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RESTRICTED

INTERROGATION NO: 410
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PLACE: TOKYO
DATE: 19 Nov 1945

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, G-2, USSBS.

Subject: Naval Intelligence at Imperial Headquarters Level.

Person Interrogated and Background of each:

Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI, Kaoru, IJN, was, from July 1942 until the end of the war, head of the 5th (U.S.) section of the 3rd (Intelligence) department of the Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building.

Interrogator: Lt. Comdr. T. M. CURTIS, USNR

Interpreter: Major JOHN C. PELZEL, USMCR

SUMMARY:

The purpose of this interview was to supplement information secured in a previous interview with Rear Admiral TAKEUCHI and to correct discrepancies in information prepared by him in written form.

Admiral TAKEUCHI stated that his section prepared a document in March of 1944 outlining in detail the organization of the U.S. Army and Navy Air Forces, including a roster of U.S. aircraft carriers showing air groups assigned by air group number. This document, also included a detailed organization chart of the U.S.S. SARATOGA. Admiral TAKEUCHI said that sources of this information were:

1. Data gathered prior to the war, including a roster of officers of the SARATOGA. Such rosters were exchanged on a routine basis prior to the war.
2. U.S. aircraft shot down in raids on TRUK and SAIPAN following the MARSHALLS operation. The majority of these planes had fragments of information and in a few instances documents which were useful.
3. Prisoner-of-War information.
4. Announcements of ship launchings, disposition of forces, and new developments which appeared in the American press and on the radio.
5. Front line information relayed to Imperial General Headquarters by operational forces.

Admiral TAKEUCHI also discusses briefly information received from Naval Attaches abroad and denies any connection between the Naval Headquarters Intelligence Department and any secret or special organizations.

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Q.1. This is the translation of a document which fell into your hands and has in it information of the U.S. forces, the organization of the Army and Navy Air Corps, the names of carriers, the air groups assigned to carriers, the numbers of air groups. With respect to the organization of the Army and Navy Air forces as given here, this is a list of aircraft carriers, the construction number (hull number), date of sinking or damage, number of aircraft carrier groups, etc. We would like to know the source of the information given here.

A. I was not connected with operational planning as I have been out of the fleet for a good number of years, but I think I may know how they got this information. I believe the report was made in March of last year in the section which I headed. When I compiled something of this sort, I usually gathered the data for a good number of years before the war, and it is based on that. This Air Group 6 was on a carrier, but I wouldn't know whether the information was correct or not. Your carrier planes have on their tails markings of the squadron and the carrier fleet from which information could be derived. The announcement of ship construction could be tabulated statistically. On the basis of the time that we know it took to fit out ships, to move from the yards as they were constructed, through, for example, the Panama Canal, to the Pacific Areas, such information could be tabulated statistically. We could come out with an answer a month, more or less, on either side. The knowledge of plane markings was a matter known to practically everyone in the Japanese Navy. Even the most junior man in an area, when a plane was shot down, could tell from what carrier it came. Although our radar and early warning devices were very ineffective, with glasses and visual observation, we could often tell the identification of unit and ship. My work was of a statistical nature. It did not involve an aspect of spying which is a type of "last century intelligence work". My estimates would be about 20% correct. If it fell within those limits, I was satisfied.

Q.2. With regard to the changing of air groups aboard carriers, the information presented in this document is too up-to-date to have made such methods effective with regard to that particular item.

A. This document was made up, as you know, after the GILBERT Operations and just after the time of the MARSHALL Operations, during which period the number of American aircraft shot down was high. Consequently, we had many sources of information of the type I have outlined before, available upon which to make this estimate. In later operations, we did not have so much information. The fact that this estimate is accurate may be offset by later estimates which may not have been so accurate. At the time of the MARSHALL and GILBERT Operations, we had very good communications with our forces in the field and afloat. The collection of such information was relatively easy. Later our communications were not as good. Consequently, estimates as accurate as these were by no means easy to make. Only about fifteen copies of this document were made.

Q.3. The information with regard to Tables of Organization in the Army Air Forces and the Navy Air Organization is greatly detailed. Could you tell us something about the sources for this detailed information?

A. Our information for computing this sort of estimate on organization of units came from a large number of sources beyond those I have already mentioned. Information on U.S. Army Air Forces came to us from our Army General Headquarters. Information also came to us from communications intelligence activities. In addition,

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particularly with regard to your Naval organization, a great deal of information came to us from TRUK, SAIPAN, etc., where your planes were shot down. The majority of these planes had in them some sort of documents which we were able to capture. Most of these documents were not of a detailed, elaborate nature, were not tables of organization in themselves, but were isolated orders, operations orders for example, given to the pilot of the plane. From such information, we could gather fairly well the organization of Naval air units. My operations consisted largely of putting together the very many pieces of individually meaningless information. These were gathered together from all of these sources which I have mentioned today and in previous conversations. It was my job to consider all of these very carefully and combine them into some sort of coherent picture. Any piece of information by itself meant nothing. This sort of work cannot be done over a short period of time such as six months or a year, but you must remember that I have been working on this for over three years. Consequently, I have been able to achieve a larger perspective of it than had I been working for short periods alone.

Q.4. Now with regard to the organization chart of the SARATOGA which is printed in great detail, was that specific piece of information gained from a crashed plane, from interrogation of prisoners, or from some other source?

A. I believe this information must have come from captured documents; your roster of naval officer personnel would have given such information. I kept lists based originally on your roster of naval officers, which was received every year before the war. (I would not have been able to compile such a list for a new ship)

Q.5. Could you supply us with a list of the documents captured by the Japanese throughout the war?

A. All of the material has been burned, and I do not remember, in detail, what the individual pieces were. You must realize that captured documents and other sources of information might pertain to only one squadron or one part of the ship's complement, but all other information, over a period of years, enabled me, particularly in the case of older ships, to make such detailed estimates.

Q.6. Could you supply us from memory with a partial list of very important documents captured during the war?

A. I do not remember in detail many of them, but I recall that one document obtained during the SAIPAN Operation, I believe by a ship off shore, gave the organization, including, I believe, even the air group organization of one of the task forces, though I cannot remember which task force it was. Most of the time, however, documents captured by us were only individual sheets of paper embodying small, detailed pieces of information. Such complete, large documents as the one mentioned were very rare.

Q.7. Do you know the details of how this document came into the possession of your ship?

A. I do not remember in detail how this was picked up. The fleet unit picked it up and sent it as it was into TOKYO by airmail. This is the extent of my knowledge. After the air raids began on TOKYO, in the early part of this year, we got a great number of documents from planes shot down. These did not include organizational charts but did include a great number of charts with the attack dis-

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position drawn on the map of the TOKYO area.

Q.8. You are familiar with the TENGO Plan, are you not?

A. I have heard of the TENGO Operation Plan, but I am completely unfamiliar with it. The procedure followed was for the 1st Section, which dealt with operations, to come to me and ask me what the latest information was. I handed them the information. At that point, my knowledge of the operation plans ceased.

Q.9. I understand that is true. However, the estimates which appear in the TENGO Plan with regard to Allied forces were prepared by the 5th Section of the 3rd Department.

A. My function was to supply them with the basic materials, but the job of arriving at the final estimate of the enemy's plans and capabilities was the job of the 1st Section of the 1st Division. I sometimes heard what their estimates were, but I never saw them. I was so unfamiliar with the operations side of the picture that I did not even know at first what you meant by the TENGO Plan. Even the names of such planes and their meanings were a matter kept within the specific section charged with making them up.

Q.10. During the early planning stages, did you sit in on the meetings held by Admiral TOMIOKA and Capt. OHMAE of the 1st Dept?

A. I was never called into the conferences. Anyone outside of the planning section during a planning phase was considered almost like the enemy and was not admitted at all to the deliberations or their plans.

Q.11. Comdr. MIYAZAKI stated that quite often the head of the 5th Section sat in on meetings during the early planning stages. Was he mistaken in this?

A. They did not rely upon us, but made their own judgments in every case. During a conference they would call me in for perhaps ten minutes, give me the results of their considerations, then drive me out.

Q.12. Capt. OHMAE has given you credit for knowing much more than you give yourself credit for, and while it is true that your estimates were subject to change by the 1st Dept., actually many times they were accepted and used as originally provided. In the TENGO Plan, your estimates with regard to the number of ships in the classification of aircraft carriers, small carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers which would be available for the defense of OKINAWA and, further, an estimate of the airplanes expected to operate against the Japanese home islands in support of that operation were used, and, I understand, very much as you prepared them. Before I go on, do you wish to comment?

A. This is the first time I have heard of it. I never received information direct from the 1st Section.

Q.13. I may say further that in inquiring about this information, I was told, Admiral TAKEUCHI knows all about this. He supplied the information. You should ask him".

A. If the Planning Section wanted any information, they would ask me for it, and I would give them the most up-to-date information I had. At the time of the OKINAWA Operation estimate, my information was based upon a modification of basic information received in the form of captured documents and other captured materials from planes shot down on FORMOSA towards the end of September 1944 in

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carrier air strikes. It was upon that basic information, as modified, that I made up my estimates of the American strength available for the OKINAWA Operation.

Q.14. You have told us about the source and have stated that the estimates were arrived at through statistical analysis of a great volume of information. Will you tell us something about the method of statistical analysis which eventually produced the estimate?

A. What I mean by statistical analysis was arrived at in the following manner: For a number of years, I gathered together pieces of information on a historical basis from such sources as books written on the subject, radio announcements, etc. Secondly, I would combine this information with information compiled on a geographical basis, based during the war upon such sources as radio broadcasts, sightings of your task forces and planes, and combine this temporal and spacial system of information, which I kept filed, with other pieces of information as they came to my knowledge. For example, an announcement of your press or radio which stated the date on which a carrier was launched; based on my past information, historical information, with regard to carriers, I could determine that within a certain period of time, say six months, this ship would be operating in the Pacific Area. Another source that I used was announcements by your side of sinkings and damage to ships and the loss of aircraft. I assumed that these announcements were the very least which you had lost. It then became a problem of determining the status of those ships which were only damaged or which may have been sunk. That could often be determined one way or another by such methods as sub-sightings or aircraft sightings. All of this information which I was able to combine together in my files over long period of years from all these sources, this combination is what I consider to be statistical analysis. We did not have a world wide organization gathering this type of information. It was a matter of statistical analysis by the individual officers concerned with the job here in TOKYO.

Q.15. How many people did you have working with you to assist in this statistical analysis?

A. I reported these figures in a written answer. Including myself, there were 41 officers at one time. Thirty-seven (37) of these were temporary and reserve officers. These had only 10 to 12 months' experience. Beside that, we had about a dozen employees, most of them young girls, used as office girls. At the beginning of my service, I had only 5 subordinates. Since the summer of last year, only one year before the end of the war, I had the staff described above. The 37 temporary and reserve officers came in the summer of 1944. They were graduated about June of last year. There was no place to put them as island bases were taken and ships were sunk. Consequently, I was able to get them for my section.

Q.16. The Communications Dept. at OWADA also supplied information, did it not?

A. A copy of any information they had of interest to me was sent to me.

Q.17. What was the nature of this information?

A. Information they gathered went directly to the 1st Section as they were directly subordinate to that section. I felt that inasmuch as much of their information was intelligence in nature, it should be mine. Such was not the case. I received only occasional copies.

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Q.18. What types of information did you receive in detail?

A. The movement of planes from PEARL HARBOR to the south and west. Movement of large forces of planes out and back to bases in NEW GUINEA. There were many cases where an occasional copy arrived as much as ten days later, after it had gone to the 1st Section. Sometimes, information with an October 1 date was received October 10.

Q.19. Did the Navy send any of its officers or anyone else to the AKASAKA Training School in TOKYO?

A. I cannot even guess. I do not know of the existence of such a school.

Q.20. In the information supplied us, there is the statement that 200,000 Yen was appropriated as an extraordinary budget for naval operations in foreign countries. How was that money spent?

A. This is the first I have ever heard of this appropriation, but I believe it was probably allotted for the most part to diplomatic personnel, such as attaches, in what might be broadly called intelligence activities, such as buying books, newspapers, etc. I do not believe that very much was received by any one attache. The man in Washington might have received as much as ten thousand yen. Probably the man in China received only two or three thousand in this type of work.

Q.21. Do you know Admiral CHUDO?

A. I know the gentlemen. About two years ago, he was in Headquarters where he was Chief of the 8th Section, concerned with England. I do not know in detail, but I believe at the present time he is in the Southwestern area attached to Field Marshal TERAUCHI's headquarters, perhaps in FRENCH INDO-CHINA, perhaps in RANGOON, carrying out liaison duties between the Army and Navy forces in the area.

Q.22. When Burma came under Japanese occupation, Admiral CHUDO was appointed naval attache at RANGOON. Did reports issued by the naval attache, for instance at RANGOON, ever come directly to the 3rd Dept?

A. I believe so, but it doesn't pertain to my section. It came under the 8th Section concerned with England, India, Burma, Australia. Admiral CHUDO was once the Chief of that section, and his position now includes that area, I believe. His report was sent to that section.

Q.23. Were the reports of the Naval Attache in Argentina sent to your section?

A. Yes. His name was Rear Admiral YOKISHIDA.

Q.24. What sort of reports did you receive from him?

A. He sent reports until late 1943. Diplomatic relations were cut at that time so we do not know how he is doing now. Before that time, he sent general affairs about Latin America and sometimes about the U.S. Navy, but his post was so far from the U.S., we could obtain reports more easily from the radio.

Q.25. What information did you get through representatives in Mexico?

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A. Mexico is nearer than Argentina to the U.S., but that post was removed before the war so when I came to the post, there was no attache there, consequently, no reports. Before that time, I believe the attache in Mexico could supply some information about the U.S. It was not an important post.

Q.26. When did you receive reliable information of the shape and capabilities of the B-29?

A. We couldn't guess the shape of the B-29 until November of last year. We could only guess what general type of ship it was. I suppose it might resemble a B-17 or a B-24. It is an Army matter. About last September, we issued a report on that plane, but I had no information, so my subordinate drew a picture and asked me whether we should issue it or not. I laughed.

Q.27. Prior to the war, according to a rather voluminous document which was supplied us, the Navy had an organization working through the Naval Attache, called a Special Service Organization, and in the report, the statement was made that the reports of the Special Service field organization came directly to the Naval Staff in TOKYO and to the respective geographical section of the Intelligence Dept. What sort of Special Service organization was that?

A. As you know, I was not attached to the Intelligence activities at the beginning of the war. However, during my 30 years experience in the Japanese Navy, during which time I have had some connection with Intelligence activities, I have never heard of such an organization. If we had such an organization, it would have been a good idea, but we did not. On the basis of the money appropriated, 200,000 Yen, for extraordinary expenses, had that money been distributed in the U.S. at 7 Yen to the dollar, it would have given them a very inadequate amount of money to carry on widespread organization in the U.S., even had it been used for such purposes, which to my knowledge it was not. After the end of the last war, the British Navy in furtherance of its aims in obtaining oil fields built up some sort of an organization in the Near East, but the Japanese have never had such an organization, inasmuch as we are, comparatively speaking, a very poor country.

Q.28. Admiral CHUDO stated that it was part of his duties to form a data collecting organization. Was this with the Navy's knowledge?

A. If Admiral CHUDO made such a statement, it must have been based upon directives received by him from some Fleet Headquarters or from Marshal TERAUCHI. Certainly such an organization or any organization remotely resembling it has never been contemplated at the Naval General Headquarters in TOKYO. I do not know where the term is used by civilian elements for a regular civilian government political organization. We saw such a name in the press during the China incident as TOKUMU KIKAN, but as we had no relation with such a matter, we do not know what it meant, so I believe that special term was concocted by journalists. Such a name has attention value or interest to the world, but I do not know what it really means. If you mean it to be some big organization in Intelligence activities, our Navy had none of them. For America, I had only three staff officers and you over-praise my poor services to my country during my three years service. I cannot even dream there was any such organization in our Navy Dept.