



**S E C R E T // N O F O R N // 20331029**

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO  
U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA  
APO AE 09360



JTF-GTMO-CDR

29 October 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southern Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,  
Miami, FL 33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo  
Detainee, ISN US9AF-000944DP (S)

### **JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment**

#### **1. (S) Personal Information:**

- JDIMS/NDRC Reference Name: Sharifullah
- Current/True Name and Aliases: Sharifullah, Sharifullah  
Zaheed, Mirza
- Place of Birth: Jalalabad, Afghanistan (AF)
- Date of Birth: 1977
- Citizenship: Afghanistan
- Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9AF-000944DP



**2. (U//FOUO) Health:** Detainee is in good health.

#### **3. (U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:**

**a. (S) Recommendation:** JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Transfer Out of DoD Control (TRO). JTF-GTMO previously recommended detainee for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) on 11 March 2007.

**b. (S//NF) Executive Summary:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would possibly seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO detainee has largely been compliant with the guard force, but has verbally harassed the guard force on at least four occasions with vulgarities and threatened a guard with sexual assault. Detainee has withheld information of intelligence value, possibly indicating his continuing support for extremism. Detainee is*

**CLASSIFIED BY:** MULTIPLE SOURCES  
**REASON:** E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)  
**DECLASSIFY ON:** 20331029

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assessed to be a member of an Anti-Coalition Militia (ACM), with possible ties to the Taliban and al-Qaida. Detainee was involved in ACM operations and possibly received al-Qaida sponsored explosives training in Pakistan (PK). Detainee is associated with extremists that remain active in ACM activities in Afghanistan. JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

- A **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies
- A **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective
- Of **LOW** intelligence value

**c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes:** The following outlines changes to detainee's assessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation.

- Removed reference to detainee's brother Naqibullah being on TSA no-fly list and a possible al-Qaida member; the individual on the no-fly list is assessed to not be detainee's brother
- Based on reevaluation of detainee's information, recommendation was changed from Continued Detention to Transfer Out of DoD Control

#### **4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:**

**The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account. These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliability.**

- a. (S//NF) Prior History:** Detainee's family fled from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the Soviet invasion in 1979, when detainee was approximately three years old.<sup>1</sup> Detainee attended approximately ten years of formal education at a school in Peshawar, PK.<sup>2</sup>
- b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel:** In the summer of 1999, detainee joined Hajji Qadir's anti-Taliban resistance group.<sup>3</sup> After the fall of the Taliban, Qadir became governor of Nangarhar Province, AF. Qadir told his troops that they would become officers in the new Afghan Army if they completed the new government's official military training.<sup>4</sup>
- c. (S//NF) Training and Activities:** In early 2002, detainee received two months of formal military training at the Gund Talimi military school where British, Italian, Turkish,

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<sup>1</sup> 000944 SIR 19-NOV-2004

<sup>2</sup> IIR 6 034 0765 03, 000944 INT 26-FEB-2003

<sup>3</sup> 000944 INT 02-FEB-2003, 000944 MFR 01-APR-2003

<sup>4</sup> 000944 INT 02-FEB-2003, Analyst Note: In March 2002, Hajji Abd al-Qadir Arsala was appointed Governor of Nangarhar Province and a Vice-President in the Afghanistan Transitional Administration (ATA).

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and Nepali soldiers instructed new Afghan Army recruits in weapons and riot control techniques.<sup>5</sup> Upon graduation, detainee was assigned to “D-Company,”<sup>6</sup> a special internal security unit commanded by Major Abd al-Manan.<sup>7</sup> In late spring 2002, detainee was reassigned to protect Hamid Karzai’s presidential palace in Kabul, AF.<sup>8</sup> In mid-December 2002, detainee, disillusioned because he had not been made an officer as promised, decided to desert and requested permission to take some leave as cover.<sup>9</sup> Detainee changed his mind and traveled to Jalalabad, to request assistance from Hajji Qadir in fulfilling Qadir’s promise of making detainee an officer. Hajji Qadir instructed detainee to fill out the appropriate administrative paperwork and wait. Detainee filled out paperwork traveled to Peshawar, to visit his family.<sup>10</sup>

**5. (U) Capture Information:**

**a. (S//NF)** On 28 January 2003, Afghan forces, under the direction of US personnel, raided a military compound in Jalalabad and arrested detainee and Said Amir Jan, aka (Gorzang), ISN US9AF-000945DP (AF-945, transferred).<sup>11</sup> Detainee was in possession of improvised explosive devices (IED) when captured. On 1 February 2003, detainee was transferred to the control of US forces in Bagram, AF.<sup>12</sup>

**b. (S) Property Held:**

- Identification documents
  - Two identification cards
  - One student ID card
  - Two Afghan National Army (ANA) cards
- Purchase receipt for motorcycle
- Various personal items to include photographs, business cards, notebooks, an address book, a pair of pants, and a shirt.

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<sup>5</sup> TD-314/42345-01, 000944 MFR 01-APR-2003, Analyst Note: Gund Talimi is probably the Ghund-e-Markaz Talimi, located just north of Kabul. This location formally trained Arab and Pakistani Taliban volunteers.

<sup>6</sup> 000944 MFR 01-APR-2003, 000944 INT 20-FEB-2003

<sup>7</sup> IIR 6 044 3700 05, IIR 6 800 0030 03

<sup>8</sup> TD-314/33421-02, TD-314/27906-02, Analyst Note: Hamid Karzai is the current President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. During the time period detainee was part of the presidential guard, Karzai was the President of the ATA.

<sup>9</sup> 000944 INT 02-FEB-2003

<sup>10</sup> IIR 6 034 0765 03, 000944 INT 20-FEB-2003

<sup>11</sup> Analyst Note: According to detainee, the compound belonged to General Agha; according to the report of the US unit involved in the raid, the compound belonged to Hajji Zahir

<sup>12</sup> 000944 INT 02-FEB-2003

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c. (S) **Transferred to JTF-GTMO:** 14 February 2003

d. (S//NF) **Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO:** Detainee's file does not indicate why he was sent to JTF-GTMO.

6. (S//NF) **Evaluation of Detainee's Account:** Detainee's account has many inconsistencies, and is often inconsistent with known facts. For example, detainee claims to have left Kabul in December 2002 to see Hajji Qadir in Jalalabad; however, Hajji Qadir was assassinated in Kabul on 6 July 2002. Detainee has omitted details of his recruitment, possible al-Qaida sponsored explosives training in Pakistan, and details surrounding the employment of explosives devices against Coalition interests. It is assessed detainee omitted his brother's involvement in extremist activities and the extent of detainee's relationship with extremist organizations and operatives linked to the explosives operation for which detainee was apprehended.

7. (U) **Detainee Threat:**

a. (S) **Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** risk, as he may pose a threat to the US, its interests, and allies.

b. (S//NF) **Reasons for Transfer out of DoD Control:** *If released without rehabilitation, close supervision, and means to successfully reintegrate into his society as a law-abiding citizen, it is assessed detainee would possibly seek out prior associates and reengage in hostilities and extremist support activities. Since transfer to JTF-GTMO detainee has largely been compliant with the guard force, but has verbally harassed the guard force on at least four occasions with vulgarities and threatened a guard with sexual assault. Detainee has withheld information of intelligence value, possibly indicating his continuing support for extremism.* Detainee is assessed to be an ACM member with demonstrated involvement in ACM operations. Detainee possibly attended al-Qaida sponsored explosives training. Several of detainee's operational and logistic associates, including detainee's brother, remain active in ACM operations.

- (S//NF) Detainee was part of a four-man cell that planned to attack US and Coalition forces and non-government organization (NGO) personnel using IEDs.
  - (S//NF) On 29 January 2003, US Special Forces (USSF) Operations Detachment Alpha (ODA) 2025 and local Afghan police conducted a raid on the compound of General Sayed Agha Saqeb. During the raid ODA forces captured detainee and AF-945, and recovered IEDs intended for operations against US and Coalition forces and NGO personnel in Jalalabad.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> 225CL636, ODA 2025 Screening Report 31 JAN 03, 225CL624

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- (S//NF) During the raid on General Saqeb's compound, the following items were recovered: one 4-liter propane tank bomb, one 6-liter propane tank bomb, two bombs in wooden candy boxes, two bombs in a wax box, one box of igniters and fuses, two Nokia cell phones, one portable cellular base station,<sup>14</sup> one motorcycle, two bicycles, and 15-20 82mm mortar rounds.<sup>15</sup> The two Nokia phones were wired to act as detonators and the base station was wired as a bomb.<sup>16</sup>
- (S//NF) Two of the bombs were to be placed on bikes and the others were to be deployed by motorcycle.<sup>17</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee's pocket litter contained a receipt for a recently purchased motorcycle, possibly intended for use in bombing attacks.)<sup>18</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee and AF-945 admitted they were originally going to place the bombs on the evening of 28 January 2003, but were convinced to wait until the following morning.<sup>19</sup>
- (S//NF) ODA 2025 sources identified the IEDs seized during detainee's capture, as being constructed in Pakistan and scheduled for delivery to Jalalabad on 27 January 2003.<sup>20</sup>
- (S//NF) An Afghan officer stated the explosive devices found at General Sayed Agha Saqeb's compound were brought there by Qari Naqib, detainee's brother.<sup>21</sup>
- (S//NF) ODA 2025 sources identified detainee and AF-945 as having received al-Qaida probable explosives training in Pakistan.<sup>22</sup>
- (S//NF) The cell also had a cache of 170 rockets and 85 anti-tank mines, hidden and ready for use when required.<sup>23</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee's cell was operationally and logistically connected to ACM elements active in operations against Coalition interests.
  - (S//NF) Qari Mohadin, a member of the Taliban Shura, authorized rocket attacks, mining, and IED operations against Coalition forces.<sup>24</sup>
  - (S//NF) Taliban leader Mullah Kabir, aka (Maulawi Kabir), aka (Zubeer Achmad), former Governor of Nangarhar Province and member of the Taliban

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<sup>14</sup> 225CL638

<sup>15</sup> 225CL636

<sup>16</sup> 225CL638

<sup>17</sup> 225CL636, ODA 2025 Screening Report 31 JAN 03

<sup>18</sup> 000944 INT 17-FEB-2003

<sup>19</sup> 225CL638

<sup>20</sup> 225CL624

<sup>21</sup> IIR 6 044 1000 03, Analyst Note: No further information regarding this source.

<sup>22</sup> 225CL638, 225CL624, ODA 2025 Screening Report 31 JAN 03

<sup>23</sup> 225CL624

<sup>24</sup> TD-314/46802-03

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Council of Ministers, had direct involvement in operations designed to disrupt and sabotage voter registration, mining roads, the opium trade, weapon movements, and discussing ACM operations with numerous extremist organizations and personnel.<sup>25</sup>

- (S//NF) After completing their mission, each man was promised a Toyota Corolla and to be taken to Peshawar to join Qari Mohadin, the deputy to Maulawi Kabir.<sup>26</sup>
- (S//NF) Detainee's brother Naqibullah, aka (Qari Naqib), aka (Noorullah), is assessed to be an ACM member and possibly a member of al-Qaida.
  - (S//NF) Detainee and AF-945 identified Naqibullah (detainee's brother) as being present at the compound during the raid, but not apprehended by Afghan forces. (Analyst Note: Naqibullah was an officer in the Afghan militia.)<sup>27</sup>
  - (S//NF) A source identified Qari Naqib as an al-Qaida member with an office adjacent to the Governor's office in Jalalabad.<sup>28</sup>
- (S//NF) On 15 May 2002, fourteen individuals were arrested for possible connections to the firing of two rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the Jalalabad airport and Afghan military forces compound near the airport. Two individuals named Sharifullah and Noorullah were among the individuals detained for questioning about this attack.<sup>29</sup> (Analyst Note: Due to the involvement of detainee and his brother in ACM activities, the area of operations in which they attempted to conduct attacks, and similarities in the names of two of the individuals questioned in the attacks, Sharifullah (possibly detainee) and Noorullah (possibly detainee's brother), further questioning is required of detainee to determine if he was the individual questioned in the operation.)
- (S//NF) Detainee may have knowledge of the assassination of Hajji Qadir.
  - (S//NF) Detainee graduated from military training and was assigned to a security detail attached to Commander Hajji Abdul Qadir's unit in Jalalabad.<sup>30</sup> Hajji Qadir was assassinated on 6 July 2002.<sup>31</sup> (Analyst Note: Detainee may have knowledge of the events of Qadir's assassination since he held a position within Qadir's security detail.)

**c. (S//NF) Detainee's Conduct:** Detainee is assessed to be a **MEDIUM** threat from a detention perspective. His overall behavior has been not-compliant and rarely hostile to the guard force and staff. He currently has 52 reports of disciplinary infraction listed in DIMS with the most recent occurring on 03 July 2008, when he was reported flooding his cell. He has two reports of disciplinary infraction for assault with the most recent occurring on 14

<sup>25</sup> IIR 7 399 1006 04, IIR 6 034 0175 02, IIR 7 901 9889 04, IIR 6 044 2925 04, TD-314/54944-04

<sup>26</sup> 225CL624

<sup>27</sup> 000945 INT 13-MAR-2003, 000944 INT 17-FEB-2003, 000944 INT 20-FEB-2003, 000944 302 27-MAR-2003

<sup>28</sup> IIR 6 044 1000 03

<sup>29</sup> TD-314/21566-02

<sup>30</sup> 000944 INT 02-FEB-2003

<sup>31</sup> TD-314/33421-02, TD-314/27906-02

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October 2005, when he was reportedly threw food and water on guard force. Other incidents for which he has been disciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard instructions and camp rules, inappropriate use of bodily fluids, unauthorized communications, damage to government property, attempted assaults, assaults, provoking words and gestures, and possession of food and non-weapon type contraband. In 2007, he had a total of 16 reports of disciplinary infraction and he has had nine so far in 2008.

**8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:**

**a. (S) Assessment:** Detainee is assessed to be of **LOW** intelligence value. Detainee's most recent interrogation session occurred on 30 September 2008.

**b. (S/NF) Placement and Access:** From 2001-2002, detainee worked as an internal security guard for President Hamid Karzai and the Governor of Nangarhar Province, Hajji Qadir. Detainee had access to internal security details and transportation procedures for high-level officials. Detainee was part of a four-man team designed to employ explosive devices against Coalition interests and had access to operational and logistical plans supporting those operations.

**c. (S/NF) Intelligence Assessment:** It is assessed detainee has been substantially exploited; however, there is information detainee could potentially provide. Detainee may have specific knowledge on internal procedures concerning security of high-level Afghan officials. Detainee probably has information on personnel or tactics focused on breaching that security. Detainee probably has information regarding ACM recruitment operations inside Afghan army and security units. Detainee possibly has specific information relating to al-Qaida explosives training sites, associated curriculum, and instructor personnel. Detainee has specifics on identification and biographical data on Naqibullah, Ajmal, and General Sayed Agha Saqeb. Detainee may have knowledge of the assassination of Hajji Qadir.

**d. (S/NF) Areas of Potential Exploitation:**

- Afghan security procedures
- ACM personnel, logistics, training, and operations
- ACM recruitment within Afghan army units
- Assassination of Hajji Abdul Qadir
- Naqibullah
- Ajmal
- General Sayed Agha Saqeb

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**9. (S) EC Status:** Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 30 December 2004, and he remains an enemy combatant.



D. M. THOMAS, JR  
Rear Admiral, US Navy  
Commanding

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\* Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College October 2001 guide *Intelligence Warning Terminology*.