

3061

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al)

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT (Revised)

DEPONENT: ARAKI, Sadao

I, ARAKI, Sadao, make oath and say as follows:

1. Circumstances up to my acceptance of the post of War Minister

I served as the Chief of No. 1 Division of the General Staff from January 1928 to August 1928; President of the Staff College until August 1929; the Commander of the 6th Division in Kumamoto until August 1931, and Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education.

While I was in the service of those posts, I recognized from my experience in World War I and from my views on the morality of war, as well as from the basic principle in founding our army, the necessity of disassociating our army from the old Prussian style army, and so I devoted my whole hearted attention to the education and training of troops with the final object of promoting their moral standard.

The general situation in those days was by no means eventless. On the contrary, there was every sign of potential unrest. However, my view on the current problems was always different from the opinions of the leaders of Japan, including those of militarists, and I always remained unbiased to any of the movements which were opposed to each other.

It was on August 15, 1931 that I arrived in Tokyo to accept the post of the Director of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education. This was an advisory position to the Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.

The outbreak of the Manchurian Incident was known to me from the newspaper. I was told that the government had set up a non-expansion policy, and so I did not think much of this incident.

On the occasion of the October Incident, I happened to have been asked by War Minister MINAMI and Chief of General Staff KANAYA to subdue the trouble. I successfully discharged this task, but was informed nothing further as to the punishment of the people involved in this incident.

At that time, I was merely the Chairman of the committee

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of the entrance examination of the Military Preparatory School and the Military Academy, a position which was to be occupied by the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of the Department of Military Education as was regulated in that Department, and which had nothing to do with the current problems.

2. Circumstances around my acceptance of the post of War Minister.

At the end of 1931, I was the senior member of the Vice-Minister class, and because of this, I was asked on December 13th by Mr. Tsuyoshi INUKAI to become War Minister. As was customary with the army at that time, I reported this matter to and requested direction of the Three Chiefs of Army (War Minister, Chief of the General Staff, and Inspector-General of the Department of Military Education.) The opinion of the Three Chiefs was unanimous and they instructed me to accept the post. Thus I sent in my acceptance to Mr. INUKAI and became War Minister when the INUKAI Cabinet was formally organized on the same day. Mr. INUKAI at this Tribunal testified that my acceptance was made under some extraordinary circumstances, but not only was there any uncustomary procedure in connection with my acceptance, but neither my predecessor nor any person of importance at that time informed me of such circumstances.

On the following day of my acceptance of this new post and the subsequent day, War Minister MINAMI, my predecessor, Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and Chief of the General Staff KANAYA gave me the explanation of the state of affairs of Japan at that time, the outline of which was as follows:

(a) That since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, both the government and the army authorities strived to settle the trouble under a non-expansion policy, but that the condition in Manchuria which had been aggravated for many years in the past, was so complicated that both the Japanese civilian inhabitants in Manchuria and the Kwantung Army were still in danger. That the Government of the existing Manchurian regime had lost its grip, some of its influential personnel had absconded while the rest of them had established their own strongholds in various parts of Manchuria, and an absolute state of anarchy was revealed throughout Manchuria.

(b) That the army authorities, in view of their primary duty, was dually engaged to cope with this situation -- protection of the Japanese nationals and their rights and interests in Manchuria was one and self-defensive to insure the security of the Kwantung Army was the other. That the condition, as had been made clear by the second declaration of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, was so aggravated that it was impracticable to return the Japanese troops to their original stations.

(c) That Chang Hsue-liang, who had established in Chinchow District a stronghold for violation of peace and order in Manchuria, did not keep his promise of evacuating all

all the troops under his command from the Chinchow District, and that there was not the slightest indication of sincerity to show that some day he might fulfill this promise.

(d) That the fact that the Japanese force from a desire for peaceful settlement had returned its troops from half way point of its campaign to Chinchow was utilized by Chang Hsue-liang for his propaganda. He was busy propagandizing that he and his troops won the victory in this campaign and by thus instigating the fighting spirit of the troops, caused them to cross the Liao River to appear and overrun the districts as far as near Mukden. That this very much endangered Japanese nationals and the troops at the foremost front.

(e) That while the League of Nations had not appreciated the actual situation in full, the recent councillors meeting decided to despatch a commission of enquiry and that it approved our rightful assertion of reserving our rights of pacifying bandits and other groups of turbulent elements.

The above were the outlines of the actual state of affairs explained to me by those three important people of the army, and their conclusion was that if the situation was left alone, and if it should cause any damage to the Japanese nationals or should the Kwantung Army suffer any serious damage from it, the hostility would expand all over China and would result in serious international relations.

3. Determination of government policy.

When I reported these matters to Premier INUKAI, he, in his capacity as the president of a political party, and being aware of the gravity of Japan's internal and external situations more fully than I, told me his opinion as follows:

(a) Self-defense and non-expansion should be the fundamental policy to cope with the situation, and based on this policy, the restoration of law and order and termination of hostilities in Manchuria should be immediately realized.

(b) It should be borne in mind that Chang Hsue-liang, the violator of law and order, was the man to deal with, and as such, the theatre of action must be extremely restricted, and on no occasion should it exceed the territory under his domination.

(c) Military action may be required to save the imminent danger to the Chinchow District, but even in doing so, a request should be first made for the withdrawal of the troops under Chang's command from that district so that the root of future evil will be eliminated.

(d) To the League of Nations and other countries which were related to Manchuria by treaties, a thorough explanation should be made in order to gain their complete understanding as to the real state of affairs of Manchuria.

These opinions of the Premier were discussed at the

Cabinet meeting and were made the basic policy of the INUKAI Cabinet. In accordance with this decision, I made the necessary contact with the ministers of Finance and Navy to make preparation for the War Office to discharge its sphere of duty. This decision was also conveyed by me to the General Staff so as to request them to act accordingly.

In connection with this decision of the Cabinet, there is an all allegation in Exhibit No. 187 and No. 188 to the effect that I made a plan for the occupation of the Four Eastern Provinces. This is a mistake caused by the interpretation of an incompetent interpreter and it was entirely different from the fact. I shall refer to this matter at the latter part of this statement under 28.

I have never heard, not even as a rumor, that the Premier INUKAI had the intention of petitioning for an Imperial Command to withdraw the Kwantung Army, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI before the Tribunal. Premier INUKAI, as clever as he was, should have known quite well that the Emperor who was an ardent observer of the Constitution would not have granted an Imperial Command for the withdrawal of troops without first having the advice of the General Staff. I shall refute this allegation by a witness who will testify to the matters concerning the Supreme Command.

There is also an allegation by the Prosecution in Chapter 1 of Appendix A of the Indictment that after the INUKAI Cabinet was formed -- "The Japanese government which came into power on the 13th of December of 1931, and all subsequent Japanese governments adopted and continued this aggression and its gradual extension over other parts of China." That both the MATSUKI and SAITO Cabinets, while I was a member of them, had never made any such policy shall be fully shown by the several speeches made by the responsible members of the two Cabinets at public occasions, and several witnesses and documentary evidence which are to be submitted before the Tribunal will corroborate this.

4. Pacification of Liao-si (West of the Liao River) District

The Japanese government, in conformity with the abovementioned policy, expected a peaceful settlement of the troubles in the Chinchow District through diplomatic negotiations, but almost a month had vainly passed since the commencement of the negotiation and there was not a sign of their withdrawing from the district. On the contrary, the activities of the bandits along the River Liao coast were more intensified and at the end of December 1931, the aggravated situation reached such a stage that the Japanese government had to resort to arms to wipe out the stronghold of the bandits and the lawless mobs in order to save the Japanese nationals from danger. I communicated this decision of the government to the General Staff. In the meantime, the government made a proclamation on the 27th to clarify the situation and explained to the world the difficulties that Japan was confronted with.

On the 28th of the same month, the General Staff despatched to Manchuria from Korea a divisional headquarters and a brigade, the main body of which began action at the very end of the month.

The Kwantung Army by this time, in view of the daily occurrence of various casualties, had taken several measures to cope with the situation, and had several times requested without response the withdrawal of Chang Sue-liang and his men from the Liao-si District.

However, the bandit troops, upon learning that Japan had decided to take a decisive measure, fled from the Chinchow District, together with the groups under Chang Sue-liang's command. Thus, a unit of Japanese troops under command of Lt. Gen. MURO made its ontry into the city of Chinchow on January 3rd, 1932, without resorting to bloodshed and the Japanese nationals were relieved.

After this campaign, the army undertook the task of maintaining law and order in that locality, leaving the rest of the activities to the diplomatic authorities. However, during the month of January, the troops of the garrison forces suffered several casualties inflicted by bandits in various parts of the locality, including the annihilation of KOGA Regiment at Chin-si, but the troops on the spot, observing the principle of non-expansion policy, endured it and did not take any counter steps.

5. The First Shanghai Incident.

The cause of expedition and the policy of the Army.

The First Shanghai Incident was initiated when, in the middle of July 1932, a body of Chinese civilians assaulted a party of Japanese priests and either killed or wounded them. This incident induced a clash between the Japanese Navy and the Chinese 19 Route Army, and a great number of Japanese nationals in Shanghai as well as the navy itself were very much endangered.

The Navy authorities, in view of discharging their international duty in Shanghai as well as to save their own navy troops and protect Japanese nationals in that city, reported the case to the government and requested a detachment of army troops to Shanghai. The government knew the imminence of the situation and decided upon a policy of relieving the navy and protecting the Japanese nationals on the spot, and requested the army for a detachment of troops.

I consulted on this matter the Chief of the General Staff and we agreed to conform with the government policy by despatching a minimum force. The Chief of the General Staff reported the matter to the Throne and upon the approval of His Majesty, the expedition was finally decided upon.

By this time, the situation in Shanghai had become so critical that a mixed brigade was first despatched, in accordance with the request of the navy, by a destroyer,

and this brigade was on peace time footing on account of the shortage of time. Then the UEDA Division, also in a state of being immobilized, followed the brigade. The strength of the opponent at that time was said to be about 50,000.

In conformity with the policy of the government, I strived to settle this incident, as much as possible, in an amicable manner, and desired the Chief of General Affairs and Divisional Commander UEDA to follow this policy. This resulted in Divisional Commander's UEDA's advice to the opponent of the peaceful settlement, which will be shown in evidence in Dof. Doc. No. _____. This attempt at peaceful settlement by Divisional Commander UEDA was not duly responded to, and on the contrary, it drove him into a considerable plight.

This request for peace and subsequent hesitation on the part of Divisional Commander UEDA, in immediately resorting to action, was interpreted and propagandized by the China side as their complete victory over Japanese forces, and the propaganda induced a situation whereby the Chinese force under the direct control of the Nanking Government joined the Canton 19th Route Army with whom the expeditionary force was confronted. Moreover, this new situation affected the situation in Manchuria and caused further aggravation of law and order there. Even the proposal made by the League of Nations to Japan served to enhance the spirit of the Chinese people. The situation became extremely serious, and the safety of more than 20,000 Japanese nationals was menaced. Thus China's side took advantage of our aspiration for an amicable settlement and created a new situation more dangerous to Japan.

Worried with this added difficulty, the government requested the army to immediately save this situation. It was either on the 7th or 8th of February that the advance party of the army expeditionary force landed on the spot. Divisional Commander UEDA arrived there in the middle of February and this new crisis was created at the end of the same month.

On account of this renewed request from the government, my position required me to devise measures to immediately save the situation by means of close cooperation between operational tactics and diplomacy, that is to say, the measures complying with the operational request of the General Staff on one hand, and conforming with the political principle of the government on the other.

On this matter I consulted the General Staff and agreed to their appointing Colonel Binshiro OBATA (Lt. Gen. OBATA, who became Minister of State in the Prince KUNI Cabinet immediately after the surrender) the Chief of operations Section of the General Staff. We also agreed to recommend General SHIRAKAWA as the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary Force as the most appropriate person with sufficient faculty who would maintain close cooperation with the local

diplomatic agent to take timely measures in terminating the hostilities. Then, in accordance with the suggestion of the General Staff, further reinforcement of two divisions was decided upon at the Cabinet meeting.

Various preparations were made for this reinforcement and at dawn of March 1st, the advance division of the expeditionary force made surprise landing at Tzi-liao-kou, a strategic point behind the enemy. The enemy after some insignificant resistance retreated beyond the 20 kilometer line and as the retreat was in conformity with the request that the expeditionary had previously made, Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA immediately ordered cessation of hostility on the 3rd of March. The Chinese army followed suit on the following day.

Thus, due to the ingenious tactics of the operational force, the primary object of the expedition was achieved and the incident was settled while the main body of the reinforcements was still on board ship.

The Government and the central military authorities, hand in hand with the activities of the diplomatic authorities, endeavoured to settle the whole situation upon guarantee of the Chinese side to observe law and order in the future.

The Japanese troops voluntarily withdrew at the end of March to the rear line and one and one half divisions of the expeditionary force were subsequently returned to Japan. Then, through the valuable efforts of the committees of the U.S.A., Britain, France, Italy, Japan and China, a plan for international security and safety in and around Shanghai was set up and a truce agreement between Japanese and Chinese troops was signed on May 5th.

By virtue of the provisions of the truce agreement (Section 3, Appendix 2), the army had the right of stationing there a certain part of its force. However, from fear that it would turn out to be the cause of future trouble and because of respect for Chinese sovereignty, and, furthermore, as the primary object of the expedition had been accomplished, it was decided upon to withdraw, at the risk of various difficulties, all the troops from China and the withdrawal was completed by the end of May.

At that time, there were opinions among the people, however, in and out of office, that the over-all withdrawal was still premature. The opinions were regarded to be well grounded in view of past experiences, because both in Manchuria and at the early stages of the Shanghai Incident, our moderate attitude in the beginning seemed to have given cause to the enemy to make propaganda that they had won the victory, and that it succeeded to some extent in deceiving the people with a result that the over-all situation was made worse on account of this.

Nevertheless, the army, in view of its aspirations for peace, carried out the over-all withdrawal. Unfortunately, while giving a good impression among a part of the learned and well-informed classes of Chinese people, the over-all withdrawal did nothing more than to spur the Chinese general public and to create amongst them a contempt for the Japanese Army. In fact, it had a harmful effect over the situation in Manchuria and gave rise to further disturbances there. I may point out here that this was the most delicate part of the policy toward China, and both the government and the army authorities had many

difficulties on this particular point.

These circumstances will be fully shown by the government declaration, proclamations made by Divisional Commander UEDA and Supreme Commander SHIRAKAWA, my several speeches made in the capacity of War Minister concerning the withdrawal of troops and also those made in the Diet sessions, all of which will be tendered in evidence.

6. Protection of Japanese nationals in and around Harbin.

HSI HSIA (a member of the Monarchist Party) who became the Governor of Kirin Province on September 30, 1931, subsequently declared the independence of his Province. However, after two months of this declaration, he caused some discord with TING-CHAO and LI-TU of Harbin, and because of this conflict, the general situation in and around Harbin was thrown into confusion, threatening, at the same time, the safety of Japanese nationals residing there.

The danger became more imminent when HSI HSIA, in January, 1932, determined to conduct his subjugation campaign toward the north and started fighting on the 27th. This urgent situation compelled the Japanese nationals to request the Kwantung Army for their rescue, and the Koreans and Manchurians of the same district also frequently made the same request.

In the meantime, it happened that four Japanese were murdered, several Koreans were taken away, and about 4,000 Japanese and 2,000 Koreans were placed under extreme danger. The Kwantung Army ordered an aerial reconnaissance of the district, but the aircraft had to make an emergency landing near Harbin, and the crew, who were commissioned officers of the Kwantung Army, were murdered.

The government had taken a cautious attitude toward this district, but as the situation became so serious the government considered it necessary to take measures to restore law and order in that district and to protect the Japanese residents.

However, while the Japanese residents were to be protected, the government made it a policy that the international relations, especially the relation with the Soviet Union, should not be endangered. The Chief of General Staff, in conformity with this policy, ordered some restrictions to the Kwantung Army as to its military actions.

The restrictions caused much difficulty to the Kwantung Army in its operation, and a corps of the Army finally succeeded, after considerable hardships, in reaching the outskirts of the City of Harbin.

As the object of this campaign was to protect the Japanese nationals in that district, and as the object was thus accomplished, the main body of the expeditionary force retraced its course without even entering the city of Harbin.

The explanatory speeches made by Foreign Minister YOSHIZAWA on January 31, 1932, at the plenary session of the Privy Council and the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet,

the minutes of which will be tendered in evidence, will clarify the circumstances in which this campaign was carried out.

7. Independence declaration of Manchoukuo and its recognition; also the attitude of the Japanese central military authorities toward it.

Soon after the restoration of law and order in Chinchow, I think it was in the beginning of January, 1932, Staff Officer ITAGAKI of the Kwantung Army came to Tokyo and reported to me the situation in Manchuria, the picture of the independence movement and Commander-in-Chief HONJO's view of the general situation.

According to the reports I received, each Province of Manchuria had declared its independence and it was in such a precarious condition that a single false step would lead the whole situation into a state of chaos where each local regime held its own sphere of influence. On the other hand, there was an aspiration rapidly developing among the influential people all over Manchuria to found a new state. In fact, this aspiration was getting so irresistibly strong among them that it was almost impossible for the Kwantung Army, which was neither forcing a military administration nor was it provided with sufficient strength, to maintain law and order without seriously taking this new situation into consideration. In connection with this report, I further learned the following facts: That the unanimous opinion of those who were concerned in this independent movement was to have Mr. PU-YI as the ruler of the new state; that Commander-in-Chief HONJO's opinion was to leave the matter to them and not to take any measure which might interfere with the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people.

On hearing this report, I thought of the necessity of paying attention to the international problems which might arise out of Manchuria's independence declaration. However, I reported this information to the Premier.

The Premier and known by that time what was going on in Manchuria and was of the opinion that the question of independence should be left alone, only he considered that the international problems as mentioned in the above should be studied.

The decision of the government on this problem was also to leave it alone to the Manchurian people and to make no interference with it inasmuch as the primary concern of the government was in preservation of law and order.

In the meantime the independence movement in Manchuria made further progress and then a decision for independence was reached on February 28th among the influential people of Manchuria with an additional resolution to ask Mr. PU-YI to become its ruler. Then, the independence was declared on March 1st, and Mr. PU-YI became its President on the 9th of the same month.

The Kwantung Army, whose primary duty was to secure the peace and order in Manchuria, wished that the newly born regime would respect, as it had declared, the international treaties and external regulations, and

would base its administration, internally, upon the people's will, so that an ideal nation where in the King's Way is fully observed under the harmonious collaboration of five races, a real happy land, free from all the unfortunate incidents in the past, should be realized. The attitude of the Kwantung Army was that of watching its development, but not to make any interference with it.

However, preservation of peace and order and protection of Japanese nationals, which were the main duties of Kwantung Army, had to be conducted in such a way as would correspond to the ever changing situation, and so the Kwantung Army had discussions with the new regime concerning these local matters exclusively.

These reports from the Kwantung Army to the central military authorities were reported to the government by the latter as soon as they were received. The government, in view of the actual state of affairs in Manchuria, reached the conclusion that there was no alternative but to leave to the discretion and judgment of the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army the preservation of peace and order in Manchuria and decided to observe the further development of the situation.

I also followed this policy of the government and carefully watched the situation so that I should not make any mistake in the future when counter measures were to be taken.

The Foreign Office viewed this problem to be a case of a domestic split of a nation and that the independence was no an infringement of international law. Under the circumstances, all that the army could do was to follow the policy of the government and devote its efforts in successfully carrying out its original duty of preserving peace and order and securing the national defense of Manchuria.

In the meantime, the new regime gradually consolidated its foundation and so the government, with a view to avoiding further disturbances in Manchuria, decided to cooperate, whenever possible, with the new regime. The government made explanation of this new policy at the 61st session of the Imperial Diet. (Def. Doc.).

I have never heard that Premier INUKAI dispatched Mr. KIYANO as a special envoy to the Nanking Government for a friendly understanding, as was testified to by Mr. Takeshi INUKAI. Even if it were true, it must have been of a private nature. Mr. INUKAI's further testimony that Premier INUKAI talked over the matter with a chief of a section of the General Staff and that the chief of the section, because of this talk, was relegated to an other post is entirely wrong. Mr. INUKAI did not mention the name of the Colonel, but from his testimony that the Colonel was relegated to the Commander of the BANNING Regiment and also from the testimony given by witness FUJITA, it is clear that he meant Colonel SHIGETO. Colonel SHIGETO was sent out of the central military authorities, together with other people, because of his having had some relation with the March and October Incidents, and because of this, he was made an object of the army's "purging shift" of military personnel. Witness FUJITA also gave his evidence to this effect.

I had several interviews with the Premier to discuss the Manchurian problems, but never had we any friction of opinion between us. I always dealt with the matters in accordance with the fixed policies of the government, and whenever a new problem arose, I fully discussed it with the Premier and followed his decision about it.

With regard to Premier INUKAI's attitude toward the international problems, I never perceived in him any sign of an aggressive attitude. Not only Premier INUKAI alone, but the Kwantung Army was eagerly wishing for the ideal progress of Manchoukuo and that was all that they desired for this new country. This fact has already been clarified before this Tribunal by the will of late General HONJO and other evidence.

PART II.

Next I shall refer to the question of official recognition of the state of Manchukuo. Primarily this question, which was purely an international diplomatic matter, was under the charge of the Foreign Office; accordingly, the Army did not take any step in this matter and except for those problems which concerned the maintenance of peace and order and problems of national defense that might arise therefrom, I respected the opinion of the Foreign Minister and left everything to his care.

Manchukuo, since its foundation, had gradually become a subject of discussion both in and out of Japan, and the House of Representatives, on June 15th, made a resolution at its plenary session that an official recognition should be given to this new state.

The government of Japan, after careful consideration of the matter, decided to follow the views of the Foreign Office, which suggested that the new state was the result of an internal split of an independent nation and that recognition of such state which acquired its legal independence would not in any way infringe international law. Necessary procedures were then taken and the formal recognition was given on September 15th, whereupon the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was signed and an arrangement was made for the exchange of Ambassadors.

Upon this formal recognition, the Kwantung Army was charged with the new duty of garrison and joint defense of the new state. This new additional duty meant that the entire conduct of the Kwantung Army bore an international complexion by representing the two independent countries - Japan and Manchoukuo, and so they made it their rule to confer with the Manchoukuo authorities before they took any action in connection with the national defense and maintenance of peace and order.

Thus the situation made its natural development from its formation to formal recognition, and along with this development, Japan found it necessary to determine her attitude, toward this state of affairs. The government of Japan, from her desire for the sound development of Manchoukuo as her friendly neighbour, decided to give Manchoukuo, in compliance with her request, all the necessary assistance in her power, and by doing so, to take measures to prevent activities causing disturbances in Manchoukuo.

That Japan had neither the intention of making Manchoukuo her cat's paw, nor violating international law can be easily ascertained from the speeches made by the Premier and the Foreign Minister at the Imperial Diet as well as from their answers to the interpellations at the Privy Council. This will also be seen in the speech broadcasted by Mr. Ting, Premier of Manchoukuo, on the first anniversary of Manchoukuo's foundation, in which he expressed his zealous ideal of founding a new state.

Personally I desired that Manchoukuo should develop soundly along the line as was indicated in her independence declaration toward the goal of becoming an ideal nation, and would acquire every necessary qualification for an independent country.

when
In the spring of 1934, Mr. Henry Pu-Yi, Emperor of Manchoukuo, visited Japan, I was given an audience with him for several hours. Mr. Pu-Yi eagerly and strongly emphasized his desire of establishing a happy land of ODO (King's Way) and at a later stage of the conversation, he sent the interpreter away and talked to me face to face by way of writing on a sheet of paper, his ambition of becoming the Emperor of all China, thereby restoring his ancestral old Chin Dynasty there.

On this occasion I dared to give him advice and said that what the Emperor should do was to cultivate the virtue of Emperorship, as he had declared when he ascended the Throne, and to become worthy of confidence both in and out of the country.

As this conversation will show, there was not the slightest indication that Mr. Henry Pu-Yi would have become a tool of the Japanese government; on the contrary, there was even a sign that he would take the initiative to induce the Japanese government in the direction he desired.

The development of Manchoukuo after that was not quite as it should have been. Dissatisfied with this state, I refrained from attending the 10th anniversary celebration of its foundation, and I broadcast what I had in mind about the situation. My views and belief on Manchuria had been fully expressed in my talk with Lord Lytton and others.

As was explained in my speech at the 62nd session of the Imperial Diet, Chang Hsue-liang's activities, before the formal recognition of Manchoukuo, of causing disturbances in Manchuria were carried out to such an extent that it compelled Japan to take measures to settle the situation.

10. Pacification of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol.

The pacification campaign of North Manchuria, Kholombail and Jehol was somewhat different in nature, inasmuch as Manchoukuo had been founded and recognized by that time, and the military action was taken to discharge the army's duty to both Japan and Manchoukuo. In other words, the campaign was an action fulfilling the army's duty as was provided in the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol, and it was nothing but a domestic affair of Manchoukuo.

Pacification campaign by the Japan-Manchoukuo Allied Force over North Manchuria was executed because Ma Seng-shan who had once pledged his loyalty to Manchoukuo plotted a rebellion of Su Ping-wen in December, 1932, and Jehol at the end of February, 1933, because of a rebellion by Tan Wanglin.

In carrying out those campaigns, I drew the special attention of the General Staff to follow the government policy so that the expedition to Kholombail would not cause any bad influence over Soviet-Japan relations and warfare in Jehol would not expand itself over North Manchuria. I further requested them that their action should be based strictly on the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol and utmost attention be made in bringing about the termination of hostilities. I also requested the maintenance of a very close contact between the War Office and the General Staff.

In Kholombail district, we were assisted greatly by the good will of the Soviet Union and succeeded in safely saving the Japanese residents, and the pacification was ended at that.

In the Jehol campaign, the General Staff and the Kwantung Army made it their policy to stop the advance of troops at the line of the Great Wall, even at the risk of operational disadvantage. There was once an occasion when the troops marched over the Great Wall, but they were immediately ordered to return. This action caused another attack from the enemy, but our troops in a drive

after the retreating enemy, reached the Soo River and stopped there. Thus the policy of the government and the central army authorities was strictly adhered to by the troops of the Kwantung Army.

In the meantime, Chang Hsue-liang actually withdrew from all official positions and an agreement was reached and the Tangku Truce was signed between HO YING-CHIN representative of the National Government and Major General OKAMURA, Vice Chief of Staff and the representative of the Kwantung Army. Further details of this will be given by witnesses ENDO, SABURO AND TAKEDA, Hisashi.

11. Conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement.

In compliance with the request of Mr. HO YING-CHIN, Deputy Chairman of the Peking Sub-committee of the National Government Military Committee, on May 25th, 1933, cessation of hostility was discussed between Mr. HO and Major General OKAMURA, representative of the Kwantung Army, and the Truce Agreement was signed on the 31st of May of the same year. The agreement was confirmed by the governments of Japan and Manchoukuo in due course, and thus the hostilities in Manchuria virtually ended.

The Manchurian Incident was not primarily a war in the sense of definition of international law. Therefore, there was no such procedure as a peace treaty. Only an agreement was reached between the two parties as to several arrangements to prevent occurrence of further hostilities in the future.

Subsequently, the members of the government of Manchoukuo and those of China met at the DAIREN Conference to discuss practical routine matters concerning the maintenance of friendly relations between China and Manchoukuo. Some members of our government who were in charge of such matters also attended the conference, but as the matter did not directly concern the relations between Manchoukuo and Japan, I do not remember the details.

Thus the disturbances and hostilities which had been rampantly prevailing all over Manchuria at the time of the Wakatsuki Cabinet which had created a potential danger, such as would induce at any time an all out clash between China and Japan, were completely settled by me within one and half year of my acceptance of War Ministership to the INUKAI Cabinet which succeeded the Wakatsuki Cabinet, and the mission charged to the army of terminating hostilities was fulfilled.

12. Policies I adopted after the Tangku Agreement.

My most important mission as War Minister which was settling the hostilities having been thus accomplished, I decided to take this opportunity to establish plans to stabilize several internal as well as external affairs. I set up the following three main principles and determined upon their realization.

1. Stabilization of domestic state of affairs which had been in absolute chaos since the beginning of the Showa Era.
2. Complete purification of the Army so as to base itself on the principle of the foundation of the Imperial Army.
3. Improvement of foreign relations, through which to secure peace of the world, and of the Far East in particular.

In June, 1933, when the Imperial Diet closed,

I set forth to establish a practical plan to execute these principles.

The first thing I intended to do was to purify the public mind by dispelling from Japan all the evil causes accumulated since World War I, paying at the same time special attention to the internal as well as external state of affairs and to the specific feature of Japan's national character. The best way to accomplish this task was to let the people appreciate the virtue of benevolence of His Majesty the Emperor. One of the practical plans for this purpose was to petition for the grant of a general amnesty and to release both the right and left wing political criminals and other criminals with the exception of those whose crime was of particularly atrocious nature, and to give them firm warning not to repeat the same folly.

Secondly, I intended to stabilize the mind of people of the rural district and fishing villages by establishing means of relieving them from the extreme poverty in which they were at that time.

Thirdly, I thought it necessary to devise fundamental measures to settle the confusions and disturbances in political and ideological circles.

My fourth intention was to find means to secure the original character of the Imperial Army whose reason for existence was in practicing morals, and let it thoroughly understand the fundamental principles of founding the army, so that the occurrence of ominous incidents, which had been rather frequent in the past, would be prevented in the future.

Fifthly, Japan at that time was confronted with several difficult international problems. I considered it of urgent necessity to solve all of those problems by making the utmost concession that we could afford, while making full assertions on what we had to assert. What Japan needed then was to determine the minimum extent of her self-existence and protect her from being affected by the hitherto precarious state of affairs in Europe.

Under these circumstances, what should have been done before anything else was to secure peace in the Far East, and in order to do so, I determined to hold an international conference among the countries interested in Far Eastern affairs. My intention was first to establish peace in the Far East and on the Pacific after thorough deliberation upon pending matters among the participants of this international conference, and then make it the corner stone on which to secure the world's peace.

The matter was, however, too grave to be decided instantaneously. I spent the whole of July and August in studying practicability of this plan as well as in preparation of preliminary matters. In September I prepared a basic suggestion for this plan, and suggested to the Premier to make a definite plan based on my suggestions, so that it may be presented for deliberation at the Imperial Diet.

Petitioning for amnesty seemed to me the most difficult problem. On this question, I gained the approval of the Navy Minister, and the suggestion was put to the Premier as an agreed opinion of both Navy and Army.

There were several objections to the amnesty to be granted to the criminals of the extreme right and extreme left wings. I maintained that however wrong they may have been, their misconduct had arisen from their passion to improve the future of their country and community.

It was the unfortunate circumstances in which they were brought up or their narrow prejudice that had driven them to blindly rush to such an extreme ideal. They were nonetheless valuable subjects of His Majesty to whom His virtue of benevolence should equally be extended. I insisted that this was the characteristic feature of our national polity, and endeavoured to realize it.

The question having developed thus far, Premier SAITO ordered the people of the government in charge of this type of work to study the practical side of this plan, and, apart from this, he successively held conferences among the ministers who were related to the subject matter of the plan. Five Minister Conferences concerning foreign affairs and national defense were often held and other Five Minister Conferences concerning rural district problems being that they were a part of domestic political problems were also frequently held. I attended these conferences together with Mr. MITSUCHI, Minister of Railways.

Both of these conferences met more than twenty times and the gist of the plan was thoroughly discussed by the end of the year. There were several matters of which even definite plans were set up.

The basic study of the plan showed due progress and a communique in the form of a memorandum was given on matters concerning foreign affairs and national defense in October 1933. Some very important decisions were reached concerning rural district problems which were part of the problems for the domestic council.

My intention was to establish definite plans for all the subject matters by the end of January 1934, when the Imperial Diet was expected to be convened, and to present them to the Diet for deliberation. The government, army and Diet should seek for the stabilization of internal affairs by their respective function, and these efforts, combined with the activities of the diplomatic branch would induce the whole situation to opening the Far Eastern Peace Conference. This was my intention and I did my best for its realization.

As I devoted my whole attention after conclusion of the Tangku Truce Agreement to this matter, I had not much interest in other problems and even when I had some objection or different opinion on some matters, I usually let them go at that.

On the First of January, 1934, while the plan was in the midst of deliberation, I fell seriously ill and was confined to bed. However, as I most eagerly wished to execute this plan at any cost, I recommended General HAYASHI as my successor, and I resigned from the post of War Minister.

By that time, the essential portion of my plan was still being discussed, part by part by the respective Cabinet Ministers but it was not yet ready to be presented to the Cabinet meeting. Such having been the case, when I was resigning from my post, I sent to the Premier this suggestion of my plan, together with a letter, expressing all my views and beliefs, and asked him to expedite the opening of the Cabinet Meeting for this plan.

Unfortunately, not only the general situation failed to develop as I had expected but the internal conditions of the army authorities changed radically. Dissatisfied with the state of affairs I decided to avoid being materially involved in any of the official matters. My successor, General HAYASHI, after four months' tenure of office, had to resign for personal reasons and recommended me as his successor, but because of this dissatisfaction, I persistently declined its acceptance.

In the meantime, things completely turned to the worse, and after two years from the time of my resignation, the 2.26 Incident forced myself and other senior members of the army to leave active service altogether.

For two years from my resignation from the War Ministership to retirement from active service, I occupied the post of a War Councillor, but not a single enquiry of important

nature was made to me, and so there is nothing to state about this period.

Further, this was the period when the internal condition of the army was in absolute chaos, and as I was always placed outside its central circles, I did not know the helm of military affairs at that time. All of these conditions will be shown by documentary evidence and witnesses.

13. International Treaty Problems.

Diplomatic affairs were not under the charge of the War Minister. As the War Minister, I only attended to what matters were under my charge and disposed of them in accordance with the policy determined by the government and so I did not know much of the diplomatic matters.

Decision of a diplomatic affair was usually done upon investigation and opinion of the Foreign Minister. When it had an important bearing upon other departments of the government, the Minister of such Department was consulted, and when it was sufficiently important as to be related to all Departments in a general way, it was usually discussed at the Cabinet meeting. Otherwise, most of them were disposed of by the decision of the Foreign Minister.

With regard to international treaties in connection with the Manchrian Incident, the WAKATSUKI Cabinet had already invoked the right of self-defense, and the Premier and Foreign Minister of the INUKAI Cabinet also several times declared the continuation of this right of self-defense.

I was told that our action was within the limit of action for self-defense, about which every signatory of the Non-Aggression Pact had reserved the right of execution, and a prominent scholar of international law defined, "The act of self-defense is conducted until pressure by violence and menace is removed." Moreover, there was a reservation made by Japan on December 10th 1931 at the Council Meeting of the League of Nations, which was approved by the Council, of the right of subjugating bandit troops and lawless elements. The army acted within the extent of this right based on the policy determined by the government.

As for the problems concerning independence of Manchoukuo and its subsequent recognition, Premiers and Foreign Ministers of the INUKAI and SAITO Cabinets gave explanations at the Imperial Diet and the Privy Council. They said that the independence was a natural result of an internal split of a nation conducted by her own people and that the Nine Power Treaty had not provided any restriction on such action. They further said that the independence was realized upon the basis of the historical background in Manchuria. They quoted several opinions of some of the scholars of international law and said that were several instances in which the presences of foreign troops contributed toward the realization of independence.

These explanations convinced all other members of the cabinet and the army continued its action in conformity with this fixed policy until execution of the right of self-defense was no more required. As far as I remember, all of these details were contained in the Views of Japanese Government which were submitted to the plenary session of the League of Nations.

The relation with the League of Nations had already been considerably aggravated before the INUKAI Cabinet, perhaps due to lack of proper explanation of the situation. It was immediately prior to the formation of the INUKAI Cabinet that the League of Nations decided to dispatch its Enquiry Mission. This decision was quite satisfactory to us and the INUKAI Cabinet hoped that the Mission would

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arrive at an accurate recognition of the situation based on the actual state of affairs. The army also expected that the Enquiry Mission would make an unbiased conclusion toward peace by having contact with the actual conditions on the spot in the light of the historical background.

As I have stated above, the policy of the INUKAI Cabinet toward Manchuria was immediate restoration and subsequent maintenance of peace and order, and it aimed at improvement of international relations by giving cooperation and correct understanding to the problems among nations.

The army, also in conformity with this policy, minimized its military action and devoted its efforts in immediately bringing about the termination of the hostilities. The manner in which the army settled the Shanghai Incident was a good indication of this policy of the army and its overall withdrawal from Shanghai served to improve, more or less, Japan's international relations. Encouraged with this fact, the army continued to concentrate its effort on this point.

The independence of Manchoukuo and its formal recognition was studied, as was stated above, by both the INUKAI and SATTO Cabinets. By keeping a watch on the result of this study and on the prerequisite for peace and order in Manchuria, both cabinets followed the natural growth of this movement and when convinced of its healthy progress, decided to give it formal recognition. The army, in conformity with this policy of the government, strived to prevent actions disturbing the peace and order, which had barely been restored after several uprisings, and to discharge its new task of joint defense of the state of Manchoukuo.

With regard to the League of Nations, I knew that the government had tried to obtain its understanding by tendering them written views of the government on the complexity of the character of the Incident and its suggestions for the means of maintaining peace in the future. When Mr. MATSUOKA was dispatched by the government as its plenipotentiary, the government had decided its policy of staying with the League at all costs in order to seek a proper understanding, and I think Mr. MATSUOKA was instructed accordingly.

The army, also in conformity with the government policy, strived to bring about a situation in which Japan could remain with the League in order to afford them a correct understanding of the problem. However, there were continued disturbances and unrest in various parts of Manchuria and before these hostilities had been settled, the resolution of the plenary session of the League of Nations was reached. The hope of Japan's getting a true under-

standing from the League having been thus frustrated, Japan had no alternative but to withdraw from it in accordance with the provisions of Article I and 3 of its regulations. Nevertheless, Japan declared to the world by an Imperial Rescript and a government communique her determination of collaborating with the world. This will also be testified to by documents and witnesses.

14. My views and thoughts on foreign affairs.

While I was in office, foreign affairs did not come directly under my jurisdiction, and accordingly, I could not bring into practice my views on those matters. All I could do was to discharge the duty of the army in accordance with the fixed policy of the government. But in order to clarify the grounds on which my actions toward the international problems were based, I feel it necessary to state herewith my fundamental ideology on international problems and the subsequent steps that I undertook at that time.

(a) Relation with the Soviet Union.

I had been in Russia for many years and was one of those who had a fond feeling toward and a good understanding of that country. My article in the monthly magazine "Russia" correctly conveyed my true sentiment. Nevertheless, I could not advocate the world Bolshevization policy of the Third Internationale. My opposition to this principle and measures against it was more intensified when in 1923 and 1932 members of the Communist party plotted an assault on the person of His Majesty the Emperor.

In fact, from the end of the TAISHO Era (about 1923) to the earlier period of the SHOWA Era (about 1931), Japan was thoroughly subjected to clandestine activities of the Communist party manifested in the form of a labor conflict and other political struggles of sinister nature, and the existence of the country was endangered as it never had been before. A publication of Mr. Bezedovsky, the Soviet ambassador in Japan in 1926 and 1927, explaining the details of such activities, gave a deep warning to the world. I took it as the weakness in the ideological status of Japan, and did not take it so seriously as to consider that it strained the relation between the Soviet and Japan.

I may say that I am not inferior to the Communist party in the passion to relieve the poor class of people, which, I understand, is one of the tenets of that party. However, my belief is that if the administration under the Emperor based on the original doctrine of this country is realized, not only the poorer class of people, but the whole people in general can enjoy better welfare without being forced to anything. This was clearly manifested in the message of one of the Emperors who said, "Should there be a single person among the whole population who is not given his proper place, we are to blame for that." I believed that neither violence nor crafty measures was required in providing welfare to the people. My opinion was if the Soviet Union believed in communism, that was their affair and we had no reason to interfere with it. Every country is entitled to follow its own policy in accordance with the internal condition of that country. This having been my conviction, my opposition to the Third Internationale did not go as far as to advocate interference with the Soviet Union.

I felt at that time the necessity of taking self-defensive measures against the menace of eastward infiltration of the Soviet influence and of the very active policy of the Third International of bolshevizing the whole world, but never had I felt the necessity of preparation of any positive military action against the Soviet Union, to say nothing of taking such action.

To cope with this menace of the Soviet Union, there may have been several researches and suggestions among the people whose duty was to deal with such matters, and I believe those in charge of the matters would have devised measures within the extent of their duty, but I have reason to believe that such measures should not have exceeded the extent of research. The research alleged by the prosecution to have been made by KAWABE and KASAHARA would have been one of their opinions as members of the General Staff, but whatever it may have been, it had no relation with me. As far as I knew, no positive plan of the responsible authorities against the Soviet Union existed. On the contrary, the fact was that the army had once placed much expectation in the change of policy of the Soviet Union.

To the conclusion of that Non-Aggression Pact, I was not necessarily opposed in principle, but I seriously and carefully listened to public opinion that before signing such pact as the Non-Aggression Pact, all the pending problems between the two countries ought to be settled upon the basis of sincerity by both parties, as otherwise, the pact was destined to fail and was apt to leave cause for future trouble.

I do not admit the conclusions and the allegation tendered in evidence by the prosecution against myself. When I pointed out the obscurity of the borders of Outer Mongolia, it was not from an aggressive intention toward Soviet as it was a defensive precaution. This can be easily ascertained from the other parts of the sentence around that expression.

I sincerely hope that good Russians will peacefully display their rich natural gift.

(b) Relation between China and Japan.

With regard to the relation between China and Japan, we have been told since we were children how eagerly our seniors of high ideals and experiences endeavored, since the MEIJI Era, to secure a firm and healthy independence for China our good and friendly neighbour, and thereby to bring happiness to the people of our friendly nation. Such expression as DOBUN LOSHU (same character and same race) and SHINSPI HOERA (relation between lips and teeth, and wheels and axis) were often used to denote how the relation between China and Japan should be. This was how my original conception of China was formed, and I believe it was the same with all the people who had some interest in China. My article in the magazine BUNGEI SHUNJU entitled "To President Chiang Kai-shek and appeal to my brethren" expresses my view and conception in this matter.

I advocated that the cooperation of China and Japan should be based upon the promotion of Oriental culture which is further based on the union of eastern and western culture. I expressed this opinion of mine in 1925, when I had a chance of talking to some of the Chinese people in Shanghai who are now engaged in important tasks as leaders of that country. As for the means of bringing about perfect independence to China, I had the occasion of giving my personal suggestion to President Chiang Kai-shek in the spring of 1932, through the staff of the Chinese Legation in Japan.

China is destined to be our friendly neighbor. I most sincerely.

desire perfect independence for this country, but never had I dreamed of her division. This is the reason why I always quote the Outer Mongolian and Sinking problems for comparison.

I viewed the Manchurian Incident as a kind of explosion of a situation which had been brought to the bursting point by variegated historical background and the complicated state of affairs of Manchuria at that time, and the explosion resulted in the independence declaration by the people of Manchuria. In other words, it was the natural result, caused by the influence of the mass of the people, which could not have been stopped merely by the strength of a limited number of people, without first correcting its cause. If China wanted to get rid of this sinister incident, she should have devised adequate measures immediately after World War I and for a person like myself who was charged to deal with this Incident from its half way mark, the first necessity was to put an end to the hostilities. I considered that if Manchuria should turn out to be an ideal happy land, whether politically independent or not, and gained the approval of the world, its relation with China and peace in the Far East for that matter could be somehow readjusted in the future and I dealt with this matter along this train of thought. What I really had in mind was to welcome the creation of an ideal happy land on a part of Chinese soil, in anticipation of rehabilitation of its mother land.

When I saw the Manchurian people who had been under the hard rigors of living, I could not help praying for realization of an ideal happy land of ODO (King's Way) as had often been talked of by the leaders of Manchuria. It was not myself alone, but all the people of broader views who had the same opinion as above. The main thing was to bring peace immediately between China and Japan and let the world recognize the fact. Readjustment of relations between China and Manchoukuo could be thereafter easily accomplished.

With this view in mind, I considered as War Minister that what was required most urgently was to terminate hostilities. This was the reason why I evacuated all the Japanese troops from Shanghai, and advocated after the Tangku Truce Agreement, the opening of a Far Eastern Peace Conference. This will be proven by witness and documents.

The Marco Polo Incident occurred four years after the Tangku Truce Agreement. It would hardly be necessary to say that this incident had no relation to the Manchurian Incident. I acceded to the request of Premier KONOYE, accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor and Education Minister in his cabinets. The object of the Premier was to let me find means to terminate the China Incident. I did my best to comply with the request of the Premier, but my power was not strong enough to bear any fruit along this line.

On the occasion of the Nanking campaign, I opposed the act of occupying the enemy capital. I thought it was detrimental to the feelings of the people of both countries in the future. This was why I deplored the occupation of that city.

It was then I thought of the poem of seven steps of Tsao Tzu-kian.

It is my belief that if the leaders of China and Japan and the leading countries of the world had a little deeper appreciation of the relations between China and Japan, the Marco Polo Incident would not have had such repercussions as it did.

It was from these same views that before the occupation of Canton and Hankow, I made my suggestions and opposed the military action against those cities. However, at that time I was not a member of the army authorities, nor was I keeping contact with the actual state of affairs and so my hopes were not fulfilled. I have never dreamed of aggression against China and

never acted accordingly. In fact, I placed my utmost importance in the cultural and spiritual unity between China and Japan.

(c) Relations with the U.S.A. and Britain.

I am not a so-called pro-Anglo-Saxon, nor am I, of course, an anti-Anglo-Saxon. I am a Japanese. I can not bear the sight of Japan being held in contempt by others or being reduced to destruction. Moreover, I am of the opinion of obeying His Majesty the Emperor and bringing about peace and welfare upon the basis of the original doctrine of Japan. I believed so and I have practiced so. This was not an opinion formed from so-called divine-inspirationism or from dogmatic ultra-nationalism. On the contrary, I trust it is a most humane principle agreeable to the world's omnipresent natural law. With this principle in mind, I did not try to cater to the current trend of making omnipotent Germany and Italy. Because I did not do so, I was sometimes blamed and abused as a pro-Anglo-Saxon. It has not been my practice to flatter or fawn upon others. I was sometimes unscrupulous in commenting upon what seemed to me wrong, and warned about the same, but I was never reluctant in praising what I believed to be right. Above all, I cannot help feeling grateful throughout my life to the obligation under which I was once placed. On such an occasion, I always expressed my gratitude whatever the reason for the obligation may have been. It was in this sense that I opposed the suggestion that the monument of Commodore Perry in KURIHAM should be removed. I expressed similar types of opinions on several occasions. It was one thing I could not understand why, because of my above belief and attitude, I should have been called during the war by the opportunists and by those who were obsequious to the current trend to be an unpatriotic pro-Anglo-Saxon.

It was my consistent ideal that war should not be waged to satisfy meaningless desires. Except for some special occasions, war is apt to leave behind it certain aftermaths of personal feeling. Japan had never fought against the U.S.A. or Britain. On the contrary, it was my belief that Japan had been under the obligation of those two countries for the past ten years in connection with the crisis with which Japan had been confronted. Britain in particular was our ally for many years in the past, and to the U.S.A. while we had owed her much financially, there was not the slightest friction of feeling.

There had only been a slight unpleasant feeling between the two nations in connection with the racial problem and the Washington Conference. However, even on these matters, I think there was sufficient understanding among the people of learning and fame in the U.S.A. and Japan. Furthermore I did not take it any more than as a mere political problem, in which there was not the slightest factor of danger for the relations between the two countries.

To be quite frank, the relation between the U.S.A. and Japan after the Manchurian Incident had not always been a pleasant one. Of course each party must have had its own reason to remain so, but the main thing hinged upon sentiment and misunderstanding, and I believed it was not so deeply rooted as would completely destroy the friendly relation which had existed between the two countries.

PART III

During the time of the Manchurian Incident, I was one of those who was worried over the general situation of the world. I had had sincere faith in Britain's refined diplomacy and the U.S.A.'s power of enforcement, and upon those I placed much expectation to save the world from the deteriorated situation facing it.

I expressed my opinion to many of the well-informed people of learning and fame in both Britain and America and wanted to adjust through those people the application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, and also, more importantly, to prevent the explosion of the general unrest which was then prevailing all over the world. I believed I was doing much good for the sake of world peace, and I repeatedly warned them that unless steps were taken along the line as I suggested, the situation in Europe was suggestive of a world war.

It was also from my fear of the above that I desired that those people improve the method of application of the sanctions of the League of Nations, based more upon the actual facts than anything else.

It looked to me that the U.S.A. had maintained an indifferent attitude having stayed outside the realm of the League of Nations, and therefore, was in a position to make a calm and unbiased judgment of the world's state of affairs and Britain was also, in my opinion, in the same position, because of her rich experience in dealing with important international problems. The rest of the countries were, I thought, too busy in rehabilitating the damages of World War I to do anything else.

Japan had been recognized as having the power of maintaining the security of the Far East, and so I considered that much could be contributed to the world's peace if those three countries, Japan, U.S.A. and Britain, discussed the basic policy of peace in the world without prejudice and bias.

Because of this conviction, I had deliberate discussions over the world's state of affairs since the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident with Sir Lindley and other successive British Ambassadors to Japan and Major-General Piggot, British Military Attache and others. I also appealed to the learned American people to call their attention to the situation in the East. Mr. Releigh, lecturer of the Oxford University was another person with whom I had heavy discussion. I also appealed to a group of foreigners in my speech at Karuizawa in the summer of 1934.

In these speeches and discussions, I frankly indicated the points on which I thought there should be self-reflection and reconsideration on the part of the U.S.A. and Britain. It had not been my practice to flatter, nor was it my habit to commit myself to anything unreasonable, to say nothing of the abuse of armed force.

It had been my belief that world peace could only exist if people based their conduct upon warm-heartedness and justice of natural law, restricted their selfish desires and conceded to others to the utmost to such an extent as would not impair their self-existence.

At the time when the question of importation of Siamese rice was much discussed in Japan, I insisted that we should endure some economical disadvantages to accede to the request of Siam so that we could express our appreciation of the warm friendship that Siam had shown us for many years in the past. I explained this to the people of rural districts in order to gain their understanding of the question.

When we had an occasion of negotiating with Lancashire in connection with our exportation of cotton piece goods, I insisted that we should make the best possible concession in the negotiation and should not effect any undue pressure upon Lancashire, and that all international problems should be settled from a broad point of view. This conduct of mine was always based upon the belief as I have stated above.

It was my opinion that in facing the activities of the League of Nations or fulfilling the provisions of international treaties, Japan should always stand on this belief, that by no means should she lose sight of her ultimate object in selecting means. I advocated from the same belief that those who had power should be right and those who were right should have power. The idea of power to power principle was one thing I detested most.

I believed that all of these assertions could be fully understood by Britain and America, and heartily desired that by understanding them, they would contribute to the peace of the world. I feel ashamed in being even alluded to as a person advocating world domination or aggression and expansion.

My Ideas

In 1895, I was much disturbed with an incident known as "Three Power Interference" which resulted in Japan's retrocession of Liaotung, and it caused me to join the army to defend the motherland.

I participated in the Russo-Japanese War when I was a Lieutenant. In World War I, I was with the Russian Army at the eastern front of Europe and had ample opportunities of witnessing the true nature of war among the civilized countries.

This experience affected greatly the views of war which I had had by that time, and became the second epochal period in the history of my ideology. The essence of my new ideology was that war, if inevitable, should be the war of human beings not the struggle among beasts. I came to have new ideas as to weapons, style of fighting and equipment for national defense, and with a view to lessen the war damage have made an appeal based on this idea to the people both in and out of Japan for the past twenty years.

Parallel with the above advocacy, I speculated over the basis of peace, namely, the means with which to avoid the occurrence of war. I came to the conclusion that the existing international treaties alone were not only virtually insufficient to avoid war, but they sometimes caused war, and I intended to improve this short-coming.

There were numerous causes of war, but economic pressure, menace on self-existence, denial of the special characteristics of a nation and racial prejudice constituted their principal part and so far as they were not completely eliminated, war was unavoidable. The method of maintaining peace by way of keeping a certain balance of armament among the nations was nothing but a camouflaged peace, which could be easily broken by a miscalculation on the part of a nation over the balance of her armament and that of other nations. Once the peace was broken, the scale of equipment and installation for war and the selected arms of precision would give cause to boundless calamity. I, therefore, considered it the duty of a civilized nation to go a step forward to study the fundamental cause of war, and take every possible opportunity to propagate this idea to the people of the world.

There was another point to be considered. After World War I, a disruption took place in the world of thought dividing the whole world into three ideological circles, and each circle contested one another beyond the barrier of economy and living.

I perceived a danger of inducement to war in this conflict of thought. I drew attention of the people to the necessity of securing a fundamental ideal for establishment of peace, and in order to achieve this purpose, I advocated the amalgamation of eastern and western culture, enhancement of the spirit of mutual concession, and, in order to heighten the sense of sympathy I advocated KODO (Imperial Way).

Thus, I endeavoured to harmonize the interests of the world to avoid the potential calamity, but unfortunately most of the countries of the world were indifferent to this advocacy because of their lack of recognition of this fundamental ideal and each rushed forward to expand its influence into the world according to its long entertained or newly harboured ideal.

After World War I, two world offensive movements occurred with the support of armed force, one was the World Bolshevizing Movement and the other was Nazism as a totalitarian nation. Japan's attention was drawn to this and the necessity of self-defense impressed her. I personally considered that the most effective self-defense could be carried out by promoting the sense of morality and justice.

Primarily, my views of peace or views of life do not admit of territorial expansion. Amalgamation of a nation which had its own race and history was one thing I definitely rejected. I said it was one thing to protect the land of their ancestors and it was quite another to expand it. I considered that a land other than its own could be developed as a source of raw materials under the principle of mutual help. That was why I objected to the amalgamation of Korea and although I was abroad when it took place, I sent a letter to my senior, expressing my views, and insisted that Japan should cooperate with Korea by respecting its civilization.

Such having been my views, I can clearly declare that never in my life have I entertained an idea of aggression, to say nothing of world domination.

If I may be allowed to express my views, such ambition as territorial expansion is nothing but an infantile glory which is far from permanent welfare.

With regard to Manchuria, I accepted the post of War Minister when Manchuria was in a turmoil of disturbances. My whole-hearted attention was devoted to nothing but terminating the hostilities. As I was so deeply impressed solely with the miserable conditions in which the Manchurian people lived I took a sympathetic view in the establishment of a happy land of King's Way (KODO). Further, I was favorably impressed when, after the foundation of Manchukuo, by the zealous aspiration of the Manchurian people, the leaders of that new country made Confucianism, a doctrine originated in China, their principle for creation of an ideal country. The complicated international problems of Manchuria had not slipped out of my mind, but since the independence had been declared, I wished from this sense of morality, the realization of an ideal nation.

However, as time passed, it did not develop in the way that I had hoped and several petitions and bitter criticisms of the Manchurian people reached my ears. Worried over this situation as I have stated in the above, I declined to go to Manchuria to celebrate her tenth anniversary of independence and did not attend the celebration held in Japan.

I have already stated that my views of war, nation and peace which I had had since my participation in World War I, were definitely opposed to imperialism, exclusive egoism and the coercion

control principle. My conduct was always coherent to this principle. I feared that the manner in which the powers, after World War I, dealt with Germany were portent of future trouble. Pressures which all the countries that won victory over Germany, (including Japan) imposed upon this defeated country as well as the attitude of the newly awakened Germany toward the world were quite precarious from the standpoint of world peace, and because of my aforementioned views, I expressed my desire, whenever I could, for the alleviation of such conditions.

Historically, the strained situation of Japan in the past has been continuous, but as far as I was concerned, I had my own ideal as above stated and because of this, I disassociated myself from the movements before and after my tenure of War Minister. I went my own way in accordance with my ideal, and did not take any action in concert with the people who had different views. On the other hand, I endeavoured to propagate my idea of international morality and beliefs throughout the world.

15. Armament and my policy in directing the Army.

The equipment and strength of our army was so poor that it was not even as good as that of Poland. In 1921 the army authorities desired to raise the standard of armament of the entire Japanese Army to only half of that of the other powers at the time of World War I. For this purpose, a bill of approximately 460 million yen for running expenses for ten years was presented to the Diet and was duly approved. However, the payment of the whole amount was successively postponed and in 1931, which was a year before the Manchurian Incident, the sum of 360 million yen was still left unused. That is to say, not even one quarter of the original plan was accomplished.

I had my own view toward the establishment of the army and war, which I had harbored since World War I. I believed in the necessity of modern equipment for an independent nation, but I had never dreamed of completing armament for the sake of waging war. I regarded the army as a symbol of morality and placed more importance on its spiritual element. I felt the necessity of a completion of armament, but I never considered its completion in connection with preparation for aggression. On the contrary, my opinion was just the reverse. However, I could not bring this ideal of mine into practice, having been disrupted by the necessity of satisfying the Manchurian Incident.

I It was also from this ideal of mine that in 1932 and 1933, I conceded the sum of 15 million yen and 10 million yen respectively from the Army budget to the Navy and cooperated with the Finance Office and Navy Office. I thought it would be detrimental to the credit of Japan if the army and navy disagreed with each other for a matter of a small amount in the budget and if, because of this, the Navy Minister should resign from his post. As far as the army was concerned, serving the country under the complete harmony of the army and navy was its first moral duty and accomplishment of this mission was considered by it much more important than a monetary question of ten or fifteen million yen.

The army budgets in 1932 and 1933, excluding the budget for the Manchurian Incident, was about one hundred and seventy million yen each and there are virtually no increases in comparison with those of preceding years. On the contrary, 1933 showed some decrease. New installations and equipment which had to be provided to cope with the incident were paid by appropriating the budget of the following year. Under such circumstances, any positive preparation of war was impossible.

The army budget for the Manchurian Incident while I was War Minister was one hundred and forty or fifty million yen each for the two successive years. After the recognition of Manchukuo, the army was charged with the added task of Manchurian national defense by the provisions of the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol. Also, there was some reinforcement of railway guards in compliance with the expansion of the railways to be guarded, but this did not involve any material increase of expense. In attending to the joint defense of Manchoukuo, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of a defensive nature, and nothing was undertaken by way of offensive action.

Establishment of railway lines, unification of communication systems and exploitation of natural resources were the reasonable necessities for a new state on her way to development; also from the necessity of maintaining law and order. It was nothing more than an ordinary step that a newly born nation should take, and Manchukuo merely did it. It is definitely wrong and groundless to accuse that Japan made Manchuria a militaristic base for aggressive war. To further support this, the military installations in Manchoukuo were limited to those of defensive nature.

As I have stated before, my view of war and view of national defense, which I had harbored since World War I, was fundamentally different from those of other people. Therefore, armaments of powers did not attract my attention and I did not approve any imperialistic policy or immoral equipment, whether militaristic, ideological or economic. The armament was consequently carried out in view of this consideration.

In the administration of military affairs, I abolished discrimination in treatment between the rich and the poor. I also denounced the system of paying money to become a cadet and equalized the opportunity in military service. Because of this change some of the college students who wanted to become cadets, may have sought some preparatory military knowledge out of their desire for enlightenment. I contend that this cannot be called militarization of education.

I also established a policy which I believe to be the basic conditions for the purification of the army and intended for the improvement in the treatment of war wounded.

Since this was my principle even in armament, I can definitely say that there was not the slightest truth in the testimony of witness OUCHI that during my tenure of office as War Minister, I militarized school education.

The guiding principle in my direction of the army was first to make an army based upon morality, the principle upon which the army was founded and second to let it display its characteristics as an army which observed the Imperial Way. In order to realize this, refer to my purging in the aftermath of several disastrous incidents in the past. This was the reason why I conducted shifts of several of the military personnel. I did my best in quieting the young officers who had been dissatisfied with the situation and in the May 15 Incident, there was not one participation in it by any army officer and I am proud to say that throughout my tenure of office as War Minister, there was not a single case of any such unlawful action.

I further endeavored to eliminate the Prussian type from the army. I insisted that the troops should further the virtue of the army to such an extent that they would not cause grudge from an opponent, and to win the favor and respect of inhabitants wherever they might be stationed. Our army in those days was apt to be ideologically confused with the Prussian army and such conception needed correction. I, first of all, wanted some of the members of the cabinet to understand this spirit and with it to rectify the common misconception that armament was for the sake of waging war. I determined that this must be thoroughly understood by the whole public and whenever possible expressed my views in speeches and other writings.

With regard to the strained situation of Japan, I requested the earnest reflection of the people over the current problems and urged them to place their first importance in the promotion of morality.

The real meaning of my speech entitled "Emergency Japan" which was offered in evidence by the prosecution can be proved by many other speeches bearing "emergency" in their titles. If the whole of this speech is read without prejudice, I believe the real intention of mine will be understood. The process of manufacture of this film and the impression that this film gave to the spectators will also be a good indication of the intention with which I made this speech.

All of these speeches were made with a view to introducing my moral views which I gained through my experience in World War I.

What underlies the Imperial Rescript granted by the late Emperor MEIJI to the army and navy personnel is the sense of sincerity. The present Emperor showed in his Imperial Rescript granted when he ascended the Throne that the true principle of the foundation of Japan was based upon the spirit of benevolence. I advocated that the army should observe the principle of these Imperial Rescripts and should exert their best to discharge its duty. My intention was to enhance, by my advocacy, the virtue of benevolence of the Emperor among the people, and this was, I thought, the first step to let the troops completely become aware of the true spirit of the Imperial army. By their efforts, I believe I succeeded, even in the slightest degree, in removing imperialistic thought from the army and also from the people and prevented them from egoistical conduct.

16. Military discipline during the Manchurian Incident.

The Manchurian Incident arose from what had been vitally important to Japan. As the ultimate object of this incident was to bring peace and welfare to both Japanese and Chinese nationals, the officers and soldiers of the Japanese Army at the front as well as the general public in Japan were sympathetic toward the Manchurians and other people on the spot. The hostilities were not of the nature of a declared war, and so all the captives were immediately released and were given assistance to engage in peaceful work. Those who were in distress were given relief funds. These facts were made clear by the report of those who inspected conditions there. There was not a single case of massacre or violence, nor was there any report made to that effect. Lord Lytton's Report admitted this fact.

The incident which was reported by the Chicago Tribune as having occurred near SENKINSAI was nothing but a minor skirmish between a small squad and a body of local bandits. This was exaggerated and made the subject of propaganda as was the usual practice with the Chinese people, and the propaganda was reported by Mr. Powell and was inserted in the paper as it was. This is clear by the testimony of Mr. Powell himself, and the same may be supported to some extent by the protest of the Japanese consul. The skirmish was too small to be reported to me, so I did not know of it.

17. The circumstances under which I became Cabinet Councillor in the First KONOYE Cabinet.

Since my withdrawal from active service in March 1936, I had not been quite satisfied with the state of affairs and was leading a life of a retired man. During that time there was an occasion when, at the outbreak of the China Incident in July 1937, I was extremely worried about the situation and suggested to Prince KONOYE my view on means of bringing about peace.

It happened in September 1937 that Prince KONOYE who was the Prime Minister at that time sent for me. When I saw him, he was very much worried about the China Incident and asked me if I had any idea as to the means of saving the situation. It was the time when the Second Shanghai Incident had broken out and the situation was really serious.

I told him that if a frontal clash between China and Japan should take place, it would not only be against the policy of our country, but would also cause great difficulty for Japan from the operational viewpoint. I suggested that he should ask Lt. Gen. OBTANI's opinion about those matters, but he told me that he had had Lt. Gen. OBTANI's opinion already and that from his opinion he was more convinced of the gravity of the situation. He said that it was the reason why he came to me and wanted my unreserved opinion for saving the situation.

I told him that since the state of affairs had developed to such an extent as those existing, it would require a person with strong influence among military circles, not a retired soldier like myself, to settle the affair. I added that in any case, Prince KONOYE would require a great deal of resolution to cope with the situation.

In the meantime, Premier KONOYE set up an organization of Cabinet Councillors and about ten people including myself were appointed the Cabinet Councillors. The object of this organization was to seek suggestions to check the expansion of the incident and to settle it.

18. The functions of the Cabinet Councillors and my suggestions to the Premier.

The Cabinet Council was not organized into a regular system of a council. Its members were to make their individual suggestions to Premier KONOYE and the Council had no recognized right of resolution. The Councillors were to meet regularly once or twice a week. However, it was to hear the latest information from the government or to exchange each other's views, and not to discuss any fixed agenda.

As the KONOYE Cabinet did not place much importance in this system, the Cabinet Council was gradually reduced to a nominal existence and a Councillor was an honorary post for which no pay or other form of treatment was given. At the time when this system was established, the China Incident had considerably expanded and the troops had reached somewhere near Nanking.

I submitted my opinion to the Premier saying that to attack and subsequently occupy the capital of China would only make the whole situation more serious than over and would create a considerable hindrance to the readjustment of China-Japan relations in the future. I suggested that peace should be sought before this campaign took place.

All the Councillors were of more or less the same opinion, and the government authorities seemed to have done their best in endeavoring to save the situation. However, what was lacking with the government authorities was a resolute determination to push through their policy, whereas the military action which was under the direction of the Supreme Command gained more influence every day and resulted in the further aggravation of the situation.

I think it was around this time that a peace negotiation was made through the good offices of Mr. Trautman, German Ambassador in China. All of the councillors were looking forward to the success of this negotiation, but the repeated efforts on the part of the Japanese government were frustrated. The Councillors did not participate in the deliberation of this peace negotiation and accordingly were not informed of its details. However, they eagerly expected the government, in an abstract manner, to accomplish this negotiation, until it proved in vain on the 16th of January.

Thus, the Councillors, whose duty from its inception had been nullified, became a mere nominal sinecure. The Councillors are charged with atrocities in Nanking, but they had neither the authority nor duty of controlling such an incident.

19. The circumstances in which I became Education Minister and the state of affairs during my tenure of office.

Prince KONOYE, from his sincere apprehension over the situation, and desiring to devise counter means against it, determined at the end of May to reshuffle his Cabinet, and selected as ministers the following members from the Cabinet Councillors. General UGAKI was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs; Mr. IKEDA, Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Finance and concurrently Minister of Commerce and Industry; and myself Minister of Education. He then appointed Lt. General ITAGAKI as War Minister. I had some expectation for this renovated Cabinet, but Premier KONOYE, after the renovation made it his practice to confer on current problems only with the Five Minister Conference comprised of Ministers of War, Navy, Foreign and Finance, and other Ministers were not invited to the discussions.

At that time military operations were in progress, and as they were under control of the Supreme Command, the Cabinet had no authority to check them. Thus, while the Premier was indecisive military action gradually developed and reached as far as Wuchang, Hankow and Canton. During this time, the members of the Cabinet other than those of the Five Minister Council were not immediately informed of the latest state of affairs.

Under the circumstances, my position was merely the chief of the education administration, which was entirely outside the realm of current affairs, and all I did was to promote education and its administration.

20. My work as Minister of Education.

The Ministry of Education, as one of its fixed duties, shared with the Ministry of Home Affairs the task of keeping surveillance over the General Spiritual Mobilization Organization. Consequently, the Minister of Education had to write in magazines and make broadcasts in connection with educational matters, as part of his routine duties. The drafts of articles or broadcasts usually prepared by the staff of ministry in charge of such matter and the Minister only made them public. The work was executed along the customary line. I do not think there was anything which was planned with specific intention or departed from the customary practice.

Excerpts of some of my books were tendered to the Tribunal as prosecution evidence. To those I contend that if the whole book had been read, instead of excerpts, what I was aiming to explain would have been understood.

During the earlier period of my tenure of office as Education Minister, there were some in the Ministry who were inclined toward flattery or fanatically pleaded the true principle of the fundamental policy of our country; there were some who were inclined to agree with the Nazi ideology; on the other hand, there were still some submerged elements in the schools who followed communism.

This situation required competent persons who could regulate this confusion, and this was why I conducted personnel shifts among the Education Office Staff.

I also appointed competent people who could cope with confidence with the request from the military authorities and other government branches so that the evil practice of being obsequitous to such requests could be eliminated.

At that time, the Education Council had already been established (in 1937). This was the highest institution for the renovation of the education system and it comprised as Councillors the most prominent persons of learning and experience, both in and out of office. All the important problems of education were deliberate upon at this Council and the government policies on education were decided upon by its resolution.

The inception of the advocacy for compulsory education at the Youths School dates back to the beginning of the T.ISHO Era when it was then only a Supplementary School,

In 1937, the Educational Administration Council made a report, in answer to the inquiry from the government about the question of Youths School. In January 1938, at the time of my predecessor, compulsory education was already decided upon at a Cabinet meeting. Then the question was again deliberated upon by the Education Council and according to its reply in July of the same year, it was arranged that an Imperial Ordinance be issued in April 1939 for its enforcement.

This new system was to give equal opportunity of education to all people and help to develop their natural gifts. It is entirely wrong to interpret this change as militarization of education.

The education system in Japan since the MEIJI Era had been formed after the European and American lives. While the system enjoyed certain popularity among the public, it offered more opportunity to the well-to-do class of people, and those of talent and faculty from the power classes found difficulty in developing their natural gifts. I perceived that this was contrary to our original program to let everyone gain his proper place, when the Educational Council submitted its decision that education in the Youths School should be made compulsory. I took this opportunity to develop the education of the working class of youths, and to give to those who showed good result in the Youths School ample opportunity to develop their talent.

The most serious apprehension of Japan at that time was the disturbance of ideological circles. There was a time when communism spread widely among the people and once it became the tide of public opinion; then there was a time, later when people followed Nazism or Fascism. This trend, gave rise to complications between the liberalism which had also existed at that time and caused a terrible state of chaos.

The several unfortunate incidents which arose from the current situation at that time were due to the disturbance of thought on the part of the people. On the other hand, the rise of the Nippon spirit tended to create a dogmatic nationalism, which from its lack of ubiquity, was apt to fall into extreme rightism and was pregnant of such danger. The cause of this defect was due to the want of perfunctory education which had a tendency of making the people lose sight of ideological independence and lofty ideas. In order to reform this, I advocated that the imperial virtue of benevolence and tolerance, which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of our country, should be borne in mind and cultivate in it an ubiquitous character which was welcome in all the modern civilized countries of the world. Imperial admonition was my guiding principle when attending to this work, inasmuch as the imperial admonition was teaching us the basic principle of humanity with His Majesty's generosity, and I considered that that was the code that the people should observe. This principle which had been the basic spirit from the time of the foundation of the Empire was entirely different from militarism not only was it just the contrary to militarism, but it was the one essentially required for the correction of the defect in ideological circles at that time.

21. Military Training in Schools

The history of physical exercise in military style which was eventually turned into military training dates back many years ago, but I am not going into its detail now. I had heard of some conflict between the education institutions and the military authorities with regard to military training in the schools, but neither of the parties had my sympathy, inasmuch as the whole conflict seemed to be due to their narrow views.

It was quite natural that school education placed its importance in cultivating the spirit of discipline and cooperation by training. But as the result of the training depended on the character of the person who was in charge of training, there were instances when the training was executed in excess of the above object. On the other hand, there were several cases where, on account of lack of proper understanding on the part of the school authorities, liberalism was regarded as synonymous to a sloven life and students were left in an irregular and slatternly existence. Another fearful tendency was communistic ideology, which, combined with some of the political plotters caused deterioration of the student's spirit by abetting them into the habit of disdain such virtues as discipline, moderation, cooperation and diligence, all of which were indispensable to the promotion of the culture of a nation.

During the earlier period of my Education Ministership, these fearful tendencies were gaining influence, much to my regret. There were frequent occasions when students were arrested and detained by the police on the charge of disturbing public order. These types of students were given to slandering the training in the schools as being militarization of school education. There were some even among the teachers and professors who encouraged students toward such tendencies.

I changed the system of training in the schools in such a way so as to observe moderation between the above two extremes and with it I tried to promote the lofty ideals of the students.

The reformation of the system of the Youths School was an act of equalizing the right and duty of education. By the reformation, there was no increase in hours allotted for training and there was not the slightest evidence to show that the education was militarized.

Military training in the schools was a part of the school education and from the viewpoint of educational administration it should not have exceeded this category. This was my principle in coping with this training, and so any request from the army authorities which attempted to bring it out of this category met my refusal.

There were occasions when in compliance with the request of students and school authorities, the use of modern weapons was introduced in training, but this decision was an autonomous disposition of the school authorities in view of the students' request, and was not done by the request of the Education Ministry.

While I was Education Minister, I placed importance on cultivating the moral element rather than promoting the skill of combat. This moral element served to reveal the Emperor's virtue of benevolence.

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That is to say, by training I taught students to cultivate their morals rather than to cultivate the habit of depending on armed force.

23. National Spirit General Mobilization

The National Spirit General Mobilization system had been established at the time of the First KONOYE Cabinet and its object was to straighten the national spirit against the state of affairs after the outbreak of the China Incident. It had been established before I became the Education Minister.

Its central executive organ was civilian comprised of people of learning, fame and experience which had been placed under the charge of the Departments of Home Affairs and Education. Its main object was the improvement of the people's daily life and spiritual restraint.

Later, there was a tendency for the policy of this central executive organ to become dogmatic. The HIRANUMA Cabinet, desiring to follow its policy properly, established a committee system with the chairman of the committee to be selected from among the cabinet ministers, to pursue a basic policy, and all the people of learning and experience both in and out of office were requested to deliberate so that the committee could submit its opinion to the government.

In my capacity of Education Minister, I was recommended to the chairmanship of this committee, but most of the actual work was handled by the Intelligence Bureau of the Cabinet. The committee and staff included many civilians, especially women, and deliberated on renovation and curtailment of daily living.

However, in spite of its primary objective, the discussion tended to delve into current problems, diverting from its original purpose of cultivating the fundamental character of the people in order to be worthy of associating with the modern world.

What was most urgently required under the circumstances was to ask the people to undertake a sever introspection into their daily mode of living, concentrate upon the cultivation of the spirit of endurance and improvement of their daily life, respect social morality and help them to bring about efficiency in their work.

In order to realize the above, I established a day of self-introspection. I decided that the first day of every month be called the "Serving Day" and requested the people to lead a life of restraint on this day. There was an opinion at that time that in view of the current situation, the 7th of every month, the day of the outbreak of the China Incident would be a better day for

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"Servin? Day". However, my opinion was that "Servin? Day" should be disconnected with the current state of affairs. My intention was to use this day for permanently promoting the basic standard of living of the people, and in order to get the people to understand this principle, I made the first day of every month the day for self-introspection. Thus I tried to prevent everything from coming under the influence of the current situation.

I wish to add that the National Spirit General Mobilization was entirely different in nature from National General Mobilization and Student Mobilization. The National Spirit General Mobilization was merely a part of the daily life renovation movement.

24. International problems while I was the Education Minister.

My duty as Education Minister was limited mainly to education administration, and the general international problems were outside the scope of my work. I have no recollection whether such matters as Premier KONCZE's declaration of the Establishment of the New Order or Foreign Minister ARITA's declaration was debated at the Cabinet Meeting.

My non-association with the international problems was more conspicuous at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet. In fact, I knew nothing about those matters at that time, inasmuch as all the important problems were discussed and decided at the Five Minister Conference.

Japan-German Cultural Agreement was first proposed to me by the Foreign Office and then Japan entered into this agreement. The agreement concerned culture only and had no political significance.

Exchange of boys between Germany and Japan was planned and executed before my acceptance of the Education Minister-ship. The first group returned home after my assumption of office. I did not see in this party anything more than an ordinary social visit of a tourist party. I wanted to send a similar party not to Germany alone, but to all other civilized countries, but could not realize it.

The Khasan and Nomonhan Incidents were reported to the Cabinet Meeting as being mere skirmishes between the border garrisons of both countries. The Education Minister was not concerned in the disposal of such incidents. Only one thing was clear that the government desired an amicable settlement and the army acted from the beginning to end in conformity with this policy. That was why those incidents did not become serious subjects of discussion at the Cabinet Meeting.

I did not know anything about the Tripartite Pact and the Wang-Chin-wei government. I did not even know how they were discussed or made. As for the stationing of troops in French Indo-China and the problems concerning

the Lesser Southern Group of Islands and Hainan Island, I had not the slightest idea of what was going on.

25. Cabinet Councillor at the ABE and YONAI Cabinets.

It was quite a long time after the formation of the ABE Cabinet that I was asked to become a Councillor of that Cabinet. (I think it was in December 1939). I had known that a Cabinet Councillor was merely a nominal post and that I could not be of any material service to that Cabinet, so I first declined to accept it but the Premier was so persistent that I had to accept it after all. The ABE Cabinet resigned en bloc after two months of my acceptance of this post, and so I did not even have a chance of talking to the Premier.

When the YONAI Cabinet was formed, I was asked to become its Home Minister. However, my view was as I have stated above, and furthermore, the state of affairs was so aggravated at that time that I considered it was impossible for anyone except those who held strong influence over the military authorities, to exercise an effective administration to cope with the situation, and so I refused to accept it.

Then I was asked to become its Cabinet Councillor, but as my view was unchanged since the ABE Cabinet, again I declined to accept it. But when I was persistently asked by him to list my name among the Councillors only for nominal purpose, I could not very well refuse it and became a Cabinet Councillor.

As my assumption of the post had taken place under such circumstances, I remained its nominal member and actually did not do any work. I did not even know what was going on in the cabinet. It was, however, conceivable that both the ABE and YONAI Cabinets were opposed to the Tripartite Pact and that they were eager to put an end to the China Incident.

26. My attitude toward the Second KONOYE Cabinet

It was in September 1940, about two months after the formation of the Second KONOYE Cabinet that Mr. Tomita, Chief Cabinet Secretary unexpectedly visited me and asked me to become a Cabinet Councillor of the Second KONOYE Cabinet.

I had been told that the establishment of the Grand Rule Assistance Association and the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact were going to be disclosed shortly. These were the two important domestic and foreign problems, over which I had had serious apprehensions for some time in the past. Since those two problems were to be realized, it meant that my apprehension could not remain mere apprehension, but developed into something very serious. I decided that I could not assist the Cabinet which was to commit those mistakes. In fact, the things were so serious that I thought I had to make a very careful consideration about it. I confided these considerations to Mr. Tomita and told him that I could not accede to his request.

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On the evening of the same day, Prince KONOYE visited me at my house and repeated his request. We had a hot discussion for more than five hours. I explained to him that the state of affairs at that time indicated very grave consequences and I did not accept his request.

From March 1936 to October 15th, 1937, from September 1939 to November, 1939 and after July 1940, I was not in any official position and no public activity was undertaken by me during those periods. The incidents such as the Anti-Comintern Pact, outbreak of the China Incident, Stationing of troops in French Indo-China, Tripartite Pact and the Pacific War occurred during those periods, and so I do not think it necessary for me to state anything about those incidents.

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28. My refutation against Prosecution testimony.

Prosecution's record of my interrogation and its intrinsic value.

1. The Prosecution tendered Exhibit No. 187-A onward as being the record of my interrogation. I presume the prosecution meant by this to submit to the Tribunal the record of the interrogation which the prosecutors (Colonel Morrow and Mr. Hyder) conducted of me at the Sugamo Prison. The interrogation was carried on for more than twenty times, between January 18th and March 12th, 1946, by the prosecutors, assisted by one or two interpreters each time.

The English versions of the said interrogations were stenographically recorded for the first few occasions, but this procedure was stopped later, whereas the Japanese version was not recorded from the beginning. The interpreters were not fully conversant with Japanese and there were several points over which, on account of incompetent interpretation, we failed to come to a mutual understanding. Moreover, the record of this interrogation was not read to me, nor was it even shown to me.

I was never asked to give oath or sign the statement in connection with this interrogation. The record, when presented before the Tribunal, contained quite a number of misunderstandings, complications and mistakes; more remarkable were its diversions from the facts, and as a whole, I cannot hold myself responsible for the contents of these statements.

2. Through the whole course of interrogation, the prosecution changed interpreters almost on each occasion, and as far as I could see, all of them were unable to thoroughly understand Japanese and the Japanese

state of affairs. The interpreters themselves seemed to have conscientiously admitted their incompetence.

As I felt uneasy of this situation, I suggested that I should write the outline, if not the details, of what were asked of me. I said that if the prosecutors were to make interrogations based on my written statement, it would not only save considerable time, but also would help to convey my idea accurately and correctly.

This suggestion was duly agreed to by the prosecution and although I had not much time to elaborate on its contents, I made a statement concerning the settlement of the Manchurian Incident after my acceptance of the post of War Minister, and also, in answer to the question of the prosecution regarding the movement of young officers, I made another statement concerning the situation of Japan at the time of the Incident and the general outline of how I acted in it. The former was handed over to Mr. Hyder and the latter to Colonel Morrow, and I asked them to let me read the English translation of those two statements when it was ready.

I think this took place on or about 11th or 12th of February 1946. There is a remark in Exhibit No. 187-C, as having been said by the prosecutor, "I will bring you a copy of this translation.", and also as my statement, ~~all~~ of these are written in the document that I gave you refer to this conversation.

However, much to my anxiety, the translation was not shown to me, and the interrogation of the prosecutors continued. Of course the interrogation, which was carried out in the same manner as before, filled me with apprehension, but since I had already presented my written statement, it did not worry me too much. I only waited for the time when a proper interrogation based on my written statement would take place.

After the commencement of this trial, the translation of the documents in question was handed to me through my defense counsel, and the prosecution submitted to the Tribunal the record of my interrogation in evidence. On that occasion, my counsel tried to explain to the Tribunal the circumstances in which the interrogation was carried out, but my impression was that the explanation was not properly understood.

My counsel subsequently tried to take every opportunity to explain this matter to the Tribunal. He once tendered a copy of this translation in evidence under a general phase, but it was not admitted on the ground that it should be submitted under the individual phase. (document)

I contend that the written statement that I made at the Sugamo Prison is indispensable to the record of my interrogation and that they should be read together. I further suggest that even in that written statement, there is a slight mistake which occurred through misinterpretation of prosecutor's question.

3. Such being the case, the record of my interrogation contained several important mistakes and, furthermore, the contents are not consistent as a Japanese sentence, some of which, I shall point out in the following:

1. The allegation that during the Manchurian Incident, I established a plan for occupation of Manchuria. (Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B, 188-C, among which 188-C is slightly better, but the other two do not make sense.)

This allegation is entirely different from the fact. That this allegation is wrong can easily be checked by comparing the date of my interrogation, my written answer to the prosecutors and Exhibit No. 188-A, 188-B and 188-C.

The real state of affairs at that time has been fully Explained in my present statement, and the statement will be supported by the evidence which has been submitted by this time and also by those which will be submitted in the future.

2. The allegation makes us believe as if the Privy Council was the party which decided the national policy. That this is wrong is quite clear even from common sense.

3. It is also a great mistake, as can easily be ascertained, in the allegation that the War Minister dictated orders to the Chief of General Staff for the dispatch of troops.

4. The date when the INUKAI Cabinet decided the outline of its Manchurian policy was not the 17th of December. This mistake arose when the Prosecutor insisted that the plenary session of the Privy Council for the deliberation of "Issuance of Bond to cover the Emergency Expense to deal with the Manchurian Incident" was on that date.

5. My statement concerning the basic principle of dealing with the Incident was confused by the interpreter with my statement concerning the fact. By this I mean our conversation relative to whether or not the document in question is still kept, regulation of Cabinet meeting, whether or not attendance at the Cabinet meeting was compulsory.

6. The allegation is that I stated that the sovereignty over
5 Manchuria rests with China. It may be so from general conception based on a map, but the fact was different, and my statement to that effect was mistaken as above shown.
7. The allegation that I directed the independence declaration of Manchuria and its subsequent recognition is entirely mistaken. This will be clarified by the allusion to the same in this statement as well as by other evidence which is to be tendered.
8. Conversations concerning the responsibility of Cabinet members, the declaration of the Foreign Minister, those who were responsible for the China Incident, and the circumstances in which I accepted the post of Cabinet Councillor were only partially recorded, and because of this, the record failed to convey the real meaning and is apt to mislead the readers. This will be clarified by documentary evidence and witnesses.
9. The extent of authority of the Supreme Command, which was in charge of the expedition, and that of the government was not thoroughly expressed in the record of my interrogation.

I merely stated an instance to show that in ordinary times, the government policy is shown to the Supreme Command by the government in order to make it a basis for the former to decide upon its movement, but by this I did not mean to specifically state the fundamental power and authority of those two organs.

When the warfare was started, or when the Supreme Command deemed it necessary from national defense point of view, it was entitled to make a direct access to the Throne, and so it can not be said that the dispatch of troops was done only when it was agreed to by the government.

2. Further refutation to other evidence of the Prosecution.

a) The Motion Picture "Emergency Japan."

"Emergency Japan" was the title of my speech which I made, in compliance with the request of the Osaka Mainichi Newspaper, on the subject of Emergency.

It was the time when Japan was unfortunate to have to withdraw from the League of Nations. An air of uneasiness prevailed throughout the country, and there was utter confusion both politically and ideologically.

I had an idea of my own, with which I wanted to appeal to my fellow compatriots. My afore-mentioned speech was to restrain the people from corrupt customs and from habits which prevailed throughout the country, and to encourage them to further their recognition of the international relations, and, by doing so, to quiet the people's mind which was apt to run to extremes.

I advocated in this speech that the real object of national defense is not in waging war, but in protecting and securing morals, and justice; that the troops of Japan should not make it their first object to blindly resort to armed force, but that they should place the first importance in securing morals, and thus I requested the self-reflection of the people over the circumstances in which they were, in order to enhance their culture.

I was not concerned in any way in the manufacture of this film. I trust the section of the War Office in charge gave necessary warning to the manufacturers to be very careful not to provoke international feeling by this film. The above intention of mine was clearly manifested in 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th and 12th reels of this film.

I have used this expression of emergency on several other occasions and other documentary evidence bearing this title of emergency will clarify what I meant by this expression.

I made a speech in the summer of 1933 in which I said, "what is needed by the people of emergency Japan is the watchword, don't reject others, don't abuse others, don't blame others, but cultivate your character." I also told the younger generations of Japan the state of mind that they should have, "don't be satisfied by finding yourself alone contented. Cooperate with and assist others in bringing about peace and welfare of the people. Don't criticize to fault of others. Be generous and broad minded. The peace of the world and your own welfare will be realized by observing the above. Be kind to foreigners and take into your consideration the welfare of the foreign countries. Let us teach the world the path of humanity to reach world peace."

I advocated these principles in connection with the expression "Emergency" and I tried to introduce this principle into the film when it was manufactured in dealing with the subject of the fundamental principle of the Japanese troops. By this I intended to show the aspiration of Japan of cooperating with the world in realizing peace on earth.

There were some minor points which, due to technical reasons and because of the intention ^{of the} manufacturer to cater to the taste of the lower standard of people, were not quite up to my original intention, but as a whole, I considered that the film was faultless. I never heard from any one that the film made any acute ~~impression~~ on the spectators. (b)

(b) My articles in "Mombu Jiho" while I was the Education Minister and my speeches and broadcasts that I made during that period were nothing but the routine work of an Education Minister, and they were not delivered in connection with any Incident in particular. The Prosecution depicted several words as being provocative, but I contend that the Incident was going on at that time and expression of that kind was quite common with the general public and there was nothing strange in that. Those speeches and articles were prepared in such a way that one can really appreciate my purported principle only when he reads through the whole text. I never considered them as giving encouragement to the expansion of the Incident or instigating aggression. Lastly, as can be seen from what I have explained, at no time did I conspire with anyone to commit nor did I commit myself ^e personally, directly or indirectly any of the crimes ^r charged by the prosecution. On the contrary I did every thing in my power to avoid war and the tragic consequences in which Japan finds herself today.

On this 25th day of August, 1947

At War Ministry.

DEPONENT ARAKI, Sadao (seal)

I, SUGAWARA, Yutaka, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence

DEF. DOC. #2488

of this witness.

On the same date
AAt War Ministry.

Witness: (signed) SUGAWARA, Yutaka (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth
withholding nothing and adding nothing.

ARAKI, Sadao (seal)