cavalry, could be discerned on the ridge commanding the town. Whitaker's brigade of Stanley's division at once moved forward up the moderate slope of the range occupied by the enemy, and with a single line of skirmishers drove the enemy from the hill, assisted by the Fifth Indiana battery, Lieutenant Morrison, one

section of which was located on a commanding hill about a mile north-west of the town.

While the Fourth corps were thus engaged, Johnson's and Davis' divisions moved up from Catoosa Platform, on the centre, and entered Tunnel Hill. Davis' division moved along the main wagon road running parallel with the railroad, and threw his line across the valley. Johnson came up on the right and entered the town by a narrow trail running down from the direction of Nickojack's Gap. Barnett's Illinois battery, attached to Davis' division, opened their guns upon the enemy's position about nine, and a brisk cannonading was kept up for two hours until the enemy was flanked and took flight. The fire of the enemy's artillery was quite accurate, and the cavalry displayed remarkable abandon and contempt for our fire, only retiring when compelled to by overwhelming numbers.

On comparison of notes by brigade commanders, it was found that less than ten wounded was our total loss in the occupation of the town and the surrounding ridges.

Immediately on the retirement of the enemy Stanley threw his column forward along the ridge overlooking the approach to Buzzard Roost, and joined his right to Palmer at the wagon road leading to Dalton. At one P. M., a small brigade of rebel infantry approached within a mile of our advance and formed in an open field, but a few well-directed shots from the Fifth Indiana battery soon dispersed them, and they retired, leaving a small picket force.

Generals Sherman and Thomas were early on Tunnel Hill, and to-night have their headquarters within a mile of our advance line. Both Generals watched every movement of the enemy, and gave their orders with a coolness and confidence that proved them to be equal for any emergency that may arise. The brigades in Stanley's division of the Fourth corps engaged, were commanded by Generals Whitaker and Cruft, and Colonel Gross, and those of the Fourteenth corps by General Morgan and Colonels McCook and Mitchell. The principal skirmishing was performed by McCook's brigade, which lost no men.

Our line to-night is about one mile south of Tunnel Hill, and within three miles of the celebrated Buzzard Roost, near which the Fourteenth corps had the spirited engagement on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of February last. Our line extends from Rocky Face Ridge to (report says) the left of General Hooker, who has come up on the enemy's left flank. A large force of cavalry is under General Kilpatrick, scouring the country on our extreme right.

To-day, while Barnett's Illinois battery was playing upon the rebels, who responded vigorously, a shell struck the ground and exploded within three feet of Brigadier-General Davis and Captain Barnett. The General had a narrow escape from death, but he remained in his position and looked on as coolly as though there were no enemy within a hundred miles.

Sunday, May 8.

At 8 A. M. the assembly was sounded in General Johnson's division, and it immediately moved forward and formed line of battle about a mile in advance of its former position. Immediately after General Howard, who, in the absence of General Thomas, had command of the Fourteenth and Twenty-third corps, in addition to his own corps, ordered forward General Stanley's division on the centre to make a demonstration to develop the enemy's strength and position. Simultaneously with this order General Newton was instructed to endeavor to throw a regiment or two up Rocky Face, and to move along it cautiously. General Harker was instructed by Newton to execute the order, and promptly selected the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio, Colonel Opdycke, to perform the task. The response of Colonel Opdycke and his "Ohio Tigers" was prompt, fearless, and steady. The veteran regiment climbed the steep ride, ever and anon stopping to cross some rocky gorge, or scale almost perpendicular bluffs, where to miss a step was certain death. Arriving on the summit of the ridge the regiment immediately encountered the skirmishers of the enemy, who in small force extended across the ridge. The enemy was slowly driven from the ridge toward Dalton, retreating before the unerring fire of the brave regiment that confronted them. So many natural and artificial obstructions were encountered that the regiment did not move more than half a mile per hour. Learning that the rebels were moving to our left against our force in large numbers, General Harker was ordered to throw his whole brigade up the ridge to support the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth. The order was obeyed with alacrity, and the enemy was driven about three miles, when a deep gorge was encountered which checked the advance for the rest of the day.

The regiments that played a conspicuous part in the capture of the hill were the One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, and the Seventy-eighth Illinois.

General Cruft held the right of Stanley's line, and when the forward movement was ordered sent the Thirty-first Indiana out as skirmishers. They moved rapidly and in excellent order across the open fields, the enemy retreating from behind their barricades at their approach, and seeking safety in flight.

Halting for a brief moment, and seeking protection behind the rebel barricade, the Thirty-first again moved forward, and the whole line simultaneously pressed forward, and at the close of the skirmishing, at sundown, occupied a position about one mile in the rear of the gaps in which Palmer fought the enemy so stubbornly on the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh of February.

Brigadier-General Wood's skirmishers were engaged during the day on the left of Stanley extending to the base of Rocky Face.

The day has not brought on a regular en

gagement, though it has witnessed the repulse of a gallant charge made by two brigades of Geary's division of Hooker's corps.

As I have already said, Schofield's corps is working east of the rebel positions, while Hooker's bears south-west of Dalton, and McPherson, with a large army, is aiming at Resacca, in the rear of the rebel works at Dalton. Geary's division is in front of Dug Gap, in John's Mountain, which is a precipitous elevation four and a half miles south-west of Dalton, covered with forests, some undergrowth, and loose with tumbling boulders.

About three o'clock this afternoon Colonel Buschbeck's and Colonel Candy's brigades, the first consisting of the One Hundred and Nineteenth, One Hundred and Thirty-fourth, One Hundred and Fifty-fourth, New York, Twenty-seventh, Seventy-third, One Hundred and Ninth, Pennsylvania, and Thirty-third New Jersey, and the latter of the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, and Twenty-ninth, Fifth, and Seventh Ohio, were marshalled for assault. They advanced up the mountain with splendid spirit, meeting with little opposition until they toiled up the crest, where they received a withering and concentrated fire, which, in about twenty minutes, compelled them to fall back to a plateau on the mountain not far from its base. The rebels were commanded by General John H. Morgan, who is now leading a division of rebel infantry. Two of our batteries were at the base of the mountain in a field, but they could not be sufficiently elevated to be effective. At the same time the rebels could not depress their guns to contest our advance up the hillside. They were in heavy rifle-pits, and their concentrated fire was not to be borne by mortal man.

Our troops held their ground for about half an hour at the first assault. A second assault was made about six o'clock by the Thirty-third New Jersey, One Hundred and Thirty-fourth New York, and One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Pennsylvania, led by Colonel Mindel, of the former, the object being to flank the rebel right on the crest. Like the first, it failed after a gallant fight.

Our troops withdrew about dark to their position occupied in the morning, and went into bivouac. The loss during both assaults will not exceed two hundred and fifty killed and wounded.

It must be remembered that large bodies of troops are working around the rebel left flank. Kilpatrick occupies our right with his cavalry. Stoneman is on the left. The failure of one or two storming parties is expected before Johnston can be expelled. His attention will soon be called to other localities than Dalton.

General Schofield, with his corps, to-day reached Newton's left, and this afternoon moved up Crow Valley, to the left of Rocky Face Ridge. He will possibly strike the enemy on his right flank, simultaneously with an attack on his left by a column now moving forward for that purpose. Should these flank movements succeed,

Johnston must of necessity vacate his almost impregnable position, and move back on Atlanta or Roine, or fight us this side at Resacca, in a less strong position. I shall not attempt to speculate upon the probable work of to-morrow, but record the movements as they occur.

The rebel sharpshooters seem to be the possessors of excellent guns, which are completely under their control. To-day General Howard rode out to meet General Stanley, and in conversation, about a mile from the front, received a bullet through his coat. The same ball passed through the hat of Captain Kniffin, commissary of Stanley's division.

Monday, May 9.

At six o'clock Davis' division opened the ball on the right by throwing forward his whole line towards the base of Rocky Face Creek into the gaps where the engagement took place in February last. Much difficulty was experienced in crossing the creek, which the rebels had inundated since our last visit to Buzzard Roost; yet the difficulty was overcome by wading the stream, an attack was at once made up the knolls and hills on the left of the railroad, which were gallantly carried by our skirmishers, the One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Warner, occupying the hill on the immediate left of the railroad, while Morgan's brigade, which occupied the centre, carried the hill to the left, or immediately to the right of Rocky Face Ridge. Morgan's brigade was immediately thrown round on the left of the hill, carried by it, and pushed rapidly forward through a gap separating it from Rocky Face. In his attack the fire was quite brisk, and his loss in wounded was about thirty.

At six in the morning brisk skirmish fire was heard on Rocky Face, near the position held by Newton's division, the balance of which was thrown up at an early hour. Musketry and artillery firing from Newton was kept up for half an hour, when a wild cheer was heard, and it was supposed that Newton had carried the fortified gorge which impeded Harker's advance yesterday. This, however, proved unfounded, for to-night his line is but a few hundred yards in advance of where it was last night. During the afternoon Wood's and Stanley's divisions of the Fourth corps made an assault upon the base of Rocky Face from the valley with the view of making a demonstration in favor of Newton. Very heavy skirmishing ensued, in which the line took part for a few moments, but so rugged was the slope that the jutting rocks and steep gorges rendered an assault and capture of the ridge impossible. In the operations of the day Wood lost about seventy wounded and six killed.

At eleven o'clock, and previous to the assault by Wood and Stanley, the enemy opened upon Johnson's division from a mountain howitzer, planted on the summit of a commanding hill, which forms a link in the chain of hills known as the Chattanooga Mountains. Johnson promptly ordered one section of Houghtalling's Illinois

battery into position, and shelled the rebel battery, the third shot taking effect in the howitzer, and silencing it until in the afternoon, when Wood and Stanley made their demonstration, and called out a vigorous artillery and musketry fire along the whole line.

At four o'clock, General Howard ordered the divisions of Stanley and Wood forward into the gaps facing the enemy's breastworks and fortifications to the right of Dalton. The movement had the desired effect, compelling the enemy to open his artillery, and expose the position of his batteries. From five until after dark a heavy fire was kept up, and when it ceased Stanley was far in advance of Davis' position of the morning, and extended his line some distance up the slope of Rocky Face, supported by General Wood's division. With the exception of Davis' division, the Fourteenth corps was not engaged.

General Schofield, with his corps, succeeded about one o'clock in getting up and confronting the enemy's fortifications on the left of Dalton. Brick firing was heard in the direction of his position, and I learn to-night that he holds, like the centre and right wings of the army, every foot gained during the day.

A despatch was received at noon from General McPherson, who had occupied Snake Gap, near Resacca, in Chattanooga Mountains, with his force, on Sunday night, which was within six miles of Resacca at that time. The General is directly on the enemy's flank, and it is very strange that he was permitted to occupy so vital a defile without great opposition. His present position is about thirty miles in the rear of Dalton, and in all probability the enemy, in finding his flanks and rear exposed, will fall back from the gap in front of Dalton, and give McPherson battle, or retreat hastily without offering fight.

The loss of Newton's division (chiefly in Harker's brigade) on Rocky Face Ridge, was, up to last evening, one field and one line officer and fifteen men killed, and three line officers and thirty men wounded.

Our casualties, I have just learned, include Colonel McIlvaine of the Sixty-fourth Ohio, and Lieutenant Ehler, same regiment, killed; Colonel Buckner, Seventy-ninth Illinois, wounded in the body; the gallant Major Boyd, Eighty-fourth Indiana, shot through both thighs; Captain Chamberlin and Lieutenant Hall, Sixty-fourth Ohio, slightly, and Lieutenant-Colonel Bullett, Third Kentucky, slightly. The Sixty-fourth was in the hottest of the desperate conflict for the possession of Rocky Face Ridge, and, led by the dauntless McIlvaine, it won the encomiums of all who witnessed its daring and intrepidity.

Tuesday, May 10.

The weather to-day was exceedingly unpropitious for active operations. Heavy showers of rain fell during the entire day, with short intermissions. But, notwithstanding this, the eagerness of our troops to advance was un-

hour the news of General Grant's splendid victory over Lee spread from camp to camp, and along the whole line the shout of joy was carried until the valley rang with loud huzzas, to which frowning Rocky Face, that sternly gazed down upon us, gave back its echo. Never was more joy and enthusiasm manifested by an army, who momentarily expected to be led against the enemy's frowning fortifications and bristling guns, around which, with the aid of a glass, their cannoneers could be easily discerned.

Had the command been given to assault the works at that moment, when the spirits of the whole army were elated, no one can doubt the result. We would have had a repetition of Mission Ridge upon a larger scale, with, I fear, however, a very heavy loss. Generals Sherman and Thomas are slow to sacrifice life by direct assault, when the same results can be worked out by strategy.

At half-past seven, in the midst of a heavy rain shower, brisk skirmish fire was heard on Rocky Face, between Hooker's advance and the enemy. It lasted only fifteen minutes, when a lull of an hour followed.

At half-past eight, Davis's artillery awoke the enemy from their meditations upon Lee's discomfitures, by vigorous shelling, which drew forth no response for some time. Late in the afternoon a few guns opened from a point on Rocky Face, when Brydges's Illinois battery was moved into position, and opened upon the battery on the ridge. The third shot was effective, and was placed among the rebel guns, which were silenced for an hour.

At one o'clock it again opened upon Stanley's line of battle, exposed in the fields in the valleys. The Fifth Indiana battery took position, and, in conjunction with Brydges's, promptly silenced the fire from Rocky Face. For some time all was quiet; the rain poured down in torrents, as though Heaven had opened its flood-gates to deluge the earth. For half an hour together not a sound was heard, except the occasional witticism from a mirth-provoking soldier, and the *reparts* of his companions, interrupted by an occasional report of a rifle or cannon. Thus the skirmishing waged all day, and night found us still in our former position, with our front well protected by hastily constructed fortifications.

Battery C, First Ohio artillery, and Hough-talling's battery, of the Fourteenth corps, were ordered into an advanced position, early in the morning, by General Thomas, who personally went out under a brisk sharpshooters' fire, and pointed out the position to be taken, and the point upon which to direct their fire. These batteries did excellent work, and spread terror in the enemy's lines, the men comprising which could be distinctly seen, at each discharge of our guns, running in all directions.

The very faint responses to our fire to-day is unaccountable. Some are of the opinion that the enemy is retiring a large portion of his

force to confront and drive back McPherson. Others believe that the quiet was owing to the dispirited condition of the army over news from the Rapidan and Richmond. That the enemy cannot spare many troops from the front is evident, inasmuch as they have but two corps in our front.

The Twenty-third corps, which had been developing the enemy on the left of Rocky Face, this morning met the enemy in very heavy force, and retired to his position of yesterday, about one mile in the rear, where he held the enemy in check.

Yesterday a brigade of McCook's cavalry division, which has been making demonstrations for some days on Schofield's left, engaged two rebel brigades of infantry. The charge was led by Colonel La Grange, of the First Wisconsin cavalry, who, everybody agrees, is one of the bravest of the brave brigade commanders of cavalry. After frequent assaults upon the wall of rebel infantry, our cavalry was repulsed, Colonel La Grange captured, after two horses were shot under him, and a large portion of the command wounded or captured, including Captain Starr, of the Second Indiana, who escaped from his captors, and came in.

Wednesday, May 11.

Wednesday broke damp and chilly, but the rain cleared off before it had deluged the roads sufficiently to retard operations. The army was now in position—that is, in its first position. It coiled round the Chattanooga or Buzzard Roost Mountains like a huge snake, and was pushed so close to the enemy's intrenchments that a few yards, more or less, became a matter of infinite importance to life and limb.

No movement is visible anywhere this afternoon. The smoke drifts off lazily and the skirmishers chaff at each other at their grim, favorite occupation. The verdant, but treacherous ridges of Buzzard Roost, are dim and gloomy through the cold and clouded atmosphere, and in the shady forests confronting us are long lines of shivering blue coats resolutely, nay, indifferently waiting for orders. I cannot but name a wish that God grant that the order for assault may not be given. My heart beats faster at the bare thought of standing near and gazing on it, convinced as I am that all the armies ever marshalled could not successfully storm the position, if occupied by thirty thousand determined men.

No movement up to dark had been made by the troops. The camp-fires shone brightly—nothing in the enemy's range of vision had been moved. The night was dark, and by the time it had fairly overspread nature, a sudden, stealthy life was infused into the hitherto recumbent troops. Hooker moves his corps to the right, and being near at hand, reports before daylight to McPherson. Schofield comes drifting in the same direction from his fruitless position east of Rocky Face. Other corps follow; perhaps, when daylight comes, the enemy

will discover that he has permission, if he chooses, to mass on the division or two in his front, which being done and their lines broken, he may pass through to Chattanooga—all this if he pleases. But there is an ominous drift towards Resacca. The price of his looking at Chattanooga would be Atlanta and liberty. Sherman, at last, has indicated the point where he intends to thrust, and if Dalton is not in our possession by the day after to-morrow morning, there are no warnings in history for rebel generalship.

The strength of Johnston's army is estimated by the best judges with whom I have conversed to be about fifty thousand, exclusive of Georgia militia, of whom probably fifteen thousand are bearing arms, and distributed at Rome and Resacca. Their journals estimate the strength of our army at sixty thousand. They will be astonished after they annihilate that number of Sherman's Yankees to find their work signally incomplete.

General Sherman has been constantly in the saddle, and has displayed himself in front of Buzzard Roost, directing operations at points where the rebels could hardly fail to identify him. In company with General Thomas he has just moved to the right—the current that way being strong enough to carry along the heads of the army.

One of McPherson's couriers has just dropped the intelligence that Kilpatrick, under orders from McPherson, cut the enemy's rear last night, a few miles south of Resacca. We are evidently moving to cut off their supplies, and so compel them to come out and attack us or beat a precipitate retreat. The army will be closed up to-night, and to-morrow will make history. If Johnston retreats he must not be long in doing it; and with the railroad in his rear severed, he must probably lose or destroy some of his heavy munitions.

General Sherman is pointedly hostile to correspondents, and the pursuit of their avocation at this time is under severe, and, to the anxious relatives and friends of his brave army, almost cruel restrictions. The General, perhaps, has adequate reason for his course; but as the news of all engagements must drift to the rear sooner or later, it seems plausible that a trustworthy correspondent can send it with less injury to the service than when borne by demoralized stragglers, or by wounded men, whose observations can hardly go beyond their brigades. Mr. Benjamin F. Taylor, whose contributions to the press from this army will fill some of the most delightful pages of its history, has gone North under the ban of the commanding General, for saying in one of his letters, "our lines now extend from Nashville to Huntsville." It is reported that General Sherman, upon reading this item, wrote an order to his Provost Marshal-General, directing the immediate arrest of a spy, one Benjamin F. Taylor, his trial by drum-head court-martial, and execution. This order resulted in the withdrawal of Mr.

Taylor, and the abrupt termination of his series of delicious letters.

Our losses to date, foot up about eight hundred. The wounded have all been removed to Chattanooga, and are well cared for. We have lost a few prisoners and captured about twenty.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

ROSACCA, GA., May 17, 1864.

Notwithstanding the defiant boast of the haughty Georgians, while yet their valleys resounded with the war tocsin's first appeal, that her mountains should be "slaughter pens" for presumptuous invaders, and their rugged heights should smoke with the sacrifice of Federal troops, should their footsteps ever press her sod, one of the mightiest armies that ever trod the earth now sleeps upon her fairest fields, feeds from her granaries, lays waste her harvests, strolls through and occupies her groves, or reclines in her choicest mansions. Ten days of incessant rattle and roll have passed, intermingled with privations, dangers, and death, and I sit me down to jot you the particulars and the results. I briefly alluded, in a short note a few days since, which you saw fit to publish, to the operations of the first few days, which brought our army *front-a-front* with that of the enemy at Buzzard Roost. There is so much of interest connected with the introductory or incipient movements of an army, when one desires to study and understand the routes and aims from the time tents are struck to the very moment that marks the termination of the bloody struggle, that without fear of eliciting censure or of adding that which might be termed superfluous, I take up the story from the day the army moved, and hurrying past a multitude of interesting incidents of the march, the dark encounters, the daring deeds, and "hair-breadth 'scapes" related partially before, plunge boldly *in medias res*.

Palmer's corps, of the immortal old "Army of the Cumberland," lay in and about Ringgold or Hooker's Gap. General Howard, having moved from Cleveland simultaneously with the marching of Palmer's corps, halted his column and encamped on the hills and in the rapturously elegant groves about Catoosa Springs. The picturesqueness of the landscape, assisted by the comforts that art lavished with bounteous hand to contribute to man's enjoyments, made, no doubt, a lovely resort for the *élite* and chivalry of the sunny South during the oppressive summer months.

Scarcely had the object of the General to encamp here been known, and the troops relieved from the restraint of a mathematical alignment after a tiresome march, than, forgetting fatigue in their unbridled curiosity, they emptied the bath-houses of their tubs and pans, and floated them out upon the placid little lakes, where we left them sailing about like the painted hulls of miniature ships. In humbling the *dignitas* the soldier is not careful to span that which evi-

denced the *otium*. At and near Red Clay, prepared to co-operate and guard Howard's line lay the Twenty-third army corps, under Maj General Schofield, whose flank in turn was closely guarded by the vigilant Edward M Cook, commanding a division of cavalry. Hooker lay far to the right of Palmer, ready at the signal to move through Nickojack Gap; and heading towards Rocky Face, protect Palmer's right flank with Logan's Fifteenth army corps and Dodge's division of the Sixteenth, passing to the rear of Hooker, headed towards Snake Creek Gap, supported on the flank by Garrard's magnificent division of cavalry and mounted infantry. His communication with Hooker was maintained by General Kilpatrick's dashy little division of cavalry.

The grand battle line proper extended, the fore, from the Red Clay to some point a short distance this side of Snake Creek, the corps the following order: Schofield, Howard, Palmer, Hooker, and McPherson, the latter holding the extreme right.

At daybreak great columns of dust began to float upward in long gray lines. A tropical sun poured over all its suffocating heat, and the troops, overburdened with heavy knapsacks, threw aside blankets, drawers, pants, shirts, and even knapsacks—any thing calculated to weary or impede them.

Johnson's column filed through Hooker's Gap just after daybreak, and ere long was driving the enemy's skirmishers before him. Near Tunnel Hill he veered from the main road, a screened by the forest threw his troops into open fields around the ridge running parallel with the Tunnel range, and separated from by a valley about a mile in width. Some artillery practice was indulged in by both sides, but I apprehend, no loss to either.

Simultaneously, Howard broke camp, moving more directly towards Rocky Face, with Stanley in front, Wood and Newton rather in reserve, soon joined Davis' left, and the whole line pushed not only up Tunnel Hill proper, but occupied and passed through the valley between Rocky Face and it. At night of the seventh our troops lay in exactly the position designated above.

It is exceedingly dangerous to-day to march out in open view on the road leading to Buzzard Roost. All the morning, from the earliest dawn to noon, the valley has reverberated with the clang of the vicious rifles, the exultant shout and the roll of wheels. It is determined first to storm the hills in front, and Colonel John Mitchell, commanding brigade in General Davis' division, is to have the honor.

His line for the assault is drawn up in the following order: two companies of the Seventh Illinois, as skirmishers on the right, thrown forward for action, immediately preceding the Ninety-eighth Ohio; to the left of the Ninety-eighth lay the Thirty-fourth and One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Ohio, just in rear and supporting the One Hundred and Thirteenth

Ohio and Seventy-eighth Illinois, who have in turn their skirmishers in front. At fifteen minutes after four o'clock the artillery rouses the hoarsest echoes of the glens and valleys, and heralds the coming of the assaulting column. Hazen, of Wood's division, then joins Davis' left, and he too throws forward by way of diversion a heavy line of skirmishers. The first few shells dislodged the rebels from their barricades of boulders, and the rapidity with which they measured ground *en retraite* elicits a shout of merriment that accelerates, if such were possible, their speed.

There is at least one thing in which the rebels cannot be easily excelled, and that is the accuracy of aim displayed by their sharpshooters. It was actually unsafe to show one's self within three-quarters of a mile of Rocky Face or of the little spurs that guard the entrance to the gap.

The fire of the rebel sharpshooters slackens. The skirmishers are quiet, and all along the line the stillness is so intense that one intuitively feels a storm is coming.

Looking to the woods below, which is but one dense mass of foliage, I catch glimpses of troops in motion and change my point of observation. The line moves on as I supposed, and now, as I see it quit the works, the regular sway of that long, calm line assures me all will be well.

A quarter before five and my eyes had the long watched-for confirmation. Like the tiger from his lair, flushed with the ardor of confidence that knows no failure when the will commands, cheering lustily as throats e'er cheered, the men seem borne forward by some supernatural impetus. The hill is very steep, and the enemy has circled the point with a heavy line of rifle-pits. Firing almost ceases. Naught is heard to break the taxing stillness save an occasional exchange of shots between our daring skirmishers and the sharpshooters on the slope. Officers may be brave, *brilliant*, even in recklessness; and yet genuine fearlessness, the lion hearts, the dispassionate characters that love scenes where men pit their lives against the lives of other men merely for the novelty, for the satisfaction that follows a safe return, are oftener found in the ranks than elsewhere.

There were no cowards here. If the national cause could have been personated and could have witnessed the ascent as I did, the "well done" would have hailed the flag that Mitchell's gallant fellows planted on the rebel parapet that day.

While the rebel forces on the centre are employed in vigilantly preparing to oppose successful resistance to Davis and to such forces as we might hurl against the Gap, Willich, taking advantage of the diversion, ascends to the summit of Rocky Face, and asks that he be permitted to march steadily forward toward the Gap. The Fifteenth Wisconsin regiment—the original old Norwegians—ascended to the summit of the ridge and held it firmly until re-

lieved by General Newton under proper orders. Whether an opportunity was lost or not I do not presume to say publicly, for such criticism would seem to impugn the judgment of our leaders and lead to no good results. We shall see the result.

General Wood's division was taken from the left of Davis and placed in the centre, communicating with Newton, who still holds the summit of the mountain unable to advance against such superior numbers. Now it seems that the possession of the summit by sweeping its whole length if possible seems feasible, and Wood is ordered to demonstrate in front to attract the enemy, while Newton sallies out to press forward his lines. At half-past eight o'clock in the morning the firing opened with great severity, and Wood pushes his skirmishers to the very base of that lofty *façade* of solid rock, which, in the language of the General, "not even a cat could ascend."

The rebels, secure comparatively on their rocky eyry, hurled down upon our troops huge rocks and clubs and logs. The Thirty-fifth Illinois, of Willich's brigade, lost in this sham effort to scale an impassable barrier, over thirty men killed and wounded. The loss of the division in this demonstration numbered not less than eighty men. Arriving at the base of the towering cliffs from which the enemy's sharpshooters were picking off our men at a murderous rate and with a malicious pleasure, General Ward so reported, and the main force retired from easy range, leaving a line of skirmishers to answer the enemy's shots.

At ten minutes before nine o'clock the Ninety-sixth Illinois and Fifty-first Indiana regiments, of Whitaker's brigade, enter the forest on the slope of Rocky Face, just on the left of Davis, and at once engage the rebel skirmishers. Ten minutes later the firing becomes brisk. The enemy, holding a gorge, seems to have made a sally, and is determined to push our forces to the base again. The bugle sounds the "forward," and a portion of Cruft's brigade, that had up to this time been in reserve, moves across the open field and enters the fight.

Major Simonson trots out a section of the Fifth Indiana battery, which takes position just in front of General Stanley's headquarters in the open field, and, with the usual precision that marks the practice of this famous battery, a plentiful supply of shells is pitched among the jubilant Johnnies on the mountain, which is found wonderfully efficient in assisting them to the adoption of a lower pitch of voice and a loftier and securer perch among their rugged fastnesses.

Two guns of the Second Pennsylvania battery, planted to the left and rear of the former battery to command the enemy's position in the gorge, industriously hurl their iron missiles against the mountain, and so vigorously ply the work that no further effort on the enemy's part is made to affect our lodgment on the slope.

As I toiled along the rugged, rocky slope,

climbing to get a view of the cliffs and of the enemy's position, an excellent brass band, attached to General Beatty's brigade, strikes up a stirring national air. The rebels on the mountain, as if lacerated and provoked beyond suffering by the melody that filled the forest, stirred the sweetest echoes of the caverns, and, when an inequality in their rocky battlement softened and flushed it again, sending up in the blue expanse trilling as sweetly as an angel choir, and thrilling the hearts of the loyal and true, answered back the enchanting strains with a volley of bullets that crashed through the tree-tops and fell as harmless as pebbles around. Falling in that, they threw against the freighted air curses that could not but have been fresh coined in hell. The skirmishing grew brisker, and as I toiled along I could not but mark that as distance mellowed the strains of music the vicious crackle of the musketry lent, after all, an accompaniment that smacked of the musical.

Colonel La Grange, whose short experience has already won for him in the army a distinction that few enjoy, for cool calculating judgment in the hour of danger, and brilliant dashing valor in the hour of battle, I regret very much to say encountered an overwhelming force to-day near Poplar Spring, on the main road from Cleveland to Dalton, and was captured. His officers and men in referring to his personal intrepidity as displayed in the effort to-day to retrieve his fortunes after others had almost ceased to hope, pay the highest tribute to his character that could be tendered.

The Colonel has for a long time been commanding a brigade of cavalry in Colonel Ed. McCook's division, which I have referred to before as operating on Schofield's left. The particulars are not fully given as yet, and perhaps will not be accurately known until the official report is forwarded. From what I can gather, however, it seems that Colonel La Grange, isolated and acting somewhat independently of the main force, encountered a force of rebel skirmishers near Poplar Spring, and drove them to the shelter of a little fort. From all appearances and from such information as he could obtain from the citizens, the rebels had no force of consequence at the fort, and he determined to charge and take it.

The enemy, it appears, had concealed two regiments of infantry, that rose and poured in such a destructive fire that the line was forced to withdraw. In this encounter Colonel La Grange's horse was shot under him, and he received some painful bruises. On either flank, in addition to the infantry that lay in ambush, a force of cavalry, much superior in numbers to the brigade under La Grange, had been concealed up to this time, and now bore down upon his little force to crush it at a blow.

Equal to any emergency where personal bravery is required, the Colonel prepared to resist, and did fight manfully until overpowered. His horse falling caused his capture. He

lost, I am informed, over a hundred men, killed wounded, and missing.

Leaving the left for the time to visit the right and centre, we leave Schofield in his old position, Newton on the mountain, Wood and Stanley on the slope, and Davis confronting the Gap from the sentinel hills at its entrance.

Rocky Face Ridge suffers an abrupt depression at Buzzard Roost, and, curving to the east in the shape of a horse-shoe, rises again to the same lofty altitude and courses toward the south. The railroad that crosses the ridge to Dalton, just here passes between the two hills Davis carried, touching the one on the right. Between the road and hill on the left, which is bisected by a gorge, runs a tortuous little water course, which, at every crossing between our lines and the rebel works, was so firmly dammed with logs, stones, and earth, that the valley around was flooded to such a depth as to make an assault impracticable. Along the slope of the continuation of Rocky Face, on the right of the gap looking eastward along the road, and on the slope to the left, it was determined to make a simultaneous advance this afternoon, and Colonel Scribner's brigade of Johnson's division, and Morgan's brigade of Davis' division, were the attacking forces. It was late in the afternoon when the fighting began. The rebels on the loftiest pinnacle of the Chattanooga Range had planted a battery of four or five guns, and they used them with good effect.

Colonel Scribner's charge was characterized, as far as the troops are concerned, by the same tireless energy and fearless will to accomplish whatever task is set before them that has ever earned for them the confidence of commanders and the gratitude of the people. To say that Colonel Scribner himself bore his part unflinchingly, and evinced a clearness of judgment that fits him for the command of even more than a brigade, would be saying that which is so well known that it might be censured as a superfluity. I did not learn his loss. I saw the fighting, and when I commend him and his brigade I speak "that which I do know" he well deserves.

Colonel Hambright accompanied the brigade while charging, under command of Colonel Scribner, and was struck by a piece of shell in the head. There was universal regret in the army over his misfortune, for few men are more highly esteemed for his multitude of shining qualities of heart and head than Colonel Hambright.

The mill on the left slope was a kind of partnership affair; and, as in matters so amicably conducted by the Generals, where one of the party steps in and gets pummelled awhile and *kindly* retires, to let his neighbor at his elbow feel a few stunning counters, no one with prudence will interfere without common consent, I prefer not to dispense the honors, according to my judgment, least I should drop the wreath

where it does not properly belong. There may have been an object in that outlandish medley of musketry, artillery, shouts, cheers, commands, etc., etc., but not knowing the object, of course I can't properly gauge the success.

Geary's struggle for Dug Gap was perhaps one of the stubbornest conflicts of the campaign, and certainly in boldness is surpassed by none. During the afternoon of to-day General Geary, with two brigades (Buschbeck's and Candy's), made an effort to carry one of the most rugged and scraggy heights along the Chattoogata range. Dug Gap is in what the citizens call John's Mountain. I learn from a deserter, who, by the way, was exceedingly intelligent, that the rebels regarded that gap as of great importance, and yet, from the impregnable character of the place, up to the time Geary suffered his first repulse, and until *after* that, the place was held by but one brigade (once the famous McNair's), now commanded by the rebel General Reynolds.

The brigade consists of the First and Second Arkansas regiments and the Eighth Mississippi. It was feared that Geary would renew the assault, and Cleburne's brigade reinforced the enemy. Not possessed of the gift of ubiquity, I cannot be at every point along the line, the right and left of which are fourteen miles apart, and hence I was unable to witness what is pictured to me as one of the boldest and most pertinacious struggles for the numbers engaged during the war. The story of the ascent—how coolly they bared their breasts to the rebel volleys that swept the rugged steep—how long and gallantly they clung to the hazardous and almost hopeless effort to gain the top, and how at last the stalwart little band retired but to return again, and again to return unsuccessful—is only a repetition of what has occurred and been read of a hundred times since the war began. "I will not weary you with the details, but return to Buzzard Roost.

This was the entertainment to which I was treated an hour or so before retiring to-night. Morgan, the common, unassuming, old farmer-warrior, was still fighting under the dark foliage of the mountain slope on Davis' left.

Our artillerists are a set of tireless fellows who want no better fun than what they call "plugging the rebels," and would, if they had ammunition enough, begin at the top of Rocky Face and shoot the whole mountain away in a very few days. The rebels from their cloud battery were plugging shells through what seemed a cloud in our direction until long into dark. Not a breeze was stirring. Camp fires blazed all through the valley, and as the mountain battery would discharge its missile a long bright sheet of sparks would shoot down the rocks as if some one had thrown out into the darkness a crucible of molten iron.

There is poetry in war, but isn't it more enjoyable in a book on a sofa in a neat, cozy room? What do the drafted men say?

Operations on the tenth.

A heavy, beating rain fell to-day, and refused to even the sharpshooters an opportunity to spoil each other's physiognomies.

Yesterday our pioneers and artillerists were busily employed in dragging artillery up the precipitous sides of the little hills at the entrance to the gap, for the purpose of silencing the enemy's guns on the points of the mountains on either hand.

Just after daybreak an order embodying the news of General Grant's victories in the East was read to the troops, and then all through the numberless valleys and ravines echoed and re-echoed the glad and hearty shouts of the joyous soldiery.

The rebels swarmed on the very top of their parapets, and in sullen wonderment looked on, guessing what news, and no doubt cursing that any should come that would elicit a shout from the Yankees.

Enemy opened out this morning more heavily than ever with artillery, evidently to learn where our newly planted batteries were. All the forenoon busily toiled the men, digging, tugging, hauling, and cutting, and just after noon displayed, much I apprehend to rebel chagrin, the number and calibre of our guns, and the superb manner in which they may be handled.

Operations on the eleventh.

Clouds were still sailing overhead portending another storm. All day the musketry rattles as before. The artillery now and then bellows and answers back. Misty, drizzling showers succeed each other, and through the fog the flame that shouts from the rebel mountain guns, glares fiercely over us.

General Dodge, in command of all the troops of the Sixteenth army corps available in the present contingency, is ordered to pass through Snake Creek Gap, hurry forward to Resacca, and if possible cut the railroad and hold the works. General Sweeney, with the Second division, led the advance. From the moment the movement began, the enemy's skirmishers displayed a determination to oppose all the resistance possible against so superior a force, and succeeded in wounding numbers of good men during the advance.

Colonel Phillips' Ninth Illinois mounted infantry was skirmishing in front. The Colonel's horse was killed under him, and he himself was too badly wounded to support himself in the saddle. Covered in front by a light force of cavalry the division continued to move toward Resacca. Passing the junction of the Dalton and Resacca roads the column was greeted, much to its surprise, with a shower of shell from a rebel battery on the ridge directly in front, afterwards occupied by batteries of the Fifteenth corps.

The advance force consisted of the Sixty-sixth Illinois sharpshooters, the Eighty-first Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Bob Adams command-

ing, and the Seventh Iowa. They moved straight up to the ridge from which the rebels opened on us in the advance. The enemy, unsupported by infantry of any number or importance, hurriedly vacated the summit, and carried with them the little howitzers.

Sweeping around the Resacca road, the column moved forward toward the gap, through which leads the wagon road to the town. Just to the left of the road stands a bald knob, from which the rebel artillery again opened, but which the industry and skill of our sharpshooters compelled the enemy to leave. The knob was then possessed, and the enemy, with a few pieces from the forts near the town, thundered away until nightfall.

General Dodge did not regard his flanks as sufficiently protected to warrant an attempt to possess the town, or even to remain and hold the heights, and he retired under cover of the night to the main force at Snake Creek Gap, where, by this time, Logan's Fifteenth corps was rapidly arriving.

To whose account must be credited a woful failure I shall not determine. That some one is censurable for our failure to cut the railroad at and hold Resacca there seems to me to be no manner of doubt.

Operations on the twelfth.

In obedience to orders from the General commanding, this morning, cool and pleasant, with excellent roads, the Fourteenth corps moves from Buzzard Roost, and following the Twentieth, hurries forward to Snake Creek Gap.

While this concentration of the armies is going on, Kilpatrick determines to reconnoitre in the direction of Dalton, which is now almost eighteen miles north of us.

Leaving the Third Kentucky, under command of Major Wolfey, to picket and hold the Resacca road, the General, with Colonel Murray's brigade, leaves our outer barricade, and bears towards the enemy. He is soon engaged, but lightly, however, and the Ninety-third Illinois, Colonel Atkins' mounted infantry, drives the rebels rapidly before it. The losses were light on both sides, and the boys professed themselves highly disappointed.

Operations on the thirteenth.

At six o'clock the cavalry left camp, and took the advance toward Resacca, General Kilpatrick leading the van. Skirmishers were deployed at the picket line, and, though the enemy fought stubbornly, he was pushed persistently back. The country here on either hand is very hilly, rough, and broken, and is covered with pine jungles and brush thickets, through which it is almost impossible to penetrate on horseback. Through this dense undergrowth, however, our cavalry pushed the enemy foot by foot, Kilpatrick busily riding the lines, superintending the work, and cheering the boys.

I admire, and so does the world, the man who,

fearless when duty calls, steps forward to place, and holds ever a dauntless front to the enemy. But in all candor, and that can springs from my esteem and admiration for a man, I cannot see the good to be accomplished by General Kilpatrick's constantly galloping and down the skirmish line in full view of the enemy, who want nothing better than an opportunity now and then to send a bullet through one of our general officers. His command might just as readily be carried front in the usual manner, and he remain somewhat retired. However, in my regret for the General's fall find myself turning critic.

General Kilpatrick, accompanied by his faithful staff officer, Captain H. E. Stansbury, endeavoring to find through the pine thickets the direction of his skirmish line, when it came suddenly upon a party of rebels lying in wait for him. So near were the rebels that rising, one of them struck Captain Stansbury's horse with his gun. The escape of the colonel with their lives is certainly miraculous.

General Logan, with Osterhaus and Harrow of the Fifteenth, is seen arriving, and soon begins to form his line just at the intersection of Dalton and Resacca roads.

Troops are manœuvred with great difficulty in a densely wooded and rolling country, hence we leave the infantry to form its line of battle.

Colonel Murray assumed command of the division, and upon Colonel Atkins, of the Ninth Illinois, devolved the command of Colonel Murray's brigade. A force of cavalry is at once ordered out on the main Dalton road, and an outpost is at Holcomb's, three miles from Resacca.

At 2:30 p. m. General Osterhaus is ordered forward toward Resacca. General M. L. Smith's division climbs to the summit of the ridge front, and Harrow is held in reserve on the left.

The skirmishers of General Osterhaus' division are soon engaged, but the line scarcely halts. The firing is desultory along the entire front, and with but very little difficulty we gain the curve of the road, just where it sweeps around the point of the ridge and passes through the gap. To the left of the road on the bald knob taken by Dodge, on the eleventh, the enemy has two guns, and opened viciously as our skirmishers, moving from the cover of the ridge, exposed themselves in the open fields.

The line was halted, and a few minutes before three o'clock Griffith's First Iowa battery answering the iron compliments of our malic brothers *in kind*. The artillery "mill" continued for a half hour, when the bugle sounds the advance for the skirmishers, and the line steamed coolly, bravely goes forward.

The Twenty-seventh Missouri, Colonel C. of General Wood's brigade, rises the bald knob and drags up its declivitous sides the First Indiana battery. Scarcely have the guns been placed in position when a terrible concentration of fire of artillery from the forts near the

sweeps the hill. Never, during all my experience, have I witnessed such a storm of shell and shot of every character as on that day tore the earth and shivered the trees on the little knob held by the Twenty-seventh Missouri. No musician extant could allot to its proper place in any diapason known the perfectly incredible and inconceivable variations in sound that on that day floated through the valleys of Oostanaula. Ear never before heard, I am sure, such a perfectly hideous transfusion and jumble of noises, such a perfect salmagundi of screeches, hisses, howls, rolls, yells, thuds, and even whispers, as was heard on that occasion.

Shortly after three o'clock Colonel Williams' brigade of Harrison's division emerges from the wooded hill to the left of the road, and swinging round to the left of the bald knob, enters the fight. His right is in an open field, but his left is somewhat sheltered by the forest. From the time the brigade entered into action until five o'clock in the evening it battles and bleeds, and at nightfall bearing with it five wounded officers, one killed, eighty-two wounded soldiers, and fourteen killed.

The figures speak for the gallantry of the brigade, and every regiment of which fought with all the bravery and tenacity that the occasion demanded. To this brigade the famous Irish regiment (the Ninetieth Illinois) belongs. It is indeed a proud spectacle to see America's adopted sons from the Emerald Isle baring their breasts in battle with the colors of the Union and the green flag of Ireland floating side by side.

As I looked upon the bronzed and bloody faces of the heroes borne upon litters from the field, I could not but regret that the monuments that Irish bravery had reared on every soil the sun of heaven shines upon should not be planted on their native soil, among a people united in heart and hand as when Erin's bards sang of Ireland's independence, and told in song the story of brave deeds wrought by her brave sons.

Evening came on; thousands of camp-fires shot their bright beams through the darkness from every knoll and depression in the plain; long, thin, spiral columns creep upward through the twilight, and all around, far as the eye can reach, busy thousands, just returned from battle, are preparing their frugal meals; wagons and artillery and horses and men are moving over the plain, their voices and noises commingling to make one continuous din. What a change!

"But yester eve, so motionless around,
So mute was this wide plain, that not a sound
But the far torrent, or the forest bird,
Hunting among the thickets, could be heard."

The line to-night was as follows: General M. L. Smith held the ridge to the right of the road. Two pieces of the Fourth Ohio battery occupied the hill immediately next in order to Bald Knob, on the opposite side of the road, and the First Indiana still held Bald Knob.

Supporting the First Indiana, lay along the foot of the hill General Ward's brigade of Harrison's division. Colonel Walcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, with his brigade, relieved Colonel Williams. A gap between General Johnson and the Fifteenth corps was supplied for the night by throwing into it General Daniel Butterfield's division of the Twentieth corps, and so let us look into the operations on the fourteenth.

Johnson's left was too far out of line, and he determined to swing around and align with Butterfield, pushing up further towards the brink of the ridge, which at this point is very precipitous. The line was early in motion, and the progress, though disputed, was steady.

Before I refer to the charge made by Judah, and gloriously supported by Turchin, of Baird's division, let us, after the shifting and manœuvrings of the few past hours, look again at the line, and notice the position of the forces.

We have already seen that Johnson was successful in rectifying or straightening his line. His left, then held by King, touched Baird's right, held by Van Derveer. Turchin, on Baird's left, joined Hascall, the right of General Judah's line, and Este, of Baird's division, lay in reserve.

Take, for instance, the letter L. Let the longer stroke represent a ridge about five miles in length, the shorter one the ridge occupied by the Fifteenth army corps, and running a distance of two and a half or three miles, to the Oostanaula. Place the letter so that the longer ridge inclines a little to the northwest. Now grasp the shortest stroke and pull it back so as to add to the angle it makes with the longer at least fifteen degrees. Now imagine enough of the ridges at the angle cut away to measure two hundred yards, and you have our line of battle at Resacca. In this open space of the angle is where Colonel Williams' brigade fought so long and lost so heavily.

The rebel line of works run along the summit of a ridge of almost equal altitude, and as nearly parallel to the one occupied by the Federal forces as two ridges ever were. They are separated by a narrow valley not more than six hundred yards in width, measuring from base to base. Two water courses traverse the valley. One hugs the base of the Union ridge, venturing out only now and then, and then only apparently to water some little willow copse. The other is a serpentine little stream, winding about in more contortions than a reptile could display in a lifetime, and finally joins the other at the farther extremity of the valley.

The rebel ridge is unbroken save at the extreme right, where a gap admits the Dalton road. Ours is broken in two places, at the angle and about half way down the line. Just where the ridge is broken in the centre, terminated Baird's line on the terminus of the part next the angle. Judah's line began just on the point of the continuation. The opening here is perhaps two hundred yards in width.

Standing in an open wheat field near the cut in the ridge, and looking towards the long white serrated parapets on the heights opposite, screened by a thicket of young pines and a clump of tall forest trees, is a battery, which, from the conformation of the hill, has an enfilading fire on a portion of our rifle-pits, and on any force attempting to charge across the valley. It was determined, therefore, to assault, and, if possible, carry this work.

At 1:30 p. m. General Judah was directed to lead a column against the heights, and Turchin descending the precipice in his front was to form in line and move to his support. At the same time, by way of diversion, Johnson was to quit his line and charge the heights immediately opposite.

The forces advanced under a terrific hail of bullets, shells, grape, and deathly missiles of every character, in the following order:

Hascall, of Judah's line, lapped Turchin's left in front. The right of Turchin and the left of Judah were somewhat screened, while the flanks lapping were exposed to a seething fire. There was no lagging. The colors of every regiment went right along to the base of the stronghold, and until the men were sheltered by the front from the artillery, which could not be sufficiently depressed to do them harm. Now from every angle along the line within range of the stormers poured down the merciless sleet of bullets. Artillery opens on both sides, and the whole valley is filled with the dun, sulphurous smoke, through which the steady assailants move more like churchyard ghouls or gnomes than human beings, braving the terrors of our modern Mars.

A half hour later, and the quick, sharp volleys, further to the right, announce that Johnson is on the move. He, too, with banners flying, and covered by the plunging shell and canister, is fighting his way across the valley with the object of assaulting the enemy's works. As the line left the slope on the perilous charge, Captain Irvine McDowell, of the Fifteenth Kentucky, than whom, for bravery and exemplary qualities of heart, no man in the division was more highly esteemed, dropped from the line a bloody corpse. Here, too, in this charge, memorable ever as connected with that bloody assault of Judah and Turchin, fell Captain Potrel and Lieutenant Higby, the latter of the Thirty-third Ohio.

Johnson, unable to scale the hill, retires, and the enemy, pouring over his works, form in line to charge him. Facing about the thrilling "forward" rings again along the line, and Johnson's men have again scattered, as the wind scatters the straws before it, the presumptuous graycoats that thought to follow him.

Let us return again to the assailants under Judah and Turchin. Still persistently the column clings to the slope, and seems determined to have the fort if fighting will suffice to capture it. Now and then the sulphur cloak that obscures and at times hides them from view

floats off on the breeze, and clear and bright above the line that sways first to the right then to the left, now advances, now retires, but still bleeds on, floats, and flaps our flag so plainly that I half imagine I can hear the rustle of its silken folds.

For one long hour this contest raged, and these sturdy heroes that would not waver labored and struggled to gain the top. The odds was too great, however, and the column, torn and mangled, fell back to our works on the ridge.

A party of officers, among whom were General Schofield, Palmer, Thomas, Elliott, and Whipple, were standing in the open field to which I have referred, just in front of the gap in the ridge; a rebel gunner discovering the group trained his gun and sent a round shot whizzing within a few feet of the knarled and knotty old war horse, on whose countenance and gray hairs I never look but in reverence, for there is sound, tried, genuine military ability. The effect of the shot after deigning first to spare the head of Captain Snodgrass, that it actually endangered, was to cause what the boys call a "scatterment."

Captain Ingalls, who was serving on General Schofield's staff, was torn to pieces by a shell, a short distance from the spot just referred to.

Stanley, who is being hard pressed, sends hastily for aid, declaring that the enemy is massing with the aim of turning our left. Hooker is called on, and prompt and eager as though not half the years that his gray locks denote had passed over him, he is in the saddle and shortly leads reinforcements to the left.

Anxious to witness the struggle, should any come, I accompanied Lieutenant Shaw, of General Elliott's staff, towards the left. On the way we meet General Stanley and staff, their horses all afoam, galloping toward the left to bring up the reinforcements. He soon meets Hooker and his troops, and proposes to lead them down a dark and narrow gorge, by a nearer route, to join and assist the left.

The mingled sound of cheers and musketry is distinctly heard, darkness is fast approaching, and, descending the slope as rapidly as the nature of the ground would permit, we are soon in an open field. This field contains about ten acres, is rectangular in shape, and in the centre, on a knoll, Major Simonson has planted the Fifth Indiana battery, better known as the "Old Simonson battery." In front, after passing over the open ground, runs a succession of very high hills. One of these is called "Round Hill." Stanley pushed his division up this and occupied it all the afternoon. The enemy, finding our left weak, determined to mass against it, and, if possible, crush it before nightfall.

Their onslaught had been boldly met and once or twice repulsed. Numbers, however, will at times prevail over tenacity and courage, and so it was with Stanley. The forces that were broken were defeated by force of numbers, and once disordered, that portion of

it was impossible to rally to effective resistance.

The condition was indeed critical. Our troops came out of the woods in confusion and poured over the barricade and towards the guns. The enemy's skirmishers appeared at the edge of the forest and then the batteries' thunders spoke. Shell and shot whistled so keenly about the rebels' ears that they did not care to expose themselves in the open field. Marching by right flank Stewart led his forces under cover of the ridge, the rebels' lines started and reformed in line of battle, and determinedly pushed forward to take the battery. The rebel command to charge rang out on the evening air; as I anticipated, the remnants of the flight that were gathered behind the barricade to support the guns, fled without firing a gun. Fled did I say? No; there was one who did not flee, and his name should be treasured in the reports among those of the *hero boys* who at times of sorest need have shown by their unflinching firmness, amid dangers that appal the hearts of men, that they are worthy the honors that men wear.

Jonas Perkins, Company D, of the One Hundred and Eighth Ohio, performed an act of heroism on that occasion that entitles him to an acknowledgment from the General commanding, and to whatever mark of confidence and esteem he in the exercise of his influence can secure for him.

Huddled, not *aligned* behind the rails near the battery, were at least a hundred men who had been driven there by the officers on duty after having been demoralized in fight. When the rebel line a second time started on a charge—this time to take a battery and destroy the last hope for holding the left—they gave way and ran.

Jonas Perkins, a boy about seventeen years of age in appearance, but a *full-grown man* in action, stood alone and at his post. The cannoner at post No. 3 was struck by a Minié ball and disabled. Young Perkins leaned his gun against the barricade, and there amid the thunders of six guns when stout hearts were failing and all seemed lost, when that little cove darkened by the smoke of battle was ringing with the lusty cheers of the enemy, he stepped up and asked the Captain if he might take the post of the fallen man, and throughout the action bore himself as nobly as the noblest. Simonson, the very embodiment of bravery, stood firmly at his guns and hurled across the plain his double-shotted canister. A cheer is heard at last, and down the gorge comes Robinson's brigade of Williams' division, who, on hurrying to the barricade, soon thrust back the eager assailants and closed the contest.

At five and a half o'clock in the evening, General M. L. Smith, with one brigade on the right, and General Osterhaus, with Wood's brigade on the left, descended from the hills, and charging across the undulating country in his front, carried the first line of the enemy's

rifle-pits between us and his main works around Resacca. The rebels retiring to their main line, are reinforced, and returning with cheers, charge up to the very ditch, but are repulsed. At nightfall, finding that the enemy's guns, from a fort to the left of the town, enfiladed the lines, it was determined to add to the depth of the pits and throw up traverses.

So determined had been the charge of the rebel line to retake their works, that one fell with his head actually hanging over the edge of the ditch. In deepening them the dirt thrown up buried him, save his feet, and to-day his shoes may be seen sticking from the breast-works, in attempting to storm which he became a part.

About ten o'clock at night French's rebel division stole stealthily towards our line, and advancing by column, attempted to turn our left. A fresh brigade from the heights was hurried across the rolling ground below, and succeeded after a desperate conflict in driving the enemy back.

The struggle seen from the hills was grand beyond description. Lifted above a line of battle the musketry seems like hammers, and the sea of sparks that fall from the flame as it leaps from the muzzle like so many sparks from an anvil. To see a whole line firing, not by volley, but as rapidly as the men may load, and at night the line of flame looks like glowing chain-work that artisans are welding at the forge. Listen to it attentively and one would say that there are anvils employed of different weights. Some have a tinkling treble, and others have a hoarse dull bass. Mingle with this now the bellowsings of the artillery, and the chime makes real music.

With the object of throwing Garrard's cavalry across the Oostanaula, the second division of the Sixteenth was ordered down to lay pontoons. The enemy was found on the opposite bank, and a sharp fight ensued. Artillery was brought up, the enemy was dispersed, and at four o'clock the pontoons were down, and the cavalry was crossing.

The cavalry once across, General Sweeney crossed with his infantry, and threw up good works to protect the boats.

Thus closed the fighting on the sixteenth.

As I pass around the camp, even among those who have come out from the fiery ordeal unscathed, are not a few making the hours speed in hilarity as though Momus were indeed holding court instead of Mars.

Operations on the fifteenth.

Musketry begins at daylight again. I hear it last when I go to sleep and first when I waken. There is a haze floating through the atmosphere, and the sun this morning is the blood-red orb that rose on Chickamanga. May its setting leave to rest and night our troops victorious, was said more than once that morning, for we all knew there would be fighting—hard, bloody fighting, done that day.

Where? Was the question every one asked and no one replied, except to guess. No troops were stirring. It was a quiet morning indeed.

General Sherman was seen going to the left, and General Thomas, the staid old adviser of Rosecrans, and who is the most intimate and respected adviser of General Sherman, was seen jogging quietly in the same direction. It was determined at last by General Sherman that a high knob, the slope of which was covered with a dense growth of underbrush, should be carried by assault.

Brigadier-General Ward, the rough, stern old Kentuckian, who commands a brigade in Butterfield's division, was chosen to perform the work, and it delighted him. The assaulting force was formed in column of battalion, the Seventieth Indiana taking the lead, followed in turn by the other regiments of the brigade. General Coburn's brigade was to have been held in reserve, but afterwards participated. Colonel Wood's brigade participated also in the grand assault. General Ward moved his brigade, which he had formed under cover of the woods, out into the open field, and prepared to move towards the knob. On the very summit of this almost inaccessible knob the enemy had constructed a redoubt for four guns. No sooner had Ward's troops emerged into the open ground beyond the works, when the little redoubt belched forth a torrent of missiles that overshot the column and failed to injure a man. From the rebel rifle-pits on the right flank, however, and from the rebel infantry on the knoll, came a sleet of bullets, in which it seemed almost, if not quite miraculous that anything could live. Through all this the column pressed, the Seventieth Indiana rising the slope, entering the thicket, and pushing towards the redoubt. The artillerists apply their matches to no effect; up go the men; they enter embrasures, shoot the gunners at their work, and the flag floats from the parapet.

General Ward is severely wounded in the charge, and upon the young and gallant Harrison devolves the command of the brigade.

Just in rear of the redoubt runs a splendid line of rifle-pits, rising from behind, from which the rebels pour in such withering volleys that we were forced to retire from the work. Through the interstices, now and then, as the breeze carries off the sulphur cloud, the flag is seen waved by the faithful color-bearer.

Finding that the brigade was not strong enough to carry the rifle-pits, Colonel Harrison determined to withdraw the troops under cover of the fort and hill.

As we were leaving, the rebels, thinking we had been repulsed, cheered lustily. This stung the gallant color-bearer Hees, of the One Hundred and Twenty-ninth Illinois, and springing back to the embrasure again stood and floated the colors defiantly at the enemy. Brave fellow, his death atoned his rashness. A rebel, levelling his musket, shot him through his heart. There were other hands to grasp the flag, and it came

back only to return and wave from the very spot where its former bearer fell.

The boys were determined not to let the guns slip from their grasp, and about three hundred huddled under cover of the redoubt, and picked off every enemy that made an effort to take them out. Was ever battery in such an anomalous position? Within grasp almost of two parties, and yet it would be almost death to either to attempt their seizure. There with straining eyes lay the disputants hour after hour, killing and maiming each other, and yet both determinedly clinging to the trophy. After dark the rebels made a charge for the battery, but the staunch three hundred drove them back and retained possession.

About eleven o'clock at night the three hundred men were released by a detail, which with spades widened the embrasures and dragged out the guns.

The loss of the brigade in this brilliant affair was almost four hundred men.

General Harrison, grandson of the old President, in whose veins courses the same patriotic ardor that so distinguished his grandfather, made application in conjunction with General Ward for permission to charge the enemy's main line in rear of the redoubt, but the General regarded the sacrifice as unnecessary, and the request was not granted.

Colonels Coburn and Wood, each of whom fought brigades on the left of Ward, suffered heavy losses, and reaped honors that will not soon fade.

General Geary, who attacked the enemy, was in turn attacked further to the left, also suffered heavy losses, but he has the satisfaction of knowing by the best evidence in the world, the bodies of the slain that were strewn over the ground in the morning, that he wreaked terrible vengeance for the blood he lost.

Of all the fearful things in the world a night attack, I truly believe, is most dreaded by the soldier. Between eleven and twelve o'clock to-night our whole line was roused to arms by volleys of musketry and the deafening cheers of the charging enemy. The most exciting and most demoralizing rumors imaginable took wing at once, and the uproar was indescribably bewildering. Were you ever thrown under the influences of a night assault? Well, if you were not you don't know what a "skeer" is, then, at all. Did you ever put on boots, vest, coat, and hat, wrap up your blankets, run a mile in a circle in search of your horse, find him, strap on the saddle, and mount in less than four minutes and a half? Well, I think I did on the night of the grand sham assault. All night the rebels worked like beavers, chopping and swearing (especially the latter), and apparently rolling logs.

The morning of the sixteenth my ears were greeted by the same sounds of musketry, but they were from our skirmishers who were endeavoring "to wake the Johnnies up," as they expressed it. The Johnnies were all gone, however, safe over the Oostanula. They had

burned the bridge as they left, and we were behind holding the bag. If I was familiar with Johnson, I'd say: "Pretty sharp. Joe, and I'd carry the joke no further."

Here along the road on the slopes, in the redoubt, and through the thickets, lay the dead and mangled. In one house not far distant from the scene of conflict the rebels had huddled at least twenty ambulance loads of wounded. But to the hill. Here in front of Ward and Coburn, and Wood and Geary, the dead were numerous. We found one dead Colonel, but on his person no marks or papers by which to recognize him.

A short distance from the battle-field lived a family that had members in the rebel army, and it was supposed they were in this battle. The mother and sisters were searching the thickets and looking into the faces of the dead in feverish anxiety to know whether their dear ones were among the number who should never wake again to earth's reveille.

At the foot of the hill, near a long row of dead men laid out for burial, stood the four guns, to capture or retain which all these lives were paid. The boys of the brigade felt and examined every piece of mechanism, point, or clasp, or ring. A soldier was astraddle every piece, and some supported two. They would step about, and scrutinize and talk about them fully as proud of them as an affianced bride would be of a charming trousseau.

In front of Logan's line even more ghastly sights were seen than on the enemy's right. The dead that lay here had lain for two days, and were badly swollen. They were lying in the ditches, on the knolls near the works, in the ravines, in every conceivable place, and in every possible shape. As I travelled among the corpses on the night of the sixteenth instant, just above me on a knoll a party of church members were singing a hymn. A few feet from them lay the corpse of an old bald-headed man. There was a strange contrast between the mellow sweetness of their voices chanting a hymn, and the cold, rigid features and the glassy glare of the eyeballs, as the moonbeams fell upon them. There was too much food for solemn thought. Death, to which we all must come at last, and they who were preparing for it.

On a little knoll we found three bodies. Wild flowers of every hue were blooming here as though nature had decked these rolling green swards for a gala day. To descend from the knolls into the thickets to hunt dead men was the straw too much for my curiosity, and I returned to camp to revisit the field in dreams.

Lieutenant Shaw, on the staff of General Elliott, Chief of Cavalry of the Department of the Cumberland, was very conspicuous on the field bearing orders, and in making and reporting observations. Always cool amidst danger, and remarkably concise, he is worthy of the many compliments that were paid him during the four memorable days before Resacca.

Mr. C. F. Wagner of New York, for a long

time connected with the army as Sutler of the Nineteenth regular infantry, performed praiseworthy service as a volunteer aid on the staff of General R. W. Johnson. He flinched from no duty, encountered danger, and performed every task with satisfaction to the General.

Major Connolly, of General Baird's staff, is equally deserving of commendation for his attention to duty and unflinching bravery.

Our losses from the seventh up to the sixteenth, will amount to at least four thousand men.

The enemy's loss will, I apprehend, not exceed in killed, wounded, and missing, twenty-five hundred, as he fought mostly behind breast-works.

A. J. DAUGHERTY.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

RESACCA, GA., May 17.

The preliminary operations of General Sherman's campaign are already known to the public—the massing of General Thomas' army at Chattanooga; the advance to Ringgold, and the passage of Taylor's Ridge; the march of McPherson from Huntsville, Decatur, and other places, towards the great theatre of operations in North Georgia; the descent of Schofield from East Tennessee to form part of the left of the grand army—all these things are known.

Equally well understood are the next series of movements—the march from the eastern foot of Taylor's Ridge to the western base of the Chattanooga Mountain; the occupation of the town of Tunnel by a portion of Palmer's corps; the retreat of the enemy, after some insignificant skirmishing, from the Tunnel Hill range of eminences; the movement of Schofield and Newton along the east side of Rocky Face, a part of Chattanooga Mountain; the ascent of the northern slope of the ridge by Harker, until stopped by an almost impassable ravine, across which the enemy opened a fierce fire; the splendid achievement of Colonel John G. Mitchell, in driving the rebels from the mouth of Buzzard Roost Gap, taking possession of three hills at its western entrance, thus closing it as effectually against the rebels, should they attempt to assail our rear through it, as they had closed it against any direct advance of ours upon Dalton; the fearless charge of Colonel B. F. Scribner across some open fields to the right of the gap, by which he cleared everything except the ridge itself of the rebel sharpshooters, and then retired with his troops orderly, as if on parade, although exposed to a plunging fire from six pieces of artillery on the summit of Rocky Face; the brave but unavailing effort of General Geary to penetrate the enemy's strong barrier by way of Dug Gap. I cannot now pause to dwell upon any of these. Hereafter, even the hurried correspondent, grasping at events as they pass, may find time and opportunity to notice some of them at greater length.

But no one of these achievements, nor all of

them combined, had or could put us in possession of Rocky Face Ridge, the impregnable rampart upon and behind which the rebels lay, and which we must either penetrate or turn ere we could ever hope to see Dalton. Boldly and abruptly the ridge rises out of the valley, covered to its summit with a thick growth of pines, and traversed by innumerable ravines. Two-thirds of the way up the individual seeking to ascend is met by a stupendous cliff, rising perpendicularly to a height ranging from twenty to sixty feet, according to locality. Could we hope to storm this ridge? A line of skirmishers could defend it against a host. Could we hope to pass through Buzzard Roost Gap, lined as it was with rifle-pits and cannon? Annihilation awaited the force that should attempt it. Could Schofield proceed down the valley, along the east side of the ridge, and effect an entrance into Dalton in that way? By so doing he would cut himself off from support by the rest of the army, and probably be crushed by the enemy massing his forces against him. Besides, before going far upon his way, he would find another gorge almost as easily defensible as that of Buzzard Roost.

All this we had discovered last February, when Palmer, under the direction of Thomas, reconnoitred that stronghold of the enemy; but it is sometimes well to learn a lesson a second time. Four days we lay at the foot of Rocky Face, engaged in almost incessant skirmishing with the enemy's sharpshooters, effecting little or nothing toward the accomplishment of our object, and losing about eight hundred men.

But a blow was about being struck in another direction. Twelve or fifteen miles south of Buzzard Roost is a long oblique cut in Chattanooga Mountain, called Snake Creek Gap, from a small stream which, running through the cut in a south-east direction, finds its way into the Oostenaule below Resacca. Thither McPherson, with parts of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth corps, wended his way, after passing through Ship Gap in Taylor's Ridge, and marching by the town of Villanow. It was on Monday, the ninth of May, when he reached the western entrance of Snake Creek Gap, and prepared to wrest it from the enemy. Singularly enough, it had been left both unfortified and unguarded by the rebels; a brigade which was hurried forward to dispute McPherson's passage, came too late; and ere the day was closed, that General found himself in full possession of this important pass, with scarcely the firing of a gun. On Tuesday, the tenth, General Dodge, with two divisions of the Sixteenth corps, closely supported by General Logan, with the Fifteenth, moved from the mouth of the gap, passed the Sugar Valley Post Office, drove in some small bodies of rebel skirmishers, and actually advanced to the range of hills which, in this direction, overlook Resacca. There were the enemy's formidable lines of works in open view; not so strong, indeed, as they were afterwards found to be, formidable nevertheless even at that

time. Had General Dodge thought best to do so, or had General McPherson deemed it prudent, we might then have occupied these works; for they were defended by only a couple of the enemy's brigades. The reason we did not then take possession of Resacca, is probably because it was not at that time determined by the commanding General to make his principal attack upon the enemy's left wing.

A portion of Hooker's corps went down to the gap on the eleventh, and passed through.

On the morning of the twelfth, the Fourteenth corps, General Palmer, began its march for the same locality, Geary's division, of Hooker's corps, preceded; Schofield's corps and Newton's division, of Howard's, followed. Stanley relieved Davis at the mouth of Buzzard Roost Gap, and Wood shifted down toward the right to support Stanley, ready to carry these two divisions into Dalton as soon as the attack upon the rebel left should compel them to withdraw from Buzzard Roost. As long as the great movement toward Snake Creek Gap was going on, it was Howard's business to keep up as much noise as possible at Buzzard's Roost, in order to deceive the enemy as to what was taking place, and make him believe as long as possible that the assault was to be made directly in front. Accordingly, long after we had left Buzzard Roost, on the morning of the twelfth, we could hear Howard's cannon pounding away lively as ever.

All along the road to Snake Creek Gap I found the country deserted, as usual, when our army first passes through; and the members of the only family I saw in the entire fifteen miles' ride to Snake Creek Gap, gave me in answer to my question, "Where are the people gone?" the invariable answer "Down below!" meaning, of course, further South. The head of this family was a villainous looking fellow, with rebel, *rebel*, depicted in unmistakable lineaments all over his countenance. It is very silly for any of the people to run away from their homes on the approach of the Union army, but I could not avoid thinking that this fellow remained behind from pure impudence. "I don't see," said he to me, "what all you folks are going to do down thar. I reckon if all that have passed here in the last two days are thar now, they must be piled on top of one another!" "I reckon," said I, a little nettled, "that when they get ready they'll go through the Gap to the other side." "If they do they'll get hurt!" was his cool rejoinder, and I could not prevent a smile as I found myself unable to add anything more.

I passed on through the famous gap, which is some four or five miles in length, and found the idea of the rebel citizen almost realized. Infantry, cavalry, and artillery covered the earth wherever the eye was directed; the gap throughout its whole extent literally swarming with living men. It called forcibly to my mind the mighty hosts of which we read in ancient history, sacred and profane. As I passed on,

the immense masses everywhere confronted me. Surely no nobler body of men, in all that constitutes genuine nobility, was ever collected together upon this continent. Here was a force much larger than that with which Napoleon, when a mere boy, won a score of pitched battles, destroyed four mighty armies, conquered all Italy, and sent the Austrian eagles screaming with terror back over the Noric Alps. The pride, the flower, the chivalry, the strength of the whole vast West was here. In able hands, how effective it might be made for the suppression of treason and the advancement of our glorious cause! Was it in such hands? The ardent enthusiast might answer unhesitatingly in the affirmative; the thoughtful patriot would only hope and pray.

All this day the army was employed in coming through the gap, and getting into position on the eastern side. Strange that the enemy never once attempted to interfere with our arrangements! Had he thrown himself with determined valor upon the heads of our columns as they were debouching into the plain, he might have inflicted upon us a heavy loss, and given us a world of trouble. But he was busy strengthening his defences at Resacca. All the operations of our army were covered with consummate skill by the cavalry, and it may be the enemy did not even know our infantry was through the gap, until a corps or two was in line of battle upon the eastern side.

Early on the morning of Friday, the thirteenth of May, preparations were made to advance towards Resacca. General Kilpatrick galloped forth to beat up the enemy's pickets. While he and members of his staff were in advance of his men, he fell into an ambuscade laid by a small party of the enemy, and received a painful, although not dangerous wound. Both he and his staff escaped with some difficulty from the rebels. The command of General Kilpatrick's division now devolved upon Colonel Murray, Third Kentucky cavalry, heretofore commanding a brigade in the division. It could not have fallen into better hands, for Colonel Murray is a young man who truly as any with whom I am acquainted, represents the chivalry of Kentucky. The command of Colonel Murray's brigade devolved upon Colonel Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois; and this, too, was fortunate, for the army contains no better man than he. The cavalry operations were conducted to general satisfaction all through the day.

At one o'clock p. m. news arrived that General Howard had passed through Buzzard Roost Gap and entered Dalton, finding the place entirely evacuated by the enemy. Shortly after the announcement of this intelligence, Osterhaus' and Harrow's divisions, of the Fifteenth corps, Logan's, began to advance towards Resacca. The rebels retreated rapidly until they came to a point where the Sugar Valley road, which so far runs nearly south, bends suddenly round some steep hills to the east, and passing through a ravine between two hills, continues

its course to Resacca. Here a heavy skirmish commenced, and at three p. m. the enemy opened a battery of twelve-pounders upon our troops, and shelled them most viciously. Our own batteries replied with spirit and effect, and a charge being sounded, a part of Osterhaus' division rushed forward and carried the hill upon which the rebel batteries had been planted. The rebels withdrew precipitately into their works, and this initial success encouraged our men greatly. It exasperated the rebels, however, for, concentrating the fire from a dozen cannon upon the summit of the hill, they hurled round shot and shell upon it so furiously, that it seemed impossible anything could continue there alive. But Foelkner's and De Gress' batteries were not to be intimidated, any more than were the Twenty-seventh Missouri infantry, which occupied the hill. The former returned fire for fire, and the latter crouching close to the side of the eminence, held fast to their position. The firing at last ceased, and just as the sun was about to go down, Sherman, Thomas, Elliott, and other Generals came up to the summit of the height, and through their glasses viewed long and attentively the rebel works around Resacca.

The sun had not risen on the morning of the fourteenth, Saturday, when the skirmishing recommenced; and until two p. m. there was not a single minute in which the dropping sound of musketry could not have been heard. It was half-past twelve, perhaps, when the rebels opened a severe fire of both small arms and artillery upon the left of the Fifteenth corps. At the same time the noise of battle could be distinctly heard away to the left. This last was readily understood.

After entering Dalton the day before, and finding nothing there save a ruined and deserted town, Howard, with Wood and Stanley's divisions, had moved rapidly southward, to effect a junction with the remainder of the army. The rebels were making a feeble effort to prevent this, and hence the firing upon the left. By noon the pickets of Howard communicated with those of Schofield or rather with Newton's division of his own corps, which had marched down the western side of Rocky Face, and passed through Snake Creek Gap in company with Schofield. Half an hour later the lines communicated, and thus the entire army was again united and in order of battle surrounding the enemy's works; Howard being upon the extreme left, Schofield next in order. Hooker next, Palmer next, Logan next, and Dodge on the right.

Whoever would form a general idea of the field of battle, has only to conceive of a river, the Oostenaula, with a great bend; at the middle of the semicircle thus formed, is the town of Resacca, through which runs the Western and Atlanta Railroad.

The rebel works extend generally north and south in front of the town, bending east and west at the extremities, so as to rest both flanks upon the river. Outside of this arc, and in a

manner surrounding it, extend our lines. A little stream called Camp Creek flows through a narrow valley with precipitous bluffs on each side. For more than a mile our lines extend on one side of this valley, and the rebel lines on the other. The opposing armies shoot at each other across this valley! A country abounding in steep hills thickly wooded, with almost impassable ravines, and with here and there a cleared patch of ground, makes up the remainder of this great theatre of warfare where two mighty armies were about to enact another tragedy.

The rebel army was divided into three great corps: Hardee's on the right, Hood in the centre, and Polk on the left. All the reinforcements brought up from Mobile, Savannah, and other parts, were distributed among these three.

About one o'clock it was determined to attack the enemy's lines, partly for the purpose of directing his attention from the left of the Fifteenth corps, where, as I have said, he had commenced a fierce fire, but mainly to test his strength and determination, and if possible to drive him from his works upon this part of the field.

The attack was commenced by Schofield, who, with Newton, advanced gradually up to the enemy's work, Wood and Stanley pressing closely the extreme rebel right. Further to our right, Carlin's and King's brigades of Johnson's division assailed the enemy's lines in front of them with great vigor and determination. Never was field more stubbornly contested. Officers vied with the men in acts of daring. Judah's division, of Schofield's corps, blazed like a volcano all round a low hill upon which were the rebel works they designed to storm. But every instant their ranks were thinned by showers of bullets and grapeshot hurled among them by the rebels, who fought with comparative security inside their rifle-pits.

Our line wavered. Turchin's brigade of Baird's division was ordered to the rescue. As a portion of Johnson's men had done, they hurled themselves down the almost perpendicular bluffs of which I have spoken; waded through Camp Creek, waist deep at the foot; and attempted to charge across the valley under a most murderous fire. The charge was unsuccessful—the bulk of the brigade withdrew; but a couple of regiments crossed the valley, and taking shelter under the very bluffs upon which the enemy's works were constructed, lay there in comparative security until the friendly night came on, when they quietly withdrew.

Colonel John G. Mitchell's brigade, of Davis' division, was now sent to the assistance of Turchin. It came gallantly into the fight, as does any body of troops with Colonel Mitchell for a leader. But the relentless storm from the enemy's works fell upon it also; the Colonel himself narrowly escaped death, a shell exploding at the feet of his horse, a huge fragment knocking to flinders the field glass which hung at his side, and which alone saved his life.

The order was finally given for the whole line to withdraw, which it did in good order. The enemy had been driven from a portion of his outer line of works, and although we did not occupy them at that time, the fire of our artillery was so effective that the rebels never reoccupied them.

Joe Johnston now determined to assume the offensive in earnest, and began massing his troops upon his right, with the design of turning our left. The movement would probably have been successful had it not been discovered in time and prevented. To Lieutenant W. L. Shaw, of General Elliott's staff, the honor of the discovery belongs. From a hill upon the right of our lines his keen eye detected the rebel columns moving towards our left. Hooker was instantly despatched to breast the coming storm, but before he could arrive it burst upon a portion of our line. Cruft's brigade of Stanley's division occupied an advanced position to the east of the Tilton and Resacca road, which Stanley had been ordered to hold. Upon this brigade the rebels fell in immense numbers, and after a gallant resistance it was broken and pushed back. As it emerged from the woods near the road, and came across some open fields west of the same, the enemy pressed after it with terrific yells. It seemed as if the left was really about to be turned, but Simonson's old battery, the Fifth Indiana, was posted at the western edge of the field, and as the rebels advanced, it poured into them so destructive a fire of grape and canister, that notwithstanding they rushed with determined bravery to within one hundred feet of the battery, they were finally driven back in great disorder. A brigade of Hooker's men, which had arrived at the nick of time, contributed greatly to this result, and manfully supported the battery.

Just as the battle ended upon the left a terrible conflict broke out upon the right. During the afternoon portions of Logan's corps, and Sprague's brigade of the Sixteenth corps, had dislodged the enemy from a line of works almost exactly in front of the town. Just after dark the rebels made a desperate effort to regain them. With long lines of infantry, whose fixed bayonets glittered in the moonlight, they charged up the hill upon which the works were situated, and forced their way to the very foot of the bulwarks. But a deadly fire from the Union lines mowed them down, until at last they gave up the fruitless contest and fled with precipitation and terror down the heights. It was nearly ten o'clock before the storm of battle ceased to rage.

Early on Sunday morning the skirmishing recommenced, but it was not until about half-past one that anything of importance took place.

It should be observed here, that in order to fill up the gap occasioned by Hooker's withdrawal the day before, the whole of Palmer's corps was shifted to the right, or rather was expanded so as to cover twice as much ground as it did the day before.

Hooker was now upon the extreme left, and about one P. M. commenced a general assault upon the works immediately in front. With dauntless bravery his men advanced to the attack, and Ward's brigade, of Butterfield's division, stormed a small fort, and captured four pieces of artillery. A tremendous fire from a long line of rebel rifle-pits, behind and around the fort, compelled the greater portion to retire; but enough remained to hold the cannon and prevent the rebels from recapturing the works. In this fight, Colonel Harrison, of the Seventieth Indiana, who assumed command of Ward's brigade upon the latter being wounded, particularly distinguished himself.

Our plan of battle for the coming day was to mass the bulk of our forces upon the wings of our army, assailing the rebels on both flanks at once, while our centre was held by a single line. Had this design been known to the enemy, he might have attempted to break our centre during the night. Consequently, the utmost vigilance was exercised after dark, and some rapid firing which took place in front of Johnson's division about midnight, caused the whole army to stand to its guns. But at that very hour the rear guard of the rebel forces was evacuating Resacca. The firing precipitated its movements, because the rebels in the town supposed we had discovered the retreat and were about attacking in force in the middle of the night.

When morning dawned, not a rebel, save some stragglers, was in or around Resacca. McPherson immediately started in pursuit. Ere this, his advance must have reached Calhoun; and while I am warned that the sixteenth of May has passed away, and the seventeenth is about to dawn, I see the Army of the Cumberland filing out from Resacca to join in the chase.

Kingston, Ga., May 20.

General Sherman's advance occupied this place yesterday, before noon. The rebel rear guard had left after daylight. The day before, eleven engines with trains, lay here, and moved south before the rear of the army; this morning, before daylight, a Yankee engineer pulled the whistle that sounded the arrival of the first engine under Federal direction. As the roar of the whistle resounded through these mountains, it received an answering echo from the thousands of Union soldiers who literally swarm all over the ground. The "boys" facetiously remark that General Johnston is on the train just in advance of Sherman, and keeps his train flagged in order to avoid being run into. Now (ten A. M.) it is reported that the train is eight miles further down, the next two bridges below being uninjured. The pursuit was so close that no attempt was made to burn the first bridge. At the second, our cavalry arrived in time to capture the squad which was attempting to fire the bridge, and with the prisoners' greasy haversacks, put the fire out.

The Etowah River is fourteen miles from

Kingston. There a stand will certainly be made, or it may be that a gap in the Altoona Mountains, at Altoona, six miles from the Etowah, may be chosen. The Etowah—improperly called the Hightower and Highflower—unites with the Oostenaula at Rome, forming the Coosa. A railroad unites Kingston with Rome, the distance being about thirty miles in a western direction.

My last letter gave an account of operations in McPherson's command on the right, up to Saturday night, the fourteenth. That day and evening, heavy fighting near Resacca was going on, in part of which one brigade of Dodge's command participated—Colonel Sprague's, of General Veatch's division. General Fuller's brigade was held in reserve. I regret being unable, on account of the steady moving of troops, to obtain particulars of their engagement. The Sixty-third and Forty-third Ohio are in Colonel Sprague's brigade. Their loss is not great. I am informed that this brigade had the honor of first entering Resacca.

Resacca being evacuated, and the enemy in full retreat, early Sunday morning General Dodge's second division was ordered to lay a pontoon bridge, and cross the Oostenaula at Lay's Ferry, in order to throw a column on the Rome road below Calhoun, and thus harass the enemy as much as possible. The first brigade, Colonel Rice, advanced a line of skirmishers, supported by artillery and infantry, and in a short time cleared the opposite bank of the force stationed there. The Sixty-sixth Indiana lost a number in killed and wounded, by supposing the enemy to be gone, and by marching by flank into range, where a volley taught them to form in line of battle in short order. Under cover of artillery, the pontoon wagons were brought to the river bank, and by ten o'clock the first brigade of infantry was over the river. The remainder of the troops were immediately forwarded, and all the infantry of two brigades—the First and Second—thrown across.

A skirmish line was thrown out, which soon developed a considerable force in plain view.

The Seventh Iowa, of the First brigade, and the Sixty-sixth Indiana, were thrown forward on the right of the road, under cover of the woods towards a brick house, behind which the main rebel force was formed. The artillery got excellent range, and literally perforated the house and outhouses with round shot and shell. The skirmish line was all that was visible in the open field, and when all was ready, a staff officer rode forward with the order for it to advance. Away went the blue line like so many moving dots, exploding into puffs of smoke at intervals, and again collecting into their original form. They had proceeded but a little way, until from the woods beyond emerged a dirty gray and brown line of big monsters bearing bright guns at a "right shoulder shift," and threatening to swallow up the little sprinkling of Yankees before them. Alas! they could not see the compact line of blue waiting to fall upon their left and crush it. Like sheep to the slaughter, they came

on until they had passed the crest of the little elevation, when a storm of shell from our battery, and a blinding shower of bullets from the First brigade, brought terror into their ranks. Their line halted—then wavered—rallied—wavered again, and then melted away, leaving traces of its position by the blood of the wounded and the bodies of the slain.

During this little affair—as pretty an engagement as you ever saw depicted on paper—the Second brigade, Colonel Burke, was in line along the river bank, and, although only skirmishers were actually engaged, yet many of the men could not repress their desire to “have a pop,” and consequently a considerable little volley was sent. The rebel lines were near enough for some of the balls to reach us. One man, of the Sixty-sixth Illinois, was killed here, and Color Sergeant John A. Wilson, Eighty-first Ohio, was wounded while defiantly waving his flag in the face of the foe.

With this the enemy withdrew, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. Among them was Captain Whitaker, commanding a battery of artillery.

Battle of Rome Cross Roads.

The remainder of General Dodge's command was immediately ordered up, but could not arrive until some time the next day; consequently, the Second division built temporary works to guard against surprise in the night, and waited. It was ten o'clock of Monday when General Sweeney's division started towards Calhoun. General Veatch's division was considerably in the rear. At the distance of a mile or two a strong defensive position was found evacuated, showing that retreat was in progress. About one o'clock our advance became engaged. At the same time General Dodge arrived, having ridden all the way from Resacca, and immediately set about putting his command in position. The First brigade was formed on the left of the road, facing eastwardly, the Third brigade on the right of the First, forming the centre, facing north-east, and on the right of the Third was the Second, facing nearly north. Thus disposed, a heavy line of skirmishers was sent out to ascertain the position of the enemy. It was soon found that their line was formed to protect a road a little in the rear of what is known as the Rome road, which crossed the Calhoun road a little in advance of the right of the Second brigade. Along this back road a heavy train of wagons was passing, and it was important that it should be well guarded. Cleburne's and Walker's divisions, the best of Johnston's army, were detailed for this duty, and were strongly posted.

Of course, General McPherson, who was also present, did not desire to engage these troops until the remainder or a portion of the rest of his command should come up. General Veatch's division and the Fifteenth corps were coming; consequently orders were given to not press

an engagement. Firing all along the skirmish line was quite brisk, but especially on the right of the entire line, which was bent back so as to cover the flank and also conform to the enemy's line in front of the Rome road. Two hours of skirmishing ensued, with an occasional shot from our batteries, when our boys on the right, becoming impatient, advanced and drove the rebel line beyond the Rome road. This portion of our skirmish line was composed of three companies of the Sixty-sixth Illinois, under command of Captain George A. Taylor, of Lima, Ohio. Brave as the bravest, and always impetuous, this officer, on reaching the Rome road and perceiving a party of rebels retreating in that direction, took four or five men with him and started in pursuit. Reckless of life, he followed until suddenly a volley from a strong line in ambush burst upon him, and he fell dead—shot through the brain. His men could not bear off his body, and it was left to rebel magnanimity. When found next morning, his boots, pants, hat, money, watch, and ring, were gone, and the buttons were cut from his coat. He was decently interred by the men of his regiment, as soon as possible next day.

The death of Captain Taylor had such a disheartening effect on his men that they began to yield gradually the ground they had gained. Almost the entire regiment of sharpshooters (One Hundred and Sixty-sixth Illinois) was deployed as skirmishers, and several companies of the Eighty-first Ohio were sent out to support. Still, the Fourth division did not come up, and we could not attack. Perceiving this, and perhaps thinking we were weak, the enemy began to press our lines. Stronger and stronger came the firing on the right, until it became evident their attack would be there.

Colonel Burke went forward to learn, as well as possible, the ground and the position of the enemy. It was almost all a dense forest, thickly covered with pine brush, and it was impossible to learn anything except by hearing. Both General McPherson and General Dodge now came to the right, and the former ordered the right to fall back. Although the enemy was hidden from view and the balls striking among the trees, General Dodge rode forward to the advanced line and gave directions in person as to its position. The attack was coming on the right flank of the Second brigade. The Sixty-sixth Illinois was scattered along a mile of skirmish line; the Eighty-first Ohio was divided into three battalions, under Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Major Evans, and Captain Hill, and each battalion separated from the others. The Twelfth Illinois, still on the left of the Eighty-first, was almost entire, only one or two companies out skirmishing. A change of front by the battalions of the Eighty-first Ohio, was ordered so as to face towards the Rome road. Hardly was this done when the rebels advanced in force on the right battalion of the Eighty-first Ohio, under Captain Hill, and were pressing it hard when the centre battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel

Adams, joined it and checked the advance. The Twelfth Illinois was hurried forward to fill the gap now made between Colonel Adams and Major Evans, who, with the left battalion of the Eighty-first, was ordered to hold that valley until further orders. Before the Twelfth got into position, the rebel line had so overlapped the right of the Eighty-first Ohio, that it was compelled to fall back a short distance, which was done in good order, and a position taken. But by this time Major Evans perceived a line advancing upon him, and relying on the tried gallantry of his command, without stopping to think how many were in his front, he ordered a charge. With a cheer which I wish might ring in every disloyal ear in the North, the line moved forward like one man, stopping for no obstacles. Volley after volley went rattling and thundering through the rebel ranks as the line kept still advancing. By this time, too, the Twelfth got in position on the right, and a volley from them told the rebel Generals that our commanders understood their business. Back, back, fell the rebels, and on sped the gallant Second brigade. Even when the rebel line was passed, and their right overlapped our left, there was no pause; but two companies, quickly changing front and having advantage of position, drove them like sheep before them.

In the meantime the Third brigade, commanded by Colonel Bane, was menaced. A party of sharpshooters attempted to capture one of his batteries, which was well forward. The battery had to be withdrawn. A few shells were thrown directly upon or near the house where General McPherson and General Dodge and staff were stopping, doing no more damage than causing a little sensation among the glittering officers, and cutting off a horse's tail.

As it was now late, and the Second brigade had driven the enemy in confusion, the order was given to withdraw it, and relieve the whole division with the Fourth division, which had just come up. The withdrawal was made in excellent order, and so confused was the enemy that not a shot was fired as the brigade retired.

Colonel Burke was in the front from the beginning. Early in the engagement a ball struck his left leg below the knee, and shattered the bone, then penetrated through his horse. The horse was not killed instantly, and the Colonel rode up to Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, Eighty-first Ohio, and quietly remarking that he was wounded, turned over the command to him and rode away. His leg had to be amputated. During the short time that Colonel Burke has been in command of the brigade, he has endeared himself to his entire command by his gentlemanly courtesy and uniform kindness. By his bearing in the field, every soldier who knew him was constrained to place the fullest confidence in him. An important and responsible command (that of the Second brigade) devolves by this casualty upon Lieutenant-Colonel R. N. Adams, Eighty-first Ohio.

It was a matter of wonder, after the engage-

ment, to ascertain that the loss in action did not exceed seventy-five. It could only be accounted for by the fact that the rebels fired too high, their balls striking always above our heads. The rebel loss in killed was much greater than ours, though it was impossible to ascertain it correctly.

I could not imagine a more gallant charge made with more fearful courage and confidence than that made by Colonel Burke's brigade through that dense forest. Headless alike of dangers seen and unseen, every man felt himself a host, and pressed forward with as much confidence of success as if the battle was over and the victory already won. Nothing short of annihilation could resist them. When they learned afterwards that they had fought the flower of the rebel army, their victory grew the brighter, and they felt certain of the result when the final contest shall come.

Retreat and Pursuit.

That heading tells the rest of my story. No man can tell you now where General Sherman's army has been since Monday last, unless the General himself. Every road, every field, every by-path, day and night, has been thronged and crowded by the hot pursuit of this great army. It has been a grand charge forward of men, horses, artillery, and trains—the earth has trembled with the vast movement. All the wonderful energy and restlessness of its great leader seem to be instilled into every part of the army, and with one mind and one purpose everything goes forward. Nobody doubts the result; every one knows it will be glorious.

With the exception of here and there a rich plateau or valley, the country from Calhoun to Kingston is a barren pine-covered wilderness. At Adairsville there is a long, fertile strip of country. Here the soil is good in some places, but covered with broken stone. Only here and there, at long intervals, do we see a good farmhouse or country residence. Citizens are more scarce than houses. Everybody is gone. I have seen but one slave man in the State of Georgia.

In the operations so far, General Dodge's command has taken one hundred prisoners. Of these thirty-two were captured by Colonel Burke's brigade, twenty-two of whom were taken by a party of not more than fifty, at the first crossing of the Oostenaula, on the fourteenth. After the battle of the sixteenth, one rebel found two or three of our men lost, and volunteered to show them back to our camp. They trusted him, and he was faithful. He gave himself up as a deserter.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

THE FRONT MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
May 21, 1864.

On Monday, immediately after the rebel army had evacuated its position at Sugar Grove, the Union army was mobilized, and at noon was on the move in pursuit of the retreating rebels.

Our force moved in three grand columns, sweeping the country for twenty miles. The rebel wounded and dead were scattered along the road and in the edges of the woods, where temporary hospitals had been established. Our surgeons had the rebel wounded conveyed to our own hospitals in the rear and cared for. At Resacca the rebel commissary left behind in his flight a considerable quantity of corn and meal, which was turned over to the hospitals, or given to the soldiers.

While the fight was progressing on Saturday and Sunday at Sugar Creek, McPherson was engaged in shelling Resacca, to interrupt the passage of the rebel army, which, late in the day, was observed to be moving in long and unbroken trains. The houses, stores, depot buildings, telegraph office, were riddled by the exploding shells and round shot, and the place rendered very uncomfortable. The inhabitants, like most of the people from Dalton and Tilton, took the train with their household effects, provisions, etc., and went South. The few who remained stated that a massacre and destruction of the people was expected, from the statements of the rebel officers and men. The order for the army to fall back was captured from the rebel courier on his way from Johnston's headquarters, and the whole programme thus revealed to us.

Taking the main road to Resacca, the enemy's rear passed the Coosawatchee on Sunday forenoon, and burned the railroad bridge. They also attempted, but failed, to destroy the trestle-bridge near it, which, with our pontoon, served an admirable purpose for crossing our artillery and ambulance train.

Resacca was strongly fortified by earthworks commanding the road, which passes through a line of irregular hills, so as to enfilade the approach. Being in the bend of the river, which protects it on three sides, and with forts crowning all the prominent hills on each side of the road, as well as long lines of rifle-pits running zig-zag along the sides and bases of the undulating ground, it would have been next to impossible to have carried the place by assault without the greatest destruction to the attacking force. It might have been taken by overcoming, first, any force stationed on the south side, and then by laying siege to the place, and driving out the enemy by artillery at long range. It was evidently no part of the rebel programme to make a stand at Resacca. There was some necessary detention in crossing the river by the limited means provided, but before sunset the large portion of the forces, with the immense wagon train, were winding over the hills beyond Resacca, while the left wing was crossing the river at Field's Ferry, and going by the way of Newtown. Stragglers and deserters were picked up at every mile of the march; many of them purposely stopping behind and giving themselves up. The road was lined and thickly strewed with broken muskets, blankets, and clothing,

which the retreating forces had thrown away to facilitate their flight.

On Monday evening the rear-guard skirmished lightly with our advance, but as they were not pushed very hard, the fight was not a serious one. On Tuesday the centre column, which the rebels chiefly pursued, came up to and passed Calhoun, a quiet country town of about four hundred inhabitants, which possesses many attractions for a country residence. The houses indicated to some extent wealth and thrift; there were handsome gardens, shade trees, an abundance of flowers, and other evidences of refinement and comfort. The people had mostly followed the army South. Three miles beyond, at the "Graves House," the rebels made a determined stand, and our skirmishers, assisted by artillery, were engaged for over two hours in a spirited contest with the enemy, whose sharpshooters occupied the octagon cement house, which served them quite well for a fort. The Union skirmishers of General Howard's Fourth corps, Newton's division, occupied rail barricades and trees, behind which they had partial shelter while peppering away at the enemy. An accident occurred here from the premature bursting of a shell fired from the Sixth Ohio battery, which killed six of our own men and wounded several others.

There is too much of this defective ammunition among our ordnance stores. Who is in fault? We had but few casualties, and went into camp on the ground, the heavens being lighted up by the flames of burning buildings on the Saxton estate, where the fight had occurred.

General Thomas' and General Howard's headquarters were at the front.

Early Wednesday morning the army was again in motion, the Fourth corps leading the way. The estate where the rebels had made their stand, and which the rebel Generals had occupied for their headquarters, was a fine cotton farm, with all the buildings, presses, gins, etc., attached. The dwelling was also a good one, of quite large dimensions. The soldiers were permitted to rifle it of the old rags and rubbish left by the occupants, and then to set it on fire, with all the other buildings on the estate—a bad use to make of an enemy's property, and a very foolish one, if it were not our own by the treasonable act of the owner. How far this vandalism is to be tolerated remains to be seen. The owners were undoubtedly rebels, as shown by the letters found upon the premises, but has the army of the Union come into Georgia to burn all rebel property, and to lay waste the country? and if not, why this incendiary beginning?

The country becomes more open as we advance. There are finely cultivated fields of corn and wheat. Some of the houses are large, with ample shaded grounds, with cotton-presses, barns, and other evidences of wealth. We have passed through the poor North Georgia

border of sandy, hilly soil, and are trenching upon the more fertile wheat and cotton lands of Middle Georgia. We have already passed through three counties, and will soon be in the fourth.

The centre passed through Adairsville this forenoon; a small, but heretofore a thriving town of two or three hundred inhabitants, with a hotel, a dozen stores, railroad depot, and an extensive machine shop and arsenal, where there was formerly a large manufactory of arms. All the people have run away, all the goods have been taken—they had light loads to carry I reckon—another machine shop and foundry were long since dismantled, and the work removed to Atlanta.

Here Cheatham had a hospital, in the loft of a brick store, where he left behind the amputated leg of an unfortunate rebel soldier, and there were other limbs in different places left behind as evidence of the bloody character of the previous day's fight. One or two dead lay in deserted buildings in the town. Some few families remained here, and, with one or two exceptions, were not disturbed. I heard some complaints that the meat and flour saved for families' use had been taken by our soldiers. These actions were unnecessary, and were to be attributed solely to the thieving dispositions of some of the men generally, "buzzards" who are always straggling behind the army, that they may plunder with the greater impunity. Not satisfied with taking articles of food, and, in some cases, all that they can lay hands on, they break and destroy furniture, looms, and farming implements, in the most wanton spirit. The commander of the Twenty-third army corps, I am glad to observe, has a stringent order against this indiscriminate pillaging. Officials of this corps, to my certain knowledge, have set their faces as a flint against these outrages, and have done all they could to prevent them. Colonel Bull, commanding the pioneer corps, is also entitled to the thanks of all who value the good name of the army. He allows no soldiers to enter a house upon any pretext, and when obliged to stop for water at a well, upon any person's premises, personally sees that they commit no depredations, and that they "move along." Such officers redeem the character of the army.

On Friday morning Rome was occupied by McPherson, who came upon the place suddenly, and prevented the destruction of the machine-shop, which the rebels attempted to burn. I understand that a considerable number of prisoners were also captured.

The bridge across the Resacca having been repaired by the pioneer corps in an incredibly short time, the trains are now running to Kingston with supplies for the army. A train was also run up to Rome on Friday. The railroads have all been left intact by the retreating army. They undoubtedly expect to return and have use for them hereafter.

The Twentieth and Twenty-third corps, oc-

cupying the left, pushed the enemy rapidly back, skirmishing heavily on the roads beyond Kingston. At Cassville, a handsome village six miles beyond Kingston, the enemy had constructed earthworks, and after occupying for a time the brick college-buildings, lately used for hospitals, they fell back through the town, taking shelter behind barricades of rails, and finally going to the rifle-pits on the range of high ground back of the village.

General Johnston ordered all the people away, and the rebels took their turn in pillaging as they passed through the place. The work which was begun by the rebel soldiers, was finished by our own. Not one house escaped. Every house was rifled of the few articles left behind, and the clothing and furniture wantonly broken up and destroyed. Some poor families, who only left their houses for a few hours to avoid danger, lost all they possessed, and your correspondent witnessed several cases of the greatest distress growing out of these cases of brigandage. Women and children were frequently seen weeping and mourning in the midst of the wreck which war had made. They had not a shred of personal or of bed-clothing to cover them. Their houses had been emptied of everything except the fragments of torn garments and broken furniture, which lay in a pile about the floor, and every morsel of food had been taken away. These people will have to be fed out of army rations or perish.

The enemy fell back doggedly towards High Tower, on the Etowah River, crossed over and burned the bridge, closely pursued by General Schofield's corps. The day was extremely hot, and the roads filled a foot deep with impalpable dust, which whirled and eddied in suffocating clouds, enveloping the army, and partially shutting all objects from sight. It will take several days to construct the bridge across the Etowah, which will have to be done under the enemy's fire, or we shall have to cross by some other route, and push them further back. The army is soon to go marching on. The officers and men are in good spirits.

Johnston's army drew rations here for seventy-nine thousand men—so says an escaped officer. General Polk holds their right, corresponding to our left, General Hood the centre, and General Hardee the left. We have taken some three or four hundred prisoners during the past two days.

Sunday, May 12, 1864.

The enemy still have a small party of skirmishers on this side of the Etowah or High Tower, in their earthworks, and we have had some skirmishing with them. Preparations are making for another grand advance, when these rear-guards of the rebel army will probably get up the dust. We shall have some show of a fight, probably, before getting across the river.

General Judah has been relieved of the command of the Second division, Twenty-third army

corps, and General M. S. Hascall appointed in his place. The latter commander has steadily progressed in the confidence and esteem of the army since he came to the Department of the Ohio.

I have just seen a copy of the *Confederacy*, published at Atlanta, May fifteen, which contains an editorial article copied from the *Chicago Times* of April thirty, giving the exact strength of General Steele's army in Louisiana, the position of his forces, and the exact distance of his army from his base of supplies; also hinting that small reinforcements of Price would be able to overwhelm and capture his whole command. Here is "liberty of the press" with a vengeance.

Battle of Sugar Valley, or Resacca.

The heaviest fighting of the campaign has taken place to-day, and though it was indecisive, we have cause to be thankful at the results.

Our line, as formed last night, was in the form of a semicircle, to the north-west of Sugar Valley, while the Oostenaule River completes the circle on the south-east. Sugar Valley is a fertile little plain of about ten square miles in size, much broken by hills, which at this season of the year are covered by a dense undergrowth of small trees and vines, rendering them very difficult to penetrate. It was in this valley, between the projected Rome and Dalton Railroad and the river that encircles Resacca and Tilton, that the enemy made a stand after being closely pressed on his retreat from Dalton. From our centre to the river, the distance this morning was about seven miles. Our line extends completely around the valley, McPherson's right resting on the river near its junction with the Oothkalaga Creek, or Calhoun, while the left strikes the river north of Tilton, near the junction of the river with Swamp Creek, that takes its rise in the hills of Sugar Valley. Lick and Camp creeks also burst out from the hills in the valley and empty their waters into the Oostenaule River, which is very broad and deep, but can be forded, when the water is low, at six points. The above is as intelligible a description of the field as can be given without the aid of a map; and now for the opening of the ball.

As I have already said, our line was formed in a half circle, extending from the river on the left to a point on the river near Calhoun. The corps occupied positions in the line as follows, extending from right to left: first, McPherson; second, Hooker; third, Palmer; fourth, Schofield; fifth, Howard.

Skirmishing commenced early in the morning, and many prisoners were brought in as the result, although the attack made by us was but faintly responded to. Skirmishing continued, with occasional truces, lasting from ten to thirty minutes, all the morning. Meantime our General officers were not idle. Generals Sherman and Thomas, with their indefatigable corps com-

manders, rode along the line with their staffs, personally superintending the parking of ambulances and ammunition trains, and assigning batteries to positions where they could be of the most service in the event of a general engagement.

At nine o'clock General Schofield was ordered to withdraw his corps from the part of the line between Palmer and Hooker, and take a new position on the left of Newton's division of the Fourth corps. Palmer closed up the gap between his left and Newton, and Judah's and Cox's divisions of Schofield's corps came up in the place assigned to them. Hovey's brigade of the Second corps was left in reserve, and did not participate in the battle of to-day. By some mistake in the giving or reception of the order, General Cox's division failed to get up in time, and Judah and the force on his right advanced upon the enemy, thus leaving a gap of half a mile between Judah's left and Stanley's right, which was promptly filled by cavalry. Considerable confusion followed the announcement of the existence of this gap, and staff officers in vain rode for hours in search of Cox's division through the thick underbrush in which our line was formed. It was lost, and staff officers reported that General Schofield could obtain no intelligence from it.

General Judah, just before noon, received an order from General Schofield to open the attack, and though his left flank was liable at any moment to be turned, he informed General Schofield of the fact, and at once moved forward upon the enemy's skirmishers. The boys moved rapidly through the vines and shrubbery, down the valley, drove the enemy before them, and with a cheer crossed the deep gorge near which the enemy had thrown up strong breastworks commanding the valley. The enemy opened a very destructive fire, and for half an hour the battle was a bloody one, the main lines being within a few yards of each other. The enemy at once opened a destructive fire from their artillery, which the brave division stood for some time, vainly striving by superhuman efforts to carry the breastworks. It was repulsed after a gallant effort, and retired into the valley in disorder. We had not yet got up on the left, and no artillery support was at hand. Nevertheless, General Judah resolved not to retire without one more effort. Collecting together the fragments of his broken but not discouraged regiments, a new line was hastily formed, and the whole division was just in the act of advancing in a charge which all felt would have put it in possession of the enemy's line of works, when the division was relieved by General Newton's division of the Eleventh corps. In the meantime the gap in the line was filled, Cox took his position, and for an hour the incessant roll of the musketry, as volley after volley was poured into the ranks of the enemy, and as vigorously returned, told that the conflict was a desperate one. Artillery fire was delivered into the enemy's ranks rapidly, and with excel-

lent effect. Their artillery did not do much injury, as Palmer had silenced eight guns with his regiments, who under cover acted as sharpshooters, and picked off the cannoners as often as they advanced to work their pieces. No better evidence can be given of the desperate nature of the conflict between Judah's division and the enemy, than the loss in McLean's brigade, which went into the fight with one thousand three hundred and eighty-eight men, and lost five hundred and ninety-five in the short time it was engaged. General Newton's division pressed the enemy strongly, and inflicted serious injury upon him. Every man, with the exception of half a dozen stragglers, stood up to the work like veterans. A piece of a shell struck Generals Hooker and Manson, but both escaped without serious injury, General Hooker remaining on the field for some time, while General Manson is rapidly recovering from the effects of the shock. About two o'clock the firing on the centre in front of Newton subsided into a slight skirmish fire.

The division of General Cox, which finally turned up on Judah's left, fought with great pluck and obstinacy, driving the skirmishers back upon their main line and the line into their breastworks, from which they poured into his ranks an incessant fire of shell and ball; across valleys, up hills, through gorges, and ravines, they were driven, until they gained their first line of rifle-pits. Cox soon dislodged them and sent them back howling to their more formidable breastworks. At this moment Cox found that he was out of ammunition, and by some stupid blunder on the part of somebody, the trains were too far in the rear from which to replenish his cartridge-boxes. Yet he was determined not to be foiled, and gathering together all his strength, he advanced his line. A cheer went up from his boys, and resounded through the hills as his serried line advanced upon the enemy's works, which they carried at the point of the bayonet in splendid style; but not without the loss of many brave men.

The heaviest fighting of the day was on the centre. Palmer's corps, on the right of Newton's division, had heavy skirmishing along the whole line, lasting from half-past twelve until one o'clock, when Carlin's brigade, of Johnson's division, advanced down a slope of a hill, and drove the enemy into their breastworks on the south side of a hill, rising out of the valley on the south. An assault on the breastworks was not ordered. The brigade at once sought cover in a ditch, formed by a dried up stream, and until night covered them, acted as sharpshooters and did good execution in silencing batteries engaged in enfilading Judah and Newton. Mitchell's brigade, of Davis' division, got into a similar position and picked off every rebel whose head protruded above the breastworks.

Turchin's brigade, of Baird's division, joined Judah on the left of Palmer's corps and fought desperately, but were compelled to fall back with Judah's division. The loss in the corps,

outside of Turchin's brigade, was light. Captain McDowell, a promising young officer of the Fifteenth Kentucky, was killed during the engagement. Captain Sheridan, of the Sixth Ohio, well-known in Cincinnati as an actor of some ability, is among the wounded, and will probably be compelled to submit to the amputation of his right arm.

The Fourth corps, under command of Major-General Howard, the "one armed veteran," as he is styled in the corps, played a very conspicuous part in the tragedy of war enacted to-day. All the corps, with the exception of Beatty's fighting brigade, for which room could not be found, as the circle was gradually compressed as we advanced, was engaged and covered itself with imperishable glory. Wood's division was ordered into position on the right of General Stanley just before noon, and was soon hotly engaged with Hazen's and Willich's brigades driving the enemy. For some time a destructive infantry and artillery fire was kept up, and ere long his main line advanced in overwhelming strength upon the enemy, who fled, at his approach, to his rifle-pits, from which the energetic Wood soon dislodged him and compelled him to seek shelter under cover of their breastworks, from which he was driven later in the day. Hazen and Willich's losses were severe, but nothing in comparison with those in the Twenty-third corps, which, to-day, bore the brunt of the battle.

After three o'clock the resistance offered by the enemy on the centre, through which he had vainly striven to force a passage, grew more lax, and very little firing other than skirmishing was heard. Foiled at every point in his efforts to break our walls of iron that environed him, Johnston, early in the afternoon, commenced massing heavily on our left, where Stanley, with as brave a division as ever marched to the music of the Union, had been skirmishing and feeling the enemy while awaiting the developments of the enemy's attempt to break the centre. Generals Sherman and Thomas were not slow to detect the enemy's design, and preparations to resist it were at once commenced. Joe Hooker's gallant Potomac veterans were selected at once, and immediately retired from the line and commenced moving to the left of Stanley, whose flank was covered by McCook's cavalry, in front of which Johnston was massing his columns for the desperate effort. Hooker arrived none too soon.

At seven o'clock, when quiet reigned along the whole line, with an occasional interruption from a sharpshooter's rifle, the expected attack came. Down upon Stanley's exposed flank came the enemy in overwhelming numbers. For a few minutes the line nobly resisted the terrific shock; but as it was renewed with ten-fold fury by the enemy, who fought with a desperation equal to anything ever performed by our own soldiery, the line wavered, and the regiments on the left were giving back in confusion and disorder, when, above the roar of the artillery





Engelmann

MAJ. GEN. RUFUS INGALLS.

and musketry that seemed to make the old hills tremble and quake, a cheer was heard, and into the deadly breach, over the dead bodies of the fallen, came on the double-quick Robinson's brigade, who advanced to the assault with desperate determination to drive back the solid columns of the enemy, and save the army from disaster. Nobly they met the enemy, and when the shock came, reeling like drunken men, the line of the enemy was broken and sent back, smarting under the shock. The contest was of short duration, but, while it lasted, the roar of artillery and the roll of musketry told that this was one of the most critical moments of the day—a period when the heart of the listener seemed to stand still in suspense. The Fourth corps will never forget Hooker and the noble brigade which, at a moment when the fate of the army, and perhaps of the nation, hung upon a slender thread, which the enemy would have severed, came up and turned the tide of battle. A nation's thanks are due to Joe Hooker, and may it never forget Robinson's brave brigade, whose gallantry to-night is on every tongue.

In summing up the results of the day, I am pained to say that, while we have driven the enemy at every point where he presented himself in force, our losses are heavy. Probably two thousand will not cover the killed, wounded, and missing. Nearly all of the killed and wounded are in our hands, as we were not driven a foot, except in those instances already recorded. Our line on the left centre and centre has advanced over a mile from its position of the morning. We have made heavy slaughter in the enemy's ranks—whose loss must be larger than ours. We have lost but a few prisoners, and taken about two hundred, among whom is the Colonel of the Nineteenth Alabama regiment, a very intelligent officer, who estimates the rebel forces, including Polk, who is here, at fifty-five thousand. He informs me that their only loss in General officers is Brigadier-General Tucker, slightly wounded. So far, all goes well. The enemy is hemmed in between our lines and the river, which is not now fordable, and will hardly get off without giving us a general engagement. When the student of military strategy takes up a map and examines the country of this region of Georgia, he cannot but feel impressed with the masterly movements of Sherman, which have placed us in so favorable a position.

Sunday, May 18.


During last night quiet reigned along the whole line, the enemy being very quiet and rarely firing a shot. The falling of trees and the sound of axmen, however, convinced our commanders that the rebels were erecting stronger fortifications upon the innumerable hills that rise out of the valley. At half-past seven in the morning our skirmishers opened fire upon the rebel line, which was as vigorously returned upon the left and left centre. The enemy, however, did not seem disposed

to attack with their main line, after the fearful slaughter and repulse that Hooker administered to them last night. It was not until nine or ten o'clock in the morning that the Twentieth corps arrived from the right, and got into position on Stanley's left. The Twenty-third corps was immediately withdrawn from the right of the line and thrown in on the left. As our line was nearly fourteen miles long, these necessary changes occupied nearly the entire morning, so that mid-day arrived ere we were ready to make the assault on the enemy's works.

Hooker threw forward Butterfield's division against the enemy's strongest position, supported by Williams' and Geary's divisions, and the battle opened vigorously on both sides. Hooker fought for three or four hours and made steady headway, carrying line after line of rifle-pits, until Butterfield's division encountered a lunette of formidable size. Several attempts were made to carry it, and capture its four guns, which were pouring a destructive fire into our lines, but the attempt was futile. The troops fought with great desperation, but as often as they advanced upon the lunette the terrific volleys of musketry from the enemy in the fortification hurled them back in confusion. At last Butterfield charged forward and took a position under the protecting works of the fort, so close to the guns within that they could be touched by the men's hands. In the effort to gain this unexposed position, the contest was a bloody one, Geary's division supporting Butterfield. Ward's brigade, which were participating in their first battle, fought with marked determination, and contributed much to secure the position.

After vain efforts to capture the lunette, from which the enemy poured into our ranks grape, canister, and sharpnel, Hooker's forces gave up the unequal contest, and during the balance of the day lay under the breastworks protected from the enemy's fire, and picking off every rebel who showed himself above the works. Darkness found him in this position, and he at once matured plans for capturing the works by strategy, under cover of the night. The pioneers were brought up; the ends dug out of the works, and the guns drawn out by the aid of ropes, under a destructive fire from the occupants of the works, who were driven out or captured, as our troops swarmed in through the opening in overwhelming numbers. The guns were four twelve-pound brass pieces; a number of battle-flags, including those of the Thirty-eighth and Thirty-fifth Alabama, were captured, with over two hundred prisoners. Prisoners report General Walthall (rebel) killed, and General Tucker wounded.

The losses in Hooker's corps were very heavy, especially in the repeated charges upon the enemy's works. Butterfield lost about five hundred; Geary one hundred; and Williams' division about one hundred and fifty, making Hooker's loss about seven hundred and fifty in the battle of the afternoon. The Twenty-third





Major General Ingalls

MAJ. GEN. RUFUS INGALLS.

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corps, which was moved around from the right, as a support for Hooker, lost slightly.

About two o'clock the enemy, learning from prisoners taken from us, that Hovey's Indiana division of "raw recruits" held a position in the line, and smarting under their successive repulses on other portions of the line, hurled a heavy force upon Hovey, convinced that the recruits would run. Not so, however, The rebels held a strong position in a gorge in the hills, and out of their breastworks they swarmed in large numbers and made a furious attack upon the division, which nobly repulsed them after a short and bloody contest of fifteen minutes. The assault was renewed, when the "raw Hoosiers" charged upon them on the double-quick, under heavy fire of grape, and literally mowed them down. They did not assault the Indians the third time. To-night the encomiums of the whole corps are being showered upon Hovey's division, who have written a glorious introductory chapter in their history.

About ten p. m., Hooker's command commenced throwing up breastworks to strengthen their position; and to cover their movements, it was found necessary to advance their skirmish line. In doing so the skirmishers ran against the rebel line. Immediately a heavy artillery and musketry fire opened from both contestants, which lasted until two o'clock in the morning. The night battle was desperate and losses on both sides heavy, probably three hundred killed and wounded. At two the rebels were repulsed along the whole line; a deafening cheer rang out on the night air, and all was still save the piteous moans of the dying, who lay upon the bloody field, awaiting with anxiety the early dawn, when they were gathered into the hospitals, and every care bestowed upon them by our hard-working surgeons.

Monday, May 16.

The morning was very bright, but the whole valley was filled with smoke and fog. At daylight not a gun was heard. Newton immediately advanced to feel the enemy, and discovered that they had disappeared.

The Retreat across the Oostenaula.

Immediately upon being informed of the evacuation of the valley, General Howard informed General Sherman, and our lines at once advanced. It was discovered that the enemy had made good his retreat, carrying off all his artillery, but destroying his wagon trains by fire lest they should fall into our hands. I have just made a tour of the field on the left, and find it covered with rebel dead and wounded, all of whom were left in our hands for burial and treatment. Prisoners, at the hour I write, nine a. m., are being brought in by hundreds. The victory is complete so far, but would have been more so had McPherson's corps been enabled to cross the river and take a position in the rebel rear. McPherson made several at-

tempts to throw down the pontoons and cross his corps, but the enemy poured such a raking fire into his pontoons that the work had to be abandoned. I have no particulars of what was accomplished by McPherson's command, but I learn that the Fifteenth corps, under Logan, lost forty-eight killed and four hundred and forty-eight wounded.

Our total losses are estimated at from four thousand to five thousand, of whom fully two thousand are so slightly wounded in the hands and feet that they will be fit for duty in two or three weeks. The killed will amount to about eight hundred, among whom are many brave officers who have left behind them brilliant records. Ohio has lost her full proportion. Indiana, too, will mourn the loss of many of her brave sons.

The enemy's losses are fully as large as ours, if not larger. In every assault upon our lines their loss was very heavy, and they were driven back, leaving hundreds of their killed and wounded in our hands each day.

We have taken nearly four thousand prisoners and deserters, including many Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, Majors, and line and staff officers. Many of them were willing prisoners, who remained in the rebel works and surrendered when we advanced in pursuit.

On the evacuation of the valley, the enemy crossed all his cars and locomotives and burned five span of the railway bridge, which can be repaired, however, in one or two days. At nine this (Monday) morning, Hooker's corps threw down pontoons and crossed near Resacca, while Schofield is crossing on the left near Pelton. The cavalry, under Stoneman and McCook, commenced the pursuit early in the morning, and at the present writing they are engaging the enemy with artillery. Brisk firing can be heard, and the rebel rear-guard are evidently meeting with a warm parting salute from our cavalry, which this season is in excellent trim and superior to that of former seasons. McCook, Stoneman, and Kilpatrick, are dashing officers, who never refuse a fight, and invariably whip their antagonists when the forces engaged are at all equal.

Two battles, two defeats, and two retreats, have so dispirited the enemy that it is almost idle to speculate upon what he will probably do, or where he will make his next stand. Sherman is too much for Johnston, especially on the flanking process, and it is not unlikely that the rebel chieftain will retreat until he reaches the Altoona range of mountains, where he can better protect his flanks than he could at Buzzard Roost and Sugar Valley. Citizens and deserters say that the Altoona Mountains are filled with very powerful fortifications capable of great resistance, and that the enemy will make a stand there and give us battle. Be that as it may, the country may rely upon Sherman and Thomas, and the invincible force they command, for working out a more glorious victory than the one just achieved.

For the benefit of those croakers who are never satisfied with the results of our movements upon the enemy, I will briefly state wherein our victory consists. We have driven the enemy over forty miles, compelled him to evacuate a position at Buzzard Roost that may be justly styled the stronghold of the Confederacy, recovered a large amount of territory, repulsed Johnston in every attack upon our lines, taken four thousand prisoners, compelled him to abandon his fortifications near Resacca, and destroy his whole ammunition and supply trains, inflicted heavy losses upon him, and demoralized his army to a great extent. As an offset, the enemy has taken but one hundred or one hundred and fifty prisoners, inflicted a loss upon us equal to their own, and by their precipitate retreat stimulated our troops to greater efforts when they again meet Johnston and his followers upon the field of battle.

To show that Sherman, on his advance into the heart of Georgia, is strongly in earnest and determined to conquer, I may state that he keeps the railroad communication with his army complete. Three hours after the evacuation of Dalton, heavy trains loaded with supplies arrived from Ringgold, and before night the town presented quite a business aspect. The rear-guard of the enemy had not vacated Resacca two hours, ere the familiar whistle of Sherman's train was heard by the retreating army. The telegraph line was kept up well by Captain Van Duzen, who followed in the rear of our advancing columns, and repaired it thoroughly. Resacca is now the advanced depot for supplying the army, which is well provisioned with bacon, hard-tack, coffee, and all the *et ceteras* of the Commissary department.

The strength of the enemy is variously estimated at from fifty-five thousand to seventy thousand by prisoners and deserters. The better informed, however, place their numbers at fifty-five to sixty thousand, which corresponds with estimates furnished by our scouts. We have in front Hood's and Hardee's corps, with about twenty thousand of Polk's army commanded by the Parson in person. Among the General officers holding commands, are Johnston, Hardee, Hood, Stevenson, Pat Cleburne and Gibson, Bates and Polk.

MAJOR LANDGRAEBER'S REPORT.

Report of the battalion of artillery of the First division, Fifteenth army corps, under command of Major O. Landgraeber, Second Missouri artillery and Chief of Artillery, of the part taken in the battle of Resacca, Georgia :

The First division of the Fifteenth army corps marched on the morning of the thirteenth of May, 1864, from Snake Creek Gap, with a line of skirmishers in front, in the direction of Resacca. Battery F, Second regiment artillery, Missouri volunteers, the two twelve-pound field howitzers leading, marched behind the First brigade, and the Fourth Independent Ohio battery, the four Napoleon guns leading, behind

the Second brigade. After a lively skirmish the enemy made a stand about one mile from Resacca, Georgia, having posted his artillery on a hill. I brought the howitzer section of battery F forward, and it took position on the left side of the main road, next to a plantation, having for support a company of sharpshooters of the First division. The enemy was deploying his cavalry about seven hundred yards in front, but after a few rounds he was compelled to give way. The enemy was firing shells and spherical case shot at our infantry and artillery, and after being hardly pressed by our skirmishers, had to withdraw their pieces.

Our forces then took possession of the hills, and I posted three-inch Rodman guns of battery F, Second Missouri artillery, on a steep hill, about four hundred yards on the left of the main road, and opened fire with shells on the enemy's works, where he was busily engaged with working parties to finish his breastworks. The two twenty-pound Parrott guns of the Fourth Independent Ohio battery I brought into position on the right of the road on a hill and opened fire with them, first on the enemy's works, and then at the railroad, where troops and trains of the enemy were passing.

At dark the firing ceased, and during the night I brought the section of howitzers of battery F, forward to a position on the left of the road, in advance of the Rodman guns, and posted also the four twelve-pound Napoleon guns of the Fourth Ohio battery in a position on the hill on the left of the road, some distance to the right and rear of the howitzer section.

On the morning of the fourteenth of May, the howitzers of battery F, Second Missouri artillery, fired on a line of rifle-pits in front with shells, nearly enfilading them, and the twelve-pound Napoleon guns of the Fourth Ohio opened on a piece of timber which was occupied by the enemy in force. Our skirmishers advanced then, and the Napoleons were obliged to cease firing, the left wing of our infantry having advanced in front of these pieces.

The three-inch Rodman guns of battery F held their old position of the day before, and maintained a very annoying fire on the enemy. The twenty-pound Parrott guns of the Fourth Ohio battery did also very good execution during the day. In the afternoon all the artillery was ordered to open a severe fire on all points occupied by the enemy, after which the infantry of the First division made a brilliant bayonet charge, crossing a deep ravine and a creek, taking possession of the hills in front of them. After sundown the firing ceased.

During the night I built a breastwork in the ravine on the right of the main road, for the two twelve-pounder howitzers which were brought to this point at five o'clock A. M. on the fifteenth of May. The twelve-pound Napoleon guns were also brought forward to the position held the day previous by the howitzers of battery F, Second Missouri artillery. The two twenty-pound Parrott guns, of the Fourth Ohio

battery, I brought forward to the left of the main road, next to the Rodman guns, and opened fire on the enemy's fortifications. The Napoleon guns and the twelve-pound howitzers fired in the morning in the rifle-pits of the enemy, and in the afternoon the four twelve-pound Napoleon guns were removed to a position in front of Brigadier-General Lightburn's brigade of the Second division Fifteenth army corps. The section of twenty-pound Parrott guns were also removed to a position on the right of the First division Fifteenth army corps, and directed their fire at the railroad bridge.

On the sixteenth of May, early in the morning, the sections of howitzers advanced at a trot through Resacca, and unlimbered several times to fire on the retreating rebels.

Loss—One man, Corporal H. White, battery F, Second Missouri artillery, and one man wounded; seven horses killed.

The Fourth Independent Ohio battery fired two hundred and twenty-seven rounds; battery F, Third Missouri artillery, fired five hundred and sixty rounds.

CLERK LANDGRABER,
Major and Chief of Artillery.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

IN THE FIELD NEAR RESACCA, }
MAY 16, 1864. }

At the close of my last letter the grand army was in position, confronting the rebel army, which had been in occupation of Northern Georgia. The flanking movement had been well and skilfully made, a road secured for supplies and the movement of troops. Johnston had been compelled to withdraw from Dalton—Sherman had followed with his main army, and was ready to give battle to the rebel army concentrated in his front.

The Federal army was in a novel position. Its front was North. The country in which the battle was fought is rolling, and generally densely wooded, with a growth of timber and underwood. There are occasional openings and good roads; but it was very difficult, at most points along the line of battle, to see anything beyond our immediate vicinity.

The advance commenced early in the morning of the thirteenth. The troops were mainly on the road through Snake Creek Gap to Resacca, the right resting at its intersection with the Dalton road, six miles from Resacca, the rebel left. The rebel pickets were well up to our front. The Third cavalry division, General Kilpatrick, had the advance, and soon drove in the enemy's pickets. Kilpatrick's command was followed by the Army of the Tennessee, the Fifteenth corps leading. These troops keeping the main road, the Twentieth corps moved to the left, at its intersection with the Calhoun road, and the remainder of the centre and left, the Fourteenth and Fourth corps, taking the same direction at the intersection with the Dalton road. Kilpatrick's cavalry had moved forward, driving in the enemy's pickets on the Re-

sacca road, nearly to a cross road about two miles from Resacca, when General Kilpatrick was wounded in the leg and compelled to leave the field, the command devolving upon Colonel Murray, of the Fifth Kentucky cavalry.

When the head of the Fifteenth corps reached the cross road to Calhoun Ferry, it moved to the right and went into position on each side of the Resacca road, the Sixteenth moving down to its right. By one o'clock the different corps were all in position, the enemy was found, and the picket firing was quite lively.

Resacca is situated on the right bank of the Oostenaula River, a stream running in a south-westerly direction, and not fordable. The object of the afternoon's work seemed to be to advance the right so that the Sixteenth corps should rest its right on the river, and that the Fifteenth should secure possession of the hills in front of Resacca.

About two o'clock, General Logan rode up up from Sherman's headquarters of this corps—an old tree in the road—"Where is my staff? Broke up? There is work." Staff officers and orderlies were off with orders, and matters speedily began to assume the serious, lively appearance of preparation for battle.

General Sherman's headquarters were near those of General Logan, on a patch of open timber. The scene there was characteristic and suggestive. Sherman was seated on the ground, leaning against a tree, his feet drawn up to him, and a map on his knees, his coat unbuttoned, his hat anti-regulation and *à la mode*. Cigar in mouth, he looked no older, and not much worse than when he saved the first day's field at Shiloh, and footed it above Stubs' Bayou. Around him stood a large amount of rauc—Thomas, Hooker, Palmer, Logan, Elliott, Sickles, Butterfield, and a small host of Major and Brigadier Generals. They were receiving their final instructions for the afternoon's field.

Logan moved first and drew the first fire. In front of his second division was an open field, in it were the enemy's skirmishers—across in the woods his line of battle. At the bugle, the division fell into line of battle, deployed skirmishers, and swept across the field, driving the enemy in splendid style. General Logan accompanied the line. At the same time Herron, who had fallen back of the main road to allow Hooker to move to the right, moved on the double-quick to the left of Osterhaus, the two divisions pushing into the thick wood on the left of the Second; Dodge moved his command from the Ferry road down through the forest to fill up the space between the Fifteenth and the Oostenaula, his Fourth division, General Hatch, having the advance. After crossing the field, General Morgan L. Smith entered the wood, and pushed rapidly for the hills in his front.

As the right of the Fifteenth corps came up on the rising ground beyond the open hill, it was found to be uncovered, Dodge's left not being up. The rebels opened a severe flanking fire, from which Lightburn's brigade suffered

considerably. General Smith brought up battery H, and with a few shots from his twenty-pounder Parrott's, De Grasse upset and scattered the rebels and their barricades. The Fifteenth moved steadily forward, driving the enemy for a mile and a half, until the corps were in possession of the hills which they had been ordered to take. Their loss was comparatively light. The Sixteenth made its connection to the river, but with a considerable loss to the Fourth division. The Thirty-fifth New Jersey and Twenty-fifth Wisconsin received a fire from the opposite side of the river, while marching by the flank, from which they suffered severely. I send the list of their casualties—the skirmishing regiments, One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois, Fifty-seventh Ohio, Sixth Missouri, of Giles A. Smith's brigade, losing nine killed and twenty-four wounded, and the Fifty-third and Thirtieth Ohio, of Lightburn's brigade, losing fifty-four killed and wounded.

The positions having been successfully and brilliantly carried, the remainder of the afternoon was occupied in straightening the lines and bringing up the batteries, a work of great labor, and requiring much care, on account of the great number of hills and ravines, and the thick growth of timber. The rattle of musketry was kept up by the skirmishing lines, the batteries occasionally putting in their heavy notes, so that there was much of the noise of battle until dark. Occasionally a man would come back wounded from the skirmish line, but no serious work was done after the right wing occupied its lines.

In this afternoon's work, the One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois, Colonel Martin, were for the first time under fire. It behaved well, losing eight killed and sixteen wounded.

The left and centre moved into the positions ordered without serious opposition.

Lieutenant John Rumsey, of Battery A, was wounded late in the afternoon by a fragment of shell. Captain Wood had been compelled, by severe illness, to leave the field on the seventh, and Lieutenant Rumsey was in command of the battery. The wound was severe, tearing off the flesh and denuding the bone of the right shoulder. He was a brave, intelligent officer, very highly esteemed by his men and his superior officers.

On the morning of the fourteenth, the skirmishers commenced firing as soon as it was light. The musketry extended along the fronts of both armies, and at intervals the different batteries opened. In the immediate front of Resacca, the Fourth Ohio, Landgraber's, and Batteries A, B, and H, of Chicago, tried their guns upon the town, the enemy's redoubts, and the bridge. Their practice was most excellent; the school of artillery at the siege of Vicksburg exhibiting its training in every shot that was fired. During the forenoon nothing of any importance transpired.

Soon after noon the dance commenced in the centre and left-centre. First came the rattle of

the skirmishers' musketry as they advanced; the batteries followed, their heavy voices echoing and re-echoing through the ravine, among the hills and back to the mountains, until the earth shook and the air was full of vibrations, and every breath seemed a wave of sound. The heavy music of artillery ceased, and was succeeded by the long roll of musketry. Volley after volley was fired; then rose the cheers of the men, and the battle was opened. In plain language, the army of the Cumberland was assaulting the rebel position on Camp Creek, entrenched by rifle-pits in their front. The first fire of musketry was when the skirmishers were advanced. Under the fire of our batteries the assaulting columns were moved into their places so soon as the troops were deployed into line of battle. The artillery ceased, the advance commenced, with wild cheers from the men, on the double-quick. The first terrible volley of musketry came from the enemy in his rifle-pits; our line returned it in kind, and the struggle was commenced. A few minutes and the rifle-pits were carried; a few minutes more and with a terrific yell another line of rebels came over the hill and assaulted our men. Artillery could not be used, it would kill alike friend and foe. The struggle was brief, and we were driven out. This line was carried three different times within two hours, and each time lost. The casualties were heavy on both sides. Johnston had evidently massed at that point, and it would seem for the purpose of himself making an attack upon the centre along the Dalton road. The next morning the line was carried by General Thomas and held.

During this terrible engagement on the left the right wing was quiet. Towards its close General Morgan L. Smith opened his batteries upon Resacca and its fortifications to detain the rebels in his front from moving to the centre.

About five in the afternoon General Logan received orders to make an assault upon the rebel lines in his front. On the right of the bridge, on a commanding elevation, the rebels had a redoubt mounting three twenty-four pounders on the face towards Logan. Still further back, and on higher ground, there was another redoubt. Between the first redoubt and the line occupied by the Fifteenth corps were two ridges with a slight depression between them. The space between them and the rebel redoubts afforded an excellent cover to the troops which were massed in it, and was made safer and stronger by three lines of well-constructed rifle-pits. Between the ridge and the line of the Fifteenth corps the ground was an open field, sloping to the south-west, affording but little cover. Near the woods in which our troops lay was a creek not fordable.

General Logan directed the assault to be made by one brigade from each of the First and Second divisions. General Chas. R. Wood's brigade, of the First division, and General Giles A. Smith's brigade of the Second division, were selected. The important and perilous charge

could not have been intrusted to better men. The remainder of the divisions were put in position to give such immediate support to the brigades as circumstances might require, while the whole of the right wing that was in front acted as the principal reserve.

Generals Logan and Morgan L. Smith were in front, busy along the line. It being very difficult to cross the creek, the troops were passed over singly to the opposite bank on logs, and in any way they best could, under the cover of a heavy fire from the batteries.

The brigade of General Giles A. Smith consisted at the time of the Sixth Missouri, Colonel Van Duzen, One Hundred and Eleventh Illinois, Colonel Martin, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Curtis, Fifty-seventh Ohio, Colonel Rice, and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Colonel Froman.

At six the line of skirmishers was advanced to the foot of the hill, driving the rebels. At the order the brigades sprang up from the bank under which they were covered, deployed and marched forward at double-quick. The rebel main line occupied a rifle-pit along the crest of the hill, at the foot of which ran a sluggish creek some three or four feet in depth. Across this creek and up the hill into the rifle-pit they had been driven by the skirmishers. The distance from the lines where the two brigades deployed to the rifle-pit of the enemy was two hundred and fifty yards. Across this space, exposed to a severe fire of musketry, our line advanced with trailed arms, forded the creek, and reached and carried the rebel rifle-pit without a shot from their main line. It was well and magnificently done. The shouts of the men were answered by the cheers of their comrades of the corps that were heard for miles. The position had been carried; the problem now was to hold it. General Wood's brigade was on the left and General Giles A. Smith on the right. Under a heavy fire from the redoubts the rebels formed a column to retake the hill. Very soon a strong force, displaying seven regimental colors, was discovered moving to the attack in column, by regiments. From the hill, where Generals McPherson and Logan stood, the attacking column looked formidable. The whole force of the two brigades was deployed in front. The rebel column would strike in a few minutes. If it broke our line the position was gone and the brigades lost. Logan hurried along the front. It seemed but an instant when the whole rebel force made its assault upon the right of Giles A. Smith's brigade. The One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, which was deployed as skirmishers, fell back, forming on the right and left of the Fifty-seventh Ohio. Colonel Froman had been wounded in crossing the creek. The rebel column, a portion of Hardee's corps, came boldly and steadily on. Colonel Rice reserved his fire until the rebels were within sixty yards, when he delivered a terrible fire straight in their faces. At the same time the One Hundred and Elev-

enth Illinois and the right of General Wood's brigade changed front a little towards the right, and the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois on the extreme right, changed direction to the left, and both wings poured in a terrific oblique fire on both sides of the rebel column. It staggered and fell back, but instantly re-formed and renewed the assault and was again repulsed. They massed and assaulted Wood's brigade on the left, and were terribly repulsed. Failing in their direct assaults, they attempted to turn the right of our line. In their last assault the oblique fire on the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh was increased by a part of our Lightburn's brigade. The assaults were rapidly and boldly made. Reinforcements were on their way to the front before the aids asking them ever reached General Logan. But still the main heavy blows of the rebel assaults were received and repulsed by Wood's and Giles A. Smith's brigades before they reached them. The last effort of the enemy was an attempt to turn each flank. In this they were met by the supporting brigades, and repulsed with severe loss; our loss was less than three hundred. The rebel loss of course was very much greater. They admitted a loss of two thousand during the day, on their left. This charge and the engagement which ensued lasted until after dark, and was one of the best fights ever made within my experience by Federal troops. They were led by Generals Wood and Giles A. Smith, two of the ablest brigade commanders in the field. The men behaved with the greatest coolness and courage while receiving the assaults of the rebel columns. The Fifty-seventh Ohio, against which the attack was directed, fired and loaded by front and rear rank at the command. The One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois loaded and fired at the word.

The rebel Colonel Stanton was killed, an Aide-de-Camp to Hardee was killed, and General Hardee's horse killed under him. I have seen an *Atlanta Intelligencer* of the eighteenth, which claims a victory in the battle on the centre, and states that the battle in the evening with Logan was terribly severe—their losses heavy, but claims that they finally repulsed the "Yankee charge."

It would be unjust to omit to make record of the universal testimony of officers and men to the conduct of Colonel Rice. With the utmost intrepidity and coolness he remained assisting the assault and handling his men as steadily and with the precision of a dress parade.

During the afternoon a force with a pontoon train had been moved to the ferry across the Oostenaula on the Calhoun road, for the purpose of crossing and making lodgment on the south side of the river. The enemy was found there in force and intrenched. The position of the Federal army after a hard day's work was this: The left and centre was substantially as in the morning. They had fought against positions and a superior force, and had suffered severely. A portion of the right, two divisions of the

Fifteenth, had taken and held an important position in front of the enemy's works at Resacca, while a division of the Sixteenth corps was at the ferry intrenching. Howard had moved along the railroad within eight miles of Resacca. The particulars of the engagement on the center your correspondent with the army of the Cumberland will furnish. During the night the advance position of the Fifteenth corps was thoroughly intrenched.

On the fifteenth, the position at which the Fourteenth corps had the battle of the day previous was carried without great loss. On the right, Sweeney's division of the Sixteenth corps, with a portion of the Third cavalry division, after a sharp engagement, crossed the Oostenaula at Calhoun Ferry. The passage was effected late in the afternoon.

The fifteenth was comparatively quiet until after midnight. Occasional shots were exchanged by the pickets. But the evening was the most quiet since the armies were engaged. About two in the morning a most tremendous artillery fire was opened by the batteries of the left, in consequence of the discovery of a movement of the enemy. A short time before day the railroad bridge was discovered to be on fire. The pickets of the brigades of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith were advanced, and the colors of the Fifty-seventh Ohio were placed on the abandoned redoubt. Resacca was destitute of rebels and rebel property for purposes of war. We captured three guns, three forges, some caissons, and a small quantity of salt and corn.

A rebel regiment was captured by Howard, and a few vagabond pickets were picked up in various places. On the whole, Johnston had gone, and to a great extent had taken his army with him. Twenty-four hours later and he could not have moved off so well and clearly. As to the rebel strength, judging from the length of the line that Johnston held, and the battle which he made on the fifteenth, at different points, it could not have been less than forty thousand. Prisoners claim that it was sixty thousand.

A SOUTHERN ACCOUNT.

IN THE FIELD NEAR CALHOUN, GA., }
Monday afternoon, May 14, 1864. }

The army having settled down for a while, I avail myself of the opportunity offered to give a full account of the battle of Oostenaula, between the entire Yankee army and the divisions of Hindman, Stevenson, and Stewart, of Hood's corps—these troops composing the right wing of our army. The enemy's force was reported to be the corps of Hovey, Howard, and Palmer, composing between thirty-five and forty thousand men, evidently the flower of the Yankee army, as they were composed almost entirely of Western troops, who, for fighting, rank only second to our own, as has been proven on many battle-fields during this war.

In the morning our forces left their works, and took position about one mile further, and immediately erected new breastworks on the ground they had captured the night previous, and which the enemy had not reoccupied. The object of this advance was to prevent an enflading fire which had been obtained on our line the day previous, and to find room for our artillery to play upon the enemy with effect. As soon as our men, composed of Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, advanced, a brisk fire ensued between our skirmishers and those of the Yankees, but it ceased on the arrival of our column. The new works were promptly erected, and before ten o'clock everything was prepared for the anticipated aggressive movement of the enemy, whose manœuvres the night previous, after they were driven from the ridges, indicated that some plan was contemplated by them for the regaining of the lost ground.

About twelve o'clock the Yankee skirmishers opened a heavy fire on our pickets, compelling them to fall back behind the intrenchments, and at the same time heavy columns were seen forming on the right of Hindman's, Stevenson's, and Stewart's divisions. There were four lines of battle in depth, and appeared to number about eight thousand men, and from the number massed in front of Stevenson's line it became apparent that his division would have to stand the brunt of the engagement. One hour passed off slowly to the gallant men who were gazing over the works in anxious expectation for the advance of the enemy, when at about four o'clock the Yankee line of battle moved slowly forward in fine order. As soon as they crossed a ravine which divided the ridges held by our forces from those occupied by them, Captain Corbett's battery of Georgia artillery was ordered to advance outside of our lines, and about fifty yards from them, and take up a position, which would have given us an enflading fire on the approaching column. The battery, consisting of four twelve-pounder Napoleons, moved out of the line and took up position as ordered, but before they could fire a gun, or their infantry support could come up, the charge was made along the whole line. The Yankees had crossed the ravine, and with a loud cheer rushed on our works. Hindman quickly repulsed them, but the fighting on Brown's line, of Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, was long and desperate. Captain Corbett's battery being subjected to a fearful fire, the men left their guns, but not before they had lost thirty of their number in killed and wounded, and entered our line. No sooner did the Yankees perceive this than a fresh column of their troops was thrown rapidly forward, and uniting with that which had gone before, rushed on the abandoned guns with the hope of capturing them and carrying our line.

Their anticipations were, however, foiled by the gallantry of the Third and Twentieth Tennessee, Colonels Walker and Saffell commanding. These noble men perceiving the intention of the enemy, withheld their fire until the Yankee

column had approached to almost an arm's length of the guns, when a volley, steady and accurate, was poured into the ranks of the foremost column. It broke and ran, having been fearfully cut up. The second column advanced over the bodies of their comrades, and endeavored to achieve what they failed to do. A second volley from the gallant Tennesseans filled the ground with dead and wounded, and imitating the example of those before them, they fled, but not before two fresh regiments had been thrown forward under cover of their fire, and made to lie behind the four guns of Corbett's battery, at the same time planting their colors on the parapet of the redoubt.

In the meantime the Yankees had advanced on Stewart's line, and made a desperate attempt to take it by storm. Clayton's and Baker's brigades of Alabamians, aided by Stovall's and Gibson's, received them with great gallantry, and poured a terrible fire into the Yankee advance. They, however, continued to move forward, and approached very near the line, when Clayton's brigade gave them another well-directed fire, and they fell down the slope of the hill until out of range of our guns. This charge was desperately made, and the masses of the enemy's dead that lay piled up before Stewart's line attested the courage and determination of our foes.

A pause of nearly three-quarters of an hour elapsed, broken only by the incessant fire of the Yankee sharpshooters, who, mounted on trees and other prominent positions, made it dangerous for any one to walk erect along the line. At the expiration of the time named, a fresh column of Yankees advanced upon our lines, and in a few seconds Hindman's, Stevenson's, and Stewart's men were pouring in a well-directed fire. A second time they broke and ran, but still leaving the two regiments mentioned before, which, being ensconced behind the redoubt, were safe from the volleys poured on their comrades, although they suffered terribly from our sharpshooters.

Two charges had been repulsed, with heavy loss to the enemy, and the ammunition of the Twenty-sixth Tennessee had been half expended, when fresh columns of Yankees were seen forming in line of battle opposite Brown's works. The charges on Hindman and Stewart, who were on the right and left of Stevenson, had become feebler, while the movements of the Yankees notified the last-named officers that his division would have to bear the brunt of the engagement. Reynolds' brigade had been previously ordered up, and were lying on the ground about fifteen yards in the rear of General Brown's line, the officers with difficulty restraining the men from entering the breastworks before they were called for. The Yankee column made the third charge, and was again repulsed with heavy loss. As rapidly as I can relate it, another fresh column was thrown forward and made the fourth charge. Several volleys were thrown into their ranks by the brave Tennes-

seans, and a fourth time they broke and retreated in disorder to the ridge on which their forces were massed.

It was now past three o'clock in the afternoon, and in these two hours of fighting Brown's brigade had expended forty rounds of ammunition, each man. Reynolds' brigade was now ordered to relieve them, and giving a yell, the Fifty-fourth Virginia entered the evacuated works of the Twenty-eighth North Carolina and Sixty-third Virginia. Neither Hindman nor Stewart had need of their reserves, as the charges of the enemy, though made with vigor and gallantly repulsed by these men, were neither as numerous nor determined, and were intended to cover their design on Stevenson, and to prevent the reserves of these divisions from being sent to his support. The three regiments named above took their positions on the line, and General Brown's men retired about two hundred yards to the rear, for the purpose of receiving a fresh supply of ammunition. General Pettus' brigade of Alabamians had been ordered up a few minutes before, General Stevenson perceiving the enemy were determined in their purpose to carry his line. The gallant brigade was formed in two lines of battle, behind the Virginians and North Carolinians, about twenty yards apart, and remained there lying close to the ground, for the moment their services were wanted.

At a quarter from four o'clock a fifth charge was made, the enemy throwing forward fresh troops every time. The charge was very heavy, and was made with spirit. As the long and close column of Yankees moved swiftly through the winding ravine, every face assumed a rigid expression of unyielding determination, while the hearts of those looking on the movements of the enemy almost ceased their vibration with anxiety. It was certain from the large numbers of the enemy that this would be the heaviest charge yet made, and extreme anxiety for success was manifested. At last, with a prolonged cheer, they rushed upon our works. A volley—a terrible, death-dealing volley—was poured into their ranks, and a loud and enthusiastic yell of defiance rang out from the lips of the Virginians and North Carolinians. This was more than the men of Brown's and Pettus' brigades could withstand, and though threatened with death by their officers, numbers of the gallant Tennesseans and Alabamians had entered the pits to assist in repelling the charge. But their services were not needed. Almost as quick as lightning, another volley had been already poured into the enemy's line of battle, and they turned and retreated in disorder to the cover of their ridge, followed by the derisive shouts of their victors.

The fifth charge had now been repulsed, but still the enemy evinced neither the desire nor the intention to abandon their efforts to carry our works. They had almost ceased their attacks on Hindman, but continued to assault Stevenson's and Stewart's lines with the greatest

fury and determination possible. Stewart had already repulsed him three times, and Stevenson five. A fourth time the enemy essayed to carry Stewart's line of battle, and were repulsed with fearful loss. The carnage here was dreadful, for the gallant men of Clayton's brigade withheld their fire until the enemy had approached close to them, when they poured in a terrible volley, breaking them, and forcing their massed columns to retire to their lines, badly scattered.

I said that the enemy evinced neither the desire nor intention to abandon his efforts, and so it was, for within half an hour after his fifth attack and repulse, three lines of battle, closely massed, were seen forming in front of that portion of the line held by the Fifty-eighth North Carolina. As I looked over the works, a feeling of mingled fear and anxiety pervaded me, that if they succeeded in forcing the line, our army would then be cut to pieces, and overwhelmed with disaster and disgrace. There was not much time for reflection, however, for very soon a voice on the right of the regiment exclaimed, "They are coming!" and the first column was seen to advance. "Withhold your fire until they come close to you, and then aim low," ordered the officers. On came the enemy, cheering loudly, and confident that their superior numbers would insure them success. They approached to within fifty yards of the line firing rapidly on our men—a sheet of fire, one deafening roar which sounded like the eruption of a volcano was the answer, and the dead and wounded lie piled up before our works. This was more than human endurance could command, and bewildered by the fierceness of our fire they scattered throughout the woods, and reached their line, our sharpshooters killing and wounding them by dozens in their rout down the ridge.

This was the severest charge of the day. The Yankees advanced well and with spirit, but were forced to succumb to the fierce fire of our troops. To describe the scene would be almost an impossibility, for it beggars description. The Minié balls of the Yankees poured over our line in an unceasing stream, and in such numbers that the air seemed black with them. The sharp and musical whiz they emit was no longer heard; it was an angry and discordant imitation of a peal of thunder rolling along the clouds, while the booming of the artillery and the bursting of the shells as they came flying over our lines, formed a fire, unequalled, perhaps, since nations first made war upon each other. But one thing saved us from a fearful loss of life, and it was that the Yankees fired entirely too high.

The sixth column was repulsed only a few minutes, when the remaining two columns of Yankees marched forward with the hope of reaching our line before our men could fire more than one volley. But their charge was not made with the same firmness which characterized that of the preceding one, and two or

three well-aimed volleys from the Fifty-eighth North Carolina, assisted by a cross fire from the Fifty-fourth Virginia on the one wing, and the Sixty-third on the other, routed the seventh attacking column of the enemy. They also retired to their ridge, and for a few moments only their sharpshooters could be seen, their main body being, no doubt, engaged in reforming their broken columns.

According to the order, General Stewart advanced to the enemy, but unfortunately obliqued too much to the right, and destroyed all connection with General Reynolds. He attacked the enemy and drove him from his front until he reached his line of battle, when fresh troops reinforced the Yankees; they rallied, and making a stand, opened fire on our men. No sooner had they fired the first volley, than one of the brigades of Stewart's division broke, compelling the others to fall back, which they did in good order, although pressed by the enemy, and regained their works without losing very heavily. In this charge General Clayton's brigade distinguished itself above the balance of the division by its fine conduct. Although these men were subjected to a fearful fire from four lines of battle of Yankees, they received it with praiseworthy firmness, and succeeded in driving the enemy from their front, and regained the works in safety. Baker's brigade, aided by Gibson, also behaved splendidly, and distinguished themselves by their brave conduct; in fact, covered themselves with glory.

It was now past six o'clock in the evening, but though night was fast approaching, the enemy exhibited no disposition to cease from his fruitless efforts to carry the right of General Stevenson's line, and was determined to endeavor to turn his left wing and force him on his right. Accordingly, General Stewart was ordered to leave his works and drive the enemy from his front, sweeping towards his centre, while Reynolds' brigade of Stevenson's division was ordered to advance at the same time, for the purpose of forming a pivot to General Stewart, and changing the line of battle obliquely to the left, thus flanking the enemy, and giving General Hardee an opportunity to advance and cut the enemy off from Snake Creek Gap, while Hood cut him off from the Dalton road.

While Stewart was making his movement a peremptory order reached General Reynolds for him to advance his command as a pivot. The General opposed the movement unless General Stewart's left wing formed a junction with his right, but upon the order being repeated in a more peremptory manner, the Fifty-fourth Virginia regiment was ordered to advance from their line of works and carry the ridge before them, while the other regiments were directed to be ready to move at a moment's notice for the purpose of making the pivot complete and thus performing the work allotted to them. The Fifty-fourth leaped over the works, and

with their gallant Colonel, Robert Trigg, and Lieutenant-Colonel John J. Wade, in front, moved forward. At this moment the enemy was about to make another charge, and were pouring a heavy fire over our works, compelling the regiment to advance under a galling fire. It, however, disregarded the storm of shot and shell poured upon it, and drove the charging column of Yankees through the woods until it reached the open field, when, to the astonishment of the Colonel, it was discovered that Stewart's division was not in sight, and consequently there was no connection with the regiment.

This was most unfortunate, for the enemy perceiving the regiment "solitary and alone" in the open field, commenced pouring a galling fire into their ranks; but nothing daunted by this, Colonels Trigg and Wade, waving their swords, gave the order to charge. On the men marched, until they were not five paces from the enemy's line, when four distinct lines of battle, extending as far as the eye could reach, were seen by this command, and numbered over eight thousand men. The Adjutant of the regiment, with pistol in hand, rushed forward and seized the Yankee colors, and fired into their ranks, when a bullet pierced his brain, and he fell dead across the enemy's works. His name was Hammet, and a braver and nobler man never sacrificed his life on the altar of his country.

Colonel Trigg perceiving that his men were falling fast from an enfilade fire, as well as a fire in front, and observing them giving way in disorder, rallied them under a heavy fire, and in pretty good order brought them back to our lines, when it was discovered that in less than five minutes he had lost over a hundred men out of four hundred and fifty he had led to the charge. His conduct, and that of Lieutenant-Colonel Wade, is deserving of the greatest praise; and I do not flatter when I assert, from my personal experience, being an eye-witness to their behavior, that braver and more gallant officers never existed than Colonel Trigg and his Lieutenant-Colonel.

This engagement was emphatically that of Generals Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, for although Hindman was engaged, the part borne by the division was insignificant compared with that of the other two. The two Major-Generals behaved with the utmost coolness during the engagement, and proved themselves to be able officers. Generals Brown, Reynolds, Clayton, Baker, Gibson, and Stovall, exhibited the greatest amount of heroism, but were, perhaps, a little too careless of their persons, and exposed themselves without any actual need. General Pettus, although his brigade was not engaged, distinguished himself by the manner he encouraged the troops in the works. General Cumming's brigade of Georgians, on the left of Stevenson's division, were not charged, and had no opportunity of giving the Yankees a lesson in defence of their State. They were, however, ready for any attempt the enemy may have

made, and would, I feel certain, have displayed their usual courage had the Yankees charged their line.

Our total loss in this engagement could not have exceeded two thousand, while that of the Yankees is estimated at nothing less than six thousand, while there are many prominent officers who believe it to reach double that number. One thing is certain, that they were slaughtered by hundreds at every charge, and must have suffered severely.

At ten o'clock last night our entire army left the works and proceeded to cross the Oostenaule River. Before the rear had proceeded a mile from the works, a sharp fire was opened between our pickets and those of the enemy, ours being driven in. The enemy must then have advanced their column for a night attack, as they opened a terrific fire of musketry on the vacated lines, cheering vociferously at the same time. Our men were then marched rapidly forward through Stewart's division, which had formed in line of battle across the railroad for the purpose of covering the retreat, which was not occasioned from any fear that the Yankees would be able to carry our line of works, as the army felt confident of holding its position an indefinite period of time, but because our stand at Oostenaule River was only to protect the withdrawal of our large wagon trains.

The Yankees followed our army closely, and pressed us all the day, but Stewart's division has kept him at bay so far. This evening there was sharp firing on our right, but I have not learned what it was caused from.

Our present position is around Calhoun, but the chances are that we will continue our retreat to Adairsville to-morrow. We may fight here, but I do not think it likely. In the meanwhile the Yankees are reported to be massing heavy columns on our left with the view of flanking us. Let them continue; it cannot last forever.

I am glad to say that the wound of Captain W. H. Claiborne is not as severe as was first supposed, and that it is mending rapidly. I trust that the gallant Captain will soon be able to return to duty as Inspector-General of Reynolds' brigade, for his services are very valuable.

Captain Wise, of General Stevenson's staff, was wounded yesterday, while accompanying the Fifty-fourth Virginia in its charge on the enemy. His wound is very painful, but not severe, as the ball injured no bones whatever. He is a nephew of Governor Wise of Virginia, and is a really brave officer.

In my last letter I omitted to mention a gallant son of Georgia. I allude to Captain Jossie, of Macon. This officer behaved with great heroism in the battle of Saturday, and received the thanks and compliments of our General. The Captain is, I regret to state, sick at present, but I trust he will soon recover.

The army is still, in fine spirits, retains un-

bounded confidence in General Johnston, and is eager to meet the enemy. The Confederacy may depend upon the Army of Tennessee.

ANOTHER NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

TWO MILES NORTHEAST OF DALLAS, GA., }
May 26, 1864.

The movements of this army have already been chronicled up to and through the battle of Resacca, and the precipitate retreat of the rebels through Kingston and Cassville, upon Etowah River, and Allatoona Gap. At the two former places they offered a slight opposition to our advance, which was quickly swept away, and the pursuit continued to Cassville. Here the army halted two days to recruit after its late battles and marches, and then its indefatigable leader gave orders to take twenty days' rations and set out on a march, supposed to be a flank movement upon Atlanta. The right of the army went by the way of Rome, the centre crossed the Etowah at Gillum's bridge, about twelve miles west of the railroad, while the left proceeded by parallel (r) roads at supporting distance from the centre. Why the enemy did not anticipate our crossing the river below, and attempt to forestall it, is not clearly shown. They did think of it, but too late. After the army had safely crossed at Gillum's bridge, a rebel bearer of despatches was captured, with an order from Johnston to his cavalry leader to intercept us at the bridge, as we would probably attempt to cross it. General Thomas at once clad one of his spies in rebel uniform, instructed our pickets to fire at him (over his head, of course), and sent him through the lines with a despatch to Joe Johnston that he (Taylor) had done so with a loss to us of two thousand or so, and many prisoners. It was a cruel joke upon the rebel, and procured for the spy, besides, access to valuable information from pretty high rebel sources. The army then marched quietly on towards Dallas.

May 26.

The day passed off without incident or note, till about five o'clock in the afternoon, when the sound of a brisk cannonade in the advance discovered a fight in progress. It proved to be General Hooker's corps, which had held the advance on the march, engaged with the rebel General Hood's corps. Early in the forenoon, while the General and his staff were inspecting the bridge over Pumpkin Vine Creek, about half way between Burnt Hickory and Dallas, he was fired upon by a cavalry picket, which then immediately fled. After proceeding two or three miles beyond the bridge, boldly in front of his entire force, his escort became engaged with a small body calling themselves the Louisiana Sharpshooters, and killed their Major and a few men. At noon the Second division (General Williams), which was leading the way, discovered that they had a considerable body of infantry before them, instead of the few cavalry they

had supposed. Skirmishing immediately began, the Second division driving the enemy steadily from their first line of works about two miles, entirely unsupported. About five o'clock they came upon a stronger line, and, being fatigued, they were relieved by the Third and First divisions (Generals Butterfield and Geary commanding). The Third divided, a brigade and a regiment going to the left, and the remainder to the right, and the First taking the place of the Second. After a short time the Second was brought up at an angle upon the right, and took part in the remainder of the engagement. Advancing steadily under a fire of musketry, which those who witnessed it declare they have seldom seen equalled in severity, they proceeded to within forty yards of a concealed battery, planted by sections, which opened upon them a sudden and murderous discharge of grape and canister. One company of the Fifth Ohio approached as near to suffering absolute annihilation as, perhaps, is ever witnessed. A withering volley of grape from the battery prostrated upon the ground nearly the entire company, every man and file-closer in his place and his face to the front, with almost the regularity of a skirmish line. The rebel firing was rapid and terrific. At this point the gallant Colonel of the Fifth, J. H. Patrick, fell mortally wounded, at the head of his regiment, and expired in a few minutes. He was struck on the leg by a shell, and died before an amputation could be performed. The First division suffered severely, losing near nine hundred men. Some companies of the Second division fired sixty rounds, and the division, as a whole, maintained its position against the entire rebel corps for some time, and till others could be brought to its assistance. The heavy losses of the First division were occasioned by the destructive fire of the central battery, and it is worthy of the greatest praise for the undaunted steadiness with which it bore the fierce fire of the rebel battery, until it was disabled by the loss of all its horses, and many of its gunners, from the close volleys which were poured into it. The One Hundred and Second Illinois, armed with the Spencer rifle, claims the honor of reducing it to silence, though it was most efficiently assisted by others to the right or left. The enemy were driven entirely away from the pieces, yet we could not take them, owing to the proximity of their lines; and thus they remained on neutral ground, claimed by neither, and useless to both. The Sixtieth Illinois played a prominent part in unmanning and unhorsing another section of the battery in the same manner. Their sharpshooters picked off forty of its gunners, who had the temerity to elevate their heads above the breastworks.

But to enumerate the instances of individual heroism and good conduct in this brilliant episode, would be to introduce the name and history of every man and company and regiment in the Twentieth corps. A narrative with so many chapters is impossible. I asked repeat-

edly for special instances of daring and merit, but could find none, so admirable was the behavior of all alike. It was a special pleasure of the officers to speak of the magnificent enthusiasm with which the men "went in," and the steadiness they exhibited under the galling fire which met them. General Thomas publicly declared that he had not at any time seen men bear themselves more bravely than these. Let this verdict suffice for every one who is anxious for the good name of the Twentieth corps.

Few prisoners were taken on either side. The loss on our side was probably greater than that of the enemy, amounting to about one thousand five hundred killed, wounded, and missing. The substantial fruits of the day's work are a gain of two miles of ground, giving us a favorable position, two pieces of artillery, and a better arrangement of the line for subsequent operations.

The fighting was conducted by General Hooker on his favorite plan, and with his wonted dash and audacity. At one time the Second division was exposed alone to the attack of the whole rebel force; but the General, who was, as always, at every right place at the right time, instead of halting for assistance to arrive, or falling back, which would have insured an attack and rout, dashed the division headlong against the rebels, and, what with the belief this inspired in them of a larger force, and the stun and panic of the shock, drove them before him at will. Supreme daring in this case was supreme safety. The General's peculiar and admirable tactics were here clearly shown. Forming the men in several lines of battle, he pushes them rapidly on by a continual sort of a revolution. As the front line becomes exhausted, it is halted, and the extreme rear is hurried to the front, which is thus kept constantly fresh.

Night put an end to the firing, but all night trains and ambulances and artillery were rumbling to and fro, troops were marching into line, and everything gave promise of stern work on the morrow. But it did not come. The woods were thick, the fortifications had all to be built, the lines of troops were immensely long, winding off to the left and right into their places, and so the whole of May twenty-six passed away, and nothing was accomplished save getting into position. But this was much, far more than one who has not seen it with his own eyes can believe. A continuous front of many miles in extent, in dense forests, over creeks and hills and valleys, with only a few rugged and narrow parallel roads, out of which to deliver the huge masses of men and guns, is not the creation of an hour, nor of a day. But during the night a part of the Fourth corps had come up and gone in to the left, and in the morning Gibson's brigade (Willich's old) was thrown out as skirmishers. During the day, the Twenty-third and part of the Fourteenth corps advanced to the extreme left, but General McPherson failed to come up on the right, as was expected. Scattering shots of musketry flew

either way all day, and two or three batteries were planted on a commanding ridge of ground, which failed to elicit any reply from the other side, besides an occasional angry shell. The rebels were chary of their powder, saving it for sterner uses, and anxious to conceal their pieces that they might again employ them at a range of their own choosing, as on the day before. They were very quiet, and concealed themselves in the thick undergrowth to such an extent that our gunners must fire pretty much at random, and seek to discover their whereabouts. Evidently they had not completed their preparations, had not yet received all the reinforcements they expected, and felt that they could afford to bide their time while their skirmishers were harassing ours, and their silence was emptying our caissons to no purpose, till everything was well ready. Some prisoners brought in in the evening, and examined rigorously and apart, disclosed the fact that they had received reinforcements from Florida, and now claimed an effective strength of seventy thousand. As their stories agreed, it was concluded that reinforcements had probably arrived, but not in such numbers as represented. It was accordingly expected that the next day would see a general engagement; but either they or we were not even yet ready. The skirmishing was sharp and continuous, but neither party seemed to advance or retreat. A few of the rebel rifle-pits were carried, and in the evening the lines got afool of each other, and a small squad of prisoners was brought in. The undergrowth, which covers the whole face of the ground, prevents the lines from seeing each other till very close, consequently many of the wounds are very severe. About a hundred may be set down as the day's losses along a front of three miles.

May 27.

The expectations of the day before were not destined to be realized, for operations on both sides were confined to a desultory artillery practice, fortifying and manœuvring into better positions. McPherson was expected to have closed up the gap on the right, and his failure, for some reason, to do so, postponed still further an active work of any magnitude. A general attack was to have been made early in the day, but with the whole right wing floating loose and detached, it was utterly impossible. General Jeff. C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps, however, occupied Dallas, and, late in the evening, intelligence arrived that McPherson had reported himself on Davis' right, and that the latter had "side stepped" to the left, so as to fill up the gap intervening between himself and the Twentieth corps. On the right, then, all was as it should be. On the left, also, connection was made between Schofield and the three infantry divisions under Elliott, commanded by Murray (Kilpatrick's division), Garrard, and Ed. McCook, General McCook connecting with the infantry. General Stoneman had an independent command, also, on the immediate left. At day-

light the monotonous popping of musketry and occasional bellowing of artillery opened again, to continue the whole of another stale day of skirmishing.

Early in the forenoon the monotony was sadly broken by the death of Major J. B. Hampson, of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, and Aid to General Wood. He was struck in the left shoulder by a musket ball, which broke the spine, and ended his life in a few hours. He was a general favorite, and his death produced unfeigned sadness among a wide circle of friends.

The play of the artillery was, for the most part, necessarily aimless, and consequently harmless. One gunner, however, by the felling of trees, at last discovered an inviting target, and succeeded in throwing into it a couple of shells, most handsomely. A house was discovered about two miles distant, in the yard of which the rebels had planted a battery, and whose tall red chimney stood out among the trees too temptingly to be refused. A piece was trained on it, and the first shell went home without bursting, and left no indications except its effects. These were sufficiently obvious. Immediately a prodigious flutter was visible about the premises, men vigorously running away among the trees, and most ludicrous and yet most cruel of all, a woman, in white, fleeing out of the house in the greatest apparent terror. The gun was held a little to the left and a second shell lodged directly in the yard, bursting immediately above the surface of the ground, in a position to do the utmost possible slashing among the rebel gunners, if any were there. Two more accurate deliveries, at that distance, are seldom seen.

Early in the afternoon long lines of dust were seen about four miles away to the rear and left, rising over the tops of the trees, and about five o'clock we received a conclusive and stunning explanation of their import. It was simply a rapid concentration to strike our extreme left, which was still weak and unsteady, from its having been continually shoved out in that direction, and from the distance and the roughness of the way over which supporting artillery must pass. The rebels had evidently discovered this state of affairs, and meant to thrust a heavy column in between Schofield and the cavalry before these could be united in a strong line. They were at their old work. Fortunately the game was detected and our combinations made in time to save the line, but not a minute to spare. The blow was parried, but we staggered under it. Wood's division of the Fourth corps had been relieved from line of battle on Schofield's right in the forenoon by the division of General Stanley, and had rested but a short time when it was hurried over to the point of danger. The ground was very rough and the bushes almost impenetrable, but boldness was here again the safe policy and the division was soon engaged. The ground on which it must fight was peculiarly bad. Two parallel ridges hemmed in its flanks, and directly in front was

another, on all of which the rebels had guns which delivered at once a direct, enfilading, and cross fire. Their volleys were quick and terrible as cross-lightning; grape, canister, shell, and round shot pouring in all at once, and musket balls flying thick as hail. Out of Wood's division, and Scribner's brigade of Johnson's division, which was supporting on the left, four hundred men fell in thirty minutes, when darkness happily intervened. Our lines had held their own stubbornly in the face of this terrible slaughter, but by ten in the evening were drawn back so that they could be supported by batteries which had in the meantime been planted. Here lay four hundred wounded and dead men in need of immediate care, and the ambulances and stretchers were three miles away, and the road between was very bad. Despite the best endeavors of Captain Tonsley, Chief of Ambulance corps, who ordered up the whole corps at once, nearly a hundred men lay on the field all night. Those who could dragged themselves wearily along, with the aid of comrades, to the hospital. This number of wounded and killed were found on the field, and others may have been left in the retreat. Among the missing is Colonel Payne, of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, who is either a prisoner or killed, and fallen into the hands of the rebels. Another painful loss was that of Captain Harry Stinson, of General Howard's staff, who was shot early in the day through the lungs, and will not probably survive. He is but twenty years of age, and had just been appointed Major by the General, though not yet commissioned. The General himself exposed his person recklessly, and came sufficiently near being a one-legged, as he is already a one-armed veteran. A ragged piece of shell contused his foot severely while he was riding coolly *outside the skirmish line*, and another piece slightly bruised his forehead. The General's remark that he has already made sufficient sacrifices to the rebels, and must, therefore, be entitled to immunity at their hands, would weigh lightly with the bloody-minded traitors, if any opportunity against him should be presented, and will lack much of dispelling the anxiety of his friends.

The heaviest sufferers by the evening's attack was, probably, Hassen's brigade. Forming the centre of the attacking column, and driving upon the foe in the form of a wedge, it courted the enemy's fiercest, and, as it came, braced itself up stoutly against it, and stood.

Here again the conduct of the troops was all that could be desired. Though melting fast, under the double fire of cannon and musketry, and unsupported by artillery, they remained steadfast. They load and fire until the ammunition is nearly gone, and when there are no more cartridges in the boxes, they stand fast till more is brought. The glorious earnestness of American citizens contending in a just cause is nowhere more nobly evinced than here to-day in the army of General Sherman. The patience, too, with which the men bear wounds and

suffering, is worthy of all praise. Cheerily, and even merrily, those who can do so, hop away to the rear on poles and sticks, or leaning on the shoulder of a comrade, and those who have fallen await the coming of the stretcher, and, in the hospital, their turn under the lance and the saw, quietly and without complaint. One poor fellow, whose life was swiftly running out in a great red stream, from a ghastly shell-wound which severed his leg, uttered no groan, nor did his check blanch, though he knew too well that death was but a few hours off.

FOUR MILES NORTHEAST OF DALLAS, GA., }
May 26, 1864. }

In my last letter I gave you a brief account of the operations of this army up to the twenty-seventh, including the affairs of Generals Hooker and Wood—battles they would have been in the younger days of the war, but not now—and will now continue it to date.

At the time of General Wood's fight with the enemy, the lines of battle had been completed, though since modified, and were after the following order: The right resting on, and extending a mile beyond Dallas, under McPherson, was composed of the commands of Generals Logan, Dodge, and Jeff. C. Davis. Its flank was protected by Garrard's cavalry. Next in order, to the left, were Generals Hooker, Howard, and Johnson, forming the centre, with General Schofield on the left, and the flank covered by the cavalry of Generals Stoneman, McCook, and Kilpatrick. These forces were drawn out in an irregular line, running north-east and south-west, and presenting a front of twelve or fourteen miles. The location was on the southern spurs of the Allatoona range of hills, across a continuous succession of hills and valleys, forming a very broken surface, and the whole—except now and then a cleared field—covered with heavy pine and oak forests. Through this range, down into the open country beyond, pass several roads which we wish to pass over, and which the rebels intend to dispute by planting artillery on the flanking hills. Military men say they occupy a strong position; one which it will be wasteful of human life to attempt to carry by straight work. Such, then, being the position, and the rebels having felt our strength in the centre, in resisting General Hooker's advance, and having found that our line was not easily to be broken at that point, next made an attempt to break over the lines on the left, which attempt it cost the unfortunate division of Wood so many men to resist. The exact loss, so far as ascertained, of the division, and Scribner's brigade, which assisted on the left, was one thousand six hundred and ten. But many were wounded who fell into the possession of the rebels, as did nearly all the dead, so hard were our forces pressed. Some of the stretcher-bearers, even, were captured as they attempted to push too far out in the prosecution of their humane work. Batteries were at length planted which replied to the enemy's fire, and

occasional shells were pitched into our camp all night, though the enemy has not attempted anything since upon the left. This affair, it will be remembered, occurred on the evening of the twenty-seventh of May. On the evening of the next day they made a similar attempt to turn our right flank, under McPherson. About half-past four in the afternoon, after having vigorously shelled our position for three-quarters of an hour, they made a simultaneous assault upon the works of the Fifteenth corps and the left wing of the Sixteenth, forming an unbroken front of more than a mile in extent. The Fifteenth corps, under command of General John A. Logan, formed the right of the line, and the left wing of the Sixteenth corps, under command of General Dodge, was posted on the left. The assault was one of the most furious and persistent yet made in the campaign. It was made by the corps of Hardee, supposed to be about twenty-three thousand strong, all of them seasoned veterans, and fighting with the utmost obstinacy. They rushed impetuously forward under a withering fire from our musketry, until many of them were within twenty feet of our breastworks. Five of their color-bearers were found dead in their places at that distance from our front. Fifty-four dead rebels were counted lying on the ground directly in front of one regiment, the Sixty-sixth Indiana. After they had withdrawn from the bloody field, our forces had buried three hundred of their dead, and there were yet many more, when they were ordered by the rebels, with curses, to desist, and our stretcher-bearers were at once fired upon. What better evidences than the above of the bravery, and at the same time of the barbarity of the rebels, could be asked? Yet it was all unavailing. Our forces stood like a wall, and it was to the audacious rebels a wall of devouring fire. General Logan depended almost entirely on musketry for repelling the attack, since he had few pieces in position, and fewer still (four) were enabled, from the nature of the ground, to play on the enemy. He had not yet completed the breastworks, even, but only got them in readiness on the summits of the hills and extended a little way down the sides, so that on a good portion of the front the men fought face to face, with only their good muskets for a defence. But Logan himself was a host. Riding along the entire line, with an electric word for each brave regiment, swinging his hat and cheering where the bullets were thickest, his strong voice rising high above the roar of the fight, the splendid enthusiasm of the man inspired the troops with like temper, if such inspiration were needed, and insured their invincibility, which was never for a moment doubtful. "They were more than we," said the General, "but we can whip them every time—every fifteen minutes a day." And he is right, so long as himself is included in the number. With such a leader, the men who compose the Army of the West can accomplish almost miracles.

The rebel loss is estimated at headquarters at about two thousand five hundred or three thousand, and the estimate can well be accepted when the fact I have given above is recalled. One hundred and fifty prisoners were taken, and none lost. Our loss is set down at about four hundred and eighty, in the two commands of Logan and Dodge; the exact number in the Fifteenth corps was two hundred and thirty-eight. The figures given above include, on both sides, the killed and wounded and captured, and on our side also, the trivial losses by skirmishing on the two subsequent days. Among the commissioned officers killed on our side were Colonel Dickerman, of the One Hundred and Third Illinois, Major Geisy, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, and Lieutenant Lovell, of the Twenty-seventh Ohio. The body of Major Geisy has been embalmed, and sent home to his friends. Captain Congers, of the Sixty-fourth Illinois, and Captain McRae, Sixty-sixth Indiana, were severely wounded. On the morning of the thirtieth, also, a stray shot from a skirmisher slightly grazed General Logan on the left arm, and entered the right breast of Colonel Taylor, chief of artillery to General McPherson, inflicting a very painful wound, though it is thought he will recover.

There have thus occurred, since the opening of the campaign south of the Etowah River, up to the evening of the twenty-eighth, three separate affairs which approached almost to the dignity of battles. On the afternoon of the twenty-fifth the enemy attempted to resist the advance of Hooker in the centre; on the twenty-seventh they attempted to turn the left flank, under General Wood, and on the twenty-eighth, to turn the right, under McPherson. An honest statement of the facts compels the acknowledgment, that in the first they succeeded substantially, though the affair wore a sufficiently brilliant aspect from our having carried the first slight line of works, and carried on the pursuit with so much *elan*, till we were rudely halted by the artillery and heavier forces of the second. Our losses, too, here, being the attacking party, and encountering a severe discharge of canister, with none to answer it, was, doubtless, heavier than that of the enemy. So in the second. Here we had little available artillery, and met a formidable fire from every species of arms. It cost us a heavy loss, but it was imperatively necessary to stop the enemy's advance. But in the action on the right it was better. The results were equally good, while the losses were far lighter, and the enemy suffered in an inverse ratio. Not that the troops were any braver on the right, or the fighting any better, for they were not, nor could they be, but they fought on the defensive.

May 29.

After having remained in position before the enemy three days, and tested pretty thoroughly his strength and disposition, and ascertained that the passes were too strongly fortified to be

carried without an unnecessary loss of life, the determination seems to have been formed to march the whole line of battle by the left flank, and then, by a sudden massing of troops, to effect a passage by certain roads in that quarter, yet undefined. This plan was to have been carried out quietly and secretly during the night of this day. But, in some way, the rebels were informed of the design, or at least strongly suspected it, and succeeded in postponing its execution. This they did by noisy and buncombe attacks with artillery and musketry upon the right centre and right, which they made at frequent intervals during the night, and with so much apparent fury and purpose that our Generals deemed it unwise to attempt the movement. It is an axiom of war that a flank march in front of the enemy is the most dangerous that a commander is called upon to make, and should always be covered with the utmost secrecy. Though the enemy's fire was necessarily aimless and vain in the darkness of the dense forests, still it was not known to what it might lead; and as it showed that our plan was discovered, the men lay quiet in their works, and allowed the skirmishers and the cannon to make reply. And reply they did, with a mighty emphasis. Five or six batteries of thunderers gave forth into the still midnight air of Georgia such sounds as they were little wont to hear, and as their deep voices reverberated, far and wide, through the forests, they admonished the impudent rebels, in tones which were not to be mistaken, of the potency of the monster they had awakened from his slumbers. As we lay that night, on our sleepless beds of leaves, while an occasional Minié sputtered through the leaves overhead, and the loud bellowing of the cannon made the whole air quake, we had a slight earnest of "the pride, the pomp, the circumstance of glorious war." The result of all this noise and fury was, as might have been expected, very slight, twenty men wounded on our side, and probably a greater number on the other. The attack on McPherson's line was equally impudent and empty. It was repeated three several times, and caused a loss equally trivial with our own.

May 30.

The last night's work had disarranged the plans for this day, and there must be new consultations, new drawing of lines on the maps, new calculations of chances and balancing of probabilities; and, meantime, the great army lies quiet, and the day is distinguished for nothing, except the endless skirmishing and picket-firing. Will they never have done with that popping and peppering of guns? Are our ears made of leather, and our nerves of tanned leather? Besides all that, there is great danger that somebody will get hit.

To-morrow will, no doubt, "usher in great events." They can not long be delayed.

A CAVALRY AFFAIR ON SHERMAN'S REAR.

KINGSTON, GA., May 30, 1864.

We had an ugly little affair on the twenty-fifth instant, that cost the Eleventh Kentucky cavalry pretty dearly. The First and Eleventh Kentucky cavalry, commanded by Colonel Holman, a brave and daring officer, had advanced some ten miles beyond this place, which is a small county town on the Dalton and Atlanta railroad, thirty-eight miles from the former and about sixty from the latter place. Some of the enemy's cavalry had been discovered on our left flank, and had succeeded in capturing a few horses of the Eleventh Kentucky, who were out foraging.

On the morning of the twenty-third, our brigade, composed of said regiments, the former commanded by Colonel Adams, and the latter by Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander, and the whole under command of Colonel Holman, was ordered back to Cassville Station (a depot on said railroad about eight miles beyond this place, and about two miles south of Cassville, from which the station takes its name), to aid in protecting a train of wagons at that station. We reached that place towards noon, and in the afternoon we went into camp. On the next morning we were ordered to saddle up and be prepared to move at a moment's warning. In a short time our pickets came in, and reported they had been driven in by a superior force of the enemy's cavalry. Major Boyle, a brave young officer, took a few companies of the Eleventh Kentucky, and went in search of the enemy, but returned without succeeding in finding him. In a short time we heard brisk firing in front, and were ordered immediately to mount and advance towards the scene of action. We hastened forward, and soon learned that the enemy had attacked and burned our wagon train. The train comprised some thirty or forty wagons, which had been ordered back to this place.

The force to protect them, as I have been informed by some of the soldiers, was the Fourteenth Kentucky infantry, nine hundred and eighty-eight strong, and some two hundred of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Indiana infantry, with said brigade of cavalry, composed of six or seven hundred men. The wagons are said to have been ordered by General Schofield to move out in front. The infantry in their rear, and the cavalry again in the rear of them, General Schofield supposing that if any attack were made upon the train, it would come from the rear. And if the rebels had been accommodating enough to make the attack just at that point all would have been well, and they would have been handsomely repulsed, but the ill-bred, cowardly scamps waited until the head of the train had advanced about a mile and a half, and then attacked them about the centre, where there were no ugly guns to confront them, and succeeded in burning the greater portion of the train. The presumption is, when General Schofield gave such orders, he was not

aware that the enemy's cavalry had been for some days hovering about our left flank, though in what numbers it was impossible to conjecture. Fortunately, our mule train containing our ammunition was in the rear of the wagons, and was all safe.

Had one regiment of the cavalry advanced in front, and the other in the rear, with the infantry on each side of the wagons, with skirmishers thrown out at some distance in every direction, to guard against a surprise, the result would have, doubtless, been very different. The loss of property, however, was very trifling.

After this disaster the small amount of forage at Cassville Station was burned, and our whole force, with the mule trains, advanced a short distance, when the trains and infantry were halted, and the cavalry advanced across a small stream, near to which was a heavy line of breastworks and rifle-pits, made by Johnston on his retreat, and thence across an open field, and attacked the enemy in a dense oak and pine forest, entirely beyond supporting distance of the infantry. The fire from the enemy concealed in the bush was so heavy and murderous that our brave boys were immediately driven back and hotly pursued by a heavy line of the enemy across the open field, nobly contesting the ground, as they retreated before a superior force; and to increase the difficulty, our brave fellows had to file away to the right to get round said breastworks and rifle-pits. The Eleventh Kentucky cavalry had five killed on the spot, one mortally wounded, who died the ensuing night, one slightly, and two badly, though not dangerously, wounded. The names of the killed are E. Colvin, Company D; James Kallaher, Company B; Alex. Knight, Company I; Samuel Kidwell, Company D; John Smithy, Company H, and John Martin, mortally wounded and since died, of Company K. Brave fellows, they died in a noble cause. All honor to their memories. They are buried near the hospital in the vicinity of Kingston. Boards, with their names rudely carved upon them, mark the places where they sleep their last sleep. Samson Braydon, of the Sixth Tennessee infantry, a wagoner, was also mortally wounded, and died on Wednesday night, the twenty-fifth instant. A board with his name carved upon it marks his resting-place beside the others.

The names of our wounded are, Francis Lewis and Valentine Her, Company K, and Augustus Foldon, Company H, Eleventh Kentucky cavalry. There are also missing upwards of thirty, one of whom, Captain Linthark, is known to have been taken prisoner. The others are doubtless prisoners. The First Kentucky cavalry had two men wounded: Timothy Lake, badly though not dangerously, of Company C, and Lewis Huddleston, slightly. They are all doing well. These are all the casualties in our brigade so far as I can learn.

The enemy did not accomplish all this mischief with impunity. The gallant Lieutenant Hall emptied one saddle, and the brave Lieu-

tenant Harris another. Lieutenant Harris also disabled one of the rebels by a blow on his head with a saber, and captured him. There was also a rebel Sergeant-Major taken prisoner. Whether the enemy sustained any further loss or not, I don't know.

Our boys state that they saw some of our men shot and others knocked upon the head after they surrendered, and three of the men that we buried have marks of having been knocked on the head; two of them had fatal gunshot wounds. The other had the side of his forehead crushed in, apparently by a blow with a clubbed gun; there were no other marks of violence upon his person.

The rebels were led by the savage Wheeler, so I am informed by the wounded rebel prisoner we have in charge. I asked him how many men Wheeler had. He replied he did not know, but that he did not think that he could have had more than seven or eight hundred.

As our force was probably double that of the enemy, had there been a combined attack by our cavalry and infantry, it might have succeeded in entirely discomfiting him.

In a little skirmish which we had with the enemy on the twelfth inst., the morning we reached our lines near Dalton, we had one man killed, James Self, a brave fellow, greatly beloved by all the boys who knew him.

JOHN TAFFE,
Chaplain Eleventh Kentucky Cavalry.

THE LEFT WING OF THE ARMY,
NEAR DALTON, MAY 31, 1864.

The chief transactions of the past three days, forming episodes in the daily and nightly skirmish firing, shelling, and assaults by the enemy on various parts of our extended and impregnable line, have been the attack upon McPherson on the extreme right, on Saturday, the twenty-eighth. Three divisions were moved to the attack at a time when he was supposed to be about to move by the flank, to close up the gap between his left and the right wing of Thomas. But, though about to move, he was found still in position, and prepared to inflict a severe chastisement upon the enemy. The fight was a severe one, lasting about one hour, during which our men are said to have behaved with consummate coolness and courage. The enemy was repulsed with a very heavy loss. The field was covered with their dead and wounded. General McPherson reports that he buried three hundred, and had about fifty mortal cases of rebel wounded in his hospitals. The loss of the enemy cannot, he thinks, fall short of twenty-five hundred.

On Monday night there was an attempt to drive in our skirmishers in front of the Twenty-third corps; but the Second and Third divisions sent them to the right about, inflicting considerable loss upon the attacking party. Our loss was not large.

On Tuesday morning, Polk's corps lying in

front of the Twenty-third corps, made a dash at the Second and Third divisions with two heavy lines of skirmishers. Our advance line was obliged to fall back upon the second line, and they in turn upon the reserve, when the enemy met with such a hot reception, they fell back in disorder, leaving many dead and wounded on the field. Our loss was ten or twelve killed, and some forty wounded, in the two divisions. We brought eight rebel dead within our lines, from the immediate vicinity of our works, which were only a small part of those who fell under the steady fire of our troops. Our lines were again established in the same positions, and have not since been disturbed, except by the perpetual attention of the sharpshooters, who occasionally pick off a man. The wounded have been sent to the rear, under the arrangements of Dr. Shippen.

Killed.—John Coffelt, I, One Hundred and Seventh Illinois; William Peer, B, Fiftieth Ohio; W. R. Hager, I, Fiftieth Ohio; John Franklin, B, Fiftieth Ohio; William Wiley, A, Fiftieth Ohio; John Clotter, K, Fiftieth Ohio; Joseph Smith, F, One Hundred and Fourth Ohio; Samuel F. Totten, F, One Hundred and Fourth Ohio; Thomas E. Williams, G, One Hundredth Ohio; Daniel Hager, K, Fourth Kentucky.

June 1.

The enemy have been very active in shelling our line to-day, under the impression, possibly, that some change is occurring in the disposition of our lines—which may prove correct. I refrain at present from indicating what the nature of the movement is, as it may fall into rebel hands, and afford the enemy some clue to our future plans.

Everything is working well. McPherson is closing up upon our right, and the army will now be ready to make the next move on the chess-board at once.

Writing evidently under a total misunderstanding of the facts, your correspondent did the greatest injustice to General Cox's division, in the account he gave of the battle of Rosacca. Your fairness will, I am sure, lead you to correct the mistake.

The division was not "last," as the correspondent states, but was on the extreme left, and was the first to encounter the enemy on Saturday morning, the fourteenth of May. The column had moved through woods impassable for artillery, and the skirmishing had commenced before any battery had come up. The artillery of General Cox's division cut their own road through the woods, bridged ravines, and were on the enemy's right in position, and had opened on them about nine o'clock A. M. The Fifteenth Indiana battery, and Battery D, of the First Ohio Light Artillery, dismounted two rebel guns in a work situated to the enemy's right and rear. They also set fire to a building containing ammunition, which was burned towards eleven o'clock. The infantry of the division were the only troops that charged and actually carried the enemy's lines on that day. This was accomplished be-

tween twelve and one p. m. They afterwards kept the enemy from loading and firing their guns by a sharp fire upon their cannoniers. The One Hundred and Third Ohio volunteer infantry carried the division standard a hundred yards to the rear of the enemy's chief rifle-pits, where it was maintained until the regiment was relieved, after dark. This gallant act cost the regiment two ranking captains, who were successively in command, the whole color-guard, and one hundred men. The division held its position, not retiring an inch, until relieved about dark, and when every round of ammunition had been expended.

These statements I know, from personal observation, and from information obtained from the most credible sources, are entirely true. The statement that General Cox acted independently of orders, or in violation of them, it were hardly worth while to contradict for the information of any persons at all acquainted with that officer.

Doc. 9.

FIGHT AT ROUND MOUNTAIN, TENN.

COLONEL GROSE'S REPORT.

MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE, }
August 30, 1862. }

General J. Ammon, McMinnville, Tennessee:

I arrived here this morning at six o'clock. The forces under my command had an engagement with General Forrest between three and four o'clock p. m., on the twenty-seventh instant, at "Round Mountain," two and a half miles from Woodbury. He made the attack upon our rear, and, as he supposed, upon our train. But instead of my train, his heavy force came in contact with the Twenty-third Kentucky, under Colonel Mundy. The enemy were handsomely repulsed, and with a portion of Captain Mendenhall's battery, the right wing of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, and Colonel Mundy's regiment, we pursued and drove them over two miles, scattering them in every direction. Our loss is four of the Twenty-third Kentucky, and one of Lieutenant-Colonel Cochran's cavalry wounded. The loss of the enemy is much larger.

Your obedient servant,

W. GROSE,

Colonel, commanding Tenth Brigade.

J. E. HOLLAND,
A. A. G.

Doc. 10.

BATTLE OF PITTSBURGH LANDING, TENNESSEE.

HEADQUARTERS THIRTY-SIXTH REGIMENT INDIANA }
VOLUNTIERS, NEAR PITTSBURGH LANDING, }
TENNESSEE, April 8, 1862. }

Colonel Jacob Ammon, commanding Tenth Brigade, Fourth Division:

Sir: In discharge of my duty, I make the following report of the part the Thirty-sixth

Indiana volunteers took in the general engagement at this place on the evening of the sixth and day of the seventh instant. On the march from Savannah on the sixth, my regiment had the advance of the column of General Buell's army, and I sent four companies forward as an advance guard, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Cary, leaving four with me at the head of the column (two companies having been left behind on other duty). On reaching the river, with the four companies at the head of the column, they were immediately ferried over to join those under Lieutenant-Colonel Cary, that had passed over before my arrival. On arriving on the south side of the river, under circumstances that looked discouraging to new troops, my regiment, eight companies, about four hundred strong, was formed amid great commotion and excitement. While forming the regiment one of my men was killed by a ball from the enemy's artillery. As soon as formed, I was ordered by General Buell, in person, to advance to support Captain Stone's battery, about one hundred and fifty yards distant from my place of forming, which was done in tolerable order, and as soon as the regiment was in place the firing commenced, and continued until near dusk. I there lost another man killed and one wounded, repulsed the enemy and saved the battery, which was the only part taken by General Buell's army that day. During the fore part of the night, with the brigade we took an advance position of about two hundred yards, and took our position on the left of the brigade and extreme left of the line of battle, which seemed to have been formed during the night, and lay on our arms until five and a half the next morning, when we were ordered and moved forward with the brigade in line of battle, in the front line, with two companies thrown forward and to the left as skirmishers. We advanced forward, to the left of the Corinth road, about one-half mile, when our skirmishers engaged the enemy, we advancing steadily, and the enemy falling back for a distance of about one mile from where we lay in the morning, when the engagement became general, in strong force on both sides. Seeing the enemy making continuous efforts to turn our left, I threw out a third company as skirmishers, which, with the assistance of the skirmishers from the Twenty-fourth Ohio on my right, succeeded in saving our left from being turned. We slowly advanced, our skirmishers maintaining their positions, driving the enemy's cavalry, infantry, and artillery before them, over the same ground fought over the previous day. About eleven o'clock my remaining five companies not on skirmish to our left, were ordered forward in conjunction with the Twenty-fourth Ohio, and a part of the Fifteenth Illinois, that had been sent to me and placed on my left, into the general fight, and engaged the enemy in strong force, they with a heavy battery, cavalry, and infantry in our front and to our left. My regiment advanced to a fence mostly thrown down, where a desperate contest ensued, during

which my regiment (five companies) advanced about seventy-five yards to a second fence, mostly down, my right resting on some old buildings. While in this position my ammunition gave out, most of my men having fired forty to fifty rounds. I then ordered my command to fall back to the first fence to secure a new supply of ammunition, which was obtained, and we then again advanced to and beyond the position we had left. The enemy at this time maintained an eminence about four hundred yards distant, in a woodland upon an old Union camp ground. We now received orders from General Nelson to charge them with bayonets, which was commenced in quick time. As my regiment reached the summit of the eminence, the enemy was far out of our reach, moving off with their battery and infantry, their cavalry taking the Corinth road to the left, all in double-quick time. We now occupy the ground from which we drove the enemy, over which we found many of their dead. The main struggle at the fences, as above stated, before we received orders to charge, lasted for two hours, from eleven to one o'clock.

My officers and men behaved well, stood the fire with great bravery, and even to daring, without flinching. I know not in truth how to compliment any one of my command over the others, for I was well pleased with all. The casualties of my regiment during the engagement, including the first evening, were eight killed, one missing, and about fifty wounded, six of the latter probably mortally; a complete list of which will be forwarded as soon as the same can be obtained. Among my killed is Lieutenant A. M. Davis, of Company H, who commanded Company E in the engagements; he fell by my side, bravely discharging his whole duty. During most of the engagement I was on foot, my horse having been shot at an early part of the main fight.

I have the honor to be
Your obedient servant,

W. GROSE,

Colonel, Thirty-sixth Regiment Indiana Volunteers.

MADISON GROSE,

Lieutenant and Adjutant.

COLONEL GROSE'S LETTER.

ON BATTLE-FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG LANDING, TENN., }
April 11, 1862. }

DEAR FRIEND: I wrote you yesterday and sent you a copy of my official report, and now send you a complete list of our killed, eight; missing, two; wounded, thirty-seven; total loss, forty-seven. Yet all of the wounded but twenty-five remain with us and are on duty. The twenty-five we have sent down the river, and hope they may get to Indiana; we got them on boats as soon as it was possible, for there they are well cared for, and cannot be elsewhere. Lieutenant Chambers and Sergeant Fentriss are both able and on duty, and ready for another contest, which I think we will have in a few days.

I would like to give you many particulars if it were possible; taking my official report as the main basis, I will add, that as we landed our regiment on the south side of the river there were at least fifteen thousand of Grant's panic-stricken troops who had thrown away their arms, and were pressing to get on board the boats to clear themselves from danger by running, and as my regiment marched up the hill we would hear the cowards say to my men, "You will get it!" "You will come back!" "You will see!" and many other such expressions; yet our men went bravely up, formed in line of battle, Generals Buell and Nelson both with me. While forming, the heavy fire of the enemy was passing thick and fast over and around us. Poor White was struck by a canister shot and both his legs torn off, and about the same time, a staff officer, ten feet in front of the line, on horse, between General Nelson and myself, had his head torn off with a cannon ball and fell a ghastly sight before my regiment, at seeing which a few of our men nearest to the scene shrank back a few steps, but as soon as I commanded them to dress up their lines they did so promptly, and obeyed the command I gave them to "forward, march" in the line of battle, and moved off about one hundred yards to support one of our retreating batteries, and there we opened up a severe fire on the approaching enemy, which I think was the first evidence the rebels had that the advance of Buell's army was arriving. The firing of our regiment into the enemy's advancing forces, and thereby announcing the arrival of Buell's army, checked the enemy for the night, and everybody here says, turned the tide of battle, and saved Grant's forces from being driven pell mell into the river, cut to pieces, or taken prisoners by tens of thousands. It is admitted here, without contradiction, that if we had been one hour later, the enemy would have gained the river, and their victory would have been complete. None of Nelson's or Buell's forces took part that night, but my regiment. At the place to which we advanced at this place, is where the brave Duboese, of Company C, fell. The next morning we found that we had dealt out death to the enemy in fair proportions; in fact, while I was out establishing pickets that night, we passed over their dead bodies. I went with our pickets that night until the rebels fired on us. As we were ordered, we did not fire on them on that occasion, for our object was to find out their position for the work next morning, and not let them know ours. That night we lay on our arms, ready for action any moment, under a pelting rain most of the night. At half-past five next morning, wet and hungry, we moved off into the desperate encounter. I have often read of "death and carnage on the field of battle," but never had any just conception of it until now. We fought forward as my report shows (that I sent yesterday) for three miles, the particulars of which I am unable to give you more fully now. Suffice it to say now,

that the Thirty-sixth began the fight, and my tent is now reared (to-day) on the advance post where the last dead rebel fell. General Nelson thinks we buried the great Sidney Johnson, their commander, within two rods of where I am now writing. He lies silently "seeking his rights in the territories." The provisional rebel, Governor Johnson, of Kentucky, is also in our hands, wounded, God bless him. I hope he will die without delay. Our loss is heavier than I wrote you yesterday; it is now estimated at one thousand five hundred killed, two thousand taken prisoners on Sunday, and four thousand wounded; total seven thousand five hundred. That of the enemy is much larger, particularly in killed.

I will write you some of the particulars more definitely, of the latter part of the battle, in my next, if there is no move to interrupt. My horse is still alive, but I cannot see how he can live; I intend saving him if possible. It is due to Mat to say he commenced and helped me through to the end, in the thickest of the fight and danger, from beginning to the last. I hope you will keep securely the reports sent you.

Yours affectionately,
W. GROSE,
Colonel.

Doc. 11.

THE BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.

REPORT OF COLONEL GROSE.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
LEFT WING, ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
NEAR MURFREESBORO, TENN., JANUARY 8, 1863.

Captain D. W. Norton, A. A. A. G., Second Division:

SIR: In accordance with duty, I have the honor to submit the report of the part which this brigade, under my command, took in the recent battles before Murfreesboro. The five regiments—Thirty-sixth Indiana, Major Kinley; Twenty-fourth Ohio, Colonel Jones; Sixth Ohio, Colonel Anderson; Eighty-fourth Illinois, Colonel Waters; Twenty-third Kentucky, Major Hamrick; aggregate officers and men, one thousand seven hundred and eighty-eight—left our camp near Nashville December twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, with the division; bivouacked that night in front of Lavergne, twelve miles distant. Next day, the twenty-seventh, we moved to the west bank of Stewart's Creek, five miles, and my brigade was put in position in front, to the right of the pike, the pickets of the enemy separated from ours by the creek. With light skirmishing, we rested here until Monday morning, the twenty-ninth, when we received orders and moved forward in double lines of battle on the right of the pike, the Thirty-sixth Indiana and the Eighty-fourth Illinois in the front line, wading Stewart's Creek—waist-deep to most of the men—to within two and a half miles of Murfreesboro, where

we arrived near sunset, with skirmishing all the way, which was only ended by the close of the day. We there rested for the night. At early morn next day skirmishing again commenced, and continued during the day, with more severity than before, the artillery taking a heavy part. This ended again with the day. Up to this time the loss in my brigade was ten wounded. During the night the brigade was relieved from the front by the brigade of Colonel Hazen, and retired to the rear to rest, and to be held in reserve. Thus, on the bright morning of December thirty-one, the division, under command of its brave general, at early day, were in battle line, the brigade of General Craft on the right, that of Colonel Hazen on the left, both in double lines, with my brigade in reserve in rear of the centre, in supporting distance, with the batteries of Cockerell and Parsons in position to support the lines. While we were perfecting our lines in the morning, the divisions of Generals Negley and Rousseau fled by my rear through a heavy cedar grove which lay in rear of General Craft's brigade, and immediately up to the right of my brigade, the brigade of Colonel Hazen in an open cotton field, the pike dividing his left from the division of General Wood, the line of these two divisions resting nearly perpendicular to the pike. The engagement had been raging fiercely some distance to our right during the early morning, and at near eight o'clock the clash of arms to our right had so far changed position that I saw the rear of my brigade would soon be endangered; hence I set to work changing my front to the rear, which was done in quick time, with the left, when changed, a little retired, to support the right of Colonel Hazen's brigade, then closely engaged with the enemy, our two brigades forming a V. My brigade was not more than thus formed to the rear before the enemy appeared in heavy lines, pressing the forces of ours that had been engaged to the right of our division, on our front, in fearful confusion. In this new formation the Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana were in the front line, the latter on the right, supported in the second line by the Eighty-fourth Illinois and Twenty-third Kentucky, with the Twenty-fourth Ohio, in an oblique form, a little to the right of the rear line. In this shape the Thirty-sixth Indiana and Sixth Ohio advanced into the woodland about two hundred and fifty yards, and there met the enemy in overwhelming numbers. Here Major Kinley and Captain Shutts, of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, fell, the former named badly wounded, the latter killed. Colonel Anderson, of the Sixth Ohio, was here wounded, and his Adjutant, A. G. Williams, and Lieutenant Foster, fell dead, with several of their comrades. These two regiments were forced from the woodland, and retired to the right, in the direction of the pike, while the other three regiments, aided by the eight-gun battery commanded by Lieutenant Parsons, with the efficient aid of Lieutenants Huntington and Cushing, poured a galling fire

into the ranks of the pursuing enemy, causing him to break in confusion, and retire back to the woods out of our reach, leaving the ground covered with their dead and dying, with the heavy loss of the Thirty-sixth Indiana and Sixth Ohio lying mingled with them on the bloody field. After some half hour or three quarters, the enemy renewed his attempt to advance, but was again repulsed, with heavy loss on both sides. After this, then between eleven and twelve o'clock, the enemy not appearing in our immediate front, the lines of our forces that had retired or been driven from the right, by this time were reformed parallel with the pike, so that the front of the brigade was again changed, so as to assist the brigade of Colonel Hazen in the direction as formed in the morning. The Twenty-fourth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana were soon thrown forward near the pike, and had a terrible conflict with the enemy. Here Colonel Jones and Major Terry both fell and were carried off the field in a dying condition. Each regiment of the brigade, from this until nightfall closed the awful scene, alternately took its part in holding the position we occupied in the morning.

The enemy having gained the heavy cedar woods to the right, where we took position in the morning, it became necessary to so change our position as not to be in reach of small arms from that woodland; hence, at nightfall, the centre of the front line of the brigade laid on the pike, and diagonally across the same, fronting to the south-east, our left resting at the right of the line of General Wood's division. We were then a little retired, and the centre of the brigade about two hundred and fifty yards to the left of where we commenced in the morning. We ceased fighting for the night in the front lines on the pike. During the day, each of the regiments having exhausted, had to replenish their ammunition, many of them having fired over one hundred rounds. When Major Kinley, of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, fell, nearly at the commencement in the morning, the command devolved upon Captain Woodward, and upon the fall of Colonel Jones and Major Terry, of the Twenty-fourth Ohio, Captain Weller was left in command. Although I was at Shiloh, and commanded in that battle, at the head of General Buell's army, and fought throughout that battle with that army, yet this battle, on the last day of the old year, was by far the most terrible and bloody (in my command) that I have ever witnessed. During the latter part of the battle of the night, or rather in the early morning, of the first day of January, 1863, our whole line was retired, for a more eligible position, six or seven hundred yards, and my brigade was retired from the front to rest.

During Thursday, January first, we were ordered across to the north bank of Stone River, to support a division on the extreme left of our line, an attack being anticipated in that direction, but returned to our resting-place before night, no attack being made that day. On the

next day, January second, in the forenoon, we were again ordered across the river to support the division there in position, with its right resting on the river bank, and its lines (double lines) formed at right angles to the river, extending therefrom about one-half mile. The river, below the right of the division line about eight-hundred yards, changes its direction, running about one-half mile in the rear, and nearly parallel to the lines of the division formed as above. When my brigade arrived on the ground I was requested to put it in position so as to protect the left flank of the division referred to, and repel any attack that might be made in that direction. The Twenty-third Kentucky was posted to the left of the division spoken of, about two hundred yards retired; the Twenty-fourth, three hundred yards to its rear, fronting same way; the Thirty-sixth Indiana to the rear of the Twenty-fourth Ohio, fronting diagonally to the flank of the other two; the right of the Thirty-sixth Indiana distant from the left of the Twenty-fourth Ohio about one hundred and fifty yards, and with directions specially given to each of these regiments to change fronts as the exigencies of the occasion might require in case of an attack. The Eighty-fourth Illinois and Sixth Ohio were placed one hundred and fifty yards from the left of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, in one line fronting the same direction of the Twenty-fourth and Twenty-third, as well as in the same direction of the division so posted as above, to our right and front; the right of the Eighty-fourth Illinois resting on the bluff at the river, with the Third Wisconsin battery near the left and front of the Eighty-fourth; the Sixth Ohio on the left of the Eighty-fourth Illinois. Thus in position, I took the precaution to have each regiment hurriedly throw before them barricades of such materials, as fences, buildings, etc., as were at command. About half past three p. m., in front and right (as above shown in position), in strong force, perhaps in three lines, and with three batteries distributed along the forest, a heavy contest ensued, which lasted from one-half to three-quarters of an hour, when the lines of the division gave way in considerable confusion, retiring towards the river; and many of them breaking through the lines of my brigade, I went to my front regiments and superintended the changing of their fronts, respectively, so as to meet the enemy the best we could, coming from an unexpected direction, which, to some extent, threw the Twenty-third Kentucky and the Twenty-fourth Ohio, my advanced front regiments, into confusion, and caused them to retire towards the left of the main line of the brigade; but they kept up a strong fire on the advancing enemy as they retired. The Thirty-sixth Indiana changed its front, and as the enemy's lines came near, opened on them a deadly fire; but on they came, until in reach of the Eighty-fourth Illinois and Sixth Ohio, behind their barricades, when both these regiments saluted them with a terrible fire; and by this

time all my regiments were engaged, and the masses of the enemy began to falter, and soon broke into disorder and commenced their flight back over the area they had so fiercely advanced upon, pursued by the Thirty-sixth Indiana, Twenty-third Kentucky, and Twenty-fourth Ohio, to the line occupied by the out-picket posts of the division before the battle commenced. Here night overtook us. The battle was over, and the enemy were gone beyond the reach of our guns. Colonel Hasen's brigade crossed the river to our rear, to support us, about the time of the enemy's retreat, and moved closely, with the Eighty-fourth Illinois, after my pursuing regiments, to give assistance, if needed. Some other forces collected or crossed the river to my right, and moved up the river bank in pursuit of the enemy, as my regiments advanced. What forces these were I have not learned. The battery posted near the brigade at the commencement of this day's fight, fired a few rounds, took a hasty leave from the field, and I have not made its acquaintance since. Artillery from the opposite side of the river rendered valuable aid, by playing upon the enemy in his advance and retreat. Our loss this day was not large, compared with that on the thirty-first. That of the enemy was very heavy. I can not too favorably notice the coolness and promptness of each and every field-officer of the brigade. They seemed to vie with each other which should most promptly execute every command, without regard to danger. And the line officers and men of the respective regiments appeared to fear or know no danger. New and old regiments alike acted the heroic part and braved every peril. Captain Weller, in command of the Twenty-fourth Ohio, fell at his post on the last battle-field, and left Captain Cockerell in com-

mand, who bravely and skillfully filled his whole duty; and as much may be said of Captain Woodward, who succeeded to the command of the Thirty-sixth Indiana upon the fall of Major Kinley, at a critical and perilous moment in the first day's engagement.

I am under lasting obligations to my staff and orderlies, for their efficient assistance during these several days' fighting. Captain Peeden, Thirty-sixth Indiana, is entitled to great credit for his aid rendered me up to the time he fell wounded, on the thirty-first. Lieutenant J. P. Duke, of the Twenty-third Kentucky, also on my staff, deserves a high meed of praise for promptness and aid rendered me at all times during the whole of these engagements. Doctor Silas H. Kersey, Acting Brigade Surgeon, with unsurpassed industry and skill, rendered invaluable assistance to the wounded. My mounted orderlies, Frank Brough, Frank Webb, Albert Woods, William D. Smith, Martin Mann, and Lewis Miller, of the Second Indiana cavalry, and George Shirk and Isaac Bigelow, of the Thirty-sixth Indiana infantry, rendered me valuable services. But I am left to remember and lament, with friends, the fall, in this mighty struggle for human progress, of such brave spirits as Colonel Jones, Major Terry, Captain Weller, Captain Shultz, Captain King, Adjutant Williams, Lieutenant Foster, Lieutenant Ball, Lieutenant Abercrombie, and others, whose earthly conflicts closed with these battles. I may truthfully add, that I mourn with those who mourn, over these irreparable losses. To the brave wounded, whose fate may or may not be uncertain—you have my earnest prayer for a speedy restoration to health and usefulness.

The casualties of the brigade, as near as can be ascertained, are as follows:

	OFFICERS KILLED.	OFFICERS WOUNDED.	MEN KILLED.	MEN WOUNDED.	MEN MISSING.	TOTAL.
Twenty-fourth Ohio	4	4	10	68	12	98
Twenty-third Kentucky	6	8	8	80	28	88
Eighty-fourth Illinois	2	5	38	119	8	167
Thirty-sixth Indiana	2	6	23	85	18	134
Sixth Ohio	2	4	28	184	14	177
Total	10	23	97	456	74	650

Lists of which, with the reports of the regimental commanders, for further details, are herewith respectfully forwarded.

I have the honor to remain
Your obedient servant,

W. GROSE,
Colonel, commanding Third Brigade (old Tenth).

RICHARD SOUTHGATE,
Captain and A. A. General.

COLONEL ANDERSON'S REPORT.

St. CLOUD HOTEL, NASHVILLE,
Jan. 7, 1863.

Colonel W. Grose, commanding Tenth Brigade:
COLONEL: In accordance with orders from headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Sixth regiment Ohio volunteers in the late series of battles, beginning on the morning of December thirty-first:

At about eight o'clock A. M. on that day, we were drawn up in line of battle, in the open field to the north of the Burnt Brick, and to the west of the Cedars, while Rousseau's division filed by us to get position. Scarcely had the rear of that column passed, when heavy firing was heard to our right, coming from the cedars, and approaching rapidly. I was ordered with my regiment, into the woods. I immediately changed front, and advanced some two hundred yards, when I saw our troops flying in wild disorder, and hotly pursued by the enemy. I formed my line, and waited the escape of our men, and the nearer advance of the enemy. In a few moments a terrible fire was opened on us, scarce a hundred yards distant from a rebel line apparently four deep. This fire we returned, and a dreadful carnage ensued on both sides. Finding myself badly pressed, I had determined on a charge, and the order was already given to fix bayonets, when I saw my regiment was flanked completely, on both sides, by two rebel regiments. I gave the order to fall back, firing. As soon as we reached the edge of the woods, Lieutenant Parsons, of the Fourth Kentucky artillery, opened on the enemy with terrible effect, and I reformed my line behind his guns, having held my position against tremendous odds, but with great sacrifice, for forty minutes. I then replenished my ammunition, and was soon after ordered to throw my regiment diagonally across the Murfreesboro pike, and hold that position. This we did, under destructive fire and much loss, during the rest of the day and until midnight, when I was relieved by the Twenty-fourth Ohio, and took my regiment a short distance to the rear.

During the first day of January my regiment was moved from one place to another, as the plan of the battle required, but did not get into any general action. On Friday, the second, my regiment was ordered with the brigade across the river, and placed in position on a slight eminence to the rear of, and as a support to, Van Cleve's division. All was quiet until about half-past three o'clock P. M., when a tremendous fire was heard along our front, and whole masses of the enemy were hurled against Van Cleve's division, which soon gave way. The enemy came down boldly, when I brought my regiment into action simultaneously with the Eighty-fourth Illinois, and we opened a severe cross-fire on the enemy. For more than an hour we held our hill, and under our heavy fire, and that of a battery from the other side of the river, the enemy soon gave way, and when reinforcements poured in for us they were already in full retreat. We held our position without further molestation till Sunday morning, when we were ordered across the river into camp, the enemy having retired.

My regiment, both officers and men, I am proud to say, behaved throughout with bravery, courage and discipline during the entire battle. The loss of the regiment was one hundred and seventy-seven killed and wounded.

Yours respectfully, N. L. ANDERSON.

Doc. 12.

FIGHT AT WOODBURY, TENNESSEE.

REPORT OF COLONEL GROSE.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE SECOND DIVISION, LEFT WING, }
MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE, JANUARY 23, 1863.

Captain D. W. Norton, A. A. A. G.:

SIR: I have the honor to report the part this brigade took in the engagement at Woodbury, in this State, on the twenty-fourth instant. According to orders, I left camp near Murfreesboro at four o'clock P. M., on the twenty-third, with the Sixth Ohio, Colonel Christopher; Twenty-third Kentucky, Major Hamrick; Eighty-fourth Illinois, Major Morton; Twenty-fourth Ohio, Captain Cockerill; and Parson's Battery, Lieutenants Cushing and Huntington (the Thirty-sixth Indiana absent at Nashville with supply train). We marched that night to Readyville, ten miles, and bivouacked until five o'clock next morning, when, according to the General's order, we crossed the river there and took position on the other side on the Woodbury pike, our skirmishers feeling their way into the woodland in front, before daylight, where the enemy was known to have been the evening before. The other forces that were to have cooperated with us not being up, we there rested until eight o'clock, when the General arrived, and we moved forward on the pike towards Woodbury, yet six miles distant, where the enemy was supposed to be in force, variously estimated from one to six thousand. The Second brigade, Colonel Hazen, under the command of Colonel Blake, came up and moved forward close in our rear; the Twenty-third Kentucky and Twenty-fourth Ohio, of my brigade, taking the advance, with two companies from each thrown forward as skirmishers on either side of the road.

After advancing about three miles we came to the enemy's out-post, and skirmishing commenced. We advanced, however, cautiously and steadily, driving the enemy within one mile of the town, where we found him posted in considerable numbers, behind a double stone fence, with a deep ravine in his rear, forming complete protection against our small arms. My two front regiments, with the skirmishers, gained the crest of some high ground on the road, which off to the left raised to a high hill; the Twenty-third Kentucky on the left, and the Twenty-fourth Ohio on the right, of the pike, in line, about five hundred and fifty yards distant from the enemy behind the stone fences; the Sixth Ohio and the Eighty-fourth Illinois in reserve in rear. Colonel Blake now came up and put in position the Forty-first Ohio and Sixth Kentucky to my left on the high hill, driving the enemy's skirmishers therefrom as he advanced. At this time a general heavy firing was kept up on both sides, all along the line, our men sheltered by the crest of the hill, the enemy by the stone fences, so but little injury was being sustained on either side. I then requested,

and the General sent me, two pieces of Captain Cockerill's battery, under command of Lieutenant Osborne, who soon paid his compliments to the stone fences and those behind them, causing the enemy to "retire" in confusion, double-quick. We pursued to the further side of the town. The enemy, being all cavalry, could easily move out of our way. He was, perhaps, about one thousand strong, with no artillery. My forces met no serious injury.

We found that the enemy had lost Lieutenant-Colonel Hutchison, one captain, and three men killed on the field (the former in command of the forces at the place), and heard of others being carried off, killed or wounded. One we saw mortally wounded left in the town. My men having had so much desperate fighting recently with the enemy, we might well have doubted a desire to again engage him; but I am proud to say every officer and man, with energy and alacrity, moved upon the discharge of his whole duty. Captain Boden, Twenty-third Kentucky, and Lieutenant Dryden, Twenty-fourth Ohio, I noticed as prompt and efficient commanders of the front skirmish lines, and perhaps to some one of their men belongs the credit of killing Colonel Hutchison, as he was killed by a Minié ball at an early stage of the skirmishing.

Allow me to call attention to the want of the cooperation of the cavalry that was to have acted with our forces, as the cause of our not capturing the enemy.

I am your obedient servant,

W. GROSE,

Colonel, commanding Third Brigade.

RICHARD SOUTHGATE,

Capt. and A. A. G. Third Brigade.

The foregoing is the official report of Colonel W. Grose, commanding Third brigade of Second (General Palmer's) division, of the battle of Woodbury. Colonel Grose has left no room for comment, nor will I attempt to make any, as he has mentioned *facts*, as he always does. I noticed a communication from some correspondent of the Sixth Kentucky to the *Louisville Democrat*, published February first, 1863, in which said correspondent ignores the presence of any other regiment than his own. While Colonel Grose is ever ready to give praise to his own command, he is equally prompt in giving other regiments that come under his notice their just due. It is remarked throughout the corps, that the official report of the Third brigade of the battle of Stone River is the most correct handed in or published. Colonel Grose shows modesty (a scarce article in the army) in all his reports—letting his *actions* and *deeds* tell the story for him.

I have the honor to remain

Your most obedient servant,

W. H. MUNDY,

Adjutant Twenty-third Kentucky Infantry.

Doc. 13.

THE BATTLES OF CHICKAMAUGA, TENN.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION,
TWENTY-FIRST ARMY CORPS, IN CAMP AT
CHATTANOOGA, TENN., Sept. 27, 1863. }

Major-General J. M. Palmer, commanding
Second Division:

SIR: I have the honor to make a brief report of the part this brigade took in the recent engagements with the enemy. I crossed the Tennessee River at the mouth of Battle Creek, on the night of the third of September, by means of log rafts, sending most of my train by way of Bridgeport, six miles below, to cross on the bridge. I passed over without any loss of either men or property. My command consisted of the Sixth Ohio, Colonel N. L. Anderson; Eighty-fourth Illinois, Colonel L. H. Waters; Twenty-fourth Ohio, Colonel D. J. Higgins; Thirty-sixth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel O. H. P. Cary; Twenty-third Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel James C. Foy; aggregate officers and men, including staff, one thousand six hundred and eighty-seven.

To which were attached Batteries H and M, Fourth United States artillery, commanded by Lieutenants Cushing and Russell (ten pieces). In conjunction with the division, we marched thence to Shell Mound, to Squirrel Town Creek, and thence to Lookout Valley; and on the morning of the ninth instant, with the Twenty-fourth Ohio, Twenty-third Kentucky, and Eighty-fourth Illinois, I ascended, or rather climbed, upon Lookout Mountain, near Hawkins' farm, nine miles to the right of Chattanooga, and met and drove the enemy from the mountain, with no loss to my force. The enemy left the mountain to the north-east, via Sumner City. Cavalry was all that I found on the mountain. As I reached the point of the mountain overlooking Chattanooga, the remainder of my brigade, with the first brigade, General Cruft's, and General Wood's division, were entering the city. I may here notice Captain Isaac N. Dryden, of the Twenty-fourth Ohio, and his company, for daring bravery in the advance, in ascending the mountain, and driving and punishing the enemy. With light but successful skirmishing near Grayville, Ringgold, and Chickamauga Creek, and a reconnoissance from the latter to Worthen's farm, to a pass in Pigeon Mountain, I was directed, on the morning of the nineteenth instant, to make a reconnoissance below Lee and Gordon's Mills, on the Chickamauga Creek, in the State of Georgia, which I did, and found the enemy in force, and on receiving orders I withdrew the brigade, joined the column, and with it moved upon the enemy, into an open woodland to the right of the road leading towards Chattanooga. My position happened to be on a small elevation, General Cruft's brigade to my left, and General Reynolds' division on my right. We met the enemy's lines about twelve o'clock *x*. My brigade was formed in double lines; the Twenty-fourth Ohio Colonel

Higgins, and Twenty-third Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel Foy, in the front line; the Thirty-sixth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Cary, and the Eighty-fourth Illinois, Colonel Waters, in the rear line; the Sixth Ohio, Colonel Anderson, in reserve. On meeting the enemy with the front line, the troops on the right of my brigade gave way, and the Thirty-sixth Indiana was immediately changed to the right to defend the flank, and in a very few minutes the enemy passed so far by my right and rear, that, the Sixth Ohio, as well as the Thirty-sixth Indiana, Twenty-fourth Ohio, and Twenty-third Kentucky, were all desperately engaged, and so continued for two long hours.

Here was the best fighting and least falling out of ranks (except the killed and wounded) I ever witnessed. Finally, the ammunition of these four regiments gave out, and there being none at hand (bad luck), they had to be retired. Now came the time for the Eighty-fourth Illinois to come into the breach. The Colonel changed front to the right, and with his brave and hitherto well-tried regiment, contested every inch of ground until compelled to give way before overwhelming numbers. The enemy having reached his then right flank (our former rear), all was retired in tolerably good order, which ended my fighting for the day. General Cruft's brigade, that had not yet exhausted its ammunition, nor been seriously engaged, now changed front to the enemy, engaged him, and came off master of that part of the field.

The ensuing night we laid upon our arms, without water or rest, and though the fatigues had been great, yet there were more to endure upon the coming day. Ammunition replenished, we were again in position for the fearful labors that awaited us on the holy Sabbath. Early, I was ordered to take position on the right of General Hazen's brigade, on the right of our division, which was done, and each regiment quickly threw before it barricades of logs and such materials as could readily be obtained; but before the action on our part of the line commenced, one of my regiments, the Twenty-third Kentucky, had been loaned to General Hazen, to fill out his lines, and with the other four, about nine o'clock, I was ordered to the left of General Baird's division (General Rousseau's old division) to strengthen his left. Before we arrived at the intended position in the line, the enemy came upon Baird's division, and consequently upon my command, in fearful numbers. I formed the four regiments, under a destructive fire from the enemy, in a woodland covered with a heavy underbrush, fronting nearly north, and at right angles with the main line of battle; the Thirty-sixth Indiana and Eighty-fourth Illinois in the front line, the Sixth and Twenty-fourth Ohio in the second line. Thus formed, we met the enemy and had a desperate struggle, with fearful loss on both sides. The brigade advanced and was repulsed, advanced a second time and was repulsed, and with some

forces that now came to our assistance, advanced the third time and held the woodland.

In this contest for mastery over the woodland, fell many of my best and bravest officers and men. The dead and dying of both armies mingled together over this bloody field. Here I parted with my comrades in arms for ever, particularly old messmates of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, and whose remains I was unable to remove from the field. In this conflict, and amid the shifting scenes of battle, Colonel Waters, of the Eighty-fourth Illinois, with a part of his regiment, became detached from the brigade to the west of the road, and became mingled with the division of General Negley, who, it seems, shortly after ordered that portion of Colonel Waters' regiment, with at least a portion of his own command, towards Chattanooga, on the pretext of sending that of Colonel Waters as train guard; for particulars of which reference is made to the report of Colonel Waters. The residue of the Eighty-fourth Illinois regiment, under the command of Captain William Erwin, of Company C, with Lieutenants McLain, Scroggan and Logue, with parts of four companies, remained with the brigade, and on the left of, and with, the Thirty-sixth Indiana, did efficient and good service. Captain Erwin deserves notice for coolness and bravery during this fight, as well as the lieutenants above named. After the fighting had ceased, and with seeming success to our arms on this portion of the line—now about one or two o'clock P. M.—I withdrew the Thirty-sixth Indiana, Twenty-fourth and Sixth Ohio, with that portion of the Eighty-fourth Illinois under command of Captain Erwin, to near the position we had taken in the forenoon, near the right of General Hazen's brigade, and put my men in position to rest, and to await further developments; the Twenty-third Kentucky having remained with General Hazen at that point where I had left it in the morning. The enemy's sharpshooters and occasional cannonading kept up amusement for us in the meantime. It was here, near by me, that Colonel King, of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, fell a victim to the aim of a sharpshooter.

In these two days my command took a considerable number of prisoners and sent them to the rear. Amongst them was Captain E. B. Sayers, Chief Engineer of General Polk's corps. He surrendered to me in person, was put in charge of Lieutenant Scott, my Engineer, and sent back to General Thomas' corps hospital. Sayers was one of the Camp Jackson prisoners, and formerly a citizen of St. Louis, Missouri. I presume many of the prisoners taken on Sunday escaped.

About four o'clock a deserter came in and informed us that Breckenridge's division of the rebel army was advancing towards the same point where we had been in such deadly strife during the fore part of the day, which statement was soon verified by the roar of artillery and small arms in that direction, again moving

upon Johnson and Baird's shattered divisions; about the same time a heavy force of the enemy commenced an attack to our right and rear, from towards Lee and Gordon's Mills, and from the direction we had come in the morning, and opened the most terrific cannonading I had heard during these battles, and in a few moments completely enfilading our entire rear. At fifteen minutes before five o'clock, Lieutenant Thomas, Major-General Palmer's Aid, brought me an order to "retire my command." Which way or where to retire to was not an easy question to solve; the enemy fast approaching from the right and left towards our rear, their artillery fire meeting. I, however, immediately sent orders to the regiments there with me, to retire across the farm to our rear, passing to the right of the farm-house, in the following order: Sixth Ohio, Thirty-sixth Indiana, and that portion of the Eighty-fourth Illinois with me, the Twenty-third Kentucky to bring up the rear; portions of the Twenty-fourth Ohio were with each of those regiments. My artillery had been retired to the west of the farm. The forces that were to my left, when faced about, had to retire further to my right and cross the farm further north. When I commenced the move it seemed evident that my now small command would be swept away by the artillery fire of the enemy. To prevent breaking of ranks or any further panic, and to indicate to the men that this was a time for coolness and "steady habits," with Lieutenant Boice, one of my Aides-de-Camp, he carrying the brigade flag at my side, we rode on the left of the front regiment, and in the direction from which the most terrible fire of the enemy emanated, until we passed the ordeal of danger. As soon as we passed the point of greatest danger, I halted the two front regiments, Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana, and into line faced them to the rear to defend and cover the retreat; this was done coolly and deliberately. General Palmer was here to consult with me and give directions. Here was the last I saw of Captain J. R. Muhleman, A. A. G. of the division, and I presume he fell near this place, for we were yet under a sharp fire. As soon as all was closed up and had passed this line, I again retired the force across another farm about one-half mile and ascended a high wooded hill, and re-formed, faced as before, now out of the range of the enemy's fire. It was now dusk, and as soon as all was closed up, and meeting General Cruft, with his brigade, here, we consulted together with our division commander, and retired to Rossville, about four or five miles distant, on the Chattanooga road, and rested for the night. It is due that I mention, in this place, an act of bravery and danger of my Aid, Lieutenant Boice. After we had passed over the first farm, fearing that my orders to Captain Erwin, of the Eighty-fourth Illinois, had not been definitely understood, and that he, with his command, might be left behind and lost, I directed Lieutenant Boice to return again over the field

of death, and see that the captain was coming with his command. The direction was promptly obeyed, and the lieutenant made the trip and returned unharmed. My fears for his safety were inexpressibly relieved when I saw him safely return. For this and similar efficient service during all these battles, Lieutenant Boice deserves the most favorable notice. In the position assigned me, with my command, at and near Rossville, on the twenty-first, although I did no fighting, and a better situation could not have been given me, yet I lost one man killed and one wounded from the enemy's artillery. From thence we withdrew to our present position without further harm.

Lieutenant Russell, in command of M Company, Fourth United States artillery, on Saturday, the nineteenth, was placed in position in the centre of my front line, and did effective service. On Sunday he, as well as Lieutenant Cushing, commanding H Company, Fourth United States artillery, played a heavy part upon the enemy's columns. Those lieutenants, although they look like mere boys, yet for bravery and effective service they are not excelled, if equalled, in efficiency by any artillerist in the army. They have the credit of being in the last of the fighting, and then retiring, all but the loss of one piece, of Lieutenant Cushing's, that had been disabled during the engagement. Colonel Waters, with his brave regiment, deserves great credit for the manner in which the one commanded, and the other performed the perilous duties devolving upon them during the battles. The brave Colonel Nick Anderson, with his regiment, Sixth Ohio, performed a whole duty up to the evening of the nineteenth; he having been wounded during that day, was compelled to be relieved. The command thereafter devolved on Major Erwin, who performed it highly satisfactory. Lieutenant-Colonel Carey, Thirty-sixth Indiana, brave to the last, received a severe wound during the battle on the nineteenth, and was succeeded by Major Trusler in command, who deserves a high meed of praise for continuing the good management of the regiment. Brave old regiment, your country will remember you when these trying times are over. Lieutenant-Colonel Foy and Twenty-third Kentucky, side by side with your comrades and brothers in arms from Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, you did your duty well. Colonel Higgins and Twenty-fourth Ohio can boast of as brave and dutiful officers and men as can be found in any army. Captain George M. Graves, my Assistant Adjutant-General, a brave and good officer, fell by my side mortally wounded on the nineteenth, while rendering efficient service. He has since died. Rest in peace, brave soldier. Isaac Bigelow and George Shirk, two of my orderlies, were wounded on the twentieth, the latter seriously, and who was carrying the brigade flag when he fell. Corporal Dossey Lennin, of Company I, Twenty-fourth Ohio, seeing the flag fall, rushed to it, rescued it, and bore it off the field, as he did his own regimental colors on

two occasions the day before, when the color guards had been shot down. Such bravery and high bearing as this is highly deserving the notice of the appointing power. My grateful thanks are due to the brave officers and men of the brigade for their noble conduct through these trying scenes in behalf the right, and to put down the wrong. My staff officers, Captain Brooks, Inspector; Lieutenant Scott, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant Livzey, Aid-de-Camp; Major Kersey, Medical Director; Captain Peden, Provost Marshal, with those heretofore mentioned, as well as my non-commissioned staff, have my grateful acknowledgments for their kind and efficient help during these laborious battles; and they, with me, unfeignedly lament the fall of our comrade and brother,

Captain George M. Graves. Many officers and men of my command, that it is impossible to refer to especially, are equally deserving with the best of soldiers. Patriots, Captain Adams, Eighty-fourth Illinois; Captain Tinker, Sixth Ohio; Captain Wadsworth, Twenty-fourth Ohio; Lieutenant Patterson, Thirty-sixth Indiana; Lieutenant Hoffman, Twenty-third Kentucky, with fifty-seven brave enlisted men, fell on these battle-fields a sacrifice upon their country's altar. My heart sickens to contemplate these irreparable losses. To the suffering wounded: may the God of battles soothe their afflictions, heal and restore them again to usefulness.

The following table shows the casualties of the brigade, as near as is possible to ascertain at the present time:

Loss and Casualties.

COMMANDER.	COMMAND.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
		Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Colonel William Grose.....	Headquarters	1	3	1	3	4
Lieutenant-Colonel Carey..	Thirty-sixth Indiana Vol. Infantry..	1	13	3	39	17	9	119	123
Colonel Higgins.....	Twenty-fourth Ohio	3	3	57	16	3	76	79
Colonel Anderson.....	Sixth Ohio	1	13	7	94	1	16	9	123	132
Colonel Waters.....	Eighty-fourth Illinois	1	12	2	81	9	3	102	106
Lieutenant-Colonel Foy....	Twenty-third Kentucky	1	10	3	49	6	4	65	69
Lieutenant Russell.....	Battery M, Fourth U. S. A.....	2	6	8	8
Lieutenant Cushing.....	Battery H, "	4	1	16	1	1	21	22
		5	57	24	395	1	65	30	517	547

Add to this the six hundred and fifty-nine loss at Stone river, with many other casualties in smaller engagements, it shows a fearful destruction of human life in one small command.

For further and more minute particulars, reference is made to the reports of regimental commanders herewith forwarded.

I have the honor to be

Your most humble servant,

W. GROSE,

Colonel, commanding Third Brigade.

L. BOICE,

Lieutenant and A. A. D. C.

Doc. 14.

THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL PECK'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS PECK'S DIVISION,
HARRISON'S POINT, July 11, 1862 }

Captain C. C. Snydam, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Corps:

SIR: I have the honor to report that I assumed command of this division at White Oak Swamp, on the twenty-fourth of June, 1862, in compli-

ance with orders from Headquarters Army of the Potomac.

The division consisted of two brigades, one of which, commanded by General Wessells, was at the headquarters at White Oak Swamp. The other, under General Naglee, was guarding the entrenched line between the railroad and Bottom's bridge, distant some four-and-a-half miles. A squadron of cavalry and nine pieces of artillery were at the headquarters, and four pieces of artillery near Bottom's bridge.

On assuming command, I proceeded to make a personal examination of the whole of the White Oak Swamp, commencing at the pickets of General Couch, and also of the Chickahominy, up to and beyond the railroad bridge. My conclusions were that the swamp offered but a slight defence against enterprising infantry. During my stay at that place, I kept several hundred choppers employed in closing up, with trunks of trees and other obstructions, all the fords and passages. An *abatis* was constructed across the open area in front, and the timber slashed extensively on the right and left. By cutting certain timber on the right, three large clearings were connected and brought under the guns of the batteries. At last one-half mile

rifle-pits was constructed, adding materially to the strength of the position. A small work was ordered, across the railway, near a screen of timber, on the right of General Naglee's line; also a general slashing of timber in his front. A redoubt, on the road from Bottom's bridge, was found in a half-finished state, which I directed to be completed. The whole country beyond the White Oak Swamp, in the direction towards Richmond, New Market, and the Chickahominy, and also the territory across Bottom's Bridge, was most thoroughly covered by cavalry patrols, under the general direction of Captain Keenan. From him I had information of the movements of General Wise, with his force of some five thousand of all arms, his headquarters being near New Market.

Late on the twenty-sixth, I was advised that the enemy had crossed the Chickahominy, in large force, for the purpose of cutting our communications. Early on the twenty-seventh, I proceeded to Bottom's Bridge and made a careful reconnoissance of all the approaches, in conjunction with General Naglee, which resulted in ordering the construction of a redoubt for ten or twelve guns at the bridge, close to the river; an *éparement* for three guns was also ordered on the railroad. I reinforced General Naglee with Colonel Hovell's regiment, placing it at the battery below Bottom's Bridge. Lieutenant Morgan's regular battery was sent to General Naglee, also all the entrenching tools at my command. A squadron of cavalry for special service was asked for on that part of the line. The reported crossing of Jackson with sixty thousand men proving too true, I deemed it advisable to guard the whole line to the extent of my ability, from Bottom's Bridge to the White Oak Swamp. By a thorough examination, I found a line of high bluffs commanding all the approaches from Chickahominy Swamp. Four different sites were selected for lines of rifle-pits, and the work commenced; one was completed and Colonel Lehman's regiment placed in position that night.

The instructions from headquarters to destroy Bottom's and the railroad bridge, in case an attack should be made in overwhelming force, I communicated to General Naglee, and the necessary preparations were made therefor. The important order "to hold the road to the James river over White Oak Swamp at all hazards," was received and carried out to the letter.

During the evening, Captain Fitch's battery, Colonel Russell's Seventh Massachusetts volunteers and General Woodbury's engineer force, joined for duty at my headquarters. Parties, under discreet officers, were sent down the Chickahominy, with instructions to burn all bridge structures, and to proceed as far as Jones' Ford, if possible. General Woodbury was employed in preparing bridge structures to be thrown across the White Oak at or before daylight. He was furnished with men and implements, and every facility afforded for the discharge of his duty. A large force was employed during the night clearing the obstructions in the road lead-

ing to the bridge. Reports were made to the headquarters Fourth corps at intervals of half hours.

On the twenty-eighth, at daylight, I received instructions from headquarters, Fourth corps, to throw my immediate command across the White Oak Swamp, and *seize strong positions so as to cover* most effectually the passage for other troops. So soon as the bridge was passable I moved General Palmer, (who had joined me with his brigade,) Russell's regiment leading a squadron of cavalry, and Regan's and Fitch's batteries of artillery, forward, to a position of much strategic importance, some four miles in advance towards Richmond, covering the junction of the Quaker, New Market, Charles City, and other principal roads. General Woodbury, at my request, accompanied General Palmer, and made a hasty reconnoissance of the position. Having placed Wessell's brigade, with Lieutenant Mink's battery, in movement to support General Palmer, I proceeded in advance with Captain Keenan, to make a careful reconnoissance of the country between the main road and the White Oak Swamp. After placing Colonels Rose and Dunkee's regiments on the right of the road, and the Sixty-second New York, Colonel Niven, far to the right, towards the swamp, in advance of Palmer's line, for the purpose of covering an important road, I examined the dispositions of General Palmer, which met my approval. The remainder of Wessell's brigade, with the artillery, were placed in reserve. Soon after General Couch came up with his division, and after examining and approving the dispositions, placed his command in position. Lines of pickets were established, but every precaution was taken to prevent any information from reaching the enemy.

At two p. m., I ordered Colonel Fairman's New York regiment and two sections of Fitch's battery to proceed to Long's Bridge to destroy what remained of it, and prevent the enemy's crossing in that quarter. A detail of two hundred infantry was sent, with a section of artillery, to Jones' Bridge, with similar instructions. About this time the Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel Hovell, was established as an outpost on the Charles City road, to cover the debouch of the crossing of the White Oak Swamp at Bracket's Ford. Infantry and cavalry pickets were established in advance of this.

In this connection, I would mention that the Ninety-second New York, Colonel Anderson, was left on duty at the White Oak Swamp bridge. At this time, in consequence of the numerous detachments along the Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp, my force in hand was reduced to less than one thousand four hundred. An *abatis* was ordered to be cut in front, but not much progress was made, for want of tools. The day passed without disturbance, which I attributed in a great degree to the precaution I had taken of having the provost guard over every house within a distance of two or three

miles, with instructions to prevent any person leaving his premises.

About nine A. M., on the twenty-ninth, some of Wise's cavalry dashed into the camp in a reckless manner, cheering, and were received with a volley, which resulted in the death of the Major, and capture of some twenty-five, among whom was Captain Ruffin. The troops lay in position all day, awaiting in anxious suspense the movements of the enemy, somewhat encouraged by the arrival of supports from the White Oak Swamp, at six P. M. My command was relieved by that of General Slocum, and in obedience to orders from General Keyes, took up the line of march to James river, where it arrived in safety, with its train and artillery, at nine A. M. on the thirtieth, having been on the road, without sleep, in expectation of meeting the enemy, the whole night.

MALVERN HILL.

I placed Wessell's brigade in position not far from Turkey Creek, Naglee's brigade not having joined. The enemy having commenced his attack upon the columns *en route*, my command was placed in line of battle by General Keyes about 3:30 P. M., on the extreme right, and entrusted with the defence of the reserve artillery. For a long time it was the only command on the ground. Early on the first of July, General Slocum was placed on my left (Malvern Hill), and in conjunction with him arrangements were made for the defence of our portion of the line.

During the day my detachments at Turner's and Long's Bridge, and Jones' Ford, were compelled to withdraw, to avoid being destroyed by the overwhelming force on the opposite side of the Chickahominy. They reported the enemy had already crossed at Jones' Bridge in considerable numbers.

REAR GUARD.

At midnight I was advised that the army would immediately commence its movements to Harrison's Landing, some seven miles, and that my command would constitute the rear guard. After consultation it was deemed best, in case of there being only one road, that the brigades of Wessell and Naglee should cover the rear alternately, with the needful supply of artillery. At half past one A. M., I was in my saddle aiding General Wessell in forming his line of battle on the heights, a short distance this side the headquarters of General McClellan. Miller's battery only was retained; all the principal by-roads were picketed with cavalry. Naglee's brigade was formed about a mile in the rear, on a commanding position. Stationing myself in the road, I gave my entire time and personal attention to the supervision of troops, batteries, and trains. Long trains of wagons and ambulances converging from every quarter towards the road, it became a very important question how to dispose of them, under my instructions, which

were, to operate with reference to the rear of the artillery and troops, and not with reference to the trains, save the leaving of a single regiment in their rear. The plan which I adopted was this: that there should be one unbroken line of troops and batteries on one side of the road; and that the trains should move in like manner on the other side. That so long as the troops moved the trains could move; but that upon any detention of the troops the wagon trains must be halted. Batteries, ammunition, and hospital wagons had the preference. When extensive openings bordered the road, steps were taken to shorten up the trains by moving in several columns. Reports frequently came in of the movements of the enemy in various quarters, and on the reception of one of these, General Smith formed line of battle for some time to co-operate with me.

About twelve o'clock A. M., Colonel Averill passed by with his fine command, bringing up everything from the direction of Turkey Creek, in excellent order and time. As every command, ambulance, wagon, and straggler, had gone by the rear guard, I directed General Wessell to draw in his pickets and detachments, and move on and take up a position in the rear of General Naglee. About five o'clock P. M., it was evident that, owing to the terrible condition of the roads, the whole country being flooded with water, which had poured down upon the clay soil uninterruptedly since early in the morning, that the train could not reach its destination that night, and, without protection, would fall into the hands of the enemy rapidly advancing.

I placed Wessell's brigade in position on the other side of Kimagen's Creek, with Miller's battery and seven small companies of cavalry. The brigade of Naglee, he being unwell, was placed in supporting distance this side of the creek. Soon after, the enemy opened with artillery upon the train for the purpose of creating confusion and stampeding the animals. Two additional regiments were sent to reinforce General Wessell. Judicious dispositions were made by him, and every step taken to keep the train of wagons moving through the night across the creek. At daylight on the third, the crossings of the stream were well nigh impassable, the rain having continued through the night. The drivers and animals were exhausted by want of food and great exertion, and the prospect for the balance of the train being passed was exceedingly dubious. New roads were cut through the woods, teams were doubled and fresh ones sent for. The enemy's pickets were around us, and his advance columns not far distant; doubtless held in check by the fire of the gunboats.

The work proceeded slowly but surely through the day, and at seven o'clock P. M. on the third I had the proud satisfaction of reporting for the information of the headquarters Army of the Potomac that the last vehicle had crossed the creek. The opinion is ventured that the history of military operations affords no instance whe

a train of like magnitude and value was moved so great a distance in the presence of the enemy, and in the face of so many material obstacles, with so trifling loss.

As soon as the train was fairly out of the way I brought the rear guard to this side, where I established my line of battle, along the crest of the creek, my left resting on the James river. On the fourth I called the attention of the General-in-Chief to the advantages of this line, and after an examination he was pleased to adopt it. The timber on the opposite side has been slashed down to the James, also in the ravine and up to the crest of the creek on one side, which is lined with rifle-pits and batteries. Numerous roads have been cut, giving free communication between the reserves and the front.

General Ferry, with Thirty-ninth Illinois, Thirteenth Indiana, Sixty-second and Sixty-seventh Ohio regiments, was assigned to my division on the sixth instant. The record of these troops in the Shenandoah Valley is highly creditable, and gives promise of brilliant conduct when opportunity offers.

General Naglee was entrusted with a highly responsible and trying command at Bottom's Bridge and the railroad, which he discharged with zeal and fidelity. His troops at Dispatch Station were brought in at the night time. His batteries and sharpshooters inflicted severe punishment upon the enemy when pressing upon the approaches to the bridges. In consequence of the absence of General Naglee no report has been received from that brigade, and I am embarrassed with respect to the details thereof. His report, as soon as received, will be sent forward to accompany this.

General Weasell has labored most faithfully, night and day, since I joined the division, and displayed the greatest interest in the service, under very critical circumstances. In the midst of difficulties and dangers his judgment seemed most reliable.

General Palmer led the advance from the White Oak Swamp, and made excellent dispositions, of which I am happy to make mention. Colonel Russell, Seventh Massachusetts, was in advance of the advance as usual, and exhibited his anxiety to meet the foe with his fine regiment.

Colonels Farniman, Ninety-sixth New York; Lehman, One Hundred and Third Pennsylvania; Rose, Eighty-first New York; Belknap, Eighty-fifth Pennsylvania; and Lieutenant-Colonel Durkee, Ninety-eighth New York, are all meritorious officers who have rendered the country good service, and exert a salutary influence upon their troops. Colonel Gregg, Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, was of great assistance in these movements, scouring the country and watching the enemy. Captain Keenan, Eighth Pennsylvania cavalry, deserves especial notice for untiring and valuable services. When he was in the saddle no movement of the enemy escaped his eye. Lieutenant C. H. Morgan, Fourth artillery, displayed extraordinary zeal,

pushing on many miles from Bottom's Bridge to join the advance to James river. He is an officer of merit.

As usual, all the members of my staff were active, and rendered great assistance. It is due to Surgeon A. B. Crosby, that I should acknowledge his untiring devotion to the sick and the wounded. That he should have deemed it necessary to tender his resignation is to be much regretted.

The artillery under Captains Regan, Miller, Brady, Fitch, Lieutenants Morgan and Mink, was in excellent condition and responded promptly to every call of duty. With such batteries I felt confident of more than ordinary success in any encounter with the rebels.

The severe labors that have devolved upon me since taking the division have prevented my finding out many deserving of notice, and I desire to thank every officer and soldier in the command for the cheerful and faithful manner in which they have discharged duties incessant and arduous, by day and by night. Chickahominy and White Oak Swamp will bear evidences of their industry for generations. While the late severe service has not been so brilliant as that which fell to other troops, it will even be deemed honor enough to have been a member of that division which held the troops of Jackson at bay across the Chickahominy, destroyed all the bridges, which led the advance of the Army of the Potomac from White Oak Swamp, and covered the rear safely during the great strategic movement from (Malvern Hill) Turkey Creek to Harrison's Point.

I am, very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

JOHN I. PECK,

Brigadier General, commanding Division.

Doc. 15.

VISIT OF MESSRS. GILMORE AND JAQUESS TO RICHMOND, VA.

On the sixteenth of July, 1864, J. R. Gilmore, a well-known author, and Colonel James F. Jaquess, of the Seventy-third Illinois volunteers, obtained a pass through the rebel lines, and visited Jefferson Davis at Richmond. This visit, in many respects, was one of the most extraordinary incidents of the war. With no safe conduct, and no official authority, these gentlemen passed the lines of two hostile armies, gained access to the leaders of the rebellion, and came away in safety; bringing with them information which was of great importance at the time, and proved of vast service to the Union cause in the election which soon followed. As it will be matter of history, we condense from the *Atlantic Monthly* Mr. Gilmore's account of this singular and most successful enterprise:

When the far-away Boston bells were sounding nine, on the morning of Saturday, the six-

teenth day of July, we took our glorious Massachusetts general by the hand, and said to him:

"Good-bye. If you do not see us within ten days, you will know we have 'gone up.'"

"If I do not see you within that time," he replied, "I'll demand you; and if they don't produce you, body and soul, I'll take two for one—better men than you are—and hang them higher than Haman. My hand on that. Good-bye."

At three o'clock on the afternoon of the same day, mounted on two raw-boned relics of Sheridan's great raid, and armed with a letter to Jeff. Davis, a white cambric handkerchief tied to a short stick, and an honest face—this last was the Colonel's—we rode up to the rebel lines. A ragged, yellow-faced boy, with a carbine in one hand, and another white handkerchief tied to another short stick in the other, came out to meet us.

"Can you tell us, my man, where to find Judge Ould, the Exchange Commissioner?"

"Yas. Him and t' other 'change officers is over ter the plantation beyont Miss Grover's. Ye 'll know it by its heviny nary door nur winder [the mansion, he meant]. They's all busted in. Foller the bridle-path through the timber, and keep your rag a-flyin', fur our boys is thicker n huckelberries in them woods, and they mought pop ye, ef they did n't seed it."

Thanking him, we turned our horses into the "timber," and, galloping rapidly on, soon came in sight of the deserted plantation. Lolling on the grass, in the shade of the windowless mansion, we found the Confederate officials. They rose as we approached; and one of us said to the Judge—a courteous, middle-aged gentleman, in a Panama hat, and a suit of spotless white drillings—"We are late, but it's your fault. Your people fired at us down the river, and we had to turn back and come overland."

"You don't suppose they saw your flag?"

"No. It was hidden by the trees; but a shot came uncomfortably near us. It struck the water, and ricocheted not three yards off. A little nearer, and it would have shortened me by a head, and the Colonel by two feet."

"That would have been a sad thing for you; but a miss, you know, is as good as a mile," said the Judge, evidently enjoying the "joke."

"We hear Grant was in the boat that followed yours, and was struck while at dinner," remarked Captain Hatch, the Judge's adjutant—a gentleman, and about the best-looking man in the Confederacy.

"Indeed! Do you believe it?"

"I don't know, of course;" and his looks asked for an answer. We gave none, for all such information is contraband. We might have told him that Grant, Butler, and Foster examined their position from Mrs. Grover's house—about four hundred yards distant—two hours after the rebel cannon-ball danced a break-down on the Lieutenant-General's dinner-table.

We were then introduced to the other offi-

cial—Major Henniken of the War Department, a young man formerly of New York, but now scorning the imputation of being a Yankee, and Mr. Charles Javins, of the provost guard of Richmond. This latter individual was our shadow in Dixie. He was of medium height, stoutly built, with a short, thick neck, and arms and shoulders, denoting great strength. He looked a natural-born jailer, and much such a character as a timid man would not care to encounter, except at long range of a rifle warranted to fire twenty shots a minute, and to hit every time.

To give us a *moonlight view* of the Richmond fortifications, the Judge proposed to start after sundown; and as it wanted some hours of that time, we seated ourselves on the ground, and entered into conversation. The treatment of our prisoners, the *status* of black troops and non-combatants, and all the questions which have led to the suspension of exchanges, had been good-naturedly discussed, when the Captain, looking up from one of the Northern papers we had brought him, said:

"Do you know, it mortifies me that you don't hate us as we hate you? You kill us as Agassiz kills a fly—because you love us."

"Of course we do. The North is being crucified for love of the South."

"If you love us so, why don't you let us go?" asked the Judge, rather curtly.

"For that very reason—because we love you. If we let you go, with slavery, and your notions of 'empire,' you'd run straight to barbarism and the Devil."

"We'd take the risk of that. But let me tell you, if you are going to Mr. Davis with any such ideas, you might as well turn back at once. He can make peace on no other basis than independence. Recognition must be the beginning, middle, and ending of all negotiations. Our people will accept peace on no other terms."

"I think you are wrong there," said the Colonel. "When I was here a year ago, I met many of your leading men, and they all assured me they wanted peace and reunion, even at the sacrifice of slavery. Within a week, a man you venerate and love has met me at Baltimore, and besought me to come here, and offer Mr. Davis peace on such conditions."

"That may be. Some of our old men, who are weak in the knees, may want peace on any terms; but the Southern people will not have it without independence. Mr. Davis knows them, and you will find he will insist upon that. Concede that, and we'll not quarrel about minor matters."

"We'll not quarrel at all. But it's sundown, and time we were 'on to Richmond.'"

"That's the *Tribune* cry," said the Captain, rising; "and I hurrah for the *Tribune*, for it's honest, and—I want my supper."

We all laughed, and the Judge ordered the horses. As we were about to start, I said to him:

"You've forgotten our parole."

"Oh, never mind that. We'll attend to that at Richmond."

Stepping into his carriage, and unfurling the flag of truce, he then led the way, by a "short cut," across the corn-field which divided the mansion from the high-road. We followed in an ambulance drawn by a pair of mules, our shadow—Mr. Javins—sitting between us and the twilight, and Jack, a "likely darky," almost the sole survivor of his master's twelve hundred slaves ("De ress all stole Massa—stole by you Yankees"), occupying the front seat, and with a scout whip "working our passage" to Richmond.

Much that was amusing and interesting occurred during our three-hours' journey, but regard for our word forbids my relating it. Suffice it to say, we saw the "frowning fortifications," we "flanked" the "invincible army," and at ten o'clock that night, planted our flag (against a lamp-post) in the very heart of the hostile city. As we alighted at the doorway of the Spotswood Hotel, the Judge said to the Colonel:

"Button your outside-coat up closely. Your uniform must not be seen here."

The Colonel did as he was bidden; and without stopping to register our names at the office, we followed the Judge and the Captain up to No. 60. It was a large, square room in the fourth story, with an unswept, ragged carpet, and bare, white walls, smeared with soot and tobacco juice. Several chairs, a marble-top table, and a pine wash-stand and clothes-press straggled about the floor, and in the corners were three beds, garnished with tattered pillow-cases, and covered with white counterpanes, grown gray with longing for soapsuds and a wash-tub. The plainer and humbler of these beds was designed for the burly Mr. Javins; the others had been made ready for the extraordinary envoys (not envoys extraordinary) who, in defiance of all precedent and the "law of nations," had just then "taken Richmond."

A single gas-jet was burning over the mantelpiece, and above it I saw a "writing on the wall" which implied that Jane Jackson had run up a washing-score of fifty dollars!

I was congratulating myself on not having to pay that woman's laundry-bills, when the Judge said:

"You want supper. What shall we order?"

"A slice of hot corn bread would make me the happiest man in Richmond."

The Captain thereupon left the room, and shortly returning, remarked:

"The landlord swears you're from Georgia. He says none but a Georgian would call for corn bread at that time of the night."

On that hint we acted, and when our sooty attendant came in with the supper things, we discussed Georgia mines, Georgia banks, and Georgia mosquitoes, in a way that showed we had been bitten by all of them. In half an hour it was noised all about the hotel that the two

gentlemen the Confederacy was taking such excellent care of were from Georgia.

The meal ended, and a quiet smoke over, our entertainers rose to go. As the Judge bade us good-night, he said to us:

"In the morning you had better address a note to Mr. Benjamin, asking the interview with the President. I will call at ten o'clock, and take it to him."

"Very well. But will Mr. Davis see us on Sunday?"

"Oh, that will make no difference."

WHAT WE DID THERE.

The next morning, after breakfast, which we took in our room with Mr. Javins, we indited a note—of which the following is a copy—to the Confederate Secretary of State:

"SPOTSWOOD HOUSE, RICHMOND, VA.,
"July 17, 1864."

"Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of State, etc.:

"DEAR SIR: The undersigned respectfully solicit an interview with President Davis.

"They visit Richmond only as private citizens, and have no official character or authority; but they are acquainted with the views of the United States Government, and with the sentiments of the Northern people, relative to an adjustment of the differences existing between the North and the South, and earnestly hope that a free interchange of views between President Davis and themselves may open the way to such official negotiations as will result in restoring PEACE to the two sections of our distracted country.

"They therefore ask an interview with the President, and awaiting your reply, are

"Truly and respectfully yours."

This was signed by both of us; and when the Judge called, as he had appointed, we sent it—together with a commendatory letter I had received, on setting out, from a near relative of Mr. Davis—to the Rebel Secretary. In half an hour Judge Ould returned, saying: "Mr. Benjamin sends you his compliments, and will be happy to see you at the State Department."

We found the Secretary—a short, plump, oily little man in black, with a keen black eye, a Jew face, a yellow skin, curly black hair, closely trimmed black whiskers, and a ponderous gold watch-chain—in the north-west room of the "United States" Custom House. Over the door of this room were the words, "State Department," and round its walls were hung a few maps and battle-plans. In one corner was a tier of shelves filled with books, among which I noticed Headley's, "History," Lossing's "Pictorial," Parton's "Butler," Greeley's "American Conflict," a set of Frank Moore's "Rebellion Record," and a dozen numbers and several bound volumes of the "Atlantic Monthly," and in the centre of the apartment was a black-walnut table, cov-

ered with green cloth, and filled with a multitude of "state papers." At this table sat the Secretary. He rose as we entered, and, as Judge Ould introduced us, took our hands, and said:

"I am glad, very glad, to meet you, gentlemen. I have read your note, and"—bowing to me—"the open letter you bring from——. Your errand commands my respect and sympathy. Pray be seated."

As we took the proffered seats, the Colonel, drawing off his "duster," and displaying his uniform, said:

"We thank you for this cordial reception, Mr. Benjamin. We trust you will be as glad to hear us as you are to see us."

"No doubt I shall be, for you come to talk of peace. Peace is what we all want."

"It is, indeed; and for that reason we are here to see Mr. Davis. Can we see him, sir?"

"Do you bring any overtures to him from your Government?"

"No, sir. We bring no overtures and have no authority from our Government. We state that in our note. We would be glad, however, to know what terms will be acceptable to Mr. Davis. If they at all harmonize with Mr. Lincoln's views, we will report them to him, and so open the door for official negotiations."

"Are you acquainted with Mr. Lincoln's views?"

"One of us is, fully."

"Did Mr. Lincoln, in any way, authorize you to come here?"

"No, sir. We came with his pass, but not by his request. We say, distinctly, we have no official, or unofficial, authority. We come as men and Christians, not as diplomatists, hoping, in a frank talk with Mr. Davis, to discover some way by which this war may be stopped."

"Well, gentlemen, I will repeat what you say to the President, and if he follows my advice—and I think he will—he will meet you. He will be at church this afternoon; so, suppose you call here at nine this evening. If anything should occur in the meantime to prevent his seeing you, I will let you know through Judge Ould."

Throughout this interview the manner of the Secretary was cordial; but with this cordiality was a strange constraint and diffidence, almost amounting to timidity, which struck both my companion and myself. Contrasting his manner with the quiet dignity of the Colonel, I almost fancied our positions reversed—that, instead of our being in his power, the Secretary was in ours, and momentarily expecting to hear some unwelcome sentence from our lips. There is something, after all, in moral power. Mr. Benjamin does not possess it, nor is he a great man. He has a keen, shrewd, ready intellect, but not the *stamina* to originate, or even to execute, any great good or great wickedness.

After a day spent in our room, conversing with the Judge, or watching the passers-by in the street—I should like to tell who they were

and how they looked, but such information just now contraband—we called again, at nine o'clock, at the State Department.

Mr. Benjamin occupied his previous seat at the table, and at his right sat a spare, thin-tured man, with iron-gray hair and beard, an clear, gray eye, full of life and vigor. He had a broad, massive forehead, and a mouth and countenance denoting great energy and strength of will. His face was emaciated, and much wrinkled, his features were good, especially his eyes, though one of them bore a scar, apparently made by some sharp instrument. He wore a suit of grayish-brown, evidently of foreign manufacture, and, as he rose, I saw that he was about five feet ten inches high, with a slight stoop in the shoulders. His manners were simple, easy, and quite fascinating; and he had an indescribable charm into his voice, as he extended his hand, and said to us:

"I am glad to see you, gentlemen. You are very welcome to Richmond."

And this was the man who was President of the United States under Franklin Pierce, who is now the heart, soul, and brains of the Southern Confederacy!

His manner put me entirely at my ease—Colonel would be at his, if he stood by the side of Caesar—and I replied:

"We thank you, Mr. Davis. It is not only you meet men of our clothes, and our principles in Richmond."

"Not often—not so often as I could wish, and I trust your coming may lead to a more frequent and a more friendly intercourse between the North and the South."

"We sincerely hope it may."

"Mr. Benjamin tells me you have asked to see me, to——"

And he paused, as if desiring we should finish the sentence. The Colonel replied:

"Yes, sir. We have asked this interview with the hope that you may suggest some way by which this war can be stopped. Our people want peace—your people do, and your Congress has recently said that *you* do. We have asked to ask how it can be brought about."

"In a very simple way. Withdraw your armies from our territory, and peace will come of itself. We do not seek to subjugate you. We are not waging an offensive war, except far as it is offensive-defensive—that is, so far as we are forced to invade you to prevent you from invading us. Let us alone, and peace will come at once."

"But we cannot let you alone so long as you repudiate the Union. That is the one thing which the Northern people will not surrender."

"I know. You would deny to us what we want exact for yourselves—the right of self-government."

"No, sir," I remarked. "We would deny you no natural right. But we think it essential to peace; and, Mr. Davis, could we speak to you as people, with the same language, separate

only an imaginary line, live at peace with each other? Would not disputes constantly arise, and cause almost constant war between them?"

"Undoubtedly—with this generation. You have sown such bitterness at the south, you have put such an ocean of blood between the two sections, that I despair of seeing any harmony in my time. Our children may forget this war, but *we* cannot."

"I think the bitterness you speak of, sir," said the Colonel, "does not really exist. *We* meet and talk here as friends; our soldiers meet and fraternize with each other; and I feel sure that, if the Union were restored, a more friendly feeling would arise between us than has ever existed. The war has made us know and respect each other better than before. This is the view of very many Southern men; I have had it from many of them—your leading citizens."

"They are mistaken," replied Mr. Davis. "They do not understand Southern sentiment. How can we feel anything but bitterness towards men who deny us our rights? If you enter my house and drive me out of it, am I not your natural enemy?"

"You put the case too strongly. But we cannot fight forever; the war must end at some time; we must finally agree upon something; can we not agree now, and stop this frightful carnage? We are both Christian men, Mr. Davis. Can *you*, as a Christian man, leave untried any means that may lead to peace?"

"No, I cannot. I desire peace as much as you do. I deplore bloodshed as much as you do; but I feel that not one drop of the blood shed in this war is on *my* hands—I can look up to my God and say this. I tried all in my power to avert this war. I saw it coming, and for twelve years I worked, night and day, to prevent it, but I could not. The North was mad and blind; it would not let us govern ourselves; and so the war came, and now it must go on till the last man of this generation falls in his tracks, and his children seize his musket and fight his battle, *unless you acknowledge our right to self-government*. We are not fighting for slavery. We are fighting for independence—and that, or extermination, we *will* have."

"And there are, at least, four and a half millions of us left; so you see you have a work before you," said Mr. Benjamin, with a decided sneer.

"We have no wish to exterminate you," answered the Colonel. "I believe what I have said, that there is no bitterness between the Northern and Southern *people*. The North, I know, loves the South. When peace comes, it will pour money and means into your hands to repair the waste caused by the war; and it would now welcome you back, and forgive you all the loss and bloodshed you have caused. But we *must* crush your armies, and exterminate your Government. And is not that already nearly done? You are wholly without money, and at the end of your resources. Grant has

shut you up in Richmond. Sherman is before Atlanta. Had you not, then, better accept honorable terms while you can retain your *prestige*, and save the pride of the Southern people?"

Mr. Davis smiled.

"I respect your earnestness, Colonel, but you do not seem to understand the situation. We are not exactly shut up in Richmond. If your papers tell the truth, it is your capital that is in danger, not ours. Some weeks ago, Grant crossed the Rapidan to whip Lee, and take Richmond. Lee drove him in the first battle, and then Grant executed what your people call a 'brilliant flank movement,' and fought Lee again. Lee drove him a second time, and then Grant made another 'flank movement,' and so they kept on, Lee whipping, and Grant flanking, until Grant got where he is now. And what is the net result? Grant has lost seventy-five or eighty thousand men—*more than Lee had at the outset*—and is no nearer taking Richmond than at first; and Lee, whose front has never been broken, holds him completely in check, and has men enough to spare to invade Maryland, and threaten Washington! Sherman, to be sure, *is* before Atlanta; but suppose he is, and suppose he takes it? You know, that the farther he goes from his base of supplies, the weaker he grows, and the more disastrous defeat will be to him. And defeat *may* come. So, in a military view, I should certainly say our position was better than yours.

"As to money; we are richer than you are. You smile; but admit that our paper is worth nothing, it answers as a circulating medium; and we hold it all ourselves. If every dollar of it were lost, we should, as we have no foreign debt, be none the poorer. But it *is* worth something; it has the solid basis of a large cotton crop, while yours rests on nothing, and you owe all the world. As to resources; we do not lack for arms or ammunition, and we have still a wide territory from which to gather supplies. So, you see, we are not in extremities. But if we were—if we were without money, without food, without weapons—if our whole country were devastated, and our armies crushed and disbanded, could we, without giving up our manhood, give up our right to govern ourselves? Would *you* not rather die, and feel yourself a man, than live, and be subject to a foreign power?"

"From your stand-point there is force in what you say," replied the Colonel. "But we did not come here to argue with you, Mr. Davis. We came, hoping to find some honorable way to peace; and I am grieved to hear you say what you do. When I have seen your young men dying on the battle-field, and your old men, women and children, starving in their homes, I have felt I could risk my life to save them. For that reason I am here; and I am grieved, grieved, that there is no hope."

"I know your motives, Colonel Jaquess, and I honor you for them; but what can I do more

than I am doing? I would give my poor life, gladly, if it would bring peace and good-will to the two countries; but it would not. It is with your own people you should labor. It is they who desolate our homes, burn our wheat-fields, break the wheels of wagons carrying away our women and children, and destroy supplies meant for our sick and wounded. At your door lies all the misery and the crime of this war—and it is a fearful, fearful account."

"Not all of it, Mr. Davis. I admit a fearful account, but it is not *all* at our door. The passions of both sides are aroused. Unarmed men are hanged, prisoners are shot down in cold blood, by yourselves. Elements of barbarism are entering the war on both sides, that should make us—you and me, as Christian men—shudder to think of. In God's name, then, let us stop it. Let us do something, concede something, to bring about peace. You cannot expect, with only four and a half millions, as Mr. Benjamin says you have, to hold out forever against twenty millions."

Again Mr. Davis smiled.

"Do you suppose there are twenty millions at the North determined to crush us?"

"I do—to crush your *government*. A small number of our people, a very small number, are your friends—Secessionists. The rest differ about measures and candidates, but are united in the determination to sustain the Union. Whoever is elected in November, he *must be* committed to a vigorous prosecution of the war."

Mr. Davis still looking incredulous, I remarked:

"It is so, sir. Whoever tells you otherwise deceives you. I think I know Northern sentiment, and I assure you it is so. You know we have a system of lyceum-lecturing in our large towns. At the close of these lectures, it is the custom of the people to come upon the platform and talk with the lecturer. This gives him an excellent opportunity of learning public sentiment. Last winter I lectured before nearly a hundred of such associations, all over the North—from Dubuque to Bangor—and I took pains to ascertain the feeling of the people. I found a unanimous determination to crush the rebellion and save the Union at every sacrifice. The majority are in favor of Mr. Lincoln, and nearly all of those opposed to him are opposed to him because they think he does not fight you with enough vigor. The radical republicans, who go for slave-suffrage and thorough confiscation, are those who will defeat him, if he is defeated. But if he is defeated before the people, the House will elect a worse man—I mean worse for you. It is more radical than he is—you can see that from Mr. Ashley's Reconstruction Bill—and the people are more radical than the House. Mr. Lincoln, I know, is about to call out five hundred thousand more men, and I can't see how you *can* resist much longer; but if you do, you will only deepen the radical feeling of the Northern people! They will now

give you fair, honorable, *generous* terms; but let them suffer much more, let there be a dead man in every house, as there is now in every village, and they will give you *no* terms—they will insist on hanging every rebel south of —. Pardon my terms. I mean no offence."

"You give no offence," he replied, smiling very pleasantly. "I wouldn't have you pick your words. This is a frank, free talk, and I like you the better for saying what you think. Go on."

"I was merely going to say, that let the Northern people once really feel the war—they do not feel it yet—and they will insist on hanging every one of your leaders."

"Well, admitting all you say, I can't see how it affects our position. There are some things worse than hanging or extermination. We reckon giving up the right of self-government one of those things."

"By self-government you mean disunion—Southern independence?"

"Yes."

"And slavery, you say, is no longer an element in the contest."

"No, it is not, it never was an *essential* element. It was only a means of bringing other conflicting elements to an earlier culmination. It fired the musket which was already capped and loaded. There are essential differences between the North and the South that will, however this war may end, make them two nations."

"You ask me to say what I think. Will you allow me to say that I know the South pretty well, and never observed those differences?"

"Then you have not used your eyes. My sight is poorer than yours, but I have seen them for years."

The laugh was upon me, and Mr. Benjamin enjoyed it.

"Well, sir, be that as it may, if I understand you, the dispute between your government and ours is narrowed down to this: Union or Disunion."

"Yes; or to put it in other words: Independence or Subjugation."

"Then the two governments are irreconcilably apart. They have no alternative but to fight it out. But it is not so with the people. They are tired of fighting, and want peace; and as they bear all the burden and suffering of the war, is it not right they should have peace, and have it on such terms as they like?"

"I don't understand you. Be a little more explicit."

"Well, suppose the two governments should agree to something like this: To go to the people with two propositions: say Peace, with Disunion and Southern Independence, as your proposition—and Peace, with Union, Emancipation, no Confiscation, and Universal Amnesty, as ours. Let the citizens of all the United States (as they existed before the war) vote 'Yes,' or 'No,' on these two propositions, at a special election, within sixty days. If a majority votes Disunion, our government to be bound by it, and to let

you go in peace. If a majority votes Union, yours to be bound by it, and to stay in peace. The two governments can contract in this way, and the people, though constitutionally unable to decide on peace or war, can elect which of the two propositions shall govern their rulers. Let Lee and Grant, meanwhile, agree to an armistice. This would sheathe the sword; and if once sheathed, it would never again be drawn by this generation."

"The plan is altogether impracticable. If the South were only one State, it might work; but as it is, if one Southern State objected to emancipation, it would nullify the whole thing; for you are aware the people of Virginia cannot vote slavery out of South Carolina, nor the people of South Carolina vote it out of Virginia."

"But three-fourths of the States can amend the Constitution. Let it be done in that way—in any way, so that it be done by the people. I am not a statesman or a politician, and I do not know just how such a plan could be carried out; but you get the idea—that the PEOPLE shall decide the question."

"That the majority shall decide it, you mean. We seceded to rid ourselves of the rule of the majority, and this would subject us to it again."

"But the majority must rule finally, either with bullets or ballots."

"I am not so sure of that. Neither current events nor history shows that the majority rules, or ever did rule. The contrary, I think, is true."

Why, sir, the man who should go before the Southern people with such a proposition, with any proposition which implied that the North was to have a voice in determining the domestic relations of the South, could not live here a day. He would be hanged to the first tree, without judge or jury."

"Allow me to doubt that. I think it more likely he would be hanged, if he let the Southern people know the majority couldn't rule," I replied, smiling.

"I have no fear of that," rejoined Mr. Davis, also smiling most good-humoredly. "I give you leave to proclaim it from every house-top in the South."

"But, seriously, sir, you let the majority rule in a single State; why not let it rule in the whole country?"

"Because the States are independent and sovereign. The country is not. It is only a confederation of States; or rather it *was*: it is now two confederations."

"Then we are not a *people*—we are only a political partnership?"

"That is all."

"Your very name, sir, '*United States*,' implies that," said Mr. Benjamin. "But, tell me, are the terms you have named—Emancipation, No Confiscation, and Universal Amnesty—the terms which Mr. Lincoln authorized you to offer us?"

"No, sir, Mr. Lincoln did not authorize me to offer you any terms. But I *think* both he and the Northern people, for the sake of peace, would assent to some such conditions."

"They are *very* generous," replied Mr. Davis, for the first time during the interview showing some angry feelings. "But amnesty, sir, applies to criminals. We have committed no crime. Confiscation is of no account, unless you can enforce it. And emancipation! You have already emancipated nearly two millions of our slaves—and if you will take care of them, you may emancipate the rest. I had a few when the war began. I was of some use to them; they never were of any to me. Against their will you 'emancipated' them; and you may 'emancipate' every negro in the Confederacy, but *we will be free!* We will govern ourselves. We *will* do it, if we have to see every Southern plantation sacked, and every Southern city in flames."

"I see, Mr. Davis, it is useless to continue this conversation," I replied; "and you will pardon us, if we have seemed to press our views with too much pertinacity. We love the old flag, and that must be our apology for intruding upon you at all."

"You have not intruded upon me," he replied, resuming his usual manner. "I am glad to have met you both. I once loved the old flag as well as you do; I would have died for it; but now it is to me only the emblem of oppression."

"I hope the day may never come, Mr. Davis, when I say that," said the Colonel.

A half-hour's conversation on other topics—not of public interest—ensued, and then we rose to go. As we did so, the Rebel President gave me his hand, and, bidding me a kindly good-bye, expressed the hope of seeing me again in Richmond in happier times—when peace should have returned; but with the Colonel his parting was particularly cordial. Taking his hand in both of his, he said to him:

"Colonel, I respect your character and your motives, and I wish you well—I wish you every good I can wish you consistently with the interests of the Confederacy."

The quiet, straightforward bearing and magnificent moral courage of our "fighting parson" had evidently impressed Mr. Davis very favorably.

As we were leaving the room, he added:

"Say to Mr. Lincoln from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other."

When we went out, Mr. Benjamin called Judge Ould, who had been waiting during the whole interview—two hours—at the other end of the hall, and we passed down the stairway together. As I put my arm within that of the Judge, he said to me:

"Well, what is the result?"

"Nothing but war—war to the knife."

"Ephraim is joined to his idols—let him alone," added the Colonel, solemnly.

I should like to relate the incidents of the next day, when we visited Castle Thunder, Libby Prison, and the hospitals occupied by our wounded; but the limits of a magazine article will not permit. I can only say that at sundown

we passed out of the Rebel lines, and at ten o'clock that night stretched our tired limbs on the "downy" cots in General Butler's tent, thankful, devoutly thankful, that we were once again under the folds of the old flag.

Doc. 16.

OPERATIONS IN TENNESSEE.

MAJOR-GENERAL STEEDMAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT OF ETOWAH,
CHATTANOOGA, JANUARY 27, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command during the recent campaign, which resulted in the defeat of the enemy before Nashville, and his retreat to Alabama.

In obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, my command, consisting of the Eighteenth regiment Ohio volunteers, Sixty-eighth regiment Indiana volunteers, Sixth Indiana dismounted cavalry, Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Forty-fourth United States colored troops, detachments of the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Seventeenth army corps, organized into a provisional division, and commanded by Brigadier-General Charles Cruft, and the Eighteenth Ohio and Twentieth Indiana batteries, amounting in the aggregate to about fifty-two hundred men, moved from Chattanooga by railroad on the twenty-ninth day of November, and proceeded to Cowan, Tennessee, where I took my command from the cars the next morning at eight o'clock and placed it in position.

At six o'clock P. M. of the same day I received an order by telegraph from the Major-General commanding, to proceed as rapidly as possible with my command and report to him at Nashville, arriving at that place at five o'clock P. M. on the first day of December.

By an accident to one of the trains the command of Colonel Johnson, of the Forty-fourth United States colored troops, was detained until the morning of the second December, when the train conveying his troops was attacked by the cavalry of the enemy, five miles south of Nashville.

I herewith submit Colonel Johnson's report of his encounter with the enemy.

On the second day of December I moved my command, by order of the Major-General commanding, into position, and occupied and fortified the ridge between the Murfreesboro and Nolensville pikes, and crossing the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad on Raine's farm.

December 3.

By order of Major-General Thomas I withdrew my command from the position occupied the day previous, and placed it on a line indicated, nearer the city of Nashville, on the north side of Brown's Creek, extending from the Nolensville pike across the Murfreesboro pike, the left resting near the house of Major Lewis, a short distance from the Lebanon pike.

This position was strongly fortified by my troops, and held until they were withdrawn to participate in the action on the fifteenth of December.

December 5 and 7.

By order of Major-General Thomas I directed a small brigade of colored troops, under the command of Colonel T. J. Morgan, of the Fourteenth United States colored troops, and the Sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers and Sixth Indiana dismounted cavalry, under the command of Colonel Biddle, to reconnoitre the position of the enemy in my front.

This force on both days drove the enemy from the left of the works constructed by my command on Raine's farm, which he had taken possession of after my troops abandoned them.

These reconnoissances were conducted by the officers in command with prudence, energy, and ability, and were successful in developing the enemy's position.

A detailed account of the results will be found in the report of Colonel Morgan, herewith forwarded.

December 11.

In compliance with the order of Major-General Thomas, I directed Brigadier-General Cruft to reconnoitre the enemy's position. This reconnoissance (made by a brigade under the command of Colonel J. G. Mitchell), owing to the whole surface of the country being covered with ice, rendering it almost impossible for men or animals to move over uneven ground, and on account of the steep slopes to be ascended in approaching the position of the enemy, was a difficult duty; but it was accomplished, and the position of the enemy developed.

December 13.

In obedience to the order of Major-General Thomas, a brigade of General Cruft's troops under the command of Colonel A. G. Malloy reconnoitred in front of my position and felt the enemy's right. The ground being still covered with smooth ice, rendered the movement tedious and hazardous; but, under all the disadvantages, was skillfully executed, the enemy forced into his works, and the object of the reconnoissance accomplished. The movement was made under the immediate direction of General Cruft.

December 15.

The weather having moderated and the ground thawed sufficiently to enable men and animals to stand up, in obedience to the order of Major-General Thomas, the provisional division of troops, under the command of Brigadier-General Cruft, moved at four o'clock A. M., relieved the troops of the Fourth and Twelfth third army corps, occupying their exterior of works and picketing the front of this from the Acklin Place to Fort Negley, commanding the approaches to the city by Granny White, Franklin and Nolensville pikes.

Brigadier-General J. F. Miller reported command to me at four o'clock A. M., and occu

the works from Fort Negley to the Lebanon pike, commanding the approaches to the city by the Murfreesboro, Chicken and Lebanon turnpikes.

Brigadier-General J. L. Donelson reported his command at six o'clock, and occupied the works from the right of General Cruft's command to the Cumberland river, commanding the approaches to the city by the Harding and Hillsboro' turnpikes.

Having thus disposed the troops as directed, for the protection of the city, fully commanding all its approaches, and rendering the public property and supplies secure against sudden attack from either flank, I moved out at half-past six o'clock A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, with the Twelfth, Thirteenth and One Hundredth regiments of colored troops, under the command of Colonel Thompson, of the Twelfth colored; the Fourteenth, Seventeenth, Forty-fourth and a detachment of the Eighteenth regiments colored troops, under command of Colonel T. J. Morgan, of the Fourteenth colored; the Sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers, and the Second battalion, Fourteenth army corps, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Grosvenor, and the Twentieth Indiana and Eighteenth Ohio batteries to attack the enemy's right, employ his forces at that point, and as far as possible by my movements to mislead him as to real point of attack. The fog was very dense, and delayed, somewhat, movements on the entire line. A few minutes before eight, when the fog had partially cleared away, and all my dispositions had been made for attack, Brigadier-General W. D. Whipple, Chief of Staff of the Department of the Cumberland, instructed me, by order of Major-General Thomas, as to the time of attack. At eight o'clock, the time designated, the attack was made by the troops of Colonel Morgan and Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, Colonel Morgan commanding—advancing from the Murfreesboro turnpike towards Riddler's Hill, rapidly driving in the pickets of the enemy and assaulting his line of works between the U. and C. railroad and the Murfreesboro turnpike. In this assault the troops behaved well, carrying a portion of the enemy's works, but as they were exposed to a destructive fire, (the enemy rapidly reënfencing that part of his line), and as my object was to deceive the enemy as to the purposes of the Major-General commanding, I withdrew this force and immediately re-formed it for an attack on a force occupying an earth-work, east of and within short musket range of the Raine's house.

This attack was made at eleven o'clock A. M., and resulted in my troops getting possession of the Raine's house and other adjacent brick out-buildings, which were loop-holed and held until the next morning. While these attacks were being made by the troops under Colonel Morgan, Colonel Thompson's command moved across Brown's creek, between the Nolensville and Murfreesboro turnpikes, and attacked and car-

ried the left of the front line of works of the enemy, resting on the Nolensville pike. This portion of the enemy's line was held by Colonel Thompson's command until the morning of the sixteenth.

During the operations of my command against the enemy's right, General Cruft, holding the exterior line protecting the city, and watching vigilantly all the movements, saw an opportunity to use his artillery on a flying column of the enemy's troops, and promptly ordered the Twenty-fourth Indiana battery, Captain Sturm, to open, which he did with effect, scattering and demoralizing this force.

Darkness closed the operations of the day; all the orders I received from Major-General Thomas had been executed; his plans successful, and victory crowned our efforts. Throughout the day, and until the action closed at dark, my command behaved nobly, making the several assaults ordered with cool, steady bravery, retiring only when ordered to do so. A portion of the command suffered severely, but no troops behaving as gallantly as they did, in assaulting fortified position, could have suffered less, or borne their losses more heroically.

December 16.

At six o'clock A. M., in obedience to the orders of Major-General Thomas, my command moved on the enemy's works, and found that he had evacuated the right of his line, in my front, during the night. Pushing out my troops on the Nolensville pike, rapidly driving his cavalry, I took up a position between the Nolensville pike and the left of the Fourth corps, commanded by Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, my right resting on the railroad, my left reposing near the Nolensville pike, and covering the entire left of our line, engaging and putting to flight a portion of the enemy's cavalry. General Cruft, as I advanced with the troops under my immediate command, uncovering the approaches to the city by way of the Murfreesboro and Nolensville turnpikes, promptly pushed forward a brigade of his troops under the command of Colonel John G. Mitchell, and occupied Riddle's Hill, protecting our rear against any attempt of the enemy to use his cavalry to annoy us, or interfere with our ammunition or ambulance trains.

At one o'clock P. M., in obedience to an order from Major-General Thomas, my command formed a junction with the command of General Wood, and my troops united with General Wood's in assaulting the enemy, who was strongly posted and fortified on Overton's Hill. In this assault, although unsuccessful, the troops engaged—two brigades of General Wood's, and Colonel Thompson's brigade of colored troops, and Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my command—exhibited courage and steadiness that challenged the admiration of all who witnessed the charge. The concentrated fire of musketry and canister from the enemy's works forced them back with severe loss. They were

immediately re-formed to renew the assault, which would have been promptly made; but a division of General Wood's troops, as I was informed, on the right of the Franklin pike, taking advantage of the withdrawal by the enemy of a portion of his troops in their front, to reinforce Overtons Hill, made a charge, which caused the entire line of the enemy to give way, and retreat rapidly and in disorder. My troops, in conjunction with General Wood's, immediately pursued rapidly, taking a number of prisoners. The pursuit was continued until after dark, when our exhausted troops bivouacked for the night near Brentwood.

December 17.

My command, in obedience to orders, continued the pursuit, covering and protecting the left of our line, moving from Brentwood, on the Wilson pike, to a point four miles south of Brentwood, and crossing from that point by a south-west road to Franklin, where it bivouacked for the night, not being able to cross the Harpeth river, which was much swollen by the heavy rain of the night and day previous, and the bridges destroyed by the enemy.

December 18.

My command moved across the river and proceeded about three miles beyond Franklin, on the road to Spring Hill, when, in obedience to orders, I returned with my troops to Franklin and marched to Murfreesboro, to proceed by rail to Decatur, moving General Cruft's troops from Nashville by the Murfreesboro pike. The whole command was concentrated at Murfreesboro, on the evening of the twentieth.

At Murfreesboro I received despatches from Colonel A. J. McKay, Chief Quartermaster of the Department, informing me that the transportation necessary to move my command by rail to Decatur, was on the way from Chattanooga, and transports conveying supplies would meet me at such point as I might designate. These orders and dispositions of Colonel McKay were all perfect, but the severe cold weather, the injuries to the road, and the criminal negligence, incompetency, and indifference of a portion of the railroad employes, occasioned serious delays.

On the morning of the twenty-second December, my command moved from Murfreesboro, reaching the mouth of Limestone River on the evening of the twenty-sixth, where I found Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, with his command, with four gunboats, one armed transport (the Stone River), and five transports, with rations and forage, forwarded from Chattanooga for my command.

December 27.

Having constructed the trestles, and secured the plank necessary to bridge a lagoon on the south side of the Tennessee River the night previous, I moved a portion of my command with the transports, convoyed by the gunboats down the river to a point three miles above Decatur, where a landing was effected, the la-

goon rapidly bridged, the troops crossed, and pushed out in the direction of Decatur. The enemy attempted to check the crossing of the troops with artillery, which he posted within half a mile of where we were crossing the lagoon, but my advance, having crossed before this artillery opened, was rapidly pushed out, and drove it off. At three o'clock P. M. the whole of my infantry had crossed, and at seven o'clock P. M. was in possession of Decatur.

December 28.

My artillery and cavalry was crossed, the command rationed, and moved out three miles on the road to Courtland. The cavalry, the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Colonel Palmer, and detachments of the Second Tennessee, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser, amounting in the aggregate to about six hundred and fifty effective men (Colonel Wm. L. Palmer, of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, commanding), moved from Decatur at 8 P. M., and pushed rapidly forward, encountering the enemy six miles from the river, on the Courtland road, and at once attacked and routed him, capturing his artillery, a section of six-pounder brass guns.

December 29.

My command moved at daylight, the cavalry in advance, and went into camp at five o'clock, within four miles of Courtland. The infantry met no opposition. The cavalry skirmished most of the day in advance of the infantry, driving the enemy rapidly towards Courtland. At Pond Spring, three miles north-east of Courtland, he made a stand, but was immediately charged and routed by my cavalry. The report of Colonel Palmer, commanding the cavalry, herewith forwarded, gives a full account of this affair.

December 30.

My infantry moved to Courtland and went into camp on the south side of the town, on Big Nance Creek, the cavalry pushing on as far as Leighton, thirteen miles west of Courtland.

At five o'clock P. M. I received a despatch from Colonel Palmer, written at Leighton, asking my permission to pursue, capture, and destroy Hood's pontoon train. I immediately gave him permission to exercise his own judgment in the matter. He decided to pursue, and in the most splendid manner not only accomplished all he proposed—the destruction of the pontoon train—but pursued, captured, and destroyed a supply train of one hundred and ten wagons.

Colonel Palmer's command, in this enterprising and daring expedition, captured and destroyed upwards of three hundred wagons, nearly one thousand stand of arms, a large number of mules and oxen, and captured and turned over two pieces of artillery, two hundred prisoners, including thirteen commissioned officers, and one hundred and seventy serviceable mules.

To support the movement of Colonel Palmer, I advanced two brigades of infantry, under com-

mand of Colonel Thompson, to Town Creek, seven miles west of Courtland, and one brigade, under command of Colonel Salm, to Leighton. General Cruft's division, with the artillery, remained at Courtland.

January 3.

Having learned that Colonel Palmer had been successful, and receiving an order from Major-General Thomas to return with my command to Chattanooga, I moved with my infantry and artillery for Decatur, reaching that place in the evening of the fifth of January.

January 4.

At one o'clock A. M. I moved, with the artillery and sick of the command, on board the transports for Chattanooga, leaving Brigadier-General Cruft to return with the infantry by rail. General Cruft was delayed several days in his return

by an order from Major-General Thomas, directing him to pursue the rebel General Lyon. This portion of the campaign, owing to the heavy rains swelling all the streams out of their banks and rendering the roads almost wholly impassable, was very arduous, but was skillfully and satisfactorily conducted by General Cruft, resulting in the capture of a part of Lyon's men, and driving all that escaped out of the country, utterly demoralized. The report of General Cruft, herewith forwarded, gives a detailed history of his operations in pursuit of General Lyon.

January 13.

General Cruft returned to Chattanooga with his command.

The following table will show the casualties of my command during the entire campaign:

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
Fourteenth U. S. Colored Infantry.....		4		41		20		65
Forty-fourth " ".....	1	2		27	3	49	3	78
Sixteenth " ".....		1		2				3
Eighteenth " ".....		1		5		3		9
Seventeenth " ".....	7	14	4	64			6	75
Twelfth " ".....	3	10	3	99			6	109
Thirteenth " ".....	4	51	4	161		1	8	213
One Hundredth " ".....		12	5	116			5	128
Eighteenth Ohio Infantry.....	2	9	2	38		9	4	56
Sixty-eighth Indiana Infantry.....		1		7				8
Provisional Division, A. C.....	1	19	3	74		33	4	126
Twentieth Indiana Battery.....			2	6			2	6
Aggregate.....	13	124	23	640	2	115	38	879
Total.....								88
Total.....								917

Organized as the First Colored Brigade, Colonel T. J. Morgan, commanding.

Organized as the Second Colored Brigade, Colonel C. K. Thompson, commanding. Included in the Provisional Division, A. C., Brigadier-General Cruft, comd'g. Captain Osborn.

The larger portion of these losses, amounting in the aggregate to fully twenty-five per cent. of the men under my command who were taken into action, it will be observed, fell upon the colored troops. The severe loss of this part of my troops was in the brilliant charge on the enemy's works on Overton Hill on Friday afternoon. I was unable to discover that *color* made any difference in the fighting of my troops. All, white and black, nobly did their duty as soldiers, and evinced cheerfulness and resolution, such as I have never seen excelled in any campaign of the war, in which I have borne a part.

In closing the brief report of the operations of my command during the campaign, I feel that justice compels me to mention several officers, who distinguished themselves by their energy, courage, and unremitting efforts to secure success.

Brigadier-General Charles Cruft performed herculean labor in organizing, arming, and equipping the detachments of recruits, drafted men, and furloughed soldiers of the Army of the Tennessee to the number of fourteen thousand,

ten thousand of whom took part in the campaign, in battles before Nashville, and in guarding the railroad defences south of the Tennessee River.

Six thousand of these men were commanded by the General in person, in the field, from the commencement until the close of the campaign. The General deserves the thanks of the country for the able and efficient manner, in which he has performed this duty.

Brigadier-General John F. Miller, commanding Post of Nashville, displayed energy, efficiency, and promptness in placing his troops in position, to hold a portion of the exterior line protecting the city of Nashville.

I am much indebted to Brigadier-General Donelson, Chief Quartermaster of the Department, for his efficient and energetic efforts to fit out my command on its arrival at Nashville, and for the assistance he rendered with the armed men of his department in protecting the city of Nashville, pending the engagement.

My thanks are due Colonel A. J. McKay, Chief Quartermaster Army of the Cumberland,

for his promptness in furnishing transportation to convey my command from Murfreesboro to Decatur, and forwarding supplies for my troops by transports, to the mouth of Limestone River.

Colonel Felix Prince Salm, Sixty-eighth New York veteran volunteers, commanded a provisional brigade of my troops, and exhibited high qualities as a soldier. I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

Colonel T. J. Morgan, Fourteenth United States colored troops, behaved gallantly. I respectfully recommend him for promotion.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Grosvenor, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers, behaved nobly in leading a charge on the rebel works, on the Raine's place.

The following officers of my staff accompanied me on the campaign, and discharged all the duties that devolved upon them in a most satisfactory manner:

Colonel C. S. Cotter, First Ohio light artillery; Chief of Artillery, Major S. B. Moe; Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain A. Mills, Eighteenth United States infantry; Inspector, Captain M. Davis, Fourteenth Ohio volunteers; Aide-de-Camp, Captain W. B. Steedman, Fourteenth Ohio volunteers; Aide-de-Camp, Lieutenant J. G. McAdams, Sixth Kentucky cavalry, A. C. S. Colonel H. B. Banning, One Hundred and Twenty-first Ohio volunteers, served me ably as a provost marshal.

Captain A. R. Keller, Assistant Quartermaster, reported to me, and rendered me efficient service as quartermaster for my command.

I am deeply indebted to Major S. B. Moe, my Assistant Adjutant-General, for his efficient and gallant services on the field, as well as for the valuable aid which his large experience as a railroad man enabled him to render me in pushing through the trains conveying my troops from Chattanooga to Nashville, and from Murfreesboro to Decatur.

Captain Osborn, Twentieth Indiana battery, and Captain Ayleshire, Eighteenth Ohio battery, deserve praise for the effective and gallant manner in which they handled their respective batteries.

I am pleased to mention Mr. Stevens, Superintendent of the N. and C. Railroad; Mr. Tallmadge, Master of Transportation at Chattanooga; and Mr. Bryant, Assistant Superintendent N. and C. Railroad, as most honorable exceptions, among the railroad men who have been censured by me for neglect of duty. These gentlemen did everything in their power to aid me in getting over the railroad with my command. I respectfully commend them for their efforts.

I respectfully recommend Colonel William L. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, for promotion, for distinguished, gallant and successful services in pursuing, capturing and destroying the pontoon and supply train of the enemy.

I fully concur in all General Cruft has said in his report, in commendation of the officers of his command.

Mr. James R. Hood, of Chattanooga, accompanied me throughout the campaign, and rendered me efficient and valuable service as volunteer aide.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES B. STEEDMAN.

Major-General, commanding.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL CRUFT'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS PROVISIONAL DIVISION,
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND,
CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, JANUARY 20, 1863.

Major Moe, Assistant Adjutant-General, District of the Etowah:

The following report of the recent campaign is respectfully submitted:

I had been ordered by Major-General Thomas to organize the troops belonging to Major-General Sherman's field command within this department, and report them to Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah.

On the twenty-ninth day of November, 1864, while on the above duty at Chattanooga, Tennessee, an order was received from Major-General Steedman to move that day by rail, all available force. A portion of the garrison at Tunnel Hill was withdrawn, and, with the Eighteenth Ohio volunteers from this post, was added to my command.

November 30, 1864.

Reached Cowan Station at eight o'clock A. M.; disembarked the command and bivouacked.

December 1.

Shipped the command by rail during the night and left Cowan about daylight. Reached Nashville at five P. M., and went into camp in the eastern suburbs of the city.

December 2.

Moved to the hills near Raine's house and built a strong line of fortifications and a redoubt for the Twentieth Indiana battery (Captain Osborn commanding), which was upon service with my command this day.

December 3.

In compliance with orders from Major-General Steedman, I abandoned the works built the day previous and fell back to a line indicated, nearer the city. In the new position, the right rested at Judge Trimble's house, and the line extending northward across the Murfreesboro pike, the left resting near Major Lewis' house. A substantial line of earthworks, with a protecting line of palisades and an *abatis* of brush in front, was speedily constructed. During the day, the Eighteenth Ohio battery (Captain Ayleshire, commanding) was assigned to me for duty. A strong redoubt was built for the artillery at a point where the line crossed the Murfreesboro turnpike. My command occupied this line until the general assault upon the enemy. The position was materially strengthened from day to day by the construction and raising of a dam across Browne's Creek, at the bridge below, on the Lebanon turnpike. The creek ran nearly

parallel to the line of works, and about two hundred yards in front of the *abatis*. It became, as the depth of water increased, a material impediment in the way of an assault. My command performed about four thousand five hundred days' work in the construction of this dam. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor principally superintended its construction, in obedience to orders from district headquarters. Major Roatch, com-

manding battalion, Fourteenth army corps, was seriously wounded while superintending a fatigue party at the dam, and the services of this meritorious officer were thereby lost to his command during the residue of the campaign.

The following statement exhibits the number of officers and men comprising the command, on leaving Chattanooga, and the formation of battalions and brigades temporarily made, to wit:

COMMAND.	COMMANDING OFFICER.	OFFICERS.	MEN.	AGGREGATE.	TOTAL.
<i>Fourteenth Army Corps.</i>					
<i>Colonel J. G. Mitchell, commanding.</i>					
First Battalion.....	Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Lister.....	8	526	534
Second Battalion.....	Lieutenant-Colonel William O'Brien.....	4	256	260	794
<i>Twentieth Army Corps.</i>					
<i>Colonel Benjamin Harrison, commanding.</i>					
First Battalion.....	Lieutenant-Colonel McManis.....	8	390	407
Second Battalion.....	Major Haskins.....	6	304	310	717
<i>Eighteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.</i>					
<i>Lieutenant-Colonel Banning, commanding.</i>					
Eighteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.....	Captain Henderson.....	9	316	325
Third Battery, Fourteenth A. O.	Major Roatch.....	8	311	319	644
<i>Seventeenth Army Corps.</i>					
<i>Colonel A. G. Malloy, commanding.</i>					
Field and Staff.....		8		8
Twentieth Illinois Battery.....	Captain C. C. Cox.....	1	126	127
Thirtieth Illinois Battery.....	Captain J. Kemmitser.....	1	208	209
Thirteenth Iowa Infantry.....	Captain C. Haskins.....	1	186	187
Third Battery, Twentieth A.C.....	Captain Hurlbut.....	6	290	296	822
Total.....		55	2922	2977	2977

December 11.

My command was increased on and after the sixth instant by the assignment of recruits arriving from the rear, amounting in the aggregate to two thousand three hundred and twenty-seven enlisted men, which were properly armed and distributed to their respective battalions and brigades.

The Sixty-eighth Indiana volunteers (Lieutenant-Colonel Espy, commanding) was also added. These reinforcements brought the effective strength of the division up to five thousand two hundred and forty-nine.

This day orders were received, directing a reconnoissance in force upon the enemy, occupying our old line of works, near Raine's house. Colonel J. G. Mitchell, commanding the brigade of detachments from the Fourteenth army corps, was assigned to that duty. He moved his brigade on the Murfreesboro turnpike, for about one-half mile, then made a detour to the right, where he formed his lines behind a small ridge, and sent his skirmishers to the front, drove in the skirmishers of the enemy, advanced upon his works, and thoroughly reconnoitered his

position. The casualties of Colonel Mitchell's command were trifling, having none killed and but three or four slightly wounded.

December 12.

The command was put in shape to move at six o'clock A. M., on the following morning.

December 13.

In obedience to orders, another reconnoissance was made on the enemy's line near Raine's house. This duty was assigned to Colonel A. G. Malloy, commanding brigade of detachments of Fifteenth and Seventeenth army corps.

Colonel Malloy, with twelve hundred men of his command, advanced upon the enemy's line at the point indicated. Some sharp skirmishing ensued, but the objects of the reconnoissance were attained. Colonel Malloy's casualties were as follows: killed, one; wounded, six; missing, one; making a total of eight (8) enlisted men.

December 14.

The effective force of the division was five thousand three hundred and fifty-nine, as shown by the following:

Statement.

EFFECTIVE STRENGTH—DECEMBER 14, 1864.

Commands.	Commanding Officers.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.
Division Headquarters	6	20	26
First Brigade.....	Colonel Harrison.....	26	1,088	1,069
Second Brigade.....	Colonel Mitchell.....	24	1,104	1,128
Third Brigade.....	Colonel Grosvenor.....	30	852	891
Second Brigade (Army of Tennessee).....	Colonel Malloy.....	23	1,925	1,947
Miscellaneous Camp.....	Captain Eaton.....	4	304	308
Total.....	121	5,238	5,359

Orders were again received to be ready to march at six o'clock A. M., of the next day. Arms were issued to the portion of troops that were unarmed, and command was put in readiness to comply with the order. In the evening orders were received from Major-General Steedman to detail one of the brigades to report for duty, to Colonel Morgan, commanding colored brigade, on my left. Lieutenant-Colonel C. H. Grosvenor (who had succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Banning in command of the brigade) was ordered to report to Colonel Morgan. This order detached Colonel Grosvenor's brigade from my immediate control during the operations before Nashville, and it did not again rejoin its command until it reached Murfreesboro, marching by way of Franklin, Tennessee.

December 15.

According to directions from the Major-General commanding, the division moved at four o'clock A. M., and abandoning its line of defences, relieved a portion of the troops of the Fourth army corps (Brigadier-General Wood, commanding) and Twenty-third corps, (Major-General Schofield, commanding), and held their exterior line of works—picketing also the front—from the Ackland place to a point north of Fort Negley, and commanding the approaches to the city by the Granny White, Franklin, Nolensville and Murfreesboro turnpikes. Details were furnished to support the batteries of artillery in the line, and to garrison Fort Mirton and redoubt Casino. The brigade of Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor (temporarily reporting to Colonel Morgan) was engaged during the day in the assault on the enemy's works near Raine's house, and was the only portion of the division in the fight. It suffered considerably in killed and wounded, and behaved creditably. The Twenty-fourth Indiana battery (Captain Stume), in position on the right of the line, near the Ackland place, was ordered by me, near nightfall, to fire upon a retreating line of rebels which came in sight, passing parallel to my right from left of the Fourth corps. The fire was opened with good effect (though at long range), and the rebel line was dispersed in great confusion.

Captain Stume and his officers and artillerists deserve great credit for the precision with

which they worked their guns, and the good results that followed.

December 16.

The command remained in position as of yesterday. The brigade commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor was engaged on the left during the day, and contributed its share in the work achieved by Major-General Steedman in that quarter. The assault made upon the enemy's lines and works in the afternoon of this day was under the immediate sight and direction of Major-General Steedman, and the brigade will, without doubt, receive due credit from him. All accounts that reach me speak well of the conduct of the troops in this action. During the afternoon Colonel Mitchell's brigade was moved rapidly out from the works and occupied the hills beyond Raine's house, in compliance with orders, pushing a strong line of skirmishers to Ridler's hill beyond. The brigade held this position firmly and in shape to repel any attack on the part of the enemy's cavalry to turn the left of the general line, and protected all approaches from the east, during the residue of the time this command at Nashville.

Monday, December 19.

Received orders to march to Murfreesboro—moved the command at six and a half A. M., leaving behind those sick and unable to march, in all say five hundred. Reached Lawrence fifteen miles, and encamped at nightfall.

Tuesday, December 20.

Marched to Murfreesboro, and encamped.

Wednesday, December 21.

Shipped the command on cars, without rations, and started on the morning of twenty-second for Stevenson. Remained on cars four days.

Sunday, December 25.

Reached Limestone Creek, eight miles beyond Huntsville, and bivouacked.

Monday, December 26.

Marched to bayou near mouth of Limestone Creek, say ten (10) miles, and bivouacked. Sent back by train those sick and unable to march, say four hundred men.

Tuesday, December 27.

Waded bayou at four A. M., and marched down on north side of Tennessee, nearly opposite mouth of Flint river, and awaited orders. The enemy shelled the transports sent to convey my command over, but no casualties resulted therefrom. Signalled General Steedman information of the enemy's strength, etc., at Decatur, obtained from Colonel Prosser and one of my staff officers. Crossed the river and lagoon beyond, and halted to receive rations from the transports at four P. M., as directed by Major-General Steedman. Soon received orders from him to move up to support Colonel Thompson's division, which had been advanced towards Decatur, and had been engaged during the afternoon in skirmishing with the enemy. The command was brought up as rapidly as possible, and formed in line on Colonel Thompson's right. The enemy opened fire with two pieces of artillery. Some of the shots fell near my line, but without damage. An advance was ordered, and both divisions moved rapidly on the town. The enemy ran away before we reached it, taking his two pieces of artillery, and our troops occupied the place. Marched to the woodland near Decatur, and encamped for the night.

Wednesday, December 28.

Marched at five P. M. on Courtland road to Moseley's farm, say three miles west of Decatur, and bivouacked.

Thursday, December 29.

Marched thirteen and a half miles to Snope's place, and bivouacked.

Friday, December 30.

Marched at seven A. M. to Courtland, four miles, and encamped. Remained at Courtland five days.

Wednesday, January 4, 1865.

Left Courtland at two P. M., marched back to Snope's, and bivouacked.

Thursday, January 5.

Marched at dawn of day; made thirteen and a half miles, and encamped at Moseley's. Here orders were received from Major-General Steedman, advising of his departure by transports with the artillery, and turning over the entire infantry command to me.

Friday, January 6.

Crossed the Tennessee at the Decatur pontoon, and sent forward one division to Huntsville, which arrived about dark; the transportation doubling back for the other. It was designed to remain at Huntsville until one P. M. of the next day, to bring up the residue of the command, and to await transportation and the completion of the Paint Rock bridge, which had been destroyed by the enemy. At an interview with Brigadier-General Wood, commanding Fourth corps, then at Huntsville, he requested me strongly to press forward a brigade to Larkinsville, apprehending that the rebel General Lyon might be in the vicinity. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was sent forthwith (at eleven and

a half P. M.), with instructions to get over Paint Rock Creek in some manner, and reach Larkinsville by march, patrol the country thoroughly, and engage Lyon, if he could be found. Colonel Mitchell used every possible effort to carry out his instructions. He reached Larkinsville on the morning of the seventh, and made an extensive patrol of the surrounding country, and reported that he could hear nothing of Lyon.

Saturday, January 7.

General Wood advised, at an interview during the morning, that I should personally go to Larkinsville with all the troops for which transportation could be had. The condition of the troops, and the orders of General Steedman, etc., were explained to General Wood. In the emergency, however, I followed his advice. There could be but one train made up at Huntsville. On this Colonel Harrison's brigade was loaded at twelve M., and the train run to Paint Rock station. Here the railway managers kept the troops, until, say two A. M., waiting on westward bound trains, and for repairs of the bridge. A telegraphic instrument was put in operation, and communication had with Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman. Here an order from General Wood reached me by telegraph, based upon instructions from the Department Commander, "to stop the return of Major-General Steedman's troops." The telegraphic message directed me to disembark the forces that are on the cars immediately, scour the country thoroughly, and find out, if possible, where Lyon is, and get in pursuit of him. He must be found, and either captured or driven across the Tennessee river. General Thomas' orders on this subject are emphatic, and he says: "you must not go on your way until this work is finished."

Here intelligence was received, that all the troops on trains following me—Colonels Thompson's, Morgan's, and Salm's brigades—had been stopped and unloaded at Brownsboro, by orders from Brigadier-General Wood; that a portion of these were ordered to New Market by his direction, and that the arrangements for shipping Colonel Malloy's troops had not been carried out. The men were out of rations; the weather now cold, rainy, and disagreeable, and the roads well nigh impassable for infantry. On reaching Larkinsville, a telegraphic message was sent to Colonel Krizzanowski, commanding at Stevenson, asking a supply of rations. He promptly promised them. Owing to delays on the railway, however, they did not reach the troops in time.

The garrison at Larkinsville consisted of company M, Eleventh Indiana cavalry (Captain Given, commanding), numbering probably sixty men, and a sort of amateur gathering of mounted men, who styled themselves "Alabama Scouts," under Captain Sparks, say thirty or forty in number. At seven A. M. all the cavalry and the anomalous scouts were sent to patrol the roads in the direction of Winchester and New Nashville, Robinson's farm, &c., with instructions to keep

a strong vidette post at Colonel Province's. Infantry patrols were sent out to watch the approaches leading through the coves, in the direction of Bellefonte, Scottsboro, and Larkinsville. The intelligence which reached my headquarters from all these parties and from citizens during the day, showed that no enemy was in the vicinity, except the "bushwhacking gangs" of Russel, Hayes, Mende, and Wilson, which constantly invest the mountains in the vicinity. Lyon could not be heard of. At two fifty-five p. m. a dispatch was received from Colonel Krizzanowski, reciting a dispatch from Major-General Milroy, as follows: "General Lyon crossed the mountain last night, going towards Bellefonte. Has five hundred men—many of them dressed in Federal overcoats. He has one howitzer. Colonel Harrison's brigade was immediately loaded on the only train at Larkinsville, and started, before four p. m., to Bellefonte, with instructions to patrol the road from there west to Scottsboro, and place a battalion at Bellefonte landing—engage Lyon, if possible, and pursue him at all hazards. He was directed to inform the officer commanding at Scottsboro of the intelligence received—to direct him to make stalwart resistance, and to reinforce him, if he heard firing at Scottsboro. The garrison at Scottsboro consisted of two lieutenants (whose names have been mislaid), and say fifty-four colored soldiers of the One Hundred and Tenth unorganized United States colored volunteers—supposed to be in a substantial earthwork at the place. At about five and one-half p. m. a train arrived from the west—the last one bringing Colonel Malloy's brigade. This was immediately sent forward to Scottsboro by rail, at say eight o'clock p. m., as soon as the road was clear—with proper instructions. Shortly after Colonel Malloy left, a few single discharges of artillery were heard at long intervals, in, what citizens said, was the direction of Bellefonte. It seemed possible that Harrison had fallen in with Lyon, or that the gunboats were shelling his river detachment. However, as Colonel Malloy was rapidly nearing Scottsboro, and the firing soon ceased, it seemed to demand no special attention. The commanding officer at Scottsboro erred in leaving the earthworks, and betaking himself and command to the brick depot building. He made, however, from the latter place a sturdy resistance to the attack of the skirmishers, and held out well (as the enemy's prisoners admit), and forced Lyon to dismount and form line of battle, bring up his artillery and use it, thus consuming considerable time. In the meanwhile, the two sections preceding Colonel Malloy dashed past the troops on the trains, firing on the enemy, confusing him and stopping his attack on the garrison. In the confusion and cessation of the fire the garrison escaped and came to Colonel Malloy, who was unloading and forming his lines at the water tank in the edge of the town. A reinforcement from Colonel Harrison at Bellefonte arrived at this time, on the east of the place, and the enemy ran away rapidly. Colonel Malloy

sent back one of his sections, with one of the lieutenants of the colored troops, to report—reaching headquarters about midnight. This lieutenant was badly *stampeded*. His statements were miserably incongruous, childish and improbable; a complete physical terror seemed to possess him, and nothing he stated could be relied on. Colonel Mitchell's brigade was immediately ordered from Larkinsville in the direction of the river, to try and intercept Lyon at Perry's house—the junction of the Larkins Ferry and Gunter's Landing roads. Colonel Mitchell moved at about two a. m. Colonel Thompson arriving from west with his brigade, was sent forward to join Colonel Malloy, and press on in pursuit. Colonel Salm's brigade—arriving in the night—was rationed, and soon after day left to follow up Colonel Mitchell, by a line more to the right. At daylight the troops were disposed as follows:

Colonel Malloy and Colonel Thompson in direct pursuit of Lyon and close on him; Colonel Harrison to his left pressing down the river and feeling into Bellefonte, Sublett's, McGuin's and Larkin's Landings, and preventing retreat up the river; Colonels Mitchell and Salm trying to cut him off by shorter lines to the river, at Roman's and Law's Landings, and to strike the Gunter's Landing road below him. Colonel Mitchell pushed his column rapidly forward. Soon after dawn of day, he came upon a detachment of the enemy attempting to burn the bridge across Santa Creek, while the main portion of his forces had swam the creek, some three miles below, and were passing the junction of the roads at Perry's, say four miles down the Gunter's Landing road. Colonel Mitchell drove off the enemy, extinguished the fire on the bridge, and pushed on after him. He was only about an hour behind him at Perry's Cross Roads. Colonel Malloy was compelled to delay his pursuit at the creek below for some three hours, to construct a crossing for his men. The streams were all flooded, the mud deep, the rain pouring down, and the men (except Colonels Mitchell's and Salm's commands) without rations. I accompanied Colonel Mitchell's columns; Colonel Malloy joined this during the afternoon. Pursuit was made vigorously till near nightfall, when the troops were so exhausted, that they were bivouacked as an act of humanity. I rode back to Larkinsville, and during evening informed Brigadier-General Wood and Major-General Steedman, by telegraph, of the condition of affairs, and tried to get at Colonel Morgan's command, to send it from Woodville, to strike the Tennessee, at mouth of Paint Rock. It was impossible to reach Colonel Morgan, the telegraphic station having been removed from Brownsboro. He came up during the night with his own regiment, and Colonel Shafter. Colonel Morgan was unloaded at Larkinsville to get rations and rest, and Colonel Shafter sent on to Scottsboro to protect that place from guerillas, who were reported to have been firing at the small guard there during the afternoon. Efforts were again

made to have rations at Gunter's landing by transport, and a message was received from Major-General Steedman, announcing their shipment.

Tuesday, January 10.

Colonels Mitchell, Malloy, Salm and Thompson were in motion at 4:30 A. M., continuing the pursuit. I reached the column of Colonel Mitchell soon after dawn of day. Colonel Thompson's command was thrown off to the left to Lawe's Landing. About eight miles from Gunter's Landing the head of Colonel Mitchell's column struck quite a force of the enemy—probably a hundred were in sight. Two battalions were thrown into line, and, with the small cavalry force which was taken from Larkinsville, was pushed for them. They broke to small squads and ran away to the hills and woods on each side, and down the road in great confusion. But few shots were fired. The gun-boats on the river were at this time shelling the woods on the north side, near Gunter's Landing, and below. The enemy could be seen running about in small detachments, in almost every direction and without any order, but being well mounted, kept beyond musket range. The column was pressed steadily towards Gunter's Landing, with patrol parties in every direction on the flanks, and the enemy chased in towards the river. They all, however, that were on the left of the road, crossed it in advance of the columns, and, with those on the right, left rapidly by the roads running down the river. Some were driven into the river bank, but, being mounted, could swim the lagoons in the bottom that could not be waded by infantry. Here they encountered the gun-boats; a few abandoned their horses, and they were captured by the boats. General Lyon had reached Clayville, opposite Gunter's Landing, the evening before, with the greater portion of his command and the piece of artillery. Citizens reported that he had abandoned his command during the night, and had crossed the river by a scow, with the piece of artillery and a portion of his staff. It is probable that about two hundred of his command crossed during the night at Lawe's Landing, and at a point about one and a half miles above Clayville, in canoes and by swimming their horses. The rest of his command at Clayville was collected at the head of the island, above, on the eleventh, attempting to cross, and was alarmed by the coming down of a gun-boat, and dispersed. A portion of the command, under Colonel Chenoweth, left Clayville about twelve M., in direction of Deposit. My advance reached Clayville at two P. M. Colonel Salm leaving his men who were barefooted, was sent on immediately towards Deposit, with instructions to make that point, or the creek, and beyond, if possible by daylight. He marched his command vigorously, pursuing the enemy retreating as squads, and making the points ordered. The ambulance, wagon and artillery harness, which General Lyon had with him, were captured, as well as those wounded at Scottaboro, viz.: one captain and

three (3) soldiers. Patrol parties were sent from Colonels Mitchell's, Malloy's and Thompson's commands, to scour the woods along the river, and to watch the various ferrying places in the vicinity. Lieutenant-Colonel O'Brien's battalion of the Fourteenth corps detachment was placed opposite Gunter's Landing. The few cattle and sheep the country afforded were collected by the commissary, and distributed to the command. The gun-boats on the river had no co-operation with me. I was able to get on board but one of them, the "U. S. Grant," I think. The commanding officer was informed of the nature of my dispositions, and all the intelligence that had been obtained. By some mistake, one of the gun-boats, as Colonel Thompson reported, threw some shells into his camp at Law's Landing, fortunately without hurting anybody. The rebels were much alarmed by the shells of the gun-boats, but there were no casualties from them that could be heard of. Being satisfied that none of the rebel squads had gone up the river, Colonel Harrison was ordered to march to the railway at the nearest point, and lead his command for Chattanooga.

Wednesday, January 11.

No rations arriving by river, Colonel Malloy's and Colonel Thompson's commands were ordered back to the railway at Larkinsville by different routes, with instructions to subsist on the country. Colonel Mitchell remained at Clayville, patrolling the country in the vicinity. Colonel Salm pushed his march towards mouth of Paint Rock Creek. On arriving at Honey Comb Creek, it was found to be impassable. The few mounted men of the Eleventh Indiana with the command, swam the creek and patrolled the country to Paint Rock during the day. It was impossible, however, to catch the small parties of rebels to be seen without a cavalry force. The high waters, and impossibility of procuring rations, rendered it out of the question to push forward infantry further. The pursuit was abandoned, therefore, towards nightfall—confirming the experience of all time, that troops of the line cannot "run down" cavalry.

Thursday, January 12.

Orders were issued to Colonel Salm, to march to the railway at Woodville, by Honey Comb Valley, and to Colonel Mitchell to make the same point by the mountain road from Clayville. They reached Woodville at dark, obtained rations sent there for them, and were shipped in the night to their former camps at Bridgeport and Chattanooga. One captain (Murray) and two soldiers were captured, in addition to those mentioned heretofore, making a total of two captains and five soldiers.

Friday, January 13.

The residue of the troops along the railway were rationed, provided with transportation, and returned to the places indicated in Major-General Steedman's orders.

The total casualties of the division in battle

on the entire campaign cannot be given with exact accuracy, as to names and regiments, at this time. It was impossible to prepare correct lists of the recruits received during the last few days at Nashville, before starting upon the march, and in some instances, in the haste of

arming and equipping the men, this important matter was improperly neglected. It is probable that a number of worthy men have fallen in battle and by disease, of whom there is no record. The following statement is made up from the reports of commanding officers, to wit:

Casualties.

COMMAND.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSED.			AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	
Colonel Malloy's Brigade.....		4	4		7	7		6	6	17
Colonel Grosvenor's Brigade.....	3	25	28	5	108	113		33	33	174
Colonel Mitchell's Brigade.....					4	4		3	3	7
	3	29	32	5	119	124		42	42	198

Among the officers killed, was Captain E. Grosvenor, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers, and First Lieutenant Samuel W. Thomas, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers. They fell, gallantly leading their commands, on the fifteenth of December, in the assault upon the enemy's works. They held high character in the service for manly and soldierly qualities. A lieutenant of the Second battalion, Fourteenth corps, was also killed, whose name and regiment has not yet been obtained. Among the officers wounded were Captains Benedict, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers; Henderson, One Hundred and Twenty-first Ohio volunteers; Brown, Twenty-seventh Ohio volunteers, and J. B. Emery, Eighteenth Ohio volunteers.

The number of men who were left at Nashville, by direction of the surgeons, and from various points sent to hospitals in rear, was large, owing to the material of the command—reached eleven hundred during the campaign. Those left at Nashville were reported at five hundred. The number sent back by trains from Limestone Creek reached four hundred, and those from Decatur, by transports, say two hundred. Several officers were sent back also from these points (and among them some of the best officers in the command), suffering from disease and former wounds. In addition to these, a few men were left upon the march, at houses, sick, and unable to be moved. These men were as well cared for as possible, and measures have since been taken to bring them up. The number of deaths from disease among the men since leaving Chattanooga is reported at eleven (11).

In closing this sketch of the late campaign, it is due to the officers and troops of my command, to bear unequivocal testimony to the patience, cheerfulness and pluck with which they endured the fatigues of *forty-six days' con-*

tinued field service in mid-winter. The command was hastily thrown together. It consisted of detachments from more than two hundred regiments. It was rapidly armed, and from its very composition could be but illy provided with the ordinary appliances which render field service endurable. About one-fourth of the command consisted of soldiers recently from hospital, scarcely convalescent; another fourth, of soldiers returned from furlough, and the remaining half of raw recruits of every nationality, without drill or experience of any kind, but earnest and worthy men. The officers, as a class, were good, and perhaps superior to the average of the army; but they were separated from their regular commands, without their personal baggage, camp furniture, servants, change of clothing, stationery, etc., and many of them without money, or time to procure any supply of these necessities. The command left without ambulances or wagons. The medical department had not adequate supplies. Measles, small-pox, and camp disorders were constantly appearing among the new men, and often at points beyond the reach of hospitals. The weather was bitterly cold at times, and during the coldest days there was much suffering by transportation on the railroad. In spite of all such difficulties, however, the division performed its share of military and fatigue duty during the campaign. It built its share of defences at Nashville, and not only held them, but participated to some extent in the general assault. It moved by rail four hundred and fifty-one miles, and marched one hundred and fifty-five miles, wading streams and laboring through mud and rain. It was, from necessity, out of rations sometimes for days. These sufferings are incident to a soldier's life; but they are much lessened by experience and thorough organization, neither of which this division had.

It is simple justice to both the soldiers and officers of this provisional division, that the services they have rendered should be thoroughly understood, and that their individual reputations shall not suffer in their commands, with charges of idleness or "shirking" during their absence. The officers necessarily were compelled to become responsible for arms, equipments, ordnance stores, clothing, etc., and to issue them irregularly, in the exigency, to men of all regiments, and many who did not know their assignments. A liberal course of settlement should be adopted by the supervising authorities of the various departments, with regard to these officers.

Hereto are appended the reports of Colonels Harrison, Mitchell, Malloy and Grosvenor, commanding brigades of this division; also that of Colonel Salm, covering his services in pursuit of Lyon, marked respectively A, B, C, D and E. Reports from the other brigade commanders of the part taken by their brigades in the "tramp" after Lyon, have not been as yet received.

It affords me pleasure to say of Colonels Harrison, Seventieth Indiana volunteers; Mitchell, One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio volunteer infantry, and Malloy, Seventeenth Wisconsin volunteers, who commanded each one of the brigades of the division, that throughout the campaign, they performed their duties and handled their commands in a creditable and soldierly manner. They are brigade commanders of much experience and reputation in the army, and deserve well for long and faithful services, and for their management of their respective commands on the recent campaign.

Colonel Felix Prince Salm (commanding Sixty-eighth New York), who served with me in command of a temporary brigade, after leaving Decatur, is an officer of experience in European armies, and is commended for the zeal, energy, and good sense which he brings to the service of the Government.

Lieutenant-Colonel Banning, One Hundred and Twenty-first Ohio, and Grosvenor, of the Eighteenth Ohio, each commanded for a short while a brigade of the division. They are good officers, and rendered the country service which should be remembered.

Colonel Thompson, Twelfth United States colored infantry, and Morgan, Fourteenth United States colored infantry, commanded brigades of colored soldiers for a short while with me. Their troops were disciplined, and behaved uniformly well. These officers are entitled to the consideration of the Government for their personal efforts in the late campaign, and for the good results following from their labors in demonstration of the problem that colored men can be made soldiers.

It is impossible to note all the deserving officers in command of battalions or companies of the division. The reports of the brigade commanders contain general and special notices of these officers, and the attention of the Major-

General commanding is directed particularly to them.

The cheerful manner in which Captain Given (Company M, Eleventh Indiana cavalry), commanding garrison at Larkinsville, responded to all orders from my headquarters, and the valuable service which his command rendered, from thorough knowledge of the surrounding country, is entitled to creditable mention.

My staff consisted of the following officers, viz.: Captain John A. Wright, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain G. W. Marshall, Assistant Quartermaster; Captain A. C. Ford (Thirty-first Indiana), Acting Commissary of Subsistence; Captain A. Vallander (One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio volunteer infantry), Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Captain L. S. Windle (One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio volunteer infantry), Ordnance Officer; Surgeon J. D. Cotton (Ninety-second Ohio volunteer infantry), Medical Director; First Lieutenant J. M. Leonard (Ninth Indiana volunteers), Acting Aide-de-Camp.

Each of these officers merits my thanks for the satisfactory manner in which he discharged his duties, and they are all worthy of higher positions than they hold.

With my regards to the Major-General commanding district,

I am, very respectfully,

Yours, etc.,

CHARLES CRUTT,

Brigadier-General United States Volunteers.

S. B. MOE,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

COLONEL JOHNSON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FORTY-FOURTH UNITED STATES COLORED INFANTRY,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, December 4, 1864.

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to submit the following report of the affair which occurred on the second and third instant, at Stockade No. 2, on Mill Creek (C. and N. R. R.), between the troops temporarily under my command, and the enemy under General Forrest.

At eight A. M. the train containing the Forty-fourth United States colored infantry, and Companies A and D of the Fourteenth United States colored infantry, left Murfreesboro, and arrived at the bridge over Mill Creek guarded by Blockhouse No. 2, at almost eleven A. M., when suddenly a battery opened upon the train, nearly all of which was upon the trestle bridge. The locomotive and first car were struck, and several of the men injured. I immediately got my command off the train, and moved it up to the Stockade, which I supposed was evacuated, but on my arrival found it occupied by a detachment of the One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio volunteers, commanded by Lieutenant Harter; as the Blockhouse was full, and three batteries were shelling us terribly, and a heavy musketry fire commenced from all sides, I formed my men around the house, and then pushed a portion up a hill on the east side of the fort, which entirely commanded it, and from where the

heaviest fire was kept up. Unable to carry the crest of the hill, I kept the men on the side of it, and had logs and stumps of trees converted into a breastwork. This position afforded them much shelter, and they held it against several assaults of the enemy. The batteries, which continued their fire, injured the Blockhouse constantly. They had to change position a dozen times, being silenced by our musketry. At about five p. m., the enemy managed to establish a battery on the hill, of which I spoke above, and it was this battery which did more harm than all the rest. It knocked the look-out of the Stockade to pieces, and also the roof, which caved in at several places. The shots fired by it struck the house every time, and a number penetrated it; one shell exploded inside, killed the railroad conductor, who had sought shelter in the house, and wounded several of the garrison. It was now dark, and the artillery fire ceased, but musketry was still kept up. I drew the command back to the Blockhouse, and left a strong skirmish line at the position which we had occupied during the day.

As my ammunition was nearly exhausted (the men who came off the train only had forty rounds), and I expected an assault, I stopped all firing, in order to reserve the four rounds I had left per man for the last effort. The firing was kept up until three o'clock a. m. of the third instant, but not answered by my men. My position was quite desperate, and when I took into consideration that my stock of ammunition was almost expended, the Stockade so much

used up that a few shots would have knocked it down, and having lost one-third of the men, I resolved to abandon the Stockade, and fight my way to Nashville.

I knew that should the place be surrendered, or taken by assault, a butchery would follow, and I also knew that reinforcements would have been sent to me, if it had been possible to send them. I therefore left the Blockhouse at half past three p. m., and, contrary to my expectations, got through the rebel lines without much trouble. I arrived at Nashville at about daylight.

In addition to the above, I have to state that I left Surgeon J. T. Strong, Forty-fourth U. S. colored infantry, and Chaplain Railsback, Forty-fourth U. S. colored infantry, in the Blockhouse, to take care of the wounded men.

The soldiers and officers of the different commands behaved well and steady during the entire fight, and especially during the retreat. Every man did his duty, not a shot was fired, but silently they marched, determined to die rather than be taken prisoners.

The force engaged numbered as follows :

	<i>Muskets.</i>
Forty-fourth U. S. colored infantry.....	227
Companies A and D, Fourteenth U. S. colored infantry.....	80
Detachment One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio volunteer infantry.....	25
Total.....	332

The Losses are :

COMMAND.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.		
	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.	Officers.	Men.	Total.
Forty-fourth U. S. C. Infantry.....	8	8	25	25	2	27	29	2	20	22
Companies A and D, Fourteenth U. S. C. Infantry.....	2	2	5	5	18	18	25	25
Detachment One Hundred and Fifteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry.....	2	2	6	6	8	8
Total.....	12	12	46	46	2	55	57	2	113	115

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. JOHNSON,
Colonel, commanding.

Lieutenant JNO. E. CLELLAN,
A. A. A. G., Colored Brigade, First Separate Division.

COLONEL T. J. MORGAN'S REPORT.

CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE, }
JANUARY 16, 1865. }

S. B. Moe, Assistant Adjutant-General, District of Iowa.

MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the forces under my command in the recent campaign :

On November twenty-ninth, 1864, by order of Major-General Steedman, I assumed command of the Fourteenth United States colored infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin; the Sixteenth United States colored infantry, Colonel William B. Gaw, and the Forty-fourth United States colored infantry, Colonel L. Johnson, at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and proceeded by railroad to Cowan,

Tennessee, and thence by railroad to Nashville, Tennessee, reaching there with the Sixteenth and the main portion of the Fourteenth regiments, United States colored infantry, on the first day of December, 1864.

Colonel L. Johnson, with the Forty-fourth United States colored infantry, and Captain C. W. Baker, with companies A and D of the Fourteenth United States colored infantry, occupied the rear section of the train, which was transporting General Steedman's command to Nashville, Tennessee.

Seven miles north of Murfreesboro a train containing artillery and horses ran off the track and stopped the progress of the rear train, which for some reason, unexplained, was taken back to Murfreesboro with troops on board, a guard being left with the wrecked cars. During the night a construction train from Nashville removed the wreck and brought the remaining cars, horses, artillery, and guard at an early hour on the second ultimo to Nashville. At eight o'clock A. M., second ultimo, Colonel Johnson again started for Nashville, but when near Mill Creek, he was attacked by a rebel cavalry command, under General Forrest. The fight that ensued was quite creditable to the forces under Colonel Johnson. Colonel Johnson and Captain Baker are entitled to credit for the skill with which they fought and baffled the enemy and brought out their commands. I append the reports of those officers concerning this affair. Marked (A) (6).

During the second ultimo the portion of the brigade with me, conforming to the movements of General Cruft, occupied the extreme left of the first line of battle, formed near house of Robert Raine's, and constructed in its front, hastily, a line of defence—a breastwork of rails and earth with a light palisade in front.

On the third this line was abandoned and a new line established nearer the city, where the brigade—increased by the return of Colonel Johnson and Captain Baker, and the addition of a battalion of the Eighteenth United States colored infantry, under Major L. D. Joy—took position near the residence of Major William B. Lewis.

On December fifth and seventh reconnoissances were made by the brigade, in conjunction with other troops, and the enemy were found to occupy the first line of works, built by General Steedman near Raine's house. Each day the enemy was driven from the left of these works with slight loss to us.

On the fifth, one lieutenant and seven enlisted men of the enemy were captured by this brigade. A citizen living near the Murfreesboro pike, was killed by a member of B company, Sixteenth United States colored infantry. The report of Colonel Gaw concerning this is enclosed. Marked (C). The conduct of officers and men on those occasions—save the misconduct of Colonel Gaw, which was reported at the time—was, so far as came under my observation,

good. The coolness of the enlisted men under fire was especially gratifying to me.

On the night of the fourteenth of December orders were received to move at daybreak, to make a demonstration upon the left, to occupy our first line of works near Raine's house, if practicable, and to strongly menace the enemy's right, to prevent the moving of his troops to resist the advance of the right of Federal army, when the main attack was to be made.

On the evening of the fourteenth, Colonel Gaw, by an unsoldierly process, succeeded in getting his regiment taken from the First brigade and ordered a safer place in the rear. An excellent regiment, Seventeenth United States colored infantry, under a brave and gallant officer, Colonel Shafter, reported to me, instead of the Sixteenth. Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor, commanding brigade of white troops, reported to me, and remained with me during the two days' battle. I enclose Colonel Grosvenor's report of the part taken by his command. A section of artillery from Captain Osborn's (Twentieth Indiana) battery likewise was put under my charge.

In company with my Adjutant-General, during the night of the fourteenth ultimo, I visited the picket-line near the enemy's work, which it was designed to attack on the morning of the fifteenth. The Murfreesboro pike at this point runs a little east of south, nearly parallel with N. and C. R. R. The line of works was built almost at right angles with these roads.

We ascertained from the pickets that the rebels had been at work actively during the afternoon with the spade, and that their line of fire extended well towards the south. I concluded that a curtain had been built to protect the flank of the work, and that a line of rifle-pits had been made on the ground marked by the fire, and that if these rifle-pits could be carried and a column pushed well to the rear, the works near Raine's house would become untenable, and the ground east of N. and C. R. R. be given up to us, with little loss.

Accordingly, on the morning of the fifteenth, when the fog, which lay like a winding-sheet over the two armies, began to disappear, I moved my command out upon the Murfreesboro pike and disposed it as follows: the Fourteenth colored infantry was deployed in front as skirmishers; the Seventeenth and Forty-fourth colored infantry were formed in line of battle, in rear of Fourteenth, and given in charge of Colonel Shafter, of the Seventeenth. The section of Captain Osborn, Twentieth Indiana battery, was supported by the battalion Eighteenth United States colored infantry, Major L. D. Joy. Colonel Grosvenor was directed to send one battalion of his command to guard the left flank, and to hold the remainder of the command in rear of Colonel Shafter.

The artillery then opened upon the enemy, and the lines moved forward. The Fourteenth advanced until they drew a severe fire, when

Colonel Shafter was ordered to carry the rifle-pits, which he did handsomely, killing, wounding, capturing, or driving away the enemy from his front. He pushed forward until he reached the N. and C. R. R., when he was met by a destructive fire at short range, from a battery planted on the opposite side of a deep cut made by railroad.

Seeing that Colonel Shafter had carried the line in his front, and that the enemy still held their position on his right, I ordered up to his support the reserve of Colonel Grosvenor. This command carried a portion of the line, but was quickly compelled to retire with severe loss, by reason of musketry fired on its right flank.

What I had thought to be a mere curtain, proved to be a rude but strong lunette, with ditch in front and heavy head logs on top of parapet, forming a very safe cover for Granberry's brigade, which occupied it. About the time of the repulse of Colonel Grosvenor, Colonel Shafter was compelled to withdraw his line from the range of the artillery.

The entire command was then withdrawn by order of General Steedman, and moved to the north of Raine's house. A strong skirmish line connecting on the right at the railroad with Colonel Thompson's command, advanced very close to the enemy's line. Sharpshooters loopholed a dwelling-house and outbuildings, and silenced the enemy. Thus the day wore away.

The General's purpose, as communicated to me the night previous, had been accomplished.

The enemy had been deceived, and in expectation of a real advance upon the right, had detained his troops there, while his left was being disastrously driven back.

The troops under my command have, as a whole, behaved well, and if they failed to accomplish all I expected, it was my fault, not theirs. I was deceived as to the character of the work built by the enemy on the fourteenth. Could I have known the exact nature of the work, the troops would have carried it by a direct assault from the north side, with perhaps less loss than was sustained.

During the night of the fifteenth the enemy retired from our front.

On the sixteenth my command, by order of General Steedman, crossed the N. and C. railroad, the Nolensville Pike and the Tennessee and Alabama railroad, skirmishing with and driving the enemy.

At an early hour in the afternoon the command joined the left of Colonel Thompson, and confronted Overton Hill. Colonel Grosvenor was ordered to join the left of Second colored brigade and conform to its movements. He thus took part in the first assault upon Overton Hill.

Colonel Shafter, with Seventeenth, was in echelon in rear of Grosvenor. Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, with Fourteenth, was directed to support and protect the artillery. Colonel Johnson, Forty-fourth, was directed to guard the left. Captain Osborn, Twentieth Indiana battery, and Captain Aylshires, Eighteenth Ohio

battery, kept up an incessant fire upon the enemy, and did excellent work.

Subsequently the Fourteenth United States colored infantry was deployed as skirmishers in front of the artillery and directly facing the enemy's works, where they kept and received a brisk fire. When the first assault upon the hill failed, the assaulting column retired in disorder, passing through my skirmish line without shaking it.

At one time I thought, and so reported, that the line was being forced back, but it was not true. The line remained—did its work amid the confusion that followed the repulse. When the Sixty-eighth Indiana struck this line they asked what regiment (?); being answered Fourteenth, they cried: "bully for you, we'll stay with you," and they did. I assisted Colonel Thompson in re-forming his broken lines. When the final assault was being made upon Overton Hill, the forces under me moved forward and joined in the pursuit of the enemy, which followed as far as Franklin, Tennessee.

Subsequently the First colored brigade, as part of Second provisional division, accompanied the expedition towards Tusculum, Alabama, going as far as Leighton, Alabama. On its return it joined General Cruft's forces in the fruitless chase after General Lyon's rebel cavalry. The brigade was disbanded January twelve, 1865.

Colonel Shafter, Seventeenth, acquitted himself well; is cool and brave and a good disciplinarian.

Lieutenant-Colonel Corbin, Fourteenth United States colored infantry, does not possess sufficient courage to command brave men.

Captain Baker, in reality commanded the Fourteenth United States colored infantry in the battle of the fifteenth and sixteenth, and acquitted himself with great credit. He is brave, cool, untiring, and deserves promotion.

Lieutenant-Colonel Grosvenor obeyed every order with promptness, and is a good soldier.

To each member of my staff, Lieutenants Cleland and Hall, Forty-fourth United States colored infantry; Wadsworth and Dickman, Sixteenth United States colored infantry, and Wyrill, Fourteenth United States colored infantry, I am indebted for the promptness with which they carried out my desires, exposing themselves cheerfully to necessary danger.

The wounded of the First colored brigade were faithfully cared for by Surgeon Clements, Seventeenth United States colored infantry; Surgeon Stony, Forty-fourth United States colored infantry, and Assistant-Surgeon Oleson, Fourteenth United States colored infantry.

I have as yet received no reports from battalion commanders, and no lists of casualties. These will be forwarded as soon as received.

I am, Major,

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS J. MORGAN,

Colonel Fourteenth United States colored infantry.

S. B. MOE,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

COLONEL PALMER'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH PENNSYLVANIA (ARMED) CAVALRY, }
HUNTSVILLE, January 10, 1862. }

*Major S. B. Moe, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Headquarters District of the Etowah, Chat-
tanooga:*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report as directed by Major-General Steedman, the operations of my command since the twentieth ultimo.

On the evening of December nineteenth, I received orders to march with my regiment from Wauhatchie, near Chattanooga, where I was encamped, to Bridgeport, where transports would probably meet me, to take my command to Decatur.

I reached Bridgeport at four p. m. on the twentieth, but found no transports; and after telegraphing the facts to General Steedman at Murfreesboro, was directed by telegraph on the evening of the twenty-second to march immediately to Huntsville.

I accordingly started at six p. m. the same day, but was obliged to go into camp six miles from Bridgeport, on the bank of Widow's Creek, in consequence of that stream being past fording, and of the bridges having been swept away.

I marched at daylight the next morning, and by taking a circuitous route around the source of Widow's Creek, succeeded in reaching Stevenson with my wagons early in the afternoon. Here I met Major-General Steedman, who had just arrived by rail from Murfreesboro, and received from him verbal instructions to leave my wagons at Caperton's ferry, to be shipped by transports to Decatur, and to march as rapidly as possible with my regiment to the same place.

This march occupied four days and a half—the rise of water in Crow Creek and Paint Rock river, making it necessary to go round by the head of Coon Creek and of Hurricane Fork of Paint Rock river, crossing the spur of the Cumberland mountain, which divides these streams at their source on this route. I had no difficulty in fording the water courses, and found sufficient forage for my command.

I reached the north bank of the Tennessee river, opposite Decatur, at one p. m. of December twenty-eighth, and by dark had finished crossing—the infantry and artillery of expedition, with Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command of cavalry, having nearly finished crossing when I arrived at the river bank.

I at once received orders from Major-General Steedman to take command of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's cavalry (detachments of the Second Tennessee, and Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana, numbering in all about three hundred effective men), in connection with my own regiment, and to advance on the Courtland road.

After feeding the horses, I started at eight p. m., and on reaching a hill two miles from Decatur, saw camp-fires of the enemy on an elevation about two miles beyond. Halting the

command, I took a battalion of one hundred and thirty men of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, and advanced to reconnoitre the enemy's strength and position.

On nearing the lights their pickets fired, when I ordered my advance guard of thirty men to charge, which they did so boldly, that the enemy, who proved to be Colonel Wine's regiment of Roddy's command, had not time to form, but fled in disorder down the road, followed closely by my advance guard for one mile, when the enemy attempted to make a stand to cover his artillery.

Another vigorous charge by our advance, however, drove him from his guns (two six-pounders), which fell into our hands, with all the horses standing hitched to them in the road.

We then went into camp (at ten p. m.) to rest the men and animals for the next day's work. Thus, in less than four hours after landing from the boats at Decatur, we had advanced in the night six miles in a country, and against an enemy, of which we were almost entirely ignorant, and had taken possession of the camp and artillery of his rear guard.

Early the next morning I sent Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser, with his command, on the main Courtland road, while I advanced with the Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry by the Brown's Ferry and Courtland road, both for the purpose of meeting the flank movement of any force that might come up from Bainbridge, where Hood's army had but just crossed the Tennessee river, and also to enable me to get in the rear of Roddy's force, if practicable, while he was being attacked by Colonel Prosser in front.

Colonel Prosser first encountered the enemy at Hillsboro, five miles from our camp, and after a running skirmish of five miles more, met General Roddy's main force drawn up in two lines at Pond Spring. Without hesitation he charged it in the most gallant manner, broke both lines of the enemy, routing him so completely that he hardly attempted to make another stand, but fled ingloriously through Courtland, and for eight miles beyond to Town Creek, on the banks of which General Roddy succeeded in re-forming such portion of his command as had not taken advantage of their two successive defeats to go home and spend Christmas with their families. Colonel Prosser's attack was so vigorous, that my force on the Brown's Ferry road, having several miles the longer distance to march and in an unknown country, did not have time to reach the flank or rear of the enemy.

Forty-five prisoners were captured in this affair, including three commissioned officers; the enemy also lost one man killed and two wounded.

Colonel Prosser's loss was one man wounded. It appeared that Patterson's (so-called) brigade, of Roddy's command, having crossed at Bainbridge, had come up, the preceding evening, to Pond Spring to reinforce Roddy, and constituted,

with the balance of Wine's regiment, the force in our front on this day.

Being now within half a day's march of Bainbridge, where I knew the whole of Forrest's cavalry had but just crossed the river, it was necessary to advance with more caution. We reached Leighton, however, thirteen miles west of Courtland, by one P. M. of the next day.

Friday, December 30.

Having skirmished nearly all the way with flying parties of Roddy's cavalry, who attempted to delay us by burning a bridge over Town Creek, on the Bainbridge road, and by some show of holding the ford of the same stream on the main Tuscumbia road, most of the latter force drifted in squads southward towards the mountains; the remainder, with General Roddy, taking the roads to Tuscumbia and Florence.

Towards dark a new force appeared in our front, on the Tuscumbia road, believed to be Armstrong's brigade, which I afterwards learned definitely, had been sent back by Forrest from Barlow Station, to reinforce Roddy and protect General Hood's trains.

At Leighton I learned that Hood had commenced crossing the river at Bainbridge on Sunday morning, and finished on Tuesday evening, marching at once towards Corinth. This railroad had never been in operation east of Cane Creek, three miles west of Tuscumbia. I also learned that the pontoon bridge had been taken up on Tuesday night and Wednesday morning, and that the entire pontoon train, of two hundred wagons, had passed through Leighton on Thursday, and camped at Lagrange the same night, and that it was bound for Columbus, Mississippi, with a comparatively small guard.

Roddy's (so-called) division of cavalry had apparently been relied upon to prevent any advance of our forces, until the train could get to a safe distance; but his men had become so demoralized by their successive defeats, that we could afford to disregard him. Having communicated with Major-General Steedman, who left me free to make the expedition or not, as I might deem best, I started from Leighton before daylight on Saturday morning, December thirty-first, taking a trail which enabled us to avoid Armstrong's force and to get in the rear of a portion of Roddy's command at Lagrange, where we captured Colonel Jim Warren, of the Tenth Alabama cavalry, and some other prisoners.

About one P. M. we passed through Russellville, where we encountered another portion of Roddy's force, which had just arrived from Tuscumbia, and drove it out on the Tuscumbia road, while we kept on the Cotton Gin or Bull Mountain road, after the train.

Some attempt was made to delay us by burning a bridge over Cedar Creek, but we found a ford, and caught up with the rear of the pontoon train at dark, ten miles beyond Russellville.

met no resistance, and our advanced

guard rode through to the front of the train, which extended for five miles, and consisted of seventy-eight pontoon-boats and about two hundred wagons, with all the necessary accoutrements and material, engineering instruments, etc.; all the mules and oxen, except what the pontoniers and teamsters were able to cut loose and side off, were standing hitched to the wagons. Three boats had been set fire to, but so carelessly that no damage had been done.

We captured a few prisoners, and went into camp at about the centre of the train, fed our horses, and I then started the entire command out in either direction to burn the train, which was done in the most thorough manner, and occupied till three A. M. I should have been glad to bring the pontoon train, which was built at Atlanta last winter, and was an exceedingly well-appointed one, back to our lines; but the condition of the mules, the mountainous character of the country, and the presence, in our rear, of a force of the enemy's cavalry, estimated at three times our own strength, prevented.

I had also learned from a negro servant of Captain Cobb, of the Engineers, who commanded the train, that a large supply train of General Hood's, bound from Barton Station to Tuscumbia, was ahead.

Early next morning (Sunday) I pushed on through Nauvoo, taking the Aberdeen road, which I knew would flank the train.

I led a detachment from near Bexar across by a trail to head the train on the Cotton Gin road, and sent another, under Lieutenant-Colonel Lamborn, to follow it, and by ten P. M. had surprised it in camp a few miles over the State line, in Itawamba county, Mississippi. It consisted of one hundred and ten (110) wagons, and over five hundred mules. We burned the wagons, shot or sabred all the mules we could not lead off or use to mount prisoners, and started back. In one of the wagons was Colonel McCrosky, of Hood's infantry, who had been badly wounded at Franklin. I left a tent with him, some stores, and one of the prisoners to take care of him; about twenty of the teamsters were colored United States soldiers of the garrison captured by Hood at Dalton—these came back with us.

We returned *via* Tollgate and the old Military and Hackleburg roads, capturing an ambulance, with its guard, on the way, to within twenty-five miles south of Russellville, when I found that Roddy's force, and the so-called brigades of Biffles and Russel were already stationed in our front at Bear Creek, and on the Biler road towards Moulton, to retard us, while Armstrong was reported as being in pursuit.

The country was very difficult and rugged, with few roads or trails, and scarcely any forage; but we evaded, by a night march of twenty-three miles, all the forces of the enemy except Colonel Russel, whom we attacked unexpectedly on the Moulton and Tuscaloosa road, twelve miles east of Thornhill. On Wednesday noon Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser, having

the advance, routed him so speedily and completely that he did not delay our march twenty minutes, and this only to pick up prisoners and burn his five wagons, including his headquarters wagons, out of which we got all the brigade and other official papers. We had but a few hours previously captured, with its guard of three men, a small mail bound for Tuscaloosa.

About fifty or seventy-five conscripts from both sides of the Tennessee river, that Russel was hustling off to Tuscaloosa, were released by our attack; also eight Indiana soldiers, captured by Russel near Decatur.

We then continued our march unmolested, by way of Mount Hope, towards Leighton; but learning, when within ten miles of that place, that all our troops had returned to Decatur, we came on by easy marches to the same post, reaching it on Friday evening, sixth instant.

The whole distance marched, from the time of leaving Decatur, nine days previously, was two hundred and sixty-five; and about four hundred miles, from the time of leaving Chattanooga, two weeks and three days previous.

My entire command numbered less than six hundred (600) men, consisting of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania (Anderson) cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Charles B. Lamborn, and detachments of the Second Tennessee, and Tenth, Twelfth and Thirteenth Indiana cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel William F. Prosser.

To these officers, and all those under them, much credit is due for their gallantry and energy, as well as to all their men, for the dash and courage with which they attacked any enemy that appeared, and for the patient manner in which they bore, on the most scanty rations, the severe fatigue of this expedition.

I desire particularly to recommend for honorable mention in general orders, Sergeant Arthur P. Lyon, of Company A, of the Anderson cavalry, for repeated acts of marked bravery during this short campaign—including the capture of two pieces of artillery, which fell into his hands on the night of December twenty-eight, six miles from Decatur, on the Courtland road, by a daring charge of our advanced guard of fifteen men, which he led on this occasion.

We took about one hundred and fifty prisoners after leaving Leighton, including two colonels (one of whom was left in consequence of his wounds), two captains and six lieutenants, and destroyed, in all, between seven hundred and fifty and one thousand stand of arms, and captured a considerable number of pistols.

Our entire loss, one man killed and two wounded—all (of Lieutenant-Colonel Prosser's command) in the charge on Russel's force.

The whole of Forrest's cavalry, except Armstrong's brigade, was at Okalona, Mississippi, within one day's march of us, when the supply train was captured. He had been sent there as soon as he crossed at Bainbridge on Tuesday evening, to repel our cavalry from Memphis,

who had destroyed the railroad for twenty miles near and above Okalona.

I do not think General Hood brought across the Tennessee river, at Bainbridge, more than twelve thousand infantry and thirty-five pieces of artillery.

I am, very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

WM. J. PALMER,
Colonel, commanding.

S. B. MOE,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

CAPTAIN OSBORN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS TWENTIETH INDIANA BATTERY, }
MURFREESBORO, TENNESSEE, December 20, 1864. }

Major Moe, Assistant Adjutant-General, District Bowling:

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by the Twentieth Indiana battery, in the engagement near Nashville, Tennessee, on the fifteenth and sixteenth of December, 1864. The battery was engaged from eight o'clock A. M., of the fifteenth instant, throughout the day, both sections having taken position early in the day, within five hundred yards of the enemy's main line of works, the right section operating with Colonel Morgan's U. S. colored brigade and the left section with Colonel Thompson's U. S. colored brigade. The right section changed its position at ten o'clock A. M., and took a position in the open field, within three hundred yards of the enemy's works, and held the position until the infantry, Colonel Morgan's and Colonel Grosvenor's brigades, had passed to the rear and re-formed, in the mean time keeping up a continual fire, which enabled the infantry the more successfully to be withdrawn. This section then retired and took up a position north-east of the Raine's house, immediately behind the skirmish line of Colonel Morgan's brigade, where the section remained, keeping up a continual fire until night. Early on the morning of the sixteenth the two sections of the battery were brought together, and moved, with Colonel Morgan's brigade, across the Nolensville pike, to a position on the left of Colonel Thompson's brigade, which was then on the left of the Fourth corps, shelling the woods as the column advanced, where the battery participated in the general engagement which then took place, and from this position on the extreme left of the line kept a constant and terribly effective fire on the enemy's artillery in position on the Overton Hill, during the charges which were made by the infantry.

The enemy's artillery being silenced and captured, and our infantry having possession of the work, at about five o'clock P. M. I moved the battery in the general pursuit, with Colonel Morgan's brigade.

The casualties on the fifteenth instant were as follows:

Lieutenants E. D. York, severely wounded, left

arm broken, and T. H. Stevenson, slightly wounded, musket shot; Sergeant I. V. Elder, severely wounded in left side, musket shot; Privates Wm. Campbell, severely wounded in thigh; James Stuard, severely wounded by shell in back; James Evans, seriously wounded in breast, musket shot; I. O. Eversole, slightly wounded by shell; T. E. Stanley, slightly wounded by shell.

Five horses were killed, three by musketry, two by shell; nine horses were wounded, two by shell, seven by musketry.

The following ammunition was expended:

	SHOT.	SHELL.	SP. CARTR.	TOTAL.
First day.....	372	176	176	624
Second day.....	160	280	260	500
	432	406	406	1204

No casualties on the sixteenth instant.

I take pleasure in reporting the good conduct of officers and men of the command throughout the engagement.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully

Your obedient Servant,

MILTON A. OSBORN,

Captain Twentieth Indiana Battery.

S. B. MOE,

Major, and Assistant Adjutant-General, commanding.

COLONEL C. E. THOMPSON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS TROOPS OF N. & N. W. RAILROAD,
KINGSTON SPRINGS, TENNESSEE,
February 24, 1865.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit the following report of the action of my command during the past campaign:

On the seventh day of December, I reported to Major-General Steedman, in accordance with verbal orders received from department headquarters, and by his directions placed my brigade in line near the city graveyard, the right resting on College street, and the left on the right of Colonel Harrison's brigade, where we threw up two lines of rifle-pits.

On the eleventh of December made a reconnoissance by order of the General commanding, to see if enemy were still in our front. Two hundred men, under command of Colonel John A. Hottenstein, pressed the enemy's picket line, and reserves to their main line of works, where they were found to be in force. The object of the reconnoissance having been accomplished, we retired to our position in line by the direction of the Major-General commanding. This was the first time that any of my troops had skirmished with an enemy, and their conduct was entirely satisfactory.

On the thirteenth of December, by order of the General commanding, I reported to Colonel

Malloy, commanding brigade, provisional division, District of the Etowah, to make a reconnoissance on the east side of the N. and G. railroad, to see if the enemy was still in force in that vicinity. The Thirteenth regiment, United States colored infantry, was deployed as skirmishers, and the Twelfth and One Hundredth regiments, United States colored infantry, were held in reserve in line. We advanced from the Murfreesboro pike, with the skirmishers of Colonel Malloy's brigade connecting with my left, and drove the enemy's picket and reserves to their main line, after a somewhat stubborn resistance on the grounds of Mr. Raines.

The enemy were there in full force, and sharp firing was kept up as long as we remained there, which was until nearly dark.

We retired to our position in line, but not without loss. Captain Robert Headen, of Company E, Twelfth United States colored infantry, was mortally wounded, while on the skirmish line, pushing his company forward under a heavy fire from the enemy's earthworks; several men were also killed and wounded.

On the fifteenth of December, by directions received by the Major-General commanding, I moved my command at six o'clock A. M., to assault the enemy's works between the railroad and the Nolensville pike. So that the movement might be made more rapidly, I moved the two regiments, which were to be in the first line (the Thirteenth and One Hundredth United States colored infantry), under cover of the railroad bank, and placed them in column of company, side by side, and awaited the opening of the battle, which was to be done by Colonel Morgan on the left.

As soon as his guns were heard, I moved across the railroad; the reserve regiment (the Twelfth United States colored infantry) passing in the rear through a culvert, and wheeling into line, charged and took the works in our front. The enemy was evidently expecting us to move to the left of the railroad, as their artillery was moved to meet us there, and was not opened on us until we had gained the works and were comparatively well protected. My orders being to await there the orders of the General commanding, my command was kept in the same position during the day, except making slight changes in the direction of the line, to protect the men from an enfilading fire. Sharp firing was kept up between the skirmishers, and considerable artillery ammunition expended.

The section of the Twentieth Indiana battery, commanded by Lieutenant York, who was wounded, and afterwards by Lieutenant Stevenson, did excellent execution, and drove the enemy's battery opposing it from the position which it took to operate against us.

During the night we strengthened our rifle pits, and threw up an earthwork for the protection of the artillery, which had been much exposed during the day to the fire of the enemy's sharpshooters.

At daylight on the morning of December

sixteenth, indications that the enemy had left our front being apparent, I sent my skirmishers forward and found the rifle pits occupied by the enemy's sharpshooters vacant. By direction of the General commanding, I then sent the skirmishing line to the hill south, and about one mile from the one we had taken the day previous. Finding no enemy there, the whole command was ordered forward.

We marched about one mile and a half towards the south and then moved in a westerly direction, my left connecting with the right of Colonel Morgan's brigade. We halted on the hill east of the T. and A. railroad until the General commanding could communicate with the right of the army.

When this was done I was ordered to move to the east side of the Franklin pike and connect with the left of General Wood's (Fourth) corps. This was done without material damage, though the enemy opened on us from two batteries on Overton Hill. Immediately upon getting my command into position, I reported the fact to General Wood, who said he was about to make a charge, and desired me to support his left.

At about three o'clock p. m. his command started, and after they had proceeded about forty yards, I moved the left regiment. The Twelfth United States colored infantry was obliged to move about eighty yards in column, as there was a dense briar thicket on the left, which it could not penetrate.

After passing this thicket it was my intention to halt the command, until I could see what was on General Wood's left, and how it would be best to charge the works. The deploying of the Twelfth regiment at double quick caused the other regiments to think that a charge had been ordered, and they immediately started at double quick. Being under a heavy fire at the time, I thought it would cause much confusion to rectify this, so I ordered the whole line to charge. The Hundredth regiment was somewhat broken by trees, which had been fallen.

The Twelfth regiment United States colored infantry, and the left wing of the Hundredth regiment United States colored infantry, passed to the left of the enemy's works, they making a sharp angle there. This gave the enemy an enfilading and rear fire on this portion of the command. It being impossible to change front under the withering fire, and there being no work in front of them, I gave orders for that portion of the command to move by the left flank to the shelter of a small hill a short distance off, there to re-organise. The right wing of the Hundredth regiment moved forward with the left of the Fourth corps, and was repulsed with them.

The Thirteenth United States colored infantry, which was the second line of my command, pushed forward of the whole line, and some of the men mounted the parapet, but having no support on the right, were forced to retire. These troops were here, for the first time, under

such a fire as veterans dread, and yet, side by side with the veterans of Stone River, Missionary Ridge and Atlanta, they assaulted probably the strongest work on the entire line, and though not successful they vied with the old warriors in bravery, tenacity, and deeds of noble daring.

The loss in the brigade was over twenty-five per cent. of the number engaged, and the loss was sustained in less than thirty minutes.

While re-organizing my command, the troops on the right had broken the enemy's line, which caused them to retreat from Overton Hill.

The enemy on Overton Hill was considerably reinforced, during the attack, on account of the firmness of the assault, and which naturally weakened the enemy's left and made it easier for our troops to break their line at that point.

Under orders from the General commanding we moved down the Franklin pike and bivouacked on the left of the army.

December seventeenth, we marched to the north bank of the Harpeth river, opposite Franklin, in pursuit of the enemy.

December eighteenth, marched about three miles south of Franklin, where orders reached us to return to Franklin, and from there to move to Murfreesboro. We arrived in Murfreesboro on the twentieth of December at about noon, the men completely worn down, having accomplished by far the hardest march that I ever experienced.

The rain had fallen almost constantly, and every brook had overflowed its banks and assumed the proportions of a river. The mud was ankle deep, and when we arrived at Murfreesboro, over fifty per cent. of the command were in need of shoes.

On the twenty-third of December, 1864, moved from Murfreesboro by rail, and on the twenty-sixth of December disembarked from the cars about nine miles east of Decatur, Alabama, and moved within a mile of the Tennessee river, near the mouth of Flint river. Was placed in command of the Second provisional division, consisting of the First and Second colored brigades and reserve brigade.

On the twenty-seventh, in accordance with orders from the General commanding, I moved my command to the river, and embarked them on transports. We were landed on the opposite shore, and a bridge which had been prepared was thrown across a lagoon (which still separated us from the main shore) by the men of the Eighteenth Ohio volunteer infantry.

Too much praise cannot be given to this regiment for the skill and energy displayed in the laying of this bridge.

Skirmishers were sent across this lagoon immediately upon landing, and in wading the water was up to their necks.

Before noon the whole command was across, and I pushed it forward, driving the enemy before until I reached a point at which I had been directed to halt and await further orders from the General commanding.

From information received from citizens I was sure that there was not more than two hundred cavalry at Decatur, and so informed the General commanding.

General Cruft, with the First provisional division, having crossed the river and lagoon, came up and joined my right. We then moved forward into Decatur with but little resistance.

We moved from Decatur on the twenty-eighth of December, with the whole command, and arrived at Courtland on the thirtieth December.

On the thirty-first, in accordance with directions from the General commanding, I started with my division from Courtland to proceed as far as La Grange and Leighton, to support the cavalry under Colonel Palmer, that had gone to destroy the train of the enemy. Moved on this day as far as Town Creek, when we found it necessary to build a bridge, which was done with great dispatch by the Eighteenth Ohio volunteer infantry.

We moved from Town Creek at four o'clock A. M., January first, 1865, and arrived at Leighton at nine o'clock A. M. Sent Colonel John A. Hottenstein, with the Second brigade colored troops, to La Grange, with orders to take post there and find out all he could about Colonel Palmer, and to communicate to me any information that he might receive.

On the second, received orders from the General commanding to move east with my command, and rejoin him at Courtland. I started immediately, but at Town Creek received orders directing me to send one brigade to Leighton, and with the others to remain, when the order reached me, until Colonel Palmer could be heard from.

In compliance with this order I went into bivouac with the First and Second brigades colored troops, and sent the reserve brigade to Leighton.

On the fourth of January, received orders to move to Courtland, as Colonel Palmer had been heard from, and was on his way to Decatur, having destroyed the pontoon and another of the enemy's trains. On arriving at Courtland, found that the General commanding, with the First division, had gone to Decatur, orders having been left for me to follow with my command.

On the fifth, moved to within four miles of Decatur, where I received orders to move with my old command (the Second brigade colored troops) to Nashville, Tennessee.

On the sixth of January, moved to the terminus of the railroad opposite Decatur, and waited transportation.

On the seventh sent the Twelfth regiment off, and on the eighth started for Nashville with the Thirteenth and One Hundredth regiments.

On arriving at Larkinsville, found that the rebel General Lyon had cut the road, and was sent in pursuit of him by General Cruft, who was at Larkinsville.

Moved to Scottsboro on the morning of the

ninth, and found that Lyon had gone towards the Tennessee river. In conjunction with Colonel Malloy's brigade, started in pursuit on Guntersville road.

On the tenth, overtook Mitchell's brigade, and marched to Law's Landing, where, by order of General Cruft, I took post.

On the eleventh, I received orders to return to Larkinsville, as Lyon had escaped across the Tennessee river.

Arrived at Larkinsville on the evening of the twelfth, and loaded troops the next evening (thirteenth), and started for Nashville, at which place we arrived at four o'clock P. M., on the fifteenth day of January, 1865.

The conduct of the troops during the whole campaign was most soldierly and praiseworthy.

Before making the assault on the enemy's works, the knapsacks of the troops comprising the Second brigade were laid aside, and after the works were taken, being ordered to go in pursuit, these were left; and without blankets or any extra clothing, and more than one-half the time without fifty good shoes in the whole brigade, this whole campaign was made with a most cheerful spirit existing. For six days rations were not issued, yet vigorous pursuit was made after the rebel General Lyon.

To Colonel John A. Hottenstein, Thirteenth United States colored infantry, commanding Second brigade colored troops; Colonel Morgan, Fourteenth United States colored infantry, commanding First brigade United States colored troops, and Colonel Felix Pr. Salm, Sixty-eighth New York volunteer infantry, commanding Reserve brigade, my thanks are due, and are warmly given for their promptness to answer every call, and for their great assistance to me in helping to lighten the heavy responsibility that chance had thrown upon me.

Of the officers of my staff, Captain Henry A. Norton, Twelfth United States colored infantry, Acting Assistant Inspector-General; Lieutenant George W. Fish, Twelfth United States colored infantry, Acting Assistant Quartermaster, wounded by the enemy after having been taken prisoner, while taking stores to the command; Lieutenant Wm. H. Wilday, Twelfth United States colored infantry, Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant John D. Reilly, Thirteenth United States colored infantry, Acting Aide-de-Camp; Lieutenant Thos. L. Seaton, Twelfth United States colored infantry, Act. Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenant D. A. Grosvenor, One Hundredth United States colored infantry, Acting Aide-de-Camp, who, after having been wounded in three places, took the colors of his regiment from close to the enemy's earthworks—the color bearer having been killed; and Lieutenant R. G. Sylvester, Twelfth United States colored infantry, Commissary of Subsistence of the brigade, I cannot speak too highly. Uniting in the performance of their several duties, and on the field anxious to do the cause service in the most dangerous places, they richly deserve the thanks of the country.

To the glorious dead we drop a tear, and

while we cannot but deeply regret the great loss, not only we, their companions, but the country, has sustained, we could not wish them more honorable graves. The conscientious, brave, and high-minded Captain Robert Headen, the gallant Lieutenant Dennis Dease, the gentle, but firm and untiring Lieutenant D. Grant Cooke, of the Twelfth United States colored infantry—the two former receiving their death wounds while leading their men against their country's and freedom's foe, the latter butchered by the savage enemy while performing his duties as regimental quartermaster, taking supplies to his command—we can never forget as friends, and their positions can hardly be re-filled.

In the death of Lieutenant John M. Woodruff, Lieutenant George Taylor, Lieutenant L. L. Parks, and Lieutenant James A. Isom, of the Thirteenth United States colored infantry, the service has lost brave and efficient officers, the country patriots, and humanity friends. They all fell close to the enemy's works, leading their brave men.

The loss of the brigade is as follows:

	COMPANIES OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.	AGGREGATE.
THE TWELFTH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY.			
Killed.....	3	30	15
Wounded.....	3	99	102
Missing.....	0	0	0
Total.....	6	109	116
THIRTEENTH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY.			
Killed.....	4	81	55
Wounded.....	4	161	165
Missing.....	0	1	1
Total.....	8	213	221
ONE HUNDREDETH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY.			
Killed.....	0	12	12
Wounded.....	5	116	121
Missing.....	0	0	0
Total.....	5	128	133
SECOND BRIGADE, U. S. COLORED TROOPS.			
Killed.....	7	72	89
Wounded.....	12	375	386
Missing.....	0	1	0
Total.....	19	450	469

All of which is respectfully submitted.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

CHARLES K. THOMPSON,

Colonel Twelfth U. S. Colored Infantry, commanding Brigade.

MAJOR S. B. MOE,

A. A. G., Dist. of the Etowah, Chattanooga, Tennessee.

COLONEL FELIX PR. SALM'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
BRIDGEPORT, ALABAMA, Jan. 17, 1865.

To Major-General James B. Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, Chattanooga, Tennessee:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report:

On the twenty-ninth December, 1864, after having left Decatur, Alabama, I received reliable information that a great number of small arms, ammunition, and other ordnance stores, were concealed in a house a few miles in my rear, near the main road to Tusculumbia, Alabama. I therefore ordered a party, consisting of one officer and twenty men, to proceed to the place to try to discover the hiding-place of the stores, and to destroy them when found.

On the thirty-first December, 1864, the patrol returned, and the officer in charge reported as follows:

After leaving the brigade he proceeded in the direction of Decatur, following the Tusculumbia road. About the distance of six miles, a hundred yards from that road, in the vicinity of a farm known as "Kimball's place," stood the house said to contain arms and ammunition.

The officer found there about one hundred and ten Springfield and Enfield rifles, in good condition; from fifteen to twenty thousand carbine cartridges, English manufacture, India-rubber cases; one hundred to one hundred and twenty rounds of heavy ordnance ammunition; also a great quantity of wrought iron horse-shoes, &c.; several hundred sets of artillery harness, evidently condemned; a large bundle of telegraph wire, glass insulators, &c., the whole of which was destroyed, and the building set on fire.

Some more ammunition or powder must have been hidden there, as several explosions took place during the time the house was in flames. It is apparent that the Rebel authorities had established an ordnance store at this place, and that the men in charge left on a stampede, as several muskets and accoutrements were found on the ground outside the house.

Most respectfully submitted.

FELIX PR. SALM,

Colonel Sixty-eighth Regiment New York Vol. Vols.,
commanding Post.

S. B. MOE,

Major and Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 17.

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

GENERAL J. T. WOOD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
HUNTSVILLE, ALA., Jan. 5, 1865.

GENERAL: The Fourth army corps arrived in the vicinity of Nashville, on the retreat from Pulaaki, on the first December ultimo. Major-General D. E. Stanley, having been wounded in the

conflict at Franklin, on the thirtieth November, and having received a leave of absence on account of his wound, relinquished, and I assumed, command of the corps on the second of December.

So soon as I had assumed command of the corps, I placed it in position as follows, in conformity with orders received from the commanding General of the forces in the field in person: The left of the corps rested on the Casino, and, extending westward across the Granny White and Hillsboro pike, the right rested on the left of the detachment of the Army of the Tennessee (Major-General A. S. Smith's command), midway between the Hillsboro and Harding pikes. As the condition of the forces was not such as to warrant the commencement of offensive operations immediately, the first duty to be provided for was the safety of Nashville against assault. For this purpose a line of strong intrenchments, strengthened with an *abatis*, slashes of timber, and pointed stakes planted firmly in the ground, was constructed along the entire front of the corps. The entire development of this work was something over two miles. It was completed by the morning of the fifth of December. But while the safety of Nashville was being provided for, preparations were also being made for offensive operations. The troops were rapidly re-equipped in every particular, the trains repaired and loaded with supplies, etc. As early as the seventh of December, the commanding General of the forces had begun to communicate to the corps commanders his plan of attack, and had intimated that the morning of the tenth would witness the inauguration of offensive operations. But the morning of the ninth dawned upon us, bringing a heavy sleet-storm, which soon covered the whole face of the earth with a perfect *mer de glace*, and rendered all movement of troops, so long as it remained, impossible. The weather and condition of the ground were not sufficiently ameliorated before midday of the fourteenth of December to permit the commencement of operations with any hope of success. The commanding General summoned a meeting of corps commanders at his headquarters at three P. M., on the fourteenth, and delivered to them written orders, from which the following are extracts:

"As soon as the weather will admit of offensive operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:

* * * * *

III. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, commanding the Fourth corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Lauren's Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth corps on the Hillsboro pike to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on Montgomery's Hill."

* * * * *

"Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed in time to commence operations at six o'clock A. M., or as soon thereafter as practicable."

To carry out these brief but sententious and pointed instructions of the commanding General, I directed, so soon as I had returned to my headquarters, the division commanders to assemble there at seven P. M., and, after explaining to them fully the intended movements, delivered to them the following written orders:

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
NEAR NASHVILLE, TENN., December 14, 1864. }

*Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps,
for to-morrow, December 15, 1864.*

II. Reveille will be sounded at four A. M.; the troops will get their breakfast, break up their camp, pack up everything, and be prepared to move at six A. M.

II. Brigadier-General Elliott, commanding Second division, will move out by his right, taking the small road that passes by the right of his present position, form in echelon with General A. J. Smith's left, slightly refusing his own left, and, maintaining this relative position to General Smith's troops, will advance with them. When he moves out he will leave a strong line of skirmishers in his solid works.

III. Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding First division, on being relieved by General Steedman, will move his division to the Hillsboro pike inside of our lines, and by it through the lines, and form in echelon to General Elliott's left, slightly refusing his own left. He will maintain this position, and advance with General Elliott.

IV. As soon as General Kimball's division has passed out of the works by Hillsboro pike, General Beatty, commanding Third division, will take up the movement, drawing out by the left, and will form in echelon to General Kimball's left. He will maintain this position, and advance with General Kimball. He will also leave a strong line of skirmishers behind the solid works along his present position.

V. The pickets on post, being strengthened when in the judgment of division commanders it becomes necessary, will advance as a line of skirmishers to cover the movement.

The formations of the troops will be in two lines, the first line deployed, the second line in close column, by division, massed opposite the interval in the front line. Each division commander will, so far as possible, hold one brigade in reserve. Five wagon loads of ammunition, ten ambulances, and the wagons loaded with intrenching tools, will, as nearly as possible, follow after each division. The remaining ammunition wagons, ambulances, and all other wagons, will remain inside of our present lines until further orders. One rifle battery will accompany the Second division, and one battery of light twelve-pounders will accompany each of the remaining divisions. The rest of the artillery of the corps will maintain its present position in the lines.

By order of Brigadier-General T. J. Wood.

J. S. FULLERTON,
Lieut.-Col. and A. A. G.

The morning of the fifteenth was dark and sombre. A heavy pall of fog and smoke rested on the face of the earth, and enveloped every object in thick darkness. At six A. M. the movement of the troops was entirely impracticable, but between seven and eight A. M. the fog began to rise, and the troops silently and rapidly commenced to move into the positions assigned to them. This preliminary work being completed, nothing further remained for the Fourth corps to do until the cavalry and General Smith had made the long swing from our right which was necessary to bring them on the rear and left of the enemy's position. At 12:30 P. M., General Smith having swung up his right so that his command prolonged the front of the Fourth corps, the serried ranks of the corps began to advance towards the enemy's entrenched position. I should have remarked previously, that as soon as the troops began to debouch from our entrenched line, the skirmishers were pushed forward to cover the movement, and soon became sharply engaged with the enemy's skirmishers and readily drove them back.

During all the preliminary movements an occasional shot from the enemy's batteries showed he was keenly watching our movements. As the shells hurtled through the air, and burst over the troops, they added interest to the scene. When the splendid array of the troops began to move forward in unison the pageant was magnificently grand and imposing. Far as the eye could reach the lines and masses of blue, over which the nation's emblem flaunted proudly, moved forward in such perfect order that the heart of the patriot might easily draw from it the happy presage of the coming glorious victory. A few minutes after 12:30 P. M., I deemed the movement favorable to the attack on the left and rear of Montgomery's Hill. Montgomery's Hill is an irregular cone-shaped eminence, which rises four hundred and fifty feet above the general level of the surrounding country. The ascent to its summit, throughout most of its circumference, is quite abrupt, and its sides are covered with forest trees. The enemy had encircled the hill, just below its crest, with a strong line of intrenchments, and embarrassed the approach of an assaulting force with an *abatis* and rows of sharpened stakes firmly planted in the ground. This hill was the enemy's most advanced position, and was not more than eight hundred yards from our lines.

The ascent on the left and rear of the hill, taken in reference to the enemy's occupation, is more gradual than the portion which directly confronted our intrenchments. As our troops advanced and swung to the left, the left of the hill was brought directly in front of the third division of the corps. This disposition was favorable to the intended assault. I ordered Brigadier-General Beatty, commanding the Third division, to detail a brigade to make the attack. The Second brigade of the Third division, commanded by Colonel P. Sidney Post, Fifty-ninth

Illinois veteran volunteers, was selected for the work. The necessary arrangements having been made at one P. M., I gave the order for the assault. At the command, as sweeps the stiff gale over the ocean, driving every object before it, so swept the brigade up the wooden slope, over the enemy's intrenchments, and the hill was won. The Second brigade was nobly supported in the assault by the First brigade (Colonel Straight's) of the Third division. Quite a number of prisoners and small arms were captured in the assault. Previous to the assault I had caused the enemy to be well pounded by the artillery from our lines. This was the first success of the day, and it greatly exalted the enthusiasm of the troops. Our casualties were small, compared with the success.

Up to this time, the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield, commanding, had been held in reserve in rear of the Fourth corps and Major-General A. J. Smith's command; but shortly after the assault on Montgomery's Hill, I received a message from the commanding General of the forces, to the effect that he had ordered General Schofield to move his command to the right, to prolong General Smith's front, and directing me to move my reserves as much to the right as could be done compatibly with the safety of my own front. The order was at once obeyed by shifting the reserve brigade of each division to the right. The entire line of the corps was steadily pressed forward, and the enemy engaged throughout its whole front. The battery accompanying each division was brought to the front, and being placed in short and effective range of the enemy's main line, allowed him to rest. As the troops advanced, the skirmishers were constantly engaged, at times so sharply that the fusilade nearly equalled in fierceness the engagement of solid lines of battle. I pressed the corps as near the enemy's main line as possible, without making a direct assault on it; in doing so, at the same time swinging to the left, the right of the corps which had, during the previous part of the day, been in rear of General Smith's left to support it, passed in front of it. This movement brought the centre of the corps, General Kimball's division, directly opposite to a very strongly fortified hill near the centre of the enemy's main line. Impressed with the importance of carrying this hill, as the enemy's centre would be broken thereby, I ordered up two batteries, and had them so placed as to bring a converging fire on the crest of the hill.

I will here remark, that the enemy's artillery on this hill had been annoying us seriously all the day. After the two batteries had played on the enemy's line for half an hour, during which time the practice had been most accurate, I ordered General Kimball to assault the hill with his entire division. Most nobly did the division respond to the order. With the most exalted enthusiasm, and with loud cheers, it rushed forward, up the steep ascent, and over the intrenchments. The solid fruits of this

magnificent assault were several pieces of artillery and stands of colors, many stands of small arms, and numerous prisoners. The Second division of the corps, General Elliott's, followed the movement of General Kimball's division, and entered the enemy's works further to the right, shortly after the main assault had been successful. The division, in this movement, captured three pieces of artillery. Further to the left, the Third division, General Beatty commanding, had attacked and carried the enemy's intrenchments and captured several pieces of artillery and caissons, and a considerable number of prisoners.

Fortunately, this brilliant success along the entire front of the corps was achieved with comparatively slight loss. The onset was so fierce, the movement of the troops so rapid, that a very brief interval elapsed between the first shout of the advancing lines and the planting of our colors on the enemy's works. But this rapid movement had somewhat disordered the ranks, as well as blown the men, and it was hence necessary to halt the corps a brief space to re-form and prepare for a further advance. The enemy, on being driven from his works, had retired in the direction (eastward) of the Franklin pike. His works, extending across this pike, were still.

While the troops were being re-formed I received an order from the commanding General to move towards the Franklin pike, some two and a half miles distant; to reach it, if possible, before dark, drive the enemy, and form the corps across it, facing southward. This order was received about five P. M., almost sunset. The re-formation of the troops was quickly completed, and the whole corps, formed in two lines and covered by a cloud of skirmishers, was pushed rapidly towards the Franklin pike. Soon our skirmishers became engaged with the enemy's, but only to drive them. But the rapidly approaching darkness too soon brought a period to this glorious work. After crossing the Granny White pike and arriving within about three-fourths of a mile of the Franklin pike, the darkness became so thick that it was necessary, in order to avoid confusion and to prevent our troops from firing into each other, to halt the corps for the night. The corps was formed parallel to the Granny White pike, its right resting on General Smith's left, and its left on the most northern line (then abandoned) of the enemy's works. In this position, at about seven P. M., of a bleak December night, the troops bivouacked after their arduous, but fortunately glorious, labors of the day. The result of the day's operations for the corps was the capture of ten pieces of artillery, five caissons, several stands of colors, a considerable number of small arms, and some five hundred prisoners. The enemy's intrenched lines had been broken in two places by direct assault, and he driven more than two miles. Of his loss of killed and wounded I could form no estimate, must have been heavy.

Fortunately, casualties were unusually light, compared with success achieved, not more than three hundred and fifty killed and wounded in the corps. After having provided for the safety of the corps for the night, I repaired to the quarters of the commanding General to receive his orders for the operations of the morrow. These orders were to advance at daylight the following morning, the sixteenth, and if the enemy was still in front, to attack him, but if he had retreated, to pass to the eastward of the Franklin pike, to face southward, and to pursue him till found. At 11:30 P. M., of the fifteenth, instructions were distributed to the division commanders to advance at daylight, and attack the enemy if found in front of their commands, but if he should not be found, to cross to the eastward of Franklin pike and move southward, parallel to it—Elliott's division leading, followed by Kimball's, then Beatty's.

At six A. M., on the sixteenth instant, the corps commenced to move towards the Franklin pike. The movement at once developed the enemy in our front, and sharp skirmishing commenced immediately. The enemy was steadily driven back, and at eight A. M. we gained possession of the Franklin pike. The enemy's skirmishers, after being driven eastward of the pike, retreated southward. Elliott's division was deployed across the road, facing southward. Beatty's division was formed on the left of Elliott's, and Kimball's division massed near the pike, in rear of Elliott's. In this order the corps advanced nearly three-fourths of a mile, when it encountered a heavy skirmish line, stoutly barricaded. Some half mile in the rear of the enemy's skirmish line, his main line, strongly intrenched, could be seen. An effort was at once made to connect General Elliott's right with General Smith's left. The interval being too great to accomplish this, I ordered General Kimball to bring up his division and occupy the space between Generals Smith and Elliott's commands. This was promptly done, the troops moving handsomely into position under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery. Thus formed, the entire corps advanced in magnificent array, under a galling fire of small arms and artillery, and drove the enemy's skirmishers into his main line. Further advance was impossible without making a direct assault on the enemy's intrenched line, and the happy moment for this grand effort had not yet arrived. I hence ordered the division commanders to press their skirmishers as near to the enemy's intrenchments as possible, and to harass him with a constant fire. In a conflict of this nature I knew we would have greatly the advantage of him, as our supply of ammunition was inexhaustible, and his limited. All the batteries of the corps on the field were brought to the front, placed in eligible positions in short range of the enemy's works, and ordered to keep up a measured but steady fire on his artillery. The practice of the batteries was uncommonly fine. The ranges were accurately obtained, the elevations

correctly given, and the ammunition being unusually good, the fire was consequently most effective. It was really entertaining to witness it. The enemy replied spiritedly with musketry and artillery, and his practice with both was good. In the progress of the duel he disabled two guns in Ziegler's battery. After the disposition above recounted had been made, the commanding General joined me near our most advanced position, on the Franklin pike, examined the posting of the troops, approved the same, and ordered that the enemy should be vigorously pressed and unceasingly harassed by our fire. He further directed that I should be constantly on the alert for any opening for a more decisive effort, but, for the time, to abide events. The general plan of the battle for the preceding day, namely, to outflank and turn the enemy's left, was still to be acted on. Before leaving me the commanding General desired me to confer with Major-General Steedman, whose command had moved out that morning from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and arrange a military connection between his right and my left. The enemy had made some display of force between the Franklin and Nolensville pikes, but its extent could not be fixed, and it was hence necessary to take precaution in reference to it. Near twelve M. I rode towards the left and met Major-General Steedman; communicated to him the views of the commanding General, and submitted him some suggestions with regard to the disposition of his command to meet those views. General Steedman coincided in opinion with me, and promptly and handsomely, though exposed to a sharp fire from one of the enemy's batteries, placed his command, both infantry and artillery, in a position which effectually secured my left from being turned. I will here remark that General Steedman's command most gallantly and effectively co-operated with my command during the remainder of the day. For a proper understanding of the last, great, and decisive struggle in the battle of Nashville, a brief description of the scene of its occurrence, and of the topography of the adjacent country, is requisite. The basin in which the city of Nashville stands is enclosed on the south-west, south, and south-east, by the Brentwood Hills.

The Franklin pike runs nearly due south from Nashville. The Brentwood Hills consist of two ranges or branches; the branch to the west of the Franklin pike runs from north-west to south-east, the branch to the east of the Franklin pike runs from north-east to south-west. The two branches unite in a depression or gap, about nine miles from Nashville. The Franklin pike passes through the gap, and in it is situated the little hamlet of Brentwood. The most northern point of each branch of hills is about five miles from Nashville. From this description it will be perceived that the general configuration of the Brentwood Hills is that of a rudely shaped V. Nashville is north of, and about opposite, the centre of the space included between the two branches. Brentwood is at the apex. The

valley inclosed between the two branches is nearly bisected by the Franklin pike. The average elevation of the Brentwood Hills above the general level of the surrounding country, is about three hundred and fifty feet. The surface of the Nashville basin is broken by detached hills, some of which rise to an elevation of a hundred and fifty feet, with abrupt sides, densely wooded. About five miles from Nashville the Franklin pike passes along the base of one of those isolated heights, which is known as Overton Hill. When the heavy stress which had been put on the enemy during the forenoon of the sixteenth had forced him into his works, he was found to occupy a strongly entrenched line, running for some distance along the base of the western branch of the Brentwood Hills; thence across the valley, eastward, to and across the Franklin pike, around the northern slope of Overton Hill, about midway between its summit and base, with a retired flank running nearly southward, prolonged around its eastern slope. This line of intrenchments was strengthened with an *abatis* and other embarrassments to an assault.

The right of the enemy's main line rested on Overton Hill. A close examination of the position satisfied me that if Overton Hill could be carried, the enemy's right would be turned, his line from the Franklin pike, westward, would be taken in reverse, and his line of retreat along the pike and the valley leading to Brentwood, commanded effectually. The capture of half of the rebel army would almost certainly have been the guerdon of success. It was evident that the assault would be very difficult, and even if successful, would probably be attended with heavy loss; but the prize at stake was worth the hazard. Early in the afternoon I began to make preparations for assaulting the hill. Owing to the openness of the country, the preparatory movements could not be concealed from the enemy; in truth, from our extreme proximity to his intrenchments, they were necessarily made under the fire of his artillery. Knowing that the safety of his army depended on holding Overton Hill to the last moment, he reinforced the position heavily with troops drawn from his left and left-centre. I directed Colonel Post to reconnoitre the position closely, with the view of determining—first, the feasibility of an assault; and secondly, to determine the most practicable point on which to direct it. After a thorough and close reconnoissance, in which perhaps three-fourths of an hour were spent, Colonel Post reported that the position was truly formidable, that it would be very difficult to carry, but that he thought he could do it with his brigade. He further reported that an assault, in his opinion, on the northern slope of the hill, held out the greatest promise of success. I ordered him to prepare his brigade for the assault immediately, and to inform me when he was ready to move. I directed General Beatty, commanding Third division, to have the First brigade (Colonel Streight's) formed

to support Colonel Post's. I further ordered Major Goodspeed, Chief of Artillery of the corps, to open a concentrated fire on the hill, for the purpose of silencing the enemy's batteries and demolishing his defences, and to continue the fire as long as it could be done with safety to our advancing troops. The order was effectively obeyed. I also conferred with Major-General Steedman, and explained to him what I intended to do. He promptly agreed to move his command forward with the assaulting brigade, to cover its left; also to participate in the assault with a view to carrying whatever might be in his front. Everything being prepared for the attack, near three p. m., I gave the order for the assaulting brigade to advance. This it did steadily, followed by its support. Major-General Steedman's command moved simultaneously. I will here remark, that General Steedman's artillery had kept up an effective fire on the enemy's works during the interval in which the preparations for the assault were being made.

The front of the assaulting force was covered with a cloud of skirmishers, who had been ordered to advance rapidly, for the purpose of drawing the enemy's fire as far as possible, and to annoy his artillerists, and to prevent, as far as possible, the working of his guns. The assaulting force was instructed to move steadily forward to within a short distance of the enemy's works, and then, by a "bold burst," ascend the steep ascent, cross the *abatis*, dash over the rude but strong parapet, and secure the coveted goal. The troops were full of enthusiasm, and the splendid array in which the advance was made gave hopeful promise of success. Near the foot of the ascent the assaulting party dashed forward for the last great effort; it was welcomed with a most terrific fire of grape and canister and musketry. But its course was onward. When near, however, the enemy's works (a few of our men, stouter of limb and speedier of movement, had already entered his line), his reserves on the slope of the hill rose and poured in a fire before which no troops could live. Unfortunately, the casualties had been particularly heavy among the officers; and more unfortunate still, when he had arrived almost at the *abatis*, while gallantly leading his brigade, the chivalric Post was struck down by a grape shot, and his horse killed under him. The brigade, its battalions bleeding, torn, and broken, first halted, and then began to retire; but there was little disorder, and nothing of panic. The troops promptly halted and were readily re-formed by their officers. But for the unfortunate fall of Colonel Post, the commander of the assaulting brigade, I think the assault would have succeeded. I had watched the assault with a keen and anxious gaze. It was made by troops whom I had long commanded, and whom I had learned to love and admire for their noble deeds on many a hard-fought field. I had observed, with pride and exultation, the evident steady resolve with which they had prepared for the assault, the cheerfulness with

which they had received the announcement that they were *les enfans perdus*.

So soon as I perceived the troops begin to retire, apprehending that the enemy might attempt an offensive return, I despatched an order to all the batteries bearing on the hill to open the heaviest possible fire so soon as their fronts were sufficiently cleared by the retiring troops to permit it. I also ordered Colonel Kuefter, commanding Third brigade, Third division, to hold his command well in hand, ready to charge the enemy, should he presume to follow our troops. Both orders were promptly obeyed, and if the enemy ever had the temerity to contemplate an offensive return, he never attempted to carry it into effect. Not a prisoner was captured from us—a fact almost unparalleled in an assault so fierce, so near to success, but unsuccessful. And no foot of ground previously won was lost. After the repulse, our soldiers, white and colored, lay indiscriminately near the enemy's works, at the outer edge of the *abatis*. But while the assault was not immediately successful, it paved the way for the grand and final success of the day. The reinforcements for Overton Hill, which the enemy had drawn from his left and left-centre, had so much weakened that part of his line as to insure the success of General Smith's attack.

After withdrawing and re-posting the troops that had been engaged in the assault, I rode towards the right to look to the condition of the First and Second divisions. Shortly after reaching the First division, which was on the right of the corps, an electric shout, which announced that a grand advance was being made by our right and right centre, was borne from the right towards the left. I at once ordered the whole corps to advance and assault the enemy's works. But the order was scarcely necessary: all had caught the inspiration, and officers of all grades, and the men, each and every one, seemed to vie with each other in a generous rivalry, and in the dash with which they assaulted the enemy's intrenched lines. So general and so combined an attack on all parts of the enemy's line, was resistless. It rushed forward like a mighty wave, driving everything before it. The sharp fire of musketry and artillery did not cause an instant's pause. I advanced with the First division, and witnessed, with the highest satisfaction, the gallant style in which it assaulted and carried the enemy's works. The division carried every point of the works in its front, and captured five pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and many hundred stands of small arms.

The Second division gallantly carried the works in its front and captured many prisoners and small arms. The Third division re-assaulted Overton Hill, carried it, and captured four pieces of artillery, a large number of prisoners and small arms, and two stands of colors. The enemy fled in the utmost confusion. The entire corps pushed rapidly forward, pressed the pursuit, and continued it several miles, and till

the fast approaching darkness made it necessary to halt for the night. In the pursuit the Third division captured five pieces of artillery. The batteries of the corps advanced with the infantry in the pursuit, and by timely discharges increased the confusion and hastened the flight of the enemy. The corps bivouacked eight miles from Nashville, and within a mile of the Brentwood Pass, which was under our guns. By the day's operations the enemy had been driven from a strongly intrenched position by assault, and forced into an indiscriminate rout. In his flight he had strewn the ground with small arms—bayonets, cartridge-boxes, blankets, and other material, all attesting the completeness of the disorder to which he had abandoned himself. The captures of the day were fourteen pieces of artillery, nine hundred and eighty prisoners, two stands of colors, and thousands of small arms. It may be truthfully remarked that military history scarcely affords a parallel of a more complete victory.

At 12:30 A. M., of the seventeenth, instructions were received from the commanding General of the forces to move the Fourth corps as early as practicable down the Franklin pike in pursuit of the enemy. At six A. M., of the seventeenth, I directed division commanders to advance as early as practicable, move rapidly, and if the enemy should be overtaken, to press him vigorously. The night had been rainy and the morning was dark and gloomy. It was hence nearly eight A. M. before the column was well in motion, but it then advanced rapidly. The instructions of the commanding General, received during the night, informed me that the cavalry would move on my left during the day; it did not, however, get to the left before I moved, and at ten A. M. I was detained a short time in permitting a portion of the cavalry to get to the front, which was necessary in order that it might reach the position assigned to it in the order of march. After this brief delay I pushed rapidly forward, and, although the road was very heavy, reached Franklin at 1:20 P. M. The whole line of march of the day bore unmistakable evidence of the signalness of the victory our arms had achieved and the completeness of the rout. The road was strewn with small arms, accoutrements, and blankets. The enemy had destroyed all the bridges over the Big Harpeth at Franklin, and as the rain of the previous night and that morning had swollen the stream so as to make it impassable by infantry without a bridge, it was necessary to halt to build one, the pontoon train not having come up. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, nobly volunteered to build the bridge, and, thanks to his energy and ingenuity, and the industry of his gallant regiment, it was ready (though he had few conveniences in the way of tools, the scantiest materials, and the stream was rising rapidly) for the corps at daylight, the morning of the eighteenth. This service was the more useful, as well as the more gratifying, as our cavalry (which, from reaching the Harpeth ear-

lier on the seventeenth, had been able to ford it) was sharply engaged with the enemy's rearguard, several miles in front, and the whole corps was burning with impatience to get forward to join in the conflict. The corps was pushed rapidly across the Harpeth, pressed forward, and marched eighteen miles that day, though the road was very heavy and many crossings had to be made over the streams. Near nightfall it passed in front of the cavalry and encamped a mile in advance of it. The weather was very inclement. During the night of the eighteenth the rain poured down in torrents, and the morning brought no improvement to the weather of the night. During the night I received instructions from the commanding General of the forces, informing me—first, that the cavalry then encamped in my rear would move at six A. M., pass to the front; and, secondly, that I should move at eight A. M. The cavalry had not all passed at eight A. M., but at the appointed hour the corps was in motion. The rain still fell in torrents, flooding the earth with water, and rendering all movements off the pike impossible. The head of the column advanced three and a half miles and arrived at Rutherford Creek. This is a bold and rapid stream, usually fordable, but subject to rapid freshets; and the heavy rains of the preceding twenty-four hours had swollen it beyond the possibility of being crossed without bridges. To construct these it was necessary we should first occupy the opposite bank of the stream. As the head of the column approached the creek the hostile fire from the southern bank was opened with artillery and musketry. To clear the enemy from the opposite bank at the turnpike crossing where the bridge for the passage of the artillery and trains had to be constructed, it was necessary to pass troops over either above or below; and as the pontoon train was not yet up, every expedient that ingenuity could devise was resorted to to effect the desired object. Rafts were constructed and launched, but the current was so rapid that they were unmanageable. Huge forest trees, growing near the margin of the stream, were felled athwart the stream, with the hope of spanning it in this way and getting some riflemen over; but the creek was so rapid and the flood so deep that these huge trees of the forest were swept away by the resistless torrent. In these efforts was passed one of the most dreary, uncomfortable, and inclement days I remember to have passed in the course of nineteen years' and a half of active field service. Late in the afternoon, some dismounted cavalry succeeded in crossing the creek on the ruins of the railroad bridge, and drove off the enemy from its southern bank. During the night and the early forenoon of the following day (the twentieth) two bridges for infantry were constructed across the stream, one at the turnpike crossing, by Colonel Oddycke's brigade of the Second division, and the other by General Grose's, of the First division. So soon as these were completed the infantry of

the corps were passed over, marched three miles, and encamped for the night on the northern bank of Duck River.

During the night of the twentieth the weather became bitterly cold. Wednesday, the twenty-first, operations were suspended, and the corps remained quietly in camp, as the pontoon train, detained by the swollen streams, the inclement weather, and the miserable condition of the roads, had not been able to get to the front. The day was bitterly cold, and the rest which the command gained by lying in camp was much needed after their arduous and laborious service of the many preceding days. During the night of the twenty-first, between midnight and daylight, the pontoon train came up and reported. I had, as early as the evening of the twentieth, encamped a brigade (the First brigade of the Third division Colonel Streight, commanding) on the margin of the river, ready to lay down the bridge the very earliest moment that it could be done. So soon as it was light enough to work, the morning of the twenty-second, a sufficient number of pontoons (they were canvas) were put together to throw across the river a detachment of the Fifty-first Indiana to clear the opposite bank of the enemy. The service was handsomely performed by the detachment, and quite a number of prisoners was the result of the operations. So soon as the opposite bank was cleared of the enemy, Colonel Streight commenced to lay down the bridge, and completed the work with celerity; though, owing to the inexperience of the troops in such service, and the extreme coldness of the weather, more time was consumed in doing it than could have been desired. So soon as the bridge was completed, passed over the infantry of the corps; and during the time which intervened before the hour designated by the commanding General for the cavalry to commence crossing, succeeded in getting over most of the artillery, and a sufficiency of the ammunition and baggage trains, to permit the corps to continue the pursuit. After crossing the river I moved the corps a mile out of the town of Columbia, which stands on the southern bank of the river, and encamped it for the remainder of the night. During the evening of the twenty-second, the commanding General informed me that he wished the pursuit continued by the Fourth corps and the cavalry conjointly, so soon as the cavalry had crossed the river; that he wished the Fourth corps to press down the turnpike road, and the cavalry to move through the country on either side the corps. Friday, the twenty-third, I rested near Columbia, waiting for the cavalry to complete its passage of Duck River, till midday, when, the cavalry not being yet over, I informed the commanding General I would move the corps a few miles to the front that afternoon, encamp for the night, and wait the following morning for the cavalry to move out, with which, as already stated, I had been instructed to co-operate. While at Duck River we learned that the enemy had thrown several

pieces of artillery into the river, being unable to get them across. We also learned that his rear guard was composed of all the organized infantry that could be drawn from his army, which was placed under the command of General Walthall, and his cavalry, commanded by General Forrest.

After advancing some five miles south of Columbia, the afternoon of the twenty-third, the head of the corps came on a party of the enemy posted advantageously in a gap, through which the highway passed, with enclosing heights on either side. I ordered Brigadier-General Kimball, commanding the leading division, to deploy two regiments as skirmishers, to bring up a section of artillery, and with this force to advance and dislodge the enemy from the pass. The service was handsomely and quickly performed. One captain of cavalry and one private certainly killed, and four privates captured, were among the known casualties to the enemy. It being now nearly nightfall, the corps was halted to await the completion of the crossing of the cavalry. On the following morning, the twenty-fourth, I was detained till twelve m. waiting for the cavalry to come up and move out. Shortly after the cavalry had passed out through my camp, Brevet Major-General Wilson sent me a message to the effect that he had found the ground so soft that he could not operate off the turnpike, and begging that I would not become impatient at the delay he was causing in the movement of my command. At twelve m. the road was free of the cavalry, when the corps was put in motion, and marched sixteen miles that afternoon, and encamped two miles south of Linnville.

During all this period of the pursuit, and indeed to the end of it, the rear guard of the enemy offered slight resistance, and generally fled at the mere presence of our troops.

Sunday morning, the twenty-fifth, the corps followed closely on the heels of the cavalry, passed through Pulaski, from which the cavalry had rapidly driven the enemy's rear guard, and encamped for the night six miles from the turn in the Lamb's Ferry road. The corps marched sixteen miles on the twenty-fifth, the last six miles on a road next to impracticable, from the depth of the mud. As we could not have the use of the turnpike further south than Pulaski, I ordered all the artillery of the corps, but four batteries, to be left at Pulaski, using the horses of the batteries left to increase the horses of the pieces taken with the command to eight, and of the caissons to ten horses each. I also ordered that only a limited number of ammunition wagons, carrying but ten boxes each, should accompany the command. These arrangements were necessary, on account of the condition of the road on which the enemy had retreated.

Without extra teams to the artillery carriages, and lightening the usual load of an ammunition wagon, it would have been impracticable to get the vehicles along; a vigorous pursuit

would have been impossible. These dispositions were reported to the commanding General. He directed me to follow the cavalry and support it. The pursuit was continued, with all possible celerity, to Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles south of Pulaski. Six miles south of Lexington, Brevet Major-General Wilson learned certainly, on the twenty-eighth, that the rear of the enemy had crossed the river on the twenty-seventh, and that his bridge was taken up on the morning of the twenty-eighth. These facts were reported to the commanding General, who ordered that the pursuit be discontinued. To continue it further at that time, besides being useless, even if possible, was really impossible. Of the pursuit it may be truly remarked that it is without a parallel in this war. It was continued for more than a hundred miles, at the most inclement season of the year, over a road the whole of which was bad, and thirty miles of which were wretched almost beyond description. It was scarcely an hyperbole to say that the road from Pulaski to Lexington was bottomless when we passed over it. It was strewn with the wrecks of wagons, artillery carriages, and other material, abandoned by the enemy in his flight.

The corps remained two days at Lexington, awaiting orders. On the thirtieth December, instructions were received to take post at this place. On the thirty-first, the corps marched to Elk River, a distance of fifteen miles. The river being too swollen to ford, two days were spent in bridging it. Colonel Suman, Ninth Indiana, and Major Watson, Seventy-fifth Illinois, using the pioneers of the corps as laborers and mechanics, built a substantial trestle-bridge three hundred and nine feet long, over which the corps, with its artillery and wagons, safely passed. Elk River was crossed on the third of January, and on the fifth the corps encamped in the vicinity of this place.

Thus was closed, for the Fourth corps, one of the most remarkable campaigns of the war. The enemy, superior in numbers, had been driven by assault, in utter rout and demoralization, from strongly-intrenched positions, pursued more than a hundred miles, and forced to recross the Tennessee River. By actual capture on the field of battle, and by abandonment in his flight, the enemy lost three fourths of his artillery; in prisoners taken from him, by desertion, and in killed and wounded, his force was certainly diminished fifteen thousand; and his loss in small arms, ammunition, and other material of war, was enormous. From an organized army, beleaguering the capital of Tennessee, the foe had been beaten into a disorganized mass—a mere rabble. The Fourth corps captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, four stands of colors, and of small arms a large number, of which, however, no accurate account could be taken, as the pursuit was commenced early the morning of the seventeenth. Of the artillery captured, nineteen pieces were taken by assault in the enemy's works. The corps captured one hundred and eleven commissioned officers and

eighteen hundred and fifty-seven non-commissioned officers and privates. The casualties of the corps amounted to—officers killed, nineteen; officers wounded, fifty-five; non-commissioned officers and privates killed, one hundred and fourteen; non-commissioned officers and privates wounded, seven hundred and fifty-nine.

For the more minute details of the movements of the troops on the field of battle and in the pursuit, I most respectfully refer the commanding General to the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders. And for the special mention of numerous acts of gallantry and good conduct, I must also refer him to their reports. I desire to commend to the consideration of the commanding General the skill and intelligence evinced by the division commanders, Brigadier-Generals Kimball, Elliott and Beatty, in the handling of their commands, and for the personal gallantry displayed by them on the field of battle. Their services entitle them to the gratitude of the nation, and to the most kindly consideration of the government. The division commanders mention the services of the brigade commanders, and of the brigade staff officers. From the very best opportunity of observing, I can truly bear testimony, and I do it with the highest satisfaction, to the soldierly—in truth, splendid conduct of the whole corps in all the conflicts of the fifteenth and sixteenth; have never seen troops behave better on any battle-field. To the members of my staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff; Lieutenant-Colonel Greenwood, Assistant Inspector-General; Major Sinclair, Assistant Adjutant-General; Major Dawson, Fifteenth Ohio volunteers, Chief of Outposts and Pickets; First Lieutenant George Shaffer, Ninety-third Ohio volunteers, and First Lieutenant C. D. Hammer, One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio volunteers; Aides-de-Camp Captain Stansbury, Nineteenth regulars, Commissary of Musters; Captain Kaldenbaugh, Provost Marshal; and Lieutenant Kennedy, Acting Assistant Inspector, I owe many thanks for the zealous, intelligent and gallant manner in which they performed their duties, both on the field of battle and in the long and arduous pursuit.

I commend them to the favorable consideration of my seniors in rank, and to the government. Major Goodspeed, Chief of Artillery, rendered the most valuable service on both the fifteenth and sixteenth. A battery was never required in any position that it was not promptly put there. The officers of all the batteries engaged behaved with great gallantry, as did their men. The artillery practice on both those days was splendid. Surgeon Heard, Medical Director; Surgeon Bromley, Medical Inspector; and Captain Towsley, Chief of Ambulances, performed their duties most satisfactorily. Ample preparations had been made in advance for the wounded, and humane and efficient care was promptly rendered them. Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes, Chief Quartermaster, and Captain

Hodgdon, Chief Commissary, performed the duties of their respective departments in a satisfactory manner. To the officers of every grade, and to the brave, but nameless men in the ranks, my grateful thanks for the cheerful, gallant, and effective manner in which every duty was performed, are due, and are hereby officially rendered.

I am, General,
Very respectfully
Your obedient servant,
T. J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, commanding.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GROSE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, FOURTH }
CORPS, HUNTSVILLE, ALA., JANUARY 6, 1865. }

Captain:

SIR: I have the honor to report the part taken by my command in the battles at Nashville, Tennessee, on the fifteenth and sixteenth of December, 1864. Pursuant to orders from division commander, I moved my brigade from its position in front of Nashville, near the Franklin pike, to the right of the Hillsboro pike. Six regiments marched with me at daylight on the morning of the fifteenth. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, being on picket, followed as soon as relieved. My effective force was two thousand one hundred and ninety. The order of battle was to be by divisions in echelon, forward on the right. My brigade was formed on the right of the Hillsboro pike, and in front of our fortifications surrounding the city; the Second division of the Fourth corps on my right, the First brigade of our division on my left. Of my command, the Eighty-fourth Illinois, the Eightieth Illinois, and Ninth Indiana, were in the front line, from right to left, in the order named; the Seventy-fifth Illinois, Thirtieth, and Eighty-fourth Indiana, in the second line. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, when relieved from picket, came up in reserve. The lines of the enemy ran at right angles with the Franklin and Granny White pikes, and continued in the same direction on to a hill near to the left of the Hillsboro pike, where it made an angle obliquely to the rear, fronting the Hillsboro pike, and covering well his left flank of his main line. My position was immediately in front of the angle, as above-described, of the enemy's lines. The Sixteenth corps, on the right of our corps, which was to move forward in echelon to us, had much further to move and skirmish over more ground than we, before reaching the enemy's main line; hence the forenoon was used in the Sixteenth corps swinging around and driving in the outer lines of the enemy so as to meet his main lines at the same time our corps would, in a general advance. Upon an intervening ridge, half way distant from where my lines were formed and the enemy's main lines, were his lines of outposts, and about six hundred yards from where we formed. At about noon our corps lines moved forward and drove in the enemy's out-

posts; my front line capturing several prisoners and sustaining some loss, mostly from artillery. We occupied the ridge that had been in possession of the enemy, with our skirmishers well advanced down the further slope. While in this position I suggested to the corps commander that if another intervening eminence to the left of my command, and in front of Colonel Kerby's brigade, was carried, and the enemy's outposts driven therefrom, I thought I could then advance over the valley in my front and ascend the hill, and carry the enemy's main line and his artillery, that had been dealing roughly with us. The corps commander said it should be done. In a few minutes thereafter I received directions from the division commander to advance, in conjunction with Colonel Kerby's brigade, on my left, which was then commencing to move. I sounded the forward, and advanced my front line down the slope, over hedges and stone fences, across a narrow valley, and to a large stone fence at the base of the enemy's hill, about four hundred yards from his main works and battery in the angle, as I have above described. Colonel Kerby's brigade advanced equally as far. The division on my right did not come up until some time after. Some time was consumed in this position in preparing for the assault, our skirmishers gradually crawling up the hill. In this position my two left regiments in the front line had crossed and lay to the left of the Hillsboro pike. At about four o'clock the corps and division commanders, I think, were on the lines to the left. I discovered preparations for the advance in that direction, and the lines began to move. I ordered the forward, and the whole lines from right to left, as far as I could see, advanced rapidly. The Eightieth Illinois, my centre regiment, struck the enemy's works at the angle, the Eighty-fourth Illinois to the right, and the Ninth Indiana to the left. The struggle was soon over, the enemy routed, leaving four pieces of artillery and some prisoners in this part of their works. My two left regiments, without further orders, and without stopping to count their trophies or captures, pursued the fleeing enemy beyond his works about six hundred yards, and was anxious for further pursuit. It was now nightfall; we formed and readjusted our lines, and attempted pursuit; succeeded in crossing the Granny White pike, moving along the enemy's works to the left and east, when the darkness prevented further movements, and we threw up some works at our front lines and rested for the night. At daylight, on the morning of the sixteenth, I was permitted and moved my command to the front, crossed a creek, and occupied the abandoned works of the enemy to the right of the Franklin pike. Skirmishing was now going on in front. We soon advanced to another abandoned line of works; and after considerable moving about near the pike, and the position of the enemy being ascertained, I was directed, and near noon formed in line on the right of the Second division of our corps, and some distance

to the right of the pike, and on the left of the Second brigade of our division; the Seventy-fifth Illinois, Eighty-fourth Indiana, and Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania in the front line, from right to left, in the order named; the Eighty-fourth Illinois and Ninth Indiana in the second line; the Eightieth Illinois and Thirtieth Indiana in the third line. The enemy's lines were now in plain view, and skirmishing and artillery firing were briskly going on. The ground to my front was open; mostly a farm, with a ravine running obliquely across my front to the left, and which I had to cross before reaching the enemy's lines. A little after noon the advance was ordered, and the whole line moved as far as I could see either way. We soon drove in the enemy's skirmishers to their outposts, or first works, and assaulted and carried them. On gaining these works I discovered the Second division to my left, moving beyond towards the main line of the enemy's works, which was about four hundred yards to my front. I also ordered the forward, but as I was starting I discovered the line to my right was not moving, and I halted my two right regiments, seeing they could not advance alone without a severe flank fire upon them. The left regiment, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Colonel Rose, moved forward on the right of the Second division to within a few paces of the enemy's main works. The Second division being repulsed, Colonel Rose's regiment also fell back to the first line gained, which we strengthened and maintained under a severe fire from the enemy's main line. We were now safely in this position and ready for another move. Near four o'clock the fighting was very severe far to our right, and it was discovered that our forces had turned the rebel left, and was "rolling" them. The assault was taken up from right to left all along our lines. My front moved in conjunction with the lines on my right. The engagement now became general. The enemy's lines were soon carried, with many prisoners, and all his artillery that were in his works. The scene was magnificent—the grandest I have beheld during the war. Most of the enemy in my front were captured, with three pieces of artillery. The enemy's trenches were strewn with arms, accoutrements, and camp equipage. The officers of the three

front regiments, with many private soldiers, led the van, cheering onward, as did those who followed in the rear lines.

Lamented Adjutant Gregory, Eighty-fourth Indiana, fell when within about one hundred yards of the enemy's works, from an artillery ball or shell, while pressing forward and encouraging his regiment. May kind remembrances follow him.

My brigade moved forward of all other troops on the right of the Franklin pike, so that my skirmishers covered the mountain pass at Brentwood at nightfall, where we rested for the night. Early next morning the pursuit was continued—my brigade in front. Our forces continued to press the enemy until his remainder, not killed, wounded, or captured, had crossed the Tennessee River, about one hundred and ten miles from Nashville. We pursued under bad weather, over bad roads, and with great fatigue and hard labor to the command, to Lexington, Alabama; from thence to this place (Huntsville).

The regimental commanders, Colonel Bennett, Colonel Rose, Colonel Suman, Lieutenant-Colonel Morton, Major Taylor, Captain Lawton, and Captain Cunningham, with their officers and men, have my grateful thanks for their willing obedience to orders, their brave and efficient execution of every duty upon the battle-field and during the campaign.

My command routed the enemy from his lines and positions, containing seven pieces of artillery: four on the first and three on the second days; capturing a large number of small arms, with twelve captains, twenty-three lieutenants, and six hundred and six enlisted men prisoners, as shown by copies of vouchers hereto attached. It is hoped that credit will not be given or claimed for prisoners, without vouchers. The trophies captured are shown by separate special reports from regiments, and have been forwarded.

I am indebted to my staff officers, and non-commissioned staff, for their interest manifested in the action and welfare of the command, and their prompt and efficient service on the battle-field and during the march.

The following table shows the casualties in the command, viz.:

COMMANDS.	OFFICERS.			MEN.			TOTAL.
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	
Seventy-fifth Illinois.....	..	2	..	22	2	..	6
Eightieth Illinois.....	..	1	..	22	5	..	7
Eighty-fourth Illinois.....	..	1	7	1	9
Ninth Indiana.....	..	1	17	..	18
Thirtieth Indiana.....	6	..	6
Eighty-fourth Indiana.....	1	19	..	20
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania.....	1	15	..	16
Total.....	2	4	..	4	71	1	82

I miss the gallant young officer, Lieutenant Parrott, Seventy-fifth Illinois, one of my Aides, who fell in the second day's battle, badly wounded in the thigh.

Whilst I rejoice that the number of casualties is not large, yet I deeply regret the loss of such excellent and brave soldiers. Lieutenant Baldwin, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, an excellent and brave young officer, fell in the second day's battle, at his post, and died as heroes die.

For further particulars of the part taken by each regiment respectively, reference is made to reports of regimental commanders herewith forwarded.

I have the honor to be, Captain,
Your obedient servant,
W. GROSE,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

FRANK BINGHAM,
Captain, and A. A. Gen.

Doc. 18.

REGULAR AND VOLUNTEER FORCES.

In the Senate of the United States, on December fourth, 1861, Mr. Wilkinson asked, and by unanimous consent obtained leave, to bring in the following bill, which was read twice, referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be printed :

A BILL,

To abolish the distinction now existing between the regular and volunteer forces of the United States.

SECTION 1. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of volunteer regiments or corps now in military service of the United States for the period of three years, or during the war, or who may hereafter enter the said service for said period, shall hereafter have all the rights, privileges, and benefits hereafter granted to the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of the regular army of the United States, and said officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of volunteers, shall form, and be hereafter considered, a part of the regular army of the United States.

SEC. 2. And be it further enacted, That all such volunteer regiments of foot shall be considered regiments of infantry, and shall be numbered in the same series as the (19) regular regiments of infantry now in the service of the United States; the oldest of such volunteer regiments of infantry to be called the (20th) United States infantry; the next oldest the (21st), and so on until all such regiments now in service, and that may hereafter come into service, be numbered in the same series.

SEC. 3. And be it further enacted, That all such volunteer regiments of cavalry now in the service of the United States be numbered in the

same series with the (6) regular regiments of cavalry in the service of the United States, in the manner prescribed in the third section of this act for the regiments of infantry.

SEC. 4. And be it further enacted, That all such volunteer regiments of artillery now in the service of the United States be numbered in the same series with the (5) regular regiments of artillery now in the service of the United States, in the manner prescribed in the third section of this act for the regiments of infantry.

SEC. 5. And be it further enacted, That promotions shall hereafter be made as they have been heretofore made, except that no regard shall be had to the fact that the vacancy to be filled is in an old or a new regiment, or that the officer to be promoted belongs to an old or a new regiment.

SEC. 6. And be it further enacted, That the commissions given by Governors of States to such volunteer officers shall be considered the same as if given by the President of the United States, and the officers holding them shall take rank according to the date of such commission.

SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That all vacancies hereafter occurring in said volunteer regiments shall be filled by the President according to existing laws and regulations for the government of the army of the United States.

SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That all laws, regulations, articles of war, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this act, be, and the same are hereby repealed.

On the seventeenth of December, reported this bill without amendment, and accompanied it with the following adverse report :

The Committee on Military Affairs and the Militia, to whom was referred Senate bill, "to abolish the distinction now existing between the regular and volunteer forces of the United States," having had the same under consideration, report:

That they have given the subject that careful attention which its great importance seemed to demand at their hands. The object of the bill is clearly set forth in its title. It proposes a radical change in that branch of the public service, which, in the present condition of affairs, is almost the sole reliance of the country. A change so sweeping as the abrogation of the line between the regular and volunteer systems of military service, would, even in the most ordinary and peaceful times, have been fraught with the gravest consequences, and would have arrested the attention, if it had not excited the alarm, of the whole country. At this moment, with over half a million of new troops in the field, drawn thither from civil pursuits, and, as a mass, without previous knowledge of the business of arms—a vast body, imperfect yet in drill, and greatly wanting in discipline—it seems to your committee the least propitious of all

times to attempt the introduction of any radical change affecting the character and organization of the military forces of the republic.

The committee are free to confess, therefore, that leaving out of account all considerations touching the constitutional right and power of Congress involved, the mere object of the bill is one which they could not commend at the present juncture, except upon grounds of the most urgent and imminent necessity; and, in the opinion of the committee, no such necessity now exists, nor is any likely to exist in the future.

Passing, however, from the consideration of the object of the bill to its subject matter, the committee find serious grounds of objection to it, both in respect of its unconstitutionality and its inexpediency. No fact is more clearly deducible from the Constitution than this, that there should always exist in the country two different and distinct classes of military organizations: the one, a permanent organization to be raised, supported, armed, and disciplined by, and to belong to, and represent, the whole Union, as a Federal army; the other, a temporary organization, to be raised by the respective States, whenever the exigencies of public danger, in the obstruction of the laws, the raising of insurrections, and the fact of invasions, should necessitate the use of a larger force than that possessed by the Federal Government, to be called into being only upon extraordinary occasions, to preserve their distinct character as volunteers or militiamen during the term of their service, and to be disbanded again when the occasion which called them forth had passed away.

The absolute and continually existing necessity of an army to maintain the power and dignity of the nation; the constitutional prohibition that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress," "keep troops;" and the express authority granted by the Constitution to Congress, "to raise and support armies," are all confirmatory, beyond question, of the right, power, and duty of the Government to maintain a regular standing army as a Federal establishment; while the clauses of the Constitution which provide for "calling forth the militia," and for their arming, discipline, and governance by Congress, in "reserving to the States, respectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training" them, while "employed in the service of the United States," mark the latter as a fundamentally separate and distinct organization, and one which cannot, under the Constitution, be amalgamated with, and made a part of, the regular army.

The committee, therefore, are of the opinion that, as the volunteers were recruited under State authority, and constitute a part of the militia system of the country, the clause of the bill which provides that the "officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates of volunteers shall form, and hereafter be considered, a part of the regular army of the United

States," is in violation of the Constitution, and cannot become law. The provision of the bill above recited, and which embodies its whole substance, being thus, in the opinion of the committee, violative of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, they would be justified, perhaps, in closing their report, at this point, with a recommendation that the bill do not pass; but they find, on examination, that the details of the bill are as objectionable as its general features.

The sixth section provides "that the commissions given by Governors of States to such volunteer officers shall be considered the same as if given by the President of the United States, and the officers holding them shall take rank according to the date of such commissions." It is believed that the Constitution of the United States interposes an obstacle against such officers being "considered" officers of the regular army by any such process. The second clause of the second section of Article II. of the Constitution, provides that the "President shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law." It is further provided, that "Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments." No one who considers the subject will assume that officers of the army belong to that "inferior" class specified in the latter clause, whose appointment can vest solely in the President. On the contrary, a uniform interpretation has been given to both these clauses by Congress since the foundation of the Government; and, according to that interpretation, all officers of the rank, dignity, and responsibility of officers of the regular army, have been held to belong to that higher grade specified in the first of these clauses, whose appointment could only be constitutionally made "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."

The seventh section of the bill provides "that all vacancies hereafter occurring in said volunteer regiments shall be filled by the President, according to existing laws and regulations for the government of the Army of the United States." This section is open to the same objection as the preceding one; for, while the Constitution (section 8, article 1) gives Congress the power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions," and "to provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States," the right of "the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress," is, by the same section, "reserved to the States respectively." The committee are not able to reconcile the proposition

of the bill, that the President shall fill all vacancies occurring in the volunteer regiments, with this counter requirement of the Constitution.

The eighth section repeals all laws and parts of laws conflicting with the provisions of the bill under consideration. Repealing thus the law or laws under which the volunteers enlisted and were mustered into the service, this section would, in the opinion of your committee, disband every volunteer regiment now in the field.

The committee believe that the distinction which the Constitution has drawn between the regular and the militia service is too plain to need further elucidation, and too well grounded to be abrogated by a simple act of Congress, even in these revolutionary times. It is not doubted that Congress has power to increase the regular army to the number contemplated by the bill under consideration, or to any larger number deemed necessary for the protection and vindication of the Union and its laws, but it is doubted that the Congress possess power, in defiance of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, to transmute volunteers into regulars and regulars into volunteers. The two systems are made different and distinct in their whole object and organization, by the Constitution itself, and they must be kept so by law.

Had your committee felt no distrust of the present as the proper time for effecting radical changes in our military system, nor found any constitutional embarrassments in the way of recommending the passage of the bill by the Senate, there exist other substantial objections which would alone impel them to withhold such recommendation.

Our people are not a military people. Practicing the gentler arts of peace, we have been builders, not destroyers; and the instruments by which we have reclaimed a land from barbarism to civilization have not been the gun, the sabre, and the lance, but the plough, the loom, and the anvil. The genius of our people has thus been averse to war.

Our people are jealous of their personal liberty, and are impatient of restraint. Enjoying, in a larger degree than the people of any other country, freedom of action and of speech, they do not willingly yield such enjoyment, except in the presence of some great public danger, which requires the sacrifice of individual comfort to the general good. It is thus that the dispositions of our people have harmonized with the true interests of our country. A large military establishment is the bane of any nation, exhausting its resources, and endangering its liberties. Happily for us, the unerring instincts of our virtuous, intelligent masses, have uniformly thwarted all the attempts of ambitious men to create great standing armies; and the saving of our wealth, which has made us strong, and the preservation of our institutions, which has left us free, is owing, more than to all other causes, to the peaceful temper of our people, and to their jealous love of personal freedom.

The deep-seated prejudice against the profes-

sion of arms as an employment, has been amply illustrated since the beginning of this rebellion. When the President called upon the country for volunteers, more than a million of citizens tendered themselves for this branch of the military service. When, on the other hand, the Congress, by the act of twenty-ninth of July last, authorized the addition of eleven regiments to the regular army, the people gave, comparatively, no response. It is true that the offices of these new regiments were quickly applied for and appointed; but their ranks remain unfilled to this day. No fact could demonstrate more fully than this the repugnance of the great mass of the people against entering the regular army as common soldiers.

The Congress recognized this popular repugnance in the act above referred to; for, in the fifth section, the term of enlistments made during the years 1861 and 1862 is reduced from five years to the volunteer term of three years, and in all respects, as to bounties already allowed, or to be allowed, the regular recruit is placed upon the same footing as the volunteer. In spite of all this, the fact remains that the volunteer enlistments have been more than fifty to one over the enlistments in the regular service. And this is a fact, the significance of which your committee do not feel at liberty to disregard. It shows that the people consider service in the ranks of the regular army as a personal degradation. They have, in following their instincts and prejudices, unconsciously voted upon the proposition of the bill under review, that the "volunteers shall form, and be hereafter considered, a part of the regular army of the United States," and their verdict is before the country, protesting, nearly a hundred voices to one, against its adoption.

If, therefore, there were no objections against the measure proposed, either in respect of the time when it is to go into effect, or of the constitutional barriers which stand in its way, the fact here demonstrated, that, with the vast bulk of the grand army now enlisted for the defence of the Union, the measure will be regarded as one of degradation, and as an outrage upon their rights and character, would, of itself, determine the committee to report against its passage.

If, however, it shall be considered that your committee have misconceived the whole subject under consideration, and that they have been in error in regarding the regular as the least popular branch of the military service, they would yet be inclined to doubt the expediency of the change proposed. They can realize that if the regular branch of the army be considered the most desirable, its own character, and that of the volunteer branch may be improved by keeping the two organizations separate and distinct, as they now are. In such a view, the transfer from an inferior to a superior branch of the service, would be an ever present object of ambition, stimulating the volunteer to a higher valor, and to the more faithful discharge of his duties; while its beneficial effects would soon



MAJ. GEN. G. W. ...

WEST COAST

be shown upon the regular branch, in improving its material and tone, and making it in all respects the picked army of the world. The committee do not feel authorized to propose any measure of this character, in connection with this report, but they respectfully refer the suggestion to the consideration of the Senate.

It is not deemed necessary by your committee to enter at further length upon the discussion of the measure proposed in the bill submitted for their examination. The arguments against it which might be drawn from its tendency to a dangerous centralization of power in the hands of the Federal government; the manifest injustice which would be done to the officers of the regular service, whose education and pursuits have been of a character to fit them peculiarly for the intelligent practice of the profession of arms, by reducing them to a level with volunteer officers, lacking both in professional skill and experience; the injustice, also, on the other hand, of forcing untaught volunteer officers into direct competition with practiced regulars, by placing them on the same footing, and thus requiring of them the same knowledge and proficiency; these, and other arguments which might be brought forward, your committee have not thought proper to advance. It is believed that enough has already been said to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Senate that the bill is wanting in every essential quality which would justify its enactment into a law.

The committee, in conclusion, recommend that the military service of the country shall be permitted to remain undisturbed upon the basis where it was placed by the Constitution. Upon that basis the military affairs of the government have been satisfactorily managed ever since the government itself has had existence; and regulars and volunteers, in following the instincts of their patriotism, and in pursuing the generous rivalry which springs from the distinct character of their organizations, have been at once the defence and the glory of the republic.

The committee report the bill back to the Senate, with a recommendation that it do not pass.

Doc. 19.

THE SIEGE OF SUFFOLK, VIRGINIA.

GENERAL JOHN J. PECK'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES, SUFFOLK, VA., }
May 6, 1863.

Colonel D. T. Van Buren, Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of Virginia:

On the twenty-second September, 1862, I was ordered to Suffolk, with about nine thousand men, to repel the advance of Generals Pettigrew and French from the Blackwater, with fifteen thousand men.

No artificial defences were found, nor had any plan been prepared.

Situated at the head of the Nansemond River, with the railway to Petersburg and Weldon,

Suffolk is the key to all the approaches to the mouth of the James River on the north of the Dismal Swamp. Regarding the James as second only in importance to the Mississippi for the Confederates, and believing that sooner or later they would withdraw their armies from the barren wastes of Northern Virginia to the line of the James, and attempt the recovery of Portsmouth and Norfolk, as ports for their iron-clads and contraband trade, I prepared a system, and on the twenty-fifth commenced Fort Dix. From that time until the present, I spared no pains for placing the line of the river and swamp in a state of defence. My labors alarmed the authorities at Richmond, who believed I was preparing a base for a grand movement upon the rebel capital, and the whole of the Blackwater was fortified, as well as Cypress Swamp and Birchen and Chipok Rivers. This line rests upon the James, near Fort Powhatan.

About the twenty-sixth of February, Lieutenant-General Longstreet was detached from Lee's army, and placed in command of the Department of Virginia, with headquarters at Petersburg; of his corps fifteen thousand were on the Blackwater, and fifteen thousand between Petersburg and the river, near the railway. This distribution enabled him to concentrate in twenty-four hours within a few miles of Suffolk, and looked threatening. Reports were circulated and letters written to the effect that Longstreet was in South Carolina and Tennessee, with all his forces, with the view of throwing me off my guard.

My information was reliable, and I fully advised the department of the presence of this force, and on the fourteenth of March, Getty's division, Ninth corps, reported for duty.

Early in April deserters reported troops moving to the Blackwater, that many bridges were being constructed, and that a pontoon train had arrived from Petersburg.

On the sixth I was advised that General Foster was in great need of troops, and asked to send him three thousand. I replied, no soldiers ought to leave the department, but I would spare that number, provided they could be supplied at short notice. On the tenth, at 4:30 P. M., as the troop train was leaving, I was informed of the contents of a captured mail by General Viele, to the effect that General Longstreet would attack me at once with from forty to sixty thousand; that he had maps, plans, and a statement of my force, and that General Hill would co-operate. On the eleventh, Hood's division followed up my cavalry returning from Blackwater on the South Quay roads, and about four P. M. captured, without a shot, the cavalry outposts. Others followed on other roads, and a surprise in open day was attempted. The signal officers, under Captain Tamblin, rendered most signal service. Lieutenant Thayer held his station for a long time, in spite of the rifle-men about him.

On the twelfth, about noon, Pickett's division advanced on the Sommerton, Jenkins on the

Edenton, and a large column on the river, by the Providence Church road. Much fine skirmishing took place on all these roads, but the pickets were pressed back and the enemy was not checked until he came within artillery range. He sustained some loss, and fell back a few miles to his line of battle.

On the thirteenth the enemy skirmished with our light troops on all the approaches. On the Sommerton, Colonel Foster handled him very roughly, driving him back and restoring his picket line at sundown. On the river the contest was sharp and long, but the batteries and gunboats held the enemy at bay.

On the fourteenth, Lieutenant Cushing, United States Navy, was hotly engaged for several hours with a large force at the mouth of the West Branch. His loss was severe; but the enemy suffered much, and had some artillery dismantled.

The enemy opened a ten-gun battery near the Norfleet House, for the purpose of destroying the gunboats and of covering a crossing. Lieutenant Samson, with the Mount Washington, West End, and Stepping Stones, engaged the battery for some hours in the most gallant manner, but was compelled to drop down to the West Branch.

The Mount Washington, completely riddled and disabled, grounded, as did the West End, and both were towed off by the Stepping Stones. The rudder of the Alert was broken.

Several batteries on the river were opened with fine effect, and others were pushed with all despatch towards completion. More or less skirmishing and artillery fire on all portions of the lines.

In the night the Smith Briggs, lying near my headquarters, was attacked, but Captain Lee and the guns of the Draw-bridge repulsed the enemy.

Fifteenth.—The force between Suffolk and West Branch, last night, was reported by the best authorities at ten thousand, with a pontoon train, under the immediate command of General French. About noon our batteries, under direction of General Getty, below the mouth of Jericho Creek, were warmly engaged with the Norfleet battery. Four of the rebel twenty-pounder rifles were dismantled, and the battery was silenced.

A party sent out on the Edenton road captured the camp equipage of one regiment. Fear of an ambush alone prevented taking many prisoners.

Seventeenth.—Major Stratton, with a force of cavalry, held South Mills, which is the key to nearly all the approaches from North Carolina on the south side of the Dismal Swamp.

There was much skirmishing on all the avenues of approach, with some field artillery. General Terry's front was much annoyed from the first day by the near approach of riflemen. Under his orders the enemy was signally punished.

General French's engineer was taken pri-

oner by Lieutenant Cushing's pickets. He was laying out works, and had a map of Suffolk, which he tore in pieces.

Eighteenth.—The enemy was very active in throwing up new batteries and rifle-pits along the river. A heavy one was in progress near the mouth of West Branch, on Hill's Point.

Admiral Lee, United States Navy, ordered all the boats out of the upper Nansmond, lest they should be destroyed, leaving the whole defence of the river to the land forces. The Admiral was urged to reconsider his orders. Upon my representation the order was temporarily suspended.

Nineteenth.—About dusk General Getty and Lieutenant Samson executed most successfully a plan which had been agreed upon for crossing the river and capturing Battery Huger, at the mouth of the West Branch. The Eighty-ninth New York and Eighth Connecticut were taken over on the Stepping Stones. Five pieces of artillery were captured, nine (9) officers, and one hundred and twenty (120) soldiers. It was well conceived, ably conducted, and reflects great honor on the combined arms. Lieutenant Samson suggested the enterprise, landed with four of his howitzers, and played a most brilliant part. Captain Stevens was conspicuous for his gallant conduct in this affair, and deserves mention; also Lieutenants McKechine and Faxon, Aides of General Getty.

Twentieth.—Major Stratton visited Elizabeth City, North Carolina, and found it abandoned by our troops. He found General Longstreet's pickets in the vicinity of Sandy Cross.

Twenty-first.—The command was highly honored by a visit from Major-General Halleck, Commander-in-Chief, accompanied by Major-General Dix.

Twenty-second.—A heavy rain storm commenced, suspending all fatigue labors; but adding materially to the strength of the swamp on the left flank.

Twenty-fourth.—A demonstration was made upon the enemy's right flank on the Edenton road, under General Corcoran, Colonels Foster and Spear, while a feint was made on the Sommerton by Colonel Buler. The enemy was driven in confusion from all his advance points and rifle-pits, back upon the main line of defence behind the dam and swamp at Darden's Mill. A force, estimated at about fifteen thousand, was believed to be massed on that front. The object of the move was attained, and the command withdrawn. Colonels Beach, Drake, and Murphy, had provisional brigades, and handled them extremely well. Captain Simpson commanded the artillery.

Twenty-fifth.—Information was received of the arrival of heavy artillery from Petersburg. Troops were reported on this side of the Chowan, on the way from General Hill, under General Garnett.

Twenty-seventh.—Major Stratton occupied Camden Court House, and burned a ferry boat of the enemy's. The rebels were very active at

night, chopping, moving troops, and signaling. A new battery of three guns was opened by them below Norfleet battery. Chopping parties were broken up by the Redan and Mansfield battery. They re-occupied the Hills Point battery in the night.

The steamers Commerce and Swan, under the volunteer pilotage of Lieutenants Rowe and Norton, of the Ninety-ninth New York, ran down past the batteries in the night, but not without many shots. These officers are entitled to much credit for this service.

Twenty-eighth.—Suffolk was visited by a heavy storm. A rebel work for several guns was discovered on the river.

Twenty-ninth.—The Honorable Secretary of State, William H. Seward, paid a visit, in company with Major-General Dix, to this command.

Thirtieth.—The enemy opened early this morning with one Whitworth, one thirty and thirty-five-pounder Parrott. Towards night they opened fire upon the Commodore Barney, and the battery was silenced by the Barney (Lieutenant Cushing, United States Navy), and Captain Norris' battery, in Fort Stevens.

May first.—There was a sharp skirmish in General Terry's front, about five p. m. The enemy, reinforced largely, was held in check from the guns of Nansemond, South Quay, and Rosecrans, with considerable loss.

Another brigade, from North Carolina, was reported to have joined Longstreet.

Third.—A reconnoissance in force was made by Generals Getty and Harland on the enemy's left flank. The troops crossed at nine a. m., at the Draw-bridge, under the fire of Battery Mansfield, Onondaga, and the Smith Briggs, and seized the plateau near Pruden's house, in spite of sharpshooters in the rifle-pits, orchards, and woods. The advance was slow, every inch being hotly contested. The movement resulted in bringing heavy reinforcements for the enemy. His numbers and artillery failed to check the troops. By night the enemy was massed on his strong line of intrenchments, and under the fire of a numerous artillery. The purpose of the movement having been attained, the troops were directed to remain on the ground, awaiting events.

In conjunction with the above, Major Crosby crossed the Nansemond, near Sleepy Hole, with the Twenty-first Connecticut, a section of the Fourth Wisconsin battery, and eleven Mounted Rifles, at four a. m., and pushed on and occupied Chuckatuck, driving out three hundred rebel cavalry. He skirmished all the way to Reed's Ferry, capturing sixteen prisoners, and then returned to the river, under the cover of the gunboats.

At the same time Colonel Dutton crossed in boats and occupied Hill's Point with the Fourth Rhode Island, a portion of the One Hundred and Seventeenth New York, and a detachment from the Commodore Barney. He advanced some distance, but was met by a superior force, posted strongly in the woods, and after much

skirmishing returned upon Hill's Point, from which the enemy could not dislodge him.

I again take pleasure in acknowledging the valuable services of Lieutenants Cushing, Samson, and Harris, United States Navy. These officers rendered every assistance in their power in crossing the river. Lieutenant Cushing sent a boat, howitzer, and detachment, with the Fourth Rhode Island, under Colonel Dutton.

I regret to state that Colonel Ringgold, of the One Hundred and Third New York, lost his life from two wounds, while leading on his men in the most gallant manner. He was a meritorious officer.

Fourth.—About nine p. m., on the third, the enemy commenced retiring upon the Blackwater. His strong line of pickets prevented deserters and contrabands from getting through with the information, until he had several hours the start. Generals Corcoran and Dodge were promptly in pursuit on the Edenton road, while Colonel Foster followed upon the Somerton. By six a. m. Colonel Foster was pressing the rear of a formidable column on the old road near Leesville. He was compelled, from the smallness of his force, to wait for the command under General Corcoran, and could not again strike the column before it reached the river. The cavalry of Colonel Spear and Colonel Onderdonk were pushed on numerous roads, and rendered valuable services, procuring information and capturing prisoners.

Thus ends the *present* investment, or siege of Suffolk, which had for its object the recovery of the whole country south of the James, extending to the Albemarle Sound, in North Carolina, the ports of Norfolk, and Portsmouth, eighty miles of new railroad iron, the equipment of two roads, and the capture of all the United States forces and property, with some thousands of contrabands.

General Longstreet, finding that an assault at the outset upon works defended by one-half his own force, would be expensive and uncertain, and having failed in turning either flank, decided to besiege the place, and asked for reinforcements. Probably not less than two divisions joined from General Hill. The works are constructed on the most extensive scale, and in the most approved manner. The rules and regulations prescribed by military authorities for the conduct of siege operations, have been observed. Some idea may be formed of this so-styled "*foraging expedition*" when I state that not less than ten miles of batteries, covered ways, and rifle-pits, have been thrown up. Most of the artillery was protected by embrasures. The parapets were from twelve to fifteen feet in thickness, and well rivetted, while the covered ways were from eight to ten feet. Longstreet had a wire laid from the Blackwater, and telegraphic arrangements throughout his lines.

Results.

We have taken five pieces of the famous Fauquier artillery, about four hundred prisoners,

some rifles and camp equipage. Probably five hundred or six hundred have been killed and wounded, and five hundred have deserted, making a total loss of at least fifteen hundred.

Our own killed is forty-four, wounded two hundred and two, missing fourteen, and total two hundred and sixty.

All the *morale, prestige* and glory belong to the patient and brave officers and men of the Federal army.

Besides these brilliant results, this command has held the masses of the enemy around Suffolk, in order that General Hooker might secure the crowning victory of the war, and it is entitled to a share of the glory that may accrue to his arms.

My thanks are due all officers and soldiers who have worked cheerfully and patriotically on these fortifications. They now see that their labors are not in vain.

The truth of history requires that I should state that a small portion of the One Hundred and Twelfth New York became home-sick and discontented, and said that they came to fight and not to dig. This feeling was seized upon by politicians, and since the adjournment of the Senate I have been advised that efforts were made to defeat my confirmation in consequence thereof.

Soldiers who love their country will cheerfully perform any duty assigned them; men who know how to build fortifications, will know how to defend or assault them. It should not be forgotten that the principal rebel successes have been behind intrenchments, as at Manassas, Fredericksburg, Richmond, Vicksburg, Charleston, &c., &c.

It is an unpleasant duty to state that most of the Ninth New York, Colonel Hawkins, left this command on the third, by expiration of their term of service, while their comrades were actively engaged with the enemy. It can be regarded only as an unfortunate termination of a hitherto brilliant career of service.

To Generals Corcoran, Terry, Dodge, Harland, Colonels Dutton and Gibbs, commanding fronts lines; Colonels Spear and Onderdonk, of the cavalry; Colonels Gurney and Waddrop, commanding reserves, and Captain Follett, Chief of Artillery, I am under very great obligations for the able, faithful, judicious, and cheerful discharge of every duty incident to their important positions.

General Getty was intrusted with the river line below Onondaga battery, the key of the position, and about eight miles in length; a very difficult line to defend against an enterprising enemy, acquainted with every by-path, and guided by owners of the soil. His responsibilities were of the highest order, and the labors of his troops were incessant. Under his vigilant supervision everything was done that could be for the security of the right flank, and the enemy was foiled in all plans for crossing.

Colonel R. S. Foster, of Indiana, commanding brigade and portion of the front, added fresh

laurels to the high reputation which he established in West Virginia and the Peninsula. He was at home in grand skirmishes, and the enemy always recoiled before him.

General Gordon reported three days before the conclusion of the siege, and was assigned to the command of the reserve division. His long and varied experience rendered his judgment of great value, and I regret that he has been called to another field.

My thanks are due General Viele, of Norfolk, for the prompt transmission of important intelligence, and for the alacrity with which my calls were responded to.

Captain Ludlow, Quartermaster at Norfolk, deserves mention for his untiring efforts in forwarding the main bulk of supplies for this army.

The Medical Department, under the able management of Dr. Hand, was in excellent working order, and equal to every emergency. The wounded were promptly cared for, and spared all unnecessary suffering.

The Commissary Department was admirably managed by the late Captain Bowdish, and since his death by Captain Felt.

Colonel Murphy commanded brigade; Colonel Drake, Fort Union; Colonel Hawkins, Fort Nansemond; Captain Sullivan, Fort Halleck; Colonel Davis, the Draw-bridge Battery; Colonel Worth, Battery Mansfield; Colonel Thorpe, the Redan, and Rosecrans; Captain Johnson, Battery Mowdey; Colonel England, Battery Montgomery; Colonel Pease, Battery Stevens; Colonel McEvilly, Fort Dix, with ability, and their troops were always ready for the enemy.

Major Stratton, Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, was at South Mills watching the operations of the troops from Carolina. By his discretion and energy the rebels were prevented from penetrating the Dismal Swamp.

Captain Tamblin, Lieutenants Seabury, Young, Thayer, Strong and Murray, of the signal corps, have been indefatigable, day and night, and of the greatest service in their departments. Captain Davis shares the above commendation for the few days he was here.

The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Nixon, Ninety-ninth New York; of Captain Morris, Lieutenants Hasbrouck, Hunt, Whitney and Beecher, of the artillery; Lieutenants James, Grant, Macardle, Soederquist, Burlison, Engineers; of Lieutenant Butts, Assistant Provost Marshal, and of Major Wetherell, was conspicuous. Major Stuart, of the Engineer corps, joined for a few days, evincing the same lively interest which characterized his valuable services on the Peninsula.

The command is mainly indebted to the Provost Marshal, Major Smith, of the One Hundred and Twelfth New York, for the good order and cleanliness which has prevailed in the town and camp.

The co-operation of the gunboats, under Lieutenants Cushing, Samson and Harris, United States Navy, sent by Admiral Lee, has been very

effective, and I take great pleasure in acknowledging the gallant services of their officers and crews. The army gunboats, Smith Briggs and West End, commanded by Captain Lee and Lieutenant Rowe, proved invaluable. The Smith Briggs was for many days the only boat above the West Branch, in consequence of the order of Admiral Lee.

My personal staff have all earned a place in this record by their zeal, fidelity, and unremitting labors, day and night, increased by injuries which I sustained from the fall of my horse. Their claims to promotion were established long before the siege of Suffolk: Major Benjamin B. Foster, A. A. G.; Captain George S. Dodge, Quartermaster; Lieutenants Charles R. Stirling and James D. Outwater, Aides-de-Camp; Lieutenant A. B. Johnson, Ordnance Officer, and Lieutenant J. D. Mahon, Judge Advocate.

Doubtless many names have been omitted, but discrimination is impossible where all have done so well.

For the conclusion is reserved the agreeable duty of testifying to the cordial and efficient support I have ever received from Major-General Dix. No request or suggestion has ever escaped his attention, and most of my requirements have been anticipated by his liberal and comprehensive policy.

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

Supplementary.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AND DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, }
NEWBERN, N. C., December 26, 1863.

*Brigadier-General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General
United States Army:*

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following supplementary report, as a part of my report of operations during the siege of Suffolk, in April and May last:

The name of Colonel J. R. McMahon, One Hundred and Sixty-fourth New York, should have been in the paragraph commencing with "Colonel Murphy, commanding brigade."

My right flank rested upon the upper Nansemond for some eight miles, a narrow, shallow, and tortuous stream, offering great facilities to an enterprising enemy for crossing and cutting the communication with Norfolk. Including this, the whole line extending to the Dismal Swamp was from twelve to fifteen miles in length; besides, a force in observation was requisite at South Mills, thirty miles distant—the key of the southern approaches to the Swamp. In view of these and other objections, I advised the withdrawal of the troops to a reduced short line near Portsmouth, after the reduction of the rebel and Union fortifications.

The advance of Pettigrew towards Newbern, and of Hill upon Little Washington, were only feints (our casualties being less than a dozen at both places), made by order of Longstreet some

days before the date fixed for his own advance upon Suffolk, for the purpose of inducing the authorities in North Carolina to call on Virginia for reinforcements. As designed, ten thousand men were asked for North Carolina, of which I was contributing three thousand on the tenth. The information reached Longstreet at Franklin, and he crossed the Blackwater last night.

Major-General Hooker kindly telegraphed that he had advised that General Hill would join Longstreet. The time when the North Carolina troops arrived is material; Major Stratton, of the cavalry, reported the fact on the twentieth, and I did the same on the twenty-fifth; some of them being captured. Major Stratton was correct, for Major-General Foster advised that the enemy retired from Little Washington on the evening of the fifteenth, and that the deserters said the cause was that they were ordered to "*reinforce the army in Virginia.*"

May fourth.—While in full pursuit of the columns of Longstreet and Hill towards the Blackwater, an order was received to despatch General Gordon with a large force to West Point. Ten thousand additional were also ordered to be held in readiness to be moved at a moment's notice, leaving but the ordinary small garrison intact at Suffolk, and, of course, ending offensive operations.

On the fourth of May prisoners were taken representing forty odd regiments and independent commands, which gives some idea of the organization and masses of the enemy.

The many miles of earthworks thrown up by the rebels were constructed by the troops. Least the contrabands should come into my lines, the bulk of them were left on the other side of the Blackwater.

It is proper to remark, that the forces under my command, from September to April, 1863, were rated by the public at twice and even thrice the actual numbers.

I am, very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
NEWBERN, April 17, 1863. }

*Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief,
Washington, D. C.:*

Being about to start with a relieving force to raise the siege of Washington, North Carolina, I learned that the enemy had evacuated the batteries in front of Washington; and deserters say that *the cause* was that they were ordered to *reinforce the army in Virginia.*

I shall march myself, with my force, in pursuit, and endeavor to overtake the enemy.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

J. G. FOSTER,
Major-General, commanding.

GENERAL PECK'S FINAL REPORT.

DEPARTMENT OF THE EAST,
HEADQUARTERS, NEW YORK, MAY 4, 1865. }

General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, United States Army:

I have the honor to transmit the following additional supplementary report upon the siege of Suffolk, and request that it may be attached to the reports already made, and published with them:

On or about the twentieth September, 1864, I gave the following communication to the press, through the columns of the New York *Daily Herald*; General Hooker being then in this city:

SIEGE OF SUFFOLK, CHANCELLORSVILLE.

New York, September 20, 1864.

The truth of history and justice to the little army of Suffolk, demand that I should place this paper before the reading world.

Campaign of 1863.

"The Southern History" has the following on the campaign in April, 1863, which locates the position of Lieutenant-General Longstreet, viz.:

"Now they (the rebels) confronted the enemy from the Rappahannock, and hovered upon his flank, within striking distance, to the Potomac, while another portion of our forces manœuvred almost in the rear, and quite upon the flank, in Norfolk."

Longstreet had been promised sixty thousand men for his spring work, and was ready about the last of March to open the campaign for the recovery of Southern Virginia. He ordered Hill and Pettigrew to make a series of demonstrations at Newbern, Little Washington, and other points in North Carolina, with the design of causing troops to be sent from Norfolk, Fortress Monroe, and other localities. In consequence I was ordered, on the tenth of April, to despatch a considerable portion of my force to General Foster. Longstreet, advised of the order and success of his feints, crossed the Blackwater, and on the same day advanced, with about twenty-eight thousand men, upon Suffolk. On the fifteenth of April, Hill discontinued his feints upon Little Washington, and sent those troops to Suffolk. He followed soon after with the remainder of his command.

The rebel force in North Carolina was estimated by General Foster as very large, and in my judgment far above the real numbers. If his estimate was correct, there must have been with Longstreet, after the concentration, more than fifty thousand men. Probably forty thousand is a safe estimate; and he had associated with him such able West Pointers as Lieutenant-Generals Hill, Hood and Anderson, and Major-Generals Pickett, French and Garnett, &c. The Petersburg *Express* of the fifteenth of April reflected the Confederate expectations in regard to Longstreet's army, in the following:

"Our people are buoyant and hopeful, as they

ought to be. We have in that direction as gallant an army as was ever mustered under any sun, and commanded by an officer who has won laurels in every engagement, from the first Manassas to that at Fredericksburg. Such an army, commanded by such an officer as Longstreet, may be defeated; but such an event is scarcely within the range of possibility."

In spite of the high hopes of the South, the siege was raised during the night of the third of May (twenty-four days), after the construction of from eight to ten miles of covered ways, rifle-pits, field works, and the loss of the celebrated Fauquier battery and some two thousand men.

The rebel press, with few exceptions, admitted the failure, and censured Longstreet. The Richmond *Examiner*, of November twenty-seventh, 1863, pronounced his Knoxville and Suffolk campaigns as parallel failures, and said:

"It was during the parallel campaign of Longstreet against Suffolk that Hooker made his *coup* at Chancellorsville; but he found there Jackson, while Grant had to do with Bragg alone."

The effective Federal force at the outset was nearly fourteen thousand, with three small wooden gunboats. This was distributed on lines of about twelve miles in extent. No defeat was experienced by our arms.

Rappahannock.

During the presence of Longstreet's wing at Suffolk, Lee, with Jackson's wing, was confronted by the army of Hooker. Hooker was advised of every change in my front, and assured that I would hold Longstreet as long as possible in order that he might destroy Lee. He was urged to strike before aid could be sent to the Rapidan.

Perhaps a division, or a portion of one, joined Lee, in spite of the interruption of the communications by Stoneman. Longstreet did not; for his horses and servants fell into our hands near Suffolk, on the fourth of May. No mention of his presence is made in any accounts of Chancellorsville, nor in the "Southern History." Jackson contended with Hooker on the first and second of May, while Early fought Sedgwick, near Fredericksburg. On the third, Stewart succeeded Jackson.

Hooker's and Lee's Forces.

Up to the meeting of Congress, Hooker had made no report to General Halleck, and official data is out of the question. But information is at hand from which an approximation can be made.

Lee's Army.

New York <i>Tribune</i> , May 18, 1863, estimates.....	50,000
New York <i>Tribune</i> , March 26, 1864, estimates.....	47,700
New York <i>Herald</i> , March 26, 1864, estimates.....	64,000
"Southern History" (Pollard's) gives.....	50,000

Hooker's Army.

New York <i>Times</i> gives.....	150,000
"Southern History" gives.....	100,000 to 150,000
New York <i>Tribune</i> , March 26, 1864, gives.....	123,300

The editor of the *Times* had the very best opportunity for getting reliable data, and there are many reasons for accepting his figures as nearest the true ones.

This paper explodes the idea that any material portion of Longstreet's army was transferred to the fields of Chancellorsville. No such theory is entertained in any quarter now; but in the smoke of that disaster it was mooted.

These figures show where the rebel pressure really was, and attest the good conduct of the soldiers and sailors at Suffolk, under the weightiest responsibilities. The army should no longer be deprived of its honors and rewards because of the unexpected reverse on the Rapidan.

Further details cannot be given without trenching upon the official documents. The allusions to Hooker's operations are made solely to shed proper light upon the campaign, and not for the purpose of criticism.

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

My object was to ventilate the spring campaign of 1863, and secure a proper recognition of the services of the army of Suffolk, without criticising the operations of General Hooker.

More than seven months having elapsed without any adverse reply from any quarter, the government and people are warranted in accepting my theory of the campaign as conclusive, and based upon facts and principles of the military art.

Besides the demonstrations made early in April, in North Carolina, by Hill and Pettigrew, Wise made a bold one on Williamsburgh, to favor Longstreet. All were regarded as real. Ten thousand men were asked for North Carolina, and it was thought I would have to contribute for Williamsburgh also.

LONGSTREET'S ARMY

General William Hays, United States Army, was taken prisoner at Chancellorsville, third May, and passed through Lee's army to Richmond. He thinks Longstreet took four divisions, of eight thousand each, in January or February, to Suffolk—thirty-two thousand men.

General Hooker telegraphed, April thirteen: "All of Longstreet's forces that have gone from here, left in January and February."

May second, he telegraphed: "Longstreet has three divisions at Suffolk. When they left Lee they were each eight thousand strong. D. H. Hill is ordered from Washington to reinforce Longstreet's corps."

May second, General Hill reported by letter to Longstreet, the arrival of an "entire division." This arrival was in addition to the forces from Washington, North Carolina.

Spies sent into his camp reported the forces on the Blackwater from thirty thousand to thirty-two thousand.

Union men, deserters, prisoners, and contra-

bands, placed the force that crossed, tenth April, at thirty thousand and over.

Governor Wise had five thousand (Hooker's figures) or more. After his demonstration upon Williamsburgh, he withdrew, and beyond doubt sent a portion of his force to Longstreet.

The troops from North Carolina commenced arriving about the eighteenth or nineteenth of April, having left Little Washington on the fifteenth, *under orders*. Not less than twelve thousand came under Hill, French, and others. General Foster's estimates were very high, and I have not adopted them in consequence.

These, independent of the forces about Richmond, which could always be drawn upon temporarily for any great operation, since Longstreet had two railways.

Among the division commanders were Lieutenant-Generals Hill and Hood, French, Picket, &c. Major-General Anderson was not present, although so reported often—troops claimed to be under some General Anderson, and hence the error.

LONGSTREET NOT AT CHANCELLORSVILLE.

On the twenty-ninth of April I was informed by a member of the Cabinet that the army of the Potomac, in round numbers, reached one hundred and sixty thousand men. Being wholly ignorant of the plans and movements of Generals Hooker and Stoneman, I deemed it probable that at the *crisis* Lee would call for Longstreet, and that the latter might, perhaps, get through with a division.

Had I been advised of General Stoneman's movements on the communications near Richmond, as I should have been, the idea of Longstreet's leaving would not have been entertained.

General Stoneman's report, doubtless, will show that no part of Longstreet's army passed to Lee until some time after Chancellorsville. His reports not being accessible, I addressed him upon the subject; also Generals Meade and Slocum. A brief extract will suffice:

[Extracts.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE OHIO,
LOUISVILLE, KENTUCKY, JANUARY 30, 1866. }

Major-General J. J. Peck:

In regard to the subject therein referred to, I had thought the thing was settled long since, and that it had become a historical fact that Longstreet had no hand whatever in the battle of Chancellorsville, which proved so disastrous to our arms, &c. &c. * * * * *

I have always looked upon it as a most fortunate thing for us that you were enabled to hold Longstreet at Suffolk, and also that Jackson was killed. * * * * *

Very truly,
GEORGE STONEMAN.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
February 16, 1863. }

Major-General J. J. Peck:

DEAR GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of the eighth instant, with the documents enclosed, relating to the defence of Suffolk, in 1863.

The testimony and evidence which you have accumulated, prove most conclusively the importance and value of the services rendered on that occasion by yourself and the gallant army under your command, for which I doubt not full credit will hereafter be awarded you.

Lee's army at Gettysburgh was from forty to fifty thousand stronger than at Chancellorsville, and it is only reasonable to infer that this difference was in front of you at Suffolk.

That with the limited force under your command you should have held in check and defeated the designs of such superior numbers, is a fact of which you may well be proud, and is the most practical proof of your own skill and the gallantry of your troops.

Very respectfully yours,
(Signed) GEORGE G. MEADE,
Major-General.

ARMY OF GEORGIA, HEADQUARTERS LEFT WING, }
SAVANNAH, GA., JANUARY 1, 1865. }

My Dear General:

Your esteemed favor of the twenty-second ultimo, has just come to hand. I was fully convinced, at the battle of Chancellorsville, that the force of the enemy did not exceed fifty thousand men, of all arms, and was satisfied at the time that but a small portion of Longstreet's command was in our front.

I believe that the force of the enemy in your front, at Suffolk, far exceeded your own; and I think the gratitude of the nation is due to you and your gallant army for the important services performed at that point.

I am, General,
Very truly your friend
And obedient servant,
(Signed) H. W. SLOCUM,
Major-General.

Major-General J. J. Peck, New York.

My *theory* is proved by these witnesses from General Hooker's army. No higher evidence can be produced. General Stoneman had all the railways in his hands, just outside of Richmond. General Slocum had the confidence of his commander, and was thanked by him in orders. The President made General Meade the successor of General Hooker, with the concurrence of all his leading officers.

This evidence is in harmony with all that of the army of Suffolk. In my possession is a communication from General Hill to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding department of Virginia and North Carolina, in which he reports the arrival of a "division," and asks for orders. It bears date second May, 1863, and

fell into our hands on the fourth, as also did Longstreet's servants and horses, a few miles from Suffolk.

This division came by the Weldon railway to Franklin, and marched twenty miles, being engaged, on the third, at Suffolk. Had Longstreet wished to send troops to Chancellorsville (third), why did not this division keep the rail? By coming to Suffolk it lost more than two full days.

Longstreet's army did not pass through Richmond until after the tenth of May. The rear guard left the Blackwater on the eleventh, and was met by our exchanged officers, near the city, on the thirteenth or fourteenth of May.

GENERAL LEE'S TESTIMONY.

Lee, in his report of Chancellorsville transmitted to the rebel Congress by Jefferson Davis, December thirty-first, 1863, says of Longstreet, that he "was detached for service south of the James River in February, and did not rejoin the army until after the battle of Chancellorsville."

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S REPORT.

The commanding General visited Suffolk during the investment, and in his annual report, says, viz.: "The rebel General Hill marched towards the Nansemond to reinforce Longstreet, who was investing Suffolk. Failing in his direct assault upon this place, the enemy proceeded to establish batteries for its reduction. General Peck made every preparation for defence of which the place was capable, and retarded the construction of his works, till finally the attempt was abandoned.

TELEGRAMS.

The following telegrams reflect much light upon the campaign:

NORFOLK, April 10, 1863.

Major-General Peck:

I have a man just in. He says that Longstreet has at least 60,000 men, and will attack you as soon as his material is on the ground. They expect to get in your rear, have exact drawings of all your works, and know your force and means. Hood's division is the largest of all. They are building three bridges on the Blackwater, and have a large pontoon train.

E. L. VIELE,
Brig.-General.

NORFOLK, April 10, 1863.

Major-General Peck:

A letter I am reading, written on the train, corroborates what I have telegraphed to you to-day. The date is April seventh—says: "We are massing large bodies of troops on the Blackwater. Have pontoon bridges. Our generals intend to attack Suffolk."

(Signed) E. L. VIELE,
Brig.-General.

NORFOLK, April 10, 1863.

Major-General Peck:

Another letter says, that a Major-General, Lee's right hand man, was down on the Black-water last week, and reconnoitred the whole position.

(Signed) E. L. VIELLE,
Brig.-General.

NORFOLK, April 10, 1863.

Major-General Peck:

I do not think there is much doubt of the truthfulness of the message I sent you. The man was captured with a large mail. He did not give himself up. He told this with the hope of mitigating his punishment, &c.

(Signed) E. L. VIELLE,
Brig.-General.

DEPARTMENT HEAD QUARTERS, }
FORT MONROE, April 10, 1863. }

Major-General Peck:

We have been informed that the enemy have sent bridge material for five bridges from Petersburg, to be used in crossing the Black-water in five places. This information is reliable.

(Signed) D. L. VAN BUREN,
Col. and Asst. Adj.-General.

April, 10, 1863.

Major-General Peck:

Information has been received at Newport News that rebel gunboats are removing channel obstructions from before them, and placing others in their rear, preparatory to coming down the river.

OPERATOR.

In my report of December twenty-fifth, 1863, I stated that on the fourth of May, while in pursuit, a telegram was received directing me to send six thousand men and several batteries to West Point. Ten thousand more were ordered to be held in readiness to move at a moment's notice.

These orders, of course, ended offensive operations. A base was established at West Point, and abandoned when it was found that General Hooker was not likely to advance again.

The present is the proper occasion for saying that the "army of Suffolk" was in no manner connected with the campaign planned by General Hooker. The public has been under the impression that I was charged with a co-operative movement on Richmond. Such was not the case. General Hooker, with his vast army, was confident of destroying Lee, taking the rebel capital at pleasure, and conducted the campaign in his own way.

I volunteered to aid him in so far as possible, but he declined to give any intimation of his plan or his purposes.

For twenty-four days the army of Suffolk held one wing of Lee's army, which outnumbered it nearly two to one (as I assured General Hooker), that he might win the crowning victory

of the war. Had he been successful my command would have been entitled to share the glory with the army of the Potomac.

Is not the "army of Suffolk" entitled to as much credit as if General Hooker had been victorious? Certainly. How that credit shall be estimated, is arrived at by placing Longstreet with Lee at Chancellorsville. If Lee, with fifty odd thousand, forced General Hooker over the Rappahannock, no doubt that with ninety thousand he would have demoralized his army.

Independent of the credit of holding Longstreet's army from Lee, my command is entitled to great honor for saving itself, many thousand contrabands, the Navy Yard, Norfolk, and Portsmouth, two railways, eighty odd miles of track, and the navigation of the James and Hampton Roads.

The value of this latter service may be appreciated by supposing I had been overwhelmed by Longstreet. Defeat at Chancellorsville and Suffolk would indeed have disheartened the people and embarrassed the government at one of the most critical periods of its domestic and foreign relations. With such defeats the nation would have had no glorious Gettysburg in 1863, to gladden loyal hearts by stemming and turning back the aggressive tide of rebellion.

I am, very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

JOHN PECK,
Major-General.

Doc. 20.

CAPTURE OF PLYMOUTH, N. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY AND DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA, }
NEWBERN, NORTH CAROLINA, April 26, 1864. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report upon the loss of Plymouth, which is as full as it can be until General Wessels is able to make his reports, when I will make a supplementary one:

On the twentieth, at seven o'clock, P. M., I received your communication of the seventeenth, in reply to the letter of General Wessels, of the thirteenth, asking for reinforcements. As this letter must have reached your headquarters in the evening of the fourteenth, or early on the fifteenth, a reply could have reached me on the sixteenth in time to have communicated with General Wessels during the evening or night of the seventeenth. Unfortunately, the reply was not written until the seventeenth, and did not arrive on the twentieth until some hours after the fall of Plymouth.

You replied, viz.: "You will have to defend the district with your present force, and you will make such disposition of them as will, in your judgment, best subserve this end."

General Wessels sent his communication direct to your headquarters, to save time, expecting that any aid which might be sent, would come from Virginia, and not North Carolina. He

sent a duplicate to me, with a letter expressing the above views, knowing the reduced state of the force at my disposal. He writes, viz.: "I have no idea of getting any troops, but have always been anxious to see more troops in North Carolina."

Notwithstanding this expression of his sentiments, I had a conference with General Palmer and Commander Davenport, United States Navy, and the heavy gunboat "Tacony," which is equal to two or three regiments, was immediately despatched to Plymouth.

On the eighteenth instant the "Tacony" arrived back from Plymouth, with despatches from General Wessels and Commander Flusser. General Wessels wrote that he did not apprehend any attack, and did not think there was a large force in his front. He expressed the opinion that there was doubt as to the "iron-clad" making its appearance, and believed that she was at Hamilton undergoing repairs or modifications. He wrote on the sixteenth, viz.:

"I have the honor to report that the gunboat 'Tacony' arrived here to-day, but as her presence at this time does not seem to be necessary, I have so informed her commander, and he proposes to return to Newbern to-morrow.

"I cannot learn that there is any considerable force of the enemy on the river now, though such is the report from various sources.

"I very much doubt if there is any design of bringing the thing (iron-clad) down. Still there may be, as they say, when the 'Neuse-Ram' is ready.

"I am desirous of seeing more troops in this State," &c.

Commander Flusser, also, wrote to Commander Davenport, Senior Naval Officer, viz.: "I think General Peck misinterpreted General Wessels' letter. We have had no scare here yet, and not even a small one for several days."

These able commanders had so much confidence in their ability to hold their positions against anything the enemy could bring against them, that they sent back the reinforcements sent them. This action placed me entirely at rest respecting affairs at Plymouth.

On Monday (eighteenth) afternoon, about 5:30 p. m., I received advices by deserters that General Corse was in front of the outposts at Bachelor's Creek, with a large force of all arms, and that General Pickett would attack Little Washington on Tuesday.

This information, taken in connection with that from General Wessels, of the sixteenth instant, respecting the disappearance or diminution of the force in his front, led the authorities here to believe that Little Washington would be attacked immediately. Two steamers loaded with troops, together with the gunboat "Tacony," were despatched to Little Washington.

At an early hour on Tuesday morning, the nineteenth instant, despatches were received from General Wessels and Commander Flusser, announcing an attack by a rebel land force, on the afternoon of the seventeenth instant. This

was the *first* information received from General Wessels subsequent to the sixteenth instant, when the "Tacony" was sent back as above stated. The latest information received, through a contraband, the servant of Captain Stewart, A. A. General, General Wessels' staff, is to the effect that early on Tuesday morning the "iron-clad" had complete control of the Roanoke River, and in conjunction with the floating iron battery—the "Cotton Plant"—was attacking the town in rear, while the land forces were engaging our troops in front.

From this statement it will be seen that the enemy had complete control of the Roanoke River, within a very few hours of the time I received General Wessels' despatch of Sunday night, the seventeenth instant.

On the reception of these despatches, which were very favorable, steamers were despatched with such available infantry as General Palmer could spare, together with supplies of ammunition for the Army and Navy at Plymouth. These steamers were detained in the Albemarle Sound by the gunboats, then lying in Edenton Bay, which had escaped from the "iron-clad" at Plymouth. In my judgment the non-arrival of the infantry at Plymouth, is most fortunate, as they, together with the steamers, beyond doubt, would have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

A steamer with despatches was promptly sent to General Harland, commanding at Little Washington, notifying him of the state of affairs at Plymouth. He was also requested to send down such surplus troops as he might have, to be used at such points as might seem necessary. I also sent despatches for the "Tacony" to proceed at once from Little Washington to Plymouth. Before these despatches arrived, Colonel Dutton, Chief of my Staff, had procured the sailing of the "Tacony" for Plymouth—going on board himself. Colonel Dutton also suggested to General Harland that he should send the steamer "Pilot-Boy" with the Seventeenth Massachusetts volunteers to Plymouth, but General Harland did not feel at liberty to do so, in view of his situation.

All the information received by both the Senior Naval officer, Commander Davenport, and myself, was promptly sent to your headquarters, by both lines of communication.

General Wessells was supplied with provisions, forage, ammunition, tools, and other requisites for a protracted siege. His command numbered some two thousand five hundred at Plymouth, and the casualties were very small, notwithstanding five assaults on Monday. His position was intact up to the appearance of the "iron-clad" and "Cotton Plant" at three a. m., the nineteenth, and but for the loss of the river he could have held the land forces at bay for weeks.

General Wessells and his command, and the navy under the late gallant Lieutenant-Commander Flusser, made a heroic fight worthy of our arms. They deserve well of the country, and

history will record in glowing terms their honorable conduct.

A few days since, I communicated the information, entirely reliable, that floats were being prepared to buoy the "ram" over the principal shoals in the Neuse River, between this place and Kinston. It has been the intention from the first to bring the two "iron-clads" from the Roanoke and Neuse together in an attack upon Newbern. Should this movement be delayed, it will result solely from the exigencies of rebel service in other parts of the Confederacy.

Colonel Ripley, commanding Sub-District of Beaufort, advised me of a contemplated movement upon Fort Macon, down the Banks, and that pontoons were being made with reference to this object. He further advised that it is currently believed in Onslow county, that General Martin has been assigned the same duty as before, to wit: the attack upon Newport Barracks and the railroad.

The reinforcements sent to General Wessells have since been ordered to occupy Roanoke Island. The Chief Engineer has also been there to aid the Commander, in placing the Island in the best state of defense. The Chief Engineer expresses the opinion that the "iron-clad" will have no difficulty in passing through the Croatan Sound, and this opinion is concurred in by the Captains of our Transports.

General Palmer, who is immediately responsible for the safety of Newbern and its appendages, was of the opinion that no more troops should be detached from his command. The Senior Naval Officer did not think it his duty to detach any of the force at his disposal here.

"Iron-clads."

Since our only disaster in North Carolina has resulted from the introduction by the rebels of formidable "iron-clads" in their offensive operations, it becomes very important to show what steps have been taken to advise Major-General Butler, and to protect North Carolina from rebel invasions.

Soon after my arrival, I learned that the "iron-clad" was on the stocks at Edwards' Ferry, and advised the Department Commander in two communications, proposing a raid to burn it. The reply (in September) was, that "the force of the Department will not permit of the proposed movement at present."

September tenth, I asked for a small "iron-clad."

November fifteenth, 1863, I addressed Major-General Butler as follows, viz.:

"During a recent visit at Plymouth, I found the Senior Naval Officer somewhat nervous in consequence of a report having reached General Wessells of an examination of the Roanoke, with a view to bringing down a 'ram' at Edwards' Ferry, some twelve or fifteen miles below Halifax. All sorts of reports are put afloat for the purpose of influencing our operations. My latest advices are that she is not yet complete.

"Since assuming the command in North Carolina, I have kept strict watch over this matter, and frequently advised General Foster respecting the progress of the work on the 'iron-clad.'

"I suggested the propriety of burning it in August, but the General did not feel very apprehensive, and replied that the troops at our command would not warrant the enterprise.

"The fortifications at Plymouth have been pushed with great vigor, and I have added materially to the armament. A water battery is in progress for a two hundred pounder rifle with a centre pintle carriage, which will complete the river works. While waiting for the two hundred pounder, I have moved a hundred pounder from Hatteras, which is the only available gun of the kind in North Carolina. I do not feel very apprehensive, unless the 'ram' moves in conjunction with a land force.

"Doubtless General Foster advised you that he had withdrawn all the best and available troops in North Carolina. There is no reserve force here, nor in any of the sub-districts. In case of an advance upon the lines, the force would be quite too small for a proper defence."

December twenty-sixth, 1863, I wrote Major-General Butler, viz.:

"If Longstreet is well provided for during the inactivity of Grant and Meade, and the quiet of General Gillmore, some forces could be collected for rebel enterprises in North Carolina, during our destitute condition."

After the attack on Newbern, about the first of February, I wrote as follows:

"In view of the great interests at stake in the State, and of the smallness of the force for its protection, I hope one regiment of cavalry and a brigade of infantry may be sent to me. A large force is much needed, and should be sent, if it can be spared without jeopardizing public interests elsewhere."

February thirteenth, I wrote, viz.:

"My information is of such a nature as to induce the belief that 'Jeff Davis' has decided upon recovering Newbern and the Sounds, probably as a preliminary step to Lee's retrograde movement in the spring. Both *rams* are expected down the Neuse and Roanoke in conjunction with land troops. It seems certain that the one at Kinston is intended to come down on the next high water."

February eighteenth, I wrote, viz.:

"On receiving most reliable information of the organization of a naval brigade for opening these Sounds, with the aid of the *rams* in Neuse and Roanoke rivers, I directed the blockading up of the Neuse with old hulks, within range of our batteries. This work is now in progress. I then proceeded to Little Washington and perfected similar arrangements in the Tar River, and fully advised all the authorities of the rebel plans, and gave the necessary orders for foiling them, to the extent of our means.

"Since my return I have examined men respecting the 'ram' at Kinston, and their in-

formation is positive, reliable, and confirmatory of what I had advised you. The ram is to be sent down on the next high water. The engine has been taken from 'Pugh Mills;' it was once in a factory in this city."

February twenty-third, I wrote, viz.:

"Your letter of the twentieth has just reached me, and I agree with your views, except in one particular, viz.: 'I don't believe in the iron-clad.'

"Hitherto it has been a question of iron and time. A communication from General Wessels, of the same date as yours, settles the matter in my judgment. His spy has just come in from Halifax. He came from Wilmington, and twenty-five thousand pounds of iron was on the same train for this identical gunboat. The General writes that other parties, from near Garrysburg, who have not seen the boat, confirm the reports of the shipment of iron. He adds the following: 'In view of the possibility of such a monster coming down it would be well, I think, to procure the hulks, if practicable, and cause them to be sunk in suitable places.'"

February twenty-fourth, I wrote, viz.:

"Every day and hour brings testimony bearing upon the plan of the Confederate authorities for driving us out of the old North State. It has been substantially communicated by me.

"The present intention is to attack us as soon as the gunboat can get down.

"Mr. Hall visited the *ram* on Monday, this week, and confirms all that has been reported. Her machinery is all in, and she is about ready. Mr. Hall is about fifty-five years of age, of intelligence and extensive acquaintance, and has come back with his family."

February twenty-ninth, I wrote, viz.:

"He is now removing the blockade and obstructions, some six miles below Kinston, for the purpose of bringing the *ram* and boat flotilla to this city. The ram in the Roanoke is expected to be in condition to co-operate. The one at Kinston is virtually completed, and on the first flood will come down. They are so confident of success in the Neuse, that General Pickett will not delay for the one at Halifax."

March seventh, I wrote, viz.:

"Colonel McChesney, on the fifth, states, that all the contrabands agree that there is a large force at Kinston, and also at Greenville, and that the obstructions below Kinston are being removed."

March twelfth, I wrote, viz.:

"He states that some four hundred men were put to work on the gunboat by Pickett on his return, with instructions to complete her as soon as possible, and before the fourteenth, the anniversary of the fall of Newbern. The boat is virtually done, and two additional guns for her arrived last Tuesday, making four in all. He was at the blockade, and it has been all removed and the channel staked out.

"He thinks they have great faith in the *ram*, and fully intend an attack when there is a freshet.

"I had hoped a sufficient force might be sent here to enable me to take the offensive and give the State a chance to break away from the rotten Confederacy, when the people would rally round the army of deliverance and the Union. This hope is long deferred, I fear."

March eighteenth, I wrote, viz.:

"A few weeks since I advised you of the return of a man sent out by General Wessels to procure information concerning the '*ram*' at Halifax. He was on a train that carried some twenty-five thousand pounds of iron from Wilmington to Halifax.

"Yesterday several refugees came in from Wilmington. One of them had been in the Coleraine Foundry, at Wilmington, since the commencement of the war. He is from Indiana. He says several shipments of iron have been made to Halifax and Kinston for the gunboats, and confirms the report made to General Wessels. Some of the iron has been made near Atlanta, where the Confederates have extensive works."

March twenty-ninth, I wrote, viz.:

"My spy came in from Kinston last evening, having been out seven days. He says the two '*iron-clads*' are to act in conjunction, and when the enemy is ready he will be attacked. The water has risen in the river, and the '*iron-clad*' is afloat at Kinston."

April fourteenth I wrote, viz.:

"General Harland reports no change in his front on the twelfth inst.; his letter has the following, which I extract:

"John Wolfenden, who lives about two miles from Fort 'Jack,' says that he was up towards Greenville last Sunday and saw Captain Myers of Whitford's regiment; he says that Myers told him, that the *ram* at Kinston was completed, and that the only delay was in the construction of the small boats, to take her over the shoals. He thought everything would be ready in less than a week."

"I think his account of his conversation with Myers can be relied on."

General Butler and Admiral Lee examined a courier of General Pickett's, and he was sent to me March eighth. He stated:

"Impression when he left was that Newbern would be attacked when the '*ram*' was done. General Hoke said it was a pity they had not waited for the '*ram*,' as Newbern might have been taken without trouble.

"General Hoke placed three hundred men at work on the '*iron-clad*.'"

On the ninth of March he wrote, viz.:

"I have laid your previous despatches before General Halleck, and he tells me that he knows of no troops that can be spared for our Department; so we must work along as we are."

Major-General Butler wrote, February twentieth, in response to this and much more information, viz.: "I don't believe in the '*iron-clad*.'"

On the ninth of March, he wrote as follows: "With the force you have, we shall expect you to hold North Carolina against all comers."

"Don't let the army get frightened at the 'ram,' she must have at least two feet of water to float in, and with proper vigilance you can take care of her."

This command has been depleted from time to time, until on the day of the attack at Plymouth, there was only *ten thousand* men for duty in the whole District, scattered from the banks below Fort Macon to Plymouth, guarding long lines and many posts.

"Fortifications and their Armaments."

About the first of March there was strong reason to believe that an attack, in conjunction with an "iron-clad," was meditated on Newbern. Works of vital importance were ordered, and a few rifled guns were called for to arm them. To the letter disapproving of these works, as not required, I replied March twenty-seventh, viz :

"General Foster's plan of defense, on my arrival (in August), depended upon the presence of a goodly number of gunboats, which should command the interior of his flank-works, Stephenson, Anderson, and Spinola, and sweep the ground in form of the Cremailléré line, and also on the other side of the Trent, about Amory and Gaston. Upon calling his attention to the uncertain nature of the Naval defences, he assured me that he would send six army gunboats, and in a measure render the army independent. In view of this arrangement the naval force was materially reduced, as well as the land force, and the expected army boats did not arrive. Under these circumstances, I proposed a small work (Fort Chase) across the river, the strengthening of Anderson, and the short face on the water side of Spinola.

"General Foster never expected a water attack, much less by an 'iron-clad' which he attempted to burn at Whitehall, or he would not have made wooden gunboats an important element in his defensive system. Consequently, when attack may be looked for by an army and 'iron-clad,' some slight modifications are essential to security."

In the latter part of February, two "iron-clads" were near completion, and all information from all quarters, indicated a grand combined attack upon Newbern. The Senior Naval officer had some four gunboats for this river, which he regarded as mere "*shells*," and only fit for the "Coast Survey Service." For a few days the "Eutaw" was here. In the interview with the Commanders, Davenport and Blake, both agreed that the shots from the "iron-clad" at the obstructions would pass through their steamers with the greatest ease. They also conceded that the Whitworth guns had far greater range than any at their command. Commander Blake assured me that he would take position on the right of the Cremailléré line, and let the "Eutaw" sink, if necessary, for the security of that flank. Under the circumstances I deemed it judicious, in common with officers of rank, to attempt to hold that flank with earthen walls, rather than depend

upon wooden ones. The Senior Engineer traced out a small redoubt, using the old lines, and giving a face upon the river. It was done quickly; a one hundred pounder rifle is in the salient, with two thirty-two's sweeping the dead angle in front of the Cremailléré line, between the line of fire of Rowan and the river. The Army and Navy appreciate the importance of this work, which I brought to your notice on the twelfth inst.

"Fort Amory."

The Trent River is a very weak feature in the defence of Newbern, compelling two distinct lines, dependent for communication upon a bridge, liable to be burned at any moment, and giving the enemy the opportunity of concentrating upon either line. Last summer the river was guarded by one or two gunboats, which afforded a measure of protection to the small works, Amory and Gaston, exposed to assault from their advanced positions. These works are located upon the high ground where the bank is bluff, permitting a flotilla of small boats, or a column of infantry, to pass with comparative security in dark and stormy weather.

Upon an examination with General Palmer and Colonel Dutton, something was deemed essential for the Trent side. This conviction was greatly strengthened by the information that the officers do not like to have their gunboats in the Trent.

The absence of the naval element, and the expectation of an early attack, decided that a slight extension of Amory was imperatively demanded. Colonel Dutton, one of the most accomplished Engineers in the service, and of great experience, has looked after this work. It will command the Trent and have a cross-fire upon all the approaches to Fort Totten, besides making us independent of gunboats in that quarter.

"Ordnance."

The preceding observations upon the general system of defence, apply with equal force to the armament of the fortifications. While no water attack was expected, the old ordnance in North Carolina, when I assumed command, would have sufficed. Not so now. Two "iron-clads" menace us, and may at any moment attempt to recover the command of the Sounds, in conjunction with land forces. In view of this sudden revolution in the rebel means of attack, what artillery has this army which can be depended upon to destroy these "iron-clads" in the absence of "Federal iron-clads?"

It has only seven suitable rifles, six of which were here when no iron boats were dreamed of. A two hundred pounder and a one hundred pounder are at Plymouth. A one hundred pounder is at Hatteras; two are at Fort Macon, and two at Newbern.

In case the "iron-clad" passes Plymouth, Roanoke Island and Hatteras will be visited. One rifle is needed at Hatteras to replace the

one moved to Plymouth; and one at Macon, to replace the gun removed to Newbern. "Guns are burst, and otherwise crippled in active service," and there should be at this depot, at least one or two extra, for such contingencies.

"The 'Southfield,' burst a one hundred pounder in extricating the 'Bombshell' on the Chowan. On the twenty-fourth Commander Flusser was expecting the 'iron-clad' and an attack at Plymouth, and wrote to Commander Davenport, urgently, for a one hundred pounder rifle, for the 'Southfield.' Had I an extra gun, I could have served our naval friends at a time when it would have been appreciated.

"If these considerations have any force at all, the number (seven) of guns asked for by the Ordnance Officer on the fourteenth instant, is quite as small as is proper.

* * * * *

"What has been done are such modifications as seemed imperatively called for, in view of the public interests intrusted to me. Had they not been made, and disaster befallen us, the Government and the Major-General commanding the Department would not have excused me for delaying to communicate with the Engineer Officer at Fort Monroe."

"Conclusion."

The criticisms in the letter on "Fortifications and Armaments" are based upon principles, and are unanswerable. The views set forth on the twenty-ninth of March, have been verified in the clearest manner by the fall of Plymouth. The defenses on the left of Fort Williams (the central work) consists of open works, and are dependent upon the gunboats. The gunboats were forced out of the river, the 'iron-clad' attacked these works in rear, and they soon became untenable. The land forces entered the town on that flank. Had all the works been enclosed, the results would have been very different.

When we were at Plymouth, I called your attention to this feature of the system of defence.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

To Major-General BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Commanding Department Virginia and North Carolina,
Fortress Monroe, Virginia.

SYRACUSE, New York, May 23, 1864.

General L. Thomas, Adjutant-General, U. S. A.:

SIR: There is much in this report that the Honorable Secretary of War should see, and as I am no longer in the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, I hasten to transmit the same with the request that General Butler may be furnished a copy.

On the fourth inst., Colonel F. Beach, United States army, second in command at Plymouth, reported to me in person, that General Hoke informed General Wessells and himself, that the works I had constructed, since Pickett's demonstration at Newbern in February, saved that place

from attack at that time. The works referred to are those pronounced unnecessary by General Butler.

In my correspondence, the belief is uniformly expressed that the Confederates would attempt to drive us from Eastern North Carolina.

In February, Pickett attacked Batchelor's Creek, Croatan, Havelock, Newport, and other places, threatening Newbern. Other plans were interfered with, or delayed. The loss of Plymouth and Little Washington was promptly followed by a campaign for Newbern. The following letter is pertinent and verifies my prediction.

May 3, 1864.

GENERAL: I have just heard from Captain Cook, commanding the iron-clad Albemarle, who writes that he feels satisfied that the boat can stand the Sound, and will be with us.

I will move at six o'clock to-morrow morning, and will communicate with you at Pollocksville, on the river bank, as soon as I reach that point. I desire you to move at six o'clock to-morrow morning, and proceed to Pollocksville, and while your column is resting there, you will construct a bridge over Mill Creek. You will have two miles less to march than my column, in going to Pollocksville.

Respectfully yours,

R. T. HOKE,
Major-General.

To General WALKER.

Hoke's forces, estimated at twelve thousand, left the vicinity of Newbern on the sixth of May, for Richmond, and Newbern is still ours.

General Butler did not believe any demonstration would be made upon my command, at any time, and adhered to his theory up to my withdrawal, as will be seen from the following extract:

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
FORTRESS MONROE, May 3, 1864. }

GENERAL: Your note of the twenty-fourth of April reached my hand to-day, and I hasten to reply.

Your being relieved from Newbern by me in no manner implies any censure upon your action or disapproval of your administration, and was determined upon many days before the order was actually sent, and before it was known or believed that there would be any demonstration upon your command by the enemy. That order was delayed by the necessities of the service in other movements of the Department, which are solely subjects of explanation.

With sentiments of respect and esteem,

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General.

To Major-General PECK.

I am, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
NEWBERN, August 17, 1863. }

Major-General J. G. Foster, commanding Department of Virginia and North Carolina, Fortress Monroe:

On the fifteenth instant I received a communication from Admiral Lee, United States Navy, to the effect that the iron-clad on the Roanoke, at Edwards' Ferry, was nearly completed.

On the sixteenth I reached Plymouth, and had an interview with General Weasels and Captain Flusser. Some deserters had just arrived, and from them the following information was elicited in respect to Rainbow Bluff, etc., etc.: Three guns in embrasure to command the approach by the river from below. One, a rifled thirty-two pounder; others twenty-four pounders.

One twenty-four pounder on field carriage in an angle of the fort, sweeps the land approaches. There are also two twelve-pounders, brass, and three six-pounders playing over the breastwork; rifle-pits on bank below fort, two hundred yards long; five field-pieces artillery in Hamilton—Graham's battery; three companies, Pales' battalion, garrison the fort. At Butler's Bridge, two miles from the fort, are intrenchments, with a place for one gun.

Camp of Seventeenth regiment (eleven hundred strong), near the fort, and the camp of the Fifty-sixth regiment about one mile from Hamilton, from fort, and from Butler's Bridge.

At Whitney's Bridge (river road) the bridge is destroyed, road barricaded, and a breastwork one hundred yards above. Five thousand men at Garrysburg; five hundred men at Edwards' Ferry, guarding the iron-clad battery and iron-clad in course of construction.

These recent dispositions have resulted from your late raids, and will make it a matter of some difficulty to destroy the "iron-clad" at Edwards' Ferry.

For this enterprise, from eight hundred to one thousand good cavalry will be requisite. My plan would be to land the cavalry six or eight miles above Plymouth, and move by Windsor, on an intermediate road, Roxobel, etc., since this rout has been less used by our troops than the one *via* Winton.

A demonstration from Norfolk *via* Winton upon Weldon, at the same time, would materially enhance the chances of success.

I respectfully submit the above information and suggestions for your consideration.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. PECK,
Major-General.

Doc. 21.

BATTLES OF PILOT KNOB AND LEESBURG, MISSOURI

GENERAL EWING'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS ST. LOUIS DISTRICT,
St. LOUIS, MISSOURI, October 20, 1864. }

Colonel J. V. Du Bois, Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department of the Missouri:

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the

night of the twenty-fourth September, the Major-General commanding, having learned that Price's army had entered the Department by way of Poplar Bluffs and Bloomfield, ordered me to take a brigade of the Second division, Sixteenth army corps, which was then at Jefferson Barracks, and patrol and garrison the Iron Mountain railroad—reporting to Major-General A. J. Smith, who was to follow next day with the other brigade of the division.

At De Soto, leaving the rest of the brigade to await further orders from General Smith, I went on with the Fourteenth Iowa infantry, strengthening the garrisons at all the bridges, and making temporary headquarters at Mineral Point. From each station where there was cavalry, I sent scouting parties east and west, which returned by Monday morning, reporting no enemy north of Fredericktown. They brought, however, apparently credible rumors that Price was at Fredericktown with all his army.

At ten, Monday morning, I took companies B, C, D, E, and H, Fourteenth Iowa infantry, under Captain Campbell, and went to Pilot Knob. Major James Wilson, Third Missouri State militia cavalry, then commanded the Third sub-district of this district, with headquarters at that post. He had, under orders, withdrawn his outposts from Patterson, Centreville, Fredericktown, and Farmington, and collected at Pilot Knob all the available force of his sub-district except brigade guards. The force there present consisted of companies A, F, E, G, H, and I, Forty-seventh Missouri infantry, Captain Lindsay's company, Fiftieth Missouri infantry, which were raw troops, with an aggregate of four hundred and eighty-nine officers and men for duty; and companies A, C, D, H, I, and K, Third Missouri State Militia cavalry; company L, Second Missouri State Militia cavalry; company G, First Missouri State Militia infantry, and Captain Montgomery's battery, which, with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa, made an aggregate of old troops for duty of five hundred. The entire command was one thousand and fifty-one volunteers, and one hundred and fifty citizens—enough to man the fort. My instructions from Major-General Rosecrans were to have Major Wilson endeavor to hold Pilot Knob against any mere detachment of the enemy, but to evacuate if Price's main army should move against it.

The village of Pilot Knob, which is the terminus of the railroad, and the Depot for supply of the lower outposts, is eighty-six miles south of St. Louis. It lies in a plain of about three hundred acres, encircled by Cedar and Rock Mountain on the North, Pilot Knob on the east, and Shepherd Mountain stretching around the valley on the south and west. Each hill is from five hundred to six hundred feet in height, and rises abruptly from the valley, with the sides towards it covered with rocks, gnarled oaks, and undergrowth. The southern and western slopes of Shepherd Mountain are accessible, and several roads lead over them to "the coalings" on its summit. Stout's Creek flows along the base of Shepherd's Mountain, and through a

gap between it and Pilot Knob, into a larger valley of several thousand acres, encircled by a chain of hills, in the northern end of which, and about a mile from the town of Pilot Knob, is the village of Ironton. Through this gap runs the road from Pilot Knob to Frederickton, passing out of the larger valley by "the Shut-in," a gap four miles south-east of Pilot Knob. The two valleys are called "Arcadia."

Fort Davidson is a hexagonal work mounting four thirty-two pounder siege guns, and three twenty-four pounder howitzers *en barbette*. It lies on the plain south of the village of Pilot Knob, about three hundred yards from the base of Shepherd Mountain, six hundred from the base of Pilot Knob and one thousand from the gap. From the Fort to the remotest summit of these hills visible from it, it is not over twelve hundred yards; while all parts of the hillsides towards the Fort, except the west end of Shepherd Mountain, are in musket range. The Fort was always conceded to be indefensible against any large army having serviceable artillery. Early last summer I sent competent engineers to select another site; but such are the difficulties of the position, no practicable place could be found any more defensible. I therefore had the roads leading up the hills obstructed, cleared the nearest hill-sides of timber, and put the fort in a thorough state of defence by deepening the ditches, strengthening the parapet, and adding two rifle-pits, leading north and south, commanding the best approaches.

On reaching Pilot Knob at noon of Monday, September twenty-sixth, I found scouting parties had been sent the night before on all the main roads, but that the party sent towards Fredericktown had returned after going but six or eight miles. I forthwith sent two companies to make a thorough reconnoissance towards Fredericktown, and a small scouting party, under Captain Bowers, to cross the roads leading from the south to that place, and learn of the loyal people on them as much as possible as to the force of the enemy. Both commands met Price's advance in Arcadia Valley, near Shut-in Gap, and were forced back into the town of Ironton, where, with Captain Dinger's company, Forty-seventh Missouri volunteers, then on duty there, they made a stand. I reinforced them with the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa, under Captain Campbell, a section of Montgomery's battery, Lieutenant Simonton commanding, and all my available cavalry, placing the whole under command of Major Wilson, with orders to drive the enemy, if possible, through Shut-in Gap. He drove them to the Gap, but was unable to hold them there, and was being forced back gradually, when night and a rain-storm suspended the engagement.

By midnight it was evident the enemy were in strong force, as their column could be heard coming into the valley in steady procession, and their encampment grew extensive. We still did not know positively that Price's main army was there, though all our information was decidedly

to that effect. But the advantages of delaying the enemy two or three days in his march northward, and of making a stubborn fight before retreating, were so great, even though the defense should be unsuccessful and much of the garrison be lost, that I resolved to stand fast and take the chances. I immediately forwarded up the railroad all the Quartermaster and Commissary stores not needed in the fort, and all the rolling stock, and started the Quartermaster's wagons empty. Details were set at work constructing in the fort six platformed barbettes for the field artillery, four pieces of which were taken into it. Lieutenant David Murphy, Forty-seventh Missouri Volunteers, a most gallant officer and experienced artilleryman, was assigned to duty on my staff as Aide-de-Camp, and given general control of the artillery. Major-General Smith, whose immediate command was at De Soto and Mineral Point, was kept fully advised by telegraph of my information, movements, and purposes, until eleven o'clock Tuesday forenoon, when the line went down.

At daylight (Tuesday) the enemy pushed Wilson back through Arcadia Valley to the gap between Shepherd Mountain and Pilot Knob. While they were trying to force the gap, I ordered the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa to take position on the east end of Shepherd Mountain, and ordered Wilson to fall back with his cavalry along the side of Pilot Knob, thus commanding the gap from both sides, and opening a clear range from the fort. Wilson soon sent me word that the enemy were displaying a flag of truce. I knew it was a trick to effect a safe passage of the gap while parlying about a surrender, and therefore ordered him to renew the fight at once. A long and obstinate struggle ensued, in which the enemy lost considerably in an unsuccessful effort to pass the defile. During an hour of comparative quiet which followed, they threw a force around Shepherd Mountain and approached from the west, but that approach was too greatly exposed, and they were driven from it by our artillery, aided by two companies of skirmishers. An hour more, and my troops were summarily ejected from the points commanding the gap, the enemy following them along the hill-sides in strong force. When they had well advanced, we opened on them with all our guns and drove them back in disorder with heavy loss. We retook the gap—were again forced from it—and again with artillery drove them from the hill-sides. They got two pieces in position on the east side of Shepherd Mountain, commanding a part of the side of Pilot Knob, which, being equally commanded by the fort, became neutral ground. We still held, with skirmishers, the sides of Shepherd Mountain, except next the gap, and the side of Pilot Knob not raked by their artillery.

After an hour of lull, lines of the enemy were seen at exposed points on the summits of the two hills, moving down, and almost before we could open fire on them, another white flag

was raised on a rock near the summit of Shepherd Mountain, where a group of officers had been taking observations under shelter. With the opening of a brisk cannonade on the group the flag was hauled down. The design was plainly to suspend the firing, so that their forces might approach to the assault in safety. I now ordered into the fort the section of artillery operating outside, but the horses stampeded and could not be got in. The section remained under cover of our fire, however, and was brought in before dark. Here the enemy opened on us with two guns from the Summit of Shepherd Mountain, at about seven hundred yards, and two from the side, at a less distance. The guns were well covered, and we could silence only one of them, the two nearest getting and keeping our range exactly.

The division on Shepherd Mountain was Marmaduke's, which, on the withdrawal of the white flag, and the opening of their artillery, moved rapidly down to the assault, his lines greatly broken by the rugged and steep descent, and by our fire, which told with marked effect upon them. On reaching the plain, the most of the assaulting force took cover in the deep bed of the creek, from which they opened and kept up an incessant fire. About one hundred ventured on to the assault, but fell, or were driven back before they reached the ditch.

Almost simultaneously with the movement of Marmaduke's division, that of General Fagan marched over Pilot Knob in stronger force, and less disturbed by our fire, sweeping back in disorder, or cutting off our companies which held the town and part of the mountain sides. His lines were greatly broken by the houses and fences of the skirt of the town, but were hastily re-formed by him, and by General Cabell, who led the assault, and swept upon the plain in handsome style, yelling, and on the double-quick. We opened on them when at four hundred yards from the fort, with musketry from the ramparts, and from the long line of the north rifle-pit, and with grape and canister from seven pieces of artillery. They rushed on most gallantly, but were broken, confused, and swept down by our rapid and well-directed fire, until the advance reached the ditch, when the attacking forces fled in dismay, leaving apparently almost half their comrades dead or wounded on the plain. Pending the assaults, the enemy threw a large cavalry force around the west end of Shepherd Mountain, to occupy the road north of us to Mineral Point. As they moved along the base of Cedar Mountain, just after the last assault was repulsed, a sortie was made from the north ditch, by which they were routed and lost considerably. A half hour of ineffective musketry and artillery firing ended the engagement with the approach of night.

An examination of prisoners that evening convinced me that Price was there, with about twelve thousand men and ten pieces of artillery—Shelby's division, with eight pieces, having

gone from Fredericktown to Farmington. I had found myself unable, with my force intact, to hold the mountain sides so as to prevent his planting artillery there. My command was now reduced one-fourth in effective strength, as I had lost seventy-five killed and wounded, and more than double that number missing. I knew that next morning the enemy, having possession of the mountain top and sides, would place all his artillery in position to command the fort, which would make it certainly untenable. That morning, at the time when telegraphic communication ended, two regiments of Major-General Smith's command were at Mineral Point, twenty-three miles north of us, and four miles east of Potosi. I thought they were probably there still, and that by getting a good start we could effect a junction with them, and fall back or stand, as the movement and force of the enemy might permit. I therefore determined to evacuate that night. The chief danger, was that the preparations for the retreat might be observed, and the garrison cut to pieces or captured, in the confusion incident to the exit. The works of the Iron Company, at the north base of Pilot Knob had been fired by the enemy, and the immense pile of charcoal glowed and flamed all night, making the valley as light as noonday. Moreover, I learned Colonel Slayback's command held the Mineral Point road just north of the town, leaving the Potosi road the only exit not certainly in the possession of the enemy. But, with all its dangers, the policy of retreat was clearly best; and preparations for it began at midnight. I had Colonel Fletcher arrange for having the magazine, (which was large and filled with every variety of ammunition) blown up two hours after we left, or as soon as our exit should be discovered by the enemy. We took possession of the town and valley, and drove thence, all straggling rebels. The garrison was then aroused, knapsacks packed, haversacks and cartridge-boxes well supplied, and everything destructible, which we could not take away, and the enemy might use, placed near or on the magazine. At three o'clock Colonel Fletcher silently led the infantry out of the sally-port, around the ditch and through the north rifle-pit, forming them under the cover of a deep shadow at the end of the pit. The drawbridge was then covered with tents to muffle the sound, and the cavalry and battery, marching out, formed column with the infantry, and took a by-way to the Potosi road. We left Slayback's camp on our right, and another rebel camp near the road on our left, both unapprised of our movement. The body of the rebel army was at Ironton; and, thinking us sufficiently hemmed in, were busy making fascines and scaling ladders, for an assault in the morning. They even failed to take the hint when the magazine, an hour before daylight, shook the hills with its explosion.

At sunrise, I started Captain Hills, Tenth Kansas, Acting Aide-de-Camp, with twelve men, to Mineral Point, to acquaint the command there of my approach, and request it to march to join me.

On starting, they fell upon about twenty rebels in the town of Caledonia, and routed them, killing one. We there learned that our forces had fallen back from Mineral Point, and that Shelby had taken Potosi the evening before; and I therefore at once left the Potosi road and took that through Webster towards Rolla. I afterwards learned that, after his repulse Tuesday, Price ordered Shelby's division down from Potosi to Pilot Knob, to take part in a second attack, and that the squad we routed at Caledonia was Shelby's advance. He waited several hours with his division, to give us battle two miles north of Caledonia, thus giving us a good start on the Webster road before pursuing. Marmaduke's division left Pilot Knob at eight that morning to overtake us, and joining Shelby in the pursuit at Caledonia.

At sundown, we reached Webster, thirty-one miles from Pilot Knob, and rested until midnight. From information received there, I determined to go to Harrison (Leesburg), on the south-west branch of the Pacific railroad, because part of Colonel Warmuth's militia regiment was there, but especially because the road to Rolla was one on which we could be easily surrounded by a superior cavalry force, while that to Harrison led nearly all the way along a sharp spur of the Ozark range, separating the waters of the Huzza and the Courtois, and through the gorge of the Huzza, walled in with untraversable cliffs. To Rolla was fifty-five miles, to Harrison thirty-five. I here sent Captain Hills with ten men in advance to Franklin, with instructions to telegraph to the Major-General commanding at St. Louis, and to General McNeil, at Rolla, of our movements, and to arrange means for securing our safe and speedy withdrawal from Harrison to Rolla or St. Louis.

The night was intensely dark and stormy; and we groped our way with great effort and little progress. We had just reached the ridge at eight o'clock Thursday morning, when the enemy charged upon our rear guard and drove it upon the column. I placed the detachment of the Fourteenth Iowa infantry, company H, Forty-seventh Missouri, companies C, D and K, Third Missouri, State Militia cavalry, and Lieutenant Smiley's section of artillery, in the rear, all under command of Major Williams, Tenth Kansas, acting Aide-de-Camp, and with occasional halts to rake the woods with shell and canister, we made a good and successful march, the enemy almost constantly engaged with our rear guard, but unable to break through or flank it, until within four miles of Harrison. There the road debouches on a high sweep of gently rolling woodland, and from that we fought hard for every step we gained. The refugees, men, women and children, white and black, who clung to the command, nearly sacrificed it by their panics. I had to throw out the available fighting force, infantry and cavalry, as advance and rear guards and flankers, leaving in the body of the column the affrighted non-combatants and two sections of artillery, not often brought into action

on the retreat. Repeated and stubborn efforts were made to bring us to a stand, and could they have forced a halt of an hour, they would have enveloped and taken us; but our halts, though frequent, were brief, and were only to unlimber the artillery, stagger the pursuers with a few rounds, and move on. We reached Harrison just after dark, having made the march of sixty-six miles in thirty-nine hours. We found Warmuth's militia gone.

The station is thirty-five miles from Rolla, forty-five from Franklin, and eighty-two from St. Louis. The position is naturally strong, being on the crest of a ridge, with no timber to obstruct the range for two hundred yards on either side. A cut for the railroad track gave shelter for the horses; a large number of ties were there, of which the militia had made breastworks, and the adjacent buildings were well situated for purposes of defence. My command had just time to form and the artillery to unlimber when an assault was made; but, aided by darkness and our rude defences, we repulsed it. Just then the eastern train arrived with military stores for Rolla, and cars enough to move my troops. We got the command aboard, and were about to start for St. Louis, with the cavalry moving on a parallel road, when the nearest stations north and south of us were seen in flames. The command was at once taken off the cars, and the night spent in fortifying.

At daybreak, Friday, the enemy appeared in force and prepared apparently for an assault. They kept up a demonstration throughout the day, accompanied with a heavy fire of skirmishers, which was well replied to from our defenses. Having less than thirty rounds to the gun we used our artillery but little, reserving it for the moment of assault, or the emergencies of a further retreat. The day passed in instant expectation of an attack in force and in unremitting labor on the defenses, which were extended and strengthened so they grew formidable. Friday night another assault was repulsed, and the night passed in snatches of rest amid hourly and most harassing alarms. Hearing nothing of reinforcements, I at midnight dispatched a citizen messenger to Rolla, to ask help from there; and Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin to Franklin to advise the Major-General commanding of my condition, and endeavor to bring some mounted militia from Franklin county to my aid, if nothing better could be done—my now total want of serviceable cavalry, and the exhausted condition of the infantry, having made a further retreat extremely hazardous. The citizen got to Rolla, but Lieutenant-Colonel Maupin and Captain Schenck and Lieutenant Fletcher, who accompanied him, could not accomplish their errand, and barely escaped capture.

Saturday morning the enemy appeared in increased force, thoroughly reconnoitred our position and made every preparation to take us. But the forenoon passed like the day before; in an incessant fire with their skirmishers, and constant expectation of an assault. I think our

thorough readiness and plain purpose to fight it out made General Shelby, who was in command, feel that we would cost more than our worth. He drew off at two p. m., and at four p. m., Lieutenant-Colonel Beveridge, Seventeenth Illinois cavalry, with five hundred men of his command, came to our rescue from General McNeil, at Rolla. Strong cavalry pickets were at once posted on four roads occupied by the enemy north of our encampment, and were pushed out more than a mile. At midnight, leaving an hundred men to occupy Harrison and reinforce the pickets if necessary, and to destroy the few stores left in the train unissued, I withdrew my command and marched for Rolla. On arriving at St. James, twelve miles from Rolla, at noon Sunday, the infantry were sent to that post by railroad. Next day I turned over my infantry and cavalry, worn out with toil and watching, to General McNeil, to garrison Rolla—whereupon he marched with his cavalry and that of General Sanborn, and my battery, to the defense of Jefferson City. Tuesday I got an escort of forty men, and passing in the rear of the enemy, reached St. Louis, with the members of my staff, Wednesday night.

Our loss at Pilot Knob was about two hundred, killed, wounded, and missing; and in the several engagements on the retreat to Rolla, about one hundred and fifty more. Of the missing, the most were cut off in detachments, and escaped capture, so that our whole actual loss was about one hundred and fifty killed and wounded, and fifty captured and paroled.

Among our severely wounded were, Lieutenant Smith Thompson, Fourteenth Iowa, and Lieutenant John Fessler, First infantry, Missouri State Militia, and Lieutenant John Braden, Fourteenth Iowa, since dead. Major Wilson, Third Cavalry, Missouri State Militia, after being wounded, was captured on Pilot Knob, and subsequently, with six of his gallant men, was brutally murdered by order of General Price's Field Officer of the day.

The rebel loss at Pilot Knob, killed and wounded, exceeded fifteen hundred, as is shown by the enclosed letter of Surgeon T. W. Johnson, who was left there in charge of our hospital, and also by corroborating testimony gathered since our re-occupation of the post. In the hospital at Ironton, on the twelfth instant, there fell into our hands Colonel Thomas, Chief of General Fagan's staff, three Majors, seven Captains, twelve Lieutenants, and two hundred and four enlisted men (representing seventeen regiments and four batteries), all dangerously and nearly all mortally wounded. The rest of the rebel wounded who were not able to follow the army, were sent south by General Price, under escort of Colonel Rain's regiment. As to the loss of the enemy in the pursuit and at Harrison, I have no information.

To the officers commanding the several detachments, to wit: Colonel Thomas C. Fletcher, Forty-seventh Missouri infantry; Captain Wm. J. Campbell, Fourteenth Iowa infantry; Captain

Wm. C. Montgomery, Second Missouri artillery; Lieutenant John Fessler, First infantry, Missouri State Militia; Captain Robert L. Lindsay, Thirtieth Missouri infantry; Captain A. P. Wright, Second cavalry, Missouri State Militia, and also Major H. H. Williams, Tenth Kansas; Captain Charles S. Hills, Tenth Kansas; Captain H. B. Milks, Third cavalry, Missouri State Militia; Lieutenant David Murphy, Forty-seventh Missouri infantry, and Surgeon S. D. Carpenter, of my staff, and to Sergeant Daniel Flood, Third Missouri State Militia, who fired the magazine, I am indebted for an intelligent and thorough discharge of duty which contributed largely to our success. The officers and men of the old troops, without known exception, and those of the new, with rare exceptions, behaved with splendid gallantry, and showed extraordinary will and power of endurance. Nearly an hundred citizens of Pilot Knob and Ironton (among whom were General McCormick, Colonel Lindsay, Captain Leper, Major Emerson, and other well-known gentlemen), organized and commanded by Captain P. F. Lonergan, First infantry, Missouri State Militia, fought and worked well. A colored man, named Charles Thurston, organized and commanded a company of negroes, who also eagerly bore a large share of labor and danger. Before concluding my report, I owe it to the cherished memory of Major James Wilson to make honorable mention of his name, not only because of the nerve and skill with which for two days preceding the assault he embarrassed and delayed the overwhelming forces of the enemy, but also because of his long and useful service in the district, unblemished by a fault.

I have the honor to be,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

THOMAS EWING, JR.,

Brigadier-General.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

St. Louis, October 6.

Your correspondent is enabled to lay before the readers of the *Gazette* a full and authentic account of the operations of Brigadier-General Tom Ewing, Jr., since he left the city on Saturday night, September twenty-fourth, until he returned last evening with the news of victory sparkling on his laurels. These operations embrace a reconnoissance in force, a successful battle with overwhelming numbers, and a retreat which for masterly accomplishment stands unrivalled, save and except by the great retreat of Sigel in this State, in 1861. These, together with a constant succession of skirmishes, ambuscades, and forced marches, distinguished this brief but brilliant campaign, and make it what it must ever be, one of the most remarkable and eventful of the war. By it Ohio, "the bright particular star" of the West achieves fresh honors at the hands of another of her brave and skillful sons.

When the rebels demonstrated three weeks ago on Bloomfield, Fredericktown, and Centreville, General Ewing inferred that their intention was to move upon St. Louis, destroy its military stores, release the prisoners, and inflict whatever carnage they could, making just such a dash as they did at Memphis. General Rosecrans held the same opinion, and he ordered Ewing to Pilot Knob, with a brigade of A. J. Smith's command, but for some reason not apparent now, these troops were detained at Mineral Point on the Iron Mountain railroad, and Ewing pushed on to the Knob with a hundred and thirty men. When he got there he found his entire command to number very little over a thousand men, viz.: Captain Montgomery's battery—six Rodman ten-pounders—one company of the First Missouri State Militia infantry, three companies Fourteenth Iowa infantry, six companies Third Missouri cavalry, and six companies Forty-seventh Missouri (St. Louis Guards, raw), and commanded by the Union candidate for Governor, Colonel Tom Fletcher, a brave man, good soldier, and true patriot. In a previous letter, you were acquainted with the operations up to the time Ewing was compelled to defend himself at Fort Davidson. That affair was one of those desperate ventures which a brave man only will make rather than surrender. During the reconnoissance towards the Knob on Sunday, and the skirmishes of Monday and Tuesday, prisoners and rebel wounded all spoke of Price being in command, and told wonderful stories of his strength and numbers. This determined General Ewing to hold his advance in check to the last possible moment, and made him defend the Valley of Arcadia, which lies between Shepherd's, Iron, and three other mountains, which rise abruptly to elevations of from four hundred to five hundred and fifty feet. Fort Davidson lies in the centre of the valley, which is longitudinal east and west. It has a range of one thousand *yards only* on the only practicable ground for the enemy except he reached the apex of the mountains, which he did not, in the haste of his advance, either think of or attempt until too late. Ewing contended every inch of the valley before entering the fort, and he was reduced to the last extremity before adopting that plan. The rebels pressed him closely from the east inlet to the valley, but when at last he gathered up his little army and took them inside the fort, he gave the rebel advance such a salute as drove them back flying. This was on Tuesday, the twenty-seventh of September. The assault was kept up all day—Fagan's forces operating on Iron Mountain, and Marmaduke's on Shepherd Mountain. The former is east of the fort, the latter south of it. On the afternoon of Wednesday the enemy was seen in force immediately west of the fort, having got around Shepherd Mountain, and they commenced a simultaneous attack on the three sides named. Ewing changed his guns and his men, and gave the rebels the best he had. They yielded first on the west, and he fol-

lowed up his advantage by turning all his guns in that direction for a short time. The rebels did not try their luck in the west again. Towards nightfall they succeeded in planting two guns on the east face of Shepherd Mountain, and they had just got the most admirable range on the fort when night saved it from being made a perfect slaughter-pen. Ewing is in a dilemma. It is unmilitary to evacuate—to retreat; but better take any risk than remain there to either surrender or be annihilated. He decided upon retreat; but as the devil would have it, the rebels set fire to the iron furnace on Iron Mountain, and one may readily imagine the pyrotechnic effect of one hundred thousand bushels of coal a-fire. The valley and mountains were lit up as at full noon—magnificent—beautiful to behold, but terrible to contemplate; for the flames flickered and flashed and cast their blood-red light upon the writhing forms of the wounded and the rigid ones of the rebel dead lying in full sight of the fort.

General Ewing held a council with his officers, but Colonel Tom Fletcher alone decided with him to take the terrible chances of retreat. The rebels were swarming, literally, on three sides of the fort, and they had already discovered that its drawbridge was down and could be crossed by the sacrifice of a hundred men. They had full command at musket range of the little garrison with whatever artillery they had, and nothing was left but to run over in the morning and put it to the sword. General Ewing commenced his preparations at midnight; he filled his limbers with ammunition, piled his caissons on the magazine, laid a train to it, threw down an enormous pile of tents on the drawbridge to muffle the sound of his artillery, and causing his men to glide over the sides of the fort to the west side found himself at the head of his little column safely in the shadowy west outlet of the valley. Then Tom Fletcher and he looked back at Fort Davidson and — laughed. The column headed for Potosi, confident that the force of A. J. Smith was still at Mineral Point, but this turned out incorrect, for as soon as Ewing reached Caledonia he encountered Shelby's advance, and a little fight ensued, in which the rebels were driven back and Ewing concluded that the road above must be in the hands of the rebels. This was correct, and he struck for Rolla.

Previous to the evacuation of Fort Davidson, Mrs. Marion, a Union lady of Pilot Knob, whom Colonel Slayback of Price's staff, released on condition that she would communicate with General Ewing, arrived bearing a message to the latter from General Price, that if he would surrender the fort and garrison, the latter would be permitted to go unmolested, officers would be permitted to carry side-arms, and all the personal property of the command would be unmolested, but if he persistently held out, and fired upon flags of truce as he had been doing, an overwhelming force would be sent to carry the work, and every inmate be put to the sword. This proposition and bloody threat was alike un-

headed by General Ewing, for he had already commenced evacuation and retreat, and of course made no reply. There is no doubt whatever of the purpose of Price to carry his intention into effect, for after the repulse of Tuesday, and his manifest design to march his army through the valley, together with his proposition, he could not do otherwise if it cost him thousands of lives.

General Ewing marched for Rolla by way of Webster and Osage, and was hotly pursued by Shelby, whose advance he encountered at Caledonia. Marmaduke soon discovered Ewing's evacuation, for the magazine blew up at three o'clock that Wednesday morning, telling the tale in such thunder-tones as roused the rebel hosts to a man, and awoke the echoes of the valley for twenty miles around. It is to be remarked here that Shelby was to have made the attack on Fort Davidson Wednesday morning; for Price desired to make Shelby's tattered demoralized, guerrillas, and Indians stand the brunt of that assault, which Ewing's evacuation saved them from, much to their cowardly content, no doubt; for it may be observed that had Shelby's cut-throats had a spark of soldierly ability, they could at any time during Ewing's retreat have swallowed up his brave little band. But because they were brave, and had everything that a just cause and true patriotism can inspire men with, they held their sneaking, savage foe at bay, and cutting through his line, reached at last safety and rest.

The night of Wednesday was pitch dark—a circumstance which, while it delayed the retreat, allowed the poor wearied soldiers to snatch a very brief repose. They were trammelled by refugees, affrighted men, wretched women, and helpless children. God pitied them and shielded them with his protecting Providence, which in darkest hours of the march still inspired the fainting band with hope. The soldiers and their heroic leader felt indeed, with Richmond, that

"True hope is swift, and mounts with swallow wings:
Kings it makes gods, and meaner creatures kings."

At three o'clock on Thursday morning the march was resumed, the column turning off from the main road, and taking an unfrequented one to Leesburg (or Harrison), on the Southwest branch of the Pacific Railroad, hoping to go by rail the rest of the way to Rolla. The unfrequented road was taken because it led to the crest of a sharp ridge dividing the waters of Dry Creek and Huzza, and affording a favorable line for defense and retreat.

On reaching the ridge, at about ten o'clock Thursday morning, Shelby overtook and attacked the rear with great vigor, and from that place to Leesburg, a distance of some miles, the devoted band, nearly surrounded by cavalry, were compelled to keep a strong skirmish line thrown out, or keep in line of battle front and rear. Still they pushed on. When a favorable point was reached the artillery was unlimbered and

placed in position. The enemy either had none or did not use it, and that was favorable to the retreat. On two or three occasions the attacks on flank and rear were in such force as to drive in the lines and throw the little command into disorder, which was frightfully augmented by the refugees; but General Ewing, by his indomitable coolness, courage, and skill, soon restored order, and by his own defiance of danger and death, infused renewed life and determination into his little band. Leesburg was reached at last, and just in time to receive the train from St. Louis, ten cars loaded with military stores. These were speedily unloaded and the command put aboard; but just as the train was ready to start, the stations above and below were observed to be in flames. This was the worst dilemma of the entire retreat. Cut off by rail, surrounded on all sides, a terrible struggle with overwhelming numbers—overwhelming? yes, a thousand against every hundred of the command—and nothing stared them in the face but total destruction and death. This they chose, rather than at the heels of such success as they had, yield to the scalping-knife of savages.

Ewing immediately seized everything available for defence. Railroad ties, barrels, boxes, bales of hay, everything and anything to turn a bullet, was used, and by the time night again overtook the busy and anxious throng, they found themselves besieged, but in a tolerable state of defence.

Friday morning came, and with it a storm of bullets from all sides. The little army was completely surrounded; not a single outlet could be found, even for a single messenger, and the situation was really desperate. Coolness and courage still was theirs, and they awaited each attack of the enemy with undaunted spirits. The rebels charged upon the defences again and again, but recoiled, carrying back their dead and wounded. The slaughter of their horses was large, and they became more careful and economical in future. On Friday night the rebels menaced the little camp, and conducted an Indian-like warfare against it. They would make a demonstration on one side, and then send a few treacherous shots from an opposite direction, which did more damage than any others. On Saturday the rebels massed for assault, and appeared four or five thousand strong, but the day passed without other action on their part than firing at long range. So much for Ewing's artillery.

On Sunday they prepared again for assault, and at three o'clock P. M., were really about to charge, when a most unlooked-for circumstance occurred and changed the entire aspect of affairs. A body of the Union cavalry appeared in the direction of Rolla, and dashing through the enemy's lines, galloped into the charmed circle of the little garrison. Such a shout went up as rent the air and "made the welkin ring." It seemed as though the "God of Battles" had sent them, and there and then the thankful soldiers fell upon their knees and devoutly thanked

Him. Colonel Beveridge, of the Seventeenth Illinois cavalry, hearing through citizen refugees of General Ewing's critical situation, started promptly from Rolla, with five hundred men, and arrived in the very nick of time. The cavalry soon cleared the lines, except immediately in front of the camp where the enemy's main force was massed, and at a distance of three miles to the northeast. This left the southwest clear, and on Sunday night Ewing pushed out a heavy picket force on each road and drove the rebel pickets in. While this was being done, the garrison struck out at midnight, and before the enemy discovered the real intent, the command was nigh Rolla, and nearer safety than it had been for many weary days. They marched thirty miles that night, and reached St. James' station, whence they took the cars for Rolla, where the light of Monday morning's sun found them as we must leave them, rejoicing in their success, while we brush away a tear for the poor fellows who were left behind, hushed in the silence of death.

The garrison at Rolla was relieved and immediately started for Jefferson City with Generals McNeil and Sanborn at its head. They have no doubt reached that point in safety ere this; if not, they have given Price a touch of their quality, which he will not forget, more than he will forget Rosecrans at Corinth, or Ewing in Arcadia Valley.

General Ewing saved the stores at Pilot Knob, and sent them to St. Louis in safety; he saved the stores at Leesburg, and all his artillery, and reached Rolla with a total loss of only about three hundred men. His entire command, as before stated, was little over a thousand, and when all the facts are gathered, it will be found that his killed and wounded will not exceed two hundred. His glory and his danger were shared with Colonel Tom Fletcher, whom the rebels would have given anything almost, to hang, and both are entitled to the warmest gratitude, not only of this State but of the country. Indeed, too much praise cannot be given the officers and men alike, of that brave thousand who resisted the repeated assaults of five times their number, and by throwing themselves into the desperate gap, which, gained by the rebels, would have lost St. Louis to us, successfully held them at bay until other operations, under the more immediate direction of the General Commanding, rendered this city safe, and foiled the purposes of Price to pillage and destroy it.

GENERAL ROSECRANS' ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, }
ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, October 6, 1864. }

With pride and pleasure the Commanding General notices the gallant conduct of Brigadier-General Thomas Ewing, Jr., and his command in the defence of Pilot Knob, and in the subsequent retreat to Rolla. With scarcely one thousand effective men they repulsed the attacks of Price's invading army, and successfully retreated with their battery a distance of one

hundred miles, in the face of a pursuing and assailing cavalry force of five times their number. Such conduct deserves imitation, particularly when contrasted with the cowardly conduct of the troops at Osage Bridge. The General Commanding presents his hearty thanks and congratulations to

Colonel Thomas C. Fletcher, Forty-seventh Missouri volunteers.

Major James Wilson, Third cavalry, Missouri State Militia.

Captain Robert L. Lindsay, Fiftieth Missouri volunteers.

Captain William J. Campbell, company K, Fourteenth Iowa volunteers.

Captain W. C. Montgomery, Second Missouri artillery.

Captain A. P. Wright, Second cavalry, Missouri State Militia.

Lieutenant John Fessler, First infantry, Missouri State Militia.

And the officers and men under their command.

They have deserved well of their country. The General Commanding desires, also, publicly to recognize the courage and efficiency of Lieutenant-Colonel John W. Maupin, Forty-seventh Missouri volunteers; Major H. H. Williams, Tenth Kansas volunteers; Captain Charles S. Hills, Tenth Kansas volunteers; Captain H. B. Milks, Third cavalry, Missouri State Militia; Captain P. F. Lonergan, First infantry, Missouri State Militia; and First Lieutenant David Murphy, Adjutant Forty-seventh Missouri volunteers. Under such commanders Federal troops should always march to victory.

By command of Major-General ROSECRANS.

FRANK ENO,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 22.

LETTER OF GENERAL GRANT:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, }
CITY POINT, VA., August 16, 1864. }

Hon. E. B. Washburne:

DEAR SIR: I state to all citizens who visit me, that all we want now to insure an early restoration of the Union is a determined unity of sentiment North.

The rebels have now in their ranks their last men. The little boys and old men are guarding prisoners, guarding railroad bridges, and forming a good part of their garrisons or intrenched positions. A man lost by them cannot be replaced. They have robbed the cradle and the grave equally to get their present force. Besides what they lose in frequent skirmishes and battles, they are now losing from desertions and other causes at least one regiment per day. With this drain upon them, the end is not far distant, if we will only be true to ourselves. Their only hope now is in a divided North. This might give them reinforcements from Tennessee, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri, while

it would weaken us. With the draft quietly enforced, the enemy would become despondent, and would make but little resistance.

I have no doubt but the enemy are exceedingly anxious to hold out until after the Presidential election. They have many hopes from its effects. They hope a counter revolution. They hope the election of a peace candidate. In fact, like Micawber, they hope for something to "turn up." Our peace friends, if they expect peace from separation, are much mistaken. It would be but the beginning of war, with thousands of Northern men joining the South because of our disgrace in allowing separation. To have "peace on any terms," the South would demand the restoration of their slaves already freed; they would demand indemnity for losses sustained, and they would demand a treaty which would make the North slave-hunters for the South; they would demand pay for the restoration of every slave escaped to the North.

Yours truly,

U. S. GRANT.

Doc. 23.

GOVERNOR CURTIN'S MESSAGE.

DELIVERED AUGUST 9, 1864.

I have called you together in advance of your adjourned session, for the purpose of taking some action for the defence of the State.

From the commencement of the present Rebellion, Pennsylvania has done her whole duty to the Government. Lying, as her southern counties do, in the immediate vicinity of the border, and thus exposed to sudden invasion, a selfish policy would have led her to retain a sufficient part of her military force for our defense.

In so doing, she would have failed in her duty to the whole country. Not only would her men have been withheld from the field of general operations, but the loans and taxation which would have become necessary, would have, to a large extent, diminished the ability of her people to comply with the pecuniary demands of the United States. She would also have necessarily interfered with and hampered all the military action of the Government, and made herself to some extent, responsible for any failures and shortcomings that might have occurred. In pursuance of the policy thus deliberately adopted, this State has steadily devoted her men to the general service.

From the beginning she has always been among the first to respond to the calls of the United States, as is shown by her history from the three months' men and the Reserve Corps to the present moment. Thus faithfully fulfilling all her own obligations, she has a right to be defended by the national force as part of a common country. Any other view would be absurd and unjust. She of course cannot complain when she suffers by the necessary contingencies of war.

The reflections that have in too many quarters been made upon the people of our southern

counties are most unfounded; they were invaded in 1862, when a Union army, much superior to any force of the rebels, and on which they had, of course, a right to rely, was lying in their immediate vicinity and north of the Potomac; they were again invaded in 1863, after the defeat of the Union forces under Milroy, at Winchester; and they have again suffered in 1864, after the defeat of the Union forces under Crook and Averill.

How could an agricultural people, in an open country, be expected to rise suddenly, and beat back hostile forces which had defeated organized veteran armies of the Government? It is, of course, expected that the inhabitants of an invaded country will do what is in their power to resist the invaders; and the facts hereafter stated will show, I think, that the people of the counties have not failed in this duty. If Pennsylvania, by reason of her geographical position, has required to be defended by the national forces, it has only been against a common enemy; it has never been necessary to weaken the army in the field, by sending heavy detachments of veterans to save her cities from being devastated by small bands of ruffians, composed of their own inhabitants, nor have her people been disposed to sneer at the great masses of law-abiding citizens in any other State who have required such protection.

Yet when a brutal enemy, pursuing a defeated body of Union forces, crosses our border and burns a defenseless town, the horrid barbarity, instead of firing the hearts of all the people of our common country, is actually in some quarters made the occasion of mocks and jibes at the unfortunate sufferers, thousands of whom have been rendered homeless; and these heartless scoffs proceed from the very men who, when the State authorities, foreseeing the danger, were taking precautionary measures, ridiculed the idea of there being any danger, sneered at the exertions made for the purpose of meeting it, and succeeded, to some extent, in thwarting their efforts to raise forces.

These men are themselves morally responsible for the calamity over which they now chuckle and rub their hands. It might have been hoped—nay, we had a right to expect—that the people of the loyal States, engaged in a common effort to preserve their Government and all that is dear to a freeman, would have forgotten at least for the time, their wretched local jealousies, and sympathized with all their loyal fellow-citizens wherever resident within the border of our common country. It should be remembered that the original source of the present Rebellion was in such jealousies, encouraged for wicked purposes by unscrupulous politicians.

The men who, for any purpose, now continue to encourage them, ought to be held as public enemies—enemies of our Union, our peace—and should be treated as such. Common feelings, common sympathies, are the necessary foundations of a common free Government.

I am proud to say that the people of Pennsyl-

vania feel every blow at any of her sister States as an assault upon themselves, and give to them all that hearty good will, the expression of which is sometimes more important, under the infliction of calamity, than mere material aid.

It is unnecessary to refer to the approach of the rebel army up the Shenandoah valley, on the third day of July last, to the defeat of General Wallace on the Monocacy, their approach to and threatening of the Capital, or their destruction of property and pillage of the counties of Maryland lying on our borders. These events have passed into history, and the responsibilities will be settled by the judgment of the people.

At that time a call was made upon Pennsylvania for volunteers, to be mustered into the service of the United States, and to serve for one hundred days, in the States of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and at Washington and its vicinity.

Notwithstanding the embarrassments which complicated the orders for their organization and muster, six regiments were enlisted and organized, and a battalion of six companies. The regiments were withdrawn from the State, the last leaving the twenty-ninth of July.

I desire that at least part of this force should be confined in the service to the States of Pennsylvania and Maryland, and made such an application to the War Department. As this proposition did not meet its approbation, it was rejected, and the general order changed to include the States named and Washington and its vicinity. No part of the Rebel army at that time had come within the State. The people of the border counties were warned, and removed their stock, and at Chambersburg and York were organized and armed for their own protection.

I was not officially informed of the movements of the Federal armies, and of course, not of the strategy of their commanders; but it was stated in the newspapers that the rebel army was closely pursued after it had crossed the Potomac, and was retiring up the valley of the Shenandoah.

Repeated successes of our troops were also announced, and the people of the State had just cause to believe that quite sufficient Federal force had been thrown forward for its protection upon the line of the Potomac.

On Friday, the twenty-ninth of July, the rebel brigades of Johnson and McCausland, consisting of from twenty-five hundred to three thousand mounted men, with six guns, crossed the Potomac at Clear Spring. They commenced crossing at ten o'clock A. M., and marched directly into Mercersburg.

There were but forty-five men picketed in that direction, under the command of Lieutenant McLean, United States Army, and as the enemy succeeded in cutting the telegraphic communications, which from that point had to pass west by way of Bedford, no information could be sent to General Couch, who was then at Chambersburg.

The head of this column reached Chambersburg at three o'clock A. M., on Saturday, the thirtieth ult.

The rebel brigades of Vaughn and Jackson, numbering about three thousand men, crossed the Potomac about the same time, at or near Williamsport.

Part of the command advanced on Hagerstown; the main body moved on the road leading from Williamsport to Greencastle; another rebel column of infantry and artillery crossed the Potomac simultaneously at Sheppardstown, and moved towards Leitersburg.

General Averill, who commanded a force reduced to about twenty-six hundred men, was at Hagerstown, and being threatened in front by Vaughn and Jackson, and on his right by McCausland and Johnson, who also threatened his rear, and on the left by the column which crossed at Sheppardstown, he therefore fell back upon Greencastle.

General Averill, it is understood, was under the orders of General Hunter, but was kept as fully advised by General Couch, as was possible, of the enemy's movements on his right and to his rear. General Couch was in Chambersburg, where his entire force consisted of sixty infantry, forty-five cavalry, and a section of a battery of artillery; in all less than one hundred and fifty men.

The six companies of men enlisted for one hundred days remaining in the State, and two companies of cavalry, had, under orders from Washington, as I am officially advised, joined Averill. The town of Chambersburg was held until daylight by the small force under General Couch, during which the Government stores and train were saved.

Two batteries were then planted by the enemy, commanding the town, and it was invested by the whole command of Johnson and McCausland. At seven A. M. six companies of dismounted men, commanded by Sweeny, entered the town, followed by mounted men under Gilmore.

The main force was in line of battle, and a demand was made for one hundred thousand dollars in gold, or five hundred thousand dollars in Government funds, as ransom, and a number of citizens were arrested and held as hostages for its payment.

No offer of money was made by the citizens of the town; and even if they had any intention of paying a ransom, no time was allowed, as the rebels commenced immediately to burn and pillage the town, disregarding the appeals of women and children, the aged and infirm; and even the bodies of the dead were not protected from their brutality.

It would have been vain for all the citizens of the town, if armed, to have attempted, in connection with General Couch's small command, to defend it. General Couch withdrew his command, and did not himself leave until the enemy were actually in the town.

General's Averill's command being within

nine miles of Chambersburg, it was hoped he would arrive in time to save the town, and efforts were made during the night to communicate with him.

In the meantime the small force of General Couch held the enemy at bay. General Averill marched on Chambersburg, but did not arrive until after the town was burned and the enemy had retired. He pursued and overtook them at McConnellsburg, in Fulton County, in time to save that place from pillage and destruction. He promptly engaged and defeated them, driving them to Hancock and across the Potomac.

I commend the homeless and ruined people of Chambersburg to the liberal benevolence of the Legislature, and suggest that a sufficient appropriation be made for their relief. Similar charity has been heretofore exercised, in the case of an accidental and destructive fire at Pittsburg. And I cannot doubt the disposition of the Legislature on the present occasion.

On the fifth day of the month a large rebel army was in Maryland, and at various points on the Potomac as far west as New Creek; and as there was no adequate force within the State, I deemed it my duty on that day to call for thirty thousand volunteer militia for domestic protection.

They will be armed, transported and supplied by the United States, but as no provision is made for their payment, it will be necessary, should you approve my action, to make an appropriation for that purpose.

Feeling it to be the duty of the General Government to afford full protection to the people of Pennsylvania and Maryland by the defence of the line of the Potomac, I united with Governor Bradford in the following letter to the President, dated July twenty-first, 1864:

STATE OF MARYLAND, EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, }
ANNAPOLIS, July 21, 1864. }

His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States:

SIR: The repeated raids across the Potomac River made by portions of the rebel army, and the extent of the damage they have succeeded so frequently in inflicting, have most injuriously affected the people of Maryland and Pennsylvania, in the neighborhood of that river, and many of them, it is believed, as the only security against such losses in the future, are seriously considering the propriety of abandoning their present homes, and seeking safety at the North.

It seems to us that not merely in the sectional aspect of the case, but in its national relation, the security of the border line between the loyal and rebellious States, is an object justifying and requiring a disposition of a portion of the national force with an especial view to its defence.

The Potomac river can only be crossed in its ordinary state of water at some five or six fords, and we propose to enlist from our respective States a volunteer force that shall be sufficient, with the aid of the fortifications which the force itself can speedily construct, to effectually guard

them all. We ask of the Government that the recruits thus raised shall be credited to the quotas of our States, on the call last made, to be armed, equipped, and supplied as other volunteers in the service.

We are aware that, as a general rule, well-founded objections exist to the enlistment of a force to be exclusively used for home or local defense, but we regard such a service as we now suggest as an exceptional case, and the complete protection of this part of our frontier as of admitted national importance.

For after the outbreak of the rebellion, the importance of a special defence of the region bordering on the Upper Potomac was recognized by the Government, and the Honorable Francis Thomas, of Maryland, was authorized by it to raise three regiments with a view to the protection of the counties on either side of the river.

Regiments were raised, but the subsequent exigencies of the service required their employment elsewhere, and they therefore afford at present no particular security to that region beyond other troops in the service.

The necessity, as we think, for some such peculiar provision has now become so obvious, that we would, with great respect, but most earnestly, urge upon your Excellency the expediency of acceding to the suggestions we have made, and we will immediately set about raising the forces required, and we have no doubt they will be promptly procured.

We have the honor to be,

With great respect,

Your obedient servants,

(Signed) A. W. BRADFORD, and
A. G. CURTIN.

The following letter, from the Assistant Adjutant-General, dated August first, 1864, is the only reply received by me up to this time:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 1, 1864 }

His Excellency, the Governor of Pennsylvania:

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the joint letter from yourself and the Governor of Maryland, dated July twenty-first, 1864, asking authority to raise a volunteer force in your respective States, to be exclusively used for home or local defenses, and for guarding the fords of the Potomac.

In reply, I am directed by the Secretary of War to inform you that the proposition has been fully considered, and that the authority asked for cannot be granted. In this connection please see the Act of Congress, approved February sixteenth, 1862, and promulgated in General Orders, No. fifteen, series of 1862, from this office.

I have the honor to remain,

Sir, respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) THOMAS M. VINCENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

MEM.—Similar letter sent to his Excellency, the Governor of Maryland, this date.

The reason given for the refusal to act on this proposition can be made consistent with the enlistment of men for one hundred days, to serve in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and at Washington and vicinity.

The following communication, dated twenty-second July, 1864, was made by Major-General Couch to the Secretary of war:

[copy.]

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF SUSQUEHANNA, }
HARRISBURG, July 22, 1864. }

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

SIR: During the recent raid into Maryland, the citizens of Chambersburg turned out with a determination to stand by the few soldiers present and hold the town against any cavalry force that might assault it. Five hundred citizens of York, irrespective of party, volunteered and were armed, and went down the Northern Central Railroad and repaired the bridges.

In order to show you that the border citizens are beginning to realize that by united action they have the strength to protect themselves against an ordinary raiding party, enclosed I invite your attention to a letter addressed to the Governor, together with the endorsement upon the subject of forming a special corps from the six border counties most exposed.

If ten thousand men can thus be organized, its existence would be a protection and give confidence. I am informed that the general sentiment of the people in question is in favor of something being done at once, and as a military measure I think it will be of essential service to the General Government, and recommend that the War Department encourage the movement, by authorizing the loan or issue of uniforms, provided the law in question is enacted.

It is believed that the new militia law of this State will practically prove of no value, expecting that an enrollment will probably be made.

I am, sir,

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) D. N. COUCH,
Major-General, commanding Department.

Headquarters Department of Susquehanna, Harrisburg, August 4—A true copy: respectfully furnished for the information of his Excellency, Governor A. G. Curtin.

(Signed) JOHN S. SCHULTZ,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the same day approved in writing of the proposition, and expressed my opinion that the Legislature would pass an act in accordance with it at its adjourned session, on the twenty-third of August.

I am furnished with an official copy of the following reply, dated August first, 1864, to the proposition of General Couch:

(copy)

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., August 1, 1864. }

Major-General D. N. Couch, Commanding, &c.,
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the twenty-second of July, relative to the United States providing uniforms for a special corps of militia from certain border counties of Pennsylvania.

In reply, I am directed to inform you that the subject has been carefully considered by the Secretary of War, who cannot sanction the issue of the clothing in question.

I am, General,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

(Signed) THOS. M. VINCENT.

Headquarters Department of the Susquehanna, Harrisburg, August sixth, 1864.—A true copy, respectfully furnished for the information of his Excellency, Governor A. G. Curtin.

(Signed) JOHN S. SCHULTZ,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

In each of the three years, 1862, 1863, and 1864, it has been found necessary to call out the State militia for the defence of the State, and this has been done with the assent and assistance of the General Government.

From the want of organization, we have been obliged to rely exclusively on volunteer military, and with few exceptions to organize anew for such occasions.

This has caused confusion and a loss of valuable time, and has resulted in sending to the field bodies of men in a great measure undisciplined.

The militia bill passed at the last session is, I think, for ordinary times, the best militia law we have ever had, but under the existing extraordinary circumstances it seems to require modification.

I suggest that the Assessor be directed to make an immediate enrollment, classifying the militia as may be thought best.

That the officer be appointed by the Governor, on the recommendation, approved by him, of a board of examination, composed of three Major-Generals for each Division, of whom the Major-General of the Division shall be one, the other two to be designated by the Governor, from adjoining divisions, or in such other modes as the Legislature may think fit; that in all cases the officers shall be selected by preference from officers and men who have been in service, and shall have been honorably discharged by the United States, and that effectual provision be made for drafting the militia when required.

The recommendation in regard to appointments is made to avoid the angry dissension, and too often political jealousy, which divide military organizations by the election of officers, and to secure the services of the most deserving and competent men. The election of officers in

the volunteer forces in the field has been found to be injudicious to the service, while promotions by seniority and appointments of meritorious privates have produced bravery, and stimulated to faithfulness. In the enlistment of new organizations the plan adopted of granting authority to officers to recruit companies has been found to be the best policy.

I also recommend that the Governor be authorized to form either by the acceptance of volunteers or by draft, in such parts of the State as he may deem expedient, a special corps of militia, to consist in due proportions of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to be kept up to the full number of fifteen regiments, to be styled Minute Men, who shall be sworn and mustered into the service of the State for three years; who shall assemble for drill at such times and places as he may direct, who shall be clothed, armed, and equipped by the State, and paid when assembled for drill or called into service; and who shall at all times be liable to be called into immediate service for the defence of the State, independently of the remainder of the term enlisted for.

As this force would be subjected to sudden calls, the larger part of it should be organized in the counties adjoining our exposed border, and as the people of those counties have more personal interest in their protection, the recommendation is made to authorize the Governor to designate the parts of the State in which it shall be raised, and save the time and expense of transporting troops from remote parts of the State, and the subsistence and pay in going to and from the border. A body of men so organized will, it is believed, be effective to prevent raids and incursions.

The expenses of clothing, arming and equipping such a force cannot be correctly ascertained, but the Quartermaster-General has been directed to approximate estimates for your information, which will be independent of pay and subsistence.

The State should provide at least six four-gun batteries of field artillery, with all the modern improvements. The suggestion has been frequently made by more reflecting persons that the State should raise a force and keep it permanently in the field for her defense.

Apart from other considerations, it is to be observed that the expense of such a measure would be quite beyond the present ability of the State.

To raise and maintain an army of fifteen regiments (and any smaller force would be inadequate) would involve an annual expenditure of more than fifteen millions of dollars.

The plan which I have above proposed would, I think, give the State efficient protection, and if the Legislature should think fit to adopt it, the expense can be readily provided for by loan or otherwise.

Having an organized force under the control of the authorities of the State, and mustered into service for domestic protection, we would not, as heretofore, lose time in arranging for

transportation and supplies with the National Government when it becomes necessary to call it into the field.

When thoroughly organized, it should be in all its appointments an army which could be increased from our enrollment of classified citizens.

The plan which I have above suggested is the result of the reflection and experience which I have had during the last three years, and I have felt it to be my duty to submit it for your consideration, for the purpose of providing for the effectual defence of the State.

If the Legislature should prefer the adoption of any other plan, more efficient and economical than that which I have herein proposed, it will give me pleasure to co-operate heartily in carrying it into effect.

In accordance with the act of March 4, 1864, I have appointed for the Eastern armies, Colonel F. Jordan as agent at Washington, and Lieutenant-Colonel James Gilliam as Assistant Agent at that place; and also for the Southwestern armies, Lieutenant-Colonel James Chamberlain as Agent at Nashville.

These agents are now actively engaged in the performance of their duties, and it is desirable that our people should be aware that a part of them consist in the gratuitous collection of all claims by Pennsylvania volunteers, or their legal representatives, on the State and National Governments.

Volunteers having claims on either of these Governments can have them collected through these agents without expense, and thus be secured from the extortions to which it is feared they have sometimes heretofore been subjected.

Having received information from the agents of the State that our sick and wounded were suffering greatly for the want of comforts and even necessaries, I have been recently compelled to call on the people to contribute supplies mainly in kind, for their relief; and it gives me pleasure to say that this appeal has been cheerfully responded to, as have been all my former appeals to the same end.

It seems impossible to exhaust the liberality of our generous people, when the well-being of our brave volunteers is in question.

In my special message of the thirtieth of April I stated the circumstances attending the advance, by banks and other corporations, of funds for the payment of the militia called out in 1863.

In consequence, the Legislature passed the act of May 4, 1864, authorizing a loan for the purpose of refunding, with interest, the amount thus advanced, in case that Congress should fail to make the necessary appropriation at its then current session.

I regret to say that Congress adjourned without making such appropriation. The balance in the Treasury being found sufficient to reimburse the funds so advanced without unduly diminishing the sinking fund, I have deemed it

advisable not to advertise for proposals for the loans, and I recommend the passage of an act directing the payment to be made out of the money in the Treasury.

As the omission of Congress to act on this subject involved an unprecedented disregard of the good faith of the national authorities, I recommend that the Legislature take measures for procuring an appropriation at the next session of Congress.

The revenue bill passed at the last session has been found to be defective in several points, and I recommend a careful and immediate revision of it.

The bounty bill passed at the last session is found to be defective and unjust in many of its provisions, and from the manner in which it is administered in some parts of the State, oppressive on the people.

I therefore recommend a careful revision of it, as the present session has been called for the consideration of matters of vital public importance.

I recommend them to your earnest and exclusive attention.

A. G. CURTIN.

Doc. 24.

SPEECH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS:

AT MACON, GA., SEPTEMBER 23, 1864.

Ladies and Gentlemen, Friends, and Fellow-citizens:

It would have gladdened my heart to have met you in prosperity instead of adversity. But friends are drawn together in adversity. The son of a Georgian, who fought through the first Revolution, I would be untrue to myself if I should forget the State in her day of peril. What though misfortune has befallen our arms from Decatur to Jonesboro, our cause is not lost. Sherman cannot keep up his long line of communication, and retreat, sooner or later he must; and when that day comes the fate that befell the army of the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow will be re-acted. Our cavalry and our people will harass and destroy his army as did the Cossacks that of Napoleon; and the Yankee General, like him, will escape with only a body-guard. How can this be the most speedily effected? By the absentees of Hood's army returning to their posts; and will they not? Can they see the banished exiles; can they hear the wail of their suffering countrywomen and children and not come? By what influence they are made to stay away it is not necessary to speak. If there is one who will stay away at this hour he is unworthy of the name of a Georgian. To the women no appeal is necessary. They are like the Spartan mothers of old. I know of one who has lost all her sons, except one of eighteen years. She wrote that she wanted me to reserve a place for him in the ranks. The venerable General Polk, to whom I read the letter, knew that woman well, and said

it was characteristic of her; but I will not weary you by turning aside to relate the various incidents of giving up the last son to the cause of our country, known to me. Wherever we go we find the hearts and hands of our noble women enlisted. They are seen wherever the eye may fall or the step turn. They have one duty to perform; to buoy up the hearts of our people. I know the deep disgrace felt by Georgia at our army falling back from Dalton to the interior of the State. But I was not of those who considered Atlanta lost when our army crossed the Chattahoochee. I resolved that it should not, and I then put a man in command who I knew would strike a manly blow for the city, and many a Yankee's blood was made to nourish the soil before the prize was won. It does not become us to revert to disaster. Let the dead bury the dead. Let us, with one arm and one effort, endeavor to crush Sherman. I am going to the army to confer with our Generals. The end must be the defeat of our enemy. It has been said that I abandoned Georgia to her fate. Shame upon such falsehood. Where could the author have been when Walker, when Polk, and when General Stephen D. Lee were sent to his assistance? Miserable man. The man who uttered this was a scoundrel. He was not a man to save our country. If I knew that a General did not possess the right qualities to command, would I not be wrong if he was not removed? Why, when our army was falling back from Northern Georgia, I even heard that I had sent Bragg with pontoons to cross it to Cuba. But we must be charitable. The man who can speculate ought to be made to take up his musket. When the war is over and our independence won—and we establish our independence—who will be our aristocracy? I hope the limping soldier. To the young ladies I would say that when choosing between an empty sleeve and the man who had remained at home and grown rich, always take the empty sleeve. Let the old men remain at home and make bread. But should they know of any young man keeping away from the service, who cannot be made to go any other way, let them write to the Executive. I read all letters sent me from the people, but have not time to answer them. You have not many men between eighteen and forty-five left. The boys—God bless the boys—are, as rapidly as they become old enough, going to the field. The city of Macon is filled with stores, sick and wounded. It must not be abandoned, but when the enemy come, instead of calling upon Hood's army for defence, the old men must fight, and when the enemy is driven beyond Chattanooga, they too can join in the general rejoicing. Your prisoners are kept as a sort of Yankee capital. I have heard that one of their Generals said that their exchange would defeat Sherman. I have tried every means, conceded everything to effect an exchange, but to no purpose. Butler, the beast, with whom no Commissioner of Exchange would hold intercourse, had pub-

lished in his newspapers that if we would consent to the exchange of negroes, all difficulties might be removed. This is reported as an effort of his to get himself whitewashed by holding intercourse with gentlemen. If an exchange could be effected, I don't know but I might be induced to recognize Butler. But in the future every effort will be given, as far as possible, to effect the end. We want our soldiers in the field, and we want the sick and wounded to return home. It is not proper for me to speak of the number of men in the field, but this I will say, that two thirds of our men are absent, some sick, some wounded, but most of them absent without leave. The man who repents and goes back to his commander voluntarily, appeals strongly to executive clemency. But suppose he stays away until the war is over, and his comrades return home, and when every man's history will be told, where will he shield himself? It is upon these reflections that I rely to make them return to their duty, but after conferring with our Generals at headquarters, if there be any other remedy it shall be applied. I love my friends, and I forgive my enemies. I have been asked to send reinforcements from Virginia to Georgia. In Virginia the disparity in numbers is just as great as it is in Georgia. Then, I have been asked why the army sent to the Shenandoah Valley was not sent here? It was because an army of the enemy had penetrated that valley to the very gates of Lynchburg, and General Early was sent to drive them back. This he not only successfully did, but, crossing the Potomac, came well-nigh capturing Washington itself, and caused Grant to send two corps of his army to protect it. This the enemy denominated a raid. If so, Sherman's march into Georgia is a raid. What would prevent them now, if Early was withdrawn, from taking Lynchburg, and putting a complete cordon of men around Richmond? I counselled with the great and grave soldier, General Lee, upon all these points. My mind roamed over the whole field. With this we can succeed. If one half the men now absent without leave, will return to duty, we can defeat the enemy. With that hope I am going to the front. I may not realize this hope, but I know there are men there who have looked death in the face too often to despond now. Let no one despond. Let no one distrust; and remember that if justice is the beau ideal, hope is the reality.

Doc. 25.

THE NEW MADRID EXPEDITION.

COLONEL BURRUS' REPORT.

NEW MADRID, Mo., August 7.

To Brigadier-General Ewing:

Have been out seventeen days with a battalion of the Second Cavalry, Missouri State Militia, under Lieutenant-Colonel Heller, detachments of the Second and Third, under Major

Wilson, and of the First and Sixth Missouri Cavalry Volunteers, under Captain Prewitt.

I had skirmishes with guerillas and bushwhackers, in Mississippi, Stoddard, New Madrid, Pemiscot and Duncan counties, Arkansas, killing considerable numbers of them.

We had quite a brisk running fight at Osceola, Arkansas, on the second instant, with Bowen's and McVaigh's companies, of Shelby's command. We captured their camp, killing seven, and took twenty-five prisoners, including Captain Bowen, their commander.

On the fourth, at Elksehula, we fought the Second Missouri rebel cavalry, and Conyer's Guthrie's and Darnell's bands of guerrillas, all under the command of Colonel Cowan. We routed them completely, killed and mortally wounded about thirty, and slightly wounded (those who escaped in the swamps, as I am informed by prisoners subsequently captured), between thirty and forty, and took twenty-eight prisoners.

We lost Captain Francis, Third cavalry, Missouri State Militia, mortally wounded, and two others slightly wounded. We have killed in all full fifty rebel soldiers and bushwhackers, including one Captain and three Lieutenants, wounded between thirty and forty we know of, and took fifty-seven prisoners, including two Captains.

We also captured full two hundred stand of arms, and over two hundred horses and mules.

JOHN L. BURRUS,
Colonel commanding the Expedition.

Doc. 26.

AMNESTY TO INSURGENT ENEMIES.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, August 8, 1864 }

1. The attention of commanding officers of departments, districts, military posts, and detachments, is called to the following paragraph in the Proclamation of the President, dated the twenty-sixth of March, 1864, defining the cases in which insurgent enemies are entitled to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation of the eighth of December, 1863:

"It (the amnesty) does apply only to those persons who, being yet at large and free from any arrest, confinement or duress, shall voluntarily come forward and take the said oath, with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority."

From various departments and districts information has been received by this department that insurgent enemies in the States of Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri, have endeavored, fraudulently and treacherously, to obtain the benefits of the President's amnesty by taking the prescribed oath, without any purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority, but for the purpose of preserving their property from the penalty of their crimes, or of screening themselves from punishment for the commission

of arson, robbery, treason and murder. All commanders of departments, districts, posts and detachments, and all officers in the military service, are directed to use the utmost diligence in detecting and bringing to punishment all insurgent enemies who have been or may be guilty of fraudulently and treacherously taking the oath prescribed by the President's Proclamation for any other purpose than that of "restoring peace and establishing the national authority," and they will treat such oath, when fraudulently and treacherously taken, as not entitling the guilty parties to any clemency, but as being in itself a substantive offence against the Government, and as affording no protection to the individuals by whom it has been or may be taken, either in their persons or property, and as depriving them of all claim to immunity, protection or clemency.

2. Commanders of departments and districts are also authorized to prescribe such rules and regulations in respect to the administration of said oath in future, as may be needed to prevent the improper administration of said oath to persons taking it for any other than the "purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority." To all persons who have or shall voluntarily come forward and take the oath, "with the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority," full protection, and all the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation will be extended.

3. Commanders and all military officers will exercise strict vigilance within their respective commands, in order to detect and bring to punishment any officer, civil, military or naval, who knowingly and wilfully has administered or shall administer the said oath to any person or persons, except the insurgent enemies, who are, by the proclamation of the twenty-sixth of March, entitled to the benefits of said amnesty proclamation, by reason of their taking the oath for "the purpose of restoring peace and establishing the national authority."

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 27.

SECRETARY BENJAMIN'S CIRCULAR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
RICHMOND, VA., Aug. 25, 1864.

SIR: Numerous publications which have recently appeared in the journals of the United States on the subject of informal overtures for peace between two Federations of States now at war on this Continent render it desirable that you should be fully advised of the views and policy of this Government on a matter of such paramount importance. It is likewise proper that you should be accurately informed of what has occurred on the several occasions mentioned in the published statements.*

* See page 79 Anta.

You have heretofore been furnished with copies of the manifesto issued by the Congress of the Confederate States, with the approval of the President, on the fourteenth of June last, and have, doubtless, acted in conformity with the resolution which requested that copies of this manifesto should be laid before foreign Governments. "The principles, sentiments, and purposes, by which these States have been, and are still actuated," are set forth in that paper with all the authority due to the solemn declaration of the legislative and executive departments of this Government, and with a clearness which leaves no room for comment or explanation. In a few sentences it is pointed out that all we ask is non-interference with our internal peace and prosperity, "and to be left in the undisturbed enjoyment of those inalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, which our common ancestors declared to be the equal heritage of all parties to the social compact. Let them forbear aggressions upon us, and the war is at an end. If there be questions which require adjustment by negotiation, we have ever been willing, and are still willing, to enter into communication with our adversaries in a spirit of peace, of equality, and manly frankness."

The manifesto closed with the declaration that "we commit our cause to the enlightened judgment of the world, to the sober reflections of our adversaries themselves, and to the solemn and righteous arbitrament of Heaven."

Within a few weeks after the publication of this manifesto, it seemed to have met with a response from President Lincoln. In the early part of last month, a letter was received by General Lee from Lieutenant-General Grant, in the following words:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
CITY POINT, VA., Aug. 8, 1864.

General R. E. Lee, commanding Confederate Forces, near Petersburg, Va.:

GENERAL: I would request that Colonel Jaques, Seventy-third Illinois volunteer infantry, and J. R. Gilmore, Esq., be allowed to meet Colonel Robert Ould, Commissioner for the exchange of prisoners, at such place between the lines of the two armies as you may designate. The object of the meeting is legitimate with the duties of Colonel Ould as Commissioner.

If not consistent for you to grant the request here asked, I would beg that this be referred to President Davis for his action.

Requesting as early an answer to this communication as you may find it convenient to make, I subscribe myself,

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General U. S. A.

On the reference of this letter to the President, he authorized Colonel Ould to meet the persons named in General Grant's letter; and

Colonel Ould, after seeing them, returned to Richmond and reported to the President, in the presence of the Secretary of War and myself, that Messrs. Jaques and Gilmore had not said anything to him about his duties as commissioner for exchange of prisoners, but that they asked permission to come to Richmond for the purpose of seeing the President; that they came with the knowledge and approval of President Lincoln, and under his pass; that they were informal messengers, sent with a view of paving the way for a meeting of formal commissioners authorized to negotiate for peace, and desired to communicate to President Davis the views of Mr. Lincoln, and to obtain the President's views in return, so as to arrange for a meeting of commissioners. Colonel Ould stated that he had told them repeatedly that it was useless to come to Richmond to talk of peace on any other terms than the recognized independence of the Confederacy, to which they said that they were aware of that, and that they were, nevertheless, confident that their interview would result in peace. The President, on this report of Colonel Ould, determined to permit them to come to Richmond under his charge.

On the evening of the sixteenth of July, Colonel Ould conducted these gentlemen to a hotel in Richmond, where a room was provided for them, in which they were to remain under surveillance during their stay here, and the next morning I received the following letter :

SPOTSWOOD HOUSE, RICHMOND, VA., }
July 17, 1864. }

Hon. J. P. Benjamin, Secretary of State of Confederate States of America :

DEAR SIR : The undersigned, James F. Jaques of Illinois, and James R. Gilmore, of Massachusetts, most respectfully solicit an interview with President Davis. They visit Richmond as private citizens, and have no official character or authority; but they are fully possessed of the views of the United States Government relative to an adjustment of the differences now existing between the North and the South, and have little doubt that a free interchange of views between President Davis and themselves would open the way to such *official* negotiations as would ultimate in restoring PEACE to the two sections of our distracted country.

They therefore ask an interview with the President, and, awaiting your reply, are,
Most truly and respectfully,

Your obedient servants,
JAMES F. JAQUES,
JAMES R. GILMORE.

The word "official" is underscored, and the word "peace" doubly underscored, in the original.

After perusing the letter, I invited Colonel Ould to conduct the writers to my office; and on their arrival stated to them that they must be conscious they could not be admitted to an in-

terview with the President without informing me more fully of the object of their mission, and satisfying me that they came by request of Mr. Lincoln.

Mr. Gilmore replied that they came unofficially, but with the knowledge, and at the desire, of Mr. Lincoln; that they thought the war had gone far enough; that it could never end except by some sort of agreement; that the agreement might as well be made now as after further bloodshed; that they knew by the recent address of the Confederate Congress that we were willing to make peace; that they admitted that proposals ought to come from the North, and that they were prepared to make these proposals by Mr. Lincoln's authority; that it was necessary to have a sort of informal understanding in advance of regular negotiations, for if commissioners were appointed without some such understanding, they would meet, quarrel, and separate, leaving the parties more bitter against each other than before; that they knew Mr. Lincoln's views, and would state them if pressed by the President to do so, and desired to learn his in return.

I again insisted on some evidence that they came from Mr. Lincoln; and in order to satisfy me, Mr. Gilmore referred to the fact that permission for their coming through our lines had been asked officially by General Grant in a letter to General Lee, and that General Grant in that letter had asked that this request should be preferred to President Davis. Mr. Gilmore then showed me a card, written and signed by Mr. Lincoln, requesting General Grant to aid Mr. Gilmore and friend in passing through his lines into the Confederacy. Colonel Jaques then said that his name was not put on the card for the reason that it was earnestly desired that their visit should be kept secret; that he had come into the Confederacy a year ago, and had visited Petersburg on a similar errand; and that it was feared if his name should become known, that some of those who had formerly met him in Petersburg would conjecture the purpose for which he now came. He said that the terms of peace which they would offer to the President would be honorable to the Confederacy; that they did not desire that the Confederacy should accept any other terms, but would be glad to have my promise, as they gave theirs, that their visit should be kept a profound secret if it fail to result in peace; that it would not be just that either party should seek any advantage by divulging the fact of their overture for peace, if unsuccessful. I assented to this request, and then rising, said: "Do I understand you to state distinctly that you come as messengers from Mr. Lincoln for the purpose of agreeing with the President as to the proper mode of inaugurating a formal negotiation for peace, charged by Mr. Lincoln with authority for stating his own views and receiving those of President Davis?" Both answered in the affirmative, and I then said that the President would see them at my office the same evening, at nine P. M.; that, at least,

I presumed he would; but if he objected, after hearing my report, they should be informed. They were then recommitted to the charge of Colonel Ould, with the understanding that they were to be reconducted to my office at the appointed hour, unless otherwise directed.

The interview, connected with the report previously made by Colonel Ould, left on my mind the decided impression that Mr. Lincoln was averse to sending formal commissioners to open negotiations, lest he might thereby be deemed to have recognized the independence of the Confederacy, and that he was anxious to learn whether the conditions on which alone he would be willing to take such a step would be yielded by the Confederacy; that with this view he had placed his messengers in a condition to satisfy us that they really came from him, without committing himself to anything in the event of a disagreement as to such conditions as he considered to be indispensable. On informing the President, therefore, of my conclusions, he determined that no question of form or etiquette should be an obstacle to his receiving any overtures that promised, however remotely, to result in putting an end to the carnage which marked the continuance of hostilities.

The President came to my office at nine o'clock in the evening, and Colonel Ould came a few moments later, with Messrs Jaques and Gilmore. The President said to them that he had heard from me that they came as messengers of peace from Mr. Lincoln; that as such they were welcome; that the Confederacy had never concealed its desire for peace; and that he was ready to hear whatever they had to offer on that subject.

Mr. Gilmore then addressed the President, and in a few minutes had conveyed the information that these two gentlemen had come to Richmond impressed with the idea that this Government would accept a peace on a basis of a reconstruction of the Union, the abolition of slavery, and the grant of an amnesty to the people of the States as repentant criminals. In order to accomplish the abolition of slavery, it was proposed that there should be a general vote of all the people of both federations in mass, and the majority of the vote thus taken was to determine that as well as all other disputed questions. These were stated to be Mr. Lincoln's views. The President answered that as these proposals had been prefaced by the remark that the people of the North were a majority, and that a majority ought to govern, the offer was, in effect, a proposal that the Confederate States should surrender at discretion, admit that they had been wrong from the beginning of the contest, submit to the mercy of their enemies, and avow themselves to be in need of pardon for their crimes; that extermination was preferable to dishonor.

He stated that if they were themselves so unacquainted with the form of their own Government as to make such propositions, Mr. Lincoln ought to have known, when giving them his

views, that it was out of the power of the Confederate Government to act on the subject of the domestic institutions of the several States, each State having exclusive jurisdiction on that point; still less to commit the decision of such a question to the vote of a foreign people; that the separation of the States was an accomplished fact; that he had no authority to receive proposals for negotiation, except by virtue of his office as President of an independent Confederacy; and on this basis alone must proposals be made to him.

At one period of the conversation, Mr. Gilmore made use of some language referring to these States as "rebels," while rendering an account of Mr. Lincoln's views, and apologized for the word. The President desired him to proceed, that no offence was taken, and that he wished Mr. Lincoln's language to be repeated to him as exactly as possible. Some further conversation took place substantially to the same effect as the foregoing, when the President rose, to indicate that the interview was at an end. The two gentlemen were then recommitted to the charge of Colonel Ould, and left Richmond the next day.

This account of the visit of Messrs. Gilmore and Jaques to Richmond, has been rendered necessary by publications made by one or both of them since their return to the United States, notwithstanding the agreement that their visit was to be kept secret. They have, perhaps, concluded that, as the promise of secrecy was made at their request, it was permissible to disregard it. We had no reason for desiring to conceal what occurred, and have, therefore, no complaint to make of the publicity given to the fact of the visit. The extreme inaccuracy of Mr. Gilmore's narrative will be apparent to you from the foregoing statement.

You have no doubt seen in the Northern papers an account of another conference on the subject of peace, which took place in Canada, at about the same date, between Messrs. C. C. Clay and J. P. Holcombe, Confederate citizens of the highest character and position, and Mr. Horace Greeley, of New York, acting with authority of President Lincoln. It is deemed not improper to inform you that Messrs. Clay and Holcombe, although enjoying in an eminent degree the confidence and esteem of the President, were strictly accurate in their statement that they were without any authority from this Government to treat with that of the United States on any subject whatever.

We had no knowledge of their conference with Mr. Greeley, nor of their proposed visit to Washington, till we saw the newspaper publications. A significant confirmation of the truth of the statement of Messrs. Gilmore and Jaques, that they came as messengers from Mr. Lincoln, is to be found in the fact that the views of Mr. Lincoln, as stated by them to the President, are in exact conformity with the offensive paper addressed to "Whom it may concern," which was sent by Mr. Lincoln to Messrs. Clay and Holcombe by the hands of his private secretary, Mr. Hay, and

which was properly regarded by those gentlemen as an intimation that Mr. Lincoln was unwilling that this war should cease while in his power to continue hostilities.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
J. P. BENJAMIN,
Secretary of State.

HON. JAMES M. MASON,
Commissioner of the Continent, etc., etc., etc., Paris.

Doc. 28.

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND.

DIARY OF LIEUTENANT W. ASHLEY.

NEW MARKET, VA., Saturday, July 1, 1864.—Daylight, start through Edinburg; rest about one hour; took bath at High Bridge; through Woodstock, encamped; made 21 miles; hot, tired, and heartily sick of infantry; start at daylight.

July 2.—Through Strasburg, straggled and got a good dinner; encamped near Middletown.

July 3.—Daylight start, through New Town, Kern's Town, Mill Town, and Winchester; encamped near Darkeville.

July 4.—Start to Martinburg; Yanks had left in a hurry; lots of plunder; rested, and then on to Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; tore it up considerable; dreadful tired, all but worn out; still hot and dusty.

July 5.—Clear. Into line and marched against the enemy; countermarched, as they had fallen back; drew coffee, lager beer, candy, &c. 10 A. M., took road and marched to Potomac River, near Sheppardstown; waded it, and encamped at Sharpsburg. Onions, &c.; many excesses; troops charged a place where there was liquor; lots of 'em got drunk, necessitating heavy guard duty and stringent orders.

July 6.—Clear—still no rain; rest; T. Stuart makes raise from Lt.; we are now on the field of Antietam; ration of whisky issued, being the second I have known in over three years' service; drew one month's pay (the officers only) for November, '63, yesterday; no use to us here, "Confed. won't go;" good living; coffee, ham, whisky and wine in infinitesimally small doses. 5 P. M., marched; made foot of Maryland Heights about 11 P. M.

July 7.—Cannonading all night; daylight start; we are now in position as reserve; sharp fighting going on immediately in front; shells coming unpleasantly near every once in awhile; passed over a man's foot on our road, just now taken off by a cannon ball; suppose we are about one mile from their works; Harper's Ferry; dark; moved out, over mountain, to Rollersville, by 2 A. M.; rain; rough, and very dark; Captain Singleton left behind.

July 8.—Clear. Captain got in, narrowly escaping capture. Three men marched around town carrying rails and placards on their backs, marked "Thief," for pilfering. 7 A. M., marched to a shade then to town; had passed through

Labb; straightened out, we as rear-guard. The enemy made a dash on our wagons; we repulsed them easily, and were not again interrupted. Crossed Blue Ridge and marched to Middletown; counter-marched and encamped in a meadow; awful rain during the night, all and everything wet through. Captain in charge of picket—to spring; dark, creek to wade, and about a mile to it.

July 9.—Clear. To town; stacked arms and levied black mail to the tune of \$60,000. We expect to fight at or near Frederick this morning; but little secesh proclivities—people all scared, doors all closed, and no talk for you at all; girls very different from ours—don't like them, though they may improve on acquaintance. Made Frederick City; Yanks fell back as we advanced, and gave us battle on Monocacy River; we, the reserve, were not engaged, but lay close up until they retreated, when we soon put in pursuit. Counter-marched back through Frederick (a handsome, clean, and I should think, wealthy place; so old Jubal thought, for he made them shell out \$250,000), and on to battle-field; saw plenty of dead and wounded Yanks lying about. Our loss must have been considerable from the number of ambulances with wounded and wagons with the dead which we met on their way to Frederick. Took up 12 P. M.

July 10.—Daylight start; our battalion as advanced guard; found a Colt's army repeater, No. 47,868, under a dead horse; marched beyond encampment—had to come back—making our march about twenty-six miles. The inhabitants are badly scared; our cavalry are driving all before them, and we have to make forced marches to keep within supporting distance. We now know that Washington is our destination, and we are only twenty miles from it. Saw Generals Early, Breckinridge, Elzey, Echols, and Vaughan to-day.

July 11.—Into line at 4 A. M., and now lying here; expect to get to Georgetown to-day. The band is now enlivening us; we have just had a hasty, but good breakfast of coffee, sugar, butter, and bread; started about 11 A. M.; we, as rear, are making slow speed through Rockville; cannonading all day. Our forces have driven the enemy into their works, and given them seven hours in which to surrender. We are about five miles from the Capital; our cavalry is in Georgetown, and Early's corps have been hammering away at the White House for some hours, and still "we hold Richmond." It is reported that Abraham has fled from the wrath to come, but whither no man knoweth, that is, the Confederate army. Hottest day we have experienced.

July 12.—Clear; all quiet; occasionally the report of cannon breaks the monotony; my dirk-knife and tobacco disappear; washed my shirt, slips, and socks, mended my wardrobe generally, making suitable preparations for my *entrées* into the capital; drew for shoes; will either have to take Washington to-night or get

from here, but what the programme is I know not; sultry, every indication of a storm; got some fine potatoes, enjoyed them; sundown, took the back track, travelled all night, through Rockville, encamped on creek; made fifteen miles.

July 13.—Clear; rested the balance of the day; sundown, again pegging it through Booneville; took up on the banks of the Potomac for about twelve hours; daylight, waded river.

July 14.—Took up at a big spring near Leesburg, on the ground where Evans achieved his victory in 1861; cooked two days' rations; we have an immense number of cattle and over 1,000 prisoners; over the river, and thus far safe; fighting all day over the river; infantry all on Virginia side; all horses captured by men taken away from them, officers, though, I see, are permitted to steal.

July 16.—Clear; daylight, start through Leesburg; had to lay down to rest for an hour; Yankee cavalry made a charge on our train, capturing and destroying several wagons before we could form and get to them; we easily scattered them, killing three and capturing three; artillery, two pieces, took position on slope of mountain, and lay two hours expecting an attack there; mountain at Snicker's Gap; camped on Shenandoah River.

July 17.—Clear; at daylight waded the river and on to Berryville; counter-marched and are now lying in the woods. Vaughan's horses arrived from Grayson County in charge of Captains Reese, Fisher, and others.

July 18.—Clear; when will it rain? Inspection; drew coffee and sugar; plenty of mountain ditney, makes a very palatable tea. 1 P. M.—Marched and put into line near the river; water good but unhandy. 2 P. M.—Marched, under heavy artillery fire, closer to the enemy; several men wounded in getting into position; they are splendid artillerymen; heavy fighting; we, as the reserve, slept under arms.

July 19.—Clear; we drove the Yanks across the river last night, and are still peppering away at them; Thomas Smith and Joseph Stuart are sharpshooting. 12 M.—Relieved and back to old quarters; cooked; at dark moved through Berryville, and by daylight made Ashby's Gap; rested three hours and then on to Gap; camped in a meadow.

July 21.—Clear; daylight start; we are attached to Wharton's brigade; quick time to Middletown, and are now lying in the woods here; it is reported that Ransom's cavalry and Ramsuer's infantry were whipped yesterday near Winchester; got this man's book from Joseph Smith; our boys have numerous nic-nax captured from the Yankees; rumored there are four corps after us; if so, we are in a tight place.

July 22.—Clear; daylight start; took position on hill at Strasburg; lay in line all day, awaiting an attack; evening, drew off to woods; McRea rejoined us; no rations.

July 23.—Clear; half rations; out on picket; euche; H. Roddy rejoined us.

July 24.—Clear; army in motion; no move toward Winchester; all sorts of grape-vines in circulation; one day's rations, very short, issued; came up on enemy near Newtown; we are in centre of front line, skirmishing, heavy shells and bullets coming thick among us; McRea wounded in knee. 2 P. M.—Moved to and by the right flank and ordered to charge; did so, and drove the Yanks, under a hot fire, several miles through Winchester and encamped about three miles; our boys behaved gallantly; we gained a victory, but don't know anything of the advantages, beyond removing a formidable enemy from our front; they gave way too soon for us; had they fought us half an hour longer, we should, in all probability, have made a brilliant day of it. Part of our infantry was aiming to get at their rear, but the precipitation with which they broke, if it did not redound to their honor, saved their carcasses. I got a canteen, knapsack, haversack, crackers, a sponge and a saddle, which I gave the Colonel, but had to leave my sword—so much in my way, having no belt, and using my repeater.

July 25.—Rain; all wet through and cold; nothing to eat but a little coffee we picked up. "We marched and fought yesterday about 25 miles;" to town with Colonel McRanny; turned back by the guard, having no pass; hungry. 5 P. M., took the road, and encamped near Darksville about 10 P. M.; one day's rations issued and cooked for to-morrow, cheating us out of to-day's. We have eaten just half what we drew this evening, so that to-morrow we suffer again. Not right, but we can't help ourselves. Kelly and Roddy to hospital at Winchester; Yanks said to be just ahead of us; look sharp for to-morrow.

July 26.—Clear. Started at 6 through Martinsburg on to Baltimore and Ohio Railroad; encamped to cook two miles east of town; are now playing smash with the railroad. Our cavalry have hard and continuous fighting, but are driving the enemy all the time.

July 28.—Clear. Resting.

July 30.—Wet.

July 31.—Clear. Daylight start; marched to Darksville. Roberts, Smith, and Wear to hospital; about the hottest day I ever experienced; in charge of picket of twenty men at White Sulphur Springs. All quiet.

August 1.—Clear. Got a good breakfast; bought Starr's repeating pistol from Stewart on General Gordon's staff; price —, No. 9,010; pleasant and shady out here; would like to stay on duty. Buttermilk and pork for dinner. 5 P. M., relieved by Clark's battery men; slight rain this evening.

August 2.—Dull. Slight rain; how I do wish it would come down for a twenty-four hours' stretch. Yanks said to be cautiously advancing; all of them across the Potomac.

August 3.—Clear. General inspection; preaching yesterday; slight shower; orders to cook two day's rations and move daylight in morning. Colonel McRanny to hospital yesterday; Mann

in from hospital; Lieutenant Young and Jno. Long sick; Captain in command of battalion; self in charge of company; it numbers but eleven men rank and file.

August 4.—Clear. Moved out toward Staunton; about one mile out, struck across country and on to Newtown, when we filed left and encamped near Shepardstown. Slight rain.

August 5.—Clear; moved out at 6 A. M., waded Potomac and are now lying at Sharpsburg; our company all on duty, and sick, but one Corporal, Second Lieutenant, and Captain; sharpshooters are engaged about one mile to our front; the line moving up; will be our turn in a few minutes; had to try my skill as cook, smartly out of practice I find.

August 6.—Early daylight, start through Sharpsburg; filed left through Logtown and Williamsport across Potomac; heavy rain; all wet through; encamped one mile from river; again we have to get from the Yankees; I wish this raid was through with.

August 7.—Daylight; shoes drawn; 5 A. M., marched in rear; awful hot; through Martinsburg to Darksville; encamped; much tired; Russell sick; bought tobacco; rations too scanty for the severe duty we are doing.

August 8.—Clear; Tennessee officers drew a pair of pants apiece; Colonel McRanny back from hospital; received a letter from N. A. W., highly pleased, it being the first received from her; she has not forgotten her rebel friend; must take an early opportunity of replying to it.

August 9.—Clear; took Russell to hospital yesterday; 9 A. M., marched about five miles on Winchester Road; very hot; stewed apples for supper; encroached on to-morrow's rations; I act as water-bearer for Mess. No. Nasty, and find it a hard pill; officers drawing their pay; would much rather draw a clean shirt and slip.

August 10.—Clear; start daylight; now resting five miles from Winchester; filed left, passing Jordan's White Sulphur Springs; here Yankee cavalry made a dash on our wagons; repulsed them easily; encamped six miles west of Berryville; had just commenced cooking; firing commenced; ordered into line; proved to be cavalry harassing us; formed into a hollow square, and witnessed the execution of a deserter, private, 22d Virginia Regiment, marched in column of review past him, and saw the work had been surely done; I counted five bullet-holes in his breast I could have covered with my hand. Afterward put in position behind a battery, where we now are. It's awful hot, and yet our Generals have all the wells guarded, compelling us to drink creek-water. You'll think of this, soldiers, "when this cruel war is over;" it is not the first time it has been done. Martinsburg—brought flour from brick mill at night back to camp and cooked.

August 11.—Called at 3 A. M. Marched to near Winchester and placed in line of battle. Musketry and cannonading to our right; we shall have another fight of it. Counter-marched and

moved on right bank past Winchester to Mill Town. Lay in line here for two hours; shelling us; some fell about one hundred yards from us. Sharpshooters engaged in our immediate front. A few prisoners brought in, who report Burnside in command of four corps. They keep striving to turn our right or get in our rear. Moved again and lay in line at New Town. Brisk cavalry fighting. 12 P. M., moved to right about one mile and lay until daylight of the 12th.

August 12. Took the road, reaching Strasburg about 10, and immediately formed into line—still fighting—the enemy appear to provoke a battle. They can now get one, but it is awful hot for such work. Privates Roddy and Kelley in from hospital. Just had fixed to cook. Ordered into line again. No shade. J. W. McCullough gave me pistol scabbard—drew tobacco—dark. Moved to Fisher's Hill. 1 P. M., Legion put on picket. Battalion as vedettes. A raid on roasting ears.

August 13.—Awful hot. Made a glorious breakfast of corn. Moved to extreme right in woods as pickets—country rough and mountainous—like our position. Fighting going on around; as yet, we are not in. Think the Yanks getting around us, up the other valley. 2 P. M.—The enemy appear in beautiful order on heights near Strasburg, evidently to turn our left. If they keep on, in a few minutes we shall join issue. Their numbers, order, and deliberation look enough to scare Confeds, but "*nil desperandum*," our motto. We are in say one half mile of each other, where they fall back, in a hurry too. We watch them as they rapidly disappear toward Washington—at a loss to know what it means—the general supposition is that Longstreet has come to our relief *via* Front Royal. Rain. We have put up a shanty.

August 14.—Sunday, clear, hot; 7 A. M., ordered out to make a reconnoissance. Our brigade (Smith's) and two pieces of artillery marched through Strasburg on to the heights, when sharpshooters were immediately engaged; lay the whole day behind the artillery, in line, and about sundown returned and took up our old position on the ridge near the Shenandoah River. The enemy are in strong force, and fortifying on Cedar Creek, about three miles from us. We also are some on fortifications, I see, and Early will not attack, but await one if they want to pitch in. George Ross, is slightly wounded in the arm.

August 15.—Clear. Musketry on and off all day. Euchre; rain at night.

August 16.—Slight rain; very warm. Fine mess of roasting ears; went to the river to bathe; all unusually quiet. Had time to-day to think of absent friends, and wonder when, if ever, I may enjoy their dear society again. The next highest gratification is in studying when the next clean linen will adorn our persons. Most of us have had but one shirt on during this campaign, and not a particle of soap. Think of this, oh ye who are blessed with a change, and to whom wood-ashes and grease are no strangers.

It makes me mad, miserable and melancholy to ponder on this subject, for I think Jeff. might make a great sanitary improvement by a little attention to this simple, but most important, to the human economy, subject.

August 17.—Clear. At daylight ordered into front. At 8 o'clock took the road, in charge of road-guard. Marched to near Kernstown and rested about an hour; unusually hot. Filed left, put into position, and ordered to charge the enemy; did so under a heavy fire of artillery and small arms. We drove them from hill to hill, over their breastworks, through Milltown to Winchester; the fight was continued until 11 p. m. J. Kelley was struck by a piece of shell, slight contusion. I was hit on the left knee by a spent ball, but did not find it out until next day. I stripped to louse a little and found the contusion. We suffered for water. T. Stuart had been sent for water just as we went in, and got to us at the wind up; never was so pleased to see any one. I got a Burnside-belt, spur, and pistol-scabbard.

August 22.—Heavy firing; we move up and find the Yanks have retreated; we follow to Charleston, where we take up in woods; put up shanty; heavy rain; roasting-ears and apples.

August 23.—Clear; cleaning up arms. 12 m.—Ordered out, and marched to our old position, four miles west of Charleston.

August 24.—Clear; ordered out swamp; put into line, and awaited all day; at night, back to camp.

August 25.—Clear; daylight start to Leetown; about one mile from there came on enemy in ambush. They opened on us unexpectedly, with artillery, causing temporary confusion. Wharton's brigade being in the advance, were deployed as skirmishers; our brigade was next in line; had a short but severe time of it, but drove them on to the right of Sheppardstown, where they came across Gordon, who took them in hand, and put them across the river; we here re-formed and tried to intercept, but failed; dark, we marched back through Sheppardstown, and encamped in meadow; much tired; got a Sharp's rifle; gave it to Lieutenant McLamy.

August 18.—Rain. To hospital to see McRea; doing tolerable only; his wound is a very painful one, and he is much out of heart; lying here to-day; Longstreet's corps going through tomorrow; bought cabbage, tomatoes, and cucumbers; Colonel found about a half pound bacon, and we had a fine dinner.

August 19.—Hazy; Daylight start; skirmishing near Berryville; we keep to the left, and encamp near Bunker Hill.

August 20.—Rain. Apples and corn; I drew eight months' pay to 31st July, 1864; cleaned my pistols; skirmishing in front; drew and cooked two days' rations; Government charging officers twenty-five cents each for pistol-cartridge; at those prices I can't afford to kill Yanks for Jeff, unless he gives scalp money.

August 21.—Daylight start; filed right at Bunker Hill; struck across country through Smithland to near Charleston; came upon Yankees intrenched; put in line; heavy skirmishing just in our front; our men are much exposed, judging from the wounded brought out past us; we drive them from their first line; fighting continued until away in night; on our right heavy cannonading all day; suppose it is Longstreet at Snicker's Gap.

August 26.—Clear; Captain bought a Spencer rifle for \$25; learnt the force we were opposed to yesterday was 10,000 cavalry; cannonading toward evening, about Bolivar Heights; buried Lieutenant Colonel Wolfe with military honors; 4 p. m. marched back to Leetown; encamped at dark; Captain bought a Colt's navy pistol for \$1 50.

August 27.—Clear; took road and arrived at Bunker Hill.

August 28.—Clear; Sunday, rest, preaching; T. Stuart brought in a lot of pine-apples; enjoying them, when "fall in" admonished us there was no rest for the wicked; all is now bustle; as yet we do not know whether it's a fall back or forward; remain under arms till night; get ye cook-vessel; a charge is made; some get, some don't. The alarm was caused by the enemy running our cavalry into Smithfield; the infantry soon put them back.

August 29.—Night very cold, clear; inspection; to-day is supposed to be fraught with weal or woe to the Confederacy; the Chicago Convention meets; 10 a. m. into line and moved toward Smithfield; heavy cannonading; lay in line all day in reserve; General Early sent us word he had men enough; so back to camp; toward evening drew half ration of mutton; appointed with Captain and Lieutenant McColister on ordnance board; acted; euchre.

August 30.—Clear; inspection; on O. B.; on picket in evening; got a letter from my sister, greatest treat I have had for months; they are faring better in Yankee hands than I expected; how I do wish we could effect an honorable peace, and all that are spared return to their several avocations; had I my own way it would take but little welding to convert my sword into a reaping-hook.

August 31.—Clear. Skirmishing on our left; roasting-ears *ad libitum*; relieved about sundown; back and formed new camps.

September 1.—Clear. Chicken for breakfast; another picket sign; orders to leave in one hour; countermanded.

September 2.—Clear. Nights very cold; 10 a. m. marched to road; general fall back. We take a roundabout, a zig-zag, an about-face, and near 4 p. m. find ourselves at Bruce-Town and still going, all utterly bewildered. I will except "Jubal," perhaps he knows. At dark take up—or rather at 11 p. m., before things are ship-shape. We are now about six miles from Winchester, hid.

September 3.—Cloudy. March across country to turnpike, 10 a. m., and lay in line till 4 p. m.;

back to camp; heavy artillery and musketry in direction of Berryville; rain; still fighting until far away into the night. Learned to-day that we had started yesterday expecting to surprise and bag a brigade of Yanks; that they had driven our cavalry and would have got our wagon train but for our prompt counter-movement. So much for what was Greek to us yesterday.

September 4.—Cloudy; started to scene of last night's action, by Jordan's Spring, where the sign gets strong, dead horses, scattered newspapers, letters, graves, &c.; immediately put in position in center, sharpshooters already engaged; 3 p. m. flanked to left and lay until night, endeavoring to draw them out to fight; they won't leave their intrenchments; bullets are whistling around us close; Brooks wounded; lying inactive under fire I have always found very trying on a man's nerves; back to center, where we lay under arms all night; the enemy are in force, strongly intrenched around Berryville, and not more than one-fourth to one-half mile from our line; the woods and ground, however, hide us, which I suppose is the reason they don't use artillery, and we have no position for it; rain, cold and disagreeable.

September 5.—Rain. Skirmishing heavy. Sent out reinforcements to sharpshooters' line—the 35th and 60th Virginia regiments. Finding they won't come out, we fall back leisurely. Conner just brought in killed (McConnel's Co. C); he had left his company to try his Spencer rifle, and got with the sharpshooters; had proceeded some three miles when we heard firing in our front; looked squally. The Yankees had evidently got around us; double-quick was the word; rain falling heavy; we put over about three miles, and found they were being driven without our assistance; so took up at our old camp near Bruce Town, thoroughly wet through; dark, and miserable.

September 6.—Rain all day.

September 7.—Clear; fighting on creek; 3 p. m., ordered out, and remain in line until night; back to camp; shoes repaired; company went out to-day without an officer; Captain Young had gone to Vaughn's; I was absent, and John McKaney sick; we got with them by the time they were well in position.

September 8.—Clear; news in of fall of Atlanta; I look upon it as bad news; signs from late papers look ominous; we here, though, are having it all our own way; we whip the enemy every time we fight.

September 9.—Clear, cold night. Ordered out to Bruce Town; remained in line most of the day. In coming back to camp the enemy came to the creek, and kept up smart skirmishing, burned two mills and fell back. We get papers now pretty regular. General John W. Morgan killed near Greenville, Tennessee.

September 10.—Rain. Up at 3 a. m. to go on picket. So intensely dark, could not go. Wet through. 3 p. m., moved out on picket on an advanced post. All quiet.

September 11.—Relieved and back to camp;

10 a. m., moved to new camp on our right, about one mile. Rain.

September 12.—Rain. Camp guard established; orders strict. Apples and corn declared contraband.

September 13.—Clear; fighting on our left. 11 a. m.—Put in line; fighting is winding to our right; it is very heavy. 2 p. m.—Ordered to cook two day's rations; half an hour after, "fall in" again; cannonading heavy on our right; hope we are going back; indications point that way; we have had a severe campaign, and are now pretty much worn out with fatigue, lice, dirt, and rags; we are also hungry, don't get enough sleep; having an average of two blankets to three men, we have to take reliefs at the fire to keep from freezing; Colonel Love and Major Stringfield sick, leaving Colonel McLamy in command of Legion, Singleton of battalion, self of company, which now rarely averages ten men under arms, an effective total of eighteen; we move toward Winchester and are hoping this valley trip is near ended, when we are counter-marched back to camp.

September 14.—Rain. No papers; bad sign. I hear Petersburg has gone up; if it has for the lack of men, what the duce are they keeping us here for. The Yanks are just playing with us; they can harass and run us to death, and get back to shelter of their fortifications immediately. I want out of here. Our rations are scanty; I can eat what I draw at two meals and then not have enough. How long are men going to submit to this state of things? time I suppose will show.

September 15.—Cloudy. Skirmish drill. R. means to guard mill. Ramseur's and Gordon's divisions left for parts unknown; rumored that we (Breck's) go to Dublin in a day or two; any change will be welcome.

September 16.—Rain; 6 a. m., brigade on picket; Legion in advance post on Charlestown Road.

September 17.—Clear; relieved about 7 a. m.; skirmishing close on our right; I had gone out to the lines and left behind, but found the company, soon after, in camp; clothing drawn, not enough though; I bought a clean shirt from D. Wear; mended my things, took a dip in creek, and put on clean clothes; feel like a new man; the author of the quotation, "cleanliness next to Godliness," was sound on the goose.

September 18.—Clear; drill; ordered men out; countermanded, Colonel Smith having forgot the day; went to preaching; heard an excellent sermon on faith (about the woman being made whole); heavy skirmishing on picket line; all troops out but our brigade; we are wagon guard to-day.*

* This Diary was found on the person of Lieutenant W. Ashley, of Vaughn's Brigade, Company C, Battalion Thomas' Legion, Wharton's Division, Breckinridge's Corps, General Early's Army, September 19, 1864, on the battle-field, near Winchester, Va.

The memorandum-book in which the diary was kept had been captured from a Union soldier of a Maryland regiment, supposed to have been killed at Snicker's Gap.

Doc. 29.

THE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.

COMMISSIONER OULD'S STATEMENT.

To the Relatives and Friends of Confederate Soldiers Confined in Northern Prisons:

On the twenty-second of July, 1863, the Cartel of Exchange was agreed upon. The chief, if not the only purpose of that instrument was to secure the release of all prisoners of war. To that end the fourth article provides that all prisoners of war should be discharged on parole in ten days after their capture, and that the prisoners then held, and those thereafter taken, should be transported to the points mutually agreed upon at the expense of the capturing party. The sixth article also stipulates that "all prisoners, of whatever arm of service, are to be exchanged or paroled within ten days from the time of their capture, if it be practicable to transfer them to their own lines in that time; if not, as soon thereafter as practicable."

From the date of the cartel until July, 1863, the Confederate authorities held the excess of prisoners. During the interval deliveries were made as fast as the Federal Government furnished transportation. Indeed, upon more than one occasion, I urged the Federal authorities to send increased means of transportation. As ready as the enemy always has been to bring false accusations against us, it has never been alleged that we failed or neglected to make prompt deliveries of prisoners who were not under charges, when we held the excess. On the other hand, during the same time, the cartel was openly and notoriously violated by the Federal authorities. Officers and men were kept in cruel confinement, sometimes in irons or doomed cells, without charges or trial.

In July, 1863, the enemy, for the first time since the adoption of the cartel, held the excess of prisoners. As soon as the fact was ascertained, whenever a delivery was made by the Federal authorities, they demanded an equal number in return. I endeavored frequently to obtain from the Federal agent of exchange a distinct avowal of the intentions of his Government as to the delivery of prisoners, but in vain. At length, on the twentieth of October, 1863, I addressed to Brigadier-General Meredith the following letter, to wit:

"RICHMOND, VA., October 20, 1863.

"*Brigadier-General S. A. Meredith, Agent of Exchange:*

"SIR: More than a month ago I asked your acquiescence in a proposition that all officers and soldiers on both sides should be released in conformity with the provisions of the cartel. In order to obviate the difficulties between us, I suggested that all officers and men on both sides should be released unless they were subject to charges; in which event the opposite Government should have the right of holding one or more hostages, if the retention was not

justified. You stated to me in conversation that this proposition was very fair, and that you would ask the consent of your Government to it.

"As usual, you have as yet made no response. I tell you frankly I do not expect any. Perhaps you may disappoint me, and tell me that you reject or accept the proposition. I write this letter for the purpose of bringing to your recollection my proposition, and of dissipating the idea that seems to have been purposely encouraged by your public papers, that the Confederate Government has refused or objected to a system of exchange.

"In order to avoid any mistake in that direction, I now propose that all officers and men on both sides be released in conformity with the provisions of the cartel, the excess on one side or the other to be on parole. Will you accept this? I have no expectation of an answer; but perhaps you may give me one. If it does come, I hope it will soon.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Ro OULD,
"Agent of Exchange."

On the twenty-ninth of October, 1863, I received from General Meredith a communication informing me that my proposal of the twentieth was "not accepted." I was insultingly told that if the excess of prisoners was delivered they would be wrongfully declared exchanged by me and put in the field. To show how groundless this imputation was, it is only necessary for me to state that since then I have repeatedly offered to give ten Federal captives for every Confederate soldier whom the enemy will show to have been wrongfully declared exchanged.

From the last-named date until the present time there have been but few deliveries of prisoners, the enemy in each case demanding a like number in return. It will be observed that the Confederate authorities only claimed that the provisions of the cartel should be fulfilled. They only asked the enemy to do what, without any hesitation, they had done during the first year of the operation of the cartel.

PRESENT POSITION OF THE QUESTION.

Seeing a persistent purpose on the part of the Federal Government to violate its own agreement, the Confederate authorities, moved by the sufferings of the brave men who are so unjustly held in Northern prisons, determined to abate their fair demands, and accordingly, on the tenth of August, 1864, I addressed the following communication to Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange, in charge of the flag-of-truce boat, which on the same day I delivered to him at Varina, on James River:

"WAR DEPARTMENT, RICHMOND, VA., }
August 10, 1864. }

"*Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange:*

"SIR: You have several times proposed to me to exchange the prisoners respectively held by

the two belligerents, officer for officer, and man for man. The same offer has also been made by the other officials having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners. This proposal has heretofore been declined by the Confederate authorities, they insisting upon the terms of the cartel, which required the delivery of the excess of either side upon parole. In view, however, of the very large number of prisoners now held by each party, and the suffering consequent upon their continued confinement, I now consent to the above proposal, and agree to deliver to you the prisoners held in captivity by the Confederate authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of Confederate officers and men. As equal numbers are delivered, from time to time, they will be declared exchanged. This proposal is made with the understanding that the officers and men who have been longest in captivity will be first delivered, where it is practicable. I shall be happy to hear from you, as speedy as possible, whether this arrangement can be carried out.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Ro OULD,
"Agent of Exchange."

I accompanied the delivery of the letter, with a statement of the mortality which was hurrying so many Federal prisoners at Andersonville to the grave.

On the twentieth of the same month Major Mulford returned with the flag-of-truce steamer, but brought no answer to my letter of the tenth of August. In conversation with him I asked him if he had any reply to make to my communication, and his answer was, that he was not authorized to make any. So deep was the solicitude which I felt for the fate of the captives in Northern prisons, that I determined to make another effort. In order to obviate any objection which technically might rise as to the person to whom my communication was addressed, I wrote to Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, who is the Federal Commissioner of Exchange, residing in Washington city, the following letter, and delivered the same to Major Mulford on the day of its date. Accompanying that letter was a copy of the communication which I had addressed to Major Mulford on the tenth of August:

"RICHMOND, VA., August 22, 1864.

"Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner of Exchange:

"SIR: Enclosed is copy of a communication which, on the tenth instant, I addressed and delivered to Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange. Under the circumstances of the case, I deem it proper to forward this paper to you, in order that you may fully understand the position which is taken by the Confederate authorities. I shall be glad if the proposition therein made is accepted by your Government.

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Ro OULD,
"Agent of Exchange."

On the afternoon of the thirtieth August, I was notified that the flag-of-truce steamer had again appeared at Varina. On the following day I sent to Major Mulford the following note, to wit:

"RICHMOND, VA., August 31, 1864.

"Major John E. Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange:

"SIR: On the tenth of this month I addressed you a communication, to which I have received no answer. On the twenty-second I also addressed a communication to Major-General E. A. Hitchcock, United States Commissioner of Exchange, enclosing a copy of my letter to you of the tenth instant. I now respectfully ask you to state in writing whether you have any reply to either of said communications; and, if not, whether you have any reason to give why no reply has been made?

"Respectfully, your obedient servant,
"Ro OULD,
"Agent of Exchange."

In a short time I received the following response, to wit:

"FLAG-OF-TRUCE STEAMER NEW YORK, }
"VARINA, VA., August 31, 1864. }

"Honorable R. Ould, Agent for Exchange:

"SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of to-day, requesting answer, &c., to your communication of the tenth instant, on question of exchange of prisoners. To which, in reply, I would say I have no communication on the subject from our authorities, nor am I yet authorized to make answer.

"I am, sir, very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"JOHN E. MULFORD,
"Major, and Assistant Agent for Exchange."

I have thus fully set before you the action of the Confederate authorities in relation to a matter which lays so near your hearts, and how it has been received by the enemy. The fortunes of your fathers, husbands, sons, brothers, and friends are as dear to those authorities as their persons are precious to you, and I have made this publication, not only as an illustration of Federal bad faith, but also that you might see that your Government has spared no effort to secure the release of the gallant men who have so often fronted death in the defence of our sacred cause.

Ro OULD,
Agent of Exchange.

August 31, 1864.

REPLY OF MAJOR-GENERAL BUTLER

FIFTH AVENUE HOTEL, NEW YORK, }
MONDAY, Sept. 5, 1864. }

SIR: Enclosed I send you a note from the Agent of Exchange of Prisoners to the Confederate Commissioner, Mr. Ould, in reply to his offer to accept, in part, a proposition made by me eight months since, to exchange all prisoners of war held by either belligerent party.

Without awaiting my reply, Mr. Ould has printed his offer, for which purpose it seems to have been made.

I am, therefore, driven to the same mode of placing my justification of the action of this Government in possession of the public before it reaches the Confederate Commissioner.

Respectfully,

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Major-General, and Commissioner of Exchange.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND
NORTH CAROLINA, IN THE FIELD, August —, 1864. }

Hon. Robert Ould, Commissioner of Exchange:

SIR: Your note to Major Mulford, Assistant Agent of Exchange, under date of tenth of August, has been referred to me.

You therein state that Major Mulford has several times proposed to exchange prisoners respectively held by the two belligerents, officer for officer and man for man, and that "the offer has also been made by other officials having charge of matters connected with the exchange of prisoners;" and that "this proposal has been heretofore declined by the Confederate authorities." That you now consent to the above proposition, and agree to deliver to you [Major Mulford] the prisoners held in captivity by the Confederate authorities, provided you agree to deliver an equal number of officers and men. As equal numbers are delivered from time to time they will be declared exchanged. This proposal is made with the understanding that the officers and men on both sides who have been longest in captivity will be first delivered, where it is practicable.

From a slight ambiguity in your phraseology, but more, perhaps, from the antecedent action of your authorities, and because of your acceptance of it, I am in doubt whether you have stated the proposition with entire accuracy.

It is true, a proposition was made both by Major Mulford and myself, as Agent of Exchange, to exchange all prisoners of war taken by either belligerent party, man for man, officer for officer, of equal rank, or their equivalents. It was made by me as early as the first of the Winter of 1863-64, and has not been accepted. In May last I forwarded to you a note, desiring to know whether the Confederate authorities intended to treat colored soldiers of the United States army as prisoners of war. To that inquiry no answer has yet been made. To avoid all possible misapprehension or mistake hereafter as to your offer now, will you now say whether you mean by "prisoners held in captivity," colored men, duly enrolled and mustered into the service of the United States, who have been captured by the Confederate forces; and if your authorities are willing to exchange *all* soldiers so mustered into the United States army, whether colored or otherwise, and the officers commanding them, man for man, officer for officer?

At an interview which was held between yourself and the Agent of Exchange on the

part of the United States, at Fortress Monroe, in March last, you will do me the favor to remember the principal discussion turned upon this very point; you, on behalf of the Confederate Government, claiming the right to hold all negroes, who had heretofore been slaves and not emancipated by their masters, enrolled and mustered into the service of the United States, when captured by your forces, not as prisoners of war, but upon capture to be turned over to their supposed masters or claimants, whoever they might be, to be held by them as slaves.

By the advertisements in your newspapers, calling upon masters to come forward and claim these men so captured, I suppose that your authorities still adhere to that claim—that is to say, that whenever a colored soldier of the United States is captured by you, upon whom any claim can be made by any person residing within the States now in insurrection, such soldier is not to be treated as a prisoner of war, but is to be turned over to his supposed owner or claimant, and put at such labor or service as that owner or claimant may choose, and the officers in command of such soldiers, in the language of a supposed act of the Confederate States, are to be turned over to the Governors of States, upon requisitions, for the purpose of being punished by the laws of such States, for acts done in war in the armies of the United States.

You must be aware that there is still a proclamation by Jefferson Davis, claiming to be Chief Executive of the Confederate States, declaring in substance that all officers of colored troops mustered into the service of the United States were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but were to be turned over for punishment to the Governors of States.

I am reciting these public acts from memory, and will be pardoned for not giving the exact words, although I believe I do not vary the substance and effect.

These declarations on the part of those whom you represent yet remain unrepealed, unannulled, unrevoked, and must therefore be still supposed to be authoritative. By your acceptance of our proposition, is the Government of the United States to understand that these several claims, enactments, and proclaimed declarations are to be given up, set aside, revoked, and held for naught by the Confederate authorities, and that you are ready and willing to exchange man for man those colored soldiers of the United States, duly mustered and enrolled as such, who have heretofore been claimed as slaves by the Confederate States, as well as white soldiers?

If this be so, and you are so willing to exchange these colored men claimed as slaves, and you will so officially inform the Government of the United States, then, as I am instructed, a principal difficulty in effecting exchanges will be removed.

As I informed you personally, in my judgment, it is consistent neither with the policy, dignity, nor honor of the United States, upon

any consideration, to allow those who, by our laws solemnly enacted, are made soldiers of the Union, and who have been duly enlisted, enrolled, and mustered as such soldiers—who have borne arms in behalf of this country, and who have been captured while fighting in vindication of the rights of that country, not to be treated as prisoners of war, and remain unexchanged, and in the service of those who claim them as masters; and I cannot believe that the Government of the United States will ever be found to consent to so gross a wrong.

Pardon me if I misunderstood you in supposing that your acceptance of our proposition does not in good faith mean to include all the soldiers of the Union, and that you still intend, if your acceptance is agreed to, to hold the colored soldiers of the Union unexchanged, and at labor or service, because I am informed that very lately, almost contemporaneously with this offer on your part to exchange prisoners, and which seems to include *all* prisoners of war, the Confederate authorities have made a declaration that the negroes heretofore held to service by owners in the States of Delaware, Maryland, and Missouri, are to be treated as prisoners of war when captured in arms in the service of the United States. Such declaration that a part of the colored soldiers of the United States were to be prisoners of war, would seem most strongly to imply that others were not to be so treated, or, in other words, that colored men from the insurrectionary States are to be held to labor and returned to their masters, if captured by the Confederate forces, while duly enrolled and mustered into, and actually in, the armies of the United States.

In the view which the Government of the United States takes of the claim made by you to the persons and services of these negroes, it is not to be supported upon any principle of national or municipal law.

Looking upon these men only as property, upon your theory of property in them, we do not see how this claim can be made, certainly not how it can be yielded. It is believed to be a well-settled rule of public international law, and a custom and part of the laws of war, that the capture of movable property vests the title to that property in the captor, and, therefore, when one belligerent gets into full possession property belonging to the subjects or citizens of the other belligerent, the owner of that property is at once divested of his title, which rests in the belligerent Government capturing and holding such possession. Upon this rule of international law all civilized nations have acted, and by it both belligerents have dealt with all property, save slaves, taken from each other during the present war.

If the Confederate forces capture a number of horses from the United States, the animals immediately are claimed to be, and, as we understand it, become the property of the Confederate authorities.

If the United States capture any movable

property in the rebellion, by our regulations and laws, in conformity with international law and the laws of war, such property is turned over to our Government as its property. Therefore, if we obtain possession of that species of property known to the laws of the insurrectionary States as slaves, why should there be any doubt that that property, like any other, vests in the United States?

If the property in the slave does so vest, then the "*jus disponendi*," the right of disposing of that property, rests in the United States.

Now, the United States have disposed of the property which they have acquired by capture in slaves taken by them, by giving that right of property to the man himself, to the slave, *i. e.*, by emancipating him and declaring him free forever, so that if we have not mistaken the principles of international law and the laws of war, we have no slaves in the armies of the United States. All are free men, being made so in such a manner as we have chosen to dispose of our property in them which we acquired by capture.

Slaves being captured by us, and the right of property in them thereby vested in us, that right of property has been disposed of by us by manumitting them, as has always been the acknowledged right of the owner to do to his slave. The manner in which we dispose of our property while it is in our possession certainly cannot be questioned by you.

Nor is the case altered if the property is not actually captured in battle, but comes either voluntarily or involuntarily from the belligerent owner into the possession of the other belligerent.

I take it no one would doubt the right of the United States to a drove of Confederate mules, or a herd of Confederate cattle, which should wander or rush across the Confederate lines into the lines of the United States army. So it seems to me, treating the negro as property merely, if that piece of property passes the Confederate lines, and comes into the lines of the United States, that property is as much lost to the owner in the Confederate States as would be the mule or ox, the property of the resident of the Confederate States, which should fall into our hands.

If, therefore, the principles of international law and the laws of war used in this discussion are correctly stated, then it would seem that the deduction logically flows therefrom, in natural sequence, that the Confederate States can have no claim upon the negro soldiers captured by them from the armies of the United States, because of the former ownership of them by their citizens or subjects, and only claim such as result, under the laws of war, from their captor merely.

Do the Confederate authorities claim the right to reduce to a state of slavery free men, prisoners of war captured by them? This claim our fathers fought against under Bainbridge and Decatur, when set up by the Barbary pow-

ers on the Northern shore of Africa, about the year 1800, and in 1864 their children will hardly yield it upon their own soil.

This point I will not pursue further, because I understand you to repudiate the idea that you will reduce free men to slaves because of capture in war, and that you base the claim of the Confederate authorities to re-enslave our negro soldiers when captured by you, upon the "*jus post limini*," or that principle of the law of nations which rehabilitates the former owner with his property taken by an enemy, when such property is recovered by the forces of his own country,

Or in other words, you claim that by the laws of nations and of war, when property of the subjects of one belligerent power, captured by the forces of the other belligerent, is recaptured by the armies of the former owner, then such property is to be restored to its prior possessor, as if it had never been captured, and, therefore, under this principle your authorities propose to restore to their masters the slaves which heretofore belonged to them which you may capture from us.

But this post liminary right under which you claim to act, as understood and defined by all writers on national law, is applicable simply to immovable property, and that, too, only after the complete re-subjugation of that portion of the country in which the property is situated, upon which this right fastens itself. By the laws and customs of war, this right has never been applied to movable property.

True it is, I believe, that the Romans attempted to apply it to the case of slaves, but for two thousand years no other nation has attempted to set up this right as ground for treating slaves differently from other property.

But the Romans, even, refused to re-enslave men captured from opposing belligerents in a civil war, such as ours unhappily is.

Consistently, then, with any principle of the law of nations, treating slaves as property merely, it would seem to be impossible for the Government of the United States to permit the negroes in their ranks to be re-enslaved when captured, or treated otherwise than as prisoners of war.

I have forborne, sir, in this discussion, to argue the question upon any other or different grounds of right than those adopted by your authorities in claiming the negro as property, because I understand that your fabric of opposition to the Government of the United States has the right of property in man as its corner-stone. Of course it would not be profitable, in settling a question of exchange of prisoners of war, to attempt to argue the question of abandonment of the very corner-stone of their attempted political edifice. Therefore I have omitted all the considerations which should apply to the negro soldier as a man, and dealt with him upon the confederate theory of property only.

I unite with you most cordially, sir, in desiring a speedy settlement of all these questions, in view of the great suffering endured by our pris-

oners in the hands of your authorities, of which you so feelingly speak. Let me ask, in view of that suffering, why you have delayed eight months to answer a proposition which, by now accepting, you admit to be right, just and humane, allowing that suffering to continue so long? One cannot help thinking, even at the risk of being deemed uncharitable, that the benevolent sympathies of the Confederate authorities have been lately stirred by the depleted condition of their armies, and a desire to get into the field to affect the present campaign, the hale, hearty and well-fed prisoners held by the United States in exchange for the half-starved, sick, emaciated and unserviceable soldiers of the United States now languishing in your prisons. The events of this war, if we did not know it before, have taught us that it is not the Northern portion of the American people alone who know how to drive sharp bargains.

The wrongs, indignities and privations suffered by our soldiers would move me to consent to anything to procure their exchange, except to barter away the honor and faith of the Government of the United States, which has so solemnly been pledged to the colored soldiers in its ranks.

Consistently with national faith and justice, we cannot relinquish this position. With your authorities it is a question of property merely. It seems to address you in this form. Will you suffer your soldier, captured in fighting your battles, to be in confinement for months rather than release him by giving for him that which you can call a piece of property, and which we are willing to accept as a man?

You certainly appear to place less value upon your soldier than you do upon your negro. I assure you, much as we of the North are accused of loving property, our citizens would have no difficulty in yielding up any piece of property they have in exchange for one of their brothers or sons languishing in your prisons. Certainly there could be no doubt that they would do so were that piece of property less in value than five thousand dollars in Confederate money, which is believed to be the price of an able-bodied negro in the insurrectionary States.

Trusting that I may receive such a reply to the questions propounded in this note as will lead to a speedy resumption of the negotiations for a full exchange of all prisoners, and a delivery of them to their respective authorities, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General and Commissioner of Exchange.

Doc. 30.

BATTLE AT BRICE'S CROSS-ROADS, MISS.
GENERAL STURGIS' REPORT.

MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24.

Sir: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the expedition which

marched from near Lafayette, Tennessee, under my command on the second instant.

This expedition was organized and fitted out under the supervision of the Major-General commanding the district of West Tennessee, and I assumed command of it on the morning of the second of June, near the town of Lafayette, Tennessee, in pursuance of Special Orders No. 38, dated Headquarters, District of West Tennessee, Memphis, May 31, 1864, and which were received by me on the first instant.

The strength of my command, in round numbers, was about eight thousand men, and composed as follows:

Cavalry.

First brigade—Colonel G. E. Waring, jr., Fourth Missouri, commanding; strength, one thousand five hundred.

Second brigade.—Colonel E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa, commanding; strength one thousand eight hundred, with six pieces of artillery and four mountain howitzers—the division commanded by Brigadier-General B. H. Grierson.

Infantry.

First brigade.—Colonel A. W. Wilkins, Ninth Minnesota, commanding; strength, two thousand, with six pieces of Artillery.

Second brigade.—Colonel G. B. Hoge, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, commanding; strength, one thousand two hundred, with four pieces of artillery.

Third brigade.—Colonel E. Benton, Fifty-ninth United States colored infantry, commanding; strength, one thousand two hundred, with two pieces of artillery.

My supply train, carrying rations for eighteen days, consisted of one hundred and eighty-one wagons, which, with the regimental wagons, made up a train of some two hundred and fifty wagons.

My intentions were substantially as follows, viz.: to proceed to Corinth, Mississippi, by way of Salem and Ruckersville, capture any force that might be there; then proceed south, destroying the Mobile and Ohio railroad to Tupelo and Okolona, and as far as possible toward Macon and Columbus, with a portion of my force; thence to Grenada and back to Memphis. A discretion was allowed me as to the details of the movement, when circumstances might rise which could not have been anticipated in my instructions.

Owing to some misunderstanding on the part of the Quartermaster, as to the point on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at which some forage was to have been deposited from the cars, there was some little delay occasioned in getting the column in motion.

The following incidents of the march are taken from the journal, kept from day to day, by one of my staff, Captain W. C. Ravalle, A. D. C., and A. A. G.:

Wednesday, June 1.—Expedition started from Memphis and White's Station toward Lafavette.

Thursday, June 2.—The General and staff left Memphis on the five o'clock A. M. train, and established headquarters at Leake's house, near Lafayette, and assumed command. Cavalry moved to the intersection of the State Line and Early Grove roads, six miles from Lafayette. It rained, at intervals, all day and part of the night.

Friday, June 8.—Ordered the cavalry to move to within three or four miles of Salem. Infantry marched to Lamar, eighteen miles from Lafayette. Owing to the heavy rains during the day, and the bad condition of the roads and bridges, the train could only move to within four miles of Lamar, and did not get into park until eleven o'clock P. M., the colored brigade remaining with the train as guard.

Saturday, June 4.—Informed General Grierson that the infantry and train, under the most favorable circumstances, could only make a few miles beyond Salem, and to regulate his march accordingly. Train arrived at Lamar about noon; issued rations to the infantry and rested the animals. It rained heavily until one o'clock, P. M., making the roads almost impassable. Moved headquarters to Widow Spight's house, two miles west of Salem, and Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry to Robinson's house, four miles from Salem (west).

Sunday, June 5.—Infantry and train started at half-past four A. M., and joined the cavalry, two miles east of Salem, at 10 A. M.; issued rations to the cavalry, and fed the forage collected by them. Infantry remained in camp during the day. Cavalry moved to the intersection of the LaGrange and Ripley and the Salem and Ruckersville roads. Colonel Joseph Karge's 2d New Jersey, with four hundred men, started at six P. M., with instructions to move *via* Ripley to Reinza, to destroy the railroad; to proceed north, destroy bridges on the Tuscumbia, and to join General Grierson at Ruckersville. Heavy showers during the afternoon.

Monday, June 6.—Infantry and train moved at four o'clock A. M., on the Ruckersville road; commenced raining at five A. M., and continued at intervals all day. Progress very slow. Marched thirteen miles, and made headquarters at Widow Childers', at intersection of the Saulsbury and Ripley and the Ruckersville and the Salem roads. Cavalry moved to Ruckersville. The advance guard of the infantry encountered a small party of rebels about noon, and chased them toward Ripley, on the LaGrange and Ripley road.

Tuesday, June 7.—Upon information received from General Grierson that there was no enemy near Corinth, directed him to move toward Ellistown, on the direct road from Ripley, and instruct Colonel Karge to join him by way of Blackland and Carrolls ville. Infantry moved to Ripley, and cavalry encamped on New Albany road, two miles south. Encountered a small party of rebels near Widow Childers', and drove them toward Ripley. In Ripley met an advance of the enemy and drove them on the New Albany road. Cavalry encountered about a regi-

the cross-roads. Before proceeding far, however, I sent a staff officer back, directing Colonel McMillen to move up his advanced brigade as rapidly as possible without distressing his troops. When I reached the cross-roads, I found nearly all the cavalry engaged, and the battle growing warm, but no artillery had yet opened on either side. We had four pieces of artillery at the cross-roads, but they had not been placed in position, owing to the dense woods on all sides, and the apparent impossibility of using them to advantage.

Finding that our troops were being hotly pressed, I ordered one section to open on the enemy's reserves. The enemy's artillery soon replied, and with great accuracy—every shell bursting over and in the immediate vicinity of our guns. Frequent calls were now made for reinforcements, but until the infantry should arrive, I had, of course, none to give. Colonel Winslow, Fourth Iowa cavalry, commanding a brigade and occupying a position on the Gun-town road, a little in advance of the cross-roads, was especially clamorous to be relieved and permitted to carry his brigade to the rear. Fearing that Colonel Winslow might abandon his position without authority, and knowing the importance of the cross-roads to us, I directed him, in case he should be overpowered, to fall back slowly toward the cross-roads—thus contracting his line and strengthening his position. I was especially anxious on this point, because, through some misunderstanding, that I am unable to explain, the cavalry had been withdrawn without my knowledge from the left, that I was compelled to occupy the line, temporarily, with my escort, consisting of about one hundred of the Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry. This handful of troops, under the gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Hesse, behaved very handsomely, and held the line until the arrival of the infantry.

About half past one the infantry began to arrive. Colonel Hoge's brigade was first to reach the field, and was placed in position by Colonel McMillen, when the enemy was driven a little. General Grierson now requested authority to withdraw the entire cavalry, as "it was exhausted and well-nigh out of ammunition." This I authorized as soon as sufficient infantry was in position to permit it, and he was directed to reorganize his command in the rear, and hold it ready to operate on the flanks. In the meantime I had ordered a section of artillery to be placed in position on a knoll, near the bridge, some three or four hundred yards in the rear, for the purpose of opposing any attempt of the enemy to turn our left.

I now went to this point to see that my orders had been executed, and also to give directions for the management and protection of the wagon train. I found the section properly posted, and supported by the Seventy-second Ohio infantry, with two companies thrown forward as skirmishers, and the whole under the superintendence of that excellent officer, Colonel Wilkins, of the Ninth Minnesota. While

here the wagon train, which had been reported still a mile and a half in the rear, arrived. It was immediately ordered into an open field near where the cavalry were reorganizing; there to be turned round and carried further toward the rear. The pressure on the right of the line was now becoming very great, and General Grierson was directed to send a portion of his cavalry to that point. At this time I received a message from Colonel Hoge that he was satisfied the movement on the right was a feint and that the real attack was being made on the left. Another section of artillery was now placed in position, a little to the rear of Colonel Wilkins, but bearing on the left of our main line; and a portion of the cavalry was thrown out as skirmishers. The cavalry which had been sent to the extreme right began now to give way, and at the same time the enemy began to appear in force in rear of the extreme left, while Colonel McMillen required reinforcements in the centre. I now endeavored to get hold of the colored brigade, which formed the guard to the train. While travelling the short distance to where the head of the brigade should be found, the main line began to give way at various points. Order soon gave way to confusion, and confusion to panic. I sent an aid to Colonel McMillen, informing him that I was unable to render him any additional assistance, and that he must do all in his power with what he had to hold his position until I could form a line to protect his retreat.

On reaching the head of the supply train, Lieutenant-Colonel Hesse was directed to place in position in a wood the first regiment of colored troops I could find. This was done, and it is due to these troops to say here that they held their ground well, and rendered valuable aid to Colonel McMillen, who was soon after compelled to withdraw from his original line, and take up new positions in the rear. It was now five o'clock P. M. For seven hours these gallant men had held their position against overwhelming numbers, but at last, overpowered and exhausted, they were compelled to abandon not only the field, but many of their gallant comrades who had fallen to the mercy of the enemy. Everywhere the army now drifted toward the rear, and was soon altogether beyond control. I requested General Grierson to accompany me, and to aid in checking the fleeing column and establishing a new line. By dint of entreaty and force, and the aid of several officers whom I called to my assistance, with pistols in their hands, we at length succeeded in checking some twelve or fifteen hundred, and establishing a line, of which Colonel Wilkins, Ninth Minnesota, was placed in command. About this time it was reported to me that Colonel McMillen was driving the enemy. I placed but little faith in this report, yet disseminated it freely for the good effect it might produce on the troops.

In a few minutes, however, the gallant Colonel McMillen, sad and disheartened, arrived and reported his lines broken and in confusion. The

new line, under Colonel Wilkins, also gave way soon after, and it was now impossible to exercise any further control. The road became crowded and jammed with troops; the wagons and artillery sinking into the deep mud, became inextricable, and added to the general confusion which now prevailed. No power could now check or control the panic-stricken mass, as it swept toward the rear, led off by Colonel Winslow, at the head of his brigade of cavalry, and who never halted until he had reached Stubbs', ten miles in rear. This was the greater pity, as his brigade was nearly, if not entirely, intact, and might have offered considerable resistance to the advancing foe. About ten o'clock P. M., I reached Stubbs' in person, where I found Colonel Winslow and his brigade. I then informed him that his was the only organized body of men I had been able to find, and directed him to add to his own every possible force he could rally as they passed, and take charge of the rear—remaining in position until all should have passed. I also informed him that, on account of the extreme darkness of the night, and the wretched condition of the roads, I had little hope of saving anything more than the troops, and directed him therefore to destroy all wagons and artillery which he might find blocking up the road and preventing the passage of the men. In this way about two hundred wagons and fourteen pieces of artillery were lost, many of the wagons being burned, and the artillery spiked and otherwise mutilated; the mules and horses were brought away. By seven o'clock A. M., of the eleventh, we had organized at Ripley, and the army presented quite a respectable appearance, and would have been able to accomplish an orderly retreat from that point but for the unfortunate circumstances that the cartridge-boxes were well-nigh exhausted. At seven o'clock the column was again put in motion on the Salem road, the cavalry in advance, followed by infantry. The enemy pressed heavily on the rear, and there was now nothing left but to keep in motion so as to prevent the breaking up of the rear, and to pass all cross-roads before the enemy could reach them, as the command was in no condition to offer determined resistance, whether attacked in front or rear.

At eight o'clock A. M. on the twelfth the column reached Collierville worn out and exhausted by the fatigues of fighting and marching for two days and two nights, without rest and without eating. About noon of the same day a train arrived from Memphis, bringing some two thousand infantry, commanded by Colonel Wolf, and supplies for my suffering men, and I determined to remain here until the next day, for the purpose of resting and affording protection to many who had dropped by the roadside through fatigue and other causes. Learning, however, toward evening that the command at White's Station had information of a large force of the enemy approaching that place from the southeast, and knowing that my men were in no condition to offer serious resist-

ance to an enemy presenting himself across my line of march, I informed the General commanding the district by telegraph, that I deemed it prudent to continue my march to White's Station; accordingly, at nine P. M. the column marched again, and arrived at White's Station at daylight next morning.

This report having already become more circumstantial than was anticipated, I have purposely omitted the details of our march from Ripley to White's Station, as they would extend it to a tiresome length, but would respectfully refer you for them to the sub-reports herewith enclosed.

Casualties—Cavalry.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
First Brigade.....	22	51	134	207
Second Brigade.....	12	2	52	1	69	3	123
Total.....	34	2	103	1	193	3	330

Casualties—Infantry.

	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL.	
	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.	Officers.	Men.
First Brigade.....	2	38	10	145	25	811	37	994
Second Brigade.....	5	84	18	407	23	441
Third Brigade.....	1	109	3	131	8	160	12	400
Total.....	8	191	13	276	51	1378	72	1835

Total Infantry and Cavalry.

	OFFICERS.	EN.
Killed.....	8	216
Wounded.....	16	379
Missing.....	62	1,571

Total Killed, Wounded, and Missing.

Officers.....	75
Enlisted Men.....	2,165

It is difficult to furnish any accurate estimate of the losses of the enemy, but they are supposed, by the principal officers of my command, to be fully as great as our own in killed and

wounded, and by many supposed to largely exceed ours. I need hardly add, that it is with feelings of the most profound pain and regret, that I find myself called upon to record a defeat and the loss and suffering incident to a reverse at a point so far distant from the base of supplies and reinforcements. Yet there is some consolation in knowing that the army fought nobly while it *did* fight, and only yielded to overwhelming numbers. The strength of the enemy is variously estimated by the most intelligent officers, at from fifteen thousand to twenty thousand men. A very intelligent sergeant who was captured, and remained five days in the hands of the enemy, reports the number of the enemy actually engaged to have been twelve thousand, and that two divisions of infantry were held in reserve. It may appear strange that so large a force of the enemy could be in our vicinity, and we be ignorant of the fact; but the surprise will exist in the minds of those only who are not familiar with the difficulty (I may say impossibility) of acquiring reliable information in the heart of the enemy's country. Our movements and numbers are always known to the enemy, because every woman and child is one of them; but we, as everybody knows who has any experience in this war, can only learn the movements of the enemy, and his numbers, by actually fighting for the information. That our loss was great, is true, yet, that it was not greater, is due in an eminent degree to the personal exertions of that model soldier, Colonel W. L. McMillen, of the Fifty-ninth Ohio infantry, who commanded the infantry, and to the able commanders under him.

While I will not prolong this already extended report by recording individual acts of good conduct, and the names of many brave officers and men who deserve mention, but will respectfully refer you for these to the reports of division and brigade commanders, yet I cannot refrain from expressing my high appreciation of the valuable services rendered by that excellent and dashing officer, Colonel Joseph Karge, of the Second New Jersey volunteers, in his reconnaissance to Corinth, and his subsequent management of the rear guard during a part of the retreat, fighting and defending the rear during one whole afternoon, and throughout the entire night following.

To the officers of my staff—Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Hope, Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, commanding escort; Captain W. C. Ravallo, A. D. C. and A. A. A. G., whose horse was killed under him; Captain W. C. Belden, Second Iowa cavalry A. D. C.; Lieutenant E. Caulkins, Seventh Iowa cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieutenant Samuel Oakford, Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieutenant Dement, A. A. Q. M.; Lieutenant W. H. Stratton, Seventh Illinois cavalry, A. A. C. S.—whose names appear in no other report—I am especially grateful for the promptness and zeal with which my orders were exe-

cuted at all times, and often under trying and hazardous circumstances.

I am, Major, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

S. D. STURGIS,

Brigadier-General, commanding.

To Major W. H. MORGAN,

A. A. G., Headquarters District W. T.,
Memphis, Tenn.

SURGEON DYER'S ACCOUNT.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTY-FIRST ILLINOIS, }
MEMPHIS, TENN., July 6, 1864. }

At my request Dr. Lewis Dyer, of the Eighty-first regiment Illinois infantry volunteers, and Acting Surgeon-in-Chief, division Seventeenth Army Corps, on the expedition, has prepared a paper on the late retreat of General Sturgis' command from Guntown, Mississippi, to Memphis. I am taking notes and sketches of persons and things, for a permanent history of the regiment in particular, and of the war in general.

This article was written for my own personal use and benefit; but being prepared with so much care and ability, I have no doubt you will gladly insert it in your journal, which circulates extensively among the friends of our pet regiment in Southern Illinois.

Yours truly,
W. S. Post,
Chaplain, Eighty-first Illinois.

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTY-FIRST ILLINOIS INFANTRY }
VOLUNTEERS, MEMPHIS, TENN., June 30, 1864. }

Rev. William S. Post, D. D., Chaplain Eighty-first Illinois Infantry Volunteers:

DEAR SIR: You have of course heard of our defeat under General Sturgis at Guntown, Mississippi, the other day. I wish I could give you some idea of the scenes enacted on that occasion—the awful fight, the repulse, the defeat and rout. It was a new chapter in the history of the Eighty-first—a new and bitter experience to both officers and men—and as they believe, a needless one. Never before, in all their deadly conflicts with the enemy, had they suffered defeat. And the recollection is all the more bitter now that the day was lost to us, not by the numbers or prowess of the enemy, but by—well, it might be as safe not to say.

In speaking of the Eighty-first, the coolness and self-possession of its officers, and the bravery and desperate fighting of its men, I have no intention of intimating the least thing in disparagement of other troops. The regiment was marched upon the field and placed in position under a general and vague order, and finding it needlessly exposed to the enemy's deadly fire, with no adequate support, its commanding officers changed it for a better position, which position it held until entirely out of ammunition, when, being harassed by a galling flank fire, it fell back some three hundred yards, to a line with the artillery, when, being replenished with ammunition, it continued the fight for hours, and until it was almost surrounded by the enemy.

The precision with which the order to take the new position was executed, the determined valor of the men, the seizing and bearing off a stand of the enemy's colors, and finally the manner in which the regiment was retired from the field, afforded a fine exhibition of military discipline and soldierly bearing.

In this battle, the infantry especially engaged the enemy at the greatest disadvantage. The troops were hurried upon the field, having already marched all day at a rapid pace for miles, under a broiling sun; and before reaching the scene of conflict, they were shorn of half their strength from heat and exhaustion. As I rode along from regiment to regiment, and saw the numerous cases of sun-stroke and the scores and hundreds of men, many of them known to me as good and true soldiers, falling out by the way, utterly powerless to move forward, it was a sad, a fearful reflection that this condition of so many would ensure defeat and terrible disaster.

The cavalry had been for hours hotly engaged with the enemy, who was in strong force and occupied a well-chosen position. Although they had behaved nobly, they were now in urgent need of support, and hence the order despatched to commandants of regiments five miles in the rear, to "hurry up;" and on that memorable day—a hot summer's day in a Southern clime—they did "hurry up." Our troops did all that troops could do under the circumstances—fought bravely, desperately, but were compelled to give way—to fall back. And it was now obvious that no preparation had been made in anticipation of a possible defeat. Two hundred and fifty wagons had been permitted to crowd far to the front, greatly endangering their own safety in case of a repulse, blocking up the road against the running of ambulances, and interfering with any necessary movement of the troops to the rear.

Most of the commands, on falling back, intermingled with the great number of those who had been unable to reach the field, and being greatly disorganized, all turned their faces to the rear, and joined in a common retreat. And now began the difficult task of wheeling around the teams and wagons. You have heard teamsters yell at their mules, crack their whips, and sometimes—swear, haven't you? Well, they did all these things on this occasion, and whatever else teamsters properly may do. At all events, Bedlam let loose could hardly excel in the noise and commotion you would have witnessed had you been there, in their efforts to get out of range of the enemy's guns.

Stretcher-bearers and ambulances could now reach the gory field no more, and although comparatively few of the fallen had been brought off, there now remained no alternative; the dead and wounded alike must be abandoned to the victors. Our hospital being under fire, the enemy having flanked us, our suffering men were taken to a new location three fourths of a mile further back, and again laid upon the green grass, while the Surgeon bestowed such atten-

tion as it was possible to do under the circumstances. In less than thirty minutes, however, we found ourselves under the necessity of moving again. And so, lifting the poor mangled fellows into the ambulances once more, the drivers were directed to fall into the retreating column, and follow on until further orders.

All efforts to form a new line of battle that day were unavailing, except for a few minutes, once or twice. The army was now rapidly retreating—marching to the rear—I should say, changing front, and with rapid strides seeking to go the furthest possible in the shortest space of time. Every body seemed to be in a hurry. The road was not wide enough—it was filled up to overflowing from fence to fence, with wagons, ambulances, artillery, horsemen, and footmen—everybody trying to get ahead of everybody else, as though everybody else were in their way. Then, there were two columns of cavalry to the left, moving parallel to the road, their files not very well dressed, to be sure, but still making good time. The infantry, poor fellows, seemed light of foot, by the way they plodded along on either side of the road, dodging through the brush, over logs and gulleys, constituting a dense body of flankers to the column that filled the road. But there was a sad deficiency of arms among them, having left their guns at Guntown.

This rapidly-moving army of living creatures, consisting of men, horses, negroes, mules, wagons and artillery, would every few minutes receive a fresh impetus from the shot and shell of the enemy, as they came crashing and screeching over our heads and bursting among us. Good heavens! what a spectacle! Five thousand infantry, three thousand five hundred cavalry, four batteries, two hundred and fifty wagons, and all the appurtenances thereunto belonging—every man, horse and wagon bent on getting to some distant place before anybody else did!

But O, the roads! They had been well-nigh impassable in places when we were advancing toward the enemy, and now, while advancing from him, and just as night was throwing her dark mantle around us, these horrid roads must be travelled over again. No stopping to repair them now. O, no! our errand was too pressing for that. Well, perceiving no advantage in staying behind, but a strong probability of some disadvantage, and being well mounted, I proposed to my ever faithful "John" that we go forward. He quickly responded that "he would stick by me if I would by him," and with this understanding we pushed on—travelled all night, amid such darkness, some of the time, as only dwells in these benighted regions of the Prince of Darkness.

We arrived at Ripley, thirty miles distant from the battle-field, soon after daylight. Not doubting but we had pretty much led the van, you can imagine my surprise on finding there a brigade of cavalry, as well as many of the artillery and infantry. They might truly be called

light artillery and *light* infantry, so far as arms and munitions of war were concerned. In a brief space of time most of the army had come up. But everything was out of joint and in a sad plight. Some men had hats on, and some ha'n't. Some rode horses and mules with saddles and bridles, and some didn't. A great many, having exhausted their ammunition the day before, had thrown away their arms and accoutrements, as useless encumbrances in their flight.

The wagon train had all been lost. A caisson having stuck fast, the road was completely obstructed, and all the wagons and ambulances, with commissary stores, ammunition, hospital and medical supplies, and officers' baggage, were necessarily abandoned. The officer in charge of the ambulance train, and the surgeons who were along, exhausted every means in fruitless efforts to bring it forward, but after two hours of toil were compelled to leave it. There in the wilderness, in the darkness and gloom of midnight, our wounded companions were taken out and gently laid upon the bosom of mother earth—the precious trust left to the tender mercies of the pursuing foe! In anticipation of such an event, I had, just before night, addressed a respectful note to the surgeons of the Confederate army, requesting their kind offices in behalf of our wounded men as we could not remove, and I have already learned with much satisfaction that these men have received the kindest treatment.

We had not long been at Ripley before the pursuing column was upon us. Our cavalry, with a short supply of ammunition, quickly formed in line of battle, while several shattered regiments, without ammunition, hastened to their support. After a vigorous show of resistance, maintained for some time, our dispirited troops slowly fell back. Quite a number of men, with only flesh wounds, had managed, by the aid of horses and mules picked up on the road, to keep along with their friends to this place. But here it became necessary to leave the graver cases, and, acting under an order from the division commander, I detailed two assistant surgeons to remain in charge of them. The citizens to whose houses they were taken gave every assurance that our wounded, whether white or black, should be well cared for—and I have good reasons for believing this promise has been fulfilled. It was here I joined for a brief period my own regiment, from which I had necessarily been separated for a time. I had seen it as it moved unflinchingly into the hottest of the fight, but had heard little of its casualties. I knew not who of my friends and companions had fallen, and great was my joy to meet my Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Adjutant, Captain, and Lieutenant, not one missing, though some of them wounded. I need hardly say it was to me an affecting meeting.

My duties to others, which hitherto had called me everywhere, appeared now to be wholly at an end. I had now at my command neither am-

bulance, dressings, medicines, nor instruments. I had "turned over" all my supplies to the "rebs;" and believing in the philosophy that teaches that "self-preservation is the first law of our nature," I resolved to put it into practice. and so John and I mounted our horses, agreeing we would not stop until we reached Memphis, notwithstanding the distance was seventy-five miles, and our horses had not been fed for twenty-four hours. As we passed rapidly by many a weary footman, and some who were more poorly mounted than we, but one idea seemed to engross their mind—and that was, that salvation depended wholly on works, wholly on getting within our lines before the "rebs" caught them; and I confess I shared largely in this feeling myself, as my poor horse would testify, could he speak.

As "birds of a feather flock together," and as "misery loves company," so the stragglers who had managed to mount themselves, from all regiments, and of all complexions, began to consolidate their forces, until we numbered about one hundred and fifty, without counting mules. As good fortune would have it, we were soon overtaken by about an equal number of cavalry, who had been cut off from their main body. They had but two or three rounds of ammunition, and we had neither arms nor ammunition—but it was proposed by us, and accepted by them, that for purposes of mutual protection, we keep together. I was appointed to the command of the "regiment of mounted men without arms," with an imperative order to keep my men from straggling. And so we rode on and on, weary and sleepy, and hungry. One of my darkies fell asleep on his mule, and then he fell on to his head in the middle of the road. This awoke him, when he mounted again and came on. We had travelled all the night before, and were now entering upon another, and finding it a delusive hope to reach Memphis without stopping, it was concluded to halt for a few hours during the night, and rest ourselves and animals; and on arriving at a place three miles west of LaGrange, at one o'clock at night, having travelled over all the by-roads and cow-paths in the country, we "went into camp." This consisted in lying down without your supper, upon a blanket if you had one, and upon the ground if you hadn't.

At dawn of day, having been perfectly refreshed by a hard shower, we started off on our march, without "surgeon's call," and without breakfast. At Moscow, we crossed Wolf river where it divides into two branches, making an island. The branch nearest us was bridged; we passed over it to the island and pulled it up after us—the bridge, not the branch—in order that we might bridge the other. This was a better philosophy than the Irishman's, whose blanket being too short at the bottom, lengthened it with a piece cut from the top. It was now nine o'clock A. M., and we still had twenty-four miles to make before reaching our lines at Collierville. But we were encouraged. We felt sure we had outstripped every body else in this race for dear

life and liberty, and if any were saved we should be of the number. I had very little doubt myself but I should "live to fight another day," if not "to run away."

About the middle of the afternoon we came in sight of our picket lines, and truly glad were we. It had, however, all along been a troublesome question to me as to the reason I should assign for having left the wounded behind, and, in fact, everybody else. The truth is, my friend, I couldn't repress the feeling that I had acted very cowardly, and I almost wished myself back again, even at the price of my liberty. But on arriving at the station at Collierville, what was my astonishment and relief to see hundreds of infantry and thousands of cavalry, who had arrived before us; and to settle all questions of cowardice, here were two Brigadiers, a score of Colonels and Lieutenant-Colonels, including my own, and other commissioned officers without number, all of whom had eclipsed us in this extraordinary race.

You know, Chaplain, I keep a fast horse, and am a pretty fast man, but I am compelled to admit that both horse and rider were distanced this time.

I am, dear sir,
Very truly yours,
L. DYER,
Surgeon Eighty-first Illinois.

COLONEL McMILLEN'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION, SIXTEENTH
ARMY CORPS, MOSCOW, TENN., June 24, 1864. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the twenty-second instant, requesting me to give you a statement in writing, setting forth my views of the causes of our defeat at Brice's cross-roads, my knowledge of your general management of the campaign, and whether or not, in my opinion, you were to blame for the failure of the expedition, and if so, to what extent.

I respectfully submit the following statement:

First—As to the causes of the defeat.

In my opinion, they are to be sought in the nature of the campaign you were charged with conducting. The expedition consisted of five thousand infantry and three thousand cavalry, with a train of more than two hundred wagons, making some four thousand six hundred animals to be subsisted. Rations for the same were transported in the wagons; but, after leaving Lafayette, you were entirely dependent on the country for forage. The line of march was through a country devastated by the war, and containing little or no forage, rendering it extremely difficult, and for the greater portion of the time impossible, to maintain the animals in a serviceable condition. The roads were narrow, leading through dense forests, and over streams rendered almost impassable by the heavy rains which fell daily, from the time we left Memphis until our return. The country was new to you, and I know the


difficulty you constantly encountered in obtaining information concerning roads and the crossing of streams. Almost every man and woman along the line of march is an enemy, eager to communicate information of our force and movements, but professing entire ignorance as to the position or number of the enemy. Laboring under all these disadvantages, you moved against an enemy who possessed long lines of railroad with which to concentrate troops and supplies at any point you might threaten. It only had to await your arrival near the railroad, and, with a superior force, overpower your army, and drive it back with a heavy loss in men and material. Either you were obliged to abandon the object of the expedition before reaching the immediate presence of the enemy, or overpower him with that portion of your army which could be spared from guarding the long line of wagons. The latter you attempted, but failed in, from the simple fact that the enemy developed a heavier force than you could bring into action.

The engagement itself was, as far as I know, managed as well as circumstances would permit; was fought with spirit, even desperation, and and with no loss of consequence in material or men (except the killed and wounded).


You were, however, defeated and obliged to retreat over an impassable road, during a dark night and with exhausted animals and men. Under these circumstances, trains and artillery were abandoned in order to save a heavier loss in men.

Second—As to your management of the campaign. I have never known greater efforts to be made by any commanding officer to conduct a column of troops in an orderly and compact manner, than were made by you. I know that you were extremely anxious that the troops should be kept well in hand, ready for any emergency, and that every precaution was taken to prevent surprise. I also know that every means was taken by you to obtain information as to the movements of the enemy and its strength, and that your efforts in this line were extremely unsatisfactory. On the day of the battle, the column was as well closed up as the nature of the road over which we were moving would permit, and the troops were put into position as fast as they could come up.

Before closing, General, I desire to bear testimony to the important fact, that, when we reached Ripley, your judgment and the judgment of officers high in command, would have turned you back, had it not been that your orders to proceed were positive, and for the reason that only a short time before you had conducted another expedition to near the same point, and had returned because you considered further progress extremely hazardous, if not impracticable. In the face of this decision, you were sent through the same country, encumbered with a heavy train, without, so far as I know, discretionary powers, and you went on to meet the disaster your better judgment told you was







Engr. by A. B. Foster

SAMUEL P. CARTER.

COMMANDER U. S. NAVY.

Late First Maj. Genl. U. S. Army.

REBEL

REBEL

imminent should we encounter an enemy in force beyond Ripley.

As to the slanderous charges with which the country is being flooded concerning you personally, they are simply false, and beneath your notice or mine.

W. L. McMILLEN,
Colonel Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, commanding.
To Brigadier-General S. D. STURGIS, U. S. V.
WILLIAM C. RAVALLE,
Captain, Aide-de-Camp, and A. A. G., U. S. A.

COLONEL WARING'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, CAVALRY DIVISION, }
SIXTY-NINTH ARMY CORPS, WHITE STATION, TENNESSEE, }
June 23, 1864. }

Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis :

GENERAL: I have received your letter of this date, asking me to state my opinion of the manner in which you conducted yourself in the recent expedition into Mississippi, and of the extent to which the failure of that expedition is to be attributed to your fault.

In reply, I beg to state, that while I was not informed of the precise orders under which you proceeded, and had no means of knowing the full import of the information which you received of the position, strength, and intentions of the enemy, so far as I was able to judge of the objects of the expedition, and of the forces opposed to us, I at no time doubted that it was your duty to go on and to engage the enemy wherever he might be found.

On the day of the battle of Brice's cross-roads, I commanded the head of the column, and found it impossible to get any but the most vague information concerning the rebel force in our front, until we actually reached the field where the battle was fought. Even here it seemed doubtful that we would meet with serious opposition.

It became necessary to send out patrols to procure fuller information. The patrol toward Baldwin almost immediately struck a strong picket of the enemy, and was reinforced before the numbers opposed to us could be known. We were engaged by a force which I thought, as did General Grierson, must be met by my whole brigade, and I at once took up the only good position for more than a mile to our rear.

I think that you were right in desiring to hold this position, and nothing for the first two hours of the battle indicated that it could not be held until the whole infantry force came up. Indeed, it was held until my brigade was relieved by the head of the infantry column. Even when I fell back to a new position, I saw no reason why the battle should not be decided in our favor.

From this time until the retreat I was with you, and I had occasion to observe your management of the battle. Here, certainly, was no cause for the unjust criticisms which have been passed upon you. You were cool and energetic, and certainly did all that lay in your power to make the engagement successful; and,

when defeat was evident, you did all that could be done to prevent the disaster which followed. I am confident that, owing to the force and vigor of the enemy's pursuit, it was impossible to save the train, or the artillery which was behind it, on the retreat, and that any decided stand made with the intention of rescuing the infantry, which was last engaged, would have resulted in the capture of the entire force. The only plan by which any of the infantry could be saved, was the one which they instinctively adopted—that of taking to the woods and finding their own way to our lines.

Had you taken the grave responsibility of turning back the expedition at Ripley, you would have avoided the disaster of the battle. Whether or not you ought to have done so, I cannot decide, not knowing what your information was; but I am sure, that if you had, the unfavorable comments of the discontented would have been tenfold more loud and annoying than they now are.

The rude character of the country through which we moved rendered all tactical precautions, except a simple advance guard, impossible, while it was so utterly barren that an immediate advance or retreat was necessary to procure forage for teams and cavalry horses.

Not turning back, you had but one course to pursue; to find the enemy where you could, and to fight him on his own ground and on his own terms.

This you did as well as you could, and I am ready to testify, with a full knowledge of the circumstances of the battle and the defeat, that you acquitted yourself nobly and well, and that you merit the commendation of all who have a right to express an opinion in the matter, as you have already received that of your comrades, who saw you under the trying circumstances of action and defeat.

I wish that any word of mine could arrest the slander that you were under the influence of liquor during the fight, but such calumnies travel too fast for honest refutation to overtake them; and on this score I can only offer you the modified consolation of saying, that I and my staff, who saw much of you before, during and after the battle, are ready to brand that falsehood as it deserves whenever it may appear before us.

Be good enough, General, to accept the assurance of my personal regard, and command my assistance whenever it may be of service to you.

Very respectfully and truly yours,
GEO. E. WARING,
Colonel Fourth Missouri Cavalry, commanding.
W. C. RAVALLE, A. D. C.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

MEMPHIS, TENN., June 16, 1864.

In justice to the brave troops engaged by Brigadier-General Sturgis in the late disastrous battle with the rebel Forrest, at Brice's cross-

roads, near Guntown, Mississippi, I, an eyewitness and participator in the engagement, with present facilities for full data and information in regard to the object, force, conduct, and management of the expedition, the valor with which our troops fought, and the manner in which the retreat was conducted, cannot refrain from submitting the following truthful narrative of events, just as they occurred, for publication:

General Sturgis was ordered to strike the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad at a point south of Corinth, destroy the same, and engage any forces of the enemy in that vicinity. The forces composing his expedition were four thousand seven hundred infantry, with sixteen pieces of artillery, in three brigades, under Colonel McMillen—three thousand three hundred and fifty white troops, and one thousand three hundred and fifty colored; General Grierson's division of cavalry: First brigade, under Colonel Waring, probably one thousand two hundred strong, with two rifled guns and two sections of mountain howitzers (attached to Fourth Missouri cavalry); Second brigade, under Colonel Winslow, numbering one thousand five hundred men, with two rifled guns; Tenth Missouri cavalry and two rifled guns; Seventh Wisconsin light artillery. About two hundred wagons, loaded with supplies and ammunition, composed the train.

The morning of the tenth of June found this little army, complete in organization, in good spirits and undoubted efficiency, encamped together at Stubbs' plantation, on the Ripley road. At 5:30 o'clock A. M., Colonel Waring's brigade took the advance on the Fulton road, Winslow's brigade following, the infantry and trains marching behind. Two miles beyond Stubbs' the army crossed a swamp, known as the Hatchie River, covered with water, and abounding in small creeks meandering the road in great diversity. The artillery and train was moved into the swamp without any attempt being made by pioneers to render the crossing better, and before all of the train had made the passage the clearing through which the road ran was so badly cut up as to render a recrossage impossible. Two hours' work would have sufficed to construct a road upon which the artillery and train could have been recrossed with ease.

At ten o'clock, A. M., twenty-three miles from Ripley, about eighteen miles from Tupelo, and six miles from Saltillo, at the cross-roads at Brice's plantation, half a mile east of a deep creek, passable only by a bridge, and while the train was but in part across the Hatchie swamp, the advance encountered the enemy, which it immediately engaged.

At twelve o'clock the Second brigade of cavalry moved into position, half a mile in advance of the point of intersection of the Fulton and Pontotoc road, defending this position. The engagement had now assumed a general character, the enemy apparently in great force, pressing with vigor upon the whole line, while the

artillery was hotly engaged. At two o'clock P. M. the enemy had succeeded in forcing our cavalry back a quarter of a mile from its first position, but the retirement was made in good order, and the new line was steadily held. At this period the infantry, exhausted by a march of five miles during the heat of the day, at as fast a gait as it was possible to move them, arrived and relieved the cavalry, which was ordered by General Sturgis to fall back across the creek.

The infantry went into the fight with bravery and determination, but exhausted by their forced march, and outnumbered and outflanked by their fresher foe. Fresh batteries were placed in position, and added their thunders to the horrid tumult. The dead and wounded had been carried to the rear for several hours. Now the ghastly throng grew more numerous as the tide of battle surged with greater fierceness along the line. Stragglers, many of them wounded, came in numbers from our right, and from the approaching sounds and rebel cheers, it seemed certain that the rebels had turned that flank. General Sturgis had arrived upon the field at 1:30 o'clock P. M., yet, at the moment of which I write, numbers of our teams were occupying the bridge of the deep creek toward the enemy, and being parked in the field upon its eastern bank. At three o'clock P. M., the rebels made a fierce attack along the whole line, outflanking our troops to the right and left, and driving them back in disorder.

The Fourth cavalry, in the rear of the Second cavalry brigade, had not yet succeeded in crossing their horses over the crowded bridge, and perceiving the retreat of the infantry, they were dismounted and formed upon the crest of the hill upon the eastern bank of the creek. Here, with their carbines, under a deadly fire of musketry and artillery, they fought for thirty minutes, covering the retirement of their horses, and saving the fragments of two infantry regiments threatened with complete annihilation or capture by the victorious rebels. I wish to remark in this place that I was informed by an officer of prominence, that while our entire army was in full retreat, and a great portion had already crossed the creek, General Sturgis told him that *Colonel McMillen was driving the enemy.*

At four o'clock P. M., that portion of the army not killed, wounded, or captured, was west of the bridge retreating in disorder, the First brigade of cavalry taking the advance of the retreating column. The negro brigade formed first west of the creek, and gave the rebels a check, after which it fell back with the receding masses. General Sturgis now ordered the Second cavalry brigade to endeavor to get ahead of the column and stop the retreat, and it accordingly proceeded to Stubbs', two miles west of the Hatchie, and ten miles from the cross-roads, formed line in front and to both flanks, effectually stopping all except the First brigade, which had gone on. In the meantime a remnant of an infantry brigade had made a stand four or

five miles west of the creek, effectually stopping the rebel pursuit.

About nine o'clock p. m. the Hatchie swamp was completely choked with artillery, caissons, wagons, ambulances, and dead animals, the debris of a broken army, and General Sturgis, two miles ahead at Stubbs', said that he did not expect to save any artillery, wagons, or supplies, and ordered all to move forward except the Second cavalry brigade, directing Colonel Winslow to halt at Stubbs' until all the army had moved past, and then take the rear of the column as far as Ripley, saying that at that point or just beyond he would reorganize.

At 2:30 o'clock a. m. of the eleventh inst., Colonel Winslow, supposing the army all past, moved his brigade slowly in the direction of Ripley, but hearing that a portion of the brigade which protected the rear the previous night was yet behind, the cavalry was halted at a creek east of Ripley, and waited for the infantry to come up and pass. Here, as the infantry moved past, the enemy made a vigorous attack upon the rear guard, which was gallantly met by the Third and Fourth Iowa cavalry.

The column then moved slowly toward Ripley, at which place it was fiercely attacked by the enemy in the rear, while the roads north and south of the town were occupied in force.

Here, again, the Third and Fourth Iowa cavalry deploy, manœuvring by squadrons and battalions, meeting the foe with volley for volley, and sending the bullets back into their ranks with a fierceness and rapidity more than equal to their own. The colored brigade was again pushed into action, but after firing a few volleys without checking the rebel advance, it retreated down the Salem road.

The column was then moved out of Ripley, and the Third and Fourth Iowa again took the rear, fighting severely for several hours. Twenty miles from Colliersville, the Second brigade, being out of ammunition, was relieved by the Second New Jersey, and at nine o'clock a. m. of the twelfth inst., having marched seventy-five miles in fifty-two hours—men without rest, and horses without forage—the remnant of the army arrived at Colliersville. The First cavalry brigade had saved its howitzers. The Second had saved all its artillery, ambulances and wounded, and accompanying the cavalry were a few infantry mounted on mules, horses, etc., and a few who had marched from the battle-field on foot.

Here General Sturgis said we would rest until the next morning, and collect stragglers, and as a reinforcement of two thousand fresh infantry met us there, and we were not attacked, I do not see why it was not done; but at dark the tired troops were marched seventeen miles to White Station, where they arrived at daylight the next morning. Here General Sturgis ordered a detail of his exhausted cavalry to proceed back to Colliersville and cover some stragglers reported to have arrived there.

Our loss in this battle was probably one thou-

sand killed and wounded—most of the wounded falling into the enemy's hands—sixteen pieces of artillery, two hundred wagons, and one thousand five hundred prisoners. After the abandonment of the trains, most of the infantry was out of ammunition, and the cavalry had but a few rounds left, with no source of supply. All of the troops under my personal observation fought with valor and determination worthy of more glorious results, and after the entire army was defeated and running back, the men were cool and collected, marching without organization to be sure, but without panic. A little judgment upon the part of the commander of our forces would, in the opinion of all military men present at the retreat, have saved our artillery and trains; and I am satisfied that, with a supply of ammunition, the Second brigade of cavalry, which stood so staunchly when all else was demoralized, could have protected the van. A rally of the entire force could, I think, have been made within four miles of the battle-field, enabling us to bring off the greater portion of our artillery and train, and saving from capture hundreds of our exhausted men.

I cannot close this narrative without awarding my meed of just praise to the lion-hearted commander of the Second cavalry brigade, who, amid the tumult of battle, the horrors of defeat, and the aggravation of horrors upon the retreat, was cool, collected, and ready for any emergency. His strong sense and ripened judgment never forsook him, and, better than all, he served to infuse his own spirit and devotion to duty into his gallant command.

I have no inclination to extend this narrative into a criticism upon the General commanding. I have made some plain statements plainly, without comment. They will, I think, prove as damning as the more labored denunciation could be. The Tenth Missouri was the only artillery that was brought safe to Memphis. The First brigade of cavalry was composed of the Second New Jersey, Fourth Missouri, Nineteenth Pennsylvania, Ninth Illinois, and Seventh Indiana regiments of cavalry, Colonel Geo. E. Waring, commanding. The Second brigade, Third and Fourth Iowa, Tenth Missouri, and Seventh Illinois cavalry, Colonel E. F. Winslow commanding.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

CAMP FIFTY-FIFTH U. S. COLORED INFANTRY,
FORT PICKENS,
MEMPHIS, TENN., June 24, 1864.

SIR: I wish to give you some particulars of the defeat and disastrous rout of our forces in the expedition under General Sturgis—particulars that fell under my own observation, for I was in the midst of them during their occurrence.

On the tenth, the skirmishing in front became quite severe, but our cavalry slowly drove the rebels back, until they arrived within about two miles of Guntown, when their defence became more obstinate, and our cavalry was compelled

to fall back. Colonel Hoge's brigade of infantry being in the advance, was immediately ordered to the front on a double-quick, and the day being very warm, many became over-heated and exhausted, and were compelled from faintness to lie down by the roadside. I have it from the lips of those who were in this brigade, that not more than two thirds of their men reached the battle-field. As soon as this brigade had formed in line of battle the rebels came down upon them with great fury in three lines of battle. They withstood this impetuous and overwhelming force bravely for over half an hour, when the enemy performed a flank movement, and their only alternative was to retreat or be captured. By this time, however, the Second brigade had arrived, and was brought immediately into action, and were successful in checking the assault of the enemy and in holding him at bay for nearly an hour. In the interim the train had been hurried up and corralled in an open field not more than half a mile from the battle-field. The Third brigade (colored) had in the morning been disposed along the train, four men to each wagon, as a guard; as fast as this brigade could be assembled by companies they were ordered to the front, and were soon confronting the enemy in deadly conflict.

By the time this brigade had all arrived on the field, the other brigades were fleeing to the rear in considerable confusion and disorder, many throwing away their arms and accoutrements before they were fairly out of sight of the enemy.

As soon as the panic was discovered the train was ordered to retreat; but as the enemy's artillery had attained almost a perfect range of the field where the wagons were corralled and the road upon which the retreat was ordered, many of the teamsters unhitched their mules, and soldiers, mounting them, rushed frightened and panic-stricken to the rear, their pace being somewhat accelerated by the close proximity of shot and bursting shell. In this way the road became blocked, and at least two thirds of our supply and ammunition train was either destroyed or captured. The Third brigade held the enemy in check until the most of the artillery and the remainder of the train had succeeded in getting a mile or so to the rear; but they were soon overwhelmed and flanked on three successive lines of battle, and were compelled to retreat precipitously.

By this time our army was in a perfect rout, and every one who was not disabled rushed to the rear, while many of the wounded who could ride were mounted on mules and with difficulty pressed their way along with the crowd. Night now coming on, the enemy ceased their pursuit. Never was darkness more welcome or distance more enchanting to the view, than to that devoted army on this occasion.

It is impossible to give anything like a correct estimate of the number of killed or wounded in this engagement, as they nearly all fell into the hands of the enemy. It is supposed, however,

that they will number over five hundred. Our loss in prisoners was considerable, as many of our men, after becoming panic-stricken, rushed to the woods in all directions, and were gobbled up by the rebel cavalry.

What was left of our army continued their march all night long, and what remained of our artillery and train becoming blocked and stuck in crossing the Tallahatchie river, was abandoned.

About six o'clock the following morning we reached Ripley, and found that our fleeing forces had halted, apparently for a rest. Every man appeared to be going on his own hook, and caring for no one but himself. We had been here scarcely more than an hour when an ominous firing was heard on the south and east of the town, showing that the enemy were still in hot pursuit. At this indication the most of the cavalry started to the rear, together with the infantry, who were without arms or ammunition, and the wounded who were mounted. That portion of the infantry who had retained their arms prepared for resistance near the centre of the town. On came the rebels with most hideous yells, and a severe fight ensued, which lasted nearly two hours, when our forces were completely routed and driven to the woods. While fighting at this place, large numbers of men and women secreted in the houses, fired upon our men from the doors and windows, and Colonel McCraig, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois, was shot dead in this manner while bravely urging on his men. Our men becoming enraged at the sight of this, poured a volley among them, killing and wounding several women. After this engagement, our forces made no resistance as a body, but kept constantly retreating and skirmishing. I would say, however, that the Third Iowa cavalry made themselves very useful as a rear guard, and would compliment their coolness and bravery amid the heat and excitement of this disastrous retreat. The appearance of the road over which we retreated but too plainly indicated how serious was this disaster. It was completely lined with hats, boots, shoes, coats, saddles, and harness, while there was no end to arms and accoutrements.

A man would pick up an old horse or anything that was rideable, and mounting it, would soon ride it down and leave it by the road-side; another man being almost exhausted, seeing the animal, would mount it again, and by the assistance of a stick or spur would urge it along for a mile or two further, until finally the animal would drop by the road-side and was then left to die. In this manner the greater portion of what was left of our army fled for two days and nights without food or sleep, and reached Memphis on Sunday, the twelfth, having performed a march of one hundred and twenty miles in that time, which required ten days to accomplish when going out. Every day since, men have been straggling in, and the experience of some is almost heart-rending. A colored man from my

own company, who reached this place last evening, reports that he and two others were captured by the rebels near Lagrange, Tennessee, and were tied together with a rope, and then shot. His two companions fell dead, while he was only wounded in the left arm, and by a dexterous movement slipped the rope over his head and miraculously escaped to the brush while they were firing at him. This is but a single instance among many that might be mentioned.

To the colored troops this has been but a reenactment of the Fort Pillow massacre. Reports reach us from all quarters, of the brutal murder of our colored soldiers and their officers, who had the misfortune to fall into the hands of the enemy. That our government does not institute retaliatory measures for such barbarous treatment of its soldiers, is becoming the wonderment of all, and of vital interest to the officers in our colored regiments.

These troops, in the late expedition, were under the command of Colonel Edward Bouton, of the Fifty-ninth United States infantry, and received many compliments from white regiments for their bravery and unflinching obstinacy in repelling the enemy while on the retreat from Guntown. As a general thing the colored soldiers retained their arms and accoutrements, and many a white soldier has said since our return that he owed his escape to the colored troops.

Doc. 31.

THE SIEGE OF FRANKFORT.

GOVERNOR BRAMLETTE'S LETTER.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
FRANKFORT, June 18, 1864. }

As various statements have gone forth in reference to the assault upon this city by the rebels, it is deemed proper to give to the public the official report of General Lindsey, Inspector-General of Kentucky.

I will remark that General Lindsey's sleepless vigilance, tireless energy, and superior efficiency, aided by Colonel George W. Monroe, of the Twenty-second Kentucky Infantry, Adjutant-General John Boyle, and Quartermaster-General S. G. Suddarth, Kentucky is mainly indebted for the security of her capital, with its valuable public property.

The young men of Frankfort, and from Peak's Mill and Bald Knob precincts, who so nobly rallied to the defence, and, with the dauntless nerve of veterans, met a foe superior in numbers and repulsed him, and who stood ready and prepared to defend the capital against Morgan's entire band of thieves, who were expected every hour to assail them, have set an example of heroic patriotism which should thrill every Kentucky heart with pride, and nerve every Kentucky arm for similar deeds of courageous and manly self-defence.

Their names, together with those chivalric and brave men from other parts of our common country who took part in the defence, shall be enrolled and preserved among the archives of the State as worthy of their country's highest meed of praise.

THOS. E. BRAMLETTE,
Governor of Kentucky.

GENERAL LINDSEY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS KENTUCKY STATE GUARD,
INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
FRANKFORT, June 18, 1864. }

General John Boyle, Adjutant-General Kentucky:

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the defence of the State capital against the recent attack of a detachment of General John H. Morgan's guerrilla forces.

The capture of the morning train from Louisville, on the eighth instant, was the first intimation had of the presence of the enemy in this section of the State. Supposing the cutting of the road to have been the work of some small marauding band of horse-thieves, who would immediately endeavor to escape, I ordered a detachment of the First Kentucky Scouts to take the road as soon as possible, and march by the way of Mount Eden to Taylorsville, on which route it was thought the depredators could either be intercepted or their whereabouts ascertained. Before the scouts could march, however, we learned that Morgan in force had succeeded in getting in between us and the United States forces, under command of Brigadier-General S. G. Burbridge; had captured Mount Sterling and Paris; and had burnt the bridges on the Kentucky Central Railroad. These events, occurring on the same day the road was cut between here and Louisville, presented the view of concerted action, and led to the belief that the enemy had an objective point somewhere between the break in the Central Railroad at Paris, and that upon the road from here to Louisville. This place, it seemed to me, held out greater inducements to him than any other; inasmuch as *here* he could strike the greatest blow to the State by the destruction of the public records, &c.; and could arm his new recruits, whom he was rapidly mounting, as he passed along, upon the finest stock ever produced in the Blue Grass region. In addition to this, General Burbridge, having come upon his rear, as we were informed by special courier, was pressing him with the utmost vigor. Here he could procure artillery, and cross his command in a few hours; and, destroying the bridges, avoid, or so delay pursuit as to be able to strike the Louisville and Nashville Railroad with impunity.

In view of these conclusions, which subsequent events proved to be correct, it was determined not to send any part of the cavalry away; and by direction of his Excellency the Governor, the militia of the county—the Thirty-sixth regiment—under Colonel Keenon, was ordered out and the various roads picketed. The rail-

road being again open to Louisville, exertions were made to ship the public papers and stores of every kind to that place. All night long the work of loading the train was kept up, until every car was filled to its utmost capacity. It is useless to say that the officers of the various departments and their clerks discharged their laborious duties with diligence.

On the morning of the ninth, the train containing the public property, with a guard, composed of the clerks of the various offices, and volunteers from the militia and strangers in the city—all under the command of Mr. J. B. Tilford, of the Adjutant-General's office—started for Louisville. When nearing Pleasureville the road was discovered to be on fire. The engine was immediately reversed, and the train attacked by guerrillas. The guard succeeded in defending the train, on which a running fire was kept up for several miles, and, notwithstanding the road was obstructed with rails, &c., every two or three hundred yards, the train and guards uninjured reached the depot at 7:15 o'clock p. m.

The enrolled militia of this city, Peak's Mill precinct, and other parts of the county, had been collecting during the day. A squad under Captain Sanford Goins were sent to man the guns in the fort; a small guard being at the arsenal, the remainder were placed in barracks near the city.

Finding it impossible for me to attend to all the details and at the same time exercise general command, I availed myself of the services of Colonel George W. Monroe, Twenty-second Kentucky infantry, who at all times has been found willing to respond to the call of his country and State, and placed him in command of forces for the purpose of organizing and distributing them, with orders to report from time to time to these headquarters.

On the morning of the tenth, the militia force was collected at the Arsenal for equipment, and then, by Colonel Monroe, distributed between the fort, the arsenal, and the bridge leading to South Frankfort.

I sent a special messenger through to Louisville, with an order to Colonel Gathright, commanding the militia of Jefferson county, to turn out his command for service, and to act, on consultation with Mr. Gill, the Superintendent of the railroad, in establishing connection between here and Louisville, leaving a sufficient guard at the most important points for the protection of the road. Lieutenant-Colonel Craig was sent from here with a company, composed of detachments from the First Kentucky scouts and the militia, as a guard to a construction train, with orders to repair whatever damage had been done to this end of the road. This expedition returned in the evening, without being able to accomplish their mission. Colonel Craig found the enemy posted in the stockade near Benson bridge, and, charging them, drove them out and across the creek, capturing two horses, with the loss of one man wounded and three missing;

what damage he did the enemy he was unable to ascertain.

These persistent efforts to stop all use of the Louisville and Frankfort Railroad demonstrated that we were in danger; and when the news was received that Morgan was at Georgetown, no one could doubt his intentions. We, here in Frankfort, were not long in finding out what those intentions were.

About seven o'clock p. m., tenth instant, a picket came into my headquarters and announced that the enemy were advancing on the Georgetown pike. The detachment of scouts had been ordered, but a short time before, to be prepared to strengthen the pickets on any road that might be threatened. They were immediately sent out the Georgetown pike. Colonel Monroe and myself accompanied them as far as the cemetery gate, when I was informed by a picket stationed to the left of the road, in position to see the Owenton pike, that a large force was advancing on that road. Hearing nothing from the pickets stationed at Hord's house, I rather doubted the information, and leaving Colonel Monroe to defend the Georgetown pike, I took six mounted men and started out on the Owenton road. I had not gone far when I discovered the enemy moving up the hill to attack the fort. Ordering the cavalry that were with me to make for the fort by the road leading up the hill next to the river, I made my way up the hill, reaching the summit just in time to see the men driven from the advanced gun and the enemy take possession of it. I was met by a large number of negroes, who had been used in building a redoubt, and who were running for the fort. I changed their course, and made them go down the hill, to the left near the river. No negroes were allowed in the fort. I had no intention of using them as soldiers, and knowing that if the enemy should succeed in taking the place they would be murdered, I ordered them from the hill.

By this time the enemy, about sixty strong, were advancing rapidly upon the fort, from the direction of the gun they had captured; a portion taking shelter behind a stone wall, under cover of which they could approach nearer the fort. As I rode around to the entrance, I observed about twenty-five of the enemy moving in the direction of the ravine on the west slope of the hill, a short distance north of the fort. I gave the command "fire," and with a few rounds the enemy were repulsed; as they were also in two succeeding assaults.

In the first assault, Major T. J. Hutchinson and John Coleman, of the Thirty-sixth Enrolled Militia of Franklin county, were wounded while working the guns in the fort. Major Hutchinson was wounded in the face, and John Coleman in the breast, both seriously, but neither mortally. Information was received through prisoners, that the enemy lost five men wounded; and there was one horse captured by us.

Hostilities having ceased for a while, and Colonel Monroe arriving, it was concluded to

send a detachment for each of the two guns outside of the fort. Colonel Monroe commanded one of the detachments in person, and Mr. Thos. Buford, of Woodford county, the other. This work they accomplished. These guns were covered by a fire from the fort; had they not been, the presence of mind of young Frank Gray in bringing away the friction primers would have prevented the enemy from using them against us.

Too much credit cannot be awarded to Sergeant Johnson, of the Second Maryland; Captain San. Goins, of this place; Mr. Albert Bayliss, of Shelby; and Mr. J. B. Gibson, of Cincinnati, the latter an old Kentucky Military Institute cadet; and also Captain Fletcher, U. S. A., and Mr. Schwitzker, for their bravery and efficiency in handling the guns in the fort.

This defence would have been creditable to the militia, had their number been sufficient to have lined the parapet from one end to the other; but I am satisfied that, when the first assault was made, there were not over forty men in the fort.

Waiting until after midnight to see if the attack would be renewed, I then turned the command of the fort over to Colonel Monroe, and rode down to the city for the purpose of visiting the arsenal and other points of defence. At the arsenal I found yourself in command, aided by Quartermaster-General Suddarth, and everything in preparation for its defence. The bridge was effectually guarded by a detachment under command of Captain Jno. M. Hewitt.

About daylight I relieved Colonel Monroe. The enemy were found to be occupying all the roads leading into the city. Several attempts were made by them to approach the arsenal through the cemetery and by the railroad, but the shells thrown from the guns at the fort, and a gun at the arsenal kept them back. The enemy showing themselves frequently on the hills southwest of the city, two guns (twenty-pound Parrotts) at the fort under charge of Messrs. Gibbons, Bayliss, and Buford, shelled them with considerable effect, as it was learned that five were killed and five wounded, and several dead horses mark the localities at which they fell. A flag of truce appearing, the firing ceased. I will here state that during the suspension of hostilities occasioned by the entrance of the flag of truce, the enemy were discovered on the north side of the river, advancing through the cemetery, and by my orders they were shelled. For further particulars I refer you to Colonel Monroe's report which I herewith transmit to you.

On the morning of the twelfth instant, General Harlan, with a detachment, reconnoitered the hills on the south side of the river, from the Louisville turnpike gate around to the railroad, without discovering any indication of the enemy. In the evening of the same day Colonel Jordan, of the Ninth Pennsylvania cavalry, arrived with his command.

On the morning of the thirteenth, the command

of the city having been turned over to Colonel Jordan, the militia were relieved from duty, and were addressed by General Harlan on behalf of his Excellency Governor Bramlette.

The citizens of this city and the State at large are under obligations to Colonel Monroe for his services in defence of the Capital, and I here tender him my thanks for his valuable assistance to me.

I here make honorable mention of the volunteer militia under General Harlan and Captain Hewitt, who rendered efficient services in guarding the railroad bridges during the night of the fifteenth instant.

Quartermaster-General Suddarth, with the assistance of Quartermaster Armer, Mr. Poynter, and Lieutenant Venable, Quartermaster of the Thirty-sixth regiment enrolled militia, attended in an efficient manner to the duties of the Quartermaster's and Commissary's departments.

Colonel Keenon and the officers and men under his command deserve especial praise for their prompt response to the call of his Excellency the Governor. The Thirty-sixth regiment have furnished another evidence of the loyalty of the militia, and of the fact that they are ready and willing to defend their State whenever called on to do so.

The presence of his Excellency the Governor and Attorney-General Harlan animated the men, and contributed very materially to the defence of the fort.

I am under obligations to W. A. Gaines and George Watson, volunteer aides, for the prompt manner in which they discharged their duties.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

D. W. LINDSEY,
Inspector-General Kentucky.

COLONEL MONROE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FORCES DEFENDING FRANKFORT,
FRANKFORT, JUNE 18, 1864. }

Inspector-General D. W. Lindsey:

SIR: I beg leave to submit the following report of the operations during the three days' siege of Frankfort:

In compliance with special orders from Headquarters Kentucky State Guard, of date June ninth, I assumed command of the active forces in and around the city, and proceeded directly to place the city in a position for defence. The following gentlemen were appointed on my staff: Captain J. M. Mills, A. A. A. G. and Chief of Staff; Lieutenants John M. Hewitt, jr., Yoder Brown, and John A. Crittenden, Aides-de-Camp. I instructed Colonel Ed. Keenon, commanding Thirty-sixth regiment enrolled militia, and Lieutenant Denton, commanding Kentucky Scouts, to report to me immediately the available force under their command. The reports were promptly furnished; and I ascertained that my active force, consisting of cavalry and infantry, amounted to only one hundred and eighty-three men. With this force I had to defend the fort, arsenal, bridges, and all the roads leading into

town. Feeling that the situation was a critical one, and determining to resist to the last any attack which should be made and, thinking the fort the better point for resistance, I ordered Colonel Keenon to summon the remainder of his regiment and occupy the fort, with instructions to all detachments who were defending the entrances to the town to fall back upon that point, in case they could not hold their positions. I inspected the fort, and found the ordnance and stores in good condition, but no regular artillery force to man the guns. I then directed Colonel Keenon to furnish Sergeant Johnson, of the Second Maryland infantry, with a force from his command to work the cannon, which being done, I commenced, in order to strengthen the position, the construction of two redoubts, with a line of rifle-pits to protect them, immediately in the rear of the fort—impressing for this purpose about seventy-five negro men. This work, however, the enemy did not allow me to complete, as will be shown hereafter.

After this disposition of the force, I rode to your headquarters to report, and while there received information that the enemy were advancing toward town, upon the Lexington pike, with a force estimated at two hundred. I immediately ordered Lieutenant Denton, of the scouts, to take thirty men, and ascertain the truth of this report. A few moments after the detachment started, I determined to go myself and find out the exact state of the case, as I apprehended great danger from that direction. I asked you to accompany me, which you did; and advancing up the road as far as the cemetery gate, we met the detachment returning, who reported the enemy advancing in large force. We then rallied the detachment, and dismounting a portion of them, sent them with a few infantry pickets, to the old railroad cut on the left, to drive back the force said to be advancing in that direction.

In the meantime you had taken six men and started for the Owenton pike, with the intention of cutting off the force supposed to be in the old railroad cut. I started with the few remaining of the detachment of cavalry toward the toll-gate, and arriving at the old depot on the hill, saw a squad of about twenty rebel cavalry moving on my left flank in direction of the fort. A squad of four men were seen approaching my right from the direction of Mr. Ambrose Dudley's house. Six men and a sergeant were despatched back, down the pike, to the road leading from Mr. Thomas S. Page's farm, to intercept the squad, but they did not attempt to approach the pike.

While watching the movements of the enemy on my left, the firing commenced at the fort, and looking in that direction, I could plainly see the enemy's sharpshooters ascending the knoll in front of the partially-constructed redoubts, in which cannon had been placed. I watched the engagement with feelings never before experienced—knowing that if the fort was taken, the city was doomed. The enemy was doubtless

aware of the force defending the fort, from the manner of assault, and desperation with which it was made. At this juncture, you, with the six men with you, had attempted to ascend the Eastern slope of the hill and reach the fort; but being intercepted by the rapid approach of the enemy, and a long line of abatis in your front, the cavalry were compelled to deploy around the brow of the hill to the left while you dauntlessly pushed your way through the abatis, being closely pursued and fired upon almost to the very gate on the western end of the fort.

Your timely and safe arrival inspired the men with fresh courage and determination, and largely contributed to their success. The artilleryists in charge of the guns at the redoubts alluded to, having no force whatever to support them, after firing one or two rounds, abandoned their position, and the enemy became so elated and emboldened as to press quickly forward across the intervening space toward the fort, making a fierce and daring assault. The result was a severe and quick repulse; every man in the walls standing to his post, and the assailants, meeting with such a steady fire and heroic resistance, retired as hastily as they came. The fighting was renewed at intervals for two hours, when the enemy retired, burning the barracks, situated near the Owenton pike.

The casualties of the assault were two wounded—Major T. J. Hutchinson, and private John Coleman of Thirty-sixth regiment of militia. Neither of the wounds are mortal; and both will soon recover.

While you were thus superintending matters at the fort, I remained on the Lexington pike with my squad of cavalry, determined, if possible, to hold in check any attacking force sufficiently long for the citizens to reach the fort, but, as it was growing dark and the gunners could not see sufficiently plainly, they mistook us for the enemy, opening fire upon us, and landed a couple of shells uncomfortably near. I then withdrew with my men to the arsenal, and, after giving them instructions, joined you at the fort. At midnight thirty men were selected, and dividing into two squads, placing one in charge of Captain Thomas Buford, I went out with the view of ascertaining the fate of the guns in the redoubts, and proceeding cautiously, we found them entirely unmolested in their places, and brought them into the fort. Owing to the vigorous fire the enemy received, and the decided repulse, they retired so hastily as not to even take time to spike them. Thus ended the conflict of Friday, the tenth.

Knowing that the attack would be renewed about daylight, if at all, every preparation was made for it; but daylight came and the old flag waved over us still.

On Saturday morning, as early as five o'clock, the enemy was discovered on the south side of the river, and at six o'clock a flag of truce was seen to approach the wooden bridge. The bearers were met on the other side by Lieutenant Armer and Mr. W. A. Gaines, volunteer Aides-de-

Camp, who blindfolded them, and reported them to Captain Mills, at the north end of the bridge; they were conducted to my headquarters. I repaired thither from the fort, and the rebel officer announced himself as Adjutant Freeman, of Colonel Giltner's Fourth Kentucky Confederate cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Pryor commanding, and verbally demanded the unconditional surrender of the town and forces. Of course I did not recognize this irregular manner, but promptly refusing the demand, directed my staff to escort them out of the lines. Everything remained quiet until eight o'clock, when the enemy were reported in the cemetery, a few of them being visible. I directed Captain Henry Brown, in charge of the gun at the arsenal, to open fire on them, which he did, driving them to safe cover. At nine o'clock a second flag of truce made its appearance in South Frankfort, and Lieutenant Yoder Brown was despatched to receive it, with instruction not to allow the bearers to come across the bridge. In connection with Captain Mills, I rode to headquarters, and Lieutenant Brown presented the following communication:

HEADQUARTERS CONFEDERATE FORCES }
SOUTH FRANKFORT, KY., June 11, 1864. }

*To the Commandant United States Forces,
Frankfort, Ky.:*

SIR: As commander of the Confederate forces on this side of the river, and under instructions from my superior, I demand the *unconditional* surrender of your forces, with this statement, that all will be treated as prisoners of war and private property respected. But, if a useless and stubborn resistance is made, we will not answer for the consequences in an assault.

I am, sir, respectfully,

M. T. PRYOR,

Lieutenant-Colonel, commanding Fourth Kentucky Cavalry.

This demand I referred to you, as I considered it a question of vital interest to the city and State, and which was returned to me with instructions from his Excellency the Governor, that he would not surrender, and that no more white flags must be sent in for the purpose of making such a demand.

Under these instructions I made the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, }
FRANKFORT, KY., June 11, 1864. }

*Lieutenant-Colonel Pryor, Commanding Fourth
Kentucky Confederate Cavalry, South Frankfort,
Ky.:*

SIR: Your note demanding the unconditional surrender of the forces under my command at this place has been received.

In reply, I will say, that I *will not surrender*.

I am, sir, respectfully,

GEO. W. MONROE,

Colonel Twenty-second Kentucky regiment, commanding.

Immediately after this the enemy commenced a sharp and rapid fire of musketry upon our forces stationed at the wooden bridge and the arsenal, which was kept up at intervals during the whole day, as late as five o'clock P. M., when they withdrew, taking the county road to the right of the Louisville pike. Two guns from the fort opened upon them and continued shelling until the enemy had gotten out of sight.

The casualties of the day's fight was one wounded, Mr. John M. Todd, shot in the hand at the bridge.

Apprehending no further danger from that quarter, but rather that the enemy would concentrate and attack again on this side of the river, every preparation was made to give him a warm reception, both at the fort and in town. Sunday morning, however, found all quiet, and being satisfied that the siege was abandoned, our little band was permitted to rest, having for forty-eight hours been vigilant and active at the post of duty. About five o'clock in the afternoon the Ninth Pennsylvania cavalry (Colonel Jordan commanding) arrived, and, reinforced by this fine body of men, made me feel that we were safe.

To you, General, and to our worthy Governor, too much praise cannot be awarded, for your fearless stand at the outset, and your unflinching determination to defend the city; and to your constant supervision of matters throughout must be attributed in a vast degree the success I am now able to report to you. Being at home on furlough, and finding you, once my senior in command of the old Twenty-second Kentucky infantry, as General commanding the State forces, I accepted the position you were pleased to assign me much more willingly than I would have done under different circumstances.

To those citizens of the town and county, especially to the noble boys of Peak's Mill precinct, who promptly responded to the call of the commanding officer in the hour of peril and danger, all honor and praise is due. To the gallant youth of the town (for such they were), who so faithfully discharged the duties assigned them, is due the thanks of every loyal citizen. Never did veteran soldiers conduct themselves more nobly than did the little band that defended the capital.

To Captain Sanford Goins, Sergeant Johnson, Mr. Bayliss, of West Point, Mr. J. B. Gibson, of Cincinnati, and Captain Henry Brown, I am under especial obligations for efficient services in manning the artillery.

To General John H. Harlan acknowledgements are rendered for his exceedingly valuable services on frequent occasions.

To my staff—Captain J. M. Mills, A. A. G.; Lieutenants J. M. Hewitt, Jr., and Yoder Brown, Mr. W. A. Gaines, volunteer Aide, and Lieutenant Ramsey, Seventh Kentucky cavalry—I tender my sincere thanks for the promptness and correct manner with which they delivered

orders entrusted to them, and the willingness displayed by them to face any danger.

I am, General, very respectfully,
GEORGE W. MONROE,
 Colonel Twenty-second Kentucky Infantry,
 Commanding Forces.

Official:

J. M. MILLS,
 Captain, and A. A. A. G.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

FRANKFORT, June 15.

I left Lexington on Thursday last, under the impression that the war was over. This impression was generally shared by the citizens of that place, and on application at the Provost-Marshal's office for a pass to Frankfort, I received the gratifying reply that none was required. Yet, so little was known of "the situation" by the authorities, that Morgan's forces entered the city the night succeeding the very afternoon on which I left. On arriving at Frankfort, to my inexpressible horror and disgust, I found the place in a state of close siege, and the citizens in great excitement.

Frankfort has been repeatedly captured and recaptured during this war, but generally given up without a fight. This time Governor Bramlette didn't see it in that light, although fabulous numbers of rebels under John Morgan, and all the other Morgans, Forrest, Everett, and other noted raiders, with smaller hosts under such lesser lights as Jenkins, Jessie, & al., were reported to be advancing from all possible and impossible directions, and closing in around the devoted town. The plucky Governor swore he'd be—something or other'd—if they should be permitted to enter the capital without a fight, and they were not.

The means of defence, outside of the "melish," did not amount to any considerable sum; but the latter proved a host within themselves. Of soldiers, there were about fifty, including the lame, halt, and blind. Then there was a little fort on Blanton's Hill, mounting several six, twelve, and twenty-four-pounders. So it was manifest that the main dependence must be in the indomitable spirit of the citizens, town and county. Peak's Mill and Bald Knob each sent in a full company of half-tamed tigers—men whose faces indicated good fighting qualities, and whose expertness with the rifle is such that any of them can knock out a squirrel's eye every "pop," from the topmost branch of the tallest white-oak in Kentucky. The town citizens either volunteered, or were impressed into the service, and so the siege began.

Not being altogether satisfied that a successful defence could be made, it was determined to convey the most valuable portion of the State property to Louisville. Accordingly, several million dollars' worth of ordnance stores, together with the State archives, were loaded on to a train, and on Thursday afternoon started down the road. On arriving at North Benson,

the track was found torn up, and a determined attack made upon the train by a party of rebels. The citizen guard made a gallant defence, and, after a spirited skirmish, the train began to back out. Then it was found that for miles in their rear obstructions had been placed at intervals on the track, rendering their return a work of danger and difficulty, the rebels following up and firing, all the way.

Friday, another force of citizens, with a small mounted force of State troops, went down the road, and encountered the rebels in a stockade at North Benson. The cavalry are not reported to have covered themselves with any particular effulgence of glory, but the "melish" charged the stockade determinedly, and drove the rebels out, wounding three of them severely and capturing some horses and prisoners. The prisoners escaped, but the horses were secured. The attacking party lost one man badly wounded—a State soldier—and three prisoners (citizens), who were kept a day or two and released on parole.

On Friday evening, just about sundown, a party of rebels made an audacious attack upon the fort on Blanton's Hill, north of the town. They drove in the pickets near the barracks, on the Owenton road, and captured a six-pounder stationed there, following it up with a determined dash for the fort, as if they meant business. Finding themselves met by a more stubborn defence and a hotter fire of small arms and artillery than they had anticipated, they fell back as rapidly as they had advanced, and in a few moments the light of the burning barracks, fired by the retreating rebels, illuminated the surrounding country. Of those in the fort, a young man named Hutchinson was shot in the mouth, and a man by the name of Coleman in the shoulder. Enemy's loss, if any, unknown.

The females and children of Frankfort passed a tempestuous night. The citizen picket manifested throughout the night the eternal vigilance which is the price of liberty, and a wonderful alacrity in pulling trigger. There was a continual popping at imaginary rebels, and several matronly cows, instead of wooing tired nature's sweet restorer, indulged in nocturnal rambles, with a reprehensible curiosity to see what the d—l was up, and failing to give satisfactory answer to the excited "Who comes there?" of the pickets, fell victims to the feminine vice of wanting to know things.

Saturday morning dawned bright and beautiful, and all serene about the beleaguered city. A glance toward the frowning battlements of the fortress on the hill revealed the gratifying fact that our flag was still there. Not a rebel was in sight, and sanguine temperaments began to indulge in fond hopes that the crisis was over, when suddenly a long, straggling string of horsemen were seen winding around the base of Monroe's Hill, in South Frankfort. The old iron six-pounder at the arsenal, which had been looking savagely up the river toward the cemetery, was slewed around and trained on the

mass, but a doubt as to whether it was composed of friends or foes reserved the fire until a flag of truce, a towel on a ramrod, was seen advancing. It came to the bridge, was blindfolded, and conducted to the Military Board, when, curse their impudence, it transpired that the rebels were anxious to secure an unconditional surrender of the town, in order to prevent the effusion of blood. A young man named Freeman, formerly of this city, was bearer of the flag. He was sent back with a polite reply that a surrender was not to be thought of. Again the flag came back with a renewed demand, and a threat to open on the town immediately. Governor Bramlette told them to go to the d—l. Colonel Monroe said if they sent any more of their "d—d white rags" he would fire on them.

Everybody that could be reached—old and young, rebel and Union, citizen and stranger, (American citizens of African descent alone excepted)—was conscripted. Remonstrance, entreaty and disability were useless. A reluctant citizen of Hebrew extraction, although at the point of death from cramp colic, was led to the slaughter, set to work building a barricade of hay-bales. Rheumatism and diarrhoea and partial paralysis were compelled to shoulder a musket. Obstinacy was tried by some, and came high proving serious. A large party of young gentlemen and ladies, who had been attending an examination at Georgetown Seminary, were stopping at the Capitol Hotel, and indulged freely and musically in sedition Friday night, while the attack was being made on the fort. A young man, with a squad, was sent down to conscript the male portion. They ran, were fired on, and one of the party severely wounded; after which the remainder came up to the defence of their bleeding country with amazing alacrity.

"You are wanted up at the arsenal," was the remark of a sweet-voiced young gentleman, with a carbine in his hand, who tapped me lightly on the shoulder.

"Am I? I was just going there."

"Well, fall in."

I fell in.

Arrived at the arsenal, Adjutant-General Boyle loaned me an Austrian rifle, and presented me with forty rounds of cartridges; so I became, for a limited time, a soldier of the State of Kentucky. The idea was not pleasant. If I had a leg or two shot away, or lost an arm, to whom could I look for a pension?

In the meantime, the fulfilment of the threat to open on the town was anxiously looked for. A force was stationed at the railroad and South Frankfort bridges, and the planks on the latter taken up. The rebels were seen manœuvring about on Monroe's Hill, as if looking out a location for their battery, while a number of sharpshooters scattered among the trees on the hillside, and kept up a spiteful popping at the force stationed at the bridge; while one fellow, who seemed to have a gun of great range, occasion-

ally dropped a bullet among the force around the gun at the arsenal, nearly a mile distant from his position on the hill-side. The fort threw shells and the little iron gun solid shot into the hill, but shelling a dozen sharpshooters with a twenty-four-pound gun proved to be a sinful waste of ammunition. The rebels did not open with their battery, and it soon became evident that they had no battery. Then an attack was looked for from the other side of the town, but it did not come. The fact became apparent that the demonstration of the rebels was mere bravado, and they were not in force enough to make an attack. But they kept it up bravely, shooting Mr. John Todd, printer of the Commonwealth, in the little finger and thumb, a nigger in the heel, and just grazing Mr. Van Winkle, Secretary of State, in the side. As for us, we killed a horse that we know of, with a shell from the fort, and suspect that some of the rebels were wounded. But the rebels effected their damage at a much less pecuniary cost. While the ammunition expended from the fort was a matter of several thousand dollars, the sacrifice of the rebels in that respect was trifling.

About twelve o'clock, becoming satisfied that the affair was not serious, I am afraid I skulked. I sat in a house during the balance of the day, conveniently near the arsenal, so that I could rush to my post, or run, as I thought proper or politic, in case of a real attack, and read "Hard Cash," while my comrades were expending hard lead in firing at impossible ranges. Under the circumstances, I believe I shall claim nothing of the State for my services. If they will say nothing, I will engage to remain silent on the subject of pecuniary compensation.

All day the rebels kept up the farce of besieging the town, sometimes appearing in one quarter, and sometimes in another, and at night disappeared, probably with enhanced ideas of the fighting qualities of the Frankfort militia. Altogether I do not think there could have been more than two hundred of them. Beyond stealing a few horses in the country about, their investment of Frankfort did not prove remunerative.

Sunday evening the Ninth Pennsylvania came in, and the siege was over. Monday morning the militia were drawn up in front of the Capitol Hotel, addressed by General John M. Harlan, and dismissed.

Governor Bramlette and his State officers, Colonel Monroe, and the citizen-soldiers of the town and county, deserve great credit for the pluck manifested in their willingness to fight for the city. They did not know whether they were to be attacked by two hundred or two thousand, but were equally resolved to fight.

I understand that extensive contributions were levied on the flower-gardens about Frankfort, for the purpose of making a magnificent floral wreath with which to encircle the brows of John Morgan. The wreath was made, and was to be presented by the transient young ladies of the Capitol Hotel. The presentation speech was written, memorized and rehearsed,

and I have no doubt every thing would have gone off well but for one thing. Mr. Morgan didn't call; and now, while the dashing horse-thief is making remarkable time out of the State, the wreath is all withered and sere.

An Illinois copperhead, present during the siege, indulged largely in fierce rebel talk, and deserves to be ventilated. His name is B. B. Pepper, and he hails from Springfield. It is hoped the people of Sangamon county will put Mr. Pepper in a box when he returns to them, and keep him at home. The loyal people of Kentucky do not want him, and the rebels despise him.

Doubts have repeatedly been expressed in regard to Governor Bramlette's soundness on the national goose. No one present during the siege of Frankfort can for a moment doubt that the Governor is thoroughly, heartily, and enthusiastically loyal. The rebels and copperheads bear testimony to his loyalty by abusing him heartily.

Several young men who were impressed into the service of the city, and afterward skulked until the danger was over, have been arrested, and are held in durance vile at the Military Board. The young gentlemen are in considerable distress, as they firmly believe they are to be shot.

• Doc. 32.

LETTER OF ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

ON STATE SOVEREIGNTY.*

CRAWFORDSVILLE, GA., September 22, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: You will please excuse me for not answering your letter of the fourteenth instant sooner. I have been absent nearly a week on a visit to my brother in Sparta, who has been quite out of health for some time. Your letter I found here on my return home yesterday. The delay of my reply thus occasioned I regret.

Without further explanation or apology, allow me now to say to you that no person living can possibly feel a more ardent desire for an end to be put to this unnatural and merciless war upon honorable and just terms than I do. But I really do not see that it is in my power or yours, or that of any number of persons in our position, to inaugurate any movement that will even tend to aid in bringing about a result that we and so many more desire.

The movement by our Legislature at its last session, at the suggestion of the Executive, on this subject, was by authority properly constituted for such a purpose.

That movement, in my judgment, was timely, judicious, and in the right direction. Nor has it been without results. The organization of that party at the North to which you refer may justly be claimed as a part of the fruits of it. These, it is to be hoped, will be followed by

* Written in reply to a communication addressed to him by his friends in Georgia, on the subject of which it treats.

others of a more marked character, if all in both sections who sincerely desire peace upon correct terms will give that movement thus inaugurated all the aid in their power.

The resolutions of the Georgia Legislature, at its last session, upon the subject of peace, in my judgment, embodied and set forth very clearly those principles upon which alone there can be permanent peace between the different sections of this extensive, once happy and prosperous, but now distracted country.

Easy and perfect solutions to all present troubles, and those far more grievous ones which loom in prospect, and portentously threaten in the coming future, is nothing more than the simple recognition of the fundamental principle and truth upon which all American constitutional liberty is founded, and upon the maintenance of which alone it can be preserved—that is, the sovereignty, the ultimate, absolute sovereignty, of the States. This doctrine our Legislature announced to the people at the North and to the world. It is the only keynote to peace—permanent, lasting peace—consistent with the security of the public liberty.

The old Confederation was formed upon this principle. The old Union was afterward formed upon this principle. No league can ever be formed or maintained between any State, North or South, securing public liberty, upon any other principle.

The whole framework of American institutions, which in so short a time had won the admiration of the world, and to which we were indebted for such an unparalleled career of prosperity and happiness, was formed upon this principle. All our present troubles sprang from a departure from this principle, from a violation of this essential law of our political organization.

In 1776 our ancestors, and the ancestors of those who are waging this unholy crusade against us, together proclaimed the great and eternal truth for the maintenance of which they jointly pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor, that governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed, and that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of those ends for which it was formed, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and institute a new government, laying its foundations on such principles and organizing its powers in such a form as to them may seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.

It is needless here to state that by "people," and "governed," in this annunciation, is meant communities and bodies of men capable of organizing and maintaining a government, not individual members of society. The consent of the governed refers to the will of the men of the community or State in its organized form, and expressed through its legitimate and properly-constructed organs. It was upon this principle the Colonists stood justified before the world in

affecting their separation from the mother country. It was upon this principle that the original thirteen coequal and co-sovereign States formed the Federal compact of the old Union in 1787. It is upon the same principle that the present coequal and co-sovereign States of our Confederacy formed their new compact of union.

The idea that the old Union or any union between sovereign States, consistently with this fundamental truth, can be maintained by force is preposterous. The war springs from an attempt to do this preposterous thing. Superior power may compel a union of some sort, but it would not be the Union of the old Constitution or of our new. It would be that sort of Union that results from despotism.

The subjugation of the people of the South by the people of the North would necessarily involve the destruction of the Constitution, and the overthrow of their liberties as well as ours. The men or party at the North, to whom you refer, who favor peace, must be brought to a full realization of this truth in all its bearings, before their efforts will result in much practical good. Any peace growing out of a union of States established by force will be as ruinous to them as to us.

The action of the Chicago Convention, so far as its platform of principles goes, presents, as I have said on another occasion, a ray of light, which under Providence, may prove the dawn of the day to this long and cheerless night, the first ray of light I have seen from the North since the war began. This cheers the heart, and toward it I could almost exclaim, "Hail, holy light, offspring of heaven, first born of the eternal coeternal beam. May I express thee unblamed, since God is light."

Indeed, I could have quite so exclaimed, but for the sad reflection that whether it shall bring healing in its beams or be lost in a dark and ominous eclipse ere its good work be done, depends so much upon the action of others who may not regard it and view it as I do. So at best it is but a ray, a small and tremulous ray, though only to gladden the heart and quicken the hope.

The prominent and leading idea of that convention seems to have been a desire to reach a peaceful adjustment of our present difficulties and strife through the medium of a convention of the States. They propose to suspend hostilities, to see what can be done, if anything, by negotiations of some sort. This is one step in the right direction. To such a convention of the States I would have no objection, as a peaceful conference and interchange of views between equal and sovereign powers, just as the convention of 1787 was called and assembled.

The properly constituted authorities at Washington and Richmond, the duly authorized representatives of the two confederacies of States now at war with each other, might give their assent to such a proposition. Good might result from it. It would be an appeal on both sides from the sword to reason and justice. All wars which do not result in the extinction or exter-

mination of one side or the other must be ended sooner or later by some sort of negotiation.

From the discussion or interchange of views in such a convention, the history, as well as the true nature of our institutions and the relation of the States toward each other and toward the federal head, would doubtless be much better understood generally than they now are; but I should favor such a proposition only as a peaceful conference, as the convention of 1787 was. I should be opposed to leaving the questions at issue to the absolute decision of such a body.

Delegates ought to be clothed with power to consult and agree, if they could, upon some plan of adjustment, to be submitted for subsequent ratification by the sovereign States whom it affected, before it should be obligatory or binding, and then binding only on such as should so ratify it. It becomes the people of the South, as well as the people of the North, to be quite as watchful and jealous of their rights, as their common ancestors were.

The maintenance of liberty in all ages, times, and countries, when and where it has existed, has required not only constant vigilance and jealousy, but it has often required the greatest privations, and sufferings, and sacrifices that people or States are ever subjected to. Through such an ordeal we are now passing. Through a like and even severer ordeal our ancestors passed in their struggle for the principles which it has devolved upon us thus to defend and maintain.

But great as our sufferings and sacrifices have been and are, to which you allude, they are as yet far short of the like sufferings and sacrifices which our fathers bore with patience, courage, and fortitude in the crisis that tried men's souls in their day. These are the virtues that sustained them in their hour of need. Their illustrious and glorious example bids us not to underestimate the priceless inheritance they achieved for us at such a cost of treasure and blood.

Great as are the odds we are struggling against, they are not greater than those against which they successfully struggled. In point of reverses, our condition is not to be compared with theirs. Should Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, Augusta, Macon, Montgomery, and even Petersburg and Richmond fall, our condition would not then be worse or less hopeful than theirs was in the darkest hour that rested on their fortunes.

With wisdom on the part of those who control our destiny in the Cabinet, and in the field, in husbanding and properly wielding our resources at their command, and in securing the hearts and affections of the people in the great cause of right and liberty for which we are struggling, we could suffer all these losses, and calamities, and greater even, and still triumph in the end.

At present, however, I do not see, as I stated in the outset, that you or I, or any number of persons in our position, can do anything toward inaugurating any new movement look-

ing to a peaceful solution of the present strife. The war on our part is fairly and entirely defensive in its character. How long it will continue to be thus wickedly and mercilessly waged against us depends upon the people of the North.

Georgia, our own State, to whom we owe allegiance, has with great unanimity proclaimed the principles upon which a just and permanent peace ought to be sought and obtained. The Congress of the Confederate States has followed with an endorsement of these principles. All you and I, and others in our position, therefore, can do on that line at this time, is to sustain the movement already inaugurated, and to the utmost of our ability to hold up these principles as the surest hope of restoring soundness to the public mind of the North, as the brazen serpent was held up for the healing of Israel in the wilderness.

The chief aid and encouragement we can give the peace party at the North is, to keep before them these great fundamental principles and truths, which alone will lead them and us to permanent and lasting peace, with possession and enjoyment of constitutional liberty. With these principles once recognized, the future would take care of itself, and there would be no more war so long as they should be adhered to.

All questions of boundaries, confederacies, and union or unions, would naturally and easily adjust themselves, according to the interests of parties and the exigencies of the times. Herein lies the true law of the balance of power and the harmony of States.

Yours, respectfully,
ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS.

Doc. 33.

VINDICATION OF COLONEL DAHLGREN.

A LETTER FROM HIS FATHER.

UNITED STATES FLAGSHIP PHILADELPHIA, }
CHARLESTON ROADS, July 24, 1864. }

I have patiently and sorrowfully awaited the hour when I should be able to vindicate fully the memory of my gallant son, Colonel Ulric Dahlgren, and lay bare to the world the atrocious imposture of those who, not content with abusing and defacing the remains of the noble boy, have knowingly and persistently endeavored to blemish his spotless name by a forged lie.

That hour has at last come. I have before me a photolitho. copy of the document which the inhuman traitors at Richmond pretend was found upon the body of my son, after he had been basely assassinated by their chivalry at midnight, and who, on the pretext that this paper disclosed an intent to take the lives of the arch-rebel and his counsellors, and to destroy Richmond, have not hesitated to commit and commend the most shocking barbarities on the

remains of the young patriot, and to exult like dastards over his sad fate.

I can now affirm that this document is a forgery—a bare-faced, atrocious forgery—so palpable that the wickedness of the act is only equalled by the recklessness with which it has been perpetrated and adhered to; for the miserable caitiffs did not confine themselves to the general terms of a mere allegation, but published the paper in all the precision of a photographic *fac-simile*, as if not to leave doubt for cavil.

I felt from the first just as if I knew the fact that my son never wrote that paper—that it was a forgery; but I refrained from giving utterance to that faith until I had seen a sample of the infamous counterfeit, and, having seen it, could say, as I now say, that a more fiendish lie never was invented.

For the poor wretches who did the work I have not a word—it was their trade, their daily bread; and they pretended to be no better than they were—hardened ruffians, fit only for a rope. I leave them to the price for which they have bartered their souls. But what doom do they deserve who have instigated the crime that they might profit by it—who devised it that they might justify to the world the gratification of their vengeance on the heroic dead, by desecrating the inanimate body of one whose high and pure purpose was to release the weary captive from the accursed dungeons of Richmond, and who to that end refused not to peril his own life? What shall be awarded to these high-minded and honorable men—the leaders of the chivalry—the impersonation of the high virtues that are supposed to disdain even the semblance of wrong?

And yet these are the criminals who conceived the thought, and, frantic with fear at what might have come to them if that daring young soldier had reached the portals of their bastle and given liberty to the weary captives, vented their cowardly rage on his cold body, and gave their names and their cause for a lie.

It is difficult to imagine such utter baseness in any but the most abandoned felons, and yet it is only of a piece with the entire conduct of the chivalry, leaders, and followers, in all the events that preceded and accompanied the untimely death of Colonel Dahlgren. The forged lie was but the seal to deeds of inhumanity and horror that no one could enact or sanction unless his nature were debased to a level with that of the brute.

It is well known that the cruel usage practised on the Union soldiers who were imprisoned at Richmond had become a theme at the North, and that their release from slow and horrid death was the object of the expedition. My son had just returned from a visit to me off Charleston when he learned of the project. Every one was aware that he had lost a leg by a wound received in a charge through Hagerstown, pending the battle of Gettysburg, and the consequent illness nearly cost him his life.

The vigor of his frame had carried him through the crisis, but the wound was not perfectly healed; he was still weak and could only move on crutches.

No sooner was he apprised of what was contemplated, than he sought to join the enterprise. The remembrance of comrades pining in loathsome dungeons—of men with whom he had ridden side by side amid the deadly conflict, and a strong conviction of their sufferings animating every pulse of his gallant heart, he felt that duty called him there, and the reluctant consent of the authorities was at last yielded to his earnest entreaties.

It is not my purpose here to narrate the whole course of this noble enterprise; that will be the duty of a future day; but no one had seen Colonel Dahlgren in his full vigor sit his charger more gracefully or better endure the incessant and multiplied hardships of that ride, by day and by night, in shine and storm.

The failure of his column to connect with that of General Kilpatrick led to the failure of the expedition and the death of as noble a soldier as ever gave life to a great cause.

On Tuesday night, March first, after dark, Colonel Dahlgren was close to Richmond, and came in contact with the rebel infantry stationed at the outer works. At such a time of peril, far away from help of any kind, with a small force of cavalry, hardly a gunshot from the stronghold of rebeldom, the splendid courage of the young leader never blazed more brightly. An officer who was nearest to him, but who had never served with him before, writes in admiration of the perfect self-possession with which he rode in front of the line, and spoke to his men under a storm of bullets. Then came the charge, scattering the rebels like chaff.

This done, it only remained to ride on from Richmond and endeavor to gain the Union lines below. The night was dark, the rain fell in torrents, and the cloaks of the men were stiffened with sleet, but the column spurred on at full speed. Sad to say, the advance, with Colonel Dahlgren, became separated from the main body, and at dawn of Wednesday he found himself, with a little party of seventy men, in the very midst of a hostile country.

Still holding on the swift tenor of his way, he crossed the Pamunkey and reached the Matapony not long after noon. The men and horses had been crossed over the river, the few videttes had been called down from their posts and also sent across, Colonel Dahlgren remaining alone on the southern bank. The chivalry had now gathered in the bushes, and deliberately opened fire on him, though they saw plainly that he was crippled by the loss of a leg and only stood erect by aid of the crutches on which he leaned; the waters of the river separated him from every helping hand, and it were easy for a strong and resolute man to rush forward and bear away by main force the enfeebled frame of the weary officer. But any manly

deed was a flight far above what the chivalry contemplated; they could assassinate him from the ambush, because it attained their base purpose without risk to their own craven carcasses. In utter scorn of such abject fear Colonel Dahlgren bid them come out from their hiding-places and discharged his pistol at them defiantly.

The contrast thus presented might well inspire the pencil of the artist.

But the young warrior was not to close his glorious career there; the ferry-boat bore him over unharmed; he mounted, and once more led his band onward. It was at this time, by their own accounts, that the chivalry had an opportunity of numbering exactly the force that was with him, and ascertained that this remnant did not exceed seventy men. So they contrived to collect various scattered parties from the neighborhood until they mustered three or four times the force of our retreating cavalry. Even with this advantage the miserable creatures dare not offer Colonel Dahlgren a fair field in open day. There were those of them who knew him—the gallant Ninth Virginia—had faced him in Fredericksburg with quite as great a superiority of numbers, and had been driven in every direction until they skulked out of the town like whipped curs. So they confederated in force where the road wound through a deep forest, and awaited the coming of the Union troop.

This happened about midnight, and repeated volleys from these miscreants did their work all too well.

The gallant youth fell, pierced by many balls at the head of his men, and even while his brave spirit still lingered about its shattered tenement, the chivalry began to strip off his clothing. Whether this detestable purpose was accomplished before he was dead I know not, nor whether the infamous wretches paused to make sure that life was extinct before they severed a finger from his hand in order to secure a ring given by a departed sister, and dearly prized by the heart that now is as still as her own.

It was not until daylight disclosed the utter helplessness of the survivors, that the victors took heart of grace and consummated their brave deed by marching the wearied and famished troopers along the road, regardless of the fact that this led them by the body of their young chief, just as it lay, stripped and covered with mud, but yet honored by the sad tokens which it exhibited of love and loyalty to the cause of his country. The absent limb told of recent battle-fields, and the breathless body gave assurance that the last sacrifice had been made. The young life, rich in promise, had been laid down, and thus was redeemed the solemn oath of fealty to the Union.

No respect for the well-known gallantry of their victim, no feeling for his extreme youth, entered into the thoughts of these atrocious ruffians, and only when satiated with the mournful

sight were the relics of the noble dead permitted such sepulture as a hasty grave could afford.

Be it remembered that to this time nothing was known of the forged document. But presently it came to the upper chivalry at Richmond that one of the leaders of the expedition had fallen. Frenzied with terror at the possible consequences of the success of the undertaking—for they had every reason to dread that the vengeance of the released prisoners would respect no person—they sought a pretext for the meditated villany on the body of Colonel Dahlgren in a forgery which they thought would extenuate all disregard of every dictate of manhood and humanity.

So they forged the lie and gave it currency in all the minuteness of a seeming *fac-simile*, while the original counterfeit was so recklessly executed that the shameful deceit could not fail to be apparent to any one having the least knowledge of Colonel Dahlgren's handwriting.

So the remains of the heroic dead were torn from the grave, conveyed to Richmond, and there exposed to the taunts and gaze of a mob; then hurried away, in the obscurity of the night, to some shameless spot, whence it was intended they should never be recovered.

There was an ingenuity in this contrived villany from which the mind recoils with horror.

Contrast the high and holy purpose of the Union soldier—his devotion to it, even to death; his calm, undaunted courage, graced by every milder virtue; his kindly hospitality to the captive rebel officer, so illy requited; contrast these with the craven cowardice of the ruffians who beset him and did midnight murder; their brutal desecration of his body; and worse than these, the crimes of the higher chivalry, who made war on the dead as such could only wage. Contrast these, and say if it were not happier to die as did Ulric Dahlgren—so true, so gentle, and so brave—than to live as those do who, to destroy his fair name, have justified and exulted in his assassination, and forged a lie, to their eternal infamy.

It was not only in the dark hours of closing life that Colonel Dahlgren's admirable qualities were exhibited; his whole life was ennobled by the presence of every trait that can adorn humanity.

He had completed the first year of his manhood when he was so basely assassinated; yet by his bravery and devotion on many a battlefield, he had won the high, but well-deserved, rank of Colonel of Cavalry. That commission was transmitted with the following letter:

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1862.

DEAR SIR: Enclosed you have a commission for Colonel, without having passed through the intermediate grade of Major. Your gallant and meritorious service has, I think, entitled you to this distinction, although it is a departure from general usage, which is only justified by distinguished merit such as yours. I hope you may

speedily recover, and it will rejoice me to be the instrument of your future advancement in the service.

With great regard,
I am yours truly,
EDWIN M. STANTON.

Colonel ULRIC DAHLGREN.

He was tall, well-built, and graceful; his frame gave every promise of future strength, but as yet lacked the development of the matured man, and was divested of all spare flesh by a life of constant activity in the saddle.

To the casual observer he appeared like a very young and very diffident man—gentle and unobtrusive, a moderate talker, and always of pleasant mood; but beneath lay a character of the firmest mould, a constancy of purpose never to be diverted from its object, courage that was never disturbed by any danger, impulses of the purest nature habitually in exercise, producing a course of life unblemished by the least meanness—a good son, a warm friend, dutiful alike to God and man. I can now look back over the whole of his young life, and declare that in no instance did he ever fail in the most respectful obedience to my least wish. A more perfect and lovely character I cannot conceive.

His mind was of no common order, and he had been carefully educated. He was well-read in classics, a good mathematician, and expert with the pencil. He delighted in all manly exercises, was an excellent swimmer, and, as a horseman, not surpassed, but was a bold, practised and elegant rider.

As a soldier his conception was quick, his judgment deliberate, but in execution rapid as lightning. No one would recognize him as the unobtrusive, retiring youth he might have passed in a throng. Having spent so much of his leisure time with me in the Ordnance Department, he had a rare knowledge of gunnery, which was often turned to good account in the field.

His courage was not of that rampant character so troublesome to friend as well as foe, but came forth instantly at the first sign of danger.

To these qualities he added a deep sense of religious obligation, having been carefully trained by a departed mother to the church and to the Sunday-school. But in this, as in many other respects, he was not demonstrative.

When apparently at the verge of death from a wound, and reminded of the danger, he smiled, and said that he had never gone into battle without asking forgiveness of his sins and commending his soul to his Maker.

And so passed away this young life, so radiant in promise.

Nor is it only a father's love and affection that prompts such praise, as the many who knew him will confirm.

Full testimony has been borne to his record in the school from which he had withdrawn but a few years before, and from the pulpit of the

church where he had been an attentive listener for successive Sabbaths.

The large number of letters which I have received from those who knew him or have heard his story assure me that my son appeared to others as he appeared to me. Among the latest received is one sent me for perusal, from an entire stranger, who writes thus:

* * * The lamented young Dahlgren, with whom it had been our pleasure to form a brief, but most agreeable acquaintance. This was while he was in the city, recovering from the amputation of his limb. We first met him at ——. He was present upon his crutches, and received marked attention both from military and civilians. The news of his cruel death produced in us a feeling of unmingled sadness—the more so, perhaps, from the vivid impression left on us by meeting him just before he went last to the field and entered upon his fatal expedition. It was at one of Speaker Colfax's receptions where we had a long and agreeable conversation with him, and had the pleasure of introducing quite a number of our friends, and I know that his gentleness and modest deportment, joined to that moral heroism that seemed to pervade his whole spirit, will not soon be forgotten by those who conversed with him. Some who heard the elaborate and wonderful sermon of Dr. Sunderland on his death, but who had never met him, were ready to say that the character drawn by the Doctor was that of a very remarkable young man. To some of these it was my privilege to say that the picture drawn of him was a true one. My wife has often referred to his conversation at Colfax's. His whole soul seemed to be patriotically absorbed in the struggle of his country. His conversation with every one, however commenced, would soon be turned to the great conflict in which our beloved country is engaged for the maintenance of its government against the determined efforts of wicked men to destroy it. To a number of young ladies that were introduced to him he said, in a pleasant but earnest manner—"Ladies, you ought to encourage the young men to enlist in the Union army, and fight for our country. It is their duty, and ought to be a privilege to be engaged in such a cause, and if they should fall, it would be in a holy cause. No one should consider his life too dear to lay it down, if need be, for our glorious Union and country." These were the sentiments, and as near as I can remember, the language used by him. There seemed a wonderful earnestness and almost inspiration about him in reference to our country. He felt that it was glorious to die for one's country. To all it is a subject of deep sorrow that one so promising and so fully imbued with genuine patriotism should thus early in life be cut down in such a ruthless manner.

Thus he appeared in the social circle. Another letter shows him in the perilous hours of the expedition that preceded his death—from an officer who was near him at the time.

His playful, pleasant smile ever cheered and inspired his companions. Good nature and firmness seemed in him most pleasantly blended, and as I rode beside him it was with the greatest pleasure that I watched his face, and with every glance gained new trust. (The column was now near Richmond.) We advanced, and as night came on we met the enemy; the skirmishing was heavy; the enemy's fire very annoying; but I stopped in admiration of the Colonel's coolness. He rode along the line, speaking to the men, so calm, so quiet, so brave, that it seemed to me the veriest coward must needs fight if never before.

When he gave the order to retire, he detailed our regiment for rear guard and placed me in charge with orders to keep well closed up, but not to let the enemy drive me on the column. He then rode ahead. In the darkness the column became divided, etc.

The last letter he ever wrote was to myself. It was from the camp, just before putting foot in stirrup, and about to set out on the last of a brilliant and eventful career. He directed that it should only be given to me in the event of his not returning. He speaks of the enterprise as "glorious, and that he would be ashamed to show his face again if he failed to go in it." He expressed himself as fully sensible of the danger, and concluded thus: "If we do not return, there is no better place to give up the ghost."

Such was the brave and generous spirit whose light has been quenched forever. That of itself might have sufficed to sate the vengeance even of traitors. The shocking cruelty which has been exhibited to his inanimate body, and the perpetration of forgery to justify it, will, in the end, recoil on the infamous ruffians.

To the gallant young soldier it has been as nothing. He had passed away to his final account, leaving behind him a name far beyond the reach of the chivalry. There are those left, however, whose pride and pleasure it will be to vindicate his fair fame, and he will be remembered as a young patriot of spotless life and purest purpose; honest, true and gentle, dutiful to every obligation, unselfish and generous to a fault; an undaunted soldier of the Union, who never struck a blow except at an armed enemy, but carefully and kindly respected the claims of defenceless women and children; an accomplished gentleman, a sincere Christian, a faithful comrade, who, not recovered from the almost fatal illness consequent on losing a limb in battle, went forth to brave every hardship in the hope of aiding in the release of our captive soldiers from the dungeons of a merciless enemy, who for this treated his dead body with savage ferocity, and hesitated not to forge his name.

Peace to his ashes, wherever they rest; the laurels on the young and fair brow of Ulric Dahlgren will never fade while there are true men and women in the land to keep them green.

JOHN A. DAHLGREN,

Rear-Admiral, commanding United States South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

Doc. 34.

RECRUITING IN THE REBEL STATES.

GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, GA., July 30, 1864. }*John A. Spooner, Esq., Agent for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Nashville, Tenn.*

SIR: Yours from Chattanooga, July twentieth, is received, notifying me of your appointment by your State as Lieutenant-Colonel and Provost-Marshal of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, under the act of Congress, approved July 4, 1864, to recruit volunteers to be credited to the States respectively.

On applying to General Webster, at Nashville, he will grant you a pass through our lines to those States, and, as I have had considerable experience in those States, would suggest recruiting depots to be established at Macon and Columbus, Mississippi; Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile, Alabama; and Columbus, Milledgeville, and Savannah, Georgia.

I do not see that the law restricts you to black recruits, but you are at liberty to collect white recruits also. It is waste of time and money to open rendezvous in North-west Georgia, for I assure you I have not seen an able-bodied man, black or white, there, fit for a soldier, who was not in this army or the one opposed to it.

You speak of the impression going abroad that I am opposed to the organization of colored regiments.

My opinions are usually very positive, and there is no reason why you should not know them.

Though entertaining profound reverence for our Congress, I do doubt their wisdom in the passage of this law:

1. Because civilian agents about an army are a nuisance.
2. The duty of citizens to fight for their country is too sacred a one to be peddled off by buying up the refuse of other States.
3. It is unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers who are fighting, as those who compose this army do, to place them on a par with the class of recruits you are after.
4. The negro is in a transition state, and is not the equal of the white man.
5. He is liberated from his bondage by act of war; and the armies in the field are entitled to all his assistance in labor and fighting, in addition to the proper quotas of the States.
6. This bidding and bartering for recruits, white and black, has delayed the reinforcement of our armies at the times when such reinforcements would have enabled us to make our successes permanent.
7. The law is an experiment which, pending war, is unwise and unsafe, and has delayed the universal draft which I firmly believe will become necessary to overcome the widespread resistance offered us; and I also believe the

universal draft will be wise and beneficial; for under the Providence of God it will separate the sheep from the goats, and demonstrate what citizens will fight for their country, and what will only talk.

No one will infer from this that I am not a friend of the negro as well as the white race; I contend that the treason and rebellion of the master freed the slave, and the armies I have commanded have conducted to safe points more negroes than those of any General officer in the army; but I prefer negroes for pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants, others gradually to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning with the duties of local garrison, such as we had at Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Nashville, and Chattanooga; but I would not draw on the poor race for too large a proportion of its active, athletic young men, for some must remain to seek new homes and provide for the old and young—the feeble and helpless.

These are some of my peculiar notions, but I assure you they are shared by a large proportion of our fighting men.

You may show this to the agents of the other States in the same business as yourself.

I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

Official copy:

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

Doc. 35.

GENERAL DENNIS' EXPEDITION.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTY-SIXTH ILLINOIS VOLUNTEER INFANTRY, }
VICKSBURG, MISS., July 13. }

I send a brief description of the expedition to Jackson, Mississippi, which left this city on the morning of the first instant, and returned on the evening of the ninth instant, under command of Brigadier-General E. S. Dennis, commander of the First division of the Seventeenth Army Corps, and a complete list of the losses in different companies during the engagement on the morning of the seventh instant, at a point some three miles west of Jackson, known as "Cross-roads," or rather where the Canton road intersects the main Jackson road.

On the evening of June thirtieth, orders were received at the headquarters of the different regiments composing the force to make the necessary arrangements for a move the next morning at two o'clock; and when the specified time arrived, everything was in readiness, and a start effected. Although the day was exceedingly warm and dusty, we marched to Big Black river, where we went in camp for the night, with the expectation of resuming our journey at an early hour next morning; but not so.

Morning came, but no orders, in consequence of which we lay in camp all day and the second night, our delay being to await the construction

of the pontoon bridge over the river, and to attend to the drawing of rations and forage; but early on the morning of the third instant we took our position in ranks, and "marched, slowly on" until we arrived at Champion Hills, a place which will long be remembered by friends of many brave men who now lie in sweet repose, filling the graves of true soldiers, who have fallen battling for their country's rights and the protection of their old emblem and protector, the Stars and Stripes, under which they have won many hard-fought battles. Here we went into camp, to spend another night under the grand canopy of Heaven.

Next morning we moved by the "break of day," and made fine progress, it having rained the night previous, which tended to recreate and enliven our little army, as it had been very warm and dusty the preceding three days; and at two o'clock p. m. we were encamped in the suburbs of Clinton, a small town on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad. Here we had made ample arrangements for doing our rations justice, when the advance, a detachment of cavalry, was attacked, and a general move was the result. Eatables of every description, which had been served in the most luxuriant style, were put aside, and a line of battle formed, but to no avail, as the enemy retreated upon our making arrangements to meet them; consequently we retired, spending the balance of our hours of rest in peace.

Morning came, and we advanced as per orders, at seven o'clock, but proceeded only a short distance when this regiment was ordered to the rear, the train having been attacked by a squad of rebel cavalry, and for the remainder of the day we acted in the capacity of rear guard, but did not encounter any enemy, they having gone to their advance to support a battery which was operating against our front. After one o'clock the enemy fell back in the direction of Canton, learning that Colonel Coates' Second brigade, First division, would effect a flank movement on them.

Previous to our entering Jackson a flag of truce was sent out by the citizens with a request that we should not shell the city, reporting no enemy there, so we marched through their once prosperous but now desolate capital, with banners flying, filling the air with the melodious sounds of martial music, amidst the prolonged cheers of the men, and arrived at the river on the southeast of the city, where we went in camp.

Here we remained until four o'clock next day, when the bugle was sounded to depart, the direction or destination being unknown to any but the commanders, and in a few moments all were on the move in the direction of what was termed "home," but alas! we proceeded but a short distance, the Seventy-sixth infantry, being in the advance, when we came to a "halt." Artillery was now put in position, cavalry thrown out as skirmishers, and the lines established by the infantry—everything in position, and the ball

opened. Heavy firing from both sides was kept up until the shades of darkness set in, when both armies retired, our men taking position and lying on their arms until the coming morn, and long ere the sun ascended from behind the hills of the far distant east, the skirmishing commenced. Heavy firing, both from artillery and musketry, was kept up continually until seven o'clock, neither party seeming to gain any advantage, until finally the Second brigade, of the gallant old Fourth division were ordered to advance, the Seventy-sixth Illinois infantry in front as skirmishers, and the Forty-sixth Illinois infantry as a support. And advance they did until the entire line was within some seventy-five yards from the enemy, who lay in one position, which they had established the previous evening, under cover, lying in the edge of a body of heavy timber, while, on the contrary, our lines were exposed to their whole fire, being in an open field which inclined toward them. In this position these two regiments lay for five hours, until the entire train had passed, without the loss of a wagon, and it has been ascertained that this command saved all from destruction by their gallantry and desperate fighting. Too much credit and praise cannot be attributed to the officers and men, and permit us to say that no braver ever entered the field of battle. Strange as it may seem, the Seventy-ninth did not lose an officer, and had twenty-one on the field, but lost about one hundred men out of three hundred and seventy-five. Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Jones had his horse shot four times while riding along the lines, the last shot proving fatal, but he never retired from the field, although his leg was somewhat fractured by the falling of his horse.

After continued fighting for five hours, orders came to fall back, and it was with the greatest difficulty that this regiment escaped capture, as they were compelled to leave all the dead and seriously wounded on the field, being obliged to crawl some two hundred yards under a heavy and galling fire, after which they re-formed the line and crossed a large opening some two miles in width, under a constant fire of grape, canister, and musketry, when we rejoined our command in good order, receiving the compliments of the General and his staff, who had given us up as lost.

After leaving the field of action we moved in the direction of the train, but were harassed in the rear by the cavalry of the enemy, who made three unsuccessful charges on a section of Bolton's Chicago battery, but were successfully repulsed on each occasion, with a comparatively small loss on our side, but heavy on the enemy's, the battery pouring a murderous fire of grape, canister, and shell into their ranks as they advanced, with the Eleventh Illinois infantry as a support, who at no time were idle. After this repulse we had no more serious trouble, but still an attack was hourly expected on the train, which at this time was perfectly safe.

In this manner we reached Baker's Creek, about one and a half miles east of Champion Hills, where we camped for the night, after a hard day's work, the men and animals being completely fatigued and worn out, having been destitute of any food of importance for the past day, and the heat being very oppressive, in consequence of which there were several cases of sunstroke, one of which proved fatal. Time rolled on, and by four o'clock the next morning our noble little band could be seen wending their way in the direction of Black River, where we arrived in the evening, after a long and arduous march, at which place we lay until four o'clock on the afternoon of the ninth instant, when our last day's march began, and by the dead hour of midnight we were once more within the walls of this ill-fated city.

Suffice it to say, that it is thought by all parties interested, that we achieved everything anticipated, having drawn forces from an important point of the enemy's, thereby gaining advantages in other sources and by destroying a bridge over Pearl River, at Jackson, which was partially completed. Still, the general supposition is that it was not the intention of General Dennis to engage the enemy as he did, knowing their forces outnumbered ours, having some three thousand five hundred cavalry and mounted infantry, while our entire force of effective men did not exceed two thousand, but to attract their attention so that our train could be put past danger.

I must not close without speaking of our noble brigade commander, Colonel Dorublazer, Forty-sixth Illinois infantry, his staff, Colonel Busey, commanding seventy-sixth, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, commanding forty-sixth, who at all times were to be found with their commands in the discharge of their duties. Also to the minor officers of the brigade, who can be numbered only among the best, and as an honor to the service of the United States. Long may they survive among the "roaring cannon and clashing of arms," is the prayer of many a noble heart under their commands, and may their heads be crowned with laurels ere this "cruel war is over."

Doc. 36.

GENERAL ROUSSEAU'S EXPEDITION.

NASHVILLE, TENN., July 27, 1864.

A raid upon the rear of Johnston's army, and the cutting of his line of communication, having been decided upon by General Sherman, the important duty of carrying it out was intrusted to Major-General Rousseau. The preparatory orders to him were issued about the first of July, and the command was to be organized out of such materials as were at hand. Several regiments of cavalry in his district, which would necessarily form a part, were only partly mounted, and were scattered at different points along the railroad. They were, however, gath-

ered together and sent as promptly as possible to Decatur, Alabama, from which point the expedition was to start.

The command was divided into two brigades—the First commanded by Colonel T. J. Harrison, Eighth Indiana; and the Second by Colonel Hamilton, Ninth Ohio, composed as follows:

First Brigade.—Eighth Indiana cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Jones; Eighth Iowa cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel M. T. Patrick; Second Kentucky cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Watts.

Second Brigade.—Ninth Ohio cavalry, Captain —; Fourth Tennessee cavalry, Major Stevens; and two guns of Battery E, First Michigan artillery, Lieutenant Wightman.

General Rousseau reached Decatur on the ninth of July, and in the evening of the same day, the last detachments of the different regiments which were to compose the command also arrived, and preparations were made for starting the next day.

Sunday, the tenth, was a busy day in camp; anything but a Sabbath-like stillness prevailed. In the morning horses were issued to regiments yet in need of them—tents, extra clothing, and other articles not necessary for the trip were packed up to be left behind, and the bustle of preparation was visible in every quarter. No vehicles were to be taken except five ambulances for the transportation of the sick and wounded. The whole command was put in light marching order, so as to move with celerity, the necessary articles, such as ammunition, axes, etc., being transported on pack-mules. The men were not allowed to carry any extra clothing except a shirt and pair of socks for a change; even blankets were to be left behind. Everything betokened that the movement was one that required rapidity of execution. Fifteen days' rations of salt, coffee, and sugar, five of hard bread, and one of bacon, were issued to the men, and carried in their haversacks. Subsistence for the rest of the trip was to be obtained in the country to be traversed by the command. To provide against lameness of the horses from loss of shoes, each man carried with him two shoes, fitted for his horse, and nails sufficient for fastening them.

In the afternoon everything was ready, the bugles sounded "forward," and the command moved out. What point it was to strike for, few, if any, knew, except its commander and General Sherman, who had intrusted to him the important enterprise. All, however, felt that the expedition was of more than ordinary importance, and that it was intended to penetrate farther into the interior of the Confederacy than any similar expedition had reached. Hazardous it might be, but there was a smack of daring and dash about it, which was captivating, and gave to officers and men an inspiring feeling different from that of an ordinary march. Entire confidence too was felt in the gallant leader of the command, and the able and far-seeing General who had intrusted him with it.

Starting out in a southeasterly direction, the expedition took the road toward Somerville, a county seat, fifteen miles from Decatur. The road crosses Flint river seven miles out, and passes over a country generally of flat surface. Somerville was reached about nine o'clock at night, and the command bivouacked until morning. A forage train accompanied it this far with corn for the horses—the wagons returning to Decatur next day. Henceforward the horses were to take the chances of such forage as the country afforded along the route.

July 11th.—The expedition was now fairly started in the enemy's country, and, judging from the rations issued, was not likely to return to our own lines in less than two weeks. The direction pursued was about the same as before—southeast. The distance marched was about thirty miles, and in the evening the command bivouacked on Sand Mountain, the dividing ridge which separates the waters flowing into the Tennessee river from those flowing into the Gulf of Mexico. The country was generally poor, and afforded but a scanty supply of forage for the horses.

July 12th.—Descending Sand Mountain in the morning, the expedition forded Black Warrior river, a tributary of the Tombigbee, and at ten o'clock reached Blountsville, the county seat of Blount county.

In the jail here were found two deserters from Johnston's army and four negroes, charged with the crime of seeking their liberty. All were released. A prisoner charged with murder was in confinement in the same jail, and was left to await his trial at the hands of the civil authorities. Beyond Blountsville the road crosses Strait Mountain, the descent of which is remarkably steep and rugged, but was passed without accident, and the command halted for the night in a fertile valley, where a good supply of oats was obtained for the horses. On this day's march the first armed rebels were met, a small party of them having fired on the advance guard on the mountain and then fled. Their shots were ineffective.

A regiment was sent forward in the night to Ashville, five miles, to secure any supplies the rebels might have at that point. A sufficient quantity of corn for the horses was obtained, and also a quantity of flour and bacon.

July 13th.—The command marched into Ashville in the morning, and remained for several hours, getting the horses completely shod up. All places of business were closed, and a number of the citizens had fled in terror at the approach of the dreaded Yankees. The printing office of the county paper (the "Ashville Vidette,") was deserted by the proprietors and printers, leaving the forms on the press, the edition being partly worked off. The paper contained Vallandigham's speech at Hamilton, Ohio, and in an editorial article eulogized Val. as a "gifted statesman, orator, and patriotic exile." The Editor further shows the follow-

ing, looking to the peace party of the North for aid in sustaining the rebellion:

"It is our desire to see the names of Fernando Wood and C. L. Vallandigham, or some of their co-laborers, placed upon the ticket of that party at the Chicago convention, for President and Vice-President of the United States, supported by such men as Long and Harris; and just in proportion to the support they receive will the North exhibit signs of returning reason and humanity. If they are elected we expect to have peace, independence, and constitutional liberty."

Several printers were detailed and sent to the office, and the press was soon put to a use never anticipated by its owner—printing orders and blanks for a Yankee command. The printers also amused themselves by taking out a column of secession stuff from the form of the "Vidette," and inserting a short editorial, changing the tone of the paper, and also some items encouraging the arrival of General Rousseau's command. A few copies of the new edition were worked off before the command again took up the line of march.

Here a change was made in the organization of the brigades. The Ninth Ohio being without a field officer, and having an inadequate number of line officers, Colonel Hamilton took command of his regiment, which was placed in the First brigade, while the Fifth Iowa, Fourth Tennessee, and the battery were made to comprise the Second brigade, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, of the Fifth Iowa.

In the afternoon the march was continued over a rough, barren country, and in the evening the expedition reached the Coosa river at Greenport. Here it was expected that the rebels would attempt to delay us, if they could gather any force, as news of our approach had been no doubt sent forward. None were to be seen when the bank of the river was reached. The ferryboat was on the opposite side, and was gained possession of by a party swimming over. General Rousseau at once ordered a detachment of three hundred men to be crossed to hold the ferry, and in the night the artillery was also ferried over, to prevent delay in the morning.

Here the Fifth Iowa performed the sad duty of interring the remains of one of its most efficient officers—Captain William Curl. The regiment was in the rear, and Captain Curl and Captain Wilcox, of the same regiment, were riding together a little separated from their companies, when they were fired upon by six men, who had concealed themselves in the bushes by the roadside. The rebels demanded their surrender before firing, but both officers attempted to escape, when they were fired on from the rear, and Captain Curl instantly killed. Captain Wilcox was severely, but not dangerously, wounded—eight buckshot having penetrated his thigh.

An inspection of the command was made,

and a number of horses found in unfit condition for the trip. All men who from sickness or other causes were not likely to endure the hardships of the march were also called out and sent with the disabled horses to make their way to Gunter'sville, on the Tennessee river, about forty miles distant. An ambulance was also sent to convey Captain Wilcox and others disabled. They subsequently arrived safely within our lines.

July 14th.—At daylight the column was in motion, preparing to cross the river. At the ferry the Coosa is a deep stream about three hundred yards wide, with but little current. Four miles further down, at Ten Islands, it spreads out to a greater width and is fordable. The detachment under command of Major Graham, of the Eighth Indiana, which had crossed at the ferry, was ordered to move down the east side to cover the ford, whilst the main column proceeded down the west side to cross at the fording.

Major Graham met the enemy immediately after leaving the ferry, and a lively skirmishing at once commenced. The rebels were strongly posted in the woods commanding the road. Skirmishers were thrown out, and the rebels were found to be in considerable force and in a position to delay the advance of a small party. They were, however, pressed back slowly by our skirmishers. Meanwhile the main column reached the fording, and the head of it (the Fifth Iowa in advance) commenced crossing. On emerging from between two islands, and having yet a width of three hundred yards to cross, it was met by a heavy fire from the rebels strongly posted behind rocks and trees on the bank. To attempt to force a passage would have been to incur a heavy loss, and the advance withdrew behind an island, under cover of which they replied vigorously to the rebels' fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick also placed the Fourth Tennessee on a larger island, below and in the rear of the first named, and the men of that regiment and of the Fifth Iowa, were deployed as sharpshooters, and from behind trees exchanged shots with the rebels who were similarly posted on the bank. Two companies were sent to look for a ford reported to be two miles down the river, but failed to find it. A detachment of one hundred men was sent across the ferry to reinforce Major Graham, to enable him to drive the rebels from his front and attack in the rear those posted at the ford. Colonel Jones, of the Eighth Indiana, was afterwards sent with the rest of the regiment for the same purpose, but the work was finally accomplished by Major Graham before his arrival. While the main column was thus delayed at the river, a fordable place was found about a mile below, and General Rousseau was about throwing a detachment across, when the rebels suddenly disappeared from the flank, Major Graham having succeeded in driving them from his front and the ford, killing some fifteen of them

(two of whom were officers, one of them being General Clanton's Assistant Adjutant-General), wounding about forty, and capturing several prisoners, among whom were Lieutenant-Colonel Lary and Major McWhorter, of the Sixth Alabama cavalry. The force opposed to us proved to be part of the Sixth and Eighth Alabama cavalry, with militia and such other troops as could be hastily got together, and was commanded by Brigadier-General Clanton. But one man was injured on the Federal side, and he was wounded by a comrade, who mistook him for a rebel.

The ford being clear, the column commenced crossing. The passage of the river was a beautiful sight. The long array of horsemen winding between the green islands and taking a serpentine course across the ford—their arms flashing back the rays of the burning sun, and guidons gaily fluttering along the column, formed a bright picture, recalling the days of romance, and contrasting strongly with the stern hardships and vivid realities of the every-day life on the duty march.

This ford is one crossed by General Jackson during his campaign against the Creek Indians.

Without further delay, the march was resumed. The day was very hot and intolerably dusty. A few miles from the river we reached an iron furnace which was being operated for the rebel authorities. It was thoroughly destroyed by General Rousseau's orders. After a march of fifteen miles a halt was made for about two hours to feed and rest. The heat of the day was very trying, particularly upon the artillery horses, and finding that to retain both guns would impede the march and prevent that rapidity of movement which was essential to the success of the expedition, General Rousseau promptly decided to destroy one and attach the extra horses to the other, so that it could be moved along at the same gait the cavalry marched. It was speedily dismounted—the trunions broken off and the carriage destroyed. The night was cool and pleasant, and the moon shone brightly: The march was continued until midnight, when the command halted at Estehawba, twenty-five miles from the Coosa. The country traversed was more fertile and better improved than any reached previously.

July 15th.—At daylight the men were again in their saddles and on the road. Passing many large farms, with good fields of corn, wheat, and oats, we reached Talladega (sixteen miles) about ten o'clock. Here we struck a railroad extending from Selma in a northeast direction, originally intended to connect with Rome, Georgia, but only completed to Blue Mountain, a few miles north of Talladega. The road has no special importance in reference to present military operations. A small rebel force left Talladega a few hours before our approach, and moved down the railroad to the bridge over the Coosa river, our coming having been heard of, and the destruction of that bridge being supposed by them to be one of the objects of the expedition.

They were unable, however, to remove their commissary stores and other supplies, which fell into our hands. About one hundred thousand rations of sugar and salt, and twenty thousand rations of flour and bacon, and a number of boxes of tobacco, were taken—the command supplied with what they needed and the rest destroyed. The railroad depot was burned, with the contents, consisting of leather, nitre, grain sacks, one hundred sacks of flour, three hundred bushels of wheat, five hundred barrels of salt, four platform scales, a lot of shoes, cotton, and other articles. Two freight cars on the track were also burned.

In the hospital were one hundred and forty-three sick and wounded soldiers, who were paroled.

A gun factory in town, which has done a large amount of work for the rebel army, principally in the way of repairing, was effectually destroyed by breaking the machinery. The building itself could not be burned without destroying a part of the town, which General Rousseau would not permit to be done. Another larger establishment of the same kind, outside of the town, was destroyed by the rebels themselves before leaving. Several cases of muskets were found stored in a stable, and were destroyed.

After resting a few hours in the heat of the day, the command again moved on at four o'clock in the evening. The direction was nearly south, and gave the rebels the impression that the Coosa bridge was the point aimed at. From Montgomery and Selma papers, afterwards obtained, it was learned that they were convinced that such was the object, and had disposed their forces accordingly, which, no doubt, saved the command considerable annoyance, as our rout was left clear. We were moving in the general direction of Montgomery, and the news caused great consternation in that rebel capital. Marching until mid-night, the command passed the little village of Syllacauga, and halted twenty-five miles from Talladega, annoyed by the rebels, who were, no doubt, busily at work fortifying themselves at the bridge, which we had left perhaps twenty miles to our right and rear, having had but two or three hours' sleep the previous night, and a wearisome march through the day, the men were nearly overcome with fatigue and drowsiness, and as soon as the halt was made dropped themselves on the ground to seek repose.

July 16th.—An early start and a march of fifteen miles, brought the command to Bradford, where a cotton factory was in operation. Here a halt was made, and several hours' rest taken.

A case of barbarous punishment occurred recently in the vicinity of Saccapatoy, a village a mile or two from Bradford, which would be incredible, were it not supported by the testimony of eye-witnesses, and had not slavery and secession together turned men into fiends. A negro, charged with having killed his master,

was arrested by the citizens of the neighborhood, tied to a tree, and *burned to death*. His torture was, no doubt, to some extent, mitigated by the very means used to make it severe. Dry pitch-pine was piled up closely around him, which burned so rapidly, and poured out such a dense smoke, that he was almost instantly suffocated. A witness stated that he never screamed or groaned, but seemed to suffocate at once.

At Youngville a quantity of rebel grain and bacon was obtained. In every county there are several depots for receiving the "tax in kind" imposed by the Confederate Government, being one-tenth of all productions of the soil. These are gathered in by agents, and sent off wherever ordered for the supply of the army. At these points the expedition found supplies ready for their use.

The Tallapoosa river was yet to be crossed before reaching the destination of the expedition. It is fordable in but few places, and the fords rather difficult for artillery. It was important, therefore, to obtain possession of a ferry. Information was obtained of an old ford near Stowe's ferry, and General Rousseau decided upon crossing at that point. The night march from Talladega, and the pressing forward during the day, had prevented news of our approach getting much ahead of us, and on arriving at the ferry in the night it was found to be all right—a rope stretching across the river and the ferry-boat in working order. The artillery and pack train were crossed over the ferry, and the rest of the command forded the river half a mile above. The fording was difficult, and the passage was not accomplished until two o'clock in the morning, but all got over safely. The day's march was about thirty-five miles.

July 17th.—The expedition was now within one day's march (about thirty miles) of the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad—a road of the utmost importance to the rebel army, being the one over which the greater portion of their supplies were drawn, and forming the line of communication with the Southwest, General Rousseau determined to push rapidly forward to reach it before night. Just as the command was about starting, the videttes fired upon a small party approaching them, and succeeded in capturing two and killing one. The one killed was a Captain Mason, in command of a scouting party from Dadeville on the way to destroy the ferry to prevent our crossing, rumors of our approach having reached them, but with no definiteness. They were a little too late to accomplish their object. No other party of rebels was met during the day. Passing through Dadeville, the march was continued toward the railroad at Loachepoka station.

Three miles from the railroad a rebel officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Craig, of the Tenth Texas cavalry, was captured by the advanced guard at a house where he was enjoying himself in the society of a bevy of young ladies. He was completely taken by surprise, and was much chagrined at his capture. A tall, elegant-looking

young lady, in great distress, and weeping with fear and vexation, approached General Rousseau and plead fervently that Colonel Craig should be allowed to remain. The General received her in the kind and urbane manner, which is one of his characteristics. "Are you the Colonel's wife, madame?" he inquired. "No, sir, I am his friend." The General smiled as he remarked that he presumed it amounted to the same thing, and assured her that her "friend" would not be injured, but would be paroled and allowed to remain. His parole was taken and he was left to enjoy the company of his fair advocate.

About sundown the command reached Loackepoka, and was in possession of the railroad. No force was there, and all was quiet. We had penetrated into the rear of the rebel army, and were now on their most important line of communication. Loackepoka Station is forty-eight miles from Montgomery.

Working parties were at once detailed, and the work of destruction commenced. The character of the superstructure of the road was peculiarly favorable for the purpose. The ties were of pine, and the track was laid of light iron, spiked to pine timbers, set into every fourth tie. These longitudinal stringers were readily raised from their position by means of fence rails used as levers. Twenty or thirty men would raise one hundred feet at a time, on one side, and place the timber and rail on top of the rail on the other side. Fence-rails and other combustible material were then piled on it, and fire started. The result of the operation was the destruction of the timbers, the complete warping of the iron rails from expansion by the intense heat, and the burning of the ties where the track rested upon them, so as to make them utterly unserviceable. On no other road, perhaps, could so thorough a destruction be effected by such simple means. The pine was of a pitchy character, and burned so readily that the ties were completely destroyed without raising them from the road-bed, and the iron was thoroughly drawn out of shape by the heat. The track was not merely torn up, but it was destroyed—ties, iron, and other material being rendered unfit to use again.

The railroad buildings at Loackepoka contained a large quantity of oats, corn, and flour from which the command was supplied. Fifteen saddle trees, two thousand pair of harness, and several hundred muskets were also captured and destroyed.

During the night, the railroad depot, a wooden building, took fire from the burning railroad, and for a time there was danger of the destruction of the hotel and several fine buildings. The flames spread in a direction where a part of the horses were picketed to fences and trees, and a stampede was feared. It was a wild and exciting scene. The long lines of fires up and down the track were sending up volumes of dense smoke, and lighting up the heavens with a lurid glare, whilst the flames from the burning buildings shot far upward and reached out

as if eager for further destruction. The neighing and rearing of the frightened horses and hurrying to and fro of the men to move them and their equipments away from the fire, added to the excitement of the scene. The buildings burned down rapidly, and the danger of the fire spreading was soon over. General Rousseau, by his personal exertions, assisted in saving the residence of a widow lady, who was astonished at finding assistance rendered from those she had been led to consider only as vandals. Men were detailed to protect the building with wet blankets until the danger was over.

July 18th.—Details working in the night destroyed several miles of the road. In the morning the command was divided into four detachments to continue the work. Colonel Hamilton, of the Ninth Ohio, with his regiment and a part of the Fourth Tennessee, moved toward Atlanta, destroying the track as he went. At Auburn, six miles from Loackepoka, his advance was attacked by the rebels, but after some skirmishing he drove them off and continued the work. He destroyed a quantity of lumber and a large amount of quartermasters' and commissary stores at Auburn. A mile or two above that place a locomotive was met coming down from Opelika. The engineer, on seeing the Yankees, endeavored to back out, but the engine ran off the track. The engineer and two other men were captured and the locomotive destroyed.

Major Baird, with four companies of the Fifth Iowa and four of the Fourth Tennessee, was ordered to march to Chehaw Station, twelve miles toward Montgomery, to destroy a trestle bridge and the station buildings and work back, destroying the road. Colonel Watts, of the Second Kentucky, moved down the railroad from Loackepoka in the same direction, and Colonel Jones, with the Eighth Indiana, started for Notasulga, a station between Loackepoka and Chehaw. The road was destroyed to Notasulga and several miles beyond. About sixty tents, with poles and pins complete, were here destroyed, and a further quantity of commissary stores. A water tank and the railroad buildings were also burned. Two miles beyond Notasulga was a camp for conscripts and convalescents, with barracks for two or three thousand men. Those who were able to do so had made their escape, leaving about one hundred sick in the hospital. The hospital buildings and tents connected with them were spared, and the remainder of the camp destroyed.

The detachment under command of Major Baird met a rebel force just upon arriving in sight of Chehaw Station. The trains were on the track which had brought them up from Montgomery. Major Baird deployed his force on both sides of the railroad and was met by the enemy in much larger force than his own. A brisk fight ensued, but the enemy proved too strong, and our men fell back with a loss of one killed and several wounded. Six companies of

the Eighth Indiana were brought up, and an advance again made. Major Baird, with two companies of the Fifth Iowa, moving on the left of the road, supported by two companies of the Eighth Indiana, and Colonel Jones, with four companies of the Eighth on the right side. The rebels were met in Major Baird's front and an obstinate fight ensued, but they were pressed back until they finally gained a position in a small ravine running down from the railroad, from which they poured a heavy fire upon our men, who could not advance upon them from the front without heavy loss. Both sides held their positions for some time, until two companies of the Eighth Indiana were sent across from the right side of the railroad, turned the rebels' left and got into their rear, pouring in a murderous fire with their Spencer rifles, while the Fifth Iowa assaulted them in front. The rebels were routed from their position and fled, leaving over forty dead and a large number of wounded on the field. The Fifth Iowa lost one killed and four wounded. Finding that the rebels were in considerable force, and were prepared to make an obstinate defence, and that to drive them completely from the road would require a withdrawal of a portion of the forces engaged in destroying the track, General Rousseau ordered that portion of the command back, the track having in the meantime been destroyed several miles below Notasulga. Returning through Loackepoka, Colonel Hamilton's command was overtaken between Auburn and Opelika, and the whole division bivouacked for the night.

July 19th.—In the morning Colonel Harrison, with a part of the Eighth Indiana and the Second Kentucky, continued the work of destruction toward Opelika, and the rest of the command marched by a road leading to the right of the railroad, and reached the Columbus Railroad, a mile or two east of Opelika. This road forms part of a line connecting Macon with the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad at Opelika. The Ninth Ohio commenced operations on this track, and destroyed it as far as the junction, where they connected with Colonel Harrison, who had moved up the other road.

A detachment under direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick, destroyed the depot buildings, turn-tables, cars, switches, &c., at the junction, and several miles of track toward Atlanta. There were six cars on the track filled with leather, nails, and other supplies, for the rebel army. Thirty boxes of tobacco were also seized and issued to the men. About seventy-five thousand rations of sugar, and thirty thousand of flour and bacon were obtained, and after supplying the command, the remainder was destroyed.

The work for which the expedition was sent out was now thoroughly accomplished. It had marched over three hundred miles in nine days—penetrated one hundred and nine miles in the rear of Johnston's army—destroyed thirty miles of railroad track, with its depot buildings, water-

tanks, switches, turn-tables, etc., one locomotive, a number of cars, and large quantities of supplies and material. As a rebel prisoner aptly remarked, it made "a big hole in Johnston's haversack." The rapidity and boldness of the movement struck terror into the heart of rebellion, and caused such bewilderment that no serious opposition was made to the progress of the expedition.

In the afternoon the work of destruction ceased, and the command took up the line of march to return. Following the railroad for some distance toward West Point, it diverged to the left, moving northwardly to Lafayette, twelve miles from Opelika. Here rumors came in thick and fast of a large force of rebel cavalry approaching from the north, having crossed the Chattahoochee at Franklin to intercept our retreat. At West Point, twelve miles to the right and rear, the rebels were gathering all the forces they could muster, and for a time the prospect of a successful retreat looked rather gloomy. General Rousseau, however, after carefully sifting the rumors, determined to move on in the direction he had started, and fight the way through, if necessary. The march was continued until midnight, and a halt made twelve miles from Lafayette, without hearing anything of the enemy.

July 20th.—Reveille was sounded at three o'clock, and the march resumed. Misled by a mistake of a guide, a road leading toward West Point was taken, but the error was discovered before much distance was lost, and a road found leading toward Rocky Mills on the route selected. A march of thirty-five miles was made, and about nine o'clock the command went into bivouac for the night. The route during the day was nearly parallel with the Chattahoochee, and with the railroad from West Point to Atlanta, and from ten to twenty miles distant from it. There are many roads running from the railroad and river across to that on which we were moving, and it was expected that the rebels would move across on one or more of these to intercept our retreat or harass our rear; but one after another of these intersecting roads was passed, and still no rebel force made its appearance.

July 21st.—The command marched thirty-six miles, passing through Carrollton and Villa Rica, and bivouacked three miles from the latter place. The advance met a party of about twenty rebels, and captured three of them, who represented themselves as scouts detailed by order of General Johnston, and then on service for General Jackson, commanding a rebel cavalry force. They were taken by surprise at our approach, having had no intimation of our coming. We learned that a small cavalry force from General Sherman's army had been at Carrollton a few days ago, and had returned toward Marietta. General Stoneman's pickets were reported to be near Powder Springs, sixteen miles in advance of us.

July 22d.—The expedition reached Powder Springs about eleven o'clock and found a Federal

cavalry picket a mile beyond. They had heard of our approach from scouts, but supposed us to be rebels. Our true character however was discovered before we reached them. A general feeling of relief pervaded the command at being again within our own lines after thirteen days of hard marching in the enemy's country, and the successful result of the expedition and its safe return was a cause of much satisfaction and congratulation.

In regard to the distance penetrated in the enemy's rear, the boldness and rapidity of its movements, the thoroughness of the work accomplished, and its complete success in every respect, this raid perhaps is the most remarkable one of the war. Its success is mainly due to the ability and discretion of its gallant leader, who has been aptly called the Chevalier Bayard of the army, the knight "*sans peur et sans reproche*." It is no fulsome eulogy to say that he manifested all the qualities which mark a great commander. The result of the expedition itself is an indication of this. One point in his character is particularly worthy of mention, as it had an important bearing on the success of the expedition. General Rousseau has a keen insight into human character, and an instinctive faculty of reading men and sifting the reliable from the false in their statements. This, with his frank and cordial manner of intercourse, enabled him to win the confidence even of enemies and to obtain information where others would have gained nothing but confusion of ideas. Throughout the whole trip he was thus enabled to pursue his course through the enemy's country with a more definite knowledge of the route, the enemy's forces and movements, etc., than could have been obtained from an elaborate system of scouts and spies. The complete success of the expedition and the directness of all its movements indicates the sagacity and judgment with which it was planned and executed.

General Rousseau is a Kentuckian by birth, but when a young man, entering the profession of law, he emigrated to Indiana, where he was engaged in the practice of law when the Mexican war broke out. He raised a company of volunteers, became its captain, and served with distinguished gallantry during that war. He afterwards returned to Louisville, and was a member of the Kentucky Senate at the time of the outbreak of the rebellion. He opposed the policy of neutrality, and, resigning his seat in the Senate, devoted his energies to the raising of troops for the support of the Government. In June, 1861, he was commissioned Colonel of volunteers, and on the first of October following, was promoted to a Brigadier-Generalship and assigned to the command of the Fourth brigade of the Army of the West, under General Buell. He fought in the battle of Shiloh, where he won the admiration of the army by his gallant conduct. He was afterward placed in command of the Third division, which he led in the battle of Perryville, and was promoted to a Major-Generalship for distinguished gallantry and good ser-

vice in that terrific struggle. At the battle of Stone River he again rendered most important service, for which General Rosecrans, in his official report, returned his thanks to "the gallant and ever-ready Major-General Rousseau." Since the twentieth of November, 1863, he has been in command of the important District of Tennessee, which he has controlled with consummate ability, and from which he was temporarily called to take the leadership of this important and daring raid upon the enemy's rear. On this expedition he penetrated further into the heart of the Confederacy, and struck a more telling blow upon the enemy's communication than any commander on a similar expedition has done during the war.

Colonel T. J. Harrison, of the Eighth Indiana, and Lieutenant-Colonel M. T. Patrick, of the Fifth Iowa, ably seconded General Rousseau throughout the expedition, and by their indefatigable efforts contributed materially to its success. In the fight of Coosa river and Chehaw Station they displayed coolness and courage, and were at all times energetic in the management of their respective brigades.

The different regiments under their command also behaved with the most commendable gallantry. The hardships and privations of the tedious march were endured uncomplainingly, and all were ready and eager at any time for a fight with the enemy. The laborious work of tearing up the railroad was entered into with most hearty good will. Officers and men worked with enthusiasm, feeling that they were accomplishing an important service, and forgetting in the excitement the fatigue and weariness which the hard marching and loss of sleep had induced. General Rousseau expressed his gratification of their conduct in the highest terms.

It is making no invidious distinction among the many officers who promptly performed their duties to say that Captain E. M. Rugean, Thirteenth Wisconsin infantry, topographical engineer on General Rousseau's staff, rendered especially important service, by his thorough study of the topography of the country and his activity in obtaining information in regard to roads, etc. He was almost constantly in the advance. His services were acknowledged by the General commanding as almost indispensable. His professional abilities have been acknowledged by his assignment to duty as Chief Topographical Engineer at department headquarters.

The staff of General Rousseau, during the expedition, was composed as follows: Captain Thomas C. Williams, Nineteenth United States Infantry, A. A. A. G.; Captain E. M. Rugean, Thirteenth Wisconsin infantry, Topographical Engineers; Captain Thomas A. Elkin, Sixth Kentucky cavalry, A. D. C.; Captain S. E. McConnell, Seventy-first Ohio infantry, A. A. J. G.; Surgeon S. D. Waterman, Eighth Indiana cavalry, Medical Director; Captain Alfred Mathias, Fifth Iowa cavalry, Provost Marshal; Lieutenant John Frey, Ninth Ohio, Quartermas-

ter; Lieutenant C. A. B. Langdon, Fifth Iowa cavalry, A. D. C.

The country along a great portion of the route traversed is barren and thinly settled, but other portions are rich and fertile, and the plantations gave indications of wealthy owners. But little cotton was seen growing—the crops generally being wheat, rye, oats, and corn. The small grain was mostly standing in shocks in the field, and the crops were generally good. The corn crop is fair but rather irregular—some fields or parts of fields just hardening into “roasting ear,” while in others the stalks were but two or three feet high. The corn ground generally is not well cultivated—probably from scarcity of labor. On the whole, the appearance of the country and crops does not strengthen the opinion that the rebels are soon to be starved out. Nevertheless there is much destitution and scarcity of food among the poorer classes. The rebel government, with inexorable rigor, seizes all the necessaries of life for the use of the army. Not only is one-tenth of all products taken in the shape of tax, but plantations generally are worked exclusively for the benefit of the government. Their owners are enrolled in the service and then “detailed” to superintend the working of their own farms, the conditions being that all the surplus above what is consumed on the place is to be sold to the Confederate government at prices fixed by the authorities. This makes food difficult to be procured, except through their agents. At one house where a party of officers had dinner prepared for them, the woman was asked to name her price, but refused to do so, saying that if she had the money she could not buy flour with it, but asked that they would furnish her flour from a mill near by, as she could not procure it otherwise. She was the wife of a rebel soldier.

The country was not so completely deprived of stock as has been anticipated, and numbers of horses and mules were obtained along the route. About three hundred fine mules were brought into our lines by the command.

Everything is under military control. The conscription law is vigorously enforced. Scarcely an able-bodied man is to be met with. Even the infirm and crippled, who are capable of doing light duty, are enrolled and detailed for such service as they are competent to perform. Tanners, millers, and others following occupations of necessity to the army or the community, are also enrolled, and then detailed to pursue their business for the benefit of the Government. Conscript officers are in every neighborhood, hunting down any who may have escaped conscription, or in any way evaded service. The most iron-heeled despotism prevails throughout, and individual rights and freedom are utterly trampled under foot. No “subjugation” could be more thorough than that under which the people of the South are placed by the rebel government.

The slaves along the route were exceedingly

anxious to follow the Yankees, but the rate of marching was too rapid for them to keep along on foot, and all the horses and mules to be found were needed for remounts for the men whose horses were daily giving out. Nevertheless a number succeeded in making their way. They would trudge along uncomplainingly, riding when they could get an animal, and walking at other times, and if asked where they were going, the invariable answer was, “*Gwine wid you all.*” They knew that they were leaving slavery behind them, and they were willing to risk all for the hope of freedom. About three hundred were with the command when it reached Marietta.

Many of the citizens fled in terror at the approach of the command, stripping their houses of their furniture and everything they could transport with them. The enormous lies so assiduously circulated by rebel papers and rebel officers as to the barbarous conduct of the Federal troops, even to the murdering of women and children, were really believed by some of the more credulous, and their fright was extreme. Those who remained even felt that they were incurring great risk, and were astonished to find that the dreaded Yankees were so different from what their imaginations had pictured them. General Rousseau's orders were stringent against depredations on private property. The following is an extract from an order issued at Ashville, and printed and distributed to the command:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY FORCE, }
IN THE FIELD, July 18, 1864. }

* * * * *
There shall be no straggling under any pretext. Private houses will not be entered by soldiers on any pretext whatever, being a prolific cause of straggling. Such entries are generally made by those who maraud and rob. Such acts are denounced as unworthy a soldier, and will be summarily punished.

The Major-General, commanding, tenders his thanks to the command generally, for their good conduct and soldierly bearing, and hopes that such deportment will continue.

By order of Major-General ROUSSEAU.

THOMAS C. WILLIAMS,
A. A. A. G.

Owing to the hasty formation of the command, and the nature of the service, discipline could not be as strictly enforced as under other circumstances, but every effort was made to protect private property, except such as was necessary for the expedition; and it was acknowledged by a number of citizens, at different places, that the people suffered less from the Yankees than from the rebel soldiers. The prisoners taken were also surprised at being treated like men, and were unanimous in grateful expressions. It was impossible to take prisoners along during the trip, and consequently all were paroled except those captured on the last two or three days before reaching our lines.

General Rousseau has demonstrated by this expedition that bold movements into the enemy's lines can be made and important results achieved against the enemy without the necessity of violating the usages of civilized warfare. His course entitles him to the nation's gratitude, while it will win for him the respect even of the rebels, at the same time that they are inspired with terror at the boldness and success of his movements.

It may be proper to add that a raid of the same general character as that made had been long since suggested by General Rousseau, though not precisely to the points to which this one was made. General Sherman's orders were fully carried out, and he has expressed the highest satisfaction at the result, the work accomplished having been fully up to his anticipations, while the good condition in which the command was brought, and with so slight loss, exceeded the most sanguine expectations.

Doc. 37.

THE ADDRESS OF THE GENEVAN'S.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE AMERICAN UNION :

The people of Geneva, in meeting at the Electoral Hall, address to the people of the Union brotherly greeting and testimonials of their lively sympathy.

The events which are happening in the bosom of the Great Republic of the Union have not found the people of Geneva indifferent. It is with painful sentiments that they have witnessed the violation of the Federal compact by some States. It is with grief they have seen States forget that federative unity is proclaimed by the Constitution; that such unity was recommended and maintained by the first Presidents of the Union—the immortal Washington, twice elected President, 1789, 1793, 1797; Thomas Jefferson, twice elected President, 1801, 1809, &c.

The people of Geneva offer the most hearty prayers that, inspired by patriotic thoughts, the States still in revolt may range themselves ever under the Star Spangled Banner of the Union. The people of Geneva, with all their wishes, forward this movement, because thenceforth liberty will be triumphant without distinction of race, at the North as at the South.

The citizens of Geneva recognize that strict solidarity exists between free people; that one of them cannot suffer without the other experiencing a sad counter blow. Convinced of this truth, in the presence of the civil war which facilitates the projects of the enemies of the American Republic, they believe it to be their duty to give expression to a fraternal word of encouragement to republicans on the other side of the ocean.

People of the United States, the only Republic of Europe, Helvetia, has had also her moments of intestine strife and attempts at separation. She has come forth triumphantly from these

trials. She has come forth stronger, more united than before. Those of our cantons which formerly wished to separate, would now rise with out distinction to uphold the Federal compact. It will be the same with the American Union. The Southern States will comprehend that the safeguard of their independence and of their prosperity is to be found in the Constitution—in liberty.

People of the Union! Soldiers of the entirety of the country! Courage and consistency. You have our sympathies, because in defending the Union, you also defend liberty. You abolish an odious and crying shame of a part of the United States—Slavery.

The violation of the Federal Constitution by some States of the Union has caused to the people of Geneva a sentiment the more painful because nothing justified that violation. No wrong can be alleged by the Secessionists either against the Federal Government or against other authorities. The determination to destroy the Federal compact of Union is explicable only by the wish to maintain slavery by the determination to make that essential to the form of government.

This scheme, we truly hope, will not be realized, but were it so, we think that only European governments, and with stronger reason, free Switzerland, would not abase itself by acknowledging a power based upon slavery. People of the Union! the citizens of Geneva assembled in meeting to address to you their felicitations on the aim you pursue to maintain the Constitution inviolate and to destroy slavery.

The struggle has commenced between the two principles—Liberty and Slavery.

The consummation of victory must be the abolition of slavery forever and everywhere.

Hail Liberty! Hail Republic of the United States.

Mr. Seward returned the following response :

To the People of Geneva :

I have received from the American Consul who resides at Geneva, and have laid before the President, your fervent, eloquent, and most fraternal address to the people of the United States. By his command, I give you thanks, in the name of all my countrymen, for the timely and appropriate words of sympathy and friendship which you have spoken. Your address adds strength to the already strong claim which binds the first federal republic of America to the oldest and foremost federal republic of Europe. The people of Switzerland may rest assured, whoever else may fail, that it will not be the people of the United States which will betray the republican system to foreign enemies, or surrender it to domestic faction. With ardent prayers for the preservation of the Constitution, the freedom and prosperity of Switzerland, I have the honor to remain, citizens,

Your most obedient and sincere friend,

WILLIAM H. SEWARD.

State Department, Washington, July 30, 1864.

Doc. 38.

BATTLES OF TUPELO, MISSISSIPPI

FOUGHT JULY 13, 14, AND 15, 1864.

LAGRANGE, TENN, July 22, 1864.

The expedition was composed of two divisions of infantry—the First and Third of the Sixteenth Army corps. The First commanded by Brigadier-General Joseph H. Mower, the Third by Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-first Missouri, one brigade of cavalry commanded by Brigadier-General Grierson, and one brigade of colored troops, Colonel Bouton, commanding; aggregate strength about thirteen thousand. The whole commanded by Major-General A. J. Smith. The expedition left Lagrange, Tennessee, July fifth, passing south near Salem, through Ripley and New Albany to Pontotoc, where it arrived on the eleventh. At Cherry Creek, six miles north of Pontotoc, on the evening of the tenth, the advance of cavalry encountered the enemy in force of perhaps a brigade, and skirmished with them, killing a few rebels, and having one or two on our side wounded. Before this, on the eighth, the cavalry had a brush with a party of the enemy north of Ripley, in which a Confederate was killed. On the morning of the eleventh, the enemy, a brigade strong, was found in our front, a few miles north of Pontotoc. Our cavalry dismounted and advanced as skirmishers, and two infantry brigades of the First division were deployed in line of battle, but the enemy fell back without any decided resistance. Our army advanced, and at noon occupied Pontotoc. We remained in bivouac at the south end of the town, and out on the Okalona road during the twelfth, our position indicating that we should advance to Okalona.

On the morning of the thirteenth the line of march was resumed, but not as had been expected on the Okalona road, but back through Pontotoc and out on the Tupelo road, which bears a little north of east from Pontotoc.

The enemy, we learned, had taken up a strong position, and fortified it, on the Okalona road, six or eight miles from Pontotoc. Two or three brigades, however, were in our immediate front at Pontotoc, and so soon as they discovered that we were moving out on the Tupelo road our rear, south of the town, was attacked. Colonel Bouton's colored brigade, consisting of the Fiftieth, Sixty-first, and Sixty-eighth regiments, United States African Infantry (commanded respectively by Major Foster, Colonel Kendrick, and Colonel Jones), and battery I, Second United States light artillery, Captain Smith, four pieces, was in the rear, charged with covering it. The Seventh Kansas cavalry, Colonel Herrick, was also in rear.

The enemy harassed our rear during the entire day's march from Pontotoc to Harrisburg, the field of battle proper, which is about a mile and a half west of Tupelo. The distance from Pontotoc to Harrisburg is eighteen miles.

Colonel Bouton, colored brigade, and Seventh Kansas cavalry, succeeded in protecting the rear of the train and column. In doing this they had frequently to form lines of battle, and may be said to have kept up a running fight the whole eighteen miles' march, but sustained only slight losses.

Two miles out on the Tupelo road Colonel Bouton ambushed with two companies of the Sixty-first, which held their fire until the head of the rebel column was within fifteen yards, when two volleys were poured in that sent them reeling back. Prisoners taken next day said that this fire killed a captain and four men and wounded eight.

About five miles out, the enemy brought forward a battery, and commenced shelling the rear, annoying the negro brigade while crossing a stretch of bottom land. On gaining higher ground beyond the bottom, the negro brigade was formed in line of battle, with battery in position, and the Sixty-eighth regiment in reserve. The enemy advanced cautiously, partly through a corn field, and got quite near our line, when the Fifty-ninth and Sixty-first opened on them, the Sixty-first having an enfilading fire with decided success. The enemy fell back without any persistence of attack.

Thus a succession of attacks, which were invariably repelled, were made on the rear, until the column was within about five miles of Harrisburg, when the enemy got on the flank and opposite the head of our column. The supply train had been got forward well towards the head of the column, and was being guarded chiefly by Third brigade, Colonel Wood, of First division.

About three o'clock the enemy's main attack of the first inst. was made on the right flank of the column, and was successfully repelled by the Seventh Minnesota, Colonel Marshall, and the Twelfth Iowa, Colonel Stibbs, of Colonel Wood's brigade. Dr. Smith, of the Seventh Minnesota, who was near the advance of the right, was instantly killed by a shot through the neck. The train was thrown into confusion, a few of the mules killed, and two or three wagons disabled by teamsters abandoning them.

The Seventh Minnesota drove the enemy back partly through an old field, out of range of the road, while the Twelfth Iowa, further back, met the enemy at close quarters in woods, and repulsed him. The Sixth Indiana battery fired a few shots. Thus the train was protected until it passed this point of attack. The Twelfth Iowa had one man killed. The Seventh Minnesota, besides losing Dr. Smith, had fifteen wounded, two dangerously.

The Fourth brigade, Colonel Ward's, of First division, which was in rear of supply train, participated in this affair—I do not know with what casualties, but not many. Captain O'Donnell, of General Smith's staff, had a horse killed under him while he was giving orders to the Seventh and Twelfth.

A scattered fire from the enemy extended

further along the column, in the advance and rear of this point of attack, but not with any serious effect.

Very soon after this flank attack, a fight opened at the head of our column. The enemy had planted a battery on the right of the road, commanding the road, and had lines of infantry in advance of the battery. The First brigade, Colonel McWilliams, and the Second brigade, Colonel Wilkins, engaged the enemy and drove him out of range of the road, except his battery, which continued to play with some effect until the entire column passed. In the column on the road, one man in the Seventh Minnesota lost a leg by a solid shot, and one in the Twelfth Iowa had his head shot off. A very heavy musketry fire on both sides was kept up for half an hour or longer, but it was late, and our only object at that hour was to get forward and into a good position for the grand fight that was expected and did follow next day. Our losses were slight. I cannot state them accurately, nor name the particular regiments of the First and Second brigades that were in the fight at the head of the column. The Ninth Minnesota, of the Second brigade, I know was in. It encountered a party of about thirty rebels, who mistook our line for their own, and before they discovered their mistake were cut down to the last man by a volley from the whole line of the Ninth Minnesota. One of our batteries was for a time in position on the right of the road, and poured a deadly fire of canister into the enemy at short range. The battery lost several horses.

General Smith selected a grove on the east of the cluster of houses that constituted the village of Harrisburg for our camp, which was the battle-field of the fourteenth and fifteenth. The road from Pontotoc to Tupelo runs east and west. The First division, General Mower's, was camped on the north side of the wood. The Third division, Colonel Moore's, was located on the south side of the wood. The train was parked on the road well toward the eastern limit of our camp, between the divisions and the hospital near a little stream in the woods.

The negro brigade was on southeast side of camp, on the left of the Third division, covering the corral on that side.

No attack was made during the night of the thirteenth. The battle opened July fourteenth.

At three o'clock in the morning the troops were up and under arms until broad daylight, when they were permitted to get breakfast, but without laying aside their accoutrements.

At six o'clock the enemy drove in our pickets, and our lines of battle were formed to receive him. Let me describe the ground more fully.

Our army was in the centre and most elevated part of an area of partly open and partly wooded ground that the eye could take it within a radius of from one to two miles. At this distance on all sides continuous woods limited the vision. From our central position the ground descended by successive undulations or ridges in every

direction. Groves of trees and underbrush were interspersed with cornfields, and old fields overgrown with weeds and bramble over this area of three miles square; the Tupelo road, as stated, lying east and west directly through our camp. The ground occupied by our camp was wooded, and declined slightly toward the east, or rather it was the head of a little valley that opened toward the east, so that the interior of our lines was lower than the circular crest in which our lines of battle were formed, giving us a decided advantage. It was a magnificent position in which to receive the attack of the enemy. The superior generalship and good judgment of General Smith, in selecting this position, were fully attested by the impregnability of our lines when assaulted, and the comparatively small loss we sustained, considering the heaviness of the enemy's fire.

Our lines may be described as having the shape of a horse shoe, with the top to the west on the road and open between the heels toward the east.

The First division, General Mower's, constitutes the right of the line; its left, Colonel Wood's brigade; the Third, extending from the road northward, bending around to the east, facing west and northwest; the Fourth brigade, Colonel Ward's, on the right of the Third, fronting north northwest, while the Second brigade, Colonel Meekin, the First brigade, Colonel McMillan, were still further to the right, fronting north and northeast. The brigades were not extended in one continuous line, but two or more lines deep. The ground was open in front of the First division line, except at the northwest angle, the centre of Colonel Wood's brigade.

The Third division, Colonel Moore, was on the left, south of the Pontotoc road, forming a semi-circle around south and east. Colonel Bouton's negro brigade was on the extreme left of the Third division. The First brigade, Colonel Murray, had the right of the Third division line; the Third brigade, Colonel Wolf, next; while the Second brigade, Colonel Gilbert's, was somewhat in rear near the train.

The battle opened about six o'clock, in the morning—our pickets being driven in and the enemy advancing in heavy force and extended lines from the west and northwest. The Twelfth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel Stibbs commanding, with two companies of the Seventh Minnesota, constituting the first line of Colonel Wood's brigade, immediately on the right of Pontotoc road, received the first fire of the enemy, and for about an hour held its position, receiving and delivering as heavy a musketry fire as troops were ever under. Their ammunition being exhausted, the second line on the west front of Colonel Wood's brigade, composed of eight companies of the Seventh Minnesota, Colonel Marshall commanding, advanced and relieved the Twelfth Iowa, receiving an equally heavy, and delivering an equally effective fire with that of the Twelfth. The Seventh Minnesota had never been in a Southern battle before, (it had been engaged in

the Minnesota Indian war two years,) and it received the highest encomiums for the veteran firmness with which it received the shock of battle.

On the right of the Seventh Minnesota and Twelfth Iowa, and Thirty-third Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, and the Thirty-fifth Iowa, Colonel Hill, their lines nearly at right angles with former were engaged, but not so heavily as the left of the brigade.

The right of Colonel Moore's division, on left of road, was also engaged.

The enemy, as we were afterwards told by prisoners, were led to believe that General Smith's army was composed entirely of one hundred days' troops and negroes, and they expected to walk right through and over us. Hence, the persistence and recklessness with which they again and again rallied to the charge, and tried to reach and break our lines. But the storm of fire that swept from our compact lines was more than mortal man could endure, and every time they charged forward, it was but to recoil, leaving their pathway strewn with dead.

They moved in heavy masses around to their left—our right—where they were met with musketry from the right of General Mower's division, the First, Second, and Fourth brigades, and a furious artillery fire from Hilmen's battery, company M, First Missouri, manned by the Sixth Indiana, Captain Miller, and the battery of company E, First Illinois light artillery.

In the road, on left of Colonel Wood's brigade, guns of the Second Iowa battery were posted and did earnest work.

The Third Indiana battery, on the left of the First brigade of the Third division, in position south of Pontotoc road, was also engaged. The roar of artillery was terrific.

For three hours—from six o'clock until nine—the battle raged—heaviest in front of Colonel Wood's brigade of General Morris's division, as before described, and as the list of casualties surely indicates—when repulsed and beaten at all points, the enemy fell back and drew off. A charge of Colonel Wood's brigade, the Thirty-third Missouri and Thirty-fifth Iowa, on the right, and the Twelfth Iowa and Seventh Minnesota on the left, was made, which swept over the field, capturing prisoners, driving the enemy and rendering the victory complete. It was too hot, and the men too much exhausted, to pursue far the retreating foe. In front of the lines of Colonel Wood's brigade lay the rebel Colonel Harrison, of the Sixth Mississippi cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson, of the same regiment, and several line officers, and a great part of their command. Colonel Faulkner's body lay in front of Colonel Moore's division on the left. A Major McKay was also killed.

Prisoners say that the attack on the morning of the fourteenth was made by seven thousand of the enemy's best troops, and that many men were shot down by their own officers in driving them to the charge. One fellow said he had

been in seventeen battles, but was never under such a heavy musketry fire before as that they encountered from us. The success that had attended General Forrest's army in repelling Grierson's and Morgan L. Smith's column that was moving to co-operate with General Sherman in the Meridian expedition, and his late decided victory over Sturgis, had emboldened the enemy to believe that any Federal force could be beaten, and in consequence they fought more confidently of success.

Our losses were light compared with that of the enemy and for the severity of the fight. We had a magnificent position. Our lines being sheltered in good part in edge of woods, the enemy exposed himself in open ground on our left and in a corn-field on the right. A strip of woods somewhat covered his centre.

A flag was shot down by the right companies of the Seventh Minnesota, but picked up by company B of the Thirty-third Missouri. It is to be sent to the Merchants' Exchange, St. Louis.

On the thirteenth the Fourteenth Wisconsin took a flag, the color-bearer of which was shot down by the Twelfth Iowa.

Colonel Alex. Wilkin, of the Ninth Minnesota, commanding the Second brigade of General Mower's division, was shot dead, the ball entering his left side, passing through his heart.

Lieutenant A. A. Burdick, quartermaster of the Twelfth Iowa, was killed by an elongated ball from a rifled cannon that passed through an oak twenty inches in diameter before it struck him. It also killed his horse.

The horses of Colonel Marshall and Adjutant Trader, of the Seventh Minnesota, were both shot as they were being led to the rear.

General Mower fearlessly exposed himself in all parts of the field, wherever his presence seemed needed. One of his orderlies was killed by his side.

General Smith saw all that was going on, but the perfect dispositions that had been made for battle, with the advantageous position selected by him, left little to be done during the engagement.

On the evening of the fourteenth the enemy attacked the extreme left of our lines held at that time by a skirmish line of Colonel Bentley's brigade. The skirmishers were driven in on the main line, when the latter in the centre, and Colonel Gilbert's brigade, of the Fourteenth, twenty-seventh, and thirty-second Iowa, and twenty-fourth Missouri on the left, and a part of Colonel Wolf's brigade on the right, charged on the enemy and drove him back with great slaughter. This work was brief, but as gallant as any of the day.

A skirmish down the Pontotoc road occurred about sunset, brought on by our sending out to bring in a piece of artillery of the enemy that we had disabled. It was some distance out from our line, but too near for the enemy to get it

away. They tried to prevent our getting it by shelling the party that was bringing it off. Our artillery was brought into play, and a duel was kept up for some time. We were successful in getting the gun.

On the morning of the fifteenth General Smith decided to move out on the homeward march. Our subsistence was almost exhausted, and our ammunition not abundant. The cavalry went out west on the Pontotoc road, while the train moved out towards Tupelo, turning off north on the Old Town road. The enemy was in force in the woods a mile and a half west of our position. They moved out and drove our cavalry back.

General Mower's division was formed in a line on the ground it occupied the day before, and partly on that held by the Third division, left of the road. The centre being on the Pontotoc road. Orders were given to fix bayonets and hold fire until the enemy advanced within fifty yards, the men lying low to conceal our position. The enemy advanced rapidly, with heavy musketry and shelling us vigorously, while only our artillery replied. It was a little trying to lie quietly and receive a heavy fire, but it did us little damage, owing to our defenses and lying low. They came to the crest of a ridge two hundred yards in our front, but the experience of the day before was fresh in their memory, and not a step further would they come. They discovered our purpose and were not to be trapped. When this was apparent, we were ordered to charge them, which was done with a yell, but they did not wait for us.

We pursued them nearly a mile and then shelled them with visible effect. In a line of skirmishers thrown out at this time, Lieutenant Louis Hardy, commanding company E, Seventh Minnesota, was killed. He was a gallant fellow, but went into the fight imprudently in full uniform, a conspicuous mark for sharpshooters.

The Third division, with the train, had got miles away by this time, and the First division was called in and took up the line of march homeward.

The army went into camp on the Old Town road, about five miles from the battle field. As our rear was getting into camp, the enemy came up and opened on us with artillery. Colonel McMillan's brigade of the First Ohio was in the rear, composed of the rearmost regiments, the Seventy-second and Ninety-fifth Ohio, and One hundred and fourteenth Illinois, which charged the enemy with a rapid musketry fire, that made him pay fearfully for this last attack. If our men had not been so weary they could have taken his battery. This was the last of the fighting.

The enemy's dead in the aggregate, by count and careful estimate, was certainly five hundred. The usual proportions would give the wounded at two thousand to twenty-five hundred. We took about two hundred and fifty prisoners.

This would make his loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, nearly three thousand. Add to this an indefinite number of missing, stragglers, and conscripts, glad of an excuse to escape to their homes, parties of whom were heard of along our homeward march, and his total loss would swell to probably four thousand.

Wounded rebel officers said that the whole force of the enemy was about fifteen thousand. Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee commanded in person. Prisoners said that General Forrest and General Lee disagreed, and that if Forrest had his way we should not have been so successful.

The following are our losses, obtained from official resources;

In First division, General Mower's, First brigade, Colonel McMillen: killed, fifteen; wounded, seventy-four; missing, four. Total, ninety-three.

Second brigade, Colonel McClure, (succeeding Colonel Wilkin, who was killed): killed, four; wounded, twenty-two; missing, four. Total, thirty.

Third brigade, Colonel Wood: killed, twenty-four; wounded, one hundred and eighty-six; missing, seven. Total, one hundred and ninety-three.

The following is a detailed statement of losses in this brigade, which suffered the heaviest of any brigade in the battle, viz.:

Twelfth Iowa, Colonel Stibbs: killed, nine; wounded, fifty-three; missing, one. Total, sixty-three.

Seventh Minnesota, Colonel Marshall: killed, nine; wounded, fifty-two; missing, one. Total, sixty-two.

Thirty-third Missouri, Lieutenant-Colonel Heath: wounded, one; missing, twenty-eight. Total, twenty-nine.

Thirty-fifth Iowa, Colonel Hill: wounded, five; missing, thirty-four. Total, thirty-nine.

Fourth brigade, Colonel Ward: killed, six; wounded, forty-six; missing one. Total, fifty-three.

Total loss in First division, Three hundred and seventy-one.

Total loss of Third division, commanded by Colonel Moore, One hundred and thirty-nine.

I am unable to give the loss in detail of the Third division. The aggregate above is official.

Negro brigade, Colonel Bouton commanding; killed, fifteen; wounded, fifty-seven; missing, thirteen. Total, eighty-five.

Total loss of the army, (exclusive of cavalry loss), Five hundred and five.

The cavalry loss I regret I have not been able to ascertain. I am informed it is not large—probably does not exceed fifty. They experienced no hard fighting, but did good service in front, on flanks and in rear, and had frequent skirmishes with the enemy. They destroyed eight or ten miles of the railroad north and south of Tupelo, including considerable trestle work.

M.

Doc. 39.

SHERMAN'S ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR DALLAS,
GEORGIA, JUNE 3. }

Thirty-five days of active campaigning under Sherman; thirty-five nights of march, picket, skirmish, battle, or of uneasy slumber on beds of grass, leaves, rails, rocks, or mother earth, with the blue heavens for a canopy; and to-day, a seat beside a mountain stream a mile from camp, with no sign of man's handiwork visible save the few rails that form my seat, can not be expected to fit your correspondent well for the task of giving a graphic account of military operations for the last ten days. Right well pleased am I to know, however, that the tardiness of my pen will work no disadvantage to the readers of the Gazette, since a "relief" in the form of another of the knights of the quill has arrived, and made this portion of the army his particular field. Yet, I know that there are some of the events that transpire among us, unimportant, perhaps, historically, but of much interest to many, which I may tell without repeating what may be better written by another.*

To make a little *resume* of the whole ten days, let us go back to Kingston, May twenty-second—the date of my last letter. On that day portions of the army had advanced some miles beyond Kingston, and were skirmishing with the enemy; while Sherman's energy had completed the railroad to his army and had thrown forward twenty days' rations, ready for a move without a base to begin next morning. But never perhaps was the saying that "large bodies move slowly," more fully verified than to the troops which formed the rear guard of McPherson's command that day. Early in the morning orders to be ready at a moment's notice were given, but the morning wore away and left the troops lying as the sunrise found them. Gladly, at noon, was the sound to fall in heard. Let the weather be as it may, there is nothing so perplexing and so troublesome as a night march; no soldiers likes to have it in prospect. Appearances, however, all deceive in a soldier's life. Doomed to a night march, it was of no avail that orders came early. It required just so many hours to get the immense wagon train in line, and the rear guard could not go until that was done. It was actually sunset when the last of the troops filed out of Kingston. A night march of course followed, and one of the most unpleasant imaginable. Following the trains would certainly wear the patience of the most patient. A movement forward of ten feet, then a halt of two minutes, another move, and another halt *ad infinitum* made up the order of march. Plunging into gutters, tumbling over rocks and stumps, and irregularities that could not be distinguished for the darkness, is it any

wonder that the poor soldier dreads a night march? Then, on this particular occasion, the dust was inches in depth; penetrating every crevice and fold, and covering the whole man with its dirty gray mist, it is the most disagreeable element, save gunpowder, with which the soldier has to contend.

This is the history of the first night's march of six miles or eight across the Etowah river, on the Van Wert road.

As it had been at Dalton, so it was to be at the Etowah. McPherson, Sherman's right-hand man, was to take the right and flank the position, not only of Etowah but of Altoona. Hence his movement by the Van Wert road, crossing the Etowah at a bridge a few miles from Kingston, which the rebels did not destroy. On the twenty-fourth his command encamped at Van Wert, a little village twenty miles southwest of Kingston, and apparently far away from any military operations. From this place the line of march was changed to the southeast, pointing towards Dallas. On the twenty-sixth, at four P. M., after slight skirmishing, McPherson's command and Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth corps, marched by different roads simultaneously into Dallas, the county seat of Paulding county. This is some thirty miles northwest of Atlanta, and nearly twenty miles west of Marietta, the nearest point on the railroad. It was, to many, a source of considerable surprise to find next morning the whole rebel army confronting us, that is confronting Sherman, who was now about ready to form line.

All day of the twenty-seventh was most busily occupied in getting into position. General Fuller's, Colonel Rice's, and Colonel Sprague's brigades, were fiercely engaged all day in as heavy and severe a skirmish as I ever witnessed. Night found them, however, in good position, a half a mile further advanced than they were in the morning. In this skirmish the Twenty-seventh Ohio lost Captain Sawyer, killed, and Lieutenant De Bote, wounded. The Sixty-sixth Indiana lost Captain H. S. McRae, wounded, besides a number of enlisted men. The Sixty-sixth Illinois, formerly known as Birge's sharpshooters, were at the front, and lost quite heavily. The Fifteenth corps, which took position on the right of the Sixteenth, also lost heavily. A portion of the Ninth Iowa was surprised and captured at breakfast.

At night the whole line threw up slight works, and, as well as it could be done, amid a continual popping of skirmishers' guns, the men rested.

All day of the twenty-eighth there had been a continuous rattle of musketry, interspersed with an occasional shot from artillery, which kept a slow procession of ambulances passing to and from the lines to convey the wounded to hospital. Toward evening an unusual activity among the rebels in front of Logan, who was on Dodge's right, appeared. Suddenly a force of infantry was seen hastening toward the rebel

* See Document 8, page 24, ante.

left, as if to turn Logan's right. Scarcely had they passed the point where they were visible to us, when a larger force returned at the same rate. Then came volleys along Logan's front, from right to left. A wonderful animation was suddenly infused into the apparently dead mass of wagons and artillery that lay all day in the great open field behind the Fifteenth Corps. A storm was gathering—where should it break? The question was not long unanswered. Minor attempts were made along almost the whole of Logan's line, but in front of General Sweeny's division was the main force. Bates' division of Hardee's corps was hurled against Sweeny's division, which at that time presented a front of two regiments and one portion of a battery. The immortal Second Iowa, and the younger, but not less gallant Sixty-sixth Indiana, with two sections of Welker's Battery, (H, First Missouri Light Artillery,) met the shock of the charge. Fierce and hot was the contest—brave men were pitted against brave—but it was impossible to advance before the withering fire of that portion of Colonel Rice's brigade. In half an hour from the first volley, the shout of victory rang on the evening air, and was taken up by regiment after regiment, until the woods rang again. A few prisoners were captured, from whom it was ascertained that the rebel Second Kentucky Regiment was engaged. One of that regiment, Badger, of Columbus, Kentucky, who was captured, has friends in Cincinnati. Another from Covington, Kentucky, named Jones, belonging to the same regiment, was also captured. The loss of the Sixty-sixth and Second Iowa, was very slight. The next day the Sixty-sixth Indiana found sixty-three dead rebels in their front.

On the twenty-ninth Colonel Mersey's brigade relieved Colonel Rice's, and still the skirmishing continued. Company B, of the Eighty-first Ohio, was deployed as skirmishers, and Private James Anderson, of Company D, volunteered to go also. Very soon he was borne back mortally wounded. All day the heavy skirmishing was kept up. The lines were so close that rebel balls reached even beyond the headquarters of Generals Sweeny and Dodge. No general attack was made, however.

It was after eleven o'clock at night, of the twenty-ninth, when as some of us were listening to the dull, heavy booming of Hooker's guns to the left, a bright flash of a musket to the right, and in front of our line, told of approaching danger. Almost instantly the whole picket line in front of Mersey's brigade was ablaze, and retreating before our advancing column. Scarcely had the pickets reached the works, until every man of the long, sinuous line, which a moment before seemed wrapped in slumber, was up to his place, and the next moment the Eighty-first Ohio and Twelfth Illinois poured a volley of death into the approaching column. A flash and a whiz was the reply, but now loading and firing as rapidly as possible, while Welker poured an almost ceaseless fire from his four guns, the scene became grand beyond des-

cription. Never before have I witnessed such a scene of terrible grandeur! The night was dark, and a heavy air seemed to weigh down the sulphurous smoke until the darkness was changed to gray, in which the dark figures of the men became visible—a sort of demon-looking set, engaged in a ghastly play with death. But it could not last long. The earthworks, together with the wild aiming of the rebels, gave us complete protection, while they were without any shield. Soon they renewed the attack at another place, then on Mersey again, and again to the right, until at three o'clock, when they recoiled from their last attack, they had made seven attempts to break our lines! The occasion of this desperation, it is thought, was that they had detected a movement commenced in the morning by the Fifteenth Corps toward our left, and thought to break through our lines while moving. The movement had commenced, and if they had waited a few hours later, their attack might have resulted in a different manner. Our loss was comparatively nothing, and was confined almost exclusively to the men deployed as skirmishers in front of the works. Lieutenant Ulrick, of the Sixty-sixth Illinois, was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Williamson, same regiment, was wounded.

Hardly had the first half hour's fighting ended, until General Dodge made his appearance at Welker's battery, carrying before him on his horse a box of canister! He had heard that their canister was gone, and unable to find the proper officer in such a melee, he went himself and carried all he could. He also seized two wagon loads of infantry ammunition from the Fifteenth Corps, which were passing, and sent boxes up to the front line, so that although at the beginning there was but forty rounds to the man, these were not gone until a beautiful supply was at hand.

The eager Sixty-sixth Indiana, who had built those works, and repulsed the attack there on the twenty-eighth could not be held in reserve. When Colonel Adams sent word that his ammunition was nearly gone, Colonel Rice ordered out the Sixty-sixth to relieve the Eighty-first. With a cheer they responded, and were soon in readiness. But here arose a question; the ammunition was now abundant, and the Eighty-first Ohio did not want to be relieved! General Dodge upon application allowed the Eighty-first to retain its position, and the gallant boys of the Sixty-sixth Indiana retired disappointed.

The loss of the enemy could not be ascertained; the intervening ground being contraband. A deserter who came in to-day, says that Bates' division was terribly cut up in that night attack, which, he says, was made under a misunderstanding of orders.

For some reason, it was determined to change the position of McPherson and Davis' divisions of the Fourteenth Corps. The orders were issued for this on the twenty-eighth, but were countermanded by the attack made by the enemy. On the twenty-ninth, the movement

was in progress, and was arrested by the night attack I have mentioned; but on the night of the thirty-first, the movement was successfully begun, and by five p. m. of June first, his entire command had changed position in the face of the enemy, some two or three miles, with scarcely the loss of a man.

Early in the night of the thirty-first, Colonel Mersey's brigade was moved to the left, to relieve Jefferson C. Davis' division, which immediately moved to the left. The next day, all the line to the right was withdrawn toward the left, leaving Mersey as rear guard for McPherson's whole command. About noon the rebels had discovered the movement, and had moved into Dallas. Coming on without opposition, their cavalry had actually gained position in Mersey's rear, while infantry was closing in upon his right flank and front. Bending back the right, until the Eighty-first Ohio and part of the Sixty-sixth Illinois formed a line of battle facing all points of the compass except the North, and with the Twelfth Illinois deployed on the left as skirmishers, Colonel Mersey safely withdrew his isolated brigade at three o'clock, and received the congratulations of his commander for so skillful a withdrawal from what was a very perilous situation.

For two days there has been a calm. The enemy is apparently nonplused. They are hastily moving to their right, fearing a storm will burst upon them there.

I nearly forgot to chronicle a daring feat which came near being accomplished by Colonel Mersey's brigade on the thirty-first. At noon his brigade was ordered to move forward and assault the enemy's works directly in our front. The plan was to form two miles of skirmishers of the Sixty-sixth Illinois; support them by the Eighty-first Ohio, with a space of forty spaces between its right and left battalions, and it in turn to be followed by the Twelfth Illinois. Everything was ready, and at twelve noon the movement began. The column was formed behind our front line of works, and moved forward. The Sixty-sixth and Eighty-first passed over the breastworks under a brisk fire from the rebel skirmishers, who were close at hand. On went the Sixty-sixth, driving all before them, when they received a check from the main rebel line. The whole column was then halted, and lay there for ten minutes, almost within stone's throw of the rebel lines, yet without firing a shot, except an occasional one from the Sixty-sixth's front line. The brigade had no support on either flank, and presented a front little longer than a regiment, while just at its left was a hill from which an enfilading fire could rake the whole brigade. Colonel Adams was getting impatient, and was just about to order "forward!" when the better judgment of somebody whose duty it was to direct affairs, ordered the brigade back.

The movement was begun under an apprehension that the rebels had vacated their works,

and was abandoned as soon as it was found they were still there in force.

As soon as the rebels perceived this they poured forth the volleys which they were reserving for the advance, into the retiring column, but fortunately they aimed too high and but little harm was done. Lieutenant Van Lieu, Sixteenth Illinois, was severely wounded in this movement. His mother lives in Butler County, Ohio. The Sixty-sixth lost also Lieutenant Williamson, slightly wounded, besides a number of men killed and wounded.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

TWO MILES SOUTH-WEST OF ACEWORKS,
GEORGIA, July 7.

In lack of events more stirring, such as battles and sieges and triumphal marches, I must write you of the incidents of march, the people, the country, etc. . . The army is no less prolific in interesting phases of human nature, no less characteristic and inimitable when on the march or in the camp, than when on the field of battle, or rushing gallantly into "the imminent deadly breach." The common places of life find no places in history; the army is an institution by itself, isolated from the observation of men, except a few who relate only the graver passages in its history, passing over its comedy, its humor, its trivialities and its domestic doings and sayings, which, after all, occupy so great a portion of its time and form the best possible mirror of its moods and manners, and unless these are chronicled for the perusal of new-readers, there is great danger that they will fall into the error of regarding the army only as a great host of romantic and impossible heroes, performing always sublime things and making always fine speeches. There are some men here who remain the same queer and crooked geniuses that they were at home, and for aught that I can see, an army of fifty thousand men makes as many false passes at the enemy, hits foul, goes down on all fours, and performs as many erratic gyrations and tumbings as would a brace of trained pugilists pitted against each other on a field so unequal as this. Whole brigades rush headlong through thick woods, where they cannot see ten lengths of a musket in advance, and come suddenly on masked cannon, which are so close that to retreat is sure death, and only a part of them can hope to escape by falling flat on their faces, and remaining in that position for hours, till darkness comes to conceal their movements. While they lie there many of them are discovered by the rebel sharpshooters and die helpless. Others are slaughtered by a cross fire from other batteries, and when at last the survivors are permitted to steal away under cover of the night, so many of their comrades lie stiff and stark in their places, that they look as if still skirmishing with the enemy—a battle-line of corpses.

Again, on a certain evening, each army is seized with a sudden delusion that the other is

about to attack, or do some other dreadful mischief, and they expend tuns upon tuns of shell and round-shot, which many an unhappy mule had perished by the roadside to drag from Kingston, and with no other effect but to nip in the bud some hundreds of hopeful saplings, splinter a few ancient oaks and hurt a score or so of men. There was one of the panics of the war. The perfect coolness and sang froid with which old soldiers, in some cases, come to regard those matters and occurrences which make the blood of a novice suddenly grow thick in the region of his heart, is one of the most noticeable features of the army. Some instances are related which are decidedly refrigerating. A soldier was carrying to his tent, for domestic use, a plate of flour, which he had very lately confiscated, and from which he was forming pleasing anticipations of being able to make an interregnum in the reign of hard-tack, when a wandering fragment of a shell suddenly descended upon the plate, scattering the flour into dust. The fellow merely looked at the piece of fractured crockery remaining in his hand for a few moments, and then drily observed, "No more of that on *my* plate if you please." Another one of the boys was saluted in the same way by a shell travelling with its peculiar infernal yell a few inches above his head, while he was walking close along the line of battle, when he came to a halt, and without winking an eye, looked in the direction of the flying shell with a quiet "good morning."

Early on the morning of the fifth of June, it was announced at headquarters that the rebels had evacuated their works, and were in retreat. Indeed, on the night before, General Hooker's advance line had occupied their works, and their movement continued through the whole night; and in the morning none were to be seen except a few cavalry scouts lingering to observe our motions. Immediately there was a rush of eager men curious to inspect the rebel fortifications, and see the effect of their firing. The former were found to be of great strength, considering the haste with which they were necessarily erected; the strongest indeed—so our engineers say—that they have seen the rebels make at any time. They are firmly built of logs and stones covered with a heavy embankment of earth and screened by green branches of trees. They evidently cost a heavy expenditure of labor, and it is idle to deny that, in many cases, they are better than our own. Whatever flimsiness the rebels used in the construction of their redoubts early in the war, these at least are creditable to their skill, and equally to their muscle. In many places their sharpshooters had constructed little lunettes for the accommodation of two or three persons, several rods in advance of their outer line of rifle pits. They had been compelled to trench deeply, and even burrow in the ground and build strong roofings of rails to protect themselves from our shells and shot. These latter were accurately put in at a distance of a mile, by the splendid batteries of Bridge and McDowell,

and, in return, the sharpshooters made large numbers of our men bite the dust. The enemy could have been forced to abandon fortifications of such strength only by strategic combinations of the most threatening character. The peculiar strength of their position, which I may say our authorities were not at all slow to admit, consisted in this, that they were posted on the summits of a series of high wooded hills, between which ran the roads, practicable for the army, while their fortifications extended in two or three strong lines down the sides of these hills, fronting directly our advance, and then for a considerable distance along the defiles parallel to the roads, and on a sufficient elevation to make it difficult to storm them. The dense thickets of bushes and trees in which they took care to locate themselves, added much to the difficulty of any attempt upon them.

In front of a part of the Fourth Corps lay a large farm, extending through a fertile valley half a mile wide, and limited at either side by slight ridges, occupied by the respective combatants. This open stretch of about a mile in extent gave free play to the gunners at either end, and made it a very injudicious act to cross this space, even some distance in the rear. This farm was checkered with fine fields of green wheat and oats, but, like the apples of Tantalus, they might not be eaten. This, when the animals were limited to four pounds a day of grain (a third ration), with no hay, and all the grass in our country eaten up, and when the four pounds of yesterday weighed but three to-day and two to-morrow, was a great grievance. Accordingly, when the rebel bullets were no longer to be encountered, the orderlies and scullions and such as curry horses, trooped forth innumerable, and forthwith there was such a confiscation of heads of wheat, wheat pulled up by the roots, green oats, and swamp grass, as is not heretofore recorded in these epistles. They then pulled wheat who ne'er pulled wheat before; and the streams of small mules that poured into the fields, and the small mules and large bundles that poured out therefrom, till the supply was exhausted, was a thing strange to behold.

The orders of General Sherman, that the army should be subsisted as far as possible off the country, are very seriously misunderstood by some soldiers, whether accidentally or otherwise, I will not say, and there is a considerable amount of indiscriminate appropriation of rebel property in consequence. As the army moves through a new tract of country which is yet untouched, the popping of guns can be heard in the roads and fields to such an extent that it might be mistaken for stray skirmishing, were it not for certain sounds which betray unmistakably a swinish origin, and at the same time bad shooting. The inhabitants of the land have driven off a great part of their stock, including all the horses oxen and cows, but there are still found running at large considerable numbers of sheep, and a species of very elongated and shadowy

hogs, fitted kindly by nature for forcing their way through the thick jungles of bushes. The former are very tempting to stragglers especially when they have eaten only hard salt pork for many days, and it is a very natural thing that many of them should be shot and carried on the march till the time for the evening halt. The sharp eye of the Provost Marshal detected some of these forbidden meats pendent from a pole carried on the shoulders of two men, who in vain sought to avoid observation by making a troublesome march through the fields, and, as a consequence, when the halt was called for the night, certain men were to be seen tramping slowly around a limited circle in the hot sunshine, and close by the roadside, carrying between them the aforesaid mutton and preceded and followed by certain others who had been accomplices thereto, carrying rails on their shoulders, and the whole marching in solemn procession to the music of tremendous volleys of cheers from the troops who were passing by and comprehended the situation. When all things were taken into consideration, both the quality of the meat involved and the crest-fallen faces of the men who carried it, the whole affair was decidedly *sheepish*. The conclusions of the matter was that the men carried off their spoils in triumph, declaring they had earned it, and would eat it accordingly.

General Sherman evidently meant by his order, as every sensible man would at once understand, that the supplies from the country were to be added to the Government stores by the proper authorities, and issued regularly to companies and squads in the usual manner. Every corps has with it its own droves of beeves, which are kept in good condition by foraging, and which have a way of absorbing all that are found by the roadside, so that the men have little to complain of in this particular. All along the lines of battle, when the armies were confronting each other, a few rods in the rear, were little pens of cattle from which the men in the trenches were well reinforced with smoking steaks, added to their coffee and pilot bread; while two or three miles in the rear could be seen large droves, under guard, serenely grazing in the pastures—forming the best possible reserve forces upon which the army could fall back.

Still there is very little danger that this army will suffer any serious demoralization by straggling and pillaging. There is very little of it. The men were thoroughly sorted over before starting, and the feeble and sick were rejected. I had occasion, in following at the rear of the whole army for a day, to observe the truth of this. Scarcely a dozen were overtaken in the whole day, where a regiment might have been expected. A hundred and twenty-eight ambulances were provided for the Fourth corps, and yet the fear of the disgrace of having been carted in the sick wagon, and the general good assurance of the men that they are going on no fools errand, kept the men square up to the

regiment. The same good sense which ordered weak, but plucky men to be transferred from the regiments to the hospital, brought out from the latter to the place where they could do some service, a host of lusty cowards. Captain Warnock has but lately returned from a visitation of wholesale purging to the hospitals of the Department, where he has been ousting from their cozy cots all malingerers and skin-deep sick men, without mercy. From the hospitals of the Department, he returned to duty about twelve hundred men, and from those at Nashville alone, nine hundred and sixty. So let it be, more and more.

There is not a superfluity of news afloat at present. Captain Tousley, of the Fourth corps, who came in to-night from our former camping-ground and the scenes of the engagements had about there, from which the corps marched yesterday, reports that the rebels had had a force of cavalry all day to-day attempting to take the hospitals stationed there. General Kimball's brigade (formerly General Little's) were guarding them, and had lost a few wounded during the day. All the wounded will arrive safely at this camp sometime to-night. Some of the wounded were so terrified at the prospect of falling into the hands of the rebels that even poor wretches whose legs were mangled by shells, crawled on the backs of mules and escaped. The damnable villainy which will make such an attack is of a piece with that which orders men to fire upon those (Federals) who are burying their own (rebel) dead.

The army is pretty much massed about here on the railroad and near it, recruiting itself for a new campaign. The cars at present come to the river at Etowah, where there is a large bridge, six hundred feet long, seventy-five feet high, and composed of three branches of trestle-work, which is announced to be completed on the tenth. Heavy wagon trains are already running from that point to the army, supplying the army anew; and as soon as the cars cross the bridge, and the wagons are again filled from them, why, then—yes.

The army extends nearly to Lost Mountain in its outposts, and will probably find no resistance this side the Chattahoochee. General Sherman's headquarters are at present established at Acworth, which is a little village on the railroad, of twenty or thirty houses, and about ten miles below the Etowah River. General Thomas' are within a quarter of a mile of this place.

The whole army has now accomplished the object of flanking the strong position of Allatoona Gap, and, at the same time, transferring itself across the range of hills of the same name, where it was expected we would meet so stout an opposition. The railroad has been brought along at the same time. Thus we have accomplished the third great step in the march to Atlanta—Buzzard Roost, Resaca, and Allatoona. There remains only the fourth—Chattahoochee River. By calculating the time it has

consumed to accomplish the preceding three, the reader may make for himself an estimate of the time it will take to put us in Atlanta. Let him not forget though that a river is hard to be flanked, and that the rebels are now fighting where they will fight best—at their very doors—while we are at the end of a very long tether.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD NEAR DALLAS, JUNE 4, 1864. }

Special Field Orders, No. 17.

The attention of the General commanding has been called to certain facts which had already attracted his own attention, and concerning which he orders:

1. In case of skirmish or battle, the wounded must be brought off the field by musicians or non-combatants, distinguished by a badge of white cloth on the left arm. In no case, as long as firing continues, should an armed soldier abandon his command in battle to attend the wounded.—*See par. 784, Army Regulations.*

2. Hospitals are too far to the rear of their corps or divisions; they should be kept up as close as possible and covered by the shape of ground, and not by distance. The surgeons in charge are responsible that slight wounds and shirking be not the cause of detaining armed men about their hospitals. Each attendant should have at all times about his person the written authority which justifies his presence at the hospital, or in passing to and from the command to which his hospital belongs.

3. Skulking, shirking, and straggling behind in time of danger are such high detestable crimes that the General commanding would hardly presume them possible, were it not for his own observation, and the report that at this moment soldiers are found loafing in the cabins to the rear, as far back as Kingston. The only proper fate of such miscreants is that they be shot as common enemies to their profession and country; and all officers and patrols sent back to arrest them, will shoot them without mercy, on the slightest imprudence or resistance. By thus wandering in the rear they desert their fellows, who expose themselves in battle in the full faith that all on the rolls are present, and they expose themselves to capture and exchange as good soldiers, to which they have no title. It is hereby made the duty of every officer who finds such skulkers, to deliver them to any Provost Guard, regardless of corps, to be employed in menial or hard work, such as repairing roads, digging drains, sinks, &c. Officers, if found skulking, will be subjected to the same penalty as enlisted men, viz: instant death, or the hardest labor and treatment. Absentees not accounted for, should always be mustered as deserters, to deprive them of their pay and bounties, reserved for honest soldiers.

4. All will be styled skulkers who are found to the rear, absent from their proper commands without written authority from their proper commander. Captains can not give orders or

passes beyond their regimental limits; Colonels, beyond brigade limits; nor Brigadiers beyond division limits. The commanding Generals of the three departments alone can order officers of detachments with or without wagons, back to Kingston or any other general depot.

5. If unarmed soldiers are found on horses or mules at a distance from their proper command or train, any cavalry escort, or patrol, will make prisoners of the men and appropriate the horse or mule to the use of the cavalry. Orderlies to general officers on duty will be easily recognized by bearing official orders or receipts for the same. But each general officer should provide his orderlies with an official detail, to be carried with him.

Horses or mules sent to forage or to graze, should be sent by detachment, with arms and military organization, when they will always be respected.

6. Brigade and regimental commanders are the proper officers to keep their officers and men to their places. The Commanding General will, by his inspectors and in person, give this matter full attention, and when the time comes for reports, on which to base claims for reward and promotion, no officer having a loose straggling command need expect any favor.

7. The commanding Generals of the three armies will make this order public, and organize at once guards and patrols to carry it into full effect. By order of Major-General W. T. Sherman.

L. M. DAYTON,
Aide-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF }
TENNESSEE, IN THE FIELD, }
NEAR NEW HOPE CHURCH, JUNE 4, 1864. }

The above order will be read at least three times to every regiment, battery, and detachment of this command. By order of Major-General McPherson.

WILLIAM T. CLARK,
A. A. G.

J. W. BARNES,
A. A. G.

TWO MILES NORTH-WEST OF BIG SHANTY, }
GEORGIA, July 11, 1864. }

After halting two days in the vicinity of Acworth to recruit and await the completion of the bridge at Etowah, the army again took up the line of march southward at six o'clock yesterday morning. They have already found the reluctantly retreating rebels drawn up in one of their usual good positions, and to-night the two armies are again fully deployed and lying in line of battle. The order of the corps had been much modified since the beginning of the campaign, and was as follows: Schofield on the right; next Howard, Palmer, and McPherson, with General Hooker bringing up the rear, for once. McPherson's command extended to the east of the railroad, while the right was several miles to the west of it; all marching on parallel roads toward Marietta. The country be-

tween Allatoona Mountains, which we were now well out of, and the Pine Mountains (or Hills) where the rebels are now posted, is moderately level and occupied by farms, and the march went briskly on till about noon, when the advance had reached a point about seven miles below Ackworth, and discovered a few rebel skirmishers. Cruft's brigade, of Stanley's division, had the advance, and with the Thirty-first Indiana and parts of the Ninetieth Ohio and Twenty-first Illinois thrown out as skirmishers, the division advanced slowly, halting frequently to await the results of the skirmishing. The rebels were evidently few in number, and retired slowly before us, throwing back now and then a shot, as if to lure us into a trap. The experience of the army near Dallas had taught it caution, and they were not to be induced to throw themselves gratuitously upon works which the rebels had constructed at their leisure, and for that very purpose. Accordingly, as soon as we were within three-quarters of a mile of Pine Mountain, on top of which could be seen through the trees a line of rifle pits, and the rebels moving about among them, a final halt was called, and the men proceeded slowly to form themselves into line. The various brigades turned into the thick woods and began scrambling their way out to the right and left of the road. What bad places the rebels select for us to fight in! It is their prerogative, however, to choose their own ground, and they seem disposed to make the most of it. Giving up all hope of a victory over our forces, they are seeking to weary our army out, and thus bring the campaign to naught, by taking advantage of every favorable site for fortifying strongly, thus compelling us to do likewise and consume time. We must defend our point till the flanking can be got well under way, and by that time several days have been consumed, and when they find our forces beginning to come upon their sides, then they quietly withdraw to choose another position. This Pine Mountain is a single range of hills simply, running parallel to the great mountain chains, north of it, but presents good facilities for impeding a march, being composed of separate summits which command the depths below, and the whole densely wooded.

In the afternoon a section of battery B, of the Second Pennsylvania artillery, was brought up, and threw a few shells wildly among the trees, without any effect whatever. The rebels did not prefer to disclose their lurking places. The only casualties of the day were one man, John F. Hoskins, Company F, Ninetieth Ohio, killed, and a member of the Twenty-first Illinois, slightly wounded. The firing was very scattering, and at long intervals. Early this morning the lines had been completed, and immense numbers of axes were then put in requisition, felling trees for the defences. Though the rebels had guns planted close, as they have shown during the day, and could have made much trouble among the swarming choppers,

they remained silent. The day was spent in perfecting and consolidating the lines and completing the works, while the firing has been sparse, and almost entirely from the Union forces. Rain has fallen in torrents, and the wagons drag heavily; but trenches dig easily, and that is the main business on hand for several days. It is pretty safe to predict that there will be little fighting of consequence here—in front, at least.

The army was surprised and gladdened to-day, by the unfamiliar sound of the railway whistle, the first for many days. A train arrived in the afternoon, and pushed clear down to Big Shanty. We have rumors in camp to-night that a train of cars was blown up on the road between Kingston and Resaca, by a torpedo, and two cars shattered to pieces.

Napoleon says: "The frontiers of States are either large rivers, or chains of mountains, or deserts. Of all these obstacles to the march of an army, the most difficult to overcome is the desert; mountains come next, and broad rivers occupy the third place." Although the Allatoona range did not present any serious obstacles in the matter of altitude or abruptness, yet they afforded many great advantages to an army obstinately bent on disputing the passage of another, and the adroitness with which these were overcome or evaded might escape the reader who did not give special attention to the manner of it. General Johnson had had sufficient time after his defeat at Resaca to fortify himself strongly in the naturally very strong position of Allatoona Gap, and, expecting that our forces would follow him up by the line of the railroad, he confidently awaited their approach. You have already been informed of the very simple and obvious expedient by which he was wholly deceived, and the crossing of the Etowah effected without loss. Finding that his opponent was well over the river and marching south by the Dallas Road, he hastily withdrew from the Gap and threw his forces before us as rapidly as possible. Hardee's corps arrived first and in time to throw up fortifications which would prevent us from passing more than two-thirds of the way through the mountain range. He then advanced boldly beyond his intrenchments sufficient to threaten the passage of the Pumpkin Vine. General Hooker, who led the way, was able to get over the river but one division of his corps, before he encountered the rebels, but he attacked so impetuously with this that they were driven back, and the remainder of the army allowed to cross undisturbed. Two-thirds of the way had thus been accomplished without sacrifice, simply by the flanking movement from Kingston. But a third of the distance yet remained to be passed, before the open country beyond could be reached. Accordingly, as soon as the lines were well formed and the strength of the rebel position had been tested, a slow but steady movement of the entire army to the left and east was begun, by drawing back cautiously, divisions and corps from their places

on the right, and marching them quietly through the woods to new positions on the left. But as the rebels continually followed this up, it was found that it would accomplish nothing, except a parallel extension of the lines indefinitely; so the movement was made more rapid, and, at the same time, our line, which was enabled to be always a little in advance of that of the rebels, was made to bear hard upon them, thus crowding them slowly back. A few miles passed over in this manner showed the rebels that we would inevitably reach the level ground, where the two armies would stand on an equality, and that they were slowly sliding out from the cover of their works, abandoned their position in despair, and have taken up the one they at present occupy. Thus the whole of the range was gained, and, in doing it, our forces had, at the same time, accomplished another desirable object, the re-occupation of the railroad and the reopening of communication, which, by this time, was highly necessary, in order to procure supplies.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL OSTERHAUS, NEAR KINESAW }
MOUFFLAIR, June 16, 1864. }

The continued rain that has been pouring for the past few days, and made it an absolute impossibility to execute any movement of large bodies of troops, ceased yesterday. Still the time that the clerk of the weather gave the troops for rest, was not unimproved. The men were moved into position, and dispositions were made that any time must be made. The troops, too, had time to become acquainted with the ground; and, speaking of the necessities, I should have been glad to have had some of the fairest of the fair (the late Sanitary) for visitors to the little bark shanties, the homes pro tem of the "brave and the free." There sat the bold warrior, some busy writing, may be to the loved ones at home, or may be his diary, for these soldiers are savage critics, and will think for themselves. "Now, then, Frank," quoth one, as I sat chatting with a brave, who, sans trowsers, sat with the before-mentioned article not-mentioned, across his knee, darning a rent that seemed large even to a poor slave of the quill, and you know—oh! but I am telling the secrets of Bohemia—"Frank, I says!" Well? What a man Logan is, I've just been writing here about the Dallas fight. Listen. We had just gotten the rebs where we wanted them, and were just making them hop, when along came Logan on horseback calling to us, "give it to 'em, boys, and when they waver, go for them." Now my idea is that the General has just got no right to be doing those scrapes all the time. Say, Mr. Man, what do you think about it? If you are all right and ain't that man that wrote that, what's name, about Dodge doing all the fighting at Dallas? Why here is your coffee and tax (on the boys)."

Enough of this. The men were in splendid trim when they were this morning made to expect a little fight, for a change of position.

General Logan this morning received orders

to make a demonstration on the enemy's right. At eleven o'clock Harrow's division was moved into position on the left of our line.

The brigade of Colonel Williams was placed in such a position as to be able to gain the enemy's flank. Walcott, as gallant a soldier as we have, had in his pocket the order to carry the crest of the hill, more than a thousand yards distant, and had for his support as good troops as the country holds, to wear the national blue for three years, or for the war. Those with Harrow were the men who were made to waver at Dallas by some knight of the quill, who was not there. But I go from my story to go at a luckless reporter.

The troops moved forward splendidly, with skirmishers in advance, until the timber that skirted the base of the ridge was reached, when the skirmishers were drawn in, and the charge ordered. Forward they threw themselves, Walcott leading the men, who seemed to feel his determined bravery as a challenge to them to stand up to their work. There, then, seemed no need of fear. The men rushed up the steep hill, with cheer after cheer, carrying the crest, and dashed over the rebel line, heedless of the fire that was poured into their ranks.

Some of our men were burned by the discharge of the rebel muskets. Soon the firing ceased, and the next scene that our eyes were greeted with was the marching of a line of men, clad in dirt colored raiment, towards us, which, when resolved into name, was discovered as portions of the Thirty-first and Fortieth Alabama regiments, to the number of over three hundred men. Our loss was forty-five men killed and wounded.

Just as General Harrow advanced, a gallant charge was made by a portion of General Osterhaus' division, led by the General himself, and the works in his front were carried, after a short but sharp skirmish.

The batteries in General Blair's front were served with good effect, and, the boys say, "made some of the graybacks *git* from the rail piles in a hurry." To-night, as I write, the soldiers about me are, to judge from their conversation, satisfied, that if the affair had been an attack instead of a demonstration, they could have carried the "lookouts" in their front, Kinesaw and Brushy Mountains.

ERG SEAWY, CORN CO., GA., }
June 16, 1864. }

At the invitation of a friend, and while in Pulaski on business, the writer sat at meat, not only with republicans and sinners, but also with rebels. A young lady did the honors of the table most gracefully, taking great pains in pouring out the essence of Java into cups of china to display to good advantage the daintiest taper fingers in the world. Withal she was very pretty.

The usual table talk began, when my friend, who well understood her secession proclivities, turned to her, and pleasantly remarked:

"Mr. ———, my friend and our guest, has relatives in the South—two brothers in the rebel army."

"Is that true? *They* are fighting in a good cause" she said spiritedly.

I rejoined, "No doubt they *think* so," and had hoped to avoid a discussion of that most of all unpleasant subject. In this I was doomed to disappointment.

"How can you, Mr. ———, fight against them?" she continued, half angrily.

"I am not fighting or willing to fight against relatives, but for principle, a flag, a Government. Nor am I in the loyal army because I hate the South, for in my opinion that man who cannot rise above sectional animosities, is not equal to the emergency! One can give no greater proof that he loves his whole country than that he is willing to die for its salvation."

A warm discussion ensued, in which the young lady became angry at every body in general, and myself in particular. But I could not wish her any harm, any way. And when a few days afterward, her brother was caught in the act of burning a railroad bridge, and she could be seen, in her despair, imploringly asking "Will the authorities hang him, my poor, dear brother?" I was glad to offer her my heartfelt sympathy.

This same young lady, so warm an advocate of Southern rights, has since married a Yankee officer.

In Huntsville I called upon a lady, and was ushered into the parlor of a large brick mansion, where every thing betokened wealth and luxury. The walls were hung with paintings, the piano was most elaborately ornamented, and the floor was covered with a velvet down of a Brussels carpet. Such a home! Was not it a happy one?

"I'll tell you, Mr. ———," said the lady, and I shall never forget her saddened tone, "Before the war we used to live luxuriously as a family; but since then many a time have we sat down to a breakfast consisting of only corn-bread and water! Meat we could not buy, and coffee was out of the country."

Her experience is but an evidence of what this war has done for Southern aristocracy. Two of her sons are in the Southern army and one of her son-in-laws is a member of the rebel Congress. What must they think of an "Independence" which only affords their mother corn-bread and water.

The effectiveness of our batteries is proverbial. The rebels have a holy horror of them. While advancing on Resaca, when Sweeny's division was on the right and in reserve, Captain Arndt's Michigan battery was wheeled into position.

"Do you see that house?" said the Captain, addressing one of his gunners, and pointing to a building a mile away.

"I do, Captain, was the response."

"Can you hit it?"

"Yes, sir!"

The piece was leveled, the lanyard drawn, and the chimney of the house fell with a crash!

Any of the Sherman's batteries could have done the same thing.

The Sixty-sixth Illinois infantry, or Western Sharpshooters as they call themselves, one of the best regiments in the Sixteenth corps, use the Henry rifle, which, when fully charged, shoots sixteen times. Generally it is employed as a skirmish regiment. Speaking of these guns, some of the rebel prisoners at Dallas remarked:

"What kind of guns do you sharpshooters use? We are forced to believe that they are loaded on Sunday so that they'll shoot all the rest of the week! And"—alluding to the peculiar motion of priming these fire-arms no doubt—"such soldiers! why they are the most polite fellows we ever saw, for every time they kill one of us they come to a present arms!"

If Georgia is noted for anything beyond its tar-makers it is for remorseless wood-ticks. The whole country is full of them. No insect could be more impertinent—none more uncomfortable to one's feelings.

It was an imposing scene. A rebel regiment, their bayonets glistening in the slanting rays of the setting sun, were having a dress parade on the summit of the Kenesaw Mountain. Below were their rifle-pits, and their *comrads de armes* occupying them. The armies of the Republic, flaunting the glorious old stars and stripes, were in the valley making gradual but confident approaches.

A courier dashed up; he hands the Adjutant a document. It is an order from Johnson, announcing that the Southern cavalry had cut the railroad, behind Sherman, and completely severed his communication with the United States. Breathless silence evinces the attention which every word of the order receives, as the Adjutant reads. Cheers are about to be given, when hark! loud whistles from Sherman's cars, at Big Shanty, interrupt them. The number of whistles increase. Altoona, Ackworth, and Big Shanty depots resound with them. The rebel soldiers set up a broad laugh, and the last my informants*—some thirty in all, including four commissioned officers—saw of the Adjutant, he was stalking away, with the order in his hand, ejaculating derisively, "Over the left!" "in a horn!" and "what will come next!"

BIG SHANTY, GEORGIA, June 17, 1864.

Joe Johnson holds steadily on his position, twenty-six miles north of Atlanta, though the heavy skirmishing along his front for the past three days, has compelled him to sharply define his lines. His line is now closely circumscribed by ours. In no place are the hostile parallels more than a musket-shot apart. The rebel right rests on Kenesaw Mountain, on the

* A company of Western Virginians, who deserted the sinking ship of the conspirators, and came into our lines yesterday, tells this story, which is well authenticated by the circumstances.

railroad, four miles north of Marietta, their left on Lost Mountain, some six miles west of Kinsaw. Between these two formidable ridges the rebels have gradually been forced back from a triangle, with the apex toward us, until their line is but a faint crescent, their centre still being slightly advanced. Right, left and centre, their position is closely invested. Our troops have shed parallel after parallel, until the country in their rear is furrowed with rifle-pits and abattis, and scored with a labyrinth of roads.

The country is covered with primitive forests, and in very few places are there cleared spans sufficiently large to display the movements of a brigade. There is an abundance of scrubby undergrowth which hides everything a few yards distant from view, and when one inspects the difficulties, it seems hardly credible—though such is the case—that we have fully developed the enemy's position with two days' skirmish enterprise.

For ten days we have had more or less rain, and toward the end of the period the water descended as it only can come down in a Southern latitude. The June rains that nearly drowned Rosecrans' army, in the advance on Tullahoma, were duplicated, and old campaigners speak of that watery siege with decreasing respect. The bad roads became impassable. Every body was drenched. The trees dropped the intercepted moisture in tears as big as walnuts. The countless mules of the trains looked more than ever like the rodent tribe, which Norway has generally implanted in every hemisphere, and teamsters became silent, because the dynamics of profanity were exhausted. Skirmishers shot at each other under compulsion. It did seem utterly superfluous to be wasting powder and ball on a melancholy, dripping human effigy, enveloped in pouches, pulling away at an unequal pipe, and despairingly stalking from one tree to another taking an involuntary bath. Skirmishing was not brisk these days. It was perhaps suspended from malice, for few men of average vindictiveness would shoot an enemy, while he was as clammy as a cod, and had a crawling rivulet trained down his back.

It is fortunate that by the time these incessant rains were upon us, we were fully established on the railroad. It would have been simply impossible to transport supplies via Kingston and Dallas. In fair weather that route was difficult and for the supply of an army as large as Sherman's, impracticable under the most propitious circumstances.

Fair weather dawned once more, day before yesterday morning, and with it renewed hostilities on the skirmish lines. Movements have been active ever since, the history of which is subjoined.

July 14 and 15.—On the fourteenth no fighting of importance took place, owing to the almost impassable roads. About noon, however, the Fourteenth and Fourth Corps advanced their lines slightly, which brought on very

slight skirmishing, and continued all the afternoon. The enemy responded to our fire with very little vigor, and gradually gave back. In front of the Fourth Corps, however, there were brief intervals when the skirmishing was quite spirited on both sides. Our artillery kept up a steady fire all the afternoon from the Fourth Corps, directed upon Pine Knob, a very high hill, which the enemy had heavily fortified, and upon which he had twenty pieces of cannon planted, very few of which opened in response to the vigorous salutes of Simonson's Fifth Indiana battery, attached to General Stanley's division. Simonson's battery, or at least one section of it, under command of Lieutenant Allison, opened at eleven o'clock from a commanding point to the west of the knob upon the enemy. The second shot fired exploded immediately in front of Generals Hardee, Johnston and Polk, who were standing together in consultation, and a fragment entered the breast of General Polk, passed through the body, causing instant death. Of this there is not the slightest doubt, as all prisoners and deserters taken in the afternoon agreed as to the manner in which the Reverend Lieutenant-General met a traitor's death.

Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was on Howard's left, skirmished all the afternoon with the enemy, whose line was crowded back steadily until dark. Johnson's division (now commanded by Brigadier-General King, during General Johnson's absence, from the effects of a late wound,) and Davis' division advanced their lines, but their efforts to find an enemy in their front failed, as the enemy had deserted that position of the line entirely. Pine Knob rises out of a valley, and can easily be flanked. General Howard's corps pushed forward on the left toward the Marietta and Burnt Hickory Road, while a demonstration was made on the right by a portion of General Hooker's corps. Night found our line advanced between a half and three fourths of a mile.

On the morning of the fifteenth, it was discovered by General Newton, of the Second division, Fourth Corps, that the enemy had, during the night, evacuated the Knob, and, with his artillery and infantry, fallen back to his main line running nearly parallel with the Marietta and Burnt Hickory Road. This gave us possession of the above road, which was one of the objects of the demonstration, as well as the Knob, from which point an excellent view of the enemy's line could be had. It also afforded an excellent point from which to open signal communication between General Schofield, who was on the extreme right, the town of Big Shanty, where General Sherman's headquarters are situated, and General McPherson's command on the left. At eight A. M., Captain Leonard, Chief Signal Officer of the Fourth corps, established a station on the Knob, and immediately opened with Hooker and Schofield. Subsequently communication was opened with other portions of the line.

Some two hours were consumed in forming our line on the south of, and nearly parallel with the Marietta road. About noon General Schofield advanced in heavy skirmish line, well supported with artillery, upon the rebel left and fought them all the afternoon, losing but few men and gaining many valuable advantages, particulars of which will be furnished you by your correspondent on the right.

The loss on our side in the skirmish of the fourteenth was quite small; while a number of bodies found next morning unburied on and about the Knob, indicated that our artillery, which got a fire upon the Knob from three directions produced its fruits.

At an early hour on the morning of the fifteenth General McPherson's command on the left, which extends from the left of the Fourteenth corps to beyond the railroad, advanced upon the enemy, with very strong lines, supported by artillery; fought them all day very energetically, driving them slowly back upon Kenesaw Mountains. The fire of McPherson's command met with vigorous response. McPherson captured four hundred prisoners during the afternoon. He got an enflading artillery fire upon the enemy, who had taken refuge in his first line of breastworks, drove them from it, and to-night McPherson leads the first line at or near the base of Kenesaw Mountains. His loss was trifling.

AN ASSAULT ON THE CENTRE.

About four o'clock P. M., the Fourth and Fifth corps formed and advanced by column in mass, with brigade front and lines of skirmishers thrown out. The demonstration was made chiefly by the Fourth corps, supported by Palmer on the left. Newton's division, of the Fourth corps, led the movement; the Forty-second and Fifty-first Illinois, under Colonel Bradley, acting as skirmishers. The enemy's skirmishers were encountered and driven about half a mile, when they took refuge behind a breastwork, composed of railway ties, about three feet high. The skirmishers of the Fourth corps, with those of Baird on the left, and Stanley on the right, moved forward and carried the breastworks which were upon the crest of a small ridge. Pushing rapidly forward with the Third Kentucky and other regiments thrown in as skirmishers, Colonel Bradley drove the enemy from the second line of ridges, and got within seventy-five or one hundred yards of the enemy's main line, in front of which was another line of works, from which the rebel skirmishers rushed out and charged upon our skirmishers, who promptly drove them back. While these operations were in progress, the enemy opened his artillery and uncovered his position to us. The main attacking column were not sent forward, and night coming on, the skirmishers were withdrawn to a position on the first ridge about two hundred and fifty yards from the enemy's artillery, where to-night strong fortifications were

erected, and our artillery placed in position to operate upon the enemy to-morrow. General Wood's division was in supporting distance of Newton, but neither division was engaged, except the regiments who acted as skirmishers, and who behaved most gallantly under the volleys of grape and canister poured into them by the rebel artillery. The skirmishers of Stanley's division were the Ninth Indiana, Fifty-ninth Illinois, and Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, the whole under Major Carter, of the Ninth Indiana.

Hooker's command supported Howard on the right, and did splendid work. No artillery was brought into action in the Fourth or Fourteenth corps. Hooker's artillery shelled the enemy vigorously.

While the skirmishers advanced, an infamous rebel assassin named C. H. Jones, company C, Sixth Florida, fell behind our skirmishers and hid himself. When Captain Towseley's ambulance corps were collecting the wounded, Jones, from his hiding place, fired and wounded one of the stretcher-carriers, and immediately came out and surrendered himself, stating that he was tired of the war and had deserted. One of the ambulance corps saw him fire upon his companion, and to-night great indignation is felt round our headquarters, where the murderer has been provided with quarters.

The assault upon the centre was so well planned and rapidly executed, that the enemy was completely taken by surprise. Our loss is very light, probably not one hundred in the three corps who took part in the assault.

The day has been one of success along the whole line, which has been advanced, some portions a mile, and in other portions two and a half miles, and this with a total loss of probably less than three hundred men. The enemy are just beginning to discover that General Sherman and his troops can storm breastworks and masked batteries as well as execute flank movements.

The Twentieth and Twenty-third corps, the latter on the extreme right, supported by the cavalry division of General Stoneman, moved to their positions on the fifteenth, which had been at an angle to the southwest, with the main line, and their skirmishers soon came upon those of the rebels. The latter fell back slowly before them, exchanging a few shots to draw them on. The division of General Hascall, together with the dismounted cavalry, commanded by Colonel Watson, appeared to extend beyond the enemy's main force; that of General Cox, however, encountered opposition. The Sand Town road formed the dividing line between the Twentieth and Twenty-third corps, and determined the line of advance. That the enemy were in inferior force on our right, is evident from the fact that Lieutenant Reynolds, of the Signal corps, had nearly reached the summit of Lost Mountain, supported by a small squad of cavalry, when he was hailed by three shots from a signal station, which alone occupied the place,

but by their firing put the cavalry-men to rout. The disgust of the Lieutenant was great; as by this means a valuable post for observation was allowed to slip through his fingers. He declared that with four resolute infantrymen he could have carried the heights and established his flag.

About noon the rebel skirmish line in front of General Cox, who was by this time slightly in advance of the Twentieth corps, arrived sufficiently near its supporting reserves who were strongly posted on a ridge and intrenched, to halt and begin to deliver a strong fire. Their fortifications could be seen quite plainly in the edge of the wood, at the opposite side of the cleared interval, and the gentle slope in front was dotted with detached rifle-pits from which sharpshooters played upon our line with considerable effect. Finding that he had developed their position, General Cox brought up and planted four pieces each of battery D, First Ohio, and battery D, of the Fifteenth Indiana, which poured into them, at a distance of three quarters of a mile, rapid and effective volleys of shells, to which they could not or would not reply. The position of the ground was such as to give admirable effect to our firing. The shells were accurately sent, and literally shaved the summit of the opposing hill, and, following along down parallel with its descent, ploughed through the tents and their inhabitants at will. Prisoners taken soon after, and bloody traces found upon the ground when we took it, testify alike to their havoc. The First and Fifty-seventh Georgia were broken and fled in confusion. Upward of forty prisoners, mainly from these two regiments, were taken by our fellows, and the manner of their capture was as honorable to the firing of our gunners as it was vexatious to the captives. They were advanced, as I have said, a little distance down the side of the hill, and stationed in little temporary works built of rails, and the explosion of our shells on the top of the hill in their rear was so rapid that they dared not retreat, and were forced to lie still, while our boys marched stealthily forward and laid hands upon them. They cursed their leaders beyond measure, because they did not employ artillery in response to ours, when they had it posted so favorably as it was. Other prisoners were taken by having been left on the skirmish line by their reserves, who departed without giving due notice of the fact, and left them to be "flanked" by our boys. The Nineteenth Ohio battery, Captain Shields, also did effective service in shelling the rebel line, preparatory to our advance. This battery was posted on the right of General Cox's division.

A short time before the batteries ceased firing a sad mishap occurred, in the death of Lieutenant William H. Knowles, Sixty-fifth Illinois, acting Inspector-General to Colonel Cameron's brigade. Riding rashly out into the very skirmish line, he was warned repeatedly of his danger, but continued to advance till he was satisfied

and turned to withdraw. A whole volley was at that moment poured into him, and he fell fatally pierced by four bullets. He survived but a few hours.

As soon as the batteries ceased playing, the entire division, with the Eighth Tennessee and Sixty-fifth Illinois as skirmishers, advanced rapidly and found the rebel works deserted. They had fallen back in haste to another line stretching from Lost Mountain to Kenesaw Mountain, which their prisoners said, and we afterward discovered, to be their main line—their ultimate reliance. But the first one which we had taken was sufficiently strong, and might have offered much more opposition.

The losses in this advance were slight, owing to the entire absence of artillery firing from the enemy.

The advance of the Twenty-third corps was ended about noon, and at once some of the guns were brought over and planted in the old rebel works to be employed again, perhaps, upon their next one, a mile or two distant. It had moved in such a direction with regard to the main line, that the Second corps began now to be crowded between it and the Fourth on the left. It was accordingly moved by the right flank to give room, and placed *en echelon* while General Hooker prepared to bring up his command even with those on its flanks. Early in the afternoon the Twentieth corps began to move forward, and as the Twenty-third on its right and Fourth on its left had already slightly passed it, and were firing into the rebels in Hooker's front "endways," as they expressed it, the corps met little resistance till they approached this main line, of which I have spoken above, the back-bone of the rebel position at this point. The Third division (General Butterfield's) occupied the right, resting on the Sandtown road, and was drawn up about three o'clock in the afternoon, in a cleared field in the rear of a protecting hill, in five lines. The Second division (Geary's) was next on the left, and the First division, with the exception of General Knipe's brigade, which was sent in on the left of General Butterfield, was held in reserve in rear of the Second. The Second division moved out from its position on the main line, and passing south of Pine Mountain, which was already occupied by the Fourth corps, compelled the rebels to fall back from a line of breastworks a mile in extent, running north and south. This result was brought about by General Geary debouching to the east and coming in their rear.

The Third brigade (Colonel Ireland) was then formed in a continuous line, and pushed forward through a piece of open timber to encounter the enemy, and develop his position. The nature of the ground in the rear and the density of the forests, prevented the employment of any supporting batteries, while the rebels had ten pieces and employed them all. The rebel skirmishers were driven from crest to crest, until they rallied upon their main line of breastworks,

about a mile south of Pine Mountain. Cleburne's division, and a portion of Walker's, were drawn up in line, about a quarter of a mile in advance of their works. The division advanced to the attack in fine style, the lines steady almost as on dress-parade, and the men cool, and about four o'clock, they began to move upon the rebel line, and, despite a stubborn resistance, drove them steadily beyond their works. The rebels opened then with a battery, directed upon the right of the division, but they were only permitted to fire six rounds, when they were silenced by Ireland's brigade. They were discovered moving a column rapidly through an open space, as if intending to turn the left of the division, and orders were at once despatched to General Williams to hurry up his division in support. But it was only a stratagem to cover a solid movement upon the right of the division, which had by this time pressed forward considerably in advance of Butterfield's division, and now found itself floating in the air. Here was the real point of danger, but it was promptly met by the One Hundred and Second and part of the Sixtieth New York, which were on the extreme right, and by swinging partly round and presenting a new front, repelled the assault and saved the flank. The division advanced to within eighty yards of the breastworks, and held their ground; but as it was unsupported on both flanks, and the rebel line was their main one, and very strong, it was, of course, impracticable for it to attempt to carry it.

The effect of the rapid discharges of grape and canister at short range upon the division had been very severe, causing a loss of about six hundred. The missing were very few in number, as were also the prisoners taken. Over sixty rounds of ammunition were expended in the attack, and, for lack of roads which were practicable for the ponderous ammunition wagons, a limited supply was hurried up on the backs of team mules.

The division had silenced all the ten guns in its front. One regiment, the Twenty-eighth Pennsylvania, unmanning three of them, and the Sixty-sixth Ohio another, and have kept them thus throughout the night and up to this time. If only the rebel line could be broken, on its flanks and driven back, the Second division would be enabled to carry off these, its fairly and hardly-won trophies, in triumph.

About six o'clock, P. M., General Butterfield's division had deployed into position a little in rear of the piece of woods in which the rebels were lurking, and upon advancing a short distance into it the firing became general in front of the two divisions, and continued to be very heavy till night, when it began slowly to slacken. The Third division had been able to advance nearly the entire distance through a cleared field, in which a rebel line could not be posted, and as it reached the woods late and was engaged a shorter time than the Second, its losses were much lighter, not, perhaps, much over one hundred and sixty. The General led

the division in column of brigades, the Third brigade, General Ward, being in advance and suffering most severely in consequence, and he had advanced but a little distance into the timber when three batteries opened on them; a heavy fire of grape and canister went smashing through the trees at a rate which, had it continued any great length of time, must have proved very destructive. Their shells, also, raked through the first line and flying high over the heads of the last, lodged in the midst of a promiscuous congregation of camp-followers, correspondents and the like, producing an active stampede among them to the no small amusement of veterans. The division bore the rebels magnificently along ahead of it, over their first rude line of works, till they got within their second, behind which they made a stand. So impetuously did the men advance, that before they were well aware of it, they had left a gap on the right, between themselves and the Twenty-third corps, and were threatened with a flank attack. Two regiments were immediately refused, and swinging back, closed the perilous interval, and rendered the position secure.

General Butterfield and staff emulated the splendid bravery of their regiments, riding to all points where orders were to be executed or delivered, with as little apparent hesitation as if the air was not thick with flying bullets. The General was made the immediate and direct object of sharpshooters' aim for the twenty-fourth time in this short war, and yet escaped with impunity.

Early in the evening, Major Griffin, commanding the Nineteenth Michigan, was mortally wounded through the lungs, and died the next morning. His name was mentioned by the General as that of an officer who had distinguished himself by the display of every quality pertaining to an able leader and fearless soldier. Among others wounded were Major Z. S. Ragan, Seventieth Indiana; Captain McManus, Second Illinois, and Captain Sleeth of the same.

Among the prisoners brought in during the day by the Twenty-third corps, were several from the First Georgia, whose intelligence appeared to be somewhat above the common level, who had come in voluntarily and given themselves up. One, in particular, said he had been long waiting for the opportunity, which had come at last. He lingered in a rifle-pit until he could hang out his handkerchief in front without being discovered by his retreating comrades. He dreaded to have the word conveyed to his friends that he was a deserter. He declared that one half his regiment, and others that he knew, would follow his example were it not for that, and for the fear they have, and which their leaders have sedulously inculcated, that they will be impressed into our armies as soon as they have taken the oath of amnesty. This lying insinuation has been circulated among them, and made to wear some coloring of plausibility from the voluntary enlistments which have, in some

cases taken place among released prisoners, and which the rebels of course, represented to their ignorant followers as involuntary. This prisoner also stated that the rebel authorities were making tremendous preparations to resist us at the Chattahoochee—employing constantly four thousand negroes upon the fortifications of the opposite bank.

During the sixteenth the Twenty-third corps was advanced about a half mile beyond the strong works they had constructed the night before, and occupied a position running more nearly north and south than the previous one. The great rebel line of works stretches from Lost Mountain in a northeast direction for about two miles, and it was as opposing this and preparing to uncover its exact locality, that the movement was made. But little skirmishing was kept up during the day, as the rebels were falling back slowly, as usual, upon the main stay of fortifications. General Butterfield also got into position in his front eighteen pieces of artillery, and with a remembrance still lingering in his mind of the rebel cannonade of the previous evening, he ordered them to fire by batteries. A few rounds of this sort of pounding effectually silenced the rebels till night. Pretty severe skirmishing took place along the line, killing and wounding about fifty men, most of whom were struck early in the day. The rebel firing was unusually spiteful and effective. Colonel Smith, of the One Hundred and Second Illinois, went out with an escort of ten men to inspect the ground where the cannons were about to be planted, when they opened a volley upon them, killing one man, and wounding several others beside the Colonel; of the whole party of eleven who had gone out, but two returned unhurt.

June 16.—To day I met a very intelligent staff officer, connected with the Fourth corps, who gave me a very accurate narrative of the operations of the Fourth corps from the time it left Resaca in pursuit of the enemy until its arrival near this point. On starting upon the sixteenth ult., in pursuit of the fleeing enemy from Resaca, the Fourth were given the advance on the line of the railway and the dirt road running parallel to it, which they held all the way to Cassville, and had almost hourly skirmishing with the enemy along the whole route of march. In all these skirmishes the corps fully maintained its well-won name for irresistibility and bravery. On the twentieth it was relieved by the Twentieth corps which took the lead. For ten days and ten nights, a large portion of the corps was under fire, and in all that time were not relieved; yet there was no complaint. The men were cheerful and the officers felt that they were but performing their duty. During the campaign from Ringgold to June first, the whole loss in the corps was three thousand eight hundred and six, in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Only about one hundred and fifteen prisoners were taken from the corps, while the missing is *nil*.

During the spirited skirmish that took place at Adairsville, the artillery fire of the enemy is represented as having been remarkable. One shell dismounted Colonel T. J. Morgan and Lieutenant-Colonel Fullerton of the corps staff, struck the horses of two of the orderlies and one of the escort, carried one of the bars off the shoulder-strap of Captain Bliss, of General Newton's staff, who was standing near, and finished its work by slightly wounding one of the orderlies.

The battle of Pickett's Mill, on the twenty-seventh, in which Wood's division acted so handsomely, was briefly described by one of your correspondents, but I have learned a few additional facts in which the public may be interested. The ground upon which the enemy had made a stand, and it was believed had heavily fortified, was in a thick and almost inaccessible wood, whose hills of various sizes, and ridges, rose out of the valley in which were deep and swampy ravines, so thickly covered with vines, creepers and undergrowth of various kinds, that they presented barriers of no mean sort to an advance. All the hills were strongly fortified by hastily thrown up works, from behind which, as Wood boldly and gallantly advanced his division, desperate volleys of musketry, grape, shrapnel, and canister were delivered into his ranks, yet the line did not break; for a moment after the shock there was a perceptible wavering along the line, when forward with a cheer the men would rush to meet another volley, equally as deadly in its effects. The enemy were driven from one ridge to another, our serried ranks were closed up, and onward moved the veterans of Wood to the charge. At last a ridge was reached where the enemy was intrenched behind very strong works; from which the fire was most destructive. Five regiments who were on the skirmish line, the Nineteenth Ohio, Seventy-ninth Indiana, Ninth and Seventeenth Kentucky, and the Seventy-eighth Pennsylvania, while advancing, came upon a rail fence. The order was given to remove the fence and construct a barricade. Seizing a rail, each of the boys charged up the hill to its crest, with a rail in one hand and gun in the other, and under a deadly fire constructed their barricade, behind which they lay returning the enemy's fire until eleven o'clock at night, when they retired. So desperate was the fighting that in two hours Wood lost four hundred and seventy-five men killed, and seven hundred and eighty-two wounded, or a total of one thousand four hundred and fifty-seven. Trees from four to five inches in diameter were cut down by bullets from the enemy's fire. The Forty-ninth Ohio in this bloody engagement lost two hundred and fifty-two men out of four hundred and seventy-five taken into the battle. All authorities agree that the engagement was the severest of the campaign, and the division led by the stubborn Wood have the full credit of a gallant resistance in a position where most commands would have retired and given up the contest, without disgrace. General Howard is justly

proud of the division, and knows that he can depend upon it every time. Indeed, the whole corps, from Ringgold to Big Shanty, have covered themselves with glory.

Colonel Vandever, commanding a brigade in the Third division, Fourteenth corps, is quite ill, but is recovering. General Cruft of Stanley's division, is also very ill, and his brigade is now commanded by Colonel Kirby, of the One hundred and First Ohio.

Nothing of any moment was accomplished on the centre, or line of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps to-day (sixteenth). Slight skirmishing has been progressing all day, with a gradual advance of our lines, but the loss was but fifteen or twenty. The batteries planted on our earth-works, thrown up on the night of the fifteenth, shelled the enemy's works quite vigorously, and inflicted quite a heavy loss upon him. Late in the afternoon, Kimball's brigade, of Newton's division, was thrown forward to an advanced position, and intrenched itself within three hundred yards of the enemy's main line of works, and toward evening the other brigade of Newton advanced and took position on the right and left. Artillery was placed in commanding position early in the evening, and opened upon the enemy, rendering his position quite uncomfortable. Stanley's division has skirmished all day with the enemy, and lost very lightly.

Baird, of the Fourteenth corps, skirmished all day, but had but trifling loss in his division.

Last night, at dark, when firing ceased on the centre, our lines were about four hundred yards in advance of the position of the morning. The enemy betrays unmistakable signs of uneasiness to-night, having been so closely pressed all day.

To-day, Captain Simonson, formerly of the Fifth Indiana battery, and one of the best artillerymen in the Fourth corps, who has been acting as Chief of Artillery for General Stanley, finding it impossible to tell where to direct his fire, went out on our advance skirmish line, where he took a position, and forming a chain line of men, passed back from one to another instructions to the batteries where to direct their fire. He was constantly exposed all the afternoon, to meet with instant death. At night, just before dark, while looking through an embrasure, he was struck in the head by a musket ball and instantly expired. No braver man ever sighted a gun; in social life he was universally beloved, not only for his military skill but also for his quiet, unassuming manner. His loss will be much felt in the corps. The Captain had a brother-in-law killed at Dallas, and on Tuesday, when his battery killed General Polk, he remarked that he had avenged his relative's death. Little did the brave Simonson then suppose that his days of usefulness were so nearly numbered. His many friends at home and in the army will have the satisfaction of knowing that Simonson died in harness, nobly battling for the overthrow of treason. May the brave soldier rest in peace. His body goes to Chattanooga to-morrow, in charge of a brother officer.

June 17, 5 A. M.—General Howard has just received a despatch from General Stanley, that the enemy had disappeared from the front, and that he entered his works at 3.30 this morning. Hooker also reports that he can find no enemy in his front.

6 53 A. M.—Ten prisoners just brought in from Stanley's front, report that the enemy has withdrawn his centre two miles, but still holds his old position at Kenesaw Mountain on our left, and Lost Mountain on our right. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that heavy firing has been heard all night and this morning in Schofield's front, and while I write, the enemy on the left centre are responding to Palmer's vigorous advance upon him, immediately to the right of Kenesaw.

It is now nine A. M., and firing in the front of Palmer has nearly died away. Nothing is heard but occasional artillery and musketry reports on the extreme left of Palmer's corps, and on M'Pherson's right. The enemy has not yet been found on the centre, where Howard has been advancing with artillery and infantry through the deserted works of the enemy, which are very formidable in their appearance. Seventy-two prisoners, chiefly taken by Stanley, have been sent in to corps headquarters this morning. Hardee's is the corps that Howard and Palmer have been fighting for two days.

General Loring is reported as General Polk's successor in command of the corps. A few deserters come to us, but it is generally on the retreat, when they fall behind purposely to be captured. At no other time is it safe to attempt to desert, especially as desertion is sure to be followed by a public shooting exhibition.

NEAR KENESAW MOUNTAIN, GA.,
June 20th, 1864, }

Johnston's army is yielding line after line of works. Instead of their bold and defiant front of a week ago, sweeping from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain, with their centre advanced to Pine Knob, three or four miles north of their flanks, they are already circumscribed around their central and last stronghold—Kenesaw. In army parlance, they are losing their grip. First, their centre at Pine Knob, where General Polk fell, was enfiladed, and their heavy works were rendered worse than valueless. Next our lines enveloped theirs on their flanks with such vigorous audacity that they relaxed their hold on Lost Mountain, the citadel on their left flank. Still the pressure continues. No sacrifice they make of position, lessens the terrible momentum of Sherman's army for longer than twenty-four hours. Like the breaking up of a broad, ice-bound river, this great movement progresses. An irresistible superiority in force, pushes the enemy back mile after mile. They have abandoned not less than six or seven parallels, several of them constructed with great labor, and aiming in their general configurations to be elaborately scientific. This is the precise situation. We crowd them day and night—push

them from tree to tree, from ridge to ridge, from earthwork to earthwork, from their first position to their last. A vast skirmish blazes from morning to night, along the ten or twelve miles of infantry lines, and our guns fill the air with round, reverberating oaths, drowning often the spiteful expletives of the musket. The enemy's sharpshooters reply bitterly to ours, but their artillery is very reticent. They seem to be nursing one grand, consuming hope—that we propose to assault. But Sherman seems satisfied with his steady progress, and, to return to our frigid metaphor, prefers to let the ice float down the river in its own good time, instead of expending energy in accelerating the motion of any particular floe. If we continue to make the mile per day which we now notch behind us regularly, we shall be in Atlanta in twenty-five days, by the mile-stones.

Our right wing is now threatening Marietta, four or five miles in rear of the rebel stronghold at Kenesaw. Our left is also working past Kenesaw. Both rebel flanks, especially their left, are bent back, and it would certainly seem that Johnston should be retreating unless he intends fighting with his wings back to back, and by that means get *our* wings to shooting each other. It is believed certain that the rebel army must soon retreat south of the Chattahoochee river, where their prisoners *now* say will be made the last ditch. I cannot but believe, however, after seeing the strength and number of their fortifications, and witnessing the tenacity of their resistance, that they may at some time have intended to make Kenesaw their last ditch. We shall see. This much is certain—they are losing their hold on the strongest position between here and Atlanta.

Our lines are close to Kenesaw Mountain, and within very easy range of the numerous rebel guns planted on that bold feature in the landscape. But we have great difficulty in developing the whereabouts of their guns, as they keep determined silence, in order to slaughter the Yankees by wholesale in case they make the hoped-for assault. The fire of our batteries on the left and right center having failed to provoke a competent answer, a locomotive was brought into action. The railroad is in plain sight of Kenesaw for several miles, and the rebels on that lofty peak observed, with increasing though undefinable apprehension, the fuming iron horse, gliding at a good rate of speed toward their position. The pace of the engine was not lessened until it had passed our skirmish line, and was nearing the base of the mountain, when the rebel artillerists, fearing, it would be hard to tell exactly what, opened their hitherto silent batteries lustily, and cheered furiously as the locomotive speedily crawfished, amid an extensive flight of shells. The engine escaped uninjured, and in a moment our guns opened again, and now being enabled to plant their shells in exactly the right place, they soon enjoined another sort of silence on the enemy's artillery. The batteries developed have since

been subjected to a most constant and fierce bombardment.

Blair, on the left, has occupied Bush Mountain, the most important eminence east of Kenesaw. McPherson's corps are, with the other portions of the line, constantly skirmishing and gaining with equal rapidity upon the rebels. The artillery practice on the left is very fine. This arm of the service has, indeed, during the present contest, proven more than usually efficient.

Despite the almost incessant rain of the nineteenth, the right wing maintained a continued activity—steadily advancing the lines by a movement to the right flank, thus gradually drawing the lines of circumvallation closer and closer around Kenesaw Mountain. Hascall's division, the Second, which had been thrown in reserve by the closing in together of the Twentieth and Twenty-third corps, was late in the day, thrown in to the extreme right, while Hooker's corps relieved in one of its divisions, was enabled to extend itself in the direction of the general movement. This latter was in a direction nearly north and south and at the same time bearing upon the rebel lines toward the south-east. The lines were advanced during the day about half a mile, abandoning, of course, the works thrown up to meet any demonstration on the part of the rebels, only to construct new ones at night, to be passed by in like manner next day. The rebels opposed to this forward movement only a desultory skirmish fire, aided occasionally by a few shots from a battery when our forces pressed too closely, but which were invariably silenced by a prompt reply from our guns. The losses of the day may have amounted to fifty men put *hors de combat* in the various commands. Among the wounded was Captain Courtois, of the Thirty-third New Jersey, of Geary's division, Twentieth corps. He was in command of a detachment of skirmishers from his own regiment and the One Hundred and Nineteenth New York, and was pressing hard upon the rebel line, when he was struck by a musket ball in the shoulder and severely wounded. The ground was open, and he was compelled to crawl away to the rear, slowly and painfully, a distance of half a mile. Occasionally he would rise and attempt to go forward erect, when the rebels would discharge a volley upon him, and seeing him drop to avoid fire, would cheer lustily. He finally escaped without further injury.

A brigade of General Stoneman's cavalry, under command of Colonel Adams, of the First Kentucky cavalry, penetrated to a point named on the maps as Powder Springs, finding there the rebel outposts, and a division of cavalry under Armstrong. These retired before our advance, without offering opposition, and left the post in our possession. This puts the cavalry forces about nine miles west of Marietta, and at least a mile south of it. The right wing of the infantry is fully down to a line running east and west through Marietta, and is continually swinging so

as finally to enclose it, unless a change is made in the order of march.

Although the campaign in this vicinity has hitherto been lacking in great battles, and those events which, from their momentous importance and tragic interest, claim a notice from the historian and enlist the profoundest sympathies of a whole nation, still there is occasionally one of those touching incidents, known, perhaps, only to the circle of the regiment or brigade, in which patriotism shines out as nobly as in the graver annals of heroism. One of these was narrated to me by a participant in it, and I give it to your readers.

A small detachment of the One Hundred and Nineteenth New York were on the skirmish line on the seventeenth of June, advanced close up to the enemy—so close that they had been compelled to halt for the time and throw up slight breastworks of logs as a defence. By some untoward mistake, a party of twelve or fifteen men were ordered to advance beyond these works on picket duty. Though knowing that it was almost certain death to show their heads above the walls of their little fort, still they obeyed without question or hesitation. They had advanced scarcely more than a rod beyond their comrades when a heavy volley of musketry prostrated to the ground every man save two! Two were killed instantly, and the rest wounded more or less severely. All of the wounded, however, were able to drag themselves back and escape, except one poor fellow, Sergeant Guider, who was so badly wounded that he could not stir from his place. There he lay almost within arm's-length of his comrades, and yet they were powerless to rescue him or give him aid, so galling was the rebel fire. One bolder than the rest made the hazardous attempt, but scarcely had he got over the breastworks when he fell severely wounded. They endeavored to allay his raging thirst by throwing to him canteens of water, and even one of these was pierced by a rebel bullet. Finally, as they could not go over the breastworks, they dug a way under them with no other implements than their bayonets, and through it two men crawled and succeeded in reaching him unhurt. Just as they reached him their comrades in the rear gave an exultant cheer, which elicited from the rebels another volley. A fatal ball pierced the poor fellow's breast for a second time, and he had only time to murmur feebly to his rescuers, "Now I die content; I am in your hands," and expired.

IN FRONT OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN, }
GEORGIA, June 23, 1864. }

THE SITUATION.

The corps on the right and left advanced again yesterday, and the centre maintained its threatening position around and upon the base of Kenesaw Mountain, in the teeth of a very heavy artillery fire from the numerous rebel batteries there, to which our guns returned

something more than an indirect reply. Our centre is very close to the heavy rebel works on the mountain, and any further progress there must be achieved by grand assault; for, though the fire of our batteries is very destructive, it can not, unaided, compel an evacuation. The movements of the wings, especially the corps of Hooker and Schofield on the right (which are now just three miles from Marietta, and feeling their way east rapidly), import the speedy accomplishment of Sherman's design of pushing Johnston south of the Chattahoochee river, without any great sacrifice of life. As our various corps converge toward Kenesaw, room to the right or the left must be yielded in order to get all our troops into position. Ground had been yielded to the right exclusively, and every day the right wing extends further to the south. Our extreme right is now south of the latitude of Marietta, and it is the current belief that it will now be speedily strengthened until it is irresistible—that is, the rebels must withdraw so many troops from Kenesaw to oppose it, that they will prefer to retreat.

There is a very pervasive rumor afloat that Joe Johnston has been superseded by Ewell, but it seems to have no better foundation than a camp rumor. An intelligent rebel Lieutenant with whom I conversed yesterday said that every effective soldier in the Confederacy was in the service of Lee and Johnston, and although he himself was a veteran of three years standing, he had just had his first experience in the field, having been stationed with his company at Savannah, Georgia, as provost guard. He stated positively that Johnston had ninety thousand men, but I think he may be safely discounted thirty-three per cent.

McPherson advanced slightly yesterday, but skirmishing along his front was very light. Day before yesterday, Colonel Minty's brigade of cavalry on the extreme left was roughly handled by an overpowering force of the enemy's cavalry, before whom it retired slowly, with a loss of about seventy killed, wounded, and missing.

On the morning of the twenty-second everything gave promise of a renewal of activity in this part of the army, which had now rested several days awaiting the action of the other corps. Hospital tents were struck, at least those occupied by men able to move; the Generals early ordered to horse, and were out on the line overseeing the preparations; and not long after came orders to strike tents of headquarters and get on the road. The rebels, as if divining the movement, and seeking to detain as many as possible in front of the centre, opened a vigorous cannonade from the summit of Kenesaw. It was equally probable, also, that this was intended to cover their retreat, as the whistles of their locomotives could be heard rapidly coming and going in the direction of Marietta.

The two corps had been lying for the pre-

vious two days in a line running about north-east and south-west, and reaching within about two miles of the base of Kenesaw. About nine in the morning the Second division (General Hascall's) which was lying in reserve, took up the line of march, passed over Nose Creek, and advancing beyond the Third, soon began to skirmish slightly with the enemy, though they were in small force, and retired slowly as the division advanced. Soon after the Third division (General Cox) left his position and began to follow up the Second to a position on the extreme right, and the Twentieth corps was likewise put in motion. The movement of the two corps was a wheel upon the left of the Twentieth as a pivot, thus tending constantly to hem in the rebels and throw them in a *cul de sac* between our line and the railroad on two sides and Kenesaw at the end. At the same time that the line was thus swinging, it was being extended considerably southward. When it had swung around so as to be on a north and south line, parallel with and about three miles west of the railroad, the skirmish firing began to grow heavier, and it soon became apparent that the enemy had become apprised of the threatening state of affairs and were hurrying up a strong force to check our advance. Accordingly, about two o'clock, the Twentieth corps and the Second division of the Twenty-third halted, and began to throw up breastworks to meet any sudden emergency, while the skirmishers were still advancing slowly, feeling the enemy's position. The Third division had not yet come up. The Fourteenth Kentucky, Strickland's brigade, of the Twenty-third corps, were acting as skirmishers in front of the brigade, and were nearly a mile in advance, when they ran suddenly upon a picket company, which was just being thrown out as skirmishers in front of the rebel General Stevenson's division, and so sudden was the onset and so thick was the undergrowth, that they were taken by surprise. Thirty-five of them were captured, and the remainder killed or dispersed. Most of the prisoners were from a North Carolina regiment, of whom the rebels are wont to say, "All the tar-heels want, anyhow, is just a chance to run away." After running away and gobbling up thus summarily these pickets, the regiment was compelled to fall back hastily before the main body of the enemy, and take up a new position about half a mile in front of our works, which were now being rapidly completed. They stationed themselves on a commanding ridge, and put out two companies as skirmishers. The rebels having ascertained our whereabouts, began also to erect breastworks and prepare to resist any further advance. It was very readily apparent that they had not expected us in that quarter, both from the statements of prisoners and from the entire absence of works of defence. About five o'clock, having secured themselves by their breastworks, they advanced to dislodge the Fourteenth from their position, which, if occupied by us all night and

fortified, would render theirs untenable. Three regiments were despatched against it, but as it was a very full one and stood well to its post, they were unable to effect their object. Two more were at once sent, and the whole mass then opened a destructive fire and began to advance rapidly upon them. The two companies on the skirmish line were put speedily to rout, but were nevertheless able to bring away five prisoners who had impetuously rushed right into their midst. The loss in these two companies was very severe, one going out with sixty-five and bringing away only twenty-six. Despite the heavy odds against them, the Fourteenth awaited the approach of the five regiments with steadiness, and made no motion toward retiring till they received positive orders from General Hascall to fall back upon the works. The enemy were then so close, and were pouring in so hot a fire, that the regiment necessarily became disorganized in retreat, and came back in confusion. They were soon reformed within the lines, and it was found that the losses amounted to about fifty men killed, wounded, and missing. So rapidly had they been compelled to retreat, that a few killed and wounded were left on the field to fall into the enemy's hands. As soon as the regiment was in, the fire from the works and a few vigorous rounds from the Nineteenth Ohio battery brought the rebels to a speedy halt, and compelled them to retire with loss.

The rattling fire of musketry, and the whistling of the enemy's bullets about them, produced a disgraceful stampede among certain fragments of regiments not yet fully formed in line, and collected about a house from an idle curiosity. General Hascall, however, soon got his men well in hand and formed in four lines, ready for the worst, should it come. Generals Hooker and Schofield were at the house when the firing opened and both rode away, General Schofield to hurry up the Third division on the right, to meet any possible attempt to turn that wing, while General Hooker hastened back along his line to learn the import of a very heavy artillery firing which had been heard for several minutes. He soon returned, reporting that the rebels had made an advance in heavy masses upon the First division, (General Williams') which occupied the right of the corps, and had been driven back by the fire of artillery alone, without the employment of a musket. Batteries I and M of the First New York had secured positions which gave them a cross-fire on the rebels, as they advanced across an open field, and it proved entirely too hot for them. Again, about six o'clock, they made the same attempt, and were driven back still more rapidly, by a combined fire of artillery and musketry, which must, from the openness of the ground, have proved very destructive. Our losses were slight. They did not probably exceed two hundred killed and wounded during the day, and one quarter of this loss was suffered in the Fourteenth Kentucky.

The operations on the centre to-day were characterized by nothing worthy of special note. After four days of assaults and heavy skirmishing with the Fourth and Fourteenth corps, in which he was invariably badly worsted, the enemy gave up all hope of beating back the centre and recovering his lost ground, and immediately turned his attention to another part of the line, the left of Schofield and Hooker, upon which he, to-day, made a desperate assault.

To cover this assault upon Hooker, at eleven A. M., the enemy opened a rapid but random fire upon our centre with his artillery, placed in our immediate front, on high ridges, and from Big and Little Kenesaw and Bald Gap. Our artillery returned their salutations with great vigor and precision; at every discharge of our guns, the rebels could be seen running in every direction, so accurate was the fire of our cannoners. The enemy's guns mounted on Kenesaw were twenty-pound Parrotts, capable of very long range. Their fire was principally directed on Whitaker's brigade, which still held the hills taken from the enemy the other night. The shots, however, did little or no damage, as nearly all of them were depressed.

The artillery duel continued nearly the whole afternoon, with trifling loss to our troops. Never has artillery achieved greater laurels than to-day. Nearly all our shots were delivered into the enemy's line and his batteries with remarkable accuracy. So wild and inaccurate was the fire of the enemy, that to-day the rear was a much more uninviting location for non-combatants than upon the skirmish line.

On the front of the Fourth and Fourteenth corps it was extremely slight—so little firing indeed, was heard that one almost was constrained to jump at the conclusion that the contestants had mutually agreed to a truce for the day. In front of Whitaker, however, there was a portion of the field upon which were thickly strewn the dead and wounded of the enemy in his seven desperate assaults upon that invincible brigade. There a brisk fire was kept up all day, to prevent the rebels from getting off their wounded. General Whitaker counted one hundred and sixty rebel dead on the ground.

IN FRONT OF KENESAW MOUNTAIN,
GEORGIA, JUNE 24, 1864. }

The problem here has not yet been solved, though our troops go to sleep every night expecting to find no enemy in their front. Kenesaw Mountain is still in the hands of the enemy, though our right wing has wheeled nearly around it, and threatens directly and imminently their rear. Yesterday morning we were within three miles of Marietta—this morning but two. Our shell go into the pretty and aristocratic town, and the roar of musketry is never out of the ears of the startled inhabitants, ever growing nearer and more ominous, and, what must be peculiarly demoralizing, extending far to the south. Universally the rebels are expected

to fall back within the next few days, and their position is now so constricted that no one would be surprised to wake up in the morning and find the enemy across the Chattahoochee.

There has been something of a lull in the tremendous skirmish fire that has been maintained day and night for the last three or four weeks, and in which our troops, by great odds, bore the most active part. An enormous quantity of ammunition has been expended. Some regiments have fired three or four hundred rounds per man, and some batteries had their caissons replenished regularly twice per week. Thanks, however, to the integrity of the great railroad in our rear, belonging to the State of Georgia, there is plenty on hand and to spare, though our batteries should continue to fire, by volleys, and our skirmishers with their Minies cut down additional young saplings around the Johnnies' dirt-piles, before breakfast.

The army was never jollier, more determined, or more confident. They complain of one thing only, a want of sleep. They must fight all day, stealthily secure an advanced position (though a point has now been reached where this is no longer possible), and at night fortify. Daylight comes early these mornings, and its initial shade is hailed by the spiteful salute of the watchful outposts. In the first gray of dawn the spade is thrown aside for the musket. The country around Kenesaw is scored with toilsome parallels, thrown up when all in nature, save the soldier, slept. Rest has been said to be simply a substitution of one kind of labor for another; the correctness of which established, our army has been uniformly and comprehensively refreshed.

The fatigue of this campaign since the first day's march from Ringgold has been enormous; indeed beyond computation. The cautious approaches on Dalton, the sleepless, laborious nights and bloody days at Resaca, the fortnight of carnage and vigilant toil near Dallas, and the many even more wearisome and sanguinary days consumed in investing the rebel position at Kenesaw, are without parallel (unless it be Grant's present campaign) during the war. The losses of both these armies in killed and wounded during this period of grand activity fully equal those of one of our great encounters, without the decisiveness that sometimes pertains to a pitched battle of the first class. Men have fallen daily by scores, hundreds, and sometimes by thousands, but the *morale* of neither army is shaken. That Sherman has gained overpowering advantages—advantages that will give him Atlanta—will be nearly conceded. But the army of Johnston has not been destroyed, and until that is done the immense labor performed and blood spilled have no adequate return. We hope to do this when we have forced the enemy from his present formidable position, which has been held, and is held, with more than usual tenacity. That he has suffered equally, to say the least, with ourselves is a matter of certainty. The fact is confirmed in a dozen ways.

No one believes, however, as some mysterious

correspondents have hinted, that Sherman will refrain, on Grant's account, from pushing Johnston to the wall. We have wrested every inch of territory we could from the enemy, and invested his position with the greatest possible celerity. If Johnston retreats to Atlanta, our army will probably halt north of the Chattahoochee river for a season of rest and preparation.

Both are necessary, the former, perhaps, the more imperatively. Another retreat cannot but greatly demoralize the enemy. The rebel rank and file were promised a grand decisive battle here. It was with this explicit understanding that they retreated from Resaca and turned upon us at Kenesaw. But Sherman, the absurd fellow, wouldn't rush upon them in headlong assaults; consequently another retreat, with another congratulatory promissory order from Johnston, may be looked for. Would any body of men in the world, save the ignorant masses in the South, be gulled in this way for the twentieth time?

The left has not advanced to-day, and the skirmishing has been light. There are indications that McPherson's corps will be transferred to the right, as the rebel position can be much more easily flanked on that wing.

To-day we have had one of the briefest and severest engagements that have occurred since the Dallas affair, in which Wood and Johnston lost so heavily in a fatal attack upon a position which was impregnable. During the morning, and in fact up to three o'clock in the afternoon, quietude reigned along the whole line. The sharp music of the rifle was hushed and not a dozen shots per hour were heard upon the line, while the loud booming of the Rodmans, Parrotts, and Napoleons no longer echoed through the hills. "After a calm comes a storm," and in this case it proved too true. Immediately in front of the Fourth Army Corps, was a long ridge on which the enemy had extensive fortifications, upon which were mounted three batteries, the fire of which had become very troublesome. Besides, it was an important position for us to possess. General Thomas ordered General Howard to assault this ridge to-day, and if possible to carry it. The General at once set about preparations to carry out his orders, and as all the details were left to his discretion, the General consulted his division commanders, and arranged the plan of attack. Placing all of his artillery in position where it could be most effective, strengthening the points of the line in front of the ridge, and giving instructions to his subordinate commanders that could not be misunderstood, the General despatched Colonel Fullerton, A. A. G., to give instructions to the commanders of batteries and superintend the execution of the orders. The Colonel placed a bugler in the centre of Newton's division, with others in either division on the right and left. Stanley on the right and Wood on the left. The batteries of the corps were instructed to open simultaneously upon the enemy, and cannonade them for fifteen min-

utes, at the expiration of which time they were to cease firing, and the line was to advance. At a quarter before four P. M., the batteries opened, and then so vigorous was the cannonading that for fifteen minutes all other noise was swallowed up in the thunders that echoed through the sultry air, while from every hill and knob along the whole line, the volumes of smoke that arose, filled the valleys and shut out all opportunities of viewing the bloody carnage that so soon was to follow.

At four o'clock the batteries quieted down, and instantly the bugle sounded the advance. It was taken up and repeated along the whole line, and in less than two minutes the line was in motion. The ground over which the advance was to be made was covered by large trees and very little undergrowth, so that a good view could be obtained of the line as it moved forward. All the brigades moved off together, with the regularity of veterans, and as they neared the rebel rifle-pits on the slope of the hill, behind which was posted a strong skirmish line, a destructive skirmish fire was opened upon the enemy, who, sheltered by his rifle-pits, suffered but little. On Stanley's front, over four hundred yards were the enemy driven, to these rifle-pits, when regiment after regiment reinforced our skirmishers—the Eighty-fourth Indiana and details—until it had assumed the proportions of a line of battle, when they advanced on the double-quick, drove the enemy from his pits, over some distance of ground, and into his main line of earthworks, where were massed heavy forces of the enemy. So formidable were the rebel works situate on the crest of the hill, and so numerous the guns that were mounted, and poured a raking fire into our line, that to attempt an assault upon it would be sheer madness. Consequently, Stanley held his position, over four hundred yards in advance of the starting-point, and fortified within seventy-five yards of the enemy's main works. Wood's and Heaton's positions, before the line was moved, were much nearer the rebel works than was Stanley's, yet they pushed their divisions forward under the deadly fire, drove the skirmishers from their rifle-pits, and advanced almost up to the rebel reserve, but were forced to fall back to the rifle-pits, where they also fortified, and held their position, within about fifty yards of the enemy's works.

The troops behaved with great gallantry, and in the charge I learn that not a regiment faltered. All are deserving of equal praise for the spirit manifested, and the energy with which they "moved on the enemy's works." That all that was desired by the Commanding General was not accomplished was no fault of the men or the fearless brigade and division commanders who led them. No troops could have accomplished more under the circumstances. The brigades commanded by Whitaker, Kimball, Wagner, Kirby, Hazen, Harker and Gross, deserve honorable mention—that of Whitaker especially, which captured twenty-nine men and two com-

missioned officers before they had time to get out of their rifle-pits.

About seven p. m. the enemy attacked along the whole line, but the heaviest blow was upon Whitaker. Here again our men had an excellent opportunity to display their valor. Lying behind their hastily-thrown up breastworks, they met the assault with shot for shot, and handsomely repulsed them.

Our losses to-day, in wounded alone, will amount to two hundred in the Fourth corps alone. The Fourteenth corps, on the left, supported, but did no heavy fighting. The Twentieth corps was on the right, but only participated with one of Geary's batteries, and experienced little or no loss. Among the killed and wounded are a number of valuable officers, whose loss will be deeply felt. Colonel Bartleson, of the One Hundredth Illinois, as brave an officer as ever marched at the head of a regiment, who lost an arm at Shiloh, was captured and wounded at Chickamauga, and only a few weeks ago released, fell dead while bravely leading the skirmish line on Wagner's front. Captain Eastman, Ninety-third Illinois, another esteemed officer, was mortally wounded, and breathed his last a few hours after. Captain Bierce, late engineer on General Hazen's staff, was slightly wounded while following the General along the lines. The names of other officers killed and wounded have not yet been obtained.

Various and strange as have been the modes suggested to stop guerrilla operations, attacks on railway trains, etc., none seem to have been successful. General Sherman, I believe, deserves the credit of having unravelled the knotty problem of suppressing guerrilla depredations.

On our lines of railway between here and Chattanooga guerrillas have become somewhat troublesome, in the way of placing torpedoes on the track. General Sherman was determined to put an end to this cowardly mode of assisting the rebels, and accordingly arrested a number of prominent secession sympathizers along the route, whom he placed in an old box-car, and daily ran them over those portions of the road where torpedoes are supposed to have been placed. These old traitor rascals do not enjoy the boon of free railway transit, but the medicine administered has cured guerrillaism effectually.

The fighting of General Butterfield's division (Third) on the twenty-second, it turns out, was more severe than at first supposed. It was on the left of the corps, and had as its task to carry and hold a difficult and important hill, or rather ridge. The whole division charged right up the hill as usual, under a severe musketry fire, pushed the rebel skirmishers into their works, approached the latter as nearly as could be done, without needless waste of life (which, with the Twentieth corps, means very close), threw up breastworks "right under the rebels' noses," all the while under fire, and planting Smith's and Geary's batteries, and training them upon the

rebel works, finally dislodged them, and drove them back entirely off the hill.

The heaviest loss was suffered in Colonel Coburn's brigade (Second). The entire loss in killed and wounded is estimated at one hundred and forty-six. Early in the day Captain William R. Thomas, of the One Hundred and Fifth Illinois, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Ward, received a severe flesh-wound in the right leg. Captain C. E. Graves, of the Twenty-third Massachusetts, was also slightly wounded in the ankle. The losses suffered by the Twenty-third Indiana, Fifty-fifth Ohio and Twenty-sixth Indiana were particularly severe.

The Second division of the Twenty-third corps, moved out a little, on the morning of the twenty-third, from its position of the previous night, sufficiently to pass over the rebel skirmish line, and ascertain the effect of the firing of the Fourteenth Kentucky. In front of this regiment alone, about twenty dead rebels were found unburied. Their own loss, it will be remembered, was but eight in killed.

All the rebel wounded had been carried away. One man was found under a tree dreadfully bruised and crushed, and upon looking into the tree above him, traces of blood were discovered on a limb, where he had evidently posted himself to pick off our men at his leisure.

After the first slight advance in the morning, the corps lay quiet throughout the day, content to forego the perilous sport of picket-firing, and seek in the shade some relief from the scorching rays of the sun. A single battery in General Geary's division was called into requisition to assist the Fourth corps, and with this exception, the right wing maintained a dignified silence. On the extreme right a portion of the Third division was refused, to assist the "dismounted" in repelling any attempt that might be made by guerrillas upon our populous and ponderous trains in that vicinity; but all apprehensions of attack, in that quarter proved groundless.

The extreme of the right wing extends southward to the latitude of Neal Dow, a station on the railroad about three miles below Marietta, and in the morning the sun rises directly on our front. How desperately the rebels cling to Kenesaw, with this long line on their flank, may be seen from this statement. But they can scarcely be blamed. With Kenesaw they abandon the last peak of the great mountain ranges through which they have struggled so long, and where, it was supposed, we would find the key and heart of their strength, and go down into the thick woods of Georgia, where they can no longer see their foe, but must grope in the dark for their *via dolorosa* to the Gulf.

June 25th.—The work of our army to-day amounted to just nothing; during the entire day the contending armies rested in their rifle-pits, and beneath their "pup tents," contenting themselves with an occasional shot to remind each other that they were still there, and had not evacuated their works. No more noise was caused by the entire army than would be pro-

duced by a dozen sportsmen in a forest where game was plenty. Our skirmishers, I understand, were ordered to fire but occasionally, and the enemy manifested no desire to provoke a severe skirmish along the line. Why this order was given I know not, but knowing ones assert that it was to give the enemy an impression that we were short of ammunition, and thereby induce them to come out of their works and attack us. If, this was the object, it failed, for no attack was made. At seven P. M., six or eight shots were fired at Kenesaw by McPherson's artillery, but they called forth no response.

During the night, however, the quietude was broken by pretty sharp skirmishing, lasting from ten o'clock until reveille this morning. The loss, however, was very light. The rest today has been fully appreciated by the over-taxed surgeons at the hospitals, who for many days have been on duty night and day, dressing the wounds of, and caring for the sufferers under their charge.

In the absence of skirmishing, both armies have occupied the day in erecting new, and strengthening their old works. The lines are now so close before the Fourth and Fourteenth corps that the skirmishers in their rifle-pits keep up a lively conversation with each other.

The intense heat which begins to prevail at this season of the year in this latitude was, on the twenty-fourth, well-nigh at its maximum. Staff officers lay in their marquees or booths, endeavoring to kill time with such vile "commissary" as could be got, and ancient newspapers, and the pickets only occasionally roused themselves from a comfortable nap in their little trenches, peered out over the small heaps of dirt which lay between their heads and rebel bullets, and fired off a gun at random, to keep up appearances, and again subsided. Has it never occurred to any, one that this campaign is a very slow one? To those who are uninitiated and have not the key to strategies and policies, the reason for this slowness does not appear. The heated term is already inaugurated, and active operations are weekly becoming more tedious by reason of the heat. Rebel prisoners almost unanimously say there is very little to offer a substantial resistance to our march into Atlanta, after getting to the banks of the river, and the men are eager for a battle to end the campaign. Are we waiting for something to turn up?

These have not been taken in any considerable numbers of late, but representatives from all States and regiments are found in the small squads that are picked up now and then. They all present the same general appearance. An observer cannot but be struck with the listless, jaded motions and sallow countenances with which these men come among us, as of those whose spirits are broken, whose hopes are few, and who have no heart for the fight. Prisoners and deserters alike wear the countenances and speak the words of men who have been overworked; of men who have been duped by fair

speeches into a service which promised great things and yielded nothing but disappointment; of men whose minds and muscle have been goaded by a lavish use of stimulants to a feverish activity, and who are now suffering the inevitable reaction and languor which follow unnatural elevation. They act like men who are thoroughly tired, worn out and disgusted. We have as little to hope from the deserters as the rebels, nor have the latter much to hope from the prisoners we may return to them by exchange, for, in the rough phrase of both alike, "They don't care a cuss, so they can get out of it and get home." A very unpromising confession from those who are looked to as the material out of which to erect new and thriving States.

It is amusing to witness the demonstration with which our boys receive rebel deserters into the lines on certain occasions. When the armies are lying very close together, as they often are, in battle lines, the disaffected rebels contrive to steal out unnoticed for a time, though they are generally discovered and fired on before reaching our lines. As soon as the soldiers see them coming, they appreciate the situation at once, and cannot resist the temptation to jump up from behind their works, though at the imminent risk of their heads, waving their hats and shouting, "Good boy, good boy!" "Come in out of the rain!" "You're our man!" "You're making good time!" etc. The first word of salutation is, "Got any tobacco, reb?" The returned prodigal, just escaped from the husks of the rebellion, is then treated to the fatted calf, the hard-tack and coffee, which latter is to him a luxury indeed.

I lately met Dr. Lucius Culver, of the Sixty-first Ohio, under circumstances so creditable to himself, and so agreeable, in contrast to those investing the case of another member of the profession, which have been heretofore narrated in this correspondence, that I cannot forbear to mention it. The Doctor had been painfully ill for many days—much more fit to go to the hospital than the field—and yet, because his regiment would be left without medical attendance entirely, by his absence, he persisted in staying with it, sharing all the hardships of inclement weather, bad roads, and bad fare, following it in the camp and into the line of battle, and giving personal attention to the wounded men as they were brought in, and before they were taken in the ambulances to the hospital in the rear. Though every one knows how important it is that a surgeon should have a sound mind in a sound body, in order to give the best energies of both to the relief of the patient, and how depressing an effect the clouded face a physician who may be soured with his own ills often has on a sensitive sufferer, still every one who has seen, as I have, men bleed to death while being carried from the field to the hospital, from the lack of a surgeon close at hand to twist a tight bandage round the limb

as soon as possible, will be able to appreciate fully the worthy self-denial spoken of above.

THE ASSAULT ON KENESAW.

Sherman's operations in Georgia, Atlantaward, have just been marked by one of those desperate assaults upon the enemy in an entrenched position, which have been tried so often by both armies, and with such uniform bad success. This one was short, sharp, and bitter, and so far as the objects to be attained were concerned, an unbroken failure. Ten brigades formed into storming columns, assaulted and were repulsed, leaving two thousand men *hors de combat*. Several of the brigades fell back to their works, close at hand, occupied in the morning; the majority retired but a short distance and fortified a line in advance of all others. All displayed supreme gallantry and struggled after struggling was hopeless, and then accepted failure, as all good soldiers do, without loss of determination or cheerfulness.

While the lessons of this war seem to render the expediency of storming heavy earthworks doubtful under all circumstances, there are periods reached in active operations, where the advantages to be gained may well counterbalance the scruples of the most cautious General, or one as careful of the lives of his men as Sherman has proven. It would have been the delirium of folly to assault the works of Johnston previous to the time his lines were enveloped as they now are, for if we had been fortunate enough to secure the slender chance of success, our mangled army would have been confronted by another chain of earthworks equally strong. The guerdon of Malakoff and its sister forte, was Sebastopol; we should only have gained a scarred and narrow belt of forest and field in a Southern wilderness. But we had pushed Johnston from several heavy parallels by the mighty momentum of our army. Long lines of his fortifications, guarded by the science of the engineer against enfilading, were enfiladed and gained. Cross-fires robbed them of the bold hill where their centre first confronted us near Kenesaw. The weight of our army on the left gave us a high mountain on the right. Their flanks were pushed back until Kenesaw Mountain became the apex of their lines, forming almost a right angle. Marietta, in the rear of their centre two or three miles, was threatened from the west and south by our right. Johnston, already constricted, could yield no more ground without placing his centre in deadly peril, and as he seems determined to hold his present position in spite of the dangers which the present circumscribed disposition of his forces entails, he erected the heaviest works we have yet encountered, and settled himself down to see how we would unravel the toils. That his position was cramped before the assault of the twenty-seventh (and became even more so through that, since on some portions of the line we advanced our trenches), his occa-

sional assaults to retake commanding positions clearly evince.

For two or three days preceding the assault, but little firing occurred along the lines. We had forced our way some distance up the eastern slope of Kenesaw, and reached its northern and eastern bases. The rebel wings, posted on advantageous ridges, behind heavy works, with frequent lunettes, and almost impracticable abatis, were closely invested by ours, in trenches quite equal to any attack the enemy could make. The salients of the hostile works were within a few hundred yards of each other in some places, and at such points no skirmisher could advance from his parapet without being pinned, as long as daylight lasted, to the tree or rock behind which he sought refuge. At such a juncture, when the opposing lines confront each other so closely, an advance of any kind must take the shape of an assault. It was necessary, if we wished to advance further directly in front, to pierce the enemy's fortifications at some point, hold it and by enfilading adjacent works, or imperilling some portion of his lines, compel him to retreat, or assault in return for its recapture. As to the practicability of flank movements, that is a question still undecided; and one upon which any speculations would be foolish or harmful—absurd if bungling and on false premises; and dangerous if built upon correct grounds and sanctioned by the conditions of military success.

The assault of the twenty-seventh was intended to cripple Johnston beyond the hope of recovery; and his complete destruction, if it succeeded, was not impossible. If the assault made by the Fourth and Fourteenth corps had succeeded, the troops comprising the centre of the enemy at Kenesaw Mountain would have been cut off from retreat; and a position obtained in the midst of the rebel lines must have wrought fatal confusion among them, and enforced a retreat which a vigorous pursuit would have rendered an overwhelming disaster. If Logan's brigades had carried Little Kenesaw, the precipitate withdrawal of Johnston beyond the Chattahoochee was equally well assured; for, from that knob, Marietta and miles of the rebel intrenchments would be at the mercy of our guns. Such could be the result of a successful assault; and I fancy, few men of military propensities will deny that the game was worth the candle.

Our army was very compactly disposed along the rebel lines, and in such plain view from the towering Kenesaw, that I have a higher regard for the discipline of the rebel gunners since they refrained for so many days from tearing the tom-pions from the muzzles of their guns, and, in spite of orders, firing every round they could lay hands on. For two or three days, however, preceding the assault, they opened from the crest of the mountain with eight guns, hurling grape and shrapnel in the valley below, filled with our army and its material.

Quiet, pastoral Kenesaw was transformed into

a volcano, the smoke drifting up in a pearl-gray, pendulous volume, and breaking into graceful garlands as it ascended, like the clouds from the lips of a dreamy senorita. Their missiles were not very damaging, the difficulty lying in the fact that the guns could not be depressed sufficiently to play upon our troops at the base of the mountain, while the thousand fields whitened by our wagons, though painfully distinct to their vision, were just beyond the range of their ferruginous bull-dogs. Sometimes their guns would suddenly burst out, after several hours' quietness, with one startling volley, the thunder of the several reports combined in one. Sometimes the lanyards were pulled consecutively, and the throbbing vibrations smote the ear at uniform intervals, and the smoke-clouds from the guns floated up in *echelon*. When the evenings were cloudy the fiery gleam of the guns was caught by the purple nimbus—the drop-curtain of the stars—that hovered behind the crest, and was reflected back to our eyes like a glare of that stealthy, noiseless lightning that often smears the horizon of a sultry night.

The day preceding the assault there was almost an absolute silence along the lines. No armies ever needed rest more than those that lay so near each other, each apparently disdaining to throw away another shot. Skirmishing was no longer a vivacious pastime, because the enemy could no longer be driven by it from field and slope. The strife could no longer swell to the thunderous verge of battle, fall to a lively racket, or dwindle to the measured pattering which this army, after its experience during this eventful and toilsome campaign, would call a silence. The skirmish was out of date; every soldier felt it to be so, and for once his rifle contained the same charge twenty-four hours.

The preparations for the assault were few and simple. Sherman's army is an instrument always carefully tuned for battle. The enemy has found it so, for there is always method in its discord when they fret the strings, and its leaders never strike up a heroic march without drawing forth an eloquent response. Now, however, a rattling bravura was to be played, which would not only test its capacity for brilliant dynamics, but the tenacity of the strings themselves. When Generals transport but a single tent, and line officers carry their effects on their arm; when, in short, an army moves with such few encumbrances as that of Sherman, home is just where it chances to halt, and nothing in the line of duty can take it by surprise, or occasion any delay between the delivery of the order and its execution.

During the few days of almost tacit truce that preceded the twenty-seventh, the strength of the enemy's works, their general configuration, and the probability of their being strongly held, were carefully noted and weighed. The points selected for assault were practicable, and were vitally important to Johnston's safety north of the Chattahoochee. It was decided to assault the rebel right and left centre, and at the same

time feel his wings strongly, without, however, resorting to storming columns in the latter enterprise. Logan was called upon to furnish four brigades to carry Little Kenesaw, which he selected from his divisions, and placed under the command of General Morgan L. Smith. Newton's division of the Fourth corps was chosen to assault a ridge on the enemy's left centre, and a short distance further to the left, a salient in the enemy's line was chosen, which Davis should carry. Accordingly, Sunday night, Davis' division, accompanied by Baird's, which was intended to act as a support, left their position at the base of Big Kenesaw, and moved to the right of the Fourth corps, closing up closely on its right flank. There was, in fact, a general extension of the line to the right, every corps moving more or less troops in that direction.

The Fifteenth corps furnished for the assault the brigades of General Giles Smith, General Lightburn, Colonel Walcutt, and detachments commanded by General C. R. Wood, from the three brigades of Osterhaus' division. Lightburn was selected to carry the western slope of the hill; Giles Smith to charge it directly in front; Walcutt to reach the top through the narrow gorge that divides Little from Big Kenesaw, and General Wood to act as an immediate support. At eight o'clock, the hour designated for the assault, the brigades pushed boldly out from their trenches, formed in four lines, and in splendid order, and at a quick step, pushed boldly toward the enemy's works. In a moment our skirmishers engaged those of the enemy, but without pausing save to kill those who refused to surrender (and there were some stubborn fellows who roundly refused to live any longer), they swept on, behind them the serried lines of our lads, colors flying, and the alignments unwavering. The enemy opened fiercely from Big and Little Kenesaw, but the column advanced in superb order until it struck a swampy tract, covered with a clinging thicket of thorny bushes. Through this, in mud knee-deep, the brigades forced their impetuous way, and the necessary disorder of the column was speedily retrieved, when it emerged from this fearful bar to success. Through a tempest of iron the advance was resumed, the troops breaking into a cheer and a run, and dashing over the stony sides of Little Kenesaw without faltering. As the difficulties of the ground increased, the fearful clangor from the enemy's trenches was heightened and became more and more prolonged. Over their yellow rifle-pits the blue tufts of musketry danced wildly, and the whirling spheres of vapor from their masked artillery, curled up as tightly as cocoons, seemed to start out hideously from the foliage of the knob. From right and left, down the slopes of Big Kenesaw and along the ridges to the west of the point of assault, the enemy poured his forces, emptying his adjacent trenches to confront us at the point of danger. The brigades charging the flanks of the mountain, subjected to a most cruel and destructive cross-fire, after repeated and heroic efforts, failed

to reach the crest, and retired in comparative disorder to the best cover they could obtain near the base of the hill. The brigade of Giles Smith, however, dashed ahead, no longer a column but a swarm of men, and poured up to the very crest of the hill, passing over the enemy's first trenches and abatis, where two color-bearers fell; but, alas, to find just as they gained the summit, the enemy in another and stronger line, posted on a slight ridge, not perceptible until the plateau of the mountain was reached. The fresh line opened with a volley, and the blast of death swelled into a hurricane. The brigade slowly fell back, while the enemy, attempting to pursue, was met by a heavy artillery fire from our trenches and hastily driven back. About fifty men of this brigade took refuge behind a ledge of rocks, where during the rest of the day they dare not expose so much as a finger. Occasionally one or two would attempt to dash down the hill and run the gauntlet, but of all who attempted this, not one escaped. At the same time the enemy was unable to come forth and capture them, for every man was covered by a hundred Federal muskets, carefully poised on our trenches for their protection.

Under the cover of our artillery a position several hundred yards in advance was fortified and held by the brigades just repulsed. So little were the troops shaken by the failure, that General Morgan L. Smith proposed to make another assault at two P. M.; but the Commanding General refused to permit it. These were the veterans of Vicksburg, and universally they pronounced the ground charged over infinitely more difficult than that at Vicksburg. The advanced position taken, left the swampy thicket to the rear, and indeed, included portions of the rifle-pits on the enemy's skirmish lines. At noon General Dodge closed upon the left of the brigades, and firing during the afternoon was desultory, the guns on Kenesaw opening occasionally and eliciting a most vigorous reply. In the evening our brass bands played a lively selection of patriotic airs, which must have sounded the least little bit malicious to the Johnnies, who were prone to imagine that we were terribly cut up, in spirits, as well as men.

The Fourth and Fourteenth corps—the stanch centre of the army—were called upon to give fresh proof of their valor. These two corps, though originally in front of Kenesaw, had been pushed by the converging advance of our army to the southward of that frowning peak. The noble Fourth corps, though by heavy odds the heaviest sufferer in the army, was one of the three from which an assault was demanded. The boys were tired of heavy skirmishing—that had grown tedious and lost its excitement—and I believe when they were apprised that their corps were to furnish two or three assaulting columns, they received the intelligence with a quick interest—nothing more. This thing of killing and being killed had become an every day affair; every platoon in the corps had bled freely since the campaign opened. They

felt, probably, as all veterans must feel, some apprehension for the result of an assault upon a heavily-fortified enemy—but none for themselves.

Early in the gray of morning the preparations for the assault commenced, the first symptom being an unusually early breakfast. There was no evidence in the movements or bearing of the men that they were soon to essay "the deadly imminent breach," though they must have been conscious that the task laid out for them was one which none but men hoping to meet death would covet. Between seven and eight o'clock the lines were formed—Newton's division, consisting of Generals Wagner's, Kimball's and Harker's brigades, being selected as the storming parties. Kimball's being on the left and somewhat retired, to act as a support to the other two. Wagner held the centre, and Harker the right. Wood's and Stanley's divisions of the Fourth corps furnished supports on the flanks of the assaulting brigades, but they were not engaged, and their loss was trifling.

This splendid brigade, composed of the Fortieth Indiana, Fifty-seventh Indiana, Ninety-seventh Ohio, Twenty-sixth Ohio, One Hundredth Illinois, and Twenty-eighth Kentucky, was thrown into a column of regimental divisions, thus giving the brigade a front of two companies and a depth of thirty lines. The advance regiment was the Fortieth Indiana, commanded by the fearless Blake. The column was formed in good season, and during the brief respite that ensued before the word *charge* was given, the men rested in their places silently, and no one would have guessed from their undisturbed faces, that all the latent gallantry of their natures could be aroused and lashed into a fury of heroism during the next ten minutes. Here was a man carefully relacing his shoe, and tucking away the strings, the proposition that forlorn hopes should be well and tightly shod expressed plainly in his movements. Letters were torn and crumpled, and thrown furtively aside. Doubtless miniatures came from their hiding-places for a moment that morning, but such things are done in the army in profound secrecy. The soldier hates a scene, and none more than the purely sentimental variety.

At half-past eight the men sprang to their feet, the word fraught with death for many, with glory for all, had that instant been given. Thirty consecutive lines of blue leaped forward with impetuous strides, making their way through the scattered trees and undergrowth in splendid order. Before them, on the crest of a ridge, was the silent, and to the sight untenanted convex salient of the enemy's works which they were aiming for. They neared it rapidly, their enthusiasm rising with every step, and their hearts rising high as each indistinct object grew plain, as the slopes of the parapet became a mere furrow, over which it seemed they must go. But the next moment the gates of hell opened in their very faces. A close, concentrated, withering blast of musketry swept over the

front line, leaving it indented but unwavering; with the momentum of a mighty river, the brigade swept on, until but two hundred paces—a mere stone's-cast it looked—divided the assailants and the assailed. The musketry of the enemy died to a mere pattering—muskets must be reloaded, and this fact sometimes loses battles. But palisades and abatis must be passed, and with the next rebel volley, fired as the fearless Fortieth Indiana reached a point within one hundred paces of their works, came a more awful thunder. Squarely in the teeth of the inspired brigade opened a battery of six guns, belching forth grape and canister, every shot ploughing through the devoted ranks, and the thick fumes of their guns enveloping the interval of ground over which our brigade must pass. Every ball from those guns enfiladed sixty men, the column of attack, as I have already said, being thirty lines deep. The front lines shattered to pieces, slackened the furious onset, which brought those in the rear jamming up in one confused mass of men—confused, but still bent on their fearfully grim and bloody task. It was intended, when the head of the assaulting column reached a point within pistol-shot of the enemy's parapet, to deploy into a column of regiments. This was no longer feasible, for organization was lost, and the whole column was a tightly closed, surging mass of men, ragged at the edges—but all moving one way—toward the enemy.

The rebel battery fired a second volley, completely shattering Wagner's column as a column, the cannon blowing aside every animated thing in their front. Masses of men moved to the right and left of the range of the battery, still bent upon one object. Many struggled up within twenty yards of the enemy's works; some penetrated the lines of palisades and abatis at their base, and a devoted few planted the foot of a Winkelreid on the slope of the parapet, but the assault had failed—failed heroically, in less time than I have taken to relate it. For nearly an hour portions of the brigade held points within fifty yards of the enemy's line, but all such were thinned out by the deadly rifleman, who, nearly secure himself, was at liberty to indulge in the uncommon luxury of gloating over a foe, before firing with cool, deliberate, and unerring aim. As the remnants of the brigade started back, long lines of rebels swarmed from their trenches, pursuing rapidly with infernal yells. They soon swarmed back, and faster than they emerged, when our reserves opened on them with a withering fire of small arms and artillery.

The brigade fell back to the line of works vacated in the morning, leaving over two hundred killed and wounded. The proportion of officers lost is larger than the average, and here, as elsewhere during the assault, an unusual number were hit in the head. Wagner's brigade left winter-quarters last spring nearly two thousand strong, but it was reduced to less than half that number, over fifty per cent.

having been killed and wounded during the campaign. General Wagner fought, where he always fights, at the head of his brigade, and his escape from hurt is almost miraculous. Two or three hours after the assault his men were bustling around their camps, making their coffee, having already exhausted conversation on the great topic which the morning had furnished. "Damn these assaults in column," I heard one of them remark, as he punched up the blaze under his coffee, "they make a man more afraid of being trampled to death by the rear lines than he is of the enemy. They might do on a marble floor." His comments would offend Jomini or Montecelli; but the speaker, as a member of one of the advance regiments in the assaulting column, had a clear right to speak his mind.

The heaviest loss in the assault of Wagner fell on the noble Fortieth Indiana, which sustained nearly one half the casualties of the brigade. The regiments in the rear suffered but slightly.

It is claimed for Wagner's brigade, and I believe with justice, that it was the last of all to fall back. Yet such, if the fact, can have but little significance. The self-same heroism inspired each of the assaulting brigades; all did their utmost, and all deserve like chaplets for their brilliant and not wholly unavailing outbursts of courage and endurance.

Harker's brigade held the right of Newton's division, the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth, Colonel Opdyke, in advance. Like Wagner's, it was deployed into a column of divisions, the six regiments forming a column just thirty lines deep. When the bugle pealed forth the clarion note for the advance, the brigade sprang into line, and marched boldly from their trenches, sweeping over the enemy's scattered pickets, and gaining the rifle-pits where his skirmishers were posted. The enemy opened a terrible fire of musketry, grape and canister, but our boys poured into the ravine equidistant from the hostile trenches, and began to ascend the slope beyond, fast becoming slippery with blood. At this moment, a battery opened on their right, enfilading the column and disordering its lines, without, however, lessening the impetuosity of the lads. Many swarmed to the rebel works, and after vainly endeavoring to scale the works, took lodgment at their base, fighting desperately within reach of each other over the parapet; so close that several of an advance regiment were dragged over by the hair and captured.

The struggle lasted one hour and twenty minutes; regiment after regiment planting its colors on the ramparts only to be driven back. Harker, the fearless and beloved commander, upon whose shoulder the star had rested but a brief month, fell mortally wounded at the head of his column, and died two hours after. No one who saw his cheerfulness on going into the fight, and his glorious bearing during the action to the moment he was hit, would have dreamed that a few hours before he had quietly handed a packet to a comrade not selected for

the assault, asking him to send it home. "I shall be killed," said he, in conclusion. Stout-hearted, kindly, noble Harker! such souls as yours are the safety of the country. The yawning rent in our forums would have closed when you fell, with an instant and thunderous clang, if a type of the richest treasure of the Republic were the only sacrifice demanded. The noble brigade at last fell back, bringing their dying chief with them, leaving a fifth of their number killed and wounded on the field; and to the eternal infamy of the wretches who fought us at that point, several of the latter were made targets after our troops had retired. Lieutenant Benham, of Harker's brigade, was one of the victims, the infernal devils shooting at him deliberately, as he lay bleeding on the ground between the lines, and hitting him not less than four times. This is the only instance in which I obtained the name, but many who participated in the assault assured me that other wounded officers were similarly butchered.

Kimball's brigade, though it did not endeavor to storm the rebel works, acted efficiently as a support, and being without our trenches and within easy range of the enemy, its loss was scarcely less than that of its fellow brigades. No higher compliment can be paid any body of troops than to say that they endured a heavy fire which they might not return, coolly and without wavering. The loss in the brigade is one hundred and ninety-three, including Lieutenant-Colonel Chandler and other valuable officers.

Your correspondent "Montr6se" furnishes the following details of the assault by Davis' division:

At eight o'clock precisely the batteries along our whole line opened almost simultaneously upon the enemy's works, and a terrific cannonading followed, lasting for about two hours, to which the enemy promptly responded from Kenesaw, Bald Top and other points on their lines. Hardly had the batteries awakened the foe from his morning slumbers, when Davis' division of Palmer's corps, who were already in position, with Baird's division of the same corps, and one division of the Twentieth supporting them, moved forward, leaving Morgan's brigade in reserve, to be called upon if it was found necessary to put in another brigade. Colonel Dan. McCook's brigade occupied the left, with the Eighty-fifth Illinois thrown forward as skirmishers, while Colonel Mitchell's brigade, with the Thirty-fourth Illinois, occupied the left. The skirmishers advanced quite rapidly for a few hundred yards, driving everything before them, until they encountered a heavy abatis, behind which the enemy had sought cover. There they were checked temporarily, until regiments from the brigades were thrown forward, and the work was carried with slight loss. Nearly all the venturesome skirmishers who remained behind the abatis were captured and sent to the rear. Retreating rapidly before our triumphant advance, the skirmishers who

escaped reached the interior of the fortifications (which at that point were in the form of a horse-shoe, with a hill in the centre which prevented their artillery enfilading our columns), with all possible despatch.

Meanwhile the veteran regiments of McCook and Mitchell never faltered, but under a very destructive musketry fire, and severe volleys of canister and grape, moved upon the enemy's works, which they reached and attempted to scale. At the head of their brigades the loud voices of Mitchell and McCook were heard above the din of battle, urging their brave followers to scale the works. Never did men seem to be possessed of more determination, while they appeared to have acquired super-human strength. But all their efforts were in vain. Under the cover of the works they were comparatively safe; but to scale the rampart was certain death. Dan. McCook, I am credibly informed, rendered furious by the frequent vain attempts to carry the works, mounted the work at the head of his men, but instantly fell back, badly wounded, in the arms of his men. Lieutenant-Colonel Clancey, of the Fifty-second Ohio, also fell, slightly wounded, under the breastworks, from which he could not be removed.

But while these desperate assaults were being made on the left, Mitchell, brave and determined, was not idle. He, too, was under as heavy a musketry fire as ever rendered a battlefield immortal, and his men never flinched. Up close, almost within bayonetting distance of the enemy, who lined their breastworks with brave and reckless traitors, stood Mitchell's boys, and gave the rebels bullet for bullet. Hardly a man on either side, who mounted the works, now lives to tell the tale of the bloody encounter that has just taken place.

At last Davis, than whom there is no more brave or tenacious division commander in this army, seeing all hope of taking the fortifications futile, retired his command, leaving upon the works and in the intrenchments representatives of nearly every regiment in the two brigades, whose eyes were sealed in the cold embrace of death.

The division at once fell back twenty yards, under a galling and deadly fire, carrying with them nearly all the wounded who had fallen on the exterior of the works. Here they fortified, and now confront the rebels, twenty yards distant.

It is impossible at this writing, two hours after the close of the brief but bloody combat, to correctly state the loss in the division; but members of the division and corps staff, who, by the way, distinguished themselves while under the death-dealing shower of bullets, state that it will fall not far short of six hundred. Probably it may exceed this number. When it is remembered that the principal loss occurred in a period of less than fifteen minutes, the reader can easily judge of the severity of the contest.

The proportion of officers wounded in the

assault is quite unusual. I have briefly collected the following, which are but a small proportion of the total number :

Colonel Dan. McCook, commanding brigade, arm, severe; Colonel Harmon, One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, killed; Lieutenant-Colonel Clancey, Fifty-second Ohio, spent ball, slight; Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, arm fractured, severe; Major Yeager, One Hundred and Twenty-first Illinois, severe; Captain Cook, Tenth Michigan, mortal; Captain Clason, One Hundred and Twenty-first Illinois, severe; Captain Neighbor, Fifty-second Ohio, mortal; Captain Durant, One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, slight; Lieutenant Walson, One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, slight; Lieutenant Bentley, One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, slight; Lieutenant Paul, Fifty-second Ohio, slight.

The above names were obtained from staff officers of the division and brigades, and are doubtless correct.

The loss of the enemy, of course, is not known. We can only judge from the position occupied by them—believed impenetrable works—that it is lighter than ours, probably by one fourth. Of one thing there is a certainty, we have many of their dead and wounded, and rarely one escaped who showed his head above the works.

Many instances of gallantry and almost impossible feats are pretty well authenticated, but lest I may lay myself open to the charge of indulging in sensational reports, I will pass them over for the present, promising to do full justice to the brave boys when I can do so without laying myself open to censure. That there should be acts of unusual bravery performed is no more than can be expected, for charging fortifications opens the door to all to win a hero's title. There the private has an equal chance with his Colonel to throw himself into the strife, and win lasting fame in history.

The color-bearer of the Twenty-seventh Illinois, Sergeant Nick Delany, planted his colors on the ramparts, after being wounded, and held them there until again shot, when the colors dropped from his grasp, toppled inside the works, and his body fell into the arms of his comrades, pierced by a rebel bayonet. He died a hero's death.

With this recital the history of the assaults of the twenty-seventh ends. On no other portion of the rebel line was a storming column hurled, though while the events I have related were transpiring, Dodge and Blair on the left, and Hooker and Schofield on the right, were not inactive. At the moment the assaulting columns moved forward, Hooker's corps, on the right of Davis' division, made a strong demonstration; Geary's division moving forward under cover of batteries I and M, First New York, and Knapp's Pennsylvania battery, and carrying, without serious opposition, an important ridge in his front, where he proceeded at once to establish himself. The other divisions

of the Twentieth corps pushed forward their skirmishers, gaining several hundred yards; and it must be remembered that every yard gained tells upon the enemy in his circumscribed position.

The Twenty-third corps, on the extreme right, had executed a long and tiresome wheel to the left, including no less than six parallels, in the week preceding the twenty-seventh.

It had pressed the enemy so closely, that it was established within four hundred yards of the main rebel fortifications, leaving no room for skirmishers, and, though on the day of assault, the Second division opened heavily, with musketry and artillery, upon the enemy, they confined their efforts to stout skirmishing, sustaining a loss of seventy-five killed and wounded.

During the preceding night, General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third corps, was pushed boldly south on the Sandtown road, and, crossing Oily creek, reached an important fork in the road, nine miles south of Marietta, and but three from the Chattahoochee river, which, at last advices, he still held, with nothing confronting him but a heavy force of cavalry. Whether cutting into the retreat of the enemy was intended by this movement, in case the assault succeeded, or whether it was simply a diversion in favor of the storming columns, or whether a permanent extension of our right wing to that point was designed, has not yet been developed. The rebel cavalry in Cox's front consisted of two divisions, commanded by Jackson, fifty of whom we captured. Our loss in the movement was not over fifty.

While the assaults were in progress, and long after they were decided, the batteries of Blair, Dodge, and Logan, all in position, maintained a heavy fire on Kenesaw, to which the rebels replied but feebly. Blair and Dodge both made formidable demonstrations, their skirmishers advancing a considerable distance up the eastern slope of Kenesaw, gaining important territory, which they held at nightfall and were fortifying. Their loss was comparatively slight.

By noon both armies were tranquil again, the enemy, on some portions of the line where assaults were made, permitting us to remove our dead and wounded, which was speedily effected. A series of vigorous assaults had been made, accompanied by demonstrations along the whole line, but the repulse of the former, beyond the loss of many as brave men as were ever marshalled, has but little bearing upon the prospects for Sherman's eventual success. We advanced our lines materially, which could not have been done by any feeble effort; we failed to pierce the lines of Johnston's army, to compass its confusion or destruction. The loss of the enemy, compared with ours, is light, for evident reasons. He can not be very joyous that we failed to drive him from a very formidable chain of earthworks, and the comparatively few brigades—ten in all—engaged in

the assault, are not crestfallen, for they achieved all that brave men might. Our lines envelop them more closely than ever before; are better poised for a general assault, if one should be ordered; and, finally, the spirit of the men is unbroken. They are resolute, earnest, heroic, self-sacrificing, and firmly convinced that their mission, sooner or later, is victory complete and overwhelming.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

IN THE FIELD, SEVEN MILES SOUTH-EAST OF
BIG SHANTY, GA., June 28, 1864. }

After an adventurous and costly experience by rail, in which some scoundrelly, petty thief robbed me of everything valuable, I arrived at Big Shanty and made inquiry for General Logan's headquarters. About one and a half miles out on the wagon road leading toward Kenesaw Mountain, a little to the left, in an open field, and in full view of the heights, about which hung the smoke from the rebel batteries that thundered constantly through the day, and blazed through the night, I found the General at home.

Men *without fear* are seldom met with, if ever. As near an approach, I think, as I have met with to that ideal I find in General Logan. An instance of his unbending will and remarkable courage and coolness I must relate: On the twenty-third, in company with his staff, he rode out to inspect his lines. The batteries on the mountain were bellowing constantly, and sweeping the woods that partially cloaked our earthworks with a perfect tornado of shell and shrapnel. The guns on the summit were not all employed when Logan and party emerged upon an open field in plain view of the enemy. The rebel gunners, thinking doubtless to appease the *manes* of the departed Polk with an offering of Yankee blood from the veins of a Major-General, turned against the party every battery on the mountain, which smoked like a volcano in eruption. Our batteries below replied with vigor, and for a time the very earth trembled with the explosions and reverberations. An open field lay in front, over which the General determined to make his way. A hurricane of missiles screamed across the space; some ploughed up the earth, and others, bursting, filled the air with flying fragments. The commotion and turmoil of war are conditions suited to men of his impetuous, fearless nature. To see this man in action, one would say at once: "He is the counterpart of Murat." And so he is. In addition to that dashing *abandon* which shines out so brilliantly in the character of Murat, he has the aspiring soul that quails before nothing that will and energy and daring can accomplish. He is restless, vigilant, quick-thoughted, and energetic. He is, too, firm and cool in a great crisis where those virtues are demanded, though at times, when foiled in a plan, or disappointed in any way, inclined to be petulant and irascible, or blunt and plain. Add to this a tender sensitiveness, and you have Logan in character. On

the occasion to which I refer, accompanied by an Aide, he rode out into that terrible maelstrom that was meant to engulf and swallow him, halted by a few coals at a camp fire, turned coolly around, and asked his Aide for a cigar. Procuring one, he dismounted leisurely, picked up a brand, and, with an air of utterly unapproachable *nonchalance*, proceeded to whiff away as though he were under his own vine and fig tree. All the while the shells and shrapnel were ploughing up the earth around him and screaming wildly overhead. He just as coolly remounted, and by this time left alone by his company to the enjoyments of the occasion, slowly continued his journey along the lines.

Standing at Logan's headquarters and facing southward, between you and Kenesaw Mountain lies first an open rolling strip of country, between which and the mountain lies a wooded plain. Through this latter strip runs our line of works. These, following the course of the mountain, which is east and west, after passing the eastern point, curve to the south-east, and continue in the same general direction to the Sandtown wagon-road. The Dallas and Marietta road crosses our line at about the centre.

On the night of the twenty-fifth Davis was withdrawn from his position on the left of the Fourteenth corps, and Harrow, of Logan's corps, supplied the place. Davis moved over toward the centre, and lay in reserve until the twenty-seventh.

Dodge's and Blair's corps were placed, the former on Logan's left, and the latter on the extreme left of the line, circling the western point of Kenesaw, and menacing the rebel right.

On the night of the twenty-sixth—calm, pleasant Sabbath evening—orders were issued for a series of simultaneous assaults on the morning following along the entire line.

Davis' division, of Palmer's corps, was to form an assaulting column, and Newton, of Howard's, another. I lay that night at General Mitchell's headquarters, near the Marietta road. It was necessary, of course, that brigade commanders should know and comprehend the work allotted to them, and at the headquarters of these divisions ordered to assail the enemy's works, little knots of earnest men in consultation could be seen huddled on camp-stools around maps and diagrams, giving and receiving orders, and investigating plans. Let me introduce you to one group. Just over there in the woods, before a few tents, seated on camp-stools, one of the party holding a lighted candle, sits the flinty-trusted Jeff. C. Davis, whose browned and wrinkled features have been fanned by bullets before they were tanned by the sun and heaven's breezes. Around him in council sit his brigade commanders. The two young men, whom even the dusky light of the candle will not let you mistake for other than bright, intelligent thinkers, who probe the questions before them to their core and comprehend their import as he who planned, are Colonels Daniel McCook

and John G. Mitchell. As though the emotions and impelling principles within worked the character in lineaments not to be mistaken on the facial front, you may read there that they know the work and appreciate its bloody import.

The word is spoken, the plan digested, and to-morrow's sun will wake to life and health for the last time many a noble fellow that slumbers in the forest around.

Morgan, the old weather-beaten farmer General, who is as stern and fearless as he is grim and rough, with his placid features is reassuring. Let what will come to pass, you can but ruffle his equanimity. It is self-adjusting; and when duty and the responsibilities of his position are in one scale, they outweigh every personal consideration that would deter or impede. He thinks and seems a statue in bronze. Give him an order, and you imbue the statue with life and fire and energy such as move a hero. All night the road was alive with troops and trains and horsemen. The clatter and rumble went on. A shimmer of moonlight sifted through the tree-tops, and one involuntarily reverted to the cavalcades of Boabdil's hosts that the Moorish legends describe.

Four men passed my tent moving silently along, bearing something on a litter. As they approached, I saw they were carrying a wounded man. The hospital was just below us in the ravine. I had almost forgotten the occurrence, and was getting drowsy, when his shrieks roused me again. The surgeons were at work. His agonizing cry was the only sound that broke the stillness, and it penetrated and impressed me. I remember the shudder with which I sank to sleep, and, as I recur to it, it comes again.

Blair was to press his lines forward on the west slope of Kenesaw, protect Dodge's flank, and, closing in as cautiously as possible, engage the enemy's attention by menacing his right. Dodge was to have taken the western division or peak of Kenesaw, while Logan was to push a strong column up the eastern. That the operations against Kenesaw may be better understood, and the difficulties to overcome in prosecuting an assault appreciated, let me devote a few lines to Kenesaw and its contour.

Seen from our lines the day of the assault, this solitary mountain, that lifts its bald summit to the clouds, looks a dark, grim sentinel that guards the beautiful little treasure—Marietta—that nestles so closely under its mighty shade. The mountain is elliptical in shape and two miles in length, running east and west, and its average height above the level of the sea is eighteen hundred feet. It terminates at either end in peaks which slope gradually toward the center, presenting a depression that gives it the general appearance, as described against a background of clear blue sky, of a grand natural redoubt. The depression which represents the embrasure apparently divides the mountain into

equal parts. The west half we will call the *first* peak, and the east the *second*.

Remember we are facing southward. On the first peak the enemy has well-manned batteries that sweep the valley in which we stand. Through the wooded strip in front our works follow the course of the mountain. In front of the first peak lie Blair and Dodge, the former circling the point, and the latter's right touching Logan's left just where the gorge marks the dividing line I have already mentioned.

Logan is to ascend, therefore, the eastern half or second peak, swinging around the point to the southern slope as far as prudence will permit.

The troops composing the assaulting column are Lightburn's and Giles A. Smith's brigades, of M. L. Smith's division, and Walcutt's, of Harrison's division.

General M. L. Smith, the indomitable old leader, whose name among the troops is a synonym for everything that is true and noble in a soldier, commands the column. A stranger in the army, who never heard of Morgan L. Smith, will learn to hold him in high esteem from what the common soldiers say of him. A better recommendation no man can have.

Eight o'clock on the twenty-seventh, and Logan, prompt to the minute, ordered his column forward. The Forty-sixth Ohio and Fortieth Illinois—the latter commanded by the lamented Colonel Barnhill—were deployed in front as skirmishers. The enemy was never more vigilant. The movement was detected; he threw forward reinforcements to his skirmishers, and the ground was stubbornly disputed. All the while the terrible artillery on the peaks—twelve guns in all—maintained a deadly cross-fire on our troops below, and was answered by our batteries with solid shot, that powdered and crippled their rocky parapets. Emerging into the open fields, the rebel infantry essayed again behind their rifle-pits to check or hurl us back. In front of his line of rifle-pits the enemy had carefully prepared two lines of perplexing abatis. The first consisted of felled saplings, with the limbs and branches sharpened and interwoven. Through these, after some difficulty, delay, and loss, we penetrated and soon again encountered a second abatis, constructed with more care, and of a more formidable nature. Heavy piles were cut for the purpose, pointed and placed the ground, and inclined toward us.

To look at these rude defences when the battle is over and the danger passed, and one might be tempted to say that these sharp sticks are insignificant obstructions that a few men in a short time would render harmless.

When we reflect that a very short distance separates the abatis from the enemy's rifle-pits, that swarm with troops, that character of defence has no mean significance. The check, however, was merely momentary. The abatis was cleared and the enemy's rifle-pits at once assailed.

A brigade of Mississippi and Missouri rebels held the works, and greeted our advance with a galling fire. The abatis once cleared, and the way was clear. A charge was ordered, a cheer rang out full and round and lusty, and the work was done.

The enemy beat a rapid retreat toward the mountain, and plunged into the underbrush of that rugged, uneven slope, hotly pursued by the eager skirmishers.

Logan's troops were worn and jaded by the heat, but victory to the soldier is as an invigorating elixir to the invalid, and in the joy he feels the very flag seems to participate. Still the bullets and missiles are showered incessantly down. The artillery peals out its hoarse, heavy thunders, hurls down its withering hail, and the mountain seems a volcano more than ever.

Success has so invigorated and inspired the men that the heat and fatigue are forgotten, and no obstacle is too difficult to check or dishearten.

The only practicable line of retreat is by the ravine that I have referred to, and toward this the pursued and pursuers tend. Over rocks and through the brush, skirmishing all the way, the race continues along the slope. A party of our troops take possession of the ravine, and about a hundred rebels, who were thus cut off, were made prisoners.

It is found impossible to take a column through the thick-standing undergrowth, and Logan directed that the column be deployed in line of battle. Lightburn holds the right, Giles A. Smith the centre, and Walcutt the left. In this order the men continue their tedious, tiresome ascent, crawling between and over rocks, and pulling themselves up at times by limbs and brush. The rebels loosen huge rocks and logs, that come crashing down the declivity with a noise like thunder. Many of the troops are crushed in this manner; but the line lags not a moment.

Hanging above the foliage of the slope now, sent by an explosion, and curling and twirling aloft in the clear expanse, a light, gauze mantle of sulphur-smoke floats along the mountain side, through which at intervals can be seen glimpses of the colors that some daring fellow has planted on a massive rock, and then the welkin rings again with the glad shouts of the watchers from below. A rumbling noise like thunder floats down the mountain again and again, and now saplings are bending before the shock of a heavy rock that the rebels from their rocky eyrie have hurled at the advancing line. The flag moves again. Upward, onward, is the cry, and as the firing grows in violence the shouts, groans, and cheers lose identity and blend into a din. It was a spectacle that once seen could not be forgotten.

The painter's pencil may portray on canvas the contour of mountain, the mosaic of fields and forests in the valley below; may picture a rocky, abrupt slope, impassable cliffs, inequali-

ties of the surface, a line of earthworks, a cannon, or a fort, but let any one see a battle as it rages, and see it in oil, and I care not what the genius of the artist, he will say, "it lacks the cheers and shouts of the combatants." The action is the life and soul of a battle, the noise, the terrible clamor, the roar, the confusion, are all parts of a drama that loses its interest if it fails in one particular.

Parrhasius wanted for his picture of Prometheus "but a dying groan," and without this he felt that he had failed. Walker, the famous army artist, whose pencil, like a magician's wand, reproduces on canvas scenes around which cluster and cling memories that will be historic, and float down to posterity, to be treasured and revered hundreds of years hence, can put on canvas every other detail of a battle; but without the ringing cheer, the exultant shout, the actual flutter of the flag, the swaying, surging line of battle; in a word, the action, the life, and the din, the conception falls far short of the reality.

Nearing the summit, just such an insurmountable façade of cliffs as opposed us at Rocky Face obstructs our path. The average perpendicular height of the precipice is thirty feet.

Along the verge of this the enemy had drawn a line of battle, and his troops, as we approached, hurled down rocks, clubs, blocks, and every conceivable species of missile that could do us injury, killing and maiming many.

Colonel Barnhill, of the Fortieth Illinois, had been ordered to go toward the summit as far as possible, and he determined to literally obey. At the head of his line along with the skirmishers, a conspicuous mark for the rebel sharpshooters, he shared with his men every danger, and fell dead at the very base of the lofty palisade of rock that barred the way.

Though Logan failed to do what was allotted him, and in that did only what every portion of the line did, he only failed to do what was, from the very nature of things, an utter impossibility.

In one hour and a quarter from the time they marched out from their breastworks, Logan's troops had cleared two lines of abatis; carried a line of earthworks at a charge; followed the routed enemy up his rugged stronghold through a murderous cross-fire of artillery, and a storm of bullets; conquered every obstacle; planted the flag at the foot of an insurmountable array of cliffs—the very furthest approach to the summit; threw up defences of logs and stones, and to-day holds the line despite the stubbornest efforts of the enemy to dislodge him.

The losses of the Fifteenth corps will foot up over sixty prominent and gallant officers and four hundred men killed and wounded. Among the officers who fell in the assault, and whose loss will be deeply deplored, because irreparable, I find the following:

Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, mortally wounded; Colonel Parry, Fifty-fourth Ohio,

severely wounded; Colonel Spooner, Eighty-third Indiana, severely wounded; Colonel Walcutt, slightly wounded; Lieutenant-Colonel Wright, One Hundred and Third Illinois, severely wounded; Colonel Barnhill, Fortieth Illinois, killed; Captain George, Fortieth Illinois, severely wounded; Captain Augustine, commanding Fifty-fifth Illinois, killed.

One regiment of the corps emerged from this ordeal with but five field and line officers for duty. The Eighty-third Indiana lost two color-bearers while ascending the mountain. Both were shot by sharpshooters, and instantly killed.

Among the mangled and lacerated sufferers that drifted from this terrible maelstrom to the rear, bearing themselves as only heroes do, was a young boy about seventeen years of age, who, while nearing the cliffs, was shot through both arms by a Minie ball that fractured the bones of both. Men with stretchers saw him clambering slowly down the rocks with his mangled arms dangling at his side, and asked permission to carry him. He was not walking because no aid was near. He, a sufferer, was sacrificing his interests to those of his fellows. With a look of mingled pain and firmness, he replied—"Go on up the mountain and bring down the boys that can't walk. Don't mind me;" and he staggered on alone and unsupported down the mountain through the hail of shells and bullets to the hospital.

Simultaneously with Logan's advance, Dodge moved from his works with three regiments—Sixty-sixth and Ninth Illinois, of Sweeny's division, and the Sixty-fourth Illinois, of Veatch's—and encountered the enemy's skirmishers directly after quitting the defences. The Fifth Illinois supported the Sixty-sixth. The Sixty-fourth was formed in two lines, one supporting the other. Colonel Murrill, of the Sixty-fourth Illinois, encountered such resistance from the enemy's skirmishers that he was compelled to bring up his reserves at the very outset.

The same obstacles that Logan met with opposed the advance of Dodge. The thickets were almost impenetrable, and it was found impracticable to attempt the ascent in column of assault. It was determined therefore to deploy in line of battle, and the men, crawling cautiously and stealthily forward as skirmishers, through brush and over rocks, sheltering themselves as best they could, pushed up the mountain.

The fighting at times was stubborn, and the losses severe for the numbers engaged. Gresham's, one of Blair's brigades, assisted and supported Dodge to-day in his assault, and won signal praise for his splendid conduct.

Well advanced toward the enemy's line, and believing that an open assault would carry the works, these two regiments boldly charged over the defences and into the enemy's rifle-pits. The admiration their gallant conduct elicited was equalled only by the poignant sorrow all felt at the huckless *denouement*.

So hotly engaged was the Fifty-third Indiana,

that a portion of the regiment having entered the enemy's works were environed at once and compelled to surrender or make an effort to cut its way out. The odds were too fearful, and a portion of the party was captured. The brave and devoted Captain White died in the act of planting his foot on the rebel parapet. His First Lieutenant was wounded three times, and cannot recover. Thus crippled and depleted, the regiment was unprepared to renew, alone, the fight. In the mean time the rebels seized an opportune moment to make a counter-charge, and drove the remnant of the regiment back to line from which it started. General Dodge immediately despatched three additional regiments to protect the flanks of his line, and having pushed it to within forty yards of the enemy's main works, threw up rude defences, and still holds the ground.

General Dodge's losses will not much exceed one hundred and fifty in killed, wounded, and missing, at least a third of which loss was suffered by the meritorious old Sixty-fourth Illinois. Among those lost whose places will never appear to the regiment so well filled as when he was there, is the Adjutant of the Sixty-fourth. Few can have it said of them, as it may be truthfully of him; "All who knew him loved and admired while living, and are ready to do honor to his memory when dead."

Blair's orders were to move out on the left, and make such demonstrations as would lead the enemy to believe his purpose to be to pass entirely around their right flank to the rear of Kenesaw. He moved at six A. M., and found the enemy in such force but a short distance out as to prevent a further advance, unless he assaulted a strong line of works, which, with a full knowledge of the plan of operations for the day, he did not deem prudent or consistent with his instructions. The situation was promptly reported to the Commanding General, and, from the absence of further orders to that corps, I presume the judgment of General Blair was fully approved.

The part of the Seventeenth corps for the remainder of the day seems to have been to maintain a threatening attitude, and employ the enemy's attention, for nothing but skirmishing transpired. The losses I have not heard estimated, but presume they will not exceed one hundred. General Liggett's division and the left of Gresham's line appear to have suffered these.

As I have chronicled operations thus far, with reference to corps, I shall describe the action on the centre in the same manner, though Newton's division, of Howard's, and Davis', of Palmer's corps, constituted to all intents and purposes, the same assaulting column. Following the Dallas and Marietta road through the forest to the south-east, at a point where the works barely cover the road, lay Newton's division of Howard's (Fourth corps). Davis passed to the rear of this division early in the morning, and formed in column of assault on the right, under

cover of high ground, and just on the left of the Twentieth corps. From some cause, probably to draw the enemy's attention toward our left, and cause the shifting of his spare force to his right, the attack was delayed until about nine A. M.

The lines at this point bear almost north and south, and continue in that direction until we reach the centre of Hooker's (Twentieth) corps, where they bear to the south-east. The ground in front of Newton is open and rolling. The rebel main works occupy a light ridge covered with timber, and his batteries sweep the whole space between the lines.

Harker's brigade on the right was formed in column of division, left in front, and Wagner in the same order on the left. Kimball's brigade, retired on Wagner's left, with orders to guard the flank and support whichever of the brigades seemed weakest, was formed in column of divisions, right in front.

Harker, debouching from the forest, is met by a withering fire of artillery and musketry, but still holds straightforward toward the rebel works. Finding that Wagner and he are moving in such close proximity as to create confusion should he desire to deploy, Harker obliqued to the right, moved off again slowly under a very destructive fire, and Wagner hastened forward to a depression where his men might be sheltered somewhat from the seething fire of grape and canister that swept through and tore his ranks. Think of columns at the distance of six hundred yards from artillery braving a continuous storm of grape and canister, and you have the ordeal through which these brave fellows passed.

Wagner was still exposed to an enfilading fire from artillery, and soon from a flank fire of infantry, that the enemy pushed out to effect his dislodgment. During the advance Wagner's troops were struck so heavily at the very first shock that a good portion crumbled off and drifted to the rear. Enfiladed, and unused to such formations for battle, it required all the firmness and sternness at command to keep the men to the work.

Now and then a little rift from the line, like the premonitory snow-slides that warn of the avalanche, drifted back, and Kimball was ordered up to Wagner's relief—to pass over him and, if possible, to enter the rebel works. The rebels, perceiving the movement, sallied out, and, forming on Kimball's left, annoyed him very much. An order came to "form in column of battalion," and at once the lines took a shape in which the troops were more readily handled; it was a return to the "good old style," as the boys said, and then the battle raged furiously. Harker, stern, determined, and desperate, hurls his column against the works, only to see it borne back with an impetus equal to the blow, and again he essays a breach. Again his column dashes madly, desperately forward, is cut and mangled by the plunging grape and canister, and returns again, exhausted. Ambitious as he

was brave, the thought of failure is unendurable, and, though the broiling heat of midsummer's sun is pouring down upon the fields, and the sweltering troops are dripping with perspiration and gasping for breath, he implores them to follow him once more. With head uncovered and hat in hand, he rides boldly out in front. As he passes Colonel Bradley he acquaints him with his intention. The Colonel answers: "General, don't go up there; we cannot take the works without support." Harker only answers: "I *must have* the works, and, turning to his men, asks: "Who will follow me?" Fifteen brave fellows, kindred spirits all, that have not in their composition a tinge of fear, spring to their rifles and answer, "I!" "I!" and the die is cast. A handful of bravery unalloyed, heroes enough to leaven an army, dauntless martyrs that Hugo's pen alone can laud as they should be lauded, this little band of devoted soldiers move quickly up the slope of a little knoll that, up to this time, has sheltered them. The summit of this knoll is but fifteen yards from the rebel works.

Harker and his little band are under fire, but the enemy, as if loth, in absolute admiration, to slaughter heroes of that stamp, are silent. Hopeless though the effort is, Harker moves on, and his men follow him. He reaches the summit; a line of gray smoke shoots out; hundreds of rifles ring, and, as the hurricane would sweep off the thistle-down, Harker and his brave fellows are swept into eternity.

Kimball and Wagner battle on, essay again and again to advance, and at last push up to the very works, when a terrible volley sweeps through the line cutting down many of their bravest, truest officers. Kimball loses the brilliant Chandler, the light of whose intellect seemed to illumine every difficult subject, and adjust it with the wisdom of a sage. Lieutenant-Colonel Kerr, of the Seventy-fourth Illinois, has also fallen, and been left within arm's reach of the rebel earthwork.

Wagner loses heavily, also, in officers and enlisted men. Captain Kirkpatrick and Lieutenant Sharp, of the Fortieth Indiana, are killed while leading their men in a charge. Lieutenant-Colonel Boone, of the Twenty-eighth Kentucky, who never thinks of danger when discharging duty, is disabled, though not dangerously injured. Scores of brave and accomplished officers in those few bloody charges are gone down, and hundreds of our best troops strew the field.

It would be invidious, where men fought so unexceptionably well, to make distinctions between regiments. A volume would hardly record the deeds of heroism performed that day; much less could I, who am limited in time and space.

An hour's bloody work has failed to achieve our object, and, oppressed with that thought, but not disheartened, the main body of the assaulting force withdraws to our main line, leaving a force adequate to the task, to intrench

and hold the little ground we did win. The losses in Newton's division will reach, I presume, at least eight hundred.

We left Davis' division, to which has been allotted a part in this sanguinary effort, sheltered by high ground, awaiting orders. At 9:20 A. M., leaving Morgan as reserve, with McCook on the left, formed in column of regiments, and Mitchell in the same order on the right, he uncovers his column, and moves through into the open fields. His appearance is the signal for the enemy's artillery that now opens from half a dozen points along his line. The troops take the double-quick, and, cheering lustily, sweep boldly across the intervening space. In advance of Mitchell's brigade the Thirty-fourth Illinois is deployed as skirmishers, with four companies in reserve. The rebel skirmishers deliver a volley and rapidly retire. A light abatis is encountered, but it offers slight resistance. Pushing through and on, the two columns descend into a hollow and are partially sheltered.

Here again the formation seemed to have proven defective. That this expedient, resorted to for the purpose of saving men, failed of its object, I have not the shadow of a doubt. The peculiar formation of the rebel lines, and the excellent judgment displayed by the rebels in planting their artillery, conspired to adduce a bloody proof of the futility of the plan. The men saw that the experiment was too costly, and long before they reached the hollow they had begun to deploy.

Here the lines were readjusted and the two columns summoning every energy and bracing every nerve, stood ready to close in a death-grapple for the works. The word is spoken, and, with a yell that has in it the evidence of soul to dare and earnest will to work, the men rush to the assault. A volley tears through our ranks and strews the ground with dead and dying. Over these, careless as to who is trampled, the furious followers rush headlong forward, and they, too, are numbered among the fallen. It was a spectacle full of sublimity. When I knew the fate of that charge my thoughts involuntarily reverted to that passage in Byron's description of Waterloo:

"When this fiery mass of living valor,
Rolling on the foe,
And burning with high hope,
Shall moulder cold and low."

Colonel Daniel McCook, in the act of mounting the rebel parapet, was pierced by a ball that passed entirely through the left breast, and he was borne from the field. Colonel Harnun, of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, a noble soldier and a popular officer, succeeded to the command. Dashing forward as the line, borne down by a mass of metal that threatened to sweep it from existence, was wavering, he raised his sword and was about to lead another charge, when a bullet struck him lifeless to the earth. Colonel Dilworth, of the Eighty-fifth Illinois was next in rank, and assumed command.

Again and again did Dilworth and Mitchell lead their men to the enemy's works. Among the fearless spirits that on that day seemed as impervious to bullets as to fear is Colonel Banning, of the One Hundred and Twenty-first Ohio, a regiment of Colonel Mitchell's brigade. He apparently ignored his own safety, refused shelter when it offered, and busied himself in steadying and holding his line. If troops could be made invincible, I apprehend it could only be under such leaders as he.

To give you some idea of the desperate character of the struggle, the following facts will be ample data:

The One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio, the regiment that led the column under Mitchell, lost ten officers out of nineteen.

Two men of the Thirty-fourth Illinois were left dead inside the enemy's works. The color-bearer of the Twenty-second Indiana—John Caton, of company F—carried his colors so near the works that a rebel cast a stone at him with such force as to fracture the skull. The same gallant fellow was struck by a bullet before being wounded in the head, and though it carried away his finger, he would not yield the flag, but bore it forward until struck down as I have mentioned. Captain Jack Kennedy, of the Eighty-fifth Illinois, was also dangerously wounded by a stone thrown from the rebel works. One of Colonel Mitchell's men was seriously wounded in the leg by a pickaxe hurled by a burly foeman at our line. The bodies of two of Colonel Mitchell's men could be seen, after our withdrawal, hanging across the rebel breastworks. It was a day pregnant with heroic deeds, and the pen of the historian and the poet, the pencil of the painter, and the chisel of the artist, will yet find matter here for thought and labor.

The correspondent only regrets that his time and space are not commensurate with his desires. Hundreds of exemplary soldiers, who have performed deeds that would brighten any historic page, and stir a patriotic pride in the hearts of his loyal countrymen, will go down to death, each of whom deserves a place with him who is

"Freedom's now and Fame's,
One of the few—the immortal names
That were not born to die."

The day of the battle was fearfully hot, and the dead and wounded lay side by side between the lines that were but thirty yards apart, while the vicious bullets whistled over them, from eleven o'clock in the day until early the following morning. The fighting on Davis' front lasted about an hour, during which time he sustained a loss of seven hundred and fifty men. Colonels Dilworth and Mitchell headed their brigades with the wisdom and dexterity of lifelong soldiers, and elicit hearty commendations. Colonel Daniel McCook won laurels to-day that all who love to be honored as a brave man and a competent leader cannot fail to envy.

Davis' division retired only to the shelter of a light knoll, when the men scooped with their hands dirt enough to shield their bodies until

intrenching tools arrived, when stronger defences were thrown up, and the two lines lie now so close, that our men lying on their backs pitch over stones and clubs into the rebel works.

To protect the flank of the assaulting column under Davis, Hooker, with Geary on the left, and Butterfield on the right, leaving Williams in reserve on the centre, moved from his works across the open fields, suffering a slight loss, and rested his line just at the edge of the forest. Just under the rebel works he lay and fortified. The new line he still holds with a light force, having retired his main forces to the original line.

Schofield's operations consisted of an advance by Riley's brigade on the Sandtown road, which resulted in a sharp skirmish, and the driving of the enemy from his works. Regretting that I am not ubiquitous, the fact that I am not, *admitted*, I presume it will only be necessary to say that our line was at least twelve miles long, to secure pardon for not furnishing the particulars.

Haecall's division, I was credibly informed, engaged the enemy and drove him at every point. The enemy's right was weak, and was held partly by cavalry. I heard no estimate of the losses in General Schofield's corps that I deemed reliable, and hence I adopt none.

I estimate the losses resulting from the assault along the line at three thousand, and feel confident that official reports will not vary far from that estimate. Of course, immediately after an engagement of the character of this, before the reports of regimental commanders have been sent in, it is impossible to be exact; but I venture the assertion that the official count will not vary one hundred either way.

The army now is executing another flank movement, and, if successful, as I cannot believe it will fail to be, when you next hear from me it will be from the banks of the Chattahoochee, if not from the objective point of the campaign—Atlanta.

SIX MILES SOUTH OF MARIETTA, }
June 30.

The assault upon the centre and left, which was made, having proved a failure, and the rebels still maintaining themselves on Kenesaw with defiance, what next shall be done to dislodge them? It is not for any one to say that it is impossible for large enough bodies of our troops to take the rebel works by direct assault, but the sacrifice of life would be so fearful that the mind cannot contemplate it without horror. To charge upon thick ranks of living men, is a thing our soldiers do with spirit, for they have good hope of success; but to be thrust against dead walls of earth and logs, only to be broken and crushed, without any compensating gain, is hard, is maddening. The flanking policy pursued by General Sherman, up to the time of the assault of the twenty-seventh, is not only the highest philanthropy, but the most successful strategy. It makes armies gain battles by marches instead of charges, with shoe-leather

rather than with bayonets; keeps the men in good spirits, and keeps them out of the hospitals and out of the graves. It takes more bread, and meat, and coffee, and is less glorious as the world goes, but it saves men's lives, and that is more than all else. We must meet the rebel army sometime, it is true, face to face, and fight it, fight it hard, and crush it, else the Confederacy will never be broken up.

What this new movement, then, is definitely, of course, I do not know; but it is evidently to be a return to the old strategy of flanking.

Certain corps of the army are being rapidly brought to a marching trim, by being sifted of rheumatics and debilitated men—all, in short, who cannot march fast—and others are making themselves impregnable behind regular forts and earthworks of a formidable character. It may not be that they will make an attempt upon the fortifications on the south bank of the Chattahoochee, and it may be they will.

The question may be asked why Kenesaw Mountain was not flanked at once, and left behind in the forward march, just as Lost Mountain and Pine Mountain were? On the ordinary maps they all appear as detached cones rising out of the surrounding level, and offering the same facilities for the passage of flanking columns at their base. The real mountains are not so. Lost Mountain is almost a perfect cone; so is Pine Mountain; but Kenesaw is composed of two sections, divided by a deep notch on the summit, and the entire length of the two at the base is nearly two miles. Besides that, they slope away gradually in a series of hills, forming approaches to the main peak, and offering great natural advantages for fortifications. Thus the length of the rebel front, which it would be very difficult to carry by assault, was upward of four miles, the east end resting on the railroad. As the army approached this stronghold, and the centre and part of the left began to bear against it, the right wing was gradually swung around parallel to the railroad, apparently with the intention of driving off a sufficient number of the enemy's forces, to enable an assault made upon these approaches to succeed. The difficulties which lay in the way of this assault, both the strength of the defences and the determination of the rebels, seem not to have been fully weighed by any one. It was made on the twenty-seventh, and failed—signally failed. Lost Mountain was so distant from the railroad that the rebel line could barely reach it by being greatly deployed, and, at the same time hold the railroad. Our own superfluity in numbers enabled us to bring a strong line against theirs, and to sweep it away at once. Pine Mountain, though much nearer to the railroad, was so entirely detached that, while a small force was left in its front, the two wings could begin at once to swing around and cause the rebels to vacate it. It required so long a line to hold the railroad and, at the same time keep a strong force all along

the base of the mountain, that there was but a small force left with which to attempt a flank on the right. So small was it that the Commanding General seems to have been deterred from pushing it vigorously eastward toward the railroad in the rear of Marietta, for fear of detaching it altogether from the main army and exposing it to disaster. Nothing further was attempted, therefore, as I have said, than to extend the right on a long line down along the enemy's flank, with the hope that this would weaken his strength in the centre and render the hills on the east and west of Kenesaw pregnable to an assault. The rebels did not allow themselves to be deceived by this lengthened line; from the elevated top of Kenesaw they could see plainly that our main posts still confronted them, and that the flanking movement was not in earnest. They contented themselves with sending a corps to check it partially, which they did in the fight of the twenty-fourth, as will be remembered. What might have been accomplished more than has been, if the force we sent out that day had been made stronger by details from the centre (which could have amply protected itself behind intrenchments), and had pushed vigorously for the railroad, even at the risk of becoming entirely detached from the main body, and had thus fallen upon the enemy's rear, I will not attempt to say. The result might have been better; possibly much worse.

Signalizing, a most interesting and useful arm of the military service is, perhaps, less heard of by the public than any other; and its invaluable labors, as well as its frequent imminent perils, are alike unrecorded, and, therefore, unappreciated. The signal-officer who would bring late and full news to the Commanding General must undergo not a little fatigue and hardship. He must climb high trees to watch the enemy; he must penetrate through tangled thickets and forests, in search of eligible stations; he must climb the sides of steep and rugged mountains, and his bright and showy flag never fails to attract the rebel sharpshooter's fire when he is in reach, which he must often be to secure a good post, or observe the enemy closely. When once a station is established, his flag must never droop by day, nor his torch grow dim by night, till he has orders from his chief to abandon the post for a new one. And yet so great is the mystery with which he must enshroud his art, so profoundly secret must he keep the weighty messages and orders confided to him, and so silent are his operations, that the world, and even the army, know little about him. He alone is proof against the wiles of those "universal walking interrogation-points," the correspondents, though he, above all others, is the man whom they would delight to be permitted to "use." But he has his reward for all this. In the clear, upper air where he dwells he sees, as with a hawk's eye, the whole great drama played out beneath him; he sees the long lines of men deployed through the valleys, and

knows where they go and why; his eyes feast upon the field of battle, where the columns of attack rush impetuously down a wooded slope, across an open field, and up into another piece of woods, and all is clear to him and intelligible, while, to others who must grovel on the ground, there is nothing but an exasperating muddle.

Signal stations are of two kinds; reflecting stations and stations of observation: the former for transmitting despatches, the latter for watching the enemy and communicating the results to the commander. Both are constructed on the same principles, and employ the same instruments. The latter are few and simple. The flag is made of different colors, to contrast with the line of the back-ground, white, black, or red. The one usually employed is but four feet square; for the longest distances it is made six feet square, and mounted on a third joint of staff, to give it wider range. The marine glass is used for scanning the horizon rapidly, and making general observations; the telescope for reading signals at a great distance, and observing fixed points minutely. Besides these, there is a certain mysterious pasteboard disc, stamped with a circle of figures, and a sliding interior one of letters corresponding to each. This is the key and clue of the whole matter, and to the uninitiated is, of course, impenetrable.

When a message is about to be sent, the flag-man takes his station upon some elevated object, and "calls" the station with which he desires to communicate, by waving the flag or torch slowly to and fro. The operator, seated at the glass, watches closely the distant flag, and as soon as it responds by dipping he is ready to send his despatch. Holding the written message before him, he calls out to the flag-man certain numbers, each figure or combination of figures standing for a letter. The flag-man indicates each separate figure by an ingenious combination of a few very simple motions. For instance, one stroke of the flag from a perpendicular to a right horizontal, indicates one figure; a stroke to the left horizontal, indicates another; a stroke executing a half circle, another, &c. After each motion indicating a figure, the flag returns always to a perpendicular. There are a few syllables which are indicated by a single stroke of the flag; otherwise the word must be spelled out letter by letter. Experienced signal-officers, however, employ many abbreviations by omitting vowels, &c., so that scarcely a single word, unless a very unused one, is spelled out in full.

When a message is being received, the operator sits at the glass, with the flag-man near to record it. This the operator then interprets, for not even the General himself is in the secret, and by supplying the omitted vowels, &c., makes out an intelligible piece of the King's English.

The rapidity with which all this is executed by experienced operators is astonishing. The

flag is kept in such rapid motion that the eye of the inexpert can scarcely follow, and his wonder is increased by being told that the reader, of whom he can not see the slightest indication with his naked eye, is ten or twelve miles away. An ordinary message of a few lines is despatched in ten minutes; a whole page of foolscap occupies about thirty minutes in its transmission. Officers who have long worked together, and are intimately acquainted with each other's abbreviations and peculiar expressions, can improve upon even this speed.

The distance, also, through which signals can be transmitted without an intermediate station is surprising. Last spring, Captain Leonard, chief signal-officer of the Fourth corps, sent despatches regularly from Ringgold to Summerville, on Lookout Mountain, a distance of eighteen miles. Lieutenant William Reynolds, formerly of the Tenth corps, signalled from the deck of a gun-boat twenty miles into Port Royal harbor. N. Daniels was sent by the Secretary of War to Maryland Heights to give information of the enemy's movements, and he succeeded in sending messages rapidly over the extraordinary distance of twenty-four miles—from the Heights to Sugar-loaf Mountain—four miles from Frederick. But these instances require remarkably favorable conditions of the atmosphere, locality, &c. Ordinarily messages are not sent a greater distance than six or eight miles. Last night, a despatch was sent from General Schofield's headquarters to Lost Mountain, a distance of six miles, and returned to General Hooker's quarters, directly over which it had passed going out, and a message returned to General Schofield in twenty minutes from the time the inquiry left him. General Hooker is one mile from General Schofield, and directly between him and the mountain, but an intervening forest prevents direct communication.

Not even the flag-men themselves have the slightest knowledge of the import of the message they are sending; not a General in the army is let into the secret, unless he comes humbly as a student; nor can the signal-officers themselves read the message sent to them unless they have first had the countersign or key, given out daily.

IN THE FIELD, FOUR MILES SOUTH OF MARIETTA, }
July 4, 1862. }

Marietta is ours; the valiant secesh who boastingly proclaimed that they would continue to hold the city at all hazards, have ignominiously abandoned their works around the Kenesaw, and at the present writing the "detested Yauks" are cooking "sow-belly" in the "Valley City." As predicted in my last, Sherman has again outflanked Johnston, and as a natural consequence *he* has—retreated. On Friday last, Hooker's and Schofield's corps moved to the right some two miles, and the same night Morgan L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth corps was withdrawn from our left and placed in position on our right, which made

our right flank about four miles from the Chattahoochee river. Johnston at once saw that he was completely outgeneralled, and on Friday afternoon Hardee's and Polk's corps began their retreat to the river, throwing out a strong skirmish line in our front, to keep up appearances. Notwithstanding their utmost caution, the rumbling of their artillery and the rattling of their wagon-trains was plainly heard by our advanced line of skirmishers and by them reported along our lines.

On Saturday night, about ten o'clock, Hood's corps, which was detailed to cover Johnston's retreat, began the retrograde movement, and, at midnight, our pickets reported that the rebels had evacuated their works, and the only force in occupation was a slight skirmish line. This good news was subsequently verified by our skirmishers along the line, and at 3.30 on Sunday morning, "solitary horsemen" orderlies, were busily engaged in carrying orders to the various corps, division, and brigade commanders, to prepare to move immediately. A little after daylight, the Fourth, Fourteenth, Twentieth and Fifteenth corps took up their march for Marietta, and, after a running skirmish with Wheeler's cavalry and the rebel pickets, of whom it captured about one thousand, including prisoners and deserters, our forces entered the city about nine o'clock A. M. Immediately on arrival, a provost guard, detailed from the First division of the Fifteenth corps, was placed around the city to prevent the soldiers from pillaging; but, with few exceptions, there was little to plunder, for most of the inhabitants had fled in pursuit of that myth—the "last ditch." Marietta, in the language of countrymen living some two or three miles from it, "was a right smart place for an up-country town," and before the breaking out of the rebellion, must have been a place of considerable business. It is prettily situated in a valley in the rear of the Kenesaw Mountain, to which there is a pleasant drive through a series of the most enchanting groves—such as wood-nymphs were wont to sport in, if there is any truth to be placed in the mythological annals of the Romans. In the centre of the town is a small park, at the corners of which are the "town-pumps"—not pumps either, for they are almost unknown in this country—but deep wells, from which the water is raised by means of a rope and windlass. It boasts, or to speak more properly, *did* boast, of a large hotel, on the piazzas of which, I have no doubt, chivalry in days of yore were wont to dilate at length on the beastly Yauks, while smoking cigars and moistening their labial organs with mint juleps. The ancient grandeur of the hotel and mine host have both departed, and in place of the gorgeous furniture there was nothing to be seen but a few old benches and piles of straw, which told too plainly that it had been used as a hospital. Near-by was a carpenter shop, at the door of which was a large pile of unplanned pine coffins, while at a short distance reposed a cemetery, in which

your correspondent noticed some eight hundred or one thousand new-made graves. Adjoining this, and enclosed with a white picket fence, is the city cemetery, in which stand quite a number of elegant marble monuments, *in memoriam* of departed citizens. On one side of the main street stands a large three-story mill—"Kenesaw Mills"—but like the dead organ-grinder, its occupation is gone. The steam engine, boiler, burrs and bolting-cloths have all been removed, and may in all probability be again used in grinding hominy for our oppressed Southern brethren. The stores were all closed; the tape and needle merchants, the green-grocers and the egg and butter venders had all packed up and skedaddled. Only one store was left with any goods in it, and that was a drug store, and from its appearance there did not seem to be much there beyond a few tinctures, some Yankee patent medicines—no doubt never paid for—and a lot of pill and salve boxes. As our troops marched through the city in solid column, their bayonets glistening in the sunshine—orderly and in good marching time—some fair secesh damsel would cautiously draw the curtain and take a peep. Finding they did not prove any attraction, they became more bold, and windows and doors were gradually opened. Little children would run out and inquire if we were Yanks, and gaze on us with childish simplicity.

All day long and far into the night, solid bodies of infantry marched, long trains of artillery rumbled, and the wheels of miles of wagon-trains creaked through the town, and it was not until near daylight that the noise ceased. General Sherman made his headquarters at the big hotel, while the Department of the Cumberland was to be found at an elegant residence—formerly occupied by the chief professor of the Marietta Military Academy. This was, in its palmyest days, quite an institution, and was largely patronized by the scions of the Georgian chivalry. The Academy is a large three-story building, built of brick, and shaped somewhat like the letter E, and is situated on the crest of a hill about a mile to the south-west of the town. In front is a beautiful lawn, on which the students were put through the manual of arms. On either side of the Academy, at a distance of about one hundred feet, are some twenty or thirty small cottages, in which the students board, in a style similar to that in use at West Point. In rear was a gymnasium, but as the gymnasts had all gone, the appliances for getting up muscle have gone also. From the top of the Academy is a splendid view of the surrounding country. Lost and Pine Mountains, the Kenesaws and Bush Mountains, together with the intervening hills and valleys—the *tout ensemble* forming a very beautiful landscape.

In company with several staff officers, your correspondent rode through the rebel fortifications a little to the south-west of the Kenesaw—particularly those which were so unsuccessfully attacked by Newton and Jeff. C. Davis on Mon-

day last. These works were the admiration of all military men, with whom we talked, and it excited no little surprise that Johnston was ever obliged to leave them. It was the universal opinion that they could never have been successfully assaulted, except at an enormous loss, and even then the issue would have been doubtful. The works were in double line, and built in conformity with the most approved style of engineering. They were so well protected by earth as to be impervious to either shot or shell, and the ditching behind is of such character as to afford the best possible protection against shelling. In front of the first line was a *cheveaux de frise*, and immediately behind a double row of *abatis*. The points of the *cheveaux de frise* were splintered almost as fine as broom corn by the terrific shower of leaden hail fired by our men, in the charge made on Monday last, but it was too strong for our brave boys to charge, and so they had to fall back to the rebel skirmish line, where they intrenched themselves. The *abatis* was very formidable, and consisted of a series of sharpened stakes firmly posted to the earth by means of riders and forks. To give your readers an idea of it, let them imagine a picket fence inclined so near the earth that the points of the pickets would reach to the knees of a man standing immediately in front of it, and in order to make it immovable, suppose the bottom board of the fence to be fastened to the earth by means of crotches. The *cheveaux de frise* resembles a long string of those domestic animals known as "saw-horses," with the ends of the "crosses" sharpened. These cross-pieces are inserted, at a distance of some two feet apart, through holes bored in a log, and make a most formidable defense.

On Tuesday last, the day after the unsuccessful assault on the rebel lines, McCook's brigade, of which the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Langley commanding, formed the front, determined to advance their line of works in order to mine those of the enemy. As the distance was not more than two hundred feet, it was an extremely hazardous enterprise; but as Yankee ingenuity cannot be balked, Colonel Langley devised a plan, the like of which has not been seen since the commencement of the war. The Colonel and one volunteer crawled from their line to a tree some twenty yards in advance, and behind it commenced digging a small pit. After digging enough earth to give protection, an empty cracker-box was dragged up from the lines by means of a rope, and filled with earth this was placed in front of the pit and after digging a little more, another cracker-box was brought along, filled and placed in juxtaposition. This was continued with success until finally the whole regiment advanced the twenty yards, and were safely ensconced behind the cracker-box fortifications. Mining was then at once commenced, but the evacuation of the rebels rendered it useless to proceed with the work to its completion. By the way, somehow or another the

rebels became aware of our design, for a prisoner captured yesterday stated that he was stationed where the mine "would have blown him to thunder, had not our's left."

The fourth—the day we celebrate, was ushered in this morning in the usual style—music and cannonading. The former was at headquarters, while the latter was at the rebels, who have made a demonstration on a range of hills immediately in our front, and four miles south of Marietta. This is in all likelihood only a feint, in order to give Johnston time to get properly posted at the Chattahoochee—a "grapevine" being in circulation that nearly all his infantry and artillery is across the river, except the rear guard.

On Wednesday morning last, a truce was arranged upon between Colonel Langley of the One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, of McCook's brigade, and the rebel Colonel Rice, of the Twenty-eighth Tennessee, to bury the dead killed in the assault made on Monday. Colonel Rice was very anxious that the arms and accoutrements of our soldiers who fell at the rebel breastworks should be given over to the rebels. But to this Colonel Langley objected, and proposed that they should be regarded as neutral property, and not touched by either party until one or the other should occupy the ground. To this Colonel Rice reluctantly consented—knowing that if he did not, it would be equivalent to saying that the rebels were not going to hold their position. The upshot of the matter was just as Colonel Langley expected; the rebels evacuated, and we got all the arms, some two hundred and fifty Enfield rifles.

From the Colonel I gather the following in relation to the *personnel* of Hindman and Cheatam, with whom he had a long conversation; Cheatam's uniform consisted of an old slouched hat, a blue hickory shirt, butternut pants, and a pair of cavalry boots. The supports to his unmentionables were an old leather strap and a piece of web—the *tout ensemble* presenting the appearance of a "Johnny" run to seed. Cheatam was of the opinion that the war would be settled by treaty, as neither party could conquer. He was satisfied that we had so completely revolutionized Missouri, Arkansas, Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Maryland and Louisiana, that they would never form part of the Confederacy. He virtually admitted that he was only fighting from principle, and not for the love of the Southern Confederacy. When Tennessee passed the ordinance of secession, he went with it, and as he had cast his lot, he did not feel disposed to "back down." Hindman hails from Arkansas, and has the reputation of being a confirmed gambler and blackleg. He does not command the respect of his own troops, and by his brother-officers is despised. In appearance he is quite dressy. His auburn hair flows in ringlets over his shoulders, and it is said a light mulatto girl dresses it for him every morning.

Great praise is due to the rebel Colonels Rice

and House, for the gentlemanly and humane manner in which they assisted our forces to pay the last sad rites to those who fell, bravely fighting in front of the enemy's works, on the twenty-seventh of June.

RUFF'S STATION, SEVEN MILES }
SOUTH OF MARIETTA, July 6. }

After the rebels fell back from Kenesaw, and assumed the second great line of defence I have mentioned before, our army at once followed them up, and with an abundance of artillery firing, made them develop their lines full and distinct. The part played herein by the left will be, doubtless, fully set forth to you by your correspondent in that portion of the forces. The Twentieth corps performed a conspicuous part in the splendid artillery practice, which finally made it too hot for the rebels in their new line, which they evidently had constructed with the fond hope that we would again fling upon it our infantry.

On the morning of the fifth, the Twenty-third corps had been fully put in the rear (in reserve) of the forward movement of the Twentieth corps, which at the same time was advancing to the right, obliquely toward the river, so that it was deployed directly in front of, and about two miles in advance of the Twenty-third. The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth corps had, meantime, got into position on the right, in the order named, from left to right, and began to advance, skirmishing slightly, and cannonading the enemy wherever the enemy appeared to be in force. The advance of the Fourteenth, Twentieth, and Fourth corps, meantime, toward the river was gradually straightening out the rebel semi-circular lines, which I have alluded to in a former letter as investing the railroad bridge, and causing their forces to lengthen out, and consequently, extend down the river. They had, besides, a good reason for this extension down the river, in the fact that the right of our army was pushing in that direction to strike the river and occupy a sufficient extent of its bank to enable us to effect a crossing. The race was so hotly pushed, however, that we did not succeed in reaching the river until above Howell's Ferry, and then only at an angle, without being able to stretch any considerable force along its immediate bank. The enemy offered what opposition they were able to this movement, by constructing hasty works, but they were unable to draw our forces into an attack. They contented themselves with simply cannonading them at long range, and marching as rapidly as possible for the river.

The task which remains for the right at present, then, is to crowd the enemy so hard against the river that he will be compelled to retire upward along its bank, and allow our forces to cross below a point which they can command with their artillery. This will be a difficult task, as the enemy are said to have constructed several forts, mounting four or five pieces each, that will offer much resistance.

CHATTANOOGEE RIVER, PAGE'S FERRY, }
July 7, 1864. }

The day has passed, and no event of unusual, indeed, I might say, *usual*, importance has transpired. The artillery of the Fourth corps, last evening and this morning, were placed in position, on hastily-erected but substantial works constructed by the "shovel brigade," and at nine o'clock, a number of our "rebel-demoralizers" opened upon the enemy's works upon the southern bank. No response from artillery was elicited; but the musketry fire was quite spirited and harmless for an hour, until our guns again resumed silence. Early in the morning, General Wood received orders to reconnoitre the banks of the stream for a place to lay pontoons, and the firing was, no doubt, to draw the enemy's attention from him. His movements were, no doubt, a feint, with the object of giving the enemy an impression that Sherman was ready for another grand flank movement. Whether the feint was successful is known alone to the enemy, whose sense of fear was not perceptibly affected by it, as no efforts were made by Hardee's corps, which is on this side of the river, strongly intrenched, to retire across upon the pontoons, which are in readiness to be laid.

The troops in Howard's front have been quite active since their arrival here, in erecting fortifications on the river front. They are very strong, and command the enemy's position as well as the crossing at the ferry.

Last night and to-night the enemy has made frequent attempts to save their pontoons, which on their crossing they cut loose from the northern bank, and permitted to float round to the south shore. Every effort, however, was frustrated by Wood, who stationed a sentinel under cover on the bank, and when the enemy sent down a force to accomplish the work, gave a signal to our troops in the fortifications twelve yards in the rear, who opened heavy batteries upon them, with visible effect, compelling them to get back hurriedly.

Our present line is one eminently suited for defence. The river is the dividing line on the left, and when Hardee crosses, a very thin line can easily hold the enemy in check, while a vast force can be centered at some particular point, thrown across, and upon the flank of the enemy, thus rendering a passage of the river a matter of small importance. There Sherman, if so disposed, with a small force, could drive Hardee across the river and occupy his line; but I surmise that Sherman will do no such thing. He and Thomas wrap their intentions in considerable secrecy, which at the present time is very necessary. That their movements for the next two weeks will mystify the ever-watchful Johnston, I am constrained to believe; but when the enemy has the solution, I prophesy that he will have another example of the well-planned strategy of those experienced leaders. Meanwhile, it behooves the people, whose interests at the present moment are centered in the visible line of bayonets that line the James

and Chattahoochee, to patiently await the results when the mantle of the future is lifted, and they can plainly see the grand results that will have been worked out, sending a ray of joy to every loyal heart in the nation. Days and weeks may be consumed in knocking at the doors of Atlanta and Richmond; but there is an overruling Providence, and the day of treason must eventually succumb and fall before the awe-inspiring banner that so long has been trailed in the dust and *débris* of Southern streets, spit upon and insulted by the promoters of would-be slave oligarchy.

Reliable intelligence has been obtained as to the number composing the army in front. The total force, including infantry and artillery, is less than fifty thousand men. With this force behind strongly-built breastworks, our army may be held in check for a few days in crossing the river, but with the force at his command, the troops seem possessed of the idea that Sherman can accomplish everything and anything he attempts.

The prisoners and deserters who have been taken since the campaign opened, will fall not far short of twelve thousand. On the three days, from July second to the fifth, inclusive, between Kenesaw and this place, fully three thousand were taken. As our column marched along the roads from Marietta to Vining's, with flankers out, a very large number were picked up and sent in. Many of these fellows were found asleep in the woods, and when awakened protested against their capture, unavoidable, when the truth was that they had lagged behind the rebel rear for no other purpose than to be captured and get out of the service on taking the oath, which they will respect until they have an opportunity to visit their families, when they will turn bridge-burners and guerrillas. Nobody seems to have any confidence in their professed penitence.

Intelligence from the rear is frequently received, giving particulars of the operations of guerrillas, who lurk about their homes during the daytime, with the oath of allegiance in their pockets, to disappear mysteriously at nightfall, nobody knows where. As all the male residents in the country over which we pass are in the rebel service, excepting those who have deserted the rebel service and got home through the instrumentality of the President's amnesty proclamation, it is fair to presume that the frequent guerrilla outrages upon people, and burning of trains, is their devilish handiwork. Better, by far, lay every house in ashes, send the helpless families north and support them until the close of the war, than permit those unprincipled men to return home and perpetrate their villiany. I think I speak the truth when I say that sufficient Government property has been destroyed on the line of the Atlanta and Chattanooga railway to support the families of all the residents living on the route within twenty miles of the railway. There are those who have heretofore been opposed to injuring the country over

which we pass, who are now strong advocates of the policy of laying everything waste and freeing the country from the operations of those miserable devils, cut-throats, and assassins, who, too cowardly to face the Union troops openly in their trenches, seek the night to perpetrate their hellish work.

The other night a train, loaded with valuable supplies, was burned by one of these gangs near Resaca. Our cavalry got on their track and captured nine of the scoundrels near Adairsville, some of whom had taken the amnesty oath.

When I speak of Federal deserters, I do not refer to men who desert to the enemy's lines. Cases of this kind are rare indeed. But still there are a class of skulkers who come under this title. They are cowardly fellows, who, having enlisted and obtained large bounties, disappear and hide away where they cannot be found, and soldiers who, having fought bravely at the front for many months, return home on furlough and neglect to report at its expiration. Almost daily large squads of the cowards and negligent veterans arrive under guard from the North, and are at once sent to the front, where the formula of a court-martial is usually dispensed with, and the men, indiscriminately, put on extra menial duty, such as burying the putrid remains of dead animals, removing filth from headquarters, and digging "gopher holes," or rifle-pits, in advance of our lines. No discrimination seems to be made by Provost-Marshal, between the "bounty-jumpers" and the heroes of a dozen battles, who from the effect of too much stimulant, allow their furloughs to expire by a few days, and are arrested by the police and reported at the front as deserters. All are sent out under a fire where escape from death is almost an impossibility, with a guard in the rear, to shoot them if they falter in the work.

ISHAM'S FORD, GEORGIA, }
July 8, 1864. }

On the evening of the seventh of July, at eight o'clock, the Fourth corps opened up along its whole line "the most tremendous cannonade of the campaign," expending over four hundred rounds of ammunition in half an hour. All this was directed against the rebels on the opposite side of the river, and was intended to draw their attention from an attempt which, through some misunderstanding, it was supposed General Schofield would make at that hour to cross the river above. All this time the Twenty-third corps lay quietly in camp four miles in reserve, wondering what it all meant, and asking in vain for information. The rebels did not vouchsafe even a single gun in reply; consequently the casualties in our lines were nothing. The next morning the Fourth corps was moved slightly up the river to support the Twenty-third in the operations of to-day.

This morning the Twenty-third corps broke camp at an early hour, and directed its march eastward, aiming to strike the river at Isham's Ford,

eight miles above the railroad bridge. Headquarters moved out in advance, and riding at a rapid pace, with an old man, a resident of the country, as a guide, we emerged suddenly from the thick forest out upon the brink of the river bluff. There lay the Chattahoochee, about one hundred and fifty feet below us, muddy and rapid from recent rains—in every respect an unclassical stream. Right here lives William Ulrich, said to be a good Union man, and a Pennsylvania German, whose honest heart was greatly delighted, perhaps, and perhaps not, at our sudden advent. Immediately the glasses of the Signal Corps were levelled at the opposite bank, but not a discovery could they make except a solitary man wandering in the bushes. Moving a little further down the bluff, a close reconnoissance with the glasses discovered on top of the opposite hill, just in the edge of a newly-harvested wheat-field, a single twelve-pound brass howitzer, with a few gunners walking about it; and close down to the river's edge, half a dozen rebel sharpshooters squatted under a large tree, just opposite the ford. We were about a mile below. The river here is about four hundred feet wide, and from crest to crest of the hills on either side of the river, between which the cannon must play, was about a third of a mile.

After reconnoitering the situation a short time, General Schofield rode away to the ford, which is just at the mouth of Soapes' Creek, to choose positions and make dispositions of the artillery. The Nineteenth Ohio and Twenty-second Indiana Batteries were, with the least possible noise and demonstration, planted so as to cover the ford and cross-fire the rebel gun, while a section of the Sixth Michigan was held in readiness to descend into the valley, a mile further down, at the proper time, and enfilade the sharpshooters on the opposite bank. All these pieces were under strict orders not to fire under any provocation, until they received positive orders. The solitary howitzer on the other side, bestowed upon them, at random, about half a dozen shots during the forenoon, and then remained quiet until the attack was made.

Meantime, and until late in the afternoon, the troops were slowly getting into shape, and the lumbering pontoon trains were coming up and parking on the hill, ready to go down into the valley when needed. A little before four, General Schofield sent orders to General Cox to have his skirmish line in readiness, and at that hour pass it rapidly across a few rods of corn-field which lay between the hill and the river, and if they drew the rebel fire, to open with his cannon and silence it.

As the hour approached, a small party of spectators posted themselves half-way down the hillside, a mile below the ford, and with glasses thrust out from behind convenient trees and fences, eagerly awaited the spectacle. The Captain of the rebel gun could be clearly seen on the distant hill, seeking comfort as best he could (it was the hottest day of the year), and reading a January number of the Chattanooga Rebel. The

gun had been drawn back to conceal it a little, and a sentinel sat on the brink of the hill to observe our movements and give notice to the gunners to bring forward the piece. The sharpshooters also could be seen, glaring intently out of their cover upon the opposite opening in the willows, where the ford was approached.

Our skirmish line was composed of about two hundred men, from several regiments; and a volunteer detachment of two hundred men from the Twenty-third and Twenty-fifth Michigan, One Hundred and Eleventh Ohio, and other regiments which had in their ranks many old Lake Erie sailors, were assigned to the use of the oars in the pontoons which were to carry over the first companies.

At half past four o'clock the little squad of skirmishers issue out of the woods which had concealed them perfectly, rush rapidly across the corn-field, and when they come close in the rear of the willows they begin pouring in a sharp fire upon the rebel gun on the hill, and keep it up without cessation. The sentinel is seen to leap up hastily and run to the rear, the gunners trundle out their gun in plain sight, and the Sergeant stoops to sight it. But it is in vain, the bullets whistle so thick about his ears, that after dodging a few moments from one side to the other, he gives up in despair, the lanyard is pulled, the shot plunges harmless in the middle of the river, and the rebel gunners all incontinently take to their heels and disappear in the woods. Our fellows keep up so hot a fire about it that no one dares to return. The shells from our batteries pour in around it, and the red clouds of Confederate dust that leap up show how fatal was their aim. A shell from one of the guns lands under the tree of sharpshooters; the glasses are quickly turned upon them, and they are discovered lying flat on the ground. The willows completely screen our brave boys, and they cannot fire a shot at them, but must hug the soil for dear life. Suddenly a pontoon boat filled with blue coats is seen nearing the opposite shore, then another, and another. As the first boat touches land, Captain Daniels, whose eye is rivetted to his glass, shouts, "They hold up their hands! they hold up their hands! they drop their guns! they run down the bank!" The shells have cut off their retreat; there is no other resource, and they come running down to the boats with uplifted hands in token of surrender, and yet crouching as if to shun a flying bullet.

The Twelfth Kentucky infantry is first over the river, they run rapidly up the hill, and three men, fully five rods in advance of all others, lay hands upon the gun in the name of the Government. With it they capture a caisson full of ammunition, two horses, two ducks, and the Captain's coat. They had left so hurriedly that they had not even spiked the piece. The gun and the accoutrements were very properly put into possession of these three men. Would I knew their names.

In thirty minutes after the stampede, Captain _____ had reached the ford, swam his horse

over behind a pontoon, and shaken out his flag in triumph on the opposite side of the Chattahoochee, where the rebels had threatened they would make so bloody a resistance.

Soon the pontoons had ferried over several regiments, who formed in line of battle at once on the top of the hill, but found no enemy. The bridge was rapidly laid, and the corps began to cross. It was necessary that all possible expedition should be used, as the enemy might learn of the movement in time to mass heavily upon the small force before others could cross to support it, and inflict much damage. To Colonel Buell, commanding the pontoon train, there is much due for the rapidity and good order with which the bridge was almost literally "flung" over the river.

There was not a man killed during the day, that I can learn of, nor so many as half a dozen wounded. So overwhelming and sudden was our firing that it took the rebels by surprise. They seem to have been entirely disconcerted, and they certainly have not made a more utter failure to carry out their fierce threats in any single case.

Soon after the troops began to cross, the corps below began to open a lively cannonade, doubtless with a view of attracting the enemy's attention away from us. Detached as this corps is, so far away from the others, I am unable to learn whether they have yet crossed over any forces or not; but if I am not greatly mistaken, the Twenty-third corps has crossed the first regiment of the army. True, they did not encounter strong forces in their front; but none could tell what they would find, and the gallantry of the men who rushed forward to man the pontoons in the face of these uncertainties, and those who ran up the hill with no others yet over to support them, when they may be met by a deadly fire from behind some screen, is worthy of all praise. How could they know but all this apparent panic and ridiculous *fasco* might be but a blind to draw them on to their death? And when men are compelled thus to go upon suspense, and charge, it may be, upon lurking volleys which shall leave no one of them to return, it requires a stouter heart than to dash forward amid the roar and rattle of arms, and to meet a foe whom they can see. I have not known a more dramatic, brilliant, and at the same time bloodless episode, in this whole campaign than was enacted to-day by the command of General Schofield—so entirely successful, and so entirely without loss.

ISHAM'S FORD, GEORGIA,
July 11, 1864.

The names of the three men mentioned as the first to take possession of the rebel gun unmanned by our sharpshooters, on the occasion of crossing the river, on the eighth, are James Vaught, Charles Miller, and James Carter. These all belong to company A, Twelfth Kentucky infantry, Bird's brigade, Cox's division, Twenty-third Army Corps.

The same day on which the Twenty-third corps effected the crossing of the river (the eighth), Colonel Garrard's cavalry also crossed at Roswell, but about an hour later than this corps. Having marched rapidly, the day before, upon the large cotton factory at that point, he took it altogether by surprise, destroying a vast quantity of army canvas, which was extensively manufactured there, and taking captive four hundred factory girls. The latter capture was certainly a novel one in the history of wars, and excited not a little discussion as to the disposition which was proper to be made of the fair captives. Giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" they most assuredly were, and much valuable tent-cloth; but in the case of many of them, it was an involuntary service, since they had been confined and compelled to labor there without cessation from the breaking out of the rebellion. Then, too, the cartel makes no provisions touching the exchange of prisoners of this sort; neither would it do to send them across the lines to their former employers, since they would immediately be set to the manufacture of tents again; nor was it at all safe to discharge them unconditionally in the midst of two great armies, many of them far removed from their friends and helpless. Thus red tape was about to become involved in a hopeless entanglement with crinoline, tent-cloth, and cartels, when General Sherman interposed and solved the knotty question by loading them into one hundred and ten wagons, and sending them to Marietta, to be sent north of the Ohio, and set at liberty. Only think of it! Four hundred weeping and terrified Ellens, Susans, and Maggies transported in the springless and seatless army wagons, away from their lovers and brothers of the sunny South, and all for the offence of weaving tent-cloth and spinning stocking-yarn! However, I leave the whole business to be adjudged according to its merits by your readers.

July 9.—The Twenty-third corps having crossed the river the evening before, and thrown up a small semi-circle of such works as they could construct in the darkness and thickets, began with the earliest light to extend the lines of defence to embrace a much wider area, and selected eligible sites for placing the artillery. Every preparation was made to meet the largest force the enemy could bring against them, though no demonstration was made during the day. They were sufficiently occupied watching our right, fourteen miles below, and could spare no force to attempt the dislodgement of the corps.

During the day Colonel Sherman, Chief of Staff to General Howard, was taken prisoner in the following manner: He was riding out entirely unattended except by an orderly, and passed over a portion of the road which our pickets had occupied the day before, but from which they had been withdrawn in the night without the Colonel's knowledge. Expecting to meet them, he rode out on a reconnaissance, and before he was aware of it, was right in the

midst of the rebel pickets, who took him without giving a shot. His fate was unknown until the rebel pickets called across the river to ours that they had got "old Sherman." From this it was supposed he was unhurt, and was mistaken by the soldiers for the General.

Just below the infantry forces of the Army of the Ohio is stationed a small body of cavalry, connecting between the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, a part of which is Colonel Jim Brownlow's regiment of East Tennesseans. Opposite this regiment, the river makes a short bend around a narrow point of land, on which the rebels kept a small picket of observation. These fellows had annoyed the Colonel's men in their bathing and foraging operations, and he determined either to dislodge or capture them. Accordingly, he ordered a few men to strip themselves, and with their cartridge-boxes tied about their necks, to ford the river in front of the rebels and attack them. This they did, directly in the face of a galling fire, and while they thus attracted the rebels' attention, the Colonel, at the head of seven men, crossed in a canoe above, came in the rear of the picket, and succeeded in taking three of them. The remaining nine fled into the thickets, and made good their escape.

It will be gratifying to the friends of the Colonel to learn that he has lately been mustered in as the Colonel of the regiment, having previously held the position of Lieutenant-Colonel.

July 10.—The announcement which I made in a previous letter, that the rebels had crossed all their forces over the river in our front, was (to use the words of General Sherman) "premature." They had at the time disappeared entirely in front of the Fourth and Fourteenth corps, but Hood's corps defiantly maintained a hold upon this side, in front of the Twentieth and Fifteenth corps, until the night of the ninth. But the pressure upon them from our artillery gradually became too heavy, and on that night they withdrew finally and fully to the south bank of the Chattahoochee, and in the morning the smoke of the railroad bridge in flames was visible to the entire army. As soon as it was certainly ascertained that they had crossed, orders were issued for the Fourth corps to march at once up the river and take up a position on the north bank, ready to support the Twenty-third corps, in case they should be attacked, as was expected they would be. This morning the corps is in camp at this ford, with the exception of General Newton's division, which marched to Roswell and crossed the river there on the ninth, at two o'clock in the afternoon. One corps also, of the Army of the Tennessee (I cannot learn which), had made a circuitous march to the rear and left, and is probably across the river this morning, at a point about ten miles above here.

Thus, it will be seen that the army is slowly executing another great flanking movement—this time to the left, as the previous two had been to the right. The entire success with

which it has been attended thus far is made the more brilliant and gratifying by the fact that, as yet, not a single life, so far as I can learn, has been lost in crossing the river—that river which was to be made so bloody and fearful to us by the desperation of its defenders. Two of the attempts made by us—that on the right and the one in the centre—have been unsuccessful, though unattended with loss of life, because so cautiously made. The attempt to cross on the right was made first. The entire Army of the Tennessee was massed near the river, above Sweetwater's factory, about five miles below the railroad bridge, and, on the sixth, the pontoon train attached to that army was sent down within a short distance of the river, and a cannonade was opened upon the opposite bank, to ascertain if it were practicable to cross at that point. The enemy were discovered to be in too strong force, and too well strengthened by artillery to allow the crossing without great sacrifice of life. On the sixth of July the pontoon train attached to the Army of the Cumberland, commanded by Colonel Buell, of the Fifty-eighth Indiana, was brought down within three quarters of a mile of the river, in front of the Fourth corps, but here again the enemy were awaiting us, and our cannon elicited such replies as made it plainly evident that the crossing should not be attempted there.

On the evening of the sixth, the train was withdrawn to a position a few miles in rear of this ford, where it remained over the seventh, and arrived here in the afternoon of the eighth, in time for the Twenty-third corps to cross that evening, as has been heretofore narrated. Fortunately, our superiority in numbers enabled us to leave large bodies of men at the points where we had previously attempted to cross, who made such demonstrations there as induced the rebels to believe we still intended to attempt to cross, while we sent others still further up the river, who reached above the rebel line, and crossed without opposition. To me it seems a great mistake on the part of the rebels to cross the river in detail, as they did, instead of making the passage with their entire army simultaneously, and deploying at once to the greatest possible extent along the banks, to oppose all attempts. Still, it was only a question of time, since the Chattahoochee is too narrow and too shallow to form an obstacle to an enterprising General and a great army.

July 17.—This portion of the army has at length entered upon the last stage of its victorious advance from Chattanooga to Atlanta; that between the Chattahoochee river and the city. The progress through this interval will constitute a distinct campaign; it is now fully inaugurated, and there is little to induce the belief that it will consume as much time, or cost as much effort and life, as did the last one, from Kenesaw Mountain to the Chattahoochee.

Early on the morning of the seventeenth, the Army of the Ohio, holding the centre, and the

Army of the Tennessee on the left, moved out from the positions they had held for a week, on the south bank of the river; the former at Isham's Ford, and the latter at Roswell, ten miles above. Advancing with a view to forming a junction as soon as possible, the Twenty-third corps moved out on a road running east, while General McPherson's corps proceeded along the Atlanta road, south. About noon, General Hascall's division debouched to the right, on a road running south-east, and soon after the signal-officers announced that General McPherson was near, and in a short time he opened communication on the left of the Twenty-third. Although it was not expected that we should find any substantial force of the enemy this side of Peach-tree creek, a stream running west about five miles north of Atlanta, still it was necessary to advance with caution for fear of a surprise. The columns moved slowly, with skirmishers deployed on either side of the roads to beat about for ambuscades, and an occasional shell was pitched into suspicious woods and ridges. No response was elicited, however, nor anything seen except flying scouts of cavalry, in bodies of from two to six, until about the middle of the afternoon, when a body of cavalry was discovered in an open field at a distance, drawn up in line of battle. Citizens found along the road and questioned, said three brigades of cavalry had been there the day before, but hearing that General Stoneman was getting in their rear, two of them had left. It was evident, then, that their force was small, though it stretched thinly over an extent of a mile and a half. They had four pieces of artillery in position, and threw a few shells at us, which were replied to by a section on our part. But their cavalry could make no head against the rattling musketry fire of our skirmishers. The range of their carbines was too short, and as soon as our line approached them so that the bullets from our long-range guns began to whistle about them, they were compelled to withdraw, artillery and all. No body of men can stand long against a fire which they are entirely unable to return. These did not, but fled precipitately. What loss we inflicted cannot be told; our own was so slight as scarcely to deserve mention—one man in the Sixth Tennessee slightly wounded.

These operations had consumed the time, so that the line advanced perhaps no more than five miles during the day; headquarters moved about four. The line of march which the two armies had pursued brought General McPherson's line at right-angles with that of General Schofield's, the latter running east and west.

General Hascall's division having pursued a diverging road, had become detached from the remainder, and at night a strong patrol was ordered to be kept up between his division until a junction could be effected along the lines.

The country through which we now advance is a compromise between hilly and rolling; the

soil is sandy and filled with great quantities of sharp fragments of flint and granite, though it appears to be productive. The growth of timber is heavy, and the crops of corn are good and in advanced state of forwardness. The young ears are in some cases within a week's growth of "roasting" ears, and another fortnight of such beautiful combining of sunshine and rain as we are now having will put the army in the way of good living on the best of the country.

All that can be found in the country through which we pass are women and children, with occasionally an old man who skipped their draft, and very rarely one in the prime of life who has eluded it by keeping the woods. Scarcely more than half the houses are occupied by any one, and negroes are as rarely to be met with as in the North. At a house where some of our officers halted a few minutes, the women told them that several of their neighbors had gone to Atlanta to invest all their money in tobacco, intending to return at once and offer their supplies to our soldiers as they came up. They are sure of a good market and good pay, if only they are permitted to return, and the profits they will realize by selling tobacco bought cheap for "whitebacks," at a very high price in "greenbacks," can readily be imagined.

ONE MILE NORTH OF DECATUR, }
July 19, 1864. }

After the Twenty-third corps effected a junction with the command of General McPherson, on the evening of the seventeenth, the direction of the march was slightly changed, by the Twenty-third taking the main road to Decatur, and the left a parallel road about five miles east of the other. Early in the morning of the eighteenth, the order came to break camp and be on the march. The cavalry of the enemy still hovered about our vanguard, as on the day before, throwing up barricades of fence-rails across the roads, from behind which they offered a feeble resistance to our approach. The history of the day's operations was but a duplicate of the day before—a slow and cautious, but almost uninterrupted march forward, with a regiment or so deployed in front as skirmishers, who, when the rebel cavalry grew too audacious, and presumed to return their fire too long, halted a little, till a shot or two from the artillery could be lodged in the rebel lines, causing them invariably to run away at once. Very few, if any, were wounded, and they but slightly. About noon, the Twenty-third crossed Nance's Creek, at a point twelve miles north-east from Atlanta, and pushed steadily on, over a rather broken and uncultivated tract of country, abounding in pine thickets and scrub-oaks. Soon after noon, Garrard's cavalry, on the left of General McPherson, struck the Atlanta and Charleston Railroad, between Stone Mountain and Decatur, and was immediately followed by the infantry division of General M. L. Smith,

which tore up the track so that the down train at three o'clock was obliged to return to Atlanta. General Sherman's, as well as General Schofield's headquarters, were pitched for the night, on a line of railroad which the rebels had begun to construct, from Decatur to Roswell Factory and Merritt's Paper Mills, on Soapes' creek, but had abandoned as soon as our forces gained possession of Marietta.

July 19.—Every thing was again under way at an early hour, moving down the Decatur road. Unless General Joe Johnston made objections, it was intended to push the army through to Decatur that day—nine miles. Still our forces met no serious opposition, nor found any enemy in their front, save a small squad occasionally, as before, of fugacious cavalry. At Peach-tree creek, which afforded in its deep ravines good opportunity for stubborn resistance, it had been confidently expected the enemy would be found at last. But no. They still cling to Atlanta, and continue to look out of its front windows, in the vain hope that we will impale ourselves upon their formidable defences, while they slaughter us at will, and all the while we are marching steadily around for its back door.

The Fifteenth corps led the advance of the Army of the Tennessee down the road, converging gradually toward Decatur, with the Eighth Missouri and Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry deployed in front as skirmishers; General Hascall's division took the front of the Twenty-third, with Colonel Swayne's brigade as skirmishers. Nothing but cavalry in front still. Rebel papers of the eighteenth were brought in early in the day, announcing the removal of Johnston from command of the rebel army, and his supersedure by Hood. The men are not alarmed at all by the news of this change, but seem rather inclined to regard it as favorable to our progress.

At a house by the road-side, seven miles from Atlanta, a woman was found who had just returned from marketing in Atlanta, and who reported the families as removing their furniture and valuables in great haste. At another house a young man was found who had just succeeded in evading the conscription from under age, and he reported that all heads of families had left the city to remove their negroes and property to a secure place, leaving their families to be brought away at the last hour. He stated also that the entire works around the city consisted of a rifle-pit encircling the city at the distance of a mile from the centre, and four pieces of artillery planted on every road coming into the city.

About a mile above Decatur, the skirmish line was stopped by a rather sharp fire from the dismounted cavalry, and a section of the Nineteenth Ohio battery was brought up to their aid. A considerable group of rebels could be distinctly seen standing just in the edge of a piece of woods, and the gun was carefully sighted and the first shell dropped right in their

midst. We afterward learned that it killed two rebel officers, one of them, a Captain, being left in a house in Decatur. This put them to flight at once, and the artillery rapidly followed up a little distance and lodged a few shells close about the village, and then Colonel Swayne's brigade pushed rapidly forward and entered Decatur close upon the heels of the flying rebels. So impetuous was their onset that the rebel citizens who were disposed to flee had barely time to get themselves off, without carrying away any considerable amount of their goods. Half of the families had gone, and a great portion of those who remained were women and children. A solitary family alone showed signs of approbation by waving handkerchiefs on our arrival; all the rest were impudent and defiant, or sullen and little disposed to answer questions. A provost guard was stationed at once at every principal place where booty could have been procured, and all pillaging and unwarranted license was repressed. The main captures of property were about five hundred coffee-pots, which had accumulated in a small tin-store, as, doubtless, the rebels had little use for them, and a box or two of laces.

Decatur is rather a pretty country village, well shaded with trees, and wearing a somewhat ancient air, as though fashioned according to the idea of a half-century past.

July 20, 4.30 A. M.—The army has lain perfectly quiet during the night. The rebels do not seem at all disposed to come out of Atlanta and throw down the gage of battle on open ground. Headquarters are agog, and the army will doubtless move early. Another day's march will carry us across the second, if not the third, of their three railroads.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

IN THE FIELD, THREE MILES EAST OF ATLANTA,
July 21, 1864. }

At daylight of the eighteenth, the Army of the Tennessee moved by the road toward Stone Mountain. The Second cavalry division took the advance, followed by the Fifteenth corps, and it by the Seventeenth corps. At Providence Church, a cross-road seven miles from Roswell, the Sixteenth corps took the Decatur road, the Twenty-third corps moving on a road still further to the right. East of Atlanta and between it and Stone Mountain, Peach-tree creek runs in a north-westerly direction emptying into the Chattahoochee. Along Peach-tree the rebels were believed to have a line. The Army of the Cumberland, which now held the right of our line, was in front of the creek. During the operations of the day, General Thomas' command remained substantially quiet. Whatever firing took place along his line was intended to detain the rebels in their position.

The object of the movement was the destruction of the railroad running east from Atlanta, at some point near Stone Mountain. It also had for a secondary object the securing of a position

upon the enemy's right. The day was excessively hot, but the men moved forward with alacrity. The cavalry reached the railroad without much opposition, and commenced its destruction. To make the work more effectual and thorough, General Logan ordered General Lightburn forward with the Second brigade of the division. The brigade, upon reaching the road, was deployed along the track, and made an excellent job of destruction by turning over the track, burning the ties, and bending the rails. The troops withdrew by a cross-road and the infantry went into camp near Henderson's Mill.

In the morning the whole army was ordered forward to carry the position at Decatur. The Army of the Tennessee moved in the following order: Eighteenth, Seventeenth, and Sixteenth in reserve; on its right was the Army of the Ohio. The rebel cavalry was pursued and driven easily back to Decatur. At that place a rebel force of a brigade of cavalry and two regiments of infantry was dislodged at once, the advance of the Fifteenth and Twenty-third corps reaching the valley about two P. M., nearly at the same time. In the evening the rebels ran up a battery of rifled guns and opened upon our cavalry in front of the village, killing and wounding several mules and horses, and causing a little excitement. They were speedily dislodged.

About five o'clock yesterday morning the whole army moved, under orders to carry or invest Atlanta. On the left the Army of the Tennessee moved with the Fifteenth in advance, the Seventeenth moving up on its left, ours, the Sixteenth, in reserve. Morgan L. Smith's division had the advance of the Fifteenth corps. The rebel pickets were found about a mile west from Decatur. The rebels were obstinate and contested every available position, but the advance drove them steadily, carrying several strong fortifications with great gallantry. About two o'clock this afternoon the rebels made a stand with artillery and infantry. The Fifteenth corps was then some distance in advance of Blair and Schofield; Logan was therefore ordered to halt until the lines could be completed by bringing up Blair on his left and Schofield on the right. Toward evening the rebels opened with artillery inflicting some injury. The Second division of the Fifteenth corps losing seven and the Fourth twenty-one men; two men of battery A—veterans of battery B—were hit, John Had-dock, killed, and J. Delevan mortally wounded. General Gresham, commanding the Fourth division of the Seventeenth corps, was severely wounded in the leg. I believe his leg was amputated. Captain Hoover, of General Logan's staff, had his horse shot, and Adler, sutler at corps headquarters lost an arm. General Logan himself narrowly escaped the rebel shell.

The bringing up and straightening of the lines used up the day. The right and centre advanced across Peach-tree creek and within a short distance of Atlanta. Briefly as I can state it that was the day's work. There was heavy picket

firing all night and as I write at seven A. M., the whole line is firing on the centre; the firing indicates work. Cars are running all night, and every few minutes we hear the whistle of their locomotives. The movement of the Army of the Tennessee completely deceived them. They supposed it to be a cavalry raid, and were surprised to find an army on their right and rear. Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith has been assigned to the command of Gresham's division.

BATTLE OF PEACH-TREE CREEK.

July 22, 1864.

The bloody campaign of Sherman has been marked by a signal proof of the unquenchable valor of his men; of their readiness to give battle at any moment; of their proof against surprise, and their tendency to whip the enemy under all circumstances and against the most discouraging odds. The tremendous rebel attack on our right, on the evening of the twentieth, was one of those rare instances in warfare where the elaborate plans of a commander for the destruction of his adversary succeed in every preliminary, yet fail totally in the fruition. Hood, whose reputation for doing desperate things has elevated him over the shoulders of a man beside whom he is a pigmy in nearly all the essentials of generalship, was to assume the offensive under the guidance of the dangerous Bragg. It was evident from the tone of their newspapers that something new was brewing. Our army was closing around Atlanta, practising, to some extent, one of its delicate flank movements. "We will seduce the Yankee south of that difficult little stream, Peach-tree creek," planned the rebel conclave, "in such a way that his army will be divided. Of course he will intrench—he always does. But on the morning of the day we conclude to fight, we shall make feints on his left wing, and induce him to send several divisions to meet the battle we seem to offer. This done, of course, his right wing advances to close the gap, and to see if there is any impediment to its entry into Atlanta. His right shall advance about a mile, capturing some prisoners, to inform them that we have no body of troops within a mile and a half. At the same time, four fifths of our army shall be massed within a few hundred yards, cleverly under cover. We shall pounce upon the advancing and unprotected fraction of Sherman's Yankees, without a note of warning, cut it off from its bridges, and will roll it back upon the Chattahoochee. Our only fear is, that the enemy will not walk into the trap."

Singular to say, our army, step by step, fell into the rebel foils, without missing a link. They crossed Peach-tree creek at points where the rebels made a suspiciously feeble resistance. The whole army effected the crossing without serious loss, leaving a gap of three miles which the rebels refused to yield. When, on Wednesday morning, Hood made his feints against our left, Wood's and Stanley's divisions of the

Fourth corps went to its support. The troops on the right, consisting of Hooker's and Palmer's corps and Newton's division of the Fourth corps alone remained on the right, and they were ordered to advance. With what extremity we involved ourselves in the rebel snare! Newton and Hooker advanced from their trenches, captured some prisoners, and listened to their unanimous story that no considerable body of rebels were within a mile and a half. Could a bait be swallowed with more than this mathematical exactness? The signal was given, and like a storm the rebel host rushed upon our lines to complete their plan. How was miscarriage possible? They poured down in torrent-like columns upon our few devoted columns on the right—and in three or four hours were crushed, humiliated, and on some parts of the line routed. Perhaps, in perusing the details of the fight, your readers will ascertain without difficulty where they made their grand miscalculation.

The attack, in that it was unexpected, was a surprise. But it did not find our troops without muskets in their hands, or beyond easy reach of their arms. I have not seen the time during this campaign when any portion of the army has not been in complete battle trim. It is useless to deny that there was a vast deal of danger in the tremendous attack. If successful, Sherman could no longer with his remaining forces carry on offensive operations with vigor; and if the rebel army, under Hood, could force him for a moment to relax his hold on its throat, it would be the highest victory they have dreamed of.

Your telegrams have fully described the situation at the beginning of the fight. Briefly, McPherson's extreme left lay across the Augusta railroad, Schofield's and other forces joined him on the right. Then occurred an interval of three miles, covered by pickets from Newton's division; then the right wing, composed of troops already enumerated, who sustained the whole weight of the fight. The country in their front was broken and rolling, dense forests, fields of corn, barren ridges, marshy meadows, and deep-washed creeks being well jumbled together in the topography.

Peach-tree creek is a narrow, sluggish stream, with sudden banks, fringed with brier patches and almost impassable undergrowth, and would be, without bridges, a fatal bar to the escape of a routed and pursued army. In the rear of Palmer, Hooker, and Newton, there had been built over ten bridges, rendering speedy retreat feasible, provided access to the bridges was not denied.

Newton's splendid division, which during the campaign has lost more heavily than any other in the army, held the left flank of the corps advancing from the north. The interval along which we had no force was picketed by three or four regiments of Newton's division, thus reducing his force in the trenches to less than — men. The impression that an attack was

impending on the left, gave Newton more territory to guard than he had troops to cover. His slender brigades, eked out never so gingerly, did not furnish one line of men, though holding the most delicate spot in our lines. His troops were shifted from right to left, from left to right, from centre to flanks, and the reverse, to suit the emergency of the moment.

Repeatedly during the morning Newton had received orders to advance to Atlanta, the impression seeming to prevail in high quarters that as the enemy was evidently massing on our left to deliver battle, his lines in front of our right must be vulnerable. But the enemy had reconnoitered our lines with extreme nicety. His movements to our left were a feint; he knew our weak point precisely, and having decided on an attack, he was right in aiming the full force of his formidable blow where it fell. Newton's left covered the bridge across Peach-tree creek, the road on which our trains were gathered, and along which communication was kept up with the heavy masses of our troops on the left. Newton crushed, our trains were open to them, and the army was completely cut in twain, one fragment facing Atlanta on the north, and one on the east. In that case the whole rebel army could be hurled against either fraction, and with Napoleonic vigor Sherman was to be whipped in detail. That part of our army on the north, consisting of Hooker's and Palmer's corps and Newton's division, was to be driven into the river; that done, the left, though too strong perhaps to be overwhelmed, could, nevertheless, be controlled and foiled.

During the morning, as I have already said, Newton received repeated orders to advance, but Hooker had not been able to connect on Newton's right, and the latter, of course, could not safely advance until this was effected. About noon Butterfield's division, commanded by Brigadier-General Ward came up and occupied a ridge on Newton's right. Preparations to advance were made immediately. Newton ordered five regiments to be deployed as skirmishers, and about two p. m., the bugle sounded the "forward." Then broke out the *allegro* of a lively skirmish. A thousand muskets sputtered, and woke the primeval echoes of the forests to the siren song of battle. Up the ridge our men slowly forced their way, driving at every step a wavering line of rebel sharpshooters, turning at bay determinedly one moment, but changing their minds the next, and stealthily gliding further to the rear. In half an hour our skirmishers had forced them from the ridge entirely, with small loss to themselves. With the ruling passion of the campaign, as soon as Kimball's and Blake's brigades occupied the ridge just carried, the men fell to building a barricade of rails and earth. A fresh line of skirmishers was adjusted and ordered forward to relieve the panting heroes who had just taken a military fee-simple of the crest.

This advance gave Newton still more territory to cover, which it was simply impossible for him

to do, with his inadequate force. He however made the hasty dispositions in his power to command it, and repel an attack, which, if made, might be disastrous, if not fatal. In taking advantage of the ridges, Newton's lines assumed a singular shape—that of the capital letter T. Bradley's brigade was placed in trenches along the main Atlanta road, forming the perpendicular line of the letter, and facing to the left; Wagner's brigade, commanded by Colonel Blake, of the Fortieth Indiana, was the left half of the horizontal top line; General Kimball's brigade the right half, facing outward. A section of artillery was in position at the bottom of the letter.

Blake's and Kimball's brigades were, it will be remembered, building a rail barricade on the crest just carried—the men with knapsacks unslung, and many of them some distance from their arms, conveying rails and logs to the rising parapet. The fresh skirmish line was just going forward when a growl came from the front. At the same moment a cheer arose—a wild, tumultuous, shrill cry, from thousands of throats—falling on the ear like a sudden and unsuspected clap of thunder. Our skirmishers commenced firing and falling back at the same moment. With lightning-like celerity heavy columns of rebels appeared in front of, or rather tumbled out of the forests, their columns seeming to be endless, and carrying themselves with a certain indescribable *verve* in the onset which made every one who beheld it from our lines tremble. "How will that fearful wave be broken?" was the piercing fear that filled every bosom, which was not allayed by seeing our lines in apparent confusion—the confusion of men grasping their muskets, taking the touch of the elbow and facing to the front. Words cannot describe the crushing suspense of the first five minutes of the charge. Newton's lines were so thin they looked, in some places, like skirmish deployments. They opened, and the section of artillery in position opened, but the momentum of the dust-colored phalanxes was hatefully steady. Their colors snapped saucily and streamed on steadily. Soon every musket in Newton's division was blazing; for at the instant Walker's rebel division attacked Blake's and Kimball's brigades, Bate's rebel division appeared on the flank and confronted Bradley's brigade, aiming for the bridge on Peach-tree creek. They seemed to spring from the ground, and to continue springing.

A stream of non-combatants commenced flowing across the bridge. Pack-mules, imprudently taken close to our lines by fortuitous darkies, came scampering back, the latter turned tawny-brown with fright and reeking with perspiration. Ambulances tumbled over the bridge in demoralized columns. A few armed stragglers stalked sheepishly along, the consciousness that everybody who met them would fathom their meanness imprinted on their faces and in their movements. The curtain of pickets guarding the interval in our lines came rushing along,

bedaubed with mud and bedraggled with water, having barely escaped the rebel rush with their liberty. Orderlies dashed up the road yelling for ammunition-trains, and teamsters climbed trees for lookouts and reported that the Johnnies were charging by the acre; that our troops were in confusion; and finally summed up the first aspect of the situation, announcing it as confounded scaly.

There are some things happen in battles which go to show that Providence does not always favor the largest battalions. Napoleon's own military career disproved his favorite maxim. It falls to the lot of some men to do the lucky things at the lucky moment; and when Captain Goodspeed, Newton's chief of artillery, twenty minutes before the charge, ordered ten guns from the north to the south bank of Peach-tree creek, he probably little thought that he was to contribute so much toward crushing the rebellion—to the repulse of what many think the most reckless charge the enemy has made during the war. It was the work of a moment to hurl the ten guns, already near the destination, to the proper point on Newton's flank, the work of another to unlimber. As the enemy reached a point within seventy-five yards of our lines these ten guns open. What exquisite music was in their crash! How joyous was the whirl of the blue glamour from their throats. How fiercely flew swab and rammer. How ceaselessly the lanyards were jerked. How hotly the cartridge-bearers shot back and forth from their caissons, and how, notwithstanding, the looker-on felt like goading them to efforts still more desperate. There was something satisfying and reassuring in the ear-splitting din. We could tell from the peculiar whistle that our gunners were firing canister, and we breathlessly waited for the smoke to lift for a moment, that we might see its effect. The moment came. With a ragged front line the rebel column had halted, and were firing wild, but tremendous volleys. Colors disappeared and alignments were lost. Colonels rallying their men became tangled up with the swaying and disordered lines, and melted out of view like Edgar of Ravenswood. Riderless horses plunged across the field with a puzzled gallop, swaying from side to side, snuffing the terror of the moment and screaming with fright. Four guns of Smith's First Michigan battery went into action hastily on Newton's right flank, and added theirs to the intermingling detonations. Portions of the assaulting lines made shivering little efforts to advance, and the next instant fell to pieces. In twenty minutes—no more—the rebel columns were routed and flying back to the forests from which they came forth, with an almost complete loss of organization. It was the last seen of them in that portion of the field, and the stirring cheers that went up from Newton's men were the charmed peroration of the history made by the unfaltering lads in blue upon that field.

"Wasn't it dusty?" exclaimed General Newton, as he came riding back, his face aglow with

triumph, and his horse laboring for breath. Up and down his division he had ridden during the fight, just as Phil. Sheridan used to ride when he marshalled the same battalions. Whatever of regret there may be in that division for the loss of the little corporal, now at the head of our cavaliers, and whatever of coldness a new commander experiences after replacing a universal favorite, both were dissipated that day by General Newton. Such courage as he displayed is a *carte blanche* to the affections of his command. He may have won it by other means. He bought it that day in good, sterling, martial coin.

For once stragglers were put to some use, and distinguished themselves. General Newton caused all he could find to be placed with his batteries as a support. As such, they contributed materially to break the rebel line when it dashed nearest the guns.

It was in Newton's front that General Stevens, commanding a brigade in Walker's division, Hardee's corps, fell. For every casualty in Newton's division, two dead rebels were picked up in his front the next morning; and it is safe to say that the loss in the two rebel divisions that assaulted his position cannot be less than one thousand five hundred. Among his prisoners is a rebel surgeon, who unsuspectingly drove into General Kimball's lines with an ambulance and a brace of splendid mules. He asked the first Yankee he encountered where he was captured, and could hardly credit his senses when he found the brogan on the other foot.

It is superfluous to say that General Kimball gave fresh instances of his heroism; that Colonel Bradley was cool, inflexible and intrepid, or that Colonel Blake added another leaf to his laurels as a gallant man and a competent leader. Their brigades did not yield an inch; no higher eulogy can be pronounced than that.

General Thomas witnessed the heavy fighting under Newton. He warmly commended Captain Goodspeed for the celerity with which he brought his guns into action. Though General Thomas' face is one in which benevolence and majesty contend, those who were with him during the bloody twenty minutes on that portion of the line—under a heavy fire, be it understood—say that the majesty was a little in excess while it lasted.

Ward, in command of General Butterfield's division, had left his trenches, and was advancing to close upon Newton's right. He had reached the base of a hill along which his column was resting, when he received a message from his skirmish line deployed along the summit of the ridge, that the enemy was approaching in tremendous force. From the crest of the hill the country in front is open, though broken, and in all the panoply of war, streaming banners, and even, swift-stepping ranks, came the enemy, pouring into the fields, filling them densely as he advanced. It was but the work of a moment for General Ward to form his line. The next his skirmishers, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Bloodgood, of the Twenty-second Wisconsin

sin, were hotly engaged, but they stood their ground. No sooner were his brigades in line, than the blunt and warlike old veteran gave the word "*Forward.*"

In superb order his division mounted the hill, and over the crest it swept, taking the skirmishers along. Portions of the hostile lines halted at close quarters and fought for a while, and on the right, so great was the momentum of the counter-charge, several regiments became commingled, the rebels in such cases exhibiting the greatest disorder, and submitting to capture without debate. The rebels opposing Ward, prominent among whom was General Featherston's division, were totally unprepared for the fearful shock which came upon them at the crest of the hill, and to a great extent they were unnerved by it. Our line poured in deadly volleys, and steadily pushed the enemy, now in confusion, across the field. The attack on Ward was virtually over in fifteen minutes, though he had not so much as a piece of artillery to settle the matter with a sharp turn. The rebels came on in double lines originally, but the moment Ward struck them they showed signs of confusion, and both lines became intermingled. Seven battle-flags were wrested from the severely-whipped foe, and are held by Ward as his tangible trophies. He too, had done the lucky thing at the lucky moment; in addition to which his personal bravery during the fight was the theme of enthusiastic comment among his men.

In front of this division the slaughter of the rebels was very great. In riding over the ground next morning, I was astonished to see the long winrows of their dead collected for burial. Many of their severely wounded—of whom one hundred and fifty-four fell into Ward's hands—were still scattered over the field, though the ambulances were all engaged in carrying them to our hospitals. General Ward's own estimate of the rebel loss in his front is from two thousand to two thousand five hundred. He captured over three hundred prisoners. His victory was the most pronounced of any along the line, and his loss, though severe, is probably much less than it would have been had he not met the enemy half way.

At noon on the twentieth, Geary advanced his *tete de pont*, and with the assistance of a section of McGill's battery, succeeded in taking a ridge in his front, to which he advanced his division, formed with Colonel Candy's brigade on the left, Colonel Jones' on the right, and Colonel Ireland's in the centre, and proceeded at once to erect barricades. The Thirty-third New Jersey went forward and occupied another hill, some one hundred yards further south, where they began to erect works. They had just fairly got to work when the fierce shout of the enemy and the confused sound of their myriad tramp struck the startled ear. More than half of Geary's line was in a dense forest filled with underbrush; the remainder faced an open field. Across the latter, it was a brave but terrifying sight. When we remember that the entire rebel attacking column

reached along the front of but four of our divisions, it can easily be conceived how massive and deep their formations were. In the forest, the thickets fairly wilted and disappeared under their feet, so closely were they packed, and so irresistible their progress. They came on without skirmishers, and as if by instinct, struck Geary's right flank, where a gap existed, that Williams' division was endeavoring to close. The four regiments forming the right brigade were enveloped on their flank and rear in a moment, and cruelly enfiladed. Subjected to half a dozen cross-fires, the brigade fell back hastily to the trenches it had left in the morning. To remain would have been annihilation.

Portions of Colonel Ireland's brigade were also torn to pieces by the withering cross-fires, and fell back after repeated gallant efforts to re-form their line to return the fire on flank and rear. The moment was a desperate one. The enemy were almost within grasp of Lieutenant Bundy's battery on the right, but he wheeled one section from front to right, and by double-shooting the guns with canister, succeeded in repelling the greedy vermin in dirty gray. His gunners, however, were shot down one after another, until a detail of infantry men from the Sixtieth New York was called for to work them. A sergeant in this battery fell pierced with seven balls. A corporal received nine, seven of which passed through his heart.

So bitter was this enfilading fire to which Geary's position was exposed, that the caissons of the guns that had been taken to the rear for safety were driven back to the front to escape a more deadly fire than was sustained at the ordinary point of danger. But the remainder of Geary's brigade stood firm as a rock. The enemy in vain charged and recharged from front and right flank. Until nightfall the unequal contest was waged, but Geary held his hill inflexibly. The enemy sullenly left his front during the evening, firing spitefully as he retired.

The regiments that had fallen back were re-formed and sent into action again on General Williams' left, aiding materially in checking the rebel column that was pouring through the untoward interval and flooding Geary's rear.

I have seen most of the battle-fields in the South-west, but nowhere have I seen traces of more deadly work than is visible in the dense woods in which Geary's right was formed. Thickets were literally cradled by bullets, and on the large trees, for twenty feet on the trunk, hardly a square inch of bark remained. Many were torn and splintered with shell and round-shot, the enemy in their attack on Geary and Williams using artillery, which they did not bring into action on other portions of the line. Knapp's Pennsylvania battery was engaged from beginning to end on Geary's left flank, and contributed vastly to his success in holding to his position, as it were, with his teeth. Captain Elliott, of Geary's staff, was instantly killed during the action. The General's staff has suf-

ferred heavily during the campaign, having lost five of its members since the movement against Dallas.

The Thirty-third New Jersey, which was advanced to fortify a hill on the skirmish line, lost more than half its number on the first onset. General Geary was on the hill with it when attacked, and had barely time to reach his main column.

ATTACK ON GENERAL WILLIAMS.

The rebel attack rolled along the left until General Williams' fine division was fully engaged. It had advanced to close up on Geary, General Knipe's brigade in the centre, General Ruger's on the right, and Colonel Robinson's on the left. It fought from four o'clock till long after dark, in a dense forest, without yielding a foot. It was a fair stand up fight, in which Williams' division lost more heavily than any other in the engagement. When they first advanced against Colonel Robinson's brigade, the rebels held up their hands as if to surrender, upon which, seeing our lads hesitate, they instantly poured a volley into them. These wretched and cowardly tactics were practised on other portions of the line.

The brigade of Colonel Ansel McCook, on Palmer's left, was at one time heavily engaged, the One Hundred and Fourth and Tenth Wisconsin losing about fifty men each. The remainder of Palmer's corps was not engaged, and so rapid and conclusive was the fighting that it was not needed to assist Hooker or Newton.

It is estimated that every man in Hooker's corps expended over a hundred rounds of ammunition. At the beginning of the fight the ammunition trains were on the north bank of the creek, but they were rushed over before the troops had generally emptied their boxes.

The enemy retired a mile or more during the night, falling back to his works around Atlanta. Hood's inaugural was not very felicitous. The battle of Peach-tree creek must rank with the most brilliant successes of the war. The failure of the rebels to destroy our right wing was owing to the indomitable pluck of the men. They couldn't afford to be whipped, and such being the case, General Hood was unhappy in supposing that he could worst ten thousand of our lads with his whole army, even after (to borrow a phrase from the Confederate classics), "getting them just where he wanted them."

AN OFFICER'S ACCOUNT.

FOUR AND A QUARTER MILES NORTH OF ATLANTA, }
GEORGIA, July 21. }

On yesterday occurred one of the most sanguinary and brilliant conflicts which have befallen this army upon the soil of Georgia. I shall endeavor to write an account of that portion of it engaged in by the First division of

the Twentieth corps, and I trust the same may not be unacceptable to your readers.

On the nineteenth instant the army of the Cumberland arrived in position south of the Chattahoochee, and north of Atlanta. The Fourteenth corps occupied the right wing, the Fourth the left, and the Twentieth the centre. The line extended along the north bank of Peach-tree creek, and in a direction perpendicular to the line of rebel works bordering the Chattahoochee. The position thus adopted compelled the enemy to change his front and assume a new line of defence. In the mean time the armies of the Tennessee and the Ohio were expected to shortly sever the Georgia railroad near Stone Mountain, and to march toward Atlanta in a direction threatening the right flank and rear of the rebel army.

On the twentieth instant a general advance in the direction of Atlanta was begun. By ten o'clock A. M. the Twentieth corps had arrived in position on the heights skirting Peach-tree creek on its south bank. The First division joined the Fourteenth corps on the right, the Second division held the centre, and the Third joined Newton's division of the Fourth corps on the extreme left. A heavy picket was thrown out, and was considered a sufficient precaution against any hostile demonstration of the enemy, since nothing was thought of but an advance against his position. The troops were permitted to rest quietly in the shade, and were not troubled with building the usual breastworks deemed necessary at each change of the line of battle. Temporary barricades of rails were thought a sufficient strengthening of the line for all necessary purposes.

Thus the day wore away until two o'clock P. M. Comparatively little firing had followed the movements of the troops—just enough to reveal the presence and position of the enemy. The developments anxiously hoped-for in the movements of McPherson and Schofield seemed to be awaited as the signal for active demonstrations by the Army of the Cumberland. But the enemy, appreciating the desperate condition to which he was being rapidly brought, bethought himself to make one bold, dashing, determined effort to thwart our designs. Accordingly, early in the afternoon a fierce, rapid fire broke out along our picket lines, which quickly grew into a volleying roll of musketry in front of Ward's and Geary's divisions. The storm soon extended along the line toward the right where Williams' division lay grouped along the crest of a rather high and densely-wooded hill. Between Williams' and Geary's divisions lay a deep hollow, down which, masked by the timber, the enemy was now advancing in heavy masses. General Williams, with that sudden inspiration which characterizes true military genius, saw at a glance the arrangement of his troops which, according to the nature of the ground and the unexpected exigencies of the moment, was best adapted

to meet this unlooked-for demonstration of the enemy. He hurried his brigades into position on the double-quick, and though they moved with all possible celerity, was unable to get them in their proper places ere they received a terrific fire from the enemy. Robinson's brigade hastened along the crest of the hill, then facing by the left flank, marched down the slope to receive the swarming masses of the overconfident and defiant foe. The fire of the enemy was so murderous, and his advance so impetuous, that it seemed for a time as if Robinson's line must surely yield. It was an awful moment. The combatants were mingled with each other, and fighting hand to hand. The safety of the corps, and indeed the entire army seemed to depend upon the courage and determination of those devoted men. Should they give way, the enemy would get possession of the hill, command the rear, break the centre, capture hundreds of prisoners, all our artillery, and drive the remnant of our troops back to the creek, and perhaps to the Chattahoochee. But not one inch would those intrepid veterans yield. Though their ranks were fearfully thinned, and the tangled forest became strewn with bleeding forms as with autumn leaves, yet they determinedly maintained their position, and compelled the enemy to withdraw, leaving his dead and wounded mingled with the brave heroes who had fought and fallen beneath the starry folds of the flag of the Union.

While Robinson's brigade was thus contending against fearful odds, Knipe's (First) brigade had formed a line of battle stretching along the crest of the hill, in continuation of Robinson's line, and forming connection with the Fourteenth corps. Knipe had no sooner got into position than the enemy poured down upon him in an onslaught no less fierce and desperate than that made against Robinson. The awful picture of the battle as it raged at this moment no pencil can paint, no pen describe. The noon-day air became dark and heavy with the powder-smoke, which hung like a gloomy canopy over the pale, bloody corpses of the slain. Wounded men were borne to the rear by scores, the blood streaming from their lacerated flesh, and presenting a sight which at any other time would sicken the heart with horror. Each instant some patriot heart, some noble form, the treasure and the light of some distant household, fell prone upon the earth and added a new martyr to freedom, a new victim to the causeless crime of southern traitors. The rattling roll of the musketry sounded like the continuous war of a cataract, and was joined by the thunderous chime of the deep-throated cannon, which spouted unceasing volumes of flames and iron into the faces of the foe. But amid all this carnage and confusion, Williams' veteran heroes wavered not, and the red star (the badge of the First division, Twentieth corps) of the First division never gleamed more valiantly than it did in the hour of that dreadful conflict. Too much cannot be said in praise of men who

would thus so nobly do and dare for the cause of country, God, and truth.

The enemy, finding it impossible to break the line or drive it from the hill, suddenly withdrew a short distance into the woods; but the fight did not end here. Ever and anon the rebels would surge forward again to the charge, as if goaded by some spirit of madness or fired by a desperate resolution which would not listen to failure. The sanguinary recklessness of Chickamauga was repeated, but with different results. Every effort of the enemy was foiled, every attack repulsed. Evening came on apace, and the battle subsided into the irregular firing of the pickets. The last beams of the declining sun, though they gleamed upon a sad and revolting spectacle, yet seemed to set the bloody field aglow with the almost unearthly light of complete triumph and glorious victory.

Thus terminated the fifth battle in which the First division has participated during this campaign. In each previous instance, as in this last, the enemy has been thoroughly beaten, and in no case has he gained the slightest advantage of General Williams' veterans. Twice at Resaca, once at Dallas, once at Kenosaw, and finally, once, at least, in the great struggle before Atlanta, the enemy has been compelled to eat the bitter fruit of defeat and disaster by this splendid division. Yet comparatively little has been said of its exploits in the public prints, and the credit of much that it has done has been unfairly awarded to other commands. Its intrepid and skilful leader, who has the most unlimited confidence of his entire command, seems to have been also overlooked, both by the public and the Government, and those cheap rewards, so justly due to long and faithful services, seem to have been withheld from him to be bestowed upon others who were less of soldiers and more of politicians. It is well that the Republic can yet boast of men to whom the voice of duty speaks more potently than the insinuations of public ingratitude and personal injustice. History will forever honor the men who have done the real work of this war, while she will utterly ignore the political scramblers who by wireworking have obtained lofty promotion, and on very small capital have managed to obtain a sort of fire-fly reputation.

In the repulse of yesterday, the enemy received a damaging blow, from which he cannot fully recover. It is almost to be hoped, that he will continue to spend his strength in such crazy attempts to destroy this army. By no other means can he more surely bring himself to that just retribution which is the proper reward of his crime against his country and the civilization of the age. Let the rebel legions continue to precipitate themselves against the iron lines that press them toward the Gulf. It may ultimately give relief to their insane hate, and bring them, by the dreadful argument of blood, to the conviction that they are wrong and we are right.

BATTLE NEAR ATLANTA.

TWO MILES EAST OF ATLANTA, }
July 23, 1864. }

The sanguinary assault by the rebels upon our right wing, on the twentieth, so shattered and disorganized their regiments, that they made no further offensive demonstrations during the twenty-first. Our own army, also, on the right wing, had escaped disaster at such cost that it was little disposed to advance, even if it had possessed the requisite strength; they were sufficiently rejoiced to see the rebel columns, beaten and broken, falling back before them. On the twenty-first, however, they advanced their line half a mile or so, and occupied the crest of the slope which descends into the valley of Peach-tree creek, and throwing up strong works of defence, remained quiet during the day. They reported to us of the center and left, certain movements of the enemy during the day, southward through Atlanta toward our left, which betokened another storm. It was not difficult to see that the rebels, goaded into a desperate energy by their continued retreats, and spurred on by the fiery words of their new leader, Hood, were forging another bolt to be hurled against us.

The Twenty-third corps, constituting the centre, having strongly intrenched itself the night before, remained quiet during the twenty-first, though preparations were being made to open upon the rebels, when the time came for united action of the whole army, with all the batteries that the ground would allow to be got into position. Prompt and daring as usual, the Signal Corps had established a station of observation in the top of a tall tree, half a mile from the enemy, from which they could look down into Atlanta, two miles distant, with ease. To try an experiment, one of the pieces of Cockrill's battery, a three-inch Rodman gun, was brought near the tree and Lieutenant Reynolds took his station in the tree with a glass, to direct the gunners in their aim. The piece was heavily charged, and the first shell is supposed to have gone high above the city and fully a mile beyond it. The second was sent lower, and passed within ear-shot of the populace, as a slight commotion could be observed among the crowds on the house-tops. The third was directed much lower, and wrought a decided moral effect at least, as it cleared the tops of the houses of the gazing Atlantians, in a remarkably short space of time. General McPherson's cannons, also, were able to throw shells into the city, as they were planted even closer than those of the Twenty-third corps.

General Blair had pushed forward his corps during the day, so as to bring them sharply in conflict with the enemy, causing pretty severe loss in wounded and captured. I have not been able to obtain full particulars of their movements, but it appears to have been made rather independently of the rest of the army, and to have entailed a loss disproportionate to the gain. The division of General Giles A. Smith was

thrust out, so that it occupied three sides of a square, and in advance of its supports on the left and right. In doing so, it encountered strong opposition, but maintained all the ground it had occupied and threw up lines of breast-works.

July 22—2.25 A. M.—It is a splendidly bright moonlight night, such as enables one almost to read, and all about camp, and along the whole battle-line, there is a silence contrasting strangely with the incessant rattle of musketry which lulled us to sleep. What does it mean? "Guard, I say, how goes the night? Have the rebels fallen back from Atlanta? Where's all the noise we heard last evening?"

Morning showed that the rebels had withdrawn from the main line of fortifications at which they had first brought us to a halt, about two and a half miles from Atlanta, and had retired to another, which was about a mile and a half nearer the city. This they had done all along the line from the extreme right of General Thomas to the left of General McPherson, shortening their front, of course, and enabling us to shorten our own. As developed by the subsequent startling movements and events of the day, their reason for this move was obvious, and was the dictate of a daring and resolute mind, such as now appears to be at the head of the rebel armies, and drew us on after them into a pursuit which came near proving unfortunate. It seems to me to have been simply this: They designed, by thus shortening their lines and relieving some portions of their army from their left, to push the relieved corps rapidly and desperately against our left wing early in the forenoon, before our marching column had come in proximity to the rebel works, and were deployed and had thrown up defences. They could rely on our following them up closely as soon as we discovered they had fallen back; and, even if we did so with the men fully deployed in line of battle, they hoped to strike us before any works could be put in our front to break the assault.

That this was their design appears from the testimony of a rebel Colonel who was captured in the assault, and said that the orders delivered to them were to assault our lines early in the morning. Fortunately for us, certain delays which took place in their march postponed the attack till nearly eleven o'clock, at which time our men had moved forward so as to come in sight of the new rebel works, had deployed and partially, and in some places wholly, completed their intrenchments.

The Army of the Tennessee advanced along the main Decatur road in a direction nearly west, and parallel to the railroad, with the Sixteenth corps on the right, next the Twenty-third, the Fifteenth on both sides of the railroad, and the Seventeenth south of it, its extreme left being about two miles below it. The Twenty-third moved along a branch of the Bucktown road, which enters Atlanta in a south-west direction, and in consequence of the convergence of

these roads the Sixteenth corps was early crowded out and thrown in reserve, in which position it was when the assault took place. The Fourth corps moved nearly parallel with the Twenty-third, but no portion of the assault was directed against it.

The rebel force which struck this portion of the line was the corps commanded by Hardee, and evidently expected to find in opposition only a thin line, if it did not count on having gone so far around as to come in altogether below. I am inclined to the latter opinion. About eleven o'clock they debouched from the woods into an open field, in which a good part of the works of the Seventeenth corps were constructed, along a ridge called Leggett's Bald Knob, and rushed upon us with the utmost fierceness, according to their usual manner. The Third division, General Leggett, was on the left of the corps, and that commanded by General Giles A. Smith occupied the right, holding, as I have said, the general position of three sides of a hollow square, though, of course, there were many deviations and breaks from so exact a figure. The men received the onset with steadiness, delivering their fire with all possible rapidity; but the overpowering numbers of the enemy, massed, as usual, in many lines, bore down all opposition at first; and breaking over the works, they drove our men back, some many rods and some less, and appeared likely to crush and scatter them in hopeless confusion and ruin, despite the obstinate valor of the troops and their almost superhuman efforts. The prospect was gloomy indeed, and dismay sat upon every countenance save those of the brave men who contended in the ranks now, if ever, for the very existence of the Army of Tennessee. If they were utterly broken and scattered, then there was little hope for the rest of the gallant army, flanked as it would be, and right well did they know it.

In the rear, fifteen hundred or two thousand ponderous supply wagons and ambulances were greatly endangered, and came streaming back in rear of the Fifteenth corps (which till then was a safe refuge), and extended over far along behind the Twenty-third, crowding and jamming in the narrow roads, in the woods, in the greatest confusion and consternation. A courier arrived at corps headquarters in hot haste, summoning every man who had a gun, or could get one, to mount his horse and come to the fight. Every one beatirred himself; the escort and the Provost Guard saddled, mounted and were off to the scene of peril, and did such service as they were able.

It was an evil hour for the Seventeenth corps, and they were rapidly approaching that point where the endurance of the bravest had reached its limits.

At this critical moment, the Fourth division of the Sixteenth corps and one brigade, Colonel Morrill's, of the Second (the other was at Decatur), arrived on the left wing, and stayed the tide of the rebel onset. Colonel Morrill's brigade had come up a few minutes before the at-

tack commenced, and constructed very slight works somewhat in the rear of the line of the Sixteenth corps; but as soon as the latter began to be pushed back, they at once leaped over their works, and together with the Fourth division, which was just then arriving, rushed boldly into the open field, and met the enemy face to face. They held their ground firmly and, when the rebels at last fell back, carried off their wounded behind their breastworks. The Seventeenth, thus timely reinforced, hastily threw up a slight line in rear of their old one, and held it throughout. All this was transpiring on the left of the corps. It is extremely difficult to give a connected narrative of the various turns of fortune through the whole corps, so great was the confusion and disorganization caused by the partial success of the attempt to flank them. The ground was uneven and sharply furrowed by gulleys, with bushes growing thick along the bottom of them, and shreds and patches of breastworks dotted and streaked the ground in almost every direction. The terrible and confused character of the strife may be conceived when it is related that the Iowa brigade, of General Smith's division, fought successive times during the two dreadful hours of the battle on both sides of their works. They would fire upon the rebels in front of them until they were somewhat repulsed, and by this time they would be attacked by another party, or a part of the same, in their rear, and, facing about, would pour into their antagonists a fire from the other side. I, myself, visited the scene of this dreadful struggle the morning afterward, and received a confirmation of the almost incredible story by seeing the rebel corpses lying plentifully about on both sides of the breastworks, mingled with those of our own men.

About noon, McPherson rode along the front just on the left of the Seventeenth corps, and made some inquiries as to the progress which the Sixteenth Corps was making further to the left. Not being satisfied he rode forward to ascertain for himself. He was accompanied by only two of his staff and a portion of his escort. A fatal impulse carried him into a gap of several hundred yards, between the Seventeenth and Sixteenth, and of which both he and his staff were entirely ignorant, and advancing to the top of a ridge, with his staff somewhat in the rear, he was suddenly confronted by a party of rebels who rose from ambush, and calling on him to halt, at the same time fired a volley which injured none but himself. A ball pierced his right breast, and severing, it is supposed, a large blood-vessel above the heart, caused instant death from suffocation by the discharge of blood about the lungs. The rebels succeeded in rifling his person of a portion of the money he carried with him and his gold watch, though a valuable diamond ring was left on his finger. A party was soon formed, which charged on the rebels and brought off his body. A sergeant of his escort, a mere boy, displayed great bravery in the rescue, and received a severe

wound while carrying him away. The body was placed in an ambulance and slowly conveyed along the rear of the lines to the house where General Sherman, General Schofield and their staff were, where the General commanding, with head reverently uncovered, took a last look at him who had been so conspicuous among his counsellors, and upon whom he had leaned as the right arm of his strength. It was a sad hour for the Army of the Tennessee—sad for the whole Army.

It is quite impossible at this time to arrive at accurate estimates of the loss in killed wounded, and captured, because it is so early after the engagement, when there are yet many men whose wounds are not dressed, and many even unsheltered by tents. Men were carried to such places as could be found, such as were safest; no distinction between divisions and brigades could be preserved in getting them into hospitals; many of the dead were yet unburied, and some not even brought away from under the fire of the rebels, and many are missing, who may yet report themselves to their regiments. All was done for the wounded that could be; the surgeons worked at the tables all night, but in some hospitals the morning saw their task little more than half completed.

The Eleventh Iowa, belonging to the Iowa brigade, which fought so obstinately on both sides of their works, are reported to have lost about two hundred men, killed, wounded, and missing. The Sixty-fourth Illinois lost one hundred and fifty-three. Still it must be remembered that these numbers may be much reduced by the appearance of missing men.

After the violence of the shock upon the Seventeenth had passed by, and the enemy were repulsed, and a degree of quiet again restored upon the left, the enemy massed a second time for an assault upon our left, this time directing it upon the centre of the Fifteenth corps, and eventually on the left of the Twenty-third. About four in the afternoon, Cheatham's corps (Hood's old corps), advanced above the railroad with great rapidity, and charged upon our line with the same impetuosity that they had on the Seventeenth. Written words can scarcely depict the incredible audacity and the seeming total recklessness of life which characterize the rebel charges of this campaign. Here, also, as in the Seventeenth, the men had not been halted a sufficient length of time to complete perfectly their fortifications, as they had been engaged a good part of the day in feeling for the rebel position and strength. The Fifteenth corps lay extending across the railroad. General Wood's division on the right, General M. L. Smith's in the centre and on the railroad, and General Harrow's on the left. Where the line crossed the railroad there was a deep cut, which was left open and uncovered by any cross-fire, and right here was a mistake, and one which cost us much mischief. Two rebel regiments dashed right up this gorge, below the range of our musketry, and passing to the rear, separated, one regiment scaling

the bank to the left, and the other to the right. They poured a destructive fire directly on the flanks of the regiments next the road, which, of course, threw them into confusion and caused them rapidly to fall back. Over the breastworks thus cleared other regiments speedily rushed, and, forming a solid column, charged along the inside of our works, literally rooting out our men from their trenches, thinking, no doubt, that when they had once dislodged them from their works they would make no further stand. The Second division, the centre of the corps, had been weakened by detaching half of Colonel Martin's brigade to the assistance of the Sixteenth on the left, and was consequently wholly dislodged from its position. Falling back a short distance into the woods, they halted, reformed, and began to deliver upon the rebels, who rushed on apparently regardless of them until they reached the First division, which occupied the right. This division immediately swung around its left, and secured a cross-fire upon the head of the rebel column, and at the same time the Second division, now fully reformed in the woods, and strengthened by the return of the detached brigade, which had come a mile at the double-quick in a broiling sun, charged upon their flank and drove them quickly over the works in confusion. Just as the rebels, while charging along the works, had reached the First division, they came out in plain view in an open field, on a ridge which confronted another about half a mile distant, on which rested the left of the Twenty-third. Immediately four pieces of Cockrill's battery, one section of the Second Missouri, two twenty-pounder Parrotts, and two twelve-pounder Napoleons, of Captain Froelich's battery, were put in position, and poured into the rebels a terrific enfilading fire of shells at short range. The effect was admirable. The rebels were scattered in the utmost confusion. The charge upon their flank coming about the same time, put them utterly to rout.

Between the two ridges of which I have just spoken there intervenes a slight hollow, and down obliquely along the side of the one on which the rebels had appeared, our forces had constructed a line of works, from which they had just swung around in order to meet the advance of the rebels. Returning to it as the rebels were driven back by the shells, they enjoyed the sight of their discomfiture in safety. But as the rebels ran back, they soon came under cover of a strip of woods running along the ridge, and going around some distance to rear, they emerged at another point, and being half concealed by the tremendous smoke of the batteries, rushed down to the works, thinking to lie under their cover and pick off our gunners. What was their surprise, on arriving at the works, to find our boys lying thick along the other side! They had lain down out of sight, to draw the rebels on. Of course the latter could not run away, as they were exposed both to the shells and a fire in the rear from the infantry.

Our boys then reached over the works at their leisure, and laying hold of the rebels by the collars, hauled them over as prisoners of war.

Below the railroad, the rebel regiment which clambered out of the cut on the south side of the railroad did not prove so completely an entering wedge to clear our men from their works as its companion. That part of the Second division, however, and two brigades of the Fourth division were driven back from there twice, and twice they rallied and repulsed the rebels, and held their ground. It was a desperate struggle, a struggle for life; the men fought over the works hand to hand, with bayonet and with breech, with a determination which knew no yielding. Such was the spirit, in fact, with which they fought everywhere, and such fighting alone it was which saved the Seventeenth corps from being crushed, and the Fifteenth from being hopelessly broken asunder, and bringing irretrievable disaster upon the entire centre and left of the army.

In a terrific charge upon the Second Regular battery, nearly every horse was shot, and all the pieces taken for the moment. The men, however, rendered it impossible for the rebels to draw them off, by a rapid fire from the sharpshooters, and charging in turn they were all retaken. Battery A, First Illinois artillery, was at the railroad, two pieces below it and four above, and all were captured when the rebels charged over the bank upon them. The two below the railroad were retaken, but the remaining four were dragged out through a road-way, and conveyed away to the rebel lines before our columns could re-form. Battery H, First Illinois, commanded by Captain De Grass, twenty-pound Parrotts, were all taken and retaken. The Captain, though a mere beardless boy, clung to his guns to the last extremity, emptying the contents of his revolver upon the rebels, and only leaving them after he had assisted in spiking them with his own hand. All his horses were shot, one whole team, consisting of eight, falling in their traces, just as they had stood in line; and as the Captain looked upon the wreck and slaughter of his battery, he wept like a child. He had made the rebels pay a dear price for their brief possession, as one of the guns was burst by being charged with three loads of canister. As soon as he returned, and could unspike the guns, he gave the rebels a parting salute, which they would, no doubt, have been most willing to omit.

The Seventeenth corps captured three stands of colors; the Sixteenth, four. The Thirteenth Iowa captured the colors of the Forty-fifth Alabama; the Eighty-first Ohio brought off another, and the Thirty-ninth Ohio a third.

The number of prisoners taken I should estimate at about one thousand. The Fifteenth corps captured two regiments entire, and the Sixteenth and Seventeenth captured about four hundred and fifty more. Among these was Colonel Hardee, from which there straightway sprung a rumor that General Hardee was mor-

tally wounded and had fallen into our hands, some even being prepared to say that they had seen his body in one of our hospitals, or, at least, had seen those who had. A Major and several other officers were also taken.

While the attack was raging so furiously on the left, the rebels had despatched a strong body of men by a wide circuit, to surprise and attempt to retake the village of Decatur. This post was held by the Sixty-third Ohio, Thirty-fifth New Jersey, and Twenty-fifth Wisconsin, a brigade of the Sixteenth corps, and appears to have been attacked by twice its own number. Having taken the precaution to station men along the Decatur road, to prevent reinforcements from being sent out from the main army, the rebels assailed the town with great fury and carried it. Our forces were driven entirely out into the woods, but they speedily reformed, and charging in turn, dispossessed the rebels after a hard fight, in which they lost about three hundred men, and held the place against all opposition. There was some artillery employed on both sides, but how much or what sort I cannot learn. Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, of the Sixty-third Ohio, was mortally wounded, and Adjutant Farr killed. The post could not have been considered as of any particular value to the rebels, except as a point for rendezvous for small parties to sally out upon our trains. The design of creating a diversion in our rear, no doubt, formed a principal reason for the attack.

The rebels appear to have preconcerted a series of petty attacks upon our rear during the day, in order to harass and distract attention from the main business in front. A train of one hundred and twenty wagons, loaded with three days' rations for the Army of the Tennessee, was attacked near Decatur, but escaped with the loss of no more than two or three wagons. A regiment, also stationed at the bridge at Roswell, was fired upon by a force of cavalry, but repulsed them and held the bridge.

The right wing of the army was extended so far around toward the west side of Atlanta, that its operations could not be observed, and was so distant that even the sound of its cannon was not to be heard in presence of the uproar in our front, but signal-officers report that during the engagement in the afternoon, they were pouring into the devoted city a heavy fire from cannon, as the smoke could be seen rising up in thick clouds.

TWO MILES NORTH OF ATLANTA, GA., }
August 1, 1864. }

There is little occurring in this grand army, at the present time, of particular interest. The Army of the Tennessee now occupies a strong position on our right wing, having been changed from the extreme left on the twenty-sixth. All day yesterday we could hear very distinctly the shrill whistle of the locomotives entering and departing from Atlanta. The cause of this extensive railroading we cannot fathom, although

officers assert that the city is being evacuated, while others insist that strong reinforcements are arriving. Both of these rumors are idle suppositions, neither of which are entertained at General Sherman's headquarters. For the past two days the enemy have been moving large bodies of troops to our left, and at an early hour this morning quite heavy cannonading was heard in that direction, and at the present hour of writing (nine o'clock A. M.), still continues with unabated fury. It is supposed by general officers that Hood has massed large forces to assault Schofield, with the belief that, by some grand *coup de main*, he can succeed in turning our left flank. As General Sherman has full knowledge of the designs of the enemy from scouts and deserters, it is fair to presume that he has taken ample means to guard against any such calamity.

Deserters continue to flock inside our lines, many of whom are men of intelligence and good education. These men report that the greatest dissatisfaction prevails in Johnston's old army at his superseding, and the appointment of Hood in his place. The troops are amazed at the reckless manner in which Hood has led his troops against the "Yankees." They avow that had Johnston remained he would have abandoned Atlanta after becoming convinced that to hold it would imperil his army. Hood, they believe, will have to surrender Atlanta within a few days, and will also lose a great portion of his army. The change of rebel commanders is not distasteful to our officers, for, though they expect he will fight and risk more than Johnston, yet there is apparent in all his movements thus far a blind desperation that reminds one of the bull butting the locomotive. Since the removal of Johnston his army has been terribly cut up, according to the testimony of rebel officers and surgeons now in our hands. The loyal public need entertain no serious apprehension for the safety and victorious progress of this invincible army. The hour is rapidly drawing nigh when the bugle-notes shall again sound the advance, "On to Atlanta."

Brigadier-General Knipe, commanding Third division, Twentieth corps, performed a very saucy, yet brilliant little "Yankee" trick, yesterday morning. The General had learned from his pickets that the rebel pickets were in the habit of sleeping upon their posts, and were also addicted to late rising. He determined to try his luck at nabbing the napping rebels. Two companies of the Second Massachusetts and Fifth Connecticut were accordingly ordered to proceed cautiously to the enemy's reserve picket post in their front, and if possible surround it. The plan was beautifully executed, and before the drowsy fishes could be made aware of their ludicrous situation they were safely within the strong meshes of a "Yankee" net, from which escape was impossible. This neat little excursion netted a handsome profit, General Knipe making a haul of one hundred

and six prisoners, including four commissioned officers.

After the prisoners were safely bagged, one company was sent with them to the rear, while the remaining company took possession of the depleted rebel picket post, determined not to be "relieved" except by "blue coats." Shortly after a company of rebels were leisurely marching down the road to "relieve" their comrades, when a few bullets whistling through their ranks laid two or three low, and so sadly demoralized the balance that they took to the woods in great disorder. In half an hour after a superior force came down boldly, bent upon dislodging the impudent "Yanks" from their picket post, but at last accounts our troops were settling the dispute with leaden messengers, and the prospects of Massachusetts and Connecticut yielding to the insolent demands of South Carolina and Mississippi were not very encouraging. We still hold the position, and it is a very favorable one, commanding a fine view of the rebel line.

NEAR ATLANTA, GEORGIA, August 2, 1864.

The campaign is running to its fourth month, with scarcely a day but a large part of the command is under fire. Our losses in killed or wounded are already over a thousand, but this is no fair proportion of the losses of our army, as the fates have, as usual, put us in warm places.

Will the people keep up their pluck and fight the thing out? It all depends upon their steadfastness of purpose. If Richmond does not fall sooner, the Army of the West will finally make its way to the back door. If none of the Eastern rebel army comes here, we will wear this one out before the close of the season, and it is but a matter of time when the entire force of the enemy must waste away. Will the people hold out?

Johnston's veteran army, by his official report, June twenty-fifth, contained 46,628 arms-bearing men, including 6,631 of Wheeler's cavalry. They have lost since that time 5,000 prisoners, and in their three assaults upon our works since arriving in front of this place, at least 20,000 men. They have received from Mississippi 3,500, and are receiving, from Governor Brown's proclamation, about 8,000 militia. This gives them to-day an army of about 25,000 veterans, and 8,000 militia; 33,000 in all.

These figures are substantially correct. The hope of being reinforced by Kirby Smith is at last given up. After exhausting the militia of Alabama and Eastern Mississippi, which may amount to ten thousand more, if they have the power to force them out, I cannot for my life see how the enemy can make up the wastage of their army.

I know the rebel army, when it was joined by Polk just before the fight at Resaca, was seventy-one thousand strong. This included Polk, and besides the additions before men-

tioned, it has received a brigade (Harding's) of at least three thousand from Mobile. This gives the enormous loss to them, since the campaign, of fifty-two thousand men. What possible chance is there for these thirty-three thousand now before us? These figures may seem exaggerations, but they are not—they are realities; and when it is remembered that we have taken twelve thousand prisoners, have had no less than twelve engagements, where from one to three corps have been in battle, with the ordinary desertions and losses from disease, the fifty-two thousand is readily made up. What will hinder the daily attrition of the next three months from completing the overthrow of the foe before us?

We are losing some good officers, and, of course, some men, but I wish all could understand how vitally this campaign is striking the rebellion. All must read Governor Brown's proclamations calling out the militia and detailed men? There is no blossoming palmetto about that, but a plain and open groan, showing clearly how deep the travel of our army is moving down upon the tender places of the Confederacy.

IN THE FIELD, TWO MILES NORTH OF ATLANTA, }
GEORGIA, August 8—12 P. M. }

At 10:30 o'clock this forenoon, General Logan ordered the Second division, commanded by Brigadier-General Lightburn, and the Fourth division, Brigadier-General Harrow commanding, to advance their lines, in order to support an infantry force which was to move out through an open field, and, if possible, drive the rebel skirmishers from a long line of rifle-pits.

From these ugly pits the treacherous sharpshooters of the enemy controlled our lines, being situated only four hundred yards distant from our main line of works. No sooner was a "Yankee" frontispiece displayed above what is called the "head logs"—logs elevated at each end, so that musketry can be fired from a small aperture without exposing the head—than unceremonious shots whistle in profusion, and in disagreeable proximity to the heads of our men. Fortunately, but few of our soldiers were wounded or killed by these sharpshooters, many of their leaden messengers piercing the heavy logs with a dull heavy "thug," oftentimes imbedding the bullet completely from view.

The object, therefore, of the movement of General Logan was to dislodge these fellows from their apparently snug position, for while they were left unmolested our men were subjected to a great many dead shots. The line having been formed, for the rebel skirmish-line was a very strong one, three batteries, belonging to the Fifteenth Army Corps, were ordered to open upon the rebel rifle-pits. Captain Frank De Grass' celebrated twenty-pound Parrott guns, battery H, Twelfth Illinois artillery, opened the soiree, sending his compliments in

iron to Mr. Hindman's men. Then, in rapid succession, Griffin's battery and the Fourth Ohio battery belched out a few shots, in order to keep a spirit of unity, and as far as possible to harmonize the lively proceedings. At a given signal, a few minutes before eleven o'clock, our ears were startled with one of those victorious Yankee shouts, and at the same time the eye was more than gratified to witness the intrepidity of the divisions as they bounded forth nimbly to the enemy's long line of rifle-pits, bent upon capturing them. As our men dashed on, the rebels fled in the wildest confusion, firing random shots at our men, and crawling out of their well-formed pits more like frightened pigeons out of a crowded pigeon-coop than "Southern knights of chivalrous renown." The pits were in full possession of the assaulting party in less than ten minutes, with fifty prisoners, who were at once sent to the rear for safe-keeping, with a rebel flag which has been flung to the breeze for the last time. Our troops were safely ensconced in their new position for two hours, when suddenly an overwhelmingly superior force of the enemy was discovered emerging cautiously from the edge of woods in rear of their strong works, and were likewise advancing through a ravine just in front of the rebel rifle-pits occupied by our soldiers.

It was discovered, fortunately, at the same time, that the enemy were in force on General Lightburn's flank of the Second division. The only alternative then left was for our troops to evacuate the rebel rifle-pits at the last moment, and then retire in good order to our first line of works, where General Logan was fully prepared and very anxious to receive such visitors with the most distinguished consideration. After discharging their last shot, our men quietly and in excellent order took the new position assigned them.

At 4:30 o'clock General Logan had again prepared his lines to advance and retake the same line of rifle-pits which prudence obliged him to abandon temporarily. With cheers the veterans pushed forward, after being thoroughly drenched with a pelting rain which descended in torrents for half an hour, and under a brisk musketry and artillery fire from the enemy's works, the pits were at once wrested from the enemy, together with fifty additional prisoners, including one or two commissioned officers. These rifle-pits were some twelve hundred yards in length, and the capture of them is quite an important item for our future movements.

Our loss was small, not over seventy killed and wounded. I am unable to forward a complete list of the casualties in season for this letter, but, among the officers killed, was Major Brown, commanding the Seventieth Ohio, one of the most gallant patriots that ever wore the uniform of honor. As an officer he was unexcelled. Always at his post in the hour of danger, his presence inspired his men with renewed

heroism, and so perfect was their confidence in their brave leader, in his energy, ability, firmness, undaunted courage, and stern determination, that he had but to point the way and they would go. His dying words were expressive of the man: "Tell my folks I died like a soldier at my post, while in the discharge of my solemn duties." Those who saw the heroic manner in which he led three regiments from General Harrow's division to carry these rebel rifle-pits unite with General Logan in saying: "He died like a true soldier, with his face to the foe, and he was a gallant fellow." Three or four more officers are reported killed, and as many wounded, the rest of the casualties being non-commissioned officers and privates.

Quite a desperate battle has been fought this afternoon on our left, but no particulars have reached these headquarters up to the present hour of writing. The engagement lasted nearly three hours, and was reported in front of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps. Very heavy musketry and artillery fire was indulged in, but at dark hostilities appeared to be suspended, as but little firing has been heard in that direction since. Rumor has it that Hardee's corps again assaulted our lines, and were driven back with great loss.

August 6.—About ten o'clock A. M., the First brigade, composed of the One Hundredth Ohio, commanded by Colonel Slevin, One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, by Lieutenant-Colonel Sterling, Eighth Tennessee, by Major Jordan, and the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois by Lieutenant-Colonel Bands. Brigadier-General Riley commanding the brigade, was ordered to make a charge upon the enemy's works.

General Cox, with staff, was on the field, and gave directions to General Riley, during a sweeping fire of the enemy, with a coolness and a precision which is admirable and characteristic of him. The man who can exhibit a moral fearlessness on such an occasion, we feel, has reached the very acme of human greatness.

When the order was given to charge, the brigade moved forward with an unflinching line, which would do credit to anything on record. Napoleon's veteran troops never exhibited more true courage than did the First brigade of the Third division, in the charge on the sixth. Not with any desire or wish to disparage the tried bravery of the One Hundredth and One Hundred and Fourth Ohio, and One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, whose list of killed and wounded tell in unmistakable language, of the part they took in the conflict, I wish to speak of the Eighth Tennessee, in connection with an incident worthy of note.

This regiment was made up in East Tennessee, of men who have been persecuted to the bitter end by their unrelenting rebel neighbors. They have left their families in a portion of country where they are liable to the spiteful revenge of rebel raiders. But banishment, persecution and death itself have been preferred to enlisting under the accursed banner of treason. The

regiment is commanded by Major Jordan of the One Hundred and Fourth Ohio.

No regiment ever charged in better line or went into action and fought more bravely than did this noble little regiment, getting within a few rods, some but a few yards from the enemy's works, in open view, without shelter or protection, yet giving shot for shot, holding the position, fighting and hoping that relief might come, for nearly two hours, and only falling back when ordered, bringing off nearly all their wounded. The colors were captured. The color-sergeant and corporal were both killed or mortally wounded, having carried the colors within a few feet of the enemy's works. About the time they got the orders to fall back, creeping quietly through the low bushes, a rebel officer, having ordered his men not to shoot unless the Yankees should shoot first, announced that he was going to make the "Yankees" a speech, and that they should not shoot him, jumped over their works and began by saying, "I am going to talk to you, my enemies. You are my men, and I might have you all killed, but I don't want to do it. I intend to capture you; you had better surrender, if you don't wish to be killed. We have ten times your number here, and can shoot you down if you attempt to get away." The "Eighth boys" "reckoned" they "couldn't see it," and having got the signal to begin falling back, those nearest crowded into the low bushes, and so all not wounded worked their way skilfully back, crawling for two hundred yards or more, until they got back to the edge of the woods.

The enemy's works were protected by palisades in front; on top they had large logs which fitted closely down to their works, with barely space enough between to admit their guns and view our men. The charge was unsuccessful, but surely as brave and skilfully managed as any during the campaign.

UTOH CAMPAIGN, August 7, 1864.

The Twenty-third corps began to advance with little difficulty. The bloody and unsuccessful assault of the previous day had demonstrated afresh the expensiveness of direct assault, and so, on the morning of the seventh, General Haecall's division pushed boldly out a little further to the right, and began to swing around upon the rebels, toward a north and south line. The division held the extreme right, as on the day before, and was about three miles north of East Point, the junction of the West Point and Macon railroads, and a mile from the south branch of Utoy creek. Overlapping the rebels by just about the half of a brigade, they advanced the right wing boldly through the woods, threatening the rebel flank, and the latter fell back at once with little show of opposition. Falling back on the wing they must also draw back the centre, and thus our advance was secured with very small loss. The Second division soon passed the works from which they had been obliged to retreat the night before, and soon also the Third division was in motion, and

moved through the works where they had been so bloodily repulsed the day before, and recovered and buried their dead left on the field. The loss was small, as might have been expected; so small as to be scarcely worth the naming. The line was completely straightened out, so that the Twenty-third corps formed a prolongation of the line of the Fourteenth, both running north and south. The Second division of the Twenty-third was still more swung around, so that its direction was a little south-east, and its extreme right was retired close along the north bank of the south branch of Utoy creek. The extreme right flank had advanced during the day fully two miles and a half, though, by swinging, it had accomplished but a small part of this distance toward the railroad. About one hundred and seventy-five prisoners were captured by the Twenty-third corps during the day by a rapid advance upon their skirmish line.

UTOY CREEK, August 8, 1864.

The movements of the day were summed up in the occupation, by Colonel Strickland's brigade, of the south bank of Utoy. The passage was effected with little difficulty, and the brigade, forming on the south bank, began to advance through a corn-field, when they encountered two rebel lines of battle, and retired to their works, though the rebels were little disposed to fight, and withdrew without offering battle. The vast importance of the advance which the Twenty-third corps has made for the few days past toward the railroad cannot well be exaggerated. The day when we lay hold upon that, that day the rebels, if they have not already left it, must lay aside their hopes of holding Atlanta. *Garrard's cavalry hold the Augusta railroad in their possession*, and, with this last one in our grasp, we throttle them as inevitably as death. Already our batteries could knock the trains from the track, if only they could find a hillock which would raise them above the interminable trees. This they cannot for the present.

NEAR ATLANTA, August 10, 1864.

The movements of the enemy during the past few days are calculated to impress one with the belief that Hood's policy is to guard the railroad until the last moment, and, when it has been struck by our prolonged lines, suddenly turn upon us, and, by massing upon a weak point, break it and throw us on the defensive. Since Friday last our line has been slowly reaching out parallel with the line of railway, and one division of the Twenty-third corps has swung round upon and struck the enemy's flank, compelling him to fall back. The situation at present is quite favorable, and our line now extends to within seven eighths of a mile of the railroad. As we approached it the enemy threw in brigade after brigade, and regiment after regiment, to cover our line; but they have put in their last regiment, and can extend no further without shortening their line on their right. *Our line is now fully fourteen*

miles long, yet we can find troops enough to cover the railroad. When that is accomplished, and the rebel's last railway communication is in our possession, he must either evacuate and march out by the dirt roads on the south-east side, or give us battle. One or two more days will develop more fully Hood's intentions.

General Sherman issued orders to-day for all the batteries of the various corps that had range upon Atlanta to open upon the city with solid shot and shell, expending fifty rounds to each gun during the day. While this artillery demonstration was making, General Schofield was ordered to fully develop the strength and position of the enemy on our right. Lively skirmishing was also to be kept up along our lines, to attract the enemy's attention. At ten o'clock the roar of artillery was terrific, beginning miles away to our left, from the Fourth corps (General Stanley), the echoes of which reverberated like rapid peals of distant thunder, and ere the dull, heavy sound had died away among the hills, the batteries in the centre belched forth their hissing shots and clouds of smoke. Oftentimes our pieces were "fired by battery," that is, by discharging all the guns at one signal or order. It was appalling to hear these fearful iron messengers as they literally tore through the air. Not less than thirty heavy guns have maintained a constant bombardment upon the doomed city, whose shattered walls and chimneys attest the accuracy of our artillery firing. Up to the present hour of writing, midnight, no report has been received from General Schofield concerning his progress to-day. This fact is looked upon as good evidence that every thing has so far progressed favorably.

General Hood, true to his word, is holding on to Atlanta, but he does not seem much in the humor of attacking us. He uses his big guns with a great deal of pertinacity; but he may learn, even to-day, that there are two parties who can handle big guns, and that he has more to damage in the beautiful town of Atlanta than we have out here in the woods. But you are deceived if you think we are asleep or idle. Could you ride over the ten miles along which our line extends and see the lines of earthworks, heavier than any we have ever made before, and notice the fine forts lately erected, you would give us credit for industry, even if you could not believe that it has been well directed. Let it, then, be understood that we are steadily at work, day and night. Do you imagine that all our toil will be unproductive of results?

When such an army as General Sherman's has closed in on three sides of a town fortified with the skill and labor that has been expended on Atlanta, their advance is necessarily slow. We are now on the east and north sides, within easy shelling distance. The extreme right of the army reaches toward the Macon railroad, which we are trying to get in our possession, and the rebels are opposing our endeavor by all means in their power. Day by day we are steadily working our way up. It is done in this way:

On one day, by aid of our artillery, we advance our pickets say three or five hundred yards. They intrench their posts, and the rebels spitefully yield the ground, or make an attempt at night to regain it. But no sooner has night clothed the earth in darkness than the corps of engineers, aided perhaps by a regiment, advance and commence to throw up a line of earthworks in the rear of the pickets, but greatly in advance of the lines of the brigade. In the morning, or whenever the work is done, the whole line advances into the new works, and it is so much permanently gained. This kind of work is not rapid, but safe and sure, and will take us into Atlanta, if no great mishap befalls us. But it would be no wiser to set a particular day for the triumphal entrance than it was for Miller to appoint a day for the world to blow up. There is a singular perverseness in human affairs that has always been very annoying to men of prophetic inclinations.

Marietta is doomed. It is being made a base of supplies, and the site for hospitals. The streets, and houses, and suburbs are crowded with men, and wagons, and trains. Fences and out-houses soon disappear, and no one can tell who was to blame. The trees are barked, shrubbery destroyed, and insensibly, but perceptibly, the beauty and marks of comfort and refinement pass away, and soon the town looks dilapidated, outcast—as the boys say “played out.” I have seen this change come over more than one town, and it makes one sad to see the work of destruction commenced upon so beautiful a town as Marietta. But it is inevitable, and a part of the retribution that follows the rebellion, as it withdraws doggedly to its original haunts.

We have had rain, in greater or less amounts, every day for more than a week; and it has happily preserved the purity of the atmosphere and allayed the heat, and been a great blessing to the wounded and sick.

NEAR ATLANTA, AUGUST 11, 1864.

We have passed a sleepless night under the ceaseless roar of our artillery that has been firing into Atlanta. The din was the most terrific and unearthly that I have ever heard; shots following each other in such rapid succession that it was impossible to count them. For nearly an hour at a time the discharge from our guns of various calibre was so rapid that one almost imagined that he was listening to a medley of thunders from the clouds. And, only think, every discharge carrying with it to the rebel city a messenger of death. Our guns command the Macon railroad, seven eighths of a mile distant, as I am informed by the topographical engineer of the Fourth Corps, who learns that the rebels have not ventured to use the road for three days.

This portion of the army still continues to be the sole point of interest, but the time seems to have arrived when even here the lively activity and advancing of the past few days must sub-

side, as it has in all the rest of the line, into the monotony of a siege. All the swinging around, of which the Twenty-third corps has accomplished so much of late, was opposed, it would appear, only by the enemy's flank forces—their lines defended by only temporary works—but the advance has at last developed a line of massiveness and strength which defies all assaults.

General Hascall's division was pushed over Utoy creek on the morning of the ninth, in support of the third brigade, which had crossed the day before, and, advancing somewhat, found themselves confronted by a parallel of earthworks, which it were madness to assail. The skirmishers approached them within three hundred yards, but there they must needs make a pause.

The engineers give it as their opinion that this is a part of the great system of defences about Atlanta, and that it will be found to stretch continuously from Atlanta to East Point. By pressing our lines strongly against theirs, we have developed this system of defences from Atlanta down as far as we have yet gone; and as we are but a mile and a half from East Point, and can see these works stretching down a valley in that direction half a mile, it is highly probable that they encircle that important point. Beginning north of Atlanta, they run, circling around, to the west, then nearly southwest to Utoy creek, then south, and finally south-east to East Point. They lose none of their formidable character as they recede from Atlanta. In our front here, only a mile and a half from East Point, there is a regular bastioned fort, not quite completed yet, and lines of abatis and carefully-constructed earthworks, capable of offering the most serious resistance to an assault. The rebels can be seen from our lines still at work completing them, and as they promise to be when finished, there is nothing which will avail against them but a regular siege.

Captain Shields plauted his battery (the Nineteenth Ohio), yesterday on a knoll, from which he declares he can shell any thing that runs over the track. There is a large trestle bridge plainly visible from this stand-point, a mile and a quarter distant, and it is believed that our batteries will be able to knock this to fragments. It is devoutly to be hoped that we shall be able to break the railroad above East Point, since, if it is done below, it will be necessary to cut it twice.

Pretty substantial preparations are in progress here for carrying on a vigorous siege. — heavy guns of — inches calibre, were brought down a few days ago, and planted near the railroad, and have already given the rebels a taste of their quality. The heaviest artillery yet employed by the rebels against us is a gun of seven and three quarters bore, throwing a shell of sixty-four pounds. Good gunners state that a gun of the size employed by us is every way more effective than such ponderous affairs as those used by the rebels.

The engineer driving the train which brought these large cannon to the army, being a gay

fellow, ran his engine clear up against our line of fortifications, and thrusting the cow-catcher into the breastworks, lay there full ten minutes, while the whistle was shrieking at its topmost. The boys of the corps, who were within hearing distance, gave cheer upon cheer, and the wrathful rebels opened upon the saucy locomotive with showers of shot and shell.

The labors of the past week have been excessive. Within five days the second division of the Twenty-third corps built nine heavy lines of works, besides marching, picketting, and skirmishing almost incessantly. All this was necessary to secure safety, but it was at a fearful cost of nerve and muscle. Besides all that, it was extremely difficult to push the supply wagons on after them, through thick woods and ravines, and there was a lack temporarily of supplies and forage.

TWENTY-THIRD ARMY CORPS,
BEFORE ATLANTA, August 11.

Everything is in a state of perfect quietude on this flank—the extreme right of the army. There has been nothing of a warlike nature, except skirmishing and an occasional cannonade, since the sixth, a day long to be remembered by the troops of General Cox's command.

Sherman's troops have advanced, until it seems impossible to gain another foot, and it is equally impossible from the nature of the country, and the *status* of affairs, for the army, or either army, for that matter, to flank to the right. In other words, things are aptly expressed by the term *statu quo*, the rebels are "pushed to the wall," and with manifest increase of strength, have become more saucy and obstinate than ever. The evident policy of Sherman is to hold his present position, feel the enemy's lines, and ascertain their weak points. Nothing decisive need be looked for from this quarter, till one side or the other break over their present boundaries or adopt a new base. Once for all, let me tell the sensation-lovers of the North that they need not expect now, a week hence, or in a month to come, any such news as "the rebels evacuating Atlanta!"

The steady day-by-day skirmishing, to which we are so well used as to scarcely notice, is picking off by degrees this large and heroic army, till our hospital lists embrace not only every regiment, but every day of the month, and yet, even in the aggregate, the figures fail to astonish. Rather do we hear the exclamation, "So few!"

The enemy have become so enraged at our close approach to their works and lines, that they have given vent by turning all their batteries of siege guns and columbiads upon us—a spleen so wildly developed and poorly executed that the damage has been but slight, and mainly consists in throwing up dirt and tearing through the timber. Our guns have either not been able to cope with them, or have lain back awaiting a more favorable opportunity for a display of their gunnery. From present indications I

think the thunders of some big guns will be heard from the embrasures of our works ere you get this into print, and that any future demonstration of the enemy's cannonading propensity will receive, for a punishment, the concentrated fire of all the guns that can be brought to bear on the offenders—and that it will be prolonged till they are silenced.

The enemy, with a city at their back, cavalry on their flanks, siege guns on their main lines, and militia and dismounted cavalry on their front, have become much emboldened of late; so much so that we look for nothing else than an early and desperate assault on our lines. This is, of all the things likely to "turn up," the one most desirable, easiest met, and for which we are best prepared. In the language of a predestined martyr, our boys unanimously exclaim: "Let 'em come!"

ON THE BANKS OF UTOY CREEK,
August 14.

Thursday passed without anything occurring to break the monotony which has settled down upon us, except a rumor that a movement was to be made upon a certain portion of the line, and a vigorous demonstration along the front of the Fourth corps (Major-General D. S. Stanley's) to support said movement. The demonstration was made; but the movement remained—a rumor. So much cannonading was done that each wing of the army believed the other heavily engaged; but it all ended in huge sounds and—smoke.

Yesterday and last night certain things occurred which would send a thrill of joy to loyal hearts throughout the land. We have recently received the most substantial proofs that in the very army which seems so obstinately to confront us, there is a wide-spread and growing dissatisfaction with the rebellion and the rebel Government, which confines itself no longer to thoughts and words, but takes the form of solemn and significant *deeds*.

We shall have battles still to fight. The leaders of the rebellion will struggle fiercely as long as they can put a legion in the field. Enough will cling obstinately to the falling "Confederacy" to make it necessary to dash their power to pieces by the weight of battalions and artillery. But if we continue the present pressure a little longer,—if we sternly and firmly fill up and push on our columns, three fourths of the strength of the rebellion will melt away, and disappear in a manner of which some of us little dream.

A singular and unfortunate casualty occurred on the evening of the eleventh instant, which will deprive the service of an able officer.

Colonel Carter Van Vleck, Seventy-eighth Illinois, was walking toward his tent, half a mile in rear of our skirmish line, when a chance bullet struck him above the left eye and penetrated his forehead. Although the wound has been probed to the depth of three inches, the ball cannot be found; and yet, incredible as it

may seem, Colonel Van Vleck not only lives, but when I last heard from him yesterday evening, was entirely free from pain, conversed with clearness and ease, and seemed likely to survive! The bullet, however, is unquestionably in his head, and was either diverted downward to the base of the cranium, or penetrating the brain, lodged against the skull on the opposite side. Such is the theory of surgeons whom I have heard discussing this remarkable case.

Colonel Van Vleck is widely known throughout the division to which his regiment is attached, as an officer of more than ordinary intellectual ability, who constantly gave all his attention and energy to the discharge of whatever duties were imposed upon him. While his efficiency gained him the esteem of those with whom he was associated, his modest demeanor and kindness of heart secured their undivided love. He is a citizen of Macomb, Macdonough county, Illinois, and I am reliably informed was accustomed to exhibit in private life, the same qualities which have endeared him to his fellow-soldiers in the field. Many a prayer will go up for his recovery.

As our guns have obtained the range of the rebel pits and batteries, our firing yesterday was more effective, and evidently did the enemy considerable damage. It must be admitted, however, that our fire was vigorously returned, and that the rebel gunners seemed deficient neither in audacity nor accuracy of aim.

The lines of the Twentieth corps were advanced and shortened in the forenoon. The rebel pickets struggled furiously to prevent it; but the Twentieth corps learned under Hooker to make its movements with very little regard to the wishes or efforts of the enemy.

Contrary to the rule which had prevailed for nearly two weeks, no rain fell on the eleventh or twelfth. Last night the atmosphere was clear, the sky cloudless. A flood of mellow moonlight fell upon the earth, softening the harsher features of the landscape, and smoothing even the wrinkles of "grim-visaged war." I rode for the distance of half a dozen miles on a route parallel with, and considerably to the rear of our lines. All was calm, peaceful, and still; and only the drippings of musketry and the occasional deep roar of a cannon reminded us that we were near two mighty armies contending for the mastery. Nature can quiet herself; but she cannot quiet those hostile hosts. She can make peace in the rear—but the musket still blazes and rattles in the front. She can hush the voices of her own children, but the thunder of the cannon reverberates ever and anon among the hills. Have you moonlight away up in Ohio?

We have as yet received no intelligence of the arrival from Richmond of any reinforcements for Hood. The rebel authorities are trying to keep up the spirits of their men by promising them that Kirby Smith will soon come to their assistance. It will be a burning shame to those who have the conduct of our

military and naval affairs if these promises are ever verified.

REPORT ATLANTA, August 14, 1864.

Last night Logan's skirmishers attacked the rebels in their line of earthworks, and in a very brief space of time carried them, and captured a large number of prisoners, about one hundred and twenty-five in all. As usual, Logan lost in the skirmish but a very few men, wounded.

The Fourteenth corps yesterday and last night got quite a number of deserters, among whom were a few commissioned officers; these, with Logan's captures, reduced Hood's army over two hundred in one night. The deserters were from the skirmish line, and declared that the reason of their farewell to Dixie was the fall of Mobile, which points to another retreat, and as the present opportunity was a good one to escape, they availed themselves of it.

The anticipated attack of the rebels upon our left was not made last night, although we had a noisy time of it during the whole night. Our artillery opened along the whole line with great vigor, and until daylight was kept up by us, with a feeble response from the enemy. Our shots must have had their effect, for picket officers report hearing bells rung and seeing fires in different parts of the city. We have occasionally glimpses of Atlanta by climbing trees, from which the interior of the city can be distinctly seen—troops moving through the streets, women waving handkerchiefs to them from windows, ambulances moving about the streets, &c. The rebel works can also be seen quite distinctly. Veterans are spread along the skirmish line, militia man the main works, with veteran reserves in the rear of both lines, to keep the raw recruits from retreating.

The army on the right, or rather the right wing—under General Schofield's temporary command—is in *status quo*, and has been for two or three days. However, it will not be so long, for there are unmistakable evidences about us that "something is going to happen."

It seems almost miraculous that in the frequent skirmishes upon the line more men are not lost. The skirmish lines will get up an impromptu fight, expend several thousand cartridges, artillery will give forth its deep-toned bass, and when the music of the battle is absorbed in air, we not unfrequently find that our loss in the whole corps front is but two or three. In these skirmishes, two or three of which occur per day, I am conscious of being within bounds when I say the average loss is less than twenty daily!

August 15—11 o'clock A. M.—Two heavy attacks upon our pickets were made during the past night, upon the right wing, with what success, of course, we have not yet learned. The first "picket fracas" was about eight P. M., lasting half an hour, the last at two o'clock, lasting about the same period. The artillery must take a hand in, and the moment the pickets get to spitting lead at each other, that moment the loud-mouthed artillery speaks.

BEFORE ATLANTA, August 16.

This is one of the most beautiful days that we have experienced since the feet of "our men in blue" first touched the rugged soil of Georgia. The dark, cloudy sky, the oppressive, damp atmosphere, and the drizzling rain for nearly a week, have disappeared, and we bask once more in the warm sun's rays, while a cool breeze, like the winds of our Northern autumn, stirs the green foliage of the trees and fans the sun-browned cheeks of the veterans who nestle in the trenches, or carelessly loll upon the ground behind the breastworks. All is quiet along the line; the skirmishers in their pits, musket in hand, keep a sharp lookout, but do not fire, as the enemy seems indisposed to break the stillness that all day has existed. Not a musket-crack have I heard to-day, and were it not for an occasional report from our cannon, and the rumbling of a passing army wagon, one would almost think we were at home in some cozy forest of a Sunday afternoon.

No material change has taken place in the line since last writing. Indeed, as far as I can learn, every regiment is in the same position. The Twenty-third corps is across the Sandtown road, and within three fourths of a mile of the railway, but unable to intercept the passage of trains by its artillery. Picket-firing in the daytime has become almost obsolete, and at night the men persist in keeping one another awake, and rendering the night hideous, by their rapid exchange of shots; artillery officers follow suit, and fire at random in the direction of the city—firing a building occasionally, and creating a general alarm among the few women and children who remain.

There has, for several days, been a truce upon the right between the pickets, who are close together, and able to join in conversation. Our soldiers treat them very civilly and the courtesy is returned. Both parties are so honorable that they will never violate the truce, and when the time comes for ending it, both sides seek their holes, and at once a brisk fusilade is begun between men who, perhaps, a moment before were exchanging coffee and tobacco, and clasping each other's hands. Several instances of honor on both sides have been stated to me. One day last week the rebel picket officer came up, and, cursing the pickets, ordered them to keep up the firing. They informed him that they were having a truce. "D—n your truce," said he, "open on the scoundrels." They all hesitated, when the officer seized a gun and fired upon our men. The rebels instantly sprang up, and, holding up both hands, to show their innocence, exclaimed, "Hold on, Yanks, it wasn't us, it was the Major; now get into your pits, as he says we must open fire."

Another of many instances: Three rebels, being assured that they would be permitted to return, came over to exchange or "swap," as they call it, and, while negotiations were pending, a picket officer came down, ordered the truce broken, and would not permit the rebels

to return. They were sent to brigade headquarters by a sergeant, who explained the circumstance to the brigade commander, who, while he was no party to the truce, gave them permission to return to their own lines or their choice of remaining. After some consultation, and being assured that they would be treated as deserters from the enemy, they voluntarily elected not to return.

Desertions from the enemy are largely on the increase, notwithstanding the closeness with which the lines are drawn, and the difficulty of passing over under fire from both sides. The men, however, resort to various ingenious devices to get over to us. In my last I stated the circumstance of almost two hundred coming in on Friday night to Johnson's (Fourteenth) corps and Logan's. I have since learned that they were the remnants of the Forty-sixth and — Georgia regiments, who during a truce had arranged, through a commissioner sent over to our line, the terms of surrender. At a certain signal the two regiments, which composed the rebel pickets, were to open upon our pickets, firing high, and falling back until the rebel pickets were drawn away from their reserve; our men were to flank them and cut them off. The ruse worked to a charm. Our boys carried out the programme faithfully, and all those who were in the secret got in. Only one man in the line, who not having been informed of the scheme, ran back, was injured by our men, who also fired over the rebels. The whole thing was ingeniously planned and cleverly executed by the skilful diplomatists. This is but one of the many ruses resorted to to reach our line without being subject to the fire of their own comrades.

On Sunday, five ladies, whose appearance denoted a higher degree of refinement than the Georgia she-rebels we have been in the habit of encountering, presented themselves in broad daylight in front of Colonel Kirby's brigade, accompanied by a negro, whom they stated they had paid fifty dollars to escort them in. They were received and passed on up, through the usual channels, to headquarters. What disposition was made of them, I have not learned; but the fact that the pickets are so close together that they could not smuggle themselves through unknown to the enemy, looks suspicious. It is an old trick of Johnston's, which Hood may have repeated, to send through soldiers or citizens, with a story of what they have suffered, and schooled to make certain statements, with the view of deceiving us. This is a game that won't work. Thomas is too sharp to be deceived by any of Hood's professed Unionists.

There are floating rumors of raids having been made on our communications in the rear; but as the mail has arrived up regularly, they cannot have done much damage to the road. I believe, however, that there is a small body of rebel cavalry north of the Chattahoochee, operating with the guerrilla banditti, but we have a

force sufficient to successfully cope with them, and keep our communications intact.

Major-General Howard, the late commander of the Fourth corps, who succeeded the revered McPherson, is rapidly growing in favor, by his splendid management of the battle of the twenty-eighth ultimo, and his cordial and unassuming manner, and is winning the confidence and esteem of those who at first felt that injustice had been done the Army of the Tennessee by selecting a commander from another army. A division commander yesterday remarked to me: "General Howard is a man who already has won the esteem and love of this army. He handles his increased command splendidly, and with such renowned soldiers as Logan, Blair, and Dodge, Howard and his army are destined to make a mark second to none on the continent."

The true and tried Brigadier-General Hazen, commanding a brigade under Wood, Fourth corps, has been ordered to report for duty to General Howard, of the Army of the Tennessee. Hazen was justly popular with General Thomas, and it is probable that nothing but the probability of immediate promotion to a division under Howard would cause the Commanding General to consent to the transfer of so efficient an officer, for whose promotion there is no vacancy in the old Army of the Cumberland at present.

August 18.—Two days of very little work have passed, and we are very little nearer the capture of the rebel stronghold. Yesterday and to-day not even a decent picket skirmish was gotten up, for a variation of the programme. Sherman and Thomas were at work, however, preparing for something that is to come. It would be improper to state what will be done in the next few days, should Hood not leave us his naked piles of red mud and logs. The batteries have tried hot shot on the city, with what effect is not known yet; as no fires have been seen, it is probable that the furnaces for heating the shot, or some of the details, are not in smooth running order.

During last night and this morning the rebels were seen moving toward our left; what their object is, of course, is mere conjecture—probably to call our attention from the right, while they attack it, and endeavor to drive it back. Our force is ample to guard against the turning of our flank, and at the same time continue our demonstrations upon the railroad, which, in a few days, must be reached.

The effect of the enemy's shells, as they come tearing through the trees, and over headquarters, is of an exciting tendency, especially among the dusky portion of hangers-on, who indiscriminately seek holes and trees in search of safe quarters. Indeed the sixty-four-pounders are not very welcome visitors to officers and soldiers, who invariably dodge as they pass. One passed over the heads of General Wagner and staff while at dinner yesterday, and continued on its course, blowing its wind upon General Wood's tents, and after boring a hole in

a flag large enough to throw a man through, brought up in the rear without injuring any one. Prisoners still persist in asserting that Mobile is in our possession. If so, the capture of the city is going to have an important bearing upon the concluding chapter of the campaign. The opening up of a new base of supplies within short rail and water distance is a result that some think certain to follow.

Ten o'clock P. M.—There are strong indications of trouble to night on the front of the Fourth corps. It is believed Hood is preparing to strike our flank at daybreak, and turn it. Let him come on; Sherman wants nothing better than an assault, and Hood will be sure to get hurt, as he was in all his previous attempts. As I write there is quite a commotion on the Fourth corps' front, by the music of the bands, the braying of mules, and artillery and musketry firing, which commingles in one strange discord, above which the measured booming of the big guns alone is heard. I have heard so much of this in the last hundred days that it is an old song, and I fervently wish they would "dry up," especially Hood's sixty-four-pounders, which at this moment are opening in reply to our long Parrotts.

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, August 19.

Four days have passed in unusual quiet. The mornings glide easily away, and a portion of the afternoons have scarcely a sound upon the air to make one think of the events which are impending. The picket firing through the nights and an occasional shot from some battery serve to remind us of the foe in front, and them of our presence and purposes. This state of affairs cannot long continue, for a long delay on our part will be the means of inspiring the enemy with hope, and if a movement of the rebels, either upon our works or away from Atlanta, is not soon accomplished, the chances of success become more certain for us and more doubtful for them.

Prisoners and deserters are constantly arriving within our lines. They come singly and in squads, numbering from three or four to ten and twelve. The accounts they furnish do not vary much in the main points of their stories. All tell of suffering, destitution, ill treatment, and a loss of confidence in the success of their cause. Their appearance speaks more distinctly of hunger, weariness and unhappiness, than any language they use can express. It must not be supposed that everything a captured rebel or disgusted conscript from the south side of the line relates is credited. A great deal of caution is indispensable in accepting and relying upon the information brought in by this class of persons. Experience has taught our officers that rebels, like pickpockets, will lie; though I am willing to favor the presumption that in both cases there are a few honorable exceptions.

Yesterday an innocent-looking fellow, who could not have been older than seventeen years, and whose childish form most emphatically pro-

tested against the profession which he had so lately followed, succeeded in creating quite a sensation for the moment, by informing our boys that the rebels were then, and had been for several days, engaged in evacuating the city of Atlanta; but the response given to our batteries at different points along the line played sad havoc with his smoothly-told story, and caused expressions of unbelief to gather upon the faces where confidence and pleasure had but lately sat secure.

If the rebels should conclude to resign their cherished city to the Federal troops, the opinion prevails that it will be only to make a more desperate and decided stand at the village of Eastport, some six miles south of their present location. At this place the junction is formed between the Mason and Montgomery railroads; and it is supposed much more formidable works, both military and artificial, are located. The city of Atlanta merely is clearly of little importance in the eyes of the Commanding General as a desirable military position. Had the object been solely to take that place, the matter would have been concluded long ago, for there has not been a day in the past four weeks when our army could not have occupied it by one of the most simple movements known to military men. But Sherman does not want Atlanta, unless he can also receive Hood's whole army within his lines as prisoners of war. Hood well-understands our commander's main object. He therefore racks his already almost exhausted brain for new plans, which may assist him in warding off the final blow until the latest possible moment; and evidently believes that by presenting a bold front, and assuming a defiant attitude, he will deceive even Sherman, the man who can see so far into and divine the intentions of a wily, subtle foe.

Our losses during the part of the month which has passed, are comparatively small to those which have been inflicted upon the rebels. Our successes during this time, though in each individual instance they might be considered unimportant, yet in the aggregate present sufficient remuneration for the slight exertion put forth.

A few more days must be passed just as the past few days have been spent, and the rebels in our front will be rebels only in name. Warnings have proven useless, and a subject for contempt in the eyes of those for whom they were intended. If their doom should be more signally fearful than that which has enveloped their fellows in the past, it can be truly said they invited it, and apparently rejoiced at the awful prospect.

It is not my purpose to speak of the movements which the past few days have witnessed, for too much injury is, innocently, no doubt, effected by such ill-timed disclosures. The slightest hint which a newspaper correspondent permits himself to disclose is eagerly caught up, and frequently affords the enemy a clue to a movement of eminent importance. We have

lost many brave men through the eagerness of writers to impress upon the minds of others the power of their perceptive faculties, while the knowledge of movements and relative positions thus disclosed really benefits, or even interests, no one but those who have a desire to prepare counter-movements for the purpose of opposing and rendering them ineffectual.

The weather in these shady forests is delightful, though in the dusty roads where many are obliged to spend a greater part of their time, it must be anything else than pleasant. The broad leaves of the trees afford an excellent shade, and the soft breezes of the South as they reach us through the innumerable ravines with which the country abounds, fan us gently, and yet effectually. Strange that this favored section could not have filled the hearts and ambition of its people. Stranger still that they would, by their own acts, permit war and its evils to swallow up their lovely homes! But they courted the tempest, and it has brought forth its fruits. They claimed that they were wronged, but they injured themselves permanently, irrecoverably.

The inhabitants in many instances are returning to the homes they deserted on the approach of our forces; though there are a few who remained and were treated well. The country people are very ignorant and stupid, but it can easily be accounted for by the associations to which they have been subjected in the past. I visited a family who live within a mile of our lines. In a conversation with the old lady she informed me that she was the mother of thirteen children, and though living within two miles of Atlanta for twenty years, she could not even approximate toward the size of the place, or the number of its inhabitants. By a reference to her son, a lad of fifteen, I was able to make out that "it was bigger nur Merryet." This family has continued to occupy the old homestead during all the fierce engagements which have occurred in their neighborhood; and, though shot and shell have shattered a part of the roof, and completely ventilate one side of the house, they remain there still, and cannot be prevailed upon to give up their old home. Old memories cling around the hearts of the humblest, and naught but death can separate their minds from the loved object.

ON THE BANKS OF UTOY CREEK, August 20.

A considerable skirmish took place on Thursday along the front of the Army of the Tennessee, and portions of our picket lines were again advanced. This was particularly the case on General Logan's front, where we now have a battery (Griffith's Iowa), sunk in the earth, so as to be perfectly protected, and within seventy-five paces of the principal rebel line. Near this battery, Captain Percy, Fifty-third Ohio, Engineer on General Harrow's staff, was killed.

Yesterday, there was a fearful cannonade along the same portion of our front. It commenced about noon, and lasted nearly an hour. The roar was terrific, and sounded like the con-

tinual bursting of heavy thunder. As the rebel batteries were first silenced, it is fair to presume that our folks did not get the worst of it.

During the day, Major-General Dodge was wounded in the head by a musket-ball. The missile did not penetrate or fracture the skull, and it is sincerely hoped that this able and excellent officer will not long be lost to his command. General Dodge is one of those men who, without much parade, pretension or show, has slowly and steadily worked his way upward to a high position, and an enduring reputation; and, throughout the army it is almost the universal opinion that he has as fairly earned the one as he is eminently worthy of the other.

Until General Dodge is again fit for duty, Brigadier-General Ransom will command the Sixteenth corps. He is a young officer who served with credit in the South-west, was seriously wounded during the Vicksburg campaign, and quite recently joined this army.

There were important movements yesterday by Kilpatrick's and Garrard's cavalry, looking to the occupation of the Montgomery and Macon railroads. Our infantry lines were extended materially toward the right.

CONFRONTING ATLANTA, AUGUST 22.

Everything upon the line is unchanged since last writing. No firing by either army to-day, excepting the exchange of a few shells. Logan has sapped up to within four hundred yards of the rebel works, and got a battery in position, with which he seriously annoys the enemy, and keeps him very quiet.

At last we have some intelligence from Kilpatrick. Colonel Kline, of the Third Indiana cavalry, who was detached by Kilpatrick, and ordered to cut the railway below Jonesboro, while the latter, with the main body of his command, fell upon it at Jonesboro, has returned, having reached the road, destroyed a few miles of track (I have not learned how many), and burned a train of cars loaded with supplies.

GENERAL KILPATRICK'S RAID.

CONFRONTING ATLANTA, AUGUST 23.

The raider, Kilpatrick, arrived in late last night, having made a complete circuit around the rebel army in the short space of four days, fighting nearly all the time against vastly superior forces.

While all that he was expected to perform was not accomplished, the raid was a great success, so far as fighting is concerned, and the enemy was soundly whipped by half his own number. Officers who have seen long service pronounce the charges among the most brilliant of the war.

From a gentleman familiar with all the details of the raid, I have secured pretty full memoranda of what was accomplished by Kilpatrick and his dashing followers.

The forces which took part, were the Third division of cavalry, about two thousand five

hundred, and Minty's and Long's brigades of the Second cavalry division, numbering two thousand five hundred and fifty-four. General Garrard, of the Second division, did not accompany the expedition, consequently Colonel Minty, of the Fourth Michigan, who, at that time, ranked Colonel (now General) Long, took command. At one o'clock on the morning of the eighteenth, the expedition left the cavalry encampment on the left of our line, for the rendezvous of the expedition at Sandtown, where it arrived at six A. M., accompanied by two sections of the Chicago Board of Trade battery, under the immediate command of Lieutenant Robinson. Colonel Minty broke camp and made Sandtown under cover of darkness, the better to prevent the enemy learning of the movement; yet a letter, captured on the twentieth, and dated on the morning of the eighteenth, at Atlanta, shows that at that time the enemy had intelligence, through their spies, not only of the number of Minty's command, but also of the destination of the raiding party; and consequently Hood had ample time to make dispositions of troops to intercept them.

Arriving at Sandtown on the morning of the nineteenth, Minty reported to General Kilpatrick, and received his orders. As soon as darkness had settled over the forest, the whole command, five thousand strong, jumped into their saddles and boldly marched upon the West Point railroad, near Fairburn, the Third division in advance, skirmishing all the way from the right of our infantry lines, until they struck the West Point railroad, when the first rebel assault was made at the moment that the Third division and a part of Long's brigade had crossed. The enemy struck the column on the left flank with artillery and dismounted cavalry, and with so much force that the Seventh Pennsylvania were cut in two, causing some confusion for the moment, but Major Jennings quickly reformed his regiment and, supported by Major May, commanding Fourth Michigan, made a vigorous and irresistible attack upon the enemy, who was driven from the ground in disorder.

At the moment when the artillery and musketry fire was opened, cutting the Seventh Pennsylvania in two, the ambulance-drivers could not withstand the alarm, and rushed their vehicles pell-mell into the woods, and smashed three belonging to Minty's brigade so badly that they were abandoned. The others were recovered by the officers of the brigade, and took their places in the column.

Kilpatrick, learning that the Third division was delayed by the rebel Ross, who, with a large force, was slowly falling back, contesting every inch, ordered Minty and Long to the front, and, with Long's brigade in the advance, followed by Minty's and the Third division, skirmished with, and gradually drove the enemy to Flint river.

Here, the destruction of the bridge, the depth of the stream, and the bad bottom, were serious impediments to our advance; and Ross and

Ferguson's brigades of cavalry presented a bold front on the east bank, and with artillery opened upon our column to dispute its crossing. Kilpatrick promptly ordered all his artillery into position, and in a very few minutes Lieutenant Bennett's section of the Board of Trade battery had "dried up" the rebel artillery most effectively. Quickly dismounting the First, Third and Fourth Ohio, and Fourth Michigan cavalry, by order of Kilpatrick, Minty formed in line of battle, when our artillery discharged four destructive volleys of grape and canister into the rebel rifle-pits, and instantly the men rushed forward upon the double-quick, with a cheer, to the bank of the river, where a deadly fire was poured into the rebels at short range, dislodging their sharpshooters. Our column at once crossed the river on the stringers of the burned bridge.

Leaving the Seventh Pennsylvania, one section of artillery, and all the led horses on the west side of the river, Minty advanced with his brigades on Jonesboro', a town on the Atlanta and Macon railroad, twenty-one miles south of Atlanta—the Fourth Michigan being deployed as skirmishers, with the First Ohio, Colonel Eggleston, and Fourth United States, in line of battle, with one section of artillery in the centre, and the Third Ohio, Colonel Sidell, and Fourth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Robie, following in column. With this formation, Minty at once advanced and drove the rebels before him into the town, from the houses of which the rebels opened a sharp but not very destructive fire upon our lines. Not wishing to unnecessarily sacrifice the lives of his men, Minty ordered forward his artillery to the skirmish line by hand, to within a very short distance of the buildings in which the rebels had taken lodgment. While he was preparing to riddle the buildings with his grape and canister, the rebels, deeming "discretion the better part of valor," retreated, mounted their horses, and evacuated in disorder. Our men charged after them into the town. Reporting the possession of the town to Kilpatrick, the Third division was quickly brought up, and then commenced the destruction of the town.

This was just before dark. The men went to work with a will, put the torch to the railway buildings, court-house, and public property; details from the command tore up and burned about three miles of the Macon railway. A brisk wind sprung up, and very soon the flames spread to stores and other buildings, and over two thirds of the town was burned to the ground, together with considerable public property and effects of the citizens.

Ferguson and Ross, while the town was being razed, were reinforced by one infantry brigade, and took position immediately south of our forces, intrenching themselves by felling timber, &c., &c. As Kilpatrick's object was not to whip the enemy, but to destroy the railway, the same night he struck east from the railway about five miles, and then marched direct for Lovejoy's

Station, the First brigade being in the advance, and the Second brigade (Long's), bringing up the rear. A few minutes before our rear skirmishers were withdrawn from the town, another infantry force arrived from toward Griffin. Reesting for the night some distance from Lovejoy's Station, at daybreak of the following morning, our flight from Jonesboro' was discovered by the enemy, who started in pursuit with their cavalry.

At one and a half miles from Lovejoy's, the dirt road upon which our column moved, forks—one branch leading direct to the station, the other crossing the railroad a quarter of a mile north of it. At this time the Second division had the advance, Minty's brigade leading, followed by Long's. The Fourth Michigan was detached from the command, on the northern branch, and succeeded in gaining and tearing up some distance of the track. About this time the main column that was moving down the direct road to the station, encountered the enemy's mounted pickets, which were driven by the Seventh Pennsylvania in a fine style. Skirmishing with the rebels continued, and when within a quarter of a mile of the station, a report was received that the Fourth Michigan had struck the railroad. Our forces were pushed rapidly forward, and at once received a fire from the enemy, when one battalion of the Fourth United States were dismounted and deployed, and brought up to the support of the Fourth Michigan, swelling the number who were engaged in tearing up the track to one hundred and fifty men. Before their line was fairly formed, a whole rebel infantry brigade, which was lying in ambush, with no skirmishers out, poured into the ranks of the working party, a terrific volley, and with wild yells that made the forests ring, rushed madly over the track-burners, killing, wounding, and taking prisoners nearly the entire detachment, who fought bravely until their arms were wrested from them.

Long's brigade was immediately formed, artillery placed in position, and the rebels were quickly repulsed, with severe loss from the effect of our grape, canister and bullets.

Scarcely had the roar of artillery and the sharp musket's crack died away, as the rebel infantry fell back, broken and demoralized, when a new danger presented itself. With wild yells a whole division of rebel cavalry (Jackson's), five thousand strong, composed of Armstrong's, Ferguson's and Ross' brigades, were seen coming down on the keen run, accompanied by ten pieces of artillery.

Ere Kilpatrick had time to learn what was coming, a spirited attack was made upon the rear, the shells came tearing across the fields, and bursting over our columns. Kilpatrick's keen eye soon comprehended the situation. Minty's brigade was instantly withdrawn and hastily formed on the right (or south) of the road in line of regimental column. The Seventh Pennsylvania, Major Jennings, on the right, Fourth Michigan, Major West, on the centre, and the

Fourth United States, Captain McIntyre, on the left. Long's brigade was formed in the rear of the first. The Third division was ordered to form in the same manner on the left of the road, and to charge simultaneously with Minty's, but it is said for some reason failed to do so.

While the various regiments were being manoeuvred into position to meet the onslaught of the rebels, who were sweeping down upon them, the men had time to comprehend the danger that surrounded them—rebels to the right of them, rebels to the left of them, rebels in the rear of them, rebels in front of them—surrounded, there was no salvation but to cut their way out. Visions of Libby Prison and starvation flitted across their minds, and they saw that the deadly conflict could not be avoided. Placing himself at the head of his brigade, the gallant and fearless Minty drew his sabre and his voice rung out clear and loud, "Attention, column—forward, trot—regulate by the centre regiment—march—gallop—march!" and away the brigade went with a yell that echoed far across the valleys.

The ground from which the start was made, and over which they charged, was a plantation of about two square miles, thickly strewn with patches of woods, deep water-cuts, fences ditches, and morasses. At the word, away went the bold dragoons, at the height of their speed. Fences were jumped, ditches were no impediment. The rattle of the sabres mingled with that of the mess-kettles and frying-pans that jingled at the sides of the pack-mule brigade, which was madly pushed forward by the frightened darkies who straddled them. Charging for their lives, and yelling like devils, Minty and his troopers encountered the rebels behind a hastily-erected barricade of rails. Pressing their rowels deep into their horses' flanks, and raising their sabres aloft, on, on, on, nearer and nearer to the rebels, they plunged. The terror-stricken enemy could not withstand the thunderous wave of men and horse that threatened to engulf them. They broke and ran, just as Minty and his troopers were urging their horses for the decisive blow. In an instant, all was confusion. The yells of the horsemen were drowned in the clashing of steel and the groans of the dying. On pressed Minty in pursuit, his men's sabres striking right and left, and cutting down every thing in their path. The rebel horsemen were seen to reel and pitch headlong to the earth, while their frightened steeds rushed pell-mell over their bodies. Many of the rebels defended themselves with almost superhuman strength, yet it was all in vain. The charge of Federal steel was irresistible. The heads and limbs of some of the rebels were actually severed from the bodies—the head of the rider falling on one side of the horse, the lifeless trunk upon the other.

The individual instances of heroism were many. Hardly a man flinched, and when the brigade came out more than half the sabres were

stained with human blood. Among the cases of daring vouched for are the following :

An orderly of Major Jennings, Samuel Walters, Company F, Seventh Pennsylvania, rode upon a rebel cavalryman, who threw up his hand to guard the blow. The sabre came down, severing the hand from the arm. Another blow followed quickly after upon the neck, and over the rebel rolled out of his saddle, the head only clinging to the body by a thin fibre. Private Douglas and Captain McIntyre, of the Fourth United States, charged side by side, killed four or five with the sabre, captured a captain and lieutenant and thirteen men, who were turned over to Douglas by the Captain, who rushed forward into the fray. After the charge was over Douglas rode up to Colonel Minty, saluted him, turned over his fifteen prisoners, and remarked, "Here Colonel, are fifteen Johnnies, the trophies of Captain McIntyre and Private Douglas, Fourth Regulars."

It was, all admit, one of the finest charges of the war. Fully one hundred men fell under the keen sabres of Minty's brigade. The praises of Minty and his command are upon every tongue. The Fourth United States, Fourth Michigan, First, Third, and Fourth Ohio regiments charged over a rebel battery of three guns on the left of the road; but no sooner had our men passed than the rebels again seized the cannon and, reversing them, poured grape and canister into the charging columns. General Kilpatrick, seeing this, with his staff and others, about thirty in all, moved forward to capture the guns, but found a high staked and ridged fence between him and the battery. Seeing the predicament in which the General was, private William Bailey, Company I, Fourth Michigan, an orderly to Colonel Minty, coolly rode up to the fence, dismounted in the face of a severe fire, tore down the fence, remounted, rode up to the battery, shot the Captain, took possession of the horse and arms, and rode out. He was immediately followed by a party of men who captured the battery and spiked the guns. In the charge, Minty's brigade captured three stands of colors—the Fourth United States taking two, and the Fourth Michigan one.

Long's brigade, being in the rear, were not able to participate generally in the charge; but they fought, when they had an opportunity, like Spartans. The General, who learned of his promotion on his return, was, I regret to say, wounded severely in the leg and arm while gallantly leading the brigade.

Colonel Minty, whose soldierly form was conspicuous in the charge, urging the men to follow him, had his horse shot under him, an orderly was shot by his side, and his Inspector, Captain Thompson, captured. General Kilpatrick is loud in his praise of Long and Minty, and the nameless heroes who fought by them.

Leaving the rebel dead and wounded on the field, preparations were made for the return. The Third division was ordered to move on the

McDonough road, the Second division to cover the movement. Before the leading brigade had moved, Pat Cleburne's division of infantry advanced and attacked Long's brigade, which fought splendidly, and although forced to fall back, they did so so slowly that the Third division had time to move. It was in this engagement that General Long received one of his two wounds. His men fought with splendid pluck, and kept at bay one of the best divisions of rebel infantry. The Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan were dismounted to cover the retreat of their gallant comrades of the Second brigade, when the Fourth United States got out of ammunition and were sent back with the Third division. Bennett's section of the Board of Trade battery was put in position with the Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Michigan. Cleburne was held in check until our led horses had been moved out upon the road. The artillery had been so busily engaged that one of our guns burst, breaking into a thousand pieces, but fortunately injuring nobody.

The night of the twentieth was consumed in marching through the rain and darkness. At one A. M. of the twenty-first, Cotton river was reached and crossed, and the fatigued men and animals bivouacked until daybreak, when they were moved forward again, encountering no enemy. At six A. M. South river was reached by the advance, but the bridge had been destroyed and the river flooded by the rains. The entire column was compelled to swim the stream—one man and about fifty horses and mules were drowned. General Kilpatrick's ambulance was lost in the rapid current of the river, and two wagons that had carried ammunition were destroyed, as the mules were required to remount the men. These were our only losses in crossing, after which the men were once more in the saddle. Lithonia, on the Georgia railroad, left of our line, was reached that evening, where the first night's rest was obtained, and yesterday the worn-out men and horses returned to camp in rear of our infantry line.

During the first three days and nights no officer or man had an hour's sleep. From the time the command left the rear of our left, on the eighteenth, until it returned to the same point on the night of the twenty-second (four days), the men partook of but three meals—of coffee and hard bread—nothing more. The horses subsisted on the country.

The results of this raid are not as complete as we should wish. While nearly a thousand prisoners were captured, and quite a number of horses, only about seventy-five of the former were retained while cutting through the heavy force of rebel infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The damage to the railway can be repaired in two or three days. A train of loaded cars was destroyed below Jonesboro', by Colonel Kline's command, which was sent out on a detached raid further south. A vast amount of damage

was done at Jonesboro' to public property. Considering that Kilpatrick's five thousand men had, probably, twelve thousand surrounding them, all must admit that this is a brilliant, if not a highly successful raid.

Colonel Minty estimates the rebel killed alone greater than our entire loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our loss in Minty's and Long's brigades and the battery was two hundred and twenty; that of the Third brigade, about ninety-four; total, three hundred and fourteen. The rebel loss cannot be less than one thousand in all.

THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE SIEGE.

August 25.—The multitudinous preparations for the grand *coup* have been made quickly and thoroughly. Superfluous wagons with baggage have been sent to the rear to be parked at the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee. Hospital trains conveyed the sick and wounded to the rear. Fifteen days' supplies have been brought up. Rations for three days are placed in the haversacks of the men—the remaining twelve are loaded on the supply trains, and gathered near Vining's Station, on the north bank of the Chattahoochee river. Regiments are cut down to a single baggage wagon. Sixty rounds of ammunition have been issued to each man carrying a musket, and the ammunition wagons are replenished. When the sun goes down on Wednesday, the twenty-fifth of August, everything will be in readiness. What a felicitous moment for a proclamatory General! What a gushing bulletin might have been issued to the troops, asking much in enthusiastic language, promising much in florid periods! Sherman has simply published an order, "You will march at such and such an hour." He asked nothing, promised nothing; but no troops know better than those he commands, how much is asked and how much is to be achieved under his leadership.

In one continuous line, in order of march, the six corps accompanying Sherman, with their trains, will make a line fifty miles long. The wagons alone, over three thousand in number, reach, on the march, for thirty miles. From this may be seen the immense labor required to perfect the details of the movement. Sherman, evidently, will be compelled to move troops and trains by parallel roads, and he must, therefore, know not only every public avenue in the country into which he moves, but be conversant with its minute topography, and able to tell where roads might be cut in localities where none existed. It is almost essential that the army have five parallel roads. It would cover that number for ten miles completely.

The public animals are in fair, not prime, condition. Many teams are cut down from their complement of six mules to five and four. This partial defection in the grand military motor—the mule—will not, however, cripple the transportation. The moiety of an ass is capable of bearing up under much lankness gracefully.

He becomes attenuated and gaunt, and his hip-bones grow as long and peering as his ears, but he waxes ethereal in flesh alone. He tugs at his chains with redoubled muscularity. True, he dies sometimes (a dead mule is no longer a myth), but he does it quickly. He refuses food, wanders around disconsolately for an hour, lies quietly down and expires.

7 p. m.—The movement has commenced. Several batteries were quietly withdrawn from the trenches this afternoon. The troops on our left are just moving to the rear, so silently that even their equipments seem to have a subdued clank. The enemy is firing briskly on the skirmish line. Were these new troops gliding dimly through the forest, they would feel guilty at every shot, but they have sounded war's every depth, and construe nothing to mean attack until the columns come pouring down upon them. We shall test Hood's sagacity within a week pretty severely.

What a momentous thing a night march seems!

August 26.—At seven o'clock last evening, the Fourth corps, occupying the left of our line, north and north-east of Atlanta, withdrew from their trenches and marched west to the rear of the Army of the Tennessee, leaving their pickets behind until midnight. The Twentieth corps, on the right of the Fourth corps, fell back about nine p. m., to the railroad bridge over the Chattahoochee, which position—a very strong one—they will intrench and defend, while the rest of the army moves around Hood's left flank.

None of the rest of our army left their trenches last night. The Fourteenth corps and Army of the Tennessee were in their old works at daybreak. The Sixteenth corps, now on the extreme left, refused their left flank considerably, and threw up works on the new line.

The enemy discovered our absence on the left early this morning, and he has made demonstrations all day along our front, winding up this evening by a strong one on General Ward's division of the Twentieth corps, now in position at the river. Wherever their skirmishers have become too bold, they have been driven off by well-delivered volleys, and in no instance has their curiosity led them into danger at the same point the second time. They reconnoitered our right in the morning, and found it unchanged.

During the afternoon the rest of the army prepared to move. The Army of the Tennessee will leave its trenches to-night, and the Twenty-third corps will follow. The Fourteenth corps is already on the march.

The columns already in motion have been headed, during the day, for Sandtown, on the Chattahoochee river, fourteen miles below the railroad bridge.

The army is moving, corps by corps, shutting up like a telescope, each corps that withdraws moving to the rear of those on the right, which maintain a bold front. By this means the dan-

gers of a massive attack from the enemy are greatly lessened.

The day has been insufferably warm. Many hundred men, exhausted by marching all night, have fallen by the way, but at this hour, ten p. m., they have all come up. This will be another sleepless night.

The Army of the Tennessee is withdrawing. To-morrow our old trenches around Atlanta will be deserted, save those held by the Twenty-third corps, on the extreme right, near East Point.

August 27.—Every road one crosses to day is filled with troops. Turbid streams of men and wagons pour along their respective roads, and are fed by tributaries from open fields and forests. It all looks like endless, inextricable confusion; but let the enemy strike any of the thousand feelers we have out, and how suddenly the columns would be fronted, the lines dressed and the charges rammed home. Even to the most accustomed eye, the motley mangle-mangle of a march like this seems to be without beginning or end. But there is method in it. By midnight, perhaps sooner, every division will be sleeping behind trenches, the turf whereof has never yet felt the footfall of a Yankee soldier.

The Twenty-third corps seems to have been selected to cover the rear during the marches—that is, the rear of the marching columns—we have no base of supplies, no real rear now. Garrard's splendid division of cavalry follows the Twenty-third corps, lingering along after the infantry is in motion, and spreading out like a fan, to protect its left flank when encamped. Kilpatrick's cavalry division covers the right flank, held to-night by the Army of the Tennessee.

The day is warm, but lovely. None have fallen out to-day, from exhaustion. The country grows open and rolling, and, as we near the West Point railroad, excellent foraging-country appears. The roads are excellent—equal, to all intents and purposes, to the best turnpikes.

10 p. m.—The troops are in line, intrenched and asleep. We are within four miles of the West Point railroad. General Sherman's headquarters are at Mount Gilead Church. No enemy yet. Is this silence ominous? Two days have elapsed, and nearly one hundred thousand prophets are wrong in their forecast. Hood lacks either discernment or pugnacity. Not the latter, perhaps. If he permits us to go unmolested for another day, he will have lost his chance, and we shall have gained—but we will not flatter ourselves. Suppose a heavy and persistent rain should set in upon us. *Carrambo!*

I hear to-night of a wagon and a straggler or two picked up in our rear. The enemy's cavalry is following us closely. Perhaps they consider this another cavalry expedition. It will, certainly, require some ingenuity to surround this little raiding party—to place around it what one of our East Tennessee Generals denominates a "ring guard." Brass band in the distance—(why were they brought along, to

eat up our precious rations?)—discourses "Shouldn't wonder, shouldn't wonder."

The Fourteenth corps and the Army of the Tennessee marched past the rear of the Fourth corps last night. The latter is now on the extreme right, the Fourteenth corps on its left, followed by the Fourth and Twenty-third corps successively. It is understood that they will hold this relative position in the line hereafter.

The enemy still hangs on our rear, but to our surprise, very chary of even a brisk skirmish. Has Hood been removed?

The supply trains for the expedition are now all up, and will move hereafter with the troops—that is, on parallel roads, which, though they have no existence now, will be well beaten to-morrow night.

August 28.—The army moved this morning at about eight o'clock. The Army of the Tennessee marched on a northerly road, and before dark struck the Atlanta and West Point railroad near Fairburn, a station eighteen miles from Atlanta. The rebel cavalry—a brigade commanded by General Ross—retreated slowly as we neared the railroad. He was evidently impressed with the notion that we outnumbered him.

The Army of the Cumberland has bivouacked at and near Red Oak, a flag-station on the West Point and Atlanta railroad, twelve miles from Atlanta. The Twenty-third corps has moved with the column, and to-night our whole army has cast loose from its old base, and is operating, as it were, in the air.

This morning a locomotive passed over the West Point railroad, whistling shrilly as it flirted by the stations which we were nearing. It is the last, we hope, that will be driven by a rebel engineer.

We begin to believe that Hood has been outwitted. We can hear nothing of his having sent any troops away from Atlanta; neither have any symptoms of attack been discovered.

The army has bivouacked in line, and thrown up trenches as usual. The wagon trains are coming up, and it will probably be morning before they all arrive.

The troops move light—very light. What a contrast between the steady, pouring columns of veterans, and the unskilled and unsettled marches of '61 and '62? Who, in those years of lumbering marches and still more lumbering battles, saw line officers harnessed up with knapsacks; or dreamed that the day would come when the soldier, in addition to carrying food, shelter, and equipments, would still find room for an intrenching tool—the last feather, though one not endangering his vertebra, for his swing is bold, and, in a martial sense, graceful. Here are spades, and picks, and coffee-pots, and kettles, giving the column a tinkerish aspect, but assuring for the cause that celerity in movement which is one of the first conditions of victory, and for the men themselves the speediest method of obtaining refection and repose, and the grateful contentment that follows.

With all these things—necessities of a light march, and peculiarly the necessities of *this* march—you might not be prepared to find any room left for the transportation of luxuries. I have seen, however, a number of articles that might be safely classed under that head—the most striking one being a cane-bottomed chair, which a captain of infantry carries dangling from his sword thrown across his shoulder. A bystander suggests it would be the height of politeness for him to carry the chair and offer it to a friend during the halts.

The men are hardy and strong. The regiments are not so long as they were when the campaign opened last May, but their experience in what a rebel journal calls the great battles of June, July, and August is, perhaps, rich compensation for the difference in numbers. Every man who passes you has fought in countless skirmishes, strained every nerve in the deadly assault, and coolly rolled back the impetuous attacks of the enemy. He knows better than the statistician how much lead it takes to kill a man; how much harmless bluster there is in a flight of shells, and what chances he has in his favor, if hit at all, of the wound being slight or severe. He has grown familiar with missiles, explodent and non-explodent. He knows, from the sounds that reach him, when, during any given passage at arms, the precise moment arrives when he is justified in pricking up his ears and getting ready to fall into line. The shrill sweep of a whole volley affects him less now than the hateful solitary whistle of a single bullet did before he had passed the ordeal of danger, hardship, and denial that have made up his life during the campaign. Our trust grows stronger and stronger as the column sweeps on, and we become certain that the present critical movement must succeed, or, in failure, inflict such damage upon the enemy, that to foil us just once more would ruin him irremediably.

While I was watching to-day the endless line of troops shifting by, an officer with a modest escort rode up to the fence near which I was standing and dismounted. He was rather tall and slender, and his quick movements denoted good muscle added to absolute leanness—not thinness. His uniform was neither new nor old, but bordering on a hazy mellowness of gloss, while the elbows and knees were a little accented from the continuous agitation of those joints. The face was one I should never rest upon in a crowd, simply because to my eye there was nothing remarkable in it, save the nose, which organ was high, thin, and planted with a curve as vehement as the curl of a Malay cutlass. The face and neck were rough, and covered with reddish hair, the eye light in color and animated, but though restless, and bounding like a ball from one object to another, neither piercing nor brilliant; the mouth well closed but common, the ears large, the hands and feet long and thin, the gait a little rolling, but firm and active. In dress and manner there was not the slightest trace of pretension. He spoke rapidly, and gen-

erally with an inquisitive smile. To this *ensemble* I must add a hat which was the reverse of dignified or distinguished—a simple felt affair, with a round crown and drooping brim, and you have as fair a description of General Sherman's externals as I can pen.

Seating himself on a stick of cord-wood hard by the fence, he drew a bit of pencil from his pocket and spreading a piece of note paper on his knee, he wrote with great rapidity. Long columns of troops lined the road a few yards in his front, and beyond the road, massed in a series of spreading green fields, a whole division of infantry was awaiting its turn to take up the line of march, the blue ranks clear cut against the uniform verdant background. Those who were near their General looked at him curiously, for in so vast an army the soldier sees his Commander-in-chief but seldom. Page after page was filled by the General's nimble pencil and despatched. For a half hour I watched him, and though I looked for and expected to find them, no symptoms could I detect that the mind of the great leader was taxed by the infinite cares of a terribly hazardous military *coup de main*. Apparently it did not lie upon his mind the weight of a feather. A mail arrived. He tore open the papers and glanced over them hastily, then chatted with some General officers near him, then rode off with characteristic suddenness, but with fresh and smiling countenance, filing down the road beside many thousand men, whose lives were in his keeping.

Here was a movement in progress, which, turn out as it may, will stand out in high relief in history, as an instance of the marvellous daring and ingenuity of Sherman, and the readiness and compactness of his army. Here was a host such as Napoleon led in the maturity of his fame and power; yet we can hardly realize, as we watch the endless river of men, that we are seeing the *event* developing—conning the history as it appeals, fresh and unwritten, to our eyes. The columns whose faces seem to have something in common—to be *uniformed* like their bodies—a brisk squadron of horse—masses of recumbent troops—a cluster of guns, looking stupid with inertia—flankers of the genus camp-African, laden, as to weight, like a Holland emigrant—a General with his staff, a trifle smarter in attire and bearing than the line—and over in valleys, creeping in relief against the hills fused of the emerald and amethyst, and on crests in relief against the pale blue of the sky, the articulated wagon-trains—these are the aggregate—the *movement*.

August 29.—To-day the army has not advanced its lines. The day has been consumed in issuing rations to the men, and tearing up and burning the railroad, thirteen miles of which have been so completely destroyed by Howard, Stanley and Davis, that nothing remains but the embankment. Generals Sherman and Thomas have their headquarters on the railway six miles from East Point.

There has been no fighting amounting to anything during the operation.

Fifteen members of the Ninetieth Ohio foolishly ventured outside the pickets to-day, two or three miles, and were all captured save one.

The operation of tearing up the road has been very interesting, and one over which the men, notwithstanding it is the hardest kind of labor, were quite enthusiastic. A regiment or brigade formed along the track; rails were loosened at their flanks, whereupon the whole line seized the track and flung a stretch corresponding to the length of their line from its bed. The rails were then detached, the ties piled up and covered with fence-rails. The iron was then deposited upon the pyre, the torch applied and the thing was soon consummated. The men, not content with the curve made in the rails by the intense and continued heat, seized many and twisted them until they looked like members of a phonographic alphabet.

The troops to-day were placed on three-quarter rations, to provide against any emergency. They are getting abundance of roasting-ears, so their dinners will have bulk as well as nutrition.

August 30.—We get the direction of Atlanta to-night by looking toward the north star. We are now directly south of the city, between the West Point and Macon railroads, and so near the latter—the last artery of the Gate City—that we must strike it to-morrow.

The Fourteenth corps broke camp at six o'clock this morning, and moved out on the direct road to Rough and Ready Station, on the Macon railroad, eleven miles from Atlanta. The Fourth corps marched at the same hour on a parallel road further north. The advance has had slight skirmishing with a brigade or two of rebel cavalry and infantry.

Learning that the enemy was fortified along the Macon railway, the Army of the Cumberland halted, and intrenched about two miles west of it. The Twenty-third corps closed up and faced north-east, to guard against an attack from the direction of Atlanta. The Army of the Tennessee moved toward Jonesboro' in two columns, Hazen's division, Fifteenth corps, in advance. On reaching the head of Flint river, about a mile from Jonesboro', skirmishers were found on the opposite bank. After a lively skirmish the Fifteenth corps effected a crossing, where it formed and intrenched.

Kilpatrick's cavalry on the right of the Army of the Tennessee, also made a crossing this morning and attempted to push their way to the railroad. While advancing with this object in view, the rebel infantry attacked him, and forced him back after a severe struggle. Infantry supports were sent up, and the enemy checked. Kilpatrick's loss was about one hundred. His assault proved that the enemy were in heavy force around Jonesboro', and intrenched.

We learn that Hardee's and Lee's corps com-

menced arriving at Jonesboro' early this morning, leaving in Atlanta Stewart's corps, and the militia. The merest tyro, by looking at the map, can see the dangers of this disposition.

The country south of Atlanta is the finest surrounding the city. The soil is tolerably productive, and we find many well-to-do farmers, but few large planters. A mania for sorgho seems to be raging. Nine farms in ten have several acres of it growing finely. The crops generally consist exclusively of corn—one stalk in a hill, of course. We find plenty of grazing and forage for horses and cattle-droves, good water and fine roads. Two or three rusty inhabitants have come in our lines, who profess to have been concealed for many months from the conscription officers. These are the only males I have seen on the march. The women and children are totally bewildered. They say that they heard a cavalry raid was coming, and they stare stupidly at the oceans of men who pour by their doors. I deliberately assert that I have never seen in the South a pretty woman among the humbler classes; and the children are sallow, attenuated little imps, with degenerate livers. No wonder they had but two methods of disposing of people who came down here to take notes—one to entertain them at princely mansions, and take up their time so luxuriously that they never escaped from the aristocratic orbit; the other, if they were rebellious—the halter.

August 31—9 p. m.—This day has been big with history. We have cut the rebel communications, divided their army, and repulsed a heavy and determined assault on our right made by Hardee's and Lee's corps—the flower of the rebel army in Georgia. The success of our grand movement is no longer problematical; it is only a question of how complete and crushing the victory will be.

During last night the tramp and rumble of a passing column were heard in front of our left and centre. It was the massing of two rebel corps on our right for assault.

At eight o'clock this morning Newton moved his division into column, and followed Kimball and Wood in an easterly direction. Arriving at the edge of a large field a strong rebel line of works was plainly discerned before us on the west bank of Crooked or Mud creek. Wood, who had the advance, promptly moved up his artillery, and deploying his skirmishers drove the enemy out and took possession. The skirmishers pushed on, crossed the creek and were soon moving right ahead on the double-quick in pursuit of the enemy. Shots were exchanged, but no casualties resulted.

Crossing the creek at Lee's Mill, Schofield's column moved off to the left toward Rough and Ready, where he struck the Macon railroad at two p. m. Stanley struck it with his advance about the same time. Arriving on the railroad, the men of the two corps commenced throwing up works, while details tore up and burned the track for over four miles.

The men had encountered no opposition after crossing the creek, but skirmishers were thrown out to prevent surprise. By dark strong works had been constructed, facing east and south, and all night the destruction continued.

But to the grand event of the day. At day-break the Second brigade in Hazen's division, Fifteenth Army Corps, advanced, gallantly driving the enemy from a prominent hill, which gave our artillery command of Jonesboro' and the railroad, now less than one half mile distant. A brigade of Osterhaus' division reinforced the brigade holding the hill, and the troops fell to fortifying the position immediately. The rest of the Fifteenth corps was rapidly brought into position on the new line, Hazen occupying the hill nearest the enemy, the other divisions, Harrow's and Osterhaus', on his flanks and in reserve. General Corse's division of the Sixteenth corps was brought forward across Flint creek and joined Logan, and General Wood's division of the Seventeenth corps also crossed and went into position on the left.

About three p. m., the enemy suddenly poured from the forests in front of Hazen's position, and formed rapidly into line for assault. On Hazen's right ran a strip of wood; in his front over which the enemy advanced, were fields of tall corn; on his left, a thick and sheltering pine grove. Lee's corps, in four lines, advanced gallantly upon Hazen, while Hardee's corps attempted to work around his right, where he was soon engaged with Harrow's division, and in pouring a converging fire on Hazen's and the other troops occupying the hill. The assault was a desperate one. The rebels were playing their last card, and they fought as if, foreseeing failure, they courted death. They swarmed through the waving corn with flaunting banners, and rushed on our works without wavering under the deadly fire pouring into their thinning ranks.

But in spite of their superhuman efforts, not a man of Lee's corps placed foot on our parapet. Major-General Patton Anderson, commanding Hindman's old division in Lee's corps, fell mortally wounded within thirty yards of our works. At the same moment, his horse, a splendid animal, toppled over, with a half dozen bullets dappling his glistening coat with blood. Brigadier-General Cummings, of Stevenson's division, also fell, desperately wounded, in the assault. Two of General Anderson's staff were killed, and lay near where he fell.

The force of the first assault was no sooner broken, than a second line came surging up, to meet with no better fate. Again and again the enemy broke, and again and again they were rallied and led back. The fighting was desperate for two hours, but at no time can there be said to have been any danger in it, for the enemy had struck us where we were strongest. General Howard sent two regiments of General Wood's brigade, and Colonel Bryant's brigade of the Seventeenth corps, to Hazen's assistance, but the gallant Ohioan would have weathered the

storm alone. Hazen captured one hundred and thirty prisoners and two stands of colors, beside many rebel wounded. It is estimated that the enemy in his front lost one thousand men.

On the right of Hazen, Harrow's division was heavily engaged, but the assault was much feeble, though it cost the enemy heavily.

Cleburne's division failing to make any impression on Harrow, marched down to our extreme right and attacked Kilpatrick, holding the bridge over Flint river. Kilpatrick held them at bay until relieved by General Giles B. Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps, which repulsed the pugnacious Hibernian chief without delay.

The loss of the Fifteenth corps during the assault foots up thirty-one killed, one hundred and twenty-six wounded, four missing. Our loss in the whole affair will not exceed two hundred. We played upon the enemy with two batteries.

Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, Tenth Mississippi, fell into our hands badly wounded. The bodies of the rebel Colonel Williams and Major Barton fell into our hands. In all, seven rebel field-officers were killed and wounded in Hazen's front. It was remarked that the officers behaved during the fight with perfect recklessness.

Toward evening the Seventeenth corps advanced, and went into position on the left of the Fifteenth. The Sixteenth corps took position on the right of the Fifteenth, and faced to the south-east.

Sixty-eight rebels, all badly wounded, are collected in one of Logan's hospitals.

The two rebel corps at Jonesboro' are commanded by Hardee. Hood remained in Atlanta, laboring under the hallucination that he could hold the city with our whole army in his rear. He, no doubt, instructed Hardee to assault us whenever he came upon us. Such are his tactics. The battles of the twentieth, twenty-second and twenty-eighth of July, and the thirty-first of August, have a distinguished family resemblance. All desperate assaults—all bitter defeats for Hood.

September 1.—Another day of grand, decisive victory. Our whole army turned this morning, like an aroused giant, upon the rebels at Jonesboro', and at the hour I write (nine p. m.), we have them enclosed on three sides. We dare not hope to find them still here when day breaks to-morrow.

The Fourteenth corps, owing to the accidents of position, has not been as heavily engaged during the campaign as some others. To day it struck a balance-sheet by the most successful, if not the most gallant assault of the summer.

At day-break this morning the Army of the Tennessee faced east, opposite Jonesboro, and joined on the left by the Fourteenth corps, facing south-east, and running a short distance across the Macon railroad. The Fourth and Twenty-third corps commenced advancing down the track to take position on the left of the

Fourteenth, and envelop the enemy's right flank. "Montrose," who was on that part of the line, gives the following relation of the events on the left and centre, including the noble charge of the Fourteenth corps:

The Fourth corps broke camp at four a. m., and Newton's and Kimball's divisions moved direct upon the Macon railroad, which they reached at five. The men were at once spread along the line fronting the track, and at a given signal the ties and rails were lifted from their beds, and turned over like the sod from a plough, the whole length of a brigade front. In a half hour, over a mile and a half was torn up and destroyed. Another advance took place for a mile and a half, when the operation was repeated. In this manner the two divisions marched, tearing up and burning every rail from Rough and Ready to within two miles of Jonesboro', a distance of ten miles, where they formed a junction with Wood, and advanced to position, Kimball's division joining his right to the First division of the Fourteenth corps, with Newton on his left. Wood's division was in reserve. The Twenty-third corps, which followed the Fourth, came up about this time on the left of the Fourth and went into position. The line thus formed was something in the form of the capital letter A, the Army of the Tennessee on the left, the Fourth and Twenty-third corps on the right, and the Fourteenth corps on the flattened apex of the letter. At four o'clock Davis and Stanley made a simultaneous advance.

Newton's division was formed with Bradley on the left, Opdyke on the centre, and Wagner on the right. Moving through a dense woods of three hundred yards, the whole division encountered the rebel skirmishers who were hurriedly driven back upon a large corn-field, across which the whole division charged in gallant style, driving the enemy from their barricades, and capturing about fifty prisoners.

The advance was in two lines. General Bradley's command captured a rebel hospital, with two hundred wounded, from the division of Major-General Anderson, who was killed the previous day by Howard. Lieutenant Cox and Captain Tinney, of Wagner's staff, captured six prisoners in person.

I have but few particulars of Kimball's division, owing to the fact that it was put in motion very early, and I had no chance to make notes. The division, however, advanced behind Wagner, but as Stanley had to swing round his corps on the left, Kimball, being on the extreme left, did not have to advance far. He drove the enemy's skirmishers, however, in good style, capturing a few prisoners and their skirmish-pits, with slight loss. The total loss in the corps did not exceed fifty men, only five or six of whom were killed.

Davis formed his line with the First division, Brigadier-General Carlin on the left, and the Second division, Brigadier-General Morgan, joining the Fifteenth corps on the right. Baird was in reserve. The line was formed in the

edge of the woods, a half circle, with the two flanks thrown forward, and the centre somewhat retired, facing a large corn-field half a mile wide, at the south-east edge of which, on commanding ridges the enemy's line was formed, covering Jonesboro'. The rebel skirmishers were in the ravines in the centre of the field.

The brigades on the line were as follows: left resting on the railroad, Colonel Moore of the Sixty-ninth Ohio, commanding, with the Seventy-fourth Ohio, reinforced by five companies of the First Wisconsin, as skirmishers; second the regular brigade, Major Eddy commanding, with the Sixteenth infantry, Captain Barry, as skirmishers; third, Colonel Simmes' brigade; fourth, Colonel Mitchell's Ohio brigade, three companies of the Ninety-eighth Ohio, Captain Roach, as skirmishers; fifth, Colonel Dilworth's (late McCook's) brigade, with the Fifty-second Ohio, Major Holmes, as skirmishers.

Davis gave the order to advance, and instantly the long line of skirmishers, stretching for over a mile, commenced moving rapidly forward; at the same instant the two lines of battle followed, driving the rebel skirmishers back upon their main line under a terrific artillery fire. Onward upon the double-quick the regiments rushed, receiving volley after volley that made gaps in their ranks, but as quickly the line was dressed, and they never halted until they had got up within two hundred yards of the works, when volleys of grape and canister made the line tremble. It was a critical moment; some regiments showed signs of halting, but none flinched. Still forward they moved, increasing their speed until they got near the works, when with one unearthly yell the men broke into a run, and forward they went, Mitchell left and Lum right, charging direct upon a rebel battery of four guns that had been dealing death into them, and instantly it was in their possession. While this was transpiring on the left of Mitchell, his right and Dilworth's left charged a six-gun rebel battery, whose canister had cut down Dilworth and many brave officers, and captured it, together with General Govan, commanding a brigade in Cleburne's division, and Captain D. C. Williams, his Assistant Adjutant-General.

General Govan subsequently stated to General Morgau that this was the celebrated Loomis' Michigan battery, captured by him from us at Chickamauga.

I have not time to dwell upon details; suffice it to say that Davis' whole line carried the rebel works, some brigades carrying two and three lines, which were very strong and protected by a difficult abatis, over which the men charged with difficulty.

The regular brigade carried their line quite early, after one regiment had been slightly thrown off its guard by a deadly volley of grape and canister, and got out of ammunition while holding it. They were relieved by Este's brigade of Baird's division, who held the works while they replenished their cartridge-boxes,

when they again took their position and hold it to-day.

Our artillery, placed on slightly elevated ground, mowed down the enemy behind their works on the skirmish line in large numbers, and when I rode over the field the following morning, I am certain I saw at least three hundred dead of the enemy in front of the corps.

Our loss is about one half of that of the enemy, who suffered largely in prisoners and killed. Davis took about four hundred prisoners, including the Second Kentucky rebel regiment, and fifty of the Sixth Kentucky and its flag, which are the trophies of Captain Dumfree, of the Tenth Michigan, to whom Colonel Lee, commanding the rebels, surrendered.

The losses in the command are, about: Carlin's division, Moore's brigade, two hundred, including Major Carter, in hip; Captain Jenkins, thigh; Captain Perry, mortally, and Lieutenant Osborne, slight; all of the Thirty-eighth Indiana. Lieutenant Bailey, killed, and Lieutenants Pierson, Murray, and Cunningham, wounded, of the Sixty-ninth Ohio.

Eddy's regular brigade about three hundred, including Captain Kellogg, Eighteenth United States, arm; Lieutenant Powell and Captain Burrows, Eighteenth United States, slight; Lieutenant McConnell, Sixteenth United States, slight; Lieutenant Honey and Lieutenant Knapp, Sixteenth, wounded.

Morgan's division, Lum's brigade, three hundred, including Colonel Grover, Seventeenth New York, severe; Major Barnett, Tenth Michigan, killed; Captain Knox, Tenth Michigan, killed, and Captain Turbis, Tenth Michigan, wounded.

Dilworth's brigade, one hundred and seventy-five, including Colonel Dilworth, serious; Captain E. L. Anderson, Dilworth's Adjutant, arm, slight; Captain Charles, One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, killed; Major Holmes, Fifty-second Ohio, slight; Captain Snodgrass, commanding Twenty-second Indiana, and the following officers of this regiment: Lieutenant Graves, wounded; Lieutenant Neland, wounded; Lieutenant Riggs, wounded; Lieutenant Rennine, wounded; Lieutenant Tinsou, killed; Lieutenant Mosier, slight. Major Riker, One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Illinois, severe; Captain Young, Fifty-fifth Illinois, slight; Lieutenant Collins, One Hundred and Tenth Illinois, severe.

Mitchell's Ohio brigade, one hundred and fifty, including Adjutant Reeves, Ninety-seventh Ohio, killed; Captain Black, Seventy-eighth Illinois, wounded; Lieutenant Long, Seventy-eighth Illinois, killed; Major Green, Seventy-eighth Illinois, wounded; Lieutenant Fuller, Thirty-fourth Illinois, wounded; Lieutenant Garver, Ninety-eighth Ohio, wounded.

Este's brigade, which relieved the regular brigade, lost a few. Our loss in the Fourteenth corps will, therefore, be about one thousand one hundred and twenty-five, a very small proportion of whom were killed.

Morgan and Carlin handled their commands with consummate skill, and deserve to share with the brave fighter, Davis, a share of the honor of this most decisive and gallant charge. This is Davis' first fight as a corps commander, and as such he has proved himself equal to the task. It is a victory that will hand him and his corps down to posterity.

I have but briefly and inadequately sketched the general charge, and leave details to a more convenient moment when the corps halts, and I can make more complete memoranda.

During the fight, the Army of the Tennessee made strong diversions along their lines. The Seventeenth corps moved to the extreme right, and supported by the Sixteenth corps, made strong demonstrations on the enemy's left, in favor of the Fourteenth corps.

September 2—6 A. M.—The enemy have gone. The toils were drawing around them too closely, and no salvation remained save in precipitate retreat. In the gray of dawn this morning, their withdrawal was discovered. A detachment of the Army of the Tennessee started immediately in pursuit, passing through the dilapidated town of Jonesboro'. What a situation for a General who has vaunted his power to foil any further flanking movements. Two thirds of his army, shattered by battle, is falling back hastily to the south, while the remainder has not only been compelled to leave the defences of Atlanta without a direct blow, but is circuitously marching for dear life to form a junction with the humbled, ruined corps of Lee and Hardee, trembling at every gunshot. The enemy at this moment cannot tell, when a collision at any point occurs, whether we are striking at him with a squad of troopers or with our whole army.

Many stragglers are coming in, mainly from S. D. Lee's corps. They report with unanimity that Hardee retreated south last night as far as the McDonough road. Upon reaching that they marched east to the main road running south from Atlanta through McDonough. S. D. Lee's corps in advance, turned north, and at last accounts were marching in that direction, endeavoring to form a junction with a portion of the army left at Atlanta—which is presumed to be retreating, and is undoubtedly doing so, if Hood has any military sagacity.

10 A. M.—In Jonesboro', and watching one of the most imposing sights of the war. Our army is marching through the village, in double columns, corps after corps, all with flags flying, and brass and field bands playing with unwonted nerve. The men cheer joyously. Their burdens of musket, knapsack, and intrenching tools are feathers, evidently. Everything is *allegro* with them this morning. The campaign for Atlanta is at an end, and they are headed southward for the new campaign. For the first time the whole South-west is open to them, bread and meat permitting.

The captured battle-flags are trailed overhead by the regiments who wrested them from the enemy over his trenches.

Jonesboro' contains about forty scattered houses. From several of them white flags are thrust out, and I observe that in all the jeers called out by these unnecessary symbols of submission, the name of Vallandigham is very pervasive. A few dirt-colored inhabitants remain, and have taken their station at front gates to gape at the solid columns of Yankees sweeping down the road. They say that for the last two days the village has been visited by a great many shells, and that the inhabitants took refuge in caves and cellars. They describe the retreat of the enemy, last night, as very confused and hasty. Darkness had barely fallen when it began, the wagons moving first, running hither and thither to escape the rain of shells from our batteries. The infantry passed through in heavy, straggling masses, having every appearance of being thoroughly whipped and disheartened. By three A. M. their rear guard evacuated Jonesboro', and we find them flown—just as we anticipated. As we lay enveloping Jonesboro' last night, girdling their discomfited army, our six corps closed compactly on three sides of the opposing two corps, the thought came to many like an electric thrill: Shall we capture them? Those familiar with war and its chances, thrust the flattering thought aside resolutely, but it insisted on dancing back again seductively. I have heard several say querulously, this morning, that we should have bagged the entire rebel command had such and such corps closed up and attacked while daylight lasted. Doubtful, very. But such is human nature. We have divided the rebel army, whipped it in detail, shattered it beyond speedy repair, and probably captured a great city, yet there are to be found those who have their regrets that something *large* has not been accomplished.

11 A. M.—Atlanta has fallen. A few moments since General Thomas received a despatch stating that the Twentieth corps occupies the city. The infinite labor and bloodshed of four long, wearisome, sleepless months has received a reward even richer than we hoped for. The siege of the Gate City is over. We were certain it must fall, but there is something intensely grateful in saying it *has* fallen. Cheering has broken out in the marching columns with redoubled violence—not a battle-cheer, but a round, rich, glorious volume, heroic in intonation, and containing, somehow, a music deeper and grander than the mellowest and most inspiring diapason of a dozen organs, such as they drown discord with in Boston.

Communication with the rear has hitherto been by the way of Sandtown on the Chattahoochee, and it now becomes a question of vast interest to correspondents to know the shortest safe route to the North, where we may spread before a gladdened nation the rich oil and wine that we hope to express from our ripening notebooks. By the road running directly north we are but twenty miles from Atlanta; by the route in use since the movement commenced we are more than double that distance. The first has

never been traversed by an armed Federal soldier—belongs, in fact, to the unexplored region into which literary non-combatants seldom have the curiosity to penetrate. But Mr. D. P. Conyngnam, of the New York Herald, and myself propose to be the Speke and Grant of a reconnaissance in that direction, influenced possibly, beside other weighty motives, by a desire to be the first of Sherman's grand army of flankers to enter Atlanta. Our horses are saddled, and with pockets crammed full of notes from which, if we are captured, the enemy may possibly extract a little aid, but not a grain of comfort, we cast loose from Sherman's noble, victorious army, still pouring densely down the road, headed south—due south.

7 P. M.—In Atlanta, after a funny, adventurous ride. Reaching the cavalry on the left of our army, General Garrard's trusty division, we halted to learn if we could pass into Atlanta from the south with safety. Our design seemed fool-hardy when we ascertained that no direct communication with our troops there had yet been established. General Garrard, however, concluded to send out a reconnoitering party over the road, to ascertain if the city could be reached by that route. Captain J. F. Newcomer, commanding General Garrard's escort, and Lieutenant W. C. Rickard, Provost-Marshal on Brevet Brigadier-General Wilder's staff, with forty men, were despatched, and, with the correspondents of the Commercial and the New York Herald, this detachment was the first to reach Atlanta from Sherman's main army, twenty miles distant, operating without a base.

During this ride we were, no doubt, watched from ambuscades by many rebel stragglers, recent traces of whom were plentiful. Armed Yankees had never before been seen on the road, and as the news of the evacuation of Atlanta had not spread through the country, our riding leisurely toward the city was viewed by the few inhabitants of the wayside farmhouses with unfeigned astonishment. At Rough and Ready Station, on the Macon railroad, eleven miles south of Atlanta, we found a few squalid women and children collected around the doorsteps—the desolation broken only by the morose drone of a spinning-wheel. The glamour of despair hung over the hamlet.

A few more miles were passed, when a shot from our vedettes excited our interest. In a moment we found they had captured an ancient negro, mounted on a brisk mule, who was endeavoring to escape, when the shot compelled him to heave-to. I have seen terror in many stages, but never a more undisguised variety than was shown by this fugacious African. His black hide had been bleached in a moment to a smoky canary-color; his dangling legs oscillated dizzily with nervous relaxation, and his eyes were immovably open as those of a plaster bust. If fear ever distilled anything to a jelly, this sable party would have melted into a strange, palpitating mass. In answer to a query as to where he belonged, he managed to gasp:

“Mum—m—m—mum—Mr. Ferguson.”

In the course of another five minutes we ascertained that the mule he strode belonged to the same gentlemen.

Taking the African in tow, we reached a fine house beside the road, the entire family being seated upon the verandah. This was Mr. Ferguson and his flock. The negro was requested to dismount. The saddle was thrown from his mule and the animal taken in charge by a trooper, while another impressed the negro's services in getting his girths taut. This done, the black-amoor was requested to deliver our respects to the ladies, in a tone intended possibly to reach them at first hand, which he gurgled he would be “suah” to do, and we rode on.

When within four and a half miles of the city, we halted at an unpretending house for refreshment, and found there an elderly and exceedingly garrulous lady, whose manner led us to fear instantly that she was determined to protest too much.

“God bless you Yankees! why didn't you let me know? should have had a hot meal.”

Then dropping her voice mysteriously, she continued:

“I've got two little boys with you-uns—nice little boys—Union boys. Didn't you ever meet any of the McCools?”

We had never met the McCools.

While quaffing a glass of milk, one of the escort noticed that the bed-spread in the next room seemed a little plethoric toward the middle. He turned it down and discovered—not a quivering virgin—but five guns duly loaded and capped. In another bed, concealed in the same manner, were two more guns. We ventured to ask our obsequious hostess why so many small arms were cultivated about her premises. Without a moment's hesitation, and with a voice whose honeyed accents would have been irresistible had they issued from a younger and prettier neighborhood, she replied:

“Oh, dear, now! my youngest—Johnny—did you never meet Johnny McCool?—was sich a great hand to hunt. Nay, do now have some more butter.”

I fear we ruined young Nimrod's armory, (which we could hardly consider complete without a battery of artillery), by breaking to pieces his seven fowling-pieces, which, by the way, bore a remarkable resemblance to army muskets.

On reaching East Point, we came upon the rebel defences of Atlanta, and upon unfinished works, which showed that they were expecting Sherman to strike at them there. We came within a mile of the city, and still met no trace of our troops. Just as we entered the suburbs, we caught a glimpse of a blue uniform. One of our escort dashed forward with a flag of truce, and in a moment we had grasped each other by the hand, with hearts swelling with something akin to tenderness. Groups closed around us, and drank in the glorious news it was our privilege to be the first to impart, and the en-



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thusiasm the relation gave rise to took epigrammatic form in many cases, in the suggestion that it was bad news for the Chicago Convention. Sure enough, there was our flag placidly waving in the twilight. To our loving eyes there seemed something effulgent about it, and as night fell its colors came out, to our excited vision, more and more plainly. A few weeks ago I clambered up a look-out at a signal-station on our left, and gazed upon the bristling trenches of the enemy, their frowning guns, and defiant flags, and wondered as I gazed, how and when I should enter there. Little did I dream that it would be from the south, and threading the road through the forts from whose embrasures deserted guns would look us a lonely, stern, but meaning welcome. Little did I think that the mesh of yawning ditches, towering parapets, tangled abatis, and impracticable *chevaux de frise* would be silently carried by a battle whose thunder should be inaudible in the streets of the city for the mastery of which it was fulminated—by a subtle *idea*, matured in the wonderful brain of the Commanding General, and by the integrity, and courage, and *morale* of the immense army he has marshalled to a victory which must affect the destinies of the country and of the human race itself.

Hood, no doubt, was quickly apprised of the unfavorable issue of Hardee's assault on the thirty-first of August on the Army of the Tennessee. With his rail communications severed, all supplies cut off, and more than half of his army defeated in attack, and impotent for defence against the hosts pushing upon it, it is plain that he was compelled to abandon the town, and endeavor to unite his army once more, now most critically divided and menaced. On the morning of the first orders were issued in Atlanta for an evacuation that night, and though confided at first to the army commanders alone, and to those citizens whose welfare they had especially at heart, it was blown over the city by the afternoon, and fell like a thunder-clap upon the unsuspecting inhabitants, who but a day or two ago had been hilarious over the withdrawal of Sherman. They thought him foiled, and put to a last trump of building railroads and, possibly, digging canals. Every vehicle in the city was brought into requisition by fugacious families. Negroes, free and bond alike, were arrested and started south on foot. Shopkeepers packed up their scanty wares, or found places where they concealed them. The confusion intensified as night came on, and I am told that the scene beggared description. The faces of most of the citizens wore a look of despair as they turned their backs upon their homes, from which they were driven so unexpectedly. The streets were cluttered with wagons, tottering under hasty, ill-adjusted loads; the sidewalks swarmed with two classes—the fugitives and the wreckers. For be it known that in the last hours of the rebel occu-

pation of Atlanta, thousands of the lower classes, who proposed to remain, fell to plundering the abandoned houses and stores as soon as their owners disappeared. Staff officers dashed from point to point with gloomy faces, while drunken soldiers brawled along the banquettes, and cursed alike the citizens they encountered and the patrols that dragged them to their commands. What pen can do justice to the scene of rapine, of anguish, of terror, of stealthy riot and brutality, which had risen through the thin crust, barely hiding the hideous elements that go to make up Southern society in the fourth year of Jefferson Davis.

With railroads cut on all sides, the trains in Atlanta, consisting of eighty-three cars and seven locomotives, could not be saved. The cars were loaded with the ammunition in Atlanta, and divided into four trains. They were taken out on the Augusta railroad, about a mile from the city, where the engines were detached and dashed into each other at the highest speed. The cars were fired, and for about an hour the most appalling explosions ensued, making the very earth tremble. The wreck of these cars has been visited by thousands since our occupation. Fragments of wood and iron were hurled to an immense distance, while the ground in the vicinity is torn up, blackened and scarred for hundreds of yards. Over one thousand bales of cotton, piled up in the southern suburbs of the city, were also given to the torch.

During the afternoon, Hood ordered what army provisions remained after filling his trains to be given to citizens, and considerable quantities were thus distributed. There were but six days' supplies for the army in Atlanta, and we found the report that Hood was subsisting his troops from hand to mouth, so long prevalent in our army, to be true. During the afternoon, specific orders for the withdrawal of Stewart's corps and the militia were issued, and about sunset the latter were withdrawn from the trenches. When they were fairly on the road, Stewart's corps followed, all being *en route* by midnight, except the cavalry, a brigade or two of infantry, and the pickets. These latter remained until the advance of the Twentieth corps neared the city on the morning of the second.

The explosion of ammunition was, of course, heard at the position of the Twentieth corps, but seven miles distant; and though General Slocum had received no intelligence of Sherman's great success, he was not unprepared to find Hood gone any morning, and the explosions convinced him that the withdrawal was taking place. He instantly issued orders to his division commanders, Generals Ward, Williams and Geary, to send out each a heavy reconnoissance at daybreak the morning of the second.

About one thousand men were detailed from each division, and at five A. M. pushed forward on neighboring roads leading into Atlanta, on the north and north-west. Encountering no

opposition, they pushed rapidly forward, and at eight o'clock came in sight of the rebel intrenchments, so lately peopled with enemies, but now silent and deserted.

Advancing rapidly, Colonel Coburn, commanding General Ward's reconnoissance, entered the enemy's works, encountering in the suburbs Mayor Calhoun, of Atlanta, and a deputation of the City Council. The former nervously presented a paper, surrendering the city and asking protection. Colonel Coburn refused to receive the paper for informality, and directed that another should be drawn up. Mayor Calhoun invited several of General Ward's staff to accompany him to the Court-house, where the document should be made *en regle*, promising at the same time to expel the drunken rebel stragglers, who were lingering in the streets, and were disposed to skirmish with our advance. He immediately took measures to effect the last, and accompanied by the officers whose names are offered in attest, he returned to the Court-house, and the following document was drawn up:

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 2, 1864.

Brigadier-General Ward, commanding Third Division, Twentieth Corps:

SIR: The fortunes of war have placed the city of Atlanta in your hands, and as Mayor of the city, I ask protection to non-combatants and private property.

JAS. M. CALHOUN,
Mayor of Atlanta.

Attest—H. W. Scott, Captain and A. A. G.; A. W. Tibbetts, Captain and A. D. C.; J. P. Thompson, Lieutenant and Provost-Marshal.

The preliminary formalities thus disposed of, our troops entered the city with music and flags, marching proudly erect. The inhabitants looked on sullenly for the most part, though there were an over-proportion of females who held their smiles, like other favors, at a cheap rate. Some peered timidly from behind blinds; others ate their humble pie morosely and unflinchingly on the street corners; and, no doubt, some innocent old ladies were duly concealed in impracticable places, to avoid a fate which they flattered themselves was imminent. A fine flagstaff was found on the Franklin Printing House where the Memphis Appeal has been printed; the Stripes and Stars were soon flung to the calm, sunny air, amid the cheers of the brave men who had fought for so many weary, consuming days to place it there.

General Slocum established his headquarters at the Trout House, the leading hotel of the city, overlooking the public square.

In the forts around Atlanta eleven heavy guns, mainly sixty-four-pounders, were left by the enemy. They were too heavy for speedy removal, and fell into our hands, still mounted in position and without serious injury. About three thousand muskets, in good order, stored in various parts of the city, were found; also

three locomotives in running order, which seem to have been overlooked. Large quantities of manufactured tobacco (which now forms part of the rebel soldier's ration), were discovered, and will, no doubt, be appropriated for the use of the army. Between one and two hundred stragglers, the majority of them very drunk, were fished from their hiding-places and placed under guard at the Court-house. Some of our convalescent wounded, disguised as rebel privates, fell into our hands. The uniforms were furnished by humble Union people in the city, of whom, if we may believe the masqueraders, there are several hundred, whose faith has been well-attested by constant attentions to our wounded prisoners—so constant, in fact, that the authorities grew jealous, and finally denied citizens access to the hospitals.

From first impressions I should say that not more than one eighth of the inhabitants remain, and those almost exclusively of the humbler class. There are a goodly number, however, who have cut the Confederate cause, and who have been long awaiting the opportunity. Nearly all of the local railway employes remain. They are already snuffing the chances of employment under the new *regime*. One thing has struck me in conversation with the citizens. They evidently have not the slightest idea that we shall ever relax our hold upon Atlanta. Our reputation for tenacity is at the highest among these newly-acquired inhabitants of Lincoln-dom.

The city is larger than I anticipated, its extent indicating that it contained, before the siege, a population of twenty thousand. It has a look of newness indigenous to railway centres; but it is well built, and has more solidity than nine tenths of cities that owe their rise to the reflective habits of the man who thought turned wheels would produce locomotion. Many of the residences, especially as you leave the centre of the city, have the florid ornamentation of the Gothic and Italian villa, and are very fresh and pretty in their uniform white paint and shrubbery surroundings. In the business quarter the buildings are of brick, compact and lofty, and of modern architecture.

The depot is, as it has a right to be, in the centre of the city. It is commodious, and though needing paint, is in good repair, save the ticket offices, which need glazing and refitting. Adjoining the depot is a public square, containing about three acres of ground. It is now encumbered with estray hospital bunks, broken boxes, miscellaneous *débris*, flanked (which is reversing the usual order) by little patches of sward. Several young poplars shoot up slenderly, but their aspiring trunks are so begnawn that I fear the wandering animals around them will complete the work of chewing them down. The "square" is surrounded by an open board fence, strangely intact.

There are several good-looking churches, the most handsome of them being near neighbors in a cluster, a square from the depot. The

Court-house is a fair specimen of the American public building. It has one green block, all to itself, and a handsome cupola. The streets are not regularly laid out, shooting out occasionally at acute angles, and only the leading ones are paved. The others are firm and hard, but I fancy, from the texture of the soil, that mud must be abundant in the rainy season. Save the three or four blocks in the centre of the city, the houses are straggling, with spacious yards and gardens; not straggling enough to render the distances magnificent, but yet not unpretending.

Altogether, Atlanta has an exceedingly brisk and "citified" air. Its business has been large, as one can tell by studying the sign-boards, than which, perhaps, no better method exists of gauging the spirit and enterprise of a town. The stores are well fitted up, and several of the larger ones look distinguished, even in their emptiness. The hotels, three or four in number, are spacious, but decidedly the worse for wear. With the exception of the Trout House, they are nearly empty; and the latter is by no means in thorough running order.

The ruins of several large buildings, by fire, are observable on the principal streets. Some of them are of ancient date, and but one, citizens say, resulted from our firing. The extensive car-shops have not been destroyed, but their machinery was sent, two months ago, to Macon and other points. None of the buildings in the city were fired at the evacuation.

As a point of recuperation to the army sick and wounded, of repair of material, and as a depot of supplies, Atlanta will be of inestimable value in the future military operations in the South.

Hardly a house in Atlanta has escaped damage from the shells which, for over a month, have been hurled at it. I have known a single battery to throw nine hundred shells into the city, between dark and daylight. This was largely in excess of the average; but the shelling has been very heavy throughout. The majority of the roofs in the city are torn, and the walls scarred. About half a dozen fires resulted from the firing. In the room where I slept last evening, the wall was garnished with a ragged orifice, made by a fragment of shell, and in the adjoining apartment was a chair, partially demolished by the same irate messenger. My hostess tells me that she didn't mind the shell a bit; but as she forgot, as she admitted, a moment after, that she had of late cooked breakfast in the cellar, we must perforce take the first assertion *cum grano salis*. The damage to life and limb was confined to women and children—if we may believe report.

The railroads from the east enter the city through a deep cut, which is bridged over at the junction of streets. In the sides of this cut numerous caves are excavated, which bear marks of constant use. Some of them have traverses to protect the entrance, for, in the words of the cockney: "You cawn't most always tell in this blarsted country" in which direction the savage

explodent purposes to fly. One must look, however, for the ravages of the shells, as the damage done by them is insignificant. They certainly made the town uncomfortable, but not sufficiently so to induce even partial evacuation by the inhabitants. Our makers of ammunition seem to improve, as report has it that nearly every one of our shells exploded.

The fortifications of Atlanta run just on the verge of the city, excluding in one or two places what might be termed the extreme suburbs. The parapets are heavy, and strengthened at frequent commanding points by regularly-bastioned forts, the ditches of which are from eight to ten feet deep. In front of the parapet are successive lines of abatis and *chevaux de frise*, from three to seven in number. The works on the west run down to East Point, and are built not over fifty yards from the railroad they are designed to cover. Two of the forts on this side are models, and splendidly finished. Near East Point new works were in course of erection. The enemy had evidently been working on them two or three days before the evacuation, showing that Sherman was expected to strike there. It is enough to say that the entire chain of defences to Atlanta is impregnable to any assault less deliberately prearranged than that which carried Sebastopol. The carnage of a determined assault must have been awful, and the result by no means certain.

I noticed on entering the city, some females walking leisurely homeward with armfuls of boxes, containing, doubtless, what might be ungallantly termed plunder. A citizen, on opening his store this morning, discovered eight empty barrels which had, the previous night, contained salt. Many of our soldiers, wandering along the streets, are certainly a little inquisitive as to the *débris* of deserted stores, but I don't believe our men are much given to pilfering the chloride of sodium, of which, under the most unfavorable circumstances they get more than they want, in various guises. One shopkeeper says the confounded women have taken his salt, and his acquaintance with the fair sex of Atlanta not being of recent growth, his opinion is entitled to weight.

The Twentieth corps and its commanders deserve the highest praise for quiet, orderly, and soldierlike conduct since the occupation. The Second Massachusetts has been detailed for provost duty in the city, and its Colonel, Cogswell, is the Provost-Marshal. I observed a lot of soldiers this morning, endeavoring to force an entrance into a store for tobacco, which is the only instance of misbehavior that came under my observation.

I have diligently inquired, since entering Atlanta, in quarters likely to be well informed, as to the past and present strength of the rebel army opposing Sherman. Johnston had at Dalton, last spring, just before Polk's reinforcement of thirty thousand, fifty-eight thousand of all arms. During the campaign, this aggregate, seventy-eight thousand, has been reduced nearly

one half, leaving Hood not over forty-eight thousand regular troops of all arms. Of militia, six thousand were collected at Atlanta, and about four thousand at Macon. Militia included, Hood probably could not muster over sixty thousand men previous to the late movement. I am pretty certain this will not vary five thousand from the morning reports of Hood's force.

Their rations for many weeks have been confined to corn-meal, bacon, and occasional issues of fresh beef. The grumbling in their army on account of the scanty supply-table has been both loud and deep.

About a mile of track was found destroyed near the city. Our indefatigable construction corps relaid it in a few hours, and at ten o'clock this morning two trains arrived, emptying their fiery lungs, as they thundered through the city to the depot, of one fierce, long-protracted, salutatory shriek. Captain John Blair's anaconda of bread and bacon, which follows up our conquests so closely that it has, figuratively speaking, been repeatedly ordered off the skirmish line, is ready to lard the lean depots of Atlanta with the riches of the United States supply-table. Just think of the aroma of coffee floating around the starveling atmosphere of the military store-houses of the Gate City, which are redolent now of musty corn-meal, rusty bacon, mingled with a vile, indefinable odor of general decay, which should be recognized as the national smell of the Confederacy.

Captain Van Duzer, Superintendent of Military Telegraphs, as soon as he became convinced of the fall of Atlanta, ran through his lines to the city, and instructed an operator to transmit the glad intelligence to Washington, via Cumberland Gap—Wheeler having destroyed the wires between Nashville and Chattanooga. At one of the repeating stations the operator interrupted the message by asking "Is this another *Fury*?" The query was, in an electrical way, warmly resented. The despatch passed on, and an answer was received from the War Department four hours after our forces entered the city.

We know of no more modest way, or one more likely to prove convincing to those who claim to think that the fall of Atlanta involves Sherman in fresh difficulties, than to permit the rebels themselves to express their opinion of the matter.

GENERAL T. J. WOOD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD DIVISION AND ARMY CORPS, }
ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 10, 1864. }

SIR: The opening of the grand campaigns in the spring of 1864 witnessed a new phase in our military combinations. Previously dispersions of our troops, and of course of our efforts, had been the order of the day; for the campaign of the spring and summer of 1864 consolidation of our troops had been wisely resolved on. In conformity with this principle of concentration, large masses of troops were collected in and near the north-western angle

of Georgia in the latter part of April, for the summer campaign into this state. The division which I have the honor to command, being the Third division, of the Fourth Army Corps, Army of the Cumberland, constituted a part of the troops so assembled; and it is the object of this report to present a faithful history of the part it bore in the great campaign, which, extending over the long term of four months of continued effort and struggle, finally resulted most gloriously to our arms in the capture of Atlanta.

At twelve m. on the third of May ult., the division broke up its encampment at McDonald's station, near Cleveland, on the East Tennessee railroad, and marched southward toward Catoosa Springs.

On the fourth of May the divisions of the Fourth corps were concentrated at the Springs. As the troops approached the Springs a light party of hostile cavalry was encountered, but it fled immediately before the onward movement.

May the fifth and sixth, the divisions, with the other troops, remained in camp. May seventh the onward movement was resumed, the First division of the corps leading. A few hours' march led to Tunnel Hill. This is a strong position, and it had been supposed the enemy might attempt a serious opposition to our further progress; but it was found to be occupied only by cavalry, which was quickly driven off by the light troops of the First division. The Hill was soon occupied by the First and Third divisions, the former on the right, the latter on the left.

During the evening of the seventh, an order was received directing the First and Third divisions of the Fourth corps to make a demonstration at six o'clock the following morning against Rocky-Face Ridge, to cover and facilitate the operations of other troops against Buzzard's-Roost Pass. Rocky-Face is a bold ridge rising some five hundred feet above the general level of the country, and running from a little east of north to west of south. The crest of the ridge is a sheer precipice of solid rock, rising in height from twenty to sixty feet.

To carry the crest by a direct movement, when occupied by the enemy, was an impossible undertaking. Hence the demonstration was ordered to be made with a skirmish line, supported by solid lines. Buzzard's-Roost Pass is a gap in Rocky-Face Ridge through which the Atlantic and Western railway passes. It is a very formidable position from its topographical features, and these had been strengthened by heavy intrenchments. The enemy held the northern entrance of the Pass in force, and had the remainder of his troops disposed thence through the pass to Dalton, on the crest of the ridge, and on the roads passing east of the ridge to Dalton. The entire position, with its strong natural advantages strengthened by defensive works, was impregnable against a direct attack.

The demonstration, commenced by the division on the eighth, was continued throughout the day, and almost continuously on the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and to noon of the twelfth, and although it was intended simply as a diversion, and was made with the skirmish line, a considerable number of casualties attest the vigor with which the demonstration against the rugged height was made.

The impregnability of the enemy's position against a direct attack having become thoroughly patent during the afternoon and night of the eleventh, a movement was commenced by all the forces in front of the enemy, less the Fourth corps, to unite with the Army of the Tennessee, and pass to the south and rear of the enemy.

Having discovered the withdrawal of our forces, the enemy, on the afternoon of the twelfth, commenced a counter-movement, the object of which was to turn our extreme left, then held by the cavalry under General Stone-man, and the Second division of the Fourth corps (General Newton's). The movement was early discovered by the signal-officers on the north-eastern point of the crest of Rocky-Face Ridge. General Newton reported his position as perilous, and asked for assistance. I immediately moved the First and Third brigades of the division to his support; but the reinforcement was not, in the end, needed, as the enemy after a bold display of force, and apparently initiating a movement which, if boldly pushed, might have seriously interfered with our plans, drew off without bringing matters to an issue. During the night of the twelfth, the enemy evacuated Buzzard's-Roost Pass, the crest of Rocky-Face, his defensive works on the roads east of the ridge, and at Dalton. Early on the morning of the thirteenth, I moved with the First and Third brigades, following the Second division into Dalton, by the roads east of Rocky-Face Ridge. The Second brigade followed the First division through Buzzard's-Roost Pass. Thus was the enemy forced from the first of the series of strong defensive positions which he had occupied to resist the progress of our arms into Georgia.

Halting a brief time in Dalton to unite all its parts, the Fourth corps soon continued its march southward, and camped for the night several miles south of that place.

The march of the day was made without any serious opposition. A few of the enemy's stragglers were picked up, and some light parties covering his retreat encountered.

The forward movement was resumed early the morning of the fourteenth. A march of a few miles effected a junction between the Fourth corps and the remainder of our forces. It had been discovered that the enemy had occupied a strongly-intrenched position in the vicinity of, and north-west of Resaca. Dispositions were at once made to attack. The First and Second brigades of my division were deployed in order of battle in two lines, the former on the right, the latter on the left. The Third brigade

was placed in reserve. Thus arranged, at the order, the line gradually advanced. By the contraction of our entire front, as it closed on the enemy's position, the First brigade of my division was forced out of line, and took position, immediately in rear, but following up the movement.

In the advance, the Second brigade soon encountered the enemy's front line, which was rudely barricaded with logs and rails. This was handsomely carried, and the brigade pushed boldly on until it confronted, at not more than two hundred and fifty yards' distance, the enemy's second and far more strongly-intrenched line. It was problematical whether this line could be carried by even the most determined assault, such was its natural and artificial strength. The assaulting force would have been compelled to pass for two hundred and fifty yards over an open field, without the slightest cover, exposed to the most deadly and galling direct and cross-fire of artillery and musketry.

To hold out the least hope of a successful assault, it was necessary that it should be made simultaneously throughout the lines.

With a view to making necessary dispositions, the Second brigade was halted; and to guard it against the dangerous consequence of a counter-attack in force (such as fell the same afternoon on a brigade of another division of the corps), its front was at once strongly but rudely barricaded. About four P. M., I received an order from Major-General Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, to relieve the brigade of Colonel Reilly, of General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Army Corps. This was promptly executed by the First brigade, General Willich's, of my division.

This disposition brought the First brigade into line, immediately on the right of the Second brigade, and in like proximity to the strongly-intrenched positions of the enemy. The brigade immediately barricaded its front securely. The Third brigade remained in reserve in an intrenched position, whence it could afford support to the front, as well as check-mate any movement of the enemy to swing into our rear by turning our extreme left. This position was maintained during the remainder of the afternoon; good roads were cut to the ammunition train in rear, and a fresh supply of ammunition brought to the front. Early in the morning of the fifteenth, an order was received for a grand advance of the whole line at eight A. M. The two brigades in line were at once instructed to be fully prepared for the movement, but the order for it never came.

Late in the forenoon, intimation was received from Major-General Howard, commanding the Fourth corps, that an attack was to be made on the extreme right of the enemy's position, by the Twentieth corps, accompanied by an order to observe closely its effect on the enemy's centre, nearly opposite to which the First and Second brigades were posted, and if any weakening or shaking of his lines was observed, to at-

tack vigorously. Whatever may have been done on the enemy's extreme right, no material effect therefrom was perceivable in his centre. But with a view to determining more certainly and satisfactorily the condition of the enemy directly in front of my two brigades in line, about four P. M. they were advanced against the enemy's line, with such a terrific direct and cross-fire of musketry and artillery sweeping over the open field which divided the hostile lines, as to show most conclusively, that wherever else the enemy might be weak, there, certainly, he was in full force.

Fortunately, the condition and strength of the enemy was discovered before the brigades were deeply or dangerously committed to the assault, which enabled them to be withdrawn without the very heavy loss, which at one time seemed so imminent. A short time after this movement, Brigadier-General Willich, commanding First brigade, was seriously wounded by a rebel sharpshooter, and was borne from the field. He has never since rejoined the command. I was thus early in the campaign, deprived of the services of a gallant and energetic officer.

During the night of the fifteenth, the enemy evacuated the position in and around Resaca, and retreated south of the Oostanaula. This was the second strong position from which the enemy had been forced. The many small arms and other articles of military use abandoned, showed that his retreat was precipitate.

The casualties of the command from the opening of the campaign to the evacuation of Resaca were: Killed, eighty-one; wounded, three-hundred and forty-eight; total, four-hundred and twenty-nine. Pursuit was made early the morning of the sixteenth, and during the day the whole of the Fourth corps passed the Oostanaula (having repaired for this purpose a part of the partially-destroyed bridge), and encamped for the night near Calhoun. The pursuit was renewed early the morning of the seventeenth, my division moving along the railway. Throughout the march, a continued skirmish was kept up with the parties covering the enemy's rear, but these were rapidly driven before the steady and solid advance of the skirmish-line of the division. At Adairsville, however, the enemy was in heavy force; indeed, it was subsequently learned that his entire army was assembled there. My division had advanced on the western side of Othkaluga creek, and in the vicinity of Adairsville met a heavy force of the enemy, strongly and advantageously posted, while the remainder of the corps, which had advanced on the other side of the creek, had earlier met a still heavier force, and been checked. A stiff skirmish at once occurred along the entire front of the division, which was kept up till nightfall. During its progress, however, I had bridges constructed across the creek, with a view to forcing a passage the following morning, but during the night the enemy retreated. The position in the vicinity of Adairsville is not naturally very strong, but it was very well con-

structed, and was the third fortified position abandoned by the enemy.

Pursuit was made the following morning (the eighteenth), my division leading. A slight opposition was made to our advance by light parties of cavalry, but these were rapidly scattered. The pursuit was continued on the nineteenth, the First division of the corps leading, followed by my division. The line of march lay through Kingston, and immediately south of this village the enemy was overtaken in force, apparently arrayed for battle. The First division of the corps was at once deployed into order of battle across the road by which we were marching, and my division deployed on its right.

Batteries were posted in eligible positions, to play on the lines of the enemy deployed in the open fields in our front. The artillery-fire was evidently effective, for the enemy very soon began to withdraw. Our advance was immediately resumed.

Within a mile and a half of Cassville, the enemy was again encountered, in an entrenched position. Our order of battle was promptly reformed, and the advance resumed, with a view to forcing our way into Cassville; but darkness falling suddenly upon us, it was necessary to desist from a further advance against an entrenched position over unexplored ground.

The Seventeenth Kentucky, which was deployed as skirmishers, to cover the advance of its brigade, suffered quite severely in the advance in the afternoon, more than twenty casualties in the skirmish line bearing unmistakable evidence of the sharp fire to which it had been exposed.

During the night of the nineteenth the enemy evacuated his works in the vicinity of Cassville, being the fourth entrenched position abandoned, and retired across the Etowah.

Friday, Saturday, and Sunday, the twentieth, twenty-first, and twenty-second of May, the troops rested quietly in camp. But it was a busy period for commanding generals and staff officers, preparing for the grand flank movement for turning the enemy's strong position at the railway gap in the Allatoona hills. Taking twenty days' subsistence in wagons, the entire army cut loose from its line of communication, crossed the Etowah river, and pushed boldly southward through a most abrupt and difficult range of hills. The movement was commenced on Monday the twenty-third. On that and the following day my division led the Fourth corps, but on the twenty-fifth was in rear. Those days' marches carried the army through the Allatoona range. Late in the afternoon of the twenty-fifth, the enemy was encountered in force by the Twentieth corps, when a sharp affair followed; it was not, however, participated in, owing to the lateness of the hour of its arrival in the vicinity of the action, by the troops of the Fourth corps. The morning of the twenty-sixth still found the enemy in our front. My division was early deployed into

order of battle on the left of the Second division, of the Fourth corps. The day was spent by my division in very brilliant and successful manoeuvring, to determine the exact position of the enemy's intrenched line. To accomplish this, it was necessary to drive in his light troops, who formed a screen to his position. The ground was in some parts difficult to manoeuvre on, and a deep spring had to be bridged, but the whole work was satisfactorily accomplished. The operations of the twenty-sixth having satisfactorily defined the position of the enemy's intrenched line, it was determined, on Friday morning, the twenty-seventh, that it should be assaulted, and my division was selected for this arduous and dangerous task. A minute and critical examination of the enemy's intrenchments rendered it evident that a direct front attack would be of most doubtful success, and certainly cost a great sacrifice of life. Hence, it was determined to attempt to find the extreme right of the enemy's position, turn it, and attack him in flank. In conformity with this determination, my division was moved entirely to the left of our line, and formed, by order of Major-General Howard, commanding the corps, in six parallel lines, each brigade being formed in two lines. The order of the brigades in this grand column of attack was, first, the Second brigade, Brigadier-General Hazen, commanding; second, the First brigade, Colonel Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, commanding; third, the Third brigade, Colonel Knefler, Seventy-ninth Indiana volunteers, commanding. When all the dispositions were completed (and these required but a short space of time), the magnificent array moved forward. For a mile the march was nearly due southward through dense forests and the thickest jungle, a country whose surface was scarred by deep ravines and intersected by difficult ridges. But the movement of the column through all these difficulties was steadily onward. Having moved a mile southward, and not having discovered any indications of the enemy, it was supposed we had passed entirely to the east of his extreme right. On this hypothesis, the column was wheeled to the right, and advanced on nearly a westerly course for about a mile and a half. The nature of the country passed over in this movement was similar in all respects to that already described. After the westerly movement had progressed about a mile and a half the flankers discovered that the column, in wheeling to the right, had swung inside of the enemy's line. It was necessary, to gain the goal, to face to the left, file left, and by a flank movement, conduct the column eastward and southward around the enemy's right flank. When all these movements, so well calculated to try the physical strength of the men, were concluded, and the point gained from which it was believed the column could move directly on the enemy's flank, the day was well spent—it was nearly four p. m. The men had been on their feet since early daylight, and, of course, were much worn.

The column was halted a few moments, to readjust the lines, to give the men a brief breathing space, and to give the division which was to protect and cover the left flank of the column, time to come up and take position. At 4:30 o'clock p. m. precisely, the order was given to attack, and with its front well covered with skirmishers, the column moved forward. And never have troops marched to a deadly assault, under the most adverse circumstances, with more firmness, with more truly soldierly bearing, and more distinguished gallantry. On, on, through the thickest jungle, over exceedingly rough and broken ground, and exposed to the sharpest direct and cross-fire of musketry and artillery on both flanks, the leading brigade, the Second, moved (followed in close supporting distance by the other brigades), right up to the enemy's main line of works. Under the unwavering steadiness of the advance the fire from the enemy's line of works began to slacken, and the troops behind those works first began perceptibly to waver and then give way; and I have no hesitation in saying that, so far as any opposition directly in front was concerned, though that was terrible enough, the enemy's strongly-fortified position would have been forced. But the fire, particularly on the left flank of the column, which at first was only *en scharpe*, became, as the column advanced, enfilading, and finally took the first line of the column partially in reverse. It was from this fire that the supporting and reversing division should have protected the assaulting column, but it failed to do so. Under such a fire no troops could maintain the vantage-ground which had been gained, and the leading brigade, which had driven everything in its front, was compelled to fall back a short distance to screen its flanks (which were crumbling away under the severe fire), by the irregularities of the ground. (It is proper to observe here that the brigade of the Twenty-third corps which was ordered to take post so as to cover the right flank of the assaulting column, by some mistake failed to get into a position to accomplish this purpose.)

From the position taken by Hazen's brigade when it retired a short distance from the enemy's works, it kept up a deadly fire, which was evidently very galling to the foe. The brigade was engaged about fifty minutes. It had expended the sixty rounds of ammunition taken into action on the men's persons; it had suffered terribly in killed and wounded, and the men were much exhausted by the furiousness of the assault. Consequently, I ordered this brigade to be relieved by the First brigade, Colonel William H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, commanding. So soon as the First brigade had relieved the Second brigade, I ordered Colonel Gibson to renew the attack. I hoped that, with the shorter distance the brigade would have to move after beginning the assault to reach the enemy's works, and with the assistance of the knowledge of the ground which had been gained, a second effort might

be more successful than the first had been. I also trusted some cover had been provided to protect the left flank of the column. This had been partially, but by no means effectually done. At the signal to advance, the First brigade dashed handsomely and gallantly forward up to the enemy's works. Men were shot down at the very base of the parapet. But again the terrible fire on the flanks, and especially the enfilading fire from the left, was fatal to success. In addition, the enemy had brought up fresh troops, and greatly strengthened the force behind his intrenchments. This fact had been observed plainly by our troops, and was subsequently fully corroborated by prisoners.

The First brigade, after getting so near to the enemy's works, and after almost succeeding, was compelled, like the Second brigade, to fall back a short distance, some seventy to eighty yards, to seek shelter under cover of the inequalities of the surface. Thence it maintained a sturdy contest with the enemy, confining him to his works, till its ammunition was expended. (I must observe that, owing to the circuitous route through the woods, with no road, pursued by the division, it was impossible to take any ammunition wagons with the command. After the point of attack had been selected, a road was opened and the ammunition brought up; but it did not come up until after nightfall.)

The First brigade had suffered very severely in the assault. This fact, in connection with the expenditure of its ammunition, induced me to order this brigade to be relieved by the Third brigade, Colonel Knefler, Seventy-ninth Indiana, commanding. Colonel Knefler was simply ordered to relieve the First brigade and hold the ground, without renewing the assault.

The purpose of holding the ground was to cover bringing off the dead and wounded.

Colonel Knefler's brigade at once engaged the enemy sharply, and confined him to his works.

Meanwhile, every effort was being made to bring off the dead and wounded. This was a work of much difficulty. The ground was unfavorable for the use of the stretchers, darkness was coming on apace, and the whole had to be done under the fire of the enemy.

Of course, under such circumstances the work could not be done with that completeness so desirable; and the subsequent evacuation of the enemy showed, from the numerous extensive places of sepulture outside of his lines, that many who were at first reported "missing" were killed in the terrific assaults.

It is proper to remark that when the Second brigade was relieved by the First brigade, a portion of the troops of the former retained their position near the enemy's works. So, also, when the First brigade was relieved by the Third brigade, a portion of the former held on near to the enemy's works. These gallant officers and soldiers remained on the field, bravely keeping up the conflict, till the Third brigade was drawn off at ten o'clock p. m. About ten o'clock p. m., the enemy, rushing over his works,

pressed forward rapidly, with demoniac yells and shouts, on Colonel Knefler's brigade.

In the long conflict which the brigade had kept up it had expended its ammunition to within the last two or three rounds.

Reserving its fire till the advancing foe was only some fifteen paces distant, the brigade poured in a terrible and destructive volley, and was then handsomely and skilfully withdrawn, with the portions of the other brigades that had remained on the field, by its gallant and most sensible commander,

The enemy was brought to a dead halt by the last volley. Not the slightest pursuit was attempted. Thus ended this bloody conflict. It was opened precisely at 4:30 o'clock p. m., and raged in the height of its fury till seven p. m. From this hour till ten p. m., the conflict was still kept up, but not with the unabated fury and severity of the first two hours and a half of its duration. Fourteen hundred and fifty-seven officers and men were placed *hors de combat* in the action.

It may be truly said of it that it was the best sustained, and altogether the fiercest and most vigorous assault that was made on the enemy's intrenched positions during the entire campaign. The attack was made under circumstances well calculated to test the courage and prove the manhood of the troops. They had made a long and fatiguing march of several hours' duration on that day, immediately preceding the assault. The assault was made without any assistance or cover whatever from our artillery, as not a single piece could be carried with us, on a strongly-intrenched position, held by veteran troops, and defended by a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Yet, at the command, the troops, under all these adverse circumstances, moved to the assault with a cheerful manliness and steadiness; no wavering on the advance, but all moved with a gallantry and dash that nearly made the effort a complete success.

After the troops had all been drawn off, and between ten o'clock in the evening and two o'clock of the following morning, the entire division was comfortably encamped, and by daylight securely intrenched. This precaution was the more necessary to protect the division against a sudden attack of overwhelming numbers, as it was in some measure isolated from the greater part of the army. The division remained in this position from the twenty-eighth of May to the sixth of June, varying it slightly by changes in the lines.

Constant skirmishing was kept up the whole time. On the thirty-first of May the rebel division of General Loring made a decided movement against the front of my division; but it was readily repulsed by the intrenched skirmish line. From prisoners subsequently captured it was learned that the rebel division had suffered severely in this demonstration.

Saturday night, the fourth of June, the enemy abandoned his position in the vicinity of New Hope Church, and moved eastward. This was

the fifth strongly-intrenched position evacuated. Monday, June sixth, my division, with the rest of the corps, moved eastward to the neighborhood of Mount Morris Church. June seventh, eighth and ninth, the division remained in camp. June tenth, the division moved with the corps southward, and took position in front of Pine-Top Knob. June eleventh, twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth, remained in this position, constantly skirmishing, with a few casualties daily. Tuesday night, June fourteenth, the enemy evacuated Pine-Top Knob, returning to his intrenched lines half a mile south of it. Wednesday, June fifteenth, the Second division of the corps was ordered to assault the enemy's works, and my division was ordered to support it. However, the assault was not made, and the corps remained in the position of Wednesday afternoon throughout Thursday, June sixteenth, carrying on the usual skirmishing with the enemy. Thursday night the enemy evacuated his lines, crossed Muddy creek, and swung back toward Kenesaw Mountain. Thus was he forced from his sixth strongly-intrenched position. Early on Friday morning the Fourth corps followed up the enemy, my division leading. The day was spent in driving the enemy's skirmishers and outposts across Muddy creek. Saturday, June eighteenth, was spent in heavy skirmishing. Saturday night the enemy evacuated his seventh intrenched position, and retired to his works around Kenesaw Mountain. Sunday morning the pursuit was renewed, and the enemy pressed in on his works. Here the division remained from Sunday, June nineteenth, to Sunday, July third. Sharp skirmishing was kept up during the whole of this time, and the period was also enlivened with some brilliant affairs and other more serious operations. Some of these affairs are worthy of special mention. Late Monday afternoon, June twentieth, a portion of the First brigade, First division, lost an important position which it had gained earlier in the day. At noon on the following day the corps commander arranged an attack, embracing a part of the First brigade (the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio), of my division, and a part of the First brigade of the First division. The Fifteenth Ohio dashed gallantly forward, carried the hill which had been lost, and intrenched itself on it under a heavy fire of the enemy; while the Forty-ninth Ohio, moving further to the right, carried and intrenched another position of importance still further in advance. This brilliant success cost the regiments quite heavily; but it was useful in enabling us to swing up our lines to the right, and circumscribing the enemy to a narrower limit of action.

The remainder of the week was passed in pressing the enemy's outposts on his main lines; affairs which, estimated by their casualties, rose to the dignity of battles.

On the twenty-seventh of June, the Second division of the Fourth corps was ordered to assault the enemy's intrenchments, and two

brigades of my division were ordered to be in readiness to support the assaulting column, and follow up any success that might be gained. Unfortunately the attack was not successful, and as a consequence no part of my division was engaged. Constant skirmishing wore away the second week in front of Kenesaw Mountain, and brought us to Saturday night, July second. On that night the enemy evacuated his position around Kenesaw Mountain, being the eighth strong line of works abandoned, and retreated south of Marietta. Sunday morning, July third, saw a renewal of the pursuit. Passing through Marietta, the enemy was found again strongly intrenched some five miles south of the town. July fourth was passed in the usual skirmishing with the enemy, and in driving his pickets with our skirmishers. During the night of the fourth, the enemy abandoned his ninth line of works, and retreated toward the Chattahoochee river. Pursuit was made early in the morning of the fifth, my division leading the Fourth corps, and such was the vigor of the pursuit on the road we followed, that the portion of the enemy retreating by this road was driven across the river, and so closely followed that he was unable to take up or destroy his pontoon-bridge. He had cut it loose from its moorings on the north side, but was unable to cut it loose on the southern side. Being under the guns of our skirmishers, the enemy was not able subsequently to get possession of the bridge.

Although the enemy had been driven across the river in front of the Fourth corps on the fifth of July, he remained strongly intrenched lower down the river, on the north side, in front of other portions of our troops, till Saturday night, July ninth. Yielding that night his tenth intrenched position, the remainder of his force passed to the south side of the river.

Tuesday, July twelfth, my division crossed the river at Pace's Ferry. Having reached the south side of the river, it remained quietly in camp, enjoying much-needed rest, till Sunday, July seventeenth. On that day it performed a critical and dangerous movement, in marching down the river three miles from its supports (with a heavy force of the enemy within two and a half miles of it, having good roads to travel on), to cover the laying down of a bridge and the passage of the Fourteenth corps. Happily the whole operation was a success. Late in the afternoon the division returned to its camp, three miles up the river.

Monday, July eighteenth, the advance was resumed, and my division encamped for the night with the corps at Buckhead. Tuesday, July nineteenth, I was ordered to make a reconnaissance with two brigades of my division to Peach-tree creek. Taking the First and Third brigades, I pushed rapidly to the creek, driving in the light parties of the enemy. The opposition was inconsiderable, and on approaching the stream it was found the enemy had previously burned the bridge, which must have been a considerable structure. The enemy was

found intrenched on the opposite bank of the creek.

About noon I received an order to force a passage of the stream and secure a lodgement on the southern side. I detailed the Third brigade, Colonel Knefler, for this service. The average width of the creek is about thirty yards, and the average depth about five feet. The crossing was effected in the following manner: One hundred picked men, fifty from the Ninth Kentucky and fifty from the Seventy-ninth Indiana, were selected to go over first and deploy rapidly as skirmishers, to drive back the enemy's skirmishers, seen to be deployed on the opposite bank. The brigade was moved down the stream some distance to a point below the enemy's intrenchments on the opposite bank. At this point a ravine leads down to the creek in such a way as to hide troops moving down it from the view of the opposite shore.

The pioneers of the brigade were each armed with a spade about thirty feet long, to be used as sleepers for the construction of the bridge, and the one hundred picked men each took a rail. Thus provided, these parties moved quietly down the ravine to the water's edge, and quickly threw the bridge over. The one hundred men passed rapidly over, deployed, and drove back the enemy's skirmishers. The brigade followed quickly, deployed, moved to the left, flanked the enemy's intrenchments, forced him out and captured some prisoners. As soon as the Third brigade had got across, the First brigade, higher up the stream, threw over a bridge, crossed, and joined the Third brigade. The two brigades immediately intrenched themselves strongly, and the lodgement was secured. The enemy resisted the crossing with artillery as well as musketry, but our artillery was so disposed as to dominate the enemy's. Owing to the manner in which the stream was crossed, as well as the rapidity with which the whole was accomplished, the casualties were small. Considering that half of the rebel army might have been precipitated on the troops which effected the crossing, and that the passage was made in the presence of a considerable force, it may be truly asserted that no handsomer nor more artistic operation was made during the campaign.

The Second brigade, General Hazen's, was ordered up from Buckhead during the afternoon, and as soon as the lodgement was made on the south bank, the brigade was put to work to construct a permanent bridge. The work was nearly finished by nightfall, and the remainder, by order of Major-General Howard, was turned over to General Newton's division for completion. Leaving General Hazen's brigade to hold for the night the intrenchments constructed by the First and Third brigades, on the south side of Peach-tree creek, I returned to the camp at Buckhead with these two brigades, to get their camp equipage, which had

been left there when they moved out in the morning to make the reconnoissance.

Monday, July twentieth, my division was ordered to follow the First division by a road crossing the branches of Peach-tree creek above the junction which forms the principal stream. During the day the brigades were deployed, two on the northern side of the main stream, and the Third brigade on the southern side, for the purpose of closing up the gaps, in our general line. Tuesday, July twenty-first, was passed in constructing intrenchments, and in forcing the enemy back into his line of works intermediate between Peach-tree creek and Atlanta.

The day was marked by some very sharp skirmishing, which fell particularly heavy on the Third brigade.

Thursday night the enemy abandoned his eleventh line of intrenchments, and retired within his defensive works around Atlanta. Early Friday morning my division was pressing closely on the heels of the retiring enemy. Pressing closely up to the enemy's main line of works, my division took a strong position in the forenoon of July twenty-second, and intrenched it securely. This position, varied slightly by changes growing out of pressing the enemy more thoroughly into his defensive works, was maintained till the night of the twenty-fifth of August. During the whole period sharp skirmishing was kept up on the picket line, and throughout the whole time the division was exposed to a constant fire of shot, shell, and musketry, which bore its fruit in numerous casualties.

During the period, also, many important demonstrations were made by the division, with the double purpose of determining the strength and position of the enemy's works and of making a diversion in favor of the movement of the troops. In some of these demonstrations the casualties, for the number of troops engaged, were quite severe. Several of them were graced with brilliant captures of the enemy's picket intrenchments.

On the twenty-seventh of July, Major-General Howard relinquished command of the Fourth corps to assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, rendered vacant by the death of the lamented McPherson. Replete with professional knowledge, patriotic zeal, and soldierly ambition, General Howard's administration of the Fourth corps was a happy combination of energy, zeal, and prudence, of enterprise and sound military views. He came among us personally a stranger, known to us only by his professional reputation. He left us regretted by all, respected as a commander, esteemed as a friend and loved as a comrade in arms.

The casualties in my division during that part of the campaign in which General Howard commanded the Fourth corps, amounted to twenty-six hundred and three officers and men.

Brigadier-General Hazen was transferred on the seventeenth August to the Army of the Tennessee. By this transfer I lost the services

and assistance of a most excellent brigade commander.

Though General Hazen no longer belongs to my command, I deem it my duty, as it certainly is a pleasure, to bear testimony to the intelligent, efficient and zealous manner in which he performed his duties while in my division.

During the late campaign his brigade was always ably handled, and rendered valuable service. In the battle of the twenty-seventh of May, leading the assault, it particularly distinguished itself.

At nine o'clock P. M., on Thursday the twenty-fifth of August, my division with the other divisions of the corps, withdrew from its lines in front of Atlanta, to participate in the bold, but dangerous flank movement which terminated, most brilliantly, in compelling the enemy to evacuate Atlanta.

Silently and quietly the troops drew out from the immediate presence of the enemy undiscovered. No suspicion of our designs or the nature of our movements seemed to have reached him.

The movement was continued nearly all night, when the troops were allowed to wait till daylight and to get their breakfast. About seven A. M., Friday, the twenty-sixth, our pickets reported some movement among the enemy, which was supposed might indicate an intention to attack—but it resulted in nothing important.

At eight o'clock A. M., our movement was continued and kept up through the day. Saturday, the twenty-seventh, the movement was resumed, and the troops moved steadily around the enemy's left toward his rear. Sunday, the twenty-eighth, the West Point railroad was reached. Monday, the twenty-ninth, my division was engaged in destroying the West Point road. Tuesday the thirtieth, the movement was resumed to reach the Macon railway.

It was considered certain that the destruction of this last line of his rail communication must inevitably compel the enemy to evacuate Atlanta. Wednesday, the thirty-first, my division leading the Fourth corps, and in conjunction with a division of the Twenty-third corps, made a strong lodgement on the Macon railroad. Early Thursday morning, September first, the work of destroying the road was commenced, but it was soon discontinued, so far as my division was concerned, by an order to move by the Griffin road in the direction of Jonesboro'. It was understood that two corps, Hardee's and Lee's, of the rebel army were concentrated there. My division being in reserve for the day, and in charge of the trains of the corps, did not reach Jonesboro' till nearly nightfall, and of course, had no opportunity to take part in the engagement which occurred there late in the afternoon. Arriving near the field a little before nightfall, I was ordered to mass my division in rear of the First and Second divisions of the corps, which were deployed in order of battle, and just then becoming slightly engaged.

During the night, orders were received to be

prepared to attack the enemy at daylight the following morning; but when the morning came, it was found the enemy had retreated.

Sept. 2.—The pursuit was continued. The enemy was again intrenched across the railway, about two miles north of Lovejoy's station. I was ordered to deploy my division into order of battle, and to advance, with a view of attacking the enemy's position. The deployment was made as quickly as possible, and at the order the division moved forward. The ground over which the advance was made was the most unfavorable that can be conceived. Abrupt ascents, deep ravines, treacherous morasses, and the densest jungle were encountered in the advance. Having arrived near the enemy's works, and while the troops were halted to readjust the lines, I became satisfied that the most favorable point for attack in front of my division was in front of my left, or third brigade. I hence ordered the brigade commander to prepare to attack.

Thinking we had arrived at or near the right flank of the enemy's line, I went toward the left, to concert with the two brigade commanders next on my left for a simultaneous attack. To reach them, I had to pass over an open space which was swept by a sharp fire of musketry from the enemy's works.

I crossed this space safely in going over, saw the two brigade commanders, and made the necessary arrangements. As I was returning across the dangerous space, I was struck down by a rifle-shot. I immediately despatched a staff-officer to the brigade commander, to direct him to proceed with the attack. This was gallantly made under a sharp fire of musketry, grape, and canister, and the first position of the enemy carried, and about twenty prisoners captured; but the failure of the troops on the left to come up, whereby the brigade was exposed to a flank, as well as a direct fire, rendered a further advance impossible, though the effort to do so was made. The front line of the brigade intrenched itself in advance of the captured line of the enemy's works, and held this position till the final withdrawal of the army. The brigade suffered quite severely in the assault, especially in the loss of some valuable officers. Captain Miller, Assistant Adjutant-General of the brigade, was killed instantly. He was a most gallant, intelligent, and useful officer. His untimely death is mourned by all who had the pleasure of his acquaintance. Colonel Mander-son, Nineteenth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey, Ninth Kentucky, Captain Colclaiser, Seventy-ninth Indiana, and other valuable officers, were wounded in the assault.

I remained on the field till I had seen my division securely posted, and finally reached my headquarters about eight P. M. The following morning the Commanding General of the Grand Military Division of the Mississippi announced the long campaign terminated.

But my division maintained its position in close proximity to the enemy, daily losing some

men in the picket encounters, till Monday night, the fifth, when it was quietly and successfully withdrawn. By easy stages, unembarrassed by the enemy, the division continued its march to this city, reaching here on the eighth instant. And here the division rests after the termination of the labors of the campaign.

If the length of the campaign, commencing on the third of May, and terminating on the second of September, with its ceaseless toil and labor, be considered; if the number and extent of its actual battles and separate conflicts, and the great number of days the troops were in the immediate presence of, and under a close fire from the enemy be remembered; if the vast amount of labor expended in the construction of intrenchments and other necessary works be estimated; the bold, brilliant, and successful flank movements, made in close proximity to a powerful enemy, be critically examined; and if the long line of communication over which the vast and abundant supplies of every kind for the use of this great army were uninterruptedly transported during the entire campaign be regarded, it must be admitted that the late campaign stands without a parallel in military history. The campaign was long and laborious, replete with dangerous service, but it was brilliant and successful. No adequate conception can be formed of the vast extent of labor performed by the troops, except by having participated in it. Whether by day or by night, this labor was cheerfully performed, and it affords me high satisfaction to bear official testimony to the universal good conduct of the officers and men of the division.

For the numerous instances of the good conduct of the officers and men deserving special commendation, I must refer to the reports of brigade and regimental commanders. To the various brigade commanders who have served in the division during the campaign my thanks are specially due for zealous and intelligent performance of duty, and hearty co-operation throughout. I have already noted that Brigadier-General Willich, commanding First brigade, was seriously wounded at Resaca. The command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Wm. H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, who performed the duties with zeal and ability till the expiration of his term of service, on the twenty-fourth of August. Colonel Hotchkiss, Eighty-ninth Illinois, succeeded Colonel Gibson in command of the brigade, and performed the duties well to the termination of the campaign.

Colonel P. Sidney Post succeeded Brigadier-General Hazen in the command of the Second brigade on the seventeenth of August, and thence to the end of the campaign performed all the duties of the position most zealously, intelligently, usefully, and gallantly. Since my injury Colonel Post has attended to all the field duties of the division commander, and performed them well.

Early in the campaign, Brigadier-General Beatty, commanding Third brigade, was disabled

by sickness from exercising command of his brigade, and it devolved on Colonel Knefler, Seventy-ninth Indiana, and well and ably has he performed all the duties of the position. Cheerful and prompt when labor was to be performed; ready with expedients when the necessities of the service demanded them; gallant and sensible on the field of conflict, he has so borne himself throughout the campaign as to command my highest approbation.

It is due to the members of my staff that I should commend their good conduct, and confide them to the kindly consideration of my seniors in rank. To them by name I return my sincere thanks: Captain M. P. Bestow A. A. G.; First Lieutenant Geo. Shaffer Ninety-third Ohio Volunteers, Aid-de-camp; Major A. R. Y. Dawson, Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, Chief of Out-posts and Pickets; Captain I. R. Bartlett, Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, Inspector-General; Captain C. K. Taft, Fifteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Provost Marshal; Second Lieutenant H. H. Townsend, Ninth Kentucky Volunteers, Topographical Engineer; Captain L. D. Myers, Assistant Quartermaster; Captain H. C. Hagdon, Commissary of Subsistence, and First Lieutenant P. Haldeman, Third Kentucky Volunteers, Ordnance Officer, all performed their duties well.

Captain Cullen Bradley, Sixth Ohio battery, was Chief of Artillery until the consolidation of the Artillery into a corps organization. For the intelligent manner in which he performed his duties, I offer to him my thanks.

Would that I could include in the foregoing list of my staff, the name of one other, who commenced the campaign with us, but whom the inscrutable ways of Divine Providence early called away: the name of Major James B. Hampson, One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers.

Preparatory to the attack which was to be made on the twenty-seventh of May, it had been ordered that all the guns should be placed in position during the night of the twenty-sixth, and to open on the enemy's works early the next morning. One of my batteries was slow in opening, and I ordered Major Hampson to go to the battery, to hasten the work of preparation. While so employed the fatal shot of the sharpshooter was sped on its murderous errand, and Major Hampson fell, mortally wounded. He expired at four p. m., of that afternoon, happy in the consciousness of dying in his country's service. Young, ardent, intelligent, graceful, gentle, and gallant, he fell in the early bloom of his manhood—a victim to an atrocious rebellion, a martyr to his devotion to his country.

During the campaign my division, in the various conflicts, captured sixteen commissioned officers and six hundred and sixty-six men, for whom receipts were obtained. Two million four hundred and twenty-eight thousand rounds of small-arms ammunition were expended during the campaign. Taking the mere strength of the division during the campaign, this number would give an average of four hundred and

twenty-one rounds per man. A report of casualties amounting to twenty-seven hundred and ninety-two officers and men killed, wounded and missing, is herewith appended.

Including so long a period of active operations, which were spread over so broad a field, this report is necessarily quite protracted; but it could not be compressed into narrower limits without doing injustice to the division whose services it is designed to commemorate. The reports of brigade and regimental commanders are herewith transmitted.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

Signed THOMAS J. WOOD,
Brigadier-General Volunteers, commanding.

GENERAL HAZEN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
EAST POINT GA., Sept. 10, 1864. }

Lieutenant-Colonel R. R. Townes, A. A. G., Fifteenth Army Corps:

This division was commanded from the beginning of the campaign to the fifth day of August by General Morgan L. Smith, from that date to the day I took command by General J. A. J. Lightburn. For that period I have caused the Adjutant-General of the division who has been on duty with it all of that time, to make a report of the operations of the division, which, upon comparison with the reports of brigades and regiments, I find to be substantially correct.

I found the division August seventeenth, in the trenches in front of Atlanta, composed of two brigades, the First, commanded by Colonel Theodore Jones, Thirtieth Ohio volunteers, with nine hundred and seventy-seven effective aggregate for duty. The Second, commanded by Colonel Wells S. Jones, Fifty-third Ohio volunteers, with one thousand one hundred and seventy-three effective aggregate for duty, with two batteries of light artillery—Company H, First regiment Illinois light artillery, with three twenty-pounder Parrotts, commanded by Captain F. DeGrass, and company A, of the same regiment, with four twelve-pound light field-guns, effective aggregate of both for duty being one hundred and forty-one, making the entire strength of the division two thousand two hundred and ninety-one.

The division remained in the position I found it, about six hundred yards from the enemy, till August twenty-sixth, when at eight p. m. it moved with the corps in the direction of Fairburn, reaching the West Point and Atlanta railroad without opposition, at a point about thirteen miles from Atlanta, at twelve m., August twenty-eighth.

On the morning of the twenty-ninth, a squad of one officer and nine enlisted men of a Texas cavalry regiment was captured and brought in by Captain George M. Crane, Eighth Missouri detachment. The division, leading the corps, took up the march at seven a. m., the thirtieth, in the direction of Jonesboro', distant thirteen miles.

After moving about five miles, we came upon a portion of Kilpatrick's cavalry that had been checked by two brigades of the cavalry of the enemy. Forming two regiments as a support to the skirmishers already made strong, they all advanced in conjunction with some troops of the Sixteenth corps on the right, the enemy giving way. As often as the enemy found time during the day, he endeavored, by making temporary barricades, and by the use of artillery, to check our column; but the march was kept up with but little delay the entire day, crossing Flint river, driving him from the other side, repairing the bridge and pushing to within one fourth mile of the town before dark. At this time we captured an infantry soldier from the enemy, who informed us that two divisions of Hardee's corps were before us, and that our lines were not over two hundred yards apart. This was also made probable by the musketry fire. The troops were here formed in line, the right resting on the Fairburn and Jonesboro' road, and extending north, and a good barricade made along their front. Early on the morning of the thirty-first, Colonel Theodore Jones, commanding First brigade on the left, was directed to seize and fortify a commanding eminence about one half mile to the front of his left. He had just gained it, when the enemy came also to occupy it. He held his ground, however, with a portion of his command, while the remainder fortified the position. It was found to be of the greatest importance, as it overlooked the entire front occupied by the enemy. Columns of rebel troops were now seen to be extending to our left, planting artillery and making all dispositions necessary to attack. As he extended beyond my left, and as my troops were formed in a light line, with considerable intervals, a brigade from the Seventeenth corps under Colonel George E. Bryant, Twelfth Wisconsin volunteers, and two regiments under Colonel William B. Woods, Seventy-sixth Ohio volunteers, were sent to me, and posted where most needed, where they afterward performed good service. I now had sixteen regiments in the line and one in reserve. No point of it could be given up without endangering the entire line. At two p. m., the enemy commenced a vigorous fire of artillery all along his line, and was soon after seen advancing his infantry. We had good works, and the attack was met with the most perfect confidence. He came on with two full lines, supported by troops in mass, coming in one place quite inside the works, and persisting in the attack for about three fourths of an hour, when he was completely repulsed at all points, and those who came too near captured.

We lost quite heavily in the trenches before the fight took place, but during the fight we had but eleven killed, fifty-two wounded, and two missing.

Of the enemy we buried over two hundred, captured ninety-nine unhurt, and seventy-nine wounded. We took also two stands of colors, and over a thousand stands of small-arms. I have

reason to believe that over a thousand of the enemy were wounded.

The division remained in this position during the fight of the Fourteenth corps on the first instant, participating in it from behind our works, and on the second moved forward to near Lovejoy's Station, remaining in position there till the night of the fourth, when it moved back to Jonesboro', and on the sixth and seventh to this point.

I learn from the records of the division, that it left Larkinsville, Alabama, in May, with three thousand four hundred and forty-one effective men. It has lost in the campaign:

Officers killed.....	21
Men killed.....	195
Total killed.....	216
Officers wounded.....	63
Men wounded.....	1,166
Total wounded.....	1,229
Officers missing.....	18
Men missing.....	430
Total missing.....	448
Grand total.....	1,893

The division has taken from the enemy six hundred and three prisoners, three stands of colors, two thousand and forty-one stands of small arms.

I have to render my warmest thanks to all the commanders, and their men, for bravery and good conduct. My staff, especially, who were strangers to me, have shown that devotion to duty which merits consideration. Captain Gordon Lofland, A. A. G., and Captain Geo. M. Crane, Eighth Missouri mounted infantry, commanding escort, were wounded while in the discharge of their duty.

To Colonel Theo. Jones, Thirtieth Ohio volunteers, commanding First brigade, I have to call especial attention, for close attention to duty, and a quick, efficient method of performing it. I believe the service would be benefited by his promotion.

Colonel Wells S. Jones, commanding Second brigade, has also shown close attention to duty, and bravery in executing it.

The artillery of this division, under Captain F. De Grass, has performed efficient service.

Brigadier-General J. A. J. Lightburn was wounded on the twenty-fourth of August, while near the lines of his troops, by a stray bullet from the enemy, causing him, for the present, to be absent from the front.

I would respectfully call attention to the marked and distinguished service of this division on the twenty-seventh of June at Kenesaw Mountain, and on the twenty-second and twenty-eighth of July, before Atlanta, with the hope,

in behalf of the brave officers and men who participated in those engagements, that just and proper consideration be given to those who were present and can speak of what they saw.

Enclosed will be seen a sketch of the field of the thirty-first, also the accompanying reports of brigade and regimental commanders.

I must also ask the indulgence of my commanders for calling attention in this report to the subject of attacks of the front of an enemy in position. Since the accurate-shooting rifle has replaced the random-firing musket; since troops now, when in position, protect their persons by shelters against bullets, and since they can no longer be scared from the line, but see safety in maintaining it; and citing as an evidence of the disproportion of advantage in those contests, the battle of the twenty-eighth of July, when the enemy attacked under such circumstances, leaving of his dead in front of this division, three hundred and twenty, while he killed along the same front but twelve, and on the thirty-first of August, when he left over two hundred dead, and killed of us but eleven.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. B. HAZEN,
Brigadier-General.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL GROSE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, FIRST DIVISION,
FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 5, 1864. }

Capt. E. D. Mason, A. A. G., First Division:

SIR: In completion of my duties in connection with the arduous campaign just closed, I have the honor to report the part taken therein by my command, the Fifty-ninth Illinois, Colonel Post, Seventy-fifth Illinois, Colonel Bennett, Eighty-fourth Illinois, Colonel Waters, Eightieth Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Kilgour, Ninth Indiana, Colonel Suman, Thirty-sixth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Cary, Thirtieth Indiana, Captain Dawson, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Captain Lawson, to which was attached battery B, Pennsylvania. Effective force, officers and men, about two thousand nine hundred. By orders from Major-General Stanley, Division Commander, we marched, with the balance of his command, on the third day of May, 1864, from our camp at Blue Springs, near Cleveland, Tennessee, to Red Clay, on the Georgia state line, and camped for the night.

May 4.—Marched with the division to Catoosa Springs, Georgia (with light skirmishing), for concentration with the army, where we rested until May seventh, when we marched with the corps, drove the enemy from, and possessed Tunnel Hill, Georgia. For several succeeding days we advanced upon, and ineffectually endeavored to drive the enemy from Rocky-Face Ridge, in our front. My position was on the left of the rail and wagon roads leading through Buzzard-Roost Gap, on the Dalton road. The

enemy had strongly fortified this pass and the high ridge on either side. I had some previous knowledge of the position, and knew that it was impregnable to our assaults, but in obedience to orders, we frequently made the attempt with a heavy skirmish line, at which my loss was about forty men. Finally, a portion of our army having passed the ridge further south, on the morning of the thirteenth of May, it was found that the enemy had retired from our front, when I was ordered and moved in pursuit on the Dalton road, but soon came up with the rear guard of the enemy, and skirmishing commenced. We drove to and through Dalton; my forces (Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana), the first to enter the place so long a stronghold of the enemy. We continued the pursuit, and at about twelve m., three miles south of Dalton, on the Resaca road, we came upon the enemy, in line upon a high, wooded hill; as we approached he opened upon us with a battery of artillery. Our artillery was placed in position, and a heavy duel commenced across a large open farm, with a low valley between. The Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana, supported on the right by the Eighty-fourth Illinois, were ordered into line, and advanced across the valley "double-quick," under a heavy fire, ascended the wooded hill, drove the enemy from his barricades, and carried the place with very light loss. This was the last of our fighting for the day. We advanced a few miles to the right, entered Sugar Valley, and camped (with the corps in line), for the night.

May 14.—Early this morning, our corps moved toward the enemy's position at Resaca, on the right bank of the Oostanaula river, Georgia. At about twelve m., we came upon the enemy in position, about three miles from the river. The face of the country is rough and hilly, interspersed with small farms, but mostly heavy woodland, with thick underbrush. I was directed and put my command in position in double lines on the left of General Hazen's brigade of General Wood's division. The Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Eightieth Illinois, Seventy-fifth Illinois, Thirtieth Indiana in the front line. The ground was too rough for the artillery to move with us. About one o'clock, General Wood informed me he was ready to advance, and I had received orders to advance in connection with his division. The other two brigades of our division were to have been in line on my left, but did not come up, and the lines advanced about two o'clock, my brigade on the extreme left of the advancing lines. We drove the enemy from the woodland, in which we formed, across a farm in my front, through another woodland, then over another small valley farm, and over a high, wooded hill beyond, upon which we were ordered to halt—a farm in a valley to our front, and the enemy fortified on the wooded hills beyond. Here I caused barricades to be constructed in front of my front line; late in the afternoon the other two brigades of our division came up, and took

position on my left. The enemy, near night, advanced upon them, and drove them back. When I discovered them giving way, I immediately formed a line from my rear regiments, facing to my left, perpendicular to the rear, to protect the left flank of the main line. This new formation was made by the Fifty-ninth Illinois, one wing of the Eighty-fourth and Thirty-sixth Indiana. It was formed and ready for action, with skirmishers out, in less than ten minutes. Our batteries in the meantime, had been brought up and put in position, under the command and personal supervision of the gallant, brave, and lamented Captain Simonson, of the Fifth Indiana battery, on the left of this flank line, but the enemy moved rapidly forward toward and to the left of the batteries, with, as he thought, no doubt, a sure prize before him. But the ever-ready Major-General Joe Hooker was advancing with his corps at this point, and met the advancing enemy, engaged and drove him back with severe punishment. My front line was engaged at long range with the enemy while the fight with Hooker was going on. Night soon threw her mantle over the bloody scene, and all was quiet except continued skirmishing. In this day's battle, some of our bravest and best officers and men were among the fallen. My Acting Assistant Inspector-General, Captain Davis, of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, a brave, good soldier fell here.

May 15.—Major-General Hooker's corps advanced on my left, my left swinging around to assist; and a severe engagement ensued, in which we gained signal advantages, capturing prisoners and artillery, and the enemy had to retreat during the night, leaving most of his dead and wounded in our possession.

May 16.—We pursued the retreating enemy across the Oostanaula at Resaca, and advanced to near Calhoun, and camped for the night.

May 17.—Advanced, encountering the enemy's rear, with heavy skirmishing, to near Adairsville, Ga., and lay for the night. My command not engaged to-day.

May 18.—Passed Adairsville, the enemy retreating with light skirmishing, and camped for the night on the Kingston road.

May 19.—Moved on to Kingston, found the enemy in position; attacked and drove him; most of the Fourth corps engaged; my command captured enemy's hospitals, with property, &c., &c. Continued to drive the enemy, with heavy skirmishing and artillery firing on both sides, so at nightfall the enemy was driven into his prepared trenches on a high ridge to the south-east of Cassville. At this point we made a junction with the Twentieth Army Corps, Major-General Hooker, and during the night the enemy again retreated, crossing the Etowah river, seven miles distant, burning the bridges behind him. Our loss not heavy.

We rested in camp at Cassville until May twenty-third, when we marched, crossed the Etowah river to the right of the Atlanta road, and camped at Euharley.

May 24.—Marched to Burnt Hickory.

May 25.—Advanced toward Dallas, crossed Pumpkin-vine creek, rested in reserve in rear of Major-General Hooker's corps, while he had heavy fighting in front, late in the evening.

May 26.—Moved into position on left of Twentieth corps, pressed close upon the enemy's lines and fortified, four miles north of Dallas.

May 27.—Changed position to the left, relieving General Wood's troops. Close skirmishing all day.

May 28.—Advanced, drove in the enemy's outposts, and fortified.

May 29.—Advanced the battery to front line. Heavy skirmishing. During the night the enemy attacked, and was repulsed with severe loss.

We continued the varied scenes, some changes in position, with heavy skirmishing, until the night of the fourth of June, when the enemy withdrew from our front.

June 6.—Marched with the corps east ten miles, to within two and a half miles of Ackworth, on railroad, where we remained with comparative quiet until June tenth, when we moved three miles south-east, and found the enemy in strong position on Pine Mountain, in my front. Skirmishing commenced and continued until the night of the thirteenth of June, when the enemy retired, and my brigade advanced upon the mountain early on the morning of June fourteenth. On this mountain is where Bishop Polk, General of the rebel army, fell, by a shot from the Fifth Indiana battery, under Captain Simonson. The battery was in position at the front and right of my lines. We pursued the enemy two miles to his new position, and found him strongly fortified.

June 16.—Advanced my lines of trenches with hard skirmishing. On this day we had the sad misfortune to lose the brave and gallant officer, Captain Simonson, our Chief of Artillery.

June 17.—The enemy again withdrew—we pursued—Wood's division in front—with heavy skirmishing.

June 19.—The enemy retired during the night; we pursued, my brigade in advance. At two miles we came upon the enemy, upon the east side of a large farm; my lines were formed for an attack. The Ninth and Thirty-sixth Indiana, Eightieth and Eighty-fourth Illinois, in the front line, advanced and drove the enemy from their position, and into their fortifications upon Kenesaw Mountain and the adjacent hills. My loss was severe, particularly in officers; Lieutenant Bowman, Thirty-sixth Indiana, fell mortally wounded, bravely leading his men in the advance.

June 20.—Contest continued, the enemy trying to hold, and we to drive him from, a swamp between our main trenches, in which we succeeded, but were compelled to abandon a portion of the ground because of a destructive fire from the enemy's artillery, bearing thereon from their main works. Upon the evening of this day, the Ninth Indiana, afterward relieved by the Fifty-ninth Illinois, were moved across the creek

to the right, to assist the Second brigade (General Whitaker). I have learned by the newspapers that the enemy made seven unsuccessful assaults on the lines of this brigade at this point. I will have to refer to the reports of Colonel Sumner, Ninth Indiana, and Colonel Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois, for the facts in the premises, as they participated in whatever fighting took place. In these two days the losses in my command were very heavy.

June 21.—On this day I was ordered to send my rear regiments to the right of the division, to support the First brigade in an attack and critical position, and accordingly moved with the Eighty-fourth and Eightieth Illinois, Thirtieth Indiana, and Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, to the position indicated, and placed them in reserve.

June 22.—Moved with whole brigade during afternoon and night two miles to the right, to support and relieve a part of the Twentieth corps. Took position in close proximity to the enemy and fortified.

June 23.—Was ordered and made an attack on the enemy's line, which was unsuccessful, and with fearful loss upon our skirmish lines, heavily formed. Lieutenant Hendricks, Thirty-sixth Indiana, an accomplished young officer, fell dead in this attack pierced by a Minié ball.

June 24, 25, and 26.—Heavy firing at the intrenched position of the enemy, four hundred yards distant.

June 27.—Heavy assault made upon the enemy's lines at various points; my command was in one line, all in the trenches, and was not to advance, yet suffered considerable loss. The assault failed, with heavy loss to our arms. Heavy skirmishing and artillery firing kept up on both sides until the night of the second of July, when the enemy retreated under cover of the night, and lost their hold and position on Kenesaw Mountain, and vacated Marietta.

July 3.—Pursued the enemy early; my brigade in advance. Fifty-ninth Illinois first to enter Marietta. Found the enemy in the evening, five miles from Marietta, on Atlanta road, strongly intrenched.

July 4.—Celebrated the national anniversary by a charge over a large corn-farm, carried the enemy's outer works, taking many prisoners, with a loss of eighty-nine killed and wounded in my brigade. Held the position until night, under the cover of which the enemy withdrew four miles to the Chattahoochee river. Captain Hale, brigade officer of the day, of the Seventy-fifth Illinois, one of the best officers in the army, fell here.

July 5.—Pursued the enemy, Wood's division in front, to the river. Continued skirmishing until July tenth.

July 10.—Marched five miles up the river.

July 12.—Crossed the Chattahoochee, marched down the left bank, and encamped at Powers' Ferry, in front of Twenty-third corps, with our corps; Thirty-sixth Indiana commenced and

built, while here, a trestle bridge over the river, which was completed on the sixteenth of July.

July 18.—Moved from Powers' Ferry, with corps, to near Buckhead, south seven miles.

July 19.—Advanced across Peach-tree creek, Seventy-fifth Illinois in advance; skirmished and drove the enemy from destroyed bridge, and rebuilt the same.

July 20.—Moved with division, Second brigade in front; crossed South Peach-tree creek; came upon the fortified position of the enemy, went into line on the right of the Second brigade, attacked the rifle-pits of the rebels, and carried the same, taking forty-three prisoners.

July 21.—Advanced my lines and fortified; skirmished all day. At night the enemy retired.

July 22.—Pursued the enemy at three o'clock A. M.; came up to him in his fortifications at sunrise, in front of Atlanta, Georgia, on the north, two miles from the centre of the city. Took position; the balance of the division came up on the left, Wood's division on the right. Here we intrenched; skirmished with the enemy daily; took up his picket lines twice, capturing most of them, until the twenty-seventh of July. Major-General Stanley being assigned to command the corps, I came in and assumed command of the division.

August 5.—Relieved from command of division, and assigned as Brigadier to the command of the brigade again. On this day, by orders from corps headquarters, the brigade attempted an assault on the enemy's works, and lost thirty-six men, among whom were the brave Captain Walker, of the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, and the gallant young officer, Lieutenant Willard, of the Thirty-sixth Indiana.

August 22.—Marched at three o'clock, with six regiments, two miles to the left; struck the enemy's out picket line, drove them, captured eight prisoners, made demonstration, and returned, with small loss. On the fifteenth of August, the Eighty-fourth Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Neff, was transposed into my brigade, and the Fifty-ninth Illinois into the Second brigade. With frequent skirmishing and changes of lines and positions of regiments, this brigade substantially remained at the same position in the siege of Atlanta, from the morning of the twenty-second of July until the night of the twenty-fifth of August, when we received orders and marched to the right, seven miles, to Procter's creek, and rested until daylight on the morning of August twenty-sixth, when, starting at eight o'clock A. M., we moved with the corps seven miles south, across Utoy creek, and camped for the night.

August 27.—Marched, with corps, four miles south, to Camp creek, and camped.

August 28.—Marched south-east three miles, to Red Oak station on West Point railroad, striking this road twelve miles south-west from Atlanta.

August 29.—Lay still and fortified.

August 30.—Marched to Shoal creek, five miles.

August 31.—The Army of the Tennessee fighting to day in front and on west of Jonesboro', Georgia; our corps advanced east; met cavalry behind works on east bank of Flint river. My brigade was formed, Ninth Indiana, Eighty-fourth Illinois, and Eighty-fourth Indiana in front line, and with a strong skirmish line drove the enemy from their position, and advanced, Wood's division in front, Twenty-third corps on our left, and both corps struck the Macon railroad about four o'clock P. M., and fortified the position, my command in line on the right of the division, the Second division, General Newton, extending my right; our corps fronting south. All quiet during the night.

September 1.—Our division marched at six o'clock A. M., First brigade in advance, moving on the railroad toward Jonesboro', and under orders spent most of the day in destruction of railroad as we advanced. At about four o'clock P. M., the advance brigade of our division made a junction with the left of the Fourteenth corps on the railroad, at a point about two miles north of Jonesboro'. The First brigade formed in line, its right near or upon the railroad. I was ordered by General Kimball to prolong the left of the First brigade, which I did without halting, until my advance was checked by getting into a thick bramble of underbrush and a swamp in a dense woodland, through which it was impossible to ride, and the enemy with a heavy skirmish line in our front, and his artillery in reach playing upon us, contributed to impede our progress. The course or direction when I entered the woods seemed to be about south, and, upon emerging from it, at a distance of a half to three fourths of a mile, the brigade to my right had shifted to the right to such an extent, that I had to move right oblique to fill the space, and my left swinging around so that when my lines came upon the lines of the enemy behind barricades, my front was about south-west. And by the time we got the lines straightened up and the enemy's skirmishers driven back, and the position of the enemy discovered, night came on. Yet my lines, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Eighty-fourth and Eightieth Illinois, and Ninth Indiana, in front line, pressed forward under a heavy canister fire from the enemy's guns to within three hundred yards of their barricaded lines. When the fighting ceased at dark, one of General Newton's brigades had moved up toward my left, and his skirmish line connected with the left of my front battle-line. The barricade of the enemy ceased opposite the left of my lines. During the night the enemy withdrew.

September 2.—At early day I advanced my brigade into the enemy's vacated works, issued rations, and marched in pursuit of the enemy on the road toward Lovejoy, my brigade in advance of our division, the Second and Third divisions of our corps in advance of me. At about one or two o'clock P. M., our advance came up to the enemy, and in the deploying of the column, I

was ordered and moved to the left of the railroad, about one mile and a half; formed my lines, Eighty-fourth Indiana, Eighty-fourth Illinois, and Seventy-fifth Illinois in front line, in a corn-field on the left of Colonel Knefler's brigade, of Wood's division, and advanced rapidly as the ground (very rough and hilly) would permit. We soon came upon the enemy in rifle-pits, about five-hundred yards in advance of his main works (heavy trenches), assaulted and carried the pits, taking most of the men in them prisoners. Our advance skirmishers went beyond these pits toward the main works of the enemy, but were driven back with severe loss. Much of the injury I received here was from the enemy's artillery with canister. Our artillery did not come up until next day, nearly twenty-four hours after the fight; my front lines maintained their positions at the line of these pits, and fortified during the night. Colonel Taylor's brigade soon came into position on my left. The loss in my command during these two last days was ninety killed and wounded; among the latter were: Captain Brinton, my A. A. G., severe wound in arm; Major Phillips, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, arm off; Captain Fellows and Captain Taylor of the Eighty-fourth Indiana; all fell bravely at their posts.

September 3.—No change in position to-day, but much firing at each other's lines, with some casualties, which remained so until the morning of September fifth. When twenty-six miles east

of south of Atlanta, in front of Lovejoy, a station on the Macon railroad, and seventy-five miles from the latter place, orders were received announcing that the campaign had ended, and that the army would fall back to Atlanta, rest for one month, and "prepare for a fine winter's campaign." Thus ended the most eventful and successful campaign in the history of the war. The enemy driven from Dalton, his stronghold, over rivers and mountains, natural strong military positions one after another were yielded up to the power of our arms, until the "Gate City," Atlanta, was at last vacated to the onward march of our brave and gallant armies. It is due to the officers and men of my command, to notice in terms of gratification to myself, and commendation to them, that better soldiers I never wish nor expect to command: all willing and ready to obey every order, without regard to fatigue, peril or danger, without halt or hesitation. Many acts of distinguished valor could be mentioned that came under my immediate notice, but they are so numerous it would be impossible to do full justice to all.

The effective force of my command monthly during the campaign was as follows:

May 30, 1864, including battery.....	2,753
June 30, " " " " " " " " " "	2,739
July 31, " " " " " " " " " "	2,395
August 31, " without " " " " " "	1,979

The casualties of the campaign are as follows:

COMMAND.	KILLED.		WOUNDED.		MISSING.		TOTAL KILLED AND WOUNDED.		AGGREGATE.
	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Commissioned Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Fifty-ninth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.....		10	1	53		2	1	63	66
Seventy-fifth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.....	1	10	4	53			5	63	68
Eightieth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.....		13	5	69			5	81	86
Eighty-fourth Illinois Volunteer Infantry.....		12	1	74	1		1	86	88
Ninth Indiana Volunteer Infantry.....		17	8	87			8	104	112
Thirtieth Indiana Volunteer Infantry.....		7	6	63		7	6	76	89
Thirty-sixth Indiana Volunteer Infantry.....	3	9	2	52			5	61	66
Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry.....	2	7	6	77		3	5	87	98
Eighty-fourth Indiana Volunteer Infantry.....		3	3	24	1		3	28	32
Battery B, Pennsylvania Veteran Volunteer Artillery.....	1	1	1	13			2	14	16
Total.....	7	89	37	564	3	12	44	665	711

This presents the bitter of such a brilliant campaign, and leaves many aching hearts, not only with families and friends at home, but these fallen heroes will ever be remembered and lamented by their comrades in arms, as the jewels sacrificed upon the altar of their country.

A change of provost-marshals inadvertently deranged the papers, so I am now unable to give an accurate list of the prisoners captured by my command during the campaign, but the probable number was about five hundred to six

hundred. From my situation I have been unable to have the reports of regimental commanders before me, and will respectfully refer to them to be forwarded herewith, for more minute particulars, and for a list of casualties in their respective commands.

I am, Captain,

Your most obedient servant,

W. GROSE,

Brigadier-General Commanding.

FRANK BINGHAM,

Captain, A. A. G.

CAPTAIN L. M. KELLOGG'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
FIRST SEPARATE DIVISION, ARMY CORPS,
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, TENN.,
March 3, 1865. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to forward report of detachment Eighteenth United States infantry, while under command of Captain Lyman M. Kellogg, Eighteenth infantry, from June fourteenth, 1864, to September first, 1864, and respectfully request that it be placed with the other reports of the regiment, and of the Second brigade, First division, Fourteenth Army Corps.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN H. KING,
Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General W. D. WHIPPLE,
A. A. G. and Chief of Staff,
Department of the Cumberland.

CAMP EIGHTEENTH UNITED STATES INFANTRY,
LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, TENNESSEE,
February 25, 1865. }

Brigadier-General W. D. Whipple, Assistant
Adjutant-General, Department Cumberland:

I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of the detachment of the Eighteenth United States infantry, embracing sixteen companies of the First, Second and Third battalions, while under my command during the Atlanta campaign, from the fourteenth of June to the first of September, 1864, inclusive, and respectfully request that it be included in the reports of the detachments already received from Captains G. W. Smith and R. B. Hull. This report would have been rendered sooner, but for the fact that I was severely wounded at the battle of Jonesboro', Georgia, on the first of September, 1864.

OPERATIONS.

In front of Kenesaw Mountain the detachment lost, after I assumed command in the month of June, wounded, eight enlisted men.

July 4.—The detachment supported two batteries under a destructively severe artillery fire from the enemy. Also charged rebel line of skirmishers and drove them, thus causing or materially aiding in causing the whole rebel line to evacuate its position during the ensuing night.

July 20.—The detachment in the battle of Peach-tree creek was under musketry fire; also subjected to severe shelling.

July 22.—Intrenched within one and a half miles of Atlanta, Georgia.

Loss during July, 1864:

Commissioned officers, wounded.....	3
Enlisted men, "	21
" " killed.....	1
" " missing.....	1
Total	26

August 3.—The detachment deployed as skirmishers and drove the enemy's cavalry vedettes and pickets.

August 7.—The detachment assaulted the enemy's line of rifle-pits; the detachment of the Fifteenth United States infantry and Eleventh Michigan volunteer infantry supported detachment Eighteenth United States infantry, and very soon connected with it on its right, the whole being under my command, as senior officer on the field. Engaged with the enemy. After the first assault I took advantage of a ravine beyond the open field, over which we had driven the enemy, to reform the line, which had become partially disorganized, owing to the difficulties of the ground and the very severe flank and front fire, both artillery and musketry, which had been playing on us while driving the enemy across the open field. After I had reformed, I again moved forward with the Eighteenth and Fifteenth regulars, driving the enemy into their main works, and arriving with my line, composed of the regular regiments above mentioned, at the abatis close to the enemy's main works. The Eleventh Michigan during the second assault remained in position, protecting my right.

Had I been supported, and the enemy attacked by the division on my right, and by the brigade on my left, as I had been told would be the case, I am of opinion that the main line of works around Atlanta would have fallen on the seventh of August.

The forces under my command had been engaged from one o'clock p. m. until nearly dusk; nearly one third of my men had been put *hors de combat*, and I was almost entirely out of ammunition, not having had time to send to the rear for it, so that had I finally succeeded in entering the enemy's works, I should only have succeeded in turning my remaining small force over to the enemy as prisoners. We, however, successfully advanced our main line about half a mile, intrenching and holding it, taking three lines of rebel rifle-pits, and capturing a large number of prisoners, three hundred of them being credited to my command; a large number of prisoners were sent to the rear without a guard, not having men to spare, by my orders, and were taken up, I have been told, by General Carlin's brigade, which was undoubtedly credited with the number thus taken up. General Carlin's brigade, however, was not actually engaged, and did not, I am sure, capture a single prisoner. This assault was most successful and brilliant, and due credit should be given to whom it was mainly owing, viz.: the Eighteenth and Fifteenth regulars.

Loss during August, 1864:

Commissioned officers wounded.....	2
Enlisted men wounded.....	31
" " killed.....	7
" " missing.....	4
Total	44

September 1.—The detachment as a portion of the regular brigade, was most actively engaged with the enemy at the battle of

Jonesboro', Georgia. We assaulted the enemy's intrenched position in the edge of woods, moving in line of battle through an open, difficult swamp, across an open field, under the severest artillery and musketry fire, flank and front.

It became necessary to reform the line, after crossing the swamp, and finding it almost impossible to get my men forward through the fire, I deemed it necessary to give them the encouragement of my example (as, indeed, I had previously done, especially on the seventh of August), and so rode in front of my colors, and caused them to be successfully planted on the enemy's works, jumping my horse over them, at the time they were filled with the enemy, being the first man of our army over the enemy's works. I was almost instantly struck from my horse, inside of the enemy's works, while cheering on my men, being severely wounded by shell and bullet. I however, held the works, and retained command for some minutes, until I was taken to the rear, in a semi-conscious state.

The detachment lost in this battle:

Commissioned officers wounded	3
Enlisted men wounded	30
" " killed	10
" " missing	7
Total	50

A large number of prisoners were also captured by the Eighteenth regulars, in this battle.

The casualties in this detachment, during the Atlanta campaign, from May 2, 1864, to September 2, 1864, were as follows:

Commissioned officers wounded	10
Enlisted men wounded	166
" " killed	38
" " missing	17
Total	231

I should be derelict in my duty, did I not most earnestly recommend for brevets the following meritorious and gallant officers, for distinguished bravery and conduct on the field of battle, viz:

Captain G. W. Smith, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain R. B. Hull, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

Captain W. J. Fetterman, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain Ansel B. Deuten, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain Anson Mills, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry and skill on the fourth of July, 1864.

Captain A. S. Burt, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

First Lieutenant Thos. B. Burrows, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for gallantry on the first of September, 1864, when he was severely wounded.

First Lieutenant James Powell, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same for great gallantry on the first of September, 1864, when he was severely wounded.

First Lieutenant Frederick Phisterer, Eighteenth United States infantry, for good conduct and gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for good conduct and great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864.

First Lieutenant Wm. H. Bisbee, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same, for great gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864; the same, for good conduct and great gallantry on the first of September, 1864.

First Lieutenant Alfred Townsend, Eighteenth United States infantry, for gallantry on the fourth of July, 1864; the same for gallantry on the seventh of August, 1864, where he was severely wounded.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

L. M. KELLOGG,

Captain, Eighteenth United States Infantry.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 15, 1864. }

GENERAL: I have heretofore, from day to day, by telegraph, kept the War Department and the General-in-Chief advised of the progress of events, but now it becomes necessary to review the whole campaign, which has resulted in the capture and occupation of the city of Atlanta.

On the fourteenth day of March, 1864, at Memphis, Tennessee, I received notice from General Grant, at Nashville, that he had been commissioned Lieutenant-General and Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the United States, which would compel him to go East, and that I had been appointed to succeed him as commander of the Division of the Mississippi. He summoned me to Nashville for a conference, and I took my departure the same day, and reached Nashville, *via* Cairo, on the seventeenth, and accompanied him on his journey eastward as far as Cincinnati. We had a full and complete understanding of the policy and plans for the ensuing campaign, covering a vast area of country, my part of which, extended from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. I returned to Nashville, and on the twenty-fifth began a tour of inspection, visiting Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; Chattanooga, Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. During this visit I had interviews with Major-General McPherson,

commanding the Army of the Tennessee, at Huntsville, Major-General Thomas, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Chattanooga, and Major-General Schofield, commanding the Army of the Ohio, at Knoxville. We arranged, in general terms, the lines of communication to be guarded, the strength of the several columns and garrisons, and fixed the first day of May as the time when all things should be ready. Leaving these officers to complete the details of organization and preparation, I returned to Nashville on the second of April, and gave my personal attention to the question of supplies. I found the depots at Nashville abundantly supplied, and the railroads in very fair order, and that steps had already been taken to supply cars and locomotives to fill the new and increased demands of the service, but the impoverished condition of the inhabitants of East Tennessee, more especially in the region round about Chattanooga, had forced the commanding officers of posts to issue food to the people. I was compelled to stop this, for a simple calculation showed that a single railroad could not feed the armies and the people too, and, of course, the army had the preference, but I endeavored to point the people to new channels of supply. At first my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course. At once the storehouses at Chattanooga began to fill, so that by the 1st of May a very respectable quantity of food and forage had been accumulated there, and from that day to this stores have been brought forward in wonderful abundance, with a surplus that has enabled me to feed the army well during the whole period of time, although the enemy has succeeded more than once in breaking our road for many miles at different points.

During the month of April I received from Lieutenant-General Grant a map, with a letter of instructions, which is now at Nashville, but a copy will be procured, and made part of this report. Subsequently I received from him notice that he would move from his camps about Culpepper, Virginia, on the fifth of May, and he wanted me to do the same from Chattanooga. My troops were still dispersed, and the cavalry, so necessary to our success, was yet collecting horses at Nicholasville, Kentucky, and Columbus, Tennessee. On the twenty-seventh of April I put all the troops in motion toward Chattanooga, and the next day went there in person. My aim and purpose was to make the Army of the Cumberland fifty thousand men; that of the Tennessee thirty-five thousand, and that of the Ohio fifteen thousand men. These figures were approximated, but never reached; the Army of the Tennessee failing to receive certain divisions that were still kept on the Mississippi, resulting from the unfavorable issue

of the Red River expedition. But on the first of May the effective strength of the several armies for offensive purposes was about as follows:

ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND, MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	54,568
Artillery.....	2,377
Cavalry.....	3,828

Total.....	60,773
Guns.....	130

ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, MAJOR-GENERAL M'PHERSON
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	22,437
Artillery.....	1,404
Cavalry.....	624

Total.....	24,465
Guns.....	96

ARMY OF THE OHIO, MAJOR-GENERAL SCHOFIELD
COMMANDING.

Infantry.....	11,183
Artillery.....	679
Cavalry.....	1,697

Total.....	13,559
Guns.....	28

Grand aggregate number of troops, ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven; guns, two hundred and fifty-four.

About these figures have been maintained during the campaign, the number of men joining from furlough and hospitals about compensating for the loss in battle and from sickness. These armies were grouped on the morning of May sixth as follows: That of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold; that of the Tennessee at Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga; and that of the Ohio near Red Clay, on the Georgia line, north of Dalton.

The enemy lay in and about Dalton, superior to me in cavalry (Wheeler's), and with three corps of infantry and artillery, viz: Hardee's, Hood's and Polk's, the whole commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate Army. I estimated the cavalry under Wheeler at about ten thousand, and the infantry and artillery at about forty-five or fifty thousand men.

To strike Dalton in front was impracticable, as it was covered by an inaccessible ridge known as the Rocky-Face, through which was a pass between Tunnel Hill and Dalton, known as the Buzzard Roost, through which lay the railroad and wagon-road. It was narrow, well obstructed by abatis, and flooded by water, caused by dams across Mill Creek. Batteries also commanded it in its whole length, from the spurs on either side, and more especially from a ridge at the further end, like a traverse, directly across its debouché. It was, therefore, necessary to turn it. On its north front the enemy had a strong line of works behind Mill Creek, so that my attention

was at once directed to the south. In that direction I found Snake Creek Gap, affording me a good practicable way to reach Resaca, a point on the enemy's railroad line of communication, eighteen (18) miles below Dalton. Accordingly, I ordered General McPherson to move rapidly from his position at Gordon's Mill, via Ship's Gap, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap, directly on Resaca, or the railroad at any point below Dalton, and to make a bold attack. After breaking the railroad well, he was ordered to fall back to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek, and stand ready to fall upon the enemy's flank when he retreated as I judged he would. During the movement, General Thomas was to make a strong feint of attack in front, while General Schofield pressed down from the north.

General Thomas moved from Ringgold on the seventh, occupying Tunnel Hill, facing the Buzzard-Roost Gap, meeting with little opposition and pushing the enemy's cavalry well through the Gap; General McPherson reached Snake Creek Gap on the eighth, completely surprising a brigade of cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it, and on the ninth General Schofield pushed down close on Dalton, from the north, while General Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard Roost and Rocky-Face Ridge, pushing it almost to a battle. One division, General Newton's, of the Fourth corps, General Howard's, carried the ridge, and turning south toward Dalton, found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulments, to enable him to reach the gorge or pass. Another division, General Geary's, of the Twentieth corps, General Hooker's, also made a bold push for the summit, to the south of the pass, but the narrow road as it approached the summit was too strongly held by the enemy to be carried. This, however, was only designed as a demonstration, and worked well, for General McPherson was thereby enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed. He found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering his left flank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over to the railroad, and accordingly he fell back and took strong position near the west end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, still appreciated the advantage gained, and on the tenth ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap in support of General McPherson, and to follow with another corps, the Fourteenth, General Palmer's, leaving General Howard with the Fourth corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, while the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap. On the same day General Schofield was ordered to follow by the same route, and on the eleventh the whole army, excepting General Howard's corps, and some cavalry left to watch Dalton, was in motion on the west side of Rocky-Face Ridge for Snake Creek Gap and Resaca. The next day we

moved against Resaca, General McPherson on the direct road, preceded by General Kilpatrick's cavalry; General Thomas to come up on his left and General Schofield on his. General Kilpatrick met and drove the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their fortified lines and occupied a ridge of "bald" hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railroad bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek, and General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This fact enabled his army to reach Resaca from Dalton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, partly from the topographical nature of the country, and partly from the foresight of the rebel chief. At all events, on the fourteenth of May, we found the rebel army in a strong position behind Camp creek, occupying the forts of Resaca, and his right on some high chestnut hills to the north of the town. I at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's ferry, in the direction of Calhoun; a division of the Sixteenth corps, commanded by General Sweeny, to cross and threaten Calhoun; also the cavalry division of General Garrard to move from its position at Villanow down toward Rome, to cross the Oostanaula and break the railroad below Calhoun, and above Kingston, if possible, and with the main army I pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp creek near its mouth, and made a lodgement close to the enemy's works, on hills that commanded, with short-range artillery, the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp creek Valley, threw General Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down to it close on Resaca.

General Schofield came up close on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the fifteenth, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, captured a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning we entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but the railroad bridge was burned.

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on his heels, General McPherson by Lay's ferry, and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. We found in Resaca

another four-gun battery and a good lot of stores.

General McPherson during the sixteenth, got across at Lay's ferry. General Thomas had to make some additional bridges at Resaca, but General Schofield had more trouble, and made a wide circuit to the left by Fue's and Fields' ferries across the Connasauga and Coosawatee rivers, which form the Oostanaula. On the seventeenth all the armies moved south by as many different roads as we could find, and General Thomas had sent by my orders, a division, General Jeff. C. Davis, along the west bank of Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day General Newton's division, in the advance, had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open, and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions—General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston, to be in close support. On the nineteenth, the enemy was in force about Cassville, with strong forts, but as our troops converged on him, again he retreated in the night-time across the Etowah river, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the most valuable country above the Etowah river.

Holding General Thomas' army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield's at Cassville depot and toward the Etowah bridge, I gave the army a few days rest, and also time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jeff. C. Davis had got possession of Rome with its forts, some eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. We also secured possession of two good bridges across the Etowah river near Kingston, giving us the means of crossing toward the south. Satisfied that the enemy could and would hold us in check at the Allatoona Pass, I resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and having supplied our wagons for twenty days' absence from our railroad, I left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, and on the twenty-third put the army in motion for Dallas.

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas, *via* Van Wert. General Davis' division moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road *via* Euharley and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on General Thomas' left.

General Thomas' head of column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry about Burnt Hickory,

and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had detected the move, and was preparing to meet us about Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the twenty-fifth of May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, General Hooker having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin-vine creek, on the main Dallas road, he found a respectable force of the enemy's cavalry at a bridge to his left. He rapidly pushed them across the creek, saving the bridge, though on fire, and followed out eastward about two miles, where he first encountered infantry, whose pickets he drove some distance, until he encountered the enemy's line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. General Hooker's other two divisions were on other roads, and he ordered them in, although the road he was then following, by reason of the presence of the enemy, led him north of Dallas about four miles.

It was near four o'clock p. m. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed two divisions, and, by my order, made a bold push to secure possession of a point known as the New Hope Church, where three roads meet, from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas. Here a hard battle was fought, and the enemy was driven back to New Hope Church; but, having hastily thrown up some parapets, and a stormy, dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive the enemy from those roads. By the next morning we found the enemy well intrenched, substantially in front of the road leading from Dallas to Marietta. We were consequently compelled to make dispositions on a larger scale. General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas was deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield was directed toward our left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman with General Schofield. General McCook looked to our rear.

Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took us several days to deploy close to the enemy, when I resolved gradually to work toward our left, and, when all things were ready, to push for the railroad east of Allatoona. In making our development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe, sharp encounters occurred between parts of the army, details of which will be given at length in the reports of subordinate commanders. On the twenty-eighth, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable me with the rest of the army to extend still more to the left and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on Dallas.

Fortunately our men had erected good breast-works, and gave the enemy a terrible and

bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, I renewed my orders to General McPherson to move to his left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and Generals Thomas and Schofield were ordered to move a corresponding distance to their left. This move was effected with ease and safety on the first of June, and, by pushing our left well around, we occupied all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, after which I pushed General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. Both of those commands reached the points designated without trouble, and we thereby accomplished our real purpose of turning the Allatoona Pass.

Ordering the railroad bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, I continued working by the left, and on the fourth of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church and move to the railroad about Ackworth, when he abandoned his intrenchments, after which we moved readily to Ackworth, and reached the railroad on the sixth of June. I at once examined in person the Allatoona Pass, and found it admirably adapted to our use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison, and as soon as the railroad bridge was finished across the Etowah our stores came forward to our camps by rail.

At Ackworth General Blair overtook us on the eighth of June, with two divisions of the Seventeenth corps that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force about compensated for our losses in battle and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

On the ninth of June our communications in the rear being secure and supplies ample, we moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of chestnut hills trending off to the north-east, terminating to our view in another peak called Brushy Mountain. To our right was the smaller hill called Pine Mountain and beyond it in the distance Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain, and Lost Mountain, form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal-stations. The summits were covered with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men, busy in felling trees, digging pits, and preparing for the grand struggle impending.

The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamors of war, but the Chattahoochee lay beyond, and I had to reach it. On approaching close to the enemy I found him occupying a line full two miles long, more than he could hold with his force. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad, General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountain, and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right, and General McCook looking to our rear and communications. Our depot was at Big Shanty.

By the eleventh of June our lines were closed up, and we made dispositions to break the line between Kenesaw and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right or General Hooker's left, General Polk was killed on the fourteenth, and on the morning of the fifteenth Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountain. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing our operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, I had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the seventeenth, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain and the long line of admirable breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. We continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber and across most difficult ravines, until we found him again strongly posted and intrenched, with Kenesaw as his salient, his right wing thrown back to cover Marietta, and his left behind Nose's creek, covering his railroad back to the Chattahoochee. This enabled him to contract his lines and strengthen them accordingly.

From Kenesaw he could look down upon our camps and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did us little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over our heads as we lay close up against his mountain town.

During our operations about Kenesaw the weather was villainously bad, and the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering our narrow, wooded roads mere mud-gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible, but our men daily worked closer and closer to the intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing, galling to him. Every opportunity was taken to advance our general lines closer and closer to the enemy.

General McPherson watching the enemy on Kenesaw, and working his left forward. General Thomas swinging, as it were on a grand left-wheel, his left on Kenesaw, connecting with General McPherson, and General Schofield all

the time working to the south and east along the old Sandtown road. On the twenty-second General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right. The enemy, Hood's corps, with detachments from the others, suddenly sallied and attacked. The blow fell mostly on General Williams' division of General Hooker's corps, and a brigade of General Hascall's division of General Schofield's army.

The ground was comparatively open, and although the enemy drove in the skirmish lines (an advanced regiment of General Schofield, sent out purposely to hold him in check until some preparations could be completed for his reception), yet when he reached our line of battle he received a terrible repulse, leaving his dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. This is known as the affair of the "Kulp House." Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the examples of Dallas and the "Kulp House," and upon studying the ground, I had no alternative, in my turn, but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers. And I perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down into a conviction that I would not assault fortified lines.

All looked to me to "outflank." An army to be efficient must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. I waited, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left centre; because, if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one half miles, it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either part, it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore, on the twenty-fourth of June, I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the twenty-seventh, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnoissance; one to be made near Little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops, and the other about a mile further south by General Thomas' troops. The hour was fixed, and all the details given in Field Orders, number twenty-eight, of June twenty-fourth. On the twenty-seventh of June the two assaults were made at the time and in the manner prescribed, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook; Colonel Rice and others badly wounded; our aggregate loss being near three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, who lay behind his well-formed breastworks. Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced

good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly, and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them.

It would not do to rest long under the influence of a mistake or failure, and accordingly General Schofield was working strongly on the enemy's left; and on the first of July I ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and to rapidly throw his whole army by the right down to and threaten Nickajack creek and Turner's ferry across the Chattahoochee, and I also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's.

General McPherson commenced his movement the night of July second, and the effect was instantaneous. The next morning Kenesaw was abandoned, and with the first dawn of day I saw our skirmishers appear on the mountain top. General Thomas' whole line was then moved forward to the railroad and turned south, in pursuit toward the Chattahoochee. In person I entered Marietta at half-past eight o'clock in the morning, just as the enemy's cavalry vacated the place. General Logan's corps of General McPherson's army, which had not moved far, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had foreseen and provided against all this, and had covered his movement well. He had intrenched a strong *levee du pont* at the Chattahoochee, with an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna camp-meeting ground, five miles from Marietta.

Here General Thomas found him, his front covered by a good parapet, and his flanks behind the Nickajack and Rottonwood creeks. Ordering a garrison for Marietta, and General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, I overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the fourth of July we pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong demonstrations along Nickajack creek and about Turner's ferry. This had the desired effect, and the next morning the enemy was gone, and the army moved to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Pace's ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve; the enemy lay behind a line of unusual strength, covering the railroad and pontoon bridges, and beyond the Chattahoochee. Heavy skirmishing along our whole front during the fifth demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee river, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

To accomplish this result I judged it would

be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, and accordingly I ordered General Schofield across from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna Camp-ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the seventh of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle-bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time General Garrard moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the factories which had supplied the rebel armies with cloth for years. Over one of these, the woollen factory, the nominal owner displayed the French flag, which was not respected, of course. A neutral, surely, is no better than one of our own citizens, and we do not permit our own citizens to fabricate cloth for hostile uses.

General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and as I contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, I ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest up to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send up a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's corps, which was soon followed by General McPherson's whole army. About the same time General Howard had also built a bridge at Powers' ferry, two miles below General Schofield, had crossed over and taken a position on his right. Thus during the ninth we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee, above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta, and Johnston abandoned his *lets du pont*, burned his bridges, and left us undisputed masters north and west of the Chattahoochee, at daylight on the tenth of July.

This was one, if not the chief, object of the campaign, viz: the advancement of our lines from the Tennessee to the Chattahoochee, but Atlanta lay before us, only eight miles distant, and was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed, with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, &c., and more especially its railroads, which converge there from the four great cardinal points. But the men had worked hard and needed rest, and we accordingly took a short spell. But in anticipation of this contingency, I had collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about two thousand strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa, at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika. There is but one stem of finished railroad connecting the channels of

trade and travel between Georgia and Alabama and Mississippi, which runs from Montgomery to Opelika, and my purpose was to break it up effectually and thereby cut off Johnston's army from that source of supply and reinforcement.

General Rousseau, commanding the District of Tennessee, asked permission to command the expedition, and received it. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochee, and as I had begun to manoeuvre on Atlanta, I gave the requisite notice, and General Rousseau started punctually on the tenth of July. He fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, whipping the rebel General Clanton en route; he passed through Talladega, and reached the railroad on the sixteenth, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and broke it well up to that place. Also three miles of the branch toward Columbus, and two toward West Point. He then turned north, and brought his command safely to Marietta, arriving on the twenty-third, having sustained a trifling loss—not to exceed thirty men.

The main armies remained quiet in their camps on the Chattahoochee until the sixteenth of July, but the time was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's station, strengthening the railroad guards and garrisons, and improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river, to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance, I ordered it to commence on the seventeenth; General Thomas to cross at Powers' and Pace's ferry bridges, and to march by Buckhead; General Schofield, already across at the mouth of Soap's creek, to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell straight against the Augusta road, at some point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railroad. On the seventeenth the whole army advanced from their camps and formed a general line along the old Peach-tree road.

Continuing on a general right wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railroad on the eighteenth, at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry, and General Morgan L. Smith's infantry division of the Fifteenth corps, broke up a section of about four miles, and General Schofield reached the town of Decatur.

On the nineteenth, General McPherson turned along the railroad into Decatur, and General Schofield followed a road toward Atlanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree creek in force by numerous bridges, in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy in more or less force, and skirmished heavily.

On the twentieth all the armies had closed in, converging toward Atlanta, but as a gap existed

between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving General Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the twentieth, about four p. m., the enemy sallied from his works in force, and fell in line of battle against our right centre, composed of General Newton's division of General Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road; of General Hooker's corps next south, and General Johnson's division of General Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail piles which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's whole corps was uncovered, and had to fight on comparatively open ground, and it, too, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his intrenchments. The action in front of General Johnson was comparatively light, that division being well intrenched. The enemy left on the field over five hundred dead, about one thousand wounded severely, seven stands of colors, and many prisoners. His loss could not have fallen short of five thousand, whereas ours was covered by one thousand five hundred killed, wounded, and missing; the greater loss fell on General Hooker's corps, from its exposed position.

On the twenty-first we felt the enemy in his intrenched position, which was found to crown the heights overlooking the comparatively open ground of the valley of Peach-tree creek, his right beyond the Augusta road to the east, and his left well toward Turner's ferry on the Chatahoochee, at a general distance from Atlanta of about four miles.

On the morning of the twenty-second, somewhat to my surprise, this whole line was found abandoned, and I confess I thought the enemy had resolved to give us Atlanta without further contest; but General Johnston had been relieved of his command, and General Hood substituted. A new policy seemed resolved on, of which the bold attack on our right was the index. Our advancing ranks swept across the strong and well-finished parapet of the enemy and closed in upon Atlanta, until we occupied a line in the form of a general circle of about two miles' radius, when we again found him occupying in force a line of finished redoubts, which had been prepared for more than a year, covering all the roads leading into Atlanta; and we found him also busy in connecting those redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle-trenches, abatis, and *chevaux de frise*.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the railroad, with the Fifteenth corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General Blair on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its right, but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth corps, General Dodge, was thrown out of line by the

Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield near the Howard house. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railroad, where the Seventeenth corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within easy view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position, and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank.

About ten a. m., I was in person, with General Schofield, examining the appearance of the enemy's lines opposite the distillery, where we attracted enough of the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry to satisfy me the enemy was in Atlanta in force, and meant to fight, and had gone to a large dwelling close by, known as the Howard house, where General McPherson joined me. He described the condition of things on his flank and the disposition of his troops. I explained to him that if we met serious resistance in Atlanta, as present appearances indicated, instead of operating against it by the left, I would extend to the right, and that I did not want him to gain much distance to the left. He then described the hill occupied by General Leggett's division of General Blair's corps as essential to the occupation of any ground to the east and south of the Augusta railroad, on account of its commanding nature. I therefore ratified his disposition of troops, and modified a previous order I had sent him in writing to use General Dodge's corps, thrown somewhat in reserve by the closing up of our line, to break up railroad, and I sanctioned its going, as already ordered by General McPherson, to his left, to hold and fortify that position. The General remained with me until near noon, when some reports reaching us that indicated a movement of the enemy on that flank, he mounted and rode away with his staff. I must here also state that the day before I had detached General Garrard's cavalry to go to Covington, on the Augusta road, forty-two miles east of Atlanta, and from that point to send detachments to break the two important bridges across the Yellow and Uco-fauhatchee rivers, tributaries of Ocmulgee, and General McPherson had also left his wagon-train at Decatur, under a guard of three regiments commanded by Colonel, now General Sprague. Soon after General McPherson left me at the Howard house, as before described, I heard the sounds of musketry to our left rear, at first mere pattering shots, but soon they grew in volume, accompanied with artillery, and about the same time the sound of guns was heard in the direction of Decatur. No doubt could longer be entertained of the enemy's plan of action, which was to throw a superior force on our left flank, while he held us with his forts

in front, the only question being as to the amount of force he could employ at that point. I hastily transmitted orders to all parts of our centre and right to press forward and give full employment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments. Not more than half an hour after General McPherson had left me, viz., about 12:30 P. M. of the twenty-second, his Adjutant-General, Lieutenant Colonel Clark, rode up and reported that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner; that he had ridden from me to General Dodge's column, moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless, having two wounds. The suddenness of this terrible calamity would have overwhelmed me with grief, but the living demanded my whole thoughts. I instantly despatched a staff officer to General John A. Logan, commanding the Fifteenth corps, to tell him what had happened; that he must assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before.

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and by a wide circuit to the east had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and his right had swung around until it hit General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the old line of the rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outward. A space of wooded ground of near half a mile, intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured, but the last order ever given by General McPherson was to hurry a brigade (Colonel Wangelin's) of the Fifteenth corps across from the railroad to occupy this gap. It came across on the double-quick, and checked the enemy. While Hardee attacked in flank, Stewart's corps was to attack in front directly out from the main works, but fortunately their attacks were not simultaneous. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were then fortifying, and captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps, who was somewhat "in air," and forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the apex of the hill, which was the only part that was deemed essential to our future plans. General Dodge had caught and held well in check the enemy's right, and punished him severely, capturing

many prisoners. Smith (General Giles A.) had gradually given up the extremity of his line and formed a new one, whose right connected with General Leggett, and his left refused, facing south-east. On this ground and in this order the men fought well and desperately for near four hours, checking and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is due both Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four P. M. had almost given up the attempt. In the meantime, Wheeler's cavalry unopposed (for General Gerrard was absent at Covington by my order), had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel, now General Sprague, covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of General Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe except three, which the teamsters had left, carrying off the mules. On our extreme left the enemy had taken a complete battery of six guns, with its horses (Murray's), of the Regular Army, as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger, in a narrow, wooded road in that unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of the men escaped to the bushes. He also got two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men in the manner heretofore described. About four P. M., there was quite a lull, during which the enemy felt forward on the railroad and main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a kind of picket, and captured the two guns; he then advanced rapidly and broke through our lines at that point, which had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's order to the extreme left. The other brigade, General Lightburn, which held this part of the line, fell back in some disorder, about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, one of which, a twenty-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, was most valuable to us, and separating General Wood's and General Harrow's divisions of the Fifteenth corps, that were on the right and left of the railroad. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, I ordered certain batteries of General Schofield to be moved to a position somewhat commanding, by a left flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight and the woods beyond, to prevent his reinforcing. I also sent orders to General Logan, which he had already anticipated, to make the Fifteenth corps regain its lost ground at any cost, and instructed General Wood, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the

parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. The whole was executed in superb style, at times our men and the enemy fighting across the narrow parapet, but at last the enemy gave way and the Fifteenth corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of view and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the twenty-second, which cost us three thousand seven hundred and twenty-two killed, wounded, and prisoners.

But among the dead was Major-General McPherson, whose body was recovered and brought to me in the heat of battle, and I had sent it, in charge of his personal staff, back to Marietta, on its way to his Northern home. He was a noble youth of striking personal appearance, of the highest professional capacity, and with a heart abounding in kindness that drew to him the affections of all men. His sudden death devolved the command of the Army of the Tennessee on the no less brave and gallant General Logan, who nobly sustained his reputation and that of his veteran army, and avenged the death of his comrade and commander. The enemy left on the field his dead and wounded, and about a thousand well prisoners. His dead alone are computed by General Logan at three thousand two hundred and forty, of which number two thousand two hundred were from actual count, and of these he delivered to the enemy, under a flag of truce, sent in by him (the enemy) eight hundred bodies. I entertain no doubt that in the battle of July twenty-second the enemy sustained an aggregate loss of full eight thousand men. The next day General Garrard returned from Covington, having succeeded perfectly in his mission, and destroyed the bridges at Ulcofauhatchee and Yellow rivers, besides burning a train of cars, a large quantity of cotton (two thousand bales), and the depots of stores at Covington and Conyers' station, and bringing in two hundred prisoners and some good horses, losing but two men, one of whom was killed by accident. Having, therefore, sufficiently crippled the Augusta road, and rendered it useless to the enemy, I then addressed myself to the task of reaching the Macon road, over which of necessity came the stores and ammunition that alone maintained the rebel army in Atlanta.

Generals Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments. I first ordered the Army of the Tennessee to prepare to vacate its line and to shift by the right, below Proctor's creek, and General Schofield to extend up to the Augusta road. About the same time General Rousseau had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing me about two thousand good cavalry, but of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, and ordering it to relieve General Stoneman at the river about Sandtown, I shifted General Stoneman to our left flank, and ordered

all my cavalry to prepare for a blow at the Macon road, simultaneous with the movement of the Army of the Tennessee toward East Point. To accomplish this, I gave General Stoneman the command of his own and General Garrard's cavalry, making an effective force of full five thousand men, and to General McCook I gave his own and the new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, which was commanded by Colonel Harrison of the Eighth Indiana cavalry, in the aggregate about four thousand. These two well-appointed bodies were to move in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and on a certain night, viz., July twenty-eighth, they were to meet on the Macon road near Lovejoy's, and destroy it in the most effectual manner. I estimated this joint cavalry could whip all Wheeler's cavalry, and could otherwise fully accomplish its task, and I think so still. I had the officers in command to meet me, and explained the movement perfectly, and they entertained not a doubt of perfect success. At the very moment, almost, of starting, General Stoneman addressed me a note asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the road, to be allowed, with his command proper, to proceed to Macon and Anderson, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points. There was something most captivating in the idea, and the execution was within the bounds of probability of success. I consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry, which was embraced in his orders, and breaking the road, he might attempt it with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to its proper flank of the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed. I have as yet no report from General Stoneman, who is prisoner of war at Macon, but I know that he despatched General Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, but for some reason unknown to me, he went off toward Covington and did not again communicate with General Garrard at Flat Rock. General Garrard remained there until the twenty-ninth, skirmishing heavily with a part of Wheeler's cavalry and occupying their attention, but hearing nothing from General Stoneman, he moved back to Conyers', where, learning that General Stoneman had gone to Covington and south on the east side of the Ocmulgee, he returned and resumed his position on our left. It is known that General Stoneman kept to the east of the Ocmulgee to Clinton, sending detachments off to the east, which did a large amount of damage to the railroad, burning the bridges of Walnut creek and Oconee, and destroying a large number of cars and locomotives, and with his main force appeared before Macon. He did not succeed in crossing the Ocmulgee at Macon, or in approaching Andersonville, but retired in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of mounted men under a General Iverson. He seems to have become hemmed in, and gave consent to two thirds of

his force to escape back while he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about seven hundred men, and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adams, came in almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised on the way back and scattered, many were captured and killed, and the balance got in mostly unarmed and afoot, and the General himself surrendered his small command, and is now a prisoner at Macon. His mistake was in not making the first concentration with Generals McCook and Garrard near Lovejoy's, according to his orders, which is yet unexplained.

General McCook, in the execution of his part, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto station of the West Point road, where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion toward Campbelltown, which regiment fulfilled its duty, and returned to camp by way of, and escorting back, the pontoon-bridge train. General McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of the wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta. These he burned to the number of five hundred, killing eight hundred mules, and carrying along others, and taking two hundred and fifty prisoners, mostly quartermasters and men belonging to the trains. He then pushed for the railroad, reaching it at Lovejoy station at the time appointed. He burned the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and finding his progress east too strongly opposed, he moved south and west, and reaching Newnan, on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in, and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures, and cut his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men, among them a most valuable officer, Colonel Harrison, who, when fighting his men as skirmishers on foot, was overcome and made prisoner, and is now at Macon. He cut his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed and got to Marietta, without further loss.

General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy's. But on the whole, the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break the enemy's communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale, that I knew the damages would soon be repaired.

Pursuant to the general plan the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines near the Decatur road during the night of July twenty-sixth, and on the twenty-seventh moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor's creek, and south, to pro-

long our line due south, facing east. On that day, by appointment of the President of the United States, Major-General Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, and had the general supervision of the movement, which was made *en echelon*, General Dodge's corps, Sixteenth, on the left, nearest the enemy, General Blair's corps, Seventeenth, next to come up on its right, and General Logan's corps, Fifteenth, to come up on its right, and refused as a flank, the whole to gain as much ground due south from the flank already established on Proctor's creek as was consistent with a proper strength. General Dodge's men got into line in the evening of the twenty-seventh, and General Blair's came into line on his right early on the morning of the twenty-eighth, his right reaching an old meeting-house called Ezra Church, near some large open fields by the poor-house, on a road known as the Bell's ferry or Licksillet road. Here the Fifteenth corps, General Logan's, joined on and refused along a ridge well wooded, which partially commanded a view over the same fields. About ten a. m., all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up the accustomed piles of rails and logs, which after awhile assumed the form of a parapet. The skill and rapidity with which our men construct them is wonderful, and is something new in the art of war. I rode along his whole line about that time, and as I approached Ezra Church there was considerable artillery firing, enfilading the road in which I was riding, killing an orderly's horse just behind my staff. I struck across an open field to where General Howard was standing in the rear of the Fifteenth corps, and walked up to the ridge with General Morgan L. Smith, to see if the battery which enfiladed the main road and line of rail-piles could not be disposed of, and heard General Smith give the necessary orders for the deployment of one regiment forward and another to make a circuit to the right, when I returned to where General Howard was, and remained there until twelve o'clock. During this time there was nothing to indicate serious battle save the shelling by one, or at most two, batteries from beyond the large field in front of the Fifteenth corps.

Wishing to be well prepared to defeat the enemy if he repeated his game of the twenty-second, I had, the night before, ordered General Davis' division of General Palmer's corps, which, by the movements of the Army of the Tennessee, had been left, as it were, in reserve, to move down to Turner's ferry, and thence toward Whitehall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of General Howard's new line, hoping that in case of an attack this division would in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. I explained it to General Howard, and bade him expect the arrival of such a force in case of battle. Indeed, I expected to hear the fire of its skirmishers by noon. General Davis was sick that day, and Brigadier-General Morgan commanded the division which

had marched early for Turner's ferry, but many of the roads laid down on our maps did not exist at all, and General Morgan was delayed thereby. I rode back to make more particular inquiries as to this division, and had just reached General Davis' headquarters at Proctor's creek when I heard musketry open heavily on the right. The enemy had come out of Atlanta by the Bell's ferry road, and formed his masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground, and after the artillery firing I have described, advanced in parallel lines directly against the Fifteenth corps, expecting to catch that flank in air. His advance was magnificent, but founded in an error that cost him sadly, for our men coolly and deliberately cut down his men, and spite of the efforts of the rebel officers, his ranks broke and fled. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail piles only to be killed or hauled over as prisoners.

These assaults occurred from noon until about four P. M., when the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands; as many as six hundred and forty-two dead were counted and buried, and still others are known to have been buried which were not counted by the regularly detailed burial-parties.

General Logan on this occasion was conspicuous, as on the twenty-second, his corps being chiefly engaged; but General Howard had drawn from the other corps, Sixteenth and Seventeenth, certain reserves which were near at hand but not used. Our entire loss is reported less than six hundred, whereas that of the enemy in killed and wounded was not less than five thousand. Had General Davis' division come up on the Bull's ferry road as I calculated, at any time before four o'clock, what was simply a complete repulse would have been a disastrous rout to the enemy; but I cannot attribute the failure to want of energy or intelligence, and must charge it, like many other things in this campaign, to the peculiar, tangled nature of the forests and absence of roads that would admit the rapid movement of troops.

This affair terminated all efforts of the enemy to check our extension by the flank, which afterward proceeded with comparative ease, but he met our extensions to the south by rapid and well-constructed forts and rifle-pits, built between us and the railroad, to and below East Point, remaining perfectly on the defensive.

Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee did not reach, I was forced to shift General Schofield to that flank also, and afterward General Palmer's corps of General Thomas' army. General Schofield moved from the left on the first of August, and General Palmer's corps followed at once, taking a line below Utoy creek, and General Schofield prolonged it to a point near East Point. The enemy made no offensive opposition, but watched our movements and extended his lines and parapets accordingly.

About this time several changes in important commands occurred, which should be noted. General Hooker, offended that General Howard was preferred to him as the successor of General McPherson, resigned his command of the Twentieth corps, to which General Slocum was appointed; but he was at Vicksburg, and until he joined, the command of the corps devolved on General H. S. Williams, who handled it admirably. General Palmer also resigned the command of the Fourteenth corps, and General Jeff. C. Davis was appointed to his place. Major-General D. S. Stanley had succeeded General Howard in the command of the Fourth corps.

From the second to the fifth we continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along our whole line. General Reiley's brigade of General Cox's division, General Schofield's army, on the fifth, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about four hundred men, who were caught in the entanglements and abatis; but the next day the position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or Macon railroad. The enemy's line at that time must have been nearly fifteen miles long, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. This he was enabled to do by the use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of the ground that we were unable to discover the weak parts.

I had become satisfied that, to reach the Macon road, and thereby control the supplies for Atlanta, I would have to move the whole army; but before beginning I ordered down from Chattanooga four four and a half inch rifled guns, to try their effect. These arrived on the tenth, and were put to work night and day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires, and creating confusion, yet the enemy seemed determined to hold his forts, even if the city should be destroyed. On the sixteenth of August I made my Orders, number fifty-seven, prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin on the eighteenth. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the Twentieth corps, General Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point railroad, near Fairburn, and afterward to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with our wagons loaded with provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders I learned that Wheeler, with a large mounted force of the enemy, variously estimated from six thousand to ten thousand men, had passed around by the east and north, and had made his appearance on our lines of communication near Adairsville, and had succeeded in capturing nine hundred of our beef cattle, and had made a break of the rail-

road near Calhoun. I could not have asked anything better, for I had provided well against such a contingency, and this detachment left me superior to the enemy in cavalry. I suspended the execution of my orders for the time being, and ordered General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about five thousand cavalry, and to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the eighteenth to the West Point road, and break it good near Fairburn; thence to proceed across to the Macon road, and tear it up thoroughly; to avoid as far as possible the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. I thought this cavalry would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of his success it would leave me in better position to take full advantage of the result.

General Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, and broke the West Point road, and afterward reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross' cavalry and got possession of the railroad, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry which had been despatched below Jonesboro' in cars was run back, and disembarked, and with Jackson's rebel cavalry, made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east, and made a circuit, and struck the railroad about Lovejoy's station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines, when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in. He estimated the damage done to the road as enough to interrupt its use for ten days, after which he returned by a circuit north and east, reaching Decatur on the twenty-second. After an interview with General Kilpatrick, I was satisfied that whatever damage he had done would not produce the result desired, and I renewed my orders for the movement of the whole army. This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with our main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta instead of against its intrenchments. All the army commanders were at once notified to send their surplus wagons, encumbrances of all kinds, and sick, back to our intrenched position at the bridge, and that the movement would begin during the night of the twenty-fifth. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth corps, General Stauley, drew out of its lines on our extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's creek. The Twentieth corps, General Williams, moved back to the Chattahoochee. This movement was made without loss, save a few things left in our camps by thoughtless officers or men. The night of the twenty-sixth the movement continued, the Army of the Tennessee drawing out and moving rapidly by a circuit, well toward Sandtown and across Camp creek, the Army of the Cumberland below Utoy creek, General Scho-

field remaining in position. This was effected with the loss of but a single man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell from the enemy. The third movement brought the Army of the Tennessee on the West Point railroad, above Fairburn, the Army of the Cumberland about Red Oak, and General Schofield closed in near Digs and Mins. I then ordered one day's work to be expended in destroying that road, and it was done with a will. Twelve and one half miles were destroyed, the ties burned, and the iron rails heated and tortured by the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, with logs, rock, and earth intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and satisfied with its execution, I ordered the whole army to move the next day eastward by several roads. General Howard on the right toward Jonesboro', General Thomas, the centre, by Shoal Creek Church to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield, on the left, about Morrow's mills. An inspection of the map will show the strategic advantages of this position. The railroad from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge or "divide" between the waters of Flint and Ocmulgee rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. Therefore, the position I have described, which had been well studied on paper, was my first "objective." It gave me "interior lines," something our enemy had enjoyed too long, and I was anxious for once to get the inside track, and therefore my haste and desire to secure it.

The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the twenty-ninth. General Thomas, on the centre, encountered little opposition or difficulty save what resulted from the narrow roads, and reached his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point, and came into position toward Rough-and-Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, had a greater distance to move. He encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal creek, where the enemy also had artillery. Here a short delay occurred, and some cannonading and skirmishing, but General Howard started them again, and kept them moving, passed the Renfro place on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of that day, but he wisely and well kept on and pushed on toward Jonesboro', saved the bridge across Flint river, and did not halt until darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the morning of August thirty-first, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth corps and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act

offensively or defensively, as the case called for.

I was that night with General Thomas at Couch's, and as soon as I learned that General Howard had passed Renfro's, I directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jeff. C. Davis' corps, to move General Stanley's corps in connection with General Schofield's toward Rough-and-Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' corps to feel for the railroad. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough-and-Ready. These movements were progressing during the thirty-first, when the enemy came out of his works at Jonesboro' and attacked General Howard in position described. General Howard was admirably situated to receive him, and repulsed the attack thoroughly. The enemy attacked with Lee's and Hardee's corps, and after a contest of over two hours, withdrew, leaving over four hundred dead on the ground, and his wounded, of which about three hundred were left in Jonesboro', could not have been much less than two thousand five hundred. Hearing the sounds of battle at Jonesboro' about noon, orders were renewed to push the other movements on the left and centre, and about four P. M., the reports arrived simultaneously that General Howard had thoroughly repulsed the enemy at Jonesboro'; that General Schofield had reached the railroad a mile below Rough-and-Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; that General Stanley of General Thomas' army, had also got the road below General Schofield and was destroying its working south, and that General Baird of General Davis' corps had struck it still lower down within four miles of Jonesboro'.

Orders were at once given for all the army to turn on Jonesboro', General Howard to keep the enemy busy while General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. I also ordered the troops as they moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the railroad, because we had it then and I did not know but that events might divert our attention. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to our rear, the north. General Kilpatrick was sent south, down the west bank of Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railroad below Jonesboro'. I expected the whole army would close down on Jonesboro' by noon of the first of September. General Davis' corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was on time, and deployed, facing south, his right in connection with General Howard, and his left on the railroad. General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down along the Rough-and-Ready road, and along the railroad, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, General Blair's corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro', to act against that flank along with General Kilpatrick's cavalry. About

four P. M., General Davis was all ready, and assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners the greater part of Govan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hurry up, but the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads are the reasons assigned why these troops did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. Of course the next morning the enemy was gone, and had retreated south. About two o'clock that night the sounds of heavy explosions were heard in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These continued for about an hour, and again about four A. M. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer us, and these sounds could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. Nevertheless, at daybreak, on finding the enemy gone from his lines at Jonesboro', I ordered a general pursuit south, General Thomas following to the left of the railroad, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield keeping off about two miles to the east. We overtook the enemy again near Lovejoy's station, in a strong, intrenched position, with his flanks well protected behind a branch of Walnut creek to the right, and a confluent of the Flint river to his left. We pushed close up and reconnoitered the ground, and found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville roads.

Rumors began to arrive through prisoners captured that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September first; that Hood had blown up his ammunition-trains, which accounted for the sounds so plainly heard by us, and which were yet unexplained; that Stewart's corps was then retreating toward McDonough, and that the militia had gone off toward Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and I was satisfied with the substantial success already gained. Accordingly I ordered the work of destroying railroad to cease, and the troops to be held in hand, ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

General Jeff. C. Davis' corps had been left above Jonesboro', and General Garrard's cavalry was still further back, and the latter was ordered to send back to Atlanta and ascertain the exact truth and the real situation of affairs. But the same night, viz.: of September fourth, a courier arrived from General Slocum, reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and had retreated on the McDonough road. General Slocum had entered and taken possession on the second of September.

The object of my movement against the rail-

road was, therefore, already reached and concluded, and as it was idle to pursue our enemy in that wooded country with a view to his capture, I gave orders on the fourth for the Army to prepare to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the fifth we drew back to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where we remained a day. On the seventh we moved to Rough-and-Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected, viz.: the Army of the Cumberland grouped round about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and that of the Ohio at Decatur, where the men now occupy clean and healthy camps.

I have not yet received full or satisfactory accounts of Wheeler's operations to our rear, further than that he broke the road about Calhoun and then made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Laibold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off. He then passed up into East Tennessee, and made quite a stay at Athens; but on the first show of pursuit, he kept on north across the Little Tennessee; and crossing the Holston near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, and passed over toward Sequatchee and McMinnville. Thence he seems to have gone to Murfreesboro and Lebanon, and across to Franklin. He may have committed damage to the property of citizens, but has injured us but little, the railroads being repaired about as fast as he broke them. From Franklin he has been pursued toward Florence, and out of the State by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger; but what amount of execution they have done to him is not yet reported. Our roads and telegraph are all repaired, and the cars run with regularity and speed. It is proper to remark in this place, that during the operation of this campaign, expeditions were sent out from Memphis and Vicksburg to check any movements of the enemy's forces in Mississippi upon our communications. The manner in which this object was accomplished reflects credit upon Generals A. J. Smith, Washburn, Slocum, and Mower; and, although General Sturgis' expedition was less successful than the others, it assisted us in the main object to be accomplished.

I must bear full and liberal testimony to the energetic and successful management of our railroads during the campaign. No matter when or where a break has been made, the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was repaired generally before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges—those of the Oostanula, the Etowah, and Chattahoochee—are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time, almost out of material improvised on the spot.

Colonel W. W. Wright, who has charge of the "construction and repairs," is not only a

most skilful, but a wonderfully ingenious, industrious, and zealous officer, and I can hardly do him justice. In like manner the officers charged with running the trains have succeeded to my entire satisfaction, and have worked in perfect harmony with the Quartermasters and Commissaries, bringing forward abundant supplies with such regularity that at no one time have we wanted for provisions, forage, ammunition, or stores of any essential kind.

Colonel L. C. Easton, Chief Quartermaster, and Colonel A. Beckwith, Chief Commissary, have also succeeded, in a manner surprising to all of us, in getting forward supplies. I doubt if ever an army was better supplied than this, and I commend them most highly for it, because I know that more solicitude was felt by the Lieutenant-General commanding, and by the military world at large, on this than on any other one problem involved in the success of the campaign.

Captain T. G. Baylor, Chief Ordnance Officer, has in like manner kept the army well supplied at all times with every kind of ammunition. To Captain O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer, I am more than ordinarily indebted for keeping me supplied with maps and information of roads and topography, as well as in the more important branch of his duties in selecting lines and military positions. My own personal staff has been small but select.

Brigadier-General W. F. Barry, an officer of enlarged capacity and great experience, has filled the office of Chief of Artillery to perfection, and Lieutenant-Colonel E. D. Hitoe, Chief Medical Inspector, has done everything possible to give proper aid and direction to the operations of that important department. I have never seen the wounded removed from the field of battle, cared for, and afterward sent to proper hospitals in the rear with more promptness, system, care, and success, than during this whole campaign, covering over one hundred days of actual battle and skirmish.

My Aides-de-Camp, Major J. C. McCoy, Captain L. M. Dayton and Captain J. C. Audenried have been ever zealous and most efficient, carrying my orders day and night to distant points of our extended lines, with an intelligence and zeal that ensured the perfect working of machinery covering from ten to twenty-five miles of ground, when the least error in the delivery or explanation of an order would have produced confusion; whereas, in great measure owing to the intelligence of these officers, orders have been made so clear that these vast armies have moved side by side, sometimes crossing each other's tracks through a difficult country of over a hundred and thirty-eight miles in length, without confusion or trouble.

Captain Dayton has also fulfilled the duties of my Adjutant-General, making all orders and carrying on the official correspondence.

Three Inspectors-General completed my staff. Brigadier-General J. M. Corse, who has since been assigned the command of a division of the

Sixteenth corps, at the request of General Dodge; Lieutenant-Colonel W. Warner, of the Seventy-sixth Ohio, and Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Ewing, Inspector-General of the Fifteenth corps and Captain Thirteenth United States Regulars.

These officers, of singular energy and intelligence, have been of immense assistance to me in handling these large armies.

My three "armies in the field" were commanded by able officers, my equals in rank and experience. Major-General George H. Thomas, Major-General J. M. Schofield, and Major-General O. O. Howard. With such commanders I had only to indicate the object desired, and they accomplished it. I cannot overestimate their services to the country, and must express my deep and heartfelt thanks that, coming together from different fields, with different interests, they have co-operated with a harmony that has been productive of the greatest amount of success and good feeling. A more harmonious army does not exist.

I now enclose their reports, and those of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, a perusal of which will fill up the sketch which I have endeavored to make. I also submit tabular statements of our losses in battle by wounds and sickness; also, lists of prisoners captured, sent to the rear, and exchanged; also, of the guns and materials of war captured, besides the important country, towns, and arsenals of the enemy that we now "occupy and hold."

All of which is respectfully submitted.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION,
OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 9, 1864.

General J. B. Hood, Commanding Army of Tennessee, Confederate Army:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball & Crew, consenting to the arrangements I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta, who prefer to go in that direction. I enclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly. You style the measure proposed "unprecedented," and appeal to the dark history of war for a parallel, as an act of "studied and ingenious cruelty." It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself, very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted.

Nor is it necessary to appeal to the dark history of war, when recent and modern examples are so handy. You, yourself burned houses along your parapet, and I have seen to-day, fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable, because they have stood in the way of your

forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to town that every cannon shot and many musket-balls from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same at Jonesboro', and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, Mississippi. I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely instance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of a brave people.

I say that it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them now, at once, from the scenes that women and children should not be exposed to, and the "brave people" should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the laws of war, as illustrated in the pages of its dark history.

In the name of common sense I ask you not to appeal to a just God in such a sacrilegious manner. You, who in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war, who dared and badgered us to battle, insulted our flag, seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance sergeant, and seized and made prisoners of war, the very garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians.

Long before any overt act was committed by the, to you, hateful Lincoln Government, you tried to force Kentucky and Missouri into rebellion in spite of themselves, falsified the vote of Louisiana, turned loose your pirates to plunder unarmed ships, expelled Union families by thousands, burned their homes, and declared by an act of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received.

Talk thus to Marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southron among you. If we must be enemies let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to do, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity. God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it will be more humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of a brave people at our backs, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

ETH. B. WADE, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF TENNESSEE, }
September 12, 1864. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commander Military Division of the Mississippi:

GENERAL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the ninth instant,

with its enclosure, in reference to the women, children, and others, whom you have seen proper to expel from their homes in the city of Atlanta. Had you seen proper to let the matter rest there, I would gladly have allowed your letter to close this correspondence, and without your expressing it in words, would have been willing to believe that while "the interest of the United States," in your opinion, compelled you to an act of barbarous cruelty, you regretted the necessity, and we would have dropped the subject. But you have chosen to indulge in statements which I feel compelled to notice, at least so far as to signify my dissent, and not allow silence in regard to them to be construed as acquiescence. I see nothing in your communication, which induces me to modify the language of condemnation with which I characterized your order. It but strengthens me in the opinion that it stands "pre-eminent in the dark history of war, for studied and ingenious cruelty." Your original order was stripped of all pretence; you announced the edict for the sole reason that it was "to the interest of the United States." This alone, you offered to us and the civilized world as an all-sufficient reason for disregarding the laws of God and man. You say that "General Johnston himself, very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down." It is due to the gallant soldier and gentleman to say that no act of his distinguished career gives the least color to your unfounded aspersion upon his conduct. He depopulated no villages, nor towns, nor cities, either friendly or hostile. He offered and extended friendly aid to his unfortunate fellow-citizens, who desired to flee from your fraternal embrace. You are unfortunate in your attempt to find a justification for this act of cruelty, either in the defence of Jonesboro' by General Hardee, or of Atlanta by myself. General Hardee defended his position in front of Jonesboro' at the expense of injury to the houses, an ordinary, proper, and justifiable act of war. I defended Atlanta at the same risk and cost. If there was any fault in either case, it was your own, in not giving notice, especially in the case of Atlanta, of your purpose to shell the town, which is usual in war among civilized nations. No inhabitant of either town was expelled from his home and fireside by either General Hardee or myself, and therefore your recent order can find no support from the conduct of either of us. I feel no other emotion than pain in reading that portion of your letter which attempts to justify your shelling of Atlanta without notice, under the pretence that I defended Atlanta upon a line so close to town that every cannon-shot, and many musket-balls from your line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. I made no complaint of your firing into Atlanta in any way you thought proper. I make none now, but there are a hundred thousand living witnesses that you fired into the habitations of women and children for weeks, firing far above and miles

beyond my lines of defence. I have too good an opinion, founded both upon observation and experience, of the skill of your artillerists, to credit the assertion, that they, for several weeks, unintentionally fired too high for my modest field-works, and slaughtered women and children by accident and want of skill.

The residue of your letter is rather discursive. It opens a wide field for the discussion of questions which I do not feel are committed to me. I am only a General of one of the armies of the Confederate States, charged with military operations in the field, under the direction of my superior officers, and I am not called upon to discuss with you the cause of the present war, or the political questions which led to or resulted from it. These grave and important questions have been committed to far abler hands than mine, and I shall only refer to them so far as to repel any unjust conclusion which might be drawn from my silence. You charge my country with "daring and badgering you to battle." The truth is, we sent commissioners to you, respectfully offering a peaceful separation, before the first gun was fired on either side. You say we insulted your flag. The truth is we fired upon it and those who fought under it when you came to our doors upon the mission of subjugation. You say we seized upon your forts and arsenals, and made prisoners of the garrisons sent to protect us against negroes and Indians. The truth is, we expelled by force of arms insolent intruders, and took possession of our own forts and arsenals, to resist your claim to dominion over masters, slaves and Indians, all of whom are to this day, with unanimity unexampled in the history of the world, warring against your attempts to become their masters. You say that we tried to force Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion in spite of themselves. The truth is, my Government, from the beginning of this struggle to this hour, has again and again offered, before the whole world, to leave it to the unbiassed will of those States, and all others, to determine for themselves whether they will cast their destiny with your Government or ours; and your Government has resisted this fundamental principle of free institutions with the bayonet, and labors daily by force and fraud, to fasten its hateful tyranny upon the unfortunate freemen of these States. You say we falsified the vote of Louisiana. The truth is, Louisiana not only separated herself from your Government by nearly a unanimous vote of her people, but has vindicated the act upon every battle-field from Gettysburg to the Sabine, and has exhibited an heroic devotion to her decision which challenges the admiration and respect of every man capable of feeling sympathy for the oppressed, or admiration for heroic valor. You say that we turned loose pirates to plunder your unarmed ships. The truth is, when you robbed us of our part of the navy, we built and bought a few vessels, hoisted the flag of our country, and swept the seas in

defiance of your navy, around the whole circumference of the globe. You say we have expelled Union families by thousands. The truth is, not a single family has been expelled from the Confederate States, that I am aware of, but on the contrary, the moderation of our Government toward traitors has been a fruitful theme of denunciation by its enemies, and many well-meaning friends of our cause. You say my Government, by acts of Congress, has confiscated "all debts due Northern men for goods sold and delivered." The truth is, Congress gave due and ample time to your merchants and traders to depart from our shores with their ships, goods, and effects, and only sequestered the property of our enemies in retaliation for their acts declaring us traitors, and confiscating our property wherever their power extended, either in their country or our own. Such are your accusations, and such are the facts, known of all men to be true.

You order into exile the whole population of a city, drive men, women and children from their houses at the point of the bayonet, under the plea that it is to the interest of your Government, and on the claim that this is an act of "kindness to these families of Atlanta." Butler only banished from New Orleans the registered enemies of his Government, and acknowledged that he did it as a punishment. You issue a sweeping edict covering all the inhabitants of a city, and add insult to the injury heaped upon the defenceless, by assuming that you have done them a kindness. This you follow by the assertion that you will "make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southron." And because I characterize what you call kindness as being real cruelty, you presume to sit in judgment between me and my God, and you decide that my earnest prayer to the Almighty Father to save our women and children from what you call kindness, is a "sacrilegious, hypocritical appeal."

You come into our country with your army avowedly for the purpose of subjugating free white men, women and children; and not only intend to rule over them, but you make negroes your allies, and desire to place over us an inferior race, which we have raised from barbarism to its present position, which is the highest ever attained by that race in any country, in all time. I must, therefore, decline to accept your statements in reference to your kindness toward the people of Atlanta, and your willingness to sacrifice everything for the peace and honor of the South, and refuse to be governed by your decision in regard to matters between myself, my country, and my God.

You say "let us fight it out like men." To this my reply is, for myself, and, I believe, for all true men, eye and women and children, in my country, we will fight you to death. Better die a thousand deaths than to submit to live under you or your Government and your negro allies.

Having answered the points forced upon me by your letter of the ninth September, I close this correspondence with you, and notwithstanding your comments upon my appeal to God in the cause of humanity, I again humbly and reverently invoke his Almighty aid in defence of justice and right.

Respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. B. HOOD,
General.

F. H. WIGFALL,
Aide-de-Camp.

THE CITIZENS' PETITION.

ATLANTA, GEORGIA, September 11.

Major-General W. T. Sherman:

SIR: The undersigned, mayor and two members of council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfully, to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta. At first view it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that the amount of it will involve, in the aggregate, consequences appalling and heartrending. Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy, others now having young children, and whose husbands are either in the army, prisoners or dead. Some say: I have such a one sick at home; who will wait on them when I am gone? Others say: What are we to do? we have no homes to go to, and no means to buy, build, or to rent any—no parents, friends or relatives to go to. Another says: I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much. We reply to them, General Sherman will carry your property to Rough-and-Ready, and General Hood will take it thence on. And they will reply to that: But I want to leave the railroad at such a point, and cannot get conveyance from there on. We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a large portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses to accommodate the people; and we are informed that many are now staying in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? and how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter or subsistence—in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them, if they were willing to do so? This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, and

the suffering, cannot be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration. We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter; but though it might be that you had not considered the subject in all its awful consequences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make that people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred; surely none such in the United States; and what has this helpless people done, that they are at once to be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts and exiles, and to subsist on charity? We do not know, as yet, the number of people still here. Of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer period, and who might not need assistance at any time. In conclusion, we most earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider that order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

Respectfully submitted,

JAMES M. CALHOUN,
Mayor.
E. E. RAWSON,
L. C. WELLS.
Councilmen.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA.,
September 12, 1864.

James M. Calhoun, Mayor. E. E. Rawson, and
L. C. Wells, representing the City Council of
Atlanta:

GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the eleventh, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions, of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have Peace, not only in Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have years of military operations from this quarter, and, therefore,

deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is not consistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go now, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting till the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course, I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that *my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away*, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have *peace and a division of our country*. If the United States submits to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on *till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war*. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to preserve it, *it is gone*, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of *Union*. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army at once become your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know, those who desire a government, and those who insist on war and its desolation. You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home is *to stop this war*, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes, or your horses, or your houses, or your land, or anything you have; but we do want, and will have, a *just obedience to the laws of the United States*. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements we cannot help it. You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters, the better for you.

I repeat, then, that by *the original compact*

of government, the United States had certain rights in Georgia, which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., long before Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I, myself, have seen in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now, that war comes home to you, you feel very different—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent carloads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good-people, who only ask to live in peace at their old homes, and under the government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect an early success.

But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call on me for anything. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your homes and families against danger from any quarter. Now, you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.

Yours in haste,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

GENERAL LOGAN'S REPORTS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSES, }
BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., July 24. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the following summary of the result of the battle of the twenty-second ult:

Total loss in killed, wounded and missing, three thousand five hundred and twenty-one, and ten pieces of artillery. We have buried and delivered to the enemy under a flag of truce sent in by them, in front of the Seventeenth Army Corps, one thousand of their killed; the number of their dead in front of the Fourth division of the same corps, including those on ground not now occupied by our troops, General Blair reports will swell the number of their dead on his front to two thousand. The number of dead buried in front of the Fifteenth corps, up to this hour, is three hundred and sixty; and the commanding officer reports at least as many more are unburied. The number of dead buried in front of the Six-

teenth corps was four hundred and twenty-two. We have over one thousand of their wounded in our hands—a larger number of wounded having been carried off during the night, after the engagement, by them. We captured eighteen stands of colors, and have them now; also captured five thousand stand arms. The attack was made on our line seven times, and was seven times repulsed. Hood's, Hardee's corps and Wheeler's cavalry engaged us. We have sent to the rear one thousand prisoners, including thirty-three commissioned officers of high rank. We still occupy the field, and the troops are in fine spirits.

Our total loss is 3,521; the enemy's dead, thus far reported, buried or delivered to them, 3,220; total prisoners sent north, 1,017; total prisoners wounded in our hands, 1,000; estimated loss of enemy, at least 10,000.

Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
JNO. A. LOGAN,
Major-General.

To Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of Mississippi.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
BEFORE ATLANTA, July 29, 1864. }

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, in pursuance of orders, I moved my command in position on the right of the Seventeenth Army Corps, which was the extreme right of the army in the field, on the night and morning of the twenty-seventh and twenty-eighth instant, and during my advance in line of battle to a more desirable position we were met by the rebel infantry from Hardee's and Lee's corps, who made a desperate and determined attack at half-past eleven o'clock A. M., on the twenty-eighth.

My lines were only protected by logs and rails, hastily thrown in front of them. The first onset was received and checked, and the battle commenced, and lasted until about three o'clock in the afternoon. During that time six successive charges were made, which were six times gallantly repulsed, each time with fearful loss to the enemy.

Later in the evening my lines were several times assaulted vigorously, but each time with like result. The most of the fighting occurred on Generals Harrow's and Smith's fronts, which formed the centre and right of the command. The troops could not have displayed more courage nor greater determination not to yield. Had they shown less they would have been driven from their position. Brigadier-Generals Wood's, Harrow's, and Smith's division commands are entitled to equal credit for gallant conduct and skill in repelling the assaults. My thanks are due to Major-Generals Blair and Dodge for sending me reinforcements at a time when they were much needed.

My losses are fifty killed, four hundred and thirty-nine wounded, and fifty-three missing; aggregate, five hundred and seventy-two.

The division of General Harrow captured five battle-flags. There were about fifteen hundred or two thousand muskets captured. One hundred and six prisoners were captured, exclusive of seventy-three wounded, who have been removed to hospitals, and are being taken care of by our surgeons. Five hundred and sixty-five rebels, up to this time, have been buried, and about two hundred are supposed to be yet unburied. Large numbers were undoubtedly carried away during the night, as the enemy did not withdraw until nearly daylight. The enemy's loss could not have been, in my judgment, less than six or seven thousand.

I am, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Major-General, commanding Fifteenth Army Corps.
Lientenant-Colonel W. T. CLARK,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The endorsement upon the above report is as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OF THE
TENNESSEE, BEFORE ATLANTA, GA., July 29, 1864. }

In forwarding the within report I wish to express my high gratification with the conduct of the troops engaged. I never saw better conduct in battle. The General commanding the Fifteenth Army Corps, though ill and much worn, was indefatigable, and the success of the day is as much attributable to him as to any one man. His officers, and in fact all the officers of this army that commanded my observation, co-operated promptly and heartily with him.

O. O. HOWARD,
Major-General.

GENERAL THOMAS' ORDER.

ARMY HEADQUARTERS, }
July 28, 1864. }

The Major-General commanding the army congratulates the troops upon the brilliant success attending the Union arms in the late battles. In the battle of the twentieth instant, in which the Twentieth corps, one division of the Fourth corps, and part of the Fourteenth corps were engaged, the total Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was one thousand seven hundred and thirty-three. In front of the Twentieth corps there were put out of the fight six thousand rebels; five hundred and sixty-three of the enemy were buried by our own troops, and the rebels were permitted to bury two hundred and fifty. The Second division of the Fourth corps repulsed seven different assaults of the enemy, with light loss to themselves, and which must have swelled the number of dead buried by the rebels to beyond three hundred. We also captured seven stands of colors. No official report has been received of the part taken in the battle by the Fourteenth corps. In the battle of the twenty-second instant the total Union loss in killed, wounded and missing was three thousand five hundred, and ten pieces of artillery. The

rebel loss in prisoners captured was three thousand two hundred. The known dead of the enemy in front of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth corps and one division of the Seventeenth corps was two thousand one hundred and forty-two. The other divisions of the Seventeenth corps repulsed six assaults of the enemy before they fell back, and which will swell the rebel loss in killed to at least three thousand. The latest reports state that we buried over three thousand two hundred rebels killed in this fight. There were captured from the enemy in this battle eighteen stands of colors and five thousand stands of arms.

By command of

Major-General THOMAS.

W. D. WHIFFLE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

GENERAL HOWARD'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE
TENNESSEE, EAST POINT, GA., }
September 2, 1864. }

General Field Orders No. 10.

It is with pride, gratification and a sense of Divine favor that I congratulate this noble army upon the successful termination of the campaign.

Your officers claim for you a wonderful record—for example, a march of four hundred miles, thirteen distinct engagements, four thousand prisoners, and twenty stands of colors captured, and three thousand of the enemy's dead buried in your front.

Your movements upon the enemy's flank have been bold and successful; first upon Resaca, second upon Dallas, third upon Kenesaw, fourth upon Nickajack, fifth, via Roswell, upon the Augusta railroad, sixth upon Ezra Church, to the south-west of Atlanta, and seventh upon Jonesboro' and the Macon railroad. Atlanta was evacuated while you were fighting at Jonesboro'.

The country may never know with what patience, labor and exposure, you have tugged away at every natural and artificial obstacle that an enterprising and confident enemy could interpose. The terrific battles you have fought may never be realized or credited, still a glad acclaim is already greeting you from the Government and people, in view of the results you have helped to gain, and I believe a sense of the magnitude of the achievements of the last hundred days will not abate, but increase with time and history.

Our rejoicing is tempered, as it always must be, by the soldier's sorrow at the loss of his companions-in-arms. On every hillside, in every valley, throughout your long and circuitous route, from Dalton to Jonesboro', you have buried them.

Your trusted and beloved commander fell in your midst; his name, the name of McPherson, carries with it a peculiar feeling of sorrow. I trust the impress of his character is upon you

all, to incite you to generous actions and noble deeds.

To mourning friends, and to all the disabled in battle, you extend a soldier's sympathy.

My first intimate acquaintance with you dates from the twenty-eighth of July. I never beheld fiercer assaults than the enemy then made, and I never saw troops more steady and self-possessed in action than your divisions which were then engaged.

I have learned that for cheerfulness, obedience, rapidity of movement, and confidence in battle, the Army of Tennessee is not to be surpassed, and it shall be my study that your fair record shall continue, and my purpose to assist you to move steadily forward and plant the old flag in every proud city of the rebellion.

O. O. HOWARD,
Major-General.

SAMUEL L. TAGGART,
Assistant Adjutant-General

ORDER OF GENERAL LOGAN.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
EAST POINT, GA., September 11, 1864.

Officers and Soldiers of the Fifteenth Army Corps:

You have borne your part in the accomplishment of the object of this campaign—a part well and faithfully done.

On the first day of May, 1864, from Huntsville, Alabama, and its vicinity, you commenced the march. The marches and labors performed by you during this campaign will hardly find a parallel in the history of the war. The proud name heretofore acquired by the Fifteenth corps, for soldierly bearing and daring deeds, remains untarnished, its lustre undimmed. During the campaign you constituted the main portion of the flanking column of the whole army. Your first move against the enemy was around the right of the army at Resaca, where, by your gallantry, the enemy were driven from the hills and his works on the main road from Villanow to Resaca. On the retreat of the enemy, you moved on the right flank of the army, by a circuitous route, to Adairsville; in the same manner from there to Kingston and Dallas, where, on the twenty-third of May, you met the veteran corps of Hardee, and, in a severe and bloody contest, you hurled him back, killing and wounding over two thousand, besides capturing a large number of prisoners. You then moved round to the left of the army by way of Ackworth, to Kenesaw Mountain, where again you met the enemy, driving him from three lines of works, and capturing over three hundred prisoners. During your stay in front of Kenesaw Mountain, on the twenty-seventh of June, you made one of the most daring, bold, and heroic charges of the war, against the almost impregnable position of the enemy on the Little Kenesaw. You were then moved by way of Marietta, to Nickajack creek, on the right of our army; thence back to the extreme left by way of Marietta and Roswell, to the Augusta rail-

road, near Stone Mountain, a distance of fifty miles, and after effectually destroying the railroad at this point, you moved by way of Decatur to the immediate front of the rebel stronghold, Atlanta. Here, on the twenty-second day of July, you again performed your duty nobly, as patriots and soldiers, in one of the most severe and sanguinary conflicts of the campaign. With hardly time to recover your almost exhausted energies, you were moved again around to the right of the army, only to fight the same troops against whom you had so recently contended; and the battle of the twenty-eighth of July, at Ezra Chapel, will long be remembered by the officers and soldiers of this command. On that day it was that the Fifteenth corps, almost unaided and alone, for four hours contested the field against the corps of Hardee and Lee. You drove them discomfited from the field; causing them to leave their dead and many of their wounded in your hands. The many noble and gallant deeds performed by you on this day will be remembered among the proudest acts of our nation's history. After pressing the enemy closely for several days, you again moved to the right of the army, to the West Point railroad, near Fairburn. After completely destroying the road for some distance, you marched to Jonesboro, driving the enemy before you from Pond creek, a distance of ten miles. At this point you again met the enemy, composed of Lee's and Hardee's corps, on the thirty-first of August, and punished them severely, driving them in confusion from the field, with their dead and many wounded and prisoners left in your hands. Here again, by your skill and true courage, you kept sacred the reputation you have so long maintained, viz.: "The Fifteenth corps never meets the enemy but to strike and defeat him." On the first of September, the Fourteenth corps attacked Hardee. You at once opened fire on him, and by your co-operation his defeat became a rout. Hood, hearing the news, blew up his ammunition trains, retreated, and Atlanta was ours.

You have marched during the campaign, in your windings, the distance of four hundred miles; have put *hors de combat* more of the enemy than your corps numbers; have captured twelve stands of arms, two thousand four hundred and fifty prisoners, and two hundred and ten deserters. The course of your march is marked by the graves of patriotic heroes, who have fallen by your side; but, at the same time, it is more plainly marked by the blood of traitors, who have defied the Constitution and laws, insulted and trampled under foot the glorious flag of our country. We deeply sympathize with the friends of those of our comrades-in-arms who have fallen; our sorrows are only appeased by the knowledge that they fell as brave men, battling for the preservation and perpetuation of one of the best governments of earth. "Peace be to their ashes."

You now rest for a short time from your la-

bors. During your respite prepare for future action. Let the country see, at all times, by your conduct, that you love the cause you have espoused; that you have no sympathy with any who would by word or deed assist vile traitors in dismembering our mighty republic or trailing in the dust the emblem of our national greatness and glory. You are the defenders of a government that has blessed you heretofore with peace, happiness and prosperity. Its perpetuity depends upon your heroism, faithfulness and devotion.

When the time shall come to go forward again, let us go with the determination to save our nation from threatened wreck, and hopeless ruin, not forgetting the appeal from widows and orphans that is borne to us upon every breeze, to avenge the loss of their loved ones who have fallen in the defence of their country. Be patient, obedient, and earnest, and the day is not far distant when you can return to your homes with the proud consolation that you have assisted in causing the old banner to again wave from every mountain, and over every town and hamlet of our once happy land, and hear the shouts of triumph ascend from a grateful people, proclaiming that once more we have one flag and one country.

JOHN A. LOGAN,
Major-General Commanding.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE }
MISSISSIPPI, IN THE FIELD, ATLANTA, GA., Sept. 8. }

Special Field Orders, No. 68.

The officers and soldiers of the Armies of the Cumberland, Ohio, and Tennessee, have already received the thanks of the nation through its President and Commander-in-chief; and it remains now only for him who has been with you from the beginning, and who intends to stay all the time, to thank the officers and men for their intelligence, fidelity and courage displayed in the campaign of Atlanta.

On the first day of May our armies were lying in garrison, seemingly quiet, from Knoxville to Huntsville, and our enemy lay behind his rocky-faced barrier at Dalton, proud, defiant and exulting. He had had time since Christmas to recover from his discomfiture on the Mission Ridge, with his ranks filled, and a new commander-in-chief, second to none of the Confederacy in reputation for skill, sagacity and extreme popularity.

All at once, our armies assumed life and action, and appeared before Dalton; threatening Rocky Face we threw ourselves upon Resaca, and the rebel army only escaped by the rapidity of its retreat, aided by the numerous roads with which he was familiar, and which were strange to us.

Again he took post at Allatoona, but we gave him no rest, and by a circuit toward Dallas, and a subsequent movement to Ackworth, we gained the Allatoona Pass. Then followed the eventful

battles about Kennesaw, and the escape of the enemy across the Chattahoochee river.

The crossing of the Chattahoochee and breaking of the Augusta road was most handsomely executed by us, and will be studied as an example in the art of war. At this stage of our game, our enemies became dissatisfied with their old and skilful commander, and selected one more bold and rash. New tactics were adopted. Hood first boldly and rapidly, on the twentieth of July, fell on our right at Peach-tree Creek, and lost.

Again, on the twenty-second, he struck our extreme left, and was severely punished; and finally again, on the twenty-eighth, he repeated the attempt on our right, and that time must have been satisfied, for since that date he has remained on the defensive. We slowly and gradually drew our lines about Atlanta, feeling for the railroads which supplied the Rebel army, and made Atlanta a place of importance.

We must concede to our enemy that he met these efforts patiently and skilfully, but at last he made the mistake we had waited for so long, and sent his cavalry to our rear, far beyond the reach of recall. Instantly our cavalry was on his only remaining road, and we followed quickly with our principal army, and Atlanta fell into our possession as the fruit of well-concerted measures, backed by a brave and competent army.

This completed the grand task which had been assigned us by our Government, and your General again repeats his personal and official thanks to all the officers and men composing this army, for the indomitable courage and perseverance which alone could give success.

We have beaten our enemy on every ground he has chosen, and have wrested from him his own Gate City, where were located his foundries, arsenals and workshops, deemed secure on account of their distance from our base, and the seeming impregnable obstacles intervening. Nothing is impossible to an army like this, determined to vindicate a Government wherever our flag has once floated, and resolved to maintain them at any and all cost.

In our campaign many, yea, very many of our noble and gallant comrades have preceded us to our common destination, the grave; but they have left the memory of deeds, on which a nation can build a proud history. McPherson, Harker, McCook, and others, dear to us all, are now the binding links in our minds, that should attach more closely together the living, who have to complete the task which still lies before us in the dim future.

I ask all to continue as they have so well begun, the cultivation of the soldierly virtues that have ennobled our own and other countries. Courage, patience, obedience to the laws and constituted authorities of our Government; fidelity to our trusts, and good feeling among each other; each trying to excel the other in the practice of those high qualities, and it will then require no prophet to foretell that our

country will in time emerge from this war purified by the fires of war, and worthy its great founder, Washington.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

THE DESPATCH FROM GENERAL GRANT.

CITY POINT, VA., September 4,—9 P. M.

Major-General Sherman:

I have just received your despatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory, I have just ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing upon the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour, amidst great rejoicing.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

All the corps, regiments and batteries composing the army may, without further orders, inscribe Atlanta on their colors. By order of
Major-General SHERMAN.

L. M. DAYTON,
Aid-de-Camp.

By command of Major-General THOMAS.
ROBERT H. RAMSEY,
A. A. G.

Doc. 40.

THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG, PA.

CORRECTION OF OFFICIAL REPORTS.

TULLAHOMA, December 30, 1863.

DEAR GENERAL: Your favor of the twenty-third has been received. I enclose a copy of a letter which I send to General Meade by the mail of to-day. I wish you would try to see Meade after he gets my letter, and talk this matter over, and learn what he intends to do. He must write to the Secretary of War on the subject.

My corps is together again, Geary having been ordered to Bridgeport and Stevenson. I feel confident that everything will work out right in the end, and I am very anxious you should return to the corps before the spring campaign opens. I will endeavor to give you a position more agreeable to you than the one you have held heretofore. So don't make arrangements which will take you away.

Williams has gone on leave.

Please let me hear from you.

Yours truly,

H. W. SLOCUM.

To Brigadier-General GEORGE S. GREENE.

LETTER FROM GENERAL SLOCUM.

HEADQUARTERS TWELFTH CORPS, }
December 1863.

*Major-General George G. Meade Commanding
Army of the Potomac.*

GENERAL: I enclose herewith the report of General T. H. Ruger, of operations of the First

division, Twelfth corps, at the battle of Gettysburg, together with the reports of his brigade and regimental commanders. General Ruger with a large portion of his division was ordered to New York city soon after the battle, and immediately after his return from New York, the corps was ordered to this department. The reports of General Williams and myself were delayed with the hope of receiving General Ruger's report in time to forward it with them. I deeply regret the necessity which compelled me to send my report and that of General Williams unaccompanied by any report of the operations of the First division, for although an account of the operations of this division was given in the report of General Williams who commanded the corps during the battle, I think the absence of Ruger's report may account for some of the errors contained in your report as to the operations of the Twelfth corps.

I enclose a letter from General Williams calling my attention to these errors, to which I respectfully invite your attention, and if anything can be done at this late day to correct these errors, I trust you will do it. Your report is the official history of this important battle, and to this report reference will always be made by our Government, our people, and the historian, as the most reliable and accurate account of the services performed by each corps, division and brigade of your army. If you have inadvertently given to one division the credit of having performed some meritorious service, which was in reality performed by another division, you do an injustice to brave men, and defraud them of well-earned laurels. It is an injustice which even time cannot correct. That errors of this nature exist in your official report is an indisputable fact.

You give great credit to Lockwood's brigade for services on the evening of July second, but state that this brigade was a portion of the First corps, while it never at any time belonged to that corps, but was a portion of the Twelfth corps, and was accompanied in its operations on the evening of July second, by General Williams in person. A portion of this brigade (the One Hundred and Fiftieth New York) is still in General Williams' division. I copy the following statement from your report: "During the heavy assault on our left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements; during their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps, advanced and occupied part of the line. On the morning of the third, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary reinforced by Wheaton's brigade of the Sixth corps, main-

tained his position and inflicted severe losses on the enemy."

From this statement it would appear that Geary's division marched to the support of your left, that Williams' division did not; that his (Williams') division, or a portion of it, were guarding the intrenchments when the enemy gained possession; that General Geary returned and with his division drove the enemy back; that the engagement on the following morning was fought by Geary's division assisted by Wheaton's brigade. This, I know, is the inference drawn from your history of these operations by every person unacquainted with the truth. Yet the facts in the case are very nearly the reverse of the above in every particular, and directly in contradiction to the facts, as set forth in the report of General Geary, as well as that of General Williams. Geary's division didn't march even in the direction of your left. Two of his brigades, under his immediate command, left the intrenchments under orders to move to the support of your left, but through some unfortunate mistake he took the road leading to Two Taverns. Williams' entire division did more to the support of your left, and it was one of his brigades (Lockwood's) under his immediate command, which you commend, but very singularly accredit to the First corps.

Greene's brigade of the Second division remained in the intrenchments, and the failure of the enemy to gain entire possession of our works, was due entirely to the skill of General Greene, and the heroic valor of his troops. His brigade suffered severely, but maintained its position, and held the enemy in check until the return of Williams' division. The "spirited contest maintained by General Geary reinforced by Wheaton's brigade," was a contest for regaining the portion of our intrenchments held by the enemy, and was conducted under the immediate command of General Williams, and was participated in by the entire Twelfth corps, reinforced, not by Wheaton's, but by Shaler's brigade.

Although the command of the Twelfth corps was given temporarily to General Williams by your order, and although you directed him to meet at the council with other corps commanders, you fail to mention his name in your entire report, and in no place allude to his having any such command, or to the fact that more than one corps was at any time placed under my command, although at no time after you assumed command of the army, until the close of this battle, was I in command of less than two corps, and I have now in my possession your written order dated July second, directing me to assume command of the Sixth corps, and with that corps, and the two then under my command, the Fifth and Twelfth, to move forward and at once attack the enemy. I allude to this fact for the purpose of refreshing your memory on a subject which you had apparently entirely forgotten when you penned your report,

for you have not failed to notice the fact of General Schurz and others having held, even for a few hours, commands above that previously held by them.

I sincerely trust that you will endeavor to correct as far as possible the errors above mentioned and that the correction may be recorded at the War Department.

I am, General, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
H. W. SLOCUM,
Major-General Commanding.

GENERAL MEADE'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
February 25, 1864. }

Major-General H. W. Halleck, General-in-chief,
Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I transmit herewith the report of Brigadier-General T. H. Ruger, commanding First division, Twelfth Army Corps, and those of his brigade and regimental commanders, of the operations of his division at the battle of Gettysburg. These reports were only recently received by me, owing to General Ruger's being detached with a large portion of his command not long after the battle, and soon after his return the corps was ordered to Tennessee. I beg these reports may be placed on file, as part of my official report of the battle.

I embrace this opportunity to make certain corrections and alterations in my report, to which my attention has been called by Major-General Slocum.

These alterations are as follows:

First. In relating the occurrences of the second of July I state: "In the meantime perceiving the great exertions on the part of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major-General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps (to the command of which I had assigned Major-General Newton), particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps, were all brought up."

This should read. "In the meantime perceiving the great exertion on the part of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major-General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps, (to the command of which I had assigned Major-General Newton) together with detachments from the Second corps, were all brought up. Subsequently the First division and Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth corps, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, then temporarily commanding the corps, arrived at the scene of action. The services of Lockwood's brigade being particularly mentioned."

Second. In relating the occurrences of July third. During the heavy assaults upon our extreme left portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. "During their absence, the line of the extreme right was held by a much reduced force, and was taken the advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Geary's division, Twelfth corps, advanced

and occupied a part of the line. On the morning of the third, General Geary having returned during the night, was attacked at early dawn by the enemy, but succeeded in driving him back and occupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained all the morning along this part of the line. General Geary, reinforced by Wheaton's brigade, Sixth corps, maintained his position, inflicting severe losses on the enemy."

This should read: "During the heavy assaults on our extreme left, the First division and Lockwood's brigade of the Twelfth corps, were sent as reinforcements, as already reported. Two brigades of Geary's division (Second) of this corps were also detached for the same purpose, but did not arrive at the scene of action, owing to having mistaken the road. The detachment of so large a portion of the Twelfth corps with its temporary commander Brigadier-General A. S. Williams, left the defences of the line previously held to the remaining brigade of the Second division, commanded by General Greene, who held the left of the Twelfth corps, now become the extreme right of the army. The enemy perceiving the withdrawal of our troops, advanced and attacked General Greene with great vigor, who, making a gallant defence, and being soon reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, contiguous to him, succeeded in repulsing all the efforts of the enemy to dislodge him. After night, on the return of the detachments sent to the left, it was found the enemy were occupying portions of the line of breastworks thrown up by the Twelfth corps. Brigadier-General Williams in command immediately made arrangements by the disposition of his artillery, and instructions to both divisions, commanded respectively by Brigadier-Generals Geary and Ruger, to attack the enemy at daylight, and regain the position formerly occupied by the corps. In the meantime the enemy brought up strong reinforcements, and at early daylight a spirited contest commenced, which continued till after ten A. M., the result of which was the repulse of the enemy in all of his attempts to advance, and his final abandonment of the position he had taken the evening before. During this contest Shaler's brigade, Sixth corps, was sent to reinforce the Twelfth corps. With this exception the line remained undisturbed."

I should be glad, as an act of justice, if this communication could be published.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
GEORGE G. MEADE,
 Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
 March 10, 1864. }

Brigadier-General G. S. Greene, Washington, D. C.:

GENERAL: I could not procure from General Halleck a copy of my letter, containing my re-

port of the battle of Gettysburg, but will have one made on my return, from the original, which I have with me. I trust it will prove satisfactory to you, although I have not made such particular mention of your services as they undoubtedly deserved, and as it would have gratified me to do had my report been other than a general one. I take this occasion to say that, as God is my witness, I had no intention of doing injustice to you, or any other man in the Twelfth corps, or any other corps.

Very truly yours,

GEORGE G. MEADE,
 Major-General.

Doc. 41.

GUERRILLA BARBARITIES.

THE FIGHT AT ROSEVILLE, ARK.

The Roseville fight occurred on the morning of the fourth of April, 1864. The attacking party consisted of the Thirtieth Texas cavalry, four hundred strong, under Lieutenant-Colonel Battles, and fifty guerrillas, under Titworth. Our force was about seventy-five men of the Second and Sixth Kansas cavalry, under Captains Gardner and Goss. The balance of their command was out foraging. The pickets were driven in at eight A. M. Our boys made barricades of cotton bales, and behind these, and in some log houses, met the enemy. The latter dismounted about half a mile from town, and advanced through the timber. They charged gallantly into the town, at the same time making flank movements. The fight was severe and gallant, both sides coming to the work bravely. Under the rapid fire of our Sharpe's rifles the enemy finally fell back disordered, retreating in great haste. Eight or ten of their dead were left on the field or found afterward. Eleven of their wounded were found, and are now in our hospital. Major Davenport and Lieutenant Armstrong, of the Texas cavalry, are also reported killed. The loss on our side was: Sixth Kansas cavalry, Company D, Captain Goss, three killed, five wounded; Second Kansas cavalry, Company D, one killed and one wounded; Company E, four wounded. Total, four killed and ten wounded. The loss of the enemy, from what they abandoned and what they left, could not be less than fifteen killed and twenty-five wounded.

Doctor Prentiss, of the First Kansas colored volunteers, arrived at Roseville next day, from General Steele's army, and took charge of the wounded. It was a fortunate circumstance, as the Assistant-Surgeon of the Sixth, Doctor S. A. Fairchild, sent with an escort from this place, was most inhumanly butchered, after capture, by bushwhackers. Doctor Fairchild left Fort Smith on the fifth, with an escort of twenty-six men, under Lieutenant McKibben, of the Sixth.

Twenty-five miles south of this place it was reported that, the day before, one hundred rebels passed through Charlestown. They passed a recently abandoned post about six miles further, and three miles further on, at the farm of a well-known bushwhacker, they were fired upon by about fifty men, stationed in a ravine. At the same time a large force was seen on each side of the road, endeavoring to surround the escort. Lieutenant McKibben, seeing that was his only chance, directed the men to keep well together, and ordered a charge. With sixteen of the men he got safely through to Roseville, after a sharp fight and severe chase. Doctor Fairchild and eleven of the men fell into the hands of the enemy. On the next day the Lieutenant returned to the scene of the attack. The bodies of nine men were found on the road. Evidences were plenty of a severe struggle, but the appearance of the bodies was the most damning evidence of the fiendishness of the rebels. All of them were stripped of all clothing, and horribly mutilated. One man's head was beaten to a jelly, evidently with the butts of guns. Not a wound was found on him, otherwise than the blows on his head. Others had their ears and noses cut off, and three of the party were castrated. Next day, the doctor's body, and those of the other two, were found. The surgeon was shot through the head and shoulders, and his was the only body un mutilated. A woman was seen on horseback among the guerrillas as our men came in sight, who galloped off when the fight commenced. A woman living near the place says Doctor Fairchild told his captors the errand he was on, and entreated that he and his men should be treated as prisoners of war. They were answered by the assassins with curses and blows. They were reported to be led by Fitzwilliams, who, if anything, is more fiendish in character than Quantrell. Over two hundred loyal Arkansians were murdered by him in the vicinity of Fort Smith during the few weeks prior to the occupation by General Blunt.

Another guerrilla band, under the lead of Buck Brown, surprised a party of ten men belonging to the First Arkansas cavalry, who were herding public stock near the Prairie Grove battlefield. The bushwhackers, twenty-one in number, were clothed in Federal uniform. They pretended to belong to the Thirteenth Kansas. The Arkansians were in a house, and were called out by the disguised rebels. While conversing in a friendly way, they commenced firing, and succeeded in killing and mortally wounding all but one, who escaped. There were five killed, and four mortally wounded. This was on the seventh.

A party of Choctaw guerrillas, on the thirteenth, made a raid in the State, at Long Prairie, twelve miles from this place. They murdered two citizens, stripped four women stark naked, and plundered everything portable.

Doc. 42.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-GENERAL GRANT.

OPERATIONS FROM MARCH, 1864, TO JULY, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., July 22, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Armies of the United States from the date of my appointment to command the same.

From an early period in the rebellion I had been impressed with the idea that active and continuous operations of all the troops that could be brought into the field, regardless of season and weather, were necessary to a speedy termination of the war. The resources of the enemy, and his numerical strength, were far inferior to ours; but as an offset to this, we had a vast territory, with a population hostile to the Government, to garrison, and long lines of river and railroad communications to protect, to enable us to supply the operating armies.

The armies in the East and West acted independently and without concert, like a balky team, no two ever pulling together; enabling the enemy to use to great advantage his interior lines of communication for transporting troops from East to West, reinforcing the army most vigorously pressed, and to furlough large numbers, during seasons of inactivity on our part, to go to their homes and do the work of producing for the support of their armies. It was a question whether our numerical strength and resources were not more than balanced by these disadvantages and the enemy's superior position.

From the first, I was firm in the conviction that no peace could be had that would be stable and conducive to the happiness of the people, both North and South, until the military power of the rebellion was entirely broken.

I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy; preventing him from using the same force at different seasons, against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance. Second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy, and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the Constitution and laws of the land.

These views have been kept constantly in mind, and orders given and campaigns made to carry them out. Whether they might have been better in conception and execution is for the people, who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and who have to pay the pecuniary cost, to say. All I can say is, that what I have done has been done conscientiously, to the best of my ability, and in what I conceived to be for the best interests of the whole country.

At the date when this report begins, the situation of the contending forces was about as follows: The Mississippi river was strongly garrisoned by Federal troops from St. Louis, Missouri, to its mouth. The line of the Arkansas was also held, thus giving us armed possession of all west of the Mississippi, north of that stream. A few points in Southern Louisiana, not remote from the river, were held by us, together with a small garrison at and near the mouth of the Rio Grande. All the balance of the vast territory of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, was in the almost undisputed possession of the enemy, with an army of probably not less than eighty thousand effective men, that could have been brought into the field had there been sufficient opposition to have brought them out. The let-alone policy had demoralized this force so much that probably little more than one half of it was ever present in garrison at any one time. But the one half, or forty thousand men, with the bands of guerrillas scattered through Missouri, Arkansas, and along the Mississippi river, and the disloyal character of much of the population, compelled the use of a large number of troops to keep navigation open on the river, and to protect the loyal people to the west of it. To the east of the Mississippi, we held substantially with the line of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, running eastward, to include nearly all the State of Tennessee. South of Chattanooga, a small foothold had been obtained in Georgia, sufficient to protect East Tennessee from incursions from the enemy's force at Dalton, Georgia. West Virginia was substantially within our lines. Virginia, with the exception of the northern border, the Potomac river, a small area about the mouth of James river, covered by the troops at Norfolk and Fort Monroe, and the territory covered by the Army of the Potomac, lying along the Rapidan, was in the possession of the enemy. Along the sea-coast, footholds had been obtained at Plymouth, Washington, and Newbern, in North Carolina; Beaufort, Folly, and Morris Islands, Hilton Head, Fort Pulaski, and Port Royal, in South Carolina; Fernandina and St. Augustine, in Florida. Key West and Pensacola were also in our possession, while all the important ports were blockaded by the navy. The accompanying map, a copy of which was sent to General Sherman, and other commanders, in March, 1864, shows, by red lines the territory occupied by us at the beginning of the rebellion, and at the opening of the campaign of 1864; while those in blue are the lines which it was proposed to occupy.

Behind the Union lines there were many bands of guerrillas, and a large population disloyal to the Government, making it necessary to guard every foot of road or river used in supplying our armies. In the South, a reign of military despotism prevailed, which made every man and boy capable of bearing arms a soldier; and those who could not bear arms in the field, acted as provosts for collecting deserters and returning

them. This enabled the enemy to bring almost his entire strength into the field.

The enemy had concentrated the bulk of his forces east of the Mississippi into two armies, commanded by Generals R. E. Lee and J. E. Johnston, his ablest and best generals. The army commanded by Lee occupied the south bank of the Rapidan, extending from Mine Run westward, strongly intrenched, covering and defending Richmond, the rebel capital, against the Army of the Potomac. The army under Johnston occupied a strongly-intrenched position at Dalton, Georgia, covering and defending Atlanta, Georgia, a place of great importance as a railroad centre, against the armies under Major-General W. T. Sherman. In addition to these armies, he had a large cavalry force under Forrest, in North-east Mississippi; a considerable force, of all arms, in the Shenandoah Valley, and in the western part of Virginia, and extreme eastern part of Tennessee; and also confronting our sea-coast garrisons, and holding blockaded ports where we had no foothold upon land.

These two armies, and the cities covered and defended by them, were the main objective points of the campaign.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, who was appointed to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, embracing all the armies and territory east of the Mississippi river to the Alleghanies, and the Department of Arkansas, west of the Mississippi, had the immediate command of the armies operating against Johnston.

Major-General George G. Meade had the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, from where I exercised general supervision of the movements of all our armies.

General Sherman was instructed to move against Johnston's army, to break it up, and to go into the interior of the enemy's country as far as he could, inflicting all the damage he could upon their war resources. If the enemy in his front showed signs of joining Lee, to follow him up to the full extent of his ability, while I would prevent the concentration of Lee upon him if it was in the power of the Army of the Potomac to do so. More specific written instructions were not given, for the reason that I had talked over with him the plans of the campaign, and was satisfied that he understood them and would execute them to the fullest extent possible.

Major-General N. P. Banks, then on an expedition up Red river against Shreveport, Louisiana, (which had been organized previous to my appointment to command), was notified by me on the fifteenth of March, of the importance it was that Shreveport should be taken at the earliest possible day, and that if he found that the taking of it would occupy from ten to fifteen days' more time than General Sherman had given his troops to be absent from their command, he would send them back at the time specified by General Sherman, even if it led to the abandon-

ment of the main object of the Red river expedition, for this force was necessary to movements east of the Mississippi; that should his expedition prove successful, he would hold Shreveport and the Red river with such force as he might deem necessary, and return the balance of his troops to the neighborhood of New Orleans, commencing no move for the further acquisition of territory, unless it was to make that then held by him more easily held; that it might be a part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it certainly would be if troops enough could be obtained to make it, without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also, that I had directed General Steele to make a real move from Arkansas, as suggested by him (General Banks,) instead of a demonstration, as Steele thought advisable.

On the thirty-first of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was instructed as follows:

"First. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red river to General Steele and the navy.

"Second. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold on the Rio Grande. This can be held with four thousand men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

"Third. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi river, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last return this would give you a force of over thirty thousand effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own arrangements with the Admiral for his cooperation, and select your own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base, but, from your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be cooperative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All I would now add is, that you com-

mence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

"U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General N. P. BANKS."

Major-General Meade was instructed that Lee's army would be his objective point; that wherever Lee went he would go also. For his movement two plans presented themselves: One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by his right flank; the other above, moving by his left. Each presented advantages over the other, with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut off from all chance of ignoring Richmond or going north on a raid. But if we took this route all we did would have to be done while the rations we started with held out; besides, it separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed how to cooperate. If we took the other route, Brandy Station could be used as a base of supplies until another was secured on the York or James river. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.

The following letter of instruction was addressed to Major-General B. F. Butler:

Four Mowson, Va., April 2, 1864.

"GENERAL: In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a day as practicable, it is proposed to have cooperative action of all the armies in the field, as far as this object can be accomplished.

"It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones, to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of holding on to the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentration can be practically effected by armies moving to the interior of the enemy's country from the territory they have to guard. By such movement they interpose themselves between the enemy and the country to be guarded, thereby reducing the number necessary to guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of a part of the enemy's force, if no greater object is gained. Lee's army and Richmond being the greater objects toward which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the force we can against them. The necessity of covering Washington with the Army of the Potomac, and of covering your department with your army, makes it impossible to unite these forces at the beginning of any move. I propose, therefore, what comes nearest this of anything that seems practicable: The Army of the Potomac will act from its present base, Lee's army being the objective point. You will collect all the forces from your command that can be spared from garrison duty—I should say not less than twenty thousand effective men—to operate on the south side of James River, Richmond being your objective point. To the force you already

have will be added about ten thousand men from South Carolina, under Major-General Gillmore, who will command them in person. Major-General W. F. Smith is ordered to report to you, to command the troops sent into the field from your own department.

"General Gillmore will be ordered to report to you at Fortress Monroe, with all the troops on transports, by the eighteenth instant, or as soon thereafter as practicable. Should you not receive notice by that time to move, you will make such disposition of them and your other forces as you may deem best calculated to deceive the enemy as to the real move to be made.

"When you are notified to move, take City Point with as much force as possible. Fortify, or rather intrench, at once, and concentrate all your troops for the field there as rapidly as you can. From City Point directions cannot be given at this time for your further movements.

"The fact that has already been stated—that is, that Richmond is to be your objective point, and that there is to be coöperation between your force and the Army of the Potomac—must be your guide. This indicates the necessity of your holding close to the south bank of the James river as you advance. Then, should the enemy be forced into his intrenchments in Richmond, the Army of the Potomac would follow, and by means of transports the two armies would become a unit.

"All the minor details of your advance are left entirely to your direction. If, however, you think it practicable to use your cavalry south of you, so as to cut the railroad about Hicks' ford about the time of the general advance, it would be of immense advantage.

"You will please forward for my information, at the earliest practicable day, all orders, details, and instructions you may give for the execution of this order.

"U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General B. F. BUTLER."

On the sixteenth, these instructions were substantially reiterated. On the nineteenth, in order to secure full coöperation between his army and that of General Meade, he was informed that I expected him to move from Fort Monroe the same day that General Meade moved from Culpepper. The exact time I was to telegraph him as soon as it was fixed, and that it would not be earlier than the twenty-seventh of April; that it was my intention to fight Lee between Culpepper and Richmond, if he would stand. Should he, however, fall back into Richmond, I would follow up and make a junction with his (General Butler's) army on the James river; that, could I be certain he would be able to invest Richmond on the south side, so as to have his left resting on the James above the city, I would form the junction there; that circumstances might make this course advisable anyhow; that he should use every

exertion to secure footing as far up the south side of the river as he could, and as soon as possible after the receipt of orders to move; that if he could not carry the city, he should at least detain as large a force as possible.

In coöperation with the main movements against Lee and Johnston, I was desirous of using all other troops necessarily kept in departments remote from the fields of immediate operations, and also those kept in the background for the protection of our extended lines between the loyal States and the armies operating against them.

A very considerable force, under command of Major-General Sigel, was so held for the protection of West Virginia, and the frontiers of Maryland and Pennsylvania. While these troops could not be withdrawn to distant fields without exposing the North to invasion by comparatively small bodies of the enemy, they could act directly to their front and give better protection than if lying idle in garrison. By such a movement they would either compel the enemy to detach largely for the protection of his supplies and lines of communication, or he would lose them. General Sigel was therefore directed to organize all his available force into two expeditions, to move from Beverly and Charleston, under command of Generals Ord and Crook, against the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad. Subsequently, General Ord having been relieved at his own request, General Sigel was instructed, at his own suggestion, to give up the expedition by Beverly, and to form two columns, one under General Crook, on the Kanawha, numbering about ten thousand men, and one on the Shenandoah, numbering about seven thousand men. The one on the Shenandoah to assemble between Cumberland and the Shenandoah, and the infantry and artillery advanced to Cedar Creek with such cavalry as could be made available at the moment, to threaten the enemy in the Shenandoah Valley, and advance as far as possible; while General Crook would take possession of Lewisburg with part of his force and move down the Tennessee railroad, doing as much damage as he could, destroying the New river bridge and salt works at Saltville, Va.

Owing to the weather and bad condition of the roads, operations were delayed until the first of May, when, everything being in readiness and the roads favorable, orders were given for a general movement of all the armies not later than the fourth of May.

My first object being to break the military power of the rebellion and capture the enemy's important strongholds, made me desirous that General Butler should succeed in his movement against Richmond, as that would tend more than anything else, unless it were the capture of Lee's army, to accomplish this desired result in the East. If it failed, it was my determination, by hard fighting, either to compel Lee to retreat, or to so cripple him that he could not detach a large force to go north and still retain

enough for the defence of Richmond. It was well understood, by both Generals Butler and Meade, before starting on the campaign, that it was my intention to put both their armies south of the James river, in case of failure to destroy Lee without it.

Before giving General Butler his instructions, I visited him at Fort Monroe, and in conversation pointed out the apparent importance of getting possession of Petersburg and destroying railroad communication as far south as possible. Believing, however, in the practicability of capturing Richmond unless it was reinforced, I made that the objective point of his operations. As the Army of the Potomac was to move simultaneously with him, Lee could not detach from his army with safety, and the enemy did not have troops elsewhere to bring to the defence of the city in time to meet a rapid movement from the north of James river.

I may here state that, commanding all the armies as I did, I tried, as far as possible, to leave General Meade in independent command of the Army of the Potomac. My instructions for that army were all through him, and were general in their nature, leaving all the details and the execution to him. The campaign that followed proved him to be the right man in the right place. His commanding always in the presence of an officer superior to him in rank, has drawn from him much of that public attention that his zeal and ability entitled him to, and which he would otherwise have received.

The movement of the Army of the Potomac commenced early on the morning of the fourth of May, under the immediate direction and orders of Major-General Meade, pursuant to instructions. Before night the whole army was across the Rapidan (the Fifth and Sixth corps crossing at Germania ford, and the Second corps at United States ford, the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan, moving in advance), with the greater part of its trains, numbering about four thousand wagons, meeting with but slight opposition. The average distance travelled by the troops that day was about twelve miles. This I regarded as a great success, and it removed from my mind the most serious apprehensions I had entertained, that of crossing the river in the face of an active, large, well-appointed, and ably-commanded army, and how so large a train was to be carried through a hostile country and protected. Early on the fifth, the advance corps (the Fifth, Major-General G. K. Warren commanding), met and engaged the enemy outside his intrenchments near Mine Run. The battle raged furiously all day, the whole army being brought into the fight as fast as the corps could be got upon the field, which, considering the density of the forest and narrowness of the roads, was done with commendable promptness.

General Burnside, with the Ninth corps, was, at the time the Army of the Potomac moved, left with the bulk of his corps at the crossing of the Rappahannock river and Alexandria rail-

road, holding the road back to Bull Run, with instructions not to move until he received notice that a crossing of the Rapidan was secured, but to move promptly as soon as such notice was received. This crossing he was apprised of on the afternoon of the fourth. By six o'clock of the morning of the sixth, he was leading his corps into action near the Wilderness tavern, some of his troops having marched a distance of over thirty miles, crossing both the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers. Considering that a large proportion, probably two thirds of his command, was composed of new troops, unaccustomed to marches and carrying the accoutrements of a soldier, this was a remarkable march.

The battle of the Wilderness was renewed by us at five o'clock on the morning of the sixth, and continued with unabated fury until darkness set in, each army holding substantially the same position that they had on the evening of the fifth. After dark, the enemy made a feeble attempt to turn our right flank, capturing several hundred prisoners, and creating considerable confusion. But the promptness of General Sedgwick, who was personally present and commanding that part of our line, soon reformed it and restored order. On the morning of the seventh, reconnoissances showed that the enemy had fallen behind his intrenched lines, with pickets to the front, covering a part of the battle-field. From this it was evident to my mind that the two days' fighting had satisfied him of his inability to further maintain the contest in the open field, notwithstanding his advantage of position, and that he would wait an attack behind his works, I therefore determined to push on and put my whole force between him and Richmond; and orders were at once issued for a movement by his right flank. On the night of the seventh the march was commenced toward Spottsylvania Court-house, the Fifth corps moving on the most direct road. But the enemy having become apprised of our movement, and having the shorter line, was enabled to reach there first. On the eighth, General Warren met a force of the enemy, which had been sent out to oppose and delay his advance, to gain time to fortify the line taken up at Spottsylvania. This force was steadily driven back on the main force, within the recently-constructed works, after considerable fighting, resulting in severe loss to both sides. On the morning of the ninth, General Sheridan started on a raid against the enemy's lines of communication with Richmond. The ninth, tenth, and eleventh were spent in manoeuvring and fighting, without decisive results. Among the killed on the ninth was that able and distinguished soldier Major-General John Sedgwick, commanding the Sixth Army Corps. Major-General H. G. Wright succeeded him in command. Early on the morning of the twelfth, a general attack was made on the enemy in position. The Second corps, Major-General Hancock commanding, carried a salient of his line, capturing most of Johnston's division

of Ewell's corps and twenty pieces of artillery. But the resistance was so obstinate that the advantage gained did not prove decisive. The thirteenth, fourteenth, fifteenth, sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth were consumed in manoeuvring and awaiting the arrival of reinforcements from Washington. Deeming it impracticable to make any further attack upon the enemy at Spottsylvania Court-house, orders were issued on the eighteenth with a view to a movement to the North Anna, to commence at twelve o'clock on the night of the nineteenth. Late in the afternoon of the nineteenth Ewell's corps came out of its works on our extreme right flank; but the attack was promptly repulsed, with heavy loss. This delayed the movement to the North Anna until the night of the twenty-first, when it was commenced. But the enemy again having the short line, and being in possession of the main roads, was enabled to reach the North Anna in advance of us, and took position behind it. The Fifth corps reached the North Anna on the afternoon of the twenty-third, closely followed by the Sixth corps. The Second and Ninth corps got up about the same time, the Second holding the railroad bridge and the Ninth lying between that and Jericho ford. General Warren effected a crossing the same afternoon, and got into position without much opposition. Soon after getting into position he was violently attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great slaughter. On the twenty-fifth General Sheridan rejoined the Army of the Potomac from the raid on which he started from Spottsylvania, having destroyed the depots at Beaver Dam and Ashland stations, four trains of cars, large supplies of rations, and many miles of railroad track; recaptured about four hundred of our men on their way to Richmond as prisoners of war; met and defeated the enemy's cavalry at Yellow Tavern; carried the first line of works around Richmond (but finding the second line too strong to be carried by assault), recrossed to the north bank of the Chickahominy at Meadow's Bridge, under heavy fire, and moved by a detour to Haxall's landing, on the James river, where he communicated with General Butler. This raid had the effect of drawing off the whole of the enemy's cavalry force, and making it comparatively easy to guard our trains.

General Butler moved his main force up the James river, in pursuance of instructions, on the fourth of May, General Gillmore having joined with the Tenth corps. At the same time he sent a force of one thousand eight hundred cavalry, by way of West Point, to form a junction with him wherever he might get a foothold, and a force of three thousand cavalry, under General Kautz, from Suffolk, to operate against the road south of Petersburg and Richmond. On the fifth he occupied, without opposition, both City Point and Bermuda Hundred, his movement being a complete surprise. On the sixth he was in position with his main army, and commenced intrenching. On the seventh

he made a reconnoissance against the Petersburg and Richmond railroad, destroying a portion of it after some fighting. On the ninth he telegraphed as follows:

"HEADQUARTERS NEAR BERMU DA LANDING,
May 9, 1864."

"Our operations may be summed up in a few words. With one thousand seven hundred cavalry we have advanced up the Peninsula, forced the Chickahominy, and have safely brought them to our present position. These were colored cavalry, and are now holding our advance pickets toward Richmond.

"General Kautz, with three thousand cavalry from Suffolk, on the same day with our movement up James river, forced the Blackwater, burned the railroad bridge at Stony creek, below Petersburg, cutting in two Beauregard's force at that point.

"We have landed here, intrenched ourselves, destroyed many miles of railroad, and got a position which, with proper supplies, we can hold out against the whole of Lee's army. I have ordered up the supplies.

"Beauregard, with a large portion of his force, was left south by the cutting of the railroads by Kautz. That portion which reached Petersburg under Hill I have whipped to-day, killing and wounding many, and taking many prisoners, after a severe and well-contested fight.

"General Grant will not be troubled with any further reinforcements to Lee from Beauregard's force.

"BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
"Major-General."

"HOB. E. M. STANTON,
"Secretary of War."

On the evening of the thirteenth and morning of the fourteenth he carried a portion of the enemy's first line of defence at Drury's Bluff, or Fort Darling, with small loss. The time thus consumed from the sixth lost to us the benefit of the surprise and capture of Richmond and Petersburg, enabling, as it did, Beauregard to collect his loose forces in North and South Carolina and bring them to the defence of those places. On the sixteenth the enemy attacked General Butler in his position in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced back, or drew back, into his intrenchments between the forks of the James and Appomattox rivers, the enemy intrenching strongly in his front, thus covering his railroads, the city, and all that was valuable to him. His army, therefore, though in a position of great security, was as completely shut off from further operations directly against Richmond as if it had been in a bottle strongly corked. It required but a comparatively small force of the enemy to hold it there.

On the twelfth General Kautz with his cavalry was started on a raid against the Danville railroad, which he struck at Coalfield, Powhatan, and Chola stations, destroying them, the railroad

track, two freight trains, and one locomotive, together with large quantities of commissary and other stores; thence crossing to the South Side road, struck it at Wilson's, Wellsville, and Black and White stations, destroying the road and station-houses; thence he proceeded to City Point, which he reached on the eighteenth.

On the eighteenth of April, and prior to the movement of General Butler, the enemy with a land force under General Hoke and an iron-clad ram, attacked Plymouth, N. C., commanded by General H. W. Wessels, and our gunboats there, and after severe fighting, the place was carried by assault and the entire garrison and armament captured. The gunboat Smithfield was sunk and the Miami disabled.

The army sent to operate against Richmond having hermetically sealed itself up at Bermuda Hundred, the enemy was enabled to bring the most if not all the reinforcements brought from the South by Beauregard against the Army of the Potomac. In addition to this reinforcement, a very considerable one, probably not less than fifteen thousand men, was obtained by calling in the scattered troops under Breckinridge from the western part of Virginia.

The position at Bermuda Hundred was as easy to defend as it was difficult to operate from against the enemy. I determined, therefore, to bring from it all available forces, leaving only enough to secure what had been gained; and accordingly, on the twenty-second, I directed that they be sent forward, under command of Major-General W. F. Smith, to join the Army of the Potomac.

On the twenty-fourth of May, the Ninth Army Corps, commanded by Major-General A. E. Burnside, was assigned to the Army of the Potomac, and from this time forward constituted a portion of Major-General Meade's command.

Finding the enemy's position on the North Anna stronger than either of his previous ones, I withdrew on the night of the twenty-sixth to the north bank of the North Anna, and moved, *via* Hanoverton, to turn the enemy's position by his right.

Generals Torbert and Merritt's divisions of cavalry, under Sheridan, and the Sixth corps led the advance; crossed the Pamunkey river at Hanoverton after considerable fighting, and on the twenty-eighth the two divisions of cavalry had a severe but successful engagement with the enemy at Hawes' shop. On the twenty-ninth and thirtieth we advanced, with heavy skirmishing, to the Hanover Court-house and Cold Harbor road, and developed the enemy's position north of the Chickahominy. Late on the evening of the last day the enemy came out and attacked our left, but was repulsed with very considerable loss. An attack was immediately ordered by General Meade along his whole line, which resulted in driving the enemy from a part of his intrenched skirmish line.

On the thirty-first General Wilson's division of cavalry destroyed the railroad bridges over the South Anna river, after defeating the ene-

my's cavalry. General Sheridan, on the same day, reached Cold Harbor, and held it until relieved by the Sixth corps and General Smith's command, who had just arrived, *via* White House, from General Butler's army.

On the first day of June an attack was made at 5 P. M., by the Sixth corps and the troops under General Smith, the other corps being held in readiness to advance on the receipt of orders. This resulted in our carrying and holding the enemy's first line of works in front of the right of the Sixth corps and in front of General Smith. During the attack, the enemy made repeated assaults on each of the corps not engaged in the main attack, but were repulsed with heavy loss in every instance. That night he made several assaults to regain what he had lost in the day, but failed. The second was spent in getting troops into position for an attack on the third. On the third of June we again assaulted the enemy's works, in the hope of driving him from his position. In this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the enemy, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light. It was the only general attack made from the Rapidan to the James which did not inflict upon the enemy losses to compensate for our own losses. I would not be understood as saying that all previous attacks resulted in victories to our arms, or accomplished as much as I had hoped from them; but they inflicted upon the enemy severe losses, which tended, in the end, to the complete overthrow of the rebellion.

From the proximity of the enemy to his defences around Richmond, it was impossible by any flank movement to interpose between him and the city. I was still in a condition to either move by his left flank and invest Richmond from the north side, or continue my move by his right flank to the south side of the James. While the former might have been better as a covering for Washington, yet a full survey of all the ground satisfied me that it would be impracticable to hold a line north and east of Richmond that would protect the Fredericksburg railroad—a long, vulnerable line, which would exhaust much of our strength to guard, and that would have to be protected to supply the army, and would leave open to the enemy all his lines of communication on the south side of the James. My idea, from the start, had been to beat Lee's army north of Richmond if possible. Then, after destroying his lines of communication north of the James river, to transfer the army to the south side and besiege Lee in Richmond, or follow him south if he should retreat. After the battle of the Wilderness it was evident that the enemy deemed it of the first importance to run no risks with the army he then had. He acted purely on the defensive behind breastworks, or feebly on the offensive immediately in front of them, and where, in case of repulse, he could easily retire behind them. Without a greater sacrifice of life than I was willing to make, all could not be

accomplished that I had designed north of Richmond. I therefore determined to continue to hold substantially the ground we then occupied, taking advantage of any favorable circumstances that might present themselves, until the cavalry could be sent to Charlottesville and Gordonsville, to effectually break up the railroad connection between Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynchburg; and, when the cavalry got well off, to move the army to the south side of the James river, by the enemy's right flank, where I felt I could cut off all his sources of supply except by the canal.

On the seventh, two divisions of cavalry, under General Sheridan, got off on the expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, with instructions to Hunter, whom I hoped he would meet near Charlottesville, to join his forces to Sheridan's, and after the work laid out for them was thoroughly done, to join the Army of the Potomac by the route laid down in Sheridan's instructions.

On the tenth of June, General Butler sent a force of infantry under General Gillmore, and cavalry under General Kautz, to capture Petersburg if possible, and destroy the railroad and common bridges across the Appomattox. The cavalry carried the works on the south side, and penetrated well toward the town, but were forced to retire. General Gillmore finding the works which he approached very strong, and deeming an assault impracticable, returned to Bermuda Hundred without attempting one.

Attaching great importance to the possession of Petersburg, I sent back to Bermuda Hundred and City Point General Smith's command by water, ~~via~~ the White House, to reach there in advance of the Army of the Potomac. This was for the express purpose of securing Petersburg before the enemy, becoming aware of our intention, could reinforce the place.

The movement from Cold Harbor commenced after dark on the evening of the twelfth; one division of cavalry, under General Wilson, and the Fifth corps crossed the Chickahominy at Long Bridge, and moved out to White-Oak Swamp, to cover the crossings of the other corps. The advance corps reached James river, at Wilcox's landing and Charles City Court-house, on the night of the thirteenth.

During three long years the Armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia had been confronting each other. In that time they had fought more desperate battles than it probably ever before fell to the lot of two armies to fight, without materially changing the vantage ground of either. The Southern press and people, with more shrewdness than was displayed in the North, finding that they had failed to capture Washington and march on to New York, as they had boasted they would do, assumed that they only defended their capital and Southern territory. Hence, Antietam, Gettysburg and all the other battles that had been fought, were by them set down as failures on our part, and victories for them. Their army believed this.

It produced a *morale* which could only be overcome by desperate and continuous hard fighting. The battles of the Wilderness, Spottsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor, bloody and terrible as they were on our side, were even more damaging to the enemy, and so crippled him as to make him wary ever after of taking the offensive. His losses in men were probably not so great, owing to the fact that we were, save in the Wilderness, almost invariably the attacking party; and when he did attack it was in the open field. The details of these battles, which for endurance and bravery on the part of the soldiery have rarely been surpassed, are given in the report of Major-General Meade, and the subordinate reports accompanying it.

During the campaign of forty-three days, from the Rapidan to the James river, the army had to be supplied from an ever-shifting base, by wagons, over narrow roads, through a densely-wooded country, with a lack of wharves at each new base from which to conveniently discharge vessels. Too much credit cannot therefore be awarded to the quartermaster and commissary departments for the zeal and efficiency displayed by them. Under the general supervision of the Chief Quartermaster, Brigadier-General R. Ingalls, the trains were made to occupy all the available roads between the army and our water base, and but little difficulty was experienced in protecting them.

The movement in the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys, under General Sigel, commenced on the first of May. General Crook, who had the immediate command of the Kanawha expedition, divided his forces into two columns, giving one, composed of cavalry, to General Averell. They crossed the mountains by separate routes. Averell struck the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, near Wytheville on the tenth, and proceeding to New river and Christiansburg, destroyed the road, several important bridges and depots, including New river bridge, forming a junction with Crook at Union on the fifteenth. General Sigel moved up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy at New Market on the fifteenth, and, after a severe engagement; was defeated with heavy loss, and retired behind Cedar Creek. Not regarding the operations of General Sigel as satisfactory, I asked his removal from command, and Major-General Hunter was appointed to supersede him. His instructions were embraced in the following despatches to Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff of the army:

* NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, VA., }
May 20, 1864. }

* * * * *

"The enemy are evidently relying for supplies greatly on such as are brought over the branch road running through Staunton. On the whole, therefore, I think it would be better for General Hunter to move in that direction; reach Staunton and Gordonsville or Charlottes-

ville, if he does not meet too much opposition. If he can hold at bay a force equal to his own, he will be doing good service. * *

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General H. W. HALLECK."

"JAMES FORD, VA., May 25, 1864.

"If Hunter can possibly get to Charlottesville and Lynchburg, he should do so, living on the country. The railroads and canal should be destroyed beyond possibility of repairs for weeks. Completing this, he could find his way back to his original base, or from about Gordonsville join this army.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General H. W. HALLECK."

General Hunter immediately took up the offensive, and moving up the Shenandoah Valley, met the enemy on the fifth of June at Piedmont, and after a battle of ten hours routed and defeated him, capturing on the field of battle fifteen hundred men, three pieces of artillery, and three hundred stand of small-arms. On the eighth of the same month he formed a junction with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on Lynchburg, *via* Lexington, which place he reached and invested on the sixteenth day of June. Up to this time he was very successful, and but for the difficulty of taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through a hostile country, he would no doubt have captured that, to the enemy an important point. The destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories was very great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent a force, perhaps equal to a corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg a short time before Hunter. After some skirmishing on the seventeenth and eighteenth, General Hunter, owing to a want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place. Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for his return but by way of Kanawha. This lost to us the use of his troops for several weeks from the defence of the North.

Had General Hunter moved by way of Charlottesville, instead of Lexington, as his instructions contemplated, he would have been in a position to have covered the Shenandoah Valley against the enemy, should the force he met have seemed to endanger it. If it did not, he would have been within easy distance of the James River Canal, on the main line of communication between Lynchburgh and the force sent for its defence. I have never taken exceptions to the operations of General Hunter, and am not now disposed to find fault with him, for I have no doubt he acted within what he conceived to be the spirit of his instructions and the interests of the service. The promptitude of his movements and his gallantry should entitle him to the commendation of his country.

To return to the Army of the Potomac: The Second corps commenced crossing the James river on the morning of the fourteenth, by ferry-boats, at Wilcox's landing. The laying of the pontoon bridge was completed about midnight of the fourteenth, and the crossing of the balance of the army was rapidly pushed forward by both bridge and ferry.

After the crossing had commenced, I proceeded by steamer to Bermuda Hundred, to give the necessary orders for the immediate capture of Petersburg.

The instructions to General Butler were verbal, and were for him to send General Smith immediately, that night, with all the troops he could give him, without sacrificing the position he then held. I told him that I would return at once to the Army of the Potomac, hasten its crossing, and throw it forward to Petersburg by divisions as rapidly as it could be done; that we could reinforce our armies more rapidly there than the enemy could bring troops against us. General Smith got off as directed, and confronted the enemy's pickets near Petersburg before daylight next morning, but for some reason that I have never been able to satisfactorily understand, did not get ready to assault his main lines until near sundown. Then, with a part of his command only, he made the assault, and carried the lines north-east of Petersburg, from the Appomattox river, for a distance of over two and a half miles, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners. This was about seven P. M. Between the line thus captured and Petersburg there were no other works, and there was no evidence that the enemy had reinforced Petersburg with a single brigade from any source. The night was clear—the moon shining brightly—and favorable to further operations. General Hancock, with two divisions of the Second corps, reached General Smith just after dark, and offered the services of these troops as he (Smith) might wish, waving rank to the named commander, whom he naturally supposed knew best the position of affairs, and what to do with the troops. But instead of taking these troops, and pushing at once into Petersburg, he requested General Hancock to relieve a part of his line in the captured works, which was done before midnight.

By the time I arrived the next morning, the enemy was in force. An attack was ordered to be made at six o'clock that evening by the troops under Smith and the Second and Ninth corps. It required until that time for the Ninth corps to get up and into position. The attack was made as ordered, and the fighting continued with but little intermission until six o'clock the next morning, and resulted in our carrying the advance and some of the main works of the enemy to the right (our left) of those previously captured by General Smith, several pieces of artillery, and over four hundred prisoners.

The Fifth corps having got up, the attacks were renewed and persisted in with great vigor

on the seventeenth and eighteenth, but only resulted in forcing the enemy to an interior line, from which he could not be dislodged. The advantages in position gained by us were very great. The army then proceeded to envelop Petersburg toward the Southside railroad, as far as possible without attacking fortifications.

On the sixth the enemy, to reinforce Petersburg, withdrew from a part of his intrenchment in front of Bermuda Hundred, expecting, no doubt, to get troops from north of the James to take the place of those withdrawn before we could discover it. General Butler, taking the advantage of this, at once moved a force on the railroad between Petersburg and Richmond. As soon as I was apprised of the advantage thus gained, to retain it I ordered two divisions of the Sixth corps, General Wright commanding, that were embarking at Wilcox's landing, under orders for City Point, to report to General Butler, at Bermuda Hundred, of which General Butler was notified, and the importance of holding a position in advance of his present line urged upon him.

About two o'clock in the afternoon General Butler was forced back to the line the enemy had withdrawn from in the morning. General Wright, with his two divisions, joined General Butler on the forenoon of the seventeenth, the latter still holding with a strong picket-line the enemy's works. But instead of putting these divisions into the enemy's works to hold them, he permitted them to halt and rest some distance in the rear of his own line. Between four and five o'clock in the afternoon the enemy attacked and drove in his pickets and reoccupied his old line.

On the night of the twentieth and morning of the twenty-first a lodgement was effected by General Butler, with one brigade of infantry, on the north bank of the James, at Deep Bottom, and connected the pontoon bridge with Bermuda Hundred.

On the nineteenth, General Sheridan, on his return from his expedition against the Virginia Central railroad, arrived at the White House just as the enemy's cavalry was about to attack it, and compelled it to retire. The result of this expedition was that General Sheridan met the enemy's cavalry near Trevillian Station, on the morning of the eleventh of June, whom he attacked, and after an obstinate contest drove from the field in complete rout. He left his dead and nearly all his wounded in our hands, and about four hundred prisoners and several hundred horses. On the twelfth he destroyed the railroad from Trevillian Station to Louisa Court-house. This occupied until three o'clock p. m., when he advanced in the direction of Gordonsville. He found the enemy reinforced by infantry, behind well-constructed rifle-pits, about five miles from the latter place, and too strong to successfully assault. On the extreme right, however, his reserve brigade carried the enemy's works twice, and was twice driven therefrom by infantry. Night closed the con-

test. Not having sufficient ammunition to continue the engagement, and his animals being without forage (the country furnishing but inferior grazing), and hearing nothing from General Hunter, he withdrew his command to the north side of the North Anna, and commenced his return march, reaching White House at the time before stated. After breaking up the depot at that place, he moved to the James river, which he reached safely after heavy fighting. He commenced crossing on the twenty-fifth, near Fort Powhatan, without further molestation, and rejoined the Army of the Potomac.

On the twenty-second, General Wilson, with his own division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, and General Kautz's division of cavalry of the Army of the James, moved against the enemy's railroads south of Richmond. Striking the Weldon railroad at Ream's station, destroying the depot and several miles of the road and the Southside road, about fifteen miles from Petersburg, to near Nottoway station, where he met and defeated a force of the enemy's cavalry, he reached Burkesville station on the afternoon of the twenty-third, and from there destroyed the Danville railroad to Roanoke bridge, a distance of twenty-five miles, where he found the enemy in force, and in a position from which he could not dislodge him. He then commenced his return march, and on the twenty-eighth met the enemy's cavalry in force at the Weldon railroad crossing of Stony creek, where he had a severe but not decisive engagement. Thence he made a détour from his left, with a view of reaching Reams' station (supposing it to be in our possession). At this place he was met by the enemy's cavalry, supported by infantry, and forced to retire, with the loss of his artillery and trains. In this last encounter, General Kautz, with a part of his command, became separated, and made his way into our lines. General Wilson, with the remainder of his force, succeeded in crossing the Nottoway river and coming in safely on our left and rear. The damage to the enemy in this expedition more than compensated for the losses we sustained. It severed all connection by railroad with Richmond for several weeks.

With a view of cutting the enemy's railroad from near Richmond to the Anna rivers, and making him wary of the situation of his army in the Shenandoah, and, in the event of failure in this, to take advantage of his necessary withdrawal of troops from Petersburg, to explode a mine that had been prepared in front of the Ninth corps and assault the enemy's lines at that place, on the night of the twenty-sixth of July the Second corps and two divisions of the cavalry corps and Kautz's cavalry were crossed to the north bank of the James river, and joined the force General Butler had there. On the twenty-seventh the enemy was driven from his intrenched position, with the loss of four pieces of artillery. On the twenty-eighth our lines were extended from Deep Bottom to New Mar-

ket road, but in getting this position were attacked by the enemy in heavy force. The fighting lasted for several hours, resulting in considerable loss on both sides. The first object of this move having failed, by reason of the very large force thrown there by the enemy, I determined to take advantage of the diversion made by assaulting Petersburg before he could get his force back there. One division of the Second corps was withdrawn on the night of the twenty-eighth, and moved during the night to the rear of the Eighteenth corps, to relieve that corps in the line, that it might be foot-loose in the assault to be made. The other two divisions of the Second corps and Sheridan's cavalry were crossed over on the night of the twenty-ninth and moved in front of Petersburg. On the morning of the thirtieth, between four and five o'clock, the mine was sprung, blowing up a battery and most of a regiment, and the advance of the assaulting column, formed of the Ninth corps, immediately took possession of the crater made by the explosion, and the line for some distance to the right and left of it, and a detached line in front of it, but for some caused failed to advance promptly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this, I have every reason to believe that Petersburg would have fallen. Other troops were immediately pushed forward, but the time consumed in getting them up enabled the enemy to rally from his surprise (which had been complete), and get forces to this point for its defence. The captured line thus held being untenable, and of no advantage to us, the troops were withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus terminated in disaster what promised to be the most successful assault of the campaign.

Immediately upon the enemy's ascertaining that General Hunter was retreating from Lynchburg by way of the Kanawha river, thus laying the Shenandoah Valley open for raids into Maryland and Pennsylvania, he returned northward and moved down that valley. As soon as this movement of the enemy was ascertained, General Hunter, who had reached the Kanawha river, was directed to move his troops without delay, by river and railroad, to Harper's Ferry; but owing to the difficulty of navigation, by reason of low water and breaks in the railroad, great delay was experienced in getting there. It became necessary, therefore, to find other troops to check this movement of the enemy. For this purpose the Sixth corps was taken from the armies operating against Richmond, to which was added the Nineteenth corps, then fortunately beginning to arrive in Hampton Roads from the Gulf Department, under orders issued immediately after the ascertainment of the result of the Red river expedition. The garrisons of Baltimore and Washington were at this time made up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred-days' men, and detachments from the Invalid Corps. One division under command of General Ricketts, of the Sixth corps, was sent to Baltimore, and the remaining two divisions of the Sixth corps, under General Wright, were

subsequently sent to Washington. On the third of July the enemy approached Martinsburg; General Sigel, who was in command of our forces there, retreated across the Potomac at Sheperdstown; and General Weber, commanding at Harper's Ferry, crossed the river, and occupied Maryland Heights. On the sixth the enemy occupied Hagerstown, moving a strong column toward Frederick City. General Wallace with Ricketts' division and his own command, the latter mostly new and undisciplined troops, pushed out from Baltimore with great promptness, and met the enemy in force on the Monocacy, near the crossing of the railroad bridge. His force was not sufficient to ensure success, but he fought the enemy nevertheless, and although it resulted in a defeat to our arms, yet it detained the enemy and thereby served to enable General Wright to reach Washington with two divisions of the Sixth corps and the advance of the Nineteenth corps, before him. From Monocacy the enemy moved on Washington, his cavalry advance reaching Rockville on the evening of the tenth. On the twelfth a reconnoissance was thrown out in front of Fort Stevens, to ascertain the enemy's position and force. A severe skirmish ensued, in which we lost about two hundred and eighty in killed and wounded. The enemy's loss was probably greater. He commenced retreating during the night. Learning the exact condition of affairs at Washington, I requested by telegraph at 11:45 p. m. on the twelfth, the assignment of Major-General H. G. Wright to the command of all the troops that could be made available to operate in the field against the enemy, and directed that he should get outside of the trenches with all the force he could, and push Early to the last moment. General Wright commenced the pursuit on the thirteenth; on the eighteenth the enemy was overtaken at Snicker's ferry, on the Shenandoah, when a sharp skirmish occurred; and on the twentieth General Averell encountered and defeated a portion of the rebel army at Winchester, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

Learning that Early was retreating south toward Lynchburg or Richmond, I directed that the Sixth and Nineteenth corps be got back to the armies operating against Richmond, so that they might be used in a movement against Lee before the return of the troops sent by him into the valley; and that Hunter should remain in the Shenandoah Valley, keeping between any force of the enemy and Washington, acting on the defensive as much as possible. I felt that if the enemy had any notion of returning, the fact would be developed before the Sixth and Nineteenth corps could leave Washington. Subsequently the Nineteenth corps was excepted from the order to return to the James.

About the twenty-fifth it became evident that the enemy was again advancing upon Maryland and Pennsylvania, and the Sixth corps then at Washington, was ordered back to the vicinity of Harper's Ferry. The rebel force moved down

the valley, and sent a raiding party into Pennsylvania, which, on the thirtieth, burned Chambersburg, and then retreated, pursued by our cavalry toward Cumberland. They were met and defeated by General Kelly, and with diminished numbers escaped into the mountains of West Virginia. From the time of the first raid the telegraph wires were frequently down between Washington and City Point, making it necessary to transmit messages a part of the way by boat. It took from twenty-four to thirty-six hours to get despatches through and return answers back; so that often orders would be given, and then information would be received showing a different state of facts from those on which they were based, causing a confusion and apparent contradiction of orders that must have considerably embarrassed those who had to execute them, and rendered operations against the enemy less effective than they otherwise would have been. To remedy this evil, it was evident to my mind that some person should have the supreme command of all the forces in the departments of West Virginia, Washington, Susquehanna, and the Middle Department, and I so recommended.

On the second of August, I ordered General Sheridan to report in person to Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff, at Washington, with a view to his assignment to the command of all the forces against Early. At this time the enemy was concentrated in the neighborhood of Winchester, while our forces, under General Hunter, were concentrated on the Monocacy, at the crossing of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, leaving open to the enemy Western Maryland and Southern Pennsylvania. From where I was, I hesitated to give positive orders for the movement of our forces at Monocacy, lest by so doing I should expose Washington. Therefore, on the fourth, I left City Point to visit Hunter's command, and determine for myself what was best to be done. On arrival there, and after consultation with General Hunter, I issued to him the following instructions:

"MONOCACY BRIDGE, MD.,
August 5, 1864—8 P. M. }

"GENERAL: Concentrate all your available force without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary. Use, in this concentrating, the railroads, if by so doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in large force, push north, following him and attacking him wherever found; follow him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained that the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detaching under a competent commander a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes. In detaching such a force, the brigade of cavalry now en

route from Washington *via* Rockville may be taken into account.

"There are now on their way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you on the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start tomorrow. In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command; such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should, rather be protected; but the people should be informed that, so long as an army can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

"Bear in mind, the object is to drive the enemy south; and to do this, you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes.

"Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens in the country through which you march.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant General.

"Major-General D. HUNTER."

The troops were immediately put in motion, and the advance reached Halton that night.

General Hunter having, in our conversation, expressed a willingness to be relieved from command, I telegraphed to have General Sheridan, then at Washington, sent to Harper's Ferry by the morning train, with orders to take general command of all the troops in the field, and to call on General Hunter at Monocacy, who would turn over to him my letter of instructions. I remained at Monocacy, until General Sheridan arrived, on the morning of the sixth, and, after a conference with him in relation to military affairs in that vicinity, I returned to City Point by way of Washington.

On the seventh of August the Middle Department and the Departments of West Virginia, Washington and Susquehanna were constituted into the "Middle Military Division," and Major-General Sheridan was assigned to temporary command of the same.

Two divisions of cavalry, commanded by Generals Torbert and Wilson, were sent to Sheridan from the Army of the Potomac. The first reached him at Harper's Ferry about the eleventh of August.

His operations during the month of August and the fore part of September were both of an offensive and defensive character, resulting in many severe skirmishes, principally by the cavalry, in which we were generally successful, but no general engagement took place. The

two armies lay in such a position—the enemy on the west bank of the Opequan creek covering Winchester, and our forces in front of Berryville—that either could bring on a battle at any time. Defeat to us would lay open to the enemy the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania for long distances before another army could be interposed to check him. Under these circumstances I hesitated about allowing the initiative to be taken. Finally, the use of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal, which were both obstructed by the enemy, became so indispensably necessary to us, and the importance of relieving Pennsylvania and Maryland from continuously threatened invasion was so great, that I determined the risk should be taken. But fearing to telegraph the order for an attack without knowing more than I did of General Sheridan's feelings as to what would be the probable result, I left City Point on the fifteenth of September to visit him at his headquarters, to decide, after conference with him, what should be done. I met him at Charleston, and he pointed out so distinctly how each army lay; what he could do the moment he was authorized, and expressed such confidence of success, that I saw there were but two words of instructions necessary—Go in! For the convenience of forage, the teams for supplying the army were kept at Harper's Ferry. I asked him if he could get out his teams and supplies in time to make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday morning. His reply was, that he could before daylight on Monday. He was off promptly to time, and I may here add that the result was such that I have never since deemed it necessary to visit General Sheridan before giving him orders.

Early on the morning of the nineteenth General Sheridan attacked General Early at the crossing of the Opequan creek, and after a most sanguinary and bloody battle, lasting until five o'clock in the evening, defeated him with heavy loss, carrying his entire position from Opequan creek to Winchester, capturing several thousand prisoners and five pieces of artillery. The enemy rallied and made a stand in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, where he was attacked and again defeated with heavy loss on the twentieth. Sheridan pursued him with great energy through Harrisonburg, Staunton, and the gaps of the Blue Ridge. After stripping the Upper Valley of most of the supplies and provisions for the rebel army, he returned to Strasburg, and took position on the north side of Cedar creek.

Having received considerable reinforcements, General Early again returned to the valley, and, on the ninth of October, his cavalry encountered ours near Strasburg, where the rebels were defeated, with the loss of eleven pieces of artillery and three hundred and fifty prisoners. On the night of the eighteenth the enemy crossed the mountains which separated the branches of the Shenandoah, forded the north fork, and early on the morn-

ing of the nineteenth, under cover of the darkness and the fog, surprised and turned our left flank, and captured the batteries, which enfiladed our whole line. Our troops fell back with heavy loss and in much confusion, but were finally rallied between Middletown and Newtown. At this juncture General Sheridan, who was at Winchester when the battle commenced, arrived on the field, arranged his lines just in time to repulse a heavy attack of the enemy, and immediately assuming the offensive, he attacked in turn with great vigor. The enemy was defeated with great slaughter, and the loss of most of his artillery and trains and the trophies he had captured in the morning. The wreck of his army escaped during the night, and fled in the direction of Staunton and Lynchburg. Pursuit was made to Mount Jackson. Thus ended this, the enemy's last attempt to invade the North *via* the Shenandoah Valley. I was now enabled to return the Sixth corps to the Army of the Potomac, and to send one division from Sheridan's army to the Army of the James, and another to Savannah, Georgia, to hold Sherman's new acquisitions on the sea-coast, and thus enable him to move without detaching from his force for that purpose.

Reports from various sources led me to believe that the enemy had detached three divisions from Petersburg to reinforce Early in the Shenandoah Valley. I therefore sent the Second corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, of the Army of the Potomac, and a force of General Butler's army, on the night of the thirteenth of August, to threaten Richmond from the north side of the James, to prevent him from sending troops away, and, if possible, to draw back those sent. In this move we captured six pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners, detained troops that were under marching orders, and ascertained that but one division (Kershaw's) of the three reputed detached, had gone.

The enemy having withdrawn heavily from Petersburg to resist this movement, the Fifth corps, General Warren commanding, was moved out on the eighteenth and took possession of the Weldon railroad. During the day he had considerable fighting. To regain possession of the road, the enemy made repeated and desperate assaults, but was each time repulsed with great loss. On the night of the twentieth the troops on the north side of the James were withdrawn, and Hancock and Gregg returned to the front at Petersburg. On the twenty-fifth the Second corps and Gregg's division of cavalry, while at Reams' station destroying the railroad, were attacked, and after desperate fighting, a part of our line gave way, and five pieces of artillery fell into the hands of the enemy.

By the twelfth of September a branch railroad was completed from the City Point and Petersburg railroad to the Weldon railroad, enabling us to supply, without difficulty, in all weather, the army in front of Petersburg.

The extension of our lines across the Weldon

railroad compelled the enemy to so extend his that it seemed he could have but few troops north of the James for the defence of Richmond. On the night of the twenty-eighth the Tenth corps, Major-General Birney, and the Eighteenth corps, Major-General Ord commanding, of General Butler's army, were crossed to the north side of the James, and advanced on the morning of the twenty-ninth, carrying the very strong fortifications and intrenchments below Chapin's farm, known as Fort Harrison, capturing fifteen pieces of artillery, and the New Market road and intrenchments. This success was followed up by a gallant assault upon Fort Gillmore, immediately in front of the Chapin farm fortifications, in which we were repulsed with heavy loss. Kautz's cavalry was pushed forward on the road to the right of this, supported by infantry, and reached the enemy's inner line, but was unable to get further. The position captured from the enemy was so threatening to Richmond that I determined to hold it. The enemy made several desperate attempts to dislodge us, all of which were unsuccessful, and for which he paid dearly. On the morning of the thirtieth General Meade sent out a reconnoissance, with a view to attacking the enemy's line if it was found sufficiently weakened by withdrawal of troops to the north side. In this reconnoissance we captured and held the enemy's works near Poplar Spring Church. In the afternoon troops moving to get to the left of the point gained were attacked by the enemy in heavy force, and compelled to fall back until supported by the forces holding the captured works. Our cavalry under Gregg was also attacked, but repulsed the enemy with great loss.

On the seventh of October the enemy attacked Kautz's cavalry north of the James, and drove it back with heavy loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the loss of all the artillery—eight or nine pieces. This he followed up by an attack on our intrenched infantry line, but was repulsed with severe slaughter. On the thirteenth a reconnoissance was sent out by General Butler, with a view to drive the enemy from some new works he was constructing, which resulted in very heavy loss to us.

On the twenty-seventh the Army of the Potomac, leaving only sufficient men to hold its fortified line, moved by the enemy's right flank. The Second corps, followed by two divisions of the Fifth corps, with the cavalry in advance and covering our left flank, forced a passage of Hatcher's run, and moved up the south side of it toward the Southside railroad, until the Second corps and part of the cavalry reached the Boydton plank-road where it crosses Hatcher's run. At this point we were six miles distant from the Southside railroad, which I had hoped by this movement to reach and hold. But finding that we had not reached the end of the enemy's fortifications, and no place presenting itself for a successful assault, by which he might be doubled up and shortened, I deter-

mined to withdraw to within our fortified line. Orders were given accordingly. Immediately upon receiving a report that General Warren had connected with General Hancock, I returned to my headquarters. Soon after I left, the enemy moved out across Hatcher's run, in the gap between Generals Hancock and Warren, which was not closed as reported, and made a desperate attack on General Hancock's right and rear. General Hancock immediately faced his corps to meet it, and after a bloody combat drove the enemy within his works, and withdrew that night to his old position.

In support of this movement General Butler made a demonstration on the north side of the James, and attacked the enemy on the Williamsburg road, and also on the York River railroad. In the former he was unsuccessful; in the latter he succeeded in carrying a work which was afterward abandoned, and his forces withdrawn to their former positions.

From this time forward the operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, until the spring campaign of 1865, were confined to the defence and extension of our lines, and to offensive movements for crippling the enemy's lines of communication, and to prevent his detaching any considerable force to send south. By the seventh of February our lines were extended to Hatcher's run, and the Weldon railroad had been destroyed to Hicks' ford.

General Sherman moved from Chattanooga on the sixth of May, with the armies of the Cumberland, Tennessee, and Ohio, commanded respectively by Generals Thomas, McPherson and Schofield, upon Johnston's army at Dalton; but finding the enemy's positions at Buzzard Roost, covering Dalton, too strong to be assaulted, General McPherson was sent through Snake Gap to turn it, while Generals Thomas and Schofield threatened it in front and on the north. This movement was successful. Johnston, finding his retreat likely to be cut off, fell back to his fortified position at Resaca, where he was attacked on the afternoon of May fifteenth. A heavy battle ensued. During the night the enemy retreated south. Late on the seventeenth his rear guard was overtaken near Adairsville, and heavy skirmishing followed. The next morning, however, he had again disappeared. He was vigorously pursued, and was overtaken at Cassville on the nineteenth, but during the ensuing night retreated across the Etowah. While these operations were going on, General Jefferson C. Davis' division of Thomas' army was sent to Rome, capturing it with its forts and artillery, and its valuable mills and foundries. General Sherman, having given his army a few days' rest at this point, again put it in motion, on the twenty-third, for Dallas, with a view of turning the difficult pass at Allatoona. On the afternoon of the twenty-fifth the advance, under General Hooker, had a severe battle with the enemy, driving him back to New Hope Church, near Dallas. Several sharp encounters occurred at this point. The most

important was on the twenty-eighth, when the enemy assaulted General McPherson at Dallas, but received a terrible and bloody repulse.

On the fourth of June Johnston abandoned his entrenched position at New Hope Church, and retreated to the strong positions of Kennesaw, Pine and Lost mountains. He was forced to yield the two last-named places, and concentrate his army on Kennesaw, where, on the twenty-seventh, Generals Thomas and McPherson made a determined but unsuccessful assault. On the night of the second of July Sherman commenced moving his army by the right flank, and on the morning of the third found that the enemy, in consequence of this movement, had abandoned Kennesaw and retreated across the Chattahoochee.

General Sherman remained on the Chattahoochee, to give his men rest and get up stores, until the seventeenth of July, when he resumed his operations, crossed the Chattahoochee, destroyed a large portion of the railroad to Augusta, and drove the enemy back to Atlanta. At this place General Hood succeeded General Johnston in command of the rebel army, and, assuming the offensive-defensive policy, made several severe attacks upon Sherman in the vicinity of Atlanta, the most desperate and determined of which was on the twenty-second of July. About one P. M. of this day the brave, accomplished and noble-hearted McPherson was killed. General Logan succeeded him, and commanded the Army of the Tennessee through this desperate battle, and until he was superseded by Major-General Howard, on the twenty-sixth, with the same success and ability that had characterized him in the command of a corps or division.

In all these attacks the enemy was repulsed with great loss. Finding it impossible to entirely invest the place, General Sherman, after securing his line of communications across the Chattahoochee, moved his main force round by the enemy's left flank upon the Montgomery and Macon roads, to draw the enemy from his fortifications. In this he succeeded, and after defeating the enemy near Rough and Ready, Jonesboro', and Lovejoy's, forcing him to retreat to the south, on the second of September occupied Atlanta, the objective point of his campaign.

About the time of this move, the rebel cavalry under Wheeler attempted to cut his communications in the rear, but was repulsed at Dalton, and driven into East Tennessee, whence it proceeded west to McMinnville, Murfreesboro' and Franklin, and was finally driven south of the Tennessee. The damage done by this raid was repaired in a few days.

During the partial investment of Atlanta, General Rousseau joined General Sherman with a force of cavalry from Decatur, having made a successful raid upon the Atlanta and Montgomery railroad, and its branches near Opelika. Cavalry raids were also made by Generals McCook, Garrard, and Stoneman to cut the re-

maining railroad communication with Atlanta. The first two were successful—the latter disastrous.

General Sherman's movement from Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt, skilful, and brilliant. The history of his flank movements and battles during that memorable campaign will ever be read with an interest unsurpassed by anything in history.

His own report, and those of his subordinate commanders accompanying it, give the details of that most successful campaign.

He was dependent for the supply of his armies upon a single-track railroad from Nashville to the point where he was operating. This passed the entire distance through a hostile country, and every foot of it had to be protected by troops. The cavalry force of the enemy under Forrest, in Northern Mississippi, was evidently waiting for Sherman to advance far enough into the mountains of Georgia to make a retreat disastrous, to get upon his line and destroy it beyond the possibility of further use. To guard against this danger, Sherman left what he supposed to be a sufficient force to operate against Forrest in West Tennessee. He directed General Washburn, who commanded there, to send Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis in command of this force to attack him. On the morning of the tenth of June, General Sturgis met the enemy near Guntown, Mississippi, was badly beaten, and driven back in utter rout and confusion to Memphis, a distance of about one hundred miles, hotly pursued by the enemy. By this, however, the enemy was defeated in his designs upon Sherman's line of communications. The persistency with which he followed up this success exhausted him, and made a season for rest and repairs necessary. In the mean time Major-General A. J. Smith, with the troops of the Army of the Tennessee that had been sent by General Sherman to General Banks, arrived at Memphis on their return from Red river, where they had done most excellent service. He was directed by General Sherman to immediately take the offensive against Forrest. This he did with the promptness and effect which has characterized his whole military career. On the fourteenth of July he met the enemy at Tupelo, Mississippi, and whipped him badly. The fighting continued through three days. Our loss was small compared with that of the enemy. Having accomplished the object of his expedition, General Smith returned to Memphis.

During the months of March and April, this same force under Forrest annoyed us considerably. On the twenty-fourth of March it captured Union City, Kentucky, and its garrison, and on the twenty-fourth attacked Paducah, commanded by Colonel S. G. Hicks, Fortieth Illinois volunteers. Colonel H., having but a small force, withdrew to the forts near the river, from where he repulsed the enemy, and drove him from the place.

On the thirteenth of April part of this force, under the rebel General Buford, summoned the

garrison of Columbus, Kentucky, to surrender, but received for reply from Colonel Lawrence Thirty-fourth New Jersey volunteers, that, being placed there by his Government, with adequate force to hold his post and repel all enemies from it, surrender was out of the question.

On the morning of the same day, Forrest attacked Fort Pillow, Tennessee, garrisoned by a detachment of Tennessee cavalry and the First regiment Alabama colored troops, commanded by Major Booth. The garrison fought bravely until about three o'clock in the afternoon, when the enemy carried the works by assault, and, after our men threw down their arms, proceeded to an inhuman and merciless massacre of the garrison.

On the fourteenth, General Buford, having failed at Columbus, appeared before Paducah, but was again driven off.

Guerrillas and raiders, seemingly emboldened by Forrest's operations, were also very active in Kentucky. The most noted of these was Morgan. With a force of from two to three thousand cavalry, he entered the State through Pound Gap in the latter part of May. On the eleventh of June he attacked and captured Cynthiana, with its entire garrison. On the twelfth he was overtaken by General Burbridge, and completely routed with heavy loss, and was finally driven out of the State. This notorious guerrilla was afterward surprised and killed near Greenville, Tennessee, and his command captured and dispersed by General Gillem.

In the absence of official reports at the commencement of the Red river expedition, except so far as relates to the movements of the troops sent by General Sherman under A. J. Smith, I am unable to give the date of its starting. The troops under General Smith, comprising two divisions of the Sixteenth and a detachment of the Seventeenth Army Corps, left Vicksburg on the tenth of March and reached the designated point on Red river one day earlier than that appointed by General Banks. The rebel forces at Fort De Russey, thinking to defeat him, left the fort on the fourteenth to give him battle in the open field; but, while occupying the enemy with skirmishing and demonstrations, Smith pushed forward to Fort De Russey, which had been left with a weak garrison, and captured it with its garrison—about three hundred and fifty men, eleven pieces of artillery, and many small arms. Our loss was but slight. On the fifteenth he pushed forward to Alexandria, which place he reached on the eighteenth. On the twenty-first he had an engagement with the enemy at Henderson Hill, in which he defeated him, capturing two hundred and ten prisoners and four pieces of artillery.

On the twenty-eighth he again attacked and defeated the enemy under the rebel General Taylor, at Cane river. By the twenty-sixth General Banks had assembled his whole army at Alexandria, and pushed forward to Grand Ecore. On the morning of April sixth he moved from Grand Ecore. On the afternoon of the seventh his advance

engaged the enemy near Pleasant Hill and drove him from the field. On the same afternoon the enemy made a stand eight miles beyond Pleasant Hill, but was again compelled to retreat. On the eighth, at Sabine Cross-roads and Peach Hill, the enemy attacked and defeated his advance, capturing nineteen pieces of artillery and an immense amount of transportation and stores. During the night General Banks fell back to Pleasant Hill, where another battle was fought on the ninth, and the enemy repulsed with great loss. During the night General Banks continued his retrograde movement to Grand Ecore, and thence to Alexandria, which he reached on the twenty-seventh of April. Here a serious difficulty arose in getting Admiral Porter's fleet, which accompanied the expedition, over the rapids, the water having fallen so much since they passed up as to prevent their return. At the suggestion of Colonel (now Brigadier-General) Bailey, and under his superintendence, wing-dams were constructed, by which the channel was contracted so that the fleet passed down the rapids in safety.

The army evacuated Alexandria on the fourteenth of May, after considerable skirmishing with the enemy's advance, and reached Morganza and Point Coupée near the end of the month. The disastrous termination of this expedition, and the lateness of the season, rendered impracticable the carrying out of my plan of a movement in force sufficient to ensure the capture of Mobile.

On the twenty-third of March, Major-General Steele left Little Rock with the Seventh Army Corps to cooperate with General Banks' expedition on Red river, and reached Arkadelphia on the twenty-eighth. On the sixteenth of April, after driving the enemy before him, he was joined, near Elkin's Ferry, in Washita county, by General Thayer, who had marched from Fort Smith. After several severe skirmishes, in which the enemy was defeated, General Steele reached Camden, which he occupied about the middle of April.

On learning the defeat and consequent retreat of General Banks on Red river, and the loss of one of his own trains at Marks' mill, in Dallas county, General Steele determined to fall back to the Arkansas river. He left Camden on the twenty-sixth of April, and reached Little Rock on the second of May. On the thirtieth of April, the enemy attacked him while crossing Saline river at Jenkins' ferry, but was repulsed with considerable loss. Our loss was about six hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Major-General Canby, who had been assigned to the command of the "Military Division of the West Mississippi," was therefore directed to send the Nineteenth Army Corps to join the armies operating against Richmond, and to limit the remainder of his command to such operations as might be necessary to hold the positions and lines of communications he then occupied.

Before starting General A. J. Smith's troops

back to Sherman. General Canby sent a part of it to disperse a force of the enemy that was collecting near the Mississippi river. General Smith met and defeated this force near Lake Chicot on the fifth of June. Our loss was about forty killed and seventy wounded.

In the latter part of July, General Canby sent Major-General Gordon Granger, with such forces as he could collect, to cooperate with Admiral Farragut against the defences of Mobile bay. On the eighth of August, Fort Gaines surrendered to the combined naval and land forces. Fort Powell was blown up and abandoned.

On the ninth, Fort Morgan was invested, and, after a severe bombardment, surrendered on the twenty-third. The total captures amounted to one thousand four hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and one hundred and four pieces of artillery.

About the last of August, it being reported that the rebel General Price, with a force of about ten thousand men, had reached Jacksonport, on his way to invade Missouri, General A. J. Smith's command, then *en route* from Memphis to join Sherman, was ordered to Missouri. A cavalry force was also, at the same time, sent from Memphis, under command of Colonel Winslow. This made General Rosecrans' forces superior to those of Price, and no doubt was entertained he would be able to check Price and drive him back; while the forces under General Steele, in Arkansas, would cut off his retreat. On the twenty-sixth day of September, Price attacked Pilot Knob, and forced the garrison to retreat, and thence moved north to the Missouri river, and continued up that river toward Kansas. General Curtis, commanding department of Kansas, immediately collected such forces as he could to repel the invasion of Kansas, while General Rosecrans' cavalry was operating in his rear.

The enemy was brought to battle on the Big Blue, and defeated, with the loss of nearly all his artillery and trains, and a large number of prisoners. He made a precipitate retreat to Northern Arkansas. The impunity with which Price was enabled to roam over the State of Missouri for a long time, and the incalculable mischief done by him, shows to how little purpose a superior force may be used. There is no reason why General Rosecrans should not have concentrated his forces, and beaten and driven Price before the latter reached Pilot Knob.

September twentieth, the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, and on the twenty-third attacked the garrison at Athens, consisting of six hundred men, which capitulated on the twenty-fourth. Soon after the surrender two regiments of reinforcements arrived, and after a severe fight were compelled to surrender. Forrest destroyed the railroad westward, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch trestle, skirmished with the garrison at Pulaski on the twenty-seventh, and on the same day cut the

Nashville and Chattanooga railroad near Tullahoma and Dechard. On the morning of the thirtieth one column of Forrest's command, under Buford, appeared before Huntsville, and summoned the surrender of the garrison. Receiving an answer in the negative, he remained in the vicinity of the place until the next morning, when he again summoned its surrender, and received the same reply as on the night before. He withdrew in the direction of Athens, which place had been regarrisoned, and attacked it on the afternoon of the first of October, but without success. On the morning of the second he renewed his attack, but was handsomely repulsed.

Another column under Forrest appeared before Columbia on the morning of the first, but did not make an attack. On the morning of the third he moved toward Mount Pleasant. While these operations were going on, every exertion was made by General Thomas to destroy the forces under Forrest before he could recross the Tennessee, but was unable to prevent his escape to Corinth, Mississippi.

In September, an expedition under General Burbridge was sent to destroy the salt works at Saltville, Virginia. He met the enemy on the second of October, about three miles and a half from Saltville, and drove him into his strongly-intrenched position around the salt works, from which he was unable to dislodge him. During the night he withdrew his command, and returned to Kentucky.

General Sherman, immediately after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies in camp in and about the place, and made all preparations for refitting and supplying them for future service. The great length of road from Atlanta to the Cumberland river, however, which had to be guarded, allowed the troops but little rest.

During this time Jefferson Davis made a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was reported in the papers of the South, and soon became known to the whole country, disclosing the plans of the enemy, thus enabling General Sherman to fully meet them. He exhibited the weakness of supposing that an army that had been beaten and fearfully decimated in a vain attempt at the defensive, could successfully undertake the offensive against the army that had so often defeated it.

In execution of this plan, Hood, with his army, was soon reported to the south-west of Atlanta. Moving far to Sherman's right, he succeeded in reaching the railroad about Big Shanty, and moved north on it.

General Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the remainder of his army fell upon him and drove him to Gadsden, Alabama. Seeing the constant annoyance he would have with the roads to his rear if he attempted to hold Atlanta, General Sherman proposed the abandonment and destruction of that place, with all the railroads leading to it, and telegraphed me as follows:

"CENTREVILLE, GA., October 10—noon.

"Despatch about Wilson just received. Hood is now crossing Coosa river, twelve miles below Rome, bound west. If he passes over the Mobile and Ohio road, had I not better execute the plan of my letter sent by Colonel Porter, and leave General Thomas, with the troops now in Tennessee, to defend the State? He will have an ample force when the reinforcements ordered reach Nashville.

"W. T. SHERMAN,
"Major-General.

"Lieutenant-General GRANT."

For a full understanding of the plan referred to in this despatch, I quote from the letter sent by Colonel Porter: "I will therefore give my opinion, that your army and Canby's should be reinforced to the maximum; that after you get Wilmington, you strike for Savannah and the river; that Canby be instructed to hold the Mississippi river, and send a force to get Columbus, Georgia, either by the way of the Alabama or the Appalachicola, and that I keep Hood employed and put my army in final order for a march on Augusta, Columbia, and Charleston, to be ready as soon as Wilmington is sealed as to commerce, and the city of Savannah is in our possession." This was in reply to a letter of mine of date September twelfth, in answer to a despatch of his containing substantially the same proposition, and in which I informed him of a proposed movement against Wilmington, and of the situation in Virginia, etc.

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11 A. M.

"Your despatch of October tenth received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee river, about Florence or Decatur? If he does this, he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee river. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwhacked by all the old men and little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage upon us than we could upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army I would prefer that; but I must trust to your own judgment. I find I shall not be able to send a force from here to act with you on Savannah. Your movements, therefore, will be independent of mine; at least until the fall of Richmond takes place. I am afraid Thomas, with such lines of road as he has to protect, could not prevent Hood from going north. With Wilson turned loose, with all your cavalry, you will find the rebels put much more on the defensive than heretofore.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

"KINGSTON, GA., October 11—11 A. M.

"Hood moved his army from Palmetto station across by Dallas and Cedartown, and is now on the Coosa river, south of Rome. He threw one corps on my road at Acworth, and I was forced to follow. I hold Atlanta with the Twentieth corps, and have strong detachments along my line. This reduces my active force to a comparatively small army. We cannot remain here on the defensive. With the twenty-five thousand men, and the bold cavalry he has, he can constantly break my roads. I would infinitely prefer to make a wreck of the road, and of the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the latter city, send back all my wounded and worthless, and, with my effective army, move through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea. Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of my being on the defensive, I would be on the offensive; instead of guessing at what he means to do, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee.

"Answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long.

"W. T. SHERMAN,
"Major-General.

"Lieutenant-General GRANT."

"CITY POINT, VA., October 11, 1864—11:30 P. M.

"Your despatch of to-day received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea-coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee river firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

It was the original design to hold Atlanta, and by getting through to the coast, with a garrison left on the southern railroads, leading east and west, through Georgia, to effectually sever the east from the west. In other words, cut the would-be confederacy in two again, as it had been cut once by our gaining possession of the Mississippi river. General Sherman's plan virtually effected this object.

General Sherman commenced at once his preparations for his proposed movement, keeping his army in position in the meantime to watch Hood. Becoming satisfied that Hood had moved westward from Gadsden across Sand mountain, General Sherman sent the Fourth corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, and the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, back to Chattanooga, to report to Major-General Thomas, at Nashville, whom he had placed in command of all the troops of his military division, save the four army corps and cavalry division he designed to move with through Georgia. With the troops thus left at his disposal, there was little doubt that General

Thomas could hold the line of the Tennessee, or, in the event Hood should force it, would be able to concentrate and beat him in battle. It was therefore readily consented to that Sherman should start for the sea-coast.

Having concentrated his troops at Atlanta by the fourteenth of November, he commenced his march, threatening both Augusta and Macon. His coming-out point could not be definitely fixed. Having to gather his subsistence as he marched through the country, it was not impossible that a force inferior to his own might compel him to head for such point as he could reach, instead of such as he might prefer. The blindness of the enemy, however, in ignoring his movement, and sending Hood's army—the only considerable force he had west of Richmond and east of the Mississippi river—northward on an offensive campaign, left the whole country open, and Sherman's route to his own choice.

How that campaign was conducted, how little opposition was met with, the condition of the country through which the armies passed, the capture of Fort McAllister, on the Savannah river, and the occupation of Savannah on the twenty-first of December, are all clearly set forth in General Sherman's admirable report.

Soon after General Sherman commenced his march from Atlanta, two expeditions, one from Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one from Vicksburg, Mississippi, were started by General Canby to cut the enemy's line of communication with Mobile, and detain troops in that field. General Foster, commanding Department of the South, also sent an expedition, *viz* Broad river, to destroy the railroad between Charleston and Savannah. The expedition from Vicksburg, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Osband (Colonel Third United States Colored Cavalry), captured, on the twenty-seventh of November, and destroyed the Mississippi Central railroad bridge and trestle-work over Big Black river, near Canton, thirty miles of the road, and two locomotives, besides large amounts of stores. The expedition from Baton Rouge was without favorable results. The expedition from the Department of the South, under the immediate command of Brigadier-General John P. Hatch, consisting of about five thousand men of all arms, including a brigade from the navy, proceeded up Broad river and debarked at Boyd's Neck, on the twenty-ninth of November, from where it moved to strike the railroad at Grahamsville. At Honey Hill, about three miles from Grahamsville, the enemy was found and attacked, in a strongly-fortified position, which resulted, after severe fighting, in our repulse, with a loss of seven hundred and forty-six in killed, wounded and missing. During the night General Hatch withdrew. On the sixth of December General Foster obtained a position covering the Charleston and Savannah railroad, between the Coosawatchie and Talifny rivers.

Hood, instead of following Sherman, contin-

ued his move northward, which seemed to me to be leading to his certain doom. At all events, had I had the power to command both armies, I should not have changed the orders under which he seemed to be acting. On the twenty-sixth of October the advance of Hood's army attacked the garrison at Decatur, Alabama, but failing to carry the place, withdrew toward Courtland, and succeeded, in the face of our cavalry, in effecting a lodgement on the north side of the Tennessee river, near Florence. On the twenty-eighth Forrest reached the Tennessee at Fort Heiman, and captured a gunboat and three transports. On the second of November he planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, on the opposite side of the river, isolating three gunboats and eight transports. On the fourth the enemy opened his batteries upon the place, and was replied to from the gunboats and the garrison. The gunboats becoming disabled, were set on fire, as also were the transports, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy. About a million and a half dollars' worth of stores and property on the levee and in storehouses was consumed by fire. On the fifth the enemy disappeared and crossed to the north side of the Tennessee river, above Johnsonville, moving toward Clifton, and subsequently joined Hood. On the night of the fifth General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-third corps, reached Johnsonville, but finding the enemy gone, was ordered to Pulaski, and put in command of all the troops there, with instructions to watch the movements of Hood and retard his advance, but not to risk a general engagement until the arrival of General A. J. Smith's command from Missouri, and until General Wilson could get his cavalry remounted.

On the nineteenth General Hood continued his advance. General Thomas, retarding him as much as possible, fell back toward Nashville, for the purpose of concentrating his command and gaining time for the arrival of reinforcements. The enemy coming up with our main force, commanded by General Schofield, at Franklin, on the thirtieth, assaulted our works repeatedly during the afternoon, until late at night, but were in every instance repulsed. His loss in this battle was one thousand seven hundred and fifty killed, seven hundred and two prisoners, and three thousand eight hundred wounded. Among his losses were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. Our entire loss was two thousand three hundred. This was the first serious opposition the enemy met with, and I am satisfied was the fatal blow to all his expectations. During the night General Schofield fell back toward Nashville. This left the field to the enemy—not lost by battle, but voluntarily abandoned—so that General Thomas' whole force might be brought together. The enemy followed up, and commenced the establishment of his line in front of Nashville on the second of December.

As soon as it was ascertained that Hood was

crossing the Tennessee river, and that Price was going out of Missouri, General Rosecrans was ordered to send to General Thomas the troops of General A. J. Smith's command, and such other troops as he could spare. The advance of this reinforcement reached Nashville on the thirtieth of November.

On the morning of the fifteenth December General Thomas attacked Hood in position, and, in a battle lasting two days, defeated and drove him from the field in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands most of his artillery and many thousand prisoners, including four general officers.

Before the battle of Nashville I grew very impatient over, as it appeared to me, the unnecessary delay. This impatience was increased upon learning that the enemy had sent a force of cavalry across the Cumberland into Kentucky. I feared Hood would cross his whole army and give us great trouble there. After urging upon General Thomas the necessity of immediately assuming the offensive, I started west to superintend matters there in person. Reaching Washington City, I received General Thomas' despatch announcing his attack upon the enemy, and the result as far as the battle had progressed. I was delighted. All fears and apprehensions were dispelled. I am not yet satisfied but that General Thomas, immediately upon the appearance of Hood before Nashville, and before he had time to fortify, should have moved out with his whole force and given him battle, instead of waiting to remount his cavalry, which delayed him until the inclemency of the weather made it impracticable to attack earlier than he did. But his final defeat of Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as a vindication of that distinguished officer's judgment.

After Hood's defeat at Nashville he retreated, closely pursued by cavalry and infantry, to the Tennessee river, being forced to abandon many pieces of artillery and most of his transportation. On the twenty-eighth of December our advance forces ascertained that he had made good his escape to the south side of the river.

About this time, the rains having set in heavily in Tennessee and Alabama, making it difficult to move army transportation and artillery, General Thomas stopped the pursuit by his main force at the Tennessee river. A small force of cavalry, under Colonel W. J. Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania volunteers, continued to follow Hood for some distance, capturing considerable transportation and the enemy's pontoon bridge. The details of these operations will be found clearly set forth in General Thomas' report.

A cavalry expedition, under Brevet Major-General Grierson, started from Memphis on the twenty-first December. On the twenty-fifth he surprised and captured Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, destroyed the railroad, sixteen cars loaded with wagons and pontoons for Hood's army, four thousand new English car-

bines, and large amounts of public stores. On the morning of the twenty-eighth he attacked and captured a force of the enemy at Egypt, and destroyed a train of fourteen cars; thence, turning to the south-west, he struck the Mississippi Central railroad at Winona, and destroyed the factories and large amounts of stores at Bankston, and the machine-shops and public property at Grenada, arriving at Vicksburg January fifth.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, with a force under General Breckinridge, entered East Tennessee. On the thirteenth of November, he attacked General Gillem, near Morristown, capturing his artillery and several hundred prisoners. Gillem, with what was left of his command, retreated to Knoxville. Following up his success, Breckinridge moved to near Knoxville, but withdrew on the eighteenth, followed by General Ammen. Under the directions of General Thomas, General Stoneman concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem near Bean's station, to operate against Breckinridge, and destroy or drive him into Virginia—destroy the salt works at Saltville, and the railroad into Virginia as far as he could go without endangering his command. On the twelfth of December he commenced his movement, capturing and dispersing the enemy's force wherever he met them. On the sixteenth he struck the enemy, under Vaughn, at Marion, completely routing and pursuing him to Wytheville, capturing all his artillery trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners, and destroyed Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, and the extensive lead-works near there. Returning to Marion, he met a force under Breckinridge, consisting, among other troops, of the garrison of Saltville, that had started in pursuit. He at once made arrangements to attack it the next morning; but morning found Breckinridge gone. He then moved directly to Saltville, and destroyed the extensive salt-works at that place, a large amount of stores, and captured eight pieces of artillery. Having thus successfully executed his instructions, he returned General Burbridge to Lexington and General Gillem to Knoxville.

Wilmington, North Carolina, was the most important sea-coast port left to the enemy through which to get supplies from abroad, and send cotton and other products out by blockade-runners, besides being a place of great strategic value. The navy had been making strenuous exertions to seal the harbor of Wilmington, but with only partial effect. The nature of the outlet of Cape Fear river was such that it required watching for so great a distance that, without possession of the land north of New Inlet, or Fort Fisher, it was impossible for the navy to entirely close the harbor against the entrance of blockade-runners.

To secure the possession of this land required the coöperation of a land force, which I agreed to furnish. I immediately commenced the

assemblage in Hampton Roads, under Admiral D. D. Porter, of the most formidable armada ever collected for concentration upon one given point. This necessarily attracted the attention of the enemy, as well as that of the loyal North; and through the imprudence of the public press, and very likely of officers of both branches of service, the exact object of the expedition became a subject of common discussion in the newspapers both North and South. The enemy, thus warned, prepared to meet it. This caused a postponement of the expedition until the latter part of November, when, being again called upon by Hon. G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, I agreed to furnish the men required at once, and went myself, in company with Major-General Butler, to Hampton Roads, where we had a conference with Admiral Porter as to the force required and the time of starting. A force of six thousand five hundred men was regarded as sufficient. The time of starting was not definitely arranged, but it was thought all would be ready by the sixth of December, if not before. Learning, on the thirtieth of November, that Bragg had gone to Georgia, taking with him most of the forces about Wilmington, I deemed it of the utmost importance that the expedition should reach its destination before the return of Bragg, and directed General Butler to make all arrangements for the departure of Major-General Weitzel, who had been designated to command the land forces, so that the navy might not be detained one moment.

On the sixth of December, the following instructions were given:

"CITY POINT, VA., December 6, 1864.

"GENERAL: The first object of the expedition under General Weitzel is to close to the enemy the port of Wilmington. If successful in this, the second will be to capture Wilmington itself. There are reasonable grounds to hope for success, if advantage can be taken of the absence of the greater part of the enemy's forces, now looking after Sherman in Georgia. The directions you have given for the numbers and equipment of the expedition are all right, except in the most unimportant matter of where they embark and the amount of intrenching tools to be taken. The object of the expedition will be gained by effecting a landing on the main land between Cape Fear river and the Atlantic, north of the north entrance to the river. Should such landing be effected while the enemy still holds Fort Fisher and the batteries guarding the entrance to the river, then the troops should intrench themselves, and, by coöperating with the navy, effect the reduction and capture of those places. These in our hands, the navy could enter the harbor, and the port of Wilmington would be sealed. Should Fort Fisher and the point of land on which it is built fall into the hands of our troops immediately on landing, then it will be worth the attempt to capture Wilmington by a forced march and surprise. If time is consumed in gaining the first

object of the expedition, the second will become a matter of after-consideration.

"The details for execution are entrusted to you and the officer immediately in command of the troops.

"Should the troops under General Weitzel fail to effect a landing at or near Fort Fisher, they will be returned to the armies operating against Richmond without delay.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General B. F. BUTLER."

General Butler commanding the army from which the troops were taken for this enterprise, and the territory within which they were to operate, military courtesy required that all orders and instructions should go through him. They were so sent; but General Weitzel has since officially informed me that he never received the foregoing instructions, nor was he aware of their existence until he read General Butler's published official report of the Fort Fisher failure, with my endorsement and papers accompanying it. I had no idea of General Butler's accompanying the expedition until the evening before it got off from Bermuda Hundred, and then did not dream but that General Weitzel had received all the instructions, and would be in command. I rather formed the idea that General Butler was actuated by a desire to witness the effect of the explosion of the powder-boat. The expedition was detained several days at Hampton Roads, awaiting the loading of the powder-boat.

The importance of getting the Wilmington expedition off without delay, with or without the powder-boat, had been urged upon General Butler, and he advised to so notify Admiral Porter.

The expedition finally got off on the thirteenth of December, and arrived at the place of rendezvous, off New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the fifteenth. Admiral Porter arrived on the evening of the eighteenth, having put in at Beaufort to get ammunition for the monitors. The sea becoming rough, making it difficult to land troops, and the supply of water and coal being about exhausted, the transport fleet put back to Beaufort to replenish; this, with the state of the weather, delayed the return to the place of rendezvous until the twenty-fourth. The powder-boat was exploded on the morning of the twenty-fourth, before the return of General Butler from Beaufort; but it would seem, from the notice taken of it in the Southern newspapers, that the enemy were never enlightened as to the object of the explosion until they were informed by the Northern press.

On the twenty-fifth a landing was effected without opposition, and a reconnoissance, under Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, pushed up toward the fort. But before receiving a full report of the result of this reconnoissance, General Butler, in direct violation of the instructions given, ordered the reembarkation of the troops,

and the return of the expedition. The reembarkation was accomplished by the morning of the twenty-seventh.

On the return of the expedition, officers and men—among them Brevet-Major-General (then Brevet Brigadier-General) M. R. Curtis, First Lieutenant G. W. Ross,——regiment Vermont volunteers, First Lieutenant George W. Walling, and Second Lieutenant George Simpson, One Hundred and Forty-second New York volunteers—voluntarily reported to me that when recalled they were nearly into the fort, and, in their opinion, it could have been taken without much loss.

Soon after the return of the expedition, I received a despatch from the Secretary of the Navy, and a letter from Admiral Porter, informing me that the fleet was still off Fort Fisher, and expressing the conviction that, under a proper leader, the place could be taken. The natural supposition with me was, that, when the troops abandoned the expedition the navy would do so also. Finding it had not, however, I answered on the thirtieth of December, advising Admiral Porter to hold on, and that I would send a force and make another attempt to take the place. This time I selected Brevet Major-General (now Major-General) A. H. Terry to command the expedition. The troops composing it consisted of the same that composed the former, with the addition of a small brigade, numbering about one thousand five hundred, and a small siege train. The latter it was never found necessary to land. I communicated direct to the commander of the expedition the following instructions:

“**CHEF PORTER, VA., January 2, 1865.**

“**GENERAL:** The expedition entrusted to your command has been fitted out to renew the attempt to capture Fort Fisher, N. C., and Wilmington ultimately, if the fort falls. You will, then, proceed with as little delay as possible to the naval fleet lying off Cape Fear river, and report the arrival of yourself and command to Admiral D. D. Porter, commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

“It is exceedingly desirable that the most complete understanding should exist between yourself and the naval commander. I suggest, therefore, that you consult with Admiral Porter freely, and get from him the part to be performed by each branch of the public service, so that there may be unity of action. It would be well to have the whole programme laid down in writing. I have served with Admiral Porter, and know that you can rely on his judgment and his nerve to undertake what he proposes. I would, therefore, defer to him as much as is consistent with your own responsibilities. The first object to be attained is to get a firm position on the spit of land on which Fort Fisher is built, from which you can operate against that fort. You want to look to the practicability of receiving your supplies, and to defending yourself against superior forces sent against you by any

of the avenues left open to the enemy. If such a position can be obtained, the siege of Fort Fisher will not be abandoned until its reduction is accomplished, or another plan of campaign is ordered from these headquarters.

“My own views are that, if you effect a landing, the navy ought to run a portion of their fleet into Cape Fear river, while the balance of it operates on the outside. Land forces cannot invest Fort Fisher, or cut it off from supplies or reinforcements, while the river is in the possession of the enemy.

“A siege train will be loaded on vessels and sent to Fort Monroe, in readiness to be sent to you if required. All other supplies can be drawn from Beaufort as you need them.

“Keep the fleet of vessels with you until your position is assured. When you find they can be spared, order them back, or such of them as you can spare, to Fort Monroe, to report for orders.

“In case of failure to effect a landing, bring your command back to Beaufort, and report to these headquarters for further instructions. You will not debark at Beaufort until so directed.

“General Sheridan has been ordered to send a division of troops to Baltimore, and place them on sea-going vessels. These troops will be brought to Fort Monroe and kept there on the vessels until you are heard from. Should you require them, they will be sent to you.

“**U. S. GRANT,**
“**Lieutenant-General.**

“**Brevet Major-General A. H. TERRY.**”

Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Comstock, aide-de-camp (now brevet brigadier-general), who accompanied the former expedition, was assigned in orders as chief engineer to this.

It will be seen that these instructions did not differ materially from those given for the first expedition; and that in neither instance was there an order to assault Fort Fisher. This was a matter left entirely to the discretion of the commanding officer.

The expedition sailed from Fort Monroe on the morning of the sixth, arriving on the rendezvous off Beaufort on the eighth, where, owing to the difficulties of the weather, it lay until the morning of the twelfth, when it got under way, and reached its destination that evening. Under cover of the fleet, the disembarkation of the troops commenced on the morning of the thirteenth, and by three o'clock P. M. was completed without loss. On the fourteenth, a reconnoissance was pushed to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, and a small advance work taken possession of and turned into a defensive line against any attempt that might be made from the fort. This reconnoissance disclosed the fact that the front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire. In the afternoon of the fifteenth the fort was assaulted, and after most desperate fighting was captured, with its entire garrison and armament. Thus was secured, by the combined efforts of the navy and

army, one of the most important successes of the war. Our loss was: killed, one hundred and ten; wounded, five hundred and thirty-six. On the sixteenth and seventeenth the enemy abandoned and blew up Fort Caswell, and the works on Smith's Island, which were immediately occupied by us. This gave us entire control of the mouth of the Cape Fear river.

At my request, Major-General B. F. Butler was relieved, and Major-General E. O. C. Ord assigned to the command of the department of Virginia and North Carolina.

The defence of the line of the Tennessee no longer requiring the force which had beaten and nearly destroyed the only army threatening it, I determined to find other fields of operation for General Thomas' surplus troops—fields from which they would cooperate with other movements. General Thomas was therefore directed to collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications at Eastport, in readiness for orders. On the seventh of January General Thomas was directed, if he was assured of the departure of Hood south from Corinth, to send General Schofield, with his corps, east with as little delay as possible. This direction was promptly complied with, and the advance of the corps reached Washington on the twenty-third of the same month, whence it was sent to Fort Fisher and Newbern. On the twenty-sixth he was directed to send General A. J. Smith's command and a division of cavalry to report to General Canby. By the seventh of February the whole force was *en route* for its destination.

The State of North Carolina was constituted into a military department, and General Schofield assigned to command, and placed under the orders of Major-General Sherman. The following instructions were given him:

"CITY POINT, VA., January 31, 1862.

"GENERAL: * * * Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to be attained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both, as you deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro', you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that place with the sea-coast—as near to it as you can, building the road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the first is to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on his line of march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the accumulation of twenty days' rations and forage for sixty thousand men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as you can house and protect to such point in the interior as you may be able to occupy. I believe General Palmer has received some instructions direct

from General Sherman on the subject of securing supplies for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of ordnance stores will also be necessary.

"Make all requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective departments in the field with me at City Point. Communicate with me by every opportunity; and should you deem it necessary at any time, send a special boat to Fortres Monroe, from which point you can communicate by telegraph.

"The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of those required for your own command.

"The movements of the enemy may justify, or even make it your imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the interior to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report, however, what you purpose doing. The details for carrying out these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge, however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the twenty-second to the twenty-eighth of February; this limits your time very materially.

"If rolling stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it can be supplied from Washington. A large force of railroad men have already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by telegraph.

"U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD."

Previous to giving these instructions I had visited Fort Fisher, accompanied by General Schofield, for the purpose of seeing for myself the condition of things, and personally conferring with General Terry and Admiral Porter as to what was best to be done.

Anticipating the arrival of General Sherman at Savannah—his army entirely foot-loose, Hood being then before Nashville, Tennessee, the Southern railroads destroyed, so that it would take several months to reestablish a through line from west to east, and regarding the capture of Lee's army as the most important operation toward closing the rebellion—I sent orders to General Sherman on the sixth of December, that after establishing a base on the sea-coast, with necessary garrison, to include all his artillery and cavalry, to come by water to City Point with the balance of his command.

On the eighteenth of December, having received information of the defeat and utter rout of Hood's army by General Thomas, and that, owing to the great difficulty of procuring ocean transportation, it would take over two months to transport Sherman's army, and doubting whether he might not contribute as much

toward the desired result by operating from where he was, I wrote to him to that effect, and asked him for his views as to what would be best to do. A few days after this I received a communication from General Sherman, of date sixteenth December, acknowledging the receipt of my order of the sixth, and informing me of his preparations to carry it into effect as soon as he could get transportation. Also that he had expected, upon reducing Savannah, instantly to march to Columbia, South Carolina, thence to Raleigh, and thence to report to me; but that this would consume about six weeks' time after the fall of Savannah, whereas by sea he could probably reach me by the middle of January. The confidence he manifested in this letter of being able to march up and join me pleased me, and, without waiting for a reply to my letter of the eighteenth, I directed him, on the twenty-eighth of December, to make preparations to start, as he proposed, without delay, to break up the railroads in North and South Carolina, and join the armies operating against Richmond as soon as he could.

On the twenty-first of January I informed General Sherman that I had ordered the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield commanding, east; that it numbered about twenty-one thousand men; that we had at Fort Fisher about eight thousand men; at Newbern about four thousand; that if Wilmington was captured, General Schofield would go there; if not, he would be sent to Newbern; that, in either event, all the surplus force at both points would move to the interior toward Goldsboro', in cooperation with his movement; that from either point railroad communication could be run out; and that all these troops would be subject to his orders as he came into communication with them.

In obedience to his instructions, General Schofield proceeded to reduce Wilmington, North Carolina, in cooperation with the navy under Admiral Porter, moving his forces up both sides of the Cape Fear river. Fort Anderson, the enemy's main defence on the west bank of the river, was occupied on the morning of the nineteenth, the enemy having evacuated it after our appearance before it.

After fighting on the twentieth and twenty-first, our troops entered Wilmington on the morning of the twenty-second, the enemy having retreated toward Goldsboro' during the night. Preparations were at once made for a movement on Goldsboro' in two columns—one from Wilmington, and the other from Newbern—and to repair the railroad leading there from each place, as well as to supply General Sherman by Cape Fear river, toward Fayetteville, if it became necessary. The column from Newbern was attacked on the eighth of March, at Wise's Forks, and driven back with the loss of several hundred prisoners. On the eleventh the enemy renewed his attack upon our intrenched position, but was repulsed with severe loss, and fell

back during the night. On the fourteenth the Neuse river was crossed and Kinston occupied, and on the twenty-first Goldsboro' was entered. The column from Wilmington reached Cox's bridge, on the Neuse river, ten miles above Goldsboro', on the twenty-second.

By the first of February General Sherman's whole army was in motion from Savannah. He captured Columbia, South Carolina, on the seventeenth; thence moved on Goldsboro', North Carolina, *via* Fayetteville, reaching the latter place on the twelfth of March, opening up communication with General Schofield by way of Cape Fear river. On the fifteenth he resumed his march on Goldsboro'. He met a force of the enemy at Averysboro', and after a severe fight defeated and compelled it to retreat. Our loss in the engagement was about six hundred. The enemy's loss was much greater. On the eighteenth the combined forces of the enemy, under Joe Johnston, attacked his advance at Bentonville, capturing three guns and driving it back upon the main body. General Slocum, who was in the advance, ascertaining that the whole of Johnston's army was in the front, arranged his troops on the defensive, intrenched himself and awaited reinforcements, which were pushed forward. On the night of the twenty-first the enemy retreated to Smithfield, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. From there Sherman continued to Goldsboro', which place had been occupied by General Schofield on the 21st (crossing the Neuse river ten miles above there, at Cox's bridge, where General Terry had got possession and thrown a pontoon bridge, on the twenty-second), thus forming a junction with the columns from Newbern and Wilmington.

Among the important fruits of this campaign was the fall of Charleston, South Carolina. It was evacuated by the enemy on the night of the seventeenth of February, and occupied by our forces on the eighteenth.

On the morning of the thirty-first of January General Thomas was directed to send a cavalry expedition, under General Stoneman, from East Tennessee to penetrate South Carolina well down toward Columbia, to destroy the railroads and military resources of the country, and return, if he was able, to East Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, releasing our prisoners there, if possible. Of the feasibility of this latter, however, General Stoneman was to judge. Sherman's movements, I had no doubt, would attract the attention of all the force the enemy could collect, and facilitate the execution of this. General Stoneman was so late in making his start on this expedition (and Sherman having passed out of the State of South Carolina), on the twenty-seventh of February I directed General Thomas to change his course, and ordered him to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying the railroad toward Lynchburg as far as he could. This would keep him between our garrisons in East Tennessee and the enemy. I regarded it not impossible that, in the event of the enemy being driven from Richmond, he might fall back to

Lynchburg, and attempt a raid north through East Tennessee. On the fourteenth of February the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 14, 1865.

"General Canby is preparing a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama. His force will consist of about twenty thousand men, besides A. J. Smith's command. The cavalry you have sent to Canby will be debarked at Vicksburg. It, with the available cavalry already in that section, will move from there eastward, in cooperation. Hood's army has been terribly reduced by the severe punishment you gave it in Tennessee, by desertion consequent upon their defeat, and now by the withdrawal of many of them to oppose Sherman. (I take it a large portion of the infantry has been so withdrawn. It is so asserted in the Richmond papers, and a member of the rebel Congress said a few days since in a speech that one-half of it had been brought to South Carolina to oppose Sherman.) This being true, or even if it is not true, Canby's movement will attract all the attention of the enemy, and leave the advance from your stand-point easy. I think it advisable, therefore, that you prepare as much of a cavalry force as you can spare, and hold it in readiness to go south. The object would be threefold: First, to attract as much of the enemy's force as possible, to ensure success to Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's line of communications and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. Tuscaloosa and Selma would probably be the points to direct the expedition against. This, however, would not be so important as the mere fact of penetrating deep into Alabama. Discretion should be left to the officer commanding the expedition to go where, according to the information he may receive, he will best secure the objects named above.

"Now that your force has been so much depleted, I do not know what number of men you can put into the field. If not more than five thousand men, however, all cavalry, I think it will be sufficient. It is not desirable that you should start this expedition until the one leaving Vicksburg has been three or four days out, or even a week. I do not know when it will start, but will inform you by telegraph as soon as I learn. If you should hear through other sources before hearing from me, you can act on the information received.

"To ensure success, your cavalry should go with as little wagon train as possible, relying upon the country for supplies. I would also reduce the number of guns to a battery, or the number of batteries, and put the extra teams to the guns taken. No guns or caissons should be taken with less than eight horses.

"Please inform me by telegraph, on receipt of this, what force you think you will be able to send under these directions.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General G. H. THOMAS."

On the fifteenth he was directed to start the expedition as soon after the twentieth as he could get it off.

I deemed it of the utmost importance, before a general movement of the armies operating against Richmond, that all communications with the city, north of James river, should be cut off. The enemy having withdrawn the bulk of his force from the Shenandoah Valley, and sent it south, or to replace troops sent from Richmond, and desiring to reinforce Sherman, if practicable, whose cavalry was greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, I determined to make a move from the Shenandoah, which, if successful, would accomplish the first at least, and possibly the latter of these objects. I therefore telegraphed General Sheridan as follows:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 20, 1865—1 P. M.

"GENERAL: AS SOON as it is possible to travel, I think you will have no difficulty about reaching Lynchburg with a cavalry force alone. From there you could destroy the railroad and canal in every direction, so as to be of no further use to the rebellion. Sufficient cavalry should be left behind to look after Mosby's gang. From Lynchburg, if information you might get there would justify it, you could strike south, heading the streams in Virginia to the westward of Danville, and push on and join General Sherman. This additional raid, with one now about starting from East Tennessee, under Stoneman, numbering four to five thousand cavalry, one from Vicksburg, numbering seven or eight thousand cavalry, one from Eastport, Mississippi, ten thousand cavalry, Canby from Mobile bay, with about thirty-eight thousand mixed troops, these three latter pushing for Tuscaloosa, Selma and Montgomery, and Sherman with a large army eating out the vitals of South Carolina, is all that will be wanted to leave nothing for the rebellion to stand upon. I would advise you to overcome great obstacles to accomplish this. Charleston was evacuated on Tuesday last.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the twenty-fifth I received a despatch from General Sheridan, inquiring where Sherman was aiming for, and if I could give him definite information as to the points he might be expected to move on, this side of Charlotte, North Carolina. In answer the following telegram was sent him:

"CITY POINT, VA., February 26, 1865.

"GENERAL: SHERMAN'S movements will depend on the amount of opposition he meets with from the enemy. If strongly opposed, he may possibly have to fall back to Georgetown, S. C., and fit out for a new start. I think, however, all danger for the necessity of going to that point has passed. I believe he has passed Charlotte. He may take Fayetteville on his way

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... enemy, under Andy Smith and Price, west of
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After the long march by General Sheridan's
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to Goldsboro'. If you reach Lynchburg, you will have to be guided in your after-movements by the information you obtain. Before you could possibly reach Sherman, I think you would find him moving from Goldsboro' toward Raleigh, or engaging the enemy strongly posted at one or the other of these places, with railroad communications opened from his army to Wilmington or Newbern.

"U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

General Sheridan moved from Winchester on the twenty-seventh of February, with two divisions of cavalry, numbering about five thousand each. On the first of March he secured the bridge which the enemy attempted to destroy, across the middle fork of the Shenandoah, at Mount Crawford, and entered Staunton on the second, the enemy having retreated on Waynesboro'. Thence he pushed on to Waynesboro', where he found the enemy in force in an intrenched position, under General Early. Without stopping to make reconnaissance, an immediate attack was made, the position was carried, and sixteen hundred prisoners, eleven pieces of artillery, with horses and caissons complete, two hundred wagons and teams loaded with subsistence, and seventeen battle-flags, were captured. The prisoners, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, were sent back to Winchester. Thence he marched on Charlottesville, destroying effectually the railroad and bridges as he went, which place he reached on the third. Here he remained two days, destroying the railroad toward Richmond and Lynchburg, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and awaiting the arrival of his trains. This necessary delay caused him to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg. On the morning of the sixth, dividing his force into two columns, he sent one to Scottsville, whence it marched up the James River canal to New Market, destroying every lock, and in many places the bank of the canal. From here a force was pushed out from this column to Duiguidsville, to obtain possession of the bridge across the James river at that place, but failed. The enemy burned it on our approach. The enemy also burned the bridge across the river at Hardwickville. The other column moved down the railroad toward Lynchburg, destroying it as far as Amherst Court-house, sixteen miles from Lynchburg; thence across the country, uniting with the column at New Market. The river being very high, his pontoons would not reach across it; and the enemy having destroyed the bridges by which he had hoped to cross the river and get on the Southside railroad about Farmville, and destroy it to Appomattox Court-house, the only thing left for him was to return to Winchester or strike a base at the White House. Fortunately, he chose the latter. From New Market

he took up his line of march, following the canal toward Richmond, destroying every lock upon it and cutting the banks wherever practicable, to a point eight miles east of Goochland, concentrating the whole force at Columbia on the tenth. Here he rested one day, and sent through by scouts information of his whereabouts and purposes, and a request for supplies to meet him at White House, which reached me on the night of the twelfth. An infantry force was immediately sent to get possession of White House, and supplies were forwarded. Moving from Columbia in a direction to threaten Richmond, to near Ashland station, he crossed the Annas, and after having destroyed all the bridges and many miles of the railroad, proceeded down the north bank of the Pamunkey to White House, which place he reached on the nineteenth.

Previous to this the following communication was sent to General Thomas:

"CITY POINT, VA., March 7, 1865—9:30 A. M.

"GENERAL: I think it will be advisable now for you to repair the railroad in East Tennessee, and throw a good force up to Bull's Gap and fortify there. Supplies at Knoxville could always be got forward as required. With Bull's Gap fortified, you can occupy as outposts about all of East Tennessee, and be prepared, if it should be required of you in the spring, to make a campaign toward Lynchburg, or into North Carolina. I do not think Stoneman should break the road until he gets into Virginia, unless it should be to cut off rolling stock that may be caught west of that.

"U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.
Major-General G. H. THOMAS."

Thus it will be seen that in March, 1865, General Canby was moving an adequate force against Mobile and the army defending it under General Dick Taylor; Thomas was pushing out two large and well-appointed cavalry expeditions—one from Middle Tennessee under Brevet Major-General Wilson against the enemy's vital points in Alabama, the other from East Tennessee under Major-General Stoneman toward Lynchburg—and assembling the remainder of his available forces, preparatory to offensive operations from East Tennessee; General Sheridan's cavalry was at White House; the armies of the Potomac and James were confronting the enemy, under Lee, in his defences of Richmond and Petersburg; General Sherman with his armies, reinforced by that of General Schofield, was at Goldsboro'; General Pope was making preparations for a spring campaign against the enemy under Kirby Smith and Price, west of the Mississippi; and General Hancock was concentrating a force in the vicinity of Winchester, Virginia, to guard against invasion or to operate offensively, as might prove necessary.

After the long march by General Sheridan's cavalry over winter roads, it was necessary to

the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and Burkeville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that in like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the twenty-ninth the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank-road. The position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy, and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL: Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank-road to Hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is pos-

sible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can; and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry, may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at eleven-thirty A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the twenty-ninth to the morning of the thirty-first, the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the thirtieth, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court-house toward Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank-road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess' Mills. Generals Ord, Wright and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated, if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend my line no further, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Steadman, particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picket line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report to General Sheridan, but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the thirty-first General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force, and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss,

and possession of the White Oak road gained. Sheridan advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the Fifth corps, reinforced the rebel cavalry defending that point with infantry, and forced him back toward Dinwiddie Court-house. Here General Sheridan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of woods and broken country, and make his progress slow. At this juncture he despatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back slowly on Dinwiddie Court-house. General McKenzie's cavalry and one division of the Fifth corps were immediately ordered to his assistance. Soon after, receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could hold our position on the Boydton road, and that the other two divisions of the Fifth corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once. Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren, because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the first of April General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his strongly-fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between five thousand and six thousand prisoners.

About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles' division of Humphreys' corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (April second), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left toward Hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's, that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, re-

turned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbons' corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong, enclosed works—the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg—thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's run retreated westward to Sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by Miles' division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's station toward Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox river. During the night of the second the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the third pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Second and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the Southside road, the Ninth corps stretched along that road behind him. On the fourth General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court-house. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the fifth.

On the morning of the fifth, I addressed Major-General Sherman the following communication:

"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and, if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the sixth it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jetersville, toward Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the Fifth corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jetersville), to strike his flank, followed by the

the enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the enemy in his intrenched position, but to force him out, if possible. Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with the full reliance that the army will engage or follow, as circumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find that the enemy keeps within his main intrenched line, you may cut loose and push for the Danville road. If you find it practicable, I would like you to cross the Southside road, between Petersburg and Burkeville, and destroy it to some extent. I would not advise much detention, however, until you reach the Danville road, which I would like you to strike as near to the Appomattox as possible. Make your destruction on that road as complete as possible. You can then pass on to the Southside road, west of Burkeville, and destroy that in like manner.

"After having accomplished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only avenues of supply to Lee's army, you may return to this army, selecting your road further south, or you may go into North Carolina and join General Sherman. Should you select the latter course, get the information to me as early as possible, so that I may send orders to meet you at Goldsboro'.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

On the morning of the twenty-ninth the movement commenced. At night the cavalry was at Dinwiddie Court-house, and the left of our infantry line extended to the Quaker road, near its intersection with the Boydton plank-road. The position of the troops, from left to right, was as follows: Sheridan, Warren, Humphreys, Ord, Wright, Parke.

Everything looked favorable to the defeat of the enemy, and the capture of Petersburg and Richmond, if the proper effort was made. I therefore addressed the following communication to General Sheridan, having previously informed him verbally not to cut loose for the raid contemplated in his orders until he received notice from me to do so:

"GRAVELLY CREEK, March 29, 1865.

"GENERAL: Our line is now unbroken from the Appomattox to Dinwiddie. We are all ready, however, to give up all, from the Jerusalem plank-road to Hatcher's run, whenever the forces can be used advantageously. After getting into line south of Hatcher's, we pushed forward to find the enemy's position. General Griffin was attacked near where the Quaker road intersects the Boydton road, but repulsed it easily, capturing about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's mill, and was pushing on when last heard from.

"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is pos-

sible to do so, before going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you can; and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry, may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one army here until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The signal officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at eleven-thirty A. M., that a cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond toward Petersburg, taking forty minutes to pass.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN."

From the night of the twenty-ninth to the morning of the thirty-first, the rain fell in such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the thirtieth, Sheridan advanced from Dinwiddie Court-house toward Five Forks, where he found the enemy in force. General Warren advanced and extended his line across the Boydton plank-road to near the White Oak road, with a view of getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was and fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main line on the Hatcher, near Burgess' Mills. Generals Ord, Wright and Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably. The enemy confronting us, as he did, at every point from Richmond to our extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be penetrated, if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined, therefore, to extend my line no further, but to reinforce General Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week before, when he assaulted Fort Steadman, particularly favored this. The enemy's intrenched picket line captured by us at that time threw the lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at once made to relieve General Humphreys' corps, to report to General Sheridan, but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement. On the morning of the thirty-first General Warren reported favorably to getting possession of the White Oak road, and was directed to do so. To accomplish this he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps, which was attacked by the enemy in superior force, and driven back on the second division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back upon the third division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the Second corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with heavy loss,

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About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin relieved Major-General Warren in command of the Fifth corps. The report of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this, General Miles' division of Humphreys' corps was sent to reinforce him, and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the morning (April second), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines. General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping everything before him, and to his left toward Hatcher's run, capturing many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division of General Ord's, that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near Hatcher's run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right, and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs, re-

turned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbons' corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong, enclosed works—the most salient and commanding south of Petersburg—thus materially shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The enemy south of Hatcher's run retreated westward to Sutherland's station, where they were overtaken by Miles' division. A severe engagement ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's station toward Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main road along the Appomattox river. During the night of the second the enemy evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated toward Danville. On the morning of the third pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed for the Danville road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General Meade with the Second and Sixth corps, while General Ord moved for Burkesville along the Southside road, the Ninth corps stretched along that road behind him. On the fourth General Sheridan struck the Danville road near Jettersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court-house. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached Burkesville on the evening of the fifth.

On the morning of the fifth, I addressed Major-General Sherman the following communication:

"Wilson's Station, April 5, 1865.

"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number one half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and, if a stand is made at Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so, push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic points to strike at.

"U. S. GRANT,

"Lieutenant-General.

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN."

On the morning of the sixth it was found that General Lee was moving west of Jettersville, toward Danville. General Sheridan moved with his cavalry (the Fifth corps having been returned to General Meade on his reaching Jettersville), to strike his flank, followed by the

Sixth corps, while the Second and Fifth corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord advanced from Burkesville toward Farmville, sending two regiments of infantry, and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered. This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which the enemy immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon General Sheridan struck the enemy south of Sailor's creek, captured sixteen pieces of artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the Sixth corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made, which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among whom were many general officers. The movements of the Second corps and General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.

On the morning of the seventh the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except one division, and the Fifth corps moving by Prince Edwards Court-house; the Sixth corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on Farmville, and the Second corps by the High Bridge road. It was soon found that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, but so close was the pursuit that the Second corps got possession of the common bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately crossed over. The Sixth corps and a division of cavalry crossed at Farmville to its support.

Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I addressed him the following communication from Farmville:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: The result of the last week must convince you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the eighth, before leaving, I received at Farmville the following:

"April 7, 1865.

"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the army of Northern Vir-

ginia, I reciprocate your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition of its surrender.

"R. E. LEE,
"General.

"Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

To this I immediately replied:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL: Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date, asking the condition on which I will accept the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia, is just received. In reply I would say that, peace being my great desire, there is but one condition I would insist upon, namely: That the men and officers surrendered shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers to meet any officers you may name for the same purpose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender of the army of Northern Virginia will be received.

"U. S. GRANT,
"Lieutenant-General.

"General R. E. LEE."

Early on the morning of the eighth the pursuit was resumed. General Meade followed north of the Appomattox, and General Sheridan, with all the cavalry, pushed straight for Appomattox Station, followed by General Ord's command and the Fifth corps. During the day General Meade's advance had considerable fighting with the enemy's rear guard, but was unable to bring on a general engagement. Late in the evening General Sheridan struck the railroad at the Appomattox station, drove the enemy from there, and captured twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and four trains of cars loaded with supplies for Lee's army. During this day I accompanied General Meade's column, and about midnight received the following communication from General Lee:

April 8, 1865.

"GENERAL: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender of this army; but as the restoration of peace should be the sole object of all, I desired to know whether your proposals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern Virginia; but as far as your proposal may affect the Confederate States forces under my command, and tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased to meet you at ten A. M. to-

morrow on the old stage road to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies.

" R. E. LEE,
" General.

" Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

Early on the morning of the ninth I returned him an answer as follows, and immediately started to join the column south of the Appomattox :

April 9, 1865.

" GENERAL: Your note of yesterday is received. I have no authority to treat on the subject of peace; the meeting proposed for A. M. to-day could lead to no good. I will state, however, General, that I am equally anxious for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed. Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe myself, &c.,

" U. S. GRANT,
" Lieutenant-General.

" General R. E. LEE."

On the morning of the ninth General Ord's command and the Fifth corps reached Appomattox station just as the enemy was making a desperate effort to break through our cavalry. The infantry was at once thrown in. Soon after a white flag was received, requesting a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for a surrender.

Before reaching General Sheridan's headquarters, I received the following from General Lee:

April 9, 1865.

" GENERAL: I received your note of this morning on the picket line, whither I had come to meet you, and ascertain definitely what terms were embraced in your proposal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that purpose.

" R. E. LEE,
" General.

" Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

The interview was held at Appomattox Court-house, the result of which is set forth in the following correspondence:

" APPOMATTOX COURT-HOUSE, VA., }
April 9, 1865. }

" GENERAL: In accordance with the substance of my letter to you of the eighth instant, I propose to receive the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia on the following terms, to wit: Rolls of the officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer to be designated by me, the other to be retained

by such officer or officers as you may designate. The officers to give their individual paroles not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly exchanged; and each company or regimental commander sign a like parole for the men of their commands. The arms, artillery, and public property to be parked and stacked, and turned over to the officers appointed by me to receive them. This will not embrace the side-arms of the officers, nor their private horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man will be allowed to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by United States authority so long as they observe their paroles and the laws in force where they may reside.

" U. S. GRANT,
" Lieutenant-General.

" General R. E. LEE."

" HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, }
April 9, 1865. }

" GENERAL: I received your letter of this date containing the terms of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substantially the same as those expressed in your letter of the eighth instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to designate the proper officers to carry the stipulations into effect.

" R. E. LEE,
" General.

" Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT."

The command of Major-General Gibbon, the Fifth Army Corps under Griffin, and McKenzie's cavalry, were designated to remain at Appomattox Court-house until the paroling of the surrendered army was completed, and to take charge of the public property. The remainder of the army immediately returned to the vicinity of Burkesville.

General Lee's great influence throughout the whole South caused his example to be followed, and to-day the result is that the armies lately under his leadership are at their homes, desiring peace and quiet, and their arms are in the hands of our ordnance officers.

On the receipt of my letter of the fifth, General Sherman moved directly against Joe Johnston, who retreated rapidly on through Raleigh, which place General Sherman occupied on the morning of the thirteenth. The day preceding news of the surrender of General Lee reached him at Smithfield.

On the fourteenth a correspondence was opened between General Sherman and General Johnston, which resulted on the eighteenth in an agreement for the suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum or basis for peace, subject to the approval of the President. This agreement was disapproved by the President on the twenty-first, which disapproval, together with your instructions, was communicated to General Sherman by me in person on the morning of the twenty-fourth, at Raleigh, North Carolina, in obedience to your orders. Notice was at once

given by him to General Johnston for the termination of the truce that had been entered into. On the twenty-fifth another meeting between them was agreed upon, to take place on the twenty-sixth, which terminated in the surrender and disbandment of Johnston's army upon substantially the same terms as were given to General Lee.

The expedition under General Stoneman from East Tennessee got off on the twentieth of March, moving by way of Boone, North Carolina, and struck the railroad at Wytheville, Chambersburg, and Big Lick. The force striking it at Big Lick pushed on to within a few miles of Lynchburg, destroying the important bridges, while with the main force he effectually destroyed it between New river and Big Lick, and then turned for Greensboro' on the North Carolina railroad; struck that road and destroyed the bridges between Danville and Greensboro', and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin, together with the depots of supplies along it, and captured four hundred prisoners. At Salisbury he attacked and defeated a force of the enemy under General Gardiner, capturing fourteen pieces of artillery and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners, and destroyed large amounts of army stores. At this place he destroyed fifteen miles of railroad and the bridges toward Charlotte. Thence he moved to Slatersville.

General Canby, who had been directed in January to make preparations for a movement from Mobile bay against Mobile and the interior of Alabama, commenced his movement on the twentieth of March. The Sixteenth corps, Major-General A. J. Smith commanding, moved from Fort Gaines by water to Fish river; the Thirteenth corps, under Major-General Gordon Granger, moved from Fort Morgan and joined the Sixteenth corps on Fish river, both moving thence on Spanish Fort and investing it on the twenty-seventh; while Major-General Steele's command moved from Pensacola, cut the railroad leading from Tensas to Montgomery, effected a junction with them, and partially invested Fort Blakely. After a severe bombardment of Spanish Fort, a part of its line was carried on the eighth of April. During the night the enemy evacuated the fort. Fort Blakely was carried by assault on the ninth, and many prisoners captured; our loss was considerable. These successes practically opened to us the Alabama river, and enabled us to approach Mobile from the north. On the night of the eleventh the city was evacuated, and was taken possession of by our forces on the morning of the twelfth.

The expedition under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, consisting of twelve thousand five hundred mounted men, was delayed by rains until March twenty-second, when it moved from Chickasaw, Alabama. On the first of April General Wilson encountered the enemy in force under Forrest near Ebenezer Church, drove him in confusion, captured three

hundred prisoners and three guns, and destroyed the central bridge over the Cahawba river. On the second he attacked and captured the fortified city of Selma, defended by Forrest with seven thousand men and thirty-two guns, destroyed the arsenal, armory, naval foundry, machine shops, vast quantities of stores, and captured three thousand prisoners. On the fourth he captured and destroyed Tuscaloosa. On the tenth he crossed the Alabama river, and after sending information of his operations to General Canby, marched on Montgomery, which place he occupied on the fourteenth, the enemy having abandoned it. At this place many stores and five steamboats fell into our hands. Thence a force marched direct on Columbus, and another on West Point, both of which places were assaulted and captured on the sixteenth. At the former place we got one thousand five hundred prisoners and fifty-two field guns, destroyed two gunboats, the navy-yard, foundries, arsenal, many factories, and much other public property. At the latter place we got three hundred prisoners, four guns, and destroyed nineteen locomotives and three hundred cars. On the twentieth he took possession of Macon, Georgia, with sixty field guns, one thousand two hundred militia, and five generals, surrendered by General Howell Cobb. General Wilson, hearing that Jeff. Davis was trying to make his escape, sent forces in pursuit and succeeded in capturing him on the morning of May eleventh.

On the fourth day of May General Dick Taylor surrendered to General Canby all the remaining rebel forces east of the Mississippi.

A force sufficient to ensure an easy triumph over the enemy under Kirby Smith, west of the Mississippi, was immediately put in motion for Texas, and Major-General Sheridan designated for its immediate command; but on the twenty-sixth day of May, and before they reached their destination, General Kirby Smith surrendered his entire command to Major-General Canby. This surrender did not take place, however, until after the capture of the rebel President and Vice-President; and the bad faith was exhibited of first disbanding most of his army and permitting an indiscriminate plunder of public property.

Owing to the report that many of those lately in arms against the Government had taken refuge upon the soil of Mexico, carrying with them arms rightfully belonging to the United States, which had been surrendered to us by agreement—among them some of the leaders who had surrendered in person—and the disturbed condition of affairs on the Rio Grande, the orders for troops to proceed to Texas were not changed.

There have been severe combats, raids, expeditions, and movements to defeat the designs and purposes of the enemy, most of them reflecting great credit on our arms, and which contributed greatly to our final triumph, that I have not mentioned. Many of these will be

found clearly set forth in the reports herewith submitted; some in the telegrams and brief despatches announcing them, and others, I regret to say, have not as yet been officially reported.

For information touching our Indian difficulties, I would respectfully refer to the reports of the commanders of the departments in which they have occurred.

It has been my fortune to see the armies of both the West and the East fight battles, and from what I have seen I know there is no difference in their fighting qualities. All that it was possible for men to do in battle they have done. The Western armies commenced their battles in the Mississippi Valley, and received the final surrender of the remnant of the principal army opposed to them in North Carolina. The armies of the East commenced their battles on the river from which the Army of the Potomac derived its name, and received the final surrender of their old antagonist at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia. The splendid achievements of each have nationalized our victories, removed all sectional jealousies (of which we have, unfortunately, experienced too much), and the cause of crimination and recrimination that might have followed had either section failed in its duty. All have a proud record, and all sections can well congratulate themselves and each other for having done their full share in restoring the supremacy of the law over every foot of territory belonging to the United States. Let them hope for perpetual peace and harmony with that enemy, whose manhood, however mistaken the cause, drew forth such herculean deeds of valor.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
November 18, 1865.

[Official copy.] E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Doc. 43.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL THOMAS.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY UNDER HIS COMMAND, FROM
SEPTEMBER 7, 1864, TO JANUARY 20, 1865.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, }
EASTPORT, Miss., January 20, 1865. }

COLONEL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the occupation of Atlanta, Georgia, as follows:

From the seventh to the thirtieth of September, the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth Army Corps, composing the Army of the Cumberland, remained quietly in camp around the city of Atlanta. The enemy was reported posted in the neighborhood of Jonesboro'. During the

greater portion of the above-mentioned period an armistice existed between the two armies for the purpose of exchanging prisoners captured on both sides during the preceding campaign.

About the twentieth of September the enemy's cavalry, under Forrest, crossed the Tennessee river near Waterloo, Alabama, and appeared in front of Athens, Alabama, on the twenty-third, after having destroyed a portion of the railroad between the latter place and Decatur, Alabama. Considerable skirmishing took place, and the garrison, Colonel Campbell, One Hundred and Tenth United States colored troops commanding, withdrew into the fort. By nightfall the town was completely invested, and the quartermaster and commissary buildings destroyed by the enemy. On the morning of the twenty-fourth the enemy opened on the fort with a twelve-pounder battery, firing from two directions, north and west, which was answered by the artillery of the garrison. Later two flags of truce were received, demanding a surrender, which was declined by Colonel Campbell, when he was requested to grant Major-General Forrest a personal interview, and complied with the request. At this interview Colonel Campbell *allowed* himself to become convinced by the rebel commander that it was useless to contend against the largely superior force of the enemy confronting him, and was induced to surrender his command. The garrison at the time consisted of four hundred and fifty men belonging to the One Hundred and Sixth, One Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundred and Eleventh United States colored troops, and about one hundred and fifty men of the Third Tennessee cavalry. Thirty minutes after the evacuation of the fort reinforcements, consisting of the Eighteenth Michigan and One Hundred and Second Ohio regiments, arrived, and after a severe fight were also forced to yield. Forrest then moved toward Pulaski, destroying the railroad as he advanced, captured the garrison at Sulphur Branch Trestle, and skirmished heavily all day of the twenty-seventh with the garrison of Pulaski, but withdrew toward nightfall. Major-General Rousseau was present at Pulaski during the engagement, having collected such troops as he could spare from other parts of his command to assist in staying the progress of the enemy in the destruction of our railroad communications.

On the twenty-ninth Forrest withdrew from the immediate vicinity of the railroad, after having thoroughly destroyed it from Athens to within five miles of Pulaski, and on the same day the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad was cut near Tullahoma and Decherd by small parties from his command sent out for the purpose; but the road was again in running order on the thirtieth. As Forrest changed the scene of his operations from the Decatur railroad over to the one leading to Chattanooga, General Rousseau moved rapidly by rail around through Nashville to Tullahoma and prepared for his reception. On the same day (twenty-ninth Sep-

tember) five thousand men from the District of the Etowah, Major-General J. B. Steedman commanding, crossed to the north of the Tennessee river, to check Forrest's movements and protect and keep open the communication by rail with Chattanooga.

Newton's division, Fourth corps, was ordered from Atlanta September twenty-sixth, and replaced Steedman's command at Chattanooga on the twenty-eighth. Morgan's division, of the Fourteenth corps, started from Atlanta for the same purpose on the twenty-ninth of September, and to reinforce the troops operating against Forrest.

In compliance with verbal instructions from Major-General Sherman, I left Atlanta with Morgan's division to take immediate charge of affairs in Tennessee, and reached Nashville October third.

On the withdrawal of Forrest's troops from Athens a garrison was sent to reoccupy the post by Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, commanding District of Northern Alabama, who also sent a scouting party from Huntsville toward Fayetteville to locate the enemy. This party ascertained that Forrest passed through Fayetteville on the night of the twenty-ninth, and moved toward Decherd. After passing Fayetteville, however, he divided his forces, part going south through New Market toward Huntsville, and the remainder, under Forrest in person, moved through Lynchburg toward Columbia. The first column, four thousand strong, under Buford, appeared in front of Huntsville during the evening of the thirtieth, and immediately sent a summons to the garrison to surrender, which the latter refused to do. The enemy remained throughout the night in the vicinity of the town, and repeated the demand for its surrender on the morning of October first, and meeting with an answer similar to the one received on the night previous, he moved off in the direction of Athens, which place was attacked by him at about three p. m., without effect, the garrison holding its own nobly. The second column (under Forrest in person, and estimated at three thousand men), made its appearance near Columbia on the morning of the first, but did not attack that place.

During these operations of Forrest in Middle Tennessee, small parties of the enemy made their appearance in the neighborhood of McMinnville and Liberty, but made no serious demonstrations.

Morgan's division of the Fourteenth corps, which started from Atlanta on the twenty-ninth of September, reached Stevenson during the morning of the first of October, and pushed on toward Huntsville immediately, reaching that place during the night, and set out for Athens at an early hour on the morning of the second, repairing the railroad as it advanced. The enemy, under Buford, resumed the attack on Athens on the second, but was again handsomely repulsed by the garrison, consisting of

the Seventy-third Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel Slade commanding. Failing in this second attempt, Buford moved off toward Elk river, pursued by a small force of our cavalry belonging to General Granger's command. The other column, under Forrest, started from near Columbia on the morning of the third, and moved off in the direction of Mount Pleasant, paroling all his prisoners before his departure. During his stay in the neighborhood he destroyed about five miles of railroad between Carter's creek and Spring Hill, including three bridges. The enemy's intention to make good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee river being now evident, directions were given to General Morgan, at Athens, to move with his division toward Bainbridge and endeavor to secure the crossing at that place in advance of Forrest, while General Rousseau, already on the way to Columbia from Nashville with a force of four thousand mounted men, hastily collected together, was to push after the enemy through Mount Pleasant and press him in the rear. Croxton's brigade of cavalry started from Farmington, and moved through Louisburg, pursued a south-westerly course toward Lawrenceburg. The above was the position of the troops on the morning of October third. On the same day information reached me that Major-General Washburn, with three thousand cavalry and fifteen hundred infantry, was moving up the Tennessee river to participate in the operations against Forrest. Directions were sent him on the fourth to leave his infantry at Johnsonville, move with his cavalry by water to Clifton, and thence across the country toward Pulaski, joining General Rousseau's command at that point. Lieutenant Commander Forrest, United States Navy, commanding the naval force on the upper Tennessee, was requested to send some gunboats down the river to Florence, Alabama, and endeavor to prevent the enemy crossing in that vicinity, if the high stage of water then prevailing in the Tennessee would admit of his crossing the upper shoals with his gunboats.

Morgan's division reached Rogersville during the evening of the fourth, having been delayed by high water in crossing Elk river; and on the same night Forrest passed through Lawrenceburg. A report was received to the effect that Buford's command succeeded in crossing the Tennessee river at Brown's ferry on the third instant.

On the sixth General Washburn reached Waynesboro, still moving eastward, and on the same day General Morgan came up with the enemy's rear guard at Shoal Creek bridge, and skirmished with it slightly, but still not in time to prevent the main body of the enemy from safely effecting a crossing of the Tennessee at Bainbridge. Thus both columns of the enemy succeeded in escaping, although closely pursued by our forces. On the eighth directions were sent to General Rousseau to destroy all ferry-boats and other means of crossing the river,

and then move his command below Florence to await further orders. At the same time General Morgan was directed to return to Athens.

Pending these operations in Tennessee, the whole aspect of affairs about Atlanta had undergone a change. Hood had crossed the Chattahoochee river, and had sent one corps of his army to destroy the railroad between Allatoona and Marietta, which he had effectually accomplished for a distance of over twenty miles, interrupting all communication between the forces in Tennessee, and the main army with General Sherman in Georgia. He then moved around south of Rome, to the west side of the Coosa river, and taking a north-easterly course, marched toward Summerville and Lafayette, threatening Chattanooga and Bridgeport.

The following dispositions were made on the eleventh: Croxton's cavalry brigade was to move to some point sufficiently near his supplies at Athens, and not too far removed from the Tennessee river to protect its crossings from Decatur down as far as Eastport. Morgan's division of the Fourteenth corps to move without delay from Athens to Chattanooga by rail, and Steedman's command following Morgan's from Decatur to Bridgeport. General Rousseau's troops were recalled from below Florence, and ordered to concentrate at Athens without delay. The district of Northern Alabama, comprising the posts of Decatur, Huntsville, Stevenson, and intermediate points, was left with its ordinary garrisons, and our whole attention turned toward Hood's movements in Northern Georgia.

On the twelfth the enemy's cavalry attacked Resaca, but the place was resolutely held by Watkins' brigade of cavalry, and the railroad bridge saved from destruction. The same day Brigadier-General Wagner reported from Chattanooga the enemy's cavalry, two hundred and fifty strong, had occupied Lafayette, Georgia, whereupon directions were sent him to call in the detachments at Tunnel Hill, Ringgold, and intermediate points along the railroad between there and Chattanooga, and quietly make preparations to defend his post. On the thirteenth, one corps of Hood's army appeared in front of Dalton, and a summons to surrender, signed by Hood in person, was sent in to Colonel Johnson, Forty-fourth United States colored troops, commanding the garrison. Colonel Johnson being convinced of the uselessness of contending against so overwhelming a force of the enemy, and knowing there was no succor at hand, complied with the demand.

On the fourteenth, Morgan's division reached Chattanooga, and General Steedman's command arrived at Bridgeport, where he received orders to proceed to Chattanooga.

After remaining at Dalton one day, during which he destroyed about five miles of railroad, the enemy moved off to the westward, through Nickajack Gap, to rejoin the remainder of Hood's army near Summerville, to which point he had been followed by General Sherman with

the Fourth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps, the Twentieth corps having been left behind at Atlanta to hold the place.

In compliance with instructions from Major-General Sherman, Morgan's division, of the Fourteenth corps, and Wagner's, of the Fourth, were sent from Chattanooga to rejoin their respective commands at Summerville.

A force of one thousand five hundred men was set to work, under the direction of Colonel W. W. Wright, Chief Engineer United States Military Railroads, to repair the railroad south of Chattanooga, there being twenty-four miles of rails and ties totally destroyed, besides several important bridges carried away by high water; yet with characteristic energy on the part of Colonel Wright and Captain J. C. Van Duzer, Superintendent of Military Telegraph, the repairs were rapidly carried forward. Telegraphic communication with Atlanta was restored on the twenty-first, and trains commenced running regularly on the twenty-eighth. On the latter date the enemy was at Gadsden, Alabama, while General Sherman's forces were at Gaylesville, both armies remaining inactive and watchful of the other's movements. While at the latter place Special Field Order No. 105, Military Division of the Mississippi, was issued by General Sherman, and the substance of it sent to me by telegraph, as follows:

"In the event of military movements or the accidents of war separating the general in command from his military division, Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding the Department of the Cumberland, will exercise command over all the troops and garrisons not absolutely in the presence of the general-in-chief."

A written communication received a few days previous, in which I was instructed to remain in Tennessee and defend the line of the Tennessee river, gave a detailed account of his plans for a campaign into the heart of Georgia. The Fourteenth and Twentieth corps of my command were to go with General Sherman, the Fourth corps remaining with me in Tennessee. My instructions were to pursue the enemy if he followed General Sherman's column, but in any event to hold Tennessee. On the twenty-sixth the enemy's infantry made its appearance in strong force in front of Decatur, Alabama, and during the afternoon attacked the garrison, but not vigorously, and without effect. Reinforcements amounting to two full regiments were sent from Chattanooga to General Granger at that point, and he was directed to hold his post at all hazards. On the twenty-seventh the enemy commenced intrenching his position around Decatur, working steadily throughout the day and skirmishing continually, but no artillery was used. At night their camp-fires showed a heavy force. Under cover of the darkness and with a strong column, the enemy drove in our pickets and established a line of rifle-pits within five hundred yards of the town. On the twenty-eighth a sortie was made by a part of the garrison, which advanced under cover of the

guns of the fort down the river bank and around to the rear of the enemy's pits, clearing them of their occupants, and capturing one hundred and twenty prisoners belonging to Cheatham's division, besides killing and wounding a number. The same day the Fourteenth United States colored troops, Colonel Morgan commanding, carried one of the enemy's batteries up the river, after driving off the supports; the guns were spiked and the command returned to Decatur. Our loss was three officers killed and several officers and men wounded.

General Granger estimated the force opposing him at one corps, and his scouts informed him there was also a corps at Warrenton, Alabama, with Russell's brigade of cavalry at Guntersville, on the river; Roddy's division of cavalry was picketing the south side of the Tennessee from Decatur to Tuscumbia, and Forrest, with the main cavalry force, was reported at Corinth, Mississippi, with outposts at Eastport and along the west bank of the Tennessee. On the twenty-ninth General Granger reported the enemy in his front to be withdrawing from Decatur toward Courtland. The same day General Croxton, commanding a brigade of cavalry picketing the north bank of the river, reported the enemy crossing at the mouth of Cypress creek, two miles below Florence, stating at the same time that he would move with all the force he could spare to drive the enemy back. Directions were sent to General Hatch, commanding a division of cavalry at Clifton, on the east bank of the Tennessee, to move to the support of Croxton at Florence, impressing upon both commanders the necessity of keeping the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river, until the Fourth corps, already on its way from General Sherman in Georgia, could arrive and get into a position to meet him.

Hood's plans had now become evident, and from information gained through prisoners, deserters, and other sources, his intention was to cross into Middle Tennessee. To enable him to supply his army he had been repairing the Mobile and Ohio railroad for some time previous, and trains were now running as far north as Corinth, and thence east to Cherokee station, bringing his supplies by that route from Selma and Montgomery.

The advance division (Wood's, of the Fourth corps), reached Athens on the thirty-first, the other two divisions of the corps following along rapidly. The Twenty-third corps, Major-General J. M. Schofield commanding, having been ordered by Major-General Sherman to take post at Resaca and report to me for orders, was immediately ordered by me to Pulaski (as soon as I learned Hood had appeared in force on the south side of the Tennessee), and was also on its way, moving in rear of the Fourth corps.

The enemy effected a lodgement for his infantry on the north side of the Tennessee, about three miles above Florence, on the thirty-first, notwithstanding Croxton's endeavors to drive

him back, and his cavalry in heavy force pressed Croxton across Shoal creek to its east bank. Orders were immediately sent to General Stanley to concentrate the Fourth corps at Pulaski and await further instructions. In the mean time Forrest was moving eastward from Corinth, Mississippi, and from Paris, Tennessee, making his appearance on the twenty-eighth at Fort Heiman, an earthwork on the west bank of the Tennessee, about seventy-five miles from Paducah, where he captured gunboat No. 55 and two transports on the thirty-first, having previously burned the steamer *Empress*. His force was composed of seventeen regiments of cavalry and nine pieces of artillery. On the second he had succeeded in planting batteries above and below Johnsonville (one of our bases of supplies on the Tennessee river, and the western terminus of the North-western railroad), completely blockading the river and isolating at that place three gunboats, eight transports, and about a dozen barges. The garrison was composed of about one thousand men of the Forty-third Wisconsin, Twelfth United States colored troops, and a detachment of the Eleventh Tennessee cavalry, all under command of Colonel C. R. Thompson, Twelfth United States colored troops. The naval forces under command of Lieutenant E. M. King attacked the enemy's batteries below Johnsonville, but were repulsed after a severe contest, but not before they recaptured from the enemy one of the transports above mentioned, having on board two twenty-pounder Parrott guns and a considerable quantity of quartermasters' stores, and forcing the enemy to destroy the gunboat No. 55, captured on the thirty-first.

On the fourth the enemy opened on the gunboats, transports, and on the town, from batteries posted on the opposite bank of the river, to which the artillery of the garrison and the gunboats gave a brisk response. The latter becoming disabled, and as great fears were entertained of their being seized by the enemy, it was resolved to fire them, as also the transports, to prevent their falling into his hands. In carrying this into operation the flames spread to the buildings of the commissary and quartermaster's departments, and also to a large amount of stores on the levee, soon converting the whole into a mass of ruins. The loss to the government, as far as estimated, is set down at one and a half million dollars, of which about three hundred thousand dollars belongs to the subsistence department, and the remainder to the quartermaster's department. I believe there was no cause to apprehend that the enemy could effect a crossing at Johnsonville, and the destruction of public property was consequently unnecessary.

On the morning of the fifth the enemy again opened fire on the garrison, and after a furious cannonade of more than an hour's duration, withdrew from his position across the river and disappeared. He crossed the Tennessee above Johnsonville by means of two large flat-

boats constructed by his men, and two small boats belonging to one of the gunboats, and then moved off in the direction of Clifton. Major-General Schofield, with the advance of the Twenty-third corps, arrived in Nashville on the fifth, and was immediately started toward Johnsonville by rail, reaching that place the same night, and finding the enemy had already retreated. Directions were then sent General Schofield to leave a sufficiently strong force for the defence of that post, and with the balance of his command proceed to carry out the instructions already given him, namely, to join the Fourth corps at Pulaski, and assume command of all the troops in the vicinity, watch the movements of Hood, and retard his advance into Tennessee as much as possible, without risking a general engagement, until Major-General A. J. Smith's command could arrive from Missouri, and Major-General J. H. Wilson could have time to remount the cavalry regiments dismounted to furnish horses for Kilpatrick's division, which was to accompany General Sherman in his march through Georgia.

At this time I found myself confronted by the army which, under General J. E. Johnston, had so skilfully resisted the advance of the whole active army of the Military Division of the Mississippi from Dalton to the Chattahoochee, reinforced by a well-equipped and enthusiastic cavalry command of over twelve thousand men, led by one of the boldest and most successful cavalry commanders in the rebel army.

My information from all sources confirmed the reported strength stated of Hood's army to be from forty to forty-five thousand infantry, and from twelve to fifteen thousand cavalry. My effective force at this time consisted of the Fourth corps, about twelve thousand, under Major-General D. S. Stanley; the Twenty-third corps, about ten thousand, under Major-General J. M. Schofield; Hatcher's division of cavalry, about four thousand; Croxton's brigade, two thousand five hundred, and Capron's brigade, of about twelve hundred. The balance of my force was distributed along the railroad, and posted at Murfreesboro, Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, to keep open our communications and hold the posts above named, if attacked, until they could be reinforced, as up to this time it was impossible to determine which course Hood would take—advance on Nashville, or turn toward Huntsville. Under these circumstances it was manifestly best to act on the defensive until sufficiently reinforced to justify taking the offensive.

My plans and wishes were fully explained to General Schofield, and, as subsequent events showed, properly appreciated and executed by him.

From the first to the tenth of November the enemy's position at Florence had remained materially unchanged. He had laid a pontoon bridge by mooring it to the piers of the old railroad bridge at that place, and had crossed over one corps of infantry (S. D. Lee's) and two divisions

of cavalry; the other two corps (Stuart's and Cheatham's) were still on the south side of the river. His cavalry had pushed out to Shoal creek, skirmishing continually with Hatch's and Croxton's commands along the line of that stream, but showing no disposition to advance beyond.

General Sherman's uncertain position at Kingston, Georgia, where he still remained in camp, had much to do with detaining the enemy, doubtless causing considerable speculation as to his future movements. On the twelfth of November communication with General Sherman was severed, the last despatch from him leaving Cartersville, Georgia, at 2:25 p. m. on that date. He had started on his great expedition from Atlanta to the sea-board, leaving me to guard Tennessee or to pursue the enemy if he followed the commanding general's column. It was therefore with considerable anxiety that we watched the forces at Florence, to discover what course they would pursue with regard to General Sherman's movements, determining thereby whether the troops under my command, numbering less than half those under Hood, were to act on the defensive in Tennessee, or take the offensive in Alabama.

The enemy's position at Florence remained unchanged up to the seventeenth November, when he moved Cheatham's corps to the north side of the river, with Stuart's corps preparing to follow. The same day part of the enemy's infantry, said to be Lee's corps, moved up the Lawrenceburg road to Bough's Mill on Shoal creek, skirmishing at that point with Hatcher's cavalry, and then fell back a short distance to some bluffs, where it went into camp.

The possibility of Hood's forces following General Sherman was now at an end, and I quietly took measures to act on the defensive. Two divisions of infantry, under Major-General A. J. Smith, were reported on their way to join me from Missouri, which, with several one-year regiments then arriving in the department, and detachments collected from points of minor importance, would swell my command, when concentrated, to an army nearly as large as that of the enemy. Had the enemy delayed his advance a week or ten days longer, I would have been ready to meet him at some point south of Duck river, but Hood commenced his advance on the nineteenth, moving on parallel roads from Florence toward Waynesboro, and shelled Hatch's cavalry out of Lawrenceburg on the twenty-second. My only resource then was to retire slowly toward my reinforcements, delaying the enemy's progress as much as possible, to gain time for reinforcements to arrive and concentrate.

General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back toward Columbus. Two divisions of Stanley's corps had already reached Lynnville, a point fifteen miles north of Pulaski, to cover the passage of the wagons and protect the railroad. Capron's brigade of cavalry was at Mount

Pleasant, covering the approach to Columbia from that direction; and in addition to the regular garrison, there was at Columbia a brigade of Ruger's division, Twenty-third Army Corps. I directed the two remaining brigades of Ruger's division, then at Johnsonville, also to move, one by railroad around through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road via Waverly to Centerville, and occupy the crossings of Duck river near Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's Ferry, and Centerville.

Since the departure of General Sherman about seven thousand men belonging to his column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents returning to their commands, and men returning from furlough. These men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might be needed. My command had also been reinforced by twenty new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired.

On the twenty-third, in accordance with directions previously given him, General Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, Decatur and Huntsville, Alabama, and moved off toward Stevenson, sending five new regiments of that force to Murfreesboro, and retaining at Stevenson the original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly made by rail, and without opposition on the part of the enemy. That same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski and moved toward Columbia, reporting himself in position at that place on the twenty-fourth. The commanding officer at Johnsonville was directed to evacuate that post after removing all public property, and retire to Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, and thence to Clarksville. During the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth the enemy skirmished with General Schofield's troops at Columbia, but showed nothing but dismounted cavalry until the morning of the twenty-sixth, when his infantry came up, and pressed our line strongly during that day and the twenty-seventh, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted intention to cross above or below the town, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of the Duck river during the night of the twenty-seventh and took up a new position, where the command remained during the twenty-eighth undisturbed. Two divisions of the Twenty-third corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity, while Stanley's corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should make to force a crossing; the cavalry under command of Brevet Major General Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry. About two A. M. on the twenty-ninth the enemy succeeded in pressing back General Wilson's cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike; at a later hour part of his infantry crossed at Huey's Mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cav-

alry having been interrupted and the line of retreat toward Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to Franklin. General Stanley, with one division of infantry, was sent to Spring Hill, about fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force, and dispositions were made preparatory to a withdrawal, to meet any attack coming from the direction of Huey's Mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but later he was attacked by the enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who engaged him heavily, and nearly succeeded in dislodging him from the position, the engagement lasting until dark. Although not attacked from the direction of Huey's Mills, General Schofield was busily occupied all day at Columbia, resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck river, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many times with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley, at Spring Hill, and when near that place came upon the enemy's cavalry, but they were easily driven off. *At Spring Hill the enemy was found bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road.* Posting a brigade to hold the pike at this point, General Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to Thompson's station, three miles beyond, where he found the enemy's camp fires still burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark, but had disappeared on the arrival of our troops. General Ruger then quietly took possession of the crossroads.

The withdrawal of the main force from in front of Columbia, was safely effected after dark on the twenty-ninth; Spring Hill was passed without molestation, about midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the thirtieth, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.

At Franklin, General Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of the town, to await the coming of the enemy, and in the meanwhile hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth river.

On the evacuation of Columbia, orders were sent to Major-General Milroy, at Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesboro, joining forces with General Rousseau at the latter place. General Milroy was instructed, however, to maintain the garrison in the blockhouse at Elk river bridge. Nashville was placed in a state of defence, and the fortifications manned by the garrison, reinforced by a volunteer force which had been previously organized into a division under Brevet Brigadier-General J. L. Donaldson, from the employes of the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments. This

latter force, aided by railroad employes, the whole under the direction of Brigadier-General Tower, worked assiduously to construct additional defenses. Major-General Steedman, with a command numbering five thousand men, composed of detachments belonging to General Sherman's column, left behind at Chattanooga (of which mention has heretofore been made), and also a brigade of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by rail on the twenty-ninth of November, and reached Cowan on the morning of the thirtieth, where orders were sent him to proceed direct to Nashville. At an early hour on the morning of the thirtieth, the advance of Major-General A. J. Smith's command reached Nashville by transports from St. Louis. My infantry force was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, although he still outnumbered me very greatly in effective cavalry, but as soon as a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted, I should be in a condition to take the field offensively, and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army.

The enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear guard in the retreat to Franklin, and upon coming up with the main force formed rapidly, and advanced to assault our works, repeating attack after attack during the entire afternoon, and as late as ten p. m. his efforts to break our lines were continued. General Schofield's position was excellently chosen, with both flanks resting on the river, and his men firmly held their ground against an overwhelming enemy, who was repulsed in every assault along the whole line. Our loss, as given by General Schofield, in his report, transmitted herewith (and to which I respectfully refer), is one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three wounded, and one thousand one hundred and four missing, making an aggregate of two thousand three hundred and twenty-six. We captured and sent to Nashville seven hundred and two prisoners, including one general officer and thirty-three stands of colors. Major-General D. S. Stanley, commanding Fourth corps, was severely wounded at Franklin while engaged in rallying a portion of his command, which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. At the time of the battle the enemy's loss was known to be severe, and was estimated at five thousand. The exact figures were only obtained, however, on the reoccupation of Franklin by our forces, after the battles of December fifteen and sixteen, at Brentwood Hills, near Nashville, and are given as follows: Buried upon the field, one thousand seven hundred and fifty; disabled and placed in hospital at Franklin, three thousand eight hundred, which, with the seven hundred and two prisoners already reported, makes an aggregate loss to Hood's army of six thousand two hundred and fifty-two, among whom were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured. The important results of this signal victory cannot be too highly appreciated, for it not only seriously checked the

enemy's advance, and gave General Schofield time to remove his troops and all his property to Nashville, but it also caused deep depression among the men of Hood's army, making them doubly cautious in their subsequent movements.

Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations—namely, to cover the withdrawal of his trains—General Schofield, by my advice and direction, fell back during the night to Nashville, in front of which city line of battle was formed by noon of the first December, on the heights immediately surrounding Nashville, with Major-General A. J. Smith's command occupying the right, his right resting on the Cumberland river, below the city; the Fourth corps (Brigadier-General Wood temporarily in command) in the centre; and General Schofield's troops (Twenty-third Army Corps) on the left, his left extending on the Nolensville pike. The cavalry under General Wilson was directed to take post on the left of General Schofield, which would make secure the interval between his left and the river above the city.

General Steedman's troops reached Nashville about dark on the evening of the first of December, taking up a position about a mile in advance of the left centre of the main line, and on the left of the Nolensville pike. This position being regarded as too much exposed, was changed on the third, when, the cavalry having been directed to take post on the north side of the river at Edgefield, General Steedman occupied the space on the left of the line vacated by its withdrawal.

During the afternoon of the second, the enemy's cavalry in small parties engaged our skirmishers, but it was only on the afternoon of the third that his infantry made its appearance, when, crowding in our skirmishers, he commenced to establish his main line, which, on the morning of the fourth, we found he had succeeded in doing, with his salient on the summit of Montgomery Hill, within six hundred yards of our centre, his main line occupying the high ground on the south-east side of Brown's creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike—his extreme right—across the Franklin and Granny White pikes in a westerly direction, to the hills south and south-west of Richland creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro' pike, with cavalry extending from both his flanks to the river. Artillery was opened on him from several points on the line, without eliciting any response.

The block-house at the railroad crossing of Overall's creek, five miles north of Murfreesboro', was attacked by Bate's division of Cheatham's corps, on the fourth, but held out until assistance reached it from the garrison at Murfreesboro'. The enemy used artillery to reduce the block-house, but although seventy-four shots were fired at it, no material injury was done. General Milroy coming up with three regiments

of infantry, four companies of the Thirteenth Indiana cavalry, and a section of artillery, attacked the enemy and drove him off. During the fifth, sixth and seventh, Bate's division, reinforced by a division from Lee's corps and two thousand five hundred of Forrest's cavalry, demonstrated heavily against Fortress Rosecrans, at Murfreesboro', garrisoned by about eight thousand men, under command of General Rousseau. The enemy showing an unwillingness to make a direct assault, General Milroy, with seven regiments of infantry, was sent out on the eighth to engage him. He was found a short distance from the place, on the Wilkerson pike, posted behind rail breastworks, was attacked and routed, our troops capturing two hundred and seven prisoners and two guns, with a loss of thirty killed and one hundred and seventy-five wounded. On the same day Buford's cavalry entered the town of Murfreesboro', after having shelled it vigorously, but he was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery.

On retiring from before Murfreesboro, the enemy's cavalry moved northward to Lebanon and along the bank of the Cumberland in that vicinity, threatening to cross to the north side of the river and interrupt our railroad communication with Louisville, at that time our only source of supplies, the enemy having blockaded the river below Nashville by batteries along the shore. The Navy Department was requested to patrol the Cumberland above and below Nashville with the gunboats then in the river, to prevent the enemy from crossing, which was cordially and effectually complied with by Lieutenant Commanding Le Roy Fitch, commanding Eleventh division, Mississippi squadron. At the same time General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin, to guard the country in that vicinity.

The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and with the exception of occasional picket firing, nothing of importance occurred from the third to the fifteenth December. In the meanwhile I was preparing to take the offensive without delay; the cavalry was being remounted under the direction of General Wilson as rapidly as possible, and new transportation furnished where it was required.

During these operations in Middle Tennessee, the enemy, under Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn, was operating in the eastern portion of the State against Generals Ammen and Gillem. On the thirteenth November, at midnight, Breckinridge, with a force estimated at three thousand, attacked General Gillem near Morristown, routing him and capturing his artillery, besides taking several hundred prisoners; the remainder of the command, about one thousand in number, escaped to Strawberry Plains, and thence to Knoxville. General Gillem's force consisted of fifteen hundred men, composing three regiments of Tennessee cavalry, and six guns, belonging formerly to the Fourth division of cavalry, Army of the Cumberland, but had

been detached from my command at the instance of Governor Andrew Johnson, and were then operating independently under Brigadier-General Gillem. From a want of cooperation between the officers directly under my control and General Gillem may be attributed in a great measure the cause of the latter's misfortune.

Following up his success, Breckinridge continued moving southward through Strawberry Plains to the immediate vicinity of Knoxville, but on the eighteenth withdrew as rapidly as he had advanced. General Ammen's troops, reinforced by fifteen hundred men from Chattanooga, reoccupied Strawberry Plains on that day.

About this period Major-General Stoneman, left at Louisville by General Schofield to take charge of the Department of the Ohio, during his absence with the army in the field, started for Knoxville to take general direction of affairs in that section, having previously ordered Brevet Major-General Burbridge to march with all his available force in Kentucky by way of Cumberland Gap to Gillem's relief. On his way through Nashville General Stoneman received instructions from me to concentrate as large a force as he could get in East Tennessee, move against Breckinridge, and either destroy his force or drive it into Virginia, and if possible destroy the salt-works at Saltville, and the railroad from the Tennessee line as far into Virginia as he could go without endangering his command. November twenty-third General Stoneman telegraphed from Knoxville that the main force of the enemy was at New Market, eight miles north of Strawberry Plains, and General Burbridge was moving on Cumberland Gap from the interior of Kentucky, his advance expecting to reach Barboursville that night. On the sixth of December, having received information from East Tennessee that Breckinridge was falling back toward Virginia, General Stoneman was again directed to pursue him, and destroy the railroad as far across the State line as possible, say twenty-five miles.

Leaving him to carry out these instructions, I will return to the position at Nashville.

Both armies were ice-bound for a week previous to the fourteenth December, when the weather moderated. Being prepared to move, I called a meeting of the corps commanders in the afternoon of that day, and having discussed the plan of attack until thoroughly understood, the following Special Field Order, No. 342, was issued:

"Paragraph IV. As soon as the state of the weather will admit of offensive operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:

"Major-General A. J. Smith, commanding detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on or near the Harding pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.

"Major-General Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, Military Division of Mississippi,

with three divisions will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting as far as possible in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major-General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike, to clear that road of the enemy and observe, in the direction of Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force.

"Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, commanding Fourth Army Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth corps on the Hillsboro' pike, to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on the Montgomery Hill.

"Major-General Schofield, commanding Twenty-third Army Corps, will replace Brigadier-General Kimball's division of the Fourth corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works, and cooperate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.

"Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the Reservoir on the Cumberland river to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations.

"Brigadier-General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on hill two hundred and ten to the extreme right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road.

"The Quartermaster's troops, under command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on hill two hundred and ten.

"The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defence of Nashville during the operations around the city.

"Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at six A. M. on the fifteenth, or as soon thereafter as practicable."

On the morning of the fifteenth December, the weather being favorable, the army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out the plan of battle promulgated in the special field order of the fourteenth. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog, which only lifted toward noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on our part to attack his position, and more especially did he seem not to expect any move-

ment against his left flank. To divert his attention still further from our real intentions, Major-General Steedman had, on the evening of the fourteenth, received orders to make a heavy demonstration with his command against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, which he accomplished with great success, and some loss, succeeding, however, in attracting the enemy's attention to that part of his line, and inducing him to draw reinforcements from toward his centre and left. As soon as General Steedman had completed his movement, the commands of Generals Smith and Wilson moved out along the Harding pike, and commenced the grand movement of the day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across the Harding and Hillsboro' pikes. A division of cavalry (Johnson's) was sent at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy on the Cumberland river, at Bell's Landing, eight miles below Nashville. General Johnson did not get into position until late in the afternoon, when, in conjunction with the gunboats under Lieutenant Commander Le Roy Fitch, the enemy's battery was engaged until after nightfall, and the place was found evacuated in the morning. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops, first struck the enemy along Richland creek, near Harding's house, and drove him back rapidly, capturing a number of prisoners, wagons, etc., and continuing to advance, while slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault, at one P. M., by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about three hundred prisoners. The infantry—McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's command—on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the above assaults; and, indeed, the dismounted cavalry seemed to vie with the infantry who should first gain the works. As they reached the position nearly simultaneously, both lay claim to the artillery and prisoners captured.

Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as I expected he would have done, I directed General Schofield to move his command (the Twenty-third corps) from the position in reserve to which it had been assigned, over to the right of General Smith, enabling the cavalry thereby to operate more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.

The Fourth corps, Brigadier-General T. J. Wood commanding, formed on the left of General A. J. Smith's command, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted the Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced

position, at one p. m., which was most gallantly executed by the Third brigade, Second division, Colonel P. Sidney Post, Fifty-ninth Illinois, commanding, capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with the left of Smith's troops (Brigadier-General Garrard's division), the Fourth corps continued to advance, and carried the enemy's entire line in its front by assault, and captured several pieces of artillery, about five hundred prisoners, some stands of colors, and other material. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main pike through Brentwood and by the Granny White pike. Our line at nightfall was readjusted, running parallel to and east of the Hillsboro' pike—Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield, Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning.

The total result of the day's operations was the capture of sixteen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners, besides several hundred stands of small-arms and about forty wagons. The enemy had been forced back at all points with heavy loss, and our casualties were unusually light. The behavior of the troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement, and the original plan of battle, with but few alterations, strictly adhered to.

The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night, on the ground occupied at dark, while preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

At six a. m. on the sixteenth Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin pike to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him, until he came upon his new main line of works, constructed during the night on what is called Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin pike. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to cooperate in the operations of the day. General A. J. Smith's command moved on the right of the Fourth corps (Wood's) and establishing connection with General Wood's right, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and toward the enemy's left flank, the line of the corps running perpendicular to General Smith's troops. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' pike, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the sixteenth had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of his two outlets toward Franklin.

As soon as the above dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy's at all points. His centre was weak as compared with either his right, at Overton's Hill, or his left, on the hills bordering the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.

About three p. m., Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan (Fourteenth United States colored troops) to cooperate in the movement. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew reinforcements from his left and centre to the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right.

The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry, our men moving steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded—black and white indiscriminately mingled—lying amid the abattis, the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. General Wood readily reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.

Immediately following the effort of the Fourth corps, Generals Smith and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, irreparably breaking his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all of his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. Our loss was remarkably small, scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the tops of Brentwood or Harpeth's Hills.

General Wilson's cavalry, dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and, gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, cut off his retreat by that route.

Wood's and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood pass, the Fourth corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness

closed the scene and the troops rested from their labors.

As the Fourth corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's division of his command, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White pike, and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged by the Twelfth Tennessee cavalry, Colonel Spalding commanding, and the enemy's lines broken, scattering him in all directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brigadier-General E. W. Rucker.

During the two days' operations there were four thousand four hundred and sixty-two prisoners captured, including two hundred and eighty-seven officers of all grades, from that of Major-General, fifty-three pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all his dead and wounded.

Leaving directions for the collection of the captured property, and for the care of the wounded left on the battle-field, the pursuit was continued at daylight on the seventeenth. The Fourth corps pushed on toward Franklin by the direct pike, while the cavalry moved by the Granny White pike to its intersection with the Franklin pike, and then took the advance.

Johnson's division of cavalry was sent by General Wilson direct to Harpeth river, on the Hillsboro' pike, with directions to cross and move rapidly toward Franklin. The main cavalry column, with Knipe's division in advance, came up with the enemy's rear guard, strongly posted at Hollow Tree Gap, four miles north of Franklin. The position was charged in front and in flank simultaneously, and handsomely carried, capturing four hundred and thirteen prisoners and three colors. The enemy then fell back rapidly to Franklin, and endeavored to defend the crossing of Harpeth river at that place; but Johnson's division coming up from below on the south side of the stream, forced him to retire from the river bank, and our cavalry took possession of the town, capturing the enemy's hospitals, containing over two thousand wounded, of whom about two hundred were our own men.

The pursuit was immediately continued by Wilson toward Columbia, the enemy's rear guard slowly retiring before him to a distance of about five miles south of Franklin, where the enemy made a stand in some open fields just north of West Harpeth river, and seemed to await our coming. Deploying Knipe's division as skirmishers, with Hatch's in close support, General Wilson ordered his body-guard, the Fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant Hedges commanding, to charge the enemy. Forming on the pike in column of fours, the gallant little command charged with sabres drawn, breaking the enemy's centre, while Knipe's and Hatch's men pressed back his flanks, scattering the

whole command, and causing them to abandon their artillery. Darkness coming on during the engagement enabled a great many to escape, and put an end to the day's operations.

The Fourth corps, under General Wood, followed immediately in rear of the cavalry as far as Harpeth river, where it found the bridges destroyed and too much water on the fords for infantry to cross. A trestle bridge was hastily constructed from such materials as lay at hand, but could not be made available before night-fall. General Steedman's command moved in rear of General Wood, and camped near him on the banks of the Harpeth. Generals Smith and Schofield marched with their corps along the Granny White pike, and camped for the night at its intersection with the Franklin pike. The trains moved with their respective commands, carrying ten days' supplies and one hundred rounds of ammunition.

On the eighteenth the pursuit of the enemy was continued by General Wilson, who pushed on as far as Rutherford's creek, three miles from Columbia. Wood's corps crossed to the south side of Harpeth river, and closed up with the cavalry. The enemy did not offer to make a stand during the day. On arriving at Rutherford's creek, the stream was found to be impassable on account of high water, and running a perfect torrent. A pontoon bridge, hastily constructed at Nashville during the presence of the army at that place, was on its way to the front, but the bad condition of the roads, together with the incompleteness of the train itself, had retarded its arrival. I would here remark that the splendid pontoon train properly belonging to my command, with its trained corps of pontonniers, was absent with General Sherman.

During the nineteenth several unsuccessful efforts were made by the advanced troops to cross Rutherford's creek, although General Hatch succeeded in lodging a few skirmishers on the south bank. The heavy rains of the preceding few days had inundated the whole country and rendered the roads almost impassable. Smith's and Schofield's commands crossed to the south side of Harpeth river, General Smith advancing to Spring Hill, while General Schofield encamped at Franklin. On the morning of the twentieth General Hatch constructed a floating bridge from the *debris* of the old railroad bridge over Rutherford's creek, and crossing his entire division, pushed out for Columbia, but found, on reaching Duck river, the enemy had succeeded the night before in getting everything across, and had already removed his pontoon bridge. Duck river was very much swollen, and impassable without a bridge. During the day General Wood improvised a foot-bridge over Rutherford's creek, at the old road bridge, and by nightfall had succeeded in crossing his infantry entire, and one or two of his batteries, and moved forward to Duck river.

The pontoon train coming up to Rutherford's creek about noon of the twenty-first, a bridge was laid during the afternoon and General

Smith's troops were enabled to cross. The weather had changed from dismal rain to bitter cold, very materially retarding the work in laying the bridge, as the regiment of colored troops, to whom the duty was entrusted, seemed unmanned by the cold and totally unequal to the occasion. On the completion of the bridge at Rutherford's creek, sufficient material for a bridge over Duck river was hastily pushed forward to that point, and the bridge constructed in time enough to enable Wood to cross late in the afternoon of the twenty-second, and get into position on the Pulaski road, about two miles south of Columbia. The water in the river fell rapidly during the construction of the bridge, necessitating frequent alterations and causing much delay. The enemy in his hasty retreat had thrown into the stream several fine pieces of artillery which were rapidly becoming uncovered and were subsequently removed.

Notwithstanding the many delays to which the command had been subjected, I determined to continue the pursuit of Hood's shattered forces, and for this purpose decided to use General Wilson's cavalry and General Wood's corps of infantry, directing the infantry to move on the pike while the cavalry marched on its either flank across the fields; the remainder of the command, Smith's and Schofield's corps, to move along more leisurely, and to be used as the occasion demanded.

Forrest and his cavalry, and such other detachments as had been sent off from his main army while besieging Nashville, had rejoined Hood at Columbia. He had formed a powerful rear guard, made up of detachments from all his *organized* force, numbering about four thousand infantry under General Walthall, and all his available cavalry under Forrest. With the exception of his rear guard, his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause, to put an end to their sufferings. The rear guard, however, was undaunted and firm, and did its work bravely to the last.

During the twenty-third General Wilson was occupied crossing his command over Duck river, but took the advance on the twenty-fourth, supported by General Wood, and came up with the enemy just south of Lynnville, and also at Buford's station, at both of which places the enemy made a short stand, but was speedily dislodged, with a loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners. Our advance was so rapid as to prevent the destruction of the bridges over Richland creek. Christmas morning, the twenty-fifth, the enemy, with our cavalry at his heels, evacuated Pulaski and was pursued toward Lamb's Ferry, over an almost impracticable road, and through a country devoid of sustenance for man or beast. During the afternoon Harrison's brigade found the enemy strongly intrenched at the head of a heavily-wooded and deep ravine, through which ran the road, and into which Colonel Harrison drove the enemy's

skirmishers, and then waited for the remainder of the cavalry to close up before attacking; but before this could be accomplished, the enemy, with something of his former boldness, sallied from his breastworks and drove back Harrison's skirmishers, capturing and carrying off one gun belonging to battery I, Fourth United States artillery, which was not recovered by us, notwithstanding the ground lost was almost immediately regained. By nightfall the enemy was driven from his position, with a loss of about fifty prisoners. The cavalry had moved so rapidly as to out-distance its trains, and both men and animals were suffering greatly in consequence, although they continued uncomplainingly to pursue the enemy. General Wood's corps kept well closed up on the cavalry, camping on the night of December twenty-five six miles out from Pulaski, on the Lamb's Ferry road, and pursuing the same route as the cavalry, reached Lexington, Alabama, thirty miles from Pulaski, on the twenty-eighth; on which date, having definitely ascertained that the enemy had made good his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge, I directed further pursuit to cease. At Pulaski the enemy's hospital, containing about two hundred patients fell into our hands, and four guns were found in Richland creek. About a mile south of the town he destroyed twenty wagons loaded with ammunition, belonging to Oheatham's corps, taking the animals belonging to his trains to help pull his pontoons. The road from Pulaski to Bainbridge, and indeed back to Nashville, was strewn with abandoned wagons, limbers, small arms, blankets, &c., showing most conclusively the disorder of the enemy's retreat.

During the foregoing operations with the advance, Smith's and Schofield's troops were in motion toward the front, General Smith's command reaching Pulaski on the twenty-seventh, while General Schofield was directed to remain at Columbia for the time being.

On our arrival at Franklin, on the eighteenth, I gave directions to General Steedman to move with his command across the country from that point to Murfreesboro, on the Chattanooga railroad, whence he was to proceed by rail to Decatur, Alabama, via Stevenson, being joined at Stevenson by Brigadier-General R. S. Granger, and the troops composing the garrisons of Huntsville, Athens, and Decatur. Taking general direction of the whole force, his instructions were to reoccupy the points in Northern Alabama evacuated at the period of Hood's advance, then cross the Tennessee with the balance of his force and threaten the enemy's railroad communications west of Florence.

General Steedman reoccupied Decatur on the twenty-seventh, and proceeded to carry out the second portion of his instructions, finding, however, that the enemy had already made good his escape to the south side of the Tennessee, and any movement on his railroad would be useless.

On announcing the result of the battle to Rear Admiral S. P. Lee, commanding the Mississippi squadron, I requested him to send as much of his force as he could spare around to Florence, on the Tennessee river, and endeavor to prevent Hood's army from crossing at that point, which request was most cordially and promptly complied with. He arrived at Chickasaw, Mississippi, on the twenty-fourth, destroyed there a rebel battery, and captured two guns with caissons at Florence Landing. He also announced the arrival at the latter place of several transports with provisions.

Immediately upon learning of the presence at Chickasaw, Mississippi, of the gunboats and transports with provisions, I directed General Smith to march overland from Pulaski to Clifton, via Lawrenceburg and Waynesboro, and take post at Eastport, Mississippi. General Smith started for his destination on the twenty-ninth of December.

On the thirtieth of December I announced to the army the successful completion of the campaign, and gave directions for the disposition of the command, as follows: Smith's corps to take post at Eastport, Mississippi; Wood's corps to be concentrated at Huntsville and Athens, Alabama; Schofield's corps to proceed to Dalton, Georgia; and Wilson's cavalry, after sending one division to Eastport, Mississippi, to concentrate the balance at or near Huntsville. On reaching the several positions assigned to them, the different commands were to go into winter quarters and recuperate for the spring campaign.

The above not meeting the views of the General-in-chief, and being notified by Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff, United States Army, that it was not intended for the Army of Tennessee to go into winter quarters, orders were issued on the thirty-first of December for Generals Schofield, Smith, and Wilson, to concentrate their commands at Eastport, Mississippi, and that of General Wood at Huntsville, Alabama, preparatory to a renewal of the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama.

During the active operations of the main army in Middle Tennessee, General Stoneman's forces in the north-eastern portion of the State were also very actively engaged in operating against Breckinridge, Duke, and Vaughn. Having quietly concentrated the commands of Generals Burbridge and Gillem at Bean's station, on the twelfth of December General Stoneman started for Bristol, his advance, under General Gillem, striking the enemy under Duke at Kingsport, on the north fork of the Holston river, killing, capturing, or dispersing the whole command. General Stoneman then sent General Burbridge to Bristol, where he came upon the enemy under Vaughn, and skirmished with him until the remainder of the troops—Gillem's column—came up, when Burbridge was pushed on to Abingdon, with instructions to send a force to cut the railroad at some point between Saltville and Wytheville, in

order to prevent reinforcements coming from Lynchburg to the salt-works. Gillem also reached Abingdon on the fifteenth, the enemy under Vaughn following on a road running parallel to the one used by our forces. Having decided merely to make a demonstration against the salt-works, and to push on with the main force after Vaughn, General Gillem struck the enemy at Marion early on the sixteenth, and after completely routing him, pursued him to Wytheville, Virginia, capturing all his artillery and trains, and one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners. Wytheville, with its stores and supplies, was destroyed, as also the extensive lead-works near the town and the railroad bridges over Ready creek. General Stoneman then turned his attention toward Saltville, with its important salt-works. The garrison of that place, reinforced by Giltner's, Cosby's, and Witcher's commands, and the remnants of Duke's, all under command of Breckinridge in person, followed our troops as they moved on Wytheville, and on returning, General Stoneman met them at Marion, where he made preparations to give Breckinridge battle, and disposed his command so as to effectually assault the enemy in the morning, but Breckinridge retreated during the night, and was pursued a short distance into North Carolina, our troops capturing some of his wagons and caissons.

General Stoneman then moved on Saltville with his entire command, capturing at that place eight pieces of artillery and a large amount of ammunition of all kinds, two locomotives, and quite a number of horses and mules. The extensive salt-works were destroyed by breaking the kettles, filling the wells with rubbish, and burning the buildings. His work accomplished, General Stoneman returned to Knoxville, accompanied by General Gillem's command, General Burbridge's proceeding to Kentucky by way of Cumberland gap. The country marched over was laid waste, to prevent its being used again by the enemy; all mills, factories, bridges, &c., being destroyed. The command had everything to contend with, as far as the weather and roads were concerned, yet the troops bore up cheerfully throughout, and made each twenty-four hours an average march of forty-two and a half miles.

The pursuit of Hood's retreating army was discontinued by my main forces on the twenty-ninth of December; on reaching the Tennessee river, however, a force of cavalry numbering six hundred men, made up from detachments of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania, Second Michigan, Tenth, Twelfth, and Thirteenth Indiana regiments, under command of Colonel W. J. Palmer, fifteenth Pennsylvania, operating with Steedman's column, started from Decatur, Alabama, in the direction of Hood's line of retreat in Mississippi. The enemy's cavalry, under Roddy, was met at Leighton, with whom Colonel Palmer skirmished and pressed back in small squads toward the mountains. Here it was ascertained that Hood's trains passed through Leighton on the twenty-eighth December, and moved off toward

Columbus, Mississippi. Avoiding the enemy's cavalry, Colonel Palmer left Leighton on the thirty-first December, moved rapidly via La Grange and Russellville, and by the Cottougin road, and overtook the enemy's pontoon train, consisting of two hundred wagons and seventy-eight pontoon boats, when ten miles out from Russellville. This he destroyed. Having learned of a large supply train on its way to Tuscaloosa, Colonel Palmer started on the first of January toward Aberdeen, Mississippi, with a view of cutting it off, and succeeded in surprising it about ten P. M. on the same evening, just over the line in Mississippi. The train consisted of one hundred and ten wagons and five hundred mules, the former of which were burned, and the latter sabred or shot. Returning, via Tollgate, Alabama, and on the old Military and Hacksburg roads, the enemy under Roddy, Biffles, and Russel, was met near Russellville and along Bear creek, while another force under Armstrong was reported to be in pursuit of our forces. Evading the force in his front by moving off to the right, under cover of the darkness, Colonel Palmer pushed for Moulton, coming upon Russel when within twelve miles of Moulton and near Thornhill, attacked him unexpectedly, utterly routing him, and capturing some prisoners, besides burning five wagons. The command then proceeded to Decatur without molestation, and reached that place on the sixth of January, after a march of two hundred and fifty miles. One hundred and fifty prisoners were captured, and nearly one thousand stand of arms destroyed. Colonel Palmer's loss was one killed and two wounded.

General Hood, while investing Nashville, had sent into Kentucky a force of cavalry numbering about eight hundred men, and two guns, under the command of Brigadier General Lyon, with instructions to operate against our railroad communications with Louisville. McCook's division of cavalry was detached on the fourteenth December, and sent to Bowling Green and Franklin, to protect the road. After capturing Hopkinsville, Lyon was met by Lagrange's brigade near Greensburg, and after a sharp fight, was thrown into confusion, losing one gun, some prisoners and wagons; the enemy succeeded, however, by making a wide detour, via Elizabethtown and Glasgow, in reaching the Cumberland river, and crossing at Burkville, from where General Lyon proceeded, via McMinnville and Winchester, Tennessee, to Larkinsville, Alabama, on the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attacked the little garrison at Scottsboro' on the tenth of January.

● Lyon was here again repulsed, and his command scattered, our troops pursuing him toward the Tennessee river, which, however, he, with about two hundred of his men and his remaining piece of artillery, succeeded in crossing. The rest of his command scattered in squads among the mountains. Colonel W. J. Palmer, commanding Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, with one hundred and fifty men, crossed the river at Paint Rock and pursued Lyon to near Red

Hill, on the road from Warrentown to Tuscaloosa, at which place he surprised his camp during the night of the fourteenth January, capturing Lyon himself, his one piece of artillery, and about one hundred of his men, with their horses. Lyon being in bed at the time of his capture, asked his guard to permit him to dress himself, which was acceded to, when, watching his opportunity, Lyon seized a pistol, shot the sentinel dead upon the spot, and escaped in the darkness. This was the only casualty during the expedition.

To Colonel Palmer and his command is accorded the credit of giving Hood's army the last blow of the campaign, at a distance of over two hundred miles from where we first struck the enemy on the fifteenth December, near Nashville.

To all my sub-commanders (Major-Generals Schofield, Stanley, Rousseau, Steedman, Smith, and Wilson, and Brigadier-General T. J. Wood), their officers and men, I give expression of my thanks and gratitude for their generous self-sacrifice and manly endurance, under the most trying circumstances and in all instances. Too much praise cannot be accorded to an army which, hastily made up from the fragments of three separate commands, can successfully contend against a force numerically greater than itself, and of more thoroughly solid organization, inflicting on it a most crushing defeat—almost an annihilation.

Receiving instructions unexpectedly from General Sherman in September to repair to Tennessee, and assume general control of the defenses of our line of communication in the rear of the Army of the Mississippi, and not anticipating a separation from my immediate command, the greater number of my staff officers were left behind at Atlanta, and did not have an opportunity to join me, after General Sherman determined on making his march through Georgia, before the communications were cut. I had with me Brigadier-General W. D. Whipple, my Chief of Staff; Surgeon G. E. Cooper, Medical Director; Captains Henry Stone, Henry M. Cist, and Robert H. Ramsay, Assistant Adjutants-General; Captain Henry Bernan, Acting Chief Commissary; Captains John P. Willard and S. C. Kellogg, Aids-de-Camp; and Lieutenant M. Kelly, Chief of Couriers; all of whom rendered important service during the battles of the fifteenth and sixteenth, and during the pursuit. I cordially commend their services to favorable consideration.

There were captured from the enemy during the various actions of which the foregoing report treats, thirteen thousand one hundred and eighty-nine prisoners of war, including seven general officers and nearly one thousand other officers of all grades, seventy-two pieces of serviceable artillery, and — battle-flags. During the same period over two thousand deserters from the enemy were received, to whom the oath was administered. Our own losses will not exceed ten thousand in killed, wounded, and missing.

I have the honor to transmit herewith a consolidated return of casualties, the report of Colonel J. G. Parkhurst, Provost-Marshal General, and that of Captain A. Mordecai, Chief of Ordnance. That of Surgeon G. E. Cooper, Medical Director, will be forwarded as soon as he is enabled to complete it.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Major-General U. S. A. Commanding.

Colonel R. M. SAWYER,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Military Division, Mississippi.

OFFICE PROVOST-MARSHAL GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, February 4, 1865.

Report of Prisoners of War captured from September 7, 1864, up to the 20th of January, 1865.

CAPTURED.	MAJOR-GENERALS.	BRIEF-GENERALS.	COLONELS.	LIEUT.-COLONELS.	MAJORS.	CAPTAINS.	LIEUTENANTS.	NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	PRIVATE.	SURGEONS AND CHAPLAINS.
September 7 to 30.....	2	4	17	145	5
October.....	12	49	151	1,135	1
November.....	3	25	87	550	2
December.....	1	7	14	10	18	173	487	1,512	6,336	77
January 1 to 20.....	1	18	45	120	3
Totals.....	1	7	16	14	22	212	601	1,887	9,008	89
Grand Total.....	11,857									

Report of Rebel Deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from September 7, 1864, up to the 20th of January, 1865.

RECEIVED.	CAPTAINS.	LIEUTENANTS.	NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	PRIVATE.	SURGEONS.	CHAPLAINS.
September 7 to 30.....	..	1	6	70
October.....	8	96
November.....	..	1	3	68
December.....	2	6	28	281	2	1
January 1 to 20.....	5	15	61	660
Totals.....	7	23	106	1,175	2	1
Grand total.....	1,314					

Prisoners of War exchanged during the month of September, 1864.

Commissioned officers.....	128
Non-commissioned officers.....	225
Privates.....	979
Total.....	1,332

(Equivalent to 2,045 privates.)

Aggregate of prisoners of war captured from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865, (inclusive)..... 13,189

Report of Rebel Deserters received outside of Nashville office from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865.

DATE OF RECEIPTION.	OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.
From September 7 to September 30.....	..	75
From October 1 to October 31.....	2	146
From November 1 to November 30.....	..	80
From December 1 to December 31.....	..	14
From January 1 to January 31.....	18	568
Total.....	20	873
Grand total.....	893	

Aggregate of rebel deserters to whom the oath has been administered from September 7, 1864, to January 20, 1865..... 2,207

Respectfully submitted,
J. G. PARKHURST,
Colonel and P. M. G.

OFFICE CHIEF OF ORDNANCE,
DEPARTMENT CUMBERLAND,
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, February 5, 1865.

GENERAL: In compliance with your instructions of the 20th ultimo, I have the honor to submit the following report of ordnance material captured from the enemy by the army under your command, between the first October, 1864, and the twentieth January, 1865, all of which material has been received by the Ordnance Department:

Forty-two light 12-pounder guns, rebel model.
Seven light 12-pounder guns, United States model.

Seven light 12-pounder howitzers, United States model.

Three 3-inch rifles, rebel model.
Two 10-pounder Parrotts, calibre 2.9 inch, United States model.

One 3-inch wrought-iron rifle, United States model.

Two 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, United States model.

Fifty-nine field carriages and limbers complete.

Two field carriages and limbers without wheels.

Two field carriages, no limbers.
Sixteen field-caissons and limbers.

Four field caissons, no limbers.
Three thousand seventy-nine infantry small arms of different models, no bayonets.

Two hundred and sixty-two bayonets of different models.

One thousand two hundred and eight cartridge boxes, infantry.

Two hundred and thirty-eight cartridge-box plates.

Two hundred and thirty-four cartridge-box belts.

One hundred and forty-one cartridge-box belt-plates.

One hundred and seventy-eight waist belts.
 One hundred and eighty-one waist-belt plates.
 One hundred and sixty-six bayonet scabbards.
 Three hundred and sixty-four cap pouches.
 Two hundred and thirty-one gun slings.

Of the above:

Two 12-pounder guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major-General Milroy at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, December, 1864.

One 12-pounder howitzer, carriage and limber, was captured by Colonel Palmer from the command of the rebel General Lyon, near Huntsville, Alabama.

Two 6-pounder smooth-bore guns, carriages and limbers, were captured by Major-General Steedman, near Decatur, Alabama.

Three 12-pounder guns, carriages, and limbers; one 10-pounder Parrott rifle and carriage; one 3-inch wrought iron rifle and carriage, United States, were captured at Columbia, Tennessee.

All the remaining artillery and carriages, and all the small arms and accoutrements were captured before Nashville, on the fifteenth and sixteenth December, 1864.

The larger number of ammunition chests captured were filled with ammunition in good condition, and six wagons loaded with similar ammunition were captured before this place.

I am informed that there are, in addition to what are reported above, four guns and carriages now at Pulaaki, Tennessee, and three or four guns in the Duck river at Columbia, Tennessee, all captured from the enemy or abandoned by him in his retreat to the Tennessee river.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. MORDECAI,

Capt. Ord., Chief Ord. Dep't., Cumberland.

Major-General G. H. THOMAS, U. S. A.,

Commanding Department Cumberland,
 Eastport, Mississippi.

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CAMPAIGN OF THE CAROLINAS.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
 GOLDENRO, N. C., April 4, 1865.

GENERAL: I must now endeavor to group the events of the past three months, connected with the armies under my command, in order that you may have as clear an understanding of the late campaign as the case admits of. The reports of the subordinate commanders will enable you to fill up the picture.

I have heretofore explained how, in the progress of our arms, I was enabled to leave in the West an army under Major-General George H. Thomas of sufficient strength to meet emergencies in that quarter, while in person I conducted another army, composed of the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Twentieth corps, and

Kilpatrick's division of cavalry, to the Atlantic slope, aiming to approach the grand theater of war in Virginia by the time the season would admit of military operations in that latitude. The first lodgement on the coast was made at Savannah, strongly fortified and armed, and valuable to us as a good sea-port, with its navigable stream inland. Near a month was consumed there in refitting the army, and in making the proper disposition of captured property, and other local matters, but by the fifteenth of January I was all ready to resume the march. Preliminary to this General Howard, commanding the right wing, was ordered to embark his command at Thunderbolt, transport it to Beaufort, South Carolina, and thence by the fifteenth of January make a lodgement on the Charleston railroad, at or near Pocotaligo. This was accomplished punctually, at little cost, by the Seventeenth corps, Major-General Blair, and a depot for supplies was established near the mouth of Pocotaligo creek, with easy water communication back to Hilton Head.

The left wing, Major-General Slocum, and the cavalry, Major-General Kilpatrick, were ordered to rendezvous about the same time near Robertsville and Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, with a depot of supplies at Pureysburg, or Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah river. General Slocum had a good pontoon bridge constructed opposite the city, and the "Union Causeway" leading through the low rice fields opposite Savannah was repaired and "corduroyed," but before the time appointed to start, the heavy rains of January had swelled the river, broken the pontoon bridge, and overflowed the whole "bottom," so that the causeway was four feet under water, and General Slocum was compelled to look higher up for a passage over the Savannah river. He moved up to Sister's Ferry, but even there the river with its overflowed bottoms was near three miles wide, and he did not succeed in getting his whole wing across until during the first week of February.

In the mean time General Grant had sent me Grover's division of the Nineteenth corps to garrison Savannah, and had drawn the Twenty-third corps, Major-General Schofield, from Tennessee, and sent it to reinforce the commands of Major-Generals Terry and Palmer, operating on the coast of North Carolina, to prepare the way for my coming.

On the eighteenth of January I transferred the forts and city of Savannah to Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, imparted to him my plans of operations, and instructed him how to follow my movements inland, by occupying in succession the city of Charleston and such other points along the sea-coast as would be of any military value to us. The combined naval and land forces under Admiral Porter and General Terry had, on the fifteenth of January, captured Fort Fisher and the rebel forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river, giving me an additional point of security on the sea-coast. But I had already resolved in

my own mind, and had so advised General Grant, that I would undertake at one stride to make Goldsboro, and open communication with the sea by the Newbern railroad, and had ordered Colonel W. W. Wright, Superintendent of Military Railroads, to proceed in advance to Newbern, and to be prepared to extend the railroad out from Newbern to Goldsboro by the fifteenth of March.

On the nineteenth of January all preparations were complete and the orders of march given. My Chief Quartermaster and Commissary, Generals Easton and Beckwith, were ordered to complete the supplies at Sisters' Ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to follow our movement coastwise, looking for my arrival at Goldsboro, North Carolina, about the fifteenth March, and opening communication with me from Morehead City.

On the twenty-second of January I embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where I held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, United States Navy, and Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, and next day proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the twenty-fourth to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth corps, Major-General Blair, was encamped. The Fifteenth corps was somewhat scattered—Wood's and Hazen's divisions at Beaufort, John E. Smith marching from Savannah by the coast road, and Corse still at Savannah, cut off by the storms and freshet in the river. On the twenty-fifth a demonstration was made against the Combahee ferry and railroad bridge across the Salkehatchie, merely to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against our supposed *objective*, the city of Charleston. I reconnoitered the line in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water stood in the swamps, for a breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one to twenty feet. Not having the remotest intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by seeming preparation to cross over, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest our advance on Charleston. On the twenty-seventh I rode to the camp of General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tullafiney and Coosawhatchie rivers, and directed those places to be evacuated, as no longer of any use to us. That division was then moved to Pocotaligo to keep up the feints already begun, until we should with the right wing move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie about Rivers' or Broxton's bridge.

On the twenty-ninth I learned that the roads back of Savannah had at last become sufficiently free of the flood to admit of General Slocum putting his wing in motion, and that he was already approaching Sisters' ferry, whither a gunboat, the Pontiac, Captain Luoe, kindly furnished by Admiral Dahlgren, had preceded him to cover the crossing. In the meantime three divisions of the Fifteenth corps had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its

wagons and was ready to start. I therefore directed General Howard to move one corps, the Seventeenth, along the Salkehatchie, as high up as Rivers' bridge, and the other, the Fifteenth, by Hickory hill, Loper's cross-roads, Anglesey post-office, and Beaufort's bridge. Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo, feigning at the Salkehatchie railroad bridge and ferry, until our movement turned the enemy's position, and forced him to fall behind the Edisto.

The Seventeenth and Fifteenth corps drew out of camp on the thirty-first of January, but the real march began on the first of February. All the roads northward had, for weeks, been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were our pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our men, that obstructions seemed only to quicken their progress. Felled trees were removed, and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the second of February the Fifteenth corps reached Loper's cross-roads, and the Seventeenth was at Rivers' bridge. From Loper's cross-roads I communicated with General Slocum, still struggling with the floods of the Savannah river at Sisters' ferry. He had two divisions of the Twentieth corps, General Williams, on the east bank, and was enabled to cross over on his pontoons the cavalry of Kilpatrick. General Williams was ordered to Beaufort's bridge, by way of Lawtonville and Allandale, Kilpatrick to Blackville via Barnwell, and General Slocum to hurry the crossing at Sisters' ferry as much as possible, and overtake the right wing on the South Carolina railroad. General Howard, with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie and push rapidly for the South Carolina railroad, at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at Rivers' and Beaufort's bridges. The Seventeenth corps was ordered to carry Rivers' bridge, and the Fifteenth corps Beaufort's bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skilfully by Mower's and Giles A. Smith's divisions of the Seventeenth corps, on the third of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder-deep. The weather was bitter cold, and Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgement below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it in confusion and disorder toward Branchville. Our casualties were one officer and seventeen men killed, and seventy men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina railroad at Midway, Bamberg (or Lowry's station), and Graham's station. The Seventeenth corps, by

threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railroad bridge, and Walker's bridge below, across the Edisto. All hands were at once set to work to destroy railroad track. From the seventh to the tenth of February this work was thoroughly prosecuted by the Seventeenth corps from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the Fifteenth corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the meantime General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to Blackville, and had turned toward Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to be drawn needlessly into a serious battle. This he skilfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterward at Williston and Aiken. General Williams, with two divisions of the Twentieth corps, marched to the South Carolina railroad at Graham Station on the eighth, and General Slocum reached Blackville on the tenth. The destruction of the railroad was continued by the left wing from Blackville up to Windsor. By the eleventh of February all the army was on the railroad from Midway to Johnson's station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston on the one hand, Aiken and Augusta on the other.

We then began the movement on Orangeburg. The Seventeenth corps crossed the south fork of Edisto river at Binnaker's bridge and moved straight for Orangeburg, while the Fifteenth corps crossed at Holman's bridge and moved to Poplar Springs in support. The left wing and cavalry were still at work on the railroad, with orders to cross the South Edisto at New and Guignard's bridges, move to the Orangeburg and Edgesfield road, and there await the result of the attack on Orangeburg. On the twelfth the Seventeenth corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held one division (Giles A. Smith's) close up to Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the enemy gave ground, and Giles Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by four p. m. the whole corps was in Orangeburg and had begun the work of destruction on the railroad. Blair was ordered to destroy this railroad effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the fourteenth; and without wasting time or labor on Branchville or Charleston, which I knew the enemy could no longer hold, I turned all the column's strength on Columbia.

The Seventeenth corps followed the State

road, and the Fifteenth crossed the North Edisto from Poplar Springs at Schilling's bridge, above the mouth of "Cawcaw Swamp" creek, and took a country road which came into the State road at Zeigler's. On the fifteenth, the Fifteenth corps found the enemy in a strong position at Little Congaree bridge (across Congaree creek), with a *levee-de-pont* on the south side, and a well-constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. Woods, who commanded the leading division, succeeded, however in turning the flank of the *levee-de-pont* by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and following up the retreating enemy promptly, he got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree river in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled our camps from a battery on the east side of the Congaree above Granby. Early next morning (February sixteen) the head of column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point. It was burned by the enemy. While waiting for the pontoons to come to the front we could see people running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass' battery was firing at their cavalry squads, but I checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots at the unfinished State House walls, and a few shells at the railway depot, to scatter the people who were seen carrying away sacks of corn and meal that we needed. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. I directed General Howard not to cross directly in front of Columbia, but to cross the Saluda at the Factory, three miles above, and afterward Broad river, so as to approach Columbia from the north. Within an hour of the arrival of General Howard's head of column at the river opposite Columbia, the head of column of the left wing also appeared, and I directed General Slocum to cross the Saluda at Zion church, and thence to take roads direct for Winnsboro, breaking up *en route* the railroads and bridges about Alston.

General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the Factory, on the sixteenth, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night made a flying bridge across Broad river, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's brigade, of Wood's division, Fifteenth corps. Under cover of this brigade, a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the seventeenth. I was in person at this bridge, and at eleven a. m. learned that the Mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage, and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone,

Twenty-fifth Iowa infantry, commanding third brigade, First division, Fifteenth corps. About the same time a small party of the Seventeenth corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west. In anticipation of the occupation of the city, I had made written orders to General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These were to destroy, absolutely, all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as well as all railroads, depots, and machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. I was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and in company with General Howard rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of our capture of Columbia, ordered that all cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent our making use of it. Bales were piled everywhere, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the Court-house, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of our soldiers. During the day the Fifteenth corps passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The Seventeenth did not enter the town at all; and, as I have before stated, the left wing and cavalry did not come within two miles of the town.

Before one single public building had been fired by order, the smoldering fires, set by Hampton's order, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark they began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Wood's division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the flames, which, by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about four A. M., when the wind subsiding, they were got under control. I was up nearly all night, and saw Generals Howard, Logan, Woods, and others, laboring to save houses and protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter, and of bedding and wearing apparel. I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestations of a silly "Roman stoicism," but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been im-

prisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina. During the eighteenth and nineteenth, the arsenal, railroad depots, machine shops, foundries, and other buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railroad track torn up and destroyed down to Kingsville and the Wateree bridge, and up in the direction of Winnsboro.

At the same time the left wing and cavalry had crossed the Saluda and Broad rivers, breaking up the railroad about Alston, and as high up as the bridge across Broad river on the Spartanburg road, the main body moving straight for Winnsboro, which General Slocum reached on the twenty-first of February. He caused the railroad to be destroyed up to Black-stakes depot, and then turned to Rocky Mount, on the Catawba river. The Twentieth corps reached Rocky Mount on the twenty-second, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed over during the twenty-third. Kilpatrick's cavalry followed, and crossed over in a terrible rain during the night of the twenty-third, and moved up to Lancaster, with orders to keep up the delusion of a general movement on Charlotte, North Carolina, to which General Beauregard and all the cavalry of the enemy had retreated from Columbia. I was also aware that Cheatham's corps, of Hood's old army, was aiming to make a junction with Beauregard at Charlotte, having been cut off by our rapid movement on Columbia and Winnsboro. From the twenty-third to the twenty-sixth we had heavy rains, swelling the rivers and making the roads almost impassable. The Twentieth corps reached Hanging Rock on the twenty-sixth, and waited there for the Fourteenth corps to get across the Catawba. The heavy rains had so swollen the river, that the pontoon bridge broke, and General Davis had very hard work to restore it and get his command across. At last he succeeded, and the left wing was all put in motion for Cheraw.

In the mean time, the right wing had broken up the railroad to Winnsboro, and thence turned for Peay's ferry, where it was crossed over the Catawba before the heavy rains set in, the Seventeenth corps moving straight on Cheraw, via Young's bridge, and the Fifteenth corps by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges. From this latter corps, detachments were sent into Camden to burn the bridge over the Wateree, with the railroad depot, stores, &c. A small force of mounted men under Captain Duncan was also despatched to make a dash and interrupt the railroad from Charleston to Florence, but it met Butler's division of cavalry, and after a sharp night skirmish on Mount Elon, was compelled to return unsuccessful. Much bad road was encountered at Lynch's creek, which delayed the right wing about the same length of time as the left wing had been at the Catawba.

On the second of March, the leading division of the Twentieth corps entered Chesterfield,

skirmishing with Butler's division of cavalry, and the next day about noon the Seventeenth corps entered Cheraw, the enemy retreating across the Pedee and burning the bridge at that point. At Cheraw we found much ammunition and many guns, which had been brought from Charleston on the evacuation of that city. These were destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry and returned, having only broken up in part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw.

Without unnecessary delay, the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville, North Carolina, the right wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw and the left wing and cavalry at Sneedsboro. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the Fourteenth corps, moving by Love's bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued unfavorable and roads bad, but the Fourteenth and Seventeenth corps reached Fayetteville on eleventh of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear river, burning the bridge. During the march from the Pedee General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the ninth of March his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton, detecting this, dashed in at daylight, and gained possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp, and everything save some prisoners, whom the enemy carried off, leaving their dead on the ground.

The twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the United States arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry United States arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined, by the First regiment Michigan engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, Chief Engineer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy, was here destroyed, or cast into the river.

Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my superior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been reinforced by Cheat-ham's corps from the West, and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear river ahead of me, and could,

therefore, complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke in North Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skilful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had despatched to Wilmington, from Laurel Hill church, two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and on the morning of the twelfth of March the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full intelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and General Schofield, at Newbern, my despatches to the effect that on Wednesday, the fifteenth, we would move for Goldsboro, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsboro, which I expected to reach about the twentieth. The same day the gunboat Eolus, Captain Young, United States Navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear river, one opposite the town, the other three miles below.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to and beyond Averysboro. He was to be followed by four divisions of the left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro. In like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's depot and Goldsboro, and to hold four divisions light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion. The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmires. Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed, to admit the passage of wheels. Still time was so important that punctually, according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear river on Wednesday, the fifteenth of March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank-road that day to Kyle's landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear guard, about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an entrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward Goldsboro, through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest that Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had baited in the narrow,

swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in hopes to hold me, to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro. Hardee's force was estimated at twenty thousand men. It was necessary to dislodge him, that we might have the use of the Goldsboro road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was therefore ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren.

The Twentieth corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery, armed as infantry (Rhett's), posted across the road, behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's), by a circuit to his left, that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which rapidly retreated back to a second line, better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery (Winniger's), well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, Chief of Artillery of Twentieth corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division over this ground, General Williams captured three guns and two hundred and seventeen prisoners, of whom sixty-eight were wounded and left in a house near by, with a rebel officer, four men, and five days rations. One hundred and eight rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced, he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis' (Fourteenth) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by McLaws' rebel division furiously, and though it fought well and hard, the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that next morning he was gone, having retreated in a miserable, stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry followed to and through Averysboro, developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South river at a mill-dam to our right, and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Averysboro, at twelve officers and sixty-five men

killed, and four hundred and seventy-seven wounded. We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (one hundred and eight), left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South river, and took the Goldsboro road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the mean time the wagon trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsboro. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column, and camped the night of the eighteenth with him on the Goldsboro road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro, about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro road. Howard was at Lee's store, only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward, to where the two roads came together and became common to Goldsboro.

All the signs induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro road, which goes by way of Falling creek church. I also left Slocum, and joined Howard's column with a view to open communications with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Terry from Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling creek church, with one regiment forward to the crossroads near Cox's bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry (Dibbrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth corps, still back near Lee's store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive station, and with the remaining three divisions of the Fifteenth corps come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's bridge. In the mean time, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro on the twenty-first; and Terry was at or near Faison's depot. Orders

were at once despatched to Schofield to push for Goldsboro, and to make dispositions to cross Little river, in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to General Terry, to move to Cox's bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Blair, to make a night march to Falling creek church; and at daylight the right wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports, I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March eighteenth, and first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns, and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole Confederate army, he promptly deployed the two divisions of the Fourteenth corps, General Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the Twentieth corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery, and massed on the left. In this position the left wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none.

Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the nineteenth, General Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth corps, which reinforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right wing found rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day, before. This body of cavalry was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the Fifteenth corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsboro road, interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution, until he

had made strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by four p. m. of the twentieth a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro, holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets and swampy obstructions.

Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the twenty-first of March. On the same day General Schofield entered Goldsboro with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got possession of the Neuse river at Cox's bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a brigade across, so that the three armies were in actual connection, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.

On the twenty-first a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division of the Seventeenth corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and it might be let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general attack by our skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position, of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the twenty-second pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle.

General Slocum reports the losses of the left wing about Bentonville at nine officers and one hundred and forty-five men killed, fifty-one officers and eight hundred and sixteen men wounded, and three officers and two hundred and twenty-three men missing, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, one thousand two hundred and forty-seven. He buried on the field one hundred and sixty-seven rebel dead, and took three hundred and thirty-eight prisoners.

General Howard reports the losses of the right wing at two officers and thirty-five men killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men wounded, and one officer and sixty men missing; total, three hundred and ninety-nine. He also buried one hundred rebel dead, and took one thousand two hundred and eighty-seven prisoners.

The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was one thousand six hundred and forty-six.

I am well satisfied that the enemy lost heavily, especially during his assaults on the left wing during the afternoon of the nineteenth; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands, I prefer to make no comparisons.

Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the twenty-first, and had full possession of Goldsboro, the real "objective," with its two railroads back to the seaports of Wilmington and Beaufort, North Carolina. These were rapidly being repaired by strong working parties directed by Colonel W. W. Wright, of the Railroad Department. A large number of supplies had already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the twenty-second, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the following day all the armies to move to the camps assigned to them about Goldsboro, there to rest and receive the clothing and supplies of which they stood in need. In person I went on the twenty-second to Cox's bridge to meet General Terry, whom I met for the first time, and on the following day rode into Goldsboro, where I found General Schofield and his army. The left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and the right wing followed on the twenty-fourth, on which day the cavalry moved to Mount Olive station, and General Terry back to Faison's. On the twenty-fifth the Newbern railroad was finished, and the first train of cars came in, thus giving us the means of bringing from the depot at Morehead City full supplies for the army.

It was all-important that I should have an interview with the General-in-chief, and presuming that he could not at this time leave City Point, I left General Schofield in chief command, and proceeded with all expedition by rail to Morehead City, and thence by steamer to City Point, reaching General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the twenty-seventh of March. I had the good fortune to meet General Grant, the President, Generals Meade, Ord, and others of the Army of the Potomac, and soon learned the general state of the military world, from which I had been in a great measure cut off since January. Having completed all necessary business, I reëmbarked on

the navy steamer *Bat*, Captain Barnes, which Admiral Porter placed at my command, and returned via Hatteras Inlet and Newbern, reaching my own headquarters in Goldsboro during the night of the thirtieth. During my absence full supplies of clothing and food had been brought to camp, and all things were working well.

I have thus rapidly sketched the progress of our columns from Savannah to Goldsboro, but for more minute details must refer to the reports of subordinate commanders and of staff officers, which are not yet ready, but will in due season be forwarded and filed with this report. I cannot even, with any degree of precision, recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and material of war captured and destroyed. In general terms we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro, with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn meal, &c. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my Chief Engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast, from Savannah to Newbern, North Carolina, with its forts, dock-yards, gunboats, &c., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaign of 1865. This was completely accomplished on the twenty-first of March by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro.

In conclusion, I beg to express in the most emphatic manner my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite as much real honor and fame as "battles gained" or "cities won," and I therefore commend all, generals, staff, officers, and men, for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them "to the front."

I have the honor to be

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General, Commanding.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL SCHOFIELD'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NORTH CAROLINA, }
 ARMY OF THE ORIO, }
 GOLDSBORO, N. C., April 3, 1865. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command since January 1, 1865, the date of my last report, addressed to Major-General George H. Thomas, commanding Department of the Cumberland, under whose command I was then serving.

On the second of January, 1865, I marched with the Twenty-third Army Corps from Columbia, Tennessee, and arrived at Clifton, on the Tennessee river, on the eighth, under orders to embark my troops at that point, and, move to Eastport, Mississippi. But before the embarkation had commenced, I received, January fourteenth, an order from the Lieutenant-General commanding, through the Chief of Staff of the Army, to move with the Twenty-third Army Corps to Annapolis, Maryland. Accordingly the movement was commenced on the following day. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by rail to Washington, District of Columbia, and Alexandria, Virginia, a second order from Washington having changed the destination from Annapolis.

Although in midwinter, and weather unusually severe, even for that season, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. By the thirty-first of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.

At Alexandria great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for several weeks. Meanwhile I met the Lieutenant-General commanding at Fortress Monroe, and went with him to the mouth of Cape Fear river to consult with Rear-Admiral Porter and Major-General Terry relative to future operations. On my return to Washington an order was issued from the War Department creating the Department of North Carolina, and assigning me to its command.

My instructions from the Lieutenant-General commanding, as well as those received from you, through Major-General Foster, made the ultimate object of my operations the occupation of Goldsboro, the opening of railroad communication between that point and the sea-coast, the accumulation of supplies for your army, and the junction of my force with your main army at or near Goldsboro. Wilmington was made my first objective, because it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City, in the event of our junction being made at Goldsboro, as designed, and because its possession by us would be of great value to you in case the movement of the enemy's main army or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of your army at some point further south than Goldsboro.

As soon as it became possible to navigate the Potomac I started from Alexandria with the Third division, Twenty-third Army Corps, under command of Major-General J. D. Cox, and reached the mouth of Cape Fear river on the ninth of February, and landed upon the peninsula near Fort Fisher.

Major-General A. H. Terry, with about eight thousand men, then held a line across the peninsula about two miles above the fort, and occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron, under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear river and off the coast, covering the flanks of General Terry's line.

The enemy occupied Fort Anderson, on the west bank, with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three fourths of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson, running across the peninsula from Cape Fear river to Masonboro sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonboro sound, above his left, or passing around the swamp which covered his right.

The force I then had seemed too small for so extended a movement as either of those mentioned, but time being important, I determined to make the attempt without waiting for the arrival of more of my troops. On the eleventh of February I pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's division, drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. I then made preparation to send a fleet of navy boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's position, while a force composed of General Cox's and General Ames' divisions was to march along the beach in the night to the point where the boats were to land, haul them across the beach into the sound, and cross the latter to the main land in rear of Hoke's position. The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the execution of this plan impossible. On the night of February fourteenth I attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides, caused by the heavy sea and wind, made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when our movement would be discovered by the enemy before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's work, the attempt was abandoned, and I turned attention to the enemy's right, where I would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea. General Cox's and General Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of General Couch's division, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road, until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while

General Cox, with his other two brigades and General Ames' division, started around the swamp covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works on both sides of the river during the night of February nineteenth, and fell back behind Town creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. We thus gained possession of the main defences of Cape Fear river and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.

On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to Town creek, behind which he was found intrenched, and had destroyed the only bridge. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior to General Terry's. General Ames' division was recrossed to the east bank and joined General Terry on the night of the nineteenth.

On the twentieth General Cox crossed Town creek below the enemy's position, by the use of a single flat boat found in the stream, and by wading through swamps reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery, three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilmington without opposition.

General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force, so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed. On the twenty-first General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick river, which he had attempted to destroy, put a portion of his troops on to Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early on the morning of February twenty-second, and General Terry pursued the enemy across North-east river.

Our total loss in the operations from February eleventh to the capture of Wilmington was about two hundred officers and men killed and wounded. That of the enemy was not less than one thousand killed, wounded, and prisoners; fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our hands.

It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the cordial and constant cooperation of the naval squadron under Rear-Admiral Porter, so far as the nature of the operations would admit.

Having no rolling stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon transportation, I was compelled to operate from Newbern alone

for the capture of Goldsboro. I had already sent to Newbern about five thousand troops belonging to the various corps of your army, and directed Brigadier-General I. M. Palmer to move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force toward Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in repairing the railroad. As soon as Wilmington was secured, I also sent General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Army Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear inlet by sea, to Morehead City, to reinforce the column moving from Newbern. On the twenty-fifth, finding that General Palmer had not moved, as was expected, I sent Major-General Cox to take command at Newbern and push forward at once.

General Couch's division, which had nearly completed its debarkation when Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and that division, with General Cox's, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Reilly, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. It was not until March sixth that I was able to obtain wagons enough, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.

On the sixth, General Couch started with the two divisions, Second and Third of the Twenty-third corps, and marched, via Onslow and Richland's, for Kinston. On the same day I went by sea to Morehead City, and joined General Cox beyond Newbern on the eighth. General Cox had advanced to Wise's forks, about one and a half miles below South-west creek, and the railroad was in rapid process of reconstruction.

The force in front of General Cox, which appeared to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind South-west creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been reinforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about seven hundred men.

The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between General Carter's and General Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by General Ruger's division, which was just arriving upon the field. There was no engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured from Colonel Upham, was insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that

reinforcements were arriving as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, I directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the ninth, the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On the tenth, the enemy having been largely reinforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by General Ruger's division, a portion of that division having been rapidly transferred from the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, also a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse, and burned the bridge. Our loss in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded; that of the enemy probably about fifteen hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Couch effected his junction with General Cox on the following day.

Having no pontoon train I was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired, or the pontoons which had just arrived from the North could be brought by rail from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the fourteenth, the enemy having abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, which was concentrating to oppose your advance from Fayetteville.

Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston I put a large force of troops to work upon the railroad, in aid of the construction corps under Colonel Wright, rebuilt the wagon bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward supplies preparatory to a further advance.

I moved from Kinston on the morning of the twentieth, and entered Goldsboro with but slight opposition on the evening of the twenty-first.

The portion of my command which had remained at Wilmington, under Major-General Terry, moved from that point March fifteenth, reached Faison's depot on the twentieth, and in compliance with your orders, moved from that point to Cox's bridge, and secured the crossing of the Neuse on the twenty-second. Your plans for the concentration of your entire army about this place having been fully accomplished on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth, I then had the honor of reporting to you in person, and uniting my troops to their old comrades in arms after a separation of near five months, marked by unparalleled marches and brilliant achievements, which will ever furnish bright pages in military history, and it is hoped proved

decisive in their results upon the present rebellion.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,
J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

GENERAL BARRY'S REPORT.

ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE
MISSISSIPPI, GOLDSBORO, N. C., March 31, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of the artillery of the armies under your command during the Carolina campaign of February and March, 1865.

In consideration of the peculiarities of the campaign, involving long and rapid marches over bad roads, and at an inclement season of the year, the same precautions which were so advantageously taken for your Savannah campaign of last autumn were again observed. The number of guns was reduced to one per thousand effective bayonets, and each artillery carriage was provided with eight draught animals.

The whole number of field batteries was sixteen, comprising sixty-eight guns, which were distributed and of calibre as follows:

	20-pounder Parrotts.	12-pounders.	8-inch rifles.	TOTAL.
RIGHT WING.				
Fifteenth Army Corps.....	4	10	4	18
Seventeenth Army Corps.....		4	10	14
LEFT WING.				
Fourteenth Army Corps.....		8	8	16
Twentieth Army Corps.....		8	8	16
Cavalry division.....			4	4
Total.....	4	30	34	68

Including the reserve supply, each gun was furnished with three hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition.

A careful and critical personal inspection, made a few days preceding our departure from Savannah, satisfied me that in all essentials the artillery was in excellent condition for any kind of work. The result fully justified these expectations. During the whole march the artillery supplied itself, unaided by infantry or cavalry, with provisions for its officers and men, forage for its animals, and to a great extent with fresh horses and mules captured in the country. A tabular statement is appended to this report, showing the extent to which this unusual artillery service was performed.

No gun or artillery carriage of any description was abandoned, disabled, or at any time even a temporary impediment to the march of the infantry columns—a fact the more credita-

ble to the artillery, since in many places the roads were of the worst possible description.

Although the nature of your operations did not, except at the battles of Averysboro and Bentonville, call for any general use of artillery, yet in support of skirmish lines, brushing away cavalry, and covering the crossings of several difficult and important rivers, it was advantageously used at the following times and places, namely:

January twenty, 1865, Pocatigo, Seventeenth Army Corps.

January twenty-two, 1865, Combahee, Fifteenth Army Corps.

January twenty-nine, 1865, Robertsville, Twentieth Army Corps.

February one, 1865, Hickory Hill, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February two, 1865, Lawtonville, Twentieth Army Corps.

February two, 1865, Whippy Swamp, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February three, 1865, "Store" at Duck creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February six, 1865, Little Salkehatchie, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February nine, 1865, Binnaker's bridge, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February eleven, 1865, North Edisto, Seventeenth Army Corps.

February fifteen, 1865, Congaree creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

February sixteen, 1865, Columbia, Fifteenth and Seventeenth Army Corps.

February seventeen, 1865, Broad river, Fifteenth Army Corps.

March sixteen, 1865, Little Rookfish creek, Fifteenth Army Corps.

At the battle of Averysboro, March sixteen, the batteries of the Twentieth corps were promptly and judiciously posted by Major Reynolds, the Chief of Artillery of that corps, and by the precision and rapidity of their fire did most excellent service in dislodging the enemy from his intrenched line, and the consequent capture of three of his guns.

At the battle of Bentonville, March nineteen, twenty, and twenty-one, it was the fortune of the artillery to play a more conspicuous part. The batteries of the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps were hotly engaged on the nineteenth, and after the first temporary advantage gained by the enemy, in which the Nineteenth Indiana battery, not by any fault of its own, lost three of its guns (one of which was recaptured next day), they poured in a fire so steady, rapid and effective, that all of the enemy's frequently repeated assaults were successfully repulsed. On the twentieth, and particularly on the twenty-first, the batteries of the Fifteenth corps lent most efficient aid in advancing our own lines, in repelling the enemy's assaults, and in inflicting heavy loss upon him. Both of these fields of battle gave abundant proof of the precision of our artillery fire.

The following tabular statements will exhibit the amounts of provision and forage, and the number of animals captured by the unaided labors of the artillery, the casualties among officers, enlisted men, and animals, the expenditure of ammunition, and the number of guns lost by us and captured from the enemy:

Provisions, Animals, Forage, &c.

BY WHAT BATTERIES PROCURED	FLOUR.	COFF MEAL.	BACON.	BEEF, &c.	POTATONS.	CORN.	HAY AND FODDER.	HORSES.	MULES.
	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.	Pounds.		
Twentieth Army corps...	3,000	10,000	25,000	50,000	50,000	850,000	300,000	96	602
Fourteenth Army corps.	3,000	8,200	4,300	8,065	219,220	91,800	53	85
Fifteenth Army corps.	4,900	5,700	23,000	2,800	37,440	499,000	90,000	50	63
Seventeenth Army corps	2,000	3,200	18,000	218,000	106,000	50	83
	17,900	24,100	70,300	60,865	87,440	1,284,220	587,800	249	783

Casualties.

	OFFICERS.				ENLISTED MEN.				HORSES.		MULES.	
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Died.	Killed.	Wounded.	Killed.	Wounded.
Fourteenth Army corps.....	1	4	6	1	25
Twentieth Army corps.....	1	14	1	3
Fifteenth Army corps.....	5	3
Seventeenth Army corps.....	1	1	1
Cavalry Division.....	1	1	13	10
	1	7	27	19	35	3

Expenditure of Ammunition.

COMMAND.	No. of Rounds.
Fourteenth Army corps.....	1,007
Twentieth Army corps.....	832
Army of Tennessee.....	1,665
Total.....	3,504

Guns Captured and Lost.

PLACE.	CAPTURED FROM ENEMY.		LOST BY US.
	No. of Guns.	No. of Guns.	
Columbia.....	43	
Cheraw.....	25	
Fayetteville.....	26	
Avery'sboro.....	3	
Benton's.....	2	
Total.....	97	2	

Of these all were serviceable, and about four-fifths were field guns of recent and approved pattern.

If to the operations of your armies, the legitimate fruits of which they really are, be credited the guns captured at Charleston and Wilmington, (excluding from the number of the latter those captured at Fort Fisher and the other forts at the mouth of Cape Fear river), the total artillery captured during the past ten months by troops under your immediate command will exceed seven hundred guns.

Throughout the campaign, the ammunition, fuses, and primers proved unusually good and reliable, the only fault observed being sand cracks and insufficient bursting charges in a few of the twenty-pounder Parrott projectiles, want of care in the screwing of the Bohrmann fuse in forty-two-pounder projectiles, and insufficient bursting charges in many of the Hotchkiss three-inch shell and case shot. Ammunition and fuses received from St. Louis arsenal appear to be more complained of (especially the fuses) than that received from other places.

In conclusion, I am gratified to be able to commend the officers and men for attention to their duties in preparation for the field, and for good conduct after entering it; for the details of which I respectfully invite attention to the sub-reports which will be laid before you.

The services of the following-named officers give evidence of industry, intelligence, and gallant conduct, and entitle them to notice and reward:

Major Osborn, First New York artillery, Chief of Artillery, Army of Tennessee; Major Reynolds, First New York artillery, Chief of Artillery, Twentieth Army Corps; Major Waterhouse, First Illinois Artillery, Chief of Artillery, Seventeenth Army Corps; Lieutenant Colonel Ross, First Michigan artillery, Chief of Artillery, Fifteenth Army Corps; Major Houghtaling, First

Illinois artillery, Chief of Artillery Fourteenth Army Corps.

I respectfully ask that each of these officers, who have also served faithfully and creditably through the Atlanta and Savannah campaigns, be recommended for promotion by brevet.

The officers of my staff, Major Dickson, Inspector of Artillery; Captain Marshall, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain Merritt, and Lieutenant Verplanck, Aides-de-camp, at all times performed cheerfully and well the duties with which they were charged.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

WILLIAM F. BARRY,
Brev. Maj.-Gen., Chief of Artillery.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi.

CORRESPONDENCE.

Wheeler to General Howard.

GRAHAM, S. C., February 7, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to propose that if the troops of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens I will discontinue burning cotton.

As an earnest of the good faith in which my proposition is tendered, I leave at this place about three hundred bales cotton, unharmed, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a million, and in our currency one and a half millions. I trust my having commenced will cause you to use your influence to ensure the acceptance of the proposition by your whole army.

I trust that you will not deem it improper for me to ask that you will require the troops under your command to discontinue the wanton destruction of property not necessary for their sustenance.

Respectfully, General.

Your obedient servant,

J. WHEELER,
Major-General, C. S. A.

Major-General O. O. HOWARD,
United States Army, Commanding, &c.

Answered by General Sherman.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
IN THE FIELD, February 8, 1865. }

GENERAL: Yours, addressed to General Howard, is received by me. I hope you will burn all cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it; and it has proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will.

As to private houses, occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.
Major-General J. WHEELER,
Commanding Cavalry Corps, Confederate Army.

General Sherman to Wade Hampton.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, February 24, 1865. }

GENERAL: It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered after capture, and labelled "Death to all foragers." One instance of a lieutenant and seven men near Chesterville, and another of twenty, "near a ravine eighty rods from the main road," about three miles from Feastersville, I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner.

I hold about a thousand prisoners, captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to the people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

Of course you cannot question my right to "forage on the country." It is a war-right as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the civil authorities will supply my requisitions I will forbid all foraging. But I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions, therefore must collect directly of the people. I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to judge, or punish with wholesale murder.

Personally I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war; but they were to be expected; and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war-right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life.

I am, with respect,

Your obedient servant

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General United States Army.

Lieutenant-General WADE HAMPTON,
Commanding Cavalry Forces, C. S. A.

Wade Hampton to General Sherman.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }
February 27, 1865. }

GENERAL: Your communication of the twenty-fourth inst. reached me to-day. In it you state that it has been officially reported that your foraging parties are "murdered" after capture. You go on to say that you have "ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner;" that is to say, you have ordered a number of Confederate soldiers to be "murdered." You characterize your order in proper terms, for the public voice, even in your own country, where it seldom dares to express itself in vindication of truth, honor, or justice, will surely agree with you in pronouncing you guilty of murder, if your order is carried out. Before dismissing this portion of your letter, I beg to assure you, that for every soldier of mine "murdered" by you, I shall have exe-

cuted at once *two* of yours, giving, in all cases, preference to any officers who may be in my hands.

In reference to the statement you make regarding the death of your foragers, I have only to say that I know nothing of it; that no orders given by me authorize the killing of prisoners after capture, and I do not believe my men killed any of yours except under circumstances in which it was perfectly legitimate and proper they *should* kill them. It is a part of the system of the thieves whom you designate as your foragers to fire the dwellings of those citizens whom they have robbed. To check this inhuman system, which is justly execrated by every civilized nation, I have directed my men to shoot down all of your men who are caught burning houses. This order shall remain in force so long as you disgrace the profession of arms by allowing your men to destroy private dwellings.

You say that I cannot, of course, question your right to forage on the country. "It is a right as old as history." I do not, sir, question this right. But there is a right older even than this, and one more inalienable—the right that every man has to defend his home, and to protect those who are dependent on him: and from my heart I wish that every old man and boy in my country, who can fire a gun, would shoot down, as he would a wild beast, the men who are desolating their land, burning their homes, and insulting their women.

You are particular in defining and claiming "war-rights." May I ask if you enumerate among these the right to fire upon a defenceless city without notice; to burn that city to the ground after it had been surrendered by the inhabitants, who claimed, though in vain, that protection which is always accorded in civilized warfare to non-combatants; to fire the dwelling-houses of citizens after robbing them, and to perpetrate even darker crimes than these—crimes too black to be mentioned.

You have permitted, if you have not ordered, the commission of these offences against humanity and the rules of war. You fired into the city of Columbia without a word of warning, after its surrender by the mayor, who demanded protection to private property; you laid the whole city in ashes, leaving amidst its ruins thousands of old men and helpless women and children, who are likely to perish of starvation and exposure. Your line of march can be traced by the lurid light of burning houses; and in more than one household there is an agony far more bitter than that of death. The Indian scalped his victim regardless of age or sex, but with all his barbarity he always respected the persons of his female captives. Your soldiers, more savage than the Indian, insult those whose natural protectors are absent.

In conclusion, I have only to request that whenever you have any of my men "murdered" or "disposed of"—for the terms seem synonymous with you—you will let me hear of it, that I may know what action to take in the matter.

In the mean time I shall hold fifty-six of your men as hostages for those whom you have ordered to be executed.

I am yours, &c.,

WADE HAMPTON,
Lieutenant-General

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, U. S. A.

Doc. 45.

GENERAL PLEASANTONS NARRATIVE.

MILWAUKEE, Wis., October 15, 1865.

To the Honorable B. F. Wade, Chairman of the Committee on the Conduct of the War:

MY DEAR SIR: Agreeably to your request, I submit for the consideration of your honorable Committee on the Conduct of the War, some of the prominent facts that came under my observation during the campaigns in which I was engaged in the late war of rebellion, and which had any bearing on their success or failure.

The first most important and prominent step in the prosecution of the war, and one whose consequences were felt to the end, was the defective and injurious organization given to the Army of the Potomac in the winter of 1861-62. It was most unfortunate, that with the finest men and material ever furnished to any army of the world, that army should have been organized with so little reference to the rules of war governing the organization of armies.

The highest military authorities have laid down, that in the proper organization of an army, the cavalry should form one fourth to one sixth of the infantry which compose it. This relation of the cavalry to the infantry is so important, in consequence of the necessary duties assigned to each in time of war, that it may fairly be said no army is fit to take the field unless these two arms are properly organized, and bear the proper proportion to each other with respect to numbers. And it is also a strong fact, which the war has demonstrated, that the more closely these proportions are observed throughout the campaign, the greater will be the success, and the greater will be the confidence reposed by the troops of the different arms in each other, which greatly tends to lighten their most arduous duties. It is a vicious organization that requires the infantry to supply the deficiencies of service, for want of sufficient cavalry, or the reverse; or that imposes upon a small body of cavalry the arduous and ruinous service that should only be borne by thrice their numbers.

With eighty thousand cavalry on the payrolls of the country in the winter of 1862, the Army of the Potomac was kept so deplorably deficient in cavalry as to be unable to ascertain what the enemy were doing at Fairfax and Manassas—were unable to raise the blockade of the Potomac; and the rebels had finally moved away from those places in the spring, before our army had started in pursuit.

Does any one now assert that those obstacles

could not have been removed by twenty thousand cavalry, properly supported by that army?

So little interest was taken in the organization, support, and efficiency of the cavalry, that it became more of a farce than the earnest effort to create an important arm to advance against the enemy.

I served with the Army of the Potomac from October, 1861, until March, 1864, in the various capacities of regimental, brigade, division, and corps commander of cavalry. My constant theme was the proper increase and organization of the cavalry, and from what has since been done I am confirmed in the opinion formed at that time, that if the proper steps had been taken that winter of 1862, a superb cavalry corps could have been organized by the spring; in which event the Peninsula campaign, one of the bad consequences resulting from the neglect of the cavalry, would not have been forced on us. McClellan dreaded the rebel cavalry, and supposed that by placing his army on a peninsula, with a deep river on each side, he was safe from that arm of the enemy; but the humiliation on the Chickahominy of having a few thousand of the enemy's cavalry ride completely round his army, and the ignominious retreat to Harrison's Landing, are additional instances in support of the maxim that a General who disregards the rules of war finds himself overwhelmed by the consequences of such neglect when the crisis of battle follows.

While the cavalry arm was thus neglected in the organization of the army, the infantry force, which was upward of one hundred and thirty thousand men, was kept in divisions until the army entered the field in the spring, when the corps formation was adopted; but so indifferently, however, that the command of the corps fell upon officers of no higher grade than that of Brigadier-General. This carelessness of assignment, by rendering every high officer uncertain of the position he held, was a fruitful source of the jealousies and dissensions that afterward occurred among the commanders in this army, and which did so much to retard and frustrate the best-devised plans that were attempted to be executed, and taken in connection with the useless superabundance of artillery with which at that time the army was supplied, and which was without higher organization than that of the battery, added to the other causes mentioned, prevented that unity of action, compactness, confidence, mobility, courage, energy and enterprise, in the army, which is so essential in the prosecution of successful warfare.

General Hooker was the first commander of the Army of the Potomac to exhibit a correct appreciation of organization in an army. He consolidated and increased his cavalry, organized them into a corps, supplied them with artillery, and was rewarded by some distinguished service, that made the march of his army a triumph from Falmouth to Frederick City.

The campaign of Gettysburg which he commenced so brilliantly, was afterward conducted by his successor with such results as to produce the deepest mortification throughout the country. The doubt, hesitation, and fear of consequences displayed by General Meade was in striking contrast to the heroic valor so constantly and stubbornly exhibited by the army. Never did the cavalry, though few in numbers for the labors assigned them, perform more brilliant and successful deeds of arms than those which, after the battle of Gettysburg, brought to bay a shattered, baffled and beaten army at Falling Waters, on the banks of the Potomac, in July, 1863! The army was eager for the attack, they knew the end of the rebellion was within their grasp, but *their commander*, General Meade, receiving no inspiration from their genius, only held them back until the enemy had escaped. The same fear of consequences which animated General Meade, caused the army to fall back from Culpepper to Centreville, in the fall of 1863, when the rebels advanced and took from the campaign of Gettysburg whatever might have been claimed for it on the score of generalship, and the Mine Run campaign showed so plainly that General Meade was deficient in the qualities required for a commander, that it was not surprising to see Lieutenant-General Grant, a short time after, assume the personal direction of the Army of the Potomac.

It is a very important fact, that the numbers of the cavalry in that Army were then more nearly in the proper proportion to those of the infantry than at any other time in its history; and the noble record of the cavalry and of the Army, while under General Grant, can consequently be accepted as one of the results of observing that important principle of war—the proper organization of an army.

In reviewing this subject, it is well to observe that the success of the rebel army in Virginia, for the first two years of the war, was mainly due to its superior organization, and to the splendid corps of cavalry it was able to maintain. That army was not hampered with a surplus of artillery, and its numerous and efficient cavalry kept its commander well informed of our movements; but when the casualties of war reduced this cavalry faster than they could replace them—which was the case in the campaigns of 1863—the Army was soon thrown upon the defensive, from which it was never after able to recover. We, then, deduce the following facts: that the Army of the Potomac was better organized in the later periods of the war than at the beginning; while the reverse was the case with the rebel army. The successes of either army bore a marked correspondence to its superior organization to that of its opponent, at the time of achievement. The question then recurs, could not the war have been much sooner closed by giving to the Army of the Potomac a proper organization at the beginning?

The Government should now decide this question; and if responded to in the affirmative, make the necessary corrections to prevent similar evils in our military system hereafter.

CAMPAIGN OF THE PENINSULA.

In the campaign of the Peninsula I commanded the Second regiment of United States cavalry, until the Army arrived at Harrison's landing, when I was made a Brigadier-General of volunteers, and commanded a brigade of cavalry in the second action at Malvern Hill, on the fifth of August, 1862, and also covered the withdrawal of the Army from the Peninsula.

Throughout this campaign there was a decided want of vigor in the conduct of the Army, and the first great mistake was made in permitting the rebels to occupy and reinforce Yorktown, before taking possession of it. Some thirty days' delay occurred in laying siege to Yorktown, when it might have been taken by assault the first few days after the Army arrived before it. At all events the importance of time at that period was such as to make an attempt worthy of a trial.

The time lost at Yorktown, and on the Chickahominy, gave the rebels an opportunity to gather their forces to defend Richmond; and the error committed in placing the Army on both sides of the Chickahominy enabled the enemy to cripple first our left wing on Fair Oaks and Seven Pines, and afterward our right wing at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill; and by the moral effect of these partial actions caused the Army to retreat to James river. There appeared no disposition throughout this campaign to bring the entire Army into action as an army: there was no controlling spirit so decidedly strong as to effect the necessary concert of action in the different portions of the Army, and as a consequence the battles that took place resulted, from the enemy's successively massing heavier forces on our detached corps, which were outnumbered, beaten in detail, and compelled to retreat.

It has been claimed that more troops should have been furnished the Army for the purpose of taking Richmond; but the facts of the case do not support this assertion, as the troops that were in the Army were never all used, and fought in connection with, and in support of each other, as should have been done. To have increased these large masses, without material change in the manner of fighting them from that which had been adopted, would not have changed the ultimate result from what it was, and would have only added to the embarrassments which already existed.

Besides the causes already mentioned, there were numerous oversights and neglects, bearing upon discipline, and which also had a serious influence upon the success of the campaign. Very little was done to excite the energy, emulation, and enthusiasm of the troops, while some measures were adopted that had a decided tendency to diminish these necessary qualities in a

marked degree. At Yorktown, an order from the headquarters prohibited all music by bands, and all calls, by either drums or bugles; and they were not resumed until after the army had arrived at Harrison's landing.

When the large masses of men which composed the Army of the Potomac were moving among the swamps of the Chickahominy, without any of the enlivening sounds of martial music, or the various well-known calls of an army life, the effect was very depressing, and caused the soldiers to exaggerate the issue that required of them to lose the most agreeable part of their profession.

The army, however, had gone to the Peninsula very enthusiastic; the soldiers always earnest and faithful in the discharge of their duties, and although the field for the campaign had been badly selected, and there were numerous drawbacks to disappoint their hopes, there were also several occasions won by their valor, when a bold, determined, resolute commander could have forced the result to a successful issue.

CAMPAIGN OF ANTIETAM.

In this campaign I commanded the cavalry division of the army, and took the advance from Washington City through Maryland, and until the field of Antietam was reached, when I fought my command in front of the bridge leading from Keedysville to Sharpsburg, and held the centre of our army throughout the battle. The same mistakes were made in this campaign that characterized that of the Peninsula: the army was not moved with sufficient rapidity or vigor from the Peninsula, or through Maryland, and the enemy was again given time to prepare and concentrate. When the battle was delivered it was fought by detached commands, in such positions as to be unable to give or receive assistance from each other. Hooker, Franklin, and Sumner's corps were on the right, too distant to receive support from the rest of the forces, while Burnside's force was on the left, at least three miles from where my command was, without any troops being between us, and with Antietam creek, which was not fordable, behind us. Fitz John Porter's corps was behind my position, a mile and a half on the opposite side of Antietam creek, as a reserve, but it was never brought into action except in small squads.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages our army labored under from these arrangements, a decisive victory could have been won at four o'clock on the afternoon of the seventeenth of September, if a strong attack had been made on Sharpsburg from our centre. My command had cleared the enemy from my front, and were in high spirits, while the stubborn fighting of the army generally had told fearfully upon the rebels. I therefore recommended this attack, and requested to be permitted to take the initiative in it. The proposition was not approved and I was directed to hold the position I then had. The enemy were then so far off, falling back, my

guns could not reach them, and the battle ended so far as my command was concerned. On the next day, the army was not permitted to advance, and on the nineteenth the enemy had crossed the Potomac and escaped. The rebel army had suffered so much more than ours in this campaign, and their ammunition was so much exhausted, that I was convinced a rapid and energetic pursuit would have routed them, if it had not caused Lee himself to surrender. Colonel Davis, of the Eighth New York cavalry, had, before the battle, destroyed all the ammunition belonging to Longstreet's corps, and the heavy demands of the fight had nearly exhausted the supply for the rest of their army. This, with the disappointment of the rebel soldiers at the failure of their enterprise to invade Pennsylvania, were advantages which should not have been thrown away.

Another opportunity for success was offered when the army was at Warrenton, in the fall of 1862. The rebel force was then divided. Longstreet, and A. P. Hill, with their corps, being at Culpepper, while Stonewall Jackson and D. H. Hill were in the Shenandoah valley, at Front Royal.

By crushing Longstreet at Culpepper, the army would cripple that of the rebels, and would cut it off from Richmond. Culpepper should have been occupied. It was at this time that General Burnside assumed command of the army, and unfortunately decided to march on Fredericksburg.

THE FREDERICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.

The details of that campaign have already been so thoroughly examined by your honorable committee, as to leave nothing to be said in reference to it except, perhaps, that the cavalry bore no prominent part in it.

CAMPAIGN OF CHANCELLORSVILLE.

In this campaign, my command was the First cavalry division of the Army of the Potomac, the First brigade of which, during the battle, was with General Stoneman on his raid toward Richmond, in rear of Lee's army. With one brigade, I preceded the Eleventh and Twelfth corps as far as Chancellorsville. The movements of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth corps across the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers were very fine and masterly, and were executed with such secrecy that the enemy were not aware of them. For, on the thirtieth of April, 1863, I captured a courier from General Lee, commanding the rebel army, bearing a despatch from General Lee to General Anderson, and written only one hour before, stating to General Anderson he had just been informed we had crossed in force, when, in fact, our three corps had been south of the Rapidan river the night previous, and were then only five miles from Chancellorsville.

The brilliant success of these preparatory movements, I was under the impression, gave General Hooker an undue confidence as to his

being master of the situation, and all the necessary steps were not taken on his arrival at Chancellorsville to ensure complete success.

The country around Chancellorsville was too cramped to admit of our whole army being properly developed there, and two corps, the Eleventh and Twelfth, should have been thrown, on the night of the thirtieth of April, to Spottsylvania Court-House, with orders to intrench, while the remainder of the army should have been disposed so as to support them. This would have compelled General Lee to attack our whole force, or retire with his flank exposed—a dangerous operation in war—or else, remain in position, and receive the attack of Sedgwick in rear and Hooker in front; a still worse dilemma.

In the third day's fight at Chancellorsville, General Hooker was badly stunned by the concussion of a shell against a post near which he was standing, and from which he did not recover sufficiently during the battle to resume the proper command of the army. The plan of this campaign was a bold one, and was more judicious than was generally supposed, from the large force General Hooker had at his command. There is always one disadvantage, however, attending the sending off of large detachments near the day of battle. War is such an uncertain game, it can scarcely be expected that all of the details in the best-devised plans will meet with success, and unless a general is prepared and expects to replace *at once*, by new combinations, such parts of his plans as fail, he will be defeated in his campaign; and as these changes are often rapid, he cannot include his distant detachments in his new plans with any certainty, and the doubt their absence creates reduces the army he can depend on to the actual number of men he has in hand. If General Hooker had not been injured at the commencement of the final battle, I am not certain his splendid fighting qualities would not have won for him the victory. It was in this battle that, with three regiments of cavalry and twenty-two pieces of artillery, I checked the attack of the rebel General Stonewall Jackson, after he had routed the Eleventh corps.

Jackson had been moving his corps of twenty-five or thirty thousand men through the woods throughout the day of the second of May, 1863, from the left to the right of our army, and about six o'clock in the evening he struck the right and rear of the Eleventh corps with one of those characteristic attacks that made the rebel army so terrible when he was with it, and which was lost to them in his death.

In a very short time he doubled up the Eleventh corps into a disordered mass, which soon sought safety in flight.

My command of three cavalry regiments and one battery of six guns happened to be near this scene, and perceiving at a glance that if this rout was not checked the ruin of the whole army would be involved I immediately ordered

one of my regiments to charge the woods from which the rebels were issuing, and hold them until I could bring some guns into position; then, charging several squadrons into our flying masses, to clear ground for my battery, it was brought up at a run, while staff officers and troops were despatched to seize from the rout all the guns possible. The brilliant charge of the regiment into the woods detained the rebels some ten minutes, but in that short time, such was the energy displayed by my command, I placed in line twenty-two pieces of artillery, double-shotted with canister, and aimed low, with the remainder of the cavalry supporting them.

Dusk was now rapidly approaching, with an apparent lull in the fight, when heavy masses of men could be seen on the edge of the woods, having a single flag, and that the flag of the United States, while at the same time they cried out: "Don't shoot, we are friends!"

In an instant an aide-de-camp galloped out to ascertain the truth, when a withering fire of musketry was opened on us by this very gallant foe, who now dropped our ensign, displayed ten or twelve rebel battle-flags, and with loud yells charged the guns. I then gave the command, "Fire!" and the terrible volley, delivered at less than two hundred yards' distance, caused the thick, moving masses of the enemy to stagger, cease from yelling, and for a moment discontinue their musket fire; but they were in such numbers, had such an indomitable leader, and they had so great a prize within their reach, that they soon rallied, and came on again with increased energy and force, to be met by the artillery, served well and rapidly, and with such advantage that the rebels were never able to make a permanent lodgement at the guns, which many of their adventurous spirits succeeded in reaching. This fight lasted about an hour, when a final charge was made and repulsed, when they sullenly retired to the woods.

It was at this time that General Jackson was mortally wounded; and as the rebel authorities have published that he had been killed by his own men, I shall mention some facts of so strong a character as to refute this statement.

Soon after the last attack, I captured some of the rebel soldiers in the woods, and they told me it was Jackson's corps that had made this fight; that Jackson himself had directed it, and had been mortally wounded, and that their loss was very heavy.

I have since met rebel officers who were then engaged, and they corroborated the above statement, and they added that it was known and believed by Jackson's men that he had been mortally wounded by our fire. Again, one of my own officers, who had been taken prisoner in that engagement, told me, after he was exchanged, that he had been taken up to Jackson soon after his capture; that Jackson questioned him about our force, and that he was then not far from our lines. This clearly proves that Jackson was on the field in command, and had not

been wounded up to and until after the fight had commenced. Now, when it is remembered the entire front of my line did not occupy six hundred yards; that the opposing forces were in open ground, not three hundred yards from each other, and so close that no reconnoissance in front was necessary by an officer of Jackson's rank; and, taken in connection with the fact that the fierce attacks characteristic of the man did not cease until he was wounded, and were not renewed after he was, the conclusion is simple, natural, and foreivable that Jackson commanded and fell in his attack on our guns. In justice to the high character as a general of Jackson, I am free to admit that had he not been wounded, and had made another attack, as he undoubtedly would have done, he would have carried my position; for my losses had already disabled more than half my guns, and the few that were left could have easily been overpowered.

There seemed a providential interference in Jackson's removal at the critical time in which it occurred, for the position fought for by him commanded and enfiladed our whole army; and had he won it on the rout of the Eleventh corps, the disaster to us would have been irreparable.*

CAMPAIGN OF GETTYSBURG.

I was placed in command of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, and made a Major-General of volunteers, after the battle of Chancellorsville, and the campaign of Gettysburg began by my attacking the rebel cavalry at Beverly ford on the Rappahannock river, on the ninth of June, 1863. The rebels were defeated, and very important information was obtained relative to their proposed invasion of Pennsylvania, upon which General Hooker acted immediately, and moved his army toward Maryland. On the seventeenth, the nineteenth and the twenty-first of June, 1863, I again attacked the rebels at Aldie, at Middleburg and Upperville, with such success, that General Lee abandoned his design of crossing the Potomac at Poolesville, and moved the bulk of his army to Hagerstown, by the way of Williamsport, and from thence to Chambersburg. When our army had arrived at Frederick City, General Hooker was relieved from the command and General Meade was assigned in his place. General Hooker left the army in fine condition and discipline, and well in hand, and he had the confidence of the troops in his ability to command them.

General Meade sent for me soon after his assignment, and in discussing the subject of the campaign, I mentioned that from my knowledge of the country, obtained the year before in the Antietam campaign, I considered the result of the present one depended entirely upon which of the two armies first obtained possession of Gettysburg, as that was so strong a position that either army, by holding it, could defeat the other; that General Lee knew this, and would

undoubtedly make for it. But in the disposition of the army for the march, I saw that General Meade did not attach that importance to the subject that it deserved, and that he was more impressed with the idea that Lee intended crossing the Susquehanna river, and accordingly threw the bulk of his army too far to the east of Gettysburg. Seeing this I directed General Buford, who commanded the First cavalry division, and who was ordered to Gettysburg, to hold that place at all hazards until our infantry could come up. Buford arrived at Gettysburg on the night of the thirtieth of June, 1863, in advance of the enemy, and moved out the next day very early, about four miles on the Cashtown road, when he met A. P. Hill's corps of the enemy, thirty thousand strong, moving down to occupy Gettysburg; Lee thus doing exactly what I informed General Meade he would do. Buford with his four thousand cavalry attacked Hill, and for four hours splendidly resisted his advance, until Reynolds and Howard were able to hurry to the field and give their assistance. To the intrepidity, courage and fidelity of General Buford, and his brave division, the country and the army owe the battle-field of Gettysburg.

His unequal fight of four thousand men against eight times their numbers, and his saving the field, made Buford the true hero of that battle.

While this terrible fight of the first day was raging, having been commenced by Buford in the morning, and continued by Reynolds and Howard in the evening; General Meade was seventeen miles off, at Tarrytown, leisurely planning a line of battle on some obscure creek in another direction; when he was aroused by a despatch from Buford through me, stating that Reynolds was killed, the field was becoming disordered, and if he expected to save it the army must be moved up at once. The different corps were then directed to march on Gettysburg, but some were so distant, Sedgwick's in particular, that it did not arrive on the field until sundown of the second of July, after having marched thirty-five miles. General Meade did not himself reach the field until one o'clock on the morning of the second, long after the first day's fight had been brought to a close.

On the second of July, 1863, that portion of the army that was on the field was placed in a defensive position, but General Meade had so little assurance in his own ability to maintain himself, or in the strength of his position, that when the rebels partially broke our line in the afternoon of the second, he directed me to collect what cavalry I could and prepare to cover the retreat of the army; and I was thus engaged until twelve o'clock that night. I mention this fact now, because when I was before your honorable Committee, and was asked the question, whether General Meade ever had any idea of retreating from Gettysburg, I answered that I did not remember; the above circumstance at that time being out of my mind, and it was

only afterward recalled by my staff officers on my return to camp. On the third of July, 1863, the last day of the battle of Gettysburg, and immediately after the final repulse of the rebels, I urged General Meade to advance his whole army and attack them; but he refused to do so quite angrily, and his remarks showed he did not or would not understand the events that were occurring around him. He directed me to send the cavalry and ascertain if the enemy were retreating, which was done at once, but as the cavalry was at some distance from the army, it was not until eight o'clock the next morning that the first report of the cavalry on the Cashtown road was received, showing the enemy were twenty-two miles off, and getting away as fast as they could. The cavalry was continued in pursuit, but the remainder of the army did not leave Gettysburg for several days after the rebels had left, and were then moved in such a leisurely manner as to show no great anxiety by the commander to overtake the rebels. Very unexpectedly, to the army and to the rebels, the heavy rains caused the Potomac to rise so rapidly that Lee could not cross, and he was again brought face to face with the Army of the Potomac at Falling Water. Every military reason demanded that the rebels should be immediately attacked; for after the three days heavy fighting at Gettysburg, it was a moderate conclusion to arrive at, that the rebels were short of ammunition and could not sustain a protracted fight. General Lee admitted this afterward in his official report, and expected to be attacked; when he says, "our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition," and again, "the enemy in force reached our front on the twelfth. A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Water, and an attack was awaited during that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines." The army of the Potomac having had all its wants supplied since the battle of Gettysburg, and with the prestige of that battle, was eager for the fight, and was in good condition for it. Here General Meade again refused to attack, and waited a whole day until the rebels had succeeded in crossing the river, and had again escaped.

The army thus lost the fruits of all its arduous toils, struggles and triumphs, and the country had entailed upon it a prolonged war for two years more, with its innumerable sacrifices of blood and treasure.

In reviewing the battle and campaign of Gettysburg, when we notice that General Meade was absent from the field on the first days' fight, that he was occupied with the idea of retreating on the second day; and that after his indomitable army had repulsed and badly beaten the rebel army on the third day, he refused to allow them to complete their victory; and still later, when fortune again unexpectedly thrust the

rebels into his power at Falling Water, he doggedly refused to fight, but waited until they could escape; we are forced to the conclusion, that General Meade was unable to fight the Army of the Potomac as it should have been fought, nor could he avail himself of the advantages which the valor of his troops at times gave him, and that the honors of that campaign are not due to any generalship that he displayed; but to the heroic bravery, patriotism and perseverance of the army.

THE RETREAT FROM CULPEPPER.

General Meade had occupied Culpepper with his army about the middle of September, 1863, General Lee's army being south of the Rapidan.

The army had been at Culpepper about a month, when General Meade decided to make an offensive demonstration against Lee; for which purpose Buford's division of cavalry was ordered to cross the Rapidan at Germania ford, and then uncover Raccoon ford, where Newton's corps was to assist him.

After Buford had started, and was too far off to be recalled, General Lee put his army in motion toward our right, which so alarmed General Meade that he made his preparations to retreat from Culpepper; and so precipitate were his movements that Buford's division was very near being cut off, while the army was hastily marched to the rear. General Lee, finding he could move General Meade so easily, urged him back as far as Centreville, and when the latter took up a position near that place, Lee contented himself with destroying the railroad we had left behind, and retired on Culpepper.

CAMPAIGN OF MINE RUN.

The President having ordered General Meade to advance and attack General Lee, Culpepper was again occupied, early in November, 1863, when, shortly after, General Meade projected the campaign of Mine Run, the plan of which was based on the supposition that there was a good road from a mill several miles above Germania ford, to Robertson's tavern, on the Orange Court-house road or turnpike, when the fact was there was no road at all, and the country was extremely difficult to pass through. I knew the country well, and I told General Meade there was no road at that place, and to attempt to march troops through it would jeopardize the campaign; but my report did not appear to make any impression on him. On the evening before the army moved, a gentleman by the name of Smith, who had resided in that neighborhood, and was a loyal man, was in our employ, and who knew the country thoroughly, came to me and said he had heard General Meade intended passing a portion of his army by that mill above the Germania ford; and that if he did so he would get his army into trouble, as there was no road at that point. I persuaded Mr. Smith to go and see General Meade, and tell him what he knew of the country; and Mr. Smith afterward told me that he had done

so, but that the General had not paid much attention to him. Two corps—French's and Sedgwick's—were put in where General Meade imagined there was a road, and they floundered about in the woods and ravines for a day and a half, the rest of the army waiting for them; and when they did join us, and we came up to the rebels, General Meade changed his mind, again refused to attack, and marched the army back to Culpepper.

Shortly after this campaign I was ordered to the Department of the Missouri, and my connection with the Army of the Potomac ceased.

CAMPAIGN OF PRICE IN MISSOURI.

The rebel General Price, with twenty-five thousand men and eighteen pieces of artillery, invaded the State of Missouri, from Arkansas, in October, 1864. He attacked the field-work near Pilot Knob, in the south-eastern part of the State and, although he was repulsed, the garrison abandoned the work and fled to Rolla, some sixty miles to the south-west, where two brigades of cavalry were stationed. Price then moved up toward Franklin, and threatened Saint Louis. General A. J. Smith's command was thrown out to Franklin to cover that place, when Price turned off to Jefferson City, destroying the railroads as he went along; and, on arriving at Jefferson City, he besieged it for several days, the garrison having some six thousand troops, with ten or twelve guns, under four volunteer brigadier-generals.

On the sixth of October, 1864, General Rosecrans, commanding the Department of the Missouri, fearing Jefferson City would be lost, ordered me to proceed to that place, and take command of all the forces in that vicinity. I arrived in time to see Price move off, and immediately organized a cavalry force of about four thousand men, with a battery, which was sent in pursuit, and which did good service in compelling Price to keep his command together, and so save the country from being badly pillaged. All other troops that could possibly take the field were prepared to do so, and by the sixteenth of October a cavalry force of seven thousand men and eight pieces of artillery, including the force that was sent in pursuit of Price, was organized and on the march. I assumed the command of this force, and by forced marches came to Lexington on the twentieth, out of which place Price had driven General Curtis' troops, under General Blunt, that morning. I pushed on the next day to the Little Blue, engaged Price's troops, captured two pieces of cannon, and drove them back to the Big Blue, through Independence.

While this was going on, General Price with part of his force attacked Major-General Curtis, who had a force of twenty thousand men and thirty-two pieces of artillery, and drove him to Westport, in Kansas, Curtis losing one of his guns.

On the twenty-third of October I attacked

Price in position on the Big Blue, drove him from his position toward the south, and took a number of prisoners. Price then moved rapidly in retreat.

At this time Major-General S. R. Curtis, commanding Department of Kansas, joined me, and proposed, as my command had done so much hard fighting, that he should take the advance. To this I assented, when Curtis, after marching for a day in front, on finding Price had halted on the Osage river, in position to give battle, requested me to take the advance and attack Price. I, therefore, moved immediately with my command to the front, and continued my march all night of the twenty-fourth of October, and at daylight on the morning of the twenty-fifth, I surprised Price in his camp, and drove him from it, and by a series of heavy engagements throughout the day, captured eight pieces of artillery, several standards, one major-general, one brigadier-general, four colonels, and many subordinate officers, and fifteen hundred men, besides a large number of wagons, beef-cattle, sheep, &c., Price's force becoming demoralized and retreating rapidly, throwing away their arms and other property that encumbered them.

I regret to add that Major-General Curtis gave me no support whatever this day, but, to the benefit of the rebels, his troops were back, and did not participate in any of the engagements; otherwise I should have captured Price's whole force. After the fighting was over, General Curtis moved his forces up, and, with the most exemplary modesty, laid claim to the prisoners, guns, &c., that had been captured, but which I could not recognize, since he had waived his right to command at the time it was necessary to take them from the enemy.

On arriving at Fort Scott, Kansas, such of my troops whose horses were able, pursued Price, to the borders of the State, and in an engagement near Newtonia, under General Sanborn, Price was again routed and a number of prisoners were taken, which ended the campaign in Missouri.

The object of General Price, in his invasion of Missouri, as shown by intercepted despatches and his speeches at Booneville and elsewhere, was, in concert with disloyal parties in the North, to hold the States of Missouri and Kansas during the time of the Presidential election, to prevent an election, and by other action embarrass the Government of the United States.

It was this design that demanded such hard marching and extraordinary energy on the part of the small force at my command, to defeat intentions so sinister and disastrous to the country; and the efforts put forth were so successful, that the State of Missouri recognized their glorious consequences by giving at the Presidential election a vote of forty thousand majority in favor of the government. This was not the only important result of the campaign to the national cause, for the defeat and discomfiture of Price also released from service in

Missouri a large force of our troops, that were sent immediately to General Thomas at Nashville, and they arrived in time to assist in the battles before that place, against General Hood, and it is not too much to assert that this addition General Thomas received to his forces in General A. J. Smith's corps, rendered him victorious in one of the crowning achievements of the war.

The mistake of this campaign consisted in not attacking Price on his entry into the State, or as soon after as possible. The same troops were able to defeat Price in the east that afterward did so on the borders of Kansas.

All of which is respectfully submitted to your honorable Committee.

A. PLEASANTON,
Major-General.

Doc. 46.

THE BATTLE OF BELMONT, MO.

GENERAL GRANT'S OFFICIAL REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES,
WASHINGTON, June 26, 1865. }

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a full and complete return of the battle of Belmont, Missouri, fought November seventh, 1861, which I would respectfully ask to have substituted, in the place of my report of that action of date of November nineteenth, 1861, made to General S. Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General to the General-in-Chief.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Hon. E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

JUNE 27, 1865.

Referred to the Adjutant-General for publication, with the accompanying report.

E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTH-EAST MISSOURI,
CAIRO, ILL., November 17, 1861. }

GENERAL: The following order was received from Headquarters Western Department:

St. Louis, November 1, 1861.

General Grant, Commanding at Cairo:

You are hereby directed to hold your whole command ready to march at an hour's notice, until further orders, and you will take particular care to be amply supplied with transportation and ammunition. You are also directed to make demonstrations with your troops along both sides of the river toward Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville, and to keep your columns constantly moving back and forward against these places, without, however, attacking the enemy.

Very respectfully, &c.,

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

At the same time I was notified that similar instructions had been sent to Brigadier-General C. F. Smith, commanding Paducah, Kentucky, and was directed to communicate with him freely as to my movements, that his might be cooperative.

On the second of the same month, and before it was possible for any considerable preparation to have been made for the execution of this order, the following telegraphic despatch was received:

St. Louis, November 2, 1861.

To Brigadier-General Grant:

Jeff. Thompson is at Indian ford of the St. Francis river, twenty-five miles below Greenville, with about three thousand men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from Pilot Knob. Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas.

By order of Major-General Fremont.

CHAUNCEY MCKEEVER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

The force I determined to send from Bird's Point were immediately designated, and Colonel R. J. Oglesby, Eighth Illinois volunteers, assigned to the command, under the following detailed instructions:

HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT SOUTH-EAST MISSOURI,
CAIRO, November 3, 1861. }

Colonel R. J. Oglesby, commanding, &c., Bird's Point, Mo.:

You will take command of an expedition consisting of your regiment, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three companies of cavalry from Bird's Point (to be selected and notified by yourself), and a section of Schwartz's battery artillery, and proceed by steamboats to Commerce, Missouri. From Commerce you will strike for Sikeston, Mr. Cropper acting as guide. From there you will go in pursuit of a rebel force, understood to be three thousand strong, under Jeff. Thompson, now at Indian ford, on the St. Francis river.

An expedition has already left Ironton, Missouri, to attack this force. Should they learn that they have left that place it will not be necessary for you to go there, but pursue the enemy in any direction he may go, always being cautious not to fall in with an unlooked-for foe too strong for the command under you.

The object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion, believing it better not to trammel you with instructions.

Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' rations and four or five days' forage. All you may require outside of this must be furnished by the country through which you pass. In taking supplies you will be careful to select a proper officer to press them, and require a receipt to be given, and the articles pressed

accounted for in the same manner as if purchased.

You are particularly enjoined to allow no foraging by your men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make open enemies where they would not otherwise exist.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

Colonel J. B. Plummer, Eleventh Missouri volunteers, commanding Cape Girardeau, was directed to send one regiment in the direction of Bloomfield, with a view of attracting the attention of the enemy.

The forces under Colonel Oglesby were all got off on the evening of the third.

On the fifth, a telegram was received from headquarters, St. Louis, stating that the enemy was reinforcing Price's army from Columbus by way of White river, and directing that the demonstration that had been ordered against Columbus be immediately made. Orders were accordingly at once given to the troops under my command that remained at Cairo, Bird's Point, and Fort Holt. A letter was also sent to Brigadier-General C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, requesting him to make a demonstration at the same time against Columbus.

To more effectually attain the object of the demonstration against the enemy at Belmont and Columbus, I determined on the morning of the fifth to temporarily change the direction of Colonel Oglesby's column toward New Madrid, and also to send a small force under Colonel W. H. L. Wallace, Eleventh Illinois volunteers, to Charleston, Missouri, to ultimately join Colonel Oglesby. In accordance with this determination, I addressed Colonel Oglesby the following communication :

Cairo, November 4, 1861.

Colonel R. J. Oglesby, commanding expedition :

On receipt of this turn your column toward New Madrid. When you arrive at the nearest point to Columbus from which there is a road to that place, communicate with me at Belmont.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

Which was sent to Colonel Wallace with the following letter :

Cairo, November 4, 1861.

Colonel W. H. Wallace, Bird's Point, Mo. :

Herewith I send you an order to Colonel Oglesby to change the direction of his column toward New Madrid, halting to communicate with me at Belmont from the nearest point on his road.

I desire you to get up the Charleston expedition ordered for to-morrow, to start to-night, taking two days' rations with them. You will accompany them to Charleston and get Colonel Oglesby's instructions to him by a messenger, if practicable, and when he is near enough you may join him. For this purpose you may substitute the remainder of your regiment in place

of an equal amount from Colonel Marsh's. The two days' rations carried by your men in haversacks will enable you to join Colonel Oglesby's command, and there you will find rations enough for several days more, should they be necessary. You may take a limited number of tents, and at Charleston press wagons to carry them to the main column. There you will find sufficient transportation to release the pressed wagons.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

On the evening of the sixth I left this place in steamers, with McClernand's brigade, consisting of : Twenty-seventh regiment Illinois volunteers, Colonel N. B. Buford ; Thirtieth regiment Illinois volunteers, Colonel Phillip B. Fouke ; Thirty-first regiment Illinois volunteers, Colonel John A. Logan ; Dollins' company independent Illinois cavalry, Captain J. J. Dollins ; Delano's company Adams county (Illinois) cavalry, Lieutenant J. R. Cattlin ; Dougherty's brigade, consisting of : Twenty-second regiment Illinois volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel H. E. Hart ; Seventh regiment Iowa volunteers, Colonel J. G. Lanman ; amounting to three thousand one hundred and fourteen men of all arms, to make the demonstration against Columbus. I proceeded down the river to a point nine miles below here, where we lay until next morning, on the Kentucky shore, which served to distract the enemy, and lead him to suppose that he was to be attacked in his strongly-fortified position at Columbus.

About two o'clock on the morning of the seventh I received information from Colonel W. H. L. Wallace at Charleston (sent by a messenger on steamer W. H. B.) that he had learned from a reliable Union man that the enemy had been crossing troops from Columbus to Belmont the day before, for the purpose of following after, and cutting off the forces under Colonel Oglesby. Such a move on his part seemed to me more than probable, and gave at once a two-fold importance to my demonstration against the enemy, namely, the prevention of reinforcements to General Price, and the cutting off of the two small columns that I had sent, in pursuance of directions, from this place and Cape Girardeau in pursuit of Jeff. Thompson. This information determined me to attack vigorously his forces at Belmont, knowing that, should we be repulsed, we could re-embark without difficulty under protection of the gunboats. The following order was given :

ON BOARD STEAMER BELLE MEURIS,
November 2, 1861, 2 o'clock A. M. }

Special Order.

The troops composing the present expedition from this place, will move promptly at six o'clock this morning. The gunboats will take the advance and be followed by the first brigade, under command of Brigadier-General John A. McClernand, composed of all the troops from Cairo and Fort Holt. The second brigade, com-

prising the remainder of the troops of the expedition, commanded by Colonel John Dougherty, will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest point on the Missouri shore, where a landing can be effected in security from the rebel batteries. The point of debarkation will be designated by Captain Walke, commanding naval forces.

By order of

Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Promptly at the hour designated, we proceeded down the river to a point just out of the range of the rebel batteries at Columbus, and debarked on the Missouri shore. From here the troops were marched, with skirmishers well in advance, by flank, about one mile toward Belmont, and there formed in line of battle. One battalion had been left as a reserve near the transports. Two companies from each regiment were thrown forward as skirmishers, to ascertain the position of the enemy, and about nine o'clock met and engaged him. The balance of my force, with the exception of the reserve, was promptly thrown forward, and drove the enemy foot by foot, and from tree to tree, back to his encampment on the river bank, a distance of over two miles. Here he had strengthened his position by felling the timber for several hundred yards around his camp, making a sort of abattis. Our men charged through this, driving the enemy under cover of the bank, and many of them into their transports in quick time, leaving us in possession of everything not exceedingly portable.

Belmont is situated on low ground, and every foot is commanded by the guns on the opposite shore, and of course could not be held for a single hour after the enemy became aware of the withdrawal of his troops. Having no wagons with me, I could move but little of the captured property, consequently gave orders for the destruction of everything that could not be moved, and an immediate return to our transports. Tents, blankets, &c., were set on fire and destroyed, and our return march commenced, taking his artillery and a large number of captured horses with us. Three pieces of artillery being drawn by hand, and one by an inefficient team, were spiked and left on the road; two were brought to this place.

We had but fairly got under way, when the enemy, having received reinforcements rallied under cover of the river bank, and the woods on the point of land in the bend of the river above us, and made his appearance between us and our transports, evidently with a design of cutting off our return to them.

Our troops were not in the least discouraged, but charged the enemy and again defeated him. We then, with the exception of the Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel N. B. Buford commanding, reached our transports and embarked with-

out further molestation. While waiting for the arrival of this regiment, and to get some of our wounded from a field hospital near-by, the enemy, having crossed fresh troops from Columbus, again made his appearance on the river bank, and commenced firing upon our transports. The fire was returned by our men from the decks of the steamers, and also from the gunboats, with terrible effect, compelling him to retire in the direction of Belmont. In the meantime, Colonel Buford, although he had received orders to return with the main force, took the Charleston road from Belmont and came in on the road leading to Bird's Point, where he had formed a line of battle in the morning. At this point, to avoid the effects of the shells from the gunboats that were beginning to fall among his men, he took a blind path direct to the river, and followed a wood road up its bank, and thereby avoided meeting the enemy, who were retiring by the main road. On his appearance on the river bank, a steamer was dropped down and took his command on board, without his having participated or lost a man in the enemy's attempt to cut us off from our transports.

Notwithstanding the crowded state of our transports, the only loss we sustained from the enemy's fire upon them was three men wounded, one of whom belonged to one of the boats.

Our loss in killed on the field was eighty-five, three hundred and one wounded (many of them, however, slightly), and ninety-nine missing. Of the wounded, one hundred and twenty-five fell into the hands of the enemy. Nearly all the missing were from the Seventh Iowa regiment, which suffered more severely than any other. All the troops behaved with great gallantry, which was in a great degree attributable to the coolness and presence of mind of their officers, particularly the Colonels commanding.

General McClernand was in the midst of danger throughout the engagement, and displayed both coolness and judgment. His horse was three times shot under him.

Colonel Dougherty, Twenty-second Illinois volunteers, commanding the second brigade, by his coolness and bravery, entitles himself to be named among the most competent of officers for command of troops in battle. In our second engagement he was three times wounded, and fell a prisoner into the hands of the enemy.

Among the killed was Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wentz, Seventh Iowa volunteers, and among the wounded were Colonel J. G. Lauman, and Major E. W. Rice, of the Seventh Iowa.

The reports of sub-commanders will detail more fully particulars of the engagement, and the conduct of both officers and men.

To my staff, Captain John A. Rawlins, Assistant Adjutant-General; Lieutenants C. B. Lagow and William S. Hillyer, Aides-de-Camp; and Captain R. B. Hatch, Assistant Quartermaster, I am much indebted for the promptitude with which they discharged their several duties.

Surgeon J. H. Brinton, United States volunteers, chief medical officer, was on the field during the entire engagement, and displayed great ability and efficiency in providing for the wounded, and in organizing the medical corps.

Major J. D. Webster, Acting Chief-Engineer, also accompanied me on the field, and displayed soldierly qualities of a high order.

My own horse was shot under me during the engagement.

The gunboats Tyler, Captain Walke, and Lexington, Captain Stembolt, convoyed the expedition, and rendered most efficient service. Immediately upon our landing they engaged the enemy's batteries on the heights above Columbus, and protected our transports throughout. For a detailed account of the part taken by them, I refer with pleasure to the accompanying report of Captain H. S. Walke, senior officer.

In pursuance of my request, General Smith, commanding at Paducah, sent, on the seventh instant, a force to Mayfield, Kentucky, and another in the direction of Columbus, with orders not to approach nearer, however, than twelve or fifteen miles of that place. I also sent a small force on the Kentucky side toward Columbus, under Colonel John Cook, Seventh Illinois volunteers, with orders not to go beyond Elliott's Mills, distant some twelve miles from Columbus. These forces having marched to the points designated in their orders, returned, without having met any serious resistance.

On the evening of the seventh, information of the result of the engagement at Belmont was sent to Colonel Oglesby, commanding expedition against Jeff. Thompson, and orders to return to Bird's Point by way of Charleston, Missouri. Before these reached him, however, he had learned that Jeff. Thompson had left the place where he was reported to be when the expedition started (he having gone toward New Madrid or Arkansas), and had determined to return. The same information was sent to the commanding officer at Cape Girardeau, with directions for the troops to be brought back that had gone out from the place.

From all the information I have been able to obtain since the engagement, the enemy's loss in killed and wounded was much greater than ours. We captured one hundred and seventy-five prisoners, all his artillery and transportation, and destroyed his entire camp and garrison equipage. Independent of the injuries inflicted upon him, and the prevention of his reinforcing Price, or sending a force to cut off the expedition against Jeff. Thompson, the confidence inspired in our troops in the engagement will be of incalculable benefit to us in the future.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General SETH WILLIAMS,
Assistant Adjutant-General,
Washington, D. C.

Doc. 47.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH-WEST.

REPORT OF GENERAL POPE.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE NORTH-WEST,
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN, November 2, 1864.

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of operations in this department during the past year:

The two great Indian nations which occupy this military department are the Chippewas, who inhabit the region between Lake Superior and Rainy Lake river on the east, and the Red River of the North on the west, and the powerful Sioux or Dakota nation which, divided into several strong and warlike tribes, claims and roams over the vast region from the western frontier of Minnesota on the east, to the Rocky Mountains on the west, and from the frontier of Iowa and the line of the Platte river on the south to the British possessions on the north. There are some small fragments of tribes on the Upper Missouri who belong to neither nation, but they are few in number, insignificant in strength or influence, and have always been at peace with the whites.

With the Chippewas there have been no difficulties which have led to hostilities, although there have been and continue to be, the constant misunderstanding, dissatisfaction and controversy, which naturally arise under our defective Indian system, between the Indians on the one side, and Indian agents and traders on the other. So far, these difficulties have not culminated in actual hostilities, but unless the Indian system be remodelled they are likely to do so at any moment. The war up to this time has been entirely confined to the Sioux nation.

It will be remembered that the campaign of last year terminated, so far as field operations were concerned, with the defeat of the Sioux by General Sully, near the James river, on the third September, 1863.

The high latitude of the theatre of war in this department, the immense region of uninhabited country covered by military operations, and the vast distances from the frontier to be traversed before the enemy can be reached, of necessity very much shorten the season during which it is possible to carry on actual field operations.

After reaching the Indian country not more than three months are left in which it is practicable to keep troops in the field.

The operations of last year ended with such defeats of the Indians occupying the vast regions east of the Missouri river as forced them for a time to take refuge in the British possessions, and relieved the entire frontier settlements of Minnesota, Iowa, and Dakota from any danger of Indian hostilities. During last winter, however, the whole Dakota nation from the Rocky mountains to the Minnesota frontier, and from the Platte river and the Iowa line to the

British possessions on the north, succeeded in combining their various and scattered tribes for a final effort against the whites, and by the opening of spring had slowly concentrated their whole force on and near the Upper Missouri, to resist the navigation of the Missouri river, prevent the passage of emigrants across the great plains, and to deliver, with their combined forces, a final battle against the United States troops under General Sully.

This Indian force was then estimated by competent authorities, and so reported by me to the War Department early in the spring, at about six thousand warriors, and this estimate was subsequently confirmed by General Sully, after his battles with them near the Little Missouri.

It was also reported at the time, and has been confirmed since by undoubted testimony, that ammunition and other necessary supplies were brought to the Indian camps during the winter by half-breeds and traders from the British settlements on the Red River of the North. It is hardly necessary for me to repeat what I have so often reported, that Indian hostilities in this department have been fomented and encouraged and the Indians supplied with the means to continue the war by the half-breeds, and other British subjects of the Selkirk settlements.

As I was satisfied that this combination of the whole of the numerous and widely-dispersed tribes of the Sioux (or Dakota) nation, who occupy the vast region north of the Platte, and the northern boundaries of Iowa, from the Rocky mountains to the vicinity of the Great Lakes, would be the final effort of the great Indian nation to continue hostilities against the whites, and as I felt sure that if once their entire force of warriors could be met and defeated this Indian war in the North-west on any considerable scale would be closed, preparations for an active campaign during the summer of 1864 were made during the close of last winter.

The plan of operations consisted in putting into the field under the command of Brigadier-General A. Sully, an active column of about two thousand five hundred men, entirely cavalry, to advance against the Indians wherever they could be found and deliver battle with them, and at the same time to follow up the movement of this force with detachments of infantry large enough to establish strong posts in the Indian country.

These posts were so located as to cover the frontier of Iowa and Minnesota and the frontier settlements of Dakota territory, at a long distance; to interpose between the different tribes so as to prevent concerted action; to command the hunting grounds of the Indians so that they would be constantly under the supervision and in the power of the military forces, which by concerted action could easily and promptly march a heavy force of cavalry upon any portion of the region in which the Indians are obliged to hunt for subsistence;

to command the Indian trails toward the frontier settlements, so as to detect the passage even of the smallest parties attempting to make raids upon the settlers, and to follow them up; and, so far as military necessities would allow, to protect an emigrant route from the Upper Mississippi river to the territories of Idaho and Montana. The details of this plan of operations were submitted to you and approved in February last, and immediate preparations made to carry them into execution.

General Sully collected the forces under his command from the various posts and stations in his district early in the spring, and commenced to move up the Missouri river, leaving only such detachments as were necessary to cover the frontier from small Indian raids during his absence. He was reinforced by about one thousand five hundred mounted men from Minnesota, leaving General Sibley with about seven hundred effective men to protect the frontier settlements of Minnesota during the summer. The mouth of Burdache creek, on the Upper Missouri, was selected as the point where the Minnesota troops should join the forces of General Sully moving up the Missouri, and the junction of these forces was made on the thirtieth of June. The spring rise in the Missouri river did not come down until very late in the season, and Sully only reached the mouth of Canon Ball river, at which point he was to establish a strong post, which was to be his depot of supplies, on the seventh of July. He established Fort Rice at that point, distant from Sioux City four hundred and fifty miles, and garrisoned it with five companies of the Thirtieth Wisconsin volunteers. The Indians, who had been concentrated on and near the Missouri river, about fifty miles above this post, had meantime crossed to the south-west side of the river and occupied a strong position in a very difficult country near the Little Missouri river, due west, and about two hundred miles from Fort Rice.

On the twenty-sixth of July, General Sully marched upon these Indians with the following forces: Eighth Minnesota volunteers (mounted) and six companies of Second Minnesota cavalry, with four light guns, under command of Colonel M. T. Thomas, Eighth Minnesota volunteers; eleven companies Sixth Iowa cavalry, three companies Seventh Iowa cavalry, two companies Dakota cavalry, four companies Brackett's battalion cavalry, one small company of scouts, and four mountain howitzers, all under command of ———, numbering in all two thousand two hundred men. A small emigrant train for Idaho, which had accompanied the Minnesota troops from that State, followed the movement of Sully's force. At the head of Heart river he corralled his trains, and leaving a sufficient guard with them, he marched rapidly to the north-west, to the point where the combined forces of the Indians were assembled. On the morning of July twenty-eighth, he came upon them—between five and six thousand war-

riors—strongly posted in a wooded country, very much cut up with high, rugged hills and deep, impassable ravines. He had an hour's talk with some of the Indian chiefs, who were very defiant and impudent, after which he moved rapidly forward against their strong position.

The action for a time was sharp and severe, but the artillery and long-range small-arms of the troops were very destructive, and the Indians began to give way on all sides. They were so closely pressed by Sully's forces that they abandoned their extensive camps, leaving all their robes, lodges, colts and utensils of every description, and all the winter supply of provisions which they had been so long collecting. The action resulted in a running fight of nine miles, the Indians finally scattering completely, and escaping with nothing but their wounded, which, according to Indian custom, they carried off, as also as many of their killed as they could. One hundred and twenty-five dead warriors were left on the field. I have transmitted heretofore the reports of General Sully and of the various commanders of his force, as also a statement of the immense quantity of Indian goods and supplies destroyed by General Sully in the captured camp of the Indians.

Finding the country nearly impracticable, having only a small supply of provisions or means to carry them, and ascertaining that the retreat of the mass of the Indians was toward the south-west, Sully returned to his train at the head of Heart river, and resumed his march westward, through an unknown and unexplored region, toward the Yellowstone, which he expected to reach near Fort Alexander, at which point it had been proposed to establish a military post.

On the fifth of August he came in sight of the Bad Lands, which border the Little Missouri on both sides. The country was exceedingly rugged and difficult, and so cut up with deep, perpendicular ravines, that it was with the utmost labor and loss of time that a narrow, winding way between the ravines, in places barely ten feet wide, was found for his wagons. I cannot convey a better idea of the country than is contained in the following extract from Sully's report, which will be full of interest to the scientific world:

"I have not sufficient power of language to describe the country in front of us. It was grand, dismal, and majestic. You can imagine a basin, six hundred feet deep and twenty-five miles in width, filled with a number of cones and oven-shaped knolls of all sizes, from twenty-five to several hundred feet high, sometimes by themselves, sometimes piled up into large heaps on top of each other, in all conceivable shapes and confusion. Most of these hills were of a gray clay, but many of a light brick color—of burnt clay—little or no vegetation. Some of the sides of the hills, however, were covered with a few scrub cedars. Viewed in

the distance at sunset, it looked exactly like the ruins of an ancient city. I regret very much that some gentleman well acquainted with geology and mineralogy did not accompany the expedition, for we marched through a most wonderful and interesting country. It was covered with pieces of petrified wood, and on the tops of some of the hills we found petrified stumps of trees, the remains of a great forest. In some cases these trees were sixteen to eighteen feet in diameter. Large quantities of iron ore, lava, and impressions of leaves in the rocks, of a size and shape not known to any of us."

In this difficult and almost impassable region, a portion of the Indians whom Sully had defeated on the twenty-eighth of July attempted to offer resistance, but were badly defeated, leaving over one hundred dead on the field.


After this hopeless effort, in which General Sully reports that they exhibited none of the spirit and audacity which characterized the fight on the 28th of July, the Indians scattered, and broke up their combination entirely. The Tetons, separated into small fragments, fled toward the south-west; the Yancktonnais, with other confederated tribes from the north and east sides of the Missouri, crossed the Missouri river, and retreated rapidly into the British possessions by way of Mouse river. General Sully followed them nearly to the British line.

Finding the country west of Fort Rice, in the direction of the Yellowstone, impracticable for wagon roads, Sully decided not to establish a post so high up on that river, but placed a garrison at mouth of Yellowstone and another at the trading post of Fort Berthold, lower down on the Missouri river. These posts, in connection with Fort Rice, will keep open the Missouri river, render travel along the valley secure, and separate the Indian tribes so that another concentration will be impracticable even should the Indians seek it.

Sully returned slowly by way of the Missouri river valley to Fort Rice. After leaving that post well garrisoned and in good condition, and sending the Thirtieth Wisconsin volunteers to the Mississippi, to go south to Sherman's army, Sully came slowly down to Sioux City, where his last despatches are dated.

To Fort Randall, and also to Fort Pierre, chiefs of the combined Sioux tribes which he had defeated, came in and asked for peace, acknowledging that they could not fight against the whites, that they had lost everything, robes, lodges, provisions, &c., and would be in a starving condition. They were informed by the commanding officers of those posts that the only conditions of peace required from them were that they would behave themselves and not molest the whites. The Indians were both surprised and gratified that peace on such easy terms was to be had, and immediately returned to their tribes to bring in the principal chiefs to meet General Sully at Fort Randall. It is expected that peace with all the tribes west of the







NAVY AND MARINE CORPS

RAY TAYLOR

REAR ADMIRAL JOHN A. DAHLGREN, U.S.N.

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Missouri river, on terms entirely satisfactory to the Government, will be made this winter; a peace which involves neither presents nor annuities of any description, but a peace simply based upon good behavior.

With the Yancktonnais and other Sioux tribes north and east of the Missouri there will be somewhat longer delay in coming to satisfactory terms. About half these Indians desire to make peace at once, but there are many who wish to keep up the war.

These last are encouraged in their purpose by half-breeds and other British subjects, and as they have a safe refuge in the British possessions, and are there supplied with means to carry on hostilities, it will probably require the hardships and privations of a winter in those arctic regions to bring them to their senses. They took refuge there after the late battles in a perfectly destitute condition, and are already beginning to rob and plunder, and in places, to commit murder in the English settlements. They will soon become as odious and dangerous to the British settlements as they have been to our own. By spring most likely everything will be satisfactorily settled.

As matters stand, and are likely to stand this winter, however, with these Indians, there is no manner of danger to the frontier settlements of Minnesota or Dakota. The Indians are driven far away, and a cold, barren and bleak prairie region, many hundreds of miles in extent, and impassable in winter, interposes between them and the frontier settlements.

In Minnesota there have been no active operations, there being no hostile Indians, except a few straggling thieves, east of the Missouri river. With the small force under his command judiciously posted, General Sibley has kept everything quiet on the Minnesota border, nor is there ever again the likelihood of any Indian hostilities from Sioux on the Minnesota frontier, beyond such small thieving raids as are incident to the situation, and must always occur so long as there are Indians on our western borders. With these, should they occur, a small force will be able to deal conclusively.

For details, of which the foregoing report is a brief summary, I have the honor to refer you to the reports of Generals Sully and Sibley herewith and heretofore transmitted.

In some manner the British Government should either prevent hostile Indians who reside within the boundaries of the United States from seeking refuge in British territory, or should secure the United States against the raids of such Indians, or should permit the United States forces to pursue into British territory all Indians who belong south of the line, and who are at war with citizens of the United States. One of these three demands is certainly reasonable, and will effect the desired purpose. In the same connection it will be necessary to prohibit half-breeds and other British subjects from coming into the territory of the United States to trade with Indians, whether hostile to us or not, who

live south of the British line. The hostile Sioux have for the past two years been supplied with ammunition, provisions, &c., to carry on hostilities against the United States by British subjects, both in their own territory and in ours. A state of hostility between the Sioux and citizens of the United States, of course, throws all the trade with such Indians into the hands of British traders. Hence the anxiety of these traders to prevent peace with the Sioux Indians.

I have the honor again to ask attention to my letter of February 6, 1864, to the Secretary of War, on the subject of our Indian system, and to beg, in view of the interests of the Government as well as of humanity, that such legislative or executive action be recommended as will, as far as practicable, correct the evils therein set forth. I transmit enclosed a copy of that letter and a copy of trade regulations with Indians, which I have heretofore forwarded, and which I deem necessary to protect Indians and white men alike against Indian traders.

It is my purpose, by forcing all traders with Indians to locate their trading posts in the immediate vicinity of the military posts, and *nowhere else*, to make these military posts the nuclei of extensive Indian camps, and as far as possible to induce the Indians to make their permanent homes so near to the posts that they will constantly be under the supervision and control of the garrisons.

If there be no other places to trade except the military posts, the Indian will necessarily resort to them, and will there remain, except when he is engaged in hunting during the summer season.

If fair dealing with Indians can be enforced, there never will be danger of any Indian wars. The object of these trade regulations is to secure these two results; but unless they are adopted and enforced by military authority, we cannot hope for any permanent peace with the Indian tribes. The regulations themselves are so full, and their object so manifest, that it is unnecessary to go further into detail concerning them.

The only other white men I would permit to have intercourse with the Indians are the missionaries. I trust that some arrangements will be made with the authorities of our home missionary societies to furnish to each military post good practical men, with their families, whose business shall be to teach the Indians the useful arts of life; the Indian men to cultivate the soil, the Indian women to sew and to do such other work as they are fitted for, and *all* to keep themselves clean and decent. These are the first lessons to be taught to Indians.

Religious instruction will come afterward in its natural order. The failure of our missionaries among Indians is due, I think, mainly to the fact that they have reversed the proper order of instruction, and have attempted to make the Indian a member of the church while he was still a wild savage. Of course, if anything is to be gained by it, the Indian will profess his be-

lief in anything whatever, without the slightest knowledge or concern as to what it all means. What is needed to civilize and Christianize Indians are practical common-sense men, who will first teach them to be human and to acquire the arts of civilized life; who will educate, as far as can be done, the children of the Indians, and who will be content to look to the future, and not to the immediate present, for results. Such missionaries could be of incalculable benefit to the Indian and to the Government; and I would recommend that whenever such men are sent to the military posts on the frontier, the Government furnish them with quarters and with rations, at the rate of two small families for each one of the larger posts, and for one small family for each smaller post. I have no doubt that these small missions at each post, if conducted by practical and earnest men, would greatly add to the hope of permanent peace with the Indians, and contribute to a healthy and increasing improvement in the moral and physical condition of the Indian tribes.

The military commanders will be instructed to give every assistance and encouragement to such missionaries, and to enjoin upon the officers and soldiers under their command that they exhibit toward the missionaries every respect and kindness.

The peace which will be made with Indians, under the instructions I have given to Generals Sully and Sibley, is based simply upon the understanding that the Indians on the one hand behave themselves and do not molest the whites, and on the other hand that the whites shall be made to deal fairly with the Indians, and not molest them in any way. The military authorities undertake to enforce good conduct on both sides, and will have the power, if not interfered with, to do so thoroughly. As such a peace involves neither annuities nor presents, and holds out no prospect in violating it, except hostilities, it will probably be lasting. Hitherto it has been the practice to accompany every treaty of peace, made by Indian agents, with expensive presents of goods and supplies of various kinds, and the Indians naturally understand that these are given them as bribes to keep the peace, and because the whites are afraid of them; and, of course, they observe such treaties only as long as they find it convenient, or until they need a further supply of presents, (ammunition, goods, &c.) In fact, it has been for years a saying with the Sioux, along the great mail-route to California, that whenever they became poor and needed blankets and powder and lead, they had only to go down to this great mail and emigrant route, and kill a few white people, and there would be another treaty of peace, which would supply all their wants.

It is beyond question that such a system of treaty-making is, of all others, the most impolitic, whether negotiated with savage or civilized people, and leads, in either case, to constant and increasing hostilities.

I intend, in settling a peace with Indians in this department, to do away entirely with this system, which, aside from its effect in stimulating and encouraging breaches of treaties of peace, is always attended with fraud upon the Government and upon the Indians.

I shall send up, in the spring, some companies of cavalry to make a cantonment for the summer, at some point on the lake, and to remain there until the last possible moment in the autumn, with the view of drawing the various tribes of Indians to that point, and furnishing them with facilities of trade during the summer and autumn. Such a cantonment, kept up for two or three seasons, will have a most beneficial effect upon the Indians, as all whites, except authorized traders acting under the supervision of the military authorities, will be prohibited from going into that region.

It is proper to remark that extensive strata of excellent coal have been found at Fort Rice, one vein six feet thick. This coal-field extends toward the south-west, and it is supposed outcrops on the slopes of the Black Hills. How far north it extends is not yet known. The existence of this great coal-field, half-way between the Great Lakes and the Rocky Mountains, is a fact, the value of which cannot well be over-estimated. Aside from furnishing fuel for the navigation of the Upper Missouri river, it is a controlling element in the location of a railroad across the great plains to the Pacific.

Its extent and character will soon be developed by the troops from Fort Rice and other points on the Missouri river.

I may state finally, that the Government may safely dismiss all apprehensions of Indian wars in the North-west. Small Indian raids there doubtless will be, as there always have been, for stealing horses; but no hostilities, on any considerable scale, are likely again to occur. A small force, such as is designated in this report, will be quite sufficient to protect the frontier and the emigration.

I only ask, now, that the military authorities be left to themselves to deal with these Indians, and to regulate the trading with the Indian tribes without the interposition of Indian agents, and I will cheerfully guarantee peace with the Indian tribes in this department.

The department has been administered, so far as its relations with the State and other civil authorities are concerned, in accordance with the views and principles laid down in the accompanying letter from me to Governor Saloman, of Wisconsin. I am gratified to say that there have been entire harmony and success. The draft and all other laws of the United States have been promptly and fully executed in the department, without difficulty or trouble of any kind whatever.

I desire to bear testimony to the hearty co-operation and zeal of the district commanders in the department in the discharge of the various and perplexing duties which have devolved upon them.

General Sully, commanding District of Iowa and the Indian expedition; General Sibley, commanding District of Minnesota, and General T. C. H. Smith, commanding District of Wisconsin, are entitled to my warmest thanks for their valuable services and the cordial good feeling which they have manifested during their entire term of service in this department.

To General Sully I particularly desire to invite the favorable consideration of the War Department. His arduous and distinguished services in organizing and conducting the Indian expedition and beating and dispersing the combined tribes of Indians in two considerable battles, at such remote points and in so difficult a country, and in thus bringing the Indians to the necessity of asking peace from the Government, entitle him to peculiar consideration, and make it proper for me to renew the application heretofore transmitted for his promotion. He has earned it fairly, and I trust and believe that the Government will not hesitate to confer it upon him.

To the reports of Generals Sully and Sibley, and to those of their subordinate commanders, I refer for details of the various military operations herein sketched, and for a proper representation of the distinguished conduct of the several officers and of the troops under their command. I cheerfully endorse their recommendations in behalf of the officers and soldiers in question.

I am, General, respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,
Major-General Commanding.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

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OPERATIONS IN ARKANSAS.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL STEELE.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF ARKANSAS, &c., }
LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, August 15, 1864. }

Record of military operations in the Department of Arkansas for the month of July, 1864:

Fourth. A party of fifty-five men of the Third Arkansas cavalry volunteers from Lewisburg, under command of Captain Hamilton of that regiment, made a raid into Searcy, Arkansas, and killed seven rebels, wounded four, and captured one captain, two lieutenants, and fifty-three men, who were organized for General Shelby's command. They also captured twelve horses and mules, fifteen stand of arms, and one stand of colors.

Sixth. Lieutenant Mason, Third Arkansas cavalry, returned to Lewisburg from a scout to Norristown, having captured three deserters, and destroyed five flats and skiffs.

Tenth. A scouting party, consisting of one lieutenant and twenty men, of the Tenth Illinois cavalry volunteers, ran into a small party of

Confederates about twenty miles north of Little Rock, killing and wounding four, and taking one prisoner.

Eleventh. Lieutenant Treadway, Third Arkansas cavalry, returned to Lewisburg from scout to near Devil's Fork, having killed rebel Captain Christopher and one man.

Twelfth. Captain Gill, Third Arkansas cavalry volunteers, returned to Lewisburg, having had a fight with Captain Adams' company on the Arkansas river, near Petit Jean, in which he killed two and wounded several of the enemy.

Fourteenth. A battalion of the Fourth Arkansas cavalry returned from scout through Saline, Hot Springs, and Montgomery counties. Fought with small bands of the enemy daily until arriving at Farr's Mill. Captain Green, with twenty-five men of this battalion, engaged Crook's and Crawford's companies, numbering about a hundred men, drove them, and killed four and wounded six of the enemy, without a single accident happening to his men.

The battalion lost during the expedition one private killed, Captain Guinn and Lieutenant Spurr and six privates wounded, and three men missing.

Seventeenth. Lieutenant Williams, Third Arkansas cavalry, returned to Lewisburg from scout to Norristown, Dover, &c., having killed three bushwhackers and two horses on the Arkansas river, below Norristown.

Twenty-second. Captain Taylor, Third Arkansas cavalry, returned to Lewisburg from scout to Red river, having killed four of the enemy.

Major L. H. Thacher, Ninth Kansas cavalry, while on a scout fifteen miles north-west of Pine Bluff, surprised the camp of Captain Lightfoot, of Cabell's command, wounding one man, capturing two horses, three guns, and a large amount of provisions and medical stores, which he destroyed.

Twenty-fourth. Lieutenant Reynolds, Third Arkansas cavalry volunteers, returned to Lewisburg from scout eight miles beyond camp Myrick, having killed ten of Jackman's and Shelby's men, and bringing in three prisoners.

Twenty-fifth. A scouting party from the Third Missouri cavalry, under command of Captain Jug, proceeded to Benton, Arkansas, and charged into the town. Private George Lucas, company C Third Missouri cavalry, pursued and killed the rebel Brigadier-General George M. Holt, Arkansas militia, capturing his arms and horse.

Twenty-sixth. A reconnoitering party, consisting of three hundred and sixty men of the Fifty-sixth and Sixtieth United States colored infantry, one section of Lembke's colored battery, the whole under command of Colonel W. S. Brooks, Fifty-sixth United States colored infantry, moved from Helena, in the direction of Wallace's ferry, on Big Creek, with the view of ascertaining the designs and force of the enemy. At the same time one hundred and fifty men of the Fifteenth Illinois cavalry volunteers, under command of

Major Carmichael, dropped down the Mississippi river on board a steamer, and landing at a point below Old Town, marched in the direction of Sims' ferry, on Big creek, to cooperate with Colonel Brooks.

The infantry and artillery crossed Big creek at five A. M., on the twenty-sixth, and learned that the rebel General Dobbins was near there in force, having three regiments, estimated at fifteen hundred men. Colonel Brooks recrossed his command, Dobbins crossing lower down and before him, and attacked him in front and right flank with vigor. The infantry and artillery held their ground stubbornly for several hours, when Major Carmichael, hearing the cannonading, made a forced march, and charged through Dobbins' command just at the moment when he had brought up his reserves, and was about to make a final charge. Our forces immediately assumed the offensive, and marched in the direction of Helena, the enemy giving away before them, but following them up within nine miles of that place. Our loss was about fifty killed and wounded, including Colonel Brooks, Captain Lembke, Adjutant Pratt, and Surgeon Stoddard, of the Fifty-sixth colored, killed, and Lieutenant Crane severely wounded, one caisson and one limber were blown up, their horses having been killed. The enemy's loss is estimated, by officers who were in the action, at about one hundred and fifty men.

Twenty-seventh. A force of between fifteen hundred and two thousand rebels, under General Gano, attacked our outpost seven miles from Fort Smith, consisting of about two hundred men of the Sixth Kansas, under the command of Captain Mefford, moving up in two columns, the one driving in the pickets and the other flanking them.

Captain Mefford fought his men bravely, but was soon overpowered, and he and eighty-two of his men were taken prisoners. The enemy retired before reinforcements could be sent. Ten of our men were killed and fifteen wounded.

The enemy lost twelve killed and twenty wounded left on the field.

Major Galoway, of the First Arkansas cavalry, routed Major Pickles' and Buck Brown's forces, killing Major Pickles and a number of his men; and capturing thirty-five horses and mules. Captain Worthington, of the same regiment, subsequently attacked a portion of Brown's force, killing nine, and capturing fifteen horses and mules.

Twenty-ninth. Captain Napirs, Third Arkansas cavalry, returned from scout to Greenbrier, having killed the rebel Captain Birt near Red river.

I have the honor to be,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

F. STEELE,

Major-General Commanding.

Brigadier-General L. THOMAS,
Adjutant-General, United States Army, Washington, D. C.

Doc. 49.

EXPEDITION TO TUPELO, MISSISSIPPI.

GENERAL MOWER'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, SIXTH ARMY CORPS,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, July 27, 1864. }

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my division on the late expedition to Tupelo, Mississippi:

I left La Grange on the morning of the fifth instant with my command, which was composed of the following brigades and batteries: First brigade, Colonel McMillen, Ninety-fifth Ohio volunteer infantry; Second brigade, Colonel Wilken, Ninth Minnesota volunteer infantry; Third brigade, Colonel Woods, Twelfth Iowa volunteer infantry; Fourth brigade, Colonel Ward, Fourteenth Wisconsin volunteer infantry. This brigade was a detachment from the Seventeenth Army Corps, temporarily assigned to my command. Second Iowa battery, Lieutenant Reid commanding; First Illinois, company E (one section), Lieutenant Cram; and a battery, four Rodmans, belonging to company M, First Missouri, but manned by Captain Miller's company, Sixth Indiana battery.

We arrived at Pontotoc on the twelfth instant, and on the morning of the thirteenth moved toward Tupelo.

The colonel commanding brigade of colored troops, which was in rear of my division about nine miles of Tupelo, sent word to me that he was threatened by a large force of the enemy. I directed Colonel Ward, whose brigade had been marching on the right flank of the train, to place one regiment in the rear, so that he might be better able to render assistance to the negro brigade. At the same time I ordered Colonel Woods to place two of his largest regiments on the right flank of the train. The column proceeded in this manner some three miles when an attack was suddenly made on the train for nearly its entire length.

The attacking force, as I have since learned, consisted of four brigades of cavalry. This attack was soon repulsed, Colonel Ward's brigade taking the chief part in the fight, and capturing a rebel flag.

As soon as the enemy was repulsed I again started the column on, keeping the wagons ahead of the main column; when, finding that the enemy were moving rapidly at some distance on my right flank toward my front, I proceeded toward the head of the column for the purpose of making arrangements to protect the wagon train.

I had just arrived at the head of the Ninth Minnesota, which had been sent forward to protect the train, when a furious attack was made on the column a short distance to the rear. I immediately halted that regiment and faced it toward the enemy and directed skirmishers to be deployed; at the same time the balance of the brigade was halted by Colonel McMillen and faced toward the enemy, and the order given to charge. The enemy was driven

in confusion. I then brought up the Eleventh Missouri to Colonel McMillen's support, but before they arrived in front the rebels had disappeared and the fight was over.

Colonel McMillen and his command displayed great gallantry in so quickly repulsing this attack.

As soon as our wounded had been picked up I again moved on and arrived at the camp about dark.

The next morning the General commanding the expedition indicated to me the positions he wished my division to occupy, and I placed the troops of my command as follows: Colonel Woods' brigade on the left, its left resting on the Pontotoc road, and connecting with the right of the Third division; Colonel Ward's brigade on the right of Colonel Woods'; Colonel McMillen's brigade on the right of Ward's; and Colonel Wilken's brigade in reserve.

The Second Iowa battery was placed on the left of Colonel Ward's brigade, and commanded the Pontotoc road and the open field on the right of that road. Captain Miller's battery was placed on the right of Colonel Ward's brigade, and the section of Company E, First Illinois battery on the right of Colonel McMillen's brigade.

The enemy commenced the attack at about half-past seven o'clock in the morning, coming down in line of battle along our front and opposite our left, moving in an irregular mass. I directed the fire to be retained until they approached quite near, and then opened on them with shell, canister, and musketry. The fight continued for about two hours and a half, when, finding that they would not approach any nearer our lines, I ordered the third brigade to charge on them. This was very gallantly done, and the enemy driven from the field with heavy loss.

I had two field officers and several men sun-struck during the charge, and the enemy, having fallen back to their led horses, disappeared from our front.

I did not attempt to pursue them any further, as my command was well nigh exhausted with the march of nineteen miles and the fighting of the day before; in fact it would have been useless to pursue mounted infantry with troops on foot under any circumstances.

On the morning of the fifteenth, the enemy again appeared in our front. I awaited their attack, but finding that they were not disposed to approach within musket shot, with the exception of their skirmishers, I moved upon them and drove them about two miles, when they again took to their horses and fled. I then followed the third division, which had already moved out on the Ellistown road. A brigade of cavalry formed the rear guard.

I arrived at the camp on Oldtown creek, and was there met by a staff officer of the General commanding the expedition, who directed that my division should pass by the Third and encamp in advance of them. Just as my rear brigade

had crossed the creek, and passed through the bottom on the north side of it, several shells were suddenly dropped into the camp by the enemy, who, it seems, had driven in our cavalry the very moment the infantry had crossed the creek.

I was directed by Major-General Smith to take a brigade and drive the enemy back. I moved the First brigade immediately back, forming them in line of battle. I attacked the enemy and drove them about two miles.

Colonel McMillen's brigade behaved most gallantly, and were led by him, he riding in advance of them and cheering them on.

After the enemy had been driven I withdrew my troops and ordered them into camp, leaving the position to be held by Colonel Moore, commanding the Third division.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of both officers and men in the several engagements.

I regret to have to report the loss of Colonel Wilken of the Ninth Minnesota, commanding second brigade, who, although he had been with the command but a short time, had already endeared himself to both officers and men by his high-toned bearing and gentlemanly conduct.

I enclose herewith a sketch of the battle-field and reports of brigade commanders.

A list of casualties has already been forwarded to you.

I am, Captain,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JOSEPH A. MOWER,

Brigadier-General Commanding.

Captain J. H. HOUGH,

Assistant Adjutant-General,

Right Wing Sixteenth Army Corps.

COLONEL McMILLEN'S REPORT.

Memphis, Tennessee, July 22, 1864.

CAPTAIN: In obedience to orders, I moved with my command (the First brigade, First division, Sixteenth Army Corps) on the morning of the first instant to the depot of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, when the Ninth Minnesota infantry, which had been temporarily assigned, joined the brigade. The troops were embarked on the cars, the artillery and train going by road, the former reaching a point near La Fayette, when we encamped for the night. On the morning of the second instant, by order of Brigadier-General Sturgis, I was placed in command of all the infantry connected with the expedition, which was organized as follows:

First brigade: Colonel Alexander Wilken, Ninth Minnesota infantry, commanding; Seventy-second Ohio infantry, veteran volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles G. Eaton, commanding; Ninety-fifth Ohio infantry volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Jefferson Brombeck, commanding; One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois infantry volunteers, Colonel DeWitt C. Thomas,

commanding; Ninth Minnesota infantry volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel John F. King, commanding; Ninety-third Indiana infantry volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F. Marsh, commanding; company E, First Illinois light artillery, Captain John A. Fitch, commanding; section Sixth Indiana battery, Captain M. Miller, commanding.

Second brigade: Colonel George B. Hoge, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois infantry, commanding; Eighty-first Illinois infantry volunteers; Ninety-fifth Illinois infantry volunteers; One hundred and eighth Illinois infantry volunteers; One hundred and thirteenth Illinois infantry volunteers; One hundred and twentieth Illinois infantry volunteers; Company B, Second Illinois light artillery, Captain F. H. Chapman, commanding.

Third brigade: Colonel Edward Bouton, Fifty-ninth United States infantry (colored), commanding; Fifty-fifth United States infantry, (colored), Major E. M. Lowe, commanding; Fifty-ninth United States infantry, (colored,) Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Cowden, commanding; Battery F, Second United States artillery (colored), Captain C. A. Lamburgh commanding.

During the organization of the infantry division the large supply and ammunition train was brought up by the cavalry and turned over to me for safe conduct. The cavalry moved on the same day in the direction of Lamar, and the next morning at half-past three o'clock, the infantry was in motion in the same direction.

From this time until the morning of the tenth instant, nothing of importance occurred beyond the difficulties constantly encountered in consequence of heavy rains daily, causing the streams to be much swollen, and the roads almost impassable, together with the embarrassment we labored under in procuring forage, our line of march being through a country destitute of supplies. Our progress was necessarily slow and laborious, giving the enemy ample opportunity to ascertain our force and make arrangements to meet us with superior numbers.

On the evening of the ninth we reached a point on the Ripley and Fulton road, fifteen or sixteen miles from the former place, where we camped for the night, marching on the morning of the tenth in the direction of the Mobile and Ohio railroad, expecting to strike it at or in the vicinity of Guntown. I had proceeded some five miles with the head of the column, and halted to permit the wagon train to cross the Hatchie river and close up. The road through the bottom land of this stream was almost impassable, and we found it impossible to put it in good condition.

While waiting at the head of my column to hear from the rear, I was informed by General Sturgis that General Grierson, commanding cavalry division, had struck the enemy beyond Brice's cross-roads, some five miles in advance, and was ordered to move my leading brigade up as rapidly as possible to the support of the

cavalry, leaving the other two brigades to come up with the train. I accordingly ordered Colonel Hoge, commanding Second brigade (the advance that day), to move up in quick time, without any reference to the column in his rear, and sent my quartermaster to close up the train, and have it, with the brigades of Colonels Wilken and Bouton, moved up as rapidly as possible. I accompanied the advance brigade and *en route* to the field received repeated and urgent orders to move up as rapidly as possible, as the enemy was developing a large force and driving our cavalry back. Colonel Hoge's advance regiment, the One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois infantry, reached the cross-roads between one and two p. m., and went into action at once on the right of the Baldwin road, relieving Colonel Waring's brigade of cavalry, which had been forced back to within a short distance of Brice's house. As fast as Colonel Hoge's regiment came up they were deployed on the right of the Baldwin road, extending the line in a semi-circular form in the direction of the Guntown road, relieving the cavalry as they took position. As soon as the regiments took their position in line, skirmishers were thrown forward, and the men told that the enemy was in their immediate presence in force, and that they must be prepared to meet a heavy attack soon. The skirmish line was established along the whole front by Captain Fernald, Seventy-second Ohio infantry, acting aid-de-camp, under a constant fire from the enemy. Chapman was ordered in battery in the open ground about Brice's house, and directed to open upon the enemy over the heads of our men.

Soon after Hoge's brigade was placed in position, the First brigade, Colonel Wilken, came up, the Ninety-fifth Ohio infantry in advance. This regiment was immediately placed in line on the left of the Baldwin road, with instructions to assist the regiments of Hoge's left in holding that road, and to govern itself by the movements of his brigade. The One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois infantry coming next was placed on the right of Hoge's brigade completing the line to the Guntown road, and relieving the cavalry to that point. The Ninety-third Indiana infantry, Colonel Thomas, was placed on the right of the Guntown road, over which it was very evident the enemy was then advancing to attack. The Seventy-second Ohio infantry and Miller's section of the Sixth Indiana battery were posted on an eminence in the rear of Brice's house to keep the enemy from getting possession of a bridge a short distance back and cutting us off. Battery E, First Illinois light artillery, Captain Fitch, and the Ninth Minnesota infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Marsh commanding, were held in reserve near the cross-roads. Colonel Bouton's brigade of colored troops had charge of the train on that day and had not yet come up.

The arrangements mentioned above had not yet been fully completed before the enemy made a furious attack along the whole line and

on each flank, developing the fact that his force was far superior to that portion of ours then engaged. My extreme right after a sharp and bloody contest was forced back, and I was obliged to throw in the only regiment I had in reserve to drive the enemy back and reestablish my line at that point. This work was gallantly performed by the Ninth Minnesota under the heroic Marsh, and I desire here to express to him and his brave men my thanks for their firmness and bravery which alone saved the army at that critical moment from utter defeat and probable capture.

As the enemy on our right was being driven back by the Ninth Minnesota and Thirteenth Indiana, I directed Captain Fitch to put one section of his battery in position on the Gun-town road and sweep it with grape and canister. Soon after our success on the right the regiments on the left and left centre gave back in considerable confusion, the rebels following them in force up to the road over which we had advanced, and from which they were kept by the Seventy-second Ohio and Miller's battery, posted in our rear. I endeavored, aided by my staff, to rally the different regiments, and get them to advance to their original position, but failed, succeeding, however, in forming a line along the Baldwin road, and at right angles with it, parallel to the Fulton road, in which position I fought until again flanked on the left, and greatly exposed to a capture of the troops engaged.

At this time I sent word to General Sturgis that I was hard pressed, and that unless relieved soon I would be obliged to abandon my position. I was informed that he had nothing to send me, and that I must use my discretion as to holding my position. It had been evident, for some time, that the troops could not remain in that position long, as the enemy were fast closing round us. I therefore determined to retire, and in order to do so, directed Captains Fitch and Chapman to open a rapid fire, with grape and canister, along the roads and through woods in our immediate front, and to maintain it until the infantry were well under way, and that I would form another line, a short distance in the rear, to keep the enemy from the cross-roads until they could get their pieces away. This new line was a prolongation of that occupied by the Seventy-second Ohio infantry, and was formed by that regiment, the Ninety-fifth Ohio infantry, and about two hundred dismounted men of the Tenth Missouri cavalry, under Captain Curry, who reported to me for orders on the field, and rendered valuable and gallant service in assisting to hold the enemy in check until the retreating column had passed.

The main portion of the First and Second brigades, which had been hotly engaged with the enemy for nearly three hours, now retired under cover of this new line, and continued to march by the flank to the rear. Just after crossing a small stream, about a quarter of a mile in the rear of the cross-roads, I met the Fifty-fifth

United States infantry (colored), Major E. M. Lowe commanding; I posted his regiment on the left of the road, with instructions to hold his position until the troops then engaged should retire, when he could bring up the rear. A short distance further to the rear I met Colonel Bouton, with the Fifty-ninth United States infantry (colored), and Lamburgh's section of artillery, in a good position on the right of the road. I remained with him until the other regiments of his brigade, which had been posted near the creek referred to above, fell back, and ordered it into line on his left, directing Colonel Bouton to hold the enemy in check as long as possible, in order to give the retiring column time to take up a new position in the rear, which was done on a ridge near a white house, about one and a half or two miles from the battle-field.

This line was formed by portions of the First and Second brigades, the whole under command of Colonel Wilken, and Colonel Bouton was informed by Lieutenant Barber, of my staff, that he could fall back and take up a new position in the rear of this line, my object being to retire by successive lines.

In the mean time the wagon train and artillery were moving to the rear as fast as possible.

When Colonel Bouton fell back the enemy followed him up in heavy force, and the line established at the white house soon fell back to another position in the rear, when a stand was made and the enemy repulsed. In this affair the Ninth Minnesota again took a conspicuous part, and the colored regiments fought with a gallantry which commended them to the favor of their comrades in arms. I desire to bear testimony to their bravery and endurance, as well as the gallantry of Colonel Cowden and Major Lowe, commanding regiments. This checked the pursuit and ended the fighting for that evening. The whole column was then put in motion for Ripley. Upon reaching the crossing of the Hatchie the wagon train was found stuck and the road completely blockaded, so that the artillery had to be abandoned, after long-continued and laborious effort, on the part of battery commanders and the men generally, to get it through.

I arrived at Ripley, in company with the General commanding, about five o'clock A. M. on the morning of the eleventh instant. I at once commenced the reorganization of my division. At seven and a half A. M. I reported my command reorganized and in tolerably good shape, with the exception that many of the men had thrown away their arms during the retreat, and that those who had arms were short of ammunition. I was directed by General Sturgis to move out on the Salem road, in rear of the First brigade of cavalry, then in advance. Before the troops all left the town of Ripley the enemy made a furious attack upon the place, gaining possession of the road on which we were marching, and cutting my command in two. In this attack the colored regiments and a part of Hoge's

brigade were engaged, and, until overpowered by superior numbers, fought bravely. That portion of the column cut off moved out on a road leading north from Ripley, and, under the brave and successful leadership of Colonel Wilken, succeeded in reaching Memphis. The enemy followed and fought our retreating

column to the vicinity of Colliersville, which place we reached on the morning of the twelfth instant, having marched some ninety miles without rest.

As nearly as I can ascertain, at the date of this report, the following table will exhibit the casualties of the infantry division:

NUMBER OF BRIGADES.	KILLED.		WOUNDED AND MISSING.		MISSING.		AGGREGATE	
	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.	Commissioned officers.	Enlisted men.
First brigade.....	2	88	10	145	25	811	37	904
Second brigade.....	5	84	18	407	23	441
Third brigade.....	1	109	3	131	8	160	12	400
Total.....	8	181	13	276	51	1,378	72	1,834

In conclusion, I beg to bear testimony to the courage, fidelity, and efficiency of my staff during the battle of the tenth. As has always been the case, they performed their whole duty.

My orderlies, Francis De Freitas, of the Hundred and Fourteenth, and Nathan Cochran, of the Seventy-second, deserve especial mention for their conspicuous gallantry and intelligent performance of every trust.

I have the honor to forward herewith official reports of commanding officers of brigades, to which you are respectfully referred for a more particular notice of those officers worthy of mention.

I have the honor to be, Captain,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

W. L. McMILLEN,

Colonel Ninety-fifth Ohio Infantry, Commanding Division.

Captain W. G. RAWALLE,

A. D. C., U. S. A., and A. A. G.

COLONEL WILKEN'S REPORT.

SIR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the Colonel commanding, the part taken by the First brigade, infantry division, commanded by myself, in the recent engagement at Brice's cross-roads, near Guntown, Mississippi, on the tenth instant. My brigade on that day marched in the rear of the Second brigade, commanded by Colonel Hoge; the Third (colored) brigade, commanded by Colonel Bouton, being in the rear of the First. About eleven o'clock on the morning of the tenth, firing was heard in front, and I was shortly after informed that our cavalry had engaged that of the enemy and been driven back from Brice's cross-roads, about six miles in advance. Soon after, the Second brigade was ordered to advance at double-quick, and I received orders to march my command as rapidly as I could do without leaving the supply train.

Soon after hearing that the Second brigade was being seriously pressed, I sent for permis-

sion to advance more rapidly, leaving the train to be protected by the Third brigade. Permission having been obtained, I moved on the double-quick for about one mile, and reached Brice's house about half-past one o'clock, when the brigade was halted. Colonel McMillen then led the Ninety-fifth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Brombeck commanding, down the road leading past Brice's house toward Baldwin, and posted it on the left of the road and on the left of the — Illinois, about one fourth of a mile beyond Brice's house. I then returned with him to the brigade, and was directed to repair with the Seventy-second Ohio and the section of Captain Miller's Sixth Indiana battery to the knoll, on which stood a log house, about eight hundred yards in rear of Brice's house, and on the right as you go to Ripley. After the guns had been placed in position, and Captain ———'s company of the Seventy-second Ohio had been thrown forward toward the woods in front, the balance of the regiment having formed in line on its left for support, understanding that the enemy were endeavoring to get around our left in order to reach the train on the Ripley road, I directed Captain Miller to throw a few shells into the timber, which was done with great precision and effect, and which evidently checked their progress. Soon after I was joined by about seventy-five dismounted cavalry, under command of an officer whose name I have not been able to learn, who formed line and kept up a spirited fire upon the enemy advancing from the direction of the cross-roads. Shortly after this a small body of the enemy, evidently skirmishers, were seen crossing the open field in our rear, and toward the Ripley road. Lieutenant-Colonel Eaton, commanding the Seventy-second Ohio, in connection with the dismounted cavalry, opened fire upon them, and drove them back in confusion to the woods.

About this time I was directed by a staff officer of the Colonel commanding to advance with the Seventy-second Ohio across the open fields

in our front and to the right of the road, and take a position in the edge of the woods. After proceeding a short distance, orders were given to return to the first position, which was done. Upon my return I found Captain Miller had left with his guns, as I presume with orders given during my absence, his support having been removed. About this time Captain —, of the — regiment, A. D., reported to me with his company, and although wounded in the leg and the only officer with the company, expressed his readiness to be of service. I directed him to send a few skirmishers in front of the log-house into the ravine, and to form the remainder of his command behind the fences and log buildings near-by, which was done. Soon after the enemy's shells and canister were falling thick and fast around us. The remainder of our force had passed us, and we were left alone. Turning, I observed my command moving by the flank to the rear, across the creek and bottom, having, as I understood, been ordered to fall back in order to form a new line. Having proceeded about half a mile, Brigadier-General Grierson rode up and directed Lieutenant-Colonel Eaton to form his regiment behind the fences on the right of the road, in rear of open fields, and resist the advance of the enemy as long as practicable. I then rode on to overtake the balance of the brigade.

At the white house, about a mile in the rear, and in the road, I found the Ninety-fifth Ohio, Ninety-third Indiana, One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois, and Ninth Minnesota. I was then directed by the Colonel commanding division to form my brigade in line on the right of the road (as you go toward Ripley), and to contest the ground, if possible, until night set in. I was informed that the Second brigade (Colonel Hoge commanding), and the Third (colored) brigade, Colonel Bouton commanding, were on our right, and that Colonel McMillen had himself placed the Ninety-third Indiana and Ninety-fifth Ohio on the left of the Second brigade, I was instructed that when they should be obliged to retire through my lines, my command should remain, the brigades relieving each other as they retired. I formed the Ninth Minnesota and One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois respectively on the right of the road as you go toward Ripley, and sent out skirmishers, who soon found the enemy in front.

Lieutenant-Colonel King having informed me that his ammunition was almost exhausted, I directed Lieutenant Cruse, Ninth Minnesota volunteers, A. A. G., to proceed to the rear to procure a supply, but finding no means of transportation, he brought back one box on his horse. The fighting at this time was severe, continuing for over half an hour, and until sundown, with considerable loss, when, being informed that we had no support on right or left, and that the enemy were about to move around our flank, I ordered the command to fall back, which they did in good order, frequently facing to the rear and firing upon the enemy. We

shortly after received an enfilading fire, as we moved down the road, when I placed the command among the trees on one side. We soon arrived at the slope where part of the train had been abandoned and a portion burned.

Shortly after passing the creek I discovered the skirmishers of the Third brigade in the open fields on our left. Perceiving an officer with them, I directed him to have the men form on the right of the Ninth Minnesota, in a thicket in front of which were large open fields over which the enemy must pass. He informed me that he was not in command, but pointed out to me Lieutenant-Colonel Crawdon, who was severely wounded. The Ninth Minnesota formed, the One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois being on the right, as I am informed by Lieutenant-Colonel King. The enemy soon appeared in large numbers, but not in line, when a heavy fire was opened upon them from the thicket, which was kept up for about twenty minutes, and large numbers fell. They retired in confusion. This was between sundown and dark, and the enemy did not again appear in force. About eight o'clock in the evening I halted the command in order to give them rest. At this point an officer in command of a squadron of cavalry reported to me that the camp fires in front were built by him, under orders from the General commanding, in order to deceive the enemy, and that he was directed to remain until we had passed, and then proceed to the front. I then moved forward the command until I joined the colored brigade. The progress was slow, and I was informed that we were delayed by the train which was slowly passing the bottom-land and creek some distance ahead. About midnight I was informed that the portion of the train in front had been abandoned, its further progress being impossible. Finding this to be the case, I directed the animals remaining with the rear of the train to be taken out and the wagons abandoned. The train was not burned, as I thought it probable that our line of battle had been reformed beyond, and that it might be yet saved. Moreover I feared the conflagration might lead the enemy to believe that we were in full retreat, and lead to their immediate advance in force.

About daylight the Fourth Iowa cavalry passed us going to the front. Shortly after, our rear was fired upon by small parties of guerrillas. At the Llewellyn church we found Colonel Winslow's brigade of cavalry formed in echelon by squadron, who were skirmishing sharply with the enemy on the opposite side of the stream. Arriving at Ripley at half-past seven A. M., I waited for orders, but receiving none, and perceiving other troops continue to pass on the road to the front, the cavalry remaining to protect our rear, I again took up the line of march. Hearing at the cross-roads, where I halted for an hour, that the enemy in force was falling upon a large detachment of our men on the Salem road, and that a large cavalry force was about three miles in our rear, and being

almost out of ammunition, I concluded to follow the Salisbury road, and toward evening was joined by Captain Foster, Fifty-ninth regiment A. D., with about six hundred of his own and the Fifty-fifth regiment A. D., he having crossed over from the Salem road, which he considered unsafe. That night we bivouacked near Brooks', about five miles from Salisbury. The next morning at daylight we resumed the march, and after proceeding about three miles turned to the left, taking a settlement road leading to Davis' mills. Upon arriving at Davis', I found the bridge partially destroyed, and upon halting to repair it we were fired upon by a considerable number of the enemy, who were soon driven back, after wounding two of our men on the hill, and one of the flankers of the One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois, and hitting the horse of Lieutenant-Colonel King, while passing the swamps beyond the bridge. Soon after, we were again attacked in front, but owing to the vigilance of the half-breed scouts of company H, Ninth Minnesota, and the handsome conduct of the advanced guard of the Ninety-fifth Ohio, under command of Captain ———, they were unable to do much execution. At one time our rear was charged upon by about one hundred and fifty of Buford's cavalry, but they were repulsed by the negro troops and a few of the half-breeds. Our rear was, however, occasionally fired upon until long after dark, but the imperturbable coolness and steadiness of the colored troops, under command of Captain Foster, kept them in check and prevented confusion.

At twelve o'clock on the night of the twelfth, the command bivouacked four miles east of Colliersville, which place was reached about nine A. M. next day. We found here neither cars, rations, nor reinforcements. The command rested until noon. In the meantime Lieutenant Hosmer, of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, Brigade Inspector, volunteered to proceed to some point on the railroad from which information could be communicated of our approach. He was joined by Captain ———, of the One Hundred and Eighth Illinois, Sergeant ———, and two privates. Within three miles of Colliersville they were attacked by a party numbering about fifteen, who ordered them to halt. Their horses, already jaded, were put to their speed. Although frequently fired upon and closely followed, no one of the party was killed or wounded. I regret to say, however, that the gallant captain and the sergeant were captured. The lieutenant and the two privates arrived in safety at White's station at ten A. M.

As the command approached the vicinity where the party referred to was attacked, the column was halted and the scouts sent in advance, who soon discovered a party of the enemy. Skirmishing continued until the whistle of the train which brought reinforcements was heard. Hard bread was here issued to the men, while the infantry reinforcements and the cav-

alry command under Major Malone formed line of battle in front of the train in time to meet the attack of a regiment of the enemy's cavalry. The command, numbering about one thousand six hundred, of the different brigades, arrived in Memphis on the same evening (thirteenth instant), in a pitiable condition. Nearly all were barefooted, their feet badly blistered and swollen, and in some cases poisoned. Most of them had eaten nothing for three days, and all had suffered from want of food.

Colonel Thomas, commanding the Ninety-third Indiana; Lieutenant-Colonel King, commanding the One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois; Lieutenant-Colonel Brombeck, commanding Ninety-fifth Ohio; Lieutenant-Colonel Eaton, commanding Seventy-second Ohio; Lieutenant-Colonel Marsh, commanding Ninth Minnesota; Captain Fitch, commanding light battery company E, and Captain Miller, commanding section of Sixth Indiana battery, deserve especial mention for the judicious and gallant manner in which they handled their respective commands.

I am much indebted to Lieutenant-Colonels King, Brombeck, and Eaton, and Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, of the One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois, and other officers, for information in regard to the roads over which we passed in the retreat.

I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of each member of my staff. The duties imposed upon them were onerous in the extreme, owing to their limited number. Lieutenant Cruse, Adjutant of the Ninth Minnesota, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, although under fire for the first time, conducted himself with all the coolness of a veteran. Lieutenant Hosmer, of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, Inspector of the brigade, rendered me great service as an Aid. His gallant conduct deserves great praise. I am also greatly indebted to Lieutenant Bailey, of the Nineteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, who volunteered his services as an Aid early in the action, and remained with me, rendering valuable service, until obliged to rejoin his regiment. Acting Brigade Surgeon R. H. Bingham, and Acting Brigade Quartermaster, Lieutenant Mower, of the One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois infantry, performed with credit their respective duties.

I transmit herewith the reports of the regimental and battery commanders, with the lists of casualties accompanying the same. I would here remark that I had no opportunity of seeing the Ninety-fifth Ohio while engaged with the enemy. Its severe loss attests its gallant conduct and great exposure.

I have the honor to be,

Your obedient servant,

ALBEE WILKIN,
Colonel Ninth Minnesota Infantry Volunteers,
Late Commanding First Brigade, &c.

Lieutenant O. H. ABEL,
A. A. G. Infantry Division, U. S. Forces, &c.

Doc. 50.

SPEECH OF JEFFERSON DAVIS

AT COLUMBIA, S. C., OCTOBER 4, 1864.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE METROPOLIS OF SOUTH CAROLINA: Your Mayor has welcomed me to your home. I receive his greeting with that gratitude which one only feels when he hears expressed the language of commendation from those whose silence would have made him realize that his conduct had been bad indeed. If in this great struggle for the rights of the States and the liberties of the people, to secure the possession of which, and to transmit which to us, our fathers of the Revolution shed their blood, South Carolina, who has stood for thirty years in the vanguard, should give him who asserted those rights no word of well done, he might feel convinced that he had failed, as a public servant, to perform his mission, and as a man had proven unable to cope with the responsibilities of his position. Therefore, it is, Mr. Mayor, and fellow-citizens of Columbia, that I feel heartily grateful for the welcome received at your hands.

South Carolina has struggled nobly in the war, and suffered many sacrifices. There is, indeed, no portion of our land where the pall of mourning has not been spread; but I thank the Giver of all good, that our people still remain firm there, above all other places. I am told there have been none to waver and none to doubt. It often happens that at a distance from a scene of action, men, who if present would measure it, magnify danger, until at last those become despondent whose hearts, if actually stirred by perils, would no sooner think of shrinking from the prompt performance of duty than the gallant sons of South Carolina, whose blood has so generously flowed on the many battle-fields of this war. But if there be any who feel that our cause is in danger, that final success may not crown our efforts, that we are not stronger to-day than when we began the struggle, that we are not able to continue the supplies to our armies and to our people, let all such read a contradiction in the smiling face of our land, and the teeming evidences of plenty which everywhere greet the eye; let them go to those places where brave men are standing in front of the foe, and there receive the assurance that we shall have final success, and that every man who does not live to see his country free, will see a freeman's grave. [Applause.]

There are those who, like the Israelites of old, are longing to turn back to the flesh-pots they have left; who have thought there still may have been some feasible mode of reconciliation, and even be willing to rush into a reconstruction of the Union. Such, I am glad to know, do not flourish on the soil of South Carolina. Such cannot be the sentiments of any man in the Confederate States, if he will only reflect that from the beginning down to the present hour, your Government has made every

effort within its power to avoid a collision of arms in the first instance, and since then, to obtain every possible means of settlement, honorable to ourselves, based on a recognition of our independence. First we sent commissioners to ask on what terms the quarrel could be adjusted, and since that time we have proclaimed in every public paper, our desire for peace. Insolently our every effort has been met. The Vice-President of the Confederate States was refused a passport to the North, when his object was negotiation—that means by which all wars must be terminated. The door was rudely shut in our faces. Intervention and recognition by foreign states, so long anticipated has proved an *ignis fatuus*. There is, then, but one means by which you can hope to gain independence and an honorable peace, and that is by uniting with harmony, energy and determination, in fighting those great battles, and achieving those great victories, which will teach the world that we can defend our rights, and the Yankee nation that it is death to invade them. [Applause.]

With every Confederate victory our stocks rise in the foreign market—that touchstone of European sentiment. With every noble achievement that influences the public mind abroad, you are taking one step forward, and bringing foreign nations one step nearer your aid, in recognizing and lending you friendly intervention, whenever they are satisfied that, intervention or no intervention, the Confederacy can sustain itself.

Does any one believe that Yankees are to be conciliated by terms of concession? Does any man imagine that we can conquer the Yankees by retreating before them, or do you not all know that the only way to make spaniels civil is to whip them? And you can whip them, if all the men capable of bearing arms will do their duty by taking their places under the standard of their country, before the veteran troops of the North receive the fresh increment which is being gathered in the Northern States. Now is the good and accepted time for every man to rally to the standard of his country, and crush the invader upon her soil, and this, I believe is in your power. If every man fit to bear arms will place himself in the ranks with those who are already there, we shall not battle in vain, and our achievements will be grand, final and complete. Is this a time to ask what the law demands of you—to inquire whether or not you are exempt under the law, or to ask if the magistrate will take you out of the enrolling office by a writ of *habeas corpus*? Rather is it not the time for every man capable of bearing arms to say: "My country needs my services, and my country shall have them!" When your heroic fathers, the Whigs of the Revolution, fought in that war which secured your birthright, their armies were not gathered by asking who can be forced into the field, but "Who are able to fight?" No man was too old, and no boy too young, if he had the physical

capacity to enter the ranks of the army. In the days of the Revolution, the boy left his paternal roof only to return to its blackened ruins. He grew to manhood among its struggles; and may not your country claim similar services from the youth of the present day? Like them you must emulate the glory of your sires. Say not that you are unequal to the task, for I believe that our people are even better than were our honored ancestors. They have fought more and bloodier battles, and there are fewer who are lukewarm in the cause now, than existed in the days of the Revolution. What a glorious reflection it is, that wherever the tide of war has rolled its devastating wave over the land, just there do you find every heart beating true to the Confederacy, strengthened, as it were by vicissitudes, and every woman ready to share her last loaf with the soldier who is fighting for our rights.

A plan of negotiation has been offered for consideration—a plan of negotiation by States. Well, it is not easy to see on what terms the States can negotiate. In the first place, they have no constitutional power to do so. In the second place, Mr. Lincoln has said that he will not negotiate with them unless they can control the army, and they can only obtain the power to control the army by traitorously attempting to enter into a treaty contrary to the Government they have instituted. But suppose this were possible, what are the terms offered? If you will acknowledge your crimes, lay down your arms, emancipate your slaves, and turn over your leader—as they call your humble servant—to be punished, then you will have permission to vote together with your negroes upon the terms under which Mr. Lincoln will be graciously pleased to allow you to live as a part of the nation over which he presides. If there be a man within the sound of my voice who contemplates such a proposition, I pity him from the bottom of my heart. My only wish is that he was north of the dividing line. His is not the spirit that animated our fathers, and he is not fit to exist among the men who are now perilling their lives in the cause in which we are engaged, for he who is so slavish can not be trusted with the sacred guardianship of the widows and orphans of the soldiers who have died in battle.

I have just returned from that army from which we have had the saddest accounts—the Army of Tennessee—and I am able to bear to you words of good cheer. That army has increased in strength since the fall of Atlanta. It has risen in tone; its march is onward; its face looking to the front. So far as I am able to judge, General Hood's strategy has been good, and his conduct has been gallant. His eye is now fixed upon a point far beyond that where he was assailed by the enemy. He hopes soon to have his hand upon Sherman's line of communication, and to fix it where he can hold it. And if but a half—nay, one fourth—of the men to whom the service has a right will give him

their strength, I see no chance for Sherman to escape from a defeat or a disgraceful retreat. I therefore hope, in view of all the contingencies of war, with all the confidence which I found in the army, that within thirty days that army, which has so boastfully taken up its winter quarters in the heart of the Confederacy, will be in search of a crossing on the Tennessee river.

That our army retreated far was but a natural precursor of that despondency which spreads itself over the country; but as I approached the region occupied by our troops the hope increased, until at last I found in the army the acme of confidence itself. General Beauregard, so well known to you all, is going there with a general command which will enable him to concentrate all the troops that can be made available for the public defence. I, therefore, say be of good cheer, for I hope that brighter intelligence will soon reach you. [Applause.]

But, my friends, if it be otherwise—if we suffer reverses, it is what is to be expected from the fortunes of war. It is the fate of all human designs. In that event we shall have reason to anticipate from all brave men a conduct becoming the occasion, and shall look to you to redress your misfortunes, to rise in the face of disaster, and resolve to succeed, determined that you will live or die free. [Applause.]

Your brave sons are battling for the cause of the country everywhere; your Fort Sumter, where was first given to the breeze the flag of the Confederacy, still stands. The honor of the State has not been dimmed in the struggle, and her soldiers will be sustained by the thought that when they are no more, South Carolina will still retain that honor with which she commenced the war, and have accumulated that greatness and glory which will make her an exemplar of all that is chivalric and manly in a nation struggling for existence. You who have so long been the advocates of State Rights have never raised a clamor against the laws which seem to invade them, and I think, for obvious reasons, you are not like those new-born lights who, perhaps, are just beginning to appreciate the great principles of that creed. You saw laws passed which were necessary to make those States which are in cooperation effective for the good of the whole. You understood the nature of the compact entered into by the sovereign States, and you have not been fearful that the agent created by yourselves was likely to turn against that Government for which he and you had been so long struggling. Understanding the means of preserving your State Government, you have not been frightened by the clamor of those who do not breathe the pure air of State sovereignty. Then, you have had no difficulty in the organization of the three forces incident to military service. You are in that condition in which your defence must depend upon what does not belong to the active forces of the country. Your battles are fought on other fields. You have on the coast some

necessity for what is termed an active army, and should it be incumbent upon you to furnish troops from your reserves, you have no constitutional scruples, like Governor Strong, of Massachusetts, against marching your militia from the borders of the State, to fight the battles of the cause in which you are engaged. I honor you for it. It is needless for me to argue questions here which have been discussed elsewhere, for here I am among the disciples of him from whom I learned my lessons of State Rights—the great, the immortal John C. Calhoun.

Among those to whom we are indebted in South Carolina, I have not yet alluded to that peculiar claim of gratitude which is due to the fair countrywomen of the Palmetto State—they who have gone to the hospital to watch by the side of the sick—those who throng your wayside homes—who have used their needle with the industry of sewing-women—who have borne privation without a murmur, and who have given up fathers, sons, and husbands, with more than Spartan virtue, because they called on no one to witness and record the deed. Silently, with all the dignity and grandeur of patriotism, they have made their sacrifices—sacrifices which, if written, would be surpassed by nothing in history. If all the acts of heroism and virtue of the women of the South could be transmitted to the future, it would present such a record as the world has never seen. All honor, then, I say, to the ladies of the Palmetto State. Their gallantry is only different from that of her sons in this, that they deem it unfeminine to strike; and yet such is the heroism they have displayed—such the noble demeanor they have exhibited—that at the last moment, when trampled upon, and it became a necessity, they would not hesitate to strike the invader a corpse at their feet. [Applause.]

It is scarcely necessary for me, at a time like this, to argue grave questions respecting policy, past, present or prospective. I only ask you to have faith and confidence, and to believe that every faculty of my head and my heart is devoted to your cause, and to that I shall, if necessary, give my life. Let every one in his own sphere, and according to his own capacity, devote himself to the single purpose of filling up and sustaining our armies in the field. If required to stay at home, let him devote himself not to the acquisition of wealth, but to the advancement of the common cause. If there is to be any aristocracy in the land after this war, I hope it will be an aristocracy of those men who have become poor while bleeding to secure our liberty. [Applause.] If there are to be any peculiarly favored by public opinion hereafter, I trust it will be those men who have longest borne a musket and oftentimes bled upon the battle-field. If there is to be any young man shunned by the young ladies when he seeks their favor, I trust it will be the young man who has grown rich by skulking.

And with all sincerity, I say to my young

friends here, if you want the right man for a husband, take him whose armless sleeves and noble heart betokens the duties that he has rendered to his country, rather than he who has never shared the toils or borne the dangers of the field. If there still be left any of those military critics, who have never spoken of our Generals but to show how much better things could have been managed, or of our Government, but to find fault with it—because it never took their advice—in mercy's name let those wise men go to the front and aid us in achieving our independence. With their wisdom and strength swelling our armies, I should have some hopes that I will not be a corpse before our cause is secured, and that our flag would never trail in dishonor, but would wave victoriously above the roar and smoke of battle.

I believe it is in the power of the men of the Confederacy to plant our banners on the banks of the Ohio, where we may say to the Yankee, "Be quiet, or we shall teach you another lesson." Within the next thirty days much is to be done, for upon our success much depends. Within the next thirty days, therefore, let all who are absentees, or who ought to be in the army, go promptly to their ranks. Let fresh victories crown our arms, and the peace party, if there be such at the North, can elect its candidate. But whether a peace candidate is elected or not, Yankee instinct will teach him that it is better to end the war, and leave us to the enjoyment of our own rights.

Prayerful for your welfare, confiding in the army of the Confederate States to do that which soft words can never achieve, and in the hope that God will preserve the little ones of all brave men who are in the field, or who are going to it, and trusting that in the future, under brighter auspices, it may be my fortune to meet the good people of Columbia; I wish you all, for the present, farewell. [Applause.]

Doc. 51.

THE CHICAGO CONSPIRACY.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF GENERAL SWEET.

HEADQUARTERS POST, CAMP DOUGLAS, }
CHICAGO, ILL., November 28, 1864. }

Captain B. T. Smith, A. A. G., District Headquarters, Springfield, Ill.:

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to respectfully report in relation to the origin, progress and result up to the present time of the late rebel raid for the purpose of releasing the prisoners of war at Camp Douglas, taking possession of the city of Chicago, creating an insurrection in and overrunning the States of Illinois and Indiana in aid of the Southern rebellion.

That Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior during the administration of Mr. Buchanan, went to Windsor, Canada, some time in May or June last, under the assumed name of Captain Carson, and having been sup-

plied by the rebel government with large sums of money for the purpose, commenced operations to organize in Canada an expedition to release rebel prisoners of war at different camps in the North-west, and aid the "Sons of Liberty" with money and arms, to raise an insurrection, especially in the States of Illinois and Indiana, against the Government of the United States.

About the twenty-fifth day of August last an expedition was organized at Toronto, Canada, under the immediate direction of Captain Hines, formerly of Morgan's command, composed of one hundred and fifty to two hundred escaped prisoners and rebel soldiers, accompanied by Colonel G. St. Leger Grenfell, at one time Morgan's Chief of Staff and afterward Inspector-General on the staff of General Bragg; Colonel Vincent Marmaduke, of Missouri; Colonel Ben. Anderson, of Kentucky; Captains Castleman and Cantrell, formerly of Morgan's command, and other rebel officers. This force was armed with pistols at Toronto, divided, and its members, in citizen's dress, came to Chicago, by different routes, in the same trains which brought the thronging thousands who assembled on the twenty-ninth of August to attend the Chicago Convention, and which made it difficult to detect their presence.

It was to have been assisted by large numbers of "Sons of Liberty" and other guerrillas, who came armed to that convention, gathered from Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana and Illinois, and were to be under the immediate command of Brigadier-General Charles Walsh, of the "Sons of Liberty."

The presence of these officers and men for that purpose was suspected by the Government, and reinforcements were made to the garrison at Camp Douglas, which thwarted the expedition, and its members dispersed, some of the rebel officers and soldiers to Canada, others to Kentucky, and yet others to Southern Indiana and Illinois, and the "Sons of Liberty" and guerrillas to their respective homes, to await a signal for the general uprising which, it was determined, should soon take place in the States of Illinois and Indiana against the Government.

About the first of November another expedition of like character was organized in Canada, to be commanded by Captain Hines, and composed of the same elements as that which had failed at the time of the Chicago Convention. It was determined that the attempt should be made about the period of the Presidential election, and the night of that day was finally designated as the time when the plot should be executed.

During the canvass which preceded the election, the "Sons of Liberty," a secret organization, within, and beyond all doubt, unknown to the better portion and majority of, the Democratic party, had caused it to be widely proclaimed and believed, that there was an intention on the part of the Government, and great danger that such intention would be carried

into effect, to interfere by military force at the polls, against the Democratic party, as an excuse under which to arm themselves, as individuals, and had also obtained and concealed at different places in this city, arms and ammunition for themselves and the rebel prisoners of war, when they should be released.

On the evening of the fifth day of November, it was reported that a large number of persons of suspicious character had arrived in the city from Fayette and Christian counties, in Illinois, and that more were coming.

On Sunday, the sixth day of November, late in the afternoon, it became evident that the city was filling up with suspicious characters, some of whom were prisoners of war, and soldiers of the rebel army; that Captain Hines, Colonel Grenfell, and Colonel Marmaduke were here to lead, and that Brigadier-General Walsh, of the "Sons of Liberty," had ordered large numbers of members of that order from the southern portion of Illinois, to cooperate with them.

Adopting measures which proved effective to detect the presence and identify the persons of the officers and leaders, and ascertain their plans, it was manifest that they had the means of gathering a force considerably larger than the little garrison, then guarding between eight and nine thousand prisoners of war at Camp Douglas, and that, taking advantage of the excitement and the large number of persons who would ordinarily fill the streets on election night, they intended to make a night attack on and surprise this camp, release and arm the prisoners of war, cut the telegraph wires, burn the railway depots, seize the banks and stores containing arms and ammunition, take possession of the city, and commence a campaign for the release of other prisoners of war in the States of Illinois and Indiana, thus organizing an army to effect and give success to the general uprising so long contemplated by the "Sons of Liberty."

The whole number of troops for duty at Camp Douglas on that day were as follows:

Eighth regiment Veteran Reserve corps, Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. Skinner, commanding	273
Fifteenth regiment Veteran Reserve corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Flood, commanding	377
Total infantry	650
Twenty-fourth Ohio battery, Lieutenant James W. Gamble, commanding	146
Making a total of	796

to guard eight thousand three hundred and fifty-two prisoners of war confined in the garrison square at this camp, by a fence constructed of inch-boards, twelve feet high.

The election was to take place on Tuesday, the eighth, two days thereafter.

By deferring action till the night of Monday,

the seventh instant, probably all the officers and leaders, and many more of the men and arms, of the expedition, might have been captured, and more home rebels exposed; but such delay would have protracted the necessary movements and attending excitement, into the very day of the Presidential election.

The great interests involved would scarcely justify taking the inevitable risks of postponement.

Sending a despatch, dated half-past eight o'clock P. M., November six, by messenger over the railroad, to Brigadier-General John Cook, commanding the District of Illinois, a copy of which, numbered *one*, is annexed to, and made a part of this report, the following arrests were made during the night.

Colonel G. St. Ledger Grenfell, and J. T. Shanks, an escaped prisoner of war, at the Richmond House; Colonel Vincent Marmaduke, at the house of Doctor E. W. Edwards, No. seventy Adams street; Brigadier-General Charles Walsh, of the "Sons of Liberty;" Captain Cantrell, of Morgan's command; and Charles Traverser, rank unknown, probably an officer under an assumed name, at the house of General Walsh; Judge Buckner S. Morris, treasurer of "Sons of Liberty," at his house, number six Washington street; also capturing at the same time in Walsh's house, about thirty rods from Camp Douglas, arms and ammunition, as per annexed schedule, numbered *two*. The shot guns were all loaded with cartridges, composed of from nine to twelve largest sized buckshot, and capped. The revolvers, (Joslyn's patent ten inch barrel,) also loaded and capped. Reported to Brigadier-General John Cook, commanding District of Illinois, and Colonel William Hoffman, Commissary-General of Prisoners, by telegraphic despatch, dated Camp Douglas, November seven, at four o'clock A. M., a copy of which is hereto annexed, numbered *three*, made a part of this report.

On the morning of Monday, the seventh inst., Colonel John L. Hancock, commanding militia, by order from Governor Yates, reported to me, and Colonel R. M. Hough rapidly organized a mounted force of about two hundred and fifty men, which was armed with the revolvers captured, (from Walsh reported,) and were assigned to duty as patrols in the city of Chicago, remaining on duty till the morning of the ninth.

Captain Bjerg, Military Provost Marshal, Captain William James, Provost Marshal First District of Illinois, the police of the city, and various detachments of this garrison, under different officers, arrested during the day and night of the seventh instant, one hundred and six bushwhackers, guerrillas, and rebel soldiers; among them many of the notorious "Clingman gang," of Fayette and Christian counties, in this State, with their Captain, Sears, and Lieutenant Garland, all of whom are now in custody at Camp Douglas.

On the eleventh of November forty-seven double-barrelled shot guns, thirty Allen's patent

breech-loading carbines, and one Enfield rifle were seized at Walsh's barn, in the city of Chicago.

Finding from investigation that the Sons of Liberty in this city continued to meet and plot, on the night of Sunday, the third of November, Patrick Dooley, secretary of the temple in this city, was arrested, and such papers as had not been destroyed, some of them valuable, as showing the intents and purposes of the organization, seized.

On the night of Monday, November fourteenth, the following named persons, members of the "Sons of Liberty," were arrested, viz: Obediah Jackson, "Grand Senior," Charles W. Patten, "Member of State Council," Mr. Fenton, "Tyler" or door-keeper, James Geary, a dangerous member, Richard T. Semmes, nephew to pirate Semmes, Dr. E. W. Edwards, who harbored Colonel Marmaduke, all of whom remain in custody.

On the fifteenth instant a young Englishman, from Canada, under British protection-papers, named Mongham, was arrested, who proves to be a messenger between Jacob Thompson, Captain Hines, Brigadier-General Walsh, and the guerrillas of Colonel Jesse, of Kentucky.

An examination of many of the persons so arrested, show, beyond all doubt, that the "Sons of Liberty" is a treasonable, widely-extended, and powerful organization, touching into almost, if not all, the counties of this State; that it is an organization of two branches, one civil, the other military, the members of the civil being on probation for the military branch; that important secrets in relation to military plans, and the location of the depots for arms, were carefully guarded from persons of civil membership, though even they well knew that the organization had such depots, and was animated with a spirit of intense hostility to the government; that many of its leaders must have known of the intended attack on this camp and city, and that some of them have actually been in consultation face to face with men whom they knew to be rebel officers, conspiring to produce a revolution in the North-west.

A schedule is hereto attached numbered *four*, which is believed to contain the names of some of the leading and most dangerous men belonging to this organization in the several counties of the State of Illinois.

I respectfully recommend that the officers of the rebel army, and as many of the "Sons of Liberty" and guerrillas above mentioned, as the interests of the Government may require, be tried before a military commission and punished.

I cannot close this report without expressing my conviction that the gratitude of the country is due to the Eighth regiment Veteran Reserve Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel L. C. Skinner commanding; the Fifteenth regiment Veteran Reserve Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Martin Flood commanding; and the Twenty-fourth Ohio battery, Lieutenant James W. Gamble commanding,

which comprised the small garrison at Camp Douglas, during two weeks of severe, and almost unexampled duty. A garrison overworked for months, its officers and enlisted men met the demand for added and wearing duty, necessary to hold harmless the great interests committed to their care, with a cheerful alacrity and steady zeal, deserving the warmest commendations.

Captain John Nelson, and so much of the police of this city as were detailed to act with him, and report to me, executed orders and performed duty with rare fidelity and energy.

Colonel R. M. Hough and the mounted patrol under his command, deserve great credit for promptitude in organization, and duty efficiently performed.

I have the honor to be, Captain,
Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
B. J. SWEET,
Colonel Commanding.

[No. 1.]

HEADQUARTERS POST, CAMP DOUGLAS,
TREMONT HOUSE, half-past 8 o'clock, P. M.,
CHICAGO, Illinois, November 8, 1864. }

Brigadier-General John Cook, Springfield, Ill.:

GENERAL: I send this despatch by a messenger for two reasons.

First. I am not entirely sure of the telegraph, and the messenger will arrive about as soon as would a telegram.

Second. Though pressed for time, I can explain more fully our circumstances here, and what I propose to do. The city is filling up with suspicious characters, some of whom we know to be escaped prisoners, and others who were here from Canada during the Chicago Convention, plotting to release the prisoners of war at Camp Douglas. I have every reason to believe that Colonel Marmaduke of the rebel army is in the city under an assumed name, and also Captain Hines of Morgan's command, also Colonel G. St. Leger Grenfell, formerly Morgan's Adjutant-General, as well as other officers of the rebel army.

My force is, as you know, too weak and much overworked, only eight hundred men, all told, to guard between eight and nine thousand prisoners. I am certainly not justified in waiting to take risks, and mean to arrest these officers, if possible before morning.

The head gone, we can manage the body. In order to make these arrests perfect, I must also arrest two or three prominent citizens, who are connected with these officers, of which the proof is ample.

These arrests may cause much excitement; I ought to have more force here at once. It seems to me as unwise as it is unsafe to leave a central location like Chicago, with an unarmed rebel army near it, insecurely guarded, especially in times of doubt like these.

I have made repeated representations on this subject, and I am well assured that they have been seconded both at District and Department

Headquarters. May I ask that you will again represent our necessities, and urge by telegraph that we be reinforced at once.

I regret that I am not able to consult with you on my proposed action, before acting, without letting an opportunity pass which may never again occur, and which so passing would leave us open to much danger.

It may happen that this action will be delayed till to-morrow night, but probably it will not. I shall telegraph in the morning if anything is done. If I do not telegraph, please give your views for my guidance to this messenger.

I fear the telegraph might notify the parties interested.

I have the honor to be, General,
Very respectfully,
B. J. SWEET,
Colonel Commanding Post.

P. S.—I have no time to copy this despatch. Please send me copy for record. B. J. S.

[No. 2.]

Schedule of arms, ammunition and equipments seized:

- 142 shot guns, double-barrelled, loaded.
- 349 revolvers, Joslyn's patent, loaded.
- 13,412 ball cartridges, cal. 44 and 46.
- 344 boxes caps.
- 3 boxes cones, (extra.)
- 265 bullet moulds, for pistols.
- 239 cone wrenches, for pistols.
- 8 bags buck-shot, No. 4.
- 2 kegs powder, partly filled.
- 114 holsters for revolvers.
- 8 belts for holsters.
- 47 shot guns, double-barrelled.
- 30 Allen's breech-loading carbines.
- 1 Enfield rifle.

[No. 3.]

CAMP DOUGLAS,
CHICAGO, Ill., Nov. 7—4 o'clock, A. M. }

Brigadier-General John Cook, Springfield, Ill.:

Have made during the night the following arrests of rebel officers, escaped prisoners of war, and citizens in connection with them:

Morgan's Adjutant-General, Colonel G. St. Leger Grenfell, in company with J. T. Shanks, an escaped prisoner of war, at Richmond House.

J. T. Shanks, Colonel Vincent Marmaduke, brother of General Marmaduke.

Brigadier-General Charles Walsh, of the "Sons of Liberty;" Captain Cantrell, of Morgan's command; Charles Traverse (Butternut). Cantrell and Traverse arrested in Walsh's house, in which were found two cart-loads large size revolvers, loaded and capped, two hundred stands of muskets loaded, and ammunition. Also seized two boxes guns concealed in a room in the city. Also arrested Buck. Morris, Treasurer "Sons of Liberty," having complete proof of his assisting Shanks to escape, and plotting to release prisoners at this camp.

Most of these rebel officers were in this city on the same errand in August last, their plan being to raise an insurrection and release prisoners of war at this camp. There are many strangers and suspicious persons in the city, believed to be guerillas and rebel soldiers. Their plan was to attack the camp on election night. All prisoners arrested are in camp. Captain Nelson and A. C. Coventry of the Police rendered very efficient service.

B. J. SWEET,
Colonel Commanding.

(No. 4.)

List of names of prominent members of the "Sons of Liberty" in the several counties of the State of Illinois.

Names.	County.	Names.	County.
Jas. W. Singleton.....	Adams	Wm S. Moore.....	Christian
Thomas P. Bond.....	Bond	B. S. Morris.....	Cook
Harry Wilton.....	Bond	W. C. Wilson.....	Crawford
Thos. Hunter.....	Bond	L. W. Odell.....	Crawford
Martin Brooks.....	Brown	Dickins.....	Cumberland
C. H. Atwood.....	Brown	J. C. Armstrong.....	Dewitt
Fred. Rearick.....	Caes	C. H. Palmer.....	Dewitt
Allen J. Hill.....	Caes	B. T. Williams.....	Douglas
David Epler.....	Caes	Amos Green.....	Edgar
James A. Dick.....	Caes	R. M. Blahop.....	Edgar
Saml. Christey.....	Caes	W. D. Latahaw.....	Edwards
T. J. Clark.....	Champaigne	Levi Eckels.....	Fayette
Jas. Morrow.....	Champaigne	Dr. Bassett.....	Fayette
H. M. Vandever.....	Christian	T. Greathouse.....	Fayette
J. H. Clark.....	Christian	Chas. T. Smith.....	Fayette
S. S. Whitehead.....	Clark	N. Simons.....	Ford
H. H. Peyton.....	Clark	Ed. Gill.....	Ford
Phillip Dougherty.....	Clark	A. D. Duff.....	Franklin
A. M. Christian.....	Clay	B. F. Pope.....	Franklin
Stephen B. Moore.....	Coles	W. B. Kelly.....	Franklin
D. Wickersham.....	Cook	A. Perry.....	Fulton
G. S. Kimberly.....	Cook	J. H. Philsob.....	Fulton
S. Corning Judd.....	Fulton	E. D. Halm.....	Knox
Charles Sweeney.....	Fulton	J. M. Nicholson.....	Knox
L. Walker.....	Hamilton	James Dethridge.....	Knox
M. Couchman.....	Hancock	E. Elsworth.....	Knox
M. M. Morrow.....	Hancock	D. H. Morgan.....	Lawrence
J. M. Finch.....	Hancock	E. D. Norton.....	Logan
Dennis Smith.....	Hancock	A. M. Miller.....	Logan
J. S. Rainsdell.....	Henderson	P. J. Hously.....	Macoupin
A. Johnson.....	Henderson	Dr. T. M. Hone.....	Madison
Ira R. Wills.....	Henry	H. K. S. O'Melveny.....	Marion
Chas. Durham.....	Henry	S. R. Carigan.....	Marion
Morrison Francis.....	Henry	John Burns.....	Marshall
J. B. Carpenter.....	Henry	P. M. Janney.....	Marshall
J. Osborn.....	Jackson	C. M. Baker.....	Marshall
G. W. Jeffries.....	Jasper	R. Smithson.....	Marshall
G. H. Varnell.....	Jefferson	J. R. Taggart.....	Marshall
Wm. Dodds.....	Jefferson	J. Haringhorst.....	Mason
J. M. Pace.....	Jefferson	J. S. Chamberlain.....	Mason
James Sample.....	Jersey	J. W. Mathews.....	McDon'h
O. W. Powell.....	Jersey	J. C. Thompson.....	"
M. Y. Johnson.....	Jo. Daviess	Thos. A. Mastevs.....	"
David Sheen.....	Jo. Daviess	Wm. H. Neese.....	"
M. Simmons.....	Jo. Daviess	R. Caswell.....	McLean
Louis Shister.....	Jo. Daviess	J. C. Springer.....	McLean
Thomas McKee.....	Knox	T. Alexander.....	Putnam
J. F. Worrell.....	McLean	W. H. G. Burney.....	Putnam
E. D. Wright.....	Menard	H. B. Kays.....	Putnam
Edward Lanning.....	Menard	E. S. Wilson.....	Richland
Robert Holloway.....	Mercer	J. W. Barrett.....	Sangamon
Robt. Davis.....	Montgomery	W. T. Barrett.....	Sangamon
Thos. Grey.....	Montgomery	Jacob Epler.....	Sangamon
W. J. Latham.....	Morgan	B. R. Piper.....	Sangamon
J. O. S. Hays.....	Morgan	W. M. Springer.....	Sangamon
J. W. McMillan.....	Morgan	E. Edmonston.....	Schuyler
D. Patterson.....	Moultrie	P. L. Campbell.....	Schuyler
Dr. Keller.....	Moultrie	J. Montgomery.....	Schuyler
G. D. Read.....	Ogle	J. C. Fox.....	Schuyler
W. W. O'Brien.....	Peoria	J. N. Ward.....	Schuyler
Peter Sweet.....	Peoria	G. W. Ments.....	Schuyler
Jacob Gale.....	Peoria	F. B. Thompson.....	Shelby
P. W. Dunne.....	Peoria	Reuben Ruessler.....	Shelby
John Butler.....	Peoria	W. Friend.....	Wabash
John Francis.....	Peoria	C. Z. Landes.....	Wabash

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Names.	County.	Names.	County.
C. H. Wright.....	Peoria	J. E. McCourtney.....	Warren
John Oug.....	Putnam	N. K. Poefler.....	Warren
M. Richardson.....	Shelby	John Hanna.....	Warren
M. Shallenberger.....	Stark	G. W. Aiken.....	Williamson
J. B. Smit.....	Stevenson	R. M. Hendley.....	Williamson
J. L. Carr.....	Vermillion	C. A. Richardson.....	Woodford
John Donlar.....	Vermillion		

Doc. 52.

BATTLE AT TAH-KAH-O-KUTY MOUNTAIN.

GENERAL SULLY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS N. W. INDIAN EXPEDITION, }
CAMP ON HEART RIVER, D. T., July 31, 1864. }

SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of my operations since July twenty-five:

On the twenty-third of this month I reached this point, having made rapid marches, considering I had a very large emigrant train under my charge. I had started in a direction west, but on the road, receiving information that the Indians were on or near the Knife river, I changed my course in a northerly direction. On my arrival at this point I coralled all my wagons and the emigrant train, leaving it under charge of Captain Tripp, Dakota cavalry, with a sufficient force to guard against danger. * * *

About three P. M., on the twenty-sixth, I succeeded in getting off, and about ten A. M., of the twenty-eighth, succeeded in reaching the enemy's camp, about eighty miles' march.

All their camp was standing when I reached there, and they prepared for a fight, no doubt with full confidence of whipping me, for they had twenty-four hours' notice of my advance, by a party of my scouts falling in with a war party of theirs, not sixteen miles from here. We followed their trail, which led me to the camp.

I found the Indians strongly posted on the side of a mountain called Tah-kah-o-kuty, which is a small chain of very high hills, filled with ravines, thickly timbered and well watered, situated on a branch of the Little Missouri Gros Ventres, latitude forty-seven degrees fifteen minutes, as laid down on the Government map. The prairie in front of the camp is very rolling, and on the left, as we approached, high hills. On the top and sides of these hills, and on my right, at the base of the mountains; also on the hillocks in front, on the prairie, the Indians were posted; there were over one thousand six hundred lodges, at least five thousand or six thousand warriors, composed of the Unk-papahs, San-saice, Blackfeet, Minniecougues, Yanck-ton-ais, and Santee Sioux. My force consisted as follows: eleven companies of the Sixth Iowa cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Pollock commanding; three companies of the Seventh Iowa cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Pattee commanding; two companies Dakota cavalry, Captain Miner commanding; four companies of Brackett's Minnesota battalion, Major Brackett commanding; about seventy scouts, and a

prairie battery of two sections, commanded by Captain N. Pope. This formed the First brigade. Ten companies of the Eighth Minnesota infantry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rodgers; six companies of the Second Minnesota cavalry, under Colonel McLaren, and two sections of the Third Minnesota battery, under Captain Jones, formed the Second brigade, under command of Colonel Thomas. The whole of my force numbering on the field about two thousand two hundred men.

Finding it was impossible to charge, owing to the country being intersected with deep ravines filled with timber, I dismounted and deployed six companies of the Sixth Iowa on the right, and three companies of the Seventh Iowa, and on the left six companies of the Eighth Minnesota infantry; placed Pope's battery in the centre, supported by two companies of cavalry; the Second cavalry on the left, drawn up by squadrons; Brackett's Minnesota battalion on the right in the same order; Jones' battery and four companies of cavalry as a reserve. The few wagons I had closed up, and the rear guard, composed of three companies, followed. In this order we advanced, driving in the Indians until we reached the plain between the hills and mountains. Here large bodies of Indians flanked me; the Second cavalry drove them from the left. A very large body of Indians collected on my right for a charge. I directed Brackett to charge them. This he did gallantly, driving them in a circle of about three miles to the base of the mountains and beyond my line of skirmishers, killing many of them. The Indians, seeing his position, collected in large numbers on him, but he repelled them, assisted by some well directed shots from Jones' battery. About this time a large body of Indians, who we ascertained afterward had been out hunting for me came up on my rear. I brought a piece of Jones' battery to the rear, and with the rear guard dispersed them.

The Indians seeing that the day would not be favorable for them, had commenced taking down their lodges, and sending back their families. I swung the left of my line round to the right and closed on them, sending Pope with his guns and the Dakota cavalry (two companies) forward. The artillery fire soon drove them out of their strong positions in the ravines, and Jones' battery, with Brackett's battalion moving upon the right, soon put them to flight, the whole of my line advancing at the same time.

By sunset no Indians were on the ground. A body, however, appeared on top of the mountain over which they had retreated. I sent Major Camp, Eighth Minnesota, with four companies Eighth Minnesota forward; they ascended to the top of the hill putting the Indians to flight, and killing several. The total number of killed, judging from what we saw, was from one hundred to one hundred and fifty. I saw them during the fight carry off a great many

dead or wounded. The very strong position they held, and the advantages they had to retreat over a broken country prevented me from killing more. We slept on the battle-ground that night.

The next morning before daylight we started to go round the mountain, as I could not get up it with wagons and artillery in front. After six miles' march I came in sight of the trail on the other side of the mountain, but could not get to it. One sight of the country convinced me there was no use trying to follow up the Indians through such a country and find them. I went on to the top of the hill, and as far as I could see with my glass (some thirty miles), the country was cut up in all directions by deep ravines, sometimes near one hundred feet deep, filled with timber, the banks almost perpendicular. I therefore thought the next best thing to do was to destroy their camp. This I did, ordering Colonel McLaren, Second cavalry, on that duty. I enclose you a report of property destroyed by him. That afternoon I marched six miles from the battle-ground and camped. About dark a large body of Indians came on to my pickets and killed two. A command was immediately sent after them, but they fled in all directions. They made no further demonstrations on my march to this point, which I reached yesterday, my animals well tired out, having made a march of over one hundred and sixty-five miles in six days one day being occupied in the fight.

The officers and men of my command behaved well, and all appeared desirous to carry out my instructions as well as they could.

My thanks are due to the officers of my staff for communicating my orders promptly, sometimes being obliged to expose themselves very much in so doing. Captain Pell, Adjutant-General; Major Wood, Fifteenth New York cavalry, chief of cavalry; Captain Marsh, Sixth Iowa cavalry, Inspector-General; Captain Von Winden, Brackett's battalion, acting Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant Ellison, Sixth Iowa cavalry, acting Ordnance Officer; Lieutenant Bacon, Dakota cavalry, acting Assistant Quartermaster; and I was also obliged to accept the services of Surgeon Freeman, Medical Director, to carry orders.

I shall march towards the Yellowstone in two days, bearing a little south, and I expect to overtake the enemy again on my way.

I would beg leave also to add that the day after the fight, when I returned to the enemy's camp, some Indians came forward and planted a white flag on the hill-side, some men, however, fired on them and they retreated. I saw the flag too late.

I enclose you the list of killed and wounded and reports of different commanders.

With much respect,

Your obedient servant,

ALFRED SULLY,

Brigadier-General,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of the Northwest.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND MINNESOTA CAVALRY, }
July 29, 1864. }

Captain John H. Pell, A. A. G.:

I have the honor, most respectfully, to report that, in accordance with Special Orders, No. 62, Headquarters Northwestern Indian Expedition, Camp No. 34, July twenty-nine, 1864, I proceeded to the Indian camp with four companies of Second Minnesota cavalry, Major Rich commanding, and two companies of Dakota cavalry, Captain Miner commanding; four companies of the Sixth Iowa, and three companies Eighth Minnesota infantry, under Major Camp. On arriving at the camp a few straggling Indians were seen lurking about the Bluffs. I immediately dismounted, and deployed company G, Second Minnesota cavalry, who skirmished through the timber and remained in a position to protect the working parties. I commenced by disposing of the various forces so as to destroy with the least delay the vast quantities of goods left in the timber and ravines adjacent to the camp. The men gathered into heaps and burned tons of dried buffalo meat packed in buffalo skin cases, great quantities of dried berries, buffalo robes, tanned buffalo, elk, and antelope skins, household utensils, such as brass and copper kettles, mess pans, &c., riding saddles, dray poles for ponies and dogs.

Finding that one day was too short a time to make the destruction complete, I ordered the men to gather only the lodge-poles in heaps and burn them, and then deployed the men, and fired the woods in every direction; the destruction was thus complete, and everywhere was manifest the rapid flight of the Indians, leaving everything, even their dogs and colts tied to the pickets. In skirmishing the timber dead Indians were found, killed by exploding shells. After a thorough examination of the camping ground, and by judging from the amount of lodge-poles burnt, I should judge the camp to have numbered fourteen hundred lodges. I would report that after the work of destruction commenced the Indians carried a white flag on the bluff close to the camp. As I could not interpret the meaning at this particular time, I did not feel called upon to report the fact to you until I had accomplished the object and carried out order No. 62.

I have the honor to be,
most respectfully,
Your obedient servant,
R. N. MCLAREN,
Colonel, Second Minnesota Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS INDEPENDENT COMPANY }
INDIAN SCOUTS, August 2, 1864. }

Adjutant-General North-West Indian Expedition:

According to the circular requesting commanders of regiments, battalions, and companies to hand in an official report of their positions in action on the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth of July, 1864, I give the following statements:

The position awarded me, when line of battle

was first formed, was in rear of Captain Pope's battery of artillery, to support the battery, which position I held until after passing around the high butte on the left, where the Indians had made a strong stand, driving them from the butte down towards their camp on double-quick, frequently halted by Captain Pope, while he would send them a few shells. When arriving near the foot of the hill Captain Pope ordered me to go ahead, deployed as skirmishers, so that he should not be surprised by parties secreted in ravines. When arriving at a point of timber before us a bold party of warriors came dashing at us; the Captain ordered me to halt, which order was obeyed. The Captain sent them a few shells, scattering them in every direction. The Captain then desired to get a position on a point some distance to the left, where he intended to shell the timber; my position was then on the right—gained the point without any difficulty; only a few Indians made their appearance, whom we drove back by a few rounds with carbines. The Captain then shelled the timber a short time; he then desired to gain another point still further to the left; he then ordered me to march my company, by file, near the timber on the right. When we reached the point, as I was getting my company into line, and the Captain planting his pieces, the Indians fired on us, killing one of my horses and wounding another. I immediately ordered the men to dismount, every fourth man holding horses, and made a charge on the enemy, firing into the dense thicket, killing two Indians and wounding one, which my Winnebago boys afterwards killed, scalped and beheaded. I then returned to the battery, marched some distance to the left, where we remained until ordered into camp. My officers and men behaved bravely. On the twenty-ninth marched with headquarters, first brigade, having no action.

C. STUFFT,

Captain, Commanding Independent Company Indian Scouts.

CAMP No. 26, N. W. INDIAN EXPEDITION, }
August 2, 1864. }

Sir: I have the honor to report that in the battle of the twenty-eighth of July, 1864, my command was held in reserve for a time in rear of the battery of the First brigade, until a space occurred in the skirmishers on the left between the Eighth Minnesota infantry and Seventh Iowa cavalry, when I was sent with company A, of my command, to occupy said space. When, after driving the Indians for some two miles, a large quantity of Indians appeared on a hill in front of us. When we charged up the hill and fired several volleys, at short range, with good effect; when Captain Pope, with his battery, company B, of my command, company M, Sixth Iowa cavalry, and the Nebraska scouts came promptly to my support, which caused the Indians to retreat. I then, with company A, Dakota cavalry, passed to the left of a hill, which was in our front, when the battery, with company B of my command, went to the right,

when, after a little skirmishing, the Indians went up the mountains, which were in front of the command.

We then halted, and soon after returned and compared with the rest of the command. On the battle field, at an early hour next morning, after ascertaining that it was impossible to follow the Indians further with any prospect of success, I went to the Indian camp with both companies of my command, in accordance with orders, for the purpose of destroying the property of said Indians, and although several other companies were at work destroying the property of the Indians my two companies destroyed some seven hundred skin lodges, a large quantity of buffalo robes, camp equipage, and provisions.

The casualties in my command was only one soldier of company A, slightly wounded. In conclusion, I beg leave to state that in my opinion great wisdom was displayed in the conducting of said battle by our most worthy General.

I am sir,

Your most obedient servant,

NELSON MINER,

Captain Commanding Dakota Cavalry.

Brigadier-General ALFRED SULLY,

Commanding Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS PRAIRIE BATTERY,
CAMP ON HEART RIVER, August 1, 1864. }

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that, in the late fight with Indians at Tah-kah-o-kuty, on Thursday, July twenty-eight, I was ordered to take position with my battery in advance and fifty yards in rear of the line of skirmishers in front, with orders to fire when I got within range. I advanced slowly to within about nine hundred yards of the Indians, when I run one piece forward in front of the skirmishing line and fired three rounds of spherical case shot, killing five or six and wounding several Indians. I was then ordered to move to the left, with instructions to head them off and drive them towards the right. I advanced at a full run, supported by four companies of cavalry, sending one section of the battery and two companies of cavalry on either side of the high butte to the left of our line of battle, wheeling and firing as often as I got within range. The line of skirmishers was a mile in rear of the battery. We succeeded in clearing the knolls on the left and driving the Indians into the ravines under the mountains. I shelled them out of there and forced them into the hills, where it was impossible to follow with either artillery or cavalry. We moved again to the left, hoping to find an opening to get the battery on top of the hills, but unfortunately did not succeed in finding a road.

It is impossible to say how many Indians were killed in this movement, as the dead were carried off as soon as they fell; but from what I saw and from information since received, I think the number will not fall below thirty killed and wounded; my loss was nothing.

Great praise is due the detailed men on duty

with the Prairie battery for their coolness and prompt obedience of orders; and it may not be improper here to mention Captain Miner's and Tripp's companies of Dakota cavalry, Captain Williams's company of the Sixth Iowa cavalry, and the Nebraska scouts, who gave me all the assistance in their power and were very efficient. I am, Captain, with great respect, your obedient servant,

NAITH POPE,

Captain Commanding Prairie Battery.

Captain JOHN H. PELL,

A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BATTALION, SEVENTH IOWA CAVALRY, }
CAMP No. 26, N.W. INDIAN EXPEDITION, August 2, 1864. }

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report that on the twenty-eighth of July, 1864, the command broke camp on a branch of the Knife river at an early hour, and marched in a northwestern direction. My battalion was marching in rear of the left column of the first brigade. At about ten o'clock, A. M., information was brought in by the guides that a large body of Indians had been discovered a few miles directly in our front. I was ordered to move my men to the head of the left column. After marching a short distance the Indians appeared in large numbers in front, and I was ordered to dismount my men and deploy them in front as skirmishers. My formation was in the centre, the Sixth Iowa cavalry being on my right and the Eight Minnesota on the left. As soon as the formation was completed the whole line commenced advancing, and after marching from one and a half to two miles a still larger number of Indians could be seen maneuvering on the base of a large and abrupt range of wooded hills a few miles in front. They soon advanced to meet our line, which continued steadily to advance, and a scattering fire was commenced, the first volley being fired at an Indian who appeared in front brandishing a war club and apparently directing the movements of the others, this being the opening fire of the fight. The fire then became general and continued with intervals along our whole line. Although my men had never before been under fire, they continued to advance steadily and deliberately, and met and repelled the charges made by the Indians from time to time with great firmness and composure.

The advance continued in this way about one hour when the Eighth Minnesota, being severely pressed, fell back leaving my left entirely unsupported and a large break in the line. This I attempted to obviate for some time by extending my intervals and allowing my left to bend slightly to the rear until a battery and its supports taking up their position on our left, I reformed my line and continued to advance. At this time a battery with its support took up its position on our left, and a force of cavalry on our right, and advancing in front of our line drove the Indians out of our reach, when we

ceased firing and followed in rear of the cavalry to the foot of the bluffs.

The whole fight lasted about six hours, during which time the Indians were driven a distance of about ten miles.

It is to be regretted that because of the nature of the ground and the Indian way of fighting, much of our fire was wasted. The ground over which we advanced was very uneven, and the Indians would gather behind knolls and in ravines on our front, and fire upon us and scatter away on their swift-footed ponies.

Too much praise cannot be given to officers and men of my command for the calm bearing and good judgment evinced upon all occasions and under all circumstances.

My troops took no part in any action on the twenty-ninth. As to casualties I am happy to state that I lost no men either in killed or wounded.

I am, very respectfully,
Your obedient servant,

JOHN PATTEE,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Seventh Iowa Cavalry Volunteers.

Captain JOHN H. PELL,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS SMOODS BRIGADE, N. W. INDIAN }
EXPEDITION, CAMP No. 26, August 1, 1864. }

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to make the following report in relation to the operations of my command during the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth of July last:

At eleven o'clock A. M., I received notice that the Indian camp was found, and my brigade was ordered from the rear to the left of the First brigade, and also to direct Captain Jones, Third Minnesota battery, to report to the Brigadier-General commanding, which was promptly done, and advance the command in column, company K, Eighth Minnesota volunteers, having the advance as skirmishers. After advancing about two miles, six companies of the Eighth Minnesota volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel Rogers commanding, were dismounted and deployed to the front on the left of the First brigade, at three paces intervals. The Second Minnesota cavalry were held in reserve marching in columns of squadrons at half distance one hundred paces in rear of the line on the left.

After advancing about one mile a light fire was commenced on the enemy, who began to appear in large numbers in front, and rapidly passed to the left flank and rear. The left of the Eighth Minnesota was thrown slightly to the rear, and two companies of the Second Minnesota cavalry dismounted and deployed still further to the left in that direction.

At this time large numbers of Indians were passing in that direction, and attacked the rear guard of the main train which was promptly repulsed by the guard, which consisted of companies B and D Eighth Minnesota volunteers,

and company B, Second Minnesota cavalry, and a shell from Lieutenant Whipple's six-pounder. At this time Colonel McLaren with two more companies of his regiment were sent to the front, immediately on the left of the Eighth regiment, when they were dismounted and took possession of a range of sharp hills, which was rapidly done by a sharp skirmish.

At this point the left of the whole line was halted and the right thrown forward. After a few minutes the whole line advanced in the same direction, the whole brigade moving as rapidly as possible, much of the time on the run, over broken ground, the firing being kept up briskly and with good effect. After advancing about two miles the miserable enemy rapidly retired. The Second cavalry was mounted and pushed rapidly forward, and the Eighth regiment closed to the right by companies; and the whole line closed on the enemy's abandoned camp, which was a splendid position for defence. After arriving in the camp four companies of the Eighth regiment were sent forward to escort Captain Jones' battery to the front, for the purpose of shelling a ravine containing water. These companies, under Major Camp, being deployed, advanced through the ravine and ascended the steep hills rapidly, and, in a lively skirmish, drove the rear guard of the enemy from the sight of camp.

At dusk the command was withdrawn a short distance to the left and bivouacked for the night. At an early hour in the morning of the twenty-ninth, the brigade took the advance to the left, searching for a passage after the Indians over the immense hill. After advancing five or six miles the attempt was abandoned, as the ground was so broken that it was impossible to proceed.

The command then countermarched, and returned to the Indian camp, when Colonel McLaren, with four companies of his regiment, three companies of the Eighth Minnesota volunteers, and a large portion of the First brigade, worked with a will for six hours, destroying the abandoned property of the Indians, which was a very large proportion of all the property belonging to the camp of one thousand six hundred lodges. Late in the afternoon the return march was resumed, and we again camped on the battle-ground.

At dusk two of the pickets, members of company D, Second Minnesota cavalry, were surprised and killed by a small party of Indians, which is the only casualty of consequence which occurred in the command during the engagement.

The complete success of our force was owing to the self-possession and bravery of both officers and men, the superiority of their arms, their skill in handling them, and the ready and cheerful obedience to all orders.

It is useless to mention individuals when the whole command did their duty so well. I take pleasure in recommending them to the Briga-

dier-General commanding the expedition as good and faithful soldiers.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

M. T. THOMAS,

Colonel, Eighth Minnesota Volunteers,
Commanding Second Brigade.

Captain J. H. PELL, A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS SIXTH IOWA VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,
CAMP No. 24, July 29, 1864.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operations of eleven companies of the Sixth Iowa volunteer cavalry on the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth of July, 1864 (company K having been left in garrison at Fort Randall, D. T.), in connection with the battle with the Indians at Tah-kah-o-kuty. On the morning of the twenty-eighth instant, the two brigades took up the line of march from their camp (number thirty-four) and Big Knife river, in a direction west of north. The First brigade, consisting of the Sixth Iowa volunteer cavalry, three companies of the Seventh Iowa volunteer cavalry, Brackett's battalion of Minnesota cavalry, two companies of Dakota cavalry, the Prairie battery, and one company of Indian scouts, being in advance. About eleven o'clock, A. M., the guides announced that they had discovered Indians in large numbers at a place called Tah-kah-o-kuty, directly in our front, and at a distance of but a few miles, as reported by them, but which eventually proved to be at least ten miles away.

The position occupied by the Indians consisted of a ridge of buttes, varying from four hundred to eight hundred feet in height, the sides of which were covered with timber and large rocks. Deep wooded ravines, almost inaccessible to cavalry, protected nearly the whole front of these buttes. South of this position were lower ranges of buttes, over which it was necessary to pass to reach the almost impregnable position occupied by the enemy. These lower ranges were broken, uneven, and stony.

Upon the announcement of the presence of Indians in our front, the line of battle was immediately formed by the General commanding: the Seventh Iowa volunteer cavalry being in the center, the Sixth Iowa cavalry on the right, and the Eighth Minnesota infantry on the left, the Prairie battery, supported by company M, Sixth Iowa cavalry, and the Indian scouts advancing in the interval between the Sixth and Seventh Iowa cavalry. One battalion, composed of companies A, G, L, and D, of the Sixth Iowa volunteer cavalry, was commanded by Captain John Galligan, company A; one battalion (companies B, E, and F), by Captain D. C. Cram, company B; and one battalion (companies C, H, and I) by Major House, company G, were thrown in advance of the line of skirmishers. Strong parties of Indians came out well mounted (some of them on American horses), and attacked us from eight to ten miles from their position in the Bluffs. Six companies, viz: A, C, D, H, I, and L were dismounted and deployed as skirmish-

ers on the right, company G dismounted and skirmishing in the advance, three companies (B, E, and F) remaining mounted, and used as a reserve, under command of Captain D. C. Cram. After advancing and skirmishing about three miles, the Indians gathered in large numbers on and near a high butte in front of our left. The Prairie battery took position, and after firing a few rounds dislodged and scattered them. We continued to advance for about two miles further, constantly skirmishing and driving the enemy before us, when they again massed in large numbers on our right front. A part of the Minnesota battery, supported by company E, Sixth Iowa cavalry, was placed in position on our right, and after a few rounds scattered them, they moving still further to our right, near the high bluffs, which extended some distance in that direction. A charge was here made upon them by Brackett's battalion of Minnesota cavalry, and they were again driven more to our front, gradually falling back to their strongest position in the range of bluffs before indicated. Our line continued to advance, but by direction of the General commanding was not to move in advance of the Seventh Iowa cavalry on our left, but was to present a connected and continuous line. We were delayed for an hour or more awaiting the advance of the Seventh Iowa cavalry.

The artillery and cavalry were thrown forward, on the right and left, driving the enemy up in the bluffs. Our line again advanced, and reached and took possession of the bluffs about sunset, the artillery having shelled the enemy from their shelter in the woods and behind the rocks on the sides of the bluffs in our front. But one casualty occurred in the regiment: one man in company M, Sixth Iowa cavalry was severely but not dangerously wounded. The day was excessively hot. The men were dismounted and carrying their arms and ammunition (weighing about twenty-five pounds), and the Indians, being well mounted, were able, generally to move out of the range of our rifles. It is impossible to give, with any degree of certainty, the number of Indians killed; many, however, were seen to fall from their horses, and several were known to have been killed. We encamped about two miles north of the battle-field, and the next morning started in pursuit of the Indians toward the Little Missouri river; but, after marching about two hours, were obliged to turn back, having found it impossible to move any further with wagons in that direction. Upon returning to the battle-field, four companies were detailed to destroy property, consisting of lodges, poles, and dried meat. Both officers and men behaved well throughout.

I have the honor to remain, sir,

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

S. M. POLLOCK,

Lieutenant-Colonel Sixth Iowa Cavalry, Commanding Regiment.

Captain JOHN H. PELL,

A. A. G., First Brigade North-western Indian Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS BRACKETT'S MINNESOTA BATTALION,
CAMP No. 26, NORTH-WEST INDIAN EXPEDITION,
August 1, 1864.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the part I took with my command in the action with hostile Indians on July twenty-eighth, 1864:

I was first ordered to move in column on the right, which I did. Subsequently I received orders to support the line of skirmishers in advance, which I did by bringing companies B and C in line, with companies A and D as support. I moved in that order some three miles when, finding the enemy massing in considerable force and attacking my right, I engaged them with company B dismounted, at the same time asking and receiving permission of you to charge them with sabre. I immediately gave the order to Captain E. Y. Shelley, of company C, to charge them with his company, which order he executed and followed up in a manner highly creditable to himself and those under him. The charge resulted in the killing of thirteen Indians found on the field, and entirely routing the balance. Finding the enemy forming in large numbers on my left and front I rallied my whole command and found it necessary to dismount them; as I was being severely annoyed from ravines and thickets impracticable for horse. After severe skirmishing, drove the enemy to the base of a high hill, where I met with a strong opposition, they being in strong force on its summit. I finally succeeded in taking possession of the hill, which I held, driving the enemy far beyond. The nature of the ground in front rendering it impracticable to pursue further at the time, I rejoined your command with my battalion.

In the charge Sergeant George W. Northrup, of company C, fell, after receiving eight or ten wounds, one of which pierced him through the heart. Horatio Austin, of Company D, was also killed while skirmishing. My loss during the day was two killed and eight wounded. I also lost twenty-two horses, punishing the enemy by killing twenty-seven found dead on the field afterward, besides quite a number that were seen to have been carried off by them.

I take pleasure, General, in saying that my officers and men displayed an amount of courage, coolness, and skill worthy of veterans that they are.

I am, General, with profound respect, yours to command,

A. B. BRACKETT,
Major Commanding Battalion.
Captain JOHN H. PELL,
A. A. G.

Doc. 53.

THE SALTVILLE EXPEDITION.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

BY SHERMAN, KY., October 12, 1864.

Having seen, in several papers, very conflicting details of the Salt-works Expedition,

and feeling that the facts have not yet been placed before the public as they occurred, and as justice to the officers and men demand, I ask a place in your columns for the publication of as accurate a report as, I think, can be made, having been an eye-witness, and, I assure you, an impartial one, to the incidents and results of this expedition. For the correctness and accuracy of my statements, my only reference will be the brave officers and men who composed the force, the two leading objects of my communication being to adhere strictly to the truth and to award to each gallant soldier his share of honor in this movement, which, if it was not a victory, was no less a test of their courage, endurance and forbearance, under the most trying circumstances, the responsibility of which rests not with them. I will not enter into the details of the expedition before reaching Prestonburg, as the march was without incidents worthy of recital. I will only mention, in the opening of my account, the fact which was, of itself, a most shameful error, six hundred of the horses which were to be used in this move, belonging to the First division, having been inspected by the Division and Brigade Inspectors, were condemned as unfit for service for a single day. A large number besides these were reported by the inspectors as probably fit for a march of three days. Upon these animals, broken down by thirty days' service with General Hobson in driving Adam Johnson from Western Kentucky, the men were started; the result was that many of the soldiers were dismounted after a few miles' travel, and walked the remainder of the trip to the salt-works and back.

The expedition left Prestonburg on Sunday, the twenty-sixth day of September, under the immediate command of General McLean, the whole under the command of Brevet Major-General Burbridge. The brigade marched in the rear from Prestonburg to Ivy Mountain, crossing this dangerous pass in the night, the road being so rough and narrow that the battery under command of Lieutenant Wallace had to be taken to pieces to effect the crossing, which would only admit one animal or man at a time. The column was occasionally bush-whacked up to the Virginia line, when we struck the Virginia State Road, one of the finest mountain roads in the United States, notwithstanding one correspondent has represented it as almost impassable. No skirmishing occurred until we were near the rebel General Berran's house, in the Richland Valley, where the Fourth brigade was engaged in two slight skirmishes for a short time, in which they drove the enemy before them. The troops encamped at General Berran's on the night of the thirtieth of September. The following morning, October first, the march was resumed, the First brigade in advance. Four miles from this point we reached the foot of Clinch Mountain, the Thirtieth Kentucky, Colonel Alexander, with two companies of the Fortieth Kentucky, under Colonel Litteral, being

the advance guard. By felling trees the rebels had completely blockaded the road over the mountain. This was naturally a very strong position. Several hundred rebels, under the command of Giltner, having taken possession of, and secreted themselves on the side of the mountain, poured a galling fire into the head of the column. The Thirtieth, Forty-fifth and Fortieth Kentucky were by General Hobson dismounted immediately, and ordered to drive the rebels from their position. The Fortieth Kentucky was sent to the left to co-operate with the Forty-fifth and Thirtieth Kentucky, who were on the right. After stubborn fighting the rebels yielded their position, with the loss of several killed and wounded. Two Federals were killed, and about ten or twelve wounded, among whom was Captain Adams, Forty-fifth Kentucky. All the officers and troops behaved with great gallantry. The column proceeded to Laurel Gap, where they again encountered the rebels. This also was a formidable position, and had it been held with tenacity, it would have been almost impossible to dislodge the enemy. By the masterly handling of his troops General Hobson compelled the enemy to fall back. The Fortieth and Thirteenth Kentucky, under command of Colonel True, were enabled, by their position, to do most of the fighting, and pouring a galling fire into the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, Colonel Alexander, Colonel True, Colonel Starling and Captain Page displayed great courage, as did the entire command. Any rash movement upon the part of Hobson at this place would certainly have brought heavy loss to his men. The troops encamped a little beyond this point, about six miles from the salt-works. The march was resumed the following morning, the Third brigade having the advance, when we arrived within two miles of the salt-works, when the skirmishing commenced, and there was constant fighting from this point to the works. Colonel Hanson and all his troops acted with marked courage, and finally drove the rebels to their lines near the salt-works. Here the troops were arranged to deliver battle, the various regiments holding the following positions: The Third brigade on the right, the First brigade the centre, and Fourth brigade the left. Our lines thus formed a semicircle. The fight was opened on the left by Colonel Ratcliffe, early in the day. Terrific fighting occurred. The action soon became general along our entire line. Our attack developed, in less than thirty minutes, the fact, that in addition to the strongest natural fortifications, the rebel position had been strengthened by the most formidable earthworks, erected with skill and mounted with rifled guns of heavy calibre and long range. It was also quickly discovered that they had received heavy reinforcements, as their long lines of infantry and cavalry, which were held in reserve, were plainly in view. The position assigned Colonel Hanson and his men exposed them to a withering and deadly fire from both artillery and mus-

ketry, thereby rendering useless all their efforts to accomplish the end intended. The position that Hanson was expected to carry was a heavy fort, protected on its left by an extensive rifle-pit, situated on the top of a cliff not less than one hundred and fifty feet high, in order to reach which he would have been compelled to ford a river from ten to fifteen feet deep, and ascend the cliff, which was almost perpendicular. The gallant Hanson could not execute impossibilities, and has probably lost his life in attempting to lead his men where it would have been certain destruction to them.

Colonel Hanson was supported by Colonel True, with the Fortieth Kentucky mounted infantry, and Forty-fifth Kentucky mounted infantry, until Hanson fell, when True was ordered to take command of Hanson's brigade, and held the position until the troops were ordered to withdraw. I may here mention that at one time Colonel Ratcliffe's brigade (Fourth) drove the enemy into the town of Saltville, and held a position nearer the salt-works than any other portion of the command. Lieutenant-Colonel Bentley distinguished himself greatly, commanding the Twelfth Ohio volunteer cavalry. About one o'clock the Thirtieth Kentucky mounted infantry and Thirteenth Kentucky cavalry were ordered by Hobson to cross the river at a point opposite the centre of our line, and carry the rebel centre, which they did, with unflinching bravery, under fearful fire from rebel batteries, killing and wounding a number of rebels. Here we also lost heavily in officers and men, but our men not only held their position, but drove the enemy to their works. Supporting this move, a detachment of the Eleventh Kentucky cavalry of seventy-five men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Grier, made a dashing charge. At this critical moment, Lieutenant Wallace, Fortieth Kentucky, was ordered to bring up his howitzer battery for the purpose of shelling the rebel lines, the reports from which sounded like pop-guns, when compared with the thunder of the rebel artillery. Of course all these movements occupied time, and about four o'clock General Hobson was ordered by the commanding general to assume command of all the troops, and withdraw them from the field, our ammunition being exhausted, the men without rations, and exposed to almost certain capture. When the facts became known to the troops that the command had been turned over to Hobson, there were outbursts of joy and many demonstrations of confidence; and during our entire subsequent march he was received by the troops with cheers and shouts as he moved backward and forward, looking after their safety and interests. General Hobson ordered fires to be built along the lines, and as soon as it was dark he withdrew his army in order and without confusion. He immediately sent forward two regiments to take possession of, and hold Laurel Gap, to prevent a flank movement by the rebels. The army marched this night eighteen miles, arriving at Berran's the following morning, where we

found Generals Burbridge and McLean. I must here remark that had the rebels been permitted to reach the gap before us, the entire command would probably have been captured, generals and all. General Hobson personally superintended the crossing of the troops through the dangerous pass of Laurel Gap that night, and was the last man to leave.

During our retreat the troops suffered great privations, substituting paw-paws, wild grapes, &c., for rations. The enemy was skirmishing constantly with our rear, in which Lieutenant-Colonel Mason, of the Eleventh Michigan, was killed. General Hobson sent detachments forward to hold the road on both flanks, to prevent the enemy from getting in our front, and to him the entire command feels indebted for bringing them safely back to Mount Sterling.

Before closing, I may mention that a detachment of the First Kentucky cavalry and Third Kentucky mounted infantry, consisting of two hundred men, under Major Keene, were sent through Pound Gap, to make a diversion in our favor. They had a fight with Prentice at Gladesville, Virginia, and whipped him, scattering the rebels and capturing their cannon. I am unable to give any account of further movements of Generals Burbridge and McLean, as they were not with the troops at any time after the command was assumed by Hobson. But I have learned that they arrived safely in Cincinnati almost a week previous to the arrival of the troops in Mount Sterling. I have endeavored to be brief and just, and if any have not been mentioned, whose bravery deserved it, the neglect is unintentional, for all deserved great praise. Although I have been in several expeditions previous to this, I have not before fought under either of the three Generals of this expedition, and can, therefore, honestly disclaim any of that preference which too frequently leads to misrepresentations. Public comment alone can rectify the wrong wherever it may be.

A SOUTHERN ACCOUNT.

For the truth of history, it is proper that we should give the country the facts connected with the late battle fought at Saltville, on Sunday the second instant. We have the facts, given us by an intelligent and reliable friend, who was present and witnessed almost the entire engagement.

It was the purpose of the enemy, under Burbridge, to take the salt-works and then form a junction with Gillem, and destroy the lead and iron-works, and then by rapid movements, form a junction with Sheridan, at or near Lynchburg. The success of these plans would have told heavily on our cause and on our country; but, thanks to the skill and valor of our officers and men, these schemes, so cunningly devised, and so extensively planned, have failed; the enemy with a large force, has been whipped, and his disorganized and scattered ranks driven from our lines.

Colonel H. L. Giltner, of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry, met the enemy, and for three days and nights contested, with great energy, his advance; but his superior strength finally pressed the gallant Giltner and his men back on the salt-works. We had, by this time, collected a little less than seven hundred reserves, and a number of pieces of artillery. Colonel Trigg, of the Fifty-fourth Virginia, had volunteered his services, and was actively engaged in disposing of the forces, when Brigadier-General A. E. Jackson arrived.

The enemy were now in our front in full force, with eleven regiments and eight pieces of artillery. The contest seemed almost hopeless, yet surrender would have been disgraceful.

All the ammunition belonging to the six-pound guns, and much of that belonging to the small arms had been sent back the evening before, nine miles distant, to Glade Springs. It seemed almost madness to yield, and yet destruction to contend. This was early in the morning, before ten o'clock. Just then, Brigadier-General John S. Williams, with his magnificent division, composed of three brigades, arrived. A new feeling and spirit at once came over the face of affairs. He promptly assumed command of all the troops present, and made his dispositions. The First Kentucky, Colonel Griffith; Tenth Kentucky, Colonel Trimble; Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Giltner; two battalions of reserves, Brigadier-General Robertson's brigade, Colonel Debrill's brigade, and Colonel Breckinridge's Ninth Kentucky cavalry, constituted our line of battle, extending from left to right in the order in which they are mentioned. We had also a number of artillery, well posted in the redoubts, so as to command the enemy as he advanced. These were well served—all of them. The fight was severe along our whole line, but the severest and most destructive was on our right. Colonel Debrill's brigade mowed down the advancing hosts of the enemy with terrible slaughter. All our troops behaved most admirably. The reserves acted well their part, and deserve all praise; but the heaviest and severest portion of the fighting was done by General Williams' division, and by Giltner's brigade.

It is to Colonel Giltner, who held the enemy in check, and kept him back from the salt-works for a period so long, and to General Williams, who placed the troops and did the fighting on the day of the battle at Saltville, on the second instant, that the credit is due for saving the salt-works, and, incidentally, the country. It is to him, and the valor of the troops under him—Brigadier-General John S. Williams—that the credit of this glorious and important victory is due.

There was not a General present ranking him, or one who assumed the responsibility of that important engagement, until the last gun was fired. And yet, strange to say, from the published accounts, made by telegraph and other-

wise, no one would suppose that this gallant and distinguished officer was even present.

The loss of the enemy was very heavy—it could not have been less than seven hundred or eight hundred in killed wounded and missing. They left dead on the field one hundred and four white and one hundred and fifty-five negro soldiers, who were buried the next day after the battle. The number of wounded and captured was much larger still.

The loss on our side is comparatively small, less than one hundred in number, killed and wounded. Among those who fell gloriously discharging their duty was Colonel Trimble, Tenth Kentucky cavalry, and Lieutenant Crutchfield of the same regiment. Their deeds of valor will long be remembered by their countrymen.

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THE CAPTURE OF FORT FISHER.

GENERAL TERRY'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES ON }
FEDERAL POINT, N. C., January 26, 1862. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following detailed report of the operations which resulted in the capture of Fort Fisher and the occupation of Fort Caswell, and the other works at the mouth of Cape Fear river.

On the second instant I received from the Lieutenant-General in person orders to take command of the troops destined for the movement. They were three thousand three hundred picked men from the Second division of the Twenty-fourth Army Corps, under Brigadier-General (now Brevet Major-General) Adelbert Ames; the same number from the Third division of the Twenty-fifth Army Corps, under command of Brigadier-General Charles J. Paine; one thousand four hundred men from the Second brigade of the First division of the Twenty-fourth Army Corps, under Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier-General) J. C. Abbott, Seventh New Hampshire volunteers; the Sixteenth New York independent battery, with four three-inch guns, and light battery E, Third United States artillery, with six light twelve-pounder guns. I was instructed to move them from their positions in the lines on the north side of the James river to Bermuda landing, in time to commence their embarkation on transport vessels at sunrise on the fourth instant.

In obedience to these orders, the movement commenced at noon of the third instant. The troops arrived at the landing at sunset and there bivouacked for the night.

The transports did not arrive as soon as they were expected. The first of them made its appearance late in the afternoon of the fourth. One of them, the Atlantic, was of too heavy draught to come up the James; Curtis' brigade of Ames' division was therefore placed on river steamboats and sent down the river to be transferred to her.

The embarkation of the remainder of the force commenced at sunset of the fourth and was completed at noon of the fifth instant; each vessel, as soon as it was loaded, was sent to Fort Monroe, and at nine o'clock p. m. of the fifth the whole fleet was collected in Hampton Roads. The troops were all in heavy marching order, with four days' rations from the morning of the fourth in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes. No horses, wagons, or ambulances were taken; the caissons of the artillery were left behind, but in addition to the ammunition in the limber-chests, one hundred and fifty rounds per gun, in packing boxes, were embarked.

I went down the river personally with the Lieutenant-General, and on the way received from him additional instructions, and the information that orders had been given for the embarkation of a siege train, to consist of twenty thirty-pounder Parrott guns, four one hundred-pounder Parrotts, and twenty Cohorn mortars, with a detail of artillerists and a company of engineers, so that in case siege operations should become necessary the men and material for it might be at hand.

These troops, under the command of Brevet Brigadier-General H. L. Abbott, were to follow me to Beaufort, North Carolina, and await orders. It was not until this time that I was informed that Fort Fisher was the point against which we were to operate.

During the evening of the fifth orders were given for the transports to proceed to sea at four o'clock the next morning, and accompanying these orders were sealed letters, to be opened when off Cape Henry, directing them to rendezvous, in case of separation from the flag-ship, at a point twenty-five miles off Beaufort, North Carolina.

The vessels sailed at the appointed hour. During the sixth instant a severe storm arose, which so much impeded our progress that it was not until the morning of the eighth that my own vessel arrived at the rendezvous; all the others excepting the flag-ship of General Paine were still behind. Leaving Brigadier-General Paine to assemble the other vessels as they should arrive, I went into Beaufort harbor to communicate with Rear-Admiral Porter, commanding the North Atlantic blockading squadron, with whose fleet the forces under my command were destined to co-operate.

During the eighth nearly all the vessels arrived at the rendezvous; some of them required repairs to their hulls, damaged by the gale; some repairs to their machinery; others needed coal or water. These vessels were brought into the harbor or to the outer anchorage, where their wants were supplied; all the others remained, until the final sailing of the expedition, some twenty to twenty-five miles off the land. The weather continued so unfavorable as to afford no prospect that we would be able to make a landing on the open beach of Federal Point until Wednesday, the 11th. On that day Admiral

Porter proposed to start, but at high water there was still so much surf on the bar that the iron-clads and other vessels of heavy draught could not be gotten over it; our departure was therefore delayed till the next day.

On the morning tide of the twelfth the vessels in the harbor passed out, and the whole fleet of naval vessels and transports got under way for this place. As we were leaving, the vessels containing General Abbott's command came in sight; orders were sent to them to follow us.

We did not arrive off Federal Point until nearly night-fall; consequently, and in accordance with the decision of the Admiral, the disembarkation of the troops was not commenced until the next morning. Our subsequent experience fully justified the delay; it would have been extremely difficult to land the men at night.

At four o'clock A. M. of the thirteenth, the inshore division of naval vessels stood in close to the beach to cover the landing. The transports followed them, and took positions as nearly as possible in a line parallel to and about two hundred yards outside of them. The iron-clads moved down to within range of the fort and opened fire upon it. Another division was placed to the northward of the landing-place, so as to protect our men from any attack from the direction of Masonboro Inlet. At eight o'clock nearly two hundred boats, beside steam-tugs, were sent from the navy to the transports, and the disembarkation of men, provisions, tools, and ammunition simultaneously commenced.

At three o'clock P. M. nearly eight thousand men, with three days' rations in their haversacks, and forty rounds of ammunition in their boxes, six days' supply of hard bread in bulk, three hundred thousand additional rounds of small-arm ammunition, and a sufficient number of intrenching tools, had been safely landed. The surf on the beach was still quite high, notwithstanding that the weather had become very pleasant; and owing to it some of the men had their rations and ammunition ruined by water; with this exception, no accident of any kind occurred.

As soon as the troops had commenced landing pickets were thrown out; they immediately encountered outposts of the enemy, and shots were exchanged with them, but no serious engagement occurred. A few prisoners were taken, from whom I learned that Hoke's rebel division, which it was supposed had been sent further south, was still here, and that it was his outposts which we were meeting.

The first object which I had in view after landing was to throw a strong defensive line across the peninsula from the Cape Fear river to the sea, facing Wilmington, so as to protect our rear from attack while we should be engaged in operating against Fisher. Our maps indicated that a good position for such a line would be found a short distance above the head of Myrtle Sound, which is a long, shallow piece of

water separated from the ocean by a sand-spit of about one hundred yards in width, and communicates with it by Masonboro Inlet.

It was supposed that the right flank of a line at that point would be protected by the sound, and, being above its head, that we should by it control the beach as far up as the inlet, and thus, in case of need, be able to land supplies in quiet water there. Our landing place was selected with reference to this idea. An examination made after we landed showed that the sound for a long distance above its head was so shallow as to offer no obstacle to the passage of troops at low tide, and as the further down the peninsula we should go the shorter would be our line across it, it was determined to take up a position where the maps showed a large pond occupying nearly one third of the width of the peninsula at about three miles from the fort. Shortly before five o'clock, leaving Abbott's brigade to cover our stores, the troops were put in motion for the last-named point. On arriving at it, the "pond" was found to be a sand-flat, sometimes covered with water, giving no assistance to the defence of a line established behind it. Nevertheless, it was determined to get a line across at this place, and Paine's division, followed by two of Ames' brigades, made their way through. The night was very dark, much of the ground was a marsh, and ill adapted to the construction of works, and the distance was found to be too great to be properly defended by the troops which could be spared from the direct attack upon the fort. It was not until nine o'clock P. M. that Paine succeeded in reaching the river.

The ground still nearer the fort was then reconnoitred and found to be much better adapted to our purposes; accordingly, the troops were withdrawn from their last position, and established on a line about two miles from the work. They reached this final position at two o'clock A. M. of the fourteenth instant. Tools were immediately brought up and intrenchments were commenced. At eight o'clock a good breastwork, reaching from the river to the sea, and partially covered by abatis, had been constructed and was in a defensible condition. It was much improved afterward, but from this time our foothold on the peninsula was secured.

Early in the morning of the fourteenth, the landing of the artillery was commenced, and by sunset all the light guns were gotten on shore. During the following night they were placed on the line, most of them near the river, where the enemy, in case he should attack us, would be least exposed to the fire of the gunboats.

Curtis' brigade of Ames' division was moved down toward Fisher during the morning, and at noon his skirmishers, after capturing on their way a small steamer which had come down the river with shells and forage for the garrison of the fort, reached a small unfinished outwork in front of the west end of the land-front of the work.

General Curtis, Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brevet Brigadier-General) Comstock, the chief engineer of the expedition, and myself, under the protection of the fire of the fleet, made a careful reconnoissance of the work, getting within six hundred yards of it. The report of General Comstock, which, with its accompanying map, is appended hereto, gives a full description of it and its condition at that time.

As the result of this reconnoissance, and in view of the extreme difficulty which might be expected in landing supplies and the material for a siege on the open and often tempestuous beach, it was decided to attempt an assault the next day, provided that in the mean time the fire of the navy should so far destroy the palisades as to make one practicable.

This decision was communicated to Admiral Porter, who at once placed a division of his vessels in a position to accomplish this last-named object. It was arranged in consultation with him that a heavy bombardment from all the vessels should commence early in the morning and continue up to the moment of the assault, and that even then it should not cease, but should be diverted from the points of attack to other parts of the work.

It was decided that the assault should be made at three o'clock P. M.; that the army should attack on the western half of the land-face, and that a column of sailors and marines should assault at the north-east bastion.

The fire of the navy continued during the night. At eight o'clock A. M., of the fifteenth, all of the vessels, except a division left to aid in the defence of our northern line, moved into position, and a fire, magnificent alike for its power and accuracy, was opened.

Ames' division had been selected for the assault. Paine was placed in command of the defensive line, having with him Abbott's brigade in addition to his own division. Ames' first brigade—Curtis'—was already at the outwork above-mentioned, and in trenches close around it; his other two brigades, Pennypacker's and Bell's, were moved at noon to within supporting distance of him. At two o'clock preparations for the assault were commenced. Sixty sharpshooters from the Thirteenth Indiana volunteers, armed with the Spencer repeating carbine, and forty others, volunteers from Curtis' brigade, the whole under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Lent, of the Thirteenth Indiana, were thrown forward at a run to within one hundred and seventy-five yards of the work. They were provided with shovels, and soon dug pits for shelter, and commenced firing at the parapet.

As soon as this movement commenced the parapet of the fort was manned and the enemy's fire, both of musketry and artillery, opened.

As soon as the sharpshooters were in position, Curtis' brigade was moved forward by regiment, at the double-quick, into line at about four hundred and seventy-five yards from the work. The men there laid down. This was

accomplished under a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, from which, however, they soon sheltered themselves by digging shallow trenches.

When Curtis moved from the outwork, Pennypacker was brought up to it, and Bell was brought into line two hundred yards in his rear. Finding that a good cover for Curtis' men could be found on the reverse slope of a crest, fifty yards in the rear of the sharpshooters, they were again moved forward, one regiment at a time, and again covered themselves in trenches. Pennypacker followed Curtis, and occupied the ground vacated by him, and Bell was brought up to the outwork.

It had been proposed to blow up and cut down the palisades; bags of powder, with fuses attached, had been prepared, and a party of volunteer axemen organized; but the fire of the navy had been so effective during the preceding night and morning that it was thought unnecessary to use the powder. The axemen, however, were sent in with the leading brigade, and did good service by making openings in portions of the palisading which the fire of the navy had not been able to reach.

At three twenty-five P. M. all the preparations were completed, the order to move forward was given to Ames, and a concerted signal was made to Admiral Porter to change the direction of his fire.

Curtis' brigade at once sprung from their trenches and dashed forward in line; its left was exposed to a severe enfilading fire, and it obliqued to the right so as to envelop the left of the land-front; the ground over which it moved was marshy and difficult, but it soon reached the palisades, passed through them, and effected a lodgement on the parapet. At the same time the column of sailors and marines, under Fleet-Captain K. R. Breese, advanced up the beach in the most gallant manner and attacked the north-east bastion; but, exposed to a murderous fire, they were unable to get up the parapet. After a severe struggle and a heavy loss of valuable officers and men, it became apparent that nothing could be effected at that point, and they were withdrawn. When Curtis moved forward, Ames directed Pennypacker to move up to the rear of the sharpshooters, and brought Bell up to Pennypacker's last position, and as soon as Curtis got a foothold on the parapet sent Pennypacker in to his support. He advanced, overlapping Curtis' right, and drove the enemy from the heavy palisading, which extended from the west end of the land-face to the river, capturing a considerable number of prisoners; then pushing forward to their left, the two brigades together drove the enemy from about one quarter of the land-face. Ames then brought up Bell's brigade, and moved it between the work and the river. On this side there was no regular parapet, but there was abundance of cover afforded to the enemy by cavities from which sand had been taken for the parapet, the ruins of barracks and store-

houses, the large magazine, and by traverses, behind which they stubbornly resisted our advance. Hand-to-hand fighting of the most desperate character ensued, the huge traverses of the land-face being used successively by the enemy as breastworks, over the tops of which the contending parties fired in each other's faces. Nine of these were carried one after the other by our men.

When Bell's brigade was ordered into action I foresaw that more troops would probably be needed, and sent an order for Abbott's brigade to move down from the north line, at the same time requesting Captain Breeze to replace them with his sailors and marines. I also directed General Paine to send me one of the strongest regiments of his own division; these troops arrived at dusk and reported to General Ames. At six o'clock Abbott's brigade went into the fort; the regiment from Paine's division—the Twenty-seventh United States colored troops, Brevet Brigadier-General A. M. Blackman commanding—was brought up to the rear of the work, where it remained under fire for some time, and was then withdrawn. Until six o'clock the fire of the navy continued upon that portion of the work not occupied by us; after that time it was directed on the beach, to prevent the coming up of reinforcements, which it was thought might possibly be thrown over from the right bank of the river to Battery Buchanan. The fighting on the traverses continued till nearly nine o'clock, two more of them being carried; then a portion of Abbott's brigade drove the enemy from their last remaining strongholds, and the occupation of the work was completed.

The same brigade, with General Blackman's regiment, were immediately pushed down the Point to Battery Buchanan, whither many of the garrison had fled. On reaching the battery all of the enemy who had not been previously captured were made prisoners. Among them were Major-General Whiting, and Colonel Lamb, the commandant of the fort.

About four o'clock in the afternoon Hoke advanced against our north line, apparently with the design of attacking it; but if such was his intention he abandoned it after a skirmish with our pickets.

During the day Brevet Brigadier-General H. L. Abbott, Chief of Artillery, was busily engaged in landing artillery and ammunition, so that if the assault failed, siege operations might at once be commenced.

Consequent to the fall of Fisher, the enemy, during the nights of the sixteenth and seventeenth, blew up Fort Caswell, and abandoned both it and their very extensive works on Smith's island, at Smithville and Reeve's Point, thus placing in our hands all the works erected to defend the mouth of the Cape Fear river.

In all the works were found one hundred and sixty-nine pieces of artillery, nearly all of which are heavy; over two thousand stands of small

arms; considerable quantities of commissary stores, and full supplies of ammunition. Our prisoners numbered one hundred and twelve commissioned officers and one thousand nine hundred and seventy-one enlisted men.

I have no words to do justice to the behavior of both officers and men on this occasion; all that men could do they did. Better soldiers never fought. Of General Ames I have already spoken in a letter recommending his promotion. He commanded all the troops engaged, and was constantly under fire. His great coolness, good judgment, and skill were never more conspicuous than on this assault. Brigadier-General Curtis and Colonels Pennypacker, Bell and Abbott—the brigade commanders—led them with the utmost gallantry. Curtis was wounded, after fighting in the front rank, rifle in hand; Pennypacker, while carrying the standard of one of the regiments, the first man in a charge over the traverse. Bell was mortally wounded near the palisades.

Brigadier-General Paine deserves high praise for the zeal and energy displayed by him in constructing our defensive line, a work absolutely essential to our success.

Brevet Brigadier-General Blackman deserves mention for the prompt manner in which he brought his regiment up to the work, and afterward followed up the retreating enemy.

To Brevet Brigadier-General C. B. Comstock, aid-de-camp on the staff of the Lieutenant-General, I am under the deepest obligations. At every step of our progress I received from him the most valuable assistance. For the final success of our part of the operations the country is more indebted to him than to me.

Colonel George S. Dodge, Chief Quartermaster of the Army of the James, accompanied me as Chief Quartermaster of the forces under my command. His able and energetic performance of his multifarious duties was all that could be wished for, and reflected the highest honor upon him.

Surgeon Norman S. Barnes, United States Volunteers, Medical Director, and Surgeon A. J. H. Buzzell, Third New Hampshire volunteers, Medical Inspector of the expedition, discharged their laborious duties on the field and in the hospital in a manner most creditable to their ability and humanity. I desire to express my high appreciation of the services of these officers.

I shall have the honor to submit a supplemental report in reference to those subordinate officers and enlisted men who distinguished themselves on the occasion.

I should signally fail to do my duty were I to omit to speak in terms of the highest admiration of the part borne by the navy in our operations. In all ranks, from Admiral Porter to his seamen, there was the utmost desire not only to do their proper work, but to facilitate in every possible manner the operations of the land forces. To him and to the untiring efforts of

his officers and men are we indebted that our men, stores, tools, and ammunition were safely and expeditiously landed, and that our wounded and prisoners were embarked for transportation to the North; to the great accuracy and power of their fire it is owing that we had not to confront a formidable artillery in the assault; and that we were able, with but little loss to push forward the men, preparatory to it, to a point nearly as favorable for it as the one they would have occupied had siege operations been undertaken and the work systematically approached. The assault of the sailors and marines, although it failed, undoubtedly contributed somewhat to our success, and certainly nothing could surpass the perfect skill with which the fleet was handled by its commander. Every request which I made to Admiral Porter was most cheerfully complied with, and the utmost harmony has existed between us from the outset to the present time.

I forward herewith General Ames' report.

I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ALFRED H. TERRY,
Major-General.

Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, City Point, Virginia.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL COMSTOCK'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES, FORT FISHER, }
NORTH CAROLINA, JANUARY 27, 1862. }

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of engineer operations in connection with the capture of Fort Fisher, together with a sketch of that work and another of the country in the vicinity. Fort Fisher is situated on the peninsula between the Cape Fear river and the Atlantic ocean, about a mile and a half north-east of Federal Point. For five miles north of Federal Point this peninsula is sandy and low, not rising more than fifteen feet above high tide, the interior abounding in fresh-water swamps, often wooded and almost impassable, while much of the dry land, till one gets within half a mile of Fort Fisher, is covered with wood or low undergrowth, except a strip about three hundred yards wide along the sea-shore. The landing of the troops composing the expedition was effected on the sea-beach about five miles north of Fort Fisher, on January twelve, and Paine's division was at once pushed across to Cape Fear river, with instructions to take up a line to be held against any attack from the direction of Wilmington. This line, on the morning of January thirteen, was already defensible, and was further strengthened during the day, while on the fourteenth a second line was laid out and begun under charge of Lieutenant J. H. Price, in rear of its left. Pioneer companies were organized in Ames' and Paine's divisions, and, as during the fourteenth the fire of the rebel gunboat Chickamauga killed and wounded a number of our men, Lieutenant O'Keeffe, with his company of the Fifteenth regiment New York volunteer engineers, was directed to build a battery for

two thirty-pounder Parrotts on the bank of the river, to keep her off.

On the afternoon of January fourteenth a reconnaissance was pushed under the direction of the Major-General commanding to within five hundred yards of Fort Fisher, a small advanced work being taken possession of. This was at once turned into a defensive line, to be held against any attempt from Fort Fisher. The reconnaissance showed that the palisading in front of the work had been seriously injured by the navy fire; only nine guns could be seen on the land-front where sixteen had been counted on Christmas day; the steady, though not rapid fire of the navy prevented the enemy from using either artillery or musketry on the reconnoitring party; it seemed probable that troops could be got within two hundred yards of the work without serious loss, and it was a matter of great doubt whether the necessary ammunition could be supplied by the open beach, if regular approaches were determined on. It was decided to assault, and the assault was made on the fifteenth, at three and a half p. m., after three hours' of heavy navy fire, by three deployed brigades, following one another at intervals of about three hundred yards, and each making its final rush for the west end of the land-face, from a rough rifle-pit about three hundred yards from the work.

At the point attacked the palisading was less injured than elsewhere, it being partially hidden, and it was necessary to use axes to cut and timbers to batter it down, in order that the troops might pass rapidly through it. Powder-sacks, for blowing these palisades down had been prepared, but were not used.

After seven hours' fighting, gaining traverse by traverse, the work was won.

Fort Fisher consists of two fronts—the first, or land-front, running across the peninsula at this point, seven hundred yards wide, is four hundred and eighty yards in length, while the second or sea-front runs from the right of the first parallel to the beach to the mound battery, a distance of thirteen hundred yards. The land-front is intended to resist any attack from the north, the sea-front to prevent any of our naval vessels from running through New Inlet or landing troops on Federal Point.

1. Land-Front.—This front consists of a half bastion on the left or Cape Fear river side, connected by a curtain with a bastion on the ocean side. The parapet is twenty-five feet thick, averages twenty feet in height, with traverses rising ten feet above it, and running back on their tops, which were from eight to twelve feet in thickness, to a distance of from thirty to forty feet from the interior crest. The traverses on the left half bastion were about twenty-five feet in length on top.

The earth for this heavy parapet and the enormous traverses at their inner ends, more than thirty feet in height, was obtained partly from a shallow exterior ditch, but mainly from the interior of the work. Between each pair of

traverses there was one or two guns. The traverses on the right of this front were only partially completed. A palisade, which is loop-holed and has a bauquette, runs in front of this face at a distance of about fifty feet in front of the foot of the exterior slope from the Cape Fear river to the ocean, with a position for a gun on the left of the front and the river, and another between the right of the front and the ocean. Through the middle traverse on the curtain was a bomb-proof postern, whose exterior opening was covered by a small redan for two field-pieces, to give flank fire along the curtain. The traverses were generally bomb-proofed for men or magazines. The slopes of the work appeared to have been revetted with marsh sod, or covered with grass, and to have had an inclination of forty-five degrees, or a little less. On those slopes most exposed to navy fire the revetment or grassing has been entirely destroyed, and the inclination reduced to thirty degrees.

The ends of traverses, as they rise above the parapet are very ragged. Still all damage done to the earthwork can be readily repaired, its strength being about the same as before the bombardment. The damage done by the navy fire was, first to the palisades, which were so injured as in most places to be little obstacle to assaulting troops; second, to guns and carriages. There were originally on the front twenty-one guns and three mortars. Of these three fourths were rendered unserviceable by injuries to either gun or carriage. The gun in the right bastion, the field-pieces in front of the postern, and one or two mortars, were used against the assaulting troops.

There was a formidable system of torpedoes two hundred yards in advance of this front, the torpedoes being about eighty feet apart, and each containing about one hundred pounds of powder. They were connected with the fort by three sets of wires; fortunately the sets leading directly to those over which the army and navy columns moved had been cut by shells and no torpedo was exploded.

2. Sea-Front.—This front consists of a series of batteries mounting in all twenty-four guns, the different batteries being connected by a strong infantry parapet, so as to form a continuous line. The same system of heavy traverses for the protection of the guns is used as on the land-front, and these traverses are also generally bomb-proofed.

Captain N. Adams, Fourth New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. H. Price, Fourth United States colored troops, commanding pioneer companies of Ames' and Paine's divisions, and First Lieutenant K. S. O'Keeffe, commanding company of Fifteenth New York volunteer engineers, have, with their commands, been of great service in the construction of batteries and defensive works. First Lieutenant A. H. Knowlton, Fourth New Hampshire volunteers, has rendered valuable assistance in making

sketches of Fort Fisher; as also private Schultz, Fifteenth New York volunteer engineers.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. B. COMSTOCK,

Lieutenant-Colonel and Brevet Brigadier-General,
Chief Engineer.

Major A. TERRY, A. A. G.

It may be added that in thirty bomb-proofs and magazines and their passages there were fourteen thousand five hundred feet of floor-space, not including the main magazine, which was exploded, and whose dimensions are unknown.

C. B. C.

BRIGADIER-GENERAL AMES' REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, TWENTY-FOURTH ARMY }
CORPS, FORT FISHER, N. C., JANUARY 13, 1865. }

Captain A. Terry, Assistant Adjutant-General:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the late movements and operations of this division:

On the night of the second the division, which had just returned to its camp from a demonstration against this point, received orders to prepare for a second expedition. It left camp on the third, and embarked on ocean transports at Bermuda Hundred, between the hours of seven and nine P. M., on the fourth instant.

The transport fleet sailed from Fortress Monroe on the morning of the sixth, and the troops disembarked some four miles north of Fort Fisher on the thirteenth instant.

At three o'clock P. M. on the fifteenth we stormed Fort Fisher. Brevet Brigadier-General N. M. Curtis' brigade (the First) made a lodgement on the north-west angle of the fort. I immediately ordered up Colonel G. A. Penny-packer's brigade (the Second). The enemy was at once driven from behind the palisading extending from the fort to the river, and about one third of the work, its north-west angle, occupied by us. I then ordered up Colonel Bell's brigade (the Third), and moved it forward against and in rear of the sea-face of the work, the ground being much obstructed by the ruins of the barracks, lumber, and other rubbish; the enemy being protected by traverses, and taking advantage of the cover afforded by magazines, &c., checked our advance.

Fighting of a most obstinate character continued till after dark, during which time we made considerable advancement on the left, and captured about four hundred prisoners.

About eight o'clock P. M., Colonel Abbott with his brigade completed the occupation of the face of the work, extending from the ocean to the river. A general advance was now made, and the fort occupied without opposition.

The conduct of the officers and men of this division was most gallant. Aided by the fire of the navy and an attacking column of sailors and marines along the sea beach, we were able to pass over the open ground in front of the fort, through the gaps in the palisading in the

ditch made by the naval fire, and finally to carry the work.

Where the name of every officer and man engaged in this desperate conflict should be submitted, I shall at present only be able to give a few of those most conspicuous. It is to be hoped they all may be properly rewarded.

Brevet Brigadier-General N. M. Curtis, commanding First brigade, was prominent throughout the day for his bravery, coolness and judgment. His services cannot be over-estimated. He fell a short time before dark, seriously wounded in the head by a canister shot.

Colonel G. A. Pennypacker, commanding Second brigade, was seriously wounded while planting his colors on the third traverse of the work. This officer was surpassed by none, and his absence during the day was most deeply felt and seriously regretted.

Colonel L. Bell, commanding Third brigade, was mortally wounded while crossing the bridge in advance of the palisading. He was an able and efficient officer, one not easily replaced.

I here submit the names of the regimental commanders; and in connection with the brigade commanders is the credit due them for the heroic conduct of their men.

Regimental commanders: First brigade, One Hundred and Forty-second New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel A. M. Barney; One Hundred and Seventeenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. Meyer; One Hundred and Twelfth New York volunteers, Colonel J. F. Smith; Third New York volunteers, Lieutenant E. A. Behna. Second brigade, Forty-eighth New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. Coan; Seventy-sixth Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel J. S. Littell; Forty-seventh New York volunteers, Captain J. M. McDonald; Two Hundred and Third Pennsylvania volunteers, Colonel J. W. Moore; Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania volunteers, First Lieutenant J. Wainwright. Third brigade, One Hundred and Sixty-ninth New York volunteers, Colonel Alonzo Alden; Thirteenth Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel S. M. Zent; Fourth New Hampshire volunteers, Captain J. H. Roberts; One Hundred and Fifteenth New York volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel N. J. Johnson. Colonel J. W. Moore, Two Hundred and Third Pennsylvania volunteers, behaved with the most distinguished gallantry. He was killed while passing the second traverse of the fort in advance of his regiment, waving his colors. Few equalled, none surpassed this brave officer.

Lieutenant-Colonel S. M. Zent, in command of the Thirteenth Indiana, with his own regiment and a detachment of volunteers from the First brigade, numbering in all one hundred men, deployed within two or three hundred yards of the fort and by their fire materially aided our advance.

Major J. R. Lawrence, Thirteenth Indiana volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. Colvin, One Hundred and Sixty-ninth New York volunteers, also behaved in the most gallant manner, and rendered efficient service in collecting and organizing the troops which had become separated from their commands in the charge, and in leading them to positions where important advantages were gained. Captain G. W. Huckins, Fourth New Hampshire volunteers, and First Lieutenant J. Konig, Seventh United States colored troops, aids on the staff of Colonel L. Bell, commanding Third brigade, were untiring in their labors, and rendered valuable services in the absence of my staff officers, who had been stricken down in the early part of the engagement.

Privates Ulric Chapin and James Spring, company G, One Hundred and Forty-second, D. C. Hotchkiss, company A, and O. R. Kingsland, company D, One hundred and Twelfth New York volunteers, volunteered to approach to a point considerably in advance of our skirmish line, which they did do, and by this step valuable information with reference to the ditch was gained. Privates James Cadman, wounded; William Cabe, company B; George Hoyt and S. R. Porteus, company C; D. H. Morgan and Edward Petue, company E; E. H. Cooper, company G, wounded; Silas Baker, company H, missing. George Merrill and William J. McDuff, company I; Z. C. Neahel and Bruce Anderson, company K, One Hundred and Forty-second New York volunteers, volunteered to advance with the head of the column and cut down the palisading.

Copies of the reports of the brigade commanders will be forwarded. In them will be found lists of officers and men who particularly distinguished themselves. It is recommended that medals be bestowed upon all enlisted men mentioned.

To my staff officers I am particularly indebted for their zeal and gallantry throughout the day; they were constantly passing to and fro, and exposed to the hottest fire.

I would respectfully recommend that they be brevetted for their services. Captain Charles A. Carleton, A. A. G.; Captain A. G. Lawrence, Acting A. D. C.; Captain H. C. Lockwood, A. D. C.; Captain R. W. Dawson, Assistant Inspector-General; Captain J. S. Mathews, Provost Marshal; Captain B. B. Keeler, Mustering Officer.

Captain Lawrence was the first man through the palisading, and while extending his hand to receive a guidon which he intended to place on the parapet of the work, a shell exploded near him, taking off his left arm and seriously injuring his throat. He was afterward shot in the right arm. For his services on this occasion, as well as those on a former one, I most earnestly urge his promotion. Captain Dawson was disabled by a wound in the left arm. To Captain Lockwood, General Whiting and

Colonel Lamb surrendered with the garrison at Fort Buchanan.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. AMES,
Brigadier-General Volunteers.

Doc. 55.

BLACK WATER RIVER EXPEDITION.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL SPURLING'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND MAINE CAVALRY VETERAN VOLUNTEERS, BARRANCAS, FLORIDA, October 31, 1864. }

GENERAL: I have the honor to respectfully submit the following report:

Pursuant to orders from Headquarters District of West Florida, I embarked, on the morning of the twenty-fifth of October, on steam transports at Barrancas, in charge of a force consisting of a detachment of the Second Maine veteran cavalry of one hundred men, one hundred dismounted of the First Florida cavalry, and a detachment of the Nineteenth Iowa infantry, Twenty-fifth, Eighty-second and Eighty-sixth United States colored infantry, and Company M, Captain Roberts, Second Maine cavalry, dismounted for battery purposes and in charge of two howitzers, the whole amounting, in the aggregate, to over seven hundred men.

Captain Stearns, of the Eighty-second colored infantry, was placed in charge of one of the transports, Lizzie Davis, with two hundred infantry, with orders to proceed up the Black Water river, to land a force eight miles below Pierce's mill, and distant from Milton thirteen miles, to raft logs, which are numerous along the shore, and by other and all his actions, endeavor to draw the enemy upon the narrow point of land or peninsula formed by Escambia bay on the west, and East bay and Black Water river on the east.

I proceeded with the other transport, the Planter, to Pensacola, remaining there till late in the afternoon, from thence up Escambia bay, and late in the night landed three hundred infantry, under charge of Major Mudgett, of the Eighty-sixth colored infantry, at Bayou ———, a point on the east point of Escambia bay, opposite Pierce's mill, with orders that he should march to the head of the bayou, and remain there till he should hear cannonading on the other side of the narrow point of land, when he would deploy his force across to Pierce's mill, thus cutting off the retreat of the enemy, whom I had expected, and had good reasons to believe Captain Stearns would succeed in drawing into the trap which I had prepared for them, inasmuch as they had, in considerable force, on a former occasion, attacked me while I was engaged in procuring logs at points seven or eight miles below the mill. After landing Major Mudgett I proceeded back with the Planter, and on the following morning, having rounded the point of the peninsula, was on my way up East bay or Black Water river. I did

not find the other transport, the Lizzie Davis, eight miles below the mill. It soon became apparent that Captain Stearns had failed to conform to my orders. Instead of landing as he was directed, he had gone six or seven miles too far, and some time elapsed before I found the Lizzie Davis, anchored in a small cove a mile or two from the mill. Thus, the enemy was not induced to come as far down upon the point of land as I had designated, and as would have been the case had my orders been fully carried out, and as my report will clearly show.

On coming up with the Lizzie Davis I directed Captain Lincoln, of the Second Maine cavalry, to relieve Captain Stearns of his command, to land with all possible despatch the two hundred men on board, and march direct to Milton. By eleven o'clock a. m., Captain Lincoln had landed the troops from the Lizzie Davis. I proceeded with the Planter to Pierce's mill, and landed the cavalry and battery, which I had been holding in reserve, and immediately moved toward Milton, soon coming upon Captain Lincoln, whom I found engaged with a force of the enemy's cavalry. It seems that Captain Lincoln, after landing, before he had hardly taken up the march, was met by a considerable force of cavalry, with which he became engaged. He drove the enemy to the mill and beyond it on the Milton road, where they made a stand under cover of some old buildings. On my arrival at this point the firing was quite rapid, and a brisk skirmish was going on, I immediately charged with the detachment of cavalry which I brought up, and drove the rebels from the old buildings. They fled in wild confusion on the Milton road. At the bridge they attempted to make a stand, but all to no purpose. I pursued them through Milton, and out on the Pallard road, a distance of over eight miles, capturing nine prisoners and wounding quite a number. Their rout was complete. Their arms and equipments, and everything that could impede flight, were thrown away. There were no casualties in my own force.

The enemy's force consisted of a detachment of between seventy and eighty of the Eighth Mississippi cavalry, and a small force of militia. Having kept up the pursuit as long as it was prudent, my horses becoming exhausted, and it growing late in the day, I returned to Milton, and leaving the cavalry to hold the place, went back to the Planter, which I ordered to move up to a place called Bag Dad, less than two miles from Milton, and here secured quite a large amount of lumber, about eighty-five thousand feet. I despatched a courier to Major Mudgett, with orders for him to move his forces from the bayou to Pierce's mill, and hold himself in readiness to embark at that point on the following morning.

On the following morning the pickets were taken in, and the Planter moved up the river to Milton, thus exploding, if not the torpedoes, the idea and belief that they are planted in the river to obstruct its passage by boats. Here

several flat-boats were secured, and the ferry across the river completely demolished. Quite an amount of commissary and quartermaster's property was found, among which was about two hundred bushels of corn and meal, and considerable ham and beef, and since there was no means of transportation by which it could be got to the boat, it was destroyed. Considerable surplus ordnance, accoutrements, and horse equipments, were also destroyed; several horses and mules were captured. Having brought off or destroyed everything that could be of use to the enemy, and having accomplished all that circumstances could admit of, I returned to Barrancas with my whole force, where I arrived on the morning of the twenty-eighth.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

A. B. SPURLING,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.
Brevet Brigadier-General I. BAILEY,
Commanding District West Florida.

Doc. 56.

EXPEDITION OF GENERAL GRIERSON.

GENERAL DANA'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI,
MEMPHIS, TENN., JANUARY 8, 1865.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. Christensen, Assistant-Adjutant-General Military Division, West Mississippi:

I have the gratifying opportunity of reporting the result of another very successful expedition to the Major-General commanding.

The cavalry expedition sent by me from this point against the Mobile and Ohio railroad has reached Vicksburg in safety and in good condition, with about five hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand negroes, and eight hundred horses and mules.

General Grierson has just arrived here, and his force will follow as fast as transportation can be procured. When his brigade commanders arrive and I receive his report, I will forward it to you. Meanwhile I give you the following outline of the work done:

The expedition left here on the twenty-first of December, in wretched weather, and moved directly east, threatening Corinth. Detachments were sent out which cut the telegraph from Grand Junction to Corinth, and also cut it and destroyed four bridges between Booneville and Guntown, on the Mobile and Ohio road. The main column then moved rapidly on Tupelo, and on Christmas night surprised, captured, and dispersed Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona. Here they captured six officers and twenty men, destroyed two trains of sixteen cars each, loaded with new wagons, pontoons, supplies, &c., for Hood, burnt three hundred army wagons, most of which had been captured from Sturgis, destroyed four thousand new English carbines which were for Forrest's command, and large

amounts of ordnance stores and ammunition, with quartermaster's stores and commissary stores for Hood's army.

From Verona the command moved south along the line of the road, destroying it thoroughly to a point between Egypt and Prairie stations.

At Okolono telegrams were taken from the wires from Lieutenant-General Taylor and Major-General Gardner, ordering Egypt to be held at all hazards, and promising reinforcements from Mobile and other points.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth the enemy was attacked at Egypt. General Grierson reports them about twelve hundred strong, with infantry, cavalry, and four guns on platform cars.

Two trains loaded with infantry, under Gardner, were in sight when the attack was made. A force was thrown between them and the garrison, and Gardner had the mortification to see his friends dispersed after a fight of two hours, and the stockade carried by assault, and its defenders, to the amount of about five hundred, captured. The rebel Brigadier Gholson was among the killed. Another train of fourteen cars was destroyed here.

The command was now incumbered with so many prisoners and animals that, with the hostile force in front, it was useless to think longer of going to Cahaba.

Accordingly the column turned west and south-west, through Houston and Bellefontaine, to the Mississippi Central railroad, striking it at Winona. A detachment was sent to Bankston, which destroyed the large and valuable factories which worked five hundred hands to supply the rebel army with cloth, clothing, and shoes. Large quantities of wool, cloth and leather were destroyed. A detachment was sent to Grenada, which destroyed the new machine-shops and all public property in the place. A brigade was sent south from Grenada, under Colonel Osband, which destroyed the road and telegraph for thirty-five miles, and then met a brigade of the enemy under Wirt Adams at Franklin; charged and drove them from the field, leaving twenty-five of their dead on the ground.

The troops arrived at Vicksburg on the fifth of January.

About forty miles on each road is destroyed, including a large number of bridges, telegraph, depots, switches, turn-tables, and water-tanks, four serviceable locomotives, and ten which were undergoing repairs, about one hundred cars, a pile-driver and engine, seven hundred fat hogs, very large amounts of corn and wheat, and a thousand stand of new arms at Egypt, in addition to the four thousand destroyed at Verona.

I believe this expedition, in its damaging results to the enemy, is second, in importance, to none during the war.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,
N. J. T. DANA,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION WEST MISSISSIPPI,
NEW ORLEANS, LA., JANUARY 18, 1866. }

SIR: Your communication of the eighth instant, giving a detailed account of the highly successful expedition led by Brigadier-General Grierson; and which resulted in the complete interruption of the enemy's communications by the Mobile and Ohio and the Mississippi Central railroads, has been received.

The Major-General commanding desires to express to you his gratification at this glorious, and, I might say, almost unexpected success.

The expedition was planned and started under very great disadvantages, and with anything but promising prospects; and but for the high degree of skill, bravery and good conduct, which was evinced throughout, such magnificent results could never have been accomplished.

He desires me to convey to you, and through you to the officers and men composing this expedition, his warmest congratulations and thanks. We all feel that such blows are indeed *death-blows* to the rebellion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

C. T. CHRISTENSEN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major-General N. J. T. DANA,
Commanding Department of Mississippi.

GENERAL GRIERSON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI,
MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, JANUARY 14, 1866. }

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from the Major-General commanding, I ordered Colonel James Karge, commanding First brigade cavalry division, to proceed, on the nineteenth of December, north-east from this point; cross Wolf river at Raleigh, demonstrate strongly toward the crossing of the Hatchie at Bolivar and Estenola; thence swinging south, destroy the telegraph between Grand Junction and Corinth, and join the main column, which was to move the following day at or near Ripley. Owing to heavy rains for several days, the roads were almost impassable, and, as a crossing of Wolf river could not be effected, Colonel Karge returned to Memphis.

On the morning of December twenty-one I moved with the effective force of my command, consisting of detachments of the Second New Jersey, Seventh Indiana, First Mississippi rifles, Fourth and Tenth Wisconsin, Third and Fourth Iowa, Second Wisconsin, Fourth and Eleventh Illinois, and Third United States colored cavalry, in all about three thousand five hundred men, organized into three brigades, and commanded respectively by Colonels Karge, Winslow, and Osband; also, company E, Second Iowa cavalry, numbering forty men, Lieutenant A. Sherer, commanding, as provost-guard and escort, and a pioneer corps of fifty negroes, commanded by Lieutenant Luviz, of the Seventh Indiana cavalry, without artillery or wagons, and with twenty days' light rations carried on pack-mules.

The whole command moved east, along the

Memphis and Charleston railroad, threatening Corinth, to a point three miles west of Moscow, from thence south-east through Early Grove, Lamar, and Salem, to Ripley.

From Early Grove the Tenth Missouri cavalry, under Captain F. K. Neet, was sent to La Grange and Grand Junction, and destroyed the telegraph and stations at those points, rejoining the column near Salem. From Ripley a detachment of one hundred and fifty men of the Second New Jersey, under Major Van Rensselaer, was sent to destroy the Mobile and Ohio railroad and the telegraph at or near Boonville. At the same time the Fourth Illinois, under Captain A. F. Search, was sent to destroy the same road near Guntown. These detachments rejoined the main column, one at Ellistown, the other at Shannon's station, having destroyed four bridges, eight or ten culverts, several miles of the track and telegraph, and a large quantity of army supplies.

With the main column I moved on Tupelo. Upon arriving at Old Town creek, five miles north of Tupelo, hearing of the existence of a rebel camp and large quantity of army stores at Verona, I ordered Colonel Karge to leave his pack train and proceed rapidly toward that point, and if his information would justify it, to make a night attack upon the place. Our movements thus far had been rapid, and the indications were that the enemy had no knowledge of our presence, as our appearance was a complete surprise to citizens on the line of march.

When within two miles of Verona Colonel Karge struck the enemy's pickets. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, his advance regiment, the Seventh Indiana, charged into the camp, dispersing the garrison, and destroying two trains, thirty-two cars, and eight warehouses filled with ordnance, commissary and quartermasters' stores; also two hundred army wagons, most of which were marked U. S., having been captured from General Sturgis in June last, and which were about being sent, loaded with supplies, to the army of General Hood. The bursting of shells which were contained in this immense depot continued until afternoon of the next day.

Colonel Karge fell back five miles to Harrisburg, and encamped with the balance of my command on the same night. I encamped between Old Town creek and Tupelo. From this point I sent the Eleventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Otto Funk, commanding, with the pioneer corps, to destroy the extensive railroad bridge over Old Town creek, and the track between that point and Tupelo. The night was very dark and rainy, notwithstanding which Lieutenant-Colonel Funk and his command responded to my orders with alacrity, and before morning had rendered the railroad from Old Town creek to Tupelo a complete wreck.

From this point I moved my entire command south along the railroad, destroying thoroughly to a point between Egypt and Prairie station,

several flat-boats were secured, and the ferry across the river completely demolished. Quite an amount of commissary and quartermaster's property was found, among which was about two hundred bushels of corn and meal, and considerable ham and beef; and since there was no means of transportation by which it could be got to the boat, it was destroyed. Considerable surplus ordnance, accoutrements, and horse equipments, were also destroyed; several horses and mules were captured. Having brought off or destroyed everything that could be of use to the enemy, and having accomplished all that circumstances could admit of, I returned to Barrancas with my whole force, where I arrived on the morning of the twenty-eighth.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

A. B. SPURLING,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.
Brevet Brigadier-General I. BAILEY,
Commanding District West Florida.

Doc. 56.

EXPEDITION OF GENERAL GRIERSON.

GENERAL DANA'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI,
MEMPHIS, TENN., January 8, 1865.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. T. Christensen, Assistant-Adjutant-General Military Division, West Mississippi:

I have the gratifying opportunity of reporting the result of another very successful expedition to the Major-General commanding.

The cavalry expedition sent by me from this point against the Mobile and Ohio railroad has reached Vicksburg in safety and in good condition, with about five hundred and fifty prisoners, one thousand negroes, and eight hundred horses and mules.

General Grierson has just arrived here, and his force will follow as fast as transportation can be procured. When his brigade commanders arrive and I receive his report, I will forward it to you. Meanwhile I give you the following outline of the work done:

The expedition left here on the twenty-first of December, in wretched weather, and moved directly east, threatening Corinth. Detachments were sent out which cut the telegraph from Grand Junction to Corinth, and also cut it and destroyed four bridges between Booneville and Guntown, on the Mobile and Ohio road. The main column then moved rapidly on Tupelo, and on Christmas night surprised, captured, and dispersed Forrest's dismounted camp at Verona. Here they captured six officers and twenty men, destroyed two trains of sixteen cars each, loaded with new wagons, pontoons, supplies, &c., for Hood, burnt three hundred army wagons, most of which had been captured from Sturgis, destroyed four thousand new English carbines which were for Forrest's command, and large

amounts of ordnance stores and ammunition, with quartermaster's stores and commissary stores for Hood's army.

From Verona the command moved south along the line of the road, destroying it thoroughly to a point between Egypt and Prairie stations.

At Okolono telegrams were taken from the wires from Lieutenant-General Taylor and Major-General Gardner, ordering Egypt to be held at all hazards, and promising reinforcements from Mobile and other points.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth the enemy was attacked at Egypt. General Grierson reports them about twelve hundred strong, with infantry, cavalry, and four guns on platform cars.

Two trains loaded with infantry, under Gardner, were in sight when the attack was made. A force was thrown between them and the garrison, and Gardner had the mortification to see his friends dispersed after a fight of two hours, and the stockade carried by assault, and its defenders, to the amount of about five hundred, captured. The rebel Brigadier Gholson was among the killed. Another train of fourteen cars was destroyed here.

The command was now incumbered with so many prisoners and animals that, with the hostile force in front, it was useless to think longer of going to Cahaba.

Accordingly the column turned west and south-west, through Houston and Bellefontaine, to the Mississippi Central railroad, striking it at Winona. A detachment was sent to Bankston, which destroyed the large and valuable factories which worked five hundred hands to supply the rebel army with cloth, clothing, and shoes. Large quantities of wool, cloth and leather were destroyed. A detachment was sent to Grenada, which destroyed the new machine-shops and all public property in the place. A brigade was sent south from Grenada, under Colonel Osband, which destroyed the road and telegraph for thirty-five miles, and then met a brigade of the enemy under Wirt Adams at Franklin; charged and drove them from the field, leaving twenty-five of their dead on the ground.

The troops arrived at Vicksburg on the fifth of January.

About forty miles on each road is destroyed, including a large number of bridges, telegraph, depots, switches, turn-tables, and water-tanks, four serviceable locomotives, and ten which were undergoing repairs, about one hundred cars, a pile-driver and engine, seven hundred fat hogs, very large amounts of corn and wheat, and a thousand stand of new arms at Egypt, in addition to the four thousand destroyed at Verona.

I believe this expedition, in its damaging results to the enemy, is second, in importance, to none during the war.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully,
N. J. T. DANA,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION WEST MISSISSIPPI,
NEW ORLEANS, LA., JANUARY 18, 1865. }

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The Major-General commanding desires to express to you his gratification at this glorious, and, I might say, almost unexpected success.

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He desires me to convey to you, and through you to the officers and men composing this expedition, his warmest congratulations and thanks. We all feel that such blows are indeed *death-blows* to the rebellion.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,
C. T. CHRISTENSEN,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General.
Major-General N. J. T. DANA,
Commanding Department of Mississippi.

GENERAL GRIERSON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, DEPARTMENT OF MISSISSIPPI,
SEPT., MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, JANUARY 14, 1865. }

COLONEL: In obedience to instructions from the Major-General commanding, I ordered Colonel James Karge, commanding First brigade cavalry division, to proceed, on the nineteenth of December, north-east from this point; cross Wolf river at Raleigh, demonstrate strongly toward the crossing of the Hatchie at Bolivar and Eastola; thence swinging south, destroy the telegraph between Grand Junction and Corinth, and join the main column, which was to move the following day at or near Ripley. Owing to heavy rains for several days, the roads were almost impassable, and, as a crossing of Wolf river could not be effected, Colonel Karge returned to Memphis.

On the morning of December twenty-one I moved with the effective force of my command, consisting of detachments of the Second New Jersey, Seventh Indiana, First Mississippi rifles, Fourth and Tenth Wisconsin, Third and Fourth Iowa, Second Wisconsin, Fourth and Eleventh Illinois, and Third United States colored cavalry, in all about three thousand five hundred men, organized into three brigades, and commanded respectively by Colonels Karge, Winslow, and Osband; also, company E, Second Iowa cavalry, numbering forty men, Lieutenant A. Sherer, commanding, as provost-guard and escort, and a pioneer corps of fifty negroes, commanded by Lieutenant Luvis, of the Seventh Indiana cavalry, without artillery or wagons, and with twenty days' light rations carried on pack-mules.

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Memphis and Charleston railroad, threatening Corinth, to a point three miles west of Moscow, from thence south-east through Early Grove, Lamar, and Salem, to Ripley.

From Early Grove the Tenth Missouri cavalry, under Captain F. K. Neet, was sent to La Grange and Grand Junction, and destroyed the telegraph and stations at those points, rejoining the column near Salem. From Ripley a detachment of one hundred and fifty men of the Second New Jersey, under Major Van Rensselaer, was sent to destroy the Mobile and Ohio railroad and the telegraph at or near Boonville. At the same time the Fourth Illinois, under Captain A. F. Search, was sent to destroy the same road near Guntown. These detachments rejoined the main column, one at Ellistown, the other at Shannon's station, having destroyed four bridges, eight or ten culverts, several miles of the track and telegraph, and a large quantity of army supplies.

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When within two miles of Verona Colonel Karge struck the enemy's pickets. Notwithstanding the darkness of the night, his advance regiment, the Seventh Indiana, charged into the camp, dispersing the garrison, and destroying two trains, thirty-two cars, and eight warehouses filled with ordnance, commissary and quartermasters' stores; also two hundred army wagons, most of which were marked U. S., having been captured from General Sturgis in June last, and which were about being sent, loaded with supplies, to the army of General Hood. The bursting of shells which were contained in this immense depot continued until afternoon of the next day.

Colonel Karge fell back five miles to Harrisburg, and encamped with the balance of my command on the same night. I encamped between Old Town creek and Tupelo. From this point I sent the Eleventh Illinois, Lieutenant-Colonel Otto Funk, commanding, with the pioneer corps, to destroy the extensive railroad bridge over Old Town creek, and the track between that point and Tupelo. The night was very dark and rainy, notwithstanding which Lieutenant-Colonel Funk and his command responded to my orders with alacrity, and before morning had rendered the railroad from Old Town creek to Tupelo a complete wreck.

From this point I moved my entire command south along the railroad, destroying thoroughly to a point between Egypt and Prairie station,

fifty-six miles from Boonville, where it was first struck. The enemy had concentrated a considerable force at Okolono, which, upon our approach, fell back to Egypt. Having tapped the wire at Okolono and intercepted despatches from Lieutenant-General Taylor and others, indicating that reinforcements would be sent from Mobile and other points, and learning from deserters who came in on the night of the twenty-seventh, that the reinforcements would not be likely to arrive before eleven o'clock A. M. the next day, I accordingly, on the morning of the twenty-eighth, attacked the enemy, variously estimated at from twelve hundred to two thousand strong, consisting of cavalry, infantry, and one battery of four guns on platform cars, at Egypt. While the fight was in progress two trains with reinforcements, said to be under command of General Gardner, came in sight, but I threw a force between them and Egypt, which succeeded in capturing a train of cars, tearing up the track two and a half miles south of that point, and engaged the trains with reinforcements, preventing them from joining the garrison at Egypt.

After an engagement of two hours, we killed, captured, and dispersed the enemy. Among the rebel killed were Brigadier-General Gholson and several other officers. Having secured about five hundred prisoners, cared for the dead and wounded, and destroyed all government property, I moved due west to Houston, crossing the Sockatanuchie and Houlika rivers, to both of which streams I sent detachments in advance to secure the bridges. Here the Second Wisconsin, Major Woods commanding, was detailed to take charge of the prisoners; and the officers and men of this regiment deserve much praise for the cheerfulness with which they performed this arduous duty during the balance of the march.

From Houston demonstrations were made to the north toward Pontotoc, and south-east toward West Point, while the column moved south-west via Bellefontaine to the Mississippi Central road, striking it at Winona. From Bellefontaine a demonstration was made south-east toward Starkville, threatening again the Mobile and Ohio railroad. At the same time a detachment of one hundred and twenty men of the Fourth Iowa, under Captain Beckwith, was sent south via Greenboro to Bankston, to destroy large cloth and shoe factories at that point, which employed five hundred hands for the manufacture of those articles of prime necessity to the army.

From Winona Colonel Noble, with detachment of three hundred men of Colonel Winslow's brigade, was sent north to destroy the railroad and all government property between that point and Grenada. Colonel Osband's brigade was sent south on the line of the railroad to destroy it as far as practicable. With the main column I moved south-west, via Lexington and Benton, to Vicksburg. At Benton Colonels Osband and Noble rejoined us, having been

highly successful; Colonel Osband met and engaged a detachment of Wirt Adams' command, about five hundred strong, under Colonel Woods, in which the enemy were defeated, with a reported loss of fifty killed and wounded. I reached Vicksburg with my entire command in good condition, with about six hundred prisoners, eight hundred head of captured stock, and one thousand negroes, who joined the column during the march. For particulars I refer you to the report of the brigade commanders herewith enclosed.

The average distance marched was four hundred and fifty miles.

The entire loss in the command during the expedition was four officers and twenty-three enlisted men killed, four officers and eighty-nine enlisted men wounded, and seven enlisted men missing. The destruction of property may be summed up as follows:

Twenty-thousand feet of bridges and trestle-work cut down and burned.

Ten miles of track, (rails bent and ties burned.)

Twenty miles of telegraph, (poles cut down and wires destroyed.)

Four serviceable locomotives and tenders, and ten in process of repair.

Ninety-five railroad cars.

Over three hundred army wagons and two caissons.

Thirty warehouses filled with commissary, quartermasters' and ordnance stores.

Large cloth and shoe factory, employing five hundred hands.

Several tanneries and machine shops.

A steam pile-driver.

Twelve new forges.

Seven depot buildings.

Five thousand stand of new arms.

Seven hundred head of fat hogs.

Five hundred bales of cotton, marked C. S. A.

Immense amount of grain, leather, wool, and other government property, the value and quantity of which cannot be estimated.

Over one hundred of the prisoners captured at Egypt formerly belonged to our army, and were recruited from Southern prisons into the rebel service, and most of whom, I believe, were induced to join their ranks from a desire to escape a loathsome confinement. I commend them to the leniency of the government.

I take pleasure in bearing testimony to the uniform good conduct of the officers and men of my command, and desire to express my thanks to Colonels Karge, Winslow and Osband, for their cheerful support. I also take occasion to make honorable mention of Major M. H. Williams and Captain S. L. Woodward of my staff, for their untiring energy and gallantry in the discharge of their duties.

This, one of the most successful expeditions of the war, undertaken as it was, at a period when roads and streams were considered almost impassable, could not have met with such extraordinary success without the patient

endurance and hearty cooperation which were evinced by my entire command; and all those who participated richly deserve the lasting gratitude of the Government and remembrance of their countrymen.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. H. GRIERSON.

Brigadier-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. H. HARRIS,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Department of Mississippi.

Doc. 57.

JAMES RIVER EXPEDITION.

UNITED STATES STEAMER ONONDAGA,
JAMES RIVER, VA., three miles above City Point,
Thursday Evening, May 6, 1864. }

" We have this day seen the beginning of the spring campaign. The strong arm of the government is again extended toward the heart of the Confederacy, and we trust—how earnestly—that it may not fail to gain the prize which seems almost within its grasp. The iron-clad fleet which has been gathered near the mouth of this river has found another, if not a safer, anchorage.

Until yesterday, we were not aware that the movement of the fleet in this matter would be made so soon. During the day, yesterday, the fourth instant, a number of new steamers, of the class familiarly called "double-enders," came up from Hampton Roads, and joined the fleet which has for a few days been at anchor off Newport News, and which consisted of the iron-clads Roanoke, Onondaga, two turrets; Canonicus, Tecumseh and Saugus, one turret each, and the Atlanta; of double-enders, the Mackinaw and Entaw; of gunboats, the Dawn, Osceola, Commodore Jones, Stepping Stone, and a large number of powerful armed tugs. Besides these there were steamboats armed as army transports, of all sizes, shapes, colors and models. In the evening the broad river off Newport News Point was filled with the different vessels, so that it was difficult for the iron-clads to manoeuvre among them, as they were obliged to do to take their allotted places in the line which had been planned for the movement in the morning. During the afternoon Admiral Lee transferred his flag from the steam frigate Minnesota, his former flag-ship, to the fine steamer Malvern, formerly the blockade-runner Ella and Annie, and came up into the fleet and took command. During the afternoon and evening all were busy in completing the plans for the work of the coming day. It was ordered that all vessels should be ready to move this morning at four o'clock. The morning came, and in the dim twilight the vessels got under way slowly, quietly moving from the stations they had occupied during the night. It was five o'clock before the column was passed, and then the movement of the strange-floking line began. The morning was unusually fine, the atmosphere was soft and refreshing, the river was without a ripple, and nature seemed strangely in contrast with the mission upon which we had set

out. Scarcely any of our rivers afford more enchanting scenery or a more delightful sail than the James, and although our errand was not one in search of pleasure, still it was impossible not to enjoy so beautiful a trip. At six o'clock A. M. the Admiral came by the line in his flag-ship, passed up, and was soon lost in the distance. Soon after we came to the "Wren" (so-called as a coast-survey signal-station), a fine Virginia residence, situated high up on the green sloping bank of the river. Upon the portico was a group of ladies, who intently viewed us through their glasses, yet made no disloyal demonstration, as Southern ladies sometimes do. At nine o'clock we came to Jamestown Island, upon the lower point of which we saw log cabins partially destroyed, and further along the banks, series of earth-works, quite extensive. The ruins of the old church, which was the first Protestant church built in America, is one of the few remaining marks of that short-lived settlement. As we moved by the island, the steamer Grayhound, with General Butler and staff, passed by; the General was carelessly leaning on the window of the pilot-house, and from his unassuming manner, his genial and frank, though much-abused face, he hardly looked the man who had just assumed command of sixty thousand men, and who "abolished slavery by an epigram."

Soon after ten o'clock we passed the mouth of the Chickahominy, and although its bosom was unruffled, and the foliage which skirted its banks was soft and green, we did not think of these which we saw with our own eyes, but of Fair Oaks, Malvern Hills, and Seven Pines; of a brilliant army demoralized and retreating, and of forty thousand graves they left behind.

At one o'clock we came to Fort Powhatan, a large, strong, and extensive work, on the west bank of the river, and where it makes a bend to the north, so that the fort commands the river for a long distance below. It is on top of a bank, at the elevation of eighty or ninety feet above the river, and seems almost impregnable, although the rebels have been driven from it once or twice by our gunboats; it is now unoccupied. Two of the transports have stopped, as though it was intended to disembark the men, but after a little while they push off, and are up the river again.

Up a few miles further, and we are in view of the advance vessels of the fleet, prominent among which is the flag-ship. Below us immediately is the remainder of the iron-clad fleet, and further below, even until they are lost in the river bend, are ocean and river steamers, side-wheels and propellers, barges, canal-boats, and sailing vessels, long lines of them, crowded even in shrouds and at mast-heads, with soldiers, whose bright belt-plates and clean bayonets glisten in the sun.

Through our glasses we look up the river again, and see our advance vessels off the long pier at Harrison's landing, and away beyond on a distant hill, between two high tree-tops, the

quick glass detects a belfry, from the top of which some earnest worshiper of secession is hurriedly signalling, and telling undoubtedly of the strange fleet which is approaching him.

But now we, too, have reached the landing, and discover, retreating behind the house upon the knoll, a half dozen of the chivalry, who have evidently seen better times, or at least cannot see much worse, if we may judge from the variety and color of their uniform, if it be a uniform.

But we are crossing Harrison bar, and there in front of us, three miles further, is City Point, a place become famous since the war as a point of exchange for the Union and rebel prisoners. At the landing we can see the large steamer City of New York, the flag-of-truce boat, which makes its weekly or tri-weekly trips between Fortress Monroe and this place.

One by one the transports move up, and the soldiers jump off, until the shore is lined with boats and steamers. Baggage-wagons, caissons and limbers are soon ashore, and almost immediately the signal station on the bank is occupied, and the familiar signal flag displayed, ready for communication with any point. The flag-of-truce boat, with the white flag still flying, moves away from the landing; still there is not room for a tenth of the steamers and transports which are coming; faster and faster they gather, until the river all about the point is covered, and almost clogged with the accumulating vessels. The S. R. Spaulding passes, unable to land the two thousand men who cluster from stem to stern, below and aloft, like immense swarms of bees. The men who have landed have formed in line, and then goes marching along the dusty road on the river bank, a full regiment, route-step, arms at will, and bound Richmondward.

The iron-clads move in order to a point two miles above City Point; come to anchor. Admiral Lee, who has been upon the Tecumseh during the afternoon, takes the gunboat Mount Washington and returns to his own ship.

And now, after a day of intense excitement and thrilling interest, the sun slowly settles behind the thick, rich foliage, promising a night of rest—if it may be—to prepare for what the morrow may bring us to do.

But on the shore, on our right, and only a little way off, are three or four ladies grouped together beneath the intertwining trees, and earnestly engaged in discussing a very interesting matter. They are evidently occupants of the fine unique old mansion which stands on the bank immediately behind them. They must be talking about the strange vessels which they have come down to see, and we think we can guess what they are saying by the little girl with a blue dress, who is one of the company, and who turns toward us, and, shutting up her little hand, shakes it at us as though she would do—oh, what terrible things, if she could only bring that little white fist against these great iron turrets.

'Tis now midnight. The fleet is quietly at anchor, and a more beautiful sight one could scarcely behold. The army vessels, have their bow, and stem, and masthead light, varicolored; the men are clustered around their brightly blazing camp-fires on the shore and on the bank; and the scene looks like an illuminated garden in some wierd fantastic land.

And so we wait the morrow.

CUEL'S NOOK, JAMES RIVER,
Friday Evening, May 6.

This morning at six o'clock a flag-of-truce boat came down the river, and from it an officer went to see the Admiral, who was in the little steamboat Shawsheen. After remaining awhile the officer-messenger returned, and the flag of truce put back up the river. The fleet were gathered at City Point, two miles below; the army steamers were unloading their regiments, which were forming and marching away toward Richmond; and the region was all activity with the preparations for the movement of the day. It is therefore more than probable that the flag of truce was only a cover under which information might be obtained respecting the anticipated movement.

After breakfast the order was given to "get under way," and soon we were off up the river. Just above our anchorage the west bank shoals off into the river, forming a sort of muddy, marshy point, around which we necessarily slowly steamed.

The steamboat New York, the regular Fortress Monroe and City Point boat, used for the exchange of prisoners, and which we last evening noted at the wharf with a large lot of unexchanged rebels on board, now passed us for the point of exchange, which now is not City Point, but some place above the river, chosen at the option of Admiral Lee.

On our right the bank now is low and marshy, yet with thick woods, while the opposite bank for a long distance is elevated twenty or twenty-five feet. It was on this side that the Union forces landed last evening, and every now and then we see upon this same bank the Union pickets, standing cautiously beneath the shadow of some majestic oak, or pacing their little beats.

At noon we arrived at a point about ten miles below Fort Darling, and a picket came down from the bank and said he had a contraband who wished to come on board. A boat was sent from our ship, being nearer than any other, and the man came on board, said he knew where the torpedoes were, and could find them. He was immediately sent to the Admiral, who, after questioning him, ordered the fleet to anchor, and the contraband was sent in a small gunboat up the river to find one of the torpedoes, which he stated was only a little way in advance of us. The gunboat Commodore Jones steamed up a little way, though her commander was advised not to by one of the officers of the fleet; yet his position was such at the moment that he was

obliged to do so to prevent his vessel from running ashore. He had gone but a short distance further when the torpedo was exploded, and the gunboat blown out of the water and entirely demolished. Some forty or fifty were killed and drowned, and as many wounded. Only a few escaped. The first two officers alone were saved. The Paymaster and engineers have not been seen. The man who fired the torpedo ran, but was immediately shot. An officer and men from a steamer near them went on shore, found the wire connecting another torpedo, traced it, and soon came upon a spot in the bank covered by brush, but from which two men sprung as they approached the spot, and ran. They were immediately caught and carried on the flag-ship and put in irons. In the excavation where the men were concealed was found a galvanic battery, from which ran a small copper wire, as large as a knitting needle, around which was a covering of gutta percha. The wire ran along the shore to the river, a few inches under the surface, and was very nicely adjusted to the torpedo, which could not have been in the water over twenty-four hours.

The wounded and scalded men were brought on board the gunboat Mackinaw, and well cared for. At dusk a portion of the fleet dropped down the river a few miles to this place, in order to coal, and we came to anchor here in the early evening. The army steamer (flag of truce), New York, went up the river, and is probably at some point arranged upon between Commissioner Ould and Major Mulford, the exchange officers, for the transfer of the men now upon the steamer.

Below our present anchorage a few miles, is a place familiarly known as the "Hundreds," and there some of the army steamers are now lying.

And so another evening, our second in the James, quietly follows the departing day. The sloping banks crowned with oak and beach, melt away in the darkness. We cannot see the steamers which lie only a few hundred feet from us, and friend and foe all alike, are hidden from the view. The stars look down upon us silently, and the river murmurs as peacefully as when the Indian princess was borne down upon its bosom in her birchen canoe. Perfect stillness and quiet pervade the region. But to us it is an ominous stillness—it is a stillness that we feel presaging the tumult. It is the calm before the coming storm—that storm, the first murmurings of whose voice we now listen for. Let us pray that its lightning and thunder may purge the land of traitors, and the atmosphere of treason, forever and forever.

Doc. 58.

BATTLES OF THE WILDERNESS, VA.

THE BATTLE OF THURSDAY, MAY 5, 1864.

From midnight of Tuesday until the dawn of Thursday the fifth, the Army of the Potomac,

closely succeeded by that of Burnside, had been crossing the Rapidan river, the Second corps of Ely's, the Fifth and Sixth corps at Germania ford. The enemy, from their signal station on Clark's mountain, observed the entire movement—a fact distinctly ascertained by our own signal officers, who deciphered their messages during the day.

The order issued to the Army of the Potomac, Wednesday night—after the crossing of that Army had been effected, and when Burnside was on the way—directed it to move forward in parallel lines, Hancock's corps to the vicinity of Shady Grove Church, the Fifth and Sixth corps along the Germania plank-road to Old Wilderness Tavern and beyond. The Fifth and Second corps were to connect as soon as possible, throw out strong reconnaissances toward Catharpen run, Todd's Tavern, and on the Orange Court-house road; the Sixth corps to preserve a flank communication with the river, where the trains and herds were still crossing, and the whole afterward to "hold itself in readiness to move forward." It would seem that this disposition of the Army was intended to be preserved until the trains could cross the river, when all should move on, avoiding a battle in the Wilderness to the right.

The hope was futile. The enemy's movement began Wednesday night, and on the following morning Ewell's whole corps had marched from the direction of Verdiersville, and was found on our right flank between the Orange Court-house pike and the river, threatening us at right angles with the Germania plank-road, up which the Sixth corps was then marching. The forward movement of the Army was checked at once; the Fifth and Sixth corps formed in line of battle along the Germania plank-road, and advanced into the forest on the right, pushing forward a strong line of skirmishers to meet and feel the enemy. The proposed connection between Hancock and Warren was thus severed, and Hancock was ordered to diverge up the Brock road from his march to Shady Grove Church, and immediately join the latter on his left wing, which crossed the Orange Court-house turnpike. The great danger which menaced us was, that the enemy, by throwing a strong body of troops against our left flank, would obtain possession of this turnpike before Hancock could come up, cutting our army in two. The First, Second, and Fourth brigades of Getty's division of the Sixth corps, were therefore detached and sent in on Warren's left as a support. Skirmishing began in the early morning. Word came in from the cavalry in front that the enemy were still advancing from Verdiersville and above; that Hill's corps had driven in our cavalry and were moving down the plank-road in the direction of Parker's store; that the whole rebel army was doubtless on the march.

Generals Meade, Warren, and Sedgwick held council at Old Wilderness Tavern. It was decided not to wait for Hancock, but to attack at

once. General Warren mounted, rode to his command, and ordered an assault. At eleven o'clock word was sent to General Sedgwick that skirmishing in front of the Sixth corps was becoming heavy, and that now was the time. General Sedgwick mounted in turn, galloped down the Germania plank-road about a mile, dashed into the forest at the head of his staff, and penetrated to the front just as the firing began to increase. We follow him.

A moment's halt for consultation—a moment's look around. Not a far look, nor an inspiring one; for, about, beneath, and overhead, the tangled underbrush, and knotted trunks and ragged foliage of a chapparal consume the spaces into which the eye yearns to penetrate. Is a battle to be fought here in this labyrinth, are troops to be manoeuvred, are lines of battle to be formed and shifted, are weapons to be used, charges made, the tragedy of a modern combat enacted in this hideous place?

Listen: the clanking music of the skirmish line sounds in the distance; the voice of cannon is deep in the recesses of the woods. There is a volley at last—General Griffin's division of the Fifth corps has opened the fight.

"Forward! by the right flank; forward!" rings along the lines. Yonder in front are the gleaming bayonets of our first line of battle; back, just in rear, is the second line, the anxious eyes of the soldiers peering through the trees.

Was it a sadder wind than usual that swept down from the front that moment, bearing the first earnest clangor of the combat? Else why, as that wind touched the faces of the men, did such a mournful fervor blend with, but not blight the resolute curves of lips that pride forbade to tremble?

"Forward! by the right flank; forward!" again and again repeated far to right and left, until it becomes an echo.

And through a thicket, blind and interminable; over abattis of fallen trees; through swamps, and ditches, and brush-heaps; and once—a glorious breathing-space—across a half acre of open field, the obedient troops move on. How long, and weary, and expectant the struggling march is, with the hollow roar of that fight sounding nearer and nearer in the hot air! Sometimes the eyes of the men sink to note a by-path in the forest, like that which many a one has travelled in old days to some old spring of home-like memory. And here is the "burr" of a bullet, like that which startled one who heard it one summer afternoon, when a brother hunter was careless, and fired at a partridge as he stood in range. The bee-like sounds are thicker on this ridge; in the forest, a little way ahead, there is a crackling, roaring tumult, seasoned with wild cheers.

The Fifth corps has begun the fight in earnest—Griffin is pressing on. Wadsworth, and Robinson, and Crawford are going in; the latter on the left, supported by Getty, is advancing toward the enemy at Parker's store. Behind

Crawford and Getty, who are on the Orange Court-house road, is the junction of that and the Brock road, up which, from the direction of Chancellorsville, Hancock is advancing to make connection. *That* is the vital point—that junction; to be held against all odds unto the death, else the army is severed.

To hold the enemy all along the line in check, to prevent his massing any forces in our front upon that point, the Fifth corps is pressing on, and the Sixth corps is about to enter.

Here, marching through the forest with General John Sedgwick and his officers, between the first and second lines of battle of that grand old corps, which has left its mark in blood on every great battle-field in Virginia, we can hear but not see the progress of the contest in front and on the left. We hear that Griffin and Wadsworth, after gallantly charging the enemy, advancing over two lines of works, have met with superior numbers, have fought courageously, but have been pushed back. The cannon that spake a moment ago are silent. They were two guns of Captain Winslow's (Second Massachusetts) battery, the horses of which have been killed, the men of which have been sorely pressed, and which have been spiked and abandoned. We hear that Crawford's division of Pennsylvania Reserves, sent forward to Parker's store to check the surging tide of Hill's troops, pouring on to attack that junction of two roads on which so much depends, have been hurled back by the same overwhelming pressure that forces Wadsworth, and that the Seventh Pennsylvania regiment has been captured. We hear that everywhere the enemy is strongly posted, everywhere, on height, in the dense forest, using occasional open fields in the rear for artillery, but forcing us to attack in positions where the use of our own artillery is impossible. A cunning and a deceitful foe, knowing of old the splendid aim and discipline of our batteries, now compelled to silence.

The air is stifling, the sun sends its rays down through the jagged limbs of the chapparal around like red hot spears. This march is long, these bullets from an unseen foe are staining some sleeves and jackets too soon. On!—for our share of the battle cannot too soon be over.

They are there at last; the bushwhackers, thick as the sprigs and leaves that partly hide their treacherous faces. As the ponderous battle-line of the Sixth corps swings into level in their front, it sends a volley in greeting that thins those faces even as a wind of autumn rushing through an oak. General Ricketts is on the left, General Wright next, General Neill, of the Second division, whose iron brigade is made up of men who never flinched a desperate strait, holds the right of the line in support.

The fighting—who shall describe it? Not a thousand men can be seen at once, yet for miles in the front thousands are engaged. The volleyed thunders of the combat roll among the glens and ravines hoarser and higher than the

voices of an Eastern jungle. The woods are alive with cries and explosions, and the shrill anvil-clatter of musketry. One cannon, pitched afar, times the wild tumult like a tolling bell. The smoke is a shroud about our heroes; there is not wind enough to lift it into a canopy.

And now, out of the concealed and awful scenery where the fight goes on, there come the ruins it has wrought, in shapes borne in blankets and on litters—maimed, tortured, writhing; with eyes dull with the stupor of coming death, or bright with delirious fire. Listen to the hell raging beyond and below; behold this silent, piteous procession, that emerges ceaselessly, and passes on. Into and out of the ordeal of fire; from the pride of the ranks to the suffering of the hospital, these forms have been, and come, and are of no more avail. Who stands at gaze between a battle and these ghastly effects, and keeps not the banner of the future his mental vision, had better let his thought be still. For else he does, that cry of the human always evoked by human suffering cannot be kept down in a presence like this.

Two o'clock. In the momentary calm that sinks upon the forest in front we can hear a louder conflict gathering and growing on the left. There Crawford has been driven back; there the enemy are pressing in hordes down the turnpike, to gain the junction of the Brock road. Getty has advanced and met them. Hancock has come up at last, and Birney is going in on Getty's right. Mott and Barlow are forming on the left of the line, and Gibbon's division is coming up as a reserve. The enemy are checked, but their concentration continues. Troops are sent to the left from the Fifth corps, and by four o'clock General Hancock is in command of half the army in action.

And now, from left to right the sound of the shock of battle arises anew. Hancock is advancing, Sedgwick is advancing, Warren is in partial wait. Along the left a guttural, oceanic roar prevails, without an interval of rest. Like a great engine, dealing death, the Second corps and its supports move forward, taking equal death in return. Companies fall, regiments are thinned, brigades melt away. Stricken in the head by a bullet, General Alexander Hayes, commanding the Second brigade of Birney's division, has rolled from his horse, dead. General Getty is wounded; Colonel Carroll, commanding the Third brigade of the Second division, is wounded; a host of line officers are stricken low; the enemy fights like a demon, but the fight moves on.

Sedgwick moves on, breaking the enemy's line for a moment, and taking four or five hundred prisoners. There are ripples of disaster on all the line, but they are quickly repaired.

Slowly, for the enemy is stubborn; slower yet on the extreme right, toward the river, for the enemy there has massed another force, and strives to break our flank. He finds a rock, and though he checks our advance, though hundreds

of soldiers make the obeisance of death before him, he does not come on.

And as the day dies, and the darkness creeps up from the west, although no cheer of victory swells through the Wilderness from either side, we have accomplished this much at least, with much sore loss: the concentration of our army, the holding of the junction of the Orange Court-house and Brock roads; the turning back of the enemy's right flank from our path toward Richmond, and the average gain of a half mile of ground.

BATTLE OF FRIDAY, MAY SIX.

It will be seen that the battle just partially sketched was a forced battle, consisting for the most part of a series of assaults for the purpose of defending the position obtained Thursday morning, and effecting the junction of the army. The uncertainty of the situation had prevented the full and combined exertion of our strength, and as Longstreet had not yet been heard of, it was surmised that the enemy would prove himself in stronger force on the morrow. During the night the sound of axes and falling trees in our front showed that the foe intended to contest his position on the morrow behind new defences. Our lines were consolidated and freshly posted, the three corps retaining their respective positions—Warren in the centre, Sedgwick on the right, Hancock on the left, the latter still having the lion's share of troops, gathered from all the corps.

An attack was ordered to be made by the whole army at five o'clock Friday morning, until which time, save slight skirmishing in the night, fighting was suspended, and the troops slept upon their arms, disposed as follows:

On the right of General Sedgwick's line, nearest the river, were three regiments of General Shaler's brigade—the Sixty-fifth New York Chasseurs, One Hundred and Twenty-second New York, and Sixty-seventh Pennsylvania; General Seymour's brigade, of Ricketts' division, connected on the left. Next came General Neill's brigade, composed of the Forty-third, Forty-ninth, and Seventy-seventh New York, the Seventh Maine, and the Sixty-first Pennsylvania volunteers. Next came Upton's and Russell's brigades of the First division; and last the Second brigade, of the Third division, commanded by Colonel Smith. A second and third line of battle, supporting the centre, was formed of the New Jersey brigade and the Fourth New York heavy artillery. The other brigades, of Ricketts' and Getty's division, were still detached, and acting with the Fifth and Second corps.

General Warren's command was still reduced to the two divisions of Crawford and Griffin and a brigade of Robinson's, General Wadsworth and Robinson being under command of Hancock. The lines formed by the two commands of Generals Warren and Sedgwick stretched from near the river, through the forest, across the road

leading to Locust Grove, to within half a mile of the Orange Court-house road.

Across this road, and far to the left, the troops led by Hancock were disposed—Colonel Carroll's and General Hayes' (now Colonel Crocker's) brigades on the right, and Generals Ward's and Owen's brigades on the left of the thoroughfare. The three brigades of General Getty's division of the Sixth corps, commanded by Generals Eustis, Wheaton, and Grant, were in support. General Mott's division, of the Second corps, adjoined on the left—the whole left of this line being under command of Birney. The divisions of Generals Gibbon and Barlow formed the left of the line, under command of Gibbon. Our cavalry were operating still further on the left, and the left flank of the army was, for the first time, in a position strongly supported by artillery.

At precisely twenty minutes before five o'clock, Friday morning, the enemy anticipated and took from us the opening honors of the intended attack, by throwing themselves, with considerable impetus, against our left and left centre. They were repulsed and driven back by the Sixth corps, which accomplished the work in time to join the advance movement begun at five o'clock by most of the army.

The right of Hancock's forces, swinging on the left like a pivot, pushed on in advance of Griffin and Crawford, leaving a gap there. The flank thus exposed was at once supported by General Wadsworth's division and the brigade of General Webb in time to repulse an effort of the enemy against it. At eleven o'clock the determined fighting of Hancock's troops had won a mile and a half of ground, part of which was open in their front, charged and taken a portion of the enemy's line of rifle-pits, together with several hundred prisoners, and were still fighting, lacking ammunition.

Meanwhile, the Sixth corps was thundering in the forest below, with musketry and a few scattered cannon. The enemy's artillery was not silent; it began early to play bass above the infernal falsetto of musketry that drowned the fair sounds and songs of early morning.

A battle fought upon the field, seen from some height, or even watched from the midst of its own danger, has a conspicuous sublimity which dulls the sense of horror. Carry the same fight into the depth of a jungle; watch it or listen to it, if you can, without a ghastly thrill.

There, in the depths of those ravines, under the shadows of those trees, entangled in that brushwood, is no pomp of war, no fluttering of banners in an unhindered breeze, no solid tramp of marching battalions, no splendid strategy of the fields Napoleon loved to fight on. There a Saturnalia, gloomy, hideous, desperate, rages confined. That metallic, hollow rack of musketry is like the clanking of great chains about the damned; that sullen yell of the enemy, a fiercest protest and defiance. How the hours lag; now each minute is freighted with a burden that the

days would have groaned to bear in other times! Still the sad, shuddering procession, emerging out of the smoke and tumult and passing on. Still the appealing eyes and clenched hands and quivering limbs of human creatures, worse than helpless, whose fighting is over. The paths are full of them; the woods are thick with them; the forest seems to take up the slow movement, and move with them, like giants hovering over the funeral of Lilliputians. Piled in ambulances, they move on further yet, while the torture of battle plies on below, making more victims. Here and there, beside some path, you shall see a heaped blanket, labelled by some thoughtful bearer with the name the corpse beneath it bore in life; here and there you shall come across a group of men bending over one wounded past help, and dying an agonized death. And often—too often—the shameful spectacle of one bearing a weapon, unhurt, pallid and fear-stricken, fits through an opening toward the rear and is gone. You shall meet with soldiers in groups of one, or two, or three, hidden in some thicket or, coolly making coffee by the roadside. And hearing the roar of the battle below, and seeing the bloody trails of the battle behind, it shall be a glad thing to see these men hunted by officers back with curses to the ranks; to share the dangers of their nobler comrades.

About this battle there is a horrible fascination. It is like a maelstrom. You feel it sucking you in, and you go nearer to see men fall like those you have seen fallen. Down through the break, underneath the edges of the smoke, where the bullets are thick and the trunks of trees, like the ranks of men, sway and fall with the smiting of shells, you have a little view of the courage and the carnage of this fight. There are the enemy, retreated to the breastworks—a ragged pile of fallen trees and heaped-up earth—hiding their heads, spitting lead and flame. Here is the Sixth corps—what you can see of it—plunging on, firing continually, tumbling over branches and limbs, sinking waist deep in swamps, fighting with its might and bleeding at every pore. The troops of the First division, under Wright, are martyred for a time in a ravine swept by musketry in front, and by a cross-fire of artillery from right and left. The few guns that we have posted to the left have funeral voices for our enemy on the ridge, perishing beneath their fire in scores. The ridge is taken, the division breathes once more, but on come the enemy, an avalanche of greater numbers, pushing us back. Not much headway can be made in a place like this against positions like these, and although at eleven o'clock, when a lull drops upon the field, not more than half a mile of ground has been gained, and the enemy's works are not taken.

Before noon, the gap still existing between Hancock's advanced line and the left of Warren's was made the opportunity of the enemy. Burnside was expected, but Burnside's troops were not in position. They were on the way.

The forces of Hill and Longstreet—the latter having arrived at this time—were massed in a grand attack, intended to envelop Hancock on both flanks. Of the details of the fighting that ensued I know but little. The brigade of Colonel Frank, on the extreme left, was broken, and fell back precipitately. The pressure was so great along the whole line of the command thus assaulted that it was also broken in several places. Portions of the front line retreated in disorder. Officers who commanded there, commanded in some instances troops not their own, and of whose fighting qualities they knew nothing—those officers did their best, but could not stem panic. General Wadsworth, galloping, appealing, commanding, fell from his horse in the front of the battle, deserted by more than half his troops. As gallant a brigadier-general as commands in the Army of the Potomac, finding himself at last alone, with the remains of one true regiment still standing to its work, looked around disgusted, grief-stricken, and in anger, and told that regiment to “run like sheep.” The enemy came on and on.

Two divisions of Burnside's corps under Park and Wilcox, were marched up and put in on the left of Warren, and General Stevenson's division subsequently marched in, connecting with Birney on Hancock's right. By this means the effort of the enemy to pierce our centre was stayed, our line of battle was made secure behind the intrenchments from which we had advanced in the morning, and the enemy were forced to fall back in turn.

There was a lull in the battle; a regathering of armies. The persistent enemy did not give up their purpose; they were marshalling menacing battalions in front of the Second corps and Burnside. They meant to attack again.

It came, at half-past four o'clock; and our left wing, which had advanced, regaining some of its ground after the disaster of the forenoon, was again pushed back nearly to the Brock road. The shock of the assault stove in the brigades of General Stevenson, and forced the divisions on his left temporarily out of the breastworks, which were set on fire. A portion of General Gibbon's troops swung to the right and formed in rear; the line was at last restored along the whole length, and the enemy again flung back with immense slaughter. The left and centre of the army thus having attacked and been attacked throughout the day, stood firm at last—the field and forest floor before it and around it strewn with its and the enemy's dead, and throbbing with its wounded. It had taken in the course of the day many prisoners; it held a larger part of the field than that occupied in the morning; its losses were severe.

A sullen silence now for a little while, if silence that may be called which is stabbed at slow intervals by the sound of cannon that will never be still. Sink, sun; fall, shadows; come night, and shroud these horrors that the day has wrought! These dead that cannot be

buried need some mantle to cover them. These shattered lives, crying for help from every glen and field, and roadside—hide them from those to whom it is enough to *hear* their despairing struggles!

The camp-fires are lighted, the darkness gathers apace; the battle, we hope, is over.

No! whatever we may hope, the enemy does not will it. If one could watch where none can watch, in the gloom of the Wilderness, he would see now a dark column, stealing out on the right from the breastworks of the foe, diverging through the forest around our right flank toward the river, silently turning that flank, creeping slowly into its rear, and actually putting up a slight breastwork between it and our unsuspecting front line, that part immediately exposed being the troops of Seymour and Shaler, where they were at the commencement of the day's battle. He would see this flanking line of the enemy lying in wait, while another and stronger column, emerging from the same breastwork it had vacated, formed, preparatory to an attack. All this between six and seven o'clock P. M., in the darkness, and while our men were engaged upon their own breastwork by the light of blinding fires.

Down this last column comes, breaking the stillness with yells, and sending a volley calculated to make each individual hair upon the heads of the devoted troops of Shaler and Seymour, erect itself to a perpendicular. The charge is resistless; Seymour's line is doubled up, rolled over, and carried away in an instant; that of Shaler fares not much better. These are troops not of the old Sixth corps; some of them Milroy's men, but who have nevertheless borne themselves gallantly in the two days' fighting. Taken prisoners, flying, finding the rebel line in their rear, turning back to seek some other way, amid the storm of bullets, a few finding their way out at last and reaching the Germania plank-road a mile in rear, they are a parlous sight.

And now is seen General John Sedgwick and the gallant young officers upon his staff plunging about in the midst of this melee, and building up order out of the ruin. That presence of the grand old commander—his hat off, his bridle dropped, a pistol in one hand and a sword in the other—is like an incarnate rebuke to these fugitives—an assurance of safety preventing further panic. The enemy come on, raging over the ruins of this route, but to no further conquest. For there is a line of steel which cannot be broken—Neill's magnificent brigade. Against it, as a hillow against a rock, the exultant masses of the enemy fall and break, and are thrown back, and retire, while the column in flank, under some strange spell which has kept it quiescent through all, sneaks into the forest toward the river, and is seen alike no more.

But the panic appeased in front is not over in the rear. Down to the plank-road through the woods, dismay in their faces and unutterable

speed in their legs, the fugitives of the fray are still pursued by threatening echoes. The road becomes populous with them; their tales of horror infuse a contagious uncertainty among officers and orderlies, galloping to front and rear. The ponderous rumor of countless hordes of rebels pouring around our right flank and already coming up the road is swung from mouth to mouth, until it smites the ears of the teamsters of the Sixth corps wagon train, parked near Wilderness Tavern. And now!

Was ever a panic like this that lays hold on the souls of these teamsters, and causes an abandonment of suppers and hot coffee, cooking over a hundred fires, and sets the lungs of stalwart men to cursing, and their hands to cruelly plying whips, and the heels of a host of mules, and the wheels of a hundred lumbering wagons rattling and clattering, heaven knows where!

There are some men who see through all this easily enough, and have the truth out of it in a few moments' time. Away down the plank-road, right in the faces of the fugitives coming out of the woods, a bonfire has been lighted. A band behind it is playing "Yankee Doodle," and the stampede is then called upon to rally. In less than half an hour quite a company is got together by this means, and got back to the ranks of the Sixth corps, again firm, advanced, and unmolested, in the Wilderness.

This break might have been a severe thing had the enemy been fully aware of his advantages, but he evidently was not, as he did not push them; as it was, Generals Shaler and Seymour, with the greater part of their commands, were taken prisoners.

In the afternoon, previous to the evening on which this misfortune occurred, a number of colored regiments, of General Ferrero's command, belonging to Burnside's corps, were sent into the woods in rear of, and between the right of the Sixth corps and the river. What those troops were doing, or where they were, when the flank movement of the enemy above described was in progress, I cannot tell.

SATURDAY AND THE NIGHT MARCH.

What had been gained in the two days of battle and bloodshed just closed?

Something, on the first day, certainly, after granting that the fight was forced upon us from the first. We had concentrated our army; we had repulsed the attempt of the foe to pierce our centre; we had held our own ground, and something more. We held our ground on the second day, and a little more. Yet the field was the same, in fact; the vast extent of the Wilderness was still behind our enemy. The headquarters of the army, established Thursday morning in a grove of pines near Old Wilderness Tavern, on the Germania plank-road, had not been moved. We had captured some prisoners certainly—two or three thousand, I believe; the enemy had suffered very greatly from our fire. Our own losses were estimated at about twelve thousand—fif-

teen hundred killed, eight thousand wounded, and the remainder prisoners and missing. It is doubtful—I say this cautiously, for I do not know—whether the losses of the enemy were quite equal to our own. They fought more than we did behind intrenchments, and used a little, though that was more, artillery than we could bring to bear.

The fact seems that there was not much gained, nor much to be gained on either side by fighting on such ground. It was irreverently said by an officer that "both armies appeared to be bumping; bumping, to see which could bump the hardest!"

General Lee appears to have made up his mind much after this fashion; and, having failed to accomplish the object sought on our flank, he concluded to remain quiescent. General Grant did not choose to take the offensive.

Our right and right-centre had been ordered round, in anticipation of another flank attack during the previous night, and the right now crossed the Germania plank-road about half way between Old Wilderness Tavern and what is called the Spottswood House, facing obliquely toward the river. It was strongly supported by the whole of the artillery of the Sixth corps, posted on heights in the centre, and on rising ground in the rear.

Heavy artillery duelling began in the early morning, and was continued at intervals, with occasional musketry skirmishing, during the day. About noon a rather vigorous demonstration was made against our centre, and repelled by a portion of the Fifth corps, and a battery which obtained position in the woods. Reconnoissances in the afternoon discovered that the main body of the enemy had fallen back some distance. The news of Torbert's successful engagement with Fitz Hugh Lee's cavalry at Todd's tavern, and the general success of our cavalry in clearing all roads to the front and left, was refreshingly told during the day.

General Grant mounted one of his splendid horses at headquarters and made a partial tour along the lines. General Sedgwick and his staff, weary with incessant marching and fighting, lounged under some bushes by the Germania plank-road side. General Grant rode up. General Sedgwick went out to meet him.

"Don't get up, General; I just came down for a little visit—that is all!"

The Lieutenant-General had a taking way with him when he chose—a straightforward way, appropriate to the men he met. The two commanders sat down by the road and talked a quiet talk. The day grew hotter; the bristling lines of battle stretching through the woods, and across the road, and up the slope behind them, seethed and shimmered in the sultry, dusty air.

No serious work would be done that day, if all the signs were true.

General Grant remounted, rode to headquarters in the pine grove up the road, threw himself down against a tree, and began to drowse.

A drowsy and a curious scene: The Lieutenant-General here, at the foot of a tree, one leg of his trousers slipped above his boots, his hands limp, his coat in confusion, his sword equipments, sprawling on the ground; not even the weight of sleep erasing that persistent expression of the lip which held a constant promise of something to be done. And there at the foot of another tree, is General Meade—a military hat, with the rim turned down about his ears, tapping a scabbard with his fingers, and gazing abstractedly into the depths of the earth through eye-glasses that should become historic. General Humphreys, Chief of Staff—a spectacled, iron-gray, middle-aged officer, of a pleasant smile and manner, who wears his trousers below after the manner of leggings, and is in all things independent and serene, paces yonder to and fro. That rather thick-set officer, with closely trimmed whiskers, and the kindest of eyes, who never betrays a harsh impatience to any comer, is Adjutant-General Williams. General Hunt, Chief of Artillery, a hearty-faced, frank-handed man, whose black hair and whiskers have the least touch of time, lounges at the foot of another tree, holding lazy converse with one or two members of his staff. General Ingalls, Chief Quartermaster of the army, than whom no more imperturbable, efficient or courteous presence is here, plays idly and smilingly with a riding-whip, tossing a telling word or two hither and thither. Staff officers and orderlies, and horses, thickly strew the grove. The sunlight streams in, a little breeze begins to sigh, a little thought of peace has come, perhaps, to the minds of these men overlaid with thoughts of war.

Not long! For war is in all the land, and the news of it outside of this little scene of the greatest struggle, is presently brought by a messenger—the Assistant Secretary of War, just from the North. As the Lieutenant-General, after proper greeting, hears the news of Sherman's and Butler's movement, ordered just previous to the march, his face wears just the faintest complaisant smile. "We shall have a little thunder elsewhere presently," he thinks.

There is the cannonade again, right in our front! And here they come, one by one, the vilest missiles ever hurled against a foe. There can be on earth no more unearthly sound than the suppressed, vindictive scream of an approaching bombshell. Standing in the forest, when you cannot see it, but can only hear it, the noise of its coming is a hideous threat. It may be death giving you a wild warning ere it strikes; it may be that it comes to strike the companion beside you low out of life; to make some spot of ground near, where a group is standing, a place of disfigured shapes and appalling cries.

The first shell of the cannonade strikes with a somewhat startling nearness, bursting just beside the grove where headquarters are lounging, killing an orderly, and wounding his horse. Headquarters do not move; the shells recede, two or three fall or burst in the air without

damage, but finally one plunges into a mess of artillerymen, on a hillside behind the grove, demolishing the dinner between them, and wounding three or four men. A sort of radiating skeddaddle prevails from that spot on the instant, and even a line of infantry drawn up on the crest of a hill is seen to slightly waver. It is difficult for troops to stand quiet under such a fire. They feel too much at an enemy's mercy. They would rather be in a position to give back blow for blow.

This is only an episode. The day wears on, and before night there are signs of something to be done.

At dusk of this day, Saturday, the seventh instant, an order was issued for the whole army to move toward Spottsylvania Court-house, via Todd's tavern. The Fifth corps marched in advance, the Sixth-corps next, Hancock and Burnside following. The Sixth corps marched on the Chancellorsville road, reaching Piney Branch Church toward the latter part of Sunday forenoon.

Soon after dark, Saturday evening, a subdued and impressive murmur began to rise from the encampments of the army. A strong picket line was pushed to the front, and an appearance of strength was kept up along the whole line. The fires burned brightly, and at a distance, upon the wooded hillsides, looked like the lights of a city. Standing upon an eminence at the junction of the Germania, Chancellorsville, and Orange Court-house roads, along which the tramp of soldiers and the rumble of wagon trains made a smothered din, one could almost imagine himself peering down through the darkness on the streets of a metropolis in peace. Back in the forest, from the hospitals, from the fields, from the roadside, the wounded were being gathered in ambulances for the long night-journey. That part of the army not on the move was slumbering by its fires, waiting for the signal.

A cheer in front of the junction of the Fifth and Sixth corps, followed by a crackle of musketry, broke in upon this slumber. The enemy felt of our position, got badly hurt in the process, and retired. The march went on. All through the night, hurrying, hurrying; for there was danger that the enemy be marching too. The privilege of rank on that march was to sleep a little by the roadside, while rank and file moved on. Down from the backs of horses into dusky thickets a general and his staff occasionally descended, to slumber sweetly for an hour, and then move forward. The root of a tree, the rut of a road, was a comforting pillow; blessed was the alightest billow of sleep, after the work past, and before the work of the morrow.

The morning came, misty and dull; but it was not long before the sun burnt the fog out of the air and set the earth a simmering. And then: I do not speak of the sufferings of men and horses, unhurt and able to tramp, even though each step was heavy with a weight like lead. I only think, but forbear to tell minutely, of the pangs of the hundreds of wounded, rocked and

racked along those parched roads—some of necessity abandoned for the present along the roadsides! Nothing better could be done than was done for these men. I am sure that there was no willing neglect. They could not be left in quiet hospitals while the army moved on; they must move on with it, or be abandoned. Yet every man who rode past that long and suffering procession, felt the hope of victory in his heart rivalled by a deep wish that these sufferers might first reach a quiet haven.

Doc. 59.

BATTLES OF SPOTTSYLVANIA, VA.

BATTLE OF SUNDAY, MAY 8, 1864.

Our cavalry penetrated to Spottsylvania Court-house early in the forenoon, finding the enemy's dismounted cavalry there, and engaging them. Word was sent back to General Warren that none of the enemy's infantry were in front; that the path was clear. General Warren was then on the road below Piney Branch Church. He pushed on vigorously. It is said that he neglected to throw out skirmishers a sufficient distance. When Griffin's division, in the advance, emerged from a dense forest, and entered a field beyond, it came suddenly upon a column of Longstreet's command, which had been pushed in two or three miles this side of Spottsylvania Court-house, and became hotly engaged, almost without warning. Bartlett's brigade suffered fearfully. The whole division, including that of Robinson, which went in immediately on the left, received, in addition to the musketry fire in front, a storm of grape and shell from front and flank. Longstreet, who was marching with his whole force in parallel lines with us, had stationed a battery on the right, commanding the junction of roads where Griffin first met the enemy. The troops, although fighting bravely, were terribly decimated, and gave way. General Robinson fell, wounded in the leg. General Warren, in person, rallied the division. Crawford's Pennsylvania Reserves came up and steadily advanced into the breach, firing telling volleys. Their advance was continued beyond the woods, through a field, and down into a swampy wood beyond, the enemy falling back and leaving a number of prisoners in our hands, chiefly of Hood's Twenty-first Mississippi and Colonel Manning's Third Arkansas regiments. The latter officer was captured. By this time the troops in the rear had been partially reformed, and Crawford's reserves fell back to join the general line. At half-past two o'clock the second advance began. The enemy was found in the edge of the woods, but no attack was ordered. Skirmishing continued about three hours, when the troops were recalled and new lines were formed, to which was added that of the Sixth corps; General Wright's division, if I remember correctly, forming on the right, and

the remaining divisions on the left of the Fifth corps.

At half-past six o'clock the order for a general attack was given. The enemy (Ewell having by this time come up) was strongly posted in the forest, along the second crest beyond. Our advance was steadily made to the foot of the second hill, when the enemy's fire was first encountered. A splendid charge was made with varying success; the artillery assisting—the artillery of the enemy replying. General Getty's division of the Sixth corps (now commanded by General Neill) rushed into the fire and up to the works in their front, carrying the position. Some of the troops of the Fifth corps wavered. Crawford's division in front had advanced nearly to the enemy's line, when the terrific fire shook their ranks to pieces. They fell back, were rallied, advanced again, again fell back, were rallied again and again, but at the close of the engagement had failed to take the work. Firing ceased about half-past eight o'clock; the first ridge in front of the enemy was gained, and our entire line was there formed and intrenched. Meanwhile General Burnside's forces had marched to the left, Hancock had come up on the right, and lay in support along the Piney Branch road.

Sunday night, therefore, found the army advanced, intrenched, facing the enemy northwest of Spottsylvania Court-house, in an irregular, but more semi-circular than otherwise, line. Still in the midst of a forest, with occasional patches of open field, but able to make its strength felt along at least seven miles of country. The artillery had position at last, though its aim could be directed, in few instances, by the eye. Its range, for the most part, had to be determined on purely scientific principles, and the engineering skill of the army had to be called upon for that purpose. Reconnoissances and scouts, to ascertain the exact position of the enemy's intrenched line, and works, and batteries, were sent out at night, and from the information thus derived, the aim of almost every piece of artillery used on our side was calculated. The reports of prisoners, and the appearance of the enemy's intrenchments, taken by us from time to time, reveal how sure and deadly was the fire of our guns, even under these embarrassing circumstances. Those of the rebels must have been fired upon much the same principle, for, except in the occasional open spaces alluded to, the lines of both armies were invisible to the artilleryists on both sides, during all these terrible battles.

There were new hospitals for the wounded that night, and new wounded to fill them. Ambulances were sent back along the line of march to gather in those who had been left, and to bring them to shelter and attendance. Blessed was the cooling darkness, blessed the silence of the forest that fell around the tired army and these bleeding proofs of hard battle, after the fight was over. Thousands slept, awaiting their turn to-morrow; thousands slept,

many to sleep no more. Walking among the white tents, where surgeons and nurses were murmuring among the wounded, one asked a foolish question: When is this to end?

In one corner of a hospital tent, as in many others that night, lay a dying man—a lieutenant in one of the Massachusetts regiments, engaged during the afternoon. Type of a thousand officers, who, like him, have been thus stricken and have thus died, his last moments demanded the hush and pause rendered by all feet and voices in that tent. His face, turned away from the battle-field, looked toward the North. A handsome, noble face it was, shadowed by dark hair, and saddened by the droop of a dark mustache. His breast was bare; a bandage was drawn across it, covering a wound, the pain of which disturbed him no more. He lay quietly breathing, as if asleep. He was not asleep, however, for presently, as two or three standing by began to say among themselves that it would soon be over, he put a pale hand, that trembled like an aspen, down beneath his shirt upon the other side, and drew forth what might have been expected, a dull, soiled velvet ambrotype case, which he held a few moments, without attempting to open. One who stood there felt instinctively that the dying man wished but could not ask him to stoop over where he lay. That one bent to hear a faint, broken whisper, beseeching him to take the velvet case and find the one who wore the face within it, and give it back with the blessing of a lover.

It would have been well, perhaps, had the one who thus accepted this trust unclasped the case before the hand from which he took it had grown quite cold and motionless. Else, having looked, he might have whispered into the dull ear of the dying lieutenant promise of a surer and speedier meeting with the girl he loved than he could have had but for this day's dark fate. For it happened that he, the living, knew that she, too, had died, and awaited somewhere the coming of what had just departed.

OPERATIONS OF MONDAY, MAY 9.

In the early part of the previous night Hancock's corps advanced, connecting on the left with Wright's division of the Sixth corps, which connected in turn with Warren, pushing his right across Po creek and seizing the Block House road, running from Parker's store to Spottsylvania Court-house. Hill's corps were discovered marching south, so that on Monday morning the entire army of Lee was again in our front.

The artillery began at early dawn, and kept up a lazy firing, occasionally heightened to a combat, throughout the day. The position of our line was advanced and strengthened, from time to time, without a general battle. General Wright's division of the Sixth corps, posted Sunday on Warren's right, was now moved round to join the Sixth, which thus, for almost

the first time in all the engagements, held an unbroken line.

The day was hot; the enemy's sharpshooters were busy. Perched in forest trees, above the heads and out of sight of our skirmishers, they played a serious havoc along our lines. No officer who showed himself was safe from the bullets of these assassins. General W. H. Morris, of the Sixth corps, another general officer, and numerous officers of the staff and line, were wounded or killed early in the day. Not even some great battles had done us more damage in commanders; yet only a slothful boom of guns, and a hollow, irregular clatter along the infantry line, were heard until the close of day, when a sharp little engagement occurred, resulting in the further advance of our right and right-centre.

About the middle of the day General John Sedgwick, who, since the march from Brandy Station, had never left his command, walked out with Lieutenant-Colonel McMahon, his Chief of Staff, to the advanced line of breastworks occupied by his men. A little hum of leaden bees about this place caused the soldiers in the works to dodge and duck their heads. The General smiled at them good-naturedly; he had a winning smile. Finally one bee hummed so near a poor Irishman's auricle that he dropped down upon his face. General Sedgwick touched him with his foot, in humorous disdain: "Pooh, pooh, man! who ever heard of a soldier dodging a bullet! Why, they couldn't hit an elephant at that distance!"

There was a laugh at this, even though the straggling bees yet hummed unpleasantly around. The General was still smiling over the banter, when Colonel McMahon heard the buzz of a bullet culminate in what seemed an explosion close beside him.

"That must have been an explosive bullet, General."

No answer. But as the face of General Sedgwick slightly turned toward the beloved officer at his side, a curious, sad, not despairing, but almost contented smile was upon it. Another moment, and the form of the General fell helplessly backward. It was caught by Colonel McMahon as it fell. A ball had entered the face, just below the left eye, pierced the brain, and passed out at the back of the head.

He never spoke afterward, though he breathed softly for a while. He will never speak again, to command or to caress; to punish with disdain and censure; to elevate with reward and praise. O, noble Sixth corps; tried and true Sixth corps; though you have been saddened by the death of many comrades, did you ever weep for a comrade like this? Are your deeds so high, your banners so glorious, now that he who directed them is fallen? Are your lost ones so low, now that he slumbers among them? Oh, well may you speak soft, lips that have shouted defiance; well may you toll slowly, guns that have rung "conquest" at his will! He sleeps; let the battle sleep for a time. He

honored the battle; let the battle do him this honor!

THE BATTLE OF TUESDAY, MAY 10.

Hancock had so pushed out his right that on the morning of this day one division, under Barlow, had crossed the Po, and was disposed almost at right angles with the general line, practically turning the enemy's flank. This position, had the river not intervened, would have been a very advantageous one, but the river weakened it. General Burnside on the left, had pushed out beyond the line of the Sixth corps, with which he was supposed to connect. It was afterward discovered by our engineers that he had, unknown to himself, unknown to our commanders, and certainly unknown to the enemy, got into a position—entirely disconnected with the left of the Sixth corps—which flanked the enemy's right, and which might have been used with victorious and overwhelming effect in subsequent engagements. On the contrary, I have been told that had the enemy been informed of the exact position in which that command stood relative to the rest of our army, it would have been in great danger of being cut off.

The right of our line, then, commanded the Brock road near Todd's Tavern, the centre faced Spottsylvania Court-house, the left was disposed across the road leading from Spottsylvania Court-house to Fredericksburg, to which latter place our wounded had been sent. A reconnaissance on the left in the morning developed no strong force of the enemy in that direction. General Mott's brigade of Carr's division, Second corps, was detached from the right and sent out on the left of the Sixth corps (now commanded by General Wright) to take and hold a strong position thus weakened. Fighting began in the early morning, and continued with more or less fierceness all day. The roar of artillery was constant; the forest in some places got on fire, discomfited our troops, and made a holocaust in some places, where the wounded could not be brought off. I do not pretend to have known or correctly ascertained what was accomplished or lost in this day's fighting until the afternoon. The dead and wounded were many on both sides.

In the afternoon a general attack was ordered, to be made at five o'clock. About four o'clock, the enemy, having discovered the weakness of General Barlow's position on the right, sent a heavy force in that direction, which pounced so suddenly and fiercely upon the division of that brave young commander, as to force it back from the flanking position it held, and produce a momentary confusion. Soldiers who got across the stream behind sooner than they ought, exaggerated the misfortune, and the report, flying to army headquarters, which were in an open field near the right, caused a pulling up of tent stakes, and a mounting of horses, which appeared very panic-stricken indeed.

General Barlow's division still pressed by superior numbers, fought its way slowly backward, and, still fighting, retreated across the river and joined the Second corps, against the right of which the enemy continued to exert his strength until after nightfall, when he was repulsed.

This episode delayed the proposed attack of our army until half-past six o'clock in the evening. For, an hour previous to that time our batteries in position played with destructive effect upon the enemy's lines. It was growing dark, and the general attack was about commencing, when Generals Grant and Meade, with their respective staffs, took position on the crest of an elevated plateau near where Griffin first met Longstreet's forces on Sunday, to see what could be seen of the battle.

It opened at last at half-past six o'clock, growing gradually from a skirmish fire into the ripe, rolling clangor of a general engagement; far enough off to drown the shouts of command, the cries of wounded, but not to drown a faint echo of the cheer with which the troops on some portions of the line started into the charge. Across the open fields, through reaches of wood, through depths of swamp and mire, the dark lines of our battalions struggled forward against a fearful fire, poured down upon them from works that only our artillery could reach effectively. The divisions of the Fifth corps, subjected to an enfilading volley of great guns from right and left, went down in that advance like deer before the hunters. The work set for these men, under such a fire, was not accomplished when darkness closed the fighting. The day closed in front of the Second corps with the repulse of the enemy on the right.

The soldiers of the Sixth, meanwhile, did a brilliant thing. About three hundred yards in front, the enemy occupied a work very strongly constructed, as high as a man's head, and loop-holed at the top. The party organized to attack this work was disposed by General Russell and led by Colonel Upton. It consisted of a portion of the First division, the Vermont brigade of the Second division, and some picked troops of General Neill's command, who were massed, on the eve of the attack, to the left and front of three batteries—Cowan's, McCartney's, and Rhodes'. Some companies of the Forty-ninth New York regiment had occupied during the afternoon a work in advance of the general line, and just to the left of the line of march of the column of attack. As the column pressed forward, these companies moved by the left flank, engaging a battery of the enemy on the right of his work. The batteries of McCartney, Cowan, and Rhodes opened on the work, over the heads of the attacking column, which moved steadily on in the face of a terrific blaze of musketry, with arms a-port, and without firing a shot, up to the very face of the enemy's position. It poured, a flood of savage faces and plunging bayonets, over the crest of the work and into the midst of the enemy, capturing in

an instant nine hundred and fifty of the very men who had stampeded the brigades of Shaler and Seymour on Friday night in the Wilderness, and sending a scattering volley after a host of flying rebels. Twelve guns also came into our possession.

This, if I am correct, was the only material success accomplished in the attack of Tuesday evening. What Burnside did on the left I have not heard. The position thus gained by Upton not being supported, and being too far in advance of the general line to be occupied with safety, had to be abandoned. The guns were spiked as they stood. It is said that some soldiers of the Vermont brigade—one of the finest in the army—actually wept when the brigade was ordered to fall back from a post it had helped so brilliantly to gain, at the expense of so many comrades' lives.

Our losses in this battle were perhaps more severe than those of any previous day. The Sixth corps alone, in the battles up to that night, had lost over five thousand killed and wounded. General Wright's old division, now commanded by General Russell, had lost nearly one thousand four hundred; the losses in General Neill's, now Colonel Bidwell's, brigade, were between eight hundred and nine hundred, and the Vermont brigade alone had suffered the loss of one thousand five hundred of its numbers.

These are specimen losses. It has been presumed, by those more competent to judge than I, that the enemy's average losses, during all the battles, must have been nearly, if not quite, as great as our own. If so, our artillery must have been a great executioner, for the rebels more than we had fought behind intrenchments, and we more than they had been the attacking party. They had attacked us at intervals, certainly; in the varying tide of battle, they took every opportunity to return our advance. They came down upon us in the old Wilderness too often. There, in the varying charges back and forth, where Hancock and Sedgwick fought, they got severely punished. But we were the invaders, and we it was who had advanced. Although they had often forced us from advanced positions, they had never driven us from those we first occupied. We had taken the most prisoners; we had gained the most ground. It was shown that we were strong enough to gradually force the enemy backward, by hard fighting, step by step. But this had been done at terrible cost, and at terrible cost must still continue.

THE BATTLE OF THURSDAY, MAY 12.

Wednesday was a day of skirmishing; of minor engagements; of changes of position on both sides. In the afternoon it was discovered that the enemy had retired from our right in front of Hancock, and was shifting his lines to the left. An effort made at evening to blind us to this fact by pushing a strong column of troops, which were afterward marched back behind a wood in the rear, around toward our

right, across an open space, did not deceive our commanders. Our lines were also shifted toward the left, and more compactly joined. During the night Hancock's entire corps was removed from the right of our position and put in on the left of the Sixth, between that and Burnside, so that on Thursday morning the corps were disposed as follows: The Fifth corps on the right, the Sixth corps next, the Second corps next, and Burnside, as before, on the extreme left.

It was in front of Hancock's new position that the vital section of the enemy lay—a strong, salient angle of earthworks, ditched in front, defended by cannon at every point, and held by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, Ewell's whole corps adjoining.

At half-past four o'clock Thursday morning, the attack upon this work was prepared. General Barlow's division—Neill's brigade leading—formed in column by battalion, doubled on the centre, and took the advance. The divisions of Birney, Mott, and Gibbon, in two lines of battle, supported the attack. A rain, which had been falling during the night, still continued, and a beneficent fog overspread the field. The storming column advanced silently, and without firing a shot, up to the angles of the breastworks, over which they rushed, taking the forces within in flank, surrounding them, capturing nearly the entire division of Johnson, with its commander, and also a brigade or two of other troops, Brigadier-General George H. Stuart in command. An unfortunate cheer from the second line of battle prevented the surprise from extending to other rebel troops, who were thus enabled to escape. Prisoners have declared that General Lee himself was within those works at the time, and narrowly escaped capture. Forty-two guns lying in the works, fell into our hands, of which eighteen were brought off with the prisoners.

The attacking column pursued the enemy some distance after this victory, engaging Early's command and beating it back. It then returned, and formed lines of battle in the intrenchments it had taken. From this time forth, a battle raged over those intrenchments, the intense fury and heroism and horror of which it is simply impossible to describe at all. Five distinct, savage, tremendous charges were made by the enemy to retake that position. Ewell's corps, driven from it in the morning, came down first *en masse*, and were repulsed. General Hill moved down from the right, joined Ewell and threw his divisions into the struggle. General Wright moved up from the right, supporting Hancock, to meet the surge. Longstreet came on from the extreme left of the rebel line. Warren sent in troops from the left of ours. The lines of both armies, thus contracted, met in a continual death-grapple in and to the right of the angle of death taken in the morning. To have looked down on that battle from a height would have been like gazing into the smoke and din of an earthquake. Column after column of the

enemy penetrated to the very face of the breast-work, to be hewn down and sent back like a broken wave. Column after column still came on, dealing death and meeting it, and making way for other columns, and others still; and all the day long, against this rush of a foe that seemed disdainful of life, the angle was held by our troops, fighting, falling, but unyielding, to the close. Our artillery made havoc on that day; from dawn to dusk the roar of the guns was ceaseless; a tempest of shell shrieked through the forest, and ploughed the field.

When the night came, the angle of those works, where the battle had been the hottest, and from which the enemy had been finally driven, had a spectacle, for whoever cared to look, that would never have enticed his gaze again. Men in hundreds, killed and wounded together, were piled in hideous heaps—some bodies that had lain for hours under the concentric fire of the battle being perforated with wounds. The writhing of wounded beneath the dead moved these masses at times; at times a lifted arm or a quivering limb told of an agony not yet quenched by the Letha of death around.

Bitter fruit, this—a dear price, it seemed, to pay for the capture of a salient angle of an enemy's entrenched work, even though that enemy's loss was terrible—even after the brilliant surprise and the prisoners of the morning. For the enemy on the right still occupied his original line, and still opposed us in front, on a prolongation of the same, leaving in our possession the angle. Of what Burnside might have done on the left this day, or of what he did, I am still uninformed.

During the night another movement by the left flank was made by the army, and in the morning the Fifth and Sixth corps had moved to the left of Hancock and Burnside. At nine o'clock A. M., the army faced the enemy, still this side of Spottsylvania Court-house, in a line south-east by north-west, stretching across the road from Spottsylvania Court-house to Fredricksburg.

Of the events of yesterday, consisting of the enemy's capture and our retaking of a position designated by a house on the extreme left of our line, you have had particulars.

The position now occupied by the enemy in our front is one so strong as to seem actually impregnable. Their works stretch in a semi-circle around Spottsylvania Court-house, and are said to have been long constructed, in anticipation of the very emergency which has now arrived. To advance directly upon these works, defended as they are by an army which has thus far so stubbornly opposed us, will prove a fearful business. I believe that General Grant will first try other means.

Meanwhile the army rests; the battle of musketry has ceased for a time in the forests; only the dull boom of a distant cannonade links the fortnight of battles past with the weeks of battle yet to come.

And as soft as the shadows and breezes that

fall upon and sweep across the slumbering lines of men in arms among these hills, ought to rise in the North and sink here, in this interval of peace, the rewarding gratitude of a nation.

Not so much, perhaps, for what the army has achieved, as for what it has suffered. Something besides military discipline, something besides the end to be attained—grand though that is—has inspired these soldiers along the pathway of blood just traversed. That element of the immortal which keeps the long slumber of an earthquake in men's breasts, during ordinary times, has made a volcano of every soldier's heart who lies here with his musket—a single scale upon this serpent in arms. There was promise of it in these faces long before the battle came; a look, prophesying tragedy. These were they who had quitted the old paths, known unto millions, that lead to peaceful graves. These were they to whom that thought of death, shunned by those who could only meet death by chance, was an understood and accepted guest. Behold, in the eyes of those in cities a kind of stupor; in the eyes of these thousands in the field a kind of electric light. Life with the first a fitful, earthly flame; with the last a fiery, hot emotion, kept awake in every vein by thought of the vulture above it, waiting to swoop. They laugh, and talk, and blaspheme, and are reckless of fine phrases, these men, much like their old selves in workshops and saloons. But there is something above the workshop and the saloon, the riot and routine of towns and farms, in the carriage of men intended for battle. They have lifted their souls out of the depths into the high tide of that majestic current of life, beneath which the accidents of earth and death are as rippling pebbles.

Doc. 60.

BATTLE OF ELKIN'S FORD, ARKANSAS.

LITTLE ROCK, May 6, 1864.

The battle of Elkin's Ford, on the Little Missouri river, took place on the third and fourth days of April. On the Union side all of the Second brigade, Third division (General Slocum's), except the Seventy-seventh Ohio and two companies First Iowa cavalry, were engaged. On that of the rebels, two brigades of Marmaduke's division.

On the afternoon of the second instant, General Steele ordered General Salomon to take and hold this ford. Thereupon General Salomon dispatched the forces referred to under command of Colonel William E. McLean, of the Forty-third Indiana infantry.

Colonel McLean made a forced march, arriving at the river after dark, seizing the ford, and crossed his command. A squadron of cavalry was sent forward as advance pickets, while the Thirty-sixth Iowa infantry, Colonel C. W. Kit-

1. 1990年10月1日以前

2. 1990年10月1日以后

1990年10月1日

SAVED BY



Engr. by A. S. P. Co.

MAJ. GEN. JEFF. C. DAVIS.

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EXPEDITION.

... .. HAKALL'S LANDING, }
 May 14—3 P. M. }

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tredge commanding; Forty-third Indiana infantry, Major W. W. Norris commanding; and Battery E, Second Missouri light artillery, Lieutenant Peetz commanding, encamped near the bank of the river.

In his report of the affair, Colonel McLean says:

The day after my arrival, occasional firing along our picket lines, and skirmishing in front, convinced me that the enemy were on the alert, either for the purpose of watching the movements of the army, of which my brigade constituted the advance, or, if possible, by a direct attack upon me in overpowering numbers, to cut me off before reinforcements could be obtained from across the river. Early on the morning of the third instant, I ordered Major Norris, of the Forty-third Indiana, to proceed with four companies of that regiment to the front, to reconnoitre the position of the enemy, deploy the men as skirmishers, and support the cavalry pickets. He soon succeeded in discovering the position of the advance pickets and skirmishers of the enemy, drove them back for some distance, pressing them so closely that, the retreat of a number of them being cut off, sixteen came into our line and surrendered.

On the same evening, being satisfied that the enemy were in our front in force, and designed attacking us during the night or early next morning, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, Thirty-sixth Iowa, to proceed with three companies from that regiment, and three companies from the Forty-second Indiana, to a position on the main road leading from the ford immediately in our front, to deploy his men on the right and left of the road, to watch the movements of the enemy, and to resist their approach as long as was prudent, and retire to the reserves when they approached in force. One section of artillery, under Lieutenant Peetz, was planted so as to fully command the road and the leading approach on our right and left.

At six o'clock on the morning of the fourth, the enemy approached in force, and commenced an attack on the advance companies of Lieutenant-Colonel Drake, who resisted them gallantly for nearly two hours, being well supported by the artillery of Lieutenant Peetz.

Too much praise cannot be awarded Colonel Drake for the very distinguished gallantry and determined courage he exhibited during this contest.

The capture by his forces early in the morning of a rebel lieutenant—an aid-de-camp of General Marmaduke—confirmed me in the belief that that General was near in person, with a large portion of his division. After a very lively skirmish of near two hours, the enemy having discovered the position of our battery, and replying to it vigorously with four pieces of artillery, our pickets and advanced skirmishers were driven back on the left upon their infantry reserves, while upon the right they maintained their position.

The enemy (since ascertained to be General

Cabell's brigade, sixteen hundred strong), charged with a yell upon our left, for the purpose of flanking us and capturing our battery.

Their approach from the cover of the timber was met gallantly by two or three well-directed volleys from the Thirty-sixth Iowa. Immediately after the charge and repulse of the enemy, the reinforcements sent for by me arrived, consisting of the Twenty-ninth Iowa infantry and Ninth Wisconsin infantry, of Brigadier-General Rice's brigade. But before they were put in position by him the enemy withdrew; not, however, until a grape-shot from the battery had inflicted a slight wound upon the General's head, from the effect of which, I am gratified to say, he has recovered.

In looking upon the results of this engagement and the great disparity of numbers of the forces engaged, I cannot but regard this encounter as one reflecting the highest praise upon the coolness and unflinching courage of the men of my command, all of whom acquitted themselves well.

The entire list of casualties (most of which are slight wounds), will not exceed forty-one, while the new-made graves of eighteen of the enemy are in sight of our present encampment, and they confess to a loss of more than fifty wounded.

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SHERIDAN'S CAVALRY EXPEDITION.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, HAXALL'S LANDING, }
ON JAMES RIVER, May 14—3 P. M. }

The cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, under the command of Major-General P. H. Sheridan, have during the past ten days covered themselves with glory, and accomplished the most decisive results of the war. They have fought and defeated Stuart's boasted cavalry for nine successive days, flanked his army, destroyed all his communications with Richmond, captured and destroyed three long trains loaded with commissary stores, together with two first-class engines; recaptured three hundred and seventy-eight Union prisoners, including two colonels, one lieutenant-colonel, and several officers of lower grade; captured three pieces of artillery and about two hundred prisoners, taken the outer line of fortifications on the north side of Richmond, whipped their cavalry and infantry within the sound of the church bells of their capital, and brought the command safely through to the James river, under the protection of our gunboats.

This has only been accomplished by the most determined and stubborn fighting, and with the loss of a large number of brave officers and men.

Our operations have been entirely on the flank and rear of Lee's army; so much so that I have had no opportunity of sending you any despatches hitherto, but will now endeavor to

give you as full an account as possible of all our doings since we crossed the Rapidan.

The cavalry corps is composed of three divisions, and numbered at the time we crossed the river several thousand mounted men. General Torbert, commanding the First division, was taken sick, being entirely disabled by an abscess in his back, so that the command of his division had to be given to General Merritt. Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg commands the Second division, and General J. H. Wilson, recently of the Cavalry Bureau, the Third. Each division had two batteries, numbering in all about thirty guns.

On the morning of Wednesday, May fourth, General Gregg's division crossed the Rapidan at Ely's ford, driving in and capturing a portion of the rebel picket stationed there. This movement was accomplished by Major Hugh H. Janeway, with a battalion of the First New Jersey cavalry, and by sunrise we had taken up our line of march toward the battle-field of Chancellorsville. We bivouacked two miles beyond the famous Chancellorsville House, and awaited the arrival of General Sheridan with the First division.

In the meantime General Wilson, with the Third division, had crossed the river at Germania ford and started upon a reconnoissance in the direction of Spottsylvania Court-house. At noon of the fifth we also marched in the direction of Spottsylvania, and when we arrived at Todd's tavern, which was the left flank of Hancock's corps, we encountered General Wilson in full retreat with his division, having been driven back some five miles by Fitz Hugh Lee, and handled rather roughly. General Gregg, who never allows his division to be driven under any circumstances, at once started for the front with General Davies' brigade, and, putting in the First New Jersey and one squadron of the First Massachusetts, drove the enemy steadily, compelling him to fall back across the Potomac and behind his fortifications.

Our loss in killed and wounded in this sharp fight was between seventy and eighty. Here Captain Hart and Lieutenant Mitchner, of the First New Jersey, were wounded, and Captain Lawrence Hopkins, of the First Massachusetts, had his horse killed by a shell, and himself wounded in the foot, as he was gallantly leading his squadron into the fight. We held the battle-field that night.

On the morning of the sixth, at daylight, General Hancock opened upon the enemy on our right, and the musketry firing was the most terrific and incessant that I ever heard. The battle raged furiously for five or six hours, at one time approaching seemingly near to us, and then receding, indicating that we not only held our own but were pushing the enemy back.

Late in the day Stuart made a demonstration upon both our right and left flanks, but was handsomely repulsed by Curtis' brigade, of the First division, on the right, and Colonel Gregg's brigade, of the Second division, on the left. General Custer went into the fight with his

usual impetuousness, having his band playing patriotic airs in front, himself charging at the head of his brigade, and the artillery playing into the enemy at the same time.

The attack on the left was very stubborn, and looked for a time as though it would be successful; but General Gregg, who is the coolest man under trying circumstances I ever saw on the field, ordered Colonel Gregg to send in the First Maine and drive "those people" away. The General always speaks of the enemy as "those people." Besides the First Maine, the Second, Fourth and Eighth Pennsylvania regiments were engaged on the left.

I forgot to mention that on the fifth, Brigadier-General Davies, who was in front with his skirmishers, was at one time in the hands of the enemy. They made a sudden dash upon our line, temporarily driving us back and leaving the General a prisoner, but Captain Thomas, of his staff, seeing his critical condition, rallied a squadron and charged, bringing the General safely out.

Through a misapprehension that Longstreet had succeeded in turning the right wing of General Hancock, and thereby exposing his flank, we were ordered at three o'clock of the sixth, to abandon our position and fall back some four miles to Aldrich's corner. The enemy at once occupied the position we left, but did not attempt to annoy us in falling back. In the morning the error was discovered, and we were again ordered forward to occupy our old position.

The enemy had done all in his power to strengthen his position during our absence, and fought us with great stubbornness. The First division had the left, and the Second the right and centre. Both sides fought dismounted, in consequence of the dense timber. It was the hardest fight we had yet had, but our men were determined to win.

The rebel loss of officers was very heavy. Colonel Green, of the Sixth Virginia, was killed, and also Colonel Collins, of Philadelphia, who graduated at West Point four years ago, and took sides with the South. There were many of our regular officers present who had known him intimately. They buried him and marked the place of his interment.

The losses of the First New York dragoons, Sixth Pennsylvania, and First regular cavalry were quite heavy. Here, also, the gallant Captain Joseph P. Ash, of the Fifth United States, was killed. He died in the thickest of the fight, and is deeply lamented by all who knew him. By night we had driven the enemy some four miles, and had taken their first line of breast-works.

The artillery practice of Captain Martin's Sixth New York independent battery, as well as the other batteries of the corps, was of the most brilliant character. The Sixth New York has the reputation of being one of the best light horse batteries in the service. They certainly did great execution during the succession of

fight in which we were engaged. The sections are commanded by Lieutenants Brown, Clark Wilson, while First Sergeant J. E. Tilston is a host in himself. On the morning of Sunday, the eighth, the Fifth corps arrived in our front, and marched toward Spottsylvania Court-house, while the Second corps relieved the cavalry.

Many of our distinguished generals were in consultation at Todd's tavern, including Generals Grant, Meade, Sheridan and others. It was now decided to send the cavalry corps to the rear of Lee, cut his line of communication, destroy his supplies, and do him all the damage possible.

For this purpose we were quietly withdrawn on the afternoon of Sunday, the eighth, and marched back to within about eight miles of Fredericksburg, on the plank-road. Here we bivouacked and made all the preparation we could for the coming trying march. We had already been four days without much sleep, and with very little to eat. Our forage for the horses had been reduced to one day's supply; but, notwithstanding all these drawbacks, the utmost enthusiasm prevailed, and all were anxious to participate in the movement.

We moved at daylight, marching in the direction of Fredericksburg until we had arrived within four miles of the city, when we struck off to the left of Spottsylvania Court-house to Hamilton's crossing, and took the telegraph road to Richmond.

We had not advanced many miles before we began to be annoyed on the flank and rear by rebel sharpshooters. The First division had the advance, the Second the rear, and the Third the centre. We paid very little attention to the firing, supposing it to be only a party of scouts watching our movements. We had flankers thrown out each side of the road, while the Sixth Ohio regiment, Colonel William Stedman commanding, were the rear guard.

About the middle of the afternoon the First North Carolina cavalry made a furious charge upon our rear guard, breaking clear through the Sixth Ohio, who were somewhat unprepared for such a vigorous movement; used both pistol and sabre to good advantage, and captured quite a number of prisoners.

Quite an amusing incident occurred in connection with this charge. A section of the Sixth New York independent battery was in the rear, supported by a squadron of the Sixth Ohio. A rebel captain cut his way through to the rear piece, and, putting his hand upon it, cried out—"This is my piece." "Not by a damned sight," replied a cannonier, and at the same time gave him a blow under the eye, *a la Heenan*, knocked him from his horse and took him prisoner. Considerable commotion was created in the column for a few minutes, when it was ascertained that Fitz Hugh Lee, with two brigades, was in the rear of us. The First New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel Kester commanding, was at once ordered to assist the Sixth Ohio, and from that time till dark both small arms and artillery were in constant use. Captain Walter R. Rob-

bins was at one time completely cut off from the balance of the command; but, placing himself at the head of his squadron, he gallantly cut his way through, bringing in several prisoners.

While these exciting events were transpiring in the rear, our advance, composed of General Custer's brigade, of the First division, was doing glorious work in the front. They forded the North Anna river, charged into Beaver Dam station, recaptured three hundred and seventy-eight Union prisoners, including colonels, majors, captains and lieutenants, belonging to the Fifth corps, and taken prisoners while charging the rebel breastworks at Todd's tavern. Their joy, when they saw the flashing blades of the Union cavalry approaching, knew no bounds. They set up a deafening cheer, while the rebel guard, composed of a lieutenant and twenty-five men, skedaddled into the woods. They had no inkling of our approach, and the transition from a state of despondency to hope and joy was so sudden that they could hardly realize it.

Reaching the station, General Custer found three long trains, loaded with commissary stores, with two splendid engines, which he at once destroyed, together with a large warehouse filled with an immense quantity of flour, bacon and whiskey. It is said that not less than one million and a half of rations were destroyed at this point. They also thoroughly destroyed the railroad for miles, burning the ties and bridges, bending the rails, and damaging it in every conceivable manner. The road which passes here is the Virginia Central, running from Richmond to Gordonsville.

The First division bivouacked on the south side of the North Anna river, while the Second and Third were on the north side. A strong picket guard was thrown out in the rear, and skirmishing was kept up all night. At daylight in the morning the enemy succeeded in getting one piece of artillery in position commanding our camp, and opened a vigorous fire. The first shell passed directly over an ammunition wagon, under which your correspondent was sleeping. Our regiment was at once ordered into line, and a crossing of the river was effected under heavy fire.

We moved south, in the direction of the South Anna river, the First division in advance. The rebels during the night had succeeded in getting a force in front of us, and were annoying our column. The First Maine charged them, and Lieutenant-Colonel Boothby received a severe wound in the shoulder, shattering the bone. It was first thought that the wound was fatal, but Dr. W. W. L. Phillips, Surgeon-in-Chief of the Second division, performed a skillful operation, cutting out the fragments of the shattered bone, and strong hopes are now entertained of his recovery.

At four p. m. we crossed the South Anna, and, after marching two miles, bivouacked for the night. At three o'clock on the morning of the eleventh, the First brigade, Second division, was sent, under Brigadier-General H. E. Davies,

on a special expedition to Ashland, a distance of seven miles, for the purpose of destroying the railroad and supplies. Great caution and haste were essential, as it was known that General Stuart, with his rebel cavalry, was rapidly making for that point. Our forces arrived in sight of the town at daylight, and formed in line of battle. The First Massachusetts cavalry, Major Sergeant commanding, was selected to charge through the town, which the men did in gallant style, driving a regiment of Virginians, under Colonel Mumford, of Fitz Hugh Lee's division, before them. They then dismounted, set fire to the railroad depot, destroying rolling stock, stores and supplies in great quantities; also tearing up miles of the track of the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad.

As they left the town they saw several of the enemy make their appearance, and it was decided to make another charge into the town to drive them off. The rebels retreated into the houses, and as our men passed through poured a murderous volley into their ranks, wounding Captain Motley, Lieutenant Smith and Lieutenant E. Payson Hopkins, son of Professor Hopkins, of Williams College, Massachusetts, who was left motionless in the road, and all fell into the hands of the enemy. We also lost about twenty-five men in killed and wounded, who likewise fell into the hands of the rebels. It was at first intended by General Davies to shell the town in retaliation, but having accomplished everything for which he had started, and aware of the approach of J. E. B. Stuart, with a large force, retired to our main column.

We were now within sixteen miles of Richmond, and at once took up the line of march directly toward the city, the First division in advance and the Second in the rear. We marched and fought all day and night, the enemy being constantly reinforced, until at daylight, when within three miles of Richmond, the force opposed to us in front were two brigades of infantry and a brigade of cavalry, while in our rear was Stuart, with two brigades of cavalry, together with every man that could be raked up in Richmond. We now turned to the left on the Meadow bridge road, leading to Mechanicsville, pressing the enemy steadily back.

When about four miles on the road we found the enemy strongly intrenched, behind fortifications composing the outer line of the Richmond defences. The position was a strong one, being situated upon a hill, commanding our whole corps, and our preservation depended on our driving them out. General Sheridan was equal to the emergency. The enemy was already pursuing us closely in the rear.

The General ordered General Custer to take his gallant brigade and carry the position. General Custer placed himself at the head of his command, and with drawn sabre and deafening cheers, charged directly in the face of a withering fire, captured two pieces of artillery, upward of a hundred prisoners, together with caissons, ammunition and horses, which he

brought off in safety. It was, without exception, the most gallant charge of the raid, and when it became known among the corps, cheer after cheer rent the air. The rebels retreated behind the Chickahominy, destroying in their flight Meadow bridge.

In the rear Colonel Gregg's brigade, of the Second division, and a portion of the Third division, under General Wilson, were hotly engaged with Stuart. General Wilson sent word to General Sheridan that the enemy were driving him slowly back. General Sheridan sent word that "he must hold the position at all hazards; that he could and must whip the enemy." Colonel Gregg's brigade, being reinforced by a regiment from the First brigade, charged the enemy and drove them nearly a mile. The day was now ours. The enemy had disappeared from our front, and we succeeded in rebuilding the Meadow bridge, and the First and Third divisions crossed, covered by the Second division, which, in turn, withdrew and also crossed without being annoyed by the enemy.

The rebels, previous to crossing the river, planted a large number of torpedoes in the road, two of which exploded, fortunately, however, killing nothing but two horses. The rebel prisoners were at once set at work, and compelled to dig carefully with their fingers for the remaining infernal machines. Twelve of these beauties were unearthed in the space of a couple of hours, and placed in the cellar of a lady with strong rebel proclivities, living on the road. She protested in the strongest terms against the indignity, but was told that if she did not handle them they would not explode.

The rebels still continued to show themselves in our front until we had passed Mechanicsville, where General Merritt, by making a demonstration, as though the column were moving toward White House, caused them to destroy a bridge, when we turned short to the right upon the road to Bottom's bridge.

We now encamped on the old Gaines' Mill battle-field, and moved at seven o'clock on the morning of the thirteenth, marched in a southeasterly direction, crossed the York river road at Despatch Station, and camped early in the day at Bottom's bridge.

It was now necessary to ascertain the whereabouts of General Butler's forces. For the past three days it had rained incessantly: our men were without rations and horses without forage, and the entire command fatigued, hungry and jaded. An officer of General Sheridan's staff, with two men, was sent in the direction of the James river, to ascertain the whereabouts of the gunboats. He returned at daylight, and reported that he could find no sign of them. An escort of sixty men was at once despatched to Yorktown, to have supplies forwarded to Haxall's Landing, where the balance of the corps marched, a distance of ten miles.

Arriving in proximity to the James river, the booming of cannon and whistling of shot over our heads admonished us that our friends were

at hand, and had mistaken us for enemies. Captain Wilson, the efficient signal officer of the Second division, was sent to the front and made signals. No attention was paid to him, however, and continued firing was kept up, and one man killed.

Captain Wilson was compelled to advance to the bank of the river, where he hailed the fleet. A boat was sent to the shore, the officers and crew having their pistols in hand and fully cocked, evidently mistrusting us. As soon as it became known who we were, the sailors gave us three hearty cheers, and our column advanced to near the bank of the river, our bands playing "The Lincoln Gunboat's Come."

Major-General Sheridan at once sent out to communicate with Major-General Butler, apprising him of our arrival and the scanty state of our forage and rations. Our immediate wants were promptly supplied, and a despatch boat instantly provided to start for Fortress Monroe to communicate with the War Department. Our men, for three days previous to our arrival at the James river, had literally lived off the country, as many poor families who have lost the whole of their scanty supplies can testify. Our provost-marshal used their utmost endeavors to protect the families of citizens, but upon remonstrating with the men, they would refer you to acts of barbarity committed by the rebels at Fort Pillow and elsewhere.

General Sheridan is eminently the right man in the right place. He is, without exception, the best cavalry commander the Army of the Potomac has ever had. He is quick to perceive and bold to execute, and has already won the entire confidence of his command. Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg was General Sheridan's right-hand man. He consulted him on all occasions, and placed in him the utmost confidence. He knew that where Gregg was, with his fighting division, everything was moving along smoothly.

All officers and men seemed to vie with each other in deeds of gallantry and daring, and were all actuated by the same feeling of determination to succeed or perish in the attempt.

During the fight on the morning of the twelfth, prisoners captured from the enemy reported General J. E. B. Stuart mortally wounded. Our entire loss, from the time we crossed the Rapidan until we reached Haxall's Landing, on the James river, is, according to the statement of the Medical Director of the corps, about six hundred in killed and wounded, of which two hundred are estimated as killed. The missing will doubtless amount to one hundred and fifty to two hundred more. Most of our dead, and all of our wounded, with the exception of about thirty mortally wounded, were brought off by us. Our means of transportation were very limited. Having no ambulance train with us, we were compelled to carry the wounded in Government trains and wagons captured from the enemy. The suffering of the wounded during the slow

and tedious march was necessarily great, but all of them preferred death itself to falling captives to our barbarous foe.

Each and all the staff officers performed herculean labors, working night and day, regardless of personal comfort, and only intent on carrying out the plans of their generals. Many of them were exposed to great danger while carrying despatches, but all providentially escaped unhurt. Captain H. C. Wier, Assistant Adjutant-General of the Second division, had his horse shot under him while leading a charge.

Our wounded received the kindest care and treatment, the surgeons working night and day in the performance of their painful duty. Among those who were most active were Surgeons Phillips, Reznor, Hackley, Hotchkiss, Tutt, and Surgeon McGill, Medical Director of the corps. Nothing was left undone to alleviate the suffering of our wounded officers and soldiers.

The loss of the enemy is at least twice as great as ours, as we had a preponderance of artillery, and as they were, most of the time, the attacking party. The ground over which we drove them, both at Todd's Tavern and within the fortifications around Richmond, was literally covered with their dead and wounded. Their loss in officers was disproportionately large.

The results accomplished by General Sheridan, by his splendid raid, are of the greatest importance and magnitude. It will, doubtless, compel Lee's army to fall back upon Richmond, which is an event wholly unlooked for by the Southern people, and for which they are totally unprepared. Both railroads have been destroyed in such a thorough manner as to render their repair at least the work of two weeks. The very morning we were occupying the road on the twelfth, the Richmond papers stated that the roads were only slightly damaged, and would be in running order on the next day; but no one who saw how completely General Sheridan had performed his work, will be deceived by these lying statements of the rebel press.

The expedition was, upon the whole, the boldest and most successful of the war. Its very boldness made it successful.

A large number of horses gave out on the march, and many were shot in battle. The dismounted men, as well as the recaptured prisoners, were compelled to walk the whole distance. This, toward the close of our trip, became a difficult matter, as the heavy rains had rendered the roads almost impassable.

It is now demonstrated, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the rebel cavalry are no match for ours. I heard a rebel captain whom we captured say, that at the commencement of the war they could whip us, but that now we whipped them every time, no matter how they fought us. The new recruits, as a general thing, fought nearly as well as the veterans. General Sheridan is very proud of his new command, and expects to achieve great things with them during the summer campaign. If the Government could furnish

horses for the large number that are dismounted, he would have the finest command in the army.

Brigadier-General H. E. Davies, one of New York's distinguished sons, commands a brigade in the Second division. Although young in years, he is a veteran in the service, and has won his way to the proud position which he now occupies by hard services in the field. He is brave almost to a fault, and is always in the front when his brigade is in action. His brigade, during the recent heavy fights, have done fully their share, and always acquitted themselves with honor.

COMPOSITION OF THE SECOND DIVISION.

Brigadier-General D. McM. Gregg commanding.

STAFF.—Captain H. C. Wier, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain R. R. Corson, Quartermaster.

Major W. W. L. Phillips, Surgeon-in-Chief.

Captain P. Pollard, Commissary of Subsistence.

Major C. Taylor, Assistant Inspector-General.

Captain W. D. Phillips, Commissary of Munitions.

Captain Frank B. Alibane, Ordnance Officer.

Captain Charles Treichel, Provost-Marshal.

Lieutenant J. R. West, Chief of Ambulance.

Lieutenant Thos. Arrowsmith, Aid-de-Camp.

Lieutenant T. J. Gregg, Aid-de-Camp.

Captain F. Wilson, Signal Officer.

First Brigade—Brigadier General Henry E. Davies.

STAFF.—Captain F. L. Tremain, Assistant Adjutant-General.

Captain H. S. Thomas, Assistant Inspector-General.

Captain W. Harper, Aid.

Lieutenant E. H. Parry, Aid.

Major W. B. Rezner, Brigade Surgeon.

Second Brigade—Acting Brigadier-General J. Irving Gregg.

A SOUTHERN ACCOUNT.

HEADQUARTERS, GORDON'S BRIGADE,
BROOK CHURCH, May 13, 1864. }

I will attempt a brief detail of the recent raid that emerged from Grant's lines on the Rapidan. Being one of the pursuing party our means of observation will not ensure a general detail of the pursuit, as, writing from the spur of the moment, we shall confine ourselves more particularly to the minutiae of the operations of our own brigade.

While our cavalry were occupying the respective positions on General Lee's advance lines, where we had for several days been engaged actively with the enemy's advance, mostly infantry, his cavalry seemed rather reserved, and whenever it made its appearance was promptly whipped and driven back upon his infantry supports, which, in most instances, we engaged with spirit and success, fighting them with our

carbines in regular infantry style, which state of facts, and the wild, wooded nature of the country, had almost resolved our arm of the service into infantry. General Lee, following his successes, was closely pressing Grant down in the direction of Fredericksburg, giving the cavalry their share in the immediate work.

In the meantime it seemed that a vastly organized force of the enemy's cavalry and artillery had concentrated and moved round far to his left, and made their appearance on Monday, the ninth instant, sweeping far around, and tapping our most extended cavalry pickets on the right, on the telegraph road, leading from Fredericksburg to Richmond. Wickham's cavalry brigade—the nearest at hand—took up the pursuit about two hours behind the rear of their column, which was tilting along at a most sweeping pace, and, from the best information, would entitle them to a more respectable term than mere raiders. From the most reliable sources their force could safely be set down at between fifteen and twenty thousand, and thirty-five pieces of artillery. At least, from one fact, this deduction may be drawn—it took them four and a half hours, marching by fours, at a sweeping trot, to pass a given point. Lomax's brigade also immediately joined in pursuit, followed a few hours after by Gordon's. Wickham and Lomax overtook their rear at Jerrold's Mills. They were plundering and destroying thoroughly that gentleman's property, breaking up his household furniture, carrying off his bacon, and emptying his grain and flour into the river. A short skirmish here ensued, the enemy retreating precipitately, leaving the telegraph road, turning to the right, and taking the Beaver Dam road. They were closely followed and overtaken, late in the evening, on Mr. Wynne's farm, where they were so closely pressed that they gave battle. A few gallant charges soon sent them adrift down the road, leaving several killed and wounded and several prisoners in our hands. They made another stand about two miles further on, at Mitchell's shop, and were again routed and pursued closely to Swann's farm, where their rear was strongly reinforced, and where a hot fight was joined. The brave Virginians delved into their heavy columns with such vigor and spirit that that field was soon cleared, leaving many dead and wounded. Our loss was comparatively small in these engagements, mostly in wounded. Here night closed on the parties, Fitz Lee still following and harassing their rear till the enemy reached North Anna river, when, about daylight, a sharp fight was kept up, these two brigades holding their own against vastly superior numbers, and steadily driving the enemy before them across the river, where the enemy protected their position at the bridge, with numerous artillery, long enough to burn it. This, then, gave them a good start on us. In the meantime Gordon's brigade came up, making three brigades, all told, not more than four thousand men, already wearied and worn down by continual watching and fighting for five

days—to be thrown against the disproportionate hosts already mentioned. Yet these brave troopers, with their noble, but now fallen leader at their head—entirely Virginians and North Carolinians—felt the importance of each man acting well his part. The road to their devoted capital was open. Many a little child had gone to bed supperless, and would rise crying to a helpless mother for bread, whose cries and earnest entreaties had failed to influence the hellish outcast vandals to leave her one dust of flour or meal. Burning fences, mills, and houses lit up their hellish course. A stream lay between them, the bridge across which was burned. This difficulty was to be overreached. Across the river, in front, two narrow cow fords were discovered—one below and the other above the bridge. A party from Gordon's brigade were dismounted and engaged the enemy in front across the river, while Wickham and Lomax led around below and Gordon above. As Gordon reached the point above, the enemy's pickets were seen guarding the ford. Woodland skirted the banks. Colonel Evans, of the Fifth North Carolina cavalry, was ordered forward to charge and take it at all hazards. Sabres were drawn; Captain Galloway, with his company, led in front. The Colonel gave the word, "Forward, my brave boys," which was responded to with a deafening yell, and onward they dashed to the ford, which was almost impassable. Horses and riders went down in the stream, yet up they grappled, and soon reached the bank, which was readily cleared of the party holding it, and which gave the regiment an exciting chase for several miles. Many of the enemy's horses fell dead in the road, while our horses got near enough occasionally to lay a blue coat in the dust, and take several of the hindmost in. Wickham, by taking a near route, reached Beaver Dam in advance of Gordon, and just in time to pitch into this living column, "which fared but middling." He killed and captured a large body of them.

Where Beaver Dam stood nothing remained but charred and burning ruins of buildings, and two trains of cars, with their contents, that were not consumed, scattered profusely over the ground. The farmers' fencing, far and wide, lighted up the midday sky with a lurid glare.

"Our evil deeds come home to us," struck us as most beautifully illustrated by the following incident: Along the road where our vengeful troopers had cleaved down the thieving villains, the fencing had been fired by the more advanced fugitives. The main column had charged on after them, through the livid flames, that were almost lapping each other from both sides of the road. Hard by the fence, just in good roasting distance, lay a wounded raider, unable to move himself; the flames from the burning fence were fast approaching him, and the wind from the contrary direction seemed hurrying them up to the poor wretch, who was wincing and cringing at the horrible catastrophe awaiting him from his comrades' own devilish hands. But the

benevolent principle, "if the enemy thirst give him drink," relieved him from his awfully pending self-wrought fate. Our loss at this point was only a few wounded.

Here the enemy had divided his forces, one column going in the direction of Hanover Junction and the other taking the Negrofoot road. Generals Stuart and Fitz Lee, with the brigades of Wickham and Lomax, followed on the former route, and General Gordon, with his brigade, pursued the latter. General Gordon followed on till a late hour in the night, and bivouacked near Beach Ford, on the South Anna river, placing himself within a few miles of the Yankee camp. Early next morning he advanced and by daylight attacked them on Mrs. Gronshaw's farm, and, after a heavy skirmish, drove them steadily before him down upon the mountain road. Here the enemy had massed a heavy body of reinforcements and taken up their position around Mr. Goodall's. The dismounted men of the enemy were posted strongly behind the houses and woods; a heavy body of cavalry was drawn up in an open cornfield to the right of the road, while another body was placed immediately down the road and on the edge of the field. Our dismounted men were thrown out on each side of the road. While the cavalry was advanced, the dismounted men, under a most galling fire, broke with a fearful yell, and, simultaneously, the mounted men responded—the Fifth North Carolina—the colonel gallantly leading at the head; The squadron of Captain Galloway dashed at the body on the left in the corn-field, and Captain Harris dashed upon the body down the road. The fierce onset of both these advance squadrons, seconded by a detachment of the First and Second regiments, broke the Yankee columns simultaneously. The scene beggars description. The entire field was wrapped in smoke and dust—the steady charge of the dismounted men drove everything from the flanks. Yelling like demons, they kept pace almost with the horse—helter-skelter, the flying Yankee horse crowd and jam down the road. The troopers goad them behind, and while the carbineers empty many a saddle from the flanks, the falling dust tells that they are making fast time in the distance.

About four miles from the opening scene the pursuit is called off. The field and roadside are dotted with blue coats, and the wood through which the carbineers passed has its sprinkling too.

Individual instances of daring are numerous; and we hope not to be invidious in mentioning an instance. In the charge, the Yankee colors at one time being almost within reach, Lieutenant Lindsay, of the Fifth North Carolina, dashes at them and grapples with the color-bearer. As he reaches for them an expert shift from one hand to the other by the color-bearer saves them from his grasp; but, with a well-plied stroke of the sabre, he almost unhorses the bearer, who, bleeding, reels, but gathers his equilibrium, and, by means of the fleetness of his

horse, saves himself with his devoted Yankee bunting.

Another instance is also worthy of publicity. Private Brown, of company H, Fifth North Carolina cavalry, a mere stripling, dashes into the heavy ranks of the First Maine regiment, and encounters an athletic Yankee captain, who, with a stunning blow with his broad sabre, knocks the lad from his horse; at the same instant the Yankee captain's horse was shot from under him. Just as this brave lad was rising from the ground his eye caught the situation of his antagonist, and raising the butt of his gun, commenced clubbing the Yankee, who lustily cried out for quarter. The brave boy had the satisfaction of seeing him subsequently shipped to the Libby.

At this point the Yankees had settled down to have a good time, for a while at least, from the number of chickens, geese, eggs, &c., they had collected into camp—some with their heads just wrung off, some half picked; while eggs, boiled and unshelled, lay in profusion around. The ladies' pantries had contributed no little to the occasion, as pickle-jars and preserve-cans lay scattered about around their camp-fires. Amid these spoils also lay a number of dead and wounded Yankees.

A remarkable instance of immediate retribution came under our observation on this part of the field. Just at the head of a dead Yankee, who had fallen near the roadside, lay a large fine preserve-can, with its rich contents scattered around the unhappy wretch's head. The peculiar cause and circumstance of his death was some subject of remark, when a little North Carolina lad curtly replied, "Ah, boys! he took his sweetened."

The Yankee loss was quite severe—nearly all killed outright; about fifty prisoners were taken. Our loss was principally in wounded.

The whole column was again formed, pursued on, and came up with the Yankees near the railroad. A charge was ordered. Colonel Andrews, of the Second North Carolina, gallantly led his regiment forward, closely followed by the other two regiments of the brigade. The first position of the Yankees was carried, but on reaching their second position it was discovered that the enemy had effectually barricaded the road, and had his artillery so posted as to rake it with a most galling fire. The charging column here retired in good order, losing several men and horses by the Yankee grape and canister thrown among them. Dismounted men were now thrown forward, and we succeeded in ousting the enemy from his strong position, driving him steadily down the road till dark, and forcing him to take position behind the railroad. Here our wearied columns were halted, the tired trooper was relieved from his saddle, and reposed till morning.

In the meantime, Generals Stuart and Fitz Lee came up with the enemy at Yellow Tavern, but, being terribly outnumbered, they managed to maintain their ground and inflict heavy loss

upon the enemy. Here, in one of those desperate charges, at the head of a charging column, the gallant and chivalrous Stuart fell, mortally wounded—an irreparable loss to our cause. His many gallant and daring deeds, and glorious exploits, will challenge the admiration of the world. He was best known and loved by his troopers. His frank and agreeable face always cheered them in the camp, the march and the bivouac. His bright, flashing eye, and clear, ringing voice, inspired and nerved them in the hour of battle.

"A noble soul to liberty born—
A noble soul for liberty died!"

In this engagement our loss was pretty severe. Colonel H. Clay Pate, and Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Randolph, were also killed—both of them brave and accomplished officers.

Colonel Henry Clay Pate was a native of Western Virginia. He gained some distinction for gallantry as a partisan leader in Kansas during the troubles which attended the formation of a government in that Territory, and on the breaking out of the present war raised a battalion of cavalry in this city, which was soon after merged into the Fifth Virginia cavalry, when he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. He served through the principal battles in Virginia; and, after the promotion of Colonel Rosser to the rank of Brigadier, he was advanced to the command of the regiment. But a few months have elapsed since this event. Colonel Pate was about thirty-three years of age, and had been married for about two years. He was a gallant and daring officer, and one whose loss will be much regretted.

On Thursday morning the enemy were still on the same road, moving toward Richmond, but closely pressed by General Gordon, who came up with the Yankee rear near Brook Church, about a mile from the last line of fortifications. The Yankees turned down a road leading to Mechanicsville. Here we were reinforced by a regiment, or a portion of a regiment of infantry, which we hoped would assist in arresting the raiders. They were placed by General Gordon on each flank, in the place of dismounted men, with orders to double-quick and charge the enemy's dismounted men simultaneously with the cavalry charge. Our boys raised the yell, and were going in, when the necessary support failed. The command was then forced to dismount and advance as skirmishers, which was done immediately, steadily driving the enemy's skirmishers, when the recreant infantry were again ordered forward by General Gordon; but the only execution they did was by firing into our dismounted men, who were far in the advance, killing two and wounding several. They then fell back upon the road. This bad conduct was retrieved by some true men, four of whom we know personally; and we would have fared better had there been more. They expressed mortification at the course pursued by their comrades, and their action and conduct

should receive individual notice. Three out of the four were severely wounded; their names should be furnished.

Another instance is worthy of special notice. The names of the parties we are unable to give. We hope the country may yet have their names, in contradistinction to those who did behave badly. When the first volley was poured into the ranks of our advancing party, the dismounted cavalry were left to bear the brunt. An old gentleman who, it seemed, had accompanied his son, a mere lad, out to the field, brought his son into line, and both fought like veteran soldiers. Would that their noble spirit could pervade the bosom of every man when his home is thus seriously endangered; and may their noble conduct be imitated by all, should Richmond be again seriously menaced.

Our lines held back the enemy and drove him gradually till nightfall. General Gordon was severely wounded while leading his men in the skirmish. He unduly exposed himself, to hold his position against the enemy. The command, we hope, is only temporarily deprived of his services. The country cannot afford to lose the services of a such a gallant and successful officer in an active campaign, and may Heaven soon see fit to heal his wound and restore him to his devoted men, and may the fire and enthusiasm, with which he inspired us in the hour of battle, lose none of its influence till he is on his war-horse again.

After resting our weary frames, it was discovered that the continued thumping we had given the enemy had induced him to causerway the Chickahominy swamp and make his escape.

This, undoubtedly, has been by far one of the most thoroughly equipped, and most powerfully supplied of Yankee commands that ever made a raid into any country. Their main object was the capture and sack of Richmond; yet, what has it accomplished? So far as we see, the Yankees have only made a hasty circuit, leaving poor, helpless women and children to suffer along their track, which seems to be the acme of Yankee chivalry. And to whom Richmond owes its security from such a powerful combination, we leave the country to judge.

Doc. 62.

BATTLE OF OLUSTEE, FLORIDA.

SURGEON MAJER'S REPORT.

OFFICE CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, DISTRICT OF FLORIDA, }
JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA, February 24, 1864. }

Surgeon Ebn. Swift, United States Army, Medical Director, Department of the South:

SIR: It becomes my duty to report to-day the result of an engagement between our forces under the command of Brigadier-General T. Seymour and the enemy, occurring at a place known as Olustee, Fla., and distant from Jacksonville some forty or fifty miles, in a westerly direction, under the following circumstances: On

the evening of February nineteenth, the general ordered his command to be in readiness, with several days' cooked rations, for a forward movement from Barber's Station, thirty-two miles from Jacksonville, on the Florida Central railroad. At daybreak, February twentieth, the command took its line of march on the road to Sanderson, with its cavalry brigade and Elder's battery, under command of Colonel Guy Henry, in the advance. Passing Sanderson, the general commanding was informed, that we should meet the enemy in force—as the information would have it, fifteen thousand strong—some miles this side of Lake City, but no reliance was placed on such dubious information, in regard to strength as well as position. About five miles further on, our advance reported some sixty or seventy skirmishers of the enemy, falling slowly back on the north side of the railroad, toward Lake City. A short distance from that point, our cavalry force, together with one company of the Seventh Connecticut volunteers, reported that they suspected the enemy to be directly in front. The general commanding gave the order to "halt," and directed shells to be thrown through the Pine barren, as "feelers." Hardly had the second shell departed when a compliment in the form of solid shot fell directly in front of the staff, a second one following on the first, and a third one passing closely over our heads. No time was to be lost to bring our guns into battery, and to throw companies of the Seventh Connecticut volunteers out as skirmishers on our right. The infantry line-of-battle was in cool promptness formed of the brigades commanded respectively by Colonels Barton, Forty-eighth New York volunteers, Hawley, Seventh Connecticut volunteers, and Montgomery, Second South Carolina volunteers. Soon our artillery-fire became hot and hotter, and the musketry incessant.

Looking about for a convenient "ambulance depot," I rode on our right toward a couple of log houses—the only ones within miles—but found, on arriving, these houses so much exposed that, while inspecting them, I was in imminent danger, in the midst of heavy and light missiles, and, while the topographical condition barely offered a slight undulation of soil, there was no protection for a depot but the cover extension of the pine barren. About three hundred yards in the rear of our left, observing a cluster of pine trees, I directed our ambulances (twelve in number) to be drawn up in line, the surgeons preparing their instruments and appliances. And while the roar of the artillery and the musketry fire continued without intermission, our wounded men began to arrive, part walking, some on litters, and others in open ambulance wagons; as it were, first in single drops, then trickling, and after a while in a steady stream, increasing from a single row to a double and treble, and finally into a mass. In half an hour from the commencement stray shots, passing through the tall pines, and breaking their trunks like canes, admonished us to

remove the depot further to the rear, when within one mile we drew our ambulances up behind a small stream, and guarded in front by miry ground, thus securing a sufficiency of water, yet not of suitable protection against missiles from rifled guns.

For three hours, without a second's intermission, had the battle been raging, when suddenly, after a heavy artillery discharge, we heard from the front three lusty cheers, and the firing ceased abruptly. Our troops fell back about one mile, and I received the order to bring our wounded as far to the rear as we could reach with our (limited) transportation. Ambulances, caissons, army wagons, litters, single horses, carts, in short, every conceivable mode of carrying was made use of, to secure the large number of our wounded, and with a readiness which deserves high commendation, did everyone busy himself to execute the order. There was no depression of spirits manifested; on the contrary, the *morale* of the command expressed its brave determination in the words: "We will give it back to them!"

Our troops fell back to Barber's, under the protection of our cavalry brigade, which, during the battle, was quietly drawn up in the rear of our right and left.

Passing Sanderson, I sent the following telegrams:

1. "To Surgeon in charge of Field Hospital at Barber's Station:

"A large number of wounded. Prepare coffee, tea and beef soup."

2. "To Post Surgeon Smith at Jacksonville:

"Send immediately a train of cars, with bales of hay, lint, bandages and stimulants. Call on Sanitary Commission.—Dr. A. M."

We reached Barber's at midnight, and while, unhappily, some forty cases of badly wounded had to be left at the ambulance depot, near the battle-field (under charge of Assistant-Surgeon C. A. Defendorf, Forty-eighth New York volunteers, and twenty-three more at Sanderson, we had now, after dismounting two companies of cavalry, for the purpose of securing an additional eighty, to take care of and forward, by car and wagon, some eight hundred and sixty wounded, two hundred and fifteen of whom were at once delivered to the hospital ship "Cosmopolitan," awaiting at wharf of Jacksonville. A list of the first shipment will be forwarded by the surgeon in charge of that steamer. A list of those admitted to the hospital in Jacksonville, from the surgeon in charge, William A. Smith, Forty-seventh New York volunteers, I hereby have the honor to transmit, together with a list of all casualties, as gathered from the surgeons in charge of brigades.

I beg leave to now add the following remarks: The expedition into Florida, and its occupation, we believed not to be a sanguinary one; no one expected, at least, a resistance so bold and stubborn, because no concentration of from twelve

to fifteen thousand enemies was deemed possible, and our hospital preparations at the post, as well as in the field, had, up to the time of the engagement, remained a mere consolidated regimental affair in supplies. When, under those circumstances, the comparatively large number of cases have been well cared for, I feel it to be my duty to be thankful to the aid and assistance of the ever-ready and assiduous agent of the United States Sanitary Commission, Mr. A. B. Day, and to the untiring exertions of our worthy colleague, Surgeon William A. Smith, in charge of hospital. Under no ordinary circumstances should I have departed from the rule of *not* making requisition on the "Commission," and unless such an emergency had arisen, in which our wants were urgent and large. Again, the very limited number of ambulances could, inside the department, not have been largely increased; therefore, transportation on army wagons and caissons could not well have been avoided; yet, in spite of these deficiencies, will any contribution to the "Surgical History of the War" speak but favorably of the manner in which the medical officers bore themselves, to the credit of the profession and administration. True, such could not have been the case were the character of the wounds in the majority grave; but, happily, the number of slight cases is large, showing, for the most part, wounds of the lower extremities, with but few cases of operations. Five hundred, at least, will be able for duty in less than four weeks, and our loss will, therefore, be mostly temporary. We have to regret the many casualties among officers, and the fact that we could not recover all our wounded, notwithstanding an effort to do so by requesting this privilege under a flag of truce. I made the proposition to the General commanding, who entertained the opinion that they might be well taken care of by the enemy, but he finally yielded to the request, which, unfortunately, was refused by our opponents. Meanwhile, the number of wounded at this post (including those of former encounters) has decreased to one hundred and sixty-five by transfer of cases to transport steamers "Cosmopolitan," "Dictator" and "Delaware," the former making within one week two trips to Hilton Head and Beaufort.

It is, perhaps, not out of place to recommend that no general hospital, beyond those already existing, be established; and especially that the general hospital at Jacksonville be merely conducted as a receiving depot, whence to forward to the above hospitals, adding thereto St. Augustine, Florida. The remoteness from the main depot of supplies of the department, with all its annoying and delaying consequences, and the readiness with which the returning empty transports can be employed for transportation of sick and wounded, brings me to this conclusion; and, while the interior of Florida, in regard to healthfulness among a larger command, is yet to be tested, there presents itself at the convalescent hospital, St. Augustine, a hospital

arrangement which, when completed, will meet all demands of sanitary law, with no heavy expenses. Should the army of occupation advance toward Middle Florida, there will be an easy and quick communication with the delightful seaside of the old Spanish colony.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DR. ADOLF MAJER,
Surgeon United States Volunteers, &c.

MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, }
April 3, 1864. }

SIR: In your report of the battle of Olustee, you mention having telegraphed Surgeon Smith, in charge of general hospital, Jacksonville, to forward you "lint, bandages, and stimulants," and to "call on Sanitary Commission." I desire you to inform me why your medical officers were not supplied with these highly essential articles before going into the engagement; and, as the chief medical officer, the Medical Director of the District of Florida, knowing the troops were about to be engaged, what provision did you make for having your medical officers furnished with everything required for the comfort of the wounded? Did you know Surgeon Smith could not procure the articles you wanted, without calling on the Sanitary Commission?

You will also state what "aid and assistance" the Sanitary Commission afforded you, and, to the best of your knowledge, the articles, and quantities, furnished by them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EBN. SWIFT,
Surgeon, United States Army, Medical Director.
Surgeon ADOLF MAJER, U. S. V.

HILTON HEAD, SOUTH CAROLINA, }
April 3-4, 1864. }

Surgeon Ebn. Swift, U. S. A., Medical Director:

SIR: Having mentioned in my report of the battle of Olustee, that I telegraphed Surgeon Smith, in charge of general hospital, Jacksonville, to "forward lint, bandages and stimulants," and to "call on Sanitary Commission," you desire me only to-day (April third) to inform you "why my medical officers were not supplied with these highly essential articles before going into the engagement, and, as the chief medical officer, the Medical Director of the District of Florida, knowing the troops were about to be engaged, what provision did I (you) make to have my (your) medical officers furnished with everything required for the comfort of the wounded?" adding: "Did you know Surgeon Smith could not procure the articles you wanted, without calling on the Sanitary Commission?" and directing me to state "what aid and assistance the Sanitary Commission afforded me, and, to the best of my knowledge, the articles and quantities furnished by them?"

Regarding the information so desired to be strictly official, and too far from any necessity of an excuse on my part, I beg leave, in answer to the several questions, to state the following facts, conforming to and explaining my report:

That up to the engagement at Olustee, our hospital arrangements in the field, as well as at the fort, had remained a mere consolidated affair of regiments in supplies.

Returning on February fourth, by steamer Fulton, from leave of absence, and, reporting for duty to the Medical Director, I was expected to proceed to St. Augustine, Florida, and reassume charge of the convalescent hospital. To this end I had already procured transportation, when I was recalled from the boat, and put to the alternative of relieving Surgeon S. W. Gross, United States Volunteers, on Folly and Morris Islands, or to be ready at once for an expedition (probably) into Florida. Expressing myself thankful, because of regarding it a favor, I declared my preference for the expedition, and was, on my request, by written order, directed to report to Brigadier-General T. Seymour, a general, from personal acquaintance, possessing the highest degree of confidence and esteem. Without delay, (nine o'clock P. M.) reporting, I was ordered to call in the morning for instructions, and received, on so doing, on the morning of the fifth the wishes of the general, that, if possible, two ambulances to each regiment of the command be furnished, and nothing be wanting in supplies. Accordingly, I addressed the Medical Director of the department, and was answered in these words: "I shall attend to that—will be there myself," and "the Cosmopolitan can bring everything." Thus positively assured that the Medical Director would personally see to it, I contented myself with procuring a list of the regiments under orders for the expedition, and of getting some information as to the qualities of any more prominent surgeons—on information, as far as it would go, readily given by Surgeon Craven, the Medical Purveyor.

In the course of the day the positive assurance that everything would be attended to by the Medical Director began to lose somewhat of its strength, from the direct inquiry of Surgeon Swift, "how many ambulances there were at Beaufort, South Carolina, and how many I had already?" The question "How many I had already?" ran in direct line against the assurance given me. The question, "How many there were at Beaufort?" I justly thought could better and more accurately be answered from the reports of my successor, the Chief of General Hospitals there, than from any "guess," by a recollection since the month of September; and my doubts were certainly not dispelled by the circumstance, that when, by transport General Hunter, six ambulances from Beaufort had arrived, they were stripped and empty, and minus their horses—an oversight which, to remedy, the transport had to return to Beaufort, with my respectful caution: "be sure to not forget the harness." Late in the evening the transport re-arrived at the Hilton Head wharf, and I ascertained then the neglect, that neither driver nor forage had come along; that the horses had not been fed or even watered, nor had any

buckets been furnished for it. My doubts as to a concerted action and foresight became, indeed, so far dominant, that before embarking with General Seymour on the *Maple Leaf*, I would fortify myself by the assurance of the Department Commander, "that the medical supplies should all be forwarded by the hospital steamer, then due from New York." On the evening of the sixth, putting to sea, we arrived off St. John's bar at early dawn of the seventh, and wending our way up the river, landed at Jacksonville. Immediately (and while a desultory firing in the town had not yet ceased) I was looking about for a proper hospital building. But before definitely deciding on it, being ordered to go forward with the General, I directed Surgeon W. A. Smith, Forty-seventh New York volunteers, to act as Post-Surgeon, select the building or buildings, and make such temporary and preliminary arrangements in cleaning and preparing house and ground as might be necessary and possible, until the arrival of the Medical Director of the department would bring a decision about it, and the supplies were received for a complete arrangement. The ambulances, brought along, were distributed to the regiments in the order of their arrival, leaving by and by a whole brigade without ambulances. We left, and within the week I had forwarded a small number of sick, and about twenty wounded, when late on Saturday evening (thirteenth) I rode from Barber's station back with the General to Jacksonville. On our arrival we found the steamers "*Ben Deford*" and "*Cosmopolitan*," with the General commanding the department, and to my agreeable satisfaction, with the Medical Director on board. On asking for the supplies, I was informed that the *Cosmopolitan* had not yet touched at Hilton Head, but was boarded outside the bar by the Department Commander, and directly brought to Jacksonville, while the Medical Director came on another boat. No supplies were at Jacksonville other than the regimental stores, according to order left with the Purveyor of the department, and now stored at a brick building near the wharf. Of these, as many as were required (called for) were sent to the respective surgeons, they being, through the senior surgeons of brigades, notified of their being ready for disposal. To how much, in every single case, these amounted, cannot accurately be stated. There may, in the one case, have been more than required (needed), of single articles; in the others expectedly sufficient; in still another way a want of articles has been experienced. Yet under ordinary circumstances, the amount in quantity and kind would well hold out till the reserve depot should be established, and the articles used for organizing the temporary post hospital at Jacksonville, could be returned to their original (regimental) issue. The Medical Director being present, everything could come under his own observation, and be acted upon accordingly.

Thus matters stood, when on Thursday

(eighteenth) I received notice from General Seymour "that we would leave at once for the front. Not exactly that we expected then a sanguinary engagement, nor even a far-off (distant) movement, but seeing, before we left Barber's to come to town, the necessity of establishing a field hospital at that comparatively secure place, and which the General, I knew from conversation, would, (and did) fortify, I had selected more than half the regimental supplies to be brought by rail to Baldwin and thence by wheel to Barber's, and these supplies had arrived about the same hour with the General and staff, on Friday, nineteenth, and could be regarded as more than sufficient. To make sure of the supplies for the post hospital, Jacksonville, however, and of more ambulances I had requested the General to send Surgeon Mulford, Forty-eighth New York volunteers, to Jacksonville and Hilton Head, and this, while not yet informed that a forward movement would take place. But Colonel Barton, his immediate commander, not approving of his surgeon leaving just then, the General cancelled the request, "for some days," when at 10 P. M., the command was ordered to have cooked rations prepared, and be ready for the march at daybreak of February twentieth (Saturday).

I repeat, I am too far from any necessity of an excuse on my part, and shall, therefore, confine myself to facts. It is a fact that the number of ambulances in the command was twelve; and that the most necessary supplies of the regiments had to be carried "on way-side carts;" but even those few ambulances would not have been on the ground could I have coincided with the opinion of Surgeon Swift, to the effect, "that all my sick and wounded from the several posts along the line of communication, which might extend sixty miles or more, should be forwarded to Jacksonville on them," and "on them alone;" an opinion, direction or order, in its execution so impracticable, howsoever well meant, that the very attempt on my part to take the only ambulance of a regiment in the field, away for an errand from which it could not return in two, four, six, and might not in eight days, should, in my conscience, have subjected me to the rigor of a court-martial, and to the feeling that the attempt would deserve my summary dismissal. How, then, on that memorable day I personally behaved, is certainly not for me to report; but that my several surgeons have merited the highest praise, I have, to the credit of profession and patriotism, recorded. My satisfaction lies "in having done my duty," so acknowledged by the General commanding in Special Orders, on being relieved in obedience to department orders, and worded:

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
JACKSONVILLE, FLA., March 6, 1864.

Special Orders No. 35—IV.

In obedience to orders from Department Headquarters, Department of the South, Surgeon

Adolf Majer is relieved from duty as Medical Director of this District.

The Brigadier-General commanding conveys on this occasion to Surgeon Majer his acknowledgment of the excellent services rendered by him during his control of the medical affairs of this district, and thanks him for the conscientious attention to duty which has characterized his administration.

(Signed) T. SEYMOUR,
Brig.-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

To Surgeon MAJER.

SIR: In drawing a *resume* from my minutia, I have thus the honor and the painful duty of answering your several questions, as follows:

A. My medical officers were not supplied with the highly essential articles, lint, bandages and stimulants, to a sufficiency adequate to our loss in wounded, as experienced at the battle of Olustee; because, first, the loss of one third of our forces engaged was so unexpected, that the sanguinary occurrence of itself has become an event highly deplored and creating surprise. Second, while for any ordinary loss (say from two hundred to three hundred) provision had been made, by bringing the available stores of several regiments to the nearest secure place in our rear, there was yet the necessary, and in any moving army customary, reserve depot of supplies, not established until several days after the battle. Third, a large part of the regimental supplies has been used for organizing the post (general) hospital at Jacksonville, as a receiving depot of sick and wounded, and a number of boxes remained stored, with their promiscuous contents. And while,

B. I did know that Surgeon Smith at all, or in time, could not procure the articles we wanted, without calling on the Sanitary Commission, there consisted the aid and assistance afforded me, on the following services performed: The agent, Mr. A. B. Day, not only furnished, with remarkable promptness, lint, bandages, and stimulants, but in addition, shirts, drawers, stockings, slippers, sheets, pillows, pillow-cases, old linen, bed-stock, soda crackers, condensed milk, dried apples, vegetables, curried cabbage, chocolate, preserves, wines, &c., &c., in quantities I do not even approximately recollect, but for which I receipted. The Medical Director himself, being so informed, suggested that he would either return them in kind or pay for them—a proposition, in which to share, does not come within my official province nor within my means, and must, therefore, entirely be left for his action. While in the name of our wounded, I feel thankful for the timely supplies, surgical aid and assistance has not been required, nor, if I am correct, been rendered. In forwarding the wounded from Baldwin, I sent one assistant surgeon with each car (drawn by horses), and Mr. Day's personal services were there meritorious beyond praise, as was his offer to stay, in addition to Assistant Surgeon Defendorf, Forty-eighth New York volunteers,

with the wounded near the battle-field, certainly generous, but finally not necessary or practicable.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
DR. ADOLF MAJER,
Surgeon, U. S. V., late Medical Director, District of Florida.

MEDICAL DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, }
HILTON HEAD, April 7, 1864. }

DOCTOR: In reply to my communication to you of the third instant, you say: "To make sure of the supplies for the general hospital at Jacksonville, however, and for more ambulances, you had addressed a request to the General to send Surgeon Mulford, Forty-eighth New York volunteers, to Jacksonville, Fla., and Hilton Head." Was not this at Dr. Mulford's own suggestion, that he might be able to see his sick wife? Did you know of any ambulances you could get by sending Dr. Mulford for them?

At Barber's place, you state you had ten wounded, and in advance of that two others. You had twelve ambulances, on your own admission, and that was not all your transportation, to transport those from Barber's place to Jacksonville, a distance of thirty-five miles. In reference to this matter, from your remarks on page six of your letter, am I to infer that you received my order "to send in your wounded at once," and that you disobeyed that order because it was so impracticable, and did you inform me of that impracticability, that I might make other arrangements?

Please to inform me if the list of articles, furnished by the Sanitary Commission was sent to the front, and give me an approximate idea of the bulk, a car-load or a cart-load, and what was their mode of transportation? I desire also to know if Mr. Day had any one to assist him in his "meritorious" services, and if you know of medical officers abandoning their dressings?

You say you returned to Jacksonville on the thirteenth with the General. Did you precede your wounded?

I desire to know how many medical officers you had with you in the engagement of the twentieth, and if the meritorious conduct of any one of them deserves especial mention by name; also, how many seriously wounded you had in that engagement, and how many of these required amputation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EBN. SWIFT,
Surgeon, U. S. A., Medical Director.

To Surgeon A. MAJER,
U. S. V. Hilton Head, S. C.

HILTON HEAD, S. C., }
April 8, 1864. }

Surgeon Ebn. Swift, U. S. A., Medical Director, Department of the South:

SIR: In reply to several questions, bearing on my report about supplies, of April third and fourth, and addressed to me on April seventh, I have the honor to state as follows:

1. I intended to send Assistant Surgeon A. W. Greenleaf, Second South Carolina volunteers, but Surgeon Mulford, Forty-eighth New York,

suggesting that he might be able to see his wife, at the same time, I was prompted to select him. There was one ambulance (broken) for repair, and one under the care of Captain Duntun, Chief Quartermaster of the District of Jacksonville; two were in the use of the Department Commander at Hilton Head, and one was left at St. Helena Island, belonging to Seventh Connecticut volunteers.

2. The opinion of the Medical Director was verbal, as usual, and might have been construed as direction, instruction or order, but had not been insisted upon, after my explanations were given. Should I have received a written order, direction or instruction, its execution would have required the endorsement "Official" from the General commanding, by the Assistant Adjutant-General. In the the particular case referred to, I had received a telegram from the Medical Director, then at Jacksonville, delivered at Sanderson, ten miles in advance of Barber's, when, by instructions, I had given the day previous, our sick and wounded were already on the way to Jacksonville, under charge of Assistant Surgeon P. Rector, then of the One Hundred and Fifteenth New York volunteers, who will fully explain the delay on the road.

3. Articles furnished by Sanitary Commission before the battle of Olustee were, together with the regimental stores, brought to Baldwin by car, and thence by wheel to Barber's, arriving there the evening previous to the battle. Assistant Surgeon Greenleaf had charge of them, and can state the number of boxes, the car and wagons. Articles furnished by the Sanitary Commission after the battle, and on my telegram to Surgeon Smith, came to Baldwin by car. Mr. A. B. Day, came along with them, and Assistant Surgeon Tremain, Twenty-fourth Massachusetts volunteers. The Doctor will give all information in regard to kind and quantity. The medicine chest of Forty-eighth New York volunteers was left at Barber's, and most of their stores were, together with baggage, commissary stores, muskets, &c., destroyed, to gain every available transportation for our wounded.

4. Returning from the front on the thirteenth, I started with the General twenty-four hours after the sick and wounded, but arrived, riding from Sanderson through in the night, twenty-four hours before them at Jacksonville. The delay, as stated in "2," will be explained by Assistant-Surgeon Rector.

5. I respectfully refer to my monthly report of medical officers in the command. The regiments and detachments engaged had their medical officers present, as mentioned in that report. The medical officers all have done their duty—it becomes a civilian only to be meritorious. The number of seriously wounded, coming under my observation, was not above three hundred. There were, to my knowledge, only three amputations.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DR. ADOLF MAJER,
Surgeon U. S. V.

HILTON HEAD, S. C., April 8, 1864.

SIR: In your communication to me of this date, you say: "Should I have received a written order, instruction or direction, its execution would have required the endorsement 'Official' from the General commanding, by the Assistant Adjutant-General." Am I to infer from this that you will not obey a "written order, instruction or direction" given by the Medical Director of this department, unless that written order, instruction or direction is made official by the General commanding, or his Adjutant-General.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EBN. SWIFT,

Surgeon, U. S. A., Medical Director

To Surgeon ADOLF MAJER,
Surgeon, U. S. V., (present.)

HILTON HEAD, S. C., April 8, 1864.

SIR: The charge of the ambulances is, if I am correct, by Army Regulations, given to the Quartermaster Department, and I would, however I might try to enforce an order from the Medical Director's Office, have to provide myself with an "official" endorsement from the Adjutant-General's Office for the compliance on the part of quartermasters. Any order, instruction, direction or wish from my superior officer of the Medical Department has been, is and always will be strictly obeyed by me, to whom good order and military discipline is not only a habit, but I may say a religion, in medical matters. My observation in to-day's communication has only a bearing to the ambulances. I am sorry it has received a general application.

I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,

DR. ADOLF MAJER,

Surgeon U. S. V.

Surgeon EBN. SWIFT,
U. S. A., Medical Director, Department of the South,
Hilton Head, S. C.

Doc. 63.

GEN. KAUTZ'S CAVALRY EXPEDITIONS.

IN THE FIELD, May 10, 1864.

The cavalry division under command of General Kautz has just reached City Point, after one of the most daring and successful raids during the war. The great railroad from Weldon to Richmond has been repeatedly cut, its bridges burned, and the inpouring of reinforcements to the threatened rebel capital and to beleaguered Petersburg has been stopped for a fortnight to come.

General Kautz's division had been for some time lying at Getty's Station, near Portsmouth, awaiting the signal for the general advance of the Union armies. It is composed of two cavalry brigades. The first, consisting of the Third New York and First District Columbia cavalry, is under command of Colonel S. H. Mix, of the Third New York, and the second,

composed of the Fifth and Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, is commanded by Colonel S. P. Spear of the Eleventh. In addition to the howitzer battery attached to each regiment, a section of the Eighth New York battery, under command of Lieutenant Morton, was attached to the expedition.

The command left Getty's station at daybreak on the morning of the fourth, simultaneously with the ascent of the James river by General Smith. We passed through Suffolk at midday, but were unable to prevent the inhabitants of that town from sending couriers in advance to telegraph our approach. The column halted for the night at Andrew's Corners, about fifteen miles from Suffolk, where some slight annoyance was experienced from the bushwhackers.

For eight miles the woods were on fire. The combustion was caused by the men, as they rode along, throwing the inextinguishable matches, in common use in the army, into the underbrush, after lighting their pipes. At nine in the evening the scene was magnificent. The country was lighted up in every direction by countless columns of luminous smoke, that rose from the thick black mass that surmounted the flames. At twelve p. m. the march was resumed and the column passed through Windsor at daybreak.

This whole section of country is densely wooded, mainly with the pine and cedar, and presents a feature almost entirely new to our army in the matter of fences. Although so near our lines, and likely at any moment to be the scene of military operations, the fences remain standing, an indisputable proof of the scarcity of visits by the soldiers of either side to the neighborhood.

We pushed on rapidly for the Blackwater, intending to cross if possible at the Blackwater bridge; but, discovering that the rebels, informed of our approach, had massed a heavy force to receive us, General Kautz turned to the north, and moved on Fernsville. The advance dashed into the village, and captured the picket and a mail-carrier, who, believing us to be rebels, had not attempted to escape until too late. It was here discovered that the rebels had built two forts to protect Blackwater bridge, which crosses the Blackwater within two miles of the village. As it would be impossible to effect a crossing here without serious loss, the head of the column was turned toward Smithfield, and rebel couriers flew before us to publish our approach. After a short march, however, we turned again to the north, and, marching rapidly along country roads, succeeded in reaching Wall bridge, before the small rebel picket stationed there could be reinforced. Colonel Spear's advance charged across the bridge on foot, before the rebels could entirely destroy it, and after a sharp conflict captured ten of the enemy, and wounded a rebel lieutenant. Lieutenant Prudhomme, Assistant Adjutant-General of the First brigade, was se-

verely wounded while charging with the advance.

We were at length across the Blackwater. By skilful manœuvring we had succeeded in forcing the much-vaunted defensive line which the rebels have long deemed invulnerable to a cavalry raid. Nothing remained between us and the great South river railroad but the Nottoway. We halted at dark at Wakefield, on the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad, and tore up the track for a long distance.

At two o'clock on Saturday morning we were again in the saddle, and a few hours afterward Captain Pierce, of the Third New York, charged into Lyttleton and captured a rebel commissary, ten men and three wagons loaded with ammunition, rations and forage. One of the wagons proved to be one that had last year been captured from Company H, Eleventh Pennsylvania volunteers, by the rebels. At this point the horses began to give out, and all equestrians met upon the road were dismounted without ceremony. So little was it expected that the Yankees would be able to penetrate this country, that we were invariably taken for rebels by the inhabitants, until we approached Homer's Well. We were warmly welcomed by some of the natives, who notified us that a large force of Yankees were endeavoring to cross the Blackwater. Others again, who conversed with some of the officers under the impression that they were rebel soldiers, regretted that the war was not yet over, and seemed to belong to the party of our "peace on any terms" politicians of the North.

Passing to the right of the Sussex Courthouse, the column reached Homer's Well at twelve o'clock m., where by some means our true character was discovered, and a courier sent ahead. Upon reaching Bolling's bridge, which crosses the Nottoway, we found that the rebels had torn up the centre planks and were in rifle-pits upon the opposite side. Captain Pierce, with his squadron, charged on foot across the bridge, and drove the enemy into the woods. The missing planks were replaced by fence rails, and the column was soon across the stream, and moving rapidly on Stony Creek station, where a battalion of the Holcome Legion, under Major Siegler, were entrenched in the houses. The carbineers of the Third New York were dismounted, and moved forward as infantry skirmishers, under command of Major Jacobs, while two bodies of troops forded the creek and got in the rear of the enemy, cutting off all retreat. The howitzer batteries, and the three-inch rifles of the Eighth New York battery, opened on the place, and after a desperate resistance the enemy were driven into the turnpike, where they surrendered. The two bridges at this place were soon in flames, and the track torn up for a considerable distance. The communication between Richmond and Weldon was thus for the first time during the war effectually broken.

Three thousand rebel troops had passed

through Stony Creek station just previous to our arrival, and five thousand more were on their way from Weldon. Owing to the destruction of telegraphic communication, however, they discovered that something was wrong, and stopped at the bridges below, which they proceeded to fortify. Large quantities of provisions and forage were found at Stony Creek, and all that could not be carried off were destroyed, together with some cotton, and a large number of railroad tools.

During the night Colonel Spear was sent with his brigade to attack Jarrett's station, about fifteen miles below Stony creek. This point was reached early in the morning; but the enemy, over a thousand in number, held a strong position in the woods around the station, and succeeded in repulsing a desperate charge of the Eleventh Pennsylvania. Upon the arrival of the Fifth Pennsylvania, however, with the howitzer batteries, the attack was renewed, and after two hours of fighting the enemy were driven from the place, with the loss of over twenty killed and an unknown number wounded. Forty prisoners were taken here. Immense quantities of supplies of every description were destroyed at this place, and the buildings composing the station, together with a large water-tank, were consumed by fire.

In the meantime General Kautz with Mix's brigade, had moved down to White bridge, where the railroad crosses the Nottoway, about six miles from Stony creek. Here three thousand rebels, under Colonel Tabb, of the Fifty-ninth Virginia, were found intrenched in a fort commanding the bridge. The rebel skirmishers extended for a mile along the railroad, and were soon engaged in a sharp conflict with the carbineers of the Third New York, under Major Jacobs. The First District Columbia, under Major Baker, entered the woods on the extreme left, and succeeded in turning the enemy's position. This regiment is armed with the sixteen shooters, and the accuracy and rapidity of their firing soon threw the right of the enemy into confusion. The howitzers and Lieutenant Morton's three inch-battery now opened on the rebels, who commenced retreating rapidly in the direction of their fort. Spear's brigade soon made its appearance, coming up the railroad track, and completed the discomfiture of the enemy, who fled in confusion. The enemy were driven pell-mell into their fort and numbers of them captured, and the bridge, under a heavy discharge of musketry from the fort, was set on fire and guarded until completely destroyed, when our forces were withdrawn.

The excessive heat of the weather, and the hard service they had been compelled to endure, had completely used up the horses, and a halt was made for necessary rest for both man and beast, at Sussex Court-house. We found a hotel at this place, where a few who were desirous of partaking of the luxury of a glass of apple-jack, discovered that the selling price

of that beverage was three dollars a glass. At daybreak on Monday the march was resumed, and General Kautz, having discovered upon reaching Lyttleton that it was rumored through the country that General Smith was in the neighborhood of Petersburg, the column was headed to the north, and we began our march for City Point. A few miles from Lyttleton the advance met and scattered a party of home guards, under Major Belger. No further annoyance was met with, and at evening the column had reached the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad, about four miles south of the latter place. The track was torn up and the bridge burned here, cutting off a train of cars that had gone down the road, which may easily be captured or destroyed whenever a party is sent down the road for that purpose.

As we neared Petersburg canonading could be distinctly heard, and from the reports of the rebels we learned that battles were being fought daily. General Longstreet was said to be wounded, and General Jenkins killed, although they claimed to have repulsed our troops every time.

On Monday night the column bivouacked at Zion church, about six miles from City Point, and entered that place this morning about ten o'clock, after having successfully accomplished every object of the expedition, bringing with them one hundred and fifty prisoners, thirteen of whom were officers.

THE SECOND EXPEDITION.

CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, Tuesday, May 17, 1864.

To-day Brigadier-General Kautz again entered City Point on his return from another still more daring and successful raid within the enemy's lines than he made a few days ago.

Arriving at this place on the tenth from his raid upon the Weldon and Petersburg railroad, he crossed the Appomattox on the eleventh, and the next morning at sunrise, leaving behind all sick men and horses, again set out to destroy rebel communications with their capital. He moved his diminished division—consisting of two brigades: the first composed of the Third New York cavalry, under Major Hall, and the First District Columbia, Major Baker, Major Jacobs of the Third commanding; and the Second brigade Fifth Pennsylvania, Major Kline, Eleventh Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Stetzer, commanded by Colonel Spear, of the Eleventh, and one section of the Eighth New York, Third Battery, Lieutenant Morton—rapidly in the direction of Chesterfield Court-house, crossing the Petersburg and Richmond Railroad, in the vicinity of Fort Darling, and thence on the arc of a circle of about fourteen miles radius from Richmond, until at midnight he struck the Richmond and Danville railroad, at Coalfield station, eleven miles from Richmond.

After destroying the track for a long distance, burning the depot, a few cars and a large amount of wood, he proceeded immediately

down the road to Powhatan, where the same process was repeated.

Again he pursued his course along the track, until he came to the Appomattox river. Here it was found the enemy had become apprised of our movements, and had strongly reinforced the detachment guarding the bridge, and as the column advanced, opened upon it from the opposite bank with several pieces of artillery. The enemy's force and position made it from this side impregnable. General Kautz then moved his division down the river, by a circuitous route, a few miles, until he came to a long and high county bridge, which was found partially destroyed.

This he repaired and crossed, and at daylight on the morning of the fourteenth, again struck the railroad at Chula, in rear of the enemy. At this place was found and captured and destroyed a powerful locomotive and a train of cars, which, during the evening before, had brought up additional reinforcements for the defence of the bridge. Here, too, the destruction of the railroad and appendages was thoroughly accomplished.

While this was being done, the Eleventh Pennsylvania, which at this time had the advance, was ordered to make a detour on the left or west side of the railroad, for the purpose of destroying a bridge over Swift creek, which lay between our forces and the Appomattox river, about one and a half miles distant from Chula Station. As the Third New York came up, the carbineers of that regiment were ordered to dismount and proceed directly by the track to the same point.

The Eleventh met the enemy first near the bridge, and were driven back by a hot fire from the rebel sharpshooters, who were lying in rifle-pits and among fallen timber. The Third then came down on a double-quick, and as they came within range, commenced a vigorous fire, at the same time deploying right and left as skirmishers, taking advantage of trees and brushwood to cover their advance. In a few minutes they recovered all which had been lost, and more, for they reached the bridge, though at the sacrifice of many of their best men.

This position was held for upward of an hour under a deadly fire; but all attempts to destroy the bridge were fruitless, as it was wet with a recent rain, and could not be burned. The order was finally given to withdraw, as the work at the depot had been accomplished, and a further demonstration could only have resulted in a useless waste of life, the enemy, from his reinforcements, undoubtedly numbering two, if not three, to our one. Besides, too, if rumor could be credited, a strong force of cavalry was endeavoring to find and intercept us.

Leaving, then, the Danville road, the column was turned in the direction of the Southside railroad, striking it the same day just before sunset at Wellville and Black's and White's Stations. This road, with station-houses, cars, &c., was also effectually destroyed for several

miles. Marching again nearly all night and the day following, Brunswick Court-house, but a few miles from the North Carolina state line, was reached at dusk of the fifteenth, Sunday.

Here, for the first, horses and men were allowed to rest, except to tear up track, fight or feed. At sunrise the march was resumed toward the bridge on the Weldon and Petersburg railroad, over the Meherren. From prisoners captured and information derived from reliable sources, it was ascertained that the enemy was apprised of our coming, and had collected a force of six to eight thousand (?) and a battery of artillery to resist us, and not only to resist at that point, but to prevent our further advance, while other forces in our rear should cut off our retreat by the route over which we had passed.

General Kautz, however, with consummate skill, completely baffled their expectations. He pressed his column forward until he drove in the outer line of the enemy, and then, while they probably imagined he was preparing for battle, turned short to the left and crossed the railroad at Jarrett's station, eight or ten miles above them. This place was destroyed by this same division of General Kautz the week before, and was now partially repaired, only to be again destroyed. Near here was also a pontoon train, consisting of a dozen or more boats, which the rebels had used in repairing the bridge over the Nottoway. These were burned.

The march was then continued toward City Point by way of Prince George Court-house. As we came to a long bridge on our course, which crossed the Nottoway, and over which we must pass, a party of rebels were found cutting it down, and throwing the planks into the stream. The First District of Columbia, then in advance, at once charged them, and held the place until it was again ready for crossing.

The last attempt made to interfere with our progress was made near Prince George Court-house by a detachment of rebel cavalry, aided by a considerable force of guerrillas, who endeavored to cut off the Fifth Pennsylvania, then in rear. Quite a skirmish ensued, but the Fifth proved too much for the bushwhackers and their associates. At four o'clock this afternoon the division entered City Point, having made a complete circle in the most vital section of the Confederacy, and effectually destroying or interrupting for some time all railroad and telegraphic communication between the South and its rebel capital.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

BERMUDA HUNDRED, VA., May 19.

It was noon of May the twelfth that General Kautz, with his noble division of cavalry, commenced a movement which had for its object the destruction of the four main railroads leading to Richmond. The men who were to perform this arduous duty had just returned from a raid of a similar character, and were thorough-

ly fatigued from the effects of long marches, loss of sleep and short allowances of food. But their patriotism instilled into them an energy that demonstrated that the work to be done would be faithfully and successfully performed, as the subjoined sequel will show.

The same day they started began their daring exploits. But a few hours out they had turned the rebels' right flank. Here was a point gained for our main army to work upon, and which was not lost by it. After this manoeuvre they pushed on and reached Chesterfield Court-house, where they visited the jail, and found confined in it three persons who had been imprisoned for refusing to take up arms against the United States Government. Releasing these, the command pushed rapidly on to Coalfield pits, within twelve miles of Richmond, on the Danville road. Here the work of destroying the track was commenced, the depot burned, and the mails captured. Bivouacking about four miles beyond, about daylight next morning started for Powhatan station, where they arrived at half-past eight A. M., driving the rebel pickets before them. Here, too, the track, depot, several cars and a large amount of forage was destroyed.

The next point visited was the bridge at Matoax. Being built of iron and solid masonry, no attempt was made to destroy it, as it was defended by four pieces of artillery, which would have caused a sacrifice of life that would not have warranted its destruction. After reconnoitering for a while in the vicinity, the command struck off on the road to Goode's bridge, on the Appomattox. On their arrival at the site, they found that the bridge had been removed by the rebels. In the astonishing short time of four hours the men had thrown a structure across the stream, marched over it, and burned it again, so that the rebels could not use it.

Forward to Chorea station the line now moved. Here it was ascertained that three trains, heavily loaded with troops, had arrived. One train remained, while the two others ran down immediately to the junction of Southside and Danville railroads. Here considerable railroad property was destroyed, much to the discomfort of the enemy, who sent a locomotive down to reconnoitre. About daylight of next morning, Saturday, the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry formed on the left, with the Third New York cavalry on the right. A demonstration was made upon Flat creek bridge. While Lieutenant Schriver was leading a charge across this bridge he fell, mortally wounded. The enemy were in strong force, and the contest waxed fierce for a time.

While it was going on, another portion of the command, the Fifth Pennsylvania and First District of Columbia cavalry, were doing important work—the demolition of the telegraphs, locomotives, cars, track and ties of the railroad. From this point it pushed for the Southside railroad, by the way of Deep creek. At the road leading from the latter place to Petersburg it was learned that five thousand rebels were in

position about three miles beyond. The scouts were driven in, and General Kautz ordered the Fifth Pennsylvania to proceed on that road a few miles, to create the impression that we were marching toward Petersburg.

While this was going on the main body was moving on to Wellville. Colonel Spear's brigade then marched to Wilson's depot, six miles beyond. After destroying much at both points, the command continued on to Black's and White's. Here a large amount of supplies were destroyed, together with the depots and tracks.

On Sunday the command had reached Brunswick Court-house, where all the commissary stores were rendered useless. Monday morning brought them to within four miles of Hicksford, where preparations had been made to entrap the command. A large force of cavalry, infantry and artillery were awaiting the approach of this body of Union troops, who proved to be too discreet for the rebels' plan of capture. Instead of striking Hicksford, the cavalry turned off to Jarrett's, and destroyed the telegraph and water-tank.

Pushing on to Nottoway bridge, it was found that that portion of the road which had been destroyed by the previous raid, about a week before, had been repaired, and that a train had passed slowly over it. From this point the command went forward to Freeman's bridge, and finding the rebels endeavoring to destroy it, drove them away, repaired the damage, and crossed by daylight.

The last day out, Tuesday, Belcher's mills were reached and destroyed. Before departing from the mills, the rear of the column was attacked by the rebels. A brisk fight ensued, and the rebels received severe punishment from the gallant men under the brave Colonel Spear, who was in command. The march continued on, taking the right hand road at Harrison's for City Point. The rebels continued to harass our rear until it reached the Suffolk and Petersburg railroad. A culvert on the line of this road, which had once before been partially destroyed, but since repaired, was again rendered useless. Tools found in the vicinity shared a similar fate. Other damage was inflicted upon the road, and finally the whole force moved directly on to City Point, which was reached about sundown on Tuesday.

The brave officers who were in command, and the men who composed the expedition, have won for themselves new and unfading laurels. They have shown that they are ready to make any sacrifice which tends to cripple the enemy and advance the cause of the Union. For more than a fortnight they have endured fatigue, loss of sleep and hunger. It was about the second of this month when they started on their first raid, which ushered in this campaign, and they had but fairly returned, when, on Thursday last, they were off again on this second raid.

Their last expedition traversed a great deal of the ground over which they before passed, and in doing this they again laid waste a great deal

of what they before destroyed. After their first raid the rebels partially repaired and re-established the communications that were broken then. This last raid has done the work more effectually, and now it will be a long while before the rebels can repair the damages. Our cavalrymen enter heartily upon the work. They are determined that the rebels' lines of communications shall remain broken, and to this end they intend to bend their energies.

The expedition lost six killed, twenty-eight wounded, and seven missing. The enemy lost heavily in the several encounters. We could have captured large numbers of the enemy, but this was not deemed advisable, as to have kept them would have retarded the movements of our troops at a time when it was absolutely necessary to be free from all encumbrances.

Doc. 64.

THE ATTACK ON LACLEDE, MO.

St. Joseph, Mo., June 24, 1864.

On last Saturday afternoon one of the boldest raids of the season was perpetrated on the town of Laclede, in Linn county, situated on the Hannibal and St. Joseph railroad. A party of guerrillas, numbering thirty men, all well armed and mounted, entered and commenced shooting and plundering. They first made for the post-office. Knowing that the muskets and ammunition of the town company was in there, they took possession, and frightened the postmaster nearly out of his wits. Four of the gang undertook to break open the safe, which contained from five to seven thousand dollars; but finding it it too tedious a job, they gave it up. They stole what they saw worth taking, and left. Others of the gang went to the drug store of Mr. Jones, but he, seeing them approaching, fled, but was shot and immediately killed. They then made for a dry goods store. The proprietor, seeing them coming, prepared himself with his revolver and fired, wounding one of the thieves. The merchant was immediately shot and killed, and another citizen wounded.

The whole party next proceeded to the office of the American Express Company. The agent ordered them to leave, but they persisted in their work, and attempted to open his safe with an axe. They damaged it to a great extent, and might have succeeded in getting it open, had not the whistle of the passenger train bound west been heard about this time, when they mounted their horses and left, carrying with them the most valuable portion of their plunder, including a large quantity of dry goods and some twelve hundred dollars in money. The Linneus hack was also taken, in which was placed their wounded comrade.

A despatch was sent to Brookfield, informing the militia there of the raid, and asking assistance. A special train was at once sent up with troops, who, upon arriving, at once started in

pursuit. The raiders were soon overtaken, and found secreted in a grove of timber. As soon as the militia had poured one volley into them, they scattered in every direction, leaving the hack with their wounded comrade. The latter died on the way back to Laclede.

Doc. 65.

CAPTURE OF THE YOUNG REPUBLIC.

NEW HAVEN, May 21, 1864.

Assistant Engineer J. M. Wheeler, attached to the United States gunboat Grand Gulf, gives us the following particulars concerning the chase and capture of this splendid vessel. It appears that the officers of the Grand Gulf saw the Young Republic running into Wilmington one week before her capture, and they also state that the rebel forts fired salutes as she steamed up the river. On the afternoon of the fifth, the same steamer, heavily loaded with cotton, came down the river and anchored near the rebel forts. To entice her out, Captain Ransom, of the Grand Gulf, steamed away and headed up the coast; but returned at daylight and discovered the blockade-runner far out to sea. He was confident of being able to overhail her, and immediately gave chase. After getting within two or three miles, Captain Ransom commenced throwing his hundred-pound shell, and at the same time the stranger was busily at work throwing over cotton to lighten ship. There was hardly a ripple on the water, and Mr. Wheeler states that for the last thirty miles they passed some two or three hundred bales of cotton, which the stranger sacrificed in his endeavor to escape. The Grand Gulf gained gradually, continuing her fire. The rebel captain could be distinctly seen standing upon the top of one of the paddle-boxes, giving his orders as coolly as though no enemy was near. The smooth sea and the valuable prize before them, made the chase unusually exciting. It now became apparent to the captain of the Young Republic that he must be captured, and he gave orders for a general destruction of property, but still continued his course. Then the scene that followed was particularly aggravating. The rebels now commenced throwing over everything of value—cotton, furniture, silverware, hose, pump-handles, barrels, &c. The water was thickly dotted with these goods, and Captain Ransom concluded there would be but little left for him, unless he checked the enemy at once. He put on all steam, and in a few minutes was in a position to give her an old-fashioned broadside. The rebel captain knew what he might expect, and stopped his engine. A pillow-case went up to mast-head, and the rebel steamer Young Republic was a prize to the United States gunboat Grand Gulf. Captain Harris, of the former, had designed blowing up his ship. To accomplish this he had fastened down the safety-valve, expecting to take to the

boats and get off a short distance before the explosion would take place. The prompt action of Captain Ransom prevented this, though the safety-valve was found closed and a fearful head of steam on. The total number of men on board was forty.

Doc. 66.

ESCAPE OF THE HARRIET LANE.

OFF GALVESTON, TEXAS, May 5, 1864.

The late United States revenue cutter Harriet Lane, in company with three other notorious blockade running steamers—viz.: Matagorda, alias Alice, Isabel, and one whose name is unknown, has escaped from the harbor of Galveston. After being so closely watched for the past fifteen months, her escape, in company with the other steamers, was effected on the night of the thirtieth ultimo, during a squall, in this wise: During the day the weather was dull and cloudy throughout, and the night set in dark and squally, with occasional quick flashes of lightning, at which time it was difficult to see anything, even at a short distance. The Harriet Lane, with a schooner in tow, followed by the Matagorda and Isabel, at intervals of three minutes, left her moorings off Pelican Spit Fort—behind which the Lane and all blockade-runners to Galveston are protected, and laden with cotton—about half-past eight o'clock in the evening, and steamed slowly along the land to the southward and westward in the South-west channel, keeping close in to the island, to elude detection by our blockading vessels. To deceive our forces, the rebels, a few days previously, had planted buoys in the North-east, or Bolivar, channel, to give us the impression they were to run out that passage. Therefore, on the night in question, apprehending their attempt to escape, additional blockading vessels were placed in that channel, and only one in the South-west channel, which was deemed too shallow for the Lane to run through, as by the chart not more than eight feet of water can be obtained therein. By information received from deserters, the Lane, when loaded, drew ten or eleven feet. The main ship channel was considered the only one in which she could run, and therefore the most effective and swiftest vessel on the station (the Lackawanna) was stationed there.

Well, to return. The Harriet Lane, deeming herself secure, from being so close to the shore, was slowly steaming out, when she was discovered by the United States gunboat Katahdin, stationed in the South-west channel, which immediately slipped her cable and gave chase without making any signal, except—about an hour and a half after slipping, she overhauled the Lane within two thousand or two thousand five hundred yards—when she fired four shots at her, if that can be called a signal; after which all was quiet. The firing of guns is not deemed any signal unless quick and rapid, as that might

be occasioned by a schooner running in or out, and when the firing ceased we were given to understand that all was over; and instead of making a signal, as he is required to do by the instructions of the blockade, the captain of the Katahdin, like the dog in the manger, chose to disobey his express orders (if his instructions were the same as those of all the rest of the gunboats here), and left the blockade, and the most dangerous of all channels open, without notifying the commanding officer, Captain J. D. Merchant, of it in any manner. Besides, it was generally understood among us gunboats that the Lackawanna (flagship) was the only vessel fitted to chase any steamer, especially the Harriet Lane, and that she alone was to fulfil that duty.

The chase was very exciting indeed, the Katahdin making the most possible speed—the vessels being at times near enough to distinguish the men on each other's decks, then again separating, the Lane keeping out of range of the Katahdin's rifled guns. At daylight the following morning the Katahdin found she was not only chasing the Lane, but three other vessels not seen before, which proved to be the three steamers before mentioned—all keeping in company and close to each other. During the day the chase was most exciting, the wind freshening so that the Katahdin could go a little faster, thus having the advantage of the Lane, whose masts had been removed before she left port; and she also gained on the Matagorda so fast that, soon coming within range, she gave her Yankee compliments in the shape of shot and shell, in many instances causing the splinters to fly, and frightening her crew into throwing overboard her whole deck load of cotton, some three hundred bales, after doing which the crew went to work tearing up the hurricane deck to burn in her furnaces; but again the pursuer and pursued separated, and during the night the Lane and Isabel were lost sight of, about thirty miles off the west coast of Louisiana, near Vermilion bayou, and the next day at dark the other two were lost to sight, owing to a head wind springing up, lessening the speed of the Katahdin some two knots, and enabling the steamers to get away.

The Katahdin, having expended all her ammunition and being short of coal, returned to this station on the third instant at daylight.

This I think one of the greatest mistakes (if not blunders) of the war, as the Harriet Lane will undoubtedly again appear upon the high seas as an armed enemy of the United States, and do more harm to our commercial marine than either the Florida or Alabama, from her great speed when in good order. The greatest speed she made while chased was not more than nine knots and that of the pursuing gunboat eight knots six fathoms, doing her best; while on this station there is not a slower craft. Even this vessel will make ten or eleven knots easy in smooth weather, and the flagship Lackawanna, the fastest vessel in the Gulf, I understand, has

been known to make thirteen or fourteen knots under favorable circumstances. If the latter vessel had gone in chase, all four steamers would, in ten hours afterward, have been on their way to New Orleans in charge of a prize crew.

The Lackawanna, I believe, was sent here for the express purpose of looking after and chasing the Harriet Lane, and the captain of the Katahdin, by his neglect of duty, lays himself liable to great blame. My only hope left is that these vessels—more especially the Harriet Lane—may be “gobbled up” by some of our cruisers before reaching Havana, in which case it will prevent one privateer from being fitted out to prey on our commerce.

Doc. 67.

THE FORGED PROCLAMATION.

The publication of the following forgery in the *World* and *Journal of Commerce*, on the morning of May eighteenth, 1864, created great excitement, until the fact that it was utterly false, concocted by enemies of the Union and of the Administration, became patent. Their indignation was aroused, and was neither reserved nor unstinted in its expression. But meantime it had operated in Wall street, had found its way on the steamer to Europe, and had secured against the Administration an unusual amount of declamation and condemnation.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
May 17, 1864. }

Fellow-Citizens of the United States:

In all seasons of exigencies it becomes a nation carefully to scrutinize its line of conduct, humbly to approach the throne of Grace, and meekly to implore forgiveness, wisdom and guidance.

For reasons known only to Him, it has been decreed that this country should be the scene of unparalleled outrage, and this nation the monumental sufferer of the nineteenth century. With a heavy heart, but an undiminished confidence in our cause, I approach the performance of a duty rendered imperative by my sense of weakness before the Almighty, and of justice to the people.

It is not necessary that I tell you that the first Virginia campaign under Lieutenant-General Grant, in whom I have every confidence, and whose courage and fidelity the people do well to honor, is virtually closed. He has conducted his great enterprise with discreet ability. He has inflicted great loss upon the enemy. He has crippled their strength and defeated their plans.

In view, however, of the situation in Virginia, the disaster at Red river, the delay at Charleston, and the general state of the country, I, Abraham Lincoln, do hereby recommend that Thursday, the twenty-sixth day of May, A. D. 1864, be solemnly set apart throughout these United

States as a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer.

Deeming, furthermore, that the present condition of public affairs presents an extraordinary occasion, and in view of the pending expiration of the service of (100,000) one hundred thousand of our troops, I, Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, by virtue of the power vested in me by the constitution and laws, have thought fit to call forth, and hereby do call forth, the citizens of the United States, between the ages of (18) eighteen and (45) forty five years, to the aggregate number of (400,000) four hundred thousand, in order to suppress the existing rebellious combinations, and to cause the due execution of the laws.

And, furthermore, in case any State or number of States shall fail to furnish, by June fifteenth next, their assigned quotas, it is hereby ordered that the same be raised by an immediate and peremptory draft.

The details for this object will be communicated to the State authorities through the War Department.

I appeal to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity and the existence of our national Union, and the perpetuity of popular government.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington, this seventeenth day of May, in the year of Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-eighth.

(Signed), ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

By the President:

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State

The above was received at the *New York Times* publication office about 3.30 A. M. The night clerk sent it up to the night editor, who suspected it at once, for several reasons, viz.: it came without the usual Associated Press envelope; the handwriting was strange, not being that of any one known to be connected with the office of the association; in addition, the usual nightly indication that everything was in had been received from that office fifteen minutes before. These facts were sufficient to cause the suppression of the document, but to render the matter positively sure, a messenger was sent to the Associated Press office, who soon returned with the statement that the proclamation was bogus, and was not promulgated through that office. In the meantime the night editor of the *Daily News*, suspecting the affair, had sent to the *Times* editorial rooms to ascertain how the matter was regarded there, and upon receiving the assurance that it was undoubtedly a forgery, and would not be printed in the *Times*, the *News* also concluded to suppress it. As soon as the copy was received in the *Times* editorial rooms, information was sought as to the party

who delivered it, but the only thing that could be ascertained was, that a boy had rushed in, thrown it on the counter and rushed out.

Early the *World* discovered its serious error and bulletined a reward of five hundred dollars for the discovery of the forger of the proclamation. It also published, in an extra, a disclaimer and explanation.

The following official denial of the proclamation was received from the Secretary of State, and to it is appended the disclaimer of the Agent of the Associated Press.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, May 18, 1864. }

To the Public:

A paper purporting to be a proclamation of the President, countersigned by the Secretary of State, and bearing date of the seventeenth day of May, is reported to this Department as having appeared in the *New York World* of this date. This paper is an absolute forgery.

No proclamation of this kind or any other has been made or proposed to be made by the President, or issued or proposed to be issued by the State Department, or any other Department of this Government.

WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
Secretary of State.

AGENCY ASSOCIATED PRESS,
No. 145 BROADWAY, May 18—11 A. M. }

The alleged proclamation of the President calling for four hundred thousand men was not received at this agency, and we have no knowledge or belief in its authenticity.

D. H. CRAIG, Agent.

At the Produce Exchange, in New York, immediately after the close of the regular business hours, an indignation meeting was organized. Mr. R. P. Getty called the meeting to order, and in a few pertinent remarks introduced a series of resolutions, expressive of the views of all patriotic produce merchants. Mr. James P. Wallace, in seconding the resolutions, spoke in the strongest manner condemnatory of the infamous hoax, its authors, and all concerned in giving it publicity. The resolutions, as unanimously adopted, read as follows:

Whereas, There was published in the *Journal of Commerce* and *World* newspapers of this morning what purported to be a proclamation by the President of the United States, calling for four hundred thousand additional men, and also appointing a day of fasting and prayer: and

Whereas, Said proclamation proves to have been a forgery of the most nefarious and villainous kind; therefore,

Resolved, That in view of the present condition of our country, the authors of such a forgery, and the publishers of it (if knowingly), are unworthy of our support or confidence, and deserve the reprobation and denunciation of every loyal man in this community, and merit the severest punishment which either civil or military law can justly inflict.

Pursuant, as was understood, to orders received from Washington for the seizure of the offices of the *World* and *Journal of Commerce*, the arrest of the publishers and proprietors, and the suppression of the papers, General Dix detailed a force of the Reserve Guard for the purpose.

At a few minutes before nine o'clock, Lieutenant G. Tuthill, in command of twelve men, appeared at the *World* office; possession was taken of the publication office, a guard placed therein, and the lieutenant visited the editorial and composing-rooms. He made no arrests but directed a cessation of business, and took possession of the premises.

The office of the *Journal of Commerce* was seized by a detachment of twelve men of the Reserve Corps, under command of Captain Candy, about nine o'clock in the evening. A reporter was informed that Mr. Hallock, one of the proprietors, was arrested at the office, and that officers were despatched to effect the arrest of Messrs. Prime and Stone, the other members of firm. The office of the *Journal* was closed and work was stopped in the composing-room, but the printing of the weekly was allowed to go on, as it does not contain the forged proclamation.

It is stated by the assistant-foreman of the *Journal* that the copy of the bogus proclamation was handed into the office about a quarter past three o'clock yesterday morning, when only four men were in the composing-room. The copy was cut into slips without being read, and set up by the different hands, who thought they were doing a great thing in getting out so important a document. The editors of the *Journal*, it is alleged, were all away, and knew nothing of the proclamation until they read it in the paper. It was also stated that the editors had prepared an article, which was set up, for publication this morning, disavowing all complicity in the matter, and offering a reward of one thousand dollars for the discovery of the perpetrator of the forgery.

The *World* offered five hundred dollars for the discovery of the party or parties perpetrating the forgery.

The *Journal of Commerce* offered a reward of one thousand dollars for the same.

The Associated Press published the following:

ONE THOUSAND DOLLARS REWARD.

At an early hour on Wednesday morning, a fraudulent proclamation, signed by the President, was delivered in manuscript to each of the editors of the morning papers in this city. By direction of the Executive Committee of the Associated Press, and with the approval of the publishers of the *Journal of Commerce*, *Tribune*, *Express*, *World*, *Times*, *Herald* and *Sun*, the Association will pay a reward of one thousand dollars for such evidence as may lead to the conviction of the author of the above-named fraudulent document.

D. H. CRAIG,
General Agent N. Y. Associated Press.

No. 145 BROADWAY, May 18, 1864.

A CARD FROM THE JOURNAL OF COMMERCE.

To the Editor of the New York Times:

The following leading editorial was prepared for the *Journal of Commerce* of Thursday morning. As it cannot appear in that paper in consequence of its suppression by the United States authorities, you would confer a favor by inserting it in your columns.

PRIME, STONE, HALE & HALLOCK.

A FORGERY.—A hoax, as ingenious in execution as it was infamous in design, was perpetrated yesterday on several of the morning papers connected with the Associated Press, ourselves among the number, by which we were led to publish, in part of our edition, a proclamation purporting to emanate from the President of the United States, but which soon proved to be a forgery. It is unnecessary to waste words in characterizing the criminality of this hoax. Whatever its design, it was the basest and most infamous outrage on the public, as well as on the individual newspapers concerned. The injury done to ourselves is but a small matter in comparison with the public wrong attempted to be inflicted; nevertheless we owe it to ourselves, as well as to our readers, to explain the circumstances under which this fraud was effected. The utmost care and vigilance are exercised in our office, as our readers are well aware, but no amount of care in a well-regulated newspaper office seems to be sufficient to prevent frauds by persons who are acquainted with the internal economy of such an establishment. That some persons familiar with the telegraphic arrangements of the Associated Press, as well as with newspaper office hours and rules, was concerned in this forgery, we think cannot be doubted.

We close our form regularly at about half-past three o'clock. Associated Press and other despatches are received frequently at the last moment, and sometimes after the form has gone down to the press-room. The Associated Press despatches are always written in a peculiar style, being manifolded on tissue paper, and having certain peculiarities of paging, &c., which mark them. At about half-past three on Tuesday morning, our form was so nearly closed that the foreman discharged the compositors, the entire force of night editors and proof-readers having already left. At this moment a despatch arrived, brought by a boy to the foreman, which was the proclamation in question. It was, in all respects, a perfect imitation of Associated Press despatches, in the minutest details of paper, paging, &c., and the foreman, thoroughly deceived, stopped a few of the men who had not yet gone out, and having set it up, inserted it in the form, so that it appeared in the latter portion of the morning edition—the early part of the edition not containing it. We may remark here, that the fraud was so perfect that we venture to affirm that ninety-nine men out of a hundred, placed in the situa-

tion of the foreman, would have been deceived, and would have acted as he did. The moment when editors have left, and the foreman is the responsible man, is well known to newspaper men as one of the most critical moments in the day's history of a newspaper. If any one suggests that it is better to reject everything at such a time, let him reflect that we frequently receive as late as half-past three o'clock A. M., urgent despatches from the War Department and other departments, the value of which to Government and people depends on their immediate publication, and let him also ask what verdict he would pass on any morning paper which refused to publish a despatch, proclamation or order from the President, which all the other papers published? This precise responsibility the author of the forgery understood, and timed his work accordingly. There must have been more than one man concerned. There was a thorough knowledge of telegraphic and Associated Press rules and customs, a clear acquaintance with newspaper offices, and an ingenious care in the procuring of manifold paper, and preparing the copy.

There are numerous details of the manner in which the deception was perpetrated, which, for obvious reasons relating to the detection of the criminal, we, for the present, withhold. We may mention, however, that manifold copies, almost fac-similies of each other, being the usual form of despatches to the press, were sent to all the morning papers connected with the Associated Press except one, and the proclamation was published in three other papers besides our own, the deception being so perfect as to succeed in each instance. It excited some surprise in one office, but it was put in type, and a messenger sent to a neighboring office to make inquiries. In this case the other paper had not received it at all, and this circumstance created the first doubt as to its being an Associated Press despatch, and it was not put into the first-named paper. Another it reached too late, and yet another printed an edition of twenty thousand copies containing it, and suppressed most, if not all of it, on learning that the other papers doubted the authenticity. Our own remoteness from the offices of other papers forbade any such comparison of notes among the men employed.

We have dwelt with such particularity on this fraud, because it is important that our readers and the public at large should know what ingenious scoundrels are at work, devising every possible method of deceiving the people, either for purposes of stock speculation or with intent to aid the enemies of the country. It is no pleasant duty to acknowledge ourselves, and our associates in the press, the victims of a forgery like this, but we trust that the exertions we are making personally, as well as all the members of the Associated Press, and the Government authorities, will result in the arrest of the forger, and his consignment to a fitting punishment.

LETTER FROM THE EDITORS OF THE SUPPRESSED JOURNALS.

To the Editor of the New York Times :

Will you oblige us by publishing in your columns the following statement of the proceedings of the Government, this evening, toward the *World* and the *Journal of Commerce*, regarding the publication, in our morning issues, of the forged proclamation, purporting to be signed by President Lincoln, appointing a day of fasting and prayer, and calling into the military service four hundred thousand men.

The document in question was written on the manifold paper, such as is used for all the despatches sent to the several newspapers of our Association, and had every external appearance and mark to identify it as a genuine despatch arriving in the regular course of business.

It was delivered at our office late at night, at the time of the receipt of our latest news, too late, of course, for editorial supervision, but, as it happened, not before our printing offices were closed.

It was delivered at all, or nearly all the newspaper offices, and was published in a part of the morning editions of the *Journal of Commerce* and *World*, and, as we are informed, in a part of the editions of one or more of our contemporaries.

Early this morning the fact that the despatch had not been sent by the agent of the Associated Press became known to us, and its fraudulent character was at once announced upon our bulletin boards, and a reward of five hundred dollars offered by us for the discovery of the forger. The Executive Committee of the Associated Press also offered a similar reward of one thousand dollars, as the fraud had attempted to be perpetrated upon all the journals composing our association.

We took pains, in the afternoon, to apprise General Dix of the facts of the case, and gave him such information in regard to the circumstance of the forgery, as might assist him in the discovery of its author. The Government was at once put in possession of the facts in the case.

Nevertheless, this evening, General Dix, acting under peremptory orders from the Government, placed our offices under a strong military guard, and issued warrants for the arrest of the editors and proprietors of the *World* and *Journal of Commerce*, and their imprisonment in Fort Lafayette. A vessel was lying under steam, at one of the wharves, to convey us thither.

Chancing to meet one of the officers of General Dix's staff, charged with the execution of this order, we proceeded in his company to the Headquarters of the Department of the East, and were informed, by General Dix, that the order for our arrest had been suspended, but that the order for the suppression of the publication of the *World* and *Journal of Commerce* had not been rescinded, and that we could not be per-

mitted to enter our offices, which continue under the charge of the military guards.

We protest against this proceeding. We protest against the assumption of our complicity with this shameless forgery, implied in the order for our arrest. We protest against the suppression of our journals, for the misfortune of being deceived by a forgery, not less ingenious nor plausible than the forged report of the Confederate Secretary of War, which Secretary Seward made the basis of diplomatic action.

PRIME, STONE, HALE & HALLOCK,
Journal of Commerce.

MANTON MARBLE,
World.
NEW YORK, May 18, 1864.

ARREST OF THE FORGERS.

Francis A. Mallison, a reporter for the *Brooklyn Eagle*, and a manifold copyist for several New York papers, was arrested on the morning of May twenty-first, at half-past nine o'clock, while on his way to the Forty-fifth Precinct Station-house, Williamsburgh, where he was to attend to the draft, by detectives Young, Radford and McDougal, on suspicion of being implicated with J. Howard, Jr., in the preparation and publication of the forged proclamation. Howard was arrested the day previous. Mallison was immediately taken before Colonel Ludlow, at General Dix's headquarters, by whom he was subjected to a searching examination. Perceiving that he was hopelessly implicated, and that the evidences of his guilt already in the possession of Colonel Ludlow were clear and overwhelming, Mallison at length made a full confession of his complicity in the matter, corroborating in every point the previous confession of Mr. Howard.

The examination of Howard and Mallison showed that the proclamation fraud was for stock-jobbing operations, in which, it is at present believed, only two persons besides Mr. Howard were concerned; that no other persons connected with the newspaper forces of New York or Brooklyn had any connection with the transaction, or were privy to it. The sole purpose of the parties was to purchase gold on Tuesday and sell it early on Wednesday morning. Mallison confessed that he wrote in manifold, at Mr. Howard's residence, the copies of the pretended proclamation, which had been prepared by Mr. Howard, and brought them over to this city about half-past eleven o'clock Tuesday night. He lingered about the streets until about three o'clock A. M., and then sent them round to the different newspaper offices by a lad, to whom he gave minute directions where and in what manner to deliver them without exciting suspicion.

At the conclusion of his examination, Mallison was sent to Fort Lafayette.

Howard was arrested at about three o'clock P. M., at his residence, corner of Middagh and Willow streets, Brooklyn. The officers, on entering the house and making the arrest, informed him

of the charge, and stated that they had incontrovertible proof of his guilt. He submitted to the arrest, received the announcement with comparative calmness, and was at once taken to General Dix's headquarters in this city, where he made a full confession.

Doc. 68.

ARMING SLAVES AT THE SOUTH.

In the Confederate House of Representatives, November tenth, 1864, on motion of Mr. Chambers, of Mississippi, the special order was called up, which was the consideration of his resolution and those offered by Messrs. Swann and Foote, all relating to the employment of negroes in the army. Mr. Chambers' resolution was as follows:

Resolved. That the valor, constancy and endurance of our citizen-soldiers, assisted by the steady coöperation of all classes of our population not in the field, will continue a sufficient guarantee of the rights of the States and the independence of the Confederate States.

The following is Mr. Swann's resolution:

Resolved, That in the judgment of this House no exigency now exists, nor is likely to occur, in the military affairs of the Confederate States, to justify the placing of negro slaves in the army as soldiers in the field.

The resolution offered by Mr. Foote embraces a series of propositions. The propositions assert that a general levy of the slaves for soldiers is unwise; that their withdrawal from labor would be inexpedient, so long as we can otherwise obtain as large an army as we can maintain; that if the alternative be presented of subjugation or their employment in the ranks, the latter should be preferred; that for the uses to which they are now applied, their ownership by the government, with prospective emancipation by the consent of the States, as the reward of faithful service, would be expedient; that the number so employed should be increased to forty thousand; concluding with a resolution affirming that it was necessary to have the antecedent consent and sanction of the States to any attempt at conferring emancipation by the Confederate authorities.

The Speaker explained that the House had decided to take up and consider all these resolutions at the same time, as they referred to the one subject. Yet the House could only vote upon one at a time. The first one in order was that offered by Mr. Chambers; when that was considered and disposed of, that of Mr. Swann would come up, and so on, each taking their turn.

So the resolution of Mr. Chambers coming up for consideration, that gentleman proceeded to express his views in its support. He said that the resolution offered by him only declared an abiding confidence in our citizen-soldiery to maintain our cause, and they needed no other

assistance than they were receiving from all other classes of our population. In other words, his resolution declared that they did not need the assistance of negro troops. When the President proposed to put forty thousand negroes in the field—when the member from Tennessee favored it—when the member from South Carolina said he had not made up his mind about it—the question could no longer be evaded. It must be met.

The question had been raised at the end of a campaign the most successful that had ever been vouchsafed the Confederate arms. If our army was prostrated and our people threatened with subjugation—but not till then—he could understand how such a proposition could be made. But why is the country agitated by it now, when the military horizon is bright and encouraging to us?

[Mr. Chambers here read that portion of the President's Message reviewing the operations of the armies east and west of the Mississippi, to show that the President himself had presented a most hopeful view of the military prospects of the South.]

Continuing, Mr. Chambers said that the whole matter hinged upon the simple question: "Are we approximating exhaustion?" He would lay it down as an undeniable fact, that our army was as large to-day, compared to that of the enemy, as at any time during the war. Taking both sides of the Mississippi, he believed that the two armies held the same ratio as they did at the beginning of the campaign. It was said by some that our army was diminished by death, by disease, and by desertion, but it had not suffered as much from these causes as the Yankee army. He confessed that the desertions in our army had been great, but not half so great as in the Yankee army.

There were thousands of men at home, from the non-execution of the laws, who should be in the army. The President had said, in his Macon speech, that two thirds of the army were absent. This was the subject that should demand the attention of Congress, rather than to be made the plea for employing negroes as soldiers in our armies. The authorities must be made to know that when laws are passed by Congress, they must be enforced and obeyed. Unless Congress correct the system of furloughs and enforce the laws, we will not be able to drive back the enemy. There are two hundred and fifty thousand men at home, subject to military duty under the present law, and he could prove it by the papers on his desk, if it did not consume too much time. Yet gentlemen say we are sinking, and appeal to African troops to save us! They appeal to them to come and help us secure our independence.

The President appeals to the sympathy of the negro. He held out to him the promise of a home. But the Yankee said he would give him a home and the right of property. The President can offer him no motive which the enemy can not easily counteract, by offering him a

higher one. To our offer of freedom, they would offer freedom and a home in the South, after our subjugation, as well as exemption from military service meanwhile.

How did gentlemen propose to fight negro troops? He hoped they did not propose to commingle them with our brave white soldiers. How would they fight them? Not by regiments; not by brigades; not by army corps; but by companies! Place the negroes in the front—put a company here and a company there—and all mutual rivalry is lost by the interposition of this timid material; our line wavers, and is swept away.

Mr. Chambers said he was ashamed to debate the question. All nature cries out against it. The negro race was ordained to slavery by the Almighty. Emancipation would be the destruction of our social and political system. God forbid that this Trojan horse should be introduced among us.

The negro, said Mr. Chambers, will not fight. All history shows this.

Mr. Simpson, of South Carolina (*sotto voce*)—The Yankees make them fight.

Mr. Lester, of Georgia—Not much.

Mr. Marshall, of Kentucky—Fill them with whiskey, and they will fight.

It is not denied that the negro will fight, but will he fight well enough to resist the Yankee armies? The negro can not be made a good soldier. The law of his race is against it. Of great simplicity of disposition, tractable, prone to obedience, and highly imitative, he may be easily drilled; but, timid, averse to effort, without ambition, he has no soldierly quality. Being adapted by nature to slavery, as he makes the best of slaves, he must needs make the worst of soldiers. He could recollect no instance in the war of '76 where negro troops were used in regular organization and regular battle, except the battalion of slaves which Lord Dunmore brought into the fight near Norfolk, against the Virginia militia, and, in that affair, as we are told by the historian Botta, they "acted shabbily, and saved themselves by flight." When, in 1793, the English landed on the Island of St. Domingo, they found it defended by over twenty thousand troops, chiefly mulattoes and negroes, but, with less than one thousand men, captured several important strongholds, and with less than two thousand, finally seized upon Port-au-Prince, the capital of the island. The French authorities, in their extremity, offered freedom to their slaves—over four hundred thousand in number—on condition of military service for the occasion, in defence of their homes, as we would say, yet only six thousand availed themselves of the offer, although these slaves were still bloody from the insurrection of 1790. They preferred slavery to military service.

So, in the beginning of this war, the negro escaped at every opportunity to our enemies, to avoid work, but since the system of negro conscription has been adopted by the United

States government, he now remains with us, true to the instinct of his race. It is not slavery he desires to avoid, it is work in any form, but especially work in the form of dangerous service.

This government possesses all the war-power originally possessed by all the people of the several States. With wise design they have delegated the whole, with little or no reservation. It is not too much to say that not the Czar of Russia, not even Peter the Great, whose despotism was restrained by no traditions and alarmed by no fears, could have brought into the field so promptly and thoroughly the entire war power of that despotism as this government has elicited the war power of the several States in defence of the rights of the States. For this purpose the first gun at Fort Sumter summoned them to arms; they will again fly to arms in the same sacred cause, whenever and by whomever menaced. When the last man shall have sunk in his tracks, when the last steed shall have fallen beneath his rider, and the last morsel of food shall have vanished from the land, then, and not till then, will the war-power of this government be exhausted.

Mr. Goode, of Virginia, said he was opposed to the employment of negroes as soldiers under any circumstances. He was opposed to it because it was a confession of weakness to the enemy. He was opposed to it, because he thought it would end in abolition. He was opposed to it, because it was degrading to our men. He believed that the right place for Cuffee was in the corn-field.

At quarter past two o'clock, on motion of Mr. Russell, of Virginia, the House went into secret session, to consider a bill reported from the Judiciary Committee.

OPINIONS OF THE PRESS AND PEOPLE

Richmond, November 4, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: Allow me a brief space to bring again to public notice the subject of negro conscription, and the probable action of the next Congress on this subject.

That the owners of fifteen negroes, and upward, would prefer that Congress should conscript ten or even a greater per centum of their negroes for the army, rather than the present law exempting them should be revoked, there can be not the least question; that the negroes then remaining at home on large plantations would produce, with the attention of their masters, more than the whole number would if the masters were conscripted, and they left intact, cannot be denied. Then what are the objections to bringing this power, which has so long been overlooked, to bear upon our enemy, who are using men of every faith, clime and color to subdue us? Some pretend that the army has great aversion to seeing the negro conscripted; that they will not allow themselves thus to be on an equality with the negro; others that there is a great principle of morality involved in thus

forcing the negro to risk his life for the freedom of his master. If the first class would cultivate the society of our intelligent soldiers more, they would discover the real sentiments of the army to be greatly in favor of negro conscription for recruiting the army for the ensuing spring. As to those who entertain the latter view of "moral objection," &c., their opinions, conscientious and moral suasions smack too much of the fanatical and Puritanical love for the negro which the Northman professes, when he sees them unwilling to allow him to strike a blow against those who would enslave to a worse than Hindostan servitude both master and servant.

That the negro will fight more faithfully for his master than for the Yankee no one can doubt who has seen the attachment of slaves to their masters in camp, and the reliance and the faithfulness with which they discharge sometimes the most dangerous and difficult duties. Then, too, the wonderful change which would be brought upon them by giving such as were enlisted their immediate freedom, with a promise of a grant of land after the war, would cause them to acknowledge and look upon the Yankees as their inferior, whom they now consider as their equal. Let this freedom be given them in due form by their masters, and solemnly confirmed by the seal of the County Court upon their being conscripted, and we would hear no more of negroes running to the enemy to be free. Contented and happy around their camp-fires, they, with proper discipline and drill, would make us soldiers superior to any the enemy have yet brought to bear against us.

Then Congress will have another vexed question that this negro conscription will dispose of, viz.: Consolidation of regiments whose numbers have been reduced to mere skeletons; and we take it for granted Congress must consolidate many regiments, battalions and companies. Let the officers thus thrown out, and others already out, and now doing nothing but troubling the authorities half their time to find something for them to do, be assigned to the command of these negro regiments and companies. Let them be placed in our sea-coast garrisons, and on lines of communication and supply, and in camps of instruction, to be there drilled and prepared for the field, if we should need them, and who doubts but what we will, by the coming spring. It might be said these officers would object to commanding negro regiments and negro companies. But no, they will not, if they have the proper qualities and qualifications for officers. It will take just such gallant men as those who have already lost their commands by leading them to the forefront of the battle, to command that respect from the negro which the Southern gentleman knows so well how to command, at the same time that he shows, without constraint, the uttermost kindness, and no officer should consider it any disparagement to him to command these troops, but rather look upon it in the light of a difficult task which the government has assigned to him for his signal success

in the past, and his ability to reduce to proper discipline, and make good soldiers of, the raw and rough material. Rather let him regard such an assignment or appointment as a compliment to his fitness for command. In other words, only the best officers should be selected to command these troops, and, our word for it, we will have in the fourth year of the war a new and powerful reinforcement, a force capable of any thing less than the greatest emergency, and an offset to the hirelings and blacks that the enemy are bringing against us, which they never dreamed of. Do this now, and we will only do what is evidently becoming more apparent we will have to do sooner or later, namely: meet with the same material that class of the enemy's army which, unless counterbalanced thus, will form an important element in our defeat and subjugation. These remarks are dictated by a clear conviction of what is daily becoming more and more urgent by the great desire of the majority of our people and army for this enactment, and by the circumstances around me—for be it noted that I write from a section of Virginia the most prosperous, and that there are ten farmers living adjacent, owning more than twenty thousand acres of land between them, and from this broad area not a single soldier is furnished to the army. Think, Virginians, of twenty thousand acres of land in Virginia, owned by ten different families, not furnishing a single representative in the army. If such be the case in Virginia, what must it be in the less populous South, where the extensive cotton lands of the rich planter extend for miles away. Yet these men are willing, yea, many of them anxious, to contribute their portion of negroes to the service, and one hundred could be raised in this immediate neighborhood without material detriment to the farming interests of the country. Then can there be any reasonable wish, on the part of Congress, to delay legislation on this subject when the forces are wanted in the army, the officers are at hand to command them, and the masters are willing to contribute them?

Let Congress take this into consideration at an early day. Let us have prompt and vigorous action on this subject, and not have to lament, in the fall of 1865, the many reverses which would have been prevented by the organization of such a force.

A VOICE FROM THE COUNTRY AGAINST IT.

GENTLEMEN: In the *Enquirer* of the eighteenth ultimo, you advance and recommend the proposition to conscript the slaves of the South for the purpose of making soldiers of them, and claim for the *Enquirer* the honor or merit (which, I suspect, none will dispute with you) of being the first to advance it.

Can it be possible that you are serious and earnest in proposing such a step to be taken by our Government? Or were you merely discussing the matter as a something which might

be done; an element of power which might be used: meaning thereby to intimidate or threaten our enemy with it, as a weapon of offence which they may drive us to use? Can it be possible that a Southern man—editor of a Southern journal—recognizing the right of property in slaves, admitting their inferiority in the scale of being, and also their social inferiority, would recommend the passage of a law which at one blow levels all distinctions, deprives a master of a right of property, and elevates the negro to an equality with the white man? For, disguise it as you may, those who fight together in a common sense, and by success win the same freedom, enjoy equal rights and equal position, and, in this case, are distinguished only by color. Are we prepared for this? Is it for this we are contending? Is it for this we would seek the aid of our slaves? To win their freedom with our own independence, to establish in our midst a half or quarter of a million of black freemen, familiar with the arts and discipline of war, and with large military experience? Has the bitter experience of Virginia, with regard to free negroes, already been forgotten? Has that fixed subject of legislation found its solution and remedy in the wise expedient of arming and training to arms, not only her worthless free negro population, but is this class to be multiplied ten-fold by this slave-conscription? Will ignorant, brutal free negroes be rendered less ignorant, less thievish, more humane, by this training of the camp? by the campaigns of three or four years? When President Davis said: "We are not fighting for slavery, but independence." he meant that the question and subject of slavery was a matter to settle among ourselves, and one that admitted of no dispute; that he intended to be independent of all foreign influences on this as on all other matters; free to own slaves if we pleased; free to lay on our taxes; free to govern ourselves. He never intended to ignore the question of slavery, or to do aught else but express the determination to be independent in this as well as in other matters. What has embittered the feelings of the two sections of the old Union? What has gradually driven them to the final separation? What is it that has made two nationalities of them, if it is not slavery? It was slavery that caused them to denounce us inferiors; it was slavery that made the difference in our Congressional representatives; it was slavery that made the difference in our pursuits, in our interests, in our feelings, in our social and political life; it is slavery which now makes of us two people, as widely antagonistic and diverse as any two people can be, and it only needs a difference of language to make the Northerner and Southerner as opposite as the Frenchman and Englishman. You say, "the liberty and freedom of ourselves and children, the nationality of our country, &c., are involved in this struggle." Yes, and of this *nationality* you would deprive us, for, instead of being, as we now are, a nation of freemen, holding slaves as

our property, you would make us a nation of white men, with free negroes for our equals. Messrs. Editors, if you had sought in the political body of the Confederacy for some spot at which to aim and strike one blow which should at once deprive it of life, you could not have found one more vital, or have struck with more deadly certainty, than you have done by the advocacy of such a scheme; and if there is any member of Congress so lost to his sense of the duty which he owes to his country and the constitution which he has sworn to defend; if there is one who is not tired of the scenes of blood and ruin, and devastation which have stained and desolated many portions of our beloved land, but yet desires to see more, and yet a thousand fold more, of the strife and woe and misery begotten by civil revolution, let him persuade Congress to pass such a law and attempt to carry out such a system, and the things which have been will be nothing to the things which shall be—the revolution and war, born and nurtured and raging in our midst, shall be nothing when compared to that struggle in which we are now engaged, as the wild and desolating tornado, compared to the mild summer wind—as the angry fury of the ocean waves, when lashed by fierce blasts, to the smooth surface of the mountain lake.

The Yankee steals my slave, and makes a soldier and freeman of him to destroy me. You take my slave, and make a soldier and freeman of him to defend me. The difference in your intention is very great; but is not the practice of both equally pernicious to the slave and destructive to the country? and at the expiration of ten years after peace what would be the relative difference between my negro stolen and freed by the Yankee and my negro taken and freed by you? Would they not be equally worthless and vicious? How would you distinguish between them? How prevent the return of him whose hand is red with his master's blood, and his enjoyment of those privileges which you so lavishly bestow upon the faithful freedman?

Have you thought of the influence to be exerted by these half or quarter million free negroes in the midst of slaves, as you propose to leave them at the end of the war? These men constitute the bone and sinew of our slaves—the able-bodied between eighteen and forty-five. They will be men who know the value and power of combination; they will be disciplined, trained to the use of arms, with the power and ability of command; at the same time they will be grossly and miserably ignorant, without any fixed principle of life or the ability of acquiring one. The camp and the battle are not considered the best school of virtue. With habits of idleness learned in camp, with no fixed calling or business in which to engage, a class by color and circumstances proscribed and unable to rise. Then, again, these men must have their wives and children slaves, subject to all the restrictions of slavery, while they are to enjoy all

the privileges of freedom. Will not this necessarily make them discontented? or, if not, you ought, in gratitude, and perhaps in policy, to free their wives and children. This will give you, instead of half a million, a million and a half or two millions of free negroes in your midst. That is more than one half of the present slave population of the Confederate States.

How long would slavery last under this strain? Is not your proposition Abolitionism in disguise? No, Messrs. Editors, we could not live in a country inhabited by such a class. Either they or we must be forced to leave. Which would it be, and where and how would they go? Abraham Lincoln emancipates all he can steal. You would take and emancipate one half at a word, or, at all events, you would take and emancipate that portion without whom the other portion would be valueless and a charge upon the country. No; our cause is not so desperate, nor its condition so low, as to need the aid of an army of free negroes. There are stout arms and brave hearts enough among the white men of the Confederacy to win and secure its freedom, and he who would call upon the poor, ignorant slave to fight his battles, for the boon of a worthless freedom, must not only be deeply despondent, but regardless of the duties he owes to his country, to his negro, and himself. It is not for the slave either to win freedom for the white men, as you would have him, or take the yoke of subjugation upon him, as would the Yankee. But it is for the Southern white man to achieve his own independence, to secure himself in the possession of his slave, and to secure to the slave the possession of a good master.—*Richmond Enquirer, November 4.*

Doc. 69.

OPERATIONS OF GENERAL LEE'S ARMY.

DIARY OF A CONFEDERATE OFFICER.

Wednesday, May 4, 1864.—Received orders at 2:15 P. M., to move by plank-road to front. Enemy reported crossing at Ely's Ford, near Chancellorsville. Camped two miles below Orange Court-house, marching thirteen miles, at a very rapid rate, over a good plank-road, which has been repaired to Unionville.

Thursday, 5th.—Moved, at sunrise, down to Mine Run, at Verdiersville, reaching there at half past ten A. M. Stopped to graze and water. Sent Captain D. to Morton's Ford to report to General Ramseur, taking two wagons with him. Firing on our right, probably at plank-road. Grant crossed, May 4, 1864, at Ely's and Germania Fords. Cavalry fighting near the river. Infantry fighting commenced. Marched twelve miles.

Friday, 6th.—Colonel John Thompson Brown, formerly Colonel of the First Virginia Artillery, was killed by one of the enemy's sharpshooters to-day, at ten A. M., while examining for position between plank-road and the turnpike, three

miles below Locust Grove. Moved up this day (weather very hot), to Locust Grove. Armed the cannoneers with muskets, to resist cavalry. Heavy fighting along our line. Enemy frequently repulsed.

Saturday, 7th.—Moved up near line of battle on turnpike. Put Captain D. in position on turnpike; rode along our picket lines; fired upon by sharpshooters; moved off, after dark, with all the batteries, as we ascertained, that though we had whipped Grant badly on the fifth and sixth, he was moving toward Richmond. Stopped at Verdiersville, near Colonel N., who had used most of the artillery engaged in this corps—his battalion alone being in.

Sunday, 8th.—About one P. M. moved toward Anticon Church, on Terry's Creek of North Anna, and camped on Po river, near Shady Grove Church—thirteen miles.

Monday, 9th.—Moved on to Spottsylvania New Court-house. Fighting yesterday and today at Court-house. We got between Grant and Richmond. Marched seven miles.

Tuesday, 10th.—At sunrise, put Captain S. in position in Daniels' brigade, and Captain J. in position in Ramseur's line. Captain D. in reserve, but near; Captain G. in reserve, near Court-house. Captain S. was about three hundred yards from a dense pine thicket, with an open field between, and our skirmishers from Dole's brigade being driven back to the rifle pits, we were much annoyed at S.'s guns by sharpshooters. Several were wounded. Went up to the right, at Major General Johnston's, who was to the right of Rodes. 'While there the Yankees charged. Captain D. was changing position, being relieved by Captain M. (Nelson's battalion) at the time. M.'s men showed good spirit but fired badly. About four P. M. went to Longstreet's line, and saw the charges made by Grant's men on our left. Seven heavy charges made and repulsed. Just before dark they charged the right of Rode's division and broke Dole's brigade, about one hundred yards to the right of S.'s battery. S. and his men acted very gallantly, firing their guns after the Yankees were in their rear. Major David Walton was with this battery. I was on the left, with Captain J. The Yankees came in the rear and right of S.'s battery, capturing the guns, as well as Captain S. and nineteen men—wounding seventeen. Ramseur charged by the right flank. I called out to Lieutenant R. to get some of S.'s men, who had got off, and come up with me to S.'s guns, and we would work them, when recaptured. Advanced with the head of the column, calling out constantly to our reinforcements, who were coming in without any order, and not knowing where to go, "by the right flank, men!" Stopped at S.'s fourth gun, a Napoleon, which I loaded with canister, and Lieutenant R. fired it. After firing seven or eight rounds, I found some of the cannoneers had returned. Told Lieutenant R. to work the Napoleon, and I would work another of the pieces. Got three infantry men to put down

their muskets and help me work a three-inch rifle. The dead were so thick around the other Napoleon we could not work it. The Yankees were firing at us from behind our breastworks, on the right, and from pens put up by ambulance men, about sixty yards to our right. This furious musketry continued for one hour and a half or two hours. W., standing by me, had his arm shot through. Took the lanyard from him and gave it to another man. L. was shot on the top of the head and scalped, but not killed. Saw Colonel P. leading in a column of infantry. Ran and asked him to send me up the first cannon-ers he could find at a reserve battery. He sent Garber's. From this fact a misapprehension arose that S. and his men had abandoned their guns. But I know they acted well. General Daniels complimented them very highly. Major David Watson escaped by jumping over in front and going over to J.'s battery, when S.'s was captured. He returned and assisted Lieutenant R. to work his Napoleon, and was mortally wounded, being shot through the bowels and pelvis. I was very much exhausted, working the guns and serving ammunition. Fired very rapidly and got the guns very hot. Sometimes had to cease firing, and take my men all back to the caissons to search for ammunition. Much of the time had only three men, and an infantry man to sit behind the breastworks and hold friction primers for us, as the implements were gone, and we had to find the extra implements that were necessary. Our works, about thirty yards to the right, had a second line run back to the rear about eighty yards long, to protect the hollow through which the Yankees broke in. When our men from Ramseur's brigade and the left advanced down our works to the right they stopped at this offset, and allowed the Yankees to hold our works until charged by Johnson and Gordon, later at night. The occupation of this offset made it very difficult for us to fire upon the Yankees behind our line without striking our men on the offset, and the blast from the nearest gun on my left, being pointed very obliquely to the right, blew off my hat twice, and seemed as if it would blow off my head. Shots passed through the leg of my pantaloons, the right arm of my coat and right breast of my coat; another struck my spy-glass in my sack coat pocket, which, resting at the time against my thigh, made me think for a moment that my thigh was broken. After recovering from the shock, went back to working the gun. Had nine bullet holes in my clothes this night. Surely I should praise God for his mercy. For one hour and a half the Yankee infantry, at sixty yards distance, behind breastworks, tried to silence these guns, and I was standing up all this time except when fusing shell. The Yankees also brought up a battery, six hundred or eight hundred yards in our front, and fired upon us during this time. General Lee rode up to my battalion next morning, saluted me by raising his hat, pulled off his gauntlet, and shook hands with me, thanking

me for my "gallantry and coolness," as he was pleased to say. I represented to him in proper light the good conduct of S. and his men, telling him forty men were put out of action in that company alone, and twenty-two horses. Four hundred Yankees were killed in our lines in this assault. A colonel and about twenty men were killed very near S.'s guns. They held the outer rifle-pits or breastworks for about two hours, until driven out by Gordon, commanding Early's division. General Johnson drove them to the breastworks by charging through the woods. Generals Ramseur, Rhodes, Gordon, and Johnson charged at the head of their troops, I know. General Ewell also led a charge.

Wednesday, 11th—Day comparatively quiet. Just before dark, Colonel C. informed me that General Long had ordered all the guns out at dark. I informed General Ramseur, and went over to General Lee's headquarters to find General Long. He (General Lee) told me he did not intend for the guns to be brought out until the troops left. I then sent word back to General Ramseur and Captains D., J., and G., not to move until the troops moved, but the orders for N., P., and C. were not changed, and all moved out that night, and left the troops on Johnson's line without artillery. [This was the cause of the disaster which happened next morning to Johnson's division.—*Editor.*] Just at night General Ramseur had a report from Major O., commanding his sharpshooters, that the enemy were using axes in our front.

Thursday, May 12—Morning foggy. At day-break, Grant charged over our lines, at Dole's position, capturing eight guns of Cutshaw's and twelve of Page's, just going into position, from which they had moved the night before. Page lost his horses and men, Cutshaw did not lose his horses. I had been at my wagons, which were with Captain Graham's battery that night, (the eleventh) and had received orders to put Graham in position, as we heard heavy cheers and no artillery firing on our side. I was told by Major Venable to open fire from about the Court-house. Went over to see Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram, who opened fire as directed by Venable. The enemy charged from Dole's on Wilcox's lines. Our men fought well. Wilcox drove the enemy three hundred yards in front of our breastworks. Edward Johnson was captured and his men scattered badly. Loss heavy. Our lines were drawn in to throw out the point which had been occupied by Johnson. This was a ridge making off from the main ridge on which the Court-house is situated, and made a weak point in our lines, as it could be occupied by Grant if we left it out of our lines, while, if we took it in, it was scarcely tenable against a heavy assault directed upon Dole. The artillery having been removed, it was indefensible. We held our new line. The Yankees shelled furiously. Started to go round to that part of our line to see how matters were progressing. In the orchard, just back of General Lee's headquarters, I was struck on the collar-bone and

shoulder by a fragment of shell, which disabled me. The infantry firing had lulled, and we had repulsed the enemy. This was about ten o'clock in the morning. The Yankees had cut off General Edward Johnson's division, capturing him, and probably most of his men, but were unable to penetrate our lines at any other point, or to break the line which was established after Johnson's was broken.

Doc. 70.

TRADE WITH THE CONFEDERACY.

GENERAL WASHBURN'S ORDER.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE,
MEMPHIS, TENN., May 10, 1864. }

The practical operation of commercial intercourse from this city with the States in rebellion has been to help, largely to feed, clothe, arm and equip our enemies. Memphis has been of more value to the Southern Confederacy since it fell into Federal hands than Nassau. To take cotton belonging to the rebel government to Nassau, or any other foreign port, is a hazardous proceeding. To take it to Memphis and convert it into supplies and greenbacks and return to the lines of the enemy, or place the proceeds to the credit of the rebel government in Europe without passing again into the rebel lines, is safe and easy. I have undoubted evidence that large amounts of cotton have been and are being brought here to be sold belonging to the rebel government. The past and present system of trade has given strength to the rebel army, while it has demoralized and weakened our own. It has invited the enemy to hover around Memphis as his best base of supply, when otherwise he would have abandoned the country. It renders of practical non-effect the blockade upon the ocean, which has cost and is costing so many millions. It opens our lines to the spies of the enemy, and renders it next to impossible to execute any military plan without its becoming known to him long enough in advance for him to prepare for it.

The facts here stated are known to every intelligent man in Memphis. What is the remedy for these great and overshadowing evils? Experience shows that there can be but one remedy, and that is total prohibition of all commercial intercourse with the States in rebellion.

It is, therefore, ordered: That on and after the fifteenth day of March, 1864, the lines of the army at Memphis be closed, and no person will be permitted to leave the city, except by river, without a special pass from these headquarters after that date. All persons desirous of coming into the city will be permitted to do so, but should be notified by the pickets that they will not be allowed to return. All persons who desire to leave the city to go beyond our lines, must do so before the fifteenth instant.

By order of Major-General C. C. WASHBURN.

WM. H. MORGAN,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

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THE RETREAT FROM ALEXANDRIA.

NEW ORLEANS, May 23, 1864.

Having got our gunboats over the falls above Alexandria in safety, about the thirteenth instant, they, together with the transports, moved down the river, and with inconsiderable annoyance from the guerrillas along the shore, reached Fort De Russy without any casualties worthy of special mention.

The capture by the rebels on the fourth instant of the little gunboat Signal has not been made public. The event occurred at or near Snaggy Point, and very close to the place where the "John Warner" was taken about the same date. The following officers were taken prisoners along with her:

Lieutenant William Simpson, A. D. C., on General Banks' staff; Lieutenant-Commanding E. A. Morgan, U. S. Navy; Acting-Ensign Charles P. Bragg, U. S. Navy; Acting-Ensign William F. Loam, U. S. Navy; Acting Master's-Mate E. D. Lovel; Acting Master's-Mate R. P. Croft; Acting Master's-Mate And. Donaldson; Third Assistant-Engineer J. F. Liddell; Paymaster's Steward Eugene Colbert, and the mail messenger.

As our army marched out from Alexandria the mounted scouts of the enemy were seen hovering almost constantly about us, though they seldom approached near enough to give a chance to pick them off.

As our forces arrived on the sixteenth at Avoyelles Prairie General Banks learned that the enemy, in heavy force, had taken a strong position to dispute our passage. A belt of thick woods on the summit of what passes in this country for a hill, but which really amounted to nothing more than a gradual swell in the prairie, was the site chosen, and from the protection which the timber afforded his men, was admirably selected.

Our skirmishers were immediately thrown out to feel the enemy and draw his fire, the artillery was brought up, and preparations made to show the rebels that the men who had fought and whipped them at Pleasant Hill and Monett's Bluff, were not to be intimidated by the prospect of another brush with the same ragged battalions then. We had not long to wait. The Confederates opened upon us at once with some twenty pieces of artillery. Having ascertained the position and strength of the enemy, we opened our batteries in return, and continued a furious cannonade on their lines for between three and four hours, when the fire from their artillery gradually slackened, and the greater part of them were silenced.

This was followed by an advance of our infantry, accompanied by a few volleys of musketry, when the panic-stricken rebels hastily retired, carrying their dead and wounded along with them from the field. It was the opinion of many of the officers that pursuit would have enabled us to make a complete route of the

enemy's retreating forces, but the Commanding General thought it best to save the extra fatigue to our already tired soldiers for the remaining march toward Simmsport, and so our column headed again for the Atchafalaya.

The remainder of that day, throughout the whole of the following one, our only collisions with the enemy were the occasional brushes which our cavalry had with theirs, really amounting to nothing, except to show the intrepid bravery which inspired our men throughout this fatiguing and really harassing movement. For it is perhaps one of the most difficult things in the whole military catalogue of difficult operations to withdraw an army from an enemy's country successfully.

On Wednesday the eighteenth, our army reached Yellow Bayou, which by the way is a bayou that unites with Bayou de la Glaise and empties into the Atchafalaya a short distance above Simmsport. Here our advance had crossed, together with stores, trains, etc., and also a part of our main forces, when the enemy made a sudden dash upon us with the evident hope to throw our troops into a panic. In this they were disappointed, as the sequel will show. His very serene highness Prince Major-General Polignac, commanded the rebels, and he was evidently burning to distinguish his new born titles with deeds worthy their exalted quality.

Brigadier-General Mower received his Highness with befitting honors, and after one of the most brilliant affairs of the war—the whole engagement lasting scarcely beyond an hour's time—despatched his Eminence back to those who sent him, with a loss in killed and wounded of not less than five hundred and three hundred prisoners left in our hands. A charge made upon their lines was one of the most spirited of the whole campaign, and resulted in the infliction of the heavier part of their losses in killed, and the capture of the three hundred prisoners above spoken of. Our casualties in this engagement were inside of one hundred and fifty all told. The rebel retreat was a scene of the wildest disorder—their troops throwing away every thing which might encumber them, and skedaddling in fine style. We lost no prisoners in this engagement.

On the nineteenth the army arrived at the Atchafalaya, and a pontoon bridge was improvised as follows: Twenty transports were anchored abreast in the stream, and over them was laid a bridge, on which the army, with all its paraphernalia, passed as orderly, conveniently, and securely as it would or could have done over a turnpike bridge in the land of steady habits. On the twentieth instant our entire army had crossed the river at Simmsport, and again moved toward the Mississippi river. The next evening it reached Morganzia, and went into pleasant camping ground in security and peace, to rest from its labors and dangers till the next move on the chess-board shall call it

forth to other labors and successes. General Canby is with the army at Morganzia.

Among the brilliant movements which deserve mention is a charge by the Twenty-sixth New York battery at the engagement of Avozelles Prairie. The cavalry was under the command of Richard Arnold, Chief of Artillery of the department, and was handsomely handled throughout. General Mower's division of the Sixteenth Army Corps, a part of the Thirteenth corps, also under the same, and the cavalry, bore the largest part of the hardest fighting.

The most severe losses were sustained by the Fifty-eighth Illinois infantry, the Sixth Massachusetts, and Third Maryland cavalry.

The *morale* of the army at its camps at Morganzia is excellent, and its position pleasant and healthful, and when again called on to act, the country will hear a good account of what it is called on to perform.

Doc. 72.

DESTRUCTION OF THE HARRIET A. WEED.

ELLOW HEAD, S. C., May 14, 1864.

The steamer "Harriet A. Weed," having in tow a schooner, left Jacksonville at about eight o'clock A. M. on Monday, the ninth. When opposite the mouth of Cedar creek, a point half-way between the town and St. John's bar, she ran upon two torpedoes, which exploded simultaneously, resulting in the complete destruction of the vessel. She was literally blown to atoms. The following are the names of the lost:

C. L. Bell, Assistant Engineer; William Harding, Thomas Johnson, A. Brown, Stephen Wilkins.

The following is a list of the saved:

Captain Gaskill, commander of the vessel; Mr. Gaskill, Mate; D. H. Pettingill, Chief-Engineer; Captain J. R. Smith, Thomas Collins, William Morris, Robert Spagg, J. Smith, Frank Collins, Fred. Hamilton, Richard Whittaker, Henry Coldback, D. Jenkins, Jacob Norcott, Jos. Home, A. Brown, Jr., and twenty soldiers of the Third U. S. colored regiment.

Of the saved nearly all are more or less injured. Captain Swift states that he was thrown in the air a distance of twenty feet. The "Harriet A. Weed" was used more as a picket-boat than a transport. She carried two guns, both of which were exploded by the concussion.

On the same day that the disaster occurred, the river was dragged, and nine torpedoes were picked up. The authorities had information that the rebels were watching for an opportunity to sink torpedoes, for a number of deserters who came into our lines a few days prior to the explosion, stated explicitly what the intention was with regard to torpedoes. The "Harriet A. Weed" makes the third vessel that has been destroyed on the St. John's within a few weeks by means of torpedoes.

Doc. 73.

THE BATTLE OF MARKS' MILLS, ARK.

Subjoined is an account of the battle of Marks' Mills, by "An Eye-witness." The battle was fought near the junction of the roads leading to Camden and Warren, and takes its name from the mill which the rebel General made his headquarters during the action.

The expedition was known to be of a hazardous nature. If Camden was to be held, supplies must be procured overland from Pine Bluff, or by steamers up the Washita. The prospect was not good for receiving them by the latter route; but it was known that only Shelby's forces was north of the Washita, and Colonel Drake's force was fully competent to manage him. If reinforcements were sent to him, General Steele relied upon being advised thereof by his cavalry in time to reinforce Colonel Drake. It subsequently transpired that General Fagen crossed the Washita on the second night after Colonel Drake left Camden, making a forced march of forty-five miles the next day, and joining Shelby in the neighborhood of Marks' Mills.

The rebel force then numbered over six thousand of the best troops in the Confederate service, while the total number under Colonel Drake was only about fifteen hundred.

The night previous to the fight was spent by the pioneer corps of the Federal force in corduroying the road through Moro Bottom. The train when well closed up was four miles long. The Seventy-seventh Ohio formed the rear guard. In the morning, in passing over this corduroyed portion of the road, after about one hundred wagons had passed, a portion of it became so defective from wear that the remainder of the train was delayed and lengthened out. This increased the distance considerably between the advance and rear guards, and was the situation when the advanced guard was attacked. The Thirty-sixth Iowa, in the centre, and the Seventy-seventh Ohio were immediately ordered up. It soon became apparent that the design of the rebels was to surround and crush the main body of our forces before the Seventy-seventh could come up. They appeared in overwhelming numbers in front and on each flank, and were gradually extending the latter so as to cut the train, and thus completely enclose the Union troops.

At this critical juncture word reached Colonel Drake that the Seventy-seventh Ohio was only a mile off. It had become evident that the train could not be saved; and he seems to have conceived the possibility of effecting a junction with the Seventy-seventh, cutting his way out; and escaping with most of his force. He proposed to take their left flank in the rear, with a charge of the small cavalry force under Major McCauleigh, and follow it up with all his available infantry, some four hundred men. Riding

across the field to give the requisite order to Major McCauleigh, he was exposed to a dreadful cross-fire from the enemy. Here he was wounded severely by a Minie ball in the left thigh and hip. Scarcely able to sit upon his horse, he still determined, if possible, to superintend in person the attack he had determined upon. He rode forward to the Major and gave the order. The Major wheeled his little cavalry force of about two hundred and fifty worn-out men and jaded beasts, and rode upon the rebels. The latter wavered and became disordered. Then Colonel Drake placed himself at the head of his men, and was about to give the order to charge, when, from weakness occasioned by loss of blood, he was compelled to dismount. He then directed Captain W. L. McGill, Inspector of the brigade, who had kept constantly by his side, to hand over the command to Major Spillman, of the Seventh Missouri, the ranking officer.

There was no cessation of firing on our side at any time. Every man fought with coolness and courage, until the rebels rushed in upon all sides, and disarmed them. There was no surrender.

Captain McGill acted with distinguished bravery and gallantry throughout the action. Musket-balls lodged in his coat and in his horse's saddle, yet he escaped without a scratch.

He did not find Major Spillman. The latter had fallen back with his cavalry to Pine Bluff. He then sought Major McCauleigh. While hunting him, the rebels made their dash. Seeing the day was lost, Captain McGill struck into the timber, and subsequently reached Pine Bluff in safety.

Major McCauleigh was wounded, and is still a prisoner.

Accompanying the train were several negro recruiting officers, with about three hundred negro recruits. About one hundred and fifty of them, probably, were killed—the balance escaped.

On our side there were between two hundred and fifty and two hundred and sixty killed and wounded.

According to the rebel official report, as I am informed by one of our wounded officers, who read it in manuscript, they had one hundred and ten killed, two hundred and seventy-eight wounded, and forty missing.

All our wounded were paroled. While they remained in the hands of the rebels they were well treated and provided for.

The rebels lost two Colonels in the action—one of them, Colonel Pettus, of this State.

Most of our wounded have arrived here, and are well cared for in the hospital.

Colonel Drake, as soon as he can bear the trip, will start North.

Among the killed is Captain Townsend, of General Rice's staff.

Doc. 74.

FIGHT ON PORT WALTHAL RAILROAD.

HEADQUARTERS, GENERAL BUTLER, May 7, 1864.

The skirmish of last night was quite serious. General Smith directed General Heckman to advance with his brigade to find out what force and position the enemy had in front of his lines on the left. General Heckman pushed forward, driving in their pickets, and skirmishing along the line, pushing the rebels back to the Port Walthal Railroad. Here the Seceah had taken advantage of the railroad embankment, and our forces were received with a volley. General Heckman was wounded in the little finger of his right hand by a Minie ball, which passed through his coat, trousers, saddle flap, and killed his horse. General Heckman opened on them with two pieces of artillery. This the rebels thought unfair, as they had no cannon, and called out to our men, "Hold on Yanks, till to-morrow, and then we will get our guns up."

The object being simply a reconnoissance, and General Heckman being instructed on no account to bring on a general engagement, as the right of our line had not got into position, he withdrew his brigade. The rebs charged after him but were handsomely repulsed twice, and our men returned to camp having eight killed, and forty wounded. It was ascertained that there was quite a force there—at least two brigades. During last night trains were heard running up, and this morning General Heckman again advanced down the same road, but did not succeed in penetrating so far. He met the rebels in still stronger force, but, obtaining a good position, sent back word that he thought he could hold it. The rest of the battery was sent out, and firing ceased soon after.

The wounds of the men hurt the day before were caused by rifle balls; to-day wounds caused by shells were plentiful. General Beauregard was in command of the rebel forces, said to number about twenty thousand, with which he came up from Weldon. Prisoners belonging to South Carolina and Virginia regiments, and to the Washington battery, were captured. Meanwhile, General Brook, commanding First division, Eighteenth corps, with three brigades, marched down the road leading to the Petersburg and Richmond road. He soon encountered the enemy in force and a severe fight ensued, lasting with intervals up to six o'clock P. M. These movements were made to cover a third, which had for its object the cutting of the R. & P. R. R. For this purpose the brigade of the Tenth corps, under Colonel Burton, pushed rapidly across the country, and succeeded in reaching the railroad, and tearing up about a mile of it. Colonel Burton then fell back. At sunset, Generals Heckman and Brooks were holding the position to which they had advanced.

The position taken by General Butler is one of great natural strength, extending from the Appomattox, near Port Walthal, on the left, to an

opposing point on the James, embracing the whole peninsula formed by the two rivers. In front of the left an impassable ravine runs down to the Appomattox, crossed only at one point by the road along that river. In front of the right is a dense forest. Beyond the whole a swamp stretches along opposite the centre. The position is an excellent one for defence, and the intrenching now being done renders it a dangerous place to attack. The gunboats on the James and Appomattox protect the flanks.

The line is only two and a half miles in length. Across the Appomattox we hold City Point, by another short line across the Point. This position is also protected by the gunboats. Great confidence is felt by General Butler and his general officers as to their ability to hold the position against any force which can be brought to attack it.

About noon to-day, while the gunboat Shoshonee was fishing for torpedoes, near Deep Bottom, a battery from Richmond appeared on the north bank, took position and opened upon the boat. A shot passed through the steam chest, blowing up the vessel. Those of the officers and crew who took to the north shore were taken prisoners. A few who reached the south bank were afterward picked up by the army gunboat, Charles Chamberlain. A deserter from Lee's army was captured, who stated that Lee had given Grant a very hard fight. Contrabands report Grant whipped, and falling back. It is life or death to us here as to which way the scales turn in reference to Grant's movement, and news from him is most anxiously awaited.

Some distance back from the shore, nearly opposite headquarter's boat, and near a brick house, a rebel signal flag has been in constant use. This afternoon, Lieutenant Bladenheizer, commanding the army gunboat, Brewster, with one hundred and twenty men from the Sixty-seventh Ohio regiment, landed and succeeded in capturing the party with all their flags, telescopes, &c. Lieutenant Bladenheizer was yesterday promoted to a Captaincy for gallant conduct.

Doc. 75.

OPERATIONS IN WEST VIRGINIA.

REPORT OF COLONEL STROTHER.

Richmond, August 10, 1864.

GENERAL: In accordance with your request, I have the honor to submit the following statement in regard to the operations of the Army of West Virginia, while under your command, during the summer of 1864. I do so the more cheerfully as I have perceived that the motives and results of these operations have been less clearly understood and appreciated by the public than any other of the important campaigns of the war.

I am the better prepared to make this statement, as I served throughout the campaign as

your Chief of Staff, and, in that capacity, kept an accurate journal of movements and events as they occurred, and of the orders, motives, and information on which they were based. I was also, from long residence, travel, and previous military campaigns, well acquainted with the whole country over which these operations were conducted, and consequently may be supposed to have an intelligent understanding concerning the propriety of the movements made, and the practicability of those suggested.

I will commence by a brief explanation of the military position in the Department of West Virginia when you took command.

Early in the spring of 1864, the forces heretofore scattered over this extensive department were concentrated at different points, prepared to co-operate in the grand combined movement which had been arranged against the national enemy. Simultaneously with the advance of General Grant on Richmond, and that of General Sherman on Atlanta, the co-operating columns of the Army of West Virginia commenced their movements, charged with the accomplishment of the most arduous and important secondary purposes of the campaign. Their orders were to move upon the enemy's communications, destroy railroads, military depots, stores, supplies, and manufactories, crippling his resources in every way practicable; to distract his attention from the vital centres of operation, and to force him, if possible, to detach troops for the defence of distant points. As the field of operations embraced in these orders was of immense extent, interrupted by chains of rugged and lofty mountains covered to a great extent with impenetrable forests, traversed by deep and rapid rivers, its topography and even its general geography but little understood outside, the General commanding the department was allowed full discretion in arranging the plans for their accomplishment.

The movement commenced under the orders of Major-General Sigel, as follows: Brigadier-General Crook with his division moved from Kanawha, striking the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at New river, and destroying it for some distance. He defeated the enemy's forces that opposed him, capturing many prisoners and valuable stores.

Brigadier-General Averell at the same time moved southward from Beverly, with his division, menacing the salt works near Abingdon, and co-operating with Crook in the destruction of the railroad. These forces then fell back to Lewisburg and Meadow Bluff in Greenbrier county, awaiting further developments.

At the same time General Sigel, in person, took command of the forces collected at Martinsburg, about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, and advancing southward, was met at New Market, on the Staunton turnpike, and defeated by the rebel forces under Breckinridge. On the following day, May sixteenth, he retired to a position behind Cedar creek,

about fifteen miles south of Winchester. On the twenty-first of May General Sigel was relieved by Major-General Hunter, who assumed command of the department and the army in the field at Cedar creek.

General Sigel having been assigned to the command of the reserves stationed on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, made his headquarters at Martinsburg.

It was determined to resume the movement on Staunton immediately, and, with a view to further operations from that point, orders were sent to Generals Crook and Averell, then supposed to be in the vicinity of Meadow Bluff, to join us at Staunton, by forced marches, moving lightly, and depending on the country for subsistence as much as possible.

The column in the Shenandoah valley having been reinforced to the extent of supplying the losses in the New Market campaign, with baggage and transportation reduced to the minimum allowance, cut loose from its communications, and began its advance up the valley on the twenty-sixth of May. The force was about eight thousand five hundred men of all arms, with twenty-one guns. The plan of action proposed was, to fight and overthrow any enemy that stood in the way, to seize upon Staunton, unite with Crook and Averell, and with the combined force occupy Charlottesville, from whence we might easily operate with our cavalry against the James River canal, and by crossing the river cut off the Southside railroad, thus cutting off the enemy from its chief source of supplies. The more extended plan, of moving on Lynchburg by the valley route from Staunton, or through the Piedmont counties of Nelson and Amherst, directly from Charlottesville, was discussed, but left for consideration after the first part of the programme should be accomplished.

The occupation of Harrisonburg, the flank movement on Port Republic, the brilliant and decisive victory at Piedmont, and the junction with the forces under Crook and Averell, at Staunton, have all been described in a former report.

The result of the battle at Piedmont was the virtual annihilation of the enemy's military power in West Virginia and the valley of the Shenandoah. All the country west of the Blue Ridge was at our mercy. As this country was the source from which the enemy drew its principal supplies of meat, grain, forage, salt, lead, and iron, we were well aware that its possession was essential to the maintenance of his army, and that he would make the most desperate efforts to regain it. He could not hope to do so without detaching a considerable force from Lee's army, and to induce General Lee thus to weaken his army was one of our principal objects in the movement. The following letter found on the body of General William E. Jones, killed at Piedmont, indicates the views and expectations of the enemy:

HEADQUARTERS, VALLEY DISTRICT, June 1, 1864.

GENERAL: This will be handed to you by General Means, of Shenandoah, who goes to meet you at my request, and will state to you fully the condition of affairs in the valley. I am holding out every inducement I can to Hunter to follow me up as far as Mount Crawford. If he does, and we can get him on "a run," we can ruin him. He is playing devilish cautious, however, and may not take the bait.

Colonel Jackson telegraphed me last night that the enemy in Greenbrier was moving, he believed in the direction of Staunton. If so, I can, with North river in my front, hold Hunter till you thrash Crook and Averell, and then we can pay our respects jointly to Mr. Hunter.

Yours, respectfully,

J. D. IMBODEN,
Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-General Wm. E. JONES,
Commanding and en route, Lynchburg, Va.

Another paper contained an appeal from the officer in command at Lynchburg, setting forth the value of that place as a centre of communications and a depot of supplies, and asking for more troops to defend it against a sudden raid of the Yankees. This paper had been referred to General Jones by the Richmond authorities, indicating thereby that the defence of Lynchburg devolved upon him.

Another suggestive paper was a telegram from Jefferson Davis to Jones, urging him to guard especially against raids into the western portion of North Carolina, intimating that they were to be dreaded for political as well as military reasons.

These proofs of the fears and weakness of the enemy, together with the encouraging reports received from the North of General Grant's progress, induced us to hope that the plan of an extensive and damaging campaign, discussed at the outset, might now be successfully carried out. It was determined, therefore, to move on Lynchburg by way of Lexington and Buchanan, crossing the Blue Ridge at the Peaks of Otter. From Lynchburg we could operate against the Southside and Danville railroads with our cavalry, cutting off the enemy's only means of supply, liberating the Union prisoners confined at Danville, and rendering necessary the speedy evacuation of the rebel capital.

If General Lee was forced to detach a considerable force to oppose us, and prevent the execution of these designs, an equally desirable and important object would be accomplished; the main army of the rebellion would be weakened; General Grant would be relieved to that extent, while we had always safe lines of retreat open to the westward, through the passes of the mountains.

In addition to these considerations, the country, we found, afforded abundant supplies for our troops, while the inhabitants were quiet and, in many instances, even favorable to us. We had also assurances that in south-western

Virginia and North Carolina we might hope for active assistance from the inhabitants. Our progress, too, revealed a much larger amount of provisions and manufactories for producing material of war than we had expected, and the destruction of this kind of property was immense.

Having sent back a convoy of prisoners, negroes, and refugees, with an empty wagon train and a strong escort of men whose terms of service had nearly expired, the Army of West Virginia started southward from Staunton on the 10th of June, moving up the valley by four parallel roads. On the 11th we occupied Lexington, and there were overtaken by a supply train sent from Martinsburg, containing commissary stores, clothing, and ammunition—this latter being most essential, as our supply was short. Although these supplies were most acceptable, this train, two hundred additional wagons, embarrassed our movements considerably.

While it was important that we should have moved from Lexington without delay, we were detained, awaiting the arrival of General Duffie's column of cavalry, which marched on the road next to the Blue Ridge, and who did not report until the thirteenth, in the afternoon. He had crossed the bridge at Tye river Gap, struck the Charlottesville and Lynchburg railroad near Amherst Court-house, destroyed it to some extent, making considerable captures of men, horses, and material. He was confused and detained by the difficult and intricate character of the country.

Upon examining these prisoners I was informed that Grant had received a severe repulse; that Sheridan, who was moving to cooperate with us at the head of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, had been repulsed at Louisa Court-house and turned back; that Breckinridge had reinforced Vaughn at Rockfish Gap with four or five thousand men, and that Ewell's whole corps was advancing by the way of Charlottesville.

On the other hand we had news, from sources equally entitled to credit, that Lynchburg was undefended, and that its inhabitants were fleeing in panic from Sheridan's advance. Cut off from all reliable sources of information, the country filled with exaggerated and contradictory rumors, it was determined to solve the problem by a bold and decisive advance on Lynchburg.

The details of this movement through Buchanan, Peaks of Otter, and Liberty, the action at Quaker Church, and the handsome repulse of the enemy's attack in front of Lynchburg, have already been described in your official report. In the last-named action, which took place about the middle of the day on the eighteenth of June, we took several prisoners belonging to Ewell's corps. The statement of these men convinced us beyond a doubt that the Army of the Potomac had suffered a temporary check before Petersburg; that Sheridan had been foiled in his attempt to open communication with us; and that General Lee had

been enabled to detach a large force of veteran troops, under Lieutenant-General Early, to operate against us; that a portion of this force was engaged in the battle then going on, and the remaining divisions were coming in rapidly, by rail, from Charlottesville.

It was now evident that the Army of West Virginia was in a critical position. Two hundred and fifty miles from its base, with ammunition nearly exhausted and commissariat entirely so, with little more than sixteen thousand effective men, it was now actually engaged with a largely superior force—a force which in the course of the afternoon would be swelled to over thirty thousand men. The greatest apprehension was felt lest the enemy would renew his attack in the course of the afternoon, as our ammunition was so nearly spent that such an attack must have proved fatal. He had been so roughly handled, however, that he determined to wait until the following morning, when, with his whole force rested and refreshed, he could fall upon us more effectively.

That night our army, with its trains and material, was quietly withdrawn, retiring by the Bedford turnpike, through Liberty and Buford's Gap to Salem, on the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. This retrograde from our hazardous position was accomplished without loss and with but little annoyance from the enemy. From Liberty to Salem, our route lay along the line of the railroad, which we destroyed as we moved, arriving at Salem about sunrise on the morning of the twenty-first of June. After a short halt, we took the road across the mountains to the Greenbrier White Sulphur Springs, *via* New Castle and Sweet Springs, arriving at the White Sulphur on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth.

This move into the mountains was necessary to disembarass ourselves of the enemy's cavalry, which had overtaken and followed us from Liberty, hanging upon our rear and harassing our flanks; without doing us much actual damage, however. After we entered the mountains, they disappeared entirely, and we found ourselves at the White Sulphur with no enemy to contend with, except the natural difficulties of the country and the scarcity of provisions.

The result of the campaign, thus far, had been eminently satisfactory; and everything that had been ordered or expected had been thoroughly accomplished, with but comparatively little loss.

About fifty miles of the Virginia Central railroad had been effectually destroyed; the Virginia and Tennessee road had been destroyed to some extent for the same distance; an incredible amount of public property had been burned, including canal-boats and railroad trains loaded with ordnance and commissary stores, numerous extensive iron-works, manufactories of saltpetre, musket-stocks, shoes, saddles, and artillery-harness, woollen cloths and grain mills; about three thousand muskets and twenty pieces of cannon, with quantities of shells and gun-

powder, fell into our hands, while immense quantities of provisions, cattle and horses were captured and used by the army. We had beaten the enemy in every engagement, killing and wounding about two thousand of his men, including officers of high rank, and capturing over two thousand prisoners. We had, by a movement of unparalleled audacity, menaced the vitals of the rebellion and forced the leaders at Richmond to detach a formidable corps for their defence and security.

The vast importance of this diversion, as proved by subsequent events, will be satisfactorily established presently.

These great results had been accomplished with but little loss of men or material on our part. About fifteen hundred men killed, wounded and missing, and eight guns disabled by a stealthy attack, while they were on the march, and inadvertently left unguarded.

Considering its orders successfully carried out, the question now was to return the Army of West Virginia to its base by the speediest route and in the best condition for further active operations. At the council held at the White Sulphur on the morning of June twenty-fifth three routes were proposed: one by the Warm Springs valley, by a road running parallel with the valley of the Shenandoah. It was foreseen that Early would, in all probability, make a counter raid against the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, overthrow General Sigel's force and do much mischief. It was urged that by marching down the parallel valley, *via* Warm Springs, Franklin and Moorfield, we might arrive in time to form a junction with Sigel, and prevent the anticipated raid. By way of objection to this route, it was argued that the distance to be marched was two hundred and fifty miles, by bad roads, and through a region sparsely populated and much wasted by war; the enemy having the advantage of shorter lines, better roads, and a considerable use of railroads, could throw his force ahead of us, block up our route by felled timber, attack us in flank through the gaps in the mountains, and thus drive us still deeper into the rugged and inhospitable regions of the Alleghaues. The army, already fatigued with long marches and suffering from irregular and limited supplies, must necessarily become more disorganized at every move, while the deficiency of ammunition made it essential that we should avoid every possibility of a serious collision with the enemy. These arguments were accepted as conclusive against the proposed route. The acknowledged impossibility of obtaining supplies and the long march were equally conclusive against the Beverley route. The route by Kanawha offered an open and safe road; a million of rations within three days' march; a shorter march to Charleston, from whence, by steamboats and railways, the troops could be transported to any point on our line where they might be needed. It was shown that these advantages, the time required to reach

the desired point would be less, and that the troops would arrive well fed and rested, instead of being worn out and exhausted, as they must be at the end of a long march through an impoverished country.

The Kanawha route was adopted, and troops moved, arriving at Charleston from the thirtieth of June to the fourth of July. On the afternoon of the fourth the Commanding General and staff arrived at Parkersburg, on the Ohio river, and there were met with the information that Early had driven Sigel out of Martinsburg, and occupied the line of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad in strong force. This intelligence was forwarded with an urgent request from the Secretary of War to hurry the troops forward.

All the necessary steps had been already taken to expedite their movement from Charleston, and whatever failure there may have been on the score of promptness was owing to the low stage of water in the river. The continuance of this unprecedented drought produced results against which human foresight could not have provided, and to overcome which human exertion was powerless. The lightest draught boats used on the river and calculated to run at all seasons continually grounded, and the troops were obliged to land and march round the bars. This unfortunate circumstance so impeded the movements that, in the aggregate, four or five days were lost. All the resources of the railroad were used to forward the troops arriving by the boats, and trains were running day and night. On the evening of July fourteen the General and staff arrived at Harper's Ferry.

Early meanwhile had crossed into Maryland, fought the battle of Monocacy, and while menacing Baltimore and Washington with his light cavalry, had retired into Virginia by way of Conrad's and Edwards' ferries. Our advanced infantry, a weak division under Sullivan, and some cavalry under Duffie, had already been sent to harass the enemy's flank, as he moved across Loudon county. Generals Crook and Averell, with a portion of their commands, were in Martinsburg. General Wright with the Sixth corps, and General Emory with the Nineteenth corps, were understood to be following the enemy, and moving in the direction of Leesburg.

On the fifteenth, by telegram from Major-General Halleck, the troops of the West Virginia army were placed under the command of Major-General Wright, then at Poolesville. By this order General Hunter, although still in command of the department, was left without troops. Under this impression he wrote to President Lincoln, asking, respectfully but peremptorily, to be relieved of command. The President replied, explaining that the order transferring the West Virginia troops to the command of Major-General Wright was only intended to be temporary in its effect, and to apply while those troops were necessarily serving outside the department commanded by

General Hunter. He concluded by a very pressing and flattering request that he should retain his position. This request was accepted by General Hunter as a command.

Instead of retiring by way of Gordonsville, as was expected, Early moved westward, and crossing the Blue Ridge at Snicker's Gap, took position on the turnpike road leading from Snicker's ferry to Winchester, his main body lying around Berryville. General Wright followed him as far as the gap. On the eighteenth General Crook, then commanding the West Virginia troops, pushed across the Shenandoah, and after a sharp action with the rebel Gordon's division, was driven back with a loss of four hundred men—the enemy losing six hundred. While the sound of cannon indicated an engagement in the vicinity of Snicker's ferry, Colonel Hays was ordered to move his brigade from Halltown by a road on the west side of the Shenandoah and strike the enemy on flank.

Averell was ordered to move from Martinsburg upon Winchester. On the twentieth Colonel Hays reported that his advance had been disputed by a strong body of the enemy, and that, after a prolonged skirmish, he had fallen back to Keys' ferry, being short of ammunition.

General Averell with his cavalry, and Duvall's infantry, in all twenty-three hundred strong, attacked and routed a greatly superior force of the enemy near Winchester, putting five hundred men *hors de combat* and capturing four guns. About this time Early retired from Berryville toward Front Royal and Strasburg, and General Wright, with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, returned to Washington. In the military movements since his arrival at Harper's Ferry, General Hunter had no control or responsibility, except in ordering the minor co-operative moves under Hays and Averell.

Our information in regard to Early was, that he was strong and confident, apparently ready for battle when we might seek it, but coolly awaiting his opportunity. His position in the valley of the Shenandoah was maintained for the purpose of protecting the harvest in the fertile region which he covered, and for the still more important object of preventing another advance on Lynchburg. His presence was also a continual menace to Maryland, Pennsylvania, and the federal capital, and was thus calculated to create a diversion in favor of Lee at Richmond. That the enemy would fail to use his advantageous position to the utmost could hardly be supposed; the withdrawal of General Wright's forces without a decisive action was therefore regretted as premature.

General Crook reported that the enemy's retreat from Berryville was apparently in compliance with orders from rebel headquarters, and evidently not from weakness or the desire to avoid battle. A rumor of the fall of Atlanta seemed to give color to the former idea. On the twenty-third of July a telegram from the President was received, asking if, "since the

departure of General Wright, General Hunter had force enough to hold the enemy, should he return upon us? It was answered that if the enemy should return in full force, we had *not* troops enough to hold him; but our best information indicated that he was falling back under orders; and that Averell's cavalry had reconnoitred as far south as Strasburg without discovering any force.

A telegram from General Halleck indicated General Grant's views in regard to the valley. He desired that the line of the Potomac should be held with a view to the protection of Washington, in case of necessity. The line of the Manassas Gap railroad and Cedar creek was suggested; it was considered more judicious to establish a line near the base of supplies, and that of Aldie, Snicker's Gap, Berryville, and Winchester was decided upon. It was the decided opinion of officers who had had experience in the valley of the Shenandoah, and were well acquainted with its topography, that there was no line of defence which could be advantageously maintained against an army marching from the south, and that the idea of holding it by fortified posts was equally futile; they were liable to be penetrated and evaded with but little risk, even by an inferior enemy, and liable to be cut off, isolated, and entrapped by a superior force. The difficulty of maintaining communication was almost insurmountable. It was urged that the only mode of holding the line of the Potomac and the valley of the Shenandoah securely, was to confront the enemy with a predominating force, and drive him out or destroy him.

In obedience to orders, General Crook (now Major-General by brevet), took command of the forces in the field, and occupied Winchester with fourteen thousand men. On Sunday, twenty-fourth, General Early suddenly returned in heavy force, and falling upon Crook, near Kernstown, defeated him, putting about a thousand men *hors de combat*. General Crook fell back behind the Potomac, saving all his guns and material.

On the twenty-seventh his command moved down on the Maryland side of the Potomac, and took position in Pleasant Valley, nearly opposite Harper's Ferry; Averell reported the enemy crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, destroying the railroad and canal, and menacing both Cumberland and Chambersburg; General Wright at Monocacy, with the Sixth corps, and General Emory coming up with the nineteenth.

On the twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth the whole force crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and took position in Halltown and vicinity. The combined force amounted to about thirty thousand men, and eighty or ninety guns. It was reported that the enemy was crossing with all arms at Williamsport, and driving Averell back on Chambersburg. This was believed to be only a cavalry force, and Early was supposed to be lying along the turnpike, between Martinsburg and Winchester;

his main force at Bunker Hill. It was proposed to attack him between Martinsburg and Bunker Hill, thus cutting his army in two.

On Saturday, July thirty, it was intensely hot; the trains of the Sixth corps still passing through toward Halltown. About mid-day we received news from Washington that the enemy had entered Chambersburg, and that the remaining divisions of the Nineteenth corps were *en route* to reinforce us. Immediately afterward orders were issued directing the whole force to fall back to Middletown valley, in Maryland; these orders, I understood, came from Washington. A retrograde movement was immediately commenced, and by the following day the whole army was in Maryland, with headquarters in Frederick City, leaving, however, a strong garrison at Harper's Ferry, under the command of General Howe. I have never been able to understand the motive of this movement, and have always considered it a most unfortunate one. The position of our troops at Halltown and Bolivar Heights was unassailable by such a force as Early commanded. It was most convenient for active operations against the enemy in any direction, and was believed to interpose an effectual check on any movement of his main body toward the invasion of Maryland or toward Washington by way of Snicker's ferry, as was apprehended in some quarters. An attempt on his part to move in either direction would have exposed his flank and rear to advantageous attack by our superior force, and have left his communications entirely at our mercy. Our retrograde movement left the whole country open to him.

August first we received information that McCausland had entered Chambersburg at the head of two thousand cavalry, and after burning and sacking the town, moved westward, followed by Averell, with an inferior force. Duffie was ordered to unite with Averell in the pursuit.

August second information was received by telegraph from Washington that a heavy column of the enemy was moving on that city, *via* Rockville. Marching orders were promptly issued, and subsequently countermanded, when it was ascertained that the alarm had originated from the appearance of a squad of United States cavalry scouting near Rockville. Headquarters were moved to the Thomas farm, on the east side of the Monocacy. News received that General Kelly had handsomely repulsed McCausland's attack on Cumberland; Early's main body still lying between Martinsburg and Winchester; small foraging parties of rebels crossing occasionally at Antietam ford, Shepherdstown, and Williamsport.

August fourth General Howe telegraphs that the enemy are menacing Harper's Ferry; General Emory, with the Nineteenth corps, ten thousand strong, was sent there during the night.

August fifth, in the afternoon, General Grant in person visited headquarters, and had a con-

ference with General Hunter. It was understood that General Phil. Sheridan was to be assigned to the command of the troops in the departments of Washington, Susquehanna and West Virginia, and an official order to that effect was promulgated a few days after. The troops were immediately returned to their positions at Bolivar Heights and Halltown.

On the last day of August General Hunter, at his own oft-repeated request, was officially relieved of command in West Virginia. At the same time, worn out with fatigue and exposure, I resigned my commission in the volunteer service, and about the first of September received an honorable discharge from the department commander.

I have thus given a brief sketch of military movements and events participated in by the Army of West Virginia while under your command, from the twenty-first day of May, 1864, to the ninth of August. I have always considered the movement on Lynchburg as one of the boldest and best-conducted campaigns of the war; that the motives which dictated it fully justified the hazard incurred, and that the results obtained by very inadequate forces have been fully acknowledged by those who best understood their real value. Lieutenant-General Grant handsomely acknowledges that "all had been accomplished that was possible under the circumstances, and more than could have been hoped for." Jefferson Davis, in his speech to the people of Georgia, after the fall of Atlanta, informed them that "an audacious movement of the enemy up to the very walls of Lynchburg had rendered it necessary that the government should send a formidable body of troops to cover that vital point, which had otherwise been intended for the relief of Atlanta." The vital importance of Lynchburg as a reserve depot and proposed place of retreat, in case of the abandonment of Richmond, was fully appreciated by the rebel authorities; by the United States it was either not fully understood, or the approach deemed too hazardous. When the enemy saw, therefore, their fatal weakness was discovered, and the approaches already reconnoitred, he was obliged to despatch a force to protect it at all hazards; nearly one third of the flower of Lee's army, under Early, was detached for this purpose. Thus the great result was accomplished: Atlanta, unrelieved, fell before the conquering arms of Sherman. Lee's army, thus enfeebled, remained imprisoned in Richmond, and was never afterward able to hazard an active demonstration. Early's presence in the valley of the Shenandoah convinced the government of the United States of the only effectual policy to be pursued in that quarter. He was confronted by a superior army, attacked and annihilated. The subsequent movements of Generals Grant and Sherman brought the war to a full and fortunate conclusion. While rejoicing in the honors accorded to those great soldiers, whose fortune it has been to gather in the glorious harvest, I still feel it my duty to claim a

modest wreath for that gallant Army of West Virginia, which through so much toil, danger and suffering, assisted in preparing the field for the reapers.

I am, General, with high respect, your obedient servant,
DAVID H. STROTHER,
 Late Colonel of Volunteer Cavalry and Chief of Staff.
 Major-General **DAVID HUNTER.**

Official copy: **E. D. TOWNSEND,**
 Assistant-Adjutant-General.
 Adjutant-General's Office, Nov. 18, 1865.

Doc. 76.

OPERATIONS AGAINST FORT FISHER.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL R. F. BUTLER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA AND N. CAROLINA,
 ARMY OF THE JAMES, IN THE FIELD, JANUARY 3, 1865. }

GENERAL: On the seventh of December last, in obedience to your orders, I moved a force of sixty-five hundred efficient men, consisting of General Ames' division of the Twenty-fourth corps and General Paine's division of the Twenty-fifth corps, under command of Major-General Weitzel, to an encampment near Bermuda.

On the eighth the troops embarked for Fortress Monroe.

On the ninth, Friday, I reported to Rear-Admiral Porter that the army portion of the conjoint expedition directed against Wilmington was ready to proceed.

We waited there Saturday the tenth, Sunday the eleventh, and Monday the twelfth.

On the twelfth Rear-Admiral Porter informed me that the naval fleet would sail on the thirteenth, but would be obliged to put into Beaufort to take on board ammunition for the monitors.*

The expedition having become the subject of remark, fearing lest its destination should get to the enemy, in order to divert from it all attention, on the morning of Tuesday the thirteenth, at three o'clock, I ordered the transport fleet to proceed up the Potomac during the day to Matthias Point, so as to be plainly visible to the scouts and signal men of the enemy on the northern neck, and to retrace their course at night and anchor under the lee of Cape Charles.

Having given the navy thirty-six hours' start, at twelve o'clock noon of the fourteenth, Wednesday, I joined the transport fleet off Cape Henry, and put to sea, arriving at the place of rendezvous of New Inlet, near Fort Fisher, on the evening of the fifteenth, Thursday.

We there waited for the navy Friday the sixteenth, Saturday the seventeenth, and Sunday the eighteenth, during which days we had the finest possible weather and the smoothest sea.

On the evening of the eighteenth Admiral Porter came from Beaufort to the place of rendezvous. That evening the sea became rough, and on Monday, the nineteenth, the wind sprang up freshly, so that it was impossible to land

* See General Terry's Report, page 426, *contd.*

troops; and by the advice of Admiral Porter, communicated to me by letter, I directed the transport fleet to rendezvous at Beaufort. This was a matter of necessity, because the transport fleet, being coaled and watered for ten days, had already waited that time, to wit: from the ninth, the day on which we were ready to sail, to the nineteenth.

On the twentieth, Tuesday; twenty-first, Wednesday; twenty-second, Thursday; and twenty-third, Friday, it blew a gale. I was occupied in coaling and watering the transport fleet at Beaufort.

The Baltic, having a large supply of coal, was enabled to remain at the place of rendezvous, with a brigade on board of twelve hundred men, and General Ames reported to Admiral Porter that he would co-operate with him.

On the twenty-third I sent Captain Clark, of my staff, from Beaufort on the fast-sailing armed steamer Chamberlain, to Admiral Porter to inform him that on the evening of the twenty-fourth I would again be at the rendezvous with the transport fleet, for the purpose of commencing the attack, the weather permitting.

At four o'clock on the evening of the twenty-fourth I came in sight of Fort Fisher, and found the naval fleet engaged in bombarding it, the powder-vessel having been exploded on the morning previous, about one o'clock.

Through General Weitzel I arranged with Admiral Porter to commence the landing under cover of the gunboats as early as eight o'clock the next morning, if possible, as soon as the fire of the Half-Moon and Flag-pond Hill batteries had been silenced. These are up the shore some two or three miles above Fort Fisher.

Admiral Porter was quite sanguine that he had silenced the guns of Fort Fisher. He was then urged, if that were so, to run by the fort into Cape Fear river, and then the troops could land and hold the beach without liability of being shelled by the enemy's gunboats (the Tallahassee being seen in the river).

It is to be remarked that Admiral Farragut, even, had never taken a fort except by running by and cutting it off from all prospects of reinforcements, as at Fort Jackson and Fort Morgan, and that no casemated fort had been silenced by naval fire during the war. That if the Admiral would put his ships in the river the army could supply him across the beach, as we had proposed to do Farragut at Fort St. Philip. That at least the blockade at Wilmington would be thus effectual, even if we did not capture the fort. To that the Admiral replied that he should probably lose a boat by torpedoes if he attempted to run by.

He was reminded that the army might lose five hundred men by the assault, and that his boat would not weigh in the balance, even in a money point of view, for a moment, with the lives of the men. The Admiral declined going by, and the expedition was deprived of that essential element of success.

At twelve o'clock noon of the twenty-fifth,

Sunday, Captain Glisson, commanding the covering divisions of the fleet, reported the batteries silenced and his vessels in position to cover our landing.

The transport fleet, following my flag-ship, stood in within eight hundred yards of the beach, and at once commenced debarking. The landing was successfully effected. Finding that the reconnoitring party just landed could hold the shore, I determined to land a force with which an assault might be attempted.

Brevet Brigadier-General Curtis, who deserves well for his gallantry, immediately pushed up his brigade within a few hundred yards of Fort Fisher, capturing the Half-Moon battery and its men, who were taken off by the boats of the navy.

This skirmish line advanced to within seventy-five yards of the fort, protected by the glacis which had been thrown up in such form as to give cover, the garrison being completely kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, which was very rapid and continuous, their shells bursting over the work with very considerable accuracy. At this time we lost ten men wounded on the skirmish line by the shells from the fleet.

Quitting my flag-ship I went on board the Chamberlain and ran in within a few hundred yards of the fort, so that it was plainly visible.

It appeared to be a square bastioned work of very high relief, say fifteen feet, surrounded by a wet ditch some fifteen feet wide. I was protected from being enveloped by an assaulting force by a stockade which extended from the fort to the sea on the one side, and from the marshes of Cape Fear river to the salient on the other.

No material damage to the fort, as a defensive work, had been done.

Seventeen heavy guns bore up the beach, protected from the fire of the navy by traverses eight or ten feet high, which were undoubtedly bomb-proof shelters for the garrison.

With the garrison kept within their bomb-proofs it was easy to maintain this position; but the shells of the navy, which kept the enemy in their bomb-proofs, would keep my troops out. When those ceased falling the parapet was fully manned.

Lieutenant Walling, of the One Hundred and Forty-second New York, pressed up to the edge of the ditch, and captured a flag which had been cut down by a shell from the navy. It is a mistake, as was at first reported to me, that any soldier entered the fort. An orderly was killed about a third of a mile from the fort and his horse taken.

In the meantime the remainder of Ames' division had captured two hundred and eighteen men and ten commissioned officers of the North Carolina reserves and other prisoners. From them I learned that Kirkland's and Hagood's brigade of Hoke's division had left the front of the Army of the James, near Richmond, and

were then within two miles of the rear of my forces, and their skirmishers were then actually engaged, and that the remainder of Hoke's division had come the night before to Wilmington, and were then on the march, if they had not already arrived.

I learned, also, that these troops had left Richmond on Tuesday, the twentieth.

Knowing the strength of Hoke's division, I found a force opposed to me, outside of the works, larger than my own.

In the meantime the weather assumed a threatening aspect. The surf began to roll in so that the landing became difficult. At this time General Weitzel reported to me that to assault the work, in his judgment, and in that of the experienced officers of his command, who had been on the skirmish line, with any prospect of success, was impossible.

This opinion coincided with my own, and much as I regretted the necessity of abandoning the attempt, yet the path of duty was plain. Not so strong a work as Fort Fisher had been taken by assault during the war, and I had to guide me the experience of Port Hudson, with its slaughtered thousands in the repulsed assault, and the double assault of Fort Wagner, where thousands were sacrificed in an attempt to take a work less strong than Fisher, after it had been subjected to a more continued and fully as severe fire. And in neither of the instances I have mentioned had the assaulting force in its rear, as I had, an army of the enemy larger than itself.

I therefore ordered that no assault should be made, and that the troops should re-embark.

While superintending the preparations for this, the fire of the navy ceased. Instantly the guns of the fort were fully manned, and a sharp fire of musketry, grape and canister swept the plain over which the column must have advanced, and the skirmish line was returning.

Working with what diligence we could, it was impossible to get the troops again on board before the sea ran so high as to render further re-embarkation, or even the sending of supplies ashore, impossible. I lay by the shore until eleven o'clock the next day, Monday, the twenty-sixth, when, having made all proper dispositions for getting the troops on board, I gave orders to the transport fleet, as fast as they were ready, to sail for Fortress Monroe, in obedience to my instructions from the Lieutenant-General.

I learned from deserters and prisoners captured, that the supposition upon which the Lieutenant-General directed the expedition, that Wilmington had been denuded of troops to oppose General Sherman, was correct. That at the time when the army arrived off Wilmington, there were less than four hundred men in the garrison of Fort Fisher, and less than a thousand within twenty miles.

But the delay of three days of good weather, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth, waiting for the arrival of the navy, and the further

delay of the terrible storm of the twenty-first, twenty-second and twenty-third, gave time for troops to be brought from Richmond, three divisions of which were either there or on the road.

The instructions of the Lieutenant-General to me did not contemplate a siege; I had neither siege-trains nor supplies for such a contingency.

The exigency of possible delay, for which the foresight of the commander of the armies had provided, had arisen, to wit: the larger reinforcement of the garrison. This, together with the fact that the navy had exhausted their supply of ammunition in the bombardment, left me with no alternative but to return with my troops to the Army of the James.

The loss of the opportunity of Friday, Saturday and Sunday, the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth, was the immediate cause of the failure of the expedition.

It is not my province even to suggest blame to the navy for their delay of four days at Beaufort. I know none of the reasons which do or do not justify it. It is to be presumed they are sufficient.

I am happy to bring to the attention of the Lieutenant-General the excellent behavior of the troops, both officers and men, which was all that could be desired.

I am under special obligations to Captain Gleson, of the Santiago de Cuba, for the able and efficient manner in which he covered our landing; to Captain Alden, of the Brooklyn, for his prompt assistance and the excellent gunnery with which the Brooklyn cleared the shores of all opposers at the moment of debarkation. Lieutenant Farquhar, of the navy, having in charge the navy boats which assisted in the landing, deserves great credit for the energy and skill with which he managed the boats through the rolling surf. Especial commendation is due to Brigadier-General Graham and the officers and men of his naval brigade, for the organization of his boats and crews for landing, and the untiring energy and industry with which they all labored in re-embarking the troops during the stormy night of the twenty-fifth and the days following. For this and other meritorious services during the campaign since the first of May, which have heretofore been brought to the notice of the Lieutenant-General in my official reports, I would respectfully but earnestly recommend General Graham for promotion.

The number of prisoner captured by us was three hundred, including twelve officers, two heavy rifled guns, two light guns, and six caissons.

The loss of the army was one man drowned, two men killed, one officer captured, who accidentally wandered through our pickets, and ten men wounded while upon the picket line by the shells of the navy.

Always chary of mentioning with commendation the acts of my own personal staff, yet I

think the troops who saw it will agree to the cool courage and daring of Lieutenant Sidney B. DeKay, aid-de-camp, in landing on the night of the twenty-fifth, and remaining aiding in re-embarkation on the twenty-seventh.

For the details of the landing and the operations, I beg leave to refer you to the reports of Major-General Weitzel, commanding the division landed.

Trusting my action will meet with the approval of the Lieutenant-General, the report is respectfully submitted.

BENJAMIN F. BUTLER,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT,
Commanding Armies of the United States.

Doc. 77.

OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.

GENERAL BUTLER'S DESPATCH.

OFF CITY POINT, VA., May 5, 1862.

Lieutenant-General Grant, Commanding Armies of the United States, Washington, D. C.:

We have seized Wilson's wharf landing. A brigade of Wild's colored troops are there. At Fort Powhatan landing two regiments of the same brigade have landed. At City Point Hinks' division, with the remaining troops and battery, have landed. The remainder of both the Eighteenth and Tenth Army Corps are being landed at Bermuda Hundreds, above the Appomattox.

No opposition experienced thus far. The movement was apparently a complete surprise. Both army corps left Yorktown during last night. The monitors are all over the bar at Harrison's Landing and above City Point. The operations of the fleet have been conducted to-day with energy and success. Generals Smith and Gillmore are pushing the landing of the men. General Graham, with the army gunboats, led the advance during the night, capturing the signal station of the rebels.

Colonel West, with eighteen hundred cavalry, made several demonstrations from Williamsburg yesterday morning. General Kautz left Suffolk this morning with his cavalry, for the service indicated during the conference with the Lieutenant-General.

The New York, flag-of-truce boat, was found lying at the wharf, with four hundred prisoners, whom she had not time to deliver. She went up yesterday morning.

We are landing troops during the night—a hazardous service in the face of the enemy.

BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General Commanding.

A. F. PUFFER,
Captain and A. D. C.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

SEAMAN GRAYBOND, OFF FORT POWHATAN,
JAMES RIVER, Va., Thursday, May 5, 1862. }

The movement of the Union army in this di-

rection, which, for weeks past, has been vaguely expected, commenced this morning.

To Major-General Butler is exclusively due whatever credit shall result from the inception and execution of the plan. When, four weeks since, Lieutenant-General Grant, the actual commander of the armies of the United States, visited Fortress Monroe, it was for the purpose of ascertaining the views of General Butler respecting an advance upon the rebels by way of the Peninsula, to be carried out in co-operation with the Grand Army of the Potomac. General Grant had considered the various plans proposed with this object in view, but had committed himself to none, and was inclined, therefore, to listen attentively to what General Butler might suggest.

The project was to advance upon Richmond by the James river; get a foothold as near the city as possible, on the south bank of the stream; seriously interrupt the communications of the rebel capital southward, and eventually compel the evacuation by Lee's army of their strongly-fortified position on the Rapidan, thus forcing the rebels to give Grant battle, or press rapidly rearward to the walls of their capital.

The first step toward organization was made some weeks since, by the concentration at Yorktown, from the various posts in the Department of North Carolina and Virginia, the great bulk of the Eighteenth Army Corps. To the command of these troops was assigned Major-General W. F. Smith. In addition to these war-worn heroes from the coast of North Carolina and the posts in Virginia, nearly all the brave and gallant fellows in the Tenth Army Corps (under Major-General Gillmore), were sent to General Butler, to participate in the movement, forming their encampment at Gloucester Point, opposite Yorktown.

That Yorktown and Gloucester Point, both at the mouth of the York river, should have been selected for the rendezvous of these troops, naturally led to the supposition that the advance was intended to be made up the Peninsula by the route which proved so fearfully disastrous to McClellan. But this show of force was merely a stupendous *ruse de guerre*, and circumstances indicate that it succeeded admirably in deceiving the rebels. Their journals have constantly spoken of these troops as destined to follow the path of 1862, and that the assurance of their deception might be made doubly sure, a brigade of Union troops was despatched by General Butler even as late as yesterday to White House landing, where, at sunset, when we last heard from them, they were sedulously engaged in felling timber and constructing a wharf, as if preparing to facilitate the landing of a large army. To aid in this scheme of mystification, all the light-draft steamers were kept until the last moment at Fortress Monroe, whence, early yesterday morning, they were despatched to the York river, and the work of embarking the troops, whose arrangements for the purpose had been

already made, was begun promptly. Soon after the shades of evening closed over the camping-ground, the last tent was struck and the troops were all on board.

General Butler's order to his subordinate Generals made it incumbent for them to repair to Hampton Roads as quickly as possible after dark, where they were to anchor for the night. At daybreak the order commanded an advance of the troops up the James river, convoyed by three army gunboats, under Brigadier-General Graham, and a naval force, consisting of five monitors and eleven gunboats, under Rear-Admiral Lee.

The cavalry branch of the expedition is commanded by Brigadier-General A. V. Kautz, who, with a fine body of several thousand white troopers, left Suffolk, Va., also, at daylight yesterday morning. The point at which he aims primarily to strike is Hickford, a town on the Petersburg, Richmond and Weldon railroad. A ride of about eighty miles, by the Surrey and Sussex roads, allowing him time to pay his compliments to the people as he passes along, would bring him to Hickford to-morrow evening. The railroad bridge there, which is a strong one, about three hundred feet long, will be destroyed if possible; and then the dashing horsemen will do other damage to the enemy's means of supply as far as they can find opportunity. General Kautz has received a roving commission, and if not too hardly pressed by the rebels, he may penetrate as far south as Weldon, N. C., returning when it suits his convenience.

Starting up the Peninsula from Williamsburg, another cavalry force, somewhat smaller, commanded by Colonel West, also set out at daybreak. Their object was to create a diversion in our favor by keeping the rebels excited and attacking guerrillas and the garrisons of the outposts. Colonel West would try to cross the Chickahominy at Bottom's bridge and make his way to the main body on the James.

As on every occasion when a large piece of machinery is put in operation, there is certain to be more or less friction of the parts, so this complex machine of a gallant and mighty army did not move smoothly according to the programme. The Eighteenth corps (General Smith's), having the advance, was promptly up to time, dawn finding all the steamers used in its transportation steaming by Newport News into the mouth of the James river. But the steamers of the Tenth (General Gillmore's) corps were still quietly at anchor off Fortress Monroe. Here was an unexpected source of detention. General Butler had every reason to suppose that the sailing orders were perfectly understood, and would be implicitly followed by his corps commanders. It was easy to perceive that he was both distressed and annoyed at the delay. He had hoped to reach his intended point of debarkation (City Point, fifteen miles below Richmond), at three o'clock in the afternoon. This he expected to accomplish, even in

case that the possession of two points on the way up the river, viz., Wilson's wharf and Fort Powhatan, should be contested by the enemy, as it was very likely would be done. There was nothing for it, then, but to learn the cause of this dilatoriness of the Tenth corps, and to hasten the vessels forward. This was done.

The fleet new steamer Grayhound, the flag-boat of the expedition, on board which General Butler, with his staff, had come at midnight, went back from Newport News to Fortress Monroe. General Gillmore was sent for, and made satisfactory explanations to General Butler. This accomplished, off we started at eight o'clock up the river.

The scene in the hazy light of the beautiful spring morning was picturesque and animated. Crowded steamboats labored heavily through the still water, pontoon trains and lumbering canal barges, to be used in disembarking, were in tow of the swifter transports. The long, low lines and wedge-like shapes of those naval non-descripts, the monitors, with their high cylindrical turrets amidships, gave variety to the scene. The swift Grayhound flits among the slow-moving craft and slackens her speed an instant as she comes abreast each vessel, allowing General Butler from the hurricane deck to order them to advance with all the celerity possible. "Give her all the steam you can, Captain," shouts the General, with upraised cap, and as the crowds of blue-coats recognize him they burst out vociferously in cheers. The scene, as we pass up the river, is charming in the extreme. The high wooded banks of the stream present us every variety of delicate foliage with which the spring delights to clothe the earth in vernal beauty. Occasionally a house is visible over the bluffs, and a man appears, beyond doubt very much amazed at the sudden appearance of so large a fleet of invading Yankees. The trip up the river is unbroken by any sign of war.

Taking the advance, General Butler's boat reaches Wilson's wharf, a point about thirty-five miles below Richmond. Here a regiment of General Wiide's negro brigade have effected a landing, and are busily engaged in making preparations to hold the place. From this point up the river to Fort Powhatan is a clear straight reach of seven miles, which it would never do to leave in command of the enemy, who could fortify the bluffs and play the mischief with our water communications. So General Butler takes possession of both these strong positions. The stalwart Africans gaily run up the bluffs, and are soon at work swinging axes with a will, and the giant trees fall with a mournful crash under their sturdy strokes. Soon a wide space of woods on the high banks are cleared away, and rebels approaching from toward Richmond must come within the sweep of our batteries. There can be nothing mentioned which better shows the perfect surprise of this movement to the rebels, than the fact that, so-

ording to their own admission, they have a strong force at Charles City Court-house, six miles inland from Wilson's wharf, engaged in collecting negroes together for work on the Richmond fortifications. It is strange, if this force was aware of our approach, that they did not come up and give us a few shots from a field battery. But no welcome of this left-handed sort greeted us. It is quite likely that our negroes may repair *vi et armis* to the Charles City rendezvous, and so reverse the kind of work their brethren have been assembled to perform on the strongholds of Richmond. The boat is just now leaving Powhatan, where a strong negro garrison has been landed, having little to do in the way of securing their position but mount the ordnance in the works which the rebels two years ago so laboriously constructed.

GENERAL BUTLER'S HEADQUARTERS,
RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG PIKE, WITHIN THREE MILES OF
FORT DARLING, May 13, 1864. }

I write to-night, in the house latterly occupied by Dr. Cheatham, an account of yesterday's and to-day's operations, to the music of the rifles of our own and the rebel skirmishers, in the woods a mile distant. These rifle-balls sing soprano, and the bass of the guns of our batteries, and of the cannon in the rebel intrenchments, only ceased with the coming of night. The good news from Grant, read to the troops to-night, called forth cheers that must have awakened the echoes of Richmond, and elicited from the rebels a few parting shots of spite. We will settle that score with them to-morrow, however.

Wednesday night orders were issued to General Smith to move with five brigades at daylight, and occupy a position at right angles with the Richmond and Petersburg pike, above Chester station. As General Smith occupied our left, this necessitated a march across the right. General Gillmore was directed to leave sufficient force in the intrenchments, and to move with the rest of his command to the junction of the railroad with the Richmond and Petersburg pike. This was to prevent the forces said to be in Petersburg from moving up the pike to Richmond. The first object of the move was to mask a cavalry raid by General Kautz, for the purpose of cutting the Danville railroad, and the second to reconnoitre the position about Fort Darling, and ascertain the enemy's strength or weakness.

Thursday morning brought with it a drenching rain, which, of course, retarded the movements of the troops. General Smith was in motion soon after daylight, and got into position by noon, when it was found that his force was insufficient to properly cover the whole line. Part of General Gillmore's force was therefore ordered up to complete it. The Commanding General and staff left headquarters at seven o'clock, expecting to find all the troops in position, but, as before stated, an unavoidable delay

occurred in consequence of the heavy rain. General Butler, therefore, went riding around to find the lines, and found himself once or twice in rather close proximity to his skirmishers. We finally struck the turnpike, about midway between Richmond and Petersburg, and then waited, in a most terrific rain, till couriers, who were sent out to ascertain where General Smith was to be found, returned. The good-natured Chief of Staff, in response to the half-earnest, half-joking remonstrance of one of the staff, as to the propriety of bringing them out in such a shower, remarked, "I know it rains pretty bad; but, gentlemen, this rebellion has got to be crushed." The party persisted in having their jokes, even though their boots were filled with water and their coats wet through. At last General Smith was found to the left of the pike and about the centre of his line.

It must be said that this country is one of the very worst to campaign in.

Roads leading nowhere; swamps where swamps ought not, by any physical rules, to be; woods, impenetrable at the very points where, for military operations, they should be at least passable; ravines of considerable width and variable depth; creeks, formidable for their muddy bottoms more than their width; in short, everything that is horrid, and rendering the country one of peculiar advantages for defence. A brigade lost its commander, and the commander lost his brigade, and the General's aids could find neither. Division commanders lost their line, or rather never found it, and the whole thing, which was perfectly plain on the map, became an unaccountable muddle on land. Under all these difficulties the Commanding General and all his officers preserved a remarkable equanimity, and philosophically worked out the difficult problem. General Turner, with his division of the Tenth corps, held the extreme right, resting on James river, at Dr. Howlett's farm. General Weitzel held the centre, and General Brooks the left. Subsequently General Gillmore was sent to the left with a portion of his command, a brigade from General Terry's division being ordered to the support of General Weitzel. General Ames, of the Tenth corps, was at Walthal Junction with his brigade. General Weitzel moved up the pike, in conjunction with General Brooks, and their skirmishers soon met those of the enemy. General Turner, on the right, did not advance as soon as directed and the enemy succeeded in driving Weitzel's skirmishers back. With the force sent to his support in reserve, Weitzel again advanced, and drove the enemy up the pike nearly a mile. The One Hundred and Forty-eighth New York, Colonel Guyon, Wistar's brigade, steadily pushed the enemy back. General Turner, by this time, was also in motion, and our whole line obtained an advanced position beyond Kettle run, and near Proctor's creek. The enemy had a battery in position on the pike, which annoyed our men considerably, and we were unable to obtain a position which com-

manded it. It was then determined to attempt a movement to the left, so as to obtain a position on the high ground beyond, which commanded that of the rebel battery, and also opened a prospect of turning the right of the enemy's position. After much necessary delay, and after several reconnoissances had been made, a crossing was discovered over Kettle run: also, a road through the swamp, and a fording-place on Proctor's creek; but darkness coming on, the move was deferred until the morning. The rain continued, and the troops slept on their arms all night in a drenching rain. Headquarters were established on a cross-road off the pike, in the house of a woman, who lost her temper and scolded her negro girl and her children; who objected to doing anything for us, and who pays twenty dollars a year, Confederate money, rent for a house and a small farm; whose husband is in the rebel army, and stationed at Drury's Bluff, and whom the General promised to catch and return to her; who took her ducks, her pigs, her dogs, and her turkey-eggs to bed with her, lest they might "turn up missing" in the morning. The good woman never had seen an army in her immediate vicinity before, and evidently didn't like it. She was somewhat appeased when the General told her he would pay her for everything he took, and also twenty dollars apiece for several chickens "gobbled" by some of the passing troops. She was not so highly gratified when the General added "in Confederate money."

From information received from prisoners and other sources it was ascertained that a portion of Beauregard's force marched up the pike last night and reached the intrenchment in front of Fort Darling. Had our troops been able to move promptly, as ordered, the capture of a portion of the rebel force would have been certain. While all this manoeuvring was going on, General Kautz with his cavalry slipped off, and ere this must have effected their object. Captain James Shafer of General Butler's staff, who was sent after the cavalry to communicate with them, and return at once and report progress, has not yet been heard from, and it is feared that he has been captured, though some incline to the belief that, finding the country with too many guerrillas around, he prudently decided to remain with General Kautz. A report came to General Butler that torpedoes had been planted on Dr. Howlett's farm, and Major Ludlow of the staff was despatched with several orderlies to hunt them up, with the characteristic instruction from the General, "If you find any, don't fire them, but send for me." Major L. did not find torpedoes. This propensity of seeing and judging for himself is so strong in General B., that one who was on the Highland Light when the Commodore Jones was blown up, remarked to one of the General's staff also present, "For my sake Major, don't tell the General about the torpedoes, for he will want to take the Grayhound and explore the river himself."

Captain West of General Smith's staff, with a party of men, went over to James river where a rebel schooner lay, made a raft of logs, went off to the boat, and set her on fire. It was thought that a torpedo was attached to her, and she had been floated down and anchored at that point.

In the fight of Monday last, the three Massachusetts regiments were encountered by General Hazard's brigade, of South Carolina, their regiments being the same numbers, Twenty-three, Twenty-five and Twenty-seven. They were badly whipped, and Captain Leroy Hammond, who was mortally wounded, told one of the surgeons, before his death, "If we had known you were veterans we wouldn't have charged so." It was like retribution.

Friday dawned with alternate cloud and sunshine. General Butler's staff were early in the saddle, and galloped to the position of yesterday on the left of the pike. The disposition of the troops was at once made and the force put in motion. General Gillmore was to move from the left to the railroad at Chester Junction, thence up the road to turn their flank. General Gibbon's forces occupied the line between General Smith's left and General Ames' right, and to add to the force General Marston's brigade was ordered to cross Kettle run and Proctor's creek, and advance up the line of the railroad. General Turner had also been withdrawn from the right, as the bend in the river narrowed the line, and was transferred to the left of General Brooks' division. A portion of General Gillmore's command made a detour to the left of the railroad, in order to flank the enemy's position, while another portion moved directly up the line of the railroad to feign a direct attack. This movement was successfully accomplished, and the enemy forced to retreat.

Meanwhile skirmishing had commenced on the left of the pike about noon. The enemy were discovered up the pike in position, with two guns, from which they opened on us pretty lively. The wounded were carried to the rear, and everything betokened that the fight had begun in good earnest. Presently the line of skirmishers fell back, and commenced running out of the woods. It was ascertained that the "Rebs" advanced in a very thickly-formed line, and apparently in great force. This was really to cover their weakness, for our men were rallied and went into the wood again, when the enemy retired.

HEADQUARTERS GENERAL BUTLER, HALF-WAY HOUSE, }
RICHMOND AND FREDERICKSBURG PIKE, MAY 14, 1864. }

As anticipated, the success of General Gillmore on our left, compelled the evacuation of the first line of works held by the enemy, which they did upon the advance of General Smith this morning, after a brief resistance. This line of works is formidable, and pierced at commanding points for artillery. It extends from beyond the railroad across to the James. Riding out to the right, from the high land on the river we could see the rebel works at Che-

pin's Farm, on the north bank of the river, and supporting the works upon this side of the river. As our troops advanced with Heckman's brigade on the right of the pike, the rebels made an assault and charged them, but were no better pleased with the result than on former occasions. Steadily but surely our lines advanced, Follett's and Belger's batteries hitting their works from the Half-way House, where we now are. A drenching rain came, but operations were continued, General Butler being determined to push matters vigorously. General Weitzel quickly got his batteries, Follett's, Company D, Fourth United States, and Belger's, Company F, First Rhode Island, into position, using the embrasures from this side the enemy's intrenchments to fire through. A ride along the centre and right showed the enemy to be very strongly posted. On the left of the pike, General Brooks with his brigade occupies the rebel intrenchments, our men having about one foot and a half of level ground to stand upon between the ditch which surrounded the works and the embankment. Here they lie against the slope, carefully watching, while the line of skirmishers in the woods beyond tell by their continual popping of the presence of the foe. To the right of the road, in rear of the rebel works, now our front, is an open field, and beyond that is a formidable earthwork, with a curtain connecting other works, bastions, &c., evidently built with great care. Over this flaunts the rebel flag, and on it seven guns have been discovered. They kept up a sharp fire for a while, but were soon silenced by our fire. Here, on the parapets of our first line of works, our sharpshooters are posted, and keep a close watch against the approach of any rebel marksmen who may aim to shoot down our artillerymen. Still further along our skirmishers are deployed through the woods, and Heckman's gallant men lie on their arms, ready for any emergency.

Here we encountered General Weitzel seated upon a log, quietly smoking his pipe, the shells from both Union and rebel batteries flying over his head, and the singing of Minie balls occasionally becoming unpleasantly loud. The General has been hit, he laughingly says, for the first time, a fragment of shell striking his whiskers. He waits for the artillery on the left to commence "shooting" before he opens with all his guns, which he has been massing to bear upon the redoubt in front of us. As we look, a puff of white smoke from an embrasure, followed almost instantly by a report from the battery behind us, and the two shells traversed the air, crossing each other in their deadly flight. The rebel shell exploded to the rear of our battery, while ours struck the rebel works just at their entrance, and the gun was immediately withdrawn. Our fellows watch the appearance of a gun on the fort, and then rattle away at it until it is taken off. Beyond the rebel work other defences were seen stretching away toward Fort Darling, situated on the

next bend of the river. The rebels are evidently husbanding their resources expecting an assault. As we ride along we encounter soldiers lying asleep in small squads, "just relieved from skirmish line," and snatching what sleep they can. Poor fellows! tired and weary, which of you will be the beloved to whom He giveth sleep, the sleep of death, from which you shall awake to life immortal? Here comes a stretcher, having upon it a man just wounded, and who is being taken to the rear. There limps a poor fellow who has some slight wound. Another walks slowly along, his arm in a sling, and faint from loss of blood and reaction of the nervous system. Here, by the battery, they are removing a dead comrade for burial. At one point on the parapet, where the rebel fire was particularly severe, one of our men was wounded. We could see him—though at some distance from the spot—raise his head occasionally as if imploring help. At last two or three of his comrades discovered him, made a rush, and dragged him off a parapet into the ditch, where they awaited an opportunity to remove him.

General Gillmore rides up from the left to consult with General Butler, who directs that he get his batteries in position and open on the enemy's works in his front, while General Smith increases his fire on the right. About five o'clock the fire opened along our whole line, and continued for an hour, the rebels taking the whole without an answering shot. The only damage done was the bursting of a rebel caisson. Our men were a good deal annoyed by rebel sharpshooters, who picked off whoever dared to show himself. From the top of the mansion of one Friend, a good view was obtained of General Brooks' and General Turner's divisions in position. A battery near the house was firing three guns at a time, with terrible effect, as far as noise was concerned. The battery of 20-pound Parrotts on the right of the pike belched forth responsive notes, which were echoed and re-echoed from the extreme right and left. The intervals were filled with the popping of small arms. Tiring of the continued shooting, I did Mr. Friend the honor to look through his premises. The vandals had been there, and everything was turned upside down. This friend must have been a minister and scholar. A large number of valuable books were still left lying about the floors, among them many classical works. Private letters were strewn about, and a receipted tailor's bill bore testimony to the man's integrity and conscientious scruples. The mansion is quite roomy but old-fashioned, delightfully situated, and but for the teachings of Mr. Friend and his brother ministers, would not have come to such desolation as was presented. Quite a quantity of unginne'd cotton covered the attic floors, while unnumbered Scotch ale jugs and a large quantity of carefully selected straws, for the imbibition of mint juleps, sherry cobbler, &c., told of the Virginian's hospitality. The fire

of the batteries slackened; there was some talk of an assault, and other talk of no demonstration of so warlike a nature; and then General Butler returned to his headquarters at the house of Dr. Cheatham. The military gentlemen who thoroughly understand the art of war wish everything done on profoundly scientific principles, while the Commanding-General cares not how, so that the thrashing of the rebels be accomplished. He knows the importance of keeping this force here, be it large or small, employed, and he intends to do it. He can afford to be defeated for the sake of making Grant's victory thoroughly complete, and the rebels will find that he will give them all they want to do. Prisoners already talk of short rations and a limited supply of ammunition, and if the juncture indicated by the arrival at Bermuda Hundred of General Sheridan with ten thousand cavalry from the Army of the Potomac means anything, the traitors may be prepared to meet their doom.

On Friday morning General Butler despatched Major Ludlow of his staff back to Bermuda Hundred to communicate with Admiral Lee, inform him of the intended attack, and to urge upon him to co-operate with the monitors and gunboats. To this statement the Admiral replied, in substance, that owing to shoal water in Trent Reach, as shown by coast-survey chart, the draft of the monitors, and rebel torpedoes, it would be very difficult, if not impracticable, at present, to get up as high as Dr. Howlett's farm. In order to thoroughly remove obstructions, it would be necessary to control the left bank. The enemy now occupy, in considerable force, the high ground on the left bank, around Jones' Neck, and the same difficulty will be found at Dutch Gap. This occupancy would interrupt the supply of coal for the monitors. The Admiral, however, promised all possible aid and support, and would at least protect the river line below where the fleet now lies (Four Mile Creek). A despatch has since been received that he has started to move up, and will come as far as possible.

IN CAMP, Tuesday Morning, May 17, 1864.

The hardest fighting of the campaign on the south side of the James river occurred yesterday. In the early morning, under cover of a fog so dense as to limit vision to the distance of a few yards, the enemy fell upon the right of our line of battle with the force of an avalanche, completely crushing it backward, and turning our flank, as two days before we had turned theirs. Their advantage, however, was but temporary, for our veterans quickly recovered from the sudden shock, and drove their assailants back beyond the line of the attack. The fighting, thus unceremoniously inaugurated, continued with more or less briskness throughout the day, and the losses on both sides were severe. The impression is, however, that the rebels in this respect were the greater sufferers, but our loss is estimated at not less than fifteen hundred to two

thousand in killed, wounded and missing. The day's operations resulted in our entire army being ordered to return from its advanced position, within ten miles of Richmond, to the line of defence known as Bermuda Hundred, between the James and Appomattox rivers. Here the troops were securely encamped before ten o'clock last night, having buried their dead, and brought from the battle-field in perfect order their wounded and all their supplies.

The five days' campaign which has been thus unexpectedly closed, can in no wise be designated a defeat. General Butler has accomplished all, and more than all that he intended. When, on Thursday morning last, the army left its intrenchments, and faced toward Richmond, its object, primarily, was to engage the attention of the strong rebel force garrisoning the outer defences of the city, and thus permit General Kautz, with his cavalry, to emerge from our lines, with the object of pushing forward to the Danville and Richmond railroad. This road being cut, every line of travel radiating from Richmond, by which Lee could receive supplies for his army, would be closed. To accomplish an end of such advantage to Grant as the crippling of his antagonist in this regard, General Butler considered, would be cheaply gained, comparatively speaking, even by the sacrifice of his entire command.

Kautz has been heard from. The damage he set out to do has been fully inflicted, and by our stubborn fighting of the enemy in our front, a force which we have reason to believe is greatly superior to our own, has been kept constantly busy south of Richmond, instead of passing northward to reinforce the exhausted and demoralized hordes opposed to Grant.

It may well be supposed that the troops were greatly fatigued after the four days' hard fighting prior to yesterday, coupled, as the warfare was, with the discomfiting incidents of a persistent rain, which kept every shred of clothing almost constantly drenched, and liquefied the clayey soil into a pasty mud. In this condition the troops lay down to rest on Sunday night, along the line of intrenchments which we had taken two days before. The heavens were black, and the atmosphere damp and heavy. At day-break, Monday morning, a thick fog shut out everything from view. A horse was completely enveloped from sight a dozen yards away. In these bewildering circumstances, the massed enemy came up on the right of our line, which was the thinnest place in our position. General Heckman's brigade of Weitzel's division, in the Eighteenth corps, whose bravery on many a hard-fought field has won for them the title of "the invincibles," was posted here. The surprise was, however, so complete, that these gallant fellows were for once and for a moment helpless. The first they knew of the enemy upon them, was when his fierce yell awoke them as he dashed across the earthworks and turned the flank of their line of battle. General Heckman's voice was speedily heard calling upon his

men to rally, and they, answering the rebel yells with Union cheers, formed as best they could in the horrible darkness and confusion, when a hand-to-hand contest followed. The assailants and the assailed fell in heaps together. The enemy at last, outnumbering the gallant Heckman's forces five to one, enveloped the remnant of the brigade, and ordered them to the rear. Resistance, on their part, was no longer possible. All this occurred in less time than the reader can glance over what is written.

Meanwhile the firing has dispelled sleep from every eye. The most tired man along the line is now thoroughly awake, and ready to do his share in battle. In the rear of Heckman's brigade, as a reserve, are two regiments of the Tenth corps, the Eighth Maine, and One Hundred and Twelfth New York, temporarily detached for duty under Weitzel. They are led by Colonel Drake, who brings them up from the woods in the rear to the relief of General Heckman. They make a splendid charge upon the enemy and drive him outside the line of earthworks. The immediate effect of this is to release from three to four hundred of Heckman's men, who are prisoners. Heckman himself, however, is carried off. Again the enemy charge with fresh troops, but are repulsed and slaughtered by our men, only to rush up once more over the dead and dying with the fury of demons, with still another line of fresh troops, to be again dashed back in confusion. So the battle raged on the extreme right—the Eighth Maine and One Hundred and Twelfth New York having received aid from the fragments of Heckman's crippled force.

The attack was not confined to the extreme right, although it was there most determined. It was simultaneously undertaken along our entire line of two miles and a half in length. On the left, however, it was scarcely more than a feint, compared with the fury which characterized it on the other end. Wistar's and Burnham's brigades, also of Weitzel's division, were set upon with the same impetuosity exhibited toward Heckman. The rebel plan of massing brigade after brigade in line of battle, and hurling them in rotation against us, was here tried with very bad result. General Smith, with that forethought which is characteristic of him, anticipating some such movement on the part of the enemy, had ordered a large quantity of telegraph wire to be intertwined among the trees and undergrowth which lay in front of our position. Wistar and Burnham received the order and obeyed it. Heckman failed, unfortunately, to get it. When, therefore, the rebels charged upon our intrenchments in the "dull light," hundreds of them were tripped down and unable to tell the cause. As they lay upon the ground our musketry fire kept many of them from ever rising more. As with the first line so with the second. They met the same fate. The third line fared no better, and this simple agency of a telegraphic wire interlaced among the trees played more havoc in the rebel ranks than any-

thing else. The dead lay like autumn leaves before the front of Wistar and Burnham.

At eight o'clock there was a cessation of the fighting; at least there was comparative quietness. The centre of our line of battle, resting on the turnpike, had been comparatively weakened by moving forces toward the right, and General Gillmore, on the left, was ordered by General Butler to close up the gap. Here there seems to have been a misapprehension of orders. General Gillmore understood that he was commanded to retire, instead of moving to the weakened point. This he accordingly did, and the rebels on the extreme right, having gained a temporary advantage by again flanking our position, the whole line moved slowly back, and reformed about half or three quarters of a mile in the rear. After resting for a while, although the skirmishing in front was still quite heavy, the command to advance was again given, and the movement forward was splendidly made *en echelon*. There was not the slightest wavering, and the enemy retired before us. The line of battle was once more formed within a few hundred yards of the position held by us at the commencement of the fight, and when the dead and wounded had been cared for, the order to retire was given. The Eighteenth corps moved back first, and the Tenth brought up the rear. The route back to our intrenchments was by different roads, but everything was conducted in an orderly manner, and there was no molestation on the part of the enemy.

Among our losses in the fight were four guns. Three of these pieces belonged to Ashby's battery. They were twenty-pounder Parrotts. This battery supported Heckman, and thirty of the horses were killed in the first impetuous attack of the rebels. Ashby was wounded slightly in the head, and not one of his officers escaped a wound, though none were seriously hurt. Fifteen of the gunners were killed. By great efforts the artillerists brought off the limbers and caissons.

Belge's First Rhode Island battery, famous all along the coast, for the first time lost a gun—a twelve-pounder brass field piece. Captain Belge is reported wounded in the leg, and a prisoner. The loss of the battery was heavy.

Hawley's and Barton's brigades, of Terry's division, Tenth corps, did the hardest fighting on the left of our line. Both organizations suffered severely.

We took in all about two hundred rebels prisoners. Among them were several high officers, a colonel, a major, and a score or more of captains and lieutenants. Prisoners tell us that on Sunday night they were reinforced by three brigades from Richmond, but whether from Lee's army or not we could not determine. Bragg and Jeff. Davis are positively asserted to have come from Richmond to be near Beauregard during the fight.

Major Brooks, Chief Engineer of General Gillmore's staff, slightly wounded in right arm.

Captain Platt, of the Second New-Hampshire, was killed. He was the only officer killed of the Second, Tenth, Twelfth and Thirteenth New Hampshire regiments.

Lieutenant Wheeler, of General Heckman's staff, was killed.

The fog was so dense during the early part of the fight that officers and men, on both sides, stumbled into each other's lines, and very many amusing scenes occurred. At one time General Weitzel and his orderly got among the rebels, and the latter was captured. He called to Weitzel to save him, which was done by placing a pistol at the rebel's head and ordering him to yield his musket to the orderly, by whom he was marched off. Tables of this kind were constantly turned. General Butler was out in the thick tempest of rifle-shells. One shot passed between him and Colonel Kensett, one of his aids. General Martindale's sword was struck by a shrapnel shot and indented greatly.

While the fighting was going on toward Richmond, an attempt was made on the part of the enemy to attack in rear, by coming up from Petersburg. General Ames, of the Tenth corps, who commands in that direction, gallantly kept them at bay until the order was given to retire.

TENTH ARMY CORPS, NEAR CITY POINT, VA., }
Friday Evening, May 20, 1864. }

There has been to-day a fierce and sanguinary battle on the spot which I mentioned in my last—the front of the Third division of this corps, under General Ames.

Our line passes irregularly from the Appomattox on the left to the James on the right. The approachable spot was at a single point of the line, in a space of about eight hundred yards in width and the same in depth.

The rebels had come up in front of the clearing, having followed us down from Fort Darling, and had posted their first guns in the yard of the Howlett House. This house is behind a fall in the ground, and at several points along the same line they have posted light batteries. The clearing is wholly our own work, and is faulty only in not having been done to a greater extent. One strip of woods which threatened us with sharpshooters on Thursday is, happily, now down; but those next the Howlett House remain, and are now beyond our power to remove.

On Wednesday night our pickets dug a rifle-pit in front of the rebel position, and about eight hundred yards from our line, extending a quarter of a mile into the woods on our right, which yet stand. It was evident that this pit is invaluable to its possessors, and accordingly the rebels drove us out of it this morning, and the struggle of to-day has been an attempt to regain it, which is so far unsuccessful, although we have retaken the right of it, which is in the woods.

Last night there was an alarm between eleven and twelve, and another between two and three, caused by picket firing. Both times there was

skirmishing and charging, but our troops held their pit. The moon shone, setting just after the second alarm, and our old enemy, the fog, was so thick that a man could not be distinguished at fifteen paces, even in a camp where fires had been burning all night. What mischief the rebels might prepare under its cover, no one knew; but it was thought they would try to plant batteries in the woods on the right of the Howlett House, on the ground where is now our section of the rifle-pit, and further alarm was looked for later in the night, but none came.

At nine, or thereabout, the muskets began a lively crackle, and the guns opened from the rebel position. Hurrying to the scene, I found the enemy had advanced and been repulsed, yet had the rifle-pit in their possession. The whole of the Ninth Maine, with portions of the Fourth New Hampshire, Fifty-fifth Pennsylvania, and Ninety-seventh New York, were occupying the rifle-pit, the regiment first named being nearly in the centre. The rebels charged upon them with their peculiar short-lived enthusiasm and their yell, and were met firmly, and the position might have been held without difficulty, had not the Ninth Maine broken and fled to the woods, thus permitting the rebels to enter the pit and flank the remaining regiments, compelling them to retire. Two Lieutenants of the Ninth Maine, who retired their men without orders, were brought this afternoon before General Ames, and by him sent to General Butler, who summarily dismissed one of them from the service. Both deserve severe punishment, for this unfortunate affair has cost hundreds of lives to-day, and threatens us with severe battles as the price of holding our position. The rebels in the pit, and the woods which yet stand next the Howlett House, are the twin sources of apprehension.

Our men once out of the pit and in retreat, the impetuous rebels pursued, recklessly charging into full view in the clearing. Then our guns, angry but silent while they shelled away at us yesterday, opened with spherical case, and they tumbled back to their newly-acquired pit.

Now came a momentary lull, and then the Third Regular battery, in the left redoubt, the Fourth New Jersey adjoining it on the right, both facing the pit, and the First Connecticut in the elevated redoubt further to the right, pointing diagonally and partly across it, opened fire, roaring without a moment's stop from half-past ten to half-past eleven, using at first mostly spherical case. The practice was mainly excellent, under the personal direction of General Ames, most of the shell bursting over the pit. The rebel guns returned the fire, but their shots counted hardly more than a fifth of ours, and only an insignificant number were struck, while our own fire was not in the least retarded. Meanwhile the Thirteenth Indiana, Colonel Dobbs, made a gallant and, as it seemed, imprudent charge upon the pit on the right, but was repulsed when within about a hundred yards of







REYNOLDS

MAJ. GEN. F. C. BARLOW.

10-2-15

the work. During this charge we took prisoner Major-General Walker, of South Carolina, who was here temporarily in command of a brigade. He had his foot torn off by a shell, and states that his brigade ran off and left him on the field.

The firing being over for the present, our men could be seen huddled behind apple trees and others in the clearing. The Lieutenant-Colonel of the One Hundred and Fifteenth New York rode airily out upon an elegantly-caparisoned horse, against warning, when down went the horse, off went his rider on foot, and soon after a man was seen to crawl carefully to the animal and remove the trappings, the rebels amusing themselves by firing at him.

For a rarity there was no rain, and the day was oppressively hot. The hot noon steamed away, and at half-past two our guns again began to roar. Word was brought that the left of the pit was empty, and soon the Ninety-seventh Pennsylvania was seen advancing against the left of the rifle-pit, in the open clearing. Their leader had mistaken or not followed precisely his orders, and the rebels had come in, and suddenly they rose and poured upon the Ninety-seventh a murderous fire of infantry and grape, and they seemed to fall in swaths. It was a sad sight, without help, but they ran deperately forward, hesitated, wavered, and ran back, all in the space of a moment of time. Meanwhile our guns were turned upon the spot, and the fire of the rebels rapidly diminished. Thenceforward, for something like an hour, it was possible with a fair chance of impunity to sit upon the parapet and watch our shells, although for a time rebel shot flew wildly over us, and the trees flew into splinters. The clearing was now nearly empty of men, but about four o'clock word came that Colonel Howell's brigade was in the rifle-pit on the right. Five o'clock, and musketry crackled vigorously in the woods, showing that Terry's division was contesting there the right of the pit, and the guns were turned in that direction. They fired without intermission until half-past five; then came a lull, during which the rebels could be seen busily spading and throwing the pit over the other way, while our men repaired the embrasures, many of which were too narrow, besides having been torn by the guns themselves.

Evening came, and all was quiet on the front, but on the extreme left we heard heavy firing from gunboats on the Appomattox, or from Hinks' battery on the other bank, shelling the ravine which runs from the river to the rebel position here. The woods have been so slashed that the signal corps communicate between the redoubts, and Terry's headquarters on the banks of the James are plainly visible.

Our losses to-day cannot now be estimated. In infantry fire they are heavy, and probably exceed that of the enemy; but our artillery practice was good, the rebels being sometimes seen on the run for the woods, and, perhaps, thus we have restored the balance of death. A

few casualties occurred from our own guns. Not a musket shot was fired from our works.

Some shells of the Third artillery failed to explode this afternoon. One or two were examined and found to be filled with harmless plaster.

Saturday, seven A. M.—Firing on the left continued far into the night. Our batteries have just begun to fire again slowly, and the pit must be retaken to-day at whatever cost, for its loss will be the loss of our position on the Peninsula.

IN THE WOODS BACK OF BERMUDA HUNDRED,
VIRGINIA, May 26, 1864. }

Things are not working nor promising altogether well just now, in General Butler's command. For more than a week past the whole army here has been as good as shut up within its intrenchments back of Bermuda Hundred, and, instead of prosecuting a siege against Richmond or Fort Darling, is itself fairly under siege. Meanwhile the enemy has recovered possession of the Richmond and Petersburg railroad, and is evidently running trains over it day and night, his locomotive whistles being audible within our intrenchments. This is an ugly set-back from the state of things that existed, and from the prospect with which we were cheering ourselves a little more than a week ago. I, for one, am not happy—not altogether happy—in the change. But there is no use disguising the fact, and I can anticipate no good from the loyal public being under a delusion in regard to the matter. The prevailing opinion here is, that General Butler has made one or two capital mistakes. He is indeed a strong man, a very strong man, and a glorious good fellow in the right place; but many a good and true man among us doubts seriously whether his right place be to have command of military operations in the field. I suppose that nobody will pretend that General Butler was educated a soldier. And it seems tolerably clear that he was not born one. Such being the case, I do not well see how he can be reasonably expected to show much mastership in a soldier's work. Probably there is no man now living in the United States who can justly claim to have been born a soldier; but we have quite a number who have been educated soldiers, and some of these, it must be confessed, are turning out pretty good ones. I must think, too, that we have had enough of undertaking to extemporize military leaders out of civilians, however capable these may be in their proper walks. And it seems rather unfortunate, to say the least, that in matters purely military the judgments of some of our best military men should still be liable to be overruled and set aside by civilian commanders.

For a due explanation of certain things already stated I must go back a little.

Up to the evening of Sunday the 15th, the whole movement of this army, in all its parts and particulars, had been a complete success. The sudden departure of the troops from

Gloucester Point and Fortress Monroe; their passage up the James; their landing at Bermuda Hundred; their advance to a position some six miles beyond that place, and intrenching themselves there; their pushing on some three miles further, fighting their way to the railroad, and their thorough, though temporary, disablement of the road for several miles;—all this, accomplished within the brief space of six days, was full of encouragement, and the wisest tongues among us were fluent in praise of it. The enterprise seemed both judicious in the conception, and swift and strong in the execution. "A superb piece of work," was the thought uppermost in the minds of all. General Butler received ample credit for the operation; his popularity among the troops was very great; wherever he made his appearance, cheers and benedictions greeted him full and free. What made all this still better was, that while the troops had been thus fighting successfully with the rebels directly in front, General Kautz, with his cavalry, had executed a grand raid round to the south of Petersburg, playing the mischief with the railroads leading from that place to Suffolk and Weldon. Nor did our success stop there. On the morning of Thursday the twelfth, the army, after a rest of twenty-four hours, began another advance in full force; General Kautz setting forth about the same time on another raid, to break up the railroad between Richmond and Danville. This advance of the army was crowded with still more important success.

General Smith, with the Eighteenth corps, held our right, toward the river, and General Gillmore, with two divisions of the Tenth corps, Terry's and Turner's, held our left; his third division, under General Ames, being left in the rear of the main body, to act as a corps of observation against any approaches of the enemy from Petersburg. Slowly and steadily the army fought its way onward toward Richmond, though not a little impeded, meanwhile, by a drenching rain. Before Friday night, Gillmore had succeeded in turning the right of the enemy's outermost line of defences on the hither side of Richmond. This is a strong line of earthworks, its east end abutting on the river, where it connects with the system of fortifications on what is called Drury's Bluff. Westward the line extends upward of three miles, crossing the railroad, and of course commanding both that and also the fine Macadam turnpike, which runs about midway between the railroad and river. Before Saturday night, the whole western portion of the line, for nearly three miles, had been carried and was firmly held by Gillmore, the enemy charging fiercely upon him, but meeting with a decisive repulse. General Smith, meanwhile, had approached to within a few hundred yards of the eastern portion of the line, which being too strong to be carried by assault, preparations were forthwith set on foot for carrying it by siege. To this end, the engineers of the Tenth corps, the veterans of

old Wagner and Gregg, and known as Serrell's New York Volunteer Engineers, were immediately ordered to the front with their tools, and the siege train was started forward. Monday morning the siege work was to begin in good earnest.

Gillmore, having thus firmly planted himself within the enemy's works, was clear and decided in the opinion that the army should go right to intrenching its position. The line, which had been captured, of course, needed a little engineering, to give it a practicable front the other way, and thus make it available as a base against the enemy's other works. He sent an earnest recommendation to General Butler in that behalf. General Butler, who was present, and commanding the army in person, would not listen to it. When it was urged upon him, with not a little persistency of argument, he set it aside peremptorily, saying that the movement was purely an offensive one, and that he would not stop for any defensive work. Yet it was clear enough that the proposal did not necessarily involve any loss of time; it only required that a portion of the troops should be at work, who would otherwise have a time of rest. General Butler seems to have had an odd sort of fear, lest the offensive character of the movement should be somehow compromised by stooping to defensive measures. I suppose it is not too much to say that this was a fatal mistake. And it was, surely, a most unmilitary proceeding. For the life of the enterprise manifestly depended on our keeping the advantages we had gained. And the obstinacy with which the rebels had disputed our progress, showed what a high value they set upon the ground whence we had driven them. So that the whole military reason of the case clearly indicates that no pains should be spared, no possible precautions omitted, for strengthening and securing our position.

Monday morning found both armies enveloped in a fog so thick that you could scarce distinguish a man five yards off. Under cover of this fog the rebels, at a very early hour, came upon us in strong force, and were almost literally in our midst before we knew it, their first attack being on our left, which, however, was quickly repulsed, and was probably intended as a feint. Soon after, they came with prodigious force against our right. Heckman's brigade, which held our extreme right, was quickly driven back, thrown into confusion, and a large part of it captured, including the gallant Heckman himself. Following up his success, the enemy completely turned us in that quarter, doubled up a portion of our line on itself, and even penetrated so far as to command the turnpike in our rear, over which a part of our army had advanced. On the whole, matters were drawing into a pretty critical shape. By this time, however, the fog had begun to lift, and General Smith had succeeded in restoring order among his troops and getting them in trim for good work.

Still our left, under Gillmore, stuck fast to its

place within the enemy's works, and showed no disposition to budge an inch, though the enemy was assaulting it with great vigor and resolution. Gillmore was of opinion, that if he held his end of the line firmly where it stood, the enemy would soon be forced to relinquish the advantage he had gained at the other end; especially as, in the meantime, Smith might make, as indeed he did make, the place too hot for him; insomuch that his very advantage was likely to become his adversity. Things standing thus, or moving thus, General Butler sent to Gillmore ordering him to withdraw. Gillmore was very reluctant to do this, as he saw in it nothing less than perdition to the whole enterprise; he, therefore, still lingered, hoping the commander would see cause to waive or suspend the order. But it was not long before a second and more peremptory message reached him, ordering him to retire immediately. This, of course, left him no choice; and he, therefore, withdrew slowly and in perfect order, bringing off everything except some of his killed, and took up a position on elevated ground, some three fourths of a mile this side of the place he had left. Here he effectually covered the retreat of the army, which was gradually withdrawn, and before sleeping-time all were back within their intrenchments at Bermuda Hundred.

Meanwhile, information came, by a Richmond paper, that General Kautz had succeeded perfectly in his undertaking, making havoc of the Danville railroad at a place called Coal Mines, and also blowing up the bridge over the Appomattox, an iron structure, upward of three hundred feet long. So that thus far the movement was a success, the enemy having been thoroughly occupied while Kautz did his work; which was doubtless one of the leading purposes of General Butler in ordering the advance. As to the rest, the movement was a failure, and a bad failure too, inasmuch as it put the enemy in full possession of the Richmond and Petersburg railroad, from which there seems little prospect of driving him again for the present. General Gillmore, and other pretty good military heads, thought at the time, as indeed they still think, that apart from the Commander's positive order, there was no necessity of leaving his position within the enemy's works—that those works might be held, and, with proper engineering, made effective against the fortifications of Drury's Bluff, which, no doubt, are the key to Richmond on this side, as the reduction of them would open the river to Admiral Lee.

For the last eight days, the army, when not at rest, has been mainly occupied in finishing up and enlarging the defences of this place. The principal work is a huge line of intrenchments, composed of earth and logs, and extending nearly from river to river, a distance of about three miles. Both ends of the line are covered by gunboats. The line is not far from six miles back of the landing-place called Ber-

muda Hundred, which is on the point of land formed by the junction of the James and Appomattox rivers, so that the space now occupied by the army is of a peninsular shape. Most of it is covered with thick woods, though we find here and there openings of considerable extent, which appear to be slovenly and lazily cultivated by a sort of third or fourth rate farmers, or, in the Virginia dialect, planters. I have made a little acquaintance with some of the natives. The first thing I learn from them generally is that they have a pedigree.

The railroad is about three miles in front of our main line of intrenchments; too far to be reached by our guns; besides, the woods are so thick that we cannot see it. The enemy have a considerable force in our front; how large I cannot say. Well, our intrenchments are pretty strong; so strong, indeed, that, well manned as they now are, I think we may safely laugh to scorn almost any force the enemy may pit directly against us, for the ground all along our front is anything but a lovely place to manoeuvre an army in. Some half a mile in advance of our breastworks we have a line of rifle-pits. The rebels have made several pretty fierce attempts to oust us from these and turn them against us. Last Friday morning they did force us from a considerable portion of them.

In the afternoon, Colonel Howell, a regular old war-horse, and one of the finest gentlemen you ever saw, who commands a brigade of General Terry's division, Tenth corps, was thrown against the intruders; and his brave boys soon cleared the rascals out. Several prisoners were taken, and among them Brigadier-General William S. Walker, of Mississippi, was brought in, badly wounded. I had an interview with him the next morning; found him a good-looking and well-spoken man; his age, I should think, about forty. He told me he was a nephew of Robert J. Walker, who was his guardian from the age of twelve years. He said that the day before he would have preferred to die, but that he felt much better now, as everything was done, that could be done, for his health and comfort.

I told General Walker that I believed there was no disposition among us to treat otherwise than with all kindness, any wounded and suffering man who might fall into our hands. His eyes filled with tears at these words. He told me he was a member of the Episcopal Church. When first taken, his behavior was rather savage and fierce, but when I saw him he was very gentle and subdued. I felt no little interest in him. His leg had been amputated, and he expressed himself confident he should recover. This, however, I understand, is rather doubtful. While talking with him, I could not help thinking whether he knew, what I had been well assured of, that right here, in several instances, the rebel bloodhounds had been seen murdering our wounded men whom they found lying helpless before them.

THE ATTACK ON FORT POWHATAN.

HEADQUARTERS OF GENERAL BUTLER, May 26, 1864.

General Wilde is in command at Wilson's wharf, on the north side of the James. He has a garrison, all negroes, with artillery belonging to the colored battery raised by General Butler. Wilson's wharf implies more than the name suggests. The wharf is one thing; the adjacent country quite another. The bluff rises somewhat abruptly, and then there is level land. Hereon our line was established, about a mile and a half in length, and thanks to the never-tiring energy of colored soldiers, has been well fortified.

Yesterday about noon, Fitz Hugh Lee, now Major-General and commanding the cavalry of the Confederate army, *vice* Stuart, killed by Sheridan's men, appeared before the place with thousands of the Southern chivalry. With the courtesy of a Fitz Hugh, the characteristics of a gentlemen, and the arrogance of the southern planter, F. H. L., Major-General, sent into our lines and demanded a surrender, promising that in case his request or demand was complied with, the garrison should be sent to the authorities at Richmond as prisoners of war, but if refused he would not be answerable for the result. Chivalrous gentleman! shrewd financier of lives! Did you not know that the "authorities at Richmond" had by public manifesto refused to recognize negroes as prisoners of war? Was it not plain to your intelligent mind that under this refusal these negroes could be again placed in bondage by those authorities, provided they should, by a special interposition of divine Providence, escape butchery at the hands of your gentlemen comrades?

General Wilde replied, "We will try *that*." And the fight commenced. At first it raged fiercely on the left. The woods were riddled with bullets. The dead and wounded of the rebels were taken away from this part of the field, but I am informed by one accustomed to judge, and who went over the field to-day, that from the pools of blood and other evidences the loss must have been severe. Finding that the left could not be broken, Fitz Hugh hurled his chivalry—dismounted, of course—upon the right. Steadily they came on, through obstructions, slashing through, past abattis, without wavering. Here *one* of the advantages of negro troops was made apparent. They obeyed orders, and bided their time. When well tangled in the abattis, the death-warrant "Fire" went forth. Southern chivalry quailed before Northern balls, though fired by negro hands. Volley after volley was rained upon the superior by the inferior race, and the chivalry broke and tried to run. The fight lasted till about five o'clock, when hostilities ceased. General Wilde directed the operations in person, and made preparations to renew the fight, but during the night the chivalry imitated the Orientals, as told in the song, and

"Folded their tents like the Arabs,
And silently stole away."

General Wilde is an *enthusiast* on the subject of colored troops. He firmly believes that a white man, in course of time and by strict discipline, can be made as good a soldier. He has the most implicit confidence in his troops, and so have they in him. General Hinks, who commands the colored division, took it by preference. There are those who affect to despise negro troops, and say they cannot be trusted in positions of responsibility, or in an emergency. Talking with a Regular Army officer, who entertains many of these prejudices, he admitted that with good officers the negroes would make good soldiers. An old adage, and true of any men of any color.

On the right of the line, at Wilson's wharf, between twenty and thirty dead rebels were found, among them Major Bricker, of the Second Virginia cavalry. Their total loss was one hundred and fifty; nineteen prisoners were taken. Our loss was one killed and twenty wounded.

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GENERAL THOMAS' OFFICIAL REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND, }
NASHVILLE, June 1, 1865.

GENERAL: I have the honor to report the operations of my command from the date of the last report made by me, January 20, as follows:*

General A. J. Smith's corps, at that period, was with me at Eastport, Mississippi; four divisions of General Wilson's cavalry were encamped on the opposite or north bank of the Tennessee river, at Waterloo and Gravelly Springs, Alabama, and the Fourth corps, Major-General Stanley commanding, was stationed at Huntsville, Alabama. This, with the ordinary garrisons of the country, composed my command.

The General-in-chief of the army having given up the intention of my continuing the campaign against the enemy in Mississippi and Alabama, I received an order by telegraph from Major-General Halleck, Chief of Staff, to send General A. J. Smith's command and five thousand of General Wilson's cavalry by river, to report to Major-General Canby, at New Orleans, for the purpose of taking part in an expedition at that time preparing to operate against Mobile. Smith's corps started from Eastport on the sixth of February, and Knipe's division of cavalry left Nashville on the twelfth.

About the period of the departure of Smith's corps information was received, through various sources, to the effect that part of the shattered remnants of Hood's army, *viz.*, Cheatham's and Lee's corps, where on their way from Mississippi to South Carolina, moving *via* Selma and Montgomery, Alabama, to reinforce that portion of the enemy's army operating against

* See page 356, ante.

General Sherman. There remained in Central Mississippi, under General Taylor, but one corps of the enemy's infantry, and about seven thousand of Forrest's cavalry, the headquarters of the command being at Meridian, Mississippi.

On the sixth of February a communication was received from Lieutenant-General Grant, directing an expedition, commanded by General Stoneman, to be sent from East Tennessee to penetrate North Carolina, and well down toward Columbia, South Carolina, to destroy the enemy's railroads and military resources in that section, and visit a portion of the State beyond the control or reach of General Sherman's column. As the movement was to be merely for the purpose of destruction, directions were given General Stoneman to evade any heavy engagements with the enemy's forces.

Again, on the thirteenth of February, General Grant telegraphed me to prepare a cavalry expedition, about ten thousand strong, to penetrate Northern Alabama, acting as a co-operative force to the movement on Mobile by General Canby. Before leaving Eastport, Mississippi, I had directed General Wilson to get his command in readiness for just such a campaign, of which the above was simply an outline—my instructions being for him to move on Tuscaloosa, Selma, and Montgomery, Alabama, and to capture those places if possible, after accomplishing which, he was to operate against any of the enemy's forces in the direction of Mississippi, Mobile, or Macon, as circumstances might demand. The bad state of the roads, combined with the condition of the horses of his command after completing the severe campaign in pursuit of Hood, prevented any movement for the time being, and it was only on the twenty-second of March that General Wilson, with Upton's, Long's, and McCook's divisions, could leave Chickasaw, Alabama. Hatch's division remained at Eastport, Mississippi, and R. W. Johnson's at Pulaaki, Tennessee, it not being possible to mount them fully, to hold the country and prevent guerrilla depredations.

When General Sherman was organizing his army for its march to the Atlantic seaboard, in November, he issued an order directing me to assume control of all the forces of the Military Division of the Mississippi not present with him and the main army in Georgia. Based on that order, all the operations of the troops within the limits of the above-mentioned military division have, during the interval, been made under my immediate direction, and I have been held responsible for their faithful execution.

On the thirtieth of March General Wilson's cavalry reached Elyton, after an extremely difficult, toilsome, and exhaustive march, on account of bad roads, swollen streams, and the rough nature of the country, which had also been almost entirely stripped of all subsistence for man or beast. At Elyton Croxton's brigade, of McCook's division, was detached and sent to capture and destroy Tuscaloosa, and then march to rejoin the main body near Selma.

With the remainder of his command, General Wilson pushed rapidly forward to Montevallo, where he destroyed five extensive iron works, and other valuable property. On the outskirts of the town the enemy's cavalry was found in force, attacked, routed, and pursued through Plantersville, leaving in our possession three pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners. At three p. m. on the second of April General Wilson reached the immediate vicinity of Selma, and rapidly formed Upton's and Long's divisions to attack the defences of the town—Long attacking on the Summerfield road, and Upton across a swamp deemed impassable by the enemy. Dismounting two regiments from each of the brigades of Colonels Miller and Minty, General Long and those two officers gallantly leading their men in person, charged across an open field five hundred yards wide, over a stockade which they tore up as they passed, through the ditch, and over the enemy's parapets, sweeping everything before them. Our loss was forty-six killed and two hundred wounded; Colonel Dodds, Fourth Ohio, among the former, and General Long and Colonels Miller and McCormick among the latter. General Upton met with less resistance than Long—entered the enemy's works and the town, capturing many prisoners. In the darkness and confusion following the assault Generals Forrest, Buford, Adams, Armstrong, and others, made their escape. Lieutenant-General Dick Taylor had left earlier in the afternoon. As the fruits of the victory, however, there remained twenty-six guns and two thousand seven hundred prisoners, besides large amounts of ordnance and other property of great value. Twenty-five thousand bales of cotton had already been destroyed by the enemy.

General Wilson remained at Selma from the second to the tenth of April, resting his command and completing the destruction of the immense workshops, arsenals, and foundries, and waiting for Croxton to rejoin from his expedition to Tuscaloosa, it having been ascertained, through the enemy, that he captured Tuscaloosa, and was moving to Selma *via* Eutaw. On the tenth General Wilson crossed the Alabama river and moved toward Montgomery, receiving the surrender of that town, without a contest, on the twelfth. The enemy burned eighty-five thousand bales of cotton before evacuating. At Montgomery five steamboats, several locomotives, one armory, and several foundries were destroyed.

On the fourteenth operations were resumed by Upton's division moving through Mount Meigs and Tuskegee toward Columbus, Georgia, and Colonel La Grange, with three regiments of his brigade, of McCook's division, marching along the railroad to West Point, *via* Opelika.

On the sixteenth, General Upton, with about four hundred dismounted men, assaulted and carried the breastworks of Columbus, saving, by the impetuosity of his attacks, the bridges over

the Chatthochee, and capturing fifty-two field guns in position, besides twelve hundred prisoners. The rebel ram "Jackson," nearly ready for sea, and carrying an armament of six seven-inch guns, fell into our hands and was destroyed, as well as the navy-yard, foundries, the arsenal and the armory, sword and pistol factory, accoutrements, shops, paper-mills, four cotton factories, fifteen locomotives, two hundred cars, and an immense amount of cotton, all of which were burned. The same day, the sixteenth of April, La Grange captured Fort Taylor, at West Point, above Columbus, on the Chatthochee, after assaulting it on three sides, the defence being stubborn. Three hundred prisoners, three guns, and several battle-flags were taken, besides a large quantity of supplies.

On the eighteenth the march toward Macon was resumed, Minty's (late Long's) division leading. By a forced march, the bridges across Flint river, fifty-four miles from Columbus, were secured, compelling the abandonment by the enemy of five field-guns and a large amount of machinery; forty prisoners were captured, and two cotton factories destroyed. At six P. M. on the twentieth of April, the authorities of Macon, under protest, surrendered the city to the Seventeenth Indiana, Colonel Minty's advance regiment, claiming, under the provisions of an armistice then reported existing between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, that the capture was contrary to the usages of war. General Wilson, not being at hand when the surrender was made, when the case was reported to him, with admirable good judgment, declined to recognize the validity of the claim asserted, as the city had been taken possession of by one of his subordinates before he (General Wilson) could be advised of the existence of an armistice, and he therefore held as prisoners of war Major-Generals Howell Cobb and G. W. Smith, and Brigadier-Generals Mackall, Robertson, and Mercer. On the twenty-first, General Wilson was notified by General Sherman, from Raleigh, North Carolina, over the enemy's telegraph wires, and through the headquarters of General Joseph Johnston, that the reported armistice was a reality, and that he was to cease further operations.

To return to General Stoneman's expedition from East Tennessee. Owing to the difficulty of procuring animals for his command, and the bad condition of the roads, General Stoneman was only enabled to start from Knoxville about the twentieth of March, simultaneously with General Wilson's departure from Chickasaw, Alabama. In the meantime General Sherman had captured Columbia, South Carolina, and was moving northward into North Carolina. About this period reports reached me of the possibility of the evacuation of Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg, Virginia, and in that event, of his forcing a passage through East Tennessee *via* Lynchburg and Knoxville. To guard against that contingency, Stoneman was sent toward Lynchburg to destroy the railroad and military

resources of that section, and of Western North Carolina. The Fourth Army Corps was ordered to move from Huntsville, Alabama, as far up into East Tennessee as it could supply itself, repairing the railroad as it advanced, forming, in conjunction with Tilson's division of infantry, a strong support for General Stoneman's cavalry column, in case it should find more of the enemy than it could conveniently handle, and be obliged to fall back.

With three brigades, Brown's, Miller's, and Palmer's, commanded by General Gillem, General Stoneman moved *via* Morristown, Bull Gap, and thence eastward up the Watauga, and across Iron mountain to Boone, North Carolina, which he entered on the first of April, after killing or capturing about seventy-five home guards. From Boone, he crossed the Blue Ridge, and went to Wilkesboro', on the Yadkin, where supplies were obtained in abundance, after which he changed his course toward South-western Virginia.

A detachment was sent to Wytheville, and another to Salem, to destroy the enemy's depots at those places, and the railroad, while the main body marched on Christianburg and captured the place. The railroad to the eastward and westward of the town was destroyed for a considerable distance. The party sent to Wytheville captured that place after some fighting, and burned the railroad bridges over New river and several creeks, as well as the depots of supplies. The detachment sent to Salem did the same, and proceeded to within four miles of Lynchburg, destroying as they advanced.

A railroad was never more thoroughly dismantled than was the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad, from Wytheville to near Lynchburg.

Concentrating his command, General Stoneman returned to North Carolina, *via* Jacksonville and Taylorsville, and went to Germantown, whence Palmer's brigade was sent to Salem, North Carolina, to destroy the large cotton factories located there, and burn the bridges on the railroad between Greensboro' and Danville, and between Greensboro' and the Yadkin river, which was most thoroughly accomplished, after some fighting, by which we captured about four hundred prisoners.

At Salem, seven thousand bales of cotton were burned by our forces.

From Germantown the main body moved south to Salisbury, where they found about three thousand of the enemy defending the place, and drawn up in line of battle behind Grant's creek, to await Stoneman's attack. Without hesitation, a general charge was made by our men, resulting in the capture of all the enemy's artillery, fourteen pieces, and one thousand three hundred and sixty-four prisoners. The remainder scattered, and were pursued.

During the two days following, the troops were engaged destroying the immense depots of supplies of all kinds in Salisbury, and burn-

ing all the bridges for several miles on all the railroads leading out of the town.

On the afternoon of April thirteenth, the command moved westward to Statesville and Lenoir, at which latter point General Stoneman left the troops to be disposed of by General Gillem, and proceeded with the prisoners and captured artillery to East Tennessee, reporting his arrival, on the nineteenth, at Greenville, and detailing the disposition of his troops, which was as follows: Palmer's brigade, with headquarters at Lincolnton, North Carolina, to scout down the Catawba river toward Charlotte; Brown's brigade, with headquarters at Morgantown, to connect with Palmer, down the Catawba, and Miller's brigade, with General Gillem, was to take post at Ashville, with directions to open up communication through to Greenville, East Tennessee. The object in leaving the cavalry on the other side of the mountains being to obstruct, intercept, or disperse any troops of the enemy going south, and to capture trains.

General Gillem followed the directions given him, and marched on Ashville, with Miller's brigade, but was opposed at Swannano Gap by a considerable force of the enemy.

Leaving sufficient of his force to amuse them, with the balance he moved by way of Howard's Gap, gained the enemy's rear, and surprised and captured his artillery; after which he made his appearance in front of Ashville, where he was met by a flag of truce on the twenty-third, with the intelligence of the truce existing between Generals Sherman and Johnston, and bearing an order from General Sherman to General Stoneman, for the latter to go to the railroad station at Durham's, or Hillsboro', nearly two hundred miles distant, whereas the distance to Greenville, East Tennessee, was but sixty. Coming to the conclusion that the order was issued by General Sherman, under the impression that the cavalry division was still at Salisbury or Statesville, General Gillem determined to move to Greenville. The rebel General Martin, with whom he communicated under flag of truce, demanded the rendition of the artillery captured, which, of course, could not be granted, and in return General Gillem requested the rebel commander to furnish his troops with three days' rations, as by the terms of the armistice they were required to withdraw. Had it not been for this, Ashville and its garrison would have fallen into our hands.

Up to that period I had not been officially notified of the existence of any armistice between the forces of Generals Sherman and Johnston, and the information only reached me through my sub-commanders, Generals Wilson and Stoneman, from Macon, Georgia, and Greenville, East Tennessee, almost simultaneously. The question naturally arose in my mind, whether the troops acting under my direction by virtue of General Sherman's Special Field Orders No. 105, Series of 1864, directing me to assume control of all the forces of the Military Division of the Mississippi "not absolutely in the presence of

the General-in-chief," were to be bound by an armistice or agreement made at a distance of several hundred miles from where those troops were operating, and of which they were advised through an enemy, then in such straightened circumstances, that any ruse, honorable, at least in war, was likely to be practised by him to relieve himself from his difficult position.

Then, again, General Sherman was operating with a movable column beyond the limits of his territorial command, viz., the Military Division of the Mississippi, and far away from all direct communication with it, whereas "the troops not absolutely in the presence of the General-in-chief" were operating under special instructions, and not even in co-operation with General Sherman against Johnston; but, on the contrary, General Stoneman was dismantling the country to obstruct Lee's retreat, and General Wilson was moving independently in Georgia or co-operating with General Canby.

Before I could come to any conclusion how I should proceed under the circumstances, and without disrespect to my superior officer, General Sherman, Mr. Secretary Stanton telegraphed to me from Washington on the twenty-seventh of April, and through me to my sub-commanders, to disregard all orders except those coming from General Grant or himself, and to resume hostilities at once, sparing no pains to press the enemy firmly, at the same time notifying me that General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston had been disapproved.

Based on that notification the following dispositions were made with a view of capturing President Davis and party, who, on the cessation of the armistice, had started south from Charlotte, North Carolina, with an escort variously estimated at from five hundred to two thousand picked cavalry, to endeavor to make his way to the trans-Mississippi.

General Stoneman was directed to send the brigades of Miller, Brown, and Palmer, then in Western North Carolina, to concentrate at Anderson, South Carolina, and scout down the Savannah river to Augusta, Georgia, if possible, in search of the fugitives. General Gillem being absent, Colonel Palmer, Fifteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, took command of the expedition. By rapid marching they succeeded in reaching and crossing the Savannah river in advance of Davis, and so disposed the command as to effectually cut off his retreat toward Mississippi, and forced him to alter his route toward the Atlantic coast. General Wilson, at Macon, Georgia, was also notified of the action taken at Washington on General Sherman's negotiations with Johnston, and he was directed to resume hostilities at once—especially to endeavor to intercept Davis.

Scarcely were the above orders issued and in process of execution, when notification reached me of the surrender by Johnston of all the enemy's forces east of the Chattahoochee river. General Wilson received similar notification from General Sherman direct, through the

enemy's territory, and immediately took measures to receive the surrender of the enemy's establishments at Atlanta and Augusta, and to occupy those points, detailing for that purpose Brevet Major-General Upton, with his division. General McCook was sent with a force to occupy Tallahassee, Florida, and to receive the surrender of the troops in that vicinity. Thus a cordon of cavalry, more or less continuous, was extended across the State of Georgia from north-west to south-east, and communication established through the late so-called Southern Confederacy. With characteristic energy, Generals Wilson and Palmer had handbills printed and profusely circulated in all directions throughout the country, offering the President's reward for the apprehension of Davis, and nothing could exceed the watchfulness exhibited by their commands.

On the third of May, Davis dismissed his escort at Washington, Georgia, and accompanied by about half a dozen followers, set out to endeavor to pass our lines. Nothing definite was learned of the whereabouts of the fugitives until on the evening of the seventh of May, the First Wisconsin cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harndon commanding, with one hundred and fifty men, ascertained at Dublin, on the Oconee river, fifty-five miles south-east from Macon, that Davis and party had crossed the river at that point during the day, and had moved out on the Jacksonville road. At daylight on the eighth Colonel Harndon continued the pursuit, finding the camp occupied by Davis on the evening previous, between the forks of Alligator creek, which was reached just four hours after it had been vacated. The trail was pursued as far as the ford over Gum Swamp creek, Pulaski county, when darkness rendered it too indistinct to follow, and the command encamped for the night, having marched forty miles that day.

On the ninth Colonel Harndon pushed on to the Ocmulgee river, crossed at Brown's ferry, and went to Abbeville, where he ascertained Davis' train had left that place at one A. M. that same day, and had gone toward Irwinsville, in Irwin county. With this information Colonel Harndon moved rapidly on toward the latter town, halting within a short distance of it to wait for daylight, in order to make certain of the capture.

Before leaving Abbeville, Colonel Harndon, learning of the approach, from the direction of Hawkinsville, of the Fourth Michigan cavalry, Colonel Pritchard commanding, went to meet that officer, and informed him of his close pursuit of Davis, Colonel Pritchard stating in reply that he had been sent to Abbeville also, to watch for Davis. After Colonel Harndon's departure, Colonel Pritchard, with part of his command, started for Irwinsville by a more direct route than that used by the detachment of the First Wisconsin, arriving at Irwinsville at two A. M. on the tenth, where, on inquiry, it was ascertained that there was a camp about a mile from

town on the other road leading to Abbeville. Approaching cautiously, for fear it might be our own men, Colonel Pritchard sent a dismounted party to interpose between it and Abbeville, and then waited for daylight to move forward and surprise the occupants. Daylight appearing, a rapid advance was made, and the encampment surprised, resulting in the capture of Jefferson Davis and family, John H. Reagan, postmaster-general of the so-called Confederacy, two aides-de-camp, the private secretary of Davis, four other officers, and eleven enlisted men.

Almost immediately after the completion of the above movement, Colonel Harndon's men coming down the Abbeville road were hailed by the party sent out during the night by Colonel Pritchard to secure the capture of the camp, and on being challenged answered "Friends," but fell back, under the impression they had come upon an enemy; whereupon shots were exchanged before the real position of affairs could be ascertained, resulting in the loss on one side of two men killed and one wounded, and of three wounded on the other. Considerable feeling was caused by the manner in which the Fourth Michigan effected the apprehension of Davis, to the detriment of Colonel Harndon's party, but great credit is justly due and should be given to the First Wisconsin cavalry for the persistency of its pursuit, and it is only to be regretted they did not arrive on the ground in time to reap the benefit of their labors. For the full particulars of the operations of both detachments I have the pleasure of referring you to the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Harndon, First Wisconsin, and Captain Hathaway, Fourth Michigan.

With the surrender of Johnston's army to General Sherman all the detachments of the Confederate armies east of the Chattahoochee signified their willingness to surrender, except a few guerrilla bands who were outlawed, special directions being given to grant all such no quarter. On the seventh of May notification was received by me, *via* Eastport and Meridian, Mississippi, of the surrender of General Taylor's army to General Canby, at Citronnella, Alabama, on the fourth. No armed force of the enemy east of the Mississippi remaining to interfere, I gave orders for the occupation by my forces of such portions of the reclaimed territory as it was necessary to hold while telegraphic and railroad communication was being restored, to the accomplishment of which the people of the country zealously gave their assistance.

May sixteenth General Grant, through his Chief of Staff, General Rawlins, directed me to order to some point north of the Tennessee river all of Wilson's cavalry except four thousand veterans, who are to remain at Macon, Augusta, and Atlanta, Georgia; those returning to be concentrated at some convenient point in Tennessee or Kentucky, preparatory to being mustered out or otherwise disposed of. All convalescents and others about the hospitals

throughout my command not requiring medical treatment have, by virtue of General Orders No. 77, been mustered out of service. The quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance departments have all been reduced to the smallest scale consistent with the demands of the service. During the past three months the defences of all the posts within my command have been thoroughly inspected by Brigadier-General Tower, Inspector of Fortifications, Military Division of the Mississippi, whose reports, with drawings attached, I have the honor to forward herewith.

For detailed accounts of the operations of the commands of Generals Stoneman and Wilson I invite the attention of the Lieutenant-General commanding to the reports of those officers, as well as to those of their subordinates, Generals Gillem, Palmer, and others. They have brought

the cavalry arm of the service to a state of efficiency unequalled in other armies, for long and difficult marches through the enemy's country, and particularly for self-reliance and fortitude in assaulting strong positions which might well cause hesitation in veteran infantry.

Herewith I have the honor to forward the report of Brevet Brigadier-General J. G. Parkhurst, Provost Marshal General of my command, giving the number of prisoners and deserters registered at his office during the period of which the foregoing treats.

I am, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.
Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, U. S. A.

Report of Prisoners of War received at the office of the Provost Marshal General, Department of the Cumberland, from January 21 to May 31, (inclusive,) 1865.

CAPTURED.	RANKS.								NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	PRIVATE.
	COLONEL.	LEUTENANT-COLONEL.	MAJOR.	CAPTAIN.	LEUTENANT.	SERGEANT.	ASSAULT-SERGEANT.	CHAPLAIN.		
January 1 to 31.....			1	2	6				5	85
February.....			1	2	6				17	102
March.....		2	1	3	6	3	1	1	9	98
April.....	1		3	17	28				61	584
May.....				3	10				8	60
Total.....	1	2	6	27	54	3	4	1	100	924
Grand total.....										1,123

Report of Rebel Deserters received at Nashville, Tennessee, from January 21 to May 9, (inclusive,) 1865.

RECEIVED.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.
January 21 to 31.....	18	365
February.....	23	786
March.....	23	608
April.....	18	578
May 1 to 9.....	8	334
Total.....	90	2,661
Grand total.....		2,751

Report of Rebel Deserters received and disposed of at Chattanooga office from January 21 to May 31, (inclusive,) 1865.

RECEIVED.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.
January 1 to 31.....	..	21
February.....	4	103
March.....	10	422
April.....	8	519
May.....	32	1,477
Total.....	54	2,542
Grand total.....		2,566

Report of Confederate Officers and Enlisted Men who voluntarily surrendered themselves, and who have taken the oath of allegiance and been allowed to return to their homes, from May 10 to 31, (inclusive,) 1865.

Officers.....	486
Enlisted men.....	3,559
Total.....	4,045

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL,
Nashville June 8, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded for the information of the Major-General Commanding.

J. G. PARKHURST,
Brevet Brigadier-General and Provost Marshal General, &c.

Official:

S. C. KELLOGG,
Brevet-Major and Aid-de-Camp.

Doc. 79.

OPERATIONS AGAINST GENERAL PRICE.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL ROSECRANS.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF MISSOURI,
St. Louis, December 7, 1864.

COLONEL: The Commanding General of the military division is already informed, by my current official despatches, of the principal incidents of the late campaign against Price in this department; but it is proper that I should submit a more detailed and connected report of the operations, for a correct understanding of their extent and the importance of the results.

From early in the Spring it was known, through the lodges of the O. A. K.'s and other rebel sources, that Price intended a great invasion of this State, in which he expected the co-operation of that order, and of rebels generally, and by which he hoped to obtain important military and political results. In pursuance of these plans, the lodges, with rebel recruiting officers and agents, sent into Missouri clandestinely or under cover of the amnesty oath for that purpose, began an insurrection in Platte county on the seventh of July last. From that time guerrilla warfare raged in the river counties, west from Calloway on the north, and from Cooper on the south side of the Missouri.

This department having been depleted of troops, permission was obtained to raise volunteers to meet the exigencies of our situation, and under it about five complete, and as many incomplete regiments of twelve-months volunteer infantry had been organized previously to the raid.

On the third of September General Washburn sounded the tocsin by information that the force under Shelby, at Batesville, Arkansas, was about to be joined by Price, for the invasion of our State. The ripening of the corn lent to this additional color of probability, so that on the sixth Major-General A. J. Smith, passing Cairo with a division of infantry on the way to General Sherman, I telegraphed General Halleck the state of affairs, requesting orders for this division to halt at that point and wait until we could ascertain the designs of the enemy.

The division was halted, and on the ninth General Smith received orders from General Halleck to "operate against Price & Co.;" but, deeming it impracticable to penetrate between one and two hundred miles into Arkansas with a small column of infantry, in pursuit of a large mounted force, the exact whereabouts as well as intentions of which were still unknown, he decided to move his command to a point near St. Louis, whence he could readily move by rail or river, and await Price's movements.

From that time information accumulated, showing the imminence of the raid. On the twenty-third we received certain information that Price had crossed the Arkansas with two divisions of mounted men, three batteries of

artillery, a large wagon train, carrying several thousand stand of small arms, and was at or near Batesville, on White river. From this point, midway between the Mississippi and the western boundary of the State, there are three practicable routes of invasion: one by Pocahontas, into South-eastern Missouri; another by West Plains and Rolla or vicinity, north, toward Jefferson City; a third by Cassville, north, either through Springfield and Sedalia, or by the Kansas border, to the Missouri river. Strong military reasons favored the movement of their main force by the central route, while a detachment should go by Pocahontas, and strip South-eastern Missouri. Under these circumstances my first object was to secure our great depots at Springfield and Rolla, the hay cut during the summer, and our train of government wagons, required to maintain the troops in the Springfield district. To do this, and, as far as possible, save the scanty agriculture of the country from devastation, it was necessary to hold both Springfield and Rolla. Indeed, to have abandoned these points would have been not only to abandon the loyal people of those districts and their property to destruction, but to invite the enemy to destroy our trains while moving them, capture our stores, and beat our troops in detail.

Generals Sanborn and McNeill were therefore informed and ordered to place the trains and public property of their districts under the protection of the fortifications of Springfield and Rolla, to put their forts in the best possible state of defence, using every foot and dismounted cavalry soldier, including citizens and local militia, to the best advantage, and with all their efficient mounted force to watch the enemy's motions, and report the earliest indications of the direction of the coming storm. General Brown was ordered to concentrate all the troops from the west of the central district at Sedalia, to notify the citizen-guards, and see that neither they nor their arms were exposed to capture.

On the twenty-fourth Shelby was reported south of Pilot Knob, moving toward Farmington, with five thousand men and four pieces of artillery. General Ewing was ordered to concentrate the troops in the southern part of his district at Pilot Knob and Cape Girardeau, and to verify the accuracy of this report, which proved true. On the twenty-sixth General A. J. Smith, with two of his brigades, was ordered to a point on the Iron Mountain railroad "as far toward Pilot Knob as he deemed compatible with certainty that his position could not be turned," and the "enemy get between him and St. Louis." On the day before Sanborn had orders to move, with all his mounted force, to Rolla, it having become evident that the enemy would not probably strike west of that point.

The safety of St. Louis was vital to us; I therefore telegraphed Brigadier-General H. E. Paine, commanding in Illinois, who promised me assistance from some regiments of returning "hundred-day volunteers," who, though they

had already served beyond their time, generously consented to come for the defence of the city. The enrolled militia of St. Louis, though but skeleton regiments, were called out, and the citizens also requested to organize and arm. General Ewing was sent to Pilot Knob, with directions to use his utmost exertions to find out whether any more than Shelby's division was in South-east Missouri, and to that end to hold Pilot Knob until he was certain. With a soldierly comprehension of the importance of his duties, while reporting the current rumors of the advance of Price with his whole force, he expressed his doubts, and held his position until the twenty-seventh, when he sustained a terrific assault in Fort Davidson, a small field-work in the valley, surrounded by hills within cannon range, which he held with about one thousand men, one half raw troops—establishing, beyond question, the presence of all Price's command in that quarter. He gloriously repulsed, killing and wounding some fifteen hundred of the enemy, and lost only twenty-eight killed and fifty-six wounded, as appears from his report herewith. While Ewing's fight was going on, Shelby advanced on Potosi, and thence to Big River bridge, threatening General Smith's advance, which withdrew from that point to within safer supporting distance of his main position at De Soto.

Previous to, and pending these events, the guerrilla warfare in North Missouri had been raging with redoubled fury. Rebel agents, amnesty oath-takers, recruits, sympathizers, O. A. K.'s, and traitors of every hue and stripe, had warmed into life at the approach of the great invasion. Women's fingers were busy making clothes for rebel soldiers out of goods plundered by the guerrillas; women's tongues were busy telling Union neighbors "their time was now coming." General Fisk, with all his force, had been scouring the brush for weeks in the river counties, in pursuit of hostile bands, composed largely of recruits from among that class of inhabitants who claim protection, yet decline to perform the full duties of citizens, on the ground that they "never tuck no sides." A few facts will convey some idea of this warfare carried on by Confederate agents here, while the agents abroad of their bloody and hypocritical despotism, Mason, Slidell, and Mann, in Europe, have the effrontery to tell the nations of Christendom our government carries on the war with increasing ferocity, regardless of the laws of civilized warfare. These gangs of rebels, whose families had been living in peace among their loyal neighbors, committed the most cold-blooded and diabolical murders, such as riding up to a farm-house, asking for water, and, while receiving it, shooting down the giver, an aged, inoffensive farmer, because he was a radical "Union man." In the single subdistrict of Mexico, the commanding officer furnished a list of near one hundred Union men who, in the course of six weeks, had been killed, maimed, or "run off," because they were radical

"Union men or d—d abolitionists." About the first of September, Anderson's gang attacked a railroad train on the North Missouri road, took from it twenty-two unarmed soldiers, many on sick-leave, and, after robbing, placed them in a row and shot them in cold blood. Some of the bodies they scalped, and put others across the track and ran the engine over them. On the twenty-seventh this gang, with numbers swollen to three or four hundred, attacked Major Johnson, with about one hundred and twenty men of the Thirty-ninth Missouri volunteer infantry, raw recruits, and, after stampeding their horses, shot every man, most of them in cold blood. Anderson, a few days later, was recognized by General Price, at Boonville, as a Confederate captain, and, with a verbal admonition to behave himself, ordered, by Colonel McLane, chief of Price's staff, to proceed to North Missouri and destroy the railroads, which orders were found on the miscreant when killed by Lieutenant-Colonel Cox, about the twenty-seventh of October ultimo.

On the twenty-eighth, when information of Ewing's fight and Price's presence at Pilot Knob came to hand, General Smith, discovering the enemy in his front, moving to west and north, in pursuance of his orders to hold the most advanced position compatible with the certainty of keeping between the enemy and St. Louis, determined to leave De Soto and retire behind the Meramec, a stream which, at from ten to fifteen miles south of St. Louis, offered considerable obstacles to the passage of a hostile force with wagons and artillery. General Ewing, finding Marmaduke's and Fagan's rebel divisions before him, and his position commanded by a numerically superior artillery, acting on suggestions made when discussing with him the possibilities of the position on the night of the twenty-seventh, spiked his heavy guns, blew up the magazine, ammunition and supplies, and, with the field battery and remains of his command, retreated through the hills toward the Meramec valley, hoping to reach a point on the railroad from whence he could move to St. Louis. But, as will be seen from his report, the enemy pursued him, harassed his rear on the march, which he directed along a ridge where the enemy could not flank him, and overtook him near Harrison's station, where, seizing and extending the temporary defences constructed by the militia, he displayed such vigor that, after harassing him for thirty-six hours, and making several attacks, on the approach of a detachment of Sanborn's cavalry, the rebels left him, and he escaped, with all his command, to Rollo. The enemy's strength and position thus developed, my first business was to secure the points he best could strike—St. Louis, Jefferson City, and Rolla. General Smith's four thousand five hundred infantry, and the mounted force we could raise—Seventh Kansas, just in from Memphis, part of the Thirtieth Missouri volunteer cavalry, Colonel Catherwood, and the recruits of Merrill's Horse, hastily mounted and

organized, a total of fifteen hundred men—were all the force we could place between St. Louis and an invading army of at least fifteen thousand mounted men, whose advance was within a day's march of the city. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Pike, ably seconded by Generals Wolfe and Miller, of the Enrolled Missouri militia, had assembled and armed skeletons of the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh, Thirteenth, and Fifty-second regiments of enrolled militia. The Mayor and others, under the direction of the Hon. B. Gratz Brown and Major Ledergerber, organized the citizens exempt from militia duty, who volunteered for the defence of the city, into companies and regiments, numbering, by the thirtieth, some four or five thousand men. The One Hundred and Thirty-second, One Hundred and Thirty-fourth, One Hundred and Thirty-eighth, One Hundred and Fortieth, and One Hundred and Forty-second Illinois hundred-day volunteers also began to arrive on the thirtieth, and were all in by October first, and formed into a brigade, under Colonel Wangelin, for the immediate defence of the city, beyond which they did not wish to serve, as all of them were over time, and many having desirable offers as substitutes.

The enemy, moving up by Potosi, seemed to halt at Richwoods, about four miles south-west of St. Louis, in the hills between Big River and the Meramec, as if concentrating for an attack on the city. This appeared the more possible from the magnitude of his interest in it, and the fact that he did not show much force in the Meramec valley, even on the thirtieth. On that day Major-General Smith was ordered to occupy Kirkwood, which commands the Richwoods road and crossing of the Meramec to St. Louis, his cavalry to reconnoitre south and west, Colonel Merrill going as far as Franklin.

General Fisk, previously ordered to join General Brown with all his available force, reached and reported from Jefferson City to-day. At the close of it, news came that a brigade of rebel cavalry had burned the Moselle bridge, and were moving north toward Franklin. General Smith was ordered to send a brigade of infantry to support the cavalry at that point, and on the first of October Colonel Wolfe, with his brigade, reached Franklin, and, after a sharp skirmish, drove the enemy from the place, but not until he had burned the depot.

The rebels were now apparently at bay, with fifteen hundred cavalry and four thousand five hundred infantry. General Smith was not in condition to attempt offensive movements against a force of fifteen thousand veteran mounted rebels, who could reach St. Louis from any point in the Meramec valley, where he might confront them, in half the time it would take his infantry to reach it. Our obvious policy, under these circumstances, was to keep as close as possible to the enemy, without risking St. Louis, until General Mower's command should arrive from Arkansas, or at least we be able to

join to Smith's our mounted forces at Rolla. Every hour's delay of the enemy in the Meramec valley brought Mower nearer, and increased our chance of striking him, as it did the security of Jefferson City. On the second the enemy was reported massing in the vicinity of Union, on the road either to Jefferson City or Rolla, and General Smith was ordered to Franklin. But as the enemy's movements appeared to tend westward, on the third General Smith was advanced to Gray's Summit, and General Pike moved to Franklin. On the fourth General Smith pushed his cavalry toward the Gasconade, advanced his infantry to Union, followed up by General Pike's militia. On the fifth Price's command took Herman, burned the Gasconade bridge, and was crossing that stream at the old State road ford. General Smith followed him. General Mower reported his arrival at Girardeau, out of supplies, his teams worn down, part of his cavalry dismounted, and many horses unshod. Transports and supply-boats were at once despatched, and on the eighth and ninth his command reached St. Louis, from whence the infantry was pushed forward by water as rapidly as the low stage of the river would permit, to join General Smith. The cavalry under Winslow re-shod and started by land from St. Louis on the tenth, toward Jefferson City, which point it reached on the sixteenth instant, one day in advance of the infantry.

On the sixth, the enemy began crossing the Osage at Castle Rock and one or two other fords under cover of his artillery, opposed by Colonel Phillips with the available cavalry at Jefferson City. While thus engaged, Generals McNeill and Sanborn reached Jefferson City, by a forced march, with all the mounted force from Rolla, and uniting with Fisk and Brown, gave us a garrison there of four thousand one hundred cavalry and two thousand six hundred infantry, mostly the new and partially organized twelve months' men, with a few citizens and militia. As this force, though capable of giving a strong battle behind intrenchments, was not very formidable to act offensively against a veteran force like that of the enemy, it was decided by General Fisk, the other three Generals concurring, to oppose a moderate resistance to the enemy's advance across the Moreau, a small stream with muddy banks and bad bottom, four or five miles east of the city, and then to retire and receive his attack at the defensive line, which with industry and good judgment had been prepared by the entire laboring force, civil and military, at Jefferson City. The enemy burned the Osage bridge and crossed the river on the sixth.

On the seventh, he advanced on the city, crossed the Moreau, after sharp fighting, and developed a line of battle three or four miles long, east, south, and west of the place. But after reconnoitering its apparently formidable intrenchments, warned by his Pilot Knob experience in storming earthworks, he declined attacking, and, passing his train in rear, moved

around, massing on the west, and finally retiring.

On the eighth, General Pleasanton, on his arrival at Jefferson, under orders to assume command, despatched General Sanborn with all the available cavalry, four thousand one hundred men, to follow and harass the enemy until General Smith's command could come up. General Smith was informed of the rebel failure at Jefferson, and directed to move by the most expeditious route to that place, where Mower's infantry were to join and the cavalry overtake him. He was to send all his cavalry, under Colonel Catherwood, in advance to report to Pleasanton, who, on its arrival, was to join Sanborn and assume direction of the provisional cavalry division thus formed. General Pike, with his militia, was charged with the control of the country and the defences of our line of communication from St. Louis to Jefferson City. Sanborn followed the rebels, attacked their rear guard at Versailles, where it was uncertain what course they would take; found they were going north toward Boonville, followed and drove them into line of battle near that place, and, when he found himself nearly enveloped by their entire army, fell back out of their reach to meet Catherwood's command and his provisions, which both arrived at California on the fourteenth. The enemy, taking advantage of this, crossed the Lamine at Scott's and Dug fords, and moved north toward Arrow Rock. Sanborn immediately followed this movement by Georgetown bridge, keeping between the Pacific railroad and the line of the enemy's march, and holding the line of the Blackwater, a western tributary of the Lamine, while Price, crossing a part of Shelby's command at Arrow Rock, on the Boonville ferry-boat, to the north side of the river, advanced on Glasgow, which he captured after a seven hours' fight with a part of Colonel Harding's regiment, Forty-third Missouri volunteer infantry, and small detachments of the Ninth Missouri State militia and Seventeenth Illinois cavalry.

On the seventeenth our cavalry, following his westward movement, keeping south of, without pressing him, until General Smith's and Mower's troops could be brought up, kept the line of the Blackwater, and on the seventeenth reported themselves out of supplies, and the enemy between Marshall and Waverley.

On the seventeenth, Mower's infantry, except two small regiments, arrived at Jefferson City, and went at once by rail to Lamine bridge to join General Smith, who, passing Jefferson by land on the fourteenth, had followed the cavalry movement to that point, taking charge of the supplies, which, in consequence of the destruction of the bridge by the rebels, could go by rail no further. Winslow's cavalry, marching, reached Jefferson, the advance twenty miles beyond, at California, on the sixteenth, and was ordered to join General Pleasanton without delay.

On the eighteenth, General Smith was ordered

to move to Dunksburg, near the cavalry headquarters, taking five days' rations, and leaving minimum garrisons to guard and handle stores at Sedalia and Lamine bridge.

The nineteenth found the movement accomplished, the cavalry with its centre near Cook's store, its right behind the Blackwater, and its left near Kirkpatrick's mills, toward Warrensburg. The enemy apparently hesitated in the vicinity of Marshall, as if uncertain whether to go west or double on his tracks between Sedalia and Jefferson; but our cavalry advance, receding a few miles to meet supplies and concentrate, on the seventeenth and eighteenth, seemed to decide his movement toward Lexington, where General Curtis telegraphed me on the nineteenth the head of his column had arrived, General Blunt, after a sharp skirmish, retiring toward Independence. I informed General Curtis of our position; that our troops reported Price near Waverley; advised that Blunt check his advance at Wellington, and as soon as we were sure his main force was moving on Lexington, we would endeavor, by a forced march, to strike him in the flank.

To ascertain Price's real intentions, General Pleasanton was directed to make a strong reconnaissance toward Waverley. The results of this reached me on the morning of the twentieth, and Pleasanton was directed at once to push the centre of his cavalry to Lexington, and General Smith, with his infantry, to support the movement. At seven p. m., Pleasanton reported the enemy had left Lexington, going west, McNeill and Sanborn entering the town.

October twenty-first our cavalry advance followed the enemy to Fire Creek Prairie, Brown's and Winslow's brigades reaching Lexington at two o'clock p. m., and the infantry at nine p. m. of the same day. General Curtis also reported a fight with the enemy's entire force at the Little Blue from ten a. m. to two p. m., and that to prevent being flanked he should retire to the Big Blue, where his militia and artillery were in strong position. Supposing the enemy could not cross the Big Blue in the face of Curtis, I despatched General Pleasanton my belief that he would move south, and that while McNeill's brigade should harass his rear, he, with the other three brigades, should move toward Lone Jack, near which would be General Smith's infantry, now marching from Lexington to Chapel Hill. At ten o'clock e. m., a despatch from Pleasanton informed me of the receipt of these conditional orders, and that the enemy, in full force, were moving far to the west, followed by his cavalry.

October twenty-second, Pleasanton's cavalry reached the Little Blue at ten a. m.; found the bridge destroyed; a temporary one was constructed, the enemy's skirmishers driven, the command crossed, when the enemy opened with artillery, and was steadily driven toward Independence, which place was taken by a brilliant cavalry charge, in which Catherwood's regiment captured two guns complete. Near a hundred

prisoners fell into our hands, and our troops pushed the enemy's rear guard all night. At eight p. m., Pleasonton reports, "All my brigades have been engaged. The enemy have left forty killed, and many sick and wounded in my hands. Heard nothing from Curtis. If Smith can come up in case we get a fight, it will be well. Have sent McNeill's brigade to Little Santa Fé. Price is reported intrenched this side of the Big Blue. Fighting still going on with an obstinate rear-guard. Let Smith come to this place." Reluctantly General Smith was despatched to move to Independence, as requested, the messenger reaching him at Chapel Hill as he was putting his column in motion to march there in response to a direct message from General Pleasonton, advising him of the posture of affairs.

On the morning of the twenty-third Pleasonton began to move on the enemy at the crossing of the Big Blue, where the fight opened at seven a. m. and continued until one p. m. when Shelby, who had been fighting General Curtis' command, finding Marmaduke and Fagen were giving way, turned on Pleasonton, and "for a moment shook Sanborn's brigade," but by the skilful use of Thurber's battery, throwing double-shotted grape and canister, and the gallant charging of our troops, they were routed and fled southward, pushed by Generals Pleasonton and Curtis that night beyond Little Santa Fé.

General Smith's command arriving at Independence at five p. m., was ordered to move that night by a forced march to Hickman's mill, hoping it would strike the enemy in flank while passing that point. Had he been ordered and marched for that point instead of Independence the day before, General Smith would have arrived in time to strike the enemy's compact columns and train with nine thousand infantry and five batteries. But it was too late. He did not reach the mill until long after not only the enemy's, but our own columns had passed there. News from the cavalry fronts during the night showed that nothing remained but to push the enemy with our cavalry, allowing the infantry to follow as best it could, to act as support in case of possible reverse to us, or reinforcements which were currently reported on their way to meet the enemy.

On the twenty-fourth, with the Kansas troops in advance, we pursued the enemy until within fifteen miles of the trading post, when, at General Curtis' request, General Pleasonton's command took the lead, and at the end of sixty miles' march overtook the rebels about midnight at the Marias des Cygnes: began skirmishing, and on the twenty-fifth, at four a. m., opened on their bivouac with artillery, creating the greatest consternation, following it up by an attack which drove them promptly from the field, leaving in our hands horses, mules, wagons, arms, and some prisoners. Our troops followed them in a running fight until two o'clock p. m., when they came up with them at the Little Osage

crossing, in position, with eight pieces of artillery on their line of battle. With the instinct of a true cavalry general, Pleasonton immediately ordered an attack by Benteen's and Phillips' brigades, which by a magnificent charge completely routed them, capturing eight guns, two stands of colors, Major-General Marmaduke, Brigadier-General Cabell, five colonels, other officers, and near one thousand prisoners, besides wagons, small arms, &c. Sanborn's brigade, which was a mile and a half behind, and the Kansas troops, still further in rear, did not arrive in time to take part in the battle; but Sanborn's brigade led in the pursuit of the routed enemy, overtook them at a small stream a few miles beyond the battleground, charged them in the timber, drove them across it into the open prairie, where they formed in order of battle three lines deep. But such was the enthusiasm of the men of this brigade, when they reached the edge of the wood and saw this triple line, they charged it without orders, knocked it in pieces, and chased the fugitives until night closed the pursuit, and the enemy fled under cover of the darkness, toward the Arkansas border. Besides the wagons captured during this day at the Marias des Cygnes, on the way to and at the Little Osage, the enemy had destroyed many, including ammunition wagons, and for twenty-five or thirty miles beyond the Osage battlefield their route was strewn with debris of burning wagons and other property. Pleasonton's cavalry had now been in motion almost day and night for six days, during which it had marched at least two hundred and four miles and fought four battles. It was pretty well exhausted and broken down, and went into Fort Scott that night for food and a little rest. He reported to me the result of his day's work—that the enemy was going at his utmost, and his own troops were so broken down it would be impossible, without fresh horses, to strike the enemy another great blow this side of the Arkansas, and recommended that Generals Sanborn and McNeill follow, to support Curtis' troops in pursuit, so long as there was any prospect of damaging the enemy, and then return to Springfield and Rolla.

On the receipt of the news of the enemy's rout, General Smith, whose command was out of provisions, was directed to move to Harrisonville, and thence get supplies from Warrensburg, where one hundred wagons were waiting with provisions for our command, sending thirty thousand rations to the cavalry. Further reports of the enemy's condition satisfied me there would be no use in breaking down any more of our horses, since General Curtis, whose cavalry horses were fresher than ours, supported by Sanborn and McNeill, on their way down the State line, would be more than ample to deal with any resistance Price's command would offer this side of the Arkansas.

Orders were accordingly given, and General Pleasonton returned with Phillips' brigade, the

cannon, and part of the prisoners, to Warrensburg. The Kansas troops and Benteen's brigade pursued the enemy's flying columns, a part of whom made their last stand at Newtonia, Missouri, where General Blunt overtook and attacked them on the twenty-eighth, but was being worsted when Sanborn, having marched one hundred and two miles in thirty-six hours, arrived in time to save the day. The enemy fled, making no further stand this side of the Arkansas. In a country destitute of food for man and beast, five times defeated, pursued four or five hundred miles, with the loss of nearly all their artillery, ammunition, and baggage train, demoralization and destitution and want of supplies, would the rebels cross the Arkansas for supplies at the risk of falling into the hands of Thayer's forces or Steele's cavalry; and if allowed, would almost disintegrate and disband them on the way thither.

General Curtis thought pushing them was best, and accordingly followed, although he did not again overtake them. At his urgent instance, against my own judgment as well as that of Generals Sanborn and McNeill, I pushed their two brigades down to the Arkansas border, whence Sanborn sent an advance to Fort Smith, reaching there on the morning of the eighth, to notify General Thayer of the enemy's desperate condition, and the direction he had taken from Cane Hill toward the Indian nation, between Fort Smith and Fort Gibson.

Meanwhile, at Sherman's request, followed by orders from the General-in-chief, I directed Major-General A. J. Smith to move his command by the most expeditious route to the Mississippi, in the vicinity of St. Louis, there to embark and proceed to Nashville and report to Major-General George H. Thomas.

On the third of November I returned to St. Louis, to be there during the election, and on the receipt of the news of the enemy having crossed the Arkansas, directed the cavalry to repair to their respective districts, and Winslow's cavalry to move by the best route and join General Thomas at Nashville.

In entering into details, I have aimed to give the General Commanding a sort of military photograph of our daily condition and movements, as well for his critical judgment as for history, omitting events, of whatever magnitude, not having a bearing on our movements, and most of the minor ones which did enter into their determination. I trust that the precautions taken in advance of Price's movements; the preparations before we knew where he was coming; the means taken to secure our most important points, and occupy them until we could concentrate the forces to strike him with a certainty of success, outweighing any damage he could meanwhile do us; the energy and activity in concentration; vigor in pursuit and fiery gallantry of our troops in battle, will receive the approbation of the General Commanding the military division.

It will appear from these details and accompanying reports that our dismounted cavalry, infantry, and militia nobly performed their duty, watching, marching, and fighting whenever and wherever opportunity offered; that by their aid in holding our depots and supporting our mounted force, we have saved all our important posts, and most of the country from pillage, except a belt of some twenty miles wide along the route of the invasion, and with less than seven thousand effective cavalry have pursued; overtaken, beaten in several engagements, and finally routed an invading cavalry, variously estimated at from fifteen thousand to twenty-six thousand men, reinforced by six thousand armed recruits from Missouri; taking from them ten pieces of artillery, two stands of colors, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-eight prisoners of war, a large number of horses, mules, wagons, and small-arms; compelled them to destroy most of their remaining wagons, train, and plunder, blasted all the political schemes of the rebels and traitors who concerted with Price to revolutionize Missouri, destroy Kansas, and turn the State and Presidential election against the Union cause, and by our triumph in the late elections have given to gallant and suffering Missouri the fairest prospect she has ever yet seen of future freedom, peace, and prosperity—all the fruit of a campaign of forty-eight days, in which most of our victorious troops had never before seen a great cavalry battle. Rarely, during this or any other war, has cavalry displayed more persevering energy in pursuit, more impetuous courage and gallantry in attacking, regardless of superior numbers, or had its efforts crowned with greater fruits of success.

While paying a just tribute of thanks to all the officers and soldiers of the cavalry, artillery, infantry, militia, and citizen guards, who served during the raid, for their prompt and cheerful obedience to all orders, whether to labor, march, or fight, I must refer to the accompanying reports of their commanders for special mention of individual gallantry. Major-General Pleasonton deserves the thanks of the country for the able manner in which he handled and fought the cavalry, and for the brilliant and fruitful victories he won over triple his own force. I hope he may receive promotion in the Regular Army. Major-General A. J. Smith deserves thanks for promptitude, energy, and perseverance in all his movements, and for the good judgment displayed in his campaign. Nor must I omit a tribute of admiration to those brave and true soldiers, who, under Mower, followed Price from Arkansas, marching three hundred miles in eighteen days, and after going by boat from Cape Girardeau to Jefferson City, resumed the pursuit, making another march of four hundred and sixty-two miles before they embarked for Nashville, to take part in the not doubtful contest before that city for the mastery of Middle Tennessee. The district commanders all deserve my thanks for prompt and cordial co-

operation in all measures precautionary and preparatory for the raid.

General Ewing deserves special mention for military judgment, courage and gallantry in holding Pilot Knob till he had certainty of the enemy's force, as well as for the manner in which he withdrew his troops to Rolla. Gen-McNeill, for promptitude and energy in putting Rolla in a state of defence, and for moving with all force to Jefferson City in time to succor it; General Fisk, for the prompt and cheerful discharge of very trying administrative duties, and for his energy and good sense in preparing the defence of Jefferson City, as in the subsequent repair of Lamine bridge. General Brown displayed energy and good sense in preparing the city for a good defence, and General Sanborn for vigilance, energy and soldierly judgment, while commanding the cavalry advance between Jefferson City and Dunksburg, as well as throughout the campaign. Colonel J. V. Dubois, aid-de-camp, chief of staff; Captain Henry, assistant quartermaster, of General Steele's staff, volunteer staff quartermaster in the field; Captain G. Schull, chief commissary; Surgeon P. V. Schenck, medical director in the field; Captain Hoelcke, acting aid-de-camp, engineer; Major Fisher, Fifth Missouri State Militia, on engineer duty; Captain J. F. Bennett, assistant adjutant-general, and my personal aids, Major F. S. Bond, aid-de-camp, Captain R. S. Thomas, aid-de-camp, and Captain Hills, Twelfth Kansas Militia, provost-marshal, accompanied me during the campaign, and were zealous and indefatigable in the discharge of their respective duties; Major McDermott, First Iowa cavalry, who, with his battalion of First Iowa cavalry, did such good service in North Missouri, and behaved very gallantly in the pursuit of the rebels from Jefferson City to Boonville, commanded the escort from Sedalia, and deserves honorable mention. Brigadier-General J. B. Gray, Adjutant-General of Missouri, and Brigadier-General Pike, of the enrolled, are entitled to public thanks for their valuable and indefatigable services in connection with the enrolled militia. Colonel F. J. Haines, commissary of subsistence, to whom all the armies, as well as the country, owe a debt of gratitude for invaluable services, not likely to be overpaid, displayed his usual promptitude and foresight in providing for the wants of our troops and depots. Colonel William Myers, chief quartermaster, in supplying animals, fitting up trains, and providing for the wants of our troops, exhibited his characteristic care and skill.

I must also mention the voluntary services of those tried veterans, Colonel Wangelin, of the Twelfth Missouri volunteer infantry, and Colonel Laibold, who did all in their power to aid in the defence of St. Louis.

Senator B. Gratz Brown and Mayor Thomas, seconded by the efforts of many patriotic citizens of all classes, did much to prepare for the defence of the city, and deserve my thanks. I should be glad to call the General's attention

to many militia officers, such as General Craig, whose able management in the North-west, in the absence of General Fisk; Colonel Gale, who so promptly organized his militia regiment, Fifty-fourth E. M. M., at Franklin, and many others scattered over the State, who rendered great service to the country.

But as the chief motive of these officers and the men of their commands was their country's good, the consciousness of duty manfully performed must be their chief reward, until the day comes when our children, pointing to them as to others who have borne arms in this great national struggle, shall say, "there go some of the men who helped to save our nation."

The accompanying reports show our total losses in this campaign were: One hundred and seventy killed, of whom one hundred and sixteen were murdered at Centralia; three hundred and thirty-six wounded; one hundred and seventy-one prisoners, of whom, many, if not all, are illegally paroled; six hundred and eighty-one *hors de combat*. Besides which, there were several small squads of prisoners illegally captured and paroled in South-east Missouri, and the troops at Glasgow, whose surrender was, I think, justifiable, and possibly lawful.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel CHRISTIANSON,
Assistant Adjutant-General,
Military Division West Mississippi, New Orleans, La.

Doc. 80.

BATTLE OF NEWMARKET, VA.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR STRASBURG, }
Tuesday, May 16, 1864.

A portion of the Army of Western Virginia, under General Sigel, started at five o'clock, A. M., yesterday, from Woodstock, marched eighteen miles to Newmarket, and fought the combined forces of Echols and Imboden, under Breckinridge, for four hours, and returned to this place, thirty miles—making forty-eight miles marching, and four hours' fighting, all in thirty-eight hours.

General Sigel sent out from Woodstock, where he lay encamped for several days, (during a rain of four days), a force which he thought sufficient to whip Imboden, under Colonel Moore, of the Twenty-eighth Ohio.

He attacked Imboden at Rood's Hill, two miles south of Mount Jackson, and drove him to Newmarket, and then Breckinridge and Echols reinforced him, just as General Sigel reinforced Colonel Moore. In fact, all of our troops did not arrive until the fight was over.

The rebels were just forming to charge Moore's battery, as our forces came on the field. Our drenched and jaded men were hurried on as fast as possible. The first charge was repulsed, and we rapidly formed a second line, half a mile in rear of the first.

Their second charge was successful, and drove our line back. They then came down on

our second line like an avalanche. They outnumbered us two to one, and came up in three lines in splendid style. When within two hundred yards they raised a cheer, and came on at the double-quick. We met them with seventeen pieces of artillery, loaded with grape and canister, the infantry pouring in a most destructive fire. Their first line was almost annihilated. We charged in turn, and drove them back. Our batteries had to cease firing when we charged. It was then that their numbers told on us. They drove us back in turn. Our guns were worked until the last moment, losing five, the horses having been killed or the wheels broken.

Then commenced our retreat, which was conducted in good order. The lesson they learned in charging our second line, made them cautious as they again advanced. The artillery opened on them from our third line, formed in the vicinity of Mount Jackson, and composed of troops which had just arrived, and caused them to pause in front of the hill where our artillery (composed of 6 and 12-pounders), was planted and worked with marked effect on the rebel ranks. We retired a battery at a time, and finally brought all off. Our forces were then quietly withdrawn two miles across the Shenandoah, which was flood-height from the excessive rains. It fairly poured while the battle raged hottest. The bridge was burned after our army had all crossed over, and the day closed upon our men, jaded and worn out with excessive marching and hard fighting, but in the best of spirits, and eager to resume the contest.

Colonel Starr, Provost-Marshal General of the department, had a narrow escape. A shell struck the ground under his horse's neck, but fortunately it did not explode. His horse at the same moment was shot from under him, and, in attempting to mount a riderless one, a squadron of our retreating men ran over him—without, however, doing him any serious injury.

Among the killed is Captain Boniker, formerly Post Provost-Marshal at Cumberland, who fell at the head of his command. He was universally esteemed and respected by every one in this department.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lincoln, Thirty-fourth Massachusetts, was wounded and left on the battlefield.

Colonel Wells, of Massachusetts, had a narrow escape. His clothes were pierced with four bullets.

Our engagement may be summed up as follows: We underrated the strength of the enemy at Newmarket, and sent out an insufficient force under Colonel Moore. At Rood's Hill he met Imboden, who, on the approach of our force, gradually fell back to Newmarket, skirmishing all the way with our advance, and drawing them after him. At Newmarket he was reinforced by Echols. They evidently intended to draw him into their lines sufficiently far removed from his supports, and then, with an overwhelming force attack and capture his command. In this they were defeated, for Col-

onel Moore succeeded in holding his ground until the main column under General Sigel arrived.

After a severe fight of four hours' duration, it was evident they outnumbered us two to one. So we fell back to our supply train, where a portion of our troops were stationed.

Doc. 81.

EXPEDITION ON THE POTOMAC.

HEADQUARTERS, 8D BRIG., 3D DIV., 24TH A. C.,
ARMY GUNBOAT CHAMBERLAIN,
POINT LOOKOUT, VA., [Md.] March 13, 1865.

GENERAL: In my report of March ninth, I had the honor to state my intention of starting the next morning for the Potomac and the vicinity of Coan river. The Northerner, being too unwieldy for the service required, was exchanged for the Massachusetts and the Pioneer. This change, together with the coaling, delayed me until the eleventh instant, at which date the expedition again left Fortress Monroe at eight A. M. We reached Piney Point, just above the St. Mary's river, at dusk, and waited there for the slower boats to close up. It was my intention to land at Machodoc bay, and march first on the village of Montrose, but there being no place where troops could be landed rapidly, the plan was changed, and at five A. M. the next day we sailed up the Yocomico river, and landed at Kinsale. The first boat load of cavalry was sent out at once, and met the rebel cavalry pickets a mile from the village. The second boat load of cavalry were hurried out, and at about ten o'clock were followed by the infantry and ambulances. The route agreed upon was through a place called the Hague, and thence to Warsaw. The rebel cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Chapman, of Mosby's command, were constantly hovering about our column, and being splendidly mounted, and familiar with the roads, were able to avoid a collision with anything more than our advance and rear guard. About a mile from the Hague they made a slight stand, but were driven by our charge, and chased into the village. At every cross-roads the enemy would separate, each squad taking a different path, until our cavalry found themselves pursuing only three men. These were captured and sent back toward the main column, but were retaken, together with a portion of their guard, on the way. Nothing was found at the Hague of any value. At the point where the skirmish commenced, there was a blacksmith's shop and quite an extensive wheelwright's establishment. These, with a granary containing five hundred bushels of wheat, were burned. I now decided to return. I could have marched through in any direction, but it seemed unwise to continue the risk of occasionally losing a few men, when the damage inflicted on the enemy was so trifling, and the results secured so unsubstantial. Four small storehouses, filled with grain, tobacco, and bacon, were destroyed, and

twenty-six head of cattle and fifty sheep were driven before us on our march back to Kinsale. Abundant rations of fresh meat were issued to the troops, and at eleven p. m. I ordered a portion of them to reëmbark. By three o'clock all were on board, and we dropped down to the mouth of the river, the army gunboats throwing a few shells as a farewell present to the rebels, who were concealed in the background of woods.

The casualties, which were all among the cavalry, were one commissioned officer and five enlisted men wounded. Five cavalymen were captured from us, including two of the wounded, and two of the enemy's men were captured and retained by us. Four citizens of suspicious antecedents, were also taken and brought away. The enemy followed us closely on our return, and twice charged our rear-guard, but were repulsed. It is not supposed that their loss was equal to ours. My prisoners I have turned over to the Provost-Marshal at Point Lookout, and my force is now on its way to the White House, as ordered. In closing my report, I desire to call to the notice of the Lieutenant-General commanding, the services of Captain James, Assistant Quartermaster at Fortress Monroe, who rendered me important aid with the utmost alacrity.

I enclose the report of Captain Harris, of the Mosswood, who was sent to patrol the Rappahannock during our operations on the north side of the river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. H. ROBERTS,

Colonel One Hundred and Thirty-ninth N. Y. Vols., Comd'g.

Brigadier-General J. A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-General Commanding.

U. S. A. GUNBOAT MOSSWOOD,
WHITE HOUSE, VA., March 14, 1865. }

CAPTAIN: In compliance with orders received from General Roberts, on the eleventh instant, I proceeded up the Rappahannock river as far as Urbanna, where I awaited the arrival of the other gunboats. During the night I picked up a darkey, who informed me that the enemy had three pieces of artillery near Lowry's Point. On the morning of the twelfth instant, I was signalled by the steamer Morse, that she had been attacked by a shore battery. I immediately got under way, steamed up the river, found the Morse out of range of the battery, but continuing a heavy fire with her 100-pounder Parrott. When within three quarters of a mile from the battery I opened fire, which they returned briskly, their shot going over and far beyond us. After a spirited engagement of one hour and fifteen minutes they were compelled to withdraw. I laid off and on, but finding that they did not reappear, I dropped down the river and anchored. The steamer Commodore Reed, Lieutenant-commander Hooker, then came in sight. Captain Hooker requested me to drop down the river and ascertain if there were any guns at Jones' Point, also to communicate with

your forces if possible. During the night I received orders to report at this place; where I arrived at four o'clock p. m.

I am much indebted to the naval forces for lying by me while my vessel was ashore, and assisting me in getting afloat.

I am, Captain, your obedient servant,
ARNOLD HARRIS,
Commanding.

Doc. 82.

FIGHT WITH APACHE WARRIORS.

Fort Bowler, Arizona Territory, }
May 5, 1864. }

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report for the information of the Colonel commanding, that pursuant to Special Orders, No. —, Inspector-General's Department, New Mexico, Tucson, Arizona Territory, April twenty-six, 1864, I took up my line of march from Fort Cummings, New Mexico, on the thirtieth ultimo. My command consisted of Company I, Fifth Infantry, California volunteers, forty-seven enlisted men, a detachment of one corporal and ten men of company C, First cavalry, California volunteers, and Juan Arroz, the Mexican guide at the Rio Mimbrea. Arriving at the entrance to Doubtful Canon at Steen's Peak at six o'clock a. m., fourth instant, I was fired into by a party of not less than one hundred Apache warriors, ambushed for that purpose. One of my men was dangerously wounded, and three others slightly wounded, and my horse killed the first fire. I had a rear guard of two non-commissioned officers and nine men; the balance of the men, except Corporal Vanolstine and private Doshier of company I, Fifth infantry, California volunteers, who had disobeyed my orders by going in advance, were with me about twenty yards in advance of the wagons. The Indians after firing set up their usual pow-wow, to intimidate the soldiers, and poured arrows into our ranks by the hundred, and we were hemmed in by them upon three sides. Notwithstanding their superior force and decided advantage, the men, without retreating a foot, commenced a deadly fire into their advancing columns, and kept it up for about forty-five minutes, when the Indians ceased firing and fled promiscuously into the mountains. There was a very narrow canon, through which fifty or more of them passed before they could scatter over the mountains, and while passing through this there was a continued and well-directed fire kept up by my men, which prevented many from reaching the summit. In a place like this it is impossible to tell the exact number killed or wounded, but I will report only such as I know to have been left dead on the ground. The number found dead at and near the point upon which we were attacked was ten, and judging from this and from the number of shots fired, it is but reasonable to suppose that twenty more were wounded. The men

continued to fire at them until they were out of the range of the guns, and then the man who was too badly wounded to walk was placed comfortably in a wagon; flankers thrown out on both sides of the canon, deployed as skirmishers, one line of skirmishers in the road in advance, and the rear guard at its post. I moved slowly down the canon; the Indians continued to fire upon us from the mountain tops until we reached the open ground this side of the canon, without doing more damage than that of wounding one horse. We arrived at the mouth of the canon at eight o'clock A. M., having been just two hours from the time of attack to the time the last shot was fired. The mountain summits were now covered with the cowardly assassins, who had collected there to take a farewell look upon their much-coveted prize. Upon my arrival at San Simon station at eleven o'clock A. M., I found that Corporal Vanolstine of my company, and the four privates of company C, had arrived in advance of us, but private Henry I. Doshier, of company I, Fifth infantry, California volunteers, had not been seen after entering the canon. It is the most painful part of my report to record a man missing in action, but it is only thus that I can report him. My loss was one man missing in action, one mortally wounded, one with arm broken, and three others slightly wounded; one horse killed, and one slightly wounded. I killed ten Indians and wounded at least twenty more. The non-commissioned officers and privates of company I, as well as corporal Roberts and private Ellis of company C, cannot be too highly praised for the prompt and gallant manner in which they executed all orders, and routed a force of thrice their number, and then marched through one of the worst canons in the country for a distance of about two miles, where the whoops of the savages were ringing from the rocks above upon either side, and an occasional bullet whistling over their heads or dropping near their feet. Juan Arrozas also deserves credit for his brave and cool conduct throughout the engagement. I arrived at Fort Bowie at eleven o'clock A. M. to-day, fifth instant. The wounded men are doing well.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

HENRY H. STEVENS,
Lieutenant Fifth Infantry, C. V., Commanding Company I.
Captain C. A. SMITH,
Fifth Infantry, C. V., Acting Assistant Adjutant General,
Franklin, Texas.

Doc. 83.

THANKS TO LIEUT.-COL. JOSEPH BAILEY.

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, June 15, 1864. }

The following resolution of Congress is published for the information of all concerned:

Public Resolution—No. 34.

A resolution tendering the thanks of Congress

to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, of the Fourth regiment of Wisconsin Volunteers.

Resolved, By the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the thanks of Congress be, and they are hereby, tendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, of the Fourth Regiment Wisconsin volunteers, Acting Engineer of the Nineteenth Army Corps, for distinguished services in the recent campaign on the Red river, by which the gunboat flotilla under Rear-Admiral David D. Porter was rescued from imminent peril.

SECTION 2. *And be it further resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to cause a copy of this resolution to be transmitted to Lieutenant-Colonel Bailey.

Approved June 11, 1864.

By order of the Secretary of War.

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant-Adjutant General.

Doc. 84.

BRAVERY OF CORPORAL J. C. HESSE

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 6, 1864.

SIR: Believing that I am entitled to receive a "medal of honor" as provided by the resolution of Congress, under date of July 12, 1862, to provide for the presentation of "medals of honor" to enlisted men of the army and volunteer forces who have distinguished or may distinguish themselves in battle during the present war, I have the honor to make the following statement:

At the outbreak of the rebellion the headquarters of the Eighth infantry were stationed at San Antonio, Texas. I was a corporal of company A of that regiment, and detailed as clerk at its headquarters. On the twenty-third of April, 1861, the officers and a few enlisted men at that time present at San Antonio were taken prisoners by the rebel troops under the command of Colonel Van Dorn. All the officers, with the exception of Lieutenant Edward L. Hartz, Adjutant, Eighth infantry, left a few days afterward for the States.

A few days subsequent, going to the former office of the regimental headquarters, the building then in possession and under the control of the rebels, I met there Lieutenant Hartz and Sergeant-Major Joseph K. Wilson, Eighth infantry (now Second-Lieutenant, Eighth infantry). Our regimental colors being in the office, Lieutenant Hartz proposed to us to take the colors from the staffs, conceal them beneath our clothes, and try to carry them off. We did so. I took the torn color the regiment had carried through the Mexican war, put it around my body under my shirt and blouse and passed out of the building, which was strongly guarded by the rebels. Our good luck would that the rebels did not suspect what a precious load we carried with us; if they had our lives would

not have been worth much. We put the colors in one of Lieutenant Hartz's trunks, and next day left San Antonio for the North. On the route we guarded the colors with our lives, always fearing that the rebels might find out what we had taken away and come after us, but they did not. We arrived safe, with our colors, on the twenty-sixth of May, 1861, in Washington, and turned them over to the regiment. Under these circumstances I think I am entitled to the honor of receiving a medal, as I believe that Congress intended to award them to enlisted men who have done acts similar to mine. I, therefore, very respectfully request that I may receive one, believing that I have performed one of the highest duties of a soldier, "having saved the colors of my regiment." And it will always be a happy day for me if I can see my regiment marching with their colors flying, and can say "that color I have carried on my body, and have rescued it from the hands of the rebels."

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. C. HESSE,

Formerly Corporal Company A, Eighth Infantry.

Colonel E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.

WASHINGTON, D. C., September 6, 1864.

I endorse the within statement as true.

EDWARD L. HARTZ,
Late Captain U. S. Army.

NOTE.—A medal was awarded Corporal Hesse for his good conduct in rescuing the colors of his regiment.

Doc. 85.

MAJOR-GENERAL CANBY'S REPORT.

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION WEST MISSISSIPPI,
NEW ORLEANS, LA., October 10, 1864. }

SIR: I have the honor to transmit a summary of recent operations.

1. An expedition into West Florida, under command of Brigadier-General Asboth, reached Marianna on the afternoon of the twenty-seventh of September, capturing that place after a stubborn resistance of several hours. The result is the capture of eighty-one prisoners of war (among them a Brigadier-General and a Colonel), ninety-five stand of arms, large quantities of quartermaster's and commissary's stores, over two hundred fine horses and mules, and four hundred head of cattle. Our loss in killed and wounded amounts to thirty-two; of the former, Captain M. M. Young, Seventh Vermont, and Lieutenant E. W. Ayer, Second Maine cavalry; of the latter, General Asboth himself, who had his left cheek-bone broken and his left arm fractured in two places.

2. An expedition sent by Major-General Dana, from Rodney, Mississippi (composed of colored cavalry and infantry), reached Fayette on the second instant, capturing six hundred head of fine cattle, a large number of horses and mules, and several prisoners. Another expedition sent by General Dana attacked the enemy at Woodville at seven o'clock on Thursday morning, capturing three guns, one captain, one lieutenant, fifty-four enlisted men, and killing forty of the enemy. No loss whatever on our side sustained in this engagement.

3. A cavalry expedition under Brigadier-General A. L. Lee, reached Clinton on Thursday morning at seven o'clock, capturing forty-seven prisoners, the rebel mails, telegraph office, &c., and a considerable quantity of stores and ammunition. Among the prisoners captured is Lieutenant-Colonel Pinckney, Provost Marshal General of the district, (installed in his office a few hours before the arrival of our troops), one captain and two lieutenants. From there the expedition moved to Greensburg, where a tannery and two thousand sides of leather were destroyed; and thence to Osyka, where four thousand pounds of bacon, twelve barrels of whiskey one hundred dozen boots and shoes, and large quantities of corn and meal were destroyed, and the telegraph operator and many important despatches captured. Camp Moore, with a large amount of clothing and gray cloth, was likewise destroyed, and over two hundred fine horses and mules captured. General Lee returned to Baton Rouge at noon yesterday, followed by a large number of negroes.

4. Lieutenant L. N. Earl, Fourth Wisconsin cavalry, commanding a special permanent scouting party of twenty-five men, having learned of an intended attempt to cross a valuable rebel mail at St. Joseph, on the western bank of the Mississippi, landed, on Saturday morning last, three miles above that place, proceeded inland about ten miles, where he succeeded in capturing Major Springer, Quartermaster and Chief of the Secret Service of the rebel war department, another Major, late Chief Commissary of Subsistence of the trans-Mississippi department, two captains, and two privates. The officers were riding in an ambulance which contained a large and valuable mail, and fourteen battle-flags, taken from our forces during the Red river campaign, and which were on their way to Richmond. Lieutenant Earl, upon learning that a large mounted escort was close at hand, pushed for the river with all despatch, and reached here this morning, safely, with his captures. The boats found at St. Joseph, and upon which this party were to have crossed, were all destroyed.

General Asboth, I regret to learn, will probably lose an arm.

Very respectfully, sir, your obedient servant,
ED. R. S. CANBY,
Major-General Commanding.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
Chief of Staff of the Army, Washington, D. C.

Doc. 86.

CONFEDERATE CRUELTY.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT FITCH.

NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, January 3, 1865.

MAJOR: The following report of my capture and subsequent attempted murder is respectfully submitted for your information:

I was captured on the twentieth December, fourteen miles in a south-eastern direction from Murfreesboro', in company with two other officers, Lieutenant D. G. Cooke, Seventeenth United States colored infantry, and Captain C. G. Penfield, Forty-fourth United States colored infantry, by a company of scouts belonging to Forrest's command, numbering thirty-six men, commanded by Captain Harvey. As soon as captured we were robbed of everything of any value, even to clothing. We were kept under guard for three days with some other prisoners (private soldiers of General Steadman's division, who were captured near Murfreesboro'), until we reached a small town called Lewisburg, some eighteen miles south of Duck river. There the officers were sent under a guard of four men to report, as I supposed, to General Forrest's headquarters. The guards told us that was their destination. They took us along the pike road leading from Lewisburg to Massesville about four miles, and then left the road and turned to the right, for the purpose, as they said, of stopping at a neighboring house for the night. After leaving the road about half a mile, as we were walking along through a wooded ravine the man in advance of us halted, partially turned his horse, and, as I came up, drew his revolver and fired on me without a word. The ball entered my right ear just above the centre, passed through and lodged in the bone back of the ear; it knocked me senseless for a few moments. I soon recovered, however, but lay perfectly quiet, knowing that my only hope lay in leading them to believe that they had killed me. Presently I heard two carbine shots, and then all was still. After about fifteen minutes I staggered to my feet and attempted to get away, but found I could not walk. About that time a colored boy came along and helped me to a house near-by. He told me that the other two officers were dead, having been shot through the head. That evening their bodies were brought to the house where I lay. Next morning they were decently buried on the premises of Colonel John C. Hill, near-by.

The shooting occurred on the twenty-second, and on the twenty-third, about mid-day, one of Forrest's men came to the house where I was lying, and inquired for me; said that he had come to kill me. The man of the house said it was entirely unnecessary, as I was so severely wounded that I would die any way, and he expected I would not live over an hour. He then went away, saying that if I was not dead by morning that I would be killed. After he left I

was moved by the neighbors to another house, and was moved nearly every night from one house to another, until the twenty seventh, when I was relieved by a party of troops sent from Columbus, and brought within the Federal lines.

The privates were sent off on a road leading to the right of the one we took, about in the direction of Columbia, I should judge. I cannot but think they were killed, as about that time our forces occupied Columbia, the rebel army having retreated. There were twelve privates, belonging, I think to Craft's brigade.

Very respectfully your obedient servant.

GEORGE W. FITCH,

First Lieutenant, Twelfth U. S. C. I. and A. A. Q. M.

Major WILLIAM INNESS,
A. C. O. G. U. S. C. T.

Doc. 87.

GENERAL WILSON'S RAID.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
NEAR PETERSBURG, Saturday, July 2, 1864. }

The force composing the expedition consisted of General Wilson's own division, and that of General Kautz, from Butler's department, the whole under the command of the former, and numbering from five to six thousand men. There were also with the expedition three batteries of four guns each, half rifled ordnance, and half light twelve-pounders, and one battery of small mounted howitzers. With this force General Wilson set out at one A. M., on the twenty-second of June, starting from the vicinity of Prince George Court-house. He crossed the Petersburg and Weldon railroad at Reams' station, at which point Colonel Chapman, with the Second brigade of Wilson's own division had a skirmish with a small force of the enemy, which, however, was easily driven.

The expedition moved by way of Dinwiddie Court-house toward Petersburg and Lynchburg, on the south side of the railroad, which they struck at Ford's mills, near Sutherland's station. They then moved down the road, General Kautz in advance, as far as Ford's station, destroying the road as they moved. At Ford's station they captured two trains, comprising sixteen cars, with the locomotives, laden with refugees leaving Petersburg. After destroying the depot and captured trains, the command bivouacked at Ford's station for the night.

Early on the morning of the twenty-third they resumed their march, General Kautz still in advance. Near Nottoway Court-house, a force of rebel cavalry, comprising two brigades, appeared on the right flank of the column, while moving some distance south of the railroad. Colonel Chapman, of the second brigade, formed in line and engaged the enemy.

This was about three P. M., and the rencontre continued till nearly night, when the enemy was forced back. General Kautz, who had passed before the enemy appeared, proceeded the same

evening to Burksville, the junction of the Petersburg with the Richmond and Danville railroad. Here he destroyed all the depots, railroad switches and appurtenances, and tore up the road as far as possible in every direction from the junction, after which he rested for the night.

General Wilson, who, with the remainder of his force, had bivouacked at Nottoway Courthouse, on the afternoon of the twenty-fourth advanced across the country to Neberris station, on the Danville railroad, to meet General Kautz, who was to meet him at that place, destroying the road as he advanced. After forming a junction at that station the entire force advanced to Keysville and there bivouacked. The work of destruction was resumed early on the twenty-fifth and by three P. M. we had reached the vicinity of Staunton bridge, on the Staunton river, having completely destroyed every foot of railroad to that point. The distance from Burksville, measured on the map, is about thirty-five miles, and adding to this portions of Southside road which were destroyed the aggregate would not be less than fifty miles and probably more than that distance.

The Danville road was constructed in a fashion known to some extent in the extreme West, but now little used; instead of ordinary T rail, solid beams of wood, technically called stringers, are placed upon the ties, and along their inner edges are firmly fastened long strips of iron, known as strap rails. The stringers were of yellow pine, and being perfectly dry, it was only necessary here and there to place a few rails from an adjoining fence, ignite them, and set the entire structure in a blaze. Miles of railroad might have been seen at a time in flames, and at night the whole canopy of the heavens was one glare of light. By day the conflagration, adding to the already suffocating temperature of the atmosphere, rendered the heat almost intolerable, and many people living in the vicinity of the railroad were obliged to leave their houses and settle in cooler localities.

The rear of our column moving past the fires kindled by the advance was often compelled to leave the road and move at a respectable distance on the right or left, until after a little experience the plan was adopted of leaving depots and other buildings to be fired by those in the rear. The mode in which this work of destruction was accomplished was to dismount a portion of the command, and march them parallel with the railroad; face a regiment at a time toward the road, have them advance and ignite a section of the road in their front, and then resume the march. It was but the work of a few minutes for a regiment to perform its part, and the whole was accomplished nearly as fast as the column could move.

It is only necessary to remind the public of what is already known, viz.: The fact that this railroad is now the only one upon which Lee could depend for communication with the south, east and south-west, and the only route

by which he could bring up troops or supplies to Richmond or Petersburg; and this being remembered, it is easy to appreciate the vast importance of the destruction of so large a portion of it. Even with the best facilities for repairing, it would require several weeks to place it in running order; weeks of exceedingly precious time to the enemy, and, considering the difficulties which embarrass them, including the army's interruption, it is doubtful whether they will succeed in reconstructing this railroad before the present campaign is decided.

The Weldon road, although but a small portion of it is torn up, is equally unavailable, and practically the rebel army under Lee, and the rebel Government are isolated by an interval of many miles from all railroad communication with the interior of rebeldom.

To return to the narrative of the raid. The force arrived in the vicinity of Staunton bridge, on the afternoon of the twenty-fifth. It was, of course, desirable to destroy the bridge, which was a very important one, and an effort was made to effect this object, General Kautz, who was still in the advance, being assigned to make the attempt. It was found that the enemy were fully prepared to defend it. Our approach had been heralded in advance, and the militia called hastily together from eight adjoining counties, had been concentrated at this point.

From this point the raiders moved in a north-easterly direction, toward Weylesburg, which they reached after a night's march, near daylight on the morning of the twenty-sixth, halting there for about one hour. The twenty-sixth, twenty-seventh, and the earlier part of the twenty-eighth of June were marked by few events of any importance, except that on the twenty-ninth, Brigadier-General W. F. H. Lee appeared on our left flank, which occasioned some little skirmishing, lasting but a very short time, and attended with few, if any, casualties.

On the twenty-eighth we reached the Nottoway river at Double bridge. The Second Ohio cavalry of McIntosh's brigade, having advanced, drove the rebel pickets before them some miles, before we reached the bridge. There was, however, no force there large enough to give us any trouble, and we crossed without difficulty early in the afternoon. Thence we moved on toward Stony creek, intending to cross the Petersburg and Weldon railroad at Stony creek station. It had been designed to cross some miles further south, at Jarrett's station, but it was ascertained that the road at that point was guarded by a heavy force, made up partly of militia and partly of troops sent up from Weldon, and the design of crossing there was, in consequence, abandoned.

The rebel pickets were met at the bridge, and no sooner had our vanguard, comprising a squadron or two of the Third Indiana and all of the Second Ohio, gone over, than the enemy began to show spirited resistance. They were, however, driven back along the direct road to the station, far enough to enable our entire

force to get across. Less than a mile from the crossing the enemy were found in heavier force, and McIntosh's brigade, which was in the advance, having formed in line of battle, soon became fiercely engaged.

Under the fire of the enemy our men continued to form a slight breastwork of rails, logs, stones, and whatever came to hand, and lying down behind it, held their ground with great determination against several desperate charges of the enemy. It was about an hour before sunset when the fight commenced. About eleven p. m., the impossibility of forcing a passage at this point having been clearly demonstrated, General Wilson despatched General Kautz up a left-hand road toward Reams' station.

General Kautz' division was followed by the wagon and ambulance trains of the whole force, and General Wilson, having constructed a line of rifle-pits in the rear of the front line of battle during the night, left in them the First Vermont and the Eighth and Twenty-second New York, withdrawing the rest of his force a short time before daylight, and following Kautz to Reams' station.

The men left with the led horses of the regiment, which remained to cover the rear, came in afterward, and reported that the enemy turning the right flank of the men in the breastworks, had captured the whole party.

General Kautz, on reaching Reams' station, soon found that the enemy were strongly posted at that point also, and was sharply engaged before daylight. Wilson, with the troops he had brought up from Stony creek, passed by Kautz's rear, and was about to take position on his left, but had hardly formed in line of battle when he was attacked by a heavy force of infantry, a column of cavalry in the meantime, accounts say, passing round to the rear.

The accounts of this affair are rather confused, but it appears that General Wilson, perceiving that his command was in danger of being surrounded, determined to try to save a portion of it, by moving out by the right flank, in a direction nearly due south, General Kautz in the meantime retaining his position, as also the Second Ohio, and parts of the Fifth New York, Second New Jersey, and several other regiments belonging to McIntosh's and Chapman's brigades.

It is reported that Fitz Hugh Lee was killed in one of the engagements. The first information brought to headquarters of Wilson's position was by Captain Whittaker, of the First Connecticut, and Aid-de-camp to General Wilson. He left Ream's station at eight a. m., of the twenty-ninth, with forty men of the Third New York cavalry, and by cutting his way through a portion of a column on the move, he reached headquarters exactly at 10:20 a. m.

Dashing at full speed through woods and swamps, over ditches and fences, and, in some cases, cutting their way with the sabre through the rebel troops, the greater part of General Kautz's division, consisting of the Fifth and

Eleventh Pennsylvania, First District of Columbia, and Third New York, with the numbers already stated of the Second and Fifth Ohio, and a few other regiments, made their way with great difficulty into our lines, the enemy pursuing and firing upon them until they got within our picket-lines on the Jerusalem plank-road.

It is said by some other men coming in that the rebels shot and bayoneted many after they had surrendered. One reports that while lying in a swamp he heard another, near him, cry out, "I surrender." "Surrender, you — Yankee," was the reply; "take that," accompanying the exclamation with a volley. The Richmond *Enquirer*, of the twenty-seventh, urged that no quarter should be given to any of the raiders, alleging that the death of every one of them would not be an equivalent to the rebel Government for the damage done.

This, if true, is the most conclusive testimony that could be asked as to the complete effectiveness of the raid. Prisoners captured near Reams' station states that General Lee had sworn that not a single raider should get back. He has evidently made stupendous efforts to make his oath good, for not a single crossing on the Weldon road was left unguarded.

The enemy had scouts out for miles to the westward on every road by which our troops could possibly approach, and carried information of the direction in time to meet us with a superior force at any point. It is difficult to ascertain exactly which troops were encountered at Stony creek and Reams' station, but it is certain that there was infantry at both points, besides probably the greater portion of their cavalry.

The Sixth corps was immediately ordered out to the assistance of the cavalry, but by the time they arrived, which was near evening, the affair was over. They took a position and remained there until the afternoon of the thirtieth, employing themselves meanwhile in destroying the railroad, which was done most thoroughly for three or four miles.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
Saturday, July 2, 10 a. m. }

General Wilson has come into our lines with the Third cavalry division. There is considerable rejoicing over his return. The old Third division still lives, and will yet trouble the rebels.

General Lee, in his violent rage, swore that not one should escape. The guns and wagons we can well afford to lose, in consideration of the irreparable damage done their roads.

The cavalry of the Third division, with whom I have conversed, present a sorry picture. They are dusty and almost worn out by twelve days' incessant marching and vigils, during which they have marched over three hundred and fifty miles. Finding it impossible to cut through the rebel lines at Reams' station, and

no help coming from the vicinity of Petersburg, General Wilson ordered his command to retreat, under cover of night, toward Suffolk.

Having crossed Nottoway river about thirty miles below Petersburg, they struck for the railroad and crossed at Jarrett's station, and bearing southward, crossed the Blackwater at the county road bridge, and came into our lines at Cabin Point, five miles south-east of Fort Powhatan.

Doc. 88.

GENERAL DRAPER'S EXPEDITION.

PORT LOCKOUT, Md., June 21, 1864.

THE expedition that left here on Saturday night, June eleventh, has just returned, and proved to be a complete success, having had two engagements with the rebels, and destroying and capturing over three hundred thousand dollars' worth of property, a large proportion of which belonged to the rebel government. The expedition consisted of both land and naval forces, the former under the command of Acting Brigadier-General Draper, commanding this post, accompanied by the following Staff: Captain P. H. Gibbs, Fourth Rhode Island, Assistant Adjutant General; Captain N. C. Goodwin, Quartermaster; Lieutenant A. Jenks, Aid-de-Camp; Lieutenant Scudder, Commissary of Subsistence; Lieutenant Jouley, Assistant Quartermaster; E. W. Walton, Surgeon. The land forces were conveyed on board the transports Georgia, Long Branch, Charleston, and Governor Hicks. The naval forces were under command of Commander Hooker, United States Navy, whose flagship was the Commodore Reed, together with the gunboats Fuchsia, Captain Street; Freeborn, Captain Arthurs, and the Teaser, Resolute, and Eureka. The land forces consisted of six hundred infantry, under the immediate charge of Captain Hart, Thirty-sixth United States cavalry volunteers, and fifty regular cavalry, under Lieutenant Denney. The naval land forces consisted of one hundred marines and sailors, under the charge of Captain Street, of the gunboat Fuchsia, assisted by Ensign Nelson and Assistant Engineer Delano, United States Navy. The combined forces landed at the mouth of Pope creek, in Westmoreland county, Virginia, some fifty miles above the mouth of the Potomac. On Sunday morning the forces took the direct route to Montrose, the county seat of Westmoreland, reaching that place safely, but in the town the cavalry discovered some rebels, who fired on them and escaped down a deep ravine. On Sunday night we encamped one mile south of Montrose, near the mansion of Mr. Hungerford, a former clerk in the United States Treasury Department. He has several daughters, and one among them exhibited the utmost coolness under these trying circumstances. As our men were driving off her father's stock, she

waved her head politely, and spoke as kindly as though all was expected.

There the force was divided, one party under the command of Captain Hart, proceeded to the Rappahannock direct, by way of the rich country called the Hague, while the main party, under the command of the Colonel in person, took the direct road to Warsaw, the county town of Richmond county. When within some two miles of the town, we met two or three rebel horsemen, who attempted to escape but failed, as we succeeded in capturing one Sergeant Montgomery, the enrolling officer of Richmond county. Before he would surrender, however, he had his horse shot from under him. The command now marched direct to Warsaw, and in the immediate vicinity captured a large quantity of clothing, freshly made for the rebel soldiers, together with tobacco, whiskey, and other blockade goods.

At this place we encamped on Monday night. In the meantime a large lot of stock was sent with Captain Goodwin, Second Maryland, to take the transports at Nomani creek. On Tuesday morning the forces started on the road to Derrittsville, which place they arrived at on Tuesday night, and encamped on the large plantation of Dr. Middleton, a strong secesh, who furnished us with an ample supply of bacon and flour, and with a good deal of ill humor. At this place we were joined by the command under Captain Hart, who brought in a large quantity of stock, fine horses, cattle, &c. He had a small brush with the rebels, and one man by the name of Harvey, a regular cavalry man, was captured by the rebels and carried in the brush. But when the negro infantry made a charge, they were compelled to run, and he made his escape. They told him they had a piece of rope awaiting for him, and that he would be hung at sunset. Captain Hart also burned some large mills filled with grain and flour.

On this night the Colonel communicated with the gunboats, and they started at once around to meet us at Union wharf, on the Rappahannock. During Tuesday night and Wednesday morning there was constant firing on our pickets, and as we advanced to the Rappahannock, they seemed to get bolder. We, however, reached the Union wharf by evening, and at once proceeded to build or repair the wharf, which was destroyed by General Kilpatrick in his raid through this section of the country about one year ago. This was not accomplished until Friday night. On Thursday the enemy appeared in our rear, and the cavalry were at once made in readiness to advance, the Colonel taking command in person, Lieutenant Denny being seriously indisposed. They soon came up with him in the vicinity of Parsons' farm, some three miles from the wharf. As soon as in sight of the rebels (some thirty strong), the Colonel immediately ordered a charge. This order was not obeyed by the troop of cavalrymen, who behaved in rather a bad manner.

The Colonel seeing the way the thing was working, at once turned and came back, and ordered the colored infantry to his support, which they did at a double-quick, but, as usual, the rebels failed to appear when met with the same number of men.

On Friday, the eighteenth, the two companies of the command were called to take the direct road in search of the rebel force, and either whip them or compel them to fall back, the Colonel, during the night, having received word that they had strong reinforcements, and were ready to dispute his way to Heathville. This intelligence was communicated, as usual, by the plantation negroes. The Colonel had no earthly wish to go to Heathville, but still would give the rebels a brush before he left. The troops advanced on the rebels, who were found posted at the old spot, behind barricades and fences. Their forms could plainly be seen, and from appearance, they appeared to be at least five hundred strong; over two hundred horses could be distinctly counted. The forces commanded by the Colonel consisted of one hundred and forty men in the line of advance—twenty as a reserve, and forty as a support to the cavalry, there being little dependence on the cavalry—from the former fight the day before, although I am satisfied there were some noble and daring spirits among them. The colored infantry were now deployed to the right through a grove, and as they began to advance the rebels fired several volleys. The infantry again advanced, and opened on them by file. This had its effect, and on the second volley several horsemen were seen to fall, and soon the rebels began to run, and had the charge been made as soon as ordered, their whole force would have been captured.

We learned the command consisted of over six hundred men, a portion being the advance of a large force sent by General Wade Hampton, consisting of a portion of the Seventh Virginia cavalry, and the Forty-ninth Virginia infantry, intended for the purpose of capturing this expedition, they having the idea that we would take the direct road to Heathville.

The command was then marched back to the boats, and all embarked safely, the rebels, however, appearing on the beach before we left. The Commodore Reed opened her broadside on them, and sent them some grape and shell, which had the effect to make them decamp instantly, and the wharf we had built was destroyed again, and all the boats steamed up the river to Lloyd's landing, on the south side of the Rappahannock river, some thirty miles above the Tappahannock, in Essex county, Virginia. The horses were again landed safely, and we took the direct road to Lloyd's, passing through a fine country, stocked with horses, sheep and cattle, a large number of which we succeeded in capturing. The country was highly cultivated; acres and acres of flowing grain presented itself to the eye. On the road we burned the large and extensive flouring mills of

Colonel R. T. M. Hunter, late United States Senator, now a strong rebel. The mills were filled with Confederate flour; before they were consumed, a liberal portion was delivered to the poor families connected with these extensive estates. The forces then proceeded on to Lloyd's. Here we received information that General Wade Hampton was in the rear of Sheridan, whose force had just passed on Saturday through New Town and Hampton, close after him; also, that the Ninth and Forty-ninth Virginia, of his command, had crossed over into Richmond county to intercept us, but were too late. Soon after, our cavalry pickets who were out on the road to New Town, came back and reported the rebels advancing. We made a short turn (after securing all the stock), and made direct for the cover of the gunboats, the cavalry in the meantime burning all the mills containing Confederate flour, and visiting the extensive lands and mansion of Mr. Hunter. A large number of negroes left his plantation and followed us to the boats. We got our stock all on the transports, and started them again to Point Lookout. At Tappahannock we landed, and again had a skirmish with the rebels, we holding possession of the town with the infantry, while the cavalry made some large hauls on the rich planters in the immediate vicinity. In the evening, the rebels having driven in our pickets, the colored infantry were again called up in battle line.

The cattle, horses, and farming utensils having been all safely deposited on board, the boat started on the down trip, the gunboats giving the rebels at Union wharf a salute. Here we again landed with a few men, and found that the rebels in large force had been there, and were sadly disappointed in not finding us. We reached the Point late on Monday night, having been away eight days, capturing on the route two hundred horses and mules, four hundred head of cattle, and fifty sheep, bringing away four hundred contrabands, and farming utensils to a large amount. Taking it in the whole, the raid was one of the most successful of the war, and it is not saying too much when we say that the success of the expedition depended greatly on the sagacity and skill of the acting General commanding.

Doc. 89.

THE MURDER OF NEGRO TROOPS.

OKALONA, MISSISSIPPI, June 14, 1864.

There is but one fact significant above all others in connection with the recent victory of General Forrest—it is the first which has been won by the smaller over the larger force, where the inequality in numbers was so great that every participant in the struggle must have been conscious of the relative strength of the combatants. Strategy, Forrest's name, and confidence in their leader, won the day. The Yankees and negroes opposed Forrest in Middle

Tennessee, and came forth simply to slaughter the helpless, to plunder and desolate the country.

Forrest's strength in the contest was about three thousand five hundred men. The number of negroes and whites is not accurately ascertained. Prisoners say that their force was twelve or fifteen thousand. Telegraphic despatches have given the general result of the battle, but many days must elapse before the details are known. Prisoners are constantly brought in by the country people. Very few negroes it seems have been captured. Perhaps not more than forty or fifty have appeared at headquarters. Most of them fled as soon as it was known that Forrest was on the battle-field. Those that were taken escaped. (?) The soldiers say that they "lost them."

You must know that most of Forrest's men are from Western Tennessee. Before the battle fugitives from the counties through which Sturgis and his troops were advancing, came into camp detailing incidents which made men shudder who are accustomed to scenes of violence and bloodshed. I cannot relate the stories of these poor frightened people. Robbery, rapine, and the assassination of men and women, were the least of crimes committed, while the "Avengers of Fort Pillow" overran and desolated the country. Rude unlettered men, who had fought at Shiloh, and in many subsequent battles, wept like children when they heard of the enormities to which their mothers, sisters, and wives had been subjected by the negro mercenaries of Sturgis. The mildest, most peaceable of our soldiers became madmen when they heard how the persons of their kinswomen were violated. The negroes were regardless of the age, condition, sex, or entreaties of their victims. In one instance, the grandmother, daughter, and granddaughter, were each, in the same room, held by the drunken brutes, and subjected to outrages by the bare recital of which humanity is appalled. A young wife, enciente, taken to a negro encampment, and, tied to stakes driven in the ground, was made to minister to the hell-born passions of a dozen fiends. Death, in his mercy came to her relief. A little boy, who sought to defend his mother, was brutally bayoneted. When their savage lusts were gratified, the victims here and there were burned in their dwellings. Insanity, in some cases, came to the relief of sufferings such as never before were inflicted upon human creatures by remorseless fiends in human shape. Terror, and the agony of hopeless shame, and famine, and fire, and blood, and the assassination of the helpless and unoffending, marked the progress of the "Avengers of Fort Pillow." It is not strange that negro prisoners were "lost." The whites who led them on and incited them to these damnable deeds, deserve a more terrible punishment. Yet we have sent three thousand of those white men to prison to be exchanged. Simple justice demands their instant execution by the hangman's rope.

You have heard that our soldiers buried negroes alive at Fort Pillow. This is true. At the first fire after Forrest's men scaled the walls, many of the negroes threw down their arms and fell as if they were dead. They perished in the pretence, and could only be restored at the point of the bayonet. To resuscitate some of them, more terrified than the rest, they were rolled into the trenches made as receptacles for the fallen. Vitality was not restored till breathing was obstructed, and then the resurrection began. On these facts is based the pretext for the crimes committed by Sturgis, Grierson, and their followers. You must remember, too, that in the extremity of their terror, or for other reasons, the Yankees and negroes in Fort Pillow neglected to haul down their flag. In truth, relying upon their gunboats, the officers expected to annihilate our forces after we had entered the fortifications. They did not intend to surrender.

A terrible retribution, in any event, has befallen the ignorant, deluded Africans.—*Atlanta Appeal, July, 1864.*

Doc. 90.

AFFAIRS IN ATLANTA, GEORGIA.

THE APPROACH OF GENERAL SHERMAN.

To the Ladies of St. Philip's Parish:

LADIES: It is unnecessary for us to tell you the enemy is at your door. The booming of the cannon announces the stern fact in unmistakable language; yet we may tell you what you seem to have forgotten.

This is, that wounded, mangled and dying soldiers, who have given all for the defense of your homes, are daily brought to our city, expecting the relief at your hands that their valor entitles them to receive. They have placed themselves between you and the demons let loose upon our land, contesting inch by inch their advance, giving their life-blood for your protection; dying nobly to save you from pillage, and all its attendant horrors. Is the language strong? Look at the desolated fields, ruined homes, and insulted women of those sections over which these robbers and plunderers have passed; learn what your own fate will be, should we be defeated. Can you, in this hour of peril, hesitate to come forward and render all the assistance in your power to your brave defenders? Upon the shoulders of a devoted few rests the heavy responsibility of attending to their wants, and we are finding the undertaking more than we can accomplish alone. Ladies, come forward and help us. The ordinary vocations of life must be, for a time, suspended.

Our brave soldiers are straining every nerve to win their own and our independence, and so must we bend all our energies to the task of attending those who require it. A few of us have determined to remain in the city as long

as there is a confederate soldier to care for; and we appeal to you all to lay aside your fear, forget your panic, dismiss all thoughts of "running," and join us in the noble work, and when our liberty is established you can then claim your share of its rewards.

Mrs. H. T. JONES,
President St. Philip's Hospital Aid Society.
Mrs. D. N. JUDSON,
Secretary.

THE CALL TO PRAYER.

Our readers have noticed, we presume, the proclamation of the Mayor of Atlanta, summoning the people to fasting and prayer, in view of the perils which threaten our city. A short time ago the same authority called on all the able-bodied men of the city to rally for its defence.

These two proclamations are entirely harmonious. After having employed all the means within our reach to resist the approach of the invader, it is well to remember that our chief dependence is on an Almighty arm. If Providence vouchsafe a blessing upon our armies, the preparations which have been made will be found efficient to hurl back in confusion and disaster the columns which our vaunting foe is pressing upon us. If He—the giver of victories— withhold his blessing, all that has been done, ample, gigantic as we deem it, will prove unavailing.

It is eminently proper, in view of this fact, that the people who are more immediately exposed to the present invasion should most earnestly seek the Divine succor. Let to-morrow be emphatically a day of supplication to Almighty God for his favor. Let the merchant close his doors, let the laborer intermit his toil, and let each give himself to this important work.

Let old and young, let men, women and children join their hearts and voices at home and in our sanctuaries in importune supplications at the throne of grace for the coveted good. Never could a people have a more powerful incentive to prayer than that which is now upon us. Our homes and our altars, in a great measure the safety of the State, and very largely the interest of our entire confederacy, are suspended upon the result of the battle which now seems to be impending.

A decided victory will give new courage to our people, inflict wide-spread demoralization upon the foe, and hasten the day of peace. Self-preservation, patriotism, religion—all summon us to earnest, fervent prayer.

The showers of yesterday and last night chilled the tube of our thermometer considerably. There is a pleasant breeze blowing this morning, and the ladies, taking advantage of the pleasant weather, are out shopping on Whitehall street. Bareges seemed to have the call in the matter of dress, though we noticed several pretty muslins and lawns, with now and then a light-colored summer silk, with waist of white jaconet.—*Atlanta Register*, June 10.

Doc. 91.

GENERAL HUNTER'S EXPEDITION.

GAULEY, WEST VIRGINIA, June 28, 1864.

The expedition is over—our work is done—and for the present the command is resting on its arms and trophies.

On Friday morning, June eleventh, the consolidated commands of Crook and Sullivan—the latter having the old Sigel division—all under Hunter's control—marched out with flying colors and hopeful spirits from Staunton on the road through Middlebrook to Lexington. Three miles from town the rebels were posted behind rail breastworks, apparently intending to make a serious opposition to our progress. As it was, however, our steady advance rapidly dislodged them, and we drove them before us, scarcely allowing them to halt to fire upon us. Seventeen miles from Staunton they managed to kill two and wound two of our men, when a strong force of cavalry was sent forward to charge and route them, which done, they troubled us no more that day. The force in front of us was ascertained to be merely McCausland's brigade, whose only object seemed to be to delay our advance as much as possible. On the morning of the eleventh, General McCook's division, being in the advance, approached Lexington about eleven o'clock, and a heavy cloud of smoke rising in front of us, revealed the destruction of the bridge leading over the James into the town. On the high banks opposite, with glasses, we could easily perceive rebel sharpshooters. The only ford is about a mile above the site of the bridge, and to this ford the Second brigade is sent, while the Thirty-sixth Ohio is placed on the main road to occupy the rebels there. As the Thirty-sixth drew near the banks, a rebel shell was sent so exactly in range of their position as to wound six and kill one. Captain McMullen was ordered up with one section of artillery, and proceeded at once most effectually to silence the rebels. Some of them were on top of the Virginia Military Institute, but a few shells quickly drove them from their high position, and about two o'clock they, fearing the Second brigade's having crossed the ford, rapidly skedaddled, leaving the town to our quiet occupation.

Sunday the Institute buildings and Governor Letcher's house were burned, ten minutes' time being given to remove any property from the latter. In the afternoon a contraband brought in word that seven canal boats were hidden nine miles off, deeply laden with stores, etc. To secure these, Captain Blazer with his scouts was sent out, and, skirmishing the whole route, he found the boats as reported. Burning five of them, he dismounted his men and hauled the remaining two to Lexington. In them were six cannons—two six-pounders, one twelve-pounder and three mountain howitzers—nine thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, a ton and a half

of powder, and commissary stores in great variety and abundance. General Duffie rejoined us here, having marched through Waynesboro' on to the Charlotteville and Lynchburg railroad, tearing up a small portion of the latter and capturing a good part of Jackson's wagon trains.

Tuesday evening we camped at Buchanan. Averell, coming in before us, captured the Confederate Navy records of 1861 and 1862, together with twelve more canal boats heavily laden with provisions.

On the fifteenth, while we were halting at the base of the Peaks of Otter, information was received that Breckinridge with ten thousand men was at Balcony Falls, intending to attack us on our flanks. In a good position for defence, General Crook awaited General Hunter's and the other division. The whole command then being assembled, and no foe appearing, we once more marched forward, stopping for the night at Taney Farm, almost at the base of the Peaks of Otter.

Thursday noon we entered Liberty, with bands playing "Hail Columbia," "Yankee Doodle," &c. Halting, the whole command proceeded to tear up and demolish the railroad, including a bridge seven hundred feet long. For seven miles the work is maintained, and night closed in upon a scene of smouldering timbers, ties, and hopelessly bent and twisted rails.

In Liberty were five or six rebel hospitals, in which were a large number of sick and wounded from Lee's army. We learn here that the rebels are rapidly moving all their stores from Lynchburg to Danville, anticipating the at least possible capture of the former place.

Early on the morning of the seventeenth, having heard from Averell that the enemy were drawn up in good number in front of him at New London, we marched Crook's division in advance, by a road not laid down on maps, along the north of the railroad, crossing at James Church. This movement tending to bring us in the rebel rear, caused them to retire toward Lynchburg. Cutting across the country we endeavored to intercept their retreat, but arrived just too late on the main road. Stopping here for dinner we were within about seven miles of the city, on the road to New London. The pickets of the two parties were so close, that various uncomplimentary remarks were passed quite freely from one to the other. At four o'clock, with the Ninety-first Ohio, Second brigade of Crook's division, in advance, we moved out on the road, and in about two miles the rapid firing in front told us that we were near the enemy's first position. They opened on us with a vigorous cannonade, having evidently obtained the range of all prominent points in our lines by previous practice. The Third brigade being placed on the left of the road, the Second on the right, the order to charge was given. The main opposition was found on our right, the Ninety-first and Twelfth Ohio suffering most severely. The Third brigade having little but skirmishing, as it was,

on the first charge, the rebels were driven back fully two miles to their line of breastworks, the Ninety-first Ohio gallantly capturing and bringing off the field a rifled gun made in Liverpool, a Blakeley's patent. I heard also that three other guns were captured in this charge, or rather series of charges, but have only been able to verify hearing by sight in the case of this one. During this attack both sides maintained a furious fire of shell, grape and canister, the rebel gunners evidently being skilful hands in the management of their pieces. Our loss was rather large here, especially in the Ninety-first and Twelfth, Colonel Turley of the former having his right thigh fractured.

By the time our men were safely posted, and rested from their arduous three hours' work, the moon had long been shining, and the thick darkness of the woods in our front, and the unknown character of the ground, forbade any further operations for the night. By this time the three brigades of Crook's division being encamped in line of battle, in the advance, were relieved by the First division, and the men camped and passed the night quietly enough, save occasional shots, as some incautious man of either party exposed himself too openly.

Although but two regiments of our command, the Twelfth and Ninety-first Ohio, had been engaged to any great extent, the fighting this first day was remarkable, both for the rapidity of firing, and the steady perseverance of our men. It was confidently believed that had we arrived but a few hours earlier, we would have driven the enemy through Lynchburg that night. As it was we were compelled to halt, and during the whole night the locomotive whistle told us of the rapid arrival of heavy reinforcements, that were greeted with continual cheers of welcome by the foe in our front. Saturday morning came bright and clear, and after an early breakfast I rode out to a temporary hospital on the roadside, expecting every minute to hear a renewal of the battle. While talking to the wounded, the battery right in front of the hospital sent a few shells over into the rebel line, that were immediately replied to, their shells going over and around the building, though none struck it. Save this, no firing of any consequence happened during the entire morning, the time being occupied in changing the position of our various brigades, so as best to use them against the enemy's rapidly extending line. All this time a sharp skirmishing fire was kept up in our immediate front and centre, while a louder report, followed by the ominous whistle, told of the rapid flight of shot or shell. The First division occupied the advance line, while General Crook's division was sent off to the right, but returned almost immediately. As the General's practised eye saw that the enemy were massing for an attack on our centre, he advised the Commanding General of the fact, and recalled his division. It arrived not a minute too soon. Having seen the weakening of our centre, and not knowing of the return of

the Kanawha division, the rebels came on in perfect confidence of victory. There they come, old veterans of the famous Ewell corps, practised in the hundred battles of the Potomac army, rank after rank. Will our men resist and repel this almost irresistible torrent of steel, lead and iron, rushing on to overwhelm them? We wait but a few minutes. Grape, canister, shell, are hurled on them from our batteries, while regiment after regiment pours in its effective fire at short range. They waver, halt, turn, when, with a cheer, our men are up and after them, driving them clear into and behind their breastworks. These being completely commanded by works in the rear, our men reluctantly retired, bringing with them numerous guns, dropped by the rebels in their hurried flight. In this charge the Fifth Virginia infantry by some misunderstanding got into the front ranks, although they, with the whole Second division, were only used as reserves. As it was, they rushed on with the advance occupying the left, and suffered severely, losing about thirty men.

With this charge, repulse and charge, ended the second day's work before Lynchburg. We had tested the enemy's position and numbers, and found both too great for our army, with limited rations, to overcome. Before us was a strongly-fortified town, that if taken by us at all, could only be taken by surprise. In it were troops far surpassing ours in numbers and freshness, fighting behind breastworks.

So, quietly, on the night of the eighteenth, the wagon and ambulance trains were started; in the afternoon and about nine o'clock the troops were withdrawn, and our journey home was commenced, General Crook's division bringing up and guarding the rear.

On Saturday evening, Colonel Powell, Second Virginia cavalry, with the First and Second Virginia cavalry regiments and two guns, marched around by the right, to cut the railroad east of Lynchburg, and surprise a fort about two miles from the city. By some oversight, the guide missed the road and led them ten miles out of the way, to Campbell Courthouse. After a slight skirmish, in which they killed two and captured six, a messenger arrived from Averell, informing the Colonel of our withdrawal, and he was compelled to rejoin the main column without doing much injury to the railroad.

Flying rumors, and false rumors, too, passed from one end of our column to the other, as to the number and designs of the enemy following in our rear. The event proved their only object to be to harass, as much as fifteen hundred men could, our army, and pick up stragglers. Early's division could not be spared from Richmond longer than absolutely necessary for Lynchburg's safety, so McCausland followed us with his brigade. It was galling to our brave soldiers to retire thus in the guise of retreat before the men they had so often overcome and routed. To give them a battle, if they really wished it,

at Buford's Gap, General Crook drew up his division in line and awaited their onset. The men were fairly longing for one more chance to punish the wolves hovering in our rear, but they came not, and after waiting a couple of hours, once more we marched on, and once more they followed. All night of the twentieth we marched along the line of the railroad, and every bridge or culvert that was burnable was burned, so that through the whole country for miles shone the light of these traces of our devastating march.

As the command was at breakfast on the morning of the twenty-first, in and around Salem, the rebels made a fierce attack on the rear, with both musketry and shells. A brigade being sent back to assist in covering the retreat into the valley at the foot of the Catawba Mountain, the trains were hurried on. For a few moments it was very difficult to decide whether we were not going to have a regular stampede, such a panic seemed to possess the inevitable teamsters. The trains passed on in safety, and were followed by Carlin's and Stone's batteries, that by some strange neglect, were left unguarded by any except the artillerists, they having neither revolvers nor sabres. Passing into a defile, a party of one hundred and fifty to two hundred rebels rushed down on them, drove them off, and proceeded leisurely to chop up the spokes of the wheels and cut the traces, and lead off the horses, and all, too, without firing a single shot. So quietly was it all done, that persons accompanying the line, quietly resting in a wood near by, heard or knew nothing of it, until a score or two of frightened artillerists rushed up to tell of their loss. The remaining command coming up were astonished to find the ruins of two splendid batteries standing in the road a desolate monument to somebody's inexperience and guilt. An effort was made to haul off the pieces in wagons, but it was found possible to carry but four; the remaining six, spiked, and with trunnions knocked off, were hidden. The ten carriages and ten caissons were then, by some brilliant orders, fired and left to burn by the roadside, over which almost our whole column has still to pass. The result may easily be imagined, and the folly and stupidity of the morning's work culminated in the killing of six men and wounding ten of the Second Virginia cavalry. Our loss, then, by this sole disaster of our retreat, is six cannon, ten carriages, ten caissons, one hundred and twenty horses, six men killed and ten wounded.

It is entirely owing to the policy maintained in the First division, of carrying the batteries as trains separated from the column. Unarmed as the men are, we can readily perceive what an easy matter it would be for any enterprising rebel with a small command to dash in and destroy and capture, as was done Tuesday morning. Attempts had been made to induce General Crook to place his batteries in the same position in our columns, but he steadily refused,

and the good results of his persistence became evident on Tuesday, when a similar attack was made upon Captain McMullen's battery, when the rebels were driven off, with a number killed and wounded.

On the evening of the twenty-first, General Crook, growing tired of the incessant skirmishing in our rear, determined to give the rebels a lesson, and, concealing the Thirty-third regiment on each side of the road, marched on. The over-confident bushwhackers—for such alone they are—followed, and, as usual, fired on our rear. A return fire from the infantry from the roadside greeted them, and killed fifteen and wounded several. Since then they have been very cautious of any too near approach to our columns.

At Salem we turned north on the road over Catawba Mountain to Newcastle, and on the night of the twenty-third we encamped at Sweet Springs, in whose beautiful grounds of old the chivalry were wont to assemble and disport themselves. Passing the night of the twenty-fourth at White Sulphur, we reached Meadow Bluffs on the twenty-fifth, without incident, save the great need of rations, which began to be felt so pressingly in the ranks. On the twenty-sixth and twenty-seventh the march continued; on the latter day the command meeting wagons with abundant rations. Once more rest and quiet await us, and in a short time the army will be ready for another expedition, with, let us hope, better auspices.

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

GAULEY, July 1, 1864.

I have before me some accounts of our Lynchburg expedition, taken from late Lynchburg papers, which abound with the usual amount of truth that is found in rebel papers. And just here let me note the fact, that the staunchest rebels we met everywhere on our raid, confessed that they did not and could not know the truth in regard to the success or failure of any movements. Their papers dared not tell it, and the people all knew this to be the case.

After a highly mythical account of Saturday's skirmishing—which the distorted rebel imagination magnified into an immense battle over miles of country, and in which I learn that four thousand of our cavalry unsuccessfully charged on men behind rifle-pits and breastworks—certainly a new method of warfare—we read that:

"The battle ended on Saturday afternoon, and the enemy retreated in great haste on Saturday night. Had they remained until the next day, we are satisfied, from the dispositions that had been made by General ———, that they would have been captured. Their safety is not now an assured fact by any means."

The fearful mystery involved in the blank where the general's name should be, is truly appalling, and well designed to strike terror to the heart of any impudent raider. On a par with this is the doubt in which our safety was

still involved. Certainly, the men in our gallant army will be surprised to learn that their enemies were so much more concerned about our safety than we ourselves.

"In many localities, on both the Salem and Forest roads, trees were felled and blockades of fence-rails and stones were made to impede pursuit. In removing these some hours were lost by our men."

"This is simply false. 'Some hours were lost by their men,' but they were lost—when General Crook's division lay in line of battle, waiting for these eager pursuers, hoping, longing for their approach. But, no!—they halted just outside of range and continued there, until, tired of waiting, our men once more resumed their march. Do they forget—or perhaps it were contraband to mention it—the lesson taught their valiant bushwhackers by the Twenty-third Ohio at Buford's gap?"

"Hunter reached Liberty on his retreat Sunday about two o'clock, our forces but a short distance behind. His rear-guard was overtaken about two miles west of Liberty, on the road to Buchanan, and a sharp skirmish ensued, in which we are reported to have captured about one hundred prisoners, besides killing and wounding several."

One would scarcely imagine from the above that our whole command remained in and about Liberty for dinner and rest nearly the whole afternoon, from two o'clock till dark. The prisoners taken must be the few wounded left in Liberty under the charge of the three surgeons with the rebel hospitals.

But why pursue this veracious account further? The attempt was most industriously made to convey the idea that our army was disgracefully routed, and that our return was a retreat, and not simply a homeward march from a raid. And as we of Hunter's army draw nearer the Northern world—from the wilderness of mountains and valleys in which for four weeks we have been wandering—we find the same idea prevalent among our own people. Our gallant young General, Crook, was reported killed; five hundred only of his command were returning, the rest in Libby, or their last resting-place, from life's wearisome toils. Such reports, of course, have been most easily dispelled, but there still linger in many minds distressing doubts and fears of disasters most dire. These found partial expression in a despatch published in your city that seven thousand rebels had occupied Lewisburg, which, of course, was untrue. In the valley, no little surprise was manifested when they witnessed our quiet settling into camp life, with no fortifications, no alarms, or undignified hurry. Here they soon learned our true condition; but with you it may be more difficult to see why we failed to take Lynchburg, and why this failure does not constitute a defeat.

But we didn't take Lynchburg, and why? Simply because Major-General Hunter allowed a failure in the first, most important element of

a raid—celerity of movement. A raid is an advance far into an enemy's country, where, at very short notice, vastly superior forces can be hurled against the invading party. The only hope for success in such a movement depends upon the surprise of the invaded, the suddenness of the blow, and ere he has time to recover and collect his forces, the rapidity of return to the original base, where the parties are on a nearly equal footing. Now, did General Hunter move in accordance with this requisite? General Crook, with his command, joined him at Staunton, Wednesday noon, June eighth, where he had been resting his men two days. Already, among the rebels, it was believed that Lynchburg was the point at which we were aiming. Yet we lay at Staunton until Friday morning, the tenth, and by short, easy marches, entered Lexington on the evening of the eleventh, and rested here until Tuesday morning, the fourteenth. By this time belief in the rebel mind had become certainty, and we heard that they were taking the Lynchburg stores to Danville, and making preparations to resist us at Lynchburg. Lexington is only forty-one miles distant from Lynchburg by the direct route. General Crook here implored permission to march his own gallant Kanawha division by this road, and surprise and take Lynchburg, in accordance with his own raid-like custom; but he was refused, and compelled to march with what he knew was almost fatal slowness.

Instead of taking the direct route, General Hunter leads us off to Liberty, by way of Buchanan, both trifling places, in neither of which did we gain any peculiar advantage, taking us by two sides of a triangle instead of the shorter line.

Now, notice the result of all this delay of four days, and how it defeated our design against Lynchburg. We arrived at Lynchburg Friday afternoon, attacked and drove the rebels two miles, and only halted with the coming night. During the night the heavy reinforcements, from Richmond, a division under Early, arrived in Lynchburg, having been just five days on the way. This latter fact we have ascertained from undoubted testimony. With these reinforcements, the army in Lynchburg far outnumbered ours, and that too, with the addition of strong breastworks, rifle-pits and forts. In such a situation but one course is left, and that is, speedy and cautious retreat.

Well, the retreat is begun, and certainly no complaint can be made of delay or idling in this part of the march.

Then, furthermore, look at the disgraceful loss of artillery to a paltry pack of guerrillas, not quite two hundred in all, what more, or rather less, could be expected than that such a loss would of necessity follow from the disposition made of the batteries, in what seemed to be more especially Hunter's command, of the First division. They were made a separate train, just as our wagons. Attempts had been made

to induce General Crook, to run the same risk with his batteries, but in the absence of any positive orders, he managed to avoid it.

Such, then, seems to me to be the cause of our failure to take Lynchburg. General Hunter, although a good officer of high education, is not the man to "go on a raid."

CONFEDERATE NARRATIVES.

LYNCHBURG VIRGINIAN ACCOUNT.

The line of battle extended from about half a mile above the toll-gate (two and a half miles from Lynchburg), on the Lynchburg and Salem turnpike. The distance embraced by this line must be two and a half to three miles.

Dr. E. H. Murrell, who was in a good position to observe a portion of the fight, has informed us that a battery stationed on Halsey's farm did great execution. He distinctly saw a large body of cavalry, which he supposed to be about four thousand, drawn up in line of battle in Captain Barksdale's field, on the Forest road. They charged upon our fortifications with great spirit, yelling defiance, and at the top of their voices, which were borne to the point where the doctor stood concealed, he heard them cry "Come out of your holes, you — rebels; we've got you now! come out of your holes." When these infuriated wretches got within reach of our grape and canister, our boys let fly a volley at them, which did terrible execution. Two other volleys were poured into them, when they broke and fled.

The battle ended on Saturday afternoon, and the enemy retreated in great haste on Saturday night. Had they remained until the next day, we are satisfied, from the dispositions that had been made by General —, that they would have been captured. Their safety is not now an assured fact by any means.

We rode over the battle-field on Sunday, observing the results of the previous day's work. On two or three contiguous fields, on the farm of Dr. Owen and John B. Lee, we counted some forty odd dead Yankees, who lay stiff, and stark, and nude, a spectacle of horrors. They had been denuded, it was said, by their particular friends, gentlemen of "African descent." Most of them were supposed to be sharpshooters, who fell in advance of the enemy's lines, and quite near to our rifle-pits and intrenchments.

Fully three fourths of them were shot through the head, and others through the heart, thus showing the accuracy of that unerring aim which sent them to their last account. Some of them were fierce-looking heavily-bearded out-throats, while a few were smooth-faced boys. We noticed one who seemed to be a stripling of scarce seventeen summers. On the left of the Salem turnpike, near the left of the Quaker meeting-house, we saw five graves. The wooden boards placed at their heads stated that these were all killed on Friday, the seventeenth. On the other side of the road a man was laid out

on a blanket, with a piece of paper pinned on his breast, marked "Robert J. Simpson, Company I, First Virginia Light Infantry."

ANOTHER ACCOUNT.

The fight on Saturday, near this city, says the *Lynchburg Republican*, was a much heavier one than at first supposed, and its results greatly more disastrous to the enemy than stated yesterday morning. It is now stated that their dead alone left on the field numbered one hundred and twenty, and their wounded in field hospitals, who fell into our hands—being too badly hurt to be moved—are reported at one hundred and fifty. General Averell stated to a gentleman entirely trustworthy, that their loss was eight hundred killed, wounded and missing.

Our entire loss on Saturday is semi-officially reported at nine killed and seventeen wounded. In the engagement and pursuit as far as New London, we captured in all about forty prisoners. The report of the capture of three pieces of artillery was erroneous.

The enemy commenced their retreat about six o'clock Saturday evening, after their unsuccessful assault upon our lines, previously reported. As soon as the retreat was discovered, vigorous pursuit was made. Gentlemen whose houses the enemy passed, inform us that they travelled in great haste and confusion, and they also say that in conversation both officers and men expressed great surprise at finding the city so well prepared for resistance.

The battle-field on Sunday presented quite a ghastly spectacle. A circumstance connected with the enemy's dead is worthy of notice, as showing the accuracy and aim of our sharpshooters.

A gentleman undertook to count the dead as they lay on the field, and to note the place where they were shot. Of forty-seven so counted, forty-two were struck in the head, and death appeared to have been almost instantaneous—a mete and proper fate for these ruthless invaders.

The enemy threw away a large number of guns, pistols and swords, both on the battle-field and on the route of the retreat. Knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, &c., were also profusely strewn around, and many were picked up by citizens who visited the fields and passed along the roads.

In many localities, on both the Salem and Forest roads, trees were felled and blockades of fence rails and stones were made to impede pursuit. In removing these some hours were lost by our men.

Generals Hunter, Crook, Averell and Sullivan, put up with Major Hutter, about four miles from town, whose beautiful farm was used as headquarters. In their suite were the notorious Doctor Rucker and David H. Strother (Porte Crayon), the former attached to Crook's staff.

Major Hutter, being an old army officer, was

well acquainted with Hunter, and talked freely to him respecting his expedition. Hunter said that he had fifty thousand men, and could take Lynchburg easily—that we had better make no resistance. When Major Hutter informed him that it would be no easy task, and that our people, in the last resort, would retire to the Amherst Heights and fire upon them, Hunter replied that, in such an event, he would help them to destroy the town. The general officers were in very high spirits at the supper table on Friday night, and boasted that they would be in Lynchburg the next day.

On Saturday night they took their meal at the same board in perfect silence. General Averell retired to the back porch after supper, very moody, and remarked to Miss Hutter that "the battle of Lynchburg would be one of the bloodiest records of this war for the time it lasted." He said that the loss was very heavy on both sides, theirs not being less than eight hundred to a thousand. The General was mistaken as to ours, which is six killed and ninety-five wounded.

Sullivan said they had some twenty or thirty thousand men, and reinforcements were expected under Pope, who, with other troops, had four thousand contrabands.

The Yankees avowed it to be their purpose to capture Lynchburg, and then proceed to the assistance of Butler. They placed their signal officers on the top of Major Hutter's house, and as the battle progressed on Saturday, the "look-out" declared that the cavalry were charging splendidly: after a while, however, he said that they were giving way, and finally left his eyrie in disgust.

When Miss Hutter remonstrated with General Hunter for his vandalism in burning the Military Institute, he replied, "You need not make a fuss about that, for I intend to burn the University of Virginia also."

After the melancholy supper referred to, Hunter told Major Hutter that they wanted to hold a council. They thereupon appropriated two rooms, the doors of which they locked carefully. Major Hutter, having retired to a back chamber of his house, attempted to pass out of the building, when he was informed that he was a prisoner. When the Yankee officers retired, they said that they were going to the front, and thus took up the line of retreat before Major Hutter was aware of their intentions.

Some of the Yankee soldiers repaid the hospitality of Major Hutter by plundering Miss Hutter's chamber, searching trunks and drawers, and carrying away various ornaments and valuables.

Some ninety odd wounded Yankees were left in Major Hutter's barn. Four or five of them died on Sunday. These wounded were rather the best-looking Yankees we have yet seen, being mostly Western men. Other wounded were left among the families of the people they had robbed, while many of the slightly wounded were doubtless carried off.

We are obliged to close our narrative here, by adding that the Yankees retired by the way they came.

The scenes of desolation and ruin in the neighborhood of this city, near where the enemy made their line of battle, are positively appalling. The people were stripped of everything; fences were torn down, crops trampled up, and every species of vandalism that savages could think of, was practised. Hogs, sheep, cattle, poultry, were stolen and carried off, and when not needed for food were wantonly slaughtered and left to rot on the ground.

Among others we have heard of as being thus brutally despoiled were Mrs. Poindexter, General Clay, Captain Armistead, Doctor Floyd, and N. W. Barksdale, on and near the Forest road; and on the Salem road, Samuel Miller, Major G. C. Hutter, and Doctor W. Owen. There were also others of whose names we have not been informed; and along the entire line of the enemy's march, as far as we can learn, the same scenes of plunder and robbery were enacted. Captain Paschal Buford was stripped of everything—cattle, horses, hogs, provisions, &c., all were taken; and so with Captain W. M. Smith, living near Lewry's, and all persons living on or within reach of the road. At Liberty the case was the same, and there is scarcely a family there who has a dust of meal or a ration of bacon.

Along the road between this place and Liberty a gentleman who passed over it yesterday tells us that there are at least one hundred or more dead horses and mules. When these animals gave out, they were cruelly shot.

The enemy were out of rations, and the Chief Commissary told a lady Saturday morning that they were compelled to do one of two things—capture Lynchburg and get supplies, or retreat. Finding that they could not do the former, they had to do the latter, and we predict that this is the last Yankee trip to Lynchburg.

Doc. 92.

THE NIAGARA PEACE CONFERENCE

CLIFTON HOUSE, NIAGARA FALLS,
CANADA WEST, July 12. }

DEAR SIR: I am authorized to say that Honorable Clement C. Clay, of Alabama, Professor James B. Holcomb, of Virginia, and George N. Saunders, of Dixie, are ready and willing to go at once to Washington, upon complete and unqualified protection being given, either by the President or Secretary of War. Let the permission include the three names and one other.

Very respectfully,
GEO. N. SAUNDERS.

To HON. HORACE GREELEY.

NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y., July 17, 1864.

GENTLEMEN: I am informed that you are duly accredited from Richmond as the bearers of

propositions looking to the establishment of peace; that you desire to visit Washington in the fulfilment of your mission, and that you further desire that Mr. G. N. Saunders shall accompany you. If my information be thus far substantially correct, I am authorized by the President of the United States to tender you his safe conduct in the journey proposed, and to accompany you at the earliest time that will be agreeable to you.

I have the honor to be, gentlemen,
HORACE GREELEY.

MESSRS. CLEMENT C. CLAY, JACOB THOMPSON,
JAMES B. HOLOOMB, Clifton House, C. W.

CLIFTON HOUSE, NIAGARA FALLS, July 18.

SIR: We have the honor to acknowledge your favor of the seventeenth instant, which would have been answered on yesterday, but for the absence of Mr. Clay.

The safe conduct of the President of the United States has been tendered us, we regret to state, under some misapprehension of facts. We have not been accredited to him from Richmond as the bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace.

We are, however, in the confidential employment of our government, and entirely familiar with its wishes and opinions on that subject, and we feel authorized to declare that if the circumstances disclosed in this correspondence were communicated to Richmond, we would be at once invested with the authority to which your letter refers, or other gentlemen with full powers would immediately be sent to Washington with the view of hastening a consummation so much to be desired, and terminating at the earliest possible moment the calamities of war. We respectfully solicit, through your intervention, a safe conduct to Washington, and thence, by any route which may be designated, through your lines to Richmond. We would be gratified if Mr. Geo. N. Saunders was embraced in this privilege.

Permit us, in conclusion, to acknowledge our obligations to you for the interest you have manifested in the furtherance of our wishes; and to express the hope that, in any event, you will afford us the opportunity of tendering them in person before you leave the Falls.

We remain, very respectfully, &c.,
C. C. CLAY, JR.
J. H. HOLOOMB.

P. S.—It is proper to add that Mr. Thompson is not here, and has not been staying with us since our sojourn in Canada.

INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, NIAGARA FALLS, N. Y.,
July 18, 1864. }

GENTLEMEN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of yours of this date, by the hand of Mr. W. C. Jewett. The state of affairs therein presented being materially different from that which was understood to exist by the President when he entrusted me with the safe conduct

required, it seems to me on every account advisable that I should communicate with him by telegraph, and solicit fresh instructions, which I shall at once proceed to do. I hope to be able to transmit the result this afternoon, and at all events I shall do so at the earliest moment.

Yours truly,
HORACE GREELEY.

To Messrs. C. C. CLAY, G. H. HOLCOMB, Clifton House, C. W.

CLIFTON HOUSE, NIAGARA FALLS, C. W., }
July 18, 1864. }

To Hon. Horace Greeley, Niagara Falls, New York:

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of this date by the hands of Colonel Jewett, and will await the further answer which you promise to send to us.

Very respectfully, &c.,
C. C. CLAY, JR.,
J. H. HOLCOMB.

INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, NIAGARA FALLS, }
July 19, 1864. }

GENTLEMEN: At a late hour last evening, too late for communication with you, I received a despatch from the President, informing me that further instructions left Washington last evening, which must reach me, if there be no interruption, by noon to-morrow. Should you decide to await their arrival, I feel confident that they will enable me to answer definitely your note of yesterday morning. Regretting a delay which I am sure you will regard as unavoidable on my part, I remain, yours truly,

HORACE GREELEY.

To Hon. Messrs. CLAY and J. P. HOLCOMB, Clifton House.

CLIFTON HOUSE, July 19, 1864.

SIR: Colonel Jewett has just handed us your note of this date, in which you state that further instructions from Washington will reach you by noon to-morrow, if there be no interruption. One, or possibly both of us may be obliged to leave the Falls to-day, but will return in time to receive the communication which you propose to-morrow.

We remain, truly yours, &c.,
J. P. HOLCOMB,
C. C. CLAY, JR.

To Hon. HORACE GREELEY, International Hotel.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

To whom it may Concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms in substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Major Hay would respectfully inquire whether Professor Holcomb, and the gentleman associated with him, desire to send to Washington by Major Hay any message in reference to the communication delivered to him on yesterday, and in that case, when he may expect to be favored with such message.

INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, Thursday.

Mr. Holcomb presents his compliments to Major Hay, and greatly regrets if his return to Washington has been delayed by any expectation of an answer to the communication which Mr. Holcomb received from him yesterday, to be delivered to the President of the United States. This communication was accepted as a response to the letter of Messrs. Holcomb and Clay to Hon. Horace Greeley, and to that gentleman has been transmitted.

CLIFTON HOUSE, C. W., Thursday, July 21.

The following is a copy of the original letter held by me to deliver to Hon. Horace Greeley, and which duplicate I now forward to the Associated Press.

WM. CORNELL JEWETT.

CLIFTON HOUSE, C. W., July 21.

To Hon. Horace Greeley:

SIR: The paper handed to Mr. Holcomb on yesterday, in your presence, by Major Hay, A. A. G., as an answer to the application in our note of the eighteenth instant, is couched in the following terms:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864.

To whom it may Concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States will be received and considered by the Executive Government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on other and substantial and collateral points, and the bearer or bearers thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

The application to which we refer was elicited by your letter of the seventeenth instant, in which you inform Mr. Jacob Thompson and ourselves that you were authorized by the President of the United States to tender us his safe conduct on the hypothesis that we were duly accredited from Richmond as bearers of propositions looking to the restoration of peace, and desired to visit Washington in the fulfillment of this mission. This assertion, to which we then gave, and still do, entire credence, was accepted by us as evidence of an unexpected but most gratifying change in the policy of the President; a change which we felt authorized to hope might terminate in the conclusion of a peace mutually just, honorable, and advantageous

to the North and to the South, exacting no condition but that we should be duly accredited from Richmond as bearers of propositions looking to the establishment of peace, thus proffering a basis for conference as comprehensive as we could desire. It seemed to us that the President opened a door which had previously been closed against the Confederate States, for a full interchange of sentiments, free discussion of conflicting opinions, and an untrammelled effort to remove all causes of controversy by liberal negotiation. We, indeed, could not claim the benefit of a safe-conduct which had been extended to us in a character we had no right to assume, and had never affected to possess, but the uniform declaration of our Executive and Congress, and their thrice-repeated, and as often repulsed attempts to open negotiations, furnished a sufficient pledge that this conciliatory manifestation on the part of the President of the United States would be met by them in a temper of equal magnanimity. We had, therefore, no hesitation in declaring that if this correspondence was communicated to the President of the Confederate States, he would promptly embrace the opportunity presented for seeking a peaceful solution of this unhappy strife. We feel confident you will join in our profound regret that the spirit which dictated the first step toward peace should not have continued to animate the councils of your President. Had the representatives of the two governments met to consider this question, the most momentous ever submitted to human statesmanship, in a temper of becoming moderation and equity, followed as their deliberations have been by the prayers and benedictions of every patriot and Christian on the habitable globe. Who is there so bold as to pronounce that the frightful waste of individual happiness and public prosperity which is daily saddening the universal heart, might not have been terminated; or if the desolation and carnage of war must still be endured through weary years of blood and suffering, that there might not at least have been infused into its conduct something more of the spirit which softens and partially redeems its brutalities. Instead of the safe-conduct which we solicited, and which your first letter gave us every reason to suppose would be extended, for the purpose of instituting negotiations in which neither government would compromise its rights or its dignity, a document has been presented which provokes as much indignation as surprise. It bears no feature of resemblance to that which was originally offered; as unlike any paper which ever before emanated from the constitutional Executive of a free people. Addressed to whom it may concern, it precludes negotiations, and prescribes in advance terms and conditions of peace. It returns to the original policy of no bargaining, no negotiations, no truce with rebels, until every man shall have laid down his arms, submitted to the Government, and sued for mercy. What may be the explanation of this sudden and entire change in

the views of the President; or this rude withdrawal of a courteous overture for negotiation at the moment it was likely to be accepted; of this emphatic recall of words of peace just uttered, and fresh blasts of war to the bitter end, we leave for the speculation of those who have the means or inclination to penetrate the mysteries of his Cabinet, or fathom the caprice of his imperial will. It is enough for us to say that we have no use whatever for the paper which has been placed in our hands. We could not transmit it to the President of the Confederate States without offering him an indignity, dishonoring ourselves, and incurring the well-merited scorn of our countrymen. While an ardent desire for peace pervades the people of the Confederate States, we rejoice to believe that there are few, if any, among them who would purchase it at the expense of liberty, honor, and self-respect. If it can be secured only by their submission to terms of conquest, the generation is yet unborn which will witness its restoration. If there be any military autocrat in the North who is entitled to proffer the conditions of this manifesto, there is none in the South authorized to entertain them. Those who control our armies are the servants of the people, not their masters; and they have no more inclination than they have right to subvert the social institutions of sovereign States to overthrow their established Constitution, and to barter away their heritage of self-government.

This correspondence will not, however, we trust, prove wholly barren of good results. If there is any citizen of the Confederate States who has clung to the hope that peace was possible with this Administration of the Federal Government, it will strip from their eyes the last film of such delusion; or if there be any whose heart has grown faint under the suffering and agony of this bloody struggle, it will inspire them with fresh energy to endure and brave whatever may yet be requisite to preserve to themselves and their children all that gives dignity and value to life, or hope and consolation to death; and if there are any patriots or Christians in your land who shrink appalled from the illimitable vista of private misery and public calamity which stretches before them, we pray that in their bosoms a resolution may be quickened to reclaim the abused authority and vindicate the outraged civilization of their country. For the solicitude you have manifested to inaugurate a movement which contemplates results the most noble and humane, we return our sincere thanks, and are most respectfully and truly, your obedient servants,

C. C. CLAY, JR.,
JAS. P. HOLOOMB.

CLAYTON HOUSE, July 20.

Col. W. C. Jewett, Cataract House, Niagara Falls, New York:

SIR: We are in receipt of your note advising us of the departure of Honorable Horace Greeley from the Falls; that he regrets the sad termina-

tion of the initiatory steps taken for peace, in consequence of the change made by the President in his instructions to convey the Commissioners to Washington, for negotiation unconditionally, and that Mr. Greeley will be pleased to receive any answer we may have to make through you. We avail ourselves of this offer to enclose a letter to Mr. Greeley, which you will oblige us by delivering. We cannot take leave of you without expressing our thanks for your courtesy and kind offices, as the intermediary through whom our correspondence with Mr. Greeley has been conducted, and assuring you that we are very respectfully, your obedient servants,

C. C. CLAY, JR.,
JAS. P. HOLCOMB.

SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE AFFAIR.

For the first time we have the pleasure of heartily approving a State paper of Abraham Lincoln. It is his letter addressed "To Whom it May Concern." It concerns Messrs. Holcomb, C. C. Clay and George N. Saunders, and we would fondly believe, no other person, or persons whomsoever. When officious individuals go creeping round by back doors, asking interviews with Lincoln for "a full interchange of sentiments," it gives us sincere gratification to see them spurned, yes kicked, from the said back door. To Abraham, we deliberately say "Bravo," or, if he likes it better, "Bully." Think of an ex-Senator from Alabama, and a Virginian member of Congress—for we say nothing of the third "negotiator"—exposing themselves gratuitously, idly and unbidden, to receive such an ignominious rebuff at the hands of the truculent buffoon of Illinois.

It is suggested that perhaps the cunning device of Mr. Saunders was only a contrivance for helping the peace party in the enemy's country; that the answer of Mr. Lincoln was just the very kind of answer which the "many-counselled" George expected, and that it is to be used to show how ferociously and unrelentingly the present Yankee administration is bent on war, and repulses the slightest hint of peace. As usual with such excessively cunning schemes, this one not only defeats itself, but helps the cause which it was possibly intended to damage. To exhibit an ex-Senator and member of Congress of the rebel States thus timidly crawling by a roundabout way to the footstool of the Emperor of the Yahoos, whining and snivelling about peace and "liberal negotiations," and haughtily refused even admittance to the sovereign presence, will serve, not the peace, but the war party, because it will be used to create the impression that the Confederacy must be in the agonies of death when two such distinguished legislators make so pitiful an attempt to reach the ear of offended majesty. If such was the idea, then, in this case, as in the other, "those whom it may concern" have got what they deserve.

Has any one seen the Reverend Colonel

Jacques and one Edmund Kirke? What are the detectives about? Here have been two spies, manifestly spies, "at the Spottswood Hotel, Richmond, on a secret mission," and now, instead of being in Castle Thunder, Kirke and the Reverend Colonel are again in their own country, giving mysterious hints to the Washington correspondents about their three days' entertainment in Richmond, and about two "interviews" which they say they had with Mr. Davis. They cannot disclose "for the present"—those deep diplomats—what passed at these interviews, but "it is intimated"—and here is truly a startling fact—that Mr. Davis would consent to nothing short of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy." Of course, these two Yankees were spies, or else they wanted to sell something in Richmond which they had run through the lines; or probably they combined the two objects. Our passport system, we fear, is but little protection, and the detectives are not sufficiently vigilant.

Howsoever that may be, there is now certainly a renewal of these vague whisperings of peace which have several times before circulated through society. Many think that peace is in the air. Peace and rumors of peace float around us, and men dream of peace at night. We have seen here unauthorized persons, both Union and rebel, repair respectively North and South, about the same moment, as it were, snuffing peace, as horses snuff water in the desert. If gold declines a little in New York, even in the teeth of military disaster, the *News* says it is because there is a sort of instinctive feeling that we are on the eve of peace. This is not unnatural; the plain avowals of the enemy's press four months ago, that this year's campaign must be the final one, the near approach of Lincoln's bloody term, the imminent financial ruin of the United States, all combine to produce, not so much a conviction as a presentiment, that we are soon to have peace.

And it may be so. Peace may be nearer to us than we think, and may come suddenly, though one cannot see precisely how. One thing, however, is clear. So desirable an event cannot be hastened by amateur negotiators "exchanging sentiments" with Mr. Lincoln; nor by blockade runners thrusting "interviews" on Mr. Davis; nor by any possible or conceivable correspondence between George Saunders and Horace Greeley.

STATEMENT OF HORACE GREELEY.

Mr. Greeley in the *Independent* of July twenty-sixth, 1864, gives the following account of his negotiation:

* * * In the other effort for peace I was a participant, as follows:

Some time since it was announced by telegraph from Halifax that Messrs. C. C. Clay, of Alabama, Jacob Thompson, of Mississippi (ex-United States Senators), Professor J. P. Holcombe of the University of Virginia, and George N. Saunders of Kentucky, had reached that city

from Dixie, *via* Bermuda on important business; and all of these but Mr. Thompson (who is in Toronto), were soon quartered at the Clifton, on the Canada side of Niagara Falls. I heard soon after of confidential interviews between some or all of these gentlemen and leading democrats from our own and the neighboring States, and there were telegraphic whispers of overtures for "reconstruction," and conditions were set forth as those on which the Confederates would consent to reunion. (I cannot say that any of these reports were authentic.) At length, after several less direct intimations, I received a private letter from Mr. Saunders, stating that Messrs. Clay, Holcombe, himself, and another, desired to visit Washington, "upon complete and unqualified protection being given by the President or the Secretary of War."

As I saw no reason why the opposition should be the sole recipients of these gentlemen's overtures, if such there were (and it is stated that Mr. Clay aforesaid is preparing or to prepare an important letter to the Chicago Convention), I wrote the President, urging him to invite the rebel gentlemen aforesaid to Washington, there to open their budget. I stated expressly that I knew not what they would propose if so invited, but I could imagine no offer that might be made by them which would not conduce, in one way or another, to a restoration of the integrity and just authority of the Union.

The President ultimately acquiesced in this view, so far as to consent that the rebel agents should visit Washington, but directed that I should proceed to Niagara and accompany them thence to the capital. This service I most reluctantly undertook, feeling deeply and observing that almost any one else might better have been sent on this errand. But time seemed precious, and I immediately started.

Arrived on this side of the Falls, I wrote across to Messrs. Clay & Co., stating that, on the understanding that they had the needful powers from the authorities at Richmond, I was authorized and ready to give them a safe conduct to Washington. They responded that though in the confidential employment of their government, and fully conversant with its views and purposes, they had not the specific powers I required, but would get them, if permitted, and desired, in order to save time, to proceed at once to Washington, and be permitted thence to communicate with Richmond for the purpose. Not feeling at liberty to concede this, I telegraphed to Washington for further instructions, and was duly informed that Major Hay, the President's Private Secretary, would soon be on his way to me. He reached the Falls on the twentieth, and we crossed over to the Clifton, where Major Hay, after mutual introductions, handed Professor Holcombe the following paper, in the handwriting of the President:

EXECUTIVE MANSION, }
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1864. }

To whom it may concern:

Any proposition which embraces the restoration of peace, the integrity of the whole Union, and the abandonment of slavery, and which comes by and with an authority that can control the armies now at war against the United States, will be received and considered by the executive government of the United States, and will be met by liberal terms on substantial and collateral points; and the bearer thereof shall have safe conduct both ways.

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

I left the Falls by the next train, leaving Major Hay to receive any response to the President's proffer, should any be made; but there was none. Messrs. Clay and Holcombe addressed to me a letter of sharp criticism on the President's proffer above quoted, which I first read in the columns of the daily journals of this city. And here the matter closed, despite all rumors of further or other negotiations. Messrs. Clay, Holcombe and Saunders remain at the Falls, or at the adjacent watering place of St. Catherine's, and are still in the receipt of many visits from democratic politicians, who cross the border on purpose.

I heartily approve the President's bases of negotiation, and think them calculated to exert a salutary influence at the South; and yet I think it would have been wiser to have interposed no conditions, but asked the Confederates to perfect and verify their credentials, and then make their proposition. For, thus brought to book, what could they have proffered that would not have strengthened the upholders of the Union cause? It looks to me as though a rare opportunity was lost for compelling either the democracy of the loyal States or the despots of Europe to forego further manifestations of sympathy with the rebels in their desperate struggle. I may be mistaken in this, but I cannot be in my conviction that every indication of a desire on our part to arrest bloodshed and restore amity tends to disabuse and conciliate the great perverted mass of those now fighting to divide and destroy their and our country.

Doc. 93.

THE BURNING OF CHAMBERSBURG.

CHAMBERSBURG, August 24, 1864.

The defeat of Crook and Averell near Winchester, when pursuing the retreating rebels, was the first intimation given the border of another invasion; and even then little danger was apprehended, as Hunter's army was known to have been brought to Martinsburg, and rested and reorganized, and the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were also known to be on the line of the Potomac. On Wednesday the twenty-seventh ultimo, it was known at headquarters here that our entire force was north of the

Potomac, and the line from Hancock to Harper's ferry was well picketed. General Couch had no troops—not even an organized battalion on the border. He had organized six or seven regiments of one hundred days' men; but as fast as they were officered and armed they were forwarded to Washington, in obedience to orders from the authorities. He was left, therefore, with no force whatever to defend the border. The national authorities had persistently refused to uniform the citizens of the border, and thus enable them to organize for their own defence, without exposing themselves to certain butchery in case of capture, and the border was thus entirely defenceless. General Averell was still between us and the enemy, and it was hoped that in case of an advance, he could, with the aid of citizens, successfully defend Chambersburg, which was known to be a place in which McCausland longed to glut his infernal vengeance. Hunter was compelled to manoeuvre so as to prevent Early from getting between him and Washington, and therefore, could not devote his attention to defence against raids. Had Early drawn him up the Potomac and then hastily moved upon Washington, it would have been defenceless, and must have fallen.

On Thursday the twenty-eighth ultimo, the rebels recrossed the Potomac at three different points—McCausland, Johnston, and Gilmore, with three thousand mounted men and two batteries, below Hancock, and moved toward Mercersburg. They reached Mercersburg at six p. m., where they met Lieutenant McLean, a most gallant young officer in the regular service, with about twenty men. His entire command numbered forty-five, and he had to detach for scouting and picket duty more than half his force. So suddenly did they dash into Mercersburg that they cut the telegraph wire before their movement could be telegraphed, and it was not until ten o'clock that night that Lieutenant McLean got a courier through to General Couch with the information. In the meantime, two other columns crossed the same morning, Generals Vaughn and Jackson, with over three thousand mounted men, at Williamsport, and moved toward Hagerstown. General Averell fell back to Greencastle during the day, and a small column of the enemy advanced five miles this side of Hagerstown, where they encamped that night. Another column crossed at Shepherdstown the same morning and appeared near Leitersburg, on General Averell's left, in the course of the evening, but advanced no further. General Averell was thus threatened in front and on both flanks by three columns, each larger than his own; was isolated from Hunter, his chief officer, and his whole reserve in case he fell back upon Chambersburg, was General Couch and staff, Lieutenant McLean's little command of less than fifty men, some sixty infantry, and a section of artillery. It must be remembered too, that his command was utterly exhausted; having been on duty almost day and night for a week, and previously broken down

by the movement of General Hunter upon Lynchburg and his retreat to Charleston. While it seems clear that General Averell could have saved Chambersburg had he fallen back to this point instead of halting at Greencastle, we are unwilling to censure him, or to hold him responsible for the sad record that McCausland has given to the history of our town. If but one column had threatened him, or had reinforcements been in his rear, he would doubtless have met every expectation of our people. He is a brave and gallant officer—has well earned his fame, and it should not be hastily tarnished.

General Couch, as we have stated, had no troops either here, or within reach of this point, with which to oppose the rebel advance. A few companies of infantry, but half-organized one hundred days' men, were thrown forward from Harrisburg to Averell on the morning before the Mercersburg movement was known, and they remained there under his orders. All the troops General Couch had were on picket duty, or with Lieutenant McLean, who gallantly embarrassed McCausland's advance at every step. He had not even a guard to spare to arrest the stream of stragglers and deserters from Hunter's army—chiefly one hundred days' men. Scores of them passed through, mostly without arms, and had they been arrested they would probably have been valueless.

General Averell was under orders from General Hunter, and not subject to the order of General Couch. He was advised by General Couch by telegraph of the rebel occupation of Mercersburg, and the movement toward this point, which turned Averell's right flank and rear, and urged to fall back if possible and cover this point and save his flanks; but for reasons, which we believe will yet be satisfactorily explained, General Averell did not move from Greencastle until morning, and then he made a circuit by Mount Hope, doubtless to protect his left and save his command from a combined attack by the several columns which had advanced from the river. His trains were sent here about six p. m., with a strong guard, and squads of disabled and demoralized men; but they were moved toward Shippensburg at one a. m. on Friday morning, and the guard, of course, went with them. General Averell did not reach here until about three p. m. on Saturday—nearly five hours after the rebels had burned the town and retreated westward.

General Couch was troopless, and therefore helpless as a commander. His failure to secure the aid of General Averell, and the steady advance of the rebels, made it evident that he could not hold the town, even if every citizen in it had fought resolutely by his side; and as the sequel shows, he apprehended that an unsuccessful resistance, in which citizens were engaged, against a fiendish foe like McCausland, would but swell the measure of rebel vengeance. Lieutenant McLean was driven to the western turnpike at St. Thomas by one a. m. on Friday morning, and resolved to retard the advance of

the enemy as long as possible, to enable the stores and trains to be sent off. All the government stores, railroad trains, &c., were ordered to be ready for immediate removal and they were all saved—the last train leaving the depot when the rebels were on the hill west of town. At three a. m. Lieutenant McLean reported that he had been driven into the town at the western toll-gate, and urged the immediate movement of the trains. As the stores were not yet all ready for shipment, Major Maneely, of General Couch's staff, took one gun, with a squad of men, and planted it on the hill a short distance west of the fair ground. As it was yet dark, his force could not be reconnoitred by the enemy, and when he opened on them they halted until daylight enabled them to see that they had no adequate force to oppose them. By this gallant exploit the rebels were delayed outside of the town until the stores were all saved, and General Couch left the depot as the rebels entered the western part of the town. Lieutenant McLean, and his command, and Major Maneely, being well mounted, escaped before the rebels got into the main part of the town. Major Maneely killed one rebel and wounded five by the first fire of his gun.

It seems inexplicable to persons and journals at a distance that General Couch, a Major-General commanding a department, with his border repeatedly invaded, should have no troops. The natural inclination is to blame the commander, for it is reasonable to suppose that he would endeavor to have an adequate command, and also that ample authority would be given him to have sufficient force. Just where the blame belongs, we do not choose now to discuss; but we do know that it was no fault of General Couch that he was unable to defend Chambersburg. He organized a Provost Guard regiment, some twelve hundred strong, expressly for duty in his department—the men were enlisted under a positive assurance, based on the order authorizing the organization, that they were to be kept on duty in the department. They were ordered to General Grant after the battles of the Wilderness. He organized six regiments of one hundred days' men, before the advent of McCausland, and they were ordered to Washington as soon as they were ready to move. We are assured that Governor Curtin, fully two weeks before the burning of Chambersburg, formally pledged the State to make provision for arming, organizing, and paying the entire militia force of the border for home defence, if the general government would simply give the uniforms; and we believe that General Couch pressed it upon the Washington authorities to uniform the entire force of the Southern counties—assuring them that the people were willing to defend themselves if encouraged by granting them uniforms, so as to save them from inhuman butchery, but it was denied. We do not speak advisedly as to General Couch's correspondence with the Washington authorities—we give no statements at his instance or

based upon information received from him or his officers; but we do write whereof we know, when we say that every effort was made to carry these measures into effect, and that they were not sanctioned at Washington. While we do not assume to fix the responsibility of this terrible disaster, we do mean that it shall not fall upon a commander who was shorn of his strength and left helpless with his people.

The rebels having been interrupted in their entrance into the town until daylight, they employed their time in planting two batteries in commanding positions, and getting up their whole column, fully three thousand strong. About six a. m. on Saturday morning, they opened with their batteries, and fired some half a dozen shots into the town, but they did no damage. Immediately thereafter their skirmishers entered by almost every street and alley running out west and south-west; and finding the way clear, their cavalry, to the number of about four hundred and fifty, came in, under the immediate command of General McCausland. General Bradley Johnston was with him, and also the notorious Major Harry Gilmore.

While McCausland and Gilmore were reconnoitring around to get a deal with the citizens for tribute, his soldiers exhibited the proficiency of their training by immediate and almost indiscriminate robbery. Hats, caps, boots, watches, silver-ware, and everything of value, were appropriated from individuals on the streets, without ceremony; and when a man was met whose appearance indicated a plethoric purse, a pistol would be presented to his head with the order to "deliver," with a dexterity that would have done credit to the free-booting accomplishments of an Italian brigand.

General McCausland rode up to a number of citizens and gave notice that unless five hundred thousand dollars in greenbacks, or one hundred thousand dollars in gold, was paid in half an hour the town would be burned; but no one responded to his call. He was promptly answered that Chambersburg could not and would not pay any ransom. No committee was appointed, and no individuals attempted to deal with the arch-fiend who had come at once to rob and destroy. He had the Court-house bell rung to convene the citizens, hoping to frighten them into the payment of a large sum of money; but no one attended. No sort of effort was made either by individuals singly or in organized capacities to make terms—all had resolved that the freebooter should fulfil his threat rather than pay tribute. Infuriated at the determination of our people, Major Gilmore rode up to a group of citizens, consisting of Thomas B. Kennedy, William M'Lellan, J. M'Dowell Sharpe, Doctor J. C. Richards, William H. M'Dowell, W. S. Everett, Edward G. Etter, and M. A. Foltz, and ordered them under arrest. He said that they would be held for the payment of the money, and if not he would take them to Richmond as hostages, and also burn every house in

town. While he was endeavoring to force them into an effort to raise him money, his men commenced the work of firing, and they were discharged when it was found that intimidation would effect nothing.

The main part of the town was enveloped in flames in ten minutes. No time was given to remove women or children, or sick, or even the dead. No notice of the kind was communicated to any one; but like infuriated fiends from hell itself the work of destruction was commenced. They did not have anything to learn in their horrid trade—they proved themselves experts in their calling. They divided into squads, and fired every other house, and often every house, if they presented any prospect of plunder. They would beat in the door with iron bars or heavy plank, smash up any furniture with an axe, throw fluid or oil upon it, and ply the match. They almost invariably entered every room of each house, rifled the drawers of every bureau, appropriated money, jewelry, watches, and any other valuables, and often would present pistols to the heads of inmates, men and women, and demand money or their lives. In nearly half the instances they demanded owners to ransom their property, and in a few cases it was done and the property burned. Although we have learned of a number of persons, mostly widows, who paid them sums from twenty-five to two hundred dollars, we know of but one case where the property was saved thereby. Mr. James Kennedy, near town, saved his buildings by the payment of two hundred dollars. The main object of the men seemed to be plunder. Not a house escaped rifling—all were plundered of everything that could be carried away. In most cases houses were entered in the rudest manner, and no time whatever allowed even for the families to escape, much less to save anything. Many families had the utmost difficulty to get themselves and children out in time, and not one half had so much as a change of clothing with them. They would rush from story to story to rob, and always fire the building at once, in order to keep the family from detecting their robberies. Feeble and helpless women and children were treated like brutes—told insolently to get out or burn; and even the sick were not spared. Several invalids had to be carried out as the red flames threatened their couches. Thus the work of desolation continued for two hours; and more than half of the town on fire at once; and the wild glare of the flames, the shrieks of women and children, and often louder than all the terrible blasphemy of the rebels, conspired to present such a scene of horror as has never been witnessed by the present generation. No one was spared save by accident. The widow and the fatherless cried and plead in vain that they would be homeless and helpless. A rude oath would close all hope of mercy, and they would fly to save their lives. The old and infirm who tottered before them were thrust aside and the torch applied in their presence to hasten their

departure. So thoroughly were all of them master of the trade of desolation that there is scarcely a house standing in Chambersburg to-day that they attempted to burn, although their stay did not exceed two hours. In that brief period, the major portion of Chambersburg—its chief wealth and business—its capital and elegance, were devoured by a barbarous foe; three millions of property sacrificed; three thousand human beings homeless and many penniless; and all without so much as a pretence that the citizens of the doomed village, or any of them, had violated any accepted rule of civilized warfare. Such is the deliberate, voluntary record made by General Early, a corps commander in the insurgent army. The Government may not take summary vengeance, although it has abundant power to do so; but there is One whose voice is most terrible in wrath, who has declared, "Vengeance is mine—I will repay!"

The house of Mr. James Watson—an old and feeble man of over eighty, was entered, and because his wife earnestly remonstrated against the burning, they fired the room, hurled her into it, and locked the door on the outside. Her daughters rescued her by bursting in the door before her clothing took fire. Mrs. Conner, the widow of a Union soldier, who has no means of support, got on her knees and begged to save her and her little ones from the fury of rebel wrath; but while she was thus pleading for mercy, they fired her little home, and stole ten dollars from her—the only money she had in the world. Mr. Wolfkill, a very old citizen, and prostrated by sickness so that he was utterly unable to be out of bed, plead in vain to be spared a horrible death in the flames of his own house; but they laughed at his terror, and fired the building. Through the extraordinary efforts of some friends, he was carried away safely. Mrs. Lindsey, a very feeble lady of nearly eighty, fainted when they fired her house, and was left by the fiends to be devoured in the flames; but fortunately a relative reached the house in time, and lifting her in a buggy in the stable, pulled her away while the flames were kissing each other over their heads on the street. Mrs. Kuss, wife of the jeweller on Main street, lay dead; and although they were shown the dead body, they plied the torch, and burned the house. Mrs. J. K. Shryock was there with Mrs. Kuss's dying babe in her arms, and plead for the sake of the dead mother and dying child to spare that house, but it was unavailing. The body of Mrs. Kuss was hurriedly buried in the garden, and the work of destruction went on. The next day it was taken up and interred in the Catholic graveyard. When the flames drove Mrs. Shryock out with the child, she went to one of the men, and presenting the dying babe, asked—"Is this revenge sweet?" A tender chord was touched, and without speaking, he burst into tears. He afterward followed Mrs. Shryock, and asked whether he could do anything for her; but it was then too late. The

babe has ceased to be motherless, for it shares a mother's sepulchre. The houses of Messrs. M'Lellan, Sharpe, and Nixon, were saved miraculously. They are located east of the railroad, and out of the business part of the town. They were not reached until the rest of the town was in flames, and the roads were streaming with homeless women and children. Mr. M'Lellan's residence was the first one entered, and he was notified that the house must be burned. Mrs. M'Lellan immediately stepped to the door, and laying one hand on the rebel officer, and pointing with the other to the frantic fugitive women and children passing by, said to him: "Sir, is not your vengeance glutted? We have a home, and can get another; but can you spare no homes for those poor, helpless people and their children? When you and I and all of us shall meet before the Great Judge, can you justify this act?" He made no reply, but ordered his command away, and that part of the town was saved. Mrs. Louis Shoemaker rushed up stairs, when they fired her house, to save some valuables, and returned with some silver spoons in her hand. She found the rebels quarreling over a valuable breast-pin of hers—several claiming it by right of discovery, and the dispute was ended, for the time at least, by one rudely taking the spoons from Mrs. Shoemaker and dividing them among the squad. Mrs. Denig escaped by wetting blankets and throwing them around her, thus enabling her to get out through the burning building in the rear of her house. The residence of Mr. M'Elwaine was burned by a squad of rebels, who first demanded and procured their breakfast from him, because he was guilty of teaching colored children, and he was fired at as he made his escape. S. M. Royston, bar-keeper at Montgomery's Hotel, was robbed on his way down stairs of seven hundred dollars—all the savings of his life. He was met by a squad of rebels, and dexterously relieved of his money and all valuables. Mr. Holmes Crawford was taken into an alley while his house was burning, and his pockets rifled. All he had about him was one dollar and sixty cents, and that was appropriated. He was thus detained until it was impossible for him to get out by the street, and he had to take his feeble wife and sit in the rear of his lot until the buildings burned around him. Father M'Cullen, Catholic priest of this place, was robbed of his watch. He was sitting on his porch, and a party of rebels came up and peremptorily demanded his watch, which he delivered. He was also robbed of his watch last year by Jenkins' men—the same command that burned Chambersburg. Colonel Stumbaugh was arrested near his home early in the morning, and with pistol presented to his head, ordered to procure some whiskey. He refused, for the very good reason that he had none, and could get none. He was released, but afterward re-arrested by another squad, the officer naming him, and was insulted in every possible way. He informed the officer that he

had been in the service, and that if General Battles was present, they would not dare to insult him. When asked why, he answered—"I captured him at Shiloh, and treated him like a soldier." A rebel major present, who had been under Battles, upon inquiry, was satisfied that Colonel Stumbaugh's statement was correct, ordered his prompt release, and withdrew the entire rebel force from that part of Second street, and no buildings were burned. Colonel Boyd's residence—"Federal Hill,"—was also put under guard, when Mrs. Boyd informed them who lived there. They had some recollections of Colonel Boyd occasionally penetrating the Shenandoah Valley, and it was not deemed wholesome to burn his property. Mr. John Treher, of Loudon, was robbed by the rebels of two hundred dollars in gold and silver, and one hundred dollars in currency. The money was in a bureau drawer, but it was most dexterously appropriated by the sciened light-fingered gentry of McCausland. They also stole all his liquors. Mr. D. R. Knight, an artist, started out to the residence of Mr. McClure when he saw Norland on fire, and on his way he was robbed of all his money by a squad of rebels. He reached the house in time to aid in getting the women away. Rebel officers had begged of him before he started, to get the women out of town as fast as possible, as many rebel soldiers were intoxicated, and they feared the worst consequences.

Soon after the work of destruction had commenced, a squad was detailed to burn "Norland," the residence of A. K. M'Clure. It is situated a mile from the centre of the town, and no other building was fired within half a mile of it, although fifty houses stand between it and the burnt portion of Chambersburg. The squad was commanded by Captain Smith, son of Governor Smith (Extra Billy), of Virginia, whose beautiful residence near Warrenton has ever been carefully guarded by Union troops when within our lines. The mother and sisters of the officer who fired "Norland" had lived in peace and safety in their home, under Federal guards, since the war commenced. With the cry of "retaliation," Captain Smith proceeded to Mr. M'Clure's residence. Passing the beautiful mansion of Mr. Eyster, he supposed he had reached the object of his vengeance, and he alighted and met Mr. Eyster at the door. "Colonel M'Clure, I presume," said the chivalrous son of Virginia. "No, sir; my name is Eyster," was the reply. "Where is M'Clure's house?" was the next interrogatory. As the property was evidently doomed, and in sight, Mr. Eyster could only answer that it was further on the road, and the noble warrior passed on. He found Mrs. M'Clure quite ill—having been confined to her bed for ten days previous. He informed her that the house must be burned by way of retaliation—for what particular wrong, he did not seem anxious to explain. He magnanimously stated that she should have ten minutes to get the family out of the house and

away; and to prove his sincerity, he at once fired the house on each story. To convince Mrs. McClure that he was a chivalrous foe, he ordered her to open her secretary while the house was in flames around her, and, evidently ambitious to show his literary taste and acquirements, he commenced to read her private letters. Mrs. McClure informed him that he would doubtless be disappointed in her assortment of literature, as her husband had no papers or letters in the house; but as he seemed desirous to read something, she would commend to him a letter she had just received the day before from a rebel prisoner, invoking the blessing of Heaven upon her and hers for kind ministrations to a foe. The writer had been here with Lee, in June, 1863, and was on guard at the house, and was of course treated kindly. The sick of the same command, as well as those of McCausland's forces—then under Jenkins—were all humanely cared for, by Mrs. McClure; and the author of the letter, having since been captured, and suffering from sickness and destitution, wrote her some time before stating his condition. That she had not turned a deaf ear even to a foe when suffering, is evidenced by the acknowledgment presented to Captain Smith, which was as follows:

PRISONER'S CAMP, POINT LOOKOUT, Md. }
July 20, 1864. }

Mrs. M. S. McClure:

MADAM—It is with feelings of intense gratitude I acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date of twenty-first of June, enclosing — dollars. Words are inadequate to express my gratitude for so kind, so benevolent and unexpected a favor. I can only simply say—many thanks, and may God bless you. I have a mother and sisters; and your letter I shall retain and convey to them in order that they may see the Christian kindness of one who is against us, and urge that they may emulate your example, and never be backward when an opportunity is offered in giving aid to a needy Federal soldier.

As it may never be in my power to reciprocate the favor received at your hands, my prayer is that God may reward you for it. * * * With best wishes for your health and happiness, and trusting that this dark war cloud may soon be dispelled, and peace and happiness and prosperity once more smile upon us,

I am, madam, with much respect,
Your obedient servant,

JAMES B. STAMP,
Company C, Ninth Division.

Such a letter was not just the entertainment to which the imperious son of the South considered himself invited. Instead of retaliating for wrongs done, he found himself about to apply the torch where friend and foe had found solace in distress—even his own men having been mercifully ministered to there by the one over whose aching head and enfeebled limbs he was inviting the fury of the flames. He read the

letter, and answered—“*This is awful—it is awful to burn this house!*” and in vindication of his contrition, he left Mrs. McClure to escape from the fire, while he proceeded to the adjoining room and, in a fit of remorse, stole Mr. McClure's gold watch and other articles of value which might adorn the elegant mansion of the Governor of Virginia at Warrenton. Fortunately Mrs. McClure had some of her own clothing in a trunk, and one of the squad kindly aided her in getting it out of the house, and it was saved, but nothing belonging to Mr. McClure was allowed to be removed. Rev. Mrs. Niccolls, who had rushed to the house, was caught on the stairs with a coat on her arms, and it was rudely taken from her, with the remark, “Saving anything belonging to *him* is expressly forbidden.” In five minutes the house was enveloped in flames, and Mrs. McClure, and the other members of the family at home, started on foot, in the heat of the day, to escape the vengeance of the chivalry. The torch was thrust into the large, well-filled barn, and in half an hour a few charred walls was all that remained of “Norland.” Captain Smith could conceal the watch and other articles he purloined at “Norland” as trophies of his valor, but the silver pitcher was unwieldy, and could not be secreted from profane eyes as he rode back through town from the scene of his triumph. He resolved, therefore, to give a public display of his generosity. He stopped at Rev. Mr. Kennedy's, and handed the pitcher to his wife, with the request—“Please deliver this to Mrs. Colonel McClure, with the compliments of Captain Smith.” The goblets were strapped to the saddle of one of his squad, and the watch could be pocketed to prevent the tell-tale qualities of the pitcher, and they were borne off to the land of heroic warriors and noble blood. The watch stolen by Captain Smith was presented to Mr. McClure by some friends as a testimonial for his services as Chairman of the State Committee in 1860; bears an engraving to that effect, and is worth five hundred dollars.

The following card explains itself fully:

To the Editor of the New York Times:

Your correspondent writing from the southern border of Pennsylvania, says in the *Times* of the fourth instant:

“I was informed by a gentleman on the train that Colonel McClure paid five thousand dollars as a ransom for his threatened property, and after all the scoundrels set the torch to his house, and it now stands a smoking ruin.”

The foregoing statement has not the shadow of truth. I paid no sum of money to ransom my property, nor did any one for me; and although my loss is scarcely less than fifty thousand dollars, not one dollar of tribute would have been paid to barbarous freebooters to save it. I was not present, but no member of my family would have entertained a proposition of any kind to ransom anything belonging to them or me.

A. K. McClure.

CHAMBERSBURG, Friday, August 5, 1864.

Captain Smith, the worthy son of a noble Virginia sire, now Governor of what treason has left of the Old Dominion, gave his name and parentage at "Norland," and also at Rev. James F. Kennedy's. It seems that the residences of ministers were not to be burned, and he gave the following order to Mr. Kennedy.

CHAMBERSBURG, July 30, 1864.

Rev. James F. Kennedy's house is not to be burned, positively prohibited. By order of Brigadier-General McCausland.

F. W. SMITH,
A. A. D. C.

The order was hastily written with lead pencil, but in a very legible hand, while he was delivering Mrs. McClure's pitcher to Mrs. Kennedy, and declaring by way of justification of his conduct, that his father's house had been burned by our troops, a statement he knew to be false.

Fiendish and relentless as were McCausland and most of his command, there were notable exceptions who bravely maintained the humanities of war in the midst of the infuriated freebooters who were plying the torch and securing plunder. Surgeon Budd was conversing with several citizens when the demand for tribute was made, and he assured all present that the rebel commander would not burn Chambersburg. In the midst of his assurances, the flames burst forth almost simultaneously in every part of the town. When he saw the fire break out he wept like a child, and publicly denounced the atrocities of his commander. He took no part in it whatever, save to aid some unfortunate ones in escaping from the flames. Captain Baxter, formerly of Baltimore, peremptorily refused to participate in the burning; but aided many people to get some clothing and other articles out of the houses. He asked a citizen as a special favor to write to his friends in Baltimore and acquit him of the hellish work. Surgeon Richardson, another Baltimorean, gave his horse to a lady to get some articles out of the burning town, and publicly deplored the sad work of McCausland. When asked who his commanding officer was, he answered, "Madam, I am ashamed to say that General McCausland is my commander!" Captain Watts manfully saved all of Second street south of Queen, and with his command aided to arrest the flames. He said he would lose his commission rather than burn out defenceless people, and other officers and a number of privates displayed every possible evidence of their humanity. One whole company was kept by its Captain—name unknown—from burning and pillaging, and the south-eastern portion of Chambersburg stands today solely because an officer detailed there kept his men employed in aiding people out of their burning houses, and did not apply the torch at all. After the rebels had left, the following note was received by Rev. S. J. Nicolls, Presbyterian pastor, written on an envelope with a pencil:

REV. MR. NICOLLS: Please write my father and give him my love. Tell him, too, as Mrs. Shoemaker will tell you, that I was most strenuously opposed to the burning of the town.

B. B. BLAIR,
Chaplain and son of Thomas P. Blair, Shippensburg, Pa.

That there was a most formidable opposition to burning the town in McCausland's command was manifested in various ways. In the morning before daylight, when McCausland was at Greenawalt's, on the turnpike west of Chambersburg, a most boisterous council was held there, at which there were earnest protests made to McCausland against burning anything but public property. McCausland was greatly incensed at some of his officers, and threatened them with most summary vengeance if they refused to obey orders. Many, however, did openly disobey, and went even so far as to give the utmost publicity to their disobedience.

Captain Fitzhugh exhibited to J. W. Douglas, Esquire, an attorney of this place, a written order with the name of Jubal A. Early to it, directing that Chambersburg should be burned, in retaliation for the burning of six houses in Virginia by Hunter. The burning of Chambersburg was therefore by order of one of the corps commanders of General Lee's army, instead of the work of a guerrilla chief, thus placing the responsibility squarely upon the shoulders of General Lee. We have in support of this the statement of Rev. Mr. Edwards, Episcopal clergyman of Hagerstown, who was taken as a hostage after Chambersburg had been destroyed. He was brought to General Early's headquarters at Williamsport, and there paroled to effect his exchange. General Early there informed him that he had directed Chambersburg to be burned in retaliation for the destruction of property in Virginia by Grant, Meade, and Hunter, and that the account was now squared.

A number of the thieves who participated in burning Chambersburg, were sent suddenly to their last account. An officer whose papers identify him as Major Bowen, Eighth Virginia cavalry, was conspicuous for his brutality and robberies. He got too far south of the firing parties to be covered by them, and in his desire to glut his thieving propensities, he was isolated. He was captured by several citizens, in the midst of his brutal work, and was despatched promptly. When he was fired at and slightly wounded, he took refuge in the burning cellar of one of the houses, and there with the intense heat blistering him, he begged them to spare his life; but it was in vain. Half the town was still burning, and it was taxing humanity rather too much to save a man who had added the boldest robbery to atrocious arson. He was shot dead and now sleeps near the Falling Spring, nearly opposite the Depot. He was about five feet five inches in height, very stoutly built, with sandy hair, goatee and

moustache, sandy complexion, full face, and from thirty-five to forty years of age.

Two men entered the drug store of Mr. Miller, and in their haste and confusion got the front door locked, and could not escape speedily after they had fired the store. Mr. Miller was standing in the hall of his house, which communicates with the store, and with his double-barrelled shot gun he brought both down to find sepulchres in the ashes of his house. We do not learn that they blessed the name of McCausland as their bronzed skin blistered and withered beneath the flames he had ordered. Mr. Thomas H. Doyle, of Loudon, who had served in Easton's battery, followed the retreating rebels toward Loudon, to capture stragglers. When beyond St Thomas he caught Captain Cochran, Quartermaster of Eleventh Virginia cavalry, and as he recognized him as one who had participated in the destruction of Chambersburg, he gave him just fifteen minutes to live. Cochran was armed with sword and pistols, but he was taken so suddenly by Mr. Doyle that he had no chance to use them. He begged piteously for his life, but Mr. Doyle was inexorable—the foe who burns and robs must die, and he so informed him peremptorily. At the very second he shot the whining thief dead, and found on his person eight hundred and fifteen dollars of greenbacks, all stolen from our citizens, and one thousand seven hundred and fifty dollars of rebel currency. His sword, belt and pistols were brought to this place by Mr. Doyle. He did not slip the name of McCausland with reverence or pride as he begged to be spared the just doom his deeds merited. Scores of McCausland's command were killed on the retreat by General Averell's forces. Many of them were intoxicated, and all demoralized by plunder, and they became an easy prey to the vengeance of our troops who passed through the burning town in the pursuit of the barbarians.

The fiends in human shape who passed to their final account in the midst of their own infernal work, did not reach the Great Judge without an accuser. Daniel Parker, once a "thing," a "chattel," a "slave," in the parlance and by the laws of the superior race who teach nobility and chivalry by making the widow and fatherless homeless and penniless, was the only victim unto death of rebel brutality. He had seen the North star in his earlier days, and although untutored, in obedience to the statutes which enslaved him, he followed the beacon light of heaven to freedom. He had lived quietly, soberly and industriously in our midst until he had filled the measure of patriarchal years, respected by all who knew him. He was enfeebled by age and infirmities, and his humble home excited the vengeance of the lordly sons of the South. They fired his house, and he was injured by the flames before he could escape that he died the same night, and his spirit, freed of the stain of color and caste as snuffed by man, passed with his murderers,

who found resting-places amidst the ashes of their own desolation, to the bar of Him who judges only in righteousness. Despite the wicked war they have thrown like a pall over a great and free people on the pretext of equality of races, they found a tribunal from which there is no appeal, where chattel and master, slave and lord, meet equal justice, and equal mercy. Murderers and accuser bid a final farewell to the same waning sun, and thenceforth forever became equals!

A correspondent sends the following as to the nativity of the vandal chief McCausland: Frequent inquiries are daily made regarding the nativity of the fiend McCausland. Some allege that he was born in New York State, while others think that he must certainly have first seen the light in the South. The matter seems to be important inasmuch as the individual will have a very prominent and interesting page in the history of the rebellion; but he has settled the question himself, and removed cause for further dispute. In a conversation with Rev. Mr. Edwards, of Hagerstown, McCausland said he *he was from hell*. For a verification of his statement witness Chambersburg in ruins.

Doc. 94.

GRANT'S OPERATIONS IN VIRGINIA.

MEADE'S ADDRESS TO THE ARMY,

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
May 12.

SOLDIERS: The moment has arrived when your commanding general feels authorized to address you in terms of congratulation.

For eight days and nights, almost without intermission, in rain and sunshine, you have been gallantly fighting a desperate foe, in positions naturally strong, and rendered doubly so by intrenchments.

You have compelled him to abandon his fortifications on the Rapidan, to retire, and attempt to stop your onward progress, and now he has abandoned the last intrenched position so tenaciously held, suffering in all a loss of eighteen guns, twenty-two colors, and eight thousand prisoners, including two general officers.

Your heroic deeds and noble endurance of fatigue and privation will ever be memorable. Let us return thanks to God for the mercy thus shown us, and ask earnestly for its continuance.

Soldiers! Your work is not over. The enemy must be pursued and if possible overcome. The courage and fortitude you have displayed renders your commanding general confident that your future efforts will result in success.

While we mourn the loss of many gallant comrades, let us remember that the enemy must have suffered equal, if not greater losses.

We shall soon receive reinforcements, which he cannot expect.

Let us determine, then, to continue vigorously the work so well begun, and, under God's

blessing, in a short time the object of our labors will be accomplished.

GEO. G. MEADE,
Major-General Commanding.

S. WILLIAMS,
A. A. G.

GENERAL LEE'S ADDRESS.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA }
May 14, 1864. }

First—The general commanding takes great pleasure in announcing to the army the series of successes that, by the favor of God, have recently been achieved by our arms.

Second—A part of the enemy's force threatening the valley of Virginia has been routed by General Imboden, and driven back to the Potomac, with the loss of their train and a number of prisoners.

Third—Another body of the enemy, under General Averell, penetrated to the Virginia and Tennessee railroad at Dublin depot. A portion of his force has been dispersed by Generals Morgan and W. E. Jones, who are in pursuit of the remainder.

Fourth—The army of General Banks sustained a severe defeat in Western Louisiana by the forces of General Kirby Smith, and retreated to Alexandria, losing several thousand prisoners, thirty-five pieces of artillery, and a large number of wagons. Some of the most formidable gun-boats that accompanied the expedition were destroyed to save them from capture.

Fifth—The expedition of General Steele into Western Arkansas has ended in a complete disaster. Northern journals of the tenth instant announce his surrender, with an army of nine thousand men, to General Price.

Sixth—The cavalry force sent by General Grant to attack Richmond has been repulsed, and retired toward the Peninsula. Every demonstration of the enemy south of James river has, up to this time, been successfully repelled.

Seventh—The heroic valor of this army, with the blessing of Almighty God, has thus far checked the principal army of the enemy, and inflicted upon it heavy losses. The eyes and hearts of your countrymen are turned to you with confidence, and their prayers attend you in your gallant struggle. Encouraged by the success that has been vouchsafed to us, and stimulated by the great interests that depend upon the issue, let every man resolve to endure all and brave all, until, by the assistance of a just and merciful God, the enemy shall be driven back, and peace secured to our country. Continue to emulate the valor of your comrades who have fallen; and remember that it depends upon you whether they shall have died in vain. It is in your power, under God, to defeat the last great effort of the enemy, establish the independence of your native land, and earn the lasting love and gratitude of your countrymen and the admiration of mankind.

R. E. LEE,
General.

A NATIONAL ACCOUNT.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, }
Thursday, May 19, 10 P. M. }

The rebels, at five o'clock this evening, made an attempt to repeat Jackson's Chancellorsville flanking movement, and gave us an unanticipated hour or two of fighting, which has ended with their complete repulse. Ewell's corps (Jackson's old command), made a detour around our right wing, and suddenly emerged on the Spottsylvania and Fredericksburg plank-road, striking our rear and breaking out upon our trains. The only force at the point was a portion of the heavy artillery division of General Robert Tyler, which reached the army a day or two ago from Washington, and has never before been in battle. These were unable at first to check the advance of the rebels, who pounced upon our ammunition train, a portion of which they captured, and broke into an open space within three quarters of a mile of these headquarters. General Tyler, however, promptly gathered up his force, threw it upon the rebels, and finally repulsed them handsomely. Immediately upon the announcement of the attack, General Meade despatched two divisions of Hancock's corps (those of Barlow and Birney), from our extreme left, and Crawford's division of Warren's corps from the centre. Birney formed his line, and threw it into the woods in support of Tyler, while the Pennsylvania Reserves were sent around on the rebel right flank, with the view of preventing their recrossing the Ny. The rebels, finding themselves checked, fell back and recrossed the Ny at a point three or four miles above. The rebel force engaged was Hood's division of Ewell's corps, the remainder of the corps supporting. The honor of their repulse rests with Tyler's regiments (heavy artillery used as infantry), which withstood their first baptism of battle nobly. Their loss was heavy, and will probably reach a hundred killed and four or five hundred wounded. This was in part owing to the fact that, being fresh troops, they did not know how to cover themselves, as old troops do, and they illustrated the well-known fact that new troops, in their first engagement, generally fight with more recklessness than even veterans. It should be mentioned that the wagons taken by the rebels were promptly recaptured, and we took besides from seventy-five to a hundred prisoners.

The assault on the part of the enemy was boldly conceived and executed, and was probably prompted by the fact that General Meade has to-day been withdrawing the forces from the right of our line and massing them on the left. The object of the rebels, therefore, was doubtless to discover where our right rested, and to seize such booty as might fall in their way. The purpose, as will be seen, was completely foiled, and though the suddenness of the attack produced a temporary flurry, Generals Grant and Meade seem now in perfect good humor with the result.

A SOUTHERN ACCOUNT.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, }
NEAR SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT-HOUSE, MAY 20, 1864. }

About three o'clock yesterday evening Lieutenant-General Ewell, with the whole of the Second corps, moved forward on a reconnoissance in force, leaving our intrenchments about three P. M. This move was intended to strike the enemy on their extreme right flank. The country through which the move was made is diversified by woods and fields, and so much of forest that it was quite possible so to move as to escape the observation of the enemy. Lieutenant-General Ewell moved by a circuitous route, striking the enemy's line of skirmishers at a point a little north and west of the road leading from Fredericksburg to Spottsylvania Court-house, and about eight miles from the former place.

About five P. M. our skirmishers came upon the enemy's line of skirmishers, and a sharp engagement ensued between them. Our column started with artillery, but owing to the condition of the roads, were compelled to move without it. The enemy, during the action, brought two pieces into position. The force of the enemy which we encountered consisted of Hancock's Second, a part of the Ninth, and some of the heavy artillery troops under Angur, who were brought here on Sunday last, armed as infantrymen. Our skirmishers attacked their skirmish line most furiously, and drove them back some half a mile, when we came in contact with their immense lines of battle, and we were compelled to give back, they assaulting us. Not satisfied at our temporarily giving back, the enemy, reinforced by a second line, attempted to press, when we in turn repulsed them most handsomely. After this, for four or five times, they assaulted, with great noise, our line of skirmishers, but in every instance were successfully repelled.

During the engagement, which lasted from about five until nine o'clock, our skirmishers reached the main road running from Fredericksburg to Spottsylvania Court-house. On this road the enemy's train was moving. Into it our skirmishers dashed, cutting loose some and shooting others of their mules, and capturing a quartermaster. About nine o'clock at night the fighting ceased, and our men retired to their original position behind the intrenchments, with a loss of about one hundred and fifty wounded, some thirty killed, and some few stragglers who were "gobbled up" by the enemy. We captured and brought off about a hundred prisoners, who represent their loss quite heavy. During the action, Lieutenant-General Ewell's horse was shot under him. The General received a severe fall, which jarred him considerably. He is to-day, however, again in the saddle.

The object of this move is said to have been a reconnoissance in force, to determine the enemy's position. We certainly accomplished very little, while we lost some good men, among

them the gallant Colonel Boyd, of Daniels' North Carolina brigade, who was killed. The conduct of most of the troops is highly commended, especially Pegram's Virginia brigade, of whom General Ewell spoke in regard to their bearing on this occasion in terms of most exalted praise. Jones' Virginia and the Stonewall brigade, in Johnson's division, or rather the remnants thereof, are said not to have done so well.

To-day I have ridden around the lines, and there is a quiet most profound. The pickets have ceased firing at each other. The enemy's large wagon-train can be plainly seen parked in front of the Court-house. Our boys are "gay and happy," still "ripe and ready" to meet the foe. Spottsylvania Court-house, the hotel, the jail, and the few private buildings, have all come in for a good share of the enemy's shot and shell, which were poured upon that part of the line in the cannonading on Wednesday.

Grant seems to be gradually shifting around to our right, and will doubtless await reinforcements before renewing the fight.

NATIONAL ACCOUNTS.

MOTLEY HOUSE, NEAR GUINEA'S STATION, }
MAY 21—9 P. M. }

A hasty despatch, scrawled upon the sward before the house at 4½ P. M., and sent off the moment after, has announced to you the great march of the day. Look at the map, note the relative positions of Spottsylvania Court-house and of Guinea and Bowling Green, and the mind can at once perceive the wonderful military genius that has flanked the rebel army, and advanced far to the rear of its position in the little space of twenty-four hours.

At daylight this morning no one not in the secret of headquarters had the least idea of the events impending. Our lines had been curiously and suggestively run, and the Second corps was lying around loose, but still we supposed a push for the telegraph road to be the only thing on the programme. Headquarters of the armies, both Grant's and Meade's, were astir at an early hour, and the trains sent off to the left, and the boys, used to it by this time, and admiring the immovable tenacity of Grant, when they noticed the direction taken, said, approvingly, "by the left flank, march." Long after their trains had gone, Grant and Meade, with their staff, remained on the old ground, neither of them, apparently, with any greater care on his mind than how to while away an hour or two. At last Meade rode slowly away, and a half hour after Grant followed him. Two miles brought him to the Massaponax Church, on the telegraph road, where Meade was found. Here the nature of the events transpiring began to appear to the outside minds. It was known that the Second corps was far to the left, and Bowling Green was mentioned as its probable destination. While we lay at the church, the transportation of the Fifth corps began moving past, and the information being positive that Burnside, with the Ninth, and Wright, with the

Sixth corps, would be in position to the left of the telegraph road, it became evident that the race for Richmond had commenced. Again the headquarters train was started off, and the Generals remained behind chatting leisurely under the shade of the old beeches. I rode off toward the middle of the afternoon, and soon overtook the train of wagons, and enjoyed the unusual spectacle of a headquarters transportation moving along a road from which the cavalry pickets of the army were coming, a circumstance resulting from our extremely lengthened swing around the flank of the enemy. Nor were these pickets useless, as the event proved. Just as the head of the train was crossing the railroad about a mile and a half above Guinea, up the valley came three hundred rebel horse. It was a gay sight; a wide, magnificent open valley, devoid of fences, and in full view for a mile came the rebels to seize their prey. They counted without their host. Major Poe, with three hundred cavalry, started to meet them, when the wary rebels stood not upon the order of going, but went at once. It was an exciting chase, but the rebels gained the shelter of the timber bordering the Mattapony river, when they turned and stood at bay. Here it was discovered that a brigade of the rebels, under Fitz Hugh Lee, was defending Guinea bridge, over the Mattapony river, or rather endeavoring to burn it. Major Poe was able to prevent Lee from doing this, but was not competent to draw Lee from his position. At this juncture up rode Grant and Meade. It was a curious predicament for headquarters. The Second corps was seven miles away from the front, the head of the Fifth corps was still four miles in the rear, and the Sixth and Ninth behind them yet, and there was a brigade of rebel horse within three quarters of a mile of army headquarters. The Provisional brigade, the Sixty-eighth and One Hundred and Fourteenth Pennsylvania infantry and Third Pennsylvania cavalry, commanded by Colonel Collis, were at hand, and proved equal to the emergency. Colonel Collis first endeavored to charge over the bridge, but found it barricaded on the further side, and the planks in the centre taken up; so dividing his force and wading the stream, breast deep, above and below, drove the rebels from their position, and to Catlett's house, a mile and a half beyond, inflicting severe loss on the enemy. This little episode was scarcely over, and headquarters established for the night, when just at sundown the roar of artillery was heard far in the rear. Its full import and particulars have not yet reached us; but generally it is known that the sturdy Burnside is holding a post of honor as rear guard, and making vigorous demonstrations against the enemy. At this hour, then, the position is thus: Hancock is at Bowling Green; Warren at Catlett's, a mile beyond the Mattapony, and two miles advanced from here; the Sixth corps between here and Burnside, who is holding our extreme rear, on admirable ground a mile and a half to the right

of the telegraph road, and a mile southward of Anderson's house. As I write everything is quiet; the trains have ceased moving; the camp-fires of the Fifth corps are belting the hills beyond the valley with a wide circle of light. What next? Lee cannot fight us here. His next chance is at Hanover Court-house, on the line of the North Anna, which has always been considered formidable. But let Lee beware. It is now diamond cut diamond. Grant, aided by such subalterns as Meade, Hancock, and Burnside, has been more than his match so far, and will be to the end. A word as to the country. The scenery around Guinea is beautiful. From Motley's house, which stands on an elevation half a mile from the station, the whole valley of the Upper Mattapony is as a map unrolled at our feet. Far off on its outskirts is a belt of timber skirting the sluggish Mattapony, and beyond it again rises the circle of hills, on which the sturdy boys of the Fifth corps lie dreaming of home. But beyond us is another kind of country; and unless we tumble against the indomitable Lee this side of the North Anna we will reach its confines tomorrow. The low flats and often marshes of the slow streams emptying in the ocean on the Virginia coast are just before us, and must be encountered; but what of it. The Mattapony and its swamps first, and the Pamunkey and its morasses next, will be impassable defences to our right flank; and there is determination and vim enough in this army to wade and corduroy through the Great Dismal Swamp itself, if it lies on the road to Richmond.

MOTLEY HOUSE, May 22.

The headquarters of the Ninth corps were established here at daylight. The corps is about leaving, and will proceed to-day to Bethel Church, seven miles beyond. The Sixth corps is now passing down the road in the direction taken by the Fifth corps last evening. The affair last night, indicated by the cannonading, was the holding in check of the enemy's strong rear guard by Burnside and Wright, which was handsomely done. From all present indications we will have no battle this side of the line of the North Anna river.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CORPS, May 22—6 A. M.

Up to this hour all is quiet. Warren has crossed the Po river at Guinea's bridge, on his way to form connection on our right. If Lee has not already fallen back from Spottsylvania, we shall soon, if successful in completing our lines, be in a position to cut him off from Richmond. This corps is already within a few miles of his direct line toward Hanover Junction. We can cut off his supplies from that point at pleasure, and compel him to fight us on ground of our own selection. It is just possible, however, that he may have taken the alarm yesterday and already given us the slip, by a timely retreat with the main body of his army.

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the rebel *revelle* was heard to beat, and the head of Longstreet's column, which was assigned the advance in the retreat, filed southward. Here, then, begins a grand race of the two armies, similar to that they ran from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania. A glance at the map will show us which has the better chance. It will be observed, if the examination be made with an adequate topographical map in hand, that the rebel front at Spottsylvania covers the direct and best route leading southward, namely, the telegraph road, with the roads converging on and radiating from this main line. On the other hand, it was a necessity of the proposed operation that we should bear well to the eastward. It is a recognized maxim that the party executing a flanking movement exposes his own flank. Such a manœuvre in face of a vigilant and vigorous opponent is always a dangerous one. It had, therefore, to be done both cautiously and by a route somewhat circuitous. Lee, as we know by experience, is both vigilant and vigorous. The former quality was proved by the promptitude with which he met the advance of our flanking column by a corresponding movement to the rear; the latter was made manifest in another way the next day.

Hancock (Second corps), as we have seen, had withdrawn during the night of Friday. Warren, (Fifth corps), set out early on Saturday morning, following for some distance over the same route as that pursued by Hancock. About the same time Ewell's corps of the rebel army appears to have followed Longstreet. In the meantime our old position near Spottsylvania Court-house, was still held by such portions of our front as the corps of Burnside (Ninth) and Wright (Sixth) covered. At four p. m. of Saturday, Burnside, who held position on the left of the Sixth, withdrew, and the remaining force of the rebels (Hill's corps) fancying that the Sixth also was retiring, left the works, came up directly in Wright's front and attacked. They succeeded in breaking his skirmish line in one place; but Wright opened a heavy artillery fire upon them, which checked their advance. Hill committed an error in making the attack in front, for had he crossed the river a little above, he would have struck the right flank of the Sixth corps, uncovered by the withdrawal of Warren, and would have had an enfilading fire on Wright, which it would have been difficult to withstand. In addition to this the assault was not made with much persistence, and was probably designed simply to develop our actual force left. During the night Wright withdrew; Hill did the same, and the works of Spottsylvania ceased to be the objects of either attack or defence. They remain now as parts of the series of parallels that, from the Rapidan up to our present front, stand as monuments of the most desperate campaign in history.

The two armies once fairly on the march, their operations belong to the domain of strategy, which deals with the movements of armies out of sight of each other. The first obvious goal

is the North Anna, north of which it was not deemed at all probable Lee would attempt to make a stand. From the first, however, it was a matter of certainty that the enemy would reach it in advance of us, for having possession of the telegraph road, he moved on an interior line. On Saturday night Hancock bivouacked at Milford. The Fifth followed the Second over the same road until striking Guinea station, when it diverged to the right (that is westward), crossed the Mattapony at Guinea bridge, and at nine p. m. bivouacked near the Old Academy, having made a march of fifteen miles. The Ninth and Sixth followed over the same general lines. The next day, Sunday, the twenty-second, the march was resumed—Warren crossing the Ta, and striking into the telegraph road, down which the rear of the columns of Longstreet and Ewell had a short time before disappeared. Here he had a skirmish with the enemy's rear guard of cavalry, consisting of Rosser's brigade, which was repulsed. Hancock advancing due westward from Milford, five miles, struck the telegraph road at Harris' store. Sunday's march brought our army forward an additional fourteen miles, and within a few miles of the North Anna.

The region between Spottsylvania and the North Anna, through which the advance of Saturday and Sunday carried us, is both fair and fertile. The face of the country is beautifully undulating, nowhere bold, and the river bottoms have many large and fine plantations, all under cultivation. It was virgin ground over which we marched, showing none of those desolating traces of war that mark all Virginia north of the Rapidan. Here are fields sprouting wheat, and growing corn, and luxuriant clover; here are lowing herds, and the perfume of blossoms and the song of summer birds; here are homesteads of the Virginia planter, everything on a large and generous scale, and great ancestral English elms, dating back to the times before our forefathers learned to be rebels. Coming so lately from where the tread of armies for three years has made the country bare and barren as a threshing-floor, the region through which we passed seemed a very Araby the Blest, and presented such a transition as is pictured by those who, having traversed the desert of Lahore, suddenly emerge upon the smiling vales of Cashmere.

Resuming the advance on Monday morning, May twenty-third, a march of a few hours brought the heads of our columns so near to the North Anna, that operations passed from the domain of strategy into the tactical question of effecting the passage of the river, always a delicate and difficult one when vigorously resisted. And that it would be so resisted was natural to suppose, for the reason that if the enemy proposed making a stand on the South Anna he would wish to gain all the time possible, in order to establish himself well in his position, and also for the reason that the North Anna covers the Virginia Central railroad, which here runs

in the general direction of the stream, and but from one to three miles south of it. Even if Lee should feel that he would eventually be compelled to sacrifice this important line of communications, he would still, it was reasonably argued, attempt to hold it till all the rebel detachments that have been in the valley should be drawn in. In this anticipation we were not disappointed, and not only did he contest the passage but he made one of his fiercest assaults, with the view of crushing that portion of our army that had succeeded in crossing.

The lines on which the army had been advancing brought our columns to the North Anna near the point at which the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad crosses that stream. Hancock's column, which had the left, struck it less than one mile to the west of the railroad crossing. Warren's column, which had the right, struck it at Jericho Ford, about four miles higher up. By an opposite fortune Warren was able to effect the passage without any resistance, but was savagely assailed on the other side, while Hancock had to fight on the north side for a passage, but once over, has thus far found little to bar his progress.

The head of the column of the Fifth corps, Griffin's division leading, reached the North Anna at one P. M., on Monday, and within ten minutes after the time of its arrival began to cross. The river at this point is fordable, but has a very rocky bed, with precipitous banks, and the men had to wade it waist deep. The rebels appear not to have expected that the passage would be made so high up the stream, and hence had no great force in the immediate vicinity. In fact they had no time to bring up much force, as the rear of Hill's corps was arriving almost at the same time with the head of Warren's column. Immediately on crossing, Griffin's division was formed in line of battle, the Second brigade (Sweitzer's), having the advance, while Ayres took position on his left, and Bartlett was held in reserve in the centre of the line. Cutler's division formed on the right of Griffin, and Crawford's (Pennsylvania Reserves), on his left. Moving rapidly up across an open space of six or eight hundred yards, Griffin took position in the woods, where a heavy skirmish line was soon met. At first the only rebel troops in the neighborhood consisted of McGowan's brigade, of Wilcox's division (Hill's corps), under command of Colonel Brown, of the Fourteenth South Carolina. But he was presently reinforced by the other three brigades of Wilcox's division—namely, those of Scales, Gordon and Thomas; while Heath's division joined on to the right of Wilcox, and prisoners say that Breckinridge's division afterward came up.

The skirmish line which was all our advance at first met, had been easily driven back, and the command had taken up its position in the woods, and had just received orders to intrench, the first preparations for which it was just taking, when Griffin's division, at five fifteen P. M., was furiously assailed by the rebel force above

enumerated, which suddenly developed in two lines of battle, with a heavy skirmish line in front. Volley after volley, fierce and sharp, was poured in, and the enemy opened from three batteries a very heavy cannonade. Griffin's division, however, without works, successfully resisted the attack, and repulsed it with great slaughter. Our men, in fact, served them with the same treatment they had themselves received in the numerous attacks they had been compelled to make, and illustrated afresh the enormous advantage the defensive has in such a country as this: that is, they lay low, covered themselves well, allowed the rebels to approach and when the whites of their eyes were visible, raked their line with a withering volley. Finding that he was gaining nothing and losing very heavily, it appears that the rebel commander, while continuing to hold three of his brigades on Griffin's front, detached Colonel Brown's South Carolina brigade to effect a detour and make an assault in flank. The mode in which he made this I have from Colonel Brown himself, who, not half an hour afterward, was a prisoner in our hands. Marching by column up the railroad for some distance, he wheeled by right into line of battle, and fell upon Cutler, who, as we have seen, was formed on the right of Griffin. Cutler's division had not yet gotten into position when Brown attacked with much vigor: its left gave way, and the whole command was considerably broken and thrown into much confusion. This, of course, uncovered the right of Griffin's line, held, as we have seen, by Ayer's brigade, and exposed him to imminent danger of having his flank turned. To avoid this the right was refused somewhat, and General Griffin threw forward three regiments of Bartlett's brigade, which arrived just in time to save the exposed flank from being turned, and reestablished the line. In the execution of this manœuvre, occurred one of those odd rencounters which occasionally happen in the complicated actions of battle. One of Bartlett's regiments, the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel McCoy commanding, in marching up by the flank (that is, in column, not in line of battle), ran plump against Brown's line, which was moving to follow up its success against our right. It was one of those critical situations which a moment will decide, the decision, in fact, depending on who should gain the advantage of the first volley. Rapid as a flash McCoy flung his forward companies into line, and got the first fire. One of McCoy's men seized the rebel commander by the collar and dragged him in; the Eighty-third poured in a volley on the enemy's flank and rear, and the whole rebel brigade made off in disorder. The repulse of the rebels was most complete, and during the engagement and the following morning, not less than one thousand prisoners were taken. In addition to this the rebel loss in killed and wounded was very heavy, though its precise extent could not be ascertained, as during the night the enemy made a forcible attack

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Eng. 4 by A. H. Fitch

BVT. MAJ. GEN. ALEX. B. DYER,
CHIEF OF QUARTERS

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upon our pickets, and under cover of this succeeded in carrying off their dead and wounded. Our own loss was inconsiderable: Griffin's division, which bore the brunt of the attack, may have lost two hundred; Cutler about one hundred and thirty, while the loss of Crawford's division, which held the left, and whose skirmish line alone was engaged, was but trifling. All things considered this may justly be regarded as one of the most beautiful detached engagements of the campaign; and taking into account the very important results hanging upon it, it fully merits the praise accorded to it by the Commanding General in a despatch sent to General Warren immediately after the action, in which General Meade "congratulated him and his gallant corps upon the handsome manner in which the enemy's attack was repulsed." Although the Commanding General extends praise to the whole corps, the other divisions will willingly acknowledge that it belongs more particularly to the First division (Griffin's), which received and repulsed the main attack of the enemy. Especial credit is due to the Second brigade of this division, commanded by Colonel Sweitzer, though equal eulogy is claimed by the brigade of Bartlett, which so promptly checkmated the flanking manoeuvre of Brown.

Passing now from the position of Warren, on the right, to that of Hancock, on the left, we find his corps engaged at the same time with the Fifth, though unlike Warren, who passed the river unopposed, he had to carry his crossing against severe opposition. As I have already mentioned, Hancock's point of passage was the Chesterfield or county bridge, half a mile above the railroad bridge. Here the rebels had a strong position and a *tête-de-pont*, which had to be taken before the passage could be effected. Six or eight hundred yards north of the Anna is Long creek, which runs parallel with the river, and empties into it east of the railroad bridge. The two streams, therefore, form a species of island, and here the rebels had a prepared position to oppose any crossing. Near the bridge-head is an extended redan, with a wet ditch in front, the gorge swept by rifle-pits in the rear. On the opposite, or southern bank of the river, is a similar work and other rifle-pits, while the southern bank commands the northern, and was swept by rebel artillery. These works were built a year ago, immediately after the battle of Chancellorsville. The island is a perfectly flat and bare plain, and across this it was necessary to advance in order to carry the bridge. The position was held by McLaws' division of Longstreet's corps.

To General Birney's division of Hancock's corps was assigned the gloriously perilous task of carrying it. On the left was the brigade of Colonel Egan; on his right Pierce's brigade, and General Mott's brigade on the right of Pierce. The Fourth brigade (the Excelsior, commanded by Colonel Blaisdell, of the Eleventh Massachusetts), came up partly in rear, its left to the

right of the redan. To cover the assault, three sections of artillery were put in position, and replied to the artillery fire of the enemy. On the left of Birney's division was Barlow's division, the left of which connected with the right of Gibbon's division, while Tyler's heavy artillery division was held in reserve.

An hour before sundown of Monday, the assault was begun and most brilliantly executed by Birney's command, which swept across the open space at double-quick, under a storm of artillery and volleys of musketry. Two regiments of the Excelsior brigade (the Seventy-first and Seventy-second New York), first reached the redan, the garrison of which ran precipitately as the menacing line of fixed bayonets came sweeping along. Making foothold in the parapet with their muskets, the brave fellows clambered up and simultaneously planted their colors on the rebel stronghold.

Thirty rebels, unable to get away in time, were captured in the ditch. The total loss in this brilliant exploit—the very rapidity and daring of which astonished and paralyzed the rebels—did not exceed a hundred men, and secured us the possession of the bridge, across which a portion of Hancock's corps immediately crossed, and held the bridge-head during the night.

The work of Monday, therefore, had secured us the passage of the North Anna at two different points, and night found the whole of the Fifth corps crossed at Jericho ford, and a portion of the Second corps across at Chesterfield bridge. Yesterday, Tuesday, twenty-fourth, was mainly employed in passing over the rest of the army and pushing out our lines and securing our position.

That held by General Warren was happily one of great strength—being a point at which the Anna makes a bend in the form of a horse-shoe, thus affording a secure *point d'appui* for both flanks. Early yesterday the whole of the Sixth corps (Wright's) filed over at this point, took position in rear of the Fifth, and a portion of it in the afternoon relieved part of Warren's front. Hancock, on his front, was not able to make such rapid progress. Noon found only such portions of the command as had forced the passage the previous night across the river. The rebels still held the works, rifle-pits and commanding heights on the southern bank. In the afternoon, however, Crawford's division of Warren's corps extended to the left, to make a diversion in his favor, engaged the enemy, and enabled the whole of Birney's division to pass over. The remainder of the Second corps speedily followed. Meanwhile Burnside's corps still remained on the north bank of the river; but the operations of yesterday afternoon having swept the rebels from our whole front, the Ninth corps was able this morning to make the passage at Oxford, midway between the points of crossing of Hancock and Warren. During Monday night Hancock's left extended to the railroad bridge, we holding the northern end

and the enemy the southern. The rebels, however, had prepared it for burning, and during the night it was set fire to and destroyed. This is no loss, as there appears to be no present intention to use the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroad—Port Royal, on the Rappahannock, having been to-day opened as a new base. The water transportation of the army is now all there, and a long train, with our wounded was this morning sent across under escort to that point.

This morning finds our advance pushed out three miles south of the North Anna, and across the Virginia Central railroad, which has been effectually destroyed. No engagement has, up to this hour, taken place. The main body of the rebels appear to have drawn back to the South Anna, which is a line they have long been preparing, and mean to defend to the last. Their advance line rests along Long creek, one mile north of the South Anna. General Grant's plans, with reference to this position, have not yet been developed, and though a study of the ground affords an anticipation of the nature of the operation that will next be made, I refrain, as yet, from recording even speculations.

The heat, during the past four days of marching and fighting, has been excessive, and the work has been a most severe strain on the physical and moral powers of men and officers; but there is nothing which buoys an army up like success, and the determination of the Army of the Potomac abates not a jot or a tittle of the purpose with which it set out. I need not say that purpose is the capture of the rebel capital and the destruction of the rebel army.

GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS,
NEAR HANOVERTOWN, SOUTH BANK OF THE PAMUNKEY }
May 29, 7 P. M.

The flanking movement of the Army of the Potomac from the south bank of the North Anna to the south side of the Pamunkey, accomplished by daybreak this morning, deserves to be called the most remarkable and creditable performance of this campaign. The following embodies a concise narrative of the details of Thursday and Friday.

Not having clearly established whether the whole or only a part of Lee's army confronted us south of the North Anna, and it being possible that a portion of the enemy was moving for the south bank of the Pamunkey, in anticipation of another flanking movement by our forces, it was deemed necessary to march a sufficiently strong body from the North Anna with the utmost rapidity down its left bank, for the purpose of seizing the upper crossings of the Pamunkey, and thus securing us the means of another direct advance on Richmond.

For this important duty the First and Second divisions of cavalry, under command of General Sheridan himself, together with the First division of the Sixth corps, commanded by General Russell, were selected. The latter was quickly withdrawn from its position on the right of our

line, south of the North Anna, and recrossed the river at Jericho ford in the afternoon of the twenty-seventh. It took up the line of march, immediately followed by the cavalry and a pontoon train.

The column marched continually, save short intervals of rest, making about thirty-five miles, and the cavalry, which passed to the head during the night, reached Hanover ferry at daybreak on the morning of the twenty-eighth.

About one hundred rebel cavalry were found guarding the ford. Our cavalry at once dashed across, chasing them over the bottom, and up the hills bordering it. A whole mounted brigade of the enemy was encamped on the latter, and fell back precipitately before our cavalry could come up with it. We captured a few prisoners.

Russell's division was across by nine A. M., and intrenched itself on the hills.

Meantime the main body of the army had also recrossed the North Anna, and was marching over the road toward the Pamunkey. All the corps had orders to recross after nightfall, leaving our pickets in front of the line until midnight.

The three brigades of Crittenden's division, commanded by General Lealie and Colonels Marshall and Robinson, were ordered to take a stand on the north bank at Oxford, Quarles, and Jericho fords, respectively, and hold them until our pickets came on and take up and destroy the bridges. This they did successfully.

It was a dark and rainy night, but no confusion prevailed, nevertheless, and at midnight all the infantry, artillery, and the headquarters trains were across. The pickets were then called in, but in the darkness some lost their way and fell into the hands of the enemy.

The Fifth and Sixth corps, immediately after crossing, pushed on upon their line of march. The Second, which was to follow the route of the Sixth, and the Ninth, which was to march after the Second, did not leave the banks of the river until daylight, owing to the delay in getting the trains of the preceding corps into the roads.

The enemy's pickets had discovered the withdrawal of ours, and followed them to the south bank, and fired across at Crittenden's division and Hancock's corps, killing and wounding several of our men. General Grant's and Meade's headquarters trains also received a volley before they could be moved off.

Our line of march ran northwardly for some miles over the roads the army had moved on in its march from Spottsylvania Court-house, the eastwardly and south-eastwardly. The two columns composed respectively of the Sixth and Second, and the Fifth and Ninth corps, moved on almost parallel roads. The third division of cavalry, under General Wilson, covered the rear and trains. The heads of the two columns bivouacked on Friday night about ten miles from the Pamunkey.

Great trouble had been found in laying out

the lines of march, owing to the difficulty of getting intelligible information as to the roads and crossings in this comparatively unknown region. It was at first determined to make the passage of the Pamunkey with the Sixth and Second corps at Hanover, and the Fifth and Ninth at Newcastle ferries, but engineer officers accompanying General Sheridan, reported two good crossings a short distance above and below Hanover town, and the orders of march were accordingly modified, and double pontoon bridges were thrown across at Hanover town, and the Fifth, Sixth, and Second corps passed over them in the course of yesterday. The Ninth did not get across until early this morning.

The first mentioned corps were immediately put in position as they got over on the range of hills almost east and west, about half a mile from the river, and intrenched themselves. As soon as the Ninth corps was over, an advance of the whole line was ordered. It was pushed forward about three miles to the right and left of the two roads running in a south-eastwardly direction, one via Meadow bridge, and the other through Mechanicsville toward Richmond. It rests to-night within twelve miles of the rebel capital.

Wilson's division of cavalry protects our right flank, covering the roads toward Hanover Court-house, and Torbert's and Gregg's our left, covering the roads from Richmond east of Tolo-potomy creek. The trains are all safely parked on both banks of the Pamunkey.

The movement from the North Anna to the Pamunkey occupied only about forty hours. In that time the army marched a distance of nearly forty miles, over good but dusty and unknown roads, effected the passage of two large rivers, and was brought within an easy day's march of Richmond. Of all our immense transportation not a wagon was lost. Of men, only the pickets already alluded to were lost—a few stragglers who were captured by the enemy.

The weather on Friday and yesterday was very warm, and men and animals became very weary. The comparative rest of to-day, however, has refreshed them both.

Headquarters remain on the south bank of the Pamunkey for to-night.

Prisoners and contrabands brought in to-day render it certain that Lee's whole army left the South Anna during Friday, and marched via Hanover Court-house again to our front, and took up a position north of the Chickahominy, to the right and left of the Mechanicsville road. Officers familiar with the ground claim that he will be able to form a very strong defensive line in that locality. No signs of the enemy appeared in our front to-day.

The encounter of our cavalry with Fitz Hugh Lee's and Hampton's commands on Friday afternoon was most creditable to our arms. On our side the three brigades of Gregg's division and Merritt's brigade of Torbert's division and two light batteries were engaged. The fight oc-

curred on the ground held by our main line to-day, and the right and left of the Hanover town and Richmond road.

The enemy, it seems, were fighting to retain possession of a cross-road about half a mile beyond, leading to the Hanover Court-house and Richmond road, over which it is now known that the rear of Lee's army was moving at the time of the engagement. The enemy were posted in thick woods bordering on an open field, and fortified on their right by a swamp.

Gregg's brigade dismounted, formed in line, and attacked them on the front, covered by the fire of our batteries, but they were found so well covered by the woods and swamp that they could not be dislodged until Merritt's brigade was sent to flank them on their left, when they beat a precipitate retreat, leaving Fitz Hugh Lee's headquarters tents and nearly two hundred killed and one hundred wounded, besides fifty prisoners, in our hands. Our own loss will be about four hundred, including about forty killed.

GENERAL GRANT'S HEADQUARTERS, MAY 30.

A further advance and simultaneous charge to the left of the lines has taken place in the course of to-day. During the movements of to-day there was considerable infantry skirmishing, with artillery firing at intervals, but no serious collision till about half-past five o'clock P. M. At that hour Crawford's division of Warren's corps was suddenly attacked by a strong rebel force, appearing on and to the right and left of the Mechanicsville road, and was forced back for some distance.

As subsequently established by the statements of rebel prisoners, a reconnoissance in force, consisting of Rhodes' division of Ewell's corps and two brigades of cavalry, had started early in the afternoon from the rebel right, east of Mechanicsville, for the purpose of feeling our position. It was this force that fell upon Crawford's division.

As soon as the appearance of the enemy in force on his left was discovered by General Warren, he sent supports of infantry and cavalry to the threatened part of his line, which arrived in time to prevent it from being turned by the enemy. A severe engagement ensued, lasting about three quarters of an hour. The artillery firing was very heavy, as many as seventy discharges taking place in one minute.

Just about sunset the enemy was driven back, leaving part of their dead and wounded and a number of prisoners in our hands. Warren's line is re-established at this hour in the position it held at noon. Our loss was slight.

The cavalry, forming part of the rebel reconnoissance, advanced from Mechanicsville over another road, running toward the Pamunkey, about two miles to the east of the route, followed by their infantry. They advanced to within two miles of the Pamunkey, to a point known as Old Church Tavern cross-roads, which was held by Torbert's division of our cavalry.

They drove in our pickets, and attacked the main line formed in the meantime, but yielded to the first charge made by Torbert's men. They were driven back in confusion, and pursued two miles to the vicinity of Cold Harbor. The enemy left their killed and wounded, to the number of about one hundred, on the field. Our loss was two officers killed and three wounded, five men killed and sixty-eight wounded. Lieutenants Angler and Martin, of the Seventeenth Pennsylvania, were the officers killed.

As soon as General Meade was apprised of the attempt of the enemy on Warren's left, he ordered a general advance of the whole line west of the Tolopotomy to be made for its relief, but it being nearly dark, only General Hancock, whose headquarters were nearest, received the order in time to execute it. He drove the enemy's pickets and outposts away, and took and still holds their rifle-pits. He captured about one hundred prisoners.

May 31.—At midnight the enemy attempted to surprise Hancock's corps in the position in advance of our line, which it took last evening and held during the night. They were repulsed with great slaughter, leaving five hundred prisoners in our hands.

During the night it was determined to advance the remainder of the line so as to bring it up with Hancock's left and right. This movement commenced about six o'clock this morning, and brought on heavy skirmishing along the entire front. The artillery has been at work at different points of the line during the last hour. The enemy's outposts are evidently making strong resistance to our advance, but, as yet, there are no indications that it will bring on a general engagement.

It is positively known that Lee's army holds a naturally strong position, constantly improved by steady work with picks and shovels during the last few days, on the hills skirting the north bank of the Chickahominy. We are threatening his right, but there are, as yet, no indications of any disposition on the part of the enemy of abandoning their present line and falling back to another on the south side of the Chickahominy. On the contrary, they show as much readiness to act on the offensive as they did in front of Spottsylvania Court-house and on the North Anna. They may precipitate a general action at any moment. It is certain that Breckinridge's forces are with Lee, and prisoners say that Beauregard's are joining him.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR HANOVERTOWN, VA. }
TUESDAY, MAY 31.

By one of those odd coincidences, of which the history of the Virginia campaigns is so full, General Grant's headquarters are this morning at the very point which formed the extreme right wing of the Army of the Potomac in the Peninsular campaign two years ago. Hawes' Shop, near which we now are, four or five miles south-west of Hanover Court-house, was then

occupied by the Fifth Regular cavalry, as an outpost, and it was here, just two years ago, that Stuart, moving from Hanover Court-house, to make a raid around McClellan's lines, struck our right flank.

Draw a line of five or six miles in length, from the Pamunkey near Hanover Court-house, where our right now rests, almost due south to the Tolopotomy creek, three miles south of Hanovertown, and you will have our line of battle as it now stands. Five miles west of our line runs the famous stream Chickahominy. Along that river in front of, and covering the Virginia Central railroad, from Atlee's station to Shady Grove, five miles north of Richmond, the rebel front is formed, midway in the interval that divides these two points. The skirmish lines of the two armies meet, and to our ears the morning air brings the crackle of musketry, like the sputtering of a caldron, while now and then comes the boom of guns, whose reverberations are easily heard in the capital of rebellion.

Gaines' Mill and Mechanicsville are within an hour's ride. Fair Oaks you can reach in a two hours' stroll. Richmond is ten miles off. It is there that history repeats itself. The present position of this army is the result of that fine turning movement, which, commencing on Thursday last, in two days planted our corps across the Pamunkey river, rendered useless the elaborate rebel defences of the South Anna, and secured us communication with York river, the Chesapeake, and the ample resources which those waters float.

It appears to be conceived that this movement is understood to be a following up of the enemy, who is supposed to have fallen back from his lines between the North and South Anna, a conception which does injustice to the generalship of our commander. It was not Lee but Grant who took the initiative, Lee would gladly have remained in his line along the South Anna, and would willingly have awaited battle there, but was forced out of his cherished position, just as he was compelled to evacuate the lines of Spottsylvania, by an offensive movement, threatening his communications, a movement bold in conception and masterly in execution. There are, says the Archduke Charles, battles which are already won by the mere direction of the strategy of advance. In a like sense it can fairly be claimed that by a couple of days' marching this army has gained a victory more substantial than a week's hard pounding could in the situation have won, and that we are entitled to regard this great flank manoeuvre, as confirmed by the tone of mingled mortification and braggadocio in which the Richmond press treats it. "Grant," says the *Examiner* of Saturday, the twenty-eighth, "has definitely declined battle at Hanover Junction. Perhaps we should say that his army has saved him the trouble of declining it. It is certain that both armies are moving. Two stories have lately prevailed of the direction which Grant is going. One account represented a large

body of Yankees at Negro Foot in the upper part of Havana, but it has not been confirmed, and is unlikely. The more probable statement is that Grant put fortifications along his line before the Junction to prevent an attack from General Lee, and then returning to the northern bank of the North Anna, passed down the Pamunkey to Hanovertown, a few miles above the Piping Tree, the point to which boats can come. Here he is said to have crossed the river with the greater part of his force. If Grant has really landed there, he may be said to have already reached the destination predicted for him since his check at Spottsylvania—the York and Peninsula. His next base will be the Pamunkey and York, and White House and West Point. Unable to remove the obstacle on the threshold of his campaign, nothing was left but to abandon it, and make his way down the Rappahannock to the head-waters of the York, a monstrous circle, to reach a point where he might have landed on the first of May, had not his head been addled by his victories over Pemberton and Bragg."

This is the tone of men who, knowing the prodigious labor expended in fortifying a chosen position, themselves compelled to forfeit its advantages and seek elsewhere and ominously nearer their capital, a new line of defence. Certainly, if the Richmond journalists find any satisfaction in the monstrous circuit the army has made, the point at which it has aimed, this army is in condition to share the sentiment.

Recrossing the North Anna on Thursday night and Friday morning, the corps were directed on parallel roads down the course of the Pamunkey to the town of Hanover, in the vicinity of which two divisions of cavalry crossed the river at six in the morning. Three hours afterward Russell's division of the Sixth corps, after a beautiful march of twenty-two miles, made the passage. The enemy, apparently not expecting the crossing to be made so far down the river, had only a cavalry force in observation at this point. The party was easily driven off, sixty being captured. The fords were uncovered for the passage of the army, which was effected during the day. It is certain that it was not till this movement was fairly under way, that Lee commenced the manoeuvring necessary to meet it. "Grant" says the correspondent of the Richmond papers, writing on Friday, "last night commenced moving rapidly toward our right with his whole force, and corresponding movements are now on foot on our side to meet those of Grant."

The movement necessary on the part of the rebels was a simple change of front, and a retrograde march due south along the railroad, and ten miles would bring them to the Chickahominy. For us, on the contrary, it was necessary to give a great development to our left, so that to reach the same point which the enemy could make in a ten-mile march, it was necessary for us to march something like thirty

miles. That is, we had to march in a south-east direction to effect the passage of the river, and then move westward for the purpose of striking the enemy or meeting his advance.

This detour or "monstrous circuit," as the Richmond writer terms it, was necessitated by two different considerations: First, because a flank march of the kind determined upon is one which is always somewhat hazardous in the face of a vigilant and energetic opponent, and secondly, because it was a prime desideratum to open a water-base, our communications having been abandoned when this move was initiated.

This was secured yesterday, when a cavalry force was sent down to White House, and today our water transportation is reported at that point. The work of the past three days has been the steady pressing forward of forces from Hanovertown to the westward, in a line leading to the Chickahominy and the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg and Richmond railroads.

The advance of Gregg's division on Saturday, developed the enemy, with his entire cavalry force and a portion of his infantry covering those roads, and brought on an engagement which, from the losses on both sides, ranks among the heaviest cavalry fights of the war. Gregg's division lost over three hundred and fifty men and forty officers, but drove the enemy; and during Sunday and yesterday our front has been steadily advancing. Yesterday (Monday), the thirtieth, found our right in front of Hanover Court-house, while our left stretched beyond Tolopotomy creek, about ten miles from the rebel capital. The enemy showed in our front a line of battle and skirmish line, formed by part of the corps of Ewell and Hill.

During yesterday evening skirmishing took place, we feeling the enemy's line.

Early in the morning Crawford's division of Warren's corps moved in support of General Griffin's division, which was moving out on the road toward Role creek. It was directed by General Warren to support Griffin's left, as he advanced. The road to Mechanicsville ran parallel to the road upon which it was advancing, and was held firmly by the enemy's cavalry and some infantry. Crawford determined to push for this road, cross, if possible, and advance toward Mechanicsville.

Accordingly, he ordered Colonel Hardin forward with the first brigade, directing him to advance the picket-line in his front to support it closely, and moved for the Mechanicsville road. It was nearly three fourths of a mile from our left flank.

Hardin pushed in and soon found the enemy's cavalry, which he drove across the road, occupying it, forming, when the enemy advanced, his line of battle directly on his flank.

Crawford sent two regiments to his support, but the enemy attacked on both flanks, and finding the force hotly engaged, he moved to the field with his whole division. The enemy,

having flanked Hardee when he arrived, Crawford hastily threw Fisher's brigade to hold the right, and advanced Colonel Kitchen, with two regiments to support the line on the left, but it was too late. He ordered the line to fall back to the crest of a hill. Here he extended it, and ordered the men to throw up intrenchments.

Old rail logs, and whatever was handy, were used, and breastworks soon prepared, after which Fisher's brigade was thrown across a ravine on the right, and nine pieces of artillery planted to sweep the ravine. Hardly were the men in position, when the rebels advanced their line of battle directly upon our line. Awaiting their coming until they were within one hundred yards, the Pennsylvania Reserves opened a very heavy fire. The rebel colors were shot down, and were not raised again; whoever had them crawled away with them. Twice they rallied; were advanced; each time they were driven back, until the men lay down, when they commenced running back, and our line marched out of their works and took seventy prisoners, among them six officers. A very large number of the enemy were killed, among them a colonel; many officers, and three hundred dead were left lying in our front, inside of the line of skirmishers. Crawford lost a considerable number of men. Brigadier-General Ramsay was left on the field and reported killed. Colonel W. H. Kent, of the Sixth regulars, was shot through the hand; Captain Worth, of the Sixth, was also wounded; Colonel Tyrel is killed; Sergeant Thompson, of the Bucktails, who captured the battle-flag of the Fifteenth Georgia, at Gettysburg, was wounded and made prisoner.

When the attack was made upon Warren, Hancock was ordered, at eight o'clock last evening, to make a diversion in his favor. The order was vigorously executed; and after a couple of hours' of heavy cannonade was kept up on the rebel position by several batteries and six mortars, this morning finds our line in much the same formation as it had yesterday. The Sixth corps (Wright's) holds the right, then the Second (Hancock's); the Fifth (Warren's); and then the Ninth (Burnside's), which holds our left. The only portion of our force thus far, engaged to-day, is Hancock's corps, from whose front I have just returned.

The divisions of Birney on the right, and Barlow on the centre, advanced about six hundred yards, carrying the enemy's first line, which was held by a strong skirmish force. Birney captured forty prisoners, who proved to belong to Breckinridge's command.

There is hardly a doubt, however, that the position now held by the rebels in our front is but an advanced line, which they will hold as long as possible, for the purpose of gaining time to perfect their defences on the Chickahominy. On that historic line it is now fully expected that we shall, ere long, deliver battle. In the relative positions of the two opposing forces, this is the only field-fight we are likely to have

outside of Richmond, and that its result must decide whether the rebel capital can be carried by a *coup de main*, or whether it is destined to become the object of a summer's siege.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, JUNE 1—P. M.

Like two gladiators, each bent on the destruction of his antagonist, and each watching with wary eye for a chance to grapple with and crush his foe, so stand the opposing armies this morning. How perfect they have become in the art of war! How gracefully and skilfully each parries the thrust of his opponent! How savagely they glare on each other, and yet how coolly and artfully they seek weak places, and then strike with the rapidity of lightning!

Evening.—A desperate fight took place this afternoon near Cold Harbor. Wright has been heard from. He formed a junction with Smith at Cold Harbor, when both corps attacked the enemy's right. The battle commenced at five P. M. and continued until after dark. Wright is said to have captured and held the enemy's advanced works, but Smith was not so fortunate. His men fought with great spirit, and captured a line of rifle-pits on the enemy's front, but they could not hold them. Hancock, Burnside, and Warren held their corps in readiness to attack along the line if necessary. The enemy made several attempts to force a general engagement, but did not succeed. Each of the above corps was attacked in turn, while Wright was fighting on the left, but each attack was successfully repulsed. The enemy is not driven from his position on our left. He yet holds his strongest works, and I think he will prove very troublesome there. The casualties are said to be very numerous, and Wright has taken a large number of prisoners.

THE BATTLES OF THE CHICKAHOMINY.

COLD HARBOR, NEAR THE CHICKAHOMINY, }
Friday, June 3—10 P. M.

To gain a clear view of the present situation of the relations of the contending forces, and of the purposes of to-day's action, it is necessary to glance for a moment at the series of strategic operations which, after crossing the Pamunkey, have drawn our lines in their present position and formation. After the passage of the river at the town of Hanover on Saturday last, our line of battle was formed almost due north and south, and our front thrown forward due west, for the purpose of again gaining a point of contact with the enemy, from whom we had for a day or two been separated by the flanking operation, which swung the army from the North Anna around and across the Pamunkey. This formation was necessitated by the obligation of covering the fords and bridges over the Pamunkey, by which our supplies, trains, artillery, etc., had to pass. On pushing out on Sunday and Monday, we found the enemy also forming line of battle north and south, directly in front of the Virginia Central

railroad, and extending from Atlee's station (with cavalry thrown out to Hanover Court-house), south to Shady Grove, ten miles north of Richmond. In this position Lee covered both the Virginia Central and the Fredericksburg and Richmond railroads, as well as all the roads leading to Richmond, west of and including the Mechanicsville pike. This formation had been imposed upon the enemy by a similar motive that prompted the front we took up, namely, the duty of covering the lines by which his trains and material would pass in the change of front necessitated by the turning movement which compelled Lee to abandon the line of the South Anna.

In this situation, our right, the Sixth corps (Wright), fell back near Hanover Court-house; our left, held by the Fifth corps (Warren), rested across Tolopotamy creek. Hancock had the right centre; Burnside the left centre. During Monday, energetic reconnaissances were pushed forward on the right and left, which developed the enemy in full force. On the left Warren made a vigorous effort, the full details of which you have received from me, to carry the Mechanicsville pike, but failed. Meanwhile the cavalry had been distributed on the flanks of the army; the division of Wilson on the right flank; the division of Gregg and Torbert on the left.

No serious impression having been produced on the enemy's line by Monday's operations, the Commanding-General resumed his favorite tactics of developing the left flank. This manoeuvre appears to be characteristic of him, as he adopted it both at Spottsylvania and on the North Anna. The mode of executing this ingenious movement is as follows: The corps holding the extreme right of the line is, under cover of night, withdrawn behind the line of battle of the other corps (the picket line of course being left to conceal the movement), and carried to the extreme left of the line, where it intrenches. The next corps to the right is then withdrawn in like manner, and connects in the same way with the new left, forming a prolongation of its line. In this manner, in the course of a couple of days, a complete reversion of position of the corps has taken place; what had been the extreme right forming the extreme left, and had been the extreme left forming the extreme right; and thus the army finds itself drawn to the left by the length of its whole line of battle—say eight or ten miles.

During Tuesday night, the Sixth corps (Wright), which had held the right of the army, was in this way moved down the Hanover Court-house road, and on Wednesday morning took position near Cold Harbor, on the left of the left. Here it was joined by the reinforcements (the Eighteenth corps with part of the Tenth), brought by General W. F. Smith from White House. This column had been ordered by General Grant from White House to "New Cold Harbor," but by an error in the telegraph the despatch named the point "Newcastle." The

mistake was corrected, but not until he had neared the latter place, so that this corps was compelled to make a fatiguing march of five and twenty miles, and arrived at Cold Harbor on the afternoon of Wednesday, just in time to take part along with the Sixth corps, in a severe engagement that ensued. As no accurate account of this affair has yet been given, a brief sketch of it will not be out of place.

I have already mentioned that the cavalry divisions of Gregg and Torbert had been placed so as to cover the left of our line, held by Warren, from whose corps they were separated by an interval of four miles. On Tuesday evening they met the rebel cavalry near Cold Harbor, and whipped them most completely.

On the following morning (Wednesday) they renewed the fight; once more punished the rebels severely, but presently found out that the enemy had, during the night, brought up strong infantry supports, so that Sheridan was compelled to await the arrival of Wright and Smith, then on their way up.

While writing of this affair, I have chanced to receive a copy of yesterday's Richmond *Enquirer* (Thursday, June two), and find in it an account of Wednesday's cavalry affair. It is, as follows:

"About half-past three a. m., yesterday, artillery was opened on the enemy on the Chickahominy, and by eight o'clock heavy skirmishing occurred along a considerable portion of the lines. Hoke's division commenced an advance at an early hour for a position near Cold Harbor, when it was met and attacked by a largely superior force of the enemy. The division sustained itself against the shock which ensued, but was compelled to fall back. McLaws' division coming to Hoke's support, joined in the fray, when Hoke returned to the conflict and drove the enemy back a distance of a mile and a half, capturing some three hundred prisoners and otherwise severely punishing his forces. Other portions of Longstreet's corps were engaged. The battle raged hotly for several hours, quieted down somewhat between ten and eleven o'clock, and closed about one o'clock."

Now, what is amusing in this recital is, that the rebel writer either did not know or had not the honesty to acknowledge that the rebel divisions named (the divisions of Hoke and McLaws, and "other portions of Longstreet's corps"), were fighting nothing but cavalry, who dismounted, and with their carbines were able to punish the rebels, breaking one entire division, and after retiring were able to hold in check the whole of Longstreet's corps until Wright and Smith got up. Of the sequel the rebel writer says nothing; that remains to be told. Having arrived in the afternoon, the corps of Wright and Smith formed in line of battle, Wright in four lines, and Smith in a single line, on the right of the Sixth.

In front of our lines was an open space of two thirds of a mile in width, beyond which, in a piece of pine woods, the enemy was in force,

intrenched. Across the opening General Smith ordered a charge, which was brilliantly executed by Devin's division (brigades of Drake and Barton). The division, though moving at the *pas de charge*, suffered very heavily from the artillery of the enemy, which had a clean sweep of the field. Drake's brigade especially, had been much cut up, its leader had fallen mortally wounded, and on reaching the rebel ranks began to waver. Barton's brigade, however, emerging from the woods on its right, dashed forward with a yell, cleared the abattis, and gained the enemy's works, taking about three hundred prisoners. Ricketts' division of the Sixth corps, which was formed on the left of Devin's, behaved with equal gallantry, carried the rebel rifle-pits, and also took several hundred prisoners. The enemy, however, still held his position on the right of Smith, in front of the division of Brookes. With the view of dislodging him from his position, Henry's brigade of Brookes' division, was ordered forward, and succeeded in taking the rifle-pits. Here, however, he was swept by the fire from a redoubt in his front, and Martindale, who was ordered to his support, not having been able to effect his dispositions in time to do so, Henry was compelled to fall back, the enemy following him to the skirt of the woods. The position thus carried was, as will presently be seen, one of cardinal importance, though it was purchased at a loss of two thousand killed and wounded. The rebel loss cannot have been less, as we took nearly six hundred prisoners, and the enemy left many hundred dead and wounded within our lines.

The operations of Wednesday, though they had cost us dearly, had won a point of the very highest value, and this not merely tactically and with regard to operations on our front, but strategically, and in relation both to present and prospective movements. Cold Harbor is the point of convergence of all the roads radiating whether to Richmond, our objective point, or to White House, our base of supplies. Until we gained this point, indeed, we had no line of communication with our base, except by making an immense detour to the north of the Pamunkey. The importance of this point was, no doubt, appreciated by the rebels, and one of the Richmond papers, several days ago, and before we had begun moving in this direction, said in a witty prophecy in reference to Grant's favorite tactics, that "Grant has grown so enamored of his left flank that he will probably work his way down toward the James river, and we shall have another decisive battle of Cold Harbor." By this the writer means what we term the battle of Gaines' Mill, that having been the position held by the corps of Fitz John Porter in the battle of 1862, while Cold Harbor was held by Stonewall Jackson. In the battle of to-day the relations were just reversed, we holding Cold Harbor while the rebels hold Gaines' Mill. Why, in recognizing the commanding importance of the point to us, Lee did not make pre-

parations to hold it at all hazards, is a question which he will find difficult to answer with entire satisfaction. Discovering on the night of Tuesday that the Sixth corps was retiring from the front of his left wing (held by Longstreet's command), he rapidly countermarched Longstreet, to anticipate us in the possession of Cold Harbor; and there is little doubt that he would have been able to seize it in advance of us, had it not been for the admirable tenacity with which our cavalry held on to it until it was relieved, and the position was secured beyond a peradventure, by the arrival of the columns of Smith and Wright.

Cold Harbor being secured by the action of Wednesday, General Grant determined to give battle the day following, for the purpose of essaying the passage of the Chickahominy. Accordingly, during the night, Hancock's corps, which, by the previous withdrawal of the Sixth corps, held the right of the line, was moved and took position on the extreme left; and early on Thursday, the headquarters of Generals Grant and Meade, which had been in the rear of the right, were transferred to the rear of the left and established at Cold Harbor. It had, as I have said, been designed to give battle on Thursday; but Hancock was compelled to fight his corps into position, and his formation was not completed until this afternoon. The attack was then ordered for five o'clock in the afternoon, but a thunder-storm as heavy as that which swelled the Chickahominy on the day before Fair Oaks, set in, and the order had to be countermanded.

The hour of attack was then fixed for 4:30 o'clock in the morning. Had General Lee, under these circumstances, emulated the conduct of that Union General whose chief glory is to be thought well of by the rebels, and planted his army astraddle the Chickahominy, as McClellan did, the storm which swelled that stream yesterday afternoon might have given General Grant an opportunity which you may depend upon it he would have improved. But while the rebels praise McClellan, they do not imitate him. Lee had his entire force north of the Chickahominy, and the only result of the delay in attack, caused by the rise in the river, was to give the enemy, who had by this time discovered the disposition of our troops, the hours of night during which to perfect his defensive preparations.

In saddle at four o'clock in the morning. The gray light of dawn is struggling through a thick envelope of clouds, and a light pattering rain is falling. Our men still lie behind their breastworks, worn out with the work of the night; the rebels, too, lie behind their intrenchments, and only the sleepless pickets peer with wary eyes forward through the dusk of the woods. All is still as the grave, yet in thirty minutes the storm of battle will burst forth along a stretch of six miles. There is but time to take a glance at the lines. Here on the left wing of the army is the corps of Hancock (the

Second); connecting with him on the right, and forming the left centre, is Wright's (the Sixth); then Smith's (the Eighteenth), which holds the centre; next comes Warren's (the Fifth), which forms the right centre, and then Burnside's (the Ninth), which holds the extreme right. Our line runs almost parallel with the Chickahominy, and from one and a half to two and a half miles north of it. On the left wing we approach nearest the river, on the right we are somewhat refused. Hancock, holding the left wing, rests across the Despatch station road (that is, the road leading from Cold Harbor to Despatch station); our right is across the Tolopotamy. The rebel front is formed immediately in front of the Chickahominy, in three lines (two lines of battle and a skirmish line), on an irregular line, to conform with the woods and ridges and swamps of the ground. Between the two armies is a low, swampy region, whose dark hollows will soon be lit up with the fires of death. Suddenly from behind the rude parapet there is an upstarting, a noiseless springing to arms, the muffled commands of officers forming the line. The attack was ordered for 4:30, and it may have been five minutes after that, or it may have been ten minutes, but it certainly was not later than 4:45, when the whole line is in motion. Skirmishers are thrown out, and presently meet the enemy's pickets, as we learn by the smart fusillade you hear; our artillery opens, the rebels respond, and in a moment the deadly conflict is joined.

The metaphysicians say that time is naught—is but a category of thought; and I think it must be so, for into ten mortal minutes this morning was crowded an age of action. Ten minutes of the figment men call time, and yet the scant space decided a battle! There are a thousand details, ten thousand episodes, but the essential matter is this, that that first rush of advance carried our whole front butt up against a line of works, which we were unable to break through, or, breaking through, were unable to hold. Conceive of this in the large: the fierce onslaught amid deafening volleys of musketry, and the thunder of artillery, and the wild, mad yell of battle, and see the ranks mown down and the lines break here and there, and the sullen obstinate retreat, every inch contested, and we shall then be able to descend to some of the points of action, as they individualize themselves along the line.

Hancock held the left of the whole line of battle; and of his three divisions, that of Barlow held the extreme left of the army, that of Gibbon was drawn on the right of Barlow's, while Birney's division was held in reserve. Of the four brigades of Barlow's division Brookes had the left and Miles the right—each brigade in double line of battle. Smith, commanding the Irish brigade, was placed in support. The left was protected by refusing it—the Third brigade being disposed so as to cover that flank.

The formation of Gibbon's division on the

right of Barlow was similar, Tyler's brigade (heavy artillery) holding the right, Smith's the centre and Owen's the left—McKean in rear of Tyler's centre, in two lines. On Hancock's line there were but few places where artillery could be used with effect.

Barlow had directed that his attacking brigades should, previously to the assault, be moved out, and formed just in rear of the picket line. From this point they advanced for half a mile through woods and over open intervals, under a severe fire, square up to the enemy's works. That portion of his front where the right of Miles' brigade joined with the left of Brookes—the same brigade that so brilliantly carried the famous salient in the lines of Spottsylvania—succeeded in a similar splendid coup here; they got over and into the enemy's parapet, capturing his guns (four light twelve-pounders), his colors, and five or six hundred prisoners, about three hundred of whom were secured by promptly passing them to the rear. The storming column, in fact, was just turning the enemy's guns on the retreating rebels, when powerful reinforcements from the second rebel line appeared advancing. The first rebel line was held by Breckinridge's troops, and was carried, but Lee is too good a General to leave a point so important thus weakly defended. Breckinridge's men were placed in the fore-front to receive the baptism of fire, but behind these lay the veterans of Hill's corps, and it is these we now see dashing forward to retrieve the honors we had snatched. Barlow's brigade—stout hearts not used to pale before the greatest odds—could have held their own under conditions the least short of desperation, but the situation in which they now found themselves overleaped its limits. It was not merely the overwhelming front that came pressing down upon them, of that they had no fear; but the position they had gained placed them in advance of the whole line of battle, and gave the rebel artillery the opportunity for a deadly enfilading fire. Besides this, they had lost the directing heads of two of the chief commanders. Brookes and Byrnes, "souls of courage all compact," fell mortally wounded, and all the organizations had suffered fearfully from an unparalleled loss of officers. In this state of facts they fell back, bringing with them the prisoners they had taken, and a captured color, but not the guns. They fell back, but not to their original position; to a position far in advance of that they had held, and at different points not more than fifty yards from the enemy. Here they intrenched, and here I leave them, to pass on to Gibbon's division of the same corps, on the right, and which was engaged at the same time.

Gibbon's advance was simultaneous with Barlow's, but in moving forward, he came upon one of the swamps of the Chickahominy, which had to be turned or overpassed, in the process of which it became very difficult to establish the connection between different parts of his line. This overcome, however, his troops pressed

forward with the same vigor that marked the conduct of their companion-division on the left. Parts of the brigades of Tyler and Owen gained the rebel works, but for reasons identical with those that forced back Barlow's troops, they also were compelled to give up what they had won. Gibbon's division, too, lost very heavily. General Tyler, before reaching the works, was carried off the field, shot in the ankle. One of his regimental commanders, Colonel Porter, of the Eighth New York Heavy Artillery, was killed; immediately after, the Lieutenant-Colonel (Bates) fell dead. Another of his regimental commanders, Colonel McMahon, of the One Hundred and Sixty-fourth New York, was struck while planting his colors on the rebel works, and was left a prisoner in the enemy's hands—his troops not supporting him after he was wounded. Owen's brigade lost two entire companies, taken prisoners inside of the enemy's intrenchments. In giving way, Gibbon's division also was far from losing all the ground it had gained. It took up an advanced position close to the enemy, and just over the crest, the rearward slope of which was held by the rebels. This position it has retained during the day, and McKean's brigade has held all day a position within fifteen yards of the enemy's works.

Not until the splendid attack of Hancock's corps had been made, not until after its blood-bought victory had been wrested from our hands, was he or any man in this army aware of the supreme importance of the position this morning carried and lost. The keypoint in the battle of Gaines' Mill, two years ago, it is strange and mortifying that no one should have appreciated its value. This position is a bald hill, named "Watts' Hill," dominating the whole battle-ground, and covering the angle of the "Despatch road." Along this ridge the rebel works formed a salient, and in front of it was a sunken road. Of this road Hancock got possession, and the brigades of Miles and Brookes actually struck and carried the work directly on the salient! Had we held this point, we would have had a position whence the entire rebel line might have been enfiladed; and I think it is not too much to say that the day would have been ours, and Lee pushed across the Chickahominy. Had we even known in advance its commanding importance, very different disposition for attack would have been made. We would have massed on the left, and made the victory a certainty. The considerations certainly inspire bitter regrets; but who does not know that it is on precisely such contingencies that the fate of battles often hangs?

Simultaneously with the attack of the Second corps, the Sixth, under Wright, connecting on the left with Hancock, made a general advance at a quarter before five o'clock—each division assaulting on the entire line. Of this corps, the Second division (McNeill), held the right; the Third division (Ricketts), the centre, and the First division (Russell), the left. Five batteries,

under charge of the Chief of Artillery of the Second corps, Colonel Tompkins, namely: Adams' First Rhode Island battery, Cowan's First New York (Independent), Hahn's Third New York (Independent), McCurtin's First Massachusetts, and Rhodes' First Rhode Island, were planted in good positions, and did effective service in covering the advance. The assault of the Sixth corps was made with the utmost vigor, and succeeded in carrying the first line of rebel rifle-pits along its entire front, and got up within two hundred and fifty yards of the main works. Smith's corps, connecting on the right with the Sixth, had advanced in conjunction with it; but the left division, that of Martindale, who led the attack in heavy, deep columns, got disarranged, and was repulsed. General Smith made three different attacks to relieve Martindale, but his last supports did not get up in time to allow him to hold on. The effect of this repulse on the left of Smith had a disastrous effect upon the position of Wright. It uncovered the right flank of the Sixth, and exposed Ricketts' division, which was stoutly holding the advanced position, to a savage fire on the prolongation of its line. In this state of facts, to retain possession of a position somewhat in advance of his point of starting, was the utmost General Wright could possibly do.

Operations along the fronts of Warren and Burnside were of an importance quite subordinate to that of operations on the left. No results were achieved except the carrying of the line of rifle-pits occupied by the rebel skirmishers. The Fifth and Ninth corps nowhere struck the enemy's main work. Burnside kept up a furious cannonade for some hours; but it was nothing—*vox, et preterea nihil*. From the tenor of one of Burnside's morning despatches, it was at one time hoped that he would be able to turn the enemy's left; but this hope also was doomed to disappointment.

Returning from the ride along the lines at eight A. M., I found that Generals Grant and Meade had established their personal headquarters in advance of that occupied during the night, and had taken their station on the site of Cold Harbor, where General Wright's headquarters were fixed—he himself, however, having gone forward with his corps. The rain of the early morning had ceased, and the sun was struggling through the clouds.

The fate of the day was like the aspect of the heavens above—mingled light and shade, a clear issue nowhere. The first terrible climax of the battle was over. Would the assault be renewed?

To those looking into the face of Grant for answer to this query, there was no legible response. His is a face that tells no tale—a face impassive in victory or defeat; face of stone; a sphinx face! Not of him can it be said, as Lady Macbeth to her lord: "This face, my thane, is as a book, wherein one may read strange things." Rather it is a *palimpsest*, whose obscured char-

acters escape the scrutiny of the keenest-eyed searcher.

Nothing, indeed, could be more striking than the contrast presented by the two commanders, as they stooped in consultation on that bare hill, with their faces turned Richmond-ward. The small form with the slight stoop in the shoulders, sunken gray eyes; still, reserved demeanor, impassive face, and chin as of a bull-dog or close-set steel-trap—that is Grant; the tall figure, with the nervous, emphatic articulation and action, and face as of antique parchment—that is Meade—and the antipodes could not bring together a greater contrast.

Whether it was that General Grant himself was in doubt as to the path which should be pursued, or that he felt the need of seeing for himself the actual situation—for from our point of vision everything was hid by a veil of woods—I know not, but he suddenly mounted his horse and rode rapidly down (an occasional shot or shell passing over his head and falling around us at headquarters), to the headquarters of General Hancock, and afterward to those of General Wright; and when he came back it was plain there would be no renewal of the battle, for we all rode leisurely back to the old camp occupied the night before.

This was noon, and though the white heat of battle had died out, there were still spirits of fight along the line, and vigorous interchange of fire from the hostile batteries. Such rencounters were inevitable from the unparalleled closeness of the opposing lines. This was particularly the case on the left, where there were points at which the rebels and our own men were divided but by a narrow neutral interval of fifty yards. As the possibility of our troops occupying a line in such proximity to the enemy's works may not be clear, I will offer a word of explanation. The rebel intrenchments in front of Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions had, with a fault of engineering of which the rebels are not often guilty, been drawn on the rearward slope of the crest and thrown too far back, so that after the repulse of our men, the moment after they had fallen back over the ridge, they were partially under cover, and here the sharpshooters were able to keep the rebel heads down long enough to allow portions of our lines to protect themselves with improvised parapets, which they held all day.

This explanation is the more needed, because I am about to narrate an incident which will make a draft on the faith of the reader even greater than did the assertion that portions of our lines held their position within fifty yards of the rebel works—and that is, that one portion of our line retained all day a position within fifteen yards of the rebel works. This heroic band was the brigade of Colonel McKean, a brigade of Gibbon's division of Hancock's corps, and numbering about eight hundred men. The conduct of these eight hundred is as splendid a stroke of heroism as ever lit up the story of "the glory we call Greece and the grandeur we

call Rome." Through the live-long day these men held their line, within fifteen yards of the enemy, and all his force could not dislodge them. Repeatedly during the day the rebels formed double columns of attack, to come over the works and assail them, and the officers could be heard encouraging their troops by telling them "there are only four or five hundred of them—come on." But the moment the rebels showed themselves above their parapet, a line of fire flashed out from behind the earthen mound where those eight hundred heroes stood in a new Thermopylæ, and many a rebel threw up his arms and fell prone under their swift avenging bullets.

The sequel of this bit of history is curious as the deed itself; for while the rebels dared not venture out to assail McKean's men, neither could he nor his command recede from the perilous position. He could not get back to us; we could not go forward to him. In this dilemma the ingenious device was hit upon of running a "sap," or zig-zag trench, up from our line to his. In this way a working party were able to dig their way up to where they lay, begrimed with powder and worn down with fatigue, and a few hours ago they were brought safely away. "All that were left of them, left of eight hundred!" But McKean, their gallant leader, he came not away alive. Since eleven in the morning he had lain behind the bulwark his valor defended—a corpse.

While standing up preparing to resist a rebel assault, he fell, pierced by the bullet of a sharpshooter, and after living for an hour or two in an agonizing death-in-life, begging his staff officers to put an end to his misery, his heroic soul forsook the turmoil of this weary, warring world.

There were other scenes along those lines, drawn so close up to the enemy, not so grave, and others of a grim kind of jollity. For example, a man would sing out from behind our breastworks the signal of attack, "Forward, guide centre," whereupon the rebels, plainly hearing all that we said, would start up from behind their parapet, and our men, just peering above their pits and "drawing a bead" on the uprising rebels, would bring many a one down with a bloody gift, despatched with unerring aim. Or again, one of the rebels calling a parley, would cry out: "Yanks, aint it about your time to cook coffee?" "Yes," replies Yank. "Then," rejoins Mr. Rebel, "if you won't shoot while I make my johnny-cake, I won't shoot while you make your coffee." Whereupon the culinary truce was observed with scrupulous fidelity. It is in such ways that grim-visaged war, of a time, smooths his wrinkled face.

The hours of afternoon passed away with no more of action than is indicated in the previous recital; five o'clock, the favorite rebel hour of attack, had gone by, and it seemed that the war-work of the day was over. Toward sunset the writer rode up to Hancock's front,

to learn closer at hand the details of the morning attack at this point. (But a parenthesis here; "ride" is hardly the word to indicate the mode of approach to these hot fronts. He who ventured up was speedily admonished by whizzing missiles from sharp-eyed rebel *sirailleurs* of the prudence of dismounting and making his way up as modestly as might be, whether on foot, or still better, crawling on all fours.) It must have been nearly eight o'clock, for a long Virginia twilight was fading clean out, when from behind the rebel works words of command were audible, indicating an intention of immediate attack. In a moment the rebel line of battle emerged, and came down with a fierce yell on the front of Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions, and the left of Wright's corps. It was these very troops that in the morning had gone up through the inferno of rebel fire, and stormed and carried, for a time, their works, and it was with a savage joy they saw the moment come to pay the rebels back. It will give you a conception of the fearful odds at which this army works in these constant demands imposed upon it, of assaulting the enemy's works, when I say that in the few opportunities the rebels have given us of receiving their attack on our works, each man feels himself equal to three, and never asks any better than that the rebels should just come on. Our men had now this sweet revenge. Though twilight had deepened into night, the approaching rebel line defined itself sharply athwart the horizon, as it came over the crest, and as it did so, it was met by volley after volley of musketry, and a well-directed artillery fire, under which it shook and staggered, but closing up the gaps, still rushed forward. Portions of the line got up to our works, and at places the flash of the rebel rifles came over our parapets. A few even got upon our breastworks; but they either fell dead on the outside, or were dragged inside as prisoners. Some of these have just been brought into General Hancock's tent. They prove to be North Carolinians; say they are Beauregard's troops; that they were last at battle of Olustee, Florida, and that they were brought up to Lee's army but a few days ago. This is an additional proof of a fact of which we have just had much evidence; that is, that Lee has to-day been fighting his reinforcements. We have taken to-day men from Breckinridge's command, from Buckner's, from Beauregard, from North Carolina, from the defences of Savannah. And that, somehow or other, and in spite of the supposed depletion of the rebel army, Lee has been able to get together a still formidable force, we have to-day had the evidence of demonstration. Everywhere he has shown a development of line equal to our own, and though we have made the most vigorous efforts all along his front to break through, we have nowhere succeeded.

The repulse of the rebels in their night attack, both on the front of Hancock and of

Wright, was most complete, and whatever may have been the purpose of Lee in this bold stroke it was signally foiled.

COLD HARBOR, June 4, 1864.

There has been a constant fire along the lines all day. The skirmishers are so close that the losses on both sides are many. The Surgeon-in-Chief of the Sixth corps informed me that they had averaged six wounded an hour—about two hundred during the twenty-four hours. Probably the Second and Eighteenth have lost quite as many. The enemy have retired in part, from our right, and the losses in the Fifth and Ninth are less.

The breastworks and trenches are in some places not more than two hundred feet apart, so determinedly have we pressed upon the enemy—advancing our works a few paces every night. We have a half dozen lines of breastworks. If we should be driven from the front one, there are still several others from which we could fire upon the enemy. The men take their places at midnight, where they must stay till, under the cover of darkness, they can be relieved. There they sit—crouched, cramped. To raise their heads above the parapet is certain death. And so along the rebel lines there are loop-holes where keen-eyed men watch for the enemy. The soldiers on both sides delight to draw the fire of their opponents. They raise their hats a trifle—whiz—whiz—whiz—the bullets go around, or may be through it. The obstinacy of the rebels is matched by the persistence of our own men. It is not often in field operations—not siege—that opposing forces come in such close contact.

The foreign papers are full of the war in Denmark—a war in which, in the greatest battle fought, the loss was less than a thousand men placed *hors de combat*. How little the world knows of the magnitude of our own war! How little we ourselves know of it! Our skirmishes, even, of which we hardly take notice, are of greater moment than the battles, the accounts of which fill the foreign newspapers.

There was a slow cannonade in the morning, which gradually died away; but the infantry took it up, and so the Sabbath hours have been far from peaceful.

At sunset, there was the booming of distant cannon—heavy guns to the left of Richmond—whether from the gunboats, or from the rebel artillery in the defences, repulsing Sheridan, who has gone in that direction, we have no knowledge.

8:30 P. M.—The sun has gone down, and the darkness is stealing on. It is the usual hour for the ripple of musketry along the lines, and several nights we have had it—the rebels choosing it for attacking our advanced force.

We have had occasional shots from the artillery. There is one piece which hurls its shells far over our lines toward headquarters. Other than this, there is but little to break the silence.

The skirmishers along the lines who have been firing through the day, seem to be weary. But it is the calm before the storm.

There it comes—one, two, three—a dozen, a hundred shots—a roll, deep, heavy, prolonged, like the rush of a mighty torrent suddenly let loose. How it deepens! It is like the ripping of the mower, swinging his scythe in ripened grass, dried and scorched by summer heat. The great Reaper is out there upon that field, stalking unseen between the trenches, walking in darkness, bordered with lightning flashes, showering it with leaden rain, making it the Valley of the Shadow of Death! There are the cannon. Boom, boom, boom—five, ten, twenty, one hundred discharges a minute! A forest of pines shuts out the sight, but above the evergreen branches the flashes flame upon the starry heavens. No artist can picture it, no language describe it. It is terrific, yet grand and sublime. It makes one nervous to hear it, stirs the blood, rouses and excites, to know that the defenders of those works are holding their ground. You need no telegraphic despatch to assure you of the fact. A sudden lull, after a savage cry, would indicate disaster; but there is the cry, the Indian yell, not the cheer which distinguishes the charge of the Union troops from that of the enemy. There is no cessation of the roar. It deepens rather. The cry, which a moment ago rose sharp and clear above the battle-tide becomes fainter. There is a perceptible ebbing of the tide. It has been at full flood a half hour. You have been two minutes reading this narrative. How little you know of the reality. I hear it, but have little conception of what is taking place. I shall realize it more fully in the morning, when the ambulances come in with the wounded. But to be there, in it, a part of it—with blood at fever heat—with the air full of strange, terrifying noises—hissings, screechings, howlings of balls, bullets, and deafening explosions—all darkness, excepting the blinding flashes and sheets of flame! The altar of our country drips with blood. It is a Sabbath evening sacrifice, pure and precious, freely offered. Fathers and mothers have given the firstlings of their flocks, with thanks that they had them to give; they have given the best, they have given all. Patriotism is not dead.

COLD HARBOR, June 5—Night.

Our men lie in the face of an active and wily enemy, ready at any moment to avail himself of our slightest relaxation of vigilance. He may attempt a surprise at any moment, and on any portion of our line, and the vigilance of our men is therefore kept constantly at its utmost tension. The report of a musket, a low voice or whisper, the sound of a footstep, the breaking of bushes, is heard in front of some point of our line; for aught we know, it may indicate a stealthy foe advancing, silent, and cautious, to attack us; and the possible danger is greeted with an instantaneous volley.

For this reason it is difficult at night to form any judgment of events by the amount of noise made. To-night, however, the firing was so severe, and kept up so long, as very naturally to produce the impression that the enemy was making a most desperate and determined assault on our left wing. Inquiry subsequently elicited that although an attack had been made, its magnitude was slight in proportion to the amount of powder exploded and the clamor made.

The firing was chiefly along the front of Gibbon's division of the Second corps, and Russell's division of the Sixth. Of the former division, the Second brigade, General Owen, and the First brigade, Colonel Ramsay, report that the enemy fired from their rifle-pits, the object being to stop our working parties on the intrenchments; but the Third brigade, Colonel Smith, report that in their front the rebels actually approached our works, crawling on their hands and knees almost up to our front breastwork. They were, however, glad to retire again to the cover of their own works as soon as our men opened fire; but if they were out in line of battle, as it is said they were at this point, they must have left many dead and wounded behind them.

At other parts of the line it was merely an exchange of volleys and artillery fire between the opposing works. Shells and even bullets came far to the rear of our lines of battle, and the headquarters of General Hancock was exposed for a time to a very heavy fire. Captain McEwen, of General Hancock's staff, had his leg struck by a shell while standing in front of his own tent. The wound is such as to render amputation necessary. With this exception our casualties are supposed to have been insignificant. The duration of the fire was about forty-five minutes.

The body of Colonel McKean, Eighty-first Pennsylvania, was this morning brought off the field and sent to a hospital for embalment, then to be forwarded North at the earliest opportunity. Major Hancock, Assistant Adjutant-General of General Barlow's division, at considerable risk of his own life, went out to the body while it laid under the rebel fire, but ascertaining that life was extinct, brought away such papers and other articles as were on his person, to forward home to his family.

It was difficult to get Colonel Porter's body inside the works, owing to the vigilant attention of rebel sharpshooters, but with the aid of a rope it was accomplished.

I heard to-night an incident worth relating in connection with the rebel assault of two nights ago. About thirty rebels, somewhat more daring than their fellows, crawled on hands and knees up to our breastworks on a part of General Barlow's front. On coming up they met with no resistance from our men, the latter, on the contrary, lending a helping hand to each rebel who came in their way, by seizing him by the collar and bringing him over head fore-

most into their rifle-pits, where, of course, he found himself a prisoner.

MONDAY, JUNE 6—3 A. M.

No battle yesterday, but constant firing across from one line of works to the other as soon as any portion of a man's body could be seen. The casualties during the day, all from sharpshooters and intermittent artillery, are not less than four hundred. To these must be added between one hundred and two hundred during the night.

A little after eight o'clock a furious blast rang a fierce, discordant metre from the left, where lay Hancock's corps. Judging by the powder burned, it was more than a usually desperate night assault. Soon the following despatch is received :

HALF-PAST EIGHT O'CLOCK, P. M.—They at first attacked Wright, but are now rushing down upon me. Apparently no damage.

HANCOCK.

Tremendous discharges of musketry, and the awful blasts of cohorn mortars continued fifteen or twenty minutes longer, and then like a tornado breaking into fitful squalls and then clearing into fine weather, this tempest of war broke into detached volleys, and finally ceased altogether.

It seems to have been brought on by the enemy, as is always the case with these night affairs. He discovered men planting fascines for a new line, and at once assaulted to stop the work, whereupon both sides opened fire right and left. The assault was repulsed easily enough, but neither party seemed inclined to first stop firing, hence its duration.

An hour later the Eighteenth corps made some lively shooting, but there was nothing in the nature of an attack.

During the night the Fifth corps, Warren's, has been withdrawn from the right, and marched around to the extreme left. There will be other changes of position to-night.

From the Richmond *Examiner* of the third, it is learned that ex-South Carolina Congressman Lawrence M. Keitt, was mortally wounded on Wednesday, and died the next day. Also that General Doles, commanding a division of Ewell's corps, was killed on Thursday, opposite Bartlett's brigade, Fifth corps.

The Richmond and York river railroad is being rebuilt—that part of it which we most need. The first ten miles from White House will require but few repairs. Quite distant and heavy cannonading yesterday afternoon and evening from lower down the Chickahominy, indicates that the cavalry is operating in that quarter. I suspect Sheridan has been told to take and hold the bridge till a corps of infantry can be sent there.

Reinforcements continue to arrive. The slightly wounded of the battle of the Wilderness are beginning to return. Daily mail

communication has been established with Washington, under the efficient supervision of Colonel Markland, special agent of the Post Office Department.

DISPATCH STATION, JUNE 6.

The First and Fourth divisions of the Fifth corps reached here this morning. It was three o'clock A. M. when the men began the march. When day dawned, the rebels on the south side of the Chickahominy observed the moving column, and opened on it with two guns of very heavy calibre. Several men were injured while marching in the ranks.

Colonel Hoffman's brigade, of the Fourth division, immediately took possession of this side of the railroad bridge. A barricade was thrown across the railroad about half a mile below this station. Between us and the rebels flows the Chickahominy, a sinuous, sluggish stream, bounded on either side by jungles and morasses, from which is continually arising unwholesome dampness, and noxious vapors. At this point the stream is not more than one hundred yards in width; the bridge is three times as long.

All the track is in excellent running order. A little rusty from long disuse, but still quite complete, with switches and side-tracks in good repair. During the afternoon the rebels mounted a heavy piece of ordnance upon a truck, and approached within a short distance of the bridge. They threw some six-inch shell over our men, which elicited considerable criticism from those happening to make narrow escapes.

Rifle-pits were dug, and a long line of fortifications begun. For a time the skirmishers were friendly, and conversed with each other, across the river. Before dark they were using every species of *finesse* to cause each other to expose their bodies to be shot.

Few of our peaceful readers imagine how skilful and inventive a successful sharpshooter must be ere he enters the rifle-pit, which may prove his grave. It is not enough that he be an excellent markaman. Your good sharpshooter is always a fine strategist. In front of the Second corps, Barlow's division, I believe, is a rebel battery. Our fortified skirmish line is within a few rods of the enemy's intrenchments. This battery for some days annoyed us exceedingly. Throughout the entire day shell after shell would be dropped among the troops in reserve. Shells are noisy missiles. They seldom effect great damage, unless used upon heavy masses within easy range.

A screaming shell is little more than a moral effect. I have known a brigade of infantry to be concealed in the woods, while the rebel shells appeared to burst with wonderful precision in their very midst. Scarcely a man would be hit. Upon new troops the effect is terrifying. There is no man, however brave or courageous, but will wince and shrink when he listens, for the first time, to the bursting of shells. One soon gets accustomed to them, and an old sol-

dier will calmly smoke his short pipe and speculate upon the chances of one bursting in some spot close by, which he has selected.

One morning the rebels around this battery discovered a small lunette immediately in front. It had grown up in a single night. Twenty men lay concealed in this small trench. They were but a few yards from the dark muzzles of those threatening cannon. The rebels attempt to work the guns. All efforts are futile. When a rebel shows his head a small jet of white smoke curls slowly above the small semi-circle where our men are concealed. The rebel falls. In this way we render the once formidable battery useless. During the day it is quiet; at night they use it freely.

All the old dodges are used freely practised. A man puts his hat on the end of a ramrod, and holds it above the pit. In a trice it is pierced with a dozen bullets. Another exposes his own person slightly, that an associate may get a "single fair pop at a rebel." Great quantities of powder and lead are thrown away. About sunset every night, both sides endeavor to push out their respective skirmish lines. It frequently happens that both sides open with cannon and musketry, and keep up a continual uproar for half an hour.

Already there have been two such occurrences, which, to those not upon the spot, would assume the magnitude of a fearful night attack. Barlow's and Gibbon's divisions, of the Second corps, are so near the enemy, great precautions are necessary to ward off a collision. Two nights ago there was a savage rattle of musketry and showers of grape and canister exchanged. Every one thought a bloody battle had been fought. Next morning I discovered that scarcely a dozen men had been struck.

Bottom's bridge is not quite two miles from here. The rebels had cut the supporting timbers, but were driven away before they could complete their work of destruction upon the timbers of the bridge.

A train of cars came to the station to-day from the White House. Near the river is a large saw-mill. A large quantity of lumber was here. It was loaded on the cars and carried off.

The cavalry have gone on another raid. Whatever they undertake to do will be well done.

June 9th, 1864.—There is nothing especially interesting to report to-day. On a part of the line picket firing has been kept up all day, while at other points it would seem as if by a mutual agreement this practice had ceased. Last evening a battery in Birney's division opened on a house on our left, which, according to a deserter who came in, was occupied by General Wilcox. Three shells went through it, causing the occupants to leave rather hastily. The fire was returned with very good aim, but without loss to us. The deserter says that Beauregard's troops are posted from Bottom's bridge all the way to the James River, watch-

ing for the appearance of our army in that direction.

June 10, P. M.—The enemy are busy throwing up fortifications in the vicinity of Summer's and Bottom's bridge. The spires of Richmond are in view from the signal stations at these points, and their wagon trains can be seen moving within three or four miles of the city, where the road for a short distance is visible. Very little firing has taken place to-day. No change in position has been made within the past two days. Last evening as Colonel McAlister, of the Eleventh New Jersey volunteers, was riding along the line he was fired at by a rebel sharpshooter, notwithstanding there had been a tacit agreement that no picket firing should take place. The ball passed across the Colonel's breast and entered the head of his orderly, who was riding with him. The entire command was at once put under arms expecting an attack, but nothing further occurred.

June 11, P. M.—Our lines are scarcely nearer the enemy than was their position in the case of the battle of Friday, more than a week ago. The troops on both sides, each behind their intrenchments, have kept up a desultory but useless fire, just sufficient to make it apparent that the respective works were not vacant. Both armies, in fact, have been enjoying the repose which was needed after the hard fighting and rapid marching of the three weeks' campaigning from the banks of the Rapidan.

To-day the silence is even more marked than before. The sound of a musket has scarcely been heard along the entire line. A few blurts of artillery, and the explosion of a shell or two over the trees, about the centre of the line, have been the only reminders this afternoon of the enemy's presence.

From present indications it is not likely that there will be fighting for several days to come; but a storm is brewing, and may burst in a quarter least expected by the enemy. It is not proper at this time to say precisely how General Grant will attempt to discomfit the enemy. Yesterday a general order was issued by General Meade forbidding unauthorized communication with the enemy. The men on both sides have been holding intercourse with each other, for the interchange of newspapers and the barter of coffee and tobacco. In this way a great deal of mischief was likely to result, as information of vital importance is always apt to leak out. The opposing lines of rifle-pits, it must be borne in mind, are not one hundred yards distant, and in some parts of the line much closer. For any portion of the body to be exposed the penalty is certain wounding, if not death, but the men are utterly weary with loading and firing. They have kept up this skirmishing for days, and no visible advantage has been gained by either side.

The fire gradually slackens. Officers become careless about urging the men to their work. A magnetic spell influences with equal power our own men and their mortal enemies. It is

very curious that the combatants are entirely hidden from each other's sight.

The last shot is fired, and the lull in the battle-storm is perfect. Adventurous spirits on both sides cautiously raise their heads above the earthworks. "How are you, Johnny?" "How are you Yank?" are the questions usually bandied. "Won't you shoot?" says one. "No," says the other. "Well, we won't," chime in all; and immediately the parapets are swarmed with men who have been concealed behind them. Out jump the fellows from the rifle-pits, and putting down their guns, stretch their cramped forms upon the grass. Sharpshooters covertly slide down from their perches in the trees, and lol about in utter abandon. Trade is quickly opened, and all sorts of commodities are exchanged. The men have keen pleasure in their singular armistice, bantering each other sharply, and never overstepping the half-way line which separates their respective fortifications. Suddenly the cry is raised, "Run back, Johnnies," or "Run back, Yank," just as it happens to be, "we're going to shoot," and the hostilities begin again.

It is always understood, however, that the first shot shall be aimed high, and the veriest powder gets back to shelter safely.

While this fraternal scene is being enacted on one part of the line, the battle rages hot at other portions of the extended front, which measures by miles. Was ever such strange warfare known before? It is easy enough to see, however, that these anomalous episodes may be abused. The rebels availed themselves of such a truce the other day to strengthen a battery, which had been reduced to silence, and had kept still for nearly a week. The work, consequently, has had to be done over again. I have seen a great number of prisoners lately. Their appearance utterly refutes the current stories that the rebel army is in a destitute and starving condition. It is simply idle to talk about starving the army into submission. The rebel soldiers, as a general thing, are stout, strong, and the very picture of health. It is insulting to our brave men that statements, so industriously circulated respecting the feebleness and lack of power of endurance of the Southern soldiers, should be believed. The rations of the rebel troops may not be in as great variety as those furnished our men, but they have proved to be fully as nutritious. This fact cannot be gainsaid.

JONES' BRIDGE, VIRGINIA, June 13, 1864.

By the left flank, once more! Our army has been crossing here quietly for some hours. Our wounded and sick were all sent to White House yesterday. Such of our troops as could be moved from the front, started yesterday (Sunday) morning. Our wagon trains had been packed the previous day, ready for the move. These preparatory movements always occupy a day or two, when the enemy are on our front, and it was not until last night that the comple-

tion of these preliminaries gave the signal for the troops to fall in for another move.

A portion of the Eighteenth corps and some other troops were first withdrawn and moved to the rear. During the night the rest were quietly withdrawn. It is one of the most difficult tasks to withdraw from the front of an enemy strongly entrenched, with lines of battle as close as they were, in position, just to the left. Our withdrawal was effected so quietly as not to arouse their suspicion, and here we are crossing the Chickahominy, a full and long day's march from Mechanicsville. Where we go we know not.

All have learned to follow General Grant wherever he leads, and no questions asked. We crossed in two columns, our right here at Long bridge, and our left lower down at Jones' bridge. The headquarters' trains left Cold Harbor on Sunday at three A. M., and are now encamped here. Our next march is to bring us to James river. So closely have we pressed the enemy in our front for several days, that they were unable to send off sufficient forces to hold these fords, and as we have a shorter line by twenty miles than anything they can take to reach our rear, we feel very secure in our position. White Oak swamp now protects our right wing, and the Chickahominy in a few hours will cover our rear.

The Richmond *Despatch* of Saturday, June eleventh, mentions a rumor brought into the city of Wade Hampton's having had a sharp fight with Sheridan's cavalry, west of Richmond, where the Yankees were endeavoring to reach the canal locks on James river. It claims that that they had obtained some success, but does not seem to attach much importance to the statement.

THE ADVANCE ON PETERSBURG.

IN THE FIELD, Saturday, June 11.

The Second cavalry brigade, General Kautz's division, Colonel S. P. Spear commanding, crossed the Appomattox river on pontoon bridges during the night of the eighth instant. The whole division (excepting a part of the first brigade, Colonel Mix), was across by half-past four on the morning of the ninth, and at once took up the line of march in the direction of Petersburg.

About six o'clock our advance met and charged the enemy's pickets, capturing four of them, two of whom were mortally wounded, and have since died. Captain Reynolds, with one squadron of the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, was ordered to charge about one hundred of their cavalry, with drawn sabres, which he did in gallant style. The rebels could not see the necessity of remaining in front of the Captain's brave boys, to become martyrs to cold steel, consequently they changed base to the rear in double-quick, and made the woods their next base of operations. After having driven the rebels into the woods, the head of the column was turned to the left, and proceeded

on the road leading to the Petersburg plank-road.

When within three miles of the plank-road the advance was again fired on by the enemy; the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry was at once dismounted, and skirmished the woods to the front, while the Fifth Pennsylvania skirmished to the right and left. They had not gone more than fifty yards when the enemy opened on the Fifth skirmishers with two howitzers, from a redoubt. The Fifth immediately charged their works, driving a regiment of cavalry, under Colonel Denin, of Virginia, and the cannon from their camp and works, leaving, in their precipitate flight, all their horse equipments, and a large lot of new clothing and arms. We had no means of removing our captured property, and they were consequently committed to the flames, and so perished Colonel Denin's camp, with all surplus baggage he may have had on hand, under the very noses of his boasted chivalry.

General Wise was in command of a line of ramparts in the rear of those we had just captured, and the retreating rebels took refuge in them. Wise being in command accounts for their not coming out of their works to fight us, for he always prefers having his miserable carcass behind forts or in a bed, as he did at Roanoke, to having it where there is the slightest chance to be the recipient of a shot. He may be perfectly right, for I have no doubt that it is rather more healthy behind forts than in the open field.

After having succeeded in driving them into their works, we marched on in the direction of the plank-road, crossed the Norfolk and Petersburg railroad at ten o'clock, and reached the plank-road at eleven; marched up the road to within one mile of Petersburg, when the advance came upon the enemy's works. A squadron of the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry was at once ordered to charge the works with drawn sabres, which was done in good order. They charged to within twenty yards of the works, when the enemy opened upon them a most deadly and destructive fire of musketry, compelling the squadron to fall back on the main column, the enemy at the same time firing into the column as it stood massed in the road.

The First District of Columbia cavalry (a detachment of the First cavalry brigade, accompanying the division), with Captains Loomis's and Bailey's squadrons of the Eleventh Pennsylvania cavalry, were gotten into position to charge and take the right of the works. A section of the Eighth New York Independent Battery, Lieutenant Peter Merton commanding, with the remainder of the Eleventh regiment, were put in position in the centre, while the Fifth Pennsylvania took position on the left, and in front of a very large redoubt. The charge was ordered simultaneously on the right, left, and centre, Lieutenant Merton keeping the enemy's guns engaged while the cavalry charged the works. The Fifth moved down on the left, gallantly led by Major C. Kleing, commanding

the regiment, as steadily as though they were on dress parade, to within about one hundred yards of the redoubt, when they struck up that demoniac yell of theirs, which the rebels have every reason to so well remember, and went at full speed on to the works. The enemy held their position nobly, and would not give way until our men had climbed up the embankments, and fired down into them; such work they evidently did not expect from cavalry, and when they found our men had actually gotten in their works, they skedaddled in splendid confusion, leaving everything behind them. While the Fifth was thus engaged, the First District of Columbia and Eleventh Pennsylvania were doing their work well on the right and centre; they, at the same time the Fifth charged, charged and carried the works in front of them.

The enemy left one twelve-pounder brass gun, caisson (chests full of ammunition, horses, harness, and everything connected with a battery of artillery), in the hands of the Fifth Pennsylvania cavalry; they also left all their dead and wounded, numbering about one hundred and fifty, prisoners in our hands. We destroyed their tents, and all camp and garrison equipage, with the exception of a few tents left for shelter for some wounded rebels.

After having accomplished our work effectually at the works just alluded to, the column was pushed on toward the city (it then being in full sight), Colonel Spear, or old *Spuds*, as he is familiarly called in the brigade, and his staff, riding in advance of the column some distance. We arrived within less than one hundred yards of the city, when the enemy's sharpshooters opened upon the Colonel and staff, and at the same time firing upon the main column from a battery on the right flank. "Spuds," however, with his usual daring, charged directly on at full speed, until he found it utterly impossible to get into town with the force he had up with him without a fearful sacrifice of life; consequently he wheeled the advance to the left about by fours, and marched back about fifty yards, under cover of an embankment, and then waited orders from the General commanding division. The orders, when received, were to retire slowly, as it was very evident the enemy had been heavily reinforced from Beauregard's forces out of town. The trains could be distinctly heard coming into the city, and they were undoubtedly loaded with troops. The enemy followed up the rear of the column as we were marching away, with infantry, cavalry, and artillery, for over ten miles, keeping up a constant fire upon us. Colonel Spear and staff, with Captain Bailey, of the Eleventh, remained in the rear until all danger was passed, and they went to the front and brought the column into camp about twelve o'clock the same night, without further molestation.

The cavalry of this department have been doing splendid service since the opening of the campaign, and are constantly on the move.

Our loss is very slight, not exceeding fifty, killed, wounded and missing. Among the latter, I regret to state, is Captain George D. Hart, of Company K, of the Fifth, a brave and efficient officer.

Great credit is due to General A. V. Kautz, Colonel S. P. Spear, and their subordinate officers, for their gallant attack upon the strongly-fortified city of Petersburg.

THE CROSSING OF THE JAMES.

UNITED STATES SHIPBOARD ORONOGA,
JAMES RIVER, VA., JUNE 18, 1862.

The Army of the Potomac is across the James, and the news can no longer be contraband. Those who were permitted to see the transition of this army of one hundred and thirty thousand men from the northern to the southern bank of the James, will remember a scene strange and magnificent beyond description, and which can never be effaced from the memory.

The army left the banks of the Chickahominy, and marched in the direction of Charles City Court-house, evidently puzzling and surprising the enemy as to the intention of the sudden movement from their front. The advance of the army arrived at the river near Harrison's landing—so familiar to us as the place of embarkation of McClellan's army two years ago—during the day of Tuesday, the fourteenth. It was contemplated crossing the river in this vicinity to Windmill Point, on the southern bank, and also to Fort Powhatan, about two miles farther down the river. The number, however, was comparatively few who crossed at the latter place, while at Windmill Point the main bridge of pontoons was laid. It consisted of some fifty broad, strong boats, over and upon which the planking and beams, lashed together, were laid. In the river, above and below, and at short distances from the bridge, schooners were anchored, and from them ran hawsers, fastened to the bridge, steadying it and keeping it in position. It was three thousand five hundred and eighty feet long, and probably one of the longest pontoon bridges ever laid. The planking or floor was two feet above the water, and was sufficiently wide to enable twelve men or five horsemen to cross abreast. The northern shore descended gradually to a slight elevation where the land is quite level, and a mile or more beyond the river is thickly wooded. The southern bank descends abruptly to a series of hills, all of which are heavily timbered. From Windmill Point, to which the southern side of the bridge was affixed, a good road ran directly up and over hills leading to Petersburg.

In the early daylight of the morning of Wednesday, the fifteenth, the crossing began. The open plain on the northern side of the river, and far back into the woods and through the opening, which, like a large gateway, permitted the column to pass, was crowded with the armed host preparing to form in line. A thin cloud of dust hung over the region like a gossamer veil.

The air was still, and the columns of smoke ascended from the fading camp-fires, and were lost in the blue ether above. The regimental wagons, in seemingly inextricable confusion, were running hither and thither; the ambulances and Sanitary Commission wagons were finding their proper places; companies and regiments were marching and countermarching; batteries were mounting and forming in line; and cavalry regiments were marching and wheeling to their respective brigades and divisions. The broad plain was a scene of strange activity, wonderful and grand. The sun had not risen when the crossing commenced, and the morning was delightfully cool and bracing. The corps of Burnside led the van. The regimental wagons moved on to the bridge first. From beneath the soiled and dusty wagon-covers penetrated the tent-poles and their tackling, the buckets and camp kettles, and in nearly every wagon, as an appropriate and component part of the mass of camp material, was a young contraband, with soiled cap and broken visor, with haversack around his neck, and his half-covered legs dangling over the tail-board, and shoes—"prodigious!" The commissary wagons followed, crammed with stores, and drawn by stout-looking mules, that seemed to comprehend and with wonderful alacrity obeyed the half-expressed commands of their drivers. After these came the covered ambulance wagons, that looked peculiarly comfortable and easy in contrast with the heavy teams before them. After these, the light, tidy wagons of the Sanitary Commission, attached to each of which, and following them, were fine-looking milk cows. The rear guard closed this long train, and then the crossing of the men began. The artillery led the line, and the horses moved on to the bridge as though it was the solid ground. From the plain, down the bank, across the bridge they came, horses and drivers, guns, limbers, and caissons, steadily on, and up the hill, away from sight into the woods. It was a noticeable feature that almost without exception, the batteries consisted of four pieces only, and these all Parrott guns, mostly ten-pounders, though there were twenty and thirty-pounders in some of them. This, we understand, is in accordance with an order of General Grant, which reorganizes this branch of the service. And so, the old familiar "Napoleons," the six and twelve-pounder "smooth-bores," and the "James rifled," have given way to these long, slender, saucy-looking Parrotts. The last caisson of the long line has reached the bridge, and the bayonets of the advancing infantry glisten above the bank. With ranks well aligned and in order, with steady, strong steps, they move on to the bridge, by the right flank or four abreast, and with arms "at will."

The campaign, since the fifth of May, has sifted from the ranks all those unable to endure the excessive fatigue which those men have been called upon to bear beyond that of almost any army of which history tells, and the re-

mainder, those who are now marching before us, look as though they might keep on to the Mississippi, by way of pastime, and feel no weariness. With faces browned by exposure, yet expressing in every lineament confidence in their new leader, trust in the result of this sudden movement, and hope of success; with their blue uniforms soiled and dusty, they press on. And now their places are filled by men wearing the habiliments of soldiers, and with muskets, and bayonets affixed, in their hands. There were none like these here two years ago, for these men are negroes. But wherein do they differ from those around them? These are dressed as well—indeed the same; they look as strong, they step as firmly, they move as orderly, and there is only one difference—their faces are black. But the cruel ban which we have placed on them for this has been washed away in blood, at Port Hudson, at Wagner, at Petersburg, and now they are among the regenerators of the land. Let them be honored for what they have done! They come not in companies or detachments, but in regiments. They are full of humor and good will, and, as they march along, give utterance to expressions which are alive with mirth and significant in meaning. One little wiry-looking fellow says: "Ise bin yere 'fore, I is. My ole mars'r live jist little piece ove' yere. Ise gwine t' see yim."

The cavalry's steady tramp attracts our attention, as they march from the plain and down the bank, on to the bridge, an endless troop. Across they go; a hardy, tough, wiry-looking set, up the southern bank and out of view, yet still coming, tramp, tramp, over the plain, and we cannot see the end of them. With breeches stuffed into their boots, with soiled and dusty yellow-trimmed jackets, some with blue caps, some with black felt hats, and some with straw hats, with sabre-shield clanking against their stirrups, and carbine slung over their backs, with canteen hanging from saddle-pommel, an odd and picturesque looking company indeed. Some of them were here a few weeks ago, when Sheridan led them on their wonderful raid, and many of them bear the marks of their sometime contested march. One had his shoeless bandaged foot in the stirrup; another's face is half covered with his handkerchief, stained with blood; a third has his jacket-sleeve hanging by his side, while his arm is held in a sling. Talking and laughing, they pass on, and after a seemingly long while are all over. A great drove of cattle follow them, running here and there, plunging and rearing, and crowding the narrow bridge till it would seem as though the half of them must go overboard. But safely they all cross over. And now the fighting corps of General Hancock are filling the plain and moving upon the bridge. Again the long line of regimental and commissary wagons, with sweating horses and noisy drivers; the ambulances, some empty, and some with wounded stretched at full length on the cushioned seats; the wagons and other vehicles of the Sanitary

Commission, telling, as they do so plainly, of comfort and succor, and assistance; horses, mules and cattle, the long line bearing a general likeness to that which has gone before it, and yet so different in many features and points that you readily see and draw the line of separation.

The artillery and infantry and cavalry succeed each other, all of them veterans; you see it in their brown and scarred faces, in their carriage, tone and manner. They have been here before, with McClellan, but then a half-defeated, discouraged, broken army; now they come, so far at least, victorious. They are now not sallow and cheek shrunken from fever, debilitated with swampy miasma, and worn out with working in the trenches; but with strong arms and buoyant hearts, their faces flushed with health, and their march inspired with the promise of victory.

But the day was almost gone, and we weary with this scene, ever-changing, yet continually the same; it will be a relief to step on the bridge and cross with the soldiers, and on the summit of the southern bank we can overlook the plain across the river and witness the host as it winds on its way to us.

And now, what a magnificent view! The plain before us is dotted with groups of wagons and soldiers and horses and mules, while through them comes tramping on the long endless army column. The sun, only a few feet above the tops of the trees, shines full upon them, and the polished musket-barrels and glistening bayonets flash and sparkle in the light, till it looks like a silver serpent winding over the dusty road.

The evening twilight brings no end, and not until in the night is the ceaseless tramping stopped. The morning witnesses the "forward march," as though there had been no cessation. Till mid-day it is continued, when the accumulation of steamers, on either side of the bridge, compels a passage, and in *seven minutes* it is made. The whole corps of General Smith pass on transports through the opening, and up to Bermuda Hundred, where they disembarked, as they did at that same place five weeks ago that very day. Nineteen transports, supply and mail steamers, pass down, and the river, jammed with steamers as Broadway is with teams, is again relieved, the bridge is once more closed, and again the march is taken up.

A few miles up the river we move to City Point, and all along on the water and on the land, it is one endless, busy, bustling scene.

Standing by the roadside, and a little away from the wharf, are General Grant and General Meade, in conversation. The stern, placid, yet impenetrable and unreadable face of the former, is in strong contrast with the fixed, Roman, steel-like countenance of the latter. Both are dressed roughly, with pantaloons tucked in their boots, neither wearing device or ornament of any kind. Their black, broad-brimmed hats are pulled over their faces to shield them from

the sun, and one would hardly imagine from their appearance that the destiny of the nation was in their hands. With his peculiar unassuming dignity and winning grace, General Burnside approaches them, his countenance radiant with one of those smiles, before which legions of doubts and clouds of despondency are under moral obligation to flee; he takes the hand of each, and the three watch the crossing of the armed host. The dark shadows of the trees are thrown across the river, even over the other bank, and still they come. The sun is far below the horizon, and yet there is no end. The stars twinkle into view through the deepening twilight, but over the river and through the quiet of evening is borne to our ears the rumbling of guns and caissons, and steady tramping of the men. The morn looks down upon the tide of flashing, advancing bayonets. Another morning brings no change. Guns, muskets, and sabres move on, as if the whole north were here in their loyalty and might, pressing on to find a grave for treason and secession, and to bury them beyond the possibility of resurrection.

The parapets and embrasures of Fort Powhatan are thronged with the black men who form its garrison, and who, only a few nights ago, received and repulsed the rebels who pressed upon them, sanguine and sure of success, because "it was only niggers who held it." The banks are filled with spectators, and the river is crowded with vessels, waiting to pass, and not until the day has faded into evening is the end near. Before midnight the last man had crossed, and the Army of the Potomac was south of Richmond. It was a sight of grand significance, worth a year of one's life. It was a sight encouraging beyond the power of relation. Everything seemed and promised well. There was no straggling, no murmuring, no complaining. Every man bore evidence of health and strength, and seemed conscious of the place he was filling and the duty he was performing. The horses looked strong and well: no protruding ribs or shrunken necks, but as if their power of endurance had not been half tried. And so they crossed and disappeared into Secessia, one hundred and thirty thousand men!

WALTHAM'S FARM, NEAR PETERSBURG, }
Six A. M., June 17th, 1864. }

The Eighteenth corps, under command of General W. F. Smith, which had but just returned to Bermuda Hundred, although greatly needing rest, moved out at three o'clock on the morning of the fifteenth on the Petersburg side of the river. They were joined by General Hinks' division United States colored troops, which had crossed the pontoon bridge over the Appomattox, at ten o'clock the night before. This division consisted of Duncan's brigade, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Twenty-second regiments, with Captain Angell's battery attached, of Colonel Holman's brigade, the First regiment

and a detachment of the Fifth Massachusetts colored cavalry under Colonel Russell, with Captain Choules' colored battery attached; General Kautz's division of cavalry were also with the column.

As the column approached the City Point and Petersburg turnpike at a right angle, it was suddenly enfiladed by a battery on Baylor's farm. Kautz's cavalry were sent forward to reconnoitre, and found the rebels posted on rapidly rising ground, some four hundred yards behind an almost impenetrable thicket a quarter of a mile wide, extending to a forest on the left. The rebels had four pieces of artillery, two regiments of infantry, behind breastworks, and a small force of cavalry.

Duncan's black brigade was formed in line on both sides of the pike as follows: The Fifth regiment, Colonel Conine, on the right; the Twenty-second, Colonel Kidder, at the right centre; and the Sixth, Colonel Ames, on the left. Colonel Holman's small brigade formed the second line.

In this order the troops struggled through the swampy and tangled and almost impassable woods, the rebels shelling them furiously all the distance.

As our line emerged irregularly from the woods, the rebels threw canister with terrible effect. The Fourth received their whole concentrated fire. Captain King was instantly killed, and Lieutenant Brigham mortally wounded. The whole regiment suffered severely. Both wings were forced to return and remain in cover for a short time, until the lines could be reformed; but, at the word, the right wing charged with exultant shouts up the slope and through the murderous fire. The rebels fled in confusion to the woods in their rear, leaving one gun behind, which was instantly turned upon them by some of the negroes of Colonel Kidder's regiment, under the direction of Private John Norton, of Company B, of the First District of Columbia cavalry.

The rebels at Baylor's farm opened fire at about six o'clock. By eight they were driven out. This affair, although attended with heavy losses, gave the black troops confidence in themselves, and prepared them for a more terrible trial in the attack upon the strong lines of rifle-pits, redoubts and redans which ran irregularly from the Appomattox up and along the crests of hills, on several farms, two miles from Petersburg.

In this engagement General Martindale's division of the Eighteenth corps, which suffered moderately in the action, held the right of the line, stretching along the pike and across Beasley's farm on the right of the road. General Brooks' staunch division, with two brigades of General Ames' division, had the centre, assisted by Kautz's cavalry. Hinks' division of colored troops held the left.

Brooks' division marched to some open pine woods, where they remained until the charge at

the close of the day. They had before them an open space of about eight hundred yards. The colored troops were obliged to advance across an open field, exposed the whole distance to a deadly fire, completely enflading their two lines of battle, to a fire from two batteries directly in front, and to a cross-fire from an intermediate battery. An hour was consumed in forming the lines of battle and advancing the first quarter of a mile. The men could move but a few rods before the rebels got range, when they were obliged to lie down and await opportunity. Soon they would rise, push forward a few rods further, and again lie down.

At about half-past one they gained the designated locality, and then for five mortal hours lay exposed to the strain of constant apprehension from the ceaseless shelling. Old officers declare that while they have been under a more furious cannonading, it has been under the excitement of a charge, but that they were never subjected to a severer trial under fire, considering the time during which they were exposed and the unavoidable inactivity, and add that there can be no severer test of a soldier, particularly for green troops, than Duncan's entire brigade withstood. They say that after such a long strain upon their nerves, that the troops should be able to rise, move against such a formidable line of works, and carry them triumphantly, is irresistible proof that black troops can and will fight.

At half-past six the charge was ordered. The first plan, to advance in two lines of battle, was changed, General Smith deeming it madness to throw full lines against such strong redoubts. Half the first line was, therefore, sent forward as skirmishers, to be promptly supported if any advantage should be gained. As the skirmishers pushed on, our batteries on the right opened, and were replied to by the rebels with equal vigor.

About half an hour of very heavy cannonading and musketry firing, a shout of victory drowning all other sounds, and plainly to be heard for two miles away, arose from our troops as they gained and dashed into the works. These works were five formidable redans, half a mile, three quarters, and a mile, severally, distant, on the other side of a deep and difficult ravine, and in a very commanding position. Colonel Kidder's regiment gained the hill. In support of this general flank movement of the first line, the second line, consisting of the Fifth and Sixth regiments of Duncan's brigade, were swung round and moved against the front of the remaining works. The rebels, assailed in flank and front, fought to the last moment, and then so precipitately withdrew that but few were captured.

It was now nine o'clock in the evening. Immediate pursuit was impossible, and General Smith deemed it prudent to rest and await reinforcements. The Second Army Corps, which had made a forced march, began arriving

two hours later. General Smith showed his appreciation of the day's work by remarking that "it was one of the greatest of the war." He said, "it will make the old Army of the Potomac open its eyes wide." The earthworks so successfully carried are regarded as the most formidable the army has encountered during the present campaign.

The success has a peculiar value and significance from the thorough test it has given of the efficiency of negro troops. Their losses were heavy. In the thickest of the fight, and under the most trying circumstances, they never flinched. The old Army of the Potomac, so long prejudiced and so obstinately heretical on this subject, stand amazed as they look on the works captured by the negroes, and are loud and unreserved in their praise. As near as I can make it out, Duncan's brigade alone took six redoubts or redans, with their connecting rifle-pits, and captured seven pieces of artillery. General Smith, speaking of their conduct, said "no nobler effort has been put forth to-day, and no greater success achieved than that of the colored troops." From so reticent an officer this testimony is invaluable. Subjoined is his order of the day, just issued:

To the Eighteenth Army Corps:

The General commanding desires to express to his command his appreciation of the soldierly qualities which have been displayed during the campaign of the last seventeen days. Within that time they have been constantly called upon to undergo all the hardships of the soldier's life, and be exposed to all of its dangers.

Marches under a hot sun have ended in severe battles, and after the battle watchful nights in the trenches gallantly taken from the enemy.

But the crowning point of the honor they are entitled to has been won since the morning of the fifteenth instant, when a series of earthworks, on most commanding positions and of formidable strength, has been carried with all the guns and material of war of the enemy, including prisoners and colors. The works have all been held and the trophies remain in our hands.

This victory is all the more important to us, as the troops have never been regularly organized in camps where time has been given them to learn the discipline necessary to a well-organized *corps d'armée*, but they have been hastily concentrated and suddenly summoned to take part in the trying campaign of our country's being. Such honor as they have won will remain imperishable.

To the colored troops comprising the division of General Hinks, the General commanding would call the attention of his command. With the veterans of the Eighteenth corps, they have stormed the works of the enemy and carried them, taking guns and prisoners, and in the

whole affair they have displayed all the qualities of good soldiers.

By command of

W. F. SMITH,
Major-General.

WILLIAM RUSSELL, Jr.,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

SOLOM A. CARTER,
Captain and A. A. G.

In the course of the night of the fifteenth, the Second corps occupied the works that had been captured earlier in the day, relieving General Hinks' colored division which encamped in the rear.

On the evening of the sixteenth the Second corps had a spirited fight—Barlow on the left and Birney in the centre. General Smith's corps held the right, but took slight part in the engagement. Our successes were positive but not very important. When the firing ceased, our lines in the centre had established themselves in advance of the positions occupied in the afternoon. Colonel Bell's brigade of the Eighteenth corps was swung around to support the centre.

June 18—8 A. M.—To-day the Ninth corps relieved General Barlow on the left. Late in the evening the rebels made a furious attempt to dislodge them from their positions. The fight was a severe one while it lasted, and the repulse complete. This morning the Ninth corps assumed the offensive, carried a portion of the second line of the rebel works, and took five hundred prisoners.

BEFORE PETERSBURG, June 19.

11 A. M.—Last evening the rebels made a very vigorous attack upon our centre, the Second corps, and our extreme left, the Ninth corps. After a severe engagement they were repulsed and driven to their works in disorder. Early this morning the Second corps charged the rebel centre, and carried the works in their front, which they now firmly hold. At nine o'clock two brigades of General Martindale's division, supported by Duncan's brigade, were advanced on the right, and carried the rebel line in its front, being a continuation of the works taken by the Second corps on the centre and right.

We are now within a mile of Petersburg, and the city is at the mercy of our shells. The only defences remaining to it are the intrenchments, which the rebels have hastily thrown up within the last two or three days. The two lines of formidable works which our brave troops have carried by storm, are at least four miles in length, stretching from a point on the Appomattox at our right nearly to the same river at our left, and crossing all the railroads that go out of Petersburg on the south of the Appomattox.

June 21—7 A. M.—Yesterday was quiet, that is, there were no assaults and no line-of-battle fighting; but our batteries kept exchanging occasional compliments with those of the enemy,

and along the picket line the spiteful whiz of the Minie was a very familiar sound, enough to assure one that two large armies lay in close proximity. The number of casualties in this skirmishing has been rather large.

The relative positions of our own and the rebel army appear to be nearly the same as at the several points where they have lain for a time in opposing lines of battle from the Rapidan hither.

Both occupy similar lines of intrenchments, within short rifle-range of each other, but as it devolves on us to attack, the enemy derives the greatest advantage from his works.

One unfamiliar with military operations can hardly form a conception of the value of mere impromptu earthworks; rifle-pits, such as can be constructed in a single night. But troops who have had to charge them can fully appreciate their importance as parts of a defensive system.

Every attack upon such works, unless it is a surprise, costs hundreds or thousands of lives, and men ensconced behind them can successfully hold at bay largely superior numbers. These impromptu works are all that now enable the rebel army to keep us out of Petersburg. The strong fortifications taken by the advance of our army, on the evening of the fifteenth were the regular defences of the place, and, had they been fully manned, could only have been taken by regular siege approaches, requiring protracted labors. That we gained possession of them so easily was an immense advantage, and is the more satisfactory, because it is an unequivocal strategic victory over the wily rebel commander, to whom it must be extremely mortifying.

He was, for once at least, held in uncertainty as to our movements long enough to enable us to beat him in point of time, an achievement which the chivalry ought to consider a decided feat, so confident have they always felt in his vigilance and promptness.

BATTLE-FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG, June 21—11 P. M.

A considerable portion of the army has been on the march to-day to execute another flank movement. The grand object in view seems to be to operate against the enemy's communications from the south of Petersburg and Richmond. Should we gain possession of all the railroads running northward into Petersburg, we should inflict incalculable injury on the enemy, and perhaps necessitate his immediate abandonment of Richmond.

Of the four railroads converging at Petersburg, and thence branching off in different directions southward, the City Point and the Norfolk roads are already in our hands. Only these two railroads have been included in the line our army has hitherto held in front of Petersburg, and for some time past they have been of but little consequence to the enemy. Two others are still open, and are of greater service to him, namely, the Weldon and the Danville railroads.

If the present operations—designed to give us permanent possession of those roads likewise—are entirely successful, the effect will be to prevent supplies from reaching Richmond.

The Second corps has led the advance in this important movement. Last night Burnside's corps relieved it from its former position in the line, and this morning General Birney commenced moving toward the Jerusalem plank-road and the Weldon railroad. The movement is participated in by other portions of the army. The troops have been marching all day in the scorching sun, and this evening the Second corps is in line of battle in the new position to which General Meade assigned it.

The main body of the rebel Army of Virginia is opposing us in our immediate front. Large bodies of rebel troops have been moving to our left, and the result of reconnoissances made to-day in this direction demonstrates the fact that that portion of the outer line of the Petersburg defences not in our possession has recently been strengthened, and is now firmly held by the enemy. From the stubborn resistance shown this afternoon to the advance of our skirmishers, a bloody battle on this immediate ground is not at all improbable, and might be momentarily expected.

Toward evening the lines in front of our new position were formed by Major-General Birney, and the skirmishers of General Gibbon's division of the Second corps were connected with those of General Griffin's of the Fifth, which had marched from its former position, extending to the left of the Fifth corps line, and which moved into position about the same time as General Gibbon's. General Griffin's division is formed on the right of the Jerusalem plank-road, and the whole of the Second corps, temporarily commanded by Major-General Birney, is in position on the left. Gibbon's division holds the right of the Second corps line, Mott's the centre, and Barlow's the left. While the dispositions were being made, Barlow's line was somewhat shortened in order to leave room for the Sixth corps to come in between his left and the Weldon railroad. Ricketts' division of the Sixth corps is now taking up its position on the left of Barlow's, and the remainder of the Sixth corps will probably have extended the line still further at an early hour to-morrow. Thus, while our line has been prolonged to the left, the right of the army will be protected by Smith's corps, and other troops which are taking the places of those that have just assumed the new post of honor in this latest flank offensive movement.

The rebel works directly in our front extend along the crest from Gregory's to Rives' residence, and form a part of that semi-circular chain of fortifications that appear in front of Petersburg, from the Appomattox on the right to the Appomattox on the left. This section of the country is varied with wood and meadow, and fine fields of grain; but there are not so many streams as in other portions of Virginia.

We can distinctly see the rebel works from some points, although at present our lines are formed for the most part in thick and heavy timber. As a general rule the works are constructed on commanding places, where extensive open fields spread out in front of them, and over which an attacking force must necessarily advance. Several hundred yards in front of the main defensive line, the rebels have skirmishers and sharpshooters concealed in rifle-pits.

When the lines of the different divisions of the Second corps were formed this afternoon, our skirmishers were thrown forward to within a few hundred yards of the enemy's skirmish line, outside his works, and since that time, for several hours, the skirmishers on both sides have been exchanging shots. General Barlow met with considerable resistance from dismounted rebel cavalry in advancing his line. He soon came in contact with the infantry. Artillery and musketry were used on both sides, and the skirmishing was very spirited for some time. After Barlow's line had struck the enemy's infantry his further advance was checked. Subsequently the enemy made an attack on that portion of our front, and was handsomely repulsed. The enemy's loss was considerable. That in the Second corps will probably not amount to more than a hundred killed and wounded. A few prisoners were captured.

The position of affairs at this time compelled General Birney to resume the line he had occupied in the morning, and throw his left a little to the rear, in order to protect the flank. Ricketts' division of the Sixth corps, and Crowninshield's squadrons of cavalry, were at the same time placed in position, so as to still further cover the left flank and rear until the other divisions of the Sixth corps should have taken their positions in the extending line. This was the position of the Second corps when the operations closed for the night.

BATTLE-FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG, }
July 22—11.30 P. M. }

In the operations of our army around Petersburg, this has been a strange and eventful day. During all this afternoon and evening there has been continuous fighting on some portion of the lines. Night has closed upon a day of strong endeavor and of action, and yet it is with great reluctance that we are forced to the conclusion that nothing of practical importance has been accomplished. The fortunes of war, however, are exceedingly precarious, and if it happens that to-day the advantage may be on the enemy's side, it is quite as probable that to-morrow it will be on ours.

During last night the Sixth corps had moved to the left and massed at the Williams House. This morning Wilson's and Kautz's cavalry had cut the Weldon railroad, so that orders were at once given to suspend the demonstration in that direction, and swing the left of the Second corps round, so as to develop the enemy's works in front of Petersburg, without regard to the

connection of the Sixth corps upon the left. The principal portion of the corps was soon moving further to the front. Gibbon was already in position and intrenched; for last night he had advanced as near the enemy's intrenchments as he could get without bringing on a heavy fight. Mott and Barlow pushed forward their lines of battle, with a heavy skirmish line in front.

Mott was partly in position and intrenching, and Barlow was nearing the crest in front of the rebel works, when he encountered a heavy force of the enemy marching down in column by brigades, with the evident intention of piercing our position at the interval which now existed between the left of the Second corps and the right of the Sixth. The Second, Third, and Fourth brigades of Barlow's division formed his front line; the First brigade, under General Miles, being held in rear as a reserve. In this assault by the enemy, the rebel General Wilcox's division, marching in three brigade lines behind a heavy cloud of skirmishers, led the advance of Hill's veteran corps. It was early in the afternoon when the head of the rebel column struck at once the right of the Sixth and left of the Second corps. The rebels pushed on with pertinacity, and the shock was soon felt on the flanks of both these corps. The position which they occupied rendered it necessary that they should immediately withdraw the flanks that were thus exposed, and fill up the gap by making a connection with each other along the line of intrenchments in the rear.

While this was being done, however, the enemy inflicted considerable damage on our men by his fire, and captured several hundred prisoners from us. The assaulting column came down in a diagonal direction, and, as it happened, struck the flank of the divisions, which were disconnected, and hence the disastrous consequences which ensued. These were, the forced retirement of Barlow, the hasty withdrawal of Mott and of part of the left of Gibbon, and the loss of four guns. The enemy swept down over the ground our troops had left, taking quite a number of prisoners as he advanced. Pressing on still in a diagonal direction, the column soon came to Gibbon's line, the left of which suffered somewhat from the shock. The right held its position with determined courage, and poured a murderous fire into the advancing force. The musketry was terrific on both sides.

As the enemy swept over the angle which marked the left of the division line, he enveloped a battery of four three-inch guns, which occupied an advanced position behind the parapet, and almost before the officers were aware of the situation of affairs, the artillery was in the enemy's hands. It was Captain McKnight's Twelfth New York battery. The moment the rebels appeared in sight Captain McKnight opened upon them with canister. They separated in front, and, coming in on the right and

left, surrounded the guns. A rebel color-bearer immediately mounted and planted his colors on the parapet.

In the meantime Captain Clark's First New Jersey battery, which was posted in the breastwork further to the right, opened on the enemy, and contributed considerably to check his further advance. The rebels quickly turned upon us the captured guns, and at the same time concentrated a fire of some twenty other pieces on Captain Clark's single battery. The epaulement in which this battery was placed was well battered by the solid shot which came pouring over from the fortifications of the enemy.

While this work was going on at the right of the corps, a part of the rebel attacking column, which by this time had been deployed in line of battle, was still pressing down upon the left. The interval between the right of the Sixth corps and the left of the Second was gradually growing greater, from the fact that the flanks thus exposed to the enemy were slowly melting away, when General Miles' brigade, of Barlow's division, which was in reserve, came up on the double-quick and one regiment was sent through the woods to check the enemy's advance, while the remainder of the brigade was formed behind the breastworks to fill up the interval. At the same time Lieutenant Roder's battery K, Fourth United States artillery, wheeled into position, and the infantry and artillery soon checked the further progress of the enemy at that point.

Scarcely had these dispositions been effected, however, before the rebels made another attempt to pierce our lines a little to the right of that locality; but the attack was repulsed. We took a few prisoners at this time, and among them several wounded. The casualties were not heavy, however, on either side, because the rebels did not attempt to cross the open field in front of the breastworks behind which our men were posted.

About seven o'clock in the evening an effort was made by General Gibbon, with one of his own brigades, supported by one from General Griffin's, of the Fifth corps, to retake the lost guns of the Twelfth New York. The attack was very sharp and spirited, but failed to accomplish the desired object. Another effort was attended with a similar result.

Later in the evening General Meade ordered an advance of the Sixth and Second corps, for he was exceedingly desirous of developing the continuation of the chain of fortifications for the defence of Petersburg. The Sixth corps swung round to the left, pushing back a line of rebel skirmishers, but apparently not meeting with any formidable force, for the firing soon ceased in that direction. Simultaneously with the movement of the Sixth a heavy line of skirmishers pushed forward in front of the Second corps. In the thick woods through which the line had to advance, this heavy cloud of skirmishers is more desirable than a close line of battle, because it at once gives room for the men

to move, and exposes fewer to the bullets of the enemy. And thus our lines advanced this evening, meeting with a stubborn resistance, but still pressing onward, until most of the ground which we lost has been regained and reoccupied. Our lines are now being strengthened by the construction of breastworks and the planting of several batteries of artillery. The skirmishers on both sides, however, are firing away at each other at this late hour. The casualties in the Second corps throughout the day will number only a few hundred; but the loss by prisoners captured by the enemy will exceed, perhaps, a thousand.

BEFORE PETERSBURG, June 22—11 P. M.

This afternoon, pending a fight in which the Second corps was engaged, and in which the enemy temporarily got the best and captured some guns; which, however, were subsequently retaken, General Griffin's division, of this corps, was sent to the support of the Second, should its services be needed. Happily the brave and invincible veterans of the Second corps succeeded in fighting their own battle unaided, and in winning a glorious victory. It was a fierce conflict. Not only the first division, but all the divisions of this corps, expected every moment they might be as heavily engaged. They looked for it, and were ready for it, as they always have been known to be. As it was, the shells of the enemy's cannon fell among the First division, killing and wounding several.

Rebel sharpshooters, too, kept up their accustomed watchfulness, and more than one was borne away wounded by their unerring bullets. Captain Keene, Twentieth Maine regiment, was shot by one of these sharpshooters, and instantly killed. Lieutenant Denvers, Twentieth Pennsylvania, dismounted cavalry, was severely but not dangerously wounded. This morning Brigadier-General Ayres, commanding the Second division, while inspecting his front line, had two narrow escapes from the bullets of sharpshooters. One bullet hit his right thumb, and another just grazed his face; and during some cannonading in the early part of the day the shells, as usual, dropped in pretty thick about our headquarters, but doing no damage. A like complimentary salutation was paid to the First division headquarters, and those of Colonel Sweitzer. I was at the hospital an hour ago. One poor fellow was shot in both thighs, and it was necessary to amputate both legs. "Remember, I have a wife and four children," was all he said before the operation was performed. He lived but two hours.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
June 22—6 A. M.

Wilson's division of cavalry moved off in the direction of the Weldon railroad. When last heard from they had reached Reams' station,

(ten miles west of Petersburg,) and were tearing up the track along the road.

The Second and Sixth corps moved from their old positions on the right toward the Weldon railroad. General Lee seems to have anticipated a movement by our left flank, or else he designed to turn our right, as when near the Jerusalem plank-road the two corps were confronted by General Hill's corps, and a smart engagement ensued. A battery of the Twelfth New York artillery was annoying the rebels, who succeeded in getting round on the flank and charging it. The infantry supporting the battery were surprised, and after a faint show of resistance retired, leaving four guns in the hands of the rebels. Our line was then re-formed. The men were becoming accustomed to General Lee's new practice of acting entirely on the defensive, and must have been confused by his bold and sudden onset. Two divisions of the Fifth corps were within easy supporting distance on the right, and the Sixth corps was ready for any hostilities on the left. Charges were made by the rebels, who suffered severely with each fresh assault.

ON THE JAMES RIVER,
(Eleven Miles from Richmond), June 23, 1864. }

To General R. S. Foster has been confided, by General Butler, a most important and perilous command on the James river. This position, since it is in full view of the enemy, is at a point on the James river between Aiken's landing and Four-Mile creek. General Foster's force is a formidable one, and is handled by as brave, accomplished, and sterling an officer as is known in the service. He will do the rebels and their shattered cause as much damage as any General in the army.

During the twenty-first, General Foster drove in the rebel pickets twice—the One Hundredth regiment, New York volunteers, Colonel Dandy, making two most gallant charges, upon which he was heartily congratulated by General J. B. Howell, commanding the First brigade, First division. Captain Granger, Company K, of the One Hundredth, charged fully up to Mrs. Grover's, driving the enemy from that point, they being there in force. Captain Meborne, of the First New York mounted rifles, also gallantly drove the enemy three hours. The rebel picket line is in range of ours, and the enemy develops a large adjacent force. They are also reported to be in full force, with infantry and cavalry, under command of Lee—another nephew of General R. E. Lee—at Chapin's Bluff, four miles and a half from the Grover house.

The gunboats commenced shelling the enemy at a quarter to seven o'clock on the evening of the twenty-first instant, from our left, maintaining a vigorous and effective fire until dark. The immediate result of this shelling was ascertained to be the driving of the enemy from the left to the right, whence they were again driven.

Throughout yesterday, the twenty-second, the enemy vigorously shelled our gunboats coöperating with Foster—the Mendota and the Hunchback—the former lying below the pontoon bridge, and the latter a short distance above that structure. They are commanded by Captain Nichols and Captain Fife, respectively. The Mendota returned the enemy's fire, in a short time silencing their batteries.

The enemy, on Foster's front, has been ascertained by Lieutenant Bernard N. Smith, aid-de-camp, to consist of Cook's brigade, of Heath's division, of A. P. Hill's corps. The enemy's cavalry is commanded by Major Robins, of Holcomb's Legion, which is composed of cavalry, artillery and infantry. In addition to this, several brigades of rebels passed down our front yesterday afternoon (June twenty-second), three regiments passing over Four-Mile creek, with one regiment deployed as skirmishers. The skirmishing resulted in our taking a few prisoners. The destination of the passing brigades alluded to is unknown.

On yesterday some of the troops, in making excavations, discovered five thousand dollars in gold and silver, buried in the ground beneath the ruins of a charred and destroyed mansion. The excitement was intense among the boys when these spoils of war were divided among them on their own motion.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
Thursday, June 23—10 P. M. }

The operations of the last three days have had for their object possession of the railroads south of Petersburg—the Weldon and Raleigh road and the Lynchburg. To accomplish this required an extension of the line far to the left. It was thought possible a surprise might be effected. In that case, planting ourselves on those roads, all would be attained which the occupation of Petersburg would give us. To carry the latter directly, we must expect to sustain large loss. To reach the same end by a sliding movement toward the south, was worth the trial. Besides, if successful, it would still further envelop the city, and be another step toward its fall—a step toward that remoter objective, Richmond. Well, it has been tried, and the result—if we may accept as the result the situation of this hour—is not the most cheerful in the world; nor satisfactory, nor yet disheartening, but marred by a disastrous episode—the loss of prisoners by the Second corps yesterday. There is this comfort, that the losses in killed and wounded, compared with those of last week, are inconsiderable.

The Second and Sixth corps were designated for the movement, while the Eighteenth was brought from Butler, and with the Fifth and Ninth holds the old works. Thus three corps were stretched over the ground until then occupied by four. The distance from the left of that line, being Warren's left, to the point on the Weldon road which it was thought might be

struck, is five miles or thereabout. The Second corps under Birney, had gained position on Warren's left on Tuesday—so withdrawn, however, as not to attract the attention of the enemy. By yesterday morning the Sixth had assumed a similar relation toward the Second, and now the two corps advanced toward the railroad, still three miles distant.

Whether the enemy penetrated the design, or happened to be making a reconnoissance in force on his own account, he seems to have been moving toward us simultaneously with our advance. This was about noon yesterday, and the collision was but an hour or two later. The country was utterly unknown to us, or if anything was known as to the direction and termini of roads, and the distances between given points, it was so vague and faulty that it only served to mislead. We found the woods more dense and continuous than any encountered since the wilderness; as dense as those, and different only in that there are more cleared spaces. Notwithstanding the brief time the troops had been in the position from which they started, they moved from very tolerable works—the Second Corps from a continuous line, and the Sixth from a line thrown up by Ricketts' division, which reached here in advance of the rest of the corps. The enemy discovered our advance before we did his, and made dispositions accordingly—to attack us in flank when marching. He confronted the Second corps, and Barlow's division; the left of that corps was moving still further to the left. Ricketts' division, Sixth corps, was also moving, and was within a mile and a half of the railroad. Mott's (late Birney's) and Gibbon's Second corps, were in aligned positions on the right of Barlow. Gibbon had planted one battery of four guns (McKnight's Twelfth New York Independent). I have been unable to sift a vast contrariety of statements, so as to arrive at even a theory of the precise way it all happened. But the enemy came down with little or no previous indication of his presence, in force, struck Barlow, and glanced by him, bearing away prisoners, and then falling upon Mott and Gibbon. Officers in the divisions of the latter insist that the first knowledge they had of the enemy was his presence directly in their rear. Whether he came down between Barlow and the Sixth corps, or behind him and Mott, or Gibbon, it is impossible for me to say. It is perhaps certain that Barlow was first struck, that at some points the line was struck from the rear, at others from the front—at all unexpectedly and disastrously. It was the work of an instant. Scarcely any resistance was made—there was no time for it. Gibbon's staff were eating dinner a fourth of a mile in rear of their advance, and heard no fighting; were confounded at sight of men running. These they rallied into line, but the enemy came no further. Those that did not run, some of the best troops in the army, were captured by regiments. The First brigade (Pierce's) suffered

most, and without firing a shot, yet this brigade has been the pride of the corps.

Somebody blundered, else such soldiers as the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Massachusetts, Seventh Michigan, Nineteenth Maine, Forty-second and Eighty-second New York, and Thirty-sixth Wisconsin would have made for themselves an opportunity for fighting. It was the Seventh Michigan and Nineteenth Massachusetts that volunteered to cross to Fredericksburg in boats, under a severe fire, a year and a half ago, which they did so perilously and so bravely. Some of these regiments were captured bodily, viz.: the Nineteenth and Fifteenth Massachusetts, and the Forty-second and Eighty-second New York. The brigade has lost five commanders, and other officers, and rank and file in proportion, during the campaign. Commanding it have been General Alexander Webb, wounded at Spottsylvania, and Colonels Haskell and McKean, killed at Cold Harbor. The division probably lost a thousand prisoners yesterday, and Mott's and Barlow's together as many. Beside these is the loss of four guns. McKnight stood by them and his colors till a rebel flag flaunted beside his own, and there was but one man with him. To-day, while talking of the disaster, his voice broke and his eyes filled. The presence of an enemy had never caused the one to falter nor abashed the other.

Dispositions were instantly made to retrieve the fortunes of the day. The Sixth was halted, Ricketts' even marching back a mile, and two brigades were sent for from Warren, and reserve batteries prepared for action. Miles' brigade, with certain others, retired intact to the line of the morning, and it was hoped the enemy would attempt to pursue his advantage. But he knew better, and contented himself with the trophies already won—two thousand prisoners and four guns.

At seven o'clock in the evening, Wright advanced the Sixth corps. The rebels had retired, leaving a thick skirmish line, which raised a yell and fired one volley. Our men beat them both in yell and volley, and they fled, like so many pedestrian Tam O'Shanter's. And then such cheers as the Sixth sent after them. The whole corps charged a mile and a half, halting occasionally to preserve alignment, and then bivouacked. The direction pursued, had formed it, when halted, at an obtuse angle with the Second.

Later in the evening, Burnside was attacked strenuously, but without avail.

To-day, at half-past three A. M., the Sixth and Second advanced simultaneously, having, during the night, perfected connections of brigades, divisions, and corps. Birney barely regained the position lost yesterday. Wright found nothing before him but pickets. He advanced some distance, swinging around Birney. His two left divisions, Wheaton's (late Neill's) and Rickett's, were now hardly more than a mile from the railroad. Captain Beatty, with one

hundred pioneers and sharpshooters, was sent out to reconnoitre. He reached the railroad unopposed, and found it without the pretence of a guard, and with his report, sent a couple of feet of telegraph wire he had cut from the Raleigh line. The Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Vermont were instantly despatched to take possession, and preparations were made to extend the corps to that point. But by this time the rebels were fully awake to the situation. It was as vital to them to regain the railroad as it was to us to retain it. Their interior, therefore shorter, lines gave them every advantage.

It is not less than ten miles from our right on the river to the point in question on the railroad. The rebel communication between the two is not over four. And so they pushed down in overwhelming numbers, all of Hill's corps, and attacked. We had not completed a line, had had no time to intrench, and there was nothing but to fall back. Even that was a matter of some difficulty. The Thirty-fourth Vermont lost prisoners, and it was fortunate that the order, "As you were," was issued so promptly. The rebels followed closely, attacking at the right of the corps, and then to the left, and further to the left, till they found cavalry, and knew they had determined our limit in that direction. It appeared to be his purpose to make a general assault, and it were better to sustain that covered by some sort of works. Hence, in the edge of the evening, all the divisions of the corps retired, and now occupy the positions of the morning.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
NEAR PETERSBURG,
Friday, June 24—9 P. M. }

This morning opened with one of the heaviest cannonades of the whole campaign, and the impression was produced on people at a distance from the scene, that a terrible battle was in progress. It transpired soon, however, that the enemy had merely been wasting ammunition in a concentrated and tremendous, but harmless, fire upon the troops and batteries of the Eighteenth corps, from his batteries beyond the Appomattox. Terrible as was the storm of shot, shell, grape, and canister that rained along our lines on the right, the damage done was utterly insignificant.

The ball opened at about half-past six A. M. and closed at about nine. Our own batteries during this time were not silent, but replied in spirited style. While this artillery fire was raging, a charge was made on a portion of General Stannard's division of the Eighteenth corps, by Hoke's brigade of rebels. About four hundred of them succeeded in entering our front line of rifle-pits, a mere picket line, our skirmishers retiring to the main breast-work of the front line of battle. While these were coming in, our troops did not fire, from the fear that they might hit our own men.

The rebels, encouraged by this, advanced boldly toward our intrenchments, but the mo-

ment our skirmishers had all got in, a volley was immediately fired into the ranks of the enemy that mowed them down fearfully. Their progress was all at once stopped, and to retreat was as much out of the question as to advance. When placed in this dilemma, our men continued firing rapidly upon them. They made signs of a desire to surrender, which was not at first received, but, as soon as their wish was ascertained, firing was discontinued, and they received a cordial invitation to come in.

The number of prisoners taken was one hundred and sixty-six, and thirty-six wounded were brought off the ground. The remainder of the four hundred must have been either killed or too badly wounded to get away, as the men captured say none went back. Many of the prisoners appeared to be rather pleased than sad at the lot which had befallen them. One, a sergeant, exclaimed fervently as he jumped into our intrenchments, "Thank God, I'm a white man again," a rather emphatic way of announcing that he considered himself released from slavery in becoming a prisoner.

Another one, a captain, expressed the opinion that the entire brigade to which he belonged would come in, if they could do so without being fired on. It is worthy of remark, that the men appear to be chiefly South Carolinians, and, judging by the feelings they express, one would infer that the State which inaugurated the war was ready to cry, "hold, enough;" but these men are of the poorer class, and their views and feelings are entirely distinct from those of the wealthy oligarchy who rule them, and wield them for the accomplishment of their own aims, by combining a system of the most shameless mendacity with a rigorous exercise of power.

Some of the prisoners taken this morning say they have been told constantly that the Yankees, if successful, will reduce them to a condition almost worse than that of the slaves, compelling them to work for seven pence a day, or whatever they may see fit to give. I was particularly struck by the naturalness and evident sincerity of the reply made by a wounded rebel to some one who inquired whether he came into the army on his own inclination. "No, indeed," he answered, "I ought to be home plowing corn this very hour." The look of care in his eye, as he said this, betrayed anxious thoughts of his distant wife and children, and the crops he had planted wilting under the hot sun for want of his culture.

Yesterday afternoon General Wright, with the Sixth corps, made a movement to the left, and reached the Weldon railroad, of which he destroyed some five miles. Fires were built along it, which destroyed the ties, and, at the same time, warped the iron so as to unfit it for future use. Having accomplished his object, he returned to his former position. Toward evening a report was brought in that a heavy column of the enemy was moving off toward our

left, with the probable intention of turning our flank.

Some little excitement was created by this statement, as soon as it got hinted around, but it was only a very brief time before preparations had been made to repel any attack from the threatened quarter.

Colonel Sweitzer's brigade of General Griffin's division, Fifth corps, moved down the Jerusalem plank-road at double-quick, and Colonel Collis, with the Provisional brigade from headquarters of the army, moved down in the same direction. Selecting a suitable position, they deployed across and to the right of the road, and threw up a line of breastworks, which were held throughout the night, but no enemy appeared to molest them.

Everything is extremely quiet to-night. Three or four times since dark I have heard the report of cannon and a little musketry, but now I hear no sound more warlike than that of horses browsing in the bushes near where I write, and a single wagon rattling over corduroys a quarter of a mile away; not the sound of a single gun, large or small, for the last half hour. The heat to-day has been intense, and the dust rises in clouds, which envelop everything.

FIELD REPORT PETERSBURG, }
June 24—P. M. }

The Weldon and Petersburg railroad was seized early this morning by the Sixth corps, without any opposition to speak of being offered by the enemy. Yesterday a party sent out to destroy the road were set on by Anderson's division, of A. P. Hill's corps, and driven off disastrously. This morning we take and hold it unmolested. What can be the enemy's reason for thus deserting this important point, has been the cause of much speculation.

A party advancing against the road, at seven o'clock this morning, discovered that it had been abandoned by the enemy. Reinforcements were immediately sent them, and the road is now in our possession. While moving down reinforcements on the line of the railroad, the enemy opened with artillery on them. General Birney, commanding the Second corps, soon silenced the battery in a very peculiar manner, by throwing shells into the city. He has found this a very effective way to force them to cease firing.

A mulatto, who has just come into our lines, reports Petersburg to be filled with people, all the inhabitants within a radius of ten miles having fled to the city for shelter and provisions. The latter are furnished by the commissary department, who issue to them, as well as to the troops, half rations daily.

The report of the disaster which befell a portion of the Second corps, on the twenty-second, appears to have been rather modest. Instead of simply meeting with a reverse on that unfortunate day, one entire brigade (General Pearce's), and part of another, were "gobbled"

outright. It appears that some men had gone to the front of these troops, who were throwing up temporary breastworks, and built a fire. This, running through the parched shrubbery and undergrowth, soon spread through the entire plot of timber, causing a dense smoke. The rebels, relying on the smoke to conceal them until they could approach our busy troops, dashed noiselessly at them through the fiery barrier. Wholly off their guard against any such desperate feat on the part of the rebels, our men were thoroughly surprised, and captured ere they could make the slightest resistance.

HEADQUARTERS, June 25—6 A. M.

The only fighting that took place yesterday was an attack made by the enemy on General Burnside's position. The enemy opened with a heavy fire of artillery, which was returned by our batteries, and the rebels, in making a charge, were driven back in confusion, upward of one hundred prisoners being taken.

This occurred about eight o'clock A. M., and the artillery firing was kept up for an hour, when all became quiet at that point. About the same time a battery opened in front of a hospital on the left of the Fifth corps, which the rebels seemed desirous of cleaning out; but they were deterred by our guns before any damage resulted.

Picket firing is still kept up along nearly the entire line, and in almost every hospital are a few victims of this species of warfare.

It is almost impossible to make a change in the skirmish line without some loss from the enemy's sharpshooters, and these lines have to be relieved always after dark on that account.

The engagement between the Sixth corps and the enemy for the possession of the railroad on Wednesday was quite severe, particularly in front of the Second division, commanded by General Wheaton.

Only a short distance of the railroad had been destroyed when the party were attacked by a heavy force of the enemy under General Anderson, supported by Wilcox's division. Captain Beatre, of the Third Vermont regiment, was in charge of the party that reached the road, and he fell back slowly while the skirmish line held the enemy in check. But a body of the enemy made a flank movement, expecting to turn the left flank of the line of battle.

They, however, did not penetrate far enough, although they succeeded in taking a number of the skirmishers prisoners, of the Fourth and Eleventh Vermont regiments, Vermont brigade. The enemy afterward advanced, and attempted to break through the line at several points, but were met with such a heavy fire from our forces that they were driven back every time with heavy loss.

They finally, at dark, gave up the effort, and retreated across the railroad bank, where they took up an advantageous position.

Our loss was very light in killed and wounded,

while that of the enemy, it is supposed, was more than double ours. We lost quite a number of prisoners, but the figures cannot be as yet correctly given.

The railroad from City Point to Petersburg is being placed in order, and an engine and cars are already provided to put on the road as soon as it is in running condition. Supplies arrive at the front regularly, and the troops lack nothing in that respect, but they suffer somewhat from a scarcity of water.

June 25th—9 P. M.—Our pickets extend within a short distance of the Petersburg and Weldon railroad track. The enemy seem determined to make a serious fight for its possession. The damage done to the road by Wilson's cavalry is reported to be already repaired by them.

The general course of our line is now north and south, with turns to the west on the extreme right and left. The right and right-centre are close to Petersburg, the course of the line being such as to make the left-centre on a line vergent from the city. It is owing to this that, while it has been quiet in front of our left during the past forty-eight hours, desultory musketry firing and artillery have steadily continued along the front of General Smith and General Burnside. During the latter part of the afternoon, the artillery on both sides, on that part of the lines, has been active. A battery of thirty-two-pounder guns, on the right of Smith's position, threw shells into Petersburg every five minutes for two hours.

General Smith has been engaged all day in placing heavy guns and mortars in batteries at various points on the hills in the rear of his line. He expects to give a night entertainment with them. General Burnside is also locating some heavy pieces and mortars.

The other parts of our line were too distant from Petersburg and the rebel works on the west bank of the Appomattox for an effectual use of heavy pieces, and the bombardment will be opened from the right and right-centre alone.

The extraordinary heat continues, and with the air of dust in which this whole vicinity is enveloped makes active movements almost impracticable.

Captain Elder, of the First United States Artillery, Chief of Artillery of the Eighteenth corps, rode into the enemy's lines yesterday, by mistake, and was captured.

June 26—9 P. M.—At about ten o'clock last evening the enemy, mistaking the movements of our reliefs for an abandonment of our line, attempted to advance their picket-line in front of Potter's and Ledlie's divisions of the Ninth corps, and Turner's division on the left of Smith's line. From our line a heavy musketry and artillery fire was immediately opened upon them, that speedily checked their advance. The firing continued for about an hour, and sounded like a heavy engagement. Our casualties were very few.

In the course of the night Smith's line was felt several times by the enemy, each attempt to advance being stopped by a few volleys from our side. One of the heavy batteries on the right threw shells into Petersburg all night.

Nothing occurred along our line to-day beyond the usual ragged firing on our right and right-centre.

The last few days of rest have been well improved in reorganizing the army as far as practicable.

THE COLORED TROOPS.

IN THE FIELD, NEAR PETERSBURG, VIRGINIA,
June 27, 1864. }

The problem is solved. The negro is a man, a soldier, a hero. Knowing of your laudable interest in the colored troops, but particularly those raised under the immediate auspices of the Supervisory Committee, I have thought it proper that I should let you know how they acquitted themselves in the late actions in front of Petersburg, of which you have already received newspaper accounts. If you remember, in my conversations upon the character of these troops, I carefully avoided saying anything about their fighting qualities till I could have an opportunity of trying them.

That opportunity came on the fifteenth inst., and since, and I am now prepared to say that I never, since the beginning of this war, saw troops fight better, more bravely, and with more determination and enthusiasm. Our division, commanded by General Hinks, took the advance on the morning of the fifteenth instant, arrived in front of the enemy's works about nine o'clock A. M., formed line, charged them, and took them most handsomely. Our regiment was the first in the enemy's works, having better ground to charge over than some of the others, and the only gun that was taken on this first line was taken by our men. The color-sergeant of our regiment planted his colors on the works of the enemy, a rod in advance of any officer or man in the regiment. The effect of the colors being thus in advance of the line, so as to be seen by all, was truly inspiring to our men, and to a corresponding degree dispiriting to the enemy. We pushed on two and a half miles further, till we came in full view of the main defences of Petersburg. We formed line at about two o'clock P. M., reconnoitred and skirmished the whole afternoon, and were constantly subject to the shells of the enemy's artillery. At sunset we charged these strong works and carried them. Major Cook took one with the left wing of our regiment as skirmishers, by getting under the guns, and then preventing their gunners from using their pieces, while he gained the rear of the redoubt, where there was no defence but the infantry, which, classically speaking, "skeddaddled." We charged across what appeared to be an almost impassable ravine, with the right wing all the time subject to a hot fire of grape and canister, until we got so far under the guns as to be sheltered, when the enemy

took to their rifle-pits as infantrymen. Our brave fellows went steadily through the swamp, and up the side of a hill, at an angle of almost fifty degrees, rendered nearly impassable by fallen timber. Here again our color-sergeant was conspicuous in keeping far ahead of the most advanced, hanging on to the side of the hill, till he would turn about and wave the stars and stripes at his advancing comrades; then steadily advancing again, under the fire of the enemy, till he could almost have reached their rifle-pits with his flag-staff. How he kept from being killed I do not know, unless it can be attributed to the fact that the party advancing up the side of the hill always has the advantage of those who hold the crest. It was in this way that we got such decided advantage over the enemy at South Mountain. We took, in these two redoubts, four more guns, making, in all, five for our regiment, two redoubts, and part of a rifle-pit as our day's work. The Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh United States colored troops advanced against works more to the left. The Fourth United States colored troops took one more redoubt, and the enemy abandoned the other. In these two we got two more guns, which made, in all, seven. The Sixth regiment did not get up in time, unfortunately, to have much of the sport, as it had been previously formed in the second line. We left forty-three men wounded and eleven killed in the ravine, over which our men charged the last time. Our loss in the whole day's operations was one hundred and forty-three, including six officers, one of whom was killed. Sir, there is no underrating the good conduct of these fellows during these charges; with but a few exceptions, they all went in as old soldiers, but with more enthusiasm. I am delighted that our first action resulted in a decided victory.

The commendations we have received from the Army of the Potomac, including its general officers, are truly gratifying. Hancock's corps arrived just in time to relieve us (we being out of ammunition), before the rebels were reinforced and attempted to retake these strong works and commanding positions, without which they could not hold Petersburg one hour, if it were a part of Grant's plan to advance against it on the right here.

General Smith speaks in the highest terms of the day's work, as you have doubtless seen, and he assured me, in person, that our division should have the guns we took as trophies of honor. He is also making his word good in saying that he could hereafter trust colored troops in the most responsible positions. Colonel Ames, of the Sixth United States colored troops, and our regiment, have just been relieved in the front, where we served our tour of forty-eight hours in turn with the other troops of the corps. While out, we were subjected to some of the severest shelling I have ever seen, Malvern Hill not excepted. The enemy got twenty guns in position during the night, and opened on us yesterday morning at daylight. Our

men stood it, behind their works, of course, as well as any of the white troops. Our men, unfortunately, owing to the irregular features of ground, took no prisoners. Sir, we can bayonet the enemy to terms on this matter of treating colored soldiers as prisoners of war far sooner than the authorities at Washington can bring him to it by negotiation. This I am morally persuaded of. I know further that the enemy wout fight us if he can help it. I am sure that the same number of white troops could not have taken those works on the evening of the fifteenth; prisoners that we took told me so. I mean prisoners who came in after the abandonment of the fort, because they could not get away. They excuse themselves on the ground of pride; as one of them said to me, "D—d if men educated as we have been will fight with niggers and your government ought not to expect it." The real fact is, the rebels will not stand against our colored soldiers when there is any chance of their being taken prisoners, for they are conscious of what they justly deserve. Our men went into these works after they were taken, yelling "Fort Pillow!" The enemy well knows what this means, and I will venture the assertion that that piece of infernal brutality enforced by them there has cost the enemy already two men for every one they so inhumanly murdered.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
June 20, 4 P. M. }

Wilson, with his cavalry command, is near Reams' station, on the Weldon railroad, returning from his raid at the point named, which is about eight miles from here. The main body of the enemy's cavalry are said to be obstructing his progress, and endeavoring to prevent him from forming a junction with the rest of the army. Sheridan has been sent for to come to his assistance, with the other two divisions of the cavalry corps, and pending his arrival, the Sixth corps has left its position on the left, and has gone on the same errand.

While these events are in progress on our side, a column of the enemy, comprising about eighteen regiments, is observed moving down west of the Weldon railroad. They may be making for Reams' station, in which case a collision is likely to occur between them and General Wright's corps; or possibly they may make an attack on our left, when the Second corps will have to bear the brunt of their assault. General Hancock, who has just resumed command of his corps, is making all necessary preparations for such an event, and will not be taken by surprise.

Wilson succeeded in destroying forty miles of railroad. Last night he was at Stony Grove, south of Stony creek, a branch of the Nottoway river, and on attempting to cross found his passage opposed by the enemy. He then sent Kautz's division westward to cross the stream higher up and then make for the railroad near

Reams' station, in which vicinity the entire command now is.

CONFEDERATE ACCOUNTS.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, }
NEAR GAINES' MILL, JUNE 3, 1864 }

Yesterday evening, about four o'clock, after having been previously arranged, Gordon's and Rhodes' divisions of Ewell's, and Heth's divisions of A. P. Hill's corps, executed a flank movement on the enemy's right, near Bethesda Church, on the Mechanicsville turnpike, capturing, it is said, some eight hundred prisoners. Rhodes and Gordon certainly captured five hundred and twelve, and I have it on good authority that Heth took between two and three hundred more, and driving the enemy back nearly a mile, taking from him no less than three strongly entrenched lines, two of them being lines of battle and one a skirmish line. Our loss will not reach over three hundred; of that, Ewell's loss being about two hundred, and Heth's estimated at about one hundred.

Among the killed is the gallant Brigadier-General Doles, of Georgia, who fell, pierced through the left breast, while leading his brigade into action. Among the wounded, I hear the names of Brigadier-General Kirkland, who was slightly hurt; Colonel Williams, Thirty-ninth Virginia, and Colonel Berry, Sixtieth Georgia, were also wounded slightly.

It seems Gordon, who led this flank movement, discovered a swamp, across which he charged. This swamp the enemy supposed to be impassable, and hence were not on their guard for a flank movement in that direction. Our men first drove in the enemy's line of skirmishers; then pressing them, we caused their first line of battle to give back rapidly by the vigor of our charge, and without the firing of a gun on our side, the enemy firing feebly. On our boys pressed, up to the second strongly entrenched line of battle, which was also protected by stockades; so close were our men on the heels of the enemy, that both worked together in pulling down the stockade defences, and some of our men entered their breastworks along with the enemy. The enemy dared not fire for fear of shooting their own men. As we took the second line of the enemy, our men fired into the enemy, who now made a stand and fought us until night ended the engagement.

All the troops engaged in this fight acted well, and especially that far and justly famed Stonewall brigade, under the lead of its new commander, the gallant Terry.

The position from which we drove the enemy was naturally very strong, and rendered doubly so by very heavy lines of fortifications. They had transverse lines, and parallel lines, and lines running every way, and it seems a marvel how they were driven from their position.

The force which we put to flight, and of whom we captured so goodly a number, be-

longed to Warren's Fifth corps. Five regular regiments are represented among the prisoners, namely, the Second, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth and Fourteenth. We also captured the commanding officers of three of them—Captain Kibbor of the Fourteenth; Captain Penn, of the Second, and another officer, whose name I forget. These officers seemed to care little or nothing about themselves, their great anxiety appearing to be to learn something about the fate of their colors.

Besides the five hundred well Yankees, some fifty wounded ones were captured, nearly all of whom were wounded in the back. It is also related by an officer, that, passing over one of these officers—a captain—he supposed him to be dead; chancing, however, to look back, great was his surprise to see this dead captain, as he had supposed, heeling in rearwards.

While this warm work was going on in Ewell's front, picket and field skirmish lines were heavily engaged with the enemy, and there was considerable shelling. It is also reported that the enemy attacked Hoke, near this point, about night yesterday, but were gallantly repulsed with considerable slaughter of their numbers; our side suffered little or nothing.

Last evening, just before dark, Wilcox placed a battery of twelve guns in position, on the extreme right, and having shelled the enemy's position, advanced and occupied the heights near McClellan's bridge, on the Chickahominy. During the advance Brigadier-General Lane was severely wounded in the thigh.

This morning about sunrise the ball opened again, principally on Longstreet's and Stokes' fronts, and for three hours the enemy continued to assault our lines. Each time, however, they were most gallantly and successfully repulsed, our men suffering scarcely any, while the loss of the enemy is reported to be very heavy—indeed it is believed that the enemy has lost to-day not less than seven thousand men, while ours can scarcely be one twentieth of that number. The principal and most repeated assaults have been made on Kershaw's front, the enemy, it is said, having charged him not less than fourteen times. Each time, however, his gallant division (formerly McLaws'), has successfully driven back the assailants. Hoke had also signally repulsed three different assaults, this time capturing a few prisoners.

At one time this morning, the enemy having made a most vigorous attack upon Breckinridge, a portion of his command was forced back. Finnegan's Floridians, however, at once bounded forward with a yell, and regained what Breckinridge had temporarily lost. Three pieces of artillery, belonging to Reid's battalion, were, for a while, taken, but Finnegan recaptured them. General Finnegan himself was slightly wounded, but did not leave the field. General Law, of Fields' division, was also wounded this morning, in the eye, not, however, dangerously.

The enemy also made, early this morning, a feeble assault upon Heth's and Rhodes' divisions, on our extreme left, but were repulsed by our skirmish line.

Since morning there has not been much fighting, but heavy skirmishing and artillery firing has been going on all day along the lines. Grant has evidently been reinforced from Butler, and seems to be contracting his lines and massing his troops.

My information, derived from what I deem good authority, was that Heth and Rhodes had been slightly assaulted.

Later information, however, represents that the assault on Rhodes and Heth was very vigorous, and that we literally piled up the Yankee dead in front of these divisions. Lieutenant-General Ewell has been sick, but is now recovering. His corps, for the last ten days, has been under the command of Major-General Early.

The battle-ground, to-day, has extended from one and a half miles to the left of Mechanicsville to McClellan's bridge, a distance of some seven miles.

Grant's main efforts to-day have been directed against our right wing.

BATTLE-FIELD NEAR GAINES' MILL, JUNE 3—5 P. M.

Heth's division participated with Ewell in the fight yesterday, capturing over two hundred prisoners. Among his wounded was Brigadier-General Kirkland, slightly.

The battle opened at sunrise this morning, about ten miles below Richmond, extending from the Mechanicsville road to McClellan's bridge, making the line of battle over seven miles long, the enemy making the attack.

The heaviest fighting is reported in Rhodes', Kershaw's, and Hoke's front, who gallantly repulsed every assault of the enemy.

Our loss is very slight—not over five hundred in killed and wounded. That of the enemy is fully six thousand. Some estimate it as high as ten.

The enemy at one time broke through Breckinridge's division, capturing three pieces of artillery. Finnegan, however, quickly came up, recapturing the artillery and taking one piece from the enemy. Breckinridge lost probably two hundred prisoners.

The heaviest fighting was up to eleven o'clock; since then there has been heavy cannonading and incessant skirmishing.

Generals Law and Finnegan slightly wounded. The latter did not leave the field.

THE ATTACK ON PETERSBURG.

Yesterday was another day of excitement in our midst; little more was done by our citizens than to prepare for the stern realities of the crisis which stared them in the face.

Yesterday morning at one o'clock three discharges of cannon were heard in the direction of their whereabouts, and at early dawn

our pickets were driven in on the City Point and Prince George Court-house roads. It was subsequently ascertained that these movements were but feints to deceive our forces, while the real movement for the surprise and capture of the city was on the Jerusalem plank-road, coming into Petersburg from a southerly direction. On the two first-named roads the enemy appeared in considerable numbers as early as seven o'clock, and brisk skirmishing was kept up for some. At eight o'clock the Court-house and engine bells were rung, to which the citizens responded with their usual alacrity, and manifested every disposition to defend their homes and firesides.

In the meantime, the enemy's gunboats ascended the Appomattox river, and opened a furious fire on Fort Clifton and at various other points along the river, for the obvious purpose of occupying the attention of our troops in Chesterfield.

At nine o'clock our pickets on the Jerusalem plank-road were driven in, and before ten the enemy showed himself in overwhelming numbers, filling the road and woods on both sides. Our breastworks here extended from the residence of Timothy Rivers, Esq., on the left to and across the roadway, and beyond the house of Mr. William A. Gregory on the right. The enemy manoeuvred for a while, thinking, probably, that our raw troops would abandon their position without a fight.

But never were the Yankees more mistaken. Our men were made of sterner stuff, and inspired by the cool determination of their leaders, General Colston and Colonel F. H. Archer, maintained their ground like veterans. Finally, the enemy ordered a charge, and came down to our breastworks with a yell, their drawn sabres flashing in the sunlight. When within forty paces of the fortifications the order to fire was given and the Yankees recoiled and fell back. A prisoner, taken subsequently, states that in this charge the notorious Spear led, and that he had forty killed and wounded. This charge was repeated twice, but with like results, when the enemy resorted to the flanking process, which, by reason of his overwhelming numbers, he was enabled to do with much ease. A short time afterward a regiment came round Rivers' house, on our left, another appeared on our right, and a large body came down in front. We had but a hundred and seventy men, all told, and it was impossible with this number to guard centre, right and left, along a length of three quarters of a mile or more. The order was given to retreat, and in a few minutes the enemy had possession of our works, our camp, and were in full pursuit of our men. Couriers had been despatched for reinforcements, but they did not come up in time to save our fortifications, and many of Petersburg's best and most gallant sons fell in the affray, some killed and others wounded.

The enemy came on in double columns, with sabres drawn, until they reached the hill op-

posite the waterworks, where they planted a cannon for the purpose of shelling the city. They then started down the hill, and their advance column actually took possession of a bridge which crosses Powell's run, at the foot of the waterworks hill.

They were almost in Petersburg; could see its spires and steeples, and many of the houses on our suburban limits; but again that Divine arm, which has been so often outstretched in our behalf, was bared, and our city was saved from the tread of the ruthless invader. Just at this opportune moment, Graham's battery reached the Reservoir Hill, unlimbered in an instant, and with a precision and rapidity which we have heard spoken of as being almost without precedent, threw into the ranks of the enemy a shower of shell.

The missiles of death coming so unexpectedly to the foe, he at first seemed overwhelmed with surprise, and halted, neither advancing nor retreating; but, a minute or two later, another branch of our service made its appearance, which quickly determined the enemy as to the best course for him to pursue. Dearing's cavalry brigade quickly dismounted, and descending the hill with a yell, charged upon the enemy in beautiful style. This was more than they expected (since they had encountered only a few militia in the breastworks, and had advanced nearly a mile without seeing any regulars), and they instantly wheeled their horses, and started back up hill in great confusion. Graham's battery continued to play upon them, and Dearing's men crossed the ravine and ascended the opposite hill in gallant style, their carbines keeping up a regular and musical fusillade upon Kautz and Spear and their rapidly retreating followers. Upon reaching the top of the opposite hill the enemy hoped to make a stand. Here another column which they had sent to the city for the purpose of entering by the Brentford Church road hove in sight. But this column had also started on a retrograde movement, but, to their surprise, too, they had encountered Sturdivant's battery, which had gone out by another road, and the two columns met and continued their retreat, the speed not at all slackened by Confederate shell and balls, which were falling thick and fast among them.

In Jackson's field, a mile or so from Brentford Church, we captured a handsome cannon and six horses, which the enemy were compelled to abandon in their flight. Our forces pursued them for a few miles, killing and wounding many and taking some prisoners. Yesterday afternoon late, our pickets extended several miles on the Jerusalem plank-road, but nothing of the enemy could be seen, and it is supposed that they have retreated to the river. This is only supposition, however, and the vandals will bear constant and vigilant watching.

Kautz is in command of this force, and prisoners taken variously estimate it at from three thousand to five thousand. There is no

doubt it was intended to capture the city, and all the circumstances are strongly corroborative of this view. Thanks to a kind Providence, who has nerved the hearts and strengthened the hands of our brave men, we have been again preserved.

The enemy crept up behind the residence of William A. Gregory, ascended to the roof, and, knocking off the shingles, were enabled not only to obtain an excellent view and ascertain the number of our forces, but, through the openings thus made, fired upon and killed many of our men behind the breastworks. The residence of Timothy Rivers, Esquire, fell into the possession of the invaders. After our forces had retreated, the scoundrels not only ransacked and robbed it of all its contents, but they applied the torch and burned it to the ground, they also having carried off Mr. Rivers a prisoner.

GENERAL HENRY A. WISE'S ORDER

HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT,
DEPT. N. C. AND SO. VA., June 12, 1864. }

Special Orders No. 11.

VII. To the troops of my command for the defence of Petersburg, on the south side of the Appomattox, on the ninth instant, I have, with the approval and under the instructions of the Commanding General, to offer my grateful acknowledgments for their gallant conduct, and my congratulations upon their successful repulse of the enemy. Approaching with nine regiments of infantry and cavalry, and, at least, four pieces of artillery, they searched our lines from battery Number One to battery Number Twenty-nine, a distance of nearly six miles. Hood's and Batte's battalions, the Forty-sixth regiment Virginia volunteers, and one company (Captain Woods' company F), of the Twenty-third South Carolina, with Sturdivant's battery, and a few guns in position, and Taliaferro's cavalry, kept them at bay, and punished them severely until they reached the Jerusalem plank-road, in front of battery Twenty-nine, defended by Major Archer's corps of reserves and second-class militia, and by one piece of Sturdivant's battery, a howitzer, under the temporary command of Brigadier-General Colston. Then, with overwhelming numbers, they were twice repulsed, and succeeded only at last in penetrating a gap in the line, and in flanking and gaining the rear of a mere handful of citizen-soldiers, who stood firmly and fought bravely as veterans, until ordered to fall back. Alas! some of the noblest of them fell "with their backs to the ground and their front to the foe," consecrating with their blood the soil of the homes they defended. Their immediate commanders have reported the heroism of them all, the living and the dead, and now with pride and gratitude I announce that Beauregard himself has thanked Archer and his comrades on the very spot of their devotion. If they lost killed, wounded and missing, sixty-five out of less than one hundred and fifty men, they spent their blood dearly to

the enemy; if Sturdivant's battery lost one gun, a better was captured, and another disabled, and if they lost a half a mile of ground, they gained about a half hour of time and saved their beloved city by holding on long enough for Sturdivant's and Graham's and Young's batteries, Deming's cavalry, and the Forty-sixth Virginia infantry, with Wood's South Carolina company, a company of convalescents and a company of penitents, to drive back the insolent foe from approaches which their footsteps for the first time polluted. With the help of God it shall be the last time. With such troops as all have proved themselves, commanders may well give assurance with confidence to the people of Petersburg. A people who can fight thus for their altars must be aided, supported, guarded by every arm which can be outstretched for their defence. Comrades! their wives and daughters are daily and hourly nursing our sick and wounded, they wipe the hot brow, cool the fevered lips, and tenderly nourish and comfort the suffering soldiers in their hospitals. The angel nurses and the stricken patriots of this patriotic place shall not fall into the hands of ruffian invaders. Its very militia has set an example which inspires the confidence that Petersburg is indomitable, and which consoles and compensates for every drop of blood which has been spilt at Nottoway, at Walthal Junction, and at Drury's Bluff, and Howlett's Neck, for the defence of the old Cockade City. Let the reserves and second class of militia of the surrounding counties now come in promptly, one and all, and emulate this bright and successful example—let it hotly hiss to blood-red shame the laggards and skulkers from the streets and alleys of the city to the lines; and let it proclaim aloud that Petersburg is to be and shall be defended on her outer walls, on her inner lines, at her corporation bounds, in every street, and around every temple of God and altar of man in her very heart, until the blood of that heart is spilt. Roused by this spirit to this pitch of resolution, we will fight the enemy at every step, and Petersburg is safe.

HENRY A. WISE,
Brigadier General.

Official:

J. V. PEARCE, A. A. G.

MOVEMENTS OF GENERAL GRANT.

ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, }
NEAR GAINES' MILL, June 13—4 P. M. }

Grant is again in motion on our right, and our Generals are making proper movements to meet him. He commenced retiring from our front last night, but the movement was not discovered until this morning, when our line of battle was advanced and it was discovered that the enemy were gone.

Grant commenced crossing at Long bridge with infantry, artillery and cavalry this morning, after a feeble resistance on the part of the forces there stationed. Grant is therefore across the Chickahominy, and it cannot be long before a collision occurs.

It is quite true that Grant has been taking up and burning the York River railroad, which indicates that Grant either intends to cross to the south side, or he intends taking the James river as a base. This morning troops are landing from transports near Malvern Hill. It is impossible yet to say where our lines are likely to be established. Grant has, by this movement, secured possession of Malvern Hill, it is believed.

The breastworks which Grant has left were all of the most formidable character, and were six lines deep.

No collision of any magnitude has yet occurred, but before to-morrow's sun shall set we may expect another battle.

There was an engagement this morning near Ridley's shop, on the Charles City road, about fifteen miles below Richmond, between the enemy's forces, consisting of infantry, artillery and cavalry, and a body of our cavalry. Our cavalry, however, owing to the superiority of the enemy's numbers, were forced back. The enemy is also said to be moving up the river road. Grant has gotten no nearer Richmond by this move. He has, however, reached the south side of the Chickahominy.

About one hundred and fifty prisoners, left by the enemy to-day in their abandoned trenches have been brought in—among them a mail carrier.

GENERAL LEE'S DESPATCH.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VA., }
JUNE 14—9 P. M. }

Honorable Secretary of War:

SIR—The force of the enemy, mentioned in my last despatch as being on the Long bridge road, disappeared during the night. It was probably advanced to cover the movement of the main body, most of which, as far as I can learn, crossed the Chickahominy at Long bridge and below, and has reached James river at Westover and Wilcox's landing. A portion of General Grant's army upon leaving our front, at Cold Harbor, is reported to have proceeded to the White House, and embarked at that place. Everything is said to have been removed, and the depot at the White House broken up. The cars, engines, railroad iron and bridge timber that had been brought to that point have also been shipped.

Very respectfully, &c.,

R. E. LEE,
General.

Immediately after the receipt of this despatch, a number of rumors were started through the city, and speculation was rife as to where Grant was making for. Some thought that with his army beaten and demoralized, and himself smarting under the disappointment of not being nominated at Baltimore, he was withdrawing his army to Washington. Others that he was marching back to Fredericksburg. Others again thought that he was making for Suffolk, to move against the railroads in North Carolina. Others that he was sending off the bulk of his

army to reinforce Sherman in Georgia. And still another opinion was that he was moving off to the south side. Ridiculous as some of these were, they were the rumors of the day, and as such we note them. To heighten this speculation, a deserter who came in yesterday reported that Grant was under arrest for drunkenness; that he had been dead drunk since the day of the fight near Hanover Court-house, and had to be borne in an ambulance. All this tended to increase the anxiety, and to give color to every rumor that was heard in the streets; but by night it was pretty definitely ascertained that Grant, or at least the greater portion of his army, had crossed over to the south side. We heard of no official intelligence of this, but from information we received last night we see no reason to doubt it.

Westover, where General Lee in his despatch above states the enemy to have moved, is immediately on the James river, not far from Bermuda Hundred, where Butler is, and the river at that point is narrow and well situated for the laying down of pontoons. It is likely he crossed his forces over here, and effected a junction with Butler. At any rate, it was generally reported and believed last night that the enemy was moving on Petersburg, and a rumor was current that fighting had commenced between the two armies. We learned last night, on inquiry in official circles, that they had been advised of no fighting beyond some skirmishing yesterday with Dearing's cavalry, in which our pickets were driven in. Otherwise they reported all quiet. But private accounts reported that the enemy was around Petersburg, and that his forces were in line of battle in front of the outer fortifications. This may be a little extravagant, a little too far; but from all we can learn, we think it is likely that Grant has effected a junction with Butler, and designs moving on Petersburg, with the view of cutting our lines of communication with the South. Finding that he cannot whip us he will probably resort to the other expedient of starving us.

PETERSBURG, June 16, 1864.

At five P. M. yesterday, comparative quiet had settled along our lines for two hours or more, and it was the general impression that the fighting had ceased for the day. In this our troops were mistaken, for it was ascertained before dark that the enemy had massed a very heavy force on our left, especially on the City Point and Prince George Court-house roads.

At sunset the enemy charged on batteries commanding these roads, coming up in line of battle six and seven columns deep. The brunt of the assault was sustained by the Twenty-fifth and Forty-sixth regiments of Wise's brigade and Sturdivant's battery of four guns. Three furious assaults were made, the enemy coming up with a yell, and making the most determined efforts to carry the works. Our troops received them with a terrific volley each time, sending the columns back broken and discomfited.

The fourth assault was made with such overwhelming numbers that our forces found it impossible to resist the pressure, and were compelled to give way. The enemy now poured over the works in streams, captured three of our pieces, and turning the guns on our men, opened upon them an enfilading fire which caused them to leave precipitately. The guns captured belonged to Sturdivant's battery, and we regret to hear that Captain S. himself was captured, and two of his lieutenants were wounded and fell into the enemy's hands. The gallant manner in which the battery was fought, up to the last moment, is the theme of praise on every tongue. All present, with whom we have conversed, say that Captain S. and his men stood up manfully to their work, and the last discharge was made by Captain S. almost solitary and alone.

The city was filled with rumors last night regarding the killed and wounded. But as we could get nothing authentic regarding names, we fear to give them. It is generally conceded that Captain Sturdivant was captured, and also Major Batte, of the Petersburg city battalion.

The position gained by the enemy is a most important one. Our generals are fully aware of this, and we shall undoubtedly have hot work to-day.

Officers in the field yesterday, estimate the number of the enemy actually seen fronting different portions of our lines at from ten to twelve thousand. It is believed that this is only the advance column, and that Grant has nearly his entire army on this side of the river. Thirty odd transports ascended the James river with troops yesterday.

Twenty three prisoners brought in last night, belonging to the One Hundred and Forty-eighth New York regiment, all concur in the statement that Baldy Smith's entire army corps (the Eighteenth), is on this side of the river. Again, other prisoners taken yesterday morning, state that they belong to Burnside's corps.

Doc. 95.

FIGHT WITH THE ALBEMARLE.

CONFEDERATE STATES STEAMER ALBEMARLE,
PLYMOUTH, N. C., May 7, 1864. }

Commander B. F. Pinkney, Commanding, etc. :

SIR—I have the honor to report that in obedience to yours of the fifth instant, I left here at meridian of that day, together with the prize steamer Bombshell, as tender, and the Cotton Plant, to convoy to Alligator river. As soon as we reached the mouth of Roanoke river, we discovered six of the enemy's gun-boats in the Sound, about ten miles distant.*

They immediately got under way, and stood down the Sound, E.N.E., until we had run about sixteen miles, when three more gun-boats (double-enders) of a much more formidable

class, carrying from ten to twelve guns each, made their appearance. Perceiving the unequal contest in which we were compelled to engage, I immediately prepared for action.

The enemy steamed up in two columns, half a mile apart, delivering his broadside as he passed us; two of his largest and swiftest vessels breaking off from the column, bore rapidly down upon the Bombshell, and pouring in their broadsides, forced her to surrender. The third or fourth shot fired by the enemy broke off twenty inches of the muzzle of the after gun of the Albemarle.

The action lasted from twenty minutes to five until after dark, when they moved off. One of the largest and heaviest boats endeavored to run us down, but failed in the attempt, although she struck us heavily on the starboard quarter. I think we succeeded in sinking her, as we gave her two shots while she hung to us, which must have passed through her.

The rapidity of the firing caused such a dense smoke that I was unable to ascertain the damage done the enemy, but I think I am safe in saying that we sunk one of their most formidable boats, and severely crippled two others.

The contest was a very severe one, lasting about three hours. The disadvantages under which I labored from the tiller giving way, and the impossibility of producing steam enough to manage the vessel to advantage, prevented me from inflicting much greater damage than we did. The smoke-stack was riddled to such an extent as to render it useless, and so great was my extremity at one time that I was forced to tear down the bulkheads, throw in all my bacon, lard and other combustible matter, to produce steam enough to bring me back to the river.

I cannot speak too highly of the officers and crew, especially of the following-named men, viz.: John Benton, James Cullington, J. B. Cooper, H. A. Kahn, John Smith, H. P. Hoy, Thomas Wooten, John Steely, and T. Nichols. The pilot, John B. Hopkins, deserves great credit for the manner in which he manœuvred the vessel, and brought her safely back to port. Since the engagement, I have learned by flag of truce that there was no one hurt on the Bombshell.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. M. COOKE,
Commander, C. S. N.

Doc. 96.

A NATIONAL MOTTO.

"THE HEEL OF THE OLD FLAG-STAFF SHALL BRUISE THE
RATTLESNAKE'S HEAD!"

Across the front of the stand of the National Union Ratification Meeting, held in Baltimore in June, 1864, for the purpose of ratifying the nominations of the candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the United States, was displayed the above thoroughly national

* See Document 17, page 212, Volume 10, Rebellion Record.

motto, conceived by Mr. W. W. Carter of that city, in March, 1862, and which he afterward had inscribed upon a handsome silken Union flag, which he presented to President Lincoln in the following August, accompanied by a letter requesting:

"That the flag might be deposited in the War Department, in order that the motto might be incorporated into the national faith during the present struggle for the supremacy of the Constitution and the Laws, and the perpetuity of our nationality."

The letter then continues: "The motto is national, symbolic, and prophetic. The Heel of the Old Flag-Staff represents the Federal Government; the Rattlesnake's Head represents the Rebellion inaugurated by South Carolina, the symbol of whose sovereignty is that vicious reptile; and the declaration of enmity between the heel and head is prophetic of the absolute power and inflexible determination of the Federal Government to crush out the Rebellion at any and every cost commensurate with the life of the nation."

"Let the motto then be inscribed upon the flaunting banners of our advancing armies; let it be spread before the public eye, and thundered into the public ear at all the loyal gatherings of the people; let it stimulate the heart of the nation all over the land, and finally, let it be the battle-cry for the Union until the flag of our country shall again be planted upon every mountain-top, and its musical flutterings again be borne upon every passing breeze. Yeal until—

"O'er all the cities and forts once more,
The Stars and Stripes we shall restore."

The sentiment, with its accompanying remarks, have been most heartily endorsed by a large number of the Governors of the loyal States, to whom they have been submitted, as well as by Hon. Edward Everett, Hon. Daniel S. Dickinson, Hon. Joseph Holt, and Commodores Porter, Dahlgren, and others.

Doc. 97.

EXCLUSION OF THE "ALABAMA."

ACTION OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT.

On the eighth of March, 1864, Mr. Burlingame, American Minister to China, notified the Government of that country of the appearance of the pirate Alabama in the Chinese seas, and requested that she should be excluded from Chinese ports. Prince Kung replied as follows, declaring that he had given orders for her exclusion:

I had the honor to receive your Excellency's despatch on the eighth instant, in which you inform me that the southern part of the United States has risen in rebellion to the Government; and that a steamer, called the Alabama, is now cruising on the ocean, burning and destroying vessels and property of their citizens; you

therefore request that a proclamation be issued forbidding her to enter the ports of China, &c.

It appears from this, that by the rebellion of the southern portion of the United States against their government, your country is placed very much in the same position that China is, whose seditious subjects are now in revolt against her; and as it is highly desirable to prevent this rebel steamer from injuring or molesting American merchant ships, I have notified the various Governors-General and Governors of the maritime provinces that if the steamer Alabama, or any other ship, intending to injure American shipping, come into their jurisdiction, they are on no account to permit such vessel to come into any port. They are required to issue a proclamation to this effect immediately, as a measure adapted to promote the general welfare.

I have informed the ministers of Great Britain, France and Russia, of these proceedings, that they may notify their consuls at the several ports for their guidance. I also enclose a copy of the despatch issued to the various Governors for your Excellency's information.

To His Excellency Anson Burlingame, United States Minister, China.

March sixteen, (Tungchi, third year, second moon, ninth day.)

Doc. 98.

THE EASTERN GULF BLOCKADE

U. S. S. HENDRICK HUDSON, E. G. B. SQUADRON, }
KEY WEST, FLORIDA, JUNE 5, 1864.

The following is an account of the unsuccessful attempt by the rebels to capture a number of the blockading vessels on the Gulf coast.

The plan was a bold and audacious one; deserving, perhaps, some little attention by our loyal people. It was after a fruitless cruise of thirty-two days that we again returned to Key West, "the most delightful of places," where the residents charge one dollar to be looked at, and where a malady of the most fearful nature has been discovered, namely: pecuniary fever, which is both alarmingly contagious and infectious, and has thus far baffled the skill of the M. D.'s.

The supposition was we should be delayed in port for at least three weeks. It was the old story, "machinery out of order, boilers in want of repair, needing what is technically called soft patches." I have asked the question would not hard ones suit the case better? but received in reply for such presumption, a polite invitation to refer to King's "Engineering;" so much for ignorance and curiosity. But now to business; we had made our minds up for a resting spell from that eternal rolling and pitching, which the waters of the gulf are so celebrated for; when in the midst of congratulations, an order was issued from headquarters to the effect that the Hudson should instantly coal up. The knowing ones looked dubious—what could it mean? only just entering port and ordered to

coal up was a problem even more than the wisest could solve. Yet it was plainly evident that something was about to be done, "something was in the wind." What could it be? The question was repeatedly asked but received no definite answer. Anything to relieve suspense, if nothing more than "Madame Rumor," would have been eagerly seized and devoured for truth. But in the meantime we have hauled up to the wharf and that dreadful operation commenced, "coaling;" under the heat of the sun, and the weight of coal, Jack considers the job an unthankful operation; presently a messenger makes his appearance; what news? is the first ejaculation. The abrupt reply is, "the Somerset and Chambers are both taken!" Taken! where? is the question, for such an idea was extremely preposterous. "They are taken by the rebels" was the response. "A report was in circulation that the capture has been made, and your vessel is chosen to proceed without delay to the scene of the disaster." Such was the message received. The blockading vessels Somerset and Chambers were stationed in the harbor of Appalachicola, within eight miles of the town, which was once so thriving and prosperous, but made gloomy enough by the fortunes of war. The first vessel mentioned is a steamer, and formerly a New York ferry boat; the latter a three-masted schooner, which, before the war, was engaged in the coasting-trade.

• After taking in a sufficient quantity of coal, and receiving the necessary orders, we once more started up the coast; as a matter of course, under the circumstances, all sorts of rumors were afloat; speculators were on the *qui vive*.

The cruise up the coast was a pleasant one, in regard to weather, but devoid of anything of adventure save the usual monotonous routine of ship duties; forty hours of hopes and expectations, served to convince us of the untruthfulness of the "Key West report;" yet it was not without a straw of foundation. On nearing the harbor of Appalach, the United States steamship Tahoma was descried, as the only vessel apparent to the naked eye; but by the aid of the glass the Somerset was "made out" further up toward the river; and now came proof positive of the safety of those feared to be lost. The schooner Chambers had previously relieved the United States steamship Stars and Stripes, and was then blockading off St. Marks; this accounted for her non-appearance.

The foundation of the report originated from an affair which transpired in the vicinity of Appalach; and but for the timely interference of Him who rules supreme, it would have proved severely disastrous to the fleet. On the nineteenth of May, a force of two hundred rebels, consisting in part of the crew of the rebel ram Merrimac, that was, and lead by Catesby Jones, who was formerly an officer in the United States army, but now one of the rankest of secessionists, landed upon the extremity of Dog

Island, within two miles of the United States steamship Adele. So expertly and silently was the movement executed, that not a person on the above mentioned vessel had even a suspecting thought of so near an approach of the enemy. Thus far, the marauders worked successfully, making no demonstrations whatever, until eleven o'clock at night; then embarking in boats, they pushed with full confidence of making a sure capture of the Adele. Bent on nothing less than murder, these desperate characters, in the still hours of the night, were wending their way toward their intended victims. The night was unfavorable for the consummation of the design, but so confident of the result was the leader, that he paid no heed at the time of leaving shore to the warnings which surrounded them. The moon shedding its bright lustre, reflected upon the ruffled waters a brilliant and radiating phosphorus, by which every splash of the oars could be distinctly seen for some distance; observing this, and fearing premature detection of their long-contemplated plans, the leader ordered a return to the shore, which being executed, they remained concealed for the whole of the following day.

The night of the twentieth was again the scene of a similar undertaking. The aspects of affairs were of a different nature; black, threatening clouds completely obscured the moon, thereby causing objects to be invisible to the casual glance of a lookout. But He who rules with divine power, who controls both winds and waves, and holds the destiny of nations in His hands, saw proper to cause a storm to sweep destruction over this villanous proceeding. Ere the frail boats had reached half the distance to be accomplished, the storm overtook them, and spent its fury around and about the whole scene; the impending danger, which was now fully perceived, forced the occupants of the boats to apply such means as might possibly secure safety. To go forward was nothing but pure rashness, and the only alternative was to endeavor to reach the shore. Three boats had already swamped, and the half-drowning survivors were clinging with the desperation of despair to the gunwales of the more staunch and fortunate boats. At this moment three boats belong to the Somerset were just returning from an expedition, and upon discovering the boats of the rebels, they instantly gave chase, but unfortunately succeeded in taking but ten prisoners, the officers and the largest part of the men escaping. From the accounts of the prisoners, the officers consisted of a naval lieutenant, a surgeon and passed assistant, a paymaster, four engineers, and two midshipmen; all the boats were eventually taken, numbering twenty-two; and in them were found a miscellaneous stock of goods, consisting of field telescopes, marine glasses, compasses, quadrants, sextants, arms, ammunition, &c.; scattered about in various places, there were also found letters of a private nature, corre-

spondence of the department at Richmond, relative to the plans to be pursued, and also advice in regard to the transfer of rebel soldiers from the Army of the Tennessee to what they call "Navy."

The assaulting party were clad in the uniform of the United States troops. For the better purpose of deceiving the enemy, each man had a "Sharpe's rifle," with sword-bayonet, the latter sharpened to the keenness of a razor, for the double purpose of cutting boarding nettings, should that obstacle present itself. The scheme was well planned, and must have succeeded had not the intervention of the obstacles mentioned taken place. The United States steamer *Adele* was to be boarded with the least noise possible, and, when fairly on deck, to engage the men, and quickly overpower all resistance; twenty men were detailed for the special purpose of immediately securing the captain. Their next move was to seize the code of signals; with these their true character could be concealed from our cruisers for a short time.

The anchor was then to be hove up, and, getting under weigh, they were to deliberately make for the Somerset, hoisting the signals and American colors; thus deceiving their enemy, they were to attack, grapple, and board, and take possession; the Chambers to be served in the same manner; and the Confederate flag run up to the peak, and, with this addition to the piratical crafts already afloat, more depredations were to befall our commerce. Happily this diabolical scheme was frustrated. Had it been otherwise, who can surmise the amount of damage which would have been done?

It is only another illustration of the watchfulness and vigilance which should be exercised at all times by blockaders.

An expedition was started to Appalach, upon the Hudson's arrival in the harbor, trusting to capture some representative of this late enterprise. After searching the town thoroughly, without any signs of the fugitive, the bugle announced the recalls; and two hours time, saw us on board of our respective vessels,

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THE DEFEAT OF RODDY.

CAMP 4TH O. V. C. KINGSTON, GA., }
June 6, 1864. }

The Second cavalry brigade, consisting of the First, Third and Fourth regiments Ohio veteran cavalry, Colonel Eli Long commanding, left Columbia, Tennessee, May twenty-second, and marching via Pulaski and Elktown, Tennessee, and Athens, Alabama, reached Decatur, Alabama, on the afternoon of the twenty-sixth. Hardly had the brigade encamped, and the horses been unsaddled, when "boots and saddles" was sounded, and the word flew that Roddy had driven in the pickets. Out went the brigade on the Courtland road, and marching six miles, the First Ohio in advance, found

pickets, rebel regiments of cavalry, apparently on a reconnoissance. A volley was fired from each regiment, when the First forming, part in line to the right of the road, and part in column in the road, charged with drawn sabres. The rebels did not stop to pass more compliments, but turned tail, and such running was beautiful to behold. The First, followed by the Third and Fourth, kept up the chase for two or three miles, capturing fifteen prisoners, a regimental flag, five wagons loaded with forage and officers' baggage, and a number of horses and mules, after which the brigade returned to camp. At eleven A. M., on the twenty-seventh, the brigade left camp, and again took the Courtland road, this time preceded by a brigade of infantry and a battery of artillery. After marching about twelve miles, we overtook the infantry and artillery, and learned that the rebels were stubbornly contesting their advance. The Fourth were sent to the front as skirmishers, and kept the rebels going quite lively, killing a major and several men, and had got within five or six miles of Courtland, when the rebels opened two fires of artillery on us, and the Fourth, now dismounted, except the skirmishers, on right and left, were compelled to lie down, as the rebels had evidently chosen their position beforehand, and measured the ground, for their shells passed or burst directly over our line. The artillery was ordered up, and opened briskly, silencing the rebels after a little time, and again our skirmishers advanced, but they met with slight opposition, and at dark we entered Courtland and encamped. Two men were wounded this day, in the Fourth, by shells, neither severely. The rebel force must have been considerable, as Roddy's headquarters had been near Courtland. At six A. M., the twenty-eighth, our brigade, and two pieces of artillery, took the Moulton road, the infantry and four pieces of artillery returning to Decatur. We marched over a hill and barren portion of country, and at two P. M., passed through Moulton, a small village, and camped in a woods, two miles east, on the right of the Summerville road, the rebels firing on the rear guard as it passed through town. We now began to suspect that Roddy was not satisfied with his previous experience, and intended to try the Yankees again. The horses were kept saddled, and we laid down ready to spring to arms at a moment's warning, but our rest was not disturbed. As the bugles sounded reveille, before daybreak on the morning of the twenty-ninth, however, our pickets were driven in, and Roddy with his whole force, amounting (as we afterward learned) to five regiments and two battalions of cavalry, and four pieces of artillery, attacked our camp. As the brigade marched the preceding day—the Fourth in advance, next the artillery, then the Third Ohio, and in rear the First Ohio, so that the latter regiment was attacked first; but although so little time was given, for the rebels came with a rush, the First was ready, and firing, dis-

mounted and went to work heartily. By this time the shells were bursting thick and fast in and around camp, and solid shot hissed through the air spitefully, while our artillery was hard at work. The Third and Fourth had just mounted, and formed on the opposite side of the road from camp, facing Moulton, when word was brought that the rebels were advancing on our left and entering our camp. The Fourth was dismounted in a twinkling, and forming line, went across the field and road, and into the camp at a double-quick, with a yell. We were there not a second too soon; for the rebels had just entered the other side of the camp, and were flanking the First Ohio, which was already receiving a terrible fire. The woods and open space beyond, was alive with Graybacks, but the boys went straight ahead, forming in a hot fire, and driving the rebels out of the woods, up the hill, and into an open field. In this field was stationed a piece of artillery, which had been annoying us very much; but when we made our appearance, the rebels took it to the rear in a hurry, thinking we were charging it, which we should have done, had we been mounted. The Fourth now retired to the edge of the woods, closing a little to the right, on the First Ohio, when the rebels made an attack, short but sharp, on the right of the Fourth, and getting a handsome repulse, leaving several killed. Just at this time a rousing cheer from our extreme right, told that the Third had charged, mounted, flanking the rebels, who, as usual, could not stand a charge, but broke, left the field, and rushed pell-mell, into the road and across the fields toward Moulton, while after them went the Third and our artillery, the latter, at every convenient opportunity, pouring shell into the flying rebels. The Fourth mounted and followed, but soon returned, as did the other pursuers, and the fight was over. Having considerably disappointed Mr. Roddy, we bethought ourselves of our morning meal, and as it was a seasonable hour, seven A. M., and having good appetites, we breakfasted. The rebels left two majors, and twelve or fifteen men dead on the field. We took a lieutenant-colonel, two lieutenants, and between twenty and thirty men prisoners. Their loss in wounded must have been severe. Only one man was killed outright in our brigade, and he was killed by a prisoner he was bringing in. He belonged to the Third Ohio. The First Ohio had a number wounded, two of whom have since died. The Third Ohio had several wounded, one or two dying since. The Fourth had ten wounded, one of whom, Jacob Carolus, Company C, has since died; none missing. Roddy came on with the greatest confidence, and intended to capture our whole force, for the night previous he sent to Florence, and had some of his regiments come up by forced marches to his aid, and the prisoners said that he told them that we were green Yankees, just from Ohio, and that he would rout us, and they should have our new equipments. He did

have quite a force on the road to Summerville, evidently to take in the flying Yankees when he routed them, but he didn't rout worth a cent, and thought the boot was on the other foot. It was a lively engagement, each man taking a full hand, and none to spare. The boys are very jolly about Roddy's coming to breakfast with us, and getting snubbed. The same day of the fight we marched forty miles, and afterward continued our march, via Rome, to this place, which we reached this A. M.

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DESTRUCTION OF THE PEVENSEY.

NAVAL STATION, BEAUFORT, N. C.,
JUNE 9, 1864. }

Yesterday morning, at a little past six o'clock, this quiet town and harbor was thrown into excitement by the appearance of black smoke in the offing. Now, in gun-boat parlance, black smoke is synonymous with English neutrality—King Cotton, or if you please, a blockade-runner. In a moment's space of time black smoke was discovered to be a large side-wheel steamer, chased by the supply steamer Newbern, and immediately the steamer Cherokee and the steam tug Lilac left the harbor to assist in the chase, and endeavor to keep her from the beach, to which she was making under a full head of steam; but all attempts to capture her were futile, and she was soon piled upon the sand. About fifteen minutes after striking she blew up, the shock of the explosion seriously straining her hull, and causing her to fill in short order. Her name was Pevensey, formerly called the Kangaroo. She was laden with firearms, saltpetre, dry goods, and various other things, and was first seen by the Newbern off New Inlet. The day before she had been chased by the Quaker City for more than sixteen hours, and left near where she was found by Lieutenant Harris. The Pevensey was a very large boat, and would have been to her captors decidedly the finest prize yet taken off this part of "Dixie," being over six hundred tons, and very handsomely fitted out. For the time being most of the crew escaped; but, strange to say, that the second mate of the steamer remained fast asleep in his bunk after the explosion had taken place. If the weather had proved favorable, it is more than probable she would have been got off; but a strong breeze from the southward and westward soon made her a complete wreck, not, however, before some of her cargo had been secured upon the beach. A little incident relative to the subsequent capture of the officers and crew is not without interest. Acting Assistant Paymaster Woods, while riding down the beach some distance from the prize, saw some men standing near a clump of trees, and approached them. When within speaking distance, the Captain—for they were the refugees—called him with: "Colonel, how far is it from Fort Caswell?"

stating that they had just euchred the Yankees out of a fine prize. Mr. Woods seeing their mistake, resolved to profit by it, and told the captain he was happy to hear him say so, notwithstanding he was sorry he did not get her in; and remarked that, as he was riding down the beach some distance on a reconnaissance, would not object to their company, kindly volunteering to take some things for them on his horse. As the party proceeded up the strand they met Mr. James Young, Captain's Clerk of the *Arlotta*, flag-ship of this station, who they supposed was also a Confederate officer, and again abused those Yankee boogers, both Wood and Young joining in the tirade against the good Father Abraham and also Uncle Gideon's Band until they reached the first line of pickets. Then and there Mr. Wood informed the gentlemen that they were prisoners of war to two Federal officers, excusing their deception by saying: "When ignorance was bias to you, Monsieurs, 'twould have been folly in us to make you wise," upon which one of them coolly remarked—"It was a genuine Yankee trick."

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AFFAIR AT MEMPHIS, TENN.

OFFICIAL CORRESPONDENCE.

MEMPHIS, TENN., June 12, 1864.

Major-General C. C. Washburne:

SIR—It is circulated upon the streets, to my prejudice as a candidate for Mayor, by aspirants and their friends for the same office, that in the event I should be re-elected, the military would take charge of the municipal department of Memphis. This by some is believed, and to my great injury.

To satisfy my friends, I would be pleased to know if any such intention is entertained by you. Most respectfully, JOHN PARK.

HEADQUARTERS DIST. OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
MEMPHIS, TENN., JUNE 18, 1864. }

John Park, Esq., Mayor of Memphis:

SIR—Your letter of this date is this moment received, in which you inquire if it is the "intention of the military authorities to take charge of the municipal department of Memphis in case you are re-elected Mayor;" I answer, unhesitatingly, that such is the "intention."

The disloyal character of the present city government, as well as its utter inefficiency in the management of city affairs, compels me to this declaration.

I hope that the citizens of Memphis, by electing a ticket friendly to the government of the United States, will relieve me from the duty of interfering; but of this I am determined, that while I command here, there shall be no hostile municipal government within my jurisdiction.

I find that on the second day of July, 1861, you delivered your inaugural message as Mayor

of Memphis. I recall the following extract from it, viz.:

"For years a fanatical party has been growing in the North—a party that declares for itself a law higher than the constitution, or even the word of God—combining in its elements republicanism, abolitionism, free-loveism, atheism, with every other abominable ism that strikes at the organization of society or the existence of free constitutional government.

"This fanatical party, as you know, succeeded, at the last Presidential election, in placing in the chair of Washington, Mr. Abe Lincoln, the man who promulgated the irrepressible conflict doctrine—a doctrine so utterly at war with all the best interests of the South, that when its author was placed in power, upon a platform fully endorsing his doctrine, and with evident determination upon his part to carry out his doctrine to the full extent, there was no alternative left for the South but to withdraw from a Union that, instead of affording peace and protection, as was originally contemplated, was to be used as a means of destroying all that was valuable to the South.

"Had the administration at Washington fully comprehended the state of the country and its duties, war with all its horrors might have been averted. But the head of that administration had avowed his purpose of planting his foot firmly, and on assuming the reins of government, seemed to be controlled alone by his 'higher laws' doctrine; disregarding all constitutional restraints, he set himself up as a military dictator, whose arbitrary rule was more to be feared than that of any of the monarchs of Europe.

"Against the administration of this tyrant the South rebelled. They did right. The southern people would have been unworthy the name of freemen had they submitted to Lincoln's administration, after his purposes were fully developed."

While I have understood that you have taken the oath of allegiance, it is believed, that notwithstanding, you have never repented of any of your sins against the government of the United States. This last would be a sufficient reason for the interposition of the military authorities, but the disloyal and inefficient character of the government of which you are the head, furnishes reasons that are overpowering.

Respectfully yours, C. C. WASHBURNE,
Major-General Commanding

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THE FEDERAL GENERALS AT CHARLESTON.

LETTER FROM GENERAL JONES

HEADQUARTERS DIST. OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA AND FLORIDA, }
CHARLESTON, JUNE 18, 1864. }

GENERAL—Five generals and forty-five field officers of the United States Army—all of them

prisoners of war—have been sent to this city for safe keeping. They have been turned over to Brigadier-General Ripley, commanding the first military district of this department, who will see that they are provided with commodious quarters in a part of the city occupied by non-combatants, the majority of whom are women and children. It is proper, however, that I should inform you that it is a part of the city which has for many months been exposed, day and night, to the fire of your guns.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SAMUEL JONES,
Major-General Commanding

Major-General J. G. FOSTER,
Commanding United States Forces on coast of South Carolina,
Confederate States.

GENERAL FOSTER'S REPLY.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, }
HILTON HEAD, S. C., June 16, 1864. }

Major-General Samuel Jones, Commanding Confederate Forces, Department of South Carolina, Georgia and Florida:

GENERAL—I have to acknowledge the receipt, this day, of your communication of the thirteenth instant, informing me that five generals and forty-five field officers of the United States Army, prisoners of war, have been turned over to you by Brigadier-General Ripley, with instructions to see that they are provided with quarters in a part of the city occupied by non-combatants, the majority of which latter you state are women and children. You add that you deem it proper to inform me that it is a part of the city which has been for many months exposed to the fire of our guns. Many months since Major-General Gillmore, United States Army, notified General Beauregard, then commanding at Charleston, that the city would be bombarded. This notice was given that non-combatants might be removed, and thus women and children spared from harm. General Beauregard, in a communication to General Gillmore, dated August twenty-second, 1863, informed him that the non-combatant population of Charleston would be removed with all possible celerity. That women and children have been since retained by you in a part of the city which has been for many months exposed to fire is a matter decided by your own sense of humanity.

I must, however, protest against your action in thus placing defenceless prisoners of war in a position exposed to constant bombardment. It is an indefensible act of cruelty, and can be designed only to prevent a continuance of our fire upon Charleston. That city is a depot for military supplies. It contains not merely arsenals, but also foundries and factories for the manufacture of munitions of war. In its shipyards several armed iron-clads have been already completed, while others are still upon stocks in course of construction. Its wharves, and the banks of the river on both sides of the city, are lined with batteries. To destroy these means of continuing the war is, therefore, our object and duty. You seek to defeat this effort,

and by means not known to honorable warfare, but by placing unarmed and helpless prisoners under fire. I have forwarded your communication to the President, with a request that he place in my custody an equal number of prisoners of like grade, to be kept by me in positions exposed to the fire of your guns, so long as you continue the course stated in your communication.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. FOSTER,
Major-General Commanding.

D. C. WAGER,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

CHARLESTON, June 14.

For some time past it has been known that a batch of Yankee prisoners, comprising the highest rank now in our hands, were soon to be brought hither to share the pleasure of the bombardment. They accordingly arrived on Sunday. We give a list of their names and rank:

Brig.-Gen. Seymour,	Col. W. C. Lee,
Brig.-Gen. Wessels,	Col. R. White,
Brig.-Gen. Scammon,	Col. H. O. Bolinger,
Brig.-Gen. Ehaler,	Col. H. L. Brown,
Brig.-Gen. Heckman,	Col. E. L. Dana,
Col. T. G. Grover,	Col. E. Fardell,
Col. R. Hawkins,	Lt.-Col. E. G. Hays,
Col. W. Harriman,	Lt.-Col. N. B. Hunier,
Col. J. H. Lebman,	Lt.-Col. T. N. Higginbotham,
Col. O. H. Lagrange,	Major J. E. Clarke,
Major D. A. Carpenter,	Major W. Crandall,
Major H. D. Gant,	Major J. Hall,
Major J. N. Johnson,	Major E. W. Bates,
Major O. H. Barnes,	Major W. Y. Baker,
Lt.-Col. E. Alcott,	Lt.-Col. J. Putsley,
Lt.-Col. A. F. Rogers,	Lt.-Col. J. H. Burnham,
Lt.-Col. C. P. Baldwin,	Lt.-Col. W. R. Cook,
Lt.-Col. Bartholomew,	Lt.-Col. C. J. Dickerson,
Lt.-Col. J. T. Follows,	Lt.-Col. N. Glenn,
Lt.-Col. C. A. Fairbanks,	Lt.-Col. S. F. Spofford,
Lt.-Col. W. W. Stewart,	Lt.-Col. A. W. Swift,
Lt.-Col. A. W. Taylor,	Lt.-Col. W. P. Lascelle,
Lt.-Col. C. C. Joslin,	Lt.-Col. W. E. McMakin,
Lt.-Col. D. Miles,	Lt.-Col. W. C. Maxwell,
Lt.-Col. J. D. Maybaw,	Lt.-Col. S. Moritt.

These prisoners, we understand, will be furnished with comfortable quarters in that portion of the city most exposed to the enemy's fire. The commanding officer on Morris Island will be informed of the fact of their residence in the shelled district, and if his batteries still continue their wanton and barbarous work, it will be at the peril of the captured officers.—*Charleston Mercury, June 14.*

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MORGAN'S RAID IN KENTUCKY.

LOUISVILLE, June 18, 1864.

General Burbridge, some weeks ago, started on an expedition into South-western Virginia. His objective point was the Salines, where were encamped about four thousand rebels. He moved up Sandy Valley to the mouth of Beaver, where he was compelled to await supplies. Colonel J. M. Brown was ordered forward with his brigade to reconnoitre. He went to Pound Gap, and moved out into Virginia, skirmishing with

the rebels several miles, when he found that the rebels were in ambush in superior force, and were attempting to draw him into the snug trap set for him. He then fell back to the Gap, to avoid being cut off by the flanking movements of the rebels, and from the Gap fell back to Beaver; and John Morgan followed to the Gap, and, as soon as Brown left it, passed through it, taking the direct road to Mt. Sterling.

Colonel Brown was immediately ordered in pursuit, and followed close behind Morgan, picking up stragglers. Morgan's force consisted of about two thousand cavalry and seven hundred infantry, without any artillery. His infantry and one brigade of cavalry, halted at Mt. Sterling, while the other brigade of cavalry, under Howard Smith, passed on toward Lexington, stealing horses and robbing citizens. At Mt. Sterling, they robbed the bank of about sixty thousand dollars, gutted the stores and stole all the horses in the region roundabout. General Burbridge attacked them on Thursday morning. He captured their rear picket, about twenty-five strong, at Ticktown, and moved up on the main body, completely surprising them. The inside pickets were shot down, all of them (about thirty) being killed; and Colonel Brown, who was in the advance, pushed right through the camp of the infantry, shooting them before they had finished their morning nap, and attacked the brigade under Griffith. Hanson's brigade coming up, joined in the attack, and the little battle became fierce and bloody. Hanson pushed his artillery too far forward, and the rebels charged and captured it. But before they could move it off, a squadron of the Twelfth Ohio cavalry charged the rebels and recaptured the pieces. The rebels, though fighting very bravely, could not stand the close pressing and murderous fire of our men, and soon broke and fled. Of the seven hundred infantry, scarcely fifty escaped. Over two hundred were killed, about two hundred and fifty were wounded, and about the same number captured in this little battle. Morgan was not in command. He was at Winchester, threatening Lexington. Hearing of the route of his men at Mt. Sterling, he moved on Lexington Thursday night, and commenced skirmishing with the small force under Colonel Cooper, of the Fourth Kentucky cavalry. General Burbridge's force was so exhausted by their previous hard service and hard fighting, that he was compelled to halt in Mt. Sterling until Friday morning. This gave Morgan time to attack Lexington. It was defended by about three hundred green troops. Morgan, about twelve o'clock Thursday night, made the attack. He fired several buildings on the edge of the town, and commenced his attack by the light they afforded. Colonels Cooper and Shackelford, with about one hundred men, kept his force, about seventeen hundred strong, at bay for near two hours, and then fell back to Fort Clay. The rebels entered with a yell, and rushed to

Main street and commenced their work of pillage. Hats, boots and shoes, clothing, saddles and bridles, jewelry and hardware stores, were soon burst open and their contents stolen. The Branch Bank of Kentucky was robbed of ten thousand dollars, part in gold and silver, and part in greenbacks. The Northern Bank keys were demanded, but through the luck and coolness of Mr. Cristie, one of the officials, they were kept out of their possession. Just as soon as it was light a single piece of artillery was stationed at the west end of Main street, and the second shot from it cleared the business portion of the town. Fort Clay shelled them vigorously wherever they made their appearance, and saved from destruction about sixty cars belonging to the Covington and Lexington railroad. By nine A. M. the rebels were all gone toward Georgetown. About one hundred and fifty shells were fired at them, but we have yet to learn of the first rebel being hit. The fight at Lexington was a bloodless one, no man on either side being killed. Several citizens were wounded—some by the rebels, some by our men—but none very dangerously. The heaviest losers by the robbers were J. G. Haws, \$2,000; H. & J. P. Shaw, \$1,200; Bassett & Emmal, \$1,200; Loenhart, \$1,800; Kastle, J. S. Edge and William Rule, all shoe stores, who lost stock ranging from \$250 to \$500 each. Harting's jewelry store was also robbed. Most of the money taken from the Branch Bank was special deposits, Mr. Prunket being the heaviest loser. Citizens were robbed of their pocket-books and watches, and horses suffered terribly; over one hundred were taken from F. T. Hord's stable. John M. Clay and William McCracken lost their fine trotting and racing stock. But it is useless to attempt to name all those who have lost horses; their name is legion. Everywhere they went they stole horses, from friend and foe. On reaching Georgetown, Morgan and Howard Smith demanded the keys of the bank, but were told that the money was run off. After leaving Lexington, it was evidently Morgan's intention to attack Frankfort, and move out through the south-eastern part of the State, and he had moved his command through Georgetown in that direction. But he learned that General Burbridge was at Versailles (which was false), with two thousand men, and he immediately faced about, and, passing through Georgetown, again moved on Cynthiana. General Burbridge, with his command, reached Lexington about noon, Friday, and, hastily remounting a portion of his forces, started in pursuit. He came upon Morgan Sunday morning, at Cynthiana, drawn up in line of battle and awaiting him. Burbridge immediately attacked him, and in fifty-five minutes had Morgan's command routed and flying in every direction. Morgan's loss here was about five hundred. His force was divided into half a dozen parts, each part taking care of itself. The main force fled toward Augusta, under Morgan himself, which

was pursued by Colonel Hanson, again attacked and routed, and again losing several hundred prisoners. The whole country is full of the disorganized and fleeing rebels, and they are being picked up all over the country. Thus has ended Morgan's last raid. He came into the State with about two thousand seven hundred men. He robbed and plundered on all sides. He was pursued and whipped badly three times in six days, and will lose nearly two thousand of his men. Morgan has blundered in every move he has made. He came into the State, followed closely by a superior force; his rear pickets were surprised and captured; his command was surprised and routed at Mount Sterling; he prowled around Lexington, with four or five hundred men, two or three days, when only about one hundred and fifty available men defended it. He could have gone out by Frankfort, but allowed himself to be scared and turned toward Cynthiana, by a trick; he stood up for a fair fight at Cynthiana and was whipped, and his army broken up in fifty-five minutes. His fleeing bands are being overtaken, whipped and captured on all sides. The horses he stole—many of them—have been recaptured. Thus ends the career of this great horse-thief, and his gang of robbers and plunderers. To call them soldiers would be a disgrace to the name; they are nothing more or less than highway robbers. Officers and men, with a few exceptions, are all plunderers. It is useless to say that Morgan is not to blame. Banks were robbed by his orders, and he himself demanded the keys. Yet there are some men of honor among them—men who are with Morgan not willingly, but by orders of the rebel government, and these curse him for everything mean, and openly denounce him as a common thief, fit for nothing but to plunder unarmed citizens and rob defenceless towns. General Burbridge and his command have shown conspicuous skill and gallantry in this whole campaign. The General has proved his title to an independent command, and Colonels Brown, Hanson, and Ratcliff have ably seconded him in all his movements. The men have endured privations and fought the enemy like heroes, and deserve the very highest meed of praise. Kentucky, Ohio, and Michigan men have done the work effectually this time, and none have borne themselves more gallantly than the Twelfth Ohio cavalry. But, Kentucky has suffered a good deal by the raid. The Covington and Lexington and Lexington and Louisville railroads have been damaged considerably and partly burned, and hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of property destroyed and stolen. The whole country has been full of spies; home rebels have given them aid and comfort, and helped in the work. If General Burbridge will do the thing completely, he will avail himself of their recent acts, to punish them as they deserve. We have a law, and by our law they ought to be punished. Now is the time to rid Kentucky of these foes to her peace, and these friends of her enemies.

GENERAL SHERMAN'S LETTER.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
BIG SHAWTY, IN THE FIELD, GA., JUNE 21, 1864.

General Burbridge, Commanding Division of Kentucky:

GENERAL—The recent raid of Morgan, and the concurrent acts of men styling themselves Confederate partisans or guerrillas, call for determined action on your part.

Even on the southern "State Rights" theory, Kentucky has not seceded. Her people, by their vote and their actions, have adhered to their allegiance to the National Government, and the South would now coerce her out of our Union, and into theirs, by the very dogma of "coercion" upon which so much stress was laid at the outset of the war, and which carried into rebellion the people of the middle or border slave States.

But politics aside, these acts of the so-called partisans or guerrillas, are nothing but simple murder, horse-stealing, arson, and other well-defined crimes, which do not sound as well under their true name as more agreeable ones of warlike meaning.

Now, before starting on this campaign, I foresaw it, as you remember, that this very case would arise, and I asked Governor Bramlette to at once organize in each county a small trustworthy band, under the sheriffs, and, at one dash, arrest every man in the community who was dangerous to it; and also every fellow hanging about the towns, villages and cross-roads who had no honest calling—the material out of which guerrillas are made up; but this sweeping exhibition of power doubtless seemed to the Governor rather arbitrary.

The fact is, in our country, personal liberty has been so well secured, that public safety is lost sight of in our laws and institutions, and the fact is, we are thrown back one hundred years in civilization, law, and everything else, and will go right straight to anarchy and the devil, if somebody don't arrest our downward progress.

We, the military, must do it, and we have right and law on our side. All governments and communities have a right to guard against real and even supposed danger. The whole people of Kentucky must not be kept in a state of suspense and real danger, lest a few innocent men should be wrongfully accused.

First.—You may order all your Post and District Commanders that guerrillas are not soldiers, but wild beasts, unknown to the usages of war. To be recognized as soldiers, they must be enlisted, enrolled, officered, uniformed, armed and equipped, by recognized belligerent power, and must, if detailed from a main army, be of sufficient strength, with written orders from some army commander, to some military thing. Of course we have recognized the Confederate Government as a belligerent power, but deny their right to our lands, territories, rivers, coasts, and nationality—admitting the right to rebel and move to some other country, where

laws and customs are more in accordance with their own ideas and prejudices.

Second.—The civil power being insufficient to protect life and property *ex necessitate rei*, to prevent anarchy, "which nature abhors," the military steps in, and is rightful, constitutional, and lawful. Under this law everybody can be made to "stay at home and mind his and her own business," and if they won't do that can be sent away where they won't keep their honest neighbors in fear of danger, robbery, and insult.

Third.—Your military commanders, provost-marshals, and other agents, may arrest all males and females who have encouraged or harbored guerrillas and robbers, and you may cause them to be collected in Louisville; and when you have enough—say three or four hundred—I will cause them to be sent down the Mississippi, through their guerrilla gauntlet, and by a sailing ship send them to a land where they may take their negroes, and make a colony, with laws and a future of their own. If they won't live in peace in such a garden as Kentucky, why, we will send them to another, if not a better, land, and surely this would be a kindness to them, and a God's blessing to Kentucky.

I wish you to be careful that no personalities are mixed up in this; nor does a full and generous "love of country," "of the South," of their State or country, form a cause of banishment, but that devilish spirit which will not be satisfied, and that makes war the pretext of murder, arson, theft in all its grades, perjury, and all the crimes of human nature.

My own preference was, and is, that the civil authorities in Kentucky would and could do this in that State; but, if they will not, or cannot, then we must, for it must be done. There must be an "end to strife," and the honest, industrious people of Kentucky, and the whole world, will be benefited and rejoiced at the conclusion, however arrived at.

I use no concealment in saying that I do not object to men or women having what they call "Southern feeling," if confined to love of country, and of peace, honor and security, and even a little family pride, but these become "crimes" when enlarged to mean love of murder, of war, desolation, famine, and all the horrid attendants of anarchy.

I am, with respect, your friend,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General.

Doc. 104.

ATTACK ON WHITE RIVER STATION.

UNITED STATES STEAMER LEXINGTON,
OFF WHITE RIVER STATION, JUNE 22, 1864. }

SIR: I have the honor to report that an attack was made on this place at half-past four o'clock A. M., by the Tenth Mississippi (rebel) regiment, under command of Colonel Louther.

The garrison had just completed the stockade on which they were engaged when you left, and

in it they fought bravely, though their pickets had been surprised, and the rebels were close upon them before they were discovered.

The Lexington had steam up and moved immediately out into the stream, and opened on them a rapid fire. The enemy was quickly repulsed and retired to the woods.

We have no casualties, and of the garrison one was killed and four wounded. One negro was killed, and two families of refugees carried off. Two dead and three wounded rebels fell into our hands, but most of their killed and wounded were dragged off the field.

The wounded federals and rebels are being cared for in this ship.

Had there been another armed vessel here I could have cut off their retreat and captured the whole command, but I did not deem it prudent to leave this point with the Lexington.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

HENRY BOOBY,

Acting Ensign, Commanding.

Lieutenant-Commander S. L. PHELPS,
Commanding 6th District Mississippi Squadron.

Doc. 105.

CUSHING'S RECONNOISSANCE.

BEAUFORT, N. C., June 29, 1864.

One of the most daring reconnoissances made during the war has just been successfully achieved by Captain Cushing, of the gunboat Monticello. On the night of the twenty-fourth instant the captain took a first cutter, with fifteen men and two officers (Acting Ensign Jones and Acting Master's Mate Howard), and succeeded in passing the forts of the west bar at Wilmington, and started up the Cape Fear river. After a narrow escape of being run over by one of the rebel steamers plying the river, he passed the second line of batteries and continued his course until Old Brunswick was reached, where the rebels have a heavy battery, when he was halted and fired upon, but succeeded in passing unscathed, by feigning to pass down the river and crossing to the friendly cover of the opposite bank. He then continued his course up the river. By this artifice the rebels were deceived, and signalized to the forts to intercept him as he came down the river, which they supposed was the direction taken.

At half-past two the next morning the captain had reached a point seven miles distant from Wilmington, where he caused the boat to be hauled on the banks and concealed from view by bushes and marsh grass. Day had now dawned, and it became necessary to select a place of concealment, which was found in the brush on the banks.

Soon after daylight the rebel steamers, blockade-runners and transports, could be seen by the party plying up and down the river, and, in fact, the flagship of the rebel Commodore Lynch passed by, pennant flying, the distinguished gentleman entirely unconscious of the fact that

a rifle in a steady hand, could, and would, but for obvious reasons, have given him his quietus. Two blockade steamers of the first-class passed up and one down during the first twenty-four hours. When night had fairly set in, the captain prepared to launch his boat, when two boats rounded the point, and, he supposed, having discovered his position, they designed to attack him; but it proved to be a returned fishing party. The entire party were captured—eight in number. Compelling them to act in the capacity of guides, he proceeded to examine all the fortifications, river obstructions and other objects of interest within three miles of Wilmington. Here he was compelled to pass through a creek running through a cypress swamp, for several hours, through grass eight feet high and immense cypress trees on each side, whose shadows cast a dark gloom, only exceeded by darkness.

By two o'clock that morning a road was reached, which proved to be a branch to the main road to Wilmington, and joining it at a point two miles distant. The party was here divided, ten being left to hold this road; and the captain, taking the remaining eight men, took position at the junction of the roads, one of which was the main. Several prisoners were here captured, but none of importance. At about eleven o'clock A. M., the rebel courier, with the mails from Fort Fisher and lower batteries, en route to Wilmington, whose approach was awaited, came duly along, and he, with his entire mail, was captured.

On examination this proved to be a prize of value, there being upward of two hundred documents, private and official, and many of great importance. The party, having thus far labored successfully, experienced the necessity for refreshment for the inner man, and accordingly Master's Mate Howard garbed himself in the courier's clothes, and, mounting the same worthy's horse, proceeded two miles to a store and purchased a supply of provisions with which he safely returned. The prices the mate thought exorbitant, but did not feel disposed, in his liberal mood, to haggle or beat down.

Shortly after more prisoners were captured, and all that was now required to add to the *clat* of the achievement was to capture the courier and mail from Wilmington, whose advent was looked for at five P. M. The impatience of the party may be imagined when it is stated that the mail would contain the day's papers issued at Wilmington at one P. M., and our nomadic friends were anxious to obtain the latest news early.

The courier arrived slightly in advance of time, but one of the sailors having moved incautiously across the road, was seen by him, and taking alarm, he took to his heels at full speed. Captain Cushing, like Paul Duval, No. 2, awaited him on the road, with pistol cocked, put spurs to his horse and pursued for about three miles. But the courier speeded on like a

whirlwind, and the captain being rather further from his base than he thought prudent, took to his line of retreat, and fell back in rapid but good order.

The telegraph wire leading to Wilmington was then cut for several hundred yards, and the party, with prisoners and spoils, rejoined the squad left with the boat, and, proceeding down the creek, reached the river about dark. The prisoners impeding the speed of the boats, measures were taken to dispose of them by depriving one of the fishing-boats of oars and sails and setting it adrift in the middle of the river, thus rendering it impossible for them to give the alarm until the tide floated them on some friendly bank. But while putting this plan into execution a steamer approached rapidly, and detection was only avoided by the party leaping into the water and holding on to the gunwales of the boat. The steamer passing, the prisoners and boat were sent adrift.

Nothing of interest occurred on the route down the river until a point between the batteries at Brunswick and Fort Fisher, when a boat was discovered making rapidly toward the shore. After an exciting chase she was overtaken, and her occupants, consisting of six persons, four of whom were soldiers, were taken on board, and the boat cut adrift. From them information was obtained that the rebels were on the *qui vive*, having boats posted at the narrow entrance between the forts to intercept the return. To understand the position of the party, it should be known that they were then but three hundred yards distant from two forts, and this on a moonlight night. Captain Cushing, on learning the rebels' designs, resolved to take a desperate chance of fighting his way through, supposing that, in case there were but one or two boats he might, by giving a broadside, escape in the confusion. On arriving at the mouth of the harbor he perceived, as he imagined, one large boat, which, wonderfully prolific, soon gave birth to three more, which were afterwards increased in number by five from the opposite bank. This completely blocked up the narrow entrance to the harbor. The helm was put hard aport to gain distance, and, seeing a large sail-boat filled with troops (seventy-five musketeers), at once decided that the only hope lay in outmanœuvring them. The rebels, providentially, did not during this interval fire a shot, no doubt anticipating the certain capture of all. There being another means of entrance into the harbor (the west bar), the only possible hope was in impressing the rebels with the opinion that he would attempt that, the only remaining chance of escape. Accordingly, apparently making for this point, the rebel boats were drawn together in pursuit, when, rapidly changing his direction, the captain brought his boat back to the other entrance (the east bar), and, deeply loaded as she was (twenty-six in the boat), forced her into the breakers. The rebels, evidently foiled, dared not venture to

follow, and the guns of the batteries, which were pointed to rake the channel, were unprepared to inflict damage.

Captain Cushing has arrived safely, with his eight prisoners and mail, and can congratulate himself in having performed one of the most hazardous and daring feats of the war. His escape from this position of jeopardy is regarded by the navy officers as little short of miraculous, and the rebel prisoners have not yet recovered their amazement at the boldness of the feat.

Doc. 106.

DISCIPLINE OF SOUTHERN CAVALRY.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, }
VALLEY DISTRICT, June 23, 1864. }

General Order, No. 1.

The following directions for the march of this command will hereafter be strictly observed:

Before the march begins on each morning, the rolls of each company will be called after mounting, and the Adjutant of each regiment will keep a list of the names of all deserters.

Before dismounting at camp in the evening, the rolls will again be called, and the brigade commanders will report to these headquarters the number of men absent at each roll-call.

The habitual order of march will be in column of "fours," but on narrow roads by "twos." The distance between the head of one brigade and the rear of the other will be two hundred yards.

When artillery and ambulances accompany the brigade, those assigned to each brigade will follow immediately in rear of their brigades.

During the march the brigades in rear will regulate their movements by those in front.

Regular halts will be made during the march, and neither officers nor men will leave the column except at such halts, unless by the written consent of the brigade commander, and such permission will not be granted unless for important reasons.

Brigade, regimental, and company commanders will pass frequently from front to rear of their respective commands, to see that the column is at all times well closed up.

Brigades will alternate in the march daily. A rear-guard will be placed behind each brigade, and no person except staff officers or couriers will be permitted to fall behind such guard.

All the wagons of this division will march together, under the direction of the division quartermaster.

The quartermasters of the command will constantly accompany their respective trains. One man, dismounted, when practicable, will go with each wagon to assist the driver. He will remain with the wagon. No other parties will be permitted with the train, except when a guard shall be necessary. The quartermasters will be held responsible that no others accompany the wagons. No other wagons or convey-

ances than those allowed from army headquarters will be allowed.

Upon reaching camp, officers and men must remain in their camps, and commanders will establish proper camp guards.

Immediately upon fixing the headquarters of the brigade, the commanders will report their locality to division headquarters.

The utmost order and perfect quiet will be preserved upon the march and in camp. The silly practice of whooping and hallooing is strictly forbidden.

Destruction of the fences and crops of the farmers is positively prohibited, and such outrages will be paid for from the pay of the officers of the command nearest where such depredations may be committed.

Greatest care must be taken of ammunition. Not a cartridge must be fired unnecessarily. An important campaign is commenced, and upon its results depends more than we can estimate.

The Major-General commanding asks and expects from every man of his command a hearty and cheerful compliance with orders, assuring all that they shall reap and enjoy the full fruits of whatever their labors and privations may obtain.

By command of Major-General Ransom:

WALTER K. MARTIN, A. A. G.

Brigadier-General NED McCausland,
Commanding Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION, }
June 24, 1864. }

General Order, No. 2.

The following act of Congress, approved June first, 1864, is published for the information of this command:

"The Congress of the Confederate States of America do enact that the commanding General of any army in the field shall have the power to direct the dismounting of any non-commissioned officer or officers, soldier or soldiers, in the cavalry service in his command, and to place him or them in the infantry, who shall misbehave before the enemy, or shall be guilty of wasting, spoliating, or appropriating to his use any private property, or doing any violence to any citizen.

"Sec. 2. That the horses belonging to persons so dismounted, and which they may have in the service, may be taken for the use of the army, and the appraised value thereof shall be paid to the owner."

This will be read at least three times at the head of each company in the command.

By command of Major-General Ransom:

WALTER K. MARTIN, A. A. G.

Doc. 107.

ATTACK UPON FORT FISHER.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, UNITED STATES FLAG-SHIP }
MALVERN, OFF WILMINGTON, December 24, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to inform you that I attacked the forts at the mouth of the Cape Fear

river this morning at half-past twelve o'clock, and, after getting the ships in position, silenced it in about an hour and a half, there being no troops here to take possession. I am merely firing at it now to keep up practice. The forts are nearly demolished, and as soon as troops come we can take possession; we have set them on fire; blown some of them up, and all that is wanted now is troops to land to go into them.

I suppose General Butler will be here in the morning. We have had very heavy gales here, which tugs, monitors, and all, rode out at their anchors. The transports have gone into Beaufort, North Carolina.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER.*

FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, OFF NEW INLET, NORTH CAROLINA, }
December 28, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to forward with this a somewhat detailed report of the two engagements with Fort Fisher and the surrounding works.

We attacked with the whole fleet on the twenty-fourth instant, and silenced every gun in a very short time.

On the twenty-fifth instant we again took up our position, within a mile of the fort (the iron vessels within twelve hundred (1,200) yards), without a shot being fired at us; shelled it all day, with now and then a shot from the rebels, and stopped firing after sunset.

The army landed and reëmbarked, considering it impracticable to assault the place.

I shall remain and keep shelling the enemy's works on every occasion, whenever the weather will permit.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, }
AT SEA, OFF NEW INLET, N. C., December 28, 1864. }

SIR—I was in hopes I should have been able to present to the nation Fort Fisher and surrounding works as a Christmas offering, but I am sorry to say it has not been taken yet.

I attacked it on the twenty-fourth instant with the Ironsides, Canonicus, Mahopac, Monadnock, Minnesota, Colorado, Mohican, Tuscarora, Wabash, Susquehanna, Brooklyn, Powhatan, Juniata, Seneca, Shenandoah, Pawtuxet, Ticonderoga, Mackinaw, Maumee, Yantic, Kansas, Iosco, Quaker City, Monticello, Rhode Island, Sassacus, Chippewa, Osceola, Tacony, Pontosuc, Santiago de Cuba, Fort Jackson, and Van-

* See Document 76, page 490, ante.

derbilt, having a reserve of small vessels, consisting of the Aries, Howquah, Wilderness, Cherokee, A. D. Vance, Anemone, Æolus, Gettysburg, Alabama, Keystone State, Baushee, Emma, Lillian, Tristram Shandy, Britannia, Governor Buckingham, and Nansemond.

Previous to making the attack, a torpedo on a large scale, with an amount of powder on board, supposed to be sufficient to explode the powder magazines of the fort, was prepared with great care, and placed under the command of Commander A. C. Rhind, who had associated with him on this perilous service Lieutenant S. W. Preston, Second Assistant Engineer A. T. E. Mullan, of the United States steamer Agawam, and Acting Master's Mate Paul Boyden, and seven men. So much had been said and written about the terrible effects of gunpowder in an explosion that happened lately in England, that great results were expected from this novel mode of making war. Everything that ingenuity could devise was adopted to make the experiment a success.

The vessel was brought around from Norfolk with great care and without accident, in tow of the United States steamer Sassacus, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, who directed his whole attention to the matter in hand, and though he experienced some bad weather and lost one of his rudders, he took her safely into Beaufort, where he filled her up with powder, and perfected all the machinery for blowing her up. General Butler had arrived at the rendezvous before us, and I hastened matters all that I could, so that no unnecessary delay might be laid to my charge.

On the eighteenth instant I sailed from Beaufort with all the monitors, New Ironsides, and small vessels, including the Louisiana, disguised as a blockade-runner, for the rendezvous, twenty miles east of New Inlet, North Carolina, and found all the larger vessels and transports assembled there, the wind blowing light from the north-east. On the twentieth a heavy gale set in from the south-west, and not being able to make a port without scattering all the vessels, I determined to ride it out, which I did, without any accident of any kind, except the loss of a few anchors, the monitors and all behaving beautifully.

Only two vessels went to sea to avoid the gale, and fared no better than those at anchor. The transports, being short of water, put into Beaufort, North Carolina, and were not suitable for riding out at anchor such heavy weather.

After the south-wester the wind chopped around to the westward and gave us a beautiful spell of weather, which I could not afford to lose, and the transports with the troops not making their appearance, I determined to take advantage of it and attack Fort Fisher and its outworks.

On the twenty-third I directed Commander Rhind to proceed and explode the vessel right under the walls of Fort Fisher, Mr. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, having gone in at night and

ascertained that we could place a vessel of seven feet draught right on the edge of the beach; Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, commanding Gettysburg, volunteered to go in the Wilderness, Acting Master Henry Arey in command, and tow the Louisiana into position, having assisted in the gale in taking care of the Louisiana after she and the Nansemond (the vessel having her in tow) had lost all their anchors.

At half-past ten p. m. the powder-vessel started in toward the bar, and was towed by the Wilderness until the embrasures of Fort Fisher were plainly in sight. The Wilderness then cast off, and the Louisiana proceeded under steam until within two hundred yards from the beach and about four hundred from the fort.

Commander Rhind anchored her securely there, and coolly went to work to make all his arrangements to blow her up. This he was enabled to do owing to a blockade-runner going in right ahead of him, the forts making the blockade-runner signals, which they also did to the Louisiana.

The gallant party, after coolly making all their arrangements for the explosion, left the vessel, the last thing they did being to set her on fire under the cabin. Then taking to their boats, they made their escape off to the Wilderness, lying close by. The Wilderness then put off shore with good speed, to avoid any ill effects that might happen from the explosion. At forty-five minutes past one of the morning of the twenty-fourth the explosion took place, and the shock was nothing like so severe as was expected. It shook the vessel some, and broke one or two glasses, but nothing more.

At daylight on the twenty-fourth the fleet got under way and stood in, in line of battle. At half-past eleven a. m. the signal was made to engage the forts, the Ironsides leading, and the Monadnock, Canonicus, and Mahopac following. The Ironsides took her position in the most beautiful and seamanlike manner, got her spring out, and opened deliberate fire on the fort, which was firing at her with all its guns, which did not seem numerous in the north-east face, though we counted what appeared to be seventeen guns; but four or five of these were fired from that direction, and they were silenced almost as soon as the Ironsides opened her terrific battery.

The Minnesota then took her position in handsome style, and her guns, after getting the range, were fired with rapidity, while the Mohican, Colorado, and the large vessels marked on the plan, got to their stations, all firing to cover themselves while anchoring. By the time the last of the large vessels anchored and got their batteries into play, but one or two guns of the enemy were fired, this *feu d'enfer* driving them all to their bomb-proofs.

The small gunboats Kansas, Unadilla, Pequot, Seneca, Pontoosuc, Yantic, and Huron took positions to the northward and eastward of the monitors, and enfilading the works.

The Shenandoah, Ticonderoga, Mackinaw,

Tacony, and Vanderbilt took effective positions as marked on the chart, and added their fire to that already begun.

The Santiago de Cuba, Fort Jackson, Osceola, Chippewa, Sassacus, Rhode Island, Monticello, Quaker City, and Iosco dropped into position according to order, and the battle became general. In one hour and fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired not a shot came from the fort. Two magazines had been blown up by our shells, and the fort set on fire in several places; and such a torrent of missiles were falling into and bursting over it that it was impossible for anything human to stand it. Finding that the batteries were silenced completely, I directed the ships to keep up a moderate fire in the hopes of attracting the attention of the transports and bringing them in. At sunset General Butler came in, in his flag-ship, with a few transports (the rest not having arrived from Beaufort).

Being too late to do anything more, I signalled the fleet to retire for the night for a safe anchorage, which they did without being molested by the enemy.

There were some mistakes made this day when the vessels went in to take position. My plan of battle being based on accurate calculation, and made from information to be relied on, was placed in the hands of each commander, and it seemed impossible to go astray if it was strictly followed.

I required those vessels that had not followed it closely to get under way and assume their proper positions, which was done promptly and without confusion. The vessels were placed somewhat nearer to the works, and were able to throw in their shell, which were before falling into the waters.

One or two leading vessels having made the mistake of anchoring too far off, caused those coming after them to commit a like error; but when they all got into place, and commenced work in earnest, the shower of shells (one hundred and fifteen per minute) was irresistible. So quickly were the enemy's guns silenced that not an officer or man was injured. I regret, however, to have to report some severe casualties by the bursting of a one-hundred-pound Parrott cannon.

One burst on board the Ticonderoga, killing six of the crew, and wounding seven others. Another burst on board the Yantic, killing one officer and two men. Another on the Juniata, killing two officers, and wounding and killing ten others. Another on the Mackinaw, killing one officer, and wounding five others (men). Another on the Quaker City, wounding, I believe, two or three.

The bursting of the guns (six in all) much disconcerted the crews of the vessels when the accident happened, and gave one and all a great distrust of the Parrott one-hundred-pounders, and (as subsequent events proved) they were unfit for service, and calculated to kill more of our men than those of the enemy.

Some of the vessels were struck once or twice. The Mackinaw had her boiler perforated with a shell, and ten or twelve persons were badly scalded.

The Osceola was struck with a shell near her magazine, and was at one time in a sinking condition; but her efficient commander stopped up the leak, while the Mackinaw fought out the battle, notwithstanding the damage she received. The Yantic was the only vessel that left the line to report damages.

Commander John Guest, at the east end of the line, showed his usual intelligence in selecting his position and directing his fire. Twice his guns cut down the flagstaff on the Mound battery, and he silenced the guns there in a very short time, the Keystone State and Quaker City cooperating effectively.

Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, with both rudders disabled, got his vessel, the Sassacus, into close action, and assisted materially in silencing the works; and the Santiago de Cuba and Fort Jackson took such positions as they could get (owing to other vessels not forming proper lines and throwing them out of place), and fought their guns well. The taking of a new position while under fire, by the Brooklyn and Colorado, was a beautiful sight, and when they got into place both ships delivered a fire that nothing could withstand.

The Brooklyn well sustained her proud name under her present commander, Captain James Alden; and the Colorado gave evidence that her commander, Commodore H. K. Thatcher, fully understood the duties of his position. The Susquehanna was most effective in her fire, and was fortunate enough to obtain the right position, though much bothered by a vessel near her that had not found her right place.

The Mohican went into battle gallantly, and fired rapidly, and with effect; and when the Powhatan, Ticonderoga, and Shenandoah got into their positions they did good service. The Pawtuxet fell handsomely into line, and did good service with the rest, and the Vanderbilt took position near the Minnesota, and threw in a splendid fire. The firing of the monitors was excellent, and when their shells struck, great damage was done, and the little gunboats that covered them kept up a fire sufficient to disconcert the enemy's aim.

The rebels fired no more after the vessels all opened on them, except a few shots from the Mound and upper batteries, which the Iosco and consorts soon silenced.

Our men were at work at the guns five hours, and glad to get a little rest. They came out of action with rather a contempt for rebel batteries, and anxious to renew the battle in the morning.

On the twenty-fifth (Christmas) all the transports had arrived, and General Butler sent General Weitzel to see me, and arrange the programme for the day. It was decided that we should attack the forts again, while the army

landed and assaulted them, if possible, under our heavy fire.

I sent seventeen gunboats, under command of Captain O. S. Glisson, to cover the troops and assist with their boats in landing the soldiers. Finding the smaller vessels kept too far from the beach, which was quite bold, I sent in the Brooklyn to set them an example, which that vessel did, relying, as every commander should, on the information I gave him in relation to the soundings. To this number were added all the small vessels that were covering the coast along; and finally I sent some eight or nine vessels that were acting under Commander Guest in endeavoring to find a way across the bar. This gave a hundred small boats to land the troops with. Besides those, the army was already provided with about twenty more.

At seven a. m. on the twenty-fifth I made signal to get under way and form in line of battle, which was quickly done. The order to attack was given, and the Ironsides took position in her usual handsome style, the monitors following close after her. All the vessels followed according to order, and took position without a shot being fired at them, excepting a few shots fired at the four last vessels that got into line.

The firing this day was slow, only sufficient to amuse the enemy while the army landed, which they were doing five miles to the eastward of the fleet.

I suppose about three thousand men had landed when I was notified they were re-embarking.

I could see our soldiers near the forts reconnoitring and sharpshooting, and was in hopes an assault was deemed practicable.

General Weitzel in person was making observations about six hundred yards off, and the troops were in and around the works. One gallant officer, whose name I do not know, went on the parapet and brought away the rebel flag we had knocked down. A soldier went into the works and led out a horse, killing the orderly mounted on him, and taking his despatches from the body. Another soldier fired his musket into the bomb-proof among the rebels, and eight or ten others who had ventured near the forts were wounded by our shells.

As the ammunition gave out the vessels retired from action, and the iron-clads and Minnesota, Colorado, and Susquehanna were ordered to open rapidly, which they did with such effect that it seemed to tear the works to pieces. We drew off at sunset, leaving the iron-clads to fire through the night, expecting the troops would attack in the morning, when we would commence again. I received word from General Weitzel informing me that it was impracticable to assault, and I herewith enclose a letter from General Butler assigning his reasons for withdrawing the troops. I also enclose my answer.

In the bombardment of the twenty-fifth the men were engaged firing slowly for seven

hours. The rebels kept a couple of guns on the upper batteries firing on the vessels, hitting some of them several times without doing much damage. The Wabash and Powhatan being within their range, the object seemed mainly to disable them, but a rapid fire soon closed them up. Everything was coolly and systematically done throughout the day, and I witnessed some beautiful practice.

The army commenced landing about two o'clock, Captain Glisson, in the Santiago de Cuba, having shelled Flag-pond battery to ensure a safe landing, and they commenced to re-embark about five o'clock, the weather coming on thick and rainy. About a brigade were left on the beach during the night, covered by the gunboats. As our troops landed, sixty-five rebel soldiers hoisted the white flag and delivered themselves up, and were taken prisoners by the seamen landing the troops, and conveyed to the Santiago de Cuba. Two hundred and eighteen more gave themselves up to the reconnoitring party, all being desirous to quit the war.

I don't pretend to put my opinion in opposition to that of General Weitzel, who is a thorough soldier and an able engineer, and whose business it is to know more of assaulting than I do, but I can't help thinking that it was worth while to make the attempt after coming so far.

About twelve o'clock I sent in a detachment of double-enders, under Commander John Guest, to see if I could effect an entrance through the channel. The great number of wrecks in and about the bar has changed the whole formation, and where the original channel was we found a shallow bar.

I sent Lieutenant W. B. Cushing in to sound and buoy out a channel, if he could find one, with orders to Commander Guest to drag for torpedoes and be ready to run in by the buoys when ordered. The examination was not at all satisfactory. A very narrow and crooked channel was partly made out and buoyed, but running so close to the upper forts that boats could not work there.

Lieutenant Cushing went in in his boat as far as Zeke's Island, but his researches would not justify my attempting the passage with six double-enders, some of which had burst their rifled Parrott guns and injured many of their men.

As it was getting late, and the troops were making slow progress in landing, I withdrew the vessels and boats that were searching for the channel, and sent them to help land the troops, otherwise we might have succeeded in buoying it out, though it was a difficult thing for the boats to work under the fire of the upper batteries.

One boat belonging to the Tacony was sunk by a shell, and a man had his leg cut off. Still they stuck to their work until ordered to withdraw for other duty. In conclusion, allow me to draw your attention to the conduct of Commander Rhind and Lieutenant Preston. They

engaged in the most perilous adventure that was, perhaps, ever undertaken, and though no material results have taken place from the effects of the explosion, that we know of, still it was not their fault.

As an incentive to others, I beg leave to commend them for promotion; also, that of Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, who piloted them in and brought them off. No one in the squadron considered that their lives would be saved, and Commander Rhind and Lieutenant Preston had made an arrangement to sacrifice themselves in case the vessel was boarded—a thing likely to happen.

I enclose herewith the report of Commander Rhind, with the names of the gallant fellows who volunteered for this desperate service. Allow me also to mention the name of Mr. Bradford, of the Coast Survey, who went in and sounded out the place where the Louisiana was to go in, and has always patiently performed every duty that he has been called on to carry out.

My thanks are due to Lieutenant Commander K. R. Breeze, fleet captain, for carrying about my orders to the fleet during the action, and for his general usefulness; to Lieutenant Commander H. A. Adams for his promptness in supplying the fleet with ammunition. Lieutenant M. W. Sanders, Signal Officer, whose whole time was occupied in making signals, performed his duty well; and my aids, Lieutenant S. W. Terry and Lieutenant S. W. Preston, afforded me valuable assistance.

I have not yet received a list of the casualties, but believe they were very few from the enemy's guns. We had killed and wounded about forty-five persons by the bursting of the Parrott guns.

I beg leave to suggest that no more be introduced into the service.

There is only one kind of firing (at close quarters) that is effective, and that is from nine, ten, and eleven-inch guns; they cannot be equalled.

Until further orders I shall go on and hammer away at the fort, hoping that in time the people in it will get tired and hand it over to us. It is a one-sided business altogether, and in the course of time we must dismount their guns, if, as General Weitzel says, we cannot "injure it as a defensive work." The government may also think it of sufficient importance to undertake more serious operations against these works.

An army of a few thousand men investing it would soon get into it, with the aid of the navy. When smooth water permits I will go to work looking for a channel over the bar, which has not yet been found to my satisfaction.

I must not omit to pay a tribute to the officers and crew of the monitors—riding out heavy gales on an open coast without murmuring or complaining of the want of comfort, which must have been very serious. They have shown a degree of fortitude and perseverance

seldom witnessed. Equally brave in battle, they take the closest work with pleasure, and the effect of their shells is terrific.

The following are the names of the commanders, and I hope I shall ever keep them under my command :

Commander E. G. Parrott, commanding Monadnock; Commander E. R. Calhoun, commanding Saugus; Lieutenant George E. Belknap, commanding Canonicus; Lieutenant Commander E. E. Potter, commanding Mahopac.

There are about one thousand men left on shore by the army, who have not been got off yet, on account of the surf on the beach. These will be got off in the morning, and the soldiers will then be sent home.

I enclose general order for the attack.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy.

LETTER OF MAJOR-GENERAL BUTLER.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT VIRGINIA AND
NORTH CAROLINA, December 25, 1864. }

ADMIRAL—Upon landing the troops and making a thorough reconnoissance of Fort Fisher, both General Weitzel and myself are fully of the opinion that the place could not be carried by assault, as it was left substantially uninjured as a defensive work by the navy fire. We found seventeen guns protected by traverses, two only of which were dismantled, bearing up the beach, and covering a strip of land, the only practicable route, not more than wide enough for a thousand men in line of battle.

Having captured Flag-pond Hill battery, the garrison of which, sixty-five men and two commissioned officers, were taken off by the navy, we also captured Half-moon battery and seven officers and two hundred and eighteen men of the Third North Carolina Junior Reserves, including its commander, from whom I learned that a portion of Hoke's division, consisting of Kirkland's and Haygood's brigades, had been sent from the lines before Richmond on Tuesday last, arriving at Wilmington Friday night.

General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort, while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four men of the picket line ventured upon the parapet and through the sallyport of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off, killing the orderly, who was the bearer of a despatch from the Chief of Artillery of General Whiting to bring a light battery within the fort, and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort.

This was done while the shells of the navy were falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the work, and it was evident, as soon as the fire of the navy ceased because of the darkness, that the fort was fully manned again and opened with grape and canister on our picket line.

Finding that nothing but the operations of a regular siege, which did not come within my instructions, would reduce the fort, and in view of the threatening aspect of the weather, wind rising from the south-east, rendering it impossible to make further landing through the surf, I caused the troops with their prisoners to re-embark, and see nothing further that can be done by the land forces. I shall, therefore, sail for Hampton Roads as soon as the transport fleet can be got in order.

My engineers and officers report Fort Fisher to me as substantially uninjured as a defensive work.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BENJ. F. BUTLER,
Major-General Commanding.

Rear-Admiral PORTER,
Commanding N. A. Blockading Squadron.

REPLY OF REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, }
Off New Inlet, December 25, 1864. }

GENERAL—I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, the substance of which was communicated to me by General Weitzel last night.

I have ordered the largest vessels to proceed off Beaufort and fill up with ammunition, to be ready for another attack, in case it is decided to proceed with this matter by making other arrangements.

We have not commenced firing rapidly yet, and could keep any rebels inside from showing their heads until an assaulting column was within twenty yards of the works.

I wish some more of your gallant fellows had followed the officer who took the flag from the parapet, and the brave fellow who brought the horse out from the fort. I think they would have found it an easier conquest than is supposed.

I do not, however, pretend to place my opinion in opposition to General Weitzel, whom I know to be an accomplished soldier and engineer, and whose opinion has great weight with me.

I will look out that the troops are all off in safety. We will have a west wind presently, and a smooth beach about three o'clock, when sufficient boats will be sent for them.

The prisoners now on board the Santiago de Cuba will be delivered to the provost marshal at Fortress Monroe, unless you wish to take them on board one of the transports, which would be inconvenient just now.

I remain, General, respectfully, your obedient servant,
DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral.

Major-General B. F. BUTLER,
Commanding, &c. &c. &c.

REPORT OF COM. H. K. THATCHER.

UNITED STATES STEAMER COLORADO, }
Off BEAUFORT, N. C., December 31, 1864. }

ADMIRAL—In compliance with your General Order No. 75, under date of thirtieth instant,

I have the honor to say that in the actions of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth instant, with Fort Fisher and its dependencies, these works were effectually silenced by the heavy and accurate fire of this fleet for hours at a time, the enemy only replying to our fire when an occasional cessation occurred on our part.

On the twenty-fourth an explosion took place, during a heavy fire from the fleet, within the main fort of the rebels, and immediately after which flames were observed streaming high above the walls, naturally leading to the conclusion that we had fired the barracks and other tenements connected with Fort Fisher. During the continuance of this blaze, which was for hours, not a gun was fired by the enemy (to the best of my recollection), except from the isolated work called the Mound fort.

On the twenty-fifth instant the range was shorter and the firing of the fleet more accurate than on the preceding day. It is my belief that not a shot or shell was fired by the advanced line of ships that did not either penetrate the earthworks of the enemy or explode within them. The crew of this ship were perfectly cool, and fired with deliberation and apparent severe effect upon the enemy, delivering on the first day fifteen hundred and sixty-nine (1,569) projectiles. Near the close of the second day's action we perceived the near approach of the advanced skirmishers of our army force, which had landed late in the day, when our fire ceased for nearly thirty (30) minutes, and was only resumed after we had been hulled several times by a vicious gun which appeared to be fired from the north-east angle of Fort Fisher. We then reopened heavily, but more to the left than we had previously fired, to avoid annoying our own troops, who were seen approaching the fort. The effect of this last heavy fire was apparently severe upon the casemated works to the southward and westward of Fort Fisher. At this time a succession of explosions was heard in the rear of these casemates, followed by the blaze of a large building, which continued to burn during the greater part of Christmas night.

My "impression with regard to the defensibility of the post (battered as it was) against a combined attack of the army and navy" is, that it could have been carried by assault on either of the evenings of the twenty-fourth or twenty-fifth instant.

I do not suppose that it was deemed possible entirely to demolish a casemated earthwork like Fort Fisher, but I am satisfied that everything was done that could be done on the part of the navy to render it untenable, the enemy having been again and again driven from their guns (some of which, it appears, were dismantled by our fire), and compelled to seek refuge in the sand-holes.

The shoalness of the water for a mile seaward of the forts constituted their only safety against total destruction, or, at least, the dismounting of every gun, such was the heavy and concentrated

fire of those two days' bombardment. This ship planted two hundred and thirty (230) shot in the rebel works on the twenty-fifth, and exploded nine hundred and ninety-six (996) shells within them on that day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. K. THATCHER,
Commodore, Commanding 1st Division, N. A. Squadron.
Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding N. A. Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.

REPORT OF COMMODORE SCHENCK.

UNITED STATES STEAMER POWHEATAN,
OFF BEAUFORT, N. C., January 1, 1865. }

ADMIRAL—Your General Order, No. 75 did not reach me until this morning, owing to its being sent on board the Colorado. In reply to that part of it requiring me to make a report of the part I took in the actions of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth ultimo, I have to state that at twenty minutes past one P. M. on the twenty-fourth, I took my position in the line, as directed by you, with a kedge upon my port quarter acting as a spring, letting go my port anchor with twenty-five (25) fathoms of chain, which brought my starboard broadside to bear upon the forts. I immediately opened a vigorous fire upon the batteries, paying especial attention to Fort Fisher with my eleven-inch gun, and to the Mound with my two (2) one-hundred-pounder Parrotts, and with my nine-inch guns to the batteries more immediately abreast of us. It is reported and believed on board this ship that one of the shells from our eleven-inch, which exploded in Fort Fisher, set fire to it. At 2:45 P. M., finding that some of my nine-inch shell fell short, and that the Brooklyn, being under way, occasionally interfered with my line of sight, I got under way, continuing the action, and stood into four and a half (4½) fathoms water, from which position every shot told with great effect. From this time the action was continued under way. At 3:10 P. M. the end of our spanker gaff was shot away, and our flag came down with it; hoisted it immediately at the mizzen. About the same time the rebel flag on Fort Fisher was shot away, and was not raised again during the action. At 3:45 P. M. the flag-staff on the Mound was shot away, which shot is claimed by our pivot rifle. At 5:20 P. M. the signal was made to discontinue the action. Hauled off, having sustained no loss of life or injury to the ship.

During this day's action we fired two hundred and thirty-six (236) nine-inch shell, fifty-four (54) eleven-inch shell, and eighty-two (82) one hundred-pounder rifle shell. Not a shell was wasted from the eleven-inch and rifles, and only a few in the early part of the action from the nine-inch guns. The starboard battery only was used in action, viz.: eight (8) nine-inch guns, two (2) one-hundred-pounder Parrott rifles, and one (1) eleven-inch pivot gun.

On the twenty-fifth I took my position as before, although nearer the batteries and further

in. The batteries between Fort Fisher and the Mound being abreast of us, my position was an admirable one for engaging these batteries, and my nine-inch guns were principally employed in doing this, as it was only by these we were annoyed, with an occasional shot from the Mound. During this day not a shot fell short, which accounts for my increased expenditure of nine-inch shell. At 2:10 P. M. we opened fire, which was replied to by the batteries abreast of us more vigorously than the day before. I am not aware of having received a single shot from Fort Fisher this day. At 3:30 P. M. a port main shroud was shot away; soon after we were struck three (3) times in pretty rapid succession. One (1) shot struck us under number three port, three (3) feet above the water-line, passing through into a store-room, and depositing itself in a mattress; it is a solid eight-inch shot. Two (2) shot struck under number two port, twenty (20) inches below the water line, one (1) remaining in the side and the other going through and lodging in a beam on the orlop deck, causing the ship to leak badly. A glancing shot struck the stern of the ship, but did no material injury, and some of our running rigging shot away. At 4:10 P. M., having expended all the ammunition for eleven-inch and rifles, and nearly all for my nine-inch guns, made signal, "Ammunition I am short of," which was replied to "Save some," and immediately after, "Discontinue the action," when I weighed my anchor, lifted my kedge, and hauled out of line.

During this day's action we fired four hundred and ninety-four (494) nine-inch shell, fifty-two (52) eleven-inch shell, and seventy-two (72) rifle shell.

In conclusion, I beg leave to state that every officer and man on board this ship, under my command, did his duty nobly, and I have yet to hear of any complaint, either of officer or man, except as to the failure to take advantage of our two (2) days' work. With regard to the "damage apparently done to the works," I must confess that I was paying more attention to the proper management of my own battery than the general effect; but it appears to me utterly impossible that any works could withstand such a fire and not be terribly damaged; and I am also fully impressed with the belief that by a prompt and vigorous assault late in the afternoon of either day, Fort Fisher might have been taken by a comparatively small force, say one thousand (1,000) resolute men. Fort Fisher was silenced; the Mound firing feebly; the only active firing from the enemy that I witnessed was from the two (2) or three (3) guns that annoyed me, and as long as my ammunition permitted me to fire rapidly I could keep them pretty quiet.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

JAMES FINDLAY SCHEMCK,
Commodore, Commanding U. S. Steamer Powhatan, 3d.
Division N. A. Squadron.
Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,
Commanding N. A. Squadron.

REPORT OF COMMODORE S. W. GODON.

UNITED STATES FREGATE SCOURSLAENA,
OFF FORT FISHER, N. C., December 28, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to make the following report on the movements of this ship during the engagement of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of December, with Fort Fisher and batteries:

At about meridian of the twenty-fourth instant, in obedience to general signal, I fell into line of battle, and in regular order drew into my station, as per plan of attack, opening fire from my starboard battery of eight (8) nine-inch guns, and two (2) one-hundred-and-fifty-pounders, at two o'clock. I did not, however, get fairly placed with anchors down until three o'clock, when I continued a smart fire until ordered out of action at 5:30 P. M. The firing from Fort Fisher was not sustained, and was often silenced for a considerable time. The distance, however, seemed too great, although the practice was good, and kept the fire of the enemy down.

On the twenty-fifth I did not get into position until twenty minutes past two P. M., when I tried my rifle range at about one thousand seven hundred yards, and anchored within half a ship's length on the starboard bow of the Colorado, as directed by verbal orders, and opened with the nine-inch guns most effectively, using but one division at a time. The enemy's fire, as on the day before, was feeble and not sustained, and was several times silenced for half an hour. Held my position until ordered to withdraw at fifty-five minutes past four, but afterward steamed up to Minnesota's stern and remained there, with a slight renewal of my fire, until ordered to retire from action and reserve ammunition, then growing short, for the assault.

Although fairly exposed, received but few hits, and no damage of the slightest consequence. The enemy's practice was bad on both days, owing, I presume, to the steady and well-directed fire of the large ships and iron-clads.

From my position on the wheel-house, overlooking my entire battery, I had every officer and man under my observation, and I have sincere pleasure in testifying to the fine bearing, zeal, and gallantry of the division officers, viz.: Lieutenant Bartlett and Acting Ensign Rhoades of the first division; Lieutenant Brown, commanding second division; Acting Ensign Laycock, commanding third division; Acting Master Porter, commanding fourth division, and First Lieutenant William Wallace, who, with his fine company of marines, handled most effectively two extra nine-inch guns. Lieutenant Commander Blake, my Executive Officer, is all I can desire in battle—cool and collected, calm and intelligent. He is my right-hand man.

I also beg to call special attention to Ensign Preble, the Master of this ship, who, whether under fire or any other circumstances, has proved himself without a superior in intelligence or ability on board the vessel.

My aid, Master's Mate Cooper, was prompt in

answering signals, and in his spare moments used the twelve-pounder howitzer on the hurricane-deck with effect.

Thanks to the officers of the powder division, Acting Ensign Burnham, Gunner Waugh, and Sailmaker Holbrook, the ammunition was promptly supplied throughout the engagement.

The engines, under the control of Chief-Engineer Johnson and his able assistants, were at all times ready for duty.

Boatswain Z. Whitmarsh and Carpenter J. E. Miller, stationed in the master's division, not only performed their own duties with intelligence, but gave valuable aid whenever they could.

The subordinate officers of the divisions, the captains of the guns and their spirited crews, have my thanks for their labors those two days.

In short, I have every reason to believe that in action this ship will always be found efficient wherever she may be placed.

If no more satisfactory results were obtained by the fleet from the operations of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth, we must look to the army for the cause. The navy seems to have sustained itself.

I forward herewith the report of injuries to the hull and rigging, as also Gunner's report of expenditure of ammunition.

The reports of the commanding officers in this division will be forwarded as soon as received.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. W. GODON,
Commodore, Commanding Susquehanna and Fourth Division North Atlantic Squadron.
Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

REPORT OF COM. WILLIAM RADFORD.

UNITED STATES STEAMER NEW IRONSIDES,
Anchored at sea, Beaufort bearing N. N. W.,
Distant about five miles, December 31, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to report that, in obedience to your orders, I took position under the guns of Fort Fisher, from thirteen to fifteen hundred yards distant, or as near as the depth of water would permit, the monitors Canonicus, Monadnock, and Mahopac following the new Ironsides in. As soon as I anchored I opened my starboard battery, and continued a well-directed fire for some five (5) hours. Night coming on, I hauled off, in obedience to orders. On the morning of the twenty-fifth the iron-clad division again led in under the guns of Fort Fisher and took the position we occupied the day previous. The Saugus, having arrived the night previous, took her station, and this division, in connection with the others, drove the men from the guns in the fort, they only firing one or two guns, and those at long intervals. All the monitors were handled and fought well. Lieutenant Commander Belknap took the in-shore berth, and is reported to have dismantled one or more guns in the fort.

Judging from the immense number of shells which struck the fort, it must have been con-

siderably injured. Several guns were reported to have been dismantled, two explosions took place, and three fires.

The face of the fort was very much ploughed up by the shells from the fleet. If the fort was uninjured (as a defensive work) no artillery known to modern warfare can do it. My impression is, that any considerable number of troops could have stormed and taken the fort immediately after the second day's bombardment, with but little loss.

All the officers and men belonging to the New Ironsides served their guns and country well; and I am greatly indebted to Lieutenant Commander Phythian, the Executive Officer, for his energy and ability in getting the crew and ship in such good fighting order.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM RADFORD.

Commodore, Commanding Iron-clad Division.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

Commanding N. A. Squadron, Flag-Ship Malvern.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM R. TAYLOR.

UNITED STATES SHIP JUNIATA,
OFF BEAUFORT, N. C., December 30, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your General Order, No. 75, and I rise from my sick-bed to give it an instant reply.

The part that this ship took in the actions of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth instant was as follows: On each day she took the position assigned to her in your plan of battle, and kept up a constant fire upon Fort Fisher from the moment of anchoring until ordered to withdraw. On the twenty-fourth, after having been engaged about an hour, she moved from her first anchorage, in company of several other ships, by your order, to a position nearer to the fort, thus rendering her fire more effective. During the two days she fired six hundred and eighty-one (681) shells, all but seventeen (17) of which were delivered by seven (7) guns. After obtaining the range, the firing appeared to me like target-practice.

The falling of the shells of the fleet was so incessant that the enemy was frequently unable to return our fire for long intervals. Several conflagrations occurred in the fort, and I saw one explosion. It was my impression that we had done much injury to the works, as it is impossible for me to conceive that such a weight of fire, so long continued, and falling so accurately, could have left them "substantially uninjured."

I was very much surprised and disappointed on learning that the troops had re-embarked. I saw no attack by them which looked like an earnest one, and, for a time, I entertained a hope that the fort had proved an easy capture, from the feebleness of the musketry firing, so long as we remained within sight and hearing of it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. ROGERS TAYLOR,

Captain United States Navy.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,

U. S. Navy, Com'dg N. A. Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN D. B. RIDGELY,

UNITED STATES STEAMER SHENANDOAH }
OFF BEAUFORT N. C., December 31, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to report the part taken by the Shenandoah in the bombardment of Fort Fisher and the batteries at New Inlet on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth instant.

The Shenandoah was signalled, when in line of battle, to come within hail of the Admiral, and was ordered by him to take a position near the Ironsides and open on the batteries of Fort Fisher. The position was immediately taken, and this ship commenced firing at Fort Fisher with two rifles and two eleven-inch guns, the shells falling inside of Fort Fisher, apparently with good effect.

At two p. m. a large fire broke out within the fort. At ten minutes past three the flag of the fort was shot away by the fleet. At 3:50 p. m. was ordered by the Admiral to go closer in. We steamed in and anchored, head and stern, close to the Ironsides and Monadnock. We fired from the new position with deliberation and good effect. At ten minutes past five p. m. signal was made to retire from action, when this ship withdrew.

The fire from Fort Fisher during the bombardment this day was very slack and feeble. A few shots fell near the monitors and a few went over us.

The conflagration in the fort seemed to be of considerable extent, and continued until after nightfall. The shells of the fleet were exploding on the parapet and inside of the fort so rapidly that it was difficult to make out what guns they were using. One shot carried away our stern ladder during the bombardment of this day.

On the morning of the twenty-fifth instant got under way with the fleet in line of battle. At two p. m. the Admiral signalled to the Shenandoah to await further orders. Twenty minutes afterward we were ordered to take position ahead of the Juniata. We anchored a ship's length ahead of the Juniata, and three ship's lengths outside of a wreck on the bar, and opened deliberate fire on a water battery, to the west of Fort Fisher, of four guns. We succeeded in silencing three of the guns, which were not used again during the engagement.

To the westward of this battery was another, of two guns, that seemed to be casemated. They fired very slowly, but in good line. The shells from one of them fell a few yards short of us, and the others just over us.

The firing from the guns on the Mound was very slow, and with so much elevation that they went over the fleet. We succeeded in exploding a one-hundred-and-fifty-pounder rifle-shell near the top of the Mound.

At thirty-five minutes past four p. m. was ordered to withdraw and stand outside of the Minnesota. At forty-five minutes past five p. m. a large fire broke out just in the rear of the batteries, which continued until after night. Be-

tween Fort Fisher and the Mound batteries we could discern two guns dismounted by the fire of the fleet. After the second day's bombardment I could see nothing more for the navy to do than to await the assault by the land forces, which did not take place as I expected.

It affords me much gratification to speak of the cool bearing of Lieutenant S. W. Nichols, the Executive Officer, and other officers, and the crew of this ship, during the two days' bombardment. I enclose a memorandum of the expenditure of ammunition on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth instant.

I am, very respectfully, &c.,

DANIEL B. RIDGELY,

Captain, United States Navy.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,

Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN JAMES ALDEN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER BROOKLYN, OFF BEAUFORT, N. C. }
December 30, 1864. }

SIR—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of General Order, No. 75, which not only calls upon commanding officers to give you a report of the part they took in the action of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth instant, but also their impressions as to the damage done to the enemy's works, the effect of our firing, and the defensibility of the fort after we had finished the bombardment.

On the first day, the twenty-fourth, this ship was in line of attack, and opened fire on Fort Fisher at ten minutes to one p. m., being then within good "ten-second" range. The fire was kept up, with occasional intermissions for the men to rest, till fifteen minutes past five (more than four hours), when darkness intervened, and the signal was made to retire. The enemy's fire, during the whole of that time, was much less than that of one of our large ships; an occasional shot was fired from Fort Fisher; a very feeble and desultory reply to our fire was kept up by the forts between the main work and the Mound battery, which latter was heard from but five or six times during the whole afternoon.

In a word, I am satisfied, from past experience, that if this ship, or any one of the larger ones, could have gotten near enough, say within two or three hundred yards, she would not only have silenced their batteries fully and entirely, but would have driven every rebel from the point.

On the second day, the twenty-fifth, this ship was sent to silence some of the enemy's earthworks, which were contiguous to the place fixed upon for the disembarking of the troops, to shell the woods, and to cover their landing. The first troops landed at about two p. m.: sent all our boats to assist. At four o'clock, just two hours after the landing commenced, the General commanding came alongside the ship and said, "It has become necessary to reembark the troops; will you send your boats to assist?" You can judge of my surprise at the turn affairs

had taken, for at that moment everything seemed propitious. The bombardment was at its height, little or no surf on the beach, and no serious indications of bad weather. Still, the order for retiring had gone forth, and our boats were employed till very late (the launch not returning till next morning), in reëmbarking the troops, the surf not interfering seriously with operations till near midnight, when it became impossible to land with any safety. Much dissatisfaction, I am told, was shown by the soldiers and their officers when they were informed that they were to reembark, and it was with some difficulty that they could be made to get into the boats. They were loud in their denunciations of the order turning them back, saying that they had gone there to take the fort, and they were going to do it before they left, &c., &c.

The next day, the twenty-sixth, the surf was too high for safe transit from the shore, and this vessel was employed in making a reconnoissance of the enemy's works. Nothing new, however, was discovered, and, after exchanging a few shots with Fort Fisher, we returned to the anchorage for the night. The following day all our boats were sent, and, after some difficulty, the remaining troops were safely embarked.

I have endeavored in the above to give you my ideas of the effect of our fire on the enemy's works, which was to almost silence them. In regard to the damage done, it is, under the circumstances, impossible for any one to tell without a closer inspection, for, as you remember at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, everything on the outside seemed *in statu quo*, hardly any trace of injury was apparent, but on entering and looking around, the terrible effect of the bombardment was manifest at every turn. So, too, at Fort Morgan, little or no injury could be discovered from without, but, upon close examination, it was found that almost every gun on its carriage was seriously damaged, if not entirely destroyed.

Now, as to the "defensibility" of the fort. The rebels, I am satisfied, considered, from the moment that our troops obtained a footing on the shore, the work (battered as it was), was untenable, and were merely waiting for some one to come and take it.

The General commanding furnishes us with proof of that fact, I think. In his letter to you, informing you of his determination to withdraw, a copy of which you sent me, he says that "three or four men ventured upon the parapet and through the sallyport of the work, capturing a horse, which they brought off; * * * and also brought away from the parapet the flag of the fort." This was all done in open day and without resistance, if, indeed, there was anybody there who was disposed to question their right to such trophies. From that and other current testimony, I am satisfied that if our troops had not been stopped in their triumphant march toward Fort Fisher, they would have

been in it before dark, and in quiet possession without firing a shot.

With great respect, I am your obedient servant,

JAMES ALDEN,
Captain.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

REPORT OF COM. J. C. HOWELL.

UNITED STATES STEAMER NEREUS,
BEAUFORT, N. C., January 3, 1865. }

ADMIRAL—This vessel having been ordered to support the ironclads during the attack on Fort Fisher, on the twenty-fifth day of December, I stood in to three fathoms water, and at 11:3 A. M. opened fire; at 12:40 P. M. was ordered to shell the woods; at 1:12 P. M. ordered to assist in landing troops; at 2:15 P. M. Flag-pond battery, at which this vessel and two or three small gunboats had been firing occasionally, surrendered to the navy. There was no gun in the battery. Some sixty-five or seventy prisoners were taken. At 9:45 one of the Nereus' boats returned, the officer stating that he had been employed embarking troops.

December twenty-sixth, heavy sea on. But one boat, and that in charge of Acting Master E. L. Haines, of this vessel, got off during the day. Engaged shelling woods during the day and night.

December twenty-seventh, boats and men employed in embarking troops; shelling woods. At about twelve M. General Curtis and two officers visited the ship. General Curtis desired to express his acknowledgments to Acting Master E. L. Haines and Ensign G. M. Smith, and the boats' crews of the Nereus, for courage and perseverance in getting off his command. He informed me that if he had not been ordered back, and had been supported by the troops on shore, he could, in his opinion, have carried Fort Fisher. From all the information I have been able to gain on the subject, I think he was correct in his views.

There was no exception to the excellent conduct of officers and men. I am indebted to Lieutenant H. E. Mullan for intelligent services.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

J. C. HOWELL,
Commander.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,
Commanding N. A. Squadron, Beaufort, N. C.

REPORT OF COM. DANIEL AMMEN.

UNITED STATES STEAMER MORICAN,
OFF BEAUFORT, N. C., December 31, 1864. }

ADMIRAL—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your General Order, No. 75, directing commanding officers to make their report in relation to our attack on Fort Fisher and the adjacent earthworks, and also a copy of a communication to you from Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, and in regard to some points touched upon you request an opinion.

At about half-past eleven A. M., of the twenty-

fourth the fleet got under way and stood in, in line of battle toward Fort Fisher, bearing about west south-west, and some six or seven miles distant. The Mohican was kept closely in position assigned, following the leading vessel, the frigate Minnesota, and followed by the frigate Colorado, and she successively by the other vessels forming the main line.

At about one P. M., the Minnesota sheered in out of line and took up her position at anchor, opening at once on Fort Fisher, some twenty-one hundred yards distant. As per plan of battle, the Mohican sheered in ahead of her, fired slowly on the fort to get a range and anchored, then opened briskly with the whole battery. The fort had opened on the Minnesota and on the Mohican previous to our anchoring. The Colorado sheered in ahead of us, letting go kedge astern, and then anchored and opened fiercely on the fort. The vessels forming the line then successively, with more or less success, took up their positions and opened.

The ironclads, led by the New Ironsides, had anchored a few minutes preceding the Minnesota, some five or six hundred yards to the northward and westward, and were slowly getting their range when we anchored, and the outer line of vessels moved into position after the main line had anchored and opened on the Mound and several detached casemated guns.

The fire from the fort became weak as the vessels anchored and opened fire. It was soon apparent that they could not work their barbette guns without great loss of life, and the guns' crews, no doubt, retreated under shelter, with a few exceptions, where high traverses and favorable angles gave them great protection.

Different casemated guns, particularly those mounted in detached mounds and toward the Mound, continued to fire slowly and evidently with not much effect, nor would the position of the guns served favor an effective fire. The whole body of Fort Fisher was filled with bursting shells, and only at long intervals, if at all, was a gun fired from the main work. In the meantime, owing to the wind and the set of the tide, I found that the use of the propeller and the helm would no longer enable me to bring the broadside to bear, and was obliged to weigh anchor and manoeuvre under steam, holding our position as nearly as possible, and avoiding interfering with the firing of the other vessels.

After exhausting all the filled nine-inch shells on board ready for use, the Mohican was withdrawn from the line at about ten minutes past four P. M., making signal to you of the cause, and we commenced filling shells without delay. After sunset the fleet withdrew, and the Mohican ran into line and anchored.

At about nine A. M. of the twenty-fifth, signal was made to get under way and form line of battle. The Mohican took her position, and the fleet stood in to the attack. When nearly under fire we were directed verbally from you "not to take position until further orders."

The Minnesota, the leading vessel of the main line; proceeded in and anchored, got under way, and after various attempts obtained a well-chosen position, the main line awaiting her movements. The ironclads having proceeded during this time, were in position, firing slowly and receiving a part of the fire of Fort Fisher. After the position of the Minnesota was satisfactory, I received orders from you about noon to take position close astern of the New Ironsides, which I did without delay, firing slowly until a good range was obtained; then opened briskly on the fort. I was enabled to see, through the absence of smoke, that our fire was very effective, delivered at a short ten-second range. One of the rebel guns was seen to be dismounted by our fire. Half an hour after we had anchored the Colorado passed ahead of the Minnesota and into position, anchoring and delivering a very effective fire. The whole line soon took position and opened very heavily and evidently with great effect, driving the rebels from their guns, with a few exceptions, as those in casemates and other places sheltered and distant. The position of the Mohican enabled me to see well, as I was first at anchor within half a ship's length of the New Ironsides, and finding that anchoring impeded an effective use of the battery, I weighed and in delivering fire drifted one or two hundred yards nearer the fort.

At five minutes past two P. M. the supply of ten-second fuses and the rifle ammunition was exhausted, and the Mohican was withdrawn from action for the purpose of obtaining more, speaking the Malvern for the purpose, and obtaining none. Not being directed to go under fire again, we remained spectators near the Minnesota until about four P. M., when I received orders to aid in debarking troops, and proceeded to execute, but instead of debarking, aided in bringing off the soldiers that had already reached the shore.

It has not been my lot to witness any operations comparable in force or in effect to the bombardment of Fort Fisher by the fleet, and I feel satisfied that any attempt to keep out of their bomb-proofs or to work their guns would have been attended with great loss of life to the rebels, and would have proven a fruitless attempt.

On the first day we delivered two hundred and seventeen (217) nine-inch shells, fifty-nine (59) one hundred-pound rifle, and eighty-nine (89) thirty-pound rifle shells. On the second day we delivered one hundred and three (103) nine-inch shells, twenty (20) one hundred-pound rifle, and twenty-five (25) thirty-pound rifle shells, making a total of five hundred and thirteen.

Our firing was effective as well as rapid, and I have to express my high appreciation of the ability and zeal of Lieutenant J. D. Marvin, the Executive Officer of this vessel, and of Acting Master William Burditt, whose long and varied professional experience proved useful; Acting

Boatswain Josiah B. Aiken, owing to a deficiency of officers, had charge of the one-hundred-pounder rifle and served it admirably. I have to express my satisfaction at the excellent behavior of the officers and crew, and do not doubt that when the occasion arrives when they should do so, they will stand to their guns as long as enough men remain to serve them.

In relation to the effect of the fire of the fleet on the fort, I beg leave to express my congratulations, as I did verbally on meeting you after the action. It did not require a visit to the fort to see that enormous traverses were nearly levelled, as at the south-east angle. The stockade or abatis must have been much shattered, and the debris from the parapets must have filled in the ditch greatly. I feel satisfied that everything was effected that can be by powerful batteries against a sand work, and that we could and can keep the enemy in their bomb-proofs pending an advance of troops to the foot of the parapet.

The official letter of General Butler referred to states that General Weitzel advanced his skirmish line within fifty yards of the fort, while the garrison was kept in their bomb-proofs by the fire of the navy, and so closely that three or four men of the picket line ventured upon the parapet and through the sallyport of the work, is, I think, entirely confirmatory as to the effectiveness of our fire. He adds, "this was done while the shells of the navy were falling about the heads of the daring men who entered the work," but appears to forget that at any given signal from an assaulting column this fire would cease, and the enemy be found not defending the parapet, but safely stowed away in bomb-proofs.

I do not know what more could be asked of naval guns than to afford a safe approach to the foot of the parapet, with no lines of the enemy drawn up to receive our forces; beyond that, I suppose everything would depend upon the relative forces of the combatants and the vigor of the assault, and although the work might not, in a military sense, be much injured, I would think the likelihood of carrying the work would be greatly increased by such disposition, without loss of life, of the respective forces.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DANIEL AMMEN,
Commander

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

REPORT OF COMMANDER A. C. RHIND.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, }
Off WILMINGTON, December 26, 1864. }

ADMIRAL—I have the honor to the following report of the special service assigned me in connection with your attack on the defences at New Inlet.

In obedience to your order of the twenty-third instant, the powder-boat was taken in the night as near to Fort Fisher as possible, the dis-

tance reached being estimated by all officers present at from two hundred and fifty to three hundred yards from the beach.

Owing to the night being perfectly clear, it became necessary to anchor her there to prevent discovery by the enemy and consequent frustration of the plan. Had the night been obscure, she could have reached a point about one hundred and fifty yards nearer.

The vessel, though having steam, was towed in and piloted by the Wilderness to a point within a short distance of her station, when the Wilderness hauled off and remained near to take off the party from the powder-boat. The arrangements and movements of the Wilderness were in charge of Lieutenant R. H. Lamson, of the Gettysburg, assisted by Mr. J. S. Bradford, of the coast survey, and Mr. Bowen, bar pilot—the local knowledge and judgment of these gentlemen being of the greatest service to me in perfecting all the arrangements and carrying out the plan successfully. The party on board the Wilderness, commanded by Acting Ensign H. Arey, shared with us whatever of risk or danger attended the enterprise.

Our arrangements being completed, we started in from the station vessel—the Kansas, Lieutenant Commanding Watmough—at about 10:30 p. m. At about 11:30 the Wilderness cast off the powder-boat and anchored, the latter steaming slowly ahead until she reached a point E. by N. $\frac{1}{2}$ N. from Fort Fisher and within three hundred yards of the beach. The wind was light off shore, and it was expected the powder-boat would tend to the tide if anchored. The anchor was accordingly let go, the fires hauled as well as possible, and the men put into the boat. Lieutenant Preston and I then proceeded to light the fuses and fires. The latter were arranged by Second Assistant Engineer Mullan.

When all was fairly done, we observed that the vessel would not tail in-shore, and therefore I let go another anchor with short scope. We then took to the boat and reached the Wilderness in safety at precisely midnight, slipped her anchor and steamed out at full speed, reaching in less than an hour a point about twelve miles distant from the powder-boat, where we hove to and run our steam down.

At precisely 1:40 a. m. the explosion took place, the shock being hardly felt, and four distinct reports heard. What result was occasioned near the vessel we can only estimate by the feeble fire of the forts next day. My opinion is that, owing to the want of confinement and insufficient fusing of the mass, much of the powder was blown away before ignition, and its effect lost.

The fuses were set by the clocks, to one hour and a half, but the explosion did not occur till twenty-two minutes after that time had elapsed, the after part of the vessel being then enveloped in flames.

The following officers and men manned the powder-boat:

Commander A. C. Rhind; Lieutenant S. W.

Preston; Second Assistant Engineer A. T. E. Mullan; Master's Mate Paul Boyden; Frank Lucas, coxswain; William Garvin, captain fore-castle; Charles J. Bibber, gunner's mate; John Neil, quarter gunner; Robert Montgomery; captain after-guard; James Roberts, seaman; Charles Hawkins, seaman; Dennis Conlon, seaman; James Sullivan, ordinary seaman; William Hinnegan, second-class fireman; Charles Rice, coal-heaver.

The crew were all volunteers from my own vessel, the Agawam.

The zeal, patience, and endurance of officers and men were unsurpassed, and I believe no officer could have been better supported. To Lieutenant Lamson, Mr Bradford, and the officers and men of the Wilderness, we are indebted for the means of escape; and from the first start from Norfolk, we have received every desired assistance. The vessel was towed to Wilmington bar by the *Sassacus*, Lieutenant Commander J. L. Davis, who gave us at all times a cordial support. The *Tacony*, Lieutenant Commander Truxtun, sent us a relief-crew after the gale. Both vessels furnished us a boat.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. C. RHIND,
Commander, U. S. N.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER W. G. TEMPLE.

UNITED STATES STEAMER *PONTOSUC*,
Off New Inlet, December 23, 1864 }

SIR—I have to submit the following report of the operations of this vessel in the attack upon the rebel works at the mouth of Cape Fear river, from December twenty-fourth to twenty-seventh, inclusively.

At eleven A. M. of the twenty-fourth, after some previous manœuvring, we got under way in company with the fleet, and stood in (with everything ready for action) in the wake of the four ironclads until Fort Fisher bore southwest by south, when we opened fire at 1:06 P. M. with the hundred-pounder Parrott rifles, at long range, and gradually closed in toward the position occupied by the sternmost monitor, from whence the nine-inch guns became effective, at a range of about one thousand five hundred yards. At 1:16 P. M. the enemy fired their first gun; the *Ironsides* having commenced the action at 12:50 P. M., which soon became general along the whole line, as the various ships came into position. After having carefully ascertained our range, the guns of this vessel were kept constantly and rapidly playing upon the enemy's works, until the fleet hauled off at about 5:50 P. M. Our firing, so far as it could be distinguished from that of other vessels, seemed to be accurate and effective, particular embrasures being selected for targets, and shells being seen to strike and explode at the points indicated. We fired during the action one hundred and twenty shells from the eleven-inch guns, and ninety two from the one-hundred-

pounder rifles. At 2:35 P. M. this vessel was struck just abaft the starboard paddle-box by an elongated (probably percussion) shell, from a six-and-half-inch rifled gun, which projectile passed through the side of the ship, wounding a hanging knee, and barely clearing the main condenser of the engine, through the iron bulkhead of the engine-room and the starboard steerage and mess lockers, through the berth-deck, cutting a beam entirely in two, and into the paymaster's storeroom, where it exploded close to the bulkhead of the shell-room, on striking the skin of the ship, and set the vessel on fire; the fire was soon extinguished, however; not much damage was done and nobody was hurt. Several other shot struck near enough to splash the water on deck, and others passed over us, but none other hit the vessel. The lower plates of both elevating screws (new pattern) to the hundred-pounders were torn loose from the rear transom, by the breaking of their bolts in the first four discharges; but they were lashed securely in place and performed very well during the rest of the action.

The gig, launch, and both cutters were badly shattered by the concussion of the nine-inch guns fired beneath them, although they were six feet above the muzzles; many of the hundred-pounder projectiles "wobbled," and some of them "tumbled" but a more liberal use of slush upon them seemed to correct this in a great measure.

We were employed during all that night and until ten A. M. the next day in filling and fusing additional shells, having nearly expended all that had been prepared. At 9:30 A. M. of the twenty-fifth, we got under way with the fleet, and proceeded, in company with the *Isaco* and several other gunboats, off the bar, where we opened a deliberate fire at 12:55 P. M. from the one hundred-pounder rifles, at long range, and continued the practice until 2:30 P. M., when we were ordered to haul off and send the boats in to remove torpedoes from the channel. We expended forty-six rifle shells during this day's engagement, many of which were plainly distinguished to fall within the enemy's works, and meantime the batteries on shore made some good practice at us, dropping their shots quite near, but not hitting the vessel. The boats returned at four P. M., and the gunboats steamed up the coast to where the troops had in the meanwhile been disembarked, and anchored for the night. At nine P. M. we were ordered to send all boats to the beach to assist in re-embarking the troops; but on starting they were found to leak so badly as to be unserviceable, and returned.

We were employed all the next day, the twenty-sixth, in repairing the boats, and just after sunset were sent in to within about six hundred yards of the beach (on the right of our troops, who, owing to the surf, had not succeeded in getting on board their vessels), for the purpose of supplying them with provisions, protecting them from the enemy, and boating them

off to their transports. On anchoring, we received two messages from the army authorities, stating that the enemy were massing large forces on the right and front of our troops, and that a momentary attack was expected. As we had taken up our position after dark, and had, therefore, been unable to get the bearing and distance of our own troops, we remained at the guns all night without firing, waiting for the attack to commence, that we might know where to aim; but no attack was made, and no sign of an enemy seen from this vessel. At daylight of the twenty-seventh, our three boats were despatched to the beach with provisions, and with the means prepared for sending them through the surf to the troops on shore; but the provisions were declined and returned, and the boats remained until noon taking the troops off to their vessels.

At one p. m., when the last man had been re-embarked, and the last transport was under way and standing out, we also got under way and anchored with the fleet in the offing, without having seen a single rebel soldier, although another message had been received at 10:30 a. m. that the enemy were massing for an attack.

The officers and men of this vessel behaved admirably throughout the whole four days, and performed their duties at the guns and elsewhere with most commendable coolness and precision, more particularly in view of the short time (only ten days), that they had been on board and under drill; but, where all behaved so well, it would be invidious to particularize any one.

Respectfully,

WM. G. TEMPLE,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Rear-Admiral DAVID D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Blockading Squadron.

REPORT OF LIEUT.-COM. T. C. HARRIS.

UNITED STATES STEAMSHIP YANTIC,
BEAUFORT, N. C., January 2, 1866. }

SIR—In obedience to General Order, No. 75, I have the honor to submit the following report of the part this vessel took in the attack on Fort Fisher, New Inlet, N. C., on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth December, 1864:

My position on the twenty-fourth was to the northward and eastward of Fort Fisher, distant about two thousand yards, and was doing good execution, when, at three p. m., the one-hundred-pounder rifle burst (having been fired, since the vessel has been in commission, but nineteen times), mortally wounding the officer commanding the division, the captain of the gun, and slightly wounding four of the crew. The vessel being badly shattered, not knowing the extent of the damage, and having lost what was designed to be the most effective gun, I hauled out of fire. Having obtained additional medical assistance from the Fort Jackson, I, at 4:30 p. m., again stood in and opened fire with my only remaining effective guns—the thirty-pounder rifle and nine-inch gun.

On the twenty-fifth I was assigned the duty of assisting to disembark the troops and cover the landing.

Owing to the accident just mentioned, and my non-participation in the attack of the twenty-fifth, I am prevented from giving any decided opinion as to the injury done to the fort as a defensive work. I cannot, however, refrain from giving my testimony as to the accurate and rapid fire of the fleet; no better confirmation could be required that the navy did their work well, than the fact that the enemy, protected as they were by formidable works, could only make a very feeble reply.

At two o'clock p. m., on the twenty-fifth, a portion of the troops were landed amid deafening and encouraging cheers from the men-of-war, and from the troops still on board the transports; cheers which were echoed by the fleet, by a fire that elicited but a feeble response from the fort. The landing of the troops was rapid when fairly commenced, and everything seemed to betoken that the army would soon have possession of the enemy's works; when, to the surprise and mortification of all, General Butler stopped the further disembarkation of the troops, and gave orders to re-embark those already on shore.

I congratulate you, sir, upon the brilliant share the navy took in the attack of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth; the work was well done. Had the army performed their part, the Federal flag would now be flying over the ramparts of Fort Fisher—a fitting Christmas present to be side and side with that of the glorious and gallant Sherman.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

T. C. HARRIS,
Lieutenant-Commander.

Rear-Admiral D. D. PORTER,
Commanding North Atlantic Squadron.

ADDITIONAL REPORT OF REAR-ADMIRAL PORTER.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN,
Off New Inlet, December 27, 1864. }

SIR—My despatch of yesterday will give you an account of our operations, but will scarcely give you an idea of my disappointment at the conduct of the army authorities in not attempting to take possession of the forts which had been so completely silenced by our guns; they were so blown up, burst up, and torn up, that the people inside had no intention of fighting any longer. Had the army made a show of surrounding it, it would have been ours; but nothing of the kind was done.

The men landed, reconnoitred, and hearing that the enemy were massing troops somewhere, the order was given to re-embark.

They went away as soon as the majority of the troops were on the transports, and it coming on to blow rather fresh, about seven hundred were left on shore. They have been there ever since, without food or water, having lauded with only twenty-four hours' rations. I

opened communication with them this morning, and supplied them with provisions.

To show that the rebels have no force here, these men have been on shore two days without being molested. I am now getting them off, and it has taken half the squadron (with the loss of many boats in the surf) to assist.

I can't conceive what the army expected when they came here; it certainly did not need seven thousand men to garrison Fort Fisher—it only requires one thousand to garrison all these forts, which are entirely under the guns of Fort Fisher; that taken, the river is open. Could I have found a channel to be relied on in time, I would have put the small vessels in, even if I had got a dozen of them sunk; but the channel we did find was only wide enough for one vessel at right angles, and we were not certain of the soundings. There never was a fort that invited soldiers to walk in and take possession more plainly than Fort Fisher; and an officer got on the parapet even, saw no one inside, and brought away the flag we had cut down.

A soldier goes inside, through the sallyport, meets in the fort, coming out of a bomb-proof, an orderly on horseback, shoots the orderly, searches his body, and brings away with him the horse and communication the orderly was bearing to send up field-pieces.

Another soldier goes in the fort and brings out a mule that was stowed away; and another soldier, who went inside while our shells were falling, shot his musket into a bomb-proof, where he saw some rebels assembled together; he was not molested. Ten soldiers, who went around the fort, were wounded by our shells. All the men wanted was the order to go in; but because every gun was not dismantled by our fire, it was thought that the fort "was not injured as a defensive work," and that it would be to lose men to attack it. It was considered rash to attack the works with wooden ships, and even the officers who have been on the bar a long time (and witnessed the building of the works), thought that half the ships would be destroyed; and it was said that the only hope we could have of silencing the batteries was in case the powder-vessel did the damage expected.

We silenced the guns in one hour's time, and had not one man killed (that I have heard of), except by the bursting of our own guns, in the entire fleet.

We have shown the weakness of this work. It can be taken at any moment, in one hour's time, if the right man is sent with the troops. They should be sent here to stay—to land with a month's provisions, intrenching tools, guns, and Cohorn mortars. Ten thousand men will hold the whole country. The rebels have been able to send here, all told, about four thousand men; seventy-five of them that were sent here to observe us gave themselves up to the navy. Two hundred and eighteen men, sent on the same duty, gave themselves up to our recon-

noitring party, and this would have been the case all the way through.

I know what they would do, and I shall send and ask him to let some of his troops come and locate themselves in Fort Fisher. If I can't do better, I will land the sailors, and try if we can't have full credit for what we do.

I trust, sir, you will not think of stopping at this, nor of relaxing your endeavors to obtain the right kind of troops for the business, the right number, and the proper means of taking the place, even if we fail in an assault. Every attack we make we will improve in firing, and if the weather would permit, I could level the works in a week's firing, strong as they are; but it is only one day in six that a vessel can anchor so close. We had a most beautiful time, and the weather for the attack was just what we wanted.

If General Hancock, with ten thousand men, was sent down here, we could walk into the fort.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

EFFECT OF THE EXPLOSION OF THE POWDER-BOAT.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON, U. S. FLAG-SHIP MALVERN, }
Off New Inlet, December 23, 1864. }

SIR—I am enabled, from information gained from prisoners, to tell you what effect the explosion had on the rebels in and about Fort Fisher. It was entirely unexpected, and the troops were mostly asleep at the time. It created a perfect panic, stunned and disabled the men, so that they refused to fight, notwithstanding all the efforts of their officers, and the severe bombardment that followed so completely demoralized them, that two hundred men could have gone into and taken possession of the works.

No injury was done to the forts that I can hear of, nor were any of the wooden huts, about half a mile off, thrown down; but on looking at the massive structures, built of sand-bags, it could scarcely be expected to move them by such a process; that can only be done by continual hammering with shot and shell.

As far as this squadron is concerned, the forts can be silenced at any moment, and taken possession of by a well-organized land force.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

DAVID D. PORTER,
Rear-Admiral

HON. GIDEON WELLES,
Secretary of the Navy, Washington, D. C.

CONFEDERATE REPORTS.

GENERAL WHITING'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS, WILMINGTON, December 21, 1864.

COLONEL—For the information of the General commanding, I forward the report of Colonel

Lamb, commanding Fort Fisher in the action of the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth:

On receiving the information at one p. m. on the twenty-fourth that the fleet was moving in to take position, I at once ordered a steamer, and reporting to the headquarters, proceeded to the point of attack, reaching Confederate Point just before the close of the first day's bombardment, which lasted four hours and a half. That of the second day commenced at twenty minutes past ten a. m., and continued, with no intermission or apparent slackening, with great fury, from over fifty ships till dark. During the day the enemy landed a large force, and at half-past four advanced a line of skirmishers on the left flank of the sand-curtain, the fleet at the same time making a concentrated and tremendous enfilading fire upon the curtain.

The garrison, however, at the proper moment, when the fire slackened to allow the approach of the enemy's land force, drove them off with grape and musketry; at dark the enemy withdrew. A heavy storm set in, and the garrison were much exposed, as they were under arms all night. At eight a. m., twenty-sixth, a reported advance in boats was opened on with grape and shell. The garrison remained steadily awaiting a renewal of the assault or bombardment until Tuesday morning, when they were relieved by the supports of Major-General Hoke and the embarkation of the enemy.

Colonel Lamb's report, herewith, gives all the details of the action. In an accompanying paper I will give you an account in detail of all matters which fell under my own observation during the action and the three succeeding days, which I beg you will cause to be forwarded for the information of the War Department.

As soon as other business will permit, a report in detail of the construction of the works, capacity of resistance, effect of fire, movements of the enemy, improvements suggested, will be made out and forwarded for the information of the engineer department.

In this it only remains for me to express my grateful sense of the gallantry, endurance, and skill of the garrison and its accomplished commander.

To the latter I have already paid a just tribute of praise, not for this action only, but for his whole course at Fort Fisher, of which this action and its result is but the fruit. His report of the gallantry of individuals I fully confirm from my own observation.

I wish to mention Captain Mann, Lieutenant Latham, Lieutenant Hunter, of the Thirty-sixth; Lieutenant Rankin of the first battalion; Captain Adams of the light artillery, as very active and efficient.

To Colonel Tansill of my staff we owe many thanks. To his skilful judgment and great experience the defence of the land front was committed at the critical moment of assault. Of Major Riley, with his battery of the Tenth Carolina, who served the guns of the land front

during the entire action, I have to say he has added another name to the long list of fields on which he has been conspicuous for indomitable pluck and consummate skill. Major Still, chief of my staff, and Major Strong, aid-de-camp, here, as always, actively aided me throughout. The gallant bearing and active labors of Major Saunders, Chief of Artillery to General Herbert, in very exposed positions, attracted my special attention.

I present my acknowledgments to Flag Officer Pinckney, Confederate States navy, who was present during the action, for the welcome and efficient aid sent to Colonel Lamb, the detachment under Lieutenant Roby, which manned the two Brook guns, and the company of marines, under Captain Van Benthuyesen, which reinforced the garrison. Lieutenant Chapmar, Confederate States navy, commanding battery Buchanan, by his skilful gunnery saved us on our right from a movement of the enemy, which, unless checked, might have resulted in a successful passage.

The navy detachment at the guns, under very trying circumstances, did good work.

No commendations of mine can be too much for the coolness, discipline and skill displayed by officers and men. Their names have not all been furnished to me, but Lieutenants Roby, Dorning, Armstrong, and Berrien attracted special attention throughout.

To Passed Midshipman Carey I wish to give personal thanks. Though wounded, he reported after the bursting of his gun, to repel the threatened assault, and actively assisted Colonel Tansill on the land front.

Above all, and before all, we shall be grateful, and I trust all are, for the favor of Almighty God, under and by which a signal deliverance has been achieved.

Very respectfully,

W. H. C. WHITING,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. ANDERSON,
A. A. and I. G., Headquarters Department of N. C.

P. S.—I wish it to be understood that in no sense did I assume the command of Colonel Lamb. I was a witness simply, confining my action to observation and advice, and to our communications, and it is as a witness that I report.

W. H. C. WHITING,
Major-General.

Doc. 108.

THE BATTLE OF MONOCACY, MD

MAJOR-GENERAL WALLACE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE DEPARTMENT,
EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, BALTIMORE, August —, 1864. }

Colonel E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL—I beg leave to furnish the War Department with the following report in full of the operations of my command in the vicinity

of Frederick City, Maryland, which resulted in the battle of Monocacy, fought ninth July last. The informal report telegraphed Major-General Halleck from Ellicott's Mills, during the retreat, is appended hereto, and will serve to make the record complete.

The situation in the department of West Virginia about the beginning of July was very uncertain. Major-General Hunter had retreated westwardly from Lynchburg, leaving open the Shenandoah Valley, up which a column of rebels of unknown strength had marched, and thrown General Sigel back from Martinsburg to Williamsport, thence down the left bank of the Potomac to Maryland Heights, where, with his command, he was supposed to be besieged. The strength of the invading column, by whom it was commanded, what its objects were, the means provided to repel it—everything, in fact, connected with it—were on my part purely conjectural. All that I was certain of was that my own department was seriously threatened.

July fifth, information was brought to my headquarters in Baltimore that a column of rebel cavalry—the same that had been raiding in the border counties of Pennsylvania—was in the Middletown Valley, moving eastwardly. Taking this report as true, the enemy had turned his back upon the department of Major-General Couch, and reduced his probable objectives to Washington, Baltimore, or Maryland Heights.

In this situation I felt it my duty to concentrate that portion of my scanty command available for field operations at some point on the Monocacy river, the western limit of the Middle Department. With an enemy north of the Potomac, and approaching from the west, having in view any or all the objectives mentioned, the importance of the position on which I ultimately gave battle, cannot be over-estimated. There, within the space of two miles, converge the pikes to Washington and Baltimore, and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad; there, also, is the iron bridge over the Monocacy, upon which depends railroad communication to Harper's Ferry. Moreover, as a defensive position for an army seeking to cover the cities above named against a force marching from the direction I was threatened, the point is very strong; the river covers its entire front: in a low stage of water, the fords are few, and particularly difficult for artillery; and the commanding heights are all on the eastern bank, while the ground on the opposite side is level and almost without obstructions. At all events, I was confident of ability to repel any ordinary column of cavalry that might be bold enough to attack me there; and if the position should be turned on the right, I was not necessarily disabled from defending Baltimore; in that contingency, I had only to take care of the railroad, and use it at the right time. Accordingly, I went out and joined General Tyler at the railroad bridge. The information received in Baltimore was confirmed; rebel cavalry had seized Middletown;

their scouting parties had even advanced to within three miles of Frederick City. By the evening of the sixth all my available troops were concentrated under General Tyler, making a force of scant twenty-five hundred men of all arms, and composed as follows: Third regiment (Md.) Potomac Home Brigade, Colonel Charles Gilpin; Eleventh (Md.) infantry, Colonel Landstreet; seven companies of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth, and three companies of the Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio National Guard, consolidated, temporarily, under Colonel A. L. Brown; Captain Alexander's (Md.) battery, and one hundred men of the Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio National Guard, serving as mounted infantry, and commanded by Captain E. H. Lieb, Fifth United States Cavalry, and Captain N. S. Allen. In addition, I had the service of Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin's squadron of cavalry, two hundred and fifty men, and four companies of the First regiment (Md.) Potomac Home Brigade, about two hundred strong, under Captain Brown. Of this force, it is proper to add, the Eleventh Maryland, and all the Ohio troops, were "hundred-days men."

On the night of the sixth Colonel Clendenin received my order to take the pike to Middletown, and follow it until he found the enemy, and ascertained the strength and composition of his column. Leaving Frederick City at daybreak next morning (the seventh) with his cavalry, and a section of Alexander's battery, he drove in a rebel outpost stationed in the mountain pass, and gained Middletown, where he was stopped by a body of cavalry largely superior to his own, commanded by General Bradley T. Johnson. After a smart skirmish, in which both sides used artillery, Clendenin was forced back by movements on his flanks. About ten o'clock he reported the rebels one thousand strong, pushing him slowly to Frederick City, which they would reach in two hours, unless I intended its defence. Though out of my department, it had become my duty to save the town, if possible, and as it was but three miles distant, I thought that could be done without jeopardizing the position at the railroad bridge. By direction, therefore, General Tyler sent Colonel Gilpin, with his regiment and another gun, to support Clendenin, and engage the enemy. The company of mounted infantry also went forward. In this movement the railroad was very useful.

Colonel Gilpin reached the town in good time, and deployed his command in skirmish order across the Hagerstown pike, half a mile west of the suburbs. Clendenin fell back and joined him. About four o'clock P. M. the enemy opened the fight with three pieces of artillery. The lines engaged shortly after. At six o'clock Captain Alexander, personally in charge of his pieces, dismounted one of Johnson's guns. A little before dark Gilpin charged, and drove the rebels, who, under cover of night, finally withdrew to the mountain.

You will find the locality of this action indi-

cated on the map herewith forwarded. The forces opposed, it is worthy remark, were about equal in number, yet Johnson had the advantage; his men were veterans, while Gilpin's, with the exception of Clendenin's squadron, had not before been under fire, a circumstance much enhancing the credit gained by them.

Relying upon intelligence received the evening the above affair took place, that a division of veterans of the Sixth corps was coming by rail to my reinforcement, about midnight General Tyler was sent to Frederick City with Colonel Brown's command, to prepare for what might occur in the morning. About daybreak a portion of the First brigade of the veterans arrived under Colonel Henry, which was also sent to Frederick.

The reports of the enemy continued conflicting as before; some stated that Johnson's cavalry, already whipped by Colonel Gilpin, were all the rebels north of the Potomac; others that McCausland, with a like column, was marching to join Johnson; others again represented Early and Breckinridge behind the Catoctin mountain, with thirty thousand men, moving upon Frederick City. In short, the most reliable intelligence was of a character that reduced the defence of that town to a secondary consideration; if the enemy's force was correctly reported, his designs were upon Washington or Baltimore.

In the hope of evolving something definite out of the confusion of news, I went in person to Frederick City, leaving my Inspector-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Catlin, at the railroad bridge to stop such of the veteran regiments as arrived there. The Eleventh Maryland remained with him. My purpose was to conduct a reconnaissance over the mountain, to brush aside, if possible, the curtain that seemed to overhang it.

In the midst of preparation for this movement, a telegram from Major-General Sigel reached me, stating that the enemy had that morning retired from before Maryland Heights, and was marching with his main body up the Middletown Valley toward Boonesboro. The question then was—were the rebels marching for Pennsylvania, or coming eastward by the Jefferson or Middletown pikes? I concluded to await events in Frederick City, satisfied they would not be long delayed.

As Johnson still held the mountain pass to Middletown, the day (eighth) was spent in trying to draw him into the valley, with such reinforcements as he might have received. A feigned retreat from the town was but partially successful; he came down, but under fire of Alexander's guns, galloped back again.

About six o'clock in the afternoon, Colonel Catlin telegraphed me that a heavy force of rebel infantry was moving toward Urbana by the Buckeystown road. This threatened my lines of retreat and the position at Monocacy bridge; what was more serious, it seemed to disclose a purpose to obtain the pike to Wash-

ington, important to the enemy for several causes, but especially so if his designs embraced that city, then in no condition, as I understood it, to resist an army like that attributed to Early by General Sigel. I claim no credit for understanding my duty in such a situation; it was self-apparent. There was no force that could be thrown in time between the capital and the rebels but mine, which was probably too small to defeat them, but certainly strong enough to gain time, and compel them to expose their strength. If they were weak, by going back to the bridge I could keep open the communication with General Sigel; on the other hand, if they were ever so strong, it was not possible to drive me from that position, except by turning one of my flanks; if my right, retreat was open by the Washington pike; if my left, the retirement could be by the pike to Baltimore.

I made up my mind to fight, and accordingly telegraphed General Halleck: "I shall withdraw immediately from Frederick City, and put myself in position to cover road to Washington, if necessary." This was done by marching in the night to the railroad bridge, where Brigadier-General Ricketts was in waiting. I had then the following regiments of his division:

First brigade, Colonel W. S. Truax commanding, seventeen hundred and fifty strong: One Hundred and Sixth New York, Captain Payne commanding; One Hundred and Fifty-first New York, Colonel Emerson; Fourteenth New Jersey, Lieutenant-Colonel Hall; Tenth Vermont, Colonel Henry; Eighty-seventh Pennsylvania, Lieutenant-Colonel Stahl.

Second brigade, sixteen hundred men, Colonel McClannan commanding; One Hundred and Thirty-eighth Pennsylvania, ———; Ninth New York, Colonel Seward; One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Ebright; One Hundred and Tenth Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Binkley. The residue of the division it was reported would be up next day.

Early in the morning of the ninth disposition for battle was made. The right, forming an extended line from the railroad, was given General Tyler, who, by direction, had left Colonel Brown at the stone bridge on the Baltimore pike, with his command and the company of mounted infantry.

Upon the holding that bridge depended the security of my right flank, and the line of retreat to Baltimore. Three companies of Colonel Gilpin's regiment were posted to defend Crum's ford, midway the stone bridge and railroad; Landstreet and Gilpin were held in reserve at the railroad.

The battery was divided—Ricketts and Tyler each received three guns.

On the left, as it was likely to be the main point of attack, I directed General Ricketts to form his command in two lines across the Washington pike, so as to hold the rising ground south of it and the wooden bridge across the river.

Still further to the left, Colonel Clendenin took

post, to watch that flank, and guard the lower fords with such detachments as he could spare.

On the western bank of the river, Captain Brown's detachment, of the First regiment Potomac Home Brigade, was deployed as skirmishers, in a line three quarters of a mile to the front.

A twenty-four-pound howitzer was left in a rude earthwork near the blockhouse by the railroad, where it could be used to defend the two bridges, and cover the retirement and crossing of the skirmishers.

While this disposition was going on, the railroad agent informed me that two more troop trains were on the road, and would arrive by one o'clock. These were the residue of General Ricketts' division, three regiments—making a very important reinforcement.

About eight o'clock A. M., the enemy marched by the pike from Frederick, and threw out skirmishers, behind whom he put his guns in position, and began the engagement. His columns followed a little after nine o'clock. Passing through the fields, just out of range of my pieces, without attempting to drive in my skirmishers, they moved rapidly around to the left, and forced a passage of the river at a ford about one mile below Ricketts. From nine o'clock to half-past ten the action was little more than a warm skirmish and experimental cannonading, in which, however, the enemy's superiority in the number and calibre of his guns was fully shown. Against my six three-inch rifles he opposed not less than sixteen Napoleons. In this time, also, the fighting at the stone bridge assumed serious proportions.

Colonel Brown held his position with great difficulty.

About half-past ten o'clock the enemy's first line of battle made its appearance, and moved against Ricketts, who, meantime, had changed front to the left, so that his right rested upon the river bank. This change unavoidably subjected his regiments to an unintermitted enfilading fire from the batteries across the stream. So great was the rebel front, also, that I was compelled to order the whole division into one line, thus leaving it without reserves. Still the enemy's front was greatest. Two more guns were sent to Ricketts. Finally, by burning the wooden bridge and the blockhouse at its further end, thus releasing the force left to defend them, I put into the engagement every available man, except Tyler's reserves, which, from the messages arriving, I expected momentarily to have to despatch to Colonel Brown's assistance.

The enemy's first line was badly defeated. His second line then advanced and was repulsed, but after a fierce and continuous struggle. In the time this occupied I could probably have retired without much trouble, as the rebels were badly punished; the main objects of the battle, however, were unaccomplished—the rebel strength was not yet developed. At one o'clock the three reinforcing regiments of veterans would be on the ground; and then the

splendid behavior of Ricketts and his men inspired me with confidence. One o'clock came, but not the reinforcements; and it was impossible to get an order to them—my telegraph operator, and the railroad agent, with both his trains, had run away. An hour and a half later I saw the third line of rebels move out of the woods, and down the hill behind which they made their formation; right after it came the fourth. It was time to get away. Accordingly, I ordered General Ricketts to make preparation, and retire to the Baltimore pike. About four o'clock he began the execution of the order.

The stone bridge held by Colonel Brown now became all-important; its loss was the loss of my line of retreat; and I had reason to believe that the enemy, successful on my left, would redouble his efforts against the right. General Tyler had already marched with his reserves to Brown's assistance; but on receipt of notice of my intention, without waiting for Gilpin and Landstreet, he galloped to the bridge, and took the command in person. After the disengagement of Ricketts' line, when the head of the retreating column reached the pike, I rode to the bridge, and ordered it to be held at all hazards by the force then there, until the enemy should be found in its rear—at least, until the last regiment had cleared the country road by which the retreat was being effected. This order General Tyler obeyed. A little after five o'clock, when my column was well on the march toward New Market, an attack on his rear convinced him of the impracticability of longer maintaining his post. Many of his men then took to the woods, but, by his direction, the greater part kept their ranks, and manfully fought their way through. In this way Colonel Brown escaped. General Tyler, finding himself cut off, dashed into the woods, with the officers of his staff, and was happily saved. His gallantry and self-sacrificing devotion are above all commendation of words.

The enemy seems to have stopped pursuit at the stone bridge. A few cavalry followed my rear guard to within a couple of miles of New Market, where they established a picket post. The explanation of their failure to harass my column lies in facts that have since come to my knowledge, viz.: Johnson's cavalry was marching, at the time of the battle, toward Baltimore, via the Liberty road, while McCausland's was too badly cut up in the fight for anything like immediate and vigorous action after it.

To have cut my column off at New Market, the rebels had only to move their cavalry round my right by way of Urbana and Monrovia; suspecting such was his plan, I used the utmost expedition to pass the command beyond that point. The danger proved imaginary. The reinforcements, for which I waited so anxiously the last two hours of the engagement, reaching Monrovia in good time to have joined me, halted there—a singular proceeding, for which no explanation has as yet been furnished me. Monrovia is but eight miles from the battleground. The commanding officer at that place

must, therefore, have heard the guns. But, besides this, Colonel Clendenin was effectually contesting the road which offered the enemy the advantage I have mentioned. That gallant officer—as true a cavalry soldier as ever mounted a horse—while fighting on Ricketts' extreme left, found himself cut off from the main body at the time the retreat began. Throwing himself into the village of Urbana, he repeatedly repulsed the pursuing rebels, and, in one bold charge, sabre in hand, captured the battle-flag of the Seventeenth Virginia.

The three regiments in Monrovia joined me at New Market, and afterward served a good purpose in covering the march of the weary column, which bivouacked for the night about twelve miles from the battle-field.

It would be a difficult task to say too much in praise of the veterans who made this fight. For their reputation, and for the truth's sake, I wish it distinctly understood that, though the appearance of the enemy's fourth line of battle made their ultimate defeat certain, they were not whipped: on the contrary, they were fighting steadily in unbroken front when I ordered their retirement; all the shame of which, if shame there was, is mine, not theirs. The nine regiments enumerated, as those participating in the action, represented but thirty-three hundred and fifty men, of whom over sixteen hundred were missing three days after—killed, wounded, or prisoners lost on the field. The fact speaks for itself. "Monocacy" on their flags cannot be a word of dishonor.

As to General Ricketts, attention is respectfully called to the mention made of him in the telegraphic report subjoined. Every word of it is as deserved as it was bravely earned.

If we had had intrenching tools in time, no doubt the losses of the veterans would have been greatly lessened. Another deficiency existed in the want of ambulances and wagons; but this I designed remedying by the use of the cars. That the dead and so many of the wounded were left suffering on the field, and in the hands of the enemy, is justly attributable to the base desertion of the railroad agent. I will also add that my despatches would have reached the War Office several hours sooner, if the telegraph operator had remained at his post, or within calling distance.

My intention, upon leaving the battle-field, was to march the troops directly to Baltimore, which, by the concentration at Monocacy, had been left almost defenceless.

Had this purpose been carried out, they would have reached the city on the evening of the tenth, in time to have driven off the marauders, who, under Johnson, had moved by the Liberty road from Frederick City, and taken post in the vicinity of Cockeysville. Such a result would very probably have saved the bridges on the Philadelphia railroad.

But, under an order, received while *en route* to Ellicott's mills, directing me to "rally my forces and make every possible effort to retard the

enemy's march on Baltimore," I thought it my duty to halt Ricketts' division, with the cavalry and battery, at the mills, that being the first point on the pike at which it was possible to resupply the men with rations and ammunition. In doing this, however, I was careful to leave General Ricketts' trains sufficient to bring his whole force away at a moment's notice; and as soon as it was certainly known that the enemy had marched against Washington, I ordered him to Baltimore. Before he arrived, however, I was temporarily superseded in the command of the troops by Major-General Ord.

The evening of the tenth I returned to Baltimore, and found the city very naturally in a state of alarm, occasioned by the approach of Johnson's cavalry. Thanks, however, to the energy of Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Lawrence, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Wooldey, Provost-Marshal, every measure of safety had been taken that intelligence could suggest.

The railroad communications north had been the subject of the former's special care.

The means of defense for the city, as already remarked, were very meagre; but the direction of them had, as soon as intelligence of the result on the Monocacy was received, very properly been assumed by Brigadier-Generals Lockwood and Morris, whose military experience was of very great value. To the former I feel particularly grateful.

Loyal citizens took up arms by the thousands, were organized; manned the works; and did soldiers' duty nobly.

Besides the officers mentioned in my informal report of tenth July, the following deserve similar notice, for their excellent behavior in action and the services they rendered:

Lieutenant-Colonel Lynde Catlin, Assistant Inspector-General; Major Max. Woodhull, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General; and Major James R. Ross, senior Aid-de-Camp—all of my staff. Also, Captain W. H. Weigle, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Tyler; Captain Adam E. King, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Ricketts; Captain Brown, First (Maryland) Potomac Home Brigade, and Captain N. H. Allen, of the company serving as mounted infantry.

General Ricketts has not yet forwarded his official report; when received, I shall promptly transmit it to the War Office. It will, doubtless, disclose many other officers properly entitled to special mention. At this time, I can only speak of commandants of brigades, and regiments, whose names have been already given, and repeat the commendation they have won from commanding officers in many a former battle. They are of the soldiers whose skill and courage have ennobled, not merely themselves, but the army they have belonged to so long.

The subjoined report gives my opinion of the rebel strength forwarded by telegram the day after the battle. Information, since obtained,

corroborates that opinion. It is now well assured that General Early attacked me with one whole corps, not less than eighteen thousand strong, while Breckinridge, with two divisions, remained during the battle in quiet occupancy of Frederick City. It is also certain, as one of the results, that, notwithstanding the disparity of forces, the enemy was not able to move from the battle-field, in prosecution of his

march upon Washington, until the next day about noon.

As to the casualties, I regret that the speedy movement of some regiments of General Tyler's brigade made it impossible for him to perfect his report as he himself desired. The following table, however, embraces the returns from that officer, and from General Ricketts, as accurately as was possible under the circumstances:

COMMANDER	COMMANDS	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSED.			TOTAL.	REMARKS.
		Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.		
3d Div. 6th Corps, Commanded by Brigadier-General Ricketts.....	General Staff.....	1	..	1	1	{ Capt. Adam K. King A. A. Genl., severely wounded.
	1st Brigade.....	8	54	62	17	226	243	8	429	437	737	
	2d Brigade.....	8	19	27	12	265	277	7	615	622	911	
	Total.....	11	73	84	30	481	511	10	1044	1064	1649	
Troops command- ed by Brig.-Gen. E. B. Tyler.....	3d Regt. P. H. B.	2	2	..	7	7	1	14	15	24	Commanded by Capt. E. H. Lieb., 6th U. S. Cavalry.
	1st Regt. P. H. B.	1	1	..	13	13	..	5	5	19	
	11th Maryland Volunteers.....	2	2	2	
	144th Ohio N. G.	2	2	1	10	11	1	20	21	34	
	149th Ohio N. G.	4	4	..	10	10	3	184	187	201	
	Balt. Battery Light Artillery	4	4	4	
	8th Regt. Illinois Cavalry.....	1	4	5	2	19	21	26	
	Detachment 159th Ohio N. G. serving as mounted infantry	1	8	
	Total.....	1	14	15	3	65	68	5	223	236	319	
	Total.....	12	87	90	33	546	579	15	1267	1300	1968	

The aggregate shows a heavy loss, illustrating the obstinate valor of the command. I am satisfied, however, that the casualties of the rebels exceeded mine. To reach this conclusion, one has only to make a calculation, based upon the fact that the day after the battle over four hundred men, too seriously wounded to be carried away, were captured in the hospital at Frederick City.

Orders have been given to collect the bodies of our dead in one burial-ground on the battle-field, suitable for a monument, upon which I propose to write—These men died to save the national capital, and they did save it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

LEW. WALLACE,
Major-General Commanding

HEADQUARTERS, ELLOTT'S MILL, }
2:05 P. M., July 10, 1864.

Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of Staff
at Washington City:

I have the honor to report that I have reached this point with my column. As I telegraphed you on the evening of the eighth instant, I left Frederick, and by a night march, took position on the left bank of the Monocacy, with my left on the south side of the Washington pike, and my right covering the bridge on the Baltimore pike, about two miles and a half from Frederick City.

Early in the morning of the ninth instant the enemy moved out of Frederick City, and in skirmish order, began to fight.

About nine o'clock, he opened on me with artillery, his guns being Napoleons or twelve-pounder howitzers, and mine (one six-gun battery) three-inch rifles, with one twenty-four-pounder howitzer.

His columns of cavalry and artillery worked rapidly round to my left, and crossed the river in face of my guard, and charged confidently upon Brigadier-General Ricketts' Third division Sixth Army Corps. The General changed front and repulsed them, and charged in turn, and drove them gallantly.

The enemy then advanced a second line; this the General also repulsed and drove. Meantime the enemy placed at least two batteries in positions, so that when he made his final charge, with four lines of infantry, about 3:30 P. M. the resistance of Ricketts' division was under an enfilading fire of shells really terrific.

The moment I saw the third rebel line advance, I ordered the General to make such preparations as he could, and retire his command by a county road up the river to the Baltimore pike. This was accomplished with an extraordinary steadiness,

The men of the third division were not whipped, but retired reluctantly, under my order. They bore the brunt of the battle with

a coolness and steadiness which I venture has not been exceeded in any battle of the war. Too much credit cannot be given General Ricketts for his skill and courage.

During the main fight, skirmishing across the river went on uninterruptedly, and down at the Baltimore pike bridge assumed serious form. My right, extending from the railroad to the bridge mentioned, was under charge of Brigadier-General E. B. Tyler, now supposed to be a prisoner, who, though not tried by so severe a test, met every expectation, and performed his duty with ability and courage. I do not now think myself seriously beaten; there was not a flag lost, nor a gun. The rebels captured no stores whatever, and, in face of their overwhelming force, I brought off my whole command, losing probably not over two hundred prisoners. My casualty list will be quite severe, but cannot possibly equal that of the enemy, as they charged several times in close lines, and with a recklessness that can be justified only upon the ground that they supposed my command consisted of raw militia.

Each one of his four lines of attack presented a front greater than that of General Ricketts' division, all deployed. By calculation this would give him about eighteen thousand men engaged on the left bank, while he had at least two thousand more skirmishing and fighting in my front across the river. Permit me to state that, in fighting, I had three objects in view: one to keep open, if possible, the communication by rail to Harper's Ferry, the second to cover the roads to Washington and Baltimore; the last, to make the enemy develop his force. I failed in all but the last, and from what I saw, it can be safely asserted that the enemy must have two corps of troops north of the Potomac. In the computation I include his column operating in the region of Hagerstown, that about Harper's Ferry, and the one which fought me yesterday. A rebel officer dying on the field, told a staff officer of General Ricketts that Lee was managing these operations in person, and would shortly have three corps about the Potomac for business against Washington and Baltimore. This circumstance is true; give it what weight you please. I regret to add that we were able to bring off but few of our wounded, and none of our dead. The hundred-days men straggled badly, while the men of the Sixth corps reached this place in perfect order, and covered the retreat.

The Third regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Colonel Gilpin, of Tyler's brigade, also maintained good order. I will make a more complete report with your permission when I receive the report of Brigadier-General Ricketts. I wish to make honorable mention at this time of Lieutenant-Colonel D. R. Clendenin, of the Eighth Illinois cavalry; of Captain F. W. Alexander, whose battery was well served throughout the day; and of Colonel Charles Gilpin, who, commanded during the fight at Frederick City on the seventh instant, in which the enemy lost,

killed and wounded, one hundred and forty men, while we lost one man killed, and eighteen wounded. The number of rebel casualties is given on the statements of citizens of Frederick. I wish also to make honorable mention of Colonel Brown, of the One Hundred and Fortyninth Ohio National Guard, who, ably assisted by Captain Lieb, United States cavalry, stubbornly held the Baltimore pike bridge, and thus kept open my line of retreat.

LEW WALLACE,
Major-General Commanding.

WASHINGTON CITY, April 2, 1865.

Brigadier-General E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-General:

SIR—In my official report of the battle of Monocacy I omitted to make mention of the very great obligations I was under to Hon. John W. Garrett, President of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, for his personal exertions in forwarding to my support and assistance promptly upon their arrival at Baltimore, the advance brigade of General Ricketts' division of troops. Please attach this so as to make it a part of the report alluded to.

Very respectfully,

LEW WALLACE,
Major-General, U. S. V.

REPORT OF BRIGADIER-GENERAL E. B. TYLER.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST SEP. BRIGADE 6TH A. C.,
RELY HOUSE, Maryland, July 14th, 1864.

Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Lawrence, Assistant Adjutant-General:

COLONEL—I have the honor, sir, to submit the following report of the part taken by my command in the late engagements at Frederick City and Monocacy Junction.

On Thursday, the seventh instant, Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin of the Eighth Illinois Cavalry, under the immediate orders of the Major-General Commanding, drew the enemy from the mountains west of Frederick City, and I reinforced him with three guns of Alexander's Maryland battery and the Third Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, under Colonel Charles Gilpin, then at Monocacy Junction. The promptness of these troops soon brought them in front of the enemy, who were occupying a commanding position a short distance west of the city. The action soon became warm and spirited, continuing some five hours, the enemy being handsomely repulsed just as darkness came upon us. The conduct of both officers and men was brave, gallant and creditable. Colonel Gilpin and Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin conducted themselves in the most gallant manner, deserving great credit for their skill and efficiency from first to last. These officers speak in very high terms of the officers and men under them, and they deserve it all. The three guns of Alexander's battery were served splendidly under the command of Captain Alexander, and I do but simple justice when I say that the officers and men are entitled to high

esteem and admiration for their skill and bravery exhibited in this action.

Receiving information that the enemy were being heavily reinforced, I went forward with the regiment composed of companies of the One Hundred and Forty-fourth and One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio National Guard, commanded by Colonel Brown, who took possession of the enemy's deserted lines soon after daylight Friday morning. The most of Friday was spent in cavalry skirmishing with the enemy under the personal direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin, and was very efficiently done. I continued to receive reports during the day of the increasing strength of the enemy, which was communicated to the Commanding General, who directed me to fall back on Monocacy Junction, which was successfully done during the night, leaving the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio National Guard to hold the stone bridge across the Monocacy on the National or Baltimore pike.

Saturday morning found us in line of battle, my command forming the right of the line, my left resting on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and connecting with General Ricketts, the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio National Guard and three companies of the One Hundred and Forty-fourth Ohio National Guard holding the extreme right; Colonel Gilpin's Third regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, and three companies of the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, under Captain Bamford, extending along the base of the hill, holding the ford between the stone bridge and junction; and the Eleventh Maryland, Colonel Landstreet, completing my line. The enemy appeared directly in my front about nine o'clock A. M., and opened on us with artillery, and attacked in considerable force our skirmish line, formed on the west bank of the Monocacy, and composed of the troops of the First Maryland Potomac Home Brigade, under command of Captain Brown, three guns of Captain Alexander's battery (three having been sent to General Ricketts), and a twenty-four-pound howitzer soon checked their advancing lines, and the action in my front, with the exception of sharpshooters' and skirmish firing, was an artillery fight. This at times was quite spirited, continuing until near the close of the action—we maintaining our position without serious loss.

The conduct of Captain Brown, of the First Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, and his command, merit special notice; they successfully maintained their skirmish line against a superior force, to the close, and resisted several charges of the enemy. Captain Alexander, with his officers and men, behaved in the most gallant manner, serving their guns with great coolness and effect. I desire particularly to call the Commanding General's attention to their conduct during the three days we were in front of the enemy.

The Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio, and three

companies of the Hundred and Forty-fourth Ohio National Guard, under Colonel Brown, considering their inexperience, behaved well, successfully resisting several charges of the enemy. Colonel Gilpin's regiment, with the three companies of the First Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, that were assigned him, although serving in detachments along an extended line, fully sustained the enviable reputation they had won on Thursday.

The Eleventh Maryland was not brought into action, but were exposed for a time to the artillery fire of the enemy.

The cavalry was placed under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin, who will furnish a separate report, and I would very respectfully call the attention of the Major-General to this gallant and valuable officer, and the officers and men serving under him. They certainly acquitted themselves with great credit.

A force of the enemy's cavalry came down upon me while on the right of the line near the stone bridge, and forced me, Captain Webb and Lieutenant Goldsborough of my staff, into the woods, surrounding us, and by their persistent watchfulness, prevented our following the column for nearly three days.

To the officers of my staff, Captain W. H. Wiegel, Captain F. J. D. Webb, and Lieutenants Goldsborough, George W. Startzman and R. E. Smith, I am greatly indebted for their untiring efforts and energy during the whole movement. Captain Weigle, in the heat of the engagement, took command of the twenty-four-pound howitzer on the bank of the river, serving it with marked courage and ability, and with telling effect upon the enemy. His conduct must have been observed by the Commanding General.

I send you herewith a list of the casualties as far as we are able to obtain them at this time.

Very respectfully submitted,

E. B. TYLER,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

REPORT OF LIEUTENANT-COLONEL CLENDENIN.


BALTIMORE, Md., July 14, 1864.

Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Lawrence A. A. G.:

SIR—I have the honor to report that I left Washington, D. C., July fourth, at seven o'clock P. M. with two hundred and thirty officers and men of the Eighth regiment Illinois cavalry, and arrived at Point of Rocks at two o'clock P. M., July fifth, where I found Moseby with two pieces of artillery and about two hundred men posted on the south bank of the Potomac. Dismounting one half of my command, I skirmished with him for an hour and a half, killing one of his men, and wounding two others, when he retired down the river. He fired but six shots from his artillery. I lost no men.

Hearing that he was crossing at Nolan's Ferry, I moved down and drove him back about ten o'clock P. M., and went into camp for three hours;

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By T. A. H. P. S.

BVT MAJ. GEN ALEX S. WEBB U.S.A.

... moved to Point of Rocks by sunrise the next morning and sent one squadron to Berlin and another to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At 11:30 a. m. I received a telegram from General Howe to repair to Frederick and meet the force of the enemy reported in the vicinity of Monocacy. Calling in my forces I arrived at Frederick at eight o'clock p. m. and received orders to report in person to General Wallace, at Monocacy Junction, and was ordered to take two pieces of artillery and move forward by the way of Middletown and find the enemy. I left Frederick at 7:30 a. m. July fifth and met the enemy in equal force approaching from the north and immediately engaged and drove them back when they were heavily reinforced, until they fled to Catocin mountain and took a strong position from which it was impossible to dislodge the enemy's skirmish-line with shot. The enemy had used two guns of longer range than the metal than those of Alexander's battery, but we had the advantage in position. After a short skirmishing, the enemy was heavily reinforced, and flanking me, I was obliged to fall back on Frederick. For several days I had been fighting at least one hundred men and I could see additional reinforcements coming up from Middletown.

The enemy pressed me closely as I retired on Frederick where I found an additional gun and ammunition. Finding the guns rapidly in position behind the road of cavalry and opened fire ahead of the approaching column, which they repulsed and deployed to our left, bringing up the main body of the force south of the Hagerstown pike in a commanding position. At this point General Hays with the Third Maryland regiment, Potomac Home brigade, came up, and Major Robert took command of all the forces. I moved to our left, and with my cavalry company engaged the enemy, fighting continuously until dark, repulsing them effectually. The loss this day was one officer, Lieutenant Robert, mortally wounded, two men killed, and seven wounded. The enemy fled to Catocin mountain during the night.

During the night I sent forward a portion of my forces to find the enemy, and skirmished with them the greater part of the day, repulsing several charges and driving their skirmishers to the mountains. Captain Lieb, Fifth United States Cavalry, with ninety-six mounted men, Major Wells, First New York veteran cavalry, with two hundred and fifty-six cavalry of two regiments, and the Independent Louisiana Light Cavalry were ordered to report to me that day, all of whom I had supporting the rear of my own regiment or on the flanks watching the movements of the enemy. The loss in the battle was one man killed, and seven men wounded.

The infantry having fallen back, I called in my forces covering the rear of the column, leaving Frederick City about two o'clock a. m. on the morning of the ninth of July. I arrived at Mo-

nocacy Junction, via Baltimore turnpike, about daylight. After two hours rest I deployed a squadron (Eighth Illinois cavalry) on the Georgetown Pike between the junction and Frederick; sent Captain Lieb with the mounted infantry to hold a ford above the bridge where the Baltimore pike crosses the Monocacy, and one company (Eighth Illinois cavalry,) down the Monocacy, to move well round on the enemy's right flank. The squadron on the Georgetown pike met the enemy's skirmishers within a mile of the junction and held them in check until compelled to retire before vastly superior numbers, which they did in good order. I moved with all the available force I had to our left, where I had been informed the enemy were making demonstrations with their cavalry. I had posted one company on the left of the infantry to cover a ford across the Monocacy, and was down between the river and the road to Buckeystown, which was the line I designed taking up, when the enemy charged across the river with a brigade of cavalry upon the company I had just posted. Lieutenant Corbit, in command of the company, drove the advance back, and for a few minutes held his ground, then retired in good order to the Buckeystown road, which he held until the infantry came to his support. The enemy dismounted their cavalry, and engaged the left of our infantry. During this time I was cut off from the main body of our forces, having three orderlies with me, and directly in rear of the rebel cavalry. Two squadrons of my regiment were also cut off, but further down the river. One squadron I directed to accomplish the work of destroying bridges and obstructions crossing over the Monocacy and making circuit of the enemy's right to join me on the Georgetown pike, near Monocacy Junction; the other squadron I brought around the enemy's flank, and took a position on the left of the infantry. During this time I had scouts and patrols on the Georgetown pike as far as Urbana, and fifty men of Major Wells' command at the latter place, patrolling toward Buckeystown.

When the rebel infantry charged upon our left and our forces had fallen back, I retired toward Urbana, skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry. They pressed me closely and made several charges. At Urbana the Seventeenth Virginia cavalry charged me with desperation, but were repulsed with the loss of their colors, their major, color bearer, and several men killed and a number wounded. The force pursuing me was McCansland's brigade.

I had eighty (80) men of my own regiment and thirty-five (35) men of Stahl's cavalry I could not bring into action, and ordered them to the rear to enable me to keep a clear road in my rear. Deploying my eighty men as skirmishers, and making a show of having received reinforcements, the enemy dismounted their advance regiment to fight me on foot, sending their horses to the rear, and blocking up the road. I immediately called back my skirmish-



BYT MAJ GEN ALEX S WEBB U.S.A.

I returned to Point of Rocks by sunrise the next morning, and sent one squadron to Berlin and Sandy Hook to protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. At 11:30 A. M. I received a telegram from General Howe to repair to Frederick and ascertain the force of the enemy reported in the vicinity of Boonesboro. Calling in my forces I arrived at Frederick at eight o'clock P. M., where I received orders to report in person to Major-General Wallace, at Monocacy Junction, and by him was ordered to take two pieces of Alexander's battery and move forward by the way of Middletown and find the enemy. I left Frederick City at 5:30 A. M. July fifth and met the enemy's cavalry in equal force approaching from Middletown, and immediately engaged and drove them back, when they were heavily reinforced, and I retired slowly to Catoclin mountain and placed the artillery in position, from which it was able to shell the enemy's skirmish-line with effect. The enemy had used two guns of longer range and heavier metal than those of Alexander's battery, but we had the advantage in position. After five hours' skirmishing, the enemy being heavily reinforced, and flanking me, I was compelled to fall back on Frederick. For three hours I had been fighting at least one thousand men, and I could see additional reinforcements moving up from Middletown.

The enemy pressed me closely as I retired on Frederick, where I found an additional gun and ammunition. Placing the guns rapidly in position I cleared the road of cavalry and opened on the head of the approaching column, which fell back and deployed to our left, bringing up artillery which was posted south of the Hagerstown pike in a commanding position. At this time Colonel Gilpin with the Third Maryland regiment, Potomac Home brigade, came up, and being senior officer took command of all the forces. I moved to our left, and with my cavalry dismounted, engaged the enemy, fighting continually until dark, repulsing them effectually. My loss this day was one officer, Lieutenant Gilbert, mortally wounded, two men killed, and seven wounded. The enemy retired to Catoclin mountain during the night. The next morning I sent forward a portion of my regiment to find the enemy, and skirmished with them the greater part of the day, repulsing several charges and driving their skirmishers into the mountain. Captain Lieb, Fifth United States cavalry, with ninety-six mounted infantry; Major Wells, First New York veteran cavalry, with two hundred and fifty-six cavalry of various regiments, and the Independent Loudon Rangers were ordered to report to me that day, all of whom I had supporting the men of my own regiment or on the flanks watching the movements of the enemy. The loss in the Eighth Illinois cavalry, was Captain John V. Morris, one man killed, and seven men wounded. The infantry having fallen back, I called in my forces covering the rear of the column, leaving Frederick City about two o'clock A. M. on the morning of the ninth of July. I arrived at Mo-

nocacy Junction, *via* Baltimore turnpike, about daylight. After two hours' rest I deployed a squadron (Eighth Illinois cavalry) on the Georgetown Pike between the junction and Frederick; sent Captain Lieb with the mounted infantry to hold a ford above the bridge where the Baltimore pike crosses the Monocacy, and one company (Eighth Illinois cavalry,) down the Monocacy, to move well round on the enemy's right flank. The squadron on the Georgetown pike met the enemy's skirmishers within a mile of the junction and held them in check until compelled to retire before vastly superior numbers, which they did in good order. I moved with all the available force I had to our left, where I had been informed the enemy were making demonstrations with their cavalry. I had posted one company on the left of the infantry to cover a ford across the Monocacy, and was down between the river and the road to Buckeystown, which was the line I designed taking up, when the enemy charged across the river with a brigade of cavalry upon the company I had just posted. Lieutenant Corbit, in command of the company, drove the advance back, and for a few minutes held his ground, then retired in good order to the Buckeystown road, which he held until the infantry came to his support. The enemy dismounted their cavalry, and engaged the left of our infantry. During this time I was cut off from the main body of our forces, having three orderlies with me, and directly in rear of the rebel cavalry. Two squadrons of my regiment were also cut off, but further down the river. One squadron I directed to accomplish the work of destroying bridges and obstructions crossing over the Monocacy and making circuit of the enemy's right to join me on the Georgetown pike, near Monocacy Junction; the other squadron I brought around the enemy's flank, and took a position on the left of the infantry. During this time I had scouts and patrols on the Georgetown pike as far as Urbana, and fifty men of Major Wells' command at the latter place, patrolling toward Buckeystown.

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I had eighty (80) men of my own regiment and thirty-five (35) men of Stahl's cavalry I could not bring into action, and ordered them to the rear to enable me to keep a clear road in my rear. Deploying my eighty men as skirmishers, and making a show of having received reinforcements, the enemy dismounted their advance regiment to fight me on foot, sending their horses to the rear, and blocking up the road. I immediately called back my skirmish-

ers over a hill, and fell back to Monrovia, where I found trains loaded with wounded and stragglers moving off. Crossing to the Baltimore turnpike I covered the rear of our retreating forces until they arrived at Ellicott's Mills. My loss this day was one man killed—Lieutenant J. A. Kinley—and five men wounded.

Companies C and I, Eighth Illinois cavalry, Captain Wells commanding, were entirely cut off, and fell back on Washington. Captain Lieb's men behaved well, and fell back in good order from our extreme right, forming part of the rear guard.

The Loudon Rangers are worthless as cavalry.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. CLENDENIN,

Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Eighth Illinois Cavalry.

SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,

Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN F. W. ALEXANDER.

CAMP No. 24, BALTIMORE BATTERY LIGHT ARTILLERY, }
Near Baltimore, July 18, 1864. }

Samuel B. Lawrence, A. A. G., Eighth Army Corps:

SIR—In pursuance of orders, I have the honor to make the following statement regarding the fight at Frederick and the battle of Monocacy. At one A. M. Thursday, seventh, I received an order to send a section to Frederick to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin, Eighth Illinois cavalry. Lieutenant Leary of the battery reported at half-past four A. M. with his section at Frederick to Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin, and advanced at six A. M. along the road leading westwardly to Middletown. The enemy were encountered two miles this side of Middletown, and the section gradually retired toward Frederick. At eleven A. M. of the same day, I received orders to go to Lieutenant Leary's assistance with another gun and ammunition. I met them at half-past twelve P. M., and with Colonel Clendenin formed a line of defence on the edge of the town. The enemy opened on us with three guns about four P. M. About six P. M. we dismounted one gun and began to silence their artillery fire. Shortly before dark Colonel Gilpin, who, on his arrival, had assumed command, charged and forced back the rebels, and they appeared no more that night.

On Friday, eighth, the battery was filled by the arrival of the remaining three pieces at nine A. M. No engagement took place, except slight skirmishing on the Middletown road, but the battery was constantly on the move until four A. M., Saturday, ninth, when it returned to the Monocacy somewhat short of ammunition, as the fire on Thursday had been continuous all day. On Saturday, ninth, at nine A. M., I was ordered to place three guns on the hill beyond Monocacy, toward Frederick, and commenced firing on the enemy as they advanced on both sides of the pike from Frederick. They soon returned with artillery, but with little effect. Finding

this, they proceeded around toward the left of our position, where the ground gradually rose in the distance, while on our side it sloped away. The other three guns were then placed on the hill on this side of the Monocacy, so as to meet their movement to our left. The enemy brought, as nearly as I can judge, about sixteen guns to bear on us, but owing to the advantages of the ground, and the infantry preventing them from gaining ground to our left, where they could have commanded the battery, did but little damage, though some of their guns were of heavier calibre. (The guns of the battery are three-inch rifle.) When more guns of the enemy began to appear on our left, with infantry, I moved two more guns from the hill on the right to the hill on our left. Finally, about three P. M. our troops made a charge, and drove them back, and they then uncovered their forces and came on in about three lines, and forced our troops to retreat. Our ammunition almost gave out about four P. M., but the guns were kept in position until the order was given from General Ricketts to retire by the Baltimore road. We moved out along the road which led to the Baltimore pike at a walk, and I was ordered by General Wallace, at New Market, to proceed along the road to Baltimore. Two of the guns were left in the rear to assist in guarding the column, though with little ammunition left, and joined the battery at Ellicott's Mills at eleven A. M., Sunday, July tenth, when I moved to Baltimore, as ordered, for ammunition and supplies. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the officers and men of the battery, viz.: Lieutenant Evans, Lieutenant Leary, and Lieutenant Hall. Lieutenant Alexander was absent as Acting Assistant Adjutant-General on General Kenly's staff. My loss was four men wounded and five horses killed, one caisson body (empty) and the body of the battery wagon left behind in order to attach a twenty-four pounder howitzer, which did not belong to the battery, to the limber. I succeeded in bringing it safely to Baltimore, as also a mountain howitzer, which had been used to defend the Monocacy bridge.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. W. ALEXANDER,

Commanding Baltimore Battery of Light Artillery.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN EDWARD H. LIEB.

BALTIMORE, July 18, 1864.

GENERAL—I have the honor to report that I left with my command of mounted infantry on the sixth instant for Monocacy Junction. I arrived and reported to General Tyler, who immediately ordered me to move to the front and report to Colonel Gilpin of the Third Potomac Home Brigade. I reported to him and was ordered to support Alexander's battery of artillery. About twelve o'clock at night I was again ordered to move to the Monocacy pike bridge and hold it. On the eighth I was ordered again

to the front, with my command, to report to Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin of the Eighth Illinois cavalry. He ordered me to move to the extreme front, and turn out my men, which I did. I remained in position all day; at dusk I was relieved by a regiment of the Sixth corps, with orders to feed my horses, and procure rations for my men. I met General Tyler on the road, who ordered me to move out on the Buckeystown road and feel the enemy. I moved out about five (5) miles, and was moving on when I was ordered back to Frederick. I arrived there about twelve o'clock at night, and, in conjunction with the Eighth Illinois cavalry, brought up the rear guard to the Monocacy junction; from there I was ordered to move up the Monocacy river one mile, to the Baltimore pike bridge, to a ford and hold it. I was also requested to assist the Colonel of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio, one hundred (100) days' men, to hold the bridge. I arrived at the ford and drove the rebels off, placed my men in position, and then returned to assist the Colonel to hold his position, which, at that time, was being hard pressed. The rebels made a charge on the left of the line, and drove the left in, within one hundred yards of the bridge. I immediately rode up and rallied the men, and drove the enemy back, captured some prisoners, and retook the old ground. I then assisted Colonel Brown to establish the line, and he threw his whole force over. The position was a very good one; the enemy tried hard to take it, but at every point were driven back; my men on the extreme left held their position, and were not troubled by the enemy. I relieved all my mounted men and placed a company of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio in their old position; took my command to the bridge for the purpose of holding it until our forces fell back on the Baltimore pike. General Tyler requested me to draw the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio over the Monocacy bridge, as soon as possible. I reported the intention of the General to Colonel Brown, and started to carry out the order. The men commenced moving to the bridge, and were crossing; the enemy arrived in force on the opposite side, and attacked our men on the left flank. I pushed all the men over I could, and when I started to cross I found the rebels in strong force in my front; and when I started to move to the rear, found it impossible to move in that direction.

The rebels were coming in rear and on all flanks; the way open was up the river, and I started in that direction, the rebels closing in in all directions. I could not strike the ford, and was compelled to ride my horse down a very steep bluff into the river. I crossed the river, and directed the officer commanding a company of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth Ohio in what direction to move. He commenced moving before I left, and I have since been informed that he is now in the city with his command. I started to the point where I had left my men to cover my crossing over the bridge, but found

all had gone, and the rebels in possession of the ground. I met a few men of the Eighth Illinois cavalry, and took to the woods at twelve (12) o'clock at night. I arrived on the Baltimore pike two (2) miles this side of New Market, and found that the enemy had not been on the road further than New Market. I brought up the rear guard, with eight men, to one mile on the other side of Ridgeville, and there met my command. I reported to Lieutenant-Colonel Clendenin for orders; he ordered me to act in conjunction with himself in bringing up the rear of our forces. I must here state that Captain Allen, of the One Hundred and Fifty-ninth Ohio, mounted infantry, repelled the rebel cavalry, killing six (6) and wounding quite a number. The enemy did not follow after he drove them back. At Ellicott's Mills I threw out pickets and remained under General Ricketts' orders. I sent out small parties to scout the country to the right, rear, and left, and drove the rebel cavalry back on the different roads. I sent Captain Allen out on the Elysville road six miles. He came up in the rear of a few rebel cavalrymen, killed two, and wounded the officers in command. All that could be found on my flank were a few rebel cavalry. On Monday evening, the eleventh, I was ordered to bring up the rear of General Ricketts' division, and move to Baltimore on the pike. I arrived in the city about seven (7) o'clock in the evening, and immediately reported to the commanding officer for orders, and was ordered to go into Camp Carroll, and rest my men and horses.

In conclusion I am pleased to state that Captain Allen did all in his power to assist me in carrying out my orders. All the orders I gave he promptly carried out, and to my entire satisfaction. I am pleased to state that the mounted men under my command did well, more than I expected from men that have been in the service so short a time, and not used to riding. The whole time I was absent I could not find time to procure forage for my horses, and rations for my men. Not a man complained, all stood the hard marches like faithful soldiers, and in battle I cannot find fault with one of my men; all did well.

I arrived in the city with sixty-six (66) men; I left with ninety-eight (98) privates and two officers; since that time all had returned except ten; a few of my horses were shot, and I could not bring them off the field with me.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EDWARD H. LIEB.
Captain Fifth U. S. Cavalry.

SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Casualties in the First Separate Brigade, Eighth Army Corps, commanded by Brigadier-General E. B. Tyler.

THIRD REGT., POTOMAC HOME BRIGADE, MD. VOLS.
Company A—Missing—Privates James Tennant, George C. Wilcher, Peter Conroy, Zacha-

riah Loman, Lloyd S. Buckingham, John T. Gasnell, Patrick Daily, Edward Cromer, John Somerville, Thomas H. Russell, and Corporal William Uphold.

Company B—Wounded—Abraham Powell. Missing—Corporals Lewis Hampton, Josiah K. Cooper; Privates William Bishop, Frederick Devilliss, John Foreback, Frederick Hessner, B. M. Powell, and David Simmons.

Company C—Wounded—Corporal Jas. Holstead; Private James W. Rice. Missing—Private James H. D. Biderman.

Company D—Missing—Privates Henry Series, Alfred Sisler, and J. J. Johnson.

Company E—Killed—Corporal J. D. Barker. Missing—Privates George J. Siess, Christian Dayhuff, James Hutzell.

Company F—Wounded—Privates J. W. Cunkelton, George W. Springer. Captured—Sergeant Michael Huffer, Corporal G. W. Barber (Paroled, Private Daniel Grey). Missing—John Donohue, Lewis Peters, Ezra T. Reese, Martin Brenanan, Reuben Myers, and John Carson. (The last named not in either engagement, as he went to the rear upon the appearance of danger.)

Company G—Wounded—Privates J. Baker, J. Clabangh, J. B. Fike, Charles Mason, D. McAlister, J. E. Shipway, Samuel Yeats. Missing—J. Cook, G. Crouse, M. Donovan, E. Fike, A. Kayser, W. Lugenbeel, H. Mugness, A. McLean, G. W. Nalls, S. Slagman, J. Stedding, and Captain C. B. McCoy.

Company I—Wounded—First Sergeant Jefferson Davis, supposed to be wounded and prisoner, John A. Pierce, Abraham Humble. Missing—Jacob E. Thomas, Edward Herman, George W. Hileman, John Nagle, and Ephraim Speck.

Company K—Wounded—Privates John Cassner, Andrew Mobley, D. A. Barney. Missing—Jacob Barney, Charles Phelas, Jacob Renger, George Whalen, Corporal David Graham, Private Lewis Becan.

DETACHMENT FIRST REGT. P. H. B., MD. VOLS.

Company B—Wounded—Privates Adam Best, G. A. Zahn, G. W. Pool. Missing—Sergeants G. E. Ramsberg, D. J. Zarlton, Corporal J. A. Wagner, Privates R. C. Balsell, James D. Keller, R. M. Mitchell, Thomas Smith, U. H. Yingling, Andrew Teakle.

Company G—Captured—Corporal Henry Nafe, Privates Rufus P. Burner, G. G. Brane, Garded Lutman. Missing—James Irvin, G. W. Gatlen, George W. Goodwin, Ephraim Stonesifer, Hezekiah Shelling, Henry Taylor, James Young.

Company C—Missing—Sergeant J. R. Poffenberger, Privates Martin Glass, Henry R. Haines, George W. Palmer.

Company K—Wounded—James Fisher, William Harris, Frederick Lutz, John H. Weldy. Missing—Thomas Brown, Thomas P. Collins, Nicholas Serverns, Gotleib Siedel, G. Hamilton Smith.

149TH REGIMENT OHIO NATIONAL GUARD.

The medical officer on duty with this regiment, including Dr. Burnison of the Eleventh Maryland, together with the killed and wounded fall into the hands of the enemy. No report has yet been received from the commanding officer.

ELEVENTH MARYLAND VOLUNTEERS (MILITIA).

Wounded—John Fade, Company A (leg), Thomas Woodfield, Company C (hip). It is believed that the largest part of those heretofore reported as killed and wounded will yet turn out as prisoners or stragglers.

Alexander's battery lost three (3) men wounded, names not yet ascertained.

SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

REPORT OF G. R. JOHNSON.

BALTIMORE, July 13, 1864—11 o'clock A. M.

GENERAL—I was in the rebel lines at Monocacy and Frederick during Saturday and Sunday last. The entire corps of Ewell and Breckinridge were there, estimated to be twenty-five or thirty thousand (25,000 or 30,000) strong. They had beside a large cavalry force, say five or six thousand (5,000 or 6,000). They were well supplied with artillery and stores. The main body left Monocacy Sunday morning, and a strong rear guard left at twelve m., or one p. m. They marched down the Georgetown pike. I last heard of them at Hyattsville, on that pike. It was said that they were making for Edwards' and Nolan's ferries. A Union cavalry force from Hunter's command entered Frederick as the rebels left it. The rebels' rear guard left precipitately, being under the impression that Hunter's main force was approaching. When I left Frederick at twelve m. yesterday, Hunter was said to be at Martinsburg, with a part of his force. The railroad is intact this side of Monocacy. I came down the pike, which is now unobstructed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully yours,
G. K. JOHNSON,
Medical Inspector, U. S. A.

Major-General ORD.

REPORT OF COLONEL A. L. BROWN.

HEADQUARTERS ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH REGIMENT,
OHIO NATIONAL GUARD, HALLTOWN, VA., Aug. 7, 1864.

Lieutenant-Colonel Samuel B. Lawrence, A. A. G.,
Eighth Army Corps:

I have the honor to report the following as the losses of my command at the battle of Monocacy, July 9, 1864:

SEVEN COMPANIES ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-NINTH.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.
Killed.....	..	4
Wounded.....	..	10
Missing.....	3	184
Total.....	3	198

DETACHMENT ONE HUNDRED AND FORTY-FOURTH—THREE COMPANIES.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.	ENLISTED MEN.
Killed.....	..	2
Wounded.....	1	10
Missing.....	1	20
Total.....	2	32

Of the missing of the One Hundred and Forty-ninth about one hundred and twenty men, including the three commissioned officers, have been heard from, some having made their escape, and others reported to different posts, making my loss about sixty-seven men, in missing. Of the One Hundred and Forty-fourth, one man wounded has since died.

Recaptulation.

	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.		ENLISTED MEN.
Missing.....	4	Killed.....	8
Wounded.....	1	Wounded.....	20
Total.....	5	Missing.....	204
		Total.....	230

Since heard from, three commissioned officers, one hundred and seventeen enlisted men.

Active duty in the field and sudden and frequent changes of position, have made it impossible for me to get accurate returns. This report is as nearly correct as I can get under the circumstances.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. L. BROWN,

Colonel One Hundred and Forty-Ninth Ohio National Guard.

List of Commissioned Officers Missing from One Hundred and Forty-ninth Regiment Ohio National Guard.

Captain Charles W. McGinnis, Company C.
First Lieutenant George H. Bowers, Company G.
Second Lieutenant St. Clair Pittzer, Company G.

List of Commissioned Officers Wounded and Missing One Hundred and Forty-fourth Ohio National Guard.

Captain John McKee, Company I, wounded.
Lieutenant George Weddell, Company I, prisoner.

SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Casualties in the Third Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, at the Battle of Monocacy Junction, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, Maryland, July 9th, 1864.

STATION.	Co.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	CAPTURED.	REMARKS.
Monocacy Junction.....	A	1	..	Stationed at base of mountain, north of railroad. Afterward died, skirmishing on Monocacy river.
" ".....	B	..	1	
" ".....	C	1	..	Supporting Alexander's Battery, north of railroad river ford, one mile north of railroad.
" ".....	D	8	
" ".....	E	1	2	Stationed at block-house, north of railroad, supported howitzer skirmishing on river.
" ".....	F	..	2	1	..	
Monrovia.....	G	1	8	Supporting battery north of railroad, not engaged. Mounted as scouts.
Monocacy Junction.....	H	..	1	..	5	
" ".....	I	1	..	Supporting section of Alexander's battery east of Monocacy, north of railroad, skirmishing on river.
" ".....	K	
Total.....	..	2	7	4	10	

I certify that the above is a correct list of casualties in the Third regiment, Potomac Home Brigade, Maryland Volunteers, at the Battle of Monocacy Junction, June 9th 1864.

CHAS. GILPIN,

Colonel Third Maryland Volunteers, Potomac Home Brigade.

SAML. B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Casualties of the First Maryland Regiment, Potomac Home Brigade, at the Battle of the Monocacy, July 9th, 1864.

NAMES.	RANK.	Co.	REMARKS.
Moses A. Gosnel.....	Private.....	C	Killed by a musket ball through the head.
Gideon L. Wilmer.....	Corporal.....	C	Wounded, left ear shot off.
Frank A. Hall.....	Private.....	C	Captured.
Frank M. Ford.....	".....	G	Wounded in right hand.
Ephraim Stonestifer.....	".....	G	Captured.

NAME.	RANK.	Co.	REMARKS.
George W. Goowin	Private.....	G	Captured.
H. B. Sobs	Sergeant.....	H	Wounded slightly in the arm.
J. W. Nicholson.....	Musician.....	H	Wounded in face and leg.
Martin Glass	Private.....	H	Slightly wounded and missing.
Wm. S. Bumford.....	".....	H	Slightly wounded.
James Cunningham.....	".....	H	Wounded in hip.
John Cuddy.....	".....	H	Wounded slightly.
Charles J. Brown.....	Captain.....	K	Wounded slightly, in arm.
William Harris.....	Private.....	K	Shot in the leg, leg amputated.
Frederick Lutz.....	".....	K	Wounded through the left breast, mortally.
John H. Welch.....	".....	K	Wounded on shoulder and side.
James Fisher.....	".....	K	Shot through the neck.
Joseph Maloney.....	".....	K	Captured.
John Craft.....	".....	K	Captured.

I certify that the above is a correct list of casualties of the First Maryland Regiment Potomac Home Brigade, at the Battle of Monocacy, July 9th, 1864.

CHARLES J. BROWN,
Captain Commanding Detachment
First Maryland Regiment, Potomac Home Brigade.

SAML. B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN CHARLES J. BROWN.

HEADQUARTERS FORT WORTHINGTON, July 20, 1864.

*Captain R. H. Offley, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Defences of Baltimore.*

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to submit the following report of my command at the battle of Monocacy. My two companies, "C" and "K," First Maryland regiment, Potomac Home Brigade, were occupying, at the commencement of the fight, the block-house on the west side of the Monocacy, which I, in obedience to orders from the General Commanding, evacuated and burned. I was then ordered to hold the bridge over the railroad on the Georgetown pike, one company of the Tenth Vermont Infantry and one company of the Ninth New York Heavy Artillery being added to my command. This position I held until the left of our army fell back, when, having received a discretionary order to fall back while I could do so with safety, I left my position, fell back across the railroad

bridge, and occupied the rifle-pits on the east side of the Monocacy, covering the retreat of our army for a short time, and then following the line of march until my command was increased by companies B, G and H, First Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, being added to it at Ellicott's Mills, where I was furnished transportation to Baltimore Sunday, July tenth, and ordered to report to Colonel Gilpin, commanding First Separate Brigade, Colonel Gilpin being in command of Fort Worthington.

On Wednesday, July thirteen, Colonel Gilpin being ordered elsewhere, I was placed in command of the fort, which I now occupy with companies B, C, G, H, and K of the First Maryland regiment, Potomac Home Brigade.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,

CHARLES J. BROWN,
Captain Commanding First Maryland,
Potomac Home Brigade, Detached Infantry.
SAMUEL B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Report of Casualties in Third Division, Sixth Army Corps, for July 9th, 1864.

COMMAND.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.	REMARKS.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Aggregate.		
General Staff.....	1	..	1	1	} Captain Adam E. King, A. A. G., severely wounded.
First Brigade.....	8	54	62	17	226	243	8	429	432	743	
Second Brigade.....	8	19	22	12	255	267	7	615	622	911	
Total.....	11	73	84	30	481	511	10	1044	1054	1655	

JAMES B. RICKETTS,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

SAML. B. LAWRENCE,
Lieutenant-Colonel and A. A. G.

Doc. 109.

SURRENDER OF GENERAL JOHNSTON.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, City Point, Virginia, May 9, 1865. }

GENERAL—My last official report brought the history of events, as connected with the armies in the field subject to my immediate command, down to the first of April, when the Army of the Ohio, Major-General J. M. Schofield commanding, lay at Goldsboro', with detachments distributed so as to secure and cover our routes of communication and supply back to the sea at Wilmington and Morshead City; Major-General A. H. Terry, with the Tenth corps, being at Faison's depot; the Army of the Tennessee, Major-General O. O. Howard commanding, was encamped to the right and front of Goldsboro', and the Army of Georgia, Major-General H. W. Slocum commanding, to its left and front; the cavalry, Brevet-Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding, at Mount Olive. All were busy in repairing the wear and tear of our then recent and hard march from Savannah, or in replenishing clothing and stores necessary for a further progress.

I had previously, by letter and in person, notified the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States that the tenth of April would be the earliest possible moment at which I could hope to have all things in readiness, and we were compelled to use our railroads to the very highest possible limit in order to fulfil that promise. Owing to a mistake in the railroad department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot gauge, we were limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot-eight-and-a-half-inch gauge already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major-General Terry at Wilmington, and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judicious use was made of these, and such industry displayed in the railroad management by Generals Easton and Beckwith, and Colonel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, that by the tenth of April our men were all reloaded, the wagons reloaded, and a fair amount of forage accumulated ahead.

In the meantime Major-General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry operating from East Tennessee in connection with Major-General George H. Thomas, in pursuance of my orders of January twenty-one, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-five, had reached the railroad about Greensboro', North Carolina, and had made sad havoc with it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying *en route* bridges, culverts, depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the break in the railroad down to the Catawba bridge.

This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies and as their ultimate line of retreat. Major-General J. H. Wilson, also in command

of the cavalry corps organized by himself under Special Field Orders No. —, of October twenty-four, one thousand eight hundred and sixty-four, at Gaylesville, Alabama, had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood at Nashville Tennessee; but the roads being too heavy for infantry, General Thomas had devolved that duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit, has struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the Confederacy. His route was one never before touched by our troops, and afforded him abundance of supplies as long as he was in motion, namely, by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus and Macon. Though in communication with him, I have not been able to receive as yet his full and detailed reports, which will in due time be published and appreciated. Lieutenant-General Grant, also in immediate command of the armies about Richmond, had taken the initiative in that magnificent campaign which, in less than ten days, compelled the evacuation of Richmond, and resulted in the destruction and surrender of the entire rebel army of Virginia under command of General Lee.

The news of the battles about Petersburg reached me at Goldsboro' on the sixth of April. Up to that time my purpose was to move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh and striking straight for Burksville, thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the auspicious events in Virginia had changed the whole military problem, and in the expressive language of Lieutenant-General Grant, "the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston" became the "strategic points." General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and my task was to capture or destroy the latter. Johnston at that time, April six, had his army well in hand about Smithfield, interposing between me and Raleigh. I estimated his infantry and artillery at thirty-five thousand, and his cavalry from six thousand to ten thousand. He was superior to me in cavalry, so that I held General Kilpatrick in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on the tenth of April.

At daybreak of the day appointed all the heads of columns were in motion straight against the enemy, Major-General H. W. Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield; Major-General O. O. Howard making a circuit by the right and feigning up the Weldon road, to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west side of the Neuse river, and aiming to reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Schofield followed General Slocum in support.

All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsboro', more or less cavalry, with the usual

rail barricades, which were swept before us as chaff, and by ten a. m. of the eleventh the Fourteenth corps entered Smithfield, the Twentieth corps close at hand. Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse river, and, having his railroad to lighten up his trains, could retreat faster than we could pursue. The rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary to pass even ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible Major-General Slocum got up his pontoons and crossed over a division of the Fourteenth corps. We there heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, which was announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy. Not an officer or soldier of my armies but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of Armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that held them so long in check, and their success gave new impulse to finish up our task. Without a moment's hesitation we dropped our trains and marched rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place at 7:30 a. m. of the thirteenth in a heavy rain. The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to Durham's station, the Fifteenth corps following as far as Morrisville station, and the Seventeenth corps to Jones' station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railroad as a line of retreat, by Hillsboro', Greensboro', Salisbury, Charlotte, &c., I had turned the other columns across the bend of that road toward Ashboro' (See Special Field Orders number fifty-five.) The cavalry, Brevet Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding, was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit to the "Company's Shops," in Alamance county; Major-General O. O. Howard to turn to the left by Hackney's cross-roads, Pittsboro', St. Lawrence and Ashboro'; Major-General H. W. Slocum to cross Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills; Major-General J. M. Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, and with his spare force to follow an intermediate route.

By the fifteenth, though the rains were incessant and the roads almost impracticable, Major-General Slocum had the Fourteenth corps, Brevet Major-General Davis commanding, near Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear river at Aven's ferry, with the Twentieth corps, Major-General Mower commanding, in support, and Major-General Howard had the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps stretched out on the roads toward Pittsboro', while General Kilpatrick held Durham's Station and Chapel Hill University.

Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from Hillsboro' to Greensboro', he himself at Greensboro'. Although out of place as to time, I here invite all military critics who study the problems of war to take their maps and compare the position of my army on the

fifteenth and sixteenth of April, with that of General Halleck about Burksville and Petersburg, Virginia, on the twenty-sixth of April, when, according to his telegram to Secretary Stanton, he offered to relieve me of the task of "cutting off Johnston's retreat." Major-General Stoneman at the time was at Statesville, and Johnston's only line of retreat was by Salisbury and Charlotte. It may be that General Halleck's troops can outmarch mine, but there is nothing in their past history to show it, or it may be that General Halleck can inspire his troops with more energy of action. I doubt that also, save and except in this single instance, when he knew the enemy was ready to surrender or disperse, as advised by my letter of April eighteen, addressed to him when Chief of Staff at Washington city, and delivered at Washington on the twenty-first instant by Major Hitchcock, of my staff.

Thus matters stood at the time I received General Johnston's first letter and made my answer of April fourteenth, copies of which were sent with all expedition to Lieutenant-General Grant and the Secretary of War, with my letter of April fifteenth. I agreed to meet General Johnston in person at a point intermediate between our pickets on the seventeenth at noon, provided the position of the troops remained *status quo*. I was both willing and anxious thus to consume a few days, as it would enable Colonel Wright to finish our railroad to Raleigh.

Two bridges had to be built and twelve miles of new road made. We had no iron except by taking up that on the branch from Goldsboro' to Weldon. Instead of losing by time I gained in every way, for every hour of delay possible was required to reconstruct the railroad to our rear and improve the condition of our wagon-roads to the front, so desirable in case the negotiations failed, and we be forced to make the race of nearly two hundred miles to head off or catch Johnston's army, then retreating toward Charlotte.

At noon of the day appointed I met General Johnston for the first time in my life, although we had been interchanging shots constantly since May, 1863.

Our interview was frank and soldier-like, and he gave me to understand that further war on the part of the Confederate troops was folly; that the cause was lost; and that every life sacrificed after the surrender of Lee's army was the highest possible crime. He admitted that the terms conceded to General Lee were magnanimous and all he could ask, but he did want some general concessions that would enable him to allay the natural fears and anxiety of his followers, and enable him to maintain his control over them until they could be got back to the neighborhood of their homes, thereby saving the State of North Carolina the devastations inevitably to result from turning his men loose and unprovided on the spot, and our pursuit across the State.

He also wanted to embrace in the same general proposition the fate of all the Confederate armies that remained in existence. I never made any concession as to his own army, or assumed to deal finally or authoritatively in regard to any other, but it did seem to me that there was presented a chance for peace that might be deemed valuable to the Government of the United States, and was at least worth the few days that would be consumed in reference.

To push an army whose commander had so frankly and honestly confessed his inability to cope with me were cowardly and unworthy the brave men I led.

Inasmuch as General Johnston did not feel authorized to pledge his power over the armies of Texas, we adjourned to meet next day at noon. I returned to Raleigh and conferred freely with all my general officers, every one of whom urged me to conclude terms that might accomplish so complete and desirable an end. All dreaded the weary and laborious march after a fugitive and dissolving army back toward Georgia, almost over the very country where we had toiled so long. There was but one opinion expressed, and if contrary ones were entertained they were withheld, or indulged in only by that class who shun the fight and the march, but are loudest, bravest, and fiercest when danger is past. I again met General Johnston on the eighteenth, and we renewed the conversation. He satisfied me then of his power to disband the rebel armies in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, as well as those in his immediate command—namely, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Georgia.

The points on which he expressed especial solicitude were lest their States were to be dismembered and denied representation in Congress, or any separate political existence whatever, and that the absolute disarming his men would leave the South powerless and exposed to depredations by wicked bands of assassins and robbers.

President Lincoln's message of 1864; his amnesty proclamation; General Grant's terms to General Lee, substantially extending the benefits of that proclamation to all officers above the rank of colonel; the invitation to the Virginia legislature to reassemble in Richmond by General Weitzel, with the approval of Mr. Lincoln and General Grant, then on the spot; a firm belief that I had been fighting to re-establish the Constitution of the United States; and last, and not least, the general and universal desire to close a war any longer without organized resistance, were the leading facts that induced me to pen the "memorandum" of April eighteen, signed by myself and General Johnston.

It was designed to be, and so expressed on its face, as a mere "basis" for reference to the President of the United States and constitutional commander-in-chief, to enable him, if he chose, at one blow to dissipate the military power of the Confederacy, which had threatened the na-

tional safety for years. It admitted of modification, alteration, and change. It had no appearance of an ultimatum, and by no false reasoning can it be construed into an usurpation of power on my part. I have my opinions on the questions involved, and I will stand by the memorandum; but this forms no part of a military report. Immediately on my return to Raleigh I despatched one of my staff, Major Hitchcock, to Washington, enjoining him to be most prudent and careful to avoid the spies and informers that would be sure to infect him by the way, and to say nothing to anybody until the President could make known to me his wishes and policy in the matter.

The news of President Lincoln's assassination on the fourteenth of April (wrongly reported to me by telegraph as having occurred on the eleventh) reached me on the seventeenth, and was announced to my command on the same day in Special Field Orders No. 56. I was duly impressed with its horrible atrocity and probable effect upon the country; but when the property and interests of millions still living were involved, I saw no good reason to change my course, but thought rather to manifest real respect for his memory by following after his death that policy which, if living, I feel certain he would have approved, or at least not rejected with disdain.

Up to that hour I had never received one word of instruction, advice, or counsel as to the "plan or policy" of Government looking to a restoration of peace on the part of the rebel States of the South. Whenever asked for an opinion on the points involved, I had always evaded the subject. My letter to the mayor of Atlanta has been published to the world, and I was not rebuked by the War Department for it.

My letter to Mr. N— W—, at Savannah, was shown by me to Mr. Stanton before its publication, and all that my memory retains of his answer is that he said, like my letters generally, it was sufficiently "emphatic, and could not be misunderstood."

Both these letters asserted my belief that, according to Mr. Lincoln's proclamation and messages, when the people of the South had laid down their arms and submitted to the lawful power of the United States, *ipso facto* the war was over as to them; and furthermore that if any State in rebellion would conform to the Constitution of the United States, "cease war," elect senators and representatives to Congress, if admitted (of which each house of Congress alone is the judge), that State became instantan as much in the Union as New York or Ohio. Nor was I rebuked for this expression, though it was universally known and commented on at the time. And again, Mr. Stanton, in person, at Savannah, speaking of the terrific expenses of the war, and difficulty of realizing the money necessary for the daily wants of the government, impressed me most forcibly with the necessity of bringing the war

to a close as soon as possible for financial reasons.

On the evening of April twenty-three Major Hitchcock reported his return to Morehead City with despatches, of which fact General Johnston, at Hillsboro', was notified, so as to be ready in the morning for an answer. At six o'clock A. M. on the twenty-fourth Major Hitchcock arrived, accompanied by General Grant and members of his staff, who had not telegraphed the fact of his coming over our exposed road for prudential reasons.

I soon learned that the memorandum was disapproved, without reasons assigned, and I was ordered to give the forty-eight hours' notice, and resume hostilities at the close of that time, governing myself by the substance of a despatch then enclosed, dated March third, twelve noon, at Washington, District of Columbia, from Secretary Stanton to General Grant, at City Point, but not accompanied by any part of the voluminous matter so liberally lavished on the public in the New York journals of the twenty-fourth of April. That was the first and only time I ever saw that telegram, or had one word of instruction on the important matter involved in it; and it does seem strange to me that every bar-room loafer in New York can read in the morning journals "official" matter that is withheld from a general whose command extends from Kentucky to North Carolina.

Within an hour a courier was riding from Durham's Station toward Hillsboro' with notice to General Johnston of the suspension of the truce, and renewing my demand for the surrender of the armies under his immediate command (see two letters, April twenty-four, six A. M.), and at twelve noon I had the receipt of his picket officer.

I therefore published my Orders No. 62 to the troops terminating the truce at twelve M. on the twenty-sixth, and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that hour on the routes prescribed in Special Field Order No. 55, April fourteen, from the positions held April eighteen.

General Grant had orders from the President, through the Secretary of War, to direct military movements, and I explained to him the exact position of the troops, and he approved of it most emphatically; but he did not relieve me or express a wish to assume command. All things were in readiness, when, on the evening of the twenty-fifth, I received another letter from General Johnston asking another interview to renew negotiations.

General Grant not only approved, but urged me to accept, and I appointed a meeting at our former place at noon of the twenty-sixth, the very hour fixed for the renewal of hostilities. General Johnston was delayed by an accident to his train, but at two P. M. arrived. We then consulted, concluded and signed the final terms of capitulation. These were taken by me back to Raleigh, submitted to General

Grant, and met his immediate approval and signature. General Johnston was not even aware of the presence of General Grant at Raleigh at the time.

Thus was surrendered to us the second great army of the so-called Confederacy, and though undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to the country, without the loss of a single life to those gallant men who had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not want to fight. As for myself, I know my motives, and challenge the instance during the past four years where an armed and defiant foe stood before me that I did not go in for a fight, and I would blush for shame if I ever insulted or struck a fallen foe. The instant the terms of surrender were approved by General Grant, I made my Orders No. 65, assigning to each of my subordinate commanders his share of the work, and with General Grant's approval, made Special Field Orders No. 66, putting in motion my old army (no longer required in Carolina) northward for Richmond. General Grant left Raleigh at nine A. M. of the twenty-seventh, and I glory in the fact that during his three days' stay with me I did not detect in his language or manner one particle of abatement in the confidence, respect, and affection that have existed between us throughout all the varied events of the past war, and though we have honestly differed in opinion in other cases, as well as this, still we respected each other's honest convictions.

I still adhere to my then opinions, that, by a few general concessions, "glittering generalities," all of which in the end must and will be conceded to the organized States of the South, this day there would not be an armed battalion opposed to us within the broad area of the dominions of the United States. Robbers and assassins must in any event result from the disbandment of large armies, but even these should be and could be taken care of by the local civil authorities without being made a charge on the national treasury. On the evening of the twenty-eighth, having concluded all business requiring my personal attention at Raleigh, and having conferred with every army commander and delegated to him the authority necessary for his future action, I despatched my headquarters wagons by land along with the Seventeenth corps, the office in charge of General Webster from Newbern to Alexandria, Virginia, by sea, and in person, accompanied only by my personal staff, hastened to Savannah, to direct matters in the interior of South Carolina and Georgia. I had received across the rebel telegraph wires cipher despatches from General Wilson at Macon, to the effect that he was in receipt of my Orders No. 65, and would send

General Upton's division to Augusta, General McCook's division to Tallahassee, to receive the surrender of those garrisons, take charge of the public property, and execute the paroles required by the terms of the surrender. He reported a sufficiency of forage for his horses in South-west Georgia, but asked me to send him a supply of clothing, sugar, coffee, &c., by way of Augusta, Georgia, whence he could get it by rail.

I therefore went rapidly to Goldsboro' and Wilmington, reaching the latter city at ten A. M. of the twenty-ninth, and the same day embarked for Hilton Head in the blockade-runner *Russia*, Captain A. M. Smith. I found General Q. A. Gillmore, commanding Department of the South, at Hilton Head, on the evening of April thirtieth, and ordered him to send to Augusta at once what clothing and small stores he could spare for General Wilson, and to open up a line of certain communication and supply with him at Macon. Within an hour the captured steamboats *Jeff Davis* and *Amazon*, both adapted to the shallow and crooked navigation of the Savannah river, were being loaded, the one at Savannah and the other at Hilton Head. The former started up the river on the first of May, in charge of a very intelligent officer (whose name I cannot recall) and forty-eight men, all the boat could carry, with orders to occupy temporarily the United States arsenal at Augusta, and to open up communication with General Wilson at Macon, in the event that General McCook's division of cavalry was not already there. The *Amazon* followed next day, and General Gillmore had made the necessary orders for a brigade of infantry, to be commanded by General Molyneux, to follow by a land march to Augusta as its permanent garrison. Another brigade of infantry was ordered to occupy Orangeburg, South Carolina, the point furthest in the interior that can at present be reached by rail from the sea-coast (Charleston).

On the first of May I went on to Savannah, where General Gillmore also joined me, and the arrangements ordered for the occupation of Augusta were consummated.

At Savannah I found the city in the most admirable police, under direction of Brevet Major-General Grover, and the citizens manifested the most unqualified joy to hear that, so far as they were concerned, the war was over. All classes, Union men as well as former rebels, did not conceal, however, the apprehensions naturally arising from a total ignorance of the political conditions to be attached to their future state. Anything at all would be preferable to this dread uncertainty.

On the evening of the second of May I returned to Hilton Head, and there, for the first time, received the New York papers of April twenty-eighth, containing Secretary Stanton's despatch of nine A. M. of the twenty-seventh of April to General Dix, including General Halleck's, from Richmond, of nine P. M. of the night before, which seems to have been rushed with

extreme haste before an excited public, namely, morning of the twenty-eighth. You will observe from the dates that these despatches were running back and forth from Richmond and Washington to New York, and there published, while General Grant and I were together in Raleigh, North Carolina, adjusting, to the best of our ability, the terms of surrender of the only remaining formidable rebel army in existence at the time east of the Mississippi river. Not one word of intimation had been sent to me of the displeasure of the Government with my official conduct, but only the naked disapproval of a skeleton memorandum sent properly for the action of the President of the United States.

The most objectionable features of my memorandum had already (April twenty-fourth) been published to the world in violation of official usage, and the contents of my accompanying letters to General Halleck, General Grant, and Mr. Stanton, of even date, though at hand, were suppressed.

In all these letters I had stated clearly and distinctly that Johnston's army would not fight, but, if pushed, would "disband" and "scatter" into small and dangerous guerrilla parties as injurious to the interests of the United States as to the rebels themselves; that all parties admitted that the rebel cause of the South was abandoned; that the negro was free; and that the temper of all was most favorable to a lasting peace. I say all these opinions of mine were withheld from the public with a seeming purpose; and I do contend that my official experience and former services, as well as my past life and familiarity with the people and geography of the South, entitled my opinions to at least a decent respect.

Although this despatch (Mr. Stanton's of April twenty-seventh) was printed "official," it had come to me only in the questionable newspaper paragraph, headed "Sherman's truce disregarded."

I had already done what General Wilson wanted me to do, namely, had sent him supplies of clothing and food, with clear and distinct orders and instructions how to carry out in Western Georgia the terms for the surrender of arms and paroling of prisoners made by General Johnston's capitulation of April twenty-sixth, and had properly and most opportunely ordered General Gillmore to occupy Orangeburg and Augusta, strategic points of great value at all times, in peace or war; but as the Secretary had taken upon himself to order my subordinate generals to disobey my "orders," I explained to General Gillmore that I would no longer confuse him or General Wilson with "orders" that might conflict with those of the Secretary, which, as reported, were sent, not through me, but in open disregard of me and of my lawful authority.

It now becomes my duty to point, in justly severe characters, the still more offensive and dangerous matter of General Halleck's despatch of April twenty-sixth to the Secretary of War,

embodied in his to General Dix of April twenty-seventh.

General Halleck had been Chief of Staff of the army at Washington, in which capacity he must have received my official letter of April eighteenth, wherein I wrote clearly that if Johnston's army about Greensboro' were "pushed" it would "disperse," an event I wished to prevent. About that time he seems to have been sent from Washington to Richmond to command the new military division of the James, in assuming charge of which, on the twenty-second, he defines the limits of his authority to be the "Department of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac, and such part of North Carolina as may not be occupied by the command of Major-General Sherman." (See his General Orders No. 1). Four days later, April twenty-sixth, he reports to the Secretary that he has ordered Generals Meade, Sheridan, and Wright, to invade that part of North Carolina which was occupied by my command, and pay "no regard to any truce or orders of" mine. They were ordered to "push forward, regardless of any orders save those of Lieutenant-General Grant, and cut off Johnston's retreat." He knew at the time he penned that despatch and made those orders, that Johnston was not retreating, but was halted under a forty-eight hours' truce with me, and was laboring to surrender his command and prevent its dispersion into guerrilla bands, and that I had on the spot a magnificent army at my command, amply sufficient for all purposes required by the occasion.

The plan of cutting off a retreat from the direction of Burkville and Danville is hardly worthy one of his military education and genius. When he contemplated an act so questionable as the violation of a "truce" made by competent authority within his sphere of command, he should have gone himself and not have sent subordinates, for he knew I was bound in honor to defend and maintain my own truce and pledge of faith, even at the cost of many lives.

When an officer pledges the faith of his government, he is bound to defend it, and he is no soldier who would violate it knowingly.

As to Davis and his stolen treasure, did General Halleck, as Chief of Staff or commanding officer of the neighboring military division, notify me of the facts contained in his despatch to the Secretary? No, he did not. If the Secretary of War wanted Davis caught, why not order it, instead of, by publishing in the newspapers, putting him on his guard to hide away and escape? No orders or instructions to catch Davis or his stolen treasure ever came to me; but on the contrary, I was led to believe that the Secretary of War rather preferred he should effect an escape from the country, if made "unknown" to him. But even on this point I enclose a copy of my letter to Admiral Dahlgren, at Charleston, sent him by a fleet steamer from Wilmington on the twenty-fifth of April, two days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis' move-

ments, designed doubtless to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch their treasure for their own use.

I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the twenty-sixth, and had acted on it before General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I don't believe a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck or anybody has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my command.

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's despatch is wherein he goes out of his way, and advises that my subordinates, Generals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.

This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's truce disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the New York papers of April twenty-eighth.

During the night of May second, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the Department of the South, I began my return to meet my troops then marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the third we ran into Charleston harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection; also General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullafinny camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false doctrine is again preached in our Union.

We left Charleston on the evening of the third of May, and hastened with all possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the fourth. I immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that the Lieutenant-General commanding the armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensboro' reported about thirty thousand (30,000) already made, and that the greater part of the North

Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers, but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About eight hundred (800) of the rebel cavalry had gone south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be encouraged to go and stay; they would be a nuisance to any civilized government, whether loose or in prison.

With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." When to the number of men surrendered at Greensboro' are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts, I have no doubt fifty thousand (50,000) armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation made near Durham's station, North Carolina, on the twenty-sixth of April, and that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.

On the fifth of May I received and here subjoin a further despatch from General Schofield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide the military remedy.

[By telegraph]

RALEIGH, NORTH CAROLINA, May 5, 1865.

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. I hope the Government will make known its policy in the organ of State governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done; the people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite settlement.

What is to be done with the freedmen is the question of all, and is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State, it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here, it cannot be done too soon, for he will probably undo the most that I shall have done. I shall be glad to hear from you freely when you have time to write.

I will send your message to Wilson at once.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
Morehead City.

I give this despatch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters

with the military, and how almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act a purely military part.

There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal with no other sort. The marshals and sheriffs with their *posses* (of which the military may become a part), are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and marauders. But I will not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject, but instance the case to show how difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of the rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel embarrassed by them.

General Schofield, at Raleigh, has a well-appointed and well-disciplined command, is in telegraph communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all strategic points.

In like manner General Gillmore is well situated in all respects except as to rapid communication with the seat of the general Government. I leave him also with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department; and General Wilson has in the very heart of Georgia the strongest, best-appointed, and best-equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of Savannah river that simplifies his military problem, so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.

I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for any "orders" they may have received from me, and the President of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and willing to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past, and I shall confine my attention to the army composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, the Fourteenth and Twentieth corps, unless the Commanding General of the armies of the United States orders otherwise.

At four p. m. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on the James river, opposite Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march toward Alexandria.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

Doc. 110.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE SOUTH-WEST, }
NEW ORLEANS, Louisiana, July 16, 1865. }

GENERAL—I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command in the campaign from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, to the armies in front of Peters-

burg, beginning February twenty-seventh, and ending March twenty-eighth.

The command consisted of the First and Third divisions of cavalry, of the Army of the Shenandoah, under the immediate command of Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, Brevet Major-General George A. Custer commanding the Third division, and Brigadier-General T. C. Devin, the first. The following was the effective force:

Effective Force First and Third Cavalry Divisions, Army of the Shenandoah, February Twenty-eighth, 1865—Major-General Wesley Merritt, Chief of Cavalry.

	CONDENSED OFFICERS.	ESTIMATED MEN.
First cavalry division, Brigadier-General T. C. Devin, commanding.....	260	4,787
One section (companies C and E) Fourth United States artillery.....	2	52
Third cavalry division, Brevet Major-General George A. Custer commanding.....	240	4,800
One section (Company M) Second United States artillery.....	1	45
Total.....	503	9,484

On the morning of February twenty-seventh, 1865, we marched from Winchester up the valley pike with five days' rations in haversacks, and fifteen days' rations of coffee, sugar and salt in wagons, thirty pounds of forage on each horse, one wagon for division headquarters, eight ambulances and our ammunition train. No other wagons, except a pontoon train of eight boats, were permitted to accompany the command.

My orders were to destroy the Virginia Central railroad, the James river canal, capture Lynchburg, if practicable, and then join Major-General Sherman wherever he might be found in North Carolina, or return to Winchester, but in joining General Sherman I must be governed by the position of affairs after the capture of Lynchburg.

The command was in fine condition, but the weather was very bad, as the spring thaw, with heavy rains, had already come on.

The valley and surrounding mountains were covered with snow which was fast disappearing, putting all the streams nearly past fording. On our first day's march we crossed Cedar creek, Tumbling river, and Tom's brook, and went into camp at Woodstock, having marched thirty miles. At six o'clock in the morning of the twenty-eighth instant the march was resumed through Edinburg and across the north fork of the Shenandoah river, and through Newmarket, going into camp at Lacey's spring, nine miles north of Harrisonburg; the crossing of the north fork of the Shenandoah was by a pontoon bridge. Small bands of guerrillas hovered on our flanks during the day, but no effort was made to drive them off, and no damage was done by them; distance marched, twenty-nine miles. The march was resumed at six o'clock on the morning of the twenty-ninth, through Harrisonburg and Mount Crawford, and camp pitched on Middle river at Kline's mills. Guerrillas hovered around us during the march, and at

Mount Crawford General Rosser, with two or three hundred cavalry, attempted to burn the bridge over the middle fork of the Shenandoah, but did not succeed; two of Capehart's regiments swam the river above the bridge, charged Rosser and routed him, driving him rapidly to Kline's mills, the advance pushing almost to Staunton; but few of the enemy were killed, thirty taken prisoners, and twenty ambulances and wagons with their contents were captured and destroyed; our loss was five men wounded. Kline's mills are seven miles from Staunton, where the headquarters of General Early were said to be. Not knowing but that he would fight at Staunton, Colonel Stagg's brigade of General Devin's division was ordered to destroy the railroad bridge over Christian's creek, between Staunton and Waynesboro, to prevent his getting reinforcements by rail, or in case he would not stand, to prevent him carrying off supplies and ordnance stores; the bridge was burned, but General Early, learning of our approach, made hasty retreat to Waynesboro, leaving word in Staunton that he intended to fight at that place. The next morning we entered Staunton. The question then arose in my mind whether I should pursue my course on to Lynchburg, leaving General Early in my rear, or go out and fight him with my cavalry against his infantry and what cavalry he could collect, defeat him, and open a way through Rock Fish Gap, and have everything in my own hands for the accomplishment of that portion of my instructions which directed the destruction of the Central railroad and James river canal. I decided upon the latter course, and General Custer's division (Third), composed of Colonels Wells', Pennington's, and Capehart's brigades, was directed to take up the pursuit, followed closely by General Devin's division, composed of General Gibbs' and Colonels Fitzhugh's and Stagg's brigades. The rain had been pouring in torrents for two-days and the roads were bad

beyond description; nevertheless the men pushed boldly on, although horses and men could scarcely be recognized for the mud which covered them. General Custer found General Early, as he had promised, at Waynesboro', in a well-chosen position, with two brigades of infantry and some cavalry under General Rosser, the infantry occupying breastworks. Custer, without waiting for the enemy to get up his courage over the delay of a careful reconnoissance, made his dispositions for attack at once, sending three regiments around the left flank of the enemy, which was somewhat exposed by being advanced from instead of resting upon the bank of the river in his immediate rear; he, with the other two brigades, partly mounted and partly dismounted, at a given signal, boldly attacked and impetuously carried the enemy's works, while the Eighth New York and the First Connecticut cavalry, who were formed in columns of fours, charged over the breast work and continued the charge through the little town of Waynesboro', sabering a few men as they went along, and did not stop until they had crossed the south fork of the Shenandoah river, which was immediately in General Early's rear, where they formed as foragers, and with drawn sabres held the east bank of the stream. The enemy threw down their arms and surrendered with cheers at the suddenness with which they were captured. The general officers present at this engagement were Generals Early, Long, Wharton, Lilley, and Rosser, and it has always been a wonder to me how they escaped, unless they hid in obscure places in the houses of the town. Colonel Capehart, with his brigade, continued the pursuit of the enemy's train which was stretched for miles over the mountains, and the other two brigades pushed rapidly after him, with orders to encamp on the east side of the Blue Ridge. The substantial results of this brilliant fight were eleven pieces of artillery with horses and caissons complete, about two hundred wagons and teams, all loaded with subsistence, camp and garrison equipage, ammunition and officers' baggage, seventeen battle-flags, and sixteen hundred officers and enlisted men. The results in a military point of view were very great, as the crossing of the Blue Ridge, covered with snow as it was, at any other point would have been difficult. Before leaving Staunton for Waynesboro', I obtained information of a large amount of rebel property at Swoop's depot, on the Lexington railroad, and sent a party to destroy it, which was done; a list of which property will be attached to this report. General Custer's division encamped at Brookfield, on the east side of the Blue Ridge, General Devin's division remaining at Waynesboro'. The next morning the prisoners were sent back to Winchester, under a guard of about fifteen hundred men, commanded by Colonel J. H. Thompson, First New Hampshire cavalry, who safely reached that point, notwithstanding he was harassed by General Rosser's command as far as the crossing of the north fork of the Shenau-

doah near Mount Jackson, at which point General Rosser made a fierce attack upon him and tried to rescue the prisoners, but he was handsomely repulsed by Colonel Thompson, who captured some of his men and finally arrived at his destination with all his own prisoners and some of Rosser's men besides. General Devin resumed his march at six A. M., leaving General Gibbs' brigade to destroy the iron bridge over the south fork of the Shenandoah, and to burn and destroy the captured wagons and their contents. General Custer moved on toward Charlottesville, destroying much government property and subsistence at Greenwood depot and Ivy station, also the railroad and the large bridge over Meacham's river, arriving at Charlottesville at four P. M., the mayor and several of the most prominent citizens meeting him in the suburbs of the city and delivering up the keys of the public buildings.

The roads from Waynesboro' to Charlottesville had, from the incessant rains and spring thaws, become so terribly cut up, and the mud was of such a depth, that it was impossible for our train to reach Charlottesville under two days. I therefore notified the command that we would remain two days at this point for the purpose of resting, refitting, and destroying the railroad; parties were sent well out toward Gordonsville to break the railroad, and also about fifteen miles toward Lynchburg for the same purpose, to prevent troops massing on me from either Richmond or Lynchburg. A thorough and systematic destruction of the railroads was then commenced, including the large iron bridges over the north and south forks of the Rivanna river, and the work was continued until the evening of the fifth instant, when General Gibbs reported with our trains; forage and subsistence was found in great abundance in the vicinity of Charlottesville. Commodore Hollins of the confederate navy was killed while trying to escape from a scouting party from General Custer's division. This necessary delay forced me to abandon the idea of capturing Lynchburg, but trusty scouts had been sent there to find out the state of affairs in that vicinity. When the time to start came I determined to separate into two columns, sending General Devin's division, under immediate command of General Merritt, to Scottsville, thence to march along the James river canal, destroying every lock as far as Newmarket, while with Custer's division I pushed on up the Lynchburg railroad through North and South Gardens, destroying it as far as Amherst Court-house, sixteen miles from Lynchburg, and then moved across the country and united with General Merritt's column at Newmarket.

General Merritt started on the morning of the sixth, first sending the First Michigan cavalry, Colonel Maxwell commanding, down the Rivanna river to Palmyra and toward Columbia, with directions to rejoin him at Scottsville. General Merritt thoroughly accomplished his orders, destroying all large flour-mills, woollen factories,

and manufacturing establishments, tearing up and demolishing all the locks on the James river canal from Scottsville to Newmarket. I had directed him to try and obtain possession of the bridge across the James river at Duiguiddsville, intending to hold it and strike the Southside railroad at Appomattox depot, and follow up its destruction to Farmville, where the High bridge crosses the Appomattox. A bold dash was made to secure this bridge, but without avail, as the enemy had covered it with inflammable materials and set it on fire the instant their scouts signalled the approach of our forces; they also and by the same means burned the bridge across the James river at Hardwicksville, leaving me master of all the country north of the James river. My eight pontoons would not reach half way across the river, and my scouts from Lynchburg reported the enemy concentrating at that point from the west, together with a portion of General Pickett's division from Richmond and Fitz Lee's cavalry. It was here that I fully determined to join the armies of the Lieutenant-General in front of Petersburg, instead of going back to Winchester, and also make a more complete destruction of the James river canal and the Virginia Central and Fredericksburg railroads, connecting Richmond with Lynchburg and Gordonsville. I now had all the advantage, and by hurrying quickly down the canal and destroying it as near Richmond as Goochland or beyond, and then moving up to the railroad and destroying it as close up to the city as possible in the same manner I did toward Lynchburg, I felt convinced I was striking a hard blow by destroying the means of supply to the rebel capital, and, to a certain extent, the Army of Northern Virginia, besides leaving the troops now concentrating at Lynchburg without anything to oppose them, and forcing them to return to Richmond. This conception was at once decided upon and Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade was ordered to proceed to Goochland and beyond, immediately, destroying every lock upon the canal and cutting the banks wherever practicable. The next morning the entire command moved from Newmarket down the canal leisurely, and completely destroying the locks and banks about the aqueducts, and in some places cutting the banks; the rain and mud still impeded us, and the command, particularly the transportation, was much worn and fatigued; however, by replacing our worn-out mules with those captured from General Early's trains, and with the assistance of nearly two thousand negroes who attached themselves to the command, we managed to get along in very good shape, reaching Columbia on the evening of the tenth instant, at which place we were rejoined by Colonel Fitzhugh's brigade.

Colonel Fitzhugh had destroyed the canal about eight miles east of Goochland, thereby reducing it to a very small length. At Columbia we took one day's rest, and I here sent a communication to the Lieutenant-General commanding the Army of Northern Virginia, notifying him of our success,

position, and condition, and requesting supplies to be sent to White House. My anxiety now was to be able to cross the Pamunkey. I felt confident that the enemy would march out a heavy force and try to destroy my command and prevent me from crossing the river. The railroad from Richmond to Gordonsville was still intact, and to go south of the Pamunkey river, and between it and Richmond, I regarded as too hazardous, and I was fearful that the enemy might use it to get on my flank and rear. General Custer was therefore directed to strike the railroad at Frederick's Hall and General Merritt at Louisa Court-house. General Custer was ordered to thoroughly destroy the track toward Richmond as far as Beaver Dam, while General Merritt did the same thing from Louisa Court-house to Frederick's Hall. While at this latter place Major Young's scouts from Richmond notified me of preparations being made to prevent me from getting to the James river, and that Pickett's division of infantry was coming back from Lynchburg *via* the Southside railroad, as was also the cavalry, but that no advance from Richmond had yet taken place. I at once determined that there was no way to stop me unless General Longstreet marched directly for the White House, and that he would be unable to do so if I pushed boldly on toward Richmond, as he would be forced to come out and meet me near Ashland; then I could withdraw, cross South and North Anna and march to White House on north side of the Pamunkey. It proved true. But, to divert from the narrative; when General Custer struck Frederick's Hall Station he entered it so suddenly that he captured the telegraph office with all the despatches. Among them was one from Lieutenant-General Early to General Lee, stating that he had been informed that Sheridan's forces were approaching Goochland, and that he intended to move up with two hundred cavalry which he had, and attack them in the flank at daylight. General Custer immediately ordered a regiment of cavalry in pursuit of this bold party, which in about two hours it overtook, attacked, and captured or dispersed in every direction, Lieutenant-General Early escaping on a side road with five or six orderlies and two staff officers; he was, however, closely followed by a small detachment, and his staff officers captured, he barely escaping over the South Anna with a single orderly, and the next day he made his way to Richmond, after a campaign in the Shenandoah valley in which he lost nearly the whole of his army, together with his battle-flags, and nearly every piece of artillery which his troops opened upon us, and also a large part of his transportation. But to resume: General Custer in the morning of the fourteenth instant was directed to push down the Negro-foot road and cross the South Anna. He sent his scouting parties up to within eleven miles of Richmond, where they burned a hospital train. The object of this move was to divert the attention of the enemy from the North and South Anna

bridges and bridges over Little river, which Merritt was ordered to destroy with Devin's division; Custer's main column meanwhile being held at the Negro-foot crossing of the South Anna. General Merritt was ordered to follow the railroad to Hanover Junction, cross the Little river, and go into camp on the north bank of South Anna. In the attack upon the railroad bridge over the South Anna, the Fifth United States cavalry charged up to the bridge, dismounted, dashed across it, and drove away the company of artillery who tried to defend it, and turned their own guns—four twenty-pounder Parrotts—upon them. I here received a despatch from the Lieutenant-General that supplies were at the White House for me, and one brigade of infantry; and also captured the following despatch, which led me to doubt whether General Longstreet had yet determined in his own mind where I was going:

HANOVER JUNCTION, March 14—11.25.

[By telegraph from Richmond.]

COLONEL HASKELL—General Longstreet desires you to follow the enemy if he goes east, until he crosses the Rapidan or Blue Ridge. If he goes toward the Peninsula follow as far as you can.

By order of Lieutenant-General Ewell:

T. O. CHESTNEY,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Next morning General Custer was ordered to move by the Negro-foot crossing of the South Anna, and thence to Ashland, and General Devin was ordered to proceed to the same point. This developed the situation. The prisoners captured in front of Ashland reported Longstreet, with Pickett's and Johnson's divisions and Fitz Lee's cavalry, on the Ashland road, in the direction of Richmond, and four miles from Ashland. My course was now clear and the feat successful. General Devin was quickly ordered to the north side of the South Anna and General Custer was ordered to follow, sending Colonel Pennington's brigade to amuse the enemy, cover his front, and gradually fall back. The whole command was, meanwhile, ordered to cross the North Anna and go into camp at Carmel church, and at daylight take up the line of march for White House, *via* Mangohick church. I then knew I could get to White House before the enemy, and that he could not operate upon the Chickahominy, as it would be too close to the lines of the Army of the James. The enemy, finding that he had made a mistake, moved rapidly during the night toward the Pamunkey, through Hanover Court-house, but forgot his pontoon trains and could not cross the river; it would have made no difference, however, as I then could have gotten to the White House without question.

At daylight on the morning of the sixteenth we leisurely resumed the march to White House, encamping at Mangohick church. On the seventeenth we marched to and encamped at Prince William Court-house. On the eight-

teenth we reached Indiantown, and on the nineteenth crossed the Pamunkey, at White House, on the railroad bridge, which had been repaired by Lieutenant-Colonel Babcock, of Lieutenant-General Grant's staff; we here found supplies in abundance.

The amount of private and public property collected for the use of the enemy, and destroyed, and the destruction of lines of communication and supplies was very great and beyond estimating.

Every bridge on the Central railroad between Richmond and Lynchburg, except the one over the Chickahominy and that over the James river at Lynchburg, and many of the culverts, were destroyed. The James river canal was disabled beyond any immediate repair. There, perhaps, never was a march where nature offered such impediments and shrouded herself in such gloom as upon this. Incessant rain, deep and almost impassable streams, swamps and mud were overcome with a constant cheerfulness on the part of the troops that was truly admirable. Both officers and men appeared buoyed up by the thought that we had completed our work in the valley of the Shenandoah, and that we were on our way to help our brothers in arms in front of Petersburg in the final struggle.

Our loss in horses was considerable, almost entirely from hoof-rot. After refitting at White House until the twenty-fourth instant, we resumed our march, crossing the Chickahominy at Jones' bridge, and arriving at and crossing the James river on the evening of March twenty-fifth, and on the following day, by direction of the Lieutenant-General, went into camp at Hancock's station, on the railroad in front of Petersburg. The whole number of prisoners captured on the march was about sixteen hundred, but some of them we were obliged to parole, as they were unable to keep up with the column, though, after the first three days, our marches did not average over eighteen miles per day.

To General Merritt, Chief of Cavalry, Generals Custer and T. C. Devin, division commanders, Generals Gibbs and Wells and Colonels Fitzhugh, Capehart, Stagg, and Pennington, brigade commanders, my staff, and every officer and man of the First and Third cavalry divisions I return my sincere thanks for patriotic, uncomplaining, and soldierly conduct.

To Major H. H. Young, of my staff, Chief of Scouts, and the thirty or forty men of his command who took their lives in their hands, cheerfully going wherever ordered, to obtain that great essential of success—information—I tender my gratitude. Ten of these men were lost. Our entire loss during the march did not exceed one hundred men; and some of these we left by the wayside, unable to bear the fatigues of the march.

This report should be regarded as the preface of my report of operations in front of Petersburg and Richmond, as my command only rested one day before its commencement.

I forward herewith list of prisoners captured, and property destroyed.

I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General.

Brevet Major-General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

Official:

E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18,
1865.

Doc. 111.

LOSS OF THE HOUSATONIC.

CHARLESTON, S. C., June 10, 1864.

Since the destruction of the Housatonic, at Charleston, nothing has been heard of Captain Dixon and his crew, by whom the act was accomplished. The following letter on the subject is addressed to Major-General Maury:

OFFICE SHERMAN'S DEFENSE,
CHARLESTON, April 29, 1864.

GENERAL—The United States sloop of war Housatonic was attacked and destroyed by Lieutenant Dixon and crew on the night of the seventeenth of February.* Since that time no information has been received of either boat or crew.

I am of the opinion that the torpedo being placed at the bow of the boat, she went into the hole made in the Housatonic by explosion of the torpedo, and did not have power sufficient to back out, consequently sunk with her.

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. M. GRAY,
Captain in charge Torpedoes.

To Major-General D. H. MAURY,
District of the Gulf, Mobile, Ala.

Doc. 112.

CAPTURE OF THE QUEEN CITY.

St. LOUIS, July 2, 1864.

The rebel General Shelby attacked the gunboat Queen City, No. 26, on the morning of the twenty-fourth instant, while lying off Clarendon, on White River, at anchor. The attack was made between three and four o'clock A. M., with a battery of four guns, two ten and two twelve pounders, at a range of about one hundred yards. The combat was terrible for a short time. The machinery of the Queen City was soon disabled, and the Commander, Captain Hickey, commenced dropping with the current, with a view to get a range for his guns, which it was difficult to do owing to the high banks and narrow stream.

After a contest of nearly an hour he was com-

pelled to surrender, previous to which he informed his men, and gave them the privilege of trying the only means of escape (swimming to the shore on the opposite bank), if they preferred that to surrender.

Many of the men took to the water, most of them reaching the shore in safety. A few were shot in the water. The boat was surrendered to Shelby in a disabled condition, together with about thirty officers and men. Most of the men were colored seamen and of their fate there is no reliable intelligence. The officers were divided into three squads and sent in different directions under flags of truce; one to Duvall's Bluff with Captain Hickey, his pilot, and a cabin boy, another to Helena, which had been there two days when the Platte Valley passed; the third not heard from. Upon getting possession of the Queen City, Shelby improved his time by taking her effects ashore as quickly as possible. The paymaster is supposed to have had about \$6,000 in money. She had a good supply of clothing, which was appropriated by Shelby's men, as was evident from the amount of rags left on the bank. He also got a twelve-pound howitzer, mounted on two wheels, which gave him five guns to hold the point with. At about nine o'clock the same morning he was apprised of the approach of the gunboats Tyler, Fawn, and Naumkeag, in convoy of a fleet of ten transports, in command of Captain Bache, of the Tyler. He having learned of the disaster to the Queen City, through the refugees from her, had ordered the transports back to the bluff, and proceeded with despatch to Clarendon. On his approach to the bluff, Shelby fired her to make his work of destruction more complete. The explosion was heard many miles, and the Queen City was a thing of the past. Before the smoke had cleared away, Captain Bache, of the Tyler, Captain Grace, of the Fawn, and Captain Rogers, of the Naumkeag (a noble trio), approached. General Shelby had chosen a position to give them battle, and, with a bravery worthy of a better cause, the rebel General, with his men, worked their batteries. Well did they stand the repeated broadsides of the boats, as they ran the batteries; nor was there any apparent finching on the part of the rebels until the gunboats rounded to, after having run past.

Then came the enflaming fire from a range that gave Shelby's men more than was congenial, and he precipitately decamped to the woods, leaving his prize gun and considerable of the captured ordnance on the bank, to be retaken by our brave sailor-boys.

The Tyler received eleven shots. Eight or ten men were wounded; all doing well. The pilot was seriously wounded in the head. Hopes are entertained of his recovery. It is thought there was no one mortally wounded in this engagement on our side, nor do we know the casualties of the enemy. They must have been severely punished when they abandoned a good twelve-pound gun on a light carriage, that could have been drawn by four men out of the reach

* See Rebellion Record, Vol. 8, p. 291. Documents.

of the gunboats. General Shelby having retired from the river, Captain Bache collected the wounded and stragglers and brought them to Duvall's Bluff, and communicated with General Steele, and he immediately ordered a force under General Carr to proceed to the scene of action. General Carr, with about three thousand infantry and cavalry, on transports, accompanied by the above gunboats, landed at Clarendon on the morning of the twenty-sixth instant, to again contest General Shelby's position. Skirmishing commenced immediately, but it was soon apparent to the most experienced commander, that Shelby was not disposed to make a stand. General Carr followed him some twenty miles to the interior, with slight skirmishing, and having no transportation returned to the river by easy marches. The General arrived at Clarendon about midnight of the twenty-eighth instant. He captured one twenty-four-pounder gun (that must have been taken from the Queen City after she was sunk, while the gunboats were away with their wounded), and one thirty-two-pounder that he brought with him from the south side of the Arkansas.

General Carr captured one rebel Colonel, wounded, believed to be Colonel Schenck, and many wounded were found, but owing to the excessive heat, were left in care of their friends. Our losses could not be ascertained, from the fact that we did not know how many there were taken prisoners; could learn of but five deaths and twenty wounded. There were many cases of sunstroke; among them, Lieutenant-Colonel Stephens, of the Eleventh Missouri cavalry, well known in St. Louis, who was carried from the field, supposed to be dead, but he lives to fight another day.

Doc. 113

RAID ON DUFFIELD'S DEPOT, VA.

DUFFIELD'S, VA., July 8, 1864.

Our quiet village was thrown into quite a stir last Wednesday, about two o'clock, by the appearance of a flag-of-truce coming in from the rebel side of the road, and demanding the unconditional surrender of this post. The command here, consisting of two companies, I and F, of the First Maryland, Potomac Home Brigade, under command of Lieutenant John Beard, who was at the time away on official business, the command at the time falling upon Lieutenants Long and Matthews, who had to comply with the demand of the rebels, their force consisting of about four hundred cavalry, with two pieces of artillery. The rebels then entered the camp, taking prisoners all the men found about the encampment, some forty seven, after which they entirely destroyed the camp with all its equipment, together with all the books and papers belonging to the command. During this time a large number entered the store at this place and plundered and carried off nearly the entire stocks

of dry goods and groceries, boots and shoes, causing a loss to the owner of about two thousand dollars. They also took a large amount of goods from the Waw House, belonging to other parties, to the amount of some four thousand dollars, after which they left, and the last heard of them they had crossed the Shenandoah without molestation. There was no damage done to the railroad or trains. They cut the telegraph wire near this place, and expected to have captured the mail train going east, but the train was notified in time to put back before getting here. The place was soon occupied by our troops. Those who escaped coming in, and the pickets that had been cut off making their appearance, with a portion of other forces near at hand made us feel safe again.

Doc. 114.

GENERAL AVERELLS EXPEDITION.

CHARLESTON, WEST VIRGINIA, }
July 5, 1864. }

The cavalry of this department is divided into two divisions, of which General Averell commands the second. On the first of May this division, starting from Charleston, moved down through the uninhabited and almost unknown region of South-western Virginia, toward the Virginia and Tennessee railroad. The design of the movement was to prevent such a concentration of the rebel force as would defeat or delay the main column of General Crook moving on Dublin depot. For a hundred and fifty miles, across deep streams and over trackless mountains, where a wheel had never been seen, and up which the horses were dragged, among fallen trees and huge rocks, the command held its way, surrounded on all sides by an active enemy. The news of their approach preceded them, and at Cove Gap, eight miles from Wytheville, they encountered the command of General W. E. Jones, which, advancing against Crook, had been brought to a halt by the sudden appearance of this new enemy at their very camps. The rebels were five thousand, and they doubtless expected to crush, easily the little division of eighteen hundred men, which had so impudently thrust itself between them and their goal. For five hours they hurled themselves against it, until dark put an end to the conflict, and they retired to Wytheville, leaving Averell, wounded in the head, to move off the field unmolested, with a loss of one hundred and thirty men. The object of the expedition had been accomplished, for Crook was, at this time, on his way to Lewisburg, having defeated the ex-Vice-President, and destroyed New river bridge. Averell's command moving toward Lewisburg, destroyed the railroad from New river to Christianburg, at which place two guns were captured. The ammunition had been spoiled in crossing New river and by days' and nights' exposure to rain, and no more could be obtained

until Crook's column was reached. A junction was effected with him at Union, and the division halted there to cover the passage of his command across the Greenbrier.

They encamped at Lewisburg on the nineteenth of May, having marched three hundred and fifty-one miles. They were out nineteen days on nine days' rations, and with such forage for their horses as they could pick up during the unfrequent halts. Resting for ten days without supplies, and on half rations, they moved eastward to join General Hunter at Staunton, which place was reached on the ninth day of June. Now commenced the real work of the already worn-out division. In advance of the army, they occupied Lexington, drove the enemy thence to Buchanan, so rapidly that the bridge over the James at that point was destroyed only by leaving the rebel General McCausland on the north side of the river, to escape by swimming as best he might. From Lexington a detachment was sent out by General Averell which crossed the Blue Ridge; cut the Lynchburg and Charlottesville railroad; swam the James river; destroyed the Southside railroad; passed around Lynchburg and rejoined the division at Liberty. They passed through Imboden's camp by night, killing and capturing a number of his men, and making prisoner of the sentinel in front of the headquarters of the rebel General. While at Buchanan, a portion of the Second cavalry division destroyed the branch of the Tredegar Iron Works, near Fincastle. The enemy were driven by the Second cavalry division, in a succession of sharp skirmishes from Liberty to New London, from New London to the point where, meeting their main body, they had resolved to make their final struggle. On the afternoon of the seventeenth, Averell, unsupported, attacked the enemy in front of Lynchburg, and by the impetuosity of his assault, drove them nearly a mile before the infantry could come up. A carbine would carry its ball from the place where Averell drove the rebels to the spot where the foremost Union soldier fell the next day. It is generally considered the thing for infantry to assist cavalry, and had all our infantry been up that night, the rising moon would have seen the Union troops in Lynchburg. That night General Hunter asserted that to Averell belonged the honor of the day. During the fighting of the eighteenth the Second division protected the right and rear. In the retreat which followed the battle of the eighteenth, General Averell with his division brought up the rear. At Liberty the division, and especially the first brigade, sustained for two hours a fierce attack from the pursuing enemy, the infantry a mile in rear commenting upon the progress of the fight and quietly cooking their coffee, while the slighted cavalry were beating back a superior force, that the weary footmen might rest. And this was done by the Second division, for the other was already far on its way to Salem. Marching his division all

that night and holding it in line of battle all the next day, the evening of the twentieth found General Averell hurrying on to Salem, picketing the roads, and ensuring a safe march to the trains and worn-out column. At Salem the division repulsed a fierce attack on the right flank of the retreating army, and while so engaged their commander received notice of the most serious disaster of the campaign. By gross neglect of the orders of General Averell a by-road had been left without a picket, and the enemy suddenly advancing upon it, attacked the artillery and captured ten pieces, but Averell moved his division quickly to the spot and in fifteen minutes, by a gallant charge, had recaptured the guns with thirty prisoners, losing, however, forty men in killed and wounded. Now rumors became rife of an enemy in our front, and Averell was put in charge of all the cavalry, and hurried in advance, leaving one brigade of his own division as rear guard of the army. To General Averell, now that the rear was comparatively safe, was entrusted the task of choosing a sure route of retreat, and repulsing the enemy should he dare to interfere with the homeward march of the column. This done, the cavalry again took the rear, protecting the trains, picking up the numerous stragglers, and transporting on the wagons and on their own horses such of the starving footmen as could walk no further. The loss of the division in this campaign was two hundred and fifty killed, wounded, and missing in action. This ends the story. The first in advance, the last in retreat, their casualties nearly double in proportion to those of the rest of the army, show the duty that they did. The history of this past campaign, truly told, will reflect honor alike upon the General and the troops which he commanded.

Doc. 115.

SURRENDER OF GENERAL R. E. LEE.

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL MEADE.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, }
April 30, 1865. }

COLONEL—I have the honor to submit herewith a succinct report of the operations of this army in the recent campaign resulting in the evacuation of Richmond and Petersburg, and terminating in the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On the twenty-ninth ultimo, in pursuance of orders received from the Lieutenant-General commanding, the Second and Fifth corps were moved across Hatcher's run, the former by the Vaughan road, the latter by the old stage road crossing at Perkins'. The Second corps, holding the extreme left of the line before Petersburg prior to moving, was relieved by Major-General Gibbon, commanding two divisions of the Twenty-fourth corps.

Major-General Humphreys, commanding the Second corps, was directed after crossing

Hatcher's run, to take position with his right resting on Hatcher's run, and his left extending to the Quaker road. Major-General Warren, commanding Fifth corps, was directed at first to take position at the intersection of the Vaughan and Quaker roads, and subsequently, about noon of the twenty-ninth, he was ordered to move up the Quaker road beyond Gravelly run.

These orders were duly executed, and by evening Major-General Humphreys was in position, his right resting near Dabney's mill, and his left near Gravelly meeting-house, on the Quaker road. In taking this position Major-General Humphreys encountered but little opposition, meeting only a small force in a line of rifle-pits, who were quickly driven out. Major-General Warren was delayed in his movement by having to rebuild the bridge over Gravelly run. The advance of his column, Brigadier-General Griffin's division, was attacked about four p. m., when about a mile and a half beyond Gravelly run, by Bushrod Johnson's division. A spirited engagement ensued, in which Griffin handsomely repulsed and drove the enemy, capturing over one hundred prisoners.

On the thirtieth, Major-General Humphreys again advanced, driving the enemy into his main line of works, and by night occupying a line from the Crow house, on Hatcher's run, to the intersection of the Dabney's mill and Boydton plank-roads.

Major-General Warren during this day advanced on the Quaker road to its intersection with the Boydton plank, and pushed Ayres' division in a north-westerly direction over the White Oak road. No fighting of any consequence occurred this day except picket skirmishing and exchange of artillery shots from the respective lines, now close to each other.

During the night of the thirtieth, Major-General Humphreys, who had intrenched his line, was directed to relieve Griffin's division, Fifth corps, by Miles' division, and Major-General Warren was ordered to move both Crawford and Griffin within supporting distance of Ayres, whose position on the extreme left was considered likely to invite attack.

On the thirty-first, about ten a. m., Ayres, under General Warren's orders, advanced to dislodge the enemy in position on the White Oak road. Ayres' attack was unsuccessful, and was followed by such a vigorous attack of the enemy that Ayres was compelled to fall back upon Crawford, who, in turn, was so strongly pressed by the enemy as to force both divisions back in considerable disorder to the position occupied by Griffin, when the pursuit of the enemy ceased. Immediately on ascertaining the condition of affairs, Major-General Humphreys was ordered to move to Warren's support, and that officer promptly sent Miles' division to attack in flank the force operating against Warren.

This movement was handsomely executed by

Miles, who, attacking the enemy vigorously, drove him back to his former position on the White Oak road, capturing several colors and many prisoners.

In the mean time Warren advanced with Griffin's division, supported by such portions of Ayres' and Crawford's divisions as could be rallied, and regaining the position held by Ayres in the morning, Griffin attacked with Chamberlain's brigade, driving the enemy and securing a lodgement on the White Oak road.

These operations over, hearing heavy firing to the left and rear, which was presumed to be the cavalry moving up from Dinwiddie Court-house, Warren was directed to send a brigade down the White Oak road to cooperate with the cavalry. This brigade by night reached the crossing of Gravelly run, by the road leading through J. Boisseau's, where, not meeting any enemy, it bivouacked.

During the night, having been directed to send support to Major-General Sheridan at Dinwiddie Court-house, Major-General Warren was ordered to move with his whole corps, two divisions by the White Oak road and one by the Boydton plank-road. Major-General Humphreys was ordered to extend his left as far as practicable, consistent with its security.

During the foregoing operations, the Sixth and Ninth corps remained in the lines in front of Petersburg, with orders to watch the enemy closely, and, in the event of the lines in their front being weakened, to attack.

On April first, after consultation with the Lieutenant-General commanding, believing from the operations on his right that the enemy's lines on his left must be thinly held, orders were sent to Major-Generals Wright and Parke to attack the next morning at four. About seven p. m., intelligence having been received of the brilliant success of the cavalry and Fifth corps at Five Forks, orders were sent to Generals Parke and Wright to open their batteries and press the enemy's picket line. At the same time, Miles' division, Second corps, was detached to the support of Major-General Sheridan, and Major-General Humphreys advised of the intended attacks of the Twenty-fourth, Sixth, and Fifth corps, and directed to hold his two remaining divisions ready to cooperate in the same, should they prove successful.

On the second of April, Major-General Wright attacked at four a. m., carrying everything before him, taking possession of the enemy's strong line of works, and capturing many guns and prisoners. After carrying the enemy's line in his front, and reaching the Boydton plank-road, Major-General Wright turned to his left, and swept down the enemy's line of intrenchments till near Hatcher's run, where, meeting the head of the Twenty-fourth corps, General Wright retraced his steps and advanced on the Boydton plank-road toward Petersburg, encountering the enemy in an inner line of works immediately around the city. Major-General

Wright deployed his corps confronting their works, in conjunction with the Twenty-fourth and part of the Second corps.

Major-General Parke's attack at four A. M. was also successful, carrying the enemy's lines, capturing guns and prisoners, but the position of the Ninth corps, confronting that portion of the enemy's line, the longest held and most strongly fortified, it was found he held a second and inner line, which Major-General Parke was unable to carry. Receiving a despatch during the morning from Major-General Parke, reporting his being pressed by the enemy, the troops left in City Point defences, under Brigadier-General Benham and Brevet Brigadier-General Collis, were ordered up to General Parke's support; their prompt arrival enabling them to render material assistance to General Parke in holding his lines.

So soon as Major-General Wright's success was reported, Major-General Humphreys was ordered to advance with the remaining divisions of his corps; Hays, on the right, advanced and captured a redoubt in front of the Crow house, taking a gun and over one hundred prisoners. Mott, on the left, on advancing on the Boydton plank-road, found the enemy's line evacuated. Hays and Mott pushed forward and joined the Sixth corps confronting the enemy. Early in the morning Miles, reporting his return to his position on the White Oak road, was ordered to advance on the Claiborne road simultaneously with Mott and Hays. Miles, perceiving, the enemy were moving to his right, pursued and overtook him at Sutherland's station, where a sharp engagement took place, Miles handling his single division with great skill and gallantry, capturing several guns and many prisoners. On receiving intelligence of Miles being engaged, Hays was sent to his support, but did not reach the field till the action was over.

At three A. M. of the second of April, Major-Generals Parke and Wright reported no enemy in their front, when, on advancing, it was ascertained Petersburg was evacuated.

Wilcox's division, Ninth corps, was ordered to occupy the town, and the Second, Sixth, and Ninth corps immediately moved up the river, reaching that night the vicinity of Sutherland's station.

The next three days, the third, fourth, and fifth, the pursuit was continued along the river and Namozine roads—the Fifth corps following the cavalry, and the Second and Sixth following the Fifth; the Ninth having been detached to guard the Southside railroad. The progress of the troops was greatly impeded by the bad character of the roads, the presence of the supply-trains of the Fifth corps and cavalry, and by the frequent changes of position of the cavalry, to whom the right of way was given. On the night of the fourth, receiving a despatch from Major-General Sheridan that his army was in position at Amelia Court-house, immediate orders were given for the resumption of the

march by the troops of the Second and Sixth corps, reaching Jetersville between four and five P. M., where the Fifth corps was found intrenched expecting an attack. No attack being made, on the morning of the sixth of April the three corps were moved in the direction of Amelia Court-house, with the intention of attacking the enemy, if found there; but soon after moving, intelligence was received that Lee had moved from Amelia Court-house toward Farmville. The direction of the corps was changed, and the six corps moved from the right to the left. The Second corps was ordered to move on Deatonsville, and the Fifth and Sixth corps to move in parallel directions on the right and left respectively.

The Second corps soon came up with the enemy, and commenced a rear-guard fight, which continued all day till evening, when the enemy was so crowded, in attempting to cross Sailor's creek, that he had to abandon a large train. Guns, colors, and prisoners were taken in these successful operations of the Second corps.

The Sixth corps, on the left of the Second, came up with the enemy posted on Sailor's creek. Major-General Wright attacked with two divisions, and completely routed the enemy. In this attack the cavalry, under Major-General Sheridan was operating on the left of the Sixth corps, while Humphreys was pressing on the right. The result of the combined operations was the capture of Lieutenant-General Ewell and four other general officers, with most of Ewell's corps.

The next day, the seventh of April, the Fifth corps was moved to the left toward Prince Edward's Court-house. The Second corps resumed the direct pursuit of the enemy, coming up with him at High bridge over the Appomattox. Here the enemy made a feeble stand with his rear-guard, attempting to burn the railroad and common bridge. Being driven off by Humphreys, he succeeded in burning three spans of the railroad bridge, but the common bridge was saved, which Humphreys immediately crossed in pursuit, the enemy abandoning eighteen guns at this point. Humphreys came up with the enemy at the intersection of the High bridge and Farmville roads, where he was found intrenched behind rail breastworks, evidently making a stand to cover the withdrawal of his trains. Before reaching this point Humphreys had detached Barlow's division to the left toward Farmville. Near Farmville Barlow found the enemy, who was about evacuating the place, which operation was hastened by a successful attack of Barlow's.

When Humphreys ascertained the position of the enemy, Barlow was recalled, but did not reach Humphreys till evening, and after an unsuccessful assault had been made by part of Miles' division.

The Sixth corps moved early in the morning toward Farmville, but finding the road occupied,

first by the cavalry and subsequently by the Twenty-fourth corps, it was too late in the afternoon before it reached that place, where it was found the enemy had destroyed the bridge. On learning the position of Humphreys, orders were sent to Wright to cross and attack in support. By great exertions a bridge for infantry was constructed, over which Wright crossed, but it was nightfall before this could be effected.

The next day, April eighth, the pursuit was continued on the Lynchburg stage road. On the ninth, at twelve *m.*, the head of the Second corps, when within three miles of Appomattox Court-house, came up with the enemy. At the same time I received a letter from General Lee, asking for a suspension of hostilities pending negotiations for surrender. Soon after receiving this letter, Brigadier-General Forayth, of General Sheridan's staff, came through the enemy's lines and notified me a truce had been made by Major-General Ord, commanding the troops on the other side of Appomattox Court-house. In consequence of this I replied to General Lee that I should suspend hostilities for two hours. At the expiration of that time I received the instructions of the Lieutenant-General commanding to continue the armistice until further orders, and about four *p. m.*, I received the welcome intelligence of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.

It has been impossible, in the foregoing brief outline of operations, to do full justice to the several corps engaged; for this purpose reference must be had to the reports of corps and division commanders, which will be forwarded as soon as received. At the same time I would call attention to the handsome repulse of the enemy by Griffin's division, Fifth corps, on the twenty-ninth ultimo; to the important part taken by the Fifth corps in the battle of Five Forks; to the gallant assault, on the second instant, by the Sixth corps—in my judgment the decisive movement of the campaign; to the successful attack of the Sixth corps in the battle of Sailor's creek; to the gallant assault, on the second instant, of the Ninth corps, and the firmness and tenacity with which the advantages then gained were held against all assaults of the enemy; to the brilliant attack of Miles' division, Second corps, at Sutherland's station; to the energetic pursuit and attack of the enemy by the Second corps, on the sixth instant, terminating in the battle of Sailor's creek; and to the prompt pursuit the next day, with Barlow's and Miles' attacks, as all evincing the fact that this army, officers, and men, all nobly did their duty, and deserve the thanks of the country. Nothing could exceed the cheerfulness with which all submitted to fatigue and privations to secure the coveted prize—the capture of the Army of Northern Virginia.

The absence of official reports precludes my forwarding any statement of casualties, or lists of the captures of guns, colors, and prisoners. To my staff, general and personal, I am indebted,

as I ever have been, for the most zealous and faithful discharge of their duties.

Respectfully yours,

GEORGE G. MEADE,

Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

Colonel T. S. BOWERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS, May 16, 1865.

GENERAL—I have the honor to submit the following narrative of the operations of my command during the recent campaign in front of Petersburg and Richmond, terminating with the surrender of the rebel Army of Northern Virginia, at Appomattox Court-house, Virginia, on April 9, 1865:

On March twenty-sixth my command, consisting of the First and Third cavalry divisions, under the immediate command of Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, crossed the James river by the bridge at Jones' landing, having marched from Winchester, in the Shenandoah valley, *via* White House, on the Pamunkey river.

On March twenty-seventh this command went into camp near Hancock station, on the military railroad in front of Petersburg, and on the same day the Second cavalry division, which had been serving with the Army of the Potomac, reported to me under the command of Major-General George Crook.

The effective force of these three divisions was as follows: General Merritt's command, First and Third divisions, 5,700; General Crook's command, Second division, 3,300. Total effective force, 9,000.

With this force I moved out on the twenty-ninth March, in conjunction with the armies operating against Richmond, and in the subsequent operations I was under the immediate orders of the Lieutenant-General commanding.

I moved by the way of Reams' station, on the Weldon railroad, and Malone's crossing, on Rowanty creek, where we were obliged to construct a bridge.

At this point our advance encountered a small picket of the rebel cavalry and drove it to the left across Stony creek, capturing a few prisoners, from whom, and from my scouts, I learned that the enemy's cavalry was at or near Stony creek depot, on the Weldon railroad, on our left flank and rear. Believing that it would not attack me, and that by pushing on to Dinwiddie Court-house I could force it to make a wide detour, we continued the march, reaching the Court-house about five o'clock, *p. m.*, encountering only a small picket of the enemy, which was driven away by our advance.

It was found necessary to order General Custer's division, which was marching in the rear, to remain near Malone's crossing, on the Rowanty creek, to assist and protect our trains, which were greatly retarded by the almost impassable roads of that miry section. The First and Second divisions went into camp, covering the

Vaughan, Flat Foot, Boydton plank, and Five Forks roads, which all intersect at Dinwiddie Court-house, rendering this an important point, and from which I was expected to make a cavalry raid on the Southside railroad, and thence join General Sherman, or return to Petersburg, as circumstances might dictate. However, during the night the Lieutenant-General sent me instructions to abandon the contemplated raid and act in concert with the infantry under his immediate command, and turn the right flank of Lee's army if possible.

Early on the morning of the thirtieth of March I directed General Merritt to send the first division, Brigadier-General Devin commanding, to gain possession of the Five Forks, on the White Oak road, and directed General Crook to send General Davies' brigade of his division to the support of General Devin.

Gregg's brigade, of Crook's division, was held on the Boydton plank-road, and guarded the crossing of Stony creek, forcing the enemy's cavalry, that was moving from Stony creek depot to form a connection with the right of their army, to make a wide detour, as I had anticipated, on the south roads of Stony creek and west of Chamberlain's bed—a very fatiguing march in the bad condition of the roads. A very heavy rain fell during this day, aggravating the swampy nature of the ground, and rendering the movement of troops almost impossible. General Merritt's reconnoissance developed the enemy in strong force on the White Oak road in the vicinity of the Five Forks, and there was some heavy skirmishing throughout the day. Next morning, March thirty-one, General Merritt advanced toward the Five Forks with the First division, and meeting with considerable opposition, General Devin's brigade, of Crook's division, was ordered to join him, while General Crook, advancing on the left with the two other brigades of his division, encountered the enemy's cavalry at Chamberlain's creek, at a point a little north and west of Dinwiddie, making demonstrations to cross. Smith's brigade was ordered to hold them in check and Gregg's brigade to a position on his right. The advance of the First division got possession of the Five Forks, but in the mean time the Fifth Army Corps, which had advanced toward the White Oak road from the Vaughan road, was attacked and driven back; and, withdrawing from that point, this force of the enemy marched rapidly from the front of the Fifth corps to the Five Forks, driving in our cavalry advance, and moving down on roads west of Chamberlain's creek, attacked General Smith's brigade, but were unable to force his position. Abandoning the attempt to cross in his front, this force of the enemy's infantry succeeded in effecting a crossing higher up the creek, striking General Davies' brigade of the second division, which, after a gallant fight, was forced back upon the left flank of the first division, thus partially

isolating all this force from my main line covering Dinwiddie Court-house.

Orders were at once given to General Merritt to cross this detached force over to the Boydton plank-road, and march down to Dinwiddie Court-house and come into the line of battle. The enemy, deceived by this movement, followed it up rapidly, making a left wheel, and presenting his rear to my line of battle. When his line was nearly parallel to mine, General Gibbs' brigade of the First division, and General Irvin Gregg's brigade of the Second division, were ordered to attack at once, and General Cuarter was directed to bring up two of his brigades rapidly, leaving one brigade of his division with the trains that had not yet reached Dinwiddie Court-house. In the gallant attack made by Gibbs and Gregg, the enemy's wounded fell into our hands, and he was forced to face by the rear rank, and give up his movement, which, if continued, would have taken in flank and rear the infantry line of the Army of the Potomac. When the enemy had faced to meet this attack, a very obstinate and handsomely contested battle ensued, in which, with all his cavalry and two divisions of infantry, the enemy was unable to drive five brigades of our cavalry, dismounted, from an open plain in front of Dinwiddie Court-house. The brunt of their cavalry attack was borne by General Smith's brigade, which had so gallantly held the crossing of Chamberlain's creek in the morning. His command again held the enemy in check with determined bravery, but the heavy force brought against his right flank finally compelled him to abandon his position on the creek, and fall back to the main line immediately in front of Dinwiddie Court-house. As the enemy's infantry advanced to the attack, our cavalry threw up slight breastworks of rails at some points along our lines, and when the enemy attempted to force this position they were handsomely repulsed, and gave up the attempt to gain possession of the Court-house. It was after dark when the firing ceased, and the enemy lay on their arms that night, not more than one hundred yards in front of our lines. The commands of Generals Devin and Davies reached Dinwiddie Court-house without opposition by way of the Boydton plank-road, but did not participate in the final action of the day. In this well-contested battle the most obstinate gallantry was displayed by my entire command. The brigades commanded by General Gibbs and Colonels Stagg and Fitzhugh, in the First division, Generals Davies, Gregg, and Smith, in the Second division, Colonels Pennington and Capehart, in the Third division, vied with each other in their determined efforts to hold in check the superior force of the enemy; and the skilful management of their troops in this peculiarly difficult country entitles the brigade commanders to the highest commendation.

Generals Crook, Merritt, Cuarter, and Devin, by their courage and ability, sustained their

commands, and executed the rapid movements of the day with promptness and without confusion.

During the night of the thirty-first of March my headquarters were at Dinwiddie Court-house, and the Lieutenant-General notified me that the Fifth corps would report to me, and should reach me by midnight. This corps had been offered to me on the thirtieth instant, but very much desiring the Sixth corps, which had been with me in the Shenandoah valley, I asked for it, but on account of the delay which would occur in moving that corps from its position in the lines in front of Petersburg, it could not be sent to me. I respectfully submit herewith my brief accounts of the operations of the day, the response to which was the ordering of the Fifth corps to my support and my command, as also the despatch of the Lieutenant-General notifying me of his action. I understood that the Fifth corps, when ordered to report to me, was in position near S. Dabney's house, in the angle between the Boydton road and the Five Forks road.

Had General Warren moved according to the expectations of the Lieutenant-General, there would appear to have been but little chance for the escape of the enemy's infantry in front of Dinwiddie Court-house. Ayres' division moved down the Boydton plank-road during the night, and in the morning moved west *via* R. Boisseau's house, striking the Five Forks road about two and a half miles north of Dinwiddie Court-house. General Warren, with Griffin's and Crawford's divisions, moved down the road by Crump's house, coming into the Five Forks near J. Boisseau's house, between seven and eight o'clock on the morning of the first of April. Meantime I moved my cavalry force at daylight against the enemy's lines in my front, which gave way rapidly, moving off by the right flank, and crossing Chamberlain's creek. This hasty movement was accelerated by the discovery that two divisions of the Fifth corps were in their rear, and that one division was moving toward their left and rear.

The following are the instructions sent to General Warren:

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,
DINWIDDIE C. H., April 1, 1865—3 A. M. }

I am holding in front of Dinwiddie Court-house, on the road leading to Five Forks, for three quarters of a mile, with General Custer's division. The enemy are in his immediate front, lying so as to cover the road just this side of A. Adams' house, which leads out across Chamberlain's bed or run. I understand you have a division at J. Boisseau's; if so, you are in rear of the enemy's line, and almost on his flanks. I will hold on here. Possibly they may attack Custer at daylight; if so, attack instantly and in full force. Attack at daylight anyhow, and I will make an effort to get the road this side of Adams' house, and if I do, you can capture the whole of them. Any force moving

down the road I am holding, or on the White Oak road, will be in the enemy's rear, and in all probability get any force that may escape you by a flank attack. Do not fear my leaving here. If the enemy remains I shall fight at daylight.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General.*

Major-General WARREN,
Commanding Fifth Army Corps.

As they fell back the enemy was rapidly followed by General Merritt's two divisions, General Devin on the right and General Custer on the left; General Crook in rear. During the remainder of the day General Crook's division held the extreme left and rear, and was not seriously engaged.

I then determined that I would drive the enemy, with the cavalry, to the Five Forks, press them inside of their works, and make a feint to turn their right flank, and meanwhile quietly move up the Fifth corps with a view to attacking their left flank, crush the whole force, if possible, and drive westward those who might escape, thus isolating them from their army at Petersburg. Happily, this conception was successfully executed. About this time General McKenzie's division of cavalry, from the Army of the James, reported to me, and consisted of about one thousand effective men. I directed General Warren to hold fast at J. Boisseau's house, refresh his men, and be ready to move to the front when required; and General McKenzie was ordered to rest in front of Dinwiddie Court-house until further orders.

Meantime General Merritt's command continued to press the enemy, and by impetuous charges drove them from two lines of temporary works; General Custer guiding his advance on the Widow Gilliam's house and General Devin on the main Five Forks road. The courage displayed by the cavalry officers and men was superb, and about two o'clock the enemy was behind his works on the White Oak road, and his skirmish line drawn in. I then ordered up the Fifth corps on the main road, and sent Brevet Major Gillispie, of the engineers, to turn the head of the column off on the Gravelly Church road, and put the corps in position on this road obliquely to and at a point but a short distance from the White Oak road, and about one mile from the Five Forks. Two divisions of the corps were to form the front line, and one division was to be held in reserve, in column of regiments, opposite the centre.

I then directed General Merritt to demonstrate as though he was attempting to turn the enemy's right flank, and notified him that the Fifth corps would strike the enemy's left flank, and ordered that the cavalry should assault the enemy's works as soon as the Fifth corps became engaged, and that would be determined by volleys of musketry. I then rode over to where the Fifth corps was going into position, and

* See page 536, Volume x., Rebellion Record.

found them coming up very slowly. I was exceedingly anxious to attack at once, for the sun was getting low, and we had to fight or go back. It was no place to intrench, and it would have been shameful to have gone back with no results to compensate for the loss of the brave men who had fallen during the day. In this connection, I will say that General Warren did not exert himself to get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done, and his manner gave me the impression that he wished the sun to go down before dispositions for the attack could be completed. As soon as the corps was in position, I ordered an advance in the following formation: Ayres' division on the left in double lines, Crawford's division on the right in double lines, and Griffin's division in reserve, behind Crawford, and the White Oak road was reached without opposition.

While General Warren was getting into position I learned that the left of the Second corps of the Army of the Potomac, on my right, had been swung around from the direction of its line of battle until it fronted on the Boydton road, and parallel to it, which afforded an opportunity to the enemy to march down the White Oak road and attack me in right and rear. General McKenzie was therefore sent up the Crump road, with directions to gain the White Oak road if possible, but to attack at all hazards any enemy found, and if successful, their march down that road and join me. General McKenzie executed this with courage and skill, attacking a force of the enemy on the White Oak road, and driving it toward Petersburg. He then countermarched, and joined me on the White Oak road just as the Fifth corps advanced to the attack, and I directed him to swing round with the right of the infantry and gain possession of the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run. The Fifth corps, on reaching the White Oak road, made a left wheel, and burst on the enemy's left flank and rear like a tornado, and pushed rapidly on, orders having been given that if the enemy was routed there should be no halt to reform broken lines. As stated before, the firing of the Fifth corps was the signal to General Merritt to assault, which was promptly responded to, and the works of the enemy were soon carried at several points by our brave cavalry men. The enemy were driven from their strong line of works and completely routed, the Fifth corps doubling up their left flank in confusion, and the cavalry of General Merritt dashing on to the White Oak road, capturing their artillery and turning it upon them, and, riding into their broken ranks, so demoralized them that they made no serious stand after their line was carried, but took to flight in disorder. Between five thousand and six thousand prisoners fell into our hands, and the fugitives were driven westward, and were pursued until long after dark by Merritt's and McKenzie's cavalry for a distance of six miles.

During this attack I again became dissatisfied with General Warren. During the engagement

portions of his line gave way when not exposed to a heavy fire, and simply from want of confidence on the part of the troops, which General Warren did not exert himself to inspire. I therefore relieved him from the command of the Fifth corps, authority for this action having been sent to me, before the battle, unsolicited. When the pursuit was given up, I directed General Griffin, who had been ordered to assume command of the Fifth corps, to collect his corps at once, march two divisions back to Gravelly church, and put them into position at right angles to the White Oak road, facing toward Petersburg, while Bartlett's division (Griffin's old), covered the Ford road to Hatcher's run. General Merritt's cavalry went into camp on the Widow Gilliam's plantation, and General McKenzie took position on the Ford road at the crossing of Hatcher's run. I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops in this battle, and of the gallantry of their commanding officers, who appeared to realize that the success of the campaign and fate of Lee's army depended upon it. They merit the thanks of the country and reward of the Government. To Generals Griffin, Ayres, Bartlett, and Crawford, of the Fifth corps, and to Generals Merritt, Custer, Devin, and McKenzie, of the cavalry, great credit is due; and to their subordinate commanders they will undoubtedly award the praise which is due to them for the hearty co-operation, bravery, and ability which were everywhere displayed. At daylight on the morning of April second, General Miles' division of the Second corps reported to me, coming over from the Boydton plank-road. I ordered it to move up the White Oak road toward Petersburg, and attack the enemy at the intersection of that road with the Claiborne road, where he was in position in heavy force, and I followed General Miles immediately with two divisions of the Fifth corps. Miles forced the enemy from this position and pursued with great zeal, pushing him across Hatcher's run, and following him up on the road to Sutherland's depot. On the north side of the run I overtook Miles, who was anxious to attack, and had a very fine and spirited division. I gave him permission, but about this time General Humphreys came up, and, receiving notice from General Meade that General Humphreys would take command of Miles' division, I relinquished it at once, and faced the Fifth corps by the rear. I afterward regretted giving up this division, as I believe the enemy could at that time have been crushed at Sutherland's depot. I returned to Five Forks, and marched out the Ford road toward Hatcher's run.

The cavalry had in the meantime been sent westward to cross Hatcher's run and break up the enemy's cavalry, which had collected in considerable force north of that stream, but they would not stand to fight, and our cavalry pursued them in a direction due north to the Namozone road. Crossing Hatcher's run with the Fifth corps, the Southside railroad was struck at

Ford's depot, meeting no opposition, and the Fifth corps marched rapidly toward Sutherland's depot, in flank and rear of the enemy opposing Miles. As he approached that point the force of the enemy fled before the Fifth corps could reach them, retreating along the main road by the Appomattox river, the cavalry and Crawford's division of the Fifth corps engaging them slightly about dusk. On the morning of the third our cavalry took up the pursuit, routing the enemy's cavalry, and capturing many prisoners. The enemy's infantry was encountered at Deep creek, where a severe fight took place. The Fifth corps followed up the cavalry rapidly, picking up many prisoners and five pieces of abandoned artillery, and a number of wagons. The Fifth corps, with Crook's division of cavalry, encamped that night (the fourth) at Deep creek, on the Namozine road, neither of these commands having been engaged during the day. On the morning of the fourth General Crook was ordered to strike the Danville railroad between Jetersville and Burke's station, and then move up toward Jetersville. The Fifth corps moved rapidly to that point, as I had learned from my scouts that the enemy was at Amelia Court-house, and everything indicated that they were collecting at that point. On arriving at Jetersville, about five o'clock p. m., I learned without doubt that Lee and his army were at Amelia Court-house.

The Fifth corps was at once ordered to intrench, with a view to holding Jetersville until the main army could come up. It seems to me that this was the only chance the Army of Northern Virginia had to save itself, which might have been done had General Lee promptly attacked and driven back the comparatively small force opposed to him and pursued his march to Burksville Junction. A despatch from General Lee's chief commissary to the commissary at Danville and Lynchburg, requiring two hundred thousand rations to be sent to meet the Army at Burksville, was here intercepted. So soon as I found that the entire army of the enemy was concentrated at Amelia Court-house, I forwarded promptly all the information I had obtained to General Meade and the Lieutenant-General. On the morning of April five General Crook was directed to send General Davies' brigade to make a reconnoissance to Paine's cross-roads on our left and front, and ascertain if the enemy was making any movement toward that flank to escape. General Davies struck a train of one hundred and eighty wagons, escorted by a considerable force of the enemy's cavalry, which he defeated, capturing five pieces of artillery. He destroyed the wagons and brought in a large number of prisoners. Gregg's and Smith's brigades of the Second division were sent out to support Davies, and some heavy fighting ensued, the enemy having sent a strong force of infantry to attack and cut off Davies' brigade, which attempt was unsuccessful. During the afternoon, and after the arrival of the Second corps at Jetersville, which General

Meade requested me to put in position, he being ill, the enemy demonstrated strongly in front of Jetersville against Smith's and Gregg's brigades of Crook's division of cavalry, but no serious attack was made. Early on the morning of April sixth General Crook was ordered to move to the left to Deatonsville, followed by Custer's and Devin's divisions of General Merritt's command. The Fifth corps had been returned to the command of General Meade at his request. I afterward regretted giving up the corps.

When near Deatonsville the enemy's trains were discovered moving in the direction of Burksville or Farmville, escorted by heavy masses of infantry and cavalry, and it soon became evident that the whole of Lee's army was attempting to make its escape. Crook was at once ordered to attack the trains, and, if the enemy was too strong, one of the divisions would pass him while he held fast and pressed the enemy, and attack at a point further on, and this division was ordered to do the same, and so on, alternating, and this system of attack would enable us finally to strike some weak point. This result was obtained just south of Sailor's creek and on the high ground over that stream. Custer took the road, and Crook and Devin coming up to his support, sixteen pieces of artillery were captured and about four hundred wagons destroyed, and many prisoners were taken, and three divisions of the enemy's infantry were cut off from the line of retreat. Meantime Colonel Stagg, commanding the Michigan brigade of the First division, was held at a point about two and a half miles south of Deatonsville, and with this force and a section of Miller's battery, which shelled the trains with excellent effect while Colonel Stagg demonstrated to attack them, thus keeping a large force of the enemy from moving against the rest of the cavalry and holding them until the arrival of the Sixth corps, which was marching to report to me. I felt so strongly the necessity of holding this large force of the enemy that I gave permission to General Merritt to order Colonel Stagg's brigade to make a mounted charge against their lines, which was most gallantly done, the men leaving many of their horses dead almost up to the enemy's works.

On the arrival of the head of the Sixth corps the enemy commenced withdrawing. Major-General Wright was ordered to put Seymour's division into position at once, and advance and carry the road, which was done at a point about two miles or two miles and a half from Deatonsville. As soon as the road was in our possession, Wright was directed to push General Seymour on, the enemy falling back, skirmishing briskly. Their resistance growing stubborn, a halt was called to get up Wheaton's division of the Sixth corps, which went into position on the left of the road, Seymour being on the right. Wheaton was ordered to guide right, with his right connecting with Seymour's left and resting on the road. I still felt the great importance of pushing the enemy, and was unwilling to wait

for Getty's division of the Sixth corps to get up. I therefore ordered an advance, sending word to General Humphreys, who was on the road to our right, and requesting him to push on, as I felt confident that we could break up the enemy. It was apparent, from the absence of artillery fire and the manner in which they gave way when pressed, that the force of the enemy opposed to us was a heavy rear guard. The enemy was driven until our lines reached Sailor's creek; and, from the north bank, I could see our cavalry on the high ground above the creek and south of it, and the long line of smoke from the burning wagons. A cavalryman, who, in a charge, cleared the enemy's works and came through their lines, reported to me what was in front. I regret that I have forgotten the name of this gallant young soldier. As soon as General Wright could get his artillery into position I ordered the attack to be made on the left, and sent Colonel Stagg's brigade of cavalry to strike and flank the extreme right of the enemy's line. The attack by the infantry was not executed exactly as I had directed, and a portion of our line in the open ground was broken by the terrible fire of the enemy, who were in position on commanding ground south of the creek.

This attack by Wheaton's and Seymour's divisions was splendid, but no more than I had reason to expect from the gallant Sixth corps. The cavalry in rear of the enemy attacked simultaneously, and the enemy, after a gallant resistance, were completely surrounded, and nearly all threw down their arms and surrendered. General Ewell, commanding the enemy's forces, and a number of other general officers, fell into our hands, and a very large number of prisoners. I have never ascertained exactly how many prisoners were taken in this battle. Most of them fell into the hands of the cavalry, but they are no more entitled to claim them than the Sixth corps, to which command equal credit is due for the good results of this engagement. Both the cavalry and the Sixth corps encamped south of Sailor's creek that night, having followed up the small remnant of the enemy's forces for several miles. In reference to the participation of the Sixth corps in this action I desire to add that the Lieutenant-General had notified me that this corps would report to me. Major McClellan and Lieutenant-Colonel Franklin, of General Wright's staff, had successively been sent forward to report the progress of the corps in coming up, and on the arrival of Major-General Wright he reported his corps to me, and from that time until after the battle received my orders and obeyed them; but after the engagement was over, and General Meade had communicated with General Wright, the latter declined to make his report to me until directed to do so by the Lieutenant-General.

On the seventh instant the pursuit was continued early in the morning by the cavalry, General Crook in the advance. It was discovered that the enemy had not been cut off by

the Army of the James, and under the belief that he would attempt to escape on the Danville road through Prince Edward Court-house, General Merritt was ordered to move his two divisions to that point, passing around the left of the Army of the James. General Crook continued the direct pursuit, encountering the main body of the enemy at Farmville, and again on the north side of the Appomattox, where the enemy's trains were attacked by General Gregg, and a sharp fight with the enemy's infantry ensued, in which General Gregg was unfortunately captured.

On arriving at Prince Edward Court-house I found General McKenzie, with his division of cavalry from the Army of the James, and ordered him to cross the bridge on the Buffalo river and make a reconnoissance to Prospect station, on the Lynchburg railroad, and ascertain if the enemy were moving past that point. Meantime I heard from General Crook that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox, and General Merritt was then moved on and encamped at Buffalo creek, and General Crook was ordered to recross the Appomattox and encamp at Prospect station. On the morning of the eighth Merritt and McKenzie continued to march to Prospect station, and Merritt's and Crook's commands then moved on to Appomattox depot, a point on the Lynchburg railroad, five miles south of Appomattox Court-house. Shortly after the march commenced, Sergeant White, one of my scouts, notified me that there were four trains of cars at Appomattox depot loaded with supplies for General Lee's army; Generals Merritt and Crook were at once notified, and the command pushed on briskly for twenty-eight miles. General Custer had the advance, and on nearing the depot skilfully threw a force in rear of the trains and captured them. Without halting a moment he pushed on, driving the enemy (who had reached the depot about the same time as our cavalry) in the direction of Appomattox Court-house, capturing many prisoners and twenty-five pieces of artillery, a hospital train, and a large park of wagons. General Devin coming up, went in on the right of Custer. The fighting continued till after dark, and the enemy being driven to Appomattox Court-house, I at once notified the Lieutenant-General, and sent word to Generals Ord and Gibbon, of the Army of the James, and General Griffin, commanding the Fifth corps, who were in rear, that if they pressed on there was now no means of escape for the enemy, who had reached "the last ditch." During the night, although we knew that the remnant of Lee's army was in our front, we held fast with the cavalry to what we had gained, and ran the captured trains back along the railroad to a point where they could be protected by our infantry that was coming up. The Twenty-fourth and Fifth corps, and one division of the Twenty-fifth corps, arrived about daylight on the ninth at Appomattox depot.

After consulting with General Ord, who was in command of these corps, I rode to the front, near Appomattox Court-house, and just as the enemy in heavy force was attacking the cavalry with the intention of breaking through our lines, I directed the cavalry, which was dismounted, to fall back, gradually resisting the enemy, so as to give time for the infantry to form its lines and march to the attack, and when this was done to move off to the right flank and mount. This was done, and the enemy discontinued his attack as soon as he caught sight of our infantry. I moved briskly around the left of the enemy's line of battle, which was falling back rapidly (heavily pressed by the advance of the infantry), and was about to charge the trains and the confused mass of the enemy, when a white flag was presented to General Custer, who had the advance, and who sent the information to me at once that the enemy desired to surrender.

Riding over to the left at Appomattox Court-house, I met Major-General Gordon, of the rebel service, and Major-General Wilcox. General Gordon requested a suspension of hostilities, pending negotiations for a surrender then being held between Lieutenant-General Grant and General Lee. I notified him that I desired to prevent an unnecessary effusion of blood, but as there was nothing definitely settled in the correspondence, and as an attack had been made on my lines with the view to escape, under the impression our force was only cavalry, I must have some assurance of an intended surrender. This General Gordon gave by saying that there was no doubt of the surrender of General Lee's army. I then separated from him, with an agreement to meet these officers again in half an hour at Appomattox Court-house. At the specified time, in company with General Ord, who commanded the infantry, I again met this officer, also Lieutenant-General Longstreet, and received from them the same assurance, and hostilities ceased until the arrival of Lieutenant-General Grant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General.

Brevet Major-General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff.

CAVALRY HEADQUARTERS,
DINWIDDIE COURT-HOUSE, March 31, 1865. }

The enemy's cavalry attacked me, about ten o'clock to-day on the road coming in from the west and a little north of Dinwiddie Court-house. This attack was very handsomely repulsed by General Smith's brigade of Grook's division, and the enemy was driven across Chamberlain's creek. Shortly afterward the enemy's infantry attacked on the same creek in heavy force, and drove in General Davies' brigade, and advancing rapidly gained the forks of the road at J. Boisseau's. This forced Devin, who was in advance, and Davies, to cross to the Boydton road. General Gregg's brigade

and General Gibbs' brigade, who had been toward Dinwiddie, then attacked the enemy in the rear very handsomely. This stopped the march toward the left of our infantry, and finally caused them to turn toward Dinwiddie, and attack us in heavy force. The enemy then again attacked at Chamberlain's creek and forced Smith's position. At this time Capeheart and Pennington's brigades of Custer's division came up and a very handsome fight occurred.

The enemy have gained some ground, but we still hold in front of Dinwiddie, and Davies and Devin are coming down the Boydton road to join us.

The opposing force was Pickett's division, Wise's independent brigade of infantry, and Fitzhugh Lee's, Rosser's, and W. H. Lee's cavalry commands.

The men have behaved splendidly. Our loss in killed and wounded will probably number four hundred and fifty men; very few were lost as prisoners.

We have of the enemy a number of prisoners.

This force is too strong for us. I will hold on to Dinwiddie Court-house until I am compelled to leave.

Our fighting to-day was all dismounted.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General.

Lieutenant-General GRANT,
Commanding Armies United States.

DARNEY MILLS, March 31, 1865—10:05 P. M.

The Fifth corps has been ordered to your support. Two divisions will go by J. Boisseau's and one down the Boydton road. In addition to this I have sent McKenzie's cavalry, which will reach you by the Vaughan road.

All these forces, except the cavalry, should reach you by twelve to-night.

You will assume command of the whole force sent to operate with you, and use it to the best of your ability to destroy the force which your command has fought so gallantly to-day.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN.

Official copy:
E. D. TOWNSEND,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, November 18,
1865.

Doc. 116.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILSON'S EXPEDITION.

OFFICIAL REPORTS AND DESPATCHES.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., June 29, 1865. }

Brigadier-General Wm. D. Whipple, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff, Headquarters Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL—I have the honor to transmit herewith a detailed report of operations of the Cavalry corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, from the first of March, 1865, to the present time, with the reports of Brevet Major-General

E. Upton, Brigadier-Generals McCook and Long, commanding divisions, Brigadier-General Croton, Brevet Brigadier-Generals Winslow and Alexander, and Colonels Minty, Miller, and La Grange, commanding brigades; also the report of Major Hubbard, commanding pontoon train, and Major C. L. Greene, Provost-Marshal.

If not inconsistent with the customs of service and the views of the War Department, I have the honor to request that the reports of division and brigade commanders may be published in the *Army and Navy Journal* or *Official Gazette*.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MOON, GA., June 29, 1865. }

Brigadier-General Wm. D. Whipple, Chief of Staff, and Assistant Adjutant-General, Headquarters Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL—My last general report of operations dated at Gravelly Springs, Alabama, February eighth, 1865, completed the history of the Cavalry corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, from its organization to that date.

In pursuance of instructions from General Thomas, I was authorized, after the escape of Hood to the south side of the Tennessee river, to assemble the available force of the corps in the vicinity of Eastport, at the head of steamboat navigation on the Tennessee river, for the purpose of completing the organization and putting the troops in the best possible condition for early active operations.

By his direction, after transferring the Seventh Ohio and Fifth Iowa from the Sixth division, it was ordered to Pulaaski with a view to its remaining in Tennessee for local operations. No reports have since been received of its services.

On the twenty-fourth of January La Grange's and Watkins' brigades of the First division, after a fatiguing march, arrived at Waterloo landing, in the north-western corner of Alabama. They had been detained in Kentucky under General McCook, for the purpose of ridding that State of a band of rebel cavalry under Lyon. In pursuance of previous orders the Third brigade of this division was then distributed between the First and Second brigades. Brevet Brigadier-General Watkins, at his own request, was ordered to Nashville to report to Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, commanding the Sixth division, for assignment to the command of a brigade in that division. About the same time the Second division, Brigadier-General Eli Long commanding, and newly mounted and equipped, arrived from Louisville, having marched from that place, a distance of three hundred and eighty-five miles, in mid-winter, over bad roads with scanty supplies of forage, in twenty-eight days. Soon after this, Winslow's brigade of the Fourth division arrived by steam transports from the same place. The

Second brigade of this division was then organized by joining the First Ohio (transferred from the Second division) with the Fifth Iowa and the Seventh Ohio (transferred from the Sixth division). Brevet Brigadier-General A. J. Alexander, a young officer of courage and administrative ability, was assigned to the command. Brigadier-General B. H. Grierson had been originally assigned to the command of this division, but failing to use due diligence in assembling and preparing it for the field, he was replaced by Brevet Major-General E. Upton, an officer of rare merit and experience.

The troops were all cantoned on the north bank of the Tennessee river—Long's, Upton's, and Hatch's divisions, and Hammond's brigade of Knipe's division at Gravelly Springs, and McCook's division at Waterloo. The aggregate force was about twenty-two thousand men, thirteen thousand of whom were armed with Spencer carbines and rifles; sixteen thousand were well mounted on horses simply requiring a few weeks rest, feed and attention, to become fit for active service. The balance were poorly armed and dismounted.

On the third of February I received instructions to send a division of five thousand cavalry to General Canby. After consultation with General Thomas it was decided to send Knipe's division, but in order to furnish it with horses, it was found necessary to dismount a part of the command remaining behind. General Hatch's division, composed of most excellent troops, had, under its gallant commander, won great distinction during the recent campaign, but having the largest number of dismounted men, and having been constantly in service from the beginning of the war, I thought it best to take the horses from it necessary to mount the troops about to leave. I wished to give it an opportunity to rest, furnish it a remount of fresh horses, equipments, and arms, and hoped thereby to make it a model in drill, discipline and equipment, as it had already made itself in dash, constancy and the cheerful performance of duty.

On the third of February the mounted portion of the Seventh division embarked at Waterloo on transports for Vicksburg. The dismounted portion, with such horses as could be obtained, followed from Nashville under the direct command of General Knipe, as soon as transportation could be furnished. Brevet Brigadier-General J. H. Hammond had been relieved by direction of the Chief Surgeon from the command of a brigade in this division, after having earned great credit with it in the battles about Nashville and the pursuit of Hood from Tennessee.

These changes left under my immediate command seventeen thousand men, requiring about five thousand horses to furnish a complete remount.

As the troops arrived at Gravelly Springs they were assigned to camps as close together as the circumstances of ground, water, and

contiguity to the landings would permit. The mild climate, rocky soil and rolling surface of the country, rendered this altogether the best locality that could have been found for recuperating and preparing both men and horses for an early spring campaign.

The camps were laid out with regularity, comfortable quarters for the men, and shelters for the horses were constructed without delay; roads were made to the landings, and supplies of forage, rations, clothing, equipments and ammunition were furnished in great abundance. A thorough system of instruction for men and officers was instituted, and every necessary effort was made to bring the corps to the highest possible state of efficiency. I transmit herewith a topographical sketch, showing the situation of the camps, and their arrangement. The plan of that constructed by General Hammond and afterward occupied by a part of General Upton's division, I regard the best arrangement of a cavalry cantonment yet devised.

The influence of the system adopted on the subsequent career of the corps cannot be over-estimated. The final victory over Forrest and the rebel cavalry was won by patient industry and instruction while in the cantonments of Gravelly Springs and Waterloo. The great fault in our cavalry system had previously been over-work in detachments, and the absence of instruction, organization and uniformity of equipment.

On the twenty-third of February, General Thomas arrived at Eastport with instructions directing me to fit out an expedition of five or six thousand cavalry, "for the purpose of making a demonstration upon Tuscaloosa and Selma," in favor of General Canby's operations against Mobile and Central Alabama. After consultation, in which I expressed a belief in the capacity of my command to capture those places, and conduct from the latter most important operations, General Thomas gave me permission to move with my entire available mounted force, and authorized me to pursue such a course as I might see proper, keeping in view the general objects of the impending campaign. The instructions of Lieutenant-General Grant, transmitted to me by General Thomas, after directing me to be ready to march as soon as General Canby's movement had begun, allowed me the amplest discretion as an independent commander.

It was at first intended that the expedition should begin its movement by the fourth of March, but heavy rain storms setting in, the Tennessee river became very much swollen and the roads impassable.

Lieutenant-General Grant having directed all the surplus horses purchased in the West to be sent to General Canby, there were no means left in the hands of the Cavalry Bureau to mount Hatch's division. I therefore directed him to turn over his few remaining horses to General Upton, and continue the instruction of his com-

mand at Eastport. It was expected that the supply departments would soon be able to furnish him horses and Spencer carbines, so as to enable him to take the field and join the corps somewhere in Alabama or Georgia. By a voluntary arrangement between Brevet Brigadier-General D. E. Coon, commanding the Second brigade of Hatch's division, and Brigadier-General Croxton, the former also turned over to the latter all the Spencer carbines then in his brigade. By these means the troops of the First, Second and Fourth divisions, with the exception of a few hundred, were armed with the Spencer carbine, and all had arms using cartridges with metallic cases.

The heavy rains continued, in consequence of which the river overflowed its banks and destroyed a large quantity of grain, accumulated for the horses at Chickasaw landing. The steamboats could not reach the highlands, except by working their way through the woods and fields, until the river subsided to its natural banks. The crossing was, therefore, delayed till the eighteenth instant.

Division commanders were directed to see that every trooper was provided with five days' light rations in haversacks, twenty-four pounds of grain, one hundred rounds of ammunition and one pair of extra shoes for his horse; that the pack animals were loaded with five days of hard bread, ten of sugar, coffee and salt, and the wagons with forty-five days coffee, twenty of sugar, fifteen of salt and eighty rounds of ammunition. These calculations were made upon the basis of a sixty days' campaign, and under the supposition that the command would be able to supply itself from the enemy's country with everything else in abundance. Only enough hard bread was taken to last during the march through the sterile regions of North Carolina.

A light canvas pontoon train of thirty boats, with the fixtures complete, transported by fifty six-mule wagons, and in charge of a battalion of the Twelfth Missouri cavalry, Major J. M. Hubbard commanding, was also got ready to accompany the expedition.

The entire train in charge of Captain W. E. Brown, Acting Chief Quartermaster, numbered not far from two hundred and fifty wagons, escorted by fifteen hundred dismounted men of the three divisions. These men were organized into battalions and commanded by Major, now Colonel Archer.

At daylight on the twenty-second of March, all the preliminary arrangements having been perfected, and the order of march having been designated, the movement began.

The entire valley of the Tennessee having been devastated by two years' of warfare, was quite as destitute of army supplies as the hill country south of it. In all directions, for a hundred and twenty miles, there was almost absolute destitution. It was therefore necessary to scatter the troops over a wide extent of country, and march

as rapidly as circumstances would permit. This was rendered safe by the fact that Forrest's forces were at that time near West Point, Mississippi, one hundred and fifty miles south-west of East Port, while Roddy's occupied Montevallo, on the Alabama and Tennessee River railroad, nearly the same distance to the south-east. By starting on diverging roads, the enemy was left in doubt as to our real object, and compelled to watch equally Columbus, Tuscaloosa and Selma.

Upton's division, followed by his train, marched rapidly by the most easterly route, passing by Barton's station, Throgmorton's Mills, Russellville, Mount Hope, and Jasper, to Sanders' ferry, on the west fork of the Black Warrior river.

Long's division marched by the way of Cherokee station and Frankfort, but being encumbered by the pontoon train, and having mistaken the road by which it should have ascended the mountain, was considerably delayed in reaching Russellville.

From this place it marched directly south by the Tuscaloosa road till it crossed Upper Bear creek; thence turned to the eastward by the head of Buttahatchie creek, crossed Byler's road near Thorn Hill, and struck Blackwater creek, about twenty-five miles from Jasper. The crossing of the last mentioned stream, and the road for six miles beyond, were as bad as could be, but by industry everything was forced through to Jasper and the ford on the Warrior with but little loss of time.

McCook's division pursued the same route, to Bear creek, or the Tuscaloosa road, but instead of turning to the eastward at that place, continued the march toward Tuscaloosa as far as Eldridge, and thence east to Jasper.

In this order the different divisions arrived at and crossed the two forks of the Black Warrior river.

The ford on the west branch was extremely difficult of approach as well as of passage. The country on both sides very rugged, and six or seven hundred feet above the bed of the stream, was entirely destitute of forage; the stream itself was at the time likely to become entirely impassable by the rain which threatened to occur at any moment. I had also heard at Jasper, on the twenty-seventh, that a part of Forest's force, under Chalmers, was marching by the way of Bridgeville toward Tuscaloosa, and knew that if the true direction of our movement had been discovered, it would be but a short time till the balance of the rebel cavalry would push in the same direction. I therefore directed my division commanders to replenish the haversacks, see that the pack animals were fully laden, to leave all the wagons except the artillery, and march with the greatest possible rapidity *via* Elytown to Montevallo. I felt confident that the enemy would not relinquish his efforts to check the movement of the troops in the hope of destroying our supply train. I therefore left it between the two streams with instructions to push on as far as Elytown, where it would receive further orders. By great

energy on the part of commanding officers, the two branches of the Warrior were crossed, each division losing a few horses but no men.

At Elytown, on the evening of the thirtieth, I directed General McCook to detach Croxton's brigade, with orders to move on Tuscaloosa as rapidly as possible, burn the public stores, military school, bridges, foundries and factories at that place, return toward the main column by the way of the Centreville road, and rejoin it at or in the vicinity of Selma. Besides covering our trains and inflicting a heavy blow upon the enemy, I hoped by this detachment to develop any movement on his part intended to intercept my main column.

General Upton's division encountered a few rebel cavalry at Elytown, but pushed them rapidly across the Cahawba river to Montevallo. The rebels having felled trees into the ford and otherwise obstructed it, the railroad bridge near Hillsboro was floored over by General Winslow. General Upton crossed his division and pushed on rapidly to Montevallo, where he arrived late on the evening of the thirtieth. Long and McCook marched by the same route. In this region General Upton's division destroyed the Red Mountain, Central, Bibb, and Columbiana iron works, Cahawba rolling-mills, five collieries and much valuable property, all of these establishments were of great extent and in full operation. I arrived at Montevallo at one p. m., March thirty-first, where I found Upton's division ready to resume the march. Directly after the enemy made his appearance on the Selma road. By my direction General Upton moved his division out at once, General Alexander's brigade in advance. After a sharp fight and a handsome charge, General Alexander drove the rebel cavalry, a part of Crossland's Kentucky brigade and Roddy's division, rapidly and in great confusion toward Randolph. The enemy endeavoring to make a stand at a creek four or five miles south of Montevallo. General Upton placed in position and opened Rodney's battery "I" Fourth United States artillery, and passing Winslow's brigade to the front, they again beat a hasty retreat, closely pursued and repeatedly charged by Winslow's advance. About fifty prisoners were taken with their arms and accoutrements, and much other loose materials were abandoned. The gallantry of men and officers had been most conspicuous throughout the day, and had resulted already in the establishment of a moral supremacy for the corps.

Upton's division bivouacked fourteen miles south of Montevallo, and at dawn of the next day, April first, pushed forward to Randolph. At this point, in pursuance of the order of march for the day, General Upton turned to the east for the purpose of going by the way of Old Maplesville and thence by the old Selma road, while General Long was instructed to push forward on the new road.

At Randolph, General Upton captured a rebel courier just from Centreville, and from his per-

son took two despatches, one from Brigadier-General W. H. Jackson, commanding one of Forrest's divisions, and the other from Major Anderson, Forrest's Chief of Staff. From the first I learned that Forrest with a part of his command was in my front: this had also been obtained from prisoners that Jackson with his division and all the wagons and artillery of the rebel cavalry, marching from Tuscaloosa *via* Trion toward Centreville, had encamped the night before at Hill's plantation, three miles beyond Scottsboro; that Croxton with the brigade attached to Elyton had struck Jackson's rear guard at Trion and interposed himself between it and the train; that Jackson had discovered this, and intended to attack Croxton at daylight of April first. I learned from the other despatch that Chalmers had also arrived at Marion, Alabama, and had been ordered to cross to the east side of the Cahawba near that place for the purpose of joining Forrest in my front, or in the works at Selma. I also learned that a force of dismounted men were stationed at Centreville, with orders to hold the bridge over the Cahawba at that place as long as possible, and in no event to let it fall into our hands.

Shortly after the interception of these despatches, I received a despatch from Croxton, written from Trion the night before, informing me that he had struck Jackson's rear, and instead of pushing on toward Tuscaloosa as he was ordered, he would follow up and endeavor to bring him to an engagement, hoping thereby to prevent his junction with Forrest.

With this information in my possession I directed McCook to strengthen the battalion previously ordered to Centreville by a regiment, and to follow at once with LaGrange's entire brigade, leaving all pack-trains and wagons with the main column, so that he could march with the utmost possible celerity, and after seizing the Centreville bridge, and leaving it under protection of a sufficient guard, to cross the Cahawba and continue his march by the Scottsboro road toward Trion. His orders were to attack and break up Jackson's forces, form a junction with Croxton if practicable, and rejoin the corps with his entire division by the Centreville road to Selma. Although he did not leave Randolph till nearly eleven o'clock A. M., and the distance to Scottsville was nearly forty miles, I hoped by this movement to do more than secure the Centreville bridge, and prevent Jackson from joining the forces in front of the main column.

Having thus taken care of the right flank and anticipated Forrest in his intention to play his old game of getting upon the rear of his opponent, I gave directions to Long and Upton to allow him no rest, but push him toward Selma with the utmost spirit and rapidity. These officers, comprehending the situation, pressed forward with admirable zeal and activity upon the roads which have been previously indicated. The advance of both divisions encountered

small parties of the enemy, but drove them back to their main force at Ebenezer church, six miles north of Plantersville. Forrest had chosen a position on the north bank of Bogler's creek, and disposed of his force for battle, his right resting on Mulberry creek and his left on a high wooded ridge, with four pieces of artillery to sweep the Randolph road upon which Long's division was advancing, and two on the Maplesville road. He had under his command in line Armstrong's brigade of Chalmers' division, Roddy's division, Crossland's Kentucky brigade, and a battalion of three hundred infantry just arrived from Selma, in all about five thousand men. Part of his front was covered by a slashing of pine trees and rail barricades.

As soon as General Long discovered the enemy in strength close upon the main body, he reinforced his advance guard (a battalion of the Seventy-second Indiana mounted infantry) by the balance of the regiment, dismounted and formed it on the left of the road. Pushing it forward the enemy was broken and driven back. At this juncture he ordered forward four companies of the Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White commanding. With drawn sabres this gallant battalion drove the enemy in confusion into the main line, dashed against that, broke through it, rode over the rebel guns, crushing the wheels of one piece, and finally turned to the left and cut its way out, leaving one officer and sixteen men in the enemy's hands, either killed or wounded. In this charge Captain Taylor, Seventeenth Indiana, lost his life, after having led his men into the very midst of the enemy and engaged in a running fight of two hundred yards with Forrest in person.

General Alexander's brigade had the advance of Upton's division, and when within three miles of Ebenezer church heard the firing and cheers of Long's men on the right, pushed forward at the trot and soon came upon the enemy. General Alexander hastily deployed his brigade, mostly on the right of the road, with the intention of connecting with Long's left, and as soon as everything was in readiness pushed forward his line dismounted. In less than an hour, although the resistance was determined, the position was carried by a gallant charge, and the rebels completely routed. Alexander's brigade captured two guns and about two hundred prisoners, while one gun fell into the hands of General Long's division.

Winslow's brigade immediately passed to the front and took up the pursuit, but could not again bring the rebels to a stand.

The whole corps bivouacked at sundown about Plantersville, nineteen miles from Selma. With almost constant fighting the enemy had been driven since morning twenty-four miles.

At daylight of the second, Long's division took the advance, closely followed by Upton's. Having obtained a well-drawn sketch and complete description of the defences of Selma, I directed General Long, marching by the flanks

of brigades, to approach the city and cross to the Summerville road, without exposing his men, and to develop his line as soon as he should arrive in front of the works. General Upton was directed to move on the Range Line road, sending a squadron on the Burnsville road. Lieutenant Rendelbrook, with a battalion of the Fourth United States cavalry, was instructed to move down the railroad, burning bridges, stations, and trestle-works as far as Burnsville. By rapid marching, without opposition, the troops were all in sight of the town, and mostly in position by four P. M.

As I approached the city I perceived that my information was generally correct. I therefore made a reconnoissance of the works from left to right for the purpose of satisfying myself entirely as to the true point of attack and the probable chances of success. I directed General Long to assault the enemy's works by moving diagonally across the road upon which his troops were posted, while General Upton, at his own request, with a picked force of three hundred men, was directed to penetrate the swamp upon his left, break through the line covered by it and turn the enemy's right; the balance of his division to conform to the movement. The signal for the advance was to be the discharge of a single gun from Rodney's battery, to be given as soon as Upton's turning movement had developed itself.

Before this plan could be put into execution, and while waiting for the signal to advance, General Long was informed that a strong force of rebel cavalry had begun skirmishing with his rear, and threatened a general attack upon his pack-train and led-horses. He had left a force of six companies well posted at the creek in anticipation of this movement, afterward ascertained to have been made by Chalmers, in obedience to the instructions of Forrest. This force was at Marion the day before and was expected on the road from that place. Fearing that this affair might compromise our assault upon the main position, General Long (having already strengthened the rear by another regiment), with admirable judgment, determined to make the assault at once, and without waiting for the signal gave the order to advance. The troops dismounted, sprang forward with confident alacrity, and in less than fifteen minutes, without even stopping, wavering, or faltering, had swept over the works and driven the rebels in confusion toward the city. I arrived on that part of the field just after the works were carried, at once notified General Upton of the success, and ordered him to push in as rapidly as possible, directed Colonel Minty, in command of the Second division, to gather his men for a new advance, ordered Colonel Vail, commanding the Seventeenth Indiana, to place his own regiment and the Fourth Ohio in line inside the works, hurried up the Fourth United States cavalry, Lieutenant O'Connell, and the Board of Trade battery, Captain Robinson commanding, and the attack. The rebels had occu-

ped a new line but partially finished in the edge of the city. A most gallant charge by the Fourth United States cavalry was repulsed, but rapidly reformed on the left. It was now quite dark. Upton's division advancing at the same time, a new charge was made by the Fourth Ohio, Seventeenth Indiana, and Fourth cavalry, dismounted. The troops, inspired by the wildest enthusiasm, swept everything before them, and penetrated the city in all directions. During the first part of the action the Chicago Board of Trade battery had occupied a commanding position, and steadily replied to the enemy's guns.

I regard the capture of Selma the most remarkable achievement in the history of modern cavalry, and one admirably illustrative of its new powers and tendencies. That it may be fully understood particular attention is invited to the following facts.

The fortifications assaulted and carried, consist of a bastioned line, on a radius of nearly three miles, extending from the Alabama river below to the same above the city. The part west of the city is covered by a miry, deep, and almost impassable creek, that on the east side by a swamp extending from the river almost to the Summerfield road, and entirely impracticable for mounted men at all times. General Upton ascertained by a personal reconnoissance that dismounted men might with great difficulty work through it on the left of the Range Line road. The profile of that part of the line assaulted is as follows: Height of parapet, six to eight feet, thickness eight feet, depth of ditch five feet, width from ten to fifteen feet; height of stockade on the glacis, five feet, sunk into the earth four feet. The ground over which the troops advanced is an open field, generally level, sloping slightly toward the works, but intersected by one ravine and marshy soil, which both the right and left of Long's line experienced some difficulty in crossing. The distance which the troops charged, exposed to the enemy's fire of artillery and musketry, was six hundred yards. Particular attention is invited to that part of General Long's report which describes the assault. He states that the number actually engaged in the charge was one thousand five hundred and fifty, officers and men. The portion of the line assaulted was manned by Armstrong's brigade, regarded as the best in Forrest's corps, and reported by him at more than fifteen hundred men. The loss from Long's division was forty killed, two hundred and sixty wounded and seven missing. General Long was wounded in the head, Colonels Miller and McCormick in the leg, and Colonel Briggs in the breast.

I doubt if the history of this, or any other war, will show another instance in which a line of works, as strongly constructed and as well defended as this, by musketry and artillery, has been stormed and carried by a single line of men without support. Too much credit cannot be accorded to General Long, Colonels Minty,

Miller, and Vail, or to the gallant officers and men under their command. I submit herewith a map of Selma and its defences surveyed and drawn by Capt. H. E. Noys, Second United States cavalry and aid-de-camp.

The immediate fruits of our victory were thirty-one field guns, and one thirty-pounder parrot, which had been used against us; two thousand seven hundred prisoners, including one hundred and fifty officers; a number of colors, and immense quantities of stores of every kind. Generals Forrest, Armstrong, Roddy, and Adams escaped, with a number of men, under cover of darkness, either by the Burnsville and River roads, or by swimming the Alabama river. A portion of Upton's division pursued on the Burnsville road until long after midnight, capturing four guns and many prisoners. I estimate the entire garrison, including the militia of the city and surrounding country, at seven thousand men; the entire force under my command, engaged and in supporting distance, was nine thousand men and eight guns.

As soon as the troops could be assembled and got into camp, I assigned Brevet Brigadier-General Winslow to the command of the city, with orders to destroy everything that could possibly benefit the rebel cause. I directed General Upton to march at daylight with his division, for the purpose of driving Chalmer to the west side of the Cahawba, to open communication with McCook, expected from Centreville, and, in conjunction with the latter, to bring in the train.

The capture of Selma having put us in possession of the enemy's greatest depot in the southwest, was a vital blow to their cause, and secured to us the certainty of going in whatever direction might be found most advantageous. I gave direction to Lieutenant Heywood, Fourth Michigan cavalry, engineer officer on my staff, to employ all the resources of the shops in the city in the construction of pontoons, with the intention of laying a bridge, and crossing to the south side of the Alabama river as soon as I could satisfy myself in regard to General Canby's success in the operations against Mobile. On April fifth Upton and McCook arrived with the train, but nothing definite had been heard of Croxton. McCook had been entirely successful in his operations against Centreville, but on reaching Scottsboro he found Jackson well posted with a force he thought too strong to attack. After a sharp skirmish he retired to Centreville, burned the Scottsboro cotton factory and Cahawba bridge and returned toward Selma, satisfied that Croxton had taken care of himself and gone in a new direction.

On the sixth of April, having ordered Major Hubbard to lay a bridge over the Alabama with the utmost despatch, I went to Cahawba to see General Forrest, who had agreed to meet me there under flag of truce for the purpose of arranging an exchange of prisoners. I was not long in discovering that I need not expect liberality in this matter, and that Forrest hoped to recapture the men of his command in my

possession. During our conversation he informed me that Croxton had had an engagement with Wirt Adams near Bridgeville, forty miles southwest of Tuscaloosa, two days before. Thus assured of Croxton's success and safety, I determined to lose no further time in crossing to the south side of the Alabama. I had also satisfied myself in the meantime that Canby had an ample force to take Mobile, and march to central Alabama. I therefore returned to Selma and urged every one to the utmost exertions. The river was quite full and rising, the weather unsettled and rainy, but by the greatest exertion night and day on the part of Major Hubbard and his battalion, General Upton, General Alexander, and my own staff, the bridge, eight hundred and seventy feet long, was constructed, and the command all crossed by daylight of the tenth. So swift and deep was the river that the bridge was swept away three times. General Alexander narrowly escaped with his life, boats were capsized and men precipitated into the stream, but the operation was finally terminated by complete success. The report of Major Hubbard, transmitted herewith, will give additional details of interest. Before leaving the city General Winslow destroyed the arsenals, foundries, arms, stores, and military munitions of every kind. The enemy had previously burned two thousand five hundred bales of cotton.

Having the entire corps, except Croxton's brigade, on the south side of the river, and being satisfied that the rebels could receive no advantage by attempting to again occupy Selma, so thoroughly had everything in it been destroyed, I determined to move by the way of Montgomery into Georgia, and after breaking up railroads and destroying stores and army supplies in that State, to march thence as rapidly as possible to the theatre of operations in North Carolina and Virginia.

Enough horses were secured at Selma and on the march to that place to mount all our dismounted men. In order to disencumber the column of every unnecessary impediment I ordered the surplus wagons to be destroyed, and all of the bridge train except enough for twelve boys. The main object for which the latter was brought had been secured by our passage of the Alabama.

I also directed the column to be cleared of all contraband negroes, and such of the able-bodied ones as were able to enlist to be organized into regiments, one to each division. Efficient officers were assigned to these commands, and great pains taken to prevent their becoming burdensome. How well they succeeded can be understood from the fact that in addition to subsisting themselves upon the country they marched (upon one occasion) forty-five miles, and frequently as much as thirty-five in one day.

In the march from Selma, La Grange's brigade of McCook's division was given the advance. The recent rains had rendered the roads

quite muddy, and a small body of rebel cavalry in falling back before La Grange destroyed several bridges, so that our progress was necessarily slow.

At seven A. M., April twelfth, the advanced guard reached Montgomery, and received the surrender of the city from the mayor and council. General Adams, with a small force, after falling back before us to the city, burned ninety thousand bales of cotton stored there, and continued his retreat to Mount Meigs on the Columbus road. Five guns and large quantities of small arms, stores, &c., were left in our hands and destroyed.

General McCook assigned Colonel Cooper, Fourth Kentucky cavalry, to the command of the city, and immediately began the destruction of the public stores. Major Weston, of the Fourth Kentucky, with a small detachment of his regiment, made a rapid march toward Wetumpka, swam the Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers, and captured five steamboats and their cargoes, which were taken to Montgomery and destroyed. Early on the fourteenth the march was resumed. I instructed Major-General Upton to move with his own division directly upon Columbus, and to order La Grange with his brigade to make a rapid movement upon West Point, destroying railroad bridges along the line of his march. I hoped to secure a crossing of the Chattahoochee at one or the other of these places.

Minty followed Upton by the way of Suskegga. McCook, with a part of his division, remained a few hours at Montgomery to complete the destruction of the public stores. Shortly after leaving his camp near Montgomery, La Grange struck a force of rebels under Buford and Clanton, but drove them in confusion, capturing about one hundred and fifty prisoners.

About two P. M. of the sixteenth, General Upton's advance, a part of Alexander's brigade, struck the enemy's pickets on the road, and drove them rapidly through Girard to the lower bridge over the Chattahoochee, at Columbus. The rebels hastily set fire to it, and thereby prevented its capture. After securing a position on the lower Montgomery road, General Upton detached a force to push around to the bridge at the Factory, three miles above the city. He then made a reconnoissance in person, and found the enemy strongly posted in a line of works covering all the bridges, with a large number of guns in position, on both sides of the river. He had already determined to move Winslow's brigade to the Opelika or Summerville road, and assault the works on that side, without waiting for the arrival of the Second division. I reached the head of Winslow's brigade of the Fourth division at four o'clock, and found the troops marching to the position assigned them by General Upton. Through an accident, Winslow did not arrive at his position till after dark; but General Upton proposed to make the assault in the night, and, coinciding with him in judgment, I ordered the attack.

Three hundred men of the Third Iowa caval-

ry, Colonel Noble commanding, were dismounted, and, after a slight skirmish, moved forward and formed across the road, under a heavy fire of artillery. The Fourth Iowa and Tenth Missouri were held in readiness to support the assaulting party. At half-past eight P. M., just as the troops were ready, the enemy, at a short distance, opened a heavy fire of musketry, and, with a four-gun battery, began throwing canister and grape. Generals Upton and Winslow, in person, directed the movement; the troops dashed forward, opened a withering fire from their Spencers, pushed through a slashing and abattis, pressed the rebel line back to their out-works, supposed at first to be the main line. During all this time the rebel guns threw out a perfect storm of canister and grape, but without avail.

General Upton sent two companies of the Tenth Missouri, Captain Glassen commanding, to follow up the success of the dismounted men and get possession of the bridge. They passed through the inner line of works, and, under cover of darkness, before the rebels knew it, had reached the bridge leading into Columbus.

As soon as everything could be got up to the position occupied by the dismounted men, General Upton pressed forward again, swept away all opposition, took possession of the foot and railroad bridges, and stationed guards throughout the city.

Twelve hundred prisoners, fifty-two field guns, in position for use against us, large quantities of arms and stores, fell into our hands. Our loss was only twenty-four killed and wounded. Colonel C. A. L. Lamar, of General Cobb's staff, formerly owner of the Wanderer slave-trader, was killed.

The splendid gallantry and steadiness of General Upton, Brevet Brigadier-General Winslow, and all the officers and men engaged in this night attack, is worthy of the highest commendation. The rebel force was over three thousand men. They could not believe they had been dislodged from their strong fortifications by an attack of three hundred men.

When it is remembered that this operation gave to us the city of Columbus—the key to Georgia—four hundred miles from our starting-point, and that it was conducted by cavalry, without any inspiration from the great events which had transpired in Virginia, it will not be considered insignificant, although shorn of its importance.

General Winslow was assigned to the command of the city. His report will give interesting details in regard to the stores, railroad transportation, gunboats, armories, arsenals, and workshops destroyed.

After much sharp skirmishing and hard marching, which resulted in the capture of fourteen wagons and a number of prisoners, La Grange's advance reached the vicinity of West Point at ten A. M., April sixteenth. With Beck's Eighteenth Indiana battery, the Second and

Fourth Indiana cavalry, the enemy were kept occupied till the arrival of the balance of the brigade. Having thoroughly reconnoitred the ground, detachments of the First Wisconsin, Second Indiana, and Seventh Kentucky cavalry dismounted and prepared to assault Fort Tyler, covering the bridge. Colonel La Grange describes it as a remarkably strong bastioned earthwork, thirty-five yards square, surrounded by a ditch twelve feet wide and ten feet deep, situated on a commanding eminence, protected by an imperfect abattis, and mounting two thirty-two pounder and two field guns.

At half-past one p. m. the charge was sounded, and the brave detachments on the three sides of the work rushed forward to the assault, drove the rebel skirmishers into the fort, and followed, under a withering fire of musketry and grape, to the edge of the ditch. This was found impassable, but, without falling back, Colonel La Grange posted sharpshooters to keep down the enemy, and organized parties to gather materials for bridges. As soon as this had been done, he sounded the charge again. The detachments sprang forward again, laid the bridges, and rushed forward, over the parapet into the work, capturing the entire garrison, in all two hundred and sixty-five men. General Tyler, the commanding officer, with eighteen men and officers, were killed, and twenty-eight severely wounded. Three guns and five hundred stands of small arms fell into our hands. Our loss was seven killed and twenty-nine wounded. Simultaneously with the advance upon the fort, the Fourth Indiana dashed through the town, secured both bridges over the Chattahoochee, scattered a superior force of cavalry, which had just arrived, and burned five engines and trains. Colonel La Grange highly commends the accuracy and steadiness of Captain Beck in the use of his artillery.

I cannot speak too warmly of the intrepidity, good management, and soldierly ability displayed by Colonel La Grange in this affair, nor too strongly recommend the steadiness, dash, and courage of his officers and men. Captain Ross S. Hill, commanding the Second Indiana, dangerously wounded in the assault, and previously wounded at Scottsboro, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harnden, commanding the First Wisconsin, slightly wounded, were noticeably conspicuous, and I trust will receive the promotion for which they have been recommended.

Colonel La Grange destroyed at this place two bridges, nineteen locomotives, and two hundred and forty-five cars loaded with quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores. Before leaving he established a hospital for the wounded of both sides, and left with the Mayor an ample supply of stores to provide for all their wants.

Early on the morning of the seventeenth he resumed his march toward Macon, passing through La Grange, Griffin, and Forsyth, and breaking the railroads at those places. He would have reached his destination by noon of

the twentieth but for delay caused by an order to wait for the Fourth Kentucky cavalry, which had gone through Columbus.

The afternoon of the seventeenth I directed Colonel Minty to resume the march with his division on the Thomaston road toward Macon, and to send a detachment forward that night to seize the double bridges over Flint river. Captain Van Antwerp of my staff, accompanied this party. He speaks in the highest terms of the dash with which Captain Hudson, Fourth Michigan cavalry, discharged the duties assigned to him. By seven a. m. the next day he had reached the bridges fifty-five miles from Columbus, scattered the party defending them, and took forty prisoners.

Before leaving Columbus General Winslow destroyed the rebel ram Jackson, nearly ready for sea, mounting six seven-inch guns, burned fifteen locomotives, two hundred and fifty cars, the railroad bridge and foot bridges, one hundred and fifteen thousand bales of cotton, four cotton factories, the navy-yard, foundry, armory, sword and pistol factory, accoutrement shops, three paper mills, over a hundred thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, besides immense stores of which no account could be taken. The rebels abandoned and burned the gunboat Chattahoochee twelve miles below Columbus. On the morning of the eighteenth the whole command resumed the march on the route pursued by the Second division. On the evening of the twentieth, when within twenty miles of Macon, the advanced guard, composed of the Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, Colonel White commanding, encountered about two hundred rebel cavalry on the road, but drove them rapidly back toward the city, and saved the Echconnee and Tobesopkee bridges. Colonel White deserves great credit for the boldness and skill with which he conducted his command.

When within thirteen miles of Macon he met a flag of truce in charge of Brigadier-General Robertson of the rebel army, bearing a written communication addressed to the commanding officer United States forces. Colonel White halted the flag and his advance, and sent the communication to Colonel Minty commanding the division. After reading it, Colonel Minty forwarded it to me, gave instructions to Colonel White to renew his advance, after waiting five minutes for the flag of truce to get out of the way, and sent a note to General Robertson informing him of his action. I received the communication at six p. m. nineteen miles from Macon, and upon examination found that it was a letter from General Howell Cobb, commanding the rebel forces at Macon.

The following is a true copy of the original :

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT TENNESSEE AND GEORGIA, }
Macon, April 20, 1865. }

To the commanding General of the United States forces:

GENERAL—I have just received from General P. T. Beauregard, my immediate commander,

a telegraphic despatch, of which the following is a copy :

GREENSBORO, April 19, 1865.
Via COLUMBIA, 19; via AUGUSTA, 20.

Major-General H. Cobb :

Inform General commanding enemy's forces in your front that a truce for the purpose of a final settlement was agreed upon yesterday between Generals Johnston and Sherman applicable to all forces under their command. A message to that effect from General Sherman will be sent him as soon as practicable. The contending forces are to occupy their present position, forty-eight hours' notice being given on the event of resumption of hostilities.

P. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, second in Command

My force being a portion of General Johnston's command, I proceed at once to execute the terms of the armistice, and have accordingly issued orders for the carrying out the same. I will meet you at any intermediate point between our respective lines for the purpose of making the necessary arrangements for a more perfect enforcement of the armistice. This communication will be handed to you by Brigadier-General F. N. Robinson.

I am, General, very respectfully yours,

HOWELL COBB,
Major-General Commanding, &c.

Without giving entire credence to the communication, I rode rapidly to the front, accompanied by several officers of my staff, determined to halt the advance at the defences of the city, and see General Cobb, so as to satisfy myself entirely in regard to every point before consenting to acknowledge the armistice. But before I could overtake the advance, or arrest it through an order carried by a staff-officer, Colonel White had dashed into the city and received its surrender. The garrison made a slight show of resistance, but laid down their arms promptly at the summons of Colonel White. General Cobb protested at what he professed to regard a violation of the alleged armistice, forgetting that my subordinates could neither acknowledge him as a channel of communication nor assume the responsibility of suspending their operations.

I arrived at Macon at half-past eight p. m., had an interview with General Cobb, during which he renewed his protest, insisting that I should acknowledge the existence of the armistice and withdraw my troops to the point at which they were met by the flag of truce. While I had no reason to doubt that an arrangement had been entered into by General Johnston and Major-General Sherman in the terms asserted, I could not acknowledge its application to my command, or its obligation upon me till notified to that effect by specific instructions from proper authority, authentically transmitted. My forces, although known as the "cavalry corps of the military division of the Mississippi," organized under General Sherman's orders, had

not served under his direct command since I separated from him at Gaylesville, Ala., in October, 1864. He at that time directed me to report to Major-General Thomas, with my troops, for the purpose of completing the organization and assisting in the operations against Hood and Forrest. From that time till my arrival at this place all of my operations were conducted under instructions either directly from General Thomas or transmitted through him from Lieutenant-General Grant. But I fully expected to join the armies operating in the Carolinas and Virginia, and therefore to be under and receive my instructions from General Sherman whenever I should re-establish communication with him. I therefore felt it to be my duty to obey whatever instructions General Sherman might send me, unless they would clearly injure the cause of our arms.

No orders having yet been received by me, I accordingly informed General Cobb, without questioning the existence of an armistice, or that it might be applicable to my forces, I could not acknowledge the justice of his protest, but must regard all the acts of my command which had transpired that evening, or which might transpire before the official propagation of the armistice, legitimate acts of warfare. I further informed him, without any regard to the principle just asserted, that I had used all diligence in endeavoring to halt the advance of my troops till I could obtain satisfactory information, and should therefore not withdraw from the city, but continue to hold it and consider the garrison, including the generals, prisoners of war till my conduct was disapproved by competent authority after full investigation of the case. I was permitted to send to General Sherman, by telegraph, a despatch in the following terms :

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
Macon, Ga., April 20, 1865—9 p. m. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, through Headquarters General Beauregard, Greensboro, N. C. :

My advance received the surrender of this city this evening. General Cobb had previously sent me under flag of truce a copy of a telegram from General Beauregard, declaring the existence of an armistice between all the troops under your command and those under General Johnston, without questioning the authenticity of this despatch or its application to my command, I could not communicate orders to my advance in time to prevent the capture of the place. I shall therefore hold its garrison, including Major-Generals G. W. Smith and Cobb, and Brigadier-General Mackall, prisoners of war. Please send me orders. I shall remain here a reasonable length of time to hear from you.

Fearing that it might be tampered with by the rebel telegraph operators, I had it put in cipher, in which shape I have reason to believe it reached its destination. The original was materially changed. I have seen in the newspapers what purported to be the reply of Gen-

eral Sherman, directing me to withdraw from the city and release my prisoners. No such despatch ever reached me, and had it done so in the most unquestionable form I should have obeyed it with great reluctance, and not until I had received every possible assurance that the case had been fully understood.

At six p. m. on the twenty-first, I received the following message from General Sherman, and though not in reply to mine, I regarded it as convincing proof that an armistice had actually been agreed upon :

HEADQUARTERS GREENSBORO, N. C., }
April 21, 1865—2 p. m. }

*Major-General Wilson, Commanding Cavalry,
Army United States, through Major-General
H. Cobb :*

The following is a copy of a communication just received, which will be sent you to-day by an officer :

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION, MISSISSIPPI, }
RALEIGH, April 20, 1865. }

*Major-General Wilson, Commanding Cavalry,
United States Army, in Georgia :*

General Joseph E. Johnston has agreed with me for a universal suspension of hostilities, looking to a peace over the whole surface of our country. I feel assured that it will be made perfect in a few days. You will, therefore, desist from further acts of war and devastation until you hear that hostilities are resumed. For the convenience of supplying your command you may either contract for supplies down about Fort Valley or the old Chattahoochee arsenal, or if you are south of West Point, Georgia, in the neighborhood of Rome and Kingston, opening up communication and a route of supplies with Chattanooga and Cleveland. Report to me your position through General Johnston, as also round by sea. You may also advise General Canby of your position and the substance of this, which I have also sent round by sea.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General Commanding.

Please communicate above to the Federal commander.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

I therefore issued the necessary orders to carry it into effect, and determined to suspend operations till I received orders to renew them, or till circumstances apparent to me should seem to justify independent action. General Cobb gave me every assistance in his power in the collection of supplies for my command. He directed his quartermasters and commissaries throughout the State, particularly in South-Western Georgia, to ship their grain and provisions to me, and this before any terms of capitulation had been made known to him or myself. I had about seventeen thousand men, besides prisoners, and twenty-two thousand animals to feed, and to have been compelled to

forage for them would have resulted in the devastation of the entire country in the vicinity of the city.

On the thirtieth of April General Croxton, with his brigade, last heard of through General Forrest, arrived at Forsyth, and the next day marched to this place.

After having skirmished with Jackson's force, estimated correctly at two thousand six hundred men, near Trion, on the morning of April second, he determined to effect by strategy what he could not expect to do by fighting, having with him only one thousand one hundred men; he, therefore, marched rapidly toward Johnson's ferry, on the Black Warrior river, forty miles above Tuscaloosa, threw Jackson completely off his guard by a simulated fight, crossed his brigade to the west side of the river, and turned toward Northport, where he arrived at nine p. m. April fourth. About midnight, fearing that his presence must become known, he surprised the force stationed on the bridge, and crossed into Tuscaloosa. He captured three guns, one hundred and fifty prisoners, and after daylight scattered the Militia and State Cadets, destroyed the military school, the stores, and public works. He remained at that place until the fifth, trying to communicate with General McCook, or to hear from me, but without success. Knowing that Jackson and Chalmers were both on the west side of the Cahawba, he thought it too hazardous to attempt a march by the way of Centreville, and therefore decided to move toward Eutaw in the hope of crossing the Warrior lower down, and breaking the railroad between Selma and Demopolis. Accordingly he abandoned Tuscaloosa, burned the bridge across the Black Warrior, and struck off to the south-east. When within seven miles of Eutaw he heard of the arrival at that place of Wirt Adams' division of cavalry, numbering two thousand six hundred men. Fearing to risk an engagement with a superior force, backed by the militia, he countermarched, and moved again in the direction of Tuscaloosa, leaving it to the right, passed on through Jasper, recrossed the west fork of the Warrior river at Hailby's mill, marched nearly due east, by the way of Mount Penon and Trussville, crossed the Coosa at Truss and Collins' ferries, and marched to Talladega. Near this place he met and scattered a force of rebels under General Hill, captured one hundred and fifty prisoners and one gun, and moved on toward Blue mountain, the terminus of the Alabama and Tennessee railroad. After destroying all the iron works and factories left by us in Northern Alabama and Georgia, he continued his march by Carrolton, Newnan, and Forsyth, to this place. He had no knowledge of any movements except what he got from rumor, but fully expected to form a junction with me at this place or at Augusta.

The admirable judgment and sagacity displayed by General Croxton throughout his march of over six hundred and fifty miles in

thirty days, as well as the good conduct and endurance of his command, are worthy of the highest commendation. For the details of his operations I respectfully refer to his report herewith.

On the thirtieth of April I received notice of the final capitulation of the rebel forces east of the Chattahoochee, and the next day, by the hands of Colonel Woodall, the order of the Secretary of War annulling the first armistice, directing the resumption of hostilities and the capture of the rebel chiefs. I had been previously advised of Davis' movements, and had given the necessary instructions to secure a clue to the route he intended following, with the hope of finally effecting his capture.

I directed General Upton to proceed in person to Augusta, and ordered General Winslow, with the Fourth division, to march to Atlanta for the purpose of carrying out the terms of the convention, as well as to make such a disposition of his forces, covering the country northward from Forsyth to Marietta, so as to secure the arrest of Jefferson Davis and party. I directed General Croton, commanding the First division, to distribute it along the line of the Ocmulgee, connecting with the Fourth division, and extending southward to this place. Colonel Minty, commanding the Second division, was directed to extend his troops along the line of the Ocmulgee and Altamaha rivers as far as Jacksonville. General McCook, with about five hundred men of his division, was sent to Tallahassee, Florida, with orders to receive the surrender of the rebels in that State, and to watch the country to the north and eastward. In addition to this, troops from the First and Second divisions were directed to watch the Flint river crossings, and small parties were stationed at the principal railroad stations from Atlanta to Eufaula, as well as at Columbus and West Point and Talladega. By these means I confidently expected to arrest all large parties of fugitives and soldiers, and by a thorough system of scouts hoped to obtain timely information of the movements of important personages.

The pursuit and capture of Jefferson Davis have already been reported.

A. H. Stephens, vice-president, Mr. Mallory, secretary of the navy to the rebel Government, and B. H. Hill, senator from Georgia, were arrested by General Upton's command, and sent forward in accordance with the instructions of the Secretary of War.

By reference to the reports herewith, it will be seen that since leaving the Tennessee river, the troops under my command have marched an average of five hundred and twenty-five miles in twenty-eight days, captured five fortified cities, twenty-three stands of colors, two hundred and eighty-eight pieces of artillery, and six thousand eight hundred and twenty prisoners, including five generals; have captured and destroyed two gunboats, ninety-nine thousand stands of small arms, seven iron-works,

seven foundries, seven machine-shops, two rolling-mills, five collieries, thirteen factories, four nitre works, one military university, three Confederate States arsenals and contents, one navy-yard and contents, one powder magazine and contents, one naval armory and contents, five steamboats, thirty-five locomotives, five hundred and sixty-five cars, three railroad bridges, two hundred and thirty-five thousand bales of cotton, and immense quantities of quartermaster and commissary and ordnance stores, of which no account could be taken; and have paroled fifty-nine thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight prisoners, including six thousand one hundred and thirty-four commissioned officers. Our total loss was thirteen officers and eighty-six men killed, thirty-nine officers and five hundred and fifty-nine men wounded, and seven officers and twenty-one men missing. I cannot close this report without calling attention to the remarkable discipline, endurance, and enthusiasm displayed throughout the campaign. Men, officers, regiments, brigades, and divisions, seemed to vie with each other in the promptitude and cheerfulness with which they obeyed every order. The march from Montgomery to this place, a distance of two hundred and fifteen miles, was made between the fourteenth and twentieth of April, and involving the passage of the Chattahoochee river at two important points, both strongly fortified and well defended, is especially worthy of notice.

The destruction of iron-works, foundries, arsenals, supplies, ammunition, and provisions in Alabama and Georgia, as well as the means of transporting the same, to both the armies under Taylor and Johnson, was an irreparable blow to the rebel cause. The railways converging at Atlanta, and particularly those by which the immense supplies of grain and meat were drawn from South-Western Georgia and central Alabama, were firmly under our control. The final collapse of the entire Southern Confederacy east of the Mississippi became simply a question of time. Fully appreciating the damage already done, I had determined to make a thorough destruction, not only of them, but of everything else beneficial to the rebels which might be encountered on the march to North Carolina and Virginia.

It will be remembered that my corps began the march from the Tennessee river with something more than twelve thousand mounted men, and one thousand five hundred dismounted. When it arrived here every man was well mounted, and the command supplied with all the surplus animals that could be desired. I have already called attention in a previous communication to the great merit of Brevet Major-General Upton and Brigadier-General Long, commanding divisions, and Brigadier-General Croton, Brevet Brigadier-Generals Winslow and Alexander, and Colonels Minty, Miller, and La Grange, commanding brigades. I have seen these officers tested in every con-

ceivable way, and regard them worthy of the highest honor their country can bestow.

For many interesting details and special mention of subordinate officers, I respectfully refer to the reports herewith submitted. The accompanying maps and plans were prepared under the direction of Lieutenant Heywood of my staff, and will materially assist in understanding the foregoing narrative of the campaign.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

OPERATIONS OF THE FIRST DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS, }
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
MACON, GA., June 2, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this division since March twenty-second, 1865, when it broke camp at Chickasaw, Alabama, and marched *via* Buzzard Roost, Russeville, and Jasper to Elyton, which point was reached on the thirtieth, after a march of nine days over the worst roads I ever saw, and with but little forage. At this place, in obedience to orders from the Brevet Major-General commanding, the corps—my First brigade, Brigadier-General Croxton, commanding—was detached, and ordered to proceed to Tuscaloosa, Alabama, destroy all public property there, and rejoin the command in the vicinity of Selma as soon as practicable. At the same time orders were sent to Captain Kingcote, A. A. Q. M., to move his train as rapidly as possible to Elyton, and report to Captain Brown, Chief Quartermaster of the corps, with the Second brigade and Eighteenth Indiana battery. I marched *via* Cahawba railroad bridge and Montevallo, reaching Randolph April first, where information was received that General Croxton was confronted by a superior force under General Jackson, near Trion. I was ordered to march rapidly *via* Centreville and Scottsville, with La Grange's brigade, and form a junction, if possible, with Croxton. One battalion was sent in advance to secure the bridge over Cahawba river at Centreville, and the command pushed rapidly forward, reaching Scottsville at five p. m. Here information was received that Jackson's command of three thousand five hundred to four thousand men was between me and Croxton's command, and couriers were at once despatched to communicate with him, but without success.

At daylight on the second instant two regiments were ordered out on the Trion road to feel the enemy, and found them occupying a strong position and prepared for battle. A short and severe skirmish ensued, when my forces were withdrawn. In the mean time I learned from prisoners that Croxton had moved toward Elyton twenty-four hours before. I could hope to accomplish nothing by making a serious attack on a force three times my numbers, unless

it was rendered absolutely necessary in order to prevent a junction between Jackson and the rest of Forrest's command, consequently I drew back slowly toward the Cahawba, hoping the enemy would follow. They did so in full force, and when the head of their column reached the river I burned the bridge, destroying the only means of crossing, thus cutting off the larger part of Forrest's command from joining their leader. I destroyed all boats up and down the river, and as this was the only bridge on the stream, Jackson was never able to cross any portion of his command in time to interfere with the operations of the main body of General Wilson's corps, then moving against Selma. The Second brigade of my command arrived at Selma on the sixth, and crossed the Alabama river at ten p. m. April ninth, and on the twelfth reached Montgomery, skirmished all the way, and meeting very decided resistance at several points.

Montgomery was surrendered, and all public property destroyed; the amount will be found included in a summary at the close of my report. The rebels had burned about ninety thousand bales of cotton the night before my command entered the city. On the sixteenth Colonel La Grange, with his brigade, appeared before West Point, and carried that strong position by assault; it was desperately defended and gallantly won. The results of this capture were most important, securing to us the crossing of the Chattahoochie, and placing in our hands all the rolling stock of the Montgomery and West Point railroad.

We marched into Macon on the twentieth, and on the twenty-ninth Croxton's lost brigade made its appearance, after having made one of the most extraordinary marches on record.

The route taken by Croxton's brigade, after leaving Elyton, Alabama, March thirtieth, encamped same night eight miles south of Elyton, marched next day to Trion, and returned ten miles on Elyton road, thence to Johnson's Ferry, forty miles above Tuscaloosa. April third, moved to Northport, and on the fifth marched twenty-five miles on Columbus road to King's store; sixth, moved on Pleasant Ridge road twelve miles to Lanier's mill, from there returned to Northport, and remained until the eleventh instant. On the eleventh marched to Windham Springs; twelfth and thirteenth marched around head of Wolf Creek; fourteenth to Comack's mills, on Blackwater, thence to Sipsey Fork, off Black Warrior, and crossed during sixteenth. On the seventeenth marched *via* Arkadelphia to Mulberry Fork, crossing at Hanley's mills; eighteenth, marched to and crossed Little Warrior, at Menters Ferry; nineteenth, moved to Mount Pinson, fourteen miles north of Elyton; twentieth, moved *via* Trussville and Cedar Grove, and arrived at Talladega on the twenty-second. On the twenty-third moved to Munford's Station; twenty-fourth marched *via* Oxford and Davistown to Blue

Ridge, on the Tallapoosa, from thence, on the twenty-fifth, *via* Arbacorhee and Bowdoin to Carrolton, Georgia; twenty-sixth, marched to and crossed the Chattahoochee; twenty-seventh, *via* Newman to Flat Shoals, on Flint river; twenty-eighth and twenty-ninth, *via* Barnesville and Forsyth to Macon, Georgia.

During this march he skirmished with Jackson at Trion, whose force he estimated at five thousand; also with Wirt Adams, between Romulus and Northport, who had about two thousand eight hundred men. At Munford's Station, General Hill's brigade, with two pieces of artillery, was encountered, his force scattered, and artillery captured.

In conclusion, I submit the following summary statement of arms, prisoners (including those surrendered in Florida), and stores captured; also the number of factories, foundries, and other public works and property destroyed by my division during this campaign:

Commanding officers captured, 158; enlisted men captured, 7,044; small arms captured, 27,300; artillery pieces captured, 64; factories destroyed, 9; foundries destroyed, 3; nitre works destroyed, 3; machine-shops destroyed, 2; rolling-mills destroyed, 2; iron-works destroyed, 5; steamboats destroyed, 3; locomotives destroyed 20; cars destroyed, 470; railroad bridges destroyed, 3; covered bridges destroyed, 2; military university destroyed, 1; Confederate bonds, money, etc., destroyed, \$2,785,263.26; Specie, \$206.13.

This does not include the quartermasters, commissaries, and ordinance stores surrendered to me in Florida and South-Western Georgia. I have submitted a separate and detailed report relative to them.

The casualties of my division were: Officers killed, 6; officers wounded, 5; officers missing, 5; enlisted men killed, 27; enlisted men wounded, 84; enlisted men missing, 135. Total, 262.

Among the killed I have to lament the loss of Captain Goulding and Lieutenant Miller of my staff. They died bravely in the discharge of their duty. I had prepared a map of the roads over which the First division marched, but unfortunately it was lost with Captain Goulding, my inspector.

The brigades of this division marched, I believe, some three hundred or four hundred miles further than the rest of the corps, and came into Macon in good condition.

No other cavalry expedition of the war can compare in magnitude with this one, marching over almost impassable roads, through a country so barren that it offered no sustenance for man or beast; far away from support or supplies, carrying fortifications by assault, and fighting all the time, the soldiers and officers have shown a patience, fortitude, and courage, a cheerfulness under trials, and determination in overcoming all obstacles, that has been rarely equalled and never surpassed.

I enclose the reports of my subordinate com-

manders, and refer the General Commanding to them for details.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
EDWARD M. McCOOK,
Brigadier-General, commanding.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT,
A. A. G. Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS,
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
ASSISTANT INSPECTOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
MACON, GA., June 1st, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to report that in accordance with orders received from Headquarters Cavalry Corps, I, with five staff officers, the Second Indiana cavalry and Seventh Kentucky cavalry, numbering about five hundred men, proceeded from Macon, Georgia, *en route* for Tallahassee, Florida, on the fifth day of May, 1865, for the purpose of receiving the surrender of troops in the State of Florida, going by rail to Albany, Georgia, a distance of one hundred miles.

Here several hundred prisoners were paroled and a large amount of quartermaster, commissary, ordinance, and naval stores, were received from the rebel authorities.

Marched from Albany on the eighth instant, reaching Thomasville, Georgia, on the ninth instant. A raid had been made on the night previous by citizens and soldiers—the raiders seizing a railroad train and taking off seventy thousand pounds of bacon, besides large quantities of forage and other stores from Thomasville, the property of the Rebel Government.

One hundred men, in charge of Captain M. H. Creager, were sent by special train in pursuit of the raiders. The detachment went down to Station No. 10, on the Gulf railroad, and succeeded in recapturing two cars loaded with forage.

Lieutenant Scott, Seventh Kentucky Cavalry, with fifty men, was left at Thomasville, Georgia, to parol the prisoners and receive all public property. A commissioned officer, with twenty-five men, was also sent to Bainbridge for the same purpose.

The public property at Bainbridge was transferred to Thomasville, by wagons. On the tenth instant I reached Tallahassee, Florida, a distance of two hundred and ten miles from Macon, Georgia—the command arriving on the eleventh instant. Major Bloome, with a detachment of the Seventh Kentucky cavalry, was ordered to Bainbridge, leaving me only three hundred men at Tallahassee, Florida.

Colonel W. Cooper, Fourth Kentucky cavalry, with his command, reported to me for duty, and was ordered to remain at Thomasville, with instructions to patrol the country thoroughly in search of Jefferson Davis, and to assist in collecting all public property there and in the vicinity.

The rebel troops, with all the public property in the District of Florida, were surrendered to me by Major-General Sam Jones, on the tenth

day of May, and the United States flag raised over the State House, and fort at St. Mark's.

The number paroled and already reported is seven thousand two hundred, and will doubtless reach eight thousand when the returns are completed. The amount of property received from rebel authorities was:

Ordinance Stores.—Artillery, 40 pieces; stands small arms, 2,500; cavalry sabres, 450; bayonets, 1,618; cartridge boxes, 1,200; waist belts, 710; pounds of lead, 63,000; nitre, pounds, 2,000; sets accouterments, 2,000; artillery ammunition, 10,000 rounds, mostly fixed; small ammunition, 121,900 rounds; musket balls 700 pounds; pikes and lances, 325; besides large amounts of various other ordinance stores.

Quartermaster's Stores.—Horses, 70; mules, 80; wagons, 40; ambulances, 4; also tools of various kinds, with a large amount of stationary, clothing, and camp and garrison equipage.

Commissary Stores.—Bacon, 170,000 pounds; salt, 300 barrels; sugar, 150 barrels; syrup, 100 barrels; corn, 7,000 bushels; cattle, 1,200 head; also small amounts of flour, ground peas, &c.

There was a large amount of hospital stores turned over to the medical officer, Dr. Chapman, who was designated to receive them. Many of the horses and mules were exchanged for corn and forage, and others were loaned to citizens, subject to the orders of the Federal authorities. A memorandum of all the cotton in and about Tallahassee, Thomsonville, and Albany was taken, with names of claimants, where, when, and by whom stored; also the marks on the bales. So soon as a schedule can be made, it will be forwarded for the information of the War Department.

People apparently honest in other respects, seem to think it entirely legitimate to steal cotton. As I had been ordered to leave the country, I adopted this system of making a descriptive schedule of the cotton in the country, as the only means in my power for protecting the interests of the Government.

In my intercourse with the citizens and surrendered soldiers of this Florida command, I found only the most entire spirit of submission to my authority, and in the majority of instances an apparent cheerful acquiescence in the present order of things. The citizens expressed, and apparently felt entire confidence in the magnanimity of the Government and its officers, and seemed to feel that our success had at last relieved them from the oppression they had so long suffered at the hands of the rebel authorities.

Unless the present growing crops of this country are cultivated to maturity the people there, both black and white, will suffer for food.

I had no collision with any of the authorities except the Ecclesiastical. The pastor of the Episcopal Church, in his public services, omitted the customary prayer for the President of the United States. I thought it my duty to Christianize him if possible, and succeeded in convincing him of the error of his way by a

communication, a copy of which I have the honor to enclose. He prayed for the President that afternoon.

I will forward you a copy of the cotton schedule as soon as received from the officers directed to make them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. M. McCook,
Brigadier-General Commanding.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT,
A. A. G. Cavalry Corps, M. D. K.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION,
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
MACON, GEORGIA, April 25, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to report the following trophies captured on the march from Chickasaw to this point:

First. The Palmetto flag carried by Buford's (rebel) brigade, captured by Seventh Kentucky in a gallant charge against double its numbers near Montgomery, Alabama, April twelve, 1865.

Second. Colors (blue silk with inscriptions) of Clauton's Alabama brigade, captured by Second Indiana, near Montgomery, Alabama, April twelve, 1865.

Third. United States garrison flag (inscribed, "Montgomery True Blue") captured by a detachment of the Seventh Kentucky, in a skirmish near Montgomery, Alabama, April thirteenth, 1865.

Fourth. Two United States flags (regimental colors) captured by enemy (Tyler's brigade), near Etowah creek, Georgia, recaptured by Seventh Kentucky, at Fort Tyler, Georgia, April sixteenth, 1865.

Fifth. Flag of Dixie Rangers, captured by detachment of Fourth Indiana cavalry, in skirmish near Burnsville, Georgia, April nineteenth, 1865.

Sixth. The garrison flag of Fort Tyler, Georgia, captured in the assault upon Fort Tyler, at West Point, Georgia, by detachments from First Wisconsin, Second Indiana, and Seventh Kentucky, April sixteenth, 1865. The First Wisconsin was first inside the fort, and lost twice as many men as both the other detachments; I therefore respectfully request, as an evidence of appreciation of the conduct of the regiment, and as a personal favor to myself, that the flag be returned to the regiment commander with permission to send it to the Governor of Wisconsin, to be placed in the State Capitol, among the trophies forwarded by other regiments. No other trophy has ever been asked by the regiment, and no regiment from the State has captured a greater number.

Other trophies, as arms, horses, etc., etc., captured by the brigade, have (in accordance with established usage in the cavalry) been appropriated by the captors.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. LA GRANGE,
Colonel Commanding.

Major J. M. BACON,
A. A. G. First Cavalry Division, M. D. K.

(Endorsement on Above.)

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION CAVALRY, }
 MACON, April 27, 1865. }

Respectfully forwarded, one flag not enumerated in this communication is also sent. It is the flag of the twenty-seventh Pennsylvania infantry, recaptured from the enemy near West Point. If consistent with the good of the service I would most respectfully recommend that the request of Colonel La Grange, "to have the garrison flag of Fort Tyler returned to him in order that he may send it to his State," be granted.

E. M. McCook,
 Brigadier-General Commanding Division.

GENERAL CROXTON'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE FIRST DIVISION, C. C. M. D. M., }
 MACON, GEORGIA, May, 1863. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to report that on the twenty-second of March, my command of sixty-five officers, and one thousand seven hundred and thirty-four enlisted men, mounted and equipped for line of battle, started from Chickasaw, Alabama, on the late campaign. By hard work in procuring horses from other commanders, and by taking the mules from my train, I had succeeded in increasing my effective force two hundred and sixteen men, in three days previous. The first day's march was a distance of sixteen miles, passing through Buzzard Roost, and camping near Barton's Station.

March twenty-third. Had charge of the division train, and toiled with it from daylight to dark, using almost all of the brigade to carry it along. Made four miles.

March twenty-fourth. Marched through Frankfort to the right of Russellville, camping two miles south, distance thirty miles.

March twenty-fifth. Starting at 4:30 A. M., marched to Haley's on the Buttahatchee, a distance of twenty-nine miles. After this hard day's march, during which we crossed Big Bear creek, and other troublesome streams, went into camp without forage.

March twenty-sixth. Marched to Kansas, twenty-five miles, passing through Eldridge, and crossing New river. Found plenty of forage and quite a number of loyal people.

March twenty-seventh. Marched to Sander's ferry on the Mulberry Branch Black Warrior, a distance of twenty-eight miles, passing through Jasper.

This was one of the hardest day's marches in the campaign. The roads were in terrible condition, and I was compelled to cut new roads, corduroy old ones, build bridges over swamps, and use my command to carry wagons and ambulances along.

March twenty-eighth. Crossed the river and camped seven miles beyond. Ford very dangerous and uncertain. Quite a number of men dismounted, several horses and mules drowned, and some few arms lost.

March twenty-ninth. Crossed Locust Fork of the Black Warrior river, marching towards

Elyton, and camping seven miles from there. Ford over river deep, but not dangerous. On the thirtieth, at four o'clock P. M., left Elyton under the following order, sending two staff officers by different routes to order the Fourth Kentucky mounted infantry, which was twenty miles in the rear with the train, to strike directly south, and join us if possible, before we reached Tuscaloosa. Two companies of this regiment, one of the Sixth Kentucky cavalry, and forty pioneers, in the aggregate two hundred men, were with the train, thus reducing my effective force to about fifteen hundred men.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION C. C. M. D. M., }
 ELYTON, ALABAMA, March 30th, 1865. }

GENERAL: The following order has just been received by me from Corps Headquarters:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION C. C. M. D. M., }
 ELYTON, ALABAMA, March 30th, 1865—2 o'clock, P. M. }

GENERAL: Detach one brigade of your division with orders to proceed rapidly by the most direct route to Tuscaloosa, to destroy the bridge, factories, mills, University (military school), and whatever else may be of benefit to the rebel cause. As soon as this work is accomplished, instruct the commanding officer to join the corps by the Centerville road. Caution him to look out for Lyon, who was expected at Tuscaloosa yesterday with a small force, marching toward Montevallo.

In case the bridge at Centerville is destroyed, let him cross the Cahawba, wherever he can do so best.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
 Brevet-Major-General.

Brigadier-General E. M. McCook,
 Commanding First Cavalry Division.

You will march with your brigade in compliance with the foregoing order, and report in person to General Wilson, for further instructions.

E. M. McCOOK,
 Brigadier-General Volunteers.

General JOHN T. CROXTON,
 Commanding First Brigade, First Division.

Reporting to the Battalion Major-General Commanding in person for instructions, he directed me, in case I found it practicable, after executing my mission at Tuscaloosa, to destroy the railroad between Selma and Demopolis. From Judge Mudd, at Elyton, I learned that he had left Tuscaloosa on the twenty-eighth; that Lyon's brigade was expected there; that there were no troops there except cadets and militia, and none between that point and Elyton.

Encamped on the night of the thirtieth eight miles south of Elyton, finding the roads wretched.

March thirty-first. Moved at daylight, sending a detachment to the right, through Jonesboro, to destroy the stores there, and three companies of the Eighth Iowa, in charge of Captain Sutherland, my Assistant Adjutant-General, to the

left six miles, to destroy Sanders' Iron Works, which they accomplished, rejoining the column five miles south of Bucksville, and ten from Trion. It was now four o'clock P. M., when I learned from this detachment and from a prisoner, that Forrest's whole command were passing Trion, marching from Tuscaloosa to Montevallo *via* Centreville.

I moved rapidly on, and at sundown reached Trion, striking the rear of Forrest's column. Here I learned that Lyon's brigade, under Crossland, had passed the evening previous; that Forrest's had passed at daybreak that morning, and Jackson's division, with part of Chalmers', numbering in the aggregate five thousand men, had passed during the day, moving rapidly and expecting to march during the night.

Here a state of case arose not contemplated by my orders, and in view of the great importance of disposing of Forrest's command, which would leave not only Tuscaloosa, but every vital point open to us, I determined to follow him during the night, hoping to be near enough to co-operate with the corps in an attack on the following day.

My advance guard was ordered in pursuit, while the horses were fed, intending, as I did, to follow forthwith.

The information obtained was despatched by three trusty scouts to the Brevet-Major-General commanding the corps, and also a verbal message of my intention to follow Forrest, which I did not deem prudent to incorporate in my written despatch.

While feeding, the officer in command of my advance reported the enemy holding against him the Centreville road, two miles from my camp. Repeated attempts to circumvent them proved failures, until after midnight, when it became very evident that the enemy were in strong force, reconnoitering and moving to envelop my position, preparatory to an attack at daylight. I had but eleven hundred men. The Fourth Kentucky mounted infantry had not been heard from. The enemy held the road already in my rear and front. I determined, therefore, to avoid an engagement with a force of unknown strength, by moving directly west by a road leading from my camp to the "Mud Creek Road," which runs from Jonesboro to Tuscaloosa, parallel to and ten miles west of the road I had travelled.

Two companies of the Sixth Kentucky cavalry were left behind under Captain Penn, to determine and report the strength and movements of the enemy, all of which I relied upon, knowing by the time I struck the "Mud Creek Road" I could then determine upon the course to be pursued. Scouts were sent to meet the Fourth Kentucky and bring it to that road. The rear of my column had just left camp at dawn, when the enemy in force attacked, driving in the pickets which had not been relieved. Captain Farris, with one of the companies left with Captain Penn, charged the enemy's column in a *laze*, and being deceived by a party of rebels,

whom in the early dawn he mistook for our troops, he went too far, was surrounded, and after a gallant attempt to extricate his command, was wounded, and captured with the most of his men, a number of whom were killed and wounded.

The enemy pressed vigorously on, driving the pickets with Captain Penn's detachment through our camp and after the column.

Major Fidler, commanding Sixth Kentucky cavalry, was in the rear, and promptly threw a battalion into line to re-enforce the detachments, and when they came up, relieved them; the enemy following several miles, making several ineffectual attempts to break up this battalion; the whole command losing in this affair two (2) officers and thirty (30) men.

At this time, as I afterward learned, Forrest's entire train, with his field artillery, was at Tuscaloosa, and in apprehension of my approach was ordered to Northport. In view of this Jackson, instead of following directly, took a road striking the Mud creek road four miles nearer Tuscaloosa, and moving rapidly, succeeded in throwing his force there between me and that place upon the only road east of the Black Warrior; he had two brigades, numbering, as I then supposed and have since learned, twenty-six hundred men. I could hardly hope to run over this force and take Tuscaloosa with fifteen hundred men (four hundred of them, the Fourth Kentucky, I had not yet heard from), supported as he was by four hundred militia, and three hundred and fifty cadets, who filled the trenches around the city.

I determined, therefore, to effect by stratagem what I could not hope to accomplish directly.

I therefore turned north, marching ten miles on the Elyton road, halted and fed while the Fourth Kentucky, from which I heard at this point, joined me.

From this point we moved directly west to Johnson's ferry, forty miles above Tuscaloosa, which point we reached at sundown, having travelled during the day over forty miles.

I ordered the Eighth Iowa to begin crossing at once, and at sundown on the next day (April second), the whole command was west of the Black Warrior, the men with their equipments crossing in a single flat boat, and the horses swimming, losing only two or three.

April third. Moved at daylight toward Tuscaloosa, the advance guard capturing all the scouts, and the citizens, thus preventing any knowledge of our approach.

At nine o'clock at night reached the suburbs at Northport, massed the brigade in Cedar grove, and with one hundred and fifty picked men of the Second Michigan moved up near the bridge.

I intended to put this picked force in ambush as near the bridge as I could get it, quietly await daybreak, then seize the bridge by a dash, and throw the whole brigade over mounted, and envelop the city before the cadets and militia could be assembled.

As I approached the bridge, however, I could distinctly hear the rebels removing the flooring in the bridge, and apprehending they had received notice of our approach, and knowing the difficulty of success should they have time to assemble their troops, I gave the order, and Colonel Johnston dashed ahead on the guards, who fired and retreated into the bridge, in the centre of which the reserve was stationed behind cotton bales, in front of which twenty feet of bridge had been torn up. The detachment of the Second Michigan, led by Colonel Johnston in person, rushed into the bridge, halted for nothing until they had killed and captured the whole of the guard, and had possession of the bridge.

They were moved ahead to cover the approaches to the bridge, and fifty men sent double-quick to seize the two pieces of artillery, the location of which I had learned, and which were soon in our possession.

In the meantime the floor of the bridge was relaid so that footmen could pass, and the balance of the Second Michigan, the Sixth Kentucky, and Eighth Iowa thrown across dismantled, and put in position to cover the bridge against an attack from the militia and cadets which were assembling. They made several unsuccessful attempts to dislodge us, but failed, and morning found us in peaceful possession of the premises, with sixty prisoners and three pieces of artillery.

April fourth. Destroyed the foundry, factory, two nitre works, the military university, a quantity of stores, and supplying the command with all the rations we could carry, spent the day resting men and animals, and reconnoitering and trying to discover some safe exit by which to rejoin the corps.

The bridges over Hurricane creek had been burned, making it necessary to move south-east in the direction of Marion, which would bring me directly in contact with Jackson's division, supported by a brigade of Chalmers' division at Greensboro. Seeing no possible means of getting east to join the corps, I determined to recross the Black Warrior, and, if possible, destroy the railroad between Demopolis and Meridian, as I had been verbally instructed to destroy it west of Selma, and about Uniontown.

At this time I could hear of no troops that could offer any resistance to my movement, and I was assured the Tombigbee could be forded at Jones' Bluff, reasoning upon this, as on all occasions, that if Forrest detached a force inferior to my own to look after me, I would smash it up and go whither I pleased, while if he sent a superior force it was my object to draw it as far as possible from the theatre in which the corps was operating, thus giving General Wilson still greater advantage in point of numbers, which I would be careful should not be counterbalanced by any disaster to my command.

My only apprehension was that the General would be embarrassed by my

delay in joining, and that it might seriously affect the rapidity of his movements, on which I felt so much depended.

Accordingly I despatched a scout with a despatch in cypher informing him fully of my movements and designs.

April fifth. Recrossed the Black Warrior, burned the bridge, and took the Columbus road, encamping that night twenty-five miles from Northport at King's store, and sending a company of the Sixth Kentucky with Captain Sutherland, my A. A. G., on the upper Columbus road, with directions to cross the Sipsey, turn south, and join me.

April sixth. Took the road to Pleasant ridge, and after marching twelve miles came to Laniers' mills on Sipsey, eight miles from Vienna, where I learned that three thousand men left by Forrest at West Point, were marching down the Tombigbee, and that owing to the late rains that stream could not be forded.

Here also I learned that Selma had been taken, and that Forrest was at Marion, and Jackson in the neighborhood of Tuscaloosa.

It was plainly impossible to execute my designs, and I determined to return to Newport, by which time I hoped to learn definitely the movements of the corps from Selma.

Accordingly I crossed Sipsey, burning the mills with a large amount of flour, meal, and meat, and took the road for Tuscaloosa, and after marching several miles, halted two hours to feed. We had just resumed the march when Wirt Adams attacked my rear guard, with two brigades numbering twenty-eight hundred men, drove in the rear regiment (Sixth Kentucky cavalry) on the Second Michigan, which was thrown across the road, and after repulsing several charges were not molested further.

In this affair we lost two officers and thirty-two men, two ambulances broke down and were left, the wounded being brought off.

These troops of Adams' had been at West Point, and had crossed the Tombigbee the day previous at Pickensville.

April seventh. Moved from Romulus to Northport, hearing nothing of the corps.

April eighth. Owing to scarcity of forage at Northport, moved twelve miles north on the Boiler road, where we remained until the eleventh, attempting by various methods to communicate with the corps, or find out its movements from Selma, but without success. Finally I concluded that if the corps had moved at all, it was either south or east, as the movement west would have driven Forrest to Demopolis, cleared the country between Tuscaloosa and Marion, and enabled me to communicate beyond doubt. I determined, therefore, to recross the Warrior into Elyton valley, by which I should certainly learn whether Montgomery or Mobile was the destination.

April eleventh. Moved to Windham Springs, where I learned that all the boats on the river had been destroyed, rendering it necessary for us to move further north in order to effect a

crossing of the Warrior, which, as well as its tributaries, was greatly swollen.

April twelfth. Moved by the Jasper road to Wolf creek, finding it impassable.

April thirteenth. Marched around the head of Wolf creek.

April fourteenth. Crossed Lost creek at Holly Grove, and marched to Cormack's mills on the Black Water, finding the stream swollen and half the bridge down. This we rebuilt in two hours, and that night camped within four miles of Sipseey fork of the Black Warrior.

April fifteenth. Began crossing Sipseey fork at Calloways' and Lindsey's ferries, having no means of crossing men and equipments but in canoes, and the horses by swimming.

April seventeenth. All were over and marching *via* Arkadelphia; we struck the Mulberry fork at Handly's mills, finding a good ferry-boat and a good place for swimming horses.

April eighteenth. Crossed Mulberry fork, and reached Little Warrior at Menter's ferry, finding no boats but a few canoes with which we began crossing, and were over by sundown next day (nineteenth), all the command except the Eighth Iowa encamping at Mt. Pinson, fourteen miles north of Elyton. Here I learned that the corps had taken Montgomery, and gone east. Destroyed the foundry and nitre works near Mt. Pinson.

April twentieth. Moved *via* Trussville and Cedar Grove, thence three miles on the Montevalle road to make the impression that we were going that way.

April twenty-first. Moved towards Talladega, sending the Fourth Kentucky mounted infantry ahead before daybreak to seize the boats at Truss' and Collins' ferries, on Coosa river, which they did, driving the guard off, and by night that regiment had crossed.

April twenty-second. By noon the command had crossed, and at sundown reached Talladega, driving out a force of about seventy rebels, and encamping at that place.

April twenty-third. Learning that Hill's brigade was between Talladega and Blue Mountain, I moved in that direction, finding him in position at Mumford's station, ten miles from Talladega, with five hundred men and one piece of artillery; attacked and routed him, capturing his artillery and a number of prisoners, and scattering the force in the woods. Destroyed the Oxford and Blue Mountain iron works, the railroad bridges and depots to Blue Mountain, at which place we encamped, destroying the depots, rolling stock, and a quantity of ordnance stores.

April twenty-fourth. Sent the Eighth Iowa *via* Jacksonville and moved *via* Oxford and Davistown, where the Eighth Iowa rejoined us, burning a large cotton factory, and encamping at Bell's bridge on the Tallapoosa.

April twenty-fifth. Marched through Artacoochee and Bowden, and encamped near Carrolton, Georgia.

April twenty-sixth. Marched through Carrol-

ton to the Chattahoochee at Moore's and Reese's ferries, and by eight o'clock of the next morning had crossed the river.

April twenty-seventh. Marched *via* Newman to near Flat Shoals. At the Chattahoochee a flag of truce from the commanding officer at Newman, informed me of the armistice, and claimed protection under it; I informed them I could not recognize the information as official, but presuming it was true, would trouble nobody who kept out of my way and would observe the armistice as far as foraging was concerned, but could not consent to discontinue my march.

April twenty-eighth. Crossed Flint river at Flat Shoals and marched to near Barnesville.

April twenty-ninth. Through Barnesville to Forsyth, sending Lieutenant Prather and Captain Walden of my staff, by railroad to inform the Brevet Major-General Commanding of my whereabouts, this being the first information he had received since my despatch from Trion, March thirty-first, which reached him at nine A. M. on the following day, and about the same time one from Jackson to Forrest, captured by General Upton, informing Forrest where I was, and that he (Jackson) was preparing to attack me at daylight on the first of April.

April thirtieth. Marched through Forsyth and camped near Crawford's station.

May first. Rejoined the corps at Macon, having been absent just one month, during which time I communicated with no Federal force, neither heard from any one, nor, so as heard, was heard from.

During this time we marched six hundred and fifty-three miles, most of the time through a mountainous country, so destitute of supplies that the command could be subsisted and foraged only by the greatest efforts. Swimming four rivers, destroying five large iron works, the last in the cotton States, three factories, numerous mills, immense quantities of supplies, capturing four pieces of artillery and several hundred small arms, near three hundred prisoners rejoining the corps; the men in fine spirits and the animals in good condition, having lost in all but four officers and one hundred and sixty-eight men, half of the latter having been captured at various points, while straggling from foraging parties and not in line of duty.

Throughout the long and arduous campaign, though often surrounded by perils, the spirits of the veterans never faltered. Officers and men vied with each other in the cheerful performance of their duty.

I am especially under obligations to the regimental commanders, Colonels Dorr, Kelly, and Johnston, and Major Fidler and Captain Penn, for their hearty and earnest co-operation.

To Lieutenant Prather, Fourth Indiana cavalry, and aide to the General commanding the corps, I am obliged for his valuable services so cheerfully rendered.

Captain Sutherland, A. A. General, was of great service to me until sent on a reconnois-

sance towards Columbus, from which he found it impossible to rejoin the command, and conducted his small command safely to Decatur, capturing prisoners nearly double in number to his detachment. To Captain Baker, A. A. I. G., Captain Walden, Provost Marshal, and Lieutenants Lusk and Kelly, aides-de-camp, I am under obligations for their zeal, activity, and efficiency in the execution of my orders.

To Quartermaster Sergeant Walker, and Commissary Sergeant Wentworth, I am indebted for invaluable services performed by them for the brigade, in the absence of the officers of those departments of the staff.

I have the honor, very respectfully your obedient servant,

JOHN T. CROXTON,
Brigadier-General U. S. Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, C. C. M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., May 23, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to recommend the following named officers for promotion as a reward for gallantry and meritorious service in the field during the late campaign:

Colonel O. H. La Grange, First Wisconsin cavalry, commanding Second brigade, to be Brigadier-General of volunteers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Win. W. Bradley, commanding Seventh Kentucky cavalry, to be Colonel by brevet.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Harnden, commanding First Wisconsin cavalry, to be Colonel by brevet.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas W. Johnston, commanding Second Michigan cavalry, to be Colonel by brevet.

Major W. H. Fraler, commanding Sixth Kentucky cavalry, to be Lieutenant-Colonel by brevet.

Captain R. S. Hill, commanding Second Indiana cavalry, to be Major.

Captain Jas. M. McCown, Sixth Kentucky cavalry, to be Major by brevet.

Captain Edmund Penn, Sixth Kentucky cavalry, to be Major by brevet.

Captain Walter Whittemore, Sixth Kentucky cavalry, to be Major by brevet.

I am, Major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

JOHN T. CROXTON,
Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT,
A. A. General, Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

COLONEL LA GRANGE'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE,
FIRST CAVALRY DIVISION, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., May 4, 1865.

MAJOR—I respectfully submit the following report of the operations of this brigade since leaving Chickasaw, March twenty-second, 1865.

No incident occurred to break the monotony of marching and foraging until April first, when the brigade marched through Randolph *via* Centreville to Scottsville, a distance of thirty-eight miles, for the purpose of uniting with the

First brigade, which had previously been ordered to Tuscaloosa.

A battalion of the First Wisconsin, under Major Shipman, was moved at a trot from Randolph to Centreville, made the march of fifteen miles in two hours, drove out a rebel force of one hundred and fifty, captured fifteen prisoners, and secured the bridge which he was left to guard with his battalion. Information received from prisoners captured between Scottsville and Trion, led the General Commanding to believe that the First brigade, after a sharp skirmish, had fallen back towards Elyton, and convinced him that the rebel force near Trion was more than double that of the Second brigade. For these reasons he determined to order the brigade back *via* Centreville to rejoin the main column. A demonstration made on the morning of the second by the Second and Fourth Indiana, caused the enemy to display force which could not have been less than three thousand, while the brigade having nine companies detached, only numbered twelve hundred men. In this skirmish the Second Indiana behaved handsomely, and from a strong position punished the enemy severely, with a loss of only one man killed and eight wounded, six of whom fell into the hands of the enemy. Captain R. S. Hill, commanding battalion, behaved with his usual gallantry, and though severely wounded in the early part of the engagement, refused to leave the saddle until the fight was over.

Lieutenants Moulton and Chase, of my staff, merit commendation for their conduct in this affair.

After destroying the factory, mill, bridge, and nitre works, the brigade marched to Centreville, crossed, and burned the bridge over the Cahawba, after a skirmish with a body of the enemy which attempted to cross.

It moved thence *via* Plantersville to within eleven miles of Selma, where an order was received to return and bring in the wagon train, which was met near Randolph and escorted to Selma, arriving on the evening of the sixth.

On the seventh, the Fourth Kentucky was sent in the direction of Tuscaloosa to communicate with the First brigade, and made a forced march to Centreville, where it was overtaken by a party sent twelve hours later, from the Second Indiana, and ordered to return. Both detachments reached Selma on the evening of the ninth, after a march of ninety miles. On the tenth the command left Selma and marched thirty miles, skirmishing a portion of the way with Clanton's brigade. On the eleventh marched twenty-six miles, and built two large bridges, skirmishing constantly with Clanton's brigade.

On the morning of the twelfth the brigade entered Montgomery. The Fourth Kentucky, Colonel Cooper, having taken possession at daylight after a single skirmish with the enemy's rear guard, Colonel Cooper was placed in command of the post, and deserves high commendation for the manner in which he discharged

the duties of that position. His command destroyed all public property before leaving the city, including three steamboats with their cargoes, captured by Major Weston of the Fourth Kentucky. Within two miles of the city, the Seventh Kentucky encountered seven hundred of the enemy under General Buford, and drove them rapidly eight miles, capturing three stand of colors and thirty prisoners. In this affair Lieutenant-Colonel William Bradley was severely wounded in the foot while charging at the head of his regiment.

On the fourteenth, the brigade (except Fourth Kentucky, and a detachment of First Wisconsin, under Colonel Cooper, which rejoined the command at this point) moved on the Columbus road and made a running fight of thirty-eight miles with Clanton's brigade, killing twelve and capturing one hundred prisoners, with a loss of one killed and eleven wounded. The First Wisconsin had the advance and behaved finely, driving the enemy by repeated charges from his rail barricades.

On the fifteenth, the brigade moved on the West Point road, a distance of twenty-seven miles, after rebuilding the bridge across Ufoupee creek, and camped at Auburn.

At two o'clock A. M. on the sixteenth, the Second and Fourth Indiana, with one piece from the Eighteenth battery, moved to West Point, capturing a train of fourteen wagons on the way, and arriving at ten o'clock A. M. within range of the guns of Fort Tyler, which is a remarkably strong earthwork thirty-five yards square, surrounded by a ditch twelve feet wide and ten deep, situated on a commanding eminence, and protected by an imperfect abattis. The second Indiana was placed in a sheltered position within carbine range, and ordered to begin the attack should re-enforcements for the enemy arrive on the opposite bank of the river, or an attempt be made to evacuate the fort.

The Fourth Indiana was also securely posted, and the piece of artillery amused the fort by a steady, well-directed fire, until half-past one o'clock P. M., when the remainder of the brigade arrived.

Detachments of the First Wisconsin, Second Indiana, and Seventh Kentucky, advanced dismounted upon three sides of the fort, rapidly driving in the enemy's skirmishers, while the Fourth Indiana, seizing the proper moment, charged through the town, secured both bridges, scattered a force of the enemy's cavalry larger than its own, which had just arrived on the opposite bank, and captured and destroyed five engines with trains of cars. The grape from the thirty-two pounder, which was designed to cover the wagon bridge, fell short and did no damage, except killing the horse of the Colonel commanding brigade. As our dismounted men advanced upon the fort the enemy fired rapidly but without effect from two field pieces, until silenced by our sharpshooters. Our battery replied with a most accurate fire. At a

distance of six hundred yards, fourteen shots from one of our guns struck the thirty-two pounder planted in the fort. The ditch being found impassable, bridges were prepared and sharpshooters posted, and when the charge was sounded the three detachments, vieing with each other, rushed forward under a scathing fire, threw their bridges over the ditch and entered the fort. Sergeant Edward Carrel, Company K, First Wisconsin, was first inside the work, Lieutenant S. Vosburg, Company A, same regiment was killed on the embankment, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harnden slightly wounded. Captain R. S. Hill, commanding Second Indiana battery, was dangerously wounded in the thigh, within a few feet of the ditch, while struggling with the abattis which impeded his column. He started on this campaign with a leave of absence in his pocket, and at the time of the attack was suffering from a wound received two weeks previous. No braver man or better soldier has worn a sabre in this war. He deserves to command a brigade. The garrison at the time of the attack was composed of two hundred and sixty-five desperate men, commanded by Brigadier-General Tyler. Eighteen, including the General commanding, two captains, and one lieutenant were killed, and twenty-eight seriously wounded, mostly shot through the head. Two hundred and eighteen were held as prisoners. At this point two field pieces, one thirty-two pounder siege gun, and five hundred stand of small arms were captured, nineteen engines and three hundred and forty cars loaded with quartermaster's and commissary stores, machinery from factories, leather osnaburgs, &c., &c., were destroyed. Both bridges were burned, sixteen of the enemy were paroled to nurse the wounded who were left in charge of the Confederate surgeons. Our loss was seven killed and twenty-nine wounded. Seven hog-heads of sugar, two thousand sacks of corn, ten thousand pounds of bacon, and other stores, were left in charge of the mayor, to provide a hospital fund for both parties, with instructions to distribute any excess among the poor. On the seventeenth the brigade resumed its march toward Macon, passing through La Grange, cutting the railroad at that point, also the Macon and Atlanta road at Griffin and Forsyth. It would have reached Macon at noon on the twentieth, had it not been delayed by orders to wait for the detachment under Colonel Cooper, which came *via* of Columbus, and had much further to march. The results of the campaign may be summed up as follows: A march of five hundred miles through an enemy's country, the capture of four hundred and fifty-six prisoners with arms in their hands, including thirty-five officers, seven battle flags, twenty-one thousand three hundred stand of small arms, two siege guns in position, six field pieces, three steamboats laden with stores, twenty locomotives, three hundred and fifty cars loaded with stores and machinery, and enough horses and mules to replace those broken down by the

march. The destruction of eight railroad depots, store houses, water tanks, &c.; three railroads and two covered bridges, and innumerable smaller bridges and culverts, three large cotton factories, saddle factory, nitre works, tanneries, three foundries, two machine shops, two rolling mills, and a great number of smaller manufacturing establishments. Where it was possible provisions captured from the enemy were given to the poor. The casualties in the brigade are ten killed, sixty-four wounded, and sixteen missing.

The brigade did all that it was ordered to do, but, considering the nature of the expedition, the temptations offered, and the injuries many of our men had previously received as prisoners, I have less pride in what was accomplished than in what was omitted. The steadiness, valor, and self-denial of the men are beyond my praise. It gives me pleasure to acknowledge my great obligations to regimental commanders and to the several members of my staff.

I remain, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

O. H. LA GRANGE,
Colonel Commanding.

Major JAS. H. BACON,
A. A. G., First Cavalry Division, M. D. M.

OPERATIONS OF THE SECOND DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS,
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
SELMA, ALA., April 7, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my division from the time of leaving Chickasaw, Alabama, on the twenty-second day of March, until the capture of Selma, Alabama, on the second day of April:

On the morning of the twenty-second of March, my command moved from Chickasaw, the train having preceded it two days. My progress was delayed by the pontoon train, which was placed under my charge, and the excessive badness of the roads that we were forced to travel. My division arrived at Montevallo on the thirty-first of March, having crossed Buzzard Roost mountains, forded the deep and rapid waters of the Black and Little Warrior, and crossed the Cahawba on a narrow railroad bridge. At Montevallo I found the Fourth division were a few miles in advance and skirmishing with the enemy.

I went into camp near the town. On the morning of the first of April, I moved out on the main Selma road and struck the enemy near Randolph, and commenced skirmishing with him. The Seventy-second Indiana volunteers were in the advance, and four companies were ordered forward and instructed to press the enemy vigorously and charge them whenever they attempted to stand. Skirmished briskly until the enemy reached Ebenezer Church, six miles north of Plantersville, where they were found in force and seemingly determined on making a stand.

The remainder of the Seventy-second Indiana

was brought forward, dismounted, and formed on the left of the road. The enemy's lines were soon broken and a charge was made by four companies of the Seventeenth Indiana volunteers, with sabres, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White. They charged over a mile, cutting through the enemy's lines and reaching their artillery, four pieces, which had been firing on them heavily as they advanced. Our charging force being much scattered, and a second and stronger line of battle confronting them and pouring a heavy fire upon them, they were forced to turn to the left and cut their way out, resulting in the loss, however, of Captain Taylor and sixteen men, who charged through and were either killed or fell into the enemy's hands.

The enemy commenced falling back immediately, and the Fourth division, striking them on the left, they fled in confusion, leaving three pieces of artillery in our hands, also a number of prisoners. They succeeded in carrying off most of their killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White, Seventeenth Indiana volunteers, distinguished himself greatly by his gallantry in this action.

No further opposition was met that evening, and I went into camp at Plantersville.

On the morning of the second of April I moved at six A. M. on the main Selma road, meeting with but little resistance. When within six miles of the city, I moved to the right, taking the Summerfield and Selma road, and at three P. M. the head of the column arrived in front of the works on the south-west side of the city. My command was at once dismounted, taking position on the right and left of the road. During this time I was engaged in a personal inspection of the enemy's works, with a view of learning, if possible, their relative strength and position. While my lines were forming, the enemy kept up a rapid firing with his artillery, which, although well directed, did but little damage. A short time before the formation was completed I addressed a note to Major E. B. Beaumont, A. A. General, cavalry corps, M. D. M., stating that I thought that it was most too large an undertaking for one division alone to assault the works in my front; but that if General Upton, who was just coming with his division into position on my left, on the main Selma road, would leave a thin line of skirmishers in his front and place his division in rear of mine, that I would lead with my division in the assault. At this time the Brevet Major-General commanding cavalry corps, M. D. M., rode up, who first agreed to this proposition, as I understood, but afterwards changed his mind, and stated that he would have General Upton, as soon as he got into position, push forward on the left, at a signal gun from his battery; at which time I must also advance with my division. About this time frequent reports were brought to me that there was a force of rebel cavalry, estimated from five hundred to one thousand men, skirmishing with my rear and

firing into the pack stock and led animals, and threatening to make an attack in force. Fearing that some confusion would result among the led animals by this attack in my rear, and the enemy gaining strength in my front every moment, I determined to make the assault at once, without any further delay or waiting for the signal gun on the left. I moved forward at five P. M., my entire line advancing promptly, and in less than twenty-five minutes after the command to advance had been given, the works were ours.

The works carried consisted of a heavy line of earthworks, eight to twelve feet in height and fifteen feet in thickness at the base, with a ditch in front, partly filled by water, four feet in width and five feet deep, and in front of this a stockade or picket of heavy posts planted firmly in the ground, five feet high and sharpened at the top. Four heavy forts, with artillery in position, also covered the ground over which the men advanced. The ground was rough, and a deep ravine had to be passed before the works could be reached. The men fully understood the difficulties before them; there was no finching; all seemed confident of their ability to overcome them. As soon as we uncovered the hill about six hundred yards from the earthworks, the enemy opened a rapid and destructive fire of musketry and artillery on the line, but we moved forward steadily until within short range, when a rapid fire was opened by our Spencers, and with a cheer the men started for the works on a run. Sweeping forward in solid line, over fences and ravines—scaling the stockade and on the works with resistless force, the enemy fighting stubbornly—many of them clubbing their guns, but forced to retreat in the greatest disorder—our men continuing in pursuit through the city and taking many prisoners.

The troops confronting me behind the breastworks were composed of a portion of General Forrest's command, which are regarded as the best troops in the West. According to General Forrest's own statement, under a flag of truce to the Brevet Major-General commanding cavalry corps, M. D. M., his force exceeded the assaulting force in numbers, my entire force in the charge, fifteen hundred and fifty officers and men. The carrying of these works and the town by my division, resulted in the capture of over two thousand prisoners, although this division did not stop or take time to pick them up or gather them together, and only between six hundred and one thousand were collected by the Provost Marshals, their guards, and other officers and men not otherwise occupied. We captured no less than twenty pieces of artillery in position, including one thirty-pound Parrott, and a large number of small arms were taken and destroyed.

When within one hundred and fifty yards of the works, on the Summerfield and Selma road, I was wounded and carried off the field. A short time after which General Wilson was rid-

ing by and inquired of my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Deiring, if we had carried the works. I had the satisfaction of hearing the answer in the affirmative.

The Chicago B. T. Battery, commanded by Captain George J. Robinson, occupied a position on the hill in the rear of my line. Their rapid and effective firing contributed greatly to the demoralization of the enemy. It was afterwards reported to me that this battery did good and efficient service in assisting the driving of the enemy through and beyond the town. Although not personally cognizant of the part it took throughout the entire action, I have no doubt, from the manner in which it had always executed its work hitherto, that it did everything possible to be done.

Our loss, although slight compared to the work accomplished, would have been much less had the Fourth Michigan cavalry charged as I ordered on the left of the line in front of the battery, and thus covered a work which enfladed our whole line, instead of remaining as it did, through some mistake of the regimental or brigade commander, with and in support of the battery.

I cannot, in justice to the division, refrain from stating what the Brevet Major-General commanding cavalry corps must know to be a fact, that this was the decisive fight of the campaign—that the crushing and demoralizing defeat here given to the Confederate forces opposing us contributed in no small degree to the success of our expedition, and in fact by defeating them so badly as to render any further resistance on their part out of the question, and made the latter portion of the campaign comparatively a work of ease. In this affair the entire division did their whole duty, than which no greater praise can be given to a soldier. The First brigade, commanded by Colonel A. O. Miller, Seventy-second Indiana volunteers, owing to longer practice, and being more accustomed to fighting on foot, probably kept a better line than the Second brigade, but so far as courage is concerned and the time that different regiments and portions of the division approached the works, no appreciable difference could be seen, or was reported to me. When it is remembered that it was a depot of ammunition, which supplied a large portion of the so-called Southern Confederacy, the importance of its capture cannot well be magnified. Where all portions of the command have done their duty so faithfully and well during the entire march, it would seem unjust to make special mention of individuals; but I feel compelled to mention a few instances of gallantry in action where the persons mentioned here had a favorable opportunity of distinguishing themselves, and whose conduct in action came under my own personal observation. Of this class I must mention Captain T. W. Scott, Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, my A. A. A. General; Captain W. W. Shoemaker, Fourth O. V. cavalry, A. D. C.; Lieutenant Henry Deiring, Fourth O. V. cav-

alry, A. D. C., and Lieutenant S. S. Culbertson, Nineteenth United States Infantry, Assistant Com. Musters, who were by my side, and departed themselves during the whole fight with all the courage of true and gallant soldiers; Captain W. B. Gates, Third O. V. cavalry, Provost-Marshal; Capt. J. N. Squire, Third O. V. cavalry, A. A. I. General; Captain P. B. Lewis, Third O. V. cavalry, Topographical Engineer; Lieutenant J. B. Hayden, Eleventh O. V. cavalry, A. C. S.; Lieutenant W. N. McDonald, One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers, Ord. Officer; and Captain Hartraupt, Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry, commanding escort, were on duty in other portions of the field under the enemy's fire, and distinguished themselves for the faithful execution of their orders.

For gallant services, Colonel A. O. Miller, Seventy-second Indiana volunteers, commanding First brigade (severely wounded); Colonel R. H. G. Minty, Fourth Michigan cavalry, commanding Second brigade; Colonel C. C. McCormick, commanding Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry (severely wounded); Colonel J. G. Vail, commanding Seventeenth Indiana volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Briggs, commanding One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers (severely wounded); Lieutenant-Colonel E. Kitchell, commanding Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers; Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White, Seventeenth Indiana volunteers; and Lieutenant-Colonel G. W. Dobbs, Fourth Ohio volunteer cavalry, killed in action. I would respectfully, but most urgently, recommend Captain A. O. Miller and R. H. G. Minty to the rank of Brigadier-General; the others to Brevet Brigadier-Generals.

To the Surgeon-in-Chief of the division, Frederick Carpe, much praise is due for his prompt attention to the wounded, and his able administration of the Medical Department of the division; Major Archer, Third Ohio volunteers, commanding train guard; Captain S. B. Coe, Third Ohio volunteer cavalry; A. A. Q. M. Lieutenant T. G. Pattin, Seventeenth Indiana volunteers; Lieutenant John Bennett, Fourth

Michigan cavalry, and the pioneers under their charge, are entitled to great credit for the successful manner in which the division and pontoon train were brought through, and for their untiring industry on all occasions; and the division is, in fact, mainly indebted to their individual exertions for the presence of the train with them at this time.

To Captain T. W. Scott, Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General of the division, for his industry, energy, and sound judgment, and faithful performance of his manifold duties under all circumstances, I am greatly indebted, and would respectfully and most urgently recommend as only a just recompense for his gallant services that he receive the appointment of captain and A. A. General United States Volunteers, or that his services in some other manner be fittingly acknowledged by such promotion as can be granted him, consistent with the interests of the service.

Private Henry Prince, Orderly, and Bugler Henry Grible, Fourth Ohio volunteer cavalry, were with me during the entire action, and distinguished themselves by their coolness and bravery while in discharge of their duties. I regret to report the death of Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Dobbs, Fourth Ohio volunteer cavalry, and the other brave officers and men who fell upon the field of battle, whose names will be found in the list of casualties here appended. But it is a proud and consoling thought in the remembrance held of them by their friends to know that they died a noble death, their faces to the enemy and battling for their country's cause.

For individual acts of gallantry which did not come under my personal observation, I would respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of brigade and regimental commanders.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELI LONG,

Brigadier-General, United States volunteers,
Commanding division.

To Major E. B. BEAUMONT,
A. A. G., C. C., M. D. M.

Report of casualties in the Second division, Cavalry corps, in the action of April first, 1865, near Plantersville, Alabama.

COMMAND.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	
Seventeenth Indiana volunteers.....	1	7	8	..	11	11	6	6	1	24	25
Seventy-second Indiana volunteers	1	3	4	1	3	4
Total.....	1	7	8	1	14	15	6	6	2	27	29

Report of Casualties in Second division Cavalry corps, M. D. M., at Selma, Alabama, April second, 1865.

COMMAND.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Second cavalry division Headquarters.	1	..	1	1	1	1
Seventeenth Indiana volunteers.....	..	12	12	7	79	79	7	84	91
Seventy-second Indiana volunteers.....	1	..	1	1	..	1
Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers.....	..	11	11	5	31	36	5	42	47
One hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers.....	1	7	8	6	42	48	7	49	56
First Brigade.....	1	30	31	19	145	164	20	175	195
Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry.....	1	1	2	4	47	51	5	48	53
Fourth Michigan cavalry.....	..	2	2	..	1	1	2	3
Third Ohio cavalry.....	1	8	9	1	6	7	1	14	15
Fourth Ohio cavalry.....	2	5	7	1	44	45	3	49	52
Second Brigade.....	3	8	11	5	100	105	1	6	7	9	114	123
Total.....	4	38	42	25	245	270	1	6	7	30	280	319

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH INDIANA MOUNTED
INFANTRY, SELMA, April 6, 1865. }

*Captain O. F. Bane, A. A. A. G., First brigade,
Second division, Cavalry Corps.*

SIR—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the affair near Bogues Creek, on April first, 1865, and the taking of Selma on April second, 1865.

On the first instant the regiment was the third in the order of march of the brigade, which was following the retreating enemy in the direction of Selma, driving them, and continually skirmishing with them. The advance had pushed them easily until near Bogues Creek (twenty miles from Selma). Here they made a stand, and offered a good deal of resistance to our further advance. Four companies of this regiment being armed with sabres (companies "E," "G," "H," and "I"), were ordered forward by Colonel A. O. Miller, commanding First brigade, Second division, Cavalry corps, to charge the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel F. White took command of them, and moved forward, charging the enemy, who were engaging our skirmishers, overtaking Patterson's regiment, and running past them, sabering a number of them.

Dashing on, they struck the enemy's line of battle about one mile from where the charge commenced, charged on and cut through them under a fierce fire, and reached the enemy's artillery (four pieces) which had been firing on them as they advanced. Here Lieutenant-Colonel White, finding another line of battle of the enemy confronting him, and firing on him, having so few men, and being so far from support, turned off the road into the woods to the left, charging on the enemy there, and cutting his way out with his command, with the exception of Captain

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Taylor and sixteen enlisted men. The captain had command of the advance company ("G"), and did not hear the order to turn off the road, so he charged on past the artillery, cutting right and left among the enemy, until shot down by them. Of the sixteen enlisted men following him, six were killed, five wounded, and five were taken prisoners.

Lieutenant-Colonel White having to fall back, with his command, could not retain or bring off the captured artillery. When the enemy afterward fell back they left one twelve-pounder howitzer on the field, one wheel being broken by the horses rushing against it in charging. There were about one hundred of the enemy captured, but being unable to guard them, they escaped, with the exception of about sixteen or twenty.

The four companies that took part in the affair numbered about two hundred men. The loss was: Killed, one commissioned and seven enlisted; wounded, eleven enlisted; missing, five enlisted.

The enemy's loss cannot be ascertained. It cannot have been less than fifty killed and wounded, far more than that number having been sabred. They got their killed and wounded off the field, with the exception of one killed and ten wounded, who fell into our hands.

We camped for the night near Plantersville. On the second instant the march toward Selma was resumed, and we marched on the Plantersville road until within six miles of Selma. We then moved on a cross-road to the Summerfield road, and advanced by it. On arriving within sight of the enemy's works that encircled Selma, we were dismounted by order, and formed in single rank in line of battle. The line was

charged shortly afterwards, and the regiment placed on the right of the brigade. At about five P. M. we were ordered to commence the attack on the works, and we advanced across an open field and swamp, across a deep ravine, and up to the enemy's works, under a terrible fire from the enemy's line behind the works. As we advanced, we delivered our fire rapidly—drove the enemy from their breastworks, and breaking through the palisades, rushed over the works and through the embrasures of the forts, cheering and firing. The enemy, driven back, fought stubbornly. The enemy's batteries fired with seemingly little effect, injuring but few of our men. The left of the regiment was opposite to, and took, forts numbers fifteen and sixteen, and the centre and right to fort number seventeen, and the lunette near fort number eighteen, and fort number nineteen. The enemy having fallen back to the railroad, which served them as a breastwork (being about three feet higher than the adjacent ground), we reformed our line preparatory to advancing on them.

At this time Colonel Miller being wounded—I being next in rank, assumed command of the brigade, and turned over the command of the regiment to Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White.

Sufficient credit cannot be given to the officers and men of the regiment for their gallantry and for the promptitude in which every order was executed. To mention acts of individual bravery, would be to speak of every man of the regiment engaged. Special mention, however, is due Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White and the officers and men of the four companies engaged on the first instant, for their bravery and for the gallant manner in which they broke through the enemy's lines, ran over their artillery and sabred their men, and then in the face of such overwhelming numbers, cut their way out.

For the lists of killed and wounded and official figures, I respectfully refer you to Lieutenant Colonel F. White, to whom I turned over the regiment.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. G. VAIL,
Colonel Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH INDIANA VOLUNTEERS, }
April 6, 1865. }

Captain O. F. Bane, A. A. A. G., First brigade,
Second division, C. C.

Sir—On the second instant the command of the regiment having been turned over to me by Colonel J. G. Vail shortly after passing through the enemy's works, and the enemy being in force in our front behind the railroad embankment and in the interior forts, I moved forward with the regiment, charged and drove the enemy from their position, and followed them into town so closely that they had no time to rally. On assuming command the regiment almost deployed as skirmishers, held all the ground between the Summerfield road on the left, and the enemy's works on the right, and in advancing into town we moved parallel with the western line of de-
the town, and inside of them, driving

the enemy from all along the line, and taking all the forts from No. 18 to the river on the west side of town. We captured four pieces of artillery in the works, also their caissons. We took during the fight about three hundred prisoners, including most of the First Mississippi regiment, and a large portion of the Tenth Mississippi regiment, with the colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, and adjutant, of the former regiment, Colonel White of the Eighth Mississippi, and a number of officers of inferior rank. The prisoners were sent to the rear, and were turned over to and picked up by various officers having charge of prisoners. We also captured the ordnance wagons of Armstrong's brigade, (two in number) destroyed the ammunition and retained the wagons. We took into action seventeen commissioned officers and four hundred and four enlisted men.

We lost as follows:

Killed—Enlisted men 12; total killed 12.

Wounded—Commissioned officers 7, enlisted men 73; total wounded 80. Aggregate killed and wounded 92.

To all the officers and men engaged I return my heartfelt thanks for their unflinching gallantry.

Respectfully submitted,

FRANK WHITE,
Lieutenant Commanding Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE,
SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M. }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 7, 1865. }

Captain T. W. Scott, A. A. A. General, Second division.

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this brigade in the engagements of April first and second:

On the morning of the first instant we moved at 5:30 o'clock from our camp near Randolph, and after passing through that place our advance struck the enemy and commenced skirmishing. The Seventy-second Indiana volunteers were in the advance, and four companies of that regiment under charge of Major L. S. Kilborn, were sent forward with instruction to press the enemy as vigorously as possible. This was done so effectively, charging them whenever they made a stand, that although they were skirmishing all the time our column was scarcely halted, until we arrived near a little station on the railroad, some five miles north of Plantersville, where we found the enemy in force, and seemingly determined to make a stand. The remainder of the Seventy-second Indiana Volunteers was here brought forward, dismounted, and formed on the left of the road, and at the same time I directed Colonel Vail, commanding Seventh Indiana volunteers, to send forward four companies armed with sabres to charge the enemy as soon as his lines were broken. They reported under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White, and the Seventy-second Indiana volunteers having broken the first line of the enemy, Colonel White was at once ordered to charge the re-

treating foe. For particulars of this charge I would respectfully refer you to the report of Colonel J. G. Vail, commanding Seventeenth Indiana volunteers. Great credit is due Colonel White, and the men under his command, for their bravery and gallant conduct, and although repulsed by the immensely superior force of the enemy, there is no doubt but this charge contributed greatly to the demoralization which soon after ensued in the rebel ranks, and caused them to retreat in the utmost confusion, as soon as an attack was made by General Upton's division, which arrived about this time on a road to the left of where we were moving. Finding there was a heavier force than we expected, by the direction of General Long, my brigade was placed in line, the Seventeenth Indiana volunteers on the right, One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers the right centre, Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers the left, and Seventy-second Indiana volunteers the left centre, and moved forward as rapidly as possible; but the ground being very rough and broken we were unable to overtake the enemy, who was rapidly retreating, and we were ordered to remount and move forward on horseback. Our loss in this engagement was one officer and seven men killed, one officer and fourteen men wounded, and five men missing. We captured one twelve-pounder brass piece, a number of small arms, which were broken up, and secured about thirty prisoners.

We camped that night near Plantersville, and on the second instant moved at half-past six A. M. in rear of the Second brigade, and arrived in front of the works of Selma, on the Summerfield road, northwest of the city about three o'clock P. M.

By direction of the general commanding the division I formed my brigade on the left of the Second brigade and battery, with the Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers on the right, Seventeenth Indiana volunteers in the centre, and One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers on the left, and skirmishers were thrown forward to engage the attention of the enemy; four companies of the Seventy-second Indiana volunteers had been detailed to take charge of the division pack-train, five additional companies were detailed to picket the roads in our rear, leaving only one company of this regiment, which was dismounted and held in reserve. Soon after forming on this line four companies were detailed from the Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers to go in pursuit of a rebel wagon train, for particulars of which expedition I would respectfully refer you to report of Lieutenant-colonel Kitchell, commanding Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers. We remained in position skirmishing with good effect until the arrangements for the attack had been completed, when I moved my brigade by direction of General Long, by the right flank, past the Second brigade, and formed my line on the right in a ravine and under cover of a hill. My line

was formed with the Seventeenth Indiana volunteers on the right, Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, six companies, in the centre, and One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers on the left, connecting with the Second brigade. The Ninety-eighth and One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers were formed in single rank, and the Seventeenth Indiana volunteers was formed in double rank, with instructions to deploy to the right as soon as the nature of the ground would permit a single rank formation. While forming this line the enemy kept up a rapid fire from his artillery, which, although well directed, did very little damage.

The works to be carried consisted of a heavy line of earthworks from eight to twelve feet high, and fifteen feet in thickness at the base, with a ditch in front four feet wide and five feet deep, partly filled with water, and in front of this ditch a stockade or picket of heavy posts placed firmly in the ground five feet high, and sharpened at the ends. There were also four heavy forts with artillery mounted, and covering the ground over which we had to advance. The ground was rough, with a fence and deep ravine to cross before reaching the works. The men fully understood the difficulties before them, but there was no flinching, and all seemed confident of their ability to accomplish whatever should be ordered.

About five o'clock the charge was ordered and the whole line moved promptly forward. As soon as we uncovered the hill, about six hundred yards from the earthworks, the enemy opened a rapid and destructive fire of musketry and artillery upon the line, but it moved steadily forward until within short range, when a rapid fire was opened from our Spencer rifles, and with a cheer the men started for the works on the run. They swept forward in a solid line over the fence, across the deep ravine, over the pickets of the stockade and the works with resistless force. The enemy fought stubbornly, many of them clubbing their guns upon us as we were climbing the works, but they were compelled to retreat. I was wounded before reaching the works, and being unable to proceed farther, I sent word to Colonel J. G. Vail, Seventeenth Indiana volunteers, to take command of the brigade, but I had the satisfaction of seeing my men beyond the works before I was removed from the field.

It would be impossible for me to mention individual acts of bravery in either officers or men, as I would have to mention every one engaged. All the regiments did equally well, and the work accomplished shows for itself. I instructed the men before starting on the charge that the works were to be taken, and knew they would do it. No one faltered, and I am proud to say that they have never failed to do the work assigned them, however difficult or hazardous, and the history of the war will not show another instance where such formidable

works, well manned and defended with men and artillery, have been stormed and captured by a single line of men without support.

In consequence of the heavy details from my brigade I had only forty-two officers and eight hundred and fourteen men engaged in the action. Of this number we had one officer and twenty-eight enlisted men killed, and eighteen officers and one hundred and thirty seven men wounded. To Colonel J. G. Vail, commanding Seventeenth Indiana volunteers, Lieutenant-Colonel E. Kitchell, commanding Ninety-Eighth Illinois volunteers, and Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Biggs, commanding One Hundred and Thirty-third Illinois volunteers, my heartfelt thanks are due for their gallant conduct and their aid and assistance throughout the entire engagement. Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs deserves great credit for his efforts to bring every man possible into action, leaving only one in eight with his horses. I regret to state that this officer was dangerously wounded after crossing the works, and while charging the woods between the works and the city. The ground over which the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers and left of the Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers advanced was more favorable than the rest, and they were first inside of the rebel works.

The One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers has the honor of planting the first stand of colors on the fortifications. My thanks are due to Lieutenant-Colonel C. G. Thomson, commanding Seventy-second Indiana volunteers, and the officers and men of his command, for the able manner in which they repulsed an attack upon our rear while the engagement was going on, and for the support given our battery by the company that was formerly placed in reserve. Great credit is due the officers of my staff for their assistance throughout the engagement. Lieutenant H. M. Ashmore, One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers, and aide-de-camp, deserves commendation for going through the action on horseback, and being the first person to enter the rebel works mounted.

For full particulars of captures, &c., I would respectfully refer you to the reports of regimental commanders, and to Colonel J. G. Vail, who assumed command of the brigade after it entered the works, and he was notified of my being wounded.

I have the honor to be, Captain, very respectfully your obedient servant,

A. O. MILLER,
Colonel Seventy-second Indiana Volunteers,
Commanding Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY }
CORPS, M. D. M., SHELMA, ALA., April 7, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this brigade after I assumed command of it on the evening of the second instant:

On being notified that Colonel Miller was wounded and desired me to take command of

the brigade, I turned over the command of my own regiment to Lieutenant-Colonel Frank White, and found the other two regiments, the Ninety-eighth and One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois Volunteers, near the left flank of the inner line of works which run east and west. With the Second brigade we moved along the line of these works under a heavy cross fire of artillery and musketry from the works along the line and the depot in front of the town until we reached the Plantersville road, where I formed a line facing the town. I placed Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchell with his regiment, the Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, along the line of fence in front of the nitre sheds, and to the left of the railroad depot, with orders to hold his ground until I could get into line to advance upon the town. I formed the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers across the Plantersville road, and a portion of the Second brigade that was with it on the left. The Fourth division coming up at this time several shots were exchanged between us, when I rode out of the works to ascertain who they were, and met General Upton's column. Colonel Minty coming up, I was ordered to remain in position on the Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers. I went into camp at twelve o'clock at night. The Seventeenth Indiana volunteers had been operating along the line below the town, and entered it about the same time with General Upton. As they were not under my personal directions during the latter part of the engagement, I would respectfully refer you to the report of Lieutenant-Colonel White for particulars of their operation.

My thanks are due all the officers and men for their gallantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Kitchell, commanding Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, and Captains Wiley, Wood, and DeLong, One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers, are deserving of special mention for their promptness and acts of bravery. Captain Wiley with a squad of men captured about twenty prisoners and two pieces of artillery three hundred yards in advance of the line and east of the Plantersville road. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson and Major L. S. Kilburn, Seventy-second Indiana volunteers, are deserving of credit for their promptness in supporting the battery with that portion of the regiment not on picket.

Captain O. F. Bane, Lieutenant H. M. Ashmore, and Lieutenant G. B. Sweet, of Colonel Miller's staff, are entitled to great credit for their promptness in the discharge of their duties and for their courage. Captain W. A. Owens, Provost Marshal, is entitled to credit for his energy and industry in collecting prisoners. Captain John C. Scott, brigade inspector, did good service during the action by giving his personal attention to the pickets when they were attacked. I would especially commend Sergeant Jackson S. Ball, Seventy-second Indiana volunteers, on duty at brigade headquarters, for his bravery in riding under a terrific fire to bring me the news of Colonel Miller being

wounded, and for his energy in the performance of his duties at all times.

We assisted in capturing no less than eighteen pieces of artillery, all mounted and in position. We had no men to spare to guard prisoners, and they were ordered to the rear as fast as captured, and were gathered up by parties from our own and other commands. We only claim credit for assisting in the capture of all prisoners taken in the city. A large number of small arms were captured and broken up.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. G. VAIL,
Colonel Seventeenth Indiana Volunteers,
Commanding Brigade.

Captain T. W. Scott,
A. A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY }
CORPS, IN THE FIELD, April 10, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to make the following report of property, &c., destroyed to date:

Two (2) miles railroad, four (4) railroad bridges, two (2) foundries, two (2) machine shops, one (1) saw-mill, one (1) turn-table, five (5) large collieries; number of small arms broken up estimated at seven hundred; number of prisoners turned over to Division Provost-Marshal, two hundred and eighty-five; number of pieces of artillery taken by this brigade alone, eight; also assisted in the capture of a number of other pieces with the Second brigade. Large details at work in Selma, destroying property for five days—no inventory taken.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. G. VAIL,
Colonel Commanding Brigade.

Captain T. W. SCOTT,
A. A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH MICHIGAN CAVALRY, }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 8, 1865. }

Major Robert Burns, A. A. A. G. Second Brigade, Second Division Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

SIR—In compliance with orders from Division Brigade Headquarters, I have the honor to submit the following as a report of the part taken by the Fourth Michigan cavalry under my command in the engagement of the second instant, which resulted in the capture of the city of Selma, Alabama.

The regiment moved from camp one mile north of Plantersville on the morning of the second, with a fighting force of four hundred and twenty men and twenty-four officers, and an aggregate strength of four hundred and forty-four; it being the rear regiment of the brigade that day, nothing of interest above the ordinary incidents of a march occurred, until arriving in front of the fortifications of the city of Selma, which point it reached about one o'clock, P.M., having marched a distance of twenty-two miles. The regiments were immediately formed in line, and I received orders from Colonel Minty, commanding brigade, to prepare to fight on foot,

and moved the regiment, dismounted for that purpose, but before being assigned a position in the line, I received orders countermanding the former, and directing me to move the command back to the horses, and to hold it in readiness to mount at a moment's notice, and to charge with the sabre as soon as the enemy's line should be broken; and in this position the command was held for the space of nearly two hours, and until a few minutes before the assault was made upon the enemy's position, when I received orders from Colonel Minty to move the regiment out dismounted, to act as support to the battery then in position on a slight eminence to the left of the road leading into the city, to the left of our line of battle, as then formed, with directions to remain and support the battery, and manœuvre the command as circumstances might require. In this position the regiment drew for a few minutes the fire of both the enemy's guns operating in front of the Second division, but, by a flank movement of one battalion, the range of one of the enemy's guns was avoided, but the regiment continued to receive the special attention of their other gun up to the moment of the commencement of the assault upon their works. The command acted in this capacity until the first line of works was fully in possession of our forces, and the enemy pushed back into the woods, in rear of their breastworks, when I received orders from General Wilson to press forward and attack in flank that portion of the enemy's lines confronting the Fourth division and on our left, and which still disputed its entrance to the works. But before reaching the points of attack, I received orders from Colonel Minty (at the front) to mount the regiment and move forward as fast as possible. The horses were immediately ordered forward, but before he arrived I received a second order from General Wilson to move up the main road, dismounted, to charge the enemy's second line of works, from which a portion of our line had suffered a repulse. The regiment was formed for the charge, about sixty rods in front of the rebel line, with its right resting on the road, with the Third Ohio cavalry on our right; the order to advance was given and most splendidly executed, the whole line moving with the precision of a parade, and the sturdy bravery thus displayed proved too much for the weak-kneed Johnnies, for before we reached the breastworks they broke and fled in the wildest confusion, leaving nought of the chivalrous garrison, save a lone and decrepid chaplain to reward their efforts.

I immediately broke the regiment in column, and pushed forward at double-quick, until we reached the heart of the city, where we succeeded in capturing one hundred and fifty-two prisoners, and met the advance of the Fourth division just entering the town from the other side. The casualties in the regiment was one, wounded by shell—Edward Ludlow, Company "E"—in arm severely.

I cannot close this report without adding my evidence of the noble conduct and soldierly bearing of those under my command, and especially would I mention the names of Major Eldridge, Captain Hathaway, and Captain Potter, commanding battalions, and Adjutant Dickinson, who rendered much valuable assistance in the general management of the regiment, although to individualize would seem unjust, when every officer and man performed their whole duty.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. D. PRITCHARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Fourth Michigan Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH MICHIGAN CAVALRY, NEAR }
MACON, GA., April 20, 1865. }

Major Burns, A. A. G. Second Brigade,
Second Division, Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

SIR—I have the honor to submit the following as a report of the doings of the troops under my command, which resulted in the capture of the bridges over Flint river, on the eighteenth instant.

In obedience to orders received from Colonel Minty, commanding division, I moved from camp, near Columbus, Georgia, at five and a half o'clock p. m., on the seventeenth instant, in command of the Fourth Michigan and Third Ohio cavalry, with directions to make a forced march during the night, and to reach (practicable) at daylight on the eighteenth, and capture what is known as the double bridges over Flint river, and to spare nothing necessary for the accomplishment of the object.

The command was put in light marching trim, all pack animals and everything which could impede our march being left behind. For the first six miles our march was through a blind wood road, after which we struck the old telegraph road from Columbus to Macon, which was commodious and in good repair. Nothing occurred until daylight to break the mournful monotony of a night march, which was incessant and rapid with the exception of three slight halts, comprising about one hour in all.

It was reported that the enemy in various forces was just in our front, and that we might fall upon them at any moment; and to provide for any emergency that might arise, I sent one full battalion of the Fourth Michigan out as an advance, with orders to charge and capture, or cut through any force which might appear in front; but nothing was seen, although I learn that large numbers of stragglers together with three pieces of artillery were driven into the woods, and passed by the column unobserved in the darkness.

Just after daylight, at a point nine miles from the bridges, we came upon a squad of five rebels, and took them in. One mile further several mounted men appeared, who were chased and driven into another road.

From this point the gait of the column was increased to a trot; three miles further, five more prisoners were captured. At Pleasant Hill, four miles from the river, we came upon a refu-

gee train and several rebel soldiers, who showed symptoms of fight, but two or three minutes served to settle their accounts; two were killed, one mortally wounded, and three captured. From there a charge was ordered, and was executed with such precipitancy that the guard at the bridge, consisting of a force of fifty men, under command of Major Osborn, First Georgia cavalry, with instructions to defend and destroy the bridges, was completely surprised, receiving no knowledge of our approach until the head of our column struck the bridge, at the gallop, which was swept like a hurricane, not allowing the enemy time to fire a volley. A few scattering shots were fired, but to no effect. The whole force then broke and fled, and some made good their escape, being mounted on fresh horses, which were more fleet than ours in their jaded condition.

The advance followed them nearly four miles beyond the bridges, when the chase was given up. The object of the expedition having been fully accomplished, the forces were thrown into position to meet any attack that the enemy might make to regain possession of the bridges, where they awaited the arrival of the main column.

The results of the expedition were the capture of the two bridges, in good repair, five commissioned officers, and forty-four enlisted men, prisoners, killing two and wounding three, one mortally, and capturing fifteen wagons, one hundred and fifty head of mules and horses, besides a large quantity of bacon and provision, with no casualties on our part. To accomplish this the command had marched forty-six miles inside of fourteen hours, including all halts.

In closing this report, I would not omit to mention the high merit due to every officer and soldier in the command, for their untiring perseverance and prompt action throughout, to render the expedition a perfect success; and among whom I would specially mention Major Eldridge, commanding Fourth Michigan cavalry, and Major Livermore, commanding Third Ohio cavalry, for the good management of their regiments; and to Captain C. T. Hudson, commanding the battalion of Fourth Michigan cavalry, acting as advance, great credit is due not only for the full execution of every order, but for his bravery and gallantry in leading the charge upon the bridges, which swept everything in its impetuosity, and secured at a dash what might have been lost by fighting.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. D. PRITCHARD,
Lieutenant-Colonel Fourth Michigan cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND }
DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS. }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 4, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I beg to hand you the following report of the part taken by my brigade in the assault and capture of Selma, on second instant:

On the night of the thirty-first of March I was

encamped ten miles north of Montevallo, and on the night of the first of April I camped at Plantersville, having marched forty-five miles on that day.

On the morning of the second I marched at six o'clock, taking the advance on the main road to Selma. The Third Ohio was my advance regiment. It easily drove what small force we met without delaying the column for a moment. About six miles from Selma I turned to the right, taking a cross road which led to the Summerfield road. At about three p. m. I found my left in front of the works around Selma. In accordance with orders from Brigadier-General Long, I sent the Third Ohio to the right and rear to cover led horses and pack mules. The other three regiments, Fourth Ohio, Seventh Pennsylvania, and Fourth Michigan, were dismounted, and formed line about half a mile from the works. A strong skirmish line was pushed forward a few hundred yards in advance, and was immediately engaged with the enemy's skirmishers.

At about four p. m., Major-General Wilson, accompanied by Brigadier-General Long, came forward to my skirmish line. After examining the ground for a few moments General Wilson ordered an assault.

The First brigade was now moved to my right, and my skirmishers from that direction were drawn in by direction of General Long. I left one regiment, the Fourth Michigan, to support the Chicago Board of Trade battery, the Third Ohio was still protecting the led animals, and was at this moment skirmishing with Chalmers' advance. This left me but two regiments

for the assault, numbering in all thirty-three officers and six hundred and seventy-one men.

At about five p. m., the order was given to advance. The men moved forward with enthusiasm, and kept a perfect line until their left struck a swamp, in which they were almost knee deep.

This threw the right considerably in advance. The left of the First brigade came forward in the same manner, and as I afterwards learned from the same cause, swamp in front of the outer flank; thus the right of the Fourth Ohio, and the left of the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois, gained the works first, the flanks sweeping forward as if the movement had been that of individual echelon. Corporal Booth, A company, Fourth Ohio, was the first man inside the works; he was almost immediately afterwards shot through the head.

The works at the point of assault consisted of a breastwork or parapet from six to eight feet high, with a ditch about five feet deep, in front of which there was a well-built palisade stretching along the entire line.

After entering the works we pushed up the line to the left, cleaning the rebels out of the bastions, in which we captured a considerable amount of artillery, until arriving opposite the fort near the cotton gin, which formed a portion of the inner line of works. This was immediately assaulted and carried. Three field pieces were captured in this work.

Here we again turned to the left and attacked and carried the works on the Plantersville road, capturing five pieces of artillery, one of them a thirty-pounder Parrott.

Report of Casualties in Second Division Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, in the Action at Selma, Alabama, on the second of April, 1865.

COMMAND	NO. ENGAGED IN CHARGE.			KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			TOTAL.		AGGRAVATED CASES.
	C.	R.	TOTAL.	C.	R.	TOTAL.	C.	R.	TOTAL.	C.	R.	TOTAL.	C.	R.	
Second Division Headquarters	1	..	1	1	..	1
Seventeenth Indiana Mounted Infantry	17	404	421	..	12	12	7	72	79	7	84	91
*Seventy-second Indiana Mounted Infantry
†Ninety-eighth Illinois Mounted Infantry	11	161	172	..	10	10	5	51	56	5	41	46
One hundred Twenty-third Illinois Mounted Infantry	14	239	253	1	7	8	6	42	48	7	49	56
First Brigade Headquarters	1	..	1	1	..	1
Total in First Brigade	42	804	846	1	29	30	20	145	165	21	174	195
Seventh Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry	13	363	376	1	1	2	4	47	51	5	48	53
‡Fourth Michigan Cavalry	2	2	..	1	1	2	3
§Third Ohio Cavalry	2	8	8	1	6	7	1	14	15
Fourth Ohio Cavalry	16	318	334	..	5	7	1	44	45	..	6	6	3	55	58
Second Brigade Headquarters
Total in Second Brigade	29	671	700	3	8	11	5	100	106	1	12	13	9	120	129
Total in Second Division	71	1475	1546	4	37	41	25	245	270	1	12	13	30	294	324

ROBERT H. G. MINTY,
Colonel Fourth Michigan, Commanding Division Cavalry.

- * Eight companies on picket, remainder superintending battery.
- † Four companies on a sec. d.
- ‡ Supporting battery
- § Covering right flank.

At this point I collected and reformed my command, and at about eleven p. m. bivouacked between the lines of works.

As before stated the number engaged in the assault was thirty-three officers and six hundred and seventy-one men; of these nine officers and one hundred and fourteen men were killed and wounded. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobb, commanding Fourth Ohio, was, I regret to say, killed, and Colonel McCormick, commanding Seventh Pennsylvania, was severely wounded.

Each officer and soldier performed his duty well and nobly, it is therefore difficult for me to make special mention of any. The gallant Corporal Booth, of the Fourth Ohio, was the first man in the enemy's works, but he fell in the moment of victory, shot through the head.

Captains Moore and Richardson, of the Fourth Ohio, were amongst the first to enter the works, and acted throughout with conspicuous gallantry.

Major Burns, Fourth Michigan Cavalry, my A. A. G., and Major Greeno, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, my A. A. I. G., were also amongst the first to enter the works, and acted in the most gallant manner throughout the entire action.

I strongly and earnestly recommend the four above-mentioned officers for brevet.

Enclosed herewith I hand you sub-reports of regimental commanders, together with report of casualties.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. G. MINTY,

Colonel Fourth Michigan Cavalry; Commanding Brigade.

Captain T. W. SCOTT,

A. A. G., Second Division, Cavalry Corps.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY CORPS,
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
MACON, GA., May 10, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to hand you the following report of the part taken by this division in the late campaign during the time I have had the honor to command it.

I assumed command of the Second division cavalry corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, on the second of April, 1865, during the assault on the enemy's works at Selma, Ala., Brigadier-General Long, commanding the division, having been seriously wounded before we gained the breastworks.

General Long's report includes the capture of Selma, I will therefore commence my report with our march from that place.

April eighth, at ten minutes past four p. m., I commenced crossing the Alabama river on the pontoon bridge which had that moment been completed, and had the entire division across by twenty-five minutes past seven p. m., notwithstanding the fact that the crossing had to be stopped three times in consequence of damage done to the bridge by driftwood. I camped that night seven miles from Selma.

April tenth. Marched at one o'clock p. m. in rear of the First and Fourth divisions, having charge of the wagon and pontoon trains. This

day I marched only eleven miles, having been delayed first by waiting for the other divisions to get out of my way, and next by very bad roads, which I had to corduroy in some places for a distance of two or three hundred yards. I camped at eleven o'clock p. m., two miles east of Benton.

April eleventh. Marched twelve miles to Big Swamp creek, which I found impassable. I waited until six p. m. for the pontoon train, and then had to send two miles for planking, which I procured by pulling a barn to pieces. I had also to corduroy about half a mile of swamp road west of the creek. I got the last of the division over by half-past four a. m.

April twelfth. Marched twenty-eight miles, and camped within four miles of Montgomery. The first eight miles of this day's march was over roads which were impassable until they were corduroyed.

On many occasions I had from three to five hundred men at work carrying rails to build roads.

April thirteenth. Marched eleven miles, passing through Montgomery on the Columbus road.

April fourteenth. Marched at 1 p. m. in rear of the First and Fourth divisions, again having charge of the trains. Camped two miles east of the Cubahatchie creek, having marched fourteen miles over very bad roads.

April fifteenth. Marched at four o'clock a. m.; was delayed until two p. m. crossing a swamp about three hundred yards wide. Marched twenty-two miles, and camped two miles east of Tuskegee.

On leaving Montgomery I detached one regiment (the Seventy-second Indiana mounted infantry) with orders to destroy the Montgomery and West Point railroad. Lieutenant-Colonel Thompson, commanding that regiment, reported having destroyed thirty-six culverts and bridges, together with a large quantity of bridge timber and the mills at which it had been cut.

April sixteenth. Marched thirty-nine miles; camped after dark ten miles west of Columbus.

April seventeenth. Marched at three a. m., arrived at Columbus at seven a. m., and halted until six p. m., when I sent the Fourth Michigan and Third Ohio cavalry, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard, of the former regiment, with orders to march all night and gain the double bridges over Flint river by daybreak, and to save them at all hazards. I followed with the division at about seven p. m.

Colonel Pritchard pushed the retreating enemy so closely that he forced them to abandon three pieces of artillery. He gained the bridge shortly after daybreak. One battalion of the Fourth Michigan cavalry, led by Captain Hudson, made a gallant sabre charge, crossing both bridges at the gallop, and capturing the battalion which was guarding them, which was well posted on the island between the bridges. I arrived at the bridge on the forenoon of the eighteenth, having marched sixty-three miles since daybreak on the seventeenth.

April nineteenth. Marched twelve miles, camping three miles east of Thomaston. I destroyed three large cotton factories.

April twentieth. Marched at three A. M., taking the direct road to Macon. Near Spring hill, twenty-one miles from Macon, my advance (the Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry) struck a rebel force, estimated at about four hundred.

This force was driven by a series of brilliant charges from about a dozen well-built rail barricades; a number of prisoners and about one hundred stand of arms were captured.

At Tobasopkey creek the rebels, about three hundred strong, were posted at the east end of the bridge, which they had fired, and had also torn up a portion of the planking.

Their sharpshooters were lying behind rail barricades, and about a dozen occupied a store mill about one hundred yards below the bridge. The advance went on to the bridge at a gallop, but were stopped by the planking having been taken off; they quickly dismounted and crossed on the burning stringers in the most gallant manner, routed the enemy and saved the bridge, which is an important one, being over one hundred yards long.

About three miles from Tobasopkey creek the advance was met by Brigadier-General Robertson, of the rebel army, with a flag of truce, having a despatch from General Cobb, stating that an armistice had been agreed on between General Sherman and the rebel General Johnston. This document was delivered by General Robertson to Captain Lewis, of my staff, and his receipt taken therefor. Captain Lewis handed me the despatch, when I directed him to inform General Robertson that I had sent it by special messenger to General Wilson, and that I required him, General Robertson, to return to Macon immediately and await the reply.

General Robertson declined receiving the message from Captain Lewis, and demanded that it should be in writing.

General Robertson's course led me to believe that he was merely endeavoring to delay my column. He had already succeeded in doing so for nearly an hour, and I feared that I would be unable to save the bridge over Rocky creek. I therefore wrote him as follows:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION CAVALRY, CORPS. M. D. M. }
IN THE FIELD NEAR MACON, GEORGIA, }
April 20, 1865. }

GENERAL—I have received the despatch from General Cobb, and have sent it by special messenger to Major-General Wilson, a few miles in my rear. As there may be some delay in receiving an answer, it is necessary for you to return immediately to Macon, to which place General Wilson's reply will be forwarded.

I have directed the officer commanding my advance to move forward five minutes after this is handed you.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,
ROBERT H. G. MINTY,
Colonel Commanding Division.

I directed Colonel White to give the flag of truce five minutes' start and then to push forward, and if General Robertson and his party did not keep out of his way to take them prisoners.

After the expiration of the given time, Colonel White pushed rapidly forward, succeeded in saving the bridge, which the rebels were about to burn, and continuing his pursuit, entered Macon with them.

The city and defences were immediately surrendered by Major-General Cobb. Our captures were five Generals and three hundred and forty-five other officers, eighteen hundred and forty-three enlisted men, and sixty pieces of artillery.

I beg to refer you to the reports of Lieutenant-Colonel Pritchard, Fourth Michigan cavalry, and Lieutenant C. White, Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, which are enclosed herewith. Both of these officers are deserving of promotion for the gallant and soldier-like manner in which they have performed their duties.

Captain Hudson, Fourth Michigan cavalry, Major Weiler, Lieutenant McDowell, and Lieutenant Doyle, of the Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, are also deserving of promotion for their gallantry.

Herewith I also hand you the report of Captain Robinson, Chicago Board of Trade battery, one of the most industrious and untiring officers in the service.

Below I give you a summary of the distances marched since leaving Montgomery, Alabama: April fourteenth, marched fourteen miles; April fifteenth, marched twenty-two miles; April sixteenth, marched thirty-nine miles; April seventeenth, marched sixty-three miles; April nineteenth, marched twelve miles; April twentieth, marched forty-five miles. Total, six days, one hundred and ninety-five miles.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT H. G. MINTY,

Colonel Fourth Michigan Cavalry, Commanding Division.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT,

A. A. General Cavalry Corps Mil. Div. Miss.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH INDIANA VOLUNTEERS, MOUNTED }
INFANTRY, MACON, GA., April 21, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to make the following report of this regiment which I commanded on the twentieth instant.

On the morning of the twentieth, the regiment being the advance regiment of the division (Second), the four companies with sabres were sent forward as advance guard of the division under Major Weiler. I had the remaining companies as the regiment in the proper order of march in rear of the headquarters. From our camp of the preceding night, from whence we started in the morning, it was forty-five miles to Macon. After marching about twenty-four miles, and when near Spring Hill, the advance guard first met a small force of the enemy and drove them off, capturing a few. I then moved forward with the other companies and assumed

command of the advance. We rested near Spring Hill about an hour and then moved on. Near Montpelier Springs we again met the enemy, and charged him up to and through a strong barricade of rails and brush across the road, charging it, driving the enemy from it, and capturing about a dozen of them, three officers and a few horses. Resting a minute I again moved forward at a fast trot, in order to be in time to save the bridge over the Tobesofkee creek at Mimms' Mills. Here we found the enemy in line about three hundred strong, and attacked them. The advance charged, mounted over the burning bridge until stopped by the plank being torn up; they then dismounted, as did also the two advance companies, E and H, and I double-quickened them across the bridge, and after a sharp fight of about five minutes drove the enemy off in confusion. In the mean time I had parts of the other companies at work extinguishing the fire on the bridge, the men carrying the water in their hats, caps, and everything else available. As we drove the enemy from the bridge I sent two companies across a ford below the bridge (I and G) to pursue the enemy, and gave pursuit at the same time with the dismounted men. The road after crossing the bridge makes a bend, and the enemy had to retreat around this bend, whilst my dismounted men double-quickening across the bend had the enemy under fire for about two hundred yards, and took good advantage of it, firing very rapidly, demoralizing the enemy, causing them to throw away guns (over one hundred), blankets, haversacks, &c., and fly as for their lives. The fire on the bridge was sufficiently suppressed in about fifteen minutes to admit of horsemen crossing, and, leaving men still at work against the flames, I crossed the command and pushed on. About two miles from the bridge, and about thirteen from Macon, I was met by a flag of truce under the rebel Brigadier-General Robertson. The force we were pursuing passed the flag of truce and thus saved themselves. I sent word to Colonel Minty, commanding Second division, of the state of things, and awaited orders. The flag of truce detained us about half an hour. I then received orders from Colonel Minty to give them five minutes to get out of the way, and then to drive everything before me, and save the bridge over Rocky creek at Bailey's Mill. I placed Adjutant W. E. Doyle in charge of the advance guard of fifteen men, giving him instructions and sending him forward at a trot, supporting him closely with the regiment. After going about two miles he came in sight of the flag of truce party covering the rear of a force of about two hundred and fifty men, said to be Blount's battalion. They were moving slowly, and evidently trying to delay us. Seeing this, the adjutant, as I had instructed him, charged them, causing the flag of truce to run into the woods, capturing three of the officers that were with it, and driving the rebel cavalry pell-mell along the road. They kept up a continual fire

on us for some time, but with no effect. On getting in sight of the Rocky Creek bridge the enemy were discovered on foot attempting to fire the bridge. The advance drove them off, however, and pursued them closely to the palisades in the road. Before getting to the bridge the adjutant had sent to me for a small re-enforcement, and I sent him Major Weiler and Lieutenant James H. McDowell, with company "E." The major caught up before getting to the bridge. On arriving at the palisades the advance got up among the rebels and some firing ensued, the rebels breaking off the road through the gardens on the right in confusion. The advance tore down a few of the palisades, passed through, and rode up to near the rebel works. Here Major Weiler and Adjutant Doyle rode up on the works and demanded their surrender, telling them that we had two divisions of our cavalry in their rear. The colonel commanding not being present the men believed they were cut off; subordinate officers surrendered their commands, and the soldiery threw down their arms, and as directed marched down to the road where Lieutenant McDowell took charge of and formed them. The major and adjutant were at this time riding along the line of works, telling the men to throw down their arms and surrender, that they were cut off and were our prisoners, that flight was vain, and that fighting would avail nothing, and the rebel soldiery were throwing down their arms and hastening to the road, and the officers were following the men. I came up at this time with the regiment, and found the rebel prisoners in line along the road, under Lieutenant McDowell. I ordered Adjutant Doyle to the forts on the right of the road to receive their surrender. As soon as the regiment got inside the line of works, the entire line surrendered, finding themselves cut off from town, and Colonel Cummins, who commanded the forces (one brigade) immediately on the road, came down with about five hundred men and surrendered to me. I left two companies (G and I) in charge of prisoners, and moved on towards town with the other companies. At the edge of town I was met by some officers with a flag of truce from General Cobb, asking what terms I would give him if he surrendered the city and forces. My answer was—unconditional surrender, and gave the flag five minutes to get out of my way. After passing into the town the distance of four or five squares, another flag of truce met me stating that General Cobb submitted to my terms, surrendering the city and everything in it. I marched into town and up to General Cobb's headquarters, thus taking formal possession of the city. I placed patrols on duty at once, and camped the regiment on the Court-house square and adjoining street.

We captured in the city and in the works, Major-General Howell Cobb, Brigadier-General Gus Smith, Brigadier-General Mackall, and Brigadier-General Mercer, three thousand five

hundred prisoners, including over three hundred officers of all grades below Brigadier-General, five stand of colors, about sixty pieces of artillery of all calibres, and about three thousand stand of arms.

There was also large quantities of quartermaster, commissary, medical, and ordnance stores captured in the city, the exact estimates of the stores I have not been able to find out.

We had in the action during the day, twenty-one commissioned officers and five hundred enlisted men. We lost one killed and two wounded.

I have to return thanks to Major J. J. Weiler for the efficient aid given me in commanding the regiment, to Adjutant Doyle for the able manner in which he handled the advance guard whilst in command, and to Lieutenant G. H. McDowell, who ably assisted the major, for his promptitude and energy in getting the prisoners together and retaining them. I have also to return my thanks to every officer and man in the regiment, for the cheerfulness with which they endured the hardships incident to the march, for the alacrity with which they obeyed every order, and for the gallant manner in which they have gone at the enemy wherever they have found him since the opening of the campaign.

And I have also to return thanks to Captain T. W. Scott and Lieutenant Culbertson, of Colonel Minty's staff, for the efficient aid and assistance given me in taking the city.

I had omitted to state that we captured, after getting in the city, four (4) two-pound breech-loading guns—known as Travis guns—made and intended for General Forrest, and a large number of horses and mules.

I have the honor to remain, Captain, respectfully your obedient servant,

FRANK WHITE,
Commanding Regiment.

Captain O. F. BANE,
A. A. A. G., First Brigade,
Second Division, C. C. M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTY-SECOND INDIANA VOLUNTEERS, }
SELMA, ALA., April 5, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to report the following as the operations of the Seventy-second regiment Indiana volunteers, on the first and second of April, 1865.

April first. My regiment having the advance, four companies were sent forward as advance guard, under command of Major L. S. Kilborn, with orders to advance rapidly that the column might not be detained.

The enemy was found near Randolph, and contended for every point on the way, but was so vigorously pressed that the command marched rapidly for fifteen miles, where they were found in line protected by rail works. I received orders from Colonel Miller, commanding brigade, to dismount the remaining six companies of my regiment and dislodge them from their position, which was done at once by charging their lines on the left of the road,

after which I was joined by the other regiments of the brigade, and advanced to Vogle's creek, the enemy abandoning the field. The casualties during the day were—one officer, Captain Crayens, and three enlisted men wounded. Private L. B. Edwards was severely wounded while leading a charge (mounted). His action is worthy of special mention for courage and heroism. Major L. S. Kilborn deserves credit for the energy and skill with which he conducted the advance.

My regiment having had the advance on the first, was by the general order of march assigned to the rear on the second, and four companies, under command of Captain Herron, were detailed to guard the division train. On the arrival of the division in front of Selma, five additional companies were ordered in to picket the roads in the rear of the line of battle, and the remaining one company to support the battery. Captain Herron brought the train in safely. The companies on picket promptly repelled the advance of a brigade of the enemy which were threatening our rear, and each officer and man discharged the duty assigned him promptly and faithfully.

I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
C. G. THOMPSON,
Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Seventy-second Regiment Indiana Volunteers.
N. GASKILL,
Lieutenant and Acting Adjutant.

Captain O. F. BANE,
A. A. A. General.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION }
CAVALRY CORPS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISS., }
NEAR MACON, GEORGIA, April 26, 1865. }

Captain T. W. Scott, A. A. A. General.

SIR—In accordance with orders, I would respectfully present the names of Corporal John Kidney, and Private Lemuel Edwards, special messenger at headquarters First Brigade, as being worthy of notice. Private Edwards, for great gallantry at Ebenezer Church, where he was wounded while leading a charge (mounted), and Corporal Kidney for coolness and daring in action at all times.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
FRANK WHITE,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS COLORED TROOPS, CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M. }
NEAR MACON, GEORGIA, May 17, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to make the following report of the organization of the colored troops under my command, and their march from Selma, Alabama, to this place:

On or about the sixth day of April, 1865, at Selma, Alabama, orders were received from Headquarters C. C., M. D. M., authorizing each division commander to recruit one colored regiment; and in compliance with such orders Colonel R. H. G. Minty, commanding Second Division C. C., directed me to take charge of, and organize the regiment of his division.

On the morning of the seventh of April I com-

menced recruiting, and by night had succeeded in enlisting over five hundred negroes. Eight men were detailed from the division to take charge of the men as they were organized into companies.

The eighth was spent in examining those I had enlisted the day before.

Captain W. G. Young, Ninety-eighth Illinois, Dr. Briggs, Fourth O. V. C., L. C. Remington, Fourth Michigan, Acting Adjutant, reported to assist me in my work.

On that night I received orders to cross the Alabama river, but a break in the pontoon bridge prevented, and I returned to the barracks, where I had previously been encamped.

On the ninth we drilled some, in order to have the regiment so we could move out in some order when we received orders to do so.

On that night we crossed the river, and moved out three miles on the Montgomery road, and camped near the division for the night.

Next morning Lieutenant C. L. Conner, Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry, reported to me for duty, moved at ten a. m., and marched twenty miles, camping near Brandon.

On the eleventh I moved out again about noon in advance of train; the roads being very bad, I employed my men in working the road, in order to facilitate the passage of the train. Distance marched was twenty miles.

On the twelfth I received orders to march in rear of the train, which necessitated a late start, but by marching late at night we were enabled to make a march of twenty miles.

The colored regiment of the Fourth division reported to me on the evening of the twelfth, numbering about five hundred men.

On the thirteenth I reached Montgomery and camped four miles east, on the Columbus, Georgia, road, having marched fifteen miles.

On the morning of the fourteenth I procured about one hundred Mississippi rifles, but could get no ammunition; moved about noon and marched late at night, making twenty-five miles.

The colored regiment of the First division reported to me this day, numbering about four hundred men.

On the fifteenth I made twenty miles, and camped three miles east of Tuskegee.

On the sixteenth I moved about ten o'clock a. m., marched very hard all day, and until two o'clock the morning of the seventeenth.

On the seventeenth I reached Columbus, Georgia, moved out four miles on the Macon road and camped, having marched fifteen miles; at this place I procured a lot of clothing and arms; most of the arms were given to the regiment belonging to the First division, which was ordered to report this eve to the quartermaster of that division.

Our march, all the way from Selma to Columbus, was over the worst of roads, made almost impassable by the passage of the entire command and all the trains.

The number of men were constantly increasing, so that when I reached Columbus my regi-

ment alone numbered fourteen hundred men, of whom about twelve hundred men were mounted on horses and mules turned over daily by the division to me.

Great difficulty was experienced in procuring provisions for these men and forage for the animals, and it was only by the utmost diligence that sufficient could be obtained.

I moved at daylight on the morning of the eighteenth, and camped at twelve o'clock at night at Flint river, having marched forty miles; next day made fifteen miles, camping five miles east of Thomsonville.

On the twentieth I made another hard day's march of thirty miles, and camping within fifteen miles of this place; next day I reached this place with two thousand seven hundred men belonging to my regiment and the regiment of the Fourth division.

In compliance with orders received from the Brevet Major-General commanding cavalry corps, M. D. M., on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of April the men were examined by the surgeon, and the regiments each reduced to one thousand men.

On the first of May, in compliance with orders received from headquarters cavalry corps, each regiment reported to their division commanders.

My regiment is progressing finely in discipline and the drill. We have nine hundred and fifty stand of arms, and four hundred and fifty sets of accoutrements.

The officers are well supplied with tents, and the men have tents and sheds sufficient to cover them and protect them from the inclemency of the weather, and will do very well until better shelter can be obtained; the greater portion of them are very well clothed in rebel uniforms.

The most difficult part of the organization of the colored troops was that of subsistence, as we were compelled to subsist entirely upon the country. And when we take into consideration that a large cavalry force were constantly in our advance, nearly clearing the whole country of subsistence, making the procuring of rations for the regiments a difficult matter indeed, which was only accomplished by industry and perseverance on the part of officers and men of the command.

I cannot speak in terms of too high praise of the officers and men that were ordered to report to me to assist in the organization of the regiment; to them is due great praise for the energy and efficiency evinced on all occasions, ever at their post at all times doing their whole duty.

To Lieutenant L. C. Remington, Fourth Michigan cavalry, Acting Adjutant, Captain Young, Ninety-eighth Illinois volunteers, Lieutenant Conner, Seventh Pennsylvania cavalry, Dr. Briggs, Fourth Ohio cavalry, I am greatly indebted for their industry, energy, and faithful performance of their whole duty.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

MARTIN ARCHER,

Major Commanding Colored Troops.

Major E. B. BRAUMONT,

A. A. G. Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEER CAVALRY, }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 5, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to make the following report of operations on the first and second instants.

On the first, the regiment marched forty-six miles, but took no part in the engagement. On the second instant marched in advance of division toward this place, skirmishing occasionally with the enemy's rear guard until within sight of his works, when two battalions (the Third battalion having been sent to the right of the road) were deployed as skirmishers (mounted), but did not advance until the first line of the enemy's works was captured, when they were ordered to charge the second line of works on the enemy's left, in rear of the Fourth United States cavalry, which was repulsed. The regiment was then dismounted and marched into town, meeting with but slight resistance, capturing about forty (40) prisoners and several horses and mules. The casualties were six men wounded, none dangerously.

The Third battalion (sent to the right) found the enemy in force, and, after a skirmish, were forced to return by a circuitous route to avoid being captured to the main road, and follow the column. The loss sustained was two men wounded, one commanding officer (Lieutenant D. E. Lewis, Company M) and seven enlisted men captured. Total loss of regiment eight men wounded, one commanding officer and seven men captured.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. LIVERMORE,

Major Commanding Third Volunteer Ohio Cavalry.

Major ROBERT BURNS,
A. A. G., Second Brigade, Second Division C. E., M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD OHIO VOLUNTEER CAVALRY, }
MACON, GEORGIA, April 30, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to forward herewith the battle-flag of the Twelfth Mississippi cavalry, Confederate States of America, which was captured, with the commanding officer of the regiment, Major Cox, on the fifteenth instant, about six miles from Tuskegee, Alabama, by John H. Shoup, private, Company H, Third Ohio cavalry.

He is very desirous of retaining it, if he can be allowed to do so,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. LIVERMORE,

Major Commanding Regiment.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH OHIO VOLUNTEER CAVALRY, }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 5, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to report that this regiment was not engaged in the action of the first instant. On the second instant it formed the right of the Second brigade, Second division, and was immediately on the left of the First brigade, Second division, dismounted. It participated in the charge of the enemy's works, and was among the first to enter them, capturing one gun. Corporal John H. Booth, Com-

pany A, was the first man on the works, and was instantly killed. The regiment continued in the charge, after passing the first line of works, assisting in capturing one lunette with two guns, and another with five. Lieutenant-Colonel George W. Dobb, commanding regiment, was wounded near the works, and died shortly after.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. SHOEMAKER,

Captain Commanding Fourth Ohio Volunteer Cavalry.

Major R. BURNS,
A. A. G., Second Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS CHICAGO BOARD OF TRADE BATTERY, }
SECOND DIVISION, CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GEORGIA, May 4, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the battery under my command in the late campaign:

The battery left Chickasaw, Alabama, on the morning of March twenty-second, marching in connection with the division *via* Cherokee station, on the road leading to Frankfort, as directed by the orders of the commanding General, marching this day about twenty-two miles, over roads naturally very bad, but rendered much worse by the recent rain and the passage of the wagon train in advance of us. On the twenty-third continued the march, camping with the division at Frankfort, Alabama. Thus the march was continued, in close connection with the division, until one o'clock P. M. of March twenty-seventh, when I received orders to move my battery off the road, and wait for the pontoon train to pass. This I did, the First brigade being in the immediate vicinity, and, as I learned from its commander, was also waiting for the passage of the pontoon train. The rear of this train hardly passed my command when it found itself with nearly the entire train stuck in the mud; and, as it was now getting dark and raining hard, the road being completely blockaded by the pontoon train, in absence of orders from the division commander, I put my command into camp, and waited until the morning of the twenty-eighth, when, marching at five o'clock, I attempted to rejoin the division, but found the road still blockaded by the pontoon train, and the soil of such a quicksand nature as to render it almost impossible to move out of the beaten road, but by using my entire force of cannoniers as a pioneer party, and taking a circuitous route through the woods, I was enabled, after about two hours' labor, by this means to repossess the pontoon train and secure the road; and, reaching headquarters of the division at eleven o'clock, I received orders from the Brigadier-General commanding to move on and join the First brigade beyond Jasper; but, upon reaching Jasper, I was unable to ascertain the direct road taken by the First brigade, and I therefore moved my battery on the direct road leading to the ford by which it was expected the command would cross the Black Warrior river. I arrived with my battery at this ford about

five o'clock that evening and encamped, learning that the Second brigade would be there also that evening. On the morning of the twenty-ninth I moved my battery across the Black Warrior river, complying with the orders of the division commander, and moving in connection with the division, camped about a mile south of Cane creek and eighteen miles from Elyton. On the morning of the thirtieth, after marching some four miles on the road leading to Elyton, the streams were found to be so much swollen by the rain of the night previous, as to make it impracticable to ford them with my battery, and I was ordered by the division commander to move back on this road, recross Cane creek, and take the road leading to the left, by which I was compelled to make a circuitous march of thirty-six miles to reach Elyton, where I arrived at eight o'clock p. m., but not finding the division at that point, and in the absence of orders, my horses being very much fatigued by the excessive march over bad roads, I encamped; soon after which I learned from Colonel Minty, commanding Second brigade, that he was then with his command about two miles from me, and would move at four o'clock a. m. on the thirty-first. I called on Colonel Minty in person that night, and decided to move in connection with him until I could rejoin the division, which I did at ten o'clock p. m. of April first, at Plantersville, having marched that day forty-nine miles.

Up to this time the only obstacle encountered by my command was the very bad roads, the nature and condition of which is, of course, so well known to the division commander, as to make any description of them unnecessary in this report.

On the morning of April second, at half-past seven o'clock, I again moved my battery in connection with the division, as per order of the division commander, on the road to Selma, Ala., in front of which I arrived about three o'clock p. m., and took up a position about two miles from the city on the Summerfield road, and awaiting further orders from the division commander. My position at this time was about fourteen hundred (1,400) yards from the strong works of the enemy, behind which he was posted. At about half-past four o'clock, at an interview with the division commander, I was notified that the line was about to make the assault upon the works of the enemy, who had already commenced the use of his artillery upon our line. I was further directed to conform the movements of my battery as much as I could to the movements and advance of our line, and to direct my fire so as to produce the most effect upon the enemy, and to render the most assistance to the advance of the line making the assault. I therefore decided that as the line advanced to advance one section of my battery as close to the enemy's works as the nature of the ground would permit, that my fire could be directed with more precision and effect. Noticing movements in the line on my right which I supposed to be an advance, I moved one sec-

tion forward, about four hundred yards, thus exposing both its flanks to an almost direct fire from the enemy's artillery, while he was using it upon me directly in my front. As I was thus in an advanced and very exposed position with this section, and having mistaken the movement of the line for an immediate advance, I withdrew this section to my first position, and kept up my firing from that point until the line moved forward to the assault, when I moved my whole battery forward to the advance position referred to, replying rapidly to the fire of the enemy's artillery until it was silenced by the close approach of our men to the works, which in a moment more were in their possession. From this advanced position I was able to partially enfilade a long line of the enemy's works on my left, which was being enfiladed by the fire of our forces that had carried the works to my right and front, causing the enemy to seek shelter outside of the breastworks, and between them and the palisades, under the protection of which he was endeavoring to make his escape. Noticing this I directed the fire of two of my guns down this line, and with good effect. At the same time I ordered one section, under Lieutenant Griffin, to advance inside the works, now in our possession, for the purpose of engaging the rebel artillery that had now opened upon our line from works close up to town, riding forward myself to select the position for the section. The road was now being rapidly filled by an advancing column of mounted troops, which prevented this section from getting up as promptly as I desired; but I soon had it in position, closely followed by the balance of my battery, and opened upon the inner line of works, which, like the first, was soon in the possession of our troops, and rendering further firing unnecessary.

Receiving no further orders, and having learned that the Brigadier-General commanding had been wounded early in the engagement, I held my battery awaiting orders from his successor, which I received from Colonel R. H. G. Minty late in the evening to go into camp. I have no losses to report during this engagement.

On the morning of April third, by direction of the Colonel commanding division, I proceeded to destroy the captured ordnance along the line of works, of which the following is a memoranda, viz.: thirty-pounder Parrott gun, one; fourteen-pounder iron guns (old model), five; twelve-pounder light guns, four; three-inch rifled guns, three; twelve-pounder howitzers, three; six-pounder rifled guns (brass), two; mountain howitzers, two. Total, twenty guns, with carriages. These guns were spiked, the trunions knocked off of the most of them, rendering them entirely useless until recast. The carriages and limbers, with field caissons, were burned. I also caused to be destroyed about four thousand three hundred rounds of ammunition. On the evening of April fifth I received orders from the Colonel commanding

to have a section in readiness at midnight to accompany an expedition that was to be sent out. This section was furnished under command of Lieutenant Griffin, returning to Selma, after an absence of twenty-four hours, having marched about forty miles. On the afternoon of April eighth I crossed the Alabama river with my battery, and encamped with the division on the road leading to Montgomery and five miles from Selma. On the evening of the ninth, in obedience to the orders of the Colonel commanding, I proceeded with one section of my battery to the Alabama river, at a point some six miles above Selma, with instructions to watch for and prevent any boats passing down the river. On the morning of the tenth I was ordered back to my encampment, not having had occasion to use my guns, and shortly afterwards resumed the march in connection with the division toward Montgomery, encountering very bad roads, and camping at eight o'clock p. m. near Benton. Resuming the march on the eleventh found the roads at times almost impassable, requiring much labor of a pioneer character, keeping the command up and on the road all of that night. Continued the march during the twelfth, and camped at Catoma creek. On the morning of the thirteenth I marched my battery in connection with the division through Montgomery, camping seven miles east of it. On the fourteenth the march was resumed toward Columbus, Georgia, at which place the command arrived on the seventeenth, from thence to Macon, Georgia, where it arrived on the evening of April twentieth.

In view of the fact of the division commander being always in the immediate vicinity of the command, I can hardly feel justified in making so lengthy a report, and any report of the operations and movements of my battery would seem to be almost unnecessary.

It will be observed that this battery has marched in twenty-one days upwards of six hundred miles, varying from twenty-two to forty-nine miles each day, or at an average of about thirty-miles, which in consideration of the very bad condition of the roads for a large part of this distance, I consider almost unprecedented in the movements of artillery.

I am, Captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. J. ROBINSON,
Captain Commanding Battery.

Captain T. W. SCOTT,
A. A. G., Second Division C. C., M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY, }
April 9, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken in the engagement of the second instant in front of Selma, Alabama:

The regiment went into action with three field and staff officers, ten line officers, and three hundred and fifty-three enlisted men. We formed on the left of the brigade, covering the Summerfield road.

As we advanced the enemy from his entrench-

ments poured deadly volleys into our ranks, but without a check the works in our front were carried, and the rebels driven in confusion before us. Portions of Companies "E and I," led by Lieutenant Sigmund (who was killed just at the moment of victory), were among the first to enter the works, taking possession of a fort with one piece of artillery, caissons, and twelve prisoners. We followed closely after the discomfited enemy, but a dense and swampy woods prevented our inflicting much damage. Emerging from the timber we found the rebels under shelter of some interior works, cotton bales and old buildings. They were soon flying from this point, and we were in possession of six additional pieces of artillery, including one thirty-pounder and one twelve-pounder Parrott, with many prisoners. At this juncture we were directed by Colonel Minty, commanding division, to halt and reform, and were afterwards held in reserve.

The forts containing the Parrott gun mounted seven, others which were taken by the men of the Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Ohio, but are not included in the capture of this regiment. Sergeant Seigfæid, Company "F," was the first in the fort, followed closely by Sergeant Bickel, Company "I," with the regimental colors, Sergeant John Ennis, standard bearer, having fallen mortally wounded in the charge on the outer works. In the work most of the gunners were taken with their pieces.

The regiment captured one hundred and ninety-eight prisoners, seven pieces of artillery, and two hundred and forty-muskets and rifles; the latter were destroyed on the field.

Our casualties were one line officer killed, one field officer and three line officers wounded, one enlisted man killed, and forty-seven wounded.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. F. ANDRESS,
Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Regiment.

HEADQUARTERS ONE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-THIRD ILLINOIS }
VOLUNTEERS, SELMA, ALA., April 6, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—I have the honor to transmit you a report of the part taken in the fight with General Forrest, at Mapleville station, on the afternoon of the first instant, and in the assault and capture of Selma, on the evening of the second instant, by the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers, mounted infantry.

Early in the afternoon of the first instant, after our scouts and advance guard had skirmished for some twenty miles with two or three battalions of rebels, killing, wounding, and capturing some along the whole route, on reaching Mapleville station, on the Selma railroad, the enemy was found in considerably stronger force; and as our advance guard had been temporarily repulsed, our brigade was ordered forward, dismounted in line, One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois occupying the right centre of the brigade. We advanced through the woods a mile or more, reaching a slough over which

skirmishers immediately hurried, on a sort of old dam, and pursued the routed enemy, who were flying in the wildest confusion from General Upton, who charged opportunely on our left. They succeeded in capturing quite a number of prisoners, and in conjunction with the cavalry ran the enemy away before the main line could effect a crossing of the slough. Our horses coming up we mounted and moved to Plantersville station, and went into camp for the night. We sustained no loss. Our skirmishers brought in eight prisoners.

We moved on the morning of the second day of April at nine o'clock for Selma, Alabama. Marched twenty-one miles, and at a quarter-past three o'clock, the advance of our division arrived before the formidable works of Selma, when the enemy defiantly sallied out and made demonstrations as if about to attack us. The One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois volunteers was ordered up in line in front of the works on the north-west side of the city, dismounted, and formed on the left of the line joining the Seventeenth Indiana on the right. After driving the enemy inside their works we lay for a short time skirmishing to good effect, until arrangements being perfected for a permanent formation of the line preparatory to the assault, we were moved by the right flank past Colonel Minty's brigade, which had been formed on our right, and formed on the right of his brigade, just behind a slight ridge a half mile from the rebel works, my regiment occupying the left of our brigade, the Ninety-eighth Illinois the centre, and Seventeenth Indiana the right. Throwing forward two men from a company out of this their lines for skirmishers, at General Long's "forward" the entire line started up with a bound, yelling, shouting, and all pushing forward under a most terrific cannonade, and through a perfect storm of bullets, losing officers and men at every step, until we cleared the high picket fence, crossed the ditch and scaled the high earthworks, and planted our regimental standard first of any in the command on the works of Selma. The most of our men who were hurt fell killed or wounded almost at the rebel works, where we struck and scaled the works; and the rebels, who had fought us so desperately as to club their guns on some of our men broke and fled, we following them on through the thick swampy woods, while we could only hear the roar of the conflict, and the shouts of our comrades on the right and left, but could see nothing. At the edge of the woods Lieutenant-Colonel Biggs, commanding regiment, was severely wounded while leading the regiment rapidly and resistlessly forward, Captain Adams the next ranking officer having been wounded before we reached the works. I assumed command of the regiment about the time Colonel Vail took command of the brigade (Colonel Miller having been wounded). We captured prisoners by the score, fort after fort, with their guns, until we had reached and planted our flag on the three inner forts, and

were nearing the city itself, when General Upton came dashing through the outer works, and mistaking us for the enemy fired on us until we signalled him who we were. He then charged (his men mounted) right into town and after the retreating enemy. Our forces being almost tired down, we were halted by Colonel Minty near the place where our brigade encamped on the night of the second instant, on the field in the suburbs of Selma.

My regiment went into action with fourteen commissioned officers and two hundred and forty-nine enlisted men. Our loss was one officer killed, Lieutenant Otho J. McMannus, who fell just before reaching the works while gallantly leading his men, and six officers wounded, seven men killed, and forty-two wounded. It is unnecessary to make particular mention of either officers or men. All did their duty and deserve the highest praise. Sergeant John Morgan, Company "I," is deserving the highest credit for his gallantry in being the first to plant a flag upon the rebel works, and for being in the extreme advance until all the rebel forts were captured, planting our colors on each of them successively. The officers wounded are Lieutenant-Colonel Jonathan Biggs, Captain William E. Adams, and Lieutenant Alexander P. McNitt severely, and Captain Owen Wiley, Adjutant Levi B. Bane, and Lieutenant J. R. Harding slightly.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

OWEN WILEY,
Captain Commanding Regiment.

Captain O. F. BANE,
A. A. G., First Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS NINETY-EIGHTH ILLINOIS MOUNTED INFANTRY, }
SELMA, ALA., April 7, 1865. }

Captains O. F. Bane, A. A. G., First Brigade, &c.

SIR:—I have the honor to report that my regiment was not actively engaged on the first instant, near Plantersville. My regiment dismounted and formed on the left of the Seventy-second Indiana, and moved forward (without encountering the enemy) until we reached the creek, where I moved by the left flank to our horses.

On the morning of the second instant, the Ninety-eighth Illinois held the advance of the brigade, and upon arriving within one mile of the enemy's works in front of Selma, on the Summerfield road, was quickly dismounted, and formed in line under the cover of the hill in front of the enemy's works, on the left of the Second brigade, and supporting the battery on the hill. Skirmishers were immediately thrown forward. Remained in this position from about two P. M. until near four and a half P. M., when I was ordered to change position, and move to the right of the Second brigade, forming on the left of the Seventeenth Indiana, under cover of a ridge, the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois forming on my left.

Previous to change of position I was ordered to furnish a detail of four companies to proceed

in search of a wagon train in direction of Summerfield. Captain Montry, of Company H, was ordered to take charge of Companies H, G, F, and K, for that purpose. Details had been made for picket upon my regiment in the morning, so that my effective force in action consisted of but one hundred and sixty-one enlisted men, and eleven officers. I formed my regiment in single rank, directing the men to reserve their fire until near enough the enemy to be effective. At about five p. m. orders were given to move forward, when within about four hundred yards of the enemy's works the whole line moved forward at double-quick under a severe fire of musketry and artillery. My regiment went through the stockade (or picket works) over the ditch and breastworks in a gallant style, encountering the enemy hand to hand in their works, compelling many to surrender, and the rest to retire in confusion.

The left flank of the Ninety-eighth Illinois and the right flank of the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois charging over better ground, were first to enter the enemy's works. The point first struck by my regiment was that fronting the bridge over the ravine on the Summerfield road, and between the two redoubts. After passing the enemy's line of works, the Seventeenth Indiana bore to the right, and the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois to the left, thus leaving a large interval to be covered by the Ninety-eighth Illinois. I moved forward as fast as possible towards the city, passing squads of the enemy who had thrown away their guns, and whom I ordered to the rear. The enemy from the lower part of the city and the fortifications on my right, kept up a continuous but harmless fire of musketry and artillery upon my command, whilst I was moving up to a position near the cotton gin in front of the passenger depot. There I rallied my regiment to resist what seemed to be a thousand cavalry charge by the enemy, who were forming near the saltpetre works; soon after this Colonel Vail, who had assumed command of brigade (Colonel Miller being wounded), ordered me to form fronting the city, and hold the regiment ready for any emergency.

Lieutenant Wheelers, Company I, and a squad from the Ninety-eighth Illinois, with squads from the One Hundred and Twenty-third Illinois and the Second brigade, were first to enter the fort in front of the city, and take possession of the four guns therein. Lieutenant Junkins, Company B, and six men from Company B, became separated from this regiment after passing the enemy's line of works, and moved forward and fought with the Seventeenth Indiana.

My regiment remained in line under fire of musketry from the city, until the Fourth division charged into the city, on the Burnville road, went into camp near saltpetre works at ten p. m.

Some seventy or more of the enemy were captured by my regiment in works, and within two hundred yards after passing the same. I ordered all the prisoners to the rear, but on ac-

count of the paucity of my command could not spare any men to guard them. I kept my men together until after we went into camp, and did not permit them to straggle or go in search of plunder or captured property in the city, although quite a number of them following the general example did find their way there during the night time. The enlisted men of my regiment fought as they always have, nobly and bravely. The officers, Captain Hoffman, Company B, Captain Flood, Company E, Captain Thistlewood, Company G, Captain Stanford, Company A, Captain Banta, Company I, Lieutenant Spurgen, Company K, Lieutenant Junkins, Company B, Lieutenant Boes, Company E, and Lieutenant Wheeler, Company I, all acquitted themselves in a becoming and praiseworthy manner. Captains Hoffman and Flood, senior line officers and acting field officers, were especially useful in that capacity. Captain Thistlewood, of Company E, after being severely wounded in the right leg, kept up with the command for over a mile. Adjutant Adenknoph, whilst bravely encouraging the men on the right flank to charge the enemy's works, fell severely wounded in the left thigh, across the ravine in front of the picket works.

The loss of the Ninety-eighth Illinois is as follows: Enlisted—killed upon the field, nine; mortally wounded, two, both since dead; severely wounded, eleven; slightly wounded, ten; commissioned officers, severely wounded, two; slightly, three: Total killed and wounded, thirty-nine. Effective force engaged—Enlisted, one hundred and sixty-one; officers, eleven. I do not claim for my regiment the exclusive honor of entering the enemy's works first, but I do claim that the left flank of my regiment were upon the works as soon as the men from any other regiment.

Captain Montry, Company H, in command of the four companies detailed from the Ninety-eighth Illinois, proceeded to Summerfield, driving the enemy's pickets through the town until he came to the enemy in force, supposed to be fifteen hundred or two thousand strong, being a portion of Forrest's command moving towards Marion; not finding any wagon train he returned to camp without loss.

The officers and men of the Ninety-eighth Illinois under my command on the second instant, did their duty cheerfully, manfully, and without once faltering. I only claim for them a fair and equal share of "all the honors and all the glory" attached to the capture of Selma.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. KITCHELL,

Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding Ninety-eighth Illinois.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH REGIMENT INDIANA VOLUNTEERS, }
April 26, 1865.

Captain T. W. Scott, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Division Cavalry Corps:

SIR—I have the honor to send (in accordance with your order) four rebel flags, marked by whom captured.

The large flag of the "Sixth Regiment Arkansas Volunteers" was captured on a train at the railroad depot, on occupying Macon, by Sergeant John W. Deen, of Company "C," Seventeenth Indiana volunteers.

The flag marked "captured by Reuben Phillips, Company 'C,' Seventeenth Indiana volunteers" (battle flag), was got at the same time and place.

The battle flag marked "captured by First Lieutenant James H. McDowell, company 'B,' Seventeenth Indiana volunteers," was surrendered to him by Colonel Cummins, in the rebel works on the Columbus road, one and a half miles from Macon, Georgia, on the surrender of said works.

The rebel flag marked on the flag "Worrell Greys," was captured by privates A. R. Hudson and J. Davis, from a battalion of militia near Culloden, Georgia, after a sharp skirmish, in which a small party of the regiment ran about two hundred militia.

I also hold, subject to orders, four two-pounder Travis guns, breech-loading smooth-bore, brass.

They are not mounted. They were found by Corporal Bottoff, of Company "K," boxed up and buried in the small-pox graveyard. He (Bottoff) was directed to them by a rebel soldier. The guns were made for presentation to Lieutenant-General Forrest.

I would respectfully suggest that it has been the custom to allow regiments to retain flags captured by them, in order that they may be sent by the regiments to their State libraries, and I would, therefore, ask that the flags be returned to the regiment, to be disposed of in this manner.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN J. WEILER,
Major Commanding Regiment.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION }
CAVALRY CORPS, NEAR MACON, GEORGIA, }
April 29, 1865. }

CAPTAIN—Below please find report of number of guns, prisoners, flags, &c., captured by this command, forwarded in compliance with circulars from headquarters Second division cavalry corps, dated April 6, 1865.

REGIMENT.	PRISONERS.	PIECES OF ARTILLERY.	SMALL ARMS.	REMARKS.
Seventh Pennsylvania Cavalry....	215	7	250	
Fourth Michigan Cavalry.....	152		50	Railroad bridge west of Selma destroyed April 3d.
Third Ohio Cavalry.....	40			
Fourth Ohio Cavalry.....	100	8		Three hundred bales cotton destroyed near Selma.
Total.....	507	15	300	

The pieces of artillery mentioned above were captured jointly by Seventh Pennsylvania and Fourth Ohio.

Respectfully,
HORACE N. HOWLAND,
Lieutenant-Colonel Commanding Brigade.
Captain T. W. SCOTT,
A. A. G. Second Division, Cavalry Corps.

OPERATIONS OF THE FOURTH DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH CAVALRY DIVISION, }
May, 1865. }

Major E. B. Beaumont, A. A. G. Cavalry Corps,
M. D. M.:

I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the Fourth cavalry division during the late campaign.

To avoid delay in leaving Chickasaw, the train was seen on the nineteenth of March to Cherokee station, on Memphis and Charleston railroad, and was followed by First brigade, commanded by Brevet Brigadier-General Winslow, on the twenty-first.

The general movement commenced on the twenty-second of March—Winslow's brigade and train camping near Throckmorton's mill, the Second brigade, commanded by Brevet Brigadier-General Alexander, camping on Cane creek, twenty-five miles from Chickasaw.

March twenty-third. Left Russellville to our

right and camped at Newburg—distance thirty miles. Found plenty of corn and provisions.

March twenty-fourth. March resumed—General Alexander moving from Mount Hope *via* Houston toward Clear Creek Falls, General Winslow and train moving *via* Kinlock and Hubbard's mill, on head waters of Sipsey.

The road was exceedingly mountainous and forage scarce. First brigade made sixteen miles.

March twenty-fifth. March resumed. Brigades united and camped at Clear Creek Falls—distance thirty miles. Country almost destitute of forage.

March twenty-sixth. General Winslow was directed to move *via* Bartonville and Hanly's mill toward Elyton; General Alexander and train *via* Jasper and Democrat.

General Winslow, finding the Sipsey unfordable, moved down the Black Warrior to Sanders' ferry, where the division camped for the night—distance twenty-three miles.

Forage found below Sanders' ferry.

March twenty-seventh. Crossed Black Warrior over an extremely dangerous ford. General Alexander's brigade camped on east bank of Locust Fork. General Winslow's brigade marched all night and arrived on west bank at four o'clock A. M., next morning—distance fifteen miles. Provisions and forage scarce.

March twenty-eighth. Marched at ten o'clock A. M.—General Alexander's brigade camping at Elyton; General Winslow at Hawkins' plantation, two miles west—distance twenty miles.

The road was exceedingly rough, but at the end of the day's march we debouched into a beautiful valley, rich in provision and forage.

Patterson's regiment, from Northern Alabama, passed through Elyton just before the arrival of the division. Its rear was driven out by General Alexander's advance.

By direction of the Brevet Major-General commanding the corps, the train remained at Elyton till the arrival of the corps train. The division moved at 10:30 A. M., on the twenty-ninth, with a view to secure a crossing over the Cahawba river that night; but the ford having been obstructed by Patterson's regiment, and a heavy rain setting in, which soon raised the river, prevented more than one regiment getting across—distance fifteen miles.

The McIlvain and Red Mountain Iron Works were destroyed near Elyton.

March thirtieth. General Winslow converted the railroad bridge over the Cahawba into a foot bridge, and at half-past nine A. M. the crossing commenced. The division camped at Montevallo, distance seventeen miles.

Road was bad; forage and provisions found in abundance around Montevallo. A colliery and the Central Iron Works were destroyed near the Cahawba, while detachments sent out from Montevallo destroyed the Columbiana and Bibb Iron Works. There being strong indications of the presence of the enemy in large force, the division awaited the arrival of the corps.

March thirty-first. The Brevet Major-General commanding the corps having arrived, I was directed to move out at half-past one P. M. About two miles south of the town the advance of Roddy's division was encountered. It was immediately charged by General Alexander and driven back in great confusion upon their main position behind a difficult creek, losing several prisoners, and abandoning arms and accoutrements at every step. Dispositions were at once made to turn the enemy's right while Rodney's battery I, Fourth artillery, was placed in position and opened fire.

After some skirmishing, without awaiting a trial at arms, the enemy withdrew. General Winslow now took up the pursuit, and by a series of brilliant and impetuous charges drove the enemy till late in the night, capturing many prisoners, arms, and accoutrements.

The division, elated with having ridden down the enemy in every conflict during the day, camped three miles north of Randolph, having made fourteen miles.

April first. The pursuit was resumed as far as Randolph, where pursuant to your instructions the division took the road to the left, leading to Old Maplesville, leaving the main Selma road, along which the enemy retired for General Long's division. To cover the movement the advance guard was directed to pursue

the enemy a mile and a half, and then remain until relieved by General Long's division. Proceeding about four miles to the left of Randolph my command took a road to the right, leading through Maplesville station, and intersecting the main Selma road at Ebenezer Church.

Anticipating an opportunity to flank the enemy at this point the march of the division was hastened, and at four P. M. he was found in position, his force, commanded by General Forrest in person, consisting of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, his right resting on Mulberry creek, and his left on a high wooded ridge near Bogler's creek.

General Alexander threw his brigade into action, dismounted with great celerity, and after a stubborn fight of an hour's duration routed the enemy and captured his guns. General Winslow took up the pursuit with his brigade, mounted, captured three hundred prisoners, and drove the enemy through Plantersville, nineteen miles from Selma, where the division camped for the night, having made twenty miles.

April second. The division marched at ten A. M. for Selma, following the Second division, arriving in front of the fortifications on the Plantersville road at four o'clock P. M.

It was being placed in position, preparatory to a night attack on the enemy's right, when General Long's division carried the works in its front.

The division was immediately ordered forward, the skirmish line driving the enemy from the works in its front and capturing five guns.

General Winslow brought forward the Fourth Iowa at a gallop, and charging into the city in various directions, captured several pieces of artillery and several hundred prisoners.

The Seventh Ohio cavalry was sent out the Burnsville road and captured four guns, one hundred and twenty-five prisoners, and many small arms.

April 3d. The division moved out from Selma with instructions to pursue the remnants of Forrest's command across the Cahawba, and to meet and escort the general train to the city. It returned on the sixth, having made a circuit of ninety miles.

April eighth. At nine P. M. the division commenced crossing the Alabama river on a pontoon bridge. The passage was soon interrupted by the descent of drift wood, which carried away the bridge. The breach was repaired at about two P. M. on the ninth, and the crossing resumed, but was again interrupted by descending driftwood. The breach was repaired by six P. M., and at nine P. M. the division was across, and encamped on the south bank.

General Alexander narrowly escaped with his life while endeavoring to pass a heavy log safely under the bridge.

April tenth. Marched for Montgomery, camped at Church Hill, distance twenty-four miles. Plenty of forage.

April eleventh. Marched at 5:30 A. M. Crossed Big Swamp on Big Swamp creek, and camped at

Colonel Harrison's, four miles east of Loundesborough, distance twelve miles.

April twelfth. Marched at 5:30 A. M., passed through Montgomery at four P. M., camped four miles east on Columbus road, distance twenty-seven miles.

Lagrange's brigade of McCook's division having been placed under my command, I received orders on the fourteenth to march to the Chattahoochie, to secure the bridges over that river either at Columbus or West Point, thereby opening for the cavalry corps the road into Georgia. In pursuance of these instructions I sent Lagrange's brigade *via* Tuskagee and Opelika, to West Point, where he arrived on the sixteenth.

We immediately attacked the garrison at that place, captured it, and secured the bridge. My own division marched directly upon Columbus, eighty miles distant. Columbus is a fortified city of twelve thousand inhabitants, situated on the east bank of the Chattahoochie.

Three bridges span the river at this point, one foot bridge at the lower end of the city, the other foot bridge and railroad bridges are three-quarters of a mile above, opposite the upper end of the city. There is a fourth bridge at Clapp's factory, three miles above, which was destroyed upon the approach of Captain Young, of Tenth Missouri cavalry, who was sent to secure it.

On the west bank of the river, between the upper and lower bridges, lies the small town of Girard.

Mill Creek, which flows through an open valley about a mile in width, separating two prominent ridges, which approach the river perpendicularly and overlook the city, empties into the river near the centre of Girard.

The lower bridge was defended from the east bank by a rifle-pit, and three pieces of artillery sweeping it. The upper foot and two railroad bridges were defended by a *ête de pont*, consisting of two redoubts connected by a range of rifle-pits about three-quarters of a mile long, extending across the upper ridge, strengthened by slashing in front. The lower redoubts, situated just below the upper bridge, contained six twelve-pounder howitzers; four ten-pounder Parrott guns were in position on its right.

These guns completely swept Mill Creek Valley.

The upper redoubt contained four guns, commanding the Summerfield road. Five guns swept the railroad, and two howitzers the upper foot bridge, making in all twenty-four guns in position. The works were held by about twenty-seven hundred infantry. The division moving along the lower Crawford road, arrived about two P. M. opposite the lower bridge. Colonel Eggleston, commanding the advance guard, immediately charged to secure it, but was received with a heavy fire of artillery and musketry, while the bridge previously prepared with combustible material was at the same time fired. He therefore retired behind the ridge, Rodney's battery fired a few shots which developed the position of the enemy's artillery.

It being impossible to attack successfully the *ête de pont* from this direction, General Alexander's brigade was placed in position along the crest of the lower ridge, while General Winslow's brigade, making a wide detour, was sent under cover across to the Summerfield road on the upper ridge.

The brigade was preceded by two companies of the Fifth Iowa cavalry, under Captain Lewis, who drove in the opposing picket, and charged gallantly upon a strong line of works, which in the darkness appeared to be the enemy's main position. General Winslow at once disposed his command for the attack, the plan of which was to penetrate the work with dismounted men, and then to send a mounted force through the breach, with instructions to charge directly upon the bridge.

The assault was made about nine P. M. by six companies of the Third Iowa cavalry, commanded by Colonel Noble. The front line of works was soon carried, which being mistaken for the main line, two companies of the Tenth Missouri cavalry were ordered to charge to the bridge.

These companies, supposed by the enemy to be his own men, passed through to the works on the Summerfield road unharmed, charged and secured the bridge, capturing many prisoners. Captain McGlasson, finding himself in the enemy's rear and vastly outnumbered, rejoined his regiment. In the mean time the main line opened fire upon the right with grape and musketry. The Third Iowa pressed forward through a slashing one hundred yards deep, and after a charge unexampled in cavalry service, and with but few parallels in infantry, crowned the works.

General Winslow promptly followed up the success, ignoring the redoubt on the right, which still continued its fire. The Fourth Iowa cavalry, dismounted, under Captain Abraham, passed through the breach, turned to the right, charged the redoubt, capturing ten guns, and then sweeping across the bridge with the flying rebels, captured the two howitzers loaded with canister at the opposite end.

Mounted companies from the same regiment followed in the rear of Captain Abraham's, and after crossing the bridge, turned to the right and charged in flank the works at the lower bridge, capturing prisoners and the three guns at that point. By ten P. M. Columbus, with its vast munitions of war, fifteen hundred prisoners, and twenty-four guns, was in our hands.

This victory, which was the closing conflict of the war, was achieved with the loss of but thirty men killed and wounded.

April eighteenth. At 8:30 A. M. the division marched for Macon *via* Double bridge and Thomaston, arriving and going into camp at East Macon on the evening of the twenty-first.

The march was through a rich country, and the distance marched ninety-eight miles. Here official information of the armistice between

Generals Sherman and Johnston having been received, the campaign closed.

The conduct of the officers and men during the campaign is deserving of the highest commendation.

Whether mounted or dismounted, but one spirit prevailed, and that was to run over the enemy wherever found or whatever might be his numbers. Nothing but the impetuosity of the charges, whereby the enemy was not given time to defend himself, can account for the small list of casualties, amounting to ninety-eight killed and wounded.

In every conflict the troops actually engaged were vastly outnumbered. At Ebenezer Church General Alexander routed Forrest's command with less than one thousand men, while General Winslow carried the formidable works at Columbus with but eleven hundred.

From the members of my staff, Brevet Major James W. Latta, A. A. G., Captain T. C. Gilpin, A. A. D. C., Lieutenant Sloan Kock, A. A. D. C., and Lieutenant Peter Keck, ordnance officer, I received on all occasions prompt and gallant assistance.

The division arrived at Macon in good fighting condition. I respectfully refer you to the accompanying reports of the brigade commanders, in which the charges of the regiments under their command are minutely described; also mentioning the names of officers and men distinguishing themselves for gallantry and soldierly conduct.

In conclusion, I desire to ascribe the success of the division in the first degree to the zeal, energy, and ability displayed by Generals Winslow and Alexander, commanding First and Second brigades. They have shown in every battle great skill and gallantry, and possessing in an eminent degree all the qualities of a cavalry officer. I respectfully urge their immediate promotion for the good of the service.

Enclosed is a list of officers and men who have distinguished themselves, and are entitled to promotion.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. UPTON,

Brevet Major-General, Commanding Fourth Division.

HEADQUARTERS FOURTH DIVISION C. C., M. D. M., }
ATLANTA, GA., May 24, 1865. }

Major E. B. Beaumont, A. A. G., C. C., M. D. M.

SIR—I have the honor to recommend the following promotions, to date April sixteenth, 1865:

Colonel John W. Noble, Third Iowa cavalry, to be Brevet Brigadier-General, for gallant conduct at Montevallo and Ebenezer Church, April first, 1865, and strict attention to his duties as a soldier.

Colonel B. B. Eggleston, First Ohio cavalry, to be Brevet Brigadier-General, for gallant conduct at Ebenezer Church, April first, 1865, and Columbus, April sixteenth, 1865.

Brevet Major James W. Latta, A. A. G. of

volunteers, to be Major and A. A. G., for gallantry during the campaign.

Captain Thomas C. Gilpin, Third Iowa cavalry, and A. A. D. C., to be Brevet Major, for gallantry at Ebenezer Church, April first, 1865.

Major W. W. Woods, Fourth Iowa cavalry, and A. A. I. G. Fourth division C. C., M. D. M., to be Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel, for his habitual good conduct and gallantry at Selma, Alabama.

Captain J. H. Simpson, Fourth Michigan cavalry, and A. A. Q. M. Fourth Division C. C., M. D. M., and First Lieutenant T. H. Brown, Third Iowa cavalry, and A. C. S., thoroughly efficient and energetic officers, for commissions in their respective departments.

First Lieutenant John S. Keck, Fourth Iowa cavalry, and A. A. D. C., for gallant conduct at Columbus, April sixteenth, 1865, to be Brevet Captain.

Second Lieutenant Peter R. Keck, Fourth Iowa cavalry, Acting Ordnance Officer, for his habitual good conduct in the field throughout the campaign, and especially for gallantry in a charge near Montevallo, on the thirty-first of March, 1865, to be Brevet Captain.

Captain Lot Abraham, commanding Company D, Fourth Iowa cavalry, for his gallantry at Columbus, April sixteenth, 1865, and Selma, April second, 1865, to be Brevet Major.

Captain Asa B. Fitch, commanding Company H, Fourth Iowa cavalry, for his great gallantry in repulsing an attack made upon the flank of the column near Montevallo, to be Brevet Major.

Captain John D. Brown, Company L, Third Iowa cavalry, for his habitual good conduct on this and other campaigns, to be Brevet Major.

Captain George W. Johnson, Company M, Third Iowa cavalry, for repeated evidences of courage and gallantry, to be Brevet Major.

Captain R. M. McGlasson, Company I, Tenth Missouri cavalry, for a gallant charge through the enemy's lines at Columbus, to be Brevet Major. Captain Samuel J. McKee, Company B, Third Iowa cavalry, for gallantry at Columbus, to be Brevet Major.

First Lieutenant George D. Womaldorff, Company L, Seventh Ohio cavalry, for his gallant conduct at Ebenezer Church, in holding a position in advance of the other troops until their arrival, receiving a terribly severe fire from front and left flank, to be Brevet Captain.

First Lieutenant J. A. O. Yeoman, First Ohio cavalry, and A. A. I. G. Second brigade, Fourth division, for his many and repeated acts of gallantry, and indefatigable courage, energy, and perseverance, exhibited on all occasions during the campaign, to be Brevet Captain.

Second Lieutenant Ferdinand Owen, Company I, Tenth Missouri cavalry, for his gallantry in leading his command over the bridge at Columbus, to be brevet First Lieutenant.

Second Lieutenant Lloyd Dillon, Company C, Fourth Iowa cavalry, for his gallantry at Selma, and good conduct and courage during other campaigns, to be brevet First Lieutenant.

The individual actions and deeds of these

officers, and the occasions on which they particularly distinguished themselves, are more fully set forth in the report of Brevet Brigadier-General E. F. Winslow, and Brevet Brigadier-General A. J. Alexander, to which your attention is respectfully invited.

I would respectfully recommend that medals of honor be awarded to the following named enlisted men:

Sergeant Robert S. Kiles, Company G, Fourth Iowa cavalry, who, in an individual encounter with the enemy in the streets of Garrard, manifested a spirit of bravery and determination, which entitles him to the highest commendation and reward.

Robert C. Woods, private of Company C, Fourth Iowa cavalry, who after being captured by the enemy whilst in the line of his duty at Columbus, escaped with the aid of a few others, and took as prisoners the Colonel and Adjutant of the regiment that but a short time before held him in custody.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully,
your obedient servant,

E. URTON,
Brevet Major-General.

Major E. B. BRAUMONT,
A. A. G. Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

[Copy Endorsement on above.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., June 7, 1865.

Respectfully forwarded, approved, and strongly recommended. I would also request that Lieutenant-Colonel T. W. Benteen, Tenth Missouri cavalry, be brevetted Brigadier-General, for gallant and meritorious services, not only during the recent campaigns in Georgia and Alabama, but for distinguished and conspicuous bravery in the pursuit of Price out of Missouri.

JAMES H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION,
CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., MACON, GA., April 25, 1865.

MAJOR—In obedience to orders from division headquarters, I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command since leaving Chickasaw landing on the 22d of March, 1865:

The march from Chickasaw to Montevallo, Alabama, which occupied eight days, was made through an inhospitable and mountainous region, and passed without meeting any enemy. Upon moving out from Montevallo my advance was opposed by the advance of Roddy's division, whereupon skirmishing immediately commenced. I at once ordered the detachment, about three companies of the Fifth Iowa cavalry, under Colonel Young, to charge, which they did in gallant style, driving the enemy a distance of some three miles at full speed, killing one, wounding two, and capturing some fifteen men, and about thirty stand of arms. The main body of the enemy were formed in position behind a difficult creek, about three miles from Montevallo. My brigade (which was much weakened by detachments being sent

off to burn the iron works) was immediately dismounted and deployed as skirmishers. After a slight skirmish the enemy retired. On the next morning my brigade again having the advance, struck the enemy at Randolph. After a slight skirmish, he retired on the main Selma road. Under instructions of the Brevet Major-General commanding, I moved on the Maplesville station road, leaving the direct road for the Second division. Upon approaching within about three miles of the junction of this road with the main road, I heard sharp firing and cheers upon our right. I immediately ordered my command to trot, which gait I kept until I came upon the enemy in strong force of infantry and cavalry in position behind fences and rail barricades. Upon debouching from the woods, my advance (two companies of the Seventh Ohio cavalry) received a heavy and well-directed volley from the enemy's entire line, which killed two and wounded a number more. At the first glance I saw that my command was largely outnumbered, and therefore deployed the Fifth Iowa cavalry and First Ohio cavalry on the right, with the view of connecting with the Second division, which I was expecting to hear every instant open in the woods on my right. I ordered two squadrons to take and hold a house and outbuildings directly in front of my centre and which secured my position. The line was then advanced, and after a sharp fight of about an hour, the enemy was completely routed, leaving two pieces of artillery in our possession. In this connection I wish to have it distinctly understood that no other troops except those belonging to my brigade were engaged, although some unofficial statements to the contrary have been made. Upon entering Selma, by direction of the Brevet Major-General commanding, I sent the Seventh Ohio in pursuit of the enemy, on the Montgomery road. Colonel Garrard, commanding the regiment, pursued him with the greatest pertinacity as far as Burnsville, despite the darkness and almost impassable roads; so active and unremitting was the pursuit that the enemy was forced to abandon four pieces of artillery, ten wagons, and a large number of small arms. Colonel Garrard also captured one hundred and twenty-five prisoners. This brigade did not meet the enemy again until the sixteenth instant, when my advance, consisting of six companies of the First Ohio, under Colonel B. B. Eggleston, struck the enemy's outposts at Crawford, and followed them with such rapidity as to prevent them burning the very important bridges over which the command had to pass. Upon arriving opposite to Columbus, Colonel Eggleston charged into the town of Girard, driving the enemy back to within two hundred yards of their entrenchments. Upon a careful reconnoissance of the position it was deemed impracticable to attack from my front. My command was, therefore, withdrawn by direction of the Brevet Major-General commanding, and took no further part in the capture of Columbus. The march from Columbus to Macon was with-

out incident worthy of note. The average distance marched by the regiments of this brigade is about six hundred and fifty miles. It has destroyed about eleven million dollars' worth of property, principally iron works and rolling mills. In the only action in which the brigade has been engaged, the officers and men fought with the greatest gallantry, repeatedly charging and finally putting to rout a force estimated at three or four times their own number. It is worthy of remark that Company C, Seventh Ohio cavalry, which had the advance at Ebenezer Church, and received the first volley, from probably one thousand muskets, maintained its position until the command was deployed, although every man in it was either killed, wounded, or had his clothes riddled with balls. Lieutenant Womeldorff commanded this company. Colonel Garrard behaved with conspicuous gallantry, steadying his men, and setting them a brilliant example of coolness and courage. Colonel Eggleston led his men also with great determination and bravery, both on this occasion and in the attack on Columbus. To the officers of the brigade staff, Lieutenants Mitchell, Yeoman, McKee, and Dryden, I am greatly indebted for their untiring exertions. In the fight at Ebenezer Church they were particularly active in urging forward and leading the men.

In conclusion I am proud to say that the discipline and soldierly conduct of the men of the Second brigade, is only excelled by the gallantry which they have displayed in every encounter with the enemy, and I trust they will receive due credit in the official reports of this campaign.

The official reports of the regimental commanders are hereto attached.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. J. ALEXANDER,
Brevet Brigadier-General.

To Major JAMES W. LATTA,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, UPTON'S FOURTH DIVISION,
C. C., M. D. M., EAST MACON, GA., May 3, 1865. }

Major J. W. Latta, A. A. G.:

MAJOR—I have the honor to request that Colonel B. B. Eggleston, First Ohio veteran volunteer cavalry, may be brevetted for gallant and valuable services rendered during the campaign just closed. He led his regiment with great gallantry in the fight at Ebenezer Church, and again in the charge into Girard.

Colonel Eggleston deserves especial praise for the fine discipline, military appearance, and condition of his regiment.

He has always co-operated with and assisted me promptly and cheerfully in carrying out the orders transmitted from superior headquarters for the suppression of straggling and plundering in the command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. J. ALEXANDER,
Brevet Brigadier-General.

[Endorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., June 27, 1865. }

Respectfully forwarded, approved, and strongly recommended. Colonel Eggleston is a most worthy and gallant officer, fully entitled by distinguished services to this acknowledgment of his merit.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE, UPTON'S FOURTH DIVISION
C. C., M. D. M., EAST MACON, GA., May 3, 1865. }

Major J. W. Latta, A. A. G.:

MAJOR—I have the honor to request that First Lieutenant Y. O. A. Yeoman, First Ohio veteran volunteer cavalry, may be brevetted for gallantry in the charge at Montevallo, in the fight at Ebenezer Church, in the advance on Columbus, when he followed the enemy so closely with two men as to prevent their burning the bridges. He also behaved with his usual conspicuous gallantry in the charge into Girard.

Lieutenant Yeoman is an officer of education, a good disciplinarian, and has been of great value as the Inspector General of this brigade.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. J. ALEXANDER,
Brevet Brigadier-General.

[Copy of Endorsement.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GA., June 27, 1865. }

Respectfully forwarded, approved, and strongly recommended. There is no more gallant officer in service than Lieutenant Yeoman.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION, C. C.,
M. D. M., MACON, GA., April 21, 1865. }

MAJOR—I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of my command since leaving Chickasaw landing, Tennessee river, March twenty-first instant:

The distance marched direct has been four hundred and eighty-eight miles, while the scouting, expeditionary, flanking, and foraging marches swell the number of miles to an average of six hundred to each regiment.

Though much of this has been over a mountainous and partially sterile region, we have found sufficient corn, and if it were not for the long, hard marches, often extending into the night, our animals would now be in exceedingly good condition. Those worn out have been abandoned or turned over to the negroes, and their places supplied with captured horses and mules. The care of animals has been good, and straggling has not been marked or frequent.

The general conduct of officers and men has been excellent, and the command has been at all times in such condition that it could have been promptly used against an enemy with full effect.

With one week's rest I think it will be in an effective condition, and as well mounted as when the campaign commenced.

We had slight skirmishing just before entering Montevallo (March thirtieth), one man, Fourth Iowa cavalry, being slightly wounded.

March thirty-first. My brigade moved in rear of the division; when a few miles south of Montevallo it passed to the front, and the Tenth Missouri cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Benteen commanding, being dismounted, the enemy, an Alabama brigade, were at once pushed out of position. Two men of the Tenth were wounded while this regiment mounted, the Third Iowa, Colonel John W. Noble commanding, took the advance, and one company charged the enemy on the road at a time when his column was in retreat. A portion of the enemy being separated from their main force Captain Johnson, with two companies, was sent to the right, and charging captured quite a number. Several of the enemy were killed and wounded. This officer acted with vigor and gallantry. The enemy were driven in great confusion to Randolph, leaving many animals and a number of men along the road, and seventy-five prisoners in our hands. Colonel Noble led his regiment, which behaved admirably, and his adjutant lost his horse in the first charge.

Meantime a body of the enemy attacked my column in rear and on the right, but this force was speedily driven off by Lieutenant-Colonel Peters with a portion of the Fourth Iowa cavalry.

The enemy were very roughly handled today, and scattered by the impetuosity of our men. I have no doubt that the manner in which this day's work was done tended much to render our subsequent victories the easier achieved.

At an early hour on this day, Lieutenant-Colonel Benteen, with his regiment, destroyed the "Bibb Iron Works," about six miles south of Montevallo, in the presence of a superior force of the enemy, sent there to protect them.

Moved April first in rear of the division, and when at Maplesville station, heard firing in front; receiving soon after orders to push forward rapidly, two regiments, Third Iowa leading, were hastened to the battle-ground of "Ebenezer Church," arriving just as the engagement was being decided.

Captain Arnheim's company "I" was thrown out on the left of the road, and directed to charge a line of the enemy formed on the bank of the creek, four hundred yards from the head of my column. This company, having to throw down a fence under a severe fire, had one officer, Lt. John J. Veatch, and several men, wounded, losing also about fifteen horses. Captain Arnheim and his company behaved in a gallant manner, as did also Captain A. Clark, Fourth Iowa cavalry, A. A. Q. M., who voluntarily aided in conducting this movement.

The column moving forward, the enemy quickly retired, and the Third Iowa cavalry was

sent in pursuit, following the enemy to Plantersville, five miles.

Captain John Brown, "L" Company, charged his men over a deep stream, capturing more of the enemy (a color company) than his command numbered. This officer had been sent with his company to Maplesville early in the day, and, meeting a body of the enemy, charged it, capturing several and scattering the others.

Sergeant John Wall, guidon-bearer, "K" Company, after being wounded in the hand, retained the saddle, carried his colors, and, in subsequent engagement, captured a rebel officer.

We arrived near Selma April second, at two p. m., dismounting in battalion lines until five o'clock. At that time, in obedience to orders from the Brevet Major-General commanding division, I dismounted my command, and, leaving every eighth man to hold horses, formed the Third Iowa on the right and the Tenth Missouri on the left of the Plantersville road in line, about half a mile from the rebel works, and fronting them. Seven companies, Fourth Iowa, were preparing to move to the left of the Tenth Missouri, when the Second division, on my right, attacked in force, and soon gained possession of the fortifications in its front.

Observing this attack, the dismounted regiments were immediately advanced, and when the Second division obtained possession of the outer works, the Fourth Iowa cavalry, which had not yet left their horses, came forward at a gallop in column of fours, and at once pushed into the city, companies going in various directions to complete the discomfiture of the enemy. About this time the Third Iowa and Tenth Missouri were directed to remount, but the road being blocked by subsequent movements this was not fully accomplished until a late hour.

The advance guard of the division, fourth company, Fourth Iowa, under Major W. W. Wood, had been dismounted in front of the enemy's works on the Plantersville road since one o'clock p. m., and when Brigadier-General Long had charged the enemy on the right this force pushed forward into the works in their front, capturing an entire regiment and five pieces of artillery. The mounted companies secured four guns, three stands of colors, and about one thousand prisoners; several hundred of the enemy were killed and wounded, or drowned in attempting to escape. Captain E. R. Jones, Company I, and chief bugler D. J. Tabor, were killed; both belonged to Fourth Iowa cavalry.

April third. By direction of Brevet Major-General Wilson, I assumed command of the city, while my brigade, Colonel Noble commanding, made a march to the rear, through Summerfield, to Johnson's Ferry, returning on the sixth instant.

With the army this brigade moved from Selma, April tenth, arriving at Montgomery on the twelfth, near which city we remained until the fourteenth. Major Cruikendoll, with six companies Third Iowa cavalry, was here detailed

as Provost Guard, and did not rejoin the command until after the capture of Columbus.

Captain Whiting, with Companies H and M, Fourth Iowa cavalry, was sent to Grey's Ferry, Tallapoosa river, with directions to destroy the bridge over the Coosa at Wetumkee. He was unable to do this, but in conjunction with Major Weston, Fourth Kentucky, captured and took to Montgomery three steamboats. While the command was marching to Columbus, Captain Young with two hundred men, Tenth Missouri cavalry, was detached from the column at Crawford, and proceeded to Clapp's factory, three miles above Columbus, on the Chattahoochie river, with orders to seize and hold the bridge at that place. It was, however, partially destroyed before he arrived. This brigade reached the point of attack before Columbus about half-past seven p. m., and at eight o'clock was disposed in the following order :

Six companies Third Iowa cavalry, Colonel Noble commanding, dismounted, in line at right angles to the Summerville road, with the left resting thereon, two hundred yards from one line of the enemy, immediately in front, and about two hundred and fifty yards from his main line on our left; the latter formed behind fortifications running parallel with the Somerville road. The Tenth Missouri cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Benteen commanding, on the Somerville road, four hundred yards in rear of the Third Iowa, in column of fours, mounted, and the Fourth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel John H. Peters commanding, in the same order on a byroad three hundred yards from the point of its intersection with the Summerville road, being thus to the right and rear of the Third Iowa two hundred yards.

The moment we were ready to attack the enemy opened fire in front with small arms, and on the left with shell, canister, and musketry, when the Third Iowa were directed to charge, and in five minutes we were in possession of the rifle-pits in our front. Supposing the captured works to be a portion of the enemy's main line, the Tenth Missouri cavalry were ordered forward at a gallop, and two companies pushed at once to the bridge, nearly three-fourths of a mile distant, securing it with about fifty prisoners. This detachment passed in front and to the rear of the enemy's lines unhurt, but the officer, Captain R. B. M. McGlasson, finding his position untenable, released the prisoners and rejoined his regiment, with loss of one man killed.

When this regiment commenced its forward movement the enemy developed his main line on our left. The Third Iowa was immediately directed to the other position, and this gallant regiment pressed forward vigorously, Captains McKee and Wilson, with about fifty men, penetrating the line, capturing some prisoners and holding the position. The remainder of the Tenth Missouri were now directed to prepare to fight on foot. This command had, however, been thrown into much confusion by the ene-

my's fire, being only about one hundred yards in front of their best position. The officers had done all they could, but the confusion was almost unavoidable. The Fourth Iowa, which was now immediately in front of the enemy's lines, was dismounted except four companies, and in charge of Captain Abraham, D Company, were pushed into the enemy's works, near where the detachment Third Iowa had secured a lodgement.

In obedience to instructions, when inside the works, Captain Abraham moved directly towards the bridge, not stopping to secure the prisoners, who after being made to throw away their arms, were left where found. Near the end of this line of rifle-pits was a work with six twelve-pounder howitzers, which Captain Abraham at once assaulted, capturing the garrison and armament, together with four ten-pounder Parrott guns, gunners, and caissons, which were in position, and firing near this fort.

Without halting, a portion of his command rushed over the bridge (a covered one), capturing two twelve-pounder howitzers, caissons, &c., on the east end. These two guns were loaded with canister, but the gunners could not fire without killing the rebels flying over the bridge with our men.

The capture of this bridge was in itself a great victory, as it had been fully prepared for sudden and complete destruction. The enemy were unable to fire this structure, which being saved enabled our forces to occupy Columbus, and march immediately upon Macon; any delay at the Chattahoochie would have prevented our forces reaching Macon before the armistice went into effect.

The capture of Columbus involved the fall of Macon. The conduct of this brigade whenever it has been engaged with the enemy, has been highly creditable to the men composing it, and to our cause and country, which it represents. The Brevet Major-General commanding division having been present at every engagement, has full knowledge of the enthusiasm, courage, and determination displayed by officers and men on every occasion. Having personally shared their dangers, I am confident he is ready to award them their full meed of praise. Private Robert C. Woods, A Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, orderly for Major Woods, A. A. I. G., Fourth division, having been captured in line of duty, escaped, and with the aid of some of his company captured the colonel and his adjutant, who shortly before had held him as a prisoner.

There have been very many instances of individual heroism, while almost every one did all he could. If in this report some persons seem to have done more than well, it must not be inferred that others would not have done equally well if they had been as fortunate in securing opportunities.

During this campaign this brigade has taken in action thirty-one hundred prisoners, including two hundred commissioned officers, eleven stands of colors, thirty-three guns, twenty-five

caissons, thirty-five hundred stands of arms, and a large number of horses, wagons, and mules.

The defeat of the enemy at Columbus gave us possession of the gunboat Muscogee, alias Jackson, a very formidable ram. She was nearly ready for active service, her armament six seven-inch Parrott guns, engines, a portion of her ordnance and other supplies being on board.

The fruits of our victories have been materially increased by having mounted columns always ready to take advantage of opportunities offering. This has been shown to have been the case at Selma.

At Columbus the four companies Fourth Iowa cavalry, which were pushed over the bridge (mounted) immediately after it was in our possession, captured five hundred prisoners, and completed the disorganization of the enemy. During this march we have destroyed the Hannan and Briarfield, or Bibb iron works, near Montevallo, several railroads and station houses, four steamboats and one foundry at Montgomery, a large distillery above Columbus, and great quantities of corn, meat, and other supplies, gathered up for the Confederate government.

As a testimony of my respect and appreciation of their ability and services, and because of gallantry in presence of the enemy, I respectfully recommend that the rank of Major by brevet be conferred upon the following named officers:

Lot Abraham, Captain D Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry. This officer has frequently displayed great courage, handled his command in a very gallant manner at Columbus, and captured a four-gun battery at Selma, repulsing the enemy in his attempt to recover it.

Asa B. Fitch, Captain Company H, Fourth Iowa cavalry, when the enemy assailed our column in flank, near Montevallo, March 31, this officer, who commanded the color company, had the colors unfurled, and with his company and the colors dashed ahead, leading the attacking party with great gallantry. He has many times acted with judgment and gallantry. I consider him one of the best officers in my command.

John D. Brown, Captain Company L, Third

Iowa cavalry. This officer was wounded severely at the battle of Big Blue, October 23, 1864; has twice on the present expedition attacked, with his company, a force of the enemy greater than his own, and each time completely routed him, once capturing more men than his own command numbered.

George W. Johnston, Captain Company M, Third Iowa cavalry. This officer once with two, and again with one company, charged a superior force of the enemy with great gallantry, routing them each time, and killing, wounding, and capturing quite a number. His courage, good conduct, and gallantry have been frequently observed.

R. B. M. McGlasson, Captain Company I, Tenth Missouri cavalry. He led two companies of his regiment through the enemy's lines to the bridge at Columbus, and though surrounded came out losing only one man.

Samuel J. McKee, Captain Company B, Third Iowa cavalry. This officer has several times led his company gallantly, and was the first officer to enter the lines of the enemy at Columbus, himself and men having to work their way through abattis in presence of an enemy securely posted behind entrenchments, and only a few yards distant. With two companies he met and repulsed the enemy at Fike's Ferry, Cahawba river, killing and wounding some and capturing thirty animals.

And the rank of Captain by brevet upon Ferdinand Owen, First Lieutenant Company I, Tenth Missouri cavalry, who when his company reached the bridge at Columbus, gallantly led it over, and immediately upon a rebel battery of two guns while completely surrounded by the enemy.

And the rank of First Lieutenant by brevet, upon Lloyd H. Dillon, Second Lieutenant Company C, Fourth Iowa cavalry, who has repeatedly acted in the most gallant manner. He was severely wounded at Guntown, June tenth, 1864. At Selma, he led his company, which he was commanding, upon the enemy, killing several with his pistol and sabre. At Columbus he was among the first men to rush upon the enemy, and over the bridge into the city.

RECOMMENDATIONS.	KILLED.			WOUNDED.			MISSING.			AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Total.	Enlisted men.	Total.		
Third Iowa.....	1	3	4	2	37	39	3	3	46	
Fourth Iowa.....	1	2	3	..	23	23	26	
Tenth Missouri.....	..	1	1	..	4	4	6	6	11	
	2	6	8	2	63	65	9	9	82	

Strength at starting, and at present time.

	THIRD IOWA.		FOURTH IOWA.		TENTH MISSOURI.		TOTAL.		AGGREGATE.
	Officers.	Enlisted Men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	Officers.	Enlisted men.	
Strength on leaving Chickasaw.....	42	906	41	831	27	523	110	2265	2375
Gained by enlistment by the army.....	11	..	11	11
Killed during expedition.....	1	3	1	2	..	1	..	6	6
Died of wounds and disease.....	2	2
Missing.....	6	..	9	9
Left in hospitals on the way.....	1	23	..	7	1	3	..	33	35
Present with command.....	35	810	30	656	26	494	91	1970	2061
Present detached.....	5	65	10	156	..	35	15	256	271

I desire to remark the attention to duty and the valuable aid given me by each member of my staff, and respectfully call your attention to the foregoing table of condition of this command, and to the lists of killed and wounded in each regiment.

Your obedient servant,

E. F. WINSLOW,

Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.

MAJOR JAMES W. LATTA,

A. A. G. Fourth Division C. C., M. D. M.

COLUMBUS, GEORGIA, April 18, 1865.

MAJOR—Having been assigned to the command of this city, I have the honor to make the following report of property captured and destroyed, in obedience to orders from the Brevet Major-General commanding corps:

Fountain Warehouse—Six thousand bales C. S. A. cotton.

Alabama Warehouse—Seven thousand bales C. S. A. cotton, one hundred boxes tobacco, twenty hogsheads and one hundred barrels sugar, and other commissary stores.

Near Macon Railroad Depot—Three large warehouses, containing twenty thousand sacks corn, an immense amount of quartermaster's property, commissary stores, and valuable machinery, all in readiness for shipment.

A large number of caissons and timbers, generally unserviceable; one hundred bales cotton; also thirteen locomotives, ten passenger, forty-five box, twenty-four flat, and nine coal cars.

One round house and machine shop. Naval armory.

One small rolling mill in operation, one engine, forty horse-power, one blast engine eight horse-power, two sets rollers, and three furnaces, capable of making four thousand pound of iron per day.

One new rolling mill nearly completed, one one hundred and fifty horse-power engine, intended to roll railroad and boiler-plate iron, three large furnaces, one blast engine ten horse-power, one ten-horse power steam hammer. This building was one hundred and fifty feet square.

One machine shop, two engines, forty-five

inch cylinder, nearly completed; one hundred and sixty feet shafting, three small and two large planers, sixteen iron lathes, one large lathe, seven feet face plate, three drill presses, thirty vises, fifteen thousand pounds brass. All lathes and planers had full sets of tools.

One blacksmith shop, containing ten forges.

Several offices and drawing-rooms, with their contents.

One pattern shop, with three wood turning lathes and one wood planer.

Foundry, boiler shop, copper shop, and their contents.

Navy Yard—Containing brass foundry, boat-building house and one machine shop, with hot-air furnace, one engine eight-horse power, one large planer, one rip saw and drill press, five thousand rounds large ammunition; also one blacksmith shop and tools.

McElhanev & Porter's Foundry—Containing one engine twenty-horse power.

Nitre Works—Two hundred hands were here employed.

Muscogee Iron Works—Consisting of foundry, machine shop, small arms manufactory, blacksmith shop (thirty forges), a large saddler's shop with tools, one hundred sets flasks, one engine thirty-horse power.

Confederate States Arsenal—Consisting of Machine shop, foundries, with two thirty-horse power engines, two furnaces, a large amount of machinery and war material; blacksmith's shop (sixteen forges).

Two Powder Magazines—Thirteen thousand pounds powder, four thousand loaded shell, eighty-one thousand rounds ammunition for small arms, and large quantities of rockets, fuses, &c.

Oil Cloth Manufactory—Eagle Factory—Four-story brick, one hundred and fifty feet by fifty feet; one hundred and thirty-six looms, three thousand four hundred and fifty spindles cotton, and twelve hundred spindles wool, two thousand two hundred yards jeans, and fifteen hundred yards Osnaburga, made each day.

Howard Factory—Five-story brick building, with basement, one hundred and twenty feet by fifty feet; one hundred and forty-six looms, five

thousand two hundred spindles, cotton. This factory made five thousand yards cloth per diem.

Grant Factory—Three stories and basement brick building, seventy feet by forty feet; sixty looms and two thousand spindles, cotton. Made two thousand yards cloth each day.

Haiman's Iron Foundry—One small engine.

Rock Island Paper Mill—Manufactured printing, letter, and wrapping paper.

Columbus Iron Works—Sabres, bayonets, and trace chains were here made. One thousand stand of arms found.

Haiman's Pistol Factory—This establishment repaired small arms, made locks, and was about ready to commence making revolvers similar to Colt's Army.

Hughs, Daniel & Co.'s Warehouse—Ten thousand bales cotton.

Presses and type of following named newspapers:

Columbus Sun, Columbus Enquirer, Columbus Times, and the type, one press, &c., of Memphis Appeal.

The following is a list of pieces and calibre of artillery which was either partially or wholly destroyed, viz.: one ten-inch columbiad, four ten-pounder Parrotts, one ten-pounder smooth bore, and eighteen six-pounder and twelve-pounder guns and howitzers, with limbers and caissons (except the columbiad), all used in the action of the sixteenth instant, and taken while in position.

At the navy yard were two six-inch siege guns mounted, one thirty-pounder Parrott, and four boat howitzers (brass) not mounted.

At the depot were two rifled siege guns, and one smooth bore ditto not mounted, also four old iron guns (field pieces), and two mountain howitzers mounted. Near headquarter post were four brass six-pounders and limbers, smooth bore, and at a foundry north-east part of town were sixteen field pieces, caissons, &c., calibre not known. At the arsenal was one Napoleon gun new, quite a number of limbers, and caissons. Total number of guns, exclusive of the six splendid seven-inch rifled ones on gunboat "Jackson," sixty-eight; nearly all were thrown into the river.

Quartermaster's property found in store and issued to the troops and negroes or destroyed:

Four thousand five hundred suits Confederate uniform. Five thousand eight hundred and ninety yards army jeans. One thousand yards Osaburgs. Eight thousand eight hundred and twenty pairs shoes. Four thousand seven hundred and fifty Paris cotton drawers. One thousand seven hundred gray jackets. Four thousand seven hundred Paris pants. Two thousand Paris socks. Four thousand tin cups. Two thousand tin plates. Nine hundred and sixty wooden buckets. Four hundred shirts. Three hundred and seventy-five batchets. Six hundred and fifty gray caps. Thirty-three tin pans. Six coils half-inch rope. Fifteen boxes carpenter's tools. Four hundred wall tents and flies. One

thousand axes and helvies. One thousand picks and helvies. Four hundred spades and shovels. Twenty telegraphic instruments.

Destroyed at Girard (opposite Columbus)—One rope factory. Two government blacksmith shops. Two locomotives. Fifteen box cars, and an extensive round house and railroad machine shop.

The machine shops, foundries, factories, and other works destroyed here as above enumerated, were of immense value to the rebels, and to the entire South. More than five thousand employees are thrown upon the community for other support. No private buildings in Columbus were destroyed, and no buildings fired except by order and with proper authority.

There are thousands of almost pauper citizens and negroes whose rapacity under the circumstances of our occupation, and in consequence of such extensive destruction of property, was seemingly insatiable. The citizens and negroes formed one vast mob, which seized upon and carried off almost everything movable, whether useful or not. Four bridges over the Chattahoochie river at and near Columbus were thoroughly destroyed, one (old) by the enemy, and three (including the railroad bridge) by our troops.

Respectfully submitted.

E. F. WINSLOW,

Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding Post.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT,

A. A. General C. C., M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION C. C.,
M. D. M., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, JUNE 19, 1865.

CAPTAIN—For long and valuable services as Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, and for gallantry in presence of the enemy at Big Blue, Missouri, Oxford and Tupelo, Mississippi, Selma, Alabama, and Columbus, Georgia, I respectfully recommend the promotion of Ambrose Hodge, Captain Company K, Fourth Iowa veteran cavalry, to Major by brevet.

Brevet Major-General Emery, Upton's Fourth division C. C., M. D. M., early recognized his merit, and offered to recommend his promotion to Captain and Assistant Adjutant-General volunteers, but Mr. Hodge would prefer a brevet promotion.

Very few officers are more deserving of a commission from our government than Captain Hodge.

Knowing the desire of the Brevet Major-General commanding corps to reward worthy men, I take the liberty of forwarding this letter.

Your obedient servant,

E. F. WINSLOW,

Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding.

Captain E. P. INHOFF,

A. A. General Cavalry Corps Mil. Div. Miss.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION C. C.,
M. D. M., ATLANTA, GEORGIA, JUNE 19, 1865.

Captain E. P. Inhoff, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.:

I respectfully recommend that Major A. R. Pierce, Fourth Iowa veteran cavalry, be promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel by brevet.

He is one of the most cool and gallant officers in the service; has frequently unusual courage and judgment.

At Guntown, when the infantry had suddenly and in great confusion retreated (before his regiment, which he then commanded had mounted), the enemy came victoriously and impetuously down upon him; he formed his men and held the entire force back till his horses crossed the creek in the immediate rear of that disastrous battle field.

I consider this check as the sole cause of safety for five hundred horses and nearly as many men, while it enabled his regiment to aid in covering the hurried and disorderly retreat to Colliersville, Tennessee. Major Pierce acted on his own responsibility and judgment, his brigade commander being at the time at another part of the field.

At Big Blue, Missouri, October twenty-third, 1864, he led his regiment with great spirit, aiding in winning that important victory.

At the "Osage," October twenty-fifth, 1864, his regiment came in sight of the enemy, Marmaduke's division, at the moment when our line had been checked and the forces of the enemy about to take the offensive. Had Major Pierce halted his regiment that victory, in my opinion, would have been a defeat, a rout. Without orders, and governed by his sense of the right, he led his regiment in one impetuous line upon the enemy's right, riding over men, horses, guns, and carriages, initiating the charge, which taken up along our whole line, broke the enemy in pieces. In this engagement Major Pierce rode in advance of his command and sabred nine rebels.

In a subsequent engagement on the same day his steady bravery and his coolness saved a part of our line and his regiment from breaking in confusion when a charge not properly supported had been repulsed.

He was severely wounded in the foot, and has not yet recovered.

I submit this recommendation for the action of the Brevet Major-General commanding, as I am satisfied such services should be put on record and recognized.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

E. F. WINSLOW,
Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST BRIGADE, FOURTH DIVISION C. C., }
M. D. M., MACON, GEORGIA, April 24, 1865. }

Major James W. Latta, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fourth Division Cavalry Corps.

I have the honor to transmit herewith eleven stands of colors captured from the enemy during the late campaign in Alabama and Georgia, with the circumstances connected with the capture of each.

1. Sergeant H. L. Birdsell, "B" Company, Third Iowa cavalry:

"Captured the bearer and a garrison flag while my company was assailing the line of works on the left of Summerville road, near Columbus, Georgia, April sixteenth, 1865."

2. Private Andrew W. Tibbets, Company "I," Third Iowa cavalry, at Columbus, Georgia:

"Captured the bearer, a sergeant, and flag of Austin's battery, inside the line of works, and to the right of the four-gun battery on the right of the enemy's line."

3. John H. Hays, private "F" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry volunteers, at Columbus Georgia:

"Captured the standard and bearer, who tore it from the staff and tried to escape. He fired two shots from his revolver, wounding one man of my regiment at my side."

4. Corporal Richard H. Morgan, "A" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, at Columbus, Georgia:

"I captured the standard and bearer in the first charge my company made inside the line of works, April sixteenth. The bearer contested with me for its possession."

5. Nicholas Fanning, private "B" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry:

"Captured at Selma, Alabama, in the city an elegant silk Confederate states flag, and two staff officers April 2, 1865. The standard bearer was reported killed."

6. Sergeant Holman F. Bates, "E" Company, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, at Columbus, Georgia, April sixteenth, 1865, took a rebel and standard in the street, three blocks from the bridge.

7. Private Charles A. Swan, "K" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, while following the retreating enemy through and out of Selma, Alabama, April 2, 1865, one flag and the bearer, who said it belonged to Eleventh Mississippi.

8. Private Richard H. Cosgriff, "L" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, at Columbus, Georgia, on the west end of the bridge:

"Captured a standard and the bearer, having to knock him down with the butt of my gun before I could get possession of the flag," April sixteenth, 1865.

9. John Kinney, private "L" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, captured at Columbus, Georgia, sixteenth April, a standard and bearer of Tenth Missouri battery: "I had a tassel with the fellow to get the flag."

10. Edward J. Bebb, private "D" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, at Columbus, Georgia, April sixteenth, about one hundred yards from the bridge, and in the line of works took a flag, the rebels near it running away before our men, leaving the flag.

11. James P. Miller, private "D" Company, Fourth Iowa cavalry, captured at Selma, Alabama, April second, 1865, a sergeant and standard of Twelfth Mississippi cavalry. He was mounted and trying to get away.

Respectfully submitted,

E. F. WINSLOW,
Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding.

SELMA, ALABAMA, April 9, 1865.

MAJOR—I have the honor to submit the following statement concerning the destruction of public property captured and found at this place:

In obedience to orders from the Brevet Major-General commanding corps, I assumed the command of the city on Monday the third instant, and commenced destroying everything which could be of benefit to the enemy.

The following is a partial list, which was not made complete, as in many cases the whole property could not be destroyed in the limited time allowed:

1. Selma Arsenal—Consisting of twenty-four buildings, containing an immense amount of war material and machinery for manufacturing the same. Very little of the machinery had been removed, although much of it was packed and ready for shipment to Macon and Columbus, Georgia. Among other articles here destroyed were fifteen siege guns and ten heavy carriages, ten field pieces, with sixty field carriages, ten caissons, sixty thousand rounds artillery ammunition, one million rounds of small arms ammunition, three million feet of lumber, ten thousand bushels coal, three hundred barrels resin, and three large engines and boilers.

2. Government Naval Foundry—Consisting of five large buildings, containing three fine engines, thirteen boilers, twenty-nine siege guns, unfinished, and all the machinery necessary to manufacture on a large scale naval and siege guns.

3. Selma Iron Works—Consisting of five buildings, with five large engines and furnaces, and complete machinery.

4. Pierces Foundry, Nos. 1 and 2—Each of these contained an engine, extensive machinery, and a large lot of tools.

5. Nitre Works—These works consist of eighteen buildings, five furnaces, sixteen leaches, and ninety banks.

6. Powder Mills and Magazine—Consisting of seven buildings, six thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, and seventy thousand rounds small arms ammunition, together with fourteen thousand pounds powder.

7. Washington Works—Small iron works, with one engine.

8. Tennessee Iron Works—Containing two engines.

9. Phelan and McBride's Machine Shop, with two engines.

10. Horse Shoe Manufactory—Containing one engine; about eight thousand pounds of horse shoes from this establishment were used by our army.

11. Selma Shovel Factory—This factory contained one steam engine, eight forges, and complete machinery for manufacturing shovels, railroad spikes, and iron axle-trees for army wagons.

12. On the Alabama and Mississippi Railroad—One roundhouse, one stationary engine, and much standing machinery, together with twenty box and two passenger cars.

13. On the Tennessee Railroad—One roundhouse, with machinery, five locomotives, one machine, nineteen box and fifty platform cars.

14. In the Fortifications—One thirty-pound

Parrott gun, four ten-pound guns, eleven field pieces, ten caissons, two forges, and five hundred rounds of fixed ammunition.

A portion of the guns destroyed in the arsenal were those captured on the fortifications at the time of the assault. The machinery, engines, and the trunnions of the guns were broken before being burned.

The arsenal buildings were of wood, with but few exceptions, the foundry buildings were of brick. Together with all other buildings enumerated these were completely destroyed, without firing other than public buildings. Several buildings were fired on the evening of the second instant, and quite a number of private dwellings were thereby consumed. This burning being done without authority, destroyed supplies which would have been useful to the army, and did no particular damage to the enemy.

I cannot estimate, in dollars, the value of the public property here destroyed; but all can readily see that the value in a mechanical, social, and war point of view is almost inestimable.

Respectfully submitted,

E. F. WINELOW,

Brevet Brigadier-General Commanding Post.

Major E. B. BEAUMONT.

A. A. General Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

HEADQUARTERS POSTOFFICES C. C., M. D. M., }
NEAR MACON, GA., May 9, 1865. }

Major E. B. Beaumont, Assistant Adjutant
General Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

MAJOR—I have the honor to report that the Pontoon train (fifty-eight wagons) loaded with thirty canvas pontoons, together with the lumber necessary to lay a bridge, at least four hundred feet long, also the pontoniers, consisting of the Third battalion of the Twelfth Missouri cavalry volunteers, under my command, left Eastport, Mississippi, at 8 o'clock A. M., on the twentieth of March, 1865. (The teamsters were all detailed from the battalion of pontoniers, which consisted of two hundred and five (205) men, and five (5) line officers, besides Lieutenant Acting Assistant Quartermaster.) The Twentieth marched by the way of Iuka to Bear river, escorted by the Second battalion of the Twelfth Missouri cavalry. The distance was about fifteen miles. We arrived at the river at about five o'clock, and finding it not fordable, laid pontoon bridges across it, of one tressel and thirteen boats.

Twenty-first. We took up the bridge, and travelled six miles, the roads in very bad condition, it having rained the night before, making the roads very muddy. The men had to lift a great many of the wagons out of the mud. The mules in the train were small, and in not very good order.

Twenty-second. Travelled about ten miles, halted early, passed through Dickson station.

Twenty-third. Roads were very miry, had to travel very slow, and across all low places had the men corduroy the road; also passed over

some mountainous country, frequently having to put eight mules to a wagon. On one very high hill was assisted by Captain Coe, Assistant Quartermaster, Second division, sending thirty span of mules to help us up. The men being along with the wagons were much assistance to them, frequently helping to push the wagons all the way up the hill.

Twenty-fourth. Train was escorted by the Fourth Ohio cavalry. After getting over the hill, the roads began to get better; passed through Frankfort, Russellville, and overtook the army at Cedar creek, having travelled about twenty-three miles that day.

Twenty-fifth. Procured all the forage that could be taken on the train. After travelling about ten miles the train of the Second division, and the pontoon train, stuck in the mud, and the pioneers and the pontoniers were at work all night making corduroy roads. By morning, the twenty-sixth, the road was made passable; travelled about twelve miles by one and a half o'clock at night, when we came to a swamp that was almost impassable. The Second division train was mired in it. The men worked almost all night; they were becoming much fatigued, but the work was carried on with energy until the road was completely corduroyed across the swamp; made twelve miles that day.

Twenty-seventh. Roads were some better, until we passed into Walker county, when we began to come to swamps again; the mules were becoming much fagged, the loads being evidently too heavy for the bad roads. This night the train got mired at one o'clock A. M., it having been the third night that the mules were not unharnessed, and that the men had no sleep. Made about one and one-quarter mile of corduroy road, and threw off about one and one-half of the lumber of kind that could be procured in the country; made sixteen miles.

Twenty-eighth. Reached Jasper at one o'clock, making eight miles by one o'clock P. M.

Twenty-ninth. Travelled about thirteen miles against twelve o'clock M., and arrived at Black Warrior river.

Thirtieth. Crossed the river without loss, although the water was swift, the bottom very uneven, and the wagons on both sides had to be let down and drawn up by the assistance of men with ropes. Travelled seven miles to Little Warrior river, raining incessantly. The road was much cut up by the main force of cavalry that had gone ahead, leaving us behind on the twenty-fifth, with an escort of cavalry and dismounted men.

Thirty-first March. Laid a pontoon bridge of eleven boats, and put two tressles in all the trains belonging to the army, crossed also the escort, took the bridge up in an hour, looking for an attack from the north side of the river, while we were raising it, and travelled four miles. Roads some firmer but hilly and rocky; arrived at Elyton at ten A. M., April second, having made twenty miles. Since early the morning before, travelled eight miles south of

Elyton, and encamped, making seventeen miles.

Third April. Arrived at the Cahawba river, and laid a pontoon bridge across it, which took seven boats and one tressle, both men and officers working energetically, laying the bridge in one hour and a quarter, and taking it up after all had crossed in three-quarters of an hour, and travelled twenty miles same day, passing one mile south of Montevallo.

Fourth. The advance guard was attacked by militia and guerillas but were repulsed without any loss; fears were entertained that a general attack on the train would be made, but fortunately we were that evening re-enforced by the Second brigade, First division, under command of Brevet Brigadier-General Alexander, having travelled twenty-seven miles.

Fifth. Roads good; made sixteen miles, encamped early, plenty of forage, foraging parties capturing quite a number of mules, and supplying the place of those giving out.

Sixth. Reached Selma at eleven o'clock A. M., twelve miles that morning, having travelled the distance of about two hundred and twenty-seven miles in seventeen days.

April seventh and eighth. Laid a bridge across the Alabama river, finishing three P. M. Eighth, having put in forty-six pontoons, thirty canvas and sixteen wooden, also two very large barges on the north side, and one on the south, the distance across being about seven hundred feet (700); about nine P. M., eighth, the bridge was broke into in the centre by drift wood; we immediately set to work to repair it, and had it ready for crossing by two P. M.

Ninth. When about two regiments had crossed, two wooden pontoons sank; the weight of the bridge being too great for it to bear, it gave way in the centre and swung around. By this time the pontoniers were very much fatigued, a large detail was made to assist, and the bridge was drawn back to its place, making a gap of only about fifty feet; this was soon repaired and made substantial, consequently we got a night's rest, the first for three nights.

Tenth. The pontoon train was across by nine A. M., footmen and stragglers by ten A. M., when we immediately commenced taking up the bridge, scuttling all the barges, wooden pontoons, also eighteen of the canvas pontoons, and destroying thirty wagons and harness, and mounting the pontoniers, that heretofore had been on foot, on the surplus mules. Left Selma at two o'clock P. M., tenth, and travelled all day and night, making only about ten miles, the roads being so intolerably bad.

Eleventh. Travelled to Cypress creek, about twelve miles; found it deep, put in a bridge of four boats.

Twelfth. Crossed, took up the bridge and travelled twenty miles. Roads some better.

Thirteenth. Arrived at Montgomery and passed it seven and a half miles, making about twenty-eight miles.

Fourteenth. Moved forward at three o'clock

p. m., and travelled fifteen miles against one o'clock a. m.

Fifteenth. It rained a shower and made the roads very muddy; made fourteen miles.

Sixteenth. Made twenty-eight miles.

Seventeenth. Arrived at Columbus three p. m., making ten miles; passed on four miles.

Eighteenth. Travelled from three o'clock a. m., to nine o'clock p. m., forty-two miles; roads good.

Nineteenth. Travelled fifteen miles.

Twentieth. Travelled twenty five miles, roads good and solid.

Twenty-first. Travelled eleven miles to within four of Macon.

Twenty-second. Moved into Macon, Georgia, having travelled from Selma, Alabama, to Macon, Georgia, the distance of about two hundred and forty miles, and laid one pontoon bridge, in nine days. Average per day twenty-six and two-thirds miles. Mules in good condition.

Hoping the above may prove satisfactory, I am, Major, very respectfully your obedient servant,

J. M. HUBBARD,
Major Commanding Pontooners C. C.

History of the Campaign of the Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., in Alabama and Georgia, from the twenty-second of March to April twentieth, 1865.

The First, Second, and Fourth divisions, together with the Fourth United States cavalry, all under command of Brevet Major-General Wilson, composed the troops engaged in this campaign.

The First division, under Brigadier General Edward McCook, numbered four thousand and ninety-six men.

The Second division numbered five thousand one hundred and twenty-seven men, under command of Brigadier-General Eli Long.

Brevet Major-General Upton commanded the Fourth division, containing three thousand nine hundred and twenty-three men.

The Fourth United States cavalry were on duty as headquarter guard, and were three hundred and thirty-four in number.

There were thus engaged in the expedition in all, thirteen thousand four hundred and eighty men.

The chief medical officers of the command were Surgeon Francis Salter, U. S. V., Medical Director; Assistant-Surgeon William J. Okey, U. S. A., Medical Inspector; Surgeons Benjamin McCluer, Francis Green, and Frederick Crofe, chief surgeons of the First, Fourth, and Second divisions. There were altogether fifty medical officers on duty with the command.

Orders were given to march early on the morning of March twenty-second. The several divisions moved out on parallel roads, in a south-easterly direction, the First division forming the right, the Second division the centre, and the Fourth the left.

The roads all led to the south-east, passing through Russelville and Jasper. The weather

was pleasant, and the roads, though rough, were nevertheless very firm and passable. Corps headquarters passed through Cherokee station at twelve m., and at five o'clock p. m., after a march of eighteen miles, camped within a mile from Barton's station.

March twenty-third. March began at an early hour; weather fine, country similar in appearance to that passed over on the day before, being hilly and rough. The soil is here sandy and barren, and the population small. General Wilson and staff marched twenty-four miles, and at twelve m. arrived at the dilapidated village of Russelville, county-seat of Franklin county. It has been a place of some local importance, with a population of two thousand inhabitants. It has, however, suffered severely from the ravages of war. Camped there for the night.

March twenty-fourth. Weather pleasant; march began at eight o'clock, but after reaching a point three miles distant, corps headquarters went again into camp, in order to await the arrival of the pontoon and wagon trains, which had been delayed on the march. General Long, with the Second division, passed by in the morning at nine o'clock; General McCook and headquarters arrived in the evening at six.

March twenty-fifth. Reveille at five o'clock a. m. Marched at six, weather very pleasant, roads good though occasionally rough. Crossed Big Bear river at Bell's factory at three o'clock p. m. Travelled twenty-one miles and camped on a branch of the Buttahachie river; General Upton with the Fourth division was a considerable distance in advance. General McCook guarded the rear.

March twenty-sixth. Started at an early hour and marched twenty-five miles to Blackwater creek; weather continued to be pleasant. The country like all yet passed over is barren. The soil is sandy and supports a forest of pines; water good, forage found in sufficient quantity for the necessities of the command. Camped for the night; during the night a bridge was constructed over the Blackwater.

March twenty-seventh. Reveille at four p. m.; marched at half-past five a. m., on road to Jasper; General Upton on the left led the advance. General Long held the centre with the Second division, and General McCook with the First division the rear; weather mild with indications of rain; road to Jasper was found, except in one or two places, to be in good condition; arrived there after a march of seventeen miles, at half after eleven o'clock a. m.; we heard news to the effect that Forrest was fortifying the road from Montevallo to Tuscaloosa, with a force of ten thousand men. Orders were given to General Upton to push rapidly forward, leaving the wagon trains to take care of themselves. Similar orders were also issued to Generals Long and McCook. General McCook entered Jasper with the First division at two p. m.; at five o'clock p. m. General Wilson and staff arrived on the banks of the Mulberry Fork of the Black Warrior river, eight and one half miles distant from

Jasper. The skies had shown symptoms of rain since noon, and now it began to fall. It continued to rain during the whole night; Corps headquarters camped on the north bank of the stream. Jasper, through which we passed at noon, is a large village of from four to five thousand inhabitants; has a court-house and a jail. The road thence to Black Warrior was firm and good. On arriving at that stream we found that General Upton had already crossed it at the ford with all his troops and most of his wagons. This fork of the Black Warrior was at this point about one-eighth of a mile wide, with a depth ranging from one to three or four feet, and a very rapid current. The bottom was very rocky and uneven, and the banks on each side very precipitous.

March twenty-eighth. The weather was very damp and disagreeable. The greater part of the day was taken up in getting the troops and wagon trains over the river. Many horses lost their footing, and many men were dismounted, but none were drowned. We crossed the Locust fork of the Black Warrior at the ford, at four o'clock p. m. This stream is deeper than the Mulberry fork, but not so wide nor so rapid. The distance between the two forks is eight and a half miles. The country between them is barren and thinly settled. The people are very ignorant and poor, but of Union proclivities. General Wilson camped at night on south bank of this fork.

March twenty-ninth. The day was occupied in getting the First and Second divisions over the Locust fork of the Black Warrior river. General Wilson remained in camp all day. Captain Brown, Acting Chief Quartermaster, was ordered to take charge of corps trains. Weather rainy.

March thirtieth. Started on the road to Elyton at half-past six, weather cloudy but cold, rain had ceased to fall. The main road was found to be very muddy. We arrived at Elyton at one o'clock p. m., a distance of twenty miles, having crossed Black creek on our way at Lamson's flour mills. These mills were burned. The country had now begun to assume a more fertile and cultivated appearance. Elyton is a very pretty village of from three to four thousand inhabitants. The route on which we had hitherto come since leaving Chickasaw had been south-easterly from Elyton until we arrived at Selma. We now advanced due south. The First brigade of the First division was detached from the command at this point, and ordered to proceed to Tuscaloosa and destroy the government works there. Large iron works six miles south of Elyton were burned. We arrived at night on the banks of the Cahawba river, fifteen miles from Elyton. The railroad bridge had fortunately been left uninjured, and was easily fixed to allow the crossing of trains. The last four miles of the road were very rough and muddy.

March thirty-first. Fine drizzling rain fell early in the morning; weather cleared after sunrise. The railroad bridge across the Cahawba was

a quarter of a mile long, and had been planked the day before by General Upton. The Cahawba river is at this point an eighth of a mile broad and is quite deep. The crossing would have been troublesome had the bridge been burned. Large iron works half a mile from the river were burned. Arrived at Montevallo at eleven o'clock a. m., distance fourteen miles from Cahawba; road was good; the country was wooded, but the forests now different in character from those through which we had hitherto passed, there being some oak mixed with the pines. The soil, though still sandy, is now more fertile than that north of Elyton. Montevallo is a village of two thousand inhabitants, but was nearly deserted on our entrance. General Upton had his headquarters there, and was now awaiting our approach. The rebels were now reported for the first time to be in advance of us in some force. They were charged by the Third Iowa, and dispersed with the loss of twenty prisoners. Left Montevallo on road to Selma at three o'clock p. m. General Long advanced with the Second division on the road to Randolph to the right of the main road to Selma. General Upton kept the main road. There was continued skirmishing with the rebels, but they were unable to check our advance in the slightest degree. We went into camp twelve miles from Montevallo, at half-past seven o'clock p. m. There had been during the day several men wounded and one or two killed.

April first. Marched at an early hour at Randolph, a small village seventeen miles from Montevallo. General McCook was ordered with the Second brigade of the First division to take the road to Centerville, and to co-operate with General Croxton against Jackson, who was reported to be on Tuscaloosa and Centerville road with four thousand men. General Long on the right and Upton on the left had a brilliant fight with the rebels under Forrest in person, defeating them with severe loss. There were captured from the enemy three pieces of artillery and three hundred prisoners, and there were besides quite a number killed. The loss on our side was forty wounded and twelve killed. Arrived at Plantersville after a march of twenty-six miles, at six o'clock p. m. Headquarters of corps at house of Mrs. Discoe; a quantity of rebel "hard tack" and some forage bags were found in the depot.

April second. A hospital was established in the village church for the reception of the sick and wounded. Assistant Surgeon J. A. McGraw, United States volunteers, was ordered to remain in charge with Assistant Surgeon Done, Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry, and Assistant Surgeon Maxwell of the Third Iowa cavalry, as assistants. There were left in the hospital forty wounded and eighteen sick, together with a sufficient number of nurses. The depot was burned, together with a storehouse containing cotton. The command then moved on toward Selma, twenty-one miles distant. The Fourth and Second divisions arrived

in front of Selma at two o'clock in the afternoon, and at sundown a simultaneous attack was made along the whole line. Forrest was in command of the rebels in person, and endeavored to defend the city, but without success. Our troops took the breastworks by assault and entered the city. In the confusion resulting from the night attack, a large number of stores were plundered and burned. In the morning, however, order was again restored. Our loss was killed, four officers and thirty-five enlisted men, wounded twenty-four officers and twenty-two enlisted men. Among the killed was Colonel Dobb; Brigadier-General Long was severely wounded in the head while leading the assault; we captured twenty-three hundred prisoners, a large number of small arms and cannon, and the workshops and arsenals which supplied the armies of the West with ammunition of all kinds. Forrest escaped with his escort of one hundred men, and retreated toward Plantersville. On his way he came across a party of Federals asleep in a neighboring field under command of Lieutenant Roys, of the Fourth United States cavalry and Lieutenant Mullen. He charged on them in their sleep, and refusing to listen to their cries of surrender, killed or wounded the entire party, numbering twenty-five men.

April third. The day was spent in restoring order in Selma. The Second brigade of the First division, which had been unsuccessful in its attempts to unite with the First brigade, was ordered back to protect the wagon trains. Forrest arrived at Plantersville on his retreat, and captured the hospital, which had been left without a guard. He paroled all the nurses and slightly wounded men, and left the surgeons and patients unmolested. A corps hospital was established in Selma for our wounded.

April fifth. A party of the Second division went to Cahawba and recaptured several of our prisoners confined there.

April sixth. Wagon train arrived at Selma. Arsenals and government warehouses destroyed by fire.

April seventh. Negroes gathered together to be organized into three regiments, one for each division. Sick and wounded were brought in ambulances from Plantersville and put in corps hospital. General Wilson met Forrest on the Cahawba river under a flag of truce. It was determined to take along on the march all the sick and wounded whose situation would permit of it, and to leave only such as were very ill or badly wounded. Engineers were busily engaged in building a pontoon bridge over the Alabama river. The Alabama river is at this point about five hundred yards wide. It has a very rapid current, and a depth that admits of navigation by steamboats of considerable size. Selma is situated on its north bank. It is or was a beautiful city of fifteen thousand inhabitants, containing many fine residences and large government workshops. Its loss to the rebels can hardly be estimated.

April ninth. It had been determined to move to-day toward Montgomery, but the pontoon bridge broke for the second time, and prevented the whole command from crossing until late in the night. Camped on the south side of the river. Left in hospital at Selma sixty-eight patients under charge of Surgeon Larkins and Assistant Surgeon Raley, Tenth Missouri cavalry. Rations for forty days were left with them, as also plenty of medicines and other supplies.

April tenth. Began our march to Montgomery. Forrest had refused to acknowledge any paroles, and General Wilson accordingly ordered all prisoners to be brought along under guard. The citizens, however, and some of the militia were paroled. Weather was good, although the roads were muddy from recent rains. Surgeon Carter, Third Iowa cavalry, was ordered to take charge of the hospital train. This train was composed of the ambulances belonging to the corps, together with a number of wagons properly fitted up with beds and blankets. We marched fifteen miles to the village of Benton, and camped there during the night. Benton is a small village of no particular importance.

April eleventh. Began to march at six o'clock A. M.; skies cloudy and threatening rain. Our route since leaving Selma has been due east on the road to Montgomery, south of the Alabama river; one mile from Benton we passed through a swamp a mile long. The road was very bad, and almost impassable for wagons. After leaving the swamp, however, we found the roads to be smooth and dry, leading over a rolling country. Thirteen miles from Benton the columns passed through the village of Lawnsboro. This village is one of the most beautiful that we have yet passed through. It is built up of large, elegant mansions, and is inhabited by rich planters. It has a population of about one thousand five hundred. Small-pox was raging furiously, and in some families had attacked all the members. We here received news of the fall of Richmond. Went into camp eighteen miles from Montgomery after a march of eighteen miles.

April twelfth. Started from camp at five A. M.; weather very pleasant and roads good. General McCook with the First division led the advance. The city was capitulated to General McCook early in the morning, and a provost guard having been stationed in it, the troops marched through and camped outside. The inhabitants received the troops if without manifestations of joy, at least without any evidences of dislike. Private property was everywhere respected. The rebel troops before our entrance had burned eighty-five thousand bales of cotton, valued at forty millions of dollars in gold. The citizens expressed a great deal of anger at the occurrence. Montgomery, the capital of Alabama, is a beautiful city, and contains a large number of elegant residences. It is situated on the south side of the Alabama river. This river is navigable to the city by small steamers.

April thirteenth. Hospital train came into the city at five o'clock P. M., and was unloaded at St.

Mary's hospital. The transportation of so many sick and wounded had been found to be a serious incumbrance on the march, and it had, therefore, been determined to leave them at this city. There were, accordingly, sufficient quantities of commissary stores and medicines left in the hospital for the wants of the sick and wounded. There were left in Montgomery one hundred and forty-four men under charge of Assistant Surgeon Done, Seventeenth Indiana mounted infantry.

April fourteenth. Started for Columbus at eight A. M.; weather pleasant and roads excellent. Marched due east twenty miles and then camped.

April fifteenth. Started at half-past seven o'clock, A. M.; Upton way ahead; weather cloudy and threatening rain. Arrived at Tuskegee, forty-two miles from Montgomery, at two o'clock P. M. Tuskegee is a village of three thousand inhabitants, a county seat. It has a jail, courthouse, and young ladies' seminary. Left Tuskegee at five o'clock. It began to rain just as we left Tuskegee, and continued to do so for two hours. Camped at last at seven o'clock at a farm house forty-eight miles from Montgomery, and thirty-six from Columbus.

April sixteenth. Commenced our march at seven o'clock. The country passed over is not so fertile as in the immediate vicinity of Selma, and has been worn out by the defective system of agriculture. We passed through Society Hill and two other small villages on our route. General Upton again led the advance; weather was fine and the roads were in good order. We arrived opposite Columbus at three P. M., and found General Upton preparing to attack the works. The attack began at seven o'clock, P. M., and notwithstanding the resistance of the enemy, who were intrenched on the neighboring hills, our forces drove them from their breastworks, and captured the bridges leading over the Chattahoochie river to the city. The attack was made exclusively by the Fourth division; our loss was but twenty-eight wounded and five killed. There were captured from the enemy nearly two thousand prisoners, a large quantity of arms and ammunition, and all the government stores, shops, and arsenals in the city itself. Columbus was a city of nearly twenty thousand inhabitants, and is situated on the east bank of the Chattahoochie river. It was connected with the Alabama bank by three bridges at the time of its occupation by our forces. It was a place of considerable importance as a manufacturing town, having a number of mills and workshops of different kinds. While the main body of troops were thus engaged Colonel La Grange had been detached at Opelika, and ordered to destroy the railroad and the depots at West Point. Arriving there on April sixteenth he attacked and carried the fortifications, built to defend the place, though not until after a severe struggle, in which we lost in killed and wounded thirty-nine men, of whom seven were killed.

April seventeenth. The women and children who had been employed in the factories and arsenals turned out with one accord to pillage the stores and the government warehouses. The government buildings were burned, with the exception of the hospitals. It was determined to leave our sick and wounded, with a proper amount of stores of all kinds, in the hospitals of the city; Assistant-Surgeon Whetton, Third Iowa cavalry, was detailed to take charge of them. In all, thirty-five patients were left at Columbus.

April eighteenth. Bridges over the Chattahoochie were burned, together with such public buildings as had escaped the day before. Commenced to move at nine o'clock on the road to Macon, *via* Thomaston; marched twenty-one miles and camped. The weather was pleasant, and the roads good. The character of the soil differs from that of Alabama. It consists of red clay, beneath which is a layer of limestone. Several cannon and a large number of wagons deserted on the road, showed that the enemy had fled in the greatest confusion.

April nineteenth. The command marched at an early hour, the Second division in the advance. The weather was very windy, and the roads dry and dusty. The forests presented a somewhat different appearance to those by which we rode yesterday, having oak mixed with the pines. Our advance, consisting of the Fourth Michigan cavalry, had captured, by forced marches, the double bridges over the Flint river, forty four miles from Columbia. We arrived there at twelve M. The Flint river here is very rapid, and not easily fordable. A further march of ten miles brought us to Thomaston, a village of about fifteen hundred inhabitants; after having crossed Big Potato creek, camped at six P. M. at Thomaston.

April twentieth. Corps headquarters began their march at six A. M.; weather was good, the roads were very dry and dusty; our course, which from Columbus to Thomaston had been to the north-east, now directed to the south-east. Thomaston is forty-seven miles from Macon. Our advance was met by a flag of truce, announcing that Sherman had entered into an armistice with Johnston, and demanding that we should "halt" where we were. The officer commanding the advance, however, had no authority to stop his march; and by the time the letter had reached General Wilson, the city of Macon had been already captured.

Thus imperfectly are the main incidents of the march of General Wilson's command from Chickasaw, Alabama, to Macon, Georgia, recorded and reported for the information of the Medical Director, Army and Department of the Cumberland, Surgeon George E. Cooper, U. S. A.

It had been intended to render this report more complete, and give the points of interest more in detail. The reports, however, from surgeons in charge of subordinate commands are not so explicit as to permit the execution of this intention. One or two points I desire to

present to the Medical Director, Department of the Cumberland:

First: That the ambulance corps organization operated as successfully in the cavalry as in the infantry corps.

Secondly: No patients were left on the roadside in the rear of the advancing forces, and all were provided for in regularly-furnished hospitals.

Two accidents arose from the magazines of the Spencer carbines exploding from being half-filled while on hot-march from concussion

in one instance, the magazine was in the pouch in the other, in the stock of the carbine. The tin tubes or magazines which contain the fixed ammunition—metallic cartridges—should be therefore kept filled, four inches of play on a hot day may explode them, as evidenced in those two cases.

The greatest energy and assiduity on the part of all the medical officers was observable throughout the campaign.

F. SALTER,
Surgeon United States Volunteers,
Medical Director Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.

Names of Officers and Men of the Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., mentioned by their respective commanders for bravery and efficiency shown in the late campaign from Chickasaw, Alabama, to Macon, Georgia.

FIRST DIVISION.

NAME.	RANK.	REGIMENT.	BY WHOM MENTIONED.	REMARKS.
J. B. Dorr.....	Colonel.....	8th Iowa.....	Brig.-General J. T. Croxton,	
R. M. Kelley.....	".....	4th Kentucky M. I.	" " " "	
Thos. W. Johnson.....	Lieutenant-Colonel.....	2d Michigan.....	" " " "	
W. H. Fidler.....	Major.....	8th Kentucky.....	" " " "	
Edmund Penn.....	Captain.....	".....	" " " "	
Sutherland.....	Captain and A. A. G.	".....	" " " "	
Baker.....	Capt. and A. A. I. G.	".....	" " " "	
Walden.....	Capt. and Pro. Mar.	".....	" " " "	
Lusk.....	Lieut. and A. D. C.	".....	" " " "	
Kelley.....	".....	".....	" " " "	
Prather.....	".....	4th Indiana.....	" " " "	Aide to General commanding corps.
Walker.....	Quartermaster Sergt.	".....	" " " "	
Wentworth.....	Commissary Sergeant	".....	" " " "	
Cooper.....	Colonel.....	4th Kentucky.....	Colonel O. H. La Grange.	
R. S. Hill.....	Captain.....	2d Indiana.....	" " " "	Wounded at West Point; left Chickasaw with leave of absence in his pocket. At West Point was suffering from a wound received two weeks previously.
D. S. Moulton.....	Lieutenant.....	4th Indiana.....	Brigade Staff.	
E. S. Chase.....	".....	1st Wisconsin.....		
Ed. Ferrel.....	Sergeant.....	".....	Colonel O. H. La Grange.....	First inside the rebel works at West Point.
O. H. La Grange.....	Colonel.....	".....	Comd'g Second Brigade.....	To be Brigadier-General of Volunteers.
W. W. Bradley.....	Lieutenant-Colonel.....	7th Kentucky.....	Recommended by Brigadier-General John T. Croxton for promotion.....	To be Colonel by brevet.
Henry Harnden.....	" ".....	1st Wisconsin.....	" " " ".....	" " " "
Thos. W. Johnston.....	" ".....	2d Michigan.....	Comd'g Second Brigade.....	" " " "
W. H. Fidler.....	Major.....	8th Kentucky.....	Recommended by Brigadier-General John T. Croxton for promotion.....	To be Lieut.-Colonel by brevet.
R. S. Hill.....	Captain.....	2d Indiana.....	" " " ".....	To be Major.
James M. McCown.....	".....	8th Kentucky.....	" " " ".....	To be Major by brevet.
Edmund Penn.....	".....	".....	" " " ".....	" " " "
Walter Whittemore.....	".....	2d Michigan.....	" " " ".....	" " " "

SECOND DIVISION.

Frank White.....	Lieutenant-Colonel.....	17th Indiana.....	Colonel J. G. Vail.....	Gallant charge on artillery, with but four companies of his regiment.
Eldridge.....	Major.....	4th Michigan.....	Lieut.-Col. B. D. Pritchard.	
Hathaway.....	Captain.....	".....	" " " "	
Potter.....	".....	".....	" " " "	
Dickinson.....	Adjutant.....	".....	" " " "	
C. T. Hodson.....	Captain.....	".....	" " " "	
D. C. Livermore.....	Major.....	8d Ohio V. C.	" " " "	
John H. Shouf.....	Private.....	".....	Major D. E. Livermore.....	Captured battle flag of Twelfth Mississippi cavalry, and was the regimental commander.
John Morgan.....	Sergeant.....	123d Illinois.....	Captain Owen Wiley.....	Planted the first flag on the works at Selma, and in advance till all the works were taken.

NAME.	RANK.	REGIMENT.	BY WHOM MENTIONED.	REMARKS.
Lemuel Edwards	Private	123d Illinois	Lieut.-Colonel Frank White	Special Messenger Headquarters First brigade. Wounded while leading a charge at Ebenezer Church.
John Kidney	Corporal	"	"	Coolness and bravery in action at all times.
L. S. Kilborn	Major	72d Indiana	Lieut.-Col. C. G. Thompson	
L. B. Edwards	Private	"	"	Wounded while leading a mounted charge April first
L. C. Remington	Lieutenant	4th Michigan	Martin Archer, Major Commanding Colored Troops.	
W. G. Young	Captain	98th Illinois	"	
C. L. Conner	Lieutenant	7th Pennsylvania	"	
Dr. Biggs	"	4th Ohio V. C.	"	
John W. Deem	Sergeant	17th Indiana	Major J. J. Weiler	} Captured flag at Macon, Georgia. Captured a flag at Macon, Georgia. Each captured a flag in a skirmish near Culloden, Georgia. Found four two-pounder guns buried at Macon.
Reuben Phillips	Private	"	"	
James H. McDowell	First Lieutenant	"	"	
A. R. Hudson	Private	"	"	
J. Davis	"	"	"	
Batloff	Corporal	"	"	
John H. Booth	"	4th Ohio V. C.	Captain W. W. Shoemaker	
Hoffman	Captain	98th Illinois	Lieut.-Colonel E. Kitchell	
Flood	"	"	"	
N. B. Thistlewood	"	"	"	After being severely wounded kept up with the command over a mile, Selma, April 2d.
J. J. Weiler	Major	17th Indiana	" Frank White	
Doyle	Adjutant	"	"	
J. H. McDowell	Lieutenant	"	"	
T. W. Scott	Captain	"	"	Colonel Minty's Staff.
Culbertson	Lieutenant	"	"	"
J. G. Vail	Colonel	17th Indiana	Colonel N. O. Miller	
E. Kitchell	Lieutenant-Colonel	98th Illinois	"	
Jonathan Biggs	"	123d Illinois	"	
C. G. Thomson	"	72d Indiana	"	
N. M. Ashmore	Lieutenant	123d Illinois	"	Aide-de-camp; first to enter the rebel works at Selma, mounted. With a guard of men captured twenty prisoners and two pieces of artillery, three hundred yards in advance of the line.
Wiley	Captain	"	Colonel J. G. Vail	
Wood	"	"	"	
Delong	"	"	"	
O. F. Iane	"	"	"	
G. B. Sweet	Lieutenant	"	"	Colonel Miller's Staff.
W. N. Owens	Captain	"	"	Provost Marshal First Brigade.
John C. Scott	"	"	"	Brigade Inspector First Brigade.
Jackson S. Bell	Sergeant	72d Indiana	"	For his energy in performance of his duty at all times. Rode under terrific fire to report Colonel Miller being wounded to Colonel Vail, next in command.
B. D. Pritchard	Lieutenant-Colonel	4th Michigan	Colonel R. H. G. Minty	
Frank White	"	17th Indiana	"	
Moore	Captain	4th Ohio V. C.	"	
Richardson	"	"	Earnestly recommended by Colonel Minty for Brevet.	
Burns	Major	4th Michigan	"	A. A. A. G. Second Brigade.
Greene	"	7th Pennsylvania	"	A. A. I. G. Second Brigade.
F. W. Scott	Captain	98th Illinois	Brigadier-General Eli Long	A. A. G.
W. W. Shoemaker	"	4th Ohio V. C.	"	A. D. C.
Henry Deiring	Lieutenant	"	"	A. D. C.
S. S. Culbertson	"	18th U. S. Infantry	"	A. C. M.
W. B. Gates	Captain	8d Ohio V. C.	"	Provost Marshal.
J. M. Squire	"	"	"	A. A. I. G.
P. B. Lewis	"	"	"	Topographical Engineer.
J. B. Hayden	Lieutenant	4th Ohio V. C.	"	A. C. S.
W. N. McDonald	"	123d Illinois	"	Orderly Officer.
Harttraight	Captain	7th Pennsylvania	"	Commanding escort.
Fred. Carpe	Surgeon	"	"	Chief Surgeon.
Martin Archer	Major	8d Ohio V. C.	"	Commanding train guard.
S. B. Coe	Captain	"	"	A. A. Q. M.
T. J. Patten	Lieutenant	17th Indiana	"	With Pioneers.
John Bennet	"	4th Michigan	"	
Henry Prince	Private	4th Ohio V. C.	"	Orderly.
Henry Gibb	"	"	"	
T. W. Scott	Captain	98th Illinois	Recommended by Brig.-General Long for promotion	
N. O. Miller	Colonel	72d Indiana	"	To be Captain and A. A. G. United States Volunteers.
R. H. G. Minty	"	4th Michigan	"	To be Brigadier-General.
C. C. McCormick	"	7th Pennsylvania	"	"
J. G. Vail	"	17th Indiana	"	To be Brevet Brigadier-General.

NAME	RANK	REGIMENT	BY WHOM MENTIONED.	REMARKS
Jonathan Biggs.....	Lieutenant-Colonel	128d Illinois.....	Recommended by Brig-Gen-eral Long for promotion....	To be Brevet Brigadier-General.
E. Kitchell.....	" "	98th ".....	" " " " " " " "	" " " "
Frank White.....	" "	17th Indiana.....	" " " " " " " "	" " " "
G. W. Dobb.....	" "	4th Ohio V. C.....	" " " " " " " "	" " " "

FOURTH DIVISION.

James W. Latta.....	Brevet Major.....	Brevet Maj.-General E. Upton	A. A. G.
Tom C. Gilpin.....	Captain.....	" " " "	A. A. D. C.
Sloan Keck.....	Lieutenant.....	" " " "	A. A. D. C.
Peter Keck.....	" " " "	" " " "	Ordnance Officer.
Geo. D. Womeldorf.....	First Lieutenant.....	7th Ohio V. C.....	Brig.-Gen'l N. J. Alexander..	Gallant conduct with his Com-pany (L) at Ebenezer Church.
Gerrard.....	Colonel.....	" " " "	" " " "
B. B. Eggleston.....	" " " "	1st " " " "	" " " "	Recommended for promotion by brevet by General Alexander.
Mitchell.....	Lieutenant.....	" " " "	Second Brigade Staff.
J. N. O. Yeoman.....	" " " "	" " " "	Recommended for promotion by brevet by General Alexander.
McKee.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Samuel Dryden.....	" " " "	" " " "	Second Brigade Staff.
H. S. Birdsall.....	Sergeant.....	3d Iowa.....	" E. F. Winslow...	Captured Garrison flag and bearer near Columbus, Georgia, April 16, 1865.
Andrew W. Tibbetts.....	Private.....	" " " "	" " " "	Captured flag of Austin's Battery and bearer at Columbus, Georgia, April 16, 1865.
John H. Hays.....	" " " "	4th " " " "	" " " "	Captured standard and bearer at Columbus, Ga., April 16, 1865.
Richard H. Morgan.....	Corporal.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Nicholas Fanning.....	Private.....	" " " "	" " " "	Captured silk Confederate States flag and two staff officers at Selma, Alabama, April 2, 1865.
Norman F. Bates.....	Sergeant.....	" " " "	" " " "	Captured a rebel and standard at Columbus, Georgia.
Charles N. Swan.....	Private.....	" " " "	" " " "	Captured flag of Eleventh Mississippi and bearer at Selma, Ala.
Richard H. Coggliff.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	Captured standard and bearer at Columbus, Georgia.
John Kinney.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	Captured standard and bearer of Tenth Missouri Battery at Columbus, Georgia.
Edward J. Belb.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	Captured flag left by the rebels at Columbus, Georgia.
James P. Miller.....	" " " "	4th Iowa.....	Brevet Brig.-General E. F. Winslow.....	Captured sergeant and standard of Twelfth Mississippi cavalry at Selma, Alabama.
Lot Abraham.....	Captain.....	" " " "	Recommended for promotion by Brevet Brig.-General E. F. Winslow.....	To be Major by brevet.
Asa B. Fitch.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
John D. Brown.....	" " " "	3d Iowa.....	" " " "	" " " "
Geo. W. Johnson.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
R. B. M. McGlasson.....	" " " "	10th Missouri.....	" " " "	" " " "
Samuel J. McKee.....	" " " "	3d Iowa.....	" " " "	" " " "
Frederick Owen.....	First Lieutenant.....	10th Missouri.....	" " " "	To be Captain by brevet.
Lloyd Dillon.....	Second Lieutenant.....	4th Iowa.....	" " " "	To be First Lieutenant by brevet.
John W. Noble.....	Colonel.....	3d " " " "	Recommended for promotion by Bvt. Maj.-Gen. E. Upton..	To be Brig.-General by brevet.
B. B. Eggleston.....	" " " "	1st Ohio V. C.....	" " " "	" " " "
James W. Latta.....	Bvt. Maj. and A. A. G.	" " " "	To be Major and A. A. G.
Thomas C. Gilpin.....	Captain.....	3d Iowa.....	" " " "	To be Major by brevet.
W. W. Woods.....	Major.....	4th " " " "	" " " "	To be Lieut.-Colonel by brevet.
J. H. Simpson.....	Captain.....	4th Michigan.....	" " " "	A. A. Q. M. } For commissions in A. O. B. } respective dep'ts.
F. H. Brown.....	First Lieutenant.....	3d Iowa.....	" " " "	To be Captain by brevet.
John S. Keck.....	" " " "	4th " " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Peter R. Keck.....	Second Lieutenant.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Lot Abraham.....	Captain.....	" " " "	" " " "	To be Major by brevet.
Asa B. Fitch.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
John D. Brown.....	" " " "	3d " " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Geo. W. Johnson.....	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "	" " " "
R. M. McGlasson.....	" " " "	10th Missouri.....	" " " "	" " " "
Geo. D. Womeldorf.....	First Lieutenant.....	7th Ohio V. C.....	" " " "	To be Captain by brevet.
J. A. O. Yeoman.....	" " " "	1st " " " "	" " " "	" " " "
Ferdinand Owen.....	Second Lieutenant.....	10th Missouri.....	" " " "	To be First Lieutenant by brevet.
Lloyd Dillon.....	" " " "	4th Iowa.....	" " " "	" " " "
Robert S. Kiles.....	Sergeant.....	" " " "	Recommended by General Upton to receive medals of honor.....	" " " "
Robert C. Woods.....	Private.....	" " " "	" " " "	For individual bravery at Girard. Being taken prisoner he escaped, and with a few others took prisoners the Colonel and Adjutant of the regiment that had held him.

Consolidated Report of Casualties in Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., commanded by Brevet Major-General Wilson, during the late Campaign.

COMMAND.	COMMISSIONED OFFICERS.						ENLISTED MEN.					
	Killed.	WOUNDED.			Missing.	Drowned.	Killed.	WOUNDED.			Drowned.	Missing.
		Severely.	Slightly.	Mortally.				Severely.	Slightly.	Mortally.		
Cavalry Corps.....	27	85	48	139	7	..
First Division.....	46	73	128	51
Second Division.....	..	15	11	..	108	206	68
Third Division.....	6
Fourth Division.....	No report.
Fifth Division.....
Sixth Division.....	No report.
Seventh Division.....
Total.....	18	19	5	23	18	..	187	467	176	180	7	705

Brigadier-General Eli Long wounded, Selma, April, 1865.

C. L. GREEN,

Major and Provost Marshal C. C., M. D. M.

OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL C. C., M. D. M., MACON, GA., June 28, 1865.

Consolidated Report of Confederate Prisoners paroled under the direction of Brevet Major-General Wilson.

BY WHOM PAROLED.	NUMBER PAROLED.	WHERE PAROLED.	WHEN PAROLED.
Provost Marshal Cavalry Corps, M. D. M.....	14,965	Macon, Ga.	1865.
Colonel Eggleston.....	10,000	Atlanta, "	April and May.
*Colonel Cooper.....	5,000	Albany, "	May.
Major Williams.....	957	Milledgeville, "	"
Captain Walden.....	956	Forsyth, "	"
Captain Lambson.....	2,700	Columbus, "	"
Captain Abraham.....	5,026	Washington, "	"
Captain Gates.....	1,247	Hawkinsville, "	"
General Upton.....	6,315	Augusta, "	"
General McCook.....	7,200	Tallahassee, Fla.	"
Captain Hathaway.....	2,816	On the march.	April.
Major Dartt.....	225	Enfala, "	May.
General Fry, C. S. A.....	2,181	Augusta, Ga.	April.
Total.....	59,878		

Commissioned officers..... 6,134
Enlisted men..... 53,744

Total..... 59,878

C. L. GREEN,

Major and Provost Marshal C. C., M. D. M.

OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL C. C., M. D. M., MACON, GA., June 28, 1865.

Consolidated Report of Cotton Destroyed by Cavalry Corps, M. D. M., commanded by Brevet Major-General Wilson, during the late Campaign.

NO. OF BALES.	WHERE DESTROYED.	REMARKS.
85,000	Selma, Ala.	Destroyed by the Confederate forces before retreating.
85,000	Montgomery "	Destroyed by the Confederate forces before retreating.
125,000	Columbus, Ga.	Destroyed by the Cavalry Command after the place was taken.
10,000	On the line of march.	Destroyed by the Cavalry Command.
265,000		Total number of bales destroyed.

C. L. GREEN,

Major and Provost Marshal C. C., M. D. M.

OFFICE PROVOST MARSHAL CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., MACON, GA., June 28, 1865.

* An estimate; no report received up to date.

OFFICIAL DESPATCHES.

[By Telegraph from Augusta, Georgia, May 3, 1865.]

Brevet Major-General Wilson, Macon :

General Fry has been paroling men of various commands to go to their homes, and there remain undisturbed, on condition of not taking up arms against the United States until properly relieved of the obligation of their paroles. He has kept a register of all men so paroled. It was necessary to do this to get the soldiers out of the city, there having been some depredations committed. There is a question as to the validity of these paroles. Shall they cease to be issued, or the form be changed ?

E. UPTON.

Brevet Major-General United States Volunteers.

[Telegraph, Augusta, May 3, 1865.]

Major-General Wilson, Commanding Cavalry Corps, Macon

I arrived this morning ; have sent the torpedo operator who laid the obstructions in the Savannah river down to remove them ; will take them four to six days. Will send communication to General Grover to-morrow morning by Captain Lamar, of General McLaws staff'. Atlanta has rations enough if the soldiers have not appropriated them to supply the paroled men of Lee's and Johnston's armies. The citizens fear a disturbance should Wheeler's men pass this way, and it may be necessary for their protection, as well as the vast amount of government property here, to have a dismounted force sent by rail, to garrison the place, while the troops are in transitu. Lee's army has mostly passed through. Many of Johnston's army are passing across the river, higher up in the direction of Washington. Shall I order supplies to this place from Savannah ? There ought to be a sufficient amount accumulated here in the event of the river's falling, to hold out till the Central Railroad is repaired.

E. UPTON,

Brevet Major-General United States Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
SELMA, April 4, 1865. }

GENERAL—I took this place by assault at six P. M. on the second ; captured twenty field guns, two thousand prisoners, and large quantity of stores, besides all the iron works north of here.

Forrest, Dick Taylor, Adams, and Armstrong succeeded in getting out in the dark, by wading the swamps on the east side of the city. The place is strongly fortified with two lines of bastion forts, the outer one with continuous line of stockade from river to river.

The conduct of my troops was magnificent ; loss not very heavy ; General Long wounded slightly in the head ; Colonel Dobb killed ; Colonels Miller, McCormick, and Biggs wounded.

I shall burn the arsenal, naval foundry, and everything of service to the rebels ; but hold the place for you as long as I can do so without jeopardizing my command, or the campaign.

Three brigades of Forrest's are west of the Cahawba. I shall go after him as soon as I hear definitely from you. Hurry forward your gunboats and transports ; relieve me of my capture, and let me finish up the balance of the rebel cavalry. I may possibly move to Montgomery, if I find that I can do so soon enough.

J. H. WILSON,

Brevet Major-General

Major-General E. R. S. CANBY,
Mobile, Alabama.HEADQUARTERS, CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
SELMA, April 5, 1865. }

GENERAL—I have about two thousand prisoners of war, a number of them first and second class militia, captured at this place, besides the sick and wounded in the hospitals in this city. I am willing to release them at once on parole, subject to exchange hereafter, provided the necessary arrangements can be made. I make this proposition to save the country through which they will be compelled to march north from the injury that will necessarily be inflicted upon it by the impressment of supplies for so large a body of men, and in the hope that the aged and respectable gentlemen of this city so indiscreetly impressed into its defence may be spared the toilsome and painful march they will be compelled to make, unless my proposition is accepted by the Confederate authorities. This communication will be handed you by Captain Hosea of my staff, who is authorized to enter into the necessary arrangements, and who, if granted, can explain more fully my views.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

(Signed)

J. H. WILSON,

Brevet Major-General.

Lieutenant-General RICHARD TAYLOR,
Commanding Confederate Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, Demopolis or elsewhere.

(Official)

J. H. WILSON,

Brevet Major-General.

(Declined.)

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
SELMA, ALABAMA, April 7, 1865. }*(Special Field Order No. 16.)*

The Brevet Major-General commanding congratulates the officers and men of the cavalry corps upon their late signal victory. After a march of nearly three hundred miles over bad roads, through a sterile and mountainous country, passing wide and rapid rivers, you in twelve days found yourselves in front of Selma, with its arsenals, foundries, and workshops, the most important city in the south-west. The enemy attempted to delay our march at Ebenezer Church, and paid the penalty of his temerity by leaving three guns and two hundred prisoners in your hands. Selma lay before you surrounded by two lines of entrenchments, the outer one continuous, flanked by impassable swamps, covered by stockades, and defended by seven thousand troops under the command of Lieutenant-General Forrest. Like an avalanche the intrepid soldiers of the Second division

swept over the defences on the Summerfield road, while the Fourth division carried those on the Plantersville road. The enemy, astonished and disheartened, broke from their strong works, and Selma was fairly won.

The enemy, under Chalmers, attempted to drive in the Second division picket line during the battle, and go to the rescue of the rebel garrison, but their efforts were futile, and they were compelled to retreat rapidly beyond the Cahawba. The First division, in the mean time, was making hard marches, harassing in front and rear the bewildered rebels under Jackson. The wagon train had been left behind, that your march might not be impeded, but has arrived in safety, its guard having frustrated all attempts of the enemy to delay its progress. Soldiers, you have been called upon to perform long marches and endure privations, but your General relied upon and believed in your capacity and courage to undergo every task imposed upon you. Trusting in your valor, discipline, and armament, he did not hesitate to attack entrenchments believed by the rebel leaders to be impregnable, and which might well have caused double your numbers of veteran infantry to hesitate. You have fully justified his opinions, and may justly regard yourselves invincible. Your achievements will always be considered among the most remarkable in the annals of cavalry. The fruits of your victory are numerous and important. Twenty-six field guns and one thirty-pounder Parrott captured on the field of battle, and over seventy pieces of heavy ordnance in the arsenal and foundry; two thousand prisoners, a number of battle-flags, the naval foundry and machine shops, the extensive arsenal, filled with every variety of military munitions, and large quantities of commissary and quartermaster's stores in depot.

During your march you have destroyed seven iron works and foundries, several factories and collieries, many railroad bridges and trestle works, and large quantities of cotton. While you exult in the success which has crowned your arms, do not forget the memory of those who died that you might conquer.

By command of Brevet Major-General Wilson.

E. B. BEAUMONT,
Major and A. G.

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS, CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MONTGOMERY, ALABAMA, April 12, 1865. }

Major-General Canby, Mobile, Alabama:

My command took possession of this place yesterday morning after slight skirmishing; Buford and Adams have fled in the direction of Columbus. Most of the stores have been moved to that place and Macon. There are no forces in Alabama that can resist you, or even stand before my corps. You have only to move into the interior, occupy Selma and Mont-

gomery, and restore the State to the Union. You will find a most admirable condition of affairs, plenty of forage and provisions. Half of your force can complete the work after Mobile is taken.

My orders were to make a demonstration towards Selma and Tuscaloosa, and then to act as I might think best. Having destroyed those places, and everything of value between here and the Tennessee river, and in consideration of General Grant's late victory, and the capture of Richmond, as well as your capacity to effectually dispose of the rebels in this State, I have determined to move at once and rapidly towards Columbus and Macon. If I can destroy the arsenals at those places, the rebel armies must fall to pieces for want of munitions. There are but few troops to resist my march. My command is in splendid condition, every man mounted, plenty of ammunition, and in splendid spirits.

Forrest is between the Cahawba and Demopolis, unless he has moved to follow me. I am sorry I have not been able to hear from you. I have already delayed longer than I expected in this region.

In evacuating this place the rebels destroyed eighty-five thousand bales of cotton. We have destroyed trains, stores, and everything else of value. We captured twenty-six field guns, thirty-pounder Parrott, and two thousand six hundred prisoners at Selma, five field guns here and some prisoners.

My command will march from here early tomorrow. This will be handed to you by Sergeant Bailey, Fourth Michigan cavalry. Please have him rewarded, and return him as soon as you can.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[In Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
COLUMBIA, GEORGIA, April 17, 1865. }

*Major-General E. R. S. Canby, Mobile, Alabama,
Commanding Officer at Pensacola:*

My forces captured this place by a most gallant attack at ten o'clock last night; twenty-five men killed and wounded. Captured about fifteen hundred prisoners, many colors, twenty-four field guns, and one gunboat, carrying six rifled seven-inch. Generals Cobb and Buford escaped in the dark. Major-General Upton and Brigadier-General Winslow deserve the highest commendation for their personal intrepidity and good management.

General Winslow is burning the navy yard, foundries, arsenals, armory, railroad stock, depots, and cotton warehouses to-day. The value in Confederate currency of the property destroyed cannot be computed. A part of my corps is now moving eastward, and everything will follow in the morning. I anticipate no great difficulty. My command is in magnificent condition. Please communicate this despatch to

Generals Thomas and Grant, and direct the Quartermaster's department to reward the bearer.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GEORGIA, April 20, 1865.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, through Headquarters General Beauregard:

My advance received the surrender of this city this evening.

General Cobb had previously sent me, under flag of truce, a copy of a telegram from General Beauregard, declaring the existence of an armistice between all the troops under your command, and those under General Johnston.

Without questioning the authenticity of this despatch, or its application to my command, I could not communicate orders to my advance in time to prevent the capture of the place; I shall therefore hold its garrison, including Major-Generals G. W. Smith and Cobb, and Brigadier-General Mackall, prisoners of war. Please send me orders. I shall remain here a reasonable length of time to hear from you.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram in Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GEORGIA, April 21, 1865.

Major-General W. T. Sherman, North Carolina:

I left Chickasaw with three (3) divisions on the twenty-second March; destroyed all the foundries and rolling mills in Northern Alabama; defeated Forrest, Adams, and Roddy at Ebenezer station, south of Montevallo. April first, captured three hundred prisoners and three (3) guns. Assaulted and captured Selma the evening of the second, with twenty-seven hundred (2,700) prisoners, twenty-eight (28) field guns, and one (1) thirty-pound Parrott in action, besides about fifty pieces of various calibre in the town. Burned arsenal, foundries, rolling mills, and large quantities of stores; drove Forrest to the west side of the Cahawba; destroyed the bridges; built a pontoon bridge across the Alabama; marched to Montgomery, which capitulated on the fourteenth; destroyed the arsenal, foundry, five steamboats, and five field guns; marched thence to Columbia, sending a strong column to West Point.

General Upton assaulted and carried the defenses of Columbia, ten P. M. on the seventeenth; captured thirteen hundred prisoners, fifty-two field guns, in position, destroyed one hundred thousand bales of cotton, the arsenal, foundry, armory, navy yard, one iron-clad ram, mounting six (6) guns, nearly ready for sea, four (4) extensive factories, fifteen locomotives, and a very large quantity of military stores of every kind.

The same day Colonel La Grange took West

Point, two hundred prisoners, killed General Tyler, captured three hundred cars, and fifteen locomotives.* Both columns converged in this place, where they arrived last night. The rebels destroyed twenty-eight thousand bales of cotton at Selma, and eighty-five thousand at Montgomery. The damage inflicted upon the rebels up to this time cannot be reckoned in Confederate currency.

Croxtan's brigade left me at Elyton, burnt Tuscaloosa, and when last heard from was near Columbus, Mississippi. I have organized and partially armed three negro regiments. My command is in excellent condition, and can go anywhere. I have no definite information from Canby, but rumors that he had taken Mobile; I know he ought to have done so some time ago.

Shall wait here a few days to rest, and wait a reply to my despatch of last night.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

General Wilson presents his compliments to General Beauregard, and requests him to forward this telegram to General Sherman. It has no reference to future operations or plans, but relates purely to what has already transpired. It is sent in cipher merely to insure its correct transmittal. If the General desires it, the message may be repeated in its original form for his information.

[In cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M.,
MACON, GEORGIA, May 21, 1865.

Major-General E. R. S. Canby, Commanding Military Division West Mississippi, near Mobile, Alabama.

GENERAL—This place surrendered to me last night unconditionally. Major-Generals Cobb, G. W. Smith, and Brigadier General Mackall, with 1,500 militia, are prisoners.

Since arriving here, I have received through General Cobb, a copy of an official despatch from General J. E. Johnston, declaring the existence of an armistice between the troops under his command, and those under General Sherman, for the purpose of arranging terms of agreement between the belligerents. General Cobb has also received a despatch ordering him to communicate this information to General Taylor, who is requested to solicit an extension of its terms to your forces and his own. My own impression is that it is not contemplated by our authorities that a general armistice should be declared, or that its terms should apply to your or my forces. There is no doubt, however, that General Lee and his army are prisoners of war, and that General Johnston is in command of the Confederate forces. I have telegraphic communication through the rebel lines and General

* Nineteen locomotives, the entire stock of the Atlanta and Montgomery roads, were destroyed by La Grange.

Beauregard's headquarters to Goldsboro, N. C., and have sent a message to General Sherman.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., April 21, 1865, 8 P. M. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, through General J. E. Johnston :

Your despatch of yesterday is just received. I shall at once proceed to carry out your instructions.

If proper arrangements can be made to have sugar, coffee, and clothing sent from Savannah to Augusta, they can be brought hither by way of Atlanta, or they can be sent by boat directly to this place from Darien.

I shall be able to get forage, bread, and meat from south-western Georgia, the railroad from Atlanta to Dalton or Cleveland cannot be repaired in three months.

I have arranged to send an officer at once, *via* Eufala, to General Canby, with a copy of your despatch. General Cobb will also notify General Taylor of the armistice. I have about three thousand (3,000) prisoners of war, including Generals Cobb, Smith, Mackall, Mercer, and Robertson. Can't you arrange with General Johnston for their immediate release? Please answer at once. I shall start a staff officer to you to-morrow.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[By telegraph.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., April 23, 1865. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding Military Division of the Mississippi, Raleigh, North Carolina :

In compliance with instructions by telegraph through General J. E. Johnston, I have the honor to send to your headquarters, Captain L. M. Hosea, Sixteenth U. S. Infantry and Acting Aide-de-camp of my staff. I have conferred fully with him in regard to the status of affairs here under the armistice; he can, therefore, give you all necessary information.

I have also sent you several communications through the telegraph, but have received no notice of their having reached you. Be good enough to send me definite instructions for my future government, and make the necessary arrangements for forwarding to us supplies of small stores and clothing. I have directed Captain Hosea to see my chief quartermaster and commissary before returning, and give them such instructions after conference with you as may be necessary.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram in Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GEORGIA, April 23, 1865. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, Raleigh, North Carolina :

An officer under flag of truce from Columbus reports that Canby has captured Spanish fort and Mobile, with the garrison of the fort. Selma and Montgomery were occupied a few days ago by our troops. Forrest and a part of the garrison of Mobile have retreated into Mississippi.

(Signed)

J. S. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

Official :

Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GEORGIA, April 29, 1865. }

To General Grant or General Thomas :

General Sherman has directed me to open a supply line for my command by the way of Dalton and Atlanta. It will require days to repair the road. There are but few materials and means for that purpose to be had at this end of the line; please give the necessary instructions to have the work begun at Dalton and pushed forward as rapidly as possible to Atlanta. I am making arrangements to have everything done from this end that our means will permit.

General Cobb has turned over all the Confederate supplies under his control on the S. W. Railroad, and done all in his power to assist us in buying from the people, but it will be difficult to obtain a sufficient quantity of forage to last till the new crop is ready for use.

We shall soon begin to need small stores and clothing; they might be sent from Savannah to Augusta, or up the Altamaha and Ocmulgee to Buzzard Roost.

Both State and Confederate authorities seem anxious to give me all the assistance in their power. The people are well disposed and anxious for peace. By an arrangement with General Cobb I have paroled all of the prisoners captured in Georgia, besides the remnant of those brought from Alabama.

If Croxton's brigade were moved to Dalton it could protect the railroad repairs in that quarter in case guard should become necessary. There is enough C. S. A. cotton in store here to pay for opening the road.*

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GEORGIA, April 29, 1865. }

Lieutenant-General Grant and Major-General Thomas :

Since writing my last telegram General Croxton has joined me with his command in fine con-

* About five hundred bales of C. S. A., fifty thousand bales private, in warehouse.

dition. After burning Tuscaloosa, capturing three (3) guns and a number of prisoners, he moved toward Columbus, fought Wirt Adams near Eutaw; moved thence to Hanby's mill, on Black Warrior, crossed Coosa near Talladega, fought and dispersed Hill's forces between there and Blue Mountain, burned several factories and iron works,* and then marched *via* Carrolton, Newnan, and Zebulon to this place. General Croxton deserves great credit, and should be brevetted.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram in Cipher.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., April 30, 1865. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, Raleigh, North Carolina:

Since my telegram of to-day, I have received a despatch from General Steedman, Chattanooga, April 25th, through Generals Judah, Wofford, and Cobb, notifying me that the Government had refused to endorse your action in arranging an armistice with General Johnston, and declaring the resumption of hostilities. As the date of this despatch is prior to your last, I shall disregard it till further orders from you; please send me instructions at once. To begin hostilities again in this Department would be productive of great detriment to a final settlement.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

[Telegram.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., April 30, 1865. }

Major-General W. T. Sherman, Raleigh, North Carolina:

The telegram announcing the convention between yourself and General Johnston is just received.

I shall send Brevet Major-General Upton to Atlanta and Augusta to-morrow—and General McCook to Tallahassee—for the purpose of carrying out your instructions. An officer will start immediately to General Canby, to apprise him of what has transpired. He will carry copies of the despatches.

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

GREENSBORO, 30.

His Excellency Governor J. E. Brown:

The disaster in Virginia—the capture by the enemy of all our workshops for the preparation of ammunition and repairing arms; the impossibility of recruiting our little army—opposed by more than ten times its number—of supplying its wants, except by robbing our own citizens, destroyed all hopes of successful war. I have therefore made a military convention with General Sherman to terminate hostilities in North and South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. I

* There are no iron works or factories left in Georgia or Alabama.

made this convention to spare the blood of the gallant little army committed to me, to prevent further suffering of our people by the devastation and ruin inevitable from the marches of invading armies, and to avoid the crime of wanton, hopeless war.

J. E. JOHNSTON.

Official:

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, M. D. M., }
MACON, GA., May 3, 1865. }

GENERAL—Colonel Woodhall, of General Judah's command, delivered to me yesterday an official copy of your despatch of April 26, in regard to the resumption of hostilities, and the terms of capitulation which I might offer to the commanding General of the rebel forces in Georgia, Alabama, or Mississippi. I also received, yesterday, your despatch of 12 m., April 27, in regard to military operations and the apprehension of the rebel chiefs.

General Sherman had also sent scouts to me with the information that his action in arranging the armistice with General Johnston had been disapproved, and orders to resume hostilities; but prior to all of these, I received through telegraph his order of April 27, declaring the capitulation of all the rebel troops east of the Chattahoochie, and directing me to carry out terms of his convention with General Johnston, as they are the same as those you authorize me to offer, there being no resistance whatever to them upon the part of any rebel forces in this State or Florida, and no forces able to offer successful resistance. I do not suppose it to be the wish of the Secretary of War that I shall disregard them.

In view of these facts I have designated Brevet Major-General Upton to receive the surrender of the garrisons at Atlanta and Augusta; he left here for that purpose on the first instant, and reached Augusta this morning. I am expecting to hear from him every moment by telegraph.

I have sent Majors Williams, and McBurney, of my staff, to Milledgeville, to receive the surrender of the troops there, and to direct the transportation of the Confederate stores to the place. I have also demanded of Governor Brown, Commander-in-chief of the Georgia militia, the surrender of his troops and the military stores pertaining to them.

He is to meet me in person at this place to-morrow afternoon, for the purpose of arranging the details of the capitulation.

I have already conferred with General H. C. Wayne, Adjutant and Inspector-General, who assures me that the terms prescribed will be carried into effect.

General McCook will start to-morrow with a small force to Tallahassee, Florida, to receive the surrender of the troops under the command of General Sam Jones in that district.

As you doubtless know, General Cobb sur-

rendered this place, with its garrison, to me on the 20th of April, immediately after the appearance of my advance before it. Since then he has put my officers in possession of all the Confederate supplies within our reach by rail, in central and south-western Georgia. I can supply the command with bread and meat for sixty days, and forage for the same period, but must have funds at once. After the expiration of that time if troops are retained here, supplies must be sent to us from the North. I fear that great suffering will be inflicted upon some districts, even then, as it will require all the supplies now in the State to feed the people till the new crops can be used.

I have paroled the prisoners captured by my command since leaving the Tennessee river, nearly six thousand in all, including those taken at this place. They have been deprived of their arms, and are going to their homes in all directions.

The men belonging to Lee's army have been passing at the rate of nearly a thousand a day for the past week. Those surrendered by Johnston have begun to arrive.

I had also taken precautionary measures to prevent the escape of Jeff Davis, by sending scouts and detectives to watch the line of the Savannah river, and the roads leading through north Georgia. I have ordered troops to Atlanta and Newnan, to care for the public property, and effectually watch and guard the country to the north and eastward, connecting with General Judah's troops. I had also requested General Grierson, who arrived at Eufula the day before yesterday, to move by the way of Union Springs, Tuskegee, Montgomery, and Selma, towards Mississippi. He will send forward to put all the troops in central Alabama on the alert. Mr. Davis cannot possibly get through the country with wagons and a large escort, but it will be quite difficult to apprehend him if he attempt it well mounted with one or two attendants. I have already heard rumors, but which I can trace to no reliable source, that he went through this State between Atlanta and Marietta, five or six days ago.

As soon as I hear from General Upton I shall increase the force now on the way to Atlanta, so as to make it sufficient to meet all contingencies. Colonel Woodhall, by whom I send this, will explain more fully the condition of affairs in this section. I also send by him a summary of our operations, and copies of the original despatches, sent to you from time to time during the campaign.

As a matter of protection to the command, I have organized, armed, and equipped three full regiments of colored infantry since the capture of Selma. The men have all been carefully examined by medical officers. They cannot be excelled for physical qualities, according to the report of the surgeons, and as abundantly proved by the fact that they have marched upon several occasions thirty-five miles per day.

What shall I do with them? If directed to

perfect their organization and discipline I can make them extremely useful, as train guards, garrison, &c. Please send me the necessary authority, if it is the policy of the Government to call into service any new regiments of this sort. If they are to be disbanded they can be used in repairing the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad.

In order to obtain small stores and clothing, I have sent a steamboat down the Ocmulgee and Altamaha to Darien and Savannah. It will require about ten days for the round trip. I think I can supply everything that we may need in that way till the railroad is opened.

My command is splendidly mounted, in most admirable discipline, and in every way ready for any service that may be assigned it. It has aided our cause as much by the influence of its discipline and good behavior as by its gallantry and endurance.

It may not be improper to say before closing this letter that the present condition of affairs is accepted throughout Alabama and Georgia, as far as I can learn, by all classes with becoming resignation, and in the hope that they will soon enjoy the privileges of peace, commerce, and good law. I am told by men of good judgment and unquestioned loyalty, that seven-eighths of the people are ready and anxious for a return to their duties as citizens, without slavery, and under the laws of the land, whatever they may be. They express some anxiety in regard to confiscation and sweeping proscriptions, but seem to have confidence in the magnanimity of the Government. As a matter of course, from my position men of influence have inquired my views in regard to the civil and political matters. While I have endeavored as much as possible to avoid such questions, declaring that I could not speak officially, I have not hesitated to urge the civil officers of the peace to exert all of their powers in preserving good order throughout the community, by requesting the good citizens to resume their usual avocations, and compelling marauders and vagabonds to respect the new condition of affairs.

I have discountenanced everything like political meetings and discussions, and counselled the people to defer all political action till the excitement of the recent events has abated. I do not think a Legislature of State officers composed of men elected for their avowed hostility to the Union should be permitted at this time to exercise a controlling influence in determining the future conduct of the State. I shall, therefore, forbid any session of the Legislature, or the Assembly of any State or county convention, under such auspices as those to which I have mentioned, until the proper authority shall have been obtained from Washington, or till I shall have received definite instructions covering such matters. I am sure that when the soreness necessarily felt at defeat has been allayed, and the people have had time to think dispassionately, there will be no difficulty in re-establishing the relations of this State and Alabama with

the balance of the country upon whatever just and equitable basis the Government may designate.

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. WILSON,
Brevet Major-General.

Major-General GEORGE H. THOMAS,
Commanding Department of the Cumberland,
Nashville, Tennessee.

Doc. 117.

THE SHENANDOAH CAMPAIGN.

MAJOR-GENERAL SHERIDAN'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF, }
NEW ORLEANS, February 3, 1866. }

Brevet Major-General J. A. Rawlins, Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

GENERAL—I have the honor to make the following report of the campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah, commencing August fourth, 1864.

On the evening of the first of August I was relieved from the command of the cavalry corps of the Army of the Potomac, to take command of the Army of the Shenandoah, and, on arriving at Washington on the fourth instant, I received directions from Major-General H. W. Halleck, Chief of the Staff, to proceed without delay to Monocacy Junction, on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, and report in person to the Lieutenant-General. At Monocacy the Lieutenant-General turned over to me the instructions which he had previously given to Major-General Hunter, commanding the Department of West Virginia, a copy of which is herewith attached.

The Army of the Shenandoah at this time consisted of the Sixth corps, very much reduced in numbers, one division of the Nineteenth corps, two small infantry divisions under command of General Crook, afterwards designated as the Army of West Virginia, a small division of cavalry under General Averell, which was at that time in pursuit of General McCausland, near Moorefield, McCausland having made a raid into Pennsylvania and burned the town of Chambersburg; there was also one small division of cavalry, then arriving at Washington, from my old corps.

The infantry portion of these troops had been lying in bivouac in the vicinity of Monocacy Junction and Frederick City, but had been ordered to march the day I reported, with directions to concentrate at Halltown, four miles in front of Harper's Ferry. After my interview with the Lieutenant-General, I hastened to Harper's Ferry to make preparations for an immediate advance against the enemy, who then occupied Martinsburg, Williamsport, and Shepherdstown, sending occasional raiding parties as far as Hagerstown. The concentration of my command at Halltown alarmed the enemy, and caused him to concentrate at or near Martinsburg, drawing in all his parties from the north

side of the Potomac. The indications were that he had intended another raid into Maryland, prompted perhaps by the slight success he had gained over General Crook's command at Kernstown, a short time before. The city of Martinsburg, at which the enemy concentrated, is on the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, at the northern terminus of the valley pike, a broad macadamized road running up the valley, through Winchester, and terminating at Staunton. The Shenandoah valley is a continuation of the Cumberland valley, south of the Potomac, and is bounded on the east by the Blue Ridge, and on the west by the eastern slope of the Alleghany mountains, the general direction of these chains being south-west.

The valley at Martinsburg is about sixty miles broad, at Winchester forty to forty-five, and at Strasburg twenty-five to thirty miles, where an isolated chain, called Massanutten mountain, rises up running parallel to the Blue Ridge, and terminates at Harrisonburg; here the valley again opens out fifty or sixty miles broad. This isolated chain divides the valley, for its continuance, into two valleys, the one next the Blue Ridge being called the Luray valley, the one west of it the Strasburg or main valley. The Blue Ridge has many passes through it called gaps, the principal ones and those which have good wagon roads, are Snicker's Ashby's, Manassas, Chester, Thoroughfare, Swift Run, Brown's, Rock-fish, and two or three others from the latter one up to Lynchburg. Many have macadamized roads through them, and, indeed, are not gaps, but small valleys through the main chain. The general bearing of all these roads is towards Gordonsville, and are excellent for troops to move upon from that point into the valley; in fact, the Blue Ridge can be crossed almost anywhere by infantry or cavalry.

The valley itself was rich in grain, cattle, sheep, hogs, and fruit, and was in such a prosperous condition that the rebel army could march down and up it, billeting on the inhabitants. Such, in brief, is the outline, and was the condition of the Shenandoah valley when I entered it August fourth, 1864.

Great exertions were made to get the troops in readiness for an advance, and on the morning of August tenth, General Torbert's division of cavalry having joined me from Washington, a forward movement was commenced. The enemy, while we were making our preparations, took position at Bunker Hill and vicinity, twelve miles south of Martinsburg, frequently pushing his scouting parties through Smithfield and up to Charlestown. Torbert was ordered to move on the Berryville pike, through Berryville, and go into position near White Post; the Sixth corps moved *via* the Charleston and Summit Point road to Clifton; the Nineteenth corps moved on the Berryville pike, to the left of the position of the Sixth corps at Clifton; General Crook's command *via* Kabletown, to the vicinity of Berryville, coming into position on the left of

the Nineteenth corps; and Colonel Lowell, with two small regiments of cavalry, was ordered to Summit Point; so that on the night of August tenth, the army occupied a position stretching from Clifton to Berryville, with cavalry at White Post and Summit Point. The enemy moved from vicinity of Bunker Hill, stretching his line from where the Winchester and Potomac railroad crosses Opequan creek, to where the Berryville and Winchester pike crosses the same stream, occupying the west bank. On the morning of August eleventh, the Sixth corps was ordered to move from Clifton across the country to where the Berryville pike crosses Opequan creek, carry the crossing, and hold it; the Nineteenth corps was directed to move through Berryville, on the White Post road, for one mile, file to the right by heads of regiments, at deploying distances, and carry and hold the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about three-fourths of a mile from the left of the Sixth corps; Crook's command was ordered to move out on the White Post road, one mile and a half beyond Berryville, file to the right and secure the crossing of Opequan creek at a ford about one mile to the left of the Nineteenth corps; Torbert was directed to move with Merritt's division of cavalry up the Millwood pike towards Winchester, attack any force he might find, and, if possible, ascertain the movements of the rebel army. Lowell was ordered to close in from Summit Point on the right of the Sixth corps.

My intention in securing these fords was to march on Winchester, at which point, from all my information on the tenth, I thought the enemy would make a stand. In this I was mistaken, as the results of Torbert's reconnoissance proved. Merritt found the enemy's cavalry covering the Millwood pike west of the Opequan, and, attacking it, drove it in the direction of Kernstown, and discovered the enemy retreating up the valley pike.

As soon as this information was obtained, Torbert was ordered to move quickly, *via* the toll gate on the Front Royal pike, to Newtown, to strike the enemy's flank, and harass him in his retreat, and Lowell to follow up through Winchester. Crook was turned to the left and ordered to Stony Point, or Nineveh, while Emory and Wright were marched to the left, and went into camp between the Millwood and Front Royal pikes, Crook encamping at Strong Point. Torbert met some of the enemy's cavalry at the toll gate on the Front Royal pike, drove it in the direction of Newtown, and behind Gordon's division of infantry, which had been thrown out from Newtown to cover the flank of the main column in its retreat, and which had put itself behind rail barricades. A portion of Merritt's cavalry attacked this infantry, and drove in its skirmish line, and although unable to dislodge the division, held all the ground gained. The rebel division during the night moved off. Next day Crook moved from Stony Point to Cedar creek, Emory followed; the cavalry

moved to the same point, *via* Newtown and the valley pike, and the Sixth corps followed the cavalry. On the night of the twelfth, Crook was in position at Cedar creek, on the left of the valley pike, Emory on the right of the pike, the Sixth corps on the right of Emory, and the cavalry on the right and left flanks. A heavy skirmish line was thrown to the heights on the south side of Cedar creek, which had brisk skirmishing during the evening with the enemy's pickets; his (the enemy's) main force occupying the heights above and north of Strasburg. On the morning of the thirteenth, the cavalry was ordered on a reconnoissance towards Strasburg, on the middle road, which road is two and a half miles to the west of the main pike.

Reports of a column of the enemy moving up from Culpepper Court-house, and approaching Front Royal through Chester gap, having been received, caused me much anxiety, as any considerable force advanced through Front Royal, and down the F. R. and W. pike toward Winchester, could be thrown in my rear, or, in case of my driving the enemy to Fisher's hill, and taking position in his front, this same force could be moved along the base of Massanutten mountain on the road to Strasburg, with the same result.

As my effective line of battle strength at this time was about eighteen thousand infantry, and thirty-five hundred cavalry, I remained quiet during the day—except the activity on the skirmish line—to await further developments. In the evening the enemy retired with his main force to Fisher's hill. As the rumors of an advancing force from the direction of Culpepper kept increasing, on the morning of the fourteenth I sent a brigade of cavalry to Front Royal, to ascertain definitely, if possible, the truth of such reports, and at the same time crossed the Sixth corps to the south side of Cedar creek and occupied the heights above Strasburg. Considerable picket firing ensued. During the day I received from Colonel Chipman, of the Adjutant-General's office, the following despatch, he having ridden with great haste from Washington through Snicker's gap, escorted by a regiment of cavalry, to deliver the same. It at once explained the movement from Culpepper, and on the morning of the fifteenth, the remaining two brigades of Merritt's division of cavalry were ordered to the crossing of the Shenandoah river near Front Royal, and the Sixth corps withdrawn to the north side of Cedar creek, holding at Strasburg a strong skirmish line.

(By Telegraph, received in Clipher.)

CITY POINT, August 12, 1861, 9 A. M.

Major General Halleck:

Inform General Sheridan that it is now certain two divisions of infantry have gone to Early, and some cavalry and twenty pieces of artillery. This movement commenced last Saturday night; he must be cautious, and act now

on the defensive until movements here force them to this—to send this way.

Early's force, with this increase, cannot exceed forty thousand men, but this is too much for General Sheridan to attack. Send General Sheridan the remaining brigade of the Nineteenth corps.

I have ordered to Washington all the one hundred day men. Their time will soon be out, but, for the present, they will do to serve in the defense.

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

The receipt of this despatch was very important to me, as I possibly would have remained in uncertainty as to the character of the force coming in on my flank and rear, until it attacked the cavalry, as it did on the sixteenth.

I at once looked over the map of the valley for a defensive line (that is, where a smaller number of troops could hold a greater number) and could see but one such. I refer to that at Halltown, in front of Harper's Ferry. Subsequent experience has convinced me that no other really defensive line exists in the Shenandoah valley. I therefore determined to move back to Halltown, carry out my instructions to destroy forage and subsistence, and increase my strength by Grover's division of the Nineteenth corps, and Wilson's division of cavalry, both of which were marching to join me, *via* Snicker's gap. Emory was ordered to move to Winchester on the night of the fifteenth, and, on the night of the sixteenth, the Sixth corps and Crook's command were ordered to Clifton, *via* Winchester. In the movement to the rear to Halltown, the following orders were given to the cavalry and were executed:

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, }
CEDAR CREEK, VA., August 18, 1864. }

To Brigadier-General A. T. A. Torbert, Chief of Cavalry, Middle Military Division.

GENERAL—In compliance with instructions of the Lieutenant-General commanding, you will make the necessary arrangements and give the necessary orders for the destruction of the wheat and hay south of a line from Millwood to Winchester, and Petticoat gap. You will seize all mules, horses, and cattle that may be useful to our army. Loyal citizens can bring in their claims against the Government for this necessary destruction.

No houses will be burned, and officers in charge of this delicate but necessary duty must inform the people that the object is to make this valley untenable for the raiding parties of the rebel army.

Very respectfully,
P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General Commanding.

On the afternoon of the sixteenth I moved my headquarters back to Winchester; while moving back (at Newtown) I heard cannonading at or near Front Royal, and on reaching

Winchester, Merritt's couriers brought despatches from him, stating that he had been attacked at the crossing of the Shenandoah by Kershaw's division of Longstreet's corps, and two brigades of rebel cavalry, and that he had handsomely repulsed the attack, capturing two battle flags and three hundred prisoners. During the night of the sixteenth, and early on the morning of the seventeenth, Emory moved from Winchester to Berryville, and, on the morning of the seventeenth, Crook and Wright reached Winchester and resumed the march toward Clifton; Wright, who had the rear guard, getting only as far as the Berryville crossing of the Opequan, where he was ordered to remain; Crook getting to the vicinity of Berryville. Lowell reached Winchester with his two regiments of cavalry on the afternoon of the seventeenth, where he was joined by General Wilson's division of cavalry. Merritt, after his handsome engagement near Front Royal, was ordered back to the vicinity of White Post, and General Grover's division joined Emory at Berryville. The enemy having a signal station on Three-top mountain, almost overhanging Strasburg, and from which every movement made by our troops could be seen, was notified early in the morning of the seventeenth as to this condition of affairs, and without delay followed after us, getting into Winchester about sundown, and driving out General Torbert, who was left there with Wilson and Lowell, and the Jersey brigade of the Sixth corps. Wilson and Lowell fell back to Summit Point, and the Jersey brigade joined its corps at the crossing of the Opequan. Kershaw's division, and two brigades of Fitz Lee's cavalry division, which was the force at Front Royal, joined Early at Winchester, I think, on the evening of the seventeenth.

On the eighteenth the Sixth corps moved, *via* Clifton, to Flowing Spring, two miles and a half west of Charlestown, on the Smithfield pike; Emory about two miles and a half south of Charlestown, on the Berryville pike; Merritt came back to Berryville; Wilson remained at Summit Point, covering the crossing of Opequan creek as far north as the bridge at Smithfield; Merritt covering the crossing of the Berryville pike; Crook remained near Clifton, and the next day moved to the left of Emory. This position was maintained until the twenty-first, when the enemy moved a heavy force across the Opequan at the bridge at Smithfield, driving in the cavalry pickets which fell back to Summit Point, and advanced rapidly on the position of the Sixth corps, near Flowing Springs, when a very sharp and obstinate skirmish took place with the heavy picket line of that corps, resulting very much in its favor. The enemy appeared to have thought that I had taken position near Summit Point, and that by moving around rapidly through Smithfield he would get into my rear. In this, however, he was mistaken. During the day Merritt (who had been attacked and held his ground) was recalled from Berryville. Wilson had also been attacked

by infantry, and had also held his ground until ordered in. During the night of the twenty-first the army moved back to Halltown without inconvenience or loss; the cavalry, excepting Lowell's command, which formed on the left, moving early on the morning of the twenty-second, and going into position on the right of the line.

On the morning of the twenty-second the enemy moved up to Charlestown and pushed well up to my position at Halltown, skirmishing with the cavalry *videttes*.

The despatches received from the Lieutenant-General commanding, from Captain G. K. Leet, A. A. G., at Washington, and information derived from my scouts, and from prisoners captured, was of so conflicting and contradictory a nature, that I determined to ascertain if possible, while on this defensive line, what reinforcements had actually been received by the enemy. This could only be done by frequent reconnoissances, and their results convinced me that but one division of infantry, Kershaw's, and one division of cavalry, Fitz Lee's, had joined him.

On the twenty-third I ordered a reconnoissance by Crook, who was on the left, resulting in a small capture, and a number of casualties to the enemy.

On the twenty-fourth another reconnoissance was made, capturing a number of prisoners, our own loss being about thirty men. On the twenty-fifth there was sharp picket firing during the day on part of the infantry line. The cavalry was ordered to attack the enemy's cavalry at Kearneysville. This attack was handsomely made, but, instead of finding the enemy's cavalry, his infantry was encountered, and for a time doubled up and thrown into the utmost confusion. It was marching towards Shepards-town. This engagement was somewhat of a mutual surprise—our cavalry expecting to meet the enemy's cavalry, and his infantry expecting no opposition whatever. General Torbert, who was in command, finding a large force of the rebel infantry in his front, came back to our left, and the enemy believing his (the enemy's) movements had been discovered, and that the force left by him in my front at Halltown would be attacked, returned in great haste, but, before doing so, isolated Custer's brigade, which had to cross to the north side of the Potomac, at Shepards-town, and join me *via* Harper's Ferry.

For my own part I believed Early meditated a crossing of his cavalry into Maryland, at Williamsport, and I sent Wilson's division around by Harper's Ferry to watch its movements. Averell in the mean time had taken post at Williamsport, on the north side of the Potomac, and held the crossing against a force of rebel cavalry which made the attempt to cross. On the night of the twenty-sixth the enemy silently left my front, moving over Opequan creek, at the Smithfield and Summit Point crossings, and concentrating his force at Brucetown

and Bunker Hill, leaving his cavalry at Leetown and Smithfield.

On the twenty-eighth I moved in front of Charlestown with the infantry, and directed Merritt to attack the enemy's cavalry at Leetown, which he did, defeating it, and pursuing it through Smithfield. Wilson recrossed the Potomac at Shepards-town, and joined the infantry in front of Charlestown.

On the twenty-ninth Averell crossed at Williamsport and advanced to Martinsburg. On the same day two divisions of the enemy's infantry, and a small force of cavalry, attacked Merritt at the Smithfield bridge, and, after a hard fight, drove him through Smithfield and back towards Charlestown, the cavalry fighting with great obstinacy until I could reinforce it with Rickett's division of the Sixth corps, when in turn the enemy was driven back through Smithfield, and over the Opequan, the cavalry again taking post at the Smithfield bridge.

On the thirtieth Torbert was directed to move Merritt and Wilson to Berryville, leaving Lowell to guard the Smithfield bridge and occupy the town.

On the thirty-first Averell was driven back from Martinsburg to Falling Waters.

From the first to the third of September nothing of importance occurred.

On the third, Averell, who had returned to Martinsburg, advanced on Bunker Hill, attacked McCausland's cavalry, defeated it, capturing wagons and prisoners, and destroying a good deal of property. The infantry moved into position stretching from Clifton to Berryville, Wright moving by Summit Point, Crook and Emory by the Berryville pike; Torbert had been ordered to White Post early in the day, and the enemy, supposing he could cut him off, pushed across the Opequan towards Berryville with Kershaw's division in advance, but this division not expecting infantry, blundered on to Crook's lines about dark, and was vigorously attacked and driven with heavy loss back towards the Opequan. This engagement, which was after nightfall, was very spirited, and our own and the enemy's casualties severe.

From this time until the nineteenth of September I occupied the line from Clifton to Berryville, transferring Cook to Summit Point on the eighth, to use him as a movable column to protect my right flank and line to Harper's Ferry, while the cavalry threatened the enemy's right flank and his line of communications up the valley.

The difference of strength between the two opposing forces at this time was but little.

As I had learned, beyond doubt, from my scouts, that Kershaw's division, which consisted of four brigades, was to be ordered back to Richmond, I had for two weeks patiently waited its withdrawal before attacking, believing the condition of affairs throughout the country required great prudence on my part, that a defeat of the forces of my command could be ill-afford-

ed, and knowing that no interests in the valley, save those of the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, were suffering by the delay. In this view I was coinciding with the Lieutenant-General commanding.

Although the main force remained without change of position from September third to nineteenth, still the cavalry was employed every day in harassing the enemy, its opponents being principally infantry. In these skirmishes the cavalry was becoming educated to attack infantry lines.

On the thirteenth, one of these handsome dashes was made by General McIntosh, of Wilson's division, capturing the Eighth South Carolina regiment at Abram's creek; on the same day Getty's division of the Sixth corps made a reconnoissance to the Opequan, developing a heavy force of the enemy at Edwards' Crossing.

The position which I had taken at Clifton was six miles from Opequan creek, on the west bank of which the enemy was in position. This distance of six miles I determined to hold as my territory by scouting parties, and in holding it in this way, without pushing up the main force, I expected to be able to move on the enemy at the proper time, without his obtaining the information which he would immediately get from his pickets, if I was in close proximity.

On the night of the fifteenth I received reliable information that Kershaw's division was moving through Winchester, and in the direction of Front Royal. Then our time had come, and I almost made up my mind that I would fight at Newtown, on the valley pike, give up my line to the rear, and take that of the enemy. From my position at Clifton I could throw my force into Newtown before Early could get information and move to that point I was a little timid about this movement until the arrival of General Grant at Charlestown, who endorsed it, and the order for the movement was made out, but, in consequence of a report from General Averell, on the afternoon of the eighteenth of September, that Early had moved two divisions to Martinsburg, I changed this programme, and determined to first catch the two divisions remaining in vicinity of Stevenson's depot, and then the two sent to Martinsburg, in detail. This information was the cause of the battle of Opequan, instead of the battle of Newtown.

At three o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth September the army moved to the attack. Torbert was directed to advance with Merritt's division of cavalry from Summit Point, carry the crossings of Opequan creek, and form a junction at some point near Stevenson's depot with Averell, who moved from Darksville. Wilson was ordered to move rapidly up the Berryville pike from Berryville, carry its crossing of the Opequan, and charge through the gorge or cañon, the attack to be supported by the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, both of which moved across the country to the same crossing

of the Opequan. Crook moved across country to be in reserve at the same point.

Wilson, with McIntosh's brigade leading, made a gallant charge through the long cañon, and meeting the advance of Ramseur's rebel infantry division, drove it back and captured the earthwork at the mouth of the cañon; this movement was immediately followed up by the Sixth corps. The Nineteenth corps was directed, for convenience of movement, to report to General Wright on its arrival at Opequan creek. I followed up the cavalry attack, and selected the ground for the formation of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, which went into line under a heavy artillery fire.

A good deal of time was lost in this movement through the cañon, and it was not till perhaps nine o'clock A. M., that the order for the advance in line was given. I had, from early in the morning, become apprised that I would have to engage Early's entire army, instead of two divisions, and determined to attack with the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, holding Crook's command as a turning column to use only when the crisis of the battle occurred, and that I would put him in on my left, and still get the valley pike. The attack was therefore made by the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, in very handsome style, and under a heavy fire from the enemy, who held a line which gave him the cover of slight brushwood and corn-fields.

The resistance during this attack was obstinate, and, as there were no earthworks to protect, deadly to both sides.

The enemy, after the contest had been going on for some time, made a counter charge, striking the right of the Sixth corps and left of the Nineteenth, driving back the centre of my line.

It was at this juncture that I ordered a brigade of Russell's division of the Sixth corps to wait till the enemy's attacking column presented its flank, then to strike it with vigor. This was handsomely done, the brigade being led by General Russell, and its commander, Upton, in person; the enemy in turn was driven back, our line re-established, and most of the two or three thousand men who had gone to the rear brought back.

I still would not order Crook in, but placed him directly in rear of the line of battle; as the reports, however, that the enemy were attempting to turn my right kept continually increasing, I was obliged to put him in on that flank instead of on the left, as was originally intended. He was directed to act as a turning column, to find the left of the enemy's line, strike it in flank or rear, break it up, and that I would order a left half wheel of the line of battle to support him. In this attack the enemy was driven in confusion from his position, and simultaneous with it Merritt and Averell, under Torbert, could be distinctly seen sweeping up the Martinsburg pike, driving the enemy's cavalry before them in a confused mass

through the broken infantry. I then rode along the line of the Nineteenth and Sixth corps, ordered their advance, and directed Wilson, who was on the left flank, to push on and gain the valley pike south of Winchester; after which I returned to the right, where the enemy was still fighting with obstinacy in the open ground in front of Winchester, and ordered Torbert to collect his cavalry and charge, which was done simultaneously with the infantry advance, and the enemy routed.

At daylight on morning of the twentieth of September the army moved rapidly up the valley pike in pursuit of the enemy, who had continued his retreat during the night to Fisher's hill, south of Strasburg.

Fisher's hill is the bluff immediately south of and over a little stream called Tumbling river, and is a position which was almost impregnable to a direct assault, and as the valley is but about three and a half miles wide at this point, the enemy considered himself secure on reaching it, and commenced erecting breastworks across the valley from Fisher's hill to North mountain; so secure, in fact, did he consider himself, that the ammunition boxes were taken from the caissons and placed for convenience behind the breastworks.

On the evening of September twentieth, Wright and Emory went into position on the heights of Strasburg, Crook north of Cedar creek, the cavalry to the right and rear of Wright, and Emory extending to the back road. This night I resolved to use a turning column again, and that I would move Crook, unperceived, if possible, over on to the face of Little North mountain, and let him strike the left and rear of the enemy's line, and then, if successful, make a left half wheel of the whole line of battle to his support. To do this required much secrecy, as the enemy had a signal station on Threetop mountain, from which he could see every movement made by our troops; therefore, during the night of the twentieth, I concealed Crook in the timber north of Cedar creek, where he remained during the twenty-first. On the same day I moved Wright and Emory up in the front of the rebel line, getting into proper position after a severe engagement between a portion of Rickett's and Getty's divisions of the Sixth corps, and a strong force of the enemy. Torbert, with Wilson's and Merritt's cavalry, was ordered down the Luray valley in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry, and, after defeating or driving it, to cross over Luray pike to New Market, and intercept the enemy's infantry should I drive it from the position at Fisher's hill.

On the night of the twenty-first, Crook was moved to, and concentrated in, the timber near Strasburg, and at daylight on the twenty-second marched to, and massed in, the timber near Little North mountain. I did not attempt to cover the long front presented by the enemy, but massed the Sixth and Nineteenth corps opposite the right centre of his line. After

Crook had gotten into the position last named, I took out Rickett's division of the Sixth corps and placed it opposite the enemy's left centre, and directed Averell with his cavalry to go up on Rickett's front and right, and drive in the enemy's skirmish line, if possible. This was done, and the enemy's signal officer on Threetop mountain, mistaking Rickett's division for my turning column, so notified the enemy, and he made his arrangements accordingly, whilst Crook, without being observed, moved on the side of Little North mountain, and struck the enemy's left and rear so suddenly and unexpectedly, that he (the enemy) supposing he must have come across the mountains, broke; Crook swinging down behind the line, Rickett's swinging in and joining Crook, and so on the balance of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, the rout of the enemy being complete.

Unfortunately the cavalry which I had sent down the Luray valley to cross over to New Market was unsuccessful, and only reached so far as Millford, a point at which the Luray valley contracts to a gorge, and which was taken possession of by the enemy's cavalry in some force. Had General Torbert driven this cavalry, or turned the defile and reached New Market, I have no doubt but that we would have captured the entire rebel army. I feel certain that its rout from Fisher's hill was such that there was scarcely a company organization held together. New Market being at a converging point in the valley they came together again, and to some extent reorganized. I did not wait to see the results of this victory, but pushed on during the night of the twenty-second to Woodstock, although the darkness and consequent confusion made the pursuit slow.

On the morning of September twenty-third, General Devins, with his small brigade of cavalry, moved to a point directly north of Mount Jackson, driving the enemy in his front, and there awaited the arrival of General Averell's division, which for some unaccountable reason went into camp immediately after the battle. General Averell reached Devins' command at three o'clock p. m. and, in the evening, returned with all the advance cavalry of which he was in command, to a creek one half mile north of Hawkinsburg, and there remained until the arrival of the head of the infantry column, which had halted between Edinburg and Woodstock for wagons, in order to issue the necessary rations.

Early on the morning of the twenty-fourth the entire army reached Mount Jackson, a small town on the north bank of the north fork of the Shenandoah. The enemy had in the mean time reorganized, and taken position on the bluff, south of the river, but had commenced this same morning his retreat toward Harrisonburg; still, he held a long and strong line with the troops that were to cover his rear, in a temporary line of rifle-pits on the bluff commanding the plateau.

To dislodge him from his strong position,

Devins' brigade of cavalry was directed to cross the Shenandoah, work around the base of the Massanutten range, and drive in the cavalry which covered his (the enemy's) right flank; and Powell, who had succeeded Averell, was ordered to move around his left flank *via* Simberville, whilst the infantry was rushed across the river by the bridge.

The enemy did not wait the full execution of these movements, but withdrew in haste, the cavalry under Devins coming up with him at Newmarket, and made a bold attempt to hold him until I could push up our infantry, but was unable to do so as the open, smooth country allowed him (the enemy) to retreat with great rapidity in line of battle, and the three or four hundred cavalry under Devins was unable to break this line. Our infantry was pushed by heads of columns very hard to overtake, and bring on an engagement, but could not succeed, and encamped about six miles south of Newmarket for the night.

Powell meantime had pushed on through Simberville, and gained the valley pike near Lacy's springs, capturing some prisoners and wagons.

This movement of Powell's probably forced the enemy to abandon the road *via* Harrisonburg, and move over the Keezeltown road to Port Republic, to which point the retreat was continued through the night of the twenty-fourth, and from thence to Brown's gap in the Blue Ridge.

On the twelfth-fifth, the Sixth and Nineteenth corps reached Harrisonburg. Crook was ordered to remain at the junction of the Keezeltown road with the Valley pike until the movements of the enemy were definitely ascertained.

On this day Torbert reached Harrisonburg, having encountered the enemy's cavalry at Luray, defeating it and joining me *via* Newmarket, and Powell had proceeded to Mount Crawford.

On the twenty-sixth Merritt's division of cavalry was ordered to Port Republic, and Torbert to Staunton and Waynesboro to destroy the bridge at the latter place, and, in retiring, to burn all forage, drive off all cattle, destroy all mills, &c., which would cripple the rebel army or confederacy.

Torbert had with him Wilson's division of cavalry and Lowell's brigade of regulars.

On the twenty-seventh while Torbert was making his advance on Waynesboro, I ordered Merritt to make a demonstration on Brown's gap to cover the movement. This brought out the enemy (who had been re-enforced by Kershaw's division which came through Swift Run gap), against the small force of cavalry employed in this demonstration, which he followed up to Port Republic, and I believe crossed in some force. Merritt's instructions from me were to resist an attack, but, if pressed, to fall back to Cross Keys, in which event I intended to attack with the main force which was at Harrisonburg, and could be rapidly moved to

Cross Keys. The enemy, however, advanced with his main force only to Port Republic, after which he fell back. Torbert this day took possession of Waynesboro, and partially destroyed the railroad bridge, but about dark on the twenty-eighth was attacked by infantry and cavalry, returned to Staunton and from thence to Bridgewater *via* Springhill, executing the order for the destruction of subsistence, forage, &c.

On the morning of the twenty-eighth Merritt was ordered to Port Republic to open communication with General Torbert, but on the same night was directed to leave small forces at Port Republic and Swift-run gap, and proceed with the balance of his command (his own and Custer divisions) to Piedmont, swing around from that point to near Staunton, burning forage, mills, and such other property as might be serviceable to the rebel army or confederacy, and, on his return, to go into camp on the left of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, which were ordered to proceed on the twenty-ninth to Mount Crawford, in support of this and Torbert's movements.

September twenty-ninth, Torbert reached Bridgewater, and Merritt Mt. Crawford.

On the first of October Merritt reoccupied Port Republic, and the Sixth and Nineteenth corps were moved back to Harrisonburg.

The question that now presented itself was, whether or not I should follow the enemy to Brown's gap, where he still held fast, drive him out and advance on Charlottesville and Gordonsville. This movement on Gordonsville I was opposed to for many reasons, the most important of which was, that it would necessitate the opening of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Alexandria, and to protect this road against the numerous guerilla bands, would have required a corps of infantry; besides, I would have been obliged to leave a small force in the valley to give security to the line of the Potomac. This would probably occupy the whole of Crook's command, leaving me but a small number of fighting men. Then there was the additional reason of the uncertainty as to whether the army in front of Petersburg could hold the entire force of General Lee there, and, in case it could not, a sufficient number might be detached and move rapidly by rail and overwhelm me, quickly returning. I was also confident that my transportation could not supply me further than Harrisonburg, and therefore advised that the valley campaign should terminate at Harrisonburg, and that I return, carrying out my original instructions for the destruction of forage, grain, &c., give up the majority of the army I commanded, and order it to the Petersburg line, a line which I thought the Lieutenant-General believed if a successful movement could be made on, would involve the capture of the Army of Northern Virginia.

I therefore, on the morning of the sixth of October, commenced moving back, stretching the cavalry across the valley from the Blue Ridge to the eastern slope of the Alleghenies,

with directions to burn all forage and drive off all stock, &c., as they moved to the rear, fully coinciding in the views and instructions of the Lieutenant-General that the valley should be made a barren waste. The most positive orders were given, however, not to burn dwellings.

In this movement the enemy's cavalry followed at a respectful distance until in the vicinity of Woodstock, when they attacked Custer's division and harassed it as far as Louis brook, a short distance south of Fisher's Hill.

On the night of the eighth, I ordered General Torbert to engage the enemy's cavalry at daylight, and notified him that I would halt the army until he had defeated it.

In compliance with these instructions, Torbert advanced at daylight on the ninth of October, with Custer's division on the back road, and Merritt's division on the Valley pike.

At Louis brook the heads of the opposing columns came in contact and deployed, and after a short but decisive engagement the enemy was defeated, with the loss of all his artillery excepting one piece, and everything else which was carried on wheels. The rout was complete, and was followed up to Mount Jackson, a distance of some twenty-six miles.

On October tenth the enemy crossed to the north side of Cedar creek, the Sixth corps continuing its march to Front Royal; this was the first day's march of this corps to rejoin Lieutenant-General Grant at Petersburg. It was the intention that it should proceed through Manassas gap to Piedmont east of the Blue Ridge—to which point the Manassas Gap railroad had been completed, and from thence to Alexandria by rail; but on my recommendation that it would be much better to march it, as it was in fine condition, through Ashby's gap, and thence to Washington, the former route was abandoned, and on the twelfth the corps moved to the Ashby gap crossing of the Shenandoah river; but, on the same day, in consequence of the advance of the enemy to Fisher's Hill, it was recalled to await the development of the enemy's new intentions.

The question now again arose in reference to the advance on Gordonsville, as suggested in the following despatch:

[Cipher.]

WASHINGTON, October 12, 1864, 12 M.

Major-General Sheridan:

Lieutenant-General Grant wishes a position taken far enough south to serve as a base for further operations upon Gordonsville and Charlottesville. It must be strongly fortified and provisioned.

Some point in the vicinity of Manassas gap would seem best suited for all purposes.

Colonel Alexander, of the engineers, will be sent to consult with you as soon as you connect with General Augur.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major-General.

This plan I would not endorse, but, in order to settle it definitely, I was called to Washington by the following telegram:

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1864.

Major-General Sheridan: through General Augur.

If you can come here, a consultation on several points is extremely desirable. I propose to visit General Grant, and would like to see you first.

E. M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

On the evening of the fifteenth I determined to go, believing that the enemy at Fisher's Hill could not accomplish much; and as I had concluded not to attack him at present, I ordered the whole of the cavalry force under General Torbert to accompany me to Front Royal, from whence I intended to push it through Chester gap to the Virginia Central railroad at Charlottesville, while I passed through Manassas gap to Piedmont, thence by rail to Washington. Upon my arrival with the cavalry at Front Royal, on the night of the sixteenth, I received the following despatch from General Wright, who was left at Cedar Creek in command of the army:

HEADQUARTERS, MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION, }
October 16, 1864.

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, commanding Middle Military Division.

GENERAL—I enclose you despatch which explains itself (see copy following):

If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry, he might, by turning our right, give us a great deal of trouble. I shall hold on here until the enemy's movements are developed, and shall only fear an attack on my right, which I shall make every preparation for guarding against and resisting.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. G. WRIGHT,
Major-General Commanding.

To Lieutenant-General Early:

Be ready to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan.

LONGSTREET,
Lieutenant-General.

This message was taken off the rebel signal flag, on Three Top mountain. My first thought was that it was a ruse, but, on reflection, deemed it best to abandon the cavalry raid, and give to General Wright the entire strength of the army. I therefore ordered the cavalry to return and report to him, and addressed the following note on the subject:

FRONT ROYAL, October 16, 1864.

Major-General H. G. Wright, commanding Sixth Army Corps:

GENERAL—The cavalry is all ordered back to you; make your position strong. If Longstreet's

despatch is true, he is under the impression that we have largely detached. I will go over to Augur, and may get additional news.

Close in Colonel Powell, who will be at this point. If the enemy should make an advance, I know you will defeat him. Look well to your ground, and be well prepared. Get up everything that can be spared. I will bring up all I can, and will be up on Tuesday, if not sooner.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General.

After sending this note I continued through Manassas gap and on to Piedmont, and from thence by rail to Washington, arriving on the morning of the seventeenth. At twelve o'clock *m.* I returned by special train to Martinsburg, arriving on the morning of the eighteenth at Winchester, in company with Colonels Thorn and Alexander, of the Engineer corps, sent with me by General Halleck. During my absence the enemy had gathered all his strength, and, in the night of the eighteenth, and early on the nineteenth, moved silently from Fisher's Hill, through Strasburg, pushed a heavy turning column across the Shenandoah, on the road from Strasburg to Front Royal, and again recrossed the river at Bowman's ford, striking Crook, who held the left of our line, in flank and rear, so unexpectedly and forcibly as to drive in his outposts, invade his camp, and turn his position. This surprise was owing, probably, to not closing in Powell, or that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed on the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack.

This was followed by a direct attack upon our front, and the result was that the whole army was driven back in confusion, to a point about one and a half miles north of Middletown, a very large portion of the infantry not even preserving a company organization.

At about seven o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth October, an officer on picket at Winchester reported artillery firing, but, supposing it resulted from a reconnoissance which had been ordered for this morning, I paid no attention to it, and was unconscious of the true condition of affairs until about nine o'clock, when, having ridden through the town of Winchester, the sound of the artillery made a battle unmistakable, and on reaching Mill creek, one half a mile south of Winchester, the head of the fugitives appeared in sight, trains and men coming to the rear with appalling rapidity.

I immediately gave direction to halt and pack the trains at Mill creek, and ordered the brigade at Winchester to stretch across the country and stop all stragglers. Taking twenty men from my escort, I pushed on to the front, leaving the balance, under General Forsyth and Colonels Thorn and Alexander, to do what they could in stemming the torrent of fugitives.

I am happy to say that hundreds of the men, who on reflection found they had not done themselves justice, came back with cheers.

On arriving at the front, I found Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, and General Getty's division of the Sixth corps, opposing the enemy. I suggested to General Wright that we would fight on Getty's line, and to transfer Custer to the right at once, as he (Custer) and Merritt, from being on the right in the morning, had been transferred to the left; that the remaining two divisions of the Sixth corps, which were to the right and rear of Getty about two miles, should be ordered up, and also that the Nineteenth corps, which was on the right and rear of these two divisions, should be hastened up before the enemy attacked Getty.

I then started out all my staff officers to bring up these troops, and was so convinced that we would soon be attacked, that I went back myself to urge them on.

Immediately after I returned and assumed command, General Wright returning to his corps, Getty to his division, and the line of battle was formed on the prolongation of General Getty's line, and a temporary breastwork of rails, logs, &c., thrown up hastily.

Shortly after this was done the enemy advanced, and from a point on the left of our line of battle I could see his columns moving to the attack, and at once notified corps commanders to be prepared.

This assault fell principally on the Nineteenth corps, and was repulsed.

I am pleased to be able to state that the strength of the Sixth and Nineteenth corps, and Crook's command, was now being rapidly augmented by the return of those who had gone to the rear early in the day. Reports coming in from the Front Royal pike, on which Powell's division of cavalry was posted, to the effect that a heavy column of infantry was moving on that pike in the direction of Winchester, and that he (Powell) was retiring and would come in at Newtown, caused me great anxiety for the time; and although I could not fully believe that such a movement would be undertaken, still it delayed my general attack.

At four *p. m.* I ordered the advance. This attack was brilliantly made, and, as the enemy was protected by rail breastworks, and in some portions of his line by stone fences, his resistance was very determined. His line of battle overlapped the right of mine, and by turning with this portion of it on the flank of the Nineteenth corps, caused a slight momentary confusion. This movement was checked, however, by a counter-charge of General McMillans' brigade upon the re-entering angle thus formed by the enemy, and his flanking party cut off.

It was at this stage of the battle that Custer was ordered to charge with his entire division, but, although the order was promptly obeyed, it was not in time to capture the whole of the force thus cut off, and many escaped across Cedar creek.

Simultaneous with this charge, a combined movement of the whole line drove the enemy in

confusion to the creek, where, owing to the difficulties of crossing, his army became routed.

Custer finding a ford on Cedar creek west of the pike, and Devins, of Merritt's division, one to the east of it, they each made the crossing just after dark, and pursued the routed mass of the enemy to Fisher's Hill, where this strong position gave him some protection against our cavalry; but the most of his transportation had been captured, the road from Cedar creek to Fisher's Hill, a distance of over three miles, being literally blocked by wagons, ambulances, artillery, caissons, &c.

The enemy did not halt his *main* force at Fisher's Hill, but continued the retreat during the night to Newmarket, where his army had, on a similar previous occasion, come together by means of the numerous roads that converge to this point.

This battle practically ended the campaign in the Shenandoah valley. When it opened we found our enemy boastful and confident, unwilling to acknowledge that the soldiers of the Union were their equal in courage and manliness; when it closed with Cedar creek, this impression had been removed from his mind, and gave place to good sense and a strong desire to quit fighting.

The very best troops of the Confederacy had not only been defeated, but had been routed in successive engagements, until their spirit and *esprit* were destroyed; in obtaining these results, however, our loss in officers and men was severe. Practically all territory north of the James' river now belonged to me, and the holding of the lines about Petersburg and Richmond, by the enemy, must have been embarrassing, and invited the question of good military judgment.

On entering the valley it was not my object, by flank movements, to make the enemy change his base, nor to move as far up as the James' river, and thus give him the opportunity of making me change *my* base, thereby converting it into a race-course, as heretofore, but to destroy, to the best of my ability, that which was truly the Confederacy—its armies; in doing this, so far as the opposing army was concerned, our success was such that there was no one connected with the army of the Shenandoah who did not so fully realize it as to render the issuing of congratulatory orders unnecessary; every officer and man was made to understand that, when a victory was gained, it was not more than their duty, nor less than their country expected from her gallant sons.

At Winchester, for a moment the contest was uncertain, but the gallant attack of General Upton's brigade of the Sixth corps restored the line of battle, until the turning column of Crook's and Merritt's and Averell's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, "sent the enemy whirling through Winchester."

In thus particularizing commands and commanders, I only speak in the sense that they

were so fortunate as to be available at these important moments.

In the above-mentioned attack by Upton's brigade, the lamented Russell fell. He had been previously wounded, but refused to leave the field. His death brought sadness to every heart in the army.

It was during a reconnoissance to Fisher's Hill, made on the thirteenth of October, 1864, that Colonel George D. Wells, commanding a brigade in Crook's corps, was killed while gallantly leading his men.

At Fisher's Hill it was again the good fortune of General Crook's command to start the enemy, and of General Ricketts' division of the Sixth corps to first gallantly swing in and more fully initiate the rout.

At Cedar creek, Getty's division of the Sixth corps, and Merritt's and Custer's divisions of cavalry, under Torbert, confronted the enemy from the first attack in the morning until the battle was decided, still none behaved more gallantly, or exhibited greater courage than those who returned from the rear, determined to reoccupy their lost camp.

In this engagement, early in the morning, the gallant Colonel Lowell, of the Regular brigade, was wounded while in the advance *en echelon* of Getty's division, but would not leave his command, remaining until the final attack on the enemy was made, in which he was killed.

Generals Bidwell of the Sixth corps, and Thorburn of Crook's command, were also killed in the morning, while behaving with conspicuous gallantry.

I submit the following list of the corps, division, and brigade commanders, who were wounded in the campaign, the killed having already been especially noticed, regretting that the scope of this report will not admit of my specifying by name *all* the many gallant men who were killed and wounded in the numerous engagements in the Shenandoah valley, and most respectfully call attention to the accompanying sub-reports for such particulars as will, I trust, do full justice to all.

Generals H. G. Wright, J. B. Ricketts, Grover, Duval, E. Upton, R. S. McKenzie, Kitchen (since died of wounds), J. B. McIntosh, G. H. Chapman, Thomas C. Devins, Penrose, Colonels D. D. Johnson, Daniel McAuley, Jacob Sharpe.

From the seventh of August, the Middle Department, Department of Washington, Department of the Susquehanna, and Department of West Virginia, were under my command, and I desire to express my gratitude to their respective commanders, Major-Generals Lew Wallace, C. C. Augur, Couch, and Cadwallader, and to Major-Generals Hunter and Crook, who at separate times commanded the latter Department for the assistance given me.

General Augur operated very effectively with a small force under his command, the reports of which were forwarded direct to the War Department.

After the battle of Cedar Creek nothing of importance occurred in the valley up to February twenty-seventh, 1865, the day on which the cavalry moved from Winchester to Petersburg.

On the night of November eleventh, 1864, General Early moved some of his shattered forces to the north of Cedar creek for the purpose of bluster, I suppose, as on the night of the following day he hastily retired. In consequence of contradictory information received from scouts and captured cavalry prisoners, I was unconvinced of any rebel infantry being in my vicinity until it was too late to overtake it in its galloping retreat, a retreat which was continued until in the vicinity of Lacy's springs near Harrisonburg. Powell engaged the rebel cavalry co-operating on the Front Royal pike with this force, and drove it through Front Royal to Milford, capturing two pieces of artillery.

During this campaign I was at times annoyed by guerilla bands, the most formidable of which was under a partisan chief named Mosby, who made his headquarters east of the Blue Ridge, in the section of country about Upperville. I had constantly refused to operate against these bands, believing them to be substantially a benefit to me, as they prevented straggling, and kept my trains well closed up, and discharged such other duties as would have required a provost guard of at least two regiments of cavalry. In retaliation for the assistance and sympathy given them, however, by the inhabitants of Loudon valley, General Merritt, with two brigades of cavalry, was directed to proceed on the twenty-eighth of November, 1864, to that valley, under the following instructions:

HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION }
November 27, 1864. }

Brevet Major-General Wesley Merritt, commanding First Cavalry Division.

GENERAL—You are hereby directed to proceed to-morrow morning at seven o'clock with the two brigades of your division now in camp to the east side of the Blue Ridge, *via* Ashby's gap, and operate against the guerillas in the district of country bounded on the south by the line of the Manassas Gap railroad as far east as White Plains, on the east by the Bull Run range, on the west by the Shenandoah river, and on the north by the Potomac.

This section has been the hot-bed of lawless bands, who have from time to time depredated upon small parties on the line of army communications, on safeguards left at houses, and on troops. Their real object is plunder and highway robbery.

To clear the country of these parties that are bringing destruction upon the innocent, as well as their guilty supporters, by their cowardly acts, you will consume and destroy all forage and subsistence, burn all barns and mills and their contents, and drive off all stock in the region, the boundaries of which are above de-

scribed. This order must be literally executed, bearing in mind, however, that no dwellings are to be burned, and that no personal violence be offered the citizens.

The ultimate results of the guerilla system of warfare is the total destruction of all private rights in the country occupied by such parties. This destruction may as well commence at once, and the responsibility of it must rest upon the authorities at Richmond, who have acknowledged the legitimacy of guerilla bands.

The injury done this army by them is very slight. The injury they have inflicted upon the people, and upon the rebel army, may be counted by millions.

The reserve brigade of your division will move to Snickersville on the twenty-ninth. Snickersville should be your point of concentration, and the point from which you should operate in destroying towards the Potomac.

Four days' subsistence will be taken by the command. Forage can be gathered from the country through which you pass.

You will return to your present camp at Snickersville on the fifth day.

By command of Major-General P. H. SHERIDAN.

JAMES W. FORSYTH,
Lieutenant-Colonel and Chief of Staff.

On December nineteenth General Torbert, with Merritt and Powell's division, was pushed through Chester gap to strike the Virginia Central railroad at Charlottesville or Gordonsville. An engagement took place, in which two pieces of artillery were captured, but failing to gain Gordonsville, or strike the railroad, he returned to Winchester, *via* Warrenton.

Custer, with his division, was at the same time pushed up the valley to make a diversion in favor of Torbert; but encountering the enemy near Harrisonburg, who attacked his camp at daylight on the ensuing day, he was obliged, in consequence of superior force, to retire.

The weather was so intensely cold during these raids that horses and men suffered most severely, and many of the latter were badly frost-bitten.

On the fifth of February, Harry Gilmore, who appeared to be the last link between Maryland and the Confederacy, and whose person I desired in order that this link might be severed, was made prisoner near Moorfield, his capture being very skilfully made by Colonel Young, my chief of scouts, and a party under Lieutenant Colonel Whittaker, First Connecticut cavalry, sent to support him.

Gilmore and Mosby carried on the same style of warfare, running trains off railways, robbing the passengers, &c.

In closing this report, it gives me great pleasure to speak of the skill, energy, and gallantry displayed by my corps and division commanders, and I take this opportunity of acknowledging the assistance given me by them at all times.

To the members of my staff, who so cheerfully on all occasions gave me their valuable assistance, who so industriously labored to execute every duty promptly, and who always behaved with gallantry, I return my sincere thanks. They all joined with me in the deep grief felt at the loss sustained by the army, and the friendly ties broken by the death of their fellow staff officers, Colonel Tolles, Chief Quartermaster, and Assistant Surgeon Ohlenschlaeger, Medical Inspector, who were killed while on their way from Martinsburg to Cedar creek, in October, 1864, and in that of the death of the gallant Lieutenant Meigs, my Chief Engineer, who was killed while examining and mapping the country near Bridgewater just above Harrisonburg. This young officer was endeared to me on account of his invaluable knowledge of the country, his rapid sketching, his great intelligence, and his manly and soldierly qualities.

I would also here especially mention the loss of two of my most efficient staff officers, Lieutenant-Colonels Kellogg and O'Keefe, both of whom died, after having passed through the dangers and privations of years of warfare; the former of fever consequent upon excessive labor during the campaign from Petersburg to Appomattox, the latter from wounds received at the battle of Five Forks.

The report of the march from Winchester to Petersburg, to engage in the final campaign, has heretofore been furnished, but I consider it, in fact, a sequel to this.

I attach hereto an abstract of ordnance and ordnance stores captured from the enemy during the campaign (the one hundred and one pieces of artillery being exclusive of the twenty-four pieces recaptured in the afternoon at Cedar creek), also a detailed report of my casualties, which are in aggregate as follows:

Killed, 1,938; wounded, 11,893; missing, 3,121; total, 16,952.

The records of the Provost Marshal, Middle Military Division, show about thirteen thousand prisoners (as per annexed certificate) to have been received by him, and receipts are among the records of the Assistant Adjutant-General, Middle Military Division, for forty-nine battle flags, forwarded to the Honorable the Secretary of War.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General U. S. A.

HEADQUARTERS IN THE FIELD, }
MONOCACY BRIDGE, MD., August 5, 1864. }

Major-General D. Hunter, commanding Department West Virginia.

GENERAL—Concentrate all your available forces without delay in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, leaving only such railroad guards and garrisons for public property as may be necessary.

Use in this concentration the railroad, if by so

doing time can be saved. From Harper's Ferry, if it is found that the enemy has moved north of the Potomac in great force, push north following and attacking him wherever found; following him, if driven south of the Potomac, as long as it is safe to do so. If it is ascertained the enemy has but a small force north of the Potomac, then push south with the main force, detailing, under a competent commander, a sufficient force to look after the raiders, and drive them to their homes.

In detailing such a force, the brigade of cavalry now *en route* from Washington *via* Rocksville may be taken into account.

There are now on the way to join you three other brigades of the best cavalry, numbering at least five thousand men and horses. These will be instructed, in the absence of further orders, to join you by the south side of the Potomac. One brigade will probably start tomorrow.

In pushing up the Shenandoah valley, as it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that buildings should be destroyed, they should rather be protected, but the people should be informed that so long as an enemy can subsist among them, recurrences of these raids must be expected, and we are determined to stop them at all hazards.

Bear in mind the object is to drive the enemy south, and to do this you want to keep him always in sight. Be guided in your course by the course he takes. Make your own arrangements for supplies of all kinds, giving regular vouchers for such as may be taken from loyal citizens.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant General.

Official:

T. W. C. MOORE,
A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE GULF, }
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER, }
NEW ORLEANS, LA., November 18, 1865. }

Major-General P. H. Sheridan, U. S. Army.

GENERAL—I have the honor to report that the number of Confederate prisoners received by the forces under your command from August first, 1864, to March first, 1865, was about thirteen thousand. The names of nearly that number are recorded on the books recently used in the office of the Provost-Marshal General, Middle Military Division.

Respectfully submitted,

E. B. PARSONS,
Late Provost-Marshal General,
Middle Military Division.

Official:

T. W. C. MOORE,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

Abstract of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores captured from the enemy by the United States Forces commanded by Major-General P. H. Sheridan, Campaign of the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia, 1864.

WHEREABOUT OF CAPTURED ORDNANCE AND ORDNANCE STORES.	DATE OF RECEIPT.	ORDNANCE STORES																								
		12-12-PDR. GUN, BRONZE, U. S.	17-12-PDR. GUN, IRON, U. S.	17-12-PDR. GUN, BRONZE, U. S.	3 1/2-INCH REPEATING GUN, U. S.	3-INCH ORDNANCE GUN, U. S.	3-INCH CUMMINS GUN, R., U. S.	3-INCH R. BRONZE GUN, U. S.	10-PDR. PARROT, U. S.	6-PDR., BRONZE, U. S.	12-PDR. O. MK. HOWITZER, U. S.	12-PDR. Fd. HOWITZER, U. S.	3-INCH ORDN. AND 12-PDR. 17. U. S.	TOTAL ARTILLERY.	ARTILLERY CARTRIDGES AND LINDERS.	CANNONS.	ARTILLERY HARRIS, LEAD AND WHEEL NETS FOR TWO HORSES.	ARTILLERY.	EXPLODED REPAIRED MORTARS.	SPRINGFIELD REPAIRED MORTARS.	GRUPE, ASSORTED.	CANNONS, ASSORTED.	AUTOMATIC RIFLES.	CANNONUS HORSES.	TOTAL SMALL ARMS.	
Washington Arsenal.	October 19.	2			12				1	1			16													
" "	" 25.												1													
" "	" 27.	4	8	7	1	2	2						24													
" "	November 7.							10		1			10													
" "	" 14.					1							2													
" "	" 17.					1							2													
" "	" 18.							1	1				2													
" "	December 31.							2					2													
" "	Various times												47	34	120		44	34	644	207	407				1,428	
Alleghany Arsenal.	August 20.							4					4		1											
Harper's Ferry Depot	December 28.	6				6				1			13						2,148	1,117	1,068				1,184	
Dupont's Battery	October 10.					1							1													
Reissued to Batteries in Mid. Mil. Div. by the Ordnance Department.	Various times between Sep. 1, 1864, and Jan. 1, 1865.												24	24	24											
TOTAL		12	9	7	128	3	1	11	1	2	1	24	101	83	35	128	2,150	1,151	1,082	207	407			1,184	5,067	

HEADQUARTERS, MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION,
January 7, 1865.

I certify that the above is a correct statement of ordnance and ordnance stores captured by Major-General Sheridan, and turned over to the Ordnance Department for reissue, up to the first day of January, 1865.

GEO. W. MCKEE,
First Lieutenant Ordnance, U. S. A.,
Chief Ordnance Officer, Mid. Mil. Div.

Official Copy:
T. W. C. MOORE,
A. A. G.

List of Casualties in the United States Forces commanded by Major-General P. H. Sheridan, Campaign in the Shenandoah Valley, Virginia, 1864.

COMMAND.	BATTLE	DATE.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	AGGREGATE.
Sixth Army Corps.....	Opequan.....	September 19.....	213	1,424	48	1,685
	Fisher's Hill.....	" 22.....	24	210	3	227
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19.....	256	1,466	294	2,215
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements.....		86	665	11	762
Total.....			578	3,965	356	4,899
Nineteenth Army Corps....	Opequan.....	September 19.....	275	1,228	453	1,956
	Fisher's Hill.....	" 22.....	11	47	2	60
	Cedar Creek.....	October 19.....	243	1,352	893	2,488
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements.....		57	446	13	516
Total.....			586	3,073	1,361	5,020
Army of West Virginia....	Opequan and Fisher's Hill....	September 19 and 22.....	105	840	8	953
	Cedar Creek.....	October 10.....	46	268	533	847
	Reconnoissances and minor engagements.....		150	539	96	1,085
Total.....			301	1,947	637	3,985

COMMAND.	BATTLE	DATE.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.	AGGREGATE.
Provisional Division.....	Cedar Creek.....	October 19.....	19	91	124	231
Cavalry.....	Opequan.....	September 19.....	68	267	109	441
	Tom's Creek.....	October 9.....	9	48	...	57
	Cedar Creek.....	" 10.....	25	139	50	214
	Twenty-six other engagements.....	355	2,363	487	3,205
Total.....	454	2,817	646	3,917
GRAND TOTAL.....	1,988	11,893	3,121	16,962

Official :

T. W. C. MOORE,
A. A. G.

Report of Property Captured and Destroyed "from the Enemy" by the Middle Military Division, Major-General P. H. Sheridan commanding, during the campaign commencing August 10, 1864, and ending November 16, 1864.

No. of Pieces Artillery.	No. of Carriages.	No. of Limbers.	No. of Forges.	No. of Battery Wagons.	ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.	No. of Army Wagons.	No. of Ambulances.	No. of Medical Wagons.	SEES OF HARNESSES.	SEES OF HORSE EQUIPMENTS.	No. of Battle Flags.	No. of Small Arms.	ROUNDS OF SMALL ARM AMMUNITION.	No. of Horses.	No. of Mules.	No. of Flour Mills.	No. of Woolen Mills.	No. of Saw Mills.	No. of Powder Mills.	No. of Saltpetre Works.	No. of Barrels.	No. of Furnaces.	No. of Vessels.	No. of R. R. Depots.	No. of Locomotives.	No. of Box Cars.	BUSHELS OF WHEAT.
94	89	8	9	1	23,000	181	137	7	1,134	1,040	40	19,230	1,061,000	3,772	545	71	1	8	1	3	1,200	7	4	1	1	3	435,302

BUSHELS OF OATS.	BUSHELS OF CORN.	BARRELS OF FLOUR.	TONS OF HAY.	TONS OF FODDER.	TONS OF STRAW.	No. of BEEF CATTLE.	No. of SHEEP.	No. of SWINE.	No. of CALVES.	LSB. OF BACON AND HAM.	LSB. OF TOBACCO.	MILES OF RAILS.	BUSHEL OF POTATOS.	LSB. COTTON YARN.	PRISONERS, NOT INCLUDING WOUNDED, "CAPTURED."		
20,000	77,176	874	20,397	500	450	10,918	12,000	15,000	250	12,000	10,000	947	2,500	1,665	COMD.	E. M.	AGG.
															276	7,707	7,983

Report of Property "Lost by Capture," by the Middle Military Division, during the campaign commenced April 10, and ending November 18, 1864.

No. of Pieces Artillery.	No. of Carriages.	No. of Limbers.	No. of Forges.	No. of Battery Wagons.	ROUNDS OF ARTILLERY AMMUNITION.	No. of Army Wagons.	No. of Ambulances.	No. of Medical Wagons.	SEES OF HARNESSES.	SEES OF HORSE EQUIPMENTS.	No. of Battle Flags.	No. of Small Arms.	ROUNDS OF SMALL ARM AMMUNITION.	No. of Horses.	No. of Mules.
24	19	None.	16	3	460	86	48	2	726	525	None.	1,849	1,300	359	564

HEADQUARTERS, MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION }
NEAR KINGSTOWN, VA., November 23, 1864 }

Most of the articles under the heading "Lost by Capture," were recaptured subsequently. The 24 pieces of artillery were all recaptured.

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Major-General U. S. A., Commanding.

GENERAL TORBERT'S REPORT.

HEADQUARTERS, CHIEF OF CAVALRY, }
MIDDLE MILITARY DIVISION. }

SIR: On the night of the thirtieth July, 1864, I received an order to march the First division of cavalry, which I was then commanding, and which was at that time encamped near Lee's Mills, Prince George county, Virginia, to City Point, for the purpose of embarking it for Washington, D. C.

The division moved according to orders, and commenced to embark on the night of the thirty-first. It was concentrated at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, by the night of the ninth of August following.

On my arrival at Harper's Ferry, Virginia, on the afternoon of the eighth of August, I reported in person at once to Major-General Sheridan, who was then commanding the Middle Military Division, and was appointed Chief of Cavalry for that division, which command consisted (organized troops for the field) of the First division of cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, General Merritt commanding; Second division West Virginia cavalry, General Averell commanding; and First division West Virginia cavalry, Brigadier-General Duffie commanding.

Brigadier-General Averell's division was then at Cumberland, Maryland, and Brigadier-General Duffie's at Hancock, Maryland. Both of these divisions were ordered to join the army by the shortest practicable route.

At this time a brigade was formed, consisting of the Second Massachusetts, Twenty-second Pennsylvania, Cole's cavalry, and a detachment of the Fourteenth Pennsylvania cavalry, and placed under command of Colonel Lowell, Second Massachusetts cavalry, and assigned to the First division as the Third brigade.

I left Harper's Ferry, Virginia, August tenth, with the First division cavalry (General Merritt commanding) on the advance.

Arriving at Charleston, Virginia, the Reserve First and Second brigades took the direct road to Berryville, Virginia; the Third brigade was sent to Summit Point, Virginia, thus placing it on the right of the army, and the Reserve First and Second brigades on the left.

Arriving at Berryville, a reconnoissance was sent in the direction of Winchester, as far as the Opequan creek, driving the enemy's pickets across the creek. The main body took the Berryville and Millwood pike as far as the Stone Chapel, about three miles, and turned to the right to go over to the Millwood and Winchester pike. About half a mile from the latter pike the enemy's cavalry was met in pretty strong force; they were immediately engaged and driven from the field. The command then went into camp in the neighborhood for the night.

At daylight the next day (eleventh), the Reserve First and Second brigades moved on the Millwood and Winchester pike to the Opequan creek. From this point the First brigade (Brigadier-General Custer) was sent in the direction

of Winchester, driving the enemy's cavalry about three miles, and within two miles of the townd, on their infantry lines, and remained in that position until the arrival of our infantry at the Millwood and Winchester pike, near the Opequan creek.

In the mean time the Reserve and Second brigades (Brigadier-General Merritt) moved round still further to the left, to get possession of the Front Royal and Winchester pike. About a mile from the pike they met the enemy's cavalry in force, with artillery. Brigadier-General Merritt immediately engaged them, and, after a severe fight, he drove them across the pike and three miles back in the direction of Newton, Virginia, on the Valley pike. In the mean time the First brigade (Brigadier-General Custer) was brought up, and the whole division was advanced in the direction of Newton. Advancing about a mile and a half, they were opposed by a strong force; not being able to tell whether they were dismounted cavalry or infantry, an attack was ordered, the attacking party being dismounted.

After a very severe fight, the enemy was driven from his first position.

By prisoners being captured we learned that it was Gordon's division of infantry, the rear-guard of Major-General Early's army. The attack was immediately suspended, and our force fell back about a mile and a half and went into camp, it being now after dark.

About this time the Third brigade (Colonel Lowell), with the exception of one regiment, joined us from the right of the army.

On the next morning (twelfth) the cavalry moved in the direction of Newton, the Third brigade (Colonel Lowell) in advance.

Arriving at Newton, on the Strasburg and Winchester pike, the Third, First, and Reserve brigades moved in the direction of Strasburg.

The Second brigade (Brevet Brigadier-General Devin) moved west, in the direction of Fawcett's gap, and then toward Cedar creek, on the back road, about three or four miles from the main pike.

These columns moved steadily along toward Cedar creek, Virginia, skirmishing slightly with the enemy. Arriving at Cedar creek, on the Valley pike, the Third brigade (Colonel Lowell) drove the enemy's skirmishers across, and advanced to the other side, and held this position until relieved by our infantry during the same afternoon. The command then went into position as follows for the night: the First brigade (Brigadier-General Custer) on the left of the pike, picketing the Shenandoah river and watching the left; the Third and Reserve brigades on the right of the pike, picketing Cedar creek and watching the right.

Just after dark the Second brigade (Brevet Brigadier-General Devin) arrived from the back road and went into camp on the left of the Valley pike, in rear of the First brigade.

On the thirteenth the First, Second, Third, and Reserve brigades moved to the right,

crossing Cedar creek about a mile from the Valley pike, and moved in the direction of Strasburg, in two columns.

After remaining in front of Strasburg, in rear of the infantry skirmish line, a short time, the command recrossed Cedar creek and went into its former position.

At daylight on the fourteenth the Second brigade moved off to the left on to the Front Royal and Winchester pike, at Cedarville, about seven miles, and two miles from the Shenandoah river, for the purpose of watching the Luray valley.

The same day the Third brigade (Colonel Lowell) moved off to the right, on the back road, where it crossed Cedar creek.

On the fifteenth Brigadier-General Duffie reported to me with his division, about nine hundred strong, and was ordered to Berryville.

Brigadier-General Averell also reported the arrival of his division at Martinsburg, and was ordered to remain there until further orders.

On the morning of the fifteenth Brigadier-General Merritt, with the First and Reserve brigades, moved over to the Front Royal and Winchester pike, posting the Reserve brigade at Stony Point, about three miles north of Cedarville, and the First brigade at Cedarville. One regiment of the Third brigade was left at the crossing of Cedar creek, on the Valley pike.

On the afternoon of the fifteenth the pickets of the First and Second brigades were attacked near the Shenandoah river, by two brigades of infantry of Kershaw's division and Wickham's brigade of cavalry, supported by three pieces of artillery.

Brigadier-General Merritt moved out with the First and Second brigades to meet the attack, and after a severe engagement totally routed the enemy and drove them back across the Shenandoah river, killing and wounding about three hundred men, capturing nearly three hundred prisoners and two infantry battle-flags, with a loss on our side of but sixty men.

Too much praise cannot be given to Brigadier-General's Merritt, Custer, and Brevet Brigadier-General Devin for their good judgment and gallantry displayed on this occasion—for with two brigades of cavalry they defeated two brigades of infantry and one of cavalry, with a loss on our side of but sixty men.

Orders were issued this day for the cavalry to fall back the next morning (the sixteenth) in the direction of Winchester and Berryville, with directions to drive off all stock and destroy all forage they were not able to use, up as far as the Millwood and Winchester pike.

On the morning of the sixteenth the First division of cavalry (Brigadier-General Merritt) fell back, moving in five separate columns, the First reserve and Second brigades concentrating at Berryville, the Third brigade at Winchester.

About eleven A. M. this day, the sixteenth, Brigadier-General Wilson, with the Third division of cavalry from the Army of the Poto-

mac, reported to me at Winchester, having been ordered from the Army of the Potomac *via* Washington and Ashby's gap.

The infantry having left Winchester that morning, and being ordered to cover the rear, I placed Brigadier-General Wilson's division (the Third) in position for that purpose in the hills south of Winchester, also one brigade of infantry (seven hundred muskets), the First brigade of the First division, Sixth corps, commanded by Colonel William H. Penrose, Fifteenth New Jersey volunteers, which had been ordered to report to me that morning. Late in the afternoon of the same day, the enemy having followed up, attacked the pickets of the Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), which was concentrating at Winchester; that brigade was then drawn in and placed on the left, to cover the Berryville and Winchester pike. Skirmishing soon became general, the enemy apparently in strong force; it was some time before it could be definitely determined whether the enemy had cavalry only, or both cavalry and infantry.

The engagement became pretty general, and I learned I was fighting Breckenridge's corps—the advance of the rebel army. It was now about dark and I immediately made dispositions to withdraw, ordering the Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), to fall back to the Opequan creek, on the Winchester and Berryville pike.

The Second brigade, Third division (Brigadier-General Chapman), was ordered to move through the town and take position on the opposite side; just as the infantry and the First brigade, Third division (Brigadier-General McIntosh) was about to withdraw, the enemy made a charge on the whole line, and succeeded in capturing about two hundred of the infantry and fifty of the cavalry. The artillery, which was admirably served, and up to the last moment with a plentiful use of canister, checked the enemy's advance, and gave us time to withdraw in good order. The whole command was withdrawn to the opposite side of Winchester, and formed to await a further advance of the enemy and for our trains to get to the rear.

About nine P. M. we commenced to fall back to Summit Point. At this time orders were sent to Brigadier-General Averell to move in the direction of Charlestown. Orders were afterwards sent him by Major-General Sheridan to move in the direction of Shepherdstown and cover the fords across the Potomac.

On the morning of the eighteenth the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) arrived at Summit Point and took position on the right of the infantry, and watching the country well to his front, and connecting with Brigadier-General Averell on his right in the vicinity of Smithfield. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was in the vicinity of Berryville, covering the country from the Opequan creek to Snicker's gap.

The First division West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Duffie) was ordered to Charlestown.

On the nineteenth and twentieth the main body of the cavalry remained in the same position as that of the eighteenth.

On the twenty-first the rebel army advanced in three columns by Smithfield, Summit Point, and Berryville on our army, concentrated about Charlestown, Virginia.

The First division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Duffie) was ordered out across the Charlestown and Leetown road on the right of the infantry.

The First and Third divisions of cavalry (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Wilson) were ordered to fall back slowly as the enemy's infantry columns advanced, and pass to the right of the army, where they were massed, except the Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), which was posted on the left and front. The army fell back to Halltown, Virginia, that night (the twenty-first), and the cavalry was ordered to fall back the next morning.

Early on the morning of the twenty-second the enemy advanced rapidly with strong infantry skirmishers, and were held in check by the First division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Duffie), the Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), and part of the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson), until the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) could withdraw in the direction of Shepherdstown, and the trains withdraw to the rear. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) marched direct to Shepherdstown, the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) fell back to Halltown, Virginia, taking position on the right of the infantry. The First division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Duffie), moved to Point of Rocks, Maryland, crossing the Potomac *via* Harper's Ferry, Virginia. The Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), fell back to Halltown and took position on the left of the infantry.

The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Averell), was now across the Potomac river, his main force in the vicinity of Fair Play, Maryland, and watching the fords on the upper Potomac.

On the twenty-third and twenty-fourth the cavalry remained in the same position as on the twenty-second.

On the morning of the twenty-fifth I marched the First and Third divisions of cavalry (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Wilson) to Kearneysville by two routes, making the junction half a mile from Kearneysville—from there proceeded in the direction of Leetown in two columns. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) on the right, and the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) on the left. About a mile from Leetown a small cavalry force was met in a heavy woods, and from all the information that could be obtained, went to show that nothing but cavalry was in our front, and disposition

was immediately made to attack. A brigade was sent on each flank, two to attack in front, and one held in reserve. Soon after the attack was commenced it was found that we were fighting infantry (a division of Breckenridge's corps), while on the march in the direction of Shepherdstown, Virginia.

The attack was so sudden and vigorous the division was thrown in complete confusion and back three-fourths of a mile.

The enemy lost about two hundred and fifty killed and wounded, together with one brigade commander.

I then concluded to fall back, which was done in good order—the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) taking the road from Kearneysville, *via* Duffield station, to the right of the army, the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) taking the direct road to Shepherdstown, Virginia, the enemy following up the latter column with infantry and artillery. Near Shepherdstown the First brigade (Brigadier-General Custer) was sent to the relief of a regiment of the Reserve brigade which was the rear guard, and which was about to be cut off from the main body. Soon after this brigade was cut off from the main force and they quietly withdrew to the other side of the Potomac river, *via* Shepherdstown ford, and covered that and the Antietam ford; the balance of the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) fell back and took position on the right of the army.

On the night of the same day (twenty-fifth) the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) was sent across the Potomac river, *via* Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and took position in the vicinity of Boonsboro, Maryland.

On the twenty-sixth the cavalry remained in the same position as on that of the twenty-fifth instant.

On the twenty-seventh, the First New York Lincoln cavalry was ordered from Brigadier-General Duffie's division to Brigadier-General Averell's division, and the Twelfth Pennsylvania cavalry in the same division was ordered to report, temporarily, to Brigadier-General Stephenson, at Harper's Ferry, Virginia; the balance of Brigadier-General Duffie's division was dismounted and ordered to Cumberland, Maryland, to remount, their horses being turned over to other commanders.

On the morning of the twenty-seventh, the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) was ordered to Sharpsburg, Maryland; the same day I went to Hagerstown, Maryland, to visit the Second division, West Virginia cavalry, Brigadier-General Averell.

The next day (twenty-eighth), Brigadier-General Averell's division was ordered to cross the Potomac river at Williamsport ford, and move on Martinsburg, Virginia, the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) to cross at Shepherdstown ford, and the First brigade, First division (Brigadier-General Custer), to cross at Harper's Ferry, Virginia.

The First division (Brigadier-General Mer-

ritt) moved out in the direction of Leetown, Virginia, where it met the enemy's cavalry in force, and gallantly drove them with the sabre through Smithfield and across the Opequan creek, a distance of five miles. The Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) moved from Shepherdstown to Charlestown, Virginia, where it took position on the left of the army.

On the twenty-ninth the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was attacked by the enemy in strong force and driven back about a mile, when they were relieved by the Third division, Sixth corps, who turned and drove the enemy across the Opequan creek. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) then went into camp on the Smithfield and Charlestown pike.

On this day I had to regret the loss of Surgeon Rubison, my Medical Director, who was killed by my side by being shot by a minnie-ball.

On the thirtieth the First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Wilson) concentrated at Berryville, Virginia. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) moving across country to the Summit Point and Berryville pike. The Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) moving down the Winchester and Berryville pike.

On the thirty-first August and first of September, the cavalry remained in the same position in the vicinity of Berryville as on the thirtieth of August.

On the morning of the second of September the cavalry moved back to Charlestown, Virginia, in two columns; the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) *via* the Charlestown and Berryville pike, and the Third Division (Brigadier-General Wilson) *via* Kabletown.

At 5 p. m., same day the First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Wilson) moved to Berryville by the Winchester and Berryville pike.

The next morning (the third) at daylight, both divisions moved *via* Millwood and White Post to the Front Royal pike, with the expectation of drawing the enemy's cavalry from their infantry lines by threatening their communications in the Valley pike; no opposition was made to this advance.

On the fourth the cavalry was ordered back to Berryville, moving back in two columns. Arriving near Berryville the advance of the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was opposed by the enemy's cavalry; they were immediately driven back, when the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) changed front on the Berryville and Snikersville pike, thus making connection with the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) which was marching on our right, and also connecting with the left of the army.

On the same afternoon, the First brigade, First division (Brigadier-General Custer), was moved to the right of the army, joining the Third brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), in the vicinity of Summit Point.

On the fifth the balance of the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was moved to the

right of the army. The cavalry remained in the following position from the fifth September to the nineteenth September:

The Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) covering the country from Snicker's gap to the Opequan creek on the Winchester and Berryville pike.

The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) covering the country from the latter point to Smithfield, Virginia.

The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Averell), covering the country from Smithfield in the direction of Martinsburg, and the vicinity of the Potomac river.

During this time the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was reorganized in three brigades—the First brigade commanded by Brigadier-General Custer, the Second brigade by Brevet Brigadier-General Devin, and the Reserve brigade by Colonel Lowell of the Second Massachusetts cavalry.

While the army lay in this position the cavalry was constantly active, annoying the enemy by forced reconnaissances and otherwise.

On the thirteenth, the Second brigade, Third division (Brigadier-General McIntosh), moved up the Berryville and Winchester pike in the direction of Winchester, drove the enemy's cavalry before them three miles, and within two miles of Winchester came upon a regiment of infantry (the Eighth South Carolina), and by a sudden dash of the Third New Jersey and Second Ohio regiments, this regiment was broken and completely surrounded, and the whole regiment entire, officers, men, and colors, marched into camp. Too much praise cannot be given Brigadier-General McIntosh for his quick decision and gallantry on the occasion.

Orders were issued for the army to move on the nineteenth September.

The Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) moved on the Berryville and Winchester pike, in the direction of Winchester, in advance of the infantry.

The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) moved on the right to cross the Opequan creek at Sevres and Locke's fords.

The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Brigadier-General Averell), was ordered to cross the Opequan creek and move on the Winchester and Martinsburg pike, in the direction of Winchester.

I remained on the right in command of these two divisions. Early in the morning the crossing of the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was opposed by rebel infantry, but the cavalry gallantly charged across the creek and drove them from their first position back to their second, about a mile and a half from the creek, where the infantry held the cavalry in check for some time, they being posted behind stone walls and rail breastworks; in the mean time Brigadier-General Averell was steadily driving the enemy's cavalry before him in the direction of Winchester. Brigadier-General Averell getting well in rear of the infantry force in front of the First

division (Brigadier-General Merritt), they commenced to fall back, when the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) advanced rapidly and made a junction on the Valley pike with Brigadier-General Averell in the vicinity of Stephenson's depot. Both divisions immediately formed to advance on Winchester, Brigadier-General Averell on the right and Brigadier-General Merritt on the left of the Valley pike. We were now about four miles from Winchester; both divisions advanced rapidly, driving the enemy's cavalry pell-mell before them, on and behind their infantry, near Winchester. We came square upon the left flank of the rebel army, now hotly engaged with the Federal forces, their infantry lines were at once charged by brigades, which lines were broken and a great many prisoners and battle flags captured.

This day the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) alone captured seven hundred and seventy-five prisoners, about seventy officers, seven battle-flags, and two pieces of artillery.

The rebel army being driven through Winchester, after dark the pursuit was stopped, and the First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Wilson) bivouacked on the Winchester and Strasburg pike, and Brigadier-General Averell's division on the Moorfield pike, about three miles from Winchester.

During the day the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) fought gallantly, doing wonders, driving a division of rebel infantry from different positions, and clearing the way for our infantry to form.

On this occasion Brigadier-General McIntosh, commanding Second brigade, Third division, suffered the loss of a leg, and Brigadier-General Chapman, commanding First brigade of same division, was slightly wounded.

No one could have acted with more coolness and gallantry than did Brigadier-Generals Merritt, Wilson, Custer, McIntosh, Chapman, and Brevet Brigadier-General Devin and Colonel Lowell. Too much praise cannot be given the cavalry for the active part they played on this memorable occasion.

At daylight on the twentieth the army started in pursuit of the rebel army, Brigadier-General Averell's division of cavalry moving on the back road to Cedar creek, Brigadier-General Merritt's on the valley pike to Cedar creek, and Brigadier-General Wilson's *via* Stephensburg and Cedarville on the Front Royal pike.

The enemy were overtaken posted in a strong position at Fisher's Hill, above Strasburg, Virginia. The infantry coming up relieved the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) in front of the enemy, and this division was then placed on the right of the infantry, near Strasburg.

Brigadier-General Averell's division was moved across Cedar creek, and placed on the right of Brigadier-General Merritt's division on the back road.

The next day (the twenty-first) Brigadier-General Wilson, commanding Third division,

drove Wickham's division of rebel cavalry from Front Royal back toward Luray, six miles. On the same day Brigadier-General Merritt's division, with the exception of Brevet Brigadier-General Devin's brigade, which was left at Cedar creek (in rear of the main army), marched across the north fork of the Shenandoah river, at Buckton's ford, through Front Royal, and encamped about a mile and a half beyond. Brigadier-General Wilson was now about six miles in advance, the enemy having halted in a very strong position on the south side of Gooney Run.

At two A. M. the next day (twenty-second) the First brigade, First division (Brigadier-General Custer), moved across the ford over the South fork of the Shenandoah river, near Front Royal, with orders to move up and recross the Shenandoah at McCoy's ford, two miles in rear of the enemy's position; the enemy fearing, or knowing this move, commenced to evacuate at about ten P. M. the previous night.

At daylight, the twenty-second, the balance of the command moved up the valley. About eleven A. M. that day the advance came upon the enemy posted in a still stronger position on the south bank of Millford creek, their left resting on the Shenandoah, which runs so close under the mountain it was impossible to turn it, and their right rested against a high mountain; the length of their line was very short and the banks of the creek so precipitous it was impossible for the men to get across in order to make a direct attack; in addition to their naturally strong position, they were posted behind loop-hole breastworks, which extended clear across the valley. Not knowing that the army had made an attack at Fisher's Hill, and thinking that the sacrifice would be too great to attack without that knowledge, I concluded to withdraw to a point opposite McCoy's ferry.

The next day, the twenty-third, Brigadier-General Wilson's division moved across at McCoy's ford and proceeded to Buckton's ford, on the north side of the Shenandoah. Brigadier-General Merritt's division went through Front Royal, crossing the Shenandoah, and stopping at Cedarville; in the mean time having a skirmish with Mosby's guerillas at Front Royal, killing two officers and nine men. About four P. M. that day news was received of the victory at Fisher's Hill, and directions to make up the Luray valley.

The Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) was ordered to proceed immediately to McCoy's ford on the Shenandoah river, and the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) to move up the Luray valley through Front Royal. Both divisions bivouacked near daylight at Millford creek, the enemy having evacuated that position.

The next morning at daylight (the twenty-fourth) both divisions moved up the valley, the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) in advance. The advance came upon the enemy in position about three miles from Luray; they

were immediately engaged, and by a gallant charge of the First brigade, First division, led by Brigadier-General Custer, were driven about eight miles in the direction of New Market, capturing some seventy prisoners. The command passed through Luray, on the pike leading to New Market, crossed the Shenandoah river and bivouacked at the foot of the pass, the enemy having taken the mountain road leading out of the valley.

The next day (twenty-fifth) at daylight passed over the mountain and joined the army at New Market, issued forage and rations, and marched to Harrisonburg that day. In the mean time Brevet Major-General Averell had been relieved from the command of the Second division, West Virginia cavalry, and Colonel Powell, First Virginia cavalry, placed in command. On arriving at Harrisonburg, Virginia, I found this division on the Valley pike about eight miles from Harrisonburg, on the North river. The Second brigade, First division (Brevet Brigadier-General Devin), was in the direction of Keselton and Port Republic.

The next day (twenty-sixth) the Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), was ordered to move in the direction of Staunton. Brigadier-General Merritt with the First brigade, First division, was ordered to move in the direction of Port Republic and join Brevet Brigadier-General Devin's brigade.

I moved with the Third division, Brigadier-General Wilson, and Reserve brigade, First division (Colonel Lowell), in the direction of Staunton. Brigadier-General Custer having been assigned to the command of the Second division, West Virginia cavalry, he moved with me in order to join his division; Colonel Powell moving in the Valley pike turned off to the left from that road, in the direction of Piedmont, following the enemy.

I moved direct to Staunton, capturing in and about that place the following articles, viz.:

Three hundred muskets; seventy-five sabres; fifty cartridge boxes; seventy sets horse equipments, complete; sixty rounds field ammunition; two hundred sets harness; three hundred saddle-trees; two hundred tents; sixty-five head beef cattle; twenty-five wagons; five tons salt; one hundred barrels flour; five hundred bales hay; one thousand bushels wheat; one hundred and twenty-five barrels hard bread; fifty boxes tobacco; fifty horses; medical stores, &c.; fifty-seven prisoners.

On the twenty-seventh started a regiment with Brigadier-General Custer to join his command at Piedmont. At the same time a reconnoissance in force to Waynesboro and Rock Fish gap, but heard nothing from the reconnoissance until the whole party returned. I immediately started the whole force to Waynesboro, which place we reached, a distance of twelve miles, just after dark, and bivouacked for the night.

On the next morning (the twenty-eighth) proceeded to destroy the railroad bridge across

the south fork of the Shenandoah river, and burnt the depot and government buildings. Late in the afternoon the enemy attacked us in strong force with infantry, cavalry, and artillery. They were held in check until after dark, when on the return of the regiment sent with Brigadier-General Custer, notifying me of an attempt by the enemy to cut me off from the main army, which was then twenty-five or thirty miles distant, I fell back to Spring Hill, on Middle river, on the back road from Staunton to Harrisonburg.

On the morning of the twenty-ninth marched to Bridgewater, on the North river. Left the Third division (Brigadier-General Wilson) in position there, and sent the Reserve brigade (Colonel Lowell), of the First division, to join its division in the neighborhood of Cross Keys. In the mean time the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) and the Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), were operating in the vicinity of Brown's gap and Piedmont.

On the thirtieth the Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), was withdrawn from the front and sent back to Harrisonburg, Virginia. One brigade of the Third division was ordered on the Valley pike, crossing the North river. On the same day Brigadier-General Wilson was relieved from the command of the Third division, and ordered to report for duty to Major-General Sherman. Brigadier-General Custer was relieved from the command of the Second division, West Virginia cavalry, and placed in command of the Third division; Colonel Powell (First Virginia cavalry) being placed in command of the Second division, West Virginia cavalry.

On the next day (October first) the Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), was ordered down the Luray valley to take position at Luray, and watch the country in that vicinity.

On October second the First and Third divisions of cavalry (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) were disposed on the line of the North river, about seven miles in front of the army. About two p. m. the enemy made a reconnoissance in force, with infantry, artillery, and cavalry, and attempted to cross the river, but were prevented from doing so by the cavalry alone.

October third, fourth, and fifth.—The cavalry remained somewhat in the same position, sending reconnoissances to Swift run and Brown's gap, and all the time skirmishing with the enemy.

October fifth.—Three hundred men of the Second division, West Virginia cavalry, under command of Major Farabee (First Virginia cavalry), were sent from Luray to destroy the railroad bridge over the Rapidan river, to proceed from thence to Culpepper, and thence by Sperryville to Luray.

He completely destroyed the bridge. Much credit is due to the officer in command for the

prompt and energetic manner in which he carried out his instructions.

October sixth.—The First and Third divisions of cavalry (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) followed the army down the valley, the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) taking the middle road, and stopping at Timberville, the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) taking the back road and camping for the night in the neighborhood of Turleytown and Brock's gap. The enemy made an attack at this point, but were handsomely repulsed.

One brigade of Second division, West Virginia cavalry, came from Luray through New Market gap, and returned same night to Luray.

October seventh.—The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) continued its march on the middle road, and came into the valley at Edinburgh, and camped for the night about two miles south of Woodstock.

The Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) continued its march on the back road, and camped in the vicinity of Columbia Furnace for the night. The rear guard of this column was fighting all day. The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), marched from Luray down Luray valley to Millford creek.

October eighth.—The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) continued its march on the Valley pike, and stopped on Brook creek. The Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) continued its march on the back road, and camped for the night on Tumbling run. The rear guard of this division was fighting or skirmishing during the whole march. About four p. m. this day Brigadier-General Merritt, commanding First division, sent one brigade back on the pike to make the enemy develop the force which had been following him during the day, and at the same time he sent two brigades to attack the enemy's column, which had been following the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer), and stopped their further advance, and at dark the first division was drawn in, and camped near Brook creek, three miles south of Strasburg.

The Second division West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), moved from Millford creek to Front Royal, holding Chester and Manassas gaps.

The next day (the ninth) I had received orders from Major-General Sheridan to start out at daylight and whip the rebel cavalry, or get whipped myself. My command was disposed as follows:

Brigadier-General Merritt, commanding First division, was in the Valley pike at Brook creek, at the foot of Round Top mountain.

Brigadier-General Custer, commanding Third division, was on the back road at Tumbling run. These two roads, as a general thing, are parallel, and from two and a half to three miles apart. Brigadier-General Custer being about six miles from Brook creek, was ordered to move at daylight back on the back road and attack as soon as met. Brigadier-General Mer-

ritt being near Brook creek and the enemy, was directed to move about seven a. m. one brigade in the pike, and two brigades between the roads, and connect with Brigadier-General Custer and the brigade in the pike.

The enemy's force was as follows: On the back road under General Rosser three brigades, from three thousand to thirty-five hundred men; on the pike, under Generals Lomax and Bradley Johnson, one thousand to fifteen hundred men.

Brigadier-General Custer's guns were heard early in the morning on Brook creek, and Brigadier-General Merritt moved to the attack, and to make a connection with Brigadier-General Custer.

Colonel Lowell, commanding Reserve brigade, First division, moved on the pike and attacked Lomax and Johnson; the First brigade, First division, moved on the right to connect with Brigadier-General Custer, and to attack the enemy on the right flank; the Second brigades First division, moved in the centre. After a spirited engagement for about two hours, the enemy seeing that they were being flanked and severely pressed in front, gave way in great confusion, which was immediately taken advantage of by both division commanders. The enemy endeavored to rally several times, but were unable to stand the desperate charges made by my men, and they were driven in a perfect rout for twenty miles; the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) on the pike pursuing them beyond Mount Jackson; the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) in the back road, pursuing them beyond Columbia furnaces.

The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) captured five pieces of artillery (all they had on the road except one), their ordnance, ambulance, and wagon trains, and sixty prisoners.

The Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) captured six pieces of artillery (all they had on the back road), all of their headquarter wagons, ordnance, ambulance, and wagon trains. There could have hardly been a more complete victory and rout. The cavalry totally covered themselves with glory, and added to their long list of victories the most brilliant one of them all, and the most decisive the country has ever witnessed.

Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer, and Colonels Lowell and Pennington, commanding brigades, particularly distinguished themselves; in fact no men could have rendered more valuable services and deserve higher honors from the hands of the Government.

My losses in this engagement will not exceed sixty killed and wounded, which is astonishing when compared with the results.

The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) returned as far as Woodstock, and camped for the night.

The Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) returned about six miles and camped for the night.

October tenth, the First and Third divisions

cavalry (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer), remained in camp, and the captured property, sent to the rear.

The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), was ordered from Front Royal, through Chester gap in the Blue Ridge to Sperryville, and obtained important information.

October eleventh.—The First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) moved back to the north side of Cedar creek, taking position as follows: The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) on the left of the army, and the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) on the right of the army. The Second division, West Virginia cavalry (Colonel Powell), marched to Arnisville.

October twelfth.—I sent reconnoissances from the First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) up the Valley pike and the back road for ten or twelve miles, but could find no signs of the enemy.

October thirteenth.—All quiet during the day until about two P. M., when the enemy advanced a strong infantry force in the Valley pike and commenced an attack on the pickets, at the same time they appeared in strong cavalry force on our right, opposite the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer). They succeeded in driving part of the cavalry pickets across Cedar creek, and advanced about a mile. Brigadier-General Custer moved out promptly and drove the enemy back across the creek and held that line. When the attack commenced, Brigadier-General Merritt put his division (First) in the saddle, and late in the afternoon the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was moved on the right of the army and to the left of the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer).

October fourteenth.—The First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) were in camp on the right of the army, covering the country for five or six miles to the right of the infantry. Brigadier-General Custer sent reconnoissances out on the back road and found the enemy had retired to the line of Fisher's Hill.

October fifteenth.—Remained in camp. All quiet. The Second division (Colonel Powell) was still near Front Royal, covering the line of the Shenandoah from the left of the infantry to beyond Front Royal. After dark the First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was ordered to move to Front Royal. The Second division (Colonel Powell) was ordered to concentrate at the same point. Both of these divisions being designed for a raid on Charlottesville and Gordonsville, I moved to the Shenandoah near Front Royal in the afternoon to go in command of the expedition, which was to start on the morning of the sixteenth. During the night of the fifteenth I received orders suspending the expedition.

October sixteenth.—The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was ordered back to the army, and took position on the right of the infantry. The Second division (Colonel Powell)

was ordered to resume its old position, and I returned to the army on Cedar creek. Brigadier-General Custer made a reconnoissance in his front, but could find no enemy outside of their lines on Fisher's Hill.

October seventeenth.—Just before daylight the rebel General Rosser, with one brigade of infantry and three brigades of cavalry, the infantry riding behind the cavalry, attacked Brigadier-General Custer's extreme right picket from the rear, and succeeded in capturing the right reserve of a major and twenty-five men, and then fell back rapidly, evidently frightened from his original designs, whatever they may have been, as he had made a circuit of thirty-two miles in the night to get in rear of our picket line. The same day one brigade of Second division (Colonel Powell) was moved nearer the infantry and posted at Buckton ford on the Shenandoah river, connecting their pickets with the left of the infantry.

October eighteenth.—All quiet, and cavalry in same position. Reconnoissances showed no enemy in their immediate front. While the Second division (Colonel Powell) was at Front Royal, the rebel General Lomax with his division was at Millford creek, up Luray valley, about fourteen miles distant, and did not come out.

October nineteenth.—Before daylight the enemy made a vigorous attack, having surprised and turned the left of the army. The cavalry was immediately put in the saddle, and the First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) put in position on the right of the infantry. The trains were then sent to the rear. The First brigade, Second division (Colonel Moore commanding), being at Benton's ford on the Shenandoah, was by this move cut off from the main army, and Colonel Moore (Second Ohio) immediately passed around the enemy's right, and came up on the left of our army at Middletown, on the valley pike, having previously sent his trains to Winchester. This brigade immediately attacked the enemy and held them in check on the pike until they could be reinforced. At daylight in the morning the enemy made his appearance in front of Brigadier-General Custer's pickets, on the extreme right, but the gallant men of the Third division prevented their further advance.

A great portion of the army, being badly broken, was going to the rear by thousands; to check this stream of stragglers I deployed my escort (First Rhode Island cavalry), as did Brigadier-General Merritt his (Fifth United States cavalry). After an hour or two's work it proved to be a fruitless effort. The escorts were drawn in, and officers sent further to the rear to form the men. By this time the enemy had come near enough for the cavalry batteries to open upon them, which they did.

The enemy did not bring their lines in the open country between them and the cavalry, but kept under cover of the woods. Between nine and ten o'clock I was ordered by General

Wright, commanding the army (temporarily, Major-General Sheridan being temporarily absent), to move my whole cavalry force on the left of the army; this I was opposed to, but proceeded to obey the order; but on my own responsibility I left three regiments to picket the right, and to this fact thousands of our stragglers are indebted for their safety, for these brave men held their position against great odds for five hours.

The First and Third divisions (Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer) were ordered to the left of the army. The First division (Brigadier-General Merritt) was put in position across the pike, just north of Middletown. The Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) was formed on the left of the First division. The First brigade, Second division (Colonel Moore), was formed on the left of the Third division. The horse batteries "B" and "L," Second Artillery, U. S. A. (Lieutenant Taylor commanding), was left on the right fighting on the infantry line, where it did admirable service, and was the last artillery to leave the front.

Too much praise cannot be given to the officers and men of this battery, for their coolness and gallantry on this occasion. When the infantry was forced back, and the battery was obliged to retire, it joined its brigade (Second, First division) on the right of the pike, where it immediately went into action. As soon as the cavalry was in position on the left of the army, they attacked the enemy. Colonel Lowell, commanding Reserve brigade, First division, dismounted a part of his little band, and they advanced to a strong position behind a stone wall, from which the enemy's infantry failed to drive them after repeated attempts. The cavalry fought infantry and artillery only on the left of the army.

About twelve o'clock, *a. m.*, the cavalry was moved to the left about three hundred yards, thus bringing it on the left of the pike. Thus matters stood with cavalry until three o'clock *p. m.*, holding on to their ground with more than their usual dogged persistence, displaying gallantry which has never been surpassed, while most of the infantry was reforming several miles on their right and rear.

During this time the Second brigade, Second division (Colonel Powell commanding division), fell back slowly (by order) on the Front Royal and Winchester pike, to Stony point, and then to a point near Newtown, followed by the rebel General Lomax's division of cavalry, where they remained during the greater part of the day; Colonel Powell thus prevented the enemy's cavalry from getting on the pike to attack our trains and rear.

About two *p. m.*, Major-General Sheridan arrived upon the ground, and directed me to send one division of cavalry on the right of the army. I immediately ordered the Third division (Brigadier-General Custer) to that position, where he arrived just in the nick of time, for the enemy had just succeeded in crossing—infantry

and cavalry—over Cedar creek on the right of the army. But the gallant Custer was equal to the emergency. He immediately charged the cavalry and drove them about a mile in the most beautiful manner behind their infantry support, from which they did not show themselves in force again during the day.

On the left the battle was going well for us; in fact it could not be otherwise, with the cool and invincible Merritt on the ground, supported by such soldiers as Devin and Lowell.

At this time the First brigade, Second division, was temporarily under the orders of Brigadier-General Merritt, who was constantly annoying and attacking the enemy whenever an opportunity presented itself, although his men were completely within range of the enemy's sharpshooters, his shot and shell, and many a horse and rider was made to bite the dust. They held their ground like men of steel—officers and men seemed to know and feel that the safety of the army in no small degree depended upon their holding their position, and they can never receive too much credit for the manner in which they did their duty.

About four o'clock *p. m.*, Colonel Moore, commanding First brigade, Second division, was ordered to join his division at Newtown, and Colonel Powell, commanding the division, directed to shove out a strong force to hold the Front Royal and Winchester pike. About four o'clock, in a charge, the gallant but lamented Lowell received a severe wound in the arm and side, but still kept his saddle.

About 4:15 a general advance of the army was made, and 'twas truly grand to see the manner in which the cavalry did their part. In this general advance, Colonel Lowell, Second Massachusetts cavalry, commanding Reserve brigade, First division, while charging at the head of his brigade, received a second wound, which proved to be mortal; thus the service lost one of the most gallant and accomplished soldiers. He was the beau ideal of a cavalry officer, and his memory will never die in the command.

In the general advance Brigadier-General Custer, commanding Third division, left three regiments to attend to the cavalry in his front, and started with the balance of his division to take part in the advance against the enemy's infantry. Thus the cavalry advanced on both flanks, side by side with the infantry, charging the enemy's lines with an impetuosity which they could not stand.

The rebel army was soon routed and driven across Cedar creek in confusion. The cavalry sweeping on both flanks crossed Cedar Creek about the same time, charged and broke the last line the enemy attempted to form (it was now after dark), and put out at full speed at their artillery and trains.

They continued the pursuit to the foot of Fisher's Hill, about four miles from Cedar creek, and captured the following property and prisoners, *viz.*:—Forty-five pieces of artillery,

thirty-two caissons, one hundred and fifty-six sets artillery harness, one hundred and eighty-four horses, one hundred and fifty six mules, one hundred and fifty sets wagon harness, forty-six army wagons, six hundred and seventy-two prisoners of war, five battle flags; also many muskets, sabres, etc., which it took them about all night to bring in. Darkness alone saved the greater part of the rebel army from capture, for there never were men who displayed more fear of cavalry than they did upon this occasion.

The service of the cavalry on this day to the army and the country can never be too highly appreciated. The Horse artillery, Companies K and L, of the First United States, commanded by First Lieutenant Taylor, Companies B and L, Second United States, commanded by First Lieutenant Pierce, Company C, Fifth United States, commanded by First Lieutenant Wier, and Captain Martin's battery of the Sixth New York, rendered invaluable services on this day, as for five or six hours the only artillery used was that of the cavalry, and nobly did they do their duty, having but about two rounds per piece left after the engagement.

For the gallantry and good judgment displayed by Brigadier-Generals Merritt and Custer, and Brevet Brigadier-General Devin, and Colonel Lowell in this battle, I must again recommend them for promotion, which on several occasions has been justly earned.

I will take this occasion to recommend to the favorable consideration of the proper authorities the following members of my staff as fit recipients of higher honors than lies in my power to bestow, for gallantry and courage displayed on this and several other occasions during the campaign. Braver and more efficient staff officers never drew rein or sabre, viz.:

Major William Russell, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain M. A. Reno, First United States cavalry, Chief of Staff; Captain R. Ellis,

Sixth Pennsylvania cavalry, Assistant Inspector-General; Captain George B. Sandford, First United States cavalry, Assistant Commissary Musters; Captain J. J. Coppinger, Fourteenth Infantry, United States Artillery, A. A. D. C.; Captain Bailey, First New York Lincoln cavalry, A. A. D. C.; Captain Martindale, First New York Lincoln cavalry, A. A. D. C.; Captain M. Berry, Twentieth Pennsylvania cavalry, A. A. D. C.; First Lieutenant Wallace, Fifth Michigan cavalry, A. A. D. C.; First Lieutenant Ellis, Sixth Pennsylvania cavalry, A. A. D. C.; First Lieutenant Slater, First New York dragoons, amb. officer; First Lieutenant H. H. Goldsmith, Fifteenth New Jersey volunteer infantry, A. D. C.

I take pleasure in expressing my sincere thanks to division commanders and their commands for the hearty co-operation given to me and each other. When such feelings exist success must attend our efforts, and yours have been such that all in future can revert with pleasure to the fact that you belonged to the cavalry of the Middle Military division, and participated in the successful campaign of Major-General Sheridan in the Shenandoah valley.

For further particulars I would respectfully refer to division and brigade commanders' reports herewith enclosed.

Annexed is also a report of casualties.

It is also proper to remark in this connection, that as General Averell, in his report, has gone beyond his province to report upon General Merritt (First division cavalry), at the battle of Winchester, September nineteenth, to mention a few facts received from official reports, viz.:

The loss of General Averell's division (Second division), West Virginia cavalry, at this time was: aggregate, thirty-two, and not two hundred and fifty as he supposes, and the loss of General Merritt's division (First division cavalry) in the same engagement was three hundred and eleven.

Statement of the Casualties in the Cavalry Middle Military Division, from the 1st of August to the 31st of August, 1864.

DIVISION.	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSED.	AGGREGATE.	
Cavalry Headquarters.....	1	..	3	4	First Rhode Island Cavalry .
First Cavalry Division.....	136	778	504	1558	
Second Cavalry Division.....	39	145	112	299	
Third Cavalry Division.....	67	835	321	778	
Total.....	293	1811	1030	2684	

Report of Property Captured and Destroyed from the enemy by the Cavalry Middle Military Division, August 8 to October 31, 1864.

PROPERTY CAPTURED.

	PIECES OF ARTILLERY.	CANNONS.	ARMY WAGONS.	AMMUNITION, ETC.	FOSSILS.	HOUSES.	MILLS.	HARROWS (BAR).	MISCELLANEOUS WAGONS.	BATTERY WAGONS.	HOSES EQUIPMENTS.	BEEF CATTLE.	BATTLE FLAGS.	PERSONS CAPTURED DURING CAMPAIGN.
First Division.....	29	12	29	69	1	124	172	292	199	799	12	..
Second Division.....	13	10	2099	..	177
Third Division.....	29	30	64	23	..	422	182	404	1	1	..	152	6	..
Total.....	71	52	106	92	2	2867	354	674	1	1	199	1152	18	266

PROPERTY DESTROYED.

	CANNONS.	ARMY WAGONS.	AMMUNITION.	FUSILS.	LENNES.	MUSKETS.	BARRELS.	MILLS (FLOUR).	MILLS (RAW).	MILLS (WOOLLEN).	TONS OF HAY.	TONS OF STRAW.	TONS OF FODDER.	BUNDLES OF WHEAT.
First Division.....	2	50	28	3	4	81	690	47	4	1	2,426	265	272	419,742
Second Division.....	3	60	4	140	10	1,590	10,000
Third Division.....	..	4
Total.....	5	94	32	3	4	81	799	57	4	1	4,066	265	272	429,742

	BARRELS OF OATS.	ACRES OF CORN.	BARRELS OF FLOUR.	WAGONS LOADED WITH FLOUR.	CATTLE DRIVEN OFF.	SHEEP DRIVEN OFF.	SWINE DRIVEN OFF.	FUSILS.	TARBARRELS.	RAILROAD DEPOTS.	LOCOMOTIVE ENGINES.	BOX CARS.	STAGES OR AMBUSHS.	ROUTES OR AMBUSHS.
First Division.....	750	515	500	2	1,947	1,231	725	3	2	1	1	3	..	700,000
Second Division.....
Third Division.....	2,000	100	400
Total.....	2,750	515	500	2	1,947	1,631	725	3	2	1	1	3	3,000	700,000

Respectfully submitted,

A. T. A. TORBERT,
Brevet Brigadier-General of Volunteers,
Chief of Cavalry, Commanding.

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EXPLANATION OF ABBREVIATIONS IN THE INDEX.

D. stands for *Diary of Events*; Doc. for *Documents*; and P. for *Poetry, Rumors, and Incidents*.

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
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