

2414-17
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Served 22 Apr

DEF. Doc. No. 193

Exhibit No. _____

DOCUMENTS

1. Subject: **Excerpt from the Robert Commission's Report on the Pearl Harbor Disaster.**
2. Date: **Jan. 23, 1942.**
3. Certificate of Origin: Necessary Yes () No ()
or Authentication : Served Yes () No ()
4. Correct Translation : Applicable Yes () No ()
Approved Yes () No ()
5. If not processed in entirety --
Additional excerpts requested Yes () No ()
Filed under Rule 6B(1) Revised Yes () No () 21 Apr
6. Comment as to Admissibility, etc: Yes () No ()
7. Comment as to Rebuttal: Yes () No ()
8. SUMMARY:

Part III of the findings of fact is quoted to show that the policy of the U. S., was in conflict with certain other governments, and the State, War and Navy Departments knew that was was inevitable.

Part IX of the findings relate briefly that on November 27, 1941 the Army Chief of Staff, the Chief of Military Intelligence, the the Chief of Naval Operations each sent to their respective Hawaiian subordinate chiefs a communication to the effect that negotiations with Japan appeared to have ended, that Japanese action was unpredictable, that hostilities were momentarily possible and precautions should be taken accordingly.

Part XII relates that the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department ordered alert effective November 27th which was maintained until December 7th. Also, that the Commandant of the Naval district called a conference of destroyer commanders that they would be on the alert. The fleet commander made certain dispositions of units and ordered that any Japanese submarine found in the area be attacked, (the latter being beyond his authority to order).

Part XVIII relates that in the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 A. M. It proved to be a submarine and was sunk. A destroyer was dispatched to investigate but no alert warnings were issued.

In Summary it is stated that as early as October 16th the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack and the warnings indicated war.

Excerpt from the Robert Commission's Report
on the Pearl Harbor Disaster

Washington, January, 23, 1942.

The President,

The White House.

Sir: The undersigned were appointed by Executive Order of December 18, 1941, which defined our duties as a commission thus:

Findings of Fact VIII

It has been well known that the policy of the United States as to affairs in the Pacific was in conflict with the policies of other governments. It was realized by the State, War and Navy Departments of the United States that unless these policies were reconciled war in the Pacific was inevitable.

Findings of Fact IX (Excerpt)

Army Message of November 27

The responsible commanders in Hawaii knew that negotiations had been continued through October and November, and were awaiting further developments. November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the commanding general, Hawaiian Department, that the negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this nation should not commit the first overt act; the Department commander was not to be restricted to any course which would jeopardize his defense.

The message directed him, even prior to hostile action, to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as he deemed necessary, but to carry them out in such a way as not to alarm the civil population or disclose his intent. He was directed to the information contained in the message to the minimum of essential officers and to report to the Chief of Staff the measures taken. The purport of this message was communicated by the department commander to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the commanding general and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue, and that subversive activity might be expected.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next few days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kran Peninsula, or possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their naval task forces.

It directed the execution of a defensive deployment in preparation for carrying out war tasks. It stated that Guam, Samoa and Continental Districts had been directed to take appropriate measures

against sabotage and that a similar warning was being sent by the War Department. It ordered the addressee inform naval districts and Army authorities. The commander in chief of the fleet communicated the purport of this message to the general commanding the Hawaiian Department of the Army.

Findings of Fact XII (Excerpts)

After receipt of the message of November 27, the following action was taken:

The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, ordered Alert No. 1 (see next succeeding paragraph) into effect on November 27, and it was maintained in effect until December 7. At the same time he ordered that the aircraft warning system operate daily from 4 a.m. to 7 a.m. The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, in his capacity as base defense officer, called a conference of all the destroyer commanders of the inshore patrol, advised them that something might happen, and that they should be on the alert.

The Commander in Chief of the Fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order that any Japanese submarine found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.

Findings of Fact XVIII (Excerpts)

In the attack on Oahu a suspicious object was sighted in the prohibited area off Pearl Harbor at 6:30 a.m., by the U.S.S. Antares. Between 6:33 and 6:45, this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of a naval patrol plane and the U.S.S. Ward.

A report of this action by the Ward reached the naval base watch officer at 7:12 a.m., who notified his chief of staff. The ready destroyer was dispatched to investigate, but no alert warnings were issued, based upon this report.

Summary of the More Important Facts (Excerpts)

This conviction persisted notwithstanding messages containing warnings and orders, brought to the attention of both commanders over a period of weeks prior to the attack. As early as October 16 the commanders were warned of the possibility of an attack by Japan on the United States and were directed to take precautions and make preparatory dispositions in the light of this information. A significant warning message was communicated to both the local commanders on November 24. On November 27 each responsible commander was warned that hostilities were momentarily possible. The warnings indicated war, and war only.

ロバート委員会報告

真珠灣慘劇ニ關スルロバート委員会報告抜萃（一頁）
拔萃

白照館

華盛頓一九四二年一月二十三日

大統領閣下

閣下 下名等ハ一九四一年十二月十八日付大統領令ニ依リ委員ニ任命セラレタリ。茲令ハ我が委員團ノ任務ニ就キ次ノ如ク規定セリ。

第三（四頁抜萃）

合衆國ノ對太平洋問題政策ガ諸外國ノ政策ト相容レザリシコトハ夙ニ周知ノトコロナリ。是等國家間ノ政策ガ一致スルニ非ザレバ太平洋ニ於テ戰爭ノ回避シ得ラザリシコト亦合衆國國務省陸軍省及ビ海軍省ノ認知シタルトコロナリ

十一月二十七日付陸軍ノ通告（九頁抜萃）

布哇現地諸指揮官ハ米日外交交渉ガ十月ヨリ十一月ニ亘リ引續キ行ハレタルヲ心得ヘ居リ其ノ後ノ發展ニツキテ待機シヤ、アリタリ。

一九四一年十一月二十七日陸軍參謀總長ハ布哇軍管區司令官ニ日本トノ交渉ハ打切ラルモノ、如ク、續行ノ見込極メテ渺少ナルコト、日本ノ行動ハ豫想スベカラザルコト、日本側ヨリノ戦闘開始ハ何時イカナル時ニモ起リ得ルコト戦争不可避ノ場合、合衆國ガ先ンジテ露骨ノ行動ニ出デザルヲ希望スルコト並ニ軍管區司令官ハ其ノ防備ヲ危殆ニ瀕セシムルカ如キ如何ナル方針ニモ拘束セラル、モノニ非ザルコトヲ通達セリ。

該通告ハ敵對行動開始以前ト雖モ司令官ノ必要ナリト認ムル偵察又ハ其他ノ方策ヲ講ズベキコト、但シコレガ實行ニ當リテハ一般民衆ヲ驚カシ若クハ其ノ意圖ヲ曝露スルコトナキ様行ハルベキコトヲ命令セリ。又軍管區司令官ハ右通告内容ノ傳達ヲ最小限度ノ必要缺クベカラザル將校ニ限定スルコトヲ命ゼラレ、併セテ司令官ノ實行セル處置ニ就テ參謀總長ニ報告スベキ様命ゼラレタリ。

本通告ノ要領ハ軍管區司令官ヨリ太平洋艦隊司令長官ニ通告セラレタリ。同日（一九四一年十一月二十七日）軍情情報部長ハ布時軍管區司令官麾下ノ情報官ニ通告ヲ發シ、日本トノ交渉ハ殆ド打切ラレタルコト、其ノ結果トシニ戦闘行爲發生ノ可能性アルコト並ニ暗中破壞的行動ノ予測セラレベキヲ司令官及參謀長ニ傳達スル様命ジタリ。

同日（一九四一年十一月二十七日）海軍作戰部長ハ太平洋艦隊司令長官ニ通告ヲ發シ、本通告ハ實質上戰爭予告ト見做サルベキコト、太平洋情勢ノ安定ヲ齎サントシテ努力ヲ拂ヒタル對日交渉ハ遂ニ打切トナリタルコト、日六ハ數日內ニ攻撃的行動ニ出ザルモノト期待セラル、コト、比律賓、泰、若クハ「ウラツ」半島或ハ又「ボルネオ」ニ海陸ヨリ同時ニ作戰進軍ノ行ハルベキコト日本軍隊ノ兵力及裝備並ニ海軍機動部隊ノ編成ニ依リ窺知セラルベキヲ傳達セリ。

右通告ハ equal 於ケル任務遂行ノ準備トシテ防衛展開ヲ施行スベキコトヲ命ジタリ。本通告ハ又「ダラム」「サモア」及大陸地區ニ於テハ、サボターヂニ對シ適當ナル施策ヲ施スベク命ゼラレタルコト並ニ同様警告

ガ陸軍省ヨリモ發セラレツ、アル旨述べ、受信者ハ更ニ海軍管區及陸軍當局ニ通告スベキコトヲ命ジタリ。依テ陸隊司令長官ハ本通告要旨ヲ布哇電管區司令官ニ通達セリ。

(十國頁拔萃)

十一月二十七日付通告接手後次ノ如キ行動採ラレタリ。

布哇軍管區司令官ハ警報第一號(次項ヲ見ヨ)ヲ十一月二十七日發令シ右ハ十二月七日迄繼續實施セラレタリ。同時ニ司令官ハ同日午前四時ヨリ午前七時マデ空襲警報網ノ活動ヲ命ジタリ。第十四海軍區司令官ハ根據地防衛官ノ交棒ニ於テ空襲警報網ノ活動ヲ命ジタリ。第十海軍區司令官ハ根生ノ懸念アルコト並ニ全艦警戒態勢ニ入ルベキ事ヲ勸告セリ。艦隊司令官ハ前哨點ヲ布哇群島南方及西方ニ擴充強化ノ目的ヲ以テ、其ノ艦隊中ノ一部ヲ或ル位置ニ配置シ、又「オアフ」島周邊ノ作戦地域内ニ日本潛水艦ヲ發見シタル時ハ之ヲ攻撃スベシト命令セリ。如斯命令ハ海軍省ノ司令長官ニ與ヘタル權限ヲ越エタルモノナリ。

(二頁拔萃)

「オアフ」島攻撃中、合衆國軍艦「アンタレス」號ハ午前六時三十分、眞珠灣外禁止區域ニ於テ奇怪ナル物体ヲ望見セリ。此ノ物体ハ小型潜水艦ナリシガ、海軍警戒機及合衆國軍艦「ウオイド」號ハ午前六時三十三分ヨリ六時四十五分ニ至ル間、共同之ヲ攻撃、撃沈セリ。

此ノ戰國報告ハ午前七時十二分「ウオイド」號ヨリ海軍根據地監視官ノ許ニ通達セラレ、監視官ハ是ヲ參謀長ニ通告セリ。出動態勢ニアリタル一驅逐艦ハ直ニ之ガ調査ノ爲メ派遣セラレタルガ、此ノ報告ニ基キテ何等警戒警報發令セラレタルコトナカリキ。

(三五頁拔萃)

此ノ信念（日本ニ如斯襲撃ヲ行フ意思ナシトノ）ハ攻撃ニ先立ツ數週間前ニ警戒ト命令トヲ發メタル通牒ヲ以テ兩司令官ノ注意ヲ喚起セラレタルニ拘ラズ依然持續セラレタリ。既ニ十月十六日ノ早期ニ於テ兩司令官ハ日本ガ合衆國領土ニ攻撃ヲ加フベキ可能性アルコトヲ警告セラレ、本

通告ニ徴シ豫防手段ヲ講ジ準備的處置ヲ採ルベキコトヲ命ゼラレ居リタリ。十一月二十四日ニハ現知西村軍官ニ一ノ意味深キ重大ナル警告的通告ヲ送達セラレタリ。更ニ十一月二十七日ニ及ビテハ各關係指揮官ニ對シテ戰爭ノ一觸即發ノ危機ニアルヲ警告セラレタリ。此ノ警告ハ戰爭ノ勃發ヲ示唆スルモノ以外ノ何物デモナカリシナリ。