

R E S T R I C T E D

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(Pacific)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO: (NET-ASSIGNED) ⁶⁰³ PLACE: TOKYO
(Japanese Intell No. 43) DATE: 28 Nov.45

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2,
USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence for Attack on Pearl Harbor.

Person Interrogated and Background:

FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Capt. IJN.

Captain M. FUCHIDA, IJN, graduated from the Naval Academy in 1924. He became a flier in 1927, training at KASUMIGAURA. He entered the Naval War College in 1935 graduating in 1937. Then in September he became HIKOTAICHO aboard the RYUJO. In October 1938 he became Staff Officer at SASEHO. In November 1939 he boarded the AKAGI as HIKOTAICHO. In October 1940 he became Staff Air Officer of the 3rd Carrier Division. In August 1941 he boarded the AKAGI again as HIKOTAICHO. In November 1941 he was promoted to Commander. (The AKAGI participated in a number of raids--Pearl Harbor, Rabaul, Port Dawson, Ceylon, Midway, etc.) At the time of the battle of MIDWAY he was aboard but was operated on for appendicitis and so was hospitalized til October when he went to the YOKOSUKA Air Group as instructor in tactics. In December 1942 he was given additional duty as instructor in tactics at the Army and Navy War Colleges. In June 1943 he became the Senior Staff Officer of the 1st Air Fleet. In April 1944 he became, with the advent of Admiral TOYODA as CINC Combined Fleet, the Combined Fleet Air Officer. In October 1944 he was promoted to Captain.

Captain FUCHIDA has had 3000 flying hours as pilot and observer.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogators: Lt. Comdr. William H. Botzer USNR
Lt. Comdr. F. Shackelford USNR

Interpreter: Lt. Otis Cary USNR

Allied Officers Present: None.

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SUMMARY

Captain Mitsuo FUCHIDA, IJN, a pilot with 3000 hours, led the attack on Pearl Harbor as Air Group Commander of the Group based on the AKAGI and claims for himself a direct 800 kilogram hit on one of the battleships. He was in one of the 50 torpedo planes that bombed from about 10,000 feet in the first wave which was comprised, in all, 190 aircraft. In the second waves there were 170 planes.

The pilots were first briefed at Etorofu Island, Tankan Bay on 23 November 1941 (Tokyo time) and on this date were given one map of the Hawaiian Islands and another of Oahu. It was then estimated that the target would include 4 CV, 8BB, and 17-18 cruisers, and the exact location of this shipping was indicated. This briefing was handled by Lt. Comdr. KANAMOTO, a former assistant Naval Attache in Washington, who was sent specially for the purpose by the Naval General Staff and who, Captain FUCHIDA thinks, had just come back from Hawaii enroute from Washington to Tokyo.

On 3 December (Tokyo time) the pilots were told that the attack on Pearl Harbor was definite and that it would be launched on 8 December (Tokyo time). A day later warship figures were changed from 8 BB to 7, from 4CV to 1 and from 17-18 cruisers to 10. Again on 7 December the figures were revised--no change in BB's, from 1 CV to 0, from 10 cruisers to 7. Two hours before takeoff the pilots were given last minute information and on mimeograph sheets the warships around Ford Island and in the Navy Yard were identified by position and, for the most part, by name.

The Pearl Harbor mission as outlined on 23 November was to incapacitate for six months the U.S. Fleet by sinking or seriously damaging 4 BB and 4 CV. After the attack it was estimated that 3BB (including the Utah) were sunk, 2 more greatly damaged and 3 moderately damaged. Also reported were 2 cruisers, 3DD, and 2 transports damaged and 250 planes destroyed.

Captain FUCHIDA was operated on for appendicitis the day his carrier (AKAGI) sailed for the Battle of Midway, but he did attend the briefing on Midway before his task forces sortied. The staff intelligence officer, the staff communications officer and an air officer handled the briefing, outlining the plan for neutralizing the Midway Airfield and occupying the Island. It was estimated that they would be attacked by 100 multi-engine bombers and 200 fighters, with no U.S. task force opposition expected until the 3rd or 4th day after Midway was hit. Still in bed recuperating during the Battle, Captain FUCHIDA disclaimed knowledge of any of the details except that his carrier was hit with all planes aboard after the first wave had returned for refueling.

In comparing the administrative and intelligence work of HIKOSHI (pilots who are regular officers) with YOMUSHI (reserve officers), Captain FUCHIDA expressed the opinion that the former were more competent and handled a number of duties as contrasted to the YOMUSHI who usually were limited to handling a single problem.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN)

Q. We are interested in obtaining certain information for historical study purposes, especially concerning operational intelligence and information. To begin, will you tell us briefly about your navy career and background, commands you have held, numbers of hours you have flown, etc.?

A. (Answer under background on first page and number of hours flown 3000 (as pilot and observer).

Q. I understand you were the lead pilot in the Attack on Pearl Harbor. In what other battles or strikes did you take part?

A. Rabual, Port Darwin, Ceylon, Columbo, Trincomalee. I then came back to Japan after which I was at Midway.

Q. In which carrier were you on, on the Pearl Harbor Attack?

A. AKAGI.

Q. I know that you have been interrogated before. I would like you to check and confirm some of the information as shown here.

Q. How many aircraft used in the attack?

A. A total of 350.

Q. What types were employed?

A. In the first wave: 50 High Level Kates
40 UTB Kates
50 Dive Bombers Vals
50 VF Zekes

In the second wave: 50 High Level Kates
80 Dive Bombers Vals
40 VF Zekes

Q. How many aircraft were lost?

A. 29 in all. (9 VF in the first wave and 15 dive bombers and 5 VTB in the second wave.

Q. Which units of the fleet participated in the Pearl Harbor Attack?

A. BBs HIYE, KIRISHIMA
CVs AGAGI, KAGA, SORYU, SHOKAKU, HIRYU, ZUIKAKU
CAs TONE CHIKUMA.
CL NAGARA.
DDs 20 (Large Type)

Q. How many aircraft were employed as CAP over the Task Force?

A. 50 VF from CVs plus 12 float planes from the BBs, CAs and CL.

(NOTE-The rest of the questions on this recheck are on next page.)

Q. Were they in addition to the 350 planes used in the actual attack at Pearl Harbor?

A. Yes.

Q. How many were on station at a time of the CAP?

A. About 1/3 of the 50 aircraft were airborne at a time.

Q. Any losses from CAP, either VF or float planes?

A. None.

Q. Any additional planes employed as ASP?

A. None, VF served as ASP as well as CAP.

Q. How many pilots were lost in the attack?

A. A total of 29---none were recovered from the 29 aircraft that failed to return.

(NOTE--The following questions were asked directly to Captain FUCHIDA.)

Q. In what type of plane did you fly at Pearl Harbor?

A. In a type 97 Torpedo plane (Kate).

Q. You were the lead plane in the attack?

A. Yes.

Q. Are these figures correct on the planes that took part in the attack? Are there any others not included?

A. Three groups of 18 planes each, 54 in all, flew CAP over the Force. There were 350 planes actually attacking. 50 of these flew CAP over the target at the start and later went in on the attack.

Q. Will you give us a general description of the attack?

A. (See Chart #1 attached)

FIGURES QUOTED:

270 Nautical miles at 0130 Tokyo time.
Spotted OAHU, KAHUKU POINT at 0310
Formation, 50 at high level, 10,000 feet,
fighters all around.
Fighters sent to various points.
Attack at 0330.
Rendezvous at KAENA POINT, 0430.
Back to carriers at 0630 (First Group)
Course of second group shown on chart.
Lost 10 planes in first phase of attack, 19 in Second
Second group left carrier 0215 Tokyo time.
KAHUKU POINT reached at 0400
Rendezvous point KAENA POINT 0530
Back at carrier 0730 - all planes back by 0900.

Q. Did you believe you were sighted (carrier force)?

A. At 0830, after the attack, we believed one of our submarines was spotted by a flying boat. We had a submarine picket line 20 miles below our task force between the force and KAHUKU POINT. One of these subs sighted an enemy flying boat.

Q. Did the submarine break radio silence?

A. "By radio telephone". Yes, he opened up.

Q. Coming back to the activity going on aboard the carrier before you took off this particular morning at this point (indicating in chart a point 230 miles north of KAHUKU POINT) for the attack, of what did your activity enroute consist?

A. No planes were flown at all. There was a little working on instruments (bombardier's).

Q. When did you first learn of the plans to attack Pearl Harbor, and how long did you have to prepare for the attack?

A. On the 23rd of November, all officers to participate in the attack were gathered together aboard the AKAGI, at TANKAN BAY and were told. The preliminary briefing was on the 23rd.

Q. You sortied TANKAN BAY on the 26th of November. While you were enroute to Pearl Harbor, did you study this area in here (indicating Hawaiian Islands in chart), its geography? What other information was given you?

A. We were drilled all day the 23rd on conditions at OAHU. We got three maps; HAWAIIAN ISLANDS, OAHU, PEARL HARBOR.

Q. And what other information was given you?

A. The plans were gone over carefully and in detail. The initial plan was to prevent fighters from getting off the ground. The main function for the second wave was to hit HICKAM FIELD so its heavy planes couldn't get to our task force.

Q. All this information was given to you on the 23rd?

A. Yes.

Q. Who gave you that information?

A. A special man from Naval General Staff did the briefing. He was a Lt. Comdr. who I think just came back from HAWAII by liner. I think he was assistant to the Naval Attache in Washington. His name was KANAMOTO. He has since died, from sickness-not combat.

Q. Had you ever been to HAWAII yourself, before the attack?

A. I was there in 1924 during my midshipman's cruise.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, M. Capt. IJN.)

Q. Do you believe that many of the pilots in the attack had been to HAWAII before?

A. Not one specially as far as I know.

Q. These (referring to maps attached) were given you in the lecture on the 23rd and then on the 26th you sortied TANKAN BAY. While enroute, was any more information given to you concerning the target (Pearl Harbor)?

A. We were given approximate information of what composed the Pacific Fleet based at Pearl Harbor. 8 battleships, 12 heavy cruisers, 5 or 6 light cruisers, 25 destroyers, several submarines, and 4 aircraft carriers, the LEXINGTON, 2 of the ENTERPRISE class, and the SARATOGA. We were informed the SARATOGA was on the west coast but might be back.

The orders were to incapacitate the Pacific Fleet for at least 6 months (orders of the 23rd). That was the objective of the attack. On the 24th and 25th, we held discussions and games on planning the attack. In order to incapacitate the U.S. Pacific Fleet for six months, we figured we would have to sink or seriously damage 4 battle ships and 4 aircraft carriers. We were told that cruisers were in the East Loch. There was room for 12 here. On the 24th and 25th, we discussed in detail how to best run our attack. We were told that there were battleship berthing facilities here (indicating SE side of Ford Island on chart).

Q. Was the date for the attack set on the 23rd?

A. We were told on 3 December that the attack would take place on the morning of 8 December (Tokyo time).

Q. Was there any one officer who gave you all this information, or did many different officers give you this information?

A. All information was given us by Lt. Comdr. KINAMOTO.

Q. When you sortied TANKAN BAY, what other information was given you while you were enroute?

A. On the 3rd, we were told that we would attack on the 8th. On the 4th, we were told that there were 6 battleships, the UTAH, one aircraft carrier, and about 10 cruisers. Four cruisers were in this general area (indicating East Loch), and one aircraft carrier in this general area (indicating NW end FORD), 4 battleships in the battle ship berths (Ford Island), 2 battleships and 4 cruisers in the Navy Yard. For target designation purposes, the southeast side of Ford Island and the Navy Yard were designated Target Area "A". The northwest side of Ford Island and West Loch Area were designated Target Area "B". East Loch, Target Area "C". Middle Loch, Target Area "D". The area to the south and east of Ford Island was designated Target Area "E". On the morning of the 4th, we were told that there was nothing in "E" area. We were also told that there were about 10 mine sweeps in "D" area, cruisers and destroyers in "C" area, the UTAH and one aircraft carrier in "B" area, about

4 battleships on the Ford Island side of "A" area, and 2 battleships and 4 cruisers on the mainland side of "A" area. We were informed they might be lined up double, and after thinking it over we decided that one would be on each side of the berthing facility. When we made the attack, however, we found they were both on one side of the berthing facility tied together. As I recall, this information was said to be about two weeks old at the time it was given to us.

Q. Where did you suppose that information was gotten?

A. The information was so ancient, at the time we thought perhaps it was gotten from somebody who had come from HAWAII, and had passed the word, and that it had been passed to us merely incidentally.

Q. Who gave you that information, the Commanding Officer of the ship or another officer?

A. The captain informed me and I, in turn, informed my men.

Q. What other specific information was given you while you were enroute?

A. At 2330 Tokyo time on the 7th, word came in from Imperial Headquarters through the commanding officer of the ship, that they believed there were no aircraft carriers, no heavy cruisers, 4 "B" class (medium heavy) cruisers, 3 light cruisers (OMAHA Class), 17 destroyers, 2 destroyer tenders, 3 seaplane tenders, 2 tankers, 2 repair ships, 4 submarines, 1 submarine mother ship in Pearl Harbor for the weekend. Cruisers are broken up into "A", "B", and "light cruisers" according to size.

Q. On board your carrier while enroute, had there been daily sessions when you lectured to the pilots?

A. We had a session on the 4th. On the afternoon of the 7th, we had "skull practice".

Q. Approximately how many flying hours did most of those flyers have?

A. An average of 2000 hours, perhaps.

Q. Did you have an intelligence officer or an officer especially charged with information and intelligence to work with you, attached to the group?

A. We had a "HIKOTAISHI", a Lt. (jg) who got together all the intelligence material and distributed it. Information picked up on patrols and information from higher headquarters was disseminated by this officer.

Q. Did the HIKOTAISHI fly?

A. He is a flyer but while doing this type of work he does not fly.

Q. Did he go on the Pearl Harbor Raid?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall exactly what sort of information the pilots took with them in their planes when they went on the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. (Here, 3 sizes of charts were described). Included, in mimeographed charts, were all possibilities for the attack. We marked off specific targets (docks and berthing areas) "A", "B", "C", "D", etc for communications and target designation purposes. Each anchorage was designated.

Q. Did all pilots carry these or only lead pilots?

A. Yes, all pilots carried them. One was also passed out for LAHAINA. We had already written off LAHAINA as a possibility, however, LAHAINA had not been used recently as an anchorage at all for any fleet activities. Two hours before we took off, the last intelligence "rundup" was given us and word was passed that nothing was in LAHAINA. The fleet would be either in Pearl Harbor or to the south of Pearl on hour's plane ride from OAHU. The fleet usually left on Tuesday and came back on Friday, or left on Saturday and came back in time for liberty the next week-end. Every other Sunday was spent ashore.

Q. If you had not found the American Fleet in Pearl Harbor, did you have sufficient gasoline to go one hour out to sea and make the attack there, and then return to your carriers?

A. Yes, we had sufficient gasoline to do that. Four cruiser planes left a half hour before the attacking force, at 1 A.M., to reconnoiter this area to the south. The attack planes were prepared to go as far as 150 miles to the south of Pearl Harbor, in which case our carriers would come in closer. As a protectional measure, the four planes from the cruisers made this preliminary reconnaissance.

Q. Were communications opened up, reporting back to the carrier?

A. They reported directly to me in the air. As a matter of fact, I had actually seen Pearl Harbor before they reported in, however.

Q. Is this the type of information you carried in your planes (indicating Page 18, CINCPAC Weekly Intelligence Bulletin, Volume 1, No. 22, dated 8 December 1944)?

A. Yes, that's it.

Q. Where do you suppose this information was gathered and prepared?

A. At First Air Fleet Headquarters.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, N. Capt. IJN.)

Q. These were mimeographed and handed out to the pilots?

A. Yes.

Q. Will you describe the scene on your carrier just before takeoff. What final instructions were given, who gave them, what time?

A. The Commanding Officer of the carrier simply said, "All right, all the plans are made, let's get going".

Q. Was your plane the first one off the deck?

A. No. The fighters took off first, then the dive bombers, the high level planes, then the torpedo planes. This was our spot on the flight deck. I had the high level group in the first phase attack.

Q. Were there communications with the carrier after you were in the air or did you observe silence on the approach to the target?

A. There were no communications until we saw Pearl Harbor. We were instructed that should it prove necessary there would be communications from the ship to the planes.

Q. What was your first report back to the ship?

A. I handled communications for the entire flight myself. My first communications back to the carrier was at 0333, at which time I reported that the attack was progressing. At 0320 I had ordered all forces to attack. At this point the torpedo bombers, the high level bombers, and some of the other planes pulled away to hit the various targets.

Q. Did you yourself attempt to maintain coordination of the entire attack? Did you direct it after your initial order to attack?

A. I commanded up to here (indicating a point off WAIALAE on the chart) and was in direct charge after that of the 50 plane high level formation. Other formations were under immediate command of other pilots.

Q. Did you find those ships in Pearl Harbor where you expected to find them?

A. By and large, yes. We did not have to change our original plans radically. We expected a lot more anti-aircraft on this side (indicating SE side, Battleship Row) of Ford Island than there was.

Q. What types of bombs were carried in your high level bombers?

A. Armor piercing 800 Kilogram bombs.

Q. Did you take photographs?

A. There were pictures taken by portable camera, none by fixed cameras.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: FUCHIDA, M. IJN, CAPT.)

Q. Did you report the success of the attack while enroute back to the carrier or did you report after you had landed?

A. At about 0350, I reported back to the carrier, just on my 50 plane high level part of the attack. "Attack completed - damage great".

Q. Did you run into much anti-aircraft fire?

A. We got some anti-aircraft about 0333. There was no AA from Barber's Point. As we started to make our run, we got some anti-aircraft from Pearl Harbor. My plane sustained a hit about 4" in diameter. The second plane was hit in the bomb carriage, releasing the bomb prematurely.

Q. Did the ships put up much anti-aircraft fire?

A. The ships were the first to respond.

Q. Which type of ship put up the most accurate fire and in greatest quantity?

A. Cruisers and destroyers. Battleships - not so much.

Q. Did ground anti-aircraft bother you very much?

A. Ground batteries began firing at us on our way back to the carrier, starting about the time the first wave was leaving.

Q. Was there much airborne opposition?

A. About 5 or 6 fighters were in the air but did not bother us much.

Q. What type of planes were those in the air?

A. I was told by some of the fighter pilots after the attacks that they were P-40's.

Q. Were you surprised at the lack of greater opposition?

A. I was surprised by the quick reaction.

Q. Where and when do you think you were first discovered?

A. About the time we reached WAIALEE. It was so overcast that we had to come quite close to KANUKU POINT. I thought we would get some AA fire about the time we got to BARBER'S POINT, but we didn't. After being discovered at WAIALEE, I thought about half our planes would be damaged by the time we were ready to make our runs, but as BARBER'S POINT did not throw up any AA fire, such was not the case.

Q. What was your priority of targets?

A. We figured as follows: We wanted to get 4 battleships and 4 aircraft carriers. We had 50 high level bombers, 40 torpedo planes, 50 dive bombers, plus 50 fighters on the first flight, so we would hit WHEELER FIELD to offset fighter opposition. In the second wave, 80 dive bombers would come in on the carriers, and 50 to HICKAM FIELD to keep "big stuff" (heavy bombers) from getting out to the task force. The reason battleships actually became priority targets was because there were no aircraft carriers. Aircraft carriers had turned into battleships for us as targets because the carriers were not there. The No. 1 priority target originally had been the carriers, to keep their fighters from coming out to attack our task force.

Q. Will you describe the scene back on the carriers after you landed? What was your estimate of damage? Who made the report?

A. I was one of the last to come aboard because I waited around here (indicating rendezvous area off KAENA POINT) to rendezvous with the fighters. By then, the HIKOTAI HI was collecting the information. We collected all information and made reports to the Commanding Officer of the ship.

Q. What was your immediate estimate of the damage?

A. From my observations during the attack, and from the opinions of the pilots, I felt that at least 4 battleships had been either seriously damaged or sunk, at any rate, were out of commission for 6 months. I knew further damage had been done, but this was the report I handed in.

Q. What was the total damage report?

A. The night of the attack, after all reports were in, before developing of photographs, the damage was estimated at 2 battleships and the UTAH definitely sunk; 2 battleships greatly damaged, 3 battleships slightly damaged, 2 cruisers moderately damaged, 3 destroyers greatly damaged, 2 transports greatly damaged, 250 fighters destroyed. After I turned in my report, the first wave prepared to take off again. By that time the reports from the second wave had already come in, then Admiral WAGUMO decided we would not attack a third time.

Q. Do you know when the task force first broke radio silence to report back to Tokyo on the success of the attack?

A. The second day, as soon as we believed ourselves out of range of any attacking possibilities, we communicated the report as given above. 4 or 5 days after the attack, we sent another report which included results as shown by our photographs.

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TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUCHIDA, N. Capt. IJN.)

Q. Did you have many pictures of the strike?

A. We had about 20 pictures.

Q. They confirmed the damage reported in the earlier estimate?

A. About the same, yes.

Q. On what course was the retirement made?

A. We gave MIDWAY a 400 nautical mile berth to the south of our formation.

Q. To what port in Japan did you return ?

A. Through BUNGO CHANNEL to the INLAND SEA.

Q. At what speed was the retirement made after the attack?

A. 24 knots for 24 hours and then 16 knots the rest of the way.

Q. Were you attacked at any time during the retirement?

A. I believe we were attacked by a U.S. submarine, but there was no damage. We had planned to attack MIDWAY on the way back, but because of weather conditions Admiral MAGUMO decided not to.

Q. Were you sighted by any enemy force during the retirement?

A. Only by the submarine.

Q. Did you deliver an attack?

A. Yes, we sent up 8 planes to attack it. I do not know if they sank it. 4 of these planes were from the KAGA, 4 from the AKAGI. Our course fell off to the south after we were sighted by this submarine.

Q. Where did you get those 3 charts that were given you on the 23rd of November?

A. We got two at TANKAN BAY. We kept these two and printed a third, a detailed map of Pearl Harbor which was passed out on the 4th.

Q. Was a revision of this map made on the basis of information received on the last day?

A. We did have some details of Pearl Harbor, of the anchorages there and of LAHAINA. We made up another one on the 4th, including the latest information.

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Q. The one on the 4th was not changed again?

A. The one on the 4th was 2 weeks old at that time and was passed out as background material. The dope 2 hours before the attack (take-off) was passed out and properly considered in a "skull practice" session.

Q. Did Lt. Condr. KANAMOTO, who briefed you, go along on the mission.

A. No, he returned to Tokyo.

Q. From what altitude did the high level bombers drop?

A. At 10,000 feet.

Q. Did your plane drop a bomb?

A. Yes. My bomb hit here, (indicating stern of south western most outboard BB).

Q. Were all of those bombs 800 Kilograms?

A. Yes. We worked in 5-plane formations (U "Shaped, or "Horseshoe Pattern" of bomb drop). We estimated that we would get one direct hit within each 5-plane formation if we bombed at 3,000 meters. We estimated further that within 10 five-plane formations, 5 of the bomb formations would straddle a ship. Within one straddle, one hit would be certain. Within 50 planes, there would be 5 hits.

Q. What bombs did the dive bombers carry?

A. 250 Kilegram bombs.

Q. In the Pearl Harbor Attack, how many aircraft were on the 6 carriers?

A. About 450.

Q. How many of the 450 would you estimate were flyable? (operational).

A. About 10 were out of commission. 40 were "port" planes. Usually later in the war about a third of our planes were inoperative. We took special care, however, with this Pearl Harbor group.

Q. When you attacked PORT DARWIN in May 1942, where were you based at that time?

A. KENDARI in the CELEBES.

Q. How many Japanese planes were lost in that attack?

A. 15.

Q. What damage did you inflict at DARWIN?

A. 7 transports, 3 destroyers, 20 planes.

TRANSCRIPT OF INTERROGATION: (FUJIDA, N. Capt. IJN)

Q. On the subject of Midway, on what carrier were you based in the MIDWAY attack?

A. AKAGI.

Q. Will you tell us about the attack and occupation information you received concerning the MIDWAY plans?

A. I was operated on for appendicitis the day we sailed for MIDWAY and did not participate in that attack.

Q. Before you were operated on, and before the task force sailed, had you received details regarding the MIDWAY attack?

A. Yes, I know of that.

Q. What information did you receive?

A. We were instructed to attack and destroy the air power at Midway and do what we could to damage the airfields. We planned to come up thru the MARSHALLS from the south to take it (transport forces).

Q. In the course of that briefing, did you get detailed maps of a nature similar to those obtained for the Pearl Harbor attack?

A. We received one chart and a mimeographed sheet of instructions which had as much detail as could be gathered in addition to the chart.

Q. Who supplied you with this information? Who briefed you?

A. Staff Communications and Air Intelligence officers.

Q. Do you remember the name of the Staff Intelligence Officer?

A. Lt. Comdr. YOSHIOKA.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. He was down at CLARK FIELD. I do not know if he came through.

Q. Who was the air officer who briefed you?

A. GENDA, Minoru.

Q. Is he still alive?

A. Yes. He is in KYUCHU.

Q. How many days before MIDWAY was your operation?

A. 28 May 1942. I was operated on the night we sortied for MIDWAY.

Q. As you recovered from your operation, did you get any more data regarding the attack?

A. No.

Q. When your ship was sunk were you still in bed?

A. I was transferred, by stretcher, to the NAGARA, a light cruiser.

Q. What opposition did you expect from U.S. Forces in the battle of MIDWAY?

A. We believed you had 100 2-engine and 4-engine planes and 200 fighters (land based). We did not expect to have to deal with your task force until the 3rd or 4th day after we hit MIDWAY.

Q. After you were transferred from the AKAGI did you get any reports of the battle?

A. I was put into the dispensary, and did not get much word of its progress.

Q. Were many planes caught on the deck of your carrier when she was hit?

A. The first wave had gone and were back for refueling. The carrier was hit at that time. Everything was aboard. I heard this later.

Q. We are especially interested in your intelligence officers and their work with operational information. I understand you had intelligence officers only down through the staff and fleet levels. Is that correct?

A. Yes, Nothing below staff officer level.

Q. You have had a great deal of experience with carrier based and land based Naval aircraft. Did you normally have sufficient information on which to base attacks?

A. I was never really satisfied with the information until I was actually over the target. Our attack information was poor as was our reconnaissance.

Q. Generally speaking, did you make much use of photographic reconnaissance?

A. We did not use very much of it.

Q. What in your opinion was the turning point of the war as far as the Japanese Naval Air Forces were concerned.

A. When we lost the initiative in the MARIANAS.

Q. What were your "YOMUSHI"?

A. They were used as administrative personnel. This probably because they were trained too late.

Q. How many were trained?

A. Approximately 4,000.

Q. What was the original plan for training them?

A. To relieve regulars for more important positions.

Q. All of these "YOMUSHI" were reserves?

A. Yes.

Q. How much training did they get?

A. 6 months as YOMUSHI. After that they might be sent to various places for further training or direct to assignments.

Q. Was it planned that they be attached only to the Naval Air Force?

A. No. It was intended they be used within the Navy for general service. On ships too.

Q. What were the "HIKOSHI"?

A. They were not specially trained. They were pilots picked from the squadron or group. They were regulars.

Q. What were their principal duties?

A. To pass on the orders of the commanding officer of the group and to find out the next days program. To help the commanding officer.

Q. How were the duties of the "HIKOSHI" different from those of the "YOMUSHI"?

A. The HIKOSHI were capable, with actual experience, and handled a number of problems. The YOMUSHI handled one problem and were not flyers.

Q. Looking generally at the Naval Air Forces, toward the end of the war, what would you say was the single, most critical item - fuel, pilots, airplanes, engines?

A. Fuel. We had enough for operational purposes but not enough for training purposes.