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740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/1-147 -- 1-3147



253

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

PREPARING OFFICE WILL INDICATE WHETHER Collect

PREPARING OFFICE WILL TYPE HERE CLEARLY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE MESSAGE:

Department of State

Washington

PLAIN

Charge Department:

Charge to

PLAIN

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

TOKYO

INFO WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

JAN 2 1947

Sebald scheduled depart NATS January 2. ETA Tokyo January 6.

Byrnes (JCP)

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-247

TELEGRAM RELEASE DESK

JAN 2 PM 6 35

DC/T

DISTRIBUTION DESIRED (OFFICES ONLY)

JAN 2 1947 P.M.

JA:RAFearey/pm 1/2/47

FE

Form with fields for name, address, city, and state, containing handwritten initials.

CS/A

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 1-247



JAN 31 1947

**SECRET**

No. 406

To the  
Acting United States Political Adviser to  
The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,  
Tokyo.

The Secretary of State encloses for the information of the Acting Political Adviser copies of two SWNCC papers, listed below.

Enclosures:

1. Decision on SWNCC 227/17, copy no. 42.
2. SWNCC 259/8, copy no. 45.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-3147

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A true copy of the signed original.

JAN 30 1947 P.M.  
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FE:HSTumas  
1-30-47

JA

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740.00119 Control  
(Japan) / 1-3147  
SECRET FILE



Form DS-302  
(7-2-46)

DIVISION OF  
COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS  
TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INCOMING TELEGRAM  
RESTRICTED

ACTION COPY

*m*  
*Barrett*  
*No action required*

7

Control 836

Rec'd January 4, 1947  
4:39 a.m.

Action: ESP--  
Info :  
A-H  
FE  
OCD  
FC  
CIG  
DC/R

FROM: SCAP Tokyo  
TO : Washington (State Department)  
CITE: C-68754

	ACT	INF
ESP		
ES		✓
GA		2
JK	✓	3

REUR State serial No. 631, December 31, 7 p.m.

There is no objection in general principle to American or other foreign advisors being assigned or attached to the Chinese Mission Tokyo. The objection to Colonel Ballard was due to the knowledge he had acquired during his service with the occupation forces in a responsible position in matters that were secret, confidential and restricted. It is believed it would be detrimental to the American Government and its interests to have an officer who is so thoroughly acquainted with intimate American details and correspondence transferred to a foreign government to assist it in matters directly or indirectly involving our own government. For this reason Colonel Ballard is not acceptable but there is no objection to other American advisors unless their service would tend to bar them for similar security reasons as exist in the case of Colonel Ballard.

JMS:PPM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 6 1947

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AND KOREAN  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
JAN 6 - 1947

JAN 22 1947

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PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-447 (RECD) LRC



JAN 4 1947

In reply refer to  
JA

My dear Mr. Mansfield:

Mr. Vincent has asked me, pursuant to your request to him of December 30, to provide you with a resume of United States policy toward Japan from the beginning of the occupation.

I am accordingly enclosing a copy of a pamphlet, "Occupation of Japan: Policy and Progress", recently put out by the Department's Division of Public Liaison, and a copy of the new Japanese Constitution as promulgated on November 3. I think that you will find presented in the body of the pamphlet (pages 1-49) a comprehensive but conveniently summarized statement of this country's policies in the occupation of Japan and of the measures taken in implementation of those policies. The Appendix (pages 51-173) contains the partial or full texts of major policy statements, principal directives from the Supreme Commander to the Japanese Government, and a considerable number of miscellaneous, fundamental documents, such as the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, for reference purposes.

If this material does not fully meet your needs I should be very happy to undertake to answer particular questions you may have regarding the occupation of Japan, or to provide more detailed information on points of special interest to you.

Sincerely yours,

Hugh Borton  
Chief

Division of Japanese Affairs

Enclosures:

As stated.

The Honorable  
Mike Mansfield,  
House of Representatives.

JA: R. Grey

122-47

A true copy of  
the original  
sent  
FE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/ 1-447

CS JA  
740.00119 Control  
(Japan) / 1-447

✓  
JAN 6 1947



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

RAH

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12-31-46

TO : JA  
FROM : FE - Mr. Vincent  
SUBJECT :

Will you please see what you can do to get together something for Mansfield.

JCV

H B -  
Reply attached  
DAR

FE:JCVincent:ALM

Note corrected  
HB



(COPY)

MIKE MANSFIELD  
1st District Montana

Committee:  
Foreign Affairs

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

December 30, 1946.

Hon. John Carter Vincent, Chief,  
Division of Far Eastern Affairs,  
Department of State.

Dear John:

I had hoped to see you before this but due to the amount of work which piled up during my absence, I have been unable to get around to it. However, I do hope to see you in the near future at which time there will be some matters which I think should be discussed because of their bearing on the future of the United States.

In the meantime, I would appreciate it if you would contact the Philippine desk and ask them to send me a resume of our policy in the Philippines since the occupation uptodate and also ask the Japanese desk to do the same thing for that country. I am not looking for anything specific but I would appreciate as detailed report as possible as I am interested in checking on my own understanding and bringing my background uptodate. Will you also send to me a report on commercial conditions and possibilities in China as they exist at the present time with, of course, a sufficient background to be able to understand what went on before and also what the State Department's view is on the possibilities for American business enterprises in China at the present time? I would like this report to be as specific and detailed as possible and would appreciate receiving the material requested at your earliest convenience.

Must close, John, but with best personal wishes and thanking you for all the courtesies in the past, I am

Sincerely yours,

MIKE MANSFIELD



In reply refer to  
FE

Dear Mike:

I have received your letter of December 30 and have asked the Chiefs of the Philippine, Japanese and Chinese Divisions to prepare reports for you as soon as they can get the information together. It will not be easy and the process of trying to get information together will take some time. Therefore, I may send along to you initial reports on what we can get together quickly and supplement them later with additional information.

I have looked forward to seeing you since you returned from the Pacific and do hope that you will soon find time for a talk. Just let me know when it would be convenient and I will come down to your office.

With best wishes for a very Happy New Year,

Sincerely,

John Carter Vincent  
Director  
Office of Far Eastern Affairs

The Honorable

Mike Mansfield,

House of Representatives.

FE:JCVincent:ALM  
12-31-46

A true copy of  
the signed copy  
sent.



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

**Memorandum of Conversation**  
OFFICE OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRSDATE: January 6,  
1947.SUBJECT: Withdrawal of UK Brigade from British Commonwealth  
Occupation Force in JapanPARTICIPANTS: Mr. H. A. Graves,  
Counselor, British Embassy,  
and  
Mr. Penfield*File  
gd*

COPIES TO:

F. W. 740.00119

/ 1-647

CONTROL (JAPAN)

JAN 23 1947

CS 1A

1-647

Mr. Graves called today at his request and handed me the attached "Notes of Conversation". I noted that the document states that the "Australian Government will now seek the formal agreement of the United States Government to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade", and asked Mr. Graves if he did not mean actually that US agreement would be sought through military channels within the framework of the existing governmental level agreement. He stated that my understanding was correct and that the Australian military representatives here are now taking the matter up through Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff machinery. He added that he was giving me this information under instructions from the Foreign Office merely for our information in order to avoid possible confusion or misunderstanding. He also said that the matter had been taken up in Tokyo and that General MacArthur had no objections to the withdrawal on the understanding that the British Commonwealth Force commander continued to assume responsibility for his presently assigned area.

In thanking Mr. Graves for the information I reiterated my understanding, which he confirmed, that no action by the Department is necessary.

(In view of the receipt later of note no. 4/47 of January 6 from the Australian Embassy it appears that Mr. Graves was mistaken in his impression that governmental level action was unnecessary.)

*gd*  
FE:JKPenfield:hst



*File*

NOTES OF CONVERSATION

In this Embassy's Aide Memoire of the 18th November last it was stated that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom were discussing with the Governments of Australia and New Zealand the withdrawal from Japan of a portion of the United Kingdom forces now on duty with the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. As a result of these discussions the Australian Government will now seek the formal agreement of the United States Government to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade.

The reasons which led His Majesty's Government to take this decision were as follows:-

- (a) The United Kingdom commitments throughout the world exceed the man power available unless measures, politically and economically undesirable, were taken.
- (b) The hope that United Kingdom commitments would be progressively reduced was not fully realised, especially in regard to Italy and Venezia Giulia.
- (c) After reaching the conclusion that a reduction had to be made somewhere it was considered that British troops could best be spared from Japan since Allied control over that country was firmly established and reduction of the small United Kingdom contingent would therefore be unlikely to endanger the occupation.

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/1-647

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
WASHINGTON, D.C.,

6th January, 1947.

TO	UNIT
NO.	
DATE	
INITIALS	<i>SE</i>
REMARKS	<i>ga</i>

740.00119 Control (Japan)  
CS/A 1-647



*File  
JKP*

January 7, 1947.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel Bastion, OPD, War Department  
FROM: Mr. Penfield, FE, Department of State  
SUBJECT: British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan

There is attached a copy of a self-explanatory note of January 6, 1947, from the Australian Embassy requesting the agreement of "the United States Government to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom brigade from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force as soon as the necessary shipping can be made available".

It is understood that SCAP and the War Department have already informally approved of this withdrawal. If you will confirm this understanding we shall take the necessary steps to inform the Australian Embassy that the United States Government has no objections.

Attachment:  
Note no. 4/47, January 6,  
from the Australian Embassy.

740.00119 CONTROL  
(JAPAN) / 1-647

*an*

740.00119 Control  
CS/A  
*Penfield/1-647*

FE:JKPenfield:hst  
1-7-47 *JKP*

TO	Colonel Bastion
FROM	Mr. Penfield
SUBJECT	British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan
DATE	1-7-47
INITIALS	<i>JKP</i>





AUSTRALIAN EMBASSY  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

No. 4/47.

6th January, 1947.

FE  
DC/R

*replied  
1/24/47  
see  
file*  
JAN - 3 1947  
Department of State

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the United Kingdom recently advised the Government of Australia that a review of their military manpower position shows that the commitments of the United Kingdom at home and abroad exceed the manpower that the United Kingdom can make available to meet them. As the necessary economy of manpower could not be secured by a reduction to be effected in other areas, and as Allied control over Japan is firmly established, it was represented that a reduction of the United Kingdom contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force would be unlikely to endanger our common objectives. Accordingly, the views of other British Commonwealth Governments participating in the British Commonwealth Occupation Force were sought concerning a proposal for the withdrawal of a United Kingdom brigade from Japan prior to approaching formally the United States Government in regard to this matter.

2. The withdrawal of the United Kingdom brigade would involve about 3,500 men, but about 6,500 United Kingdom personnel would remain in Japan and total numbers of the British

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)/1-647

RECEIVED  
JAN 29 1947

The Honourable James F. Byrnes,  
Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DCR - EUR Unit  
*[Signature]*

*Jan 8/1-647*



- 2 -

Commonwealth Occupation Force would still be over 30,000. In view of the military manpower difficulties being experienced by the United Kingdom Government the other British Commonwealth Governments concerned agreed in principle with this proposal. It is understood that the United Kingdom authorities have already informed the State Department and the United States Chiefs of Staff of the proposal. Lord Tedder and General Gairdner have also discussed the matter informally with General MacArthur and the Commander-in-Chief B. C. O. F.

3. In accordance with paragraph 3 (b) of the MacArthur-Northcott Agreement the Australian Government submits this request for the agreement of the United States Government to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom brigade from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force as soon as the necessary shipping can be made available.


4. An early reply would be appreciated, as the United Kingdom Government has stressed the urgency of this matter.

I have the honour to be,

with the highest consideration,

Sir,

Your obedient servant,



(For the Ambassador)



JAN 24 1947

**Excellency:**

I have the honor to refer to the Embassy's note of January 6, 1947, requesting the agreement of the United States Government to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom Brigade from the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan as soon as the necessary shipping can be made available.

I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government has no objection to this proposal.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

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na.		<i>JE</i>
Rev.		<i>LD</i>
Cat.		
Dist.		

*JE Vincent*

**His Excellency  
Norman J. O. Makin,  
Australian Ambassador.**

A true copy of this document is on file

JAN 24 1947 P.M.

FE:JKPenfield:hst  
1-24-47

*MH*  
BC

JA  
*ma*

*Tub*  
AH

740.00119 CONTROL(JAPAN)/1-647

740.00119 Control (Japan)  
CS/R  
1-647







A man who helped  
to direct the  
Occupation tells  
about . . .

# SNAFU IN TOKYO

By ARTHUR BEHRSTOCK

(Former Chief, Policy Division, Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ, Tokyo)

**G**ENERAL MacArthur had no plans for occupying Japan when the war ended. In Manila, there was a small group of military government officials sent out from Washington who had been furiously drawing up plans for several months. The head of this group was a Regular Army General by the name of Crist. He was a large, beefy, red-faced man in the Blimp tradition who coughed importantly when he spoke. He was to be the military governor of Japan. MacArthur blandly ignored him. He had never asked Washington for help during the war, and he did not intend to ask for any now.

Inside GHQ, a bitter struggle for power was taking place among the generals around MacArthur. They were a strange group of men; in GHQ, we called them the "Bataan Gang." Most of them had come up with MacArthur from the Philippines. They were all different, but all MacArthur men—all anti-British, anti-Russian, anti-Roosevelt and fanatical in their loyalty to the Old Man. During the war, there had always been a constant jockeying for position among them. Now they were frantically maneuvering to create jobs for themselves in Japan.

Overshadowing almost everything else was MacArthur's fatical hatred for Roosevelt, his conviction that the President was part of a great conspiracy in Washington to undermine and destroy him. He was sure that the President and other leaders in Washington were in league to rob him of credit for his military victories.

## MacARTHUR EXPECTS WORLD WAR III

MacArthur was opposed to our entering the war in Europe. He thought that we were too far away to exert any influence there and that it made no difference to us who dominated the continent—Hitler, Stalin or Churchill. He mistrusted all of them. To him World War II was only a curtain-raiser, anyhow. The real war, for him, was still to come—the war between the Mongol-Slavic hordes from the East and the civilized peoples of the West. He had no faith in the United Nations.

MacArthur believed that America's real destiny lay in the Far East. He saw the Pacific as a big American lake, and Japan as a jumping-off place, for the holy crusade against the new anti-Christ, the pagan armies from the East. In conquering Japan, he saw himself as future historians would see him—as the savior of Western civilization. Few men ever had such a keen historical sense; even his daily communiques were written for the textbooks of tomorrow.

The Philippines was our bridge to the Orient as we maneuvered behind the scenes to restore him. He was terribly afraid of the new liberal movement in the Free Hills during the Japanese occupation.

It is a mistake to underestimate MacArthur. He is not a Prussian in the rigid, Prussian sense of the word. He is a Prussian and possesses a tremendous intellect. But he is not a Prussian partist—a man with an almost paranoic belief in his own egotism cannot be measured in ordinary human terms. He was the most successful of almost every other military commander of his time. He missed Eisenhower as a second-rater and regarded him as inept and wasteful of the lives of his men.

## CONFUSION OF FIRST DAYS

I arrived in Japan 10 days after the surrender. I was appointed chief of the policy division of the Civil Information and Education Section, which had the overall responsibility for the Japanese psychology. It was a formidable job. It included newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasting and television, as well as over the school system. We also had the responsibility of encouraging the growth of "democratic organizations," parties, trade unions, women's clubs, etc. My job was in contact with every section of the Japanese people.

It is difficult to describe the confusion in the first months of the occupation. There was only a handful of government officials in the country. Many of them were from combat outfits. Suddenly they found themselves in positions in the government. The man who was in charge of distributing food supplies in Japan was a young man who had been the head of all radio broadcasting in the country. He had never been inside a radio station before.

Everyone rushed about furiously, but no one knew what to do. There was a general paralysis throughout the country. Policies to work with MacArthur were still being formulated. Meanwhile, the militarists were organizing political parties under democratic names. The newspapers were enjoying a slight change in approach, they carried on bus-

## MacARTHUR'S ONE-MAN SHOW

The opponents of militarism came out of the

(Continued on Page 18)



*Nisei Weekender  
Jan: 1, 1947*

# SNAFU IN TOKYO

## ARTHUR BEHRSTOCK

*Civil Information and Education Section, GHQ, Tokyo)*

had no plans for occupying Japan when the war was over. There was a small group of military government men in Washington who had been furiously drawing up plans for months. The head of this group was a Regular Army officer of Crist. He was a large, beefy, red-faced man who coughed importantly when he spoke. He was a native of Japan. MacArthur blandly ignored him. He was not to be of help during the war, and he did not intend

the struggle for power was taking place among the military leaders. They were a strange group of men; in GHQ, they were known as "the Gang." Most of them had come up with MacArthur. They were all different, but all MacArthur types—Russian, anti-Roosevelt and fanatical in their views. During the war, there had always been a constant struggle among them. Now they were frantically maneuvering for themselves in Japan.

But everything else was MacArthur's fateful conviction that the President was part of a great conspiracy to undermine and destroy him. He was sure that the leaders in Washington were in league to rob him of his military victories.

## HE EXPECTS WORLD WAR III

MacArthur refused to our entering the war in Europe. He was far away to exert any influence there and that the Americans who dominated the continent—Hitler, Stalin and Churchill—all of them. To him World War II was only a prelude to the real war, for him, was still to come—the war between the hordes from the East and the civilized peoples of the West in the United Nations.

MacArthur felt that America's real destiny lay in the Far East. The Pacific Ocean, the big American lake, and Japan as a jumping-off point against the new anti-Christ, the pagan armies of the East. When he came to Japan, he saw himself as the savior of Western civilization. Few men ever had more sense; even his daily communiques were written in a straight row.

The Philippines was our bridge to the Orient. In Manila, I watched him as we maneuvered behind the scenes to restore the old gang to power. He was terribly afraid of the new liberal movements that had bloomed in the Free Hills during the Japanese occupation.

It is a mistake to underestimate MacArthur. He is not a military man in the rigid, Prussian sense of the word. He is cultured and widely read, and possesses a tremendous intellect. But he is one of our few living Bonapartists—a man with an almost paranoid belief in his own destiny. His egotism cannot be measured in ordinary human terms. He was contemptuous of almost every other military commander during the war. He dismissed Eisenhower as a second-rater and regarded Nimitz as blundering, inept and wasteful of the lives of his men.

## CONFUSION OF FIRST DAYS

I arrived in Japan 10 days after the surrender. A short time later, I was appointed chief of the policy division of MacArthur's Civil Information and Education Section, which had the overall mission of reorienting Japanese psychology. It was a formidable job. We had control over all newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasting and other information media, as well as over the school system. We also had the nebulous mission of encouraging the growth of "democratic organizations" in Japan—political parties, trade unions, women's clubs, etc. My job was to throw me into contact with every section of the Japanese people.

It is difficult to describe the confusion in Japan during the early months of the occupation. There was only a handful of military government officials in the country. Many of them were fresh, eager young boys from combat outfits. Suddenly they found themselves occupying top positions in the government. The man who was (and still is) in charge of distributing food supplies in Japan was a young boy just out of Harvard; the head of all radio broadcasting in the country was about the same age. He had never been inside a radio station before.

Everyone rushed about furiously, but no one knew exactly what to do. There was a general paralysis throughout GHQ. We had no broad policies to work with. MacArthur was still silent and unapproachable. Meanwhile, the militarists were organizing political parties under new, democratic names. The newspapers were enjoying a field day. Except for a slight change in approach, they carried on business as usual.

## MACARTHUR'S ONE-MAN SHOW

The opponents of militarism came out of their caves slowly. They were

(Continued on Page 18)

100-1119 Arthur's Report / 1-8-47



**BARNEY ONO**

Former Chairman Hawaii American Veterans Committee

Hawaii, the land of peaceful swaying palms, has recently undergone a period of radical face-lifting, economically, socially and politically. Within the last six months, two major strikes have hit the island—the West Coast shipping tie-up and the sugar strike of 75 day's duration, both paralyzing its economic life. On top of all this came the elections, characterized by veteran Island politicians as the hardest fought and dirtiest in all Hawaiian history. Let's stop and survey the conditions leading to these repercussions.

The first and foremost fact of Hawaii is its complete domination by the so-called "Big Five," an oligarchy of the five leading sugar and pineapple plantation interests. Since practically everyone is dependent upon the sugar and pineapple industries for a living, and since 85% of the total arable land is held by these interests, the "Big Five" rules supreme.

Indirectly, the rest of the population not dependent upon sugar or pineapple must also feel the tentacles of the "Big Five" financial octopus. The public utilities, transportation, banking, insurances, communications and real estate, among other enterprises, are controlled by the "Big Five." Moreover, the basic commodities of food and clothing, much of which is imported, arrive via another "Big Five" interest, the Matson Navigation Co., which, by squeezing out the Dollar Steamship and the America-President Lines, now has virtual monopoly over Pacific trade.

What may break this strangle-hold of the Islands by the plantation interests is the rapid unionization of labor. It was bound to come sooner or later, but conditions produced by the war simply accelerated the process. By 1941 the CIO unions had secured a modest beachhead among the plantations. But military rule, distrustful of activities in which Japanese participated and hostile to unions anyway, collaborated with the plantation interests to stifle unionism. This resulted only in the piling up of grievances and frustrations, which was eventually to boomerang in favor of unionism, once military restrictions and pressures were removed.

So, when, in January 1944, the CIO International Longshoremen's Union launched their drive, their membership leaped in two years from 900 to about 37,000. The drive was capped with the victorious 75 day sugar strike, which ended a few weeks ago. All but one of 25 decisive points were won by the union, including a minimum wage increase of \$32.80 a month. Moreover, adoption of seniority and non-discrimination rules offers promise of a drastic modification of racial favoritism, which has traditionally cursed working conditions and hiring policies on the plantations. Most significant, however, is the demonstrated fact that workers of several racial descent can unite and emerge victorious after a long-drawn war with the hitherto invulnerable "Big Five."

Nisei like Yasuki Arakaki, Bert Nakano and Carl Fukumoto of Hawaii island, Y. Takemoto of Maui, Yoshikazu Morimoto and Matsuki Arashiro of Kauai, "Major" Okada and Wilfred Oka of Oahu and Jack Kawano, the

Honolulu longshore leader, are some of the persons who may be expected to broaden and to weigh heavily in the political sphere. Kawano's reputation is already Territory-wide. He was recently elected to the Territorial House of Representatives.

CIO prestige, enhanced by the victorious sugar strike, has an important bearing upon the elections. The CIO influence on the Islands and while the PAC on the mainland was taking shape, 37 CIO-PAC endorsed candidates were elected in Hawaii, four of whom came out on top. The central issue in the PAC fought out its campaign was the outlawing of unfair labor practices through a Fair Employment Practices Act. That success was overwhelmingly supported by the Islands' voters in the recent election of the PAC endorsed candidates.

The election served also to bring out into the open the opposition in the ranks of Hawaii's big business. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin, traditionally represented big business; its publisher, R. H. R. Rington was one of the few Republicans endorsed by the voters on the one issue of his forthright stand and record.

The Star-Bulletin's leading rival is the Honolulu Advertiser, moderate and middle-of-the-road in its policies. It was under the editorship of the Advertiser shifted hands from R. H. Rington, considered incapable of handling the situation, to Charles R. Rington, director of the Hawaii Employers' Council, the island's main house organ for big business, now found itself on the defensive in its vigorous attacks of the Advertiser, spurred by Editor Rington's vigorous attacks of the Advertiser, spurred by Editor Rington's vigorous attacks of the Advertiser, spurred by Editor Rington's vigorous attacks of the Advertiser. One wonders if there is a bigger market for Hawaii's big business than meets the eyes in the Advertiser and the Star-Bulletin.

The Japanese community, too, found dissension in the ranks. They threw their support to the CIO-PAC program for the benefit of all people. Vested interests among the Japanese community were on the side of obstruction and resistance. That there is a three-fold system of employment and discrimination—Caucasians working for Caucasian firms, Orientals working for firms and Orientals working for Oriental firms. When such legislation as FEPC and a minimum wage law are passed, the most vicious behind-the-scenes manipulators to block the way of the members of the Japanese community.

By and large, however, the Japanese community has participated in labor unions, in community activities and has incontestably proven their worth as a loyal, hard-working force, fully integrated into the life of the islands.



**BARNEY ONO**

Hawaii American Veterans Committee

peaceful swaying palms, has recently undergone lifting, economically, socially and politically. Two major strikes have hit the island—the and the sugar strike of 75 day's duration, both. On top of all this came the elections, characterized as the hardest fought and dirtiest in all and survey the conditions leading to these

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aki, Bert Nakano and Carl Fukumoto of Hawaii ai, Yoshikazu Morimoto and Matsuki Arashiro and Wilfred Oka of Oahu and Jack Kawano, the

Honolulu longshore leader, are some of the personalities whose influence may be expected to broaden and to weigh heavily in the Islands' labor sphere. Kawano's reputation is already Territory-wide and Arashiro was recently elected to the Territorial House of Representatives.

CIO prestige, enhanced by the victorious sugar strike, no doubt had an important bearing upon the elections. The CIO imported its PAC to the Islands and while the PAC on the mainland was taking a beating, 22 out of 37 CIO-PAC endorsed candidates were elected in Hawaii. Six of these were nisei, four of whom came out on top. The central issue on which the CIO-PAC fought out its campaign was the outlawing of racial discrimination through a Fair Employment Practices Act. That such legislation is overwhelmingly supported by the Islands' voters is conclusively shown in their election of the PAC endorsed candidates.

The election served also to bring out into the open an apparent cleavage in the ranks of Hawaii's big business. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin has traditionally represented big business; its publisher is Joseph Farrington, Hawaii's Delegate to Congress, who ran on the Republican ticket. Farrington was one of the few Republicans endorsed by the PAC, presumably on the one issue of his forthright stand and record for Statehood.

The Star-Bulletin's leading rival is the Honolulu Advertiser, more moderate and middle-of-the-road in its policies. It was reported that the editorship of the Advertiser shifted hands from Raymond Coll, probably considered incapable of handling the situation, to Charles Hogue, publicity director of the Hawaii Employers' Council, the island counterpart of the mainland's National Association of Manufacturers. The Star-Bulletin, house organ for big business, now found itself on the defensive from the vigorous attacks of the Advertiser, spurred by Editor Hogue of the Employers' Council. One wonders if there is a bigger cleavage within the ranks of Hawaii's big business than meets the eyes in the squabble between the Advertiser and the Star-Bulletin.

The Japanese community, too, found dissension in its ranks. Not all threw their support to the CIO-PAC program for extending democracy to all people. Vested interests among the Japanese business and professional people were on the side of obstruction and reaction. It so happens that there is a three-fold system of employment and wages in the Islands: Caucasians working for Caucasian firms, Orientals working for Caucasian firms and Orientals working for Oriental firms. When the drive was on to secure such legislation as FEPC and a minimum wages bill, among the most vicious behind-the-scenes manipulators to block such bills were found members of the Japanese community.

By and large, however, the Japanese community, through their participation in labor unions, in community activities and in the war effort, has incontestably proven their worth as a loyal, healthy and progressive force, fully integrated into the life of the islands.



## SNAFU IN TOKYO

(Continued from Page 9)

still bewildered by the end of the war. They were also puzzled—puzzled by our curious indifference, by our lack of enthusiasm for what they had to offer us. They could not understand why we did not arrest any war criminals and why a whole procession of people—thin, raggedly dressed, but pathetically eager to help—would stream into my office. They wanted to know what they could do. But there was little I could tell them.

MacArthur regarded Japan as his empire and resented any attempts to infringe on his sovereignty. For months the State Department officials in Tokyo were placed in a humiliating kind of political quarantine; it was known that they were not even allowed to send reports directly to their home office. Delegations from Washington—"visiting firemen" we called them—were told only what MacArthur wanted them to know. I know, because I was one of the people who met with these delegations. Our daily and monthly reports to Washington were carefully prepared to leave the impression that the occupation of Japan was the best of all occupations. I know about that, too, because I helped to write those reports for many months.

MacArthur made it clear from the very beginning that the Allied Council was not welcome in Japan. We were instructed in detail how to hamper their work. MacArthur's first strategy was to filibuster. In the impressive Council chambers in the Meiji Building overlooking the Emperor's Palace,

I heard General Whitney, MacArthur's chief adviser, as he droned off the names of 164 organizations in Japan, while the Council members mopped their foreheads and shifted uncomfortably in their seats. Occasionally he would look up from his paper and, with a malicious smile on his face, ask the Russian delegate politely: "Am I reading too fast?"

### Right vs. Left in GHQ

Since there was no overall policy, each section in GHQ formed its own policy; sometimes there were two or three different and often conflicting policies followed in one section. As the months went by it soon became clear that there were two distinct groups in GHQ. There was the Bataan Gang supported by the Old Japan Hands, who wished to salvage as much as possible of the Old Regime. And there was a group of young liberal officers who were trying, against almost overwhelming opposition at times, to effect some kind of democratic reforms. At night, these young officers would get together over the dinner table or in the lobby of the Dai-ichi Hotel, shrug their shoulders hopelessly and continue to plan and scheme and sketch the outlines for the kind of Japan they hoped to build.

It was soon clear to my chief, General Dyke, which side of the fence I was on. The first major problem that confronted GHQ was a strike on one of the big Tokyo newspapers, the Yomiuri-Hochi; the strikers wanted the president of the paper to resign because of his "war responsibility." General Dyke wanted to let the government use the police against the

strikers. I fought stubbornly against it. A curious situation developed. The president of the company, Shoriki, who was later arrested as a war criminal, would come in to see General Dyke. The strikers would come in to see me.

This strike marked the rebirth of the entire Japanese labor movement. The arrest of the president during the strike was regarded by all Japanese as a sign that GHQ supported the strikers. Actually the arrest at that time had nothing to do with the strike. The section responsible for the action did not even know that there was a strike. But the trade unions publicized our action as a statement of labor policy, and, as a result, thousands of workers immediately flocked into the trade unions.

The conflict between the two groups came to a showdown when the question of a political purge in Japan was discussed. The Bataan Gang, supported by the State Department, wanted to take the teeth out of the purge. The younger officers, including myself, argued bitterly against them. The result was, at least to us, a frustrating compromise, which again placed the old regime back in the saddle.

### Not Like Nazis

Although we did not like many of the compromises we had to make, there were some compensations. After much pushing and prodding, political prisoners were finally released. It was thrilling to watch them march down the street as they came out of their dungeons. The newspapers and

(Continued on Page 19)



# SNAFU IN TOKYO

(Continued from Page 18)

radio were gradually liberalized. There was arrest of some war criminals. The secret police were abolished, although they would often reappear in strange places. A program of land reform was announced.

The Japanese—the average Japanese—are quite different from the sly people with horn-rimmed glasses, as conceived in Hollywood movies. They are a tired, patient, self-effacing people. Their minds had been perverted during the years of militarism, but they have no conscious philosophy of brutality like the Nazis. Most of them were glad the war was over. They did not like the militarist and the bureaucrats, and they are eager to learn about this thing we vaguely call democracy — but which we stubbornly refuse to define for them, because we do not have a very clear idea of it ourselves. The women are happy about their new rights; for years they had chafed under the tyranny of the Japanese family system. The response of the women to the occupation is perhaps one of the amazing phenomena of modern times.

The furniture of militarism has been swept away, but the foundation of the Old Order is still intact. The same clique that was in power before the war is still running the show. The number one men are gone, but the number two men are still riding high. They are now singing a new tune. They are all, quite understandably, pro-American. They study English, see American movies, and are enthusiastic about American efficiency.

## Butt of People's Jokes

Our basic reforms still remain on paper. The high style of early directives is an ironic monument to the hopeful young men who wrote them. Around the countryside, the village head-man still dominates the village as he always did. There has been no real land reform.

The Imperial system, with its long tradition of militarism, has been retained. The Japanese people had no choice in the matter. The new constitution for Japan was drawn up in GHQ (in English), translated (into cumbersome Japanese) and presented to the Japanese government. The debate on the constitution in the Diet was a formality. The Prime Minister was instructed to pass it.

MacArthur became the Emperor's public relations advisor. Behind the scenes, GHQ officials encouraged the Emperor to leave the splendid isolation of his palace grounds and become a "man of the people." The historic Imperial Rescript in which the Emperor renounced his divinity was "cooked" (to use the expression of the man who "cooked" it) in GHQ. The Imperial system was tailored to meet the time. But the campaign to "humanize" the Emperor has not been an unqualified success. The present Emperor is not very good material with which to work. He has a thin, watery voice and a helpless manner, and is not very much comfort to a hungry and spiritually bewildered people. In the bars and restaurants the people mimic his manner and, for the first time in history, crack jokes about him.

## Props Up Old Japan

As the months went by, the pattern of the occupation began to be clear to us. There had been a pattern all along, but we had stubbornly refused to recognize it. MacArthur did not want a liberal, democratic government in Japan. I say "he" because the State Department had nothing whatever to say about it except to fully support him after he had acted. He wanted a government that would provide him with the jumping-off for the unfought war of the future. At GHQ conference tables, the shadow of Russia was always present.

Everything was subordinated to one aim now. The present government, which all of us had regarded as only a transition government, had to be supported and strengthened at any cost. We could not afford to let it fall. The broad program of democratic reforms which that group of earnest young officers had dreamed about had fought for so stubbornly during the early days of the occupation, was scrapped. Even the most innocuous directives were vetoed by MacArthur because they might "embarrass" the government. Anti-Emperor motion pictures were taken off the screen. Pressure was put on the liberal newspapers to change their policies. Public demonstrations were virtually banned.

The Japanese government is giving the orders now. The rulers of Japan soon realized that MacArthur needed them more than they needed him. When Leo Cherne came to Japan and proposed a progressive tax reform program, the government stubbornly refused to consider it. The program was has-

tily withdrawn. The busy little bureaucrats in the government were also learning their way around GHQ. They knew that they were divided among ourselves. They knew whom to go to for support for their anti-progressive measures.

The position of the young liberal officers was becoming increasingly difficult. The pattern was set now. There was very little we could do to change it. Besides, there were only a handful of us left in GHQ. Some had gone home. A few had been dismissed outright. Others became weary of the struggle and resigned. In 1946 I handed in my resignation also. I hated to go; there was still many things to be done. But I had been overseas a long time and was tired of fighting. It had been an exciting year. I had seen a whole society in birth; but as I left Japan, I could not help feeling that the most critical years lay ahead.



MS

DC/R

January 8, 1947

MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY,  
STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE  
SUBCOMMITTEE FOR THE FAR EAST

It is recommended that the following changes be incorporated in SFE 183, 31 December 1946, "Policy for the Interchange of Persons Between Japan and Other Countries", as amended 3 January 1947:

Page 2, Subparagraph d, to read:

"No interchange for the purposes of this program shall be effected of persons who will engage in political or commercial activities."

Page 3, Subparagraph g, first sentence, to read:

"The general program shall be drafted by SCAP in consultation with the governments represented on the Far Eastern Commission."

It is anticipated that the Supreme Commander will consult with the governments through their Missions in Tokyo, although he may prefer other channels.

Page 13, Subparagraph e:  
Delete last two sentences.

Page 13, Subparagraph d:  
~~Delete Subparagraph d.~~

Delete last two sentences.

It is believed that the content of the sentences recommended for deletion is adequately contained in the first sentences of these paragraphs.

Anal.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Rev.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Col.	<i>[Signature]</i>
Dist.	

Hugh Borton  
State Member and Chairman  
Subcommittee for the Far East

JAF:RA Fearey/pm  
1/8/47

FE

ADO  
Cleared by telephone  
with Buchand

HST(FE)

CS/V

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-847

740.00119 Control (Japan) / 1-847



## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Mr. Emersow JK Sec.

I believe this should probably be filed with you.

(Hud)

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE:

9 Jan. 47

TO : Mr. Gross

FROM : Mr. Line, FEC

SUBJECT: FEC consultation

Enclosed is the original of a  
FEC request for consultation with  
SCAP + the letter of transmittal.  
I am sending copies to Col. Fahy  
for transmittal of the message to  
Tokyo, in accordance with the procedure  
agreed upon in the case of our last  
consultation + confirmed by Mr. Stout.

EOJ

FID 740.00119 Consultation (Japan) / 1-947



FAR EASTERN COMMISSION  
2516 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

9 January 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

JAN 16 1947

The Honorable James F. Byrnes  
Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission provide that the Commission "may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

At the fortieth meeting of the Far Eastern Commission, held on 9 January 1947 at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., the Commission unanimously approved the enclosed request for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers relative to the election of members of the House of Councillors.

As Chairman, I am forwarding this request for consultation to you with the request that you transmit it to the Supreme Commander as expeditiously as possible. I would appreciate your notifying me when the Supreme Commander's reply has been received.

Sincerely yours,

*Frank R. McCoy*

Frank R. McCoy  
Chairman

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
/1-947

DOR NE Unit  
*mg*

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JAN 13 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*memo to Sec. 1/14/47*  
*JCD*

CS/A  
STAMP  
JAN 16 1947

740.00119 Control (Japan)



CONFIDENTIALENCLOSURE

*Request for*  
PROPOSED CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR  
THE ALLIED POWERS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF  
THE HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS

The Far Eastern Commission requests the Chairman to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection with the following two points:

1. The Commission requests clarification of Articles 56 and 67 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Councillors (FEC-101/1). According to the English translation it appears that only the one person who has obtained the greatest number of valid votes shall be declared elected to the House of Councillors either from the prefectural constituencies or from the nationwide constituency. It also appears that in election by the nationwide constituency and in election of members for prefectures each voter has only one vote, no matter how many vacancies have to be filled. The Commission will appreciate it if the Supreme Commander will check the accuracy of this translation, and will favor the Commission with his views on the reasons for such a restricted vote.

2. The Commission would further welcome the Supreme Commander's comments on the provision in Article 34, paragraph 6, that "a vote on which the name of a candidate has not been written by the voter himself" is not valid. The Commission queries whether this provision may not unduly limit eligibility for voting by excluding those who cannot write, such as the illiterate and the infirm of hand, thus conflicting with Articles 15 and 44 of the Japanese Constitution.



D/R

JAN 16 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY, SWNCC

**Subject:** Request for Proposed Consultation With the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Regarding the Election of Members of the House of Councillors.

The Far Eastern Commission, acting under paragraph VI of its Terms of Reference which provides that the Commission "may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers", requested its Chairman on January 9, 1947 to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers regarding the election of members of the House of Councillors.

XK 894.00

There is enclosed a draft consultative message on this subject.

It is requested that the enclosure be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for transmission to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

*Ernest A. Jones*

*JH*

J. H. Hilldring  
Assistant Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft Message.

JA:ALDunning:mle  
1-14-47

*ald*  
*ga*

*gcp*  
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DCR NE Unit

*mjs*

*[Signature]*

JAN 15 1947

A copy of this message is being sent to the Secretary of State

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 740.00119 Control (Japan)  
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OS/A  
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CONFIDENTIALENCLOSUREREQUEST FOR PROPOSED CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS REGARDING THE ELECTION OF MEM-  
BERS OF THE HOUSE OF COUNCILLORS

The Far Eastern Commission requests the Chairman to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection with the following two points:

1. The Commission requests clarification of Articles 56 and 67 of the Law for the Election of Members of the House of Councillors (FEC-101/1). According to the English translation it appears that only the one person who has obtained the greatest number of valid votes shall be declared elected to the House of Councillors either from the prefectural constituencies or from the nationwide constituency. It also appears that in election by the nationwide constituency and in election of members for prefectures each voter has only one vote, no matter how many vacancies have to be filled. The Commission will appreciate it if the Supreme Commander will check the accuracy of this translation, and will favor the Commission with his views on the reasons for such a restricted vote.

2. The Commission would further welcome the Supreme Commander's comments on the provision in Article 34, paragraph 6, that "a vote on which the name of a candidate has not been written by the voter himself" is not valid. The Commission queries whether this provision may not unduly limit eligibility for voting by excluding those who cannot write, such as the illiterate and the infirm of hand, thus conflicting with Articles 15 and 44 of the Japanese Constitution.



Form DS-302 (7-2-46)

ACTION COPY

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS TELEGRAPH BRANCH

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

JA	✓
SA	✓
TA	✓
RA	✓
PL	✓

INCOMING TELEGRAM CONFIDENTIAL

Office of FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS 11:15 am JAN - 9 1947 DIRECTOR Department of State

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Handwritten: Tel drafted 1/10/46 9/12

January 9, 1947 7:49 a.m.

FROM: Tokyo via War from SCAP signed McArthur

TO: SECSTATE (INFO WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF)

Cite C X 68893.

9 January 1947

REURAD State serial No. 5, January 3, REC 3.

As pointed out in Acheson's message to Secretary of State 553, December 24, all bills with the exception noted were dispatched by air from Tokyo in ample time to have arrived in War Department before conclusion of the Diet session. The exception (Diet law) similarly dispatched promptly after introduction in the Diet is still in the process of legislative action.

At no time did SCAP make any commitment to or have any direct contact with Far Eastern Commission in this matter, but acted solely upon request of the War Department, which request for prompt forwarding of the bills when introduced in the Diet was fully complied with. If any delay ensued in transmission to Far Eastern Commission after receipt of bills in Washington, it obviously involved a problem of coordination there, completely beyond SCAP control. The statement quoted by you as made by the Australian member alleging a breach of faith is entirely unwarranted by the facts and should not have gone unchallenged.

MJF:ACM

Handwritten: CM-IN 1629

CONFIDENTIAL

PERMANENT RECORD COPY: THIS COPY MUST BE RETURNED TO DC/R CENTRAL FILES WITH NOTATION OF ACTION TAKEN.

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FEB 18 1947

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UNITED STATES POLITICAL AGENCY  
FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF FR

UNRESTRICTED

Tokyo, January 10, 1947

No. 811

1947 JAN 24 PM 2 38

MAIL ROOM

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY  
FEB 6 1947  
Mr. McDermott

SUBJECT: Twenty-third Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 8, 1947.

RECEIVED  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
1947 JAN 24 AM 9 36  
The Honorable  
The Secretary of State  
Washington  
D O M  
FACILITIES BRANCH

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
JAN 21 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN)  
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I have the honor to refer to this Mission's despatch No. 788, December 24, 1947, and to previous correspondence in regard to meetings of the Allied Council for Japan, and to forward as an enclosure five copies each of the Agenda and Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Twenty-third Meeting of the Allied Council, held on January 8, 1947.

ACTION  
2 FE  
COPIES  
20s  
1 EE  
2 TRC  
1 FM  
1 CP  
2 ESP  
6 OGD-lead  
1 DCP  
1 SA/M  
1 CPG  
1 FC

The subject "Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan" placed upon the Agenda of the Twenty-first Meeting by the Supreme Commander and held over for the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Meetings at the request of the Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was discussed. The Soviet Member recommended State exploitation of radio stations in Japan under the supervision of the Ministry of Communications. He supported his recommendations in a long statement which appears on page two et seq. of the Corrected Verbatim Minutes.

The Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposed the subject "The Date for Conducting the Purge of Local Administrative Organs and the Date of Election of Local Municipal Organs." Prior to the meeting, he requested answers to six questions. General Headquarters furnished information covering the points raised by the Soviet Member, which appears on page four et seq. of the Corrected Verbatim Minutes.

3 War-lead  
1 Navy-lead

In Imperial Ordinances Nos. 1-4 of 1947, promulgated on January 4, 1947, translations of which will be submitted as soon as available, there are set forth the precise rules with respect to the purge.

The tenor of the Soviet Member's remarks was that the Japanese Government was deliberately delaying the purge and the holding of municipal and other elections.

Although he made no specific recommendations, the Commonwealth Member strongly supported the remarks of the Soviet

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73  
[Signature]

Member on  
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Tokyo's No. 811  
January 10, 1947

-2-

Member on alleged postponement of local elections.

The Chinese Member recommended that the Japanese Government be reminded to add, if they are not already included, Chiefs of the Chiho Jimusho (local bureau) to the list of those to be purged.

I confined my remarks to pointing out that the extension of the purge was proceeding according to plan; that irrespective of the prophecies of various Japanese officials, no date has been set for the elections; that the approximate official date for completing the purge is April 15; and that the date for the elections will depend to some extent upon the progress of the purge.

Respectfully yours,

George Atcheson, Jr.

Enclosures: *Att. WDS*

As stated

Original and Hectograph to Department

Copies to: American Embassy, London  
American Embassy, Nanking  
American Embassy, Moscow  
American Embassy, Canberra  
American Embassy, New Delhi  
American Legation, Wellington

500  
GAAbbey:cbk



Enclosure No. 1 to Despatch No. 811, January 10, 1947, of the U.S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Twenty-third Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 8, 1947."

23-108

AGENDA


for the

TWENTY-THIRD MEETINGALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

To be held in the Meiji Building, Tokyo,  
Wednesday, 8 January 1947, at 1000 Hours

- I APPROVAL OF THE CORRECTED VERBATIM MINUTES OF THE TWENTY-SECOND MEETING (1 Session, Numbered 22-1223).
- II PROCEDURAL MATTERS
- None held over or submitted as items for this Agenda.
- III OFFICIAL MATTERS
1. Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan (Inclosure #1).
  2. The Date of Conducting the Purge of Local Administrative Organs and the Date of the Election of Local Municipal Organs (Inclosure #2).

By Direction of the Chairman:

  
GLENN ABBEY  
Secretary-General

2 Incls:

- 1-Agenda Item 21-1211-1 (Revised 3 January 1947).
- 2-Agenda Item 23-108-1.

3 January 1947



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPANProposed Discussion Agenda

- I AGENDA ITEM NO. 21-1211-1 (Revised 3 January 1947).
- II PROPOSED BY: SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.
- III SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION: Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan.
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Wednesday, 8 January 1947. (Held over from Twenty-first and Twenty-second Meetings at request of Soviet Member).
- V SCOPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED: Comments of the Members of the Council.
- VI SPECIFIC INFORMATION DESIRED ON PROGRESS TO DATE: None requested.
- VII REFERENCES:
1. Partial Staff Study on Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan (Inclosure #1-1, Agenda 21-1211, Twenty-first Meeting, Allied Council for Japan).
  2. Letter from the Secretary-General to Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, 21 December 1946 giving certain information on radio broadcasting in Japan ( Corrected Verbatim Minutes of the Twenty-second Meeting, Allied Council for Japan, Number 22-1223).

Inclosure #1



ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN  
Proposed Discussion Agenda

- I AGENDA ITEM NO. 23-108-1.
- II PROPOSED BY: LIEUTENANT GENERAL KUZMA N. DEREVYANKO,  
Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
- III SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION: The Date of Conducting the Purge  
of Local Administrative Organs and the Date of the  
Election of Local Municipal Organs.
- IV DATE PROPOSED FOR DISCUSSION: Wednesday, 8 January 1947.
- V SCOPE OF INFORMATION DESIRED: Information on the proposed  
dates of conducting the purge and the election of local  
municipal organs.
- VI SPECIFIC INFORMATION DESIRED ON PROGRESS TO DATE:
1. What are the reasons for the delay in carrying out the  
program of the purge of local municipal organs, which  
was announced by the Japanese Government?
  2. What is the proposed order of conducting the purge?
  3. Is it intended to include the representatives of  
public organizations into the control commissions?
  4. When does the Japanese Government intend to finish the  
purge of local municipal organs?
  5. What are the reasons for the repeated postponement of  
elections to the local municipal organs?
  6. What is the proposed date of conducting elections to  
the local municipal organs?
- VII REFERENCES: None.

Inclosure #2



Enclosure No. 2 to Despatch No. 811, January 10, 1947, of the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Twenty-third Meeting of the Allied Council for Japan, January 8, 1947."

23-108

CORRECTED  
VERBATIM MINUTES  
of the  
TWENTY-THIRD MEETING  
ALLIED COUNCIL FOR JAPAN

Meiji Building, Tokyo, Wednesday, 8 January 1947, at 1000 Hours

MEMBERS PRESENT

The Honorable George Atcheson, Jr., Deputy for the Supreme Commander, Chairman, and Member for the United States

The Honorable Yorkson C. T. Shen, representing the Member for China

The Honorable W. Macmahon Ball, Member representing jointly the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and India

Lieutenant General Kuzma N. Derevyanko, Member for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

SECRETARY-GENERAL

Mr. Glenn Abbey

Office of the Secretariat  
Allied Council for Japan  
9 January 1947



THE CHAIRMAN: The meeting will please come to order.

The Verbatim Minutes of the Twenty-second Meeting--the last meeting--have been circulated among the Members for correction. In the absence of objection (Pause) they will be recorded as approved.

Are there any Procedural Matters?

MR. BALL: There is just one small point, MR. CHAIRMAN, that I mentioned to you over the telephone one day this week, and that was my suggestion that the word "restricted" might be omitted from the Verbatim Minutes. These Minutes, I think, are made available for the press, quite rightly, and it might be a good idea to leave the word "restricted" off the front page so that anybody who wants to use them would feel free to do so without restriction.

THE CHAIRMAN: I perceive no objection to omitting the word "restriction" except that I would suggest it be retained until the Minutes have been approved.

MR. BALL: No, I think that is all right, MR. CHAIRMAN, but that would mean, wouldn't it, that any report--any, say, newspaper report--based on the Minutes before the time they had been approved would remain an unofficial report? It would not be an official handout.

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it would be a report based upon a transcript of the proceedings.

MR. BALL: Yes, I see.

THE CHAIRMAN: (To MR. SHEN) MR. MINISTER, do you have any objection to the suggestion?

MR. SHEN: No objection.

THE CHAIRMAN: Under Official Matters the first subject, "Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan" was proposed by the Supreme Commander for discussion two meetings ago, and has been held over at the request of the Soviet Member.



Does the Soviet Member wish to make any comment on the subject?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: MR. CHAIRMAN, Gentlemen: Having studied the material concerning the problem under discussion, I have come to the conclusion that at present it is not expedient to recommend the creation of private broadcasting in Japan; that under present conditions it is more expedient to have State exploitation of radio stations in Japan, under the supervision of the Communications Ministry. Recommending the preservation of State form of ownership and exploitation of radio stations, I have taken into consideration the following:

Firstly, the concentration of broadcasting in the hands of one Government organ will considerably help the Occupation authorities to control the Japanese broadcasting and will guarantee the proper contents of these broadcasts in the interests of the United Nations, about which MR. BALL spoke here before.

Secondly, as the construction of radio stations is an expensive undertaking, the introduction of private broadcasting would lead to the concentration of broadcasting in the hands of the most powerful financial, industrial companies, and would deprive new democratic organizations of Japan which do not have sufficient means for using broadcasting in the interest of furthering democratization of Japan.

Thirdly, private broadcasting companies, the main purpose of which is to get profit, could be used by non-democratic groups of Japan for transmitting broadcasts which would not be in conformity with the objective of educating the Japanese people in democratic spirit.

Fourthly, the principle of private exploitation of radio stations will still more strengthen the disproportion of



distribution of broadcasting stations on the territory of Japan. It is known that before the war, in Japan, were about five million receivers which were very unequally distributed in various districts of the country. In some prefectures where a saturation of receivers was always from 50% to 70%; there were prefectures where this saturation varied from 0.8 to 10%. It seems this situation remains unchanged until now. As far as the main source of profit of private broadcasting companies is advertising, it is natural that private broadcasting stations will be built only in large cities, providing greater possibilities of advertising. Thus, the introduction of private ownership and exploitation of radio stations will not weaken but will strengthen the unequal distribution of radio broadcasting and receiving stations; whereas the concentration of all broadcasting in the hands of the State will provide more adequate development of the system of broadcasting stations all over the country, in the interests of the majority of its population.

THE CHAIRMAN: Is there any further comment on this subject?

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: That is all.

THE CHAIRMAN: The next subject under Official Matters, proposed by the Soviet Member, "The Date for Conducting the Purge of Local Administrative Organs and the Date of Election of Local Municipal Organs." In accordance with our established procedure, I will ask if the Soviet Member has any introductory comment he wishes to make on this subject.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I would like to ask MR. CHAIRMAN to answer the questions which were submitted when that subject was placed on the Agenda of the Council.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have here a memorandum from General Headquarters, providing information in response to the questions asked by the Soviet Member.



The first question, "What are the reasons for the delay in carrying out the purge of the local municipal organs which was announced by the Japanese Government?"

There has been no delay in the administration of the purge. The ordinances have just been issued. They have been worked out according to plan.

The second question, "What is the proposed order of conducting the purge?"

The administration of the purge, as heretofore, will be the responsibility of the Japanese Government. The covering ordinances have just been promulgated and the details of administration are now being developed necessarily on the basis of those ordinances.

The third question, "Is it intended to include the representatives of public organizations into the control commissions?"

This question is not entirely clear to me. If the "control commissions" refer to screening committees, there is no restriction on members appointed, so long as they have been screened and passed as not undesirable within the purview of the purge.

The fourth question, "When does the Japanese Government intend to finish the purge of local municipal organs?"

The answer is, approximately April 15, but this date is contingent upon the progress of the purge.

The fifth question, "What are the reasons for the repeated postponements of elections to the local municipal organizations?"

No date has as yet been fixed for local elections. I am unaware of any postponement of any date.

The sixth question, "What is the proposed date of conducting the elections to the local municipal organs?"

The date has not yet been determined. It will depend, of course, upon the progress of the purge, and it is expected



that the elections will be held at an early date. I might add that the ordinance which has just been promulgated is a very detailed document, some eighty pages in length, and it is now in process of being mimeographed--that is, the English translation is in process of being mimeographed, and when the mimeographing has been completed, copies will be furnished the Members if they wish.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: I would like to make some comments, sir. The question of the date of conducting the purge of local administrative organs and the date of the election of municipal organs has been placed by me on the Agenda for discussion in the Allied Council because up till now the Japanese Government has not fixed the final date for conducting these measures, important from the point of view of democratic reconstruction of Japan. In official statements made by the representatives of the Japanese Government, the preliminary dates of conducting elections were mentioned several times, but for no reasons the elections were postponed again and again. At first it was explained by the necessity of finishing the 90th Extraordinary Session of the Diet. Then by the necessity of drawing up new lists of electors and the necessity of conducting the examination of candidates. Then by the creation of screening committees, the examination of the members of electoral commissions, the waiting for special Imperial Ordinances on these questions. Then by technical difficulties of carrying out all these measures, and by other reasons.

However, the above-mentioned measures are quite natural in the electoral campaign and the Japanese Government evidently foresaw the necessity of carrying them out at the time when its representatives made official statements about conducting the elections, already in October 1946. Therefore, I do not understand the real reasons for the delay of conducting the



elections of local municipal organs and carrying out the measures which are connected with them.

I would like to refer to some official statements of the Japanese Government concerning the date of conducting the elections of local municipal organs. More than half a year has passed since that time when, on the third of July, the representative of the Ministry of the Interior, replying to the interpellation in the Lower House, said that the Government intended to conduct the elections of members of prefectural assemblies at the beginning of October, the members of city and village assemblies at the end of October, prefectural governors at the end of November, mayors of cities and village chairmen in December of the last year. The representative of the Ministry of the Interior also pointed out that the Government considered it quite necessary to conduct the examination of political qualifications of the members of prefectural and municipal assemblies, and that by the beginning of October new lists of electors would be drawn up. Then, on the first of August 1946 MR. OMURA, the Minister of the Interior, made a statement in the Lower House, in which he said that in connection with the continuation of the work of the session of the Diet, the elections of local municipal organs would be postponed for one month, and pointed out that the elections of the members of prefectural assemblies would be conducted in November, the members of city and village assemblies in December 1946, prefectural governors in January, the city mayors and village chairmen in February 1947.

On September 6, 1946, the Ministry of the Interior published the following dates of the elections: 7 December, the elections of the members of city and village assemblies; 15 December, the election of the mayors of cities and the heads of neighborhood association; 17 December, the elections of the



mayors of towns and village chairmen; 25 January, the elections of the prefectural governors; 20 February, the elections of the members of the prefectural assemblies.

As is seen from all this, the exact dates of conducting the elections were established. It was also pointed out that local government organs were instructed that necessary preparations be carried out for the elections to take place on the above-mentioned dates and new lists of electors be completed by November 25, 1946.

However, in the following month, namely on 3 October 1946, MR. OMURA, the Minister of the Interior made a speech in the Lower House and said that the election evidently would be conducted in the period from December 1946 to March 1947. On December 21, MR. OMURA, the Minister of the Interior again spoke in the Lower House in response to the interpellation as to the date of conducting the elections. That time, he made a very vague statement that the Government so far did not fix the date of conducting the elections as the Government was waiting for the promulgation of the Imperial Ordinance on the purge of local administrative organs of all undesirable elements.

Concerning the date of conducting the elections of prefectural governors which was fixed on January 25, the Minister said that these elections would be postponed for one month or for two months. And finally, on December the 27th, the Ministry of the Interior published general principles of the elections of local municipal organs saying nothing concerning the date of the elections.

In connection with the publication of the above-mentioned decision of the Ministry of the Interior on the general principles of conducting the elections, the Japanese press began to express the apprehension of the Government circles that it was uncertain whether or not it would be possible to



conduct the elections before May 1947.

It is clear from the above-mentioned official statements to which I have referred, that the Japanese Government, without any serious reasons, every month postponed the date of the elections and even now has not fixed definite dates of carrying out this important measure. On the ground of all said above, I recommend that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers order that the Japanese Government fix definite dates of conducting the purge of local administrative organs and the dates of the elections of local municipal organs without further delay.

THE CHAIRMAN: Irrespective of what various individuals have prophesied in regard to this matter, as I mentioned, my information is that the official date, the approximate official date, for completing the purge is April 15th and the date for the elections will of course depend to some extent on the purge.

It of course takes a little time to reconstruct an old and poorly-built house. As I mentioned, these matters have been going according to plan and I am unaware of any dissatisfaction in their progress on the part of the interested Governments.

MR. BALL: Well, I have listened with very great interest, MR. CHAIRMAN, to what GENERAL DEREVYANKO has said. I think he has produced a very thoroughly documented and unanswerable case to the effect that local elections have been postponed several times far beyond the dates at which Japanese Cabinet Ministries had planned to hold them. I also think it is quite reasonable for him to ask when it is expected these elections will be held, and if I might, I should like to ask you just to elaborate a little on what you said earlier. I think you said the expected purge of local government officials would be completed--hoped it would or was to be completed by April 15th. Now, do you mean to say that the elections will be held as soon



as possible after April 15th?

THE CHAIRMAN: As I have said, the date hasn't been determined. I should imagine that, depending of course upon the progress of the purge, elections will be held, or might be, shortly thereafter. They might be held before. It is a matter that hasn't been determined.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: So, sir, there is nothing definite as far as the dates are concerned?

THE CHAIRMAN: The date has not been determined. I have no doubt from the instances that the Soviet Member has cited and also from MR. BALL'S remarks that various Japanese officials had hoped that these matters would progress faster than they have. I also have no doubt that with the constant interest in these matters and consideration given to them in General Headquarters the question of dilatory problems has not arisen.

MR. SHEN: MR. CHAIRMAN, from what I gathered from the Japanese press, it seemed that the elections of local municipal organs would be carried out sixty days after the purge was completed by law. I wonder if this period--sixty days--has been stipulated by the Japanese Government, or it was directed by SCAP.

THE CHAIRMAN: I have not seen that press report and there has been no directive issued to the Japanese Government in this matter.

MR. BALL: Could we ask MR. SHEN what is the press report he spoke of.

MR. SHEN: The press report says the elections of local municipal organs would be carried out sixty days after the purge is completed by law.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: What kind of press report is that? When was it issued?



MR. SHEN: May I quote some sentences from NIPPON TIMES, November 11, 1946? "As it is required that those to be purged have to resign from their posts at least sixty days before the holding of local elections, it is observed that elections cannot be held until next February or even March, because purging of local officials may not be completed before the end of the year." MR. CHAIRMAN, in connection with the purge of local organs, I wish to avail this opportunity to point out that in the latest purge decree there seems no mentioning about the chiefs of local bureaus, namely CHIHO JIMUSHO, in Japanese, which I understand have replaced GUN, in Japanese, which formerly were between prefectures and cities and towns. This apparent omission may be due to some oversight when the decree was drafted. These bureaus, CHIHO JIMUSHO, now acting as liaison between prefectures and cities and towns, actually handle administrative duties of local administrative organs. Their staffs are therefore influential elements, though not in a prominent position, and should be purged in accordance with the SCAP Directive of January 4th. Therefore, for clarification's sake it seems necessary that the Japanese Government be reminded to insert these local bureaus, CHIHO JIMUSHO, in the latest decree if they were really omitted.

THE CHAIRMAN: I do not have the purge ordinance before me; it is a long detailed document of eighty pages. The matter can be looked into.

MR. BALL: MR. CHAIRMAN, can we accept it as a fact that the elections will not be held until sixty days after the purge has been completed so that if the purge is not completed until April 15th or later, the elections will not be held until June or later?

THE CHAIRMAN: I would prefer not to comment on a press



report. As I mentioned, my understanding is that the elections --the date of the elections, which has not been determined-- will depend to some extent upon the progress of the purge. Whether it will be the approximate date of April 15th, or whether it will be shortly afterwards, I do not know.

There appears to be no further business before the meeting.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO: No, sir.

THE CHAIRMAN: We shall adjourn.

(The meeting adjourned at 1055 Hours).

oo00oo

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND  
SUGGESTIONS FOR SCAP

ITEM I -- "Control and Ownership of Radio Broadcasting in Japan."

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO made the following recommendation to SCAP:

That the State continue to own and control radio stations in Japan under supervision of the Communications Ministry rather than create private broadcasting.

ITEM II -- "The Date of Conducting the Purge of Local Administrative Organs and the Date of the Election of Local Municipal Organs."

THE HONORABLE YORKSON C. T. SHEN made the following recommendation to SCAP:

That the Japanese Government be reminded to add the chiefs of local bureaus, namely CHIEO JIMUSHO, which appear to have been omitted from their latest purge decree.

LIEUTENANT GENERAL DEREVYANKO made the following recommendation to SCAP:



That the Japanese Government be ordered to fix definite dates for conducting the purge of local administrative organs and dates for the elections of local municipal organs without further delay.

END



That the Japanese Government be ordered to fix definite dates for conducting the purge of local administrative organs and dates for the elections of local municipal organs without further delay.

END



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2840 WOODLAND DRIVE  
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1947

Dear Will:

I enclose the article by Burton Crane which I mentioned to you on Saturday evening. As I said to you, I feel very strongly that the breaking up of the Zaibatsu is one of the most essential steps in getting rid of the old feudalistic concepts in Japan, but I do not think this should be carried so far as to penalize all Japanese business men merely because they have a little money as this would lead directly to communism and render impossible individual initiative in getting the country on its feet. I think it is of the greatest importance that those who are responsible for formulating our official directives for the occupation in Japan should realize that the Japanese people cannot be driven to democracy by mandate and by artificially created hardships. If such a policy is followed, it will have precisely the reverse effect of that intended and will drive Japan - at least those who are able to survive - straight into the Russian orbit.

Sincerely yours,

*Joseph C. Grew*

Joseph C. Grew

Honorable Will Clayton  
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

*W.C.*

*[Handwritten mark]*

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RE - Mr. Clayton  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs  
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## PRO-ALLIED GROUP IS COOLER IN JAPAN

Managerial Class Is Doubtful  
of Recovery With Reparations  
and Widening Purges

By **BURTON CRANE**

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

TOKYO, Jan. 10—Under the joint impacts of the Pauley reparations plan and the recently announced purges, Japan's administrative and business classes are falling out of love with the occupation. Marked changes have been noticeable in the past two months.

Japanese observers report that the "pro-American and pro-British group," which backed the occupation until last autumn, has become much less vocal. This group, many of whom were educated abroad, understood what we were trying to do here and formed an important link between the Allies and the Japanese, interpreting our actions and coordinating them with Japanese beliefs and customs.

This group has been lost because many of those purged belonged to it and the rest were unable to understand how our purge program for business men, which was plainly intended to penalize the rich regardless of their war responsibility, can be part of any program for democratization along American lines.

The managerial class, which generally is content to see the big industrialists' power reduced, to see farm reforms, to see labor receive a greater voice and to see emphasis placed on personal liberties, is beginning to doubt whether the occupation really knows where it is going. Business men generally interpret Edwin W. Pauley's final reparations plan as condemning Japan to economic levels below the subsistence point. With most trained executives removed by purges, they see slight hope for recovery or for democratization, which depends upon recovery.

### Pressures Are Concealed

Since last summer the occupation has grown increasingly bashful about admitting its part in economic and other measures. The Japanese Government was ordered



which depends upon recovery.

#### Pressures Are Concealed

Since last summer the occupation has grown increasingly bashful about admitting its part in economic and other measures. The Japanese Government was ordered not to reveal what Supreme Command pressure had been used to force it to act and the civil censorship detachment suppresses newspaper mention of the headquarters role except where actual directives have been issued.

Directives—at least written directives—are becoming scarcer. The present method is to call in the Japanese and tell them what they must do, and then forbid them to discuss what they have been told.

Informed Japanese are not fooled by these methods.

Although the Jan. 4 Imperial ordinance implementing the local administration and economic purges was ostensibly a purely Japanese measure, every provision was dictated by the Supreme Command's Government section. Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, former Manila lawyer, heads this section, and Col. C. L. Kades, former assistant general counsel of the United States Treasury is the executive officer.

A Japanese business man with many connections in official circles expressed concern because officials were lessening their cooperation with the occupation.

"Many of them," he said, "are convinced that headquarters is sending Japanese economy into a crash by playing around with ideologies. They figure that the best way to remedy the situation is to go into slow motion, distributing the shocks of the occupation's measures and giving the country time to adjust itself between them."

Although the occupation keeps criticism of its policies from the Japanese press there is a general understanding that all is not well. Japanese businessmen look forward to an economy with all top executives and top companies removed and point out that the Japanese system left a wide gap between executives and plant foremen, a gap filled with "industrial bureaucrats," whose chief aim was to avoid making decisions. If responsibility for industrial reconstruction is placed on these responsibility dodgers they see a long, painful education process ahead.









THE FOREIGN SERVICE  
OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

*Handwritten initials and scribbles*

No. 409

American Embassy, Nanking  
January 14, 1947

DC/R

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Mass Meeting in Protest of America's  
Japan Policy Held at Taipei, Taiwan.

Office of  
FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS  
FEB 2 1947

The Honorable  
The Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

DIVISION OF CHINESE AFFAIRS  
Approval  
JAN 29 1947  
in CA-file 54  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

*Handwritten initials*

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose for the information of the Department the ozalid copy of Taipei's despatch no. 33 of December 31, 1946 containing a comprehensive report of a mass meeting held at the Taipei City Auditorium in protest against American policy toward Japan.

It is interesting to note from the despatch that even though the mass meeting was nominally for the purpose of protesting against American policy in Japan, there was ample reason to believe that the meeting was also motivated by strong feeling against the present Central Government regime in Taiwan.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:

*Signature of W. Walton Butterworth*  
W. Walton Butterworth  
Minister-Counselor of Embassy

1947 JAN 28 PM 3 16

DC/M  
FACILITIES BRANCH

Enclosure: *att 100*  
Taipei's despatch no. 33  
dated December 31, 1946 (in ozalid)

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Copy for Department.

No. 33

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Taipei (Taihoku), Taiwan (Formosa)  
December 31, 1946

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Mass meeting in protest of  
America's Japan policy, and  
China's weakness, and sub-  
sequent failure of projected  
demonstration before the  
American Consulate.

The Honorable  
J. Leighton Stuart,  
American Ambassador,  
Nanking, China.

Sir:

I have the honor to report events of the week of December 15, during which a mass meeting was planned and held at the Taipei City Auditorium to protest the 'injustice' of the sentences passed upon certain Formosan Chinese found guilty of disturbing the public peace in Tokyo. While evidence has not been found to indicate that the local Government initiated this protest against American policy, it is believed by Formosan observers as well as by this Office that the Government welcomed an opportunity to divert public censure of itself to an external issue and to undermine the general goodwill toward America which heretofore has been evident in this island.

On

- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

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Summary

On December 19 the Governor General despatched the Acting Secretary General to the Vice Consul with forewarning of probable large-scale demonstrations before the Consulate, and possible violence. On December 20 an elaborate police and military guard was provided which marked a line of progress from the City Auditorium to the American Consulate. However the meeting was orderly and upon conclusion, the demonstrators marched to the Governor's office, ignoring the Consulate. Five hours later a committee presented a letter to the Vice Consul, in an earnest but friendly atmosphere.

The issue of America's "selfish policy" in Japan was raised, but mixed with sharp and outspoken criticism of the Central Government of China, which in failing to unite the country has failed to preserve China's prestige and the confidence which America once placed in her Chinese ally. Demonstrators appear to have been motivated in different degree by a confusion of four principal ideas which were as follows, in order of importance:

- a. America is unjust in discrimination against Formosan Chinese and is blind to the wiles of covert Japanese militarism;
- b. China's Central Government is weak, torn by civil war and unable to maintain China's rightful position internationally;
- c. Formosans, traditionally of revolutionary spirit, must lead China to unite through political reconstruction, with a government of Formosa by Formosans;
- d. Students must organize to make their influence felt in the government of Formosa.

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- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

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It is believed that although the immediate demonstration before the American Consulate failed to take place, the fact remains that the organized sowing of doubt and mistrust on such a scale will probably increase the success of subsequent efforts to undermine public goodwill toward the United States. One newspaper continues a campaign of attack upon American "imperialism" and "discrimination" against Formosans in Japan. People are being led to believe that a protest to General MacArthur will immediately bring a modification of the sentences passed.

Sources of information for this despatch include the Acting Secretary General, police representatives, the press, acquaintances who have volunteered information, and five persons who were asked individually to attend the demonstration.

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Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/48.

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Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

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The Governor-General's warning to the Vice Consul

At twelve noon, December 19, the Acting Secretary General of the Taiwan Government (Mr. YEN Chia-kan 嚴家淦) telephoned to request an immediate conference with the Vice Consul, at the direction of the Governor General. He arrived at the Consulate to convey information which, he stated, was in possession only of the Governor-General, the Chief of the Gendarmerie, the Commissioner of Police and the Acting Secretary General, and was obtained through the Governor's intelligence agents. The Governor General asked that the subject of the conference be kept secret.

According to the Acting Secretary General, four Formosan Chinese known definitely to have "Yenan connections" on December 15 called a meeting attended by fifteen persons (including themselves) to plan a protest to the Governor General and to the American Consulate regarding the conduct of the so-called "Shibuya Affair" at Tokyo. Three organizations are concerned, according to Mr. Yen, namely, the Taiwan Political Construction Association (台灣省政建會), the Taiwan Student's Self-Government Association (台灣學生自治會) and the (temporary) Taiwan "Shibuya Incident Committee" (台灣進駐谷事件後援會). It was determined to hold a mass meeting and demonstration at the City Auditorium at 9 a.m., December 20. According to Mr. Yen, ostensibly the purpose of this meeting is to protest American policy in Japan, with special reference to the alleged discriminatory treatment of Formosan Chinese arrested in connection with the Shibuya riots. The Governor General believed, however, that the true motive was to alienate the Chinese and American governments and people and to embarrass the United States locally.

In the interests of free speech Mr. Yen stated that the Governor felt he must permit the meeting to be held, but that he was taking the precaution to alert the Chief of Gendarmes (Army) and the Commissioner of Police. According to Mr. Yen, the recent Shanghai riots suggested to the Governor General that a small incident such as this protest meeting might set off uncontrollable mob violence. The Governor General anticipated that a deputation would present him with a memorial or protest and that similar protests would be brought to the American Consulate.

The



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

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The Governor General instructed Mr. Yen to tell the Vice Consul that he (the Governor General) would receive the memorials, explain that jurisdiction in the Shibuya trials lies in Tokyo, and promise to forward them through appropriate channels. He proposed to assure the deputation that the Chinese representatives in Tokyo are fully prepared to defend China's interests. The Governor General further wished to suggest to the Vice Consul that in his opinion the Vice Consul should likewise accept the protests with the simple assurance that since the Consulate had no jurisdiction in the case, the protest would be forwarded through appropriate channels. The Vice Consul responded that this was obviously the reception which should be accorded such a representation.

Mr. Yen then conveyed the Governor General's assurances that the Government would understand the Communist-inspired origin of such protests, recognizing this as an effort to alienate the people of China from the United States. The Governor wished to assure the Consulate that the Chinese Government and people were keenly aware of the friendship shown by the United States to the government and people of China, and were grateful for the help extended to China throughout the war. Mr. Yen added his own personal expressions of such appreciation.

According to Mr. Yen, the four Formosan instigators are Communists formerly imprisoned by the Japanese, and whose earlier communist records are established. They were released by the Chinese after the transfer of authority to General Chen's government. Mr. Yen expressed the belief that although some of the remaining eleven in the group promoting this meeting may have communist connections, it is believed by the Governor that they are merely local people being made the unwitting tools of men with "Yenan connections".

One of these is the spokesman, CHIANG Wei-tsuan ( 蔣 渭 川 ), who is, according to Mr. Yen, a stationer fond of public notice through speech-making and pamphleteering. Mr. Yen advised that although Chiang might appear excited and bold in his address to the Vice Consul, little attention need be paid to him.

Mr.

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Mr. Yen here again repeated the Governor's expression of goodwill toward America and appreciation of America's help to China.

The Vice Consul asked, as if to confirm a point forgotten, if the meeting were to be held in the Public Auditorium. Mr. Yen affirmed this, and perhaps sensing a point, elaborated upon the Governor General's profound respect for freedom of speech, in the interests of which he felt required to permit the meeting to be held.

Mr. Yen took leave with the request that the subject of his call be kept secret, and with reiterations of the Governor's hope that the Consulate would recognize this protest as communist-inspired.

The public meeting, demonstration before the  
Governor and presentation of a letter to the  
Consulate

Discreet inquiry in the city late on the afternoon of December 19 failed to disclose general knowledge of the projected meeting, although it was then being well-publicised in the schools.

Before 8:30 a.m. on December 20, civil police and uniformed military police, wearing special service arm bands, were stationed in the area adjacent to the Consulate. Truckloads occasionally came and went, assumed ranks and dispersed throughout the morning. It is estimated that approximately fifty were the maximum present at any one time.

Members of the office staff on the way to work inquired of these special police the reasons for their presence and were told that propaganda against the American Consulate had been spread in town and that trouble was anticipated.

The Vice Consul requested Mr. Robert J. Catto, Staff Officer, to spend the morning in the American Library rooms, which are adjacent to the Public Auditorium in which the meeting was to be held. Mr. Catto reports that school children in large numbers were marched in rank to the auditorium under guidance of their teachers, and that the age range was from early primary school through middle school grades. There was no excitement apparent among the children or the adults who drifted into the building.

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Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

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A member of the staff, asked to attend the meeting, returned with printed matter which had been distributed to the audience. The translated texts appear on page 27. One copy of the original is forwarded herewith. He reports that the auditorium was filled completely, that the agitation for this meeting has been systematically developed through a student organization which has branches in every school. The students were impressed and enthused by the fact that this is the first opportunity for students to demonstrate "without restriction".

Distinguished visitors in the hall included the Mayor of the city, the Commander of the Fourth Regiment of Military Police, Mr. Chang Wei-tsuan (president of the Chamber of Commerce) and Mr. Keh Kuo-chi ( 郭國基 ), member of the People's Political Council for Kao Hsiung hsien. The proceedings were directed by student leaders. In all about 12 speeches were delivered, with great enthusiasm.

According to the Consulate staff member, the Chairman endeavored to stress the purpose of the meeting, i.e., a protest against unfair discrimination against Formosans in the trials and convictions of the Shibuya Incident. According to the story, the tribunal at Tokyo consisted of two Americans and one Chinese and the decisions to convict were made on a two to one vote. This was stressed as discrimination which must be protested in as much as the Japanese are defeated people and the Formosan-Chinese as Chinese are among the victors. An issue of racial pride is involved.

It was resolved to telegraph protests to the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai-shek, to the National People's Assembly, and to the Central News Agency, and to present protests locally to the Governor General, to the Taiwan People's Political Council and to the American Consulate.

Only one speaker was unreservedly critical of the United States, attacking American policy in Japan as a selfish one designed to strengthen Japan as an ally in a forthcoming struggle with Russia.

Observers

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Observers state that while the theme of American injustice in the Shibuya Incident trials was developed, the latent antagonism toward the mainland government welled up repeatedly. Speakers reviewed Taiwan's rebellious history from the 17th century onward, and pointed out that although a supine government at Peking had turned the island over to the Japanese, the Japanese had been able to overcome the rebellions of the Formosan people only at great sacrifice and with infinite trouble. The Central Government was blamed for its diplomatic failures and its weakness which betrays the Chinese people in every international issue. It was stressed that Formosans are different from mainland people, who are "foolish brothers", and are capable of showing the mainland people the strength of unity and pride of nation.

The Taiwan Students Association which has been attempting to organize branches in every school, was the active agency in building the demonstration, but from a sharp exchange between the platform and audience, it appears that the University students were not wholly cooperative. Upon being accused of weakness and failure to join in the program, members of the University student body retorted hotly from the floor in Japanese as well as in Fukien and Mandarin dialects.

Speeches lasted from about 9:30 until noon. At about 12 o'clock the police guard was suddenly increased at the Consulate. A plainclothes representative called on the Vice Consul to warn him of an approaching demonstration and to say that the Governor General was embarrassed and wished the police to prevent any "untoward event". He suggested closing the gates, being unwilling to have large numbers of people enter the grounds.

While he was conversing a large contingent of special military police drew up at parade rest in ranks outside of the Consulate gates. An additional truck load of civil police arrived. The crimson jeep belonging to police headquarters drew up. Unfortunately a sedan bearing plainclothesmen stranded at the entrance, causing some confusion. Representatives of both civil and military police came to the Consulate office entrance, where the Vice Consul met them to thank them for their efforts on behalf of the security of the Consulate. However, desiring not to have the American Consulate appear to need protection by the government against the local populace, and wishing to avoid any possible

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cause of a clash between police and people within the Consulate's gates, the Vice Consul requested the police representatives to permit the crowd to come into the Consulate grounds if it so desired and to permit the spokesmen freely to come into the building if they wished to present their complaints directly. There was some hesitancy before the police finally agreed to this proposal.

The chief police representative again came to say that the demonstrators would arrive within ten minutes. The Vice Consul asked the staff to remain quietly at work.

After approximately fifteen minutes of suspense, and without warning, all police and military personnel suddenly left the premises and the street before the Consulate. After waiting a further half hour the staff decided that nothing would occur and resumed routine activities.

It was later seen that the demonstrators had marched across the city to assemble before the office of the Governor General, who addressed them.

At 4:30 p.m. after all signs of unusual activity in the streets had vanished, two adult members of the Taiwan Political Reconstruction Association with eleven students called at the Consulate. They made a short statement of their desire to protest against the verdicts in the Shibuya Incident and to request the Consulate to forward a protest to General MacArthur asking him to reconsider the court's decisions.

The delegation came and went in a friendly manner, several students with smiling self-consciousness expressed thanks in English and ended with "See you again, Goodbye".

The letter was presented with an English translation enclosed. The originals are forwarded herewith. Copies of the English translation appear on page 23.

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The Vice Consul's remarks

Upon the occasion of the Acting Secretary General's call at the Consulate, the Vice Consul expressed appreciation of the Governor's concern that no untoward incident might happen, and assured the Secretary-General that he fully appreciated the expressions of friendliness delivered on behalf of the Governor, and would be prepared to understand the anticipated demonstration in the light of the secret information so kindly provided.

The small delegation which called at the Consulate at 4:45 p.m. December 20, without banners, badges or fanfare of any sort, was received with assurances that the Consulate appreciates freedom of speech, welcomes any legitimate expression of public opinion, and at their request would undertake to forward the statement in which they desired to express themselves. The Vice Consul said that it was always a pleasure to meet students representing the schools in which he himself had taught some years ago.

The Government's attitude toward the demonstration

There is nothing to indicate that the Government initiated the affair, but rather recognized its possible usefulness and so permitted it to take place.

The Government permitted the demonstration to be held in the largest Government-owned auditorium, and permitted the use of Japanese language in the printed handbills.

The government is unpopular. It is possible that the Governor actually entertained the fears he expressed, namely, that the demonstration might turn into riots not unlike the recent Shanghai mob actions but that the action might be directed toward his government. To forbid a public meeting announced for the purpose of "defending the national honor" would be too drastic at this point. The Government therefore did the next best thing by appearing to be in sympathy with the demonstration, at the same time taking advantage of this opportunity to divert attention from Chinese policy in Formosa and Japan to American "injustice" and Japanese militarism.

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By its action it is believed that the Government hoped to divert the first attention of the demonstrators to the American Consulate; a route of march from the Public Hall to the Consulate was clearly indicated by the presence of police. Although it failed of its purpose, nothing could have been more calculated to focus public attention and curiosity on the Consular property. A more fundamental purpose was served if the demonstration lessened American popularity among the Formosan-Chinese who have made no secret of their dislike of mainland Chinese and, heretofore, of their admiration for America and Americans.

Prominent persons present at the mass meeting

The mayor of the city (Yiu Mi-chien 游彌堅) was present and delivered a speech in which he expressed a sense of encouragement in the fact that Formosan students are eager to organize and to become the leaders of tomorrow. He called for Formosa to produce a leader for China as Corsica had produced a Napoleon for France. He interpreted the Shibuya incident to be a serious portent of surviving Japanese aggressiveness and of America's inability to sense the sinister designs of the Japanese under whose militaristic rule Formosa had remained for fifty years. He did not question the conduct of the trials at Tokyo or the verdicts themselves.

The Mayor's presence and willingness to be heard at a rally of students and his call for new leadership is interesting in the light of recent assertions that he is aligning himself with Formosans who foresee a crisis for Taiwan if a breakup of China's central controls (or of a central economy) takes place. This group foresees a struggle for control of Taiwan in which they intend that Taiwan shall exclude civil war from the island and shall be guided by Taiwanese. A recent critical test of rule by law versus a rule by government police force which remains above the law, has hastened the growth of public discontent upon which this present incident has fed.

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Keh Kuo-chi, voluble member of the People's Political Council from Kao Hsiung hsien, is a man of violent and unreasonable argument. As a person he is not popular, and many of his views are strongly criticised. His support, however, springs from appreciation of his fearless attacks upon the corruption and inefficiency of the local government, which he frequently embarrasses. He advocates troops and fortifications for Taiwan, demanding that armed forces be raised among the Formosans and trained for use in defending Taiwan. The recent rumors of war and of America's intention to use Japanese as allies has given Keh many new, fantastic, but exciting arguments. He is well known for his use of public office for self advertisement, and in this instance he had to be asked to cut short his ranting address so that the protest meeting could go on.

The president of the local Chamber of Commerce, Mr. Chiang Wei-tsuan is the younger brother of one of Taiwan's most famous anti-Japanese agitators, now dead. He is well-known because of his brother's reputation, but is himself considered to be blundering, unskilful and inexperienced as a leader in public affairs. A close business and friendly relationship exists between Chiang and the proprietor of the Jen Min Tao Pao, only newspaper which can be described as consistently anti-American and which has given most publicity to the incident under discussion.

Chiang's attacks on the Central Government of China are violent; he sees America as an ally and supporter of reactionary elements in both China and Japan.

Chiang has been arrested since the demonstration because of his unbridled attacks upon the Governor General and the Central Government during a radio broadcast of December 15.

The commanding Office of the Fourth Regiment of Military Police was present to address the meeting briefly with a suggestion that no mass demonstration would be necessary. His suggestion was ignored.

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The Political Reconstruction Association of Taiwan

The men alleged by the Government to be Communists with established records and "Yenan connections" upon investigation are found to be Formosan Chinese long identified with the group of intellectuals who consistently pressed the Japanese, through many years, for representative government in Taiwan, who promoted the only Formosan-Chinese newspaper, the single short-lived Formosan political party and a literary magazine which attempted to offer resistance to Japan's efforts to destroy Formosa's cultural identity. One "political reconstructionist" is well known to the Vice Consul, who is prepared to doubt the authenticity of the charge of "Yenan connections". In 1945 members of this group were freed from Japanese imprisonment and met the incoming Chinese government with immense enthusiasm. They have become disillusioned and now attack it as vigorously as they attacked the Japanese, in an effort to bring economic reform and a government of law and equal opportunity for Formosans. If agents from Yenan have recently established connections with them, and found them receptive, it is believed that the relationship is prompted more by a desire to find support in opposition to the Government of General Chen than by any ideological agreement with or understanding of Yenan principles. It is natural that the present Government, under sharp attack, should label such opposition "radical" and "communist".

These adults are without skillful leadership, however sincere, courageous and emotional they may be. They appear to have used the "demonstration" as an effort to win organized support from the students. They are making the best of their new opportunity to call for organization and to give vent to their feelings, without capacity to weigh the possible consequences of an upsurge of anti-Americanism.

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### The Student Organizers

The very few students who promoted the demonstration found a "cause" with which to revive interest in a Student Union such as was suppressed by the Governor General some months ago. By their own accounts in the meeting, the principal student agitators, (emotional and feeding on the importance of public attention) met with luke warm reception in the higher schools. Although a number were present, the University students (many of whom have recently been repatriated from Japan) refused to appoint delegates to the "demonstration" stating that they did not know enough of the facts of the "Shibuya Incident" to take a position on it. The College of Law and Commerce provided the most enthusiastic promoters. The lower grades (middle and primary schools) in some instances sent their students under order and class discipline, and were marched to and from the auditorium with their teachers. The principal agitator confessed that even among the middle school teachers he found unwillingness to be stirred up by an incident of which they had little knowledge. One of the two young women who spoke at the meeting was a mainland student agitator, blue-skirted, bobbed haired, who spoke in Mandarin which most students here cannot understand. She appealed for students to rise in repetition of the "May 30 Incident", the identity of which is obscure and which has no appeal on Formosa.

### Student attitudes

Formosan students are becoming self-conscious and demonstrate a sense of responsibility which they did not have under the Japanese. They say that the weakness of the present government thrusts upon them duties of leadership in their own local communities. Under a strong (Japanese) government international affairs were of a world in which they had no part. Having been long subjected to Japanese propaganda which freely exposed and emphasized China's weaknesses, they are perhaps the more sensitive as they begin to believe that Japan's propaganda had some true substance. The Japanese stressed China's inability to assume the responsibilities of a nation.

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The present incident (presented in the light of a national humiliation, involving Formosan Chinese, against which no protest has been made) seems to Taiwanese students to confirm their deep suspicion that the Central Government is more interested in personal prerogatives derived from wartime absolutism and the current civil strife than in a unified China having equal status with other nations. The students themselves generally feel no hostility to America, but on the contrary continue to look to America and American institutions for guidance. The small delegation which called at the Consulate at 4:30 December 19 included only youths of a rough appearance and less sophisticated type, but they attempted to use their English, self-consciously, with friendly expressions of thanks for the opportunity to forward their views to SCAP. The adult leader and spokesman lingered to express to the Vice Consul his appreciation of the Vice Consul's long-standing friendship with the leader's son, and to request the Vice Consul's continued guidance of the son, a circumstance hard to reconcile with the Government's assertion that this man is a communist, Yen-an-inspired to destroy good relations between Formosans and the United States.

Subsequently Formosan Chinese in close touch with the student group, suggested that in view of the complete lack of details in the China News Agency dispatch by which this demonstration was inspired, the Consulate would do well to get before the people as many facts bearing on the case as possible. Three Formosan Chinese have expressed the opinion that this incident was promoted by the Government to break down Formosan Chinese admiration for the United States.

Summary of the speeches,  
paraphrased

Slogans attached to curtains hanging behind the speakers were as follows:

"Elevate our revolutionary spirit, lift up the national prestige in the international field"

"Thoroughly root out Japanese militarism and aggression; protest the injustice of the Shibuya Incident."

"Unite

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"Unite and concentrate full strength and all resources on building a new Taiwan under the Three People's Principles."

"Ten thousand years for the Republic of China."

The principal student agitator, first speaker, stressed the national humiliation which must be felt when one reads the Central News Agency dispatch regarding the Shibuya incident. "We are so far not sure of the actual circumstances, but we feel such verdict is unfair and is insulting. Formosans are people of a victorious nation whereas the Japanese are a defeated nation. Regardless of the merits of the case, the judgement should have gone to the victorious people.

The people of Formosa are descendents of Koxinga, and therefore have inherited a most revolutionary, patriotic fighting spirit, especially evident in youth . . . . Students of the College of Law and Commerce [of which the speaker is one] are most active and energetic in preparing this meeting, whereas University students are cold-blooded cowards who, though they are bright, capable of reasoning and sound in argument, are negative and irresponsible. When urged to participate they said 'What are the actual facts of the incident? We do not know and unless we do we cannot take action' Today none are here; most of the attendance is of middle school grade. Furthermore at several schools the teachers were negative in response, interested only in the good behaviour and order of their students. Order, order, study, study! Can the descendents of Koxinga be so indifferent to such an unjust sentence? . . . ."

The second speaker, a well known rough emotional figure among local students, made a plea for students to revive the Student's Union, once repressed by the Government. He demanded that the Government be pushed into doing the people's will, to which the students should give expression. He cried out against the well-publicised Time magazine news comment (June 10) that Formosa would choose America first and Japan second now that they have tasted Chinese government as here manifested. "The excellent youth of this island should take advantage of this rare opportunity to organize a Student's Union or League; only by doing so can we have the power to bring to ourselves and to our homes a self-governing government!"

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The third speaker, Mr. Liao (廖), head of the Taiwan Political Construction Association (made by the Government as a "Communist" who desires to split China and the United States) failed to mention the Shibuya Incident or the United States in his discourse. He confined himself to a bitter attack upon corruption in local government, unemployment, instability of public peace, "In spite of our joy at the Japanese surrender, most of us have lost hope; too many people are starving. Though the Bank of Taiwan has assets of only TY60,000,000, it has printed more than TY6,000,000,000.... Just as no one can tailor a dress for someone else without consulting him, so with Government. To be able to meet the needs of Taiwan, the government of Taiwan must be of Formosans and for Formosans. The Taiwan Political Construction Association derives from the Taiwanese cultural and political associations kept alive during Japanese days, and today the students are asked to join in its movement for self-government. "Our aim is to liberate Taiwan and we strive to bring into being a self-governing government. We are especially interested in the livelihood of the people. ...."

The fourth speaker, principal of a girl's school, found this opportunity for a student organization very encouraging after the disappointments which have followed the Chinese take-over and the failure of Taiwan to produce leaders of its own even though they are all descendents of the revolutionary Koxinga. America was not mentioned by this speaker, though the Shibuya Incident was alluded to in passing as an indication that the Japanese have not given up their militaristic and aggressive policies.

A University student in the audience came forward as fifth speaker to express an opinion common among many well-educated Formosans. "First of all, I am against Communism, which although it maintains an army has not used its power to back up China in international diplomacy, nor, in this [Shibuya] instance, has it even given expression to an opinion regarding Chinese rights in the case. I am against the Kuomintang, because of its monopoly

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in Government. It is interested only in civil war and struggle for political dominance. They have done nothing but invite the help of the United States, and because of this they will not of course support any criticism of MacArthur's policy in Japan."

The sixth and seventh speakers (from the Normal College) pointed out that food stuffs and materials are going to Japan from Taiwan today, thus continuing in the old role of supplier of Japan's livelihood. The Shibuya Incident clearly suggests that the United States Government has no respect for the Chinese people. This is because China is so internally divided and weak that she cannot make her influence felt internationally. The Japanese boast that they were defeated by America and not by China, and have indicated clearly their intent to return to conquer the mainland of China.

The eighth speaker called for protests against favoritism for Japan but found reason for contempt for China is the corruption of officials, corruption and misuse of UNRRA supplies, the diversion of relief stuffs to private pockets, the general attitude summed up in "ma-ma fu-fu". He reminded the audience of Taiwan's revolutionary ancestry and called for unity in resistance to external threats. He called for action, to begin with a demonstration in the streets.

A girl student from the mainland, typical of student agitators, addressed the uncomprehending audience in fluent Mandarin, urging Taiwan students to join in the student tradition of protest in China. She cited mainland demonstrations of the past as examples to be followed.

(The reaction of local students to this speaker were not cordial, for not only are aggressive women leaders unknown here, but her appeal assumed an identity of interests with mainland students which does not yet exist. The undercurrent of the meeting was anti-mainland to which her contribution was not altogether welcome.)

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The Mayor's speech, summarized on page 12, and the unnoteworthy speech of a local person were followed by the long emotional outburst of the People's Political Council member, Keh Kuo-chi, who attacked American policy as one of selfish interest in building Japan into an ally for the impending war with Russia. The mainland people are interested only in civil war. Formosans should form an army to be used in the occupation of Japan. Formosans should become new leaders in Asia. If a few Mongols could establish the Mongol Empire, and a few hundreds of Manchus could establish the Ch'ing Empire, why cannot 6,000,000 Formosans stand together "to build and control a new China?" Formosa must be armed and fortified to resist the next Japanese attempt to invade the island.

After Keh had been interrupted, the last speaker Chiang Wei-tsuan called for the reorganization and emergence of strong student organizations in which the University men should take the lead. The long delay in public recognition of the significance of the Shibuya incident had left it to students to organize a protest and an exposure of the weakness of China's diplomatic and governmental representation abroad.

Following the presentation of resolutions for approval the commanding officer of the Fourth Military Police Regiment suggested that the meeting break up without demonstration, confining itself to a committee representation. He called for unity of the people who should trust the Government itself to take action.

#### Press and Publicity

On December 12, local newspapers carried a brief China News Agency dispatch announcing the verdicts and sentences imposed upon Formosan Chinese involved in the "Shibuya Incident" at Tokyo.

The December 15 meeting of 15 Formosans long identified with organizations resisting Japanese political and cultural assimilation programs, and active in demanding reforms in Chinese administration, determined to assist in sponsoring a meeting of protest against the Shibuya verdict, then being agitated by certain students.

On the same evening Keh Kuo-chi and Chiang Wei-tsuan made radio broadcasts in the

Formosan

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Formosan vernacular which warned that war was imminent between Russia and the United States, that American policy was intent upon rebuilding Japan as an ally and that Taiwan may have to face a Japanese invasion again. One is said to have been emphatic in statements that China has forfeited America's confidence and betrayed General Marshall's sincere efforts to achieve unity, and that therefore the Central Government is to blame if America abandons her efforts in China and seeks to rebuild Japan as an ally in the Far East. The essence of the speeches however, was a violent attack upon the inefficiency and corruption of the mainland Government and of its representatives, the present Government in Taiwan. It was interpreted by many hearers as a direct challenge to the mainland Chinese to get out of Taiwan and leave the island to the Taiwanese, who are capable (Keh assumes) of raising and maintaining armed forces of their own and of fortifying the island against future invasions. Formosans who heard the broadcast have expressed fears for Keh's personal safety. Chiang has been arrested.

On December 19 the Hsin Sheng Pao (新生報 Government paper) and the Jen Min Tao Pao (人民導報 Editor: Vice Commissioner of Education; critical of Anglo-American imperialism") carried short items which announced that a general meeting concerning the "Shibuya Incident" would be held at the City Auditorium on the following day. The latter paper used very heavy type, prominently displayed. Subsequent announcements on December 20 in the Min Pao (民報 Formosan; critical of Chen's government) and Ho Ping Jih Pao (和平日報 formerly published by National Military Council) were given inconspicuous places in the make-up. In each publication the byline stated this was the paper's "own dispatch" but the stories were the same, indicating a single release.

The "First Letter to Formosan Compatriots", quoted on page 23, appeared in the Min Pao on December 20. The Jen Min Tao Pao of the same date published this letter and a second entitled "A Letter to Our Compatriots on the Unfair Verdict of the Shibuya Incident in Tokyo". Using heavy and prominently displayed types, telegraphic requests to the Central Government and to the National Assembly were likewise published in this issue.

Handbills

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Handbills were distributed at the City Auditorium on December 20, which bore a Chinese text on one side and a Japanese translation on the reverse. Inasmuch as the use of Japanese in public prints is forbidden except in special circumstances it is interesting to note in this instance that the Government permitted Japanese to be used thereby assuring that the subject matter would reach an audience which, generally speaking, continues to be ignorant of written Chinese. A translation appears on page 27, the original is enclosed.

The mass meeting resolved that protests urging strong action must be addressed immediately to the following persons and agencies:

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek;

The Central Government, for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs;

The National Assembly at Nanking;

The Central News Agency, to urge maximum publicity and pressure upon the Government;

The Taiwan People's Political Council, to urge pressure upon Governor General Chen;

Governor General Chen Yi;

General MacArthur's Headquarters through the Taipei American Consulate.

All local papers played the story of the public meeting heavily on December 21, but none of the stories alluded to the American Consulate or to the fact that a letter had been presented to the Vice Consul for transmission to SCAP.

The Second Assembly of the People's Political Council on December 24 resolved to send a telegram to all other People's Provincial Councils to appeal for their support in protesting against the "American decision" in the Shibuya Incident.

On December 25 the Jen Min Tao Pao carried a vicious attack on General MacArthur's policy in Japan, alleging that he was stripping Formosans of their property for the benefit of the Japanese

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and treating them as subjugated people. It asserted that Formosans being repatriated are allowed to carry only 200 yen. This appears to be pure fabrication, for to the best knowledge of the Taipei Consulate and of the Army's Repatriation Team on Formosa, there has been no limit placed on the amount which Formosans can bring back with them except on the cubic content or weight of baggage allowed on the repatriation ships.

Related documents, translated

1. A Letter to Our Compatriots on the Unfair Verdict of the Shibuya Incident in Tokyo.

(This appears as Chinese text of pamphlet distributed on December 20.)

Our beloved six million Formosan brothers and sisters:

How happy we are to have returned to the embrace of our fatherland after fifty years of Japanese occupation! Having gone through such a long period of suppression by Japanese Imperialism, we will not forget the Japanese slaughter and exploitation for which our sufferings are beyond redress. As we all know, the Japanese warlords are extremely barbarous and atrocious. They started their invasion of China in 1937 by which millions of our compatriots were slaughtered. They looted, they raped. Their atrocities are unprecedented in the history of mankind.

Though they are now subjugated, current events prove that the ambitious Japanese aggressors have not yet all been obliterated. Even before our old bloody accounts are settled, they have again applied their misdeeds on our Formosan residents in Tokyo. That is how the Shibuya incident has happened:

An open space of a certain Japanese corporation had been rented by some Formosan residents as stalls for selling goods.

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Intending to get rid of the Formosans, the Japanese Government asked the corporation to stop renting the space. Negotiations between the two parties began but there was no result. Consequently, the corporation staged an incident by means of Japanese rascals.

On July 14, Formosan Chang Yu-hsun was stabbed but the Japanese police refused to take action. Two days later, hundreds of Japanese rascals raided the Chinese stalls at Hsin Chao. The Formosans, without means of defending themselves, immediately sent word to the Chinese Residents' Association, and through the personal efforts of Chairman Chen Li-kuei the Japanese rascals finally dispersed. In the afternoon at about 3.00 p.m. another gang of about fifty men again appeared with swords and sticks but was repulsed by the Formosans.

On the 17th, the Formosans appealed to the Chairman for arbitration and they also reported the case to Mr. Lin Ting-ping, who is in charge of Overseas Chinese Affairs, for appropriate action. Accordingly, Mr. Lin negotiated with the Japanese police authorities requesting a compensation and a guaranty. Next day, Mr. Lin further called on the Japanese Police Commissioner in Tokyo and obtained the latter's verbal guaranty that no such incident would be repeated.

On the 19th, some of the Formosans appeared before Major General Li Li-pai, member of the Chinese Delegation, who having pacified their anxiety and despair, sent them back in three jeeps escorted by a jeep of the Chinese Delegation. When the cars passed Shibuya, over three hundred Japanese were seen gathering at the Police Station. The road was blocked by several Japanese constables and police officers. Mr. Chou was sent into the Station to negotiate, and the police finally consented to let them go. But no sooner than the motors of the jeeps got started when shots were heard. One driver was killed instantly. More than ten were wounded and four died afterwards. The rest were arrested and detained by the police.

Regarding the case, the Chinese Delegation launched a strong protest against the authorities concerned. Later on, the arrested Formosans were transferred to the U. S. 8th Army Headquarters.

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According to the news of December 10, as the result of the Shibuya trial, one Formosan was sentenced to three years and thirty-three were sentenced to two years at hard labor, all to be banished afterward forever from Japan.

Our despair is beyond measure when we read this verdict. The Japanese slaughtered our compatriots and were judged not guilty. It is clear to us who are on the wrong side, and we are convinced that the trial was unfair. In order to obtain true liberty and equality for China among the world nations, in order to safeguard the security of our Formosans far from home, we must rise up and request the government to demand, through diplomatic channels, a just and fair trial of the case in the international court of justice. This is the time for us to make manifest the racial spirit and the sense of righteousness! Let us respond to this call. He who stands aside will not deserve to be a patriotic Formosan. We are filled with the Formosan traditional revolutionary spirit which has run for over 200 years. (Full Text)

2. A (second) Letter to our Compatriots  
on the Unfair Verdict of the Shibuya  
Incident in Tokyo.

The verdict of the Shibuya incident has come out. What it has brought to us is shame and wrath.

[Here is a summarized account of the incident]

However, the dispatch received regarding the case has proved to us that we have been too innocent expecting a fair settlement. The murderers are free from guilt and the persecuted and wounded are to serve terms and be exiled.

Events have turned out contrary to our expectation. The verdict of the international court is one hundred percent in favor of the Japanese.

If this is what we call law, we will be sorry for the law. If this is justice, such justice is entirely for meeting the wishes of the reactionaries contrary to the people's wishes.

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We cannot help feeling extremely outraged that when the democratic front finally won victory, the U. S. Government should have prepared a hot bed in the Far East for the cultivation of the Fascist bacilli. It fosters feudal power in Japan with the hope of controlling the entire economy of the nation and of building a reactionary administration absolutely obedient to its will.

The Shibuya incident is caused by such a policy, and the relevant verdict sufficiently reflects the success of such a policy.

Even though we do not want to reproach General MacArthur for his over-indulgence of Japan, we cannot allow the court of international justice to show favoritism.

We cannot help strictly pointing out: The Chinese strongly object to such unfair and unreasonable verdict. We cannot keep silent, because it is not merely a question of life and death or of fame and shame of a few Formosan compatriots. It concerns the dignity of a nation, the security of the lives and property of overseas Chinese, and the democratic and peaceful development of the world.

Therefore, we in great anxiety make the following demands:

1. The Allied Supreme Command will immediately release the arrested Formosans and guarantee the rights of freedom in residence and movement of our overseas Chinese.
2. The Allied Supreme Command will immediately arrest the murderers of the Formosans and give them a trial with representatives of the Chinese residents in Tokyo to take part in the trial.
3. The Chinese government will immediately dispatch troops to partake the occupation of Japan in order to secure the dignity of the nation and to safeguard the lives and property of the Chinese residents.
4. The U.S. Government will immediately reconsider the Japan control policy, since a second "Shibuya Incident" will follow and the world will not have a single day of peace if the U.S. Government does not change its policy indulging the reactionaries and fostering the remnants of the Fascists.

We

- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

- 27 -

We hope that all of us will unit and join  
in the incessant struggle for righteousness and  
human culture.

(Extract, Jen Min Tao Pao,  
December 20, 1946)

3. Pamphlet distributed on December 20  
(Japanese text, translated)

A Statement to the Taiwanese Regarding the  
Shibuya Incident

Dear Citizens! Friends who have earnest  
patriotism and racial spirit!  
It is assumed that you have all read in the local  
newspapers the judgment passed on the perpetrators  
of the Shibuya Incident. Do you think that this  
is just day-to-day news? Definitely not. This  
is another national catastrophe after years of  
resistance. The old Japanese dream of swallowing  
up the territories of China in three months and  
the ultimate conquest of the whole world has been  
shattered by the sacrifice of millions of Chinese  
lives during the eight years of resistance. The  
international court at Tokyo composed of two  
Americans and one Chinese judicial officers  
recently adopted a brutal decision vis-a-vis the  
Taiwan brethren. Although China made repeated  
representations, these bore no fruit.

Part of the misdeed may peradventure be  
attributed to the Taiwanese involved. At the same  
time, it also betrayed the perennial aggressive  
attitude of the Japanese and their age-old  
contempt for the Chinese people. We must not  
forget for an instant the atrocities and diabolic  
crimes perpetrated by the Japanese against the  
islanders during their 51 years of exploitation.  
Viewed in this light, the misconduct of the  
Taiwanese involved in Tokyo is but infinitesimal.  
As a matter of fact we can all do something in  
order to avenge what Japanese did to us before.

Look at the Japanese now in Taiwan! Have  
they been subjected to such brutalities as our  
brethren have in Japan? As yet who did the first  
shot is still undiscovered but the fact remains  
that 20-30 Taiwanese were slain. Even the Jap-  
anese police admitted that they themselves fired  
543 shots.

The

- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

- 28 -

The Japanese, perpetrators of a defeated nation have been proclaimed innocent but the nationals (Taiwanese) of the United Nation are on the contrary considered guilty. Do you think this is reasonable?

As patriotic youth, can you remain silent? Let us trace the Incident to its initial causes. At that time 2000 to 3000 Taiwanese were surrounded by the Japanese, and the Japanese used every intrigue to align themselves with the ruffians and hoodwink the Americans, fabricating the story as if the Taiwanese were the first to start the trouble. The Taiwanese in self-defence grouped themselves together but were later disbanded by order of the allied headquarters. Passing through the Shibuya police station on their way home, the Taiwanese were surrounded by the Japanese and the incident broke out. Who fired the first shot was not known but the Taiwanese were regarded as disturbing public peace and were arrested and now they got the unfair verdict.

You dastardly Japanese! Not long after your defeat, you were so bold as to cause the present trouble. The present judgment is the result of your intrigue. We believed that the International Court was impartial, but the decision has driven us to think that this is a flagrant insult to the Chinese Nation, particularly to us, Taiwanese. We are highly dissatisfied. Remember, the Taiwanese are not dead. We will not let the event go as it is. We are a model province.

Taiwanese! Come on! We must realize our sense of responsibility! We must stand and unite together! We will proceed en-masse!

(Signed) Taiwan Political Reconstruction  
Association

Taiwan Provincial Students Association

Taiwan Youth's Association in Support  
of the Shibuya Incident.

4.

- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

- 29 -

4. Text of English letter presented to  
Consulate. (Exact copy)

The Taiwan Political Improvement  
Association  
The Taiwan Students' Autonomist Association

Dec., 20th, 1946

Sir:-

A telegram dated tenth instant from Central  
News in Tokyo reads:

"Of the thirty-six Taiwanese arrested in  
connection with the Shibuya Incident, the Inter-  
national Tribunal, composed of two United States  
and one Chinese judges, acquitted two and  
sentenced one to three years and thirty-three  
to two years penal servitude, the guilty  
Taiwanese to be banished from Japan and not  
permitted to return thereto during the occupation  
of the country by the United Nations."

The population of this island greatly resent  
this unfair decision, The Taiwanese under sentence  
had been first humiliated by the Japanese Ronin  
and then machinegunned by the Japanese police.  
As a result, four were killed and eighteen badly  
wounded. The above mentioned court, not only  
did not punish the culprit, but evinced  
partiality towards them. Where is justice?  
How can there be world peace? An assembly of  
the representatives of the people was held here  
to day and it was resolved to request that you  
convey our wish to General MacArthur's  
Headquarters to reconsider the decision, and  
release the Taiwanese immediately, so that  
righteousness may be preserved and the friend-  
ship between the peoples of these two Allied  
Nations be maintained.

We have the honor to be,  
Sir,  
Your obedient servants,

Ralph J. Blake, Esquire  
Consul-General for the United States of America,  
Taipoh, Taiwan.

Respectfully

- CONFIDENTIAL -



Taipei despatch no. 33  
of 12/31/46.

- 30 -

Respectfully yours,


George H. Kerr  
American Vice Consul

Enclosures:

One letter (Chinese text) with original.  
English version and cover.  
One propaganda pamphlet.

Original to Embassy, Nanking.  
Two copies (one ozalid) to Department.

George H. Kerr/klc



- CONFIDENTIAL -



FORM DS-322  
7-18-46

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

CLASSIFICATION

INDICATE

Collect

Charge Department:

Department of State

2748

PLAIN

Charge to Mrs. Herbert von Wolff Washington  
P.O. Box 229  
Montvale, New Jersey

PLAIN

JAN 14 1947

SUPREME COMMANDER FOR ALLIED POWERS

TOKYO (JAPAN)

14 FOURTEENTH

INFO WAR DEPT CHIEF OF STAFF

FOR POLITICAL ADVISER

Mrs. Wolff American citizen desires know whether  
husband Herbert von Wolff Austrian national Kobe will  
be permitted remain Japan.

KR 863.012

Byrnes (JKP)

TELEGRAM  
RELEASE DESK

DC/T

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-1447

CS/JEC (Japan) / 1-1447

740.00119 Control

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JAN 13 1947

DIVISION OF BUDGET AND FINANCE

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JAN 14 1947 P.M.



FAR EASTERN COMMISSION  
2516 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N. W.  
WASHINGTON 8, D. C.

16 January 1947

CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable James F. Byrnes  
Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The Terms of Reference of the Far Eastern Commission provide that the Commission "may make such arrangements through the Chairman as may be practicable for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

At the forty-first meeting of the Far Eastern Commission held on 16 January 1947 at 2516 Massachusetts Avenue, Northwest, Washington, D. C., the Commission approved the enclosed request for consultation with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers relative to the Imperial House Economy Law and assignment of State properties.

As Chairman Pro Tempore of the Far Eastern Commission, I am forwarding this request for consultation to you with the request that you transmit it to the Supreme Commander as expeditiously as possible. I would appreciate your notifying me when the Supreme Commander's reply has been received.

Sincerely yours,

*George H. Blakeslee*

George H. Blakeslee  
Chairman Pro Tempore

RECEIVED  
JAN 20 1947

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DIVISION  
JAN 17 1947  
DEPARTMENT

DIVISION OF JAPAN  
JAN 16 1947  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) 71-1647

SECRET FILE

740.00119 Control 8/1-16



CONFIDENTIALENCLOSURE

*Request for*  
CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED  
POWERS RELATIVE TO IMPERIAL HOUSE ECONOMY LAW:  
ASSIGNMENT OF STATE PROPERTIES

The Far Eastern Commission requests the Chairman to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection with the following:

The Commission has studied the reply of the Supreme Commander to the informal inquiry on the subject of Article 1 of the Imperial House Economy Law (FEC-101/3)--the assignment of state properties--but considers that it has inadequate information on which to judge the merits of the law. The Commission wishes to be able to assure itself that no sums or properties which were within the direct or indirect control of the Imperial House, the Imperial Household, or any member of the Imperial Family or his or her nominee, have been placed beyond the effective control of the Diet.

For this purpose the Commission desires to have a detailed and complete schedule of all properties and possessions (except purely personal items of comparatively small value or objets d'art) of the Imperial House, the Imperial Household, and all members of the Imperial Family and their nominees, as at the moment of surrender, showing against each item the manner in which it has been disposed of.

FEC-104







CONFIDENTIAL

E N C L O S U R E

REQUEST FOR CONSULTATION WITH THE SUPREME COMMANDER  
FOR THE ALLIED POWERS RELATIVE TO IMPERIAL HOUSE  
ECONOMY LAW: ASSIGNMENT OF STATE PROPERTIES

The Far Eastern Commission requests the Chairman Pro Tempore to consult with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in connection with the following:

The Commission has studied the reply of the Supreme Commander to the informal inquiry on the subject of Article 1 of the Imperial House Economy Law (FEC-101/3)-- the assignment of state properties-- but considers that it has inadequate information on which to judge the merits of the law. The Commission wishes to be able to assure itself that no sums or properties which were within the direct or indirect control of the Imperial House, the Imperial Household, or any member of the Imperial Family of his or her nominee, have been placed beyond the effective control of the Diet.

For this purpose the Commission desires to have a detailed and complete schedule of all properties and possessions (except purely personal items of comparatively small value or objets d'art) of the Imperial House, the Imperial Household, and all members of the Imperial Family and their nominees, as at the moment of surrender, showing against each item the manner in which it has been disposed of.

FEC-104



JAN 16 1947

740.00119 CONTROL (JAPAN) / 1-1647

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY GENERAL,  
FAR EASTERN COMMISSION

TR  
894.044  
894.50

In answer to an inquiry of the United States Government regarding the Imperial House Law and the Imperial House Economy Law, the enclosed message, dated January 11, 1947, was received from the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

It is requested that the Secretary General, Far Eastern Commission, make this message available to the members of Committee No. 3 for their information.

*C. A. Cross*

J. H. Hildring  
Assistant Secretary

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Enclosure:

Message from SCAP,  
January 11, 1947.

A true copy of the original copy

JAN 16 47 P.M.

JA: ALDunning/sg  
1/16/47

*yes*  
FE

CS/G

740.00119 Control (Japan)



## E N C L O S U R E

Reference your requests concerning Imperial House Law and Imperial House Economy Law.

I. Imperial House Law

1. Text is correct "eldest grandson of emperor".
2. Imperial House Office is an agency to be established by law in the cabinet under Prime Minister to administer imperial house use property staffed by regular civil service personnel. Details of appointment not yet worked out.
3. The members of the imperial family elect two of their members to sit in the council; the justices (other than the chief) elect their representative.
4. Article 37 does not refer to any specific existing laws but provides that council will exercise such functions as may be delegated by law in the future.
5. The Japanese word Fusoku could be translated provision as well as rule.

II. Imperial House Economy Law

1. Law refers to movable as well as immovable property.
2. Article refers to state property assigned for use of throne and emperor and his family serving in their public capacities. As such it will not be income producing property and being state property will not be taxable.
3. Authority to assign property is vested in the Diet. Only such non income producing property, that is palaces and adjacent grounds, as is essential to maintain throne will be assigned. Income producing properties of present imperial household will be turned over to appropriate economic ministries for control and administration for the state. Total estimated value of all properties of the Imperial Household Ministry as of 1st September 1945 is 1,800,000,000 yen. The personal fortune left to the emperor will be little other than his personal effects and certain objects of art. The empress dowager and the crown prince have about 2,500,000 yen saved out of their portion of the privy purse during recent years. Present actual ratio of dollar to yen is approximately 100 to 1.

Japanese text is controlling text and any obscurities in English text should be clarified by reference to Japanese text.





UNITED STATES POLITICAL ADVISER FOR JAPAN

DIVISION OF FR

1947 JAN 30 PM 2 26

Tokyo, January 17, 1947

UNRESTRICTED

No. 816 MAIL ROOM  
DIVISION OF OCCUPIED AREAS  
ECONOMIC AFFAIRS  
MAR 25 1948  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF JAPANESE AFFAIRS  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

LEGAL ADVISER  
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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SUBJECT: Transmission of Imperial Ordinances on the Purge of Undesirable Japanese Personnel

MAR 30 1948

VR  
894.044

The United States Political Adviser has the honor to  
1/ 2/ transmit one copy of the Japanese text and three copies of the English translation of four Imperial Ordinances and  
3/ one Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance, promulgated on January 4, 1947, which contain instructions and regulations regarding the purge of undesirable Japanese personnel.

740.00115 CONTROL

Enclosures:

- 1/ Japanese text, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947; Imperial Ordinance No. 2 of 1947; Imperial Ordinance No. 3 of 1947; Imperial Ordinance No. 4 of 1947.
- 2/ English translation of same (in triplicate)
- 3/ Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No. 1 of 1947.

Original and Hectograph to Department

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
RECEIVED  
MAR 18 1947

JAPAN) / 1-1747

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION  
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1948/1-17



Copies of enclosures  
1, 2, & 3 retained in DRF  
Japan - Political

an 17, 1947, from  
kyo, subject: "Transmission  
desirable Japanese

1947

47

public service of undesir-  
m of the Supreme Commander

for the Allied Powers dated 4 January 1946 on the removal and exclu-  
sion of undesirable personnel from public office (including extensions  
of scope and criteria of screening as supplemented thereafter in the  
form of additional interpretations of the Memorandum: called the Memo-  
randum hereafter) shall be dealt with in accordance with the provi-  
sions of this Ordinance.

Article II. The term "public service" as used in this Ordinance  
shall mean and include positions of members of Imperial Diet, person-  
nel of the national government entity, assembly members and personnel  
of the local public organizations (including To, Do, Fu, Ken, Shi,  
Ku, Machi, Mura and Cho-Son Kumiai), and positions of specific per-  
sonnel of specific companies, associations, mass communication media  
and other organizations, and shall be classified into the principal  
public office and the ordinary public office.

The "principal public office" and the "ordinary public office"  
shall be defined by the Prime Minister.

Article III. Any person who falls under the provisions of Ap-  
pendix "A" to the Memorandum, in case he holds any principal public  
office, shall and, in case he holds any ordinary public office, may  
be removed therefrom.

Any person, holding any position in the public service, who has  
been designated as falling under the provisions of the Memorandum  
(called the person who falls under the Memorandum hereafter) shall,  
in case he does not retire from the position within twenty days from  
the day of the designation or the day of designation of positions as  
the public service, forfeit, regardless of the provisions of other  
laws and ordinances,

his



Encls. No. 2 and 3 to Despatch No. 816, Jan 17, 1947, from the U. S. Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo, subject: "Transmission of Imperial Ordinances on the Purge of Undesirable Japanese Personnel"

IMPERIAL ORDINANCE No. 1 of 1947

Promulgated on 4 January 1947

Article I. Removal and exclusion from public service of undesirable personnel in pursuance of the Memorandum of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers dated 4 January 1946 on the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office (including extensions of scope and criteria of screenings as supplemented thereafter in the form of additional interpretations of the Memorandum: called the Memorandum hereafter) shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of this Ordinance.

Article II. The term "public service" as used in this Ordinance shall mean and include positions of members of Imperial Diet, personnel of the national government entity, assembly members and personnel of the local public organizations (including To, Do, Fu, Ken, Shi, Ku, Machi, Mura and Cho-Son Kumiai), and positions of specific personnel of specific companies, associations, mass communication media and other organizations, and shall be classified into the principal public office and the ordinary public office.

The "principal public office" and the "ordinary public office" shall be defined by the Prime Minister.

Article III. Any person who falls under the provisions of Appendix "A" to the Memorandum, in case he holds any principal public office, shall and, in case he holds any ordinary public office, may be removed therefrom.

Any person, holding any position in the public service, who has been designated as falling under the provisions of the Memorandum (called the person who falls under the Memorandum hereafter) shall, in case he does not retire from the position within twenty days from the day of the designation or the day of designation of positions as the public service, forfeit, regardless of the provisions of other laws and ordinances,

his



his position automatically on the twenty-first day from the said day. However, the Prime Minister or the prefectural governor (including governors of To Do, Fu and Ken; ditto hereafter), in case he deems it specifically necessary, may approve the person to stay at his position till the thirtieth day from the said day.

Any person who falls under the Memorandum shall be excluded thereafter from any position in the public service. ✓

When it is impossible to obtain a suitable replacement, person who falls under the Memorandum may, in spite of <sup>the</sup> provisions of the preceding three paragraphs, be temporarily retained or reinstated in the principal or ordinary public office in accordance with the rule laid down by the Prime Minister.

Any person falling under the Memorandum whose temporary retention or reinstatement has been approved under the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall be defined, for the term of his approved retention or reinstatement and in connection with his approved position, not to be a person who falls under the Memorandum.

Article IV. The designation of a person as a person who falls under the Memorandum shall be effected, according to classification of public offices laid down by the Prime Minister, by the Prime Minister or by the prefectural governor in accordance with the result of examination by the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee.

Article V. Any person who receives at present or who is entitled to receive any public or private pensions, annuities or other emoluments or benefits, in case he is designated as a person who falls under the Memorandum and accordingly retires from or forfeits his position, shall be deprived of such right or title since the date of the designation.

With reference to the person provided in the preceding paragraph the Prime Minister, when he deems it justified owing to special circumstances, may exempt the application of the provisions of the preceding



preceding paragraph in accordance with a rule to be laid down by the Prime Minister.

Article VI. Any person who falls under the Memorandum shall be disqualified from filing his candidacy for any elective position in the public service.

Any candidate for any elective position in the public service, when designated under the provisions of Article IV, shall be deemed to have withdrawn his candidacy.

Article VII. In connection with designation provided in Article IV, the Prime Minister or the prefectural governor, shall collect the questionnaire prescribed by the Prime Minister.

The questionnaire collected under the preceding paragraph shall be forwarded immediately to the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee concerned.

The Prime Minister or the prefectural governor, at the request of the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee concerned, may cause persons who are concerned to present materials or to give explanations of facts to the Committee.

Article VIII. The prefectural governor, in compiling the list of coopting persons under Article 39 of the Rules for Cooptation of the High Tax Payer members of the House of Peers, shall cause would-be coopting person to present a duplicate of certificate of eligibility to certify that he is not a person who falls under the Memorandum.

The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply correspondingly to the election of the count, viscount and baron members of the House of Peers and of Imperial Academy members of the House of Peers. In that case, however, the "prefectural governor" shall, when pertaining to the count, viscount and baron members of the House of Peers, read "President of Peerage Bureau" and, when pertaining to

the



the Imperial Academy members of the House of Peers, read "President of the Imperial Academy".

When a notification of candidacy or a notification of recommendation for a candidate is required for running for election<sup>posi-</sup> for elective<sup>tion</sup> in the public service, any person who desires to file the notification or the notification of recommendation shall present, attached thereto, to the presiding officer of election or an official corresponding to the above a duplicate of certificate of eligibility to certify that the candidate is not a person who falls under the Memorandum.

The certificate of eligibility prescribed in the preceding three paragraphs shall be issued, in accordance with the rule laid down by the Prime Minister, by the Prime Minister or by the prefectural governor according to the result of examination conducted by the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee on the questionnaire submitted by the person in question.

Article IX. The Prime Minister or the prefectural governor, when he designates a person as falling under the Memorandum or issues the certificate of eligibility in accordance with result of the examination conducted by the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee shall publish it immediately.

Article X. Any person who is a relative within the third degree by blood, marriage or adoption of any person<sup>who</sup> falls under the Memorandum shall be ineligible, for a period of ten years from the day of the designation, to succeed or to be appointed to any position or positions in the public service from which the latter has been removed as falling under the Memorandum (including position in connection with which a person be designated as falling under the Memorandum after his retirement therefrom and any principal public office from which the latter has been barred specifically) and, further, to exercise any of the power of the latter.

However



However the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applied to any elective position in the public service.

Article XI. Any person in the public service shall neither establish nor maintain, in connection with his handling of official affairs or political activities, the continuity of influence of a person falling under the Memorandum on behalf of the latter by receiving instruction, advice or compensation from or communicating in any means with the latter.

Any person in the public service, when prosecuted pertaining to violation of the provisions of the preceding paragraph, shall not, regardless of the provisions of other laws and ordinances, carry out his official activities. In that case, when he holds position regarding which "temporary retirement or suspension from the office" is provided by law or ordinance, he shall be defined to have temporarily retired or to have been suspended from his office at the date of the prosecution.

Article XII. Any person falling under the Memorandum shall not cause a person in the public service, in connection with handling of official affairs or political activities of the latter, to establish or maintain, on behalf of him, the continuity of his influence by giving instruction, advice or compensation to or by communicating in any means with the latter.

Article XIII. Any person who has been removed from the public service as falling under the Memorandum shall neither make entry into nor retain or set up his dwelling or office in the place of business of government entity, company or other organization from which he was removed or the place in the same premises which is under management of such organization. However the provisions above shall not be applied to such entry as may be necessitated by his conduct of his private life or as to be established legally.

Article XIV



Article XIV. Any person who falls under the Memorandum who holds any position in an executive, staff or other capacity, in addition to those designated as public office, in any newspaper company, magazine or other publishing company, broadcasting corporation, company producing motion picture or in any other media of mass communication shall retire therefrom without delay.

Any person who falls under the Memorandum shall be excluded from any position prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

Article XV. Any person who comes under any one of headings below shall be liable to penal servitude or imprisonment for not exceeding three years or to a fine of not exceeding 15,000 yen.

(1) Any person who has made false entries or entries lacking full and complete disclosure on relevant or material matters in the questionnaire prescribed in Article VII, paragraph 1.

(2) Any person who has been asked for presentation of the questionnaire prescribed in Article VII, paragraph 1, but failed to do so.

(3) Any person who has been asked for presentation of materials or explanation of facts under the provisions of Article VII, paragraph 3, but failed to do so or presented false materials or explanations, or materials or explanations lacking full and complete disclosure on relevant or material matters.

(4) Any person who has committed wrongful act in connection with presentation of duplicate of the certificate of eligibility under the provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article VIII.

(5) Any person who has made false entries or entries lacking full and complete disclosure in a report to be submitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in pursuance of the provisions of the Memorandum.

(6) Any person who has violated the provisions of Article XI, paragraph 1, Article XII, XIII or the preceding Article.

Any



Any person who has been sentenced to penalties provided in the preceding paragraph who does not fall under the Memorandum shall be removed, in addition to cases provided in other laws or ordinances, from any position in the public service which he occupies and be excluded thereafter from any position in the public service.

Any person coming under the preceding paragraph shall be ineligible for any elective position in the public service. Concerning a person who has filed his candidacy already <sup>he</sup> shall be defined <sup>to</sup> have withdrawn his candidacy.

#### Supplementary Rule

The present Imperial Ordinance shall come into force as from the day of its promulgation.

The provisions of Article V shall be applied correspondingly to any person, while having retired during the time between 4 January 1946 and the promulgation of this Imperial Ordinance from public positions which come under the provisions of former Articles I and IV and which correspond to any of the public offices prescribed in this revised provisions, who will be designated hereafter as falling under the Memorandum regarding positions from which he has retired.

Any person who retires from any public office after the day of the promulgation of this Imperial Ordinance, in case he is designated, regarding the position from which he retires, as a person falling under the Memorandum, shall be defined, in connection with application of the provisions of Article V, as a person who has been removed from public office as falling under the Memorandum.

With reference to election to be held under <sup>the</sup> Imperial Order issued prior to the promulgation of this Imperial Ordinance, in accordance with Article 39, paragraph 1 of the Rule for Cooptation of High Tax Payer member of the House of Peers, the former provisions

concerned



concerned shall be applied in spite of revised provisions of Article VIII.

The provisions of Article VIII, paragraphs 3 and 4 shall not be applied ~~to~~ election of members of City, Town or Village Land Committee (including those corresponding to the above) and ~~to~~ co-optation of members of the Prefectural Land Committee to be held in pursuance of paragraph 2 of the Supplementary Rule of the Imperial Ordinance No. 556 of 1946.



## IMPERIAL ORDINANCE No. 2 of 1947

Promulgated on 4 January 1947

Article I. With a view to conducting examination concerning matters necessary for designation as a person who falls under the Memorandum in accordance with the provisions of the Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (called the Ordinance hereafter) and other matters prescribed in this Imperial Ordinance, there shall be established the Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee.

The Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee shall be the Central Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee (called the Central Committee hereafter), the To, Do, Fu or Ken Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee (called the Prefectural Committee hereafter) and the Municipal Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee (called the Municipal Committee hereafter). The Central Committee shall be established in Tokyo, the Prefectural Committee in each To, Do, Fu or Ken, and the Municipal Committee in each city with a population exceeding 50,000 and other cities as may be designated by the Prime Minister.

The Central Committee shall be under jurisdiction of the Prime Minister and the Prefectural and the Municipal Committee under the prefectural governor.

Article II. The Public Office Qualifications Examination Committee shall conduct examinations concerning the following matters, in the case of the Central Committee, regarding persons to be designated by the Prime Minister under the provisions of Article IV of the Ordinance; in the case of the Prefectural Committee, regarding persons to be designated by the prefectural governor under the said Article excluding those under the screening jurisdiction of the Municipal Committee and, in the case of the Municipal Committee, regarding personnel in the public service of the city where

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