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THE
BHAGAVAD-GĪTĀ;

A DISCOURSE BETWEEN KRISHNA AND ARJUNA
ON DIVINE MATTERS. -

A SANSKRIT PHILOSOPHICAL POEM :

TRANSLATED,
WITH COPIOUS NOTES, AN INTRODUCTION ON SANSKRIT PHILOSOPHY, AND
OTHER MATTER :

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TO

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PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY,
ETC., ETC.,

TO WHOM

EUROPE OWES SO MUCH OF HER KNOWLEDGE OF INDIA, INDIA SO MUCH
OF THE ESTEEM OF EUROPE ;

AND WHOSE INDEFATIGABLE LABOURS AND RARE ABILITIES HAVE THROWN A
BRIGHT LIGHT OVER THE MYSTERIES OF THE EAST ;

THIS HUMBLE ATTEMPT TO FOLLOW IN HIS FOOTSTEPS

IS INSCRIBED,

AS A MARK OF ADMIRATION FOR HIS TALENTS AND GRATITUDE FOR HIS
FRIENDSHIP ;

BY HIS PUPIL,

THE TRANSLATOR.

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P R E F A C E.

THERE are many portions of Sacred Writ which, while it would be presumptuous to refuse their literal acceptation, forcibly prompt an allegorical construction, serving at once as a lesson and a prophecy. Such is the narrative of the building of the Tower of Babel. When the world, recovered from all but entire destruction, rose fresh in all its worldliness, Godless and independent, exulting in the discovery of the strength of its physical, and the unbounded^e vastness of its mental powers, man first learnt the truth that union is the secret of all strength, and that by it, though a mere unit in creation, he might attain a super-human position. Nor was ever confusion more complete or more wonderful than the miracle which crushed his efforts and lowered his proud schemes to the dust.

Yet since that moment man has ever been building another and a greater tower which, none the less, has Heaven for its object. Science and enlightenment are

ever rising brick by brick, layer by layer, story by story, towards the level of super-human knowledge; and the great obstacle which put a stop to the erection of the material Babel—the confusion of tongues—still exists to impede that of the Tower of Knowledge, and still constitutes the chief hindrance to man's united action and united strength.

But if the obstacle exist, the means of surmounting it have been granted us. We have never been debarred from acquiring another language than our own; and if the scientific man of each country be considered the maker of the bricks, the linguist may, at least, claim to be that no less useful workman who visits the kiln of knowledge in every land and brings together the materials for the great work.

The study of tongues, then, is not to be slighted. Through a nation's language alone can its character, as well as its labours after truth, be really known; and the study of nations is the study of mankind in its most liberal form.

We cannot deny that the present age has felt this to be the case more than any that has gone before it, when we see in every country throughout Europe, that the Classics of foreign languages constitute the first food administered to the young mind. But what has been granted to Greek and Latin has been refused to Sanskrit

literature, which, if it offer more difficulties and impediments in its approach than others, indisputably possesses as rich, as varied, and as valuable a treasure as any that can be ranked among the dead. Yet it has found many zealous opponents among the learned of the west, and many delusive arguments have been brought against it. It has been called *useless*, as well for practical as scientific purposes.

Let us first consider the former accusation,—its uselessness to those whom we send from our little island to be the governors and dispensers of justice over a hundred and sixty millions of inhabitants, and a continent almost as vast as that of Europe itself. And here it is argued, that because Sanskrit is the parent of the many dialects spoken in India, it is not on that account the more useful to those who must employ them. It would be no more absurd, it is urged, to oblige every Englishman holding an appointment in Malta or the Ionian Islands to pass an examination in Homer or Virgil, because Greek and Latin are the sources of the vernaculars there spoken. But the case is very different with the Indian Peninsula. The modern Greek and Italian races differ far more from the Greek and the Roman of old than even their altered languages;—their character, their religion, their institutions, their modes of expression even, are completely changed, and the heroes of Thucydides and Livy would

come among them as utter strangers. Not so the Hindú. His religion, his institutions, his character, aye, even his mode of thought, is the same now as in the time of Kálidása, the dramatist; or, still more, in that of the poets, Vyása and Válmíki.¹ If there be any change at all, it is only that of day to night. Gross superstition and awful fatalism now reign where thought and the search for truth have existed before,—the pedantic Paṇḍit has replaced the learned Bráhmaṇ, who was poet and philosopher, astronomer and theologian alike; and an age of ruminating lethargy has succeeded to one of action and invention. But the faults of the one have proceeded in a natural course from the uncorrected errors of the other; and these errors should be studied if we would understand and learn to deal with the character of which they are the origin. The European who has not studied the Áryan² will never comprehend the Hindú.

Again, in a scientific point of view, Sanskrit, as a language, must take a very high place, and claim a very con-

¹ Kálidása flourished at the Court of Vikramáditya, 56 years before Christ. Vyása, the supposed author of the Mahábhárata, etc., and Válmíki, that of the Rámáyana, lived several centuries earlier, though the exact dates cannot be fixed with any certainty.

² The name generally given to the people who *used* the Sanskrit language in contradistinction to the modern inhabitants of India. I say *used*, since there is reason to believe that from a very remote period the people of the Peninsula have *spoken* one or more impure dialects.

siderable amount of usefulness. The etymologist, the philologist, the ethnologist, and even the historian, cannot perfect their investigations without it,—parent, as it is, of almost every European, and of many Asiatic languages. Among the literatures, also, of bygone ages, we must, at least, accord to that of India a third place in extent and value. If Greece and Rome can boast of lyric and dramatic poets, whom we may still use as models of style, or of Philosophers whose theories have not yet ceased to exert some influence, surely ancient India will be able to do as much, when rightly and generally understood; and I shall not have succeeded in the least of my objects, if the pages of the following Introduction do not prove my position to the reader.

But I will not now enter into details. I will content myself with one assertion, which future ages and future Indianists will triumph in proving. Of all the accusations brought against Sanskrit literature, none appears so incontrovertible as that it possesses no *history*. This I deny. The late M. Burnouf—whom all Oriental scholars must honour as one of the fathers of the study of the East in Europe—was wont to say, that when rightly understood and duly compared, every work in Sanskrit would supply some historical material to fill up the gap which undoubtedly seems to exist; and that a history of the Aryan nation might eventually be traced with as much accuracy as that

of any race which has not deigned to chronicle its own existence.

Whence, then, these mistaken notions of Sanskrit literature? Whence these impediments in the way of its study; these mists of doubt and delusion which surround it? We answer that the study of Sanskrit is still in its cradle; and we are forced, at the same time, to confess that it has been but indifferently nursed even by its most zealous students. It is now more than a hundred years since Father Pons, a French missionary, wrote a letter, dated Karikal, the 23rd of November, 1740,¹ on the religion, philosophy, and literature of the Hindús; yet it was only in 1852 that a first attempt was made at Berlin, by Professor Weber,² in the form of lectures, to arrange and consolidate all that has been agglomerated on the subject of the literature of Hindústán; and, great as is the praise due to his diligence and research in so difficult a task, we cannot but regret that even this undertaking should have been carried out in a manner to make it useless to any but scholars.

We must yield a full palm of praise to the labours of all the founders of this study in Europe,—men who have devoted their lives to the unravelling of the mysteries of the East. Great names are not wanting among the dead

¹ See "Mémoires des Indes" [in "Lettres édifiantes"], vol. xix. 1781.

² See "Vorlesungen ueber die Indische Literatur-geschichte." Berlin, 1852.

and the living to call forth the admiration of their followers — Jones, Wilkins, Colebrooke, Wilson, Johnson, Williams, and many others among ourselves; Schlegel, Lassen, and Windischmann, in Germany; Chézy, Burnouf, Langlois, and Deslongchamps, in France; but we cannot refrain from regretting that all, or nearly all, these distinguished men should have looked on their pursuits as peculiar and exclusive, and retained their greatest discoveries for the small chosen circle of Orientalists;—in short, that the external and less laborious world has as yet derived little benefit from them.

Though we may regret, we cannot, however, blame. Every study, be it of languages or of science, passes through the same tedious course. A few eccentric minds, fired with a burning thirst for knowledge, have set out with slight materials on an unbeaten track of discovery. Their followers have modified and corrected the work of their masters, and have worked alike in their own confined sphere.

But a period arrives in every study, when the labours of all its scholars must be reduced to one united and harmonious whole; when the bricks that one has baked, the mortar another has mixed, and the beams which a third has cut, must be brought together and arranged by the hand of the builder, in the form of another story added to the great Tower of Knowledge which may reach to the skies.

Such a period, it seems to me, has now arrived for the

study of the Indian Peninsula and its sacred tongue. Much has been written, much hazarded, much even proved on particular branches and single topics; and a demand is now made for some one who, content to work on the foundation laid by others, will collect the broad features that reign through all and present them to the general reader. In such a capacity I now volunteer; and if I be found, on test, to succeed but indifferently, some allowance may, I trust, be made for me, in the novelty and difficulty of the task.

The method I have adopted is simple, and makes its results available at the same time for the student and the general reader. It is that of giving an easy but literal translation of the best Sanskrit works, accompanied by copious explanatory notes, and preceded by such an introduction on the subject-matter of the work, as shall make the translation intelligible and palatable to all who may read it, and spare the student the labour of searching among remote and scattered heaps for the information he requires.

If the choice of a philosophical work, with which to commence, should seem strange to some, I may be allowed to defend it in a few words.

In the first place, I must remind the objector that the choice is far from being unlimited. There are very few works in all the mass of Sanskrit prose and verse com-

positions which have not been already sufficiently treated by scholars of acknowledged authority, as to enable me to dispense with many tedious preliminaries; and still fewer, the style and language of which is sufficiently simple for the student who is not far advanced. Again, of all the subjects treated in Indian literature, few seem to me so well adapted to the taste of the general reader as that of philosophy. While he would shrink from an investigation of their religious ideas, through the thick maze of complicated mythology and symbolism which envelopes them, he will gladly inquire what the Hindú mind has been capable of producing in the clearer field of theoretical investigation. While its Science might interest those only who had pursued the same subjects with European and modern materials, its Philosophy seems to me to offer something of interest to every thinking mind. Their Drama, their Poetry, their Didactic Literature, were mostly devoid of the indispensable requisites; and the only other work which was fully suited to the same object was the well-known collection of instructive fables called Hitopadesha. When for a moment I hesitated between this and the present work, I was reminded that the ground of the former was already occupied by the excellent English and German translations of Professors Johnson and Max Müller. Lastly, the Bhagavad-Gítá itself offers many advantages. Belonging to that school of Sanskrit philosophy

which I think we must regard as the first upward flight of the Hindú mind, shackled hitherto by the trammels of superstition, and weighed down by the arrogant oppression of an all-powerful hierarchy, it adds to its theories the first ideas of that strange system which converted the multitudes of a vast region into the most rigid ascetics, and which reigns gloomily over the minds of so large a portion of its population. In this respect it presents a strange and complete picture of the Hindú character, and is therefore not without general interest.

In the Introduction which follows will be found an account of the poem entitled the Bhagavad-Gítá and of its subject-matter. It is here scarcely necessary to state more than that it is a philosophical poem,—not merely philosophical theories in Sanskrit verse,—but really a poem in the fullest acceptation of the word. It is an episode inserted in the great Sanskrit Epic called Mahábhárata—the Iliad of India,—which, if it be not equal to the great Epic of the West in the brilliancy and variety of its colouring, and the music of its style, is not inferior to it in that masculine power which only rude uncivilized nations can produce. Its philosophy has been ranked under that most ancient school—the Sánkhya—which claims Kapila as its founder; and under that branch of it, the Yoga, which is ascribed to another half-fabulous Bráhmaṇ, Patanjali. What those systems are, and how

far it is justly ranked with them, is the subject of the ensuing Introduction.

I must now speak of the forms in which the Bhagavad-Gítá has been already made public. It was first brought to light in that of a translation by the learned Oriental scholar, Sir Charles Wilkins, in the year 1785, and the translation was published in French by M. Parrāud in Paris in 1787. Of the original translation we cannot speak with entire satisfaction. Doubtless, as a first attempt, and with the slight knowledge of Hindú philosophy then at hand, it is praiseworthy; but it is defective in being *too little* translated. All words that present the slightest difficulty of rendering into English are left untranslated, and nothing but a short and barely sufficient note added to explain them. In the French version this is not amended, and the meaning of Wilkins is rendered rather more obscure than clearer. The first edition of the Sanskrit Text of the Bhagavad-Gítá was published in Calcutta in 1808, edited by the Bráhmaṇ Bábú-ráma—editor, before and since, of many other standard Sanskrit works—and at the suggestion of the illustrious Colebrooke. The edition most generally used is that of the celebrated August Wilhelm von Schlegel, published, with a very literal Latin translation and notes, at Bonn, in the year 1823; while, for a greatly improved and augmented edition, we have to thank his no less celebrated pupil

Christian Lassen, who reproduced it at the same place in 1846. Of the Latin translation which accompanies these editions, and which is used and appreciated by all Orientalists, I need only now say that it cannot be too highly praised: though perhaps it is to be regretted that in their zeal to correct the error into which their predecessor had fallen, both master and pupil have gone too far, and attempted to translate much that had better have been left alone. Lastly, we must name with the highest eulogy a most able Greek translation prepared at Benares by the learned Greek Orientalist, Demetrios Galanos, with the assistance of the Bráhmaṇ Kandadarsa, and printed at Athens, with an introduction by M. Typaldus, in 1846. This, it will be seen, is by far the best translation which exists, while the notes which accompany it are in every respect invaluable. But I cannot conclude this notice without referring, as I do with the greatest pleasure, to a French translation, prepared some years past by one whose name has been already raised high in the esteem of the scholastic world by his essays on the Sánkhyā and Nyáya systems of Hindú philosophy, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire. This able production has been unfortunately prevented from appearing at present, but with that frank and amiable generosity by which he is distinguished, its author has laid the manuscript entirely at my disposition. It is an excellent free translation, following in

most essential points that of Schlegel and Lassen, but preferable to it from its superior clearness and explicitness.

Of these four translations the only one available to the general English reader was that of Wilkins, and even were this still easily obtainable, it would be far from giving a clear idea of the work in question, and still less of its philosophy. The work of Schlegel and Lassen contains no account whatever of the philosophical ideas of the Bhagavad-Gítá, nor is any attempt made in their notes to explain the more obscure passages; while I think it will be admitted that the student who knows little of Sanskrit philosophy, will often be as much puzzled to divine the meaning of the Latin translation, as of the original Sanskrit text. Lastly, the excellent work of M. Galanos is in Greek, which would deter many from its perusal.

I cannot pretend that I have departed very materially from any of these translations in the more essential points; it will be seen later in what details I may differ from each, and on what points I may claim the right of a fresh version. Yet it is not so much, be it well understood, the details of my translation which I seek to thrust before the public, but the popular form with which I have attempted to invest it. The Introduction presents a general view of the rise of philosophical ideas in India, and of the principal schools into which they distributed themselves.

It then particularizes the Sánkhya system, and the Yoga and Karmayoga branches of it, and proceeds to a minute investigation of the doctrines contained in our poem. Lastly, it presents a Critical and Historical Review of the whole work. In the Translation itself, I have attempted to preserve, if not the order of the words, at least that of the sense of the original, and while making it so literal that the beginner may employ it as a key to the text, have endeavoured to render it sufficiently English for the general reader not to be turned back by its peculiarities. The Notes have been placed at the foot of each page, that the sense of every obscure word or passage may be grasped at once, and long explanations are given wherever they are required. Lastly, an Index of Proper Names contains all that I have been able to gather on the subject, and is much more extended than that of Lassen.

The task has not been an easy one, and I leave it to the reader to judge if I have performed it suitably. I can only say that it was not undertaken without the countenance of one whom I am proud to be able to call my friend and preceptor, and who is justly considered as the first of living Orientalists, Horace Hayman Wilson, and with that I courageously face criticism.

I cannot refrain, ere I conclude, from paying some slight tribute to the liberality of those among whom I

write this. During the last year I have continually enjoyed the friendship and assistance of some of the most illustrious *savans* of France; and, indeed, to their generosity and aid it is owing that I have been enabled to complete the attempt which I now submit to the public.

J. COCKBURN THOMSON.

Paris, 1855.

INTRODUCTION.

ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HINDÚS.

PART I.

ON THE ORIGIN OF PHILOSOPHICAL IDEAS IN INDIA.

WHEN we strive to furnish a definition of the meaning of the word "Philosophy," we are startled at the difficulty of the task. We are met by one of those many abstract ideas which cannot be handled, or reduced within the narrow circle which a definition requires; one of those vague expansive conceptions which belong only to a high state of civilization, and which if they existed at all in the mind of the past did so as mysteries only, and found no words by means of which they might be vulgarized for the use of a licentious world. The word 'philosophy' has a far narrower and better defined meaning in the distant past, in the rude methodical school-days of mankind, than in the present age. And this meaning is sufficiently demonstrated in its very etymology, to which we are compelled to have recourse.

There are few countries, among all that can boast a literature, where philosophy has developed itself clearly, independently, and, so to speak, spontaneously; and demanded for itself a name. Perhaps Greece and India may be considered as the only two such, and the philosophies of other nations may be looked upon, either as the offspring of these, or as a species of religious mysticism. Under the former we may rank all the modern European schools: under the latter the great systems of China, Persia, Syria, and Egypt. In

India and Greece, then, the names for philosophy have the same meaning—‘the desire for knowledge’—*φιλοσοφία* and *jijnásá*; and in them we find a true definition of its origin and original form. It is the dawning consciousness of the power of the intellect, which, blushing at its ignorance and its blind belief, urges the search after hidden and unknown truth through the immediate channels of internal investigation, rather than the surer but more tedious path of established science.

The birth of Philosophy is an era in the annals of every people; and the enquiry as to the causes of its origin is inseparable from the investigation of their religious and social history. Thus the history of most nations is divisible into three great periods, which serve alike for their religious and social peculiarities; 1st. The Age of Barbarism; 2nd. The Age of Mysticism; 3rd. The Age of Investigation. Let us examine these briefly.

1st. The Age of Barbarism. When man went forth from Ararat and spread himself over the face of the earth, little was left him but instinct and conscience. Instinct prompted self-preservation, and this again suggested invention. Hence the origin of useful arts. According to the nature of the climate, and the soil to which he wandered, he became husbandman or shepherd. Choice would send him to the pleasant district which could be tilled, necessity drive him to the mountain, or the wild plain, where cattle would yield him equal support. But in either case he was dependent on nature. If a husbandman, earth afforded him grain, which he laid in her bosom, and left, as it were, to her to foster; while, when the grain sprung up, sun, rain, and air, as he soon discovered, were necessary for its growth. If a herdsman, his flock no less required water to drink and warmth to cheer them; and the air or wind could counteract the excesses of both, could cool the heat of the one, and dry the land when deluged by the other. Thus he felt his dependence.

Sun, wind, and rain, were necessary for his happiness, and even for his support; but they were above his control, and seemed to favour him at their own will. He felt that they were his superiors, and their spontaneous action suggested the idea of their personality. The elements and the common phenomena were deified. But how to propitiate them, how to make the clouds rain, the sun shine, the wind blow, when his crops, his herds, or himself required it? If his fellow-man were to be conciliated, and won to perform some act of favour, the request must be preceded with the indulgence of some wish of the other's, a gift must be offered. A gift, therefore, should be offered to the elements, and, forsooth, the best that might be. Hence the origin of sacrifice. But if the gift were wanting, instinct had already taught him the power of flattery, and hence the origin of hymns of praise. Prayer naturally followed these, and we have thus a complete system of Element-worship. But while this was the work of instinct, conscience was not quite forgotten, though man's natural selfishness had led him to put it aside. Conscience taught him that there was some unseen, unknown, Almighty Being in and out of the world. Some one to create himself, some one to create the world around. Some one to bring death, and to receive him after death, and accordingly the notion of a Supreme Being took root deep in the mind, though always with mystery and uncertainty. This, then, constitutes the religion of the Barbarian age of most nations, and to this may the most complicated mythology, the most superstitious mysticism of after ages be reduced—the worship of the elements, and the idea of a Supreme Being.

2nd. The Age of Mysticism. But as civilization progressed, when the city rose from the village, and arts became more and more polished, the elements, which had been all in all to the rude countryman, were useless to the civilian. Every calling had now its patron, which, were he an element, an historical personage, or merely an abstract idea, was equally

deified. Self-interest demanded a supernatural guardian for each man's vocation. The soldier must have a god of war, the sailor personifies and propitiates the storm and the waves, the woodman cannot be alone in the huge forest rustling around him, and peoples it with sylvan beings. Hence the origin of Polytheism and Hero-worship. But the dawn of civilization is also the age of poetry. It is not till man is severed from nature that he loves and learns to imitate her, to dream of her, and picture her in glowing colours. The rustic may mingle rude verses in his village dance, and the savage warrior chant fierce couplets of war, but though these will possess a physical and majestic power, they will not be that poetry which touches the heart with its softness, and inflames it with its fancies. The true birth of poetry dates in every country from the first dawn of civilized life. And this poetry exercises a powerful influence on the religion of the people. It seizes greedily on all that is ideal; all, too, that is ancient. Tradition has an untold charm for it, and it blindly receives the errors of the past, for the mere sake of their antiquity. Thus the idea of a great invisible Supreme Being comes prominently forward, and the worship of the elements, no longer the simple, selfish, but necessary faith of the shepherd and husbandman, is incorporated with this spiritual idea, and they themselves invested with mystic personality. Hence we find in so many countries the notion of a Trinity in Unity, superior to all deities; and even where this distinct notion is wanting, as perhaps in the western mythology, the elements have still lent their character to the chief of gods. Jupiter has become at once the giver of life and warmth, the lord of thunder and of rain.

But the idea of a deity once removed from the visible to the invisible—from the actual to the ideal—poetry—imagination—does the rest. A complete theogony and a world of gods is soon established. Man's relation to the superhuman world is now, too, placed on a different basis. Where before

the gods were propitiated with an express selfish interest, they now claim worship as their due, and promise little in return. Something, however, must be promised, or their worship would soon fall into disuse and contempt; and the reward offered is an equally ideal one, that of happiness after death. But the hope of an uncertain future is not a sufficient encouragement; some punishment must be added to frighten man into the worship of the ideal and invisible; and the punishment is misery hereafter. These inventions, which follow in a natural course upon the worship of ideal deities, are supported and developed by the priesthood, a class which has arisen in every country at a very early period, from the practice of performing sacrifices by proxy to the elements and primitive deities; and who, when once established, lose no means of keeping the religion they administer ever before the minds of its followers. Hence the first ideas of right and wrong, future punishment and reward; and hence too the first dawning notion of the immortality of the soul. In manners, then, this is the age of early civilization and commerce, of the establishment of government, and the administration of justice; in literature, it is the age of the Lyric and Epic; in ideas, the age of superstition and mythology, of the establishment of a religion and a priesthood, of invention and imagination.

But a faith of such fictitious origin as that of Polytheism could not long maintain its hold on thinking minds, at a period when man discovered that he could reason as well as imagine; that, in short, he was gifted with intellect. The priesthood might impose their invented cosmogonies and legions of gods and demigods on a timid populace, who dared not risk their crop or their cow for the sake of truth; but men were found towards the end of this period, who were not only willing but determined to *think*, and throwing the whole constitution of religion into the abyss of doubt, to hazard even futurity for the liberty of thought.

3rdly. The Age of Investigation. The consciousness of mental power and the desire of knowledge were disgusted at the corrupt theology thrust upon the mind by a now tyrannical and all-powerful hierarchy, and common sense began to triumph over superstition. But the doubt which had been cast on the fictions of the priesthood went no further. In no country has early philosophy been sceptical: none among the first thinkers have sought to deny the existence of what is obvious to the senses, or of those senses themselves. Nay, on the other hand, conscience has developed itself; and the enquirer has been the first to establish the existence, and even the immortality, of the soul. The existence of self and of the world has been taken for granted, and the question has been, "Why, and how, do I,—does this world, exist?" "How long do we exist, and what do we become when we apparently cease to exist?" The nature of the soul and of the universe, rather than that of God, has been the topic of early philosophy. The soul afforded a freer field for investigation, unshackled as it was by the work of preceding ages. But when the nature of the gods was proposed to the enquirer, he generally accepted much from the established religion; the deities were left alone in their places, nor were their various attributes disputed. But their glory had departed from them. A still higher being walked over their heads: the Great Unknown was higher than they, because more spiritual, less defined, and more absolute in his sovereignty. Thus, at least, was it with Socrates and Kapila. Both of them left their country's gods in their places, but both of them brought forward a new ideal deity to rob them of their divinity—Socrates his Unknown One, and Kapila his Pantheistic Soul.

This, however, could not last. All men were not such spiritualists as the first thinkers, and man demanded some more palpable notions of the deity whom he was asked to acknowledge. From this arose the attempt to reconcile

philosophy and the established faith, and consequently the Age of Investigation has generally concluded with one of controversy, and schools of philosophy and sects of belief have divided the world between them.

We have thus seen the history of the mind of every nation divided into three periods, the Barbaric or physical—the period of conscience and instinct; the Mystic, superstitious, and mythological period—that of dawning civilization and Idealism; and the Intellectual period—that of enquiry and light. We do not for a moment suppose that every nation of the earth has passed through these periods of development. Far from it. Had such been the case, we should have had fifty times the actual number of national philosophies. Both internal and external circumstances have occurred to obstruct and often annihilate the development of a race. Thus the Britons were conquered by the Romans at a period of barbarism. The Slavonic races are still lingering in the second period. Egypt had never power to rise from mysticism—which took such firm root along the borders of the Nile—to the light of philosophy; and the Hebrew people is an exception to the whole theory, since they, and they only, have been favoured at all times with direct revelations of the Truth. •

But of all nations which have had time and opportunity to work out their own civilization, none affords so excellent an example of what has been just shown as the Áryan or Hindú race. For at least twenty centuries they were undisturbed possessors of the same seat, in a climate which was itself opposed to internal revolution, and with a character that, more than any in the world, favoured the progress of thought. When we speak of the Áryan race, we must not of course consider them as the aborigines of India. There seems little doubt that, at a period not long anterior to the use of the Vedic hymns, they were a race of simple cowherds, who entered the Peninsula at the north-west corner, and long

dwelt on the banks of the Scinde ere they penetrated into the interior. Whatever the aborigines were, one thing would at least seem clear, that the new race borrowed little from them, save perhaps a few generic names. But if the people they subdued or drove out had no influence on the character of the conquerors, the latter were not equally free from that of the climate, and a great difference of character can be remarked between the Epics that were sung in the Panjáb and the Drama that was acted on the banks of the Ganges.

In the Vedas we can trace with ease the period of barbarism,¹ the nomad herdsman life, and the worship of the elements. In the Vedic period only four elements are known, or at least only four are personified, fire, water, air, and earth. But the fourth, neither in India nor elsewhere, has been deified at an early epoch, and the reason is obvious. The worship of the elements is a selfish one. Sun, rain, and wind could administer, as they thought, voluntarily to the wants of man; but the earth was under man's own control: he could plough or dig it, and it yielded fruit; he could leave it alone, and it did not act spontaneously. Again, the other three had something unknown and unapproachable about them; the earth, however, was man's own, and he could not worship the ground beneath his feet. Thus we find three elements deified in the Vedas, fire, water, air, or in their more common forms of sun, rain, and wind, and the chief of these is naturally the sun. The consciousness of a single Supreme Being, Creator and Guardian of the world, was then brought into play; and to invest the idea with a palpable form, the chief of the triad, the sun, was identified with it. Hence we find in the Vedas, hymns which attribute to the sun all the

¹ I do not mean by this that the Vedas, as writings, and as we possess them, belong to the age of Barbarism. Polytheism and Mysticism have already impregnated these ancient hymns. It must, however, be remembered that older songs, belonging to a simpler age, were handed down, and were incorporated with the more recent ones, and it is among these that we find marked traces of Element-worship.

qualities of a Supreme Being, omnipresence, omnipotence, the oversight and care of mankind, and a hundred more. Thus the idea of one God was established by the side of that of a Trinity, and in some degree connected with it.

Meanwhile, however, the phenomena of nature found first wonderers, and afterwards worshippers; or rather they received the respect, without the position of Gods. The thundercloud was personified in Indra, and as he was the most terrible and least comprehended, he soon became the chief of the deities. Earthly fire and earthly water were distinguished from sun and rain, and Agni, Varuṇa, and even Vāyu (the wind) were ranged among the demigods. But once the habit of deification established, and it extended in every direction; the earth, the air, the water, and the upper regions of the clouds were peopled by the superstitious with beings favourable or obnoxious to mankind; Gandharvas, the musicians, and Apsarasas, the beautiful nymphs, of heaven, on the one hand: Daityas, demons and giants; Rākṣhasas, evil sprites; and many more, on the other.

To this second period moreover must be assigned the strange institution of Caste; which, in its perfection, if not in its first idea, may be said to belong exclusively to India. Its origin is to be traced, first to the separation of the conquered aborigines from their conquerors, and next to the power of the priesthood. In an examination of the four castes, Bráhmans or priests, Kṣatriyas or warriors, Vaishyas or artizans, and Shúdras or slaves, we find that the three first are united, and severed widely from the last, by the privilege of investiture with the Bráhmanical thread at years of maturity, which seems to indicate that they all ranked among the conquerors; while the wretched Shúdra, who claimed no right to such a privilege, was undoubtedly the converted but enslaved native. Meanwhile the priesthood, as is everywhere the case, being the class to whom learning of every kind was confined, felt and asserted their mental

superiority; and drawing themselves apart, secured their right by making it a crime unpardonable in this or the next life, to kill a Bráhmán. The distinction, lastly, between the knight and the artizan, is but a natural one, which has sprung up in every land and every age. Thus the institution of Caste, so favourable to the supremacy of the hierarchy and the pride of the nobility, gained ground, till a divine origin and supreme laws were arrogantly claimed for it, and the Vaishya and Shúdra did not dare to rebel. But this very institution—established so firmly, and strengthened by every artifice of the priesthood, supported as they were by warriors and monarchs—was well nigh the cause of its own ruin.

¹ Five hundred years before Christ a social and religious revolution took place in India, which only failed because it was premature, but which nevertheless could send its doctrines over the whole earth, and gain a hold, which it has since kept, over nearly a third of the inhabitants of the entire globe. We have said that learning was centered in the Bráhmans. It was their profession, as war and kingship were that of the Kṣhatriya. The Bráhmán was therefore the first in whom the light of reason dispersed the cloud of superstition. The Bráhmán was the first to doubt the truth of the faith he upheld and administered to passive multitudes. The Bráhmán was the first philosopher: Kapila, Patanjali, the Vyása, Jaimini, Gautama and Kaṇáda, the founders of the philosophic schools of India, were all Bráhmans. Poets, astronomers, grammarians, musicians and physicians, belonged to the same caste.

But if the light shone among the Bráhmans, they were sensible enough to hide it beneath a bushel, and their policy

¹ The Hindús place Buddha 544, 543, or 546, B.C. This however is by no means a certainty. The King Kanishka or Kanerki is said to have flourished exactly 400 years after Buddha, and the coins of this monarch determine his date as 40 A.D., thus making the date of Buddha 360 B.C. For a full account of the controversy on the subject, see Weber's "Vorlesungen über Sanskritische Literatur-Geschichte."

was that of the priesthood of popery, to keep the people always in the dark. The schools that listened to the doctrines of Kapila and Patanjali were but small knots of studious Bráhmans, and it was only when controversy broke in, that the fever of sectarianism was communicated to the people. Then was the power of the priesthood shaken, then was its infallibility declared a falsehood, when it could not agree in the tenets it taught; and, when nothing but the spark was wanting to set the whole in a blaze, Buddha came from the far west—a prophet of liberty appeared to preach the divine doctrines of equality and independence, and the people rose in a mass against their oppressors. But the foresight of the Bráhmans had been judiciously employed. They had bound the strength of the nation firmly to their side. The Kṣatriya had been taught that all his interests were with the priesthood, and opposed to the artizan and the merchant; and Buddhism, which flourished for a while, was at length driven by arms to seek a long home in China, in Ceylon, and in Thibet, and even to impregnate early Christianity with some of its forms,¹ if not of its doctrines.

We have dwelt long on this Buddhist revolution, because we look on it as a visible manifestation of Hindú Philosophy. It is, on the one hand, a social, on the other, rather a philosophic than a religious revolution, and late studies have demonstrated that the doctrines of Buddha were, one and all, those of Kapila, the founder of the Sánkhyā school. Nor can we consider the latter to be very long anterior to the former. Whether Buddha be placed in the sixth or the fourth century before Christ, the rise of philosophical ideas cannot date much before the seventh century. The Áryans can scarcely have established themselves in the north and

¹ Such for instance are the institutions of monastic and conventual life, the retirement from the world and self-torture of hermits, the use of bells for churches, of rosaries, of pictures and relics of saints; and many other customs, the origin of which is difficult to account for in any other manner.

centre of India long before the ninth or tenth centuries before Christ. The system of castes had then to be established, the character of the whole nation had to change gradually, through the effect of the climate; from the hardy activity of the Doáb, to the contemplative routine of the Ganges: the disgust to life, the great secret of the first ideas of Hindú Philosophy, had to be induced and fixed by a steady change, wrought by the climate and geographical peculiarities of the new country; ere the Bráhmañ even, supported as he was by tithes, and faring on the fat of the land, without labour and with nothing but the mind to set in motion, could find it necessary to seek consolation in a hidden and uncertain future.

To this disgust to life must we therefore attribute the first blooming of contemplation in India, the first philosophical ideas; and when we say that the Sáñkhya system must be regarded as the earliest development of such ideas; and Kapila considered not only the founder of that school, but the originator of all Indian philosophy; we must be understood to speak of those ideas reduced to a system. Singly, they must have had an earlier origin, and much speculation, much demonstration even, must have preceded Kapila. The very regularity, simplicity, clearness, and decisiveness of his arrangement militate forcibly against the supposition that any man should have discovered, worked out, and perfected such a system, without any groundwork to build upon. We might as well believe Euclid to have been the earliest mathematician, as that Kapila was the first philosopher. He is, however, the first of whom we have any traces, and it will therefore be our object to delineate, as correctly as possible, the rise and development of those ideas which he borrowed from his predecessors.

The first great tenet which Indian philosophers established, if we may not say discovered, was the individual but connected existence of souls. That man, endowed with a consciousness

of his own existence, with the power of reflection, and the thirst for knowledge through internal investigation, should feel convinced, in the very outset, that there existed that within him which was neither matter nor mind, which was eternal and superior to matter, is only natural: but that, knowing that each man was more or less like himself, and therefore gifted with a like soul, he should perceive any original connection between his own soul and his neighbour's, and seek a common origin for them, is not consequent on mere contemplation. Some existing belief must have aided the earlier philosophers in arriving at this conclusion; and this we believe to have been metempsychosis or the transmigration of souls. As this belief constitutes the basis of all Indian philosophy, it may be well to give some account of it. Undoubtedly it is the most novel and original idea ever started in any age or country; undoubtedly, too, the place of its invention is India, and India only; and the age—that period immediately preceding the rise of what are properly called philosophical ideas, and immediately following the reduction of polytheism to a system. Greece owes it to Pythagoras, Pythagoras had it in person either from Egypt or India. Egypt received it from India with her Osiris and Isis, with her cargoes of apes, parrots, and gold. In India it originated; and—though Voltaire would attribute it to the prohibition, necessitated by the climate, against killing certain animals, and the reverence thence attached to them, from which they were supposed to possess souls like man; and though St. Hilaire would discover its origin in the absence of any feeling of individual personality and spirituality, arising from the sensuality of the Indian disposition—I cannot but think that it is to be traced to nothing more nor less than the polytheism which preceded it. We have already shown how the elements were personified. Other personifications followed quickly upon these; but what did these personifications amount to? In the most

mystic periods of the mythological age, these elements, these natural phenomena, these beings which peopled space, were undoubtedly believed to possess bodies more or less like those of men; but this did not constitute their personification: it was not by these invisible bodies alone that they could witness, judge of, and interfere in the affairs of men; they must have possessed more than a mere corporeal likeness to man in order to do this, they must have had minds to discriminate and wills to apply; and this will constitutes, in the earliest ideas, the soul itself. The deities, then, possessed an individual personality like that of man. But the system of deification had gone still further. Admiration had given heroes an apotheosis; and, in the meanwhile, the life of the jungle, and the love of, and necessity for, the chase, had rendered the Indian more intimate with the inferior animals than any other race. He had learnt to descry several of the attributes of man in each of the wild beasts with which he had to deal. The ape had afforded him a most striking instance of this; and from India do we thus derive those many fables which attribute human thoughts and human voices to quadrupeds, birds, and reptiles.¹ Thus gods, animals, and even elements and natural phenomena, were, so to speak, humanized; while, on the other hand, men and beasts were deified; and hence the recognition of like souls in all three classes of beings. But the likeness of these souls to one another would immediately give rise to the idea that the same souls passed through certain grades of bodies, from animals to man, from man to gods. This idea once

¹ It is worthy of notice that those animals chiefly are introduced in these fables with which the Hindú was most intimately acquainted—domestic animals and the larger beasts of the forest (fish and insects appearing but rarely). The characters given to each—the good-natured gullibility of the elephant, the bumptious stupidity of the ass, the insidious pandering of the jackal, the calm philosophy of the tortoise, and the folly of the ape—are proofs of the early attempt to affirm their possession of souls, endowed with the same peculiarities as those of man.

implanted, the belief in the eternity of the soul would immediately ensue, since it would be seen that in passing from one body to another, the body it quitted died, whereas the soul died not, and this idea would be repeated to infinity. The eternity of the soul once established, a certain number of individual souls would be supposed to exist and to have existed from the creation of matter, which they occupy, and thus a common origin would have been easily asserted for them. This common origin was Spirit, which was later only identified with the Supreme Being ; and since the individual souls emanated from it, they must also, at the dissolution of matter, be re-absorbed into it. It therefore exists, and continues to exist, and keeps up its connection to a certain degree with the souls which have emanated from it.

Thus, then, we have the first tenet of philosophy, the individual existence and connection of souls, with which are connected the eternity of the soul and its transmigrations. The disgust to this life, the certainty of its repetition by means of those transmigrations, the knowledge of the eternity of the soul, and of the existence of a spiritual essence, into which it would eventually be re-absorbed, now induced men to ask how this re-absorption might be hastened, and transmigration thus avoided. The answer was both natural and noble—Knowledge. The grades through which the soul had been traced, from reptile to beast, from beast to man, from man to inferior deity, from inferior to superior deity :—when the soul had reached this point, it was at the utmost limit of material bodies : what was beyond ? The essence of spirit, into which it was to be eventually re-absorbed. How then could this point be gained without the long process of transmigrating from body to body ? Of course, by rendering the soul as much as possible like that of the superior deity. And in what did his superiority consist ? The superiority of man over beasts was that of his mind, his knowledge ; that of the gods over man would be the same ; and it was there-

fore knowledge which made perfect, and perfection which emancipated the soul from matter. This superior knowledge, said the earlier philosophers, is philosophy itself acquired by contemplation.

The next great tenet established by the early Áryan philosophers was the individual existence and connection of material bodies. This, of course, resulted from perception and reflection, a very little of which showed them that when a body of any kind lost its individuality, it decomposed and yielded up each of its elementary parts to those other combinations of elements which were ready to receive them. But though they were fully convinced that each body of matter was composed of elementary parts, they did not recognize the fact that these elementary parts re-appeared in other bodies, after the decomposition of the first, and they consequently attributed the apparent disappearance of these elements to re-absorption in a new principle, which Kapila was probably the first to systematize, and which we shall have occasion to describe later. It is now sufficient to say that it was matter what the essence of spirit was to the individual soul. From it the elementary parts emanated, and into it they were again absorbed.

Thus, in the earliest ages of investigation, was the great question, 'What am I?' answered in its psychological and physiological points of view; and in all this, inquiry, not doubt, was the impulse. The existence of the soul was first established, and consciousness was the means employed. From this fact was deduced the existence of spirit. Again, the existence of matter was received as a thing of course, and perception was here the instrument of investigation. From the existence of matter, that of a material essence was deduced by a like process. In both these deductions, inference had to supply the place which Revelation on the one hand, and science on the other, occupy in Christian philosophy. But it remained for a later age, it remained for

Kapila to draw the line accurately between matter and soul, soul and spirit, and to reduce to a regular system their respective developments.

But a loftier question was soon to be proposed, and doubt was soon to replace investigation. This question was, 'Why do I exist? Why does matter exist?' 'I grant,' said the enquirer, 'that matter and soul, that spirit and material essence, exist under the given conditions; I feel the same disgust to life, and I am convinced that there is a future of some kind; that, when my body is exhausted by age and disease, my soul quits it, but still exists. I have perfect confidence in the grades of transmigration you put before me; I believe that I shall be a deity, and that I have been an animal; I can judge for myself that one such state of existence is better than another, and since all are more or less bad, I admit that the only real state of happiness for my soul will be liberation from material existence of every kind, and re-absorption into the spiritual essence. But what is the reason of this existence? what is that which condemns me to what I loathe? to what can we ascribe this regular organization of spirit and matter? I know the *how*, I wish to know the *why*.' It was this question which first divided philosophers. As long as investigation was confined to perception, to inference drawn from perception, and lastly to Revelation, the final resource when these two failed, philosophers had been united. But this was a question of speculation, and as such many views might be maintained of it according to each man's ideas rather than his belief.

At this period of enquiry Kapila stood up, not however to answer, but rather to evade the question. He had turned his attention rather to the physiological than to the psychological view of the universe, and he became, without an effort, materialist. Perception and inference had taught him a system for matter, which removed the necessity of the existence of a Creator. He had inferred the existence of a material

essence, and the regular emanation of all matter from it, and its re-absorption into it. One thing only was wanting, the will to decree this emanation and this re-absorption. This will he gave to the material essence, and this, under the name of Prakṛiti, or nature, became the plastic principle, and, to a certain degree, the deity of his system. At the same time he did not deny the superiority of spirit, and the inferiority of matter. He tacitly admitted the spiritual essence side by side with Prakṛiti, the material essence; and the connection of soul—the emanation from the one—with body—the emanation from the other; but he went no further. Had he given to that spiritual essence the will which he gave to Prakṛiti, acknowledging, as he did, the superiority of spirit, he would have dubbed it a deity—a supreme being, the efficient, though not the material, cause of the existence both of soul and matter. But this was a point of speculation beyond the limits of his field of enquiry. Kapila is silent on this point, and his silence has acquired for him the name of atheist (*nīrīshwara*).

The question of 'why?' was now taken up, and while Kapila, followed by minds the most remarkable in India, if not in the whole ancient world, formed a school which laid the basis of Buddhism, and through it, was destined hereafter to influence the minds of a third part of the human race; another school arose, scarcely less atheist indeed to our ideas, but theist compared with what had gone before. Of this school we have no actual remains; but its existence cannot be doubted, from that of the two schools which grew out of it, namely, Patanjali's, and that of the Bhagavad-Gítá. This school we may denominate the Theistic (*śeṣhīwara*) Sāṅkhya. It received from Kapila all but the concession of will to Prakṛiti, the material essence. Its great addition was the assertion of the existence of a Supreme Being. This idea was not a new one, it was no invention, but simply a revival. We have already seen that it existed in the wor-

ship of the elements, but whether it were there the remains of a tradition handed down from Ararat, or the pure detection of conscience, is of no importance here. It is sufficient to know that it was not entirely lost sight of in the age of superstition and polytheism which followed, and that it was now again brought forward to solve the doubt which rose, as speculation advanced upon investigation. But the Supreme Being of early philosophy was the necessary result of Kapila's system. Will was denied to the material, and conceded to the spiritual essence. The latter was deified, and the material essence was then in a mystic manner made a portion of this deity. In short all existence was referred to the existence of this Being, all action to his will. His will it was which caused souls to emanate from himself, and which, working on the material portion of himself, caused matter to emanate from the material essence. Thus the position which Kapila had demanded for Prakriti, the material essence, was not refused to it. It was still deified in being made a portion of the Deity himself; but volition, and that only, was denied it. The *why* was now explained. It was the will of the Supreme Being that he himself should undergo this development into individual soul and organized matter. It was his will that evil should exist beside good, which alone existed in him; and that the soul, placed in a body the lowest in the scale, should gradually ascend till it reached that of man. To man alone was the choice between good and evil granted, to him alone was it possible to effect his emancipation from material life, by the same means which Kapila had set forward—perfection through knowledge; or by the neglect of this means, to rise in the scale of material bodies by obedience to the established religion, or to sink by neglect of both.

Thus a new school was formed which seemed to satisfy doubt, and was the more attractive to the Hindú mind, since it offered it a mystery on which to contemplate, and

a theory to be worked out according to fancy. It was a more pliable, a more acceptable, a more tangible system than that of Kapila; and while the latter, careless of the future, and seeking truth in the explanation of the present, gained admirers and followers among the less selfish, the more courageous, and the higher class of minds, the Theistic Sánkhyas found many to espouse its cause among those secondary intellects which a fear of the future urged to demand some palpable object of worship. These followers, however, were not men of the first class of intelligence, and we have consequently no writings left by them; while those of the schools which were grafted on the pure Theistic Sánkhyas were the productions of later ages, and the works of Bráhmans, who could not forget their office of preceptor in their love of philosophy. Their systems are so closely connected with the history of the changes of the Indian mind, that we shall devote the next section to the attempt to demonstrate the causes that gave rise to their formation, and the controversies which, ensuing on their promulgation, were the origin of the foundation of the other so-called schools of Indian Philosophy.

PART II.

ON THE SCHOOLS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE schools of which we have received actual remains are considered by the Hindús themselves as six in number, in the following order:—

1. The Atheistical (*nirishwara*) Sánkhyā, attributed to Kapila.
2. The Yoga Schools of Patanjali and the Bhagavad-Gítá.
3. The Púrva-Mímánsá, attributed to Jaimini.
4. The Vedánta or Uttara-Mímánsá, to the Vyása, Kṛishṇa Dwaipáyana.
5. The Nyáyā, of Gautama.
6. The Vaisheshika, of Kaṇáda.

Our own arrangement would differ somewhat from that of the natives. We would reject the Púrva-Mímánsá entirely from the list. As will afterwards be seen, when we come to speak of it, this work is not a treatise on Philosophy, but a mystical, superstitious, Bráhmanical essay on the Vedas, to call which Philosophy would be to insult the schools which properly bear that title. We would also supply that school mentioned in the last part of the preceding section, of which, it is true, we have no actual remains, but which must necessarily have preceded the Yoga of Patanjali and the Bhagavad-Gítá. Our list would then stand as follows, as far as is possible, in chronological order:—

1. The Atheistical Sánkhyā, of Kapila. The plastic principle
2. The Theistical Sánkhyā. The Supreme Being.
3. The Nyáyā, of Gautama. The logical method.
4. The Yoga, of Patanjali. Emancipation by asceticism.

5. The Vaisheshika, of Kaṇāda.¹ The Atomic system.
6. The Karma-Yoga, of the Bhagavad-Gítā. The principles of asceticism applied to every-day life.
7. The Vedānta, or controversial and mystic Bráhmañical school.

These seven schools, however, are comprehended in not more than three principal systems, which for the sake of conciseness may be denominated the Sánkhyā, the Nyáya, and the Vedic systems. The first will include Nos. 1, 2, 4, and 6; the second, Nos. 3 and 5; the third is No. 7.

Of the six schools recognized by the Hindús, none are considered as strictly heterodox; none, in short, denied the existence of the deities of the established mythology, none subverted the existing forms of worship; but the Púrva-Mímáñsá is the only one which is considered as strictly orthodox. The Bráhmañ was permitted to study the Sánkhyā, the Yoga, the Nyáya, and the Vaisheshika systems; but while much of their doctrine might be received without danger, much also was to be rejected. In our own arrangement, the first three schools probably preceded the revolution of Buddha. When once that great blow had been aimed and struck with effect at Bráhmañism, an age of sectarianism followed; not however till the shock had been recovered, the malcontents again forcibly reduced to submission, and the hierarchy resumed its tyrannical supremacy. It was impossible for a contemplative race like that which dwelt on the banks of the sacred river, when once the chains had been snapped asunder, to submit tranquilly while the links were being mended; but the Bráhmañ was now determined to fortify his rule against all such conspiracies, and the new schools

¹ Weber ("Indische Literatur-Geschichte," Berlin, 1852) considers that the Nyáya and Vaisheshika were composed much about the same time, and sees no reason to doubt that the latter is the more ancient. I am far from insisting on anything so doubtful as a chronological arrangement, but the school of Kaṇāda bears, to my mind, marks of being posterior to that of Gautama.

were declared heterodox and heretic, and their followers compelled to gather themselves into sects. As in the period which succeeded the first spread of Christianity in the east, and that which followed our own reformation in the west, the spirit of sectarianism grew apace. Sects multiplied on all sides, divided and sub-divided chiefly by minute philosophical distinctions; and ere long, India was severed into more classes of belief than perhaps any country, including America at the present moment, ever contained.¹

The founders, however, of the schools of philosophy recognized by the established religion, had a better claim to the clemency of the priesthood. Unlike those of the earlier heterodox sects, they were Bráhmans; and however little they may have credited the doctrines upheld by their caste—however little respect they may have entertained for their text-books, the Vedas—they were certainly too much wedded to the institutions of their country, and had too little reason to complain of a system which gave to the caste to which they belonged a position of undisturbed ascendancy. They were also, perhaps, too negligent of the things of this world, wedded as they were to their own theories, to attempt to infuse their dogmata into the minds of the populace, and by so doing to undermine the existing state of government.

As it is to the system which we have generally termed Sánkhyá that the doctrines of the Bhagavad-Gítá most directly draw our attention, its separate branches will be separately treated; and we shall now confine ourselves to a view of the causes which influenced the rise of those branches, and shall then proceed to a brief sketch of the Nyáyá and Vedic, more properly called the Logical and Mystic, systems.

¹ For an account of these sects, consult Colebrooke's *Miscell. Essays*, vol. i. 'On Indian Sectaries,' and Wilson's *Essay* on the same subject in vols. xvi. and xvii. of the '*Asiatic Researches*.'

We have already said that the history of Indian philosophy was intimately connected with that of Indian civilization and development. This is more particularly perceived in observing the rise of those branches of the Sāṅkhya system which seem to be posterior to the revolution of Buddha. The Theistic Sāṅkhya, which placed the philosophic doctrines already uttered by Kapila on a more certain and tangible footing, by introducing and uniting with them the notion of one Supreme Being, had already been received and gained ground; but—though the existence of such a Being had been admitted, and that, too, not only among the philosophers who now formed themselves into a school, but even among the Bráhmans themselves, who afterwards incorporated this idea with their own religion, and even found it expedient to prove its existence in the Vedas—though no one denied the importance of effecting by some means the emancipation of the soul from material existence—no one had as yet thought it necessary to diverge from the existing state of things, by raising this Being to the position of an object of worship, and making the accomplishment of emancipation dependent on adoration of him. The followers of the Theistic Sāṅkhya, while they insisted on the existence of a Supreme Being, as uniting the essences of matter and soul, as creator of the universe, and as receiving into himself on emancipation the souls which had emanated from him, still received the same means of effecting that emancipation as Kapila had put forward, namely, knowledge; that is, a correct knowledge of the nature of matter and spirit, and of the causes which occasioned the union of these two. When asked how such knowledge was to be acquired, Kapila, imbued with a thorough belief in his own system, had triumphantly pointed to it. To be a faithful believer in that system was to ensure emancipation. But when a school was formed which denied one of its principal dogmata, and inserted another still more important, the study of that

philosophy was no longer a sufficient means of emancipation. Practice had hitherto been confined to the established religion; theory and belief only had been brought into the field by philosophy. But this philosophy was now to become practical—this speculation was to be superseded by application, and a mere theoretical belief was to be extended to a system of religious worship. This extension was the work of Patanjali.

We have then much reason to believe that this extension, this adaptation, and, so to speak, organization of the Sánkhya system, was posterior to the revolution of Buddha. In the first place the Yoga of Patanjali offered a new scheme of religious worship; and, though it is true that in so doing it did not displace the established religion, its very principles were of so absorbing a character, that it rendered that religion an useless and worthless formality. Before the shock which Bráhmaism received from Buddha, such a proceeding would have been impossible. The very despotism which caused that revolution would have prevented a form of worship rising up in its own bosom to replace the one which it cherished. As long as philosophy was confined to theory, Bráhmaism could leave it undisturbed; but when it was organized into practice, and threatened to displace what the Bráhma used all his influence to uphold, it became dangerous, and had to be treated accordingly. When, however, Buddhism had burst forth, when the Bráhma was attacked, not in his belief only, but in the ordinances of his practice,—when the altars of the established religion were abandoned by thousands, and its temples destroyed,—he was but too glad quietly to connive at the introduction of a system which, from the very difficulties it offered, threatened no extensive injury to his profession; or, at least, he was too much occupied with Buddha, and the rising of other castes, to attend to a movement which took place in his own under the calm direction of Patanjali.

The system of ascetic exercises, of austere mortification of the flesh, and the eremite life in the jungle, did not originate with the Yoga school. The very cause which induced the whole Indian nation, Áryan and aboriginal,—when once settled on the banks of the Ganges, and in the interior and east of the Peninsula,—to submit without a murmur to, if not to receive with acquiescence, at least for some centuries, the system of caste imposed on them by the Bráhmaṇ; while, when yet but an unorganized horde pushing on from the west and north-west, the Kṣhatriya, then the most extensive and most powerful caste, had struggled against his growing supremacy in that insurrection of which we have traces in the legend of Parashu-Ráma (see *Index*),—that very enervating settled stillness of the climate had also wrought in the character of the nation a complete and general change. No longer itching for activity from the vital energy boiling in their blood—no longer exhilarated by a fresher and less leaden sky—the Kṣhatriya and the Vaishya gradually succumbed to the same irresistible climatic influence which had made the Shúdra, once their opponent, now their slave. Too inert for ambition, too torpid for action, they were fain to receive a system which prescribed limits to their field of duty, and were satisfied so long as those bounds were not passed. Nor would they ever have been passed, had the hierarchy, acting with judgment, never exceeded moderation in laying the yoke too closely on their shoulders. The climate induced inertness and sloth; inertness gave time to an Indian mind to turn its power towards contemplation. Contemplation loves isolation, and, in all ages, isolation and contemplation have induced that 'self-examination which has resulted in an internal war of soul against body, of the conscious sentiment of religion against the senses. This war was carried out by mortification, which the very burning of the southern sun rendered still more necessary. When once the senses gained the ascendancy,

the climate rendered their victim more beast than man. He became like an elephant in the season of rut—mad, raging. What fasting effected, and still effects in the south-west of Asia, mortification was found necessary to supply in India; and this mortification had already been necessitated—already brought into general usage—long, perhaps many centuries, before Patanjali endeavoured to reduce it to a system, and employ it as a means to organize philosophy into a religion.

Patanjali was, moreover, a follower of the Theistic Sāṅkhya. He tacitly received Kapila's psychological and physiological system; denying, of course, the deification of Prakṛiti, the plastic principle, by itself alone; admitting it when incorporated with the deification of spirit, and with it forming one Supreme Being. But since the establishment of a Theistic Sāṅkhya school, it had become necessary to render these doctrines more practically applicable. The revolution of Buddha, and the gradual enlightenment which smoothed its path, had made it needful to place philosophy on the same footing as religion had hitherto maintained, and so to break down the limits which confined it exclusively to a small circle of intelligent and studious Bráhmans. Emancipation was to be acquired by all alike. But the means which the Theistic Sāṅkhya had offered were the exclusive property of the learned. Knowledge—acquired by instruction and study—even when contemplation was added to these—was within the reach of the Bráhman alone. Patanjali did not deny the efficacy of knowledge, but extended the facilities for its acquirement. Contemplation and ascetic exercises superseded instruction and study, and his system was thus made open to all.

There is reason to believe that in the period which followed the expulsion of the Buddhists from India, Patanjali's school spread very generally through the wide regions which owned the sway of Bráhmanism. One portion of the system in particular afforded a bait for the worldly and self-interested

of all castes to adopt it in practice, if not in faith. The lengths to which mortification was carried by men whose contemplation and solitude had rendered them more than ordinary fanatics, had often reached the marvellous; and the apparent ease with which the austere hardships and the most excruciating tortures were endured by these ascetics, gave rise to the belief that these very exercises endowed them with superhuman powers. In systematizing the whole, Patanjali had brought this idea prominently forward. He believed that such powers—which he classed under the name of *vibhúti* (see Section IV.)—were actually acquired by the exercises he enjoined; and that the latter, united with devotion of the heart, thoughts, and soul to the Supreme Being, obtained for their practiser a state in which—though still existing in the material body—the soul was virtually severed from it, though not so completely as at the final emancipation. This state of existence he called *jivanmukti*, and among the miraculous powers which the being possessed while in this state was that of destroying one's private enemies by a curse. This then was the lure which drew so many followers to the practice of Yoga; and when to this is added the awe and reverence naturally felt for a man endowed with such superhuman capabilities, and the good treatment and hospitality which all to whom he came would be careful to show him, we cannot wonder that a class of hypocrite Tapaswins should have sprung up and infested the land, as they still do in most parts of our Indian possessions.¹

Wherever a burning sun scorched, and a hot wind stifled, the broad plains of eastern and central India, the disgust to life, the disposition to contemplation, and the desire for final emancipation, drove the populace to the consolation of

¹ Of the prevalence of this custom we have many hints in our own poem, e.g. Chapter XVII., shlokas 5, 6, and 7.

asceticism. The very nature of the life led by the Muni, the cool retreat by some refreshing stream in the distant solitude of the jungle, the serenity to which he reduced his heart, the taming of burning lusts and luxuriant senses, and the halo of pure and all-powerful sanctity which surrounded him, allured first the Bráhmaṇ, but soon the Kṣhatriya also, from the toils of an active life to the enjoyments of such profitable repose. Kingdoms and principalities were abandoned to their own guidance, states were left defenceless, and nobles and princes vied with priests and pietists in the sanctity of their monastic lives, the austerity of their devotions, and the supernatural powers acquired by their means.¹ Nor was this all. In virtue of the powers they acquired, the nobility would seem to have asserted their equality with the hierarchy, and even to have attempted to wrest from them their exclusive rights of administering to the mental and spiritual necessities of the people. The Bráhmaṇ trembled at this new danger; and, no longer able to seek support in any of the other castes, had recourse to conciliatory means; and the way was thus prepared for the teachings of the Bhagavad-Gítá. Such, however, were not the only causes which gave rise to the Karma-Yoga doctrines of our poem; and a long interval of perhaps several centuries must have intervened between the Yoga of Patanjali and the new branch of that school. Indeed if we may place the probable date of the Yoga-sútras between 400 B.C. and 100 B.C., we must consider that of the Bhagavad-Gítá to lie between 100 B.C. and 300 A.D. But this only by-the-way.

From the first revival of the idea of a Supreme Being, a considerable change had been wrought in the established religion. The Bráhmaṇs had found it expedient gradually to admit and incorporate with their own teaching the more

¹ A story of such rivalry between Church and State is found in the Vishwámitra, an episode inserted in the well-known epic, Rámáyana.

general and broader theories of philosophy, while in the mean time they wove around them a peculiar mysticism of their own, which formed at once their charm and their defence. The mystic triad of Brahmá, Viṣṇu, and Shiva, had succeeded to those of the Elements, the Vedas, and the Epos; and were soon identified with the Supreme Being. Brahmá was considered the manifestation of the creative, Viṣṇu of the preservative, Shiva of the destructive and regenerative, powers of the One Supreme. But though these three dignities had been recognized as a triad; they do not appear to have been regarded as a Trinity in Unity until a much later period. Brahmá, as the first—and for a long time the most important—person of this triad, and as having taken the place of the sun in the worship of the elements, was first identified with the Supreme Being; and this identification would seem to have held good for a long period, while the established religion was occupied in combating the numerous heresies which succeeded Buddhism. But the very elevation of his position rendered the worship of Brahmá less general than that of the other persons of the triad, and Shiva and Viṣṇu each rejoiced in more numerous shrines. It would seem that the awful character as Destroyer which Shiva (who replaced Váyu, or the wind, in the elementary, Agni, or fire, in the Vedic, and Yama, or death, in the Epic triad) bore, won him more followers than Viṣṇu, his brother deity; and at an early period his worshippers identified him with the One Supreme. At length reason and love surmounted fear and superstition, and Viṣṇu the preserver—the kind, the merciful, the tender—was identified with the Supreme Being in like manner.

All this took place in the established religion, and was the work of Bráhmans themselves; but the spirit of schism had already crept in, and the animosity between the Shaivyas, or worshippers of Shiva, and the Vaiṣṇavas, adorers of Viṣṇu, was far more hot and bitter than any that had

existed between the established religion and the seceding heresies. Lastly, Kṛiṣṇa, the eighth and most important of the incarnations of Viṣṇu—who in his character of Preserver of mankind was supposed to descend to earth in certain earthly forms (*avatāras*) for the purpose of protecting or extending his religion—Kṛiṣṇa was himself raised to an equality with Viṣṇu, and identified with the Supreme One. To this sect of the Vaiṣṇavas—which is commonly called the Bhāgavata sect, from *Bhagavat*, ‘the Holy One,’ a title of Kṛiṣṇa—does our author belong; and at this period—when the strife between the Vaiṣṇavas and Shaivyas was first growing warm—when religious enthusiasm, pervading the whole nation, had rendered asceticism dangerous to the community, on the one hand, as threatening to destroy its vitality and energy: and to the Brāhmins, on the other, as raising rivals on their own hitherto-undisputed ground in the persons of fanatic Kṣatriyas—when the taste for literature, which civilization had infused into the people, was sufficiently cultivated to appreciate and encourage the dramas of a Kālidāsa, and to revive the elegant and measured shlokas of a Vālmiki—when the crafty Brāhmin seized this growing taste to turn it to his own account in the diffusion of didactic writings—the Bhagavad-Gītā appeared. It was the work of a Brāhmin, a philosopher, and a poet, united in one man. With unparalleled skill, its author converted the very doctrines—which, originating with Patanjali, had seduced thousands from the active duties of the city or the provinces to the monastic seclusion of the jungle—to a means of recalling them to those duties, of setting a limit to the fanaticism and ambition of the nobility, of establishing the necessity of the restrictions of caste even under the most difficult circumstances, and of infusing into the hearts of all a religious, a philosophic, and, in some respects, almost a Christian, morality. As a Brāhmin, he belonged to the more liberal and less Vedic party; and while conciliating

the Kṣhatriya, sought to place Bráhmaṇism on a more generous and less prejudiced footing. As a philosopher, he united the metaphysics of the Theistic Sánkhyā with a system of ethics quite his own, though formed on the basis of those most popularly received. As a poet, he incorporated his piece with the most favourite of the ancient epics, and worked on the feelings as well as on the minds of his readers, by interlacing with his sterner dogmata the fanciful, the mysterious, and the awful. In a word, if the Bhagavad-Gítá be the work of one man, and we have no reason for believing the contrary, its author was undoubtedly the most remarkable man of his own age, and would have been an honour to any nation and any epoch. To unite the skilful and elegant poet with the clear and systematic philosopher, and these two with the shrewd and successful reformer, is an undertaking of no small merit; and this was achieved by the author of our poem.

We have now traced the causes which gave rise to the foundation and formation of the Yoga and Karma-yoga schools. In Sections IV. and V. the doctrines of these schools will be examined in detail. It only remains at present to give a concise description of the principal objects in the Vedic, the Nyáyā, and the Vaisheshika schools. As these schools present no direct bearing on the teaching of the Bhāḡavad-Gítá, we cannot do more than give a general outline of their distinctive features, and must refer the student who would examine them more minutely to the fountain-heads whence we draw our information.¹

At the period when the sun of civilization was first dawning upon the night of superstition and blind faith, and the more refined among the Indian nation sought those deep waters

¹ Such as Colebrooke's *Essays*, vol. i., 'On the Philosophy of the Hindus.' Windischmann's 'Geschichte der Philosophie' (Bonn, 1827-34), pp. 1740, 1904, etc.

which they believed would quench their thirst for knowledge of the truth, the learned Bráhmans employed two means for arriving at this end. The less superstitious applied themselves to investigation by means of the powers which they felt they possessed, and the result was the development of that Sánkhyá system which we have traced through its various changes. The more conservative had recourse to revelation, and laid the foundation of what we have termed the Vedic school. Both, however, felt that no certain conclusion could be educed without a systematic process of reasoning; and by the side of these schools, which hurried past the means in their haste to arrive at the end, arose a third, which made the arrangement of the means their more particular object. This school was that which not long after was moulded into the Nyáyá, and maintained its position till, in after-ages, it flourished in the Vaisheshika system.

The existing revelation (for such it was believed to be), embodied in the Vedas and sacred writings, belonged chiefly to a period anterior by some centuries to that of the dawn of enlightenment; and every day the real meaning of that writ became more and more obscure, partly from the changes which the Sanskrit language was undergoing, and partly from the attempts of the Bráhmans themselves to turn its tenets to their own purposes, and the mysterious complications that resulted from such efforts. It would appear that schools were soon formed for the sake of discussing and disputing the meaning contained in the Vedic writings, and among the fruits of these discussions we have received the Púrva- or Karma-Mímánsá,¹ which is attributed to Jaimini, and the principal commentary on which is by Kumáрила

¹ For a detailed account of this Darshana, see Colebrooke's *Miscel. Essays*, vol. i. p. 295, and Windischmann's *Gesch. der Philos.*, p. 1760. The meaning of the name is 'The first investigation,' or, 'The investigation as to actions.' *Mímánsá* has almost the same meaning as *Jyótsná*. It is the abstract substantive from *mímáns*, the desiderative form of *man*, 'to investigate,' and would therefore mean 'the desire to investigate the truth'

Bhaṭṭa, the chief opponent of Buddhism. The Hindús rank it among their six Darshanas, or schools of philosophy; but, as we have already said, it cannot be considered to possess any title to that position. It treats of the practical part of the Bráhmānical religion, and consists of 915 *adhikaraṇas*, or topics of discussion, each of which contains five subdivisions, as follows:—

1. The subject to be investigated.
2. The doubt and question relative to it.
3. The first view and comprehension of the grounds of proof, the *primá-facie* argument (*púrva-pakṣha*).
4. The answer (*uttara-pakṣha*).
5. The conclusive test.

The only philosophical dogma which it appears to contain is, that all actions are mystically connected with their results, so that from the moment the act is concluded, the agent acquires a mystic virtue (*apúrva*) which does not quit him until, whether in this or in a future existence, the reward of the action be administered to him; in short, a species of spiritual promissory note for services performed.

When—a century or more after the establishment of such theological schools—the revolution of Buddha broke out, Bráhmānism was for a long time too much occupied with its avowed enemies to attend much to its own internal changes. The Bráhmāns gradually received—partly from conviction, partly from expediency—the broader tenets which philosophy was daily establishing. The change was slow, for the conservative spirit was difficult to combat; and the Vedas, for which a divine authorship had long been arrogated and conceded, and even the later works which professed to explain and elucidate them, were regarded by all with a degree of reverence, which the difficulty of comprehending them materially increased. Whenever a new idea, propagated by the schools of philosophy, obtained so profound a credence in the minds of the rational and intelligent, and was sup-

ported by such irresistible arguments as to render it dangerous, the Bráhmaṇ, adopting a wise policy, did not oppose it with his Vedic texts; but, on the contrary, used all his logic to prove that somewhere or other in the sacred writings the very dogma had been hinted at, if not clearly expressed. But a considerable change had taken place in the relative position of the Bráhmaṇical religion. No longer the universal church of civilized India, it was surrounded by new sects more or less popular. Like the once universal church of civilized Europe, when, after the Reformation, it was compassed by sectaries, Bráhmaṇism employed an admirable and prudent policy. It gathered itself firmly together, and—supported by its antiquity, and its asserted divine authority—it declared the new doctrines unworthy of its refutation, and damned them as heretical and destructive. When its external enemies were thus shaken off, and the established church stood firm in its compactness, it at length found time and tranquillity to examine its own organization. The Darshanas or schools of philosophy which had grown up within its own bosom, and quietly influenced its own changes, now became the object of its enquiries; and the line was at length distinctly chalked out between what of their theories could be received and what must be rejected. Several centuries after our own era, the Vedánta or Uttara-Mímánsá¹ school collected its forces, revised its materials, and came forward as the philosophical opponent of the philosophical schools.

The foundation of this school was attributed, like many other works of very different ages and contradictory doctrines, to the^o Vyása, Kṛṣṇa Dwaipáyana, the supposed compiler and arranger of the Vedas. He is otherwise called Bádará-

¹ That is, 'The Latter Mímánsá.' It is also called the Sháriraka or meta-physical Mímánsá. Both titles are meant to distinguish it from the Púrva- or Karma-Mímánsá, with which, however, there is little danger of confounding it. It is generally said by the Hindús that the Púrva treats of the practical (*karma-bhāṣya*), the Uttara of the theological part (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) of the Vedas.

yaṇa; and in order to claim a divine authority for the doctrines attributed to him, he was said, as a Bráhmaṇ of the name of Apántara-Tamas, to have once attained final emancipation, and have been absorbed in the Supreme Being; but, at his command, to have emanated again and assumed a corporeal form as Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipáyana. The principal Scholiast on his writings is Shankara Áchárya, who is thought to have flourished in the eighth century of our era,¹ and his work is entitled the Sháríra-ka-Mímánsá-Bháṣhya, or commentary on the Sháríra-ka-Mímánsá. As a theological school, the name Vedánta refers to the whole Vedic School, which explains the whole theological portions of the Vedas; and among the works belonging to it are numbered many of the Upaniṣhads or Vedic writings, as the Ísha, Keneṣhitam, Muṇḍaka, and Kathaka and parts of the Chaṇḍagya. The doctrines of the pure Vedánta school are, to a great extent, those which we shall find put forward in our own poem; but there are very considerable and very important differences, which it is not in our plan to particularize here.² Their chief peculiarity is, of course, the Bráhmaṇical and superstitious odour which pervades them all, and the mystery and obscurity which have been purposely introduced. The arguments employed against the doctrines of the other schools are extremely subtle and refined, but one instance will suffice to show their worth.

As in the Bhagavad-Gítá, the Supreme Being is regarded as the *material* as well as the *efficient* cause of creation; in other words, he is supposed to have formed everything by changing himself into matter. This was opposed by the assertion that in every creation an instrument or instruments

¹ Weber (Ind. Phil. Gesch.) places the composition of the Vedánta two or three hundred years before Shankara Áchárya, thus about 400 or 500 A.D. It cannot be earlier than the third century after Christ.

² We must therefore refer the reader to Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, vol. i. p. 325; and Windischmann's 'Gesch. der Philosophie,' p. 1767, etc.

are required besides the creator and the material. To this the Vedánta replies by comparing this change of the deity himself into matter with that of milk into curds. The objection is thus raised that here too an instrument, namely, *heat*, is employed; and the Vedánta replies by asserting that milk will turn of itself, and that heat merely hastens the action of turning; or, again, that other things are subjected to heat without becoming curds.

The triviality of such arguments is sufficiently obvious to all; but there is a grand fallacy at the bottom which we are astonished the would-be philosopher has not perceived. If spontaneity of change be admitted, as he would have it, in milk, and if, as he also insists, the same rule holds good for the Supreme Being as for milk, then milk must be on equality with the Supreme Being. He asserts that the spontaneity of change in the Supreme Being is the proof of his having created the universe. But since the same rule holds good for milk, the spontaneity of change in milk must also be a proof of its having created the universe, and milk is therefore creator of all things, which is absurd, etc.

The Nyáya¹ system has been attributed to a celebrated sage named Gotama, or Gautama (who must not, however, be confounded with Gautama, or Buddha, the founder of Buddhism). The order he observes is Enuntiation (*uddesha*), Definition (*lakshana*), the mention of some property peculiar to the thing enuntiated, and Investigation (*parikshá*), examination of the pertinence of the definition; and with his method he has treated sixteen topics, as follows:

- I. Proof (*pramāna*) of four kinds, viz. Perception;
 - Inference, both consequent (*à priori*), antecedent (*à posteriori*) and analogous; Comparison; Affirmation, *i.e.* revelation and tradition.

¹ For minuter details, see Barthélemy St. Hilaire, 'Première Mémoire sur le Nyáya,' published by the Institut de France; and Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays*, vol. i. p. 261.

II. Things to be proven (*prameya*). Under this head he includes all the psychological and physiological theories, borrowed with little alteration from the Sāṅkhya, viz. :—

1. Soul, of two kinds—the *Paramātmā*, or supreme soul, creator of all things; and *Jivātmā*, individual souls of men.
2. Body, of four kinds—aqueous, igneous, aërial, and terrene.
3. Organs of sense—five in number.
4. Objects of sense—including all external matter.
5. Intellect—part of internal matter.
6. Heart (*manas*)—another part of internal matter, the internal organ of sense.

III. Doubt (*sanshaya*).

IV. Motive (*prayojana*).

V. Instance (*driṣṭānta*)—a point on which both disputants agree.

VI. Demonstrated Truth (*siddhānta*) of four kinds, according as it is universally, partially, hypothetically, or argumentatively acknowledged.

VII. A complete syllogism (*nyāya*) consists of the following five members (*avayava*), of which the first two are simply enuntiative.

1. The proposition (*pratijnā*), as, This hill is fiery.
2. The reason (*hetu* or *apadesha*), as, For it smokes.
3. Instance (*udāharaṇa* or *nidarshana*), as, What smokes is fiery, *e.g.* A fire-place.
4. Application (*upanaya*), Accordingly the hill is smoking.
5. Conclusion (*niyamana*), Therefore it is fiery.

VIII. Reduction to absurdity (*tarka*).

IX. Ascertainment (*virneya*), the result of proof.

X. Disputation (*kathā*) of the kind called *jalpa*, of adversaries contending for victory.

- XI. Disputation (*kathá*) of the kind called *váda*, or discussion of adversaries only in pursuit of truth.
- XII. Disputation (*kathá*) of the kind called *viñāḍá*, or wrangling, wherein one seeks to overthrow the other, without putting forward a proposition of his own.
- XIII. Fallacy or mere semblance of reason (*hetwābhāsa*).
- XIV. Fraud (*chhala*) of three kinds.
- XV. A futile answer (*jāti*) of twenty-four kinds.
- XVI. Failure in argument (*nigrahasthāna*), or, Reason of defeat (*parájayahetu*) of twenty-two kinds.

The Vaisheshika school is attributed to the Muni Kaṇáda, who follows the same method as Gautama. The chief difference is the introduction of a theory of atoms, in the physiological portion of his arrangement. His atom is however a different object, being the sixth part of a mote in a sunbeam. The mote is divided into three parts, each of which is a double atom. The cause of the concurrence of these atoms is either the will of the Creator, or time, or any other competent one. The single atoms unite with one another to form a double atom; three double atoms unite to form the smallest visible body, and these bodies unite to form larger bodies, and so on. The atoms themselves are eternal. The dissolution of matter is merely its resolution into atoms. Under the head of 'Things to be proven,' the second topic of Gautama's system, Kaṇáda has—

I. Objects of sense, consisting of six *padárthas*, or categories, as follows :—

1. Substances—nine in number, viz. :—

I. *Earth*—eternal as atoms, transient as aggregates.
 • The latter are either organized or inorganic.

II. *Water*—the same.

III. *Light*—the same, identified with heat. Organic light includes the bodies of the solar realm; inorganic is of four kinds, terrestrial, celestial, alvine, and mineral.

- IV. *Air*—the same. Organic aërial bodies are angels and demons. Inorganic air is wind.
- V. *Ether* (*ākāsha*)—is infinite and therefore eternal.
- VI. *Time*—is one, eternal and infinite.
- VII. *Space*—the same.
- VIII. *Soul*—immaterial.
- IX. *Heart* (*manas*)—the internal organ of sense.
2. Quality, of twenty-four kinds, viz.: colour, savour, odour, feel, number, quantity, individuality, conjunction, disjunction, priority, posteriority, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, sound, intelligence, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, virtue, vice, and faculty (*sanskāra*).
3. Action (*karma*), of five kinds. It is motion, devoid of quality, abiding only in substance.
4. Community (*sāmānya*), of three kinds, abides in substances, quality, and action.
5. Difference (*viśeṣha*), the direct opposite of community.
6. Aggregation (*sāmāvaya*).
7. Negation (*abhāva*), of two kinds, universal and mutual.
- II. Activity (*pravṛitti*), is oral, mental, and corporeal.
- III. Faults (*doṣhāḥ*), are desire (*rāga*), aversion (*virāga*), and delusion (*moha*).
- IV. Condition after death (*pretyabhāva*), is transmigration.
- V. Retribution (*phala*), is the result of fruition (*punarbhoga*).
- VI. Pain (*duḥkha*).
- VII. Liberation from pain, or beatitude, is of twenty-one kinds.

It has thus been seen that there is a strong connection between the logical system of Gautama and the physics of Kaṇāda,¹ but both are indebted for their truly philosophical portion to the Sāṅkhya. In short, when we reconsider the

¹ For further details of the Vaisheṣhika, see Colebrooke's *Miscellaneous Essays*, vol. i. p. 261.

six Darshanas, acknowledged by the Hindús, we shall find that one of them, the Uttara-Mímánsá, bears no title to be ranked by the side of the others, and is really little more than a mystical explanation of the practical injunctions of the Vedas. We shall also admit that the earlier Vedánta, very different from the School of Nihilists now existing under that name, was chiefly a controversial essay, seeking to support the theology of Sacred Writ, but borrowing all its philosophical portions from the Yoga school, the most popular at the time of its composition. Lastly, the Nyáya is little more than a treatise on Logic, introducing the doctrines of the theistic Sánkhya; while the Vaisheshika is an essay on Physics, with, it is true, the theory of atoms as its distinguishing mark, though even to this we feel inclined to refuse the imputation of novelty, since we find some idea of it lurking obscurely in the theory of *tanmátráni*, or subtle elements, which is brought forward in Kapila's Sánkhya.¹ In short, the basis of all Indian philosophy, if, indeed, we may not say the only system of philosophy really discovered in India, is the Sánkhya; and this, as it forms the basis of the doctrines expounded in the Bhagavad-Gítá, we shall now attempt to explain in detail.

¹ See Section III.

PART III.

THE SÁNKHYA SYSTEM.

To a European of education a name is of trifling import. When once his reading or his experience has connected a certain idea, however vague, with a certain name, however inconsistent with it, that name will be as good as, and better than, any other to convey that idea. Not so to the literal and logical Hindú of some six or seven centuries before Christ, and accordingly the names of the schools of philosophy convey the meaning of the most prominent doctrine which they put forward—Sánkhyā, Yoga, Nyāya, Vaisheshika, and even Vedānta, are titles which indicate at once the school and its principal peculiarity, and from internal evidence these names would mostly seem to have been assumed by the earliest writers themselves on the doctrines they designate.

The word Sánkhyā has been interpreted in two ways. It is an adjective derived from the substantive *sankhyā*, the first meaning of which is 'number,' and has hence been rendered 'the numerical system' by those who were misled by the distribution of its principles into twenty-five categories. But besides this first meaning the word *sankhyā* has also that of 'numeration, computation, calculation,' and hence 'deliberation, reasoning,' and *sánkhyā* has with more reason been translated 'the rational system.' Kapila, like Descartes, refused to accept the authority of anything which had preceded him; he placed revelation in the lowest rank of the sources of ascertainment; he would accept only what his reason or his conviction would accept, and hence the origin of the title.

The Sánkhyā system was the first and only real system of philosophy to which the Indian mind gave birth. Though

six or even seven schools of philosophers may be admitted to have existed in the earlier ages of that nation, they were all more or less indebted to this school for their fundamental dogmata. Some of these, however, have followed more closely in its steps, and have been generally ranked under the same name. Of these we may distinguish four, viz. :—

1. The pure Sánkhyā (*nirishwara*), of which we have remains.
2. The Theistic Sánkhyā (*seshwara*), of which we have no remains, but which must have existed, and is undoubtedly meant by the allusions in the Bhagavad-Gítá; as, for instance, in Chapter III. shloka 3, etc.
3. The Yoga of Patanjali; see Section IV.
4. The Karma-Yoga of the Bhagavad-Gítá.

These doctrines extended however still further, and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of our era we find them somewhat changed, and frightfully disfigured by Bráhmānical mysticism in many of the Purāṇas. A Paurāṇika-Sánkhyā school is therefore generally enumerated among the branches of the general system; but, as far as it is possible to judge of the philosophical tenets contained in those eighteen extraordinary works of the debased age of the Indian mind, they bear no title to be considered as a separate school of philosophy. It is with the first of these schools, the pure, the *nirishwara*, or atheistic Sánkhyā, that we have now to do; and the first questions which enquiry prompts are, who and what were its founder and its earliest teachers? what the existing remains of it which we have received?

To the first question we must answer, the Hindú Kapila: not necessarily that this great Rīṣhi was the first philosopher of which India could boast, or even the first to discover the doctrines of this system, but that to him has its foundation always been referred; while the Sútras attributed to him are the earliest which reduced these theories to a system. Kapila was in all probability a man, and not a myth, though his

Asiatic admirers have done all they could to make him one. Though he has been called an incarnation of Agni, the personification of fire, and of Viṣṇu himself, he was probably, like most early philosophers both in India and Greece, a simple schoolmaster. He was a bráhmaṇ, whose learning had acquired for him the privilege of instructing the young of his own caste, when they had finished the rudiments of their Vedical education; and he taught them, for want of text books and a printing press, in short, well-composed, well-defined, sentences, which his pupils committed to memory, and which, as they strung them together one with another, in the best way they could, were called Sútras, or 'threads.'

The first disciple of Kapila of whom we have mention in the Sánkhyā-káriká (shl. 70) is Ásuri, of whom we know nothing more. Ásuri delivered the doctrines he had received to Panchashikha, to whom Sútras are attributed, and who is named in the Mahábhárata as teaching the Sánkhyā to Janaka, the celebrated King of Mithilá. Panchashikha is said by Íshwara Kṛiṣṇa (Sánkhyā-kár. shl. 70) to have made these doctrines generally known, and may therefore possibly have lived but a short time previous to the revolution of Buddha, one of the causes of which was undoubtedly the propagation of these philosophical theories. Perhaps some six or seven hundred years¹ later, at an age when literature was generally appreciated, and when all learning was greedily sought after, when the garb which enclosed it had become sufficiently attractive, Íshwara Kṛiṣṇa, who had received these doctrines transmitted from bráhmaṇ to bráhmaṇ, sat down to arrange them in a new and more comprehensible form, and to invest them with the charms of an epic metre. Íshwara Kṛiṣṇa was not, like Kapila, a schoolmaster. He

¹ Barthélemy St. Hilaire suggests that Íshwara Kṛiṣṇa may have been one of the many learned men gathered round the throne of the patron of sciences, Vikramáditya, who flourished 56 B.C. Weber would place him in the sixth century of our era.

did not detail his doctrines to studious ears; but, an author of no mean merit, he experienced the difficulties of acquiring the Sánkhyā from the existing Sútras; and being superior to the drudgery and dependence of a mere scholiast, undertook to put them before a reading public in a clear and systematic form.

The works from which we gather our knowledge of the Sánkhyā system in its purity consist, firstly, of the Sútras. These are attributed to Kapila himself; but it is not on that account to be imagined that that philosopher ever descended to the transmission of his ideas to the page. The collections of his dogmata, as they have been handed down, were probably made by studious disciples, long after he had ceased to exist. They are entitled the 'Sánkhyā-pravachana, or Introduction to the Sánkhyā,' a work of four hundred and ninety-nine Sútras, comprised in six Adhyáyas or readings. This work was printed at Serampore in 1821, and is now extremely rare. Another collection, an abbreviation of this, and also attributed to the great founder, is the Tattwa-samása, published at Mirzapore, by Doctor Ballantyne, in 1851. The first of these works is accompanied by a commentary by Vijnána Bhikshu, entitled Sánkhyā-pravachana-bháshya.

Our next source is the Sánkhyā-káriká of Íshwara Kṛiṣhṇa, the text of which was published by Lassen at Bonn in 1832, to which was added a Latin translation. In 1833, M. Pauthier added to his translation of Colebrooke's Essays, a text in Latin characters, and a French translation. Windischmann gave a German translation in his 'Geschichte der Philosophie,' vol. i. p. 1812, published at Bonn in 1834. In 1837, Professor Wilson published the translation made by Colebrooke, with the addition of the text, a translation of the Scholia of Gauḍapada, and a short commentary of his own. Lastly, in 1852, M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire has given us an able French translation, with explanations and essays, which do great honour to his thorough insight into the philosophical

ideas of India. These works, and the well-known treatise by Colebrooke, are the reliable sources from which a knowledge of the Sánkhyā system may be derived.

Indian commentators have distinguished the pure Sánkhyā as *nirīshwara*, which has been injudiciously translated by 'atheistic.' *īshwara*, lit. 'lord,' is the title given by the Theistic Sánkhyā to the Supreme Being, whose existence is their chief doctrine. This branch has therefore been called *śeshwara* (= *sa*, 'with,' + *īshwara*), 'possessing,' that is, 'acknowledging such a Supreme Deity'; and to distinguish it, the other has been termed *nirīshwara* (= *nir*, 'without,' + *īshwara*), 'not possessing,' that is, 'omitting to acknowledge such a Being.' But the word 'atheist,' as we are accustomed to use it, is a term of the greatest reproach, and signifies one who actually denies the existence of a Being superior both to matter and to man. Kapila has not done this. He does not, it is true, mention the existence of such a Being, but he leaves it doubtful whether he exists or not. He treats of philosophy rather in relation to matter and man than to spirit; for, as has been already asserted, the earliest philosophers rather desired to satisfy the enquiry as to 'what is man? and what is this world?' than to push speculation beyond the limits of obvious proof; and it was left to a later school to enquire into the final cause, when once matter and spirit had been fully investigated and firmly established. Again, it is true that he grants volition to nature, and thus in some sort deifies it; but when, by the side of this, we find him, at the same time, asserting the superiority of spirit even to this deified nature, we cannot accuse him of complete materialism. Lastly, he admits the existence of a spiritual essence, from which individual souls have emanated, and into which they are eventually to be re-absorbed; and though he confines himself to this simple admission, and does not investigate the real nature of this spiritual essence, the very fact that he makes it superior to nature is sufficient to show

that, had he gone farther, he would, like his successors, have declared it to be the Supreme Being. The pure Sāṅkhya is therefore so far atheistic as it refers the creation of matter to a system of emanation, obedient to the will, not of a creator, but of Prakṛiti, 'nature,' the essence of matter; but not only does it not deny the existence of a Supreme Being, but even hints at it in referring the emanation of individual souls to a spiritual essence gifted with volition.

What is Kapila's idea of philosophy? A cure for the evils of this life;¹ and since the heavens, and deities to which we are supposed to go, are also material, and since we are subject to the necessity of transmigration, it is a cure for the evils, not only of this life, but of any material existence through which we may pass. It has already been said that the disgust to life was the cause of the rise of philosophy, and we have here the proof of it. That these evils exist no man will deny. But where is the remedy for them? The specific remedies which each man may practically apply to each particular evil are obviously faulty; for the evils will return again, and even the necessary means of cure cannot always be obtained. Again, the established religion of Bráhmaṅism is of no validity. It offers, as a reward to its followers, a material heaven, in which even the gods themselves are liable to evils, and are not immortal. The only means of overcoming evil—which is of three kinds, internal or personal, external or that which is received from without; and, lastly, that which is beyond our power to oppose or check, the superhuman—is by liberating the soul from the shackles of matter, and this is performed by the perfection of knowledge. In granting so much power to knowledge, Kapila is undoubtedly on the right tack. Knowledge is power; knowledge is the highest perfection of man; the superiority of one

¹ Kapila, Sāṅkhya-pravachana, ch. i. sūtras 1-4; and Ishwara Kṛiṣṇa, Sāṅkhya-kārikā, shl. 1.

man over another, of gods over man, and of the Supreme Being over gods, is according to the superiority of their knowledge; but we must not allow ourselves to be beguiled by this siren-like dogma. Kapila has omitted by the side of knowledge what is undoubtedly superior to it, virtue; and in so doing has incurred the censure of making it of no avail. This is a most dangerous principle, since morality is at once destroyed by it; and though Kapila himself, accepting as he does the established religion, the usefulness of sacrifice, and the excellence of doing one's prescribed duty, is far from inculcating it; the result of the mere omission was that the Theistic Sāṅkhya, which succeeded him, in raising a deity above the gods of Bráhmaṅism, threw such contempt on the ordinances of that religion as threatened to subvert all morality, and necessitated the adoption of the devotional system contained in the Yoga of Patanjali, where the ordinances of Bráhmaṅism were superseded by a new system of practical morality. Thus the object of philosophy is final emancipation, and in the mean time that consolation for the evils of this world, which practical philosophy affords. The means proposed is knowledge.

But what is this knowledge? It is the knowledge of the whole truth, which philosophy teaches, and which defines the reason of our existence here on earth, by drawing the line between matter and soul, nature and spirit; and showing the connection of these four to one another; the reason of their connection, and their final disconnection.¹ How then is this knowledge acquired? What, in short, is the philosophical method adopted by Kapila? Perception, inference, and testimony. Perception is the use of our senses in grasping those objects which are within their reach, such as developed matter. Inference is the use of our reason, in proving the 'existence of what is beyond the reach of our senses from that which is

¹ Kapila, ch. i. sūtras 6, 15, 18, 19, and 81; Sāṅkh-kār., sbl. 1 and 2.

within their reach, and it is of three kinds, viz. that of effect from cause, that of cause from effect, and from comparison. Testimony is of two kinds, actual revelation and tradition. By inference the great doctrine of causality is established, and the existence of the imperceptible is proved, as that of nature, or the material essence, from that of developed matter. When both perception and inference fail, we must often accept revelation and tradition, and from this are received the doctrine of transmigration, and the existence of the gods.¹ Kapila has often been accused of scepticism, from a misunderstanding of shl. 64 of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā; but for two reasons we should rather impute to him too great credulity. In the first place, he has accepted without a murmur two important dogmata, transmigration and the existence of the gods, from Brāhmanism; and in the second place, he has omitted, as quite unnecessary, the greatest means in the true philosophical method—conscience, or internal conviction. The excuse for the first is that transmigration was a theory which chimed in wonderfully with his own ideas, besides being long firmly implanted in the Indian mind, while the gods interfered not the slightest with his system; but at the same time he has made testimony the *last* resource of investigation, and placed it on a far inferior footing to perception and inference. The excuse for the second is his distance from scepticism. He never doubted for a moment his own existence, he never dreamed of denying the truth of the impressions made on the senses, and by them conveyed to the mind and the soul. The questions he proposed to answer were not “Do I exist?” “Does matter exist?” but “What am I?” “What is matter?” and tacitly receiving conscience as an axiom, he thought it needless to make it a means of proof, since what it could prove was already admitted.

So far we have followed the order of the Sāṅkhya-kārikā,

¹ Sāṅkh.-kār., shl. 4-8; Kap., ch. i. sūtras 99, 100, 61-65, 107, 108.

and, as far as possible, that of Kapila's Sútras also. We have shown his idea of philosophy, and his method, and we must now proceed to his doctrines and system. It is here unnecessary, and would become tedious, to follow the order of the originals, and we shall therefore endeavour to put before the reader a general view of the system, under the most convenient arrangement. We have first to treat of the general system, and the psychological portion of it.

The pure Sánkhya itself, and all the schools which follow it, distinguish everything which exists (the latter of course excluding the Supreme Being) into the following twenty-five categories.

1. Nature: the material essence, which is Kapila's plastic principle, by him gifted with volition. It is called by the following names, Prakṛiti, or Múlaprakṛiti; Pradhána, or Múlapradhána; Avyakta (the undeveloped principle); Mâyá (the magic illusion); and in the Bhagavad-Gítá, ch. xiv. shl. 3, Brahma (neuter). This principle has no cause, no origin, is not produced by anything; but is eternal, universal, immutable, single, independent, free from qualities, simple and sovereign.

With these nine attributes it produces Matter, the developed principle, which emanates from it. This is called *vyakta* or *jagat*, and has nine attributes opposed to those of nature, viz. (a) it has a cause or origin (namely nature), (b) is not eternal, (c) not universal, (d) mutable, (e) multiple, (f) accidental, (g) attributive or gifted with qualities, (h) compound, (i) subordinate, which are thus accounted for:—

(a) Because it emanates from nature.

(b) It has been created, and must therefore perish; it has emanated from nature, and will be re-absorbed into it.

(c) It is this universe only, and must therefore be finite.

(d) It varies in its various component parts, which it produces in order.

- (e) It is composed of twenty-three parts.
- (f) It depends on nature for its existence.
- (g) It has various attributes,
- (h) And components.
- (i) It is subordinate to the will of nature, on which it depends.

This general term comprises twenty-three components, viz.:—

2. Intelligence (*buddhi, mahat, ásuri, mati, kyáti, prajná*): the first and immediate production of nature. Although it is material, it is the link between the soul and matter, and in the same relation to the soul as the senses are to the body, it is the actual vehicle and material manifestation of the faculty given to the soul, of perceiving and employing matter. Without it the soul could never be connected with matter. This category produces, or rather from it emanates

3. Consciousness (*ahankára, abhimána, bhútádi, taijasa, vaikrita*): the conviction inherent in us of our own individuality. It produces two classes of material components: firstly

4.—8. The five subtile elements (*tanmátra*): the elements of the elements, which would seem to be essences containing the attributes of the five grosser elements. They are sound or noise, tangibleness, odour, visibleness, and taste, which each in turn produce

9—13. The five grosser elements (*mahábhúta*): which are ether (*ákásha*), which is produced by the subtile element of sound, and is that subtile fluid which fills all space, and exists everywhere and in everything:—air (*váyu*); atmosphere and wind, which is produced by the subtile element of tangibleness, which is its peculiar attribute:—earth, produced by the subtile element of smell:—light, heat, or fire, produced by that of visibility:—and water, produced by that of sapidity. On the other hand, consciousness also produces

14—18. The five senses (*indríya*), faculties of perception,

corresponding respectively with the elements, viz. hearing, touching, smelling, seeing, and tasting, and also

19—23. The five organs of action (*karmendriya*), viz.: the voice, the hands, the feet, the anus and the penis. Lastly, consciousness produces

24. The heart (*manas*), which is considered as an eleventh or internal organ. It is the general power of sensibility, it receives and arranges the impressions made on the senses by external objects, transmits them, thus arranged, to the consciousness, which transmits them to the intelligence, which transmits them to the soul. It is also the seat of desires and passions. These twenty-three components, then, make up the *Vyakta*, the developed principle, perceptible matter.

25. Spirit (*átmá, puruṣha, pumán, kṣhetrajña*), special and independent of both nature and matter. It is not produced by anything, nor can it produce anything; and while nature and matter are irrational, it is all reason.

Nature and matter have thus each nine opposite attributes, but they have also six attributes common to both,¹ viz.: 1. Want and comprehension. 2. Objectiveness; being the objects of use to the soul. 3. Commonness; they are common to all alike, and objects of use to all. 4. Insensibility; for though the senses themselves belong to matter, it is not really they which feel, and are impressed, but the soul; they being merely the material vehicles and instruments of sensibility. 5. Intelligence; for though intelligence is the first product of nature, and, in turn, produces all the categories of matter, it is, like the senses, a mere material and physical machine, dead and useless without the soul, which sets it in motion, as the steam engine is only locomotive when united with the steam. 6. Productiveness; nature produces matter,

¹ Sánk.-kár., shl. 11. Kapila, ch. i. sūtra 121.

which produces its own components. Lastly, they are in common subject to the three qualities of good, bad, and indifferent, of which anon.

Such is the outline of the system to which the Sāṅkhya reduces all that exists. But before inquiring into the relationship of these parts, and the positions, independent and relative, which they hold, we must show some proofs of their existence. As scepticism has no place in the philosophy of Kapila, he does not apply his method rigidly to developed matter. The means of proof of its existence is simply perception through the medium of the senses and the judicious employment of our mental faculties. The existence of nature and spirit are therefore to be demonstrated, and the means employed is inference.

The existence of nature as the cause of matter is proved in five ways,¹ and the great doctrine of causality thus established:—

1. The *finite* individuality of different existing things proves that they must have an external cause. Were they themselves their own cause, they could have no limits, no beginning.

2. The likeness which exists between several individual objects, forming them into a class; and again, the broader features of resemblance discovered between such classes; proves a common origin.

3. The actual activity in everything that is formed for action, proves the existence of an enlivening principle, and the special destination of each agent. (N.B. This argument, which scarcely proves the existence of a material essence, would be an excellent proof for that of a Supreme Being,² director and destinator of everything; but, in his view of matter, Kapila is undoubtedly materialist *to a certain extent*.)

¹ Sāṅk.-kār., shloka 15.

² It is, in other words, the old argument: 'The world exhibits works of design, and must therefore have had an intelligent maker.'

4. The complete difference between cause and effect, which is perceived in every common matter, proves that matter cannot be its own cause, and requires something distinct from matter as its cause, and this is nature.

5. The inseparable unity of the whole universe, no part of which can exist without and independent of the rest, shows the indivisible source from which all spring.

In these arguments we perceive that the Sánkhyas has not hesitated to grant volition to nature, and by this concession has made it at once the material and the efficient cause of creation, and hence the fallacy of its arguments. In the third reason, however, the philosopher contradicts himself. He has denied intelligence to nature, and yet asserts the destination of each material object.

The great doctrine of causality, on which these arguments depend, is thus put forward: the proofs that every effect is produced by a cause which actually exists, are: that that which does not exist cannot be the cause of anything whatsoever; that not everything is capable of doing anything, but everything must be done by that which is fitted to do it, and also that the character of the cause exists to a certain extent in the effect.¹ In other words, that which exists cannot have been produced by what does not and never did exist; but must have been produced by something gifted with existence, and must therefore have a cause.

The existence of spirit, that is, of a rational being which can comprehend matter and nature, the existence of which is already proved, is likewise demonstrated in five ways:²—

1. The existence of matter, of the world, must have some object; it cannot be merely useless and accidental; and that object cannot be itself, but some other, viz. the soul.

2. Everything which exists has a direct positive opposite.

ár., shl. 9. Kapila, ch. i. sút. 38, 77, 110, 115, and 128.
Sánk.-kár., shl. 17. Kapila, ch. i. sút. 66, 132—136.

Nature and matter are both under the influence of the three qualities, and thus viewed may be considered as one. Something must therefore exist as their opposite, not under the influence of those qualities, and this something is spirit.

3. The body moves and fulfils its functions according to the laws of nature, but the variety of its actions in its relations to matter require that there should exist that which can direct and prompt them.

4. Matter has qualities and attributes which fit it for enjoyment; but since it is not the mere body which enjoys them, there must exist something which does so.

5. From the existence of a conviction in every being of his own possible existence distinct from the body, which is evinced in the desire he feels to be set free from material existence, and from mundane regeneration and transmigration, in which he learnt to believe, every one feels the misery of this life, and is aware of its finiteness and mutability, and desires to be quit of it. This proves the consciousness in man of the possibility of liberation; of the distinctness of the soul from matter; of the existence of another non-material, and consequently eternal life; and therefore of the eternity of the soul, since it is considered impossible for a man really to desire complete annihilation.

These arguments are very poor, and we are therefore pleased to find in Kapila (ch. vi. sūt. 1) another which is worth them all. He says, 'The soul exists, because there is no means of proving that it does not exist.'

The system has now been put forward, and its component parts proved, at least to the satisfaction of the philosopher, to exist. Moreover, it has been shown that nature and matter are connected in the relative position of cause and effect, while spirit is completely distinct from both, having merely the character of a witness, an enjoyer and an employer of matter.

We proceed to speak of spirit; and the first doctrine established is the plurality, individuality, and personality of souls, attempted to be proved in three ways:¹—

1. The birth and death of each individual taking place at different times seems to preclude the possibility of all souls being one.

2. The difference in the actions of individuals proves a different impulse in each, which suggests a distinct existence; for if all souls were the same, they would be prompted to the same actions at the same moment.

3. The three qualities influence individuals in different degrees, some being born with a greater amount of goodness, some of badness, etc.

Independent of the poverty of these arguments, the truth of each is doubtful. In the last, for instance, he has forgotten that elsewhere the influence of the three qualities is said to be confined to matter, and that, therefore, the difference of disposition proves nothing more than the difference of bodies.

The doctrine of the individuality of the soul is worthy of particular notice, as being peculiar to this school. In the Vedas, and the so-called philosophical works based upon them, one universal soul is supposed to pervade all material bodies, while in other schools, and even in the Bhagavad-Gítá among them, this doctrine is not clearly marked, though often evidently admitted.

The soul, thus shown to be individual, is also distinct from the body,² but it alone, and not the body, is really sensitive, and the body alone, and not the soul, is really active.³ From the union of the body with the soul, the body wrongly appears to be sensitive, and the soul active. In making the soul inactive, Kapila is undoubtedly in error according to our

¹ Sánk.-kár., shl. 18. Kapila, ch. i. sút. 141—146.

² Kapila, ch. vi. sút. 2.

³ Sánk.-kár., shl. 20.

extended notions of action, but it must be remembered that he considered action as essentially material in its nature. For every kind of action something besides the agent must exist. There must be tools, instruments and organs, and these belong to matter only. Action in the Sánkhyā is not mere volition or impulse, but must be achieved either by the organs of action, the senses, or the heart, regarded as an internal sense. It is therefore quite in keeping with his theories to make the soul inactive, and in so doing he does not deny activity to spirit; and this leads us to speak of the ideas of the pure Sánkhyā as to spirit.

Although no mention is made in the pure Sánkhyā of a spiritual essence, from which the soul emanates, and into which it returns, there can be no doubt that Kapila had an idea that such existed, from the fact of final emancipation being the loss of the soul's identity, which it only preserves while connected with matter. This he has shown distinctly by making the consciousness of that individuality an attribute of matter. Moreover, in speaking of soul, sundry indications are given of the notion of their being all one and the same, which, when placed by the side of their plurality on which he insists, would be a most direct and bold contradiction, if we do not understand that he alludes rather to an universal spirit from which the individual souls are emanated. One instance will suffice (Kapila, ch. i. sūt. 142 and 143), where he compares the souls to the air in different vases, which are the bodies; and adds, 'that the receptacles (the vases or bodies) are distinct, but not the air or spirit, although, in one vase, the air may be hot or foul; in another, cold or pure, and so on.'

Lastly, when we perceive in the system already described that intelligence and consciousness are set down as parts of matter, we must not be led away to the conclusion that soul is on that account unintelligent or not personal. It must be remembered that intelligence and consciousness, as conceded

to matter, refer solely to matter itself; intelligence is then the faculty of perceiving, investigating, considering, and reflecting on matter; and it is true, though Kapila may not have discovered it, that however intelligent our souls may be, their intelligence during this life is undoubtedly limited to the experience they derive from matter, and is incapable of conceiving, imagining, or even comprehending those ideas for which our experience has afforded us no precedent, such as the existence of God as a pure spirit; or infinity, eternity, and others. Again, since the soul, when once liberated from matter, loses (according to Kapila's theory) its personality and identity, it is clear that consciousness can only belong to it while united to matter; and though that consciousness may be considered as a faculty of the soul, he is quite right to make its vehicle and organ material.

To re-capitulate, the soul is considered by the Sāṅkhya as eternal, emanating from and re-entering a spiritual essence; it is sensitive, rational, free from the direct influence of the three qualities, distinct from nature and matter, its own cause, individual, personal, gifted with volition, but inactive.

We have now seen the characters of the three principal divisions of the system—nature, matter, and soul, generally explained. A few observations must now be made on the nature of the details, that is, of the twenty-three categories which compose matter in its development.

Intelligence (*buddhi*) has been already spoken of. It is the first product of nature, and is placed in the closest connection with the soul, and thus forms the link between it and the body. It is, however, material; but while it cannot be supposed to mean nothing but the actual brain, which is its seat, it must not be limited to its faculties only, such as perception, reflection, comparison, judgment, and imagination. These are the inherent powers of the physical brain, but they are only called into action when the soul is united to the body.

Consciousness (*ahankāra*) has also been explained as belonging to matter rather than to soul. It is the first product of intelligence; and this is correct; since, though the consciousness of own individual existence may exist without any connection with external matter, and though neither perception, nor inference, nor even reflection, are requisite for its existence, it cannot, as a faculty of matter, be called into life unless thought has preceded it. Consciousness, the conviction of own existence, is strictly a thought, not a creation of thought, if such a thing exists; not, to speak more strictly, a mere kaleidoscopic arrangement of impressions already received from without; not an idea or notion, but an accompaniment to thought, and a portion of thought itself. It is this, too, which gives memory to the mind.

The heart (*manas*) is sensibility, the power of feeling, the organs of which are the senses; while its changes, according to the influence of the three qualities of good, bad, and neutral, are its passions—love, hate, and indifference.¹ It is the product of consciousness, and it is evident that there can be no sensibility without personality. It is, at the same time, an organ of action and an organ of perception. In the former capacity, it is that which, prompted by desires, in turn directs the senses towards the objects in connection with each. In the latter, it simply collects the impressions made on the senses.

These three, intelligence, consciousness, and sensibility, form a triad, which is considered as the internal organ of perception. Its action is successive; the heart having received impressions from the external organs of sensation, transmits them to consciousness, which forwards them to intelligence, which, being in immediate connection with the soul, transfers them to it.²

¹ Śāṅk.-kār., shl. 27. Kapila, ch. ii. sūtras 27, 39, 40, and 41.

² Śāṅk.-kār., shls. 29 and 30. Kapila, ch. ii. sūtras 29—31.

The organ of sensation is the aggregate of the five senses, which receive their impressions of external things directly and spontaneously,¹ that is, by the connection of each sense with its associated object of sense; and though the soul is the only really sensitive thing, and the senses are merely organs, still their action is in itself wholly independent of the soul, and directed simply by the laws of nature; so that even when the soul is withdrawn from the body, if the vital function still remains to set them in action, the impressions of external objects are still received; and this is supposed to be the case in sleep. To this organ of sensation is added the aggregate of the five organs of action, and the ten are then regarded as one external organ. These are all the products of consciousness; for, as parts of sensibility and individual action, it is evident that they are dependent on personality. The other products of consciousness are the elements and subtile elements of matter, which will be treated of in the physiological portion of the system.

By these organs of perception and action, both internal and external, the soul is connected with matter, that is, with the body itself and the external world.² But what is the object of this connection of soul and matter? Final emancipation, the liberation of the soul from matter. Is then the soul merely united to matter in order to be liberated from it? If so, why was it ever united? why did it not always remain an independent portion of the spiritual essence, rather than become individual, simply with the object of losing that individuality again after a longer or shorter period of misery in this life? Why are we born, if only to die? To these three questions Kapila returns no answer; and it was left to the Theistic Sánkhyā to point to one Supreme Being, and reply that—such was his will. But he does not the less

¹ Sánk.-kár., shl. 31.

² Sánk.-kár., shls. 31—36. Kapila, ch. ii. sūtras 37—46.

insist on the necessity of final emancipation being the cause of the union of soul and matter, nor on the means that are employed to effect that object. A multitude of souls have been made to emanate from the spiritual essence; have, in short, been individualized; while, at the same time, the world, as we have seen it composed, has emanated from nature. In the ordinary course of things these souls have to retain their individuality as long as the world retains its development. At its creation, each soul has been, firstly, united with the lowest class of material body, which assumes any distinct and independent form, such as even a stone or a lump of earth. When, in the natural course of things, this body has been dissolved into its elementary components, the soul migrates to one of a higher class, as that of vegetable bodies, and ascends in this manner, through fishes, reptiles, quadrupeds, and so on, till it reaches a human body. Then, but not till then, is the power granted it of working out its own emancipation. Man is the turning-point in the scale of beings. From him the soul may either ascend further to gods and demigods, or again descend in the order in which it has ascended. But its transmigrations are now no longer obedient to the laws of nature alone, but depend on the good or bad path of life which man selects.

At this point of its individual existence, the great object of the soul is to free itself from the necessity of either one course of transmigrations or the other, and this liberation can only be effected by emancipating the soul entirely from matter, which is accomplished, says the Sāṅkhya, by perfection of knowledge. This knowledge is acquired through the connection of the soul with matter, by means of the internal and external organs of perception. To this it may be replied that every man is gifted with these organs, and that the simple use of them would therefore effect every man's emancipation; while the same may be said of animals, and, to a certain degree, of all organic matter. Why, then,

cannot every man and every beast work out its emancipation by the simple action of life? In order to answer this question, a theory is introduced, which we have as yet merely noticed casually, but which is one of the most important in the whole system. It is that of the three qualities (*guna*).

This theory, in its original simplicity, belongs to the age of observation, rather than to that of investigation, and cannot therefore be looked on as an invention of philosophy. It required but little perspicuity for man to perceive that some things in this world were good, excellent, useful, and pleasant to himself; others, bad, obnoxious, disagreeable; and others again, while they could not be considered as actually obnoxious and disagreeable, still useless, and cumbersome, and such is the theory in its primitive simplicity. Without, however, going into a minute investigation of the period at which the terms which we find in philosophy applied to these three attributes of matter were first received, or the literal and original signification of those terms,¹ we may safely say that they belong to the age of philosophy, and that their meaning, from whatever source derived, is there very clear and precise.

When the soul was clearly defined as distinct from the body, and as belonging to an universal spiritual essence, when it was felt that emancipation could be effected by perfection, and that therefore the soul must be capable of

¹ They are *sattwa*, 'goodness,' *rajas*, 'badness,' and *tamas*, 'indifference,' *Sattwa* is the abstract substantive from *sat*, pres. part. of *as*, 'to be,' and meaning therefore 'being, existing,' thence 'real,' as contrasted with what only appears to exist, and is false,—and hence 'good.' *Sattwa* therefore means 'reality, goodness.' *Rajas* is a concrete subst., derived either from *ranj*, with the meaning of 'colour,' or from the same root with the meaning of 'adhere to.' In the first place it would mean 'colour' as contrasted with goodness, which was regarded as 'light'; in the second it would be that which attaches man to the world. Lastly, *tamas* means simply 'darkness, obscurity,' whether as contrasted with light or colour; and taken metaphorically to mean the darkness of ignorance and delusion. In the Bhagavad-Gitā, ch. xiv. sh. 22, the three terms *prakāśha*, 'light, clearness,' *pravṛitti*, 'activity,' and *moha*, 'delusion,' are substituted for the more common ones.

perfection, it was set down that spirit could not be directly affected by these qualities; for it was ere long perceived that nothing which was affected even by the quality of goodness was entirely perfect, but that the qualities belonged all three to every existing thing, though the preponderance of any one of them might give it the appearance of standing alone without the other two. Perfection was impossible to matter,¹ though possible to spirit; and since the three attributes which belonged to matter were the reason of its incapability of attaining perfection, it was clear that they could not belong to spirit. But, if such were the case, how was it that the dispositions and actions of men were so clearly different, some being good, others bad, and others stupid or useless? The reply was, that those dispositions themselves belonged to the different bodies, and not to the different souls; and that those actions were prompted by the qualities themselves. In the earliest ages of philosophy, knowledge, with or without virtue, was considered the highest good: ignorance, with or without virtue, the greatest evil: and action, whether well or ill meant, since it was always attended with consequences which could not be perfectly good, as nothing material was so, but always contained more or less of evil, was considered as bad. *Sattwa*, 'goodness,' therefore became also enlightenment, knowledge, and was free from action; *rajas*, 'badness,' was action itself and worldliness; *tamas*, 'indifference,' darkness, mental obscurity, ignorance, was also free from action. But this very freedom was bad in it, since it amounted to inertness, sloth, and indifference.

As has been said, these attributes were never single, whether as forming the dispositions, or as influencing the actions of beings. They were always united in different

¹ Since the very nature of perfection precludes either qualification or variety, which are attributes of matter.

proportions. A good disposition or a good action would be influenced by a very large amount of goodness, with a small quantum of badness, and a still smaller one of indifference; a bad disposition or action, by a preponderance of badness, and so on.

These dispositions, however, were not the work of the beings to whom they belonged, but were inherent and innate in the different bodies, and according to their dispositions the bodies were then arranged in different grades. Those below man, such as animals, plants, etc., had all a less amount of goodness than of the other two qualities. They were therefore devoid of that enlightenment, which would enable them to discover the necessity of emancipation, and thus no beings below man had the power of accomplishing it. Again, in the beings above man, such as demigods and gods, the dispositions had a preponderance of goodness, and it was therefore possible for them to work out their perfection; but as the life and death of man were beyond his own power, so were those of the deities; and destiny had allotted them a term of existence which they had no means,—and, since that existence was blessed, no desire,—to shorten.

Though these deities and the beings inferior to man were ranged in divers classes according to their dispositions, Kapila was sufficiently republican to make one class only of all mankind. All men alike had the power of effecting their own emancipation, but all men had not equal facilities, nor the same inclination. The abject Shúdra, the hated barbarian (*mlechchha*), and even the despised weaker sex, to whom all advantages had been denied by the bráhmaṇ, received the right from the Sánkhyá and its followers¹ of attaining eternity; but still their dispositions were indifferent and obscure, and it was not probable that they would

¹ See Bhagavad-Gitá, ch. ix. shl. 32, note.

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accept and employ the privilege thus granted them. Thus not only knowledge, but a wish and effort were requisite to the attainment of emancipation, and the dispositions which had been allotted (Kapila and his followers are silent as to *by whom* they were allotted¹) to the different bodies in which the soul was born, had the power of suggesting the wish, and facilitating the accomplishment. But allowing the wish and the effort, if the perfection of knowledge was not attained, what was the fate of the being? In order to answer this question, we must explain the theory of transmigration, and in so doing we are led to an investigation of

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PORTION OF THE PURE SÁNKHYA.

The cosmology of Kapila and his immediate followers is divided into two principal portions, the material creation (*bhautika-sarga*), and the intellectual creation (*bháva-sarga* or *pratyaya-sarga*), the former including all external matter; the latter, the dispositions and minds of man.

The material creation is said to comprise three worlds.² The first, or upper world, consists of the different regions of divine and superhuman beings; the second, or middle world, is that of man; and the third, or lower, is that of beings inferior to man, including the demons, etc. In the first, the quality of goodness predominates; in the second, that of badness; in the third, that of blind indifference. The bodies which inhabit these worlds are of fourteen kinds, also distributed in three classes—the superhuman, the human, and the less than human.³

The superhuman descends in the following eight divisions:—The bodies belonging to—1. Brahma-loka, the

¹ Though it is generally understood that he ascribed their distribution and arrangement to Nature; which, however, would concede, that which he denied to it, intelligence. It is another point which demands the existence of a Supreme Being, which the Theistic Sánkhyas, Patanjali, and the Bhagavad-Gítá have supplied.

² Sánk.-kár., shl. 53. Kapila, ch. iii. sût. 42.

³ Sánk.-kár., shls. 54, 55. Kapila, ch. iii. sûts. 43, 44.

region of Brahmá, Viṣṇu, and Shiva, considered as the superior deities. 2. Pitṛi-loka, that of the Pitṛis or Manes, the Prajápatis or progenitors of mankind, and the Ṛiṣhis. 3. Soma-loka, the region of the moon, and other heavenly bodies. 4. Indra-loka or Swarga, the region of Indra and the multitudes of secondary deities who own him as king. 5. Gandharba-loka, that of the heavenly minstrels and inhabitants of the air. 6. Rákṣhasa-loka, that of one class of mythological demons. 7. Yakṣha-loka, that of another. 8. Pishácha-loka, that of a third class of the same.

The human is single, containing man alone, without distinction of rank.

The less than human contains five divisions in the following descending order—1. Domestic animals (*pashu*). 2. Wild animals (*mṛiga*). 3. Birds. 4. Reptiles, fishes, and insects. 5. Vegetable and inorganic matter.

All these bodies are material, all liable to more or less of pain, disease, etc., from which not even the deities are entirely free, and into such bodies as these can the soul pass. Man, as we see, stands between the two other classes, and to him accordingly is granted the power of ascending or descending, or liberating himself entirely from life. If he rigidly and piously performs the duties of his religion, and leads an upright moral life; or if, abandoning the strict letter of the law, he strives, though without success, to work out his emancipation from the flesh;¹ his reward is to inhabit one of the regions included between Brahma-loka and Gandharba-loka, according to the superiority or inferiority of his merits. After a sojourn in these regions proportionate to his dues, he is born again on earth, in a body superior to his last, in which circumstances render emancipation more easy of attainment, such as that of a member of some pious

¹ Bhagavad-Gítá, ch. vi. shls. 37-47. Sánk.-kár., shl. 44. Kapila, ch. iii. sūts. 21-23.

bráhmaṇ family, and so on. If he does not, however, now accomplish his liberation, he is carried after death to a superior world, and born again in due season on earth; and this process is repeated as long as the being does not commit great sins on earth, till he has effected his emancipation; or, failing that, till the dissolution of the world.

In the next case, that of a man whose life is neither good enough for heaven nor bad enough for hell, the soul is immediately born again on earth, in a better or worse body, according to his deserts.

Lastly, when a man's life has been irreligious and immoral, his soul is condemned after death to a sojourn of length proportionate to his crimes in one of the regions of punishment called Naraka; after which it is again enclosed in an earthly body, either that of a low caste of human beings, or, if his crimes were very great, that of some animal; and the revolving process continues till the dissolution of the world.

Such is the law of transmigration as defined by the schools, and received by the established religion. Kapila admits this law, but he does not see that in so doing he considerably disturbs his own system. Some intelligent Being must exist to allot the punishment, and to decide more accurately than human justice what is worthy of heaven, what of earth, what of hell. If the arrangement and dispensation of these judgments be referred to the action of nature, then nature must not only be intelligent, which Kapila will not allow; but must also be superior to spirit, which is distinctly denied. In the Theistic Sánkhyā the Supreme Being accordingly supplied the vacant place. In the established mythology these increased powers were added to those of Yama, the Lord of Judgment, who already figured as destroyer and judge in the Epic triad.

But another difficulty in this system of transmigration must be obvious to every reader. If these regions to which the soul migrates are material, and consequently finite, how

is it that in quitting this body at death, and passing on to another body in another region, the soul is not emancipated, since there is evidently no matter to detain it? or, again, how can the soul, which is inactive, migrate at all from one material region to another? This difficulty also presented itself to the mind of Kapila, and, perhaps, even to still earlier philosophers; and a theory was introduced, which is merely one of convenience, and cannot but be regarded with severity. To accept, with but little inquiry, a false theory, like that of transmigration, from a system of religion which he despised, and then to support this with another false invention, is unworthy of a philosopher; and in this, more than in any part of his faulty physiological system, must Kapila be blamed.

From the moment of its emanating from the spiritual essence and its union with matter, the soul was supposed to be invested with a subtile body, which it never quits till the moment of final emancipation, or till the entire dissolution of all matter takes place. This body,¹ called the *Linga*, or *linga-sharira*² (lit. 'the sign,' i.e. the reflection or shadow of the more substantial body), is the vehicle in which the soul is borne from one region to another; thus solving the difficulty. It is material, although imperceptible; it is coeval with the soul, born with it, and ceasing to exist at its emancipation; but never quitting it for a moment as long as it is subject to material existence, no matter in what sort of substantial body the soul may be placed. Yet it does not change its form in transmigration: in an animal, fish, fowl, beast, or man, and in superhuman beings the *linga* is still the same; being, as it were, a spiritual body. It is composed of the

¹ Sānkh.-kār., s̥pls. 40-43. Kap., ch. iii. s̥tras 1-16.

² A refinement, into which it is needless to enter, distinguishes these two terms. The *linga* is that which we have here described it, but is in itself incapable of sensation. It is called *atīvāhika*. The *linga-sharira*, called *anupātana*, is the grosser vehicle of the latter, though more subtile than the actual corporeal body.

following categories of developed matter, the five grosser elements being alone excluded, viz. Buddhi, Ahankára, and Manas, the five subtile elements, the five senses, and the five organs of action, so that it is capable both of action and sensation. Perhaps the best idea which can be given of it is to compare it with our own childish notions of ghosts, with the phantoms or images of bodies in Greek superstition, and with the mystic non-material body with which some of the early Christians attempted, though evidently with error, to explain the Resurrection. It cannot be called non-material, since it was composed of the subtile elements, but it is incapable of direct affection from matter. Thus when the substantial body is killed, the *linga* which exists within it remains unhurt as the coating of the soul.

The intellectual creation (*pratyaya*, or *bháva-sarga*) is described as follows. The mind of man is subject to three kinds of error, viz.:

1. Confounding the material essence with spirit, not defining the limit between them.
2. Mistaking one of nature's productions, such as intelligence, for the soul itself.
3. Supposing that emancipation can be attained by religious practices.

When the three qualities affect the mind, they cause it to range itself in the following fifty dispositions: ¹—

Five kinds of Obstructions, viz.:

1. Obscurity, or error, is of eight kinds, according as the mortal mistakes nature, intelligence, consciousness, or one of the five subtile elements, for the soul.
2. Bewilderment, or illusion (*mohana*), is of eight kinds, caused in attempting the eight kinds of supernatural powers (*vibhúti*). :

3. Great bewilderment, or extreme illusion, is of ten kinds, caused by indulging each of the ten senses.
4. Gloom (*tamas*) is of eighteen kinds, resulting from the two last, with the addition of malice.
5. Utter darkness is of eighteen kinds, being the same with the addition of fear.

Twenty-eight kinds of Disabilities, deficiency in the eleven organs, such as blindness, deafness, etc., and the inability of attaining the nine kinds of quietudes, and eight kinds of perfections, which follow :

Nine kinds of Quietudes, or contentments, consist of four internal and five external. The former are :

1. Calm expectation that nature itself will work out our emancipation, and that it is needless for us therefore to trouble ourselves.
2. The same feelings with regard to ascetic exercises.
3. The same with regard to time.
4. The same with regard to luck or accident.

The five external are abstinence from indulgence of the senses from the following temporal motives.

1. Because the trouble is too great.
2. Because, when acquired, the difficulty of keeping is too great.
3. Reluctance to lose when once acquired.
4. On account of the bad consequences resulting from fruition.
5. From fear of hurting the objects of enjoyment.

Eight kinds of Perfections are—

- 1—3. Direct prevention of the three kinds of evil, viz. internal or personal, external or accidental, and superhuman.
- 4—8. Reasoning, oral instruction, study, conversation with friends on topics of philosophy and liberality (or as Váchaspati Mishra has it, 'purity,' from a root, *dai*, the word being *dána*).

The divisions of mental modes or dispositions are systematized with the evident object of explaining the action of the three qualities on the intellect, and the consequent difficulties in the way of attaining final emancipation. Thus the Obstructions would seem to imply chiefly the influence of the *rajo-guna*, or quality of badness; the Disabilities and Quietudes that of the *tamo-guna*, or quality of indifference; and the Perfections that of the *sattva-guna*, or quality of goodness.

Here the physiological portion and the whole of our arrangement of the Sánkhyā system concludes; and as our object in placing it before the reader is rather to aid in the comprehension of the philosophy of our poem, and to exemplify the character of early speculative Indian philosophy, we leave it to him to make his own criticisms on its imperfections and shortsightedness, and again refer him to our authorities, more especially to the *Mémoire* of M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire.

The physiological portion of his system undoubtedly redounds little to the praise of Kapila's clearsightedness. Too much has been tacitly received from the superstitions of his age, and too little attempt has been made to supply the place of science. But when we call to mind that this ancient thinker thought and taught *at least* seven or eight centuries before Christ, amid superstition and ignorance of the darkest nature, we must not lose sight of two points in his system, which raise him far above the earlier speculators both of Greece and modern Europe. The one is the establishment of a fifth element, the other the mistaken theory of the subtle elements.

Up to a recent period the existence of a void was still a matter of discussion between the speculative and the scientific. Among the former, Descartes and Leibnitz had denied it. Among the latter, Newton had proved it by astronomical calculations. The barometer and the airpump seemed indisputable confirmations of the truth of Newton's apparent proofs. Leibnitz had however suggested that im-

ponderable fluids, resembling those of light and electricity, existing in the atmosphere, filled the space left by the retirement of the air in these cases. Observations made on the diminution of Euler's comet have recently proved the necessity of the existence of such fluids; and Herschel himself, in admitting this fact, believes that Newton was mistaken, in spite of the apparent exactness of his calculations, which arose from the extreme rarity of the fluid in which the heavenly bodies move.

But what Descartes and Leibnitz could assert in the sixteenth century after Christ—what Newton with the minutest calculations has failed to disprove—a simple Bráhman some seven or eight centuries before Christ could assert in the clearest manner, amid the profoundest ignorance of science. The *ákásha*, the imponderable subtile fluid of Kapila, which fills all space, and also forms an ingredient of all matter, is undoubtedly a discovery worthy of acknowledgment.

Again, when the earlier thinkers of Greece could discover no finer elements of matter than the four obvious components, earth, air, water and fire, Kapila had already gone further. His five components of matter are not elements, the *mahábhútáni* were merely gross material aggregates, and the elements of which these were composed were of a subtile and imperceptible character. The grosser elements were merely the five apparently distinct forms under which matter commonly meets the view. The finer elements (*tanmátráni*) were the essences of these which really connected them with the senses. The greatest cause of wonder in the Sánkhyá system is that these elements should be actually produced by material consciousness (*ahankára*); but to investigate this mystery would be to enter into a discussion on the real character of consciousness, and the vague ideas of illusive creation (*máyá*), which would here be both useless and tedious, even if I were, which I confess I am not, prepared to explain Kapila's ideas, if indeed he ever had any, on that subject.

PART IV.

THE YOGA, OF PATANJALI.

WE have already stated our belief, that the imperfections in Kapila's system had given rise to the formation of a Theistic Sánkhyā school; and we have further (*vide* Part II.) attempted to explain the causes which led to the moulding of that system into the Yoga, of Patanjali. Philosophy was gradually acquiring more followers than the established religion. The Theistic Sánkhyā offered a new god; but no form of worship had been hitherto prescribed for him. Knowledge was still the means of obtaining emancipation; but the means of acquiring that knowledge were unsatisfactory. Asceticism, mortification of the flesh, contemplation, and a solitary life, were already the fashion among the religious classes. Patanjali discovered in these practices an excellent casing for the Sánkhyā, and resolved to reduce the former to a system, and the latter to a practical religion. If the Pure Sánkhyā be the speculative, the Theistic Sánkhyā the theological, and the Karma Yoga of the Bhagavad-Gítā the ethical, the Yoga of Patanjali must be looked upon as the practical adaptation of the Sánkhyā system.

We have stated our reasons for believing this school to be posterior to the revolution of Buddha; but, at the same time, we cannot deny its remote antiquity. As a proof of this, the Hindús themselves place its foundation in the Satya Yuga, the first and golden age of the world; and there is every reason to believe that it preceded the Bhagavad-Gítā by several centuries.

Its founder, Patanjali, is known to us by name only. He is sometimes called an incarnation of Ananta, the serpent-

king; but it is difficult to account for the fable. Again he is, by native commentators of a late date, said to be the son of Angiras and Sutí, and to have married Lulúpá, whom he found in the hollow of a Vata tree; a fable intended to symbolize some notion about his doctrines. What we do know for certain in nowise enlightens us: namely, that an author or authors of the same name, and sometimes confounded with the philosopher, wrote a large grammatical treatise, entitled 'Mahábháshya,' a commentary on the Grammar of Páñiñi; and a medical one called 'Charaka.'

But if we know little about the founder, we are not much wiser in regard to his writings. From the Bhagavad-Gítá we can conjecture what must have been their tenor, and with the little aid we possess, we can define at least sufficiently the nature of his doctrines. His Sútras—for he is of sufficient antiquity to have employed Sútras or philosophical aphorisms—bear the name of Sánkhya-pravachana, the same as that of Kapila's principal work. They are one hundred and ninety-eight in number, and are distributed into four parts. Commentaries on them are ascribed to Váchaspati Mishra, Panchashikha and Bhojadeva.

As regards their contents, our only authorities are Colebrooke,¹ who merely mentions them very briefly; Ward,² who gives lengthy details from Bhojadeva's commentary, for many reasons of very doubtful value; and Windischmann,³ who would seem to draw his information from Ward.

The word Yoga belongs less as a title, than in its abstract sense, to the age of the Sútras themselves. Derived from the radical *yuj*, 'to join,' 'unite,' its literal meaning is 'junction,' 'union.' Used in a special philosophical sense it signifies 'a state of spiritual or mental junction with the Supreme Being;' and refers to that ultimate condition of

¹ Miscellaneous Essays, vol. i. p. 235, etc.—Essay on the Sánkhya.

² Views of Hindostan, vol. i. p. 377.

³ Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. p. 1878.

spiritualism, which is attained by ascetic contemplation, and which we have already mentioned as *jivanmukti*, or a state of absorption into the Supreme Being even during this life, which resembles final emancipation. This is the true meaning of Yoga, as an end. As a means, its sense is more limited. It is rather the mental union; the placing of our thoughts on the Supreme Being; and, in short, as we have rendered it throughout the Bhagavad-Gítá,—Devotion.

The four chapters of the Yoga Sútras contain the following treatises:—

1. On contemplation, or the concentration of thought (*samádhi*).
2. On the means of obtaining the same (*samádhiprápti*).
3. On transcendental powers acquired by the same (*vibhúti*).
4. On the ecstatic abstraction or isolation of the soul (*kaivalya*).

From this it is seen, that while the Sánkya contents itself with indicating the means of attaining final emancipation, the Yoga points out the way to obtain that means, and the process of effecting final emancipation by it.

In the first chapter, contemplation is described as two-fold:—First. *Samprajnata*, the first exercise of contemplation, in which reason still works; but the object of which is to destroy the consciousness of one's individual existence, and to bring the mind to that state, in which it is entirely oblivious of the reality of all external matter, and is convinced that the soul is actually connected and united with the Supreme One. The objects towards which this contemplation is directed are either nature, comprising the whole universe, or one's own soul. It is then divided into the following four stages:—

1. As to the distinction between the name of a thing and the thing named. The internal repetition of the name, accompanied by conception of the thing named, until at last all distinction is lost between

the name and the thing named; so that when the Yogin, or practiser of Yoga, internally pronounces the word *Íshwara*, or Deity, the name of the Supreme Being, he may have the form of that Being vividly pictured on his mind.

2. Losing by constant practice all distinction of form, time, and place; so that he may imagine and eventually believe himself to be any thing, at any time and any where.
3. The constant association of Nature (*prakṛiti*), and Spirit (*puruṣha*), until he imagines the latter only to exist in every thing, loses the sense of the existence of matter generally, and of his own body in particular, and thus becomes mentally bodiless (*videha*).
4. A stage in which his own individual existence (*ahankára*) appears to be a mere reflection on his sensibility (*manas*), and the Supreme Being alone is manifest.

Second. *Asamprajnata*. Contemplation in which reason is lost sight of; a complete restraint of the action of thought; the last stage of mental abstraction; in which even the reflection of his individual existence is lost sight of, and he is mentally one with the Supreme Being.

These are the stages of contemplation which lead to final emancipation. The first steps towards entering on these stages are three :

1. The abandonment of all worldly interests, hopes, desires, love or hate; by means of which the Yogin, or devotee, overcomes the five obstacles to Yoga, viz. pain, grief, trembling, asthmatic breathing, and sighing.

2. *Pránáyáma*, a peculiar exercise, which consists in restraining the breath, sometimes performed by closing the right nostril with the thumb, while breath is inhaled through the left, then closing both, and at length opening the right

nostril in order to exhale, and so on. During this exercise, his thoughts should be fixed on the localities of the organs of sense, such as the tip of the nose, the point of the tongue, the drum of the ear, etc., until he identifies these with the Supreme Being. Again, he should place his thoughts on external visible objects, such as the sun, the moon, fire, etc., or within his own heart, or at the bottom of his throat or the centre of his skull. The heart is the supposed seat of the soul, and its supposed passage at death is through the coronal artery passing through the throat to the centre of the skull, and thence on a beam of the sun, to the moon, through fire up to the sun, and so on, to the Supreme Being. By fixing his thoughts on these localities, he imagines that his soul is actually taking this final journey, and is thus *mentally* emancipated.

3. In muttering the names and attributes of the Deity, he should so completely associate them with the Being they indicate, that he at last finds himself mentally in the presence of that Being.

In the second chapter, it is shown that these exercises prepare the Yogin for perfect knowledge (*vijnána*), which is further acquired by the following eight stages of Yoga:—

I. *Yama*, or self-government, is of five kinds:—

1. Freedom from any wish to injure others.
2. Truth in reference to words and thoughts.
3. Freedom from appropriation of others' property, in thought, word or deed.
4. The subjection of one's members, in order to overcome desire.
5. Renunciation of all indulgence of pleasure.

II. *Niyama*, or self-restraint, is of five kinds:—

1. Purity of mind and body.
2. Cheerfulness under all circumstances.
3. Religious austerity.
4. The repetition of incantations.

5. The association of all religious ceremonies with the Supreme Being.
- III. *Asana*, the ascetic posture, admits of eighty-four varieties, each more uncomfortable than the last, but in which the Yogin must by degrees become quite easy.
- IV. *Pránáyáma*, restraint of the breath, already described.
- V. *Pratyáhára*, complete control over the senses and organs. Exclusive meditation on the Supreme Being, and the withdrawal of the senses from all external objects, compared in the Bhagavad-Gítá to the tortoise gathering its limbs together under its shell.

These exercises are continued into the third chapter, which afterwards treats of the transcendental powers (*vibhúti*) acquired by them.

- VI. *Dhárana*, steady, immoveable abstraction.
- VII. *Dhyána*, exclusive meditation on the Supreme Being.
- VIII. *Samádhi*, continual concentration of thought, by means of which all external objects, and even one's own individuality are forgotten, and the mind fixed completely and immoveably on the One Being.

These last three exercises constitute *sanyama*, or perfect concentration; and when the Yogin has arrived at perfection in them, he obtains innumerable superhuman powers, of which the following twenty-five are enumerated:—

1. Knowledge of past, present, and future things.
2. By fixing his mind on words, knowledge of universal sciences.
3. By the same on the lines in his hands, knowledge of his former states of existence.
4. On the hearts of others, knowledge of their thoughts.
5. On his own person, invisibility of form.
6. On his own actions, knowledge of their future consequences.

7. On compassion and sympathy, a feeling of beneficence to all beings.
8. On strength, perfect strength.
9. On the sun, the power, like it, of viewing all things.
10. On the moon, knowledge of astronomy.
11. On the polar star, knowledge of the constellations.
12. On the heart and stomach, knowledge of anatomy.
13. On the bottom of the throat, freedom from-hunger and thirst.
14. On the nerve in the throat, called *kúrmi*, rigidity of posture.
15. On the universality of *Manas*, knowledge of all invisible objects.
16. On the seat of the mind, knowledge of the thoughts, past, present, and future, of himself and others.
17. On the state of a Yogin when emancipated, knowledge and sight of the spirit unassociated with matter.

In the last chapter the *kairalya*, or state of emancipation even during life is described. This is the *jīvanmukti*, of which we have already spoken. It is the highest state of Yoga before the soul is actually re-absorbed into the Supreme Being. The body still exists, and of course the soul exists within it, but its connection with it is supposed to be entirely broken, and the soul can consequently quit and re-enter the body, and wander about where and as it lists. In this condition it is supposed to attain the remaining eight transcendental powers (*vibhúti*).

18. The power of entering a living or dead body and causing it to act as if it were its own.
19. Extreme lightness.
20. Resplendent brilliancy. :
21. The power of hearing sound, however distant, even from the other worlds.

22. Of transforming himself into each or all of the five elements.
23. Of passing and penetrating anywhere.
24. Of changing the course of nature.
25. Of final liberation.

These last are variously given, and the following names will spare us the trouble, and the reader the tedium, of examining these variations. 1. *Animá*, extreme minuteness; 2. *Laghimá*, lightness; 3. *Prápti*, attainment of any object; 4. *Prákámya*, fulfilment of every wish; 5. *Mahimá*, size; 6. *Íshitá*, supremacy; 7. *Vashitá*, power (over nature); 8. *Kámavashayitá*, attainment of every wish.

The Yogin thus passes through four principal stages.

1. He learns the rules of Yoga.
2. He acquires perfect knowledge.
3. He employs this knowledge practically, and overcomes the material influence of the primary elements.
4. He destroys all consciousness of personality and individuality (*ahankára*); and the soul thus becomes free from matter.

Such are the details given by Ward and Windischmann of Patanjali's doctrines. If any reliance can be placed on them, we cannot refrain from pronouncing on the whole system at least a verdict of mysticism; but before these details be verified, it is scarcely fair to enter on any criticism on the Yoga of Patanjali. It will be sufficient to point out, what every one will have already remarked, the great resemblance between these theories and the modern ideas of magnetism and mesmerism. The power of the mind, and still more of the will, over the body, is too well known and ascertained to require even exemplification; but such it receives in the miracles fabled to be performed, and literally performed, even to this day, by the Yogins and Fakírs of India; and in the Middle Ages by the fanatics of France,

Italy, and Germany. That a man, in a complete state of mental abstraction, and after continual habituation and exercise of his body, should undergo without flinching, without perhaps, a pang, what would insure death under all ordinary circumstances, may be explained; but that the same abstraction and the same exercises should give transcendental powers to the soul or even to the mind, even less marvellous than those arrogated for it by the Indian philosopher, is a subject of continual doubt, which every Christian, at least, will approach with care. In no country but contemplative India could such doctrines have been received at such an age, or such exercises practised with faith. But that they were received and followed out by multitudes, there can be little doubt: and we have already attempted (Part II.) to describe the evils which resulted from their popularity, and gave rise to the more human system of the Bhagavad-Gítá.

It is a subject, of which we would fain know more; for, if we divest it of its mysticism, we may venture to say that there would be found much truth at the bottom. If we arrogate for the Sánkhyá the honour of having systematized philosophical theories at an age when Greece could boast of nothing more advanced than a Lycurgus, or of anticipating by some thrée-and-twenty centuries the denial of a void in the enlightened West, we may at least call Patanjali the Mesmer, and more than the Mesmer of India. Sufficient praise be it to the mystic old Bráhman to have inferred amid darkness and ignorance the vast powers of the mind and the will, and to have claimed for the soul the noble capability of making the body and even external matter its slave.

PART V.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE BHAGAVAD-GITA.

OF the many parts which this wonderful production plays, the principal is undoubtedly that of a didactic work; and we have already attempted to point out (see Part II.) the causes which necessitated its composition as such. But, though a Bráhmaṇ and a reformer of national evils, its author was no less a philosopher; not only ethical, but to a certain degree metaphysical and speculative; and his theories are the more interesting, as embodying in full the theological ideas of the Theistic Sáṅkhya, for which, indeed, we have no other direct authorities.

The work itself contains eighteen chapters and seven hundred shlokas; and it has been suggested with much semblance of truth, that the distribution into chapters or readings (*adhyáya*) was the work of the author himself, and not of a later arranger, as the subject in almost all cases terminates with the chapter which treats of it; and the original point of didactic doctrine, the necessity for Arjuna to fight, concludes each. And, indeed, if we reflect at what a thoroughly literary and civilized age its author must have existed, we shall not only be inclined to accept this suggestion; but even to believe that the original length and original form of the whole poem were such as we have received them without a single interpolation. Passages have, indeed, been pointed out, which bore marks of in-

congruity in their tendency;¹ but when we recall the conciliatory and Bráhmancial character of the author, even these may be easily accounted for.

But another division is made, which may or may not have been intended by the author, however useful to the reader. The whole work has been divided into three parts, each of six chapters. The first has been considered the purely practical portion, containing the principal doctrines for the practice of Yoga generally, and more particularly for its adoption in the routine of every-day life; and may be said to follow Patanjali's, rather than any other school. The second portion is purely theological, and displays the theories of the Theistic Sánkhyā school, which we presume to have pre-existed. The third is the speculative or metaphysical portion, and follows more closely in the footsteps of Kapila and the pure Sánkhyā. Thus the doctrines of the three preceding branches of the Sánkhyā system are united in this the fourth; though each, of course, with the necessary modifications of a new school. As to the exactness of this division, it may be said that the Bhagavad-Gítá is a poem; and that system is everywhere sacrificed to poetical effect. Thus the first and second chapters introduce the whole system in its principal points without any arrangement; and in the course of a conversation, or rather discussion, on the duty incumbent on Arjuna as a Kshatriya; while the eighteenth recapitulates most of the chief ethical dogmata expounded throughout the poem. In other respects the division is generally, though not strictly, observed.

The author of this poem has done well to introduce the most prominent and important features of his doctrine early

¹ Schlegel, for instance, has suggested the introduction (shl. 1-5) to chapter xv. Humboldt regards xvii. 23-28, in the same light. To myself xv. 15, seems to be irreconcilable with the context; but it must be remembered, that in all these passages it is rather the sense than the language which is incongruous, as the latter can nowhere be referred to a later or earlier date.

in the work, and to preserve the less alluring and profounder theories for the middle and end. But, in treating it as a philosophical treatise, we must preserve the order which we have already sought to impress on the mind of the reader, as that which chronology, together with the natural sequence, demands. The order of the poem must be reversed, and the last six chapters, which treat of the speculative or pure Sāṅkhya, be first examined.

No very logical order is here observed. The thirteenth chapter takes a general view of the cosmogony of the Sāṅkhya in a very brief form, and proceeds to an analysis of matter and spirit, the connection between them, and the means of obtaining emancipation as put forward by Kapila, namely, knowledge. The fourteenth is confined to a treatise on the three qualities, and their influence on matter, directly, and on soul, indirectly. In the fifteenth, spirit is investigated, but on an entirely new system, following neither the Pure nor the Theistic Sāṅkhya. The sixteenth treats of the dispositions allotted to the different kinds of souls. In the seventeenth, the influence of the three qualities on religious faith and worship generally is shown. The eighteenth offers a recapitulation of the Karma Yoga doctrines, and a confirmation of the worship of Kṛiṣṇa, as identified with the Supreme One.

The thirteenth chapter opens with a brief announcement of the twenty-five categories of matter:—Nature (*prakṛiti* or *avyakta*), intelligence, consciousness (*ahankāra*), the eleven senses (which comprise the heart (*manas*), the five organs of perception and the five of action), the five grosser, and the five subtile elements, to which are now added the seven passions or changes of the heart.¹ This constitutes the body. The soul is first declared to be a portion of the Supreme

Being (xiii. shl. 2). It alone is gifted with sensibility, while matter only is capable of action (shl. 20). The spirit is in itself incapable of affection by the three qualities, but when united to the body is indirectly affected by them (shl. 21). Nature and spirit are both eternal, and it is by the conjunction of these two essences, each of them portions of the Supreme Being, that all matter is caused to emanate from the material essence (shls. 19 and 27).

Knowledge is the means by which emancipation is effected. But knowledge consists firstly in the investigation of spirit. Comprehension of matter is within the power of all to acquire by the use of senses; but, since spirit is invisible, it can only be understood by a certain method of comparison, inference, and revelation, which constitutes philosophy. Spirit, therefore, is the chief object of philosophical enquiry; and this spirit must be understood to be that which, gifted with intelligence, is alone capable of comprehending matter. It is, speaking generally, and not of either individual spirit or of the Supreme Being separately, eternal and universal, gifted with all faculties, free from all external influence of matter, free from qualities; and both capable of independent existence, and of union with matter. It is this which, by its intelligence, perceives, sustains, and regulates unintelligent matter (shls. 12-22).

The acquirement of knowledge, as a system, consists chiefly in humility and purity of heart, in self-government and restraint of the senses, in general equanimity and stoicism, devotion to the Supreme Being, solitary contemplation and internal investigation (shls. 7-11).

Such are the chief points of the Sánkhyā as viewed through the Bhagavad-Gítā. But a further investigation takes place into spirit, viewed generally. It is regarded as being of three kinds, all closely connected, and indeed more properly forming but one spirit regarded under three different aspects.

The first is the Supreme Being himself,¹ who, though he contains within him the essence of all matter, is, in his personality, regarded as spirit. The third is individual soul,² which emanates from him. But the second³ in rank is not so easy to understand, or account for. An universal spirit is supposed to exist throughout all matter, which is not that spiritual essence itself from which souls emanate, but itself an emanation from that essence; and apparently rather a spiritual, or perhaps vital, energy than actual spirit. It would seem to have been introduced by our poet, in his usual spirit of conciliation, as a modification of the doctrine in the Vedas of the universal spirit which was the soul in every body and the vital energy in all matter. This doctrine was a denial of the individuality and personality of souls, since all souls were thus supposed to be one and the same in different bodies, which Kapila and his followers distinctly denied; although he admitted that there was a connection between all souls which proved their common origin, and that this common origin was the spiritual essence. It is, therefore, in the endeavour to reconcile Kapila's theory with the universality of soul, supposed to be expressed by the Vedas, that our author introduces this third kind of spirit. He has already established the individuality and 'personality of souls agreeably to Kapila; he now adds an universal spirit, which is independent of individual souls, but pervades and enlivens all matter, and even exists in man as the vital energy which sets in motion the corporeal faculties, consciousness, and intelligence (ch. xv. shl. 15). This is added as a substitute for the universal spirit of the Vedas; and if such be the case, we can the more readily understand the words of ch. xv. shl. 15, which might then be rendered, 'And I alone am to be known by all the Vedas.' This

¹ Bhagavad-Gítá, ch. xv. shls. 17-20.

² Bhagavad-Gítá, ch. xv. shls. 7-11.

³ Bhagavad-Gítá, ch. xv. shls. 12-15.

spiritual or vital energy is that which lends to each material object its peculiar preëminent quality; and to this aspect of the Supreme Being does the author probably allude in his description of the universality of that Being in ch. x.

The individual soul is a portion of the Supreme Being which emanates from him and unites with the material body, thus immediately becoming connected with external matter, and receiving a mundane personality. It is imperceptible to the vulgar eye, but the philosophic and devoted can perceive it through the mind's eye, since the material faculty of intelligence, when once connected with the soul, has the two-fold power of perceiving matter and spirit. These two kinds of spirit (*puruṣha*), the universal and individual, are called the indivisible (*akshara*), and the divisible (*kshara*), and are said to exist in the world (ch. xv. shl. 16); that is, they emanate from the Supreme Being only to be connected with matter, and when matter is finally dissolved, they are re-absorbed into his bosom. But the highest kind of spirit, superior to both of these, as the whole is superior to the part, is the Supreme Being himself, who has no connection with matter, except as its creator, master, sustainer, and regulator.

In speaking of these three kinds of spirit, it will be seen that Kṛiṣṇa speaks of individual soul in the third person, while he identifies the universal spirit and the Supreme Being with himself, by using the first person. By this it is seen that no personality is allowed to the universal spirit, which is closely identified with the Supreme Being, and should therefore be considered rather as the Supreme Being himself in his character of pervader and enlivener of matter, than as an individual emanation from him.¹

So much for spirit generally. As regards the nature of

¹ It may be useful to mention here, what the reader would soon discover for himself in studying the poem, that wherever Kṛiṣṇa uses the first person, he means to speak of the Supreme Being with whom he is identified. The exceptions to this rule are few, and will be noticed where they occur.

the Supreme Being as a deity and object of worship, we must not encroach on the second portion of the Bhagavad-Gítá at present; but we may say that, philosophically, he is considered to be twofold, comprising the essence of matter and the essence of spirit. The latter is, of course, the superior portion, spirit being in everything superior to matter, and is therefore considered as the male, while the material essence is considered the female; and the result of their connection at the will of spirit is the emanation of the universe from the female. The will of the spirit is thus likened to the seed reposed within the womb of the material essence, which, impelled by it, gives birth to matter. In this case the deified material essence, being a portion of the Supreme Being, is itself called Brahma (neut.), the name generally given to the Supreme Being as a whole and in his personality, but here¹ confined to this portion of him. Thus the Supreme Being is both the material and efficient cause of creation. He cannot make anything out of nothing. The great principle of causality, established by Kapila, denies the possibility of something which exists being produced even by a Supreme, all-powerful, Being, out of nothing. As the pot is made of earth, and the earth again of certain subtile elements, which again are produced out of material consciousness, which is a product of nature; so must nature itself be either produced by something else, or be eternal, and have no beginning. The latter alternative is preferred. Nature is made eternal. But spirit is also eternal. If, then, nature and spirit were independent of one another, they would both be gods; but this is avoided by uniting them in one Supreme Being, and thus making nature, or the material essence, a portion of the great eternal Deity.

In so doing, the Hindu philosophers of the 'Theistic Sánkhyá school were guided by reason rather than con-

¹ Viz. ch. xiv. sh. 3.

science, and were quite unprovided with revelation. Conscience and revelation taught the antediluvian races, and Moses himself, who has handed it down to ourselves, that the law of causality is merely a law of matter, made by God himself for matter, but can go no farther. Matter itself, as we believe, has no material cause, and needs none. The Supreme Being whom we worship is really all-powerful, and is not subject to the laws which He himself has made for matter. He is able to create anything out of nothing; and His will causes to exist what did not exist in any form whatever. Such, alone, can be the true character of a Supreme Being; and, in the notion put forward by the Theistic Sāṅkhya philosophers, this character is denied to their Supreme One, and his supremacy therefore removed, since his power is not sufficient to rise above a law of nature.

We now proceed with our author to consider the important question of the origin of good and evil, and their consequences to man. In speaking here of good, it must be understood to be imperfect. The goodness which belongs to the Supreme Being is a positive quality; it is perfection, and is therefore capable of no direct opposite. The goodness which belongs to matter, and is consequently within the reach of man, is a comparative quality only: it is imperfect, and only good according to our notions of superiority and inferiority; but, when regarded with spiritual eyes, must be considered as really bad, since perfection alone is really good, and all imperfection more or less bad. Perfection is, therefore, the object of the devotee; and, when he attains it, he is emancipated from the flesh, because he is fit for re-absorption in the Supreme Being, who alone is perfect. But the three qualities of goodness, badness, and indifference must all alike be avoided, for they all alike hinder perfection. They spring from, belong to, and effect nature, the material essence. But it would seem that their production is only coeval with the emanation of matter from nature, and that,

though nature is eternal, these qualities do not eternally effect it, since in that case imperfection would be the attribute of nature, and since the latter is a portion of the Supreme Being, that Being would be capable of imperfection, and therefore could not be perfect.

These three qualities (*guṇa*) working on the heart are the real cause of all actions both internal and external, mental and physical. For, as has already been explained in speaking of the Sāṅkhya system (Part III.), their effect is always united, never single, but varying according to the predominance of each of the three. Thus, when goodness predominates, although it is in itself inactive, it receives the appearance of being active from its union with badness, which is active. It then prompts good—that is, upright, legally, morally and religiously good—actions. Its influence on the soul is to enlighten it, and convey pleasure to it, and thus when a mortal dies under the predominant effect of this quality, his soul migrates to the upper regions, the worlds of the deities. The quality of badness predominating, prompts bad actions; the only impulse and object of which are selfishness, self-interest, and mundane desires. The soul is, thus blindly attached to the world; and, consequently, when a mortal dies in this state, he is immediately born again in a body which has the same kind of disposition. The quality of indifference prompts actions which are neither upright, nor have a selfish object; but are totally without sense or reason, and its effect on a being is to induce sloth, unwillingness to act at all from sheer laziness, and a species of ignorant folly, which is considered the lowest possible condition of man. When, therefore, he dies under the influence of these qualities, he suffers torment in Naraka, and is afterwards born again in the body of some animal.¹

The effect of the three qualities on man is further ex-

¹ For the details, see ch. xiv. śhs. 5-20.

emplified in his religion. This consists generally of three parts, which constitute both the spirit and the practice of religion,—worship or sacrifice, self-government or mortification, and charity both in heart and deed. In other words, religion consists of one's duty to God, one's duty to one's self, and one's duty to one's neighbour. The inward and spiritual duty to God is devotion or mental worship, which is outwardly manifested in sacrifice. The duty to self is to accomplish one's own salvation, which is aided by self-government, outwardly manifested in mortification of the flesh, whether of word, thought or deed. The duty to one's neighbour is goodwill, charity, love and kindness; and this is outwardly manifested in liberality and almsgiving. Such constitutes good religion. But the mere practice of these duties is often employed with interested motives, and they then become bad. Thus sacrifice or religious ceremonies may be hypocritically performed with a false show of piety; mortification may be severely carried out for the sake of the support and hospitality accorded to Tapaswins, or self-torturers; while alms may be given in the hope of being amply rewarded at some future time. When, again, these religious offices are performed carelessly, irregularly, senselessly, and without any internal feeling corresponding to them, they are then said to be under the influence of the quality of indifference.¹ Again, the good worship the deities; the bad worship evil demons, who willingly pander to their evil desires; and the indifferent, actuated by low superstitious fear, worship ghosts and shades (ch. xvii. shl. 4).

The effect of the three qualities on man is further exemplified in the disposition or character attached at birth to the body, or according to the pure Sánkhyā ideas to the migratory body (*Linga-sharīra*), which accompanies the soul from its first conjunction with matter till the moment of its

¹ See ch. xvii. 11-22.

final emancipation. In either case these dispositions affect souls through the medium of the flesh. They are considered to be of two kinds, good and bad; the former tending towards the gods, and thence called divine, the latter called infernal, as tending towards the demons. With one or other of these dispositions every man is born, and it then becomes his duty to combat the bad, or to cherish and improve the good. But if he neglect to do so, a good disposition becomes bad, or a bad one still worse; occasioning his punishment in *Naraka*, and regeneration in the body of an animal; whence he sinks lower and lower in the scale of bodies, and is at last united with inorganic matter till the final dissolution. If, on the other hand, he combats a bad disposition successfully, he may be transported at death to the regions of the just, or the worlds of the deities; while, if born with a good disposition, he cherishes and improves it, the working out of his emancipation becomes easier to him. Thus we see in this theory the same divine will, or, as some are pleased to call it, divine injustice, which the ancients of the West attributed to the power of the Fates; and we ourselves find, in the 'circumstance' of life, which places one man in some distant race of savages, to whom the gospel-light has never penetrated, and who has never received the blessing of baptism, and another in our own happy island, where every facility enlightenment can offer is afforded him to work out his salvation. But while we refer the question to the indisputable wisdom of Providence, and seek its solution in His unlimited mercy, warned as we are by the Parable of the Talents, which our Master has left us, there would seem to be nothing in the Hindú theory to remove the injustice of this destiny; and if we praise the schools of philosophy for their liberality in allowing to all castes the chance of emancipation, which Bráhmaism refused to some, we cannot but blame so severe a doctrine, which has nothing to palliate it.¹

¹ This theory is expounded in ch. xvi. of our poem.

We have now explained the physiological and speculative doctrines of our philosopher, contained in the last six chapters of his poem. We have seen that with some modification he follows the theories of the pure Sāṅkhya school very closely. Thus he accepts the system of the twenty-five categories, admits the eternity, activity, and unintelligence of nature, and the eternity, inactivity, and intelligence of the soul; though when he comes to speak of spirit, having the idea of the Supreme Being before him, he cannot deny its activity, at least according to our acceptation of the word. But our poem is a didactic work, our philosopher a teacher of ethics, and he does not permit himself to indulge at greater length in the consideration of physiological theories, and is therefore silent on the subject of the *Linga-sharīra*, and of the system of intellectual creation brought forward by Kapila. On the other hand, he enlarges with more freedom on the theory of the three qualities, which materially affect his ethical doctrines, and here proceeds much farther than his predecessors.

We must now turn to the theological portion of our work, consisting in the second aggregate of six chapters, and following more particularly the peculiar dogmata of the Theistic Sāṅkhya. Of these six chapters the last cannot properly be said to treat of the deity, while the others mingle with their theology various practical injunctions, and expositions of the future states of men.

The great point of the Theistic Sāṅkhya in forming a Being to supply the deficiencies in Kapila's theories, was his universality. It was found expedient, when once that deity was admitted to exist, to attribute and refer everything to him. The first thing was to unite the material essence or nature (*prakṛiti*), to which Kapila had granted volition in creation, with a spiritual essence, from which individual souls emanated. This essence was superior to the material. To it volition was granted and refused to nature, and the

two together formed one Supreme Being, creator, sustainer and destroyer of the universe. Thus the deity contained the essences of all that existed, whether spirit or matter. The individual soul, which emanated from the essence of spirit, and the developed material objects, which emanated in like manner from the essence of matter, could not properly be considered as identical with the Supreme Being; but were justly regarded as distinct individuate portions of him, which, for the period of their individual existence, had a separate and independent personality. But the author of the Bhagavad-Gítá seems to have gone farther. In order to conciliate the Vedic school, he constantly mentions individual soul as the Supreme Being himself actually existing in the body of man in the personification only of an individual soul, and early in the seventh chapter he identifies nature or the material essence with the Supreme Being; but at the same time includes under this head of nature, not only the material essence, but developed matter generally included under the broad categories of external and internal matter, the latter being the material machinery for intelligence, consciousness and sensibility (ch. vii. shls. 4-11).

Thus the universality of the deity comprehends all things which exist, whether spirit or matter, either in their essences or in their individual development. But this deity is also regarded under two different aspects. We have already said that, of the three kinds of spirit supposed to exist, two were identified, and must be looked upon as different aspects only of the same spirit. These two were the Supreme Being and the universal spirit or energy, the difference between them being the personality of the former, and the impersonality of the latter; and, in other words, they may be called the Supreme Being in his independence, and the Supreme Being in his relation to matter. This latter aspect requires some explanation. We have already seen that, in order to create

a Supreme Being, the Theistic Sánkhya had united the spiritual and material essences, and to this combination granted a personality. The Bhagavad-Gítá, with the desire of conciliating the Vedic school, adopted by the side of this deity, which it admitted, an universal being to which this personality was refused. Thus, while the Supreme Being united in himself the essences of spirit and matter, from which souls and developed matter had respectively emanated and now left independent, the universal energy in like manner united these essences, which, however, were still connected with matter. Thus the material essence in its independence was nature, the material cause of the universe:—in its relation to matter it is only vital energy, the life which revolves throughout all matter. Again, the spiritual essence in its independence was the spiritual cause of individual souls, that from which they emanated, and into which they were again finally absorbed;—in its relation to matter, it was the universal spiritual energy supposed to exist throughout all matter, and in it to represent the deity.¹ Thus this universal energy, which is an aspect of the Supreme Being, consists in the vital energy which gives life and motion to all matter in greater or less proportion, and the spiritual energy which seems to be the representative of the Supreme Being in every material body. This universal spirit exists in bodies *besides* the individual soul, and thus every body contains the Supreme Being himself independent of its own individual soul, a distinct portion of that Being. This gives to each body a certain divinity, by

¹ In speaking above of the three kinds of spirit, we were perhaps wrong to use that term as the translation of the *purusha* found in chap. xv. of our poem, where we have more correctly rendered it 'person.' It designates three kinds of beings, the Supreme Being, the universal energy, and the individual soul. From this passage it may be seen how the two first contain both spirit and matter, at least in their essences, while the last depends on its connection with matter for its individuality. We may therefore consider the word *purusha*, 'man or person,' to signify 'spirit combined with matter.'

means of which Polytheism, Hero-worship and even animal worship is defended by the Bhagavad-Gītā. For, since each body contains the Supreme Being, in worshipping any material body properly and not blindly, we worship the Supreme Being within it. We are then inclined to remark that, if every material body contains the Supreme Being under his universal impersonal aspect, each man might as well worship the Being within himself, and thus become his own God. To this our philosopher gives no answer; but, while introducing this universal deification—which neither Kapila nor the Theistic Sāṅkhya had dreamed of—for the sake merely of conciliating the Vedic school, he places the worship of it on a far inferior footing to that of the Supreme Being in his personal independence (ch. xii. shls. 2-7). At the same time, the worship of the universal energy is far more easy than that of the Supreme Being in his personality, for the former is manifested in different developed bodies, and is thus more open to contemplation. This worship, however, must be distinguished from the mere Bráhmancial worship of the deities, etc., since the latter adores those things in their own individual material character, while the former discovers and adores in each of them the Supreme Being, towards which his worship is really directed (comp. ch. ix. shl. 23).

The different aspects and characters of the Supreme Being are, then, thus classed (ch. viii. shls. 3, 4).

1. *Adhidāivata*, the Supreme Being in his personality, considered as a deity, and therefore the Supreme Being in his relation to the gods. This includes the two parts, the essence of spirit and matter, called
2. *Adhyátmá*, the essence of spirit, the origin of souls, and therefore the Supreme Being in his relation to man or individual soul, and
3. *Adhibhúta*, the material essence, or the Supreme Being in his relation to matter.

4. The One Indivisible (*akshara*): that is, the universal energy called indivisible, as contrasted with individual souls (*kshara*).¹
5. *Adhiyajna*, the Supreme Being as Vishṇu or Kṛṣṇa, a manifest object of worship, and therefore the Supreme Being in his relation to religion.

We have thus seen that the universality of the Supreme Being was vigorously asserted by the Bhagavad-Gītā; and, in order to do so without annulling his supreme individual and personal character, its author regards him in two aspects, really identical, but differing in the personality of the one, and the want of it in the other. This universality is very prominent in several passages where the Supreme Being is declared to be everything that exists, such as ch. x. shl. 39, where Kṛṣṇa says, 'There exists no one thing, moveable or immoveable (that is, animate or inanimate), which is without me,' or ch. xi. shls. 36-40, where Arjuna concludes his burst of enthusiasm with the exclamation, 'Thou All!'

The attributes of this Supreme Being are those which we might expect to find in such a deity. His powers are unlimited, no less than his existence and extent. He is creator, preserver, and sustainer; destroyer and reproducer of the universe; omniscient, omnipresent, minuter than an atom, and greater than the greatest idea which we can form of infinity: and he, and he alone, is perfect. These attributes are brought forward throughout our poem, but particularly in chs. viii. shl. 9, ix. shls. 9, 18, and xi. shls. 37-39; while descriptions of his universality are given in chs. vii. shls. 7-11, x. shls. 20-39, and xi. shls. 9-31; the last passage being a description of his universal omnipresence in an imaginary visible form. But though his relations to the world are such as we might expect, his relative position to man is very different from that of our ideas of a supreme

deity. In the Supreme Being of Hindú Philosophy, there is no paternal character, no fatherly affection and interest in men, his offspring. Certain laws are made for nature, and, with the superintendence of the deity, these laws keep matter constantly revolving; and it does not depend on a separate decree of the Creator, at what exact moment each body dies and another springs up, but on these laws and destiny—an arrangement which supersedes divine will, or Providence. In the same manner the 'chances and changes of this mortal life' are not, as we should suppose them to be, dependent on a separate act of volition for each from the sustainer and preserver. Man is gifted at birth with a certain disposition, and certain laws regulate the influences of good and evil on matter, and he is then left to take care of himself, the worship of the deity not consisting in prayers for his aid, or for strength to combat evil, but in a species of devotion which we shall soon have to explain. That affection for all that he has created, which could mark when even a sparrow falls to the ground, that omniscience which could number and preserve every hair upon our heads, is unknown to the Being adored by the Hindús, and hence the absence of love in their worship, and the identification of the Supreme Being at one period with Shiva, the god of destruction, and the horrors purposely introduced in the description of his identification with Viṣṇu even, in the eleventh chapter of our poem.

We now come to speak of the practical, the ethical, and didactic portion of the Bhagavad-Gítá, generally contained in the first six chapters and in chapters xii. and xviii. For his original ideas, the philosopher is undoubtedly considerably indebted to Patanjali, and traces may be found in his work of the rules of his predecessor's system; but the character now given to them is so new, and the whole theory is so changed, and, in some respects, even contrary to that school, that we may at once call the practical doctrines of the Bhagavad-Gítá the exclusive property of its author.

In order, however, to comprehend their tendency, we must recal to mind the causes which obliged the establishment of this new school of Yoga. The system of Patanjali had, as we have seen, been found far too seductive to so contemplative and splenetic a race as the Hindú, who preferred its hard injunctions, since they insured emancipation, to the vicissitudes of a hated existence, which was certain to be resumed hereafter with nothing but a change, perhaps for the worse, of body. It was found that it destroyed the institution of caste by alluring all classes alike from their prescribed duties to follow an ascetic life, hitherto open only to Bráhmans; and, since on the institution of caste hung the vitality of Bráhmanism, it was necessary to counteract this evil influence. The author of the Bhagavad-Gítá, whoever he may have been, was a Bráhman, a philosopher, and more—a man of much more common sense than usually fell to the lot of either one or other of these characters. He stepped forward and accepted the charge. The plan of violent opposition had long since been abandoned as useless, and even dangerous by the priesthood; that of conciliation was now preferred. Two principal points were to be established, the necessity of preserving the institution of caste, and the application of the very doctrines which were to be opposed to every-day life, and the consequent reconciliation of Yoga and Bráhmanism. At the same time our author was himself a follower of Patanjali, and while he upholds the institution of caste, and seeks to recal men from asceticism to the world, he does not deny the efficacy and excellence of asceticism as taught by Patanjali; but prudently asserts that his own application of it to every-day life is still more excellent, yet more efficacious.

The arguments as to the institution of caste are negative rather than positive, and are skilfully brought in by our poet. They are mainly directed against the Kshatriyas; and Arjuna, a prince of that caste, is represented with one of

those rare characters which unite the courage of the one with the tender compassion of the other sex. At the very moment when he is called upon to draw his bow upon his enemies, when the battle is already commencing, he is struck powerless by the horrible idea of the slaughter about to take place, and refuses to fight. His arguments are favoured by the circumstance that the enemies who opposed him were all more or less related to him by blood, and that war therefore became literal fratricide, and could not be undertaken without crime. To these and many other specious arguments, the only reply is the stern necessity of the duty of one's caste. The duty of the warrior-caste was to combat the foes of one's country, and if this were abandoned even from the best feelings of human nature, the whole organization of the State would be undermined. The reproach of effeminate weakness is then added, and, on the other hand, glory is depicted in glowing colours. From this it would seem that the civilization of the period at which our author wrote had gone far to mollify the natural savage and warlike character of the Kṣatriya, while enlightenment and art had induced a general feeling of sympathy for others' sufferings, which little accorded with the Bráhmanical views of the nature of a warrior's duty. In this respect the arguments of our philosopher are often contradictory. He constantly urges throughout our poem the excellence of charity, brotherly love, and consideration for others; but, while admitting and approving these, he asserts that the duties of caste rise above all such considerations, and his arguments are so nicely introduced that the contradiction is not striking. The necessity of performing the duties of one's caste is then the didactic burden of the whole poem. At the end of nearly every chapter Arjuna is exhorted to arise and fight, and the great dogma seems to be that, however bad or obnoxious one's own duty may be, it is better than that of another (ch. iii. 35, xviii. 47).

In attempting to adapt the doctrines of Patanjali's school—so directly opposed to them, and inculcating a monastic retirement from this life's duties—to those which have just been explained, our author divides the general system of Yoga, of which he is a follower, into two classes,—Patanjali's and his own. The former he calls *Jnánayoga*, or devotional worship of the deity by means of spiritual knowledge (*jnána*); and the latter *Karmayoga*, or the like worship by means of the actions (*karma*) of every-day life. He describes the tendency and the rules pertaining to each.

Patanjali, as has been seen, acknowledged, in company with the Theistic Sánkhyá and Kapila, that spiritual knowledge of the truth was the means of acquiring final emancipation; but he reduced the acquirement of this knowledge to a certain system, and made its employment the worship of a definite object. The chief instrument in its acquirement was contemplation or internal investigation, and since the practice of this required a renunciation of the world and the common actions of this life, renunciation of actions (*sannyása*) was his principal dogma. The rules for this renunciation and the acquirement of knowledge, which it preceded, are given by our poet as follows (ch. vi. shls. 10–32).

The man who devotes himself to such a life, in the hope of working out his emancipation from the flesh, must begin by renouncing all his connection with the world. Abandoning his home, his friends, his possessions, and everything that is dear to him, he must retire into the jungle. Here he should choose a spot which is unpolluted in the eyes of the Bráhmans. It must be situated neither too high nor too low, and he must here make a couch of Kusha grass (*Poa cynosuroides*), on which to sit or lie. A woollen or cotton sheet, and the skin of some animal, should serve him for a covering. On this couch he should sit in contemplation. His posture should be easy, but erect, and as steady and motionless as possible; in order that his thoughts may not

be disturbed by the movements of his body, nor sleep be induced by recumbence. His eyes should be fixed on the end of his nose, and he should never move his gaze, lest the worldly objects around should distract his attention; while, if he shut his eyes, he would be more liable to slumber. Lastly, his mind should be intently fixed on the one object of contemplation, the Supreme Being. This exercise should be repeated during increasing lengths of time, until the Yogin, or devotee, becomes capable of sustaining it with perfection for any period. Meanwhile he must preserve a just medium in his mode of life. He must be moderate in eating, sleeping, and recreation, but should not starve completely, nor entirely refrain from sleep; but, as he advances, he will find it more easy to dispense with both rest and food. His heart also should be cleared of all worldly aversions or desires, and should preserve an equanimity which will render him indifferent to all external influences, whether pleasant or unpleasant, good or bad; and make him feel alike towards all things and beings. In this state the light of the truth is gradually kindled within him, and he experiences a feeling of internal satisfaction and pleasure superior to any sensual enjoyment. This state is internal devotion, through knowledge, to the Supreme Being, and a steady continuance in it concludes with final emancipation. Its chief requirement is the renunciation of the actions of every-day life, and abstinence even from every kind of action. Action, according to this school, was always followed with consequences more or less disagreeable; action was always imperfect, and, therefore, in the way of perfection; action distracted the thoughts, and was therefore opposed to contemplation. Lastly, action was incited by the three qualities, which it was the object of the devotee to combat and subdue, and for these reasons action was to be avoided.

In replying to these arguments, our author admits the excellence of *sannyāsa*, or renunciation, but explains it in a

very different manner. Action, he says, is only attended with consequences when the agent has any interest or motive whatsoever in what he does. Performed simply as a duty, or as a necessity in supporting life, it is attended with no consequences which can affect the soul or hinder its emancipation. It is true that action is incited by the three qualities, but the devotee should rather attack those qualities themselves in their influence on his heart, by walling his heart and senses against them, than seek to annul their power by restraining their results. Again, he admits the power of perfection in knowledge to obtain emancipation, but he would substitute for it a state of mind and heart so devoted to the Supreme Being that all actions of this life will be performed as so many sacrifices to that Being, he being their motive and always present in the mind of their agent. The *Karmayoga*, therefore, which he would teach, requires no actual retirement from the world, but, on the contrary, the full performance of that earthly calling to which we may chance to be born. He asserts that the two schools virtually teach the same dogma, viz. Renuntiation. This, however, is understood by Patanjali as the actual physical retirement from the world, and abandonment of worldly actions and duties; while our author would explain it as the moral retirement from the influences of this world and the abandonment of all worldly interests and anxieties. Actions must still be performed, but they are just as much renounced if performed as a duty and a sacrifice, without any self-interest or worldly motive, as they would be if altogether rejected. Again, this view of renuntiation is supported by the fallacy of the other, since the actual physical abstinence from action cannot be fully carried out in this life. However much we may abstain from the performance of actions, the corporeal routine action of life must still continue. The limbs must still be moved, the heart still beat and the blood circulate; we must still eat and drink, and however simple this food

may be—be it the mere leaves off the ground, which formed the dainties of some austere anchorets—we must still employ action to obtain it. Thus, as long as life continues, action, however slight, continues also, and the total abstinence from it is, therefore, an impossibility. Nor is the mere abstinence from action real renuntiation. If a man could even acquire complete inaction, he would not be a true renouncer if he did not also restrain the desires of his heart, and all worldly thoughts. The mere restraint of the senses is worth nothing, unless accompanied by a corresponding restraint of the heart; and if the latter be fully accomplished, the action of the senses will do but little harm, if any, since it will have no influence on the heart, and cannot therefore reach the soul (ch. v. shls. 4-9).

The doctrines of the two schools may, therefore, be thus epitomised. The Jnánayoga, or school of Patanjali, enjoins the avoidance of temptation. The Karmayoga, or school of the Bhagavad-Gítá, enjoins the combating of temptation. Both teach that the world is evil, and that its influence, which tends to obstruct devotion, must be destroyed. The one says, 'Avoid the world;' the other more courageously bids us meet it with a well-armed faith and a well-fortified heart. The difference between them is the same as that between the monk and the priest of modern days, and our author has justly appreciated the superiority of the latter.

The method of combating the influence of the world, put forward by the Bhagavad-Gítá, in place of asceticism, is simple, if not easy. It consists in destroying all attachment to it. When this is done, our actions are no longer prompted by interested motives, but performed as a duty or a sacrifice, with the Supreme Being ever before our eyes. But this attachment to the world can only be conquered by subjection of the heart, which is, of course, its seat. The affections of the heart are, however, received from without. The heart naturally dislikes that which does not please it, and affects

that which does please it ; but the perception of such external objects as please or displease is acquired through the medium of the senses, which connect the internal man with external matter. Patanjali, therefore, would annul their influence on the heart by removing them from the objects which are likely to please or displease it most. Our author, on the other hand, would allow their influence to continue, but would subject the heart so completely, as to make it of no effect. This subjection is accomplished by devotion. Man must be resolute and firm. He must keep the one object of final emancipation ever before him, and while he restrains his thoughts from all worldly and external objects, meditating only on the Supreme Being, he must, by the power of the soul over the body, and by the strength of his own will, prevent his heart from experiencing either affection or aversion towards the objects of which it receives impressions through the senses. Passion of every kind is the gate of destruction, and must, therefore, be subdued. One object of desire alone is allowed to the heart, and this is final emancipation. One thing alone must be loved ; one thing alone attentively thought upon, and this is the Supreme Being. Complete equanimity, complete indifference to pain or pleasure, love or hate, to all worldly matters, must be acquired before this devotion to the Supreme One can be steadily fixed in the heart. In every action of life, that Being alone must be uppermost in our thoughts. We must remember that the action performed is not done for our own sakes, with any interested motive, but as an offering of love and duty to the Supreme Being, in purity and equality of heart.

In this, at least, there is no fanaticism, as there may be in the asceticism taught by Patanjali. This is, at least, a sensible and religious doctrine ; and if we add to it faith and love, will be even a Christian doctrine. And would that in the present selfish age, and this northern active clime, it

could be applied and successfully carried out by Christians, as we call ourselves! It is the teaching of our Saviour when he bids us hate father and mother, and take up the cross, and when he points to the lily of the field, which toils and spins not, but puts faith in its Creator to give it nourishment. We, too, should have *our* final emancipation, our salvation ever as our only desire, and *our* Supreme Being—so far superior, so far more loveable than the imperfect deity of the Hindú philosopher—ever as our chief object of love. We, too, should do our duty in this world without self-interest and attachment, and morally renounce the world in the rejection of all interest in it. The great outcry against this doctrine is, that it is unnatural. Nature bids us take an interest in the world. Nature fills us with emulation and ambition. It is natural to love advancement, prosperity, increase of wealth. It is natural to depend on ourselves alone, and not to put much faith in the promises of God, who will not help us, if we do not help ourselves. All this, it is true, is natural. But it is natural to sin, and very unnatural to act uprightly; and the want of nature is no ground for accusation of our doctrines.

But we must not be carried away by enthusiasm at the apparent Christianity of the doctrines of our philosopher. We must not forget how much of the genuine Bráhmaṇ lies beneath this upper coating, nor arrogate for him more than the praise due to a clever reformer and a wise ethical philosopher. Had our author had more courage, had his policy been less conciliatory, had he sought to establish the theories of which he dreamed, independent of the rank systems to which he conceded so much, the results of his teaching *might* have been different. We say *might*, for as well strive to wash the Ethiopian white, as to convert the native of the north and centre of India from the belief which the climate, aided by the continual teaching of master minds through long ages, has planted deeply in his bosom. The Bhagavad-

Gítá obtained an exalted reputation in India, but its doctrines, like those of the Vedas, were applied as its students listed. The resignation, the indifference, the inertness, and the fatalism of the Hindú still remained, as it will remain for ages, and the banks of the Ganges will never be crowded by a Christian population till the doctrines taught be enslaved to the character of the audience.

One thing may, however, be said for the strange nation among whom these doctrines are still disseminated. In no country, under no climate in the world, has religious feeling, in whatever shape, been so firm and constant in the hearts of all classes as in India. No nation, no people under the sun, has had the future after death so constantly before their minds, has been so little wedded to this life, and so intent on their emancipation from it. This would seem to be a fine groundwork for the eternal teaching of the Sacred Book; but the climate which has effected this, has also nourished and sustained the mysticism and the fatalism of Bráhmanism and its Darshanas; and the sward that looks so green and tempting to the eye, covers a morass, in which the pure doctrines of the Gospel would sink to be swamped.

REMARKS ON THE BHAGAVAD-GÍTÁ.

THE great drawback in speaking of Hindú literature, is the complete absence of any chronological data. The nations which chronicle their own existence, and hand to posterity the history of their glories, are those over which some vain-glorious dynasty has ruled, who delighted to display their splendour to the eyes of the future as well as to those of the present. India has been always more or less governed by a hierarchy, and it was not till the minor states gradually melted together into a northern empire, in the first centuries of our own era, that any history was composed, or any dates given. The epics of the earlier ages were only partially chronicles. We know that Sútás, or bards, were attached to each tribe or principal family, and that their hereditary office was to preserve and recite to their masters the glories of their ancestors. But the very fact of their being also charioteers would seem to indicate that these recitals were originally made at the moment of battle, in order to inspire courage in the followers of the chieftains, and certainly no archives, but vague tradition thus handed from father to son, were ever preserved.

When the power of the priesthood was somewhat broken by the prevalence of Buddhism, the kingly caste gained strength and vitality. Literature flourished, and scholars and archæologists sprang up, who preferred to examine the work of their predecessors to risking any novelties of their own. Hence arose the first enquiry into the past, and dates were given to every work that had been hitherto composed. But since the language of these was no longer the vernacular,

since nothing could be really known of the true dates, and since their authority was respected, and the superiority of their contents acknowledged, the dates given by the natives to most works were purely fictitious, and as remote as possible. Among others which received this distinction was the Bhagavad-Gítá, whose conciliatory doctrines, receivable by all classes of belief, met on all sides with a welcome. No actual numerical date was stated for it, but it was unhesitatingly attributed to the same personage who is said to have compiled the Vedas, and composed most of the Pūráṇas. The slight knowledge of Indian history, which has been gathered from Indian literature, and the strong internal evidence of the language, enable us to interpose at least some nine or ten centuries between the sacred text-books and our poem, and some five or six, at least, between our poem and the Purāṇas. This would give to the Vyása the unwonted longevity of fifteen centuries, which not even Bráhmanical scholiasts care to allow him.

In the 'Index' it may be seen that the Vyása, Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipáyana, to whom the Vedas are attributed, is rather a mythological than an historical personage; and, if, by the side of this it be remembered that the modesty of the real author at an age when truth would be sacrificed to effect, might prompt him to attribute the composition of his own work to so celebrated a writer, we shall not be surprised to find that Sanjaya (ch. xviii. shl. 75) refers his knowledge of what he relates to the favour of the Vyása. This, however, is no admission that the work was his composition; and when we finally call to mind that it was intended by its author to be considered as an episode in the Mahábhárata, which was also attributed to the same compiler, we shall understand his silence as to his own name, and resign ourselves to consider the authorship of the finest specimen of Hindú literature as lost in oblivion for ever.

Not so however its date. We have already shown to what

period its doctrines should refer it; we have already approximated its date between one century before and three after Christ, and by this we feel inclined to abide. The character of the Bhagavad-Gítá as a literary composition, obliges us to place it at the prime age of Sanskrit literature. This age seems to have been that of the drama. Kálidása and our author must have been bred in the same school of civilization, and nurtured in the same lap of national taste. It is quite possible that our poet may have moved among those great minds, those philosophers and men of science, those poets, dramatists, and wits, who thronged, as we know, round the throne of Vikramáditya,¹ as bright planets round a brighter sun.

There is no doubt that our author, whatever his name, age, or birthplace, was more of a philosopher than a poet; still his work contains much that deserves the title of poetry, even according to our more delicate ideas. Though it is in form rather a dialogue than a narration, the author has succeeded in giving some portraiture of character in the personages he introduces. We may instance the delicacy, generosity, and almost womanly tenderness of Arjuna (*c.g.* in ch. i. shl. 23), the ambition and odium in Duryodhana, the ferocity of Bhíma, and the mysterious confidence of Kṛiṣṇa. Nor is the bosom friendship of the two principal speakers ill described, still less the delicate fears of Arjuna lest he should have offended his friend by his former familiarity, when he discovers in him the One Almighty Being (ch. xi. shls. 41, 42).

The Bhagavad-Gítá has been called an episode of the Mahábhárata, and some of the MSS. insert it in its proper place in that poem. It must not, however, be imagined for a moment that it has any further connection with it. The

¹ This emperor is supposed to have flourished about 56 B.C., and nine men of genius and learning, including Kálidása, the poet, and Amarasinha, the lexicographer, are called the pearls that adorned his court at Ujjayini, the modern Oujein.

Mahábhárata, as all students of Sanskrit well know, is the great epic of India, which, from its popularity and extent, would seem to correspond with the Iliad among the Greeks. The theme of the whole work is a certain war which was carried on between two branches of one tribe, the descendants of Kuru, for the sovereignty of Hastinápura, commonly supposed to be the same as the modern Delhi. The elder branch is called by the general name of the whole tribe, Kurus; the younger goes by the patronymic from Páñdu, the father of its five principal leaders.

This war between the Kurus and Páñđavas occupies about twenty thousand shlokas, or a quarter of the whole work, as we now possess it. The rest is filled with episodes and legends, chiefly didactic, of a much later date, inserted, from time to time, by authors who wished to give the authority of antiquity to their teaching. The whole forms a collection of the traditions of the early history of the Aryan people during their first settlement in India. The plan of inserting didactic and other works into the old and well-known epics of earlier ages was very common when civilization and literature had progressed to such a point that a Jesuitical fiction was a matter of small account. Thus the story of Nala is considered as an episode of the Mahábhárata, that of Vishwámitra and the Raghu-Vansha of the Rámáyana, and these, and many others, are all of later date, perhaps, by some centuries, than the original works. Some ingenuity is, however, always employed by the authors of these episodes in adapting them to the peculiar passage of the greater works to which they are to be tacked on, and accordingly we find the first chapter of our poem occupied exclusively with narrative, which savours very strongly of the epic. In order to understand the allusions there made, a knowledge is requisite of the preceding history of the tribe, which will now be given as follows.

Of the name Kuru we know but little, but that little is

sufficient to prove that it is one of great importance. We have no means of deriving it from any Sanskrit root, nor has it, like too many of the old Indian names, the appearance of being explanatory of the peculiarities of the person or persons whom it designates. It is, therefore, in all probability, a name of considerable antiquity, brought by the Áryan race from their first seat in Central Asia. Its use in Sanskrit is fourfold. It is the name of the northern quarter, or *Dwípa*, of the world, and is described as lying between the most northern range of snowy mountains and the polar sea. It is, further, the name of the most northern of the nine *Varshas* of the known world. Among the long genealogies of the tribe itself, it is found as the name of an ancient king, to whom the foundation of the tribe is attributed. Lastly, it designates an Áryan tribe of sufficient importance to disturb the whole of northern India with its factions, and to make its battles the theme of the longest epic of olden time.

Viewing these facts together, we should be inclined to draw the conclusion that the name was originally that of a race inhabiting Central Asia, beyond the *Himálaya*, who emigrated with other races into the north-west of the Peninsula, and with them formed the great people who styled themselves unitedly *A'rya*, or the Noble, to distinguish them from the aborigines whom they subdued, and on whose territories they eventually settled. These Áryans are the people who brought *Bráhma*nism and the Sanskrit tongue into India, and whom etymologists and antiquaries know to be of the same blood and origin as the races which people the whole of Persia, and almost all the continent of Europe, in short, the Indo-Germanic or Indo-Scythic class.

At the time when the plot of the *Mahábhárata* was enacted, this tribe was situated in the plain of the *Doab*, and their particular region, lying between the *Jumna* and *Sursooty* rivers, was called *Kurukshetra*, or the plain of the *Kurus*. The capital of this country was *Hastinápura*, and

here reigned, at a period of which we cannot give the exact date, a king named Vichitravírya. He was the son of Shantanu and Satyavatí; and Bhíshma and Kṛiṣṇa Dwai-páyana, the Vyása, were his half-brothers; the former being his father's, the latter his mother's son. He married two sisters, Ambá and Ambaliká, but dying shortly after his marriage from excessive connubial rites, he left no progeny; and his half-brother, the Vyása, instigated by divine command, married his widows, and begot two sons, Dhṛitaráshṭra and Páṇḍu. The former had one hundred sons, the eldest of whom was Duryodhana. The latter married firstly Pṛithá, or Kuntí, the daughter of Shura, and secondly Mádri. The children of these wives were the five Páṇḍava princes; but as their mortal father had been cursed by a deer while hunting to be childless all his life, these children were mystically begotten by different deities. Thus Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhíma, and Arjuna, were the sons of Pṛithá, by Dharma, Váyu, and Indra, respectively. Nákula was the son of Mádri, by Násatya the elder, and Sahadeva, by Dasra the younger, of the twin Ashwinau, the physicians of the gods. This story would seem to be a fiction, invented to give a divine origin to the five heroes of the poem: but, however this may be, Duryodhana and his brothers are the leaders of the Kuru, or elder branch of the tribe; and the five Páṇḍava princes those of the Páṇḍava, or younger branch.

Dhṛitaráshṭra was blind, but although thus incapacitated for governing, he retained the throne, while his son Duryodhana really directed the affairs of the State. The latter seems to have been the type of an ambitious and contentious intriguer, and among other things, he prevailed on his father to banish his cousins, the Páṇḍava princes, from the country. After long wanderings and varied hardships, these princes collected their friends around them, formed by the help of many neighbouring kings a vast army, and prepared to attack their unjust oppressor, who had, in like manner, assembled his forces.

The hostile armies meet on the plain of the Kurus.

Bhīṣma, the half-brother of Vichitravīrya, being the oldest warrior among them, has the command of the Kuru faction; Bhīma, the second son of Pāṇḍu, noted for his strength and prowess, is the general of the other party. The scene of our poem now opens, and remains throughout the same,—the field of battle. In order to introduce to the reader the names of the principal chieftains in each army, Duryodhana is made to approach Droṇa, his military preceptor, and name them one by one. The challenge is then suddenly given by Bhīṣma, the Kuru general, by blowing his conch; and he is seconded by all his followers. It is returned by Arjuna, who is in the same chariot with the god Kṛiṣṇa, who, in compassion for the persecution he suffered, had become his intimate friend, and was now acting the part of a charioteer to him. He is followed by all the generals of the Pāṇḍavas. The fight then begins with a volley of arrows from both sides; but when Arjuna perceives it, he begs Kṛiṣṇa to draw up the chariot in the space between the two armies, while he examines the lines of the enemy. The god does so, and points out in those lines the numerous relatives of his friend. Arjuna is horror-struck at the idea of committing fratricide by slaying his near relations, and throws down his bow and arrow, declaring that he would rather be killed without defending himself, than fight against them. Kṛiṣṇa replies with the arguments which form the didactic and philosophical doctrines of the work, and endeavours to persuade him that he is mistaken in forming such a resolution. Arjuna is eventually over-ruled. The fight goes on, and the Pāṇḍavas defeat their opponents with most complete victory.

Such is the plot by which the ideas and doctrines of one age are woven in with those of a far earlier one, and we cannot deny at least the ingenuity and perhaps too the elegance with which the undertaking is carried out.

This brief explanation will suffice to make the reader at home in the study of the poem, and we therefore leave him at once to its perusal.

CHAPTER THE FIRST.

OM!¹

DIRITARÁSHTRA SPOKE.

What did my followers and those of Páñdu do, when assembled for the purpose of fighting on the sacred plain,² the plain of Kuru,³ Sanjaya?

¹ This was the mystic monosyllable with which all the hymns of the Vedas, and afterwards all works which treated of theology, were commenced. It is composed of the three letters *a*, *u*, and *m*; the *a* and *u* combining to form the diphthong *o*. The Hindús look upon it as a vocal representation of the Supreme Being, in his simple character of Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer of the universe. Thus, the *a* is said to represent Viṣṇu, the preserver; the *u*, Shiva, the destroyer; and the *m*, Brahmá, the creator. A more probable origin is, that it is composed of the initials of the three personifications of the triad of elements, which is a much more ancient trinity than that of Brahmá, Viṣṇu, and Shiva. The *a* would then represent Agni, or fire; the *u* Varuṇa, water; and the *m* Marut, wind or air. The reverence attached to this monosyllable may be inferred from the fact that some transcribers of MSS. have been afraid to write the awful word itself, and have substituted some other. See Wilson's 'Viṣṇu Purána,' p. 273, note 4.

² The name of a flat region situate in the Doab, the strip of land between the Indus, the Ganges, and the Himálaya range. It lies between the rivers Yamuná (Jumna) and Sarasvatí (Sursooty), and comprises, according to Manu (ii. 19), the districts of Kurukshetra, of the Matsyas, the Páñchálas, and the Shúrásenakas. It is there called the country of the Brahmarsis. The Sarasvatí (Sursooty) is an insignificant stream flowing through Sirhind, between the Yamuná and the Shatadru. It eventually loses itself in the sand of the desert, and is, on that account, fabled by the Hindús to flow underground into the ocean. It is held, however, as one of the most sacred streams of India. Lassen (Indische Alterthumskunde, vol. i. p. 123) calls the Doab the Belgium of India. It is the gateway of the peninsula, where the eastern and western races have always met in battle. Here, in later days, was fought the battle of Paniput; and here was laid the scene of that war which transferred the sovereignty of middle India from the Kurus to the Páñdayas. As it was the gate of India, so does it in all probability derive its sacred name from being the first seat of the Aryan race, whence it worked its way from the Indus to the Ganges, and from being retained in their memory with all the respect due to a fatherland.

³ A part of Dharmakshetra, the flat plain around Delhi, which city is often identified with Hastinápura, the capital of Kurukshetra, and the seat of the government of Dhritarashtra, and of his son Duryodhana.

SANJAYA SPOKE.

When king Duryodhana beheld the army of the Páñḍavas drawn up in order,⁴ he then approached his preceptor,⁵ and spoke these words. 'Behold, O preceptor! this huge army of the sons of Páñḍu, drawn up by thy clever pupil, the son of Drupada.⁶ In it are warriors with huge bows, equal to Bhíma and Arjuna in battle, (namely) Yuyudhána and Viráta, and Drupada on his great car; Dhṛiṣṭaketu, Chekitána, and the valiant king of Káshi;⁷ Purujit and Kuntibhoja and Shaivya, chief of men; and Yudhámanyu the strong, and Uttamaujas the brave, the son of Subhadrá,⁸ and all the sons of Draupadí,⁹ too, in their huge chariots. But remark those, who are the most distinguished amongst us, the leaders of my army, O best of Bráhmaṇs!¹⁰ I will name them to thee, that thou mayst know them.

'There are thyself,¹¹ and Bhíṣhma, and Karṇa, and Kṛipa, victorious in battle, Ashwattháman, and Vikarṇa, and Saumadatti too, and many other heroes, who risk their lives for my sake, armed with divers weapons, all experienced in war. This army of mine, which is commanded by Bhíṣhma,¹² is not

⁴ Be careful to derive *vyúḍha* from *vi + úh*, not from *vi + vah*.

⁵ Droṇa, who was the military instructor of many warriors of both parties, though himself by birth a Bráhmaṇ. Note that *áchárya* is used for a preceptor in general, whether in religious or profane sciences; *guru* for one in the former only.

⁶ Dhṛiṣṭadyumna, the elder son of Drupada.

⁷ Káshi or Varáṇasí is the modern Benares.

⁸ Abhimanyu, the son of Arjuna and Subhadrá, the sister of Kṛiṣhṇa, from whom he is also called Saubhadra.

⁹ Draupadí, otherwise called Kṛiṣhṇá or Páñchálí, was daughter of Drupada, and wife of each of the five sons of Páñḍu. Her son by Yudhiṣṭhira was Prativindhya, by Bhíma Sútasoma or Shrutasoma, by Arjuna Shrutakirti, by Nakula Shatánika, and by Sahadeva Shrutasena.

¹⁰ Lit., 'Twice-born,' which was a title given especially to Bráhmaṇs, and generally to Kshatriyas and Vaishyas, all of whom were considered to be spiritually born again when invested at the age of maturity with the sacrificial thread. By this ceremony the Aryan race was distinguished from the aborigines.

¹¹ *Bhavan* is a word of respect, often used for the second person, and equivalent to 'your honour,' 'your worship,' etc.

¹² Bhíṣhma, the great step-uncle of Duryodhana and his cousins, received the command of the former's army, from being the oldest of all the warriors, and the most renowned.

sufficient; but that army of theirs, commanded by Bhíma, is sufficient. And do you, even all of you, drawn up in all the ranks of the army, according to your grades, attend even to Bhíshma.'

Then, in order to encourage him,¹³ the ardent old ancestor of the Kurus¹⁴ blew his trumpet,¹⁵ sounding loud as the roar of a lion. Then, on a sudden, trumpets, kettle-drums, cymbals, drums, and horns were sounded. That noise grew to an uproar. And standing on a huge car drawn by white horses, the slayer of Madhu¹⁶ and the son of Páñđu¹⁷ blew their celestial trumpets. Kṛiṣṇa¹⁸ (blew his horn called)

¹³ Duryodhana, who had just complained that his army was insufficient to cope with the enemy.

¹⁴ Bhíshma.

¹⁵ Lit., 'Conch-shell,' which was used as a war-trumpet, and received a 'nom-de-guerre' from its owner.

¹⁶ Kṛiṣṇa.—See *Index*, under 'Madhu.'

¹⁷ Arjuna. Kṛiṣṇa and Arjuna were in the same chariot, the former acting for the time as Arjuna's *súta* or charioteer.

¹⁸ In shloka 24, this name recurs coupled with a similar one, Guḍakesha, applied to Arjuna. A twofold method of translating them is open to each; and as the difficulty in deciding which to choose throughout our poem is great, I have preferred to leave them alone. The grammarians derive *Hṛiṣhikesha* from *hṛiṣhika*, 'a sense,' and *isha*, 'lord,'—'the lord of the senses,' a name applicable to Kṛiṣṇa, when looked on in a philosophical point of view, as identical with the Supreme Spirit. *Guḍakesha* they derive from *guḍaka*, 'sleep,' and *isha*, 'lord,'—'the lord of sleep.' The objection to both is that the words *hṛiṣhika* and *guḍaka* occur nowhere but in the grammarians' writings, and are justly suspected of being coined by them. Again, however appropriate the first epithet may be to Kṛiṣṇa, we know no good reason why the second should be applied to Arjuna. Schlegel has sought another derivation. He considers the second part of each word to be *kesha*, 'hair;' and *hṛiṣhi* to be an elongated form derived from *hṛiṣh*, 'to be rough,' while *guḍa* means the Euphorbia plant. He would therefore render the first word 'with upraised or turned-up hair,' the second 'with hair twisted, or matted like the leaves of the Euphorbia;' and he considers the first epithet duly supported by that of *keshava*, 'hairy,' so constantly applied to Kṛiṣṇa. The difficulty lies in the want of authority for the first, and the strained nature of the second, derivation. Burnouf, whose opinion must always have great weight, says, in the preface to his translation of the 'Bhágavata Purána,' vol. i. p. 168, that as the derivations given by the grammarians and by the translators are equally unsatisfactory, we should make the best of them, while waiting for better; and he proposes that the meaning attributed to these words by the grammarians should be retained in works of a metaphysical or philosophical nature, such as the Puránas; that of the translators, in works of an epic and historical character. Since the 'Bhagavad-Gítá' may side with the former in its contents, and with the latter in its form as an episode of the 'Mahábhárata,' we prefer to leave these epithets untranslated.

Pāñchajanya;¹⁹ the Despiser of Wealth¹⁷ blew 'the Gift of the Gods'; he of dreadful deeds and wolfish entrails²⁰ blew a great trumpet called Pañdra;²¹ king Yudhiṣṭhira, the son of Kuntī, blew 'the Eternal Victory'; Nakula and Sahadeva blew 'the Sweet-toned' and the 'Blooming-with-jewels.' The king of Kāshi, renowned for the excellence of his bow, and Shikaṇḍin in his huge chariot, Dhṛiṣṭadyumna, and Virāṭa and Sátyaki, unconquered by his foes; and Drupada and the sons of Draupadī, altogether, O king of earth! and the strong-armed son of Subhadrá, each severally blew their trumpets. That noise lacerated the hearts of the sons of Dhṛitarāshṭra, an uproar resounding both through heaven and earth. Now when Arjuna²¹ beheld the Dhártarāshṭras²² drawn up, and that the flying of arrows had commenced, he raised his bow, and then addressed these words, O king of earth! to Kṛiṣṇa.

'Draw up my chariot, O Eternal One! between the two armies, that I may examine these men drawn up and anxious for battle, (and see) with whom I have to fight in the strife of war. I perceive that those who are assembled here are about to fight, from a wish by so doing to do a favour to the evil-minded son of Dhṛitarāshṭra.'²³

SANJAYA SPOKE.

Kṛiṣṇa¹⁸ being thus addressed by Arjuna,¹⁸ O Bhárata! drew up that best of chariots between the two armies; and

¹⁹ Made of the bones of the giant Panchajana.—See *Ind. x.*

²⁰ Bhīma. The first epithet is a play on his name, which means 'dreadful'; the second denotes his ferocious and implacable disposition.

²¹ Lit., 'He whose standard is an ape.' It seems to have been the custom to carry some device as a war-ensign on the chariot.

²² Lit., The sons of Dhṛitarāshṭra, Duryodhana and his brothers; but here put generally for themselves and their followers, the whole Kuru party.

²³ Duryodhana. By this Arjuna, whose character is drawn throughout as one of almost feminine delicacy of feeling and noble generosity, wishes to exculpate the rest of the Kurus from the charge of cruelty towards their relations, and to throw all the blame on the odious Duryodhana.

before Bhīṣhma and Droṇa and all the kings of the earth, he said:

‘Behold, O king! these Kurus here assembled.’ Standing there, the king beheld fathers and grandfathers, preceptors and maternal uncles, brothers, sons, grandsons, and friends, fathers-in-law and acquaintances,²⁴ in both of the armies. Gazing on all these relations drawn up (in battle array), the son of Kuntí,²⁵ moved by extreme compassion, spoke with sadness, as follows:

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Now that I have beheld this kindred standing here near together for the purpose of fighting, my limbs give way, and my face is dried up²⁶ (of the blood in my veins), and tremor is produced throughout my body, and my hair stands on end. My bow, Gāṇḍīva,²⁷ slips from my hand, and my skin, too, burns (with fever). Nor am I able to remain upright, and my mind is, as it were, whirling round. And I perceive adverse omens,²⁸ O hairy one! Nor do I foresee anything better, even when I shall have slain these relations in battle. I seek not victory, Kṛiṣhṇa, nor a kingdom, nor pleasures. What should we do with a kingdom, Govinda? What with enjoyments, or with life itself, (if we slew these relatives)?’

²⁴ Here, and at shl. 34, relations of every kind are mentioned, to give more effect to Arjuna’s feelings, but those of which we know are comparatively few. Bhīṣhma, as great-uncle to both Kurus and Pāṇḍavas, may be placed among the grandfathers. Dhritarāṣṭra was uncle to the sons of Pāṇḍu, Drupada their father-in-law, and Dhriṣṭādyumna, his son, their brother-in-law. Lastly, Karṇa was half-brother to Arjuna. Moreover the principal actors in each party were cousins.

²⁵ Arjuna.—See *Index*.

²⁶ This is quite an Indian mode of depicting horror. We florid Europeans would say, ‘My face grows pale;’ but the swarthy Hindú, not *seeing* the effect on account of his colour, has recourse to the *feeling* of the blood rushing back from the surface, and leaving the face dry and bloodless.

²⁷ Gāṇḍīva is the name of the miraculous bow which Arjuna received as a gift from Indra.

²⁸ This may be taken literally, as birds, etc., actually passing before Arjuna’s eyes; or, figuratively, as referring to his fears for the event of the battle. I confess the context immediately following favours the latter acceptation: the scholiasts throw no light on the matter.

Those very men—on whose account²⁹ we might desire a kingdom, enjoyments, or pleasures—are assembled for battle, having given up their lives and riches. Teachers, fathers, and even sons, and grandfathers, uncles, fathers-in-law, grandsons, brothers-in-law, with connections also—these I would not wish to slay, though I were slain myself,³⁰ O killer of Madhu!—not even for the sake of the sovereignty of the triple world,³¹ how much less for that of this earth! When we had killed the Dhártaráshṭras, what pleasure should we have, O thou who art prayed to by mortals?³² We should incur a crime were we to put to death these villains.³³ Therefore we are not right to kill the Dhártaráshṭras, our own relations, for how could we be happy, after killing our own kindred, O slayer of Madhu?

‘Even if they whose reason is obscured by covetousness do not perceive the crime committed in destroying their own tribe, nor a sin in the oppression of their friends, should we not know how to recoil from such a sin—we, who do look upon the slaughter of one’s tribe as a crime, O thou who art supplicated by mortals? In the destruction of a tribe, the eternal institutions (laws) of the tribe are destroyed. These laws being destroyed, lawlessness prevails throughout the whole tribe. From the existence of lawlessness the women of the tribe become corrupted, Kṛiṣṇa; and when the women are corrupted, O son of Vṛiṣṇi! confusion of caste takes

²⁹ Since he deems these pleasures only enjoyable when surrounded and partaken by relations.

³⁰ Though my life depended on it.

³¹ Earth, the firmament and heaven, the last including also the regions of the demons. The sovereignty of this triple world was Viṣṇu’s, he having gained it by artifice from Bali, in the form of a tiny dwarf. See *Index* under ‘Viṣṇu.’

³² The first meaning of the root *ard* is ‘to trouble,’ from which the grammarians, followed by Bopp, have translated this word ‘the troubler of (bad) men.’

³³ This word is explained as comprising six species of villains, viz. incendiaries, poisoners, cut-throats, stealers of property, robbers of one’s land, or one’s wife, all of which pleasant and friendly parts had been, according to Shṛídarasvámín, the scholiast, filled by the Kurus against the Páṇḍavas.

place.³⁴ Confusion of caste is (a gate) to hell³⁵ both for the destroyers of the tribe, and for the tribe itself. For their fathers are deprived of the rites of funeral-cakes and libations of water, and thus fall (from heaven).³⁶ By the crimes of the destroyers of a tribe, and by those who cause confusion of caste,³⁷ the eternal institutions of caste and tribe³⁸ are sub-

³⁴ The women, for instance, whose husbands, friends, or relations, have been all slain in battle, no longer restrained by law, seek husbands among other and lower castes or tribes, causing a mixture of blood, which many nations at all ages have regarded as a most serious evil; but particularly those who—like the Aryans, the Jews and the Scotch—were at first surrounded by foreigners very different to themselves, and thus preserved the distinction and genealogies of their races more effectively than any other.

³⁵ A distinction is to be made between Naraka and Pátála, at least according to the Puráṇas. In them Naraka only is the place of punishment for mortals, Pátála being the region immediately below the earth, which is inhabited by all the 'opposition' of the Hindú Pantheon, the Daityas, Dánavas, Yakshas, Nágas, etc. It is divided into seven regions, placed one below the other; and if we may credit the account of the Muni Nárada, who, like Orpheus, went down to the regions below, the evil genii take great care to provide most comfortably for their bodily and sensual enjoyments, and make their habitation far more attractive than the cold virtue of Swarga. Thus the daughters of the demons wander about lavish of their fascinations; the sun shines for light, and not for heat; the demons themselves revel on excellent dinners and the best cellars, attended by bands of music and the songs of the Koil (*Cuculus Indicus*), the nightingale of India (see Wilson's 'Viṣṇu Puráṇa,' p. 204). Naraka is a very different place. It is said to consist of twenty-eight, and sometimes of many more divisions, each more terrible than the last, and allotted to the punishment of different crimes. For a description, see 'Viṣṇu Puráṇa,' p. 207.

³⁶ In bringing forward these and other melancholy superstitions of Bráhmanism in the mouth of Arjuna, we are not to suppose that our poet—though as much Bráhman as philosopher in many unimportant points of belief—himself received and approved of them. The present is one of those deplorable perversions of common sense which make the happiness, and even salvation of the dead, depend on the practice of the living, and which are found in many churches where the hierarchy have had recourse even to menaces, to enforce their injunctions on an ignorant and superstitious populace. For a full account of the ceremonies here alluded to we must refer the reader to Colebrooke's 'Essays,' vol. i. p. 187, etc., and vol. ii. p. 363; and to the 'Asiatic Researches,' vol. vii. p. 245. It is only necessary here to state that the Shráddha was a funeral ceremony performed at different periods by the nearest relatives of the deceased, and for fathers, grandfathers, and great-grandfathers. It consisted in offering libations of pure water, and of Piṇḍas (balls of meat or rice mixed with curds). The latter were offered for dead relatives generally, once a month at the new moon; or for one who had just died, during the ten days of mourning, one on the first, two on the second, three on the third day, and so on. The former were included in the daily duties of the householder. The neglect of their performance would cause the dead to quit their residence in heaven, and be precipitated into Naraka. See Manu, iii. 120—280; and Yájuvalkya, i. 217—225, and 249—257. •

³⁷ The women who marry men of other castes.

³⁸ The scholiast explains *jāti* by *varṇa*, 'caste,' *kula* being rather 'family' or 'tribe.'

versed. We have learnt (from sacred writ) that a sojourn³⁹ in hell necessarily awaits the men who subvert the institutions of their tribe, O Kṛiṣṇa! Alas! we have determined to commit a great crime, since, from the desire of sovereignty and pleasures, we are prepared to slay our own kin. Better were it for me, if the Dhártaráshṭras, being armed, would slay me, harmless and unresisting, in the fight.'

SANJAYA SPOKE.

Having thus spoken in the midst of the battle, Arjuna, whose heart was troubled with grief, let fall his bow and arrow, and sat down on the bench of the chariot.

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, called the holy Bhagavad-Gítá, in the science of the Supreme Spirit, in the book of devotion, in the colloquy between the holy Kṛiṣṇa and Arjuna, (stands) the first chapter by name

'THE DESPONDENCY OF ARJUNA.'⁴⁰

³⁹ Which, like the residence of the good in Heaven, lasts only for a period commensurate with their crimes; after which they are born again on earth in the bodies of animals, etc.

⁴⁰ This title is much longer in the Berlin MS., and shorter in No. 6 of the Paris MSS. There is little doubt, says Lassen, that the division of our poem into chapters or readings (*adhyaya*) was the work of the author himself, since a division of the sense almost always accompanies it; but the titles have been added by wordy copyists, who revel in long flourishing announcements, but do not always succeed in suiting the title to the contents. Each of these titles describes the Bhagavad-Gítá in its divers characters. Lassen suggests the translation of Upaniṣhad by 'episode,' viz. of the Mahábhárata, as not even the pride of the copyists would have dared to rank our poem among the Upaniṣhads of the Vedas.

CHAPTER THE SECOND.

SANJAYA SPOKE.

To him thus filled with compassion, with his troubled eyes full of tears, and sunk in grief, the slayer of Madhu spoke these words :

THE HOLY ONE¹ SPOKE.

‘Wherefore, Arjuna, has this dejection in matters of difficulty come upon thee, so unworthy of the honourable, and leading neither to heaven² nor to glory? Do not give way to weakness, O King! That does not become thee! But cast off this mean effeminacy of heart, and arise, O tormentor of thy foes!’

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘How should I, slayer of Madhu! contend in battle with my shafts against Bhīṣhma and Droṇa, both worthy to be honoured, O slayer of thy foes? For it were better to eat even the bread of beggary in this world, and not to slay these venerable³ men of great esteem. But were I to slay these venerable men here, though they long for plunder, I

¹ Kṛiṣṇa.

² Since if deprived him of the chance of being slain in battle, which would have expedited his journey to the regions of bliss.

³ Lit., ‘Preceptors’; but since Droṇa is the only one, at least of whom we know, and he rather an *acharya* than a *guru*, we prefer to take this word in a more general sense. The *guru*, or spiritual teacher, was always a Brāhmaṇ; and, to teach others, must himself be learned, old in years, and of high authority. The Brāhmaṇs were the most honoured caste, and the *guru* the most honoured Brāhmaṇ; thus the name becomes one of great distinction, and would be applied generally to such men as Bhīṣhma and Dhṛitarāṣṭra, the grand-uncle and uncle of Arjuna.

should eat of banquets smeared with blood. Nor can we tell which of these two things may be better for us—that we should conquer them or they conquer us. Those very men, the Dhártaráshṭras, whom if we slay we shall not wish to live ourselves, are drawn up opposite to us. As I am of a disposition which is affected by compassion and the fear of doing wrong, and my mind being bewildered by my duty,⁴ I ask thee which it is better to do? Tell me that distinctly! I am thy disciple.⁵ Teach me, who now implore thee! For I do not see what can dispel this grief, which scorches my senses,⁶ even were I to obtain the complete unrivalled sovereignty of the earth, and the command even of the deities.’

SANJAYA SPOKE.

Arjuna, the harasser of his foes, having thus addressed Kṛishṇa, having said to Govinda, ‘I will not fight,’ was silent. Then, between the two armies, Kṛishṇa, smiling, addressed these words to him thus downcast :

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Thou hast grieved for those who need not be grieved for, but thou utterest words of wisdom!’⁷ The wise grieve not for dead or living. But never at any period did I, or thou, or

⁴ Bewildered as to what it is my duty to do in this case.

⁵ This must not be taken literally. Arjuna, as the bosom friend of Kṛishṇa, cannot be considered as his disciple, but places himself in that relationship to him from a consciousness of his own ignorance how to act, and Kṛishṇa’s ability to instruct him. Through the poetical portraying of his struggle between duty and feeling, we mark the Bráhmaṇ in our author, who, ever mindful of the didactic nature of his poem, describes his hero as a devoted follower of the institutions of his law and religion.

⁶ Lit., ‘Dries up my senses.’ It must be understood as ‘paralyses, obscures my faculties of perception,’ the faculty being used for the perception itself. The senses (*indriyáni*) are here, in the strict meaning of the English word, the faculties of perception, not those of judgment and reason; but as the latter are influenced by the application of the former to external objects, the concrete may be here rendered by the abstract.

⁷ Namely, in what he has said concerning the destruction of a tribe and the confusion of caste. He has spoken with judgment, but is nevertheless mistaken.

these kings of men, not exist, nor shall any of us at any time henceforward cease to exist.⁸ As the soul in this body undergoes the changes of childhood, prime, and age,⁹ so it obtains a new body (hereafter);¹⁰ a sensible man is not troubled about that. But the contact of the elements, O son of Kuntí! which bring cold and heat, pleasure and pain,¹¹ which come and go, and are temporary, these do thou endure,¹² O Bhárata! For that man whom, being the same in pain and pleasure, and ever constant,¹³ these elements do not afflict, O best of men! is fitted for immortality.¹⁴ There is no existence for what does not exist, nor is there any non-existence for what exists.¹⁵ But even of both of these, those who discern the truth perceive the true end.¹⁶ Know this, that that by which all this universe is created¹⁷ is inde-

⁸ The *first philosophical tenet* of our poem, the Eternity and Immortality of the Soul, which has had no beginning and will have no end.

⁹ Childhood comprehends boyhood also, prime is youth and manhood, age the period after the turn of life. Compare 'Hitopadesha,' i. 113, where childhood is limited to the age when a girl is marriageable.

¹⁰ The *second philosophical tenet*, the Mortality and Mutability of the Body; and the *third*, the Transmigration of the Soul, are here established. The body is virtually changed in the different ages of man, though the change is gradual. Transmigration affects the soul no more than these changes; it is merely a more marked and sudden change.

¹¹ It is well to observe the order of these four words, which, when they are used together, is generally preserved. Pleasure corresponds to cold, pain to heat—a curious contrast of Hindú ideas to those of our northern chilly climes.

¹² In such a manner that both shall be alike and the difference imperceptible. He here and in the next shloka introduces at once the chief doctrine of practical Yoga, the impossibility to be acquired towards all external influence.

¹³ And of equanimity in regard to the internal influences of passion.

¹⁴ Union with the Supreme Spirit at the final emancipation, which is the only real immortality, since even heaven and the gods must have an end.

¹⁵ The only real existence is eternal existence, that of spirit. Matter does not really exist, but is merely the production of Mâyá, the mystic power by which the Supreme Being has created an illusive and temporary matter, which seems to exist, but does not really do so. There is then no real existence for matter, nor non-existence for spirit, which alone really exists.

¹⁶ Schlegel renders the word *antas* by 'discrimen,' Wilkins by 'destination.' The meaning of the passage is obscure, but I confess I see no way of translating it correctly but that which is here adopted. The end and object of the connection of spirit with matter, the philosopher knows to be the emancipation of the soul, which is effected thereby. See *Introduction*, A., Parts I. and III.

¹⁷ Lit., 'expanded.' It is a purely philosophical use of the word, and alludes to the doctrine that the Supreme Being is at the same time the efficient and

structible.¹⁸ No one can cause the destruction of this inexhaustible thing. These finite bodies have been said to belong to an eternal, indestructible and infinite spirit. Therefore fight, O Bhárata! He who believes that this spirit can kill, and he who thinks that it can be killed, both of these are wrong in judgment. It neither kills, nor is killed. It is not born, nor dies at any time. It has had no origin, nor will it ever have an origin. Unborn, changeless, eternal both as to future and past time,¹⁹ it is not slain when the body is killed. How can that man, O son of Prithá! who knows that it is indestructible, constant, unborn, and inexhaustible (really) cause the death of anybody, or kill anybody himself! As a man abandons worn-out clothes, and takes other new ones, so does the soul quit worn-out bodies, and enter other new ones. Weapons cannot cleave it. Fire cannot burn it, nor can water wet it, nor can wind dry it.²⁰ It is impenetrable, incombustible, incapable of moisture, and also of drying. It is constant, capable of going everywhere, firm, immoveable, and eternal. It is said²¹ to be invisible, incomprehensible, immutable. Therefore, knowing it to be such, thou art not right to grieve for it. And even if thou deem²² it born with the body and dying with the body,²³ still,

material cause of the universe. The essence of matter (*prakṛiti* or *máya*) is an inherent portion of the Supreme Being himself. This he causes to emanate from himself in the form of matter, and hence the use of the word *tatam* (root *tan*) 'stretched out, developed.' The more usual word for the idea of creation is *sri*, which in like manner signifies 'to send forth, to cause to come forth, emanate,' but this root has received the force of mere *efficient* creation, and *tatam* is therefore preferable in the strict philosophical sense of 'cause to emanate.'

¹⁸ The *fourth philosophical tenet* is here exhibited, the Existence of a Supreme Spirit, to whom to refer the existence of the universe (*tat sarvam*).

¹⁹ *Puráṇa* means, literally, 'ancient,' but, in opposition to *śāśhwata*, 'eternal as to the future,' it undoubtedly means 'eternal as to the past, without beginning.'

²⁰ A poetical mode of expressing that matter has no direct influence on spirit.

²¹ In former philosophical treatises, as those of Kapila and Ishwara Kṛishṇa.

²² He now adopts a new line of argument. Waiving the immortality of the soul for the sake of argument, he exhorts him not to pity his enemies because they are about to die, since that is the fate of all alike.

²³ Lit., 'Constantly born and constantly dying;' that is, born and dying with every new body which it enters.

O great-armed one! thou art not right to grieve for it. For to everything born death is certain, to everything dead regeneration is certain. Therefore thou art not right to grieve for a thing which is inevitable. All things which exist are invisible in their primeval state, visible in their intermediate state, and again invisible in their final state.²⁴ What cause is there for bewailing in this? 'One looks on the soul as a miracle, another speaks of it as a miracle, another hears of it as a miracle, but even when he has heard of it, not one comprehends it.'²⁵ The soul in every creature's body is always invulnerable. Therefore thou art not right to grieve for any creatures.²⁶ And considering thine own duty (as a Kshatriya), thou art not right to waver. For there is nothing better for a Kshatriya than lawful war.²⁷ Happy are the warriors who undertake such a war as is spontaneously offered them—an open door to heaven.²⁸ But if thou wilt not join in this lawful fight, thou abandonest thine own duty and glory, and contractest a crime. And mankind will moreover relate of thee imperishable infamy. And to a noble

²⁴ The intermediate state is this life, in which the soul is invested with a body visible to man, and before and after which it is invisible to man. *Bhūtāni* might equally refer to material objects, and the sentence to the doctrine of the emanation of palpable matter from the material essence (*avyakta, prakṛiti*), and its re-entrance into it at the dissolution. It would then be translated 'all material objects have the undeveloped principle (*avyakta*) as their origin, developed matter (*vyakta*) as their middle state, and again the undeveloped principle as their final condition.'

²⁵ This is merely a declaration of the difficulty of comprehending the soul. Three grades of students are distinguished, first, he who has arrived by the practice of Yoga at what may be compared to the actual power of mentally beholding the soul; secondly, the philosopher who teaches concerning it; and thirdly, his studious disciple.

²⁶ 'Not for all,' is often equivalent in Sanskrit to 'not for any.'

²⁷ Again he adopts a new line of argument, and reminds that the duty of the caste to which he belongs should out-balance all other considerations. The duty of the Bráhmaṇ was study, and the teaching of religion; that of the Kshatriya, government, and the subjection of one's enemies, in short the protection, internal and external, of one's country; that of the Vaiśhya, commerce and agriculture; and that of the Śhúdra, faithful service of his master. Arjuna was a Kshatriya by birth, and it was therefore a crime in him to neglect those duties on which the safety of his party depended, particularly at such a crisis.

²⁸ It was believed that the warrior who died in battle was carried at once to Indra's heaven.

man infamy is worse²⁹ than death. The great warriors will think that thou hast retired from the battle out of fear, and thou wilt undergo the contempt of those by whom thou wast greatly esteemed.³⁰ And many abusive words will thine enemies utter, sneering at thy prowess. What can be more wretched than that? If slain thou wilt go to Heaven, or if victorious thou wilt enjoy the earth. Therefore arise, O son of Kuntí! Make up thy mind for the fight. Looking on pleasure or pain, gain or loss, victory or defeat, as the same, gird thyself for the battle. And thus thou wilt not incur sin. This opinion has been set before thee in accordance with Sánkhyā (rational) doctrine. Now hear it in accordance with Yoga (devotional) doctrine.³¹ Imbued with that opinion thou wilt discard these bonds of action,³² O son of Prithá. In

²⁹ Wilkins, followed by Schlegel in his first edition, translates *atirichyate* as if it signified 'lasts long after.' Chézy discovered the fallacy, and in his second edition Schlegel has profited by his remarks. We refer those who wish to pursue the question in its details to Chézy's critique on Schlegel's edition in the 'Journal des Savans,' Paris, 1825, and Schlegel's reply ('Journal Asiatique,' vol. ix. 1826), and to the latter's note on this word.

³⁰ Lit., 'And whose contempt thou wilt incur, from having been greatly esteemed——' leaving the sentence unfinished, without any independent sentence to correspond to the relative one. This difficulty might be removed by supplying another word for *cha* and referring *yeshán* to *maháráthás*; while Schlegel and Lassen suggest *eshán* for *yeshán*, or *abhúr dyásyasi* for *blútwa yúsyasi*. None of these conjectures, however, are supported by the MSS.

³¹ Undoubtedly the names by which the two schools of philosophy were known are here intended in the words Sánkhyā and Yoga; but at the same time it must be remembered what idea those words conveyed, even when used as names of these systems, to the Hindú mind. Thus the Sánkhyā was so called from its purely speculative and theoretical nature; the Yoga, while more practical, if not wholly ethical in its tendency, was mainly distinguished by its inculcating *yoga*, or a spiritual union with the Supreme Being effected by meditation and mortification, which we may at once term 'devotion.' Kṛishṇa alludes, in mentioning Sánkhyā, to the broad philosophical principles which he has been hitherto explaining, the immortality of the soul, its transmigrations and so forth, which the Yoga system held in common with the Sánkhyā; but the peculiar tenets of the Yoga are henceforth to be explained and used as a consolation and encouragement for Arjuna.

³² The 'bonds of action' (*karmabandha*) recur so often throughout our poem, that we cannot refrain from reiterating in brief form the explanation which has already been given in the Introduction. In Indian philosophy all actions that were undertaken with an interested motive, whether to obtain some earthly advantage and gratify some selfish desire, or with the hope that they would be rewarded by admittance to Heaven, were believed to implicate the actor in certain necessary consequences. The principal of these was earthly regeneration,

this (system of Yoga) there is no destruction of nor detriment to one's efforts;³³ even a little of this religious practice delivers one from great risk.³⁴ In this (system) there is only one single object of a steady constant nature, O son of Kuru! Those who do not persevere have objects with many ramifications and without end.³⁵ Not³⁶ disposed to meditation and perseverance is the intention of those who are devoted to enjoyments and dominion, and whose minds are seduced (from the right path) by that flowery³⁷ sentence which is proclaimed by the unwise, who delight in texts from the Vedas, O son of Prithá, and say, "There is nothing else than that,"³⁸ being covetous-minded, and considering heaven as the very highest good;³⁹ and which offers regeneration as the

the very evil which philosophy was intended to assist in avoiding, and the punishment in subsequent lives on earth of many of our actions in this life. This idea took such firm root in the Hindú mind, always tending towards fatalism, that we find in works where philosophy has not the slightest part, that the speaker consoles himself for afflicting events by the comfortable reflection that they are merely the punishment of actions performed in a previous existence.

³³ Efforts made for the accomplishment of some worldly and selfish plan are always more or less liable to destruction and detriment. Even if the object be attained, the enjoyment can never last. This constitutes *destruction*, and the attempt to attain our object always meets with more or less of impediment. But the efforts made in the practice of Yoga all tend to one object,—the emancipation of the soul from material life. This, when gained, is eternal, and our efforts towards its attainment can meet with no obstruction, since the actions we perform will not affect it, whether they are successful or not, being performed without regard to their success or failure.

³⁴ The risk of failure which must always attend earthly efforts.

³⁵ In the practice of devotion the one single object is the emancipation of the soul. In worldly actions the objects are as many as our desires, and subdivided by intrigue. The word *buddhi*, which we here render 'object,' is literally 'intelligence, mental activity.' It is often used for some particular 'mode of thought, opinion,' and again for that which constantly engages the thoughts, 'plan, intention, object.'

³⁶ This is an instance of the puzzling complication of the relative construction in Sanskrit, which always begins with the dependent phrase. We are forced to begin with ŚM. 44, in order to render the meaning intelligible.

³⁷ *Puṣpita*, 'flowery,' and is explained by the scholiast to mean 'pleasant, until it falls,' in contrast to fruit, which yields a more substantial and durable pleasure. The whole passage is probably directed against the Pūrva Mimāṃsā school, which puts such faith in obedience to the practical injunctions of the Vedas.

³⁸ The Judaists of India, who believe that the letter of Holy Writ will save them.

³⁹ Heaven (*swarga*) being really nothing but a temporary residence, and, like the rest of matter, subject to destruction, the only highest good being emancipation.

reward of actions,⁴⁰ and enjoins many different ceremonies for the sake of obtaining pleasures and dominion. The subject of the Vedas is the three qualities.⁴¹ O Arjuna! be thou free from these three qualities, free from the ordinary influence of natural opposites,⁴² reposing on eternal truth, free from worldly anxieties, self-possessed.⁴³ As many uses as there are in a tank filled with waters which flow together from every quarter, so many are there in all the Vedas to a sensible Bráhmaṇ.⁴⁴ Let then the motive for action be in the action itself, never in its reward. Do not be incited to actions by (the hope of their) reward only, nor yet indulge a propensity to inertness.⁴⁵ Persisting in devotion, and laying aside

⁴⁰ It incites us to good actions, with the promise of being born in a future life in a superior condition to our present one.

⁴¹ The three qualities (*guṇāḥ*) are treated of at full length in Ch. XVII. They were irresistible influences, which were supposed to accompany all matter, to compose the dispositions of men, according to the proportions in which they were united, and to be the causes of the superiority and inferiority of all things; in short, the inherent principles of good and evil. They were,—first, *sattwa*, 'reality, truth, goodness;' second, *rajas*, 'impulse, activity, badness;' third, *tamas*, 'obscurity, ignorance, sloth, indifference.' In warning Arjuna to avoid them, he means that he should detect and repulse their influence in all his actions and passions, and act from reason, not from impulse.

⁴² *Dwandwa* is lit. 'a pair,' thence a pair composed of any one thing and its opposite, such as cold and heat, pleasure and pain, love and hate, etc. His injunction amounts to a command to acquire perfect equanimity. The word *sattwa* in the following compound has been referred by some to the first of the three qualities, and *nirđwandwa* translated in consequence, 'free from the other two qualities,' viz. *rajas* and *tamas* (see Langlois' critique in the 'Journal Asiatique,' vol. iv. 1824, p. 240, etc.). *Dwandwa*, however, will not bear this meaning, and Kriṣṇa has warned Arjuna to avoid all three qualities. Nor can they be separated, as will be seen in Ch. XVII. Their action is always mingled and united, though one of the three always predominates.

⁴³ *Yoga-kshema* is a law term, meaning a contract made between two parties, by which one undertakes to guard or insure any property, or even the life of the other, for a certain consideration. Hence it acquires the force of anxiety for one's property, for one's worldly interests generally. See Manu, vii. 127, and viii. 230.

⁴⁴ As a full tank of fresh water may be used for drinking, bathing, washing one's clothes, and numerous other purposes, so the text of the Vedas may be turned to any object of self-interest by a Bráhmaṇ who is well acquainted with them, and knows how to wield them. We may exemplify this general fact by the uses made of texts from our own Scriptures in the mouths of the Puritans on the one hand, and of the Cavaliers on the other. Our author must not, however, be understood to reject the use of the Vedas by what he here says. He merely advises a careful use of them. Kapila himself admits them as a last source of proof of the truth when others fail.

⁴⁵ He urges throughout the poem the necessity and excellence of action, and wishes it to be understood that action is injurious only when undertaken with selfish motives.

covetousness, perform thy actions, O despiser of wealth! being the same in success or failure. Equanimity is called devotion⁴⁶ (Yoga). For by far inferior is the performance of works⁴⁷ to mental devotion, O despiser of wealth! Seek a refuge in thy mind. Wretched are they whose impulse to action is its reward. He who is mentally devoted dismisses (by means of Yoga⁴⁸) alike successful and unsuccessful results. Therefore give thyself up to devotion. Devotion is success in actions. For those who are mentally devoted and wise, renouncing the reward which is the result of their actions, and liberated from the necessity of regeneration, attain to that place which is free from all disease.⁴⁹ When thy mind shall have worked through the snares of delusion, then wilt thou attain to indifference to the doctrines, which are either (already) received or have yet to be received.⁵⁰ When thy mind, once liberated from the Vedas,⁵¹

⁴⁶ The spiritual state, rather than the doctrine itself, is here alluded to. *Yoga*, derived from the root *yuj*, 'to join,' it should be remembered, originally signifies 'junction,' that is, union of the soul with the Supreme Being by means of devotion.

⁴⁷ Even of religious duties, sacrifice, mortification, etc., but only when undertaken from some selfish motive, whether personal aggrandisement, or future happiness.

⁴⁸ By these words I have rendered *iha* (lit. 'here,') which alludes to the doctrines of which he is speaking.

⁴⁹ He here asserts for his system what is generally asserted in the outest in most collections of Sūtras or philosophic maxims—the power of releasing its follower from the necessity of transmigrating and ensuring his final emancipation. The word *anāmaya* is well chosen to express the state of union of the soul with the Supreme Spirit. While, in a philosophic point of view, it contrasts real immortality with the apparent immortality of the gods, who, however, were not only destined to perish in the final dissolution, but could even (as in the case of Indra) pine away and lose their power in consequence of the curse of some sanctified mortal, it expresses perfect equanimity in a physical point of view to the mind of the Hindú, whose climate seldom left him long free from sickness.

⁵⁰ Those which have been received or heard are the Vedas; the others, the philosophic systems. The root *śru* means to 'hear traditionally, and accept;' *śruta* is constantly used for the doctrines of the Vedas, as *smṛiti* is for their ritual. *Śrotavya* is then that which, as they say, should be accepted; or the construction put on the Vedas by the schools which undertake to elucidate them, as the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta.

⁵¹ He will introduce the doctrines and rules for practice of his system till he has thoroughly destroyed all reliance on those of the established religion and its text book.

shall remain unwavering, and constant in contemplation, then shalt thou attain to devotion.'

ARJUNA SPOKE.

'What is the description⁵² of one confirmed in spiritual knowledge, and constant in contemplation, O Kṛiṣṇa? How does a man of steady meditation converse? How does he act when at rest, how when in action?'

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'When he has put away all desires which enter the heart, and is satisfied by himself in himself, he is then said to be confirmed in spiritual knowledge. When his heart is not troubled in adversities, and all enjoyment in pleasures is fled; when he is free from passion, fear and anger, and constant in meditation, he is called a "Muni."⁵³ That man possesses spiritual knowledge who is free from desire towards any object, and neither delights in nor is averse from whatever he meets with, be it good or bad. And when he draws in his senses from the objects of sense, even as a tortoise draws together its limbs on each side,⁵⁴ he is possessed of spiritual knowledge. The objects of sense turn away from a man who refrains from food. Even appetite turns away when it perceives his extreme freedom from appetite.⁵⁵ For often the

XVII. Then

⁵² Having established Yoga as the predominant, the only, means of obtaining final emancipation, he proceeds to finding a contract the man who practises it. *Bhāṣhā* is lit. 'speech,' but its exposure any pro' scholiast as *lakshana*, 'distinguishing mark,' avoids all redundancy it acquires immediately follows.

⁵³ This name is not confined to the *vairi*. See of this sect. It is generally applied to all religious devotees, and more especially to those who, by some prescribed course of abstraction and mortification, generally performed in the jungle, have acquired a state of semi-spiritualism. Here, where perfect equanimity and impassibility are the necessary conditions, it should be taken in its widest sense, that of a saintly personage.

⁵⁴ As a tortoise draws in its head and feet under its shell, and thus preserves them from external influences of all kinds, the devotee should keep his senses within himself, unaffected by the objects which surround him. That is, by complete dominion over the senses, he should not allow external objects to affect his heart through them.

⁵⁵ This would seem to be nothing more than a personification of the objects of sense and of appetite, meant to show that after a complete subjugation of his

agitated senses of a prudent man, even though he strive (to subdue them), carry off his heart by violence. Let a man, restraining all these, remain in devotion when at rest,⁵⁶ and intent on me alone. For he, whose senses are under his control, possesses spiritual knowledge. Attachment to objects of sense arises in a man who meditates upon them; from attachment arises desire; from desire passion springs up; from passion comes bewilderment; from bewilderment, confusion of the memory;⁵⁷ from confusion of the memory, destruction of the intellect; from destruction of the intellect, he perishes. But he who approaches the objects of sense with senses free from love and hate, and beneath his own control, having his soul well-disposed, attains to tranquillity of thought. In this tranquillity there springs up in him a separation from all troubles. For the mind of him whose thoughts are tranquil soon becomes fixed⁵⁸ (on one object). He who does not practise devotion has neither intelligence nor reflection. And he who does not practise reflection has no calm. How can a man without calm obtain happiness? When a man's heart is disposed in accordance with his roaming senses, it snatches away his spiritual knowledge as the wind does a ship on the waves.⁵⁹ Therefore, O great-

senses and desires, the restraint itself becomes so much the easier, since those very objects and that very appetite seem to have lost their influence and effect upon the devotee.

⁵⁶ Lit., 'Sit in devotion,' etc., in answer to Arjuna's question, 'How does he act when at rest?'

⁵⁷ Confusion of memory implies forgetfulness of his duty; and destruction of the intellect entails loss of his senses, folly, under the influence of which he acts wrongly and absurdly, and hence commits sins, which are recompensed with hell and destruction.

⁵⁸ When the thoughts quit worldly objects, the mind is secured from fear and anxiety, and fixed on the one object of pious meditation, the Supreme Being.

⁵⁹ A fine poetic simile. The ship is tossed about by the waves, and the waves are raised by the wind. The ship is man's knowledge, which should be directed towards its haven, the Supreme Being. The senses which wander here and there after every pleasant object are the waves, and the heart which directs them to those objects by its desires is the wind. The senses toss the mind about, and the heart with its passions at length wrecks and destroys it, as the wind does the vessel. The simile is interesting as one of the proofs of the state of civilization

armed one! he is possessed of spiritual knowledge whose senses are entirely withheld from objects of sense. The self-governed man is awake in that which is night to all (other) beings; that in which other beings are awake is night to the self-governed.⁶⁰ He into whom all desires enter in the same manner as rivers enter the ocean, which is (always) full, yet does not move its bed, can obtain tranquillity,⁶¹ but not he who loves desires. That man who, casting off all desires, acts without interest, free from egotism and selfishness, attains to tranquillity.⁶² This is the condition of the Supreme Being, O son of Prithá! Having obtained this, one is not troubled; and remaining in it, even at the time of death, he passes on to extinction⁶³ in the Supreme Spirit.'

Thus in the Upanishads, etc.,⁶⁴ (stands) the Second Chapter, by name

'APPLICATION TO THE SÁNKHYA DOCTRINE.'

prevailing at the period when our poem was composed. Our author belonged undoubtedly to an inland district, perhaps many hundred leagues from the sea, yet such was the communication over the vast continent that he had at least heard described, if he had not himself seen, the wreck of a vessel on the sea.

⁶⁰ Spiritual knowledge is as dark and mysterious as night to the world, though the devotee is there at home and sees clearly, whilst worldly interests, in which mankind see their way distinctly as in the day-time, are dark and unknown to the devotee, practising abstraction in the jungle.

⁶¹ He whom all desires enter without exciting or affecting any more than rivers flow into the ocean, which, though it is already full, does not make it extend its limits, etc.

⁶² Namely tranquillity (*śānti*), by which we must here understand what Kapila calls *jīvanmukti*, a state of *mukti*, or separation of the soul from the body, which takes place even during life. The soul is not really and actually so separated, but is virtually so since the influence of the body upon it is entirely destroyed. In describing it as the state of the Supreme Spirit (Brahma), he means that the soul is equally free from the influence of matter as that Spirit, and, in short, in the same state as if actually united to it.

⁶³ Lit., 'blowing out,' is the complete union of the soul with the Supreme Spirit, the loss of its individuality, and its amalgamation with the one Being. This, as being the only state of real happiness, the only one of immortality, is the aim and object of Hindú philosophy.

⁶⁴ It is useless to repeat the formula at the end of each chapter, and we content ourselves with the title. This, like most of the others, is rendered difficult by the introduction of the word Yoga, without any apparent use, merely to recall that that school is here treated of. As it is one of those words whose meanings are numberless, it is introduced without difficulty, and must here bear the translation we give it.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘If thought be deemed by thee, O thou who art invoked by mortals! superior to action,¹ why then dost thou direct me to this dreadful deed? Thou bewildereſt my mind by thy ambiguous words.² Tell me therefore one only thing for certain, by which I may obtain happiness.’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘I have already declared to thee,³ ſinless one! that there were two modes of life⁴ in this world—that of the followers of the Sāṅkhya (rational) ſchool in devotion through ſpiritual knowledge, and that of the followers of the Yoga (devotional) ſchool in devotion through works.⁵ Without undertaking

¹ See Chapter II. 49.

² Kriṣṇa has always been exhorting him to perform deeds worthy of a warrior, but has alſo told him that mental devotion is ſuperior to action. Arjuna is naturally bewildered as to which to prefer, in order to ensure his ſalvation and yet do his duty.

³ Chapter II. 39.

⁴ Of philoſophic and therefore ſalutary life.

⁵ In drawing the diſtinction between the two ſchools, and attributing knowledge as the watchword of ſalvation to the one,—‘action,’ properly undertaken, as that of the other,—Kriṣṇa muſt not be underſtood to ſeparate the ſchools themſelves, but merely their comprehension of the means of ſalvation. All the metaphyſical and phyſiological, and even a part of the theological, doctrines of the two ſchools were quite ſimilar, and were received by the Yoga from the Sāṅkhya; but while the former offers, as the means of ſalvation, action performed without worldly intereſt, and devotion conſiſting in meditation, contemplation, and ſelf-dominion, the latter bids us renounce action as uſeleſs, and have recourſe to ſpiritual knowledge. This knowledge is the clear comprehension of the nature of the univerſe and of the object of man, by the ſoul, received through the body, and as this is not merely obtained by the ſtudy of Kapila’s Sūtras, or Iſhwara Kriṣṇa’s ſhlokas, devotion, contemplation, and effort muſt be employed for that object. We have, therefore, thought fit to tranſlate the word Yoga in both compounds by ‘devotion,’ though the firſt compound might have equally well been rendered ‘application to knowledge.’

actions a man cannot enjoy freedom from action,⁶ nor does he arrive at perfection from renunciation (of actions) only.⁷ For one can never for a single moment even exist without doing some action. For every one is forced, even against his will, to perform an action by the qualities which spring from nature.⁸ He who remains inert, restraining the organs of action,⁹ and pondering with his heart on objects of sense, is called a false pietist of bewildered soul.⁹ But he who, restraining his senses by his heart,¹⁰ and being free from interest (in acting), undertakes active devotion through the organs of action, is praiseworthy. Do thou perform the actions which are necessary. Action is better than inactivity. And if inactive, thou wilt not even acquire the necessary sustenance for the body. This world entails the bonds of action on any action but that which has worship for its object.¹¹ Do thou, O son of Kuntí! being free from selfish

* This is explained by the following shloka: One should not imagine that by merely sitting still and refusing to do anything, we are exempt from action and do really not do anything, for the action of life still continues.

⁷ That is, by mere abstaining from action. True renunciation, as explained in Chapter V., consists in renouncing all interest and selfish motives in what we do.

⁸ The three qualities (see note 41 in Ch. II.) are the causes of action, although *sattwa* and *tamas* are said to be inactive, since they are invariably mingled with a greater or less proportion of *rajas*. From this passage we gather that even the commonest actions of life, the circulation of the blood and respiration, are attributed to the influence of the three qualities. For it must be remembered that they have not merely a moral influence on the heart of man, but a physical one on all matter, being sprung from *prakṛiti*, or nature, the universal principle of matter.

⁹ The distinction must be remarked between the senses and the organs of action, both called 'senses' (*indriyāni*) in Hindú philosophy, and the latter merely distinguished here by the prefixing of the word *karma*. The senses are five, hearing, sight, smell, etc.; the organs of action (*karmendriyāni*) also five, viz. the hands, the feet, the mouth, the anus and the penis. The action of these latter is necessary to existence, and it is therefore ridiculous to imagine that one renounces action merely by staying the action of these organs. The man who ponders with his heart on sensual enjoyments, though he refrains from the actual physical enjoyment of them, is a false pietist, as 'He that looketh on a woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her already in his heart.' (St. Matthew, v. 28.)

¹⁰ It must be remembered that *manas*, 'the heart,' is considered as an eleventh or internal sense, to which the ten external ones convey their impressions, and which in turn directs and rules them.

¹¹ As has been already remarked (Ch. II. note 32), actions performed from interested motives were considered as bad, however good in themselves, and entailed the necessity of being recompensed, the good actions by a temporary sojourn in Heaven, the bad by the same thing in Hell, both to be followed by

interest, practise action which has that as its object. The creator,¹² when of old he had created mortals, together with the rite of sacrifice, said to them, "By means of this (sacrifice) ye shall be propagated. It shall be to you a cow of plenty.¹³ By means of it do ye support¹⁴ the gods, and let these gods support you. Supporting one another mutually, ye will obtain the highest felicity. For being nourished by sacrifices, the gods will give you the desired food. He who eats the food given by them, without first offering some to them, is a thief indeed."¹⁵ Good men, who eat what remains after the sacrifice, are liberated from all their sins; but those bad men, who cook for their own sakes only, eat sin.¹⁶ Beings are nourished by food. Food has its origin from rain. Rain is the fruit of sacrifice. Sacrifice is performed by action.¹⁷ Know that action proceeds from the Supreme Spirit. The Supreme Being is co-existent with the indivisible. Therefore this spirit, which is omnipresent, is always present in the sacrifice.¹⁸ He who in this life does not cause this cycle, thus

regeneration on earth. These then are the bonds of action, entailed on all action which is not perfectly free from any interested or other motives, and merely performed as a means of worship to the Supreme Being.

¹² The Supreme Spirit, in his character of the creative power personified as Brahmá, instituted the sacrifice with fire as a treaty of mutual aid between the gods and man, and gave the Vedas as the text-book for the use of this rite. Man was to be propagated by sacrifice, since, when appeased and nourished by it, the deities sent the boons of sun, wind, and rain, by which his sustenance was procured.

¹³ This, the Indian cornu-copie, is the cow of Indra, from which could be milked whatever was desired.

¹⁴ The offering was believed to be actually brought away to the gods by their messenger, the fire, and by them eaten.

¹⁵ Since his food is originally the gift of the gods, to which he, however, has no right if he does not sacrifice for it.

¹⁶ Compare Manu, iii. 118.

¹⁷ Compare Manu, iii. 76.

¹⁸ The Bráhmancial scholiast has attempted to explain *brahma* to mean the Vedas, which it often does in later Sanskrit, but never in our poem. Schlegel remarks that the distinction to be here made between the two words *brahma* and *akshara*, both referring to the Supreme Being, is that the former alludes to him in his universal, omnipresent, character, existing throughout matter, the latter to his own individuality and, so to speak, personality. This would be quite correct if for *latter* we substituted *former*, and for *former*, *latter*. This will be clearly understood by a careful study of Chapter XV., and particularly the shlokas 16

already revolved, to continue revolving,¹⁹ lives to no purpose, a life of sin, O son of Pṛithá! indulging his senses. But the man who only takes delight in himself, and is satisfied with himself, and is content in himself alone, has no selfish interest in action.²⁰ He has no interest in what is done or what is not done in this world. Nor is there among all things which exist any object of use to him. Therefore do thou perform the work which should be done,²¹ without interest. For a man who performs his duty without interest obtains the highest (region).²² For by actions Janaka and others²³ arrived at perfection. Even if thou only considerest the good of mankind, thou shouldst perform actions.²⁴ Whatever the most excellent practise, other men practise likewise. The world follows whatever example they set. I (for instance), O son of Pṛithá! have nothing which I am obliged to do throughout the three worlds, nor does there remain un-obtained by me anything which I might obtain,²⁵ and yet I

and 17. Three categories of spirit are there marked out. The lowest is the soul of man called *kshara*, divisible; the next is *akshara*, indivisible, explained by the word *kúṣastha*, 'pervading all things;' the third is the Supreme Being in his own individual personality, there called *paramātmā*, and corresponding to *brahma* here. These shades of meaning are the more difficult to trace, as they are found in no other work than that before us.

¹⁹ The revolving cycle in which this life moves has been just explained. Action performs sacrifice; sacrifice brings rain, etc.; rain, food; and food supports man. He therefore who does not act at all stops the whole order of life, and though he lives, lives sensually only, not religiously.

²⁰ He who does not seek for any enjoyment from without, but is all in all to himself, performs actions as a duty, and not with any selfish or interested motive.

²¹ Generally speaking all duties of religion, but here more particularly the peculiar offices of caste which Kṛishna is exhorting Arjuna not to neglect.

²² The being of the Supreme Spirit.

²³ Janaka and other royal Rishis, or saints, not being Munis or devotees by profession, could yet attain to perfection by the upright and wise performance of their duty.

²⁴ He now commences a new line of argument, appealing to Arjuna's philanthropical feelings, and attempting to show that killing his foes is a boon to mankind generally, if not to them in particular. The force of example is great, and one who, like Arjuna, filled a lofty and responsible position, should carry out the duties of his caste, that others may profit by his example.

²⁵ Kṛishna, as identified with the Supreme Spirit, had of course no emancipation to work out, as he had adopted a material body, which, by his own power, he could at any moment shake off, nor could he who possessed all things have any interest in a petty earth. Still, as he was born in the Kshatriya caste, he was now about to fulfil its duties by fighting, as an example to others.

am constantly in action. For if I were not always to continue indefatigable in activity—(mankind follow in my steps in everything, son of Prithá)—these people would perish²⁶ if I were not to do actions. And I should be the author of confusion of the castes,²⁷ and should destroy these mortals. As the unwise act, being self-interested in acting, so should the wise act, not being interested, from the wish to do good to mankind. And they should not allow a difference of opinions to spring up in the ignorant, who act with motives of self-interest.²⁸ The wise man, acting with devotion, should fulfil all actions (which are prescribed to him). Actions are always²⁹ effected solely and entirely by the qualities of nature.³⁰ The man whose mind is befooled by ignorance thinks, “I am the doer of them.” But he, O strong-armed one! who knows the truth of the difference between the qualities and actions, believing that they revolve in the qualities, has no selfish interest (in acting).³¹ Those who are

²⁶ Would, by committing sin in the neglect of their duty, go to Naraka, etc.

²⁷ Since the *purity* of the caste was one of its highest qualities. We are struck in many passages of our poem by the ingenuity which our author displays in introducing, in both Arjuna's and Kṛiṣṇa's arguments, the strong necessity for keeping the distinction of caste ever unbroken. It is, as we have said elsewhere, a proof that at the period of the composition of our poem, some attempt had been made by the Kshatriyas to break through these well-drawn bounds, and on the one hand to assume the privileges of the Bráhmans, on the other to raise the wealthy Vaishyas to their own level.

²⁸ Should not provoke sectarianism in the lower classes by public schisms in the higher ones. We here again see the true spirit of Bráhmanism peering through the ethics of the philosopher. The learned and the powerful, the Bráhmaṇ and the Kshatriya, were allowed the liberty of thought, as long as the Vaishya and the Shúdra, the bulk of the populace, were kept in strict subservience to the established religion by the force of example. Once liberty of thought—once discord, or even discussion allowed to the lower castes—and the power of the priesthood would have tottered, as it did in the days of Buddha.

²⁹ The pres. part. pass. has here the force of continuance.

³⁰ The three qualities (*guṇa*) which belong to and affect all matter. See Chapter II. notes 41, 42.

³¹ The obscurity of this passage has not been dispersed by either scholiasts or translators. It must be borne in mind that the three qualities which influence matter are the good and inactive, the bad and active, and the bad and inactive. These qualities never act alone, but always in unison, though often in such unequal proportions that one or other seems to stand alone without the other two. This united action is treated of in Ch. XIV. All action is caused by the influence of these qualities on matter, and the spiritually-wise, knowing that they thus revolve

bewildered by the natural qualities are interested in the actions of the qualities. He who understands the whole universe, should not cause these people, slow and ignorant of the universe, to relax from their duty. Do thou fight, reposing all thy actions on me, by means of meditation on the Adhyátma,³² free from hopes and from selfishness, and having put away this morbidness. Those men who ever follow this my doctrine,³³ full of faith, and not reviling it,³⁴ are finally emancipated, even by actions.³⁵ But those who, reviling this (doctrine), do not observe my decrees, are bewildered by all their knowledge, and perish, being without reason. Even the wise man inclines towards that which agrees with his own nature. All follow their own nature. What can coercion effect? Love or hate exist towards the object of each sense. One should not fall into the power of these two passions, for they are one's adversaries. It is better to do one's own duty, even though it be devoid of excellence, than to perform another's duty well.³⁶ Death is better in the performance of one's own duty. Another's duty is productive of danger.'

within one another in constant unison, ascribe each action to them. Thus they know that when desire springs up in the heart, the second quality predominates; when aversion to religious duties, the third; and when inclination to those same duties, the first, etc. But the ignorant man, not perceiving this action of the qualities, believes himself to be the agent and motive of every action, good or bad. Being thus deluded by the influence of the qualities, he attaches himself to each action of life, and looks forward to its result. The law is then his only check against crime, and the Bráhmaṇ, and those learned in the truth, should therefore be careful not to break through it by setting a bad example.

³² See Chapter VIII. note 1.

³³ Namely, Yoga, which Kṛṣṇa calls his own, partly because he is expounding it to Arjuna, and partly because he is considered the lord of devotion (*yogeshwara*), and identified by this school with the Supreme Spirit.

³⁴ Those who reviled his doctrine were chiefly the Shaivyyas, who identified Shiva—not Vṛṣṇi or Kṛṣṇa—with the Supreme Being, and were always at war with the followers of the latter, and also the followers of the Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta systems, who attacked all schools which did not employ the Vedas as their authority.

³⁵ In opposition to Kapila and his disciples, who maintained that spiritual knowledge alone was the means of salvation.

³⁶ This arddha-shloka (half-couplet) recurs in Ch. XVIII. 47, where the disputed meaning of *viḡuṇa* is explained by the context. For in shl. 48 of that Chapter, he adds: 'One should not reject the duty to which one is born, even if it be associated with error; for all human undertakings are involved in error, as fire is

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Instigated, then, by what, does this man incur sin even against his will, O descendant of Vṛiṣṇi, impelled, as it were, by force?’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘It is desire (which instigates him). It is passion, sprung from the quality of badness,³⁷ voracious, all sinful. Know that it is hostile (to man) in this world. As fire is surrounded by smoke, and a mirror by rust,³⁸ as the foetus is involved in the womb, so is this universe surrounded by this (passion). Knowledge is surrounded by this, the constant enemy of the wise man,—a fire, which assumes any form it will, O son of Kuntī! and is insatiable. Its empire is said to be the senses, the heart, and the intellect. By means of these, it surrounds knowledge, and bewilders the soul.³⁹ Therefore do thou, O best of Bharatas! in the first place, restraining thy senses, cast off this sinful impetus, which devours spiritual knowledge and spiritual discernment.⁴⁰

in smoke.’ Arjuna complains that his duty as a Kshatriya is bad and obnoxious, since it requires him to slay his own relations, and he would prefer the duty of a Brāhmaṇ, not to fight, even though attacked (Chapter I. 35). Kṛiṣṇa now replies that the duty of one’s own caste, however bad, is better than that of another caste. He insists on the performance by each caste of its own special calling, and not of another’s. It is another apparent proof of the efforts which were being made at this period by the Kshatriyas to usurp the office, if not the power of the Brāhmaṇs. See note 27.

³⁷ *Rajas*, the second of the three *guṇas*.

³⁸ *Yathādarśha* must be resolved into *yathā* + *darśha*. Langlois (*Journal Asiatique*, vol. iv. 1824, p. 236) did not discover this crasis, and would have translated *darśha* by ‘face,’ and *mala* the ‘dirt’ that covers it. Schlegel’s idea is certainly preferable—*adarśha* is a mirror of some burnished metal, and *mala* the rust that forms upon it. *Vide* Schlegel’s ill-tempered reply to Langlois’ criticism in the *Journal Asiatique*, vol. ix. 1825, p. 3, etc.

³⁹ It must be remembered that the three qualities cannot influence spirit directly, their dominion being limited to matter, whether in its developed (*vyakta*) or its undeveloped form (*avyakta*, *prakṛiti*, etc.). The heart (*manas*) and the mind (*buddhi*) are considered parts of developed matter, just as much as the senses; and through them is matter connected with spirit, the body with the soul. Thus all impressions from without are received by the senses, and immediately transmitted to the heart. The heart transmits them to the intellect, and this again to the soul itself. If then the heart be not under the strict keeping of the soul, it is bewildered by passions, and transmits a fevered and wrong impression of external objects to the soul itself, which is then also bewildered.

⁴⁰ For explanations of these terms see Ch. VII. note 2.

They say that the senses are great. The heart is greater than the senses. But intellect is greater than the heart, and that which is greater than intellect is this passion. Knowing that it is thus greater than the mind, strengthening thyself by thyself, do thou, O great-armed one ! slay this foe,⁴¹ which assumes any form it will, and is intractable.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Third Chapter, by name

' DEVOTION THROUGH ACTION.'

⁴¹ That this alludes to the passion (*kāma*), and not to the human enemy before them, is shown by the repetition of the epithet *kāma-rūpa*, used above, in shloka 39.

CHAPTER THE FOURTH.

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘I delivered this imperishable doctrine of Yoga to Vivaswat. Vivaswat declared it to Manu, Manu told it to Ikshwáku. Thus the Rájarshtis learnt it, handed down from one to another.¹ During a considerable period of time, this doctrine has been lost in the world, O harasser of thy foes. I have now explained to thee this same ancient doctrine, (as I considered) that thou wert both my worshipper and my friend. For this mystery is very important.’

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Thy birth was posterior, that of Vivaswat anterior.² How shall I comprehend this (that thou sayest), “I was the first to declare it”?’

¹ This is a slight historical notice, destined to introduce the detailed description of the Yoga-system, and arrogating for it the highest possible origin, by attributing it to Viṣṇu, before his incarnation as Kṛiṣṇa. Vivaswat is the sun. Manu, his son, commonly called Vaivaswata Manu, is the last of the seven Manus, who have as yet existed, presides over the present Manwantara (see *Index*), and is the presumed author of the code of religious law which bears his name. Ikshwáku, his son, was the first king of the so-called solar dynasty, a mixture of saint and monarch, like David, and therefore called Rájarshtí, or Royal Saint. Through him, says Kṛiṣṇa, the rest of the solar dynasty, the Rájarshtis, received and practised this doctrine. It was then lost for some time to the world, until revived in the mouth of Kṛiṣṇa. A like assumption of divine authority is made by most authors for their doctrines; but the present is curious, not only as referring the origin of the system to Viṣṇu, rather than to Brahmá, but as giving to the Kshatriya caste, the Rájarshtis, the honour of its transmission, a sop offered to the offended lion by the wary Bráhmaṇ. How much more simple and honest is the account in the Sánkhyá-káriká (shl. 69, 70, 71), which seeks a no more mystic origin for the Sánkhyá system than the mind of its great discoverer, Kapila!

² Arjuna, ignorant that in using the pronoun of the first person, Kṛiṣṇa refers to his identity with Viṣṇu, not to his incarnation as Kṛiṣṇa, does not understand how Kṛiṣṇa could exist before Vivaswat. He replies by explaining the transmigrations of the soul.

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘I and thou, O Arjuna! have passed through many trans-migrations. I know all these. Thou dost not know them, O harasser of thy foes! Even though I am unborn, of changeless essence, and the lord also of all which exist, yet, in presiding over nature (*prakṛiti*), which is mine, I am born by my own mystic power (*máyá*).³ For whenever⁴ there is a relaxation of duty, O son of Bharata! and an increase of impiety, I then reproduce myself⁵ for the protection of the good, and the destruction of evil-doers. I am produced in every age⁶ for the purpose of establishing duty. He who thus truly comprehends my divine birth and action, does not undergo regeneration when he quits the body, but comes to me,⁷ Arjuna! Many, being free from love, fear and anger, devoted to me, and taking refuge in me, purified by the ascetic fire⁸ of knowledge, enter my being. In whatever

³ Speaking of himself as the Supreme Being, he calls nature (*prakṛiti*) his own. *Máyá* is the mystic power of the Supreme Being, by which he creates matter, which has no real existence, since real existence is eternal; and only spirit is eternal, and really exists. To man, however, matter appears to have a real existence, and hence the use of *Máyá*, *lit.* ‘magic,’ to express the creative power.

⁴ The repetition of *yadú* expresses the repetition of its meaning.

⁵ For an account of Viṣṇu’s *avatáras*, see *Index*, under the name Viṣṇu.

⁶ Not once merely in every age. The *avatáras* or incarnations of Viṣṇu are ten in number, *yugas* or ages in which they occur only four. They are the Satya, Tretá, Dwápara, and Kali, *yugas*, of different lengths in duration, and making with the Sandhyás and Sandhyántas, the periods at the beginning and end of each, altogether 5,440,000 years. (See Chapter VIII. note 19.) The first four *avatáras* took place in the Satya-yuga, the next three in the Tretá, the eighth in the Dwápara, the last two in the present or Kali-yuga.

⁷ Knowledge of the Supreme Being is then a means of emancipation. But works are equally so, when properly undertaken. (Chapter III. 19, 20.) Therefore according to the Yoga school, the paths towards final emancipation are two. Kapila arrogates the same power for knowledge of his own system, but Patanjali, and our poet, being Theists, make knowledge of the Supreme Spirit the first condition of spiritual knowledge.

⁸ *Tapas* is the name given to ascetic exercises generally; they consist chiefly in self-denial, fasting, self-castigation, restraint of the senses, and contemplation. *Tap*, the root from which it is derived, originally signifies, ‘to heat, burn,’ etc., and since, to Hindú ideas, nothing better represents pain than heat, it has received the meaning of ‘torture.’ This was applied to the practice of asceticism, and the word is aptly used in this place, as it at once conveys the meaning of ascetic exercise, and of heat which purifies. The scholiast and Galanos have wrongly taken the compound *jñána-tapas* for a *dvandwa*, or aggregative; but, as Lassen remarks, it would then require the sign of the dual number (see Wilson’s Sanskrit Grammar, p. 355). It is, however, a *Tatpuruṣha* compound, or one in

manner these men approach me, just in the same manner do I recompense them. Mankind turn towards my path in every manner, O son of Pṛithá!⁹ Those who desire success for their actions sacrifice in this world to the deities; and, forsooth, in this human world success soon arises, produced by their actions.¹⁰ The institution of the four castes was created by me, according to the distribution of the natural qualities and actions.¹¹ Know that I even am the creator of (this institution), although in reality not its creator,¹² and incorruptible. My actions do not follow me, nor have I any interest in the fruits of my actions. He who comprehends me to be thus is not bound by the bonds of actions.¹³ Those of

which the former component is governed by the latter, though in what case it should stand, is dependent on the sense. We should remember that he is now treating of *jnāna-yoga*, or devotion by means of spiritual knowledge, as contrasted with *karma-yoga*, or devotion by means of works, of which he treated in the last Chapter: and this passage may be compared with what is said farther on in shloka 19.

⁹ Mankind worship divers gods with divers objects, but though they know it not, it is really the Supreme Being that they worship under these different aspects. But as it depends on a man's heart which god he worships, I, the Supreme Spirit, reward them according to their worship. If the object of their wishes be the enjoyment of heaven, they sacrifice to Indra and his subject deities, and I recompense them by a sojourn in Indra-loka, his heaven, proportionate in duration to the fervency of their devotion. If, on the other hand, their religion be the result of base fear, they sacrifice to the Rákshasas, etc., and to them I send them after death. But if, recognizing my kind nature, they worship me in my supreme spiritual character, with true devotion, they are then finally emancipated, and enter my being.

¹⁰ This is an exemplification of the preceding shloka. Each of the deities of mythology is patron of some one craft, or donor of some peculiar blessing, and this I grant, if their worship be sincere and devout. The particle *hi* is here simply conjunctive. Wilkins has rendered the second arddha-shloka as if *kshipra* were an adjective.

¹¹ The qualities were supposed to be distributed in different proportions among the four castes. The Bráhmans had a preponderance of *sattwa*. The Kshatriyas of *sattwa* and *rajas*. The Vaishyas of *rajas* and *tamas*, and the Shúdras of *tamas* alone. The action or office of the first caste was knowledge, prayer, instruction and self-restraint; of the second, sovereignty and protection of the people, by peace and warfare; of the Vaishyas, commerce and agriculture; of the Shúdras, servitude.

¹² Referring to the belief that the Brahmá was the institutor of caste. But since Brahmá was only the Supreme Spirit in his personified character of creator of all things, he is right in calling himself its institutor. Wilkins and St. Hilaire give to the word *akartáram* (on what authority I know not) a passive signification.

¹³ Another assertion that *jnāna-yoga*, a right comprehension of Divine truth, is a means of final emancipation.

old time,¹⁴ knowing it to be thus,¹⁵ performed actions in the hope of final emancipation. Do thou therefore do an action¹⁶ which was formerly done by the ancients. Even sages¹⁷ have been troubled as to "what is action and what inaction." Such action I will explain to thee, by the knowledge of which thou wilt be liberated from evil.¹⁸ The (natures)¹⁹ of action, forbidden action, and inaction, must be well learnt. The path of action is obscure. He who discovers inaction in action, and action in inaction, is wise among mortals.²⁰ He is devoted, and performs all his duty. The wise say that the man whose undertakings are all free from plans of ambition, performs actions which are consumed in the fire of knowledge,²¹ and call him learned. He who abandons all interest in the fruit of his actions, is always contented and independent.²² Even though occupied in action, he does not really

¹⁴ Viz. : Janaka and the Rájarshis, of whom he has already spoken.

¹⁵ *Evam* always refers to what has preceded, but as, if it referred to shloka 14, it would be no reason for their thus acting, I am inclined to think it must be referred to the nature of caste, mentioned in shloka 13, and that shloka 14 must be taken parenthetically, as explanatory of the words *akartáram* and *avyayam*, if indeed it be not an interpolation of later date. It was the knowledge that the castes were divided according to their offices and duties (*karma*), and that these were instituted by the Supreme Being, that induced the devotees of old time to cling closely to the limits assigned to their caste.

¹⁶ War, the duty of the Kshatriyas.

¹⁷ Lit., 'poets, songsters,' and generally 'learned men.' Not that the poets of India, unlike those of any other nation, were necessarily wise and learned; but rather that, in the early rustic ages of the Aryan race, when the voice of man was the only organ of literature, the wise and learned breathed their knowledge in song.

¹⁸ The knowledge of action then is a part of that spiritual knowledge which aids the escape from the evil of regeneration, by final emancipation.

¹⁹ We follow Schlegel in his suggestion of *tattwa*, as the word on which these three genitives must be understood to depend.

²⁰ He who comprehends the real nature of action knows that it is not himself who acts, but the natural qualities which accomplish their office; and again, when he is apparently inactive, the vital action still proceeds.

²¹ His actions, whatever they may be, are, in effect, no actions, since his knowledge teaches him their real causes, and thus destroys his responsibility for them.

²² Lit., 'requires no refuge, no shelter.' He who acts from interested motives, seeks, whenever he commits it, a refuge from the consequences of his crime; but the man who acts with devotion may even commit a bad deed without fear of its results, since he does so without any intention, simply by necessity, or as a duty. A soldier who fires at the command of his superior officer cannot be said to commit murder. This is explained in the next shloka.

do anything. He who, without hopes (of reward), restrains his own thoughts, abandons all that he possesses, and renders his actions merely corporeal, does not incur sin. Contented with what he receives fortuitously, superior to the influence of opposites,²³ without envy, the same in success and failure, even though he acts, he is not bound by the bonds of action. The entire action of a man who is free from self-interest and devoted,²⁴ whose thoughts are directed by spiritual knowledge, and who acts for the sake of sacrifice,²⁵ is (as it were) dissolved away. The Supreme Spirit is the offering. The Supreme Spirit is the sacrificial butter.²⁶ The Supreme Spirit is in the (sacrificial) fire. By the Supreme Spirit is the offering (really) made. Therefore only the Supreme Spirit is attained by one who meditates on the Supreme Spirit in (performing) his actions.²⁷ Some²⁸ devotees attend to the sacrifice of the deities only; others offer sacrifice by the action of worship only in the fire of the Supreme Being. Some sacrifice the sense of hearing, and the other (senses), in

²³ Such as heat and cold, pain and pleasure, etc.

²⁴ I have here ventured to make a conjecture, which will be defended at length in my edition of the text, viz. *yuktasya* for *muktasya*, which is found in the two editions, and I believe in most, if not all, of the MSS. When the sense is so materially improved by so slight a change as that of *y* for *m*, I do not hesitate to adopt it.

²⁵ That is, 'instigated only by the spirit of devotion.' The shlokas 25-29 explain this species of sacrifice.

²⁶ Ghee, or clarified butter, is butter which has been boiled gently and allowed to cool. It is poured upon the sacrificial fire.

²⁷ Since the Supreme Spirit exists in every action and every thing, the man who recognizes him in every thing, and has him as his sole object in his every action, attains to him.

²⁸ Schlegel has well explained the meaning of these shlokas 25-29, and bids us compare *Manu* iv. 22-24. They appear to be explanatory of what is said in shloka 23, of acting for the sake of sacrifice; and the different means are shown by which sacrifice may be offered to the Supreme Being by a real devotee (*yogin*). We have first the common mode ordained by the established religion—sacrifices to the deities, such as Indra, Varuna, Agni, etc.; not, however, undertaken from motives of interest, as explained in shloka 12, but from the belief that the Supreme Being exists in those deities, as in everything else. In the next arddhashloka, on the contrary, are mentioned those who, abandoning the established rite, perform a mental sacrifice, as it were, in which those rites are themselves the offering which is consumed in the devotion to the Supreme Spirit, who thus becomes the sacrificial fire.

the fires of restraint;²⁹ some offer objects of sense, such as sound, in the fires of the senses;³⁰ and others sacrifice all actions of the senses and of vitality in the fire of devotion through self-restraint, which is kindled by spiritual knowledge.³¹ Others also sacrifice by their wealth,³² or by mortification, by devotion, by silent study, and spiritual knowledge, being subdued in their passions, and faithful to their vows. Some also sacrifice inspiration of breath in expiration, and expiration in inspiration, by blocking up the channels of inspiration and expiration, desirous of retaining their breath.³³ Others, by abstaining from food, sacrifice life in their life.³⁴ All of these indeed, being versed in sacrifice, have their sins destroyed by these sacrifices. Those who eat

²⁹ Those who retire from the world into the jungle, where their senses, such as hearing, sight, etc., will not be allured by the external objects of this world. This restraint (*sanyama*)—this practice of ascetic monachism—this retirement from the world—is, as it were, the sacrificial fire which destroys those senses, of the enjoyment of which they deprive themselves, as the ordinary sacrificer does of the enjoyment of the sheep or the ox which he offers.

³⁰ Those, on the other hand, who, remaining in the world, allow the objects of sense, such as pleasant sound (*e.g.* music), pleasant sights (*e.g.* female beauty, etc.), to surround and attack them, but by a complete mastery over their senses, which they assail, destroy their influence over their hearts. Here the objects, of the enjoyment of which they deprive themselves, are in the same position as the victim; and the senses, in which they are absorbed, as the sacrificial fire.

³¹ Those who, following the principles of *jnána-yoga*, and devoted to the research of the Divine truth, pass their lives in the severest austerities of asceticism in order to obtain it. They sit in contemplation, as immovable as possible, refraining from food during certain gradually increasing intervals, and even holding their breath for long periods. Their senses and breath, from the action of which they refrain, are thus likened to the victim, their devotion and self-restraint to the sacrificial fire.

³² By giving away all that they possess, and imposing poverty on themselves.

³³ As we are told in Chapter IV. 27, this inspiration and expiration are those which pass through the nostrils. This sacrifice is usually called *pránáyána*, and is accomplished in the following manner:—The followers of the Vedas close the right nostril with the thumb and inhale their breath through the left. They then close both nostrils, and finally open the right for exhalation. The followers of the Tantras close the left nostril first, and also exhale through it. During this exercise, however performed, the devotee should recite mentally the names and attributes of the Supreme Being.

³⁴ When *prána* is employed in the plural, it has always the more general signification of 'life.' This shloka therefore simply means, that by excessive abstinence, the devotee—while yet alive—becomes almost as lifeless as if dead, and thus, even during life, offers his life as a sacrifice.

of the ambrosia³⁵ left from a sacrifice pass into the eternal Supreme Spirit. This world is not for the neglecter of sacrifice. How should the other be so,³⁶ O best of Kurus?³⁷ Sacrifices of so many kinds (as the above) are performed in the presence of the Supreme Spirit.³⁸ Know that all these spring from action. Knowing this, thou wilt be (finally) emancipated. The sacrifice of spiritual knowledge is better than a material sacrifice, O harasser of thy foes! Every action, without exception, is comprehended in spiritual knowledge, O son of Prithá! Acquire this (knowledge) by doing honour, by inquiry, and by service.³⁹ Those gifted with this knowledge, who perceive the truth of things, will teach thee this knowledge. Knowing which, thou wilt not, O son of Páñdu! thus again incur an error. By this knowledge thou wilt recognize all things whatsoever in thyself, and then in me.⁴⁰ If thou wert even the most sinful of all sinners, thou wouldest cross over all sin in the bark of spiritual knowledge.⁴¹ As fire,

³⁵ As has been already said (Ch. III. 12), the man who eats without sacrificing—is a thief; but he who eats what remains, after he has sacrificed, eats ambrosia, that is, the bread of immortality (*amrita*), since it ensures for him eternal life. It does not here, however, simply refer to the actual food remaining after the offering, but to that state of life, which a devotee enjoys, after the performance of the divers sacrifices already mentioned.

³⁶ The man who makes no sacrifice either to the deities or the Supreme Being enjoys neither this world nor eternal life; for if not propitiated by sacrifice, the former will not grant him his desires, nor will the latter admit him into his being.

³⁷ The word *kuru*—here and elsewhere—when alluding to Arjuna, must be taken in the more general sense which embraces all the descendants of Kuru, both Páñdavás and Dhártaráshtrás, though more commonly confined to the latter.

³⁸ This is simply a recapitulation of what has preceded. But it has been otherwise understood by the translators. Schlegel has ‘propagata et numinis ore,’ as if the reading were *mukhát*; Wilkins, ‘manifested in the mouth of God,’ giving quite a new meaning to *vitátá*; Galanos, ‘ordained by the Vedas themselves,’ accepting, as elsewhere, the Bráhmáñical interpretation of the word *brahma*. St. Hilaire alone has ‘répandus devant la divinité.’ In Manu iii. 28, the words *vitate yajne* are used in the sense of performing a sacrifice; and in Nala i. 54, this verb, used in the same sense, is explained by the Scholiast by *akarot*, ‘performed.’ Again, the common use of the word *mukhe* is that of a post-position governing the genitive case, with the meaning of ‘in the presence, before,’ etc.; and the present translation would thus seem to be more grammatical and simpler than any other.

³⁹ To those philosophers who possess this knowledge.

⁴⁰ Thou wilt perceive the connection between all beings and thyself and me, the Supreme Spirit, since all souls are emanations from me.

⁴¹ Not implying that the devotee may sin *ad libitum*, but that spiritual knowledge, which in shloka 38 is called the best purifier, purges him of his former sin, however black.

when kindled, reduces fuel to ashes, Arjuna, so does the fire of knowledge burn to ashes all actions. For there is no purifier in the world like knowledge. A man who is perfected in devotion finds it spontaneously in himself in the progress of time.⁴² He who possesses faith⁴³ acquires spiritual knowledge, if intent on it, and restraining his senses. Having acquired spiritual knowledge, he soon attains to supreme tranquillity.⁴⁴ He who ignores the truth, and is devoid of faith, and of doubtful mind, perishes. The man of doubtful mind enjoys neither this world nor the other,⁴⁵ nor final beatitude.⁴⁶ No actions bind the man who trusts his actions to devotion, who has dispersed doubt by knowledge, and is self-possessed, O despiser of wealth! Therefore sever this doubt which exists in thy heart, and springs from ignorance, with thy sword of knowledge;⁴⁷ turn to devotion, and arise, son of Bharata!’

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Fourth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION THROUGH SPIRITUAL KNOWLEDGE.’

⁴² Active devotion and contemplation are the means by which spiritual knowledge is acquired, even without instruction.

⁴³ Faith is the absence of all doubt and scepticism, confidence in the revelation of religion and un murmuring performance of its ordinances. This is another argument against Arjuna’s refusal to fight, since it arose from doubts as to his duty as a Kshatriya.

⁴⁴ Final emancipation, freedom from the toils and pains of all material existence.

⁴⁵ Viz., the heaven of Indra and the deities, etc.

⁴⁶ Since from doubt about his duty, he neglects it, and is punished in Naraka.

⁴⁷ It will be seen that, at the end of every Chapter, wherever it is possible, Krishna exhorts Arjuna to arise and fight, whether it be against the actual enemy before him, or against some evil that threatens him. See Chapter III. shloka 43.

CHAPTER THE FIFTH.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Thou praisest, Kṛiṣṇa! the renunciation of works,¹ and on the other hand devotion (through them).² Declare to me with precision that one only which is the better of these two.’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Renunciation of and devotion through works are both means of final emancipation.³ But of these two, devotion through works is more highly esteemed than renunciation of them. He who neither hates nor loves is to be considered a constant renouncer of actions. For he who is free from the influence of opposites, O strong-armed one! is liberated from the bonds of action without any trouble. Boys, but not wise men, speak of the Sāṅkhya (rational) and Yoga (devotional) doctrines⁴ as different. For he who is devoted to one (of these) only, experiences at the same time the fruits of both.⁵

¹ Having in the last Chapter parenthetically explained the nature of spiritual knowledge, and established the fact that devotion by means of such knowledge was a part of the Yoga system, he now returns to the explanation of action as a means of salvation. In this Chapter he will show that the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines, as regards action, are in reality the same, although the watchword of the former is renunciation of all action and reliance on knowledge only, and that of the latter practice of action with devotion. This he proves by showing that the very practice held up by Yoga comprises, in fact, proper renunciation, since this is not really entire renunciation of action itself, but of all worldly interest in acting.

² The genitive *karmāṇāṃ* is dependent on *yogam*, as well as on *sanyāsam*, and the two words are together equivalent to the compound *karma-yoga*. Compare, moreover, Chapter IV. 27.

³ We will not trouble the reader with a repetition of the refined discussion on the word *nishkreyas*, but refer him to Chézy's critique (*Journal des Savans*, 1825, p. 42), and Schlegel's note on this passage.

⁴ Compare Chapter II. 39.

⁵ Viz., final emancipation.

That place⁶ which is gained by the followers of the Sánkhya is also attained by those of the Yoga system. He who sees that the Sánkhya and Yoga are one, sees indeed.⁷ But renunciation of actions is difficult to obtain without devotion. The anchorite who practises devotion approaches the Supreme Spirit in no long time. The practiser of devotion, whose spirit is purified, who has subdued himself and vanquished his senses, whose soul participates in the souls of all creatures,⁸ is not polluted even by action. The devotee who knows the Divine truth should think, "I am doing nothing"⁹ whenever he looks, hears, touches, smells, eats,¹⁰ walks,¹¹ sleeps,¹² or breathes,¹³ even when he speaks,¹⁴ lets go or takes,¹⁵ opens or shuts his eyes, believing that the senses move (by natural impulse)¹⁶ towards the objects of the senses. He who, in acting, offers his actions to the Supreme Spirit,¹⁷ and puts aside self-interest, is not polluted by sin, even as a lotus leaf is not so by water.¹⁸ Devotees perform actions by their bodies, hearts, or intellects, merely through the medium of the senses, putting away self-interest, and for the sake of purification.¹⁹ The man who is devoted, and regardless of

⁶ The being of the Supreme Spirit.

⁷ *Pashyati* is here used emphatically, seeing with spiritual sight.

⁸ Who considers all beings to be the same as himself, and feels towards them accordingly.

⁹ But the quality of action (*rajas*) working within me, causes these senses and organs to act.

¹⁰ That is, when the five senses of perception are in action.

¹¹ The action of the feet considered as one of the five organs of action.

¹² Cessation of the action of the senses.

¹³ Vital action.

¹⁴ The action of the mouth, as another of the five organs of action.

¹⁵ The same, of the hands.

¹⁶ By the quality of action (*rajas*).

¹⁷ Performs every action for the simple purpose of worship to the Supreme Being.

¹⁸ Most textures are damaged, or at least changed, by constantly remaining in water; but the leaf of the lotus is by nature fortified against the external influence of the liquid. In like manner the heart of the devotee is prepared against the effect of sin—which constantly attacks him from without—by the disinterestedness of his actions.

¹⁹ By their bodies, for bodily purification, such as religious offices; by the heart, for the purification of the desires; and by the mind, for that of the thoughts.

the reward of his actions, obtains steady tranquillity. He who is not devoted, and is intent on the reward, by the impulse of passion, is bound (with the bonds of action). The self-restrained, renouncing all actions with his heart, can, without difficulty, rest²⁰ (tranquil) within a city with nine gates,²¹ neither acting himself nor causing (others) to act.²² The lord of the world creates neither the faculty of acting nor actions, nor yet the desire for the fruits of actions. But each man's own nature produces them.²³ The Lord receives no one's vice or virtue. Knowledge is surrounded by ignorance.²⁴ Therefore creatures err. But the knowledge of those in whose souls that ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, lights up that supreme one, like the sun.²⁵ Those whose thoughts are on that spirit, whose souls are in it, who exist in it, and are intent on it, their sins being put away by knowledge, attain to that place whence there is no return.²⁶ The wise

²⁰ Lit., 'sit,'—but referring to the tranquillity of the soul.

²¹ Which is the body, whose apertures are nine, viz. two eyes, two ears, two nostrils, the mouth, the anus, and the membrum genitale.

²² Speaking, of course, of the soul, since, though the senses and organs act and even go through the performance of their duty, etc., it is the natural quality of impulse (*rajas*) which prompts the action, while the mind of the individual, which as we know, is considered by Hindú philosophers as quite distinct from the soul, directs them.

²³ The Supreme Being has created, and will again receive into himself, the universe and the souls which people it; but once life infused into the great machine—once nature, the material essence, set in motion—and, as the Hindú philosopher believes, it continues, like a clock, to go of itself. Certain qualities have been assigned to nature, and it is by these that good and evil are produced in the world, according to the predominance of one or other of the three qualities in the disposition of men. Hence man's diversity of disposition and character, and the good or bad actions which he commits. This *swabháva*, 'disposition, character, bent,' would seem to be the only substitute in Hindú philosophy for our idea of free-will; but when we remember that real sin consisted not so much in the crimes to which this disposition impelled each being, as in that blind worldliness which failed to detect its existence, and so subdue it accordingly, and when we compare it to the spirit of evil which we believe to be ever at work within us, we cannot accuse this doctrine of depriving mankind entirely of free-will and independence. The crime of the murderer is not so much in the commission of the actual deed, when he has once allowed the temptation to take hold of him, as in not before detecting and combating the temptation itself.

²⁴ Ignorance of the working of the *swabháva* within them.

²⁵ Discloses to them the true nature of the Supreme Spirit, as the sun discloses the earth.

²⁶ The being of the Supreme Spirit—since the soul always eventually returned to earth, even from the highest of other heavens.

regard a Bráhmaṇ gifted with knowledge and modesty, a cow, an elephant, and even a dog²⁷ and a Shwapáka,²⁸ as the same. Even in this life, those whose heart persists in equality, surmount the tendencies of their natures. For the Supreme Being is free from sin and equal-minded. Therefore they partake of the nature of the Supreme Being. One should not be overjoyed when one obtains what one loses, nor grieve when one meets with what one desires not, but should be of unwandering thoughts, not deluded (by the world), seeking to know the Supreme Being, remaining within the Supreme Being. He whose soul is not attached to the contact of external objects, and who²⁹ finds pleasure within himself, whose soul is united, by means of devotion, to the Supreme Being, enjoys imperishable happiness. For those enjoyments which arise from external contacts are also the wombs of pain,³⁰ since they have a beginning and an end, O son of Kuntí! The wise man does not take pleasure in them. He who can resist, even in this life, the impulse arising from desire and anger, before the liberation of the soul from the

²⁷ As a good Bráhmaṇ was considered the best specimen of a mortal, so the *Shwapáka* was the worst. Again, the cow was the most venerated among animals, the dog the least so, and the elephant a respectable medium.

²⁸ This is the name of the most abject and outcast class of Hindú society. Born of an Ugrá mother by a Kshatriya male, he was condemned by law to live without the city-gates, to feed in broken vessels, to wear the clothes of the dead, to possess no property but asses and dogs, and to be excluded from all intercourse with any other tribe except the Chaṇḍála, with whom he is really on a par. His office is that of public executioner, and to carry out the dead bodies of those who died without kindred. Perhaps in no country but India could men be found to submit, from a mere accident of birth, to so unenviable an existence; but the indolent and contemplative Hindú is satisfied if he only be left undisturbed to fulfil the wretched duties of his caste, convinced that his birth was the punishment of crimes committed in a former existence.

²⁹ See Schlegel's note on his reading, *yat sukham*. I have ventured to adopt the reading *yah sukham* which he mentions, as yielding a better sense, and being less forced in the construction.

³⁰ Contain within them the germ of pain, which they afterwards produce, as the womb contains the embryo of the child. Schlegel was induced, by the usual meaning of such compounds, to translate this (of which the second member was the word *yoní*) 'are produced by pain.' Lassen supports the present correction in a long note. The meaning is obvious, and explained by what follows. No pleasure, which arises from the senses, can be lasting; but is, on the contrary, always short-lived; and its very shortness and termination is, to a certain degree, painful.

body, is a devotee and a happy man. That devotee who is happy at heart, internally at ease, as well as internally³¹ illumined,³² partaking of the nature of the Supreme Being, attains to extinction in the Supreme Being. Those Rishis,³³ whose sins are destroyed, who have solved all doubt, who are self-governed, and delight in the good of all beings, obtain extinction in the Supreme Spirit. Extinction in the Supreme Spirit is near at hand for those who are free from desire and anger, and are temperate, of thoughts restrained, and who know their own souls. The anchorite³⁴ who renders external contact (really) external; confines³⁵ his gaze also to the space between his two brows,³⁶ and equalizes the inspiration and expiration which passes through the nostrils;³⁷ who restrains his senses, heart and mind intent on final emancipation; who is free from desire, fear and anger; is indeed always³⁸ emanci-

³¹ Contrasted with happiness derived from external and worldly objects.

³² By spiritual knowledge.

³³ The word is here used with the wide meaning of a holy and learned man.

³⁴ Contrary to custom, the sentence here extends over more than one shloka, and we must look for its subject (the word *muni*) in shloka 28.

³⁵ The participle *kritvā* also governs *chakshus*.

³⁶ In Chapter VI. 13, the Muni is directed to fix his gaze on the tip of his nose. The object of both varieties of this inelegant exercise is the same, viz. to withdraw his eyes, and consequently his thoughts, from worldly objects. He must not, to effect this, close his eyes, since that would bring sleep and destroy contemplation.

³⁷ See Chapter IV. note 33.

³⁸ That is, even during life. It refers to a state of spiritual abstraction which is called *jivanmukti*. The Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems admit two kinds of final emancipation of the soul from material existence. The former is the true emancipation, which takes place at the death of the body of a perfect devotee, when his soul is absorbed again into the Supreme Spirit from which it originally emanated, now to emanate no more. The latter, *jivanmukti*, is not real emancipation, since material existence continues, but a state of such complete abstraction of the soul from the body, that it is spiritually united to and almost absorbed into the Supreme Spirit. According to Kapila, the absorption is complete, and he compares life after it to a potter's wheel, which continues to revolve for a short time after the pot has been finished. Life goes on as if the soul were still within the body, for nature is not spent. According to Patanjali, however, the absorption is not complete, and there is always danger of a relapse even from this exalted state of spiritualism; while often the Muni is subject to the jealousy of the inferior deities, who attempt to seduce him through the ministry of beautiful nymphs, seductions which form the topic of many a Sanskrit tale. Ward (Views of Hindostan, vol. i. p. 380, etc.) gives rules, which he calls Patanjali's, for providing against such a relapse. The Vedānta system added a third kind of *mukti*, which, however, was not complete, but consisted in the soul's rising to the highest

pated. Knowing that I, the great lord of all worlds,³⁹ am the enjoyer of his sacrifices and mortification, and am well-disposed to all creatures, he obtains tranquillity.'

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Fifth Chapter, by name

'DEVOTION BY MEANS OF THE RENUNCIATION OF ACTIONS.'

material heaven, that of Brahmá. For a more detailed account of this curious doctrine, see Barthélemy St. Hilaire's 'Premier Mémoire sur le Sankhya-Káriká,' Paris, 1852, pp. 248 and 370.

³⁹ These worlds are many. The commonest classification is of three only: Heaven, Earth, and Hell. But in the Sankhya and Vedánta systems, eight regions of material existence were distinguished in the following descending order: 1. *Brahmaloka*, the world of the superior Deities; 2. *Pitřiloka*, that of the Pitřis, Rishis, and Prajápatis; 3. *Somaloka*, of the moon or planets; 4. *Indraloka*, of the inferior Deities; 5. *Gandharvaloka*, of heavenly spirits; 6. *Rakṣhasaloka*; 7. *Yakṣhaloka*; 8. *Pisháchaloka*, those of giants and demons.

CHAPTER THE SIXTH.

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'He who, careless as to the fruit of his actions, performs such actions as must be done,¹ is both renouncer (*sannyásti*) and devotee (*yogi*); not he who kindles no sacrificial fire, and performs no ceremonies.² Know, O son of Páñdu! that what they call renunciation is, in fact, devotion.³ For no one is a devotee who has not (previously) renounced all (earthly) plans of interest. The action of an anchorite, who is eager to ascend to devotion, is called a means;⁴ and when he has ascended to devotion, even his cessation of action is called a means.⁵ For when he is attached neither to the objects of the senses, nor to actions, and has renounced all (earthly) plans, he is then said to have ascended to devotion. Let him raise his soul by his own means; let him not lower his soul, for he is his soul's friend and also his soul's enemy.⁶ His self is a friend to the soul of that man who has subdued his self by his soul.⁷ But from the enmity of what is not spiritual,

¹ The duties of caste and religious offices.

² Not he who merely neglects them out of idleness, and does not supply their place with devotion.

³ See Ch. V. note 1.

⁴ Of obtaining a state of devotion.

⁵ Of attaining to final emancipation.

⁶ It must be remembered that the word *átman* has the two meanings of 'self' and 'soul,' which are here very philosophically distinguished. The soul, as we know, is considered quite distinct from the body, and lodged within it on earth to work out its salvation. But the individual 'self' in this world consists of soul and body together; and though the body, influenced by the *rajo-guṇa*, or evil impulse, is naturally hostile to the whole person, if allowed to have the upper hand, it is nevertheless its friend, if subdued by the soul, as being the means by which the soul obtains emancipation from material existence.

⁷ When a man has subdued his self (*i.e.* his body enlivened by the soul, together with its lusts, passions and natural inclination to evil) by means of his

his self might be an enemy, as it were, to his own soul.⁸ The soul of the self-subdued and passionless man is intent on the Supreme Being⁹ in cold and heat, pleasure and pain, and honour and ignominy. The devotee whose soul is sated with spiritual knowledge and spiritual discernment,¹⁰ who stands above all, whose senses are subdued; to whom a lump of earth, a stone, and gold are alike; is called "devoted." He who is of the same mind to friends, acquaintances, and enemies, to the indifferent and the neutral, to aliens¹¹ and relatives, to the good and bad, is greatly esteemed.¹² A devotee should always exercise himself, remaining in seclusion and solitude, restraining his thoughts and himself, without indulging hopes and without possessions,¹³ keeping a settled couch for himself in an undefiled spot, not too lofty nor too low,¹⁴ and with a sheet and skin

soul (the soul being the superior, the reasonable, and the governing part of the whole self), his self is then the friend of his soul; since self, or the union of soul and body, is the means by which emancipation may be effected.

⁸ Wilkins and Galanos have quite disregarded the meaning of the several words, and run off at once to the apparent sense of the whole sentence. Schlegel, as usual, has translated word for word, without giving, as far as I can see, any general sense. I confess that, at best, the whole sentence seems to be one of those Bráhmancial quibbles, redolent of tautology and alliteration, which would appear to be written to mystify and awe the humble student, and to afford employment and delight to the pedantic scholiast.

⁹ The word *paramátmá* may be taken as a compound of *parama* and *átmá*, or simply resolved into *param* and *átmá*. Galanos and Schlegel have adopted the former construction; though without, as far as I can see, any clear result, and with a forced rendering of the compound.

¹⁰ For an explanation of the difference between *jñána* and *vijñána*, see Ch. VII. note 2.

¹¹ Lit., 'Those who should be hated.' Its opposition to *bandhu*, those who are bound by some tie or other, determines its meaning here. To the Hindú, as indeed to all races who cherish the bonds of blood, all that is foreign is hateful.

¹² Another reading, equally good, is *vimuchyate*, 'is liberated.'

¹³ Comp. IV. 21. *Parigraha* is that which surrounds a man, be it his family and attendants, or his possessions. The context in both cases has induced me to prefer the latter meaning.

¹⁴ That is on level ground, where there would be no view, as from a hill, to distract his attention; and he would not, as in a valley, be hemmed in by worldly objects. The place usually chosen by the Muni as his retreat was in a jungle, on the bank of a river of fresh running water to drink and to bathe in, in a spot where the jungle had been partially cleared, and to which the wild beasts had ceased to resort.

(to cover him), and kusha¹⁵ grass (to lie on). Then fixing his heart on the one object,¹⁶ restraining his thoughts, senses and actions, seated on his couch, he should practise devotion for the purification of his soul. Holding his body, head and neck,¹⁷ all even and immoveable, firmly seated, regarding (only) the tip of his nose,¹⁸ and not looking around in different directions, the devotee should remain quiet, with passionless soul, free from anxiety, remaining under the vow of a Brahmachári,¹⁹ restraining his heart, meditating and intent on me. A devotee, who always exercises himself thus, and restrains his heart, attains to that tranquillity, the supreme extinction, which is conjoined with me. He who eats too much has no devotion, nor yet he who does not eat at all, nor he who is given to oversleeping, nor also to overwatching,²⁰ Arjuna ! Devotion, which destroys pain, is produced in one of moderate feeding and recreation, of moderate exertion in his actions, of moderate sleeping and waking. When he directs his well-governed thoughts towards himself only, and is free from desire as regards all wishes, he is then called "devoted." "As a candle placed in shelter from the wind does not flicker,"—this simile is recorded of the devotee of restrained thoughts, who practises devotion of the soul.

¹⁵ This is the 'Poa cynosuroides,' a grass, which, for some unknown reason, plays an important part in many of the Hindú rites and ceremonies, but particularly in the sacrifice, being laid beneath the sacrificial fire. The origin of its use may perhaps be connected with the forest and nomad life of the Aryan race in its earliest age. In this place its uses were, therefore, manifold, forming at once the material for the Yogi's couch, and for the rites which he would daily have to perform.

¹⁶ The Supreme Being.

¹⁷ For an explanation of this compound, see Wilson's Sanskrit Grammar, sect. 272.

¹⁸ See Ch. V. note 36.

¹⁹ *Brahmachári* (lit. 'follower of the Vedas,' from *brahman*, 'the Vedas,' and *char*, 'to go' (Wilson's Dictionary), but better, 'one who seeks to obtain the Supreme Spirit,' from *Brahman*, 'the Supreme Being,' and *char*, 'to follow') is the name given to a young man of the three principal castes, when pursuing his studies. It is taken generally to designate a man who preserves the vows of chastity and temperance, by which the student is bound. The continuance under such a vow is here marked by *sthita*.

²⁰ Devotion consists in moderation, not in excess or fanatical abstinence.

Let him know that the separation from the connection of pain, in which thought ceases,²¹ prevented by worship in devotion, and in which, beholding his own soul through his mind's eye,²² he is content with himself; in which he experiences whatever infinite pleasure the mind can receive, beyond the reach of the senses; and moreover, remaining in which, he does not verge from the truth, and after receiving which he thinks no other acquisition superior to it, and during which he is not moved even by severe pain—is known as “devotion.”²³ This devotion should be practised with that determination by which thought becomes indifferent²⁴ (to every worldly object). He who has abandoned all desires which spring from imagination, and has, by means of his heart, kept back the whole collection of the senses²⁵ from every direction (in which they would go),²⁶ should gradually become passive by his mind's acquiring firmness, and, by having caused his heart to remain within himself,²⁷ should not place his thoughts on anything at all. And keeping it back from those various²⁸ objects, to which the restless, unsteady heart wanders forth, he should bring it beneath his own control. For the highest happiness²⁹ accrues to that devotee of tranquil heart who, having set at rest the natural quality

²¹ Thoughts on worldly objects.

²² Lit., ‘by himself.’

²³ The rest of this arddha-shloka, which the English construction obliged us to transfer to shloka 20, is a play on the sound of the word *yoga*, and might be translated, ‘junction (with the Supreme Spirit), is disjunction from the conjunction with pain.’ We must suppose that this ringing of words presented something very pleasant and poetical to the Hindú ear, for such a triviality would be otherwise unworthy of the gravity of a philosophical poem, however admissible in the ‘airy fairy Lilián’ of a Tennysonian lyric.

²⁴ I have followed Schlegel's reading and translation, and beg to refer the reader to his note for its defence. The meaning is explained by shloka 25.

²⁵ A Sanskrit mode of expressing ‘all the senses,’ both of perception and action.

²⁶ The senses are supposed to be attracted towards the objects which they comprehend.

²⁷ Not allowing it to wander after external and worldly objects.

²⁸ Expressed by the repetition of the pronouns.

²⁹ Final emancipation.

of badness,³⁰ partakes of the nature of the Supreme Spirit, and is sinless. The devotee who is free from sin, and thus devotes himself continually, enjoys, without trouble, supreme felicity—the contact of the Supreme Spirit. The soul which is devoted to devotion, perceives the spirit existing in all things, and all things in the spirit, regarding everything alike in everything.³¹ I do not vanish from him who sees me in everything and everything in me, nor does he vanish from me.³² That devotee who worships me as existing in all things, if intent on unity (of object),³³ lives in me, in whatever way he may live.³⁴ He who, by comparison with himself, regards everything as the same, be it pleasure or pain, Arjuna ! is considered a most excellent devotee.'

ARJUNA SPOKE.

'I do not see any (possible) steady continuance, O slayer of Madhu ! in this devotion of equanimity which thou hast declared, on account of the variability (of the heart). For the heart is fickle, Kṛiṣṇa, full of agitation, headstrong, and obstinate. I believe the restraint of it to be as difficult as that of the wind.'

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'The heart, O strong-armed one ! is doubtless fickle and difficult to restrain. But it may be restrained, O son of Kuntí ! by practice and temperance. It is my opinion that

³⁰ The *rajo-guṇa*.

³¹ This is here said of the universal spirit (*akṣhara* or *kūṭastha*), which, as we shall see, was believed to pervade and exist in, and at the same time comprehend, matter. Nothing requires more care throughout our poem than to determine when *ātma* is to be rendered simply by 'self,' when by 'soul,' and when by 'spirit.' The sense is here determined by the following shloka.

³² I remain for ever dwelling in him and he in me.

³³ On the Supreme Being, the one object.

³⁴ Whether he live in the world, following out the duties of his caste; or, in the solitude of the jungle, as an ascetic.

devotion is very difficult for one, who is not self-governed, to obtain. But it can be obtained by the self-governed, who uses efforts, by (proper) means.'

ARJUNA SPOKE.

'What path³⁵ does the ungoverned take, O Kṛiṣṇa! if gifted with faith, but with a heart which wanders from devotion; since he does not attain to the perfection of devotion? Does he not perish like a broken cloud, ejected from both (heaven and emancipation),³⁶ not remaining steady,³⁷ O strong-armed one! and deluded in the path³⁸ of the Supreme Being? Thou shouldst completely dispel this doubt for me, Kṛiṣṇa! for there is none other to dispel this doubt than thou.'

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'Such a man, O son of Prithá! does not perish in this world nor hereafter.³⁹ For no one who acts uprightly goes to perdition. The man who fails in devotion (only) attains to the regions of the righteous,⁴⁰ and having there dwelt for years of infinite⁴¹ number, is born again (on earth) in the body of the chaste⁴² and the fortunate;⁴³ or again he is even begotten in a family of wise devotees.⁴⁴ For regeneration in

³⁵ After death, since devotion is the only means of obtaining final emancipation.

³⁶ He abandons the law of rites and ceremonies of the established religion, to follow the doctrine of devotion. In this, however, he fails; and he would, therefore, naturally lose heaven, the reward of the first; and final emancipation, that of the second.

³⁷ That is, Constant to the established religion.

³⁸ Deluded by the wavering of his heart in the pursuit of devotion.

³⁹ Lit., 'Elsewhere;' namely, 'after death.'

⁴⁰ See Ch. V. note 39. The regions here alluded to are the first five, the worlds of the just; and it is according to his amount of righteousness, to which of these the soul is transported.

⁴¹ This at first sight would seem to be a Sanskrit 'bull,' but the word must be taken in a comparative sense. His sojourn seems infinite, compared to his mundane existence; and, as the duration of the universe is not less than five millions of years, this is extremely natural.

⁴² Of the Bráhmaṇ caste.

⁴³ Of the Kshatriya caste.

⁴⁴ Thus improving his chance of final emancipation.

the world, of such a kind as this, is more difficult to obtain. In that (body) he re-assumes the mental application of his former body,⁴⁵ and from that time struggles more diligently towards perfection, O son of Kuru! For, even against his will, he is carried away by his former practice. Even if anxious to learn devotion, he only surmounts the verbal deity.⁴⁶ But the devotee⁴⁷ who continues striving with energy, purged from his sins, is perfected after several regenerations,⁴⁸ and thence reaches the highest walk.⁴⁹ The devotee is deemed superior to ascetics, and even to those gifted with spiritual knowledge, and to those who trust to works (alone).⁵⁰ But of all⁵¹ devotees even, he who, seeking me by his inmost spirit, worships me, full of faith, is considered by me the most devoted.'

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Sixth Chapter, by name

'DEVOTION BY MEANS OF SELF-RESTRAINT.'

⁴⁵ It is a curious part of the doctrine of transmigration, as received by this school, that the soul was supposed—in a future life on earth, not, as it were, to begin afresh and to be born with a new character and disposition—but to start from the point at which it had left off in its former body. Thus, the same virtuous or vicious inclinations accompanied it, and not only were its former actions punished during its present existence, but its former difficulties still surrounded and impeded it.

⁴⁶ He does not really approach the Supreme Spirit spiritually, but only acquires a mental knowledge of him, as declared by his teachers and by philosophy.

⁴⁷ He has hitherto been speaking of the man who is not, though he strives to become, a devotee. He now speaks of the real self-governed devotee.

⁴⁸ The devotee himself is liable to regeneration, because it is only perfection in devotion that brings immediate emancipation from matter in this life.

⁴⁹ The Supreme Spirit.

⁵⁰ The devotee unites all these characters in his own. He practises ascetic exercises, acquires spiritual knowledge, and performs such works as sacrifice, almsgiving, and mortification. But since he adds devotion to them all, he is superior to each of those who trust in these. The *tapasvīn*, or ascetic, who tears his flesh, starves himself to a skeleton, and so forth, wrongly imagines that these acts alone will procure him emancipation. The follower of the Sāṅkhya doctrines, who relies on his knowledge of that philosophy, and neglects everything else, is equally mistaken; and so is the man who rigidly fulfils the duties of caste, and the ordinances of the established religion.

⁵¹ Eleven kinds of devotees are mentioned in Ch. IV. 25—30. Here a stress is probably to be laid on the 'me,' and this kind of devotee may be any one of those eleven, who, to his devotion, adds the belief in the identification of Viṣṇu, and his incarnation Kṛiṣṇa with the Supreme Spirit,—in short, a Vaiṣṇava or Bhāgavata Yogī.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTH.¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'Hear, O son of Pṛithá! how, with thy heart attached to me, practising devotion, and seeking me as a refuge, thou mayest know me entirely and without uncertainty. I will declare to thee fully both spiritual knowledge and spiritual discernment,² and when that is known, there remains nothing more besides to be learnt upon earth. Among thousands of mortals a single one, perhaps, strives after perfection, and even of those who do strive after it and attain it, a single one, perhaps, really understands me. Earth, water, fire, wind, ether, heart and intellect also, and egotism, into these eight components is my nature divided.³ This (nature) is an inferior one, but learn

¹ We now commence a new division of Kṛiṣṇa's doctrine. As has been described in the Introduction, our poem must be divided into three principal parts, each containing six chapters. The first part treats of the Doctrines of the Yoga system with reference to its practice and results. The last is purely philosophical, theoretical and speculative (with the exception of Ch. XVIII.); and the second part, to which we now come, treats of Theology, the nature and attributes of the Supreme Spirit, and his relation to the universe and mankind. The first part may be called Patanjali's, the last the Sāṅkhya school, and the present the peculiar province of the 'Bhagavad-Gītā,' the description of the Deity as a Supreme and an Universal Spirit, and his identification with Viṣṇu and Kṛiṣṇa. This Chapter treats of that spiritual discernment (*vijñāna*), by which the Supreme Spirit may be distinguished in and from the universe; in refutation of those, on the one hand, who deify certain portions of creation; and of the Sāṅkhya school, on the other, which asserts all creation to be the work of a common plastic principle (*prakṛiti*).

² The difference between *jñāna*, spiritual knowledge, and *vijñāna*, spiritual discernment, is briefly this. *Jñāna* is the whole philosophic knowledge, which embraces alike the Supreme Being, the universe, the soul, and every other kind of knowledge necessary for salvation. *Vijñāna* is a more special knowledge, which comprehends the Supreme Spirit only, and that, too, in his relation to matter.

³ To comprehend this and the following shlokas properly, a perusal of that part of the Introduction, which treats of the details of the Sāṅkhya system, is quite

my superior nature other than this, of a vital kind, O hero ! by means of which this universe is sustained. Understand that all things are produced from this latter nature. I am the cause of the production and dissolution of the whole universe.⁴ There exists no other thing superior to me,⁵ O despiser of wealth ! On me is all the universe suspended, as numbers of pearls on a string.⁶ I am⁷ the savour in the waters,⁸ O son of Kuntī ! and the luminous principle in the moon and

necessary, as it is beyond the limits of our notes to give more than a summary of what is now referred to. Nature (*prakṛiti*) is nothing here but another name for matter generally which Kṛiṣṇa calls 'mine,' because matter in its essential form was a part of the Supreme Spirit himself, who, as we know, was supposed to be the material, as well as the efficient cause of the universe. This matter consists in two forms. First, that of material essence, here identified with the principle of material life, which is the plastic principle of Kapila's system, and is commonly called nature (*prakṛiti*) 'par excellence ;' and also *pradhāna*, *mūlapradhāna*, etc., but here simply the superior nature, the *avyakta*, or non-developed matter. Secondly, *vyakta*, or matter in its developed form, the universe ; all things commonly comprehended under the head of matter, here called the inferior nature. The latter properly consists of twenty-three components, but eight only are here mentioned, in which the rest are comprehended. These eight are divisible into the two great heads, which we commonly call matter and mind : namely, the five grosser elements (*mahābhūta*), for matter properly so called, under which must be comprehended the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*), and the five organs of actions ; and for mind, or internal matter :—first, the internal organ of perception (*manas*), under which we must here rank the five senses, which the *manas* governs and collects ; second, memory (*ahankāra*), realization, or conscience ; and third, judgment, intēlect (*buddhi*). The order of all these is regularly inverted, beginning with the grossest element, earth, and ending, not with *buddhi*, the first product of nature, but irregularly with *ahankāra*, the second. The reason of the inversion is the same as that which places the inferior (*vyakta*) before the superior (*avyakta*) nature, namely, of presenting more poetically to the less philosophic mind, the more tangible before the more mysterious.

⁴ Like Kapila, our author gives to nature (*avyakta*) the part of father of all matter (*vyakta*), but he qualifies the statement by immediately adding that the Supreme Spirit is the cause of the working of that principle. Nature is passive, and has no will of its own ; and it is the Deity alone that causes matter to emanate from it, and again to be absorbed within it.

⁵ Nature is superior to the universe, soul to nature, and God to soul ; but there is nothing superior to God.

⁶ A simile, at once apt and beautiful, and the watchword of philosophers of this school. The Kosmos is likened to a necklace ; the Supreme Spirit, on which its existence depends, to the string. Take away the string, and the necklace exists no more. The beads indeed exist, but their connection, their unity, and the actual necklace they formed, exists no more. Take away from the universe the Supreme Spirit, and there would remain a chaos of material objects, without order, life or reason.

⁷ This is now exemplified in shlokas 8—11 by a number of instances, destined to show that the Supreme Spirit is the essential and principal, if not actually the material part of everything.

⁸ The peculiar property of water was considered to be taste. See Introduction.

sun, the mystic syllable "Om!" in all the Vedas,⁹ the sound in the ether,¹⁰ the masculine essence in men, the sweet smell in the earth;¹¹ and I am the brightness in the flame, the vitality in all beings, and the power of mortification in ascetics. Know, O son of Prithá! that I am the eternal seed of all things which exist; I am the intellect of those beings who possess intellect, the strength of the strong.¹² And I am the power of the strong in action, which is free from desire and passion.¹³ I am the lust in all beings, which is prevented by no law.¹⁴ And know that all dispositions,¹⁵ whether good, bad, or indifferent, proceed also from me. I do not exist in them, but they in me. All this universe being deluded by these three¹⁶ kinds of dispositions, composed of the three qualities, does not recognize me, the imperishable, who am superior to them. For this divine illusion¹⁷ of mine, effected by the natural qualities, is difficult to surmount. Those who have recourse to me only can surmount that illusion. Evil-doers, fools, and low men, deprived

⁹ As being that with which each hymn commences, and which hallows all that follows.

¹⁰ Audibleness is the peculiar property of ether (*ákasha*). See Introduction.

¹¹ Smell is that of earth. See Introduction.

¹² Reason in man and physical strength in animals.

¹³ The powers (*vibhúti*) acquired by the good who act in freedom from self-interest or passion.

¹⁴ The desire of copulation, which nothing can prevent, though religion may restrain it. Be careful to separate the compound into *dharma* + *aviruddha*, by neglect of which Wilkins, Chézy, and Langlois have fallen into egregious error. See Schlegel's note.

¹⁵ These are the characters of all beings, whether gods, demons, men, or animals, and are mixtures of the three qualities (*guṇa*) in different proportions. When he says that he does not exist in them, he does not detract from his character of universal and omnipresent Being. These dispositions belong to none of the categories of existing things. They are neither nature, matter, soul, nor spirit, but abstract independent forces influencing all matter.

¹⁶ As the qualities (*guṇa*) are three in number, so are the dispositions three in kind, according to the preponderance of each quality in each of them.

¹⁷ This *māyá*, which is explained at length in the Introduction, generally refers, as in the Vedānta system, which borders on nihilism, to the whole creation, considered as having no real existence, but only appearing to man to exist. It would seem here to allude to the influence of the qualities on matter, by which the real relation of matter to spirit is disguised, and the former only appears really to exist.

of spiritual knowledge by this illusion, and inclining towards the disposition of the Asuras,¹⁸ do not have recourse to me. Four kinds of upright men worship me, O Arjuna ! (viz.) the afflicted, he who is desirous of knowledge, he who is desirous of some possession,¹⁹ and he who is possessed of spiritual knowledge, O prince of the Bharatas ! Of these, the best²⁰ is the one who is possessed of spiritual knowledge, if he always practises devotion, and confines his worship to me alone. For I am dear to the spiritually-wise beyond possessions,²¹ and he is dear to me. All of these (four) are indeed excellent, but the spiritually-wise is verily myself²² to my thinking. For, with devoted soul, he has approached even me, the highest path. At the conclusion of many generations the spiritually-wise proceeds towards me. A great-minded man who (is convinced) that "Vásudeva²³ is everything," is difficult to find. Those who are deprived of spiritual knowledge by a diversity²⁴ of desires, adopt divers²⁴ rites of worship,

¹⁸ *Asura* is here a general name for the enemies of the gods, the giants and demons who inhabit Pátála, below the earth. As the *sattva-guna*, or quality of goodness, predominates in the gods, and the *rajo-guna*, or active badness, in man; so the *tamo-guna*, or bad indifference and obscurity, preponderates in the disposition of the Asuras; and those men whose dispositions resemble theirs are therefore the worst and lowest, and blinded by the influence of the qualities, deceived by the appearance only of the universe, do not recognize the existence of the Supreme Being.

¹⁹ Whether wealth, progeny, happiness, or anything else of that kind.

²⁰ Because the motives of the other three were selfish.

²¹ The translators have all taken the commoner meaning of *atyartham* as an adverb, and rendered it by 'extremely.' I confess I think the word has here a more prominent and emphatic force, and that the context demands the translation I have given. To the afflicted, hoping for consolation, to the seeker of some possession, and the thirster after knowledge, some object (*artha*) is dear, and prompts their worship. To the spiritually-wise the Supreme Being alone is dear above all such objects.

²² A preferable reading, not, however, supported by any MS., would be *átma + iva*. As they stand, the words *átma + eva* can only be explained by supposing *íti* to be understood after them. Madhusúdana, the scholiast, explains them by *na matto bhinnah*, 'not severed from me,' i.e. 'united with me in spirit;' and this is, perhaps, supported by the next arddha-shloka.

²³ Properly a name of Kṛiṣṇa, as son of Vasudeva (see Index); but generally usurped for Viṣṇu himself, particularly in his identification with the Supreme Spirit.

²⁴ The indefiniteness is expressed by the repetition of the pronoun.

directed by their own natures, and have recourse to other deities (than me).²⁵ If any one worshipping with faith, desire to reverence any personage, I make that faith of his constant. Gifted with such faith, he seeks the propitiation of this (personage), and from him receives the pleasant objects of his desires, which were directed by me alone.²⁶ But the reward of these little-minded men is finite.²⁷ They who sacrifice to the gods, go to the gods. They who worship me, come to me. The foolish, ignorant of my lofty, incorruptible supreme being, think that I, who am not manifested, am endowed with a manifest form.²⁸ Surrounded by my magic illusion, I am not manifest to everybody. This deluded²⁹ world does not comprehend me, who neither am born nor die. I know all beings, past, present, and future, O Arjuna! but no one knows me. All beings fall into error as to the nature of the creation, Bhárata! by reason of that delusion of natural opposites,³⁰ which springs from liking and disliking,

²⁵ Those, for instance, who desire future happiness in heaven, worship Indra; those who wish for wealth, Kuvera; those who long for victory, Skanda; and so on.

²⁶ The translation of this passage by Schlegel is quite arbitrary and incomprehensible. If I have not succeeded in making it more intelligible, I have at least confined myself to the literal meaning of the words, and can only offer an explanation of the sense generally. *Tanu* is literally 'a body,' and is here used to distinguish all objects of worship generally, whether gods, demons, or earthly objects, from the one object of the spiritually-wise—the Supreme Spirit. If a man, then, having some desire at heart, and believing that prayers and sacrifice will bring it about, seeks to what deity, demon, or other object of worship he shall address himself, the Supreme Spirit himself, existing within such objects, directs his faith in the right direction, confirms and establishes it. Thus the man, with his faith directed to the proper object, propitiates it by prayer and sacrifice, and obtains his reward. In other words, the Supreme Being not only recognizes the established religion, but even arranges it as it should be, and is the means of encouraging and directing the connection between man and his superiors. Schlegel rightly observes that *tasyárdhana* must be resolved into *tasyás* and *árdhana*, and quotes Rámáyana, i. 44, 9. *Tasyás* is feminine as referring to *tanu*.

²⁷ Since even the Gods are doomed to a final destruction. The reward of those who worship the Supreme Spirit is eternal, since he and he only is immortal.

²⁸ Believe some one of the gods, as Brahma, Viṣṇu, or Shiva, to be the Supreme Spirit himself. Our philosopher would seem to be cutting his own throat on this ground.

²⁹ Deluded by *máya*, or the appearance of things, some believe even the highest Being to be born and mortal, since they perceive that this is the lot of all matter.

³⁰ These natural opposites are heat or cold, pain or pleasure; and the delusion

O tormentor of thy foes ! But those men who act uprightly, in whom sin is dead, freed from this delusion of the natural opposites, worship me firm in devotion. They who turn to me and strive after liberation from regeneration and death, know that whole supreme spirit, and the Adhyátma,³¹ and entire action. They who know me to be the Adhibhúta,³¹ the Adhidaiva,³¹ and the Adhiyajna,³¹ and also (know me to be thus), in the hour of death know me indeed.’³²

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Seventh Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION THROUGH SPIRITUAL DISCERNMENT.’

they cause arises from aversion from the one, or liking for the other. By these feelings man seeks his own interest only in his worship, and then falls into error as to the real cause of the creation of matter, which he believes to be subservient to his enjoyment, and not to the emancipation of the soul from material life.

³¹ As these words are explained in the beginning of the next Chapter, it is superfluous to attempt to do so here.

³² Compare VIII. 2, 5, and 13. *Vidus* has here an emphatic force, as *pashyati* has in V. 5, and XIII. 29. It not only indicates the possession of spiritual knowledge, but the attainment of that final emancipation itself, which is acquired by that knowledge. ‘They know me indeed, thoroughly, truly; and, since this knowledge continues with them till the hour of their death, they are by it liberated from material life.’

CHAPTER THE EIGHTH.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

'What is that Supreme Spirit? What is Adhyátma?¹ what action? O best of men! and what is called Adhibhúta?¹ and what is said to be Adhidaiva?¹ and how can there be

¹ Before entering on an explanation of these terms, we must remind the reader that this portion of our poem is a treatise on Theology, an explanation of that Supreme Being who is the object of the worship of the Yogi, and the head of the whole theistic (*seshwara*) branch of the Sankhya school. This Being may be regarded under many divers aspects, and *Brahma*, or the Supreme Spirit, which he mentions first, is the general name which includes these four others.—First, *Adhyátma* is composed of the prep. *adhi*, which has the signification of 'above,' 'superior to,' 'presiding over,' and *átma* 'soul.' It means, therefore, 'that which presides over the soul.' In shloka 3, it is said to be *swabháva*, 'own nature,' where a reflective force must be given to *swa*, as referring to the Supreme Spirit. It is, then, the Supreme Spirit viewed in his relation to the soul, in which he is known to be at the same time that soul itself and superior to it; the spirit from which it has emanated, but with which it is still intimately connected, in the relation of an inferior part to a superior whole.—Second, *Adhibhúta* is composed of *adhi*, 'superior to,' 'presiding over,' and *bhúta*, 'that which exists.' It is, therefore, 'that which presides over what exists;' and refers to the Supreme Being in his relation to the whole universe, in his connection with matter, as himself containing the essence of matter with him. In shloka 4 it is explained by the words *ksharo-bhávah*, 'divisible nature,' which must refer to *prakriti*, the essence of matter, which we know is divisible in its development into twenty-three categories. This, again, is referred to the Supreme Spirit, by what he says in Ch. VII. 30.—Third, *Adhidaiva*, or, as in shloka 4, *adhidaivata*, is composed of *adhi*, 'presiding over,' *deva* or *devatá*, 'a deity,' and here a general term for all superhuman beings. It is, therefore, that 'which presides over the divine part of creation.' In shloka 4 it is explained by the word *purusha*, for a full explanation of which we must refer the reader to the Introduction, and to Chap. XV. of our poem. Its literal meaning is 'man,' and in the Sankhya system it means 'the soul,' which is the real person of man, his body being merely a temporary setting, as it were. In the system of Patanjali, and the Bhagavad-Gítá, in which an universal spirit, from which the soul emanated, was first brought forward, it has two meanings: firstly, that of the soul, the individual man; and, secondly, that of the Supreme Spirit, from which the soul emanates, more usually called *mahápurusha*, or *purushottama*, the great or highest soul. In Ch. XV. of our poem, we shall find a third meaning attached to this word (shlokas 16—18), but it is in the second that we must here understand it, although Humboldt (*Zeitschrift der K. Academie zu Berlin*, 1825) thinks that the word can only have this meaning when an epithet is attached to it;

any Adhiyajna¹ here in this body,² O slayer of Madhu? And how art thou to be known by the temperate in the hour of death?’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘The supreme universal spirit is the One simple and indivisible,³ and my own nature is called Adhyátma. The emanation, which causes the existence and reproduction⁴ of existing things bears the name of Action. Adhibhúta is (my) own indivisible nature, and Adhidaivata is the spiritual person. Adhiyajna is myself here upon earth, in the body, O best of embodied men! And he who, remembering me at the moment of death, quits the body and comes forth, enters my nature; there is no doubt about that. Or, again, whatever nature he thinks on, when he abandons the body at the last, to that only does he go,⁵ O son of Kuntí! having been

as in VIII. 22; X. 12; XI. 18 and 38; XV. 4, etc. Of these, XI. 38 seems to favour my rendering, the epithet *adidēva* having so much similarity with the present one of *adhidaiva*.—Fourth, *Adhiyajna*, compounded of *adhi*, ‘presiding over,’ and *yajna*, ‘sacrifice,’ ‘worship,’ is the object of worship, the keystone of religion. This, says Kṛṣṇa, is myself, Viṣṇu, in this my present incarnation of Kṛṣṇa, under which form the Supreme Being is worshipped. Man is too material to be able to worship the pure abstract idea of a Supreme universal Spirit. Some tangible and manifest personification was required for the less philosophic portion of mankind, some *adhiyajna*, to give a definition and name to their faith; and Kṛṣṇa is that *adhiyajna*. Galanos would take the word *dēhabhrítam* with *dēhe*, and translate, ‘And Adhiyajna is I in all bodies.’ This construction affords no explanation of *adhiyajna*; and, moreover, forces on *dēhe* a plural or at least collective sense, which it cannot sustain.—To recapitulate, *adhyátma* is the Supreme Spirit in his relation to man’s soul; *adhibhúta*, in his relation to matter; *adhidaiva*, in his relation to the divers objects of worship; *adhiyajna*, in his relation to religion, the personified type.

² Alluding to Kṛṣṇa’s body.

³ See Chapter III. note 18.

⁴ Causes their original existence and the further production of other objects from them.

⁵ The morality of this passage at first sight seems dubious. It would appear to rest a man’s salvation on a mere chance; or, at best, on a death-bed repentance. Nothing of the kind is meant. No sudden death is here hinted at; but a man is supposed, when the awful hour of dissolution approaches, to turn with all his might and soul to that Deity, whom a lifelong worship has taught him to consider his protector. If the desire of his heart has been the enjoyment of heaven, the Deity will have been Indra, and on him will he think in the hour of death; and by his heaven is his worship consequently rewarded, and so on. Moreover, a wholesome warning is hereby administered against relaxing in devotion; for if death overtake him, when the world and its cares have driven the object of his worship from his mind, his former devotion will avail him nought.

always conformed to that nature. Therefore think on me at all times, and fight. If thy heart and mind are turned to me, thou wilt doubtless attain to me alone. By thoughts applied to diligent devotion, and turned to no other object (than me), meditating⁶ on the Supreme Divine Person, one goes to him, O son of Prithá! He who may meditate on the Sage⁷ without beginning;⁸ the regulator more minute than an atom; the sustainer of all of incomprehensible form; bright as the sun beyond the darkness, at the hour of death; with steady⁹ heart, embued with worship and by the strength of devotion collecting his breath entirely between his eyebrows,¹⁰ attains that Supreme Divine Person. I will summarily expound to thee that place¹¹ which those who know the Vedas call the one Indivisible, which those who are temperate and free from passion enter, and with the desire of which, men follow the life of a Brahmachári.¹² He who closes all the doors of the senses,¹³ restrains his desires within his heart,¹⁴ disposes his breath within his brow,¹⁰ practises perseverance in devotion, utters the monosyllable "Om!" (which is) the Supreme Spirit,¹⁵ meditating on me, and thus continues when he is

⁶ The same accusative is here governed by both verbs, *ydti* and *anuchintayan*.

⁷ This and the following are all epithets of the Supreme Being. He is called a sage (lit., 'poet') as being omniscient. He is the regulator and ordainer of all things, more minute than an atom, yet greater than the whole universe. As the sun illumines the whole world, that spirit illumines everything; superior to the darkness, which typifies the ignorance arising from the illusion of matter, and the influence of the three qualities.

⁸ Lit., 'ancient,' but used for 'eternal as to the past,' for which no word exists in Sanskrit. Compare Chapter II. note 19.

⁹ Fixed on the one object only.

¹⁰ Compare Chapter IV. note 33.

¹¹ The being of the Supreme Spirit, the spiritual region which he inhabits, which, though infinite and undefined, is called a place.

¹² See Chapter VI. note 19.

¹³ The organs of sense, through which external objects penetrate to the heart.

¹⁴ Mark the distinction between *manas*, 'the abstract,' and *hrit*, 'the concrete.' *Manas* is the heart which desires, *hrit* that which beats.

¹⁵ The mystic word being the verbal representative of the Supreme Being, just as much as Brahmá was the representative of his creative, Viṣṇu of his preservative, and Shiva of his destructive powers.

quitting the body, attains the highest walk.¹⁶ I am easy of access to that ever devoted devotee who remembers me, O son of Prithá! with his thoughts never wandering to any other object. The great-minded, who have recourse to me, reach the highest perfection, and do not incur regeneration, which is the domain of pain, and is not eternal. All worlds, up to that of Brahmá,¹⁷ are subject to return,¹⁸ Arjuna! But he who comes to me has no regeneration, O son of Kuntí! Those men who know the day of Brahmá,¹⁹ which ends after a thousand ages; and the night which comes on at the end of those thousand ages,²⁰ know day and night indeed. At the

¹⁶ Union with the Supreme.

¹⁷ See Chapter V. note 39.

¹⁸ The soul is always liable to return after a certain sojourn, and be born again on earth, from any of the eight worlds, even including Brahmá's, which is the highest.

¹⁹ We have here a mythological allusion, which is another proof that our philosopher received much with implicit faith from the established belief. To understand it properly, we must remember the true character of Brahmá. On the one hand, he is the personification of the creative power of the Supreme Being; and, on the other, he has taken the place, in mythology, of Súra or the sun, the first person of the more primitive triad. As the sun begins the day on earth, and brings all things into active life, Brahmá begins that of the universe, by causing all developed matter to issue or emanate from the *prakriti*, the non-developed essence of matter. When, again, he sleeps, developed matter re-enters and is absorbed again into *prakriti*. Hence the supposed duration of the universe in each manifestation was called a day. Some have sought to attribute the system of reckoning the ages to astronomical observations; but Wilson justly observes that it is simply derived from a descending arithmetical progression, as 4, 3, 2, 1,—the conversion of units into thousands, and the mythological fiction that these were divine years, each composed of 360 years of men. Thus the four ages would be thus reckoned—

The Kṛita-yuga has	4,000	divine years, equal to	1,440,000	mortal years.
Tretá-yuga	3,000	"	"	1,080,000 "
Dwápara-yuga	2,000	"	"	720,000 "
Kali-yuga	1,000	"	"	360,000 "

Total 3,600,000

Certain periods at the beginning and end of each yuga, called Sandhyás and Sandhyánshas, equal to	720,000	"
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Complete the period called Maháyuga, or great Age, which is equal to 4,320,000 "

1,000 Maháyugas make a day of Brahmá, which is called a Kalpa; 360 such days compose his year, and 100 such years are his lifetime, called a Para. Thus Brahmá's lifetime consists of 255,520,000,000 mortal years, and during this period the universe is supposed to emanate from and re-enter the material essence 36,000 times.

²⁰ Not common ages, but Maháyugas, or aggregates of the four common ones. See preceding note.

approach of (that) all (objects of) developed matter come forth from the non-developed principle.²¹ At the approach of (that) night they are absorbed into that (principle) called the non-developed. This collective mass itself of existing things, (thus) existing again and again,²² is dissolved at the approach of that night. At the approach of (that) day it emanates spontaneously,²³ O son of Pṛithá! But there is another invisible eternal existence, superior to this visible one, which does perish when all things perish, called invisible and indivisible. This they call the highest walk. Those who obtain this never return. This is my supreme abode. But this supreme person, O son of Pṛithá! within whom all existing things exist, and by whom all this universe is caused to emanate, may be approached by devotion, which is intent on him alone. But I will tell thee, O prince of the Bharatas! at what time devotees dying obtain freedom from or subjection to (the necessity of) return.²⁴ Fire,²⁵ day, the in-

²¹ *Avyakta, prakṛiti*, or nature, the non-developed essence of matter. See Introduction.

²² The repetition of the particle marks that of the state. The universe exists again and again in each succeeding day of Brahmá.

²³ *Arasha* cannot have its more usual signification of 'against their will,' since matter being irrational, could have no will of its own, but rather, 'without any will of their own,' i.e. in agreement with the laws of necessity.

²⁴ Return to earth, and investment with a new body.

²⁵ This and the following shloka startle us at first sight with the appearance of the meanest superstition, and have called forth the lamentations and reproaches of two able critics, Humboldt and Langlois. The matter is, however, somewhat explained by the contents of the Uttaramímánsá writings (see Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i. p. 366). It must be remembered that the soul was supposed to be accompanied in its transmigration by a subtle body (*linga sharira*: see Introduction), which it only abandons at final emancipation. This is a vehicle of the soul, which enables it, as long as it exists in a material life, to sustain its connection with matter, even when divested of a grosser body. In this subtle body, then, is the soul conducted to the divers material heavens, when it quits the mundane body; and since this body requires a conductor and a light to show it the way, a beam of the sun is supposed to meet the crown of the head at all seasons. The seat of the soul is supposed to be the heart, from which 1,001 arteries conduct to all parts of the bodies. The principal of these is the great coronal artery, which leads from the heart to the crown of the head; by this passage the soul, with its *linga sharira*, proceeds at the moment of death. At the crown of the head it meets with the guardian sunbeam; and, at the periods first mentioned, the ray being brighter and stronger, the subtle body can find its way to the highest heaven, the *Brahma-loka*; if, on the contrary, it be weaker, as at other periods, it only proceeds to an inferior region. See also note 27 *infra*.

creasing moon, six months of the northern solstice; those who die in this period, and who know the Supreme Spirit, go to the Supreme Spirit. Again, smoke,²⁶ night, the waning moon, six months of the southern solstice; a devotee dying in this period attains only a lunar²⁷ splendour, and returns. For these two ways of white and black are eternally decreed to the world. By the one a man goes without return, by the other he returns again. No devotee, O son of Prithá! who knows these two paths, is ever confounded. Thereforē, at all periods, be devoted to devotion, Arjuna! A devotee who knows all this, surmounts whatever reward is promised to the study of the Vedas, or the practice of sacrifice, self-torture, and almsgiving, and obtains the highest and best place.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Eighth Chapter, by name

'DEVOTION TO THE INDIVISIBLE SUPREME SPIRIT.'

²⁶ Smoke, as opposed to fire and light, is put for darkness.

²⁷ This may mean that he attains to the *Soma-loka*, the region of the moon, which is inferior to that of Brahmá (see Ch. V. note 39). But I am inclined to think that the whole passage has a metaphorical, not a literal, force. The Supreme Being has been compared to the sun. The whole aggregate of deities inferior to him, who reflect his glory, may be aptly likened to the moon. Following out this figure, the whole passage may be divested of its superstitious character. The Supreme Being is the sun, the ray from which to the crown of the devotee's head, is the type of the spiritual connection of the Being with the mortal's soul. When devotion is at its highest pitch, this ray would be strongest, and the Supreme Being might be considered to be in greater proximity to the mortal, as the sun is to that portion of the earth which it lights up in day-time, in the light half of the month, and during the summer solstice. In the *Uttaramśá*, this theory is doubtless taken literally and superstitiously; but I cannot help thinking that our poet has borrowed a popular superstition merely as an apt and elegant poetical metaphor. Compare also *Manu*, iv. 182, where the *Soma-loka*, or heaven of the moon, is replaced by a *Devaloka*, or heaven of the inferior deities.

CHAPTER THE NINTH.

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'But now¹ I will declare unto thee, if thou objectest not, the most mystic spiritual knowledge coupled with spiritual discernment, having learnt which, thou wilt be liberated from evil. This is a kingly science and a kingly mystery,² the most excellent of purifications, clearly comprehensible, in accordance with law,³ very easy to carry out, and immutable. Men who do not put faith in this religion, O harasser of thy foes! do not attain to me, but return to the path of this world of mortality. All this universe has been created by me, embodied as the undeveloped principle.⁴ All things exist in me. I do not dwell within them, and yet things do *not* exist in me.⁵ Behold this my lordly mystery. My spirit, which causes⁶ things to exist, sustains existing things, but does not dwell in them. Understand that even as the

¹ Expressed in the *idam*, lit., 'the following.'

² This must refer to the Yoga system, not merely to the philosophic explanation about to follow, since he says that it is 'easy to carry out.'

³ With the established religion, since it admitted its principal tenets and ordinances, the existence of the gods, the institution of caste, etc., and urged a man to perform his duty according to those ordinances, in contradistinction to the pure Sāṅkhya system, which lauded the abandonment of all these.

⁴ *Prakṛiti* or nature, the material essence, which this school considered to be part of the Supreme Being himself, he being regarded as twofold, spirit and matter, or rather material essence, which the Purāṇas call the wife of the Supreme Being.

⁵ Kṛiṣṇa is not wrong when he calls this apparent contradiction a sovereign mystery. But it is easily explained when we regard the Supreme Being in his twofold character of spirit and material essence. As material essence, the material cause of all things, they all exist within him; as Spirit only, they, being matter, cannot exist within him, since spirit and matter have no direct connection. Again, as spirit only, he does not exist in them, since the spirit cannot be inherent in matter.

⁶ Being the efficient and rational cause.

mighty air,⁷ which wanders everywhere, always dwells within the ether, so all existing things exist within me. At the conclusion of a Kalpa,⁸ all existing things, O son of Kuntí! re-enter nature, which is cognate with me. But I cause them to come forth again at the beginning of a Kalpa. Supported by my material essence, I cause this entire system of existing things to emanate again and again, without any power of their own, by the power of the material essence. Nor do these actions implicate me,⁹ O despiser of wealth! me who remain tranquil, as one unconcerned by them, and not interested by these actions. Under my superintendence, nature produces moveable and immoveable things.¹⁰ By this means,¹¹ O son of Kuntí! does the world revolve. The deluded despise me, when invested with a human form, not understanding my high existence,¹² which is the lord of all things, —vain in their hopes,¹³ their actions,¹⁴ and their knowledge;¹⁵

⁷ *Vāyu*, 'wind,' is used in philosophical language for 'atmosphere,' distinct from *ākāsha*, 'the ether,' a subtile fluid supposed to pervade all space. While *ākāsha* is supposed to be perfectly immoveable and existing everywhere, air is always moving, and penetrates only where it can effect an entrance. The two words stand in almost the same relation as our wind and air, with the exception that they are distinct substances, and that *ākāsha* is not merely atmospheric air, but that which fills all infinity.

⁸ A day of Brahmá (see Chapter VIII. note 19). It may be useful here to remark that the only word existing in Sanskrit to convey the idea of creation by God, has the literal meaning of 'emit,' 'cause to come forth, or emanate;' and this, too, in the oldest Sanskrit works. May we not receive this fact as evidence of the antiquity of the belief that the Creator was the material as well as the efficient cause of the creation, and of the philosophic bias of the Aryan mind even at a very early period?

⁹ In Chapter VIII. shloka 4, he has mentioned that the action of the Supreme Being was the creation and the dissolution of matter. But it has also been said that all action, except what is undertaken with devotion, etc., implicates the actor, entails upon him their good or evil results. He now states that he himself cannot be liable to these restrictions, since he acts without interest or concern in what he does.

¹⁰ Animate and inanimate matter.

¹¹ By my superintendence of the work of nature.

¹² Those who are deluded by the appearance of the universe, and the action of the three qualities, despise me, the Supreme Spirit, when I descend to earth in the form of Kṛṣṇa; for they do not know my real character, superior to and monarch of all.

¹³ Since these hopes are not of final emancipation, but of earthly, or at best heavenly, enjoyments.

¹⁴ Since they are undertaken with interested motives.

¹⁵ Since they believe matter supreme, and do not know the truth of things.

devoid of reflection, and inclining to the deluded nature of the Asuras¹⁶ and Rákshasas. But the high-minded, inclining to the nature of the gods,¹⁷ worship me with their hearts turned to no other object, knowing me to be the imperishable principle of all things. Always glorifying me and striving with unbroken vows, and prostrating themselves before me, they worship me, constant in devotion. Others also, offering the sacrifice of knowledge,¹⁸ worship me, who am present everywhere in divers forms, by means of my singleness and separability.¹⁹ I am the immolation. I am the whole sacrificial rite.²⁰ I am the libation offered to ancestors. I am the drug. I am the incantation. I am the sacrificial butter also. I am the fire. I am the incense. I am the father, the mother,²¹ the sustainer, the grandfather²² of this universe,—the mystic doctrine, the purification, the syllable “Om!”²³—the Rich-, the Sáman-, and also the Yajur-, Veda,—the path,²⁴ the supporter, the master, the witness,²⁵ the habitation, the refuge, the friend, the origin,

¹⁶ See Chapter VII. note 18.

¹⁷ In the Devas, the quality of goodness and light (*sattwa*) predominates.

¹⁸ Recognizing me in every object of worship, from a complete knowledge of my true nature: Compare Manu iv. 24.

¹⁹ My single nature as the one Supreme Being, and my power of separate existence in the different deities, etc. I have rendered these words, as if they were explanations of *vishayatomukham*. They might, however, be construed as if governed by *upásate*, and referring to the different characters, under which the deity was actually worshipped. Galanos has adopted this method, though I can scarcely say, judiciously.

²⁰ Galanos (though on what authority I know not) distinguishes between *kratu* and *yajna*, making the former a ‘bloody,’ the latter a ‘bloodless’ sacrifice.

²¹ Father and mother of matter, as being both efficient and material cause. See notes 4 and 5 *supra*.

²² Grandfather was a name which inspired reverence and affection in the Hindú grandchild.

²³ This triad would seem to include all religion, whether practical or doctrinal. *Vedyam*, in the first case, would be theological study and belief; *pavitram* would include all the practice of religion, whether sacrifice, mortification, etc.; and *onkara*, would comprehend prayer and praise. In the second case the three words would represent the theology, the injunctions for practice, and the hymns and prayers of the Vedas.

²⁴ Supply ‘of the universe,’ to each of the words in this shloka. He is the path by which mortals obtain final emancipation.

²⁵ Being gifted with the power of omniscience.

the dissolution,²⁶ the place, the receptacle,²⁷ the inexhaustible seed.²⁸ I heat (the world). I withhold and pour out the rain. I am ambrosia²⁹ and death, the existing and the non-existing.³⁰ Those who know the three Vedas,³¹ who drink the Soma, who purify themselves from sin, and offer sacrifices, implore of me the attainment of heaven: these, obtaining as their reward the world of the holy Indra, eat in heaven the divine food of the gods.³² Having enjoyed this great world of heaven, they re-enter the world of mortals, when the reward is exhausted.³³ Following in this manner the law of the Vedas, they indulge in their desires, and obtain a happiness which comes and goes. I bear the responsibility³⁴ of the happiness of those men, who, constant in devotion, worship me, meditating on me, and having no other object. And even those also who devotedly worship other gods with the gift of faith, worship me, too, O son of Kuntī! but not properly.³⁵ For I am the devourer and lord also of all sacrifices; but they do not understand me truly, therefore they fall.³⁶ Those who devote themselves to the gods, go to the gods; those who do so to the Pitṛis, go to the Pitṛis. The worshippers

²⁶ The cause of emanation and re-absorption.

²⁷ As being the material essence, into which all things are absorbed finally.

²⁸ Having already identified nature, or the material essence, with himself, as we have seen.

²⁹ Those who worship me obtain immortality, even as those do who eat of ambrosia.

³⁰ That which has, and that which has not a real existence, *i.e.* spirit and matter. He merely sums up all that he has declared himself to be, and says in two words, 'I am both all spirit and all matter.' The scholiasts, however, explain *sad* by *vyakta*, 'developed matter,' and *asad* by *avyakta*, 'non-developed matter.' Comp. XI. 37; and XIII. 12.

³¹ Our author does not, in this, condemn the established faith, or the Vedas; or deny the propriety of religious rites; but only condemns the spirit in which those who rely on them, prosecute them; namely, in the hope of heavenly enjoyments.

³² Enjoy their pleasures.

³³ Their sojourn in heaven, though very long, according to their merits, is finite; and at its conclusion they are born again on earth.

³⁴ Lit., 'The insurance,' vide Chap. II. note 43.

³⁵ Since the gods are impersonifications of each of my attributes: but they ought to worship me as a whole.

³⁶ From heaven, and are born again on earth.

of the Bhútas go to the Bhútas. Only my worshippers come to me. If any one offer me a leaf, a flower, fruit or water,³⁷ with devotional intention, I eat³⁸ it, thus piously offered by one of devoted mind. Whatever thou doest, whatever thou eatest, whatever thou sacrificest, whatever thou givest away, whatever mortification thou performest, O son of Kuntí! that do as an offering to me.³⁹ Thus thou shalt be freed from the bonds of action, which are the good and bad results (of actions), and if thou be devoted to devotion and renunciation, when discharged (from the body), thou wilt come to me. I am the same to all beings. I have neither foe nor friend. But those who worship me with devotion, dwell in me and I also in them. Even if one who has led a very bad life worship me, devoted to no other object, he must be considered as a good man;⁴⁰ for he has judged aright. He soon becomes religiously disposed, and enters eternal rest. Rest assured, O son of Kuntí! that he who worships me, never perishes. For even those who are born in sin⁴¹—even women,⁴² Vaishyas and

³⁷ The simplicity of the offerings here mentioned may be contrasted with the pomp and expense of such sacrifices as the Ashwa-medha, which were made to the deities. The victim, says Kṛishṇa, is nothing, but the spirit in which it is offered—the disinterestedness of the sacrificer.

³⁸ That is, accept it, since the deities were supposed, originally, to devour the offerings made, and this word is therefore used in the sense of accept. Of course the Supreme Spirit could not be supposed to eat, even by the most materially-inclined philosophers.

³⁹ The very commonest actions of life may be looked upon as sacrifices to the Supreme Being, if performed without interestedness and in a devotional-spirit.

⁴⁰ His former bad life must be forgotten, and his present devotion wipes it all out.

⁴¹ The offspring, probably, of illicit marriages, of those between different castes, etc. Or perhaps a general term for all but the privileged Aryans, including all foreigners, etc.

⁴² The fair sex has fared as ill in India as in many other parts of the world, where man, who owes all to her, has ungratefully cast her physical weakness in her face, and has gone so far as to declare her unfit for Heaven. It is easy to account for this shameful conduct, as for many other peculiarities of Eastern character, by the heat of the climate, which deprives women of the exclusive esteem, and the halo of superiority which surrounds her beneath less enervating and passionate skies; and by the warlike habits and ideas of these nations who were wont to despise all that was physically weak. But even in the drama, which flourished at a much more civilized period (about our own era), the ladies are not supposed competent to speak the same language even as their husbands, but, with slaves and outcasts, must be content to lisp their loves in the softer tones of the Prakṛit dialect.

Shúdras⁴³—take the highest path, if they have recourse to me. How much more, then, sacred Bráhmans and pious Rájarshis.⁴⁴ Worship me by obtaining this finite and wretched world.⁴⁵ Place thy heart on me, worshipping me, sacrificing to me, saluting me. Thus shalt thou come to me, if thou thus devotest thyself, intent on me.’

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Ninth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION BY MEANS OF KINGLY KNOWLEDGE AND KINGLY MYSTERY.’

⁴³ That the Shúdras, slaves, and probably, too, descendants of the conquered aborigines, should be denied a place in heaven by the imperious Bráhman, astonishes us but little; but that the same fate should attend the Vaishya—the merchant caste—who were dignified with the Bráhmanical thread, and undoubtedly belonged to the Aryan race, is a significant fact, which marks the period at which our poet wrote. The struggle had hitherto been between Bráhman and Kshatriya—church and state—and, as must have resulted from the meditative character of the Hindú, the former had triumphed. The Kshatriya had consented to receive his laws, as well as his religion, from the Bráhman, and even an alliance, offensive and defensive, was mutually agreed on, both uniting to turn the channel of their animosities against the people. The “bourgeoisie” were growing powerful by their wealth, and the Shúdras impatient of oppression. Knowledge and philosophy found its way out of the exclusive, but now leaky schools of the Bráhman; and the Vaishya learnt from the latter the real equality of all men. When at length the revolution of Buddha broke out, the Bráhman compelled the warrior-caste to join him against the bulk of the populace, and their united weight obliged the latter to succumb. From that time, the Vaishya was denied the privilege of heaven, and hence, among other reasons, it may be inferred that this poem was composed after the rise of Buddhism.

⁴⁴ Derived from *rájan* ‘a king,’ and *ṛiṣhi* ‘a pious personage.’ “Half king, half saint.” See *Index*, under ‘Riṣhi.’ The allusion is here a lump of sugar thrust down the Kshatriya’s throat.

⁴⁵ As usual, Kṛiṣṇa closes the chapter with a reiteration of the exhortation to fight, and brings it in with his wonted dexterity. He has said that every action of life should be made a sacrifice to the Supreme Being, and he now bids him undertake even fighting with the same object.

CHAPTER THE TENTH.

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Listen even further, O strong-armed one! to my important words, which I will proclaim to thee, whom I love,¹ from a desire for thy good. Neither the multitude of the Suras know my origin, nor yet the Maharṣhis,² for I am the origin of all gods and of all the Maharṣhis. He among mortals who knows that I, the great Lord of the world, have had neither birth nor beginning, is not confounded by error, and is liberated from all his sins.³ Intelligence, spiritual knowledge, absence of error, patience, truth, temperance, tranquillity, pleasure, pain, birth, death, danger, and also security;—innocence, equanimity, satisfaction, mortification, almsgiving, glory and ignominy; are the dispositions of beings, severally derived from me alone. The seven Maharṣhis,⁴ and the four Ancients,⁵ and the Manus,⁶ partaking of my existence, were born by my mind,⁷ and from them these inhabitants of the

¹ *Priyamāna* is the pass. part. pres. of *pri* ‘to love,’ but the passive of this verb having also the sense of ‘to be delighted,’ etc., Schlegel and Wilkins have given it a middle force; Galanos supports me in what seems to be the simplest and most natural mode of rendering this word.

² See *Index*, under ‘Rīṣhi.’ The name is here given (see shloka 6) to the seven Prajāpatis, or progenitors of mankind.

³ Belief in the eternity, etc., of the Supreme Being, is a means of emancipation. The reader will have observed, already, that this is the constant formula for establishing any dogma put forward.

⁴ These must be the same as the Prajāpatis, or progenitors of mankind, sprung from Brahmá’s brain. They are, however, generally said to be ten in number. See *Index*, under ‘Rīṣhi’ and ‘Prajāpati.’

⁵ The four Kumáras, or sons of Brahmá and companions of Viṣṇu. Their names are Sanatkumára, Sanaka, Sanátana, and Sanandana.

⁶ See *Index*.

⁷ They were fabled to be sprung from Brahmá’s brain, when he was reflecting how to people the universe.

world are sprung. He who truly comprehends this pre-eminence⁸ and mystic faculty of mine, is gifted with unshaken devotion; there is no doubt about that. I am the origin of all.⁹ From me all proceeds. Believing me to be thus, the wise, gifted with meditative powers, worship me. Thinking on me, dead in me,¹⁰ teaching one another, and constantly telling of me, they are both satisfied and delighted. To them who are constantly devoted, and worship me according to (the ordinances of) love, I give that mental devotion, by means of which they eventually come to me. For them only do I, on account of my compassion, remaining in my own condition,¹¹ destroy the darkness which springs from ignorance by the brilliant lamp of spiritual knowledge.'

ARJUNA SPOKE.

'Thou art the Supreme Universal Spirit, the Supreme dwelling,¹² the most excellent purification. The Eternal Person,¹³ divine, prior to the gods, unborn, omnipresent, all the R̥ishis declare thee to be,¹⁴ and the Devar̥shi¹⁵ Nārada, Asita, Devala, and the Vyāsa,¹⁶ and thou wilt also tell me

⁸ The word *vibhūti*, besides the usual meaning of 'pre-eminence, mastership,' which may be used here, has a peculiar philosophical one, which we find in shlokas 16 and 19, and elsewhere. It signifies some individual manifestation of the universality of the Supreme Being in all things, but especially in the first and best of all classes and collections of things and beings. In the language of Patanjali, and in other philosophical works, it again denotes a number of supernatural powers generally attributed to Shiva, but capable of being acquired by man by means of austere devotion. They are eight in number, such as 'extreme minuteness,' 'illimitable bulk,' etc.

⁹ The universe.

¹⁰ Dead to the world, absorbed in me. Schlegel, however, translates 'me quasi spirantes,' which is not justified by the usual meaning of *gata-prāṇa*, and does not give any clue to the sense.

¹¹ To others I manifest myself in divers forms, quitting my own individuality to become one or other of the gods. To the devotee, however, I disclose my real nature, and thus remove that ignorance in his mind which prevented him from recognizing my true universality.

¹² That within which all the universe exists.

¹³ Compare VIII. note 1, and XI. 38.

¹⁴ In the hymns of the Vedas, which are each ascribed to one of the R̥ishis.

¹⁵ See *Index* under 'R̥ishi.'

¹⁶ We have prefixed the definite article here, because Vyāsa is not a proper name, but a title. See *Index*. It is here used *par excellence* to designate Kṛiṣṇa.

thyself too. Everything that thou tellest me, O Hairy One! I believe to be true; for neither the gods nor Dánavas¹⁷ comprehend thy manifestation,¹⁸ O Holy One! Thou thyself only knowest thyself by thyself, O Supreme Person!¹⁹ Creator and Lord of all that exists! God of Gods! Lord of the Universe! For thou shouldest completely declare thine own divine virtues,²⁰ by means of which thou hast pervaded and continuest to pervade²¹ these worlds. How shall I know thee, O mystic one! ever considering thee in all points of view?²² In what particular forms of existence should I contemplate thee, O Holy One? Relate further at full length thine own magic power and virtue,²⁰ O thou who art besought by mortals! for I am never sated of devouring this ambrosia through mine ears.'²³

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

' Well then,²⁴ I will relate to thee my own divine virtues,²⁰ at least the principal ones, O best of Kurus! for there is no end to my extensiveness. I am the soul, O Arjuna! which

Dwaipáyana, the last of the twenty-eight Vyásas, to whom are ascribed the compilation of the Vedas, the composition of many other works, and particularly that of the Mahábhárata, the great Indian epic.

¹⁷ Here a general name for all the enemies of the gods, demons, giants, etc.

¹⁸ Neither gods nor demons, much less men, comprehend thy power of appearing in a manifest form as a deity, etc., or as the chief and best in every collection of things.

¹⁹ All the translators have taken the more physical view, and translated this compound by 'best of men,' which, independently of its weakness, is a title very unlikely to be given to Kṛiṣṇa by Arjuna, at the very moment when he is speaking of him in his most immaterial and superhuman character. Compare Chapter VIII. note 1, under *adhidaiva*, and Chapter XV. 18 and 19.

²⁰ See note 8.

²¹ When the verb *sthá* is used with an indefinite participle, it has generally the force of 'continuance, remaining.'

²² This is the force of the prep. *pari* in *parichintayan*, 'how shall I discover thee in every object of the universe?'

²³ Kṛiṣṇa's words, which gave immortality to those who received them with devotion, are justly compared to ambrosia, and Arjuna's ears, through which he drinks them in, to the mouth which devours it.

²⁴ *Hanta* is merely inceptive, and shows that the narrator takes breath before he begins a long and important relation.

exists in the heart²⁵ of all beings,²⁶ and I am the beginning and the middle, and also the end,²⁷ of existing things.²⁸ Among the *Ādityas*, I am *Viṣṇu*.²⁸ Among luminous bodies, I am the beaming sun. I am *Marīchi* among the *Maruts*; among lunar mansions,²⁹ I am the mansion of the moon. Of the *Vedas* I am the *Sāma-veda*. Among the inferior gods, I am *Vāsava*;³⁰ and among senses, I am the heart.³¹ Among material principles,³² I am intellect; and among the *Rudras*, I am *Shankara*.³³ *Kuvera*, among *Yakṣhas* and *Rakṣhasas*;³⁴ and among *Vasus*, I am fire; *Meru*, among mountain-peaks. And know, O son of *Prithā!* that I am *Vṛihaspati*,³⁵ the chief of household priests. Among generals, I am *Skanda*.³⁶ Among pieces of water, the ocean. Among *Maharṣhis*,³⁷ I am *Bṛigu*. Among words, the monosyllable "Om!" Among forms of worship, the silent worship.³⁸ Among mountain ranges, *Himālaya*. The sacred fig-tree³⁹ among all trees;

²⁵ Lit., 'receptacle,' but here put briefly for *raktāshaya*, 'the receptacle of the blood.' The heart was deemed by Hindú philosophers to be the seat of the soul, and these words are so far important, that they establish the doctrine of the identification of the Deity with the individual soul.

²⁶ It may here be remarked as it should, perhaps, have been before, that *bhūta*, when a substantive, may mean either an animate or an inanimate object.

²⁷ Speaking of himself as identified with the material essence, from which materials emanate, to which they are re-absorbed, and which, as vital essence, supports and sustains them while they exist.

²⁸ Not the superior deity, the second person in my theological triad, but simply one of the *Ādityas* themselves, considered as their chief. See *Index*.

²⁹ The asterisms through which the moon passes are commonly considered to be twenty-seven in number.

³⁰ *Indra*, the chief of the *Devas*. See *Index*.

³¹ *Manas*, the heart, was considered as an eleventh or internal sense, and the collector and director of the other ten.

³² Lit., 'existing things.' The categories of developed matter (*vyakta*) are twenty-three in number, and intellect is the first of them, and naturally superior to the others.

³³ A name of *Shiva*, as chief of the *Rudras*.

³⁴ These genii being the guardians of the treasures of the god of wealth.

³⁵ He being charged with the clerical affairs of the gods. See *Index*.

³⁶ The god of war. See *Index*.

³⁷ See *Index* under 'Riṣhi.'

³⁸ Muttering prayers and passages of the *Vedas* in an inaudible tone.

³⁹ The *Banyan* or *Ficus Religiosa* (*Ashwattha*), the falling branches of which take root in the earth. It abounds in great quantities in parts of India, and w

and among Devarṣhis,³⁷ Nárada. Among Gandharvas, Chitraratha. Among the perfect,⁴⁰ Kapila, the Muni. Know that among horses I am Uchchaishshravasa, sprung from ambrosia;⁴¹ Airávata among elephants, and among men, the king. I am the thunderbolt⁴² among weapons; among cows, Kámaduk.⁴³ And I am the procreator, Kandarpa. Among serpents, I am Vásuki. And I am Ananta among Nágas; Varuṇa, among inhabitants of the water.⁴⁴ And among the Pitris I am Aryaman; Yama,⁴⁵ among correctors. And I am Prahláda among the Daityas; Time among things which count. And among animals, I am the lion; and Vainateya among birds. I am the wind among purifiers; Ráma⁴⁶ among soldiers. And among fishes I am the Makara. I am the Ganges among rivers. And of creations I am the beginning, the end, and the middle, Arjuna!; the knowledge of the Adhyátma,⁴⁷ among sciences, and (human) speech, among sounds of utterance. And I am the letter A⁴⁸ among letters, the combination itself of a compound word. I am also eternal time. I am the preserver who watches in all directions. And I am Death, who seizes all, and the Birth of those who are to be;—Fame, Fortune and Speech, Memory, Meditation, Per-

may account for its sanctification, partly from the shade it affords from an Indian sun being greater and better than that of any other tree, partly that its peculiar growth would constitute an emblem of eternity. Compare Chapter XV.

⁴⁰ *Siddha* is also the name of a particular class of demigods (see *Index*), but I do not think that Kapila, the founder of the Sāṅkhya system, could be rightly ranked among them, as in that case we might exclaim, 'Physician, heal thyself,' and wonder why his would-be infallible prescription for final emancipation had failed to liberate himself.

⁴¹ Being one of the fourteen articles produced by the churning of the great ocean by the gods and demons, for ambrosia; for account of which, see *Index*, under 'Viṣṇu.'

⁴² The weapon of Indra, the Jupiter Tonans of the West.

⁴³ The cow of plenty, corresponding to the Greek Amalthea.

⁴⁴ Lit., 'water animals,' among which Varuṇa, the Hindú Neptune, would scarcely like to be ranked.

⁴⁵ The judge of the dead.

⁴⁶ Dasharatha Ráma, the hero of the Indian Iliad, the Rámáyana, and conqueror of Rávana and his followers, the Daityas. See *Index*.

⁴⁷ See Chapter VIII. note 1.

⁴⁸ Because it is the concomitant part of all consonants and diphthongs.

severance and Patience among feminine words. I am the Vṛihatsáman among the hymns⁴⁹ (of the Sáma-Veda); the Gáyatrí among rhymes. Among months I am Marga-shírṣha;⁵⁰ among seasons, the flowery spring.⁵¹ I am the game of dice among things which deceive; splendour itself among splendid things. I am victory; I am perseverance. I am the goodness of the good.⁵² Among the descendants of Vṛiṣṇi, I am Vásudeva;⁵³ among the Páñḍavas, Arjuna.⁵³ Among Munis also, I am the Vyása;⁵⁴ among poets,⁵⁵ the poet Ushanas. The rod among tamers am I; I am polity, among means of victory. And I am silence too among mysteries;⁵⁶ the knowledge of the wise. And I am that⁵⁷ which is the seed of all existing things, O Arjuna! There exists no one thing, moveable or immoveable,⁵⁸ which is without me. There is no end of my divine virtues, O harasser of thy foes; but I have made this extended narration of my pre-eminence by way of instance. Whatever is pre-eminent, or the essence (of any thing), fortunate or mighty also; do thou understand, in truth, to be sprung from part of my

⁴⁹ Sáman is the name for the hymns of the Sáma-veda, of which the Vṛihat-sáman is a portion.

⁵⁰ November-December. It is considered the chief of the months, probably because the year began with it at that period. This, its other name, Agraháyaṇa, 'the first of the year,' would seem to indicate. The Hindú year now begins with the month Vaishákha, April-May.

⁵¹ This season, commonly called Vasanta, is comprised in the months Chaitra and Vaishákha, or from middle of March to that of May. It is the first of the six seasons of the Hindú year, the others being—

2. Gríṣhma,	heat,	Jyaishṭha-Ashádha,	Mid. May to mid. July.
3. Varṣhás,	the rains,	Shrávaṇa-Bhádra,	Mid. July to mid. September.
4. Sharad,	autumn,	Ashwina-Kártika,	Mid. September to mid. Novemb.
5. Hemanta,	snow,	Agraháyaṇa-Pauṣha,	Mid. November to mid. January.
6. Shishira,	frost,	Mágha-P'hálguna,	Mid. January to mid. March.

⁵² Schlegel has 'vigor vigentium.'

⁵³ A name of Kṛiṣṇa (see *Index*). These are little compliments, *en passant*, to his own and his hearer's superiority.

⁵⁴ See Note 16.

⁵⁵ Rather learned preceptors, teachers of precepts, than metrical composers.

⁵⁶ Lit., 'secrets.' Silence, since it explains nothing, is often a very great mystery, which cannot be fathomed.

⁵⁷ Nature, undeveloped matter, the material essence (*prakṛiti*).

⁵⁸ Animate and inanimate.

energy. But what, indeed, hast thou to do, Arjuna, with so much knowledge as all this? (One sentence comprehends it all, viz. :) I have established, and continue to establish, all this universe by one portion of myself.⁵⁹

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Tenth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION TO THE DIVINE VIRTUES.’

⁵⁹ By *prakriti*, the material essence, which, as we have seen, is the material part of the Supreme Being. This translation gives, I believe, a better sense to the whole sentence, and a truer rendering of the construction with *sthita* and a participle. Schlegel has ‘integer mansi.’ Wilkins and Galanos are not near the mark.

CHAPTER THE ELEVENTH.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘My delusion has been dispersed by the words which thou hast spoken for my good, (concerning) that highest mystery called the Adhyátma.¹ For I have heard at full length from thee, O thou whose eyes are like lotus-leaves! the origin and dissolution of existing things, and also thy inexhaustible greatness.² I desire, O highest Lord! to behold thy sovereign form,³ even as thou hast thus declared thyself to be, O best of men! If thou thinkest that that form is possible for me to look upon, master! do thou, Lord of Devotion! show thine inexhaustible self to me.’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Behold my forms, O son of Prithá! in hundreds and thousands, of divers kinds, heavenly, and of divers colours and fashions. Behold Ádityas, Vasus, Rudras, the twin

¹ See Chapter VIII, note 1.

² *Mahdtmya* cannot be here received in its usual signification of ‘magnanimity, which would yield no satisfactory sense. It is explained by the word *avyaya*, which follows it, and refers to his boundless universality, of which Kṛiṣṇa has just given so many instances.

³ It is strange, that after declaring the infinity and universality of the Deity, our philosopher should seek to invest him in a palpable bodily form, however superhuman and un-material. But we fancy that in this he has yielded partly to the poet, and partly to the man of sense and crafty schismatic, who knew that if his deity was to be well received by the public, he must wear some form or other, on which the less spiritual part of it could meditate with ease and awe, but without fatiguing the thought. Moreover, the description itself of the transfiguration, indicates that it was merely an attempt to symbolize the universality, omnipresence, and creative and destructive nature of the deity, and to unite the whole with the characteristics of Viṣṇu.

Ashwinau, and the Maruts. Behold many wonders, which thou hast never seen before, son of Bharata! Here in my body now behold the whole universe in a collective form, with moveable and immoveable⁴ objects, and whatever else thou wouldest behold, Kṛiṣṇa!⁵ But thou wilt not be able to behold me merely with this (human) eye of thine. I give thee a divine eye. Behold my sovereign mystery.'

SANJAYA SPOKE.

'Having thus spoken, O king!⁶ Hari,⁷ the mighty lord of devotion, showed to the son of Pṛithá his sovereign form, gifted with many mouths⁸ and eyes,⁹ with many wonderful appearances, with many divine ornaments,¹⁰ holding many celestial weapons,¹¹ wearing celestial wreaths¹¹ and robes,¹¹ anointed with celestial perfumes, the all-miraculous infinite deity, with his face turned in all directions. If the light of a thousand suns were to break forth in the sky at the same time, it would be similar to the brilliance of that mighty one. There did the son of Páṇḍu then behold the whole universe, so multifariously distributed, collected in one in the person of the god of gods. Thereupon the despiser of wealth, struck with amazement, and with his hair standing on end, saluted the god by bowing his head, folded his hands reverentially,¹² and spoke as follows:'

⁴ Animate and inanimate.

⁵ See Chapter I. note 18.

⁶ This is addressed to Dhṛitaráshṭra.

⁷ A name of Viṣṇu and Kṛiṣṇa. See *Index*.

⁸ As will be seen afterwards, these mouths, filled with flames, were typical of the material essence (*prakṛiti*), in which all things are re-absorbed, and thus, as it were, destroyed.

⁹ Typical of his power of seeing everything.

¹⁰ Wearing the peculiar wonders and ornaments of each deity, typical of his possessing all the peculiar powers and attributes of each.

¹¹ The weapons, wreaths, and dresses peculiar to each of the deities.

¹² This is done by placing the hands together, hollowing the palms so as to hold water, and carrying them in this position to the forehead. This is the usual reverence of inferiors of respectability to their superiors.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

' I ¹³ behold all the gods in thy body, O god! and crowds of different beings, the lord Brahmá on a throne of a lotus-cup, and all the R̥ishis and celestial serpents. I see thee with many arms,¹⁴ stomachs,¹⁵ mouths, and eyes, everywhere of infinite form. I see neither end, nor middle, nor yet beginning of thee, O Lord of All! of the form of All!¹⁶ crowned with a diadem, bearing a club, and a discus.¹⁷ I see thee, a mass of light, beaming everywhere, hard to look upon; bright as a kindled fire or the sun, on all sides, immeasurable. I believe thee to be the indivisible, the highest object of knowledge, the supreme receptacle¹⁸ of this universe, the imperishable preserver of eternal law, the everlasting person.¹⁹ I see thee without beginning, middle or end, of infinite strength, with the sun and moon as eyes, mouths like a kindled fire, heating all the universe with thy splendour. For this space between heaven and earth,²⁰ and every quarter of heaven, are pervaded by thee alone. The triple world is astounded, O mighty one! having beheld this miraculous and terrific form of thine. For these crowds of Suras turn to thee (as their refuge). Some, affrighted, murmur with folded hands.

¹³ We may here remark that the poet has shown great taste and judgment in placing the details of the appearance in the mouth of Arjuna, and not of Sanjaya. It gives the description more force, and enables him to mark the increasing awe of the spectator; concluding with a prayer for mercy, of much beauty. The conception of the whole passage renders it, perhaps, the finest in the Sanskrit language. The change of metre, too, from the common Anuṣṭubh to Triṣṭubh, lends additional spirit to the whole.

¹⁴ Typical of his infinite strength and power

¹⁵ Typical of his power of containing and comprehending all things.

¹⁶ Whose form is the universe.

¹⁷ Typical of his power of incarnation,—the club, the discus, and the tiara being the insignia of Kṛiṣṇa: compare shloka 46. The discus is a warlike missile in the shape of a quoit, but that of Kṛiṣṇa has the additional advantage of being surrounded with flames; and with it accordingly he set on fire and destroyed the city of Káshi (Benares), when engaged in the war against the Daityas under Kansa.

¹⁸ The material essence, into which all matter was re-absorbed, being a portion of the Supreme Being.

¹⁹ See Chapter VIII. note 1, under '*Adhidaiva*.'

²⁰ The air, in which the transfiguration appeared.

The multitudes of Maharṣhis²¹ and Siddhas praise thee in most excellent hymns, crying "Hail to thee!" Rudras, Ādityas, Vasus, and all the²² Sádhyas, Vishwas, the twin Ashwinau, and Maruts and Ushmapás, the crowds of Gandharvas, Yakṣhas, Asuras, and Siddhas behold thee, and are all amazed. Having seen thy mighty form, with many mouths and eyes, O great-armed one! and with many arms, thighs, and feet, many stomachs and many projecting teeth, the worlds²³ and I, too, are astounded. For, since I have seen thee, touching the skies (in height), beaming with divers colours, with open mouth, and huge glittering eyes, my inmost soul is troubled, and I lose both²⁴ my firmness and tranquillity, O Viṣṇu! I cease to recognize the regions of heaven,²⁵ and experience no joy, merely from beholding thy mouths with their projecting teeth, like the fire of death. Be merciful, O Lord of gods! habitation of the universe! and all these sons of Dhṛitaráshṭra, together with multitudes of the kings of the earth, Bhíṣhma, Droṇa, and yon son of a charioteer,²⁶ together with our principal warriors also,—hasten to enter thy mouths,²⁷ formidable with projecting teeth. Some are seen clinging in the interstices between thy teeth, with their heads ground down. As many torrents of rivers flow down direct²⁸ even to the ocean, these heroes of the human race enter thy flaming mouths. As flies, carried away by a strong impetus, fly into a lighted candle to their own destruction, even multitudes (of beings), impelled by

²¹ See *Index*, under 'Riṣhi.'

²² Expressed by the relative pronoun *ye* : lit. 'the Sádhyas whatever.'

²³ The three worlds—heaven, earth, and hell.

²⁴ Literally, 'I find neither,' etc.

²⁵ 'I lose my senses, and do not know where I am.' The regions of heaven are the points of the compass.

²⁶ Karṇa. See *Index*.

²⁷ Will speedily do so. Speaking prophetically of their death, so soon to follow. Their entrance in the mouths of the Supreme Being is typical only of the dissolution of their bodies, not of their souls; the re-absorption of the material body into the material essence (*prakṛiti*).

²⁸ Even from their sources they take the direction of the ocean.

a strong impetus, enter thy mouths also for destruction.²⁹ Devouring all inhabitants of the world from every quarter, thou lickest them in thy flaming lips. Filling the whole universe with thy splendour, thy sharp beams burn, O Viṣṇu!³⁰ Tell me who thou art, of awful form. Salutation to thee, O best of gods! Be merciful! I desire to know thee, the primeval one, for I cannot divine what thou art about.³¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

'I am Death,³² that causes the destruction of mānkind, (already) mature. I am come hither to destroy mankind. Not one,³³ except thee, of the warriors, who are here drawn up in their respective armies,³⁴ will survive.³⁵ Therefore do thou arise and seize glory! Conquer thy foes and enjoy the ample kingdom.³⁶ I also have already slain these enemies.³⁷ Be thou only the instrument, O left-handed³⁸ one! Slay Droṇa, and Bhīṣma, and Jayadratha, Karṇa and others too, strong in war, who are (really) slain by me. Be not troubled!³⁹ Fight, thou wilt conquer thy rivals⁴⁰ in the fray.'

²⁹ They rush headlong into battle, as moths fly into the flame.

³⁰ Here, and in shloka 24, we find Viṣṇu addressed, and not Kṛiṣṇa. The change of form was not merely to that of the Supreme Spirit, but firstly from the earthly body of Kṛiṣṇa, the incarnation, to the typical one of Viṣṇu, and then to the personified appearance of the universal energy.

³¹ Lit., 'thy action.' Arjuna is alarmed at seeing all these warriors thus devoured in effigy, as it were, and wants to know what it all means.

³² I risk this translation, though it is not supported by any of the translators, who have all 'Time,' (Schlegel, 'Dies,') as being the only one which will render the sense of the passage clear, and supported by all that is said before and after it.

³³ Lit., 'not all,' which, in Sanskrit, is equivalent to our 'not any.'

³⁴ Lit., 'in the hostile armies,' alluding to both.

³⁵ This prophecy is not quite correct. The Mahābhārata tells us that all perished on either side except the five sons of Pāṇḍu.

³⁶ Of Hastināpura, about which they were going to fight.

³⁷ As Kṛiṣṇa has already told us, in Chapter II., one man does not really kill another. He kills and has killed the Dhārtarāṣṭras in determination, Arjuna is only the instrument.

³⁸ From *avya*, 'left,' and *śchin*, which only occurs in this compound. It is probably derived from a theoretical root, *sach*, 'to curve or bend,' and the compound would mean, 'bending the bow with the left hand.' See Westergaard's 'Radices Linguae Sanskritae,' p. 104.

³⁹ This is the 2nd person of the 3rd preterite without the augment, which, with *nd*, is constantly used as an imperative. (See Wilson's Grammar, pp. 305, 6.) The final visarga is dropped before the semi-vowel in the next half-line.

⁴⁰ Rivals for the possession of Dhṛitarāṣṭra's kingdom.

SANJAYA SPOKE.

‘Having heard these words of the hairy one, he of the tiara,⁴¹ with his hands folded in supplication, and trembling, again saluted⁴² Kṛiṣṇa and addressed him, bending with a low murmur, overwhelmed with fear.’

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘The universe, O Kṛiṣṇa!⁴³ is justly delighted with thy glory, and devoted to thee. The Rákshasas flee, affrighted, to the divers quarters of heaven, and all the multitudes of the Siddhas salute thee. And, indeed, why should they not adore thee, O great one! thee, the first creator, more important even than Brahmá himself?⁴⁴ O infinite king of gods! habitation of the universe! thou art the one indivisible, the existing and not existing,⁴⁵ that which is supreme.⁴⁶ Thou art the first of the gods, the most ancient person. Thou art the supreme receptacle of this universe. Thou knowest all, and mayest be known, and art the supreme mansion. By thee is this universe caused to emanate, O thou of endless forms! Air, Yama, fire, Varuṇa, the moon, the progenitor, and the great-grandfather (of the world) art thou. Hail! hail to thee! hail to thee a thousand times! and again, yet again, hail! hail to thee! Hail to thee from before! Hail to thee from behind! Hail to thee from all sides too! Thou

⁴¹ Arjuna.

⁴² *Namaskritvá*, irregular for *namaskṛitya*, on account of the metre. Schlegel thinks that the rule, which requires the termination *ya* for *tva* in indeclinable participles of compound verbs, holds good only for those compounded with prepositions, not for those with other particles. The grammarians are chiefly silent on this point.

⁴³ See Chapter I. note 18.

⁴⁴ Since Brahmá, the impersonification of the creative power of the Supreme Being, is, at best, a mere perishable, material deity.

⁴⁵ Spirit and matter. See Chapter IX. note 30.

⁴⁶ The translation of this passage has been much disputed; but as it would rather perplex than enlighten the reader to repeat the arguments used on both sides, we must refer him to the critique of Langlois in the ‘*Journal Asiatique*,’ vol. vi. 1825, p. 249, and Lassen’s reply in a note on this passage. Compare, moreover, Ch. IX. shloka 19, and Chapter XIII. shloka 12.

All! Of infinite power and immense might, thou comprehendest all; therefore thou art All.⁴⁷ As I took thee merely for a friend,⁴⁸ I beseech thee without measure to pardon whatever I may, in ignorance of this thy greatness, have said from negligence or affection, such as, "O Kṛiṣṇa! O son of Yadu! O friend!" and everything in which I may have treated thee in a joking manner, in recreation, repose, sitting, or meals, whether in private or in the presence of these, Eternal One! Thou art the father of the animate and inanimate world. Thou art to be honoured as more important than that Guru himself.⁴⁹ There is none equal to thee, and how could there be another superior (to thee) even in the triple world, O thou of unrivalled power? Therefore I implore thee, saluting thee and prostrating my body; thee, the Lord, worthy of praises. Thou shouldst bear with me, O god! as a father with a son, as a friend with a friend, as a lover with his beloved one.⁵⁰ Now that I see what I have never seen before, I am delighted, and my heart is shaken

⁴⁷ No one can deny the beauty of this passionate burst of enthusiasm from the lips of Arjuna, as he strives to grasp the idea of the infinity and universality of the Supreme God, and winds up with the cry of 'Thou All!' It is such passages as this and the one that follows, and which is unrivalled in its tender pathos, that make the Bhagavad-Gītā really a poem, and not merely a collection of philosophical dogmata reduced to shlokas.

⁴⁸ Awed by the spectacle of Kṛiṣṇa's real greatness, Arjuna shudders at the familiarity with which he has always treated him, when in his mundane form, as a friend and comrade; and implores forgiveness.

⁴⁹ Compare *anor anīcīnsam* in Chapter VIII. shloka 9. This is in the same manner a play on the word *guru*, which, as an adjective, means 'weighty, important,' as a substantive, 'a spiritual teacher.' The comparative *gariyān* has, of course, the meaning of the former. *Asya* must be taken as agreeing with *guros*, and the allusion is to Brahmā, who is considered in the light of a spiritual teacher of the world, in having delivered to it the Vedas. Another reading found in the Calcutta edition, the edition of the Mahābhārata, and the Scholia of Madhusūdana, is *gurur*, the nom. sing., instead of *guros*, the gen. sing., which would render the translation of the sentence, 'thou art to be honoured as the most important teacher of the universe,' *asya* being supposed to refer to *lokasya* in the preceding line. Both the sense and the construction make the reading adopted preferable.

⁵⁰ *Priyārhasi* = *priyāḥ* + *rhasi*, the former word being in the genitive fem. sing., and the final visarga rejected, an irregularity supported by Schlegel in his note, by quoting Rāmāyaṇa, i. xlv. 9, and VII. 22 of our own poem. (See Note.) It would be simpler to resolve it into *priyāḥ* + *rhasi*, the former word being taken for the dat. sing. masc.; but, as Schlegel observes, the genitive is demanded by its presence in the preceding couples of words, and both the sense and the construction favour the genitive feminine.

with awe. Show me that⁵¹ other form only, O god! Be gracious, O king of gods! habitation of the universe! With thy tiara, thy staff and thy discus in thy hand, thus only do I desire to see thee. Invest thyself with that four-armed form, thou of a thousand arms, of every form!’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘I have shown thee that supreme form, Arjuná! in kindness to thee, by my own mystic virtue,—that, which is my splendid, universal, infinite, primeval form, never yet beheld by other than thee. Not by studying the Vedas, nor by almsgiving, nor rites, nor severe mortification, can I be seen in this form, in the world of man, by other than thee, O best of the Kurus! Be not alarmed, or in a troubled condition, at having seen this so terrible form of mine. But look, free from fear, with happy heart, upon that other form only of mine, namely, this.’⁵²

SANJAYA SPOKE.

‘Vásudeva, having thus addressed Arjuna, showed him again his proper form, and the Great One consoled him who was alarmed, by again assuming a pleasant⁵³ shape.’

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Now that I behold this thy pleasant human shape, thou who art prayed to by mortals! I am composed in my right mind, and brought back to my natural condition.’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘That form of mine which thou hast seen is very difficult to behold. Even the gods are always anxious to behold that

⁵¹ *Tad*, ‘that yonder,’ as opposed to *idam*, ‘this present,’ refers to the mundane form, which he had quitted.

⁵² The use of *idam* after *tad* is not here a redundancy, but marks the actual change of form taking place at the time he is speaking. At the moment at which he says *tad*, he is still in his universal form; but when afterwards he adds *idam*, he has resumed his mundane form, which is consequently *idam*, ‘this present.’

⁵³ As contrasted with *ghora*, ‘terrible,’ the epithet of his universal form.

form. Neither by studying the Vedas, nor mortification, nor almsgiving, nor sacrifice, can I be seen in such a form as thou hast seen me. But only by worship, of which alone I am the object, can I be really known and seen, Arjuna, and approached in this form, O harasser of thy foes! He who performs his actions for me,⁵⁴ intent on me, devoted to me, free from interest, and from enmity towards any being, comes to me, O son of Páñdu!

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Eleventh Chapter, by name

'THE VISION OF THE UNIVERSAL FORM.'

⁵⁴ Who does not neglect his duties, but performs them without any selfish interest, and as sacrifices to me. Schlegel has, '*mihi grata opera qui perficit*,' a freedom which, I think, neither precedent nor the composition authorizes.

CHAPTER THE TWELFTH.

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘Of those who reverence thee as worshippers, thus¹ ever devoted, and those also who worship the indivisible and unmanifested, which are the most skilled in devotion?’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Those who worship me, placing their hearts on me with constant devotion, and gifted with the highest faith, are considered by me as the most devoted. But those who worship the indivisible, indemonstrable, unmanifested, omnipresent, difficult to contemplate,² all-pervading, immoveable, and firm,

¹ *Evam* must be taken with *satatayuktah*, and be understood to refer to the last shloka of the preceding Chapter. The opposition is not merely between the forms under which the Supreme Being is worshipped, but between the nature of the worship addressed to him under each of these forms. These forms are two, the *vyakta* and the *avyakta*. The *vyakta*, or manifested form, is that which was described by Kṛiṣṇa himself in Chapter X., and which has been shown to Arjuna, as detailed in Chapter XI. It is the Supreme Being considered in his universality and in his relation to matter. It is his manifestation in his own works throughout the universe. The *avyakta*, or unmanifested form, on the other hand, is the Supreme Being considered in his exclusively spiritual unity, as spirit separate from matter, apart from and exclusive of everything else. This is, of course, the higher, as being the more spiritual character of the Supreme One; but when Arjuna asks under which form it is better to worship him, Kṛiṣṇa replies immediately under the *vyakta*, or manifested form, and immediately adds his reasons, namely, that contemplation of the Supreme Being, in his purely spiritual character, was too difficult to be practical. The mode of worshipping the *vyakta*, or universal manifestation, would be almost the same as that of worshipping him in his separate manifestations, as some one of the deities, etc., namely, practice, the rites of religion, practical devotion (*karmayoga*), and adherence to the duties of caste. The mode of worshipping the *avyakta* can only be the most abstract contemplation and elevation of thought; and though this is very praiseworthy when it can be accomplished, its very difficulty, and the necessity it entails of neglect of one’s duties, render it less acceptable.

² Lit., ‘not to be thought upon,’ on account of his spiritual, formless, and immaterial character.

—if they restrain all the senses,³ and are equally minded towards everything, and rejoice in the good of all beings, (also) attain to me only. Their labour is greater, since their thoughts are directed to an object which has no manifest form. For the path⁴ which is not manifest is with difficulty attained by mortals. But if men renounce in me all their actions, intent on me, and meditating on me with exclusive devotion, worship me,—if their thoughts are directed towards me, I become ere long, O son of Prithá! their extricator from the ocean of the world of mortality. Dispose thy heart towards me only, to me attach thy thoughts, without doubt thou wilt dwell within me on high after this life. But if⁵ thou art not able to compose thy thoughts immoveably on me, strive then to reach me by assiduous devotion, O despiser of wealth! If⁶ thou art not capable even of assiduity, be intent on the performance of actions for me.⁷ Thou wilt attain beatitude even if thou only performest actions for my sake.⁷ If⁶ thou art unable to do even this, though filled with devotion to me, then abandon (the consideration of) the fruit of every action, being self-restrained. For knowledge is better than assiduity, contemplation is preferred to knowledge, the abandonment of self-interest in every action to contemplation; final emancipation (results) immediately from such abandonment. He who is free from aversion, well-disposed towards all beings, and also compassionate, unselfish and unconceited, the same in pain and pleasure, patient, contented, always devotional, self-governed, firmly resolute, who directs his heart and thoughts to me (only), and worships me, is dear to me; and he from whom the world receives

³ Lit., 'the collection of the senses,' viz. five senses of perception, five organs of action, and the heart.

⁴ The mental approach of the invisible and unmanifested Being.

⁵ *Atha* is here put for *attached*. Compare Rámáy. ii. 60, 3; Hitopadesha iii. 139, etc.

⁶ The absence of *atha* in these two shlokas is accounted for by the hypothetical force being carried on from shloka 9. Compare Gítá-Govinda, p. 112.

⁷ As a sacrifice to me, offered in a spirit of devotion.

no emotions,⁸ and who receives no emotions from the world, who is free from the emotions of joy, envy, and fear, is dear to me. He who has no worldly expectations, who is pure, upright, unconcerned, free from anxiety, and from any interest in all his undertakings, and worships me, is dear to me. He who neither rejoices, nor hates, nor grieves, nor loves, who has no interest in good or bad, and is full of devotion, is dear to me. The man who is the same to a foe or a friend, in honour or ignominy, the same in cold or heat, pleasure and pain, and free from interests, alike in blame or praise, taciturn, and content with whatever may be; who has no home,⁹ who is steady-minded and full of devotion, is dear to me. But those who attend (at the banquets of) this sacred ambrosia,¹⁰ as I have explained it, full of faith, intent on me, and worshippers of me, are dear to me above all.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Twelfth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION THROUGH WORSHIP.’

⁸ These emotions are immediately explained as joy, envy, and fear, or anxiety, —feelings which a man receives from his relations with his fellow-creatures.

⁹ Who abandons his relation with the world, even so far as to quit his home and retire to solitary contemplation in the woods.

¹⁰ In Chapter X. shloka 18, Arjuna has designated the mystic doctrine of the universal manifestation of the Supreme Being as ambrosia, or food for immortality. The word is used with the same reference here, and Kṛiṣṇa again declares what he has said in shloka 2, that those who worship him under this universal form—the Supreme Being in his relation to matter—are the best of all devotees.

CHAPTER THE THIRTEENTH.¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.²

'This body, O son of Kunti! is called *kṣhetra*.³ Those who

¹ We now commence the third division of our poem. As has been said in Chapter VII. note 1, its first six Chapters treat of the practical dogmata of the Yoga system, following, of course, Patanjali's school. In the next six our philosopher has treated of its theology, the peculiar province of the Bhagavad-Gītā itself; while in these last six Chapters he will bring forward the speculative or Sāṅkhya portion, following more closely in the steps of Kapila and Ishwara Kṛiṣṇa, though, of course, distinguished from them by the introduction of a deity throughout. In the Introduction it will have been seen that all which exists, is divided into two great heads,—matter and spirit. Each of these is again subdivided,—matter into the developed principle, commonly called *jagat*, the universe; and the undeveloped principle, called *prakṛiti*, or nature:—spirit into dividuated and non-dividuate, or the soul of man and the universal spirit, called the Supreme Being. From these four categories, triads or rather triplets are sometimes formed, such as God, soul, and matter, which is the one here treated of; or spirit, nature, and the world, as afterwards employed;—nature and the world being in the first comprehended under 'matter;' God and soul in the second under 'spirit.'

² In the MS. D. of the Royal Library at Paris, in two MSS. of London, and in the Calcutta edition of the Mahābhārata, this Chapter is commenced by the following shloka :

“ARJUNA SPOKE.

Nature and also spirit, *kṣhetra* and also *kṣhetrajña*,

This I desire to learn, and spiritual knowledge and the object of spiritual knowledge, O Hairy One!”

Wilkins had it also before him in the Benares MS. from which he translated. The majority of the MSS., and the Calcutta edition of the Bhagavad-Gītā, do not contain it, and as it bears all the impress of an insertion by some studious and verse-making copyist, who did not see his way very clearly in the order here followed, we imitate Schlegel and Galanos in entirely omitting it.

³ We leave these words untranslated, as they are philosophical terms which it is impossible to render correctly by any corresponding terms in English. *Kṣhetra* is literally 'body,' not merely the personal body, but the body considered as an aggregate of all the components (23 in number), all the attributes, and all the life of matter in its development. This is explained in shloka 5, and, in short, it is matter generally, represented by the body. Nor must this be supposed to be merely the body of man. It signifies every organic aggregate of matter (and by the Hindús even inorganic bodies, as stones, minerals, etc., are comprehended under this head) which contains a soul. The *kṣhetrajña* is the individual soul which exists in such *kṣhetras*, and is in the next line declared to be (that is, to be part of) the Supreme Spirit. The literal meaning of the word is, 'that which under-

know the truth of things⁴ call that which knows this (*kṣhetra*), *kṣhetrajña*.⁵ And know also that I am the *kṣhetrajña* in all *kṣhetras*,⁵ Bhárata! That which is the knowledge of the *kṣhetra* and the *kṣhetrajña* is considered by me to be spiritual knowledge.⁶ What that *kṣhetra* is, and what it is like, and to what changes it is liable, and from what it originates, all this, whatever⁷ (it may be), and what that (*kṣhetrajña*) is, and of what it is capable, learn in a compendious form from me,—which has been sung in various ways by the Rīṣhis,⁸ separately, in different hymns,⁸ and also in metres of the well-demonstrated Brahmasútras,⁹ which treat of causes.¹⁰ The great elements,¹¹ the egotism, the intellect, and also the prin-

stands the *kṣhetra*.' It must be remembered that the Hindú philosophers believed the soul to be placed within the body in order to work out its emancipation from material and individual existence, to which the Supreme Spirit has consigned it, by causing it to emanate from himself. That emancipation can only be worked out by a complete and just comprehension of the nature of matter and its true relations with individual soul and the Supreme Spirit. Hence it is called the 'comprehender of matter.'

⁴ Philosophers : alluding to Kapila, Ishwara Kṛiṣṇa, and their followers.

⁵ In this declaration, that the Supreme Spirit is the soul within all bodies, there is no denial of the individuality of the soul, merely an assertion that it is part, though a dividual part, of the Universal Spirit.

⁶ The knowledge by which emancipation is attained.

⁷ The word *yat*, repeated here at the end of the shloka, though already introduced as the third word in it, is not, however, redundant, but refers not to *tat kṣhetram*, which is answered by the first *yat*, but to the *tat* before *samāsena*. It is the peculiarity of the relative sentence in Sanskrit, that every relative pronoun should, if possible, be balanced by a demonstrative one, and *vice versa*; but it is impossible to mark this swinging in an English translation.

⁸ The use of the word *chhandas* would seem to denote that the allusion was to the Vedas, and that the Rīṣhis here mentioned were those to one of whom each of the hymns in those books is inscribed. The context, however, demands a wider signification for both Rīṣi and *chhandas*, the former being, probably, the philosophers of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga schools, as Kapila, Patanjali, etc., called so from their piety and wisdom : the latter alluding to their productions.

⁹ This is the title of the well-known work of Bádárāyaṇa, on the Vedānta system. It has, however, been generally considered as posterior to the 'Bhagavad-Gítá ;' nor could our author attribute the teaching of purely Sāṅkhya doctrines to a Vedānta philosopher. I should conjecture that the name referred generally to works on the Yoga system, Brahma being understood to mean the Supreme Being.

¹⁰ That is, generally, of philosophy, the object of philosophy being to explain the causes of the existence of the universe, and the connection of the soul with matter, etc.

¹¹ It would be beyond the limits of these notes to enter in detail into the nature of the Sāṅkhya system of cosmology, of which we have here so brief a summary. We must refer the reader to that part of our Introduction which treats of the Sāṅkhya system, and it will here suffice to recapitulate the meaning of the terms

ciple of life, and the eleven organs and the five objects of sense—desire, aversion, happiness, unhappiness, multiplicity of condition, reflection, resolution, (all) this is briefly denominated *kshetra* with its passions.¹² Modesty, sincerity, innocence, patience, honesty, reverence towards preceptors, purity, constancy, self-government,—indifference towards objects of sense; and also unselfishness, contemplation of birth, death, old age, sickness, pain, and error,¹³—disinterest-

used, merely calling to remembrance that the order here employed is not the philosophical arrangement, nor even that of our author's fancy, but purely subservient to the metre. The twenty-five components of all existing things, whether spirit or matter, with the exception of the Supreme Being himself,—in short, of the whole creation,—are thus ranked in the Sāṅkhya system:—

- a. 1. *Prakṛiti* (here called *avyakta*), the undeveloped principle or essence of matter, from which the next twenty-three components, called altogether *vyakta*, or developed matter, emanate, viz.:
- b. 2. *Buddhi*, intelligence, that which transmits external impressions received through the senses to the soul,—the eyes, as it were, of the soul,—which produces,
- c. 3. *Ahankāra*, egotism, the consciousness of individual existence, which produces,
- d. 4—8. *Tanmātrīni* (here called *indriyagochara*), the five subtile elements of matter, the elements of the elements; the atoms which, when aggregated, form the elements. They are sound, feel, colour, sapidity, and odour; each of these, in their turn, produces each of the,
- e. 9—13. *Mahābhūtāni*, five grosser elements, ether (*ākāśh*), air (*vāyu*), fire (*agni*, light and heat), water (*āp*), and earth. Thus sound produces ether; feel, air; colour, light, etc. The subtile elements being united to
- the grosser elements, next produce,
- f. 14—18. *Indriya*, the five senses of perception, hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, and next,
- g. 19—23. *Karmendriya*, the five organs of action, also considered as senses, which are the voice, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the penis. Lastly, *ahankāra* produces,
- h. 24. *Manas*, the heart, the internal organ of perception, which receives the external impressions of the senses, and transmits them through the *ahankāra* and the intellect to the soul, and is the seat of the passions, etc.
- i. 25. *Ātmā* or *puruṣha*, the individual soul.

It is the twenty-three components from *b* to *h* inclusive which form the *kshetra*: thus the *mahābhūtāni* are 'e'; the *ahankāra* is 'c'; the *buddhi*, 'b'; the eleven *indriyaṇi* are 'f, g,' and 'h' (*manas* being considered as an internal sense); the five *indriyagocharas*, 'd.' Another component, however, is here mentioned, which requires some explanation—namely, *avyakta*. This we know to be a name for *prakṛiti*, the undeveloped principle or essence of matter; but since *kshetra* can with strictness only refer to developed matter, it can scarcely be understood to include the undeveloped principle also. This principle, however, while apart from matter, as the essence from which it emanates, is also connected with it as being the principle of *vital existence*, and in this sense it must be here understood:

¹² The passions (lit., 'changes') belonging to animate matter are those seven just named (desire, etc.), and must, of course, be referred to the sensitive part of matter, the *manas*.

¹³ Consideration of the evil and misery of this life, in order that he may not become seduced and attached to it by its apparent good and happiness. •

edness, and indifference towards one's children, wife, and household,¹⁴ and constant equanimity both in pleasant and unpleasant circumstances,—attentive worship by exclusive devotion to me, frequenting of solitary spots, a distaste for the society of men,—perseverance in acquiring knowledge of the Adhyátmá,¹⁵ consideration of the advantage of a knowledge of the truth,¹⁶—this is called spiritual knowledge; that which is contrary to this, ignorance. I will declare to thee what the object of spiritual knowledge is.¹⁷ He who knows it eats ambrosia.¹⁸ It is called the Supreme Being, without beginning, neither the existent nor non-existent.¹⁹ It possesses hands and feet in all directions; eyes, heads, and faces in all directions; having ears in all directions, he exists in the world, comprehending all things;—resplendent with the faculties of all the senses,²⁰ yet disconnected from all the senses; disinterested, and yet sustaining all things;²¹ free

¹⁴ If this doctrine be accused of unnatural austerity, we can only reply that the salvation of one's soul was justly deemed paramount to all worldly ties, the nearest and dearest of which are here mentioned; and refer our readers to the same injunction, in almost the same terms, from the mouth of the only unerring Preceptor, 'If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother, and wife and children, and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple.' St. Luke xiv. 26. Neither the Divine guide nor the Hindú philosopher meant that these words should be construed literally; both, on the contrary, exhort their hearers to brotherly love, with which it would be impossible to hate one's father and mother, etc.; but they only mean that where one's salvation requires it, even the nearest earthly ties must be disregarded.

¹⁵ See Chapter VIII. note 1.

¹⁶ Consideration that such knowledge is necessary to the attainment of final emancipation.

¹⁷ The object to be known is, of course, the Supreme Being in all phases.

¹⁸ That is, enjoys immortality, which is final emancipation.

¹⁹ Compare Chapter IX. note 30, and XI. shloka 37, in which places it is said that the Supreme Being is both spirit and matter; here Kṛiṣṇa says that the Supreme Being is not called either one or the other. He is not called spirit, because he is not spirit alone, but both spirit and matter; he is not called matter for the same reason.

²⁰ He possesses all those faculties of seeing, hearing, etc., which the senses give to man; but since he has no material body like man, he does not possess those senses themselves, and is therefore, of course, free from the evil influence which they have in attaching man to the world, etc.

²¹ That is, he acts without interest in his actions. As Kṛiṣṇa himself says elsewhere, he has nothing to gain, since all things are his; he can, therefore, have no interest in his actions, but nevertheless he continues to act. He has created the universe, but does not now cease from actions, but sustains and cherishes that which he has formed.

from (the influence of the three) qualities, yet possessing every quality;²² existing both apart from and within existing things,²³ both inanimate and also animate. It cannot be recognized on account of its subtilty, and it exists both far and near. Not distributed among beings, and yet existing as if (it were so) distributed.²⁴ And it is to be known as that which sustains existing things, and both devours and produces them again.²⁵ This light, also, of luminous bodies is said to be superior to darkness.²⁶ It is spiritual knowledge itself,²⁷ the object of that knowledge to be obtained by spiritual knowledge implanted in every heart. Thus have the *kshetra*, the spiritual knowledge, and the object of that knowledge been briefly declared. He who worships me and can discern this (spirit in all things) is conformed to my nature. Learn that nature and spirit,²⁸ also, are both of them indeed without beginning. And know that the passions and the (three) qualities are sprung from nature. Nature is said to be that which causes the power of doing what must be done in the organs.²⁹ Spirit is said to be that which causes

²² The three qualities that influence matter, *sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, have no effect on him, in spite of his connection with matter, still he possesses the powers which those qualities give to matter.

²³ In his individuality, he is separate from matter; in his universality, exists within it.

²⁴ Considered as a single indivisible personal spirit, he is not really divisible among beings; but since the soul which exists within them emanates from and is actually identical with him, he is within them, as if he were divisible.

²⁵ He here speaks of him as the material essence (*prakṛiti*), into which all things are re-absorbed, as if it devoured them and again caused them to emanate.

²⁶ This is said metaphorically. The light is the Supreme Being considered as illumining or inspiring with knowledge those who are devoted to him, and thus surmounting darkness, which is ignorance.

²⁷ This is so forced an idea that, we should greatly prefer to read *jñāna-jneyam*, But?

²⁸ See Chapter VIII. note 1, under *adhidaiva*. Here, however, it is said of spirit generally, the nature of which will be explained in Chapter XV. He has already explained matter (*kshetra*), god (*jñeya*), and spiritual knowledge (*jñāna*). It remains for him to treat of the material essence or nature (*prakṛiti*) and the soul, and of the general connection of matter and spirit.

²⁹ The material essence is also the vital principle, and this it is which gives life, motion, and the power of action to the organs of all animate things.

the power of experiencing pleasure and pain (in matter).³⁰ For spirit, when invested with matter,³¹ experiences the influence of the qualities which spring from nature. Its connection with those qualities is the cause of its regeneration in a good or evil womb.³² The Supreme Spirit within this body³³ is called the spectator and admonisher, sustainer, enjoyer, great lord, and also highest soul. He who thus understands spirit and nature with its qualities, in whatever way he may have lived, is never born again (on earth). Some behold the soul by their mind's eye, by means of contemplation on themselves, others by Sánkhyā-Yoga, and others by Karma-Yoga.³⁴ But others respect it, not knowing it in this manner, but having heard it explained by others.³⁵ And even these, if studious of such tradition, even surmount mortality.³⁶ Know, O Prince of the Bharatas! that as often as anything which exists,³⁷ animate or inanimate,

³⁰ Still, though the organs may be put in motion by the vital principle, there can be no real sensibility or perception of external objects without a soul within the body.

³¹ This is an explanation of the manner in which the soul gives that sensibility to the body. When the soul is disconnected from matter, *i.e.* before and after its individual existence, the three qualities whose influence is confined to matter can have no effect upon it; when, however, the soul is once united to matter, they have effect on it through the medium of matter, and thus the soul, before incapable of receiving any impressions from external objects, when influenced by these qualities, is enabled to appreciate the good or bad in external matter.

³² Since these qualities are, at best, all bad, their influence on the soul through the medium of matter is productive of that dreaded evil,—regeneration on earth; but if the soul has acquired more of the influence of the *sattva-guṇa*, or quality of goodness, it is born again in a good womb: that is, in the family of Bráhmans or superior Kshatriyas; if more of *rajo-guṇa*, or quality of badness, it is born in a bad womb, such as Vaishyas or Shúdras, etc.

³³ Alluding to the Supreme Being in his own body, in the person of Kṛishṇa.

³⁴ These are devotees who follow different systems. The first is that of contemplation,—the pure Sánkhyā system; the second, which he calls Sánkhyā-Yoga, is that branch of the Yoga system which confines itself to exclusive, ascetic, and contemplative devotion, and rejects all works; the third is the choice doctrine of the Bhagavad-Gítá, devotion united to works and actions. Compare III. 3—6. The Sánkhyā-Yoga is also called Jnāna-Yoga, and the only difference between it and the pure Sánkhyā is, that the former acknowledges and enjoins worship of a Supreme Being, the latter is virtually atheistic.

³⁵ These, as contrasted with devotees themselves, are merely studious and zealous disciples.

³⁶ And attain to the only true immortality,—final emancipation.

³⁷ The abstract (lit., 'existence') is here put for the concrete, 'that which exists.'

is produced, it is so on account of the conjunction of body and soul.³⁸ He, who perceives that the highest lord exists alike imperishable in all perishable things, sees indeed; for, perceiving the same lord present in everything, he does not himself destroy his own soul,³⁹ but attains the highest path. But he who perceives that all actions are entirely performed by nature⁴⁰ only, perceives that he himself is therefore not an agent. When he recognizes the individual existence of everything to be comprehended in one, and to be only an emanation from it,⁴¹ he then attains to the Supreme Being. This supreme eternal soul, even when existing within the body, O son of Kuntí! neither acts nor is affected⁴² by action, on account of its eternity, and freedom from the qualities.⁴³ As the ether, though it penetrates everywhere, is not polluted on account of its rarity, so the soul, though present in every (kind of) body, is not polluted (by action). As one sun illumines the whole of this world, so does (one) spirit illumine the whole of matter,⁴⁴ Bhárata!

³⁸ All the translators have 'by the conjunction,' etc., as if the reading were *sanyogena* and not *sanyogát*. They have evidently been misled by the idea that *kshetra* and *kshetrajna* alluded to matter and spirit, and the knowledge that the emanation of developed matter from nature was caused by the conjunction of the Supreme Spirit, as man, with the material essence or nature, as wife. The meaning seems to me to be simply that the cause of the emanation of developed matter was the conjunction of soul and body, by means of which conjunction the soul effects its emancipation. He therefore merely states that the *reason* for the production of matter was to assist the soul in emancipating itself when once placed within the body for that purpose, since it is by a knowledge of the real truth, acquired through the investigation of visible developed matter by the senses, that emancipation is achieved.

³⁹ Since he perceives that his soul is a portion of the Supreme Being existing within him, and on that account, if on no other, he is desirous to work out his emancipation, and not by his neglect and crimes to precipitate the 'divine spark' into hell.

⁴⁰ That is, by the action of the three qualities which spring from nature.

⁴¹ That all existing things, although they exist separately, are one and the same Supreme Being, and merely so far distinct from him, that they are emanations from his material essence.

⁴² Lit., 'is polluted.'

⁴³ The qualities are what really act, by their influence, on matter. The soul is passive, and although the qualities influence it through the medium of the body, they cannot render it active.

⁴⁴ The souls in every body, although individual, are really only one and the same, viz. the Supreme Spirit. Thus one soul illumines every body.

Those who thus perceive by the eye of knowledge the difference between *kṣhetra* and *kṣhetrajna*, and the emancipation of beings from nature,⁴⁵ go to the Supreme.’

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Thirteenth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE KṢHETRA AND
KṢHETRAJNA.’

⁴⁵ From material existence.

CHAPTER THE FOURTEENTH.¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘ I will explain further² the great spiritual knowledge, the chief of sciences, by the knowledge of which all Munis³ attain the highest beatitude after this life. Having acquired this knowledge, they attain to fellowship⁴ with me, and are not regenerated even at the new creation, nor disturbed at the general destruction.⁵ The great Brahma⁶ is a womb for me; in it I depose the foetus. The production of all existing things is from it, O descendant of Bhárata! Brahma is the great womb for every form which is produced in any womb.⁷ I am the father which provide the seed. Goodness, badness,

¹ In this Chapter he treats of the three *guṇas*, or natural qualities, which influence all matter (for a detailed account of this doctrine see Introduction), but only in a very general manner. The qualities are firstly accurately described; their action is then specified; and, lastly, the future state of the beings influenced more particularly by each of them.

² I will continue to explain.

³ Used generally for a pious devotee.

⁴ *Siddharmya* has been misunderstood by Wilkins. The element *dharma*, from which it has been derived, has here no allusion to law or virtue, but simply to *office*. *Siddharmin* is a man whose duty or office, or even business, is the same as one's own; and hence means a fellow, a companion.

⁵ At the commencement or conclusion of each Kalpa. See Chap. VIII. note 19.

⁶ *Brahma* is here neuter. Throughout our poem the neuter of this word has been employed to designate the Supreme Being himself in his most general character. This cannot be the case here, since Kṛiṣṇa speaks of himself as the Supreme Being, and Brahma as distinct from him. At the same time it has nothing to do with Brahmá, masculine. But as Brahmá (masc.) is the mythological personification of the creative power of a Vedic or semi-mythological Supreme Being, so is Brahma here the philosophical type of the creative principle of the philosophical Supreme Being. He is not a personification, nor even separate from the Supreme Being, but merely a part of him distinct from spirit, the material essence inherent in him, by means of which, himself, then both efficient and material creator, he produces the universe.

⁷ Not merely those forms or bodies which are literally born from the wombs of gods, men, or beasts; but generally whatever is produced from anything else, and

and indifference,⁸—the qualities thus called, sprung from nature, influence the imperishable soul⁹ within the body, O strong-armed one! Of these, goodness is lucid and free from disease, on account of its spotlessness, and implicates¹⁰ (the soul) by means of connection with the pleasant, and connection with knowledge, O sinless one! Know that badness, being of the nature of desire, arises from appetite and propensity. This implicates (the soul), O son of Kuntí! by connection with action. But know that indifference, arising from ignorance, is the delusion of all mortals. This implicates (the soul) by means of folly, idleness, and sloth, O son of Bhárata! Goodness connects (the soul) with pleasure, badness with action, Bhárata! but indifference surrounding knowledge connects it indeed¹¹ with folly.¹² When one has surmounted badness and indifference, goodness exists, Bhárata! badness when one has surmounted goodness and also indifference; indifference when one has surmounted goodness and badness.¹³ When knowledge, the bright light,

therefore all things. The object in introducing these two shlokas, before explaining the three *guṇas*, is to show what relation the material essence (commonly called *prakṛiti*, but here Brahma), from which they spring, bears to the Supreme Spirit on the one hand, and to matter on the other.

⁸ The words are translated freely, as otherwise the sense of the whole Chapter would remain obscure. Literally they would be 'reality,' 'impulse,' and 'darkness.' See Introduction.

⁹ Through the medium of matter, to which their direct influence is confined. Thus they affect the senses, which transmit their good or bad impressions to the seat of sensibility (*manas*); this, again, forwards them to individual consciousness (*ahankāra*), and this to the intellect (*buddhi*), which, being in direct communication with the soul, conveys them to it.

¹⁰ Lit.: 'binds,' viz. in the bonds of transmigration.

¹¹ Lassen has a long irrelevant note on the force of *uta*, very useful in a grammar of the Vedas, but of doubtful value for a poem of the date of ours. Suffice it to say, that, as he has shown, the fanciful explanation of the scholiasts must be rejected, and the common use of the particle throughout the Mahābhārata, and other works of like style and approximate date, be accepted, namely, that of a confirmative expletive.

¹² The whole of this shloka seems to me merely a recapitulation of shlokas 6, 7, and 8.

¹³ This is ill expressed, though the meaning is obvious. Goodness predominates when the other two qualities are conquered or suppressed; badness when the other two are in the minority, etc. The three qualities, it must be remembered, are never separated; they always act in concert, and, however good the soul may be, as even Brahmá himself, the highest of material beings, some small portion of

has been produced through all the entrances¹⁴ into this body, then one may know that goodness indeed is matured. Avidity, activity, undertaking of actions, restlessness and covetousness, these are produced when badness is matured, O Prince of Bhárata! Absence of light and of activity,¹⁵ folly, and also delusion,—these are produced when indifference is matured, O son of Kuru! But when a mortal reaches his dissolution, and goodness is matured within him, he then approaches the spotless worlds of those who obtain the highest place.¹⁶ He who reaches dissolution during (the predominance of) badness, is born again in those who are attached to actions,¹⁷ and one who dies in indifference, is born again in the wombs of the senseless.¹⁸ They call the reward of a good action, of the quality of goodness and spotless; the reward of badness, pain; the reward of indifference, ignorance.¹⁹ From goodness is produced knowledge, from badness only desire; from indifference spring folly, delusion, and also ignorance. Those

badness and indifference remains within it. It is only the proportion of their admixture which is here alluded to, since it is impossible that the soul, while united to material existence, can entirely subdue or eradicate any one of these qualities.

¹⁴ As the body has been called the mansion of the soul, so are the senses, through which the inhabiting spirit receives knowledge, considered as its doors.

¹⁵ The absence of light, the distinguishing attribute of goodness; and of activity, that of badness.

¹⁶ Wilkins, Schlegel, and Galanos have here rendered *uttamavidám* as if it meant 'those who understand the Supreme Spirit.' Such understanding is, however, constantly declared to be the gate to emancipation, and the sentence would therefore signify that those in whom goodness predominated were emancipated. This is obviously not the sense, since in shlokas 20 and 26 we are told that one must entirely overcome the influence of all *three* qualities, in order to be

st of the three places here mentioned as the futures of the three different classes of beings, and the allusion is to the worlds of Brahmá, the Pitris, the Devas, etc. (see Chapter V. note 39), as contrasted with the bodies of men or beasts on earth. Hence, too, the use of the word *lokán* in the plural. Had it referred to the Supreme Spirit, as the translations would lead us to suppose, the word *loka*, if used at all, must have been in the singular number.

¹⁷ The worldly, and consequently wicked, among men.

¹⁸ Beasts and inorganic matter.

¹⁹ As knowledge is to the Hindú philosopher, as well as to the Hebrew monarch, the greatest good, ignorance is the greatest evil to which the soul can be

who remain in goodness, go upwards; those of the quality of badness remain in a middle state. Those of indifference, remaining in a state of the lowest qualities, go downwards.²⁰ When the spectator²¹ acknowledges no agent but the qualities, and comprehends that which is superior²² to the qualities, he approaches my being. Having overcome the three qualities which co-originate²³ with the body, the soul, released from regeneration, mortality, age, and pain, eats of ambrosia.²⁴

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘By what marks is one who has overcome these three qualities (distinguished), O master? What is his course of life? and how does he overcome these three qualities?’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘He who²⁵ does not hate (the three qualities), brightness, activity, and also delusion,²⁶ O son of Páṇḍu! when they come forth (from nature’s bosom), nor long for them

²⁰ This is merely a recapitulation of shlokas 14 and 15. Upwards and downwards must be understood to allude to the scale of states, or rather bodies, in which the soul may be confined in transmigration. According to Kapila (Śāṅkhya Pravachana, iii. 42) and his disciple Ishwara Kṛishṇa (Śāṅkhya Kārikā, shloka 53), these bodies are fourteen in number, distributed in three classes, in the following descending order:—The first class were deemed divine, or rather superhuman, and were eight in number, viz.: 1. Brahmá and the superior gods; 2. The Prajāpatis or great progenitors of the human race; 3. Saumya or lunar bodies; 4. Indra and the inferior gods (Devas); 5. Gandharvas, heavenly minstrels or angels; 6. Rākshasas; 7. Yākshas; 8. Pisháchas. The second class was man. The third were beings inferior to man, of five kinds, viz.: 10. Pashu, domestic animals; 11. Mṛiga, wild beasts; 12. Birds; 13. Reptiles, fishes, and insects. 14. Vegetables and inorganic bodies. Going upwards was, therefore, entering the region of any of the first eight; going downwards being re-born in any of the last five. The middle state was man.

²¹ The soul, which Kapila and other philosophers compare to a spectator sitting passively in the body, and watching the operations of nature, which is likened to a ballet-girl dancing on the stage of life.

²² The Supreme Being.

²³ Schlegel wrongly ‘e corpore genitis.’ They do not spring from the body, but from nature, and are, therefore, co-originate with all matter, and, consequently, with the body. Remark the force of the preposition *sam* in *samuđbhavdn*.

²⁴ The food of immortality, which is union with the Supreme Being.

²⁵ The *yo* in the next shloka is also the subject here.

²⁶ Merely other names for the three qualities, *sattwa*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. See Introduction.

when they return to it,²⁷—who, sitting as if unconcerned, is not agitated by the qualities, and who does not waver, but (clings to the persuasion) “that the qualities exist;”²⁸ who is the same in pain and pleasure, self-contained, with the same (feelings) towards a lump of earth, a stone, or gold; equally-minded to those whom he likes and those whom he dislikes, constant, equally-minded in blame or praise of himself,—in honour or disgrace,—towards both parties, friends or foes; free from self-interest in all undertakings: he is said to have overcome the qualities. And he who worships *me*²⁹ with religious and exclusive devotion, when he has overcome the qualities, is fitted for the existence of the Supreme Spirit. For I³⁰ indeed am the representative of the Supreme Spirit, and of the imperishable ambrosia, and of eternal law, and of intense happiness.’

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Fourteenth Chapter, by name

‘DEVOTION IN CONNECTION WITH THE THREE QUALITIES.’

²⁷ When they come forth from nature, their action begins; and ceases when they return to it.

²⁸ Compare, but do not confound, Chapter III. 28, note 31. The meaning is here, that he knows them to exist, and, therefore, that it is they alone which impel him towards, or keep him back from, action.

²⁹ Kṛiṣṇa himself. We have here a declaration of what has been understood throughout our poem,—the identification of Kṛiṣṇa himself with the Supreme Being.

³⁰ We should conceive that this clause had been added by our artful author, that his more Brāhmanical and orthodox reader might not take advantage of the genitive *brahmanas*, which may be either neuter or masculine, and interpret it as alluding to Brahmā, the first person of the mythological triad. This he prevents by identifying it with himself, Kṛiṣṇa or Viṣṇu.

CHAPTER THE FIFTEENTH.¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘They say that the eternal sacred fig-tree² grows with its

¹ This Chapter contains a treatise on the nature of spirit generally. It commences with an allegory (shlokas 1—6), which alludes to the whole universe, the eternal revolving current of life, under the figure of the Banyan, or sacred fig-tree. It then proceeds to describe spirit in the human body or the individual soul (shlokas 7—11); then to the universal spirit (shlokas 12—17); and, lastly, specifies spirit, as individual god, the Supreme Being. This division is quite necessary for a right comprehension of the whole Chapter.

² For a complete and most interesting account of this tree, which the limits of our note will not allow us to transcribe, we must refer the reader to Lassen’s excellent work, ‘Indische Alterthumskunde,’ vol. i. pp. 255—260. The *Ashwattha* is known to botanists as the *Ficus religiosa*, and is considered as the male of the *Ficus Indica*, or Indian fig-tree, more commonly known to Europeans as the Banyan. It is found in all parts of India and Ceylon, except on the table-land of the Dekkan; and every village has one specimen which it honours with all the reverence due to its sanctity. It is found separately, and not in the forests, forming, as it does, a forest in itself. At an inconsiderable height from the ground, the stem puts forth a crown of branches, which, growing for some distance horizontally, each lets fall a single shoot, which grows downwards till it reaches the earth, and there takes root, thus forming a pillar, which supports the parent branch. Above the first crown of branches another is presently produced, which, growing beyond the first, lets fall another circle of pillars outside them. This process continues till the whole sometimes reaches the height of 200 feet, and an unlimited number of secondary stems circle around the original trunk. A vast house is thus formed, with innumerable chambers one within another, and increasing, as one penetrates further inward, in mysterious darkness and exhilarating coolness, which the hottest sun of India cannot affect. No wonder, then, that this natural dwelling, offered, as it were, to man, in the place of his own far less elegant or pleasant constructions;—no wonder that these circling mysterious bowers,—these cool but not close retreats,—planted by Providence, not in the wild jungle, but in the midst of fertile plains, should win the reverence of the native whom they sheltered! No wonder that its branches, taking root on earth and forming new stems, should figure to the reflective the idea of eternal life! And such is, indeed, the type which they presented. Lassen is of opinion that the whole passage here inserted is borrowed from an older source, and quotes a passage, supposed to be alluded to by the scholiast, from the Káthaka Upanishad, vi. 1, in which the tree is said to be the Semen and Brahma(n). He himself, however, believes the allegory to allude only to the Vedas, from what is said in shloka 1, that ‘he who knows it, knows the Vedas.’ If I might be permitted to differ from so high an authority, I should conceive that this phrase referred to

roots above³ and its branches downwards. He who knows this tree, the leaves of which are Vedic hymns,⁴ knows the Vedas. Its branches⁵ shoot forth downwards and upwards, nourished and increased by the qualities, and having objects of sense as tendrils. And their roots,⁶ which extend downwards, are the connecting bonds of action in the world of man. Its form is not thus understood in this world, neither its end, nor beginning, nor its constitution. When one has hewn down this sacred fig-tree, together with its wide-spreading roots,⁷ with the steady axe of indifference⁸ (to the world), then may that⁹ place be sought, to which those who go return no more. And I allude¹⁰ to that primeval spirit

what is said immediately before, that its leaves were Vedic hymns, for he who knows the whole tree would know the leaves too, and consequently the Vedas, of which they are the hymns. He further quotes a passage transcribed by the scholiast Madhusúdana, from some unknown *smṛiti*, in which the tree is said to represent developed matter, the trunk being intellect, the senses forming the interior cavity, the branches being the grosser elements of matter, its leaves the objects of sense, and its fruits the pains and pleasures of this life. Judging from the description in our own poem, which bears some resemblance to this, I am inclined to think with the scholiast, that the allegory is a figure of the whole universe, the mass of creation, the whole current of revolving material existence. The earth, then, from which it springs, would be nature, the material essence: and the branches, the individual bodies, which spring from matter originally, and again, eventually, return to it; the sap that runs through and influences the whole would be the three qualities; the tendrils, would be the objects of sense; which are connected to the individual bodies by the senses, and so on.

³ Alluding to the branches themselves afterwards taking root.

⁴ This may be explained in many ways. In the first place, tradition asserted that the Vedic hymns were originally written on dry leaves. Again, as a tree puts forth its leaves for the shelter of the earth, and then discards them to manure it, so has the material deity (Brahmá) put forth the Vedic institutions to shelter mankind from evil, and delivered them to him for his improvement and cultivation. Or, as the leaves are the honour and ornament of a tree, the Vedas are the glory of the world, etc.

⁵ The individual bodies of all things and beings, nourished by the three qualities, as the branches are by the sap.

⁶ As the roots connect the branches more firmly with the earth from which they originally sprung, so does action connect the bodies and the souls they contain more closely with the world, and implicate them in the necessity of regeneration.

⁷ The actions which implicate their agents in regeneration.

⁸ When one has annulled the power of matter and of action by a resolute indifference to the world.

⁹ The Supreme Being.

¹⁰ In speaking of that place. Schlegel translates this word by *déduco*, Galanos by 'I am,' and Wilkins (Parraud's trans.) 'J'ai rendu manifeste.' Let the reader choose.

only, from which the eternal¹¹ stream (of life)¹² emanates. Those who are free from arrogance and delusion, who have subdued the vice of attachment to the world, always constant to the Adhyátmá,¹³ who have repulsed desires, and are free from the influence of those opposites known as pleasure and pain, proceed unbewildered to that imperishable place. Neither sun nor moon illumines that spot. The place, to which those who go return not, is my supreme dwelling. An eternal portion¹⁴ of me only, having assumed life¹⁵ in this world of life, attracts¹⁶ the heart and the five senses,¹⁷ which belong to nature. Whatever body the sovereign spirit¹⁸ enters or quits, it is connected with it by snatching those senses from nature, even as the breeze snatches perfumes from their very bed.¹⁹ This spirit approaches the objects of sense, by presiding over the ear,²⁰ the eye,²⁰ the touch, the taste, and the smell, and also over the heart.²¹ The foolish

¹¹ Lit. : 'ancient,' *i.e.* without beginning.

¹² Among other meanings, *pravṛitti* has that of 'a continuous flow or current, the tide of events,' etc.

¹³ See Chapter VIII. note 1.

¹⁴ He is now about to speak of the lowest kind of *Puruṣha*, or spirit, the individual soul.

¹⁵ Material life, which commences and ends with the universe. Life, like time, when contrasted with eternity, can only be said of the existence of what is perishable. Life being a conditional and dependent, not a positive term, cannot be said of what never undergoes death.

¹⁶ This is a mode of showing the connection between the soul and matter. The senses and the heart are the links between the soul and the external world. When, therefore, the soul enters the body, it attracts to itself, that is, connects with itself these senses, by which it is enabled to obtain that knowledge of the universe which aids its emancipation.

¹⁷ Lit. : 'the senses, which have the heart as sixth.' The more correct rendering would therefore be, 'the six senses, including the heart;' but as the latter is superior and distinct from the senses, though improperly called a sense itself, I have preferred the given translation. Schlegel remarks, with truth, that this peculiar construction is not unwonted either in Sanskrit or other tongues. He cites, for the first, *Hitopadesha*, ed. Bonn, p. 63, 7; and 106, 16. For the latter, *Juvenal*, Sat. i. 64, and the *Nibelungen-Lied*, verse 1379 :

'Selbe vierde degene varn wir an den se.'

¹⁸ The soul being a portion (that emanated) of the Supreme Spirit (*ishwara*).

¹⁹ From the flowers which contain them.

²⁰ In these two words the concrete is put for the abstract, the organ itself for the sense of which it is the site.

²¹ The meaning of this shloka is, that without the soul, and the vital energy

do not perceive it when it quits the body, nor when it remains (in it), nor when, actuated by the qualities, it enjoys (the world). But those who have the eyes of knowledge do perceive it. And devotees, who strive to do so, perceive it dwelling within themselves; but those who have not overcome themselves,²² being destitute of sense, do not perceive it, even though they strive to do so. Know that that brilliance²³ which enters the sun and illumines the whole earth, and which is in the moon, and in fire, is of me. And I enter the ground and support all living things by my vigour; and I nourish all herbs, becoming that moisture, of which the peculiar property is taste.²⁴ And becoming fire,²⁵ I enter the body of the living, and being associated with their inspiration and expiration, cause food of the four kinds²⁶ to digest. And

which accompanies it, the senses would be passive, and have no connection with the worldly objects (*vishaya*), which they are intended to grasp. By their intervention, the soul, when it has once pervaded and directed them, becomes cognizant of the objects of sense.

²² Lit. : 'Have not formed themselves.'

²³ He now comes to speak (in shlokas 12—16) of the second kind of *Puruṣa*, or spirit, the non-individuate universal vitality, by which all things are invigorated, not merely with life, but with the properties of the soul in divers degrees. This is the Supreme Being, though not in his separate personality, but in his connection with matter. When we consider the universe in the light of a child produced in the womb of nature (*prakṛiti*), which is a part of the Supreme Being, by impregnation with spirit, the other portion of him, in the place of semen, we shall understand that that semen which gives the strength, the life, the vigour to the fœtus, is the second *Puruṣa*, which, though really an emanation from the Supreme Being, just as much as individual soul is, and remaining an emanation only so long as matter exists in its development, that is, during the existence of the universe, is so closely connected with the Supreme Spirit in his personal individuality, as to be identified with him, much more than individual soul can be.

²⁴ In the cosmology of the Sāṅkhya school, every element contains, as we have seen, the subtile element which corresponds to each one of the senses. Thus the peculiar property of ether (*ākāśa*) is audibleness, or that which corresponds to the sense of hearing; that of air is tangibleness, corresponding to the sense of touch, etc. The peculiar property of water is sapidity, which corresponds to the sense of taste. The water or moisture in the earth enters, then, the vegetable body, and, becoming sap, lends to it its sweet or sour, bitter or pungent, taste.

²⁵ *Vaiśvānara* is a name of Agni (see *Index*). It here means the heat of the stomach, which is supposed to *cook* the food within it, till all the nourishment is expunged and transmitted to the blood, etc., and nothing but the non-nutritious part left to pass away. This process of *ooking* is therefore nothing but that of digestion.

²⁶ Which are explained by the scholiast Śhrīdharaswāmin to be—1st. *Bhakṣva*.

I enter the heart of each one, and from me come memory, knowledge, and reason. And I alone am to be known by all the Vedas,²⁷ and I am the composer of the Vedánta,²⁸ and also the interpreter of the Vedas. These two spirits²⁹ (*Puruṣhas*) exist in the world,³⁰ the divisible and also the indivisible. The divisible is every living being. The indivisible is said to be that which pervades all. But there is another, the highest spirit³¹ (*Puruṣha*), designated by the name of the Supreme Soul, which, as the imperishable master, penetrates and sustains the triple world. Since I³² surpass the divisible, and am higher also than the indivisible, I am, therefore, celebrated in the world and in the Vedas as the highest Person (*Puruṣha*). He who, not deluded (by the world), knows me to be thus the highest Person (*Puruṣha*), knows all things, and worships me by every condition.³³ Thus have

such as may be chewed, as bread; 2nd. *Bhojya*, such as may be swallowed, as milk or curds; 3rd. *Lehya*, what is licked with the tongue, as liquorice; 4th. *Choṣhya*, what is sucked with the lips, as jelly, etc.

²⁷ These and the following words would seem to be a Bráhmanical exemplification of the two preceding lines. To be known by the Vedas pre-supposes an exercise of *memory* on the part of the student. The Vedánta is a philosophical treatise on the theology of the Vedas, and would therefore require *knowledge* of the Supreme Being, etc.; while to interpret the Vedas, the *reasoning* powers must be brought into full force. This explanation is undoubtedly fanciful, but it is difficult otherwise to account for what is here so foreign to all that has gone before. The whole shloka bears the stamp of a copyist's interpolation, an idea which is favoured by the change of metre in so sudden a manner.

²⁸ The name of a work and school of philosophy, the composition and founding of which are ascribed, among many other works, to the Vyása, Kriṣṇa Dwaipáyana, who compiled the Vedas. As we know it, the work, which also bears the name of *Uttara*, or second *Mimánsá*, bears internal evidence of being considerably posterior to the Bhagavad-Gítá, and cannot, therefore, be here alluded to. The word, however (= *veda + anta*), means nothing more than the 'end of the Vedas,' and might be given to any school or treatise which had the expounding of the Vedic doctrines as its chief object. If this again be not meant, we must take the word in the general sense of the 'study of Vedic theology,' and the word *kṛit* must be rendered 'institutor.'

²⁹ Namely, the individual soul, here called divisible (shlokas 7—11), and the universal vital energy, called the indivisible (shlokas 12—15).

³⁰ Put generally for the universe or matter, to which these two belong, and on the existence of which their own individual existence depends.

³¹ He now speaks of spirit entirely independent of matter, and of this there is but one form, the supreme, eternal, infinite, individual deity.

³² Kriṣṇa again expressly identifies himself with the Supreme Being.

³³ Whatever he does, in whatever condition of life, becomes a sacrifice to me.

I declared, O sinless one! this most mystic science. A man, if he knows this science, will be wise and do his duty,³⁴ O son of Bhárata !'

Thus in the Upanishads, etc., (stands) the Fifteenth Chapter, by name

'DEVOTION BY THE ATTAINMENT TO THE HIGHEST PERSON.'

³⁴ The duty of his caste. Kṛiṣṇa takes care to bring all his teaching round to the same point, the persuasion of Arjuna to fight.

CHAPTER THE SIXTEENTH.¹

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘Fearlessness, purification of his nature, continuance in devotion through spiritual knowledge, almsgiving, temperance and study, mortification, rectitude, harmlessness, truth, freedom from anger, indifference to the world,² mental tranquillity, straightforwardness,³ benevolence towards all beings, modesty, gentleness, bashfulness, stability, energy, patience, resolution, purity, freedom from vindictiveness and from conceit,—these are (the virtues) of the man who is born to the lot of the Devas, Bhárata! Deceit, pride and conceit, anger and abusiveness also, and ignorance, are (the vices) of him who is born to the lot of the Asuras, O son of Prithá! The lot of the Devas is considered conducive to final liberation,⁴

¹ This Chapter treats of that part of the doctrine of transmigration which concerns the state immediately after this life. The deeds performed on earth affect a man's soul in five ways, two of which are bad and three good, or, as they are here called, *Sampad Asuri*, or the infernal fate, and *Sampad Daivi*, or the divine fate. The two bad are as follows:—First. Those who act badly are despatched to the regions inhabited and presided over by the Asuras, the enemies of the gods, the giants and demons of Hindú mythology. These regions are limited, in philosophical works, to three—the regions of the Yakshas, Rakshasas, and Pishachas. We have also mention of Naraka as a general term. (See Chapter I. note 35.) Secondly, they are born again on earth in the bodies of inferior men or of animals. The good first receive the kingdoms of the Devas as their reward. These are five in number. (See Chapter V. note 39.) Secondly, after a sojourn in these regions proportionate to their merits, they are born again on earth in the bodies of the superior in rank and virtue among men. But the fifth fate, higher than both of these, is the object of philosophy—final emancipation from material existence and union with the Supreme Being.

² *Tyaga* means either ‘abandonment of worldly interests,’ or simply ‘liberality.’ I have preferred the former as being the meaning more usual in philosophical language.

³ *Pishuna*, is a spy; *paishuna*, the character of a spy, a taste for watching and informing of the actions of others; *apaishuna*, freedom from such disposition. As *pishuna* also means ‘cruel,’ *apaishuna* might be rendered ‘clemency.’

⁴ After a sojourn in the world of the Devas, the soul is again invested on earth with the body of the higher and superior among men, to whom the practice of

that of the Asuras to confinement (to material existence). Grieve not, O son of Páṇḍu! thou art born to a divine lot. In this world there are two sorts of natures in beings, that of the Devas (divine), and also that of the Asuras (infernal). The divine has been declared at full length.⁵ Hear from me the infernal, O son of Prithá! Men of the infernal nature do not comprehend either the nature of action, or that of cessation from action. They possess neither purity, nor yet morality, nor truthfulness. They deny that the univēse has any truth in it, or is really constituted, or possesses a Lord,⁶ or that it has arisen in certain succession,⁷ or anything else, save that it is there for the sake of enjoyment. Maintaining such a view, their souls being ruined and their minds contracted, baneful in their actions and hostile to the world, they prevail for destruction. Indulging insatiable covetousness, filled with deceit, pride, and madness, in their folly they adopt wrong conceptions,⁸ and proceed, impure in their mode of life,—indulging unlimited reflections that end in annihilation,⁹ considering the enjoyment of their desires as the highest object, persuaded that such¹⁰ (is life). Caught in a hundred

devotion is easier than to others. On the other hand, after a sojourn among the Asuras, it is invested with the body of some animal, or, at best, with that of an inferior man, to whom the practice of devotion is almost impossible, and transmigration consequently more liable to ensue.

⁵ In the first three shlokas of this Chapter.

⁶ They deny the truth of the creation and preservation of the world as taught by the Vedas or the Schools of Philosophy. They believe matter to be eternal and self-constituted, and are, in short, atheists of the most worldly and least intellectual kind. This is, of course, said of the worldly, who are atheists by neglect, indifference, and presumption, not of such reasoning atheists as Kapila.

⁷ The regular succession of supreme spirit to nature, nature to manifest matter, and of this last again in the philosophical order already described. This is the translation of Schlegel. Wilkins and Galanos have followed the scholiasts in an arbitrary explanation, which attributes to this compound the meaning of 'produced by man and woman,' and to *kámahaituka* that of 'caused by love.' Lassen has so ably supported Schlegel's rendering that it would be superfluous to reiterate here the *pros* and *cons* of the question.

⁸ As to the nature and the object of the universe.

⁹ They support their false worldly views of the nature of things by speculative reasoning, which really amounts to nothing at all. The translators have mostly very far-fetched interpretations of this simple compound.

¹⁰ Namely, *kámahaituka*, or made for the sake of enjoyment.

snarers of false hopes, prone to desire and anger, they seek abundance of wealth by improper means, for the sake of pandering to their own lusts. "I have now obtained this thing, and I will obtain that pleasure. I possess this wealth, and that, too, I will yet possess. I have slain this enemy, and I will slay others also. I am sovereign, I am enjoyer (of the world). I am perfect, strong, and blessed. I am opulent, and of noble birth. Who else is like me? I will sacrifice, I will give alms, I will slay." Thus speak those who are befooled by ignorance. Confused by many worldly thoughts, surrounded by the meshes of bewilderment, devoted to the enjoyment of their desires, they descend to foul Naraka.¹¹ Esteeming themselves very highly, self-willed, full of possessions,¹² pride, and madness, they hypocritically worship with nominal sacrifices, not according to ritual.¹³ Indulging selfishness, violence, pride, desire and anger, detesting me (who live) in their own and others' bodies, revilers of me,—such as these, hating (me), cruel, the lowest of men among mankind, and wicked, I continually hurl into wombs of an infernal nature.¹⁴ Having entered an infernal womb, more and more deluded in every succeeding regeneration,¹⁵ they never come to me, O son of Kuntí! and hence they proceed to the lowest walk.¹⁶ That gate of hell,¹⁷ which causes the destruction of the soul,¹⁸ is threefold—desire, anger, covetousness. One should therefore abandon this triad. Liberated

¹¹ See Chapter I. note 35.

¹² This compound occurs in shloka 10, with the slight change of *dambha* for *dhana*. It would be preferable to retain that reading here; but as we have no authority for the change, we must explain *dhana* as alluding to the costly ostentation of their offerings.

¹³ Merely for the sake of ostentation, their hearts taking no part therein, as Holy Writ enjoins.

¹⁴ In their repeated transmigrations, their souls are invested with bodies which are considered of an infernal nature, as animals, insects, and inorganic matter.

¹⁵ The repetition of the substantive marks that of the act increasing in intensity.

¹⁶ Junction with inorganic matter.

¹⁷ So called, because they open Naraka to receive the soul, which gives way to them.

¹⁸ Its debasement in the scale of bodies.

from these three gates of obscurity,¹⁹ O son of Kuntī! a man accomplishes the salvation of his soul, and thus attains the highest path.²⁰ He who, neglecting the law of Holy Writ, lives after his own desires, attains neither perfection, nor happiness, nor the highest walk.²¹ Let Holy Writ be therefore thy authority²² in the determination of what should be done, and what not. Knowing that works are proclaimed in the precepts of Holy Writ, thou shouldest perform actions.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Sixteenth Chapter, by name

‘ DEVOTION IN REGARD TO THE LOT OF THE DEVAS
AND THAT OF THE ASURAS.’

¹⁹ Another name of Naraka.

²⁰ Extinction in the Supreme Being.

²¹ Perfection on earth, happiness in the heaven of the Deities, and final emancipation.

²² Schlegel has shown, by numerous examples, that when the word *pramāṇa* is used without a verb, the imperative *astu*, not the present *asti*, must be generally supplied. He cites *Hitopadesha*, book i. line 114 (in Johnson's edition), and *Nala* iv. 13.

CHAPTER THE SEVENTEENTH.¹

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘But what is the state of those who, neglecting the ordinance of Holy Writ, worship, full of faith, Kṛiṣṇa? (Is it) goodness, badness, or indifference?’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘The faith of mortals is of three kinds. It springs from each one’s own disposition.² Learn that it is of the nature of goodness, and also of badness and indifference. The faith of each man is in accordance with his nature, O Bhárata! Mortal man, who is gifted with faith, is of the same nature as that (being) on whom he reposes his faith.³ The good

¹ In Chapter XIV. an explanation has been given of the nature of the three qualities which influence matter. The subject is now resumed, and the object of the present Chapter is to show how these qualities affect the religious feelings of mankind generally, apart from the consideration of the established religion. Kṛiṣṇa does not reply directly to Arjuna’s question, but indirectly, by explaining the nature of religious faith. He distinguishes its practical manifestation as of three kinds: 1st. Sacrifice, which includes all worship, or the duty of man towards God; 2nd. Mortification, or self-government, his duty towards himself; 3rd. Alms-giving, which includes all charity, or his duty towards his fellow-creature; and shows the influence of each of the qualities on these exercises severally.

² The disposition (*swabháva*) is, as we have already seen, the natural character of a man, which inclines him to good, evil, or inertness in all that he does, and is a mixture of the three qualities in different proportions,—a good disposition containing more *sattwa*, or goodness, than badness or indifference; a bad one, more badness, and so on.

³ The construction is here somewhat difficult, though the sense is clear enough. Taken in the order of the English, the Sanskrit words would stand thus,—*Ayam puru ho, yo (asti) shraddhmayah, so (asti) sa eva, yachchradho (asti)*. ‘This mortal, who is full of faith, he is that, indeed, towards which he is faithful.’ The usual construction in Sanskrit would be,—*Yah shraddhamayo ayam puru ho yachchradhah sa eva sah*. Thus the first *sa* corresponds to the *yat* in *yachchradhah*, the second to the *yah*. Two words, however, in this line have an

worship the gods, the bad the Yakṣhas and Rákṣhasas. Other men, being indifferent, worship the Pretas and Bhútas.⁴ Know that those men who practise severe self-mortification, not in accordance with Holy Writ,⁵ being full of hypocrisy and egotism, and gifted with desires, passions, and headstrong will,—torturing the collection of elementary parts⁶ which compose the body, without sense, and torturing me⁷ also, who exist in the inmost recesses of the body, are of an infernal tendency. But even the food, which is pleasant to each (kind of disposition), is of three kinds.⁸ Sacrifice, mortification, and almsgiving (are each of three kinds).⁹ Hear the follow-

unusual force. *Ayam*, which at first sight appears to be redundant, on account of the second *sa*, is really an attributive to *Puruṣha*, and marks that the latter word was to be used in its commonest sense of man, the mortal, the united body and soul existing on this earth, and not in its wider philosophical meaning of 'spirit,' as described in Chapter XV. Again, the first *sa* has here the force of 'such, of such a kind, or nature,' which renders the sense of the whole passage comprehensible. This is explained by the very next shloka. If a man worship the gods, whose nature contains a predominance of goodness, his own nature will contain a like predominance. If he worship the Rákṣhasas, and rely on them, his nature is a bad one, and so on.

⁴ These are two species of spirits which are generally mentioned together. They both of them haunt cemeteries, and animate dead bodies, and their worshippers are of the lowest kind, since it is the blackest superstition and the meanest fear only, which prompts their worship.

⁵ He here deprecates all self-torture, except that which is practised in accordance with Holy Writ, and which he explains in shlokas 14, 15, and 16. We are inclined to think that the word *śāstra*, which we have rendered generally by 'Holy Writ,' alludes here, and elsewhere in this Chapter, rather to the works which were authorities for the Yoga system (*e.g.* Patanjali's *Yoga-sūtras*), than to the Vedas, which can scarcely be considered authorities for this species of exercise. The mortification here reprobated is that which affects the body only, while the heart and mind still remain filled with lusts and passions, it being, like the long fastings of the Pharisees, a matter of mere ostentation or self-interest.

⁶ This is said generally of the body, and includes all the principal parts of the more material portion of the body, the five grosser and the five subtler elements, the senses, and the organs of action. Mere torture of the flesh, he says, is not real mortification, but should be used as a means of acquiring control over the heart and thoughts,—of self-government.

⁷ That is, the Supreme Being: but alluding rather to the vital energy than to the soul itself, which could not be affected by the torture of matter. It alludes to immoderate fasting, which destroys that vital energy.

⁸ Namely: good, bad, and indifferent.

⁹ This shloka is merely an announcement of what he is going to explain. He is exemplifying the action of the three qualities on each man's disposition, and to make the subject more clear, he takes the commonest and most homely example,—that of food; and shows how each man's disposition inclines him to a different mode of life, even in the commonest affairs.

burning, are the foods beloved by the bad, and cause pain, grief, and disease. Whatever food is stale,¹¹ tasteless, and corrupted with rottenness, and even left (after a meal), or impure, is the food preferred by those of the indifferent quality. That sacrifice which is performed in accordance with divine law by those who do not look selfishly for its recompense, and who dispose their hearts to (the conviction) that it is right to sacrifice, is a good one. But know that that sacrifice, which is offered by those who regard its recompense, and also for the sake of deceiving (by a false show of piety), O best of the Bharatas ! is a bad one. That which is not according to law, and without distribution of the food, without sacred hymns, without paying the priest,¹² and bereft of faith, they pronounce to be an indifferent sacrifice. Honouring the gods, the Bráhmans, the preceptors and the wise, purity, straightforwardness, the vow of a Brahmachári¹³ and harmlessness, are said to be mortification of the body. Speech which causes no excitement,¹⁴ which is truthful and friendly, and also diligence in muttering prayers, is called mortification of the mouth. Serenity of heart, gentleness, silence, self-restraint, purification of one's nature, this is

¹⁰ Lit. : ' fat, oleaginous.'

¹¹ Lit. : ' which has passed a watch,' ' which has been cooked over-night.' The night of twelve hours was divided into three *yamas*, or watches of four hours each.

¹² The spirit of the Bráhman here peers disgracefully through the mask of the philosopher. Like the Jew of old, and the priest of modern days, and perhaps more than either, the Bráhman knew how to acquire and keep his portion of this world's goods, and his pay for the services he performed. For every officiating priest, a fee, in proportion to the style of the offering, was specially exacted, and the offerer was enjoined to prepare a meal for all the Bráhmans who were present.

¹³ See Chapter VI. note 19. The allusion is here to the chastity and purity undertaken by that vow.

¹⁴ Such as abuse, which excites anger ; or indecent conversation, which excites desire.

called mortification of the heart. This threefold mortification, practised with extreme faith, by men who disregard the fruit of their actions, and are devoted, is pronounced good. That mortification which is practised for the sake of one's own good reception, honour, and respect,¹⁵ and in hypocrisy also, is here¹⁶ declared bad, fickle and uncertain. That mortification which is performed by merely wounding one's self, from an erroneous view (of the nature of mortification)¹⁷ or for another's destruction,¹⁸ is called indifferent. A gift which is given in a (right) place and time,¹⁹ and to a (fitting) person,²⁰ with the conviction that one ought to give alms, and to one who cannot return it,²¹ is related as a good gift.²² But that which is given for the sake of a gift in return, or, again, in the expectation of its recompense, and reluctantly, is called a bad gift. That gift which is given in a wrong place and time,

¹⁵ This proves the great esteem in which the Yogī must have been held even at the period at which our author writes, since impostors could assume that character as a means of being entertained and held in honour.

¹⁶ As Schlegel very properly translates it, 'secundum rationem nostram.'

¹⁷ Under the impression that mortification merely consists in cutting and wounding the flesh, without any subjection of the heart and passions, and that by this means final emancipation may be reached.

¹⁸ Patanjali had taught that a severe and continuous system of mortification, conjoined with meditation and self-subjection, was the means of acquiring supernatural powers (*vibhūti*), and among these was that of cursing whomever one pleased with immediate effect. The indifferent, then, having nothing but their own selfish objects in view, undertake mortification in order to acquire this power, and thus to destroy their private enemies. Of course, however, they do not succeed, from a want of the true spirit of that exercise.

¹⁹ Galanos, following the scholiast, explains the place to be any holy place, such as Benares, and the time to be an eclipse, the eleventh day of the moon, the full moon, or the morning. We confess we are unwilling to attribute so much Brāhmanical superstition to our philosopher, but can give no better explanation. Compare *Yājñavalkya*, i. 6.

²⁰ *Pātre* is, lit., 'in a fitting dish or receptacle.' - Its sense is, however, determined by shloka 22, where it again occurs in the dative plural. The scholiast would explain the locative as standing for the dative case; but if we consider that the person to whom the gift is made is regarded as the receptacle in which it is deposited, the locative is even more grammatically correct than the dative. Under these circumstances we are surprised that Lassen, in his note, should prefer to render it by 'data juxta occasione.'

²¹ The Christianity of this sentiment may, perhaps, be somewhat modified by what is said of the time and place.

²² The whole shloka is quoted in *Hitopadesha*, i. 15.

ing division of these. Those which increase life, vigour, strength, health, happiness, and gaiety, and which are savoury, rich,¹⁰ and substantial, are the pleasant foods dear to the good. The bitter, acid, salt, too hot, pungent, sour, and burning, are the foods beloved by the bad, and cause pain, grief, and disease. Whatever food is stale,¹¹ tasteless, and corrupted with rottenness, and even left (after a meal), or impure, is the food preferred by those of the indifferent quality. That sacrifice which is performed in accordance with divine law by those who do not look selfishly for its recompense, and who dispose their hearts to (the conviction) that it is right to sacrifice, is a good one. But know that that sacrifice, which is offered by those who regard its recompense, and also for the sake of deceiving (by a false show of piety), O best of the Bharatas ! is a bad one. That which is not according to law, and without distribution of the food, without sacred hymns, without paying the priest,¹² and bereft of faith, they pronounce to be an indifferent sacrifice. Honouring the gods, the Bráhmans, the preceptors and the wise, purity, straightforwardness, the vow of a Brahmachári¹³ and harmlessness, are said to be mortification of the body. Speech which causes no excitement,¹⁴ which is truthful and friendly, and also diligence in muttering prayers, is called mortification of the mouth. Serenity of heart, gentleness, silence, self-restraint, purification of one's nature, this is

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¹⁸ Patanjali had taught that a severe and continuous system of mortification, conjoined with meditation and self-subjection, was the means of acquiring supernatural powers (*vibhúti*), and among these was that of cursing whomever one pleased with immediate effect. The indifferent, then, having nothing but their own selfish objects in view, undertake mortification in order to acquire this power, and thus to destroy their private enemies. Of course, however, they do not succeed, from a want of the true spirit of that exercise.

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²¹ The Christianity of this sentiment may, perhaps, be somewhat modified by what is said of the time and place.

²² The whole shloka is quoted in Hitopadesha, i. 15.

and to the unworthy, without the proper attentions,²³ and disdainfully, is pronounced an indifferent gift. *Om, Tat, Sat,*²⁴ this is related as the threefold designation of the Supreme Being. By him were the Bráhmans, and Vedas, and sacrifices instituted of yore.²⁵ Therefore the rites of sacrifice, alms, and mortification, enjoined by divine law, are always commenced by theologians,²⁶ by pronouncing the word *Om*. (With the conviction that the Deity is) *tat*,²⁷ the various rites of sacrifice, mortification, and almsgiving are performed²⁸ by those who desire final emancipation, without consideration of the reward (of their actions).²⁹ That word *sat*³⁰ is used in reference to reality and goodness. And the word *sat* is likewise used in (reference to the) performance of a

²³ Such as embracing and washing the feet.—Galanos.

²⁴ These three words occur in the Vedas, and are there explained as designating Brahmá. They are together equivalent to the mystic phrase, *tat tvam asi*, 'thou (the Supreme Being) art that (whole universe),' the *Om!* as that by which the Deity is invoked, corresponding to *tvam*, and *sat* to *asi*. The sentence indicates the Deity in his relation to the universe, and marks his divinity in the *Om!* his universality in the *tat*, and his external existence in the *sat*. For an explanation of *Om!* see Chapter I. note 1. *Tat*, the neuter of the demonstrative pronoun, signifies 'all that,' all that exists,—the universe. *Sat*, the present participle of the verb *as*, 'to be,' marks the existence and eternity (noted by the present tense) of the *Om!* and its connection with the *tat*. Besides the meaning of 'existent,' *sat* has also that of 'real,' and it denotes the real existence of the Supreme Being, contrasted with the finite, and therefore unreal existence of matter. The whole passage seems to be nothing more than a conscience offering to the outraged Bráhmanism, and an attempt to authorize the established doctrines by a species of mystic philosophical terminology, having for its object the exaltation of the Bráhmans, the Vedas, and the established rites. We have more than once said that the plan of our author was conciliatory, and that he wrote at a period when contempt had been profusely heaped upon the hierarchical institutions, and this is one of the passages which seem to support us in our assertion.

²⁵ Namely, at the creation.

²⁶ Lit., By those who speak of the Supreme Being, that is generally those who understand and impart their knowledge of the truth of things. It probably refers to the philosophers especially, but may refer generally to all learned theologians.

²⁷ 'That all,' viz. the whole universe, everything which exists.

²⁸ From the conviction that the Supreme Being is everything, they perform sacrifices to him in the persons of the deities according to the Established Religion; but not with the selfish motives that generally prompt the adherents to the law, but only from love of the Supreme Being.

²⁹ Final emancipation not being the reward of these actions, but obtained by devotion.

³⁰ Lit., 'existent.' Hence really existent, *real*; and since what is real is good, as opposed to what has only the appearance of reality, it also means *good*.

laudable action, O son of Pṛithá! A quiescent state³¹ of sacrifice, mortification, and almsgiving, is called *sat*. And also action,³¹ on account of these (rites), is denominated *sat*. Whatever sacrifice, almsgiving, or mortification is performed, and whatever action is done, without faith,³² is called *asat*,³³ O son of Pṛithá! Nor is that (of any use) to us after death or in this life.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads, etc., (stands) the Seventeenth Chapter, by name

'DEVOTION AS REGARDS THE THREE KINDS OF FAITH.'

³¹ These two words are strongly contrasted. These three things, worship, self-control, and charity, are not necessarily *actions* in the usual acceptation of the word, but may be mental conditions, during which the body is quiescent. He says that they are called good (*sat*) when actually performed, when the person actually offers victims to the gods, or tortures his flesh or gives alms to fitting objects; but they are no less so when mentally performed, when the devotee who prefers rest to action, offers his pure thoughts as a sacrifice, keeps his body beneath the control of his soul, or maintains a benevolent sympathy towards all beings.

³² In opposition to those mentioned in shloka 27, which are done, as we are told in shloka 25, by those who desire final emancipation, etc., and therefore with faith.

³³ The opposite to *sat*, lit., 'not existing,' thence unreal, *bad*.

CHAPTER THE EIGHTEENTH.¹

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘I wish to learn, O great-armed one! the nature of renunciation (of actions), and of disinterestedness (in actions),² Kṛiṣṇa! separately, O slayer of Keshin!’

THE HOLY ONE SPOKE.

‘The sages³ know that the rejection of (all) actions which have a desired object, is Renunciation. The learned call the disregard of the fruit of every action, disinterestedness. Some wise men⁴ say, “An action must be avoided like a crime,” and others⁵ say, “The action in sacrifice, almsgiving, and mortification should not be avoided.” Hear my decision in this matter as to disinterestedness, O best of the Bharatas! For it is said, O first of men! to be of three kinds.⁶ The action in

¹ In this Chapter he re-establishes and certifies the principal and favourite doctrines of the Bhagavad-Gitá. Renunciation of action is the watchword of this system, but not inaction, only the abandonment of all interest in the action, and of all care as to its result. The two principal kinds of action are religious action, as sacrifice, etc., and duty, or fulfilment of the obligations of the station in which one is born. All other kinds of action can only have some specific interested object in view, and are, therefore, to be renounced. This having been established, he proceeds through the remainder of the Chapter, beginning at shloka 12, to explain the nature of action and all connected with it. From shloka 22 he shows the influence of the three qualities on all things.

² Compare Chapter V.

³ See Chapter IV. note 17.

⁴ Kapila and his disciples.

⁵ Particularly those of the Mímánsá School, who relied on the actions enjoined by the Vedas.

⁶ According to the three qualities, though, of course, that of the *sattva* quality was the only true one.

sacrifice, almsgiving, and mortification should not be avoided. It should be practised only. Sacrifice, alms, and also mortification, are the purifications⁷ of the wise. But such actions, indeed, must be practised after having rejected selfish interests and their consequences. Such, O son of Prithá! is my certain and supreme decision. Again, the renunciation of a necessary⁸ action is not right. The rejection of such an action is said to be from folly and of the quality of indifference.⁹ If¹⁰ one abandon any action, merely alleging that it is difficult, from fear of personal annoyance, he practises renunciation under the influence of badness, and would not receive the reward of renunciation. If one perform a necessary action, convinced that it must be done, Arjuna! putting aside self-interest and the fruit also (of his action), that disinterestedness is deemed good. The disinterested man, filled with goodness and with contemplation, and free from doubts, is not averse to unprosperous, nor attached to prosperous action. For it is impossible for actions¹¹ to be entirely abandoned by a mortal; but he who is not interested in the result of actions is called disinterested. The result of actions of three kinds, unwished for, wished for, and mixed,¹² accrues

⁷ The external visible forms of the internal spiritual purification. Sacrifice was the visible form of worship, which is the purification of the mind: almsgiving, of charity, which is the purification of the heart; and mortification is the purification of the flesh.

⁸ That is, belonging to one's duties of caste.

⁹ Since sloth and laziness were part of indifference.

¹⁰ As Schlegel remarks, the neuter relative is here ungrammatical, and we should expect the masc. *yaś* from the *sa* which follows. *Yat*, however, is found in all the MSS., and we must therefore consider it as indefinite, and supply 'if' to express the hypothesis implied in the subj. tense of *tyajet*. The same holds good for the next shloka.

¹¹ The construction is here somewhat irregular. *Shakyam* is the neut. of the fut. part. pass. of *śak*, 'to be able,' and the passive meaning contained in it must be transferred in English to the inf. *tyaktum*, as is often the case with this auxiliary. But instead of *karmāṇi* in the acc. plural, governed by *tyaktum*, we should naturally have expected *karma* in the nom. sing. as subject to *shakyam*. As this, however, is not the case, we must consider *shakyam* to be here employed indefinitely.

¹² That is, unpleasant, pleasant, and what is partly composed of each. Those who on this earth perform actions without entire absence of interest in the con-

after death to those who do not renounce actions, but not any result to those who do renounce. Learn from me, O hero! the following five principles of action declared in the Sánkhya (doctrine), and necessary for the completion of every action—the prescribed method, the agent,¹³ and the instrument of the particular description required,¹⁴ the different movements¹⁵ of the particular kind for each, and Divine will¹⁶ also as the fifth. These five requisites (attend) every action which a man undertakes, whether proper or improper, with his body, his voice, and his heart.¹⁷ This¹⁸ being thus, he who regards himself only¹⁹ as the actor, by reason of his mental imperfections, is wrong-minded, and does not really see aright. He whose disposition is not egotistical, and whose mind is not polluted,²⁰ does not kill, even though he slay yonder people, nor is implicated²¹ (in the bonds of action). Knowledge, the thing to be known, and the person who knows, constitute the threefold incitement to action.²² The instrument, the act,

sequences, receive those consequences after death, according to their merits. The wicked go to Naraka, the good to Swarga; those who have been neither very good nor very bad, are born again on earth at once. Those, however, who do renounce all such interest obtain final emancipation.

¹³ The person himself, or, in a wider sense, the mind.

¹⁴ The organs of action, as hands, feet, etc., or the senses.

¹⁵ The action of the senses and organs.

¹⁶ If the Sánkhya here mentioned refer either to Kapila's or Ishwara Kṛishṇa's writings, this word should be translated 'circumstance, destiny,' since they do not recognize a Divine will.

¹⁷ Here generally for the senses, over which the heart (*manas*) presides.

¹⁸ Mark the unwonted use of *tatra*, as the loc. sing. of the pronoun *tad*, without any meaning of *place*, but agreeing with *sati* in the loc. absolute. In all probability this locative originally ended in *tra* rather than *smi*, until, from its constant use to denote place, the older form came to be used independently, and the later one was substituted for it.

¹⁹ Forgetting that four other things are requisite to the performance of every action.

²⁰ Is not perverted and defiled by false doctrine.

²¹ Galanos, misled by what is said in Chapter II. 19, 20, translates, 'and is not killed,' from the root *badh*, 'to kill,' which, however, does not occur in the conjugational tenses.

²² The object of this life is the emancipation of the soul from material existence, which is effected by the acquirement of knowledge, that is, of true spiritual knowledge of the real nature of all things; and this is acquired by the connection of the soul with the universe by means of the body. The soul therefore is the

and the agent, are the threefold collection of action.²³ Knowledge, and the act, and the agent, are also declared in three ways, according to the difference of the three qualities. Hear these also, properly, in the enumeration of the qualities. Know that that knowledge, by which one perceives a single imperishable principle of existence in all things, not separate in separate objects,²⁴ is good. But that knowledge which perceives in all things, on account of their individuality, various individual principles of existence,²⁵ is bad. But that knowledge which attaches to one object (to be performed), as if it were everything,²⁶ and does not recognize the true cause of (existence),²⁷ which is not possessed of the real truth,²⁸ and is mean, is called indifferent. That action which is necessary,²⁹ free from self-interest, done without love or hatred by one who is regardless of its reward, is said to be a good action. But that action which is performed with great exertion, by one who desires some pleasant object, or, again, is egotistical, is called a bad one. One undertakes an action from folly, without regarding the consequences, the loss, the harm (it may do), and his own power (to carry it out), that is called indifferent. (One who acts) free from self-interest, without self-praise, with per-

parijñātri, the spectator of the universe within the body, whose object is to comprehend the universe and the nature of things, which is therefore the *jñeya*, the object of knowledge, which, being the means, is *jñāna*.

²³ Action, that is, the whole action of life, by which this knowledge is acquired, itself consists of three components corresponding with these. *Karma*, 'the thing to be done,' answers to *jñeya*, 'the thing to be known;' *karaṇa*, 'the means,' to *jñāna*; and *kartri*, 'the agent,' to *parijñātri*.

²⁴ Which recognizes the fact that all individual souls belong to the same great spirit, all individual life to the same universal vitality, all individual bodies of matter to the same material essence, and all of these consequently to the Supreme Being.

²⁵ Which believes things to be as they at first appear, independent and distinct.

²⁶ Which believes the sole object of life to be the particular one which it has marked out for itself; such as the acquirement of wealth, etc.

²⁷ Is ignorant that final emancipation is the reason of our existence on earth.

²⁸ Does not recognize the existence of a Supreme Being, and the temporary nature of matter.

²⁹ Such as the rites of religion and the duties of caste.

severance and resolution, and unchanged in success and failure alike, is called a good agent. (One who acts) with passion, who is desirous of the reward of his actions, covetous, cruel by nature, impure, liable to joy and grief, is proclaimed to be a bad agent. (One who acts) without ability, without discrimination,³⁰ who is obstinate, negligent, slothful, desponding, and dilatory, is called an indifferent agent. Hear the distribution of intellect and also of perseverance into three parts, according to the qualities, explained in full and separately, O despiser of wealth ! The intellect which comprehends the nature of action and of cessation from action, and what should be done and what not, danger and security ; and understands implication by actions and liberation from it,³¹ is a good intellect, O son of Pṛithá ! That intellect by which one takes a wrong view of right and wrong, of what should be done and what not, is a bad intellect, O son of Pṛithá ! The intellect which thinks wrong to be right, enveloped in obscurity, and believing all things to be just the contrary (of what they are), is an indifferent intellect, O son of Pṛithá ! The perseverance by means of which one resists the actions of the heart,³² the breath,³³ and the senses, with exclusive³⁴ devotion, is good perseverance, O son of Pṛitha ! But the perseverance with which one cherishes, from self-interest only, duty,³⁵ pleasure, and wealth, being desirous of their fruits, is bad perseverance, O son of Pṛithá ! The perseverance by which one fails, with foolish mind, to shake off sleep, fear, anxiety, despondency, and also rashness, is indifferent per-

³⁰ Lit., 'common,' that is, regarding everything from a common point of view, adopting a common mode of action, not varying with the nature of the thing to be done. This rendering, in which I am supported by Wilkins and Galanos, is far better adapted to the context than '*vilis*,' by which Schlegel has translated it.

³¹ Knows that when actions are undertaken from interested motives, they implicate the actor in their consequences ; and when not, he is free from such obligations.

³² The passions and desires.

³³ See Chapter IV. note 33.

³⁴ Fixed on one object, the Supreme Being only.

³⁵ In the hope of heaven.

severance, O son of Prithá! But now learn from me the three kinds of pleasure, O chief of the Bharatas! That in which one experiences delight, from being habituated, and arrives at an end to pain,—whatever is first like poison, but in the end similar to ambrosia,³⁶ is called good pleasure, sprung from the serenity of one's mind. Whatever is at first like ambrosia, from the connection of the senses with the objects of sense, but in the end is like poison,³⁷ is called bad pleasure. And that pleasure which, both at first and in its consequences, is a cause of the bewilderment of the soul,³⁸ arising from sleep, sloth, or carelessness, is called indifferent pleasure. There is no nature³⁹ on earth, or again among the gods in heaven,⁴⁰ which is free from these three qualities, which are born of nature. The offices of Bráhmaṇs, Kṣhatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shúdras, O harasser of thy foes! are distributed according to the qualities which predominate in the dispositions of each. Tranquillity, continence, mortification, purity, patience; and also rectitude, spiritual knowledge, and spiritual discernment,⁴¹ belief in the existence of another world,⁴² comprise the office of a Bráhmaṇ, sprung from his

³⁶ Such as the restraint of the senses and mortification, which is at first painful and difficult, but at length induces a pleasant feeling of satisfaction.

³⁷ Since pleasure received through the senses can last but a short time, and its cessation is of course painful; while, if too much indulged, it produces satiety, disgust, and disease.

³⁸ Since it hinders the soul from obtaining a just view and knowledge of the nature of things.

³⁹ The innate nature or character of everything.

⁴⁰ This and other passages of our poem determine what position the deities of mythology held in the cosmology of the earlier Aryan philosophers. Since the influence of the qualities can affect matter only directly, and soul indirectly, through the medium of the body, it is evident that these deities were considered, like man, as individual souls, invested with material bodies, though necessarily of a superior kind to those of mortals. Thus all beings, from Brahmá himself down to the lowest development of matter, is liable sooner or later to destruction, and nothing is really immortal and immaterial but the Supreme Being and the soul which emanates from him. Compare Sāṅkhya-Kāriká, shlokas 53, 54, and 55; and Kapila's Sāṅkhya-Pravachana, book iii. sūtras 42, 43, 44, etc.

⁴¹ See Chapter VII. note 2.

⁴² *Astikya*, derived from *asti*, third person singular of present tense of *as* 'to be,' is explained by the scholiast by *asti paro loka iti nischayah*, 'the conviction that there exists another world.'

disposition. Valour, glory, strength, firmness, ability in warfare, and also keeping one's ground, liberality, and a lordly character, are the office of a Kṣhatriya, sprung from his disposition. Agriculture, herding of kine, and commerce, are the office of a Vaishya, sprung from his disposition. Servitude is the peculiar office of a Shúdra, sprung from his disposition. Each man who is satisfied with his own office attains perfection. Now hear how he attains perfection, if satisfied with his own office. If a man worship him from whom all things have their origin, and by whom all this universe is created, by performing his own duty, he attains perfection. It is better to perform one's own duty, even though it be devoid of excellence,⁴³ than (to perform) another's duty well. He who fulfils the office obligated by his own nature does not incur sin. One should not reject the duty to which one is born, even if it be associated with error,⁴⁴ for all (human) undertakings are involved in error, as fire is by smoke. He whose thoughts are not attached (to the world), who is self-governed in everything, and free from desires, attains, by means of renunciation, the highest perfection of freedom from action.⁴⁵ Learn from me, merely briefly, how one who has attained perfection attains to the Supreme

⁴³ See note 36 on Chapter III. 35, where this arddha-shloka occurs. Compare also Manu, x. 97.

⁴⁴ Arjuna in the commencement has maintained that his duty as a Kṣhatriya was now a crime, since it compelled him to fight with his own near relations. Kṛiṣṇa cannot deny this, but insists that the consideration of one's duty outweighs all others; and if it be a crime to slay one's relatives, it is equally, and even more so, to reject one's duty by not doing so.

⁴⁵ Three stages of the life of the good are about to be distinguished. First, the attainment of worldly perfection by upright performance of the duties of one's caste. Second (shlokas 51—54), attainment, by devotion, of a mental union with the Supreme Being, equivalent to *jivanmukti*. Third, final emancipation of actual spiritual union with the Supreme Being (shlokas 56, 57). This perfection is then the first stage, and is described as perfection of freedom from action. By this, however, it is not meant that the devotee ceases to act, or that it is even unnecessary for him to perform his duties; but merely that, in this state, he is free from the responsibility entailed on other men by their actions, when undertaken with a specific object.

Being,⁴⁶ which is the highest condition of spiritual knowledge. Gifted with a pure mind, and restraining himself with perseverance, having rejected (the charms of) sound and the other objects of the senses,⁴⁷ and cast off love and hate, frequenting solitary places, eating little, having subdued his body and his heart, intent on the practice of contemplation, always endowed with apathy; when he has cast away egotism, violence, pride, desire, anger, and avarice, and is free from selfishness and calm, he is fitted for the condition of the Supreme Being. When he is in a condition for the Supreme Being, and his spirit is serene, he neither regrets nor hopes. Alike to all beings, he attains to the highest state of devotion to me. By means of this devotion, he learns truly how great and what I am. And when he has learned to know me truly,⁴⁸ he enters me without any intermediate condition.⁴⁹ And though at any time he perform any kind of action,⁵⁰ if he flees for refuge to me, he attains, by my grace, the eternal imperishable region.⁵¹ Having, by reflection, reposed all thy actions on me, intent on me, exercise mental devotion continually, and think on me (alone). Thinking on me, thou wilt, by my favour, overcome all difficulties. But if, from self-conceit, thou wilt not hearken, thou wilt perish. If, indulging self-confidence, thou thinkest, "I will not fight," that resolution of thine is vain. Thy nature⁵² will compel

⁴⁶ Not actually, but mentally, being in a state of *jivanmukti* or mental union with the Supreme Being (see Chapter V. note 38), in which he is perfected in knowledge as he was in actions in the preceding stage.

⁴⁷ Lit., The objects of sense which have sound as the first—the objects, namely, which severally affect each of the five senses—sounds, sights, smells, tastes, and things which are touched. The system of Yoga here alluded to is that mentioned in Chapter IV. 26, note 29. The devotee rejects such charms as music, female beauty, perfumes, pleasant food, etc., by retiring into the jungle beyond their reach.

⁴⁸ Since true knowledge was the most direct means of final emancipation.

⁴⁹ Without an intermediate sojourn in heaven and regeneration on earth.

⁵⁰ Actions of any kind oblige regeneration in other cases; but accompanied by devotion, and in this condition, they have no effect.

⁵¹ Union with the Supreme Being.

⁵² As a Kshatriya—thine innate feelings of courage and honour, which will prevent thee from quitting the battle-field as a coward, or allowing thy party to suffer by thy refusal to defend them.

thee to do so. Tied down by thine own duty, which springs from thy disposition, O son of Kuntí ! thou wilt, even against thine own will, do that which, in thy folly, thou wouldest not do. The lord of all things dwells in the region of the heart,⁵³ Arjuna ! and by means of his magic, causes all things to whirl round, mounted, as it were, on a circular engine.⁵⁴ Seek this refuge,⁵⁵ then, in every state of life,⁵⁶ O son of Bharata ! By its grace thou wilt attain supreme tranquillity, the everlasting region.⁵¹ I have thus expounded to thee knowledge more secret than secret itself. Having deliberated fully on it, do as thou pleasest. But further hear from me my supreme words, most secret of all. Thou art very much beloved of me, and therefore I will tell thee what is good. Place thy affections on me,⁵⁷ worship me, sacrifice to me, and reverence me. Thus thou wilt come to me. I declare the truth to thee. Abandoning all religious duties ;⁵⁸ seek me as thy refuge. I will deliver thee from all sin. Be not anxious. Thou must not reveal this (doctrine) to one who does not practise mortification, nor to one who does not worship at any time, nor to one who does not care to hear it, nor to one who

⁵³ The heart was the supposed seat of the soul and the vital energy, both of which are portions of the Supreme Being ; but the latter of which only is here alluded to.

⁵⁴ The universe is not inaptly compared to a machine, set in motion by the Supreme Spirit, and continuing so by means of his magic, which is nature, the universal principle of life, and which once set in motion produces all things according to fixed laws.

⁵⁵ The Supreme Being.

⁵⁶ Schlegel has rendered this compound by 'omni reverentia,' which does not suit the sense of the passage half so well, while it necessitates an unusual use of *sarva*, which generally presupposes multiplicity of objects, *kṛtsna* being used for a divisible whole.

⁵⁷ The repetition of the *me* would seem to imply an emphasis intended to distinguish Kṛṣṇa himself as identified with the Supreme Being, and declare that identification to be the last but most important dogma of the whole system. Otherwise this and the following shloka would be mere tautology.

⁵⁸ The sense of *parityajya* is determined by the words *sharanam vraja*, which are contrasted with it. He does not mean that Arjuna should actually lay aside and neglect the duties inculcated by the established religion, but that he should cease to place his reliance upon them ; that he should execute them as duties, not as a means of salvation.

reviles me.⁵⁹ He who shall deliver this highest mystery to my worshippers,⁶⁰ if he perform the greatest worship of me, will thus come to me, no doubt. And there will be none among men who will do me better service than he, nor will another than he be dearer to me on earth. And if any one study this sacred conversation held between us two, I shall consider that I am worshipped by him,⁶¹ with a sacrifice of knowledge. And the man who should even only hear it taught, with faith and not reviling, may even, being freed from evil, attain the regions of the upright.⁶² Hast thou

⁵⁹ Having delivered to Arjuna the whole Yoga system, he now enjoins him to promulgate it. But to whom? Not to the first comer, not to one who may deride or abuse it—for this it is too holy, too mystic—but to the religious man, who, already prepared by a practice of asceticism (of the object of which he is in ignorance, but which he derives from the Brāhmanical religion), is fitted to receive, appreciate, and make a right use of it. This shloka teaches us many things. It proves the Brāhmanical reserve of our poet-philosopher. It proves his fear of controversy. It proves that though the Kṣhatriya and Vaiṣhya might be initiated in these doctrines along with the Brāhman himself, that initiation must be performed with care. Not every one, not the ignorant and superstitious public, could receive this enlightenment, which might throw contempt and doubt upon the established religion, and perhaps urge them to subvert it; but a chosen few, to whom the consideration of their salvation was superior to that of any worldly object, and who therefore would not convert it into a tool for revolutionary purposes. Our poem must then have been written either before or after the religious revolution of Buddha, at a period when the hierarchy were supreme in power, and science and philosophy were forced, as in the days of Galileo and the Inquisition, to creep in by stealth. How different from the Buddhists, who boldly met the priesthood in an open field, and proclaimed what they believed to be the truth to the whole world without restriction! But this very caution in the promulgation of his doctrines may, as in the case of Descartes, be taken as an earnest of the belief of our philosopher in what he taught. Probably warned already by the defeat of Buddhism, his policy was to conciliate the Brāhmanic party, and to graft his new plant quickly on the old stock, rather than seek to uproot the latter. But the last words of the shloka throw more light than any other passage on the probable date of our poem. The 'me' must be understood to allude to the Supreme Being in his personification as Viṣṇu, or Kṛiṣṇa only, and none can be meant by his 'revilers,' but the worshippers of Shiva, the Shaivyas, who were in constant controversy with the Vaiṣṇava party. Our author then must have lived at the period when the battle between these two factions was hot, and when that epoch has been determined, some approximation will have been made to the date of the composition of the Bhagavad-Gītā.

⁶⁰ Yogis of the Vaiṣṇava school.

⁶¹ Beware of coupling *tena* with *jñānaya jñāna*, as it refers to the person represented by *ya*.

⁶² For a defence of the emendation (*mukto (a) shubhāllokān* for *muktāh shubhāllokān*), which I have here proposed and adopted, see my edition of the text of the Bhagavad-Gītā. It is here only necessary to mention that the regions of the upright refer, not to the mansion of the Supreme Being, but to the five worlds

heard all this, O son of Prithá! with thoughts fixed on this only? Is the delusion of ignorance⁶³ dispersed for thee, O despiser of wealth?’

ARJUNA SPOKE.

‘My delusion is destroyed; and by thy favour, Divine One! I have recovered my senses, I remain free from doubt, and will do thy bidding.’

SANJAYA SPOKE.

‘Thus did I hear this miraculous and astounding⁶⁴ conversation between Vāsudeva and the magnanimous son of Prithá! By Vyása’s favour I heard this supreme mystery—devotion—from the lord of devotion, Kṛṣṇa himself, who expounded it openly: and remembering again and again, O King! this wonderful sacred colloquy between Keshava and Arjuna, I am again and again delighted. And⁶⁵ re-

(*loka*) of the deities, mentioned in Chapter V. note 39. The sense of the whole passage is then as follows:—In shlokas 68 and 69 he speaks of the man who, perfectly comprehending and following the precepts of this system, undertakes to transmit them to the worthy. This can only allude to Bráhmans, whose office was instruction; and the reward specified is final emancipation. In shloka 70 he speaks of the man who reads and studies these doctrines, alluding either to the young Bráhman student, or to the Kṣhatriya, both of whom were able to read and employ the Sanskrit language. No reward is specified, but as such an one is considered as a worshipper of Kṛṣṇa, though he does not say ‘practically,’ but merely ‘by the sacrifice of knowledge,’ we may presume that final emancipation would be the reward, though after a greater or less number of transmigrations. Lastly, in shloka 71 he speaks of the man to whom these doctrines are verbally transmitted, and this can only allude to those who could not read Sanskrit, the Vaishya, and perhaps even the Shúdra, and females, who used the Prákrít dialect. For these the reward is not final emancipation, either immediate or eventual, but one of the five heavens, according to their practical merits. Compare Chapter IX. 32 (note).

⁶³ The false idea that it was wrong to fight, which resulted from ignorance of the true nature of action.

⁶⁴ Lit., Causing the hair to stand on end.

⁶⁵ If the *cha* here inserted after *hrishydmi* connects the whole sentence with the preceding one, it is at least misplaced. If not, another verb must have originally existed in the first half of the shloka, and the reading has been carelessly altered.

membering again and again that very miraculous form⁶⁶ of Hari, my wonder is great, and I am again and again delighted.' Wherever Kṛiṣṇa, the lord of devotion, and wherever the son of Pṛithá, the archer, are; there are fortune, victory, and power certain. This is my opinion.'

Thus in the Upaniṣhads of the Bhagavad-Gítá, in the knowledge of the Supreme Being, in the Book of Devotion, in the Dialogue between Kṛiṣṇa and Arjuna, (stands) the Eighteenth Chapter, by name

' DEVOTION AS REGARDS EMANCIPATION AND RENUNCIATION.'

⁶⁶ Which was displayed to Arjuna, as described in Chapter XI.

INDEX OF PROPER NAMES.

[NOTICE.—In the following Index some slight attempt has been made to classify the principal personages according to their historical position. Thus three periods of Mythology have been distinguished: 1st. The Vedic; 2nd. The Epic; and 3rd. The Puránic. The Vedic period includes, among the Gods, chiefly the personifications of the powers of one Supreme Being; and those of the elements and natural phenomena, as the Maruts, Indra, etc.; and among the personages, the semi-divine, as the Rîshis. The Epic period includes the semi-divine, as Manu; and the heroic personages, as Arjuna, etc. The Puránic contains chiefly new deifications of ideal creation. So little has been written, and so little is known correctly about Hindú Mythology, that the exactness of this classification cannot in many instances be vouched for; and, at the same time, it must be remembered, that, while a personage, who belongs to the Vedic, may often also belong to the Epic and Puránic periods, and one who belongs to the Epic, also to the Puránic period, his character and position will, of course, be materially different in each: and neither the limits we have prescribed ourselves, nor the object of this Index, will admit of delineating these changes minutely. We need only add, that as regards *mythological allusions*, the Bhagavad-Gítá belongs solely to the period which we have distinguished as Puránic.]

ADITYA.—[1.] The Sun, in which sense it occurs in V. 16; VIII. 9; XV. 12. [2.] The twelve solar dynasties or personifications of the Sun under a different name and sign of the Zodiac in each month of the year. Like the Vasus, they belong to the earliest period, and may probably be referred to that ante-Vedic age, when the worship of the elements, and particularly of the Sun, was first enriched and extended by fancy. In the Vishṇu-Purāna, p. 134, their names are thus given:—Dhātṛi (presiding over the month Madhu, or Chaitra, March-April), Aryaman, Mitra, Varuṇa, Indra, Vivashwat, Púshan, Parjanya, Anshu, Bhaga, Twaṣṭṛi, Viṣṇu. At p. 122 they are Viṣṇu, Shakra, Aryaman, Dhúti, Twaṣṭṛi, Púshan, Vivashwat, Savitri, Mitra, Varuṇa, Anshu, and Bhaga. All these, it will be observed, are names of the Sun itself, with the exception of Indra, Parjanya and Shakra, all names for the same being, the personification of rain and thunder; Varuṇa, water; and Viṣṇu. The exceptions may be accounted for by the stormy or rainy nature of the months over which they preside. In X. 21 Viṣṇu (presiding over the month Madhu) is said to be chief of the months, perhaps because the month over which he presided was the commencement of Spring, and therefore one of the pleasantest. From this passage it would thus appear that these names were in use before the Puránic period. XI. 6 and 22. (The name is said to be a matronymic from Aditi, the mother of the gods, the daughter of Dakṣha, and wife of Kashyapa.)

AIRAVATA.—The King of Elephants, upon which Indra rides; the elephant of the north quarter, produced at the churning of the ocean (*see* Viṣṇu). X. 27.

The name is to be derived from *irdvat*, 'watery;' and may either allude to the north, as the quarter whence rain comes, or to the original idea of a cloud, on which Indra, the King of Clouds, is mounted, and which, therefore, would be called his elephant. Lastly, Wilson refers it to the fact of his being produced from the watery ocean. He belongs to the Purāṇic age.

ANANTA (otherwise called Shesha, or Vāsuki).—The King of the Nāgas, a race of serpents, which inhabit Pātāla. He belongs purely to the Purāṇic period, and in Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 225, is described as having a thousand hooded heads, on the foreheads of which was inscribed the sign called *Swastika*, the mystic cross which betokens good fortune. He is clothed in purple, and wears a white necklace. In one hand he holds a plough, in the other a pestle. At the end of each Kalpa he vomits venomous fire, which destroys all creation. He bears the universe on his head, and produces earthquakes whenever he yawns. On his body Viṣṇu reposes, and is sheltered by his hoods, which stretch out above him like a canopy. He proved a very useful personage at the churning of the ocean: the gods seizing his head and the demons his tail, they twisted him round Mount Meru, and thus formed a churn on a large scale. (The name means "Endless.") X. 29.

ARJUNA.—The third of the five sons of Pāṇḍu by his wife Kuntī or Prithā, who, however, received amatory visits from the gods Dharma, Vāyu, and Indra, who are therefore put forward as the real fathers of Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma and Arjuna, in order to give these heroes a divine origin. Arjuna is therefore called the son of Indra. When banished with his brothers from Hastināpura by his aged blind uncle, Dhṛitarāṣṭra, at the persuasion of his son Duryodhana, Kṛiṣṇa was moved to pity at his outcast lot, and became his bosom-friend, and it is between these two that the colloquy which forms the subject of our poem takes place. His other names are Pārtha and Kaunteya (matronymics from his mother), the son of Bharata, the best of the Bharatas, the best of the Kurus, the harasser of his foes, the strong-armed one, the despiser of wealth, Guḍākesha, Savyasāchin (the left-handed one), Kapidwaja (whose standard is an ape), and Kirītīṇ (wearing a tiara), for which see Chapter I. 15 (note). He belongs, of course, to the Epic period.

ARYAMAN.—The chief of the Pitṛis (see Pitṛi). X. 29. (Name derived from *drya*, 'excellent.')

ASITA.—A Ṛiṣhi, mentioned in X. 13, of whom we know nothing more.

ASURA.—A general name for all the giants and demons who composed the enemies of the gods, and the inhabitants of Pātāla; and a special designation for a class of those of the first order. They belong, in the wider sense, to the Epic, in the more special sense to the Purāṇic, period. In the latter they are fabled to be sprung from Brahmā's thigh (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 40), and to be the sons of Kashyapa, by Diti and Danāyu. As in the earliest period the Suras were personifications of light, so the Asuras were probably those of darkness; and the original idea of the existence of malignant and terrible beings may thus be traced to the fear that man experiences in darkness, from the conviction that he is surrounded by creatures which he cannot see, in short, ghosts or goblins. (The word is derived from *a*, privative, or rather negative, and *sura*, 'a deity.') XI. 22.

ASHWATTHAMAN.—The son of Droṇa and Kṛipī, whence he is also called Drauṇi. One of the leaders of the Kuru party. (Derived probably from *ashwa*, 'a horse,' and *sthāman*, 'strength,' meaning 'as strong as a horse.') I. 8.

ASHWINAU.—This name, only used in the dual number, is derived from *ashwa*, 'a horse,' and means the 'two beings of the character of a horse.' Now this animal has with most eastern nations been the type of the Sun, probably on account of the swiftness with which the Day-god appears to move across the heavens. Accordingly, in the earliest period, the Ashwinau appear to have been the children of the Sun, wedded to Night, and personifications of the morning and evening twilight, which, from their likeness to one another, were considered as twins. In the Epic period we lose sight of their original character, and find them as the beautiful twin sons of Súrya, the Sun, the physicians of the gods, and bearing the names of Násatya and Dasra. In the Puránic period they are called the sons of Súrya and Sanjáná, his wife, daughter of Viṣhwakarman; who, being unable to support the heat of his desires, gave him her handmaid Chháyá, or Shade, as a wife in her place, and assumed the form of a mare, whence she is called Ashwiní. He, however, discovered the fraud; and, in the form of a horse, approached his wife, who afterwards gave birth to the Ashwinau. We need not examine this legend further, to be convinced that it was composed by the mythologists in order to account for the name of these Indian Dioscuri. XI. 6, 22. See also Viṣṇu-Purána, pp. 266, 437.

BHARATA.—[1.] The son of Duṣhyanta and Shakuntalá, the story of whose birth forms the plot of the well-known and beautiful play of the dramatist Kálidása, called 'Shakuntalá,' and who was supposed to be the first king or emperor of the whole of India. See Mahábhár. i. 74, 3117; and Viṣṇu-Purána, p. 449. [2.] A general name for the whole Áryan race, and afterwards for the inhabitants of the Indian Peninsula, which is thence called Bharatavarsha. In both cases the name belongs to the Epic period, and I should conjecture that it had originally been that of some Áryan tribe, whose conquests or numerical majority had spread their name over the whole continent. (It is commonly derived from the root *bhṛi*, 'to sustain,' and as referring to the monarch is rendered 'the sustainer,' which derivation we are forced to accept while waiting for a better.)

BHARATA.—A patronymic from Bharata, applied to Arjuna as his descendant, as in II. 14, 18, 28, 30, etc.; and to Dhritaráshṭra, in I. 24, and II. 10. Arjuna is also called Prince of the Bharatas, III. 41; VII. 11, 16; VIII. 23; XIII. 26; XIV. 12; XVIII. 36; and best of the Bharatas in XVII. 12, and XVIII. 4.

BHÍMA.—The second of the five sons of Páṇḍu, but mystically begotten by Váyu, the god of the wind or air, through his mother Kuntí, or Prithá. He is the principal general of the Páṇḍava army, is renowned for his strength and swiftness, and in I. 15, is said to be of dreadful deeds and wolfish entrails. He is otherwise called Bhímasena. I. 4, 10; Viṣṇu-Purána, pp. 437, 459. (The name is an adjective, meaning 'terrible.') He belongs exclusively to the Epic period.

BHÍṢHMA (otherwise called Devavrata and Gángeya).—Shántanu, a king descended from Kuru, was father of Bhíṣhma, by the river Gangá or Ganges. He was afterwards married to Satyavatí, and through her begot Vichitravírya, who married Ambá and Ambaliká, the daughters of a King of Káshí (Benares), but died of consumption from indulging too freely in connubial rites. His mother, Satyavatí, before her marriage with Shántanu, had by Páráshara, a son called Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipáyana, the last of the Vyásas (see Vyása), who married the two widows of his half-brother, Vichitravírya, and begot Dhritaráshṭra, the father of

Duryodhana and his hundred brothers, and Pāṇḍu, the nominal father of the five Pāṇḍavas. Thus Bhīṣma is half-brother to Vichitravīrya, who is half-brother to the Vyāsa, who is grandfather of the principal characters in the two contending parties. He may therefore be considered as great-uncle to Duryodhana and the Pāṇḍavas. At the time of the war he was the oldest warrior in the field, and to him was therefore entrusted the generalship of the Kuru army. He belongs exclusively to the Epic period. I. 8, 10, 11, 25; II. 4; XI. 26, 34; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 459. (The name signifies 'terrifying,' from *bhīṣh*, the causative form of *bhī*, 'to fear.')

BHRIGU.—A Rīṣi, chief of the Maharīṣhis (see Rīṣi). Also one of the ten Prajāpatis, sons of Brahmā and progenitors of mankind, and teacher of the *Dhanurveda*, or science of war, one of the Upavedas. As such he belongs to the Vedic period. In the Purāṇic period he is called the husband of Khyāti, or Fame, the daughter of Dakṣha, by Prasūti. X. 25; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 49, 284.

BHUTA.—Malignant spirits, goblins or ghosts, haunting cemeteries, lurking in trees, animating dead bodies, and deluding and devouring human beings. They are generally coupled with the Pretas, and in this character belong to the Epic period. In the Purāṇic period they are personified as demigods of a particular class, produced by Brahmā when incensed; and their mother is therefore considered in the Padma-Purāṇa as Krodhā, or 'Anger,' and their father, Kashyapa. XI. 25; XVII. 4; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 150, note 18. (The word means lit. 'a living being,' from *bhū*, 'to be.')

BRAHMAN.—In the ante-mythological age this was probably nothing but a name for the Sun, considered as producer, vivifier, and pervader. He afterwards replaced Sūrya in the triad of elementary gods, and was coupled with Viṣṇu and Shiva, who were substituted for Varuṇa and Vāyu, the other components of that triad. In the earliest mythological period, Brahmā (always masculine) is then the first person of the triad, Brahmā, Viṣṇu, and Shiva; and when later the unity of these personages was established by referring them to one Supreme Being, Brahmā was that being in his character of creator and enlivener, Viṣṇu in that of preserver, and Shiva in that of destroyer. Thus in the Purāṇas (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 22), Brahmā is said to live 100 of his own years, each of which consists of 360 days and nights. The days are called Kalpas, and consist of 4,320,000,000 years of mortals, during which the universe exists. During his nights the universe ceases to exist, and is reproduced at the commencement of the next day or Kalpa (see note on Chapter VIII. 17). He is described in the Purāṇas as having four faces, and as being produced from the cup of a lotus, which sprang from the navel of Viṣṇu. In his mythological character of creator of the universe, he is mentioned in VIII. 16, 17; and XI. 15, 37; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 19, 22, 34, 44, and 14, note 22. When, after the period of superstitious mythology, the idea of one Supreme Being was again brought forward, Brahmā was considered the chief of the existing trinity, and was at first identified with that idea of an unknown God; and though afterwards Shiva and Viṣṇu were each in turn identified with the Supreme Being by their respective followers, the Shaivas and Vaiṣṇavas, the name Brahma, in the neuter, was still retained in the language of philosophy to designate the universal Supreme One. In this sense the word occurs throughout our poem with the exception of the four places mentioned above, where it is masculine; and also of Chapter XIV. 3 (see note), where it occurs in the neuter, but no longer signifies the Supreme

Being in his complete character of the essence of both spirit and matter; but merely that portion of him which is the essence of all matter, the universal vital energy. We have thus:—1st. Brahmá, *masculine*, the mythological personage, first person of the mythological triad, and personification of the creative power, considered as a mortal and material deity; 2nd. Brahma, *neuter*, a name used to designate the Supreme Being in philosophic language; and 3rd. Brahma, *neuter*, the personification, in later philosophical language, of the material portion of the Supreme Being. (The word has never been satisfactorily derived, though commonly supposed to come from the root *vr̥ih*, 'to grow or increase.')

BRAHMASUTRA.—See note on XIII. 4. (From Brahma (*neuter*), 'the Supreme Being,' and *sútra*, 'a philosophical aphorism.')

CHEKITANA.—A king allied to the Páñḍavas. I. 5. See Mahábhár. v. 150, 5101; v. 156, 5325; ii. 23, 963; v. 18, 577.

CHITRARATHA.—The chief of the Gandharvas, or heavenly musicians. X. 26; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 153, note; Mahábhár. iii. 45, 1801, where he is called Chitrasena. (From *chitra*, 'variegated, beautiful,' and *ratha*, 'a chariot.')

DAITYA.—In the Epic period the Daityas appear to have been personifications of the aborigines of India, more particularly of the southern part of the Peninsula; who, to increase the glory of the heroes who conquered them, were represented as giants and demons. They are always associated with the Dánavas, who bear the same character. In the Purānic period they play a very important part, as the enemies who are constantly at war with the deities, for the sake of obtaining the sovereignty of heaven. They are there considered as the sons of the five sons of Hiranyakashipu, who again is son of Kashyapa and Diti (from whom the name Daitya is called a matronymic). At the churning of the ocean they attempted to seize the cup of *Amrita*, or ambrosia, which was then produced; but being defeated by the gods, they fled to Pátála, which they inhabit. Hiranyakashipu was their king, but, when deposed by Viṣṇu, his son Prahláda received the sovereignty. X. 30; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 77, 123, 124 (note 28), 126, 335, 338, and 493; Mahábhár. i. 65, 2525. (Said to be a matronymic from Diti, their great-grandmother.)

DANAVA.—A class of mythological giants, generally coupled with the last (Daityas), and belonging to the Epic period as personifications of the aborigines; to the Purānic as the inhabitants of Pátála, and enemies of the gods. In the latter they are called the children of Kashyapa and Danu (whence their name is a matronymic). In Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 147, the following twelve names are given them, but they do not throw any light on their peculiar features: Dwimúrdhá, Shankara, Ayomukha, Shankushiras, Kapila, Samvara, Ekachakra, Táraka, Swabhánu, Vr̥shaparvan, Puloman, and Viprachitti. X. 14; Mahábhár. i. 65, 2530. (A matronymic from Danu.)

DEVALA.—A R̥ishi, son of Krisháshwa. X. 13; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 123; Colebrooke's Essays, vol. ii. p. 5.

DH̥R̥ISHṬADYUMNA.—The son of Drupada, very skilful in warfare, and one of the generals of the Páñḍavas. I. 17; Mahábh. v. 150, 5100. (From *d̥hr̥ishṭa*, 'bold,' and *dyumna*, 'strength, power.')

DH̥R̥ISHṬAKETU.—King of Chedi, son of Shishupála, and ally of the Páñḍavas, and one of their generals. I. 5; Mahábh. v. 18, 576; v. 156, 5324; v. 49, 2010; and v. 170, 5900. (From *d̥hr̥ishṭa*, 'bold,' and *ketu*, 'a standard.')

DHṚITARĀṢHṬRA.—The elder son of Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipāyana and the widow of Vichitravīrya (*see* Bhīṣma), King of Hastināpura (commonly identified with the modern Delhi), and father of Duryodhana and his ninety-nine brothers. Being blind from birth, he eventually delivered his sceptre to Duryodhana, at whose suggestion he banished the Pāṇḍava princes, his own nephews, from his kingdom. It is to him that his charioteer and bard (*sūta*), Sanjaya, relates the present dialogue between Kṛiṣṇa and Arjuna, having received, as he says, from the Vyāsa, the mystic power of being present while it was carried on. His wife's name was Gāndhārī, and the chief of the hundred sons which she bore him were Duryodhana, Duhshāsana, Vikarṇa, and Chitrasena. I. 1; XI. 26; Mahābhār. i. 96, 3804; i. 101, 4085; i. 102, 4135; i. 110, 4372; i. 106, 4286. (From *dhṛita*, 'held firm,' and *rāṣhṭra*, 'a kingdom,' 'who tenaciously maintains the sovereignty.' The name, as Schlegel observes, may have arisen from his remaining on the throne in spite of his blindness.)

DRAUPADI (otherwise called Kṛiṣṇā and Pāṅchālī).—Daughter of Drupada, sister of Dhṛiṣṭadyumna, and wife of each of the five Pāṇḍava princes. By Yudhiṣṭhira she had a son Prativindhya; by Bhīma, Sūtasoma or Shrutasoma; by Arjuna, Shrutakīrti; by Nakula, Shatānika; and by Sahadeva, Shrutasena or Shrutakarman. I. 6, 18. (Patronymic from Drupada.)

DRONA.—Son of the Ṛiṣi Bharadwaja, by birth a Brāhman, but acquainted with military science, which he received as a gift from Parashurāma (*see* Rāma). He was instructor of both parties in the art of war, and is on that account called an āchārya. In Viṣṇu-Purāna, p. 454, he is called the husband of Kṛiptī, and father of Ashwathāman. I. 2, 3. Afterwards King of the north part of the Pāṅchāla country, and a general in the Kuru army. I. 25; II. 4; XI. 26, 34.

DRUPADA (otherwise called Yajnasena).—Son of Priṣhata, father of Dhṛiṣṭadyumna, Shikhaṇḍin, and Kṛiṣṇā (Draupadī, or Pāṅchālī, wife of the sons of Pāṇḍu), King of the Pāṅchālas, and one of the generals of the Pāṇḍava army. Being conquered by Droṇa, he only managed to retain the southern part of his kingdom, from the Ganges to Charmavatī (mod. Chumbal), including the cities Mākandī and Kampilya. I. 3, 4, 18; Viṣṇu-Purāna, p. 455; Mahābh. i. 138, 5509; i. 130, 5109, etc. (From *dru*, 'a tree,' and *paḍa*, 'foot, or root' (?).)

DURYODHANA.—The eldest of the hundred sons of Dhṛitarāṣhṭra, and the second in command of the Kuru party, Bhīṣma being first in command. By persuading his father Dhṛitarāṣhṭra to banish his cousins the Pāṇḍavas from the kingdom of Hastināpura, he was the original cause of the great war. I. 2. (Name derived from *dur*, 'bad,' and *yodhana*, 'fighting,' that is, 'having bad reasons for making war'.)

GANDHARBA (sometimes written Gandharva).—A species of demigods or angels, the musicians of Heaven, inhabiting Indraloka, the paradise of the deities, and witnesses of the actions of men. They are sixty millions in number. In the creation of the second Manwantara, they are called the children of Ariṣṭā and Kashyapa (whence they are sometimes called Mauneyas, children of the Muni, viz. Kashyapa). By them the Nāgas, or mythological serpents, in the regions below, were despoiled of the jewels which decorate their heads. They applied to Viṣṇu, who sent Purukutsa to Pātāla to destroy the Gandharbas. They originally belong to the later Epic period, but figure more prominently in the Purānas. X. 26; XI. 22; Viṣṇu-Purāna, pp. 41, 150, 370; Mahābhār. i. 66, 2550. (No satisfactory derivation has been given for this name. In Viṣṇu-Purāna it

is said to be equivalent to *gān dhayantas*, 'suckling the goddess of speech;' and another derivation no less ridiculous is that in Wilson's Dict., *ganda*, 'smell,' and *arb*, 'to go,' alluding to the musk-deer, for which this word is a name. Its primitive meaning was probably that of some singing-bird, as the Koil, or Indian cuckoo, and this sense is attributed to it in the *Medinī Koṣha*.)

GĀNDĪVA.—The name of a miraculous bow, which Arjuna received as a present from Agni, the god of fire. I. 30; Mahābhār. i. 255, 8177, etc.; iv. 42, 1325, etc.; v. 157, 5350, etc.

GĀYĀTRĪ.—The holiest verse of the Vedas, not to be uttered to ears profane, but recited only mentally. It is a short prayer to the sun, identified with the Supreme Being. It occurs in the 10th hymn of the 4th section of the 3rd Aṣṭakā of the Saṅhitā of the R̥gveda:—*Tat savitur varenyam bhargo devasya dhimahi dhiyo yo nah prachodayāt*: 'We meditate on that excellent light of the divine sun; may he illuminate our minds.' R̥gveda, iii. 4, 10. Such is the fear entertained of profaning this text, that copyists of the Vedas not unfrequently refrain from transcribing it both in the Saṅhitā and the Bhāshya. Wilson, Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 122, note 13. This hymn, ascribed to Vishvāmītra, is properly the only Gāyatrī; but, according to a system of the Tāntrikas, a number of mystical verses bear the same name. It is usually personified as a goddess, wife of Brahmā, and metaphorical mother of the first three castes. X. 35; Rosen's 'R̥gvedae Specimen' (London, 1830), p. 13; Colebrooke's Misc. Essays, vol. i. pp. 30, 127, 175, 309. (It appears to be the fem. of some obsolete word *gāyatra*, derivable from *gai*, 'to sing.')

GOVINDA.—A name of Kṛiṣṇa, who was brought up in the family of Nanda, a cowherd (see Kṛiṣṇa). I. 32; II. 9; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 529. (The word means a 'cow-keeper,' from *go*, 'a cow,' and *vid*, 6th class, 'to obtain.')

HARI.—A name of Viṣṇu, as to the origin of which we know nothing. XI. 9; XVIII. 77; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 7, note 1.

HIMĀLAYA.—The well-known range of mountains which form the northern barrier of the Indian peninsula, containing the highest elevations in the world. The Imaüs or Emodus of classical writers. In mythology Himālaya is husband of the Apsaras or air-nymph Menakā; father of the river Gangā and of Durgā, or Umā, in her descent as Pārvatī to captivate Shiva, and seduce him from the austerities which he practised in those mountains. In this personification the name belongs to the Purāṇic, as a mountain only to the Epic period. X. 25. (Derived from *hima*, 'snow,' and *alaya*, 'a house,' 'the home of snow.')

IKṢHWĀKU.—The son of the lawgiver, Manu Vaivaṣhwata. Considered to be the first prince of the Solar dynasty; he reigned at Ayodhyā (mod. Oude) in the second or Tretā Yuga. He had one hundred sons, and is said to have been born from the nostril of Manu when he happened to sneeze. IV. 1; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 348, 359; Rāmāyaṇa, i. 70, 20. (In the fem. the name signifies a gourd or cucumber; and is said to be applied to this king on account of his numerous progeny. But?)

INDRA.—This deity plays an important part in each of the three periods of Indian mythology. In the earliest ages he seems to have been the unknown mysterious being who inhabited the sky, the firmament between earth and the sun, who rode upon the clouds, who poured forth the rain, hurled the forked lightning upon earth, and spoke in the awful thunder. His character was at once

beneficent as giving rain and shade; and awful and powerful in the storm. He is the original of the Jupiter Tonans of the west, and the Thor of the north, and like them rose in the earliest ages to the first place, and the sovereignty among the gods. Fear, a stronger motive among men than gratitude, raised him above the elementary triad. In the Epic period he is the first person of the pure mythological triad, Indra, Agni, and Yama. In the Purāṇic age, when the powers of a Supreme Being were personified in the superior triad of Brahmá, Viṣṇu, and Shiva, Indra's star declines. He is no longer the principal divinity, but only the chief of the inferior deities; and, as such, is at constant war with the giants and demons, by whom he is for a time deposed. A curse from the Rishi Durvása causes his power and that of the deities subject to him gradually to decline; and he is defeated by Kṛiṣṇa in a fight for the Parijāta tree, which had been produced at the churning of the ocean, and planted by Indra in his own garden. An amusing account of this battle is given in Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 587. His wife's name is Shachí. He is lord of the eight Vasus (*see* Vasu). The sage Gautama pronounced upon him the curse of wearing one thousand disgraceful marks, which he afterwards turned to eyes. He ravished the daughter of Puloman, whom he slew to avoid his curse. He is borne on a white horse. The rainbow is supposed to be his bow bent for the destruction of his foes, and thunderbolts are his weapons. The heaven over which he rules, and which the other secondary deities inhabit, is, in the Epic age, called Swarga, and later, Indraloka, or Devaloka. His horse is Uchchhaisravas; his elephant, Airávata; his city, Amarávati; his palace, Vaijayanta. These details belong to the Purāṇic age. X. 22. See Monier Williams's Eng.-Sansk. Dict. He is also the guardian of the eastern quarter. Rám. i. 36; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 70-78, 411, 523. (Commonly derived from a root *id* or *ind*, 'to govern.')

JAHNAVI.—A name of the sacred river Ganges. X. 31. It is a patronymic from Jahnu, an ancient and celebrated Muni, who, being at his devotions on the bank of the sacred stream, was disturbed by its overflowing. In his rage, he exercised that supreme power, which the austerities he had practised gave him; swallowed the whole river, and was only persuaded by the entreaties of the Gods and sages to vomit it forth again; whence it obtained the name of the daughter of Jahnu. The fable is of course invented to explain the name. Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 398.

JANAKA (otherwise called Siradhwas, 'the bearer of a plough as an ensign').—He was King of Mithilá, or Videha, remarkable for his wisdom and sanctity, and therefore enumerated among the Rájarshis. III. 20. He was the father of Shítá, the wife of Dasharatha (*see* Ráma), the heroine of the Rámáyana, and the Helen of India. The legend of her birth is, that while Janaka was ploughing the ground in order to accomplish a sacrifice for progeny, the maiden sprang up, ready-made, from the furrow. It must undoubtedly be understood historically to allude to the improvement of agriculture in the south of India by a king of those regions. Videha is a district in the province of Berar, the same as the ancient Mithilá, and modern Tirhut. Wilson's Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 390, note 4. This king must not be confounded with his ancestor of the same name, about whose birth from the body of Nimi such absurd legends are related (Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 389), in order to explain the names Videha and Mithilá. (The name means a 'progenitor, or ancestor.')

JAYADRATHA (or Várdhakṣatri).—Son of Vṛiddhakṣatri, and king of the Sindhavas, Sauviras, or Shivis, and a general in the Kuru army. XI. 34;

Mahábhár. iii. 263, 15581, 15618, 15621; v. 154, 5274. (Derived from *jayad*, pres. part. of *ji*, 'to conquer,' and *ratha*, 'a car,' 'having a victorious car.')

KANDAŪPA (or *Káma*).—The God of Love, the Cupid of India. In the Epic period he seems to be merely the abstract idea, poetically personified, not a mythological personage; and wherever he is introduced, it is as a passion affecting the heart by directing the glances of the lover. In the Puránic period he is called the son of Brahmá, produced from, and inflaming his heart; but this is evidently invented to explain one of the derivations. He is sometimes called a son of Dharma, the god of justice; of Shraddhá, the goddess of faith; or of Viṣṇu, by his wife Lakṣhmí, or Rukmiṇí, the Venus of India. He is represented as a beautiful boy, bearing five flowery arrows, each tipped with a different blossom, which affects one of the five senses, and a bow of flowers with a string of bees, riding on a parrot, attended by Apsarases, or air-nymphs, of whom he is the master. X. 48. (Derived sometimes from *ka*, 'Brahmá,' and *dr̥ip*, 'to inflame,' sometimes from the root *kam*, 'to love,' and *darpa*, 'pride,' 'the pride of loving.' But?)

KAPILA.—A celebrated anchorite, to whom the founding of the Sánkhya school of philosophy is attributed. A work pretending to be written by him is still extant: it bears the title of 'Sánkhya-Pravachana,' or 'Preface to the Sánkhya Philosophy,' and was printed at Serampore in 1821. The great reverence in which Kapila was held may be presumed from the fact that he is sometimes considered as an incarnation of the god Agni, or fire (Mahábh. iii. 220, 18298), and sometimes of Vásudeva, or Viṣṇu himself. (Mahábh. iii. 47, 1896; Rám. i. 41, 25; Viṣṇu-Purána, p. 378. In this last place there is a long story about his destroying by a single look the sixty thousand sons of Ságara, who troubled the world with their sins; but it is evidently made up to explain how the word Kapila also means a horse.) In X. 26 of our poem, he is spoken of as the chief of the Siddhas. (The word means 'tawny,' and Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i. p. 229, conjectures that his connection with Agni may have originated in this meaning of his name.) He seems to belong only to the Puránic period.

KARNA.—King of the Anga country, a general in the Kuru army, son of Súrya (the Sun), and Kuntí (the mother of the Páṇḍavas), before her marriage with Páṇḍu. He was exposed by his mother on the banks of the Ganges in a basket, and being found by Adhiratha, an Anga monarch, was by him adopted (a legend possibly owing its origin to the Hebrews). He is therefore called a Súta (charioteer and bard), a caste sprung from a Kshatriya father and a Bráhmani mother, since the Anga kings were of that caste, being descended from Vijaya, whose mother was a Sútá (the children always belonging to the maternal caste). I. 8; XI. 34. In XI. 26, he is referred to as a Sútaputra, the son of a charioteer. Viṣṇu-Purána, pp. 437, 446.

KASHI, or **VARAÑASI**, is the modern Benares. I. 5, 17. The king mentioned in the first place as Káshi-rája, in the second as Káshya, which is perhaps a patronymic from Kásha (see Viṣṇu-Purána, p. 406), was an ally of the Páṇḍavas.

KESHIN.—A Daitya, or giant, who was slain by Kṛiṣṇa, who is on that account called Keshiniṣhúdana, the slayer of Keshin (see Kṛiṣṇa). Kansa, learning from Nárada that Kṛiṣṇa and Balaráma were still alive, sent the demon Keshin, who haunted the forest of Vrindávan, in the form of a horse, to

destroy them by trampling them down. Kṛiṣṇa, however, stuck his arm into his jaw, and thus throttled him. XVIII. 1; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 539. (Keshin means 'hairy,' and evidently refers to the horse; but whether the legend were invented to explain the name, or *vice-versé*, is not decided.)

KṚĪPA.—King of the Panchālas, son of Satyadhṛiti, and brother of Kṛipī, the wife of Droṇa, who is also called Gautamī and Śhāradhwatī, and was the mother of Ashwatthāman. He is one of the Kuru generals. I. 8; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 454. Satyadhṛiti was in love with the Apsaras Urvashī, and two children were the product of their connection. Santana, a Rājā, discovered the infants when on a hunting expedition, lying in a clump of Shara grass, took them, and brought them up. They received their names, Kṛipa and Kṛipī, from the compassion (*kṛipa*) which he showed them in thus preserving their lives. The legend is, of course, a Purāṇic invention, to explain the origin of their names.

KṚIṢṢṆA.—The most renowned demigod of Indian mythology, and most celebrated hero of Indian history, is the eighth Avatāra or incarnation of Viṣṇu. He cannot be said to belong really to the Epic age, but almost exclusively to the Purāṇic. When the story of his life is divested of the marvellous, he will be found to be an historical personage, belonging to that epoch when the Aryan race, leaving the north-western corner of the peninsula, began to make their way by gradual conquests towards the interior and the east. The enemies whom he attacks and subdues are the aborigines of the interior, who, to heighten the glory of the hero, are called giants and demons, Daityas and Dānavas. The Aryans were still a nomad people, pasturing their herds of cattle at the foot of the Himālaya range and in the plains of the Panjāb; and the legend would further lead us to believe that the primitive elementary worship now yielded to the more systematic religion of Brāhmanism and the institutions of caste. His identification with Viṣṇu would follow as a natural apotheosis of a monarch and warrior of such fame; but the very legend itself, even as it is given in the Purāṇas, seems to show that he existed long before the mythological triad of Brāhmā, Viṣṇu, and Shiva had ever been dreamed of. As it is from the mouth of this Indian Hercules that our system is expounded, we cannot refrain from giving a curtailed account of his birth and actions, borrowed partly from the Purāṇas, partly from Monier Williams's Eng.-Sansk. Dict., and partly from a little work of great usefulness, lately published by M. Pavie, now Professor of Sanskrit in the University of France, entitled 'Krichna et sa doctrine,' Paris, 1852.—The King of the Daityas or aborigines, Ahuka, had two sons, Devaka and Ugrasena. The former had a daughter named Devakī, the latter a son called Kansa. Devakī was married to a nobleman of the Aryan race named Vasudeva (or Anakadundubhi), the son of Shūra, a descendant of Yadu, and by him had eight sons. Vasudeva had also another wife named Rohinī. Kansa, the cousin of Devakī, was informed by the saint and prophet Nārada, that his cousin would bear a son, who would kill him and overthrow his kingdom. Kansa was King of Mathurā, and he captured Vasudeva and his wife Devakī, imprisoned them in his own palace, set guards over them, and slew the six children whom Devakī had already borne. She was now about to give birth to the seventh, who was Balarāma, the playfellow of Kṛiṣṇa, and, like him, supposed to be an incarnation of Viṣṇu (see Rāma); but by divine agency, the child was transferred before birth to the womb of Vasudeva's other wife, Rohinī, who was still at liberty, and was thus saved. Her eighth child was Kṛiṣṇa, who was born at midnight, with a very

black skin (the name *Kṛiṣṇa*, as an adjective, means 'black'), and a peculiar curl of hair called the *Shrīvatsa*, resembling a Saint Andrew's cross, on his breast. The gods now interposed to preserve the life of this favoured baby from Kansa's vigilance, and accordingly lulled the guards of the palace to sleep with the *Yoganidrā*, or mysterious slumber. Taking the infant, its father Vasudeva stole out undiscovered as far as the *Yamunā*, or *Jumna* river, which seems to have been the boundary between the *Āryans* and the aborigines. This he crossed, and on the other side found the cart and team of a nomad *Āryan* cowherd, called *Nanda*, whose wife, *Yashodā*, had by strange coincidence just been delivered of a female child. Vasudeva, warned of this by divine admonition, stole to her bedside, and placing *Kṛiṣṇa* by her, re-crossed the river, and re-entered the palace, with the female baby of *Yashodā* in his arms, and thus substituted it for his own son. When *Kansa* discovered the cheat, he for a while gave up the affair, and set the prisoners at liberty, but ordered all male children to be put to death. Vasudeva then entrusted *Kṛiṣṇa* to the care of *Nanda*, the cowherd, who took him to the village of *Gokula*, or *Vraja*, and there brought him up. Here *Kṛiṣṇa*, and his elder brother *Balarāma*, who joined him, wandered about together as children, and evinced their divine character by many unruly pranks of surprising strength, such as kicking over the cart, which served as conveyance and domicile to *Nanda* and his family. The female *Daitya* *Pūtana* was sent to suckle him; but the refractory baby, discovering the trick, showed his gratitude by slaying her. Later in life he vanquished the serpent *Kāliya* in the middle of the *Yamunā* (*Jumna*) river. A demon, *Ariṣṭa*, assuming the form of a bull; another, *Keshin*, that of a horse; and a third, *Kālanemi*, all undertook to destroy the boy; but each fell victims to his superhuman strength. *Kṛiṣṇa* now incited *Nanda* and the cowherds to abandon the worship of *Indra*, and to adopt that of the cows, which supported them, and the mountains, which afforded them pasturage. *Indra*, incensed at the loss of his offerings, opened the gates of heaven upon the whole race, and would have deluged them, had not our hero plucked up the mountain *Govardhana*, and held it as a substantial umbrella above the land. He soon took to repose from his labours, and amused himself with the *Gopīs*, or shepherdesses, of whom he married seven or eight, among whom *Rādhā* was the favourite, and to whom he taught the round dance called *Rāsa*-, or *Maṇḍala-nṛityam*. Meanwhile *Kansa* had not forgotten the prophecies of *Nārada*. He invited the two boys, *Kṛiṣṇa* and *Balarāma*, to stay with him at *Mathurā*; they accepted, and went. At the gates, *Kansa's* washerman insulted *Kṛiṣṇa*, who slew him, and dressed himself in his yellow clothes. He afterwards slew *Kansa* himself, and placed his father *Ugrasena* on the throne. A foreign king of the *Kāla-yavana* (*Indo-Scythian*) race soon invaded the *Yadu*, or *Āryan* territory, whereupon *Kṛiṣṇa* built and fortified the town of *Dwāraka*, in *Guzerat*, and thither transferred the inhabitants of *Mathurā*. He afterwards married *Satyabhāmā*, daughter of *Satrajit*, and carried off *Rukmiṇī*, daughter of *Bhishmaka*. His harem numbered sixty thousand wives, but his progeny was limited to eighteen thousand sons. When afterwards on a visit to *Indra's* heaven, he behaved, at the persuasion of his wife, *Satyabhāmā*, in a manner very unbecoming a guest, by stealing the famous *Pārijāta* tree, which had been produced at the churning of the ocean, and was then thriving in *Indra's* garden. A contest ensued, in which *Kṛiṣṇa* defeated the gods, and carried off the sacred tree. At another time, a female *Daitya*, *Ushā*, daughter of *Bāna*, carried off *Kṛiṣṇa's* grandson, *Āniruddha*. His grandfather, accompanied by *Rāma*, went to the rescue, and, though *Bāna* was defended by *Shiva* and *Skanda*, proved victorious. *Paundraka*, one of *Vasudeva's* family,

afterwards assumed his title and insignia, supported by the King of Benares. Kṛiṣṇa hurled his flaming discus (*chakra*) at this city, and thus destroyed it. He afterwards exterminated his own tribe, the Yádavas. He himself was killed by a chance shot from a hunter. He is described as having curly black hair, as wearing a club or mace, a sword, a flaming discus, a jewel, a conch, and a garland. His charioteer is Sátyaki; his city, Dwáraka; his heaven, Goloka. The epithets by which he is addressed in our poem are chiefly as follows:—*Ṛiṣhikesh*a (see note on I. 15), *Keshava*, *Keshiniṣhúdana*, *Janárdana*, *Vásudeva*, *Vārshneya*, *Yádava*, *Madhusúdana*, *Govinda*, *Hari*, and *Kiriṭin* (wearing a tiara). *Keshava* is explained in *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 497, by a legend, in which Brahmá, when supplicated by the inhabitants of earth to protect them against the *Daityas*, plucks from his own head a white and a black hair, and says, 'These hairs shall destroy the *Daityas*, *Kansa*, and *Kálanemi*.' The white became *Balaráma* (*ráma* means white), and the black, *Kṛiṣṇa*. For an explanation of the other epithets, see under *Vasudeva*, *Vṛiṣṇi*, *Yadu*, *Madhu*, *Keshin*, etc. *Janárdana* means 'the object of the supplications of men.' For a more minute description of *Kṛiṣṇa*, see *Guigniaut*, 'Religions de l'Antiquité,' Paris, 1825, vol. i. p. 194, etc.

KUNTI (or *Prithá*).—Eldest of the five daughters of *Shúra* and *Márishá*. The friend of *Shúra*, called *Kuntibhoja*, having no children, adopted *Kunti*, and married her to *Páñdu*, to whom she bore the three sons, *Yudhiṣṭhira*, *Bhíma*, and *Arjuna*. *Páñdu*, however, had, by the curse of a deer, been prevented from having progeny, and she therefore conceived these children by connection with the deities *Dharma*, *Váyu*, and *Indra* respectively. *Yudhiṣṭhira*, as son of *Dharma*, is considered the justest; *Bhíma*, *Váyu*'s son, the strongest; *Arjuna*, *Indra*'s son, the best bowshot. In like manner *Nakula*, the fourth *Páñdava*, son of *Mádrí*, by the *Ashwin Násatya*, was the wisest; and *Sahadeva*, by the other *Ashwin Dasra*, the handsomest among men. From his mother *Arjuna* is called *Kaunteya* and *Pártha*. I. 16, 27; II. 14, 37, 60; III. 9, 39, etc.

KUNTIBHOJA.—A friend of *Shúra*, who adopted his daughter *Kuntí* (see *Kuntí*), and an ally of the *Páñdav*as. I. 5; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 437.

KURU.—[1.] An ancient king, son of *Samvarāna*, by *Tapatí*; and ancestor of *Vichitravírya*, the grandfather of the *Kurus* and *Páñdav*as. [2.] A very ancient people, who would seem to have been originally situated in Central and Northern Asia, since in the *Purānas* they are mentioned as inhabiting the north of *Jambudwípa*, or the known world (that is, the Continent of Asia), between the *Shṛingaván* (horned) range of mountains and the icy sea. They must have entered India with the *Aryans*, if indeed they are not a tribe of that great race, and they settled in *Kurukshetra*. With this meaning the name applies to both of the contending parties, whence *Arjuna* is called best of the *Kurus*, etc., in IV. 31; X. 19; and XI. 48. [3.] In its particular and exclusive sense, the name is given only to that party which adhered to *Duryodhana*, and opposed the *Páñdav*as. I. 25. All these names belong to the *Épic* period.

KURUKSHETRA.—The plain of the *Kurus*. A tract of land to the east of the *Yamuná*, or *Jumna*, river, in the upper part of the *Doab*, near the city of *Delhi*, and the river *Sarashwatí* (mod. *Sursooty*). I. 1, see note 3.

MADHAHA.—A name of *Kṛiṣṇa*, which may either be derived as a patronymic from *Madhu*, who is mentioned among his ancestors, or be considered equivalent to *Madhusúdana*, 'slayer of *Madhu*' (see *Madhu*). I. 14, 37; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 418.

MADHU.—[1.] A Daitya, giant or demon, though more probably one of the aborigines, slain by Kṛiṣṇa, who is therefore called Madhusúdana. I. 35; II. 1, 4; V₄. 33; VIII. 2. [2.] An ancestor of Kṛiṣṇa, son of Kártavīrya, a descendant of Yadu, to whose family, the Yádavas, Kṛiṣṇa belonged. I. 14, 37.

MAKARA.—A huge amphibious monster, usually taken to be the shark or crocodile, but depicted in the signs of the Zodiac with the head and forelegs of an antelope, and the body and tail of a fish. It is the ensign of the god of love. X. 31. Whatever symbolism and the Zodiac painters may have made of this animal, this passage, at least, would seem to decide that it was *fish* of some sort. Varuṇa, the god of the sea, rides upon it through the waves. Cupid bears it as his emblem, on account of the fecundity of this species of animal, and the name is used in the mouth of Hindús at the present day to designate a shark. The depths of the ocean produce, and from time to time bring to light, such strange and quaint creatures, that we cannot wonder at the Hebrew ideas about Leviathan, or the Yankee faith in a sea-serpent. Still less can we blame the Indian author in an age when railways and telegraphs were not at his service, if he describe, or the astronomer if he paint, a marine monster, which he has never seen, with somewhat amphibious and ambiguous components.

MANU.—This name belongs to the Epic and Puránic periods. In the former we trace in it the remains of the tradition of a first man, alike progenitor, or even creator, like Prometheus, of his descendants, and lawgiver. We should conceive its historical value to be the allusion to some legendary personage, such as every nation can boast of, who first wakes his countrymen from barbarism and a wild life to the light of civilization and systematic government. In the Puránic period this first man is called Swáyambhuva (from Swayambhuva, 'Brahmá'), the son of Virája, the son of Brahmá: and the code of laws still extant is sometimes attributed to him. Soon, however, the idea of a lawgiver became more prominent than that of first man, and the number of Manus was multiplied. Each Kalpa, or creation of the world, is divided into fourteen Manwántarás or intervals, over which a Manu presides. Six of these have already passed in the present Kalpa, and the seventh is now going on. The present Manu, then, is considered as the actual author of the Dharma-shástra, the code which bears his name. He it is who is spoken of in IV. 1,—Vaivashwata-Manu, the son of Vivashwat, or the Sun, brother of Yama, and father of Ikṣhwáku. The Manus, who are past, are named Swáyambhuva, Swarochiṣha, Auttami, Támasa, Raivata, and Chákṣuṣha; Vaivashwata is still in office. The seven to come in the present Kalpa are Sávarṇi, Dakṣhasávarṇi, Brahma-sávarṇi, Dharmasávarṇi, Rudrasávarṇi, Rauchya and Bhautya. X. 6. (Derivable from *man*, 'to think,' meaning 'intelligent' man, that is, as contrasted with other living beings. The word itself appears to have the meaning of 'man' in the Vedas, while *mdnava*, and perhaps *manuṣhya*, both meaning 'man,' are derived from it.)

MARICHI.—The chief of the Maruts, or personified winds. X. 21. (He must not be confounded with the Marichi, who is said to be the son of Brahmá, and father of Kashyapa, and is ranked among the Prajápatis, or progenitors of mankind. Viṣṇu-Puráṇa, pp. 49, 82.)

MARGASHÍRṢHA.—The month which comprises the latter half of November and the former half of December. X. 35. To the question why this month should be placed at the head of the other eleven, the scholiast replies—because

it yields crops of rice and other natural productions, and is neither too hot nor too cold. Lassen, not content with this explanation (Bh.-G. p. 276), seeks to place this month at the beginning of the year at the time of the composition of our poem. It is otherwise called Agradhāyana, 'the commencement of the year;' and although, at present, the Hindús begin their year in the month Vaiśhākha (April-May), we find in Prinsep's Useful Tables, part ii. p. 18, that, in Bentley's opinion, this month would have begun the year, before the use of a fixed calendar in India, between B.C. 693 and 451. (The name is derived from *Mṛgashīrṣha*, a constellation, containing three stars, one of which is λ Orionis, and figured by an antelope's head: from *mṛga*, 'an antelope,' and *shīrṣha*, 'a head.')

MARUT.—The different winds personified. They are considered ॐ seven, or seven times seven in number. A ridiculous account of their birth from Kashyapa and Diti, and a still more ridiculous derivation of their name from *md rudah*, 'weep not!' is given in Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 152. X. 21; XI. 6, 22. (The real derivation is not known.)

MERU.—In the earlier Epic period this is probably the name given to the high table-land of Tartary, to the north of the Himālaya range, from the neighbourhood of which the Aryan race may originally have pushed their way southwards into the peninsula, and thus have preserved the name in their traditions as a relic of the old mountain-worship. In the Purāṇas, it appears as a fabulous peak, forming the centre of the Jambudwīpa, 'the known world,' which stands in the middle of the six other *dwīpas*, or continents of the world, and compared to the seed-vessel of a lotus-flower, of which the *dwīpas* are the surrounding petals. Its height is said to be 84,000 *yojanas* (the *yojana* is nine miles), 16,000 of which are below the surface of the earth; its diameter at the top is 30,000 *yojanas*, and at the bottom 16,000. From its summit flows the Ganges, towards the four quarters of the globe. On the south it is the Ganges of India; on the north, the Bhadrāsomā; on the east, the Sitā, on the west the Chakṣhus (Oxus?). Brahmā, the Ṛishis, and the Gandharbas reside on its summit. In short it is the Olympus of India. X. 23; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 166, and following.

NAGA.—Originally the Cobra-Capella or Coluber-Nāga. In mythology these beings have human heads and the bodies of serpents; they are one thousand in number, and bear jewels on their heads. They are the sons of Kashyapa and Kadrú, subject to Viṣṇu's bird, Garuḍa, and inhabiting part of Pātāla, called Nāga-loka, the capital of which is Bhogavatī. X. 29; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 149. (Derived from *naga*, 'a mountain.')

NAKULA.—The fourth son of Pāṇḍu, though really begotten by the elder of the two Ashwinau, Násatya, by Mádri or Bāhliká, the sister of Shalya. He is half-brother to Sahadeva, the son of Dasra, by the same mother, and nominally brother to the three other Pāṇḍavas. (The name signifies ignoble, from *na*, 'negative,' and *kula*, 'family;' but to whatever the name may allude, he is generally considered as a type of the wisest among mortals.) I. 16.

NĀRADA.—A Devarṣhi or divine Ṛishi, to whom is attributed the invention of the Víná or Indian lyre, a code of laws, and one of the eighteen Purāṇas, entitled Nāradiya-Purāṇa. In the Brahma-Purāṇa he is called the *smooth-speaking* Nārada, and his likeness to Orpheus is carried still further by a descent which he made from heaven to visit Pātāla, the nether regions. In Manu i. 35, he is mentioned among the ten Prajāpatis or progenitors of mankind; in Mahābh.

i. 66, 2553, among the Gandharbas; in *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 50, n. 2, he is said to be sprung from Brahmā's hip. X. 13, 26.

PANCHAJANYA.—The name of Kṛiṣṇa's conch. It was made of the bones of the giant Panchajana, who dwelt at the bottom of the ocean. When Kṛiṣṇa was getting up his military acquirements, the son of his āchārya, or tutor, Sandīpani, was drowned in the sea of Prabhāsa, and carried down to the bottom by the said giant. Kṛiṣṇa plunged in, dived down, slew the giant, brought up his bones to make a conch of, and restored his son to the grieving tutor. I. 15; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 562.

PANḌU.—Second son of the Vyāsa, Kṛiṣṇa-Dwaipāyana and Ambalikā, the widow of Vichitravīrya, the brother of Dhītarāṣhṭra, and nominal father of the five Pāṇḍava princes, Yudhiṣṭhira, Bhīma, Arjuna, Nakula, and Sahadeva. He married Kuntī or Prithā, and Mādri or Bāhlikā; but having incurred a curse from a deer which he shot, he was prevented from having progeny himself, and the Pāṇḍava princes were therefore begotten respectively by the gods Dharma, Vāyu, Indra, and the twin Ashwinau. I. 3. (Pāṇḍu means 'pale' or 'white,' perhaps alluding to the colour of the Pāṇḍava tribe. But?)

PANḌAVA.—Patronymic from Pāṇḍu, applied first to his five sons, and then generally to their party or army. I. 1, 2; X. 37. Also to Arjuna in particular, I. 14, 20; IV. 35; XI. 35, 55; XIV. 5.

PAUNḌRA.—The name of Bhīṣma's conch. I. 15. (Probably derived from Puṇḍra, the ancient name for Bengal, with a part of South Bahār and the jungle Mahals.)

PITRI.—This word means 'father,' but is used to designate a class of beings neither divine nor human, which may be distributed under three heads. 1. The original idea is simply that of ancestors, each man's forefathers being his *pitṛis*, to whom he made libations of water, and offerings of *pinḍas* (balls of rice and flour), at certain periods fixed by holy writ. 2. Ten mythological personages, considered to be the progenitors of the whole human race, and otherwise denominated Prajāpatis, inhabiting a region called Pitṛiloka. 3. In the *Purānas* the ancestors of all castes and tribes are divided into seven classes, three of which are incorporeal and four corporeal. The three incorporeal classes are called Vairājas, Agniṣhwāttas, and Varhiṣhads. The four corporeal classes are the Pitṛis of each of the four principal castes. Those of the Brāhmanas are called Somapās, or Uṣhmapās, descendants of Bhṛigu; those of the Kṣatriyas are Havishmantas, descendants of Angiras; those of the Vaishyas, Ajyapās, descendants of Kardama; those of the Shūdras, Sukālins, descendants of Vashiṣṭa. The origin of the Pitṛis is said to be that they were the sons of the gods, who, disobeying Brahmā, were by him commanded to learn obedience from their sons, whom they therefore called their fathers (*pitṛi*). They are the fathers of the gods, and the oldest of them. Residing in a world of their own, they receive among them the souls of those pious dead who have particularly attended to their rites. Hence in IX. 25, Kṛiṣṇa says, 'those who are devoted to the Pitṛis go to the Pitṛis,' alluding to the first kind. In X. 29, when he speaks of Aryaman as their chief, he alludes to the second kind. *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 320.

PRAHLADA.—King of the Daityas, and son of Hiranyakashipu. While a boy, he is said to have studied philosophy and religion very diligently, while his father, who had wrested their kingdom from the gods in one of the fights between Indra and the Devas on the one hand, and the demons and giants, called Daityas

and Dánavas, on the other, was revelling in Indraloka in all the luxuries that place could afford. When called upon by his father to give an account of his studies, he answered boldly that he had discovered the one great truth, that Viṣṇu, the Supreme Being, was God alone. At this, Hiranyakashipu, who hated the gods, was mightily incensed, and commanded the attendant Daityas, the elephants and the Nágas, to attack the boy; but such was the power of his faith and devotion, that all their efforts were futile, and he remained unscathed by all their tortures. At length, Viṣṇu deposed Hiranyakashipu, and established Prahláda as monarch of the Daityas. He is also regent of one of the divisions of Pátála. X. 30; Viṣṇu-Puráṇa, p. 124, *et seq.* (The name also means 'pleasure, joy.')

PRITHA.—See Kuntí.

PURUJIT.—A warrior allied to the Páṇḍavas, brother of Kuntíbhōja. I. 5. (From *puru*, 'many;' and *ji*, 'to conquer.' But ?)

RAKṢHASES (or Rákṣhasas).—In their earliest conception they seem to be those unknown creatures of darkness to which the superstition of all ages and races has attributed the evils that attend this life, and a malignant desire to injure mankind. In the Epic period they seem to be personifications of the Aborigines of India, presented under the terrible aspect of vampires, flying through the air, sucking blood, etc., in order to heighten the triumphs of the Aryan heroes, who subdued them. In this character they play a very prominent part in the Rámáyana, the beautiful epic of Válm̄ski. Here they are led by Rávana, the King of Lanká, which is supposed to be the island of Ceylon and its capital, and they are subdued by Dasharatha Ráma, the hero of the poem. In the Puránic period they are infernal giants, the children of the R̄ishi Pulastya, and enemies of the gods. They are then divided into three classes:—

1. The slaves of Kuvera, the god of wealth, and guardians of his treasures.
2. Malevolent imps, whose chief delight is to disturb the pious in their devotions.
3. Giants of enormous proportions, inhabiting Naraka, or hell, and hostile to the gods. In the second Manwantara, they are sons of Kashyapa and Khasá. It is rather in their Puránic character that they appear in our poem. X. 23; XI. 36; XVII. 4; Viṣṇu-Puráṇa, p. 150; also Mahábhárate, i. 66, 2571. (The name is commonly derived from *raksh*, 'to preserve,' because they guard Kuvera's treasures. But ?)

RĀMA.—This name, belonging exclusively to the Epic period, is given to three personages of considerable historical importance, whose mighty deeds won for them the privilege of being considered incarnations of Viṣṇu. The first is Parashuráma, or Ráma of the Axe (*parashu*). He is considered as the sixth Avatára of Viṣṇu, and belongs to the period of the first struggle between the Bráhmans and the Kṣatriyas, the hierarchy and the government. He cannot, therefore, be rightly considered chronologically anterior to the others. He is said to be the son of a certain Muni, called Jamadagni; but as his mother, Kenuká, was a lady of the Kṣatriya caste, and as the children follow the caste of their mother, he is not, like his father, a Bráhman by birth, although he espoused the Bráhman cause, and afterwards himself became a Muni. The legend relates, that the princess, his mother, having committed a sin, his father commanded his sons to put her to death. All refused, except Ráma, the youngest, who seized his axe and felled her to the ground. In reward for this triumph of duty over feeling, he

received the gift of invincibility. Afterwards, when Kártavírya, King of the Haikeyas, violated the laws of hospitality by absconding with the calf of oblation belonging to the Muni Jamadagni, to whom he was paying a visit, Parashuráma seized this pretext; and with his battle-axe, having no other weapons, exterminated the whole race of Kshatriyas. He was born at the beginning of the Tretá Yuga (second age). Vishnu-Purána, p. 401 *et seqq.* The second is Dasharatha Ráma, or Rámachandra, the son of Dasharatha, King of Ayodhyá (Oude), born at the close of the Tretá Yuga (second age). He belongs historically to the age when the Áryan race, already settled in the north, pushed their conquests towards the southern part of the peninsula, and introduced into those wild districts civilization and agriculture, which are typified by Shítá. She was the daughter of Janaka, King of Mithilá (*see* Janaka), and Ráma received her as a reward for his strength in breaking the bow of Maheshwara in that king's palace. She was carried off by Rávana (*see* Rákshasas), and the war which ensued for her recovery is the subject of Válmiki's beautiful epic, the Rámáyana. He is the seventh Avatára of Vishnu. To him does our poet allude in X. 31. The third is Balaráma, or Shriráma, the son of Vasudeva and Devakí, but mystically transferred from the womb of the latter to that of Vasudeva's other wife, Rohini, and thus saved from the hands of Kansa (*see* Kriṣhṇa). He is the playfellow of Kriṣhṇa, and shares his toils and his glory. He is at the same time, as Kriṣhṇa, the eighth Avatára of Vishnu, though sometimes considered as an incarnation of Sheṣha, and born at the end of the Dwápara Yuga (third age).

RIGVEDA.—Rích (nom. Rík) is the name of the first and best-known Veda, though from X. 22, it does not seem to be held in the greatest reverence. It chiefly consists of metrical hymns or prayers, called *súktas*, or *mantras*, addressed to the gods of the elements, and each stanza of which is called a *rich*, whence the name of the whole Veda. IX. 17.

RÍSHI.—In the Epic period this is merely a name for historical personages, distinguished for their piety and wisdom, either by their acts or their writings. Three kinds are there distinguished, Devarshis, or divine Rishis, such as have acquired complete perfection on earth, and have consequently been canonized after death,—Brahmarshis, sages of the Bráhman caste; and Rájarshis, those of the Kshatriya caste. In the Puránic period, the Rishis *par excellence* (sometimes, as in X. 25, called Maharshis, or great Rishis), are seven primeval personages, born of Brahmá's mind, and presiding, under different forms, over each Manwantara. The name has, however, a more extended sense, and seven classes are distinguished, some of whom are mythological, some not: as follows:—1. Devarshis, or divine Rishis, such as Nárada, demigods inhabiting Indra's heaven. X. 13, 26; Vishnu-Purána, p. 284. 2. Brahmarshis, seven in number, of whom Vashishtha is chief, the first institutors and guardians of divine matters. 3. Rájarshis, or royal Rishis, kings such as Vishwámitra, who have turned saints. IV. 2; IX. 33. 4. Paramarshis, supreme Rishis, are sometimes merely Maharshis, or even common Rishis, called so out of courtesy. 5. Maharshis, great Rishis, seven in number, of whom in X. 25, Bhṛigu is called the chief; but the name is also given by courtesy to common Rishis. X. 2 and 25; XI. 21. 6. Shrutarshis, Rishis who possess a thorough knowledge of the Shruta, or traditional writings; and 7. Káṇḍarshis, who had only a knowledge of part of the Vedas (*káṇḍa*). These last two, says Schlegel, only exist in the dictionaries, Y. 25; X. 13; XI. 15; XIII. 4; Vishnu-Purána, p. 284, n. 8. (The word is derived from *riṣh*, an old Vedic root meaning 'to see'.)

RUDRA.—A species of demigod, eleven in number, originally belonging to the Vedic period, and connected with the worship of Váyu, or the wind, as one of the Vedic triad. When Shiva rose in the mythological triad, in the place of this deity, as God of destruction, the name Rudra adhered to him, and the Rudras were considered as inferior manifestations of him. Hence Shankara, who is Shiva himself, is in X. 23, said to be their chief. In the Vrihadáranyaka Upanishads, that is, much later than the Vedic period, they are said to be the ten vital breaths (*prāṇa*) with the heart (*manas*) as eleventh. In Mahābh. i. 66, 2565, they are called the sons of Sthānu, which is a name of Shiva. In the Purāṇas they are also called the children of Kashyapa and Surabhi. X. 23; XI. 6, 22; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 121. (Commonly derived from *rud*, 'to weep,' which, alluding to them as personifications of the wind, connected with storm, may be explained by the sobbing, moaning noise of the wind.)

SĀDHYA.—A class of inferior demigods, twelve in number, dwelling between heaven and earth, belonging to the Purāṇic period, in which they appear as the sons of Dharma, or religious duty, and Sādhyā, daughter of Dakṣha. They would seem originally to have been personifications of sacred rites or prayers, and with these their names agree. XI. 22; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 120. The name is found in the Epic age, as in Manu iii. 195; Mahābh. i. 66, 2595. (The name signifies, as an adjective, 'to be perfected or accomplished,' such as sacred rites, etc.; and as a substantive masc., it would be a personification of such things.)

SAHADEVA.—The fifth and youngest son of Pāṇḍu, by his wife Mādrī, or Bāhlikā, but mystically begotten by Dasra, the younger of the two Ashwinau. He is considered as the *beau idéal* of masculine beauty. I. 16.

SHAIVYA.—An ally of the Pāṇḍavas, and King of the Shivis, the Sibae of the Greeks. I. 5. (Gentile name from Shivi.) Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 444.

SĀMAVEDA.—Sāman is the name of the third Veda, which in X. 22, is called the best of the three (*see* Veda). It appears to be little more than a recast of the R̥ich, (*see* R̥igveda), consisting of the same hymns, broken up and arranged so as to be chanted during the various expiatory ceremonies. Thus, while the R̥ich is said to be in regular metre, to be recited aloud, and the Yajush consists chiefly of prose, to be inaudibly muttered, the Sāman contains a certain rhythm, or mode, which was sung to music, and the name is also generally employed to designate a hymn. X. 35; Colebrooke, Misc. Essays, vol. i. pp. 21 and 79.

SANJAYA (otherwise called Gāvalgaṇi, being the son of Gavalgaṇa).—He was Sūta to king Dhṛitarāshṭra, and is on this account chosen as the reciter of this poem. Originally sprung from a Brāhmanī mother and Kṣhatriya father (*see* Manu, x. 11), the Sūtas, who often composed a whole tribe, partook of the learned character of the Brāhman and the warlike tendency of the Kṣhatriya. At the same time they were neither priest nor soldier, but united the secondary offices of both these classes. The Sūta was, on the one hand, the genealogist, the archæologist, and the bard, attached to each family, or even to each great warrior; and, on the other, his charioteer and groom, accompanying him into the battle, but not himself fighting. Thus, while his Brāhman origin prohibited his fighting, his Kṣhatriya blood prevented his officiating in any way as priest. It is strange to find the two offices he filled united in one person; but this union probably originated in the days when tribe was constantly at war with tribe, when the chariot held a most important place, and the charioteer, like the *ἵπλοχος* in Homer,

from, his proximity to his warrior master, reached a great intimacy with him. There is some indication of this in the story of Nala. See Burnouf, *Bhāgavata-Purāna*, vols. i. Preface, pp. 25 to 31; *Bhagavad-Gītā*, I. 1, 2, 24, 47; II. 1, 9; XI. 9, 35, 50; XVIII. 74.

SĀNKHYA.—The first and principal of the six philosophical schools of India, and supposed to be founded by Kapila. Its character is thoroughly explained in the *Introduction*, Ch. III. It is commonly divided into three classes:—1. The pure Sākhya, which, if it admits, does not mention, a deity or Supreme Being, but considers the material essence as the plastic principle of all things, and is therefore called *nirishwara*, or atheistical. Its text-books are the 'Sānkhyapravachana,' and the 'Tattwa Samāsa,' both attributed to Kapila himself, and the 'Sānkhya-kārikā,' to his disciple Ishwara Kṛiṣṇa. Asuri and Panchashikha are also mentioned as the earliest followers of this system. 2. The Yoga system, called *śeṣhwara*, or theistical, founded by Patanjali, whose Yoga-sūtras are its text-book, and followed by the author of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. 3. The Purānic school, a corrupt mixture of the other two. (*Lit.*, 'rational,' from *sankhyā*, 'reasoning, computation.') II. 39; V. 4, 5; XVIII. 13.

SATYAKI (otherwise called Yuyudhāna, *q.v.*).—A warrior in the Pāṇḍava army, son of Satyaka, and charioteer to Kṛiṣṇa. He is called a Shāineya prince, from Shini, the ancestor of Satyaka. I. 17. (Patronymic from Satyaka.)

SAUMADATTI.—A warrior allied to the Kuru faction, son of Somadatta, King of the Bāhikas, but also called (in *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 459) a son of Bāhlika. The Bāhikas comprehend the different nations of the Panjāb from the Sutlej to the Indus. The Bāhlikas or Vāhlikas, on the other hand, are considered to be the Bactrians, or people of Balkh, whose country is said in the *Mahābhārata* to be famous for its horses—a reputation still preserved to the neighbouring province of Bokhara. I. 8; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, pp. 459, 189, n. 56; *Mahābhārata*, vi. 51, 2108-10. (Patronymic from Somadatta.)

SHANKARA.—A name of Shiva, particularly as chief of the Rudras. X. 23. (The word is composed of *sham*, a Vedic word meaning 'happiness,' and *kara*, 'causing,' and has the same meaning as Shiva, viz. 'fortunate.')

SHIKHAṆḌIN.—An ally and general of the Pāṇḍava party, who was originally a girl, but was transformed into a boy by a certain Yakṣha. I. 17. (The name means, 'wearing the Shikhaṇḍa,' which consists of three or five locks of hair in a circular patch on each side of the head, left at the tonsure of children's heads, especially of the Kṣatriya caste.)

SHRI (or Lakṣmī).—The wife of Viṣṇu, and goddess of beauty and fortune. She belongs chiefly to the Purānic period, is said to be daughter of the Muni Bhṛigu by Khyāti, goddess of fame, and is in everything the counterpart of Viṣṇu. X. 34; XVIII. 78; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 60.

SIDDHA.—A species of demigod, apparently belonging to the Purānic age. They would seem originally to have been only mortals canonized after death; but this character is lost sight of in the Purānas. They are there said to number 88,000, being sons of Atri, one of the Prajāpatis, dwelling in that part of the sky situate between Nagavithī (Aries and Taurus, or the Milky Way) and Saptarṣhi (Ursa Major). They are chaste and free from mortal passions, etc.; thoroughly acquainted with the Vedas; and existing until the dissolution of the world at the

end of Brahmá's Kalpa. In X. 26, Kapila is assigned a place among them, but he is the only man, as far as we know, to whom this privilege was accorded. X. 26; XI. 21, 22, 36; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 227. (The name, as an adjective, signifies 'perfect'.)

SKANDA (otherwise Kumára or Kártikeya).—The god of war, ranking among the inferior deities, and belonging chiefly to the Puráṇic period. He is called son of Shambhu or Shiva, or again of Agni. Shiva being the personification of the *destructive* power of the Supreme Being, and Agni, 'fire,' being also destructive, the affiliation of war upon them is no matter of wonder or even enquiry. He is the son of Shiva and Umá, that is, of fire and water, the essences of strength, and is called Kártikeya from being brought up by the Kṛitikas or Pleiades. Like the Roman Mars, he is also the god of the year. X. 24; Rámáy. i. 38, 39.

SUBHADRA.—Sister of Kṛiṣṇa, wife of Arjuna, and father of Abhimanyu or Saubhadra, whose son was Paríkṣhit, the last Kuru sovereign, who was reigning, says the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, at the time when the Vyása compiled the Purāṇas—a date which, if it allude to some more ancient lost works supposed to have existed under that name, is very possible; but quite the contrary, if reference be made to the works still extant under that title. I. 6, 18. (From *su*, 'well,' and *bhadra*, 'propitious'.)

SURA.—This is a name for the Sun, and in the Vedic period for a class of beings connected with the Day-god, or personifications of him under different aspects. In the Epic period it is a general name for all the inferior deities, such as Indra. In the Puráṇic, it designates a class of inferior deities, who inhabited Swarga and composed the armies which Indra led against the Asuras. IX. 20.

UCHCHHAIHSHRAVAS.—Indra's charger, the chief of horses, who fed on ambrosia. He was one of the fourteen articles produced at the churning of the ocean by the Gods and Daityas, and belongs exclusively to the Puráṇic period. X. 27; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 153, p. 78 note. (A compound of *uchchhais*, 'up, on high,' and *shravas*, 'an ear;' meaning 'having his ears always pricked up,' as a sign of his high mettle.)

USHANAS (or Shukra).—The planet Venus, or its regent. As the latter, it belongs to the Puráṇic period, and is considered as a son of Kavi, the preceptor of the Asuras, said to have composed a code of law, mentioned with that of Vṛihaspati, and is himself teacher of the Daityas. His car is drawn by ten earth-born horses, each of a different colour. X. 37; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 239. As a mythological person he is son of the Rishi Bhrigu. (Derived from *us*, a root of the first class, meaning 'to shine' (Lat. *urere*), found in R̥ig-veda, i. 113, v. 7, from which *ushas*, the dawn, is derived.)

UṢMAPĀ.—A name for the manes, the shades of the dead. See Pitṛi. XI. 22. (The name is derived from *uṣman*, 'heat,' and *pa*, 'to drink,' here used in the general sense of 'devour.' The allusion is probably to the belief (*v. Manu*, iii. 237), that the shades of dead relations attended at the meals of the living, as long as the dishes served remained hot, and were eaten in silence. The scholiast thinks it refers to the fact that the manes snuffed up the warm steam that proceeded from the hot

UTTAMAUJAS.—A warrior allied to the Páṇḍavas. I. 6. (From *uttama*, 'utmost,' and *ojas*, 'strength;' 'of extreme strength'.)

VAINATEYA.—A name of Garuḍa, the sacred bird and vehicle of Viṣṇu; king of the whole feathered race, and inveterate enemy of the serpents, who are subject to him. He is otherwise called Suparna, 'the well-winged,' and the Purāṇas explain his name by making him the son of the Muni Kashyapa and one of the numerous daughters of Dakṣha, called Vinatā, from whom Vainateya is therefore deemed a matronymic. X. 30.

VAISHWANARA.—An ancient name of Agni, the god of fire, by which he is invoked in the hymns 59 and 98 of the Ṛig-veda. XV. 14.

VARUṆA.—The god of the ocean and waters, belonging to all three periods. The regent of the west, and lord of punishment. His vehicle is the Makara, on which he rides through the waters. X. 29; XI. 39.

VASAVA.—A name of Indra. X. 22.

VASU.—A class of eight semi-divine beings, personifications of natural phenomena, belonging to the Vedic period, and intimately connected with the worship of the Sun. They are attendants on their chieftain, Agni, or Pāvaka, personified fire. Their names are differently given in different places, but the best reading seems to be Ahar (day), Dhruva (the polar star), Soma (the moon), Dhava (fire), Anila (wind), Anala (fire), Pratyúṣha (daybreak), and Prabhāsa (twilight), all of which, with the exception of wind, are connected with the idea of light. X. 23; XI. 6, 22; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 119, 120, 153.

VASUKI.—Chief of a species of serpents called Sarpa, belonging to the Purāṇic period, and said to be one thousand in number, and sons of Kashyapa and Kadrá. v. Nāga. X. 28; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 149, 153.

VASUDEVA.—A name properly belonging to Kṛiṣṇa, but usurped sometimes by Viṣṇu. It is a patronymic from Kṛiṣṇa's father, Vasudeva, who was one of the ten sons of Shūra, a prince of the Yádavas, an important Aryan tribe, and Mārīshá, according to the Purāṇas, and who with his wife Devaki burnt himself on Kṛiṣṇa's funeral pile. VII. 19; X. 37; XI. 50; XVIII. 74; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 502. (A patronymic.) See Kṛiṣṇa.

VAYU.—One of the elementary deities belonging to the Vedic, and even to the Ante-Vedic period, the personification of the air and wind, and the second person both in the pure elementary triad (sun, air, and rain), and also in the Vedic triad (fire, air, and sun). He is regent of the north-west quarter and chief of the Gandharbas, who were the beings which peopled the atmosphere. In the Epic and Purāṇic periods he plays a very unimportant part as one of the inferior deities. XI. 39. (Derived from *vd*, 'to blow.')

VEDA.—Literally means knowledge or science: but in the primitive ages was a name given only to theological knowledge, the science acquired and imparted by the priests. Later it was extended to other sciences, such as medicine, and we have a number of these called Upavedas, secondary sciences. In its earliest use, then, it was more especially applied to certain works of the most ancient date, which at one period, and for a long time, constituted the only authorities for religious and civil law, which the Aryan race possessed. Their undeniable antiquity, attested by the very language in which they are composed, won for them the reputation of having been originally delivered to man by Brahmá himself, and the hymns are said to have been inscribed on dry leaves, which were collected and compiled by the Vyása, Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipáyana, and thus given to the world in

their well-known form. Originally, and, as it seems, even up to the date of our poem, three Vedas only existed, the *Rīch*, the *Yajush*, and the *Sāman*. The *Ātharvan* was a much later addition, probably composed after the first struggle between the Brāhmins and Kṣhatryias, with the latter of whom it is chiefly occupied. The *Rīch* consists of metrical hymns or prayers, termed *Sūktas* or *Mantras*, each stanza of which is called a *rich*, and addressed to the elements personified. These hymns were recited aloud at the divers ceremonies, and the *Rig-veda* is thus considered to constitute the laudatory part of worship. The *Yajush* is in measured and poetical prose, and contains prayers and invocations used at the consecration of the sacrificial victims and utensils. The *Sāman* contains hymns to be chanted at various expiatory ceremonies. Each *Veda* consists of two parts, the *Mantra* or *Sanhitā*, and the *Brāhmana*. The former is the collection (*sanhitā*) of *sūktas* or hymns, probably of the date of twelve or thirteen centuries B.C., though the separate hymns are possibly still older. The latter contains the rules for the application and use of the *Mantras* at, and for the performance of, the particular religious ceremonies, with remarks on their origin, and dating seven or eight centuries B.C. For a more ample account, we must refer the reader to Colebrooke's *Misc. Essays*, vol. i. and Weber's *Geschichte der Indischen Literatur*, Berlin, 1853. (From *vid*, 'know.') II. 42, 45, 46; VII. 8; VIII. 11; X. 22, 42; XI. 48, 53; XV. 1, 15; XVII. 23.

VIKARṆA.—The third of the one hundred sons of King Dhṛitarāshṭra, and consequently of the Kuru party. I. 8. (The name means 'earless.')

VIRĀṬA.—A King of the Matsyas (Dinajpur and Rangpur), and an ally and general of the Pāṇḍavas. It is also the name of an inland people inhabiting the modern Berar. I. 4, 17; Mahābh. iv. 1, 15, etc. (A Prākṛit form of *virūṣhṭra*, 'kingdomless.')

VIṢṆU.—1. One and the chief of the *Ādityas*. X. 21. (See *Āditya*.) 2. The second person of the mythological triad, and the personification in the Purānic period of the preservative or protective nature of the Supreme Being. This character of guardian is particularly exemplified in the ten *Avatāras*, or descents, which this deity is supposed to make to earth in different ages of the world, but generally with the object of preserving either the universe or mankind from the power of the evil spirits, or of aiding his own religion and his own people, the *Āryan* race, to gain a firm footing upon earth, or to extricate them from surrounding difficulties. These *Avatāras* are generally considered as direct emanations only from *Viṣṇu*; but in that of *Kṛiṣṇa*, the God himself is actually incarnate. They belong purely to the Purānic age, and if I may be allowed to hazard a somewhat premature opinion, I should conceive that the idea of an incarnation generally, and many of the single *Avatāras* themselves, owed their origin to the land of the Bible, but whether before or after the Christian era is a question which I am not in a position to answer, though there are, undoubtedly, many points of resemblance between *Kṛiṣṇa* and our Saviour. At the same time, it is quite possible for such a story as that of the first *Avatāra* to have been handed down by remote tradition from the time of Noah himself, without any communication with Judæa, and the discoveries of like traditions among distant races, who could have had no such connection, would seem to confirm the possibility. Nor must it be forgotten, that in whatever light the *Avatāras* two, three, four, and five be regarded, whether as remnants of traditions of actual events, thus distorted; or as pure inventions of the Purānic mythologists, the *Avatāras* six, seven, eight, and nine, most indubitably refer to historical events, the principal actors in

which, whatever may have been their names or their families, were firstly the heroes spoken of by father to son, on account of their deeds; and then, when the idea of Avatáras was once started, were considered as incarnations of the deity. Lastly, the tenth Avatára, yet to come, savours very strongly of the prophecies of the Apocalypse. The ten Avatáras are as follows:—

1. *Matsya*, the Fish.—In the Satya Yuga, or first age. While Brahmá was reposing after many ages, the demon Hayagríva stole away the Vedas (typical of the diminution of religion before the flood). Satyavrata (Noah) was making his ablutions in the river Kritamála, when a little fish approached him, and being taken up by him, grew to so great a size that he placed it in the sea. It then addressed Satyavrata thus:—‘In seven days the world will be deluged; I will, however, send thee a large vessel (the ark), which thou must enter, taking all the medicinal plants and kinds of grain, the seven R̥ishis, and pairs of all animals.’ Satyavrata obeyed these injunctions, and attached the ark, by means of a serpent, to a huge glittering fish with an enormous horn, the Avatára of Viṣṇu. The god then slew the demon, and Satyavrata became Manu Vaivaswata, the first man and lawgiver. (*See Manu.*)
2. *Kúrma*, the Tortoise.—In the Satya Yuga. The gods, being aware of their mortality, desired to discover some elixir which would make them immortal. To this end, Mount Meru (or, as others say, Mandara) was cast into the great ocean. Viṣṇu then plunged in, in the form of a tortoise, and supported on his back the mountain, round which the serpent-king Vāsuki was coiled, so that the gods, seizing his head, and the demons, his tail, twirled the mountain round till they had churned the ocean, out of which was then produced the *amṛita*, or ambrosia, and thirteen other articles. If this story have any historical allusion, it is probably to the introduction of the arts of civilization among the Áryan people.
3. *Vardha*, the Boar.—In the Satya Yuga. The demon Hiranyákṣha had carried off the earth to the bottom of the great ocean, and Viṣṇu assuming this form, dived down and rescued it, after a contest of one thousand years.
4. *Narasinha*, the Man-Lion.—In the Satya Yuga. The demon Hiranyakashipu troubled the earth and provoked Viṣṇu by his impious pride. The god, therefore, came out of a column in this form and destroyed him. If this have any historical allusion, it is probably to the introduction of the finer arts among the Áryan race.
5. *Vamana*, the Dwarf.—In the Tretá Yuga, or second age. The demon Bali had gained possession of the triple world—heaven, earth, and hell, and the gods knew not how to recover it. Viṣṇu appeared before him in the person of a very diminutive dwarf, and asked as a boon as much land as he could pace in three steps. Bali, laughing at the ridiculous request, granted it at once, and Viṣṇu expanding, grew large enough to step over the three worlds, but kindly left Pátála, or hell, the third, to Bali.
6. *Parashurama*, Ráma of the Axe.—In the Tretá Yuga. This refers to the period of the first struggle between the Church and State. (*See Ráma?*)

7. *Rámachandra*, or Dasharatha Ráma.—In the Tretá Yuga. The contest between the Aryans and the Aborigines in the south of the peninsula, and the introduction of agriculture and civilization. (*See Ráma.*)
8. *Balaráma*, or Shrí Ráma, and *Kṛiṣṇa*, in the Dwápara Yuga, or third age.—The contest between the Aryans in the north-west and the Aborigines of the interior, and the settling of the Aryan race in India. (*See Ráma and Kṛiṣṇa.*)
9. *Buddha*, the celebrated Reformer, at the end of the Dwápara, and the beginning of the Kali, or present Yuga. Viṣṇu is supposed by the enemies of Buddhism to have become incarnate in his person, in order to confound the Daityas (that is, the Aborigines, now the lower classes), who, by their devotional asceticism, were becoming too powerful. It is the period of the struggle against the tyranny of the priesthood.
10. *Kalkin*.—Seated on a white horse, the deity will descend towards the close of the Kali Yuga, the present and last age, and will destroy the universe.

It has been remarked of the first four incarnations that they present a regular progression of creation. The first is aqueous, the second amphibious, the third terraneous, the fourth the perfect, king of all animals. The first three animals are remarkable for their fecundity. During the periods of the temporary annihilation of the universe at the end of each Kalpa, Viṣṇu sleeps on the waters, lying upon the serpent-king *Sheṣha*. Brahmá is said to have sprung from a lotus which grew from his navel. His wife is *Lakṣhmí*; his vehicle *Garuḍa* (*see Vainateya*). (The name is commonly derived from *viśh*, 'to enter, to pervade,' alluding to Viṣṇu, when identified with the Supreme Being, pervading all things; but this is evidently a Puránic explanation. Lassen proposes as the derivation the root *vi*, second class, 'to watch, guard, preserve,' with the affix *anu*, alluding to the deity, as personification of the preservative character of the Supreme Being. This character of Viṣṇu is almost as late an one as the other. His original nature must be discovered before we can give a true derivation.) XI. 24, 30.

VISHWA.—A class of semi-divine beings, belonging to the Vedic period of mythology. The name signifies 'all,' and as the sacrifice offered to them is called *viśhwaáeva*, or that of 'all the Gods,' it is evident that the name was originally meant to include all the deities of minor importance. This idea is confirmed in some degree by their position in the Vedas, where they are invoked in the same hymns as the Vedic triad and the deities of a like importance, such as *Mitra*, *Saraswatí*, and the *Ashwinau*. Among these inferior deities, at an early period of mythology, before the deification of many abstract ideas, the manes of ancestors, and canonized heroes, would undoubtedly play an important part, and the mode of sacrifice to the Vishwas consequently became that of the dead, viz. *Shráddhas*, and the daily offerings of householders. Thus they seem to correspond pretty nearly to the All-Saints and All-Souls, with which a long Romish liturgy will often wind up; in short, a convenient term which included all the *etceteras*. In the Purápic period they became a regularly organized class of demigods, considered to number ten or twelve, the sons of *Yama*, the god of justice, or *Dharma*, religious duty; and *Vishwá*, the daughter of *Dakṣha*; and their names are given as *Kratu* and *Dakṣha* (names of *Pitris* or *Prajápatis*); *Purúravas*, *Kuru*, and *Madrava* (names of founders of tribes or families); and the following five names of abstract ideas, *Káma* (love), *Satya* (truth), *Dhṛiti* (constancy), *Vasu* (wealth),

Kāśa (time). From this it would seem that these ten were only representatives chosen from a much greater number, as two Pitṛis for all the Pitṛis; three ancestors of tribes for all such; and five of the principal abstract ideas. XI. 22; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 119, 326; Manu, iii. 121.

VIVASWAT.—A name of the Sun, and father of Vaivaswata Manu. IV. 1, 4.

VRIHASPATI.—The planet Jupiter. In the Purāṇic age he is the regent of that planet, son of the Pitṛi Angiras, and tutor and chaplain of the Deities. His car is drawn by eight pale horses. There is a story about his wife Tārā (star), being carried off by Soma (the moon). X. 24. (Commonly derived from *vṛihat*, 'great,' and *pati*, 'lord, master.' Lassen considers the first part to be a genitive of some obsolete word *vṛih*, which he suspects to mean 'air;' just as *vāchas* in Vāchaspati, and *divas* in Divaspati, are genitives of *div* and *vodh*.)

VRIHATSAMAN.—The great Sāman hymn, some part (it is not known which) of 'the Sāmaveda.' X. 35. (*Vṛihat*, great, and *sāman*, a hymn of the Sāmaveda.)

VRIṢṢṆI.—1. Son of Madhu, belonging to the family of Yadu, and ancestor of Kṛiṣṇa, who is therefore called Vārṣṇeya, 'the descendant of Vṛiṣṇi.' I. 41; III. 36. 2. The tribe of which this king was the founder, probably the same as the Mādhas and Yādavas. X. 37; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 418.

VYĀSA.—This is not a proper name, but a title, meaning 'the compiler,' and it is given to a personage in the Epic period, who is said to have compiled the Vedas. There is no reason for doubting the actual existence of such a person, and the name given him is Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipāyana (derived, says the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, from *dvipa*, 'an island,' because he was born on an island in the Ganges). It is the plan of the Purāṇic period to multiply or systematize all that tradition has handed down from the preceding periods, and accordingly we find mention made of twenty-eight Vyāsas, who are incarnations of Nārāyaṇa or Brahmā, and descend to earth at divers periods to arrange and promulgate the Vedas. Of these, Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipāyana was the last and most celebrated. To him accordingly do modest writers, unwilling to hand down their own names to posterity, attribute the composition of their works, and in consequence, compositions of such different dates as the Mahābhārata, with its episode, the Bhagavad-Gītā; the Vedānta, the greater number of the Purāṇas, and a grammar, are all ascribed to him. It is, however, quite possible, that in many works, where simply the Vyāsa is mentioned without the addition of the name Kṛiṣṇa Dwaipāyana, the allusion may be to the actual author of the work, the word being taken in its most general sense of 'compiler, arranger.' In the Purāṇas he is said to have been the son of Parāshara, the Muni, in whose mouth the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa is related, by Satyavatī, before her marriage to Shantanu, the father of Bhīṣma and Vichitravīrya, and when the latter died without issue, the Vyāsa married his widows Ambā and Ambalīkā, who then gave birth to Dhṛitarāṣṭra and Pāṇḍu. See Bhīṣma. X. 13, 37; XVIII. 75; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, p. 275, etc. (From *vyas*, = *vi* + *as*, 'to arrange, compile.')

YADU.—Eldest son of Yayāti, fifth King of the lunar dynasty, and founder of that tribe into which Kṛiṣṇa was born, on which account the god is called Yādava, the son of Yadu. The kingdom called Yādu is on the west of the Yamunā (Jumna) river, about Mathurā and Vṛindāvan; but the Viṣṇu-Purāṇa (p. 416) ridiculously pretends that Yayāti gave his son the Dakṣiṇa, or as his portion. XI. 41; Viṣṇu-Purāṇa, pp. 416, 418.

YAJURVEDA.—The second of the three Vedas existing at the period of *par* poem. It chiefly consists of measured and poetical prose, and of prayers and invocations applicable to the consecration of sacrificial victims and utensils. It is divided into two parts, the White and the Black Yajush. The former is called *Vajasaneyi*, and is ascribed to *Yajnavalkya*, to whom it was communicated by the sun in the form of a horse. The latter is called *Taittiriya*, and is ascribed to *Vaishampayana*. IX. 17; *Colebrooke's Misc. Essays*, vol. i. p. 55, etc. (Said to be derived from *yaj*, 'to sacrifice,' this part of the Vedas treating more particularly of offerings.)

YAKSHA.—A species of demon, belonging to the Epic and Puranic periods, and in the latter said to be the sons of *Pulastya* and *Pulaha*, and guardians of the treasures of *Kuvera*, the god of wealth. In the creation of the present *Manwantara*, they are the sons of *Kashyapa* and *Khasa*. X. 23; XI. 22; XVII. 4; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 150; *Mahābh. i.* 66, 2572. (Said to be from *yaksh*, 'to venerate.') Comp. *Rākshasa*.

YAMA.—In the Epic period this deity is the personification of lawful punishment, and as such identified with death. In the Puranic period, he is the son of *Surya*, or *Vivasvat*, the Sun, and consequently brother of *Vaivasvata Manu*. His mother is said to be *Sanjāna*, or *Conscience*. He is represented as king of justice, provided with a cord or noose as executioner, and presides over the twenty-eight (or more) *Narakas*, places of future punishment for the divers kinds of offences. *Yamapura*, the city of *Yama*, is his residence, and thither the soul departs after death, and receiving its sentence from *Yama*, either mounts to *Swarga*, the material heaven, descends to one of the *Narakas*, or is born again on earth in the body either of men, beasts, or vegetables, etc., according to its offences. X. 29; XI. 39; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, pp. 153, 207, 266. (From *yam*, 'to restrain,' as restraining mortals from evil by the fear of punishment. See *Nala*, iv. 10.)

YUDHAMANYU.—A warrior, allied to the *Pāṇdavas*. I. 6. (Lit. 'one who is enthusiastic in the fight.' From *yudhā*, instr. case of *yudh*, 'a battle,' and *manyu*, 'anger.')

YUDHIṢṢHṢHIRA.—The eldest of the five sons of *Pāṇḍu*, mystically begotten in his mother *Kuntī* by *Yama* or *Dharma*, the god of justice, and therefore remarkable for his equity, and called *Dharmarāja*, king of justice. He was King of *Indraprastha*, ancient *Delhi*. I. 16. See *Pāṇḍu*. (From *yudhi*, loc. case of *yudh*, 'battle,' and *sthira*, 'firm;' 'unflinching in the fight.')

YUYUDHANA.—A warrior, allied to the *Pāṇḍava* faction, son of *Satyaka*, and therefore called *Sātyaki* (*q. v.*). Also called *Shaineya* from his ancestor *Shini*, who was grandfather of *Vṛiṣṇi*. He thus belongs to the *Yadu* tribe. I. 4; *Viṣṇu-Purāna*, p. 435. (The word is the pres. part. *ātmane-padam* of *yudh*, 'to fight,' formed as if it belonged to the third, instead of the fourth, class of verbs.)

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