




S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20320425

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

25 April 2007


MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172.

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo  
Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000514DP (S)

### JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

#### 1. (S//NF) Personal Information:

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Abdullah T al-Anzy
- Aliases and Current/True Name: Abdallah Thani Faris al-Unazi, Abu Obeida, Abdullah al-Tayabi, Abu Sulayman al-Anizi
- Place of Birth: Dhahran, Saudi Arabia (SA)
- Date of Birth: 31 January 1980
- Citizenship: Saudi Arabia
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-000514DP



2. (U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

#### 3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

a. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) with Transfer Language on 7 April 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist who traveled to Afghanistan (AF) to support the Taliban and al-Qaida. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee admitted receiving militant training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Training Camp and staying at various al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee worked for a charity organization that may be identical to a Saudi Arabian organization that supported the jihadist cause in Afghanistan, Iraq (IZ), and

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCES  
REASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
DECLASSIFY ON: 20320425

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Palestine. Detainee holds animosity for the US and may engage in future extremist activities. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.
- A **LOW** threat from a detention perspective.
- Of **LOW** intelligence value.

c. (U) **Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will be annotated by ➤ next to the footnotes.)

- (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Ahmed Adnan Muhammad Ajam, ISN US9SY-000326DP (SY-326), stated that weapons were distributed to all Arabs entering Tora Bora.

#### 4. (U) **Detainee's Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

a. (S//NF) **Prior History:** Detainee is married with no children. Detainee dropped out of school after the eighth grade to work.<sup>1</sup> Detainee's long-time friend, Abu Said al-Shargi aka (Khalaf Tarad al-Anzi), convinced him to travel to Afghanistan to participate in jihad training.<sup>2</sup> In April or May 2000, detainee and al-Shargi traveled to the al-Faruq Training Camp in Kandahar, AF. Detainee traveled to fulfill his religious obligation to train, rather than to participate in actual jihad. Detainee left the camp after forty-five days of training because conditions were too arduous.<sup>3</sup> Detainee returned to Saudi Arabia and found work as an administrative assistant at a government-sponsored charity organization called Jama't al-Bur al-Khairi (NFI).<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> 000514 KB 11-FEB-2002, 000514 KB SUP 27-JUL-2005, IIR 6 034 0167 05

<sup>2</sup> Analyst Note: Detainee claimed he grew interested in jihad training because he felt that al-Shargi was very knowledgeable, educated, and detainee trusted him. In 000514 MFR 08-APR-2002, detainee reported his friend's name as Khalaf Tarad al-Anzi aka (Abu Said). In 000514 SIR 09-MAR-2004, Khalaf Tarad al-Anzi is associated with the alias Said al-Shargi. Variants of Shargi are Sharqi, Sharki, and Sharbi.

<sup>3</sup> 000514 FM40 06-FEB-2004, 000514 SIR 12-DEC-2004, IIR 6 034 0937 04

<sup>4</sup> 000514 MFR 07-OCT-2002, TD-314/03378-02, 000514 MFR 08-APR-2002

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**b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** In October 2001, detainee and al-Shargi returned to Afghanistan via Bahrain and Iran to receive additional training at al-Faruq. When they arrived at the camp, it was closed due to US air strikes.<sup>5</sup>

**c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** Detainee and al-Shargi traveled with a group to Kabul, AF, where they stayed in an unidentified guesthouse for approximately three days.<sup>6</sup> On the third day, US forces began bombing Kabul, including the area near the guesthouse. The Arab occupants were presented with the options of fighting or fleeing to Pakistan, and the group chose to flee.<sup>7</sup> Detainee and al-Shargi traveled to Jalalabad, AF, where they were again forced to flee. They traveled to the Tora Bora Mountains of Afghanistan on approximately 20 November 2001.<sup>8</sup> Detainee claimed to have spent approximately one month in a cave.<sup>9</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** On or about 16 December 2001, detainee and about 50-60 other Arabs left their bunkers in Tora Bora under the orders of senior al-Qaida commander Ali Muhammad Abdul Aziz al-Fakhri aka (Ibn al-Shaykh al-Libi), ISN US9LY-000212DP (LY-212), and attempted to cross the border into Pakistan.<sup>10</sup> Detainee was severely injured during an air strike, subsequently captured and taken to a hospital in Jalalabad.<sup>11</sup> After two weeks in the hospital, Northern Alliance (NA) forces transferred detainee to the Ministry of Security prison in Kabul. NA forces later transferred detainee to the custody of US forces in Bagram, AF.<sup>12</sup>

**b. (U) Property Held:** None

**c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 7 February 2002

<sup>5</sup> 000514 SIR 19-NOV-2002, Analyst Note: The Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) bombing campaign began on 7 October 2001.

<sup>6</sup> 000514 SIR 11-APR-2002, Analyst Note: Detainee thought this house formerly belonged to the Saudi Ambassador to Afghanistan. The former residence of the Saudi Ambassador was located within the Wazir Akbar Khan Area of Kabul. The Wazir Akbar Khan area is a former diplomatic district occupied by the Taliban and al-Qaida for quarters and training. This guesthouse is also known as the Yemeni Guesthouse aka the (Azam Guesthouse) (see IIR 6 034 1509 04 and IIR 2 340 6462 02).

<sup>7</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03

<sup>8</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03, 000514 SIR 07-OCT-2002, Analyst Note: Jalalabad fell to US and Coalition forces on 13 November 2001.

<sup>9</sup> 000514 SIR 19-NOV-2002

<sup>10</sup> 000514 SIR 07-OCT-2002, TD-314/14605-04

<sup>11</sup> 000568 SIR 06-JAN-2005

<sup>12</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03, 000514 SIR 07-OCT-2002, TD-314/03378-02

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**d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:**

- To provide information on al-Faruq Training Camp.

**6. (S//NF) Evaluation Of Detainee's Account:** Detainee has provided a coherent and logical timeline consistent with known events. However, detainee's claim that he returned to Afghanistan merely for additional training is probably a cover story to mask his intent to fight US forces in response to a request for additional fighters. Detainee had previously trained as a jihadist, and would have probably suspected hostilities in Afghanistan in response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.

**7. (U) Detainee Threat:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **HIGH** risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allies.

**b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention:** Detainee is assessed to be an Islamic extremist who traveled to Afghanistan to support the Taliban and al-Qaida. Detainee probably participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces. Detainee admitted receiving militant training at the al-Qaida sponsored al-Faruq Training Camp and staying at various al-Qaida guesthouses. Detainee worked for a charity organization that may be identical to a Saudi Arabian organization that supported jihadist causes in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Palestine. Detainee holds animosity for the US and may engage in future extremist activities.

- (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan twice for militant training in preparation for jihad.
  - (S//NF) Detainee claimed that he received four weeks of basic military training at the al-Faruq Camp during the summer of 2000. This included small arms training as well as individual and small group tactical movement, marching, camouflage, and trench digging.<sup>13</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee claimed his first training session was in 2000; however, he provided information on three Filipinos who received training at al-Faruq in 1999.<sup>14</sup> (Analyst Note: The report does not specify how detainee was privy to this information. There is no other reporting indicating that detainee was present at the camp in 1999. Detainee may have learned about the Filipinos second-hand while attending in 2000.)

<sup>13</sup> IIR 6 034 0937 04, 000514 MFR 08-APR-2002

<sup>14</sup> IIR 2 340 6378 02, Analyst Note: Source US-IR-7001-3068 corresponds to detainee.

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- (S//NF) Detainee claimed that he remained at al-Faruq for forty-five days, which was the halfway point of the training. Detainee advised he planned on returning to complete the more advanced course.<sup>15</sup> (Analyst Note: Basic training at al-Faruq lasted forty-five days. Advanced training required forty-five additional days, lending credence to detainee's "halfway" comment.)
  - (S//NF) After forty-five days at al-Faruq, detainee returned to Saudi Arabia, while his friend al-Shargi remained in Afghanistan for an unspecified duration before returning to Saudi Arabia as well. In October 2001, detainee and al-Shargi returned to Afghanistan together to attend advanced training at al-Faruq.<sup>16</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's commitment to extremist jihad is evident in his return to Afghanistan after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks.)
    - ◆ (C) A letter dated 29 January 2001, from a member of the al-Qaida military committee to the emir of the al-Faruq Training Camp, indicated that an individual listed as Abu Saed al-Sharki would be arriving soon to repeat his training on the SA-7.<sup>17</sup> (Analyst Note: It is highly probable that the individual referenced was detainee's friend Abu Said al-Shargi. This supports detainee's reporting that they both received training in 2000 and were returning for more training in 2001.<sup>18</sup> Al-Shargi was listed among al-Qaida-related personnel killed at Tora Bora.<sup>19</sup>)
- (S//NF) Detainee traveled to Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, probably with the intent of engaging US and Coalition forces.
  - (S//NF) Detainee probably participated in hostilities in the Tora Bora Mountains. Detainee admitted he was armed with an AK-47 in the mountains. Detainee claimed that he and al-Shargi each purchased AK-47s during their travels through Afghanistan. Detainee commented that it was very wise to have a weapon with you at all times while traveling in Afghanistan.<sup>20</sup>
    - (S//NF) NA forces captured detainee in Tora Bora with an AK-47 and two hand grenades.<sup>21</sup> (Analyst Note: SY-326 confirmed that weapons were distributed to all Arabs entering Tora Bora.<sup>22</sup> Possession of these weapons adds to the probability that detainee participated in hostilities against US and Coalition forces.)

<sup>15</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03, 000514 SIR 07-OCT-2002<sup>16</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03<sup>17</sup> IIR 7 739 3187 02<sup>18</sup> IIR 7 739 3190 02<sup>19</sup> IIR 2 340 6716 02, IIR 7 739 3111 02<sup>20</sup> 000514 FM40 06-FEB-2004, 000514 FM40 21-JAN-2004<sup>21</sup> 000514 INITAL SCREENING 02-FEB-2002<sup>22</sup> >IIR 6 034 0055 05

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- (S//NF) It is assessed detainee stayed at the Azam and/or Abu al-Zubayr al-Ha'ili's guesthouse in Kabul prior to traveling to the Tora Bora Mountains, both of which are reportedly affiliated with al-Qaida.<sup>23</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee reported that he, al-Shargi, and others traveled to Kabul, where they stayed in a guesthouse for approximately three days. Detainee speculated that the facility may have been the former house of the Saudi ambassador to Afghanistan.<sup>24</sup> Detainee also admitted leaving his passport at the guesthouse in Kabul.<sup>25</sup> (Analyst Note: This guesthouse is assessed to be the Azam Guesthouse.)
    - (S//NF) Yasim Muhammad Salih Mazeab Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP (YM-252), noted that the Azam Guesthouse in Kabul was formerly known as the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia Guesthouse. YM-252 stated that the facility was run by trusted Usama Bin Laden (UBL) aid and veteran jihadist Hamza al-Ghamdi.<sup>26</sup>
    - (S//NF) Humud Dakhil Humud Said al-Jadani, ISN US9SA-000230DP (SA-230), reported that he stayed at a guesthouse in Kabul operated by Hamza al-Ghamdi that was sometimes called the Saudi embassy guesthouse. Other detainees told SA-230 the facility was also known as the Azam Guesthouse.<sup>27</sup>
    - (S//NF) Detainee is identified on documents listing the names and aliases of suspected al-Qaida members and the contents of their trust accounts. One such list was recovered during a September 2002 raid on a suspected al-Qaida safe house in Karachi, PK. The statement "has possession of a Saudi passport" was associated with detainee.<sup>28</sup> (Analyst Note: Such a list is indicative of an individual's residence within al-Qaida, Taliban, and other extremist guesthouses often for the purpose of training or coordination prior to traveling to the front lines. Trust accounts were simple storage compartments or boxes used to secure an individual's personal valuables, including passports and plane tickets, until completion of training or other activity.<sup>29</sup>)
- (S//NF) Detainee admitted working for Jama't al-Bur al-Khairi, which detainee claimed was a prominent government-run organization in Saudi Arabia.<sup>30</sup> Detainee claimed his job was to run a satellite office in al-Qaysumah, SA, where he was the only

<sup>23</sup> IIR 6 034 0088 05, IIR 6 034 0694 03, TD-314/24501-02, Analyst Note: Variants for Azam are A'azam, Azzam, and Azaam.

<sup>24</sup> 000514 SIR 11-APR-2002

<sup>25</sup> IIR 6 034 0937 04

<sup>26</sup> 000252 SIR 30-AUG-2004

<sup>27</sup> 000230 SIR 28-APR-2005

<sup>28</sup> TD-314/40693-02

<sup>29</sup> TD-314/14620-03

<sup>30</sup> 000514 MFR 19-NOV-2002, Analyst Note: A variant for Jama't al-Bur al-Khairi is Jamiya al-Bir al-Khairiya.

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employee. His responsibility was to accept donations from people who came into the office.<sup>31</sup>

- (S//NF) Jama't al-Bur al-Khairi may be identical to the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic charity organization Jamiat al-Bir (JAB). According to a sensitive source, JAB's public mission is to solicit funds for the poor and needy and to sponsor legitimate relief services, such as medical clinics and mosques. JAB was established by a member of the Saudi royal family. However, leaders of the organization used JAB-sponsored fundraising venues as platforms to engage attendees in discussions of jihad, with particular focus on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Palestinian Territories, including calls for the killing of Jews.<sup>32</sup> (Analyst Note: Although there are similarities between detainee's description of the organization where he worked and the sensitive source's description of JAB, insufficient information is available to conclusively equate the two organizations.)
- (S//NF) Detainee is an Islamic extremist who holds great animosity for the US and may engage in future extremist activities.
  - (S//NF) Detainee repeatedly stated that America is the "Great Evil." Detainee expressed his dislike for America because he is an "innocent man" incarcerated for years away from his family.<sup>33</sup>
  - (S//NF) Detainee advised that he would engage in ground combat against the US military forces. Detainee considers the US his enemy because Americans are directly responsible for the loss of both of his legs.<sup>34</sup> However, detainee claimed he would not have gone to Afghanistan had he thought a full-scale war was forthcoming.<sup>35</sup> (Analyst Note: Even though detainee is without full mobility of his legs, it may not reduce his ability to participate in hostilities against US forces. In a 2004 letter to his brother, detainee wrote that he is able to jog around and jump rope.<sup>36</sup>)
- (S//NF) In July 2002, a delegation from Saudi Arabia visited JTF-GTMO and interviewed detainee. The Saudi delegation identified detainee as of low intelligence and law enforcement value to the US, and unlikely to pose a terrorist threat to the US or its interests. Furthermore, the Saudi delegation indicated that the Government of Saudi Arabia would be willing to take custody of detainee for possible prosecution as soon as the US determined it no longer wanted to hold him.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> 000514 MFR 19-NOV-2002, IIR 6 034 0215 03

<sup>32</sup> TD-314/50532-05

<sup>33</sup> 000514 Regional Team Assessment 09-FEB-2004, 000514 SIR 26-JUL-2004

<sup>34</sup> IIR 6 034 0215 03

<sup>35</sup> 000514 SIR 19-NOV-2002

<sup>36</sup> 000514 GUAN-2004-T01697

<sup>37</sup> TD-314/30789-02

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**c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed as a **LOW** threat from a detention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been compliant and non-hostile to the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 11 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 29 March 2007, when he was reported returning his library book with the white out of a previous offense removed. Detainee has only one Report of Disciplinary Infractions for assault occurring on 16 May 2003, when he threw water at a guard. Other incidents for which detainee has been disciplined include inciting and participating in a mass disturbance, damage to government property, failure to follow instructions and camp rules, and possession of both weapon and of non-weapon type contraband. On 3 July 2006, detainee was found to be in possession of a razor blade and a needle. Detainee had five Reports of Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and two so far in 2007.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **LOW** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 November 2006.

**b. (S//NF) Placement and Access:** Detainee trained in the summer of 2000 at al-Faruq, and stayed at various al-Qaida associated guesthouses. Detainee returned to Saudi Arabia and worked for an organization that may have supported extremists. Detainee again traveled to Afghanistan in October 2001 for advanced militant training and was sent to Tora Bora, where he probably served under senior al-Qaida operative LY-212. Detainee was a friend of an allegedly deceased al-Qaida member who convinced him to travel to Afghanistan for jihadist training.

**c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment:** Detainee can provide dated information on al-Qaida sponsored recruiting, travel facilitation, and the now defunct al-Faruq Training Camp. Detainee can also provide information on the personnel, locations and operations involved in the al-Qaida defense of Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Such information would probably not be of critical strategic value given its age and detainee's relatively limited status and access.

**d. (S//NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**


- Al-Qaida
  - Recruiting, travel facilitation, facilities and personnel
  - Al-Faruq Training Camp
  - Tora Bora personnel, activities, and disposition of forces



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9. (S) **EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 1 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



HARRY B. HARRIS, JR.  
Rear Admiral, USN  
Commanding

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\*Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.