



United States Department of State

# Voting Practices in the United Nations 1998

Report to Congress  
Submitted Pursuant to  
Public Law, 101-167

March 31, 1999

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

March 1, 1999


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Pursuant to Public Law 101-167, I am transmitting herewith the annual report for 1998 on voting practices at the United Nations.

This report assesses the voting practices of the governments of UN member states in the General Assembly and Security Council for 1998, and evaluates the actions and responsiveness of those governments to U.S. policy on issues of special importance to the United States.

We are sending two copies of this report to each U.S. diplomatic mission abroad with instructions that one copy be provided to the government and the other retained for the use of the mission.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Strobe Talbott", with a large, sweeping flourish at the end.

Strobe Talbott  
Acting Secretary

Enclosure:

Annual Voting Report for 1998.

The Honorable

J. Dennis Hastert,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
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
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# I - INTRODUCTION

This is the sixteenth annual report to Congress on voting practices in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Security Council. It is submitted in compliance with Public Law 101-167, and covers voting in 1998. The report statistically measures the voting of UN member states at the 53rd General Assembly in the fall of 1998 in comparison with the U.S. voting record (Section II). In addition to an alphabetical listing of all countries, the report presents the voting record by regional regions and by selected bloc groupings. It also lists and describes General Assembly resolutions selected as important to U.S. interests, again with tables for regional and political groups (Section III). Security Council resolutions for the entire year are described, and voting on them is tabulated (Section IV). A final section pulls together information from the other sections and presents it by country (Section V).

## GENERAL ASSEMBLY

The 53rd session of the General Assembly opened on September 9 and held 93 plenary sessions before recessing on December 18. It adopted 273 resolutions, about the same as in the past two years, but well below the 332 resolutions of 1990. This reflects the success of the United States and others in their effort to reduce the number of resolutions—by combining some issues, considering others only every two or three years, and dropping some entirely. The main subjects of the resolutions continued to be arms control, the Middle East, and human rights.

Of the 273 resolutions adopted, 78% (213) were adopted by consensus. This figure and those of recent years (75.2% in 1997, 72.9% in 1996, 76.6% in 1995, and 77.4% in 1994) illustrate the high rate of consensus agreement in the work of the General Assembly.

## Voting Coincidence with the United States

On non-consensus issues, i.e., those on which a vote was taken, the average overall General Assembly voting coincidence of all UN members with the United States in 1998 was 44.2%, down from 46.7% in 1997, 49.4% in 1996, and 50.6% in 1995. This decline in the past three years reverses the steady and dramatic increase in the several years since the end of the Cold War. (See the graphs at the end of this section.) The 50.6% in 1995 was the first time the coincidence figure had exceeded 50% since 1978, and is more than three times the low point of 15.4% in 1988. When consensus resolutions are factored in as votes identical to those of the United States, a much higher measure of agree-

ment with U.S. positions is reached. This figure (88.3%), which more accurately reflects the work of the General Assembly, has been in the 87-88% range since it was first included in this report in 1993. It was 87.3% in 1997, 87.3% also in 1996, 88.2% in 1995, 88.8% in 1994, and 88.3% in 1993.

The coincidence figure on votes considered important to U.S. interests (55.8%) is once again higher than the percentage registered on overall votes (44.2%). The graphs at the end of this section illustrate this point. A side-by-side comparison of important and overall votes for each UN member is at the end of Section III.

The following table illustrates the gradual decrease in voting coincidence with the United States since the post-Cold War high of 50.6% in 1995. This decrease is reflected also in the votes on human rights and Middle East issues. The trend has been generally up, however, on arms control votes. (See also the graph on votes by issue categories at the end of this section.)

Year	Arms Control	Middle East	Human Rights	Overall Votes
1998	64.0%	22.5%	62.8%	44.2%
1997	65.8%	26.2%	61.9%	46.7%
1996	62.3%	28.3%	68.3%	49.4%
1995	60.9%	35.2%	81.0%	50.6%

As in past years, Israel (94.1%) and the United Kingdom (74.5%) were among the highest in voting coincidence with the United States. Micronesia, Marshall Islands, and Uzbekistan were also in the top five. Most members of the Western European and Others group (WEOG) continued to score high coincidence levels; the average was 65.2%, which is down from 70.9% in 1997, reflecting a growing divergence between the United States and the European Union (which dropped from 73.0% in 1997 to 66.7% in 1998). The Eastern European group also scored high again; the average was 61.7%, down from 68.6% in 1997 and 1996, mirroring the decrease by other European countries. After this group's meteoric rise in coincidence with the United States following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, it now largely matches the coincidence level of the Western European countries. Most other geographic and political groups also decreased in voting coincidence with the United States in 1998. (See the graph at the end of this section.)

Among the lowest scoring countries were Cuba, India, DPR of Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Vietnam, all under 25%.



## Realization of U.S. Priorities

At the 53rd General Assembly, realization of U.S. priorities was again mixed. U.S. arrears in payment of assessed dues, and the linking of arrears payments to UN reforms, continued to make it difficult to exert U.S. leadership at the United Nations. In a disappointing defeat, the U.S. candidate for the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) failed to win election, despite virtually unanimous praise for her and despite pledges of support from more than enough countries to be elected. This outcome was a clear sign that the UN membership is seriously concerned about U.S. arrears, despite our being the single largest contributor to the UN system and being current in our assessments for the past many years. Unhelpful rhetoric again characterized the debate on the Middle East. There was no resolution noting the shortcomings of human rights practices in Cuba. A resolution critical of “unilateral coercive economic measures” was adopted over U.S. opposition. The U.S. embargo of Cuba—viewed as extraterritorial, interventionist, restrictive of free trade, and contradictory to the post-Cold War spirit of cooperation—remained a contentious issue.

However, active U.S. engagement and assertive multilateral efforts did lead to a number of successes:

— **On arms control issues, adoption of a resolution deploring nuclear testing in South Asia** (by India and Pakistan) in May 1998. Also, a resolution on **U.S.-Russia bilateral nuclear arms** negotiations was adopted without objection. A consensus resolution gave some additional impetus to negotiations on a  **fissile material cut-off** treaty at the Conference on Disarmament. The General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution moving forward the effort to eliminate the threat of **landmines** to civilians. On the other hand, a resolution critical of nuclear deterrence, and probably hindering the pace of nuclear disarmament, was adopted over U.S. objection. A draft resolution encouraging ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the work of the CTBT preparatory commission, which the U.S. Government supported, was withdrawn by its sponsors to avoid a divisive vote after India and Pakistan introduced “killer amendments.”

— **Prevention of an overrun on the 1998-1999 UN budget.** A budget of \$2,532,331,000 was approved in 1997. The budget remained within the Congressional cap and was revised downward by over \$5 million at the end of 1998 as a result of favorable exchange rates, lower inflation, and a higher than anticipated vacancy rate for professional staff. On a less upbeat note, a budget outline for 2000-2001 was approved in December 1998 at a level higher than the 1998-1999 budget. However, this is only the first step in the 2000-2001 budget process, and we will be working to ensure that budget discipline is maintained. We will review the detailed budget estimates in 1999.

— **On Security Council reform** the General Assembly decided not to adopt any resolution without the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members. The United States welcomed this outcome, viewing resolutions on this subject at this time as destructive to the delicate deliberative process taking place in the open-ended working group.

— **Creation of a review process for the international criminal court** that gives the United States an opening to seek changes in the Rome treaty.

— **Adoption of U.S.-initiated resolutions on human rights** in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo. Adoption of these and other resolutions on human rights sent a strong message that such matters are not purely internal issues. Also, the Assembly adopted other human rights resolutions cosponsored or supported by the United States: human rights in Burma, Cambodia, Iran, Iraq, and Rwanda, strengthening the rule of law, forced and involuntary disappearances, arbitrary executions, follow-up to the world conference on women, improvement of the status of women in the UN Secretariat, traditional practices affecting the health of women and girls, trafficking in women and girls, and an international year of older persons. The United States voted alone against a resolution on a right to development due to objectionable language on globalization and macroeconomic issues combined with a proposal to draft a convention on the right to development. All other industrialized countries abstained on the resolution.

— **Adoption of resolutions on terrorism and drugs**, again highlighting and moving forward the struggle against these two scourges. The omnibus drug resolution focused on implementing the outcome of the June 1998 General Assembly special session devoted to countering the global drug problem.

— **Adoption of resolutions which contain U.S.-authored language on the benefits of trade liberalization**, the essential role of the private sector in development, and the responsibility of national governments to create a stable macroeconomic environment. The resolutions also included language supporting globalization, foreign investment, and market access, and rejecting the use of protectionist measures.

— **Adoption of a U.S.-sponsored resolution** reiterating the importance of implementing the 1996 UN declaration **against corruption and bribery** in commercial transactions.

— **On Middle East issues, Israeli credentials were adopted** without comment despite the efforts by some to make them invalid for the occupied territories. On the other hand, the resolutions on the Middle East retained much of the unbalanced and outdated rhetoric of the past, did nothing to support the negotiating process under way between the parties, and continued to inject the General Assembly into issues that are the subject of direct negotiations. Moreover, it was not possible to adopt a “positive” resolution to note the progress made by the parties to date in the Middle East peace process. Also, at a special

session in July requested by the Arab Group, the General Assembly, over U.S. opposition, upgraded the status of the Palestinian observer mission to the United Nations, a decision that presages a continuing Palestinian effort to attain enhanced observer status in constituent UN technical bodies.

## SECURITY COUNCIL

The Security Council was again in 1998 a major focus of U.S. attention in the United Nations. The continuing tendency toward consensus among its members facilitated the Council's adoption of 73 resolutions during the year, fewer than during the post-Cold War peak of Security Council action in 1992-1994, but more than in each of the past three years and far more than during the Cold War era when Council action was often frustrated. The Council also issued 38 presidential statements; these are consensus documents issued by the Council president on behalf of the members. The large number of resolutions adopted and statements issued reflects the continuing reliance of member countries on Security Council action to assist in resolving threats to peace and security following the end of the Cold War.

The Security Council was again heavily involved in giving direction to UN peacekeeping and mediation efforts throughout the world in 1998. These efforts are described in Section IV.

Voting coincidence percentages for Security Council members were again high. Most resolutions were adopted unanimously: 68 out of 73 (93%). There were no vetoes and no other negative votes on Security Council resolutions in 1998. There were only 7 abstentions out of the 1,095 votes cast on the 73 resolutions adopted. The abstentions were by China (4 on Yugoslavia and 1 on Haiti), and Russia (1 on Yugoslavia and 1 on Haiti).

## FORMAT AND METHODOLOGY

This voting report continues the feature added in 1993: an additional column in the tables in Section II (Overall Votes), which presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, we have credited to each country a portion of the 213 consensus resolutions based on its participation in the 82 recorded plenary votes. Each country's participation rate was calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/Abstain votes it cast in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes. This is the same methodology used to combine important votes and important consensus actions since 1989.

This report also adds to the Important Votes tables (in Section III) an additional column presenting the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. The figures in this column are comparable to the figures for overall votes plus consensus resolutions described in the above paragraph.


These columns that include consensus actions provide another perspective on UN activity. In our view, they reflect more accurately the extent of cooperation and agreement in the General Assembly.

Other columns in the report remain the same. The presentation is consistent with provisions of PL 101-167, and the methodology employed is the same since the report's inception.


The tables in this report provide a measurement of the voting coincidence of UN member countries with the United States. However, readers are cautioned about interpreting voting coincidence percentages. The percentages in the last column, using the older methodology, are calculated using only votes on which both the United States and the other country in question voted Yes or No; not included are those instances when either abstained or was absent. Abstentions and absences are often difficult to interpret, but they make a mathematical difference, sometimes major, in the percentage results. Inclusion of the number of abstentions and absences in the tables of this report enables readers to include them in calculating voting coincidence percentages if they wish to do so. The percentages in the second column from the right reflect more fully the activity of the General Assembly. However, this calculation assumes, for want of an attendance record, that all countries were present or absent for consensus resolutions in the same ratio as for recorded votes. Moreover, the content of resolutions should be considered in interpreting the figures in either column. There may be overwhelming agreement with the U.S. position on a matter of less importance to us and less support on a resolution we consider more important. These differences are difficult to quantify and to present in one or two coincidence figures.

A country's voting record in the United Nations is only one dimension of its relations with the United States. Bilateral economic, strategic, and political issues are often more directly important to U.S. interests. Nevertheless, a country's behavior at the United Nations is always relevant to its bilateral relationship with the United States, a point the Secretary of State regularly makes in letters of instruction to new U.S. ambassadors. This is also why copies of this report are presented to UN member foreign ministries throughout the world and to member state missions to the United Nations in New York. The Security Council and the General Assembly are arguably the most important international bodies in the world, dealing as they do with such vital issues as threats to peace and security, disarmament, development, humanitarian relief, human rights, the environment, and narcotics—all of which can and do directly affect major U.S. interests.


OVERALL PLENARY VOTES



OVERALL PLENARY VOTES




### OVERALL PLENARY VOTES




Percent of Voting Coincidence with the United States

IMPORTANT VOTES





IMPORTANT VOTES





## II - GENERAL ASSEMBLY — OVERALL VOTES

There were 82 recorded plenary votes at the 53rd UNGA—60 on resolutions as a whole, 18 on separate paragraphs, 1 on a procedural motion, and 3 on decisions. Of these 82 votes, the United States voted Yes 25 times and No 39 times; it abstained on 16 votes and did not participate on 2.

### COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTE

The tables which follow are based on the 64 instances the United States voted either Yes or No in plenary. Columns show the number of times the United States and the country listed cast identical (Yes/Yes or No/No) and opposite (Yes/No or No/Yes) votes, as well as the number of times the country abstained and was absent for these 64 votes. The voting coincidence percentages are derived by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes, the same method used in all previous editions of this report. The column headed “Voting Coincidence (Including Consensus)” — which was new with the 1993 report — presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Extent of participation was also factored in (see the section on format and methodology in the Introduction).

Section II has four parts. The first lists UN member states both alphabetically and in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The second lists them by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage. The third lists countries by other important groupings, again in rank order. The final part compares 1998 voting coincidence percentages of UN members with those of the preceding five years.

Countries with asterisks in the Voting Coincidence columns did not vote during the session. Under Article 19 of the UN Charter, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Congo, Iraq, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, and Somalia did not vote at the 53rd UNGA because their financial contributions were in arrears. Four countries—Comoros, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, and Tajikistan—were permitted to vote despite their arrears in financial contributions on the grounds that failure to pay was attributable to conditions beyond their control. In 1992, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was denied permission to participate further in Assembly proceedings until it applied for and was granted readmission. Palau did not participate.

The United States once again voted No in plenary more often than any other UN member. It voted No alone in plenary only once (fewer times than in other recent years, and far fewer than the 20 times at the 44th session in 1989). The United States voted with only one other country on 20 occasions (18 times with Israel, once with the United Kingdom, and once with Angola). Three times it voted No with two other countries (with Israel twice, joined by Micronesia or the United Kingdom; and once with France and the United Kingdom). The U.S. vote in isolation was on a right to development. Votes with Israel were mostly on issues regarding the Middle East, Palestine, and the occupied territories. Those with the United Kingdom and France were on decolonization and arms control issues.

**All Countries (Alphabetical)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan .....	18	26	2	18	86.3%	40.9%
Albania .....	32	16	8	8	93.2%	66.7%
Algeria .....	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
Andorra .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Angola .....	18	37	3	6	85.2%	32.7%
Antigua/Barbuda .....	17	37	5	5	85.1%	31.5%
Argentina .....	25	25	14	0	90.5%	50.0%
Armenia .....	21	24	16	3	90.4%	46.7%
Australia .....	35	19	10	0	92.9%	64.8%
Austria .....	36	20	8	0	92.6%	64.3%
Azerbaijan .....	21	28	8	7	88.5%	42.9%
Bahamas .....	21	35	5	3	86.5%	37.5%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Bangladesh .....	20	37	5	2	85.9%	35.1%
Barbados .....	22	35	6	1	86.9%	38.6%
Belarus .....	21	29	14	0	89.0%	42.0%
Belgium .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Belize .....	17	36	2	9	84.8%	32.1%
Benin .....	20	40	3	1	85.2%	33.3%
Bhutan .....	11	25	13	15	87.1%	30.6%
Bolivia .....	23	36	2	3	86.2%	39.0%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	64	*	*
Botswana .....	22	38	4	0	85.9%	36.7%
Brazil .....	25	35	4	0	87.2%	41.7%
Brunei Darussalam .....	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%
Bulgaria .....	37	18	9	0	93.2%	67.3%
Burkina Faso .....	18	36	0	10	84.6%	33.3%
Burundi .....	16	23	1	24	87.5%	41.0%
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Cameroon .....	18	31	11	4	87.3%	36.7%
Canada .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Cape Verde .....	19	35	4	6	85.9%	35.2%
Central African Rep. ...	16	32	6	10	86.1%	33.3%
Chad .....	18	37	5	4	85.2%	32.7%
Chile .....	24	35	5	0	87.1%	40.7%
China .....	12	32	16	4	86.6%	27.3%
Colombia .....	19	38	7	0	85.9%	33.3%
Comoros .....	16	23	2	23	87.0%	41.0%
Congo .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Costa Rica .....	22	25	3	14	88.6%	46.8%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	20	37	6	1	86.2%	35.1%
Croatia .....	34	19	9	2	92.6%	64.2%
Cuba .....	7	37	12	8	84.2%	15.9%
Cyprus .....	26	25	13	0	90.5%	51.0%
Czech Republic .....	37	18	8	1	93.2%	67.3%
DPR of Korea .....	2	38	8	16	80.6%	5.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	13	22	7	22	87.1%	37.1%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%

**All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL		OPPOSITE	ABSTEN-	TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	VOTES	VOTES					INCLUDING	VOTES
							CONSENSUS	ONLY
Djibouti .....	20	39	4	1			85.4%	33.9%
Dominica .....	0	1	0	63			72.2%	0.0%
Dominican Rep. ....	21	20	0	23			89.1%	51.2%
Ecuador .....	24	34	5	1			87.2%	41.4%
Egypt .....	18	39	6	1			85.4%	31.6%
El Salvador .....	21	34	5	4			86.2%	38.2%
Equatorial Guinea .....	18	36	6	4			85.8%	33.3%
Eritrea .....	16	36	6	6			85.1%	30.8%
Estonia .....	36	16	12	0			94.0%	69.2%
Ethiopia .....	17	36	8	3			86.1%	32.1%
Fiji .....	19	29	6	10			87.2%	39.6%
Finland .....	36	18	10	0			93.3%	66.7%
France .....	39	14	11	0			94.6%	73.6%
Gabon .....	11	32	8	13			84.9%	25.6%
Gambia .....	22	35	1	6			86.1%	38.6%
Georgia .....	23	16	22	3			93.4%	59.0%
Germany .....	37	18	9	0			93.3%	67.3%
Ghana .....	19	39	6	0			85.6%	32.8%
Greece .....	36	19	9	0			92.9%	65.5%
Grenada .....	15	30	5	14			86.1%	33.3%
Guatemala .....	24	28	3	9			88.4%	46.2%
Guinea .....	18	38	4	4			85.2%	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau .....	17	36	6	5			85.3%	32.1%
Guyana .....	19	38	4	3			85.4%	33.3%
Haiti .....	22	36	0	6			85.6%	37.9%
Honduras .....	22	18	7	17			90.4%	55.0%
Hungary .....	38	18	8	0			93.3%	67.9%
Iceland .....	34	19	10	1			92.8%	64.2%
India .....	10	42	12	0			84.2%	19.2%
Indonesia .....	19	40	5	0			85.3%	32.2%
Iran .....	16	40	5	3			84.7%	28.6%
Iraq .....	0	0	0	64			*	*
Ireland .....	35	21	8	0			92.2%	62.5%
Israel .....	48	3	13	0			98.9%	94.1%
Italy .....	37	19	8	0			92.9%	66.1%
Jamaica .....	21	36	6	1			86.5%	36.8%
Japan .....	29	19	16	0			92.7%	60.4%
Jordan .....	15	38	6	5			84.8%	28.3%
Kazakhstan .....	25	24	14	1			90.7%	51.0%
Kenya .....	19	36	6	3			86.0%	34.5%
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3			86.1%	39.3%
Kyrgyzstan .....	22	23	14	5			90.5%	48.9%
Laos .....	9	36	7	12			83.2%	20.0%
Latvia .....	36	17	11	0			93.5%	67.9%
Lebanon .....	10	38	7	9			83.3%	20.8%
Lesotho .....	23	20	0	21			89.2%	53.5%
Liberia .....	0	0	0	64			*	*
Libya .....	14	43	2	5			83.3%	24.6%

**All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Liechtenstein .....	34	20	10	0	92.5%	63.0%
Lithuania .....	36	17	11	0	93.6%	67.9%
Luxembourg .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Madagascar .....	17	32	0	15	85.0%	34.7%
Malawi .....	22	39	1	2	85.3%	36.1%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Maldives .....	20	37	2	5	85.5%	35.1%
Mali .....	16	36	6	6	85.4%	30.8%
Malta .....	30	27	7	0	90.0%	52.6%
Marshall Islands .....	31	7	23	3	97.0%	81.6%
Mauritania .....	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Mauritius .....	18	35	6	5	86.0%	34.0%
Mexico .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Micronesia .....	36	0	18	10	100.0%	100.0%
Monaco .....	38	14	10	2	94.5%	73.1%
Mongolia .....	23	34	4	3	86.6%	40.4%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Mozambique .....	19	36	6	3	85.7%	34.5%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	15	39	10	0	85.1%	27.8%
Namibia .....	15	37	6	6	85.0%	28.8%
Nepal .....	18	37	8	1	86.1%	32.7%
Netherlands .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
New Zealand .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
Nicaragua .....	22	27	9	6	88.9%	44.9%
Niger .....	20	39	5	0	85.5%	33.9%
Nigeria .....	20	41	2	1	84.9%	32.8%
Norway .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Oman .....	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Pakistan .....	13	39	12	0	85.3%	25.0%
Palau .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Panama .....	23	37	3	1	86.3%	38.3%
Papua New Guinea .....	18	33	5	8	86.1%	35.3%
Paraguay .....	25	33	6	0	87.8%	43.1%
Peru .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Philippines .....	20	40	4	0	85.3%	33.3%
Poland .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Portugal .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Qatar .....	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
Republic of Korea .....	27	18	18	1	93.0%	60.0%
Republic of Moldova .....	32	19	13	0	92.7%	62.7%
Romania .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Russia .....	27	22	14	1	91.3%	55.1%
Rwanda .....	5	6	0	53	86.6%	45.5%
St.Kitts and Nevis .....	14	25	2	23	85.6%	35.9%
St. Lucia .....	17	38	7	2	85.4%	30.9%
St.Vincent/Gren. ....	14	14	0	36	89.2%	50.0%
Samoa .....	23	31	7	3	88.0%	42.6%
San Marino .....	30	21	13	0	92.0%	58.8%

**All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Sao Tome/Principe .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Saudi Arabia .....	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Senegal .....	23	37	4	0	86.4%	38.3%
Seychelles .....	11	17	0	36	86.3%	39.3%
Sierra Leone .....	20	36	4	4	85.9%	35.7%
Singapore .....	20	34	10	0	87.3%	37.0%
Slovak Republic .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Slovenia .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Solomon Islands .....	22	24	5	13	89.0%	47.8%
Somalia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
South Africa .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Spain .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Sri Lanka .....	18	39	7	0	85.6%	31.6%
Sudan .....	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Suriname .....	22	38	3	1	85.8%	36.7%
Swaziland .....	21	32	6	5	87.0%	39.6%
Sweden .....	36	21	7	0	92.2%	63.2%
Syria .....	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
Tajikistan .....	20	17	11	16	91.3%	54.1%
Thailand .....	22	37	5	0	86.4%	37.3%
TFYR Macedonia .....	32	19	12	1	92.7%	62.7%
Togo .....	20	38	6	0	86.0%	34.5%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	19	34	8	3	86.6%	35.8%
Tunisia .....	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Turkey .....	34	26	3	1	90.4%	56.7%
Turkmenistan .....	15	7	3	39	94.1%	68.2%
Uganda .....	14	17	1	32	88.1%	45.2%
Ukraine .....	26	23	15	0	91.2%	53.1%
United Arab Emirates .	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
United Kingdom .....	41	14	9	0	94.8%	74.5%
UR Tanzania .....	16	37	8	3	85.5%	30.2%
Uruguay .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Uzbekistan .....	20	2	24	18	98.9%	90.9%
Vanuatu .....	23	34	6	1	87.3%	40.4%
Venezuela .....	22	38	4	0	86.1%	36.7%
Vietnam .....	9	39	5	11	82.6%	18.8%
Yemen .....	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Zambia .....	21	29	7	7	88.0%	42.0%
Zimbabwe .....	18	39	3	4	84.8%	31.6%
Average .....	21.8	27.5	6.6	8.2	88.3%	44.2%

**All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENSES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Micronesia .....	36	0	18	10	100.0%	100.0%
Israel .....	48	3	13	0	98.9%	94.1%
Uzbekistan .....	20	2	24	18	98.9%	90.9%
Marshall Islands .....	31	7	23	3	97.0%	81.6%
United Kingdom .....	41	14	9	0	94.8%	74.5%
France .....	39	14	11	0	94.6%	73.6%
Monaco .....	38	14	10	2	94.5%	73.1%
Estonia .....	36	16	12	0	94.0%	69.2%
Turkmenistan .....	15	7	3	39	94.1%	68.2%
Latvia .....	36	17	11	0	93.5%	67.9%
Lithuania .....	36	17	11	0	93.6%	67.9%
Hungary .....	38	18	8	0	93.3%	67.9%
Belgium .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Bulgaria .....	37	18	9	0	93.2%	67.3%
Canada .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Czech Republic .....	37	18	8	1	93.2%	67.3%
Germany .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Luxembourg .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Netherlands .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Albania .....	32	16	8	8	93.2%	66.7%
Finland .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Norway .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Italy .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Poland .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Romania .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Slovak Republic .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Andorra .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Greece .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Portugal .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Slovenia .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Spain .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Australia .....	35	19	10	0	92.9%	64.8%
Austria .....	36	20	8	0	92.6%	64.3%
Croatia .....	34	19	9	2	92.6%	64.2%
Iceland .....	34	19	10	1	92.8%	64.2%
Sweden .....	36	21	7	0	92.2%	63.2%
Liechtenstein .....	34	20	10	0	92.5%	63.0%
Republic of Moldova ..	32	19	13	0	92.7%	62.7%
TFYR Macedonia .....	32	19	12	1	92.7%	62.7%
Ireland .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
New Zealand .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
Japan .....	29	19	16	0	92.7%	60.4%
Republic of Korea .....	27	18	18	1	93.0%	60.0%
Georgia .....	23	16	22	3	93.4%	59.0%
San Marino .....	30	21	13	0	92.0%	58.8%
Turkey .....	34	26	3	1	90.4%	56.7%
Russia .....	27	22	14	1	91.3%	55.1%



All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Honduras .....	22	18	7	17	90.4%	55.0%
Tajikistan .....	20	17	11	16	91.3%	54.1%
Lesotho .....	23	20	0	21	89.2%	53.5%
Ukraine .....	26	23	15	0	91.2%	53.1%
Malta .....	30	27	7	0	90.0%	52.6%
Dominican Republic ...	21	20	0	23	89.1%	51.2%
Kazakhstan .....	25	24	14	1	90.7%	51.0%
Cyprus .....	26	25	13	0	90.5%	51.0%
Argentina .....	25	25	14	0	90.5%	50.0%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	14	14	0	36	89.2%	50.0%
Kyrgyzstan .....	22	23	14	5	90.5%	48.9%
Solomon Islands .....	22	24	5	13	89.0%	47.8%
Costa Rica .....	22	25	3	14	88.6%	46.8%
Armenia .....	21	24	16	3	90.4%	46.7%
Guatemala .....	24	28	3	9	88.4%	46.2%
Rwanda .....	5	6	0	53	86.6%	45.5%
Uganda .....	14	17	1	32	88.1%	45.2%
Nicaragua .....	22	27	9	6	88.9%	44.9%
Paraguay .....	25	33	6	0	87.8%	43.1%
Azerbaijan .....	21	28	8	7	88.5%	42.9%
Samoa .....	23	31	7	3	88.0%	42.6%
Belarus .....	21	29	14	0	89.0%	42.0%
Zambia .....	21	29	7	7	88.0%	42.0%
Brazil .....	25	35	4	0	87.2%	41.7%
Ecuador .....	24	34	5	1	87.2%	41.4%
Burundi .....	16	23	1	24	87.5%	41.0%
Comoros .....	16	23	2	23	87.0%	41.0%
Afghanistan .....	18	26	2	18	86.3%	40.9%
Chile .....	24	35	5	0	87.1%	40.7%
Mongolia .....	23	34	4	3	86.6%	40.4%
Vanuatu .....	23	34	6	1	87.3%	40.4%
Peru .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
South Africa .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Uruguay .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Swaziland .....	21	32	6	5	87.0%	39.6%
Fiji .....	19	29	6	10	87.2%	39.6%
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3	86.1%	39.3%
Seychelles .....	11	17	0	36	86.3%	39.3%
Bolivia .....	23	36	2	3	86.2%	39.0%
Barbados .....	22	35	6	1	86.9%	38.6%
Gambia .....	22	35	1	6	86.1%	38.6%
Panama .....	23	37	3	1	86.3%	38.3%
Senegal .....	23	37	4	0	86.4%	38.3%
El Salvador .....	21	34	5	4	86.2%	38.2%
Haiti .....	22	36	0	6	85.6%	37.9%
Bahamas .....	21	35	5	3	86.5%	37.5%
Thailand .....	22	37	5	0	86.4%	37.3%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	13	22	7	22	87.1%	37.1%

**All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Singapore .....	20	34	10	0	87.3%	37.0%
Jamaica .....	21	36	6	1	86.5%	36.8%
Cameroon .....	18	31	11	4	87.3%	36.7%
Botswana .....	22	38	4	0	85.9%	36.7%
Suriname .....	22	38	3	1	85.8%	36.7%
Venezuela .....	22	38	4	0	86.1%	36.7%
Malawi .....	22	39	1	2	85.3%	36.1%
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	14	25	2	23	85.6%	35.9%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	19	34	8	3	86.6%	35.8%
Sierra Leone .....	20	36	4	4	85.9%	35.7%
Papua New Guinea .....	18	33	5	8	86.1%	35.3%
Cape Verde .....	19	35	4	6	85.9%	35.2%
Bangladesh .....	20	37	5	2	85.9%	35.1%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	20	37	6	1	86.2%	35.1%
Maldives .....	20	37	2	5	85.5%	35.1%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Madagascar .....	17	32	0	15	85.0%	34.7%
Kenya .....	19	36	6	3	86.0%	34.5%
Mozambique .....	19	36	6	3	85.7%	34.5%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Togo .....	20	38	6	0	86.0%	34.5%
Brunei Darussalam .....	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%
Mauritius .....	18	35	6	5	86.0%	34.0%
Mauritania .....	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Djibouti .....	20	39	4	1	85.4%	33.9%
Niger .....	20	39	5	0	85.5%	33.9%
Tunisia .....	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Benin .....	20	40	3	1	85.2%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	18	36	0	10	84.6%	33.3%
Central African Rep. ..	16	32	6	10	86.1%	33.3%
Colombia .....	19	38	7	0	85.9%	33.3%
Equatorial Guinea .....	18	36	6	4	85.8%	33.3%
Grenada .....	15	30	5	14	86.1%	33.3%
Guyana .....	19	38	4	3	85.4%	33.3%
Philippines .....	20	40	4	0	85.3%	33.3%
Nigeria .....	20	41	2	1	84.9%	32.8%
Ghana .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Mexico .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Oman .....	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Angola .....	18	37	3	6	85.2%	32.7%
Chad .....	18	37	5	4	85.2%	32.7%
Nepal .....	18	37	8	1	86.1%	32.7%
Indonesia .....	19	40	5	0	85.3%	32.2%
Qatar .....	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
Guinea .....	18	38	4	4	85.2%	32.1%
United Arab Emirates ..	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
Belize .....	17	36	2	9	84.8%	32.1%

## All Countries (By Voting Coincidence Percentage) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Ethiopia .....	17	36	8	3	86.1%	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau .....	17	36	6	5	85.3%	32.1%
Egypt .....	18	39	6	1	85.4%	31.6%
Sri Lanka .....	18	39	7	0	85.6%	31.6%
Zimbabwe .....	18	39	3	4	84.8%	31.6%
Antigua and Barbuda ..	17	37	5	5	85.1%	31.5%
Saudi Arabia .....	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Algeria .....	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
St. Lucia .....	17	38	7	2	85.4%	30.9%
Eritrea .....	16	36	6	6	85.1%	30.8%
Mali .....	16	36	6	6	85.4%	30.8%
Bhutan .....	11	25	13	15	87.1%	30.6%
UR Tanzania .....	16	37	8	3	85.5%	30.2%
Yemen .....	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Namibia .....	15	37	6	6	85.0%	28.8%
Iran .....	16	40	5	3	84.7%	28.6%
Sudan .....	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Jordan .....	15	38	6	5	84.8%	28.3%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	15	39	10	0	85.1%	27.8%
China .....	12	32	16	4	86.6%	27.3%
Gabon .....	11	32	8	13	84.9%	25.6%
Pakistan .....	13	39	12	0	85.3%	25.0%
Libya .....	14	43	2	5	83.3%	24.6%
Lebanon .....	10	38	7	9	83.3%	20.8%
Laos .....	9	36	7	12	83.2%	20.0%
India .....	10	42	12	0	84.2%	19.2%
Vietnam .....	9	39	5	11	82.6%	18.8%
Syria .....	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
Cuba .....	7	37	12	8	84.2%	15.9%
DPR of Korea .....	2	38	8	16	80.6%	5.0%
Dominica .....	0	1	0	63	72.2%	0.0%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	64	*	*
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Congo .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Palau .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	64	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	21.8	27.5	6.6	8.2	88.3%	44.2%

## UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the percentage of voting coincidence with U.S. votes in plenary. They list UN member states by UN regional grouping, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

### African Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Lesotho .....	23	20	0	21	89.2%	53.5%
Rwanda .....	5	6	0	53	86.6%	45.5%
Uganda .....	14	17	1	32	88.1%	45.2%
Zambia .....	21	29	7	7	88.0%	42.0%
Burundi .....	16	23	1	24	87.5%	41.0%
Comoros .....	16	23	2	23	87.0%	41.0%
South Africa .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Swaziland .....	21	32	6	5	87.0%	39.6%
Seychelles .....	11	17	0	36	86.3%	39.3%
Gambia .....	22	35	1	6	86.1%	38.6%
Senegal .....	23	37	4	0	86.4%	38.3%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	13	22	7	22	87.1%	37.1%
Cameroon .....	18	31	11	4	87.3%	36.7%
Botswana .....	22	38	4	0	85.9%	36.7%
Malawi .....	22	39	1	2	85.3%	36.1%
Sierra Leone .....	20	36	4	4	85.9%	35.7%
Cape Verde .....	19	35	4	6	85.9%	35.2%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	20	37	6	1	86.2%	35.1%
Madagascar .....	17	32	0	15	85.0%	34.7%
Kenya .....	19	36	6	3	86.0%	34.5%
Mozambique .....	19	36	6	3	85.7%	34.5%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Togo .....	20	38	6	0	86.0%	34.5%
Mauritius .....	18	35	6	5	86.0%	34.0%
Mauritania .....	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Djibouti .....	20	39	4	1	85.4%	33.9%
Niger .....	20	39	5	0	85.5%	33.9%
Tunisia .....	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Benin .....	20	40	3	1	85.2%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	18	36	0	10	84.6%	33.3%
Central African Rep. ...	16	32	6	10	86.1%	33.3%
Equatorial Guinea .....	18	36	6	4	85.8%	33.3%
Nigeria .....	20	41	2	1	84.9%	32.8%
Ghana .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Angola .....	18	37	3	6	85.2%	32.7%
Chad .....	18	37	5	4	85.2%	32.7%
Guinea .....	18	38	4	4	85.2%	32.1%
Ethiopia .....	17	36	8	3	86.1%	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau .....	17	36	6	5	85.3%	32.1%
Egypt .....	18	39	6	1	85.4%	31.6%

**African Group (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Zimbabwe .....	18	39	3	4	84.8%	31.6%
Algeria .....	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
Eritrea .....	16	36	6	6	85.1%	30.8%
Mali .....	16	36	6	6	85.4%	30.8%
UR Tanzania .....	16	37	8	3	85.5%	30.2%
Namibia .....	15	37	6	6	85.0%	28.8%
Sudan .....	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Gabon .....	11	32	8	13	84.9%	25.6%
Libya .....	14	43	2	5	83.3%	24.6%
Congo .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	64	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	16.6	31.5	4.0	11.9	86.3%	34.5%

**Asian Group**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Micronesia .....	36	0	18	10	100.0%	100.0%
Uzbekistan .....	20	2	24	18	98.9%	90.9%
Marshall Islands .....	31	7	23	3	97.0%	81.6%
Turkmenistan .....	15	7	3	39	94.1%	68.2%
Japan .....	29	19	16	0	92.7%	60.4%
Republic of Korea .....	27	18	18	1	93.0%	60.0%
Tajikistan .....	20	17	11	16	91.3%	54.1%
Kazakhstan .....	25	24	14	1	90.7%	51.0%
Cyprus .....	26	25	13	0	90.5%	51.0%
Kyrgyzstan .....	22	23	14	5	90.5%	48.9%
Solomon Islands .....	22	24	5	13	89.0%	47.8%
Samoa .....	23	31	7	3	88.0%	42.6%
Afghanistan .....	18	26	2	18	86.3%	40.9%
Mongolia .....	23	34	4	3	86.6%	40.4%
Vanuatu .....	23	34	6	1	87.3%	40.4%
Fiji .....	19	29	6	10	87.2%	39.6%
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3	86.1%	39.3%
Thailand .....	22	37	5	0	86.4%	37.3%
Singapore .....	20	34	10	0	87.3%	37.0%
Papua New Guinea .....	18	33	5	8	86.1%	35.3%
Bangladesh .....	20	37	5	2	85.9%	35.1%
Maldives .....	20	37	2	5	85.5%	35.1%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%

**Asian Group (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Philippines .....	20	40	4	0	85.3%	33.3%
Oman .....	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Nepal .....	18	37	8	1	86.1%	32.7%
Indonesia .....	19	40	5	0	85.3%	32.2%
Qatar .....	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
United Arab Emirates ..	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
Sri Lanka .....	18	39	7	0	85.6%	31.6%
Saudi Arabia .....	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Bhutan .....	11	25	13	15	87.1%	30.6%
Yemen .....	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Iran .....	16	40	5	3	84.7%	28.6%
Jordan .....	15	38	6	5	84.8%	28.3%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	15	39	10	0	85.1%	27.8%
China .....	12	32	16	4	86.6%	27.3%
Pakistan .....	13	39	12	0	85.3%	25.0%
Lebanon .....	10	38	7	9	83.3%	20.8%
Laos .....	9	36	7	12	83.2%	20.0%
India .....	10	42	12	0	84.2%	19.2%
Vietnam .....	9	39	5	11	82.6%	18.8%
Syria .....	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
DPR of Korea .....	2	38	8	16	80.6%	5.0%
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Palau .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	17.6	29.5	7.4	9.4	87.3%	37.3%

**Latin American and Caribbean Group (LAC)**

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Honduras .....	22	18	7	17	90.4%	55.0%
Dominican Republic ...	21	20	0	23	89.1%	51.2%
Argentina .....	25	25	14	0	90.5%	50.0%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	14	14	0	36	89.2%	50.0%
Costa Rica .....	22	25	3	14	88.6%	46.8%
Guatemala .....	24	28	3	9	88.4%	46.2%
Nicaragua .....	22	27	9	6	88.9%	44.9%
Paraguay .....	25	33	6	0	87.8%	43.1%
Brazil .....	25	35	4	0	87.2%	41.7%
Ecuador .....	24	34	5	1	87.2%	41.4%
Chile .....	24	35	5	0	87.1%	40.7%
Peru .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Uruguay .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Bolivia .....	23	36	2	3	86.2%	39.0%

**Latin American and Caribbean Group (LAC) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Barbados .....	22	35	6	1	86.9%	38.6%
Panama .....	23	37	3	1	86.3%	38.3%
El Salvador .....	21	34	5	4	86.2%	38.2%
Haiti .....	22	36	0	6	85.6%	37.9%
Bahamas .....	21	35	5	3	86.5%	37.5%
Jamaica .....	21	36	6	1	86.5%	36.8%
Suriname .....	22	38	3	1	85.8%	36.7%
Venezuela .....	22	38	4	0	86.1%	36.7%
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	14	25	2	23	85.6%	35.9%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	19	34	8	3	86.6%	35.8%
Colombia .....	19	38	7	0	85.9%	33.3%
Grenada .....	15	30	5	14	86.1%	33.3%
Guyana .....	19	38	4	3	85.4%	33.3%
Mexico .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Belize .....	17	36	2	9	84.8%	32.1%
Antigua and Barbuda ..	17	37	5	5	85.1%	31.5%
St. Lucia .....	17	38	7	2	85.4%	30.9%
Cuba .....	7	37	12	8	84.2%	15.9%
Dominica .....	0	1	0	63	72.2%	0.0%
Average .....	19.8	31.6	4.8	7.8	87.1%	38.6%

**Western European and Others Group (WEOG)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom .....	41	14	9	0	94.8%	74.5%
France .....	39	14	11	0	94.6%	73.6%
Monaco .....	38	14	10	2	94.5%	73.1%
Belgium .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Canada .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Germany .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Luxembourg .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Netherlands .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Finland .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Norway .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Italy .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Andorra .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Greece .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Portugal .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Spain .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Australia .....	35	19	10	0	92.9%	64.8%
Austria .....	36	20	8	0	92.6%	64.3%
Iceland .....	34	19	10	1	92.8%	64.2%

**Western European and Others Group (WEOG) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Sweden .....	36	21	7	0	92.2%	63.2%
Liechtenstein .....	34	20	10	0	92.5%	63.0%
Ireland .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
New Zealand .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
San Marino .....	30	21	13	0	92.0%	58.8%
Turkey .....	34	26	3	1	90.4%	56.7%
Malta .....	30	27	7	0	90.0%	52.6%
Average .....	35.8	19.1	8.9	0.2	92.9%	65.2%

**Eastern European Group (EE)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Estonia .....	36	16	12	0	94.0%	69.2%
Latvia .....	36	17	11	0	93.5%	67.9%
Lithuania .....	36	17	11	0	93.6%	67.9%
Hungary .....	38	18	8	0	93.3%	67.9%
Bulgaria .....	37	18	9	0	93.2%	67.3%
Czech Republic .....	37	18	8	1	93.2%	67.3%
Albania .....	32	16	8	8	93.2%	66.7%
Poland .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Romania .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Slovak Republic .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Slovenia .....	36	19	9	0	92.8%	65.5%
Croatia .....	34	19	9	2	92.6%	64.2%
Republic of Moldova ..	32	19	13	0	92.7%	62.7%
TFYR Macedonia .....	32	19	12	1	92.7%	62.7%
Georgia .....	23	16	22	3	93.4%	59.0%
Russia .....	27	22	14	1	91.3%	55.1%
Ukraine .....	26	23	15	0	91.2%	53.1%
Armenia .....	21	24	16	3	90.4%	46.7%
Azerbaijan .....	21	28	8	7	88.5%	42.9%
Belarus .....	21	29	14	0	89.0%	42.0%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	64	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	28.9	18.0	10.1	7.0	93.0%	61.7%



## OTHER GROUPINGS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes for UN member states in plenary. It lists countries by other important groupings, in rank order by voting coincidence percentage.

### Arab Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3	86.1%	39.3%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Mauritania .....	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Djibouti .....	20	39	4	1	85.4%	33.9%
Tunisia .....	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Oman .....	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Qatar .....	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
United Arab Emirates .	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
Egypt .....	18	39	6	1	85.4%	31.6%
Saudi Arabia .....	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Algeria .....	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
Yemen .....	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Sudan .....	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Jordan .....	15	38	6	5	84.8%	28.3%
Libya .....	14	43	2	5	83.3%	24.6%
Lebanon .....	10	38	7	9	83.3%	20.8%
Syria .....	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
Iraq .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	15.7	35.0	3.5	9.9	85.0%	30.9%

### Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Thailand .....	22	37	5	0	86.4%	37.3%
Singapore .....	20	34	10	0	87.3%	37.0%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%
Philippines .....	20	40	4	0	85.3%	33.3%
Indonesia .....	19	40	5	0	85.3%	32.2%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	15	39	10	0	85.1%	27.8%
Laos .....	9	36	7	12	83.2%	20.0%
Vietnam .....	9	39	5	11	82.6%	18.8%
Average .....	17.3	38.2	5.9	2.6	85.4%	31.2%

**European Union (EU)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom .....	41	14	9	0	94.8%	74.5%
France .....	39	14	11	0	94.6%	73.6%
Belgium .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Germany .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Luxembourg .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Netherlands .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Finland .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Italy .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Greece .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Portugal .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Spain .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Austria .....	36	20	8	0	92.6%	64.3%
Sweden .....	36	21	7	0	92.2%	63.2%
Ireland .....	35	21	8	0	92.2%	62.5%
Average .....	36.8	18.3	8.9	0.0	93.2%	66.7%

**Islamic Conference (OIC)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Turkmenistan .....	15	7	3	39	94.1%	68.2%
Albania .....	32	16	8	8	93.2%	66.7%
Turkey .....	34	26	3	1	90.4%	56.7%
Tajikistan .....	20	17	11	16	91.3%	54.1%
Kazakhstan .....	25	24	14	1	90.7%	51.0%
Kyrgyzstan .....	22	23	14	5	90.5%	48.9%
Uganda .....	14	17	1	32	88.1%	45.2%
Azerbaijan .....	21	28	8	7	88.5%	42.9%
Comoros .....	16	23	2	23	87.0%	41.0%
Afghanistan .....	18	26	2	18	86.3%	40.9%
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3	86.1%	39.3%
Gambia .....	22	35	1	6	86.1%	38.6%
Senegal .....	23	37	4	0	86.4%	38.3%
Cameroon .....	18	31	11	4	87.3%	36.7%
Suriname .....	22	38	3	1	85.8%	36.7%
Sierra Leone .....	20	36	4	4	85.9%	35.7%
Bangladesh .....	20	37	5	2	85.9%	35.1%
Maldives .....	20	37	2	5	85.5%	35.1%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Mozambique .....	19	36	6	3	85.7%	34.5%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Togo .....	20	38	6	0	86.0%	34.5%

Islamic Conference (OIC) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Brunei Darussalam	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%
Mauritania	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Djibouti	20	39	4	1	85.4%	33.9%
Niger	20	39	5	0	85.5%	33.9%
Tunisia	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Benin	20	40	3	1	85.2%	33.3%
Burkina Faso	18	36	0	10	84.6%	33.3%
Oman	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Chad	18	37	5	4	85.2%	32.7%
Indonesia	19	40	5	0	85.3%	32.2%
Qatar	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
Guinea	18	38	4	4	85.2%	32.1%
United Arab Emirates	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau	17	36	6	5	85.3%	32.1%
Egypt	18	39	6	1	85.4%	31.6%
Saudi Arabia	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Algeria	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
Mali	16	36	6	6	85.4%	30.8%
Yemen	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Iran	16	40	5	3	84.7%	28.6%
Sudan	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Jordan	15	38	6	5	84.8%	28.3%
Gabon	11	32	8	13	84.9%	25.6%
Pakistan	13	39	12	0	85.3%	25.0%
Libya	14	43	2	5	83.3%	24.6%
Lebanon	10	38	7	9	83.3%	20.8%
Syria	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
Iraq	0	0	0	64	*	*
Somalia	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average	18.1	33.2	4.7	8.1	86.3%	35.3%

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Uzbekistan	20	2	24	18	98.9%	90.9%
Turkmenistan	15	7	3	39	94.1%	68.2%
Honduras	22	18	7	17	90.4%	55.0%
Lesotho	23	20	0	21	89.2%	53.5%
Malta	30	27	7	0	90.0%	52.6%
Cyprus	26	25	13	0	90.5%	51.0%
Guatemala	24	28	3	9	88.4%	46.2%
Rwanda	5	6	0	53	86.6%	45.5%
Uganda	14	17	1	32	88.1%	45.2%

**Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Nicaragua .....	22	27	9	6	88.9%	44.9%
Zambia .....	21	29	7	7	88.0%	42.0%
Ecuador .....	24	34	5	1	87.2%	41.4%
Burundi .....	16	23	1	24	87.5%	41.0%
Comoros .....	16	23	2	23	87.0%	41.0%
Afghanistan .....	18	26	2	18	86.3%	40.9%
Chile .....	24	35	5	0	87.1%	40.7%
Mongolia .....	23	34	4	3	86.6%	40.4%
Vanuatu .....	23	34	6	1	87.3%	40.4%
Peru .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
South Africa .....	23	35	6	0	87.1%	39.7%
Swaziland .....	21	32	6	5	87.0%	39.6%
Kuwait .....	24	37	0	3	86.1%	39.3%
Seychelles .....	11	17	0	36	86.3%	39.3%
Bolivia .....	23	36	2	3	86.2%	39.0%
Barbados .....	22	35	6	1	86.9%	38.6%
Gambia .....	22	35	1	6	86.1%	38.6%
Panama .....	23	37	3	1	86.3%	38.3%
Senegal .....	23	37	4	0	86.4%	38.3%
Bahamas .....	21	35	5	3	86.5%	37.5%
Thailand .....	22	37	5	0	86.4%	37.3%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	13	22	7	22	87.1%	37.1%
Singapore .....	20	34	10	0	87.3%	37.0%
Jamaica .....	21	36	6	1	86.5%	36.8%
Cameroon .....	18	31	11	4	87.3%	36.7%
Botswana .....	22	38	4	0	85.9%	36.7%
Suriname .....	22	38	3	1	85.8%	36.7%
Venezuela .....	22	38	4	0	86.1%	36.7%
Malawi .....	22	39	1	2	85.3%	36.1%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	19	34	8	3	86.6%	35.8%
Sierra Leone .....	20	36	4	4	85.9%	35.7%
Papua New Guinea .....	18	33	5	8	86.1%	35.3%
Cape Verde .....	19	35	4	6	85.9%	35.2%
Bangladesh .....	20	37	5	2	85.9%	35.1%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	20	37	6	1	86.2%	35.1%
Maldives .....	20	37	2	5	85.5%	35.1%
Bahrain .....	21	39	1	3	85.3%	35.0%
Malaysia .....	21	39	4	0	85.7%	35.0%
Madagascar .....	17	32	0	15	85.0%	34.7%
Kenya .....	19	36	6	3	86.0%	34.5%
Mozambique .....	19	36	6	3	85.7%	34.5%
Morocco .....	20	38	4	2	85.6%	34.5%
Togo .....	20	38	6	0	86.0%	34.5%
Brunei Darussalam .....	21	40	3	0	85.4%	34.4%
Mauritius .....	18	35	6	5	86.0%	34.0%
Mauritania .....	19	37	4	4	85.4%	33.9%
Djibouti .....	20	39	4	1	85.4%	33.9%
Niger .....	20	39	5	0	85.5%	33.9%

**Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL		ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	VOTES	VOTES			INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Tunisia .....	20	39	4	1	85.5%	33.9%
Benin .....	20	40	3	1	85.2%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	18	36	0	10	84.6%	33.3%
Central African Rep. ..	16	32	6	10	86.1%	33.3%
Colombia .....	19	38	7	0	85.9%	33.3%
Equatorial Guinea .....	18	36	6	4	85.8%	33.3%
Grenada .....	15	30	5	14	86.1%	33.3%
Guyana .....	19	38	4	3	85.4%	33.3%
Philippines .....	20	40	4	0	85.3%	33.3%
Nigeria .....	20	41	2	1	84.9%	32.8%
Ghana .....	19	39	6	0	85.6%	32.8%
Oman .....	19	39	1	5	84.7%	32.8%
Angola .....	18	37	3	6	85.2%	32.7%
Chad .....	18	37	5	4	85.2%	32.7%
Nepal .....	18	37	8	1	86.1%	32.7%
Indonesia .....	19	40	5	0	85.3%	32.2%
Qatar .....	19	40	0	5	84.6%	32.2%
Guinea .....	18	38	4	4	85.2%	32.1%
United Arab Emirates .	18	38	3	5	85.0%	32.1%
Belize .....	17	36	2	9	84.8%	32.1%
Ethiopia .....	17	36	8	3	86.1%	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau .....	17	36	6	5	85.3%	32.1%
Egypt .....	18	39	6	1	85.4%	31.6%
Sri Lanka .....	18	39	7	0	85.6%	31.6%
Zimbabwe .....	18	39	3	4	84.8%	31.6%
Saudi Arabia .....	18	40	4	2	84.8%	31.0%
Algeria .....	17	38	9	0	85.8%	30.9%
St. Lucia .....	17	38	7	2	85.4%	30.9%
Eritrea .....	16	36	6	6	85.1%	30.8%
Mali .....	16	36	6	6	85.4%	30.8%
Bhutan .....	11	25	13	15	87.1%	30.6%
UR Tanzania .....	16	37	8	3	85.5%	30.2%
Yemen .....	16	37	3	8	84.7%	30.2%
Namibia .....	15	37	6	6	85.0%	28.8%
Iran .....	16	40	5	3	84.7%	28.6%
Sudan .....	17	43	1	3	83.8%	28.3%
Jordan .....	15	38	6	5	84.8%	28.3%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	15	39	10	0	85.1%	27.8%
Gabon .....	11	32	8	13	84.9%	25.6%
Pakistan .....	13	39	12	0	85.3%	25.0%
Libya .....	14	43	2	5	83.3%	24.6%
Lebanon .....	10	38	7	9	83.3%	20.8%
Laos .....	9	36	7	12	83.2%	20.0%
India .....	10	42	12	0	84.2%	19.2%
Vietnam .....	9	39	5	11	82.6%	18.8%
Syria .....	8	38	10	8	82.9%	17.4%
Cuba .....	7	37	12	8	84.2%	15.9%
DPR of Korea .....	2	38	8	16	80.6%	5.0%

**Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Congo .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	64	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	64	*	*
Average .....	17.0	32.2	4.9	9.9	86.2%	34.6%

**Nordic Group**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Finland .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Norway .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Iceland .....	34	19	10	1	92.8%	64.2%
Sweden .....	36	21	7	0	92.2%	63.2%
Average .....	35.6	19.0	9.2	0.2	92.9%	65.2%

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
United Kingdom .....	41	14	9	0	94.8%	74.5%
France .....	39	14	11	0	94.6%	73.6%
Belgium .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Canada .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Germany .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Luxembourg .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Netherlands .....	37	18	9	0	93.3%	67.3%
Norway .....	36	18	10	0	93.3%	66.7%
Italy .....	37	19	8	0	92.9%	66.1%
Denmark .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Greece .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Portugal .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Spain .....	36	19	9	0	92.9%	65.5%
Iceland .....	34	19	10	1	92.8%	64.2%
Turkey .....	34	26	3	1	90.4%	56.7%
Average .....	36.7	18.4	8.8	0.1	93.1%	66.6%

## HISTORICAL COMPARISON

The following table shows the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States in plenary for each UN member in the 53rd UNGA and each of the prior five years.

COUNTRY	53RD 1998	52ND 1997	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993
Afghanistan .....	40.9%	30.5%	37.9%	31.7%	33.3%	31.4%
Albania .....	66.7%	69.8%	68.5%	69.5%	77.8%	80.8%
Algeria .....	30.9%	31.1%	35.4%	32.8%	31.3%	23.1%
Andorra .....	65.5%	71.7%	73.3%	75.0%	76.0%	85.7%
Angola .....	32.7%	21.6%	35.5%	36.4%	31.3%	22.0%
Antigua and Barbuda	31.5%	35.5%	42.6%	50.0%	45.5%	27.7%
Argentina .....	50.0%	56.1%	60.7%	68.8%	67.9%	53.8%
Armenia .....	46.7%	60.0%	56.4%	61.7%	56.6%	48.8%
Australia .....	64.8%	67.8%	64.5%	60.0%	66.7%	55.8%
Austria .....	64.3%	69.5%	69.4%	72.7%	71.7%	63.4%
Azerbaijan .....	42.9%	49.0%	50.0%	52.0%	48.0%	35.0%
Bahamas .....	37.5%	41.5%	47.7%	52.3%	47.1%	32.1%
Bahrain .....	35.0%	35.0%	41.8%	37.7%	43.5%	29.6%
Bangladesh .....	35.1%	35.8%	35.4%	39.7%	36.2%	25.0%
Barbados .....	38.6%	37.3%	49.1%	56.3%	44.9%	34.0%
Belarus .....	42.0%	53.8%	58.8%	61.4%	56.9%	37.8%
Belgium .....	67.3%	73.8%	75.4%	76.6%	77.8%	72.5%
Belize .....	32.1%	36.7%	44.4%	50.7%	43.5%	36.0%
Benin .....	33.3%	36.5%	40.3%	38.2%	41.8%	29.4%
Bhutan .....	30.6%	31.0%	36.7%	48.3%	41.2%	28.6%
Bolivia .....	39.0%	44.9%	44.9%	45.6%	43.7%	33.3%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ..	**	**	57.7%	67.3%	58.6%	34.8%
Botswana .....	36.7%	38.2%	41.4%	46.1%	40.3%	28.6%
Brazil .....	41.7%	42.6%	42.4%	41.1%	39.1%	28.0%
Brunei Darussalam ...	34.4%	33.8%	40.3%	40.5%	37.7%	23.1%
Bulgaria .....	67.3%	81.1%	72.7%	73.4%	77.6%	71.1%
Burkina Faso .....	33.3%	32.2%	39.7%	33.3%	34.8%	27.3%
Burundi .....	41.0%	28.6%	34.4%	36.1%	30.4%	23.3%
Cambodia .....	**	**	44.6%	48.3%	49.2%	29.4%
Cameroon .....	36.7%	35.5%	36.7%	38.6%	39.0%	31.3%
Canada .....	67.3%	71.7%	73.0%	73.5%	74.5%	66.7%
Cape Verde .....	35.2%	19.4%	37.5%	34.9%	40.0%	24.0%
Central African Rep. .	33.3%	**	**	**	41.7%	28.6%
Chad .....	32.7%	21.4%	38.3%	38.2%	**	22.4%
Chile .....	40.7%	44.8%	46.6%	45.0%	46.4%	33.9%
China .....	27.3%	27.6%	29.7%	21.5%	22.8%	10.6%
Colombia .....	33.3%	36.4%	39.1%	38.7%	35.3%	25.0%

**Historical Comparison (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	53RD 1998	52ND 1997	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993
Comoros .....	41.0%	15.8%	40.0%	**	45.0%	22.9%
Congo .....	**	39.5%	46.0%	41.5%	34.5%	23.8%
Costa Rica .....	46.8%	48.1%	51.7%	47.5%	50.0%	35.7%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	35.1%	36.5%	40.4%	40.0%	44.8%	27.1%
Croatia .....	64.2%	70.7%	70.7%	75.0%	71.1%	84.0%
Cuba .....	15.9%	13.2%	14.5%	14.5%	15.5%	6.3%
Cyprus .....	51.0%	57.4%	61.0%	46.6%	40.3%	32.7%
Czech Republic .....	67.3%	72.6%	74.2%	77.4%	78.8%	70.0%
DR of Congo (1) .....	37.1%	34.3%	33.3%	45.0%	0.0%	36.1%
DPR of Korea .....	5.0%	4.3%	13.0%	8.7%	9.1%	7.8%
Denmark .....	65.5%	72.1%	74.2%	72.1%	75.0%	67.5%
Djibouti .....	33.9%	36.4%	40.0%	31.8%	42.4%	26.9%
Dominica .....	0.0%	42.2%	48.1%	46.7%	52.9%	41.9%
Dominican Republic..	51.2%	51.1%	52.2%	**	**	37.0%
Ecuador .....	41.4%	43.1%	43.1%	47.4%	37.8%	30.9%
Egypt .....	31.6%	34.4%	39.4%	33.3%	34.8%	22.9%
El Salvador .....	38.2%	42.4%	46.3%	48.0%	47.5%	30.6%
Equatorial Guinea .....	33.3%	37.0%	61.5%	79.2%	**	**
Eritrea .....	30.8%	36.5%	42.0%	58.9%	70.4%	0.0%
Estonia .....	69.2%	72.4%	75.0%	81.8%	75.0%	70.6%
Ethiopia .....	32.1%	39.0%	43.1%	45.7%	38.7%	27.3%
Fiji .....	39.6%	40.7%	48.1%	50.8%	50.0%	42.2%
Finland .....	66.7%	73.3%	75.0%	79.0%	77.8%	69.2%
France .....	73.6%	78.3%	77.8%	76.9%	75.8%	71.1%
Gabon .....	25.6%	30.2%	40.0%	39.1%	46.2%	24.3%
Gambia .....	38.6%	**	35.1%	33.3%	46.3%	26.5%
Georgia .....	59.0%	70.5%	67.3%	85.7%	81.0%	76.2%
Germany .....	67.3%	73.8%	74.2%	76.9%	77.8%	74.4%
Ghana .....	32.8%	31.7%	33.8%	32.8%	30.9%	20.5%
Greece .....	65.5%	72.1%	57.1%	69.2%	71.4%	58.5%
Grenada .....	33.3%	35.7%	49.2%	60.7%	43.3%	29.3%
Guatemala .....	46.2%	42.9%	48.1%	46.2%	45.1%	32.7%
Guinea .....	32.1%	36.9%	36.5%	40.6%	42.6%	27.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	32.1%	32.2%	35.7%	36.4%	**	22.0%
Guyana .....	33.3%	39.7%	41.7%	48.6%	41.9%	33.3%
Haiti .....	37.9%	43.1%	44.1%	39.7%	42.6%	24.5%
Honduras .....	55.0%	40.3%	44.3%	45.7%	45.1%	28.6%
Hungary .....	67.9%	72.6%	74.6%	83.1%	79.6%	71.1%
Iceland .....	64.2%	73.8%	73.0%	75.4%	77.4%	67.5%
India .....	19.2%	20.0%	23.1%	17.2%	16.1%	15.7%
Indonesia .....	32.2%	31.8%	31.9%	33.3%	31.5%	18.9%



## Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	53RD 1998	52ND 1997	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993
Iran .....	28.6%	27.4%	28.1%	27.3%	24.2%	18.9%
Iraq .....	**	**	**	**	23.7%	12.2%
Ireland .....	62.5%	67.8%	67.7%	69.7%	70.6%	65.8%
Israel .....	94.1%	93.3%	95.0%	97.0%	95.2%	93.5%
Italy .....	66.1%	72.6%	73.4%	74.2%	79.2%	73.7%
Jamaica .....	36.8%	40.0%	43.3%	50.0%	42.9%	32.0%
Japan .....	60.4%	67.3%	72.4%	75.4%	78.4%	65.8%
Jordan .....	28.3%	33.3%	40.3%	38.9%	34.8%	22.0%
Kazakhstan .....	51.0%	56.4%	62.1%	60.3%	60.0%	46.2%
Kenya .....	34.5%	36.1%	41.7%	40.0%	39.4%	31.9%
Kuwait .....	39.3%	40.9%	45.1%	40.5%	45.7%	34.5%
Kyrgyzstan .....	48.9%	50.0%	59.5%	55.9%	48.9%	52.2%
Laos .....	20.0%	18.4%	25.5%	27.0%	19.6%	12.2%
Latvia .....	67.9%	73.2%	81.1%	87.0%	80.0%	65.8%
Lebanon .....	20.8%	22.4%	26.7%	25.8%	28.8%	17.5%
Lesotho .....	53.5%	41.2%	47.4%	46.4%	39.3%	24.5%
Liberia .....	**	39.0%	46.8%	**	**	**
Libya .....	24.6%	22.2%	29.4%	22.5%	26.4%	12.2%
Liechtenstein .....	63.0%	70.2%	68.9%	72.3%	70.6%	64.1%
Lithuania .....	67.9%	74.1%	79.6%	81.0%	81.0%	68.6%
Luxembourg .....	67.3%	74.2%	75.8%	74.6%	77.8%	74.4%
Madagascar .....	34.7%	41.3%	45.5%	45.1%	42.1%	22.9%
Malawi .....	36.1%	35.0%	40.0%	38.5%	41.7%	26.5%
Malaysia .....	35.0%	35.4%	40.3%	39.4%	37.0%	20.8%
Maldives .....	35.1%	38.8%	44.3%	42.3%	45.8%	30.9%
Mali .....	30.8%	35.5%	43.1%	36.2%	34.8%	21.3%
Malta .....	52.6%	53.2%	50.0%	68.2%	70.2%	60.0%
Marshall Islands .....	81.6%	74.4%	68.5%	65.1%	65.5%	55.8%
Mauritania .....	33.9%	33.9%	30.6%	38.0%	40.0%	18.4%
Mauritius .....	34.0%	37.1%	42.2%	43.0%	43.3%	33.3%
Mexico .....	32.8%	37.5%	38.8%	41.6%	33.3%	28.3%
Micronesia .....	100.0%	100.0%	64.4%	66.7%	69.2%	55.0%
Monaco .....	73.1%	77.6%	75.4%	75.8%	75.4%	84.6%
Mongolia .....	40.4%	45.3%	46.8%	47.9%	41.8%	30.8%
Morocco .....	34.5%	38.3%	43.5%	40.6%	46.9%	26.5%
Mozambique .....	34.5%	33.9%	45.8%	41.1%	33.3%	23.8%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	27.8%	26.2%	30.8%	25.4%	25.4%	18.4%
Namibia .....	28.8%	32.8%	37.0%	46.7%	36.2%	23.1%
Nepal .....	32.7%	38.7%	38.5%	46.4%	39.7%	32.7%
Netherlands .....	67.3%	74.2%	76.3%	80.6%	81.5%	74.4%
New Zealand .....	62.5%	65.6%	61.5%	64.2%	63.0%	54.8%

**Historical Comparison (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	53RD 1998	52ND 1997	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993
Nicaragua .....	44.9%	42.4%	45.9%	46.6%	47.8%	35.2%
Niger .....	33.9%	35.7%	39.4%	36.1%	39.7%	29.1%
Nigeria .....	32.8%	30.9%	31.3%	31.4%	37.5%	26.5%
Norway .....	66.7%	76.3%	73.8%	79.7%	74.5%	67.5%
Oman .....	32.8%	35.4%	38.2%	35.2%	38.0%	29.1%
Pakistan .....	25.0%	31.3%	36.2%	28.4%	32.4%	26.3%
Palau (2) .....	**	**	92.3%	66.7%	**	*
Panama .....	38.3%	41.3%	41.8%	47.4%	43.8%	44.0%
Papua New Guinea ...	35.3%	33.9%	34.2%	47.2%	41.4%	38.8%
Paraguay .....	43.1%	43.3%	43.5%	51.6%	45.1%	45.5%
Peru .....	39.7%	40.9%	42.6%	46.6%	45.5%	31.5%
Philippines .....	33.3%	32.8%	39.4%	43.8%	38.8%	17.0%
Poland .....	66.1%	72.1%	72.1%	77.4%	78.4%	68.4%
Portugal .....	65.5%	72.1%	73.8%	71.6%	75.0%	69.2%
Qatar .....	32.2%	35.3%	40.0%	32.9%	38.8%	29.6%
Republic of Korea ....	60.0%	62.5%	60.0%	64.3%	55.9%	44.2%
Republic of Moldova	62.7%	69.8%	71.2%	73.3%	76.6%	69.4%
Romania .....	66.1%	72.9%	74.6%	75.0%	76.5%	71.4%
Russia .....	55.1%	58.6%	59.3%	73.1%	66.7%	68.6%
Rwanda .....	45.5%	50.0%	80.0%	53.2%	60.0%	30.2%
St. Kitts and Nevis ....	35.9%	30.8%	44.6%	83.3%	44.9%	0.0%
St. Lucia .....	30.9%	33.3%	44.3%	52.9%	46.3%	25.5%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	50.0%	48.6%	55.9%	84.6%	49.2%	26.0%
Samoa .....	42.6%	48.4%	50.0%	55.6%	57.1%	48.4%
San Marino .....	58.8%	65.5%	61.5%	65.0%	51.4%	73.1%
Sao Tome/Principe ...	**	**	**	**	**	**
Saudi Arabia .....	31.0%	31.1%	40.3%	32.9%	41.8%	30.2%
Senegal .....	38.3%	41.3%	41.7%	38.4%	45.8%	23.4%
Seychelles .....	39.3%	**	53.6%	25.0%	35.7%	20.0%
Sierra Leone .....	35.7%	37.5%	40.3%	30.6%	46.0%	27.8%
Singapore .....	37.0%	36.1%	43.3%	43.7%	41.2%	33.3%
Slovak Republic .....	66.1%	71.7%	72.1%	76.2%	79.6%	70.6%
Slovenia .....	65.5%	71.7%	72.1%	78.9%	76.0%	65.7%
Solomon Islands .....	47.8%	48.4%	47.8%	55.6%	56.9%	57.7%
Somalia .....	**	**	**	**	**	**
South Africa .....	39.7%	40.9%	44.3%	47.4%	41.7%	**
Spain .....	65.5%	72.1%	75.4%	70.1%	68.3%	59.5%
Sri Lanka .....	31.6%	33.8%	35.4%	36.2%	30.3%	25.9%
Sudan .....	28.3%	29.0%	33.3%	21.7%	25.9%	20.0%
Suriname .....	36.7%	34.4%	45.6%	50.0%	43.8%	32.1%
Swaziland .....	39.6%	45.0%	45.0%	50.7%	50.0%	28.6%

## Historical Comparison (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	53RD 1998	52ND 1997	51ST 1996	50TH 1995	49TH 1994	48TH 1993
Sweden .....	63.2%	68.9%	68.3%	71.2%	69.8%	61.9%
Syria .....	17.4%	14.0%	21.7%	20.0%	22.6%	13.7%
Tajikistan .....	54.1%	61.5%	79.3%	91.3%	62.0%	30.8%
Thailand .....	37.3%	36.9%	40.3%	40.0%	37.7%	17.4%
TFYR Macedonia (3)	62.7%	70.7%	71.7%	78.0%	76.6%	47.5%
Togo .....	34.5%	33.3%	40.6%	34.3%	37.7%	19.1%
Trinidad and Tobago	35.8%	39.1%	41.5%	48.5%	45.7%	25.5%
Tunisia .....	33.9%	35.4%	40.0%	36.1%	38.2%	25.0%
Turkey .....	56.7%	56.7%	61.8%	70.6%	65.0%	57.1%
Turkmenistan .....	68.2%	72.0%	75.0%	76.5%	55.3%	40.0%
Uganda .....	45.2%	29.3%	34.8%	40.0%	34.8%	18.6%
Ukraine .....	53.1%	59.6%	59.0%	59.6%	63.3%	41.3%
United Arab Emirates	32.1%	33.9%	40.6%	37.7%	44.9%	30.4%
United Kingdom .....	74.5%	79.4%	79.1%	85.1%	84.4%	80.0%
UR Tanzania .....	30.2%	30.0%	33.8%	35.7%	29.9%	18.4%
Uruguay .....	39.7%	45.8%	48.5%	46.1%	47.1%	37.5%
Uzbekistan .....	90.9%	74.4%	75.6%	85.7%	53.1%	**
Vanuatu .....	40.4%	41.5%	43.5%	40.4%	48.8%	83.3%
Venezuela .....	36.7%	41.2%	42.0%	42.9%	37.9%	29.6%
Vietnam .....	18.8%	17.0%	26.2%	18.8%	19.7%	6.5%
Yemen .....	30.2%	33.3%	37.5%	33.8%	33.3%	20.0%
Yugoslavia (S/M) (4)	**	**	**	**	**	**
Zambia .....	42.0%	41.5%	42.9%	44.6%	38.6%	36.1%
Zimbabwe .....	31.6%	29.5%	37.1%	36.8%	29.9%	18.4%
Average .....	44.2%	46.7%	49.4%	50.6%	48.6%	36.8%

\* Not yet a UN member.

\*\* Non-participating UN member.

(1) Formerly Zaire, until 52nd UNGA.

(2) Admitted as a member 12/15/94, but did not vote in 49th UNGA.

(3) Listed alphabetically as "The Former Yugoslav Republic...".

(4) Not permitted to participate since the 47th UNGA.



### III - GENERAL ASSEMBLY: IMPORTANT VOTES AND CONSENSUS ACTIONS

Public Law 101-167 calls for analysis and discussion of “all such votes on issues which directly affected important United States interests and on which the United States lobbied extensively.” For the 53rd General Assembly in 1998, 10 votes meet these criteria.

Section III has five parts: (1) a listing and description of the 10 important votes at the 53rd UNGA; (2) a listing and description of the 17 important consensus resolutions adopted at the 53rd UNGA; (3) voting coincidence percentages with the United States on these important votes, arranged both alphabetically by country and in rank order of agreed votes; (4) voting coincidence percentages by UN regional groupings and other important groupings; and (5) a comparison of voting coincidence percentages on important votes with those on overall votes from Section II. Starting in 1996, an additional column has been included in the tables of important votes (parts 3 and 4 above). This column presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including the 17 important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. Since not all states are equally active at the United Nations, these coincidence percentages were refined to reflect a country’s rate of participation in all UN voting overall. The participation rate was calculated by dividing the number of Yes/No/Abstain votes cast by a UN member in plenary (i.e., the number of times it was not absent) by the total of plenary votes (82).

#### IMPORTANT VOTES

The following 10 important votes are identified by a short title, document number, date of vote, and results (Yes-No-Abstain), with the U.S. vote noted. The first paragraph summarizes the subject matter of each vote, and the second provides background and the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in the order adopted.

##### 1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba

A/Res/53/4

October 14

157-2(US)-12

Calls on states to refrain from promulgating and applying laws and measures, such as the “Helms-Burton Act,” the extraterritorial effects of which affect the sovereignty of other states, the legitimate interests of entities or persons under their jurisdiction, and the freedom of trade and navigation; and urges states that have such laws to repeal them.

This Cuba-sponsored resolution, couched in terms of blocking efforts to extend extraterritorially the effects of the U.S. embargo against Cuba, again in

1998 gained increased support. A number of countries, notably Argentina, Norway, and Costa Rica, while voting for the resolution, mentioned Cuba's poor human rights record in their explanations of vote. The European Union statement (by Austria) had a strong human rights focus, making clear that full cooperation with Cuba depended on improvement in human rights and political freedom. The U.S. concern with Cuba results from the Cuban Government's systematic denial of universally recognized human rights and fundamental freedoms to the people of Cuba. The United States believes that economic sanctions are an important foreign policy tool to be used in certain compelling cases. In the case of Cuba, sanctions are but one element of a broad policy aimed at promoting a peaceful transition to democracy. Year after year the Cuban Government has sought to manipulate the concerns expressed in the United Nations to claim support for its repressive and failed policies. The record of the Cuban Government is clear: dozens of dissidents and human rights advocates have been detained and arrested over the past year. Their only "crime" was to criticize the government's failed economic policies and to call for peaceful, democratic change. In addition to maintaining pressure on the Cuban Government for change, the United States believes it is particularly important to reach out to the Cuban people. Assisting the Cuban people to develop independent civil society will help ensure that the transition which will inevitably take place in Cuba will be peaceful and democratic. This effort to support the Cuban people recognizes that change in Cuba must come from within, led by Cubans on the island who recognize the problems and injustices of the current system. They need and deserve the support of the international community. Support for the Cuban people has been and remains a central thrust of U.S. policy. Thousands of Cuban doctors, scientists, environmentalists, academics, students, researchers, artists, religious workers, and others have traveled to the United States, and hundreds of U.S. citizens have legally traveled to Cuba for similar purposes. Dozens of nongovernmental groups in the United States are engaged in projects with independent Cuban groups, and the United States has licensed over \$2 billion in private humanitarian assistance from U.S. individuals and nongovernmental organizations to the people of Cuba. Much of the assistance licensed is medicines, medical equipment, and food. (Israel also voted against this resolution.)

## 2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures

A/Res/53/10

October 26

80-2(US)-67

Calls for the immediate repeal of unilateral extraterritorial laws that impose sanctions on corporations and nationals of other states; and urges all states not to recognize or apply extraterritorial coercive economic measures or legislative enactments unilaterally imposed by any state.

The United States, which regards economic sanctions as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy, opposed this Libya-sponsored resolution. In the

U.S. view, this resolution was an attempt by Libya to divert attention from its own noncompliance with terrorism-related sanctions and to shift the focus to states that seek to call states like Libya to account. It is the U.S. view that every sovereign state has the right to decide with whom it will or will not trade. The United States is by no means the only nation that resorts to economic sanctions when necessary. When faced with unacceptable international behavior, the United States resorts to unilateral action reluctantly, working whenever possible with other members of the global community to devise a collective response to egregious behavior that violates international norms or threatens international security, as with Iraq's armed aggression against Kuwait. But the United States has responded and will continue to respond when faced with policies and actions that pose unusual and extraordinary threats to its vital interests, including security (for example, state support for international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and massive human rights abuses). The high importance of the issues involved makes the U.S. Government willing to endure the real economic sacrifice that imposing economic sanctions entails also for the United States. When forced to act unilaterally, the United States makes it clear what policies need to be changed, and what the target state must do to have sanctions lifted. These sanctions also seek to target the subject government, while avoiding harm to vulnerable civilian populations. In responding to rogue state behavior, the United States is defending not only its own interests, but also the security of the international community as a whole. (Israel also voted against this resolution.)

### 3. IAEA Report

A/Res/53/21

November 2

113(US)-1-8

Affirms confidence in the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes; commends IAEA's efforts to implement the safeguards agreement with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), expresses concern about the continuing noncompliance of the DPRK with the agreement, and urges the DPRK to cooperate fully with the IAEA in implementation of the agreement; calls upon Iraq to cooperate fully with the IAEA in accordance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the memorandum of understanding signed by Iraq and the Secretary General in February 1998; and welcomes the IAEA's measures to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.

The United States again supported this resolution endorsing the IAEA's efforts to promote peaceful use of atomic energy and guard against its use for military purposes. The United States also strongly supported inclusion of paragraphs calling upon North Korea and Iraq to comply with their obligations regarding peaceful use of nuclear energy.

#### 4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia

A/Res/53/77G

December 4

118(US)-9-33

Expresses grave concern about and strongly deplores the recent nuclear tests conducted in South Asia (by India and Pakistan); notes the moratoriums on further testing declared by these states and their willingness to enter into legal commitments; and reiterates that those legal commitments should be expressed through signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Adoption of this resolution was a key U.S. objective at the General Assembly. The resolution addressed the deep-seated, worldwide, intense concern about the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan earlier in the year.

#### 5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament

A/Res/53/77Y

December 4

114-18(US)-38

Calls on nuclear-weapon states to demonstrate a commitment to total elimination of their nuclear weapons in fulfillment of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; asks them to de-alert their nuclear weapons and remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles; urges them to examine further interim measures, including to review strategic doctrines; and considers that an international conference on nuclear disarmament could consolidate a new agenda for a nuclear-weapon-free world.

The U.S. Government vigorously opposed this resolution because it calls into question a fundamental defense doctrine of the United States and its allies, nuclear deterrence, which kept the peace for half a century and won the Cold War. Moreover, the resolution would tend to delay, not advance, the nuclear disarmament agenda. By seeming to require a new commitment to nuclear disarmament as a prerequisite to further steps to reduce nuclear weapons, the resolution would only provide an excuse for delay. And by tending to undermine existing forums for disarmament, it would not promote the speedier progress desired.

#### 6. Right to Development

A/Res/53/155

December 9

125-1(US)-42

Reaffirms the right to development for all peoples as a fundamental human right; urges all states to eliminate obstacles to development at all levels; and urges states to promote the right to development as a vital element in a balanced human rights program.



The U.S. delegation tried to negotiate compromises on contentious issues that would have permitted reaching consensus on this resolution. However, a few developing countries insisted on calling for initiation of negotiations on a new convention on right to development, while refusing to recognize the international consensus that lack of development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of human rights. While many countries sought a consensus outcome, when the United States called for a vote on the resolution, no Western country was prepared to vote in favor. There is much in the resolution that the United States supports, but profoundly disagreed on several points: (1) International macroeconomic policy-making, globalization, and debt relief are not intrinsically human rights issues. (2) It is wrong, and dangerously misleading, to pin the blame for long-standing problems of food, health, education, and unemployment on the current global financial crisis. (3) While incorporation of a human rights-based approach adds to development policy, the reverse, a development-based approach to human rights, has added neither to development nor to human rights. A convention on the right to development is a diversion to serious work both on rights and on development. (4) A new mandate in the field of development should not be added to the work of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights because it would be wasteful and duplicative, and it would divert scarce resources from human rights activities for which the High Commissioner has an exclusive mandate.

## 7. Human Rights in Iraq

A/Res/53/157

December 9

103(US)-3-56

Strongly condemns the systematic and extremely grave violations of human rights in Iraq, including suppression of freedoms, summary and arbitrary executions, systematic torture, and mutilation as a penalty, including for petty crimes; and calls upon Iraq to: abide by international human rights treaties, provide an accounting for the clean-out of prisons, cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms, restore the independence of the judiciary and abrogate all laws granting impunity, cease repressive practices aimed at Iraqi Kurds in the north and the marsh Arabs in the south, cooperate with international agencies to provide humanitarian assistance, and ensure equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies purchased with the proceeds of Iraqi oil sales in implementation of Security Council resolutions.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to highlight and condemn the human rights situation in Iraq, where freedom of thought, expression, religion, association, assembly, and movement simply do not exist. And there is no protection from arbitrary arrest, torture, imprisonment, or summary execution at the hands of a repressive one-party regime.

## 8. Human Rights in Iran

A/Res/53/158

December 9

64(US)-41-56

Expresses concern about continuing violations of human rights in Iran, especially the increasing number of executions and torture, discrimination against members of religious minorities, particularly the Baha'is, and lack of human rights for women; calls on Iran to abide by human rights instruments, eliminate discrimination in law and practice against women, and ensure that capital punishment will be imposed only for the most serious crimes; and calls on Iran to extend full cooperation to the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, introduced by the European Union, to highlight once again the violations of human rights in Iran. The Government of Iran lacks a clear commitment to protect the human rights of religious minorities. The situation of the Baha'i community is of particular concern. Also of concern are problems with the administration of justice, including torture, cruel and degrading punishment, and the fact that apostasy continues to be a crime punishable by death. Iran's leadership has made positive statements in respect to freedom of expression, but recent set-backs have been disappointing. Steps have been taken against the media. Members of the press have been harassed, and publications have been arbitrarily closed. There is also a lack of progress on women's rights.

## 9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia

A/Res/53/163

December 9

141(US)-0-21

Expresses disappointment about continuing human rights violations, and calls for full implementation of human rights provisions of the (Dayton) peace agreement; calls for an end to illegal detention by all parties, and calls on all parties to ensure that protection of human rights will be central elements in the new civilian structures; calls for cooperation with the International Tribunal and condemns the refusal of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) and Republika Srpska to arrest and surrender war criminals in their territories; calls on parties to the peace agreement to determine the fate of missing persons; urges Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure full access to its territory to implement this resolution, to create conditions conducive to the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and to provide humanitarian assistance; urges Croatia to implement its refugee return program; and urges the FRY to institutionalize democratic norms.

The United States again in 1998 introduced this resolution on human rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and the FRY. Extensive negotiation led to its passage with no votes in opposition. This resolution is one aspect of

the continuing, long-term effort to help these countries emerge from their terrible trials and develop democratic and tolerant civil societies with full respect for international standards of human rights. Some progress has been made in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia, but the FRY remains largely unreconstructed. It has done little to meet its obligations under the Dayton agreement, and has taken steps backward with respect to international standards.

#### 10. Human Rights in Kosovo

A/Res/53/164

December 9

122(US)-3-34

Condemns the overwhelming number of human rights violations by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (FRY) in Kosovo, violence by armed ethnic Albanian groups, and denial of appropriate access by nongovernmental organizations to Kosovo; expresses deep concern about all violations of human rights and repression of the ethnic Albanian population in Kosovo, and calls on the FRY to end all such violations, to allow unhindered access by humanitarian organizations, and to facilitate the return of internally displaced persons to their homes; calls on all parties to clear the area of landmines; and calls on the Special Rapporteur of the UN Human Rights Commission to continue to monitor closely the human rights situation in Kosovo.

The United States introduced this resolution, which calls international attention to the shocking injustices the people of Kosovo have suffered. The police and armed forces of the FRY have forced nearly 300,000 people to run in terror from their homes. Many were killed. Homes were destroyed. The FRY cannot justify the killing of innocent people in its effort to reestablish law and order. The FRY has perpetrated a policy intended to terrorize and cow an entire ethnic population, and this after more than 10 years of oppression. All parties to the conflict must respect the mandate of the war crimes tribunal. They must seek a peaceful settlement that includes democratic elections and genuine self-government for Kosovo. And the population of Kosovo must be permitted to enjoy their universally recognized human rights.

## CONSENSUS ACTIONS

Of the 273 resolutions adopted by the 53rd UNGA in 1998, 213 (78.0%) were by consensus. In addition, 86 of 89 decisions were adopted by consensus. Combining resolutions and decisions, the percentage of those adopted by consensus was 82.6%. The percentage of resolutions adopted by consensus has remained fairly constantly in a range of 77-80% for the past eight years and is higher than in the earlier years for which these reports were compiled. The number of plenary votes is considerably below what it was just a few years ago and less than half the number at the 42nd UNGA.

The following table illustrates these developments:

**Resolutions and Decisions**

UNGA	Votes	Consensus	Total	Percentage Consensus
53rd.....	63	299	362	82.6%
52nd.....	70	280	350	80.0%
51st.....	76	272	348	78.2%
50th.....	69	293	362	80.9%
49th.....	70	301	371	81.1%
48th.....	66	298	364	81.9%
47th.....	78	265	343	77.3%
46th.....	76	272	348	78.2%
45th.....	90	297	387	76.7%
44th.....	119	272	391	69.6%
43rd.....	138	245	383	64.0%
42nd.....	154	224	378	60.6%

**IMPORTANT CONSENSUS RESOLUTIONS**

The 17 important resolutions listed and discussed below were adopted by consensus at the 53rd UNGA. All were selected on the same basis used in determining important votes discussed above, i.e., they were “issues which directly affected United States interests and on which the United States lobbied intensively.” For each resolution, the listing provides a short title, the resolution number, date of adoption, a summary description, and an explanation of the U.S. position. The resolutions are listed in numerical order.

**1. Information Technology and Security**

A/Res/53/70                      December 4

Considering that it is necessary to prevent misuse or exploitation of information resources or technologies for criminal or terrorist purposes: calls on member states to promote multilateral consideration of threats in the field of information security; and invites all member states to inform the Secretary General of their views on: (a) information security issues, (b) a definition of basic notions on information security, including interference with and misuse of information and systems, and (c) the advisability of developing international principles to enhance global information and telecommunication systems and help to combat information terrorism and criminality.

The United States was able to join consensus on this resolution after persuading its sponsors to omit phrases pointing to potential dangers of information weapons and information warfare. The U.S. delegation also pointed to the need to discuss issues of economic cooperation and trade, intellectual property

rights, law enforcement, and anti-terrorism cooperation in other committees of the General Assembly, where they would be provided the necessary perspective.

## 2. Support of Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT)

A/Res/53/771                      December 4

Welcomes the decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish a committee to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. Consensus adoption of the resolution—after a successful U.S. appeal to Pakistan to withdraw amendments putting FMCT negotiations in the context of a time-bound nuclear disarmament process and prejudicing the question of the scope of a future treaty—augurs well for reestablishment of the FMCT ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament in 1999. This is the first time since 1993 that an FMCT resolution was adopted, moving forward the effort to stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

## 3. Causes of Conflict and Promotion of Peace and Development in Africa

A/Res/53/92                        December 7

Welcomes the Secretary General's report on the causes of conflict and the promotion of peace and development in Africa for its holistic approach and concrete recommendations, and commends his efforts to mobilize the international community; notes that implementation of the Secretary General's recommendations will require increased political will and substantial increases in the flow of financial resources; urges the United Nations and others to assist in strengthening the institutions for promotion of transparency and accountability in public administration and good governance, in respect for human rights and the rule of law, and in strengthening democratic institutions; urges all states and parties to rely on peaceful means rather than military solutions to their problems, and, to that end, to promote preventive diplomacy and confidence-building measures; calls on member states and international financial institutions to help implement the five priority areas identified by the Secretary General, namely, market access, increased official development assistance, conversion of official debts into grants, liberalization of the heavily indebted poor countries initiative, and foreign direct investment flows; and emphasizes the need for the international community to assist African countries in promoting regional economic cooperation and integration.

The United States is committed to the partnership between Africa and the United Nations in such areas as development, food security, health, humanitarian aid, and electoral assistance. During President Clinton's trip to Africa in

April 1998, African economic leaders and business people made clear that Africa is open for business. The United States is heartened by the progress in Africa toward democracy, free markets, foreign investment, and open economies. The United States is committed to helping resolve the conflicts that still plague some nations in Africa. The U.S. Government agrees with the Secretary General that the international community must do more to broaden economic opportunities for all Africans. Africa wants and needs the world's trade, investment, and economic engagement. Opening markets to investment and trade is the most successful path to sustainable development. The United States is Africa's largest single export market, and it is the goal of the U.S. Government to increase both its imports and exports. The United States is committed to increasing development assistance to Africa, is helping control the spread of diseases, and is working to improve the quality of African education. The United States is a strong supporter of comprehensive debt relief, including through the heavily indebted poor country initiative, under which official creditors and the international financial institutions are providing coordinated debt relief to poor countries with unsustainable debt burdens. The United States calls on creditors to follow the example of the World Bank and the Paris Club in providing interim debt relief to support reforms to date, rather than delaying all debt relief until a future completion of an entire reform package.

#### 4. Establishment of an International Criminal Court

A/Res/53/105

December 8

Asks the Secretary General to convene the preparatory commission envisioned in the Final Act of the Rome Conference to Establish an International Criminal Court to meet February 16-26, July 26-August 13, and November 29-December 17, 1999, to complete arrangements for implementation of the Statute and to discuss ways to enhance the effectiveness and acceptance of the court.

The United States participated actively in meetings at the United Nations and the Rome conference on establishment of an international criminal court, and, although it voted against adoption of the Statute, would support creation of a court that is fair and effective, did not impair U.S. law enforcement and military justice interests, and met all relevant standards of due process. The U.S. Government joined consensus on this resolution because it provides an opportunity to review the Rome treaty that created the court and to discuss ways to enhance the court's effectiveness and acceptance by countries with fundamental concerns, including the United States. The greatest U.S. concern is that the Rome treaty purports to give the court independent authority to assert jurisdiction over officials or the military of states that have not agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the court. Another major flaw is that those countries that do ratify the treaty can, in effect, decide among themselves

to create new war crimes, exempt themselves from prosecution, and have the new crimes apply to non-parties.

#### 5. Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism

A/Res/53/108

December 8

Strongly condemns all acts, methods, and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomsoever committed; reiterates that criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terror for political purposes are unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other nature that may be invoked to justify them; reiterates its call on all states to prevent terrorism and to strengthen international cooperation in combating terrorism; reiterates its call on states to refrain from financing, encouraging, providing training for or otherwise supporting terrorist activities; urges states to become parties to the relevant counter-terrorism conventions and protocols and to enact domestic legislation necessary to implement their provisions; decides to address at the 54th session (1999) of the General Assembly the question of convening a high-level conference in 2000 to formulate a joint organized response of the international community to terrorism; and decides that the ad hoc committee of the General Assembly will continue to elaborate a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism, will elaborate the draft of an international convention for the suppression of terrorist financing to supplement existing international instruments, and subsequently will address means of further developing a comprehensive legal framework of conventions dealing with international terrorism.

This resolution, in line with U.S. policy, reaffirms the condemnation of terrorist acts as criminal acts, and denies the validity of any justification for them. Further, the resolution does not stray into operational-type activities for the United Nations. The United States also supports the work of the ad hoc committee on a convention on the suppression of nuclear terrorism and the proposal to negotiate a convention on financing of terrorism, but continues to have reservations about the elaboration of a comprehensive convention on international terrorism, considering such a convention unnecessary and potentially undermining the effective legal framework provided by the several conventions already in effect.

#### 6. International Cooperation Against the World Drug Problem

A/Res/53/115

December 9

Reaffirms that the fight against the world drug problem is a common and shared responsibility that must be addressed in a multilateral setting; calls on all states to take further actions to promote effective cooperation to combat the world drug problem; urges competent authorities at the international, regional,

and national levels to implement the outcome of the June 1998 Special Session of the General Assembly on drugs, in particular practical measures on demand reduction, measures to prevent illicit manufacture and distribution of precursors, measures to promote judicial cooperation, measures to counter money-laundering, steps to eradicate illicit drug crops, and plans for alternative development; and calls on all states to adopt effective measures, including national laws, to meet the 5- and 10-year targets as mandated by the Special Session on drugs.

The United States cosponsored this resolution. The fight against illicit drugs remains a high priority for the U.S. Government. President Clinton has underscored the importance of the international effort against illicit drugs in his addresses to the General Assembly. Despite significant reductions in drug abuse in the United States, the U.S. Government remains concerned about drug consumption as well as the serious national and international security threat of the drug trade. Drug abuse is escalating on almost every continent. Governments now face the insidious threat of powerful drug syndicates with enough wealth to buy themselves protection through some governments, thereby manipulating the machinery of democratic government to serve their own purposes. Drug money in some nations is so pervasive that it taints legitimate investment and disrupts economies. All countries must act to develop strategies and implement goals and meet the deadlines set by the General Assembly's Special Session on drugs. UN efforts require resources. The U.S. Government hopes to increase its support significantly, and urges other governments to do so as well. No nation can afford to ignore the responsibility to fight drugs; the U.S. Government has requested a multi-billion dollar anti-drug budget to educate youth to reject drugs, to shield the country's frontiers, and to break up foreign and domestic sources of drug supply.

## 7. Follow-Up to the Fourth World Conference on Women

A/Res/53/120

December 9

Calls again on states, the UN system, and others to implement the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women, in particular by promoting an active and visible policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective; welcomes the progress achieved and calls for further efforts to integrate the equal status and all human rights of women into the mainstream of UN system-wide activity; urges the Secretary General to ensure that managers are held accountable for gender mainstreaming in their areas of responsibility; directs UN committees and bodies to mainstream a gender perspective into all their areas of work; urges governments to establish or strengthen national machineries for the advancement of women at the highest political level; invites the Secretary General to pay special attention to the needs and role of women as actors and beneficiaries in the development process in Africa; reaffirms that adequate mobilization of resources, as well as new and additional



resources from all available funding sources, will be required; stresses that implementation of the Platform for Action will require a political commitment to making available human and financial resources for the empowerment of women, the integration of a gender perspective in budgetary decisions, and adequate financing of programs for securing equality between women and men; calls on states to aim at gender balance in the composition of delegations to the United Nations and other international forums; asks the Secretary General to ensure that a gender perspective is integral to all UN operational activities; and reiterates that the special session of the General Assembly in June 2000 should review and appraise progress and identify further actions for achieving gender equality in the next millennium, and that participation in the session should be at a high political level.

The U.S. Government strongly supports implementation of the Platform for Action adopted at the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and worked for adoption of this resolution. This resolution advances the U.S. goal of promoting the policy of mainstreaming a gender perspective throughout the UN system.

#### 8. Human Rights in Myanmar (Burma)

A/Res/53/162

December 9

Deplores the continuing violations of human rights in Myanmar, including extrajudicial and arbitrary executions, rape, torture, inhuman treatment, mass arrests, forced labor, forced relocation, and denial of freedom of expression, assembly, association, and movement; notes with deep concern the increased restrictions on freedom of movement and the large number of arbitrary detentions and harassment of political activists; urges the Government of Myanmar to release detained political leaders and all political prisoners; urges the Government of Myanmar to engage in a substantive political dialogue with General Secretary Aung San Suu Kyi of the National League for Democracy and other political leaders to promote national reconciliation and restoration of democracy; urges the Government of Myanmar to allow all citizens to participate freely in the political process and to accelerate the process of transition to democracy; and calls on the Government of Myanmar to create conditions to ensure an end to movement of refugees to neighboring countries and to create conditions conducive to their voluntary return and full reintegration in safety and dignity.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, as did the Republic of Korea, the first Asian country to do so. The resolution calls international attention to the systematic and persistent record of human rights abuses by the Government of Burma over many years and calls on that government to reverse its abysmal behavior, particularly with regard to the restoration of democracy. The Government of Burma, one of the most repressive authoritarian military regimes in the world, is engaged in an intense campaign of threats, intimidat-

tion, and detentions designed to weaken and isolate its rival political party and to prevent establishment of a freely elected parliament. It has adopted a policy of systematically depriving its citizens of the fundamental right of free association and individual political beliefs. Once Burma embraces a meaningful national dialogue with the democratic opposition, the international community can support Burma's transition to democracy.

## 9. Promoting Development in the Context of Globalization

A/Res/53/169

December 15

Reaffirms that the United Nations has a central role to play in promoting international cooperation for development and in providing guidance on global development issues, including in the context of globalization and interdependence; reemphasizes the importance of recognizing the needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries and the small island developing states, in the context of globalization, and urges the international community to continue to grant more preferential treatment to developing countries; welcomes the efforts of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to help developing countries, in particular through technology-related assistance in the fields of trade, policy, and trade efficiency; emphasizes that efforts should be made to minimize the negative impacts and maximize the benefits of globalization for the developing countries; stresses the importance, at the national level, of maintaining sound macroeconomic policies; strongly underlines the importance of an enabling environment for investment, in particular foreign direct investment, market access, good governance, increase in the volume and effectiveness of official development assistance, tackling unsustainable debt burdens, and support for regional cooperation and integration in African countries; and stresses the need for continued and constructive dialogue among developed and developing countries on strengthening and reforming the international financial architecture.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution after extensive negotiations to shift the emphasis from marginalization of developing countries as a result of globalization to marginalization from globalization, making it clear that the problem was not globalization itself—which has generated unprecedented levels of trade for developing countries—but the inability of some countries to reap the benefits of globalization. The resolution, in line with U.S. views, recognizes the importance of sound macroeconomic policies at the national level and emphasizes the importance of creating an enabling environment for foreign investment and market access.

## 10. International Trade and Development

A/Res/53/170

December 15

Recognizes the importance of the expansion of international trade as an engine of growth and development; renews the commitment to uphold and strengthen an open, rule-based, equitable, nondiscriminatory, transparent, and predictable multilateral trade system which promotes the liberalization and expansion of trade; deplors any attempt to bypass or undermine multilaterally agreed procedures on the conduct of international trade; reiterates the importance of continued trade liberalization through (a) reductions of tariffs, (b) elimination of trade-distorting policies, protectionist practices, and non-tariff barriers, (c) ensuring that duties and standards are subjected to effective multilateral surveillance and not used for protectionist purposes, and (d) improvement of generalized system of preference schemes; and reiterates that it is an ethical imperative for the international community to arrest and reverse the marginalization of the least developed countries and to promote their expeditious integration into the world economy.

The United States cosponsored this resolution, which reflects U.S. policies regarding an open, rule-based trading system and the need for continued liberalization of trade. The resolution also contains very positive language about the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as the need for developing countries to accede to the WTO. The resolution also stresses the need for improved measures to address the effects of the financial crisis on the international trading system and the development prospects of developing countries, while emphasizing that keeping all markets open and maintaining continued growth in world trade are key elements in overcoming the crisis—and rejecting the use of protectionist measures. The resolution also emphasizes that each country is responsible for its own economic policies for sustainable development.

## 11. The Financial Crisis and Its Impact on Growth and Development

A/Res/53/172

December 15

Expresses concern about the negative effects of the financial crisis on international trade, in particular the sharp reduction in commodity prices and its negative effects on the development prospects for developing countries and some economies in transition, and emphasizes that keeping all markets open and maintaining continued growth in world trade are key elements in overcoming the crisis, and in this context rejects the use of any protectionist measures; stresses the importance of having an enabling international environment and a strong cooperative effort by all countries and institutions to support crisis-hit countries; also stresses the importance at the national level of sound macroeconomic policies and policies aimed at strengthening the institutional capacities

and regulatory frameworks, especially in the domestic financial and banking sectors; stresses the need for strengthening and reforming the international financial architecture; stresses the need for the international community to formulate a global approach toward financial crises; recognizes the need to improve the capacities of the international financial institutions in prevention, management, and resolution of international financial crises; stresses the need to endow the International Monetary Fund (IMF) with adequate resources to provide emergency financing to countries affected by financial crises; stresses the need to strengthen the international and national financial systems through more effective surveillance of both public and private sectors; invites the IMF and others to consider measures to ensure greater transparency of financial market participants, including international institutional investors, particularly of highly leveraged operations; encourages the IMF to expedite work on greater involvement of the private sector in preventing and resolving financial crises; calls on the international community to contribute to minimizing the excessive volatility of global financial flows, and to distribute in a more equitable manner the costs of systemic adjustments between the public and private sectors; invites the IMF to facilitate dialogue on establishing regulatory frameworks for short-term capital flows and trade in currencies; and asks the Secretary General and relevant entities to analyze the current trend in global financial flows and modalities to improve early warning, prevention, and response capabilities for dealing with financial crises in a timely manner.

This resolution addresses the concerns of developing countries impacted by the financial crisis in Asia and elsewhere. In line with U.S. views, it emphasizes that keeping all markets open and maintaining continued growth in world trade are key elements in overcoming the financial crisis, and rejects the use of protectionist measures. It also stresses the importance of sound domestic economic and financial policies, and of a healthy domestic banking sector. It does not call for a return to managed trade.

## 12. External Debt Problem of Developing Countries

A/Res/53/175

December 15

Stresses the importance for developing countries of continuing to promote a favorable environment for attracting foreign investment, thereby promoting economic growth, so as to favor their exit from debt and debt-servicing problems, and stresses the need for the international community to promote a conducive external environment through improved market access, stabilization of exchange rates, increased resource flows, access to international financial markets, and improved access to technology for the developing countries; stresses the need for various debt conversion programs, such as debt-equity swaps and debt-for-development swaps; welcomes the progress made in the heavily indebted poor countries debt initiative and stresses that it offers an important opportunity for these countries to reach a sustainable external debt position;

welcomes the implementation since 1994 by the Paris Club of the Naples terms, as well as the decision to go beyond the Naples terms to provide debt reduction for eligible countries; encourages the international creditor community to consider appropriate measures in cases with a very high level of debt overhang in order to contribute to the common objective of debt sustainability; invites creditor countries, private banks, and multilateral financial institutions to continue to address the commercial debt problems of the least developed countries to help them reduce their commercial debt; stresses the need for new financial flows, in addition to debt relief measures, to support implementation of economic reforms and stabilization and structural adjustment programs that will enable developing countries to extricate themselves from the debt overhang and attract new investment; stresses the importance of providing adequate resources for debt relief in light of the adverse effects of the current international financial crisis on development, and welcomes unilateral debt relief measures; and stresses the need to strengthen the institutional capacity of developing countries in debt management and calls on the international community to support their efforts toward that end.

This resolution, which addresses the needs of developing countries with external debt problems, is consistent with the current strategy for debt relief. It endorses the current strategy of the international financial institutions of supporting commercial debt-reduction agreements in the context of structural adjustment efforts by the developing countries. It also stresses the importance for the developing countries of promoting a favorable environment for attracting foreign investment. Language condoning unilateral suspension of debt payments by developing countries was successfully resisted. Also, language calling for wholesale debt forgiveness for some of the poorest countries was excluded.

### 13. Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions

A/Res/53/176

December 15

Welcomes recent multilateral initiatives to combat corruption; commends the work of the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice and the Center for International Crime Prevention in combating corruption and bribery in international commercial transactions; calls on member states to take all possible measures to further the implementation of the UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions; and asks the UN Conference on Trade and Development and other UN bodies to assist states, at their request, in implementing national programs to strengthen accountability and transparency and in implementing relevant conventions and other instruments to combat corruption and bribery in international commercial transactions.

This resolution—introduced and strongly supported by the United States—is part of a high-priority effort to implement the anti-crime, anti-cor-

ruption initiative put forward by President Clinton at the UN General Assembly in 1995. A large number of cosponsors, especially from Latin America and central Europe, worked hard to build support for this measure. It helps to maintain the momentum generated by the UN Declaration against Corruption and Bribery in International Commercial Transactions in further combating corruption and bribery, which are critical impediments to development and should remain under active consideration by the General Assembly.

#### 14. Renewal of Dialogue on Economic Cooperation for Development

A/Res/53/181

December 15

Reaffirms the continuing need to strengthen constructive dialogue and genuine partnership to promote further international economic cooperation for development; stresses that such dialogue should be conducted in response to the imperatives of mutual interests and benefits, genuine interdependence, shared responsibility, and partnership for achieving development and improving the international economic environment so that it is conducive to such development; decides to hold a high-level dialogue biennially in the General Assembly; and asks the Secretary General, in consultation with governments, relevant parts of the UN system, and relevant intergovernmental organizations, to propose themes for the second high-level dialogue for consideration at the 54th session of the UN General Assembly.

The United States joined consensus on this resolution, which avoids the North-South polemics of previous resolutions. The resolution affirms the need to cooperate in development on the basis of mutual interests and benefits, genuine interdependence, and shared responsibilities. The United States also supports the biennialization of this high-level dialogue.

#### 15. Triennial Policy Review of UN Operational Activities for Development

A/Res/53/192

December 15

Stresses the need for all UN development organizations to focus their efforts at the field level on priority areas; regrets that there has not been any increase in core resources for operational activities on a predictable, continuous, and assured basis; expresses serious concern about the persistent insufficiency of resources; urges developed countries to increase substantially their official development assistance; emphasizes that the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) should promote a country-driven, collaborative, and coherent response by the UN system to achieve greater impact at the country level; stresses the importance of full government participation in the formulation of the UNDAF and its full ownership through the agreement of the recipient governments concerned to the finalized framework, bearing in mind that the responsibility for coordination of all assistance and developmental activities rests with the national government; asks the Secretary General to

continue to make the resident coordinator system more participatory in its functioning at the field level; stresses that the needs and priorities of recipient countries require flexibility and decentralization of operational activities to the country level; calls for further simplification and harmonization of procedures for operational activities of the UN development system at the field level; encourages greater cooperation between the World Bank, regional development banks, and all funds and programs with a view to increased complementarity and better division of labor; reaffirms that capacity-building and its sustainability should be an explicit goal of technical assistance at the country level, with the aim of strengthening national capacities in program formulation, development management, coordination, monitoring, and review; recognizes that the phases of relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, and development often overlap and occur simultaneously, and notes the need to develop a comprehensive approach to countries in crisis, and stresses that contributions to humanitarian assistance should not be provided at the expense of development assistance; decides that the UN system should use to the fullest extent possible the available national expertise and indigenous technologies in its operational activities; and calls on funds and programs to consider ways, within existing regulations, to increase procurement of goods and services from developing countries, both as a mechanism to promote South-South cooperation and for enhancing national execution.

This triennial review resolution is a forward-looking document and addressed a number of key U.S. policy concerns. It will help to maintain momentum for development of the UNDAF, the Secretary General's initiative to improve program delivery at the field level through improved coordination of funds and programs. The review can provide a useful vehicle for the friends of reform in the UN system. The review also includes, for the first time, language, albeit qualified, on the work of the UN development agencies in promoting human rights, as well as helpful language on bridging the relief-to-development gap and on promoting civil society. The resolution emphasizes that developing countries are responsible for their development processes, and have the primary responsibility for coordinating all types of external assistance. It also urges that duplication be avoided, and that the programs of different organs and bodies complement each other.

#### 16. Proposed Program Budget Outline for 2000-2001

A/Res/53/206

December 18

Invites the Secretary General to prepare his program budget for the biennium 2000-2001 on the basis of a total preliminary estimate of \$2.545 billion at revised 1998-1999 rates; decides that this proposed program budget shall contain provisions for recosting on the basis of the existing methodology; and decides that the contingency fund shall be set at the level of 0.75 per cent of the preliminary estimate, namely at \$19.1 million.

The United States dissociated itself from this resolution because it could not accept a budget outline level that is over the 1998-1999 budget level. In particular, this outline did not take account of potential savings that may be realized for the upcoming biennium. However, the outline is only the first step in the 2000-2001 budget process; the actual budget will not be approved until December 1999. The United States will be working to have all possible savings included in the budget and to ensure that budget discipline is maintained, and will review the Secretary General's detailed budget estimates when they are released in mid-1999. These estimates should fully reflect the benefits of the reform and efficiency measures while also providing a realistic perspective of UN resource requirements for the biennium.

17. Program Budget for 1998-1999

A/Res/53/215A          December 18

Revises budget appropriations for the biennium 1998-1999 downward from \$2,532,331,200 to \$2,526,703,500.

The 1998-1999 budget of \$2,532,331,200 approved in 1997 was within the amount sought by the United States, and achieved a major U.S. objective. Preventing an overrun of the budget was a major goal achieved in 1998. Favorable exchange rates, lower inflation, and a higher than anticipated vacancy rate for professional staff kept this budget below the cap of \$2.533 billion.



## COMPARISON WITH U.S. VOTES

The tables which follow summarize UN member performance at the 53rd UNGA in comparison with the United States on the 10 important votes. In these tables, "Identical Votes" is the total number of times the United States and the listed state both voted Yes or No on these issues. "Opposite Votes" is the total number of times the United States voted Yes and the listed state No, or the United States voted No and the listed state Yes. "Abstentions" and "Absences" are totals for the country being compared on these 10 votes. "Voting Coincidence (Votes Only)" is calculated by dividing the number of identical votes by the total of identical and opposite votes. The column headed "Voting Coincidence (Including Consensus)" presents the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States after including the 17 important consensus resolutions as additional identical votes. The extent of participation was also factored in. (See the section on format and methodology in the Introduction.)

The first table lists all UN member states in alphabetical order. The second lists them by number of identical votes in descending order; those states with the same number of identical votes are further ranked by the number of opposite votes in ascending order. Countries with the same number of both identical votes and opposite votes are listed alphabetically. Subsequent tables are comparisons of UN members by regional and other groupings to which they belong, again ranked in descending order of identical votes.

## All Countries (Alphabetical)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Afghanistan .....	3	4	1	2	78.5%	42.9%
Albania .....	4	0	3	3	100.0%	100.0%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Andorra .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Angola .....	2	5	2	1	77.8%	28.6%
Antigua and Barbuda ..	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Argentina .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Armenia .....	3	2	3	2	90.6%	60.0%
Australia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Austria .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Azerbaijan .....	4	3	0	3	86.7%	57.1%
Bahamas .....	5	3	0	2	87.6%	62.5%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	2	1	82.9%	42.9%
Barbados .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Belarus .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Belgium .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Belize .....	3	3	1	3	85.5%	50.0%
Benin .....	3	5	1	1	79.8%	37.5%

**All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Bhutan .....	2	3	5	0	83.0%	40.0%
Bolivia .....	5	3	1	1	87.6%	62.5%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	10	*	*
Botswana .....	3	4	3	0	83.2%	42.9%
Brazil .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Bulgaria .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	0	5	79.3%	20.0%
Burundi .....	0	3	0	7	79.5%	0.0%
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Cameroon .....	2	4	4	0	81.4%	33.3%
Canada .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Cape Verde .....	3	4	2	1	82.3%	42.9%
Central African Rep. ...	2	4	3	1	80.5%	33.3%
Chad .....	4	4	2	0	83.0%	50.0%
Chile .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
China .....	1	4	5	0	80.5%	20.0%
Colombia .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
Comoros .....	4	4	0	2	78.9%	50.0%
Congo .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Costa Rica .....	6	3	1	0	86.8%	66.7%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	2	4	4	0	82.5%	33.3%
Croatia .....	5	2	2	1	91.4%	71.4%
Cuba .....	1	5	4	0	76.3%	16.7%
Cyprus .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Czech Republic .....	7	1	1	1	96.0%	87.5%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	1	4	3	2	74.7%	20.0%
DPR of Korea .....	0	5	2	3	71.3%	0.0%
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Dominica .....	0	1	0	9	17.2%	0.0%
Dominican Republic ...	6	3	0	1	85.3%	66.7%
Ecuador .....	6	3	1	0	88.3%	66.7%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
El Salvador .....	5	2	2	1	91.0%	71.4%
Equatorial Guinea .....	3	4	2	1	82.6%	42.9%
Eritrea .....	0	4	5	1	79.1%	0.0%
Estonia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Ethiopia .....	2	4	4	0	82.1%	33.3%
Fiji .....	2	4	2	2	80.3%	33.3%
Finland .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
France .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
Gabon .....	1	4	4	1	78.3%	20.0%
Gambia .....	3	4	0	3	82.3%	42.9%
Georgia .....	4	1	3	2	95.3%	80.0%
Germany .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Ghana .....	1	5	4	0	78.3%	16.7%
Greece .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%

## All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Grenada .....	0	3	1	6	82.0%	0.0%
Guatemala .....	5	3	0	2	87.0%	62.5%
Guinea .....	2	4	4	0	81.8%	33.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	4	0	81.3%	33.3%
Guyana .....	4	4	2	0	83.5%	50.0%
Haiti .....	5	3	0	2	87.1%	62.5%
Honduras .....	5	2	1	2	89.4%	71.4%
Hungary .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Iceland .....	5	1	3	1	95.6%	83.3%
India .....	1	6	3	0	75.0%	14.3%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Iran .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Ireland .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Israel .....	8	0	2	0	100.0%	100.0%
Italy .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Jamaica .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Japan .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Kazakhstan .....	5	2	2	1	91.6%	71.4%
Kenya .....	1	4	4	1	81.1%	20.0%
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
Kyrgyzstan .....	4	1	4	1	95.2%	80.0%
Laos .....	0	4	5	1	77.1%	0.0%
Latvia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Lesotho .....	5	3	0	2	84.5%	62.5%
Liberia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Liechtenstein .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Lithuania .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Luxembourg .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Madagascar .....	2	4	0	4	79.0%	33.3%
Malawi .....	3	5	0	2	79.5%	37.5%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Maldives .....	4	4	1	1	83.2%	50.0%
Mali .....	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Malta .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Marshall Islands .....	5	0	2	3	100.0%	100.0%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Mauritius .....	5	2	2	1	91.2%	71.4%
Mexico .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Micronesia .....	6	0	3	1	100.0%	100.0%
Monaco .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
Mongolia .....	6	4	0	0	84.5%	60.0%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%
Mozambique .....	2	4	4	0	81.6%	33.3%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	3	0	83.0%	42.9%

**All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Namibia .....	1	5	4	0	76.8%	16.7%
Nepal .....	1	2	6	1	89.9%	33.3%
Netherlands .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
New Zealand .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Nicaragua .....	5	2	2	1	91.1%	71.4%
Niger .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Nigeria .....	2	7	0	1	72.9%	22.2%
Norway .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
Pakistan .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Palau .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Panama .....	4	3	2	1	87.4%	57.1%
Papua New Guinea .....	3	3	2	2	85.7%	50.0%
Paraguay .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Peru .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Philippines .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Poland .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Portugal .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Republic of Korea .....	5	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Republic of Moldova ..	5	1	4	0	95.6%	83.3%
Romania .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Russia .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Rwanda .....	0	2	0	8	57.4%	0.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	3	2	2	3	87.3%	60.0%
St. Lucia .....	2	3	4	1	86.0%	40.0%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	1	2	0	7	82.0%	33.3%
Samoa .....	5	3	0	2	87.7%	62.5%
San Marino .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	10	*	*
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Senegal .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Seychelles .....	1	2	0	7	81.3%	33.3%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	1	1	79.1%	37.5%
Singapore .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
Slovak Republic .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Slovenia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Solomon Islands .....	5	3	1	1	86.2%	62.5%
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
South Africa .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Spain .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Sri Lanka .....	2	5	3	0	79.2%	28.6%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Suriname .....	4	4	2	0	83.7%	50.0%
Swaziland .....	5	3	2	0	87.1%	62.5%
Sweden .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
Tajikistan .....	4	4	1	1	80.6%	50.0%

## All Countries (Alphabetical) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Thailand .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
TFYR Macedonia .....	4	1	5	0	95.4%	80.0%
Togo .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	3	3	3	1	86.3%	50.0%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Turkey .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0	7	71.9%	0.0%
Uganda .....	0	4	1	5	69.0%	0.0%
Ukraine .....	4	2	4	0	91.3%	66.7%
United Arab Emirates ..	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
UR Tanzania .....	1	4	5	0	81.1%	20.0%
Uruguay .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Uzbekistan .....	4	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Vanuatu .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Venezuela .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Vietnam .....	0	5	3	2	73.8%	0.0%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Zambia .....	2	4	1	3	81.3%	33.3%
Zimbabwe .....	0	6	3	1	72.7%	0.0%
Average .....	3.7	2.9	2.0	1.4	86.4%	55.8%

## All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Israel .....	8	0	2	0	100.0%	100.0%
Estonia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Latvia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lithuania .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Bulgaria .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Czech Republic .....	7	1	1	1	96.0%	87.5%
France .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
Hungary .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Monaco .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
Poland .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Romania .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Slovak Republic .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Micronesia .....	6	0	3	1	100.0%	100.0%
Andorra .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Australia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Belgium .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Canada .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%

**All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Finland .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Germany .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Greece .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Italy .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Japan .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Luxembourg .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Netherlands .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Norway .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Portugal .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Slovenia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Spain .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Argentina .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Austria .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Ireland .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Liechtenstein .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
New Zealand .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
San Marino .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Sweden .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Brazil .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Chile .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Costa Rica .....	6	3	1	0	86.8%	66.7%
Dominican Republic ...	6	3	0	1	85.3%	66.7%
Ecuador .....	6	3	1	0	88.3%	66.7%
Malta .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Paraguay .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Mongolia .....	6	4	0	0	84.5%	60.0%
Marshall Islands .....	5	0	2	3	100.0%	100.0%
Republic of Korea .....	5	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Iceland .....	5	1	3	1	95.6%	83.3%
Republic of Moldova ..	5	1	4	0	95.6%	83.3%
Croatia .....	5	2	2	1	91.4%	71.4%
El Salvador .....	5	2	2	1	91.0%	71.4%
Honduras .....	5	2	1	2	89.4%	71.4%
Kazakhstan .....	5	2	2	1	91.6%	71.4%
Mauritius .....	5	2	2	1	91.2%	71.4%
Nicaragua .....	5	2	2	1	91.1%	71.4%
Bahamas .....	5	3	0	2	87.6%	62.5%
Barbados .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Bolivia .....	5	3	1	1	87.6%	62.5%
Guatemala .....	5	3	0	2	87.0%	62.5%
Haiti .....	5	3	0	2	87.1%	62.5%
Lesotho .....	5	3	0	2	84.5%	62.5%
Peru .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Samoa .....	5	3	0	2	87.7%	62.5%
Senegal .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Solomon Islands .....	5	3	1	1	86.2%	62.5%
Swaziland .....	5	3	2	0	87.1%	62.5%

## All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Turkey .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Uruguay .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Vanuatu .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
Mexico .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
South Africa .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Albania .....	4	0	3	3	100.0%	100.0%
Uzbekistan .....	4	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Georgia .....	4	1	3	2	95.3%	80.0%
Kyrgyzstan .....	4	1	4	1	95.2%	80.0%
TFYR Macedonia .....	4	1	5	0	95.4%	80.0%
Ukraine .....	4	2	4	0	91.3%	66.7%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Azerbaijan .....	4	3	0	3	86.7%	57.1%
Cyprus .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Panama .....	4	3	2	1	87.4%	57.1%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Chad .....	4	4	2	0	83.0%	50.0%
Comoros .....	4	4	0	2	78.9%	50.0%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Guyana .....	4	4	2	0	83.5%	50.0%
Jamaica .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Maldives .....	4	4	1	1	83.2%	50.0%
Russia .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Suriname .....	4	4	2	0	83.7%	50.0%
Tajikistan .....	4	4	1	1	80.6%	50.0%
Thailand .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Togo .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Venezuela .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Iran .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Armenia .....	3	2	3	2	90.6%	60.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	3	2	2	3	87.3%	60.0%
Belize .....	3	3	1	3	85.5%	50.0%
Papua New Guinea .....	3	3	2	2	85.7%	50.0%
Trinidad and Tobago .....	3	3	3	1	86.3%	50.0%
Afghanistan .....	3	4	1	2	78.5%	42.9%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	2	1	82.9%	42.9%
Botswana .....	3	4	3	0	83.2%	42.9%
Cape Verde .....	3	4	2	1	82.3%	42.9%
Colombia .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
Equatorial Guinea .....	3	4	2	1	82.6%	42.9%
Gambia .....	3	4	0	3	82.3%	42.9%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%

**All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	3	0	83.0%	42.9%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
Singapore .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
United Arab Emirates ..	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
Belarus .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Benin .....	3	5	1	1	79.8%	37.5%
Malawi .....	3	5	0	2	79.5%	37.5%
Niger .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Pakistan .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Philippines .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	1	1	79.1%	37.5%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Bhutan .....	2	3	5	0	83.0%	40.0%
St. Lucia .....	2	3	4	1	86.0%	40.0%
Antigua and Barbuda ..	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Cameroon .....	2	4	4	0	81.4%	33.3%
Central African Rep. ..	2	4	3	1	80.5%	33.3%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	2	4	4	0	82.5%	33.3%
Ethiopia .....	2	4	4	0	82.1%	33.3%
Fiji .....	2	4	2	2	80.3%	33.3%
Guinea .....	2	4	4	0	81.8%	33.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	4	0	81.3%	33.3%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Madagascar .....	2	4	0	4	79.0%	33.3%
Mali .....	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Mozambique .....	2	4	4	0	81.6%	33.3%
Zambia .....	2	4	1	3	81.3%	33.3%
Angola .....	2	5	2	1	77.8%	28.6%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Sri Lanka .....	2	5	3	0	79.2%	28.6%
Nigeria .....	2	7	0	1	72.9%	22.2%
Nepal .....	1	2	6	1	89.9%	33.3%
Seychelles .....	1	2	0	7	81.3%	33.3%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	1	2	0	7	82.0%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	0	5	79.3%	20.0%
China .....	1	4	5	0	80.5%	20.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	1	4	3	2	74.7%	20.0%
Gabon .....	1	4	4	1	78.3%	20.0%
Kenya .....	1	4	4	1	81.1%	20.0%
UR Tanzania .....	1	4	5	0	81.1%	20.0%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Cuba .....	1	5	4	0	76.3%	16.7%
Ghana .....	1	5	4	0	78.3%	16.7%
Namibia .....	1	5	4	0	76.8%	16.7%



All Countries (Ranked by Identical Votes) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
India .....	1	6	3	0	75.0%	14.3%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	10	*	*
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Congo .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Palau .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	10	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Dominica .....	0	1	0	9	17.2%	0.0%
Rwanda .....	0	2	0	8	57.4%	0.0%
Burundi .....	0	3	0	7	79.5%	0.0%
Grenada .....	0	3	1	6	82.0%	0.0%
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0	7	71.9%	0.0%
Eritrea .....	0	4	5	1	79.1%	0.0%
Laos .....	0	4	5	1	77.1%	0.0%
Uganda .....	0	4	1	5	69.0%	0.0%
DPR of Korea .....	0	5	2	3	71.3%	0.0%
Vietnam .....	0	5	3	2	73.8%	0.0%
Zimbabwe .....	0	6	3	1	72.7%	0.0%
Average .....	3.7	2.9	2.0	1.4	86.4%	55.8%

UN REGIONAL GROUPS

The following tables show the voting coincidence percentage with U.S. votes on the 10 important votes. They list countries by UN regional groups.

African Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Mauritius .....	5	2	2	1	91.2%	71.4%
Lesotho .....	5	3	0	2	84.5%	62.5%
Senegal .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Swaziland .....	5	3	2	0	87.1%	62.5%
South Africa .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Chad .....	4	4	2	0	83.0%	50.0%
Comoros .....	4	4	0	2	78.9%	50.0%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%

**African Group (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Togo .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Botswana .....	3	4	3	0	83.2%	42.9%
Cape Verde .....	3	4	2	1	82.3%	42.9%
Equatorial Guinea .....	3	4	2	1	82.6%	42.9%
Gambia .....	3	4	0	3	82.3%	42.9%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%
Benin .....	3	5	1	1	79.8%	37.5%
Malawi .....	3	5	0	2	79.5%	37.5%
Niger .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	1	1	79.1%	37.5%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Cameroon .....	2	4	4	0	81.4%	33.3%
Central African Rep. ...	2	4	3	1	80.5%	33.3%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	2	4	4	0	82.5%	33.3%
Ethiopia .....	2	4	4	0	82.1%	33.3%
Guinea .....	2	4	4	0	81.8%	33.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	4	0	81.3%	33.3%
Madagascar .....	2	4	0	4	79.0%	33.3%
Mali .....	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Mozambique .....	2	4	4	0	81.6%	33.3%
Zambia .....	2	4	1	3	81.3%	33.3%
Angola .....	2	5	2	1	77.8%	28.6%
Nigeria .....	2	7	0	1	72.9%	22.2%
Seychelles .....	1	2	0	7	81.3%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	0	5	79.3%	20.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	1	4	3	2	74.7%	20.0%
Gabon .....	1	4	4	1	78.3%	20.0%
Kenya .....	1	4	4	1	81.1%	20.0%
UR Tanzania .....	1	4	5	0	81.1%	20.0%
Ghana .....	1	5	4	0	78.3%	16.7%
Namibia .....	1	5	4	0	76.8%	16.7%
Congo .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	10	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Rwanda .....	0	2	0	8	57.4%	0.0%
Burundi .....	0	3	0	7	79.5%	0.0%
Eritrea .....	0	4	5	1	79.1%	0.0%
Uganda .....	0	4	1	5	69.0%	0.0%
Zimbabwe .....	0	6	3	1	72.7%	0.0%
Average .....	2.2	3.8	1.9	2.0	81.4%	37.0%

Asian Group

COUNTRY					VOTING COINCIDENCE	
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Micronesia .....	6	0	3	1	100.0%	100.0%
Japan .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Mongolia .....	6	4	0	0	84.5%	60.0%
Marshall Islands .....	5	0	2	3	100.0%	100.0%
Republic of Korea .....	5	0	5	0	100.0%	100.0%
Kazakhstan .....	5	2	2	1	91.6%	71.4%
Samoa .....	5	3	0	2	87.7%	62.5%
Solomon Islands .....	5	3	1	1	86.2%	62.5%
Vanuatu .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
Uzbekistan .....	4	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Kyrgyzstan .....	4	1	4	1	95.2%	80.0%
Cyprus .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Maldives .....	4	4	1	1	83.2%	50.0%
Tajikistan .....	4	4	1	1	80.6%	50.0%
Thailand .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Iran .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Papua New Guinea .....	3	3	2	2	85.7%	50.0%
Afghanistan .....	3	4	1	2	78.5%	42.9%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	2	1	82.9%	42.9%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	3	0	83.0%	42.9%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
Singapore .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
United Arab Emirates .....	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
Pakistan .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Philippines .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Bhutan .....	2	3	5	0	83.0%	40.0%
Fiji .....	2	4	2	2	80.3%	33.3%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Sri Lanka .....	2	5	3	0	79.2%	28.6%
Nepal .....	1	2	6	1	89.9%	33.3%
China .....	1	4	5	0	80.5%	20.0%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
India .....	1	6	3	0	75.0%	14.3%
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Palau .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0	7	71.9%	0.0%
Laos .....	0	4	5	1	77.1%	0.0%

**Asian Group (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
DPR of Korea .....	0	5	2	3	71.3%	0.0%
Vietnam .....	0	5	3	2	73.8%	0.0%
Average .....	3.0	3.4	2.0	1.7	84.0%	46.8%

**Latin American and Caribbean Group (LAC)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Argentina .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Brazil .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Chile .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Costa Rica .....	6	3	1	0	86.8%	66.7%
Dominican Republic ...	6	3	0	1	85.3%	66.7%
Ecuador .....	6	3	1	0	88.3%	66.7%
Paraguay .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
El Salvador .....	5	2	2	1	91.0%	71.4%
Honduras .....	5	2	1	2	89.4%	71.4%
Nicaragua .....	5	2	2	1	91.1%	71.4%
Bahamas .....	5	3	0	2	87.6%	62.5%
Barbados .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Bolivia .....	5	3	1	1	87.6%	62.5%
Guatemala .....	5	3	0	2	87.0%	62.5%
Haiti .....	5	3	0	2	87.1%	62.5%
Peru .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Uruguay .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Mexico .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Panama .....	4	3	2	1	87.4%	57.1%
Guyana .....	4	4	2	0	83.5%	50.0%
Jamaica .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Suriname .....	4	4	2	0	83.7%	50.0%
Venezuela .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	3	2	2	3	87.3%	60.0%
Belize .....	3	3	1	3	85.5%	50.0%
Trinidad and Tobago ..	3	3	3	1	86.3%	50.0%
Colombia .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
St. Lucia .....	2	3	4	1	86.0%	40.0%
Antigua and Barbuda ..	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	1	2	0	7	82.0%	33.3%
Cuba .....	1	5	4	0	76.3%	16.7%
Dominica .....	0	1	0	9	17.2%	0.0%
Grenada .....	0	3	1	6	82.0%	0.0%
Average .....	4.1	3.0	1.5	1.4	86.5%	57.4%

## Western European and Others Group (WEOG)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
France .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
Monaco .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Andorra .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Australia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Belgium .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Canada .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Finland .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Germany .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Greece .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Italy .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Luxembourg .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Netherlands .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Norway .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Portugal .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Spain .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Austria .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Ireland .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Liechtenstein .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
New Zealand .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
San Marino .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Sweden .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Malta .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Iceland .....	5	1	3	1	95.6%	83.3%
Turkey .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Average .....	6.0	1.4	2.5	0.1	94.3%	81.3%

## Eastern European Group (EE)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Estonia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Latvia .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Lithuania .....	7	0	3	0	100.0%	100.0%
Bulgaria .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Czech Republic .....	7	1	1	1	96.0%	87.5%
Hungary .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Poland .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Romania .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Slovak Republic .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Slovenia .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Republic of Moldova ..	5	1	4	0	95.6%	83.3%
Croatia .....	5	2	2	1	91.4%	71.4%

**Eastern European Group (EE) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Albania .....	4	0	3	3	100.0%	100.0%
Georgia .....	4	1	3	2	95.3%	80.0%
TFYR Macedonia .....	4	1	5	0	95.4%	80.0%
Ukraine .....	4	2	4	0	91.3%	66.7%
Azerbaijan .....	4	3	0	3	86.7%	57.1%
Russia .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Armenia .....	3	2	3	2	90.6%	60.0%
Belarus .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Bosnia/Herzegovina ...	0	0	0	10	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Average .....	5.0	1.3	2.3	1.5	94.5%	79.6%

**OTHER GROUPINGS**

The following tables show percentage of voting coincidence with U.S. votes for other major groups, in rank order by identical votes.

**Arab Group**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
United Arab Emirates .	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Average .....	2.7	4.1	1.4	1.9	81.0%	40.0%

**Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Thailand .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	3	0	83.0%	42.9%
Singapore .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
Philippines .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Laos .....	0	4	5	1	77.1%	0.0%
Vietnam .....	0	5	3	2	73.8%	0.0%
Average .....	2.8	4.6	2.3	0.3	80.9%	37.9%

**European Union (EU)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
France .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Belgium .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Finland .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Germany .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Greece .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Italy .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Luxembourg .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Netherlands .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Portugal .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Spain .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Austria .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Ireland .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Sweden .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Average .....	6.1	1.2	2.7	0.0	95.1%	83.6%

**Islamic Conference (OIC)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTENTIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kazakhstan .....	5	2	2	1	91.6%	71.4%
Senegal .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Turkey .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
Albania .....	4	0	3	3	100.0%	100.0%

**Islamic Conference (OIC) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Kyrgyzstan .....	4	1	4	1	95.2%	80.0%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Azerbaijan .....	4	3	0	3	86.7%	57.1%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Chad .....	4	4	2	0	83.0%	50.0%
Comoros .....	4	4	0	2	78.9%	50.0%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Maldives .....	4	4	1	1	83.2%	50.0%
Suriname .....	4	4	2	0	83.7%	50.0%
Tajikistan .....	4	4	1	1	80.6%	50.0%
Togo .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Iran .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Afghanistan .....	3	4	1	2	78.5%	42.9%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	2	1	82.9%	42.9%
Gambia .....	3	4	0	3	82.3%	42.9%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
United Arab Emirates .....	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
Benin .....	3	5	1	1	79.8%	37.5%
Niger .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Pakistan .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	1	1	79.1%	37.5%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Cameroon .....	2	4	4	0	81.4%	33.3%
Guinea .....	2	4	4	0	81.8%	33.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	4	0	81.3%	33.3%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Mali .....	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Mozambique .....	2	4	4	0	81.6%	33.3%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	0	5	79.3%	20.0%
Gabon .....	1	4	4	1	78.3%	20.0%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0	7	71.9%	0.0%
Uganda .....	0	4	1	5	69.0%	0.0%
Average .....	3.0	3.9	1.6	1.5	82.2%	43.0%



## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Chile .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Ecuador .....	6	3	1	0	88.3%	66.7%
Malta .....	6	3	1	0	88.5%	66.7%
Mongolia .....	6	4	0	0	84.5%	60.0%
Honduras .....	5	2	1	2	89.4%	71.4%
Mauritius .....	5	2	2	1	91.2%	71.4%
Nicaragua .....	5	2	2	1	91.1%	71.4%
Bahamas .....	5	3	0	2	87.6%	62.5%
Barbados .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Bolivia .....	5	3	1	1	87.6%	62.5%
Guatemala .....	5	3	0	2	87.0%	62.5%
Lesotho .....	5	3	0	2	84.5%	62.5%
Peru .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Senegal .....	5	3	2	0	88.0%	62.5%
Swaziland .....	5	3	2	0	87.1%	62.5%
Vanuatu .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Kuwait .....	5	4	0	1	84.2%	55.6%
South Africa .....	5	4	1	0	84.6%	55.6%
Uzbekistan .....	4	0	4	2	100.0%	100.0%
Algeria .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Cyprus .....	4	3	3	0	87.5%	57.1%
Panama .....	4	3	2	1	87.4%	57.1%
Bahrain .....	4	4	1	1	83.6%	50.0%
Chad .....	4	4	2	0	83.0%	50.0%
Comoros .....	4	4	0	2	78.9%	50.0%
Egypt .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Guyana .....	4	4	2	0	83.5%	50.0%
Jamaica .....	4	4	2	0	83.9%	50.0%
Maldives .....	4	4	1	1	83.2%	50.0%
Suriname .....	4	4	2	0	83.7%	50.0%
Thailand .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Togo .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Venezuela .....	4	4	2	0	84.0%	50.0%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Djibouti .....	4	5	1	0	80.5%	44.4%
Indonesia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Iran .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Malaysia .....	4	5	1	0	80.8%	44.4%
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	0	1	80.3%	44.4%
Belize .....	3	3	1	3	85.5%	50.0%
Papua New Guinea .....	3	3	2	2	85.7%	50.0%
Trinidad and Tobago .....	3	3	3	1	86.3%	50.0%
Afghanistan .....	3	4	1	2	78.5%	42.9%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	2	1	82.9%	42.9%
Botswana .....	3	4	3	0	83.2%	42.9%
Cape Verde .....	3	4	2	1	82.3%	42.9%
Colombia .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
Equatorial Guinea .....	3	4	2	1	82.6%	42.9%

**Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Gambia .....	3	4	0	3	82.3%	42.9%
Morocco .....	3	4	3	0	82.9%	42.9%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	3	0	83.0%	42.9%
Oman .....	3	4	1	2	82.4%	42.9%
Singapore .....	3	4	3	0	83.3%	42.9%
United Arab Emirates .	3	4	2	1	82.4%	42.9%
Benin .....	3	5	1	1	79.8%	37.5%
Malawi .....	3	5	0	2	79.5%	37.5%
Niger .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Pakistan .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Philippines .....	3	5	2	0	80.0%	37.5%
Qatar .....	3	5	0	2	79.1%	37.5%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	1	1	79.1%	37.5%
Tunisia .....	3	5	2	0	79.8%	37.5%
Libya .....	3	6	1	0	76.0%	33.3%
Sudan .....	3	6	1	0	76.4%	33.3%
Bhutan .....	2	3	5	0	83.0%	40.0%
St. Lucia .....	2	3	4	1	86.0%	40.0%
Cameroon .....	2	4	4	0	81.4%	33.3%
Central African Rep. .	2	4	3	1	80.5%	33.3%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	2	4	4	0	82.5%	33.3%
Ethiopia .....	2	4	4	0	82.1%	33.3%
Guinea .....	2	4	4	0	81.8%	33.3%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	4	0	81.3%	33.3%
Jordan .....	2	4	3	1	81.6%	33.3%
Madagascar .....	2	4	0	4	79.0%	33.3%
Mali .....	2	4	3	1	81.4%	33.3%
Mauritania .....	2	4	2	2	81.6%	33.3%
Mozambique .....	2	4	4	0	81.6%	33.3%
Zambia .....	2	4	1	3	81.3%	33.3%
Angola .....	2	5	2	1	77.8%	28.6%
Lebanon .....	2	5	2	1	76.5%	28.6%
Sri Lanka .....	2	5	3	0	79.2%	28.6%
Nigeria .....	2	7	0	1	72.9%	22.2%
Nepal .....	1	2	6	1	89.9%	33.3%
Seychelles .....	1	2	0	7	81.3%	33.3%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	0	5	79.3%	20.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo ...	1	4	3	2	74.7%	20.0%
Gabon .....	1	4	4	1	78.3%	20.0%
Kenya .....	1	4	4	1	81.1%	20.0%
UR Tanzania .....	1	4	5	0	81.1%	20.0%
Yemen .....	1	4	1	4	80.1%	20.0%
Cuba .....	1	5	4	0	76.3%	16.7%
Ghana .....	1	5	4	0	78.3%	16.7%
Namibia .....	1	5	4	0	76.8%	16.7%
Syria .....	1	5	3	1	75.1%	16.7%
India .....	1	6	3	0	75.0%	14.3%
Cambodia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*

## Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Congo .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Iraq .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Liberia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	0	10	*	*
Somalia .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	0	10	*	*
Rwanda .....	0	2	0	8	57.4%	0.0%
Burundi .....	0	3	0	7	79.5%	0.0%
Grenada .....	0	3	1	6	82.0%	0.0%
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0	7	71.9%	0.0%
Eritrea .....	0	4	5	1	79.1%	0.0%
Laos .....	0	4	5	1	77.1%	0.0%
Uganda .....	0	4	1	5	69.0%	0.0%
DPR of Korea .....	0	5	2	3	71.3%	0.0%
Vietnam .....	0	5	3	2	73.8%	0.0%
Zimbabwe .....	0	6	3	1	72.7%	0.0%
Average .....	2.7	3.7	1.9	1.7	82.4%	42.1%

## Nordic Group

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Finland .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Norway .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Sweden .....	6	2	2	0	92.0%	75.0%
Iceland .....	5	1	3	1	95.6%	83.3%
Average .....	5.8	1.2	2.8	0.2	95.0%	82.9%

## North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSEN- CES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
France .....	7	1	2	0	95.9%	87.5%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	2	0	96.0%	87.5%
Belgium .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Canada .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Denmark .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Germany .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Greece .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Italy .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%

**North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	ABSENCES	VOTING COINCIDENCE	
					INCLUDING CONSENSUS	VOTES ONLY
Luxembourg .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Netherlands .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Norway .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Portugal .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Spain .....	6	1	3	0	95.8%	85.7%
Iceland .....	5	1	3	1	95.6%	83.3%
Turkey .....	5	3	1	1	87.9%	62.5%
Average .....	6.0	1.1	2.7	0.1	95.3%	84.1%

## COMPARISON OF IMPORTANT AND OVERALL VOTES

The following table shows the percentage of voting coincidence with the United States in 1998 for both important votes and all plenary votes, in a side-by-side comparison.

## Comparison of Important and Overall Votes

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT
Afghanistan .....	3	4	42.9%	18	26	40.9%
Albania .....	4	0	100.0%	32	16	66.7%
Algeria .....	4	3	57.1%	17	38	30.9%
Andorra .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Angola .....	2	5	28.6%	18	37	32.7%
Antigua and Barbuda ....	2	4	33.3%	17	37	31.5%
Argentina .....	6	2	75.0%	25	25	50.0%
Armenia .....	3	2	60.0%	21	24	46.7%
Australia .....	6	1	85.7%	35	19	64.8%
Austria .....	6	2	75.0%	36	20	64.3%
Azerbaijan .....	4	3	57.1%	21	28	42.9%
Bahamas .....	5	3	62.5%	21	35	37.5%
Bahrain .....	4	4	50.0%	21	39	35.0%
Bangladesh .....	3	4	42.9%	20	37	35.1%
Barbados .....	5	3	62.5%	22	35	38.6%
Belarus .....	3	5	37.5%	21	29	42.0%
Belgium .....	6	1	85.7%	37	18	67.3%
Belize .....	3	3	50.0%	17	36	32.1%
Benin .....	3	5	37.5%	20	40	33.3%
Bhutan .....	2	3	40.0%	11	25	30.6%
Bolivia .....	5	3	62.5%	23	36	39.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0	0	*	0	0	*
Botswana .....	3	4	42.9%	22	38	36.7%
Brazil .....	6	3	66.7%	25	35	41.7%
Brunei Darussalam .....	4	5	44.4%	21	40	34.4%
Bulgaria .....	7	1	87.5%	37	18	67.3%
Burkina Faso .....	1	4	20.0%	18	36	33.3%
Burundi .....	0	3	0.0%	16	23	41.0%
Cambodia .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Cameroon .....	2	4	33.3%	18	31	36.7%
Canada .....	6	1	85.7%	37	18	67.3%
Cape Verde .....	3	4	42.9%	19	35	35.2%
Central African Rep. ....	2	4	33.3%	16	32	33.3%
Chad .....	4	4	50.0%	18	37	32.7%
Chile .....	6	3	66.7%	24	35	40.7%
China .....	1	4	20.0%	12	32	27.3%
Colombia .....	3	4	42.9%	19	38	33.3%
Comoros .....	4	4	50.0%	16	23	41.0%
Congo .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Costa Rica .....	6	3	66.7%	22	25	46.8%
Cote d'Ivoire .....	2	4	33.3%	20	37	35.1%

**Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT
Croatia .....	5	2	71.4%	34	19	64.2%
Cuba .....	1	5	16.7%	7	37	15.9%
Cyprus .....	4	3	57.1%	26	25	51.0%
Czech Republic .....	7	1	87.5%	37	18	67.3%
DPR of Korea .....	0	5	0.0%	2	38	5.0%
Dem. Rep. of Congo .....	1	4	20.0%	13	22	37.1%
Denmark .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Djibouti .....	4	5	44.4%	20	39	33.9%
Dominica .....	0	1	0.0%	0	1	0.0%
Dominican Republic .....	6	3	66.7%	21	20	51.2%
Ecuador .....	6	3	66.7%	24	34	41.4%
Egypt .....	4	4	50.0%	18	39	31.6%
El Salvador .....	5	2	71.4%	21	34	38.2%
Equatorial Guinea .....	3	4	42.9%	18	36	33.3%
Eritrea .....	0	4	0.0%	16	36	30.8%
Estonia .....	7	0	100.0%	36	16	69.2%
Ethiopia .....	2	4	33.3%	17	36	32.1%
Fiji .....	2	4	33.3%	19	29	39.6%
Finland .....	6	1	85.7%	36	18	66.7%
France .....	7	1	87.5%	39	14	73.6%
Gabon .....	1	4	20.0%	11	32	25.6%
Gambia .....	3	4	42.9%	22	35	38.6%
Georgia .....	4	1	80.0%	23	16	59.0%
Germany .....	6	1	85.7%	37	18	67.3%
Ghana .....	1	5	16.7%	19	39	32.8%
Greece .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Grenada .....	0	3	0.0%	15	30	33.3%
Guatemala .....	5	3	62.5%	24	28	46.2%
Guinea .....	2	4	33.3%	18	38	32.1%
Guinea-Bissau .....	2	4	33.3%	17	36	32.1%
Guyana .....	4	4	50.0%	19	38	33.3%
Haiti .....	5	3	62.5%	22	36	37.9%
Honduras .....	5	2	71.4%	22	18	55.0%
Hungary .....	7	1	87.5%	38	18	67.9%
Iceland .....	5	1	83.3%	34	19	64.2%
India .....	1	6	14.3%	10	42	19.2%
Indonesia .....	4	5	44.4%	19	40	32.2%
Iran .....	4	5	44.4%	16	40	28.6%
Iraq .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Ireland .....	6	2	75.0%	35	21	62.5%
Israel .....	8	0	100.0%	48	3	94.1%
Italy .....	6	1	85.7%	37	19	66.1%
Jamaica .....	4	4	50.0%	21	36	36.8%
Japan .....	6	1	85.7%	29	19	60.4%
Jordan .....	2	4	33.3%	15	38	28.3%
Kazakhstan .....	5	2	71.4%	25	24	51.0%
Kenya .....	1	4	20.0%	19	36	34.5%
Kuwait .....	5	4	55.6%	24	37	39.3%
Kyrgyzstan .....	4	1	80.0%	22	23	48.9%

## Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENT-ICAL VOTES	OPPO-SITE VOTES	PER CENT
Laos .....	0	4	0.0%	9	36	20.0%
Latvia .....	7	0	100.0%	36	17	67.9%
Lebanon .....	2	5	28.6%	10	38	20.8%
Lesotho .....	5	3	62.5%	23	20	53.5%
Liberia .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Libya .....	3	6	33.3%	14	43	24.6%
Liechtenstein .....	6	2	75.0%	34	20	63.0%
Lithuania .....	7	0	100.0%	36	17	67.9%
Luxembourg .....	6	1	85.7%	37	18	67.3%
Madagascar .....	2	4	33.3%	17	32	34.7%
Malawi .....	3	5	37.5%	22	39	36.1%
Malaysia .....	4	5	44.4%	21	39	35.0%
Maldives .....	4	4	50.0%	20	37	35.1%
Mali .....	2	4	33.3%	16	36	30.8%
Malta .....	6	3	66.7%	30	27	52.6%
Marshall Islands .....	5	0	100.0%	31	7	81.6%
Mauritania .....	2	4	33.3%	19	37	33.9%
Mauritius .....	5	2	71.4%	18	35	34.0%
Mexico .....	5	4	55.6%	19	39	32.8%
Micronesia .....	6	0	100.0%	36	0	100.0%
Monaco .....	7	1	87.5%	38	14	73.1%
Mongolia .....	6	4	60.0%	23	34	40.4%
Morocco .....	3	4	42.9%	20	38	34.5%
Mozambique .....	2	4	33.3%	19	36	34.5%
Myanmar (Burma) .....	3	4	42.9%	15	39	27.8%
Namibia .....	1	5	16.7%	15	37	28.8%
Nepal .....	1	2	33.3%	18	37	32.7%
Netherlands .....	6	1	85.7%	37	18	67.3%
New Zealand .....	6	2	75.0%	35	21	62.5%
Nicaragua .....	5	2	71.4%	22	27	44.9%
Niger .....	3	5	37.5%	20	39	33.9%
Nigeria .....	2	7	22.2%	20	41	32.8%
Norway .....	6	1	85.7%	36	18	66.7%
Oman .....	3	4	42.9%	19	39	32.8%
Pakistan .....	3	5	37.5%	13	39	25.0%
Palau .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Panama .....	4	3	57.1%	23	37	38.3%
Papua New Guinea .....	3	3	50.0%	18	33	35.3%
Paraguay .....	6	3	66.7%	25	33	43.1%
Peru .....	5	3	62.5%	23	35	39.7%
Philippines .....	3	5	37.5%	20	40	33.3%
Poland .....	7	1	87.5%	37	19	66.1%
Portugal .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Qatar .....	3	5	37.5%	19	40	32.2%
Republic of Korea .....	5	0	100.0%	27	18	60.0%
Republic of Moldova ....	5	1	83.3%	32	19	62.7%
Romania .....	7	1	87.5%	37	19	66.1%
Russia .....	4	4	50.0%	27	22	55.1%
Rwanda .....	0	2	0.0%	5	6	45.5%

**Comparison of Important and Overall Votes (Cont'd)**

COUNTRY	IMPORTANT VOTES			OVERALL VOTES		
	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	PER CENT
St. Kitts and Nevis .....	3	2	60.0%	14	25	35.9%
St. Lucia .....	2	3	40.0%	17	38	30.9%
St. Vincent/Gren. ....	1	2	33.3%	14	14	50.0%
Samoa .....	5	3	62.5%	23	31	42.6%
San Marino .....	6	2	75.0%	30	21	58.8%
Sao Tome and Principe	0	0	*	0	0	*
Saudi Arabia .....	4	5	44.4%	18	40	31.0%
Senegal .....	5	3	62.5%	23	37	38.3%
Seychelles .....	1	2	33.3%	11	17	39.3%
Sierra Leone .....	3	5	37.5%	20	36	35.7%
Singapore .....	3	4	42.9%	20	34	37.0%
Slovak Republic .....	7	1	87.5%	37	19	66.1%
Slovenia .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Solomon Islands .....	5	3	62.5%	22	24	47.8%
Somalia .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
South Africa .....	5	4	55.6%	23	35	39.7%
Spain .....	6	1	85.7%	36	19	65.5%
Sri Lanka .....	2	5	28.6%	18	39	31.6%
Sudan .....	3	6	33.3%	17	43	28.3%
Suriname .....	4	4	50.0%	22	38	36.7%
Swaziland .....	5	3	62.5%	21	32	39.6%
Sweden .....	6	2	75.0%	36	21	63.2%
Syria .....	1	5	16.7%	8	38	17.4%
Tajikistan .....	4	4	50.0%	20	17	54.1%
Thailand .....	4	4	50.0%	22	37	37.3%
TFYR Macedonia .....	4	1	80.0%	32	19	62.7%
Togo .....	4	4	50.0%	20	38	34.5%
Trinidad and Tobago ....	3	3	50.0%	19	34	35.8%
Tunisia .....	3	5	37.5%	20	39	33.9%
Turkey .....	5	3	62.5%	34	26	56.7%
Turkmenistan .....	0	3	0.0%	15	7	68.2%
Uganda .....	0	4	0.0%	14	17	45.2%
Ukraine .....	4	2	66.7%	26	23	53.1%
United Arab Emirates ...	3	4	42.9%	18	38	32.1%
United Kingdom .....	7	1	87.5%	41	14	74.5%
UR Tanzania .....	1	4	20.0%	16	37	30.2%
Uruguay .....	5	3	62.5%	23	35	39.7%
Uzbekistan .....	4	0	100.0%	20	2	90.9%
Vanuatu .....	5	3	62.5%	23	34	40.4%
Venezuela .....	4	4	50.0%	22	38	36.7%
Vietnam .....	0	5	0.0%	9	39	18.8%
Yemen .....	1	4	20.0%	16	37	30.2%
Yugoslavia (S/M) .....	0	0	*	0	0	*
Zambia .....	2	4	33.3%	21	29	42.0%
Zimbabwe .....	0	6	0.0%	18	39	31.6%
Average .....	3.7	2.9	55.8%	21.8	27.5	44.2%



## IV - SECURITY COUNCIL

In addition to the five Permanent Members—China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—the Security Council in 1998 was composed of Bahrain, Brazil, Costa Rica, Gabon, Gambia, Japan, Kenya, Portugal, Slovenia, and Sweden. The following table summarizes the activity of the Security Council for the year, and compares it with the previous 10 years.

Year	Meetings	Resolutions Considered	Resolutions Adopted	U.S. Vetoes	Presidential Statements
1998	116	73	73	0	38
1997	117	57	54	2	57
1996	114	59	57	1	49
1995	130	67	66	1	63
1994	160	78	77	0	82
1993	171	95	93	0	88
1992	129	74	74	0	94
1991	53	42	42	0	21
1990	69	40	37	2	14
1989	69	25	20	5	17
1988	55	26	20	6	8

The Security Council in 1998 continued to be heavily engaged in the international community's efforts to resolve conflicts. The Council's attention was focused heavily on Africa (38 of the 73 resolutions considered), the former Yugoslavia (12 resolutions), and the Middle East (11 resolutions). The Council also adopted resolutions on Afghanistan, Cyprus, Georgia, Haiti, India/Pakistan, and Tajikistan. The Council also issued a number of presidential statements, largely on the same subjects and in the same proportion as the resolutions. Less formal than Council resolutions, presidential statements are consensus documents issued by the Council President on behalf of the members. All were endorsed by the United States. Because no votes are taken on presidential statements, they are not summarized in this report on voting in the United Nations but will be treated in the report on U.S. Participation in the United Nations for 1998.

Council resolutions on peacekeeping are summarized in the following paragraphs. Each resolution is described in more detail later in this section.

## AFRICA

**Africa Working Group:** The Council in May established a working group of all Council members for six months to review recommendations in the Secretary General's report related to the maintenance of peace and security in Africa and to submit proposals for action for the Council to consider in September 1998. In September the Council encouraged states to consider the adoption of legislation making the violation of arms embargoes a criminal offense, asked the Council's sanctions committees to include sections on implementation of arms embargoes in their annual reports, encouraged such committees to work with regional and subregional organizations to improve monitoring of arms embargoes, and expressed a willingness to consider measures to assist in the implementation of arms embargoes, including inquiries into arms trafficking routes and the deployment of monitors at borders and other points of entry. Also in September, the Council urged the Secretary General to help the Organization of African Unity (OAU) establish an early warning system and strengthen its conflict management center. The Council also invited the Secretary General to help establish logistics assessment teams in the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa, and recommended other conflict resolution measures. In November the Council reaffirmed the principles of international refugee law and called on African states, with help from the international community, to keep refugee camps at some distance from frontiers, to separate refugees from non-refugees, and to ensure the security and civilian and humanitarian character of the camps. Also, it recommended various measures to combat illicit arms flows to and in Africa.

**Angola:** The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) to April 30, 1998, including a military task force of up to 1,045 military personnel, and asked the Secretary General to report by March 13 on implementation of obligations by the parties, with recommendations on reconfiguration of MONUA after April 30. In March the Council urged the parties, especially the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), to implement their obligations under the various agreements reached. It endorsed the Secretary General's recommendation that gradual downsizing of the military component of MONUA be resumed before April 30, with withdrawal of most units by July 1, 1998. It also decided to increase gradually the number of civilian police observers to assist the parties and to facilitate the training of Angolan police. It asked the Secretary General to make recommendations on the UN presence after April 30, including the exit strategy and expected termination date of MONUA, and on UN follow-on activities to consolidate the peace process and assist in the recovery of Angola. At the end of April, the Council extended MONUA to June 30, 1998. It condemned UNITA for attacks on MONUA personnel. It noted steps taken by UNITA regarding some of its obligations and reaffirmed its readiness to review the sanctions against UNITA. It endorsed deployment of additional

civilian police observers. It also expressed the intention to decide by June 30 on the mandate, size, and structure of MONUA or a follow-on UN presence after that date. In June the Council condemned UNITA for failure to meet its obligations. It demanded that UNITA cooperate in the immediate extension of state administration throughout the country, complete its demilitarization, and stop attacking MONUA and other personnel. It encouraged the Angolan Government to make use of UNITA personnel in areas to which state administration is extended, asked the Secretary General to redeploy MONUA personnel to facilitate extension of state administration, and called upon UNITA to cooperate in this regard. The Council also decided to establish a freeze on UNITA's funds and financial resources abroad, to ban most official contact with UNITA in areas to which state administration had not been extended, prohibit import from Angola of diamonds not controlled through the Angolan Government's Certificate of Origin regime, prohibit sale of mining equipment or services, and prohibit sale of transportation equipment or services. The freeze on assets and the other restrictions were to take effect on June 25, 1998, if UNITA did not comply with its obligations by June 23. The Council held forth the prospect of lifting these and earlier sanctions if UNITA complied, and the prospect of additional sanctions if it did not. On June 24, the Council delayed these additional sanctions on UNITA until July 1, 1998, the date on which they finally took effect. On June 29, the Council extended the mandate of MONUA to August 15, 1998. It also decided to resume withdrawal of MONUA's military component as soon as conditions permitted, and to reconsider deployment of the additional civilian police observers authorized in April. It demanded that UNITA stop its attacks on MONUA and other personnel, and called on both parties not to lay new mines. In August the Council extended the mandate of MONUA to September 15, 1998, welcomed the Secretary General's decision to send a special envoy to Angola to assess the situation and advise on a possible course of action, and asked the Secretary General to make recommendations by August 31, 1998, on the future UN role in Angola. In September the Council extended the mandate of MONUA for one month, to October 15, 1998. It stated that failure of the UNITA leadership to comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol was the primary cause of the impasse in the peace process and the current crisis in Angola. The Council demanded complete demilitarization of UNITA's forces, full cooperation by UNITA in extension of state administration, withdrawal by UNITA from territories it occupied through military action, and transformation of UNITA into a genuine political party. In October the Council again called on UNITA to demilitarize its forces, withdraw from territories it had reoccupied, and cooperate with extension of state administration. The Council extended the mandate of MONUA to December 3, 1998, and asked the Secretary General to continue to adjust MONUA's deployment and force structure in accordance with security conditions. It also asked for an investigation by the chairman of the sanctions committee of reported UNITA violations of Security Council sanctions, and it asked the Secretary General for a report on the future UN role in Angola, with

recommendations on improving implementation of sanctions against UNITA. In December the Council, reiterating its call on UNITA to comply with its agreed obligations, extended the mandate of MONUA to February 26, 1999. It also asked the Secretary General to make recommendations by January 15 on the future UN role in Angola and on the future force structure of MONUA. At the end of December, the Council deplored the lack of cooperation with search and rescue efforts following the crash of a UN plane in Angola. It called for assistance of the Angolan parties and for an international investigation, and expressed its intention to assess compliance with its demand for cooperation by January 11, 1999.

**Central African Republic:** The Council in February extended to March 16 its authorization for the use of force by the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel. It also asked the Secretary General to make recommendations regarding establishment, after March 16, of a UN peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic. On March 16 the Council extended MISAB's authorization to March 27 and affirmed that it would decide by then on establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in the country. On March 27 the Council extended the MISAB authorization to April 15. It also established the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) from April 15, for an initial period of three months, with a military component not to exceed 1,350 personnel. It gave MINURCA a mandate to help maintain security and stability, law and order, and protection of key installations in Bangui; supervise and monitor the disarmament exercise; ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; assist in training and capacity-building for the national police; and support national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for legislative elections. In July the Council extended MINURCA to October 25, 1998. In October the Council welcomed the announcement that legislative elections would be held in November and December. It expanded the mandate of MINURCA to include support for the elections, including providing secure transport for the observers. It also extended the mandate of MINURCA to February 28, 1999, with the intention to terminate it on that date.

**Ethiopia/Eritrea:** The Council in June condemned the use of force in the border dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea, urged a peaceful settlement and confidence-building measures, supported mediation efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and asked the Secretary General to provide technical support to the parties to assist in the delimitation and demarcation of their common border.

**Guinea-Bissau:** In late December the Council welcomed the agreements reached by the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta on a cease-fire, establishment of a government of national unity, holding of elections, withdrawal of foreign troops, and deployment of an interposition force

by the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). It approved implementation by the interposition force of its mandate, and affirmed that it may be required to take action to ensure its security and freedom of movement.

**Kenya/Tanzania:** The Council in August condemned the terrorist bomb attacks in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam on August 7, called for assistance to the investigations to apprehend the perpetrators and bring them to justice, and called on all states to adopt measures for prevention of terrorism and punishment of its perpetrators.

**Rwanda:** The Council in early April reactivated the arms flow commission to monitor arms sales in the Great Lakes region of Africa, and it called upon all countries in the region to ensure that their territory not be used as a base for armed groups to launch attacks. At the end of April, the Council decided to establish a third trial chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, and urged the Tribunal to continue to make its work more efficient. At the end of September, the Council nominated 18 judges for the Tribunal. From the 18 nominees, the General Assembly in November elected 9 judges for the three chambers.

**Sierra Leone:** The Council in March, following the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically elected president, terminated the oil embargo established in 1997. In April it welcomed the efforts of the president to restore peace, reestablish effective administration and democracy, and embark on the task of reconstruction. It authorized deployment of up to 10 UN military liaison and security advisory personnel to assist in designing a disarmament plan. In June the Council terminated the remaining provisions of the 1997 travel, oil, and arms embargo, and, because of continued resistance to the authority of the legitimate government, it then imposed an arms embargo on nongovernmental forces in Sierra Leone, but specifically exempted the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) from the embargo. The Council also imposed travel restrictions on leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In July, the Council established the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for a six-month period, to January 13, 1999, with up to 70 military observers, a medical unit, and civilian support staff. It gave UNOMSIL a mandate to monitor the security situation, disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, ECOMOG's role in collecting and destroying arms, and respect for international humanitarian law. The Council also mandated the Special Representative of the Secretary General, with an augmented civilian staff, to advise the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, recruitment, respect for standards of policing in democratic societies, and reform and restructuring of the police force, as well as to report on violations of human rights and assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs.

**Western Sahara:** The Council in January approved deployment of the engineering unit required for demining activities. It also approved additional administrative staff to support deployment of military personnel. It expressed the intention to consider deploying additional military and civilian police for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) when the voter identification process reaches a stage that makes their deployment essential. In April the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO to July 20, 1998, with the view that it would complete its identification tasks by that time. The Council asked the Secretary General to report every 30 days on implementation of the Settlement Plan and on the viability of the MINURSO mandate. In July the Council extended MINURSO for two months, to September 21, 1998, called for prompt conclusion of status-of-forces agreements to facilitate deployment of MINURSO-formed military units, and called for lifting of restrictions on MINURSO aircraft and on passengers whose travel MINURSO determines to be of assistance to fulfillment of its mandate. In September the Council extended the mandate of MINURSO for one month, to October 31, 1998. It welcomed the engagement of the Secretary General's personal envoy with the parties to help implement the Settlement Plan, called for the prompt conclusion of status-of-forces agreements to facilitate deployment of MINURSO-formed military units, and asked the Secretary General to report to the Council on the continuing viability of the MINURSO mandate. In October the Council extended the MINURSO mandate to December 17, 1998. It welcomed the Secretary General's report, and called on the parties to agree to the proposals therein by mid-November. It supported MINURSO's intention to publish the provisional list of voters in the referendum by December 1, increased the staff of the Identification Commission, and asked the Secretary General for a progress report by December 11, 1998. In December the Council again extended the mandate of MINURSO, to January 31, 1999.

## EASTERN EUROPE

**Bosnia and Herzegovina:** The Council in May authorized an increase of 30 monitors in the International Police Task Force (IPTF), to a total authorized strength of 2,057. It also agreed to consider the matter of funding court monitoring programs led by the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). In June the Council extended the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) for one year, and extended the mandate of UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, to June 21, 1999. In July the Council approved establishment by UNMIBH of a program to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of an overall program of legal reform under the Office of the High Representative.

**Croatia:** The Council in January authorized UN military observers (UNMOP) to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka penin-

sula to July 15, 1998, and urged the parties to take concrete steps toward a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka. In July the Council extended UNMOP's monitoring mandate to January 15, 1999, calling on the parties to reduce tensions, improve security, cease violations of the demilitarization regime, ensure the safety of the UN military observers, and implement their normalization agreement.

**Georgia:** The Council in January extended the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to July 31, 1998. It asked the Secretary General to submit a report in April on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, with recommendations on the nature of the future UN presence. In July the Council again extended the UNOMIG mandate, to January 31, 1999. It called on the parties to observe the cease-fire signed on May 25, 1998, to permit the return of refugees and displaced persons, and to reach a peaceful political settlement. It condemned the acts of violence against UNOMIG personnel, the renewed laying of mines, and the attacks on peacekeepers of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

**(The Former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia:** The Council in July authorized an increase in the troop strength of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) up to 1,050, and it extended UNPREDEP's mandate to February 28, 1999, including to deter threats and prevent clashes, to monitor the border areas, and to report any developments that could pose a threat to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

**Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro):** The Council in March established an arms embargo on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). It called upon the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian community to discuss the political status of Kosovo, suggesting that the solution should be based on the territorial integrity of the FRY and an enhanced status for Kosovo that would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration. The Council also called upon the Kosovo Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action. In May the Council established a third trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), to be composed of three judges to be elected as soon as possible. In August the Council forwarded to the General Assembly nine nominations for the three judgeships. In September the Council called for a cease-fire. It demanded that parties enter into a dialogue toward a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo issue, and take steps to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe. It demanded that the FRY cease all action by its security forces affecting the civilian population, and insisted that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action. It welcomed the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM), an international monitoring mechanism. In October the Council endorsed the verification agreements reached on October 15-16 in Belgrade with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and demanded full implementa-

tion by the FRY. It called again on the Kosovo Albanian leadership to end all terrorist attacks, demanded cooperation by the parties with international efforts to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe, and underlined the FRY's responsibility to allow the safe return of refugees and displaced persons. In November the Council condemned the FRY's failure to arrest and turn over to ICTY the three individuals indicted in connection with the massacre in Vukovar in November 1991.

## LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

**Haiti:** The Council in November extended the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) to November 30, 1999. It expressed the intention not to extend MIPONUH beyond that date, and asked the Secretary General to make recommendations on a transition to other forms of international assistance.

## NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

**Afghanistan:** The Council in August called for a cessation of hostilities and a resumption of negotiations, with the aim of creating a broad-based and fully representative government. It called on other states not to participate in military operations in Afghanistan and to end the supply of arms and ammunition to parties to the conflict. It condemned attacks on UN personnel, condemned the capture of the Iranian Consulate General in Mazar-e-Sharif, expressed concern about the fate of missing Iranian diplomats, and demanded that the parties ensure safe passage of the Iranian nationals out of Afghanistan. It asked the Secretary General to investigate alleged mass killings of prisoners of war and civilians as well as ethnically based forced displacement of large groups of people. The Council also urged an end to discrimination against girls and women, demanded that the factions refrain from harboring and training terrorists, and demanded that they halt illegal drug activities. In December the Council expressed strong support for the efforts of the Secretary General's Special Envoy, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. It called on the Taliban to cooperate in an investigation of the deaths of the Iranian diplomats at the Consulate General in Mazar-e-Sharif. It supported the Secretary General's proposal to establish a civil affairs unit in the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan to monitor the human rights situation. The Council demanded that the Taliban stop providing sanctuary for international terrorists. It also expressed readiness to consider imposition of measures if necessary to achieve implementation of the demands in its resolutions.

**Cyprus:** The Council in late June extended the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 31, 1998. It also expressed full support for the Secretary General's good offices mission, and called upon



the parties to resume their direct dialogue, create a climate of reconciliation, and avoid such actions as expansion of military forces and armaments that might increase tension. The Council also reaffirmed its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a single sovereignty that excludes union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. In late December the Council extended the mandate of UNFICYP to June 30, 1999. It welcomed the establishment of a new civil affairs branch in UNFICYP. And it endorsed the initiative of the Secretary General on a program of work by his Deputy Special Representative and the parties to reduce tensions and promote progress toward peace.

**India/Pakistan:** The Council in early June condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May, endorsed the joint communique issued by the Council's five Permanent Members on June 4, demanded that India and Pakistan refrain from further tests, urged their restraint to prevent aggravation of the situation, urged them to resume their dialogue in order to remove tensions and find solutions to outstanding issues such as Kashmir, and called on them to stop their nuclear weapon development programs. The Council encouraged other states to prevent export of nuclear weapon materials and technology to India and Pakistan, expressed grave concern about the negative effect of the nuclear tests on peace and stability in South Asia, reaffirmed its commitment to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, which the nuclear tests had seriously threatened, and urged India and Pakistan to become non-nuclear parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

**Iraq:** The Council in February extended the oil-for-food humanitarian program of Resolution 986 for another six months, with the amount of oil exports set at \$5.256 billion. It asked the Secretary General to (a) submit a report with proposals for funding the electricity sector, the situation of which was extremely grave, (b) submit studies on essential humanitarian needs in Iraq, including necessary improvements in infrastructure, (c) establish a group of experts to help determine whether Iraq was able to export oil in the above amount, and (d) prepare a report on Iraqi production and transportation capacity. The Council expressed a willingness to authorize export of the necessary equipment to enable Iraq to increase its exports of petroleum products. In early March the Council endorsed the Secretary General's memorandum of understanding of February 23 with the Government of Iraq regarding access by the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to sites for inspection of programs of weapons of mass destruction. Later in March, the Council rolled over the estimated \$400 million shortfall in Iraqi oil exports for the first 90 days of the 180-day oil-for-food period to the second 90 days. In June the Council authorized states to export to Iraq the necessary parts and equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum and petroleum products in quantities sufficient to produce the sum of \$5.256 billion authorized in February. It also eliminated the previous

requirement for a rewrite of the distribution plan every six months, thereby saving time, expense, disruption, and excuses for delay. In September the Council, in response to Iraq's decision not to cooperate with UNSCOM, suspended its periodic reviews of the sanctions imposed on Iraq until cooperation is resumed. In early November the Council condemned Iraq's decision to cease cooperation with UNSCOM and to restrict the work of the IAEA. In late November it renewed the oil-for-food program for another 180 days.

**Libya:** The Council in August welcomed the U.S. and UK initiative for the trial of the two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands and invited the Secretary General to nominate international observers to attend the trial. It reaffirmed that the sanctions imposed in 1992 and 1993 would be suspended if the two accused appeared for trial and the Libyan Government satisfied the French judicial authorities regarding the bombing of UTA flight 772. The Council expressed the intention to consider additional sanctions if the two accused did not appear for trial.

**Middle East:** The Council, in January and again in July, extended the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), first to July 31, 1998, and then to January 31, 1999. In May and November, the Council extended the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Syrian Golan Heights, first to November 30, 1998, and then to May 31, 1999.

**Tajikistan:** The Council in May extended the mandate of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) for six months, to November 15, 1998, and, in November, extended it to May 15, 1999. The Council condemned the renewed fighting in violation of the cease-fire. It also called on the parties to implement their peace agreement, create conditions for holding elections, and ensure the safety of international personnel. It condemned the murder of four members of UNMOT, and urged the Government of Tajikistan to bring those responsible to justice.

## RESOLUTIONS

Substantive resolutions formally addressed by the Security Council in 1998 are listed and described below. They are organized by topic. Each listing provides the number of the resolution, date of the vote, results (Yes/No/Abstain), with the U.S. vote indicated, and a summary description. The descriptions, which include key elements of the resolutions, are composed of excerpts from the resolution language; "Security Council" is the subject of the verbs. The U.S. position, drawing on the statement made by the U.S. delegate when the resolution was adopted, is given in the paragraph following the resolution description. Because this statement gives the U.S. view and reasoning at the time the resolution was adopted, many of the verbs are in the present tense.

## AFGHANISTAN

S/Res/1193

August 28

15(US)-0-0

Demands that the factions stop fighting, resume negotiations, and cooperate to create a representative government; reiterates that outside interference in Afghanistan should cease, and calls upon all states to prohibit their military personnel from participating in military operations in Afghanistan and to end the supply of arms and ammunition to all parties to the conflict; calls on neighboring and other states to intensify efforts under the aegis of the United Nations to bring the parties to a negotiated settlement; reaffirms support of the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan and the Secretary General's special envoy in facilitating the political process toward national reconciliation and a lasting political settlement; condemns the attacks on UN personnel in the Taliban-held territories, and calls upon the Taliban to investigate these crimes and keep the United Nations informed; demands that all Afghan factions, and in particular the Taliban, ensure the safety of UN and other international personnel; condemns the capture of the Consulate General of Iran in Mazar-e-Sharif, and demands that the parties, in particular the Taliban, ensure safe passage out of Afghanistan of the personnel of the Consulate General and other Iranian nationals missing in Afghanistan; urges all factions to facilitate the work of the international humanitarian organizations; appeals to all states, UN organizations, and others to resume providing humanitarian assistance to all in need of it in Afghanistan as soon as the situation on the ground permits; expresses readiness to call for assistance in reconstruction of Afghanistan after achievement of a lasting peaceful solution of the Afghan conflict and return of refugees and displaced persons; asks the Secretary General to continue investigations into alleged mass killings of prisoners of war and civilians as well as ethnically based forced displacement of large groups and other forms of mass persecution; urges the Afghan factions to put an end to discrimination against girls and women and to other violations of human rights; and demands that the Afghan factions refrain from harboring and training terrorists and halt illegal drug activities.

The U.S. Government supported the resolution and emphasized that no faction in Afghanistan can impose its will on the entire country through military action. A lasting settlement can be achieved only by establishing a representative and broad-based, multi-ethnic government. The Afghan factions should work with the United Nations, in particular Special Envoy Brahimi, to reach this goal. The factions should also facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and work to protect the human rights of all Afghans. The United States is particularly concerned about the women and girls of Afghanistan, who are subject to systematic discrimination and repression. The U.S. Government urges the Afghan factions to cease all assistance to terrorists, including providing sanctuary, and to expel them from Afghanistan. Afghanistan's neighbors should not interfere in that country. The United States supports the territorial

integrity of Afghanistan and of all its neighbors. The U.S. Government reminds the Afghan factions that holding of diplomats for any reason and at any time is unacceptable.

S/Res/1214

December 8

15(US)-0-0

Demands that the Taliban and other factions stop fighting, conclude a cease-fire, and resume negotiations with the aim of creating a fully representative government; encourages the Secretary General to continue his efforts to investigate reports of violations of international humanitarian law, in particular mass killings of prisoners of war and destruction of religious sites; supports the Secretary General's proposal to establish a civil affairs unit in the UN Special Mission to Afghanistan to promote respect for humanitarian standards and deter violations of human rights; encourages the initiatives of member states to facilitate the peace process in Afghanistan; reiterates the call on states to refrain from participating in military operations in Afghanistan, on the factions to demonstrate commitment to security of international and humanitarian personnel, on the Taliban to stop providing sanctuary and training for international terrorists, and on the Taliban and others to halt production and trafficking of illegal drugs; and, given the failure of the Taliban in particular to comply with the demands of previous resolutions, expresses readiness to consider imposition of measures to achieve implementation.

The U.S. Deputy Representative spoke in support of this resolution, describing it as a clear stand against terrorism and those who provide safe haven to terrorists. The United States joined in the demand that the Taliban inform the United Nations of the results of their investigation into the deaths of UN workers. The United States was pleased that this resolution supported human rights initiatives in Afghanistan, including an investigation into reports of mass killings and the stationing of human rights monitors throughout the country. Respect for human rights and international humanitarian law is at the foundation of a long-term solution to the conflict. The Taliban in particular must respect the rights of women and minorities. The U.S. Government is gratified that the resolution recognizes and encourages the work of the Group of Six plus two (Afghanistan's immediate neighbors plus the United States and Russia) in facilitating the peace process.

## AFRICA WORKING GROUP

S/Res/1170

May 28

15(US)-0-0

Decides to establish an ad hoc working group, comprised of all members of the Council, for a period of six months, to review all recommendations in the Secretary General's report of April 13, 1998, on "The Causes of Conflict

and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa”, to prepare a framework for the implementation of recommendations, and to submit specific proposals for concrete action for consideration by the Council by September 1998; expresses the Council’s intention to convene at the ministerial level on a biennial basis beginning in September 1998 to assess progress in promoting peace and security in Africa; stresses the importance of appropriate consultations and cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the follow-up to the Secretary General’s report; and invites UN member states and regional organizations to provide assistance to the OAU mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution to enhance its capacity in anticipation and prevention of conflicts.

S/Res/1196

September 16

15(US)-0-0

Reiterates the obligation of all member states to carry out decisions of the Council on arms embargoes; encourages member states to consider adoption of legislation or other legal measures to make the violation of arms embargoes established by the Council a criminal offense; asks Security Council committees established by resolutions imposing arms embargoes in Africa to include in their annual reports a section on implementing and strengthening arms embargoes; encourages the chairmen of such committees to establish channels of communication with regional and subregional organizations in order to improve the monitoring of arms embargoes through wider and regular exchange of information with relevant parties; expresses willingness to consider all appropriate measures to assist effective implementation of arms embargoes, including inquiries into arms trafficking routes, follow-up of violations, and deployment of border or point of entry monitors; and stresses that arms embargoes established by the Council should have clearly established objectives and provisions for regular review of the measures with a view to lifting them when the objectives are met.

S/Res/1197

September 18

15(US)-0-0

Urges the Secretary General, through the use of the UN Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa, to assist in the establishment within the OAU of an early warning system, and to assist in strengthening and making operational the OAU conflict management center and its situation room; invites the Secretary General to assist the OAU and subregional organizations in Africa to establish logistics assessment teams; encourages establishment of partnerships between states and regional and subregional organizations involved in peacekeeping operations, in which one or more states or organizations contribute troops and others contribute equipment; encourages states to enhance African preparedness with joint training and simulation exercises and seminars with African peacekeepers; wel-

comes the proposal by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to establish a council of elders to facilitate mediation efforts; endorses establishment of a UN Preventive Action Liaison Office in the OAU; and welcomes the agreement between the United Nations and the OAU to strengthen cooperation on measures to prevent and resolve conflicts in Africa, and in this regard invites the Secretary General, in collaboration with the OAU, to: (a) adopt measures for improved flow of information between the UN and the OAU, (b) develop common indicators for early warning and share early warning information, (c) arrange visits of working-level staff, and (d) arrange joint expert meetings on early warning and prevention.

S/Res/1208

November 19

15(US)-0-0

Calls upon African states to ensure implementation of the provisions of international law relating to the status and treatment of refugees and the provisions of the OAU convention, especially those relating to location of refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of origin and separation of refugees from persons who do not qualify for international protection; recognizes that the international community needs to share the burden borne by African states to help ensure the security and civilian and humanitarian character of refugee camps, including in law enforcement, disarmament of armed elements, and curtailment of the flow of arms; urges establishment of programs to provide advice, training, and technical assistance to African states that host refugee populations; expresses support for inclusion in the UN Stand-by Arrangements of military and police units trained for humanitarian operations, to be drawn on to assist in providing security for refugee camps and in maintaining the civilian and humanitarian character of the camps and refugee settlements; and asks the Secretary General to consider establishing a new category in the UN trust fund for improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa.

S/Res/1209

November 19

15(US)-0-0

Expresses grave concern about the destabilizing effect of illicit arms flows to and in Africa; encourages African states to enact legislation on domestic possession and use of arms, including restricting arms transfers that could provoke or prolong armed conflicts; encourages African states to participate in the UN Register of conventional arms and encourages member states to cooperate with African states to strengthen their capacity to combat illicit arms flows; encourages the Secretary General to explore means of identifying international arms dealers contravening national legislation or UN embargoes on arms transfers to and in Africa; encourages the Secretary General to promote cooperation in combating illicit arms flows to prevent exacerbation of armed conflicts and humanitarian crises; asks the Secretary General to work with African states to

implement programs for voluntary weapons collection, disposal, and destruction in post-conflict situations; and calls for information sharing among organizations in Africa to combat illicit circulation of and trafficking in small arms.

## ANGOLA

S/Res/1149

January 27

15(US)-0-0

Stresses the urgent need for the Government of Angola and in particular the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) to complete the implementation of their obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and Security Council resolutions; decides to extend to April 30, 1998, the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA), including the military task force (up to 1,045 military personnel) as outlined in the Secretary General's report of January 12, 1998; and asks the Secretary General to submit a report by March 13 on the situation in Angola, especially in regard to implementation of the timetable approved by the Joint Commission, with recommendations on possible reconfiguration of the components of MONUA before April 30 and on a UN presence in Angola after April 30.

The U.S. Alternate Representative welcomed the agreement by the parties to a timetable for completion of the remaining tasks of the Lusaka Protocol and urged them to comply strictly with the timetable. The United States stands ready to reconsider the need for sanctions if UNITA moves rapidly to complete the remaining tasks in the peace process. The United States joined in voting for a three-month extension of MONUA in the belief that it would help promote a secure environment for completing the peace process. By requesting a mid-term progress report by the Secretary General, this resolution provides the needed flexibility for a review to consider whether and how the international community could be of further assistance in a post-MONUA context.

S/Res/1157

March 20

15(US)-0-0

Stresses the urgent need for the Government of National Unity and Reconciliation (GURN) and in particular UNITA to complete immediately and without conditions the implementation of all remaining obligations under the Peace Accords, the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant Security Council resolutions, and demands that UNITA stop its pattern of delays and linkages; calls on the GURN and in particular UNITA to complete their obligations in the areas of demobilization of all military elements of UNITA, normalization of state administration throughout the national territory, transformation of Radio Vorgan into a nonpartisan broadcasting facility, and disarmament of the civilian population; endorses the recommendation of the Secretary General to resume the gradual downsizing of the military component of MONUA before April 30,

1998, with the understanding that the withdrawal of all formed military units (except one infantry company, the helicopter unit, and the signals and medical support units) will be completed as soon as conditions on the ground permit, but no later than July 1, 1998; decides to increase gradually and as needed the number of civilian police observers by up to 83 to assist the GURN and UNITA to resolve disputes during the normalization of state administration, identify and investigate allegations of abuse, and facilitate the training of the Angolan National Police; asks the Secretary General to report by April 17, 1998, on the status of implementation of the peace process, with final recommendations on the modalities of the UN presence in Angola after April 30, 1998, including the exit strategy and expected termination date of MONUA and UN follow-on activities, after termination of MONUA, to consolidate the peace process and assist in the social and economic recovery of Angola; condemns attacks by members of UNITA on MONUA personnel and on Angolan national authorities; reiterates the belief that a meeting between the President of the Republic of Angola and the leader of UNITA could accelerate the process of peace and national reconciliation; and urges the UNITA leadership to move to Luanda.

S/Res/1164

April 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MONUA until June 30, 1998; condemns the attacks by members of UNITA on MONUA personnel and others, and demands that UNITA immediately stop such attacks; takes note of steps taken by UNITA regarding some of its obligations under Resolution 1127 and reaffirms readiness to review the sanctions specified in that resolution or to consider imposition of additional measures; endorses the Secretary General's recommendation to deploy 83 additional civilian police observers; expresses the intention to decide by June 30, 1998, on the mandate, size, and organizational structure of MONUA or a follow-on UN presence after that date, based on progress in the peace process and a report by the Secretary General; and asks the Secretary General to report by June 17 on the status of the peace process, with recommendations on the mandate, size, and organizational structure of MONUA or a follow-on UN presence after June 30, 1998, and revised estimates of the cost of that presence.

The U.S. Alternate Representative said that most of the tasks set forth in the Lusaka Protocol had been accomplished, but the final steps toward peace still must be taken. The parties must complete the normalization of state administration throughout the country. They must also disarm the civilian population, cease all hostile propaganda, and turn their efforts toward reconciliation and reconstruction. The United States renews its commitment to reconsider the need for sanctions against UNITA, but is concerned about reports of involvement by armed UNITA units in attacks against UN and international personnel and against Angolan authorities. And the Angolan Govern-



ment must ensure that the national police normalize state administration in a manner that promotes reconciliation, and must bring to justice those government authorities responsible for abuses. President dos Santos and UNITA leader Savimbi should meet as soon as possible. The U.S. Government supports this resolution, which contributes to the transformation of MONUA from a peacekeeping operation to the observer mission it was originally intended to be. However, the withdrawal of MONUA must not be precipitous. The nonmilitary functions of MONUA should be transferred gradually to other UN or international agencies. Angola will continue to need international assistance to strengthen its democratic institutions, reinforce the rule of law, and initiate economic reform leading to a full economic recovery.

S/Res/1173

June 12

15(US)-0-0

Condemns UNITA for its failure to implement fully its obligations contained in the Lusaka Protocol, in Security Council resolutions, and in the plan submitted by the Secretary General's Special Representative; demands that UNITA fully cooperate without conditions in the immediate extension of state administration throughout the national territory and stop any attempts to reverse this process; reiterates its demand that UNITA complete its demilitarization and stop any attempts to restore its military capabilities; demands that UNITA stop attacks on the personnel of MONUA, international personnel, the authorities of the GURN, and the civilian population; urges the GURN to continue to refrain from any action that might undermine the process of normalization of state administration, and encourages the GURN to make use of UNITA personnel in areas to which state administration is extended; stresses the importance of strengthening the rule of law; asks the Secretary General to redeploy MONUA personnel to facilitate the extension of state administration throughout the national territory, and calls upon UNITA to cooperate fully in this regard. ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII of the UN Charter: decides that all states, except Angola, in which there are funds and financial resources of UNITA as an organization or of senior officials of UNITA or adult members of their immediate families, shall require all persons and entities within their own territories holding such funds and financial resources to freeze them and ensure that they are not made available to or for the benefit of UNITA or of senior officials of UNITA or adult members of their immediate families; decides also that all states shall take the necessary measures (a) to prevent all official contacts with the UNITA leadership in areas of Angola to which state administration has not been extended, except for those by representatives of the GURN, the United Nations, and the observer states to the Lusaka Protocol, (b) to prohibit the import from Angola of all diamonds that are not controlled through the Certificate of Origin regime of the GURN, (c) to prohibit the sale or supply, to persons or entities in areas of Angola to which state administration has not been extended, of equipment used in mining or mining services, and (d) to

prohibit the sale or supply, to persons or entities in areas of Angola to which state administration has not been extended, of motorized vehicles or watercraft or spare parts for such vehicles, or ground or waterborne transportation services; decides that the committee created pursuant to Resolution 864 may authorize exemptions to the above measures for verified medical and humanitarian purposes; decides that the above measures shall come into force on June 25, 1998, unless the Security Council decides, on the basis of a report by the Secretary General, that UNITA has fully complied by June 23 with all its obligations under this resolution; expresses readiness to review these measures and those in Resolution 1127 and terminate them if the Secretary General reports that UNITA has fully complied with its obligations; and expresses readiness to consider imposition of additional measures if UNITA does not fully comply with its obligations.

The U.S. Alternate Representative expressed dismay that the Council again had to consider measures to compel UNITA to abide by its commitments. UNITA must abide by its commitments and begin the long-awaited era of national reconciliation. The United States voted in favor of this resolution to push UNITA to change its behavior. The resolution does not impose sanctions immediately, but rather gives UNITA one last chance to fulfill its obligations and avoid additional sanctions. UNITA should make use of this opportunity. If UNITA does not act now, the sanctions will come into effect on June 25. Decisive action now will also enable the Council to remove the sanctions imposed in October 1997. The United States urges the Government of Angola to exercise patience and restraint. Reports that government police and security forces have committed acts of violence against UNITA supporters damage confidence in the peace process. The steps taken recently by the Angolan Government to curb these offenses are welcome. The Angolan Government must win the confidence of UNITA followers through a campaign of reconciliation, including by making full use of trained UNITA personnel to provide services in areas where government administration is extended, especially in areas of health and education. This resolution urges redeployment of MONUA personnel to areas where state administration has yet to be extended. This is a clear invitation to the UNITA leadership to join in the building of a democratic Angola. UNITA must understand that it will face serious consequences if it fails to act. The time has come for an end to the stalling, and an end to the fighting.

S/Res/1176

June 24

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that, notwithstanding paragraph 14 of Resolution 1173 (specifying that additional sanctions against UNITA would begin on June 25), the measures specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of that resolution (freezing of UNITA's financial assets outside Angola, limiting of official contacts with UNITA, and prohibiting diamond

exports by UNITA and outside support of its mining activities) shall come into force without further notice on July 1, 1998, unless the Council decides, on the basis of a report by the Secretary General, that UNITA has fully complied with all its obligations under paragraph 2 of Resolution 1173 (extension of state administration throughout Angola).

S/Res/1180

June 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MONUA until August 15, 1998; decides also to resume the withdrawal of the military component of MONUA as soon as conditions permit; asks the Secretary General to reconsider deployment of the additional civilian police observers authorized in Resolution 1164, taking into account conditions on the ground and progress in the peace process; reiterates its demand that UNITA immediately stop any attacks by its personnel on the personnel of MONUA, international personnel, GURN authorities, and the civilian population; demands that the GURN and in particular UNITA cooperate fully with MONUA and reiterates its call on the GURN to notify MONUA in a timely manner of its troop movements; and calls upon the GURN and in particular UNITA to refrain from the laying of new mines.

S/Res/1190

August 13

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the decision by the Secretary General to dispatch a special envoy to assess the situation in Angola and advise on a possible course of action, and asks the Secretary General to submit a report by August 31, 1998, with recommendations on the future UN role in Angola; decides to extend the mandate of MONUA until September 15, 1998; calls on the GURN and in particular UNITA to refrain from steps which could further exacerbate the present situation; demands that UNITA comply with its obligations under the Lusaka Protocol and Security Council resolutions, in particular the complete demilitarization of its forces and full cooperation in extension of state administration throughout the national territory; demands that UNITA cease its reoccupation of localities where state administration was established and stop attacks by its members on civilians, GURN authorities, including police, and UN and other international personnel; calls on the GURN and UNITA to cease hostile propaganda, refrain from laying new mines, stop forced conscriptions, and renew efforts toward national reconciliation; calls on the GURN to ensure that the Angolan National Police respect the legal activities of UNITA as a political party; demands that the GURN and in particular UNITA cooperate fully with MONUA in providing full access for its verification activities and guarantee the safety and freedom of movement of all UN and international personnel; expresses the belief that a meeting in Angola between the President of the Republic of Angola and the leader of UNITA could provide momentum to the

peace process; and welcomes the appointment of a new Special Representative to Angola.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the peace process in Angola was at a critical stage, and the deteriorating political and security situation in Angola called for creative and constructive measures. The United States welcomed the Secretary General's decision to send a special envoy to Angola, and was encouraged by Special Envoy Brahimi's success in getting the parties to resume their dialogue. The parties should cooperate fully with the Secretary General's new special representative, Mr. Diallo, to build on this momentum. The United States will vote in favor of extending the mandate of MONUA, and looks forward to an in-depth review of the future UN presence in Angola when the Secretary General presents his recommendations to the Council at the end of September. The U.S. Government notes that the responsibility for peace rests with the Angolans, and urges the Government of Angola and UNITA to respect the obligations they undertook in the Lusaka Protocol. UNITA must demilitarize completely and cooperate in the extension of state administration throughout the national territory. The Government of Angola must respect UNITA's legitimate role as a political party. Violence, propaganda, forced conscription, and the laying of new mines must stop. MONUA must be permitted full and immediate access to the sites of recent massacres so it can undertake its mandated verification activities. UN and international personnel must have guaranteed safety and freedom of movement.

S/Res/1195

September 15

15(US)-0-0

Emphasizes that the primary cause of the crisis in Angola and the current impasse in the peace process is the failure by the UNITA leadership to comply with its obligations under the Peace Accords, the Lusaka Protocol, and relevant Security Council resolutions, and demands that UNITA comply immediately, in particular the complete demilitarization of its forces and full cooperation in extension of state administration; demands that UNITA withdraw immediately from territories it has occupied through military action; demands that UNITA transform itself into a genuine political party through the dismantling of its military structure, and urges Angolan authorities to reconsider their decision to suspend the participation of members of UNITA in the GURN; and decides to extend the mandate of MONUA to October 15, 1998, to assess the situation, and to take action on recommendations to be submitted by the Secretary General by October 8, 1998.

In a press release, the U.S. Government expressed profound concern about the impasse in the peace process, while voting to extend the mandate of UNITA in the hope that the peace process could be saved. The United States urges the Government of Angola and UNITA to reject military action, to pursue dialogue, and to cooperate with the Secretary General's new special representative. The U.S. Government recognizes that UNITA's failure to honor its

commitments under the Lusaka Protocol lies at the heart of the crisis, and demands that UNITA fulfill its obligations. The United States is deeply concerned about the decision by Angolan authorities to suspend UNITA members from the Government and the National Assembly. This decision has been counterproductive and should be reversed. The international community has made an enormous investment in helping the people of Angola turn away from war and toward peace. The Government of Angola and UNITA bear the responsibility for getting the peace process back on track.

S/Res/1202

October 15

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MONUA until December 3, 1998; calls on the Government of Angola and UNITA to cooperate with the Special Representative of the Secretary General and facilitate his contacts with all those key to the peace process; encourages the Special Representative to coordinate efforts with regional and subregional organizations; stresses the importance of strengthening the rule of law and respect for human rights; calls on member states to implement the measures (sanctions) imposed on UNITA contained in Resolutions 864, 1127, and 1173, and expresses readiness to consider reinforcing steps; requests an investigation of reports that the leader of UNITA traveled outside Angola in violation of Resolution 1127 and that UNITA forces received military training, assistance, and arms from outside Angola in violation of Resolution 864; asks the Secretary General to submit a report by November 23, 1998, on the future UN role in Angola, with recommendations regarding ways of improving implementation of sanctions against UNITA; and calls upon the Government of Angola, with MONUA's assistance and UNITA's cooperation, to investigate the cause of the Russian civilian plane crash in the Malange region of Angola.

S/Res/1213

December 3

15(US)-0-0

Emphasizes that the primary cause of the crisis in Angola and the current impasse in the peace process is the failure by the leadership of UNITA to comply with its obligations, and demands that UNITA comply immediately, in particular with its obligation of complete demilitarization of its forces and full cooperation in the extension of state administration; demands also that UNITA withdraw from territories it has reoccupied through military or other action; calls on the UNITA leadership to cooperate in the withdrawal of MONUA personnel from Andulo and Bailundo; stresses that there can be no military solution to the conflict in Angola; emphasizes the importance of the Secretary General's Special Representative's maintaining contact with all elements of UNITA in Luanda to revive the stalled peace process and encourage the transformation of UNITA into a genuine political party; urges all member states to support the peace process through full and immediate implementation of the

sanctions against UNITA contained in previous resolutions; decides to extend the mandate of MONUA to February 26, 1999; expresses growing concern for the security and freedom of movement of MONUA personnel, and calls on the Government of Angola and in particular UNITA to ensure their safety; asks the Secretary General to report by January 15, 1999, on the status of the peace process, the future UN role in Angola, and the force structure of MONUA in light of its ability to carry out its mandated tasks; and reiterates its request for recommendations from the Secretary General regarding ways for member states to improve implementation of sanctions against UNITA.

S/Res/1219

December 31

15(US)-0-0

Expresses deep concern regarding the fate of the passengers and crew of United Nations flight 806, and deplores the incomprehensible lack of cooperation in clarifying the circumstances of this tragedy and in permitting the prompt dispatch of a UN search and rescue mission; demands that the leader of UNITA, Mr. Jonas Savimbi, immediately respond to UN appeals and guarantee the security and access necessary for, and assist in, the search and rescue of possible survivors in territory controlled by UNITA, and calls on the Government of Angola to cooperate in fulfillment of its expressed commitment to do so; expresses serious concern about the increase in incidents involving the disappearance of aircraft over territory controlled by UNITA; calls for an international investigation of these incidents and expresses the intention to assess compliance with this resolution by January 11, 1999; and reaffirms the need for compliance with measures (sanctions) against UNITA contained in earlier resolutions.

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

S/Res/1168

May 21

15(US)-0-0

Decides to authorize an increase in the strength of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) by 30 posts, to a total authorized strength of 2,057; supports the improvements in management of the IPTF undertaken by the Secretary General and others, and stresses the importance of continued reforms, in particular with regard to personnel management issues; encourages UN member states to provide, on a voluntarily funded basis, training and equipment for local police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina; and agrees to consider expeditiously court monitoring programs, led by the UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH), as part of a program of legal reform, and asks the Secretary General to submit recommendations on the possibility of utilizing locally hired personnel and voluntary funding.

The United States supported this increase in the number of monitors. Believing, however, that a strong division should be maintained between classic peacekeeping and nation-building activities, the U.S. Government opposes the use of funds from the peacekeeping assessment to pay for court monitoring. Deferral of the court monitoring issue for further consideration permitted the United States to support this resolution.

S/Res/1174

June 15

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: authorizes member states to continue for a further 12 months the multinational stabilization force (SFOR) established in accordance with Resolution 1088 in December 1996; authorizes SFOR to take all necessary measures to effect implementation of and ensure compliance with the peace agreement, and to defend itself from attack; authorizes SFOR to take all necessary measures to ensure compliance with procedures governing control of the airspace over Bosnia and Herzegovina; and decides to extend the mandate of UNMIBH, which includes the IPTF, until June 21, 1999.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said that U.S. support for this resolution reaffirms its commitment to consolidating peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to the international community's efforts to help the people there build a secure and democratic society. SFOR and UNMIBH have been critical during the past two years to implementation of the long-term process agreed to by the parties in Dayton, Ohio. War is now a receding memory, but the peace remains fragile. SFOR and the IPTF provide the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina the security and confidence they need to move forward to consolidate the peace. Much work remains and will take time. Meeting the NATO benchmarks for measuring progress will permit progressive reductions in the size and profile of the force. The primary responsibility for implementation of the peace agreement rests with the parties, themselves. They must redouble their efforts to implement the agreement and abandon patterns of procrastination, obstructionism, and minimal compliance. Full cooperation with the international tribunal, the return of refugees, and strengthening of joint institutions are key. Despite problems, there are hopeful signs. Moderate leadership was elected in the Republika Srpska. The political and economic influence of indicted war criminals in the Republika Srpska has been significantly reduced. The state-run media have been restructured. The local police are now cooperating with IPTF restructuring and reform programs. Police restructuring and training in Bosnia and Herzegovina are facilitating freedom of movement across the inter-entity boundary line. Many refugees and displaced persons have returned home. Municipal elections were successfully held, and democratically elected local officials have been installed. The nationwide elections scheduled for September 1998 provide an opportunity for the people to vote for a democratic future and reject the politics of the past.

S/Res/1184

July 16

15(US)-0-0

Approves establishment by UNMIBH of a program to monitor and assess the court system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as part of an overall program of legal reform as outlined by the Office of the High Representative.

In a press statement, the U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government strongly supports judicial reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and has chosen not to block establishment of this program for court monitoring because of the importance of judicial reform to the successful implementation of the Dayton Accords. The United States has reservations, however, about the role of UNMIBH in this effort. Judicial reform, including court monitoring, is a development activity, not a peacekeeping activity, so it should not be incorporated into peacekeeping operations or funded through peacekeeping assessments. The United States was willing to make an exception in this case, however, because of the unique nature of the U.S. and international commitment to peacekeeping in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including provisions in the Dayton Accords. The United States also recognized that there are resource constraints on developmental and other organizations that might normally take the lead in court monitoring. The U.S. Government welcomed the Secretary General's stated intention to include local experts among the court monitors and his assurances that UNMIBH's role will be limited in duration and structured to permit a handover of responsibilities to other organizations as soon as possible.

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

S/Res/1152

February 5

15(US)-0-0

Approves the continued conduct of the operation by member states participating in the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in a neutral and impartial way; ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII of the UN Charter: authorizes the states participating in MISAB, and those states providing logistical support, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel until March 16; recalls that the expenses and logistical support for MISAB will be borne on a voluntary basis; welcomes the intention of the Secretary General to appoint a special representative to the Central African Republic (CAR); asks the states participating in MISAB to report to the Security Council through the Secretary General before March 16; asks the Secretary General to report by February 23 on the situation in the CAR, with recommendations regarding establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation, including the structure, specific goals, and financial implications of such an operation, and with information on implementation of the Bangui Agreements and on the commitments made by the CAR President; and



expresses the intention to decide by March 16 on establishment of a UN peace-keeping operation in the country.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States commends the contributions by the participants in MISAB to the consolidation of peace. They have reestablished security in Bangui, conducted an effective disarmament program, and helped to create the conditions necessary for implementation of the Bangui Agreements. For this reason, the United States fully supported an extension of the Chapter VII authorization of MISAB until March 16. The U.S. Government noted that it would be prepared to decide on a possible UN peace-keeping operation by March 16, and would take into consideration whether the process of institutional, political, military, and economic reforms could be assisted by the security that a peacekeeping operation could provide. The United States would study the Secretary General's recommendations regarding the size, mandate, cost, and exit strategy of the proposed peacekeeping operation, and would give equal consideration to the commitment of the parties to implementation of the Bangui Agreements. The United States supported the Secretary General's intention to appoint a special representative, who could help develop a coordinated transition program to resolve the crisis in the country and build a more permanent peace.

S/Res/1155

March 16

15(US)-0-0

Calls upon the parties in the CAR to complete the implementation of the provisions of the Bangui Agreements and to implement the conclusions of the National Reconciliation Conference. ACTING UNDER CHAPTER VII of the UN Charter: authorizes the member states participating in MISAB and those states providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel, and decides that this authorization will be extended to March 27, 1998. Affirms that it will take a decision by March 27 on establishment of a UN peacekeeping operation in the CAR on the basis of the report of the Secretary General of February 23.

S/Res/1159

March 27

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: authorizes the MISAB participants and those states providing logistical support to ensure security and freedom of movement of their personnel, such authorization to end on April 15, and recalls that MISAB expenses will be borne on a voluntary basis. Decides to establish a UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) with effect from April 15, 1998, and that its military component will not exceed 1,350 personnel; decides that MINURCA will have a mandate to: (a) assist in maintaining security and stability, including freedom of movement, in Bangui, (b) assist the national security forces in maintaining law and order and in protecting key installations in Bangui, (c) supervise, control stor-

age, and monitor final disposition of weapons retrieved in the disarmament exercise, (d) ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and safety and security of UN property, (e) assist in a short-term police trainers program and in other capacity-building efforts of the national police, and provide advice on restructuring of the national police and special police forces, and (f) provide advice and technical support to the national electoral bodies regarding the electoral code and plans for the conduct of legislative elections scheduled for August/September 1998; decides that MINURCA is established for an initial period of three months, until July 15, 1998; affirms that MINURCA may be required to take action to ensure security and freedom of movement of its personnel in the discharge of its mandate; and welcomes the appointment by the Secretary General, within MINURCA, of his Special Representative in the CAR to assist in promotion of reforms necessary to achieve national reconciliation, to head MINURCA, to have overall authority over all UN activities in the country, to provide good offices and mediation between the government and political parties, to provide advice and facilitate technical assistance in good governance and the rule of law, to cooperate with other international partners in support of activities to establish peace as well as reconstruction and development, and to encourage UN agencies and programs to provide assistance to the CAR.

The U.S. Representative expressed support for this limited but essential peacekeeping mission. The Council's action would help consolidate the work of MISAB, which restored order to Bangui and initiated an efficient disarmament program. MINURCA's role is to provide security long enough for the CAR Government to undertake the reforms it has promised and to provide its own security. MINURCA is a temporary bridge to give the Government time to reestablish a secure state under good governance. If the Government does not make concrete progress toward necessary economic, political, and security reforms during the initial three-month mandate, the U.S. Government will find it difficult to renew MINURCA for another period. Elections are another important part of the democratic reform process in the CAR. Parliament's passage of the electoral code was welcome news. The United States hoped firm dates for legislative elections would be announced soon. The U.S. Government supports the formation of a "friends" group to help coordinate international economic assistance and to advise the country, because no one nation can do alone what the international community can accomplish by working together and pooling resources. The United States also supported this African solution to an African problem. UN involvement in this peacekeeping mission supports and extends a regional initiative to help a neighbor.

S/Res/1182

July 14

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MINURCA to October 25, 1998; calls upon the CAR Government to adopt plans for effective restructuring of the

armed forces and for organizing legislative elections; encourages MINURCA to consult with the UN Development Program about providing advice and assistance to electoral bodies; urges member states to provide assistance for organizing free and fair elections; and urges member states and the international financial institutions to support the efforts of the CAR authorities in the economic and social development of the country.

In a press statement, the U.S. Government noted that its support for extension of MINURCA was based on progress made by the CAR in implementing reforms. The United States was pleased that MINURCA could continue to play an effective role without requiring additional troops, personnel, or resources beyond existing budget levels. The United States congratulated MINURCA for its success in guaranteeing an atmosphere of calm in Bangui that enabled the CAR Government, with the assistance of the international community, to implement reforms. These reforms can build the foundation for stability, enhance the functioning of government institutions, and bring prosperity to the people. CAR authorities must continue to work with the international financial institutions to address remaining problems and promote economic development. The CAR has also made progress in organizing legislative elections, but more remains to be done, especially regarding security reforms. The United States urges the CAR to work with organizations and countries that offer help for its restructuring of the security forces. Appropriate military restructuring and retraining can prevent a return to the conflicts of 1996 and are critical to the country's long-term security. Prompt retraining efforts can also help the security forces guarantee security during the upcoming elections.

S/Res/1201

October 15

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the announcement by the CAR and the Electoral Commission (CEMI) to hold legislative elections on November 22 and December 13, 1998; decides the mandate of MINURCA shall include support for the elections, including secure transport of electoral materials, equipment, and UN electoral observers; approves the Secretary General's recommendation regarding provision of security, recognizing the need for stability and security in Bangui; welcomes establishment of a joint committee of the CAR Government and MINURCA to restructure the Central African Armed Forces (FACA); welcomes the deployment of a maximum of 150 FACA troops (under UN rules of engagement) to selected sites; calls upon the CAR authorities to provide the necessary assistance and security to the legislative elections; urges all parties in the CAR to participate in the legislative elections; urges member states to provide technical, financial, and logistical assistance; decides to extend the mandate of MINURCA to February 28, 1999; asks the Secretary General to submit a progress report by December 20, 1998; and expresses the intention to terminate MINURCA no later than February 28, 1999, with drawdown beginning no later than January 15, 1999.

## CROATIA

S/Res/1147

January 13

15(US)-0-0

Authorizes the UN military observers (UNMOP) to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula, in accordance with Resolutions 779 (1992) and 981 (1995), until July 15, 1998; calls upon the parties to make further progress in adopting practical options to reduce tension and improve safety and security in the area; urges the parties to abide by their mutual commitments and to implement fully their Agreement on Normalization of Relations; urges the parties to take concrete steps toward a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council by July 5, 1998, on progress made toward a settlement.

S/Res/1183

July 15

15(US)-0-0

Authorizes UNMOP to continue monitoring the demilitarization of the Prevlaka peninsula until January 15, 1999; calls upon the parties to take further steps to reduce tension and improve safety and security in the area, to cease all violations of the demilitarization regime in the UN designated zones, to ensure the safety of UN military observers, and to complete the demining of the area; urges the parties to implement fully their Agreement on Normalization of Relations, and in particular their commitment to reach a negotiated resolution of the disputed issue of Prevlaka; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council by October 15, 1998, on the situation in the Prevlaka peninsula and progress made toward a peaceful resolution of differences.

## CYPRUS

S/Res/1178

June 29

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) to December 31, 1998; reminds both sides of their obligation to prevent violence against personnel of UNFICYP and to ensure its freedom of movement; calls upon the military authorities on both sides not to exacerbate tensions; underlines the importance of early agreement on measures to reduce tension along the cease-fire lines; reiterates great concern at the continuing excessive and increasing levels of military forces and armaments and the rate at which they are being expanded, upgraded, and modernized, including by the introduction of sophisticated weaponry, and the lack of progress toward reduction in the number of foreign troops; calls upon all concerned to reduce both defense spending and the number of foreign troops to help restore confidence between the parties and as a first step toward withdrawal of all non-Cypriot forces; stresses the importance of eventual demilitarization of Cyprus; calls on

the leaders of the two communities to resume discussions on security issues; and reiteratés support for the efforts of the United Nations and others to promote the holding of bi-communal events so as to build cooperation and trust between the two communities.

S/Res/1179

June 29

15(US)-0-0

Reaffirms that the status quo is unacceptable and that negotiations on a final political solution in Cyprus have been at an impasse for too long; reaffirms that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities, in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession; stresses full support for the Secretary General's mission of good offices and for the efforts of his special advisor on Cyprus to resume a sustained process of direct negotiations; calls again on the leaders of the two communities, in particular the Turkish Cypriot side, to commit themselves to this process of negotiations and to resume the direct dialogue; and calls on the parties to create a climate for reconciliation and genuine mutual confidence, and to avoid any actions that might increase tension, including through further expansion of military forces and armaments.

S/Res/1217

December 22

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNFICYP to June 30, 1999; reminds both sides of their obligation to prevent violence against UNFICYP personnel and to ensure their freedom of movement; calls on both sides not to exacerbate tensions; reiterates grave concern about the continuing excessive levels of military forces and armaments; calls for a commitment to reduction in defense spending and in the number of foreign troops; stresses full support for the Secretary General's mission of good offices; calls again on the leaders of the two communities to commit themselves to negotiations; welcomes the efforts by UNFICYP to implement its humanitarian mandate; reiterates support for efforts to hold bi-communal events so as to build trust between the two communities; and welcomes the establishment of a new civil affairs branch in UNFICYP.

S/Res/1218

December 22

15(US)-0-0

Endorses the initiative of the Secretary General, announced September 30 in the framework of his mission of good offices, with the goal of reducing tensions and promoting progress toward a just and lasting settlement in Cyprus; expresses appreciation for the spirit of cooperation the two sides have demon-

strated in working with the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General; and asks the Secretary General to work with the two sides on: (a) an undertaking to refrain from the threat or use of force, (b) a staged process to limit and reduce the level of troops and armaments, (c) implementation of the UNFICYP package of measures to reduce tensions, (d) further progress on reduction of tensions, (e) efforts to achieve progress on a comprehensive settlement, and (f) other measures that will build trust and cooperation between the two sides.

## ETHIOPIA/ERITREA

S/Res/1177

June 26

15(US)-0-0

Condemns the use of force and demands that both parties immediately cease hostilities and refrain from further use of force; urges the parties to exhaust all means to achieve a peaceful settlement of the (border) dispute; calls upon the parties to take steps to build confidence between them and to cooperate fully with the Organization of African Unity (OAU); asks the Secretary General to make available his good offices in support of a peaceful resolution of the conflict; and asks the Secretary General to provide technical support to the parties to assist in the eventual delimitation and demarcation of the common border between Ethiopia and Eritrea and, for this purpose, establishes a trust fund and urges all member states to contribute to it.

## GEORGIA

S/Res/1150

January 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG) to July 31, 1998, subject to a review by the Council in the event of any changes that may be made in the mandate or presence of the peacekeeping force of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS peacekeeping force); emphasizes that the primary responsibility for reinvigorating the peace process rests upon the parties themselves; condemns the intensified activities by armed groups, including the continued laying of mines; asks the Secretary General to report in three months on the situation in Abkhazia, Georgia, including on the operations of UNOMIG, and to provide recommendations on the nature of the UN presence; and expresses the intention to conduct a thorough review of the UNOMIG operation at the end of its current mandate.

S/Res/1187

July 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNOMIG to January 31, 1999, subject to a review in the event of any changes in the mandate or presence of the CIS peacekeeping force; calls on the parties to observe the cease-fire signed on May 25, 1998, and to resolve disputed issues by peaceful means only; calls on both sides to permit the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons, and demands in particular that the Abkhaz side allow the return of all persons displaced since the resumption of hostilities in May 1998; condemns the deliberate destruction of houses by Abkhaz forces, with the apparent motive of expelling people from their home areas; reiterates that the primary responsibility for achieving peace rests upon the parties themselves and reminds them that the continued commitment of the international community to assist them depends on their progress in this regard; calls on the parties to display the political will to achieve substantial results, with full respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia; welcomes the meeting of the parties in Geneva July 23-25, 1998, and calls on them to continue their active engagement in this process initiated by the Secretary General aimed at achieving a comprehensive political settlement; reminds the parties of their commitments to ensure the safety of international personnel; condemns the acts of violence against the personnel of UNOMIG, the renewed laying of mines in the Gali region, and the attacks by armed groups against the CIS peacekeeping force; and calls on the Abkhaz side to cease its mass media campaign and acts of harassment against UNOMIG.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the peace process in Georgia was in a critical period. While the cease-fire agreed upon in May continued to hold, the situation remained tense and attacks against peacekeepers continued. UNOMIG continues to contribute to implementation of the cease-fire agreement and to play a constructive role in the overall peace process. That is why the United States favors extension of the UNOMIG mandate. But the parties have not shown the political will to renounce violence and to take steps toward a comprehensive political settlement. The parties must engage in substantive talks on the real issues: the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, and the political status of Abkhazia. The United States condemns the attacks on CIS peacekeepers and is concerned about the safety of UNOMIG personnel. The parties must protect the peacekeepers. Both sides must rein in terrorist activity. And they must cease violence and harassment against refugees and displaced persons. It is essential that further arrangements be made to protect UNOMIG and that the Secretary General's recommendation for a self-protection unit be adopted.

## GUINEA-BISSAU

S/Res/1216

December 21

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the agreements between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta signed in Praia on August 26 and in Abuja on November 1, and the additional protocol signed in Lome on December 15; calls on the parties to implement their agreements, including the cease-fire, establishment of a government of national unity, holding of general and presidential elections by March 1999, opening of the airport and seaport in Bissau, and withdrawal of foreign troops and the simultaneous deployment of the interposition force of the Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); commends the members of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries and ECOWAS on the key role they are playing to restore peace in Guinea-Bissau and on their intention to participate with others in observing the forthcoming elections; welcomes the role of ECOMOG in implementing the Abuja Agreement aimed at guaranteeing security along the border with Senegal, keeping apart the parties in conflict, and guaranteeing free access to humanitarian organizations to reach the affected civilian population; approves implementation by the ECOMOG interposition force of its mandate; and affirms that ECOMOG may be required to take action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel.

## HAITI

S/Res/1212

November 25

13(US)-0-2

Reaffirms the importance of a professional national police for the consolidation of democracy and the revitalization of Haiti's system of justice; decides to extend the present mission of the UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH) to November 30, 1999, to support and contribute to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP); affirms that future international assistance to the HNP should be considered through UN specialized agencies and programs and other international and regional organizations and member states; urges the Haitian authorities and political leaders to negotiate an end to the crisis in the country in a spirit of tolerance and compromise; calls on the Haitian authorities to reform and strengthen Haiti's system of justice, in particular its penal institutions; emphasizes that economic rehabilitation and reconstruction constitute the major tasks facing the Haitian Government and people, and stresses the commitment of the international community to a long-term program of support; asks all states to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund for the HNP; and expresses the intention not to extend MIPONUH beyond November 30, 1999, and asks the Secretary General to make recommendations on a viable transition to other forms of international assistance. (China and Russia abstained.)



The United States expressed full support for the extension of MIPONUH for one year. In the U.S. view, MIPONUH's police mentoring program has made great progress in helping to professionalize the HNP. Curtailing or ending MIPONUH would have put at risk all the efforts of the international community thus far.

## INDIA/PAKISTAN

S/Res/1172

June 6

15(US)-0-0

Condemns the nuclear tests conducted by India on May 11 and 13 and by Pakistan on May 28 and 30, 1998; demands that India and Pakistan refrain from further nuclear tests; urges India and Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint and to avoid threatening military movements, cross-border violations, or other provocations in order to prevent aggravation of the situation; urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them on outstanding issues, particularly on all matters pertaining to peace and security, in order to remove tensions between them, and encourages them to find mutually acceptable solutions that address root causes of those tensions, including Kashmir; calls on India and Pakistan immediately to stop their nuclear weapon development programs, to refrain from weaponization or from the deployment of nuclear weapons, to cease development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and any further production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and to confirm their policies not to export equipment, materials, or technology that could contribute to weapons of mass destruction or missiles capable of delivering them; encourages all states to prevent the export of equipment, materials, or technology that could in any way assist programs in India and Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such weapons; expresses grave concern about the negative effect of the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan on peace and stability in South Asia and beyond; reaffirms full commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) as the cornerstones of the international regime on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and as essential foundations for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; recalls that in accordance with the NPT India and Pakistan cannot have the status of nuclear-weapon states; recognizes that the tests conducted by India and Pakistan constitute a serious threat to global efforts toward nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament; urges India and Pakistan, and all other states that have not yet done so, to become parties to the NPT and the CTBT without delay and without conditions; and urges India and Pakistan to participate in negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

The U.S. Representative said the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan represent a profound blow to the stability of the region and to the

international non-proliferation regime on which all depend. This resolution does more than condemn those tests. It also makes clear the path India and Pakistan should follow to restore their standing before all nations. It calls on India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponization or deployment of nuclear weapons, to avoid a ballistic missile arms race, and to avoid further proliferation by exporting this technology. It also urges India and Pakistan to resume the dialogue between them, which is the path to peace. The United States, China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom are engaged in a continuing process that will include numerous participants in various forums and will address the entire range of South Asia security issues, nuclear and non-nuclear. They hope to reach out to India and Pakistan. The intent is not to make them pariah states, but to engage and to convince them it is in their own national security interest to do what the international community is urging them to do. India and Pakistan should do all the things the Security Council has called for because these measures are in their own best interests. The path they have started down does not add to their security but diminishes it. They must also understand that their tests do not make them nuclear-weapon states. To permit their accession to the NPT as nuclear-weapon states would completely undermine the very purpose of the NPT and the international non-proliferation regime. India and Pakistan should work to avoid igniting a conflict in Kashmir. There are a number of steps they can take to reduce chances that a miscalculation or misunderstanding might lead to a situation neither side can truly want. The leaders of India and Pakistan are urged to resist the temptation to act rashly today so that their children will have the opportunity to live in a stable and peaceful South Asia tomorrow.

## IRAQ

S/Res/1153

February 20

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the provisions of Resolution 986 (1995), except those contained in paragraphs 4, 11, and 12, shall remain in force for a new period of 180 days from the day after the Council receives a report from the Secretary General that he has entered into the necessary arrangements and has approved a distribution plan to be submitted by Iraq that includes a description of the goods to be purchased and effectively guarantees their equitable distribution; decides that the authorization given to states by paragraph 1 of Resolution 986 shall permit the import of petroleum and petroleum products originating in Iraq sufficient to produce a sum, in the 180-day period referred to above, not exceeding \$5.256 billion, of which between \$682 million and \$768 million shall be used for the purpose referred to in paragraph 8 (b) of Resolution 986 (humanitarian relief in northern Iraq); directs the Committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) to authorize reasonable expenses related to the hajj pilgrimage, to be met by funds in the

escrow account; asks the Secretary General to ensure the effective implementation of this resolution, and in particular to enhance the UN observation process in Iraq to provide assurance of the equitable distribution of goods produced in accordance with this resolution; decides to conduct an interim review of the implementation of this resolution 90 days after the 180-day period mentioned above begins, and expresses the intention to consider favorably the renewal of the provisions of this resolution, provided that these provisions are being satisfactorily implemented; asks the Secretary General to report after 90 days and again before the end of the 180-day period on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of medicine, health supplies, foodstuffs, and materials and supplies for essential civilian needs; takes note of the Secretary General's observation that the situation in the electricity sector is extremely grave, and asks him to submit a report with proposals for appropriate funding, and asks him to submit studies on essential humanitarian needs in Iraq, including necessary improvements in infrastructure; asks the Secretary General to establish a group of experts to determine in consultation with the Government of Iraq whether Iraq is able to export petroleum or petroleum products sufficient to produce the sum authorized above and to prepare a report on Iraqi production and transportation capacity, and expresses readiness to take a decision on the basis of recommendations in this report regarding authorization of the export of the necessary equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum or petroleum products; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council if Iraq is unable to export petroleum or petroleum products sufficient to produce the total sum mentioned above.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States is proud to cast its vote in favor of this resolution to expand the humanitarian program in Iraq, the largest UN-sanctioned humanitarian program in the history of the organization. The United States is deeply concerned about the welfare of the Iraqi people and wants to make sure their basic needs are met. For this reason, the United States strongly supported expansion of the oil-for-food program. This position, and that of all Council members, stands in stark contrast to the policies of Iraq's leadership, which has diverted scarce resources to build more palaces and weapons of mass destruction. While Iraq has complained about delays in the Sanctions Committee, it has submitted contracts that fail to meet the criteria and procedures it agreed to, and it has stooped to political favoritism in the contracting process. And after the Council extended the program twice in 1997, the Iraqi Government twice delayed new oil sales, needlessly slowing the delivery of humanitarian goods. Indeed, Iraq refused even to provide input to the Secretary General's report, a report providing recommendations on ways to improve the delivery and increase the supply of humanitarian goods to Iraq. Food and medicine, and infrastructure improvements directly related to their distribution, remain the top priorities. The goods imported must be carefully observed and monitored, so they cannot be diverted to military purposes or used for the personal benefit of the Iraqi leadership. The purpose of this pro-

gram is to provide essential humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people, not to refurbish Iraq's economy. That will be possible only when the sanctions are lifted. And that will happen when Iraq complies fully and unconditionally with the Council's resolutions.

S/Res/1154

March 2

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: commends the initiative by the Secretary General to secure commitments from the Government of Iraq on compliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions, and in this regard endorses the memorandum of understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary General on February 23; asks the Secretary General to report to the Council with regard to finalization of procedures for presidential sites; stresses that compliance by the Government of Iraq with its obligations, repeated again in the memorandum of understanding, to accord immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is necessary for implementation of Resolution 687 (1991) (lifting of sanctions after weapons of mass destruction have been destroyed), but that any violation would have severest consequences for Iraq; and notes that by its failure so far to comply with its obligations Iraq has delayed the moment when the Council can lift these sanctions.

The U.S. Representative said the United States welcomes the Secretary General's efforts to obtain Iraqi agreement to comply with its obligations, and is impressed that he was able to bring back the memorandum of understanding (MOU) the Council has endorsed. The MOU forcefully reiterates that Iraq must cooperate fully and unconditionally with UNSCOM and the IAEA. The Secretary General, through his diplomacy, backed by U.S. willingness to use force, has achieved what could be, if implemented by Iraq, a breakthrough. The proof of Iraq's commitments to provide UNSCOM with full, immediate, and unrestricted access to all sites is in the testing. The United States hopes the signing of this MOU will mark an end to Iraq's policy of noncooperation and confrontation and will lead to its full compliance. Any attempt by Iraq to provide less than immediate, unrestricted, and unconditional access to any site will, as this resolution states, result in the severest consequences for Iraq. Unless Iraq demonstrates that it is ready to rejoin the international community and abide by the rules of civilized behavior, it can expect nothing but certain punishment and continued isolation.

S/Res/1158

March 25

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the provisions of Resolution 1143 (1997) (the oil-for-food arrangement) shall remain in force, except that states are authorized to permit the import of petroleum and petro-

leum products originating in Iraq sufficient to produce a sum not exceeding \$1.4 billion within the period of 90 days from March 5, 1998.

The effect of this resolution, supported by the United States for humanitarian reasons, is to roll over the estimated \$400 million shortfall in Iraqi oil exports for the first 90 days (through March 5, 1998) of the period specified in Resolution 1143 to the second 90 days of that period. This will allow Iraq the opportunity to export its full quota of oil under the provisions of the resolution, thus enabling the Iraqi people to receive the full humanitarian benefit the Security Council intended to provide.

S/Res/1175

June 19

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: authorizes states to permit the export to Iraq of the necessary parts and equipment to enable Iraq to increase the export of petroleum and petroleum products in quantities sufficient to produce the sum (\$5.256 billion) established in Resolution 1153 (1998); and notes that the distribution plan approved by the Secretary General on May 29, 1998, or any new distribution plan agreed upon by the Government of Iraq and the Secretary General, will remain in effect for each subsequent periodic renewal of the temporary humanitarian arrangements for Iraq.

The U.S. Representative said the United States was pleased to support this resolution authorizing the export to Iraq of spare parts and equipment to assist in refurbishing Iraq's oil-export infrastructure, and described it as a very important step forward in the Council's efforts to ensure that the genuine humanitarian needs of all Iraq's people are met. The resolution streamlines the process by eliminating the expensive and time-consuming requirement to rewrite the distribution plan every six months, thereby preventing future disruptions in the humanitarian program. It ensures that there will be no gaps between plans, as occurred in the past, so there can be no more excuse for delays in future oil sales for humanitarian purposes or in the delivery of food and medicine to the people of Iraq. It also makes clear that the Council intends to renew the humanitarian program as long as it is needed.

S/Res/1194

September 9

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: condemns the decision by Iraq to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA, which constitutes a totally unacceptable contravention of its obligations under Security Council resolutions and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and the Secretary General on February 23, 1998; demands that Iraq rescind this decision; decides not to conduct the (sanctions) review scheduled for October 1998, and not to conduct any further such reviews until Iraq rescinds its decision and until UNSCOM and the IAEA

report to the Council that they are satisfied that they have been able to exercise the full range of activities provided for in their mandates, including inspections; and notes that by its failure so far to comply with its obligations Iraq has delayed the moment when the Council can act in accordance with Resolution 687 (1991) (lift sanctions).

The U.S. Government believes this resolution is a measured and appropriate step in response to Iraq's suspension on August 5 of cooperation with UNSCOM and the IAEA and its continuing noncompliance with its obligations under Security Council resolutions. This resolution is important because it means there is no possibility whatsoever that the Council will alter or lift sanctions until Iraq reverses course. Unanimous adoption of this resolution shows that Iraq has failed to divide and intimidate the Council. The onus is on Iraq to reverse course and fulfill its obligations. Without that there will be no comprehensive review, no resumption of bimonthly reviews, and no possibility of easing or lifting the sanctions.

S/Res/1205

November 5

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: condemns the decision by Iraq to cease cooperation with UNSCOM; and demands that Iraq immediately rescind this decision and earlier decisions to suspend cooperation with UNSCOM and to maintain restrictions on the work of the IAEA.

The U.S. Acting Representative described this resolution as a clear and unmistakable message to Iraq that noncompliance will not be tolerated or rewarded. Compliance with the Council's resolutions is the only course that will lead Iraq back toward acceptance in the community of nations. The restrictions Iraq has imposed on UNSCOM and the IAEA are intolerable. Iraq should recognize the gravity of the situation it has created, and it must turn back from the dangerous and self-defeating course it has chosen.

S/Res/1210

November 24

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides that the provisions of Resolution 986 (1995) and 1153 (1998) (the oil-for-food program) shall remain in force for a new period of 180 days from November 26, 1998; directs the committee established by Resolution 661 (1990) to authorize reasonable expenses related to the hajj pilgrimage, to be met by funds from the escrow account; asks the Secretary General to review, by December 31, 1998, the various options to resolve difficulties encountered in the financial process, and to continue to enhance the UN observation process to assure the Council that the goods produced under this resolution are distributed equitably and that all supplies authorized for procurement are utilized for authorized purposes; decides to conduct a thorough review of all aspects of implementation of this resolu-

tion after 90 days and again before the end of the 180-day period; requests that the Secretary General report in 90 days and again before the end of the 180-day period on whether Iraq has ensured the equitable distribution of materials and supplies for essential civilian needs, including on the adequacy of revenues to meet Iraq's humanitarian needs, and on Iraq's capacity to export sufficient quantities of petroleum and petroleum products to produce the sum mentioned in Resolution 1153 (\$5.256 billion); and asks the Secretary General to submit a detailed list of parts and equipment necessary to produce the authorized amount of petroleum exports.

This resolution continues the humanitarian program for the same period and at the same level as in the previous phase. It removes any excuse for halting oil exports or taking other action to put the oil-for-food program at risk. It takes the focus of the debate off the humanitarian program and keeps it on the question of Iraqi noncooperation and noncompliance, where it should be.

## KENYA/TANZANIA

S/Res/1189

August 13

15(US)-0-0

Strongly condemns the terrorist bomb attacks in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, which claimed hundreds of innocent lives, injured thousands of people, and caused massive destruction to property; calls on all states and international institutions to cooperate with and provide support and assistance to the ongoing investigations to apprehend the perpetrators of these criminal acts and bring them swiftly to justice; and calls on all states to adopt, in accordance with international law, effective and practical measures for security cooperation, for the prevention of terrorism, and for the prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States is honored, on this sorrowful occasion, to join with the governments of Kenya and Tanzania in introducing this resolution on the tragic and indiscriminate terrorist bombings of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam. President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright have conveyed the condolences of the people of the United States to the families and loved ones of the hundreds who lost their lives and the thousands who were injured. To the governments of Kenya and Tanzania, the United States has offered support in dealing with this tragedy, meeting their needs, and working with them to find the perpetrators. These bombing incidents show that terrorists know no boundaries and that the suppression of international terrorism, the arrest, conviction, and punishment of its perpetrators, are essential to the maintenance of international peace and security. The United States will not be intimidated by terrorism and will never forget its victims, and it will spare no effort and use all the means at its disposal to track down and punish the perpetrators of these outrageous acts.

## LIBYA

S/Res/1192

August 27

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that the Libyan Government comply with Security Council Resolutions 731 (1992), 748 (1992), and 883 (1993) (in which the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 and UTA flight 772 was condemned, sanctions were imposed on Libya, and Libya was required to ensure the appearance for trial of those charged with the bombing); welcomes the initiative by the United States and the United Kingdom for the trial of the two persons charged with the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 before a Scottish court sitting in the Netherlands, and welcomes the willingness of the Government of the Netherlands to cooperate; decides that Libya shall ensure the appearance in the Netherlands of the two accused for trial, and shall ensure that any evidence or witnesses in Libya are made available to the court; invites the Secretary General to nominate international observers to attend the trial; decides that the Government of the Netherlands shall detain the two accused pending their transfer for trial before the court; reaffirms that the measures (sanctions) in Resolutions 748 and 883 shall be suspended immediately if the Secretary General reports to the Council that the two accused have arrived in the Netherlands for trial or have appeared for trial in the United Kingdom or the United States, and that the Libyan Government has satisfied the French judicial authorities with regard to the bombing of UTA 772; and expresses the intention to consider additional measures if the two accused have not arrived or appeared for trial promptly.

The U.S. Representative said adoption of this resolution is an important step toward obtaining a measure of justice for the victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing and their families. The arrangements endorsed in this resolution will ensure a fair trial for the two Libyan suspects. What is needed now is Libyan acceptance and prompt action, which means ensuring that the two suspects appear to stand trial without delay. The Libyan Government has made the explicit commitment to cooperate in bringing the defendants to trial under Scottish law, with Scottish judges, in a neutral third country. Now Libya is required to live up to that pledge. Failure by Libya to act promptly would be a monumental breach of faith which would compel the Security Council to act appropriately in response. The United States also continues to support France's demand for Libya's full cooperation on the UTA 772 question.

## (THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF) MACEDONIA

S/Res/1186

July 21

15(US)-0-0

Decides to authorize an increase in the troop strength of the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) up to 1,050 and to extend the current



mandate of UNPREDEP for six months, to February 28, 1999, including to continue by its presence to deter threats and prevent clashes, to monitor the border areas, and to report to the Secretary General any developments that could pose a threat to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, including the tasks of monitoring and reporting on illicit arms flows.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States strongly supports this resolution. UNPREDEP has been and continues to be an extraordinarily successful mission. This UN presence has helped to guard against the spillover of the tension and conflict in other parts of the Balkan region. UNPREDEP's mission is not over, however. The crisis in Kosovo reinforces the need for the increase in and extension of the mandate of UNPREDEP. The undemarcated border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia also presents a serious, ongoing problem. And UNPREDEP still plays an important role in helping to bolster confidence along the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia's border with Albania.

## MIDDLE EAST

S/Res/1151                      January 30                      15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) for six months, to July 31, 1998; and encourages further efficiency and savings provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force.

S/Res/1169                      May 27                              15(US)-0-0

Decides to renew the mandate of the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for another period of six months, to November 30, 1998.

S/Res/1188                      July 30                              15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of UNIFIL for six months, to January 31, 1999; condemns all acts of violence against the Force; and encourages further efficiency and savings, provided they do not affect the operational capacity of the Force.

The U.S. Deputy Representative, in a press statement, said the United States welcomes the Israeli cabinet's decision to accept Resolution 425 (which was adopted in 1978, established UNIFIL, and called upon Israel to cease its military action in Lebanon, withdraw its forces, and respect Lebanon's territorial integrity), calling the decision a positive development for the region. The U.S. Government believes Lebanon-Israel negotiations would advance the security of both countries. At the same time, progress between Israel and Syria would facilitate progress on the Lebanon-Israel track and movement toward a

comprehensive peace in the region. Israeli acceptance of Resolution 425 is a serious initiative that merits careful consideration by both Lebanon and Syria.

S/Res/1211

November 25

15(US)-0-0

Decides to renew the mandate of UNDOF for another period of six months, to May 31, 1999.

## RWANDA

S/Res/1161

April 9

15(US)-0-0

Asks the Secretary General to reactivate the International Commission of Inquiry, with a mandate to (a) investigate reports of arms sales to former Rwandan government forces and militias in the Great Lakes region of central Africa, (b) identify parties aiding and abetting illegal sale to or acquisition of arms by former Rwandan government forces and militias, and (c) make recommendations relating to the illegal flow of arms in the Great Lakes region; calls on all states and others to make available to the Commission information in their possession relating to its mandate; calls on all states and others to make available to the Commission information in their possession relating to its mandate; calls on all states in the Great Lakes region to ensure that their territory is not used as a base for armed groups to launch incursions or attacks against any other state; and urges all states and relevant organizations to cooperate in countering radio broadcasts and publications that incite acts of genocide, hatred, and violence in the region.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States remains extremely concerned about the continuing violence and the renewed threat of genocide in the Great Lakes region. A contributing factor has been the traffic in small arms through the region. The United States and the governments of the region affirmed their commitment, at the recent summit meeting in Kampala, to prevent a resurgence of genocide in Rwanda, combat the culture of ethnic violence that pervades the country, reactivate the arms flow commission, and stop illegal arms trafficking. Crucial to the success of the arms flow commission will be the assistance provided by the international community. The United States intends to contribute \$100,000 to the UN voluntary fund in support of the commission.

S/Res/1165

April 30

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides to establish a third trial chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda; decides that the elections for the judges of the three trial chambers shall be held together, for a term

of office to expire on May 24, 2003; asks the Secretary General to make arrangements for the elections; and urges the organs of the tribunal to continue their efforts to increase further the efficiency of their work.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said in a press release that the International Tribunal for Rwanda must carry out its mission more efficiently and productively. Trials must be completed and judgments rendered in a timely manner. The United States remains deeply concerned that, despite the efforts made toward reform, serious problems remain. The tribunal must continue to implement reform measures to improve its operations. The expansion of the tribunal by three judges, who will be elected immediately, should enable it to render prompt justice. Enlarging the tribunal should not replace ongoing reform efforts but be carried out at the same time. The effort to bring to justice those who have committed crimes against humanity is equally urgent in two other cases, the former Yugoslavia and Cambodia. Therefore, the United States is working to expand in a similar way the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and to establish a tribunal to bring to justice senior Cambodian Khmer Rouge leaders during the period 1975-1979.

S/Res/1200

September 30

15(US)-0-0

Forwards to the General Assembly 18 nominations for judges of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

## SIERRA LEONE

S/Res/1156

March 16

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: welcomes the return to Sierra Leone of its democratically elected President on March 10, 1998; decides to terminate, with immediate effect, the prohibitions on sale or supply to Sierra Leone of petroleum or petroleum products referred to in Resolution 1132 (1997); welcomes the intention of the Secretary General to make proposals concerning the role of the United Nations and its future presence in Sierra Leone; and decides to review the other prohibitions in Resolution 1132.

S/Res/1162

April 17

15(US)-0-0

Welcomes the efforts made by the democratically elected President of Sierra Leone since his return on March 10, 1998, and by the Government of Sierra Leone to restore peaceful and secure conditions in the country, to reestablish effective administration and the democratic process, and to embark on the task of reconstruction and rehabilitation; commends the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its military observer group

(ECOMOG), deployed in Sierra Leone, on the important role they are playing in support of restoration of peace and security; notes with satisfaction the steps taken by the Secretary General to strengthen the office of his Special Envoy in Freetown with necessary civilian and military personnel; authorizes deployment of up to ten UN military liaison and security advisory personnel for a period of up to 90 days to work under the authority of the Special Envoy to report on the military situation in the country and to assist in finalization of planning by ECOMOG of future tasks, such as identification of former combatant elements to be disarmed and designing of a disarmament plan; welcomes the intention of the Secretary General to make further recommendations on the possible deployment of UN military personnel; and urges all states and international organizations to provide humanitarian assistance, assist in reconstruction and development, and provide technical and logistical support to assist ECOMOG in carrying out its peacekeeping role.

S/Res/1171

June 5

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides to terminate the remaining prohibitions imposed by paragraphs 5 and 6 of Resolution 1132 (travel restrictions and oil and arms embargo provisions); also decides, with a view to prohibiting the sale and supply of arms and related materiel to nongovernmental forces in Sierra Leone, that all states shall prevent the sale or supply, by their nationals or from their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment and spare parts, to Sierra Leone other than to the Government of Sierra Leone through named points of entry on a list to be supplied by that government to the Secretary General; decides also that the restrictions referred to above shall not apply to the sale or supply of arms and related materiel for the sole use in Sierra Leone of ECOMOG or the United Nations; decides that all states shall prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of leading members of the former military junta and of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), as designated by the committee established by Resolution 1132, provided that such entry or transit may be authorized by the same committee; and expresses readiness to terminate the above measures once the control of the Government of Sierra Leone has been fully reestablished over all its territory, and when all nongovernmental forces have been disarmed and demobilized.

The U.S. Government supported enabling interested states to provide assistance to the Government of Sierra Leone and to ECOMOG, given the continued resistance to the authority of the legitimate government and the atrocities being perpetrated against innocent civilians by the RUF and former junta members. The United States also sought a new resolution to clarify that ECOWAS and ECOMOG should be exempt from the arms embargo.

S/Res/1181

July 13

15(US)-0-0

Condemns the continued resistance of remnants of the ousted junta and members of the RUF to the authority of the legitimate government and the violence they are perpetrating against the civilian population, and demands that they lay down their arms; emphasizes the need to promote national reconciliation; decides to establish the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) for an initial period of six months, until January 13, 1999, and decides that it shall include up to 70 military observers and a small medical unit, with the necessary civilian support staff, and with a mandate to (a) monitor the military and security situation and to provide regular information to the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), (b) monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants, and monitor the role of ECOMOG in providing security and in collecting and destroying arms, (c) assist in monitoring respect for international humanitarian law, and (d) monitor the voluntary disarmament and demobilization of members of the Civil Defense Forces; decides that UNOMSIL shall be led by the SRSG and that an augmented civilian staff shall (a) advise the Government of Sierra Leone and local police officials on police practice, training, and recruitment, in particular on the need to respect standards of policing in democratic societies, and to advise on reform and restructuring of the police force, and (b) report on violations of international humanitarian law and human rights, and assist the Government of Sierra Leone in its efforts to address the country's human rights needs; welcomes the commitment of ECOMOG to ensure the security of UN personnel, and stresses the need for full cooperation and close coordination between UNOMSIL and ECOMOG; expresses serious concern about reports of cross-border arms flows and support to the rebels in Sierra Leone; and reaffirms the obligation of all states to comply with the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1171.

The U.S. Representative said the ray of hope felt when President Kabbah and his government returned to Freetown in March was quickly overshadowed by the terrible atrocities committed by fleeing junta and rebel forces. The humanitarian situation needs urgent attention, and the United States will contribute \$55 million. ECOMOG has performed admirably, and ECOWAS has commendably taken a leading role in helping a neighbor restore democratic order and regain basic security. But ECOMOG needs additional troops, better transport, and greater logistical support to continue to protect civilians from the rebels and the former junta. This resolution is a vital part of giving assistance to ECOMOG: it authorizes UN military observers to cooperate with ECOMOG in monitoring disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. The resolution also reinforces the concern about cross-border arms flows and support to the rebels in Sierra Leone, and it reaffirms the arms embargo established in October 1997. The United States has reservations about the proposal for border monitors, because ECOMOG is already over-stretched and does not have the capability to take on this responsibility. ECOMOG's current priority should be to provide security in Sierra Leone, not to monitor the border. The

neighboring states are responsible for implementing the arms embargo. The U.S. Government welcomes UN plans to hold a special high-level conference on Sierra Leone to coordinate planning for peace and security, support for ECOMOG, and humanitarian assistance.

## TAJKISTAN

S/Res/1167

May 14

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) for six months, to November 15, 1998; condemns the renewed fighting in violation of the cease-fire; calls on the parties to undertake vigorous efforts to implement the peace agreement and to create conditions for holding elections; and calls on the parties to bring into operation a joint unit to provide security for UNMOT personnel and to cooperate to ensure the safety and freedom of movement of other international personnel.

The U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government, though pleased with the signing of a peace agreement in June 1997, is growing concerned that the peace process has lost its momentum. There has been some cooperation between the parties, some opposition members have been given responsible positions in the government, and a significant number of opposition soldiers have been registered and quartered in assembly areas. However, Tajikistan continues to go through round after round of violence and disruption. The U.S. vote to extend the mandate of UNMOT is a sign of continued faith in the peace process, but the willingness to support a broken process is not infinite. The parties must recognize that they alone hold the responsibility for moving the peace process forward. It is clearly within the capacity of both to comply with their obligations under the peace accords. The government committed itself to share power in the interim period until elections, and it must do so. The government must appoint opposition members to thirty percent of government positions, and it must implement provisions of the amnesty law. The opposition leaders committed themselves to demobilizing and disarming their forces, but their forces have attacked government positions. The parties should also be thinking ahead toward legalizing political parties and preparing for elections. They should also cooperate to make the joint protection unit (for ensuring the security of international personnel) a showcase of national cooperation. The United States has pledged significant quantities of assistance, and urges others to make donations to guarantee the peace process and to relieve the humanitarian crisis and the threat from landmines.

S/Res/1206

November 12

15(US)-0-0

Condemns the recent fighting initiated by forces trying to hinder the peace process, and calls on the parties to refrain from the use of force; calls on the parties to undertake vigorous efforts to implement their peace agreement, including the protocol on military issues, and to create conditions for holding elections early in 1999; condemns the murder of four members of UNMOT, and urges the Government of Tajikistan to bring those responsible to justice; calls on the parties to cooperate further in ensuring the safety and freedom of movement of UN personnel, the peacekeeping forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States, and other international personnel; reminds the parties that the ability of the international community to mobilize and continue assistance is linked to the security of the personnel of UNMOT and other international organizations, and of humanitarian workers; and decides to extend the mandate of UNMOT for six months, to May 15, 1999.

## WESTERN SAHARA

S/Res/1148

January 26

15(US)-0-0

Approves the deployment of the engineering unit required for demining activities and of the additional administrative staff required to support the deployment of military personnel as proposed in the Secretary General's report; expresses the intention to consider positively the request for the remaining additional military and civilian police assets for the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) as proposed in the Secretary General's report, as soon as the Secretary General reports that the identification process has reached a stage which makes the deployment of these assets essential; and calls upon both parties to cooperate with the Secretary General's Special Representative and with the Identification Commission to complete the identification process in a timely fashion.

In a press release, the U.S. Representative noted the need for the demining and other military support units, but pointed to the main task ahead—successful completion of the voter identification process. Impressive progress has been made in identifying voters. But both parties must avoid undermining the compromise reached in the Houston agreements on identification of tribal sub-fractions in order to avoid threatening the success of voter identification. Continued U.S. support for MINURSO in its present form depends on the willingness of the parties to make progress.

S/Res/1163

April 17

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO until July 20, 1998, in order that MINURSO may proceed with its identification tasks, with the aim of com-

pleting the process; expresses again the intention to consider positively the request for the remaining additional military and police assets for MINURSO as proposed by the Secretary General in November 1997, as soon as he reports that the identification process has reached a stage which makes deployment of these assets essential; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council every 30 days on progress of implementation of the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached between the parties, and to keep the Council informed of developments on the viability of the mandate of MINURSO.

The U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States welcomes extension of the MINURSO mandate. The Council has made clear its firm support for the UN process, but the short, three-month renewal highlights the serious concerns that remain. The parties must work sincerely to address the serious obstacles MINURSO faces if the identification process is to be put back on track and on schedule. The United States urges the parties to recommit themselves in word and deed to the Settlement Plan and their commitments under the Houston agreements. The parties should build the climate of trust and confidence necessary to success of the process. The United States wants to do its part to support the process, and, to this end, is considering how best to contribute units to serve in the region if the process reaches the stage when future deployments are appropriate. Unless significant progress can be maintained, the United States cannot support the continued renewal of MINURSO in its present form. The identification process must proceed to completion soon if MINURSO is to continue to be viable.

S/Res/1185

July 20

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO to September 21, 1998; calls for prompt conclusion of status-of-forces agreements to facilitate deployment of MINURSO-formed military units; calls for lifting of restrictions on MINURSO aircraft, or on passengers whose travel MINURSO determines to be of assistance to fulfillment of the mandate; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council every 30 days on progress of implementation of the Settlement Plan and other developments, and on the continuing validity of the mandate of MINURSO.

In a press statement, the U.S. Deputy Representative said the United States welcomes extension of MINURSO and the significant progress made in the past three months: in registration of applicants for the referendum, in deployment of military units charged with demining and construction, and in pre-registration of refugees in Mauritania and Algeria. However, a number of problems impede progress and could threaten MINURSO's ability to complete its mission. It is because of these problems that the current mandate is for only two months. The U.S. Government is not prepared to proceed with longer renewals, and especially with authorization to begin more extensive troop deployments, until there is some confidence that outstanding voter identifica-



tion issues are resolved successfully and that the parties have demonstrated the political will to hold a referendum.

S/Res/1198

September 18

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the MINURSO mandate to October 31, 1998; welcomes the engagement of the Secretary General's personal envoy with the parties to seek a solution to issues bearing upon implementation of the Settlement Plan; welcomes agreement of the Moroccan authorities to formalize the presence of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Western Sahara, and asks both parties to enable UNHCR to prepare for repatriation of Saharan refugees eligible to vote; calls for prompt conclusion of status-of-forces agreements with the Secretary General to facilitate deployment of MINURSO-formed military units; and asks the Secretary General to report to the Council in 30 days on progress in implementation of the Settlement Plan and the agreements reached between the parties, and to keep the Council informed of developments and, as appropriate, on the continuing viability of the mandate of MINURSO.

In a press release, the U.S. Acting Representative said the United States strongly supports the further engagement of the Secretary General's personal envoy, (former U.S. Secretary of State) James Baker, in the Settlement Plan process. The U.S. Government urges the parties to work constructively with him to bring this long-standing dispute to a comprehensive and mutually agreeable conclusion.

S/Res/1204

October 30

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO to December 17, 1998; welcomes the report by the Secretary General regarding: identification of persons eligible to vote in the referendum, the appeals process, UNHCR activities, and the next stages of the Settlement Plan, and calls on the parties to agree to these measures by mid-November; welcomes Morocco's agreement to formalize the presence of the UNHCR in the Western Sahara, and the POLISARIO Front's agreement to resume pre-registration activities in the refugee camps, and asks the parties to enable the UNHCR to work for the repatriation of refugees eligible to vote, and their immediate families; calls for conclusion of status-of-forces agreements for deployment of MINURSO-formed military units; supports the intention of MINURSO to publish the provisional list of voters by December 1, 1998; supports an increase in the staff of the Identification Commission to 25 members from 18 in order to enable it to keep to the proposed timetable; and asks the Secretary General to submit a report by December 11, 1998, on implementation of this resolution, the Settlement Plan, and the agreements reached between the parties, and on the continuing viability of the MINURSO mandate.

The U.S. Government appreciates the intensive efforts made by the Secretary General, Special Envoy James A. Baker, and others to keep the Settlement Plan on track. Unfortunately, the parties have not done everything possible to advance the Plan. There have been constraints on the operational capability of the engineering support unit, delays in concluding status-of-forces agreements, and delays in repatriation of refugees. The parties must keep their commitments and should accept the new MINURSO protocols for the referendum.

S/Res/1215

December 17

15(US)-0-0

Decides to extend the mandate of MINURSO to January 31, 1999, to allow for further consultations in the hope that they will lead to agreement on the various protocols without undermining the integrity of the Secretary General's proposed package; notes that implementation of the Secretary General's proposal to launch simultaneously the identification and appeals processes could clearly demonstrate the willingness of the parties to accelerate the referendum process; calls on the parties to sign the proposed refugee repatriation protocol with the UNHCR as soon as possible, urges the Government of Morocco to formalize the presence of the UNHCR, and encourages the parties to enable the UNHCR to prepare for repatriation of Saharan refugees eligible to vote; urges the Government of Morocco to sign a status-of-forces agreement with the Secretary General; and asks the Secretary General to keep the Council informed of developments, including an assessment of the continuing viability of the mandate of MINURSO.

## YUGOSLAVIA

S/Res/1160

March 31

14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: calls on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to achieve a political solution to the issue of Kosovo through dialogue and to implement the actions indicated in the Contact Group statements of March 9 and 25, 1998; calls on the Kosovar Albanian leadership to condemn all terrorist action and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only; underlines that the way to defeat violence and terrorism in Kosovo is for the authorities in Belgrade to offer the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process; calls on the authorities in Belgrade and the leadership of the Kosovar Albanian community to enter without preconditions into a meaningful dialogue on political status issues; agrees, without prejudging the outcome of that dialogue, with the Contact Group's proposal that the principles for a solution of the Kosovo problem should be based on the territorial integrity of the FRY and that such a solution must also take into account the rights of the Kosovar Albanians, and expresses support for an enhanced status for Kosovo which

would include a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-administration; decides that all states shall, for the purpose of fostering peace and stability in Kosovo, prevent the sale or supply to the FRY, including Kosovo, by their nationals or from their territories or using their flag vessels and aircraft, of arms and related materiel of all types, such as weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and shall prevent arming and training for terrorist activities there; decides to establish a committee of the Security Council to monitor these prohibitions; asks the Secretary General to keep the Council regularly informed and to make recommendations for establishment of a comprehensive monitoring regime; decides to review the situation on the basis of the Secretary General's reports and to consider additional measures if there is a failure to make constructive progress toward the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo; and notes that the FRY authorities have an obligation to cooperate with the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. (China abstained.)

The U.S. Representative said the United States strongly supports this resolution imposing an arms embargo on the FRY. It sends an unambiguous message that the international community will not tolerate violence and ethnic cleansing in the region of the former Yugoslavia. The security of the region directly affects broader international interests, and the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and security. The United States and its partners in the peace effort must not now watch years of peace-building in the Balkans be destroyed by repressive violence, or by terrorist activity in Kosovo. President Milosevic (of the FRY) must begin an unconditional dialogue on political status issues with the Kosovar Albanian leadership. The United States joins the Council in expressing support for an enhanced status for Kosovo, including greater autonomy and meaningful self-administration. The United States will not countenance terrorist activity or external support for terrorist activity. And the FRY must withdraw from Kosovo its paramilitary security forces, which have harassed, threatened, arrested, and even beaten civilians and international humanitarian workers.

S/Res/1166

May 13

15(US)-0-0

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: decides to establish a third trial chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; decides that three additional judges shall be elected as soon as possible to serve in the additional trial chamber and that they shall serve until the expiry of the terms of office of the existing judges; and asks the Secretary General to make arrangements for the elections and for enhancing the effective functioning of the Tribunal.

The U.S. Representative said the U.S. Government supports this resolution because it is an affirmation of the important work already completed by the Tribunal and of the still daunting task at hand. In the past year, the Tribunal

has seen a dramatic increase in the number of persons in custody. That many of these have recently chosen to surrender voluntarily indicates the growing realization that justice cannot be avoided. But a number of the most notorious indictees of the Tribunal remain at large. The United States commends the work of the Tribunal and its efforts to function as efficiently and effectively as possible. The Tribunal's increased work load will intensify the demand for additional resources beyond those available in its budget. The U.S. Government urges all states to make voluntary contributions to the trust fund established for the Tribunal. The Council took an important step in the quest for justice by expanding the Rwanda Tribunal last month, and by expanding the Yugoslavia Tribunal in this resolution. The U.S. Government hopes the Council will also work to establish a tribunal to bring to justice senior Cambodian Khmer Rouge leaders during the period 1975-1979.

S/Res/1191

August 27

15(US)-0-0

Forwards to the General Assembly nine nominations for judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

S/Res/1199

September 23

14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: demands that all parties immediately cease hostilities and maintain a cease-fire in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and enter into a meaningful dialogue, with international involvement, and to a clear timetable, to reach a negotiated political solution to the issue of Kosovo; demands that the FRY authorities and Kosovo Albanian leadership take steps to avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe; demands that the FRY (a) cease all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population, (b) enable international monitoring in Kosovo, including complete freedom of movement of such monitors, (c) facilitate the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and (d) make rapid progress to a clear timetable in a political dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian community to agree on confidence-building measures and finding a political solution in Kosovo; insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn all terrorist action, and emphasizes that all elements in the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means only; welcomes the establishment of the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Mission (KDOM); calls on the FRY authorities and all others in the FRY to ensure that monitoring personnel are not subject to the threat or use of force or interference; calls on the FRY authorities and the leaders of the Kosovo Albanian community to cooperate with the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its investigations; and underlines the need for the FRY authorities to bring to justice those members of the security forces who have mistreated civilians and deliberately destroyed property. (China abstained.)

The U.S. Acting Representative said the United States supports this important resolution on Kosovo. It underscores the growing U.S. concern that Belgrade's repressive actions have created a potentially catastrophic humanitarian situation as winter approaches. It increases pressure on Belgrade to negotiate seriously with the Kosovo Albanians to achieve a political settlement that provides for democratic self-government for the people of Kosovo and avoids the devastating consequences of continued conflict. It also affirms that the situation constitutes a serious threat to peace and security in the region. The best way to stem this humanitarian crisis is for Belgrade to heed the demands for an immediate cessation of offensive actions and to pull back its security forces. The U.S. Government calls for a meaningful dialogue, leading to a solution of the Kosovo question. It is the responsibility of the authorities in Belgrade to create the conditions to allow all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety. Adequate resources for humanitarian assistance in the region are vital. The U.S. Government has earmarked \$20 million in assistance, in addition to \$11 million previously identified and other donations. It is the U.S. hope that this resolution and the ongoing efforts to reach a settlement will convince Belgrade to comply with the demands of the international community. Planning at NATO for military operations if these efforts do not succeed is nearing completion.

S/Res/1203

October 24

13(US)-0-2

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN charter: endorses and supports the agreements signed in Belgrade on October 16 between the FRY and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and on October 15 between the FRY and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) concerning verification of compliance by the FRY with the requirements of Resolution 1199, and demands full implementation of these agreements by the FRY; notes endorsement by the Government of Serbia of the accord to complete negotiations on a framework for a political settlement by November 2, 1998; demands full compliance by the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership with Resolutions 1160 and 1199, and full cooperation with the OSCE Verification Mission and the NATO Air Verification Mission in Kosovo; stresses the need for the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership to negotiate a political solution to the issue of Kosovo, with international involvement; demands that the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership respect the freedom of movement of the OSCE Verification Mission and other international personnel; reminds the FRY that it has primary responsibility for the safety and security of all diplomatic personnel accredited to the FRY and to take all appropriate measures to ensure that personnel performing functions under this resolution are not subject to interference of any kind; insists that the Kosovo Albanian leadership condemn and end all terrorist attacks, and emphasizes that the Kosovo Albanian community should pursue their goals by peaceful means

only; demands immediate cooperation by the FRY and the Kosovo Albanian leadership with international efforts to improve the humanitarian situation and avert the impending humanitarian catastrophe; underlines the responsibility of the FRY to allow all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety; urges member states to provide resources for humanitarian assistance in the region; calls for a complete investigation of all atrocities committed against civilians and full cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia; and decides that the prohibitions (on supply of arms, ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment to the FRY, and arming of terrorists) imposed in Resolution 1160 shall not apply to equipment for the sole use of the verification missions. (China and Russia abstained.)

The U.S. Acting Representative said that the agreements reached in Belgrade could, upon full implementation, create an environment in which a peaceful solution could be found in Kosovo. A credible threat of force was key to achieving these agreements and remains key to achieving their full implementation. In the past, violence and the use of force have prevailed over the voices of reason and moderation in Kosovo. Belgrade has taken steps to silence the independent media, depriving the people of the FRY of the capacity to assess the actions of their leaders accurately. The U.S. Government regrets that not all Council members supported this resolution, in particular because of its reference to media closures in the FRY. To create a climate of trust and the safe return of refugees and displaced persons in Kosovo, the Belgrade authorities and the Kosovo Albanians must comply swiftly and fully with Resolutions 1160 and 1199, and must cooperate fully with the OSCE and NATO verification missions. Investigations in Kosovo by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia are essential to restoring peace and security. No parties should take any action to hinder or endanger international verifiers or the personnel of humanitarian organizations. NATO has made clear that it will not tolerate the continued violence that has resulted in thousands of deaths, a quarter million refugees, and a threat to peace in the wider Balkans. The primary responsibility for the current crisis lies with Belgrade, but all parties must comply with the agreements reached. The crisis in Kosovo can be resolved through peaceful dialogue and negotiation. The authorities in Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians must now take full advantage of the opportunities being created by the international community. The foundation has been laid; all that is required is the political will to move ahead.

S/Res/1207

November 17

14(US)-0-1

Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter: condemns the failure of the FRY to execute arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia against the three individuals (indicted in connection with the massacre in Vukovar in November 1991) noted in the Tribunal's letter

of September 8, 1998, and demands immediate execution of the warrants, including transfer of these individuals to Tribunal custody. (China abstained.)

## VOTING SUMMARIES

The table below lists the votes of Security Council members on the 73 resolutions introduced in 1998. Resolutions on which a Security Council member voted No or abstained are indicated by number in parentheses. No resolutions were vetoed in 1998, and no other negative votes were cast. Of the 73 resolutions adopted, 68 were by unanimous vote. The United States voted for all five resolutions not adopted unanimously. There were only seven abstentions on the 73 resolutions adopted: five by China (four on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and one on Haiti), and two by Russia (one each on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti).

COUNTRY	YES	NO	ABSTAIN
United States	73	0	0
Bahrain	73	0	0
Brazil	73	0	0
China	68	0	5 (1160, 1199, 1203, 1207, 1212)
Costa Rica	73	0	0
France	73	0	0
Gabon	73	0	0
Gambia	73	0	0
Japan	73	0	0
Kenya	73	0	0
Portugal	73	0	0
Russia	71	0	2 (1203, 1212)
Slovenia	73	0	0
Sweden	73	0	0
United Kingdom	73	0	0

In the following table, Security Council votes are tabulated on the same basis as overall votes for the General Assembly in this report, and voting coincidence percentages are calculated accordingly. Council members are ranked by coincidence with the United States. When the percentage is the same, members are ranked by the number of identical votes, and alphabetically when the number of votes is the same. It should be noted that group dynamics in the Security Council, whose 15 members frequently consult closely on issues before resolutions are presented for adoption, are quite different from those in the General Assembly.

COUNTRY	IDENTICAL VOTES	OPPOSITE VOTES	ABSTEN- TIONS	VOTING COINCIDENCE
Bahrain	73	0	0	100%
Brazil	73	0	0	100%
Costa Rica	73	0	0	100%
France	73	0	0	100%
Gabon	73	0	0	100%
Gambia	73	0	0	100%
Japan	73	0	0	100%
Kenya	73	0	0	100%
Portugal	73	0	0	100%
Slovenia	73	0	0	100%
Sweden	73	0	0	100%
United Kingdom	73	0	0	100%
Russia	71	0	2	100%
China	68	0	5	100%
Average	72.5	0.0	0.5	100%



## V - COUNTRY LISTINGS

This section pulls together information contained in previous sections, and presents it by country for 184 UN members (all except the United States). They are listed in alphabetical order, with Democratic People's Republic of Korea under "D", Republic of Korea and Republic of Moldova under "R", The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia under "T", and United Republic of Tanzania under "U", as they are seated at the UN General Assembly. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, formerly Zaire, is listed under "D". Congo (Brazzaville) remains at "C". Burma, which changed its name to Myanmar and is so designated at the United Nations, is listed under "M". Ivory Coast changed its name to Cote d'Ivoire several years ago; it is listed under "C". Each country listing contains the following:

— Summary coincidence percentages drawn from Sections II and III, and, for Security Council members, Section IV. Coincidence percentages for selected issue categories are included; they are derived by the same methodology used for overall plenary votes.

— Vote totals in the plenary and on the 10 important votes.

— Every vote on the 10 important issues (with the U.S. vote in parentheses for comparison). Symbols used here are Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, and X=Absent.

## AFGHANISTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 26, Abstain 2, Absent 18: 40.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 78.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ALBANIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 32, Disagree 16, Abstain 8, Absent 8: 66.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.2%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 26.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 3: 100%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ALGERIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 38, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 30.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

— Arms Control: 45.5%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 57.1%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ANDORRA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.8%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ANGOLA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 37, Abstain 3, Absent 6: 32.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 46.2%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 28.6%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 37, Abstain 5, Absent 5: 31.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ARGENTINA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 25, Disagree 25, Abstain 14, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

— Arms Control: 78.9%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ARMENIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 24, Abstain 16, Absent 3: 46.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

— Arms Control: 84.2%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 2, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 60.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 90.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## AUSTRALIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 35, Disagree 19, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 64.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## AUSTRIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 20, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 64.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

— Arms Control: 85.2%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## AZERBAIJAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 28, Abstain 8, Absent 7: 42.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

— Arms Control: 71.4%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 3: 57.1%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BAHAMAS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 35, Abstain 5, Absent 3: 37.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 71.4%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BAHRAIN

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 39, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 35.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BANGLADESH

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 37, Abstain 5, Absent 2: 35.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## BARBADOS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 38.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.9%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 71.4%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BELARUS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 29, Abstain 14, Absent 0: 42.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 89.0%

— Arms Control: 75.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 37.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) N

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BELGIUM

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BELIZE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 36, Abstain 2, Absent 9: 32.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BENIN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 40, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 33.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 42.9%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 37.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BHUTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 11, Disagree 25, Abstain 13, Absent 15: 30.6%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 36.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 3, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 40.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BOLIVIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 36, Abstain 2, Absent 3: 39.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	X
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BOTSWANA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 38, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 36.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 42.9%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## BRAZIL

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 25, Disagree 35, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 41.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

— Arms Control: 57.7%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 40, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 34.4%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 44.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## BULGARIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.2%

— Arms Control: 92.6%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## BURKINA FASO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 36, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 5: 20.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## BURUNDI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 23, Abstain 1, Absent 24: 41.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

— Arms Control: 56.5%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 7: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CAMBODIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## CAMEROON

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 31, Abstain 11, Absent 4: 36.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

— Arms Control: 58.3%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 15.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## CANADA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## CAPE VERDE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 35, Abstain 4, Absent 6: 35.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 32, Abstain 6, Absent 10: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## CHAD

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 37, Abstain 5, Absent 4: 32.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CHILE

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 24, Disagree 35, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 40.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 58.3%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 26.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## CHINA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 12, Disagree 32, Abstain 16, Absent 4: 27.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

— Arms Control: 58.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 11.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 20.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.5%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## COLOMBIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 38, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## COMOROS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 23, Abstain 2, Absent 23: 41.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.0%

— Arms Control: 56.5%; Human Rights: 42.9%; Middle East: 18.2%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 78.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CONGO

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## COSTA RICA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 25, Abstain 3, Absent 14: 46.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.6%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 44.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.8%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## COTE D'IVOIRE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 37, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 35.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%

— Arms Control: 57.7%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## CROATIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 34, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 2: 64.2%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.6%

— Arms Control: 88.0%; Human Rights: 87.5%; Middle East: 29.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 71.4%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CUBA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 7, Disagree 37, Abstain 12, Absent 8: 15.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

— Arms Control: 27.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 12.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 16.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## CYPRUS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 26, Disagree 25, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 51.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

— Arms Control: 81.0%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 57.1%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## CZECH REPUBLIC

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 8, Absent 1: 67.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.2%

— Arms Control: 92.6%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 2, Disagree 38, Abstain 8, Absent 16: 5.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 80.6%

— Arms Control: 8.3%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 3: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 71.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) N
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (FORMERLY ZAIRE)

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 13, Disagree 22, Abstain 7, Absent 22: 37.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 55.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 20.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 74.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## DENMARK

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## DJIBOUTI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 33.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## DOMINICA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 1, Abstain 0, Absent 63: 0.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 72.2%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 1, Abstain 0, Absent 9: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 17.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 20, Abstain 0, Absent 23: 51.2%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 89.1%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 71.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 66.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## ECUADOR

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 24, Disagree 34, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 41.4%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## EGYPT

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 31.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 48.0%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## EL SALVADOR

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 34, Abstain 5, Absent 4: 38.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 71.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.0%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## EQUATORIAL GUINEA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 4: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 12.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ERITREA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 6: 30.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 11.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ESTONIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 16, Abstain 12, Absent 0: 69.2%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 94.0%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	N
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## ETHIOPIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 36, Abstain 8, Absent 3: 32.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 52.2%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## FIJI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 29, Abstain 6, Absent 10: 39.6%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.2%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 22.2%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## FINLAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 18, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## FRANCE

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 39, Disagree 14, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 73.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 94.6%

— Arms Control: 96.4%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.9%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	N
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## GABON

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 11, Disagree 32, Abstain 8, Absent 13: 25.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 5.9%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 20.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 78.3%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## GAMBIA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 35, Abstain 1, Absent 6: 38.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 54.2%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 3: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.3%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## GEORGIA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 16, Abstain 22, Absent 3: 59.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.4%

— Arms Control: 88.2%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 31.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 80.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.3%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Notes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## GERMANY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## GHANA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 32.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 16.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 78.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## GREECE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## GRENADA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 15, Disagree 30, Abstain 5, Absent 14: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 57.1%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 13.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 6: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## GUATEMALA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 24, Disagree 28, Abstain 3, Absent 9: 46.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.4%

— Arms Control: 56.0%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 31.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## GUINEA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 38, Abstain 4, Absent 4: 32.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.2%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## GUINEA-BISSAU

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 5: 32.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

## GUYANA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 38, Abstain 4, Absent 3: 33.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## HAITI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 36, Abstain 0, Absent 6: 37.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## HONDURAS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 18, Abstain 7, Absent 17: 55.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

— Arms Control: 72.2%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 38.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 71.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 89.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## HUNGARY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 38, Disagree 18, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 67.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 89.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ICELAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 34, Disagree 19, Abstain 10, Absent 1: 64.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.8%

— Arms Control: 88.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 27.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 83.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## INDIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 10, Disagree 42, Abstain 12, Absent 0: 19.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

— Arms Control: 36.8%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 5.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 14.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 75.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) N

## INDONESIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 40, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 32.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 44.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## IRAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 40, Abstain 5, Absent 3: 28.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

— Arms Control: 43.5%; Human Rights: 28.6%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 44.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## IRAQ

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## IRELAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 35, Disagree 21, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 62.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

— Arms Control: 82.1%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## ISRAEL

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 48, Disagree 3, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 94.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 98.9%

— Arms Control: 85.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 95.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 8, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 100%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) N
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) N
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ITALY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 19, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 66.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## JAMAICA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 36.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.5%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## JAPAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 29, Disagree 19, Abstain 16, Absent 0: 60.4%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.7%

— Arms Control: 84.2%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## JORDAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 15, Disagree 38, Abstain 6, Absent 5: 28.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

— Arms Control: 45.8%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 11.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## KAZAKHSTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 25, Disagree 24, Abstain 14, Absent 1: 51.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.7%

— Arms Control: 78.9%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 23.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 71.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## KENYA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 3: 34.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

— Arms Control: 54.2%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 11.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 20.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.1%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## KUWAIT

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 24, Disagree 37, Abstain 0, Absent 3: 39.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 21.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 55.6%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## KYRGYZSTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 23, Abstain 14, Absent 5: 48.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.5%

— Arms Control: 82.4%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 21.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 1, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 80.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## LAOS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 9, Disagree 36, Abstain 7, Absent 12: 20.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

— Arms Control: 41.2%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 10.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 1: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 77.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## LATVIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 17, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 67.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.5%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## LEBANON

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 10, Disagree 38, Abstain 7, Absent 9: 20.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 35.3%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 28.6%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## LESOTHO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 20, Abstain 0, Absent 21: 53.5%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 89.2%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 50.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## LIBERIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## LIBYA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 14, Disagree 43, Abstain 2, Absent 5: 24.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

— Arms Control: 38.1%; Human Rights: 22.2%; Middle East: 13.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) N
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## LIECHTENSTEIN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 34, Disagree 20, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 63.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.5%

— Arms Control: 84.6%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## LITHUANIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 17, Abstain 11, Absent 0: 67.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.6%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## LUXEMBOURG

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MADAGASCAR

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 32, Abstain 0, Absent 15: 34.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

— Arms Control: 58.3%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 12.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 4: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MALAWI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 39, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 36.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 48.1%; Human Rights: 71.4%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 37.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MALAYSIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 35.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 44.4%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MALDIVES

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 37, Abstain 2, Absent 5: 35.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 21.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.2%

### Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MALI

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 6: 30.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 56.5%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.4%

### Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MALTA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 30, Disagree 27, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 52.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.0%

— Arms Control: 79.2%; Human Rights: 85.7%; Middle East: 26.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MARSHALL ISLANDS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 31, Disagree 7, Abstain 23, Absent 3: 81.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 97.0%

— Arms Control: 95.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 60.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 0, Abstain 2, Absent 3: 100%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MAURITANIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 37, Abstain 4, Absent 4: 33.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 54.2%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 10.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## MAURITIUS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 5: 34.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

— Arms Control: 52.4%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 71.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MEXICO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 39, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 32.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 45.8%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 55.6%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MICRONESIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 0, Abstain 18, Absent 10: 100%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 100%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 100%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 0, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## MONACO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 38, Disagree 14, Abstain 10, Absent 2: 73.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 94.5%

— Arms Control: 96.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MONGOLIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 34, Abstain 4, Absent 3: 40.4%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

— Arms Control: 57.7%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 4, Abstain 0, Absent 0: 60.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MOROCCO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 38, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 34.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## MOZAMBIQUE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 36, Abstain 6, Absent 3: 34.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 20.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.6%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## MYANMAR (BURMA)

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 15, Disagree 39, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 27.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.1%

— Arms Control: 47.8%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 42.9%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## NAMIBIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 15, Disagree 37, Abstain 6, Absent 6: 28.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

— Arms Control: 52.2%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 5, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 16.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## NEPAL

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 37, Abstain 8, Absent 1: 32.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 10.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 89.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	A

## NETHERLANDS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 18, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 67.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## NEW ZEALAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 35, Disagree 21, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 62.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

— Arms Control: 82.1%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

	<b>VOTES</b>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## NICARAGUA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 27, Abstain 9, Absent 6: 44.9%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.9%

— Arms Control: 60.9%; Human Rights: 71.4%; Middle East: 31.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 71.4%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.1%

### Important Issues

	<b>VOTES</b>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## NIGER

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 39, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 33.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 37.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## NIGERIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 41, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 32.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.9%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 37.5%; Middle East: 9.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 7, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 22.2%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 72.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) N
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## NORWAY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 18, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.3%

— Arms Control: 92.0%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## OMAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 39, Abstain 1, Absent 5: 32.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 2: 42.9%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## PAKISTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 13, Disagree 39, Abstain 12, Absent 0: 25.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 36.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 5.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 37.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	N
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## PALAU

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	X
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## PANAMA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 37, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 38.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 57.1%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## PAPUA NEW GUINEA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 33, Abstain 5, Absent 8: 35.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 2: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 85.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## PARAGUAY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 25, Disagree 33, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 43.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.8%

— Arms Control: 57.7%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 30.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 66.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.5%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## PERU

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 39.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## PHILIPPINES

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 40, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.3%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 37.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## POLAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 19, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 66.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 89.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## PORTUGAL

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## QATAR

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 40, Abstain 0, Absent 5: 32.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 37.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## REPUBLIC OF KOREA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 27, Disagree 18, Abstain 18, Absent 1: 60.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 93.0%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 0, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 32, Disagree 19, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 62.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.7%

— Arms Control: 87.5%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 27.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 1, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 83.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ROMANIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 19, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 66.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 89.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## RUSSIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 27, Disagree 22, Abstain 14, Absent 1: 55.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

— Arms Control: 90.5%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 22.2%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.6%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) N

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## RWANDA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 5, Disagree 6, Abstain 0, Absent 53: 45.5%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 8: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 57.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## ST. KITTS AND NEVIS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 14, Disagree 25, Abstain 2, Absent 23: 35.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 52.9%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 27.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 3: 60.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ST. LUCIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 38, Abstain 7, Absent 2: 30.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.4%

— Arms Control: 50.0%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 10.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 3, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 40.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## ST. VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 14, Disagree 14, Abstain 0, Absent 36: 50.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 89.2%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 50.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 7: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## SAMOA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 31, Abstain 7, Absent 3: 42.6%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 26.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 2: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## SAN MARINO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 30, Disagree 21, Abstain 13, Absent 0: 58.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

— Arms Control: 78.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## SAUDI ARABIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 40, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 31.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

— Arms Control: 43.5%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 21.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 5, Abstain 0, Absent 1: 44.4%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SENEGAL

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 37, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 38.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

— Arms Control: 55.6%: Human Rights: 62.5%: Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## SEYCHELLES

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 11, Disagree 17, Abstain 0, Absent 36: 39.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

— Arms Control: 58.3%: Human Rights: 25.0%: Middle East: 28.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 2, Abstain 0, Absent 7: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	X
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SIERRA LEONE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 36, Abstain 4, Absent 4: 35.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.9%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 11.1%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 37.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.1%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## SINGAPORE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 34, Abstain 10, Absent 0: 37.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 42.9%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.3%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SLOVAK REPUBLIC

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 37, Disagree 19, Abstain 8, Absent 0: 66.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 89.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	N
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## SLOVENIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.8%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	A
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent. ( )=U.S. Vote

## SOLOMON ISLANDS

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 24, Abstain 5, Absent 13: 47.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 89.0%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 36.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## SOMALIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	X
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SOUTH AFRICA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 39.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 19.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 55.6%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.6%

### Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## SPAIN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 19, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 65.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.9%

— Arms Control: 88.9%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 1, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 85.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.8%

### Important Issues

	<u>VOTES</u>
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SRI LANKA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 39, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 31.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.6%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 0: 28.6%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.2%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## SUDAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 17, Disagree 43, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 28.3%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 83.8%

— Arms Control: 45.8%; Human Rights: 22.2%; Middle East: 13.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 6, Abstain 1, Absent 0: 33.3%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 76.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) N
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## SURINAME

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 38, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 36.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.8%

— Arms Control: 53.6%; Human Rights: 50.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 83.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## SWAZILAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 32, Abstain 6, Absent 5: 39.6%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.0%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 29.4%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## SWEDEN

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 36, Disagree 21, Abstain 7, Absent 0: 63.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.2%

— Arms Control: 82.1%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 6, Disagree 2, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 75.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 92.0%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## SYRIA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 8, Disagree 38, Abstain 10, Absent 8: 17.4%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 82.9%

— Arms Control: 31.3%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 16.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 75.1%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## TAJKISTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 17, Abstain 11, Absent 16: 54.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

— Arms Control: 82.4%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 16.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.6%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## THAILAND

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 37, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 37.3%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.4%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 60.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 32, Disagree 19, Abstain 12, Absent 1: 62.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 92.7%

— Arms Control: 88.0%; Human Rights: 83.3%; Middle East: 27.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 1, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 80.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 95.4%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## TOGO

### **Voting Coincidence Percentages**

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 38, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 34.5%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.0%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

### **Important Issues**

### **VOTES**

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 19, Disagree 34, Abstain 8, Absent 3: 35.8%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.6%

— Arms Control: 52.2%; Human Rights: 66.7%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 3, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 50.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 86.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## TUNISIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 39, Abstain 4, Absent 1: 33.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 53.8%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 14.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 5, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 37.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 79.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent. ( )=U.S. Vote

## TURKEY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 34, Disagree 26, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 56.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 90.4%

— Arms Control: 92.3%; Human Rights: 75.0%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 62.5%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) N
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## TURKMENISTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 15, Disagree 7, Abstain 3, Absent 39: 68.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 94.1%

— Arms Control: 76.5%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 33.3%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 3, Abstain 0, Absent 7: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 71.9%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## UGANDA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 14, Disagree 17, Abstain 1, Absent 32: 45.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.1%

— Arms Control: 56.5%; Human Rights: 33.3%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 5: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 69.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## UKRAINE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 26, Disagree 23, Abstain 15, Absent 0: 53.1%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 91.2%

— Arms Control: 81.0%; Human Rights: 80.0%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 2, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 66.7%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 91.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 38, Abstain 3, Absent 5: 32.1%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.0%

— Arms Control: 51.9%; Human Rights: 40.0%; Middle East: 15.8%

Important Votes (10): Agree 3, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 1: 42.9%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 82.4%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

## UNITED KINGDOM

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 41, Disagree 14, Abstain 9, Absent 0: 74.5%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 94.8%

— Arms Control: 96.3%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 31.6%

Important Votes (10): Agree 7, Disagree 1, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 87.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 96.0%

Security Council Votes: 100%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N)	Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N)	A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y)	Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y)	Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N)	N
6. Right to Development .....	(N)	A
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y)	Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y)	Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y)	Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y)	Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



## UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 37, Abstain 8, Absent 3: 30.2%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 85.5%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 25.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 5, Absent 0: 20.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## URUGUAY

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 35, Abstain 6, Absent 0: 39.7%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.1%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 25.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## UZBEKISTAN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 20, Disagree 2, Abstain 24, Absent 18: 90.9%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 98.9%

— Arms Control: 100%; Human Rights: 100%; Middle East: 100%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 0, Abstain 4, Absent 2: 100%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 100%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) A
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) A
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) A
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

## VANUATU

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 23, Disagree 34, Abstain 6, Absent 1: 40.4%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 87.3%

— Arms Control: 60.0%; Human Rights: 62.5%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 5, Disagree 3, Abstain 1, Absent 1: 62.5%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 87.9%

Important Issues	VOTES
1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) Y

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## VENEZUELA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 22, Disagree 38, Abstain 4, Absent 0: 36.7%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 86.1%

— Arms Control: 55.6%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 22.7%

Important Votes (10): Agree 4, Disagree 4, Abstain 2, Absent 0: 50.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 84.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) Y
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) A
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) Y
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

## VIETNAM

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 9, Disagree 39, Abstain 5, Absent 11: 18.8%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 82.6%

— Arms Control: 35.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 10.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 5, Abstain 3, Absent 2: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 73.8%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) A
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## YEMEN

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 16, Disagree 37, Abstain 3, Absent 8: 30.2%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.7%

— Arms Control: 52.2%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 15.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 1, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 4: 20.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 80.1%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) Y
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## YUGOSLAVIA (SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO)

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 64: 0.0%  
— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

— Arms Control: 0.0%; Human Rights: 0.0%; Middle East: 0.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 0, Abstain 0, Absent 10: 0.0%  
— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 0.0%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) X
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) X
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) X
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) X
6. Right to Development .....	(N) X
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) X
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) X
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote

## ZAMBIA

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 21, Disagree 29, Abstain 7, Absent 7: 42.0%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 88.0%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 57.1%; Middle East: 38.5%

Important Votes (10): Agree 2, Disagree 4, Abstain 1, Absent 3: 33.3%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 81.3%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) A
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) Y
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) Y
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) X
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) X

## ZIMBABWE

### Voting Coincidence Percentages

Overall Votes (64): Agree 18, Disagree 39, Abstain 3, Absent 4: 31.6%

— Including All 213 Consensus Resolutions: 84.8%

— Arms Control: 52.0%; Human Rights: 20.0%; Middle East: 10.0%

Important Votes (10): Agree 0, Disagree 6, Abstain 3, Absent 1: 0.0%

— Including the 17 Important Consensus Resolutions: 72.7%

### Important Issues

### VOTES

1. U.S. Embargo of Cuba .....	(N) Y
2. Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures .....	(N) Y
3. IAEA Report .....	(Y) X
4. Nuclear Testing in South Asia .....	(Y) N
5. New Agenda for Nuclear Disarmament .....	(N) Y
6. Right to Development .....	(N) Y
7. Human Rights in Iraq .....	(Y) A
8. Human Rights in Iran .....	(Y) N
9. Human Rights in Parts of the Former Yugoslavia .....	(Y) A
10. Human Rights in Kosovo .....	(Y) A

Votes: Y=Yes, N=No, A=Abstain, X=Absent, ( )=U.S. Vote



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