

EXHIBIT NO. 361

DATE 15 January 1947

This Exhibit has been transferred to Evidentiary  
Document.

The number is 4185.

**28 February 1946 is new Evid. Dec. 4185**

JAPANESE PERSONAL NOTES

A R M Y

12 February 1946

ARAKI, Sadao (General)

1931-1933 War Minister during the main developments of the Manchurian Campaign.

1934 Retired, in order to avoid the Parliament session due to illness.

1938-1939 Education Minister in the first Konoye Cabinet and the Hiranuma Cabinet.

Publications: Japan's Mission in Showa.

He took the initiative for the revival of Bushido Spirit in the army, and later on as Education Minister in the Japanese youth groups. He had a strong influence upon the spirit, especially of the young officers, and was considered as a spiritual leader of the revolution of February, 1936, but in this revolution hadn't appeared as an active leader. Since his retirement from the army in 1936 his influence upon the army decisions seems to have diminished considerably.

KOISO, Kuniaki

1932 outstanding leader of a fighting unit in Manchuria; the same year Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

1935 Commander-in-Chief in Korea.

1939 (April) to 1940 (July) overseas minister in the Cabinets of Hiranuma and Yonai.

1942 Governor of Korea.

1945 Prime Minister.

He took the initiative for the first experiment of state controlled industry in Manchuria in 1933.

MACHIJIRI, Kozumoto (Viscount, General)

Twice aide-de-camp to the Emperor.

1937 (October) - 1939 (?) (April), Chief of the  
Military Affairs Bureau.

1943 Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces  
in China, in Saigon.

Gentleman; very clever and intelligent; expert  
concerning Indo-Chinese questions.

N

ITAGAKI, Seishiro

Chief of General Staff of Kwantung Army, 1935.

War Minister, June 1938 to August 1939, in the Cabinets of Konoye and Hiranuma during the negotiations about a military alliance between Germany and Japan.

Commander-in-Chief in Korea in 1943.

Quiet, self-composed, personality, qualified for leadership.

KAWABE, Shozo

Military Attache in Berlin about 1930.

1933, Commander of the Third Infantry Regiment in Nagoya.

1936, Chief of Staff of the Inspector of Military Education, during the revolution of February, 1936.

1939, Inspector of Education.

1941, Commander of unit in Manchuria.

1943, Commander-in-Chief of the Burman Campaign.

N  
Very moderate man of deep insight into the spiritual conditions of the Japanese Army officers; especially about the movements behind the revolution of February, 1936.

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KAWABE, Torashiro

1935, Military Attache in Russia; General Staff of the Kwantung Army.

1937-1938 Military Attache in Berlin. From 1939 on attached to the Air Corps. In charge of the surrender of the Japanese Government in Manila.

N  
Very moderate man; with personal knowledge of the situation in Berlin in 1937 and 1938, and probably of the political developments among the army groups in 1940 and 1941

MINAMI, Jiro

1931, War Minister during the beginning of the Manchurian Incident.

1934-1935, Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, and Japanese Ambassador to Manchukuo in 1935.

1942, Governor of Korea.

He has been many times considered as pretender for Premiership. Personal experience about the details of the Manchurian Incident, and long standing experience about the Japanese politics in Korea.

MAZAKI, Jinzaburo

1932-1933 (June), Vice-Chief of General Staff during the main developments of the Manchurian Campaign. Inspector of Military Education January 1934- July 1935.

After the revolution of February 1936 called to court-martial, but acquitted. Later on occasionally charged with Army inspection affairs.

He seems to have had a strong influence among the younger army officers, probably in a certain co-operation with General Araki, in spite of his vague attitude and character. He had probably no influence upon the later development of the Japanese politics after his retirement in about 1936.



SUGIYAMA, Gen

1934 (July) to 1936 (March), Vice-Chief of General Staff.

1936 (August) to 1937 (February), Inspector of Military Education.

1937 (February) to 1938 (June), War Minister in the Cabinets of General Hayashi and Konoye.

1938-1939 Commander-in-Chief in North China.

1940 (October) to 1944 (February), Chief of General Staff.

1944 Field Marshall.

Had been always in a leading position in the army during the main political developments. For instance, February revolution of 1936; conclusion of the Anti-comintern Pact; beginning and developing of the China Incident; beginning and developing of the Pacific War.

His personality was very difficult to understand, because speaking no foreign language he was rather reluctant and kept himself behind a screen. He never gave the impression of a peculiar military or otherwise intellectual capacity. So the reasons for his overwhelming influence upon the active groups of the younger army officers and the politics of the Japanese government generally are rather difficult to explain. Even his personal influence upon the Emperor must have been exceedingly strong. Probably Sugiyama on the whole was more powerful in the development of war politics than was General Tojo. It may be possible that both Generals Kawabe, especially the young brother, know of the mysterious influence of Sugiyama from their personal positions in the leading Japanese Army service.

D-

HATA, Shunroku (General)

1936-1937 Commander of Taiwan Army.

1937 full General; Inspector of Military Education.

1938 Commander-in-Chief of Japanese forces in Central China.

1939 Chief Aide-de-camp to the Emperor.

1939-1940 War Minister in the Cabinets of Abe and Yonai.

1942 Commander-in-Chief in China; successor of General Matsui.

High military qualities; close to conservative groups and to the Throne. He twice held high positions for a conservative purpose- first, War Minister in the moderate cabinets of Abe and Yonai; second, Commander-in-Chief in China as successor of extremist and noisy General Matsui.

TADA, Hayao (Lt. Gen.)

1935 Commander of the Japanese garrison in China.

1937 to March 1938 Vice-Chief of the General Staff.

1939 Commander of Japanese forces in North China.

He probably took the initiative for the peace feeler in 1937 towards Chiang Kai-Shek in his capacity as Vice-Chief of General Staff, and was the leader of the peace group in the army. A very intelligent, self-composed personality. Both philosopher and strong military leader; the most gifted among the Vice-Chiefs of General Staff in the period 1930-1940.

NAKAJIMA, Tetsuzo (Lt. Gen.)

Military attache in France.

Aide-de-camp to the Emperor.

December 1938 to October 1939 Vice-Chief of  
General Staff.

Under War Minister under Itagaki.

1943 Governor of North Sumatra.

A man without special qualities; decidedly  
inferior to his predecessor, General Tada.  
He became Vice-Chief of General Staff, prob-  
ably owing to his personal relationship with  
War Minister Itagaki.

NISHIO, Juzo (General)

1934 Vice-Chief of Kwantung Army.

1936-1937 Vice-Chief of General Staff under War Minister Teranzhi. *Terauchi.*

After the February incident of 1937 Commander of Imperial Guards. When he left the position as Vice-Chief of General Staff, General Sugiyama became War Minister.

1938 Inspector of Military Education and member of Supreme War Council.

1940 Commander of Japanese forces in North China.

Very intelligent, sincere soldier; devoted peculiarly to the efficient professional development of the army. His promotion to the position of Vice-Chief of General Staff after the February incident indicates his moderate political attitude. The same indication is given by his transfer to the Imperial Guards in 1937 when the new War Minister, General Sugiyama didn't consider him as a convenient collaborator in the General Staff.

N

*Notes Dressed in Black*  
Mrs. Homma was dressed in a black kimono when she entered the war crimes courtroom where her mate faces the hangman's noose for his part in Japan's war of aggression. She testified that Homma had once told her that Japan's worst trouble was "bad politicians and no statesmen."

She said her husband often told her that the Japanese armies should be used only for defense and never for aggression and added that the Japanese government's slogan "destroy the Anglo-American Alliance" was always a nightmare to Homma.

Mrs. Homma testified her husband made three attempts to obtain peace but these efforts only enraged Premier Tojo as did Homma's "peaceful policy" toward the Filipinos.

Camera Bulbs Flash  
Homma's wife entered court to the accompaniment of flashing camera bulbs and the glare of movie lights. Her testimony followed Homma's three day appearance on the witness stand in his own defense.

Homma earlier was extremely agitated and nervous when he testified before the American Military Tribunal while relating events preceding the Japanese conquest of Corregidor.

E. McKinney,

International Prosecution Section,  
APO 500, TOKYO,  
San Francisco, California.

8 February 1946


I have the honor to give you, herewith, the personal experience in my official capacity as Military Attache with General Homma.

When the Reich Government, in the winter of 1937 to 1938, acted as peace mediator between the Japanese Government and Chiang Kai-shek, the German Ambassador, Von Dirksen, of course was in charge of these affairs, but simultaneously and paralleling his contact with the Japanese Foreign Minister, the Japanese General Staff was very anxious to inform the German Military Attache about many details of the Japanese ideas and conflicting opinions in order to facilitate the successful conclusion of the peace negotiations. The informer was General HOMMA as Chief of the Second Section of the General Staff. He stressed repeatedly the General Staffs and his most earnest desire for peace and accepted several advices from my side for this purpose to smooth the Japanese demands.

When the Japanese Cabinet eventually decided to break off the negotiations, General HOMMA came in the night time to my mansion to inform me beforehand and he blamed with greatest despair and bitterness the Cabinet and especially War Minister SUGIYAMA because he had not resisted this fatal decision. General HOMMA even mentioned a secret meeting of the General Staff where the firing of the Japanese Cabinet had been suggested and only after a long and careful deliberation refused.

I refer this experience to you, Dear Mr. McKinney, as it may be of value to you in forming a complete picture of General HOMMA.

Yours sincerely,



8 February 1946

Mr. Worth E. McKinney,  
Attorney,  
International Prosecution Section,  
GHQ, SCAP, APO 500, TOKYO,  
C/O Postmaster,  
San Francisco, California.

Dear Sir:


I have the honor to give you, herewith, the personal experience I had in my official capacity as Military Attache with General HOMMA, Masaharu.

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Yours sincerely,



5 February 1946

MUTO, Akira (Lt. General)

Military Attache, Berlin, 1937-1939.

1937-1939 Various important posts in North and Middle China.

1939, military representative to the Anglo-Japanese parley in Tokyo.

October 1939, Director, Military Affairs Bureau.

1942, Commander in North Sumatra. He had been Director of the important Military Affairs Bureau in the most important period before the Pacific War. He seemed not to belong to the extremist groups.



ABE, Nobuyuki (General, Prime Minister)

1930, Vice War Minister under War Minister UGAKI in the liberal Cabinet of HAMAGUCHI.

1933, full general.

1936, after the Japanese incident resigned from the Supreme War Council.

August 1939 to January 1940, Prime Minister.

His Cabinet was characterized by the policy of non-involvement in the European War and by endeavors of Foreign Minister Admiral NOMURA to adjust diplomatic relations with the United States, Great Britain and Russia.

April 1940, Envoy extraordinary to the New National Government of China under Wang Ching Wei. He concluded the Sino-Japanese basic treaty after eight months' of negotiation.

1945 Governor of Chosen after the formation of the KOISO Cabinet.

A conservative member of the army close to the elder statesmen. His political attitude is characterized by the non-involvement policy of his Cabinet.

TERAUCHI, Jaichi (Field Marshal, Count)

As lieutenant attached to German Infantry Unit in Stettin.

Various posts in the Imperial Guards.

1936, after February incident War Minister in the Cabinet of HIROTA. Forced the resignation of this Cabinet after an attack against the army by a member of the Parliament.

1939, invited by the Reich Government to inspect the campaign in Poland.

1941, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in the Pacific War.

Enjoyed great confidence among the young officer groups. Probably mainly owing to his noble rank as the son of the famous Field Marshal TERAUCHI of the Russo-Japanese War and owing to his outstanding gentlemanlike attitude. His interest and influence upon the Japanese foreign policy seemed restricted and his relations with the Chief of General Staff SUGIYAMA seemed some times rather tense.

TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu (Lt. Gen., Ambassador)

Member of the Japanese delegation to the League of Nations and in 1932 of the Japanese delegation to the Disarmament Conference.

1936, Retired; afterwards engaged in political movements.

September 1940, Ambassador to Moscow (under Foreign Minister MATSUOKA). He reached, in January 1941, an understanding with Molotov to establish a mixed commission to study a long term Pacific treaty between Russia and Japan.

In June of 1941 he concluded a trade agreement and in September 1941 the Board of Demarcation Operation pending three years since the NOMONHAN incident came to a final settlement by the Manchuria, Mongolia, Soviet Border Conference.

His successes in Moscow were probably achieved mainly due to the general political situation resulting from the Neutrality Pact between Soviet Russia and Japan concluded in April 1941.

YANAGAWA, Heisuke (Lt. General, Cabinet Minister)

Usual career of a qualified officer of the General Staff.

1932, Vice War Minister.

1936, placed on reserve list.

November, 1937 Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese attack against Hangchow.

Afterwards engaged in political positions:

December 1938 to December 1940, Director of the China Affairs Board.

In the second KONOYE Cabinet Minister of Justice and concurrently Vice President of the national movement for assistance of the throne. Third KONOYE Cabinet Minister Without Portfolio.

A very intelligent and moderate man with a great knowledge of the China policy, 1938-1940, and of general politics of the Second and Third KONOYE Cabinets.

UMEZU, Joshijiro (Military Attache, Berlin)

Commander-in-Chief in North China, 1934 to 1935; concluded the Ho-Umezu agreement.

1936, after the February incident Vice War Minister in the Cabinets of ABE and YONAI.

May 1939 to the Japanese surrender, Commander-in-Chief in Manchoukuo and Japanese Ambassador.

1940, full general.

A very moderate man with profound knowledge of the Japanese policy in Manchuria.

8 February 1946

LEADING POSITIONS IN THE JAPANESE ARMY

For leadership of the Japanese Army there are three posts of paramount importance; first, War Minister; second, Chief of the General Staff, respectively, Vice Chief; third, Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. Furthermore, a strong influence had been always exercised outwardly by an anonymous group of young officers, between captains and colonels. The Inspector of Military Education claims de jure the same independent position and the same personal responsibility towards the Emperor as the War Minister and the Chief of General Staff but de facto he is, in many respects, subordinated to the War Minister and with a comparatively small political influence.

The Aide-de-Camps to the Emperor and their chiefs are only honorable and routine posts and limited to court functions.

Two lists attached

With reference to 1

DATE	NAME OF WAR MINISTER	CABINET	MAIN EVENT
1931	MINAMI	WAKATSUKI	Manchurian incident Sept. 1931
Dec 1931-May 1932	ARAKI	INUKAI	Assassination of Prime Minister
May 1932-Jan 1934	ARAKI	SAITO	Formation of Manchoukuo
Jan 1934-Sept 1935	HAYASHI	(SAITO (OKADA	No main event
Sept 1935-Mar 1936	KAWASHIMA	OKADA	February incident
Mar 1936-Feb 1937	TERAUCHI	HIROTA	Conclusion of anti-comintern pact . Cabinet resigns--forced by War Minister owing to attack in the Parliament
Feb 1937	NAKAMURA	HAYASHI	Retired due to illness
Feb 1937-June 1938	SUGIYAMA	(HAYASHI (KONOYE, 1st	No main event
June 1938-Aug 1939	ITAGAKI	( KONOYE, 1st ( HIRANUMA	Negotiations about German- Japanese Military Alliance without success.
Aug 1939-July 1940	HATA	( ABE ( YONAI	Non-involvement policy
July 1940-	TOJO	(KONOYE, 2nd (KONOYE, 3rd (TOJO	Three Powers Pact, Pacific War

CHIEFS OF STAFF AND VICE CHIEFS

Since the retirement of Prince Kanin as Chief of General Staff in October 1940, SUGIYAMA used the full weight of his position in order to influence the policy of the Cabinet. Therefore, the Vice Chief of the General Staff became restricted to his professional function as highest expert in military operations. During the appointment of Prince Kanin the vice chiefs were usually charged with the whole military and political influence of the General Staff. The following list gives the names of outstanding Vice Chiefs of Staff in this respect:

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With reference to 2:

June 1933 to July 1934	-	General UEDA
July 1934 to March 1936	-	General SUGIYAMA
Aug 1937 to Dec 1938	-	General TADA (He is mainly responsible for the peace feeler of the Japanese Army toward Chiang Kai-shek in the autumn of 1937)

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With reference to 3:

(The list of Directors of the Military Affairs Bureau may be incomplete and somehow incorrect because the personal changes in this post were not published and became known only by personal experience)

Oct 1937 to Oct 1939 (?)	-	MACHIJIRE
Oct 1939 to 1942	-	MUTO
1942		OKAMOTA (Suicide after Japanese surrender in Bern)
After 1942		SATO AND EVENTUALLY ARISUE



INTERROGATION OF  
MAJOR GENERAL EUGENE OTT

Date and Time: 18 February, 1946. 1400-1600 hours

Place : Room 740, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

PRESENT : Major General Eugene Ott

Mr. Worth E. McKinney,	Interrogator
Lt. Comdr. John D. Shea (USNR)	Interrogator
Miss Dinah Braun	Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. McKinney.

- Q. General, do you know TSUDA, Shingo - he was an industrialist?
- A. TSUDA - yes, I know him.
- Q. When did you first get acquainted with him - about when?
- A. Comparatively late. I think it must have been in 1940 or 1941.
- Q. What business or position did he have?
- A. At that time he was president of the KANABO TEXTILE CO. His residence was in Osaka.
- Q. What was the operation of this company, what were they making?
- A. They were making cloth, carpets - I think any kind of textiles and I think later on, at the beginning of my last time as Ambassador, and probably especially when I had left, he extended his business to other districts. I think it was then he began horse-breeding in Manchukuo. He wanted to be independent in raw material supplies, to create his own raw material for textiles from horse-hairs and he spoke about, but I don't know if he finished his idea, he spoke about creating an airplane factory in Kyoto. What happened about this, I do not know.

*Exhibit # 361*

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 15 cont'd)

- Q. About what size was the operation of his textile business, small or large?
- A. Large. It was one of the leading textile companies of Japan. He was a self-made man who extended his interests in a rather remarkable way.
- Q. What connection did he have with the politics of Japan?
- A. With the politics?
- Q. Yes.
- A. I asked him, after having made a little more contact with him - he became I think in 1942 the president of the German-Japanese Society in Kobe, which was a friendship Society - a German-Japanese Friendship Society - well, he became president of that and so I had some more contact with him. Whenever I went to Kobe to see my friends, Germans who lived there, I saw him, and when he came here we sometimes had tea at the Embassy. I asked him I think several times, "Are you interested to join the leading politicians", because he was a very intelligent and active man and a moderate man. He told me, "Never. I have been asked several times if I would like to become Minister without Portfolio or for Commerce, but I do not like to join this active political life. I prefer to work in my companies which I created myself and I will do my best that it works for the sake of Japan".
- Q. Did he tell you who had asked him to be Minister without Portfolio?
- A. I beg your pardon.
- Q. Did he tell you who had asked him to be Minister without Portfolio?
- A. No, I met him, I remember, only once in close contact with the official people, when I went to the Foreign Minister to have an official talk. He was in the waiting room so obviously he had been called, or he had asked to see the Foreign Minister, who was I think at that time, TOGO. It is the only detail I can give you about his personal contact with leading people.
- Q. Did he tell you that a short time before you asked him - that he had been offered a minister's post, or some time later?
- A. I think some time later.
- Q. You mean after you had asked him?
- A. Yes, some time after I had asked him. But this question of mine was just talking - not with any purpose in mind. I think I met him

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 10, cont'd)

later in the waiting room of the Foreign Minister.

- Q. Did he give you the time when he had been asked to be Minister without Portfolio?
- A. No.
- Q. You don't know what year?
- A. No, I don't know.
- Q. It was prior to 1940?
- A. I think it was after 1940 - probably this was in 1942, during the World War, I suppose.
- Q. Now, did he manufacture allkinds of textiles?
- A. As far as I know, yes. I think Mr. McKinney, this is quite easy to know because the KANABO TEXTILE CO.'s factory was a very famous enterprise with branch offices in many cities. For instance a big one in China - Shanghai.
- Q. Do you know whether or not he had any contracts with the Japanese Government - any war contracts for manufacturing any materials for war purposes?
- A. This I don't know, but I am sure he had because as one of the leading textile companies, he must have had.
- Q. What would you think he would have contracts for - to furnish what kind of material?
- A. Probably uniforms, maybe for instance, blankets for horses and maybe material for tents.
- Q. How about the naval uniforms?
- A. Probably, but I don't know because I think when the Japanese bought for war supply, they had to buy supplies very much to the last possibility of such companies because supply from abroad was not existing. They had to furnish, I think, the last fiber of supplies for war - I think so.
- Q. Do you know whether or not he furnished any fabric for the manufacture of airplanes?

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 18, cont'd)

- A. This I don't know.
- Q. What would you think, from what you know, as to whether he would have done so?
- A. I think this depends on the system in Japan - if they divided the companies as we in Germany did divide the textile companies, some furnishing material for clothing, some for airplanes, parachutes and such things. I don't know what they did here in Japan. It would depend on the system. As I have seen the system of the Japanese Supply Board, I think that he had to furnish all he could furnish at the same time.
- Q. Did he have any competitors in his line - any other companies you know of that might furnish the same materials or products?
- A. I know KANABO had some competitors - how many, I don't know. I know of only one other at this moment, only one other rather big textile concern, KATTAKURA SPINNING CO. with works all over Japan. Which one is bigger, whether KANABO or KATTAKURA, I don't know. Probably both had been used to the last possibility for war purposes.
- Q. Now, General, what would you say would be the yearly operation of TSUDO's company - what would you say would be the yearly income in yen?
- A. This I don't know.
- Q. Could you give us some idea - an enormous amount, or a small amount?
- A. I think that KANABO had been operating on a fairly large amount.
- Q. What would you say - about how many yen of business a year?
- A. That is difficult - to have the responsibility to tell you that.
- Q. Just an opinion. I know you don't know without examining the books, but give us your best opinion as to the size of his operations - what they would be in a year, during the war period, when you met him.
- A. It is with reservation, you know, because really, I do not know it. I would like to recommend to you to ask my former economical attache, Dr. TI-ZHY. He was economical attache of the German Embassy as long as I was Ambassador and I always have seen that he has very exact knowledge of the Japanese industrial situation so probably he knows too approximately the amount of business of such companies. As far as I can tell you, maybe it was 50,000,000 yen - it was a big company. And the style of TSUDO himself...his living was of a man of remarkable income.

(MAJ GEN OTT Cont'd Feb 18)

- Q. What about his friends among the Military and the Navy officers? Did he have friends among the Military and Navy men?
- A. I think that he was highly estimated because he was a man who had proved himself as a self-made man for he developed a very large company, but I think he kept himself rather aside from the Army and Navy personal friendships, more so I think, than the big ZAIBATSU Companies, to remain as far as possible independent.
- Q. He stood to gain a great deal from war contracts, if war were declared, then he stood a chance to gain a great deal of money by selling supplies to the army?
- A. Yes.
- Q. So it was advantageous financially to him if there was a war going on?
- A. As for all - as for the whole industry of Japan it would be.
- Q. Did he tell you whether or not he was in favor of war?
- A. I never remember talking with him about war that he told of any desire for Japan going to war. This I don't remember. During the war, I think and I believe we had some talks and he was earnestly devoted to his duty to furnish material to his country...but not as a war monger. You know, he was, compared with many other Japanese men, a serious objective man which I personally esteemed very highly
- Q. Do you know whether or not he was offered a place on the cabinet by either the Army or Navy?
- A. I don't know who offered it to him. I lost my contact completely after 1943 when I left. If later on he became more closely associated I do not know. In my time, decidedly he talked to me that he had been asked some time, as I told you, to join the cabinet, but he refused. But in which way, I don't believe he talked about that.
- Q. He did not tell you in what capacity?
- A. No and I did not ask him because when Japanese tell you such things as he had been asked several times to join the cabinet and refused, this is more than he usually dares to talk about. They are very reluctant on these questions so I did not like to pry him into some talk which probably later on he might regret.

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 18 cont'd)

Q. But he told you they had offered him a place so evidently he stood high enough with the peers in Japan to be considered as a man whom they thought would go along with the policy which they had established, did he not?

A. I think they considered him a man of a certain independence from the big trust companies, and as a man who could perhaps more easily be handled than those very difficult big company people who always had enormous backing and financial background. He was a comparatively simple man - a self-made man, and maybe they hoped he could be more easy to win to their side without the big financial background. This is my belief, that it was the main reason.

Q. He did, I believe you stated, become a member of the Japanese-German Society?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the object for which this organization was formed?

A. The object of this society - we created the Japanese-German Society here in Tokyo, one in Kobe and one in a smaller place, SENDAI. There had been some university professors who studied in Germany. These societies were to give personal, friendly contact with various circles of the Japanese people, and to give the Germans a little more personal contact with the Japanese, because, generally, the German people had been living here in a kind of colonial status, coming here, making their business to avoid having real personal contact with the Japanese, and so, when our relations became closer, even before the Alliance, everybody had the same desire to become a little more acquainted with Japanese circles. The society was formed for this purpose.

Q. Did you have as members of this society, members of the cabinet or members of the Diet?

A. Usually not. Usually these societies had been quite unofficial and members of the cabinet or members of the Diet - it may be - but usually the members of the cabinet and high officials were not members.

Q. Was there in this society any members from the Cabinet or Diet?

A. No.

Q. Did any of the cabinet members or any of the Diet members attend any of the meetings of this society?

A. I don't think so.

(MAJ GEN OTT Oct 18 cont'd)

- Q. Don't you know whether they ever attended?
- A. I think after the Three Powers Pact, then this society had for instance, a dinner for celebrating say the signature date of the Three Power Pact, and there I think I remember were some members of the Cabinet too - maybe usually the Minister of Education, because it was a kind of a cultural society.
- Q. How about the war minister?
- A. I don't think so.
- Q. You don't believe he ever attended any of the meetings?
- A. No, I don't think so. Usually the army and navy kept rather aside of these cultural, these more cultural things.
- Q. In this society, did you discuss Japan's policy for a Greater Asia. Was that discussed?
- A. There were no discussions - some speeches after dinner. Formal speeches were common after Japan had entered the war. The coming war had been spoken about usually in a very typical way.
- Q. Who made the speeches - who usually made the speeches?
- A. From the Japanese side, the Japanese President here in Tokyo, for instance Marquis OKOBO. He died I think and later on Marquis INOUE, former general, a retired general, who had been sent to Germany as a special ambassador to present a famous exhibition of Japanese oil art pieces sent to Germany in 1939 I think. He was the chief of this Japanese-German Society so he spoke and I as Minister usually made the speech to welcome the people, and then maybe some Japanese who liked to talk after dinner. But it was usually in an uncompromising way.
- Q. Was not the purpose of this society to make the Germans and Japanese acquainted more with the policies of the Germans in Europe and of the Japanese in Asia?
- A. Politically - it was much less political than a kind of a personal contact. I remember once when I formulated the idea of this society to be a clearing house for business men, cultured men to meet and to exchange ideas and to win closer professional relationships. This was the main purpose.
- Q. Was not the Japanese policy of war and the German policy of war discussed at these meetings?
- A. Maybe, among individuals. Among officials in the way of official speeches as at that time it was usual on every occasion where we

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met. But the purpose was as I say more professional contact between different types of professional people.

Q. Did this society have a charter or any minutes or writings or the formation of the society?

A. What do you mean?

Q. When you formed the Japanese-German Society, did you have a charter saying what the purposes of this society were?

A. I think so.

Q. Where is the original charter?

A. I think there must have been a charter -

Q. And in this charter the purposes of the society were set out?

A. Surely.

Q. Do you have a copy of that or the original?

A. I am sure that in Japanese circles, you will find it. But I personally have none and if the Embassy people here have one, I do not know.

Q. Who drew up the charter or the writings of the organization?

A. It was before my time. When I came it was already existing and who managed it I don't know.

Q. I am talking about the writing now. Who was the author who drew it up?

A. I don't know because it was before my time. when I came it was already organized. But it was developed parallel politically to the politically closer relations.

Q. If it had to develop along the political ideas, then it would have to develop and discuss the plans of the Japanese war, would it not, because that was the main talk of the day at that time, was it not?

A. Yes, but discussing the Japanese war - that was a question they were very reluctant to discuss because they were always very afraid that in speaking with foreign people, even allies, about such questions, they could become into a dangerous situation. So the Japanese side were always rather reluctant to speak about these questions. If I remember our talks on such occasions they were



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of a very vague character. The Japanese would eat their dinner without talking a word and afterwards if there was some talk, it was always very difficult for the reason that a lot of Japanese people spoke only Japanese.

Q. This charter of the Japanese-German Society, was it drawn in Japan or in Germany?

A. I think it was drawn here. But we had a parallel organization in Germany but I think the charter was a little different as I believe with all German organizations later German propaganda tried to develop these societies at more places during the war and I remember that I have seen in newspapers that General Inoue went to this city and that city for the swearing in of new Japanese societies.

Q. Was that in Germany or in Japan?

A. In Germany. If Marquis Inoue is here he probably must have this charter in his possession.

Q. Whose idea was it to organize this society - the Japanese or the German idea?

A. I think it was made here by the Japanese people.

Q. Give me the name of whomever you think was responsible for this organization.

A. Maybe Marquis OKUBO. He was a member of the House of Peers and a former governor of some province. He was a man of high personal family rank, speaking quite good German. He had studied law I think in Germany and was a personal friend of Germany. I think, but I am not sure, that he died a few years ago. He was a very old man and he probably negotiated this. But generally speaking, what I would like to stress is that the value of this society had been comparatively small because on things we have to discuss of real importance in political or professional things, we always discussed those with the official people.

Q. Your opinion is that the society was originated by a member of the Diet?

A. A member of the Peers, but not in his capacity as a member of the Peers - private interest.

Q. Did any members of the house of Peers belong to this society and attend?

A. I think several, yes. It was mainly a society from the Japanese

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side of people who had been studying in Germany medicine, or philosophy or something like that.

Q. You don't know where the original charter could be found of this society?

A. It may be that because of Japan's customs and regulations that the Minister of Education had to get a copy of the charter to be placed in the library of the Ministry of Education. It may be in the German Embassy. We had of course here a house eventually for this society. We had a kind of a mansion - a German-Japanese cultural house which was burnt down completely with the loss of the whole library.

Q. Do you suppose a copy could be found in Germany?

A. Maybe.

Q. Where do you think a copy could be found in Germany?

A. That is a very long way to get it. If you will agree, I will consider the question to find out some Japanese members of this society, until tomorrow or so, and give you the names of people that could perhaps have such knowledge.

Q. Now, TSUDO, what did he have to do in formulating policies and assisting in putting through the tri-partite pact?

A. I think only his business as chief of this textile company.

Q. Was he in favor of this tri-partite pact or not?

A. Yes, I think he was.

Q. Did he talk to you about the contents?

A. When the tri-partite pact was prepared it was in complete secrecy so nobody could talk about it. And when it had been made, probably we had talked about it. I don't remember in detail but I am sure that because it was the accomplished fact, that he agreed to it and did not object to it.

Q. Well now, the tri-partite pact had been discussed in Germany and Japan since 1938, had it not?

A. Since when?

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- Q. It started in 1938. There must have been talk of the treaty.
- A. Only more in official circles than in private circles. Private circles did not know about the negotiations concerning the military alliance in 1938 or 1939.
- Q. There was no secret made about it in Germany, that they intended to form a tri-partite pact with Japan and Italy along that time?
- A. I don't think so -
- Q. Was it not in all the papers?
- A. Not it was not in the papers.
- Q. But it was discussed among all the official family, was it not?
- A.- But here in Japan that a military alliance is being negotiated never was openly discussed here in Japan. I don't remember it and when the three powers pact had been concluded it was a complete surprise.
- Q. To whom?
- A. To the Japanese people. I remember MATSUOKA was anxious that nothing leak out about his negotiations and when it was published, it was a complete surprise.
- Q. What Japanese were backing him in obtaining this three power pact - who else was interested with MATSUOKA?
- A. MATSUMOTO now Minister working for the new constitution. He was at that time a vice prime-minister, no, he was director of the board of the law section, and in that capacity he was informed. And SHIRATORE and a man named SAITO. You will find his name in Who is Who. He was a kind of advisor to the foreign office. Can you give me the book. (Mr. McKinney hands book "WHO IS WHO" to Gen. Ott). MATSUOKA called him to his assistance occasionally to have a backing to several directions of public interest.
- Q. Anybody else?
- A. When we wondered how quickly MATSUOKA had managed this because the privy council was always rather difficult to manage as he was very exact in studying every detail of everything that we wondered about this and then I remember he mentioned the very strong assistance he had in the privy council from SUZUKI, the prime minister.
- Q. Who else backed him up in this privy council besides the ones you mentioned? Were they not all in favor of it.

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- A. I do not know. Meetings of the Privy Council were of the utmost secrecy. I only remember that MATSUOKA several times declared when we asked him how could he manage to win the privy council so quickly on this very important question, he told us "I am most strongly backed by SUZUKI who was vice president of the privy council at that time and had remarkable influence in the privy council and upon the emperor.
- Q. Who else in the privy council backed him in this?
- A. I don't know. Probably HIRANUMA. I am not sure. SHIRATORE and SAITO had been called to assist from and on account of two elements. SHIRATORE was an extremist and SAITO was a very liberal quiet minded man of law and justice.
- Q. TSUDO had nothing to do with the preparation or fulfillment of the pact?
- A. No.
- Q. But he did have, I believe you stated before, if war were declared, he would gain large financial gains by a war.
- A. The same as other people could.
- Q. Did he talk as though he was in favor of the war or against the war when you talked with him?
- A. We talked about the coming war never. When war had been declared, no Japanese, not a single Japanese dared to speak a word against the war because he was bound by the Imperial Script which absolutely controls the Japanese mind, and bound by Japanese tradition not to criticise the Emperor - that would be the case whether TSUDO was a friend or not - with anybody that would be the case. This was one of the main difficulties of our work here and you never, nearly never could have a conversation with the Japanese of a real open minded kind, you know, once a matter had been decided.
- Q. Now, TSUDO, did he know Minister Stanmer?
- A. TSUDO, as long as I have been here Ambassador, I don't think he met him; during the time of the negotiations for the three power pact, STAMMER did not see anybody to keep the thing a secret and after, he left immediately for Germany. If later on he did meet him, I don't know. You could perhaps get some more details about TSUDO from the general consul at Kobe, the German General Consul at Kobe who is living there now, Mr. BALSER because he knew him as a leading man of his district, or his consulate district. He met him many times more than I did. In fact, I think Mr. TSUDO must have a charter of the German-Japan Society because he was president in Kobe and the charter was the same all over the country so probably he has it - also Mr. BALSER might have one.

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QUESTIONS BY: LT. CMDR JOHN D. SHEA.

Q. General Ott, I have read one of your statements made to the CIC and in the first paragraph I am impressed with the inference that you did not have the desire to become a part of the political philosophy of Nazism or the Hitler Regime, am I correct in that assumption?

A. Yes, that is correct.

Q. In addition, General, have you any personal reason why you would not care to answer questions or make statements concerning the Nazi political regime of Germany, or the persons of that government, such as Hitler and Ribbentrop. Do you have any personal feeling or attitude that would lead you to desire not to answer pertinent questions touching upon this political party or these persons?

A. No, I do not.

Q. You do not?

A. No.

Q. You realize by now, General, that we are pursuing this interrogation by question and answer form with an object in view to determine what persons, and at what time and place, certain agreements and conversations were had between the persons of the German Government and the persons of the Japanese Government, having to do with the Tri-partite Pact or agreement so-called?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any allegiance to any of the persons concerned in the aforesaid question that would have a tendency to cause you to color your answer or to be, let us say, more discreet in your answers where these persons are concerned?

A. You mean Hitler and Ribbentrop?

Q. Yes.

A. My answer is no.

Q. If the questioning or the evidence, as it is developed, should perchance envelop some person in the German Government with whom you had been associated as a member of the German Army, would you still feel morally bound to speak the truth concerning that individual or do you now feel that you are willing to make the answer openly and truthfully without regard to this association or friendship?

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- A. I would like to make the answer corresponding to the truth.
- Q. I am reading now, General, from the statement which purports to have been made by you on or about January 29th, 1940, to the CIC apparently in the City of Tokyo, Japan. Did you make a statement on or about that date?
- A. Yes. On the 21st or 22nd.
- Q. It is dated here - let the record show that this statement is premised by written instrument signed by General Ott, which reads in part as follows: (Reading) "I hand you herewith a document dated November 15, 1940, prepared by me out of my own free will....!" I will ask you, General, from listening to this introduction, if that is the statement you refer to in your answer?
- A. Yes.
- Q. In Paragraph 1 of this statement, the last sentence of the paragraph, (reading) "I myself was the officer mentioned on pages 213 and 214 as intermediary between the Reich War Minister and Adoli Hitler". Do you remember having made that statement?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Can you explain now, General, what you meant by that statement, or enlarge on it so that we will know what this book is, what statements on pages 213 and 214 pertain to you in your dealings with Hitler?
- A. This book is written by GOEBBELS and is entitled VON KAISERHOF ZUR REICH KANZLEI. In this book GOEBBELS gives a report about the development of the National Socialist Movement until the moment when he came into power in 1933, and he mentioned on the pages mentioned, pages 213 and 214, that Hitler was asked by Reich's War Minister, VON SCHLEICHER, to become a member of a cabinet which SCHLEICHER tried to form after Papen had resigned. Goebbels mentions that Hitler or GOERING- this I don't remember exactly, asked to send for their negotiations, an active officer of Schleicher's surroundings. It does not mention my name but he writes that this officer tried to win Hitler over to join the cabinet; that Hitler refused after a very long explanation of his reasons, and this officer had been very much impressed and telephoned SCHLEICHER about the failure of his mission. This is the fact Goebbels gives.
- I remember this talk because it was my first meeting with Hitler, very exactly. At that time Schleicher tried to form a cabinet which could master very great difficulties such as non-employment, financial difficulties, and the danger of extremist outbursts of the German dissatisfaction with the whole situation.

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- Q. It was his object or idea generally to absorb Hitler and the National Socialist Movement into the government which he had in mind to form?
- A. It was his idea to draw in the nettles of this movement into the legal system of the Republic of Weimar.
- Q. By that you mean the then legally constituted government of Germany?
- A. Yes and I explained to HITLER that the only effective work in that time done by German groups had been the building up of a small but very well supported and trained small army, the so-called REICHSWER. That his activity with the slogan of "Treaty of Versailles" and his assistance, active assistance of communistic strikes in Berlin are impossible for the further development of the German quiet situation; that on one side there is a danger of breaking the foundation of the army and to give assistance on the other side to the most extremist left wing movements. So I asked him to stop his activity, to let the army and Schleicher form a cabinet and join this activity as vice-chancellor with the promise that the National Socialistic Movement would not interfere with the politics of this government. Hitler refused in a very long conversation. He declared the ideas of his movement and told me that the character of his movement does not allow it to stop because it is a movement which has to move and that he does not like to enter into any promises or compromises, but he asked the army to side with him and to go on in a most effective way clearing the way for the freedom of Germany. In other words, it was his idea to absorb the army rather than to join the then stabilizing government which the army was attempting to accomplish. So, eventually, we separated with this failure of my mission. Goering was present. Hitler, Goering and myself. After this conversation, Goering obviously decided that Hitler did not give any hopes to make a compromise, asked me for dinner alone and told me "Now, you heard the decision of Hitler, but you could ask Minister Von Schleicher if there is some chance that our movement goes on in attacking the Marxist movement" (that means social democrats, not the communists). I told him, "What do you mean". He told me "Clear the streets of the social democrats". I told him, "what do you mean. This is for the army absolutely impossible because it is contrary to any law". He told me, "But you must understand if we stop in our propaganda in the army and so on, we have to do nothing else then we have to go against the Marxists". I told him the army would never agree to such politics because the social democrats are considered an important part of Germany. For instance, during the world war, they proved themselves as an essential part of our nation with complete loyalty to the nation. I told him it was impossible for the army to consider this proposal. So, I went

(answer continued)

back to Berlin and met Schleicher the same evening and told him this and he told me "You see, Goering's talk gives some possibility of a split between Hitler and Goering otherwise he would not have talked to you, so probably he is gambling much cheaper than he proposed".

He telephoned to Weimar and asked me to come and arrange with him a kind of an agreement with the National Socialist party to tolerate for a short time his government. But he was completely disfavored by the National Socialists because this I suppose Hitler began behind the back of Schleicher, negotiations with Von Papen who won the vice presidency of Von Hindenberg to their other cabinet and by these veterans behind the screen, Schleicher was thrown away and Hitler came into power and the National Socialists were the leading power of the government. This was on 30 January 1933, the beginning of the real power of Hitler.

- Q. Then, it is your belief generally that certain members of the army, of the German army, not only were opposed to Hitler's program but, as with Schleicher, attempted to form a government to absorb this movement in Germany?
- A. Yes, generally the army at that time was not informed about the political details. It was Schleicher himself only and his small political staff where I had been chief, but I know by personal conversations with Rundstedt, for instance, Fromm, he was commander of the home armies, and Fritsch, he was commander-in-chief of the army, were strongly opposed to the idea that the National Socialist movement will take over the government. So Schleicher acted after my idea in the name of the majority of the army.
- Q. In relation to this incident which you have just outlined, and the outbreak of the Manchuria Incident - which was, if I am not correct, please correct me, September 10th, 1931,
- A. (Interrupting) Yes, in relation to these two dates, the Manchurian Incident had already occurred. The date we mention here is Nov. 1932.
- Q. Now, as a member of the army, the German Army, at that time, as you had previously stated in a capacity of the political staff of the German Army, so to speak --
- A. (Interrupting) Yes, that is right.
- Q. (continuing) Had the political staff of the German Army, or the German Army as such, the leaders thereof, made any plan with respect to the Manchurian Incident or not?
- A. No.



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(Answer continued)

A. As far as I know, they had not. I was chief of the interior politics but I don't believe they ever had because my demand to be sent to Manchuria was a complete surprise for the commander-in-chief. I asked him, in order to be as far as possible away from Berlin, to send me to Manchuria as I thought that was the most distant place and he was completely surprised and told me "This is an idea I appreciate because it is for the first time that by this we will be able to have some experience about the things which are going on in that part of the world."

May I mention here the day before Schleicher was overthrown - I think this is the first time this has been mentioned - we had a secret meeting of the general staff in Germany called by Von Hammerstein with two or three leading generals of the army and myself as a political chief. Hammerstein informed us on behalf of Schleicher that probably the next day Hitler would take over the power of Schleicher and Schleicher will be thrown out and asked this confidential circle "Can anything be done to avoid this very dangerous development". And we decided to ask Von Schleicher if he agrees to overthrow Hindenberg personally in a plot in order to avoid Hitler coming into power. We said "Is it not a very serious decision because Hindenberg was a man of highest estimation" and we too were very undecided if we could take responsibility for such action. So finally Schleicher asked not to do it because he felt that it would be an eternal blame on the German Army to go in this way against this most honorable man of world fame. So we did not act and fate went on.

Q. Thank you, General, that is very interesting.

A. You see the feeling at that time.

Q. Yes, and that is very interesting and very valuable in this line of questioning to determine somewhere along the line - we will have to determine when and under what circumstances the military portions came very definitely into the picture in support of this Nazi program, and their leaders, and who among their leaders, if any, had a hand in the tri-partite pact, or this desire to consolidate East Asia and bringing United States into the war.

A. In the National Socialist Development, and in the encroachment of the army to the National Socialists, they personally had a kind of responsibility like Von REICHENAU. He was a personal friend of Hitler and became later on the highest political advisor to the War Minister Von Blomberg. This General Von Reichenau had a very

(MAJ GEN CRT Feb 18 cont'd)

(answer continued)

strong influence among certain circles of younger officers, and he was the main reason, and this I do not say in dissatisfaction, why I had to leave my position. For, as I described in this document, I could not agree with his politics. I remember a meeting in the Reich where he, as the highest political advisor of the War Minister, said "Now, I have to tell you one thing. You must swallow this National Socialist movement. You can only go on with the great task of building up a new German Reich if it lays down by force many things which become absolute, and especially by going directly against the Marxists". That was just what Goering had asked me to do.

Q. By Marxists, you mean social democrats?

A. Yes.

Q. Who were the members of the Nazi Party?

A. They were the communists. The social democrats is a kind of a right wing of labor movements. Communists were the left wing.

Q. What was Hitler's party?

A. Mostly the right wing of the national fanatics. But at the same time a lot of people came from the left wing. That means people who like to be members of an activist group are partly communists and partly extremists. People like that are activists so I am sure in the development of the National Socialist party considerably came from the communist organization because of their desire to become active.

Q. When you say Marxists, you do not refer to the National Socialists?

A. No, to the social democrats. I think it is about similar to the labor union groups in the United States. Reichenau told the generals "The next time this will go on, you have to keep aside and not interfere even if it is against law and tradition. So I see still the generals sitting completely taken by surprise that this is now the new way of the government's activity. I don't know if they made protesting speeches later, but at this moment they did not. I personally took the position as quickly as possible to leave this place. As long as the interest of Hitler to build up a new army had been limited to reasonable limits, of course all German officers naturally were very glad because of it but we became very critical I think when Hitler in 1935 declared the building up of 35 divisions or something like that. Then the reasonable leaders of the army were convinced that this will surpass the solid foundation laid until that time and would eventually lead to an ill-founded army structure. And it would at the same time awaken the protest and the fear and enmity of the world.

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- Q. This General Van Scaelecker you mentioned was afterwards assassinated?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Do you think his assassination was connected with his opposition to the Nazi Party?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You contribute it directly to that?
- A. Yes.
- Q. There were other leading military men of the time purged in and about the same time?
- A. Yes. About the assassination of Von Schleicher, there had been an investigation made of this by the General Staff, and the General Staff gave a declaration to all the members of the General Staff - I got it too - where it has been said that there is not reason to blame Gen. Schleicher for his personal conduct, that unfortunately he had been the victim of political events. So it was absolutely clear to everyone who had ears that he had been assassinated for his opposition.
- Q. And this is the man to whom you have claimed your loyalty throughout these questioning periods?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And was it through his influence that you were sent in the first instance to Japan?
- A. No, it was not. It was out of no influence.
- Q. In consideration of your accepting a post out of Germany and in, as you say, so far a distant place, with an opportunity to study army procedure in Japan, had there been any consideration for such an assignment made to you by the Hitler Government or the so-called National Socialist Government at that time?

NOTE: The following answer was given as an  
"OFF THE RECORD" Answer.

- A. Nothing. I was told by the commander-in-chief: "Now, the political devil has got you (jokingly). You have to leave your position as political chief of the Minister of War". I told him "I am very glad, Your Excellency, I am waiting for that for a long time." He told me, "Now you have great merits and so I would like to send you to a place you would like to go, and as a special present, you will have to keep the whole time of your

(Answer continued)

official life the uniform of the General Staff". It was quite a peculiar thing that. So I went home to talk it over with my wife and I told her, "I think I would like to go to the southern part of Germany - Lake Conslow - as far away as possible from Berlin" and she told me immediately "Why don't you go to Manchuria? There it is a warm climate and a very interesting place to study and it is much further away". So I told her that was a fine idea and I went back to the commander-in-chief and said "Please send me to Manchuria. I would like to study Manchuria. And he told me "This is very surprising - I never thought of it but I will consider it. It would be interesting for us to have first hand knowledge of the Japanese Army after the world war. Next day he asked me to come to see him and told me, "Alright, go".

Q. What was his name?

A. Von Hammerstein. So this was just an idea of my wife's.

Q. This Hammerstein. Did you consider him a sympathizer with the National Socialists?

A. On the contrary - completely not.

Q. So that you had faith in his representations and in everything he said to you?

A. Absolutely. He was a close friend of Von Schleicher.

Q. And the consideration for your coming to Japan was your friendship with this General Von Hammerstein?

A. He was commander-in-chief and he had to decide it and my consideration was that I was upset up to here (indicating neck) and I wanted to go back to the simple professional duties of the army and wanted nothing to do with politics.

Q. When you arrived in Japan in the summer of 1933, you had no obligations at that time to the Nazi Party or Hitler, or any members of the army who were identified with that movement in Germany, is that right?

A. Yes, that is right.

Q. Now, I notice later on in your statement which seems to be divided into two parts "My activity as Military Attache to the German Embassy 1934-1938". Was there a period of time between 1933 in summer when you arrived in Japan and your taking over of this military attache position in the German Embassy? Was there

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(Question continued)

a period of time which elapsed during which you had no official position here in Japan?

- A. Yes, I went back to Germany after the term of my attachment as officer to the German Army was finished in December 1933 and started for Japan again in April 1934. I arrived in Germany about the New Year and was in Germany in preparation for my military attache task during January, February and March. This preparation consisted in my being informed about the development of weapons and technical ideas to be up to date for my official task in Japan.
- Q. When you returned then in December 1933, and during these three months that you remained there, was Hitler's government or the National Socialist Nazi Party in power in Germany?
- A. Yes.
- Q. During that three month period, did you have any meetings or conversations with the heads of the then established government independent of the army?
- A. I had a meeting with Hitler himself.
- Q. Were you invited?
- A. I was ordered by the Reich War Minister to present myself to Hitler and to present my impressions of Japan.
- Q. Who was war minister at that time?
- A. Von Blomberg.
- Q. Did you consider this Von Blomberg, the war minister, to be in support of the Nazi Party, or was he still of the cast of the army whom you considered to be pro-army as against the Nazi Party?
- A. He was a weak man so I think he was very strongly influenced by Reichenhaur and in favor of the National Socialist Party. On the other side, he was an old member of the German General Staff with remarkable merits in the world war. So he had a kind of a double position. He was considered, even by the army officers opposed to the National Socialists, as their acknowledged leader, and on the other side, as a man who is in a diplomatic way not opposing Hitler.
- Q. Did you consider that this sort of two-faced manner which you describe as weakness on the part of this war minister, might have been astuteness or cleverness on his part to bring the army officers closer into cooperation with the Nazi Party. Was he that type of a man?

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 18 cont'd)

A. I don't know. I have to look back. I think he was personally ambitious to be war minister and to keep his place on one side not to oppose Hitler and on the other side not to oppose the army. So he was making this dance on eggs.

Q. Now, General, at the time you were ordered by this war minister to go to Hitler for this conference, were you given any instructions or indications as to what might be required of you?

A. Not a word. I was only told by Von Blomberg "I like that you report to Hitler about your experience about Japan", so I told him, "Your Excellency, the last time when I met Hitler I was in very strong opposition to him so probably he will not be very glad to see me again" and Blomberg told me "This is my matter, don't worry". He said "You will have only 20 minutes to speak. He has no more time than that". So we had a meeting. I remember it very exactly.

Q. This was the second meeting?

A. Yes. I had a meeting with Hitler, Von Blomberg, Von Neurath, foreign minister at that time, and I think Fritsch, commander-in-chief of the army.

Q. May I interrupt. At this meeting were there any members either military or political of any other government present?

A. No, there were only Hitler, the war minister, the foreign minister, and I think the commander-in-chief of the army. So I entered the room and at attention made my report. "Lt. Col. Ott back from Japan" and Hitler rose from his table, came over to me, shook hands, and said "Glad to see you again. We had a very interesting meeting in Weimar." So he gave me obviously signs that he would not worry about it, to make me more comfortable. So I reported about my impressions of Japan and the Japanese Army.

Q. May I interrupt. Do you remember whether he asked you any specific questions concerning the Japanese Army?

A. He did not ask anything. He had a map of the Far East, Manchuria, Japan, Russia, Siberia, over his table and looked the whole time on his map and because he was very attentive I expended the twenty minutes given to me to forty minutes. The minister of war looked upon me as if he would say "I ordered you to go twenty minutes". I told Hitler about the Japanese army giving the judgment I always gave as I mentioned in my document. That the salient points of this army were complete obedience to the Emperor first, very high willingness for sacrifice, considerably behind the times in

(MAJ GEN OTT Feb 10 cont'd)

(answer continued)

equipment and training, and the political spirit of their officers. Eventually he told me, "It is very interesting to hear your report. The other day I saw a report of some attache of Moscow who had the idea that Japanese influence in military pressure against Russia will not influence in any way the Russian attitude on the European order." I said, "what do you mean". He said, "I think this is wrong, this idea". I told him "I agree with this man. I personally do not believe that military actions in the Far East can influence the military circumstances or situation in the west of Russia or in the western border." "But why" he asked me. I told him "Because it is very far and this Siberian army has difficulty based upon her own sources and even they are building their own war supply industry because they know that they will not be able probably to send troops from the west of Russia or western borders to this far district because of only a small railway in that time, a single track railway,". So the Fuehrer told me "I don't believe in that. I think that it will have a strong influence."

Q. So for the second time you disagreed with him and you told him so?

A. Yes, and the war minister looked upon me as if to say "you are mad to oppose Hitler". Then I told the Fuehrer, "I cannot agree. I have my reasons and my own explanations". Then he suddenly finished, and said, "I think one way and you expressed your thoughts. Whether you or I am right only the future can decide". I told him, "I think so". And I think the future has decided to my way of thinking.

Q. During this conversation that you just related, or from any other evidence of anyone else who was in the room, or conversations of other persons, were you able to determine that any military action on the part of Japan might be under consideration, having to do with the movement southward in China to Burma and Singapore, and that great movement?

A. No.

Q. Your opinion is then that the situation at that meeting was entirely in relation to Manchuria in relation to Russia?

A. It was absolutely. I am sure of that.

Q. This conversation to the best of your knowledge took place on what day and date?

A. I cannot fix the exact date, but it was probably in February, 1933. Or perhaps March, the beginning of 1933.

(MAJ GEN OTT FEB 16 cont'd)

Q. Just a minute, would not that be 1934 when you returned from Japan.

A. Yes, 1934. I might add that the military members of this meeting and the foreign minister gave no sign or idea of cooperation with Japan at that time. It was I think the first vague information about Japan. But Hitler himself was rather informed because he summarized my report eventually and was astonishing - I was astonished that he could tell so exactly. So he must have studied himself the Far Eastern question before.

Q. But nothing in his conversation would indicate to you that in considering the Far East he was considering any southward movement of the Japanese Army?

A. No, nothing. And also no military action against Russia at that time.

Q. So that you believe at that time that the so-called tri-partite pact was not under consideration?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. You returned then to the German Embassy in the City of Tokyo in 1934?

A. Yes.

Q. And that was after this meeting with Hitler?

A. Yes.

Q. And you had received a new assignment as distinguished from the first assignment when you came here?

A. Yes, as military attache.

Q. When you returned at this time as military attache, were you under any instructions, which in your opinion was a part of the design of the Nazi Government to involve Japan in a war of any kind?

A. No.

Q. You were not?

A. No.



(MAJ GEN OTT CONT'd Feb 10)

- Q. Do you mind stating now what if any secret instructions you had?
- A. I had no secret instructions. I had the instructions given generally to all military attaches, to do their best to develop friendly relations to the army they are accredited to, to study exactly the details of this army, and to be at the disposal of the ambassador for every order he gives. These were the written instructions given to every military attache. Concerning cooperation with Japan, I got no instructions, but I asked War Minister Blomberg when I left if he agrees that my understanding of my mission was such that Germany thought that Japan's sword may be bared but not sheathed. I stressed this and Blomberg told me, "I think this is an excellent formulation of our idea".
- Q. Who was the German ambassador at the time you took up this post?
- A. Von Dirksen.
- Q. Had he been appointed ambassador by the then Hitler Government or was he of the old order?
- A. He was of the old order. He had been appointed by the Hitler Government. He was before minister to Russia and Hitler appointed him here.
- Q. Hitler appointed him here?
- A. Yes, I think with the idea that he would try to find a sort of alliance, that he as an expert on Russia might be useful here.
- Q. In Japanese-Russian relations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Having in mind that this ambassador had been appointed by the Hitler government, did you take any particular pains to observe his actions as German Ambassador here, keeping in mind the development of the Hitler Government in the conditions that then troubled the world?
- A. I found out after a very short time that I could trust in him, that he was a man of the old regime and critical of the exaggerated politics of Blomberg. So we had extraordinary close confidential relations with each other. This may sound arrogant but by a certain time this position of military attache surpassed by far the position of the consulate.
- Q. How long did he remain ambassador?

(MAJ GEN OTT Oct 18, cont'd)

A. Until February 1938. Nearly four years.

Q. Was he ambassador at the time of the conclusion of the tri-partite pact?

A. No he was not.

Q. So that we may clearer understand each other, I am under the impression that some alliance had been made between Germany, Italy and Japan in 1937.

A. That was the Anti-COMINTERN Pact.

INTERROGATION ADJOURNED.

INTERROGATION OF

General Eugen Ott

Date and Time: 20 February 1946, 1430-1630 hours

Place : Room 748, Meiji Bldg., Tokyo, Japan

Present : General Eugen Ott  
Lt. Commander John D. Shea (USNR), Interrogator  
Mr. Worth E. McKinney  
Miss Jewel E. Newman, Stenographer

Questions by : Commander Shea

In order to refresh the witness's memory the interrogator read the last four questions and answers thereto appearing on pages 25 and 26 of the previous interrogation taken at 1400-1600 hours on 18 February 1946.

- Q. So at this time you were the Military Attache to the German Embassy in Tokyo?
- A. Yes.
- Q. And this was in 1934, was it, General?
- A. From 1934 to 1938.
- Q. Your instructions, you say, when you came on that mission were instructions of quite an ordinary nature having to do with the military attache position to the Embassy, is that correct?
- A. The normal regulations, orders, etc., given to every military attache in a written text.
- Q. You did not have any secret instructions from Hitler or from Ribbentrop?
- A. No, I did not have any secret instructions. I asked personally if I am right in my idea that the German interests in the Japanese Army would be that the Japanese sword would be sharp but not unsheathed and I was confirmed in this idea by the War Minister Von Blomberg when I left to assume my position.
- Q. Can you elaborate a little more on by what you mean by that expression "the Japanese sword would be sharp but not unsheathed"?
- A. I mean that I considered our interests that Japan represents strong military power but that this strong military power will

not be used for war purposes but only for political pressure. You will see that at that time there was no idea in myself and probably not in the Minister of War about military action together with Japan because when I left I asked the War Minister personally if I could get permission to see in Nanking the German Military Mission to Chiang Kai-shek. We had a big military mission to Chiang Kai-shek at that time headed by General Von Seeckt. I had felt it necessary to have a personal contact with this general before I started my work in Japan because I would try to find a union and a bridge between our military work in China of training the Chinese army and my military endeavors in Japan. So the War Minister was very glad about this idea and told me, "Please, go on!", and when I came to Shanghai the General Consul of Shanghai called on me on the ship and told me, "Please don't go to Nanking. The Foreign Minister has given instructions by telegram you may not go to Nanking in order not to trouble my future work in Japan".

- Q. What do you take as the significance of that message that you received aboard ship to mean?
- A. I was very angry and I said to this messenger, "I can't understand this sudden change in instructions", so when I came to the Japanese Embassy Von Diresen told me that he heard about my intention and that he had wired to the Foreign Office in Germany they may stop this idea because he was afraid the Japanese army would be a little sensitive against this beginning of my work in China. I told him, "This is very unfortunate because I am sure that the first question the Japanese will put onto me will be how do you think about the German military work in China". And so if I had made this trip I could have told the Japanese my endeavor to find a kind of union between these two works, in order to avoid any suspicion which was really not necessary. And the next day, when I presented myself to the General Staff, the first question was about this military mission.
- Q. That is, the Japanese Military Staff?
- A. Yes.
- Q. At that time the German Army had a commission with the Chinese Army?
- A. Yes, had a commission with Chiang Kai-shek and his army and it was not any idea of a German-Japanese military policy.

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- Q. Now you say the first question of the Japanese general did ask you concerning the German military mission in China?
- A. Yes.
- Q. With respect to the Japanese invasion of Chinese territory, with the exception of Manchuria, had there been any action by the military forces against the Chinese forces, as you recall?
- A. As I remember very vaguely in the years 1934 and 1935 there were no special military actions in North China but a certain political pressure upon the war lords of North China to enter agreements with the Japanese forces so, for instance, the Ho-Umezu Agreement made by General Ho Ying Ging, who is now Commander-in-Chief of the Chinese Army, with Lt. Gen. UMEZU who had been at that time Commander of the Japanese garrison in North China. The exact content of this agreement I cannot remember. I believe it was to create a kind of local Ho-pey Chahar government under a kind of Japanese supervision. So to repeat it once more--as I remember in 1934 and 1935 there was no special military action but several times a kind of political pressure coming from the military people to induce the war lords of North China to enter into closer relations with the Japanese forces and the main agreement is called the Ho-Umezu Agreement. You will find in the Year Book 1931 to 1932 a chapter about the North China policy of the Japanese forces which gives some hint in this respect.
- Q. Who was the Chief of the General Staff at the time of your arrival, do you recall?
- A. General UEDA.
- Q. And who was the Vice Chief or Deputy Chief of Staff?
- A. Prince KANIN was Chief of Staff the whole time until 1940 and the Deputy Chief was UEDA.
- Q. Was your first meeting with the Staff one of considerable formality or did you have opportunity for general conversation at that time?
- A. My first meeting with the Deputy Vice Chief was purely formal. He welcomed me most heartily owing to my former free relations with the Japanese troops I had been attached to, but no work of very political meaning or importance. My first meeting with the liaison officer of the General Staff to the German Military Attache, at that time I think Colonel WAKAMATSU, were more about concrete questions and, especially, about the German mission in China.

Interrogation of General Eugen Ott

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Q. When was the German mission in China withdrawn, if you remember, General, what period of time?

A. I think, I am not sure, it may be ~~1928~~ or something like that; ~~1929~~ <sup>1938 WEIM,</sup> <sup>1939 WEIM</sup>

Q. That they were withdrawn?

A. Oh, withdrawn? I misunderstood. In the summer of 1938.

Q. Was that accomplished through many dealings by the Japanese General Staff through your Embassy in your official capacity as military attache?

A. In the history of this military mission there were, if I may say, two periods. One period before the incident between Japan and China broke out and the second period from this moment until the withdrawal of the mission. The first period was a kind of growing suspicion from the Japanese side against the work of this mission because the Japanese tension with China grew up and so they were suspicious that if there will be a conflict they have to face an army trained cleverly by German experts and equipped to a certain extent by German arms industry. When the incident broke out, the Chinese conflict July 1937, then this suspicion changed to a certain pressure from the Japanese side telling the German Embassy and military attache that they cannot understand that one side we are in free relations with the Japanese and have an anti-comintern pact with Japanese and on the other side we are still supporting the military power of Chiang Kai-shek. This was, of course, a different game. And in the development of the conflict in the autumn time, 1937, the Japanese troops complained bitterly, as I was told, that they met a German kind of military training and fortifications and armaments on the enemy side.

Q. Can you recall who made that representation to you?

A. Small representatives of the General Staff whose names I do not remember. And in order to smooth a little this bitter feeling of the fighting troops in Shanghai the Japanese General Staff asked me if I could not go in my capacity as a German general to the Shanghai troops in order that these troops could see that a German general is also on the Japanese side.

Q. And this was requested by some of the Japanese generals?

A. This was at that time Lt. Col. MANAKA. I asked permission of the Minister of War and I got permission to make this trip to Shanghai. Of course, we Germans were interested to see the fighting situation in order to form a judgment about it. And when I left--the evening before I left the Vice Chief of the General Staff--

Q. His name, do you remember?

A. TADA--asked me if I would be willing to present the peace feeler of the Japanese General Staff to Chiang Kai-shek so this trip became of very high importance. But I may not ask any German people about this so I took it on my own shoulders to present this peace feeler because I always tried to keep the Japanese out of war. I went to Shanghai, together with Lt. Col. MANAKA, and I wired to the German Ambassador, Trautmann, in Nanking, it would be very useful to see him in Shanghai. He came. I presented to him this peace feeler of the General Staff.

Q. Can you say now, General, what the nature of this peace feeler was?

A. As I remember the main points were the territorial integrity of China; sovereignty under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek; no indemnity, commercial privilege for Japan the only positive condition. Seeing that I was rather glad and surprised and so was Trautmann who was exceedingly pleased and told me, "This is a very fine thing and I hope earnestly we could succeed", and I brought the peace feeler to the Military German Mission to hand it over to Chiang Kai-shek. By this employment of the Military Mission as a kind of instrument to get Chiang Kai-shek interested in this peace feeler I had a chance to tell the Japanese General Staff who said that this military mission is very useful.

Q. In other words they were used in an attempt to ameliorate the situation?

A. And so the pressure to restore them I could diminish for some time not to save the Japanese but really to use these people as an instrument of mediation.

Q. Now, General, do you think this peace feeler which the Japanese General Staff had asked you to make was a genuine offer on their part to put an end to hostilities, or were they acting under some immediate pressure from the other war powers or from their own government?

A. I personally believe it was a genuine desire on the side of the General Staff, and especially of the Vice Chief of Staff TADA, to finish the hostilities.

Q. And you base your opinion?

A. Upon the development of this because this feeler, once accepted by Chiang Kai-shek has been broadened to a real peace negotiation between Japan and China and the German Government had been asked to act, not

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as a mediator, but as a kind of courier. We accepted this offer and, in reality, Berlin always sticks to the formal role of a courier but both Ambassadors Von Diresen and Trautmann acted in reality as advisers and so did I toward the Japanese General Staff. And in this development I experienced the very most bitter disappointment of the General Staff that a Japanese Cabinet cut off the negotiations after some delay from the Chinese side and the other day I wrote a personal letter to Mr. McKinney about General HONMA who was at that time the man on the General Staff who informed me all of the time of the inner satisfaction of the Japanese Army and Cabinet toward the Chiang Kai-shek negotiations. And he was terribly annoyed that the Cabinet cut off the negotiation so I am convinced that in that time the Japanese generals had an earnest desire to finish the hostilities probably seeing that otherwise this will be a very difficult situation.

- Q. Were you able to judge what influence in the Japanese Cabinet or Government or in the Army, if there was any such in the Army, brought about this sudden cutting off of this dealing with the Chinese to put an end to the hostilities?
- A. The peace feeler had been made during a rather hard and undecided fighting around Shanghai. That means a situation where the Japanese were not very victorious. During this peace feeler development suddenly Nanking was taken.
- Q. By some Japanese forces?
- A. By General MATSUI. As I believe in a speed absolutely unexpected so it was a kind of conflict between the peace feeler and the victorious military development. This is why the Japanese, having got at first an unfavorable answer of Chiang Kai-shek by not obliging him as Chinese used to answer. The Japanese Army hardened to peace demands but I don't remember which point had been added anyhow because the situation was much more favorable to the Chinese after having taken the capital Nanking. I am convinced that those things, even if it seems rather difficult to believe, crossed each other and then some extremist circles of the Army and I believe especially the War Minister SUGIYAMA hardened the demands of the Japanese so that there came some delay from the other side and reproach, "Now you don't stick more to your first text" so it was a kind of delayed and rather evasive kind of Chinese attitude. This change of the demands from the Japanese side and the evasive attitude from the Chinese side together gave a possibility to the extremist circles in the



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Japanese Cabinet to say this is only a play for time from the Chinese side so we have to cut off the negotiations.

- Q. Well, General, haven't there been some other incidents where the Chinese Chiang Kai-shek's forces and the Japanese military forces had entered into an agreement concerning certain territories in the vicinity of the Great Wall and Jehol and Chahar where an agreement had been made between the two forces and the Japanese used this agreement and the neutralized area or zone agreed upon as a basis from which to initiate further offensives against China, if you recall?
- A. That is usual characterization of the Japanese politics in North China. I personally would like to say that it is difficult for me to believe in a farsighted and continued plan. I believe after all my experience that the Japanese made something and that by a very unlucky kind of execution of these agreements they found resistance because they are unable to find a psychological contact with these people. So they found resistance and out of this resistance followed a certain new clash. It was not a plan but it was a kind of logical conclusion; it is a sequence of reasons. They made their agreement, executed it very strongly, very hard. There were some executions and then came the clash.
- Q. You don't think it was designed as much as it was finding themselves to fit themselves into the new situation without making clashes?
- A. This I believe, but generally speaking it was enormously difficult for every foreigner to look behind the screen of events in North China. One other reason for pursuing that line of thought is this: the League of Nations, the committee who reported on the Manchurian incident as a whole, I believe, has left a definite opinion that the Japanese provocation in that instance was not bona fide but rather one created by designed plan to accomplish this territory without regard to the national integrity of the people who were there. I do not remember the text of this commission but if it is not too arrogant I may even say that these people, perhaps judging the developments in a European way of thinking, as a logical idea and a blind but the Japanese way of thinking is a different one.
- Q. As you recall now this peace feeler which apparently at the outset was destined for success was suddenly brought to an end by the advance of Nanking.
- A. If it had been continued in changing the Japanese demands and then finished I don't remember exactly about the year 1938. The pressure had been reinforced after the cutting off of this peace feeler to withdraw the German Military Mission in China. This was in the springtime 1938. In that time I became Ambassador and

Interrogation of General Eugen Ott

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I was ordered to present myself as quickly as possible to Hitler to get my instructions.

Q. In the spring of 1938?

A. Yes. I asked permission to come by aeroplane in that time quite unusual and took an aeroplane from Hongkong to Berlin. And starting in Hongkong I once more tried to find a unanimous solution of this difference with our German Ambassador in Hankow so I wired my colleague, the German Ambassador, to come to Hongkong to have a talk with me to find a common way in order to advise our Government. We met about the 10th of May 1938 in the Peninsular Hotel in Hongkong and discussed the question, especially concerning the military mission in China, and found a unanimous formula to advise our Government that the contracts of the military mission may expire and it was just in this year 1938 that they expired, and after the expiration to order our military mission in China not to renew the contract. Trautmann, my colleague, promised to recommend this way to Chiang Kai-shek and I promised to recommend this way to the Government. I left by plane. I had to wait nearly a fortnight before being received by Ribbentrop. I was terribly angry but I did not know he was very much occupied by the Czechoslovakian crises in 1938. When I addressed him for the first time he immediately told me I have recalled the Ambassador of China because he disagreed with me about the withdrawal of the military mission. He told me that, "Your Excellency, this is just what I had to advise you after a very long and careful deliberation. This military mission had not been a Government's mission--it was a private contract of officers who did not belong to the German army. This is of some importance. They all had left the German army and had been in certain opposition to the German Government.

Q. During this period that we covered, 1934 to 1938, and, particularly, from 1937 to 1938, when you were ordered to Berlin to accept the Ambassador's position, had you any knowledge of any communications between your Government and the Japanese Government, or representatives thereof, concerning this so-called tripartite pact, up to that time?

A. No. This came a considerable time later. It was the anti-comintern pact.

Q. So that you arrived back in Berlin in May, approximately of 1938?

A. Yes.

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Q. And all of your labors concerning this mission had been rendered to little or nothing as the result of having recalled the Chinese Ambassador?

A. Yes.

Q. But the military commission as such did eventually conclude its operation of Chiang Kai-shek, didn't it?

A. They got the order to leave their position but it was made eventually in not too brutal a way. Now Chiang Kai-shek sent off with his kindest regards and thanks and paid to each of them an amount of money as a reward.

Q. And you remember about when that occurred?

A. Between August and October 1938.

Q. During your contact over that period of years, 1934 up to the time you became Ambassador as the Military Attache, you did become acquainted with the character of the members of the General Japanese Staff, didn't you?

A. Some of them. It was the Japanese way to limit the contact of every foreign representative to a very small amount of people especially charged with this contact. They were suspicious that a contact with other people might lead to talks and insight of the foreign people they didn't like. So again a kind of characteristic picture of the leading men by having very many relations and by a rather big social entertainment life. This was very difficult but finally I got a certain picture.

Q. And what was that picture, General, are you prepared to outline it now to us?

A. It was at that time the picture which really only confirmed my first impression about these four points of the characteristics of the Japanese army; complete obedience to the Tenno; very deep rooted willingness or complete willingness for personal sacrifice; a considerable lack in equipment and model training and dangerous political tendencies or activities among the officers.

Q. Why, General, have you used the term "dangerous political tendencies"?

A. Yes, with this term "dangerous"--after my own education in the German army we were all the time strictly trained not to interfere in any politics, to be pure soldiers and especially

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we had this education and I had to educate the army myself as Chief of the Political Section of the Minister of War during the Republic of Weimar because it was the only way to avoid the fanatical development of the army into socialism. He stopped the political interests in the army to avoid that we lose control of a moderate minded professional instrument.

- Q. You found in the Japanese army just the opposite tendencies on the part of the officers to inject themselves in the politics--to interfere in politics?  
Did your observations indicate to you, General, that there was any leadership in the Japanese army which fostered this attitude on the part of the army officers?
- A. I did not, now looking back in this respect, I didn't find out peculiar personalities in that time. It was more this mysterious so-called political group of captains and colonels in the army which influenced the politics. After looking back now I personally believe that Marshall SUGIYAMA had been the real leading man in this respect. I mentioned in a small note I gave you concerning him. About his real assistance in this way this is very difficult to say. So far as TOJO is concerned I met TOJO in this whole time never. I met him as I remember the first time in 1939. The whole time before I did not know his name. So I believe a certain influence had been exercised by ARAKI as the initiator of the revival of the Bushido period. And later on in a more active and leading way by SUGIYAMA.

ADJOURNED AT 1630 HOURS

Certificate of Interpreter

I, \_\_\_\_\_, \_\_\_\_\_  
(name) (Serial Number)

being sworn on oath, state that I truly translated the questions and answers given from English to Japanese and from Japanese to English respectively, and that the above transcription of such questions and answers, consisting of \_\_\_\_\_ pages, is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_, 1946.

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name and Rank)

Duly Detailed Investigating Officer,  
International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP.

Certificate of Stenographer

I, Jewel E. Newman hereby certify that I acted as stenographer at the interrogation set out above, and that I transcribed the foregoing questions and answers, and that the transcription is true and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

*Jewel E. Newman*

Certificate of Interrogator.

I, ~~(us)~~ John D. Shea, Lt. Comdr, 194620 USNR,  
and \_\_\_\_\_,

certify that on 20th day of February, 1946, personally appeared before me ~~(us)~~ General Eugen Ott, and ~~according to~~ Interpreters gave the foregoing answers to the several questions set forth therein.

Tokyo, Japan  
Place

Feb 28-1946  
Date

*John D. Shea*  
*J. D. Shea USNR*

INTERROGATION OF

Major General Eugene Ott

Date and Time : 27 February 1946, 1400-1600 hours.

Place : Room 619, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : Major General Eugene Ott  
Mr. Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Interrogator  
Mr. Worth E. McKinney  
Miss Gizella Koncz, Stenographer

Questions by : Mr. Tavenner

Q. General, before going back to the line of questions I was asking you yesterday about your conference with Hitler, I want to go a little farther back in an effort to refresh your recollection about the situation that confronted you at the time of the Matsuoka trip to Germany. As early as June 1940, the records show, you had a conversation with Koiso, Japanese Minister of Colonies, and that you made a report to your government reporting that conversation. Now, will you tell us what that was about?

A. I met Koiso in Prince Tokugawa's house, I think, by his request because as a minister of overseas, I had nothing to do with him usually.

Q. You were saying--at his request?

A. I think so, yes.

Q. What request?

A. Of his request to see me. This conversation had been held because as Ambassador I had usually nothing to do with Ministers except the Foreign Minister or the Minister of armed forces.

Q. What was the nature of your conversation with him?

(GIT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- A. The nature of the conversation with him was--
- Q. What was the reason he sent for you?
- A. I think, if I am right, he spoke first to me about Dutch East India--no--not at this time--no. About Indo-China.
- Q. He spoke to you about Indo-China?
- A. Maybe about Indo-China--about Japanese interests in Indo-China, or the invasion of the Japanese into Indo-China.
- Q. Well, what was the request that he desired to make of you, if any?
- A. Probably there had been made later on certain requests--if on this occasion already at the present time--I don't remember exactly. Later on, on certain occasions when the policy against Indo-China went on the Japanese government requested me to secure the assistance of the German government towards Vichy to tolerate Japanese in the fields in Indo-China in order to close the supply route to Chiang-Kai-Shek from Indo-China.
- Q. Let us confine ourselves for the present to this conference in June 1940 with Minister Koiso. What did you discuss with him regarding Indo-China?
- A. I think so I discussed with him that I would inform my government about his idea of the interest of Japan to interfere in Indo-China in behalf of the war against Chiang-Kai-Shek, so I believe. June 1940 (pause) I think the main question was his idea of using the situation created by the French collaborators to interfere in Indo-China.
- Q. What did you tell him about the attitude of Germany?
- A. What?
- Q. What, if anything, did you say to Minister Koiso about the attitude of Germany toward such an enterprise?
- A. (Long pause) I think I told him that I would report this question to the government--maybe I told him I will support it.

(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- Q. Do you remember discussing also the importance of the United States in that movement?
- A. (Silence--no answer)
- Q. Do you remember discussing the United States in any connection in your conversation with Koiso?
- A. (Long pause) I think we mentioned the United States. (Long pause) I may have. We probably discussed if it would have some reaction from the side of the United States.
- Q. Did you discuss in that connection the Philippines?
- A. I don't believe.
- Q. Did you discuss Singapore?
- A. I don't believe.
- Q. Did you discuss Russia?
- A. I think it was only--I think so--it was only a discussion about Indo-China. (pause) As I remember, the discussion was mainly made by himself. He draws some circles of influence--I see him sitting at the table.
- Q. Circles of influence in what areas?
- A. I think Indo-China connected with the Chinese war. About Russia, I don't think so.
- Q. Well, there is no secret, is there, to the fact that Germany was endeavoring to get Japan to attack Singapore, is there?
- A. In this time no--in June 1940----
- Q. Well, when did that idea develop?
- A. This idea developed with increasing pressure, as I remember--the embargo placed upon Japan especially in oil, when the Japanese Armed Forces had several talks about the idea how to cut and break through the embargo. This had been developed more and more after



(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

the conclusion of the Three-Powers Pact only. The Three-Powers Pact had been concluded in September 1940. Before the Three-Powers Pact had been concluded I don't think there was any talk about Singapore. After that, there were in the winter of 1940 to 1941, a lot of talks in this respect and I ordered to make a study about this question--I ordered my Military Attache Lt. Gen. Kretschmer to have a personal opinion if the Japanese Armed Forces are able to attack Singapore.

Q. When did you give those instructions to your military attache?

A. It was in December or January, this I don't know exactly.

Q. That is, in December 1940 or January 1941?

A. December 1940 or January 1941--about just around Christmas, or after Christmas.

Q. Had not discussions gone very far between Germany and Japan looking to the investment of Singapore by Japan before November of 1940?

A. No, this was for me the first time. If with Koiso, I don't think so. Just for a moment to return to Koiso. After this Koiso conference I made I think a telegram to Berlin and I got a reply from Berlin that "We don't like to have Japan in any way in the fields." We don't like Japan as an "assistant for harvest"--that means Berlin at that time in June 1940 under the very strong impression of the Blitz victories in France and Poland was afraid obviously that Japan would now use the situation, enter the war and take over Indo-China and Dutch East India and take a share of the harvest. So, I got the information that "We have no interest that Japan is assisting us in the harvest."

Q. That information, however, did not come from Ribbentrop?

A. No.

Q. It came from your Secretary of State?

A. Not from him personally, but at that time the Chief of the Far Eastern Section.

Q. What was his name?

(OTI, Eugene, 2, Feb Cont'd)

- A. Knoll. But he probably must have made it by order of Weitzsaecker because it was very important information that Berlin doesn't like any interference from the Japanese side.
- Q. You learned, however, that Matsuoka had approached Ribbentrop through the Ambassador to Germany, Kurusu?
- A. This is, I think, not quite correct. If I may give my memory for that. When Matsuoka came to power as Foreign Minister, end of July, I think, 1940, he invited me to his house and I was astonished to have had a very warm, and you might say, intensive welcome from his side; serving champagne and telling me, "I am very glad that I am now in this place, and I think we will have a very friendly and close cooperation." And then he made some, as I remember, quite vague and general suggestions for such a kind of cooperation. Among these suggestions I don't think that he mentioned Singapore or military cooperation. So, I, after having got this warning by Knoll, which I considered as a warning of Weitzsaecker, against close cooperation with Japan, I reported this first meeting of Matsuoka as vaguely as I considered his suggestions. Later on, I don't know by which source I heard that Matsuoka had given maybe similar words, same suggestions to his Ambassador in Berlin, Kurusu. And, Kurusu, obviously very glad to give something to the German government, went to Ribbentrop and Ribbentrop had the impression that his Ambassador in Tokyo obviously wasn't willing to give, I may say, the serious content of Matsuoka's suggestions; and so, I believe, I got some telegram that, I think it was this way, that I had been informed that Berlin--maybe Staummer told me of it--I got a telegram that Berlin had a different impression from my report and from Kurusu's report and this may have been the main reason for sending Staummer here because Ribbentrop always mistrusted me to a certain extent in being strong enough to push ahead the military cooperation. And, I think, this had been the preliminary situation for sending Staummer to make the Three-Powers Pact.
- Q. Let us go back to Kurusu's delivery of Matsuoka's message to Ribbentrop. Did you not then receive a message from the Foreign Office in Germany stating what Japan's plan was with reference to the South Pacific?
- A. I don't remember--I can't think it, because--
- Q. Let me read you this and see if it refreshes your recollection.

OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

This is a message from Weitzsaeker to the Embassy at Japan and Russia reporting on Kurusu's visit to him and outlining Japan's plan which he had discussed with Ribbentrop. "Kurusu wants non-aggression pact with China and Russia as pre-condition for a Jap advance through areas south of China including Thailand which are necessary to achieve the fall of Singapore." Now, you received that message?

A. I don't decidedly remember.

Q. You don't remember that message?

A. Decidedly not. Would you perhaps ask my minister at that time, Counselor Boltze if he remembers that? I decidedly do not remember that. I have no reason not to remember it if I had to do it, but I really do not and to me, Matsuoka, I am decidedly sure, made no such kind of suggestions.

Q. The question is whether or not you received that message or knew anything about it?

A. No, as I tell you, I would be very glad if you would hear my Counselor at that time if he remembers this. Mr. Boltze--he must have known it as I have known it--it wasn't for the Ambassador personally. Weitzsaeker signed it. A non-aggression pact with China?-----

Q. Well, you had recommended that at one time; that there be a pact between China, Russia, and Japan, so there is nothing strange about China being included in it, is there?

A. I had personally always had the idea by being together with China and Russia our situation would be very strong and safe, and especially after the Three-Powers Pact, I did all I could to achieve that, but before---

Q. In other words, General, if there could be a non-aggression pact between Japan and Russia, Japan would be protected from an attack in the rear while it proceeded south and that is what Japan wanted, isn't it?

A. Probably, yes.

(OrT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- Q. And Japan wanted that protection and assurance against danger from the rear before it was willing to proceed to Singapore, isn't that true?
- A. This is logical.
- Q. Furthermore, isn't that what Germany was attempting to do in behalf of Japan, bring Russia into the orbit of the alliance so that Japan would be free to attack England?
- A. It might be the idea of Ribbentrop and Hitler. My personal idea was a different one. My personal idea concluding the Three-Powers Pact and after the Three-Powers Pact was that by including Russia and possibly China this pact would be so strong that there would be no possibility of war with the United States.
- Q. Wasn't there another interpretation to be placed on that also? That such an alliance would be so strong that Japan could proceed with its plan of invasion in the south including an attack on Singapore without danger from the United States?
- A. I think at that time it wasn't a German interest, at the time before we concluded the Three-Powers Pact. It became the German interest during the conference with Matsuoka and I try to remember these things and I will tell you afterwards what I experienced-- a little different from yesterday--but it was a turning point of my memory in this respect that, at least it seemed to me a turning point. Maybe the idea of Ribbentrop and Hitler had always been this that Weitzsaecker arrested these ideas because maybe he was afraid that very big interests of Germany in Dutch East India would be hurt and that Indo-China, which we had in the Armistice with France, guaranteed to a certain extent, that the armistice would be very much hurt and the armistice with France was always a great source of sorrow for us because obviously at that time already the conditions of insecurity in France began for our occupying forces, so we had been very careful, and the things changed. If I am right about the visit of Matsuoka to Berlin--may I give my impression of that time?
- Q. Go ahead.
- A. As I told you yesterday, I don't remember that in the first and only meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, the question of Singapore

(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

had been mentioned. I was present too. I try to think it over once more--I am even surer than before because Matsuoka's talk was so long and especially directed to explain to Hitler in a very broad way his ideas of "Hawqu-Ichiu." This is a very difficult word--of the eight corners of the world--a kind of mystic vision of the Japanese that they have some duty to bring to the whole world a kind of peace; quite vague and mysterious things and this he explained in such a broad way that Hitler became rather annoyed and angry and I was very glad about it because I put very much importance on the fact that the Japanese were so vague in their ideas, to show it to Hitler, contrary to the impression Ushima had given that Japan is a very decided nation. So, these things would have too much contrast--so I don't believe that in this first meeting there was talk about Singapore.

Q. Who else was present at the first meeting?

A. Ribbentrop, Meissner, Staumner as representative of Ribbentrop for the Far Eastern question--he was promoted to it after the Three-Powers Pact, and Oshima. The meeting you mentioned on the 27th of Mar., I remember as a fact owing to the event--to the accident--that Ribbentrop had to leave it suddenly and I remember the reason why he had to leave it suddenly; because he got a telegram about a Jugoslavian revolution which was a completely surprising event. Three days before had been the signing of the entrance of Jugoslavia to the Three-Powers Pact in Vienna in the presence of Hitler, Ribbentrop, etc., and three days later, suddenly a Jugoslavian revolution, and the whole situation was completely reversed. So, for this telegram, Ribbentrop had to leave, and the whole situation the next days was completely dominated--the days following--by this very important event which nobody had obviously reckoned with. If Ribbentrop in this meeting, which I remember now, had used these words and influenced Matsuoka regarding Singapore, this I can't remember. But I think it may have been told to him because as a result of those days with Matsuoka in Berlin, when Matsuoka had already left for Moscow, Hitler gave me an order to do what I could to bring Japan to an attack in Singapore. So, if he gave me this order--I am not sure, but I believe--that he had given these ideas to Matsuoka too, probably in the conversations he had with him afterwards alone because I can't remember being personally present. By telling you that he gave me this order, I think this one conversation with Matsuoka maybe not so important because the order I had had

(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

gives the tendency of this time. Two days after this mentioned meeting, I remember a luncheon in Hitler's residence, where all the Field Marshals were present at a round luncheon table, obviously summoned to get the instructions for the Jugoslavian campaign and Matsuoka and myself were invited obviously to impress Matsuoka by the presence of so famous German military leaders who had won this fame in the campaign of Poland and France. Matsuoka, himself, never mentioned to me, as I remember, that Hitler had asked him about Singapore.

- Q. Who was present at the time of your conference with Hitler at the time he advised you to do what you could to get Japan to attack Singapore?
- A. Only Ribbentrop. It was on the 8th of April--I remember this date exactly because it was my birthday. How I executed this order-- I think we can talk about it later on.
- Q. I am still interested in the telegram that was sent by your Foreign Office to you regarding Kurusu's plan; that is, making a non-aggression pact with Russia a condition to Japan's proceeding south.
- A. I can't remember it--decidedly not, and I would be glad to ask my Counselor.
- Q. I would rather not ask you any questions if you are not going to tell me the truth about it.
- A. Of course.
- Q. And I can hardly understand how you could fail to remember a matter which is of such importance as that; but I want to give you the benefit of every doubt about your honest intentions in telling the truth, and I will ask you to think that over, and tell me at a later time.
- A. All right. As I told you, I can't decidedly remember. I told you the truth in every respect until now.
- Q. Do you recall receiving a long message from your Foreign Office regarding an interview between Ribbentrop and Usonima in the early part of 1941?

(OTT, Eugene, 2/ Feb Cont'd)

- A. In the early part of 1941? Before Matsuoka's visit to Berlin?
- Q. yes.
- A. I got many telegrams but they weren't about those questions.
- Q. Did you receive more than one telegram regarding a conference between Ribbentrop and Oshima?
- A. Several times, not in this time, but several times during my Ambassadorship, so if I received such a telegram about an interview between Oshima and Ribbentrop, without having a hint about the contents, I can't remember it. If you will give me a hint maybe I will find it out. Those things are now five to six years ago, and I had not a single document in my hands the whole time. So, only by memory it is very difficult to remember all those things. Especially by one reason that instructions from Berlin had so many times being contrary to each other that the whole picture of my instructions from Berlin is rather complicated.
- Q. On February 28, 1941, a report was made by Ribbentrop to the Heads of Departments and Ambassadors on his conversations with Oshima in Germany and Ribbentrop in his report gave at length the substance of his own statement to Oshima and Oshima's replies. Does that refresh your recollection?
- A. No.
- Q. Well, suppose you tell me what messages you did receive which referred to conferences between Ribbentrop and Oshima?
- A. Oshima had been sent for the second time. The time before I had telegrams when Oshima had been informed about the Russia-German treaty.
- Q. Pass that over for the present.
- A. This time, if I got a telegram from Ribbentrop about an interview with Oshima, it was probably the presentation of Oshima as coming back again as Ambassador--his second period of Ambassador.
- Q. That is correct. That is the time I am speaking of.
- A. yes.

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- Q. When Oshima's credentials were presented.
- A. He left here in the middle of January about and in the middle of February he presented his credentials. On this occasion he probably had a general interview with Ribbentrop. May I suggest that you read the statement, because at this moment I can't remember the content of the interview.
- Q. Let me ask you this: Do you recall receiving information from Berlin to the effect that Oshima had reported that preparations for the occupation of Singapore would be completed by the end of May?
- A. (Pause) No.
- Q. You don't recall having heard that?
- A. I don't recall it.
- Q. If such an outstanding piece of information as that cannot be recalled by you, it is useless for me to question you about anything else in that report.
- A. I am very sorry.
- Q. You stated a few moments ago that the question of the attack on Singapore had been discussed in the winter of 1940 and in the early part of 1941. The date of this message that I refer to was in February 1941. Now, what was the nature of the information you had at that time regarding the proposed attack on Singapore?  
heard
- A. As I remember, I had/about the attack on Singapore, from my government, once a very short telegram--maybe in February or March ordering, "You have to influence with all means for Japan to attack Singapore." Finished. So, I was rather surprised to having such an enormous important question a telegram like this to an Ambassador without giving the reasons and details and so on. And after that, I only remember in this moment that the question had been repeated by Hitler when I have met him for the last time on the 8th of April, 1941. This state of preparation for the end of May, I am very sorry, I can't recall.
- Q. Were there not other occasions on which you discussed that



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important matter with members of the German Staff or members of the Foreign Office?

- A. As I told you, all this study of the attack on Singapore I ordered through Lt. Col. Kretschmer in winter of 1940 to 1941 and we considered this matter about two or three days in a kind of study on the map--if I may use a military expression--and on the end of this, I sent a telegram to my government that I have studied this question, that we think, under present conditions, Japan will be able to win to capture Singapore owing to the weakness of the present defense conditions; that Japan's fighting power would be a very short one; that in case Japan would attack Singapore it would probably bring United States into the war. So it would completely reverse our present idea about a defensive meaning of the Three Powers Pact and the government may give me the ideas.
- Q. When did you send that message to Berlin?
- A. On the end of this study or in the end of December, or in the first part of January, I can't fix the date exactly. It was a rather long message.
- Q. January 1941?
- A. 1941, Yes. I didn't hear anything about it from Berlin for some time and I think I got this telegram that I may do all I can to influence Japan to attack Singapore.
- Q. That is all that occurred before Matsuoka's trip to Berlin?
- A. Yes.
- Q. When did you leave Japan?  
for
- A. I left Japan, I think, the 10th or 12th of March, some days before Matsuoka. We had agreed upon to travel together but Matsuoka was still kept back by arranging the treaty between Thailand and Indo-China at that time concerning some border questions, so he asked me in the last moment if I could stop my departure and wait for him. I said, "No. I like to go to Berlin now. I have arranged all my trip and I hope you will come after me." So, I arrived some days earlier than Matsuoka in Berlin.
- Q. How long was it after you arrived in Berlin that you had the conference with Hitler?
- A. How long?

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- Q. Yes.
- A. The personal conference with Hitler I had only the day when I left again for Russia, on the 8th of April.
- Q. I was speaking of the conference of Matsuoka with Hitler attended by you.
- A. This may have been on the 26th or 25 of March, the day after Matsuoka arrived. I personally left on the 10th and arrived in Berlin on the 23rd.
- Q. Had you conferred with Ribbentrop or any of the other members of the Foreign Office or the military authorities before you had your conference with Hitler?
- A. Yes, I conferred with Ribbentrop, that is true.
- Q. With Ribbentrop? What was the subject of your conversation?
- A. I was called to Vienna to wait for Ribbentrop who had been signing the Three Powers Pact with Yugoslavia in Vienna, and I had been waiting for him and in the night train we went back together and we had a discussion about, I think, about the question of Singapore.
- Q. What was the nature of that conversation? Just what did Ribbentrop say?
- A. It may be that Ribbentrop, on this occasion, already told me the same as Hitler told me on my departure, that the government is interested in the attack against Singapore, as I had it in this telegram I mentioned. If I remember correctly, he asked me to give him a small statement about my opinion and I dictated a kind of statement in the train about the same nature as we had when I gave him the big message about our study. In this statement, I think I mentioned especially, probably, the interference of United States may have serious consequences owing to the submarine warfare against Japanese supply routes which was, after the opinion of our Naval Attache, a very difficult problem, as it proved later on.
- Q. Did you also estimate the period of time in which Japan would be prepared to attack Singapore?

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A. I don't think so.

Q. From your statement a little while ago, I understood that it was your opinion that the Japanese forces were strong enough and prepared well enough to capture Singapore?

A. Strong enough--about the already finished preparation--I don't think I made references to. They were strong but about the time necessary for preparation, I don't think that I made a reference to. This war of a short time has another meaning, that they are not able to wage a long war.

Q. Yes, I remember. I think I should advise you that according.....

A. (Interrupting) It is possible, I don't remember it exactly, that we reckoned with a time of about six months preparation.

Q. That was the substance of your report in the last of December or the first of January?

A. Yes, I think so.

Q. So that, if you stated to Ribbentrop in March that the Japanese would be prepared by the end of May, that statement would conform with the report you made in December?

A. Only if the Japanese began the preparation, which I didn't know.

Q. Did you talk to General Sugiyama?

A. ( Long pause ) I remember in this moment the conversation with the Vice-Chief of the Admiralty, Kondo, before I left for Berlin, who spoke on that occasion from himself about ideas of the war in the Pacific and he was very much reluctant stressing that the navy has to fear the cutting off of the supply routes by submarines and airplanes in case of United States would enter the war which he considered as certain if there would be an attack against Singapore. This warning, these prohibitive ideas--in German I would say "Bedenklich"--influenced me in stressing in my short statement this question to Ribbentrop. About Sugiyama, it may be that he or I sought for a conversation, and that a conversation has taken place.

Q. As a result----

(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- A. (Interrupting) My I try to think this over? In this moment I have a kind of vision of seeing him in my Embassy before he started for Berlin, but I can't remember at this moment what he said.
- Q. Did you not receive ideas of the state of preparedness of Japan for a move on Singapore through your discussion with those two persons?
- A. From the navy, decidedly not. From the navy I got the impression that they are looking to the matter--
- Q. Did you not, in your report, also emphasize the fact that airfields on Indo-China were necessary for the attack on Singapore?
- A. If I mentioned it in this statement to Ribbentrop, I don't know for the moment. In the contents of this game or essay made in winter time, I believe it had been mentioned because it belonged to the military aspect of the whole thing. If I repeated it in this statement--I tried the last days to, many times already, in the last weeks to remember the content of this statement. I had no copy of it. I made it at night in the train and it is terribly difficult for me to repeat the content. By your questioning I slowly remember it about the airfields of Indo-China. It may be, certainly it had been included in the former message about the whole military aspect of the question.
- Q. And isn't it true that if Ribbentrop wanted information as to the state of preparation of Japan for such an attack that such information as airbases on Indo-China would be a very important element to consider?
- A. True. I remember about the question of airbases in Indo-China that we got a telegram from our military attache in Thailand, Lt. Col. Scholl. The time of it--I try to find it out--saying that after his impressions there is a preparation of airbases going on in Indo-China which might be an overture, a beginning, a preparation for an attack against the Malayan States. If this telegram came before I started for Berlin or in summer time--I think it came later in the summer time, later on when preparations were going on, but we got only a copy of it because he reported immediately to Berlin.

(OTT, Eugene, 2/ Feb Cont'd)

- Q. In your discussion with Ribbentrop on the train, was the question of Russia mentioned?
- A. I told Ribbentrop, so I remember, that it seems to me after my impressions in Moscow, a dangerous trend of tension with Russia. Ribbentrop evaded this question, as I remember, in confirming it and I was very much distressed about this question because coming to Moscow--it was the first time on my trip to Berlin--I got a real idea that obviously Berlin is preparing a conflict with Russia in a night-long conversation with a friend of mine, Ambassador Von Schulenburg, and we both agreed that it would be a very dangerous thing. So, I tried by this hint of mine in expressing openly to tell Ribbentrop that it is a very dangerous question, but he evaded it. I think this is a true description of this part.
- Q. What other discussion did you have with Ribbentrop on that occasion? What did he ask you?
- A. He asked me about, I think, about this question of Singapore as I reported.
- Q. In what way did he ask you about Singapore? What language did he use?
- A. The language of being very much interested that Japan goes to war.
- Q. Did you have a map before you in your conversation with Ribbentrop?
- A. This conversation took place in the salon of his car; there may have been a map, but I can't tell you this moment. For my side, I don't think I had a map.
- Q. Do you recall pointing out on a map location of airfields in Indo-China? Do you recall pointing out points relating to the defense of Singapore?
- A. I don't remember that we had such a detailed conversation because Ribbentrop usually wasn't in any way interested in military details of this kind. It may be, but this I don't know.

(OTT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- Q. Who were the military men that you had your conference with?
- A. Nobody, I was alone with Ribbentrop.
- Q. I understand, but at a later time who were the military men with whom you conversed?
- A. I met later on General Matzky, former Military Attache to Japan, at that time chief of a leading section of the German General Staff.
- Q. Give me the details of your conversation with him.
- A. I would be very glad to think it over. For a moment, I remember only that it was a private visit to him because he was my former military attache, in his private house for a luncheon or something like that and that he informed me about his personal sorrows that Hitler seemed decided to attack Russia and that the General Staff has very different views about this thing. But this information confirming the first and more indefinite--less defined--information of Schulenburg I got for the first time a strict impression of an imminent war with Russia and I was very strongly impressed by that. So that we had a conversation about details of Singapore--in this moment I can't remember.
- Q. As the Ambassador from Japan, the General Staff would most certainly have been interested in discussing in detail with you plans relating to Singapore.
- A. I had been asked to have a luncheon with Von Brauchitsch in the headquarter of the Commander in Chief air shelter outside of Berlin. This luncheon didn't realize, didn't take place, because the day after my arrival the General Staff was completely absorbed by the sudden campaign against Yugoslavia, so I didn't see Von Brauchitsch. I have only seen all the Field Marshals at this luncheon table, where we had, of course, no official conversation. The only possibility that there had been some talk in details about Singapore had been in that time this talk with Matzky, but I don't think that we talked about details of Singapore. The General Staff in Germany was technically and tactically rather uninterested in military questions of Japan.
- Q. But at this particular time, General, wasn't it very plain that Germany desired to strengthen the military forces of Japan so that Japan's chance of crippling England at Singapore would be increased?

(CIT, Eugene, 27 Feb Cont'd)

- A. We had no possibilities of strengthening the forces of Japan.
- Q. Were not orders issued by Hitler, or at his direction, to cooperate in every way with this strengthening of the Japanese military forces?
- A. Yes. But, in fact, the two war theaters were so distant from each other that the only possibility of strengthening were an air fleet which couldn't arrive because the distance was too big. So, we didn't discuss the question never. Or an assistance by submarines which at that time wasn't even considered, much later on they began. The only assistance possible at that time were to give to Japan, as we did sometimes, new German inventions on blueprints, because even the sending of samples were impossible in the moment where our railway connections with Russia were cut off. So, I would like to think it over.

(Interrogation Adjourned)

INTERROGATION OF

Major General Eugene Ott

Date and Time : 5 March 1946, 1000-1200 hours  
1400-1600 hours

Place : Room 643, Meiji Building, Tokyo, Japan.

Present : Major General Eugene Ott  
Mr. Frank S. Tavenner, Jr., Interrogator  
Miss Gizella Koncz, Steographer

Questions by Mr. Tavenner

Q. General Ott, I desire now to review our consideration of your interview with Minister Koiso. This interview took place in June 1940 and as you have stated, related to the subject of Indo-China. I hand you herewith a memorandum involving the subject of your report to the Foreign Office regarding your interview with Gen. Koiso for the purpose of refreshing your recollection.

(Following is a copy of the report handed to Gen. Ott)

AA-Unter Stattssekte

24 June 1940

Nr. 20

Indo-China

Subject: Ger. Ambass. in Tokyo, OTT reporting to For. Office his interview with Jap. Minister of Colonies, Gen. KOISO.

- 1.) Ott remarks to KOISO that Ger. would not object to Jap. in Indo-China if Jap. would promise to tie up America in Pacific, in case of American entry in war, and also to attack Philippines and Hawaii.
- 2.) KOISO and SHIRATORI want non-aggression pact with Russia.
- 3.) OTT thinks Pac. bloc of Japan, China (CKS) and Russia is possible. It would tie up America in Pacific and lame American freedom in action in Europe.

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(OIT, Eugene, 5 March Cont'd)

- A. This "attack Philippines and Hawaii", I refuse; absolutely refuse.
- Q. Explain what you mean by refuse?
- A. I refuse that we had talked about the Philippines and Hawaii, especially not Hawaii. Hawaii never appeared in any conversation we had.
- Q. Speak a little louder.
- A. The attack of Philippines and Hawaii I refuse to have mentioned it. Hawaii especially never appeared in any thought of us concerning America; and this study we made, as I mentioned, Hawaii too never was considered as a possible aim of attack. May I take it exactly-- "Ott remarks to Koiso that Germany would not object"--this is impossible because I was not entitled in any way to give the view of the German government.
- Q. General, it may be true that you were not acting upon specific authority, but many situations occur in diplomatic relations where a representative expresses what he considers to be the view of his government.
- A. (Reading it over again carefully) And Shiratori (pause) I don't remember that he played any role in this interview. I may----- judge the whole talk with Koiso. It was the first time I met Koiso in his capacity as Minister of Colonies on his request. It was a non-committal talk which gave some ideas--(pause)--generally spoken I think it is right except the mentioning of attacking the Philippines and Hawaii. The idea of tying up America, it may have been discussed. The discussion of the pact of Japan, China and Russia is possible.
- Q. In other words, the basic thought of this conference was that Germany would not object to the Japanese going into Indo-China if by doing so they would tie up the American forces in the Pacific. That is the real basic thought of this conference?
- A. The real basic thought.
- Q. It is also plain from this conference that Minister Koiso and probably others were anxious to have the Japanese rear protected by a non-aggression treaty with Russia?
- A. After this telegram, it must be so.

(CIT, EUGENE, 5 March, Cont'd)

Q. I wish you would enlarge upon that--explain further in detail, having had your memory refreshed, as to what plans Minister Koiso had in mind with reference to Indo-China?

A. (Pause--no answer)

Q. Doesn't this record indicate to you now that Koiso anticipated possible involvement of the United States in the war and that you recognized this fact also in the event Japan proceeded to Indo-China?

A. Must be.

Q. If Japan proceeded to Indo-China, would not its lines of communication be threatened by the Philippine Islands? Or, in other words, would not the Philippine Islands constitute a continuous threat to the lines of communication between Japan and Indo-China?

A. As later on it has been established.

Q. Did not Minister Koiso discuss that problem with you?

A. (Long pause) I don't remember that the discussion entered those details.

Q. Well, let me ask you this question. You at once recognized the advantage that Germany would gain by possible involvement of the Navy of the United States in Far Eastern waters, did you not?

A. This is obvious.

Q. Just what did you mean by indicating that a promise should be exacted of Japan to involve the American Navy and tie it up in the Pacific in the event that the United States entered the war?

A. (Pause) I try to remember the situation between Germany and the United States at that time. It was a comparatively early time, in June 1940, just after the defeat of France.

Q. I think this was before the defeat of France.

A. Before the defeat of France?

Q. Yes.

A. No, probably----

(OIT, Eugene, 5 March, Cont'd)

- Q. I am mistaken--this was, I believe, just a few days after the defeat of France.
- A. The whole question of Indo-China was brought up by Koiso just owing to the defeat of France, then immediately the interest of Japan arose. But before France had been defeated, I don't believe that Japan would have dared to think of Indo-China. But at that time, do you know if the lend-lease had been already existing?
- Q. I am uncertain.
- A. I think the relations between Germany and United States at that time were still not so far advanced in tension when France had been defeated. But these conversations had been made out of an urgent need. It was a time when Germany, having defeated France, had a very strong position in the whole of Europe and we were waiting for a new turn of the war against Great Britain and America at that time was not so in the fore-ground of consideration, I think.
- Q. This conference took place, I understand, in the house of Prince Tokugawa. What position did Prince Tokugawa have at that time?
- A. Prince Tokugawa is the brother-in-law of Prince Chichibu, the eldest brother of the Emperor; and the son-in-law of Minister Matsudaira, the former Ambassador in London and Minister of the Imperial household.
- Q. Was he a member of the military caste?
- A. No, he was more a man close to the conservative elements, so I was very surprised that this interview was made in his house and I didn't know his relations with Koiso.
- Q. Gen. Koiso was a leader in the military group, was he not?
- A. At that time I can't place him exactly in this respect. In former years in Manchukuo he was an active man of the Manchukuo aggression. Later on I met him as Commander in Chief in Korea in 1935 as a military man interested in the development of Manchuria and a certain friendly cooperation between Germany and Japan. This time in 1940 I met him again after five years without having a real knowledge about his position in military circles and I was rather surprised at that time that the conversation took this turn from his side; because he was overseas minister in a cabinet which was just composed out of conservative elements. It was the Yonai Cabinet, if I remember correctly. So I remember that after this conversation

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I got this message, "We don't want an assistant in harvest," and the personal letter from Mr. Knoll that time Chief of the Eastern Section of the Minister of War, where he told me that Koiso is a man without influence so I think the ideas of Koiso are not interesting for us.

Q. Now, just a moment. (Miss Koncz, will you read that please?)

(Whereupon the foregoing answer of the witness was read)

A. Knoll knew these people out of his own long personal experience in Japan. So I think if we made such a discussion the situation between Germany and the United States at that time was still in a kind of beginning tension and this discussion had no real urgent foundation.

Q. Did you discuss this matter again with Minister Koiso?

A. Again? I don't think that I have seen him later on.

Q. Were the conversations taken up by any other individual representing the Japanese government or the Japanese nation?

A. (Pause) If I remember correctly--having got this general view of the government that "assistant of the harvest is not wanted," I refrained from such conversations and I went up to the summer resort in Karuizawa in order to be away out of contact. I remember that once-- (Pause)---a representative from the army, but not a soldier, came to my house in Karuizawa in order to hear my views about the closer cooperation between Germany and Japan. (Pause) I try to find the name, I think it was a mining proprietor.

Q. When did that occur?

A. It was before Matsuoka started his first talk with me in the beginning of August after having become Foreign Minister. I refused to enter into those conversations owing to my direction from Berlin. And the first time when I remember exactly a talk of a kind of reproachment between Germany and Japan was the welcome reception by Matsuoka as Foreign Minister in his house where he suggested his preparadness to cooperate closely with Germany, but as I remember, without very concrete proposals. So I wired this friendly atmosphere to the German government without giving any suggestions to go on in this way and as I heard Matsuoka had given Kurusu, the Ambassador in Berlin some suggestions which Kurusu presented to Ribbentrop, but I think Ribbentrop was rather angry that I didn't react as urgently as Kurusu did upon the suggestions of Matsuoka. He got the idea that I am not very anxious about a closer

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cooperation and decided to send Stahmer to Tokyo in order to try to conclude the Three Powers Pact. Stahmer arrived in the beginning of September. This is for the moment the picture of the development. It may be that Shiratori tried or had conversations too as he had several times, but those conversations with Shiratori were nearly almost in very vague and general terms because I never was sure if he really represented some background, and he was considered as a man which was mentally a little hurt. So the conversations with him were much more to have some impressions than to speak exactly about things to influence people.

Q. These conferences with Shiratori occurred when?

A. (no answer)

Q. As shown by the report of your conference with Koiso, were you not having conferences of a similar character with Shiratori at that time?

A. I don't remember at that time having had conversations with Shiratori. It may be, but surely not in such a semi-official way because Shiratori was a private man, retired ambassador and more useful for giving some information and less useful to exercise some influence. The main conversations with Shiratori I remember from the summer of 1941.

Q. Let us pass that for the present.

A. About this time, I only remember Shiratori being sometime used as an advisor by Matsuoka in concluding the Three Powers Pact. Matsuoka used two Advisors; Shiratori and Mr. Saito. In this respect I remember some talks with him but not at that time with Koiso. Maybe Koiso mentioned Shiratori's idea, that may be. And about the same subject I had only this one discussion which had been stopped by Berlin.

Q. Do you know the names of any other Japanese who attempted to have a conversation with you relating to the subject of your conference with Koiso.

A. This one man. I try to find out his name.

Q. Is that the same person to whom you referred a few moments ago?

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- A. As representative of the military circles.
- Q. I will ask you to furnish me his name at a later date.
- A. Yes. I will try to find it out. Being retired to my summer resort at Karuizawa I was distant from Tokyo in order to avoid such discussions, so I don't believe that in that time somebody else attempted.
- Q. Will you now tell me what negotiations were conducted in Japan leading to the conclusion of the Three Powers Pact? You have already stated that Stahmer had been sent as the special envoy of Ribbentrop and that he arrived here in September.
- A. Yes.
- Q. 1940--suppose you begin at that point.
- A. Yes. Not knowing at that time the subject of his mission, I asked him to have some holidays in my summer resort in Karuizawa because in that time Tokyo is very hot. Stahmer was very anxious to enter into contact with Matsuoka as quickly as possible without giving the exact details to me. I asked Matsuoka and we contacted him in his private house where all the negotiations had been made for the first time I believe--
- Q. Let me interrupt you. You stated: Where all the negotiations had been made?
- A. Yes.
- Q. You mean that you had been there before?
- A. No, no, no, the following.
- Q. I understand--proceed.
- A. It may have been one of the first days of September, I don't recall the exact date.
- Q. Who were present?
- A. Matsuoka, Stahmer, and myself. Maybe that Matsuoka had called during this time, or only for the next time, Matsumoto, now Acting

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Minister without Portfolio, Matsumoto had been Chief of the Legal Section of the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Q. Is that Shunichi Matsumoto?

A. I don't remember his given name but he is the man now charged with the drafting of the new Constitution of Japan. He had been at that time Vice Foreign Minister.

Q. Now, tell us what occurred at that conference?

A. (Pause) In that conference as far as I remember, Stahmer outlined the mission he had been sent with to Japan. That the treaty may be concluded guaranteeing Japan and Germany to leadership in Europe and East Asia and obligating the nations immediate cooperation in case of an attack by a third nation not involved in the war.

Q. At that time the United States was the only major power not involved in the war?

A. Yes. Matsuoka reacted very favorably and asked us to repeat the conversations the next day.

Q. Did Matsumoto make any statement in that conference?

A. I don't believe so--this I am not sure if he was present--or if he was called to the conference later when the question of the formulating of the Pact became urgent. Probably Matsuoka let him join the conversations at a later period. I don't remember that. We had then conversations nearly every day. So the content of every day's conversation will be very difficult to remember. Now the things were progressing very quickly because Matsuoka, when we came the next day, had already prepared a kind of draft--no, no, he had recorded the conversation with the salient points in a very astonishing way, very correctly and very clearly. So he presented this to be confirmed that this idea had been the idea presented by Stahmer, and on this basis slowly the contents of the Pact had been developed. Matsuoka announced that he will take as advisors Shiratori and Saito.

Q. Saito?

A. Saito. Legal Advisor of the Foreign Office.

Q. Do you know Saito's first name?

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- A. No, this I don't know, but if you have a Who's Who, I think I can give it to you. Obviously, it was the idea of Matsuoka by these two people to have a kind of different views upon the question. Shiratori as an activist, and Saito as a very quiet, legal, moderate man. Probably. Because, otherwise I didn't understand exactly why he just used those two people; and during the conversations when there were some conflicts of opinions about small items, Saito came to the Embassy on behalf of Matsuoka to smooth things out in a very quiet way but the functioning of these people was not very distinctive.
- Q. Will you tell us what the differences of opinion were which gave rise to these discussions?
- A. (Long pause) For the moment I remember--it may be not complete--I may have to think it over. For this moment I remember as one part of the difficulties the speed of the negotiations. Berlin, as usual, was very anxious to speed up the negotiations for one week maybe. This was completely contrary to the Japanese customs to negotiate about such things for months. We had one example in 1939. Oshima and Shiratori negotiated with the German government about a military alliance. These negotiations took place for months and months and failed eventually. So, this time the German government are very urgent to go on as quickly as possible and Matsuoka did his best but he had to reckon with the Privy Council, who was always a rather delaying instrument of the Japanese policy. So I think in this respect Saito was sent sometimes to explain to us the difficulty in convincing the Privy Council. And another difficulty was that Berlin suddenly declared that notwithstanding the negotiations having been made exclusively in Tokyo, the signature should be made in Berlin. So Matsuoka was rather annoyed and Stahmer too was rather annoyed because both thought they could sign themselves this important treaty, out of ambition. Matsuoka tried to bring the signing to Tokyo. These are more formal frictions. About the substantial frictions---
- Q. Were there any disputes regarding the proper interpretation of the language of the Pact?
- A. Of the language? This too, yes.
- Q. What, for instance?
- A. I think there was a discussion about the question of attack.
- Q. Explain that.



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A. Have you a text here? If I could see it? It is also included in the Japanese Yearbook, 1941, Article 3.

Q. Here it is (handing it over to Gen. Ott)

(Interrogation adjourned at 1200)

(Interrogation resumed at 1400)

Q. You stated this morning that there was a difference in opinion regarding the use of the word "attack" in the text of the Three Powers Pact. Please explain.

A. As far as I remember in the first draft of the text, it was "unprovoked attack", and about this question of "unprovoked attack" there arose a dispute how to define the question of "unprovoked", and as I remember the German government's legal advisor Von Gauss made some comment about it that the definition of "unprovoked attack" may be a cause of great difficulties and the German government would have dropped the "unprovoked" and only put "attack."

Q. At whose instance was the word "unprovoked" placed in the draft?

A. I think by Matsuoka; but just during the lunch time I thought it over--the details of the negotiation are very confused in my memory, so if we could talk about these questions tomorrow and I think it over tonight; because which part Matsuoka proposed, which part Stahmer proposed and the telegrams of the German government--this to give you correctly takes some memory.

Q. That will be satisfactory.

A. If I find it out.

Q. At any rate, the treaty was finally concluded?

A. Yes.

Q. In a form that the word "unprovoked" was omitted?

A. Yes.

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- Q. Now, what question arose, if any, regarding the definition of the word "attack" as it was finally used in the text of the treaty?
- A. (Pause) I think the Japanese government or Matsuoka tried to include a consultation about the question of attack.
- Q. Please explain further.
- A. That the case of an attack may be defined by a consultation of the powers concerned.
- Q. What ideas were expressed at the time of the negotiations?
- A. About the question of "attack?"
- Q. As to the definition of "attack."
- A. I would like to think it over and if we could go on tomorrow about this question.
- Q. I would like you to consider that point also then.
- A. Yes.
- Q. Who took part in the negotiations on behalf of Japan other than Matsuoka?
- A. Matsuoka and partly--I don't know on which occasions--Matsumoto. I think Matsumoto joined the conference in the last part when the question of formulating the treaty was necessary. Shiratori was never present. Saito may have been present one or two times; anyhow both sometimes came as messengers to the German Embassy in behalf of Matsuoka.
- Q. Who were known by you to be advisors of Matsuoka during the period of those negotiations?
- A. Shiratori and Saito.

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- Q. On what do you base your statement?
- A. Upon the declaration of Matsuoka. He informed me that he has selected those two advisors to assist him in negotiations for the Three Powers Pact.
- Q. Shiratori?
- A. The former ambassador to Italy and he may not have informed more people because he was most anxious that the secret of those negotiations may not leak out.
- Q. Did you talk to Shiratori during this period?
- A. I think I had once a talk with Shiratori on behalf of Matsuoka.
- Q. You stated this morning that there were a number of occasions on which Shiratori talked to you.
- A. Afterwards in 1941.
- Q. But during the period of the negotiations Shiratori spoke to you about this matter only-----
- A. Very occasionally.
- Q. Occasionally?
- A. Very occasionally. I don't know how many times but comparatively very few talks.
- Q. Those conversations were sufficient to inform you that he knew of the negotiations?
- A. Of course. Because he was selected as advisor by Matsuoka and used to bring some information.
- Q. Were you present when Shiratori brought information on occasions?
- A. To the German Embassy?

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Q. Yes.

A. He came to the German Embassy, yes.

Q. Was that information brought at the direction of Matsuoka?

A. (Long pause) I try to remember what he brought. (Pause) If I remember correctly, he came together with Saito, so-----  
(pause)

Q. Can you recall what the nature of your conference was with Shiratori and Saito or what information it was that Shiratori brought to you?

A. It is very difficult, those details.

Q. Was the information related to the subject of your negotiations with Matsuoka?

A. Sure, sure. It was in the line of the negotiations.

Q. You can say definitely then, of your own knowledge, that Shiratori was assisting in the negotiations without having to rely upon the statement that Matsuoka made to you that Shiratori was an advisor? Do you understand?

A. No, if I am now able-----

Q. As a result of your discussions with Shiratori you are able to say of your own knowledge that Shiratori was taking part in the negotiations for the treaty?

A. Yes.

Q. Of course you know that is true from what Matsuoka told you.

A. I have it before my eyes that Matsuoka told me that now he selected two advisors from different camps and Shiratori acted in this capacity going between Matsuoka and myself.

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- Q. Yes, that is true. But in view of the work that Shiratori was doing and the conferences that Shiratori took part in, you would have known that he was working as a negotiator even if Matsuoka hadn't told you so?
- A. Yes, but then probably I wouldn't have seen him personally, because I received him after Matsuoka had told me that he is his advisor. Otherwise I would not have talked with him because I kept the questions in the line of the people joining in the negotiations.
- Q. But the point is that as a result of your conferences with Shiratori, you knew that he was taking a part in the negotiations?
- A. Yes, that means he didn't join our conferences.
- Q. I understand that.
- A. But he was obviously talking questions over with Matsuoka as advisor, in this way he took part.
- Q. On occasions he came to you about the same matters?
- A. Yes.
- Q. What part, if any, did Gen. Oshima play in these negotiations at this time?
- A. Gen. Oshima was completely reluctant and I remember him the day of the signing of the Pact in the house of Mr. Matsuoka; it was an evening reception and we made a toast to the happy conclusion of the Pact. Oshima was present and looked very angry obviously being not used in these negotiations. Personally I think he was, after having failed in former years with his own endeavors to come to a closer cooperation, very envious that Matsuoka had succeeded in this respect.
- Q. In other words, he resented the fact that he had not been given the opportunity to play a more important role at this point?
- A. Decidedly, and this bitterness against Matsuoka may be created by this

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fact even when he left for Germany to tell me that the idea of a visit of Matsuoka to Berlin seems completely undesirable. So I had the idea that he didn't like to have another important man aside of him presented in Berlin. We had a very sharp conversation about this question and he gave me personally a farewell dinner at the Imperial Hotel and we came nearly to a conflict.

Q. Now, what other differences?

A. (Interrupting) May I say about the taking part in the negotiations? The Italian Ambassador joined the negotiations on the last day. I was ordered by Stahmer to keep the whole negotiations secret towards the Italian Ambassador. This was one more detail of dispute between Matsuoka and us because the Japanese government didn't like to exclude Italy so completely from the negotiations. But the German government said that the moment when Italy is informed, things leak out. So Japan finally consented and I took it on my own responsibility to inform Indelli, the Italian Ambassador, the day before we had the final conclusion in order to have not too difficult a time with him in the management of the Pact afterwards. Because he, of course, I thought must be very resentful to be excluded in such a way. So I asked him into the German Embassy and asked his word of honor not to inform anybody and informed him personally about the things going on. He was very grateful, but of course, he was in a rather awkward position.

Q. What other differences arose between Germany and Japan with regard to the formulation of the treaty?

A. (Pause) If I remember correctly, there was some question from the German government about a preamble of the Pact. The preamble has been arranged by Matsuoka himself and this preamble is a little large in the text so I think it was once more asked if the Japanese government is desirous to have this text taken and this question was finished.

Q. Will you state any other differences in opinion that arose during the period of negotiations?

A. As I told you, may I think it over until tomorrow? I think I can find it out.

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- Q. In giving further thought to these matters, I want you also to consider what prior understandings were reached as between the parties.
- A. Yes.
- Q. During this period; that is, during the month of September did you have occasion to get in touch with the Foreign Office in Germany frequently?
- A. We sent daily telegrams about the proceedings of the negotiations and got replies giving direction to the proceedings. These telegrams were prepared by Stahmer, myself and Minister Boltze every day.
- Q. Is it not true that Stahmer, the personal envoy of Ribbentrop, was taking the lead in these negotiations?
- A. Yes.
- Q. Did he express to you privately or in any other manner any underlying purpose?
- A. No.
- Q. For this fact?
- A. No.
- Q. Were his relations with you such as to lead you to believe that he was withholding information from you?
- A. At that time not. I didn't know him before other than when he had been the partner of the Duke of Sax Coburg Gothe to the United States and to the anniversary of 2600 years of the Tenno family in Japan in the springtime of 1940. I had to consider him as envoy of the government and I didn't doubt that he speaks to me the truth. I didn't think that he was withholding things.
- Q. But you changed your view about that at a later period, did you not?
- A. I changed my view about that after having seen the development of the

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Ambassadorship in Japan during Stahmer's time. I would like not to give a judgement about my successor if possible.

Q. I will not ask you any further questions about that at this time.

A. Yes, but this changed my opinion about his character completely. As I stated in my former statement of November 19, 1945, I worked with all my energy for the conclusion of this Pact being convinced that it is in line with my wishes to have an instrument to keep United States out of the war. If I had been troubled in this fundamental idea, I would not have done the work I did to conclude the Pact.

Q. I will ask you more questions about that as we arrive at the proper period.

A. Yes.

Q. What knowledge did you have of the action taken by the Privy Council and by an Imperial conference regarding the conclusion of this treaty?

A. The proceedings of the Privy Council usually were kept secret. In this case, Matsuoka had been required urgently by Stahmer to speed up the conclusion of the Pact disclosing to us that the Privy Council had been driven to a very quick study of the Pact by the personal influence of Admiral Suzuki, who had been Prime Minister during the surrender here.

Q. What was Suzuki's full name, and what position did he occupy at that time?

A. He was Vice-President of the Privy Council and his full name is, I think, Baron Kantaro Suzuki. I think there was a special difficulty to conclude or to sign the Pact in English because there was no time. There was a big dispute in order to send the Japanese text with necessary signatures to Berlin. So an arrangement was made. This was a formality, a special arrangement to over-come this difficulty, and this concerned the Privy Council too because it was very strict.

Q. Did you discuss the matter with Suzuki?



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A. No.

Q. Did Suzuki discuss it with any member of your staff, including Stahmer?

A. No, we only heard by Matsuoka's remarks that he was very happy to have a special strong assistance of Admiral Suzuki in the direction of the Privy Council.

Q. The consent of the Emperor was also necessary, was it not?

A. Yes.

Q. How was the consent of the Emperor obtained?

A. I don't know if there had been a special way after the consent of the Privy Council. Usually there is a Privy Council session in the presence of the Emperor where the Privy Council presents the matter and the Emperor agrees. If this was changed in this time, I don't remember.

Q. What did Matsuoka tell you about that?

A. (Long pause--no answer)

Q. Do you recall whether Matsuoka----

A. I have a faint memory that he told me that he had got the agreement of the Emperor and it would be impossible to make a last change, or something like that, but-----

Q. Do you recall whether Matsuoka advised you that he had had a personal interview with the Emperor?

A. That he advised me?

Q. Did Matsuoka tell you that he had a conference, a personal conference, with the Emperor regarding the Pact?

A. This may be.

Q. You say, it may be?

A. It may be, because I have a faint memory that he went a special

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quick way to bring the Pact through all the necessary authorities. Maybe he told me he had a special conference with the Emperor.

Q. Was this conference held before the Privy Council had considered the matter?

A. (Pause) Could I take this question for tomorrow?

Q. That will be satisfactory. I want you to try to recall what Matsuoka said he did in getting this Pact approved including a statement of whether or not he discussed the matter privately with the Emperor at any time. What argument did Stahmer present as to the advantage to Germany of the signing of such a Pact?

A. What argument?

Q. Yes.

A. (Pause) The main argument I had in mind was to-----

Q. I am not asking what you had in mind, what Stahmer said?

A. I mean the argument I had in mind as being presented by Stahmer; that the Pact is the main instrument to keep the United States out of the war and this would be a great advantage for Germany concerning the leadership in Europe and the New Order. I wondered that this question had been taken as a kind of symbol without defining the idea and the scope of this. I think, because the question of the New Order at that time was a vague idea at that time without being defined.

Q. Why was this treaty signed in Germany?

A. I think this treaty was signed in Germany to give the German government an opportunity for a big demonstrative propoganda. This was the very angry idea of Stahmer too, and was resented rather strongly by Matsuoka who had the ambition to sign the treaty in Tokyo.

Q. Do I understand that Stahmer also wanted it signed in Germany?

A. Here in Tokyo, to have his name attached to the treaty. And I

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personally had the idea that it would be better to sign it in Tokyo in order to show that this treaty is a special treaty concerning the situation with United States.

Q. When did you first learn that the treaty was to be signed in Germany?

A. It may have been in the middle of September, in the middle of the negotiations.

Q. Did it not occur to you then that the signing of the treaty in Germany meant that there was another purpose that Germany had in mind in concluding the treaty other than merely the question of keeping the United States out of the war?

A. I considered the signing of the treaty in Berlin as one more example of the ambitious attitude of Minister Von Ribbentrop. This, I considered as a result of this signing. And in my talk with Stahmer, he too didn't mention any other reason and when we tried to bring the signing place to Tokyo by telegram, which I personally initiated mainly, Stahmer told me, all right, but he thinks it would be useless because he knows the ambition of the Foreign Minister and he will not give up the occasion of a big demonstration. I was confirmed in my idea that this is a question of vanity.

Q. Did Matsuoka discuss the advisability of his going to Germany to take part in the signing of the treaty?

A. I think there was no more time, because (pause) going by plane was out of custom at that time; going by train took about a fortnight. The German government urged to sign the end of September, so I think this question was technically impossible. I remember that Matsuoka was angry not to be more personally present so eventually we arranged a telephone call on the day of the signing immediately after the signing in Berlin. Then Matsuoka from his Foreign Office called Ribbentrop by telephone and was by this way to a certain extent present. I remember this telephone call.

Q. You were familiar, in a general way, were you not with the fact that

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Matsuoka, beginning in August 1940, made various public announcements of his views regarding what he considered to be the duty of Japan to impose the Imperial Way upon the universe?

A. Yes.

Q. For instance, on August 10, 1940 he made a speech on the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. You knew in a general way of that matter, did you not?

A. Yes. I believe the term Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was used for the first time by Minister Arita earlier.

Q. You were also familiar with the fact, were you not, that on the 27th of September 1940, the day when the treaty was concluded, Matsuoka made a speech in which he advocated and praised the alliance with Germany and Italy as nations having the same policy and mental attitude as Japan with respect to the New World Order?

A. Yes, in the first Article of the Three Powers Pact, this is guaranteed.

Q. Now, how did Matsuoka claim he expected to bring about this New World Order in the South Pacific?

A. This question remained all the time completely vague and just the same ideas Matsuoka developed towards Hitler in his welcome reception in a very vague way about Hakuighchu. It means the eight corners of a roof, that the Japanese ideas may be spread out over the world, over mankind like the eight corners of a roof to bring to mankind the ideas of family under the Tenno leadership as in Japan. Very vague ideas which we never took as a concrete policy. Nobody.

Q. But didn't you understand that to be the Oriental way of indicating that this Pact would be used to extend the influence of Japan through the entire South Pacific?

A. The influence of Japan?

Q. Yes.

A. We had in this Pact respected the leadership of Japan in the New Order in Greater East Asia.