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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
THE ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE
WASHINGTON



DEPARTMENTAL RECORDS BRANCH, T.A.G.O.

INTERROGATION OF

(Marquis) KIDO, Koichi

(Continued)

DATE AND TIME: 16 March 1946, 1400 - 1630 hours
PLACE : Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan
PRESENT : (Marquis) KIDO, Koichi
Mr. Henry R. Sackett, Interrogator
Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa, Interpreter
(Miss) S. M. Betar, Stenographer
Questions by : Mr. Sackett

- Q What is your recollection with reference to what happened on November 5 and around that time?
- A I wasn't able to get accurate and clear information on it but generally I got an approximate idea of it after reading events previous to it.
- Q Tell me about the events just prior to November 5 and why that conference was held on that day and what was decided.
- A I believe it was this. Upon the formation of a Cabinet by TOJO, I asked the Emperor through an Imperial Order that the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 be considered and revised.
- Q You say you asked TOJO that or the Emperor asked that?
- A Through the Imperial Order, I asked it.

- Q The Emperor asked you to tell TOJO that he desired the decision of September 6 to be revised and revamped?
- A I informed TOJO and OIKAWA.
- Q What did the Emperor say to you to tell TOJO as to the details as to how the decision of September 6 should be revamped?
- A I believe the details of that is answered in my October 17 entry and it goes like this: "There was a word concerning cooperation between the Army and the Navy by the Emperor and the Emperor said that in handling any problems that foreign policies and various other policies, especially foreign policies, the Government should not adhere to the decision of the September 6 Imperial Conference but should take into consideration the internal and foreign situation thoroughly and work accordingly".
- Q Did he make any suggestions as to what changes should be made in the September 6 decision?
- A And a serious study of the matter should be given so I said that I will inform them through the Emperor's order so a definite order was not given and everything in that respect has been left to the decision of the Cabinet.
- Q Then what happened after that?
- A And it seemed that the Cabinet opened daily, probably very frequently, a liaison conference.
- Q That is with the military people?
- A It is a General Headquarters liaison conference and as entered in the diary of November 2, there was a phone from TOJO and he said that the liaison conference has ended and that the Foreign Minister and Finance Minister said that the situation is so serious that they will like to think over the problem until eleven o'clock. "After they have given a reply, I will make a decision", said TOJO. As entered in November 19, merely the fact that it has gone into

- A (Cont) November does not mean that war should be entered into. As entered in the diary of November 5, TOJO reported to me about the Southern army being organized and about dispatching KURUSU to America. So after deducting from all the entries there which I have looked over, the Imperial Conference of November 5 handled the same matter as that of September 6 but that the negotiations was decided to be continued and if it was not successful by the end of November, war shall be started. In this Conference of November 5, it was also decided to dispatch KURUSU to America and since there is not enough time for instruction through telegram, it was decided that KURUSU would be directly sent out there.
- Q He was sent immediately after that November 5 meeting?
- A Yes. Also preparation for war was started and so this plan as a result of the decision at this Imperial Conference was two-fold.
- Q One was to get ready for war and the other was to send KURUSU to try to negotiate but if negotiations were not successful at the end of November 5, it was decided that war would result. Is that correct?
- A I presume so, although I am not clear about it.
- Q You are positive and there is no question in your mind but what there was an Imperial Conference held on November 5?
- A I believe it has actually been opened because I have written it here.
- Q Don't you have any personal recollection of various people involved coming to the Palace on that occasion and meeting in the presence of the Emperor?
- A Because the place where they hold the Imperial Conference is so far away from my place, I would not know even if they had convened.
- Q Don't you remember talking to any of the Ministers or Premier immediately before or immediately after that Conference so as to refresh your recollection?
- A I have no recollection there.

- Q You are positive you would not have written in your diary that there was an Imperial Conference unless there was one?
- A If I mentioned about this Imperial Conference, then there must have been an Imperial General Headquarters Conference and that is the only possibility.
- Q Do you actually know whether the Emperor was present at whatever type of conference it was?
- A I have no recollection there.
- Q But you do know that on that date it was decided to send KURUSU to the United States and it was determined to get ready for war and it was decided that war would be commenced at the end of November if negotiations were not successful?
- A Yes.
- Q How did you know that decision came out of whatever type of conference was held on that day? How do you know those were the decisions?
- A Because when such a thing like this occurs, there is a story to that effect at the office and so as a result of that, I would be informed of it.
- Q And you remember hearing that story as of this time?
- A Yes.
- Q If it was just a meeting of Imperial General Headquarters rather than what you more or less call an Imperial Conference, would the Emperor have attended that?
- A There are times when the Emperor would be present at the Imperial General Headquarters Conference, too.
- Q Would it be possible for such a decision as we have just described to be made at an Imperial General Headquarters meeting rather than at an Imperial Conference, or would that type of a decision require an imperial conference?
- A I believe that the imperial conference is more accurate in that respect.

- Q- The reason I am asking these questions is that in talks with Premier TOJO and TOGO and some other gentlemen, none seem to recall that there was an imperial conference on November 5 although there may have been a meeting held of some type, but no one else verifies what you have written in your diary - that there was an imperial conference. Everyone agrees that there was an Imperial Conference on July 2, 1941, September 6, 1941, and December 1, 1941 but no one else seems to recall an imperial conference on November 5 and I am trying to get the truth is all.
- A Because I have written here, I believe that there was an imperial conference but I do not know anything else about it. After looking at previous events and deducing many of those events, I believe there was actually an imperial conference at this time.
- Q I think others agree there was some sort of a meeting among Government officials at that time but no one seems to recall it was an imperial conference.
- A Perhaps I was mistaken in writing it down as an imperial conference. After looking over other events, I believe it was an imperial conference but I am not very sure.
- Q In other words, your best opinion from your notations is that there was an imperial conference although you could be wrong and it might have been an Imperial General Headquarters Conference?
- A Perhaps I was mistaken in writing it down as an imperial conference but actually there was some kind of a conference. One suspicion is, if there actually was an imperial conference, the Emperor would have called me and I would have had an audience with him but because I did not make a notation to that effect, I may have been mistaken.
- Q There is some doubt in your mind whether the Emperor attended a meeting on November 5 because you didn't write anything about it?

A I usually have an audience with the Emperor but since I did not have any on this day, I am of great doubt.

Q Do you think it would have been possible to make a decision to go to war by the end of November if negotiations weren't successful if the Emperor had not been present at the time such a decision was made?

A That depends upon the wording of the plan or proposal. If the wording is ambiguous, then it will require a definite stand.

Q You mean if it wasn't an absolute and final decision it would not have to be in the presence of the Emperor but if it was a final decision, it would have to be in the presence of the Emperor?

A Yes.

Q Do you know if it was a final or general decision?

A I have no recollection because I did not see it.

Q Getting back to where we were before, in the middle of October, 1941 when the KONOYE Cabinet fell, I would like to review a little bit of our talk and refresh my recollection and then I want to talk to you with reference to the appointment of TOJO as Premier. From our previous talks here, I have made a few notes. Isn't it true that in the middle of October 1941, you knew and realized this to be the general situation, whether you had anything to do with bringing it about or not is a different question. I am not saying you caused this situation to exist but you knew generally this was the situation. Do you understand the question?

A Yes.

Q I want to ask some questions about it. I am not implying you brought this about. All I am saying is that it existed in this day and this is sort of a summary. You knew that Japan had expanded throughout Manchuria and was controlling Manchuria through a puppet government and you felt, as you expressed to

Q (Cont) me, that some of that activity was in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

Q Also, Japan had announced as her foreign policy the formation of a new order in East Asia which involved leadership of East Asia through the exercising of a controlling influence in East Asia by Japan. That situation existed, did it not?

A Yes.

Q Also, you realized in those days that certain factions in Japan advocated the accomplishment of a new order in East Asia by peaceful means and other factions advocated bringing a new order in East Asia by force of arms. That is a true situation, is it not?

A Yes.

Q You personally favored carrying out this foreign policy of establishing a new order in East Asia but you didn't like the use of force of arms and hoped it could be accomplished by peaceful means. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q You realized, and it was true that Japan was fighting a war in China in order to bring about and establish its foreign policy of a new order in East Asia. That is true, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q And Japan had set up and recognized a puppet government in Nanking in order to bring about a new order in East Asia, with Japan exercising control and influence in China through its puppet government as she was exercising influence and controlling Manchuria through a puppet government. That was true in those days, was it not?

A Yes.

- Q And you knew that Germany had embarked on an announced policy in Europe of creating a new order there by force of arms in that case and that Germany had attacked Poland^{and} was engaged in an all-out war of expansion which started in September 1939. That is true, is it not?
- A Yes.
- Q You also knew that while the European war was being successfully fought by Germany in those days, Japan signed the Tripartite Pact in September 1940 with Germany and Italy, and by the terms of this Pact, Japan agreed to support Germany and to obtain support from her. Isn't that true?
- A Yes.
- Q And by virtue of this Tripartite Agreement, Japan sanctioned German expansion in Europe and agreed to assist Germany if other powers interfered. Isn't that true?
- A I have no accurate recollection of the Tripartite Pact.
- Q I understand by that Pact it was agreed that if some other powers interfered with what she was doing, Japan pledged herself to support Germany and conversely if anyone interfered with her plans, Germany would support Japan. Wasn't that the situation between Germany and Japan?
- A Yes.
- Q You also knew that Japan's traditional enemy, Russia, was engaged in a war with Germany and was in a poor position to also fight in the Pacific. That was generally true, wasn't it?
- A Yes.
- Q And you knew that Japan had successfully adopted a foreign policy of obtaining bases in Indo-China and sending troops to Indo-China. That is true, isn't it?
- A Yes.

Q And that there were certain factions in Japan that encouraged and caused the obtaining of bases in Indo-China in order to bring the China War to an end so that the Nanking Government might take charge of affairs of China. That is true, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q Another faction in Japan encouraged and caused these bases to be obtained in Indo-China in order to make it possible for Japan to conduct a campaign of expansion in the South Pacific so she might get oil and other supplies there and spread her influence and leadership there?

A Yes.

Q There were two schools of thought on the Indo-China operation?

A Yes.

Q You also realized, did you not, that what was going on in Japan's foreign policy was an effort to bring about some change in the status quo of East Asia. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And you knew that the United States in those days was strenuously opposed to what Japan was doing and the United States claimed that what she was doing was in violation of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. That was the United States' position, was it not?

A Yes.

Q You also knew that there was a clash between the foreign policy of the United States and the foreign policy of Japan over the Far Eastern situation. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q It was also true, was it not, that you realized that the younger staff officers in the Army and Navy were in favor of and advocated southern expansion by Japan in order to obtain oil and supplies so as to create a new order in the South under Japanese leadership?

A Yes.

Q And these younger staff officers advocated the use of force of arms, if necessary, to accomplish that result if the United States or Great Britain interfered with it? That is true, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q And also I think you told me in our conversations, you realized that TOJO and NAGANO, OIKAWA, SUGIYAMA and MUTO were outstanding military leaders who seemed to agree with the young Army and Navy staff officers, did you not?

A OIKAWA is different.

Q You would say all those men mentioned except OIKAWA, according to what you related, in those days favored the position of the young staff officers of the Army and Navy and really had begun to lead the young staff officers in advocating this southern expansion by force of arms if necessary. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q And that in the Japanese-United States negotiations, the United States was insisting that Japan withdraw her troops from China. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q And that Japan cease attempting to expand her control through the Nanking Government?

A Yes.

Q And that these leaders I mentioned, TOJO and the other men and the young staff officers of the Army and Navy were definitely opposed to withdrawing the Japanese troops and discarding the Nanking puppet Government and they publicly announced that was their feeling? That was true in those days, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Isn't it true that at the time of the fall of the Prince KONOYE Cabinet in the middle of October, the clash between these two foreign policies of the United States and Japan was in a critical state?

A Yes.

Q And you also realized that TOJO and these other men I just mentioned were strongly anti-American, were they not?

A Yes.

Q And that with the resignation of Prince KONOYE, the chances for a successful conclusion of these negotiations were lessened, were they not? Wasn't that your feeling, that it hurt the chances of successful negotiations for Prince KONOYE to resign because he was a leader of that movement?

A Yes.

Q It was also true and hadn't you realized that TOJO and these men we have mentioned had adopted a very strong and firm position toward the United States and they were bringing pressure to bear to win over the Navy and other undecided factions in Japan to a policy of declaring war on the United States in order to bring about a new order in East Asia. Isn't that what they were trying to do in those days?

A I don't feel that so strongly.

Q Didn't you feel there was an effort being made by TOJO and other men to try to convince the Navy that the Army's policy of fighting in the South Pacific was the best policy?

A The higher ups in the Navy did not agree to that extent. That was the difficult point.

Q Well, I thought you indicated the other day in your conversations with TOJO and NAGANO that they indicated to you they thought negotiations could not be successful and Japan should commence activity in the South Pacific in order to get these supplies.

- A OIKAWA and the Chief of the Navy Bureau, OKA, disagreed but I don't know much about the opinions of the others.
- Q You mean they disagreed in what respect?
- A They disagreed toward entering into a war without doing their utmost to settle the problems of negotiation and they wanted the Government to take charge of that situation.
- Q My question was that TOJO and NAGANO, and the other men I mentioned that favored commencing activities in the South Pacific and thought it was necessary, were bringing pressure and attempting to convince the Navy people and other factions to agree with them in order that they might go ahead and establish this new order in East Asia and the South Pacific. Wasn't that true?
- A But in my conversations I had with TOJO, he was saying that as long as the Navy remains undecided, we won't be able to enter into war and he was very hesitant.
- Q I realize there was a dispute between the factions as to what was the thing to do but my point was that these other men favored this point and tried to put it over to the other factions that that was the thing to do?
- A Yes.
- Q Also, you realized that TOJO, himself, had refused to agree to the creation of a Cabinet by Prince HIGASHIKUNI if that Cabinet was committed to peace in advance. Isn't that true? He had refused your suggestion that you would recommend the Prince if he was committed to a program of peace but TOJO refused to agree with such a procedure. That was also true, was it not?
- A Yes.
- Q And having all that knowledge in mind as we have developed it through this period of time, and with that background, you did recommend after your conference with the Juichin the selection of War Minister TOJO as Premier and I assume that as far as recommendation is concerned, you accept responsibility for having made that recommendation. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q I want to ask you these questions and I want you to give me the entire explanation as to the reasoning behind them. Isn't it true that by suggesting this appointment of TOJO you ratified, confirmed and adopted certain of his policies, such as the policy of wanting Japan to refuse to withdraw troops from China?

A No, I did not subscribe to such an idea.

Q Well, my question would be if you knew that Premier TOJO had very firmly taken that position and you recommended him as Premier, then you indirectly were putting his policies into effect, were you not?

A No, it is absolutely different. Because TOJO always has been harping about the decision of the September 5 Conference, I thought to make him change the decision through an Imperial Order and the situation at that time was very grave. It seems as though a situation similar to the Manchurian Incident would occur.

Q What do you mean by that. I am interested.

A It seems as though an incident similar to that which occurred in French Indo-China or in Thailand would happen.

Q By that you mean you were afraid that the Army might get out of hand and start operations without any direction from on top. Is that what you mean?

A Yes. When KONOYE tendered his note of resignation, he came to my room and at that time we strove vigorously for solving the situation. We decided that it would be bad to put any person of Imperial blood out as Premier and because the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 was unknown to outsiders and the decision for war is held by the Staff Officers of the Army and Navy, so even though these persons may receive an Imperial Order to form a Cabinet, the formation of a Cabinet would be difficult and consequently end in this situation of the ITAGAKI Cabinet in which the War Minister was not put in and therefore the Cabinet would not be able to be formed.

- Q At that time you were concerned about recommending somebody that would meet the approval of the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff, otherwise they might block the formation of the Cabinet as was attempted in the formation of a cabinet by ITAGAKI. Is that correct?
- A Yes and we were concerned due to the fact that there were troops out in French Indo-China and the Army's control would become loose and there was much worries as to what the military might do out there. Also, they might do something on the pretense of self-defense and it was also known that the formation of the Cabinet would require some time and depending upon the person selected, it might cause consternation within the Empire. This outlook may be pessimistic but in consideration of the fact that at the cessation of hostilities when the power of the Army and Navy was reduced, numerous incidents would occur, so at that time when the Army and Navy was at the peak strength with great energy, one can imagine just what sort of an incident could have occurred at that time. If those incidents occur, the Japanese-American negotiations naturally would be broken and so there was no other recourse but to put the trust or the charge of the situation of forming a Cabinet upon Admiral OIKAWA or Lt. General TOJO because they were well-versed in the situation. If OIKAWA is selected, then he must be made to take on the policy of being fully responsible instead of casting responsibility entirely on the Government. Since TOJO had a good record of keeping the Army under good control, we thought to utilize his capabilities in that respect, in preventing any unfavorable incidents from arising, and through him to revamp the decision of the Imperial Conference through an Imperial Order and make a reconsideration and re-study of the situation. I told KONOYE to that effect. To that KONOYE agreed completely with me and KONOYE said that at this time the control of the Army was the paramount problem and if the control became disorganized, then the Japanese-American negotiations would become completely demolished. So he said that it would be best for TOJO to be placed in charge. He said that in his conversations had with TOJO a few days ago, he could not consider TOJO as being an advocator of war with America. I believe that fact is out in the memoirs of Prince KONOYE. I also had a conversation with TOJO and I would like to give the details of the conversation at that time.

- Q Certainly. Let me ask - when did this conversation take place?
- A On the 16th. TOJO visited me.
- Q October 16, 1941?
- A Yes. So we met together in my room at three o'clock. TOJO strongly advocated the carrying out of the Imperial Conference decision. I said that the decision of the Imperial Conference is very serious and so it is needless to say anything about the gravity or the carrying out of the decision at all. But I said that the problem is so serious that the fate of the Nation is at stake. But if there is any necessity for reconsideration of the problem, then one must not avoid reconsidering just saying that the decision is the most important.
- Q What you meant was that the mere fact you decided something didn't mean that you couldn't change your mind? Is that what you mean?
- A TOJO's conception was that since it has been decided, one cannot alter from the decision. I said that according to what I hear, the Navy does not have any confidence and I feel that they are hesitating quite a bit. To that TOJO agreed and said that if the Navy does not have any confidence, then it would be impossible to carry out a war but he added "I do not think so". But I told him that this matter requires thorough study and I told him I am very much worried on that point. TOJO said that if that is the case, then the Imperial Conference would be a fatal obstruction but in altering the decision of the Imperial Conference, TOJO said that it would be impossible for the KONOYE Cabinet to do that so the change of a Cabinet cannot be avoided. So TOJO said there is no other recourse but to give the task of forming a Cabinet to Prince HIGASHIKUNI and I asked him "Is the request to be made after the Army has decided upon a peaceful course?" TOJO said that that course will be entrusted to HIGASHIKUNI and it does not mean that we have made a decision of changing our course 180 degrees.
- Q In other words, he wasn't willing to change his position and agree to an out-and-out peace policy. Is that right?

A Yes, and I objected to this by giving the same reasons as I gave previously in objecting to the formation of a Cabinet by a member of the Imperial blood. For a while TOJO was silent and TOJO inquired suddenly, "Then, what will happen to Japan?" I remember telling TOJO that "If we let you do the way you like, then Japan would be demoted to a fourth-rate power". After that, we became separated. Until then, he did not know that Prince KONOYE was trying to resign. By looking at the situation and the talk had with TOJO, I thought that if the Prime Minister, KONOYE, will take another step forward and do his utmost, then there may be some way whereby the problem may be solved, so I immediately telephoned the Prime Minister but already then, the Prime Minister was getting his note of resignation ready; he was gathering all the notes of resignation from the Cabinet members. So it was impossible to recover the situation due to that. Now, I will return to the conversation had with Prince KONOYE.

Q Let me ask you, was that the complete conversation had with TOJO. Did you come to any decision with TOJO as to what should be done other than you declined to recommend the Prince?

A That is all.

Q Was there anything said in that conversation at all about the appointment of TOJO as premier, either by you or by him?

A No.

A I felt that if the Navy came out with the attitude of opposing war, then I cannot consider TOJO to demand war against America.

Q This conversation with KONOYE was after your conversation with TOJO? Is that right?

A Yes. Because TOJO had given this matter great study, I went and had a talk with KONOYE. At this time I also had the following thought in my mind: At this time, in the foreign countries as well as among the foreign nationalities of Japan, there was opinions to the effect that the Japanese diplomatic policies cannot be found out by asking the Prime Minister nor

A (Cont) the Foreign Minister but that one must ask the Staff Headquarters; otherwise, he will not be able to find out and there were these sort of ironical criticisms concerning Japan's foreign policies. By letting the Army take charge of the national Government and by letting a cabinet of the Army take on the negotiation with America seriously, then the suspicions and the doubts of America may be dispelled. Furthermore, KONOYE told me that there were people advocating General UGAKI to be the next premier. So he said there will be quite some difficulty encountered at this time. It seems as though Prince KONOYE was greatly concerned about this and he inquired by phoning the Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA, if the next Premier would be UGAKI and Prince KONOYE was very much worried about that and KONOYE was worried that if any unqualified person is selected, then that would mean war and he was greatly worried in that respect. Under that sort of a situation, the conference of senior statesmen was opened on the 17th. For more detailed statements of what actually took place at the meeting of elder statesmen preliminary to the nomination of TOJO as premier, you may contact my former Chief Secretary, MATSUDAIRA, and he will furnish it to you. (Note: MATSUDAIRA has a written record of what took place which was reported to him by Marquis Kido. It is thought that it is still in existence.) At the Senior Statesmen's Conference, suggestions came out from HAYASHI that the next premier will be a Navy man of Imperial lineage but there were not many suggestions for putting HIGASHIKUNI out as premier. WAKATSUKI named UGAKI but there was hardly anybody who agreed to that. So I explained the difficult situation and the future outlook and proposed that War Minister TOJO be given the task of forming a cabinet and through him to revamp the decision of the Imperial Conference and make him restudy that. This proposal, the majority supported and as a consequence this fact was reported to the Emperor and the Emperor's consent was obtained. At this time, the Emperor was very unhappy that the Navy was insisting that everything be left to the Government, so the Emperor held the opinion that if the Navy has no confidence, then it should take on a clear-cut attitude and negotiate with the Army. So after issuing an order for forming a Cabinet to TOJO, he expressed the aforementioned thoughts to OIKAWA. Furthermore, through an Imperial Order to TOJO and OIKAWA, he said that they should not adhere completely to the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6.

Q Did you issue that order or did the Emperor issue that order?

A I issued that order under an Imperial Order. Furthermore, I transmitted to them the Imperial desire for a further and wider study of the situation abroad and within the Nation. Accurate details are had in my memoirs. In accordance with the Imperial wish, TOJO, after forming a cabinet, strove vigorously for Japanese-American negotiations. TOJO held the post of Home Minister simultaneously but I said it will be understandable if TOJO held the post of War Minister simultaneously and not the Home Ministry and so I asked him, "What is the reason for it?" He said that the reason is in the event the Japanese-American negotiations becomes successful, then the entire Nation will be in consternation and in that event, TOJO said that he would like to take full responsibility for preserving order within the Nation. Also, about two or three days after the formation of the Cabinet, the Home Minister SUZUKI phoned me that the Cabinet is progressing smoothly toward the desired direction; that is, for negotiation with America. In my recollection, KAYA, the Finance Minister, and TOGO, the Foreign Minister, asked TOJO if this new cabinet is a cabinet formed for war but TOJO replied it is a cabinet for Japanese-American negotiations and thereupon the aforementioned two men entered TOJO's Cabinet. Under such circumstances, TOJO's cabinet was formed.

Q I don't mean to imply that I am indifferent to the situation that existed in Japan in those days. I realize it was a critical situation but I am interested in asking some pertinent questions as to how it came about. From my conversation with you, I am confident you are willing to accept responsibility for recommending TOJO to the Emperor. That was your function and you did it and right or wrong, you assume responsibility for it. That is correct, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q You did know that at the time of his recommendation, he personally, at least, was very much opposed to the policy of withdrawing any troops from China or French Indo-China. That is true, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q That was his feeling and he had expressed them to you? And you also knew that he was very much in favor of bringing the China War to a successful conclusion? And the control of China through the Nanking puppet Government, that was known to you - that was his thinking in those days, along the same lines as Japan was controlling Manchuria through a puppet government. Is that correct?

A Yes.

Q You also knew that TOJO personally was in favor of and advocated Japanese expansion into the South Pacific. Is that true?

A Yes.

Q And he also favored a creation of a new order in East Asia under Japanese leadership and he favored the use of force of arms, if necessary, to accomplish that result. Isn't that true?

A Yes.

Q You indicated a little while ago that you did not think TOJO desired war with the United States. That is correct, isn't it?

A Yes.

Q But even though he didn't want to fight the United States, he did desire to expand Japanese influence into the South Pacific and over into China, didn't he? Isn't that correct?

A I felt that if the Navy had no confidence, war could not be conducted.

Q Can't we say that TOJO first of all favored expanding into the South Pacific and in China and he did not want to fight the United States from choice but he was willing to fight the United States in order to accomplish his foremost program. Isn't that correct?

A Yes.

Q Also, you knew, did you not, and felt that TOJO was, let us say, one of the leaders if not the leader of the expansionist group in Japan in those days, was he not?

A Yes.

Q You knew in those days he was strongly anti-American and anti-British?

A I believe so.

Q And he was the leader of that faction in Japan that wanted to use force of arms to get oil and supplies in the South Pacific? Is that right?

A Yes.

- Q And he was the leader of that faction of people in Japan that took the position that Japan should fight the United States to accomplish that program, if necessary. Is that true?
- A Yes.
- Q Wasn't it true that you felt that he was the man in Japan in those days who would most likely lead Japan into war with the United States if negotiations failed?
- A Yes, I believe he was one of them.
- Q In spite of all that knowledge, you still had the feeling that the appointment of TOJO was the best choice to avert war?
- A I believe that was unavoidable, because the selection of any other person would result in internal disorder and cause disruption of the Japanese-American negotiations or would cause incidents on foreign soil.
- Q In other words, you didn't feel that the selection of TOJO as premier was the best choice that could have been made to prevent war but you felt it was the best choice to try to hold the country together. Is that right?
- A Because TOJO was always harping about the Imperial Conference decision of September 6 and he said that if there is an order from the Emperor, then something else might be done and I felt that if the negotiations became a little more favorable then the Emperor's order will be obtained just like at the end of this hostility, at which time the Emperor issued an order. Later on in the diary, I believe that I have given all sorts of outlook regarding the course to take. As KONOYE insisted that the control of the Army was paramount and is the question of highest priority and that if the Army became disorganized, then nothing can be done and so there was no alternative.
- Q I think you said that in trying to decide on the choice of the next Premier, you felt he should have these two qualifications: One was that he could control the Army and Navy. The other was that he was a person who took a firm stand and wasn't trying to pass it off on someone else to decide Japan's future course. Is that correct?
- A Yes.

- Q And you thought either TOJO or OIKAWA could control the Army and Navy but your opposition to OIKAWA was that he would not take a firm stand and would pass the decision on to the Government?
- A Yes.
- Q And you knew that TOJO would take the firm stand that Japan should insist on her foreign policy and if she couldn't, she would fight the United States.
- A But upon the formation of a Cabinet, I instructed him through an Imperial Order he should reconsider his attitude.
- Q In view of these things that TOJO stood for and that you fully realized he stood for, when you recommended TOJO as premier, you realized, didn't you, that it meant war with the United States and Great Britain unless those countries would accede to TOJO's position. He was very firm in that position and the only way the negotiations could be successful and avert war was for the United States and Great Britain to give in. Wasn't that true?
- A I did not think in that respect. I felt that if the attitude of the Navy was made more strongly, there will be a solution, and as a result of a study of the internal and foreign situation, then the sentiment or agreement with America may be reached by making concessions.
- Q Did you think that TOJO in view of all his statements and insistence upon expansion into the South Pacific would be willing to change his policies?
- A He was thinking about settling the matter through an imperial order if the Japanese-American negotiations became favorable.
- Q Marquis, did you say with all your knowledge in those days as to what TOJO stood for and what he advocated, you honestly felt he was the most likely man in 100,000,000 people in Japan that could avert or prevent war with the United States?
- A I thought that depending upon the situation of the Japanese-American negotiations that the problem will be settled through an Imperial order. Rather than the Imperial order, that is by explaining to TOJO the sentiment or the thoughts held by the Emperor.

- Q You never before realized in view of the very definite position TOJO had taken, it would be quite difficult for him to back down, isn't that true?
- A I grant that it was very difficult for him to back down. However, the selection of another man would precipitate war.
- Q Why is it that you thought the selection of someone other than TOJO would have immediately brought about war?
- A Because then the Army would become disorganized. By being disorganized, I mean that the Army would become more corrupt and more unruly and I did not know what sort of an incident would be created out in distant places. Another thing, the formation of a cabinet was a great problem.
- Q In other words, the truth of the matter is that by the middle of October 1941, the Army in particular and the military people had gotten such control on the Government of Japan that it was impossible to move in any direction without their consent. Isn't that true?
- A And they may not send out a Minister of War into the Cabinet.
- Q In other words, you felt that some other selection would not meet with the approval of the Army and they would not nominate a Minister of War? Is that correct?
- A Because the Staff Officers in the military know the Imperial decision of September 6 so a person who is able to control those staff officers must be selected; otherwise, because of their informed status, they will start most anything.
- Q The Army was agreeable that Prince HIGASHIKUNI should be appointed, were they not, through TOJO?
- A I believe they were requesting him about half for the reason of starting war. Because I had no confidence or I was pessimistic in the outlook or result of war with America, I felt that the selection of the Prince in the Cabinet would bring forth great injury upon the Imperial household.
- Q What did you think would happen if you selected some outsider out of the Imperial household as premier, one that wasn't an Army man. What would likely have taken place in Japan in your opinion if you introduced an entirely new individual into the picture?

- A There isn't any such other men and the only person that falls under that category was UGAKI.
- Q What was the opposition to UGAKI?
- A Because about three or four years previous to that UGAKI was not able to form a Cabinet because of great opposition exerted by the Army. So a selection of him this time may incur a great trouble.
- Q Wouldn't you say that your real position is more or less like this; that for a great number of years you opposed TOJO's policies and you tried to suppress them over a period of years and you continued to do so up until the middle of October 1941. Finally you gave in and made it possible for a war to move on. Isn't that about what happened?
- A I nominated TOJO in order to stop war.
- Q It is hard for me to understand how you could contemplate that a man who had made the statements he had with reference to his position of fighting a war could be thought of as one who would prevent war.
- A That is because I thought that the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 must be revamped and because it has already been decided for war at that time and so it was inevitable. For that reason, I selected TOJO. I was fearful that while the cabinet was being formed, incidents will be precipitated and war will be started and the revision of the Imperial Conference of September 6 cannot be brought about.
- Q What you are saying is that in order to revamp and change the decision of the September 6 Conference and in order to avert war, you selected the one man that was the outstanding advocate of not changing the conference and of going to war. Isn't that true?
- A And in the conversations with TOJO and KONOYE, and TOJO and I, and KONOYE and I, TOJO said that if the Navy would not take a definite stand, then the matter would have to be reconsidered. TOJO said that if the decision of the Imperial Conference is to be revamped, then the KONOYE Cabinet would not be able to do that, so he suggested a Cabinet by a member of the Imperial blood.

Q The fact remains that in your stated attempt to avert war, you selected undoubtedly the one man that was the strongest advocate of war in those days, which seems to be inconsistent with my thinking.

A TOJO said he will reconsider if the Navy does not have any confidence and I thought that I will have the Emperor order the Navy to do its utmost to take on a definite stand; that if it was lacking in confidence, to say so; and I made the selection on the basis of maintaining control of the Army and for revamping the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6.

Q It was your feeling that there was very little chance of averting war in October 1941 in any event. If you appointed anyone other than TOJO, you thought an incident would break out and cause a war for sure, so you selected the alternative of picking the man that was a leader of the movement to go to war with the United States and one that stood out head and shoulders above everyone else in favor of war in the South Pacific for the reason that you thought he might follow the Imperial command ^{and} be able to hold the Army together and thereby avert war.

A And without the Navy's support, the war cannot be conducted so I wanted the Navy to take a definite stand whether it has confidence or not and then I thought to change the decision made at the Imperial Conference of September 6.

Q I want to ask you a question on something that is entirely different. Do you remember in the latter part of November 1941, well let us say about November 20 and the early part of December, there being sent to Japan by NOMURA or KURUSU, or either one, a message from President Roosevelt asking if it would be possible for him to convey a message to the Emperor, suggesting that the Dutch East Indies and Siam be neutralized? Do you remember anything about that?

A I have no recollection.

Q Do you remember talking to Foreign Minister TOGO about it?

A I did not hear anything about it. Perhaps that message was the one that came in on the morning of December 8.

Q No, it was earlier than that. It was prior to December 6. Don't you recall having talked with TOGO to the effect that he had received word from NOMURA and KURUSU that the President would like to suggest to the Emperor that Siam and the Dutch East Indies be neutralized and the President wanted

Q By that you mean you did not do anything to prevent the Emperor finding out about the message?

A I have no authority to prevent him. I may receive consultations but I have no authority to prevent him concerning the measures of the Cabinet. I have no authority whatsoever to prevent anything.

Q Could it have been possible that both you and TOGO discussed the matter and concluded that it should not be presented to the Emperor for the reason that the situation was so tense that it would cause trouble?

A I have no recollection.

Q In view of the fact that TOGO said it did, would you say that it did not happen?

A It did not.

Certificate of Interpreter

I, Fred F. Suzukawa, 2nd Lt. 02030605
(name) (Rank) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of 25 pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Fred F. Suzukawa 2nd Lt. A.C.S.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this _____ day of _____, 1946.

(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, S. M. Betar, hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

S. M. Betar

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, (~~was~~) Henry R. Sackett, _____, _____

~~was~~ _____, _____, _____

certify that on the 16th day of March, 1946, personally appeared before me (~~was~~) KIDO, Koichi and according to Lt. Fred F. Suzukawa Interpreter, gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, Japan.
Place

16 March 1946
Date