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CONFIDENTIAL, TIMEINC, TOKIO

3 parallelinr but going well beyond the Cleveland Time Forum winter. Time and TTLLII are joining with the City of New Orleans to present a forum to the UUSS and the world early in April. Cleveland theme was the world telling the UUSS what it needed with the UUSS attempting to indicate in very general terms what it might be able to do. We believe that all concerned are convinced that construction toward a democratic future rather than relief must be the keynote. By April interim aid money will have been spent and the third postwar winter will have closed and there will have been four months more of history in France and Italy and Greece and China and Palestine and England and Russia and the UUSS. Then as now the great issue will still be the UUSS versus the Triple Entente -- famine, chaos and Soviet Russia. Looking forward rather than backward we are billing the New Orleans Time Forum not as the inward looking conservative preservation of democracy in the UUSS but as the outreaching dynamic concept of the preservation and extension of freedom. This time we are aiming even higher than last winter for our speakers and would like to include several who although not perhaps in current government circles can be expected to contribute controversy and dynamic talk to the program. Please therefore suggest by cable topestnotch candidates from Japan for invitation to New Orleans Time Forum. Jackson

C O P Y:

MYDANS, PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL, TIMEINC, TOKIO

JA236 parallelinr but going well beyond the Cleveland Time Forum last winter. Time and TTLLII are joining with the City of New Orleans to present a forum to the UUSS and the world early in April. Cleveland theme was the world telling the UUSS what it needed with the UUSS attempting to indicate in very general terms what it might be able to do. We believe that all concerned are convinced that construction toward a democratic future rather than relief must be the keynote. By April interim aid money will have been spent and the third postwar winter will have closed and there will have been four months more of history in France and Italy and Greece and China and Palestine and England and Russia and the UUSS. Then as now the great issue will still be the UUSS versus the Triple Entente -- famine, chaos and Soviet Russia. Looking forward rather than backward we are billing the New Orleans Time Forum not as the inward looking conservative preservation of democracy in the UUSS but as the outreaching dynamic concept of the preservation and extension of freedom. This time we are aiming even higher than last winter for our speakers and would like to include several who although not perhaps in current government circles can be expected to contribute controversy and dynamic talk to the program. Please therefore suggest by cable topestnotch candidates from Japan for invitation to New Orleans Time Forum. Jackson

Suggestions inre conference with Mr. Raymond:

1. Absurdity of contention that in an occupied enemy country greater latitude should be given correspondents in the gathering of news around the offices of General Headquarters than exists even in the governmental offices in Washington. General Back says that no correspondents are permitted to roam the War Department offices in search of information.

2. Correspondents lose sight of the fact that although the war is technically concluded, consideration for the public interest continues.

3. Correspondents ignore the fact that this is an Allied occupation, and there is no official justification for extending greater latitude to the correspondents of the American press than to the press representing any of the other Allied Powers.

4. Correspondents take the view that with war's end all classification should automatically be ended, yet this view is not in conformity with United States or Allied policy as reflected in the great number of messages from Washington of a classified nature, which in turn provides the basis for the classification here of the matters therein discussed. In fact, during the month of January, 1547 of our incoming messages covering a broad field of activity were classified as were numerous telecon conferences.

5. Furthermore, all proceedings, minutes and other documents of the Far Eastern Commission are classified. Against this is the fact

that the Supreme Commander personally insisted upon the activation of the Allied Council for Japan that its entire proceedings be open to the press.

6. Army Regulations with respect to "Safeguarding Military Information" provides in AR 380-5 as to the lowest form of classification — "Restricted matter — a. Documents, information, or materiel (other than Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) which should not be published or communicated to anyone except for official purposes shall be classified Restricted."

7. These regulations during the occupation have been violated daily throughout headquarters in order to give correspondents factual background information and the basis upon which to understand the aims and purposes of the occupation.

To Mydans

Time magazine.

Miles Vaught chronicle drawing on conversation with Mac Arthur and Ross armed him reports following on Macs beliefs: (1) US anticommunist program should include F.E. as well as Europe. (2) Russian problem can be solved peacefully (3) Meeting with Stalin should be attempted. (4) Russia might retreat if U.S. indicates determination use strongest methods available against overt aggression. Would like all checked but particularly interested in points 2 and 3 if practicable from your own background knowledge & conversations with MacArthur.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

18 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: SUZUKI, Bunshiro, Editor of the Readers Digest

I CURRICULUM VITAE:

1. SUZUKI, Bunshiro, born 1890, entered the staff of the Asahi Newspaper Company in 1917. Between 1918 and 1921 he was a war correspondent with the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in Siberia, a foreign correspondent in London, Paris Washington and Genoa. During this period he covered the Versailles Conference, the first and the second International Labor Conference and the Washington Disarmament Conference. Returning to Japan in 1922 SUZUKI successively held the positions of Editor of the Weekly Asahi Graph, City Editor and Managing Editor. He became General Manager and Chief of Editorial Bureau of Asahi's Nagoya Office in April 1935.

2. SUZUKI's journalistic career was terminated temporarily in May 1937 due to his illness. (He was then promoted to associate member of the Board of Directors (JUYAKU TAIGU)). During the fall of 1938 he travelled in Central China. He carried the then Premier Konoe's personal letter to Chiang Kaishek. The letter seeking peace negotiation was forwarded to Chiang Kaishek through Mr. Hallett Abend of the New York Times. SUZUKI was a roving correspondent in Europe and America between October 1939 and October 1940.

3. SUZUKI became Director of the Asahi Newspaper Company on 25 May 1940, and subsequently held the following concurrent positions:

a. Vice Chairman of the Central Research Bureau, 1 January 1941 - 1 June 1943.

b. Chief of the Publications Bureau, 1 May 1941 - 12 March 1945.

c. Member of the Editorial Board, 15 September - 1941 - 7 December 1941.

d. Member of the Management Board, 15 September 1941 - 7 December 1941.

He became Standing Director of the company in November 1942.

II. CAREER SUBJECT TO SCRUTINY:

1. Mr. Hallett Abend of the New York Times in his book, "Pacific Charter", (Doubleday, Doran, N. Y., 1943) gives a detailed account of his interview with SUZUKI in Shanghai, 1938, in which he asserts that the latter was a secret emissary of Prince Konoe and states that he saw the credential signed by Konoe. The excerpt from the book follows:

> It was at this point in the campaign, on October 13, 1938, that there called at my office a Japanese named Bunshiro Suzuki. Mr. SUZUKI is little known in the United States, although he was traveled here and in Europe. But in Japan he is a prominent citizen, a large shareholder in several Tokyo and Osaka Japanese-language newspapers, and a writer and commentator of note.
>
> For half an hour Mr. SUZUKI talked with amazing frankness about the cost and progress of the Japanese campaigns in China, about the greed and corruption of his Empire's militarists, and about the brutal and bungling manner in which they continued to alienate all Chinese of any standing by denying them even the right of self-respect. I thought he had probably come as a secret agent of that very military group whom he denounced and was bent on sounding out my personal views, so my replies were guarded. At length I told SUZUKI that I regretted having to excuse myself, but that I had to keep an important appointment and must bring the interview to an end.
>
> He became flustered. "But I have an urgent and very confidential matter to discuss with you", he blurted at last. "I have come as the personal emissary of Prince Konoe, and here", producing a packet of papers from inside his shirt front, "are my credentials in both English and Japanese".
>
> "What is this all about? What is your mission?" I asked, and then SUZUKI astounded me by this declaration:
>
> "The Prime Minister wants to stop the war. He says the capture of Hankow would be nothing more than military masturbation, and wants to make peace without the Army's knowledge before China's capital falls".
>
> SUZUKI would say nothing more than that, insisting that he must have at least two hours alone with me in order to unfold his plans in detail. We

arranged to meet at my home after dinner that evening, and he urged that in the interval I should assure myself of the validity of his credentials by showing them to Mr. Tani, then Japan's ambassador at large in China, or to the Japanese Consul General. I did both, and found that the letter in Japanese was in Konoe's own hand, stating that SUZUKI enjoyed his complete confidence and carried a verbal message to me of "supreme importance".

2. SUZUKI was director of the Asahi Newspaper Company between May 1940 and November 1942. During this period he concurrently held four other important posts in the company which are listed below:

a. Member of the Editorial Board

The Editorial Board was established in September 1941 for unified control of editorial policies over the company's four newspapers. The meetings of the Board were attended by the Editor-in-Chief, Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Central Research Bureau, Managing Editor-in-Chief and Chiefs of Editorial Bureaus of the four newspapers. Inasmuch as this Board was the highest policy formulating body for the newspaper company, ranking above the chiefs of editorial bureaus as indicated in the organizational chart submitted by the newspaper company, a member of this Board is considered to be purgeable in itself. SUZUKI served on the Board between 15 September 1941 and 7 December 1941.

b. Member of the Management Board

The Management Board was a body of comparable level with the Editorial Board, attended by Chief of Internal Affairs, Business Managers of the four offices and those who were specially appointed by the president. SUZUKI served on the Board between 15 September 1941 and 7 December 1941. He was the only person in the company who attended both of these Boards.

c. Vice Chairman of the Central Research Bureau

A Vice Chairman of Research Bureau is not purgeable in itself in that only the chairman is to fall under the Ordinance. SUZUKI held this position between 1 January 1941 and 12 March 1945.

d. Chief of Publications Bureau

SUZUKI held this position between 1 May 1941 and 12 March 1945. During the applicable period of the PIM purge, between 1 May 1941 and 7 December 1941, the Publications Bureau published 14 books which have been designated by the Japanese Government to have violated SCAPIN 548. The periodical, "Asahi Weekly", was also designated as undesirable. A position of Chief of Publications Bureau is purgeable in itself.

3. SUZUKI during the Pacific War went to Batavia and established the Java Newspaper Company, a subsidiary of the Asahi. He stayed in Batavia between October 1942 and April 1943 as president of the newspaper company.

4. He was appointed standing director in November 1942.

III EVIDENCES OF LIBERAL TENDENCIES

1. SUZUKI's questionnaire reveals no record of his affiliation with militaristic, totalitarian or ultra-nationalistic societies or organizations otherwise considered to be undesirable.

2. On May 26, 1933, a ruffian supposedly a member of an ultra-nationalistic society named NAOE, Yasutaro broke into the editorial room of the Tokyo Asahi with a drawn sword in hand. SUZUKI received a wound of about a foot in length in his back.

James Young, the then International News Service correspondent writes of this incident in his book, "Behind the Rising Sun" (PP 129-139):

> The bulk of Japanese newspapermen, particularly when they take one of the goodwill tours to which the Japanese are so addicted, are inclined to trim their stories to suit the shifting Japanese winds. SUZUKI, however, throughout his newspaper career has remained a real newspaperman at heart and a true liberal.
>
> This almost cost him his life on one occasion, when a gangster patriot entered the big newsroom of the Tokyo Asahi and with a dagger sliced SUZUKI's back. SUZUKI lay on the threshold of death for many months. So much importance was attached to his position that he was attended by physicians from the Imperial Household.

NAOE was subsequently arrested and sentenced to three year imprisonment.

3. During the course of his tour in America and Europe as a roving correspondent, SUZUKI sent a number of dispatches which were criticized by jingoists as pro-allied. One of his dispatches from Washington which appeared in the Asahi's four newspapers was commented by Hugh Byas, then the Tokyo correspondent of the New York Times, as follows:

(N. Y. Times, 28 November 1939)

> Mr. SUZUKI follows up the work that Ambassador Joseph G. Grew began in October of enlightening the Japanese people regarding American views of Japan's actions and policy in China. But for Mr. Grew's outspoken frankness it is not probable that Mr. SUZUKI's dispatch would have been written or published.
>
> A theory that has had extensive currency here, that American antagonism toward Japan is merely a reflection of the people's sentimental sympathy for the underdog, is exploded by citing the actual causes that have built up American anger. Mr. SUZUKI notes as some of these the American suspicion that the Panay was intentionally attacked, the neglect to answer America's formal notes of last October and December and the disregard of American protest in several hundred cases of injury to American citizens or their rights.

4. SUZUKI claims that, during the latter part of the Koiso Cabinet when the collapse of Germany became evident, he succeeded in getting approval of the Swedish Minister to Japan, W. Bagge, and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu for a plan of asking the Swedish Government to act for negotiated peace on Japan's behalf. Prime Minister Koiso also supported the idea, but it was never carried through by the succeeding cabinet of Admiral SUZUKI, he claims. He further states in his counter-evidence that he was told by Miura, Defense Counsel for Shigemitsu that the case is to be cited in defense of Shigemitsu with Mr. Bagge's testimony which Miura had obtained.

JACK P. NAPIER
Maj AGD
Chief, Public Service
Qualifications Division

THE TIMES
1785

THE TIMES PUBLISHING COMPANY, LTD.,
PRINTING HOUSE SQUARE,
LONDON, E.C.4

15 December 1947

Brigadier General C. Whitney,
Chief, Government Section,
General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Dai Ichi Building,
Tokyo.

Dear General Whitney,

Thank you very much for the most profitable talk you gave me the other day. I appreciated it very much.

Enclosed is the summary, for the Supreme Commander's perusal, of a recent "Times" editorial.

Yours sincerely,

Frank Hawley

Encl.

COPY

Press Hawley London Times Tokyo

10 December 1947

For the "Asahi".

Messages from Washington reveal doubts about the practicability of General MacArthur's plan to break up the great industrial combinations controlled by the zaibatsu. In part, these doubts spring from the fear that no one in Japan is capable of replacing the zaibatsu and that the collapse of Japanese economy would impose new and formidable burdens upon American taxpayers. Additional uneasiness comes from the leakage of a confidential document known as F.E.C. 230, which was presented to the Far Eastern Commission last May by the State Department. This document proposed the sale of large Japanese businesses to new owners, some of whom might be Japanese trade unions, mostly Communist controlled. Socialization of important Japanese industrial enterprises, says "The Times", would be highly distasteful to many people in the United States, especially if brought about by American agency. For the moment F.E.C. 230 has been withdrawn but the policy of making Japan a country of small scale businesses has not so far been changed.

/Relaxation

COPY

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/Relaxation

Press Hawley London Times Tokyo 10 December 1947

Relaxation of the present attitude of the Allied Command towards the zaibatsu would profoundly affect Japanese domestic politics. If the zaibatsu were granted amnesty in whatever form, the forces of "old Japan" would be immensely strengthened. These men can no doubt be replaced in time by others accepting popular government as the foundation of Japan's future, and to restore them to power now would endanger the main results of the Allied occupation for the sake of immediate economic stability. Stability is out of reach until the peace settlement with the Allies has defined the place Japan will occupy in international commerce. General MacArthur sees this as clearly as any man and has protested energetically against any suspension of the campaign against the zaibatsu.

(Sgd.) TIMES (LONDON)

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Government Section

1 December 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Statements by Mr. Malcolm Muggridge, London Daily Telegraph

1. On 30 November, at Imperial Hotel Luncheon, during the conversation with Mr. W. S. Hunsberger, DS, Mr. Malcolm Muggridge, London Daily Telegraph, referred to his interview with General MacArthur (without referring to the Supreme Commander by name) in effect as follows: "...I was not very impressed with him...there seemed to be a torrential flood of words, and there was no opportunity to inject questions...it was like attempting to swim a swift-flowing stream, i. e., tacking one way, then the other, inasmuch as I would try to say something, only to be swept away by this overwhelming rush of expression...I like to talk as well as being talked to...and so much of what he said seemed platitudinous...his egotism is remarkable...." Mr. Hunsberger commented that he had heard of the Supreme Commander's penchant for dominating the conversation in an interview, and that the Supreme Commander is reputedly something of an egotist. In the latter respect, Mr. Hunsberger remarked that press releases issued by GHQ, during the course of the war, were datelined "General MacArthur's Headquarters", while those from General Eisenhower's and Admiral Nimitz's headquarters were not similarly captioned. Mr. Muggridge indicated that the Supreme Commander appeared to be well informed about him (Muggridge) and some aspects of developments in England, whereupon Mr. Hunsberger stated "...until 10 minutes before a visitor enters his office, General MacArthur knows nothing about him, but during those 10 minutes, the Supreme Commander is given a briefing...a copy of "Who's Who in England" was noticed on the aide's desk...."

2. At 1715 on the same day in the Tokyo Correspondent's Club, Mr. Muggridge stated to Mr. Allan Raymond, New York Herald Tribune correspondent, that he wanted to speak with the latter about his "(Muggridge's) interview with "the great man", indicating that the Supreme Commander monopolized the conversation. Mr. Raymond stated that he had seen the C-in-C three times, and discovered during the second and third interviews that "The Chief" gave full freedom to the interviewers to ask questions and to comment.

News Dispatch from Burton Crane to New York Times. Tokyo, Nov. 1947

It is becoming disturbingly clear that a great many Japanese in government circles believe that occupation officials have used their purge powers to effect a leftward realignment of Premier Tetsu Katayama's Cabinet. SCAP's Government Section is being blamed directly for the Premier's removal of Rikizo Hirano, his Agriculture Minister.

In view of the fact that Brig. Gen. Courtney Whitney, Chief Government Section, repeatedly declared that all such matters are left in Japanese hands, the political world is worried, saying openly that democracy is only an empty shell if stringpulling behind the scenes continues.

Politicians believe the Government Section took advantage of the friction between Hirano and Suehiro Nishio, Chief Cabinet Secretary, both strong rightwing socialist leaders, offering the latter their backing if he would swing leftward. Early this year a Communist coup seized control of the Japan Farmers Union from Hirano. He refused to abide by the result, forming the National Farmers Association which has been gaining strength and making the red victory a hollow one.

They also claim they have direct evidence that Government Section gave commitment that it would not purge Hirano if he would resign from the Cabinet and make room for Nomizo, President of the Japan Farmers Union. Hirano refused to quit, made perhaps too confident by the fact that he had already received a clean bill of health from the Central Screening Committee.

Again those in informed circles assert that part of the deal with Nishio was his commitment that Ken Inukai and Wataru Narahashi, Government Section favorites who were purged by the Yoshida Cabinet, would be removed from the

purge list by the Central Screening Appeal Board.

From reliable sources this correspondent has obtained reports of conversations among Cabinet Ministers. According to one of these, on September 13th at the home of Kumakichi Matsuoka, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Nishio warned Hirano that he had incurred the anger of Col. Charles L. Kades, Deputy Chief of the Government Section, by continuing to associate with Jiro Shirasu, former Chief Central Liaison Office, and by reporting his assumption to office to Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger and George Atcheson, Jr., instead of going to Kades. Shirasu, according to the Japanese, earned Col. Kades enmity by declining to accept Government Section political orders unless committed to writing.

According to another report Nishio said Col. Kades visited Katayama and Nishio on October 25th and made statements rendered as follows: "General Headquarters is sympathetic to the Katayama Cabinet and will support it. However, Headquarters does not think that Hirano is helping this Cabinet. His attitude toward the rice price and his interview with Mr. Handleman proved his indiscretion. He is also attempting to secretly organize a new Conservative Party. We in Headquarters are sympathetic to the Socialist Party and cannot tolerate such things."

Hirano opposed paying farmers 1700 yen for their rice when the black-market price was about 15,000 yen for the same five bushel unit. In an interview with Howard Handleman, International News Correspondent, published in Tokyo but not sent abroad said there is no hurry about the Peace Treaty until reforms the Occupation has introduced are "so thoroughly dug in they cannot be subverted." Hirano also charged Nishio with plotting to have the present coalition retain power under Foreign Minister Hitoshi Ashida if

Katayama forced him to resign through failure to pass the Coal Mine State Management Bill.

On October 29th Nishio said, according to these reports, "When the Cabinet was formed Hirano's status was questioned but due to Katayama's unprecedentedly strong appeal that his participation was a vital necessity, approval was obtained. Since then, however, it is becoming increasingly clear to Government Section that Hirano has actually added nothing to the present Cabinet and therefore the purge problem has come up."

The same day, according to Hirano, he visited Justice Minister Yoshio Suzuki, and was told he would not be purged if he agreed to resign.

On October 30th Matsuoka declared, "According to Premier Katayama that inasmuch as the Hirano purge was demanded by General Headquarters it was already beyond his power or Nishio's power to prevent it. Deputy Chief Kades of the Government Section had pointed out Hirano as being an obstacle to the present Cabinet, that he had been charged with falsifying qualification report forms and Headquarters had received about four hundred letters informing against him and for these reasons he must be purged."

On October 30th Nishio told representatives of the All Japan Farmers Association that the purge was unavoidable "because it was based upon the proposal that Col. Charles L. Kades made to the Premier" and asserted they must make up their minds to have the Japan Farmers Union get into the Agriculture Ministry.

20 November 1947

MEMORANDUM TO COL. KADES

SUBJECT: LIBERTY MAGAZINE

Since Liberty Magazine was established, about 25 years ago, it has shown a profit in very few years. The reason for this may be that the magazine attempted to compete in a field in which the Saturday Evening Post and Collier's were already well established, and that its editorial contents were never quite good enough to offer serious competition, nor was its editorial policy and slant ever clearly enough defined to indicate the kind and quality of circulation it offered to advertisers. As a result, the latter never considered buying space in LIBERTY of first importance.

Established by the Mc-Cormick-Patterson combination, it was later sold to MacFadden. Originally of the same format as the Post and Collier's (large size, four columns) it was later reduced to its present three-column size. The advertising rates remained the same, and advertisers objected on the grounds that they were getting less display space for the same amount of money.

LIBERTY's history under MacFadden ownership was a series of reorganizations and editorial changes in an attempt to inject new blood into the magazine. In February 1946 on a visit to their offices I saw samples of the intensive promotion campaign they were conducting to gain more advertising. Apparently it was not too successful, since the magazine was later sold to its present publisher, Paul Hunter.

In February 1947 its date of issue was changed from weekly to bi-weekly, and with the September issue it became a monthly. It is the only ten-cent monthly general (i. e., fiction and non-fiction of a general nature) magazine that comes to mind. The established general monthlies in the field (now 25 or 35¢) are Cosmopolitan, Redbook, and American. These offer the reader a lot of material for his money: five or six short stories, one book-length novel, seven or eight articles, several regular departments (movies, records, etc.)

A perusal of the contents of such magazines reveals the type of audience to which they appeal: Cosmopolitan and Redbook to sophisticated readers who like more realistic fiction than the-good-wife-always-triumphs type in women's magazines, and not too profound articles on current topics, and the American to the more conservative family-type reader. The appeal of all three is largely to women readers.

A brief review of the November and December issues of LIBERTY indicates that the editorial contents have been slanted to appeal mostly to men. But it appears that the magazine continues to lack an original and well-defined editorial policy. Allen's "Washington Undercurrent" is sandwiched in as a feature among Vox Pop, Crossword Puzzle, and Records. In both issues, articles on Hollywood's glamour girls are

included in the non-fiction features, as well as an article on Henry Wallace and Eugene Lyons' (Assignment in Utopia) "We Can Head Off a Third World War."

The magazine has borrowed the idea of a condensation of a popular book from Readers Digest, apparently finding the cost of running an original book-length novel prohibitive. Their picture articles are modelled on those of LIFE, but not as effectively presented, because of the limited page size.

LIBERTY claims a circulation of 1,600,000, and carries about 43% advertising, mostly aimed at a masculine audience. It is my opinion that such a percentage in a ten-cent magazine in these days of high cost does not insure a profit.

Cuneo Press, Chicago, reported to be the printer of LIBERTY, has for many years been the printer for Hearst's International Magazines, Inc. (Cosmopolitan, Good Housekeeping, etc) This does not necessarily indicate a Hearst interest in LIBERTY since as far as I know Cuneo is an independent printer.

Alice G. Gordon

ALICE G. GORDON
Special Projects Division



REVEREND PAUL BUSSARD
EDITOR

FORTY-ONE EIGHTH STREET
SAINT PAUL, 2, MINNESOTA

November 19, 1947

Colonel Herbert Wheeler,
Office of the Supreme Commander,
GHQ, FEC, APO 500,
San Francisco, California.

Dear Colonel Wheeler:

On my return from Europe where I spent three months setting up several new editions of the Catholic Digest, I informed myself of the role you played in getting permission to start one in the Japanese language. Father O'Connor wrote me about how you were helpful and extraordinarily cooperative in assisting in getting the necessary permission. I want you to know that I am properly grateful. I hope the Japanese edition will be of some small cultural assistance to the praiseworthy success with which the occupation has been carried out in Japan.

The December issue of the Catholic Digest, copies of which will be sent to you, carries an article on General MacArthur written by Father O'Connor.

Cordially yours,

Paul Bussard

WE DO NOT NEED MacARTHUR

Sin Min Wen Pao (Independent, Government-supervised), Shanghai
October 13, 1947

In his article "China--a report to the American people," Bullitt emphasizes the importance of aiding China and of opposing the Soviet Union. This is an inevitable consideration at this time when the conflict between the United States and Soviet Russia is at its height, and so is nothing to be wondered at. What is surprising is that he openly proposes that General MacArthur, who controls Japan, be invited to come to China to assist in planning for the use of the proposed U. S. aid. In other words, he proposes that General MacArthur be asked to serve concurrently as supervisor of the U. S. aid to China. This is something which the Chinese find it very hard to tolerate.

We should already be familiar with MacArthur's way of doing things. He has been controlling Japan, but the result is that he has become a tool whereby Japan controls the Allied nations. Fortunately, there is a country like China which, though she cannot control Japan, still holds the veto over the Japanese problem, in spite of the fact that this is only negative in character. Now, if MacArthur who is pro-Japanese were to come to China to participate in Chinese affairs, and to regulate relations between the Far Eastern countries, the result would be that China would have no power to interfere with Japan, but that Japan would be able to realize her demands on China through MacArthur. It is not impossible that some day MacArthur would want Japan to rearm and to send troops to our Northeast to help us in the Communist-suppression campaign there.

Even though at the present time conditions in China are extremely chaotic and China is weak, yet since the United States is a former ally of ours, she should not, at least as a matter of courtesy, look upon our country as an equal of defeated Japan. China is a victorious nation; China is not Japan. The Chinese will not welcome the pro-Japanese General MacArthur to come to China to assist her. (Summary)

Memo to Com C.

On the whole I think Ball was more reasonable than past experience led individuals to would be

Barky

EXTRACT FROM THE MELBOURNE "ARGUS" DATED 13TH OCTOBER, 1947

IN JAPAN TODAY.

The first of a series by W. MACMAHON BALL, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

In Tokyo a few weeks ago I was talking privately with an American general about Australia and Japan. He was anxious to know, for one thing, why Australia seemed unwilling to provide Japan promptly with the quantities and types of wool she had asked for. I was trying to explain Australia's difficulties when my friend cut in impatiently:

"When for Pete's sake, will you seven million Australians realize the importance of having seventy million allies in this country?"

The general's views were simple and logical.

In 1947 he believed that Russia was the enemy, potentially much more powerful and dangerous than Japan had ever been. Japan, he claimed, is no longer a danger to us, but she has immense strategic importance in the event of a conflict between the United States and Russia. Hence our main concern must be to draw her close in friendship and build up her strength.

There has been controversy whether the occupation is a success. Much of the argument on either side seems to me to be confusing and inconclusive. The main reason for this is the overlap and inconsistency between the aims we stated in 1945 and the aims we pursue today. In 1945 we set out the purpose of the occupation. Negatively, the Japanese were to be demobilised and disarmed. This physical task has been carried out smoothly, and is, for practical purposes, complete. Then we set out our positive aims. We were to try to establish democracy in Japan, built on respect for the worth of the individual. We were to replace a feudal economy by a welfare economy. We were to re-educate the Japanese to love peace and respect international law.

That was in 1945. They have been displaced by a new priority, the need felt so urgent, particularly in America, to make Jap an a military ally.

Two years ago the Japanese, aware of the importance of meeting the wishes of their conquerors, declared in their new Constitution that they renounced war and armed forces forever. They explained that they were happy to rely on the peace-loving Allies and on the United Nations for protection.

No one who has been in Japan this year can regard this Japanese renunciation of war and of armed forces as anything more than a polite surrender gesture.

The restoration of Japanese military forces in some form or other is sympathetically discussed at Allied social gatherings. The Japanese Foreign Office has informally sounded Allied representatives on the chances of being allowed a standing army of 100,000 men and a small air force, for "police duties when the Allied Occupation Forces are withdrawn". When a Japanese diplomat put this proposition informally to me, I reminded him that it would be contrary to the new Constitution.

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"Ah, yes," he said, "but the situation has unfortunately changed since we asopted our Constitution."

It was sometimes said that the Japanese have come to hate war and their war leaders. No, they hate losing a war, and they are glad to repudiate the military leaders whom they blame for the defeat. The Japanese today disown unhappy Tojo and his former military colleagues, not for being militarists, but for their blundering "miscalculation of chances."

It would probably be false to say that Japan's present leaders desire another war. They have too fresh a memory of the risks. But they certainly appreciate the atmosphere of hostility between America and Russia. They seek eagerly for every chance to divide the Allies that defeated them. The present atmosphere provides them a superb opp ortunity to play off Russia against America. They are fully aware of their strategic importance to both these Great Powers.

At present General MacArthur controls Japan, so that it is merely common sense to play up to the United States. The Japanese are anxious to co-operate with MacArthur's headquarters in "processing" Japanese repatriates from Soviet controlled areas. They are eager to co-op erate with the Allied Intelligence and counter-intelligence organisations. They know that two years ago these bodies were mainly concerned with catching up on Japanese militarists and ultra-nationalists, whereas today they are almost wholly concerned to catch up with Communists or Russian agents.

Hence Japan's policy today is to exploit in every possible way America's fear and suspicion of Russia and Communism. Two years ago the primary political motive in Japan was to please General MacArthur, in the hope that Japan might thereby win a gentle and short occupation. In the last six months, the emphasis has changed, though not the aim. The primary political motive today is to qualify for American aid in terms of the Truman doctrine:

One senior Japanese diplomat put it this way:

"Well, we Japanese have been fighting Communism in our part of the world since 1931; it is nice to know that the United States is now awake to the importance of helping us in this job."

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EXTRACT FROM "THE ARGUS" DATED 14TH OCTOBER, 1947

IN JAPAN TODAY

II

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

Here is the first question we must face if we are to think clearly about Japan.

Do we really want the Japanese to carry out the pacifist provisions of their new Constitution or do we want them to reorganize their national life in a way that will maximise their value as military allies?

Our answer will depend on our view of the whole world situation, and much more on what we think about Russia than on what we think about Japan. The problem of Japan is a fragment of the world problem.

If we believe that the differences between Russia and the Western democracies make war between them a great and early danger, then our military and strategic interests in Japan will override everything else.

Before we can measure the degree of success achieved by the Occupation we must clear up the confusion between Allied aims of 1945 and 1947. But if we need to think more carefully about the end we pursue, we must give equal consideration to the means at our disposal.

It seems to me that a great deal of criticism of General MacArthur is valueless because it fails to recognize that what he can do is severely limited by the instruments through which he must work. It is foolish and unfair to try to assess his achievements without taking account of the limitations his instruments impose on him.

Emperor most important

MacArthur's first and greatest instrument is the Emperor Hirohito. The Tenno is at once an immense aid and an immense frustration to Allied aims as stated in 1945. There was a good deal of disagreement then in Allied circles about what should be done with the Emperor. Some felt it would be unjust and illogical to grant him personal immunity from investigation for war guilt. The opposing school of thought won the day.

There can be no doubt that the practical reasons for keeping the Emperor had overwhelming weight. When the Emperor ordered his fighting forces to lay down their arms and to comply meticulously in every order given by their conquerors, his subjects, with negligible exceptions, obeyed instantly and without question. To the devout Japanese it was like a direct command from God. The marvelous completeness of that surrender in every theatre undoubtedly saved the lives of tens of thousands of Allied soldiers.

Occupation was smooth

During the two years of Occupation there have been no pockets of resistance, even where Allied troops are very thinly spread; there is complete safety for Allied nations, who may move at will throughout Japan; there is rarely any show of resentment at the privileges Allies enjoy; it is almost certainly the most smooth and peaceful Occupation in history.

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For all this full credit must be given to General MacArthur's firm benevolence and the generally high standard of conduct of the Occupation troops. But the basic reason why the Japanese are obedient, helpful, and peaceable under the Occupation is because it is the Emperor's will.

Notable efforts have been made to "democratize" the Emperor system. The new Constitution strips the Emperor of all absolute political power; other legislation deprives him and his family of many of the legal and financial privileges they formerly enjoyed; above all, in January, 1946, Hirohito made a public statement disclaiming divinity.

The ideas behind these Allied inspired reforms were estimable. It was hoped to reform the Emperor system on the model of the British Constitutional monarchy. But this effort to graft a quite modern British political idea on to the Japanese idea of a Son of Heaven descended in "a line unbroken for ages eternal" is a ticklish operation.

For my part I could find no evidence that the Japanese people took the Emperor's disclaim to divinity at all seriously.

Emperor stronger in 1947

It must be remembered that in Japan it is considered good form for a public speaker to end his address, no matter how eloquent and able it may have been, with an apology to his audience for having bored them with so many feeble-minded ideas, presented in such halting and stumbling words. That is the peroration and signal for applause. It is therefore possible that many Japanese regarded the Emperor's disclaimer as a superlative example of good manners.

I feel confident that the real political influence of the Emperor is stronger today than before the war, and probably stronger than that of any Emperor since the Restoration.

He is all the Japanese have left to hold on to. They have lost their Empire and their fighting forces; the wartime political personalities; the admirals and generals are discredited by failure. The Emperor alone remains; he is the divine leader who preserves their national unity and who will restore that leadership among nations that has been temporarily destroyed by the blunderings of their generals and the overwhelming material resources of the United States.

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IN JAPAN TODAY

GENERAL MACARTHUR'S DILEMMA

III

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

The retention of the Emperor in Japan is inevitable, but it means a price to be paid and a risk to be taken.

Before this war one of the most dangerous features of Japan was the fanatical fusion of religion and patriotism, and both were focused on the person of the Emperor.

During the occupation brave efforts have been made to "democratise" religion. Shintoism is no longer officially linked with the State, and Shrine Shintoism has lost its State subsidies.

It is very hard for the foreign observer to gauge the impact of such measures on the minds of the Japanese. I should not think these reforms have seriously weakened the links which bind religion and the State in the thoughts and loyalties of the ordinary man. The chief Shinto shrines, including the Meiji and Yasukuni shrines in Tokyo, have a steady stream of worshippers.

The ceremony for the promulgation of the new Constitution last year threw some interesting sidelights on this subject. This Constitution was to strip the Emperor of his political power and divine claims, and separate religion and the State.

Yet the day chosen for its promulgation was November 3, the anniversary of the birth of the great Emperor Meiji. Hirohito's first act that morning was to report on the new Constitution to his Ancestors at the three shrines in the Imperial Palace grounds.

Later a great rally of citizens was organized on the Imperial Plaza. After the crowd had accorded polite applause to speeches by political leaders the national anthem was being sung. Suddenly the Imperial coach appeared crossing the bridge over the moat. The Emperor was arriving. The crowd shouted itself hoarse in a fever of devotion. Some Allied newspapermen present told me that they had never heard such banzais since the death-charges of the war. After two minutes the Emperor withdrew, the crowd surged after him, treading many underfoot in their excitement. Priests beat their drums to ward off evit spirits. For hours afterwards the crowd filed over the dais for the honor of treading where the Emperor had trod.

It is reasonable to expect that when General Macarthur withdraws with his occupation forces the authority of the Emperor will be even greater.

It would be unreal to expect any rapid liberation of the Japanese mind from national fanaticism and superstition in these circumstances. That will take long years of education and social reform. Yet the Emperor remains the indispensable instrument through which the Allies must exercise control over the conduct of the Japanese people.

General MacArthur must not only work through the Emperor; he must work through the Japanese Government and the Japanese civil service.

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The Supreme Commander might have tried to rule Japan directly through his own American Military Government officers instead of relying on the Japanese. In fact this was considered impracticable. It would have called for the service of thousands, or tens of thousands, of highly trained Americans, for whom there was already an acute need for military government in Europe.

Language was a far greater barrier than in Europe. It is doubtful whether there are today more than a few dozen occupation officers with full mastery of spoken and written Japanese. Moreover, if the Japanese were to be trained in the methods of democratic government, the sooner they began the better. Hence the decision to use the Japanese Government and civil service.

This decision has imposed close limitations on General MacArthur's actual power. It has, indeed, confronted him with a serious dilemma.

MacArthur has tried sedulously to implant in the Japanese mind a genuine respect for the authority of the new democratic institutions. This means respect for a Government which has the majority support in a Parliament freely elected by universal suffrage.

Two free elections have been held during the occupation, in April, 1946, and April, 1947. But both elections have produced strong conservative majorities. These conservative parties - the "Liberals" and "Democrats" - have won their support mainly from those classes who greatly profit from the present inflation; the farmers and fishermen, who make up about one-half of the total population; the black-marketeers, and those with assets they can sell.

The classes being impoverished by the inflation are the wage and salary earners. Increases in their rates of pay have failed pitiably to keep pace with the rise in prices. It was quite clear to any objective observer - whatever his political colour - that a number of rigorous economic controls had to be adopted if economic diaster was to be avoided.

But the conservative parties stubbornly resisted all efforts to establish a directed economy. However essential such controls, to restore the economic health of the nation, they appeared to threaten the immediate interests of the classes they represent. They preferred external aid to domestic reform. Moreover, a high degree of inflation and an exhausted economy might make it harder for the Allies to collect reparations and the costs of occupation. The Japanese political leaders have studied carefully the economic strategems the Germans followed after 1918.

That is the dilemma. It is easy to say that General MacArthur should force the Japanese Government to adopt the control measures necessary for economic efficiency and social justice. But he must do this through the Japanese Government. And no Japanese Government with the necessary support of Parliament and people has been found ready to launch such measures. The present Prime Minister Katayama, is making worthy efforts at economic reform, but his Social Democratic Party is outweighted by more than two to one in the Diet.

It is true there have been notable efforts by GHQ to cleanse and reform the Japanese political economic system - the purge, and legislation directed to dissolve the Zaibatsu and rural land reform. I cannot discuss these interesting developments in these articles. Each of these reform programmes is faced with real and formidable difficulties; each has met quiet sabotage from conservative Japanese forces. It is far too soon to have solid hope that such projects will produce any substantial increase in economic welfare or significant redistribution of social and political power.

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IN JAPAN TODAY

AND THE JAPAN OF TOMORROW?

IV

By W. MacMahon Ball, lately British representative on the Allied Control Council in Japan. Exclusive to "The Argus" in Victoria.

As I see it, the following are the most important features of the situation in Japan today:

1. Japan's actual military power has been destroyed.

2. The Occupation is making important contributions to Japan's national vigour and economic strength.

Occupation medical officers are teaching the Japanese the most modern and effective methods in medicine, hygiene, and public health. Their work has already produced notable results in the control of epidemics and reduction of disease.

Occupation scientists are giving the Japanese a new understanding of their country's natural resources, together with a training in the most effective techniques for their development.

In production and transport the Japanese are learning new things from the Americans every day. All this should greatly help Japan to become the workshop of East Asia.

3. Although Japan has been provided with the legal framework of a Western democracy, there has yet been no important change in the distribution of economic power, in social structure, or in political and religious ideas.

The men who, within the limits of the occupation, have most influence in Japan today belong to the same class that governed Japan before the war. There are genuinely liberal and radical groups in Japan, but after long years of suupression they have not yet been able to build up the leadership and the organization necessary to threaten the stronghold of the old ruling classes.

If we accept this picture of Japan today, where do we go from there? Do we conclude that because Japan is at present without military power there is no need to be concerned about the revival of Japanese militarism and aggression in the future?

Surely not.

It is often said that the Japanese today are pro-American and anti-Russian. I believe that they are only pro-Japanese. At the moment it is elementary politics to play along with the United States; in the not too distant future it may be felt practical and expedient to imitate the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and play along with the Soviet. Today that would be fatal, while American predominance is so complete in the Western Pacific.

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But can anyone be sure that the American people will be prepared to provide indefinitely the resources necessary to maintain American predominance in the Far East?

To maintain an active and continuous control of Japan would almost certainly involve a heavy tax on the American economy, for there is little that Japan can give American economically. By contrast, East Asia can give Japan the raw materials and the markets she needs for prosperity. Such an economic union might work for the mutual welfare of Eastern peoples. But if it is under the leadership of an unchanged Japan, it holds the seeds of a second "Co-prosperity Sphere".

For all these reasons it is not enoughto have a Japan temporarily UNABLE to make war; we must strive for a Japan permanently UNWILLING to make war. That means revolutionary changes in Japan's social and economic system and in her political outlook.

If such changes are to be real and lasting, they must come from the Japanese, not from without. What we can do from outside is to insist that the Japanese Government maintains the framework of political liberty set up under the occupation so that liber al and radical leaders may continue to educate and organize the people without fear of being thrown into gaol once the occupation is over.

If the maintenance of Japanese feudalism and the restoration of Japanese military power is a threat to our future security, it is an equal menace to the future welfare of the Japanese masses. The common people in Japan, like the common people of every country, want above all else "to live out their lives in freedom from fear and from want."

The task of statesmanship today is not to struggle for control of strategic areas, but to make a world fit for common people to live.in.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

Immediate Release: 14 August 1947

General MacArthur announced today his plan to use approximately $137,000,000 worth of Japanese owned gold and silver made available by the Far Eastern Commission as a base for acquiring foreign exchange to aid in reviving a peaceful Japanese economy. This "gold pot" is the Japanese owned portion of a larger fund of gold, silver, precious metals and jewels, all of which is subject to claims for restitution, costs of occupation and eventually for reparations.

The $137,000,000 will be used to form the Occupied Japan Export-Import Revolving Fund to be utilized as a credit base against which private or governmental financing institutions of Allied or neutral countries will be asked to advance funds or commodities to activate their foreign trade with Japan.

The fund will be operated and preserved by a Controller supervised by the Supreme Commander.

The fund will serve as a credit base for loans which could eventually total upwards of $500,000,000.

Allied and neutral countries can participate in such loans to the extent their currencies are usable for Japanese foreign trade.

Safeguards designed to encourage international participation by lenders from all countries include: limitations on withdrawals for projects that are not self-liquidating; no special liens or preferences to any supplier; export proceeds and earnings from the operations of the Fund accrue to the Fund; the original assets are to be preserved; financing will initially be confined to the purchase of materials and services, the cost of which can be liquidated from export proceeds within a year after arrival of the imports at a Japanese port.

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In the event of a basic political change in the Occupation of Japan, the Fund will be liquidated and existing obligations paid off unless all parties otherwise agree.

A spokesman for the Economic and Scientific Section stated that the formation of this Fund represents an important step towards the re-creation of Japan as a self-supporting trading country. To export, Japan must import raw cotton, wool, iron, salt, petroluem products, wood pulp, hemp, metals, rubber and a number of other commodities. Only by export can Japan secure the means to feed all her people. Other nations need those exports.

He stated that the establishment of the Revolving Fund is considered an important milestone on the road to economic self-support for Japan. The use of this new credit base will permit Japan to reactivate her export industry so that when the Peace Treaty is signed her international credit standing will be satisfactory. Japan's efforts towards reconstruction will enhance such standing in the commercial countries of the world. In view of this and the urgent need for Japan's products it is anticipated that international credits based on the Fund will be offered in large volume.

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
Public Information Office

Immediate Release: 2 August 1947

Prior to his departure from Yokohama this morning, Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs, issued the following statement:

While in Japan I have been afforded the fullest facilities for seeing the situation here at first hand. I have conferred with General MacArthur on the progress of the occupation. I have met the leading officials of the occupation, both military and diplomatic, and have discussed the situation with all four members of the Allied Council and with the heads of many diplomatic missions including the representatives of the British Commonwealth.

The supreme task of the occupation has been the physical disarmament and demilitarization of Japan. That task has now been practically completed.

It has long been clear that the Australian Government shared General MacArthur's views as to the desirability of an early conference in order to negotiate a definitive Japanese treaty of peace giving effect to the general principles already laid down in the basic policies of the Far Eastern Commission. It is specially satisfactory to be able to add that there is a very substantial area of agreement with leading United States authorities in Japan on the major issues which will arise at the conference. There is also wide acceptance of Australia's view that the peace settlement should be negotiated along democratic lines giving all eleven victorious Allied nations in the Pacific war the right of full participation in the settlement and also in the machinery for subsequent supervision of the peace settlement.

I am satisfied that with continuous drive and determination, the peace treaty with Japan could be completed at a comparatively early date and the necessary machinery of peacetime supervision

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by Allied nations successfully launched. This does not mean that the peace document will be in itself a guarantee that all the Allied objectives will be automatically achieved. Documents in themselves guarantee nothing. But broad plans for the future of Japan can be built, based firmly on the foundations of the highly successful occupation, in which military disarmament has been carried out with extraordinary care and efficiency.

During my visit I have also met several leading Japanese, including the Premier, Mr. Katayama, and trade union leaders, and have discussed some of these problems. I have pointed out that the Japanese people will have to prove their good faith and renunciation of aggression not by words only but by conduct and behaviour. If they do this as a democratic and peace loving power, there is no reason why they should not redeem themselves and in due course take an active part in contributing to the welfare of eastern Asia and the Pacific.

I should like to pay special tribute to the magnificent bearing and behaviour of the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces and also of their comrades of the American occupation forces. Australia is proud to be associated in the British Commonwealth Forces under General Robertson and to have all out Australian troops serving again under General MacArthur's inspiring leadership.

Everywhere I have found great goodwill towards Australia among all Americans. The bonds of comradeship between Australia and the United States forged in war will stand firm in peacetime. Many leading American officers here, like General Eichelberger, served in Australia during the war and have been extremely helpful towards my mission. Australia for its part can never forget what it owes to the American forces, and we look forward to welcoming many of them back in future visits to our country.

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We are most grateful to the Supreme Commander and his officers for their helpfulness and cordiality. Their counsel and advice will be of great assistance to Australia in the future consideration of problems of Pacific security and Pacific welfare which are the two great objectives we are bound to pursue in the Japanese peace settlement not only in our own interest but in the interests of international peace and international justice.

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DR. AND MRS. EVATT DEPART FOR AUSTRALIA

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY, YOKOHAMA--Dr. Herbert V. Evatt, Australia Minister for External Affairs, and Mrs. Evatt departed for Australia shortly after midnight last night aboard the HMS Hobart.

Dr. and Mrs. Evatt, and W. Macmahon Ball, Head of the Australian Mission to Japan were the guests of Lt. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger, Eighth Army Commander, and Mrs. Eichelberger at luncheon yesterday.

Following the luncheon, the Evatts, Mr. Ball and other members of the party visited the BCOF cemetery in Yokohama and Mrs. Evatt placed a wreath on the grave of an Australian soldier.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14032 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

New York Times, July 28, 1947.

COMMUNISTS ATTACK MACARTHUR

The Communist party was summoned yesterday to a special effort to block any Presidential aspirations of Gen. Douglas A. MacArthur. In a front-page article in The Sunday Worker, William Z. Foster, national chairman of the party, characterised the Far Eastern military commander as "a main political hope and instrument of the most dangerous Fascist-minded and war-mongering elements in the United States." Mr. Foster called on labor unions, negroes and "other democratic elements" to concentrate their attention on "unmasking" General MacArthur.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12,958 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775-012

RESOLUTION

WHEREAS: "The Daily Worker", foremost newspaper publication of the Communist Party in the United States of America on or about 7 December 1947 [redacted] published in its columns certain false, untrue, malicious and scurrilous charges against Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army of the United States of America and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, as follows:

"General MacArthur has transformed the Pacific Stars and Stripes into one of the worst warmongering newspapers in an attempt to feed American soldiers under his command in Japan and else-where his distorted propaganda.

"The Stars and Stripes which during the early days of the occupation had a high journalistic reputation, is at present far behind the Japanese press."

and

WHEREAS: Aforesaid publication in its "The Sunday Worker", together with one William Z. Foster, National Chairman of the Communistic Party, on or about 27 July 1947, [redacted] published in its columns certain false, untrue, malicious, scurrilous and vicious charges against Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army of the United States of America and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, said charges having characterized said Douglas MacArthur as being:

"a main political hope and instrument of the most dangerous Fascist-minded and warmongering elements in the United States"

and

WHEREAS: The "Pacific Stars and Stripes" and Hanson H. Hathaway, Managing Editor and George W. Hurd, Executive City Editor, on or about 9 December 1947, with truth, fidelity, courage and accuracy, answered the charge of "warmongering" and conclusively demonstrated that said charge is not only patently untrue but is obviously a cruel and poisonous fabrication emanating from the distorted minds of those whose loyalty is to a form of government other than the Republic of the United States of America, its Traditions and Institutions,

and

WHEREAS: Aforesaid "Pacific Stars and Stripes" and Hanson H. Hathaway and George W. Hurd, with truth, fidelity, courage and accuracy, answered to the charge that aforesaid Douglas MacArthur is:

"a main political hope and instrument of the most dangerous Fascist-minded and warmongering elements in the United States"

and again conclusively demonstrated that said designation of a great American Soldier and Statesman, is in its essence and purpose not only a base, cowardly and murderous attempt at character assasination but is furthermore a deliberate and traitorous attack upon the Government of the United States of America and an insult and effront to every member or former member of the Armed Services of the United States of America.

NOW BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED,

That we, the officers and members of Tokyo Post #9450, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, at a regular meeting of said body held in Tokyo, Japan this 7th day of January 1948, hereby disapprove and condemn "The Daily Worker", "The Sunday Worker", and aforesaid William Z. Foster.

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BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

That it is the considered judgment of this body that the cowardly and unprovoked attack upon General of the Army Douglas MacArthur was unfair and untrue and was conceived in hypocracy and born in untruth;

That the gross insult and indignity committed upon General MacArthur was as un-American and reprehensible as the Communistic source whence it came.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

That this body hereby express its deep respect and affection for General MacArthur and does hereby pledge to him its unswerving loyalty and support and urges all patriotic Americans to do likewise.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

That this body hereby express its appreciation and thanks for the arduous labors that have been and are being performed by General MacArthur on behalf of the Allied Occupation of Japan and the progress of LIBERTY and DEMOCRACY in the Japanese Empire. This body urges all patriotic Americans to join in the foregoing expression.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

That this body express its confidence in the "Stars and Stripes" as a free and unfettered newspaper;

That this body express its admiration for and highest approval of the members of the staff and the employees of said "Stars and Stripes";

That this body express its special admiration for and highest approval of

Mr. Hanson H. Hathaway, Managing Editor, and
Mr. George W. Hurd, Executive City Editor, of the staff of said "Stars and Stripes",

for their outstanding truth, fidelity, courage and accuracy in exposing the falsity and viciousness of the Communist inspired attack upon General MacArthur.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED,

That this Resolution be spread upon the minutes of Tokyo Post 9450, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States;

That a copy thereof be forwarded to Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army of the United States and Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers;

That copies of said Resolution be forwarded to "The Pacific Stars and Stripes" and to Messrs. Hanson H. Hathaway and George W. Hurd;

That copies of said Resolution be forwarded to National Headquarters, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

Richard R. Elliott

RICHARD R. ELLIOTT
Commander
Tokyo Post #9450
Veterans of Foreign Wars
of the United States

Daniel H. O'Neill

DANIEL H. O'NEILL
Senior Vice Commander
Chairman, Resolution Committe
Tokyo Post #9450
Veterans of Foreign Wars
of the United States

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

CHUO KORON
The Central Review
NO.588 MARUNOUCHI BLDG.,
TOKYO, JAPAN.

千代田区日比谷
第一相互ビル、総司令部、政治部 内

Brigt. General Courtney Whiteney
The Chief of the Government Section,
Dai-Ichi Building, Hibiya, Tokyo.

JUL 31 1947

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

Kin-Ichi Ohno
The Editor of the Chuo-Koron

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 072

July 28, 1947.

Brigt. General Courtney Whitney
The Chief of Government Section

Dear Sir :

I sent my letter asking you for interview to you, but I do not yet get your letter that you permit my request. Therefore, I wish to get your permission that I will be able to ~~I~~interview you in behalf of 1oo,ooo readers.

Yours Truely
Kin-Ichi Ohno
Kin-Ichi Ohno
The editor of the Chuo-Koron

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11,652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 072

July II. 1947.

Brig. General Courtney Whitney
Chief of the Government Section

Dear Sir :

I am an editor of the Chuo-Koron, and I thank you very much to your effort to do your best to the democratization of Japan. It is very agreeable and favourable that the purge was announced by the Japanese Government on June 27. for the democratization of journalism. Therefore, I want you to contribute your article to our magagine, the Chuo-Koron (the Central Review). I hope that the subject of it is of the purge and democracy by I,ooo words.

I ask you to write your article to our magagime in behalf of IOO,OOO readers. Already I got Mr. Atchisson's writing : its subject is " AFTER THE 22MONTHS OF THE OCCUPATION "; It will be appeared in July issue of the Chuo-Koron.

Won't you please tell me at your convinience when I may meet you?

Your's Truely
Kin'ichi Ohno
Kin-ichi Ohno

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14032 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

July 28, 1947.

Brigt. General Courtney Whitney
The Chief of Government Section

Dear Sir :

I sent my letter asking you for interview to you, but I do not yet get your letter that you permit my request. Therefore, I wish to get your permission that I will be able to ~~I~~interview you in behalf of Ioo,ooo readers.

Yours Truely
Kin-Ichi Ohno
Kin-Ichi Ohno
The editor of the Chuo-Koron

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14,032 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDC # 773 072

7 June 1947

1. With regards to the Reuters' report from Delhi May 18, 1947 to the effect that Japan was seeking an army of one hundred thousand to take over the work of the British and American forces when the occupation ends, the Foreign Office, after confirming that the news was entirely groundless released on May 19, 1947 the following denial;

"A spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office denied that there was any truth in the report from Tokyo which mentioned that Japan was seeking an army of one hundred thousand to take over the work of the British and American forces when the occupation ends".

2. This denial was dispatched by the Reuter and the International News Service.

Delivered by Yamagata from Ashida

1015

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 5(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

CHECK SHEET

DRN/es

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

File No.: Subject: Press Interview with Dr. Bunce

Note No.: 1

From: CIE To: General Whitney Date: 6 June 1947

1. Forwarded herewith for information is signed statement by Dr. Bunce concerning his interview with Mr. Hennessy.

2. Chief, CIE, has every reason to believe in Dr. Bunce's judgment and integrity, as well as his sympathy for Christianity and Christian principles. It is considered that Mr. Hennessy, by omission and by implication, took facts and statements made by Dr. Bunce out of their frame of reference in order to achieve a sensational story.

3. The headlines, which are the most vicious part of the story, are believed to be the creation of Stars and Stripes. Not only are they vicious, but they are not supported by the body of the story, even as distorted by Mr. Hennessy.

4. The treatment given by Mr. Hennessy to this interview will be considered in connection with any future requests for interviews.

1 Incl.
Statement

DRN WW

-D. R. N.-

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

CONFIDENTIAL

CIVIL INFORMATION AND EDUCATION SECTION

Religions Division

6 June 1947

MEMORANDUM TO CHIEF, CIE SECTION:

SUBJECT: Article Appearing in Stars and Stripes of 5 June 1947, Entitled "Japan's Sincerity in Christianity Said Questionable"

1. A very brief conference was held on 3 June 1947 with Mr. Duane Hennessy of Associated Press in which information was sought and given concerning the Christian movement in Japan.

2. General information was furnished on the status of the prewar Christian Church, on the disabilities under which religious bodies were formerly forced to operate, and on what has been done under SCAP to remove those disabilities and to establish and promote freedom of religion. Policy in relation to the return of missionaries to Japan was explained, and statistics concerning missionaries and membership of Japanese Christian bodies were given.

3. It was pointed out that religious statistics are unreliable and that figures on formal church membership cannot be considered an accurate measure of the strength of the Christian movement or influence.

4. Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Hennessy's article are substantially correct, though the meaning of the latter part of each paragraph is not clear. A somewhat different emphasis would have been justified by the information given.

5. Paragraph 3 is substantially correct as far as it goes, but it fails to mention a fourth type (which was emphasized during the interview) comprised of persons sincerely seeking spiritual enlightenment through Christianity.

6. There is no justification for the quotation marks in paragraph 2. What was actually said is that there is undoubtedly great interest in Christianity, but the extent to which that interest will be transformed into church membership is yet unknown.

7. Paragraph 1 is purely Hennessy's creation.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

Memo to Chief, CIE Section, 6 Jun 47

8. There is absolutely no justification in what was said by the Chief, Religions Division, for the column heading used in Stars and Stripes.

9. The style and tone of the article are not those of the Chief, Religions Division.

W. K. Bunce

W. K. BUNCE
Chief, Religions Division

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12,032 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

1. EXPLAIN METHOD OF BRIEFING:

(a) Topics:

PURGE - Col Marcum.

CONSTITUTION & NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE - Cmdr. Hussey.

DIET - Col Hays.

POLITICAL PARTIES - Col Roest.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS - Col Tilton.

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM - Mr. Hoover.

(b) Advise that some of the things which will be unfolded have never before been made public -- that I shall speak to them in utmost frankness as an American to other Americans, and largely from the standpoint of the American position and interests which closely parallel the position and interests of the friendly powers seeking the path to peace in the Pacific.

Tell them that I trust, in view of my frankness, that they will not pass on matters which might compromise the American position, undermine the occupation, or otherwise embarrass the Supreme Commander.

That if there is any doubt in their minds, I would appreciate their consulting with me.

2. ORIGIN & DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING THE OCCUPATION:

"As Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, I announce it my firm purpose, in the tradition of the countries I represent, to proceed in the discharge of my responsibilities with justice and tolerance, while taking all necessary dispositions to insure that the terms of surrender are fully, promptly and faithfully complied with".

(Surrender Ceremony).

3. DISCUSS JAPANESE REACTION TO GENERAL MacARTHUR'S ANNOUNCEMENT - Report of Mr. Kase of the Foreign Office, and member of the Japanese group at the Surrender Ceremony.

4. DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED POLICY IN MANILA AND EN ROUTE ON "BATAAN".

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12(65)2 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

5. EFFORTS TO GET WEAK HIGASHI-KUNI CABINET TO TAKE AGGRESSIVE ACTION.

6. FALL OF HIGASHI-KUNI CABINET, and half page noted instructions to Baron Shidehara upon his assuming office as Prime Minister.

7. ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES (OCT 4TH, 1945) which ordered the Japanese Government, among other things, to:

A. Abrogate and immediately suspend the operation of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

(2) Establish or maintain restrictions on the collection and dissemination of information.

(3) By their terms or their application, operate unequally in favor of or against any person by reason of race, nationality, creed or political opinion.

B. Release immediately all persons now detained, imprisoned, under "protection or surveillance", or whose freedom is restricted in any other manner who have been placed in that state of detention, imprisonment, "protection and surveillance", or restriction of freedom.

C. Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 A above, and that part of, or functions of, other offices or sub-divisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions.

It also provided an injunction against the exercise of arbitrary police power and further thought control activity, and the physical punishment and mis-treatment of prisoners.

8. DISCUSS THE ISSUANCE OF THE PURGE DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 4TH 1946:

(a) Confined to the national level of Government.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12,652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDA # 775-072

(b) Shaped to prevent paralysis of the governmental machinery which General MacArthur had elected to use to serve occupation purposes.

9. EXPLAIN THE CABINET CRISIS WHICH RESULTED FROM THIS DIRECTIVE, and manner in which this crisis was resolved by General MacArthur.

10. DISCUSS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME COMMANDER AND THE EMPEROR, and the circumstances under which the Emperor first called on General MacArthur at 10 o'clock on the morning of September 27, 1945.

(a) Side note on Mrs. MacArthur. ("Doc and I peeked through the curtain")

(b) General MacArthur's reply when I mentioned a return call upon the Emperor.

(c) Tradition-breaking inclusion of photograph of the Emperor with General MacArthur in the newspapers the day following the call.

(d) Point out that throughout the occupation there has been a series of precedent-breaking events.

11. DISCUSS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENERAL MacARTHUR AND THE JAPANESE PEOPLE:

(a) Influenced more by small events rather than major ones:

(1) Instant in elevator at start of occupation.

(2) Going & coming without escrot - instant of jeep.

(3) Plots and threatening notes, with refusal to take special precautions.

(4) Gradual emergence in popular fancy as liberator rather than conqueror.

(5) Incident upon arrival on morning of his birthday (last Sunday).

(6) General MacArthur's order for the immediate release of assailant with admonition that if he "tried that again he would get hurt".

12. DISCUSS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SUPREME COMMANDER AND JAPANESE GOVERNMENT:

(a) Limitation upon reception of Japanese officials.

Note: Refusal to receive Minister for the Imperial Household in behalf of the Emperor.

(b) Initial issuance of directives to establish the over-all pattern of occupation policy and requirements.

(c) Gradual shift of emphasis toward increasing responsibility on shoulders of Government itself.

(d) Describe working relationship between Government Section and Japanese Government committees.

(e) Describe concept that Government is being <u>used</u> in the accomplishment of occupation objectives - <u>not supported</u>.

(f) Discuss degree of co-operation by governmental officials in the fulfillment of Allied objectives - not all rosy.

To understand, we must place ourselves in Japanese position and reflect on what we ourselves would do were situation reversed.

Thus, as is inevitable, there are those who seek to stall and circumvent methods of treatment of such cases.

Application of patience and encouragement through appeals of patriotism - sometimes sterner measures. (Illustrate latter by reading memorandum for record inre Chief Cabinet Secretary Hiyashi).

13. DISCUSS CRITICISM OF PRESENT CABINET:

(a) Manner in which it came into office.

Supreme Commander's "hands off" policy.

Government Section "off limits" to politcal parties during period of government re-organization following general election.

(b) Present Cabinet, from the time it came into office, has faced so critical a post-defeat internal situation that it is certain no Cabinet could have survived without similar public criticism.

The Cabinet has not been a strong one, but it has served the purposes of the occupation by a record of reform legislation which General MacArthur has described as "hardly surpassed in a comparable period in history".

(c) Present Prime Minister must be credited with consistent personal strength in the consistent assumption before the Japanese people of a full responsibility for occupation measures, and has never accepted the suggestion of the Supreme Commander that if the burden of responsibility for initiation

were too heavy, he might publicly pass the responsibility to the Supreme Commander.

(d) Describe methods of encouraging both the Government and the people by publicly lauding individual accomplishments.

14. DISCUSS THE DRAFTING OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION:

(a) General MacArthur's instructions to Prince Higashi-Kuni, and Prince Konoye's efforts.

(b) Reiteration of these instructions to Baron Shidehara.

(c) Efforts of the Matsumoto Cabinet Committee to frame a democratic constitution.

(d) Efforts of political parties and private organizations and individuals to frame constitutions.

(e) Ultimate decision for joint effort between SCAP and Cabinet representatives.

(1) Explain research into other constitutions.

(2) Explain evolution of the draft, step by step.

(3) Explain General MacArthur's constant personal advice in drafting the constitution.

(4) No directive issued throughout entire evolution of the new constitution.

15. DISCUSS RELUCTANCE OF JAPANESE TO STRIP EMPEROR OF POWERS AND PROPERTY, and Emperor's personal views when matter was cautiously put up to him by the Prime Minister.

16. DISCUSS EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:

(a) Point out freedom with which draft constitution was discussed in the Diet and the amendments made.

(b) Emphasis on complete freedom of debate, change, or rejection of Constitution. (Read memorandum for record inre clarification of SCAP position to Peers).

17. DISCUSS NEW ELECTION LAW, AND MANNER IN WHICH IT WAS SCRUTINIZED BY GOVERNMENT SECTION, AND GENERAL MacARTHUR'S DECISION TO REQUIRE NO MODIFICATION OF IT TOWARD PERFECTIONISM (February 1946).

(a) Point out General MacArthur's policy to require democratic procedures, but not perfection.

18. DISCUSS GENERAL ELECTION OF APRIL 10TH, 1946:

(a) Criticism of holding election at that time.

(b) Reasons for holding election.

(c) Results of election.

(d) Show how election and election campaign was closely observed by our field agencies.

19. DISCUSS GROWTH OF LEGISLATIVE POWER RESULTING FROM NEW CONSTITUTION, and traditional place of Diet in Japanese governmental machinery.

(a) House of Representatives refusal to leave drafting of new Diet Law to Cabinet pursuant to practice.

(b) House of Representatives to post speaker for having asked Prime Minister to put pressure on the special Constitution Committee of the House in regard to constitutional amendments (Read Govt Section report on the Higai mass).

(c) Attitude of speaker at Constitution promulgation ceremony.

(d) Innovation in hundreds of petitions being submitted to the Diet from local communities.

(e) Refusal of the House to meet on 21 January in accordance with long established custom.

(f) Decision of the House of Representatives to require that, irrespective of the effective date of the Diet, it be permitted to recommend any new Prime Minister coming into office.

(g) The refusal of the House of Representatives to permit amendments by the House of Peers to its new Diet Law.

(h) Discuss the manner in which General MacArthur, in a few words and a few moments, elevated the Diet to a position of equality with the executive branch, (General MacArthur's invitation to the speaker).

20. EXTENSION OF PURGE DIRECTIVE OF JANUARY 4TH INTO POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS:

(a) Tie-in of the political purge to the Local Government reform measure permitting the popular election of local leaders for the first time in Japanese history.

(b) Reasons for the economic purge.

Discuss the manner in which these extensions were effected and, to illustrate, read the correspondence between General MacArthur and the Prime Minister on the disputed family provision in the economic purge.

points application of the purge -

21. DISCUSS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SCAP AND THE PRESS FROM GOVERNMENT SECTION VIEWPOINT:

(a) Emphasise that the defeat of Japan was predominantly an American job, and that the occupation of Japan is predominantly a charge against the American tax-payer.

(b) Explain that the success of the occupation is dependent in large measure upon the full support of American public opinion - that this public opinion must be an informed public opinion.

(c) Discuss inaccuracies appearing in the American press.

Efforts of Government Section to prevent inaccuracies in reporting on matters involving its primary interest.

Show that we speak with utmost frankness to correspondents who call in order to do all in our power to insure factual reporting on the occupation. Illustrate - visit of Mr. Walker, writing for the Christian Science Monitor, and Mr. Dean, writing for the Daily Worker, last Friday.

Conflicts between Right and Left influence of the press insofar as occupation policy and action is involved.

(d) Discuss efforts of the Supreme Commander to shape the course for Japan attuned to moderate democracy - the necessity to swing to the Right or Left, as the situation requires, in order to preserve that course.

(e) Discuss tendency on the part of unfriendly elements of the press to misrepresent the true meaning of events and actions by headline technique and editorialized reporting. (Read General MacArthur's New Years Message to the Japanese people, and illustrate point by manner in which it was treated by "Baltimore Sun".)

22. DISCUSS DRAMATIC EXPOSURE IN CERTAIN NEWSPAPERS OF SCAP'S PART IN FRAMING NEW JAPANESE CONSTITUTION.

(a) Inaccuracies.

(b) Express hope that those present, before leaving Japan, will understand why it is necessary for the Supreme Commander to provide leadership and assistance as well as direction.

23. DISCUSS GENERAL MacARTHUR:

(a) Close attention to details of occupation -- his decisions.

(b) Directly responsible for the re-shaping of the institution and lives of nearly 80 million people, and answerable to the hundreds of millions who comprise the allied world.

His task is an unending one, and the crises which confront him are current and multitudinous.

He is the hub of the entire operation, and personally makes all major decisions.

(c) There is no greater falsehood than the statement frequently made in the press that he misconstrues the extent to which democracy has penetrated in Japan.

(d) Keenly alive to the defence and advance of American interests in the entire Pacific area, as well as localized, in Japan he occupies the dual position of Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and Commander-in-Chief of the American Forces in the Far East.

PURGE	-	Colonel Carlos P. Marcum, Chief, Public Administration Division.
CONSTITUTION, AND NATIONAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE.	-	Commander A.R. Hussey, Special Assistant to the Chief, Government Section.
DIET	-	Colonel Frank E. Hays, Chief Plans & Operations Officer.
POLITICAL PARTIES	-	Colonel Pieter K. Roest, Chief, Political Affairs Division.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT & ELECTIONS		Colonel Cecil G. Tilton, Chief, Local Government Division.
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM	-	Mr. Blaine Hoover, President, Civil Service Assembly of the United States & Canada.

A. Abrogate and immediately suspend the operation of all provisions of all laws, decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which:

(1) Establish or maintain restrictions on freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly and of speech, including the unrestricted discussion of the Emperor, the Imperial Institution and the Imperial Japanese Government.

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C. Abolish all organizations or agencies created to carry out the provisions of the enactments referred to in paragraph 1 A above, and that part of, or functions of, other offices or subdivisions of other civil departments and organs which supplement or assist them in the execution of such provisions.

It also provided an injunction against the exercise of arbitrary police power and further thought control activity, and the physical punishment and mistreatment of prisoners.

Tab "A"

Mr. Hoover: I am keenly aware of the limitations of time and will be as brief as I can. I do not know how I happened to get on the witness stand - I am here as a visitor too.

Our Mission came over in November. We were asked to review the personnel situation in the Japanese government, its laws, policies and procedures, and to make recommendations for improvement.

We came expecting to do essentially a technical job, but before we had been here very long we uncovered conditions which, intensly interesting as they were, made us completely reconsider our direction. We found that while General MacArthur and the men in the Government Section and other Sections apparently, in less than 18 months, by way of planning and indeed by way of execution of programs, had accomplished almost miracles in the reformation of the Japanese situation in the direction of democracy, we found that in spite of all of this the factor in the situation with which we were primarily concerned, i.e., the bureaucracy, was markedly feudalistic.

I think you have to view this bureaucracy at close range to get some of the picture in contrast to the American situation. The upper ranges of the Japanese hierarchy are populated almost exclusively by men who have been raised in the concept of rendering service to a sovereign; a sovereign who enjoyed all rights including the right of governing others, and who gave no accounting and had no responsibility to his people. Few, if any, of these men in advance of their appointments have been obliged to qualify for their positions. Such qualifications as they had consisted in passing law examinations at the Imperial University, which university incidentally has all but monopolized appointments in the upper ranges of the Japanese

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public service. These men in office constitute a sort of closed fraternity and men in lower branches by excellence of performance or other means can seldom crash this fraternity of officialdom. This group enjoyed a segment of the sovereignty, and with the Emperor enjoyed an extreme of special privileges within a state which is frankly acknowledged to be a government of men and not a government by law.

These men are here to-day. However inefficient they may be as public officials in a modern government within which we have specialization and the beginnings of scientific management, they do constitute the bureaucracy of Japan at the controlling levels. We know they have, generally speaking, no understanding of what is being attempted by SCAP, they have no natural sympathy, philosophical interest or other interest in democracy; they are well equipped in their knowledge of the law, and beautifully situated to block any attempt at bureaucratic reform attempted through existing administrative channels.

To get the full significance of this, I am going to ask you to bear with me while I remind you of a few facts in the history of the Civil Service. This problem of building an efficient bureaucracy has taxed the ingenuity of men for three or four hundred years. Feudalism, of course, by its very nature has always provided its own personnel system. As feudalism crumbled in western Europe, the construction and control of the bureaucracy became increasingly the concern of leaders of states including Richelieu and the Great Elector. That was, however, the problem of the bureaucracy in the great national states wherein the monarch, not the people, was to be served.

This problem had its next phase, we find, in England, where having taken over the State, Parliament, as a means of making the bureaucracy responsible to the people, took over the bureaucracy. But Parliament exploited the bureaucracy politically. It lost in efficiency and prestige, and in 1853 the historian Macaulay, sponsored by Gladstone, persuaded a reluctant Parliament to adopt the principle that men should be obliged to qualify for certain public service on the basis of their ability - objectively determined. To do this a Civil Service Commission was set up. Later that was extended. During the last century, in both Britain and the United States, in order to make the bureaucracy responsible to the people as a whole, it has been found necessary to provide an independent personnel authority and to give it strong independent institutional status.

As we approached the situation in Japan, we could not let the fact escape us that we had to accomplish in a comparatively short time as much of a transition in the bureaucracy as had taken the attention of men for generations in the Western democracies, and that here we had not the current ideological and educational influences that the Western democracies had to assist them in the transition. What was more, there was in existence here no institution to which we could turn within the Japanese Government to effect these reforms.

In that situation it was obvious that work on technical planning as a primary matter almost resolved itself to naive and academic adventure. Before we could undertake seriously the reform of the Japanese bureaucracy, there had to be established in the Japanese Government a beachhead on which we could establish ourselves and from which we could expand. When

we observed that condition to exist, we reconsidered our plan of attack, with respect to timing at least. We contimued our technical research. That is going on today, but we interested ourselves in another project which we gave priority, and that was the development, in co-operation with the Japanese, of a strong central personnel authority. We hope that we can accomplish that, and that in doing it we may be able to avoid some of the indicental mistakes which our experience in the last 60 years in the United States has brought to light.

That is where we stand. The technical projects are contimuing. They will be made available to the new agency as soon as our own developments will permit. We hope also to be able to observe and assist in the launching of the new Institution.

Question: Did you find co-ordinated effort among the old bureaucrats to back fire?

Not in those terms. We have had to study our men very carefully. We find that their normal technique is to "yes" us. They do not re-act as they should under these pressures. The "back fire" is by indirection - we appear to accept their "yes" but press for the desired result. In achieving our objective it should be borne in mind that we have certain potential factors which will aid us at the right time. First is a certain feeling of frustration which exists among the younger men in the Government who have not had the advantage of training in the Law Department of the Imperial University but who believe under proper examination procedures they could succeed to good positions. Another is the legislative resentment of the present bureaucracy.

Colonel Tilton:

Question: How are the Japanese taking to the elections on the lower levels?

From where I have been I would say that all of the people in the towns and villages of which there are about 4,000, are most interested in every change. On your tour down south I would suggest that you to to one of the small town offices and just see what the changes are.

Question: Could you describe the ballot paper to us?

The ballot is a sheet of paper normally about 4 inches by 8 inches and when it is folded resembles a small envelope. Depending upon the prefecture, in the national polls there are more than one column in which the candidates name is written.

He may write in kanji, romaji, kata kana, biragana and in Braille. The main directions on what becomes the inside of the ballot when it is folded, on one end is written "Chuo" which means "pour the mind" or "notice". In the next long column of instructions the voter is told to write in the names of the candidates only; and in the second column you are told to write only one name in each column. In other words, you are not supposed to write any fictitious names. The ballot is folded by the voter in the voting booth (which is curtained off from the main room) and is then deposited in the large ballot box in front of the officials and watchers.

Question: The handwriting is then an illiteracy test?

Yes, it is definitely a way of weeding out illiterates.

In charge of the elections is the new Election Commission which in many

ways is similar to an Election Registrar's Office, such as some of our State offices. The members of the Commission under the new law are elected by the members of the Assembly. It is independent of the legislature and the executive because it is responsible to the public at large. I should add also that the members may come from any part of a prefecture. In parallel with the prefectural law are the city and the town and village administrations, and the procedures for the election commissions on each of these levels of government are the same.

Question: Are they responsible for the purge in the elections?

No, the essential work on the purge is performed by the various Screening Committees. Evidence, however, from the Screening Committees for each candidate is on file with the Election Commissions to show that the candidate is eligible to run for office.

Question: Are the candidates permitted to have watchers?

They do. It is an interesting law: The law provides a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 10 and if there are more watchers than the local maximum, the watchers elect 10 among their own number.

Question: Does the technique differ sharply from the old voting technique?

No. It is the same technique. I may say that in the continuing conferences which started a year ago with the Japanese officials, the only difference put forward was in the adoption of the Election Administration Commission -- all the other procedures are essentially the same.

Question: Are they going to adopt the printed ballot?

At present the Local Government Committee of the Diet is debating the problem as to whether or not they will use a printed form like that

of the State of Connecticut or con tinue with the present type.

Question: Is there a list of candidates in the polling booths?

That is in the official Gazette published by each of the prefectures.

Question: Who are the people on the voting list?

All those people who become candidates are on the list which is in plain sight of everyone. In cities, towns or villages and prefectures bulletin boards are open to inspection. There is much publicity given to the fact that the average citizen can examine each candidates record. In particular this means the record of facts which each candidate submits to the Screening Committee to determine his eligibility for office. The fact that each candidate's record is open to the public and that the public is encouraged to go and read these statements has received laudatory comment from many newspapers.

Question: In the writing system, can anyone who cannot write vote?

Means are provided through Imperial Ordinance whereby really decrepit and disabled voters can be aided at the polls; however, all other individuals must write.

I would like to add one thing: We have been working since last December and many of the officials have never had an opportunity of looking at books published in the States on government and administration. I happen to have come into the service from Connecticut and the Secretary in the Governor's Office forwarded some manuels and a booklet on the Outline of Government of the States. The officials were tremendously interested and asked if they could not have the Outline translated and

sent to the Government officials throughout Japan. The State Department acquiesced and now this booklet will soon be made available.

Question: What progress has been made on the new Cabinet?

There has been no decision. I would like to add that all candidates for the Local Elections have to submit a questionnaire concerning their past, for screening. These questionnaires will be posted 15 days before the election at the polling places so that every citizen can examine them and see they are factually correct and that the candidate is eligible for the seat he is running for. This is to provide in the Japanese public a responsibility in voting. Administrative officers also have to be screened to be sure they are eligible under the directive of 4 January. There will be an overall purge committee consisting of the public of Japan.

General Whitney:

I am just about ready to wind this up, but I would like to have you hear a few words on the Civial Service.

(Following Mr. Peake's address)

Answers by Lt. Col. Hays.

Question: You told us there should be local elections in April, does that mean the Diet?

Answer: Local elections refer to Prefecture and Municipal elections.

Question: When do you suppose the Diet election will take place?

Answer: The House of Councillors established by the New Constitution must be elected some time this Spring. An election to the Lower House may be held this Spring if the Diet is dissolved.

Question: Will the House of Councillors' election take place shortly after the Constitution takes affect?

Answer: The House of Councillors' election MAY be held approximately AT that time. The date has not yet been announced. It is possible to hold it either before or after the constitution takes effect.

Question: What is the composition AND method of electing the House of Councillors?

Answer: The Upper House will be composed of two classes of Councillors: Type "A" Councillors will represent the 46 Prefectures and Type "B" Councillors, or Councillors at large, will represent a single National constituency comprising all of Japan. The law provides for a maximum membership in the Upper House of 250. One hundred fifty of these will be Type "A" Councillors, representing the Prefectures, and 100 will consist of Type "B" Councillors representing the single Nation-wide election district. That does not mean, however, that all the 250 seats will necessarily be filled. This is because of the requirement in

law that each candidate must obtain a certain minimum number of votes in order to be elected. For instance, an "A" candidate must obtain one-fourth of the votes cast in ~~a~~ his district divided by the number of seats at stake.

The law provides for a six-year staggered term, half the members being elected every three years. The registration or electoral list of ~~voters~~ voters entitled to exercise the franchise will be the identical list as used for the Lower House elections. From now on all elections in Japan, both National and local, will be conducted under the supervision of Democratically chosen electoral administrative committees, rather than under the Home Ministry.

Question: Is only one candidate voted for?

Answer: No sir. Two candidates are voted for by every elector. The voter will write in the name of one "A" type candidate and one "B" type candidate.

Question: When the new Constitution goes into affect, will the Cabinet be reformed at that time?

Answer: Not necessarily. It isn't mandatory. That is a question for the Government or the Supreme Commander to determine. If the House of Representatives is dissolved in the meantime naturally there will be a general election which could result in ~~the~~ a new Cabinet.

Question: Is there any difference in the qualifications for members in the two Houses in the Diet?

Answer: Practically none. One must be 25 years of age to be a candidate for the Lower House and 30 to be a candidate for the Upper House. Otherwise the qualifications for electors as well as candidates are identical.

Question: How does one become a candidate, will there be primary elections?

Answer: There are no primaries in Japan, Mr. Howard. One becomes a candidate simply by filing his name with the election chairman and depositing ~~the~~ a fee of 5,000 yen. This deposit is returned to the candidate if he polls at least one-tenth of the votes cast in his district divided by the number of members to be elected in that district.

Question: Rather a direct form of primary, isn't it?

Answer: Quite direct, Sir.

Question: How many members are there in the Lower House?

Answer: 466.

Question: How many political parties are represented in the Diet?

Answer: At present there are 7.

[redacted]: I will turn you over to Colonel Roest who will cover that subject for you in more detail.

Question: How many parties are represented in the Diet?

Colonel Roest: In the Diet you have six parties and one bargaining group. The parties in the Diet have simmered down to these seven groups, from the 30 which won seats, out of 268 which competed in the April 1946 election.

In the Diet we have the Liberal, Progressive, Social Democratic, Co-operative Democratic, People's and Communist Parties. In the April 1946 elections the Liberals got 140 seats, now they have 148; the Progressives 93, now increased to 111; the Social Democrats 92 and they have 99 now. The Co-operative Party got 17 seats but increased as the Co-operative-Democratic Party to 44 at present. The People's Party was formed out of odds and ends in the Diet and has 32 members now. They were first a bargaining group and as such had been in existence for some time without getting anywhere; then decided to make themselves a party. The Communist Party had five members elected and has six now. There were 82 Independents elected; their bargaining body, the Independent Club, has now 21 members and then there are 4 "independent" Independents. At the time of the April Elections there were 35 representatives elected, representing 25 minor parties, and all of these have disappeared into the major parties and the bargaining groups.

The policital party situation, due to the complete freedom given by General MacArthur, has run wild. We have now almost 1200 independent parties with about 1800 branches spread all over the country. Most of these parties are one man affairs without political significance. In the 1946 election one man actually ran a "party" all by himself, and when elected he "dissolved"

the "party" of which he was the only member! However, this multitude of parties has a serious aspect and that is that so many votes are frittered away. In an effort to reduce that waste it has become necessary to emphasize the parties which really count. The Japanese Government has drafted a Political Parties Bill which provides for recognition as official political parties only such as have proven political significance. This is not affecting the small "parties", but it allows a place on the printed ballot for for only those parties which received at least 2% of the votes in the last preceding election; or in the case of a new party that which can prove 1% of the support of the electorate; or which has 25 or more members in the Diet. These three provisions eliminate from a place on the ballot all the "splinter" parties. That does not mean that a voter cannot vote for whom he pleases. There will be blank column in which names of minor party candidates and independents can be written in. Naturally the voting will favor those in the printed columns and in that way the voting of the people will be funneled into channels that show real political differences. In the past political life has centered entirely around personalities, but under the new Constitution ~~political life has centered entirely around~~ responsibility for national policies rests with the Diet, and therefore with political parties. Now the differences in their platforms will have to become clearer, for political names mean very little in Japan. The Liberal Party is now necessarily liberal, the Progressive Party is not necessarily progressive and so on. The Communist Party is the only one with a clear cut political philosophy and a definite political strategy. The Co-operative Democratic Party favors co-operative schemes such as you find in Denmark. Its support was largely agrarian, but it

has assimilated many Diet members of city background, many of them teachers.

The Peoples\ Party is entirely composed of odds and ends, also largely educationalists, and they are standing for cultural views rather than for political or economic policies.

The Independent Club is a bargaining group, not a party. They have no particular policy or program and do not represent anything except themselves.

Question: What is a Bargaining Group?

A Bargaining Group is a group of Diet members which does not necessarily have a political platform but which is ~~able~~ allowed by the rules of the Diet to have a room where they can meet and talk, and to introduce measures on an equal basis with other parties.

The Communist party with five members had no right to speak in the Diet without special permission of another party. The Socialists did give them that permission for a while. The relation between the Socialists and the Communists is very interesting; but that is a long story.

Question: Is there such a thing here as a Primary Election? How are the candidates selected?

There are no Primary Elections in Japan. In answer to your question as to how you become a candidate: Anyone may become a candidate by merely filing a petition; however, you must deposit Y.5000.00 which the Government gets one-tenth if you do not get a certain number of the votes. As for party candidates: It is desired to democratise the parties, so in the Political Parties Bill there is a requirement that officers as well as candidates be elected by conventions composed of representatives from the lower branches, elected in plenary meetings of the local rank and file members.

Question: Does a party have to finance itself?

The parties do not receive any Government funds, but they are to be limited as to the amount of contributions. The Political Parties Bill contains several such measures as you can find in a number of the Corrupt Practices Acts of the United States.

Voting for officers, and candidate-nominations, ~~are~~ still new to ~~papers~~ Japan. On this point, we are trying to get the Japanese out of the habit of thinking that a man who does not win has lost face.

Question: Do I understand from you that when the parties evolve under the new Constitution they are in fact going to be pretty much on the status of our own parties 40 or 50 years ago, with strong political bosses dominating the parties?

A: The Boss system characterized the parties heretofore. We are seeking to break its power by demanding democratic organization of the parties within. Then political energies will apply from the bottom to the top instead of from the top to the bottom. There is undoubtedly opportunity for corruption in any scheme; but we are trying to provide ~~a~~ the machinery that will make it difficult for gangster politics to exist. Until the Japanese become aware of their rights and dignity as individuals, we cannot expect that democratic forms will be completely successful, but without such forms it will be difficult for them to achieve democracy at all.

(DR. PEAKE):

QUESTION: I would like to know about the Imperial Princes. Are they pretty well severed from their financial prerogatives and connections with the Imperial Household?

A. A directive of May 1946 divested all 14 princes and princesses of all interest in and obligations upon the Imperial Household Ministry, and any and all funds which they had entrusted to that Ministry for keeping were ordered to be returned to them. Furthermore, they were ordered to be divested of all special prerogatives, immunities, and exemptions from taxation. The application of the Capital Tax Levy Law will reduce the size of their fortune by some 40 to 50%.

Question: Will the princes be affected by the Land Reform Bill?

A. Yes, insofar as they hold excess agricultural land.

Question: How many Imperial Families are there involved?

A. Fourteen, eleven of whom will become commoners. The other three are brothers of the Emperor.

It was apparent in our discussions with the Imperial Household Ministers that they had long felt it desirable to reduce the eleven princely families (i.e. other than the families of the brothers of the reigning sovereign) to the status of commoners, as they were so far removed in direct male line of descent from the Imperial family, that it was highly improbable and very undesirable to select from among them a sovereign. Therefore, their maintenance by the State was inadvisable.

Question: How much of his fortune does the Emperor retain?

A. All assets of the Imperial Household Ministry are subject to Capital Tax Levy Law. This will cut the total assets of ¥1,700,000,000 by

some 85% to 90%. There will be left to the Emperor and his immediate family, as near as it can be estimated at this time, some ¥10,000,000 worth of clothes, books, jewelry, the marine laboratory, art objects, and some ¥3,000,000 to ¥5,000,000 in cash. Under the new constitution, the Emperor and immediate members of his family will receive sums voted by the Diet to the privy purse. All state property, designated as state property for the use of the throne, i.e. palaces, and other furnishing, equipment, etc. will be administered by State officials under sums voted in the annual budget.

Question: I would like to know how you have emancipated the little Japanese from being pushed around?

Mr. Marcum: Your question requires a complicated answer; however, before I try to answer you I would like to explain that "thought police", that is the Toko Ka or "Secret Hire Police" under the Home Ministry, and the Protection and Surveillance Police under the Justice Ministry were removed from their police duties by terms of the 4 October directive. This directive also barred them from holding any position in the Home Ministry of the Justice Ministry and a subsequent Bducational Directive barred them from the Educational Ministry. They were nos specifically barred from entering the Government service or from serving in any other Ministry, or in the Local Government.

The 4 January directive as implemented by Imperial Japanese Ordinances does, however, bar these "thought police" or any other policeman from entering the Government Service if he were involved in a notorious thought control case or in the brutal suppression of civil rights. It also bars officials engaged in thought control activities for a specific period of time; however the democraticism of the Japanese police is a complicated problem which requires action in several different fields. For example, the first step which was taken 4 October 1945, was the abrogation of Thought Police Laws etc and the release of political prisoners. (2) That same directive and subsequent instructions to the Japanese Government provide injunctions against the mistreatment of prisoners or the use of brutal police power. (3) The decentralization of police power which was hereto vested in the Home Ministry of the National Government is a part of the Local Government Reform program. (4) Another phase involves durrent plans to reform police organization and methods. (5) SCAP uses knowledge of individual cases to correct injustices and to expedite police reform by following up alleged civil liberties violations by the police or Government officials. (6) The whole question of police reform is closely tied in with judicial reform, with particular regard to criminal procedure. Judge Oppler, Chief of our Legal Division, is prepared to answer any specific questions you may care to ask on this matter. For example, the old Peace Preservation Law which was abolished by the 4 October directive, was one of the most vicious laws in existence. It provided, for example, for the

indefinite detention of any person who had already served his sentence for a thought control violation, on a mere signature of the procurator to the effect that "he was liable to commit the same offence again".

In addition, organized publicity programs had been and are being conducted to acquaint the people with their civil liberties and the responsibilities of public officials to the people.

(INCLOSURE #2) April, 1947

JAPAN OCCUPATION: AUSSIES IRED BY BAN

SYDNEY 9 - We have broadcast in an earlier bulletin an official order from the American administration in Tokyo which had banned all public ceremonials, assemblies, parades and demonstrations, except in rigidly defined areas occupied by Australian units. The order prohibits any ceremonies which might be regarded as a show of force.

The reason for the ban, which have aroused resentment and ill-feeling among Australian troops, is said by the MacArthur administration that April 25th, is also the final day of the Japanese elections. The administration feels that the Australian demonstrations might interfere with the elections.

However, our Tokyo correspondent points out that the Americans themselves staged a great mass parade of strength of army and air force in Tokyo on Monday, which was the opening day of the Japanese elections.

Servicemen's organizations in Australia have (sent their demands to) Tokyo. The Assistant New South Wales Secretary of the Returned Servicemen's League said Australian servicemen everywhere would be incensed. He said Anzac Day was the sacred symbol of the guarantee of Australia's armed forces in two World Wars. April 25th might not be a great day to the Americans, but it was very dear to Australians.

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"ANZAC DAY" COMMEMORATION SERVICES

(ENCLOSURE #2)

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xxxxxxxxxx

TO : SYDNEY SUN, Sydney, Australia.

In deference Japanese sensitivity Anzac Day commemoration services in Japan will be drastically curtailed this year.

Surprise official order through BCOF area bans any public ceremonial mass assembly march past (with or without arms) or other Anzac Day demonstration which may offend or distress Japanese people.

All commemoration services must be rigidly confined within unit boundaries. Even march from railway station by visiting unit to another unit projoint service is forbidden.

Official reason for this unprecedented restriction is that Japanese elections being conducted April 25th. It is understood that view is held certain British circles that customary public Anzac Day commemoration which was permitted last year might be construed by touchy Japanese as "show of force" calculated influence voting.

Officers and other ranks through BCOF are incensed by what is regarded as weak concession to Japanese arrogance.

Unpleasantness has also been caused by erroneous belief some Anzac units that American authorities are responsible for ban. Emphatically denying that MacArthur or any section his command had directed,authorised, recommended, or even mentioned restriction, General Courtney Whitney, head SCAP Government Section, said today: "Americans have too high regard prosanctity Australia's day of proud memory to consider venturing such intrusion in purely national matter. Rather than do so MacArthur would have gladly altered date of Japanese elections".

Americans themselves celebrated opening elections on Saturday ~~morning~~ Monday with their greatest mass parade throughout Japan of army and airforce strength for army week.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(B) OR (E) NNDG # 775 072

PRESS COLLECT VIA MACKAY

TO SYDNEY SUN SYDNEY AUSTRALIA

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for army week endit

richard hughes

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 072

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RICHARD HUGHES

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

23408

TO : TELENEWS, London.

Drastic curtailment Anzac Day commemoration services for British Commonwealth Forces Japan wide causing widespread resentment army and navy personnel Australian New Zealand troops. BCOF order banning any public ceremonial mass demonstration march past (with or without arms) and confining commemoration services unit lines regarded by officers and men of BCOF as weak concession Japan arrogance. Official reason for curtailment understood be fact Anzac Day coincides with election day for Japanese House Representatives and "Customary Anzac Day parades may be construed by Japanese as show force which may influence voting. Unfortunate situation arisen that troops who merely been given order without explanation inclined blame American authorities for ban. Emphatically denying MacArthur had directed, authorized, recommended, or even mentioned such restriction, General Courtney Whitney, Chief SCAP Government Section, said today: "Americans have too high regard for sanctity Anzac Day for British Commonwealth to consider venturing intrusion purely national matter. Rather than do so, MacArthur would have altered election date". United States Armed Forces celebrated "Army Day" here Monday with greatest mass parade land airforces since occupation began.

ARTHUR MATHERS.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

collect

press telenews london

23408 exarthur mathers tokyo exclusive stop drastic curtailment anzac day commemoration services parbritcommonwealth forces japanwide causing widespread resentment (hhhmmm navy personnel) australian zealand troops stop bbbccccoofff order banning any public ceremonial mass demonstration ~~marchpast~~ marchpast bracket with or without arms unbracket etconfining commemoration services unit lines ~~as~~ regarded parofficers men bbbccccoofff as weak concession japarroganceward stop official reason procurtailment understood be fact anzac day coincides cumelection day projapanese house representatives etquote customary anzac day parades may be ~~construed~~ construed parjapanese as show force which may influence voting stop ~~unfortunate~~ unfortunate situation arisen that troops who merely been given order without explanation inclined blame american authorities proban stop emphatically denying macarthurd directed authorised recommended even mentioned such restriction general courtney whitney chief ssscccaaappp government section said today quote americans have too high regard prosanctity anzac day probritish commonwealth to consider venturing intrusion purely national matter stop rather than sodo macarthurduv altered election date stop unquote ~~unistates~~ unistates armed forces celebrated quote army day unquote here monday cumgreatest mass parade land airforces since occupation began ~~vvjjj day~~ stop ends mathers

Please return

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12356 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

(INCLOSURE #1)

JAPAN OCCUPATION: ANZAC DAY CELEBRATION MADE ISSUE

MELBOURNE 9 - An Australian department of External representative in Japan, Mr. William MacMahon Ball, concerning the report from Tokyo that General MacArthur's headquarters has ordered a drastic cut in Anzac Day commemorative services in Japan this year.

Anzac Day is commemorated throughout Australia and by Australians overseas each year on April 25th, the anniversary of the landing by Australian and New Zealand forces on the Gallipeli beaches in the first World War. It is also Australia's day of commemoration for the second World War.

The orders from General MacArthur's headquarters is reported to ban all public ceremonials, assemblies, parades or any other Anzac Day demonstrations, except within rigidly defined areas occupied by Australian units. The reason for the ban is said to be that April 25th is also the final day of the Japanese elections, and that General MacArthur's headquarters feel that the ceremonials might interfere with the elections.

A representative of the Department of External Affairs, said in Sydney today that Mr. MacMahon Ball would be asked to make representations with the object of seeing that Anzac Day is suitably observed. He added that the department could see no reason why the ceremonies should be arranged at some suitable place without giving any impression of interference with the Japanese elections.

The New South Wales Assistant Secretary of the Returned Servicemen's League said in Sydney tonight that Australian servicemen would be upset by the ban. He said that Anzac Day is a sacred symbol of the gallantry of Australia's armed forces in two world wars and was very dear to Australians.

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14,032 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 775 012

(Inclosure #1)

MORNING SOKUHO

RADIOPRESS

JAPAN-OCCUPATION: "ANZAC DAY" CELEBRATION TO BE INQUIRED INTO

MELBOURNE 10 The Australian Minister for the Army Mr. Cyril Chambers, has asked the Commander-in-Chief of the British Occupation Force in Japan, Lieutenant-General Robertson to investigate a report that "Anzac Day" celebrations have been curtailed in Tokyo.

In a message sent to General Robertson Mr. Chambers said that "Anzac Day" celebrations were of great importance and it was desirable that they be observed with suitable ceremony in the BCOF areas.

Mr. Chambers said that General Robertson was taking appropriate actions and asked for an immediate reply.

MAY INTERFERE WITH ELECTIONS Colonel D. T. Maxwell, spokesman for the BCOF, Tokyo sub-areas, said today that it was possible "Anzac Day" celebration in Tokyo would be confined to particular areas to avoid interference with the Japanese elections.

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April 11th

G -2 Comment
6.30 P.M.

This agitation seems to continue unabated ? As yesterday, I strongly suggest that the C in C or Chief of Staff make an appropriate release (advising the Australian Legation) to the effect that the war-time C in C of Allied Forces will not interfere with a national celebration of the sentimental quality of Anzac Day and that the whole thing is a malicious Canard. My own guess is that some administrative order by BCOF was issued and that now BCOF is hiding behind us, having released the false story possibly thru error, thru their own signal channels or publicity officers. -

caw

caw

002128

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11,652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

A. C. of S., G-2
GHQ SCAP

April 10, 1947

SUBJECT : Anzac Day Accusation

TO : C in C Thru Aide de Camp

C in C called for this. It is obvious that a false report went to Australia, in this matter, and I am personally inclined to charge this to Mr McMahaon Ball - none too friendly to the occupation.

I am convinced that the C in C would have (or will) change the eleection date to accomodate the Anzac Day.

In view of the exaggerated sentimental values engendered, in such historical dates, with the damage already done by Sidney and Melbourne publications , I recommend that he C in C move fast in a flat release that this matter came to his attention, via Australian Radio Press, and that he naturally postpone the election to accomodate his old war-time fiends in giving them every facility for the celeberation of Anzac Day,

C.A.W

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

4867

News Stories on ANZAC Day Celebrations

G-2 Govt. Section 10 April 47

1. 1. Attached (Incl. #1, #2) are Radiopress stories concerning celebration of Anzac Day in Japan, on 25 April 1947.

2. Forwarded to Government Section per request of Mr. O. I. Hauge.

2 Incl.: NewsStories

- C. A. W. - - - - - - - - - - -

G-2 File Copy R&R

15392

Memo for Record:
Attached stories were checked with Government Section, as routine referral authorized by Asst. Chief of Staff, G-2. Mr. Hauge, Govt. Section requested copies for Brig. Gen. C. Whitney to show to C-in-C at 11:30 this date, 10 April 47.

W.O.P.
W. B. P.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 012

IMPERIAL JAPANESE TELEGRAPHS

R. No.	cut	Time sent	By	Collated by

NEWYORK MJ42/BH 43444 24 9 1244

PRESS UNIPRESS TOKYO

09124 AAP ASKS CHECK SOONEST REPORTS BCOF BANNED PUBLIC DEMONSTRATIONS JAPAN ANZAC DAY 4/25 NEED STORY DIRECT NEWYORK SLUGGED AAP

FLORY

Dover Pub-Rel

B-8633 Dover-22016

信第十一號

昭和二十・十一・太陽印刷 102

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11,652 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

TOKYO

NEWYORK MJ47/65515 33 9 550S
PRESS UNIPRESS TOKYO

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DECLASSIFIED E.O. 14,032 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

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Ltr.
cc - Mr. R W Reed
Kansas City Star
Editor, dtd 3 Apr 47,
Returned 8 Dec 50
by CIC -
to make copy
for Gen Lowe

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 12958 SEC. 3(E) AND 3(D) OR (E) NNDG # 773 072

31 March 1947

"I returned from Washington, D.C., today in time to hear a broadcast on the Columbia Broadcasting System from Tokyo by Bill Costello in which he said that General MacArthur's proposal at the press luncheon to place Japan under the supervision of the United Nations was a confession that American Military Government had bogged down. He also declared that General MacArthur's instructions to Premier Yoshida to tighten Japanese economic controls, together with his reference of this question to the Allied Council for Japan, was a confession of the lack of accomplishment by SCAP. He quoted Macmahon Ball as saying that MacArthur was attempting to blame the American failures upon the Allied Council."

Extract from letter from Dr Colegrove to General Whitney.

DECLASSIFIED E.O. 11652 SEC. 3(E) AND 5(D) OR (E) NNDG # 75-072

CBS TOKYO -- 10 p.m. Monday, March 31, 1947 -- Costello

General MacArthur has abandoned his policy of suppressing bad news. He now acknowledges officially that an economic diaster is in the making, and that the present Japanese government shows no signs of preventing it. In the last two weeks, MacArthur has all but admitted the occupation is becoming a failure. He gave the first hint of his new attitude when he told correspondents March 17 that the occupation should get out from under. Then he wrote Premier Yoshida a letter warning him to tighten up economic controls if any more help were to be expected from the United States. Now MacArthur has laid his troubles on the doorstep of the Allied Council. He has submitted a damning report, showing all the weaknesses of the Japanese government, and has asked the Council for advice. As one Allied official remarked with heavy sarcasm: "This is just an attempt to shift part of the responsibility off GHQ... and onto the Council." In his report, MacArthur admits without quibbling that prices are dangerously inflated, that wage levels have lagged far behind, that throughout the foreseeable future Japan's industry will be cripped by scarcities, and that the Japanese government has nothing but paper controls to deal with the crisis. It is the frankest report ever issued by GHQ, and it shows vividly the desperate living conditions today of the Japanese common man. The question comes before the Allied Council Wednesday. It is the most important question of the occupation. Japan today is threatened with stagnation and starvation -- and perhaps with Dusseldorf food riots which would be a pretty black eye for the American occupation.

This is Bill Costello in Tokyo, returning you now to CBS in New York.