GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331)
Description of contents

(1) Box no. 3282

(2) Folder title/number: (9)
Officers' Call

(3) Date: Nov. 1949, Dec. 1949

(4) Subject:

Classification	Type of record
020	t

(5) Item description and comment:

(6) Reproduction: (Yes) No

(7) Film no. Sheet no.

SRS - GHQ - SCAP

ROUTING SLIP NLM

Date NOV 3 1949

M/C Log No. 31

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(Adm. #2 ~~2~~ Revised 12 Sep 49)

Capt B.

Officers' SOS CALL

VOLUME I *The Army's Role in Future War* NUMBER SEVEN

Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

VOLUME I NUMBER SEVEN

CONTENTS

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THE ARMY'S ROLE IN FUTURE WAR

Introduction

The Army's role in the event of future war is, for officers, a topic of considerably more than academic interest. In peacetime, matters such as the Army's strength, organization, training, and equipment are determined largely by consideration of what the Army would be required to do if war came. Every officer's peacetime assignments are related to expected needs in wartime. In a future war, then, what would be the Army's role?

No single discussion, however penetrating and inclusive, will produce answers of permanent validity. The Army's combat role is determined by two sets of conditions. First of these are the considerations that largely are timeless and unchanging. Second are the transitory and constantly changing conditions, such as the world political situation and the development of new methods and devices of warfare.

Among the unchanging considerations, or conditions, are these: The United States Army exists for prompt and sustained combat operations on land; its primary purpose is to defeat and destroy enemy land forces; its ultimate objective is victory in land combat. These are fixed stars by which military planning and preparations are guided.

In the political and technological fields, consideration of the future always is partly speculative. In these areas, there are few fixed stars pointing the way with certainty. There are signs and trends instead. They may be political changes that seem to make war more imminent or more remote than before, or they may be technical developments suggestive of far-reaching adjustments in strategic and tactical concepts.

It is clear, therefore, that discussion of the Army's future role should include both the permanent and the transitory aspects of the problem. Even more important, it should clarify and demonstrate the close relationship that exists between them.



Figure 1.

In this discussion, we will consider first some contemporary factors that bear on the Army's future role. We will be seeking reasonable answers to such questions as—

Would the ground arms be less important than in the past?
If war came, what would be our broad objectives as a Nation?
Whom would we be fighting?
Where and how might the war begin?

Consideration of these will provide a more realistic background against which the Army's future combat role may be seen in relation to those of the other armed services and of the Nation as a whole.

Would the Ground Arms Be Less Important Than in the Past?

We serve today in a period when new modes of warfare—biological, psychological, atomic—invite speculation and, for some, the temptation entirely to forsake the known to venture into the unknown.

Occasionally, even among Army officers, doubt and misgivings are evinced as to the role of the ground arms in any war of the future. Inquiry and thought regarding the potentialities of new weapons are, for the Army, essential and healthy activities. But officers should not allow predicted developments in atomic, radiological, and bacteriological warfare, in long-range guided missiles, in high-speed submarines, in intercontinental warfare, to lure them from study of their own tasks and the perfection of techniques and tools already available. This certainly does not mean that officers should be men of narrow vision and imagination.

The officer who is not firmly convinced of his own and the Army's vital role can hardly bring a full measure of leadership to his job.

General Eisenhower once said: "The Army phases of a balanced air-sea-ground combination require special stress at a time when many voice the opinion that land forces have been made obsolete by the advance of aviation, the development of rockets and the atomic bomb." On the contrary, he pointed out, the only element of the military establishment which can *seize* land areas, *hold* positions, and exercise "*direct complete control* over an enemy population—three fundamental purposes of armed effort—is, as always, the foot soldier."

He added that the ground soldier who can use the vehicles of the sea and air to reach his arena, and there live, fight, and maintain himself through weeks and months of hard weather and campaigning is, in this age, more than ever before, the keystone of armed effort. "There can be no question," he concluded, "that, should war be joined with great forces on this continent or any other, a decision must be reached by the striking power of the Army."

Scientific research and development may effect considerable change in the methods by which armed forces accomplish their missions. However, man remains the master machine of war. Whatever the devastation of his cities and the disorder in his existence, he is not conquered until another man fights him for his life.

What Would Be Our National Objectives?

The Army's role, like that of the other armed services, is tied to events that already have occurred or conceivably could occur during a period of tension. These events emphasize the principles for which America stands, and the principles for which we would be fighting if war came.

Reduced to the simplest terms, the objectives of the American people are *peace*, *security*, *stability*, and *prosperity*, for themselves and for the world.

We remain firmly pledged to the United Nations as the eventual best means of attaining these objectives. We also believe that for some time to come we must maintain the "respectable military posture" recommended in 1793 by Washingon. We believe in the right of people everywhere to determine without restraint the forms of government under which they will live. We oppose only those governments whose policies indicate aggressive tendencies threatening the independence and integrity of other nations.

We desire to maintain and continue to improve our standard of living, regarded as part of "our way of life." American inventive genius and productive capacity—the know-how of both management and labor—are among the factors which have made us a great country. We have taken the lead in restoring world stability and prosperity.

There is little reason to believe that these broad national objectives will change. War would delay and impede progress toward their attainment. They would continue to be our long-term goals, and would have considerable influence in shaping our military effort toward more immediate wartime objectives.

Whom Would We Be Fighting?

Many events that have featured the period of tension in the past four years give us logical grounds for assumption as to the powers that would be aligned with us and against us in the event of war.

When he requested the Congress for authority to conduct a Military Assistance (Arms) Program, the President said: ". . . the Soviet Union, with its violent propaganda, its manipulation of the conspiratorial activities of the world communist movement, and its maintenance of one of the largest peacetime armies in history, has deliberately created an atmosphere of fear and danger."

Testifying later before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the Secretary of State added: "The danger is real . . . International Communism has made its gains in Europe. . . . Nor can the possibilities of direct military aggression be ignored."

On the other hand, our Government does not believe that war is inevitable. As Army officers, our objective of *readiness for combat* does not require us to believe that war is inevitable.

If a would-be aggressor is convinced that the United States is ready to fight, our armed forces become a strong deterrent to war. If the aggressor refuses to heed the clear warning, our forces must be prepared to take the field. In both cases, the existence of forces *in being* and their *readiness for combat* are vital.

Secretary of Defense Johnson, at the National War College graduation exercises on 21 June, said: ". . . only if American armed strength stands constantly on the political horizon can we hope to derive maximum value from our armed forces as a long-term deterrent to war. And only as long as constance in American military policy reassures free peoples that our moral persuasions in behalf of peace are backed by military muscle can we expect to hold the free world's front against armed intimidation."

The Soviet Union, through its world-wide tentacles of Communism, apparently believes it has discovered the world's cheapest form of warfare. Until recently, there seemed to be some logic in this view. Certainly Czechoslovakia, for example, was "absorbed" at a cost even less than Hitler expended for the same purpose.

On the other hand, the United States and Western Europe are finding workable methods of combatting Soviet power. The Western democracies have embarked on a program of redressing the balance which had been upset in favor of Soviet aims. Like-minded countries marshaled their efforts by slow but democratic, and admittedly dollar-costly, processes. Actions such as the European Recovery Act, the Truman Doctrine, the Voice of America, the Rio Pact, and the North Atlantic Treaty, are enabling the free countries, led by the United States, to strengthen their bargaining power in world councils. These actions are in the economic, political, and psychological fields.

In the fourth great field of international action—that of military readiness for possible conflict—the Congress is currently considering the President's proposal for United States military assistance, in the form of equipment and advice, to friendly countries. If enacted, the assistance program would mean an additional task for the Army.

It is worth noting that international communism, as such, seems to be more an indication of danger than a danger in itself. Communism, unsupported by the military power of Russia, probably would have little more than a nuisance value in the United States. Most Americans would not object to the Russian adherence to communism so long as the Soviet Union kept her beliefs at home. What we object to is Soviet support of subversive action by members of the "faith" in noncommunist countries.

Some people believe that a solution (or at least a gradual reduction) of this conflict of ideologies ultimately may be found. Only one party to the conflict is committed by tenets and program to aggression and the destruction of the other party. The leaders of communism eventually might conclude that they necessarily do not have an irreconcilable conflict with the Western way of life. This might result in a change of attitude and behavior that would warrant a reasonable degree of trust and cooperation on the part of Western nations. Unless based upon genuine good faith, however, such a trend could bring with it a new danger.

A Soviet "conciliation offensive" might disintegrate the guards quickly and weaken the present firm resolve of the Western democracies, inviting still another reversal of communist policy and a clean-up offensive. While the democracies deliberated what to do, it might become too late to do anything.

Thus, our present policies and actions stem from the conviction that Western civilization will survive only if it preserves a uniformly strong, and hence convincing, front against the attacks of communism. Lacking such a front, war then indeed might be inevitable. It almost certainly would involve all the free nations, including the British Dominions, the Latin-American countries, India and Pakistan, the Philippines, and the nations of the North Atlantic Pact. In our country, it would require all the resources we could bring to bear, and speed would be essential to avoid tragedy.

How and Where Might War Begin?

It would seem likely that Soviet Russia or one of her satellites might start hostilities by initiating action against one or more of the noncommunist countries.



Figure 2.

This might be a carefully calculated action or it might be something "blundered into." Most people assume that if it were the former, it would occur first in Western Europe.

The armed forces cannot tie themselves completely to such an assumption. The Russians have a great advantage—in a military sense—over the democratic nations. As in all totalitarian governments, the few men who determine Soviet policy can make their plans, build up their stock piles, shift their forces and begin their attack in comparative secrecy. Western intelligence, as good as it may be, might not be able to predict the time of the contemplated action. Even *where, how,* and *with what* might prove to be beyond accurate estimation.

When the Soviet Union has mastered the secret of the atomic bomb, American cities might be the initial targets. Or the USSR might decide that expansion in the Far East, or in Africa, should precede an attack on the western nations.

All these possibilities emphasize the importance of keeping our planning flexible and continuous. Besides the possibility of Soviet aggression in the more distant future, there are more immediate possibilities. The Politburo might decide that it is losing position in this period of tension—that the time has come to strike before the Soviet advantage decreases still further. Or a border incident, involving a satellite country, might develop rapidly into a world conflict.

As a member of the Atlantic Pact, we must make plans to assist the other signatories, should that be required. In late July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Bradley, Admiral Denfeld, and General Vandenberg—visited Europe for discussions relative to this problem.

Everyone is familiar with the precept that one way for a nation to avoid war is to be so strong that no one will dare attack it. Sound as it may be in theory, this method has become too expensive. A better solution is required.

Another method is to establish, through a coalition of friendly nations, collective military power capable of backing the peaceful intentions of the democracies against any challenge. In concert with other like-minded nations, particularly the signers of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States ultimately may achieve this condition. In that event, smaller forces,

readily available and readily capable of expansion, might be sufficient. The over-all allied strength would consist of the ability for prompt collective action by efficient, expandable forces.

What Is Our Share in This Effort?

The "National Team." The American share of this collective effort is not a task for the Army alone or even of the Armed Forces alone. The entire Nation contributes.

Our productive capital, our industrial "know-how," our great force of laborers and farmers, and our Armed Forces, form the "National Team."

In his final report as Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower said: "National defense is not the exclusive property and concern of men in uniform, but the responsibility as well of labor, management, agriculture, industry and every group that goes to make up the national complex."

The "National Team," when it takes the field to protect and defend its corporate existence, embraces the efforts of all citizens. It is a great and powerful machine, manned by 145 million Americans.

The Armed Forces are the *military* portion of the team. Balanced, then coordinated in a single total strategy, they provide the "cutting edge" of our national power.

The need for better teamwork by Army, Navy, and Air Force was one of the vital lessons of World War II. General Bradley selected as the theme of Army Day, 1949: "The Army, part of the team for security."

What Is Meant by "Balanced Forces"?

For maximum effectiveness, the "cutting edge" of our national power requires balanced forces—balanced in terms of land, sea, and air elements—which can oppose aggression, strike immediate blows in retaliation, guide mobilization and training, and carry war to the enemy home land in order to terminate the conflict in the shortest possible time.

At the recent graduation exercises of the Command and General Staff College, General Bradley said:

> In speaking of effectiveness—or combat readiness as the military man would term it—our greatest danger is that we will be caught up in the fancy of a futurism, and commit ourselves to unbalanced forces that will not match the forces which might oppose us.
>
> When I speak of balance, I don't mean the dividing of funds equally among the three services; nor do I mean an equation of so many ships equal so many soldiers equal so many air groups, to create a pattern on a chart.
>
> When I speak of balance, I mean *effective* forces equal to the tasks that modern warfare may thrust upon us. . . . We can upset this equilibrium by committing ourselves, not strategically, nor numerically, but financially to plans which on the surface may seem proper, but tomorrow tower over us as a burdensome upkeep.

What comprises "balanced forces" under this definition?

First, our *strategic air force* must be second to none, equipped in planes and weapons with the best that research and development can provide.

Our *Navy*, including its naval aviation and the Marine Corps, must be capable of vital offensive and defensive missions, including assistance to the Army and Air Force to project the battle as far as possible from our shores.

Our *tactical air force* must be highly proficient at furnishing the fighter-bomber support so indispensable to the infantry, artillery, and tank ground team.

What Types of Forces in General Does the Army Need?

Our *Army*, while continuing its several vital tasks during this period of tension, also must maintain a ready mobile force, self-contained and capable of major battle accomplishments. Along with this ready force we must have the reinforcements, the mobilization base, and the special-mission units that would support its operations. Our ready force must have good soldiers, trained for positions of greater responsibility, and in many types of warfare, and for many climates under many strange conditions. It must be mobile both tactically and strategically. This means the readiness of shipping and airlift in the numbers and types necessary. It also means the existence of transportation support in the form of sea (and air) ports and of port and airhead battalions.

Our minimum fighting force must have the best in modern unit equipment. The individual American soldier must be the best-equipped, the best-protected, and the man with the lightest load. This includes his rifle, his ammunition, his clothing, and his food. Research and development will need to go further in these fields than ever before. What we may lack initially in quantity, we must make up for in quality.

Our ready force must know its mission and be prepared to accomplish it with high morale. It cannot be a one-shot task force for a suicide attempt. Plans for its employment must include realistic conceptions of the logistical support and reinforcements it would need for a sustained mission.

Figure 3.

General Bradley expressed the above thoughts in his speech at Leavenworth. He ended by posing the question: "Can the United States afford an Army striking force of any less than a completely reinforced corps, balanced in division types, capable of sustained action, for the backbone of its long-range modern Army?"

This force might include several infantry divisions, several armored divisions, and several airborne divisions. The exact number of each would depend upon the exact mission and the timing and location of the force's employment. A great need is visualized for air and airborne operations. The airborne division, several of which performed daring and vital missions in World War II, probably would have even greater usefulness in any future war. Furthermore, most of our infantry and armored units must be air transportable in order to back up the airborne units in gaining and exploiting initial successes.

The ready force must have its own antiaircraft, combat engineers, heavy artillery, armored cavalry, and elements of the services (signal, quartermaster, ordnance, etc.) which make up a self-sustaining ground force organization. The more air transportable these units are, the better.

The National Guard and Organized Reserves must be prepared for the expansion that necessarily would go along with the commitment of our ready force.

The tasks of the Army during the current period of tension will continue to require world-wide dispersion of most of its strength over and above that of the ready force. This fact is a serious handicap to the assembling of maximum force in any one area in time of urgent need. At present, these missions include occupation duty in Japan, Germany, Austria, and Trieste; the furnishing of military missions to Korea, the Philippines, Greece, Turkey, and many countries of Latin America; and garrisons for important areas such as the Marianas, Okinawa, Alaska, and Panama. The ready force envisioned by General Bradley must not be hindered in its training and preparation by undue responsibility for these current tasks.

Will "Push-Button Warfare" Replace Ground Operations?

A critical phase of World War II deserves brief review in this connection. German use of the then new and bizarre V-weapons against England in 1944 was "push-button warfare" in its infancy. Some significant facts of that decisive period give us a foretaste, and miniature example, of future war.

On 12 June 1944, the first flying bombs fell in the London areas. For months, construction of their launching sites across the Channel had been known. The Normandy landings had begun only a week before. The menace was grave.

The British Home Fleet, augmented by a sizable American naval force, gave the Allies overwhelming sea power in European waters. They could bring it to bear at any point along the French coast. In the air, our command was as absolute, perhaps, as any that ever again will be achieved in war. Thousands of American and British aircraft roamed the skies over France and Germany.

To these great forces, the Nazi installations on the Pas de Calais were a target of overriding importance. Public reaction in London to the sudden, unheralded blast of a ton of explosives in a residential block, a crowded theater, or on a city street was understandably intense. Moreover, no one could be sure whether or not the missiles might be shifted to such targets as the ports of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Southampton on which depended the continued build-up of the invasion forces.

The enemy launching sites were known because of their new and unusual appearance on aerial photographs of the coastal areas. Moreover, they were of surface construction. Yet, despite all efforts by concentrated, day-to-day bombardment of the launching areas, flying bombs continued to fall in increasing numbers. They stopped falling only when Allied *ground forces* broke out of Normandy, destroyed the German armies in France, and actually seized the Pas de Calais.

Ranges of the V-weapons were comparatively short, of course. The V–1's operated from fixed platforms and carried to 90 or 100 miles, whereas the far speedier and more flexible V–2 rocket could reach London from about 190 miles. Nevertheless, we have here a military situation that very well could be repeated in a future war. And so far it cannot be met by pushing a button!

The great aerial bombing offensive nevertheless had an immediate and profound effect on the war's outcome. The direct contribution of tactical and strategic aircraft to the advance of ground forces cannot be overestimated. Moreover, our bombers forced the enemy to attempt gigantic tasks of evacuation, underground plant construction, and the building of new railroad spurs, highways, and heavier bridges. One easily can imagine how this diverted already scarce matériel from essential combat purposes, skyrocketed the manpower requirements, and eliminated many morale-giving services. Many thousands of men sorely needed for combat had to be retained for these tasks. Thus, the Allied ground offensives derived incalculable assistance from the aerial assault. In the final critical days, German army units were understrength, while reserves for defense in depth simply did not exist.

Has the A-Bomb Made Ground Action Less Important?

In his speech of 21 June, already referred to, Secretary Johnson pointed out that, while the atomic bomb has multiplied greatly the destructive force of air power, its effect upon strategic principles has not yet been explored completely.

"Certainly," he said, "the atom bomb is not the absolute weapon. But neither," he added, "is it just another piece of ordnance which has modified only slightly the strategy of war. The great significance of the atomic bomb lies in the destructive and denial power that may be carried in a single aircraft.

"Though airpower," he continued, "has given promise of a speedier end to conflict, it has not supplanted the soldier who must finally defeat the enemy land forces. For ultimately war between nations is reduced to one man defending his land while another attempts to invade it.

"Unlike the Air Force with its bombers on the ready line; unlike the Navy with its ships at sea, the Army must devote a greater share of its strength to nourish a later war potential rather than a large-scale force for instant combat. Nevertheless, it is essential to the security of this nation, vital to the conduct of war, that the Army have a mobile striking force, combat trained and available for urgent dispatch anywhere in the world."

What Other Developments Might Affect the Army's Combat Role?

Besides the atomic bomb, there are other developments, less spectacular, which may lead to important changes in the organization, tactics, and equipment of ground forces. Artillery, communications, transport and numerous ground functions may be affected.



Figure 4.

Tactical doctrine always must progress hand in hand with the development of matériel. To foresee future needs and to keep our Army the most modern in the world require the tireless endeavor and concentration of every officer. A truly efficient army is not achieved alone by broad decisions from the top level. Equally essential are the individual contributions of thousands of alert, perceiving, and ever-growing minds. Only when convinced that he has a momentous job to do can the army officer direct all his energy and talents to doing that job well.

The Future Pattern

Should war come, we, by the combined efforts of our national team, must mobilize our resources to keep the conflict as far as possible from American shores and simultaneously assist our friends in Western Europe.

Each of the three Services must do its share in securing the land mass of North America—

The Air Force must strike quickly at enemy targets.

The Navy must rid the seas of enemy submarines and protect the movement of our convoys.

The Army, together with the forces of our Allies (and with assistance from our own Navy and Air Force), must be prepared to meet the first shock of the aggressor and to contain his offensive, to beat him back, and carry the fight to him until he is driven within his own borders. There, the armed forces must be prepared to hammer him until he is willing to return to amicable relations with his neighbors and join them in a renewed quest of lasting peace, security, stability, and prosperity.

There are those who feel that we may hope for an early and sudden victory through the collapse of the enemy under the devastating bombardment of air power. Certainly the Army has good reason to hope for this—and devoutly so—but it would not be in the national interest to rely upon such a result as a virtual certainty. General Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, has said: "The three Services are in complete agreement that no one Service can do the job alone."

The only safe course, therefore, is to visualize the continued employment of combined air, naval, and ground arms in an offensive of mounting intensity against the enemy's forces and against his sources of strength.

As far as we can project our plans into the future, the Army, as our ground fighting team, has a vital role—not merely that of seizing areas from which other forces may conduct operations but, indeed, the decisive and conclusive role. From the moment hostilities begin, the combined operations of all the armed forces are directed to this end—the final, climactic struggle on land which leads to the enemy's complete capitulation. This is a tremendous role, challenging the ini-

tiative and energies of all ranks, and particularly those now holding or aspiring to hold commissions.

Effective performance of the Army's role requires the full cooperation of strategic and tactical air power, the full employment of the greatest Navy in the world, the full mobilization of the industry and manpower of this Nation and its friends. All these make possible the Army's face-to-face conflict with the enemy.

Aircraft, ships, submarines, artillery, tanks—all the elements of armed power—give indispensable help in this final task, but the last decision is made by the ground soldier. This would be especially true if the opposing mechanized forces of war proved approximately equal; if ships and submarines, bombers and fighters, tanks and antitank means, biological measures and countermeasures, became so evenly matched as to produce a stalemate.

The United States cannot ignore any of these methods of waging war. But neither can we risk finding ourselves in a situation where machines prove unable to force a decision and fighting men are lacking.

The Armed Forces execute foreign policy when other means have failed. This fact has an important bearing on the value of certain weapons under certain conditions. To destroy cities, to start bacteriological epidemics, to contaminate fertile and industrially important areas—such measures hardly would be feasible if we were forced to fight on the soil of friendly allies, and might be contrary to national policy no matter where the fighting was taking place. The Army would, in these circumstances, be the force called upon to fight, with weapons of less than mass-destruction magnitude.

These are the basic premises of the Army's plans. When conditions alter the premises, the plans will be altered accordingly. And, as the conditions change, it will be useful to examine periodically the role of ground forces in future war.

Today's problem and challenge to the keen professional officer is not so much *what* would be done as it is *how* it would be done. It is easy to say that the ability of the enemy to wage war must be destroyed and that, other methods failing, the Army must engage in that sustained effort which is part and parcel of its basic mission. "How to do it" always has been *the* great challenge in the long history of war. Victory in a future war would require techniques and methods as different from World War II as that struggle was from the first world war.

Some writers on future war incline toward easy generalizations and faulty parallels from the past. One example is: "Both Napoleon and Hitler failed to cross the Channel (or to conquer Russia)." Napoleon and Hitler were stopped by the Channel, true enough. But the Allies crossed it, thereby disproving (as did several other World War II operations) the belief once widely held that an amphibious landing in force against a hostile fortified coast could not succeed. Today, skill in such operations generally is accepted as one of our military assets, and the preponderance of opinion is that, against a well-executed amphibious landing, no sure means of defense yet has been found.

Another "maxim" sometimes emphasized is that "We can't fight mass armies over the European land mass. Mass armies are obsolete."

Standing alone, the term "mass armies" essentially is without meaning. To the military man, "mass" means simply the concentration of force and firepower for a decisive action. It always must be considered in relation to such factors as mobility, surprise, and security. Thus examined, the cliché that "mass armies are obsolete" becomes almost an absurdity. There are no other kinds but mass armies. Indeed, it is a mass land army—that of Soviet Russia—and its capabilities for overrunning and enslaving a large part of the world, that emphasize our own requirement for an effective Army and at the same time indicate what our Army's role would be in any war of the foreseeable future.

As professional soldiers, we are the Nation's repository and developers of military knowledge. Our minds must remain alert to technological changes, and adaptable to new developments. As we proceed from day to day on the basis of what is known, we occasionally will be required to abandon the tried and proven in favor of new things and new methods.

We will not be doing so merely for the sake of change. The new will be required to prove itself before it replaces the old. Every officer shares the task of testing new ideas and determining their right to replace old ones. This is how an army, like any other institution, maintains its fitness to perform its assigned tasks. An army of closed minds, resentful of all new and strange ideas, in quiet times might give a deceptive

History of World War II

The Historical Division's GUADALCANAL: THE FIRST OFFENSIVE is now available in Army libraries and by purchase ($4) through the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., OFFICERS' CALL plans to review it in a forthcoming issue.

appearance of readiness. For such an army, however, the arrival of a real crisis would bring only the tragic opportunity to prove that it is obsolete.

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Teamwork Is Our Strength, address by the Secretary of Defense before the National War College, August 1949.

Basic Elements of a Long-Range Military Policy, from Digest of Speeches, August 1949.

Considerations of economy have dictated a curtailed distribution of OFFICER'S CALL.

Effective with this issue, distribution will be on a unit rather than an individual basis.

"Your Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the defense concept of the Western Union and have found that it is in accordance with our strategic thinking."

THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

(Excerpts from statements by General Bradley before Committees of Congress)

Before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 29 July 1949:

Within the limits of safeguarding military information, every American should know the present status of our plans for defense and, as far as possible, the strategy to be employed.

. . . It is important to realize that our defensive capabilities have increased materially in the past 3 years. The European Recovery Plan, and the ratification of the Atlantic Pact are first steps in one of the most realistic and vital and productive strategic plans that has ever been adopted. Our defensive capabilities will be further improved if the Military Assistance Program which you are considering is put into effect.

As I see it, prior to World War II, part of our security was derived from the fact that the friendly nations of Europe possessed the means to defend themselves. As a result of World War II, these same nations found themselves exhausted and with minimum capabilities of self-defense. As a consequence, our own security was lessened to that extent. And in the place of the vanquished foe has arisen this new aggressor, bent upon absorbing the exhausted victors. The spectre of another would-be master attempting to enslave our presently allied peoples has given a sense of urgency to our plans. In 2 years, a foreign policy for this nation has evolved which normally would take a quarter of a century. Our participation in a collective

security pact with eleven other friendly nations has been given the stamp of approval by our people.

In order to further speed up the time when friendly nations will be able to furnish reasonable security for themselves—and for us at the same moment—it is now proposed that we furnish some assistance to them in the form of military weapons.

. . . America's prewar soldiers knew, perhaps better than any others, the disillusionment of working with limited materials, and rudely fashioned, wooden substitutes for authentic weapons. Our soldiers sense the trepidation the European soldier must feel when he is on the front lines of a cold war, without the means to defend himself. Our sympathy for the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who fought side by side with us in two World Wars, would urge us to aid them again today.

But more realistic considerations—the strategy of deterring a potential aggressor for our own protection—form the backbone of the Joint Chiefs' endorsement of this arms aid.

. . . To confirm, for the American citizen, the critical examination the Joint Chiefs of Staff have given this program, I would like to outline briefly the strategy in which military assistance to these nations plays an important part for us. A sound strategic concept is built on considerations of *geographical position; industrial capacity; populations, and the will of these peoples;* all coupled with their *military capabilities.*

. . . Reports have indicated that the European Recovery Plan has already started the wheels of industrial recovery. This military assistance program may even speed up the recovery process, and further develop their industrial capacities for self-help.

The European nations of the Atlantic Pact total more than 150 million people. Their soldiers, when given guns, can man the hard core of any Western European ground defense.

Other reports encourage our belief that *their* economic recovery and the ratification of the Atlantic Pact have strengthened the will of these people to resist Communist aggression. Military aid will rebuild the morale of their armed forces, which will be inevitably reflected in their over-all national morale.

In a broad, strategic outline then, this leaves only the military capability—the fundamental ability to defend themselves—left in the balance.

These factors are the foundation of a sound strategy for *collective* defense. But *your* counselors on security, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have also looked searchingly at this program for mutual security with the necessary attitude: What does it do to improve the security of the United States?

In our approach to this arms aid program, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have followed the principle that the man in the best position, and with the capability, should do the job for which he is best suited.

Further, our recommendations for this program have been predicated upon this basic principle, and the following *assumed* factors:

First, the United States will be charged with the strategic bombing.

We have repeatedly recognized in this country that the first priority of the joint defense is our ability to deliver the atomic bomb.

Second, the United States Navy, and the Western Union naval powers, will conduct essential naval operations, including keeping the sea lanes clear. Western Union and other nations will maintain their own harbor and coastal defense.

Third, we recognize that the hard core of the ground power in being will come from Europe, aided by other nations as they can mobilize.

Fourth, England, France, and the closer countries will have the bulk of the short-range attack bombardment, and air defense. We, of course, will maintain the tactical air force for our own ground and naval forces, and United States defense.

Fifth, other nations, depending upon their proximity or remoteness from the possible scene of conflict, will emphasize appropriate specific missions.

The essence of our over-all strategy is this: There is a formidable strength, and an obvious economy of effort, resources, and manpower in this collective strategy, when each nation is capable of its own defense, as part of a collective strategic plan. For that reason, the Joint Chiefs of Staff urge the enactment of this legislation now, when it will do the most good for each of these nations as well as our own security.

. . . Finally, we all recognize that some of the nations which seek this assistance signed the Atlantic Pact with a hope that we would share our military resources, from our storehouses and our production, with those men who have staked their lives in the common cause so close to the point of possible aggression.

With our allies, strong or weak as they may be, we face a long period of tension. Now that the Atlantic Pact has been formed, we can surely anticipate that any aggressor will alternately press and quell the crises, hoping to hold the signatory powers in perpetual irresolution. But irresolution has no apology. It is born

of fear, and selfishness, and of such meanness that all despise it.

Our rise to leadership must be attended with such courage and circumstance as will ever give it first rank in the history of great actions.

Before the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations Committees, 10 August 1949:

As this Nation emerged among the victors of World War II, we were surprised and many were disillusioned to find that we could not return to the way of life we had known before.

Through crisis after crisis we have held desperately to the wishful hope that each would be the last.

We and our friends are now arrived at a moment of possible success for which we are ill prepared. Accustomed to act in desperate counter to the moves of a malignance that stalks the world, we are surprised upon feeling the initiative.

. . . But if the American people wish to exploit the advantage we have gained, we must move in vigorous consecutive action to establish a long-range plan of defense.

In the formulation of a military plan—just as in any other plan—there are certain basic ingredients that are essential. The planners must know their capabilities before they can devise a plan, but at the same time, they must know something about the plan before the men and equipment that make capabilities can be provided. This apparent dilemma is solved in our military establishment by constantly reviewing and revising our plans. There are many factors that must be considered: new weapons, new techniques, both in our own forces and in those of potential enemies, necessitate changes in plans.

In this same way, the amount and kind of aid we give our friends will to a great extent influence *their* plans.

But this endless spiral of plans and revisions must begin somewhere, and the aid that we propose is basic to the needs of any defense force. Trucks, rifles, tanks, ships, and planes are vital to any defense plan.

As spokesman for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I can assure you that every item of this aid is allocated in consonance with our own plans for defense, and is the carefully considered minimum to start the forces-in-being of these countries toward balanced, effective strength, and without affecting adversely their economic recovery.

These are the kinds of equipment, and these are the places where we might have to send them—perhaps with American troops—if war should come again.

. . . From our observations of what is being done by Western Union, we can assure you that well-laid plans *are* being prepared. The present military leaders of those countries proved during World War II that they are capable of meeting their responsibilities. We have confidence in what they are doing, and we are more confident than ever that the Western Union, the Atlantic Pact and the others considered in this Military Assistance Program can provide a more effective collective defense organization.

The Brussels Treaty Powers are the nucleus of resistance on which any North Atlantic Defense Plans must be based. *Your Joint Chiefs of Staff have examined the defense concept of the Western Union and have found that it is in accordance with our strategic thinking.*

. . . In our visit we were everywhere heartened by the strong resurgence of spirit and morale that United States aid and encouragement have fostered. The nations of Western Europe are on the uptrend. They have hope. They are working. Arms aid by adding to their strength will add to their confidence and will hasten the day when we may see a world united in striving for peace.

All of our discussions with foreign military representatives stressed the fact that the North Atlantic Pact is a pact for peace. The organization we set up under it must be based on defense planning to secure peace and lessen the possibility of aggression. We found a growing unity in planning together for peace among the European nations; but they sorely need material to give their forces strength to support that unity.

The long-range strategy of this nation cannot continue on a unilateral basis. Exhaustion of our moral and material resources would be the result. We believe that the Military Assistance Program will form the foundation for an ever-widening framework of collective defense in which the over-all strength, increasing with the growth of each of its members, will not only lessen the likelihood of war, but should preclude the crises that have plagued us for so many years.

Notes on Works of Professional Interest to Officers . . .

IF RUSSIA STRIKES*

By George Fielding Eliot

The basic strategical question for the Western World today is: Will Russia strike? The answer involves a number of complex problems, most of which are explored in this book. Major Eliot is well known as a writer who can simplify such problems for the general reader. This book is no exception. In fact, it tends occasionally toward oversimplification. On the whole, however, its conclusions seem justifiable. In his strategic analyses of possible aggressive moves, the author usually seems on firm ground.

Major Eliot carefully distinguishes between what is possible today and what may be possible later when newer weapons and means become available in usable quantities. He shows how the capabilities of Russia and her satellites, on the one hand, and those of the western nations, on the other, will undergo considerable change from 1949 to 1952. He believes that if Russia plans to invade Western Europe to prevent its economic and military recovery, she has about a year in which to decide. If the western nations felt that only an attack on Russia could forestall a devastating atomic war, Eliot believes they have about 3 years to decide.

Each of the 13 short chapters analyzes one or more important military aspects of the problem. Some chapter titles will suggest the book's scope: What Does the Kremlin Want? Why Russia May Fight Now; Balance Sheet of Power; The Kremlin's War Plans; Could Russia Take Western Europe? Could Russia Take the Middle East? Could Russia Attack the U. S.? The Submarine in Russian Strategy; Could Air Power Defeat Russia?

No one can say with certainty what Russia will or will not do. Therefore, the big question is, rather, what are the things she is capable of doing? Major Eliot's study of Russian capabilities lacks the detail of a thorough strategic analysis, but has the main ingredients of such a study. The specialist in strategic intelligence might discern important omissions in this book. But as a broad treatment, it is well worth reading.

Major Eliot believes that if she decided on such a move, the Soviet Union at this time could overrun Western Europe and the Middle East. His calculations as to Russian strategy to accomplish this are logical. The same is true of his estimate of countermeasures open to the Western Powers.

Russian planners would hardly agree entirely with the strategy Major Eliot prescribes for them. It is equally improbable that United States planners wholly concur with his suggested countermeasures. The real value of this book lies in its candid appraisal of variables and factors of a possible war in the near future.

Consideration is given to certain countries that are strategic unknowns in relation to a posible war. What they do in case of war, or what Russia does to them, can be very important. One such unknown factor is Sweden. ". . . if Sweden is hostile—and it is hard to imagine Sweden being otherwise if there is a chance of Anglo-American help reaching her in time—the Soviet high command will have to direct a major attack against Sweden at the outset of the war." Major Eliot believes this would require "an army group of 12 to 15 divisions to move through Finland against the northern frontier of Sweden coupled with an intensive attack by short-range bombers and guided missiles against Swedish industrial and communications centers and major seaports."

He believes, however, that Yugoslavia is an even more important strategic factor. "As Sweden is the X factor in northern Europe, so Yugoslavia is the X factor in the southern campaign. If Yugoslavia is definitely hostile and prepared to fight on the Allied side, which is unlikely under existing conditions but may become more likely, the Soviet high command cannot undertake a full-scale offensive through Bulgaria against Turkey until Yugoslavia has been rendered helpless to attack the flank and supply lines of this Soviet expeditionary force. This would require 25 to 30 divisions,

*New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1949 ($2.75).

to make a fairly quick job of it, and perhaps a larger force if it were possible for Yugoslavia to be quickly supported by Allied troops . . . If, as seems more likely, Yugoslavia should be neutral, a Soviet force of perhaps the stated strength would have to be in Bulgaria, plus the Bulgarian reserve divisions, to watch the Yugoslavs." If, on the other hand, Yugoslavia should be a Soviet ally, Major Eliot thinks she would be used in attacking Greece—a logical role.

The greatest military benefit which the Russians would derive from a neutral Sweden and Yugoslavia, the author believes, would be the release of many squadrons of tactical aircraft for use elsewhere. He believes Austria would be occupied by four to six divisions. Whether or not Italy would be invaded would depend largely on the status and attitude of Yugoslavia.

The key to the Middle East is Turkey. Its fall would give the Soviets access to the Mediterranean, and thus to the Persian Gulf and Israel-Suez areas. Turkey's strategic importance is summed up by Major Eliot as follows: "If Turkey can hold, Russia's oil supplies can be destroyed and Russia will be unable to get at any Middle East source of replacement. If Turkey can hold, Russia's industrial region can be wiped out by American air power using Turkish bases."

What happens, however, if Turkey is unable to withstand a Russian assault? ". . . if Turkey cannot hold, if the Turkish barrier crashes into ruin before the Soviet onset, then the whole of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and perhaps Palestine and Transjordan lie open to Soviet incursion. It may not be possible even to hold the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal. It may not be possible, in the end, to protect North African bases on which so much depends.

Israel, Pakistan, and India are discussed in terms of their respective roles in a future world conflict. The strategic importance of these new countries probably will not have occurred to many before reading this book.

The basic theme of *If Russia Strikes* is that, with the world today consisting of two families of nations, the strategy of any future world conflict inevitably would involve both families. It examines the several members of these two families and the parts they would be likely to play if war were to break out in the near future.

THE FIFTEEN DECISIVE BATTLES OF THE WORLD*

By Sir Edward S. Creasy

In the first OFFICERS' CALL, it was promised that a military classic occasionally would share this space with new books. Creasy's *Decisive Battles* is in that class of works seen more often on library shelves than in the hands of readers. Of its many editions since the original one of 1851, perhaps the handiest (and certainly most economical) is in the famous *Everyman's Library*.*

Some may question why, half way through this eventful twentieth century, a book that ends with Waterloo is considered worthy of attention by the officer of today. It is hoped that for many more the question seems unnecessary.

War has certain universal and timeless characteristics that are not affected by the most revolutionary changes in method and equipment. Creasy spans 25 centuries from Marathon to Waterloo but, from each battle study, there emerges military truths as timely as this morning's newspaper. History of this caliber is not merely an interesting excursion into the past; it also is a means of acquiring deeper perspective on our own time and its problems.

High among Creasy's merits is that of combining purely military facts with their broader historical meanings. His criterion for "decisive" battles is that a different outcome in each case would have altered materially the subsequent history of the world. Thus, for each battle, part of his attention is given to political events and issues that led to and followed the fighting. Before the reader reaches the battlefield, to become absorbed in tactics and terrain, he knows what was at stake and how an opposite verdict would have changed all later history profoundly.

Consider, for example, Creasy's choice of Valmy as a decisive battle within his definition. Most of us know more about the great political upheaval related to Valmy than we do of the battle itself. Yet Creasy demonstrates convincingly that Europe's history after 1792 literally began with the few hours of fierce battle in the Argonne forests.

The only American battle in the fifteen (Saratoga) naturally has particular interest for Americans. But seven of Creasy's battles occurred on or near the scenes of fighting by Americans in World War II. For officers who saw action in Europe, his descriptions are bound to have special meaning and to evoke poignant memories not shared by the general reader.

*New York—E. P. Dutton & Co.

PRO & CON

Letters from the field

Anonymous letters will not be considered for publication. And since we cannot reply to them, they serve no useful purpose. (See ***Pro and Con,*** *Officers' Call No. 1. The correct address now is Troop I & E Division, Office of the Chief of Staff, Department of the Army.)*

GENTLEMEN:

I have just had the opportunity to read a borrowed copy of . . . OFFICERS' CALL. You are to be congratulated . . . and I wish you great success in this worthy program . . .

REAR ADMIRAL, U. S. COAST GUARD

GENTLEMEN:

It is recommended that there be included in . . . OFFICERS' CALL . . . a discussion or an explanation of the funding of Army activities, particularly in its impact upon the individual officer.

. . . Answers to questions such as the following should be given: "Why can't the rental allowance we lose each month be put into improvements in our temporary or substandard quarters?"; "Does anybody know what percentage of the annual Army appropriation is returned to the Treasury?".

. . . There is no doubt that a lively discussion period can be started on such a subject.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL, U. S. ARMY

● *This sort of letter is both encouraging and helpful to us. It is encouraging because it is indicative of keen interest in* OFFICERS' CALL; *helpful because it suggests a profitable subject for a future talk.—Ed.*

The following was included in an official letter from Headquarters, European Command:

The *Stars and Stripes* has five bookstores handling 445 titles . . . It is suggested that a list of books to be reviewed in OFFICERS' CALL be forwarded to this office at least six weeks before publication . . . *Stars and Stripes* has now or had on its stands the books reviewed in the first three issues of OFFICERS' CALL. 1,988 copies of "Speaking Frankly" were sold and only 12 copies remain on hand. This book was on the stands over one year ago. A reorder is being made.

● *We are gratified by this tangible evidence of interest in the Books page. Upon approval for publication of each* OFFICERS' CALL EUCOM *will be notified of the titles to be reviewed. We will gladly furnish the same advance information to other major commands requesting it.*

In selecting books for review, we always consider whether they are likely to be available in Army or public libraries, or through rental libraries. We hope most officers will be able to read them at no personal expense. While we are not interested in retail book sales as such, we are glad to help Stars and Stripes or any other agency that seeks to make worthwhile reading available to officers.—Ed.

GENTLEMEN:

It is this officer's conviction . . . that the Officers' Information Program, if successfully executed, will perform the dual mission of informing officers and of contributing to the effective implementation of the Troop Information and Education Program . . .

CAPTAIN, TC

● *We agree that* OFFICER'S CALL should be expected to *foster among all officers a better understanding of the basic aims of the Troop Information and Education Program. Attendance at officer information periods will enable officers who conduct the talks for troops to observe discussion techniques from the viewpoint of participants as well as discussion leaders.—Ed.*



Notes for the Discussion Leader

1. Points to be stressed. Choice of discussion method always depends in part on whether it will facilitate consideration of all the salient points. Regarding the present subject, these are as follows—

a. The Army has a vital role in future warfare.

b. The exact nature of the Army's combat missions in future war would be determined in part by *when, where,* and *how* the aggressor might strike.

c. Plans for the security of the United States must be based realistically on the capabilities of a potential aggressor, or coalition of aggressors, to threaten us.

d. The Army's strategic plans must be coordinated with those of the Navy and Air Force. The balanced effort of these three Forces forms the "cutting edge" of our national power.

e. Our Nation is committed to the principle of collective security—our own security plans are integrated with and dependent upon those of our Allies.

f. Nothing in the world situation today, and no weapon now known, alters the basic nature of ground conflict, or lessens the likelihood that future war would involve ground fighting on a large scale.

g. New weapons and techniques may alter *how* the Army does its job, but *what* the Army would be required to do in a future war probably would not differ greatly from its past role.

2. Suggested discussion questions.

a. In view of the points stressed in this OFFICERS' CALL, are there any Army training policies or practices which you feel may be outmoded?

b. Bearing in mind budgetary and other limiting factors, what do you feel the Army might do (in addition to Arctic test exercises, research-development projects, field maneuvers, revision of school curricula, etc.) to ready itself for any war in the future?

c. Nonmilitary spokesmen sometimes accuse the Army of "preparing for the last war." Do you believe that this OFFICERS' CALL dwells on the past to a degree that hampers constructive thinking about the future?

d. How often do you think discussion of the Army's combat role should be repeated? What are some possible developments that would lead to important changes in our thinking about the Army's role in future war?

e. Do you feel that this OFFICERS' CALL minimizes (or exaggerates) the importance of any weapon (atom bomb, tank, recoilless weapon) or any of the Armed Services?

f. Are there any major points in this OFFICERS' CALL with which you disagree? If so, why?

g. Has any factor of the Army's future combat role been ignored in this discussion? If so, what?

It is a great temptation, in writing of the possible course of a future war, to give free rein to the imagination and conjure up spectacles on the order of H. G. Wells' WAR BETWEEN THE WORLDS. It is much easier, and much more sensational, to write of ocean-spanning rockets carrying atomic warheads, and the loosing of hitherto unknown bacteria which will depopulate New York in a matter of hours, than to deal with such prosaic matters as the fuel consumption of existing airplanes or the tonnage capacity of merchant ships. Yet it is on such calculations that the conduct of war depends, and any war of the immediate future will be fought with weapons and by methods with which the last war, in general, has made us sadly familiar.——From the Introduction to IF RUSSIA STRIKES by George Fielding Eliot.

Officers' CALL

VOLUME I *Your Training Job* NUMBER SIX

CORRECTION

THIS DOCUMENT

HAS BEEN REPHOTOGRAPHED

TO ASSURE LEGIBILITY

SRS - GHQ - SCAP

ROUTING SLIP

Date DEC 12 1949
M/C Log No. #7

To	Initial		For	
Chief	2	JOL	Action	
Deputy Chief			Comment/Concur	
Exec Off	I	V	Note-Return	
Admin	4	ahm	Dispatch	
Personnel			Info	
Library Div			File	4
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Gen Aff Div			Signature	
Pol-Soc Aff Div			Suspense Slip	
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Remarks:

Cpl. Elwood 3 Us

(Adm. #2 - Revised 12 Sep 49)

REPORT to the ARMY

Washington, D. C. 15 November 1949 Vol. I, No. 16

SUMMER TRAINING--1950 In view of excellent results obtained by training ORC, both as units and individuals, with NG and RA, this method will be used where appropriate in future training. As dictated by economy and efficiency, training sites frequently will be used by both NG and ORC, successive increments of troops using the same facilities in many instances.

National Guard--Summer training will be held from 1 June to 15 Sept. All division units will be assembled at the same place and time, unless separate training is necessary for tank and AAA units for firing of primary weapons. All division tank units will train in the field concurrently with the division at least twice every three years, and all AAA units at least once every three years. The 3-year schedule of field training as prescribed will be completed by the end of the 1951 field training season.

It is desirable that non-divisional units receive the maximum of coordination and supervision, but in order to avoid excessive training burdens on divisions, State AGs and SAIs are encouraged to set up training headquarters for non-divisional units. RA demonstrations and instruction teams will be used, but efforts will be made to develop the Guard's own capacity to perform these functions.

Organized Reserve Corps--Summer training dates, both in the field and locally, will be from 1 May to 15 Sept. Army commanders will prepare training programs, based on state of training of units. ORC commanders and their staffs should be used to the maximum in preparation of programs for their units. RA teams will be used, where available, for demonstrations and instruction, and for logistical support.

In the selection of units to receive training, certain small and highly specialized units will not be sent to training areas. It is regarded as unprofitable to send units with no EM assigned, or of platoon size or larger with less than 15 men present. Within the limits of available funds, units will be selected with first priority to 18-25 Division Program units, including (a) Class A units fully organized (80% officers, 40% EM), (b) Class A units temporarily below 80-40 strength, (c) Class B units. Second priority will be given to (a) Other Class A units, (b) Other Class B units.

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"TIME FOR DEFENSE" New half-hour radio series, "Time for Defense," had its first broadcast Tuesday, 25 October, at 10:00 P.M. over the ABC network. SecDef Louis Johnson spoke. William Frye, Director of the Office of Public Information, D/D, will comment each week on D/D developments and accomplishments in national security. Documentaries, live or recorded on spot, dramatizing activities of servicemen, and Armed Forces musical organizations will be presented weekly.

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WW I HISTORY Vol. IV, "The U. S. Army in the World War, 1917-1919," will be published 25 Nov. Available at GPO, $3.75. Title: "Early Military Operations of the American Expeditionary Forces."

POLICY BOARD Following are the newly appointed members of the Civilian Components Policy Board, charged with developing, coordinating and issuing policies and programs for the Civilian Components of all the Armed Forces: William T. Faricy, chairman; Col. Luke W. Finlay, ORC, executive officer; ARMY: Karl R. Bendetsen, Special Assistant to Sec-Army; Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, USA; Maj. Gen. Leo M. Kreber, NGUS; Maj. Gen. Norman E. Hendrickson, NGUS; Maj. Gen. Julius O. Adler, ORC; and Brig. Gen. Hugh M. Milton, ORC; NAVY: Dan A. Kimball, Under Sec-Navy; Rear Adm. Frank Watkins, USN; Rear Adm. I. M. McQuiston, USNR (Air); Capt. George Parkinson, USNR; Col. Melvin J. Maas, USMCR (Air); and Col. C. H. Cox, USMCR; AIR FORCE: Harold C. Stuart, Special Consultant to Sec-AF; Maj. Gen. Victor E. Bertrandias, USAFR; Brig. Gen. John P. McConnell, USAF; Brig. Gen. Errol H. Zistel, ANGUS; Brig. Gen. Thomas O. Hardin, USAFR; and Col. Oliver H. Stout, ANGUS.

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NEW PAY ACT, 1949 The Career Compensation Act of 1949 became effective 1 Oct. '49, following passage by both Houses of Congress and signature by the President. Wide publicity has been given the new pay measure, but for those who want a detailed discussion of the Act, Armed Forces Talk No. 297, titled "The New Pay Act, 1949," is available from Government Printing Office for 5 cents per copy.

—

PROCUREMENT OF SECOND LIEUTENANTS, RA The directive covering appointment as Second Lieutenants, RA, for individuals having one year of commissioned wartime service and possessing a degree from an accredited college (D/A Cir. 382, '48) expired on 30 June '49. Since that date, numerous applications for appointment have been received from men who have now completed the required schooling. In order to procure these individuals and others who will complete their schooling during the current school year, this program has been extended until 1 Oct. '50.

—

NG PHYSICALS National Guard unit commanders are requesting help from local physicians when physical examination bottlenecks develop as a result of the influx of new recruits during the enlistment drive. The American Medical Association and State medical groups have asked their members to give their cooperation to the National Guard.

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WAC EXTENSION COURSES The AG School, Camp Lee, Va., has been designated as the agency for administering WAC Extension Courses, and the 10 through 60 series of these courses are now available. D/A Pamphlet 20-100, "Announcement of Army Extension Courses," for the school years '49-'50 and '50-'51 will be distributed about 1 Dec.

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EQUIPMENT POLICY PANEL The Army Equipment Policy Panel, in recess since 12 Aug., reconvened 17 Oct. at Fort Monroe, with ten newly appointed members, under the chairmanship of Lt.Gen. John R. Hodge, V Corps Commanding General.

The Panel will continue its review of Army equipment policies in order to provide maximum defense within the limits of peacetime appropriations and to keep mobilization demands within the industrial capacity of the nation.

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Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, advises that Army Special Regulations no longer will be stocked for sale.

75-MM. RECOILLESS RIFLE

Army Field Forces will test two types of subcaliber cartridges for the 75-mm. recoilless rifle, to be used with the weapon in training. This type of cartridge would provide practice in loading and operation with a standard-size round, and at the same time give marksmanship training at the lesser cost of subcaliber ammunition.

Light enough to be transported by two men, the recoilless design of the weapon plus its low weight (110 lbs.) allow firing from a standard .30-cal. machine-gun mount. (U.S. Army Photo.)

—

INACTIVE DUTY PAY D/A announces that payment of Civilian Component personnel for inactive duty training will not be made according to new pay system for regular establishment, effective since 1 July. Currently prescribed methods of payment will continue.

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AIRBORNE FIELD ARTILLERY In demonstration at Ft. Bragg on 4 Oct., Battery C, 376th Airborne Field Artillery, made an air drop of 150 soldiers, 4 completely assembled 105-mm. Howitzers, and 4 jeeps. Men carried complete individual equipment. A few minutes after leaving aircraft, unit was established in tactical firing positions.

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C&GSC QUOTAS D/A has announced a quota of 140 Reserve officers, 50 National Guard officers and 10 Reserve or National Guard officers on extended active duty for the Associate Course at the Command and General Staff College, which begins in Jan. '50. Quota spaces for which firm applications are not on file in the Office, Chief, Army Field Forces, by 21 Nov. '49 will be offered to ZI Army commanders for assignment to Reserve Component and Regular officers on active duty in those commands.

—

NEW MEDICAL-DENTAL PLAN D/A has adopted, after tests, a new plan under which it is believed fewer physicians and dentists will be ordered to Active Duty with Army medical units until those units are ready to move into a theater of operations. This should allow each doctor to remain in active practice in his community until the Army has an actual need for his services with troops in combat.

Hospital personnel are now divided into two groups, administrative and professional, the latter to be known as the professional complement, and to be made up of physicians, dentists, nurses and other specialists. Not only will the professional complement not join the unit until their services actually are required, but they may be moved to another theater or another area when need for their services with the original unit has ended.

Applicable principally to wartime operation of hospital units, it is planned that all field-type Army hospitals eventually will be organized according to this new plan.

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Standards and procedures for enlistment and reenlistment in the Enlisted Reserve Corps are given in SR 140-107-1, 20 Oct. '49.

UNANSWERED COMMUNICATIONS Failure of Reserve officers to reply in a reasonable length of time to official communications requiring answer may result in transfer from the Active to the Inactive Reserve for a 1-year period of grace, during which time they may justify their failure to reply. If already in the Inactive Reserve, a 1-year period of grace is also granted. Those who do not justify failure to reply to official correspondence will be discharged from their ORC commissions at the expiration of the grace period, except that those eligible for the Honorary Reserve may request transfer thereto. (Full details in SR 140-175-1, ORC, Officer Separations, 24 Oct. '49.)

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NEW TRAINING AID Army Field Forces will test new marksmanship training aid which appears to overcome many disadvantages of present system of making triangles in preliminary rifle marksmanship. Where the present system requires an assistant to move the bullseye spotter and mark the point of sight alignment, the new device uses a mirror which permits the individual receiving instruction to move the spotter as he sights the rifle. When the trainee is satisfied with the alignment, he marks the center of the bullseye himself. With the assistant eliminated, poor triangles are clearly the fault of the trainee.

—

WHAT'S NEW? Production has started on new radiation detection device for use by military and civilian defense organizations. Light-weight, compact, with standardized parts, it is suitable to combat use. Less sensitive than Geiger counter, it is designed to measure relatively large concentrations of radiation such as caused by atomic bomb. Makes possible immediate determination by trained survey teams of areas safe for human beings.

—

JA SCHOOL, ORC JA Reserve member states Fifth Army school for JAG Reservists preceded Third Army school (see "The Report" Vol. I, No. 12). Class opened in July '49 and trained 49 Reserve officers in one month.

VOL. I, NO. 16 - 15 NOVEMBER 1949

REPORT TO THE ARMY

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DISTRIBUTION:

Regular Army, same as Dept. of the Army Circulars (Z I only)
National Guard and ORC, Special.

☆GPO 0 - 851753

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ROUTING SLIP

Date DEC 28 1949

M/C Log No. 22

To	Initial	For	
Chief	2	~~Action~~	
Deputy Chief		Comment/Concur	
Exec Off		Note-Return	
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Personnel		Info	
Library Div		File	3
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Gen Aff Div		Signature	
Pol-Soc Aff Div		Suspense Slip	
Economic Liv		To Library	

Remarks:

(Adm. #2 - Revised 12 Sep 49)

REPORT to the ARMY

Washington, D. C. 1 December 1949 Vol. I, No. 17

OFFICERS WANTED FOR AD TOURS The third logistical training exercise will be held next May at Ft. Belvoir. Called "Log Ex 50," this exercise will last about one week, will have for the first time the participation of the administrative services, and will employ from 1500 to 2000 persons. Planning requires Reserve officers of all grades to be called to active duty for periods of two weeks to ninety days. Type of services desired: Writing the problem, planning administration, actual conduct of the exercise, and to a limited extent participation as players. Interested officers should write through ORC channels to the Maneuver Director of Logistical Exercise, Fort Belvoir, Virginia. State length of AD tour desired, and enclose a statement of service including present Reserve assignment.

—

CHEMICAL CORPS SHORT TOURS Qualified Chemical Corps Reserve officers are needed for 60- and 90-day tours of active duty to help in preparing extension courses, field manuals, and related publications for the Chemical Corps School at Army Chemical Center, Md.

Requirements are aptitude for writing and ability in one of the following MOS fields: Chemical Mortar Battalion Commander (1413); Procurement Officer (4320); Chemical Research Engineer (7310); Chemical Munitions Inspector (7321); Chemical Munitions Development Officer (7360); Chemical Officer (Graduate of C&GSC—7314); and Publications Editor (5420).

Applications on D/A AGO Form 1058, available from SAIs or from Army installations, should be sent through ORC channels to Hq, Second Army, Fort George Meade, Md., Attn: AIAA 6-c. Application must include resume of civilian and military experience which would qualify the officer for such tours.

—

WAC PROCUREMENT D/A is in process of publishing a program to commission outstanding women college graduates as Second Lieutenants in the WAC Section, ORC. RA appointments will be tendered to selected individuals who complete a basic officers course at Camp Lee, Va. Prior military training is not required to establish eligibility under this program.

In promoting this program, the presently established contacts between Professors of Military Science and Tactics and college presidents will be utilized. However, other colleges are invited and encouraged to participate.

A representative of D/A and designated representatives of the Army CGs will contact colleges in the Army areas in the near future.

—

NG TECHNICAL WAIVERS The time limits on many outstanding technical waivers granted Army Guard officers at the time of Federal recognition are expiring currently. At expiration, these officers will be ordered before examining boards. Boards will take the following action: 1. Recommend retirement of waiver; 2. Prescribe a new scope for the waiver including a recommendation for time extension of not more than one year; or 3. Recommend withdrawal of Federal recognition.



(Official Department of Defense Photo)

PRESENTATION

President Truman (Col.,FA-Res.) on 9 Nov. received the first of more than half a million new identification cards which will be issued to officers and EM of ORC. Sec-Def Louis Johnson (Lt. Col., Inf.-Res.) made the presentation and himself received Card No. 2.

Brig. Gen. Wendell Westover, Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs, then gave other cards to the President, who presented them to distinguished Reserve officer members of his Cabinet, the White House Staff and D/A.

—

POINTS-HOURS-CREDITS In computing retention-retirement points, it should be remembered that the term points (as used in SR 140-180-5) and the term credits (as used in the Extension Course Program) are not synonymous.

The number of credits allowed for Extension Courses is based upon the number of hours of work an average student would require successfully to complete the course. Thus, if the average student is estimated to need 15 hours of work to complete a certain course, that course would be rated at 15 credits.

Extension Course credits in effect are equivalent to rated hours of work.

SR 140-180-5 requires three rated hours satisfactorily completed for one retention-retirement point, hence Extension Course credits earned must be divided by three in order to convert them to retirement-retention points.

—

POINTS NOT LOST An ORC officer asks what happens to the retirement-retention points earned during a year when the Reservist fails to attain the minimum 50 points required for a satisfactory year.

In the determination of years on which retirement pay is computed, credit of one day will be given for each point earned by the Reservist, and all points (days) credited will be converted into years and fractions on the basis of 360 days as provided in pars. 1c and 1e, SR 135-260-1, 17 March 1949.

—

NG TEMPORARY TRANSFERS NGB states that Guard officers enrolled in civilian schools away from home localities may be attached to other NG units within the same State for drill purposes during the academic year if the following conditions are met: 1. The officer's formal education was interrupted by active service in the Armed Forces during WW II; 2. He is enrolled in a recognized civilian institution of higher learning in order to complete this education; 3. Approval of the Chief, NGB, is obtained in each case.

—

INCOME TAX DEDUCTIONS Any member of a Reserve component who attends a paid drill period away from home, and who, by virtue of the distance involved, must remain away from home overnight, may deduct travel, food, and lodging expenses when computing for Federal Income Tax Returns. Bureau of Internal Revenue emphasizes that compensation must be received for drill, and that the time spent must be overnight.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS From time to time this publication will print brief items on the organization and functions of each of the General Staff Divisions, Department of the Army. Following is the first of the series:

The Personnel and Administration Division corresponds in part to the former G-1, War Department General Staff. Its mission is to plan, direct, coordinate, and supervise the procurement, allocation, separation, and administrative management of military personnel, and to advise and assist the Chief of Staff on administrative matters.

The various functions of this Division include direction and control of the Administrative services, supervision of Army administration, personnel procurement, career management, discipline, morale and welfare, personnel management, safety, and separations. These functions are implemented by four major subdivisions: the Career Management Group, the Manpower Control Group, the Military Personnel Management Group, and the Civilian Components Group.

Career Management performs such functions as: a. Implementing the career management program for officers and warrant officers, a program designed to increase the capabilities of individuals by logical, varied assignments and military and civilian education; b. Effecting world-wide assignment, transfer, detail, and separation of officers; and c. Reviewing periodically the records of all officers.

Manpower Control performs such functions as: a. Computing and analyzing resources and correlating resources and requirements for military personnel; b. Establishing procurement quotas, and (in coordination with other Staff Divisions) allocating and controlling the distribution of personnel to meet requirements; c. Formulating policies and procedures (except in training matters) for the conversion of individuals from civilian to active duty military status, or from enlisted status to active duty warrant or commissioned status.

Military Personnel Management prepares and formulates policies, procedures, and programs for the management of military personnel while they are members of the Army. This includes such items as discipline, physical and mental testing, tours of duty, pay, leave, uniforms, decorations, promotion, demotion, retirement, and discharge.

Civilian Components, only recently made a Group, is responsible for the development of plans and policies concerning personnel and administrative matters of the civilian components when NOT on extended active duty.

—

MP TRAINING FILM A new D/A training film, TF 19-1563, entitled "Collection and Preservation of Evidence," is now available from Signal Corps libraries. First part of film shows CID investigators collecting and preserving evidence in homicide case. Second part shows how collected evidence is evaluated, how witnesses are questioned, and how solution of crime depends on correct collection, marking, and preservation of evidence. Film is considered one of best yet produced for Corps of Military Police.

—

NG STAFF PROGRAMS NGTP 7-15S, Training Program for National Guard Infantry Battalion and Regimental Staffs, is being distributed from The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. Similar programs for Field Artillery, Armored, AAA, Engineer, Ordnance units will follow, and distribution is expected to be completed by 1 July '50.

—

POLICY BOARD In the Report's 15 Nov. item on the Civilian Components Policy Board, Mr. Harold C. Stuart was listed as Special Consultant to the Secretary of the Air Force. He is the Asst. Secretary of the Air Force.

PERTINENT QUOTE "The success of our Army--and the success of our Nation--is a reflection of the sum of our individual successes. I am confident that an Army of strong individuals, held together by a sound discipline based on respect for personal initiative and rights and dignity of the individual, will never fail this nation in time of need. I am equally confident that a nation of strong individuals--which holds that its national objectives exist only to give life and meaning to individual objectives--will always produce that type of Army."
--Gen. J. LAWTON COLLINS, Chief of Staff.

—

GUARD RECRUITING At the end of seven weeks in the two-month National Guard recruiting campaign, 33,559 new recruits had joined the Guard. NG total strength had risen to the greatest in its history, 383,143 officers and men in active, Federally recognized units. Army Guard strength was 339,403. Army Guard strength goal for Fiscal Year '50 is 350,000.

—

MORE INFORMATION TO ORC The circulation of the Army Information Digest, a 64-page magazine containing articles of current interest to Army personnel, has been increased to allow wider distribution to the ORC. Additional copies will be sent to ZI Armies for distribution to ORC units. This publication also can be bought from GPO, 15¢ per copy, $1.50 per year in US, and $2.00 foreign.

—

ARMY REGISTER Completely rewritten and consisting of 2 volumes, the Official Army Register of 1949 is available at GPO for $2.00. First volume contains a list of RA officer personnel, general officers, Army pay tables, and other information. Second volume contains an officers' honorary retired list.

—

GPO PUBLICATIONS The Report often carries items about publications for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. As in the past, we will state only "For sale at GPO," but address is as above. Checks should be made payable to The Superintendent of Documents.

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VOL. I, NO. 17 - 1 DECEMBER 1949

DISTRIBUTION:
Regular Army, same as Dept. of the Army Circulars (Z I only)
National Guard and ORC, Special.

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

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Date JAN 5 1950

M/C Log No. 10

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Statistics			Initials	
Gen Aff Div			Signature	
Pol-Soc Aff Div			Suspense Slip	
Economic Div			To Library	

Remarks:

(Adm. #2 - Revised 12 Sep 49)

REPORT to the ARMY

Washington, D.C. 15 December 1949 Vol. I, No. 18

MERRY CHRISTMAS

As the Acting Chief of Information, it is my duty to see that Army personnel are kept aware of the latest developments within the Department of the Army. With "Report To The Army" we have endeavored to keep the Regular Army and its Civilian Components so informed, thereby fostering a more complete understanding of, and respect for, the problems faced by each other.

As "Report To The Army" approaches the end of its first year, I should like to take this opportunity to express my sincere hope that our mission of keeping you informed has been successful. May I also, in this last issue of 1949, extend to you my best wishes for a very Merry Christmas and a Happy and successful New Year.

F. L. Parks

F. L. PARKS
Major General, U.S. Army

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT, ORC New regulations provide peace-time training to insure optimum use in war-time of officers qualified to engage in research and development activities. In those Military Districts where at least ten Reserve officers, professionally qualified for the work, desire establishment of R&D unit, the Chief of that District will recommend same to DA. In a District where unit is already established, applications will be made to the unit's commander. In all cases, DA will give final approval. Qualifications include: at least a Bachelor's degree from accredited institution, and qualification to engage in a professional capacity in research and/or development. DA can waive requirements if background and experience warrant. Subject to review by using agency, mobilization assignments will be made on basis of training in this field. (Ref.: SR 140-190-2, dated 14 Nov. '49.)

—

CONSOLIDATED MEDICAL JOURNAL Sec-Def Louis Johnson recently announced a consolidation of all Armed Forces professional medical publications into a single monthly publication, "The U.S. Armed Forces Medical Journal." Its supplement, "The Medical Technicians Bulletin," will be published bi-monthly. A representative from each Service will be on the editorial staff. First issue due in January '50.

AGO 1-11-Dec. 851754 - O - 49

CHEMICAL COURSES Three Chemical Indoctrination Courses for Reserve Component officers will be given at the Chemical Corps School, Army Chemical Center, Md., 5-16 June, 19-30 June, 10-21 July '50. Limit for each class will be 100 officers. Purpose of the course is to orient ORC and NG officers in the latest developments and techniques in Chemical Corps matters, including radiological defense.

Applicants must be Chemical Corps officers in the Active Reserve or National Guard. Officers who already have completed a Chemical Indoctrination Course are not eligible. Send applications to unit instructor, who will forward same through channels to appropriate Army headquarters.

—

NEW GRID REFERENCING SYSTEM The Joint Intelligence Committee has resolved the problem of a common grid referencing system for large-scale maps. To the user the system will appear similar to that in general use during the past war, but it is based on the Universal Transverse Mercator Grid System (UTM). This system will be the standard large-scale referencing system used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force in most joint operations. A discussion of the theory is contained in Army Map Service TM-19, and a description of the referencing system can be found in Army Map Service TM-36 (now under preparation). References by latitude and longitude will be used in joint operations where small-scale maps are involved.

—

DISCUSSION LEADERS COURSE A total of 176 officers and enlisted men successfully completed pilot runs of a Troop Information and Education Discussion Leaders Course held in October and November at Fort Knox and Camp Campbell, Ky., and Fort Meade, Md.

The 40-hour course is intended to provide better qualified discussion leaders for Army units and so improve the value of the I&E program.

Following revision of the course based on results of the test runs, the course has been sent to all ZI Armies for nation-wide implementation.

—

SERVICE NUMBERS The Army has discontinued use of term "serial number" and has substituted in its place "service number." This brings all three services into conformity in this respect. The Navy has used "service number" for many years, and the Air Force recently adopted the same term.

The Army also has eliminated use of the abbreviations NMI (no middle initial) and IO (initials only) to indicate lack of or use of initial or initials.

—

NG IDENTIFICATION CARDS In response to inquiries about the new identification cards for National Guardsmen, NGB states that a new NG regulation on the subject is being prepared and will be distributed soon. The regulation will govern procurement, preparation, issue, accounting, and disposition of the cards for NG. NGB will make automatic distribution of the blank cards at the appropriate time. It is believed preparation and issue of the cards by the States will begin early in 1950.

—

CONTACT CAMP, ORC A two-day Contact Camp was held at Ft. Bragg, 29-30 Oct. About 200 Reserve officers attended....were given demonstrations of Field Artillery equipment, Signal equipment, self-propelled artillery, the recoilless rifle, and radar. Medics were given practical training in field hospital tents furnished with field equipment. Participants were from V Corps and North Carolina Military District.

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS Following is the second of the stories on organization and functions of the General Staff Divisions in the Department of the Army:

The Intelligence Division is the former G-2, War Department General Staff. Its present mission is in part to provide for the collection and evaluation of information; the production and dissemination of intelligence pertaining to the war potential, topography, military forces, and military activities of foreign countries and the strategic vulnerability of the continental United States.

Its organization, under the Director, consists of three major groups: the Administrative and Liaison Group, the Intelligence Group, and the Security and Training Group; and two field agencies, the Army Security Agency and the Counter Intelligence Corps.

The major functions of this Division are: 1. To collect information and produce intelligence to meet the requirements and responsibilities of the Army. 2. To formulate, promulgate, and supervise counterintelligence programs, establish counter-measures against efforts to gain unauthorized access to classified information; and to initiate, control, review, and recommend final action on certain types of security investigations of military and civilian personnel, pertaining to the Army. 3. To promulgate and interpret policy on the disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and their nationals, the U.S. Government, nongovernmental agencies, industry, and private individuals; and to monitor the release of classified information to foreign governments. 4. To represent the Army on intelligence and counterintelligence matters with other government agencies and foreign governments. 5. To supervise Army requirements for maps, mapping, aerial photography, terrain models, and related activities; to develop and coordinate programs; and monitor the performances of service agencies in these fields. 6. To prepare plans and policies for military intelligence and counterintelligence training. 7. To operate the Army Military Attache System, including the Strategic Intelligence School. 8. To exercise supervision over personnel of the Military Intelligence Reserve and Army Security Reserve. 9. To perform the Army cryptologic activities utilizing the Army Security Agency. 10. To provide the official channel of liaison between the Army and foreign military representatives in the US. 11. To formulate and recommend plans and policies for the Counter Intelligence Corps, and operate the Counterintelligence Center and School. (Ref.: SR 10-120-1, 14 Sept '49)

—

MEDICAL RESERVE PROBLEMS In a preliminary effort to locate and correct deficiencies in the Armed Forces Medical Reserve Program, a special task force, appointed by the Chairman of the Armed Forces Medical Advisory Committee (AFMAC), has begun hearings. About 1 January '50, findings of the task force will be transmitted to the AFMAC for recommending specific measures to Sec-Def. Proposals involving changes will be coordinated with the Civilian Components Policy Board (responsible for over-all program of Reserve affairs) and the Office of Medical Services.

—

NG COMBAT UNITS Major combat units of the National Guard are approaching full organization status. Fully organized are 18 of the 27 divisions, 15 of the 20 infantry regimental combat teams, and 59 of the 98 separate AA battalions in the Guard troop basis. Only 53 units remain to be organized to complete the 27 divisions and only 12 units are needed to complete the 20 regimental combat teams.

PERTINENT QUOTE--"It is only through a sound, effective integration of our military and other national policies that we can maintain the posture necessary to keep peace in the world. If, by our strength, we can discourage aggression long enough; and if, during that uneasy period, we can throw our entire weight and idealism into the effort to develop an effective organization for world peace, we may approach the goal that man has sought so long: unarmed settlement of differences between nations."--Sec-Army GORDON GRAY.

—

GUARD DRIVE ENDS The ninth and final week of the National Guard's nation-wide recruiting drive brought the Guard's strength to 391,165, of which 347,387 were in Army units. The drive netted a total of 45,196 new Guard members. Authorization has been granted several States to continue recruiting until the budgetary strength is reached.

—

FOOD SERVICE COURSE A short Food Service Course for the Civilian Components has been proposed by the Chief, Army Field Forces. Designed to prepare officers of the ORC and NG for general food service duties, the proposed 80-hour course would provide material assistance in the discharge of summer encampment food service responsibilities. Prerequisite would be successful completion of the Army Extension Course, "Mess Management," and the course would be limited to officers and warrant officers not on AD. Proposal now in hands of Army commanders for comments.

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ADDRESS CHANGES, ORC The Editor of "The Report" still receives many notifications of changes of address and many copies of "The Report" being returned for correct addresses. In the case of ORC members, both the change notifications and returned copies are sent at once to your State SAI for correction and/or re-mailing. PLEASE notify your Senior Army Instructor, not this publication, of any changes of address. This will save time and trouble, and will be in accord with regulations.

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Officers' CALL



Problems of the Army

Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

VOLUME I — NUMBER TWO

CONTENTS

Distribution: One per Army officer on active duty.



We're in This Together

Our first discussion covered the Army's broad three-fold mission and the ten major tasks arising from that mission. It also stated that early in this program we would present a picture of the problems that cross the desks of the General Staff from day to day.*

In this issue, we will try to give such a picture. First, however, it might be well to distinguish between the ten clear-cut tasks *discussed earlier, and the* problems *faced in carrying them out. An assigned task in itself may be relatively simple, but the circumstances under which it is accomplished may create many difficulties.*

Officers throughout the Army encounter their own problems, great and small, in carrying out their own tasks; for the most part, however, these local problems are but part and parcel of the broad perplexities that confront the Army as a whole.

The good leader does not seek a scapegoat when things do not exactly suit him. Neither does he regard the difficulties inherent in his work with the attitude: "This has been brought about by the oversight of someone up the line; if they knew what we're up against, this wouldn't be required of us." Nevertheless, each of us finds it helpful at times to have the larger view of his problems pointed out to him.

With this in mind, we have attempted, in what follows, to portray some of the major problems of the Army as seen by the General Staff, and explain some of their background causes.

Note. The picture at left symbolizes the Army's sharp reduction in strength after VJ-day. Rapid demobilization left the Army with many problems, some of which are still with us today.

* *Officers' Call,* Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 6–8.

PROBLEMS OF THE ARMY

The Aftermath of Victory

Since VJ-day the United States Army has had a bad case of the "bends." From a prewar strength of only 175,000 soldiers, it grew in 5 years to an all-time high of 6 million. Then in a headlong demobilization, it shrank even more rapidly to less than 540,000.

This accordion action, with its accompanying pressure and counterpressure, has given the Army 3 postwar years of intensified problems. In order to interpret properly the plans and decisions being made today, it is necessary to review briefly these postwar years. One can then see current Army problems in their true perspective.

The contraction of the Army after 1945 to a "peacetime" strength was precipitate. The demobilization of the world's greatest fighting team—our Army, Navy, and Air Force—was not an orderly, unemotional process. Across the Nation there rose a cry: "The war is over, and I want my boy home!" Foreseeing the inevitable consequences, the Army nevertheless yielded to the overwhelming demands of public opinion. Under pressure of this popular mandate for quick return of the fighting men, ordinary problems of demobilization were multiplied many times over. Shipping was diverted to bringing the men home. Supplies were left unguarded and uncared for in the fields, and on the docks. There were simply no men left to take care of them. The too-rapid demobilization increased the services' administrative burden tremendously.

At the same time, other demands on the Army were not proportionately decreased. It was thrust quickly into occupation jobs in Japan, Korea, Trieste, Austria, and Germany, plus the task of assisting in the rehabilitation of non-enemy countries.

All of these things created within the Army additional planning, equipment, and manpower problems that were staggering. The Army truly suffered a bad case of postwar "bends."

Review of the Situation:
Background to Current Army Problems

The story begins in 1945, when we had an Army, and thought that we had peace. By the end of World War II, the Army (excluding the Air Force) had 89

combat divisions comprising 9 field armies, which, with their thousands of supporting units, totaled approximately 6 million men.

These forces were equipped with the best and most modern equipment of any army in the world. Research and development were continuing to provide many new weapons—better tanks, rocket missiles, recoilless guns—and many items of clothing and equipment to make the soldier's life more bearable. Still more of these were in the planning stage, and on the drawing boards.

Then came VE-day and VJ-day. Most of our trained manpower was released and huge quantities of equipment went into war surplus sales. We didn't dismantle the Army; we wrecked it.

Uppermost in the minds of the American people was the idea that the war was won and there was no enemy in sight capable of precipitating another war. The primary consideration was to get the men home and out of uniform.

The supply situation was affected immediately. Hundreds of units in Europe and in the Pacific simply drove their vehicles into huge parking fields, turned off the motors, and left them. We didn't have the guards to protect the equipment, nor did we have the trained personnel to use the huge stores of supplies properly as salvage. Still other quantities of supplies were turned over to friendly governments.

On the homefront, civilian shortages produced an immediate demand for surplusing our stocks. Many of the items that could fit into the civilian economy—trucks, engineering equipment, work clothing—were sold through the War Assets Administration.

Why Did We Demobilize So Rapidly?

Why did all this happen? Regrettable as it may be in the light of present conditions, there are understandable reasons why our people chose this course.

In the first place, there is at each war's end, a characteristic revulsion against the armed forces and the wartime restrictions, privations, and sacrifices which the uniformed services seem to symbolize to the general public.

Then, too, our wartime alliance with Soviet Russia had blinded us in our appraisal of her postwar aims. Our people expected that peace treaties would soon be signed and that our occupation tasks might soon be diminished.

Further, the American people, in their enthusiasm for the United Nations, expected too much too soon from that organization.

Again, Congress and the people were seeking means for quickly reestablishing a normal civilian economy and cutting down on the huge wartime appropriations for the Armed Forces. Their funds reduced, the Army, Navy, and Air Force were compelled to curtail their activities and effect sharp reductions in strength.

Finally, manpower for civilian industry was badly needed to insure necessary production of goods for the reestablishment of our own economy and rebuilding of a sound world economy.

On the military side, our people and our Government hoped that in the peaceful circumstances which were anticipated, a smaller army could provide a reasonable security force, furnish a sound mobilization base, and carry out the occupation duties in Europe and the Pacific.

The Army based its mobilization plan on a sound Reserve and National Guard bolstered by Universal Military Training as a steady source of trainees.

To seek the fallacies in the national attitude and in our reasoning during this critical period is rather like crying over spilled milk. It is sufficient to point out that the United Nations could not come up to our optimistic expectations in the face of the veto in the Security Council, especially as it was used in the important field of international atomic energy control. On this and many other issues, Russia has opposed the Western powers, freely using her veto to block actions proposed before the Council.

Peace treaties have been delayed and problems of occupation, instead of diminishing, have increased. In Europe, the situation had led to Russia's withdrawal from the four-power Council in Berlin, and her blockade of that city.

How Was the Postwar Army Affected?

The occupation and foreign rehabilitation job thrust upon the Army was new and difficult in itself, but the simultaneous too-rapid demobilization increased its problems a hundred-fold. Between the end of June 1945, and the end of December 1948, the Army shrank from 5,987,000 to 540,000 men. At the same time, the total turnover during this 3-year period brought about the discharge of 6,937,000 men. This means that due to short-term enlistments and other factors there were 1,500,000 *extra* discharges over and above those involved in merely cutting the Army from its peak strength to its low-point strength. This extra turnover of men represented a huge additional administrative load.

In January 1949, 250,000 of the 600,000 enlisted

men and women in the service were serving their first "hitch," never having had any previous military training. Contrary to what many people think, the Army today is not composed of "veterans."

Furthermore, one out of every three men in the Army today is on occupation duty and, for many of these, occupation tasks interfere seriously with their military training.

So far, Universal Military Training has not been enacted and the contemplated mobilization base of Reserves and National Guard is having a tough struggle. Recently, former Secretary of State Byrnes headed and worked with a committee for the National Military Establishment reviewing the whole Reserve and National Guard situation in order to help us with further plans.

Because of the tension in world affairs, it was decided in 1948 to plan for an 837,000-man army and to train an additional 110,000 18-year-olds who might volunteer for 1 year's active training and then join the Reserves or National Guard.

It was quite evident that we could not fill a commitment for 837,000 men without some form of selective service, so appropriate legislation was passed, and the Army began slowly to rebuild.

Temporary wartime training camps had deteriorated rapidly and there was not sufficient housing for the troops we were beginning to train. In nearby communities, civilian housing was also short and Army families were competing for a place to live in the highest priced housing market in the history of the world. This was a major concern of the Chief of Staff, for it affected almost every officer and man in the Army.

One of the inducements to the prospective enlistee was proper medical and dental care for his family and himself. Yet our shortage of doctors, dentists, and nurses—which exists even today—has made it difficult to keep this promise.

These were some of the problems that faced General Bradley, the new Chief of Staff, when he took over in February 1948 and the Army was at its postwar low point. In addition, the Army faced new and even more complex problems regarding its strategic planning and the performance of its military missions.

While the detailed problems of this rebuilding process beset the Army, the bigger problem of long-range strategic planning for security had to be undertaken. Strategic and operational plans—even though war might be remote—had to be kept current.

The lessons of World War II unmistakably pointed to a need for unified armed forces to provide the security we needed. To begin this new organization, the National Defense Act of 1947 was drawn up, submitted to Congress, and passed.

Drawing up plans in an unstabilized international situation, while at the same time helping to reorganize the Nation's entire defense set-up, gave the Army General Staff many headaches. Let's take a look at what this involved.

Problem No. 1: STRATEGIC PLANNING

The three broad missions of the Army have been stated in the first issue of *Officers' Call.* The first of these, "Maintaining the Security of the United States," has become a joint proposition for all of the Government to study. Plans for national security can no longer be merely those of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The National Security Act of 1947 set up a new National Military Establishment with a Secretary of Defense. This agency has been in operation since September 1947. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, representing all of the services, was made a permanent institution to plan for our national security. In addition, other agencies are made an important part of the National Military Establishment under the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief. They are—

Military Assistants to Secretary of Defense.
Civilian Personnel (three special assistants and other civilian personnel needed in NME other than those of Departments of Army, Navy, and Air Force).
Department of the Army.
Department of the Navy.
Department of the Air Force.
War Council.
Joint Staff.
Munitions Board.
Research and Development Board.

The Essential Need: A Long-range Policy

General Bradley has expressed the essential problem in security for the United States as follows:

"Our only alternative to hopeless vacillation before the danger of war is a stable, long-range military policy in consonance with our methods and our ability to support it."

For more than a year the Army, Navy, and Air Force have worked together to evolve a joint military policy representing the balanced views of all the services. Their investigations have also covered the

far-reaching ramifications involved in unifying the services.

Unification of the Services

In this connection, much progress has been made toward unification—considerably more, in fact, than is generally realized. Such a tremendous undertaking requires much time and involves delays which are likely to be interpreted as "disunity." It should be remembered that the three services, on the one hand, are attempting to build an entirely new structure in which all their vast activities will be more closely coordinated and, on the other hand, they are required to continue functioning under the old set-up, phasing gradually into the new as segments of it are perfected. Simply to build a new organization and set it in operation would have been a considerable task; but to maintain continuity of operations and gradually substitute a new organization for the old is a proportionately longer-range undertaking.

There are encouraging signs that the general public appreciates the enormity of the unification task, and the progress so far achieved. The *New York World Telegram*, for example, on 2 February 1949, while criticizing some aspects of unification, acknowledged what has been done in these words:

"In 15 months unification can mark up these accomplishments: Long- and short-range strategic plans have been prepared. There is only one military budget. Roles and missions have been defined and assigned. We are on our way to co-ordinated buying. There is a single Reserve program. We have the outline of a civil defense plan . . . Army, Navy, and Air Force have been put under one command in major theaters. A single military air transport has been created and hospitals have been consolidated. There have been joint training maneuvers. We have an Armed Forces legislative program. There is a Joint Weapons Evaluation Board. We have an Armed Forces morale program and a unified troop education program is on its way. A unification 'pilot plan' has been set up under Gen. Mark Clark on the West Coast; a Defense Department office of public information has been set up and an Armed Forces catalog has been started."

During the past 3 years, two important reorganizations within the Army itself have been undertaken. In 1946 the zone of interior was reorganized into six army areas, the better to coordinate administrative and defense arrangements within the United States. In addition, a beginning was made in 1948 toward reorganizing the Department of the Army—the Chief of Staff's CP—to put the Army's entire administration, planning, and performance on a functional basis.

Before the Army Can Make Plans . . . . .

Army planning is contingent upon the "long-range military policy" which the Chief of Staff advocated in the remark quoted above. Before this planning can begin, however, the first step in pursuance of an over-all national policy must be taken—namely, the assignment of specific missions and basic tasks to the different Armed Forces.

Under the National Security Act of 1947, the assignment of missions and tasks to each of the services is a function of the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense. At Key West and at Newport, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff attempted to resolve the broad fields of responsibility. In weekly sessions and in even more frequent informal meetings the Joint Chiefs have worked to correlate the missions of the three services for better over-all security. Establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a permanent agency was a great step forward, and has accelerated the integrating of long-range defense problems into a single, unified pattern.

Examining the procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff more closely, we find that a certain sequence of steps is followed in determining missions and assigning them to the services.

First, the basic information concerning possible enemies and their capabilities is gathered by the various intelligence agencies of the government, including Army Intelligence; then, under the Joint Intelligence Committee, a combined estimate is made.

The importance of a joint acceptance of this intelligence estimate cannot be overemphasized. In evaluating the courses of action open to a potential enemy country, the services must agree. Following such an agreement on the capabilities of another nation to act against us, there must certainly be agreement on the strategic concepts of how we are going to prevent war or, if one comes, to win it as decisively, as quickly, and as cheaply as we can. Finally, the strategic plan must envision what we are going to do with an enemy country when victory has been achieved.

Based on the accepted intelligence estimates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assign both *long-range* and *current* missions to each of the three Services. These assignments must take into consideration the political and economic strength of our nation, and must weigh carefully the recommendations of the National Secu-

rity Resources Board, the Munitions Board, and other governmental agencies, concerning our needs and our potential.

Steps in Army Planning

Having been assigned a mission, the Army must develop plans for carrying it out and coordinate these with the Navy and the Air Force. Plans agreed upon by the three services must be further checked to insure that they are in accord with our foreign policy and international commitments.

With these requirements in mind, the General Staff studies all the political, military, and economic implications before determining the methods by which the Army shall accomplish each mission assigned to it. When these decisions are reached, they are then interpreted in terms of divisions, corps, service support, and combat support troops. These in turn are translated into terms of men, weapons, housing, training, supplies and equipment, and other specific items. Plans are worked out in detail, down to assignment of specific *tactical* missions in the over-all strategic plan.

Finally, if the plan covers a current task to be performed, its cost in dollars and cents must be computed and the appropriate budget requests submitted to Congress for examination, review, and appropriations.

The approach which the General Staff must make to problems in strategic planning requires the most painstaking study and research, and the highest order of logical thinking.

It is impossible within the scope of our present discussion to illustrate the steps which must be taken in analyzing a specific mission and working out a plan for executing it.

Suffice it to say that with respect to every mission and every assigned task, there must be careful and exhaustive analysis of all factors before a plan is conceived, and each step in a plan as it is worked out, must be checked assiduously against these factors. The course finally adopted must be unassailably sound and logical.

To this end, from the very beginning of a staff study on a particular mission or problem, every pertinent question must be raised and answered. If a question cannot be answered fully, then the soundest possible assumptions must be made before proceeding to the next question. Each assumption made along the way represents an unsolved portion of the problem, and raises a side exploration which must be made to validate the assumption or determine wherein it is in error.

Finally, when an apparently workable plan has been reduced to blueprint form, the entire process of reasoning must be scrutinized again, step by step, before conclusions are accepted.

It must be remembered also that between Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, entirely different conclusions may be reached even though they are based upon the same basic assumptions and the same general line of reasoning. The resolution of these differences on any over-all security problem is the task of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Officers who have read General Eisenhower's *Crusade in Europe* will recall that in his second chapter, entitled "Global War," he gives a glimpse of his own thinking and some of the major considerations he had to make in working out recommendations for General Marshall on the early strategy of the United States in World War II. While General Eisenhower could not, of course, set forth all the details of his own approach to that vital problem, nevertheless his discussion in that chapter sheds much light on the thinking he applied at the time to the problem assigned to him.

This sort of thinking must be applied to every mission and every basic task assigned to the Army, each of which resolves itself into the questions: How many men? When? What equipment? What weapons?—and most important: what is the price tag for the American taxpayer, and how much can we afford to pay for this particular mission or task? This brings us to an ever-present Army problem—the question of funds.

Time and the $$$$$$ Sign

The best-laid plans of mice and soldiers, to paraphrase a proverb, can go astray on two important elements: *time*, and the *dollars* that can be expended *now*, before war is upon us. Here is another sequence of great importance in current planning of any one of the Armed Forces.

A. *What are the requirements in men, weapons, and equipment?* The size and character of our Armed Forces are fixed by the missions assigned. To establish our manpower needs, we must first determine the specific tasks to be performed. Similarly, to determine what *weapons* and *equipment* are needed, we must know first the specific *missions* to be accomplished.

B. *How much time is permitted?* An important determination in all planning is the *time* element. In



Figure E.



Figure F.

the past, plans have been made for a Mobilization Day, with subsequent plans for D-day. Nowadays, however, with the possibility of rapid attack through the air, the time period between M-day and D-day may be telescoped into hours. This fact alone has made planning more difficult than ever before.

C. *How much will it cost?* Having determined the size and the character of the forces to perform a mission, and having assured ourselves that the D-day requirements can be met in proper time sequence, the entire problem goes into the budget phase. Assuming that the critical items of equipment can be stabilized and that the time lag of producing the necessary tanks and trucks for this mission isn't too great, the question resolves itself into how much money it is going to cost and whether the Congress of the United States will authorize such expenditure.

So in these three fundamentals we complete the cycle: (*a*) The mission has been assigned and the Army has determined the men and matériel it needs to perform such a mission; (*b*) the time element is considered so that the units required will be ready in time for the mission to be performed; and finally, (*c*) the money is requested from the Congress.

At this point the cycle is reversed. The Congress appropriates as much money as it deems necessary at the time. The Army then takes the money and determines how much can be spent in preparation for this particular D-day mission. Perhaps the actual outlay for equipment can be avoided and we can put a smaller amount of money into machine tools or stockpiling a critical element in the hope that time will be allowed later for the proper equipping and training of these troops to perform this specific mission.

The *money* allowed dictates the *time* allowed which in turn dictates the number of *men* and *weapons* which can be ready for this mission. In our democratic system of planning, the cycle on the fundamentals is completed.

Our plans, within the budget, are prepared and are submitted to the Joint Chiefs for approval after careful coordination with the other Services and we then have the Army's part of a basic plan of strategy in the event of war.

Current Problems

We have reviewed what happened to the Army after victory in 1945, in an effort to show the background of the major Army-wide problems which grew out of postwar events. We have also taken up the question of strategic planning, which is foremost among the requirements of the Army at all times, and here we have tried to show the functioning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the steps which must precede the Army's planning for its assigned missions.

We have attempted next to give the officers an insight into the actual staff study and thinking which takes place within the Army in developing its own plans.

The story would not be complete without mention of some of the current factors governing Army activities. These factors—or problems, if you like—are the realities which the Army must face in 1949. They lie mainly in three fields: Money, Manpower, and Materials. Let's look first at the 1949 Army budget.

A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF GENERAL STAFF PROBLEMS

Each of the matters listed below is a current project to which serious thought and study is being given by the Department of the Army. The list is by no means complete. This is only a *sample*, but it illustrates the variety and scope of problems which absorb the time and energies of the General Staff:

Enlisted Men's Rental Allowances
Enlisted Men's Recreation
Officers' Schooling
Length of Overseas Tours
Enlisted Men's Career Planning
Warrant Officers' Career Planning
Officers' Career Planning
Procurement of New Lieutenants
Army-Air Force R.O.T.C. "Unification"
Officers' Civil Schooling
Arctic Equipment
Guided Missiles
Army School System
UNIFICATION
Army Pay Scales
Uniform Allowances for Enlisted Men
New Vehicles for D-day Units
Recruiting
Economy

The Budget

The Armed Forces in the fiscal year 1949 were allocated 29 cents of the United States dollar expenditure (of which the Army's share was 9 cents). International expenditures take up 18 cents of the Federal dollar; social welfare, health, and security, 5 cents; veterans affairs, 17 cents; and interest on the national debt, 13 cents.

All other Federal expenditures, which include housing, education, agriculture, transportation, natural resources, industry-labor, and general government ac-

count for the remaining 18 cents. These figures are from the Bureau of the Budget, revised as of January 1949.

In examining the *Army* dollar—a 9-cent part of the Federal budget dollar—we spend 49 cents for military personnel costs, which include pay and allowances, clothing, subsistence, travel, and care of the sick.

Maintenance and operation, which includes special field exercises, costs 28½ cents. A surprising part of the 28½ cents is the 2.7 cents that is spent for headquarters activity. This is much smaller than most people realize.

The modernization, replacement, and expansion of equipment, including war reserve, costs 7½ cents; construction costs 2 cents; 3½ cents goes to research and development and industrial mobilization; 3 cents goes to the nonmilitary defense requirements; and an important item of 6½ cents goes to the civilian components.

There is one other important consideration in the Army budget this year. The Army dollar has been just as hard-hit as the housewife's dollar. With wholesale commodity prices a full 219 per cent of the same prices in 1939, we have had to stretch the pennies to make them cover current costs.

Here are some examples:

In 1939, it cost us $77.66 to uniform a soldier; today it costs up to $200.

In 1939, a jeep cost us $1,051; today the same jeep costs $2,000.

In 1939, it cost us 41 cents a day to feed a soldier; today it costs us $1.03 a day.

Despite rising inflation, Army planners have had to provide for strength increases from the low point reached in 1948, improve the military readiness of the Army, and still keep defense costs within the price the nation can pay. This is no small undertaking.

Manpower

If the Army had unlimited funds, there would still be problems. Men to perform the missions are the critical commodity for land forces. To train battalions and divisions properly, an Army needs men with the ability to lead and inspire other men, for an Army is only as good as its leaders. This is particularly true in the squad and the platoon. The corporals, the sergeants, the lieutenants, who train our men and lead them in battle are the men who win our wars. As an example, in an Army of 800,000, we need at least 173,000 of these corporals, sergeants, and lieutenants. Nowhere are we more sensitive to manpower shortages than at this "foreman" level of leadership.

Procurement of various specialists has also been a problem. For example, the Army has not been able to give the complete care for dependents that it promises because of the shortage of doctors and nurses. Our Joint Army-Air Force medical system was short 2,900 doctors and 3,800 nurses at the beginning of 1949. Professional inducements offered doctors in the form of interne and resident training programs did not produce the requisite number. Army pay scales could not begin to match average doctor's earnings in civilian life.

We are short many mechanical specialists—artillery repairmen, and ordnance specialists of all kinds. Trained mechanics are scarce in industry, too, and the Army is hard-pressed to compete with these civilian jobs.

Radar and radio specialists, in short supply for commercial aviation and the radio industry, are also missing in the Army line-up. However, some progress is being made in training our own.

In the research and development field, the Army needs trained scientists to direct its research and adapt research results to military problems. Modern American industry also has great demands for these chemists, physicists, and engineers. Fortunately, three-fourths of the Army's research is done under contract by industry and in college research centers. This takes a great load from our own soldier.

An additional example of our personnel shortage is in the military interrogation teams. You can't fight an enemy without knowing his language. In addition to language attainments, however, the military interrogator must have adequate intelligence training to know what he is talking about and to evaluate the information he receives. Here again is a shortage that requires time to fill.

And the over-all shortage of the trained combat soldier is best emphasized when we point out that 5 out of 12 of the soldiers in the Army today are serving their first "hitch." It takes time to make trained soldiers out of young recruits.

What Causes the Shortages?

It is impossible to ascribe these various shortages to any one cause. Some of the shortages are caused by competition afforded by the highly geared civilian economy. Here, employment has been at an all-time high and in most cases the pay is better than the Army can offer.

Another influencing factor is that the postwar Army

has not been able to offer a very stable and settled existence. Men and their families have been moved from job to job and station to station too often for satisfactory living. In many cases the stations themselves are not in areas where adequate family housing can be provided, or rented at any price. Overseas, men stationed in Korea have not had their families with them for more than a year, and the time lag in dependent travel to Japan has been from 3 to 6 months.

The Army is cognizant of these difficulties, and is trying to stabilize the situation as rapidly as possible. This is extremely difficult, however, when 1 out of 3 soldiers is stationed overseas. With an average tour overseas ranging from 2 to 3 years, men must be shifted between the continental United States and the oversea stations at least this often.

In the matter of pay scales, Congress is considering legislation based on a report of the Hook Commission, a civilian committee appointed to estimate the needs and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, for Armed Forces pay scales comparable to those in civilian enterprises. As to housing, the Armed Forces have already joined with the Federal Works Administration in submitting recommended legislation to relieve this situation.

Matériel

Weapons and other important matériel for war are produced only after considerable research, development, and production. For munitions, the time lag in this cycle ranges from about 5 years in peacetime down to 3 years in wartime; during war, the savings in time are, of course, paid for in higher prices. As part of the Army's third broad mission, "Preparation for War," the Army is responsible that it gears its matériel needs to its strategic planning in such a way as to allow for production time lags. Thus we gain not only in security, but also in economy.

As was pointed out in the previous *Officers' Call*, one of our important basic tasks is to maintain

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FAMILY QUARTERS FOR THE ARMY



Figure G.

Housing for Army families is a "must" if we are to keep a top-notch Army together. In our budget for fiscal year 1950, the Army is asking for $31,000,000 for reconversion of barracks into houses for noncommissioned and commissioned officers. This is not the most desirable housing, but our problem is one of getting the maximum number of dwellings for the least amount of money. In the fiscal 1950 budget request there is also an item of $9,000,000 for new construction of small houses, each to provide 1,080 square feet of floor space. If the total of $40,000,000 is approved, the Army will have an opportunity to house approximately 6,500 more families on Army posts.

The picture above illustrates one of the designs for family quarters which has been considered.

supremacy in research and development. With our critical manpower situation, our only hope for military supremacy lies in superior weapons and equipment, superior mobility and techniques.

The logistics story—the attainable balance between men and matériel—is a separate study in itself. Here the objective, of course, is to fill the pipelines of supply in any war so that the trained soldier arrives at the front lines with the proper equipment, in sufficient quantity, in ample time to do the job.

Our peacetime goal is to plan for the proper matériel and equipment, stockpile the necessary machine tools and critical raw materials, so that the mighty productive effort of the American people can fully support the Armed Forces in an emergency.

Summary

Starting at the eleventh hour and working desperately against time, our country built, during the 6 years of World War II, the greatest fighting forces in history. Then, immediately upon the victorious conclusion of hostilities, these forces were demobilized even more rapidly.

While the public pressure for this speedy demobilization is understandable in the light of world conditions as they looked in 1945, the precipitous haste with which it was accomplished left the Army with many difficult problems.

The unhappy direction which world events have taken has made it necessary to rebuild our Army to a safe level, and this has been undertaken during a period when our international responsibilities are heavier than ever before; when our own national economy is sorely taxed to reestablish itself on a peacetime basis; when all the things an Army needs—men, materials, equipment, housing, skilled hands and highly trained minds—are in short supply and in great demand throughout the nation.

At the same time, broad and fundamental changes in our National Security structure have been dictated by the experience of World War II; these have been undertaken and much progress has been made, even though operations under the old organizational structure had to be continued in the meantime. The record of achievement in this field augurs well for our long-range security.

Meanwhile, strategic planning—always the number one problem of the Army—has to be kept current. With an unstable world situation, awe-inspiring new weapons to be taken into account, and vast reorganizational changes within the Armed Forces now going on—and other variables—the preparation of strategic and operational security plans has become an enormously complex problem.

There are many other problems, great and small, which are interrelated with and corollary to the main requirement of strategic planning. The solution of all of these must be worked out under the limitations of money, manpower, and materials which the over-all interests of the nation dictate.

It is doubtful if any professional group is so rigorously trained and educated as the American officer. Foreign officers, because of birth or breeding, may be selected for higher training, but the American Army tries to give it to all who can qualify, and there are a lot who do qualify. When men in other professions are beginning to relax a bit after making their niche in life, the professional soldier is still plugging at his books. Men with gray-sprinkled hair not uncommonly work all night at their problems—a forty-eight-hour stretch is not rare. This strenuous work often goes on, not for a few months only, but over a period of years.

—Major John H. Burns, "The American Professional Soldier," *Infantry Journal* (1940).

AN ADDRESS BY GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY

(Boston, Mass.—4 February 1949)

Because too many Americans are searching for an easy and popular way to armed security through top-heavy trust in air power at the sacrifice of our remaining arms—we are in danger of reckoning our safety on fantasy rather than fact.

I do not deprecate the vast capabilities of air power as a priority weapon for attack against any aggressor state. Nor do I deny that the threat of instant retaliation through an air offensive is our greatest deterrent to war today.

But I must part company with those enthusiasts who ascribe to air power limitless capabilities in winning an instant decision. Air power, like every other weapon, has gaping limitations for war as we shall know it for many years to come.

However crippling air attack can be, I am convinced beyond any reasonable doubt that should this nation be forced into still another conflict, we shall once more be forced to gain the inevitable victory over our dead bodies—those of our soldiers on the ground.

If I did not believe that war in the future will still thrust its eventual burden on the soldier who fights on ground, then I would readily recommend abolition of the Army and happily bequeath our missions to anyone who would have them.

To provide long-term security for the nation, our military requirements must be related both to American foreign policy and to the known offensive capabilities of likely enemy states. They must be predicated upon preparedness for a plan of war—a strategy that can defend our shores, aid our allies, and preserve a foothold from which to strike the aggressor in his homeland.

Even in the combined employment of air, naval, and ground arms—war presents a problem of priority and sequence in mounting an offensive against the aggressor's forces and the sources of his strength. To survive, the United States must be prepared instantly to gear its counterattack to a war of increasing violence, a war of growing intensity, and a war of widening global dimensions.

At the instant of aggression, the United States must fling the full force of its strategic air offensive against the enemy's heartland. But however savage this attack might be, it is dangerous for us to count on a decisive knockout in the first round. For the concentration of this initial air offensive must diminish as we dip deeper into the stockpile of our atomic bombs.

In the second stage of war, we must rapidly seize, hold, and push nearer the target those strategic bases from which we might bomb the enemy and from which he might bomb our cities. At the same time, while the enemy is flooding his neighboring states with troops and thundering against ground defenses, we must commit ourselves unreservedly to the preservation of a springboard for an eventual climactic ground attack.

If we were to accept the inevitability of enemy superiority on the ground, we should not only be forced to abandon our allies with frail hope of liberation, but we might also find ourselves trapped in a long and punishing war of attrition through air bombardment. While the odds in such a conflict would presumably lie with us, an air war of attrition could readily lead to disaster—to a duel, a duel in the best fabled tradition of the gingham dog and calico cat who ate each other up.

Unless the enemy suddenly were to collapse from the wounds of those first two blows, the United States must then be prepared in the third round of a war to strike at the enemy's forces, wrest from him his bases, and destroy the enemy's armies in large-scale ground assaults. Whether they be airborne or seaborne, these piercing attacks of mobile, mechanized troops provide the only weapon that can find its way to the roots of enemy resistance and there crush it or subdue it.

Because the Army cannot subscribe to the thesis that air power is a self-sufficient power capable of single-handed victory in a global war, I am dismayed that those who dare question it should be tagged as ox-cart soldiers in an atomic-age.

And I am alarmed that the Army's insistence on a combined defensive force should be distorted in the minds of some Americans as stubborn opposition to the strengthening of air power.

The United States Army does not question the need for placing first emphasis on strategic air as the most formidable weapon of attack. We confirm the premise of most airmen that the fear of instant retaliation at the hands of our strategic air offensive is the most substantial deterrent to war today.

We freely affirm—in concert with the Joint Chiefs of Staff—our critical need for creating an instant war readiness in American air power.

And we readily agree that while the nation in times of peace must curb exhorbitant spending for defense, first things must come first—and the first is readiness in air strength.

But this does not mean we can abandon the others of our armed resources. For if we are to construct air power at the fatal expense of ground and naval arms, then we may foolishly be forced to desert our allies and forsake our capacity to wage a sustained war.

By reckless reliance upon a knock-out blow in the opening months of a conflict, we might unwittingly risk defeat in war and the possible loss of our lives. Even a champion does not enter the ring until he has trained for the full bout.

If the Army and Navy were to be denied relative readiness in their striking forces to hold and seize advanced bases, we might easily waste our air strength in an over-extended and therefore far less effective preliminary air war. This could do nothing but lengthen the conflict and multiply its eventual cost.

By our failure to preserve a foothold for subsequent ground assault, we might have to abandon the promise of help for our allies and discard our hopes for decisive invasion against the enemies' armies.

For no alliance can be effective anywhere in the world until the United States is ready to deploy its strength immediately in the critical theater of war. And no massive invasion can succeed without a near and friendly base from which we might launch it.

Unless the Army can maintain a minimum mobile striking force as well as an effective base for mobilization of its civilian soldiers, the Army cannot be readied in time to accomplish its mission in war.

In our mounting sequence of attack against an enemy aggressor, we cannot ring a bell for the third round and have the Army answer: "Wait a couple of years and then we'll come out swinging!"

"Then" will be too late because of too little now.

The roles of defense forces are publicly defined during Congressional hearings on their budgets. But because limited peacetime budgets cannot—and will not provide—for the wartime mission of the Army, that mission is too often forgotten and frequently ignored.

Because air power is essentially a first priority weapon, its first priority needs are provided in peacetime readiness budgets.

And because the Army is a lesser priority weapon in the sequence of attack, many of its peacetime needs are preparedness needs for wartime mobilization.

If we starve the Army in an effort to feed those first priority forces, then we shall have to anticipate that ground support will be perilously thin in the initial stages of war and the largescale ground offensive will, of necessity, be long delayed.

Ultimately a war between nations is reduced to one man defending his land while another tries to invade it. Whatever the devastation in his cities and the disorder in his existence, man will not be conquered until you fight him for his life.

I repeat what I have said before a committee of Congress: The Army will live scrupulously within the means of a budget recommended to the Congress by its Commander-in-Chief.

It is clearly apparent that in the absence of any precipitant danger, the nation must curb within reason that share of the national income it would devote to its common defenses. A nation cannot hope to purchase within the limits of its purse an assurance of guaranteed security against aggression. But it can spread the risk among its several services so that with reasonable safety we may forewarn aggressors and intelligently provide for an effective force in the event of war.

This, I believe we have done—critically, soundly and with the general approval of the services themselves.

The Department of National Defense is not irrevocably split—as critics would have you condemn it—among partisans of the several arms. We have made a start in compromising our individual requirements to construct—one with another—a security force that can best fulfill both our instant and eventual needs in the event of war. And we have learned that just as important as step-by-step sequence of fighting in modern war is the fundamental demand for complete unity in word and heart among the armed forces.

Notes on Works of Professional Interest to Officers . . .

THE GATHERING STORM*

By Winston Churchill

The two parts to this book cover logically and chronologically first the years between the wars, and second the "twilight war" preceding the invasion of France in 1940. Written by one who bore the chief responsibility for the war and policy of the British Commonwealth and Empire once hostilities began, it contains a day-to-day account of the conduct of war and administration by a democratic government. One can scarcely ask for a more authentic or more capable chronicler of these portentous years from 1919 to 1940 than the eloquent Mr. Churchill.

It becomes very apparent as one reads this book that the author wishes to convey the idea that World War II was unnecessary and could easily have been prevented. For his actual purpose in writing it, we can do no better than to quote the author himself:

"It is my purpose, as one who lived and acted in these days, first to show how easily the tragedy of the Second World War could have been prevented; how the malice of the wicked was reinforced by the weakness of the virtuous; how the structure and habits of democratic states, unless they are welded into larger organisms, lack those elements of persistence and conviction which can alone give security to humble masses; how, even in matters of self-preservation, no policy is pursued for even ten or fifteen years at a time. We shall see how the counsels of prudence and restraint may become the prime agents of mortal danger; how the middle course adopted from desires for safety and a quiet life may be found to lead direct to the bull's-eye of disaster. We shall see how absolute is the need of a broad path of international action pursued by many states in common across the years, irrespective of the ebb and flow of national politics."

All in all, this purpose is rather admirably achieved. Some readers will deplore Mr. Churchill's tedious quoting of records—all tending to show how right he was and how wrong his opponents were. Perhaps this is justified. In any event, he certainly documents his case thoroughly. He seems to have saved a record of virtually every significant thing done or said by him or his colleagues during the past thirty years.

The twenty years of history covered in *The Gathering Storm* are as important to us today as any other similar period in history. Mr. Churchill describes the historical significance of his book in these words, "I doubt whether any similar record exists or has ever existed of the day-to-day conduct of war and administration. I do not describe it as history, for that belongs to another generation. But I claim with confidence that it is a contribution to history which will be of service to the future." Yet, that he is writing for posterity, no one is left in doubt by the following: "It is not easy in these latter days, when we have all passed through years of intense moral and physical stress and exertion, to portray for another generation the passions which raged in Britain about the Munich Agreement." Anyone who reads it will certainly agree that—history or not—no account of historical events exists that is more interestingly related or more succinctly stated.

Mr. Churchill is a strong advocate of "nonappeasement," and his arguments for "diplomacy backed by adequate force" are eloquently and strongly stated. "All the words and actions for which I am accountable between the wars had as their object only the prevention of a Second World War; and, of course, of making sure that, if the worst happened, we won, or at least survived. There can hardly ever have been a war more easy to prevent than this second Armageddon. I have always been ready to use force in order to defy tyranny or ward off ruin. But had our British, American, and Allied affairs been conducted with the ordinary consistency and common sense usual in decent households, there was no need for Force to march

* 784 pp. Maps. Diagrams. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.—$6.

unaccompanied by Law; and Strength, moreover, could have been used in righteous causes with little risk of bloodshed. In their loss of purpose, in their abandonment even of the themes they most sincerely espoused, Britain, France, and most of all, because of their immense power and impartiality, the United States, allowed conditions to be gradually built up which led to the very climax they dreaded most. They have only to repeat the same well-meaning, short-sighted behaviour towards the new problems which in singular resemblance confront us today to bring about a third convulsion from which none may live to tell the tale."

One of the realities of international diplomacy—often obscured by wishful thinking—is that no nation's foreign policy has validity unless there is sufficient strength to enforce it. Strength in this sense, of course, means not only the necessary armed might but also the will to use it when circumstances clearly require its use.

Mr. Churchill makes painfully clear the reckless indifference of the Western democracies to this reality during the years between the two wars. For the victors of World War I, deluded by their own dreams of peace, this period is a tragedy of errors compounded and multiplied. Their easygoing faith in good-will alone as a deterrent to aggression stands out now as one of the major causes of World War II.

The error of misplaced confidence is clear now, but in those days few recognized it. Even fewer spoke out in protest. Mr. Churchill is one who did both. Perhaps the real burden of *The Gathering Storm* is simply to prove this point—to vindicate Winston Churchill before history.

One fact about Winston Churchill—generously reflected in this book—is that he is no shrinking violet. His unshakable self-confidence, combined with an almost cynical realism and a true warrior's spirit, has been a blessing to mankind. Without his wisdom and courage, the Western democracies might have suffered a far worse fate, and indeed, the whole course of history might have taken an even more tragic turn.

In *The Gathering Storm*, he has recorded a segment of what he conceives will be (when taken with his earlier works, *The World Crisis*, *The Eastern Front*, and *The Aftermath*) "an account of another Thirty Years' War." Four more volumes, possibly five, of the present work are promised.

While it lacks the sustained eloquence of most of Mr. Churchill's works, this volume carries his majestic narrative sweep; his subtle, mischievous humor; his amazing command of the language; his broad grasp of history and the true significance of events; his keen descriptive imagery; and not a little of his own personal charm and wit.

Only he could record the step-by-step rise of Hitler, giving due acknowledgement of the Fuhrer's evil genius, and at the same time expressing such boundless contempt for "The Corporal."

Only he could have written the description of Molotov:

"Vyacheslav Molotov was a man of outstanding ability and cold-blooded ruthlessness. . . . His cannon-ball head, black mustache, and comprehending eyes, his slab face, his verbal adroitness and imperturbable demeanour, were appropriate manifestations of his qualities and skill. He was above all men fitted to be the agent and instrument of an incalculable machine. . . . I have never seen a human being who more perfectly represented the modern conception of a robot. And yet with all this there was an apparently reasonable and keenly polished diplomat. . . . One delicate, searching awkward interview after another was conducted with perfect poise, impenetrable purpose, and bland, official correctitude. Never a chink was opened. Never a needless jar was made. His smile of Siberian winter, his carefully measured and often wise words, his affable demeanour, combined to make him the perfect agent of a Soviet policy in a deadly world. . . ."

The Gathering Storm represents a great contribution to history and is a clear guide to the proper evaluation of events which unfold themselves before us today. One of the most delightful things about this book is that there are more like it yet to come.

Conversation is but carving!
Give no more to every guest
Than he's able to digest.
Give him always of the prime,
And but little at a time.
Carve to all but just enough
Let them neither starve nor stuff,
And that you may have your due,
Let your neighbour carve for you.

From *Conversation*, by Jonathan Swift

PRO & CON

Letters from the field

Editor, OFFICERS' CALL:

Advance dope on the Officers' Information Program finds me a potential enthusiast, even while realizing that it means further demands on my time. Certainly no one can quarrel with the announced purpose or seriously claim that our Officer Corps is beyond improvement.

Comment at this post seems to feature speculation as to the content of the new program. I gather that if Washington sees the program only as a vehicle for improving our grasp of national and international affairs, not many officers will eagerly go along. On the other hand, if the discussions (at least some of the time) are devoted to specific problems common to our profession, a majority of us will gladly give the time and effort required.

Thus I feel I am not alone in asking: What will we be discussing that can pay off in our specific improvement as officers and leaders, helping us to solve the countless little problems of command and leadership in our daily experience?

Respectfully,

Company Commander

Gentlemen:

Company Commander has hit the nail on the head. We'd like to answer his letter with a message to all of you.

LEADERSHIP ranks high on the list of subjects we expect to cover. We want to offer practical solutions to your problems – not glittering generalities. Obviously, though, we need to know what your problems are in the first place.

If you have some little riddle in human relations that affects your work, which isn't solved to your satisfaction, how about describing it in a letter to Pro and Con? Better still, if you have met and solved a specific leadership problem, give us both – a statement of the problem, and how you licked it.

What we need is:

a. Statement of the problem. (Give all pertinent facts and circumstances).

b. What you have done about it.

c. What results you got.

This is the best way to guide us in shaping our material on LEADERSHIP so that it is practical, realistic, and helpful to you.

Don't leave us up here in this Ivory Tower. Let us hear from you. And thanks for your letter, Company Commander.

Sincerely,
The Editors
THE EDITORS

Suggestions for the Discussion Leader

1. *Timing.* As a lecture, the material furnished for this discussion would require about 1 hour. The discussion leader should attempt to condense portions of it so the presentation does not exceed about 45 minutes.

2. *Presentation.* Local circumstances permitting, the subject matter lends itself to forum presentation. For example, a moderator can introduce the subject, summarize the presentation, and guide the discussion; three additional speakers may present the *budgetary*, *manpower*, and *matériel* aspects, respectively, of each problem discussed.

3. *Points to be stressed.*

a. In a democracy, the Armed Forces take their orders from the people, as expressed through the Chief Executive and the Congress.

b. Over-all interests of the Nation, when thus reconciled with purely military needs, impose certain limitations within which the Army must function.

c. In carrying out its tasks within these necessary limitations, the Army encounters problems which are felt and shared by every unit and activity throughout the Army.

d. When, in time of emergency, these limitations are removed, the Army must be ready with strategic and operational plans based on full use of our national resources for victory. The restrictions of peacetime must not limit our vision in planning for the possibility of war.

4. The following questions may be used to promote discussion:

In what ways has the Army of today been affected by events of the past 3 years?

Why was it mandatory for the Army to demobilize so rapidly after VJ-day?

What events of the past 3 or 4 years have cast a new light on our national security requirements?

What were some of the problems that faced General Bradley when he became Chief of Staff?

What would you say is the Army's number one problem at all times?

What new factors since World War II serve to make this number one problem more complex than ever before?

What specific achievements have been made toward Unification of the Armed Forces?

What important reorganizations within the Army itself have taken place since 1945?

What steps must precede strategic planning by the Army?

What are the three steps in the cycle of Army planning?

At what point is this cycle reversed?

How much of the "Federal dollar" is allotted the Army for 1949?

Name some of the major items for which the "Army dollar" must be spent in 1949?

What are some of the manpower shortages of the Army?

Recalling all the problems, great or small, covered in this discussion, how many of them would you say directly affect the activities of your unit or station? Give specific examples.

What can your local officer group contribute toward solving these problems?

5. *Bringing material up to date.* Good supporting material to bring this discussion up to date locally may be found in recent newspapers and periodicals, reporting Congressional action and public discussions on matters related to National Security.

6. An outline of the material presented in this issue appears on the inside back cover.

Efficiency and economy go hand in hand.

—General J. Lawton Collins

DISCUSSION LEADER'S OUTLINE

I. Purpose of this Discussion.
- A. To give the individual officer a "larger view" of his own problems.
- B. To show kinship between individual and local problems, and the over-all problems of the Army as a whole.
- C. To outline the scope of Army-wide problems.

II. The Aftermath of Victory.
- A. The accordion action that gave the postwar Army the "bends."
- B. Demobilization under pressure was much more difficult.
- C. Other requirements of the Army were not lessened.

III. Background to Current Army Problems.
- A. Our Army on VJ-day.
- B. What happened immediately after victory.

IV. Why Did We Demobilize So Rapidly?
- A. Regrettable as it seems now, the rapid return of fighting men to their homes seemed justified in the minds of the American people at the time.
- B. The factors which have since arisen to place defense requirements in a different light.

V. Effects on the Postwar Army.
- A. Total turnover of men has meant 1,500,000 *extra* discharges.
- B. It is not a "veteran" Army.
- C. Occupation interferes with training.
- D. Problems in housing and medical care.
- E. National Defense Act of 1947 and the problem of strategic planning while reorganizing the defense structure.

VI. The Number One Problem—Strategic Planning.
- A. All security plans are now coordinated under National Military Establishment.
- B. The agencies which function as part of NME.

VII. The Essential Need.
(The work of the Army, Navy, and Air Force to evolve a joint policy.)

VIII. Unification.
- A. Why it is necessarily a long-term process.
(The services continue to function and meet their requirements under the old set-up while gradually adopting the new as it is worked out. This takes longer than merely creating and launching a new organization.)
- B. Some of the achievements of unification.

IX. What Must Precede Army Planning.
- A. Army plans are contingent upon long-range national policy.
- B. Missions of each service must be assigned by the Joint Chiefs.
- C. These must be based upon jointly accepted intelligence estimates.

X. Steps in Army Planning.
- A. Coordinate with Navy and Air Force.
- B. Check against our foreign policy and international commitments.
(Study political, military, and economic implications.)
- C. Adopt appropriate methods for accomplishing each mission.
- D. Interpret these into units, men, weapons, housing, matériel, etc.
- E. Compute the cost and ask Congress for the money.

XI. Time and Money.
- A. The three-step sequence:
  - (1) What are the requirements?
  - (2) How much time is permitted?
  - (3) How much will it cost?
- B. The planning cycle and how it becomes reversed.

XII. Current Problems.
- A. They generally fall under three headings: Money, Manpower, Materials.
- B. The Budget.
- C. Manpower.
- D. Materials.

XIII. Summary.
(In reviewing major points covered, stress that the limitations under which Army operates are necessary in best interests of the Nation, but we must not allow peacetime restrictions to limit our vision in planning for future emergencies.)

Officers' GAL

VOLUME I *Planning Your Career* NUMBER THREE

Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

VOLUME I NUMBER THREE

CONTENTS

Distribution: One per Army officer on active duty.

PLANNING YOUR CAREER

What Is the Purpose?

OUR Army has pursued many avenues of exploration since V-J day, one of the most significant of which is directed toward better use of its human resources. To officers, there is no more important single development in this field than the career monitoring program which has been designed to help them develop themselves to the limit of their individual potentialities.

Our victory in World War II was brought about by a combination of many factors, not the least of which was the readiness of our small prewar body of officers to assume the enormous responsibilities thrust upon them—to plan and direct the building of the most powerful Army in history, and to command its units in many varied types of action in many different climates and terrains around the globe.

Their success was partly the fruits of the world's finest system of military education. In our Service schools they had progressively mastered problems ranging from those of the small unit leader to those of the highest war councils.

Today that system of formal military education has been improved, expanded, and oriented to the problems of modern war. Geared directly to the school system is the officers' career development program, which reinforces their studies with *practical experience in planned duty assignments.*

These planned assignments are worked out within the framework of established career patterns. The patterns are flexible enough to answer the needs of the Service and at the same time to give each officer opportunities to utilize his own talents and explore certain fields of greatest interest to him.

This emphasis on *flexibility* of specific assignments within the framework of a given career pattern represents a marked advance in human relations—a more harmonious adjustment between the individual officer's desires and the needs of the Service, to their mutual benefit. As in modern industrial management, the Armed Forces are placing great emphasis on the treatment of men and women as individuals, with sincere consideration for their personal needs and aspirations. In the Army, as in civilian industry, the aim is to provide an environment for personal development of the leaders who one day may play such a vital role in preserving our way of life.

Our new officer development program is counted upon to achieve two things: to help meet the *Army's* future needs by providing the right numbers of leaders with the right kinds of experience and skill; and to help the *individual* officer define and work toward a personal goal suited to his particular talents, and which represents, as far as possible, his own choice.

It Takes Time and Understanding

A program so far-reaching naturally requires time to be put into smooth and efficient operation, and to be fully understood. Although officers throughout the Service are taking an active interest in the program, the queries and requests that reach the Department of the Army indicate that its purposes and potentialities for those who cooperate intelligently are not entirely understood or appreciated.

There is a tendency, for example, to interpret too literally the career patterns pictured in official publications and Service journals. The patterns shown are intended *only as illustrative examples.* There is natural skepticism about the program in cases where offi-

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cers have no tangible evidence that the principles of the program have been considered in determining their own or their acquaintances' assignments.

Most important of these misconceptions, perhaps, is the one held by some officers with 10, 15, or more years of service, who seem to feel that since the program was initiated only 2 years ago, they have more or less "missed out" on a planned career. Nothing could be further from the truth. *Every officer*, from the new lieutenant to the colonel approaching statutory retirement age, can benefit personally by cooperating in the program.

Every officer, regardless of how much service he already has completed, first should familiarize himself with the details of the program as set forth in TM 20–605, "Career Management for Army Officers." (See also the list of references at end of this article.) He then should review his own record and inventory his own experience to date. If he notes that certain types of duty which are important to a well-rounded officer's experience are missing in his own record, he should seek to get them. By and large, he will find that such needed assignments are available to him; certainly he will find that the agencies charged with administering the program will do everything possible to give an officer the types of experience required in his particular Arm or Service.

Recognizing that *all* officers are vitally interested in the program, especially in how it applies to them as individuals, we present in this issue answers to some of the questions that arise most frequently in the administration of the program.

It is difficult to imagine a subject more worthwhile for officers to discuss freely and understand fully. There is probably no single project which, successfully carried out, can bring greater benefit to the Army and its officers.

How May an Officer Influence His Career?

Through the years, the officer who consistently seeks to make every portion of his experience fit into a long-range plan directed toward maximum personal achievement and ever-increasing value to the Service, will find assistance from two sources: the Department of the Army agency responsible for determining his change-of-station assignments; and his local commanders.

As will be seen from a study of TM 20–605, the career program for officers contemplates carefully considered change-of-station assignments, supplemented by varied duty at each station to give them the greatest possible variety of experience on each tour of duty.

Change-of-station assignments will occur for most officers every 2 or 3 years, on the average. They vary in length, but the point is that in the course of a full career each officer can expect only a certain number of such changes. It is of utmost importance, then, that the officer himself know as much as possible about the various assignments open to him at each stage of his development, and that he determine early in his career what his own major objectives are. Once he is sure what he wants to do with his career, and has a long-range plan in mind, there are means whereby he can seek specific assignments of the type he feels are important. The methods by which an officer can and should indicate his desires as to station assignments are described below.

Some aspects of an officer's career should follow in a logical progression. The school system is a good example. The basic schools come first, with the more advanced courses following in step-by-step order. On the other hand, other segments of a well-rounded career may be fitted together flexibly, requiring no set sequence. For example, a tour of duty with civilian components, though extremely desirable *somewhere* along the line, can be worked into the pattern either before or after some other important types of duty. In making his own plans, therefore, each officer would do well to take full advantage of this flexibility as to timing and sequence of certain assignments.

Once having received a particular assignment in accordance with an over-all career pattern, how can the officer best utilize the opportunities for self-development on that tour of duty?

First of all, he should try to appreciate the problems of his commanding officer, and strike a reasonable balance between his own personal career needs on the one hand, and the mission and requirements of the unit or installation on the other.

Within the limitations imposed on the local commander by his unit's over-all needs, the individual officer should seek as many different types of duty as possible. Especially where he feels that by changing from one job to another he can contribute to the unit's success, he should ask for such a change.

The basic principle, of course, is that the officer should seek to master as many duties within the local command as possible, while his commander should rotate duties among officers as often as necessary and, in his judgment, permissible, to accomplish this purpose for all his officers.



Figure 1.

The Career Patterns

A successful career in the Army, as well as in the other fields of human endeavor, is composed of two ingredients—ability and opportunity. Career management attempts to equalize opportunity so that ability may be discovered and correctly evaluated. It must be realized that the basis for any successful program of this type is a standard or "typical" pattern against which the careers of individuals can be measured. These patterns are made up by the different Arms and Services and reflect the particular problems facing each branch. For the purposes of this discussion, we will examine two patterns, one for an Arm and one for a Service.

For a Combat Arm [2]

The career pattern for an Arm is shown in figure 1. Let us apply this pattern to the Armored Cavalry, for example. The pattern is designed for the officer just beginning his career, but a career already started can fit into it. It covers the first 21 years of an officer's service, and shows three types of assignments—mandatory, selective, and special. Since the mandatory assignments are those considered necessary to qualify the officer in his basic Arm, they will be considered first.

During the first year of his service, the Armored Cavalry officer will complete the basic course. That means that he will attend the *Branch Immaterial Basic Course* of the *Ground General School* at Fort Riley and the *Basic Course* of the *Armored School* at Fort Knox. These courses will run consecutively and cover one academic year. Following this, the officer will have 2 years of troop duty in a tank or mechanized cavalry platoon. These first 3 years are vital to the proper beginning of the young officer's career. Note that nothing else in the pattern is allowed to infringe on this period.

Between his third and seventh year of service, he should have a year of staff duty on a battalion or regimental level. Between his third and and tenth year, he



Figure 2.

will attend the *Officers' Advanced Course* at the *Armored School.* At some point between his seventh and fourteenth years of service, and after completion of the advanced course, he will have command of a tank company or mechanized cavalry troop. During the same period, he will have a year of staff duty in a combat or reserve command of an armored division or in an armored or mechanized cavalry group.

Finally, at some point after his third year of service, he can expect to serve a 3-year tour with one of the civilian components. Every effort will be made to alternate the troop assignments between tank and mechanized cavalry units so that the officer will be familiar with as many basic elements of the Armored Cavalry as possible. These, then, are the *mandatory* assignments. After completion of these duties, all Armored Cavalry Officers should reach their twenty-first year of service, thoroughly qualified and well-rounded. The opportunities will have been provided and those who capitalized on those opportunities, by virtue of outstanding records, will be the future leaders.

Now let us consider the *selective* assignments. These assignments are desirable but selection precludes all Armored Cavalry officers from getting them. About one-half of the Regular officers of the Army (including the Armored Cavalry) will be selected for attendance at the Command and General Staff College. This selection will take place somewhere between the officer's seventh year of service and the date when he becomes 41 years of age.

Between eight years of service and 42 years of age, about 10 percent of Regular Armored Cavalry officers will attend the Armed Forces Staff College. Between their tenth year of service and their forty-sixth birthday, about 5 percent will attend either the Industrial College of the Armed Forces or the National War College. Between their seventh and twenty-first years of service, certain selected officers will be sent to Air Force and Navy schools as well as to foreign military schools, where appropriate. Officers will not be ordered to any school unless they have credit for the next lower school; conversely, no officer will be ordered to a

school for which he already has credit. This policy has been established in order to give equal opportunity to the greatest number of officers.

At any point after completion of 3 years' service, certain selected officers may be ordered to technical duty, such as development work in motors, communications, weapons, and other fields related to the Armored Cavalry. These assignments may be preceded by graduate study at civilian institutions. Certain officers will be selected for duty as instructors in service schools. Also, some will be required for General Staff duty on the various levels. It must be emphasized that these are all *selective* assignments and such selections must be based on the record.

Turning to the *special* assignments, we enter the broadest and most varied field of opportunity open to the career officer. This type of assignment includes some relatively unpleasant ones, and some of the most desirable jobs in the Army. Every officer can expect to have some of each.

There are some jobs in the *special* grouping for which there are seldom enough interested applicants; yet, since they involve tasks the Army must perform, they must be filled. Conversely, there are other positions in the special category which are so popular there are never enough to go around. As a result, there are bound to be some personal disappointments.

Nevertheless, this broad grouping of special assignments has been left open purposely to allow the maximum area of personal choice, and the maximum development of individual talents and interests suited to the various types of work to be found in this grouping.

For examples of specific assignments falling within this category, see the section below, entitled *"Is Your Career Pattern Out of Balance?"*

Unfortunately, in some published discussions of the officer career program, the term "incidental" has been used to describe all assignments which are not *mandatory* or *selective.* It should be emphasized that these assignments are not regarded as unimportant either to the Army or to the individual officer's career development. On the contrary, they include some of the Army's most important tasks and some of the best opportunities an officer can have for broadening experience and self-improvement.

For a Service [3]

Now let's take a look at one of the Services. (See fig. 2.) The career pattern is basically the same, the major difference being that the *first 2 years* of the new officer's career will be spent *with one of the* combat Arms, with at least 1 year of this detail being served in a rifle company or comparable unit. For example, a Transportation Corps officer will spend his first 3 years in school assignments and with troops in a combat Arm. The first half of his third year will be spent as a student at the Transportation School, with the second half of the same year on duty with a company at the school.

From his fourth to seventh year, this officer will be given numerous different assignments and should acquire at least four different and (if possible) unrelated military occupational specialties. He normally will not be retained on any one local principal assignment for more than 6 months.

During his seventh to tenth year, principal duty assignments will be somewhat longer, but ordinarily no one primary assignment will continue for more than a year.

Thus the first 10 years of this officer's career have been full and well-rounded. He has touched on almost every phase of work as a service officer. His tour with the combat Arm has given him an insight into the problems that are faced by combat units and helped him appreciate the coordination necessary between the Arms and Services. During this time he should have developed an interest in a specific field of Transportation Corps work. The next 4 years are scheduled to develop that interest.

From the tenth to fourteenth years, then, is a period of *specialization.* The Transportation Corps officer ordinarily will serve this entire period at one station. His assignments will be in his special field and he should begin to gain recognition as a water, highway, rail movements, or other type specialist.

The fourteenth to twenty-first years provide a final polishing-up period. While it is likely that he will spend the greater portion of this time in his special field, the officer's experience must be broadened sufficiently to qualify him for any of the jobs he may be called upon to fill. He must be qualified to head any principal subdivision of a port or in the office of the Chief of Transportation, or to perform General Staff duties or any staff and administrative duties of comparable importance. Any deficiency in his qualifications or experience still remaining must be uncovered and remedied.

From his twenty-first year to the end of his service, if his career has been guided properly throughout, this officer will be paying the Government handsome dividends in higher command and staff responsibilities.



Figure 3.

Specialization*

Hand in hand with any discussion of the established career patterns must go a consideration of how far an officer may wisely go in developing his skill in one or more of the various technical or nonmilitary fields in which the Army is interested.

This is one of the most controversial and most misunderstood phases of the career program. "What *is* specialization for an Army officer?" "Should I be a specialist?" "What are the dangers involved, if any?" These and similar questions seem to trouble some officers.

The Department of the Army policy on specialization requires that every officer "should first get a firm basic military foundation, through approximately his first 7 years of service."

During the next 5 to 7 years, he . . . "will enter some field of specialization. Thereafter, he will from time to time, be alternated between this field of specialization and other assignments," including familiarization with the progress in his basic branch.

Every job in the Army is one of specialization, whether it be gunnery or communications, platoon leader or company commander. But, this must not follow the dictionary definition of "restrictive work and study." Therefore, the career officer must be a specialist in the *broad sense of the word*. He cannot become identified with any one narrow field of operations to the exclusion of training in others and expect to be a well-grounded officer qualified for either command or staff jobs.

When the commonly accepted use of the term "specialist" is analyzed, it is found that it applies generally to an individual highly skilled, trained, and channeled in one rather narrow field. An Army like our own

*See Figure 3.

could not expand rapidly in time of war if all Regular Army officers were specialists in the narrow sense of the word. Regular Army officers should have sufficient experience in personnel, training, tactics, operations, administration, and supply to weld the groups called into service in time of emergency into fighting units. While it may be desirable and even essential that an officer be enough of a specialist in a particular field to be capable of directing and supervising operations within it, he nevertheless must remain versatile enough to be able to handle the multitude of different assignments that he may be called upon to fill as an Army officer.

Some of the technical services like the Medical Department, for example, seek to develop a high degree of specialization in various required fields; therefore a wider leeway must be allowed in administering the program within the technical Services. Even here, however, the number of individuals who must spend the major portion of their services in some narrow specialty in order to keep abreast of developments is relatively small.

The orthopedist in the Medical Department; the ballistician in the Ordnance Department; the traffic engineer in the Transportation Corps; the gunnery expert in Artillery or Armored Cavalry; or the highly trained communications officer in the Infantry—each of these is a valued member of the service because of his specialized knowledge. But each is a *military* man, first and foremost, and each should seek to add to his military experience at all times.

Otherwise, carried to an extreme, technical specialization could mean that an officer possessed no more value to the Service than a man with equal technical knowledge who could be recruited in time of emergency from civilian life.

Maximum dependence must be placed upon civilian specialists, upon the career warrant officer, and upon Reserve and National Guard officers who may be serving on extended active duty. In an emergency, wholesale reliance will have to be placed upon specialists drawn from civilian pursuits, while career officers must be qualified to organize and direct their endeavors, or to work with them, as the case may be.

A Note for Commanders

We have mentioned earlier the important part commanders play in rotating the duties of their officers. There are other ways in which they may further the career interests of officers serving under them. Besides seeing that officers are placed in positions where they will gain needed experience, they can add continuity to each officer's pattern of experience by utilizing the entry on the bottom of the efficiency report form. Here the commander has the opportunity to indicate what type of further training and experience an officer needs. This item is always considered in change-of-station assignments and, if rating commanders will exercise care and good judgment in making this entry, the individual's subsequent assignments can be determined on a much sounder basis.

In the past it has been possible occasionally for an officer to be retained by special arrangement and serve repeated tours, at one or more stations, under the same immediate superior, accumulating in the process an enviable-looking string of "Superior" efficiency ratings. This practice, while it seems on the face of it unfair to other individuals who have made no special effort on their own behalf, may ultimately do more harm to the officer whose service is thus channelized. In time of emergency the big question in choosing an officer for broad responsibilities is not how well he did on one type of duty under one commander, but rather how varied has been his experience, and how many *different* commanders he served well.

In peacetime, asking for officers by name because they are already qualified in a job which is vacant, is in direct conflict with the aims of the program. There are so many different types of jobs to master in developing a well-rounded career that having an officer repeat in one type of work may deny him the chance to achieve his full potential stature.

Changes of Station

Although the Department of the Army makes the assignments of individuals, each officer has an opportunity to state his desires directly to his appropriate branch section of Career Management Group.

SR 605–145–1, Department of the Army, 16 December 1948, provides for submission of an Officer's Preference Card which is to be sent annually to The Adjutant General between 15 November and 15 December. This card, AGO Form 483, (see fig. 4) is filed with his records in the appropriate branch of Career Management Group. It is consulted every time he is considered for reassignment and is the only standard form that reflects his personal desires. There are occasions in every officer's experience, no doubt, when his assignment is at variance with his current wishes as indicated on the preference card. Sometimes this is due to consideration of factors in his over-all career pattern which he may not have known about

when he submitted his statement of preferences; at other times it is due to imperative needs of the Service which have arisen suddenly.

What about cases where officers change their minds after submitting the annual statement of preferences? Sometimes their personal or family circumstances change; sometimes events, new developments, new activities of the Army serve to create new career interests. There are many valid reasons why an officer might wish to modify an earlier statement of his wishes concerning future assignments.

In these cases, the officer should address a letter to his branch section (Infantry, Armored Cavalry, Transportation Corps, etc.), Career Management Group, Personnel and Administration Division, DAGS, Washington 25, D. C., and state his request.

The officer usually will be able to obtain more specific information from Career Management Group if he waits until near the time when he will be due for a change of station. Since requirements are continually changing, the further in advance an attempt is made to predict an officer's next assignment, the more speculative such information becomes.

For example, the Career Management Group receives requisitions for officers for the oversea commands for the *fifth* succeeding month, and requisitions for ZI officer needs for the *third* succeeding month. It is difficult to state with accuracy what an officer's specific assignment is likely to be, until the requirements for officers during the period when he is being considered for reassignment are known.

When an officer is reported for reassignment, his branch section studies his record to see what type of duty he needs in order to continue his proper career pattern. If he is badly in need of a particular type assignment he is given a directed or recommended MOS to insure that he receives this duty. If he is due for schooling, this usually takes precedence over other assignments. If he is due for a ZI assignment other than schooling, he is so assigned, keeping in mind his career needs and the needs of the Service as indicated by unfilled requisitions, and attempting always to reconcile the two.

Oversea Duty, Schools, and Special Assignments

As of 1 May 1949, the following policies and procedures govern selection of officers for these types of duty. They are outlined here because of their general interest to officers. An officer currently concerned with any of these subjects, or who contemplates requesting any of these types of duty, may obtain more complete information locally from official directives, or by writing to his branch section of Career Management Group.

Oversea Assignment

At present the policy of the Department of the Army provides that officers will be selected for oversea assignment based upon the number of months of prior foreign service since 7 December 1941, those with the least such service being the first to return to foreign duty. As the oversea requirements of the various Arms and Services differ greatly, the criteria for foreign service vary widely among the different branches. It has been estimated that officers of the Infantry, Field Artillery, Cavalry, and Coast Artillery may expect to serve 3 to 4 years in the United States between tours of foreign service.

The decision as to what theater an officer will be assigned is made primarily upon the needs of the various commands at the time an officer is selected for foreign service and secondarily upon the desires of the individual. Where the needs of the Service and the consideration of the preferences of all officers will permit, an officer is assigned to a theater of his choice, as indicated by his preference card. An officer is assigned to a theater in response to an approved requisition for an officer of given grade and MOS. The actual duty assignment and station within the theater then is determined later by the oversea command.

The request of an officer for the deferment of his oversea assignment will be considered on its individual merits. In general, where it is clearly indicated that oversea assignment will impose upon an officer hardships greater than those normally experienced by other officers, a deferment from foreign service may be granted for a specified period of time not in excess of one year. All such requests should be submitted to The Adjutant General through military channels.

Selection for Schools

Selection of officers for branch schools is based on previous qualifying schooling, availability, and age. For example, to attend the branch advanced course an officer must have credit for the branch basic course; he must be in the United States and due for reassignment; or he must be overseas and due to return in time for the course. The older officers thus qualified are selected first in order to make them eligible for more advanced schooling.

Many officers received constructive credit for

OFFICER'S PREFERENCE CARD

LAST NAME—FIRST NAME—MIDDLE INITIAL	SERIAL NO.

GRADE AND DATE OF RANK		BRANCH		CATEGORY (*I, II, III.*):
PERMANENT	TEMPORARY	BASIC	DETAIL	DATE OF EXPIRATION

ALL OFFICERS	OFFICERS IN ZI ONLY	OFFICERS IN OVERSEAS THEATERS ONLY
1. SCHOOLS YOU ARE QUALIFIED FOR AND DESIRE TO ATTEND	3. THEATER PREFERENCE FOR FOREIGN SERVICE IN PRIORITY	5. ARMY OR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA PREFERRED IN PRIORITY
2. SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS DESIRED (*GSC, IGD, MA, ROTC, ORC, NG*) DETAIL IN OTHER BRANCHES, ETC.	4. ARMY OR GEOGRAPHICAL AREA PREFERRED IN PRIORITY	6. EXPECTED DATE OF RETURN TO ZI
		MONTH / YEAR

REMARKS (*Include any elaboration on above items; compassionate reasons to be considered in assignment; special courses at civilian schools, preference for tour of duty with United States Air Force*)

DATE	ORGANIZATION, STATION AND APO, IF APPLICABLE	SIGNATURE

16—55210-1

DA AGO FORM 1 APR 48 **483**

Replaces WD AGO Form 483, 1 Oct 46, which is obsolete.

Preference Cards will be submitted to reach The Adjutant General annually between 15 November and 15 December. Mail directly to The Adjutant General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, D. C.

FOLLOWING FIELDS WILL BE USED AS A GUIDE IN INDICATING TYPE OF MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT DESIRED:

1. COMMAND DUTY

2. STAFF DUTY
   - A. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION
   - B. INTELLIGENCE
   - C. OPERATION AND TRAINING
   - D. SERVICE, SUPPLY AND PROCUREMENT
   - E. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
   - F. PUBLIC RELATIONS
   - G. MILITARY GOVERNMENT
   - H. IGD
   - I. ETC.

7. MOBILIZATION ASSIGNMENT DESIRED

INSTRUCTIONS

1. Volunteers for foreign service, airborne duty and civilian schools must make application through channels.
2. Personnel desiring tour of duty with United States Air Force may so indicate under Remarks.
3. Mobilization assignment preferred—on completion of 4, 7, 10, 14, 17 and 21st year of service each officer will indicate the mobilization assignment desired.
4. Under "Branch Basic—Detail" put in name of branch.
5. When orders are issued effecting a PCS, space No. 10 will be initialed by officer directing issuance of orders.

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACE BELOW

8. TO BE RELIEVED O/A	9. ASSIGNMENT SLATED FOR	10. INITIALS

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—55219-1

Figure 4.

C&GSC and therefore are also considered qualified for their branch advanced course. Sometimes it occurs that the Leavenworth credit was based on performance of high level staff jobs and the officer has no real branch experience. In such cases the Career Management Branch attempts to send the officers to their branch (infantry, artillery, etc.) advanced course and follow the schooling with a tour of troop duty. Only in this way can the officer really be branch-qualified.

Also, when officers transfer to another branch, having had insufficient experience in the new branch prior to transfer, the policy is to send them to the appropriate course at their new branch school regardless of their school status in the "losing branch."

The career pattern indicates that an officer, on completing 3 years' service, is eligible for the branch advanced course. Many officers express surprise that, having 5 or 6 years' service, they have not been sent to this course. There are several reasons for this situation. First, the age spread for the various schools was purposely made large in order to help the Career Management Branches fit in school assignments with the multiplicity of other jobs that have to be filled. Also, the present backlog of prospective students caused by the war makes it necessary to send the older officers first. Finally, oversea tours and the need for stabilizing officers several years on one assignment are contributing factors.

The regular courses at Army schools are open only to Regular Army officers until such time as school facilities can be expanded. This is made necessary by the large *backlog* of Regular officers awaiting schooling, caused by the recent war.

Since attendance at the Command and General Staff College and higher level schools is on a selection basis, selection procedures are designed to insure that the best qualified officers attend. Availability becomes less a factor the higher level the school.

The few officers who attend schools of the Navy and Air Force are selected from among those qualified for the comparable Army schools. If an officer desires such schooling he should so state on his preference card, or better still, by letter to his Career Management Branch. Only in this way can his branch know that he is interested.

Light Aviation and Airborne Training

The career pattern established for qualified light aviation pilots provides for alternate periods of flying and duty with their basic branch. Recurrent assignment to flying duty will depend upon the officers' record, with only those who are outstanding being repeatedly assigned to light aviation work. The others will revert to their basic branch for full-time duty.

An airborne-qualified officer, if due for ZI assignment, normally will be assigned to an airborne unit. If the number of such qualified officers increases above the positions available in our airborne divisions, rotation of officers to the divisions will be needed to insure that every graduate of the jump course gets an opportunity not too long after his graduation to serve in an airborne unit. At present there is a shortage of airborne battalion and regimental commanders, and the opportunities for command in this type unit are good.

Language and Area Training

A new policy on this subject is under consideration and will be published soon.

Military Missions and Attaché Assignments

Interested officers should make written application to P & A Division, DAGS, for this type duty, stating preferences and qualifications.

Attaché assignments are controlled by the Intelligence Division. Attendance at the Strategic Intelligence School is a usual assignment for officers selected for this type work.

The Career Management Branches are called upon for clearance of applicants.

Is a College Degree Essential?

Many officers were integrated into the Regular Army prior to completion of courses requisite for a college degree. These officers were selected on the basis of actual performance during wartime; they have demonstrated knowledge acquired by experience. Their military careers will not be handicapped by any lack of formal education which they may feel. (The only assignment limitations are that officers on duty with senior ROTC units must hold college degrees and, of course, postgraduate civil schooling requires that the individual possess the bachelor's degree.)

The Department of the Army recognizes that worthy officers desire to improve themselves; but due to budgetary limitations and the exigencies of the Service, the Army cannot sponsor formal undergraduate education at Government expense. For this reason, DA Circular 146, 1948, has been published; this circular outlines a system of self-study which all officers are encouraged to follow, especially those who feel for any reason that they need additional formal education.

To repeat for emphasis: the officer who has won a

commission in the Regular Army need not feel that the lack of a college degree will affect his career in any way. However, for those who genuinely desire to improve their formal educational status, *and who are willing to work*, the opportunities are present. These officers should consult local Information and Education officers, who are familiar with the Circular referred to above and with the United States Armed Forces Institute, through whose services thousands of servicemen have gained credits toward college degrees.

Are Reserve and National Guard Officers Included in the Program?

Officers of the Reserve components, including many on extended active duty, may ask, "What about me? Has the Army a plan for my future?" Career management has been applied more specifically to Regular than Reserve or National Guard officers. Because these latter officers may return to civilian life in a year or two, their assignments are influenced considerably by availability and proven experience. This is inevitable. However, the attempt is made to assign them, where possible, in accordance with career management principles. It is unquestionably true that any officer will be of more value to the Service in time of emergency if his training has been well-rounded and includes the more important types of duty. Currently, formal schooling for officers of the Reserve components is limited to associate courses at Service schools up to and including Command and General Staff College; no provisions are made at the present time for non-Regular officers to receive civil schooling under Army auspices.

Although budgetary limitations have slowed the development of a full school program, it is hoped that a greater choice of schools, civilian and military, will be made available in the future to officers on extended active duty. This hope is stimulated by the excellent work being performed by such officers in the Army today.

What Is "Command" Duty?

The terms "troop duty" and "command duty" often have been considered synonymous. They should not be so regarded. Troop duty includes staff duty on the battalion and regimental level, as well as command duty. Each line officer should have staff duty on the level commensurate with his current rank and his length of service, but he must have command duty several times during his career. *An assignment is considered to be command duty only when the officer is in actual command of a unit.* Lieutenants, although assigned to a company, are not credited with command duty unless they are assigned as platoon leaders. For this reason young officers should serve continuously with troops for the first 5 years of their commissioned service. Only when in actual command does an officer learn the many factors involved in getting men to do different jobs willingly. The principles of leadership are fixed in an officer's mind and become second nature *through command experience.*

Is Your Career Pattern Out of Balance?

The assignments of all officers have been under the influence of the career program since the termination of hostilities in 1945. Efforts are being made to give staff assignments to officers who had a preponderance of command duty during World War II and command duty to those who were staff officers during the same period. Time is required to make these corrections. The demands of oversea theaters, the expansion program, necessary schooling, and the needs of the Service often delay desirable adjustments in an officer's career pattern. It must be remembered that an officer is not adding to the sum total of a well-rounded experience in any assignment if he performs the same task for several years after he has grown proficient at it.

In examining an officer's record to determine whether his career pattern is out of balance, his length of service must be considered. Has he 5, 10, or 15 years' service? In the first 5-year period, troop duty, the basic branch school or credit therefor, and some staff duty are the primary requirements. It is desirable that attendance at the branch advanced course be included in the second 5-year period, as well as staff duty on a higher level and in a different section than previously experienced. Duty with a civilian component or as an instructor at a service school may be included in this 5–10-year period. Not all assignments appear at first glance to be stepping stones on the path to a well-rounded career. A few of these assignments are—

Duty with Counter Intelligence Corps.
Duty with Army Security agencies.
Academic Instructor at U.S.M.A.
Duty with Military Government.
Recruiting duty.
Duty with station complement, ASU, or military districts in a branch immaterial assignment.

The importance of these duties cannot be overemphasized. Any one of the above assignments broadens an officer's outlook and acquaints him inti-

mately with one of the many necessary subdivisions of a military organization.

The pattern of the 10–15-year period is much the same as the previous one. Duty, however, will be on a higher level, to include the Department of the Army General Staff and further schooling if selected. Quite naturally, as officers gain experience and receive more advanced military education, the number of possible assignments increases materially. Because of the backlog created during the period of reorganization, many officers will not attend Service schools as early in their careers as indicated by the patterns shown in TM 20–605. It will take at least 4 years to reduce the backlog sufficiently so that the present minimum age limits can be lowered. It is well to note that the career pattern is based on years of service rather than grade. The pattern can be followed more closely in the future as permanent grades supplant temporary grades.

Summary

The officer's career program as set forth in TM 20–605 is designed to help each officer define his own career objectives and provide him adequate opportunities for achieving them, to the end that each officer may develop to the full limit of his potentialities, and that in time of emergency the Army will have available sufficient leaders with appropriate training and experience.

The career patterns upon which the plan is based are made as flexible as possible, to allow for varying needs of the Service and to give each officer the greatest possible freedom in pursuing a course of development best suited to his special talents and interests.

The plan is only 2 years old now, but officers with varying lengths of service can inventory their past experience and, with assistance from their respective branch sections of Career Management Group, seek the assignments they still need. No one need feel that he has "missed out" on a well-planned career.

Since an outstanding career is based on the two factors, *ability* and *opportunity*, the plan should help all officers who possess real ability, by insuring them fair opportunities to demonstrate their worth.

The program depends for its success not only on the individual officer's willingness to make personal sacrifices if necessary in order to gain needed experience, but also on the cooperation of commanders, who must balance their desires for unit efficiency against the need for rotation of duty assignments in the interest of individual careers.

While every officer is encouraged to develop a parallel specialty at the proper time in his career, this must not lead to repeated assignments in one narrow field of work. Some assignments are more exacting than others, and some will involve personal inconvenience. But the officer most likely to emerge at the end of the career management period with a record that marks him for a position of high responsibility in any future national emergency is bound to be the officer who is willing to take his share of the bitter with the sweet. As the Secretary of Defense, speaking about a year and a half after the end of World War II, expressed it:

> It is intended that the highest posts . . . will be filled by officers of the highest attainments, regardless of specialty. Be assured whatever may be your field of endeavor, that your future as an officer rests as it always has, in your own hands. The outstanding officer will continue to be he who attacks with all his energy and enthusiasm the tasks to which he is assigned and who grows in stature and understanding with his years and with his experience. Responsibility comes to him who seeks responsibility; it is this officer, regardless of his field of effort, who will be called to high command.

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Note. We cannot furnish copies of any of these references. See *Talking Points*, this issue.

THE FUNCTIONS OF CAREER MANAGEMENT GROUP

In the preceding discussion, the purpose has been to answer the indivdual officer's questions about the career program and how it affects him.

Officers should know something also of the major functions of the General Staff agency directly concerned with Army-wide supervision of the program.

Career Management Group, which is a part of the Personnel and Administrative Division, DAGS, operates on the principle of serving all officers impartially, and within the personnel requirements of the Service.

CMG is a General Staff group charged with certain responsibilities, some of which will be outlined below. There is no separate agency set up exclusively for handling the individual problems of officers. The hundreds of queries, requests, etc., that come in each month must be handled by the officers most familiar with the matters involved.

Here are some of the major tasks at which these officers, as members of the Career Management Group, are continually busy:

Filling Requisitions for Officers

Each month, the Arms and Services are faced with the problem of filling requisitions from every major command. This involves the determination of oversea eligibles to fill the requirements of oversea commands by MOS—actual, related, or potential. Generally, the individual officer's record is studied to determine his capabilities and aptitude for a specific assignment. The type position vacancy, such as command, which the officer should fill is designated. Next, the desires of the individual officer are considered and then he is assigned against an approved requisition. The main consideration, as it must be in any army, is, however, the officer's ability to assist the major commander in the performance of his mission. Zone of interior requisitions are filled similarly from oversea returnees and school graduates.

Screening New Officers' Records

During the 3-year probationary period of Regular Army officers, their records are screened *every 6 months* under the provisions of Department of the Army Circular 19, 1948. This involves a study of the complete 201 file of each officer and, if necessary, results in the reassignment of an officer. If an officer's performance is substandard, appropriate recommendations must be prepared to revoke his probationary commission.

Screening All Other Officers' Records

Another *annual* function is the screening of the records of all Regular Army officers (less probationary) to determine whether or not their commissions should be revoked, under the provisions of Public Law 810, 80th Congress. Criteria are established by a screening board of general officers.

Selections for Service Schools

Each year Career Management Group must select officers for service schools and education at civilian institutions. A simple statement of this function is not indicative of the work involved. Quotas for schools become limited progressively in the Army school system. Selection, therefore, must be impartial and thorough to insure that the best-qualified officers, those who will give the most in efficient performance, are selected. Before final approval, the selections for higher-level schools are reviewed by the Director of Personnel and Administration. In addition, an attempt is made within the personnel requirements of the Army to assign officer graduates to position vacancies which will best utilize their training.

Miscellaneous Studies

Besides these recurring tasks, there are many problems which must be studied which do not lend themselves to such classification. A typical example is a "Survey to determine grades and Arm or Service in which serving, of officers selected as permanent warrant officers." This information, of course, is necessary in proper distribution and use of personnel. Gathering it, however, is a long and tedious task. This work, which runs concurrently with many similar studies, requires a manual search of the 201 files of thousands of individuals. Every branch section of Career Management Group is involved, and the study requires several weeks. The anticipated use of machine records equipment will expedite such studies, but at present it must all be done by individual perusal of each 201 file.

Notes on Works of Professional Interest to Officers . . .

SPEAKING FRANKLY*

By James F. Byrnes

Today, 4 years after World War II hostilities ended, the making of a real and enduring peace is still the single objective toward which most of our international commitments are directed. To understand fully the international policies we pursue now, one needs to recall accurately our peace-making efforts of the past few years. *Speaking Frankly* is a story of these efforts, beginning with the Yalta Conference in February 1945.

Many of the events recounted by former Secretary of State Byrnes took place during and immediately after the war, in a period when newspaper and periodical accounts were not available to large numbers of officers scattered throughout the world. Many no doubt have filled in this gap in their knowledge of world affairs, by extra reading and study when opportunities became available. For others, exigencies of the Service have continued to deny access to adequate information. To the latter, Mr. Byrnes' excellent book is particularly recommended.

Some of the questions raised and answered in *Speaking Frankly* are: Could the United States have had more than one vote—as compared to Russia's three—in the Security Council of the UN? When did the so-called *Cold War* begin? Has Russia broken pledges made to other members of the Big Three? What comprised the secret agreement between Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt? Was it important that the United Nations be established before the end of the war? What were the four main issues at Potsdam? What evidences of Russia's intentions today were exhibited at Yalta, at Potsdam, at San Francisco, etc.? What are Soviet tactics at peace or other conferences? This is but a small sampling of the important matters Mr. Byrnes discusses—problems which, in their later ramifications, are still plaguing the statesmen of the Allied world.

Because of his position as head of our State Department during most of the period covered in his book, Mr. Byrnes' remarks have the authority of first-hand, top-level experience. In the discussions which he reports, he was either a direct participant or an observer. Mr. Byrnes' caution throughout the book to give readers a true picture of what happened is explained in his own statement:

> Throughout the book there are many direct quotations. These are taken either from my notes, from the records of the secretariat or, in some cases, from memoranda made immediately after conversation. Nevertheless, they are subject to human error. This is particularly true in quotations of statements made by Soviet and French representatives. It should be remembered that, in those cases, the quotations are the words of the translator rather than those of the speaker. Wherever I had any reason for doubt, however, I have not used quotations but have tried instead to reflect the spirit as well as the letter of the statements, the events, and the atmosphere in which they occurred.

Mr. Byrnes states his purpose as a desire "to render a public service," to tell the people the facts about our negotiations for peace, during the period when he, more than any other American, had a full grasp of the facts. Readers may judge for themselves the significance today of the things Mr. Byrnes wrote in 1947; most readers no doubt will agree that his conclusions are still valid—that events which have followed have been of the same pattern he described or predicted.

At the Yalta Conference, Mr. Byrnes was an observer with President Roosevelt and took complete short-hand notes of all discussions. Two years later it is interesting to note the author's estimate of the accomplishments of that historic meeting, especially with respect to the "declaration of policy on liberated areas" drawn up at the close of the conference and agreed to by the Big Three. He reported:

> The American public greeted this declaration with enthusiasm. Editorial writers commented on it favorably. From

*Harper & Bros., Pub. N. Y. 1947, 324 pages, $3.50.

the close of the Yalta Conference to the present day it has been a source of conflict between the Soviet Union and ourselves. But it is the basis on which we have shown the world that Russian actions in eastern Europe have been in violation of Russia's pledged word. In that respect it has been useful.

In the light of subsequent developments, the Potsdam agreements which hinged around four major issues were equally disappointing. Mr. Byrnes describes "Potsdam—the success that failed" in these words: "The agreements did make the conference a success, but the violation of those agreements has turned success into failure."

Although the general tenor of this book is serious, it nevertheless contains vivid characterizations of important people, interesting anecdotes, and careful descriptions of meetings and events. One such instance is the interesting account of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September 1945:

> In one of several heated discussions on the protocol, Mr. Bevin referred to Mr. Molotov's denunciation of his own previous action as "the nearest thing to the Hitler theory I have ever heard."
>
> The effect was electric. Mr. Molotov rose from the table and started angrily toward the door. He slowed down a little as he approached it and gave the blunt Briton a chance to call him back and withdraw the statement—which he did.

Based on his experience in his country's top diplomatic position, and on the evidence gathered in and out of formal conferences, Mr. Byrnes arrived at certain conclusions. He states these generously and courageously. His analysis of why the Soviet government broke its promise to support a German treaty in 1947 is indeed a forthright statement:

> I have been forced to the conclusion that following Stalin's promise, on December 24, 1945, to support the treaty, the Soviet High Command or Politburo concluded they did not want the United States involved in the maintenance of European security for the next twenty-five or forty years. The pressure of American power would restrict the freedom of action which the Soviet Union, as the predominant military power in Europe, might otherwise enjoy.

Of equal significance is his comment on Soviet objections to a merger of the occupation zones of Germany and the implications of any merger without their consent:

> Allied co-operation, however, is not a part of the Soviet Program and Soviet officialdom has greeted the merger (of British and American zones) with loud protests. . . . It is a signal to the Soviet officials that the veto they have exercised so effectively since Potsdam is no longer inviolate. It is evidence that we refuse to follow indefinitely a course that conforms only to Mr. Molotov's conception of what is best.

For a proper evaluation of world events today, there is available no better background study of recent American diplomacy than Mr. Byrnes' *Speaking Frankly*.

THEIR FINEST HOUR**

By Winston Churchill

This second volume of Winston Churchill's World War II memoirs will interest Americans even more than his first, *The Gathering Storm*.

Their Finest Hour covers the period from Germany's invasion of France on 10 May 1940, to the end of that fateful year.

For the professional soldier, Mr. Churchill's treatment of the Battle of France, the tragedy of Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, the rebuilding of England's Army, the desperate struggle to maintain her supply lines against the German U-boat campaign, the strategic importance of the Mediterranean and the Middle East, Italy's blundering attempts to influence the war, the importance of the Balkans, and the victorious African campaign culminating in the capture of Tobruk, all comprise an invaluable military study.

**Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1949. 751 pp—$6.00.

Proposed Future Subjects . .

Our material in this issue on officers' career management obviously does not answer all questions on the subject. But we feel it is of value to officers because, before preparing it, we assembled a number of the questions officers ask most frequently about career management, and included the answers in our discussion.

We'd like to follow this practice with future subjects. Here are some under consideration for the near future. If officers will submit their questions promptly on any of these subjects, we will attempt to include the answers in our published material.

The Reserve Components.
Survey of the Far East.
Effective Human Relations.
The Officer's Code of Personal Conduct.
The Army's Role in War.

PRO & CON

Letters from the Field

GENTLEMEN:

. . . . . contrary to Company Commander's letter in "Pro and Con" of *Officers' Call*, Vol. I, No. 2, there is a definite need for a study of international problems, including the study of the foreigner; his country, his history, geography, culture, customs, habits, and religion . . . . .

. . . . . The *Officers' Call* program seems to be of enough importance and potential value to warrant more time than only one hour a month . . . .

Captain, F. A.

● *(So far as we know, there is no plan under consideration for increasing the number of officers' discussions.—The Editors)*

GENTLEMEN:

[The Officers' Information Program] brings to mind a call I had from General Marshall on Armistice Day, 1941. The following morning I was in Washington to receive an oral directive from General ..... calling on me to draft a plan for what was then called the Army Orientation Course. The delayed offspring of that first step is today's I & E Division. We solved the problems of gestation and the feeding of the infant, but General ..... never took to it.

. . . . But for General Marshall, the baby would have been quietly strangled. . . . . The poor thing never really grew up till after the war was over.

I am glad to see that some special attention is going to be paid to orientation . . . . for the young officers. *Officers' Call* impresses me very favorably as a first venture . . . .

I am taking the liberty of inclosing some comments from one of my staff . . . .

Colonel, USA

The Staff Officer's Comments:

The attached copy of *Officers' Call* constitutes action in a field which has long been neglected. It incorporates two recommendations contained in a paper I wrote over a year ago, namely:

a. Officers should receive a different TIP than enlisted men.

b. The officers' program should bear down on significant national and international matters.

I am sorry, however, to see that the chief emphasis is still put on the "therapeutic value of free discussion" (see TM 28–210) instead of on positive instruction in the form of lectures, panels, etc., with time at the end for questions or discussions. . . . . Concepts of duty, honor, responsibility, etc., are not determined by discussion and debate. They are set forth positively and aggressively by experienced practitioners who know and understand the lessons of human experience. and who know how to pass them on to their pupils.

Our officers have much to learn, and the time is short. Moreover, with other demands upon them, our people have little time left to devote to such a program. Therefore, it must be conducted so as to get over the most information in the shortest time possible.

Lt. Colonel, F. A.

● *(The Department of the Army leaves the administration of the program largely to discretion of local commanders. This includes choice of presentation methods.—The Editors)*

GENTLEMEN:

The undersigned wishes to express his appreciation for the information now being made available throughout the Army in *Officers' Call* . . . .

Incidentally, your attention is invited to the statement on page 8 of Volume I, Number 2, to the effect that in 1939 a jeep cost $1051. If memory serves me, the Army had no jeeps in 1939.

Lt. Colonel, GSC

● *(Touché! The price was correct, but the year wrong. First contract was let in late 1940, first jeeps delivered in early 1941. Another GSC officer who gave us this item in the first place now concedes his error. To our contributor above, a Cluster, for careful reading.—The Editors)*



Suggestions for the Discussion Leader

IMPORTANT: Training Film 12-1529, "Officers' Career Management*," has been distributed especially for use with this officers' discussion on the same subject. It is available through Signal film libraries. *All inquiries as to availability of this film should be addresed to nearest film library.*

Where facilities permit use of films, TF 12-1529 should be shown *just prior* to presentation of the material covered in this issue of *Officers' Call.*

1. *Timing.* Considerably more material is covered in this issue than can be presented in the normal discussion hour. It is suggested that officers be required to read the pamphlet prior to the meeting, and that one or more speakers summarize the material in a presentation lasting about 20–30 minutes. Since this subject concerns every officer, and each officer has his own individual problems, it is suggested that a proportionately longer period be devoted to discussion from the floor.

2. *Presentation.* (See suggestion above.) One or more officers engaged in personnel work may be used, since they should be most familiar with the subject matter.

Where the local group contains officers from the various Arms or Services, it is suggested that those of the same Arm or Service be allowed the bulk of the discussion period to talk over in separate groups the specific career patterns set up for their particular branches.

3. *Points to be stressed*

a. The program is a long-range one whose success cannot be measured for some years. It applies to *all* Regular officers.

b. It does not set up stereotyped patterns, but contemplates various combinations of assignments leading to the same goal: readiness for high command or staff responsibilities.

c. It strives to reconcile individual interests with needs of the Service, to the benefit of both.

d. The officer's career is largely in his own hands. He has more to do with his own ultimate success or failure and his own career satisfaction than has anyone else.

4. *Questions for discussion*

Have the principles of career management been applied in your case? How do you know?

Will this program solve the Army's long-range problem of developing highly trained commanders and staff officers?

Can you propose a better system, or improvements on this one?

A number of our older officers have achieved eminent success in the Army even though they did not possess a college degree when commissioned. Do you believe opportunities for such officers in today's Army are greater or less than they were prior to World War II? Why?

All in all, do you believe the principles of the career management program for officers are being followed conscientiously, or do you believe that in practice they too often are ignored? What evidence do you have to support your opinion?

Do you believe the Army should contemplate even narrower specialization for officers, or do you believe that too much is now allowed? Give reasons for your answer.

*Produced under supervision of P & A Division, DAGS.

An Important Note About References . . .

Complying with requests from the field, we have added at the end of our main topic a list of background references. Please do not query the editors of *Officers' Call* as to where these references may be procured. The Department of the Army does not supply non-official publications, and the official publications we cite as references normally will have been distributed already. In any case, queries as to any publication which might be available through Army supply channels should be addressed to the nearest AG Publications Officer.

Officers' CALL

Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

VOLUME I NUMBER FOUR

CONTENTS

Distribution: One per Army officer on active duty.

The public criticism of our Army following World War II was perhaps more intense than in any earlier post-war period. One of the grounds for complaint was the actual or supposed shortcomings of our officers. Some of this criticism was unfounded or purposely exaggerated. Some of it was justified, and was the kind of criticism the Army expects, and even solicits, from the people it serves.

When its competence and integrity are attacked, justly or otherwise, the officer corps has only one recourse. It cannot answer its critics in words alone. Instead, it must renew its efforts to promulgate standards of conduct which are above reproach, and then make sure that every officer lives by these standards. There is no other way for our officers, singly or as a corps, to earn and keep that public confidence and esteem which are among the unique rewards of an Army career.

Gordon Gray

Gordon Gray is a graduate of the University of North Carolina and Yale Law School.

He was an enlisted man and officer in the Army during World War II, and served overseas with Headquarters of the 12th Army Group.

Mr. Gray was nominated by President Truman as Assistant Secretary of the Army and took office on 24 September 1947. In February 1948, he became responsible for the Industrial Mobilization and Procurement Activities of the Department of the Army, and since that time has been the Army member of the Munitions Board. Upon the resignation of Secretary of the Army, Kenneth C. Royall, on 27 April 1949, Mr. Gray assumed the duties of Acting Secretary of the Army.

On 19 May 1949, following nomination by President Truman, he was confirmed by the Senate as Under Secretary of the Army, and on 25 May 1949, he took the oath as Under Secretary.

On 7 June, 1949, President Truman nominated Mr. Gray as Secretary of the Army.

CHARTING YOUR OFFICIAL CONDUCT

Among the objectives of the Officers' Information Program is that of promoting a mature awareness among officers of the personal and professional standards required in the military profession. Every officer, regardless of his length of service, knows in a general way what his Army and country expect of him. With experience comes a richer appreciation of the reasons behind these professional standards. His technical proficiency is normally acquired by conscious effort; but mature understanding of the more intangible facets of his profession comes less consciously. Every officer acquires knowledge that he hardly knows he possesses—unless there is opportunity now and then to think, and talk with others, about it. The material of today's discussion falls in this category. Perhaps none of it will be entirely new to any officer. But a new look at old facts can be as beneficial as the gathering of new ones.

A later discussion in this series will examine the essential PERSONAL *qualities of an officer—the ethical and moral fiber of the person himself which enables him to live by the written and unwritten standards of official behavior that are the subject of today's discussion.*



Figure 1.

What Are the Main Guides to Official Behavior?

The official actions and behavior required of an officer have two main sources of authority. First, as an official of his Service, of the National Military Establishment, and of the Federal Government, his performance of duty is governed by written law and rules which (for the Army officer) are embodied in the Articles of War, Army Regulations, circulars, bulletins, and the various orders and memoranda of appropriate commands. Second, his official behavior is affected by a body of customs and tradition.

Must an Officer Know All the Written Rules?

Admittedly it is difficult for an officer to keep himself thoroughly informed on all published orders and regulations pertaining to his official duties and conduct. Besides the general rules of Army-wide application, he must be familiar with those related to his assignment and to the affairs of his command. He is expected to keep up with changed and new material constantly being published in this field.

Discharge of this duty, like any other, calls for judgment as well as diligence. It is entirely possible for an officer to waste time under the impression that meticulous, but indiscriminate, scrutiny of a stack of regulations is required of him. Every command has facilities for lightening the burden of individual officers in this respect. The total output of higher command levels is normally screened and particularly important matters digested in daily bulletins and similar local publications. The purpose of these is to reduce the time each officer must spend keeping abreast of the instructions that guide his daily work. They give him the gist of the more general instructions, and alert him to the existence of special instructions pertaining to his field of activity.

Thus, few officers are required to read every word of every official publication in order to feel that they know what is required of them. In the normal administrative routine, an officer can be fairly certain that the things he *must* know about will be called to his attention by one means or another.

How Does Custom Affect an Officer's Behavior?

Customs of the Service constitute a body of precedent inherited from soldiers of past generations and of various countries. Usually these can be traced to historical events, often on the battlefield. Customs become obsolete or are modified to meet changing conditions. Through the centuries their value has been to give continuity to beliefs and principles of the military profession which have been found essential to its effectiveness.

A complete statement of these customs of the Service will not be found in writing, although a number of helpful compilations are available. Custom, by its very nature, eludes most attempts at codification; even the newest account is likely to be partially out of date. The officer lives in his own time, and helps to create new customs and traditions, while living by older ones. Knowing about the past does not require him to live in the past. The most valuable customs—the only useful ones, in fact—are those which help today's officer deal with today's problems. The customs which become obsolete are those which do not meet this test.

Many customs have evolved into officially prescribed practices. For example, the regulations governing salutes and ceremonies are the formalized expression of many ancient customs. The written rules provide a standard for the perpetuation and uniform observance of these customs throughout the Service.

Other customs survive without the necessity of formal expression. The commonly observed custom that officers do not carry umbrellas, for example, has its basis in common sense and the general standards regarding soldierly appearance.

Official Behavior Is a Reflection of Individual Character

The fact that *personal* standards of behavior are to be treated in a later discussion certainly carries no implication that personal and official behavior are separate or unrelated subjects. On the contrary, they are as close to (and dependent upon) each other as the two sides of a coin. It is solely for convenience in discussion that these two aspects of an officer's conduct have been arbitrarily divided. We cannot speak of an officer's honesty and integrity, for example, without involving both his character and his official actions. This direct relation between personal and official behavior will be assumed in the discussion which follows.

Professional Integrity

Written and verbal statements

The effectiveness of the Army's command and administrative machinery depends primarily upon the personal integrity of its officers. This vital machinery would break down entirely if personal integrity could not be presumed as a common characteristic. The many types of official statements and certificates by which much Army business is transacted are useful only because an officer's signature is a kind of legal tender, giving an established value to what otherwise is no more than a piece of paper. Every careless or unscrupulous use of this legal tender lowers its intrinsic value for the Army as a whole. Like money, its value is based partly upon confidence.

To be careful and scrupulous is not the same as meticulous observance of the *letter* at sacrifice of the broad *intent.* Blind adherence to an obviously inapplicable instruction is no more desirable than deliberate violation of an applicable one. For example, an officer signs the customary statement that his commissary purchases are solely for use by himself and his dependents. Then he worries about the possible impropriety of serving this food to his guests. An extreme case, certainly, but one that illustrates the folly of literal-mindedness unsupported by common sense.

The official statements of an officer, by certificate or otherwise, are worth less than nothing unless they mean what they say and are made without mental reservations or intent to evade their purpose. A good working rule is to regard even the simplest certificate as having the weight you would give to an oath in a court of law. If the certificate employs the phrase "I certify . . . " pretend that it reads "I solemnly swear . . . "

There are times when rigid honesty can be of temporary disadvantage to the officer concerned. But there is abundant proof that it is the best course in the long run. Some years ago an officer of high rank and distinguished record borrowed a relatively small amount of money from a civilian with whom he was also associated in a Government transaction. This was a relatively minor indiscretion in itself, yet when it came to light in a routine investigation, the officer denied the indebtedness. He was subsequently tried by court martial. The severe sentence of dismissal was not awarded for his indiscretion in borrowing the money, but for his deliberately false official statement concerning it.



Figure 2.

. . . an officer's word or signature is a form of legal tender, based on confidence . . .

Carelessness regarding official certificates may be less rare than outright dishonesty, but its effects can be equally unpleasant. Some years ago a civilian salvage clerk prepared a series of reports regarding the sales of unserviceable property. The accompanying signatures of the appropriate officers attested to the accuracy of the reports. When the clerk was discovered to have embezzled property included in the reports, these officers were held liable for considerable sums of money. Their honesty was not impugned; but they had not assured themselves of the accuracy of the certificates they had signed.

The most critical test of integrity an officer ever faces, of course, is when his word involves the lives of men in battle. Battle information is worse than nothing unless it can be accepted without question by those responsible for making decisions based upon it. In the flow of reports from the smallest unit to the highest headquarters, a departure from strict truth by any echelon imperils the whole operation.

The ability to report the truth at any cost is not something an officer can put on for battle purposes only. If he is not honest by long habit in all his duties, it is unlikely that he will suddenly become so under fire.

Private versus public interests

In many military assignments, officers represent the Army in important transactions with private individuals and organizations. Through the years, a body of regulatory principles have developed for the guidance of officers in performing such duties. Both affirmatively and in the form of prohibitions and restrictions, they comprise a code of official practices. Only a random selection need be considered here, the purpose being to show the common logic behind them, and why they are helpful to the officers concerned.

One familiar restriction concerns the acceptance by officers (or their families) of gifts from individuals or firms with whom they are transacting Government business. The purpose of this restriction (as with many others) is sometimes misunderstood. Certainly it does not spring from any notion that officers are prone to questionable dealings unless specifically warned to avoid them. Actually this particular restriction is a help to an officer in his official relations

with outside individuals and firms. Knowledge of its existence by both parties in the transaction helps to insure that the officer's decisions will be based solely on the best interests of the Army and the Government. It provides him with official sanction for avoiding situations which, actually or presumably, would make it more difficult to exercise impartial and detached judgment.

Similar restrictions apply to other situations that might affect an officer's fitness to discharge public business. For example, an officer cannot have a financial interest in a business concern when his duty includes arranging purchase by the Government of articles of the kind manufactured and sold by that concern. Neither can he serve as the Army's agent in business transactions with a firm in which he has a direct or indirect interest.

Officers also are required to refrain from business and professional activities and interests that tend to interfere with or hamper the full and proper discharge of their military duties. The restriction includes situations about which there might be reasonable suspicion that such is the case. The officer's personal integrity is the essential guide here, because no regulation can embrace all the particulars of all cases. If an officer has honest doubts as to whether his own case is within the letter and spirit of the regulations, he should request a decision by appropriate authorities.

Many officers have resolved such problems by disposing of business interests or discontinuing the activities in question. This is a sound general policy.

For example, some years ago an officer owned part interest in a riding school. His partner, without the officer's knowledge, arranged to stable some Army mounts at Government expense. To avoid even a suspicion of questionable practice, the officer disposed of his interests in the business. Another officer was part owner of a small rural bus line. When the Army began to patronize the line for the convenience of individual soldiers, he withdrew from the business although he had taken no direct or indirect action to obtain the Army's patronage. Both of these officers chose to protect the Army's good name and their own reputations—which is always a wise course when doubts exist.

May Officers Take Part in Politics?

Law and customs affect the extent to which an officer may take part in the political life of his nation and community. The privilege and responsibility of voting, of course, is the same for all citizens and is not the kind of political activity under consideration.

Most of the limitations on an officer's political activity are applicable to many other officials and employees of the Federal Government. Others have their roots in the tradition that our military strength is an instrument of a free people, and that undue political influence by the military would threaten the continuance of this vital relationship. These are the broad principles behind the restrictions on political activities of officers.

An officer on active duty may not use his official authority or influence to interfere with or affect the outcome of an election. His expression of private and informal political opinions is unrestricted.

An officer on active duty may not hold civil office. He may, however, accept nomination as candidate for public office provided no direct or indirect action is taken by him to obtain such nomination. If elected, his resignation, retirement, or transfer to the inactive list would necessarily precede his assumption of the office. Moreover, in election activities he is not permitted to make speeches or otherwise solicit votes for himself or others. These two latter restrictions apply whether or not an officer is a candidate for office, and prevent his taking part in political conventions, serving on political committees, and engaging in similar activities that might influence the result of an election.

Because military policy and practice are instruments of our political institutions, the public pronouncements of officers on military matters often cannot avoid political meanings and implications. Consequently, laws and regulations have defined the extent to which officers are free to engage in public discussion regarding such matters. The purpose is to avoid situations prejudicial to the discipline of the Service and the confidence of the public, resulting from undue controversy or misleading interpretations of military or Government policy.

To assist officers in the observance of these standards, the Office of Defense and the Department of the Army maintain facilities for the clearance of materials intended for inclusion in public statements, addresses, and publications. Security and propriety are the yardsticks applied to all materials submitted to these agencies. Within these limits, officers are encouraged to contribute to public knowledge of military matters. The writing of books, articles for professional journals and magazines of general circulation, and the giving of public addresses on military and general subjects—all these are in the public (and the Army's) interest so long as they conform to the spirit of the rules governing them.

The Officer and Legislation

Legislation affecting the Army

An officer may appear before a Congressional committee regarding legislation affecting the Army only when specifically authorized or directed to do so by the Secretary of the Army, or when summoned by Congressional authority. On such occasions, the officer's testimony may include his opinions and beliefs, when called for, on the policies and facts related to the proposed legislation.

Private legislation

Like all citizens, officers may avail themselves of the procedures by which the Congress, in private bills, grants reimbursement for damage or loss to person or property. However, such legislation is proper in the case of an officer only on matters which the Army or other appropriate administrative agency is not authorized to adjust.

Occasionally, an Army officer finds that he has a legitimate interest as an individual, in legislation not connected with the military establishment. For example, he may own lands in an area which would be affected by a proposed flood control project. In such a case, it would be proper for him to approach his Congressman just as any other private individual might, and state his interest in the proposed legislation. His only caution in this case, as suggested above, must be that his status as an official of the Army does not enter into or influence the transaction in any way.

The Officer and Public Property

Custody of public property is one of the most inclusive of an officer's responsibilities, applicable alike to property personally in his care and property used by persons under his command. There is hardly an assignment normally filled by an officer that does not involve the stewardship of things that belong to the American people. We need not dwell here on the technical distinctions between accountability and responsibility for public property; both relate to an officer's duty to care for property placed in his charge.

Like many other command functions, the administration of supply and supply accounting often must be delegated, but the *responsibility* is not delegated. This indicates the importance of selecting trustworthy persons to perform the administrative functions relating to property, and of inculcating habits of economy and proper maintenance throughout the command.



Figure 3.

The conditions of war inevitably cause some deterioration of personal attitudes toward public property. Officers should understand why this is so. Our wartime troops, particularly in combat units, became accustomed to somewhat relaxed standards of supply accounting. Often they are not in a position to perceive clearly the vital difference between the intentional expending of matériel which saves lives and the inevitable instances of waste unjustified by military necessity. In peacetime, especially soon after a war period, the readjustment of attitudes toward the Army's properties is an important duty of all officers. This readjustment must begin with the officer corps if it is to permeate the thinking and behavior of the Army as a whole.

The money value of the property an officer has in his care may range from a few dollars to many millions. But the same standard should guide his care and use of it: meticulous observance of appropriate regulations. This standard is most readily achieved when the officer applies high personal standards of integrity to the routine of administration.

How Well Educated Should an Officer Be?

A general objective of the Department of the Army is that all Regular officers have at least two years of college training or its equivalent. Considered superficially, this objective appears to place a rather moderate premium on academic attainments as a factor of professional fitness. The requirement, however, is clearly a *minimum* standard. No officer should consider his education completed merely because he has reached or surpassed this standard. Members of the military profession, as of all professions, are rightly said to be always in the educational process, and this process extends far beyond the military and other schooling received during their careers. An officer's successive command and staff assignments also are stages in his professional education, in the same way that a physician's practice improves his professional ability.

Concentration on purely professional studies does not always produce the best officer. In recent years, particularly, our greatest officers have shown outstanding abilities of a kind not commonly thought to be best developed in the military calling. These officers were given special responsibilities because their self-education through the years had included broad study and preparation beyond the narrow requirements of professional competence. Vast intellectual curiosity is a common characteristic of these officers, leading not only to mastery of their own profession, but of the fields which give that profession its real meaning in the affairs of the Nation and the world.

Every officer can emulate to some extent this trait of *endless curiosity* which leads to maturity and breadth of mind. The reading habits of officers cannot be standardized—nor should they be, beyond the requirement of keeping up with pertinent regulations and other official writings. But all officers are encouraged to develop their own professional and allied reading interests. Appropriate professional journals, Service papers, books, and pamphlets certainly should be regular items on the officer's reading list; the best military histories and biographies are valuable for more than facts alone. They enrich the officer's grasp of intangible and universal values without which he cannot claim to be truly wise in his profession or as a man. Even fiction sometimes can be classed as professional reading—there are masterpieces that deserve the attention of any officer. And a general disinterest in poetry ought not to prevent an officer's gaining the wisdom and history to be found in such works as Benet's *John Brown's Body*.

Officers have unusual opportunities, as well, for formal education. Extension and other courses available through the United States Armed Forces Institute may lead to academic credit without disruption of the officer's career. The Army assigns limited numbers of officers to earn graduate degrees in selected fields at outstanding American universities. Many officers, on their own initiative, attend night courses at colleges near their duty stations.

Thus, an officer's education is only partly a matter of attending the prescribed Service schools. These are the specific means of professional training. They have greatest value when the officer combines with them general educational achievements.

The Officer and Human Relationships

The structure of an Army is at once similar to, and different from, other systems by which the efforts of many are employed for a common purpose. As in any society, the Army's basic ingredient is the individual person. The Army is different from civilian society in the degree to which its members must exercise (and place themselves under) authority.

The human relationships that bind an Army together, therefore, are basically like those of all large organizations. The differences are of degree rather than of kind, and stem from the qualities an Army

must have to be an Army. There is time here to consider only a few of the most essential qualities that affect an officer's relations with his superiors and subordinates.

Loyalty

The loyalty required of an officer includes, but is more specific than, the loyalty to country, Government, and flag expected of all citizens. With these as a foundation, the officer's loyalty is applied directly to his performance of duty. It finds expression both in obedience to higher authority and in genuine concern for the welfare of all persons under his command. This two-way flow of loyalty is the intangible element which holds a military organization together, and enables it to perform its mission.

Although loyalty is a priceless quality at all levels of command, some of the most striking examples have occurred at the highest levels, where the fate of armies and nations may sometimes hinge on a single major decision. An excellent example of this kind featured the planning for the Normandy landings in 1944. The tentative plans included the landing of two airborne divisions on the Cherbourg Peninsula as integral elements of the assault force. General Eisenhower's air advisor, Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory, had strong doubts as to the wisdom of this operation. Almost until D-day he continued to press his sincere view that the possible tactical gain would be far outweighed by the chances of unduly heavy casualties in the American airborne divisions. At the same time he energetically supported all the steps taken to prepare for the proposed operations. It now is history that General Eisenhower chose to accept the risk involved in the airborne landings. It also is history that the British airman immediately expressed his delight at the successful outcome, and his regret at having been forced by conscience to add to General Eisenhower's great burdens. The loyalty of this British officer consisted in his whole-hearted support of a decision with which he sincerely disagreed.

Loyalty to subordinates is the other half of this quality. Another way of putting it is that an officer cannot be truly loyal to his superiors *unless* he also is loyal to those under his command. Only the officer guided by this principle can be fully effective as the link between the commands above and below his own. Loyalty to subordinates often is exemplified in ways that in other walks of life are regarded only as desirable outward signs of kindliness or common courtesy. They are more than this for an officer. During tours of advanced positions General Eisenhower's habitual concern for the comfort of his jeep driver was consistently evident. Many officers of far lesser rank and responsibility did not always observe these seemingly trivial demonstrations of loyalty.



Figure 4.

Respect

The necessity for discipline and the prompt and efficient performance of military duty are generally understood throughout the Army. The enforcement of these standards by commanders is never facilitated by tyrannical and capricious conduct or the verbal abuse of subordinates. The officer who errs in this direction weakens the value of whatever stronger qualities he may possess; he may avoid complete failure but he will never be as successful as he might be.

The balance between aloofness and comradeship in the relation of a commander to his troops is a highly personal thing, not capable of being stated as a universal rule. Extreme aloofness is no more commendable than its opposite of over-familiarity. Every officer necessarily finds for himself the point of balance that reconciles his personal traits with the requirements of effective command. The officer whose natural inclination is to remain coldly aloof and the officer who leans toward the "we're all-pals" kind of gregariousness, are both likely to achieve appropriate adjustments as a result of experience. If his command is exercised in a manner that preserves and actively fosters the self-respect of subordinates, the officer has the best proof that his personal traits are helping (or at least not hindering) his effective performance of duty.

Fairness

The loyalty and respect of troops for their commander is always partly conditioned by his reputation for fairness. There always are overtones of admiration when soldiers say, "The old man may be tough, but he's fair." Hardly any other personal quality can equal fairness in its effect on the attitudes of subordinates. A reputation for fairness often has led to successful command by officers whose other gifts were little better than average.

Fairness covers a broad area of official behavior. It includes a tactful combination of public praise and private censure. It enters into the selection of individuals for promotion. It dominates the whole task of military discipline. It is the core of military justice.

The Officer and Military Justice

The administration of military justice involves some of the most important duties an officer is called upon to assume. His main written guide on such matters is the Manual for Courts-Martial. But to his knowledge of the rules of justice, he is expected to apply those personal qualities of mind and heart that are the bridge between abstract principle and concrete



Figure 5.

practice. This requires sound understanding not only of the procedures by which justice is done but also of the reasons behind the procedures.

The procedures are all in writing, so that the officer faced with a problem of justice need never be uncertain of his general course of action. His specific functions as investigating officer, summary court, or member of a special or general court martial are described in the manual just mentioned and in other regulations.

It is with the larger purposes of military justice that we are concerned here. Why must an Army have its own agencies for the administration of justice? And what is the average officer's part in this vital function?

The sometimes overworked term, "military necessity," has specific meaning here. The mission of an Army, and the conditions under which it operates, require a greater degree of control over the behavior of its members than is normally true of a civilian community. Such control includes procedures capable of handling expeditiously those individuals who violate military law. Fair and prompt dealing with military offenders is an integral part of the discipline and order which in peacetime is an Army's mark of readiness and in wartime is a prime requisite of combat effectiveness. Thus, a minor offense by a soldier carries greater potential danger to the general welfare than the same offense by a private citizen. There is an obvious difference, for example, between the possible consequences of a soldier falling asleep at a front-line post and a village constable doing the same on his nightly rounds.

There are two main purposes for an Army-administered system of trial and punishment of military offenders. The first is to deter repetition of the offenses, both by the convicted persons and by others who might otherwise succumb to temptation. The second purpose is to encourage the reformation of offenders by providing understandable motives for adherence to the right and avoidance of the wrong.

Both of these purposes suggest the spirit in which the law's letter must be applied if military justice is to accomplish its ends. Observance of the spirit implies, first of all, the exercise of those qualities of leadership which solve many problems of justice before they arise. It is an axiom that unusually high rates of military offenses are symptomatic of deficient leadership.

But it also is an axiom that even under the best leadership, a certain number of soldiers will run afoul of the law through offenses of varying seriousness. The system of military justice is concerned particularly, if not solely, with this comparatively small segment of the military population.

Whether assigning "company punishment" or voting for a sentence in a general court martial, the officer has several established principles to guide him. Once guilt has been established by strict adherence to prescribed procedures, he should give due consideration to all the factors which will result in a just balance between the interests of the Army and of the individual. Matters such as the age and experience of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and the probability of reformation must be weighed against the broader interests of the Service and of the command. Will unusual leniency tend to prejudice the general discipline of the command? Will unusual severity prevent or delay this soldier's eventual reform and return to effective duty? Was his offense attributable in any way to shortcomings of his leaders? These are some of the questions that deserve serious study in reaching decisions related to military justice.

A Mobile Army Requires Mobile Minds

References to the "military mind" often are as derogatory as they are inaccurate. We need not avoid the term merely because it sometimes is used badly, for there are habits of thought, produced by military knowledge and experience, that are aptly described in summary as the "military mind."

One characteristic of the true military mind is an ability to think under stress, to reach a decision and act upon it without delay. In situations where vacillation might spell military disaster, the instant choice of the right action is, of course, the ideal. Sometimes, what appears to be the right action proves in the end to be wrong, but the officer who takes it is still partly right. In military operations, the only absolute error is no action at all. Only the officer who says, "I don't know what to do so I shall do nothing," can be said to have failed entirely in the exercise of mental mobility.

Mobility implies flexibility, which as a mental quality is marked by an officer's receptiveness to new ideas, willingness to experiment and improvise, accept carefully calculated risks, and depart from prepared plans in order to exploit boldly an unforeseen opportunity.

Among the great captains of World War II, General Bradley proved on several occasions that part of his tactical genius lay in the ability to grasp and exploit sudden opportunities. The Remagen Bridgehead in-



Figure 6.

cident illustrates this. Its capture was totally unexpected, and raised the immediate question whether to stick to the original plan of attack or to capitalize on the sudden good fortune even though it would mean far-reaching adjustments for many of the units engaged. A mind less flexible than that of General Bradley (and General Eisenhower, who instantly approved Bradley's bold concept) would probably have chosen to continue the slower, but more certain advance according to plan. Many decisions of this kind, less vital only in that fewer troops were involved, are scattered through the combat histories of units, large and small, in all the theaters of war.

An indispensable corollary of the officer's own mental mobility is the careful cultivation of this quality in the men of all ranks under his command. If the mental alertness of soldiers is permitted to deteriorate into the dull and questionless response of robots, their commander soon will discover that he has extinguished the intangible spark that is the difference between a fighting unit and a mere assemblage of people.

Keeping this spark alive is a main objective of the Troop Information Program, which is designed to assist commanders in this important duty. The soldier who is given frequent opportunity to keep up with significant happenings outside his immediate experience, to examine the principles underlying the way of life he is sworn to defend, and to learn the larger reasons for the things he is called upon to do is, in the Army's view, bound to be a better soldier and citizen. It is worth emphasizing that the principles behind the Troop Information Program are applicable to the entire official relationship of officers and subordinates. Most great military leaders have pointed to dissemination of information as a main factor of effective command and success in war. The native ingenuity and initiative of the American soldier must be actively nourished by encouragement and genuine evidence of interest by his superiors.

There is abundant proof that these qualities of American soldiers have played a large role in our military achievements. It was the genius of a sergeant, for example, that broke the stalemate in the the hedgerows of Normandy in the summer of 1944. For weeks the First Army's power was immobilized by the ancient hedgerows, behind which the Germans concentrated mortars and machine guns. Then the sergeant had an idea for an improvised cutting device to be attached on the front of tanks. The idea was promptly adopted and the tanks fitted out in great secrecy. Suddenly the enemy units which had become used to the perfect cover of the hedgerows saw our tanks penetrating them at several points, and the advantage soon shifted to our forces. It is unnecessary to make the futile claim that the sergeant's idea won

the war or even the immediate engagement. We do have the word of high authority that without his device victory would have been harder and costlier. It is worth speculating what the outcome might have been if the sergeant had belonged to a unit whose officers were accustomed to judging the merit of an idea by the rank of the person holding it.

Summary

An officer's official behavior is guided by law and other written rules, and by a body of custom and tradition. His adherence to law and custom is a reflection of his personal character; only his own integrity can guarantee full observance of many of the rules that guide his performance of duty.

Most of the restrictions on an officer's official behavior are designed to assist him, not to place arbitrary controls on his freedom. Other rules help to maintain public confidence in the Army by minimizing the grounds for possible distrust in the integrity of its officers. An understanding of the larger purposes behind these restrictions is an important facet of the officer's professional knowledge.

The educational interests of an officer should not be confined to academic achievement and completion of the prescribed Service schools. The officer's self-education is a continuing and personal responsibility leading to broader professional competence and the general cultural enrichment desirable in all professions.

Among the essential attributes for successful human relations, an officer should demonstrate loyalty to superiors and subordinates; ability to command respect by avoiding the extremes of aloofness and over-familiarity; and the application of strict fairness to all problems of command.

Mobility and flexibility are true marks of the "military mind" in the best sense of that often-abused term. These qualities should be cultivated carefully by the officer himself and encouraged actively throughout his command.

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600–40	"	"	—Wearing of Service Uniform
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600–700	"	"	—Public Relations
605–125	"	"	—Visits of Courtesy
605–180	"	"	—Traveling on Duty
605–230	"	"	—Reclassification
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" . . . the professional soldier has all the weaknesses of other humans but with few of the petty virtues. . . . But he has three great virtues which are not too common: One, he is absolutely honest, and this applies not to money matters only; second, he has a clean-cut conception of what the word 'duty' means and, drolly enough in this modern age, he uses it in all seriousness; and he has faith. Faith in the country and its destiny, in democracy and its methods, in something greater outside of this puny human intellect of ours . . . "

—*The Infantry Journal Reader*, p. 7

UNIFICATION AND THE "MILITARY MIND"

Excerpts from an Address by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson*

. . . I use the expression "military mind" in praise—even though I am conscious of the slurs that are often cast upon it. Too often the term has been taken to mean a stubborn, calloused, self-seeking, change-resisting attitude deemed characteristic of men in uniform,—especially generals and admirals. And while such a description may be applicable to a few . . . —it certainly is not characteristic of the profession as a whole . . .

On the whole . . . no profession in our lifetime has been subject to more revolutionary and dramatic change than has the military. And none has proved itself more adaptable than this "military mind."

In 1917, when I joined the Army, all military tactics were geared to the speed of a foot soldier marching 3 to 4 miles an hour. The potentialities of the combustion engine had hardly been developed, and surprise strategic efforts were made by the exploitation of 20-mile-an-hour trucks. The military mind was not much faster or more efficient than the tools it had to work with. The airplane had arrived but it served principally as an auxiliary eye to the artillery. Air power as such lived largely in the imagination of a few zealots.

A change in tempo occurred in World War II, resulting from the application of scientific developments to the art of war, which characterized our whole effort. And this must be credited to the constant endeavor by the military minds of our country to keep abreast of every development.

We won a war against the toughest and most skilful military machines the world had yet to produce—a war for which the Germans had been preparing for more than 20 years and the Japanese for about 40 years. In that victory it was the military mind that played the vital roles. When we criticize military men for some of their seeming shortcomings, in all fairness, let us remember the accomplishments of the profession as a whole and be grateful for its vital role in our history . . .

For the real pay-off in close-knit military teamwork, the crossing of the Channel in 1944 is perhaps the most triumphant illustration. Here was the finest kind of example of triphibious thinking in battle. General Eisenhower and his staff planned in terms of the capabilities of all three Services separately, together, and on the team. Officers of the three Services thoroughly familiar with their own basic weapons, tactics, and organization now had become triphibious-minded for the benefit of the all-American thrust.

On the Normandy beaches, the soldiers who went ashore were protected by Air Force cover. They were supported by Navy guns. Navy beachmasters directed the actual landings. Men of every Service died together on those beaches. Men who can die together can live together.

. . . Today we are on the threshold of the latest development of the so-called military mind, a development made necessary by the need for meeting the demands of modern war while maintaining the economic stability of our country. Those who fought overseas and experienced the unified effort of land, and sea, and air forces need no argument to convince them of the urgent requirement for greater unification. They know our people foot the bills. They recognize the indispensable military need for assuring the financial solvency of our whole economic structure. They are aware of the costly duplications inherent in three separate Services, and they demand greater unification . . .

What the Command and Staff School and the Army War College did to consolidate the Army, we are now doing at the National War College and our Industrial College in Washington and our Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk to unify the three Services.

What the War Department General Staff did in Washington to develop Army solidarity from the day of Root to the tenure of Stimson, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff consisting of officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines, together with those officers from these Services on duty in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, will do by combining their efforts to accelerate the realization of unification . . .

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* Before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, 22 April 1949.

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Notes on Works of Professional Interest to Officers . . .

THE PRICE OF POWER*

By Hanson Baldwin

Justice without force is impotent.
Force without justice is tyrannical.
We must therefore combine justice with force.
—Pascal

This volume represents a sober attempt to dispel some of the confusion in the public mind as to the nature of future war. Ridiculous theories and dangerous concepts engendered by recent scientific discoveries, especially the atomic bomb, are carefully and logically refuted.

The book, product of 2 years' study, grew out of 18 discussion meetings held by a group of distinguished experts on foreign affairs, professors, economists, Armed Forces officers, and business men. Mr. Baldwin, who is military analyst of the *New York Times*, acted as chairman of the group. Although the book is based on a composite study, the conclusions are those of Mr. Baldwin.

Some of Mr. Baldwin's assumptions and conclusions are open to argument, but there can be little possible debate as to the accuracy and authenticity of his facts. This very valuable survey is significant for its realism and its logical attention to basic fundamentals.

Mr. Baldwin has succeeded in doing three things exceedingly well: (1) he sets forth clearly the political, economic, psychological, and military position of the United States with respect to the other nations of the world; (2) he analyzes this in terms of meaning and effect; and (3) he points out a way—a course of action—to follow in maintaining world peace, or, in case of a global war, to national survival.

This is not a book for wishful thinkers, pacifists, or isolationists. Neither will the advocates of capitalistic imperialism find it any more to their liking. In fact, Mr. Baldwin says in his concluding remarks that the course of action to be followed by our Government is "the middle way"—a course of practical internationalism as opposed to isolationism, nationalism, or imperialism.

As one may judge from the title, *The Price of Power* is a book of particular significance to the military man. It is an exposition of the "modern American strategical problem." This problem, as Mr. Baldwin puts it, is that " . . . if we take a long view of history, if we keep our feet in the mud and our eyes are on the stars, we must recognize that another war, sometime, somewhere, of some nature, is extremely probable. We must also recognize that neither the United Nations nor a federalized world order are likely to avert permanently the recurrence of conflict. National military strength, therefore, is still essential —in fact, more essential than ever, in the age of atomic bombs and swift, globe-girdling missiles."

In brief, the book is addressed to the problem of American power and its proper use in this atomic age. To introduce the problem, however, the author examines and debunks a number of untruths that frequently color contemporary thinking on military matters. He says we must rid our minds of such fallacies as:

1. Peace in our time.
2. We were totally unprepared before.
3. A strong Army and Navy will prevent war.
4. Disarmament means insecurity.
5. The United States will be the first attacked in any future war.
6. Invasion of the United States is now possible.
7. The United States must be attacked before it will enter war.

* Harper & Bros. for THE COUNCIL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 1948—361 pages. Notes, appendices, index. $3.75.

What Mr. Baldwin says on these subjects makes interesting reading. His remarks are lucid, concise, and logical.

It is important to note the author's estimate of the psychological and spiritual qualities of our people. They are probably the least reassuring of the values he attributes to our great nation. Man and not the machine, in spite of the overwhelming importance of industry in war, is still the artisan of victory. Morale has always been of the greatest significance in war and nothing in the atomic age decreases the importance we must attach to leadership and moral courage. Aside from this and our tendency toward wasteful exploitation of our resources, Mr. Baldwin finds greater strength than weakness in the world position of the United States today.

Mr. Baldwin's estimate of the effect of pushbutton warfare on first, the Navy and second, the Army, is of interest to the military:

1. "Navies were not made obsolete by Bikini, but naval design and naval tactics were affected, and the persistent radioactivity introduced a new problem to military medicine and to military morale."

2. "Atomic explosives and atomic power have not, and probably will not be, utilized by ground armies for years to come, but the trend toward increased power, increased range, and greater mobility, marked during the war, will continue."

Pushbutton war is defined by the author in a discussion of missiles in which he says: "The missile combines in one implement three of war's tools—the plane, the pilot, and the gun. This is why it is, *in the fullest sense,* the instrument of pushbutton war. That type of warfare is not yet possible, will not be *fully* possible for fifteen, twenty, or thirty years, and man, in any case, will always be the controlling brain."

There are excellent chapters on intelligence, economic mobilization, dispersion and decentralization of industry, and research and development—written from the military point of view and stressing the extent to which the whole life of the nation is involved in the price of power. The chapter on the "Military Position" of the United States in the world today compares our technological and scientific developments with those of other nations. Officers who do not have access to classified materials on this subject will find this chapter interesting and informative—and debatable. The discussion of the atomic bomb, long-range missiles, new model submarines, new gases, and the threat of biological and radiological warfare, places new emphasis on the strategic problems facing this country.

The lesson to be drawn from this book is well stated by the author himself:

> ". . . a proper defense of our way of life must mean more than guns and dollars. We can prepare for total war, even in the atomic age, without becoming a garrison state, we can achieve 'defense-by-offense' without becoming an imperialist power, but we can do these things not with guns or dollars alone but with spirit, mind, and heart.
>
> "The American people must grow to their new responsibilities of power. They can be political introverts no longer; the past is dead; the future reigns. Nor can we, with safety to our institutions or to the world, retain the adolescent instability which has characterized too many of our past policies. We must develop an international sense of humor which is a sense of proportion, for proportion is the prime condition of justice."

THE OFFICER'S GUIDE*

The 1949 edition of this widely-known book is now available. Officers may purchase it by mail through the publishers, or through the various Service journals which have book service departments.

This new volume brings up to date the valuable features of its predecessors, and constitutes a treasure-chest of helpful information and guidance. For many years, younger officers have found the various editions of *Officer's Guide* useful in orienting themselves in their new profession, while older officers have found them valuable as convenient references. The new edition will continue to serve these purposes.

Leadership is given new treatment in which techniques, rather than intangible principles, are emphasized. The 68-page chapter, *The Army of the United States,* which appeared in earlier editions, has been replaced by four new chapters, *The National Military Establishment, The Department of the Army, The Air Force,* and *The Department of the Navy,* totaling some 63 pages.

Particularly appropriate to the subject matter of this issue of *Officers' Call* is the chapter entitled *The Code of the Army.*

* Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 652 pp. Illustrations, charts, diagrams, index. $3.50.

PRO & CON

Letters from the field

Gentlemen:

. . . My opinion, and that of the majority of my officers, is that this program fills a real need. I have heard no adverse comment concerning either the program itself or the subjects listed for treatment . . . .

Brigadier General,
U. S. Army

Gentlemen:

. . . I was conducting a group discussion on the subject, "The Officer Group." When I made the statement and showed my chart that 45 per cent of the Army officers had 4 or more years of college education, it was seriously questioned . . . .

Major, MSC

● *"Dear Major:*

In answer to your inquiry, there is inclosed a chart giving the latest data, based on a 10 per cent sampling, which is considered accurate. You will note that the over-all average of college graduates is 41 per cent plus. The figure of 45 per cent in Officers' Call, No. 1, was arrived at in the same way but applies to an earlier date. The survey or samplings upon which the figures are based are taken quarterly . . ."

The Editors

Gentlemen:

Just recently I completed the Armed Forces Information School at Carlisle Barracks, and we briefly touched upon the Officers' Information Program.

A few days before I left school I was given a copy of *Officers' Call*—the first edition. Presently I am at Headquarters ..... Naval District, doing Public Information work.

. . . I enjoyed the first issue very much—it has already helped me in my job.

Ensign, U. S. Navy

● *There have been a number of such letters from Navy readers, including admirals, and from members of the Air Force. We are not aware of any plans to initiate new programs (paralleling this one) in either of the other Services.*

The Editors

Gentlemen:

. . . The discussion leader experienced difficulty in attempting to cover the requisite material in the 1-hour period . . . Since the members of the group were interested and offered much in the way of pertinent comment, the meeting extended well beyond the allocated time. Perhaps the most flattering comment which can be made is a simple statement . . . That the plus time expenditure was welcomed by all concerned . . . .

Major, Signal Corps

Gentlemen:

. . . I am most pleased with the program thus far and would like to point out that the discussions have been marked by the interest, voluntary participation in discussion, and freedom of expression on the part of all concerned.

However, it is the unanimous belief of those who have expressed an opinion that there is too much material in either of the issues of *Officers' Call* to be covered in a discussion period of one hour's duration. . . .

Major General, U. S. Army

● *We consciously include more material than speakers can normally use. Since officers in most commands will have received and presumably read Officers' Call before the meetings, it might be well in some cases to summarize the material briefly, and proceed to discussion from the floor, allowing the major portion of the meeting period for this latter phase.*

The Editors



Notes for the Discussion Leader

1. This subject is not clearly and sharply separable from others such as The Officers' Code of Personal Conduct, Leadership, etc. They are not mutually exclusive. They are treated separately only for convenience in discussion. Future subjects in this program will re-emphasize points covered briefly in this discussion.

The principles stated may be presented in various ways. The *spirit* of what is offered here is the thing of importance. This subject, well handled, can provide a profitable discussion period. Poorly moderated, however, it can lead to futile debate over the rectitude of this or that course of action in various hypothetical cases.

Perhaps the best results will be obtained by stating the *principles* which guide an officer's official actions, and then encouraging discussion of their validity and necessity.

2. *Points to be stressed.*

a. The officer's authority is given him in *trust.* It must be exercised in a *responsible* manner.

b. For his guidance and protection, many of the principles governing his official behavior have been set forth in writing. Others are made known to him through customs and tradition.

c. The more completely an officer understands and lives by these principles, the more likely he is to achieve full success and genuine satisfaction in his profession.

d. An officer's word—written or spoken—is the bond of an honorable man. In battle, decisions are made on the basis of reports. Fundamentally, then, it is a matter of life and death that an officer's word be reliable.

e. In matters of legislation, care of public property, private business interests, political activities, military justice, and the less tangible problems of human relationships, the officer's position as a public servant shapes his conduct. In cases where no clear-stated guide is available, intelligent application of the spirit of existing instructions usually indicates a proper course.

3. *Questions for discussion.* Each of the questions below probably will provoke considerable group discussion. Perhaps only one or two can be used in your allotted time. They are offered as suggestions. You may choose from this list, or phrase your own questions.

a. Are the standards of official behavior for Army officers different from those required in nonmilitary professions?

b. Can these standards be incorporated into a basic set of principles? What statements would you include in such a listing of principles?

c. Do you believe the Army today clings to too many customs, some of which are outmoded and useless or harmful? If so, explain which customs you would abandon and why.

d. Has the general reputation of the officer corps as to their honesty and integrity ever benefited you as an individual? Give examples.

e. Does the Army require the signing of too many certificates? If you think so, which ones would you eliminate?

f. Do you believe that in our Army loyalty is more often extended by superiors to their subordinates than by subordinates to their superiors? Or do you believe the opposite is true? Why?

g. If you were called upon to state one general rule which is most important to the officer in charting his official conduct, how would you express that rule?

h. Do you believe that the existence of a written set of standards for official conduct would work to the detriment of the officer body? Of the individual officer?

i. Would a listing of a set of standards for official conduct be of particular use or assistance to commanders?

Officers' GAZETTE

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

VOLUME I — *Formulation of U. S. Foreign Policy* — NUMBER FIVE

Officers' CALL

Published monthly by the Department of the Army, *Officers' Call* furnishes materials intended to assist commanders in maintaining the highest standards of integrity and professional ethics among officers, as well as informing all officers on significant military matters and national and international events.

VOLUME I — NUMBER FIVE

CONTENTS

Distribution: One per Army officer on active duty.

FORMULATION OF U. S. FOREIGN POLICY

Our Army is an important instrument of our foreign policy. Thus, the American officer should know something of the principles that guide our foreign relations, the processes by which these principles evolve into established policies, and the role our Armed Forces play in attaining our national objectives.

It is on this premise that OFFICERS' CALL *(for the first but certainly not the last time) takes up a subject that is only partly "military." The main purpose is to assemble for officers' consideration some of the facts and principles that motivate and shape the relations between the United States and other countries. These relations are matters of constant interest, but the average officer, like other busy Americans, does not always have time to dig beneath headlines and front-page stories for basic truths, or to meditate on the connection between an old principle and the newest development in an international problem. The material in this issue is intended to help him cultivate this essential perspective.*

A future OFFICERS' CALL *on the same general subject will deal more specifically with its military aspects.*

". . . the foreign policy which this government has actively pursued since the termination of World War II has had as its fundamental objective the improvement of the security of the American people by assisting and bringing about conditions which will make for peace."



". . . the foreign policy of the United States—in its simplest form is concerned with those conditions abroad which affect or could later affect the future security and the well-being of our nation . . ."

How Have Our Traditional Policies Changed?

Foreign affairs and the foreign policy of the United States are now of paramount concern to every citizen of the United States. The era has passed when this country could count upon self-sufficiency and a remote location to cushion it from the woes and wars of other continents.

Today we are neither remote nor self-sufficient, in the sense that we once were. Transmitted by the many modern communications media, ideas and ideologies cross international boundaries much more freely and more quickly than they did even a quarter of a century ago. Similarly, our technological development has made us dependent on imports for critical raw materials such as manganese for making steel, and upon exports to foreign markets, to keep our economy sound. In the military field, modern science has produced weapons which have nullified the