

Doc. 2051

(182)

Doc # 2051

4

Vol. 51

Congress of the United States

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

February 1, 1946

Washington, D. C.

Pages: 9474 to 9654

NATIONAL { 4266
4267
4268

WARD & PAUL

(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

C O N T E N T S

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

SMITH, Vice Admiral William Ward (Resumed)

9475

SAFFORD, Captain Laurance Fry
United States Navy

9564

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

S. Con. Res. 27

- - -

Friday, February 1, 1946

- - -

Congress of the United States,
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of Pearl Harbor Attack,
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at
10:00 a.m., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,
Ferguson and Brewster.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: Seth W. Richardson, General Counsel;
Samuel H. Kaufman, Associate General Counsel, and John E.
Masten, of counsel, for the Joint Committee.

- - -

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

Vol. 51

(4)

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

1 The Chairman: The committee will be in order.

2 When the examination of Admiral Smith was suspended
3 the other day, Mr. Murphy was in the process of examining,
4 so you may proceed.

5 TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL WILLIAM WARD SMITH,

6 UNITED STATES NAVY

7 (Resumed)

8 Admiral Smith: Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief state-
9 ment, sir?

10 The Chairman: Yes.

11 Admiral Smith: In connection with the length of the
12 meeting between Admiral Kimmel and Captain Zacharias, when
13 I last took the stand the Chairman remarked on the fact that
14 Admiral Kimmel had agreed that the meeting was an hour and
15 a half long, and I had said 15 minutes. I have searched
16 the record of Admiral Kimmel's testimony, and I cannot find
17 that anywhere he mentioned any time.

18 However, sometime prior to his testimony, in the presence
19 of two or more members of his staff, the legal staff, he
20 told me that the meeting was, as he placed it, not more than
21 30 minutes.

22 The Chairman: I was speaking from memory when I was
23 quoting him.

24 Admiral Smith: Yes. I would like to make a brief
25

Witness Smith

1 statement of fact to the committee in connection with the
2 berthing system at Pearl Harbor. I believe this is pertinent
3 to the testimony of two witnesses whom I have heard, and
4 possibly to that of more whom I did not hear.
5

6 General Marshall, when asked how long it would take
7 for the Fleet to sortie from Pearl Harbor, qualified his
8 answer by stating it depended on whether the ships were headed
9 in or out. Captain McCollum, in his testimony --

10 Mr. Keefe: (Interposing) May I inquire, you said
11 General Marshall? Did I understand you correctly?

12 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, General Marshall. He was
13 asked the question: Had the message gone through how long
14 would it take the Fleet to go out? Captain McCollum, in
15 discussing what is now called the bomb plot message, where
16 Pearl Harbor is divided into five sections, five areas,
17 said possibly because in some of those areas ships were
18 headed in while in others they were headed out.

19 Now anywhere in Pearl Harbor, to turn a big ship,
20 battleship or carrier, results in a temporary blocking of
21 the passage. For that reason, and to facilitate very
22 quick sortie, either day or night, all big ships throughout
23 the period of Admiral Kimmel's command, all big ships, on
24 entering Pearl Harbor, were turned around and pointed out
25 before they were moored. That reduced the tugboat operations

Witness Smith

1 in getting them clear. All other ships, cruisers and
 2 destroyers, were nested between buoys and they were enabled
 3 to get out without the use of tugs, and as all ships could
 4 pass on either side of Ford Island there was no difficulty
 5 on the part of the light forces in getting clear when the
 6 battleships were leaving their moorings.

7 Like Captain McCollum, I was once a Fleet Operations
 8 Officer and I know that when the Fleet went to Pearl Harbor
 9 once per year, or once in two years, it was a staff study
 10 proposition to get the Fleet into Pearl Harbor and practically
 11 an all-day job to get them out.

12 We had been working in 1941 in and out of Pearl Harbor
 13 so much that we could clear the entire Fleet in about three
 14 hours. The only limit to getting them out was the fact
 15 that they had to go in single file through the channel entrance,
 16 and that the speed was limited to 12 knots. Beyond that,
 17 in shallow water, the light forces pulled such a wave that
 18 they would have wrecked everything on the beach on both
 19 sides.

20 But there was never any difficulty in sortieing and,
 21 as I said, the big ships were always headed out.

Hook
 follows 23

24

25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness 3010

h3.

1 The Chairman: Go ahead, Congressman Murphy.

2 Mr. Murphy: Admiral Smith, you testified, did you not,
3 before Admiral Hart?
4

5 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

6 Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to page 38 of the
7 testimony, your testimony before Admiral Hart. At that
8 time you were asked this question:

9 "What was the result in your opinion, of these person-
10 nel and materiel shortages on the training program, the
11 efficiency of the training program of the Fleet?

12 "Answer. I think it did not lower the efficiency
13 of the Pacific Fleet. As a matter of fact the complements
14 had just been revised, and I have always felt that they
15 were unnecessarily large. The Fleet was adequately manned,
16 and I consider the ships very efficiency, and the effi-
17 ciency of the Fleet was not harmed by this, but the Com-
18 mander in Chief was looking into the future when he would
19 have to send these men home for new construction."

20 Were you asked that question, and did you make that
21 answer?

22 Admiral Smith: That is correct. If I may do so,
23 I would like to modify it slightly.

24 I will say that I went into the Hart Board absolutely
25 cold. In the year immediately following Pearl Harbor, I

h2

1 Witness Smith Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 was at sea practically all the time, with six different
3 flagships from the Coral Sea through Midway, and six
4 months in the Aleutians.

5 At the time I was called before the Hart Board I
6 had a busy wartime job, and since I never kept a diary,
7 I had no papers to refresh my memory. I believe my testi-
8 mony, now that I have had a chance to think about it, is
9 probably better than it was then -- on the other hand, it
10 may be worse. In either case, I stand responsible for my
11 testimony.

12 As to the efficiency of the Fleet, I did believe that
13 the complements as revised were larger than necessary at
14 that time because we had not received the additional anti-
15 aircraft guns and radar and many things that we needed.

16 The Fleet was in a very efficient condition. We had
17 the highest type of men I have ever seen in this Navy at
18 that time. They learned quickly.

19 I believe what is meant in men being demanded more and
20 more, it required more constant training; whereas if you
21 had a crew that is well experienced, every man knows his
22 station, and knows what to do, you do not require this
23 constant day and night training that you have to have.

24 Very few officers had ever seen one of these permanent
25 crews.

h3

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 I had one on one occasion for two years, which makes
3 all the difference in the world. We did not have it
4 then. But the efficiency of the Fleet was not impaired by
5 the turnover, in my opinion.

Larry
fls

6 Mr. Murphy: You were also asked this question:

7 "Q Did that condition ever develop prior to the
8 7th of December whereby the Fleet was reduced due to
9 transfers to new construction?

10 "A No, it did not; not below the level necessary."

11 And again, question 47:

12 "Q Did any of these matters affect the maintenance
13 of the Fleet and the efficient condition of maintenance
14 of materiel?

15 "A No. Units of the Fleet were sent to the Coast
16 shortly before Admiral Kimmel assumed his duties of
17 Commander in Chief for degaussing and the installation
18 of armor -- what do you call it, splinter armor around
19 the decks and anti-aircraft guns. We had a plan mapped
20 out approximately a year in advance for the overhaul of
21 ships when they needed docking and repairs, and that was
22 continued and was in effect when the attack was made on
23 Pearl Harbor. The materiel condition of the Fleet was
24 all right. It was satisfactory to the Commander in
25 Chief."

hl

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

And again, question 50:

"Q Did these conditions such as you have outlined have any adverse effect on the morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet?

"A As far as morale and health of the personnel of the Fleet is concerned, remember that the Fleet went out there in April of 1940, with the idea of carrying on a six-weeks Fleet problem, and was held out there indefinitely."

There is considerable more in that paragraph, but I just read that part.

Now, question 51:

"Q Did the fact that the Fleet was based at Pearl Harbor rather than on the mainland, affect the material conditions and the materiel readiness of the fleet?

"A No, it did not."

And Question 52:

"Q For war?

"A No, it did not. I might add to that last statement that he often discussed the question of the condition of the Fleet and we felt that it was better out there than when it had been based on San Pedro, and I remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going out for

h2

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 the day, and shooting, that he found the best thing was
2 for them to take them out for a week and keep them going
3 day and night."

4 You were asked that question, and you made that
5 answer?

6 Admiral Smith: That is correct. I believe what
7 Admiral Kimmel actually said was if the fleet were to
8 return to the Coast, he would not keep them in San Pedro
9 where they anchored off San Clemantine every night, and
10 came in every Friday, he would keep them going day and
11 night for a week.

12 Mr. Murphy: Well, did you make that statement at
13 any rate, "when it had been based on San Pedro, and I
14 remember the Commander in Chief making the statement that
15 we had been wrong by basing our ships at San Pedro and going
16 out for the day and shooting, that he found the best thing
17 was for them to take them out for a week and keep them
18 going day and night"?

19 Admiral Smith: That is correct.

20 Mr. Murphy: Now, question 53:

21 "Q Within your knowledge, did Kimmel ever make
22 any definite recommendations that the custom of basing the
23 Fleet at Pearl Harbor should be changed -- during 1941,
24 I am speaking of -- and returning to the old way of basing
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

1 on the California coast?

2 "A To my absolute knowledge, he never made such
3 a recommendation by letter or dispatch. In July, I
4 think, 1941, he made a trip to Washington. He was accom-
5 panied only by Captain McMorris. If he ever made any
6 such recommendation, it might have been done at that time,
7 but I think I should have heard about it. I never heard
8 him say to me or any member of his staff that the Fleet
9 should return to the Coast, although he knew that his
10 predecessor had recommended it."

11 Then again, question 55:

12 "Q Then, I understand you to mean that, in your
13 opinion, the general war-mindedness of the personnel of
14 the Fleet was improved by its retention in Hawaii?

15 "A Yes, sir, I think it was. You see, in the early
16 part of our stay out there, the entire fleet was anchored
17 at Lahaina Roads, with all lights on. I think the Fleet
18 did get war-minded, because they began moving into Pearl
19 Harbor, and even moved the carriers in -- moved everything
20 in, and, of course, invariably operated without lights."

21 Admiral, yesterday, in questioning Admiral Bellinger
22 -- you were here, were you?

23 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I was.

24 Mr. Murphy: I recalled that when Admiral Kimmel was
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h4 1 on the stand, he said that he did not take the air matters
2 up with Admiral Bellinger, that he took them up with his
3 own air man, Admiral Davis. I read from testimony yester-
4 day to the effect that Admiral Davis said he apparently
5 was not consulted except as to logistics.

6 Do you know who was consulted in the air matters, if
7 it wasn't Admiral Davis, or Admiral Bellinger?

8 Admiral Smith: I think I can make a good effort to
9 explain that if I may have the time to do it, sir.

10 Davis was the Fleet Aviation Officer. Dispatches
11 such as the war warning, which Davis states he did not get,
12 passed first, of course, through the Communications Officer.

13 The Communications Officer or the Communications Secur-
14 ity Officer, checked on each message the officers to whom
15 it should be shown. These messages were carried about by
16 a junior officer of the Communications Department, and
17 shown to the officers whose names had been checked.

18 A copy of the message was never left with the officer,
19 even with the Commander in Chief. As the Commander in Chief
20 read the secret dispatch, the officer waited outside and
21 took custody of it.

22 Now, Davis and I lived within a few blocks of each
23 other in Honolulu. We almost invariably drove to and from
24 Pearl Harbor together. That gave us a half hour going and
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

1 a half hour returning each day. We talked a great deal
2 of shop and did a great deal of business on those trips.

3 For example, on the evening of the 27th of November,
4 1941, Davis drove his car, a roadster, and had great
5 difficulty in getting to Honolulu because of the caravans
6 of trucks and troops. I do not know what we talked about
7 that afternoon, but I think it very probable that we
8 talked about the war warning.

9 Davis was a very good friend of mine and I had no
10 secrets from him on anything that happened. I think it
11 might be well to read the duties of the Fleet Aviation
12 Officer as written in Staff Instructions, signed by me,
13 and approved by Admiral Kimmel on 14 July, 1941:

14 "Fleet Aviation Officer --

15 "(a) advises with reference to:

16 "(1) all aircraft operations and aviation matters
17 including those pertaining to policy with respect
18 to:

19 "(A) materiel; (B) personnel; (C) gunnery and
20 bombing; (D) radio.

21 "(2) aircraft operations and aviation shore
22 facilities.

23 "(3) coordination of aviation activities of the
24 Fleet.
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

"(4) employment of aircraft in tactical exercises, analyses and reports thereon.

"(5) by the development of aircraft tactics, gunnery, and doctrine.

"(6) Naval air operating policy.

"(b) assists War Plans Officer in the preparation of war plans.

"(c) keeps informed as to the effectiveness of aircraft units of the Fleet.

"(d) assists Operations Officer in the preparation of fleet schedules dealing with aircraft and aircraft services.

"(e) consults gunnery officer in connection with aircraft and anti-aircraft gunnery. --"

Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I have no objection to your reading that, but will it in any way clear the fact that the air man was not consulted about these matters, and was not shown the war warning and the other messages?

Admiral Smith: I am merely trying to confirm an impression that I have that he was consulted. Now, I don't know what was shown to him, but his desk was almost adjoining that of the Operations Officer --

Mr. Murphy: Are you going to show us by way of contradiction of his sworn testimony something in the Staff

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h7

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

regulations to the effect that he should have been shown them but was not shown them?

Admiral Smith: No, sir. I am telling you that he was an excellent Fleet Aviation Officer and these were some of the reasons why he had to keep in close touch, and he did.

AL
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

LaCharity (3) am
follows
Hook
AL-1

9488

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Murphy: He was an excellent Fleet Aviation Officer.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: And you had the number two aviation man at Pearl Harbor, you had some of the best air brains there, and they both say they weren't consulted.

Admiral Smith: We had another air man at Pearl Harbor.

Mr. Murphy: Was he the man consulted?

Admiral Smith: Davis was consulted by the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Murphy: You heard me read yesterday testimony where he said he wasn't?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Now, you say there was another air man there?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Mr. Murphy: Who was that?

Admiral Smith: Admiral Halsey was the number one air man in the whole area. He had more planes than all of them.

Mr. Murphy: Admiral Halsey was a busy man, was he not?

Admiral Smith: When Halsey came into port the first thing he did was to come over to see the Commander in Chief.

Mr. Murphy: When did Halsey leave port, Admiral, before December 7?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

Admiral Smith: He left on the 28th.

2

3

Mr. Murphy: The 28th. And the message came in on the 27th, didn't it?

4

5

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

6

Mr. Murphy: So that he was gone from then until after December 7?

7

8

Admiral Smith: That is correct.

9

Mr. Murphy: So surely he wasn't consulted, in his absence?

10

11

Admiral Smith: No, sir, but he was present, he saw the 27th message.

12

13

Mr. Murphy: He saw the 27th message and went out with orders to shoot down every plane seen and to sink every submarine in the ocean, every submarine sighted; is that not correct?

14

15

16

17

Admiral Smith: That is what I understand him to say; that was not his orders but I understand that is what he says.

18

19

Mr. Murphy: That is what he did with his ships, wasn't it?

20

21

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

22

Mr. Murphy: Now, as I understand it, on the night of the 27th you were going over to the City of Honolulu in your car --

23

24

Admiral Smith: No, Captain Davis' car. He was driving.

25

Mr. Murphy: Yes. And the Army had some men out and

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 some materiel out, the words were blocked?

3 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Murphy: So that every civilian could at least see
5 that the roads were blocked with the Army going on an alert?

6 Admiral Smith: That is correct.

7 Mr. Murphy: There is no doubt in your mind that anyone
8 who had eyes could see that the Army was making some special
9 move?

10 Admiral Smith: Not only then but after that they were
11 at the bridges along the highways; they were very much in
12 evidence.

13 Mr. Murphy: Different than they had been before November
14 27?

15 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

16 Mr. Murphy: Now, I direct your attention, Admiral, to
17 question 106:

18 "Q. What about the carriers?

19 "A. We had no knowledge of those; no. The Fleet
20 Intelligence Officer said that he did not know where they were."
21 That was your impression?

22 Admiral Smith: That was my impression at that time.
23 I am informed now that I was in error. The only one that
24 I recalled was the report of two carriers in the Marshalls
25 sometime previously.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

Mr. Murphy: I direct your attention to question 87:

3

"Q: Do you recall the Fleet Aviation Officer having given any opinions or advice on the matter?

4

5

"A. No, sir; I do not recall that he ever did."

6

That was Admiral Davis, wasn't it?

7

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

8

Mr. Murphy: Question 85:

9

"Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier raid, the Army radar could not be depended upon to give warning?

10

11

12

"A: Yes, sir. "

13

That was your testimony, was it not?

14

Admiral Smith: That is correct.

15

Mr. Murphy: Now, Admiral Kimmel says that, he expected a warning, was quite sure he was going to get a warning of 100 miles. How would you account for that difference of opinion on a vital subject if this had been discussed at a conference?

16

17

18

19

20

Admiral Smith: I believe it has been thoroughly covered that the radar had been working and had been working in exercises with the Fleet very shortly previous to Pearl Harbor but the system was not complete. The Information Center, as I understand it, was not working. As the radar works today there would have been in one room a representative

21

22

23

24

25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 from each command.

2
3 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I would like to talk about
4 December 7 and prior thereto. As I understand it, you say
5 that you knew you would not get a warning. Admiral Kimmel
6 felt that he would get a warning. Now, if there was a
7 conference, how do you account for that disparity, you feel-
8 ing you were not going to get a warning and the Commander
9 in Chief saying he expected and was assured at one time of
10 200miles and later correct it 100 miles, that he was depend-
11 ing on Army radar for a warning and you, as Chief of Staff,
12 say you knew there wasn't going to be any.

13 Admiral Smith: I did.

14 Mr. Murphy: Question 85:

15 "Q. You also knew that as against a Japanese carrier
16 raid, the Army radar could not be depended on the give
17 warning?

18 "A. Yes, sir."

19 Admiral Smith: That is correct.

20 Mr. Murphy: Question 86:

21 "Q. Then, if you realized the danger of such an air
22 raid, which events proved was not only possible but probable,
23 you would have seen that outside of anti-aircraft gunfire,
24 there was no security to our installations in Pearl Harbor,
25 including the Fleet, -- is that right?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

"A. Yes, sir."

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Now, Admiral, I would like to ask you a question or two about your feeling about the competency of the Army flyers. Did you have an opinion on that matter? And particularly I would like to read to you question 81:

"Q. What do you know about their combat efficiency, particularly as regards personnel.

"A. Well, we didn't have a very high regard for it. That was based upon our observations during Fleet operations, when their Flying Fortresses would come over at almost smokestack level and showed an utter disregard for possible anti-aircraft fire. In the operations between our planes and theirs, our aviators, possibly prejudiced, expressed the opinion that they were not very good."

Question 82:

"Q. Now, you are talking about the Army bombers, or the Army pursuits?

"A. Both."

Was that the feeling of the Navy at that time, Admiral, in regard to the flyers?

Admiral Smith: I do not know what the feeling of the Navy was. That was probably an unfortunate statement of mine. I believe that I gathered most of that information from my conversations to and from Pearl Harbor with the Fleet

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2 aviator.

3 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I might say you are justified
4 in that --

5 Admiral Smith: I might also say probably he got his
6 reports from young aviators, who were rivals, and who were
7 prejudiced.

8 Mr. Murphy: At any rate you stated that?

9 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Question 84:

11 "Q. Do you say that because of the doubt you had of
12 the efficiency of Army aircraft?

13 "A. That is part of it, yes, sir. I may be unjust
14 to the Army in that. It may have been prejudice on the
15 part of Navy flyers, but the opinions expressed by our
16 aviators, as I saw, were not very complimentary to the Army
17 flyers."

18 You were asked question 90:

19 "Q. Do you recall whether the tasks assigned the
20 United States Pacific Fleet were offensive or defensive,
21 in their nature?

22 "A. My recollection is -- they were defensive."

23 You were in error a little in part there?

24 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. As I say, I went into that
25 cold, and I believe they told me to refresh my memory on that.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Murphy: There is one other thing I would like to ask you in conclusion. When you were before the Navy Board you made a statement from which I get the impression that the feeling you and the entire staff had was that the Fleet had a job to do, to carry out a certain defensive operation, and that it was not a part of the Fleet's duty to be defending Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith: That is correct.

Mr. Murphy: And is it a fair assumption that the fact that the Fleet did have this offensive problem ahead of them, that having concentrated so much on the anxiety to be ready for the offensive, they overlooked the duty they had by command from the Chief of Naval Operations to help and aid the Army in the defense of Pearl Harbor because of the deficiency of the local forces in materiel?

Admiral Smith: I would not say that they overlooked anything. The matter of an air attack on the Fleet, either at its base or at sea, was frequently the subject of discussion in the staff and with the Commander in Chief.

Shefner
follows
10:35

Shefner
fls La
Char

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

I do not recall at which conferences these discussions were held but they were so frequent that I would say we did not overlook the possibility. We did not expect the attack.

Mr. Murphy: Well, I do not mean overlook in the sense of entirely ignoring, but the fact is you were so offensive minded that you stressed offense to the detriment, perhaps, of a little bit of defense in order to protect the base itself.

Admiral Smith: Well, I believe that is for you gentlemen to decide.

Mr. Murphy: All right.

Admiral Smith: I did not think so at the time.

Mr. Murphy: Well, I have no other questions. I am awfully sorry, Admiral, to have kept you waiting.

The Vice Chairman: Are you through?

Mr. Murphy: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Brewster? Not present. Mr. Gearhart? You passed, I believe, once, didn't you?

Mr. Gearhart: I did once but I would like to ask a question or two now, if I may.

The Vice Chairman: You told the committee that you did pass, as I recall it.

Mr. Gearhart: I think nearly all of us did.

The Vice Chairman: I think all of us did down to, - as

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 I remember, Mr. Murphy was examining Admiral at his last ap-
3 pearance, and I was thinking no one passed except possibly
4 Mr. Keefe and Senator Ferguson. If there is no objection from
5 the committee I think you can go ahead.

6 Mr. Murphy: I think the facts are the "Admiral had been
7 taken around down the line and when he was about to be ex-
8 cused I asked permission of the committee to ask him a few
9 questions.

10 The Vice Chairman: All right.

11 Mr. Gearhart: I think everybody has passed.

12 The Vice Chairman: All right, you are probably correct.

13 Mr. Gearhart of California will inquire, Admiral.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Admiral, were you with the Pacific Fleet
15 during the days when Admiral Richardson was the Commander-in-
16 Chief?

17 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. From June 1939 -- well, I was
18 in the Fleet when Admiral Richardson took over in 1940. I
19 joined the Fleet in 1939 with the command of the cruiser Brook-
20 lyn.

21 Mr. Gearhart: When did you become a member of Admiral
22 Richardson's staff, if you ever did?

23 Admiral Smith: I ne ver did. I was present at a confer-
24 ence between Admiral Richardson and Admiral Kimmel on Admiral
25 Richardson's flagship about mid January prior to the time

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 that Admiral Kimmel had taken over but after Admiral Kimmel
3 had asked me to become his Chief of Staff.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Those were conferences after Admiral
5 Kimmel had learned that he was to take over?

6 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: As Fleet Chief of Staff you were present
8 at all staff meetings?

9 Admiral Smith: All of the important ones, yes, sir,
10 where the Commander-in-Chief was present.

11 Mr. Gearhart: I will ask you if there were any discus-
12 sions at the staff meetings you attended from the beginning
13 down until the fateful day of the Japanese problem insofar
14 as hostilities with the United States was concerned?

15 Admiral Smith: Well, there were many discussions along
16 that line, yes, sir.

17 Mr. Gearhart: And in those discussions members of the
18 staff would endeavor to put themselves in the position of the
19 Japanese and try to think as the Jap would in order to be
20 able to think through the answers to the questions that might
21 be in the Japanese mind?

22 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: In those discussions that preceded the
24 catastrophe of December 7th did anybody in any of those staff
25 meetings raise the question of the necessity for Japan's

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 immobilization of our Fleet?

3 Admiral Smith: Not that I recall, no, sir.

4 Mr. Gearhart: Well, everyone knew that Japan was inter-
5 ested in the Southwest Pacific?

6 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

7 Mr. Gearhart: Everyone expected that their ultimate
8 objective was to conquer and to consolidate their conquests
9 in that area?

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, but also it must be remembered
11 that the Japanese undoubtedly knew that our Fleet could not
12 leave Pearl Harbor to interfere with their movement to the
13 Southwest. We did not have the auxiliaries to do it. I be-
14 lieve Admiral Kimmel testified that we had 11 oilers, only 4
15 of which could fuel at sea, whereas I know from experience
16 this summer as Commander Surface Forces, Pacific, that for
17 operations that we were carrying out in the Far East we had
18 71 modern oilers with the Fleet that could fuel at sea and
19 467 commercial tankers on the pipe line and the same was true
20 of food and ammunition. We did not have these things out
21 there in the Pacific Ocean or in the Atlantic which could have
22 supported a movement so far west as the Philippines.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Why are you so sure or were you so sure
24 at that time that the Japanese knew that we were that short
25 of auxiliary ships?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Admiral Smith: Well, we were very positive that they were watching our every move. All they had to do is stand on the hills surrounding Pearl Harbor and they could see what we had.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, if they were sure of that and sure of our lack of capacity to go to the aid of the Philippines and interfere with their operations in the South Pacific why did they take this great chance and come to the Hawaiian Islands to immobilize the American Fleet?

Admiral Smith: I do not know. That is where they took us by surprise.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, if they knew that we lacked the auxiliary ships and supplyships so necessary and the other necessary equipment to go to the aid of the Philippines their coming to Hawaii was an unnecessary action and one which would result in no benefit to them whatsoever, isn't that correct?

Admiral Smith: I believe that is the way it turned out, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, in view of the fact that they came are you willing to say that in your opinion that they knew that we could not go to the aid of MacArthur had we desired to do so?

Admiral Smith: It would appear from the results that they did not but I do not know why they could not have known.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 I would have thought that if in an attack on Pearl Harbor
3 their idea would have been to blast out the oil tanks and the
4 machine shops, then we would have been helpless for a very
5 long time.

6 Mr. Gearhart: But in coming to the Islands to attack
7 our Fleet in Pearl Harbor they risked a good proportion or
8 segment of their own fleet, did they not?

9 Admiral Smith: Very much so, yes, sir.

10 Mr. Gearhart: And since there was no purpose in their
11 mind to serve by immobilizing our Fleet doesn't it seem absurd
12 that they should have come at all?

13 Admiral Smith: It does, but long before Pearl Harbor,
14 sir, we often said it was impossible to read the Oriental
15 mind, what they might do.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Well, now, supposing our Fleet had been
17 taken to the Pacific Coast do you think they would have still
18 risked this large armada of theirs in going to the Pacific
19 Coast to immobilize the Fleet which could not be, according
20 to your testimony, any source of danger to them?

21 Admiral Smith: I have been interested here in some of
22 the naval strategy I have heard from officers who are not
23 naval strategists and I do not claim to be one by any means,
24 but it is my opinion had the Fleet been on the Pacific Coast
25 the Japanese would not have attacked it in the manner of the

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 attack on Pearl Harbor.

3 It is ridiculous to believe that a large force such as
4 the Japs had could approach San Pedro without being detected
5 because that part of the ocean is pretty well filled with
6 merchant ships. They would have been detected by someone.

7 Then there was the question they would probably have
8 had to fuel three times on the way over and the same on the
9 way back. They would not have dared, in my opinion, to ap-
10 proach the West Coast of the United States.

11 I have even heard testimony that they might have attacked
12 at Panama or anywhere. I suppose that includes New York, I
13 do not know, but I do not believe that any intelligent enemy
14 would attack the West Coast and leave Hawaii as a place from
15 which we could hit it on its way back, because it is a simple
16 matter to fly bombers from the United States to the fields on
17 Hawaii.

18 What I believe the Japs would have done had our Fleet been
19 on the coast is that they would have taken Oahu or one of
20 the other islands of the Pacific in an amphibious operation
21 and it is my opinion that they could have done it.

22 Mr. Gearhart: It is your opinion that they could what?

23 Admiral Smith: That they could have done it.

24 Mr. Gearhart: That they could have made a landing on
25 Oahu if our Fleet had been on the Pacific Coast?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2 Admiral Smith: I would say that from what we know now
3 of amphibious operations certainly we could have done it to
4 other islands. Maui, Hawaii, were not protected at all. They
5 could have taken one of those islands without any difficulty
6 and from there attack Pearl Harbor.

7 I do not believe that they would have risked their fleet
8 to the Pacific Coast of the United States without first
9 knocking out Pearl Harbor.

10 Mr. Gearhart: Anyway, the --

11 Admiral Smith: I am an amateur strategist like the rest
12 of them. I am just giving my opinions.

13 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I know you haven't got your ruler
14 and your rocking chair there but I am willing to concede that
15 you are a naval strategist because I don't think you could
16 live for so many years in that sort of atmosphere and in con-
17 stant touch with people who do know that without being one
18 yourself, but anyway it is plain to you as one who is not a
19 strategist that the hazards to the Japanese fleet and to the
20 Japanese as such would have been greatly increased if they had
21 attempted to negotiate an additional two thousand miles to
22 the Pacific Coast?

23 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Gearhart: And the reasons for it are that they would
25 have been compelled to cross many a shipping lane which would

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

be in use at that time even though one was anticipated?

Admiral Smith: Yes.

Mr. Gearhart: All right. You said no intelligent enemy would do a thing of that kind. You have already stripped the enemy of intelligence in saying that their expedition to Hawaii was a useless one.

Admiral Smith: I would say even the Japanese would not have attempted that, in my opinion.

Mr. Gearhart: So you say this whole Pacific operation was one that was devoid of intelligence, not only the question of intelligence work. I mean intelligence in the contemplation of that which exists under the canopy known as the skull. Is that correct?

Admiral Smith: I think so, yes.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, in view of the fact that the Japanese were not prepared for that landing, were not prepared for any landing operations, brought no transports with their armada, it would seem that they had but one objective and that was to immobilize our Fleet.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, there is no question about it.

Mr. Gearhart: And in view of the fact that you say they knew or must have known or must be held to have known that we had no auxiliary ships, which would make it impossible for our Fleet to be ready to interfere in any way with their

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 operations in their advance in the Southwest Pacific -- I am
3 asking you for your hind thought -- why did they do all these
4 things?

5 Admiral Smith: We had for years had a plan of what we
6 would do in the Pacific in case of war with Japan and it had
7 been studied at the War College for years. It was steam
8 roller tactics, but we departed from that plan in this war.
9 I do not know but I think it possible that the Japanese had
10 had a similar plan for years and they have shown in this war
11 that once a plan is made they rarely depart from it.

12 It may be they carried that plan too long. I mean if
13 they had had a plan years ago to do that, to immobilize our
14 Fleet, they naturally would not suppose that our Fleet could
15 move to the westward that far. I think that it was the great-
16 est mistake they ever made to have hit Pearl Harbor as they
17 did but it is without question that the purpose was to im-
18 mobilize our heavy ships.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Now, have you learned either prior to
20 Pearl Harbor or since Pearl Harbor anything which would lead
21 you to believe that they possessed this WPL No. 46?

22 Admiral Smith: No, sir, I do not believe they had. I
23 have not heard anything to that effect.

24 Mr. Gearhart: Then in coming to the Hawaii attack you
25 do not know that they knew about our intentions with respect

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

to the Marshalls?

Admiral Smith: No, I do not; no, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: The fact that they came when there was so little reason behind their coming, does it not suggest to your mind that possibly they had some idea of WPL-46 and wanted to prevent us from going into the Marshalls and interfering with their installations in that neighborhood?

Admiral Smith: It does look that way, yes, sir. Now, it may be possible that such information is now available in the Navy Department. A great deal of intelligence has been gathered after the war I understand. That is a very interesting subject and it may be true; I don't know.

Mr. Gearhart: Now, did you have discussions in the staff meetings prior to Pearl Harbor about these same things that I have been interrogating you about these last few minutes?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, we had them very frequently.

Mr. Gearhart: Was there an assumption upon the part of those who participated in those staff conferences that the Japanese were too intelligent to have undertaken such an operation against Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: Do you think that any sense of security was developed or grew from that conviction among the members of the staff?

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Smith: It is possible. I do not know.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Well, drawing upon your opinion, because
4 you were there and you took part in those conferences, I will
5 ask you do you think that the Navy air force would have been
6 used in long distance patrols if they did not have that con-
7 viction and that belief that the Japanese were too intelli-
8 gent to have embarked upon so dangerous an enterprise and so
9 foolhardy an enterprise in the light of the lack of profit
10 to result from an unsuccessful attack? Does that account for
11 the lack of patrols and lack of plans for the protection of
12 the island against such an attack?

13 Admiral Smith: I would say no, sir. I believe that the
14 lack of patrols was not only due to the small number of planes
15 we had and the offensive operations that were planned, where
16 it was stated maximum operations out of Wake would take a
17 minimum of two patrol squadrons to be held at Oahu, - I be-
18 lieve the greatest influence was our intelligence as to the
19 position of the Japanese fleet, the fact that we knew they
20 were on the way south, had been seen going south, and although
21 it is true we did not know the position of the carriers, the
22 last intelligence information that we had and I believe that
23 the intelligence issued in the biweekly bulletin by ONI on
24 1 December showed that the main carrier strength was in
25 Japanese waters.

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 It has been testified here that planes could have been
3 sent out there and that the crews would have broken down in a
4 few weeks and the planes would have broken down also. When
5 the time came that there was an indication of any such pos-
6 sible movement toward Hawaii, then it would have been time to
7 put the planes out to their maximum at the risk of wearing
8 them out entirely, but we had no such intelligence and did
9 not expect it. Everyone kept talking about the Philippines,
10 Guam and the Kra Peninsula; they never got east of that.
11 I don't know what else I can add to that, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: Well, let us pass the whole subject.

13 Now, in some of the testimony that has been taken in the
14 course of this investigation it has appeared that there was a
15 radio silence order which was made shortly before Pearl Har-
16 bor. Do you know anything about that?

17 Admiral Smith: On the part of whom, sir?

18 Mr. Gearhart: I got the impression it was made by the
19 Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet restricting the use of radio
20 by ships at sea. Is that not correct?

21 Admiral Smith: That had been an order in effect for a
22 very long time. Individual ships were not allowed to use
23 their radio. If a message was absolutely necessary it would
24 be sent out by one of the task force commanders perhaps.
25 They even went so far -- well, I wouldn't be so sure of that

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 because I get events just before Pearl Harbor and just after
3 mixed, but it was the practice when it was necessary to send
4 a message either to fly planes inshore and send it over a shore
5 station or if too far at sea to send a destroyer on the flank
6 fifty to a hundred miles and have him broadcast the message
7 from there so that no one could out the Fleet in.

8 Mr. Gearhart: So that the position of the ships or the
9 group of ships might not be disclosed?

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, and when the move of taking
11 ships was made from the Pacific to the Atlantic in May 1941
12 they observed radio silence all the way and arrived at Panama
13 with their names painted out and were supposed to have gone
14 through as a complete surprise. Those ships had no radio
15 whatever all the way.

16 Mr. Gearhart: Were any changes tightening or broadening
17 the radio restriction made within a few weeks before Pearl
18 Harbor?

19 Admiral Smith: No, sir. That had been going on for, -
20 well, almost from the time that Admiral Kimmel took over,
21 possibly before.

22 Mr. Gearhart: We have had the log of the USS Boise be-
23 fore us and it discloses that on the 27th and 28th of November
24 of 1941 that ship encountered enemy ships in Guam waters to
25 whom they signaled but their signals were not returned and

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

then the Boise turned out of its course.

3

4

5

Admiral Smith: I believe she was on the way from Pearl Harbor to Manila escorting a transport or something. She was away from the Fleet.

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

Mr. Gearhart: Information has reached me that an argument ensued between the Captain of the ship and the chief Executive Officer as to whether or not radio silence should be broken to transmit that information to American naval authorities in higher authority but that under the letter of the regulation that it was determined not to send that information. You did not receive any radios as Chief of Staff, did you?

14

Admiral Smith: No, sir.

15

16

Mr. Gearhart: Or in general with respect to the presence in American waters around Guam that there was enemy craft?

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Admiral Smith: No, sir. I heard that rumor long after the war. I never heard it at the time. I would say that it is possible. I know of one transport that went out and she carried radar to be delivered to our submarines in the Philippines and the commanding officer told me that his orders from the Navy Department were to destroy the ship if she were overhauled by Japanese forces because conditions were tight, but it is possible the Boise was escorting that ship, in which case he would have been very reluctant to use radio under

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 any conditions.

3 Mr. Gearhart: Wouldn't it have been the duty, - wouldn't
4 you conceive it to have been your duty if you had been Captain
5 of that ship, to have changed your course and gotten beyond
6 the range of the Japanese patrols or warships of whatever
7 type they were and to advise your Commander-in-Chief of their
8 presence in American waters?

9 Admiral Smith: I would not have avoided them unless ~~he~~
10 was too big, but I would have found some way, I believe, to
11 inform the Commander-in-Chief and his best method of doing
12 that was to, if within perhaps three hundred miles of Guam,
13 to have flown one of his planes to shore and sent the message
14 from there.

15 Mr. Gearhart: But that was not done either?

16 Admiral Smith: Sir?

17 Mr. Gearhart: You as Chief of Staff saw no message?

18 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

19 Mr. Gearhart: Or received a message to that effect?

20 Admiral Smith: None whatever, sir. That would have
21 been the Captain's responsibility, what he did by his action,
22 but I know of no such messages.

23 Mr. Gearhart: If you received information at that time,
24 you having just received the so-called war warning message,
25 that the Japanese were prowling American waters in the neighbor-

1 Witness Smith Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
2 hood of Guam, would that have made any difference in your
3 attitude towards the kind of a defense that should have been
4 invoked at Pearl Harbor?

5 Admiral Smith: Well, we had been told that Guam was one
6 of the probable places to come under attack and it could not
7 be defended. I don't know what effect that might have had on
8 us but it seems to me that it would have confirmed the in-
9 formation that they were going to hit Guam and possibly the
10 Philippines. We knew they were on the move to the southward.

11 Mr. Gearhart: But in all messages received they spoke of
12 an attack upon Guam and an attack on Borneo as merely the out-
13 side possibilities, did they not? 1

14 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. One message said "in any di-
15 rection, including Guam and the Philippines."

16 Mr. Gearhart: Yes. And you interpreted that, didn't you,
17 as meaning the outside limits --

18 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I did.

19 Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- of the Japanese operations?

20 Admiral Smith: I did, yes, sir.

21 Mr. Gearhart: Well, would the knowledge that the Japan-
22 ese warships were prowling Guam waters have made any differ-
23 ence in your orders or activities if you had been informed of
24 it?

25 Admiral Smith: It depends upon the nature of the prowl.

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 If they were light forces, not concentrated, they might have
3 been merely scouting their flank to make certain that we did
4 not put something over there.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Well, all right. If you had received air
6 messages that the USS Wright on the 6th of December had sighted
7 planes that they could not identify as bearing American in-
8 signia, unidentified planes, if you had received a radio in-
9 dication to that effect, what would you have done?

10 Admiral Smith: That would depend, of course, upon the
11 position of the USS Wright. I don't know where she was at
12 that time, sir.

13 Mr. Gearhart: According to the testimony she was then
14 three or four hundred miles off Hawaii.

15 Admiral Smith: I never received any such report.

16 Mr. Gearhart: She was returning with Admiral Halsey's
17 contingent.

18 Admiral Smith: I don't remember that rumor. We had
19 another one that went out that Admiral Halsey's planes had
20 sighted two planes that they could not identify but when that
21 was run down it proved to be incorrect. I don't remember--

22 Mr. Gearhart: But this one I am asking you about is
23 not rumor. It is fact. These unidentified planes were fly-
24 ing in American waters surrounding Hawaii just preceding the
25 attack on Hawaii. Now, did you receive any radio messages

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

from the USS Wright --

Admiral Smith: No, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) -- that they had seen this?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, absolutely no. Had we received--

Mr. Gearhart: You have been informed that the log discloses that fact, haven't you, since that time?

Admiral Smith: No, I never heard it until you just told me.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, we have the log before the committee and I read it. Now, the presence of unidentified planes or an unidentifiable plane would indicate that there was a carrier somewhere near, wouldn't it?

Admiral Smith: It could not indicate anything else, sir.

Mr. Gearhart: But because of your order for radio silence no message was received by the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet of this suspicious circumstance?

Admiral Smith: I would not say because of an order for radio silence. I would say it was because the Captain of the ship had very poor judgment. Any order of that nature should be broken in an emergency. I am astounded, if such a thing had happened, why he did not report it because the Wright, as I recall now, was plying between Pearl Harbor and Midway, possibly Wake. He was in our waters.

Mr. Gearhart: Well, it has been disclosed that the ship

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2 was part of the detachment which Admiral Halsey was the com-
3 mander of and had been recently delivering planes to one of
4 the far western islands of the United States.

5 Admiral Smith: It could not have been a part of Admiral
6 Halsey's forces because the Wright is not fast enough to go
7 with that force.

8 Mr. Gearhart: Well, it has been identified by naval
9 experts to have been within three or four hundred miles of
10 Hawaii.

11 Admiral Smith: It is all new to me, sir.

12 Mr. Gearhart: What?

13 Admiral Smith: It is all new to me. I never heard of it.

14 Mr. Gearhart: Then what would you have done if on the 6th
15 day of December a message had been received indicating that
16 there were unidentified planes flying within three or four
17 hundred miles of Hawaii?

18 Admiral Smith: I would have made every effort to locate
19 her both by patrol planes and by the task forces that was in
20 that area not too far away.

21 Mr. Gearhart: You would have probably, even though you
22 had a few planes to keep at your command, you would have
23 inaugurated, would you not --

24 Admiral Smith: Stopped everything.

25 Mr. Gearhart: (Continuing) a distance reconnaissance?

1 W itness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, stopped everything and put all
3 effort on that one problem.

4 Senator Lucas: Will the Congressman yield so that I can
5 ask one question?

6 Mr. Gearhart: I yield, yes.

7 Senator Lucas: What date was the Wright seen?

8 Mr. Gearhart: I understood it to be the 6th.

9 Senator Lucas: The day before the attack?

10 Mr. Gearhart: The day before the attack.

11 Senator Lucas: Thank you.

12 Mr. Murphy: The Wright is shown directly above the
13 islands there. The log is availab le to the members of the
14 committee.

15 Mr. Gearhart: May I have the log of the Wright? It is
16 in my file but I do not know where to look for it.

17 Mr. Kaufman: I have already sent for it, Mr. Congress-
18 man. It will be up in a moment.

19 The Vice Chairman: Counsel has already sent for it. It
20 will be up in a moment.

21 Mr. Kaufman: I have already sent for the log of the
22 Wright and it will be up here in a moment, sir.

23 Mr. Gearhart: Now, while we are waiting for the log,
24 and I won't wait very long for it because we can return to it
25 later, - did you during all of the time that you were acting

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

2 as Chief of Staff see any reports of any shooting or firing
3 between American and Japanese ships?

4 Admiral Smith: None whatever, no, sir.

5 Mr. Gearhart: Would you receive as the Chief of Staff
6 for the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, would you
7 receive any reports from the Asiatic Fleet in that regard if
8 there had been any exchange of fire between American and
9 Japanese ships?

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I am positive we should have
11 because Admiral Hart kept us very well informed on what he
12 was doing. The report would certainly have gone to the Navy
13 Department and it would in any case have gone to us for in-
14 formation.

15 Mr. Gearhart: Then out at Pearl Harbor there was no
16 knowledge of any firing in the Pacific, so far as you know,
17 as between the Fleet of the United States and the fleet of
18 Japan, or any of its ships?

19 Admiral Smith: No, sir. There had not even been a depth
20 charge dropped.

21 Mr. Gearhart: I beg pardon?

22 Admiral Smith: There had not even been a depth charge
23 dropped.

24 Mr. Gearhart: That is, until the morning of the 7th.

25 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

2 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield for a moment?

3 Mr. Gearhart: Yes.

4 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, on the ship location charts which
5 we have been furnished I understand that the Navy have been
6 asked to give the list of the names, but on the 5th and the
7 6th of December there was some ship right up in the vicinity
8 from which that attack came. Now, I don't mean the exact
9 vicinity, but to the north, and it went into Pearl Harbor that
10 Sunday. It was not indicated what that ship was. Do we have
11 those ship location charts here?

12 Admiral Smith: I think it is very probable that that
13 was one of our destroyers.

14 Mr. Murphy: Well, at any rate, on the 5th and 6th Sen-
15 ator Ferguson and I remember observing that there was a ship
16 to the north of Oahu and then it is gradually going in and
17 it is inport on Sunday.

18 I ask counsel if they will produce those ship charts?
19 Will you please produce those ship location charts? They are
20 photostats. Do you have the one I mean? There it is.

21 Senator Ferguson: It is a large map.

22 Mr. Gearhart: Well, I will read this to you:

23 "Saturday, December 6 - 20 to 24. Sighted vessel
24 bearing one point abaft port beam running without lights
25 on course approximately 300 degrees, true, distance four

1824

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1

2

miles. Average steam, 200 lbs., average R.P.M., 86.1."

3

4

5

6

Now, I will ask you if that was sighted, that ship was sighted, - and that seems to be a ship on the seas, - on the 6th day of December and they could not identify it, what would you have done under the silence of the radio order?

7

8

Admiral Smith: Told the ship who reported it to identify it or send a destroyer immediately to investigate.

9

10

11

Mr. Gearhart: Now, here is a ship that had a one point bearing and was running without lights on a course approximately 300 degrees, true, whatever that means.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

Admiral Smith: Of course, the first thing to have been done in that case was to go to the Operations Officer's board and find whether we had a possible ship in that location because a ship then, a merchant ship was not running without lights at that time. If we could not identify her, then send something out to identify her. Of course, I don't know what ship reported this.

19

20

21

22

23

Mr. Gearhart: This was reported by the Wright.

Admiral Smith: Oh, that was reported by the Wright?

Mr. Gearhart: This was recorded in the log of the Wright as of the 6th day of December 1941 between the hours of 20 and 24.

24

25

Now, if that had been reported to you as Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet would that have

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5
- 6
- 7
- 8
- 9
- 10
- 11
- 12
- 13
- 14
- 15
- 16
- 17
- 18
- 19
- 20
- 21
- 22
- 23
- 24
- 25

alerted the Fleet?

Admiral Smith: I believe it would have, yes, sir. The probability, of course, was that that ship was a submarine on the surface.

Shel-- 6
 Shack
 fls 7

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Shack
fls
Shel
hl

1 Witness Smith Questions by: Senator Lucas

2 Senator Lucas: Do I understand it was an unidentified
3 ship rather than an unidentified plane?

4 Mr. Gearhart: This particular item I read reveals
5 the presence of an unidentified surface ship. My interro-
6 gatories prior to getting this long in my hand were in
7 reference to an unidentified aircraft.

8 Senator Lucas: Is the unidentified aircraft in the
9 log also?

10 Mr. Gearhart: I saw it the other time I had the
11 log in my hand. This is an additional item that I have
12 run across.

13 Senator Lucas: What kind of a ship was the Wright,
14 Admiral? It was an airplane tender, was it not?

15 Admiral Smith: The Wright was an airplane tender of
16 the type like the transport Chateau Thierry. They were
17 built during the last war. The bow and stern looked like
18 they were good for 12 knots, and 14 if they were in good
19 shape.

20 Their speed is limited. She carried mostly parts for
21 seaplanes and I believe was on the way to Midway at that
22 time.

23 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield for a question?

24 Mr. Gearhart: I yield.

25 Mr. Murphy: Admiral, I show you a Guide to Symbols,

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h2

1 and then I show you a chart. What would be the technical
2 name of that chart, Admiral, do you know, in the Navy.
3 That would be a ship location chart, would it not?

4 Admiral Smith: No, I would not say so.

5 Mr. Murphy: What would you call that? I understand
6 it is to keep a daily record of the ships of the United
7 States throughout the world.

8 Admiral Smith: Yes. That is a secret chart, and
9 would show the convoys. These are Great Circle routes,
10 of course.

11 Mr. Murphy: Now, with particular reference to the
12 Guide to Symbols, I direct your attention to a ship which
13 is to the north of Pearl Harbor. At what degree would you
14 say that was on the chart, this being 160 here (indicating)?

15 Admiral Smith: It would be about 155 west, I should
16 say.

17 Mr. Murphy: And how many degrees north?

18 Admiral Smith: I should say about three degrees
19 south.

20 Senator Ferguson: How many?

21 Admiral Smith: No, no. That is north latitude. I
22 think that is about 18 degrees north. It looks like it to
23 me. The chart should have in the margin somewhere the
24 latitudes. That is probably about 18 degrees north, I
25 should say.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Murphy: Will you resume your seat, Admiral, and I will put this before you.

I direct your attention to Exhibit 109, a secret chart that is part of exhibit 109, and I direct particularly your attention to a ship to the north of Oahu, and about 155 degrees west longitude, the location being that of the ship in question on the 5th of December, 1941, and I ask you if you will look to the Guide to Symbols and tell us what kind of a ship that is.

Admiral Smith: It would appear to be a patrol vessel.

Mr. Murphy: Now, I show you another exhibit, a chart in the same exhibit, the secret chart for December 6th. With reference to the same patrol vessel, will you compare for us the relative position of the vessel in question on the 6th of December as compared to the 5th? Is there anything that would indicate to you on the chart on the 6th as to the relative position of the vessel which was to the north of Oahu, 155 degrees longitude, on the 5th?

Admiral Smith: It seems to have disappeared from this chart. I see nothing of the same ship or symbol.

Mr. Murphy: At any rate, Admiral, will you look at the map on the wall, the Disposition of U. S. Pacific Fleet, 7 December, 1941, and the point from which the Japanese force came, and compare it with the secret chart

h4

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

1 for December 5? What, in your judgment, is the relative
2 position of the vessel in question to the north of Oahu,
3 as compared with the point from which the Japanese force
4 came. I am referring to this one right here (indicating).

5 Admiral Smith: Yes, I see it. Slightly to the east
6 of the path, through which the Japanese force went.

7 Mr. Murphy: Well, it is in the same general location,
8 is it not?

9 Admiral Smith: It is, yes.

10 Mr. Murphy: On the 5th of December?

11 Admiral Smith: Yes. If you are trying to identify
12 that ship --

13 Mr. Murphy: I would like very much to.

14 Admiral Smith: If you are trying to identify that
15 ship, I would say that since we now know that the Japanese
16 had special code messages arranged between the Consul
17 General and Tokyo about the meaning of a light in one or
18 two houses on the north shore of Oahu, and the meaning of
19 two lights so far as the movement of our ships in and out
20 of Pearl Harbor is concerned, and of the hanging of sheets,
21 I believe, in the back yard during the day, that there
22 is no question whatever that Japanese submarines were opera-
23 ting to the north of Oahu, and they came to see those sig-
24 nals, and instead of a patrol boat this may very well have
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

been a submarine.

Mr. Murphy: That is an American ship, Admiral. These are our reports of only American ships.

Admiral Smith: I did not know that.

Mr. Murphy: Yes, this is the American secret chart.

Admiral Smith: I cannot identify it, no sir.

Mr. Richardson: Just to interpolate a question right there, Admiral, on the chart of the 6th, that vessel seems not to be present. It seems to have moved out of that area.

Admiral Smith: Yes.

Mr. Richardson: Can you identify where that vessel is on the 6th on that chart?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, I cannot on the chart.

Senator Lucas: I suggest the Congressman from Pennsylvania start all over again.

Mr. Murphy: I will ask the Naval Officer to furnish us with an explanation of the ship and its name to the north of Oahu on December 6th, the name of the ship, the type of the ship, and where it went after it was in the position of 155 degrees west, and 18 degrees north.

Senator Ferguson: We had asked for that before.

Mr. Murphy: I am renewing it. I would like to know what happened to the ship that was to the north of Oahu

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy

h6

1 on December 5, and where it went on the 7th.

2 I refer to the ship shown on the secret chart, giving
3 the location of the United States ships on December 5,
4 1941.

5 Admiral Smith: It would have been possible that
6 that ship was proceeding to or from Pearl Harbor, to
7 Pearl Harbor from the Coast, and it is not very far from
8 the Great Circle course between San Francisco and Oahu.

9 Mr. Murphy: Except, as I understand, Admiral,
10 there had been some order or understanding that all
11 vessels were to be out of the north and were to take some
12 other route, and we would ship everything down by the
13 Torres Strait. If it was a merchant vessel, I do not know
14 whether it would have shown on that secret chart, or not.

15 I believe it is only meant to show United States
16 vessels as such. I mean patrol vessels, war vessels of
17 different types. So, at any rate, on the chart that is
18 before you that ship to the north of the Island of Oahu
19 appears to be in the same general direction, does it not,
20 as the point from which the Japanese came on December 7?

21 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, it does.

22 AL
23 fls

24

25

Shack (5) am
follows
Hook
AL-1

9527

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The Vice Chairman: Mr. Gearhart.

Mr. Gearhart: I find, as far as I can find from this log, that we sighted a surface ship. This is a verification of a letter which I have referred to from one of the lookouts on that ship who has written to the effect that that ship was challenged and it turned and fled, and they turned and went the other way.

It appears conclusively on the log of the ship of December 6 that between the hours of 20 and 24 a ship was sighted by the U.S.S. WRIGHT.

Mr. Richardson: You cannot find any airships on there?

Mr. Gearhart: No. It must be in one of the other logs. It is not in this one. I read it into the record the last time I had a log in my hand. There were two unidentified planes.

Mr. Murphy: One plane.

Mr. Gearhart: So if we are looking for precise reasons for Pearl Harbor we might fasten upon the failure of the captain of the WRIGHT to have reported to you the unidentified vessel in Hawaiian waters on the 6th day of December, 1941?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. There is no order issued that is so hard and fast that in the interests of the security of the Fleet or of the country a captain with any judgment cannot break a radio silence when it is necessary.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Gearhart
The Vice Chairman

1 Mr. Gearhart: That is all.

2 The Vice Chairman: Admiral, I would like to ask a
3 question or two, if I may, on some of the information you
4 gave us a short time ago.

5 I believe you stated that, in your opinion, the Japs
6 could have captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands
7 if the Fleet were not present there on December 7, 1941.

8 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. By that I mean their objective
9 would have been different. In fact, had they been accompanied
10 by an amphibious force two days behind that strike they could
11 have accomplished the same thing. But I believe their in-
12 tentions would have been different.

13 The Vice Chairman: Well, if that had happened, if
14 they had captured Pearl Harbor or the adjacent islands there,
15 then we would have had to recapture Hawaii in order to
16 conduct a successful war against Japan, would not we?

17 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

18 The Vice Chairman: I understood you to also state
19 that if they had destroyed our oil supplies and our shore
20 installations there rather than attacking the Fleet, the
21 situation would have been worse for this country than it
22 was by what they did do.

23 Admiral Smith: Much worse, yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Are there any other questions?
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Senator Ferguson: Yes, I have some.

The Vice Chairman: Senator Ferguson of Michigan will inquire.

Senator Ferguson: You think then that the oil at Pearl Harbor was more important than our Fleet? Is that your answer?

Admiral Smith: The type of ships that we had at that time in Pearl Harbor, the battleships, had been so overloaded with additional gear in the past 20 years that they were well down in the water, their speed was so reduced that we had a fleet speed of 15 knots. Our light forces were not hurt very much, and it is the light forces and carriers that carried on the war from that point until we got modern heavy ships that could travel at a fleet speed of, say, 28 knots. I would say that the result of the disaster in Pearl Harbor is, first, the unfortunate and terrible loss of life.

(6)

Senator Ferguson: No doubt about that.

Admiral Smith: The other, the material, the expense, is not so important, because after those ships were raised they were entirely modernized and rebuilt along the lines that they should have been rebuilt several years before.

Senator Ferguson: Then this Fleet that we had at Pearl Harbor, in your opinion, was of very little value as far as a fighting force is concerned?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Smith: Yes.

Senator Ferguson: It did not make any difference where it was, as far as the actual ships were concerned?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, except as a supporting force. That is, if the Japs sent over surface ships in connection with our move against the Marshalls -- after our strike in the Marshalls we needed a supporting force beyond which the carriers could go for protection, fueling, getting ready for something else.

Senator Ferguson: Then it was a real value?

Admiral Smith: It was a real value in that respect, yes, sir, but not as a Fleet that could have gone to seek out the Japanese Fleet.

Senator Ferguson: But we had more than that to do. They had taken so many islands that there was a lot to do. Would not it have been valuable to go with our landing forces, with these large guns and all, and did not it delay us because we did not have this fleet?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, it did not delay us, because to recapture those islands, to take the islands away from them we had to develop an enormous amphibious force with trained men, and we did not have them at that time. By the time we got ready to move we had the ships necessary, not only for support but for bombardment.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Then, as I understand it, this
2 fleet was of no value to defend Midway or to defend Guam
3 in case they would have struck there, or struck first in
4 the Philippines?

5 Admiral Smith: We could have defended Midway, yes, sir,
6 but not Guam. Midway is not so far.

7 Senator Ferguson: Could not have defended Guam?

8 Admiral Smith: Not in my opinion, no, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: It could not have gone down there
10 after they were trying to take Guam and been of any aid?

11 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

12 Senator Ferguson: Then you come back to this, that
13 this fleet was of very little value at the time, as far as
14 the big ships were concerned?

15 Admiral Smith: The heavy ships were of very little
16 value, yes, sir.

17 Senator Ferguson: What about the airplanes that were
18 destroyed? What value were they? We were very low in
19 airplanes, were we not?

20 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

21 Senator Ferguson: How much did that interfere with
22 our action in the Pacific, the destruction of these planes?

23 Admiral Smith: I do not know how rapidly those planes
24 were replaced because I left very shortly afterward, but it
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

seems to me that we were very soon able to carry out a proper reconnaissance and that Army and Navy planes must have been sent out there promptly. I do not know.

Senator Ferguson: Do you know whether or not we had long-range reconnaissance there in July, or previous to July?

Admiral Smith: Only intermittently.

Senator Ferguson: Was there any order that ever was issued by anyone stopping that reconnaissance sometime during the summer?

Admiral Smith: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: You never heard of an order to stop it?

Admiral Smith: No, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Was it only for training purposes?

Admiral Smith: That I am unable to state. There were times when the fleet exercises were carried out to the north. Wherever we carried out the exercises the long-range reconnaissance planes took part.

Yes, you might say it was for training exercises.

Senator Ferguson: It was training?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: I did not wish to go back to the alert in the summer of 1940, I was not talking about that reconnaissance at all. There was never any reconnaissance for any other purposes than training, and there was no order

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2 stopping long-distance reconnaissance?

3 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: Any time during the year 1941?

5 Admiral Smith: To the best of my knowledge there was
6 never any such order.

7 Senator Ferguson: You would know about that?

8 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

9 Senator Ferguson: You were the Chief of Staff, were
10 you not?

11 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I would know.

12 Senator Ferguson: Will you give me the order of command,
13 as far as air was concerned, in Hawaii? How did Admiral
14 Bloch fit into the command?

15 Admiral Smith: I will try to explain the command
16 organization at that time. Admiral Bellinger, as he showed
17 yesterday, had several different titles. As Commander Task
18 Force 9, he worked with the Fleet, and had we advanced on
19 the Marshalls he would have done so as Commander of Task
20 Force 9, working directly under the Commander in Chief.

21 Now Admiral Bloch was the Naval Base Defense Officer
22 and as such he was charged by this order, which is an
23 exhibit, the letter 2 CL-41, he was charged with the distant
24 reconnaissance. Two short excerpts from those orders are:

25 "The Commandant 14th Naval District is the Naval Base

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Defense Officer. As such he shall", and one of his duties
2 is "exercise supervisory control over naval shore-based
3 aircraft, arranging through Commander Patrol Wing 2", that
4 is Bellinger, "for coordination of the joint air effort
5 between the Army and Navy."

6
7 And later, "In case of an attack the Naval Base Defense
8 Officer shall launch air search for enemy ships."

9 Mr. Murphy: Will the Senator yield at that point?

10 Senator Ferguson: Yes, I will yield.

11 Mr. Murphy: If you look at page 398 of this hearing
12 you will find Admiral Bloch says all they were was a volunteer
13 fire department.

14 Senator Ferguson: Even though they were a volunteer
15 fire department I want to know who was the head of the
16 volunteer fire department.

17 Admiral Smith: I believe I am coming to that, sir.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right, go ahead.

19 Admiral Smith: So you see, had Admiral Bellinger had
20 all this information which he said yesterday he did not
21 have, he could not initiate a long-range search.

22 Senator Ferguson: Who could?

23 Admiral Smith: Admiral Bloch. But of course had that
24 information been in Bellinger's hands he could have advised
25 Admiral Bloch of the search that should be carried out. Now

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Bloch knew all of these things, but Admiral Bloch had no planes. So as Naval Base Defense Officer he executed these orders.

Senator Ferguson: Without planes?

Admiral Smith: By borrowing planes from the Fleet, by getting his planes from Admiral Kimmel, and he had the planes that Admiral Kimmel could spare from his other exercises or intentions.

LaCharity follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Lac
fls
Shack

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: Well, as Chief of Staff, did
2 you ever find these men getting tangled up in these orders?

3 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: They were able to keep everything
5 in mind?

6 Admiral Smith: Yes.

7 So that if a long range reconnaissance was thought
8 necessary --

9 Senator Ferguson: If you had really had to operate
10 this system, in anticipation of an air attack, wasn't it
11 very confusing?

12 Is it because they weren't doing anything that they
13 didn't get tangled up in the red tape?

14 Admiral Smith: Well, they were doing things. Admiral
15 Bellinger was over there very often. The Commander in
16 Chief sent for him very often.

17 But if I may continue this involved command organiza-
18 tion --

19 Senator Ferguson: All right.

20 Admiral Smith: So Admiral Bloch had the responsibility
21 of conducting this search. To do so, he had to call upon
22 the Commander in Chief for planes, and the Commander in
23 Chief could say yes, or no, of course.

24 On the other hand, if the Commander in Chief thought
25

h2

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 a long-distance reconnaissance necessary, he would have
2 commanded Admiral Bloch, who was one of his task force
3 commanders, to carry on the search. So that after you
4 analyze it, the responsibility comes back to the Commander
5 in Chief and Admiral Kimmel in his testimony has accepted
6 that responsibility.

7 Senator Ferguson: All right.

8 Now, between Admiral Kimmel, there came next in line
9 Admiral Bloch.

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

11 Senator Ferguson: And then who would be under that,
12 on long range reconnaissance?

13 Admiral Smith: Bellinger.

14 Senator Ferguson: Bellinger?

15 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

16 Senator Ferguson: So if Bloch and Kimmel decided
17 there wasn't to be any long range reconnaissance, Bellinger
18 would never hear about it?

19 Admiral Smith: Quite possible, yes.

20 Senator Ferguson: Quite possible? There wouldn't
21 be any need for him to know about it if they decided not
22 to have long distance reconnaissance, would there?

23 Admiral Smith: I think he would have heard about
24 it.

25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h3

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: How? Did they have rumors that they relied upon?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, but --

Senator Ferguson: Was it his duty to ask about it?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, but the Fleet Aviator, as Admiral Bellinger testified yesterday, I believe, was in touch with him every day by telephone and certainly the Fleet Aviation Officer would have known had the staff met and decided not to have a reconnaissance.

Senator Ferguson: Well, as I understand it, it never arose. They never decided yes or no, on long distance reconnaissance; isn't that right? There was no decision, was there?

Admiral Smith: Not that I know of, no, sir. The matter was discussed very frequently, but I don't know that they ever reached a decision not to do it.

Senator Ferguson: They didn't reach any decision to do it; is that right?

Admiral Smith: I know that they always had in mind doing it, because you note that Admiral Bloch had requested 200 long range planes and received none of them. There is only one reason he wanted those planes and that was for reconnaissance. That was his job.

Senator Ferguson: Now you stated that the Japanese

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h4

1 were taking great chances on this attack, and, in fact,
2 it was a wrong thing to do.

3 Did you know that on the 6th day of December, 1941,
4 that Honolulu notified Tokyo and we intercepted a mes-
5 sage, we didn't translate it, but we intercepted it, and
6 had it, with this statement in it:

7 "It appears that no air reconnaissance is being con-
8 ducted by the Fleet air arm."

9 On page 27 of Exhibit 2, Honolulu notifies Tokyo,
10 December 6, 1941. It was intercepted but not shown to
11 have been decoded on the 6th.

12 Then there is this information:

13 "I imagine that in all probability there is consider-
14 able opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise
15 attack against these places."

16 Now, suppose that the task force was up, as shown
17 on that map, up there, and was receiving this informa-
18 tion, and knew by their intelligence that our radar was
19 shut off at 7 o'clock, and that we had no balloons over
20 the ships, and the information that I have read to you
21 was available, what chances were they taking? Your ships
22 were tied up there. There was nobody manning the anti-
23 aircraft guns. They knew that. They knew there was no
24 air reconnaissance. What chance were the Japanese taking?
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h5

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

We had cut off the traffic from the north. We had issued two orders, one of the 16th of October and one on the 25th of November to divert all traffic south.

Admiral Smith: The only traffic north, I believe, was Russian ships carrying lend-lease materials to Vladivostok.

Senator Ferguson: Didn't we divert all those ships?

Admiral Smith: No, sir; we had no control over the Russian ships.

Senator Ferguson: Oh, the Russian ships.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. Those are the only ships that might have been in the area.

Senator Ferguson: Well, do you anticipate that if Russia had seen this Japanese task force they would have done anything about it?

Admiral Smith: I doubt it very much. In fact, I understand that the Japanese task force had orders to sink them.

Senator Ferguson: Now, with what you know now, with what I read you here, what risks were the Japanese taking for the opportunity to sink all of our battleships, or destroy them and to destroy as many planes as they did on our air fields, and in our hangars, what risks were they taking? Use hindsight on that.

c2

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h6

1 Admiral Smith: Well, there was a risk, of course,
2 from our two carrier task forces that were missing from
3 Pearl Harbor. They couldn't have known where those ships
4 were, and they were prepared to meet them anyway. But
5 if these two messages that you read -- the first one I
6 heard read for the first time, I believe, here yesterday,
7 the second I had never heard --

8 Senator Ferguson: You never heard?

9 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

10 Senator Ferguson: In the light of this, this intelli-
11 gence that was going out of Honolulu to the Japs -- and we
12 must assume that it was going to their fleet?

13 Admiral Smith: It was, of course.

14 Senator Ferguson: That was the purpose. They had a
15 design map of the harbor and these messages were going from
16 Pearl Harbor to the Japs, and the Japs were making inquiries
17 right along as shown by these exhibits.

18 Now, under those circumstances, with that kind of
19 intelligence against us, what chance were they taking?

20 Admiral Smith: Not so much as I had testified to,
21 sir. That makes a great difference.

22 Senator Ferguson: Now, I want to show you this message
23 of the 25th.

24 The Vice Chairman: Will the gentleman yield?
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h7

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, I didn't quite understand you at one place. You said something with respect to the Russian ships and the Japanese striking force, that somebody had orders to sink somebody else. What was that?

Admiral Smith: There is always the opportunity in a movement of a large naval force that a merchant vessel will sight that force and report it to someone, so that it would be necessary for the Japs to have intercepted that ship and secured or destroyed her radio, or otherwise to have sunk her. I have been told since the war ended that the orders of that Jap task force were to sink anything that they found on the way.

I don't know that that is absolutely correct, but I believe it is.

The Vice Chairman: Even though it might have been a Russian ship?

Admiral Smith: Even though it might have been their own ships.

Senator Ferguson: Admiral, let's assume that they were 20 miles away, the message would be sent communicating that prior to their sinking it, would it not?

Admiral Smith: Naturally, if they expected -

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h8

1 Senator Ferguson: It would be too late to sink it
2 after they communicated with their government?

3 Admiral Smith: What I mean is that had they sighted
4 a ship 20 miles from their course, they probably would
5 have sent a destroyer or a light ship and placed a board-
6 ing officer on board merely to ask questions. Once he
7 arrived on board it would be too late to send a radio.

8 Senator Ferguson: Yes.

9 Admiral Smith: If the neutral ship suspected that she
10 was going to be sunk, of course she would send a radio.

11 Senator Ferguson: So we must also assume that they
12 would send a radio first, the minute they sighted that
13 Japanese Fleet.

14 Look at this message that we had changing the course
15 of our ships.

16 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, I remember that message.

17 Senator Ferguson: Now, didn't that take our vessels
18 out of this area?

19 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

20 Senator Ferguson: Well, then, we had one area that
21 we weren't looking into at all, we were not using submarines,
22 we were not using air reconnaissance, we were not using
23 our battleships, we were using no ships at all; isn't
24 that true?

25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h9

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Admiral Smith: By routing through Torres Strait, you will notice that the ships are not only south of that area, but they well south of the Hawaiian Islands. I mean, between Oahu and the Marshalls, and the Carolines there was no shipping either.

Senator Ferguson: So we left our flank to the south open?

Admiral Smith: We moved all the merchant shipping well to the south so that the area to the northward and to the westward and to the southwestward was clear of our shipping.

Senator Ferguson: Now you say they were taking a chance so far as our two task forces were concerned. That is, Halsey and Newton.

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Knowing now what the Japanese had, six carriers, three battleships, and whatever the other part of the task force was, was either one of these task forces a match for that task force of the Japanese?

Admiral Smith: By no means. If they had joined up, they were not a match for it, unless they caught them while the Jap planes were over Pearl Harbor. If they caught them with their planes not on the deck, they would have then done considerable damage.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h10

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Senator Ferguson: But our airplanes, our bombers, would have been quite a match for them either with the planes on them, or the planes off?

Admiral Smith: You mean our long range bombers?

Senator Ferguson: Yes.

Admiral Smith: We had only six, as I understand. They wouldn't have lasted very long.

Senator Ferguson: Then, do I understand that we were absolutely helpless, whether we knew it or not? Is that what you want to tell us?

Admiral Smith: No, sir; I wouldn't say that. I will say that, as has been proved throughout this war, there is no way to stop a determined air attack. Some of them will get through no matter how strong you are in the anti-aircraft guns and fighters. Some will always get through if it is a determined attack, as all Japanese attacks were.

Senator Ferguson: Did we know that on the 6th and the 7th?

Admiral Smith: I think so, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson: Then we couldn't have stopped them?

Admiral Smith: No, sir, we couldn't have stopped them. In the sinking of the Yorktown, 18 planes came in. Sixteen were shot down. Two got off their torpedoes

h11

1 and were shot down. But the Yorktown was sunk. That
2 is a determined air attack. None of them got out, but
3 they sank their ship.

4 Senator Ferguson: Then the thing to have done here
5 would have been to have taken all the men off of the
6 ships, except those with the anti-aircraft guns, and
7 in that way minimize our loss of sailors; is that what
8 you would say? Whether we knew they were coming in or
9 not?

10 Admiral Smith: It depends on how much advance informa-
11 tion we had, sir. The first thing to do was to get the
12 light forces at sea and get everything at sea, if possible.

13 Senator Ferguson: Did we have enough at Pearl Harbor
14 to get them at sea and take care of these carriers and
15 win a battle with this Japanese task force?

16 Admiral Smith: No, but had we gotten that fleet to
17 sea, of course, any commander in chief would seek out the
18 enemy. He probably would have suffered great damage.

19 Senator Ferguson: What would you anticipate he would
20 have inflicted on the enemy? That is the test, isn't it?

21 Admiral Smith: I think we probably would have sunk
22 at least two of their carriers, but we would probably
23 have lost our own in doing it.

24 We would have delayed the war for another year. There
25 would be no battle of the Coral Sea and probably no battle

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h12

1 of Midway had we lost those two carriers at that time.

2 Senator Ferguson: Then, you come back to the proposi-
3 tion that we were not prepared for war in the Pacific?

4 Admiral Smith: Not for the kind of war that was
5 thrust upon us, no, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: Well, didn't we know the kind of
7 war the Japanese could wage in the Pacific? Weren't we
8 prepared on that? Didn't our intelligence tell us that?

9 I am asking you as Chief of Staff.

10 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, --

11 Senator Ferguson: As Chief of Staff of the Commander
12 in Chief of the Pacific.

13 Admiral Smith: But to meet that kind of an attack
14 you had to have more fighting planes and long-range planes,
15 of course, and you had to have modern anti-aircraft guns
16 which we did not have.

17 Senator Ferguson: Is that what Admiral Stark and
18 General Marshall were talking about when they wrote the
19 message of the 5th of November and the message of the
20 27th of November telling Mr. Hull that they didn't want
21 any ultimatum with Japan?

22 Admiral Smith: That is what I understand from their
23 testimony, yes, sir. They wanted a delay so that these
24 things could be provided.

25

h13

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 Senator Ferguson: That is what you are telling us
2 this morning?

3 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

4 Senator Ferguson: That we were not prepared for war?

5 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

6 Senator Ferguson: With the Japanese at that time;
7 is that right?

8 Admiral Smith: That is right, and we did not get
9 such things as 40 millimeter guns and modern radar on some
10 of the ships for almost a year. We had, for example, a
11 4-barrelled anti-aircraft gun called the 1.1, but no
12 controls had been installed for it, and after a few
13 rounds, the men were blinded by the smoke from the barrels.

14 It turned out to be a very poor gun, but that was the
15 best we had at that time, and very few ships had that.

16 Senator Ferguson: Didn't we ever try it out before?

17 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. We tried it out repeatedly.

18 Senator Ferguson: Did we know that this would happen
19 with it, that the men would be blinded after a few rounds?

20 Admiral Smith: The controls had been designed, the
21 foundations were in place on the battleships, but the gear
22 had not arrived from the United States so that a man could
23 control that gun from one side, to keep him clear of the
24 gun blast.
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h14

1 Senator Ferguson: You mentioned a letter the other
2 day, and I would like to straighten that matter out.

3 To refresh your memory on the letter, I will read
4 from the Hart report:

5 "In fact, a few days after Pearl Harbor, we received
6 an official letter stating 'I know that you would like to
7 have 20,000 men and we would like to give them to you,'
8 as I remember the exact wording: 'The war is in the
9 Atlantic and we here in Washington think you are sitting
10 pretty in the Pacific.' This letter was actually received
11 a few days after Pearl Harbor, although written before,
12 of course."

13 Now, there is a note -- and you indicated in your
14 testimony that this was sent by Admiral Stark?

15 Admiral Smith: No, sir. I notice I was quoted in
16 the newspapers that way. I did not say by Admiral Stark.

17 Senator Ferguson: The newspaper item said Admiral
18 Stark.

19 Admiral Smith: No, that is incorrect.

20 Senator Ferguson: And it was Admiral Nimitz, was
21 it not?

22 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

23 Senator Ferguson: That letter was written by Admiral
24 Nimitz?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

h15

1 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir; and I mentioned that the
2 Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, now Personnel, was in
3 no way responsible for not furnishing us with information.

4 I merely mentioned that to show the apparent attitude
5 of mind among the Navy in Washington.

6 Senator Ferguson: Here in Washington?

7 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

8 Senator Ferguson: I will read this note:

9 "The Examining Officer identified the letter mentioned
10 by the witness as being one in the form of a personal
11 letter from the Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral
12 H. E. Kimmel, dated 25 November, 1941, file No. FF 12/MM(55)
13 and copy is now on file in the secret-confidential file
14 room of the Bureau of Personnel, Navy Department, Washing-
15 ton, D C."

16 How long was it taking you to get mail there -- if
17 a letter was written on the 25th of November?

18 Admiral Smith: The air mail was rather uncertain.
19 It was carried by the Clipper. I remember that many
20 people decided that straight ship mail was, for personal
21 letters, was quicker than air mail, because often the plane
22 would take off and have to come back. That is, going to
23 the eastward, which is the worst way, but the mail by air
24 was not nearly so rapid as it is today, and was not
25

h16

Witness Smith

Questions by: Senator Ferguson

1 reliable.

2 Senator Ferguson: That is all I have. I will ask
3 counsel to get this letter.

4 Mr. Kaufman: I think it is in the record.

5 Senator Ferguson: I have looked for it, and I haven't
6 found it.

7 The Vice Chairman: Are there any further questions?
8 If not, Admiral, do you have any further information
9 that you can give this committee that would be helpful in
10 this investigation that has not been brought out by ques-
11 tions?

12 Admiral Smith: No, sir. I wish I could give you more.
13 I would only like to say that if any impression has been
14 gained by the committee that Admiral Hart -- or that Admiral
15 Kimmel, rather, was closed to suggestions, that impression
16 is in error. All channels to him were open at all times,
17 and I could take anyone to see him, and I believe he
18 listened to everyone.

19 Mr. Keefe: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a ques-
20 tion or two of this witness, in view of what has gone on.

21 The Vice Chairman: Does that complete your statement,
22 Admiral?

23 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Mr. Keefe.
25

hl7

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1 Mr. Keefe: Admiral, were there minutes kept of the
2 meetings of the staff out at Hawaii?

3 Admiral Smith: No, sir, never.

4 Mr. Keefe: Do you have a present recollection of
5 the staff meeting which discussed the receipt of the mes-
6 sage of November 24?

7 Admiral Smith: No, I do not, sir. There were too
8 many of them for me to remember that. I do remember the
9 one of the 27th, because it was held the same afternoon.

10 Mr. Keefe: Do you have a present recollection as to
11 the discussion that took place at the staff meeting after
12 the receipt of the so-called war warning message of
13 November 27?

14 Admiral Smith: I do not recall the details of the
15 discussion, no, sir. I know that there was a discussion and
16 meeting.

17 Mr. Keefe: Is there anybody that would be able to
18 say and tell this committee what took place in your staff
19 and what the discussion was when this war warning message
20 was discussed?

21 Admiral Smith: Not unless someone person at that time
22 has a better memory than I have, sir. I do not know.

23 Mr. Keefe: Do you recall who was present at that
24 particular staff meeting?
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h18

1 Admiral Smith: There were present Captain McMorris
2 and Captain DeLany, both of whom are now admirals. I
3 believe Admiral McMorris is scheduled to be a witness
4 before this committee. He is in the city.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, now, in view of the tremendous
6 amount of paper work that seems to be obvious in connection
7 with the slightest activity of the Navy, it is rather
8 astonishing to me that there wasn't a secretary of these
9 meetings that kept some minutes or some record; but I
10 assume that your statement is correct that there was no
11 record kept of any of these staff meetings.

12 Admiral Smith: There was no record. The paper work
13 load was very high, and we had been trying for years, and
14 I suppose they are still trying to reduce it.

15 Mr. Keefe: I should hope so.

16 Admiral Smith: And I too, sir. But to have brought
17 in a secretary and taken down minutes for all of the meet-
18 ings we had would have filled the files with a lot more
19 of this secret correspondence, or paper work.

20 Mr. Keefe: Admiral, my purpose is this. It appears
21 quite clearly that the message of November 27 in which the
22 language appears "This is a war warning" is the first
23 message of that character that any witness from the Navy
24 has ever remembered ever having been received by the Navy --
25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h19

1

this is a war warning.

2

Admiral Smith: That is correct.

3

Mr. Keefe: Now, that would mean that a staff meeting would be called to discuss the meaning of that message and the measures that should be taken in connection therewith.

5

6

Am I to understand your testimony to be that you cannot tell now, or have no present recollection as to what took place at the staff meeting at which this very unusual message was discussed?

7

8

9

10

Admiral Smith: I cannot, sir. I know that a meeting was called as soon as the message came in, and that Admiral Bloch was sent for, but what the details of the discussion were, I simply cannot remember.

11

12

13

14

Mr. Keefe: Can you tell us what determination was arrived, if any, as a result of the collective judgment of the members of the staff?

15

16

17

Admiral Smith: The action paragraph of that dispatch said "Take defensive deployment." The other was information. The steps that we had taken in defensive deployment --

18

19

20

Mr. Keefe: Admiral, I haven't asked you that --

21

Admiral Smith: -- had already been made.

22

Mr. Keefe: I didn't ask you that.

23

Admiral Smith: You are asking what action we took.

24

Mr. Keefe: No. I asked you whether you have any

25

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

h20

1 present recollection of the agreement that was reached
2 as a result of that staff meeting.

3 Admiral Smith: I have not.

4 Mr. Keefe: Held on the 27th.

5 Admiral Smith: I have not.

6 Mr. Keefe: Resulting from the receipt of this telegram.

7 Admiral Smith: I have not.

8 Mr. Keefe: Have you any present recollection of any
9 discussion by the staff after the receipt of the November
10 24 message?

11 Admiral Smith: I have not. We had too many confer-
12 ences. I can't remember the details of one from another.
13 It is too long ago.

14 Mr. Keefe: And there is no record of any kind that
15 you can think of that would assist this committee in
16 gaining information along the lines that I have inquired?

17 Admiral Smith: It possibly may be found in the daily
18 estimate submitted to the Commander in Chief on steps to
19 be taken in the event of war with Japan within 24 hours.
20 That would show, I believe -- would reflect the action that
21 was taken in those meetings.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

ef
fls

22

23

24

25

28
Shefner fls
LaChar
12:10 PM

9555

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Keefe: There was offered here the other day in connection with the examination of one of the witnesses two written proposals as to steps to be taken in the event of war within 48 hours, I believe, and steps to be taken in the event of war within 24 hours. Do you recall that memorandum?

Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

Mr. Keefe: Who prepared that?

Admiral Smith: That was prepared by Captain McMorris, the War Plans Officer, and was considered by the Commander-in-Chief, the Operations Officer and myself every morning.

Mr. Keefe: That is signed by C. H. McMorris.

Admiral Smith: That is correct, sir.

Mr. Keefe: The first one is dated the 30th day of November 1941 and the next one is dated December 5, 1941. The first is entitled, "Steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 24 hours," and the next one is entitled, "Recommended steps to be taken in case of American-Japanese war within the next 48 hours."

Were those orders or were those just suggestions?

Admiral Smith: That was an estimate of the situation, of what we should do, something there to put right on the air when we got word, "This is war."

Mr. Keefe: Well, you got word on November 27th, "This is a war warning"?

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1
2 Admiral Smith: They did not say, "This is war." We could
3 not go ahead with WPL-46. There is a difference between a
4 war warning and war. They did not mobilize and they did not
5 execute the plan.

6 Mr. Keefe: Well, you testified before the Navy Court of
7 Inquiry that you thought it was the intent to put you on
8 your toes and get ready to carry out the mission required in
9 the war plans.

10 Admiral Smith: That is right, sir, but we had been on
11 our toes for some time, or thought we had.

12 Mr. Keefe: Well, I don't want to prolong this, Admiral,
13 to any extent, but I confess that I would like very much to
14 get clearly in my mind just what you do at these so-called
15 meetings that the staff had out there. A message comes in,
16 it is brought in to somebody and you sit around a table and
17 talk about it and decide what you are going to do and you
18 had those meetings almost daily.

19 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir, and whenever an important mes-
20 sage came in we also had the type and force commanders, task
21 force commanders present in port over and always Admiral
22 Bloch.

23 Mr. Keefe: Well, was there always an unanimity of opin-
24 ion expressed in the meetings?

25 Admiral Smith: No, sir.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

1

2

Mr. Keefe: Or was there debate? Didn't anybody ever disagree with --

3

4

Admiral Smith: Oh, plenty, yes, sir.

5

6

Mr. Keefe: Well, was there any disagreement as to what this message of November 27th meant?

7

8

Admiral Smith: I cannot remember that far back just what the particular debate on that message was. I wish I could but I do not.

9

10

11

12

13

14

Mr. Keefe: That is a pretty important matter for this committee, at least it is for me. You cannot recall whether there was any disagreement among any members of the staff as to whether or not that message meant war, "Let's get to it and go to it"?

15

16

17

18

Admiral Smith: I do not, no, sir.

Mr. Keefe: And you cannot recall now whether at the staff meeting which considered that November 27th war warning message there was any disagreement at all?

19

20

Admiral Smith: I don't remember whether there was or not.

21

22

Mr. Keefe: Obviously I cannot ask you any more questions because you don't remember anything that took place then.

23

24

25

Admiral Smith: I cannot remember any particular one conference. We had been there practically a year and we were having conferences all the time and debates all the time and

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 now -- you will have before you, if anyone will remember, the
3 opinions it is more likely to be Admiral Pye or Admiral Mo-
4 Morris.

5 Mr. Keefe: Well, Admiral, so far as any action that was
6 taken or not taken either affirmative or negative, the staff
7 evidently was in agreement with the action taken by the Com-
8 mander-in-Chief, is that a fair statement?

9 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Murphy: Will the gentleman yield?

11 Mr. Keefe: And all of you experienced officers out there
12 agreed with the course of action, or took the course of action
13 that represented your considered judgment?

14 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir. I would say that assuming that
15 this debate or conference was similar to all others held, that
16 the Commander-in-Chief did not make his decision until the
17 discussion had finished. We did not go in there to discuss
18 whether his decision was correct or not. We debated it before
19 he reached his decision.

20 Mr. Keefe: I understand.

21 Admiral Smith: And very often some of his decisions.

22 Mr. Keefe: Was Halsey at this meeting on the 27th?

23 Admiral Smith: Halsey did not get in there until the --
24 yes, Halsey was in on the 27th. He left on the 28th. Admiral
25 Pye was in on the morning of the 28th when we had another

1 Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Keefe

2 conference with the Army present at that time.

3 Mr. Keefe: Did Halsey's so-called shooting orders have
4 anything to do with this message of the 27th do you suppose?

5 Admiral Smith: I think it very probably did.

6 Mr. Keefe: It was known that Halsey was going to leave
7 on the 28th, wasn't it?

8 Admiral Smith: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Keefe: Was the question discussed at that meeting, if
10 I can refresh your recollection, as to what kind of orders
11 Halsey would sail under?

12 Admiral Smith: No, sir. Admiral Halsey received his
13 orders from the Commander-in-Chief direct.

14 Mr. Keefe: Well, didn't the staff discuss the question,
15 "Now, if we are going to send these task forces out to deliver
16 planes to Midway and Wake, what kind of orders are they going
17 to go under?"

18 Admiral Smith: I think they very probably did.

19 Mr. Keefe: You wouldn't think that the commanding of-
20 ficer, Admiral Kimmel, would give shooting orders to Halsey
21 unless there had been some unanimity of thought in the dis-
22 cussions of the staff, would you?

23 Admiral Smith: No, I would not, no, sir. I think there
24 very probably was a discussion in the staff but I do not re-
25 member it.

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murphy.

1

2

Mr. Keefe: That is all.

3

4

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, I want to add but very little right there.

5

6

7

You said that Admiral Pye had to make a report, but I think you will find on page 424, question 31 in the Naval Court of Inquiry that Admiral Pye testified:

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

"The instructions in effect to the Pacific Fleet were that task force commanders would not report to the Commander-in-Chief upon their return from duties unless they were so directed. I therefore did not see the Commander-in-Chief until Saturday, when I went to talk to him concerning the tactical exercises which had been carried out during the last period at sea. He then showed me this dispatch".

That was on the 29th.

The Vice Chairman: On what date?

Mr. Murphy: Well, on the 29th. He was not present at the conferences of the 27th and 28th.

Reference was made to another thing. The reference which the distinguished Congressman from Wisconsin asked you about, I think it is on page 561, question 159, before the Naval Court of Inquiry:

"Q Well, what did you consider the intent of this message by heading it 'A war warning'?"

Witness Smith

Questions by: Mr. Murp hy

1
2 "A Well, I thought that the intent was to put us
3 on our toes and get ready to carry out the mission re-
4 quired by the War Plan. The War Plan was not executed
5 by the Navy Department."

6 And, lastly, on page 351 of the Hewitt report:

7 "Q Mr. Sonnett: Will you state what that was?

8 "Vice Admiral Smith: During the discussion, we
9 informed the Army that the planes they placed on Wake
10 would have to remain there for the duration of a war,
11 if any, because it was impossible to put a ship in there
12 and take them out and Army planes are not equipped to
13 land on a carrier, although they can take off from a
14 carrier. Admiral Kimmel then asked, 'What may I expect
15 of Army fighters on Wake?' and General Martin of the
16 Army Air Force replied, 'We do not allow them to go more
17 than fifteen miles offshore,' to which Admiral Kimmel
18 replied, 'Then they are no damn good to me,' or words to
19 that effect. General Short stated, not angrily at all,
20 that, 'If I man these islands, I must command them,'
21 and Kimmel replied, 'Only over my dead body. The Army
22 should exercise no command over Navy bases.' General
23 Shortreplied, 'Mind you, I do not want these islands.
24 I think they are better manned by Marines. But if I must
25 put troops and planes on them, then I must command them.'

Witness Smith

1

2 And that was the extent of the controversy."

3 Which was the extent of the controversy. No more ques-
4 tions.

5 Admiral Smith: I will say that they both smiled when
6 that discussion was going on.

7 The Vice Chairman: We thank you, Admiral, for your ap-
8 pearance and the information given the committee and your
9 apparent desire to be helpful to us in this inquiry. You may
10 be excused.

11 The committee will now adjourn until two o'clock.

12 (Whereupon, at 12:20 P.M., a recess was taken
13 until 2 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

14

- - -

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:00 p.m.

The Vice Chairman: The committee will please be in order.

Counsel will please call the next witness.

Mr. Richardson: Mr. Chairman, I desire to present to the committee Captain Safford. I may state for the information of the committee that Captain Safford's testimony is desired on two main questions: First his knowledge and information with reference to the so-called 14-part message which came in on December 6 and 7, and the second subject is the question of the winds execute message which has been a matter of some interest and controversy with the committee.

I propose, with the permission of the Chairman, to go over the 14-part message testimony of Captain Safford first. Then he has advised me, and there has been circulated to the committee, a written statement which he has prepared concerning his views on the winds message.

I would like to suggest that the Chair permit him to read his statement on the winds message, after which I will ask him a few questions and then turn him over to the committee for general examination on both of these subjects.

The Vice Chairman: Without objection, it will be so ordered.

Captain, will you please be sworn.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN LAURANCE FRY SAFFORD,
UNITED STATES NAVY

(Captain Safford was duly sworn by the Vice Chairman.)

Mr. Richardson: Captain Safford, will you give your full name and your age to the reporter?

Captain Safford: Laurance Fry Safford. Age 53 years.

Mr. Richardson: How long have you been in the Navy?

Captain Safford: Thirty-four years this June.

Mr. Richardson: Will you detail in a general way to the committee, Captain, just what your Naval experience has been, the general work that you have done and the present position which you occupy?

Captain Safford: After graduation from the Naval Academy I served in battleships, destroyers, submarines, mine craft, cruisers, and battleships. I have had a total of 14 years' sea duty, the last three of which being spent as Gunnery Officer on the battleship NEW MEXICO.

I was in charge of the Anti-aircraft Gunnery School in the summer of 1935, which was fairly successful.

All my shore duty has been spent in my specialty as a cipher expert and radio intelligence expert. I came ashore to assume this duty in charge of the Navy Department Communications Intelligence Unit in May, 1936, and remained on that duty until February 15, 1942, at which time I was removed

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 by the orders of Admiral Horne.

3 In 1938 I was assigned to engineering duty only by
4 the Secretary of the Navy and ordered to remain on shore
5 duty at my post at that time in order to get ready for the
6 war which everybody could see was coming.

7 Mr. Richardson: Are you on active service in the Navy
8 now?

9 Captain Safford: At the present time I am on active
10 service in the Navy and am called the Assistant Director
11 of Naval Communications for cryptographic research.

12 Mr. Richardson: Will you detail a little more what
13 you mean by the work that you did in cryptology and in
14 intelligence, what the scope of those activities was, what
15 the general field was that you were working in when you
16 were doing that work?

17 Captain Safford: I was ordered to duty in the Navy
18 Department in January, 1924, to establish a radio intelligence
19 system for the United States Navy. At that time, and previous
20 to that time, I was given some reports and told to study
21 them and to see what I could accomplish.

22 Mr. Richardson: What do you mean by "radio intelligence"?

23 Captain Safford: By "radio intelligence" I mean the
24 interception of the radio messages of enemy foreign nations
25 and agents, their solution by crypt analytic processes,

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1 deductions of movement, locations and compositions of Naval
2 forces from an analysis of the radio traffic, by means short
3 of reading the messages, and also the tracking of enemy
4 fleets and ships by radio direction finders, after we finally
5 got the radio direction finders with which to track them.
6

7 Mr. Richardson: What were your duties in November and
8 December of 1941?

9 Captain Safford: I was immediately in charge of the
10 Radio Intelligence Unit in the Navy Department and indirectly
11 in charge of the whole organization.

12 Mr. Richardson: What was your rank at that time?

13 Captain Safford: At that time I was a permanent
14 Commander and had been selected for a Captain by a regular
15 Selection Board of nine officers, but I had not made my
16 number for promotion.

17 Mr. Richardson: How many men, roughly speaking, did
18 you have under you in the operations of your units?

19 Captain Safford: About 200 directly under me in the
20 Navy Department, and about 500 in the field units -- about
21 500 more in the field units.

22 Mr. Richardson: Now, Captain, you are familiar with
23 the subject which has been of some interest here, referring
24 to what is known as the 14-part message?

25 Captain Safford: Yes, sir; very familiar with it.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

LaCharity
follows
2:15

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Richardson: You recall in a general way that it was a message which came into this country from Japan in 13 -- first a pilot message that was followed by a 13-part message.

Now, will you tell me when you first heard of anything with reference to what turned out to be the 14th part message?

Captain Safford: I probably heard of the pilot message in the early afternoon of Saturday, December 6, 1941, although I cannot recall it.

Mr. Richardson: Would it have been the regular procedure or custom there to have acquainted you with such a pilot message?

Captain Safford: It was the regular procedure to immediately acquaint me with anything of particular importance and this was of particular importance.

Mr. Richardson: Why would you think that would be a particularly important message?

Captain Safford: Because it gave information that the long awaited reply to the Secretary of State note of the 26th of November was about to be transmitted.

Mr. Richardson: Now, you were acquainted, were you not, with the fact that the Secretary of State had submitted such a note about the 26th?

Captain Safford: We had read the text of his note from

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

1
2 the Japanese intercept. We also knew the Japanese reaction
3 to it.

4 Mr. Richardson: And your knowledge and that reaction
5 made you very much interested in when the answer would come in?

6 Captain Safford: That was extremely important to me,
7 both for information and to perform my duty, in getting this
8 information to higher authority with the least possible
9 delay.

10 Mr. Richardson: Now, would there be any duty on your
11 part when the pilot message came in to take any steps to
12 circulate the pilot message as an independent message of
13 itself?

14 Captain Safford: That was the duty of Naval Intelligence
15 and was normally performed by Lieutenant Commander Kramer
16 who was attached to that office but working under me in
17 space of my section.

18 Mr. Richardson: Would it have been the regular practice
19 where the first message that came in was a pilot message
20 for Lieutenant Kramer to proceed to deliver that message
21 without waiting for any further message in confirmation
22 thereof?

23 Captain Safford: That is correct, it would be, and
24 this pilot message indicated that the next message would
25 probably not be received until the following day.

Witness Safford

Questions by: Mr. Richardson

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

Mr. Richardson: Have you any recollection that the pilot message as a separate message was delivered by Lieutenant Kramer?

Captain Safford: Lieutenant Kramer was absent from the office from noon until about 3:00 p.m. I do not know where he was, I doubt if he can recall, but he was probably delivering this message. We know now from information which has become available to me in the last two weeks that there was a time stamp on the War Department copy of this message which said, "Received 12:05 p.m. December 6". I think that is the time. That is a matter of record. It was about 12:05.

Mr. Richardson: That would refer to the pilot message?

Captain Safford: That refers to the pilot message.

Mr. Murphy: Mr. Chairman, there was an answer of the witness to the question just before that indicated there was something that said the 14th part would come in the next day. May I have that?

Mr. Richardson: Let me ask him.

Captain, was there anything in connection with the pilot message that would inform you that there was another message to come?

Captain Safford: Yes. It says in the second paragraph "This separate message is a very long one. I will send