

Scowcroft file

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: President Nixon
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs

Bruno Kreisky, Chancellor of Austria
Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, Foreign Minister

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, June 11, 1974
9:55 a. m.

PLACE: Schloss Klessheim
Salzburg, Austria

The President: I knew several Austrian Ambassadors. Who was the last big one?

Chancellor Kreisky: Gruber.

The President: As you know, we are going to five countries in the Middle East now. They will be brief stops everywhere except in Egypt where we will stay two days -- not that we place it above the others, which are one-day stops. After that, after about five days we will leave for Moscow. It would be helpful to get your impression. You were there after Egyptian-Israeli disengagement.

Chancellor Kreisky: I had a long talk with Sadat. When I met with Nasser I tried to get him to understand he could have better relations with Social - Democratic parties in Europe if he would have relations with the Israeli labor party. Nasser had asked me what to do about the European Social - Democratic parties. Sadat is, I think -- he understands things better than Nasser. He is ready to play a decisive role. He has

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *the w.c. 5/29/04*
BY *lm* NARA DATE *5/6/04*



an idea to establish better relations with the European socialist parties. He wants the European way to socialism. He wants aid from Europe. He doesn't want to replace his friends.

I was there only on a fact-finding mission. We had good talks. There is now a Egyptian high-level mission in Vienna.

I think Sadat wants a little peace but he is realistic enough to know it will take time. He knew it would be tough to get a disengagement with Syria. He thinks Asad has more internal troubles than he has. He is impressed that this is the first time Israel has accepted and kept a treaty. I know he hoped I would tell this to the Israeli Government. He knows that their technology and civilization are highly developed in Israel and it shouldn't be destroyed. (This was in a very confidential talk.) He said Egypt had lost \$2.5 million a day in war preparations, and this can't continue. He thought he should step down, but others say it can't happen. He told me that Egypt is not an Arab state -- but they are surrounded by Arab states and must be a part of the Arab world.

He has excellent relations with Boumediene. An Algerian Minister told me that Nasser had to be replaced as moralistic leader in the Arab world. He will be replaced by Sadat or someone else in a short time and forgotten.

Qaddafi's position with the Arabs is weak. Sadat, Boumediene -- everyone dislikes him. Sadat has the 100% support of Boumediene. Boumediene has an excellent staff around him.

All the Arabs are in favor of a Palestinian state, because then things will go in a different direction. The first question is its relationship to Jordan. Then there are so many Palestinian groups who don't feel represented by the PLO that maybe there should be a Palestinian Congress to decide what the Palestinians want. Arafat is weak. I know underground movements; they can't cooperate because each wants a power position. If they select a leader, it would not be a strong man. They corrected Arafat in front of me, and so on. I was disappointed.

I talked to Ghanim [Head of the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt] and he said we are building up Arafat. This is an illusion. Kosygin said the Soviet Union had a good impression of him. But I doubt he will be the leader of the Palestinians. There is no leader -- not in the camps nor in Jordan. I think their latest declaration is hopeful, because they say they won't be classified as refugees. This is good, because Israel is wrong

to say the first question is whether there are Palestinians. If they want to be Palestinians, let them. The Palestinians have a strong position not only morally but inside some governments. Specially in Syria.

Secretary Kissinger: Dr. Elias -- he was probably in the meeting with you.

Chancellor Kreisky: In all countries but Egypt and Algeria there are big Palestinian groups.

The President: Libya is a Palestinian state.

Chancellor Kreisky: Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan. It is unjust for Israel to ask Lebanon to do something against the Palestinians -- they can't act against themselves.

The President: Israel wanted Syria to do it, but they can't.

Secretary Kissinger: In Syria they can, but they can't say it. In Lebanon, they can't do it.

Chancellor Kreisky: I told Israel they would have to give back Kuneitra and he must send back 20-40,000 people to their village. At that time Israel wasn't ready to return Kuneitra. Rabin was the only one who pursued with me the Kuneitra issue. Sadat will tell you that without progress in the Palestinian case it will be difficult to go forward.

Sadat is willing to go forward, but he had to wait a bit for Syria. Now he must wait for the Palestinians.

I asked Kosygin about the Palestinians. He said "we have to support them but it is an intricate question to go further. We will support them in Geneva but we are cautious about the size, and so on, or how and where it should be conducted. We are ready to guarantee Israel."

I asked Arafat what was their goal. He said their goal is a bi-religious state; Israel is to disappear, the Jews who entered after 1948 must leave, and then all will live together peacefully. They all thought a bi-religious state of Palestine is the solution, but a Palestinian state on the West Bank would be a settlement. I am no specialist, but without discussing such a solution, I think it is impossible to get the Palestinians to join a conference. Israel is not ready to discuss it with the Palestinians at the moment.



Secretary Kissinger: Nor to the Jordanians.

Chancellor Kreisky: I asked Asad what Palestine means. He told me "Southern Syria." So that would be a problem.

Secretary Kissinger: The Syrians have their own group which is not part of the PLO.

Chancellor Kreisky: I have been told by the Jordanian Palestinians that there are two leading ideas in Jordan. Hussein wants the Palestinians to live in Jordan; Prince Hassan wants it as a buffer -- believing that Jordan can exist only if there is tension between the Palestinians and Israelis.

Sadat is a great statesman. All the support the democratic world can give him it should. He's the best chance in a half century in the Arab world. He is a cultivated, western man. After him, I wonder if there will be a chance. We can't make him too much a man of the West or we will destroy him.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, my German friends build up their ideas based on private information from the Soviet Union. There is no such thing as private information, but only what the Soviet Union wants to get out. Bahr is stupid to think otherwise. It is stupid to think that we weaken Brezhnev if we don't support his policy. The Soviets use this as a ploy. In the Soviet Union, the government means the security apparatus and the economy. There is no public opinion. The administration is handled by Kosygin; foreign policy, security, and politics are handled by Brezhnev. Podgorny is necessary because there must be a third man. He has no special charter.

Brezhnev wants CSCE to conclude at the summit. I think he needs it and I don't know why we refuse.

The President: You want it, even without substance?

Chancellor Kreisky: They will make some concessions.

The President: What good is it for the West?

Chancellor Kreisky: The substance we have already. There is no war in Europe. The Soviets are not interested in puppet regimes. They are

worried about the young men in the western governments because they don't know what they think. The terms of trade are better for the Soviet Union, and they have the Chinese -- it is a problem. I think nothing will happen in Yugoslavia. We need visible concessions at CSCE, it is clear. There are possibilities, but the fact we are willing to go to such a meeting would give the world a sense of security.

The President: You mean the non-Communist world needs a sense of security.

Chancellor Kreisky: Not military, but psychological. A general feeling. The Third Basket.

Secretary Kissinger: The whole thing is massive hypocrisy. Being able to buy the New York Times in Moscow won't change the Soviet system.

Chancellor Kreisky: I am not an appeaser. But detente creates liberalization, not vice versa. The cold war climate creates a fortress internal climate there but detente creates a liberal climate. They can't allow in the long run more liberation in the satellites than in the Soviet Union. If it is possible to give credit to the situation we already have and to get concessions on economic cooperation and get promises on freer exchange of people and tourists, and concessions -- smaller ones -- on disarmament problems, and if we can agree on a follow-up to the Conference . . . We should want a follow-up so the situation doesn't get frozen. We should want a follow-up on contacts. Bonn is obsessed with papers. We should have five to six papers. We can't avoid going to a Conference in the long run, and if we do not do it now, we will go without any concessions.

We are all waiting for your visit to Moscow.

The President: As you know, there are some leaders in the West who are against such a Conference.

Chancellor Kreisky: Giscard has a new look. Schmidt is now the leader, but Brandt still has a big influence. Wilson . . .

The President: Wilson wasn't for it at Pompidou's funeral.

Chancellor Kreisky: Wilson should go along. Luns will oppose; he is in the business to be opposed.

Secretary Kissinger: Our problem is how to manage it with Europe. If we support it, they will oppose it.

Chancellor Kreisky: I think a summit with five to six papers to sign would be good.

The President: Why does the Soviet Union want it?

Chancellor Kreisky: They want to confirm the status quo in Europe.

Secretary Kissinger: Also they started this idea ten years ago and don't have much to show for it.

Chancellor Kreisky: China is a problem. Also they see detente as a realistic situation. Coexistence they started with, now detente. Coexistence is too much a Soviet idea, but detente is good.

The President: Do the Europeans like it? They used to, but when we push it they oppose it.

Chancellor Kreisky: We have weak governments in Europe. Wilson and Giscard are strong persons but the government is weak. Italy is weak.

Minister Kirchsclaeger: Because the European governments are weak, the Soviet Union doesn't want to offer much.

Secretary Kissinger: Most of these ideas are eyewash. The Finns now have an idea for Basket III. There is little significance.

Chancellor Kreisky: There could be a paper on the Middle East.

Secretary Kissinger: It's risky. We have to keep the Arabs fluid. And the Soviet Union wants it all reduced to writing; the Arabs don't.

The President: Let me spend just a moment on how we see the Middle East. The Soviets, and perhaps the Syrians somewhat, insist on Geneva going forward to discuss everything -- the Palestinians, Jerusalem, and further disengagement. They want to put it all on the table. That is not our position. We are not trying to push the Soviets out, but the Arabs welcome us because we can give something the Soviets can't. The Soviets can give only war; we can give -- through Dr. Kissinger's diplomacy -- some



peaceful progress. The Arabs realize that it's to their interest to have the Soviets out and work through only the U. S. The reason they want us is they don't fear us.

Our Jewish community is constantly stirred up and wants to return to the old days -- with the U. S. being the only friend of Israel. In October we came in with a massive airlift, over the objections of our entire military. We called an alert. We did both of these things because we couldn't allow the Soviet Union to move in and dominate the area. But now there are Jews who resent our building friendship and aid to the Arabs. This is short-sighted. Israel can't win in the long run with the old policy. The danger in the long run is the Soviet Union. Only the U. S. can hold them out. The Arabs will be told we won't back down if the Soviet Union tries to move in. But Israel must realize that time is not on their side.

Where do we go from here? We will reassure them, and so on, but the main point is to keep Asad and Sadat especially from pushing too fast -- going to Geneva in a massive approach. It would blow up. We need to do it piece by piece. We will play a decisive role because of our special relation with Israel. We have some of the confidence of the Arabs; we are for Israel and support them. Israel's enemies must become our friends and we must talk to the Soviet Union. We will move step by step, and bring the Soviet Union in only to keep them quiet and where they can help. We won't bite the Palestinian bullet now. Israel, Jordan and probably Saudi Arabia don't want it yet. Who are the Palestinians? We must move slowly and not push it into an open forum. The same with Jerusalem. Patient diplomacy, with some movement, is in the interest of all. Israel must realize they can't freeze it in the old way.

By the way, we are in touch with the Palestinians.

Let me say one final word on the Soviet Union. There is growing concern in the American right. They think we are inferior and that we gave away too much in SALT I, which we did not. We are roughly equal and it doesn't matter -- 70 million killed on each side is no policy. So we are generally equal. There will be some bilateral agreements at this summit. Congress is arguing there should be no trade without emigration. I have gotten them to move from 400 a year to 35,000; to push them will only close the doors. We will work on it. We will give them other fish to fry, and hope.

In Europe, we think a move on MBFR is important, but we can't move unilaterally.

Overhanging it all is China. We have a dialogue with them -- not to push one against the other but because we are a Pacific power.

We will push for MBFR, and for CSCE to get some substance in it. On SALT we are having a difficult time because the weaponry we are talking about is at the heart of the security of each side. The military on both sides are hard line, but Brezhnev and I will get them in line if we work something out.

One note on Bahr and encouraging moderate groups. I was reading the State cables during Roosevelt's last days. They said Stalin was reasonable, if not for the hard liners back in Moscow. So we go in with our eyes open, not to embarrass them. We are not trying to push the Soviet Union out -- it is happening but we are not trying. The goal in the Middle East is working step-by-step on a bilateral basis. Kissinger's approach is correct -- not the Rogers plan. We support Geneva, but the timing is very important. We can't throw these things into Geneva now.

[The meeting ended.]



✓ Pres/Krusky/R/Kirschblayel
11 June 0955 74

P When were you in US Salzburg

A. 1945-55, at Georgetown Austria

P Yes. I know several Ans Crnk. Who was
last big one

Re. Crnk

As you know we go to 5 countries. Brief stops
everywhere except E, where we stay 2 days -
not that we plan it alone - others - which
are 1 day. After that of the about 5 days
we will have for Moscow. # Would
be helpful to get your impression. You
were there after E-I change.

Re. Had long talk w/ Sadat. When Dornat w/ Messer
I tried to get him to understand he could
have better relations w/ Soc Dem parties in E in
if he would have ^{any} relations w/ I labor party.
Messer had asked me ~~at~~ what to do about
E in S D parties. Sadat is, I think, ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~best~~
thing better than Messer. He ready to play
a decisive role. He has idea ~~to~~ to establish
better relations w/ E in ~~transit~~ parties.
He wants E way to ~~control~~ ^{influence} ~~at~~
~~by E~~ He wants aid from E in. He doesn't
want to replace his friends.
I was there only on fact finding mission. We
had good talks. There is now a E high level
mission in Vienna.

I think Sadat wants a little peace but is
realistic enough to know it will take time.
He knows would be tough to get change in Syria.
He thinks Assad has more internal troubles
than he has. He is surprised that this ~~at~~ time
I has accepted & kept a treaty.



I know he hoped I would tell this to E part. He knows technology + consistency highly delayed in ~~Stage~~ I, + it shouldn't be destroyed. (This is confidential) E lost 2 1/2 mil/day in war preparations, this can't continue. He thought he should stop down, but others say it can't happen.

He told me E not an Arab state - but they are somewhat + must be a part of Arab world. He has excellent relations w/ Bonnemann. An Algerian minister told me Nassar had to be replaced as moderate leader in Arab world. Keesing says he will be replaced by Sadat or someone else in short time + forgotten. ~~Q~~

^{start} Q Arafat's position of Arabs is weak - Sadat, Bonnemann - every one - dislikes him. Sadat has 100% support of Bonnemann. Bonnemann has excellent staff around him.

All Arabs are in paralytic state, because their thing will go in diff. direction. 1st question is relationship to Jordan. Then there are so many Lebanese groups who don't feel represented by PLO that maybe should be a Paks Congress to discuss what Palestinians want. Arafat is weak. I know underground movements. They aren't cooperative since each wants a power position. If they selected leader, it would not be a strong man. They ~~was~~ created Arafat in front of me, etc. I was disappointed.

→ I talk to Gohmann (Gareen) + he said we are building up Arafat. This is an illusion. Kozzgin said SO had good impression of him. But I doubt he will be leader of Paks. There is no leader - not in a Camp nor in Jordan. I think their latest declaration is hopeful, because

?

They say they won't be classified as refugees. This is good, because I is wrong to say 1st question is whether there are Paks. If they want to be Paks, let them. Paks have strong position not only morally but inside some parts. Specially in Syria.

R De. Elias - he was prob in naty w/ you.

Ka An all by E + Algeria there are big Paks groups.

P Libya - Paks state

Ka Kuwait, Lebanon, Jordan. It is unjust for I to ask Lebanon to do something against Paks - they can't act against themselves

RP I wanted Syria to do it - they can't

K In Syria they can, but can't say it. In d, they can't do it.

Ka I told I they would have to give back Q unition. He must send back 20-40 ovs to their villages. at that time I wasn't ready to return Q unition. ~~to~~ Robin was only one who persuaded w/ me a Q possession. Sadat will tell you that w/o progress in Paks case it will be difficult to go forward.

Sadat wishing to go forward, but had to wait a bit for Syria. Now must wait for Paks.

I asked Karygin about Paks. He said "we have to support them but it is intricate question to go further." We will support them in Geneva but not emotions about size, etc, or how & where it should be created. We ready to guarantee it.

I asked Anfat their goal. He said goal is brechyan state. I to disappear, Jews who entered after 48 must leave, & them all will live together peacefully.

→ They all thought a bi-religious state of Paks is a solution, but a Paks state on w bank would be



a settlement. I'm no specialist, but w/ a chairman
such a solution, I think impossible to get Paks to
join a conf. I not ready to discuss ^{w/ Paks} at moment.

K. Use of a Jordanian

K1 Dashed what means Paks. He told me
Southern Syria. So that would be a prob.

K The Syrians had their own group which not part
of PKO

K2 I have been told by Jordanian Paks that there are 2
leading ideas in Jordan. Hussein wants Paks
to live in Jordan. Hossain wants it as buffer -
~~but~~ Jordan can exist only if Hussein let Paks
+ I.

Sadat a great statesman. All say that Assad
could conquer him it should. Best chance
in 1/2 century in Arab world. He is a cultivated,
Western man. After him, I wonder if there ^{would be}
a chance. We can't make him too much a
man of west ~~of~~ as we abandon him.

As far as SD, my German friends building their
ideas based on private info from SD - there is
no such thing as private info, but only what SD
wants to get out. Baker is stupid to think otherwise.
It's stupid to think we abandon Bey if we don't
support his policy. The Suro use this as a play.
In SD, cost means security & economy. No public
opinion. The Admin is handled by Kissinger, FP,
security, politics is handled by Bey. Polymony is
messing because there must be a 3rd man. He
has no special charter.

Bey wants CSCG at summit. I think he
needs it & I don't know why we oppose

! You want it, even w/ a substance



R: They will make some concessions.

P: What good is it for us?

R: Something we have already. There is no war in Europe. The US is not interested in puppet regimes. They worried about young men in western parts could they don't know what they think. There are of course are letters for SU, & they have China - it is a probe. I think nothing will happen in 1970. We need visible concessions, it is clear. There are possibilities, but for me nothing to go to such a meeting would give world a sense of security.

P: You mean non-crisis world needs sense of security

R: Not military, but psychological. A general feeling -
Ten 3rd Basket

R: The whole thing is massive hypocrisy. Beijing, however
Times in Moscow & want change SU

R: I am not an appeaser. But détente creates liberality, it's not ~~the~~ ~~same~~ ~~idea~~. A cold war climate creates a fortress - internal climate but détente creates liberal climate. They can't allow in being run more liberally in satellites than in SU. If it possible to give credit to détente as already done & to get concessions on econ coop & get promises on free exchange of people & tourists & ~~the~~ concessions - smaller - on disarmament problems, & if I am agreed on follow-up to Conf. We should want a follow-up to sit. I don't get frozen. We should want follow-up on contacts. Bonn is obsessed w/ papers. We should have 5-6 papers. If ~~don't~~ We can't avoid going to conf in long ~~run~~ run & if not now, we will go w/o any concessions. We ^{are} waiting for your visit to Moscow

P: as you know, there are some links in West & East

~~map~~ such a conf

Ka Giscard has a new look. Schmidt more looks, but
Brundt still has big influence. Wilson - - - -

P Wilson consent for it at P funeral

Ka Wilson should go along - demo will appear, he in
business to be opposed

K One part of it is how to manage w/ E. or. of course.

they part it, they will oppose

K I think summit w/ 5-6 papers to sign would be good

P Why do you want it?

Ka They want status quo

K. When they started 10 yrs ago & don't have much
to show for it.

Ka PRC is a job. Also they see detente as unstable
structure. Copy stone they started w/, now detente.
Copy is too much a Sov idea, but detente good.

P ~~Europe~~ like it? Used to, but when one push
it they oppose

Ka We have create gaps in E. or. Wilson, Giscard
strong person but just weak, Italy weak

Ka Because E. or. gaps are weak, S. U. doesn't want to
offer much.

K Most of these ideas are important. Finnis from
home an idea for basket III. ~~For~~ There is
with signature

Ka Time could be read paper on ME

K Really, we have to keep arms fluid. And S. U. wants
it all related to writing. And last.

P Just a moment on how we see ME. S. U. & perhaps
S. U. is somewhat, insist on Geneva going
forward to discuss, talks, June, further things.
Put it all on table. That not any further.
~~we can't~~ We will try to push S. U. out,

but Arabs welcome us because we can give
something Jews can't. So we can give only war.
We can give - then K. says - some peaceful
prog. The Arabs realize it to their interests to
have US out ~~to~~ & have them only S.U. The reason
is they can't do it they don't feel it.

Our Jewish community is constantly stirred up &
want to return to old way - US being only friend of ~~the~~ I.
In 67 we came in w/ massive airlift over
objection of entire military, we called about. Both
countries we could not allow S.U. to move in & dominate
area. But now there are Jews who want our
building friendship & aid to Arabs. This is short-
sighted. I can't win in long run w/ old policy.
Danger in long run is S.U. Only US can hold
them out. Arabs will be told we won't talk clean
if S.U. try to move in. But I must realize that
time not on their side. Where go from here? We
will reassure, etc, but main point is to keep Arab
& Soviet esp from pushing too fast - going to
Cairo in massive approach. It would blow
up. We need piece by piece. We will play
decisive role because of special relation w/ I.
We have gone confident of Arabs, we are part of
support them. I realize must become friends &
we must talk to S.U. We move step by step, S.U.
is only ~~to~~ to keep them quiet & where they help.
We want to talk Paks bullet now. To I, Jordan & probably
SA don't want it yet. Who are Paks? we must make
friendly & don't push into open from. Some of Jews
potential diplomacy, w/ some movement is in nature
of all. I must realize they can't freeze in old way.
Final word on S.U. Growing concern in US right

We in touch w/ Palastinin

They think we inferior + you coming too much in Salt I, which we did not. We are roughly equal + it doesn't matter - 70 mil shells on each side is no joke, so we generally equal. There will be bilateral agreements. Cing is saying no trade w/o emigration. I have gotten more from 400 to 5000. To push them will use a drive. We will work on it, we give them extra food to fry + hope

For E. we, we think more on MBR important, but we want more emigration. On changing it all is PRC. GSE have challenges not to push one against another but because we Pacific power.

We will push for MBR, for CSCC to get some substance in it. On Salt we having diff time because it at heart of difficulty for each. But on both sides are hard time but Beig + I will get them in line if we work something out.

Our notes about + encouraging moderate groups. I was reading State Center during Race last days. They said State - excessible if not for hard times back in Moscow. We go in w/ eyes open, not to embarrass them. We not trying to push out SE out - it happening but we not trying. Goal in NE is working step by step ~~over~~ on bilateral basis. Approach is correct - not Rogers plan. We support Geneva - but timing is very important. Can't throw these things into Geneva now.