

See interrogation of Chuokura  
Slides in file 299 serial 45

file #	ser
299	45
260	7
450	5
118	39
319	58 ✓

See Record page 2051  
re Col Chuokura & see if  
same one



IWAKURO, Takao

Request by: Tojo, Hideki

Address: 789 Denenchofu, 2 chome Ohmari-ku, Tokyo

Participated in drafting proposed agreement between America and Japan.

He will testify regarding specific drafts and other matters pertaining to the negotiations between Japan and the United States.



REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH  
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: IWAKURO, Hideo

Address: A resident of Tokyo.

Was formerly in charge of the section in the Military Affairs Bureau under MUTO.

IPS File 319, Serial 58, states Subject accompanied NOMURA to Washington and was selected for the job by the Army.

IPS File 118, Serial 39, states Subject participated in certain conversations for readjustment of American-Japanese relations and that a tentative plan was proposed as a result of these conversations. The same information is also contained in File 59, Serial 128.

File 450, Serial 5, states Subject was sent to Washington in 1941.

File 260, Serial 7, indicates Subject may have information on conversations held in Washington in December 1940.

File 299, Serial 45, is an IPS interrogation concerning Subject's knowledge of Manchukuoan set-up. Also discussed is his knowledge of 2.26 Incident. The interrogation also reveals Subject served in French Indo-China, Burma and Sumatra.

COPIES: 3 File No. \_\_\_\_\_  
1 Mr. Prout



file 319 serial 58 p 6 - interrogation of  
Mito he says referring to negotiations  
with Washington. In December 1941  
said

same serial page 11

"

"

12

File 450 serial 5 - interrogation of  
Chuburo, Hides on May 16, 1946  
Summary thereof

He left Japan March 6, 1941 ~~for~~  
for Washington to assist Ambassador  
Gomura in negotiations between  
Japan & U.S. was sent by War  
Ministry & received instructions before  
he left from ~~War~~ War Ministry - not  
from Gajo's personnel, page 1

Also received instructions from Mito  
prior to leaving he was ~~section head~~  
~~under Gen Mito~~ Chief of military  
Affair section of military affair  
Bureau. (file file 2049 Chuburo)



Prior to leaving Bishop Walsh &  
Father Brent had been in Japan <sup>had talked</sup> with Muto  
with messages from Mrs Frank  
Walker & Pres. Roosevelt. Muto told  
him to see those persons upon  
arrival in U.S. <sup>to find solution</sup> solve  
problem between 2 countries

prior to war between Russia &  
Germany relations between Japan &  
U.S. were not bad. After Japan army  
went into southern China  
"degree of difficulties were increased" P2  
Muto told him to try for a solution  
of China incident & arrange for  
intermediation of U.S. in that respect, P3  
His transfer to U.S. was requested by  
admiral Nomura

He received no direct instructions  
from War Ministry after arrival in  
U.S., indirectly thru Nomura. P4



April 15, 1941 he sent telegrams to  
Chief of Staff (Sugiyama) & War Minister  
to "explain my wishes and  
request to make peaceful solution  
between J & US according to the first  
understanding" P 41

p 5 he discussed the negotiation  
but only in such general terms  
as not to mean anything  
differences adjourned until  
an interpreter could be had.



See file 450 serial 7 for  
statements of Togo re  
relations with the US,  
file 260 serial 7 examined  
no information of value.

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file 299 serial 45'  
interruption of Shoburo  
Hideo on May 29, 1946

Manchurian part consulted  
with Kwantung Army as  
major problem. Repeat  
Nature of problem determined  
what section of army was  
consulted, P D

The relation was similar  
to 2490 present Jap government  
" but actually the Manchurian  
govt people had to consult



Japan citizens who wished to  
be employed by Manchurian  
govt had to have approval  
of Kwantung Army - Manchurian  
Citizens could work where he  
wished. - That was by  
agreement, probably written -  
~~he didn't know~~ - He thinks  
it contained 5 articles  
Thinks it was secret  
agreement p 2 Thinks  
agreement was around  
March 1932. p 2

Does not recall written  
agreement subjugating  
Manchurian govt to Kwantung  
Army but says "it might  
have been actually so but  
not in an written agreement"  
p 4



He was concerned mainly  
with industrial development  
of Manchuria. He took no  
plan with him but worked  
out plans while he was there.  
He had approval of the  
Special Duty Department  
of Kwantung Army. P 4  
Planned expansion of Manchuria  
was already in existence before  
he went there - he was  
only concerned with  
industrial development. P 4  
He received no decisions of  
cabinet while in Manchuria  
except "probably in cases  
where they wanted some  
materials for the department.  
So that extent they had to get the  
sanction of the Japanese Govt" P 4



This plan adopted by his predecessor Major Mori, Takeki big capitalists like Mitsui etc excluded. P 5

Japan Manchuria Joint Economic Committee never functioned P 5

Persons employed by Manchurian Govt had to be approved by Kwantung Army. P 6

Chief of Gen Affairs Bureau in Manchuria was always a Japanese post here of 6 was appointed by Manchurian Govt - was Liaison office between Kwantung Army, Manchurian central Govt & Major local Govt, & various departments of Manchurian Govt. P 6



Chief of General Affairs  
Bureau planned the economy  
of Manchuria. P 7

It also handled personnel matters  
of Manchurian govt. ~~to~~ etc

It was a very powerful  
authority P 8, on the whole  
the Bureau really handled  
the policy of the Government. P 8  
It was really an assistant  
prime minister. Bureau  
controlled the press.

Heads of all sections in Bureau  
were filled by Japanese P 9.

Generally speaking during  
his stay in Manchuria from  
July 1932 to late 1934 govt

of Manchukuo politically  
& economically was controlled  
by Japan P 10



after leaving Manchuria  
1934 he was in charge of a  
Manchurian Bureau in Japan  
the Industry Division of  
Manchurian Bureau in Japan  
a sort of liaison office  
between Manchurian govt  
& Jap govt.

re 2-26 chart



Translated by Ogita,

IWAKURO, Hideo

Personal History

Prefecture - HIROSHIMA Prefecture.

Date of Birth - October 10, 1897

Name - IWAKURO, Hideo

May 30, 1916	Graduated the regular course of the Army Central Preparatory School.	
May 30, 1916	Ordered to become an officer candidate and assigned to the 16 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
June 6, 1916	Entered the 16 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.	
June 6, 1916	Given the rating of superior private, infantry.	16 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Regiment.
Aug. 1, 1916	Promoted to corporal, infantry.	16 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Reg't.



v

Sept. 1, 1916	Promoted to sergeant, infantry.	16 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Reg't.
Dec. 1, 1916	Entered the Military Academy.	
May 27, 1918	Graduated the Military Academy.	
May 30, 1918	Returned to the original unit.	
May 30, 1918	Promoted to sergeant-major, infantry and ordered to become a probationary officer.	16 <sup>th</sup> Inf. Reg't.
Dec. 25, 1918	Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, infantry.	Cabinet.
	Assigned to the 16 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
Feb. 28, 1919	Given the 8 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Nov. 1, 1920	Awarded the 5 <sup>th</sup> Class Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite.	



	Awarded the Imperial Order of the Single-Rays of the Rising Sun.	
Aug. 18, 1921	Relieved of the present post. Attached to the FORMOSA 1st Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
Mar. 6, 1922	Appointed 1st Lieutenant, infantry.	Cabinet.
Mar. 10, 1922	Raised to the 7 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	
Dec. 27, 1923	Ordered to enter the Army General Staff College.	War Ministry.
Apr. 25, 1924	Relieved of the present post. Attached to the 16 <sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry.
Apr. 25, 1927	Raised to the 7 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
July 26, 1927	Appointed Captain, infantry.	Cabinet.
	Relieved of present post. Assigned	War Ministry



as a Company Commander of the 16<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment.

Nov. 29, 1927 Awarded the 5<sup>th</sup> class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.

War Ministry

Mar. 1, 1928 Ordered to serve with the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.

War Ministry

Dec. 12, 1928 Attached to the Army Technical Headquarters and serve concurrently as a member of the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.

War Ministry

May 16, 1932 Raised to the 6<sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Jr. Grade.

July 8, 1932 Ordered to be the executive officer of the Army Munitions Council.

War Ministry

Sept. 1, 1932 Relieved as executive officer of the Army Munitions Council.

War Ministry



Aug. 8, 1932	Assigned as staff officer of the KWANTUNG Army. Not registered in the official gazette.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1933	Appointed Major, infantry	Cabinet
Dec. 13, 1933	Awarded the 4 <sup>th</sup> Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Aug. 1, 1934	Assigned as administrative officer of the Natural Resources Bureau.	Cabinet
Aug. 1, 1934	Assigned as a member of the General Staff HQ, concurrently as a member of the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1934	Relieved as staff officer of the KWANTUNG Army. Not registered in the official gazette.	War Ministry



Dec. 26, 1934	Relieved of the present post and the concurrent post.	War Ministry.
Dec. 26, 1934	Relieved as administrative officer of the Natural Resources Bureau.	Cabinet.
Dec. 26, 1934	Assigned as administrative officer of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet.
Dec. 26, 1934	Ordered to serve concurrently in the Industrial Section and the Administration Section of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet.
Apr. 29, 1934	Awarded the Little Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for service in the Incident of 1931 to 1939.	
May 9, 1935	Ordered detached to KOREA, KWANTUNG Province, MANCHUKUO and the Republic of CHINA.	Cabinet.



Dec. 16, 1935	Granted 510 yen for special efforts shown in his work.	
July 3, 1936	Ordered dispatched to KOREA, KWANTUNG Province, MANCHUKUO, and the Republic of CHINA.	Cabinet.
Aug. 1, 1936	Relieved as administrative officer of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet.
Aug. 1, 1936	Attached to the Army Technical Headquarters and assigned concurrently as a member of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry.	War Ministry.
July 1, 1937	Raised to the 6 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Aug. 2, 1937	Appointed Lt. Colonel, infantry	Cabinet.
Jan. 1, 1937	Ordered to be attached to the	War Ministry



Military Service Bureau of the  
War Ministry and serve con-  
currently.

- Feb. 16, 1939 Ordered to the Preliminary Com-  
mittee of the Ordinary Civil  
Service Limitation Commission. War Ministry,
- Feb. 17, 1939 Assigned as executive officer  
of the Government Investment and  
Property Estimate Commission of  
the North China Development Co.  
Ltd. and the Central China  
Development Co. Ltd. Cabinet,
- March 9, 1939 Appointed Colonel, infantry. Cabinet.
- Mar. 23, 1939 Awarded the 3rd Class Imperial Order  
of the Sacred Treasure.
- Apr. 15, 1939 Assigned as a committee member. Cabinet.



	of the Army Ordnance Council.	
June 12, 1939	Assigned as executive officer of the Government Aircraft Investment Commission.	Cabinet.
Apr. 1, 1939	Raised to the 5 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Jr. Grade	
Feb. 10, 1939	Appointed Chief of Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. Relieved as member of the Investigation Section.	War Ministry.
Feb. 26, 1939	Ordered to be a committee member of the Army Navy Munitions Industry Mobilization Agreement Commission.	War Ministry.
Dec. 28, 1940	Concurrently a member of the Total War Research Institute.	



	Given the 3rd rank of the higher civil service.	Cabinet.
Feb. 25, 1941	Relieved of concurrent position.	Cabinet.
Mar. 18, 1941	Relieved as executive officer of the Government Investment and Property Estimate Commission of the North China Development Co. Ltd and the Central China Development Co. Ltd.	Cabinet.
Apr. 19, 1941	Relieved as a committee-member of the Army Ordnance Council.	Cabinet.
Apr. 29, 1940	Awarded the 4 <sup>th</sup> Class Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite. Awarded the Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun. Both for services in the China Incident.	



Mar. 1, 1943	Appointed Major-general.	Cabinet.
Mar. 15, 1943	Raised to the 5 <sup>th</sup> Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Mar. 7, 1944	Awarded the 2nd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	



REPORT ON : The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai  
(National Policy Research Institute)

PREPARED BY : Lt. Eric W. Fleisher  
Investigator, I.P.S.

DATE : 4 June 1947

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai, a little heard of organization with the outward appearance of a group devoted to the discussion and study of current events has since 1937 played an extremely important part in advising the various departments in regards national policy, the administration of conquered territory and the utilization of the natural resources and materials available in territories already occupied by Japan, and in those that the association considered should be occupied. Its membership consisted mostly of second rate politicians who were devoted to the cause of Japan ruling not only Asia, but of making the Pacific Ocean a "Mare Nostrum" by occupying Alaska and certain countries of South America along the Pacific Coast and thereby spreading Japan's influence into the interior of South America and through the West Coast of the United States. Lacking in power, themselves, the members of the Association sought to influence the greater political figures of the day and to gain the support of those that favored their policy of aggression and conquest, which they did with considerable success. Such men as MOTO, Akira; KAYA, Okinori; SATO, Kenryo; SUZUKI, Teiichi; GOTO, Shigenori; KISHI; TAKAHASHI; GOTO, Fumio; ABE, Nobuyuki; ISOGAYA; SHIMOMURA; HORIUCHI; SAKURAI; KOBAYASHI, Seizo; ARITA, Hachiro; IWAKURO, Tokue; SHIBAYAMA, Kaneshiro; MATSUMURA; ARISUE, Seizo; NAGAI, Yatsuji; SHIGEMITSU, Mamoru; and other influential men were affiliated with the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai and many of them made speeches at the meetings or attended them for the purpose of informing the society of recent developments in the political scene in Japan, in the occupied areas, and abroad.

In spite of the fact that the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai claimed to be a private organization under no outside influence, most of its financial backing came from the secret funds or "Kimitsuhi" of the various ministries and departments of the Government and from the larger private concerns. In the early days these contributions rarely exceeded five thousand yen, but later, especially after the outbreak of the "Greater East Asia War" contributions were rarely less and usually well over five thousand yen. The War Ministry and Navy Ministry were the most regular contributors and gave the greatest amounts, but the Greater East Asia Ministry, the Foreign Ministry, the Cabinet Bureau of Information, and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry also gave their support. Out of the almost one hundred private companies that gave financial backing to the KKK, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Asano, Ayakawa, Sumitomo, Tokyo Shibaura Denki and Osaka Seitetsu are the most well known. Extra amounts were collected from these sources on other occasions for special projects. In the end of 1941, or the beginning of 1942, the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai began research on their "Ten Year Plan for the Development of Greater East Asia."



For this project Muto, Akira of the Military Affairs Bureau gave the KKK 20,000 yen out of secret funds, and the same amount was received from Oka, Keijun of the Navy. The Foreign Office and the Cabinet Bureau of Information contributed 20,000 yen but this time only 5,000 yen was received from the Greater East Asia Ministry. From private companies 200,000 yen was collected.

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai, although not organized into definite sections for the study of various areas, did have specialists in each field and committees were formed whenever a project was undertaken, headed by these specialists. For example, specialists studying relations with the United States were Ishida, Reisuke (Mitsui Bussan); Tojima (Mitsui Bussan); Isogaye, Reisuke; and Sato, Naotake; while Okura, Kinmochi; and Kuroda, Kakuchi were the outstanding specialists on Russia.

The sources of information available to the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai were so extensive that no civilian, none government organization could ever have come near it. Much of this information was gathered from prominent members and their more influential friends, but documents too, from government ministries were in the possession of the society. Through Muto, Akira; Yatsugi, Kazuo of the KKK, was able to acquire and retain in his possession many documents of the Military Affairs Bureau, classified as "Top Secret." Yatsugi obtained documents through Muto as Muto was a good personal friend of his, but information was procured from other government ministries and from other high officials. This information was used in drawing up the various plans put out by the KKK.

In regards the United States a committee was formed in 1939 and functioned through 1941 studying U.S.-Japanese relations and conditions in the United States. The KKK published a full report in 1940 on its findings. So thorough was the knowledge of this committee that it was even familiar with the fortification of the Mandated Islands, something that was known only to a circle of the top ranking military and naval men. The material and statistics published by other societies, such as the Showa Kenkyu Kai and the Towa Kenkyu Kai was available to the KKK. An organization known as the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu (Investigation and Research Mobilization Headquarters) acted as liaison between the many associations. Okura, Kinmochi; senior member of the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai was president of the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu and Kanamori, Tokujiro, Chief of the Political Section of the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai was one of the Directors of the Chosa Kenkyu Doin Honbu.

By the end of 1941 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had worked on plans to utilize the facilities of the South Seas, Eastern Russia, Alaska, Canada, Central America, South America and India. Many members, influential sponsors, and associates thought that the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had gone too far. Even Muto was opposed to including India although he approved of evicting the British from Asia. Regardless, the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had gone ahead with these plans, some of which were later adopted in a modified form, to suit the Army, and the entire area was called the "East Asia Sphere."



In the spring of 1942 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai began research on its "Ten Year Plan for the Development of Greater East Asia." There were approximately ten different sections covering an extremely wide scope doing research on this subject. Yatsugi, Kazuo (IPS witness) was the administrative head of the project, and was responsible for financing it. Takahashi, Kamegichi was the chief investigator and Kanamori, Tokujiro was in charge of the Political Section. At first the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai received much support from the different ministries and from high officials in the Government, but as the future of the "Greater East Asia Sphere" became more and more uncertain this support decreased. The plan was finally completed and a final report published, but it was never adopted, for by this time the tide of battle had turned against Japan and she had her hands full just trying to hang on to what territory she had. With this change in the fortunes of war the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai became less and less active. Government circles became more reluctant to give out information and documents were not easily obtained. Government agencies were no longer receptive to advice or plans for the future as they had their hands full with the War and its outcome. Although by 1944 the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai had lost its influence and had become almost inactive, it nevertheless carried on its meetings and still remained well informed in almost every field. Prominent members of the KKK were familiar even with secrets such as the profits from the opium trade. Satomi, head of the hong at Shanghai, sent the profits to Suzuki, Teichi who placed them in Tojo's secret fund.

The Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai continued from 1944, when it lost its influence until the end of the War, when it was dissolved, as an organization that was extremely well informed on all matters and could be called on at all times should its need arise.

The foregoing report is based upon the interrogations of Yatsugi, Kazuo and Okura, Kinmochi conducted in June 1946. Okura was again interrogated on 27 May 1947 by this investigator prior to this writing. Documents published by the Kokusaku Kenkyu Kai in the possession of the International Prosecution Section were used as reference and background material in the preparation of this report.

*Eric W. Fleisher*  
 ERIC W. FLEISHER  
 1st Lt. Inf.  
 Investigative Division, IPS.



**IWAKURO, Hideo**

**Request by MUTO, Akira**

a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Tokyo.

b. He was formerly in Charge of a section in the Military  
Affair Bureau under MUTO and can give relevant testimony as to  
MUTO's policies, declarations, utterances and attitude toward  
the initiation of war.

*He was formerly in charge of a  
section in the Military Affair Bureau  
under MUTO and can give relevant  
testimony as to MUTO's policies,  
declarations, utterances and attitude  
toward the initiation of war.*



IWAKURO, Hideo

Request by MOTO, Akira

a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Tokyo.

b. He was formerly in charge of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau under MOTO and can give relevant testimony as to MOTO's policies, declarations, utterances, and attitude toward the initiation of war.



IWAKURO, Takao

19 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae to Mr. Dunigan; to be returned to us.

Lansh has copy CV - 25 Mar 47



IWAKURO, Takao

Request by: Tojo, Hideki

Address: 789 Denenchofu, 2 chome Chumari-ku, Tokyo

Participated in drafting proposed agreement between  
America and Japan.

He will testify regarding specific drafts and other  
matters pertaining to the negotiations between Japan and  
the United States.



(7.0)

I WAKURO, Takao

Request by: Tojo, Hideki

Address: 789 Hanenchofu 2 chome Ohmori-ku,  
Tokyo.

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between America and Japan.

He will testify regarding specific drafts  
and other matters pertaining to the negotiations  
between Japan and the United States.



457 (10/11/41)

IWAKURO, Hideo

Request by: MUTO, Akira

Address: Resident of Tokyo

Formerly in charge of a section in the Military Affairs Bureau under Mito.

*Formerly in charge of a section in the  
military affairs Bureau under Mito.*

77 44



4 st (sent)

I WAKURO, Hideo

Request by: MUTO, Akiro.

address: Resident of Tokyo.

Formerly in charge of a section in the  
Military Affairs Bureau under Muto.



REPORT BY: RICHARD LARSH  
27 Dec 46

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: IWAKURO, Hideo

Address: A resident of Tokyo.

Was formerly in charge of the section in the Military Affairs Bureau under MUTO.

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NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

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MUTO - Defense

IWAKURO - Direct

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MUTO gave assurance there had been no change. The affiant proceeded to Washington and delivered KONOYE's message to Hull about 15 November 1941.

32992 \* Exhibit 3441A, the letter of safe conduct for Bishop Walsh dated 14 October 1941 to all military and civil authorities concerned, stated that Mr. Walsh, who bore the letter, was making the trip to Canton with a special message and any courtesy shown him would be greatly appreciated. It was signed by MUTO.

32992 \* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF IWAKURO, Hideo  
By Mr. Cole

32993 The witness identified and verified exhibit 3442 as his affidavit. \*The affidavit stated that the witness, among other posts, served as chief of the military administration section in February 1939; was appointed colonel in March the same year; and went to Am. as the officer attached to the military affairs bureau to assist Ambassador NOMURA. After returning to Japan in August he served first as regimental commander and then chief of the IWAKURO Organ. \* His tenure in the military administration section was from August 1938 to March 1941. So he had a knowledge of diplomacy since external affairs affecting national defense were studied there.

32994 The army's opinion on foreign policy came from the national defense plan, of which the general staff was in charge. The general staff had the duty of collecting and examining military and diplomatic information and supervised military attaches. Army's opinion on diplomatic policy used to be initiated by the general staff. The military affairs bureau was to report matters transferred from the general staff to the war minister and negotiation with the foreign minister, according to the war minister's intention. When any matter was proposed by the foreign minister to the MAB it, after transferring the matter to the general staff for its opinion, obtained the minister's decision and replied to the foreign office.

Only a few officers therefore served at the military affairs section of the MAB in considering diplomatic affairs affecting international defense.



12 November 1947

MUTO - Defense

IWAKURO - Direct

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32995

\* On 22 January 1947 TANAKA, Ryukichi, testified that the MAB sustained a consistent policy aiming at the conclusion of the tripartite pact and of the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from the time of the ABE cabinet. Regarding the army's attitude toward the pact, it was remarkably different from TANAKA's description and it was groundless to say that the military authorities had established a policy as to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

32996

About the middle of October, 1939, MUTO became director of the MAB. The witness never heard from MUTO of the proposed tripartite alliance. MUTO did give his views frequently about the settlement of the China incident. As he had been on the China front for two years, he was well aware of the difficulty of settling it. He believed it urgent to settle it and they should not only deal direct with Chiang Kai-shek \* instead of taking the attitude of having nothing to do with him, but also make concessions in the terms of negotiations to bring about peace. He further insisted in avoiding a dispute with any third power.

32997

When Germany won a victory over the British in May, 1940, the affiant discussed it with MUTO, who said that generally many people overestimated Germany's strength. The German army, however, would never be able to invade Britain across the Straits of Dover. The English were sure to rally through America's assistance. It was to be anticipated that the war would be protracted.

\* The witness went to America in March, 1941, as an assistant to Ambassador NOMURA. Because NOMURA asked vice war minister ANAMI and chief of the general staff SUGIYAMA to send an assistant, and not on MUTO's recommendation was the witness sent. His main duty was to assist NOMURA at large. Prior to going to America he made arrangements with IKAWA, Tadao, with a view to restoring diplomatic relations promptly with America. They proceeded with private negotiations with Bishop Walsh, Father Drought, and others in America. The witness, accordingly, prepared a program of formalizing the negotiations.

KONOYE also expressed himself in favor of the negotiations. IKAWA and the witness, after going to America, reported this plan to NOMURA, who readily agreed. From then on negotiations were entered into in line with this plan.



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32998 \* On 15 April 1941 the tentative plan "Draft of the Understanding between Japan and America" was unofficially taken up by NOMURA and Hull and was reported to the foreign minister. At that time the witness wired war minister TOJO urging to give his support. MUTO was delighted and sent the witness a telegram of thanks.

In August 1941 the witness was ordered to Japan and after returning home was informed by director of the MAB MUTO that some of the foreign minister staff were criticizing the presence of outsiders in connection with foreign office affairs. Accordingly, war minister TOJO ordered the witness home to get rid of a possible obstacle to further negotiations. The witness reported to top war minister officials and found his efforts were appreciated, and MUTO especially asked him in various ways about the prospects.

32999 \* The witness answered that according to his impression when he talked with Hull and Walker there was a full possibility of bringing the negotiations to a success, MUTO was very delighted.

After the witness left the war ministry, his acquaintances in the MAB and general staff informed him that MUTO had made an effort to the last to conclude the negotiations.

\* CROSS EXAMINATION BY MR. LOPEZ

33000 The witness stated he was attached by the MAB on NOMURA's staff in Washington to represent the army's viewpoint. \* The navy side was fully represented by the navy attache, Captain YOKOYAMA. The witness went to the United States in active military status in uniform and his orders were to assist NOMURA generally. He did not know whether the United States State Department knew him as "Special Military Adviser" to NOMURA, but knew that such United States representatives as Ballantine, Hamilton, and Hull placed great importance in him.

33001 \* The witness was not a spokesman of the government but one of several responsible for the initiation of negotiations. The witness was the actual author of the draft plan for an understanding. When negotiations were brought up to the Hull-NOMURA level, the witness accompanied NOMURA in the negotiations on several occasions, and was given the opportunity to express his opinion freely. He did not know whether at one time NOMURA



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33002 requested undersecretary Wells whether the witness could see Roosevelt personally. However postmaster general Walker had \* said that the witness and IKAWA should meet Roosevelt. He did not know if NOMURA made this request when the witness was about to leave for Japan in July, 1941. The witness stated that he was conscious that he was engaged in a very important work but did not recall expressing the desire to Ballantine that he wanted to see the president.

33003 The views the witness expressed on the issues pending negotiations were in accord with the general army policy, but his own personal views were also included. \* Asked if he was being cued up from Tokyo what to do in Washington, he replied not necessarily on minor matters. He did not receive army directions with respect to any particular matters. He knew that the official government viewpoints were wired by the foreign ministry and in those reports were included the army's views. He did not recall receiving direct instructions from the army and never received any instructions from military affairs bureau chief MUTO.

The witness knew that if reports were sent to the foreign office they would be referred to the army, but he sent no direct report to MUTO.

33004 \* The witness recalled a conference with Hull, WAKASUGI, IKAWA, MATSUDAIRA, Hamilton, and Ballentine, but did not know whether it was on the 4th of June, 1941. This was probably held at the Wardman Park Hotel at 3 p.m. The witness was asked if it was not a fact that at that conference he explained that it was entirely incorrect to assume that the purpose of the understanding was to enable Japan to drift away from the tripartite pact and that if the United States became involved in the European war, and the circumstances called for Japan to act under its interpretation of its obligations, Japan would feel obliged to discharge them, much as she would regret taking up arms against the United States. The witness replied that he thought he explained probably in such a manner.

33005 \* Asked if he was pulled out from Washington after the entry of Japanese troops into FIC in July, 1941, he replied he did not know the reason, but because negotiations became difficult he wired that he would like to report the details. In reply he was called back, but did not know the



Page

33006 the reason. Asked if it was not true that weeks previous of the entry into FIC, United States representatives made representations to him and NOMURA that the United States had received reports of Japanese intention to penetrate FIC, he replied he thought there were representations but he had no clear \* recollection of them. Asked if he and NOMURA were told by Hull and Wells that the move into FIC was a demonstration on Japan's part of lack of sincerity in really entering into peace negotiations, he answered that that may have been so but he had no recollection.

He understood that because of the entry into FIC the United States president issued the freezing order. Negotiations met with more difficulty because of that entry.

33007 \* When shown a document, the witness identified the  
33008 seal on it \* as being top secret. After reading from the  
33009 document, the witness was asked \* if the IWAKURO mentioned  
33010 in it was not himself, and he replied it was. \* The chief of the military affairs bureau hat sent the cable was the accused MUTO.

33011 \* Exhibit 3443, the telegram so sent by MUTO to the witness, IWAKURO, and dated 2 June 1941, stated that according to information reportedly given by Roosevelt, his aim in adopting a new conciliatory policy towards Japan was the transfer of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic Ocean. According to this explanation, the United States seemed possessed of a specially strong wishful thinking that Japan would refuse to perform her duty of attacking the United States under the tripartite alliance even in case of the United States entering into the war.

33012 In his "fireside chats", Roosevelt concluded that the European war had already developed into a world war and openly stated that patrolling by the United States had been greatly strengthened and every possible effort should be made to insure that goods to England left here safely. He expressed praise regarding Chiang Kai-shek for his continued resistance \* against Japan and stated that he was convinced of furtherance of Chiang's resisting power. All the above was against Japan's wishes and this attitude should be carefully watched.

Furthermore, IWAKURO was presumably aware of foreign minister MATSUOKA inquiring of NOMURA regarding the report of Halifax to Eden that Roosevelt insinuated that in regard to the negotiations, different views prevailed within the



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

12 November 1947

MUTO - Defense

IWAKURO - Cross - Redirect

Page 5305

Page Japanese government (which was quite contrary to facts). IWAKURO was to furnish MUTO promptly for his own personal reference his frank opinion on the negotiations, as well as his forecast for the future.

33013

\* REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COLE

Asked if it were strictly correct to say that he was a representative of the MAB, he replied the MAB had no authority to send anyone abroad, and was in no position to send any official representative outside of Japan. In the strict sense the witness was not a representative.



Page

\* DIRECT EXAMINATION OF IWAKURO, Hideo  
By Mr. Brooks

32494 The witness identified and verified exhibit 3387 as  
32503 his affidavit. \*The affidavit stated that he was attached to  
a section of the maintenance bureau in March 1928, and in  
August 1932 was transferred to the staff of the Kwantung Army.  
After two years there he returned and served as a member of  
general staff headquarters and was junior secretary in the  
Manchurian affairs bureau.

32504 On 1 August 1929 KOISO assumed his office as chief  
of the maintenance bureau and the witness served \* as his  
subordinate then and while KOISO was chief of staff of the  
Kwantung Army. As chief of the maintenance bureau from  
August 1929 to August 1930 KOISO was greatly distressed about  
the army's ill equipment and the munition industry, and re-  
peated that it was necessary for Japan to avoid war by all  
means. When KOISO was transferred to the bureau of military  
affairs as its chief in August 1930, he was confronted with  
the dispute with China and the strained situation in connec-  
tion with Manchuria.

32505 When the witness was appointed on the staff of the  
Kwantung Army on 8 August 1932, when he arrived at head-  
quarters in Mukden on 26 August in company with commander  
MUTO and chief of staff KCISO, bandits were actively carry-  
ing out underhanded disturbance movements. \* Night trains  
would often be held up and there were attacks on the aerodrome  
outside the city late in September. In pursuance to com-  
mander MUTO's intention, KOISO as chief of staff directed  
his staff to draft policies for cooperation with Manchukuo.

These provided for the restoration of public peace  
and order: maintenance of transport and communication; and  
development of industry. The association of harmony had been  
organized in Manchukuo which, however, lapsed into a polit-  
ical body of a one party one state character. Pursuant to  
MUTO's instructions, KOISO advised the president of general  
affairs in Manchukuo that there was no objection to main-  
taining the association as a cultural body, but it would be  
inadvisable to encourage its growth as a political party.  
The witness understood that MUTO had also refused the body's  
request that he become an advisor.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
5 November 1947  
Defense - KOISO  
IWAKURO - Direct

Page 5210

Page

32506

\* When shown exhibit 230 the witness stated he had seen the document before in Manchuria in the fall of 1933. Asked if he received any request from any official government department in Tokyo as to the matter contained in the exhibit, he replied he understood the document originated and formulated in Tokyo and was transmitted to the Kwantung Army \* for its opinion. He thought the plan was formulated in general staff headquarters in Tokyo and from their to the war ministry, which forwarded it to the Kwantung army. It could not definitely be known who formulated the plan in Tokyo.

32507

Asked if there was any significance in the fact that the exhibit was dispatched in the name of the chief of staff, he replied the name "KOISO, Kuniaki, Chief of Staff" appearing on the document was only in accordance with regulations governing the handling of documents \* and did not mean the name appearing thereon was responsible for its contents. This was customary procedure.

32508

There was no cross-examination of the witness.



ERRATA SHEET  
MUTO



6 November 1947

~~Def. Doc. 2800 -- Opening Statement~~

~~Page 1 - 8 lines from bottom, "Evidence will be offered," etc., eliminate entire sentence.~~

~~Page 5 - 7 lines from end of first paragraph, "as had been initially planned", will read, "as the result of careful study".~~

Def. Doc. 2589 -- IWAKURO affidavit

Page 2 - paragraph 3, eliminate sub-paragraphs A,B,C,D, and on page 3, sub-paragraph E.

Page 3 - sub-paragraph F, line 6: these two sentences will read, "Regarding the attitude of the Army as to the Tri-Partite Pact, it was remarkably different from the way in which TANAKA described it".



ERRATA SHEET

MUTO

4 Nov. 1947

Def. Doc. 2589, Affidavit of IWAKURO, Hideo: (TAKAO)

Page 1, Para. 1, under "My Career", Line 7, "SHOWA (1939); and went over"  
should read: "SHOWA (1939); was appointed Colonel in March of the same year;  
and went over"

Page 1, under "My Career", Line 17, "in the Military Affairs Section"  
should read: "in the Military Administration Section"

Page 4, Para. 5 A., Line 2, "of SHOWA). It was because" should read:  
"of SHOWA), as an assistant of Ambassador NOMURA. It was because"



*See New Testimony # 3387  
my objections mentioned in full*

(Revised Page 1 of Def. Doc. 2589, please attach)

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

*Object - see 2 belongs to you floor  
as giving army opinion  
see 3 - belongs to floor*

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: IWAKURO, Hideo  
(TAKAO)

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I, IWAKURO, Hideo, live at No. 789, 2-Chome, DENENCHOFU, OTA-WARD, Tokyo Metropolis, and am aged 50.

My Career: I was appointed an infantry sub-lieutenant in December of the 7th year of TAISHO (1918); was appointed a staff officer of the Kwantung Army in July of the 7th year of SHOWA (1932); served at the Army General Staff Office from August of the 11th year of SHOWA (1936); was appointed the Chief of the Military Administration Section of the War Ministry in February of the 14th year of SHOWA (1939); and went over to America as the officer attached to the Military Affairs Bureau to assist Ambassador NOMURA. After returning to Japan in August of the same year, I served as the Commander of an infantry regiment and as the Chief of the IWAKURO Organ successively; was appointed Major General in March of the 18th year of SHOWA (1943) and then served as the Chief of the General Affairs Division of the Sumatra Military Administration Department and as the Chief of the Staff of the 28th Army successively. At the time of the termination of war, I was attached to the Army Munitions Department. As mentioned above, I held a post in the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau from August 1938 (the 13th year of SHOWA) to March 1941, so I have a fair knowledge of diplomatic matters, since external affairs as they affect the national defense are studied in this bureau.

2. The Army's opinion on the foreign policies came from the national defense plan, of which the General Staff was in charge. Besides, the General Staff had the duty to collect and examine military information and diplomatic information connected with it, and supervised military attaches. Accordingly, the Army's opinion on diplomatic policies used to be initiated by the General Staff. The Military Affairs Bureau was to report the matters transferred from the General Staff to the War Minister and to negotiate with the Foreign Ministry according to the War Minister's intention. On the other hand, when any matter was proposed by the Foreign Ministry to the Military Affairs Bureau, the Military Affairs Bureau, after transferring it to the General Staff to ask for its opinion, obtained the Minister's decision on it and made a reply to the Foreign Office. Such being the case, only a few officers served at the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau in considering diplomatic affairs as they affected national defense.



3. On the Tri-Partite Alliance between Japan, Germany and Italy. ---

A. It was about August or September, 1938, when the proposed Japanese-German-Italian Tri-Partite Alliance was communicated to us from the Military Attaché to the Japanese Embassy at Berlin. The then KONOYE Cabinet resigned before formally taking up that question and thereafter the HIRANUMA Cabinet was formed.

I remember it was in the spring of 1939, soon after the formation of the HIRANUMA Cabinet, that the pros and cons of concluding the Tri-Partite Alliance were formally dealt with

B. Those who advocated the Tri-Partite Alliance aimed at the immediate settlement of the China Incident. At that time, although Japan, impatient of the protracted China Incident, was eager for its prompt settlement by taking every possible means, it was observed that America, England and the Soviet Union, backing up China, were supporting China's persistent struggle; Japan, therefore, tried to expedite the solution of the Incident through the "good offices" of Germany. As regards the "good offices" of Germany, it was a fact that Japan requested the German Ambassador to China to mediate the peace negotiations between Japan and China in the autumn of the 12th year of SHOWA (1937), about the time of the occupation of Nanking, as we had an impression that Germany's vo toward China remained considerably strong.

C. Before Japan and Germany came to an agreement on the pros and cons of concluding the Tri-Partite Alliance, the non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was concluded unexpectedly in August, 1939 (the 14th year of SHOWA). As a result, the conclusion of the alliance did not come to be realized.

The main point as to the Tri-Partite Alliance on which Japan and Germany held different opinions was that, against Japan's intention of making the alliance a defensive one as to the Soviet Union, Germany tried to make it an offensive and defensive alliance against America and England.

D. The conclusion of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact gave the Army as well as the people at home a strong impression that Japan had been betrayed by Germany. So far as we were concerned, accordingly, the impression among the military circles as well as the general public that Germany had betrayed us was due to the fact that we could not but doubt what Germany's true intention was when she concluded a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union as to whom Japan had desired protection through the Tri-Partite Alliance. In the statement made by the HIRANUMA Cabinet on its resignation, there were the words "intricate and enigmatic" which were also our honest feeling toward Germany's way of doing. Thus no one came to seriously expect the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Alliance.



E. Soon after the second KONOYE Cabinet was formed in July 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA), the Japanese-German-Italian Tri-Partite Alliance was concluded. It was generally said, however, to have been proposed by Foreign Minister MATSUOKA, the Military Affairs Bureau having nothing to do with it. Therefore, on being informed of the conclusion of the alliance, we in the War Ministry were surprised, as the conclusion of the pact was out of our consideration.

F. On January 22, 1947, former Major General TANAKA Ryukichi testified that the Military Affairs Bureau sustained a consistent policy aiming at the conclusion of the Tri-Partite Pact and of construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere from the time of the ABE Cabinet. But the attitude of the Army as to the Tri-Partite Pact is as above described, and the testimony of Major General TANAKA is remarkably different from the fact. And it is also groundless to say that the military authorities had established a policy as to the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

4. On the attitude of Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO toward diplomatic problems. ---

A. It was about the middle of October, 1939 (the 14th year of SHOWA) that Major General MUTO arrived at his post as the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. I never heard from Director MUTO of the proposed Tri-Partite Alliance.

About the settlement of the China Incident, however, he frequently gave his views. As he had been on the China front for two years, he was well aware of the extreme difficulty of settling the China Incident. He believed that it was urgent for Japan to settle the China Incident, and that, for that purpose, we should not only directly deal with Chiang Kai-shek instead of taking such an attitude as saying "Japan will have nothing to do with Chiang Kai-shek", but also make the greatest concessions in the terms of negotiations, so as to bring about peace between the two nations. He further insisted on avoiding a dispute with any third power.

B. When the German forces won a victory over the British Army in Dunkirk in May, 1940 (the 15th year of SHOWA), I discussed it with MUTO. He asserted himself, saying, "Generally speaking, many Japanese overestimate Germany's strength. Nevertheless, the German Army will never be able to invade Great Britain across the Straits of Dover. The English are sure to rally mentally and materially through the assistance of America. It is to be anticipated as a matter of course that this war will be protracted."



5. On the attitude of Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO toward the Japanese-American negotiations. ---

- A. I went over to America in March, 1941 (the 16th year of SHOWA). It was because the Ambassador asked Vice-Minister of War ANAMI and Chief of the General Staff SUGIYAMA to send an assistant and, on the recommendation of Director MUTO, the Minister sent me.

My main duty was to assist Ambassador NOMURA at large. Prior to my visit to America, I made arrangements with IKAWA Tadao, with a view to restoring promptly the diplomatic relations between Japan and America. We proceeded with private negotiations on adjustment of the Japanese-American diplomatic relations with Maryknoll Bishop Walsh, Mr. Drought, Secretary-General of Maryknoll, and others in America. I, accordingly, prepared a programme of formalizing the negotiations between the two countries along this line. Prince KONOYE also expressed himself in favor of our negotiations. Mr. IKAWA and I, after going over to America, reported this plan to Ambassador NOMURA who readily agreed with us. So from then on the negotiations on adjusting the Japanese-American diplomatic relations were entered into in line with this plan.

On April 15, 1941, our tentative plan "Draft of the Understanding between Japan and America" was unofficially taken up by Ambassador NOMURA and Secretary of State Hull and was reported by telegram from the Embassy at Washington to the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, I wired War Minister TOJO urging him to give his support to our proposals. MUTO was very delighted at this and sent me a telegram of thanks.

Later, in August, 1941, I was ordered home and returned to Japan. After returning home, I was informed by Director of the Military Affairs Bureau MUTO that some of the staff of the Foreign Ministry were criticizing the presence of outsiders in connection with affairs of the Foreign Office, such as the efforts of Mr. IKAWA and myself in assisting Ambassador NOMURA, and that, accordingly, War Minister TOJO ordered me to return home in order to get rid of a possible obstacle to further negotiations.

I made a report to the top officials of the War Ministry after I returned home. I was glad to find my efforts being appreciated beyond my expectation. MUTO especially asked me in various ways about the forecast.

When I answered, saying, "According to my impression when I talked with Secretary of State Hull and Postmaster General Walker, there is a full possibility of bringing the negotiations to a success", he was very delighted.

- B. After that, I left the War Ministry to be appointed commander of an infantry regiment. My acquaintances in the Military Affairs Bureau and the General Staff Office informed me of the fact that MUTO had made an effort to the last to conclude the negotiations between Japan and America.



Def. Doc. 2589

On this 2nd day of June, 1947

At Tokyo

DEPONENT IWAKURO Hideo (seal)

I, HARA Seiji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place

Witness: (signed) Hara Seiji (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

. /s/ IWAKURO Hideo (seal)



Sustained  
in full

KOISO No. 4

29 October 1947

Re: IWAKURO, Takeo  
Def. Doc. #2567 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to and moves the Tribunal to strike out the following portions of this affidavit:

- (1) All of Section 3 of the affidavit which appears on pages 2 and 3, except the first paragraph thereof. ✓

The reference to General TATEKAWA's mission in the second paragraph of Section 3 is, we respectfully submit, repetitive and belongs in the General Phase. The statement in the rest of this section as to Japan's military equipment in 1931 is immaterial, does not prove whether or not Japan was planning aggressive war and if it were pertinent would belong in the General Phase. The last 4 paragraphs of this section make no reference to KOISO. ✓

- (2) Objection is made to all of Section 4, pages 3 and 4 of the affidavit on the ground that if pertinent it would belong in the General Phase and it contains nothing especially applicable to the defendant KOISO. The attitude of the leaders of the War Ministry described in the first paragraph of Section 4, what this witness learned from Col. ANDO's address, recited in the second paragraph of Section 4, and what steps this witness took to increase funds for supplies, as recited in the last paragraph of Section 4, are quite immaterial.

Objection is made to all of Section 5, page 4, in which the witness attempts to explain and construe Exhibit 230. ✓

- (3) All of Section 7, pages 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit, are objected to on the ground that this evidence of alleged banditry and steps taken to secure peace and order if proper would belong in the General Phase. In the last paragraph of this section, the witness gives his opinions and conclusions concerning the views of the defendant KOISO, refers to his character and then negates his discussion with the final statement that, "The Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves." ✓



- (4) All of the last paragraph of Section 9 of the affidavit, being that portion of Section 9 which appears on page 8 beginning with the words on the first line of page 8, "who was of the opinion" and continuing to the end of Section 9. The witness purports to give the opinion of the Army Commander who succeeded KOISO and then his own opinion as to the motive for action taken. ✓
- (5) We object to the last sentence in Section 10 of the affidavit beginning with the words, "in reply to this" and continuing to the end of the affidavit, on the ground that the letter referred to therein is not produced nor the failure to produce it properly accounted for. ✓

Since those portions of the affidavit to which objection is not made throw such little light on the issues before the Tribunal, we respectfully submit that the affidavit should be rejected in toto.

D. N. SUTTON



Nov. 5, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Sutton; Mr. Dunigan; Col. Fixel; Mr. Lopez  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN, Chief,  
Investigative Division, IPS  
SUBJECT : Defense Witness

1. Please find attached hereto list of material available on the following witness and/or witnesses.

DEFENDANT

TOJO  
KOISO  
MUJO

WITNESS

IWAKURO, Hideo

LIST OF MATERIAL AVAILABLE

Curriculum Vitae

2. Please acknowledge receipt of this memorandum by initialling and returning attached carbon copy to this office, Room 300.

Incl  
(Described above)

*EP M*  
EDWARD P. MONAGHAN



IWAKURO, Hideo

Prefecture - HIROSHIMA Prefecture

Date of Birth - October 10, 1897

Name - IWAKURO, Hideo

May 30, 1916	Graduated the regular course of the Army Central Preparatory School.	
May 30, 1916	Ordered to become an Officer candidate and assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
June 6, 1916	Entered the 16th Infantry Regiment.	
June 6, 1916	Given the rating of superior private, infantry.	16th Inf. Regiment
Aug. 1, 1916	Promoted to corporal, infantry.	"
Sept. 1, 1916	Promoted to sergeant, infantry.	"
Dec. 1, 1916	Entered the Military Academy.	
May 27, 1918	Graduated the Military Academy.	
May 30, 1918	Returned to the original unit.	
May 30, 1918	Promoted to sergeant-major, infantry and ordered to become a probationary officer.	"
Dec. 25, 1918	Appointed 2nd Lieutenant, infantry. Assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment.	Cabinet War Ministry
Feb. 28, 1919	Given the 8th Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Nov. 1, 1920	Awarded the 5th class Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite. Awarded the Imperial Order of the Single-Rays of the Rising Sun.	
Aug. 18, 1921	Relieved of the present post. Attached to the FORMOSA 1st Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
Mar. 6, 1922	Appointed 1st Lieutenant, infantry.	Cabinet



Mar. 10, 1922	Raised to the 7th Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	
Dec. 27, 1923	Ordered to enter the Army General Staff College.	War Ministry
Apr. 25, 1924	Relieved of the present post. Attached to the 16th Infantry Regiment.	War Ministry
Apr. 25, 1927	Raised to the 7th Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
July 26, 1927	Appointed Captain, infantry. Relieved of present post. Assigned as a Company Commander of the 16th Infantry Regiment.	Cabinet War Ministry
Nov. 29, 1927	Awarded the 5th Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Mar. 1, 1928	Ordered to serve with the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.	War Ministry
Dec. 12, 1928	Attached to the Army Technical Headquarters and serve concurrently as a member of the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.	
May 16, 1932	Raised to the 6th Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	
July 8, 1932	Ordered to be the executive officer of the Army Munitions Council.	War Ministry
Sept. 1, 1932	Relieved as executive officer of the Army Munitions Council.	War Ministry
Aug. 8, 1932	Assigned as a staff officer of the KWANTUNG Army. Not registered in the official gazette.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1933	Appointed Major, Infantry.	Cabinet
Dec. 13, 1933	Awarded the 4th class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	
Aug. 1, 1934	Assigned as administrative officer of the Natural Resources Bureau.	Cabinet
Aug. 1, 1934	Assigned as a member of the General Staff HQ, concurrently as a member of the Mobilization Plans Bureau of the War Ministry.	War Ministry
Aug. 1, 1934	Relieved as staff officer of the KWANTUNG, Army. Not registered in the official gazette.	War Ministry



Dec. 26, 1934	Relieved of the present post and the concurrent post.	War Ministry
Dec. 26, 1934	Relieved as administrative officer of the Natural Resources Bureau.	Cabinet
Dec. 26, 1934	Assigned as administrative officer of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet
Dec. 26, 1934	Ordered to serve concurrently in the Industrial Section and the administration Section of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet
Apr. 29, 1934	Awarded the Little Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun for service in the Incident of 1931 to 1939.	
May 9, 1935	Ordered dispatched to KOREA, KWANTUNG Province, MANCHUKUO and the Republic of CHINA.	Cabinet
Dec. 16, 1935	Granted 510 yen for special efforts shown in his work.	
July 3, 1936	Ordered dispatched to KOREA, KWANTUNG Province, MANCHUKUO, and the Republic of CHINA.	Cabinet
Aug. 1, 1936	Relieved as administrative officer of the Manchurian Affairs Board.	Cabinet
Aug. 1, 1936	Attached to the Army Technical Headquarters and assigned concurrently as a member of the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry.	War Ministry
July 1, 1937	Raised to the 6th Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Aug. 2, 1937	Appointed Lt. Colonel, infantry.	Cabinet
Jan. 1, 1937	Ordered to be attached to the Military Service Bureau of the War Ministry and serve concurrently.	
Feb. 16, 1939	Ordered to the Preliminary Committee of the Ordinary Civil Service Limitation Commission.	War Ministry
Feb. 17, 1939	Assigned as executive officer of the Government Investment and Property Estimate Commission of the North China Development Co. Ltd. and the Central China Development Co. Ltd.	
March 9, 1939	Appointed Colonel, infantry.	Cabinet
Mar. 23, 1939	Awarded the 3rd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	



Apr. 15, 1939	Assigned as a committee member of the Army Ordnance Council.	
June 12, 1939	Assigned as executive officer of the Government Aircraft Investment Commission.	Cabinet
Apr. 1, 1939	Raised to the 5th Court Rank, Jr. Grade.	
Feb. 10, 1939	Appointed Chief of Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. Relieved as member of the Investigation Section.	War Ministry
Feb. 26, 1939	Ordered to be a committee member of the Army Navy Munitions Industry Mobilization Agreement Commission.	War Ministry
Dec. 28, 1940	Concurrently a member of the Total War Research Institute. Given the 3rd rank of the higher civil service.	Cabinet
Feb. 25, 1941	Relieved of concurrent position.	Cabinet
Mar. 18, 1941	Relieved as executive officer of the Government Investment and Property Estimate Commission of the North China Development Co. Ltd and the Central China Development Co. Ltd.	Cabinet
Apr. 19, 1941	Relieved as a committee-member of the Army Ordnance Council.	Cabinet
Apr. 29, 1940	Awarded the 4th Class Imperial Military Order of the Golden Kite. Awarded the Middle Cordon of the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun. Both for services in the China Incident.	
Mar. 1, 1943	Appointed Major-general.	Cabinet
Mar. 15, 1943	Raised to the 5th Court Rank, Sr. Grade.	
Mar. 7, 1944	Awarded the 2nd Class Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure.	



Translated by  
Defense Language  
Branch

43387

Object Sec 4.

Reference letter p. 8 & 10

not from.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL  
FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- - Against - -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.



SWORN

DEPOSITION

Deponent:

IWAKURO, Takeo (HIDARO)

in 10 -

Both copies  
dated 5/9/47  
no official difference

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My name is IWAKURO, Takeo. I was born in Hiroshima-Ken (Prefecture) on 10 October, 1897 (30th Year of Meiji). At present I live at No. 789 Denenchofu, 2 Chome, Omori-ku, Tokyo -to.

In March 1928 (3rd Year of Showa), I was attached to a section in the Maintenance Bureau of the War Ministry, and in August 1932 (7th Year of Showa) was transferred to assume the office as staff to the Kwantung Army. After two years in Manchukuo, I returned and served as member of the General Staff (Headquarters), and junior secretary in the Manchurian Affairs Bureau, whereupon in February 1937 (14th Year of Showa) was appointed section chief for War Affairs in Military Affairs Bureau. Later in 1939 (16th Year of Showa), I was dispatched to the U.S.A. to assist Ambassador NOMURA. Since then I have taken several posts as regimental commander in the infantry, and at the time of termination of war was Chief Staff Officer of the 28th Army at the Burmese Front.







type ones.

We were a long way from having a mechanized army, and our transport corps had, for the most part, to depend on animal power. The number of automatic-weapons for the infantry as L.M.Gs and H.M.Gs fell far below what required, and we were obliged to use dummy guns (wooden guns) or flags for markings. The new type 90 field guns had been adopted, but we did not attain full equipment owing to insufficiency of manufacturing capacity.

*Object*  
*Manufacture*  
*things*  
*for flow*

The manufacturing capacity of large calibre guns (above 20 c.m.) were especially insufficient, capable of only making 5 or 6 guns in 3 year's time. Since the capacity of our munition industry had been no more than as stated above, of all our war-time military forces of 32 divisions, only 8 were newly equipped in the "World War I" type.

*Object*  
"

4. I shall next state as to the attitude of the leaders of War Ministry at the time of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. The outbreak of the Incident came so suddenly that the staff of the War Ministry were all taken aback and felt too restless to take up their work for two or three days after which time they gradually set on to resume their business. Especially on 19th September telegrams were received in rapid succession from the Kwantung Army, according to which we made every effort to find out the truth about the case, but had failed after all to acquire any exact knowledge.

*Object*  
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*nothing*  
*especially*  
*affordable*  
*Kaiso*

Immediately after the outbreak of the Incident, Colonel ANDO, Rikichi, the then Section Chief for Military Service, was sent to make investigations on the spot as to the true state of the railway explosion at LIUTIAUKOU. Upon his return he made an address of report on the investigation, at the 1st Conference Room in the War Ministry. I took the occasion to listen to him and learned that there was no doubt as to the explosion being unlawfully committed by Chinese Regulars in Mukden.

*Object*



The incident had broken out inspite of the feeling of the central authorities, but adhering to the basic policy of avoiding war, they were keenly bent on carrying out the localization policy as had also been decided upon at the cabinet meeting. As a result, an instruction was shortly issued to the Kwantung Army to keep from advancing beyond the Yin-Kow, Hsimmin, Cheng-shiatun, Changchun, Kirin line, and troops which had already crossed the line were strictly required to retreat within said line.

Apparently the whole War Ministry, to say nothing of the Maintenance Bureau, and even the General Staff Headquarters, did not have in hand any proper policy, in particular, towards the incident, and it was after about a week's lapse when the Incident showed signs of expansion that we were obliged to prepare for steps in case of emergency. With reference to materials of war, which I took charge of supplies to the Kwantung Army had been extremely insufficient, and I was forced to take immediate steps to ask for an increase in fund for supplies.

5. Next, with reference to "The guiding principle of Manchukuo" (Ct. Exhibit No. 230) sent by Lt. General KOISO, Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, to Lt. General YANAGAWA, Heisuke, Vice Minister of War, dated 3 November, 1932, the said principles were the expression of views within the Kwantung Army Headquarters, in reply to the draft policy dealing with Manchukuo by the 2nd Department of General Staff (Headquarters), which had been forwarded to the War Ministry and further to the Kwantung Army and in response to which, as above stated, the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army had them dispatched in the name of the Chief Staff Officer to the Vice Minister of War upon inspecting them in person. In addition, this document was transacted as an ordinary business-document. (It was customary of document of such kind, except those concerning business of routine and less importance, to be dispatched in the name of the Chief of Staff.)

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6. I shall state next as to the condition of peace and order in Manchukuo at the time of my assumption of post in the Kwantung Army. The order was issued, appointing me as member of staff to the Kwantung Army, on 8 August 1932 (7th Year of Showa). When I arrived at the Headquarters in the Totaku Bldg. in Mukden on 26 August via Chosen and in company with Army Commander MUTO and Chief of Staff Officer KOISO, the bandits were actively carrying out underhand disturbance movements. Night trains would often be held up, and the situation went far as to our suffering attacks by bandits at the aerodrome outside the walls of Mukden city late in September.

In pursuance to Army Commander MUTO's intention, General KOISO as Chief Staff to the Kwantung Army directed his staff to draft policies for cooperation with Manchukuo along the following lines:

- (1) Restoration of public peace and order.
- (2) Maintenance of transport and communication.
- (3) Development of industry.

7. I did not directly take charge of affairs concerning the restoration of public peace and order. However, I had knowledge of the measures taken and was well-informed of the actual situation. In order to convert bandits, totalling more than 200,000 when I assumed office, to law-abiding people, it was decided upon to divide the areas on both sides along the railway lines and main roads in the Province of Mukden into several sections and to begin with restoring public peace and order in one of these sections, thus gradually extending them to areas in other provinces.

For this purpose, the CHI-HON (T.N. Literally, to rule the source of root) and CHI-HYO (T.N. To rule an object) operation were carried out at the same time. The former was a kind of a thorough going measure to uproot and check all evil sources and was taken charge in main by the Manchukuo Government. It

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was a policy to develop industry, rule well and to accommodate wanderers and vagrants.

The latter was a swipe-out movement aimed directly at the bandits, and was carried out under co-operation of the Manchukuoan Army and the Kwantung Army. The Kwantung Army used no little funds to call on and placate bandits, which were usually the step taken up first, and only when the bandits made no response to the repeated arguments did they resort to arms. In suppression campaigns, chiefly the Manchukuoan Army used to lead the way. Whenever the bandits surrendered arms, they were forgiven. Their weapons were brought up, and they were either returned to their native places or enlisted in the Manchukuoan Army or otherwise, when not qualified for military service, in the engineering and construction unit (labor service corps) of the National Road Bureau or in other labor services fitting their experience. Such was the policy practiced in order to convert them to civilian life as law-abiding people, and we never killed a soul who had surrendered himself. Especially in the case of General Ting-Chao who had returned to civilian life upon surrender, he felt so grateful for the treatment he received that he called on 'Commander in Chief MUTO in Hsinking to pledge allegiance to Manchukuo.

Strenuous efforts were made to maintain transport and communication lines for the purpose of contributing to the restoration of public peace and order and to the development of industry.

The planning for industrial development was made in response to the request of the Manchukuoan Government, or studied on our own accord, as a result of which any definite plan we formed was submitted to the Manchukuoan Government for approval. It was left to the discretion of the Prime Minister of Manchukuo to decide whether to accept or reject any plan.

Further with regard to industrial development, General

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*Unintentional*

KOISO rejected to an extreme the ideas of interest cherished by the Japanese people (national egoism) in order to check the dominance of grafters, whereupon he was subjected to their censure. He stood firm however and adhered to his views, persistently wishing that a fair chance be given to any enterprise from any field at home and abroad in establishing itself, in compliance with principles of open-door and equal opportunity. However, due to the insufficient condition of public peace and order, it was to be regretted that even the Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves.

*Opinion to continue*

8. A certain KYOWA Association (T.N. The Association of Harmony) had been organized in Manchukuo, which however tended to lapsing into a political body of a "one party for one state" character. Pursuant to instructions of Army Commander MUTO, General KOISO advised the president of General Affairs of the Manchukuo Government to the effect that though there was no objection to maintaining it as a cultural body it would be inadvisable to encourage its growth as a political party. I understand that Army Commander MUTO had also refused the request by the said body to become an advisor.

9. In compliance with the Army Commander's strict policy, Kwantung Army forces had made every effort to keep from advancing beyond the Great Wall into North China areas. However, in April 1933 (8th Year of Showa), upon repulsing the obstinately defiant Chinese Army, some of the forces pursued them far off the battle-fields beyond the Great Wall for a time. General KOISO, Chief of Staff, was then in Tokyo on business, but I remember that on learning this, he wired to the Army Commander suggesting the prompt withdrawal of troops within the line of the Great Wall.

On the next occasion in May, when we made pursuit beyond the Great Wall, General KOISO had already returned to his post. This time it was a counter-attack carried out by order of the



Army Commander, who was of the opinion that unless we deal a smashing blow on the Chinese Army which had moved to make a serious attack on the Great Wall line we should never be enabled to bring an end to any war around the Great Wall. The conclusion of the Tangku Agreement in the end of May was attributable to this action, hereafter being able to restore peace in the adjacent zone to North China. The motive as to this action was quite different to that with regard to the first advance beyond the Great Wall Line, as I recall that the former action was taken up for the purpose of rendering any other future advance beyond the Great Wall unnecessary.

*copy*

*copy opinion*

*copy*

10. The last time I met General KOISO was in 1939 (14th Year of Showa) when I was Section Chief for War Affairs and sent on an errand of Lt. General YAMAWAKI, Vice Minister of War, to call on General KOISO, who was then Minister of Overseas Affairs, at his room in said Ministry. This visit was made to ask for the General's mediation, since there was a great difference then in opinion between the Army and Navy with regard to the conclusion of a tripartite alliance, and the atmosphere was impending that this might bring about at any time a split in public opinion. In reply to this, the General expressed his views in a letter to the effect that the disruption of the national view was by no means advisable; that in his opinion, a tripartite alliance would probably result in Germany's profit at Japan's cost which would mean greater detriment, and less benefit to us, and that therefore, the subject should be dropped whereupon we should lead the national view to unification.

*what month*

*copy*

On this 5th day of April, 1947.

At Tokyo.

Deponent: IWAKURO, Takeo (Seal)



O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ IWAKURO, Takeo (Seal)  
IWAKURO, Takeo

I hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same day.

At Tokyo.

Witness: SAMMONJI, Shohei (Seal)  
SAMMONJI, Shohei



KOISO No. 4

29 October 1947

Re: IWAKURO, Takeo  
Def. Doc. #2567 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to and moves the Tribunal to strike out the following portions of this affidavit:

- (1) All of Section 3 of the affidavit which appears on pages 2 and 3, except the first paragraph thereof.

The reference to General TATEKAWA's mission in the second paragraph of Section 3 is, we respectfully submit, repetitive and belongs in the General Phase. The statement in the rest of this section as to Japan's military equipment in 1931 is immaterial, does not prove whether or not Japan was planning aggressive war and if it were pertinent would belong in the General Phase. The last 4 paragraphs of this section make no reference to KOISO.

- (2) Objection is made to all of Section 4, pages 3 and 4 of the affidavit on the ground that if pertinent it would belong in the General Phase and it contains nothing especially applicable to the defendant KOISO. The attitude of the leaders of the War Ministry described in the first paragraph of Section 4, what this witness learned from Col. ANDO's address, recited in the second paragraph of Section 4, and what steps this witness took to increase funds for supplies, as recited in the last paragraph of Section 4, are quite immaterial.

Objection is made to all of Section 5, page 4, in which the witness attempts to explain and construe Exhibit 230.

- (3) All of Section 7, pages 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit, are objected to on the ground that this evidence of alleged banditry and steps taken to secure peace and order if proper would belong in the General Phase. In the last paragraph of this section, the witness gives his opinions and conclusions concerning the views of the defendant KOISO, refers to his character and then negates his discussion with the final statement that, "The Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves."



- (4) All of the last paragraph of Section 9 of the affidavit, being that portion of Section 9 which appears on page 8 beginning with the words on the first line of page 8, "who was of the opinion" and continuing to the end of Section 9. The witness purports to give the opinion of the Army Commander who succeeded KOISO and then his own opinion as to the motive for action taken.
- (5) We object to the last sentence in Section 10 of the affidavit beginning with the words, "in reply to this" and continuing to the end of the affidavit, on the ground that the letter referred to therein is not produced nor the failure to produce it properly accounted for.

Since those portions of the affidavit to which objection is not made throw such little light on the issues before the Tribunal, we respectfully submit that the affidavit should be rejected in toto.

D. N. SUTTON



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29 October 1947

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*The attitude of the leaders of the war ministry described in the 1st 1/2 of sec 4*

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*3/4 (we object to section 8 as immaterial & irrelevant?)*



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D. N. Sutton



INTERROGATION OF

IWAKURO, Hidao

*Kwantung Army  
Case file*

Date and Time: 29 May 1946, 1100-1230 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,  
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : IWAKURO, Hidao  
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator  
Mr. Tadao Wikawa Interpreter  
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer  
Mr. Henry R. Sackett

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that you will truly and accurately interpret and translate from English into Japanese and from Japanese into English, as may be required of you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Wikawa : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. ....

A. On the major programs the Manchurian Government consulted with the Kwantung Army.

Q. Who in the Kwantung Army?

A. They were in consultation with various people in charge of various affairs. For instance, if economics it would be the economic section.

Q. You mean, they consulted with you, for instance, on economics?

A. Occasionally they came.

Q. Who in the Manchukuo Government consulted with you?

A. For instance, people around the Industry Division came and consulted with me their plan as to what they were going to do.

Q. People in the Industry Division of the Manchukuo Government?

A. Yes. The relation was almost similar to the present relation between GHQ and the Japanese Government but actually the Manchurian Government people had to consult with the Kwantung Army. They had no construction....they had no engineers. They had to consult the differences between GHQ and Parliamentary Government. There was an agreement. There was no treaty between the GHQ and the Manchukuo Government.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. There was a secret agreement made after September 1932 that officials of the Manchukuo Government had to be approved by the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army?
- A. No, not exactly. All the Manchurian people, originally the Manchurian natives, could be employed as they wished but when Japanese citizens went to be employed by the Manchurian Government they had to get the recommendation of the Kwantung Army before they could be employed.
- Q. That was by agreement?
- A. Kind of agreement.
- Q. Written agreement?
- A. Probably a written agreement, I don't know.
- Q. You never saw a copy of it?
- A. I think I looked at it and it was in five articles. I don't remember exactly.
- Q. Wasn't it a secret agreement? It was not publicly announced?
- A. I think it was a secret agreement.
- Q. How did you learn of the provisions of that treaty? Do you recall? How did you learn that there were five articles?
- A. I looked at it.
- Q. Do you recall the other articles and the date that it was made?
- A. I do not remember the date exactly but maybe sometime in March of that year. The year I went over.
- Q. In March of 1932?
- A. 1932.
- Q. Can you recall the articles?
- A. One was about a peace agreement. I do not recall the other articles.
- Q. Maybe I can refresh your memory. Did it provide for mutual aid?
- A. No, nothing of that sort.
- Q. Did it provide for the defense of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army?
- A. That kind of article was in the agreement of military alliance, of September 15, 1932. It was the mutual defense pact. The defense ought to be carried out by both countries not by the Japanese Army.
- Q. Do you recall who signed the agreement of March? The one you think was signed in March?
- A. Probably General HONSHO.
- Q. Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army and the Chief Executive of Manchukuo?
- A. No, I don't recall the articles but my impression was a very broad ...brief one.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd.)

- Q. Do you recall the nature of it? Economics, politics, etc?  
A. I think it mentioned Manchurian Government personnel. Those were the most important articles. I don't remember the other articles. I recall that at the beginning there was a statement that Manchukuo should consist of the five races residing in the Chinese continent, Manchuria and Japan....should become a commonwealth of five races, regarding that kind of article but I don't recall exactly what it was.
- Q. Did it name the positions that were to be filled by Japanese residents or by Japanese?  
A. No, nothing of that sort.
- Q. Do you recall how long the agreement was to be in force?  
A. Until the end of the Manchukuo Government, it must have been in force.
- Q. Until the end?  
A. That means the end of this war.
- Q. Did you ever see an agreement signed by the War Minister, ARAKI, and the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army, and Henry Pu Yi of Manchukuo?  
A. I never saw that agreement.
- Q. Did you know of or hear of an agreement that provided that the entire administration of Manchukuo was to be confined to the Japanese Army....the Kwantung Army of Manchuria?  
A. I knew of no such agreement....no such written agreement that subjugated the Manchurian Government to the Kwantung Army. So far as I remember it might have been actually so but not in a written agreement.
- Q. It was a written agreement.  
A. I am surprised about that.
- Q. What was your mission in Manchuria?  
A. Chiefly, on the industrial development of Manchukuo.
- Q. Did you take with you a plan for the industrial development of Manchukuo?  
A. No, no plan.
- Q. Did you work one up while you were in Manchuria?  
A. Yes.
- Q. Can you tell us, generally, what it provided?  
A. What kind of enterprises ought to be initiated in Manchuria. The railroad and road plan....all such things.
- Q. When was that? Who worked that out?  
A. End of 1932 to 1933.
- Q. Was that plan approved by the Kwantung Army?



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd.)

A. I had the approval of the so-called Special Duty Department, (Tokumubu) of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did you receive decisions of the Cabinet here in Tokyo?

A. No, nothing at all....probably in cases where they wanted some materials for the department. To that extent they had to get the sanction of the Japanese Government.

Q. That plan that you worked out....did it provide for a controlling policy....how you could control the economy of Manchuria?

A. The so-called planned economy of Manchuria was already in existence before my arrival. I was more or less interested in this development.

Q. Who prepared that plan?

A. Probably my predecessor, Major MORI, Takeshi.

Q. Was that plan being followed?

A. It was being carried through but that plan excluded Japanese capitalists from entering Manchuria.

Q. Who was to furnish the capital under the MORI Plan?

A. They excluded such big capitalists as MITSUI, MITSUBISHI, etc. It selected wealthy rising financiers and businessmen in general.

Q. Only certain industries could be established in Manchuria, could they not?

A. It was in the beginning. Only the riveting kind of industries.

Q. None that would conflict with the industries in Japan?

A. Some were conflicting.

Q. They were not encouraged, were they?

A. It was encouraged. It was planned in accordance....an enterprise that was suitable to certain localities. It didn't pay much attention as to whether they conflicted.

Q. Didn't they attempt to correlate the economy of Manchuria and Japan?

A. The Kwantung Army....was not to utilize Manchuria for the selfish purpose of Japan so they had no consideration of that sort whether it was conflicting or not.

Q. Were you familiar with the Japan-Manchuria Joint Economic Committee?

A. There was such a Commission but they never acted. No substance or action took place by that Commission.

Q. When was it established?

A. Probably September 1932.

Q. Do you know their function?

A. They probably convened once and had supper together.

Q. This Committee was to give its opinion to Manchuria and Japan



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

- regarding the correlation of both countries?
- A. Probably so, but they never actually functioned.
- Q. Were most of the important offices in the Manchukuo Government held by Japanese?
- A. Not all of them. Japanese officials employed by the Manchurian Government were Manchurians. There was no discriminating treatment between the original Manchurian and Japanese nationalized Manchurians.
- Q. Would you repeat that again?
- A. Japanese civilians employed by the Manchurian Government would be considered Manchurians, were treated as Manchurians so that they could not have any discriminating or favorable treatment for the original Manchurians.
- Q. But they could only be appointed upon the recommendation of the Kwantung Army, could they not?
- A. By the recommendation of the Kwantung Army they were appointed.
- Q. I want to go back to the Japan Manchuria Economic Commission. When it made a decision it presented that to the Board of General Affairs of the Manchukuo Government, did it not?
- A. I don't remember exactly how it was considered. I thought that Commission did not function at all. There are so many Japanese commissions in the Japanese Government created by some officer and then the succeeding officer just destroys it or neglects it.
- Q. This Commission officed in Manchuria?
- A. It was in Manchuria.
- Q. Were there any Joint Commissions other than that?
- A. I don't remember any other. I did not think their work important. Except for that dinner party they didn't function at all. I only recalled the name by your mentioning it.
- Q. Did you ever give them records or advice or ever appear before it?
- A. I never gave any advice. I had nothing to do with that Commission.
- Q. The Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of Manchukuo was always filled by Japanese, was it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was the most important Bureau in the Manchukuo Government?
- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. Was there any understanding that it was always to be filled by Japanese?
- A. No agreement at all.



(IWAKURO, Hidao 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

- Q. How did it happen that it was always filled by Japanese?  
A. It must be tradition....with the establishment of the Manchurian Government.
- Q. Who appointed the Chief of that Bureau?  
A. The Manchurian Government or Emperor of Manchuria. In the beginning there was no Emperor so the Manchukuo Government did do that.
- Q. Do you know the function of that office..Chief of the General Affairs Bureau?  
A. A kind of liaison office.
- Q. Between whom?  
A. Between the Kwantung Army, the Manchurian central government, and the Manchurian local governments. Correction...between various departments of the Manchurian Government and the Kwantung Army and the unified program.
- Q. In other words, the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army gave his decisions directly to the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau who in turn gave them out to the various departments of the Manchukuo Government?  
A. The Commander of the Kwantung Army never gave an order to the Chief of General Affairs Bureau.
- Q. How do you know that?  
A. The Chief of the General Affairs Bureau planned various things and he was more or less independent.
- Q. He planned the economy of Manchuria?  
A. Yes, he did.
- Q. How do you know that?  
A. I have some permission with that office. If someone gave advice to him then the Chief of the General Affairs would adopt his plan and make it the Chief's own (?) plan, then issue the order through the various Executive Departments.
- Q. He did that several times?  
A. Several times he gave advice or suggestions which he thought necessary for the development of Manchuria.
- Q. And it was subsequently issued as an order of the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau?  
A. No, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau just took it as a reference but he himself planned his own.
- (Interpreter: I knew the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau, HOSHINO. He was a very independent man. He never took advice from anyone.)



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

- Q. Did the General Affairs Bureau handle personnel of the Manchukuo Government?
- A. Yes, they had authority on personnel affairs.
- Q. That is very powerful authority, isn't it?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Appointed men that would carry out their decisions?
- A. Not exactly so.
- Q. He didn't have to approve their appointment, then?
- A. Not exactly so. It depends upon the personality of the various officials.
- Q. They controlled the personnel of everyone below the rank of the Cabinet?
- A. The Cabinet Ministers were nominated by the Manchurian Government.
- Q. The Vice Ministers?
- A. A big job...the Manchurian Government...Manchurians have their own idea especially as far as Manchurians were concerned. The General Affairs Bureau had much to say.
- Q. The General Affairs Bureau really decided the policy of the Government?
- A. On the whole, but the Executive Department had their own opinions sometimes conflicting.
- Q. And the Manchukuo Cabinet or Privy Council usually went along and approved the policy decided by the General Affairs Bureau.
- A. No, they had their own opinion. They discussed it sometimes to draw their own plan against the General Affairs Bureau position.
- Q. But the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau was really the Assistant Prime Minister?
- A. Yes, you might call it so.
- Q. Very powerful position.
- A. Very powerful.
- Q. The General Affairs Bureau also controlled administration, such as finance?
- A. The Finance Department had their own decision. It was not controlled by the General Affairs Bureau.
- Q. There was a section within the Bureau that handled personnel and what else? Information Bureau?
- A. Yes.
- Q. They controlled the press?
- A. Yes, they did.



(IWAKURO, Hidao 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

Q. Censorship?

A. Yes. There was an accounting division which disbursed various budget issue money. There was a planning board.

Q. General function was economy, and what else?

A. Chiefly, economic plans.

Q. Did it plan governmental organization?

A. Yes, probably so.

Q. The heads of these sections under this Bureau were filled by Japanese?

A. During my tenure of office I remember that all were occupied by Japanese.

Q. What did the State Council do in Manchuria? Kokumuin?

A. The Kokumuin was a term given to the Legislative Department. The Legislative Department corresponded with the Executive Department.

Q. How many members did the Kokumuin have?

A. Prime Minister, Foreign Minister.....

Q. It had all the various Departments within it?

A. Yes. Finance Minister, Industrial Minister, Communication Minister...

Q. What was Mr. TANABE?

A. He was Privy Councillor.

Q. Wasn't he a member of the State Council in 1932, 1933, and 1934?

A. No, he was not a State Councillor. There were three major departments, the Legislative Department (Rippoin), the Kokumuin, and the Sangufu (Privy Council). These three were the major departments. Mr. TANABE was a member of the Sangufu (Privy Council).

Q. Their function was what?

A. Investigation and consideration of various plans which were submitted by the Emperor for consideration which were produced by various departments. They were similar to the Privy Council in Japan.

Q. Were there many Japanese in the Sangufu?

A. Only one or two.

Q. From your experience in Manchuria...from your records, from your contacts, would you say during the entire time that you were there from July 1932 up until the day you left in 1934, the Government of Manchukuo, politically and economically, was dominated and controlled by the Kwantung Army?

A. Generally speaking, it was so because it was just like nursing a baby. In the beginning they were to give more control to the Government but gradually they became more or less independent. There was such a...General ISHIWATA who advocated that Manchukuo ought to be run by the so-called Manchurians--the five races, that the Kwantung Army interference in the government ought to be given



(IWAKURO, Hidao 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

up as soon as possible so that they may enjoy the establishment of a so-called Utopia like America, free from domination of the Japanese.

Q. ISHIHARA, Kanji?  
A. Yes.

Q. What were you after you finished in Manchuria in 1934?  
What was your next position?  
A. I came back to the General Staff. I was engaged in the organization of regiments.

Q. That was in 1934?  
A. Yes.

Q. How long were you with the General Staff?  
A. Four months.

Q. Then where did you go?  
A. Then a new bureau was created in the Japanese Government....a Manchurian Bureau. I was transferred there.

Q. What was the function of that Bureau?  
A. Liaison between the Japanese Government and the Manchurian Government. I was in charge of the Industry Division.

Q. Could you tell me what they did relative to industry?  
A. It was not industry but production department.

Q. In Manchuria?  
A. Yes. Actually I was in charge of the South Manchurian Railway and the Manchurian Electric Company.

Q. They were trying to increase the production in Manchuria?  
A. I, myself, did not have any authority on that purpose.

Q. Could you tell me if someone in the Manchurian Bureau was in charge of increasing production?  
A. That was handled by the Manchurian Government in Manchuria. It was the Liaison Office that carried the plan over to the Japanese Army so they could provide necessary means for carrying out the plans. The planning itself was done in Manchuria.

Q. How long were you in Manchuria?  
A. One year and eight months.

Q. That took you up to 1936?  
A. Yes.

Q. And where did you go next?



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

- A. I was transferred to the War Department....Personnel Bureau. Actually, I was one of the judges to judge those convicts who participated in the February 26 Incident.
- Q. Was ARAKI connected with the February 26 Incident?
- A. There was such a rumor at that time but I, myself, did not investigate ARAKI at all.
- Q. Was MASAKI connected with it?
- A. MASAKI was suspected and was thrown in prison but was judged not guilty after many years of imprisonment.
- Q. Was he actually not guilty?
- A. I was in charge of the minor officers who participated in the Incident. I investigated minor officers--petty officers.
- Q. What did you do after that? What position did you hold?
- A. Then I was transferred to the so-called Division of the General Staff and was engaged in Intelligence Section. That position I held for eight months.
- Q. That was in what year?
- A. October 1938. He held that position for ten months.
- Q. What was your next position?
- A. Then I was transferred to the Military Affairs Section of the Military Affairs Bureau which I held for seven months. Then I was promoted to the Chief of that Section for two years. Then I was attached with the Embassy in Washington and participated in the negotiations with Ambassador NOMURA and President Roosevelt.
- Q. You were Chief of the Military Affairs Section for what year?
- A. 1939-1941. I was then transferred as Military Attache to the Embassy.
- Q. What were your positions after you returned to Japan in 1941?
- A. In 1941, I wasn't liked by the Army and was dispatched to French Indo-China....the front line.
- Q. How long were you there?
- A. I was wounded in the battle of Singapore and was sent back. Then I went back again and I participated in the battle against India and I was in charge of this to investigate the independence.
- Q. Can you tell me when you were sent to Burma or India? What year?
- A. After that I was transferred to Sumatra in the Civil Government. Then I became the Chief Staff Officer of our Burmese Expeditionary Army.
- Q. Do you recall the years that you went to Burma?
- A. I was in Sumatra in May of 1943.



(IWAKURO, Hidao 29 May 1946 cont'd.)

Q. How long were you in French Indo-China?

A. Three months.

Q. Then where did you go?

A. I went to Thailand.

Q. How long were you there?

A. While I was in French Indo-China the war broke out. I advanced towards Singapore to Thailand. I was in the battle of Singapore and wounded....not exactly in Singapore but the Malayan Peninsula.



David -

There's nothing in Col. Postcu-  
ro's affidavit which touches on  
Muto. I have some materials re-  
garding him which I am reserving  
when <sup>he</sup> speaks of American-Ja-  
panese negotiations as mili-  
tary adviser to Admiral Ho-  
mura.

P  
U



IWAKURO, Hideo

Request by MUTO, Akira

- a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Tokyo.
- b. He was formerly in Charge of a section in the Military  
Affair Bureau under MUTO and can give relevant testimony as to  
MUTO's policies, declarations, utterances and attitude toward  
the initiation of war.



DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Iwakura, Takao (Hides)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u> _____
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u>X</u> _____
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u>X</u> _____
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u> _____
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	<u>X</u> _____	_____
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	<u>X</u> _____	_____
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	<u>X</u> _____	_____
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u>X</u> _____
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

*Lester C. Durrigan*  
(16)



DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: IWAKURO, Hideo (MUTO)

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Pedro Lopez  
Capt. James J. Robinson  
William E. Edwards

By

P. Lopez



S. III  
Rush

3

29 October 1947

Re: IWAKURO, Takeo  
Def. Doc. #2567 - Objections

The Prosecution objects to and moves the Tribunal to strike out the following portions of this affidavit:

- (1) All of Section 3 of the affidavit which appears on pages 2 and 3, except the first paragraph thereof.

The reference to General TATEKAWA's mission in the second paragraph of Section 3 is, we respectfully submit, repetitive and belongs in the General Phase. The statement in the rest of this section as to Japan's military equipment in 1931 is immaterial, does not prove whether or not Japan was planning aggressive war and if it were pertinent would belong in the General Phase.



(2) Objection is made to all of Section 4, pages 3 and 4 of the affidavit on the ground that if pertinent it would belong in the General Phase and it contains nothing especially applicable to the defendant KOISO. What this witness learned from Col. Ando's address, recited in the second paragraph of Section 4, and what steps this witness took to increase funds for supplies, as recited in the last paragraph of Section 4, are quite immaterial.

(3) All of Section 7, pages 5, 6 and 7 of the affidavit, are objected to on the ground that this evidence of alleged banditry and steps taken to secure peace and order if proper would belong in the General Phase. In the last paragraph of this section, the witness gives his opinions and conclusions concerning the views of the defendant KOISO, refers to his character and then negates his discussion with the final statement that, "The Japanese enterprises showed little activity in establishing themselves."

(4) All of the last paragraph of Section 9 of the affidavit, being that portion of Section 9 which appears on page 8 beginning with the words on the first line of page 8, "who was of the opinion" and continuing to the end of Section 9. The witness purports to give the opinion of the Army Commander who succeeded KOISO and then his own opinion as to the motive for action taken.

*is objected to.*

(5) We object to the last sentence in Section 10 of the affidavit beginning with the words, "in reply to this" and continuing to the end of the affidavit, on the ground that the letter referred to therein is not produced nor the failure to produce it properly accounted for.

Since those portions of the affidavit to which objection is not made throw such little light on the issues before the Tribunal, we respectfully submit that the affidavit should be rejected in toto.

D. N. Sutton



*Koiso no 4*

29 October 1947

Re: IWAKURO, Takeo  
Def. Doc. #2567 - Objections

*See Summary  
copy  
JY*

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D. N. Sutton



- 2 -  
CURRICULUM VITAE

1 APRIL 1939: Relieved of Secretary of the Natural Resources Bureau and the membership of the Equipment Bureau of the War Department

Name: IWAKURO, Takao

Date of Birth: 10 October 1887

Address: 789 Denenchofu, 2-chome, Ohmori-ku, Tokyo

7 September 1939: Assigned to the General Staff Office

30 May 1916: Graduated from the Central Military Preparatory School, the Staff of the Kwantung Forces

10 February 1939: Promoted to Major-General

1 December 1930: Entered the Military Academy

15 October 1941: Promoted to Major-General

27 May 1918: Graduated from the Military Academy

1 March 1945: Promoted to Lieutenant-General

25 December 1918: Appointed sublieutenant, assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment

18 August 1921: Assigned to the 1st Infantry Regiment of Formosa

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15 April 1924: Assigned to the 16th Infantry Regiment

26 July 1927: Promoted to Captain, assigned to the Company Commander

1 March 1928: Assigned to the Equipment Bureau of the War Department

12 December 1928: Assigned to the Technical Headquarters of the War Ministry and concurrently assigned to a member of the Equipment Bureau of the Ministry

8 August 1932: Promoted to Major

21 December 1934: Assigned to the General Staff Office.

26 December 1934: Concurrently assigned to a member of the Equipment Bureau and a secretary of natural Resources Bureau

14 March 1935: Assigned to an instructor of the Military Staff College

1 August 1936: Promoted to Lieutenant-Colonel



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**IWAKURO, Hideo**

**Request by MUTO, Akira**

- a. This person is a Japanese, resident of Tokyo.**
- b. He was formerly in Charge of a section in the Military  
Affair Bureau under MUTO and can give relevant testimony as to  
MUTO's policies, declarations, utterances and attitude toward  
the initiation of war.**



1-2 Misakicho, Kanda-ku

Tadao Wikawa

Secretary General  
Cooperative Party

President

Co-operative Fire & Marine Insurance Corp.

Co-operative Development Co., Ltd.

Kanda (25)-2622

INTERROGATION OF

IWAKURO, Hideo

Date and Time: 29 May 1946, 1100-1230 hours.

Place : Room 374, War Ministry Building,  
Tokyo, Japan.

Present : IWAKURO, Hideo  
Mr. Elton M. Hyder Interrogator  
Mr. Tadao Wikawa Interpreter  
Miss Claire Stefanelli Stenographer  
Mr. Henry R. Sackett

Oath of Interpreter, administered by  
Mr. Hyder:

Mr. Hyder : Do you solemnly swear, by Almighty God, that  
you will truly and accurately interpret and  
translate from English into Japanese and from  
Japanese into English, as may be required of  
you, in this proceeding?

Mr. Wikawa : I do.

Questions by : Mr. Hyder.

Q. ....

A. On the major programs the Manchurian Government consulted  
with the Kwantung Army.

Q. Who in the Kwantung Army?

A. They were in consultation with various people in charge of  
various affairs. For instance, if economics it would be  
the economic section.

Q. You mean, they consulted with you, for instance, on economics?

A. Occasionally they came.

Q. Who in the Manchukuo Government consulted with you?

A. For instance, people around the Industry Division came and  
consulted with me their plan as to what they were going to do.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. People in the Industry Division of the Manchukuo Government?
- A. Yes. The relation was almost similar to the present relation between GHQ and the Japanese Government but actually the Manchurian Government people had to consult with the Kwantung Army. They had no construction.... they had no engineers. They had to consult the differences between GHQ and Parliamentary Government. There was an agreement. There was no treaty between the GHQ and the Manchukuo Government.
- Q. There was a secret agreement made after September 1932 that officials of the Manchukuo Government had to be approved by the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army?
- A. No, not exactly. All the Manchurian people, originally the Manchurian natives, could be employed as they wished but when Japanese citizens went to be employed by the Manchurian Government they had to get the recommendation of the Kwantung Army before they could be employed.
- Q. That was by agreement?
- A. Kind of agreement.
- Q. Written agreement?
- A. Probably a written agreement, I don't know.
- Q. You never saw a copy of it?
- A. I think I looked at it and it was in five articles. I don't remember exactly.
- Q. Wasn't it a secret agreement? It was not publicly announced?
- A. I think it was a secret agreement.
- Q. How did you learn of the provisions of that treaty? Do you recall? How did you learn that there were five articles?
- A. I looked at it.
- Q. Do you recall the other articles and the date that it was made?
- A. I do not remember the date exactly but maybe sometime in March of that year. The year I went over.
- Q. In March of 1932?
- A. 1932.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. Can you recall the articles?  
A. One was about a peace agreement. I do not recall the other articles.
- Q. Maybe I can refresh your memory. Did it provide for mutual aid?  
A. No, nothing of that sort.
- Q. Did it provide for the defense of Manchuria by the Kwantung Army?  
A. That kind of article was in the agreement of military alliance, of September 15, 1932. It was the mutual defense pact. The defense ought to be carried out by both countries not by the Japanese Army.
- Q. Do you recall who signed the agreement of March? The one you think was signed in March?  
A. Probably General HONSHO.
- Q. Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army and the Chief Executive of Manchukuo?  
A. No, I don't recall the articles but my impression was a very broad...brief one.
- Q. Do you recall the nature of it? Economics, politics, etc?  
A. I think it mentioned Manchurian Government personnel. Those were the most important articles. I don't remember the other articles. I recall that at the beginning there was a statement that Manchukuo should consist of the five races residing in the Chinese continent, Manchuria and Japan.... should become a commonwealth of five races, regarding that kind of article but I don't recall exactly what it was.
- Q. Did it name the positions that were to be filled by Japanese residents or by Japanese?  
A. No, nothing of that sort.
- Q. Do you recall how long the agreement was to be in force?  
A. Until the end of the Manchukuo Government, it must have been in force.
- Q. Until the end?  
A. That means the end of this war.
- Q. Did you ever see an agreement signed by the War Minister, ARAKI, and the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army,



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. and Henry Pu Yi of Manchukuo?

A. I never saw that agreement.

Q. Did you know of or hear of an agreement that provided that the entire administration of Manchukuo was to be confined to the Japanese Army...the Kwantung Army of Manchuria?

A. I knew of no such agreement...no such written agreement that subjugated the Manchurian Government to the Kwantung Army. So far as I remember it might have been actually so but not in an written agreement.

Q. It was a written agreement.

A. I am surprised about that.

Q. What was your mission in Manchuria?

A. Chiefly, on the industrial development of Manchukuo.

Q. Did you take with you a plan for the industrial development of Manchukuo?

A. No, no plan.

Q. Did you work one up while you were in Manchuria?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us, generally, what it provided?

A. What kind of enterprises ought to be initiated in Manchuria. The railroad and road plan...all such things.

Q. When was that? Who worked that out?

A. End of 1932 to 1933.

Q. Was that plan approved by the Kwantung Army?

A. I had the approval of the so-called Special Duty Department, (Tokumubu) of the Kwantung Army.

Q. Did you receive decisions of the Cabinet here in Tokyo?

A. No, nothing at all...probably in cases where they wanted some materials for the department. To that extent they had to get the sanction of the Japanese Government.

Q. That plan that you worked out...did it provide for a controlling policy...how you could control the economy of Manchuria?

A. The so-called planned economy of Manchuria was already in existence before my arrival. I was more or less interested in this development.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

Q. Who prepared that plan?

A. Probably my predecessor, Major MORI, Takeshi.

Q. Was that plan being followed?

A. It was being carried through but that plan excluded Japanese capitalists from entering Manchuria.

Q. Who was to furnish the capital under the MORI Plan?

A. They excluded such big capitalists as MITSUI, MITSUBISHI, etc. It selected wealthy rising financiers and businessmen in general.

Q. Only certain industries could be established in Manchuria, could they not?

A. It was in the beginning. Only the riveting kind of industries.

Q. None that would conflict with the industries in Japan?

A. Some were conflicting.

Q. They were not encouraged, were they?

A. It was encouraged. It was planned in accordance...an enterprise that was suitable to certain localities. It didn't pay much attention as to whether they conflicted.

Q. Didn't they attempt to correlate the economy of Manchuria and Japan?

A. The Kwantung Army.....was not to utilize Manchuria for the selfish purpose of Japan so they had no consideration of that sort whether it was conflicting or not.

Q. Were you familiar with the Japan-Manchuria Joint Economic Committee?

A. There was such a Commission but they never acted. No substance or action took place by that Commission.

Q. When was it established?

A. Probably September 1932.

Q. Do you know their function?

A. They probably convened once and had supper together.

Q. This Committee was to give its opinion to Manchuria and Japan regarding the correlation of both countries?

A. Probably so, but they never actually functioned.

Q. Were most of the important offices in the Manchukuo Government held by Japanese?



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

- A. Not all of them. Japanese officials employed by the Manchurian Government were Manchurians. There was no discriminating treatment between the original Manchurian and Japanese nationalized Manchurians.
- Q. <sup>you</sup> Would/ repeat that again?
- A. Japanese civilians employed by the Manchurian Government would be considered Manchurians, were treated as Manchurians so that they could not have any discriminating or favorable treatment for the original Manchurians.
- Q. But they could only be appointed upon the recommendation of the Kwantung Army, could they not?
- A. By the recommendation of the Kwantung Army they were appointed.
- Q. I want to go back to the Japan Manchuria Economic Commission. When it made a decision it presented that to the Board of General Affairs of the Manchukuo Government, did it not?
- A. I don't remember exactly how it was considered. I thought that Commission did not function at all. There are so many Japanese commissions in the Japanese Government created by some officer and then the succeeding officer just destroys it or neglects it.
- Q. This Commission officed in Manchuria?
- A. It was in Manchuria.
- Q. Were there any Joint Commissions other than that?
- A. I don't remember any other. I did not think their work important. Except for that dinner party they didn't function at all. I only recalled the name by your mentioning it.
- Q. Did you ever give them records or advice or ever appear before it?
- A. I never gave any advice. I had nothing to do with that Commission.
- Q. The Chief of the General Affairs Bureau of Manchukuo was always filled by Japanese, was it not?
- A. Yes.
- Q. That was the most important Bureau in the Manchukuo Government?
- A. Yes, it was.
- Q. Was there any understanding that it was always to be filled by Japanese?
- A. No agreement at all.



(IWAKURO, Hideo 29 May 1946 Cont'd)

- Q. How did it happen that it was always filled by Japanese?  
A. It must be tradition...with the establishment of the Manchurian Government.
- Q. Who appointed the Chief of that Bureau?  
A. The Manchurian Government or Emperor of Manchuria. In the beginning there was no Emperor so the Manchukuo Government did do that.
- Q. Do you know the function of that office...Chief of the General Affairs Bureau?  
A. A kind of liaison office.
- Q. Between whom?  
A. Between the Kwantung Army, the Manchurian central government, and the Manchurian local governments. Correction... between various departments of the Manchurian Government and the Kwantung Army and the unified program.
- Q. In other words, the Commander in Chief of the Kwantung Army gave his decisions directly to the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau who in turn gave them out to the various departments of the Manchukuo Government?  
A. The Commander of the Kwantung Army never gave an order to the Chief of General Affairs Bureau.
- Q. How do you know that?  
A. The Chief of the General Affairs Bureau planned various things and he was more or less independent.
- Q. He planned the economy of Manchuria?  
A. Yes, he did.
- Q. How do you know that?  
A. I had some permission with that office. If someone gave advice to him then the Chief of the General Affairs would adopt his plan and make it the Chief's own (?) plan, then issue the order through the various Executive Departments.
- Q. He did that several times?  
A. Several times he gave advice or suggestions which he thought necessary for the development of Manchuria.
- Q. And it was subsequently issued as an order of the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau?  
A. No, the Chief of the General Affairs Bureau just took it as a reference but he himself planned his own.