

Memorandum + r file

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OUTLINE OF METHOD TO DEVELOP CASE FOR "B" AND "C" CRIMES

1. The Period Prior to December, 1941.

1932-1936	-Head, Special Higher Police Division, Metropolitan Police Board.
Feb.-1937	-Chief, Public Peace and Order Section, Police Bureau
Jun 1937	-Director, Police Bureau
1937-1939	-Superintendent General, Metropolitan Police Board
1940	-Superintendent General, Metropolitan Police Board

ABE was the father of the Japanese counterpart to the GPM and GESTAPO-- The Special Higher Police. Through this instrumentality all freedom of speech, thought, and action was ruthlessly suppressed while at the same time protection was afforded to the extremists of the far right to pursue unhampered, their course of terror, extortion, intimidation and murder in driving the Japanese people along the road of aggressive warfare.

His career in the Police is a most interesting study and considered from the standpoint of possible "A" crimes would be most important. But other than give to the investigator and prosecutor the background to the man, and a general picture of his character and inclinations, it has no value in the consideration of "B" and "C" crimes.

2. The Period Subsequent to December, 1941.

a. Dec., 1941 -- Nov., 1943 -Vice-Chief, Cabinet Planning Board.

"The purpose of the Planning Board was to make universal plans for the economy of Japan according to decided policy..... When the Planning Board made a decision deemed important from the national point of view, it was in fact executed by the competent Ministry or Department charged with that function. (see Exhibits 841 & 842) These answer ~~completely~~ the question rather completely that the Planning Board was at the time the brain that correlated all facts and issued general instructions". (IMTFE Record -- Pages 8612-8613 Summary, Pages 1278-1279)

ABE, from his special knowledge and study of the Chinese (he spent several years in China) is bound to have been considered an expert on Chinese affairs and probably also on Korean. From evidence now in the record of USA vs KONO et al (still being tried at Yokohama) the Planning Board played a large part in working out the plans for the importation of Chinese Slave Labor into Japan. The Cabinet Decision was made on Feb., 1942--so the work of the planning board must have been done prior to that. This decision is a clear violation of the laws of war. ABE can probably be connected with it.

The Planning Board can probably be connected with the decision to utilize unlawfully POWs in industrial establishments engaged in war work and the setting up of the iniquitous "Dispatch System" for POWs.

LEADS INTO THE PLANNING BOARD and ABE's connection:

Lt. Gen. SUZUKI, Teiichi -- Chief of Planning Board from 4 April 1941 to 8 Oct. 1943. Now a defendant before the IMTFE. Check the master index to the Record for every reference. Check with G-2 and IPS for former interrogations and reports.

MIYAMOTO, Takesuke -- Vice-Chief of Planning Board from 7 April 1941 to 24 Dec. 42. Check him through the files of G-2 and IPS. If there are no former interrogations or interviews, pick him up and examine.

SUDO, Hideo -- Acting Vice-Chief of Planning Board, 24 Dec. 1942 to 27 Dec. 1942. He was probably a minor official in the Board all the time. He should be a mine of information.

NOTE: There is a discrepancy as to the exact position and tenure of ABE as Vice-Chief or Vice-President of the Board. "War Politics in Japan" differs from the G-2 Report and the IPS Dossier.

b. 7 April 1945 to 17 Aug. 1945 -- Home Minister. also Director, Air Defense General Headquarters.

ABE's responsibility as Home Minister for his Police is exactly analogous to a field commanders responsibility for his troops in so far as violations of the laws and customs of war are concerned.

Responsibility:

Mistreatment, abuse and murder of American airmen in Japan by the civilian police and the civilian population before they reached the Military.

NOTE: Bob Neptune can furnish countless examples of this from the case files now in his possession.

Mistreatment, abuse and murder of POW's, Chinese and Korean laborers in industrial work camps by the special "Thought Control" police; at least one of which was stationed at each camp.

Check on the possible use of these "Thought Control" police in the civilian-detainment camps.

The murder of 40 odd Chinese in the Akita Prefecture by Chief of Police Miura of Hanaoka and his men following the Chusan Ro Riot of July 1, 1945. (See case of USA vs. KONO et al, Yokohama)

Activities of individual "Thought Control" and Special Higher Police. (See Legal Section's file on HONMA, Fukachiki)

ABE is alleged to have been one of the die-hards in the SUZUKI Cabinet who refused to accept the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.

LEADS TO BE DEVELOPED:

NADAO, Hirokichi -- Vice Home Minister, 9 Apr 45 to 19 Aug 45.

ODACHI, Shigio -- Home Minister, 22 July 44 to 7 April 45.
(See Legal Section File -- Check with G-2 and IPS)

KARASAWA, Toshiki -- Vice Home Minister, 29 April 43 to 25 July 44.

YAMAZAKI, Iwao -- Vice Home Minister, 22 July 44 to 9 April 45.

MAKOTO, Yamada -- Official in Home Ministry in Charge of Chinese Labor Affairs -- a witness for defense in USA Vs. KONO et al -- check testimony.

Get IPS file, interrogation of General TANAKA, dated 28 March 1946 (287 - Serial NO 12.

Get IPS interrogation of ABE, 5, 8 and 9 April 1946, Document NO. 287 Serial 15.

23 June 1948

MEMORANDUM TO FILES

War Crimes Office "Background Material on Japan and the Co-Prosperity Sphere" provides the following leads regarding the official positions of ABE, Genki and ANDO, Saburo.

The Minister of Home Affairs supervises the entire police force and exercises direct control over the prefectural governments. Police inspectors in charge of each of the police bureaus in the prefectural governments are directly responsible to the prefectural governor and indirectly to the Minister of Home Affairs.

(Police activities in Tokyo and since 1943 in Osaka are supervised by prefectural police boards which are directly responsible to the Home Ministry.) The Minister of Home Affairs selects the prefectural governors. When the Greater East Asia Ministry was established in October 1942, Korea and Formosa were brought directly under the supervision of the Home Minister.

(From the Department of State Bulletin, December 24, 1944, at pages 4, 6, and 11 of the above mentioned War Crimes Office Collection).

Regarding ABE's position with the Cabinet Planning Board; see memo regarding Cabinet Planning Board and Control Associations in file for KISHI.



K. STEINER.

28 July 1948

MEMORANDUM

TO : MR. LIPSCOMB
FROM: K. STEINER

The following information may be helpful in determining the responsibilities of others than army authorities for the treatment of civilian internees and Chinese laborers, (e.g. ANDO and ABE as Home Ministers and AOKI as Greater East Asia Minister). It is based on a scanning of IPS Document #655 and #657.

1. IPS Document #655, pp 153 and 154, shows that directives pertaining to the treatment of internees were issued by the Home Ministry and especially by the Foreign Affairs Section of the Police Bureau of the Home Ministry.

2. The Home Ministry issued a "monthly report of foreign affairs" dealing, among other matters, with the conditions of civilian internees and Chinese laborers. IPS Documents #655 and #657 are examples of these reports issued in September 1943 and May 1944 respectively, during the tenure of office of ANDO as Home Minister.

According to the preface to report for May 1944 (IPS Doc 657), the material was gathered from reports made by the prefectural governments (which were under the control of the Home Minister).

3. The prefectural governments were entrusted ^{with the} second U.S.-Japanese exchange of residents, the plan for which was drafted by the Home Ministry and details of which were carried out according to "Essentials for the Treatment of Enemy Internees" and the "Basis for Treatment and Control of Enemy Internees", (IPS Doc 655, pp 12-25).

4. According to IPS Document 655, page 34, an issue arising out of the question of payment of Chinese laborers was to be decided by the Maritime Bureau of the Greater East Asia Ministry, (AOKI was Greater East Asia Minister at the time).

5. Civilian internees in North China were arrested by the military police and then put under the control of the police of the Greater East Asia Ministry, (IPS Doc.655, pp 1-31 and 150).

6. Internment Camps #1, ~~2~~⁷ and 4 in HYOGO Prefecture were moved from the center of Kobe City to the suburbs in accordance with an instruction given by the Home Ministry and with the "directive pertaining to the treatment of foreign residents in case of air-raids and other emergencies, #17 (a), Foreign Affairs Section Police Bureau issued 4 April 1944". (IPS Doc.657, pp 5 and 6.)

7. Three hundred and ninety seven (397) Chinese laborers were mustered compulsorily from among farmers near Paoting, China. Fifty of them attempted to escape before embarkation at Taku but failed. The entire group was allotted to the Mitsui Manden Coal Mine in Kumamoto Prefecture and the report states details of their transportation to the place of work, (IPS Document 657, p 20).

8. The following reports indicate that protests and other communications from protecting powers were forwarded to the Home Ministry or otherwise were in the knowledge of the Home Ministry:

(a) Protest by United States Government regarding non-compliance with the Geneva Convention 1929, and reply by the Japanese Government thereto (Note: a copy of this protest is in File CC 1.5.1. dated 5 February 1944). (The reply is #151, CC 2.1.2/1.5.1/1.1 dated 26 May 1944, also in File CC 1.5.1).

As the result of this protest which demanded that an English copy of the Geneva Convention be posted in camps, excerpts in English from "Essentials for the Treatment of Enemy Internees", "Basis for the Treatment and Trial of Enemy Internees" and "Essentials for the Treatment of Communications of Internees" were posted in certain enumerated camps including a provision that interviews may be in Japanese or English and that mail may be sent twice a week in Japanese or once a month in English, comprising 500 words in Japanese or 100 words in English.

(b) Japan's reply to the United States and British proposal regarding transport of relief goods and communications for POWS and Internees in the Japanese Empire. (Note: The proposal originated about a year earlier). (See letter from Swiss Legation to the Foreign Ministry dated 2 February 1944 bearing reference number C.C. 1.6.1 in File C.C. 1.6.2. The reply is #100 dated 28 April 1944 in File C.C. 1.6.2).

(c) Text of a proposal by United Kingdom through the Swiss Legation regarding measures against lack of proper food and medicine in camps. (This is C.C. 1.6.2. dated 8 May 1944).

Kurt Steiner

Original: Mr. Lipscomb
Copy: Mr. Elliott
File: ANDO
ABE
AOKI