

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. (USSBS NO. 65)
NAV NO. 13

Place: Tokyo
Date: 15 October 1945; 0930-1215

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Subject: PEARL HARBOR - MIDWAY - SOLOMONS.

Personnel interrogated and background of each:

Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN, Gunnery Officer on Admiral YAMAMOTO's Staff, Commander in Chief 2nd Fleet at MIDWAY Battle June 1942. Member of Military Affairs and Naval Headquarters Staff 1945. Very good command of English language.

Where interviewed: MEIJI Building.

Interrogator: Captain C. (n) Shands, USN.

Interpreter: Lieutenant Paul Brown, USNR.

SUMMARY

PEARL HARBOR: Training commenced about August 1944, with special shallow water torpedoes for attack upon PEARL HARBOR. Photo intelligence used at PEARL HARBOR to assess damage.

MIDWAY: Occupation of MIDWAY planned subsequent to the Doolittle raid on TOKYO. Necessary to illuminate that point as a base for an attack upon JAPAN. Four carriers, one heavy cruiser and 4500 personnel lost, resulting in retirement of occupation force. Loss of battle blamed on Jap cruiser force, which did not maintain sufficient caution and search of area. Same lack of caution resulted in CORAL SEA loss and failure to occupy PORT MORESBY.

GENERAL: Some feeling evident against Japanese Air Force and Army. Think Army too much in politics, not enough in fighting. Loss of war due to decline of air force and supporting fuel supply. Opinion JAPAN would have been forced to quit due to lack of fuel and food in 1946, whether cities bombed or not. No territorial aspiration other than CHINA and that part of the world to the west of a line between SINGAPORE, EAST INDIES, SOLOMONS & KISKA. This was to be a protective wall for ASIA.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN) - - - - -

TRANSCRIPT

Q. Are you familiar with and plans for PEARL HARBOR?

A. Yes, I know a little about them.

Q. Were you at PEARL HARBOR?

A. No, I didn't go there, but know a little about the plans for the attack.

Q. Can you tell us the main forces participating at PEARL HARBOR, the composition of each carrier force, etc?

A. I do not know but I will try to get the information in writing.

Q. Do you know if this operation at PEARL HARBOR had a number or name? How was the operation designated?

A. I am not quite sure, but believe it wasn't named.

Q. Do you know the track of the approach to PEARL HARBOR?

A. The start was from SAEKI, the training harbor about 17 November 1941, then north and across the PACIFIC, just south of the ALEUTIANS, then south to PEARL HARBOR. We had studied the weather on this route for a long time. Upon returning we suffered from heavy seas and strong winds. Several men were killed by the storm on the way back.

Q. Any ships lost?

A. No, but some received storm damage.

Q. When the JAPANESE FLEET left PEARL HARBOR, do you remember if they had two or three plans of retreat?

A. No, just the shortest route.

Q. Do you know about how many planes were in the attack?

A. About 450 planes. Half of them were defensive and half of them offensive.

Q. How many planes were lost?

A. The loss was not so great. Not over 30 to 40.

Q. What was the objective of the attack upon PEARL HARBOR?

A. In Japanese tactics, we are told when we have two enemies, one in front and one in the back, first we must cut in front by sword. Only cut and not kill but make it hard. Then we attack the back enemy and kill him. Then we come back to the front enemy and kill him. This time we took that tactic, having no aim to capture PEARL HARBOR but just to cripple it. We might have returned to capture later.

Q. What were your designated targets?

A. The first aim was at aircraft carriers, but they were out at sea, so attacked other ships.

Q. Did you have any special equipment such as shallow water torpedoes?

A. Yes, we had studied and trained to attack in shallow water with torpedoes. They were special torpedoes to run shallow. I do not know the details.

Q. How long had you been training?

A. Four months, since August 1941.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN) -----

Q. Where was this training conducted?

A. SAEKI.

Q. Was the purpose of this training to attack PEARL HARBOR or other areas?

A. Only PEARL HARBOR.

Q. Were your midget submarines at PEARL HARBOR considered of any value?

A. It was a morale factor. Young naval officers very much admire bravery of Italian officers in torpedo boats and small submarines. Because of their admiration of Italian officers, they also want to show bravery in submarines.

Q. Did you know the damage that had been done to the American Fleet at PEARL HARBOR?

A. Yes, we knew by photographs. About three weeks after the squadron came back to JAPAN, the fleet received photographs taken during the attack.

MIDWAY BATTLE

Q. Were you present in the Battle of MIDWAY, 4 June 1942?

A. Yes, I was Gunnery Officer on Admiral YAMAMOTO's Staff on the battleship YAMATO.

Q. What were the main forces involved?

A. See chart.

Q. What was the disposition of your fleet relative to MIDWAY?

A. During the approach the transports were to the southwest, carrier forces to the northwest; main body, battleships, cruisers; to the west. One force in ALEUTIAN ISLANDS.

Q. Who was in command of the entire operation?

A. Admiral YAMAMOTO, who was killed in a plane crash in SOUTH PACIFIC.

Q. Who was in command of occupation forces?

A. Admiral YAMAMOTO.

Q. Who was in command of the carrier forces?

A. Admiral NAGANO.

Q. How did the force retire after the battle?

A. The main body went west, carrier group ordered to join main body to return to JAPAN, some to SINGAPORE. The Cruiser Division Seven broke off from the transport group and continued on toward MIDWAY. During the night the MOGAMI and MIKUMA collided. MOGAMI received great damage from the collision. Due to the damage to this cruiser, the cruiser Division also retired. The MIKUMA was sunk by dive bombers the next day.

Q. What were the plans leading up to the attack? Did you intend to occupy MIDWAY?

A. We intended to capture MIDWAY because on 18 April we were attacked in TOKYO for the first time. We thought the planes came from MIDWAY.

Q. Did you believe that by taking MIDWAY there would be no more raids on TOKYO?

A. Yes.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y. JN)

- Q. Did you intend to go beyond MIDWAY?
- A. If we could, we wanted to go to PEARL HARBOR, but it was not authorized because it was too far. We intended to capture small islands between MIDWAY and PEARL HARBOR. If we captured these islands, the land based planes could attack PEARL HARBOR. We wanted to capture PEARL HARBOR later.
- Q. What was your plan of employment of MIDWAY after capture?
- A. We planned to use it as a base for long range search planes and for submarines. The attack on the ALEUTIAN ISLANDS was part of the same plan. We planned only air raids, but we wanted to capture KISKA a little later.
- Q. Did you plan to hold KISKA and DUTCH HARBOR and then move down to the UNITED STATES?
- A. Not that far. Only to protect JAPAN from air raids.
- Q. How much military force was in the convoy at MIDWAY?
- A. Not quite sure, but we have one marine regiment, about 1500; and one military regiment, about 1000. We expected to land 6 June.
- Q. Can you tell me what ships were lost at MIDWAY?
- A. Five ships sunk: AKAGI, KAGA, SORYU, HIRYU, MIKUMA. I think all sunk by dive bomber action.
- Q. Did this operation have any number or name?
- A. MI, which stood for MIDWAY ISLAND action.
- Q. Do you know how many personnel were lost in the MIDWAY Battle?
- A. I think 700 on each of the carriers went down and about 1000 on the MIKUMA, a few others may have been lost. The total lost was about 4,500. Admiral YAMAGUCHI was killed. If Admiral YAMAGUCHI had been saved, he would have eventually been made Commander of the Grand Fleet.
- Q. How was the operation order to attack given to the fleet?
- A. In early May we gathered at the Naval Station HASHIRAJIMA, a port near KURE, and were told in a conference. Afterwards the transports went to SAIPAN. They then received sailing orders by letter, carried by plane. Beginning to sail, orders went by wireless but after sailing they used no wireless.
- Q. How long did you expect to be able to hold MIDWAY?
- A. We expected to be able to hold MIDWAY about three months without reinforcements.
- Q. Did you lack any special equipment for the landing force?
- A. There was sufficient forces to capture and hold MIDWAY with adequate equipment, but due to lack of precaution on the part of the Air Force, it was lost. The people of JAPAN are not trained to keep secrets and the important information of the cabinet was spread by the members. JAPAN was successful in the early part of the war because its moves were secret. Before the war started, members of the Air Forces and members of Naval Officers aboard ship sometimes quarreled about ships against airplanes. During the early time of the war, the Air Force attacked the battleships REPULSE and PRINCE OF WALES and sunk them off SINGAPORE. After attacking PEARL HARBOR, the Air Force believed the aircraft carriers were very strong and could inflict a great deal of damage on enemy surface ships. This attitude continued up to the Battle of MIDWAY. The failure of the Air Force to maintain an adequate search for American Carrier Fleet at MIDWAY, plus the fact that the JAPANESE submarine line running north and south between 165° and 170°W, was too far east to locate the American Fleet, are the reasons given for the loss of the Battle of MIDWAY.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain TATANABE, Y., IJN) -----

- Q. At what point was the decision made to discontinue the campaign?
- A. After carriers were sunk the order to retire was sent out at ten o'clock in the night. At that time only the remaining ships of the Air Force and transports turned around. Cruisers and main body went ahead.
- Q. What was the plan of employment of this main body and cruisers?
- A. The cruisers were going to proceed and shell MIDWAY and the main body was to proceed towards carrier forces to give protection and rescue survivors. The main body advanced to within the range of American long range planes and then joined up with destroyers and cruisers from carrier forces.
- Q. What factor determined the cancellation of the plan to bombard MIDWAY?
- A. The collision of the two heavy cruisers during the night.
- Q. Were any battleships sunk or damaged?
- A. May have been damaged slightly by bombs, not sure.
- Q. Do you know if HARUNA was damaged at MANILA on 8 December or at MIDWAY?
- A. She did not receive damage at either place. No damage to battleships or cruisers at MANILA.
- Q. Was any transport damaged at MIDWAY?
- A. They turned back before attacked. One may have been damaged by torpedo but not sunk. I am not sure of damage.
- Q. When was first contact made with American bombers?
- A. About three hours after sunrise on 4 June.
- Q. Did you receive any reports of our long range bombers over your main body?
- A. Next day your long range bombers came, but no damage. That was on 5 June.
- Q. During the afternoon of 3 June, was your formation attacked by long range bombers?
- A. Yes, but there was no damage to battleships or cruisers. The same afternoon long range bombers also attacked transports to southwest, possibly inflicting slight damage to one transport. I heard that about midnight before the main battle the force was attacked by seaplanes with torpedoes. One transport hit but not seriously. Damaged the bottom.
- Q. Was your formation or transport formation attacked early the next morning on 4 June?
- A. No, neither main body nor transports were attacked.
- Q. On 5 June were you attacked by long range bombers?
- A. No, transports perhaps, but we received no report of having been attacked or damaged.
- Q. How near did your main body approach MIDWAY before returning?
- A. About 500 miles. The remaining ships from the carrier force were scheduled to join the main body of ships after sunrise on 5 June. Upon completion of the rendezvous all ships retired.
- Q. Were the MOGAMI and MIKUMI attacked by long range bombers on the 5th June?
- A. Yes, very high but no hits. I think it was morning.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., JN) -----

- Q. When was the MIKUMA sunk?
- A. I think the MIKUMA sank in the afternoon. But was damaged in the morning by dive bombers, couldn't navigate very well. The MOGAMI damaged at the same time but not too badly.
- Q. Just before sunset on the 5th, were those cruisers attacked by long range bombers?
- A. I don't think so. It was not reported.
- Q. Were any other ships attacked by long range bombers?
- A. Some were attacked but no hits. One destroyer damaged by carrier planes in the afternoon. The KUMA was damaged and I think the KINUGASA. I don't know what type of planes.
- Q. On the 6th of June during the retreat, did our carrier planes attack battle-ships of the main body?
- A. No bombers seen by the main body during retirement.
- Q. When the main body retired, did your submarines also retire?
- A. Yes, but couldn't find any American ships. They fired on MIDWAY while passing.
- Q. What effect did the loss of the carriers have on your later plans?
- A. Many planes and a number of pilots were lost in the action which weakened the Navy Air Force requiring training to replace them. The Army refused to take their pilots from MANCHURIA and CHINA during the SOLOMONS CAMPAIGN, therefore the Navy was required to furnish pilots in that area. Some went to ZUIKAKU and SHOKAKU.
- Q. Did the Army provide pilots in the SOLOMONS also?
- A. Yes, second class Army pilots were put ashore in SOLOMONS.
- Q. Did the Japanese Navy then plan to operate within range of the shore base planes?
- A. Yes, until they got more carriers. In the movement of the squadrons, the pilots flew from island to island. Only Navy pilots took part. The Army pilots remained on a single base due to lack of navigational training.
- Q. Did you have radar installed on your ships at the Battle of MIDWAY?
- A. No, about August 1942 it was installed..
- Q. What was the flag ship at MIDWAY?
- A. YAMATO.

SOLOMONS

- Q. At the Battle of the BISMARCK SEA, March 1943, do you know what damage was inflicted on your convoy?
- A. Am not quite sure, but think that a few transports and two escorts were sunk.
- Q. What was the plan for your Task Forces in the CORAL SEA in May 1942.
- A. In the battle of the CORAL SEA, the SHOHO had started down with a small task group to attack PORT MOPSEBY from sea. In passing through the CORAL SEA, the Air Force on the SHOHO failed to maintain proper precaution and were attacked by the American Air Force and sunk. The ZUIKAKU and the SHOKAKU were sent down at the same time to support the SHOHO force and

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN) -----

intercept the American carrier. Later, the SHOKAKU was very badly damaged, the ZUIKAKU received minor damages and many people killed. The SHOKAKU nearly capsized. Admiral YAMAMOTO sent me to investigate damage of SHOKAKU.

Q. How long was it required to repair the SHOKAKU?

A. About three months. About one month for ZUIKAKU.

Q. Did that damage to those carriers effect your plans in the SOLOMONS?

A. It delayed our plans to capture GUADALCANAL and occupy the SOLOMONS.

Q. Why were the troops and ships that were sent down to the SOLOMONS ISLAND sent down in small numbers instead of large numbers?

A. The original plan didn't call for capturing GUADALCANAL. However a local commander from TULAGI went over to GUADALCANAL for pleasure and then decided to make an airfield. We had only about 1,000 men, mostly laborers for building airfields. We received information that only about 800 to 1,000 American troops had landed so we sent down about 1000 to assist our troops then on shore, to drive out the Americans. They were defeated. This was the first time that the Japanese Army had been defeated and then we sent 5,000 down but they weren't strong enough to drive out the Americans and recapture the island. Then we tried to send more, but we lost both ships and men. The Army had been used to fighting the Chinese Army.

GENERAL

Q. Was the Navy prepared to conduct a long war?

A. Two or three years. It is the opinion of most Navy Officers that the tide was turning with the loss of SAIPAN. It was pretty definite that the war was lost following the loss of LEYTE and OKINAWA, but we were not sure.

Q. About how long did you think the war would last?

A. About three years. When MARSHALL ISLANDS, RABAU and KISKA were occupied, I felt that that should be the extent of our operation and it should be made a line of defense in order to preserve that territory for the defense of the Empire.

Q. Why wasn't the Japanese submarine used for more offensive work?

A. Since we did not have air or sea control, owing to the Army's eager request for supplies, we had to supply them by submarines. It then became a habit to supply them in that manner. Poor tactics.

Q. Do you know what caused the decrease in Japanese air power? Was it the loss of planes, loss of pilots, lack of fuel to train pilots or due to the results in the SOLOMONS?

A. The reason this war was a failure was due to the decrease of our Air Force. After you captured LEYTE, the fuel became less and less. Then we endeavored to produce fuel from sugar. The sugar was obtained from FORMOSA, but this was not enough.

Q. What caused your greatest loss in shipping?

A. In the case of shipping, the cause was by submarines in the area and later it was principally mines. Along the CHINA COAST it was airplanes.

Q. Along the southern islands of JAPAN were many ships sunk by our planes?

A. Many fishing boats. Near the end of the war, the number of ships sunk by aircraft was about the same as those sunk by submarines.

TRANSCRIPT of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., IJN) -----

- Q. Do you feel that attack on shipping was sufficient to bring about the close of the war?
- A. Yes, I think if you didn't bomb the cities your attacks on shipping would have brought the same results by next Spring (1946).
- Q. What would have been the cause of the close of the war?
- A. The great cause for the close of the war would have been lack of fuel and food which is shipped in.
- Q. Did you plan to occupy AUSTRALIA?
- A. We didn't want to go to AUSTRALIA. The Navy was very rich with ships so we only planned to set up a protective wall extending from SINGAPORE through EAST INDIES, SOLOMONS, and the MARSHALL Group to KISKA. The Japanese Army was supposed to capture CHINA, but CHINA was so big that they were unable to completely do so. We didn't think that the Japanese Army did very well. We think that the Japanese Navy did better.
- Q. Was the Navy ready for this war or did the Army force the Navy into it?
- A. After the Army captured MANCHURIA, they had great power in politics. The officers instead of studying war began to study politics. In the SOLOMONS they should have studied war instead of politics. That is my experience in this war.
- Q. Could you give me a diagram showing me the chain of commands in the Battle of MIDWAY? Also a list of the ships, including transports, that were damaged and the date of damage?
- A. Yes, I will bring it back.

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HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. USSES 65(Supplement)
NAV. NO. 13

PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 14 November 1945


Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Personnel interrogated:
Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.

SUMMARY

The following notes of battles submitted by Captain WATANABE, I.J.N. Gunnery and Landing Force Officer, Staff CinC combined fleet(Admiral YAMAMOTO). All times (-9).

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65-1(Sup)

NARRATION

MIDWAY Action 4 - 6 June 1942.

27 May 0600 Departed HASEIRASHIMA, INLAND SEA near KURE.

3 June 1030 Mobile force broke radio silence and sends out signals to change course.

Proceeding through fog from 1000 the 2nd to 2300 the 3rd.

4 June 1510 Detect what is believed to be enemy plane signals in near vicinity. At 0900 the 3rd and 2330 the 4th, AKAGI detects similar signals.

5 June 0130 36 fighters and 36 bombers take off to attack MIDWAY
0600 Return.

0130 - 0200 Air Searches.

After 0230, made contact with 2 or 3 enemy patrol planes.

0400 - 0650 Enemy planes torpedo attack carriers.

No damage sustained.

0428 Enemy surface force sighted by Japanese scout plane.

0500 One carrier sighted by search airplane.

In process of refitting with #80 torpedoes. Delay caused by shifting from bombs to torpedoes. Lost chance to hit American carriers.

0725 30 enemy planes attack. AKAGI, KAGA and SORYU burning.

0758 6 fighters and 18 bomber planes of the HIRYO take

off for attack on American carriers. One carrier of ENTERPRISE class severely damaged. One heavy cruiser seriously damaged. One large carrier sunk.

1413 Our aircraft reported enemy task force proceeding east, leaving one large carrier behind smoking.

1403 HIRYO damaged by dive bomber attack.

2355 MIDWAY Occupation cancelled by despatch from Admiral YAMAMOTO.

(This was discussed by all members of Staff. Chief of Staff (Rear Admiral UGAKI) convinced Admiral YAMAMOTO to turn back. Remainder of staff divided in opinion whether to turn back or try to capture without aircraft).

CORAL SEA Action 4 - 8 May 1942.

SHOKAKU received 3 250 kg bomb hits.

4 May About 80 enemy carrier planes attack TULAGI between 0630 and 1315.

5 May See no enemy.
3 enemy E-17's attack MO (PORT MORESBY) Occupation Force, No hits.

6 May Discover striking force at 0810.
Enemy E-17's sight MO (PORT MORESBY) Occupation Force.

7 May 3 E-17's attack transports at 0550, no damage; aircraft of CARDIV 5 discovers large tanker and mistake it for carrier at 0530; Float Recce sights striking force at 0640; SHOHO sunk at 0935; 12 bombers and 15 attack planes of CARDIV 5 take off at 1430 but fail to sight enemy; RAEUL AIR FLOT 25 cooperates in attack and sinks 1 battleship, severely damages 1 battleship, sinks (unconfirmed) 1 cruiser.

8 May CARDIV 5 SHOKAKU receives 3 #250 bomb hits at 0940; at

Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.)

0920 1 large enemy carrier (LEXINGTON) sunk, 1 medium carrier (YORKTOWN) sunk, and 1 BB or cruiser left burning.

SOLOMONS Action 23 - 25 August 1942.

7 August 30 enemy transports arrive at GUADALCANAL.

16 August 1800 Mobile Force departs INLAND SEA.

(0) General Command.

Main Unit: CinC Combined Fleet.

Supporting Force: Advance Force CinC 2nd Fleet.

Mobile Force CinC 3rd Fleet.

Mobile Force Command.

Main Unit: CinC 3rd Fleet. SHOKAKU, ZUIKAKU
CARDIV 1 (less RYUJO) 1 DESDIV
2 DD'S.

Advance Unit: Comdr 11th Division 11th Div. CHIKUMA, 7th
Div (less HOGAMI under
repair) 10th Div. (less
2 DESDIVS plus 1 DESDIV)

Detached Unit: Comdr. 8th Division. 8th Div (less CHIKUMA)
RYUJO, 2 DD'S.

20/1255 Enemy carrier sighted. Mobile Force cancels call
at TRUK and proceed to south to intercept.

20/0600 Mobile Force refuels.

0900 20 enemy carrier planes land at GUADALCANAL
DESRON 2, remaining elements of ICHIKI Detachment,
and YOKOSUKA 5th Special Landing Force (700 Army
- 800 Marines) scheduled to effect landings on
GUADALCANAL on the 24th.

23/1625 Aircraft carrier's course reversed. Course 330
due to delay in landing force.

24/0200 Destroyer Squadron 2 Detached Unit heads for attack
on GUADALCANAL. Main Unit reverses course, course
150.

0415 First searches carrier aircraft. Enemy not sighted.

0837 Enemy patrol plane contacts our main unit.

1228 Large enemy force sighted by cruiser plane.

1420 Two enemy task forces sighted and attacked.
1 carrier severely damaged and burning (HORNET
afire, sunk. ENTERPRISE damaged.
2 carriers severely damaged and burning.

2nd phase of attack. Japanese planes fail to find
United States Fleet and return to ships.

1543 Enemy not sighted.

1308 Two bombers attacked SHOKAKU. No damage sustained.
Night attacks scheduled by carriers cancelled due
to bad weather.

1300 RYUJO sinks due to dive bomb (10 hits).

2200 Night destroyer attacks cancelled. Withdrawing.

() 10 Kil. () () () ()
SUZUYA KUMANO KIRISHIMA: NAGARA HIKI CHIKUMA

10 Kilometers

: 2 DD'S

() SHOKAKU

5 Kilometers : 2 DD'S

() ZUIKAKU

65-3-7(Sup)

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Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.F.) RESTRICTED

Battle of SANTA CRUZ Island 26 October 1942
(South PACIFIC Action)

Command Channel

Advance Force Main Unit: CinC 2nd Fleet CruDiv 4,
CruDiv 5 (less HAGURO) Des-
Ron 2, DesRon 24, CarDiv 2
(JUNYO, HIYO)

Forward Attack Unit: Comdr. PatDiv 3,
BatDiv 3, DesDiv
15, DesDiv 2.

Mobile Force CinC 3rd Fleet 3rd Fleet (less a part)
6 DD'S, KUNIKAWA MARU

- 11 October Sortie from TRUK.
CruDiv 6 (AOEA, KAKO, FURUTAKA) and 2 DD'S bombard
Battle of SAVO Island.
- 13 October 2 or 3 enemy carriers, 2 battleships, 5 to 7 cruisers
and 6 to 8 DD'S sighted South GUADALCANAL, by sea-
planes from RUSSELL and RENNEL Islands.
BatDiv 3 shells GUADALCANAL.
(HARUNA and KIRISHIMA) - All planes on GUADALCANAL
believed destroyed.
- 14 October One enemy patrol plane contacted and shot down by CV-
VF. Search plane sighted 1 enemy battleship, 1 crui-
ser and 3 destroyers South of GUADALCANAL - convoy.
- 15 October Landings by high-speed transport unit land troops
Y day (about X plus 6 days). All-out attack scheduled
for 21st.
One cruiser sunk by carrier aircraft. Attack phase
#1.
One cruiser moderately damaged. One transport heavily
damaged. One transport slightly damaged. Attack
phase #2.
Our transport force makes landing on GUADALCANAL.
- 16 October Search aircraft sighted enemy near RENNEL Island. 1
carrier, 2 cruisers, 8 DD'S, 3 battleships, 6 cruisers,
7 destroyers.
- 17 October Operations to crush enemy reinforcement force.
18 fighters and 18 attack planes to GUADALCANAL.
10 attack planes to hit ships anchored at LUNGA.
- 19 October Y day set 22 October. Postponed by Army request -
not ready.
- 20 October No intelligence on the enemy forces.
- 21 October Y day set for 23 October. Postponed by Army again.
Following sighted by search aircraft in RENNEL Area:
1 battleship, 2 cruisers.
1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers.
- 22 October HIYO, flagship of CarDiv 2, develops mechanical trouble.
Proceeds to TRUK. Flag shifted to JUNYO.
- 23 October Enemy patrol plane makes contact with CHIKUMA.
Y day postponed one day by Army request.
2 battleships, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers sighted by

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65-4-(Sup)

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Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.). - - -

by search planes at RENNEL Island.

- 24 October Some refueling. Despatch sent to Army at GUADACANAL that if general attack was not made immediately Navy would leave scene due to lack of fuel and food. Army does not appreciate Navy problem. Search planes sighted enemy near RENNEL Island. Enemy judged to consist of 5 battleships, 3 cruisers and 19 destroyers.
- 25 October 0020 Received report that Army had captured GUADACANAL at 2100 the 24th. Sent planes from carriers to investigate. Army report false.
0500 Reported by Army that airfield not yet captured.
0815 United States patrol plane sights our mobile force.
1300 Raided by 6 E-17's. No damage sustained.
1130 2 battleships, 4 cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 12 destroyers sighted by search planes in RENNEL Area. Army scheduled to attack and break through at 1900/25, but failed in attempt.
- 26 October 0050 Patrol plane drops bomb in vicinity of ZUIKAKU. No hits.
0130 Mobile force reverses course and heads north at 24 knots.
0345 Dawn. Double searches, take-off at 0215 and 0245.
0450 Enemy task force sighted by search planes bearing 125° - distance 210.
0655 Attack on enemy #1 task force. 1 carrier (HORNET) burning, 1 heavy cruiser sunk (?), 1 light cruiser, 4 DD'S (1 DD sunk and 1 DD severely damaged).
0540 ZUIHO afire from dive bomber attack.
0820 - 0900 2nd attack phase #2 United States task force #2 attacked. 1 carrier (U.S.) severely damaged, 1 battleship (U.S.) sunk, 2 heavy cruisers (U.S.) and 1 heavy cruiser severely damaged, 8 destroyers (U.S.) - 2 DD'S severely damaged.


Combat record of Advance Force (JUNYO).

- 0920 Planes of CarDiv 2 sighted and attacked Task Force #3. 1 carrier (ENTERPRISE) sunk, 2 heavy cruisers - 1 heavy cruiser damaged, 1 light cruiser damaged and several destroyers.
0727 SHOKAKU hit by dive bombers and afire. Fire under control at 1230.
1310 Planes of CarDiv 2 (JUNYO) attacked task force #3 United States. 1 carrier listing to starboard, 3 cruisers - 1 cruiser severely damaged, 1 light cruiser severely damaged, six destroyers.
1345 Planes of CarDiv 1 (SHOKAKU) attacked United States Task Force #3. 1 carrier burning, 2 cruisers - 1 cruiser severely damaged, 7 destroyers.
1510 Planes of CarDiv 2 (JUNYO) attacked Task Force #3. 1 carrier afire and listing, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, 6 destroyers.

65-5-(Sup)

RESTRICTED

Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.F.) RESTRICTED



Command Channels

MIDWAY

General Command	Admiral YAMAMOTO			
Main Body	(Admiral YAMAMOTO)			
1S	YAMATO	MATSU	NAGATO	
*2S	ISE	HYUGA	FUSO	YAMASHIRO
*9S	KITAGAMI	OI		
*3sd	SENDAI	d x 12		
	ZUIHO	d x 1		
No. 1	Supply Group			
	NARUTO	TOEI-MARU	d x 1	
*No. 2	Supply Group			
	SACREMENT-MARU		TORA-MARU	
*	Screening Force for ALEUTIANS.			
Air Force	(Admiral NAGUMO)			
1sf	AKAGI	KAGA		
2sf	HIRYU	SORYU		
8S	TONE	CHIKUMA		
2D/3S	BARUNA	KIRISHIMA		
10S	NAGARA	d x 16		
No. 1	Supply Group			
	KYOKUTO-MARU	SHINKOKU-MARU		
	TOHO-MARU	NIPPON-MARU	KOKUYO-MARU	
No. 2	Supply Group			
	NAICHIRO-MARU	No. 2 KYOEI-MARU		
	HOKO-MARU			

RESTRICTED

65-6-(Sup)

Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.) RESTRICTED

Transport Occupation Force (Admiral KOFDO)

Main Body
4S (-2D) ATAGO CHOKAI
#3S (-2D) KONGO HIEI # Later acted
4sd NAKA d x 16 as support
Supply Group T x 3 force to Screening Force
in ALEUTIANS
Landing Force
2sd JINTSU d x 12 Torpedo Boat 1 T x 16
Wg x 1 Chg x 1 Torpedo Boat 1
Marine about 1500-Sand I.
Soldier about 1000-Eastern I.
Air Field making Force 1
Surveying Force 1.

Supporting Force

KUMANO SUZUYA HOGAMI MIKUMA
d x 4 T x 1

Air Force

11sf CHITOSE
TOKISEA
KAIKAWA-MARU dxl
Patrol Boat 1
Marine about 50-Cure I.

Base Air Force

24sf (MARSHAL)
26sf (LARCUS)
f^c x 36 f¹⁰ x 9 f^d x 6

ATTU KISKA Force (Admiral HOSOGAYA)

5F NACHI d x 2
4sf RYUJO JUNYO
2D/4S TAKAO MAYA
d x 3 T x 1
1sd d x 4 -----ATTU
21S KISO TAMA-----KISKA
1ss S x ? KUNIKAWA-MARU
D^{sr}p KUNIKAWA-MARU d x 1
Base Air Force f¹⁰ x 4 T x 4
Patrol Group 22S

Detachment from MAIN BODY as ALEUTIAN Screening Force..

2S (EE) ISE, HYUGA, FUSO, YAMASHIRO
9S (CL) KITAGAMI OI
3sd SENDAI dxl
ZUIHO dxl
No. 2 Supply Group: SACREMENT-MARU
TORA-MARU
dxl.

Late Support for KISKA-ATTU GROUP.

3S (EE) KONGO HIEI
4xd
1xCarrier (ZUIKAKU or ZUIHO.?)

RESTRICTED

65-7-(Sup)

Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.) RESTRICTED

Command Channels at the Beginning of War.
 General Command (Admiral YAMAMOTO).
 Pearl Hr. Action Group (Admiral MAGURO)

Carrier Group	1sf 2sf 5sf	AKAGI SORYU ZUIKAKU	KAGA HIRYU SHOKAKU
Protection Group	1sd 3S(-2D) 8S 2sg 7dg	ABUKUMA KONGO TONE S x 3 d x 2	17dg 18dg d x 1 BIEI CHIKUMA MIDWAY Bombardment
Supply Group	No. 1 No. 2	Supply Group T x 5 Supply Group T x 3	
Submarine Group	6F 1ss (-2sg) 2ss 3ss	KATORI YASUKUNI-HARU SANTOS-HARU TAIGEI	S x 10 S x 8 S x 10
SOUTH SEA Action Group (Admiral KONDO)			
Main Body	4S (-2D) 2D/3S 4sf	ATAGO HARUNA, RYUJO 3dg (d x 4)	CHOKAI KIRISHIMA JUNYO
PHILIPPINE Force	3F-16S 5sd 12sf 1Bg 2Eg 5S 2sd 4sd	ASHIGARA NATORI NOTORO (-NACHI) JINTSU NAKA KASHII	NAGARA KUMA 5dg 22dg KAMIKAWA-HARU HAGURO Sdg 15dg 16dg 24dg 2dg 4dg 9dg 24dg SHUMUSHU
HALEI Force	KF 7S 3sd	9Bg 11aBg MOGAMI SENDAI	MIKUMA SUZUYA KUMANO 11dg 12dg 19dg 20dg
Base Air Force	11AF 21sf 22sf 23sf	TSUDOM SOKTRAN SAIGON FORMOSA	f ¹⁰ x 36 f ^c x 27 f ¹⁰ x 36 f ^c f ¹⁰ x 27 flr x 6 f ^{hc} x 12 f ¹⁰
Submarine Force	4ss 5ss 6ss	KINU YURA CHOGEI	18sg 19sg 21sg NAGOYA-HARU 18sg 29sg 30sg Rio De JANERIO-HARU 9sg 13sg
Mine Force	17S	ITSUKUSHIMA	YAEYAMA
Main Body	(Admiral YAMAMOTO) 1S 2S 3sf Marine 7 Division	YAMATO ISE HOSHO	MUTSU HYUGA FUSO ZUIHO NAGATO YAMASHIRO d x 2
Northern Defence Group	(Admiral HOSOGAYA) 5F 21S	NACHI KISO 65-8-(Sup)	SAGI TAMA HATO

RESTRICTED

Narrative of Interrogation (Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.) RESTRICTED

22S T x 2
7Eg

South Eastern Defense Group (Admiral INOUE)

4F

(GUAM Action Group)

(WAKE Action Group)

KASHIMA

18S	TENRYU	TATSUTA		
19S	OKINOSHIMA	TOKIWA	TSUGARU	
6sd	UEBARI	29dg	30dg	
7ss	JINGEI	26dg	27sg	33 g
24sf	CHITOSE Base Air Force			
	YOKOHAMA Base Air Force			
	KAI OI	GOSHU-MARU		

3Eg

4Eg

5Eg

6Eg

Marine 1 Division

CORAL SEA Action

General Command (Admiral HINOUE)

Main Body

KASHIMA
d x 1

TOKIWA
KIYOKAWA-MARU

Carrier Force

5S (-NACHI) HAGURO
5sf SHOKAKU
27dg
TOHO-MARU

MYOKO
ZUIKAKU d x 2
7dg (-d x 1)

Landing Force

18S	TENRYU	TATSUTA		
6S	AOBA	KINUGASA	KAKO	FURUTAKA
6sd	UEBARI	29dg	30dg	
SHOHO				
3g x 1	Wg x 1			
TSUGARU	KARIKAWA-MARU			
KIYOKAWA-MARU				

Base Air Force

25sf

Submarine Group

8ss S x 8

65-9-(Sup)

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

HEADQUARTERS
U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
C/O POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO

INTERROGATION NO. USSES NO. 65(Supplement) PLACE: TOKYO
NAV. NO. 13 DATE: 16 November 1945

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division.

Subject: PEARL HARBOR - MIDWAY. - SOLOMONS.

Personnel interrogated:
Captain WATANABE, Y., I.J.N.

SUMMARY

The attached chart supplements Interrogation USSES NO. 65
(NAV NO. 13) and should be included as Annex A.

ENCLOSURE

Annex A - Chart of Battle of MIDWAY.


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BATTLE OF MIDWAY

4-6 JUNE 1945

(SUBMITTED BY IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE OF TOKYO, JAPAN)




BATTLE OF MIDWAY

4-6 JUNE 1945

IMPERIAL JAPANESE NAVAL STAFF COLLEGE OF TOKYO, JAPAN

By HR-... NARA, Date 1/31/91



MANY SHIPS OF THE MOBILE FORCE OPERATED SINGLY BETWEEN 082250 AND 050725, DETAILED MOVEMENTS OF THOSE SHIPS NOT AVAILABLE

R-E-S-T-R-I-C-T-E-D

HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY

Washington, D.C.
January 1946

Interrogation No. U.S.S.B.S. 65 - Sup.
(Nav. No. 13)

Division of Origin: Naval Analysis Division


Subject : PEARL HARBOR - MIDWAY - SOLOMONS.

Interrogation of: Captain ~~WATANABE~~, Y., IJN.

Interrogated by: Captain C. (n) Shands, USN

The attached chart(s) supplement Interrogation No. USSBS
65 (Nav No. 13).

Enclosure: Annex "B"




ACTION CHART OF THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY.

JUNE 5

TIME ZONE (-9)

EXTRACT FROM TRANSLATED REPORT OF ACTION
FIRST AIR FLEET STRIKING FORCE

PLATE 13-2



ANNEX-B
USSBS No.65 NAV No.13