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HEARINGS  
ON  
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT  
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2006  
AND  
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED  
PROGRAMS  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION  
—  
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING  
ON  
**BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S.  
CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S.  
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

HEARING HELD  
MARCH 2, 2005



—  
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**FISCAL YEAR 2006, NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND AND U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
*Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 2, 2005.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:09 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing will come to order.

This morning the committee continues its review of the President's fiscal year 2006 budget request. And although we have not finished with all the services, we are going to start hearing from the combatant commanders.

And today we are combining Central Command and Special Operations Command because they lie at the center of the Global War on Terrorism. And our witnesses today are General John Abizaid, United States Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM); and General Bryan Brown, United States Army, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM).

And, gentlemen, I am going to forego any lengthy statement because I think we understand how critical your leadership role is in the ongoing war against terror, and specifically the war-fighting theaters in Afghanistan and Iraq. We are going to have lots of questions, and we are going to try to ensure that all of our members have a chance to ask questions. And so we will go to you very quickly.

Before we did that, I wanted to mention to my colleagues that we are all aware that our great former colleague, a wonderful member of this committee, Tillie Fowler, has had a stroke, that we are all aware of. And I can simply tell the committee that we are awaiting news that will update Tillie's situation. And so we do not have a definitive report at this time; at least I do not have one. But she is in our prayers. And Buck, her husband, a great guy, wonderful guy, and her daughters, Elizabeth and Tillie, are with her right now. And we want the family to know that we are thinking of Tillie.

And she was a wonderful member of this committee, a wonderful leader for our country. And she, along with several of our other great defense leaders, headed up in recent times a panel on issues in the war-fighting theaters. It was very, very important to us. She

undertook many important legislative initiatives as a member of this committee and as a member of the House leadership.

And so our prayers are with Tillie and with Buck and Elizabeth and little Tillie.

And so, at this time, let me go to the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, and then we will go right to our witnesses. The gentleman is recognized.

**STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me join you in your comments about Tillie Fowler. She was an excellent member of this committee, a good friend through the years, and she did, even after she left, she stayed in touch quite well. And as you mentioned, our thoughts and our prayers are truly with her, as well as her family. She is a lovely lady.

Let me join you, Mr. Chairman, in welcoming General Abizaid, General Brown.

I thank both of you, as we begin, for the men and women that you lead. Perhaps more than any combatant commands, the troops who serve in your commands really are at the pointy edge of the spear. Every day they uphold the highest standards of service, professionalism, courage. We are grateful for the extraordinary sacrifices that they and their families are making. We commend them for their service.

General Abizaid, I do not think it is an understatement to say that you have the most challenging single area of responsibility of a combatant commander in many, many decades. A look at the map shows ongoing hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan, a brewing cauldron in Iran, and pockets of instability from the gulf to the Horn of Africa.

And, General Brown, your highly trained special operations forces are being asked to take on more and more missions as time goes by.

As we approach the two-year mark since the commencement of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, it is a time to reflect upon what is going well and what we still need to accomplish. Certainly there have been successes, and I commend both of you for your contributions.

But I want to focus on what we still need to do in order to achieve success in Iraq.

Before I do, let me say that we ask questions in this room on behalf of those we represent. Specifically, Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution gives us the responsibility to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy.

In pursuit of that constitutional responsibility, we must conduct oversight. Simply put, we ask questions.

I used to be a country lawyer before coming to Congress, and I talk to a lot of folks back home. Their questions are straightforward, but they are pretty important.

What does winning mean in Iraq?

How will we know when we have won and when we can leave, especially when, for every insurgent we kill, there seems to be another to take his place?

What are the signs along the road that let you know we are making progress? Are we trying to win more Iraqi hearts and minds, and if so, how?

Seventy five billion dollars is a lot of money to continue the war. What exactly will this money buy within your commands?

When will the Iraqis be ready to take over their own security? When will they be able to sustain their own forces?

These are tough questions, and I know a lot of them do not have simple answers, but they are important questions that should be held together by a unified strategy. And I understand that General Casey's campaign plan has some detail on how to answer many of these questions and is periodically updating it to reflect the new realities.

We needed a detailed campaign plan that brought together the military, reconstruction and political tasks for the development of Iraq in those first few critical months after Saddam fell. And needless to say, I am disappointed as we did not have an adequate one then, but I am anxious to hear about the evolution of one now.

In particular, we know that the readiness of the Iraqi security forces to provide Iraq's security will be critical to our success. Many in the Administration have said that we cannot put a timetable on our withdrawal, and I have not argued for a fixed deadline for removing our troops. But we must have goals that Iraqi forces can reach and attain. And how are you measuring the readiness of the Iraqi units? How do we measure the progress of Iraqi units if there are no goals to reach a certain level of capability by a certain date?

Our staff was told in briefings at the Joint Staff and the Comptroller's office that the money requested in the supplemental would be the last money that would be needed for the Iraqi security forces, including funds for their own combat support capability. Is this true? If so, should people at home see a connection between the time and the money and how it is spent and the capability of these forces?

I ask these questions on Iraq because, gentlemen, I wish us to succeed. I want us to succeed because the stakes are so very, very high, not only there, but throughout the region. The eyes of the world are watching, and many may not wait to act.

Already, our European allies are actively engaged in trying to deal with Iran's nuclear weapons program. It looks like our Administration may join them in this effort. I applaud that. We must lead from the front with diplomacy so that we do not have to lead with our military in the end.

We must also succeed in the Global War on Terror, as the stakes there are so high. Without question, the sustained pursuit and defeat of the al Qaeda network protects our freedom.

Yet, I must also questions about the use of one of our premier capabilities to combat terror: the special operations forces.

Even as individuals, Special Operation Forces (SOF) personnel excel and perform admirably—and they do, with valor and honor.

Recent reports bring into question the use and accountability of special operation assets, resources and personnel. Taken together,

reports portray a Defense Department determined to utilize Special Operations Forces personnel absent adequate guidelines, accountability or proper coordination with other parts of our government.

The most recent article suggests the Department hopes to receive approval from the Department of special operation personnel into foreign nations without the knowledge of American ambassadors in residence.

An early article suggests that the Department is intent on creating an in-house human intelligence capability in support of SOCOM activities, without the knowledge of congressional oversight committees, General Brown.

Again, I ask, is this true? Is any of it true? These questions have been posed by my constituents at home, and indeed been posed by the constituents many on this committee. And while my rural roots and instinct tell me that these articles are perhaps misleading, if not inaccurate—and I hope they are—I still have the responsibility to inquire, to pursue, in pursuit of my duties.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service. We appreciate it more than we can say. Thank you for being with us.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. And before we proceed, the gentleman from Pennsylvania, the vice chairman of the committee, Mr. Weldon, has an introduction he would like to make to the committee.

Mr. WELDON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members.

Many of you have traveled to Russia over the period of years for various trips to interact with the Russian military leaders. One of our members, Trent Franks, was with us on a trip to Beslan and gave a prayer at that site of the terrible tragedy at the school, two weeks after it happened.

Today, we are pleased to welcome one of Vladimir Putin's closest advisers on homeland security issues. He is the Chairman in the Parliament, the Duma, state Duma, of the security committee. He is a retired general in the military and is making his first visit to the U.S. to talk about joint Russian-American homeland security cooperation.

So I would ask my colleagues and friends on both sides to join us in welcoming Chairman Vladimir Vasiliev. Thank you.

[Applause.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. And, Mr. Chairman, good to have you with us. Well, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. Obviously, you are in critical leadership roles and the focus of the Nation is on your areas of operation, both operationally and geographically.

The elections were remarkable, and I think it is very clear that those elections came about, were carried on the shoulders of America's fighting forces, and you have a lot to be proud of. And everyone, right down to the squad and special operations team level, has a lot to be proud of in terms of that exercise in representative government that was carried out because of the Americans.

So thank you. You obviously have enormous challenges. And I think at the top of all of our lists, in terms of issues that must be met, is this threshold issue, and that is the hand-off of the security



obligation and responsibilities to the Iraqi forces, the stand-up of the Iraqi forces.

I will just tell my colleagues, we want to make sure that all members get a chance to ask questions. I am going to forego my questions until we get to the end of the session. We are going to enforce the five-minute rule.

And to our witnesses—and I am probably one of the most skilled at this—we are able ask five-minute questions, sometimes three- and four-part questions, and for two witnesses that means maybe eight answers worth of questions, and then we leave you 15 minutes to respond. And ultimately that ends up inviting mean looks from guys like Mr. Kline, who has waited for a long time to ask his question.

So we are going to do five minutes per member, and that means I ask my members to ask one question and give the witnesses a chance to answer it.

And to my witnesses, please wrap up your answer as quickly as possible so we can move on to the next Member of Congress.

I thank all the members for cooperating in making sure that everybody gets a fighting chance to ask a question and get a response.

And, with that, I am going to forego my question until we get to the end of this thing.

So we are going to start. When we start out, I am going to go—and I want to lay this out before you gentleman give you opening statement—I am going to yield my first question to the gentleman very front row, Geoff Davis, who has a good military background.

So, Geoff, you be ready. You are going to be first out of the box. Do not sleep.

And he will have, I am sure, have some very thorough questions for you.

So thanks for being with us. Appreciate you. And, General Abizaid, how is it going?

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN P. ABIZAID, COMBATANT  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. ARMY**

General ABIZAID. Mr. Chairman, it is going well. And I thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee. I have a very short statement I would like to make.

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to be here today. Most importantly, thanks for your support of the young men and women in the field. They cannot be successful without your help.

I am also honored today to be here with my colleague, Doug Brown. His forces that he provides in our Central Command area of operations do absolutely amazing work, and any success that we have is attributable to their incredibly high state of training, morale and readiness.

Over 1,500 U.S. soldiers have given their lives in the CENTCOM area of operations. Thousands more have been wounded. And over one million have served in the region in over three years of continuous combat.

What can we say other than thank you to their families, thank you to them, thank you for the tremendous service that they have

given to the United States of America. We are eternally grateful to them, and we are ever mindful of their sacrifices.

We can only look with a certain degree of amazement as to what is happening in the CENTCOM region over the past year in particular.

Who would have thought we would be here where we are now, where we have had over eight million people vote in Afghanistan. A Palestinian election. A Palestinian-Israeli process moving forward. Over 8.5 million people in Iraq voting for a national assembly. Local elections taken place in Saudi Arabia. Lebanese taking to the streets to ask the Syrians to leave. Egypt, the President talking about multi-party candidates being able to run against him in the next election.

These things that are happening in the Middle East have never happened like this before, and we should be very, very mindful of what is happening. And I believe that our forces in the region have not only been protecting the United States from attack, but has also done much to help the region move forward in a direction of moderation that is so important in the region's struggle against extremism.

I am optimistic about future opportunities. I think 2005 can be a decisive year. We have an opportunity for progress in the Middle East peace process.

We have an opportunity to move forward by having Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, an opportunity to establish greater stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, an opportunity for Iraqi and Afghan forces to take more and more of the responsibility of fighting the insurgencies within their own country, opportunity for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be helped more in their own fights against the extremists that are so important to getting the job done in the Middle East.

But we also have to be mindful of the dangers. There are no straight lines in the Middle East. There are ongoing political processes all over the region, and all of these can lead to more violence.

There is a prospect for unpredictable actions from Iran and Syria. There is possible instability that can result as a result of what is happening between Lebanon and Syria.

The extremist enemy that we face throughout the region will not surrender. They will not move away. They will continue their attacks.

And we need to understand that this battle between moderation and extremism in the region is one that the people of the region have chosen to fight, and they cannot win it without our help.

The year ahead will require patience. We must continue our military operations against the terrorists and insurgents. We must help friends in the region build military capacity to defeat the extremists. And we have to ensure that as we move forward in the region, we harness not only all power within our own national capabilities, economic, diplomatic and political, but we also seek greater opportunity for the international community to participate.

Mr. Chairman, rather than going on, I yield to your questions. And again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here.

[The prepared statement of General Abizaid can be found in the Appendix on page 61.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. General Brown, good morning.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. BRYAN D. BROWN, COMBATANT COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, U.S. ARMY**

General BROWN. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished Members of the Congress, it is an honor to be here before the committee today to report on our posture on the Special Operation Forces.

It is also a privilege to be here with the commander of the United States Central Command, a leader for whom I have great respect. I enjoy a tremendous working relationship with General Abizaid as we aggressively fight the Global War on Terror, as I do with all of the combatant commanders.

I have a prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. If it would be all right, I would like to forego it and just enter it for the record and go directly to answer Mr. Skelton's first question to me this morning.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you get the prize, General. Is that it? [Laughter.]

General BROWN. Sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very good. That is exactly what we need.

General BROWN. Mr. Skelton, SOF is accountable. And they should be accountable. I am familiar with the press article that you were referring to, and I can tell you that interagency coordination, specifically when SOF enters into a country, is total. It is complete. Every team, every person deploys with an approved, fully coordinated deployment order and a country clearance, not only from the country team in that country, but from the geographic combatant commander in the area of responsibility (AOR) that they are going into with that team.

Interagency coordination is the best it has ever been. It could be a lot better. It needs to continue to work at it. And we are working very good at it, but it is the best I have seen.

But I can tell you from that article that SOF has never, ever entered a foreign country without full coordination and approval of the chief of mission in the country team and the geographic combatant commander.

[The prepared statement of General Brown can be found in the Appendix on page 116.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.

And once again, we are going to try to make sure everybody gets an opportunity to ask a question.

And the very distinguished gentleman from Kentucky, one of our newest members of the committee sitting in front of our witnesses here, Mr. Davis, is recognized.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And just as both of us being former Rangers, I appreciate you making sure I did not fall asleep on the watch here.

I would like to begin by welcoming Colonel Lynch. We served as cadets together 25 years ago.

It is a privilege to have you both before the committee today. I have witnessed in both of your careers a tremendous transformation that has taken place in the military.

General Abizaid, you have to be part of the first public display of that with your leadership as a Ranger in Grenada.

It is great to see an army aviator commanding the Special Operations Command. That personally means a lot to me, and we are grateful for that.

But as we are facing the challenges that you alluded to in your opening statement, many of the questions as well that the uninformed public hears from time to time, you are facing extremely serious, complex problems in the region.

And as the Army is going through its process of transforming to deal with asymmetric warfare, adopting more and more the small wars doctrine, becoming more culturally relevant, focusing on changing the force, you are also effectively fighting two wars simultaneously.

And I would appreciate, first General Abizaid and then General Brown if you could give a short perspective from the SOF community, if you could comment on force levels right now, if you feel you have the capability to surge if another threat were to emerge, either in the region or at another part of the world, in a public and general sense, how you would adapt to that. And do you feel that you have currently the level of forces necessary to be able to plan for such a contingency?

General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congressman.

First of all, I believe that when you look at the total military power of the United States of America, in the CENTCOM, the Central Command area of responsibility, it is very, very substantial. We need to look at it in all of its components.

The air component is unequaled. The naval component is unequaled. The special operations component is unequaled. And the ground conventional component is adequate for doing the tasks at hand and able to deal with other threats that could emerge, provided that we can bring in additional capability to deal with them.

So I am satisfied that the levels of United States military power in the Central Command region is adequate. I am also satisfied that there is no power in the region that can challenge our military might. And that is a very important statement to make.

In terms of transformation, we are just starting to see some of the new Army designed units, brigades that are coming into the field, with the 3rd Infantry Division arrived. And it is my impression in looking at them that their design, which is not necessarily more in combat power, it is certainly more in reconnaissance power.

And in this particular campaign that we are fighting, the reconnaissance power adds to the overall intelligence capability. It should make our precision targeting capability better. And so, I am very excited about the direction in which the Army is moving in relation to improving this capability in their units.

General BROWN. Sir, I think special operations is meeting all the requirements that General Abizaid has for us right now. Our force structure in the CENTCOM AOR I think is doing a good job, and it is the appropriate level of force structure.

It does not mean we are without stress. We are stressing the force to continue operating at the level we are operating at.

When I testified last year, we had the biggest deployment of special operations in history. We still are. We are about 6,100 people deployed around the world today. For us, that is a large portion of our force deployed.

So we have some stress points. Our Green Berets, our SEALs are deployed at a pretty high OPSTEMPO right now. Our combat controllers. Our civil affairs is probably our biggest issue right now.

Twenty-six of those battalions are in the Army Reserve, and we are working through some answers to do that, to fix that. And by the end of the year, about 90 percent of my psychological operation (PSYOPS) forces that are in the reserves will have deployed into General Abizaid's AOR. So we have some stress points.

What we are doing about it is, the good news is, that we are growing. Special operations forces are growing. We will grow about 1,405 spaces this year. We will grow 500 Green Berets over the next couple years.

We are already in the process of growing. One of the things we have done is put a lot of money and energy into our schools so that we would then have the wherewithal to allow the force to grow without cutting the standard, which we think is pretty important.

So I would tell you our force levels today are probably not where they should be, but we believe they will be as we continue to grow. We have added 1,300 civil affairs people over the last 3 years.

So in the CENTCOM AOR, I think our force levels are good. I think we are doing what we are supposed to do over there. And I think we can sustain it.

We are sustaining it by managing the forces, quite frankly, that would be doing things in other AORs around the world. We are having to very carefully manage who does joint combined exercise training in another AOR to move it into this, into John's AOR, so that we get some rotation on our forces.

And what that means, quite frankly, is, as you know, all of our forces, our special operating forces, particularly the Green Berets, have to have a language capability. You cannot graduate from the school without a language capability. And so you can be a great shooter and you can do a thousand pushups, but you have to be able to speak a foreign language before you graduate.

So if you went in and talked to some of the special forces guys today in the CENTCOM AOR, they may be speaking Spanish. And that is because we are having to rotate our forces through there.

But we are taking care of it. We have a good plan to grow in the future. And we have the authorities to grow. We are adding two SEAL team equivalent. I will not go into the great details about how the number of aircraft, 10 C-130's, four AC-130 gunships, but SOF is on an upward scale, growing to where we need to be.

Mr. DAVIS OF KENTUCKY. Great. Thank you, gentlemen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Kentucky, and I thank him for the military expertise he brings to the committee. And the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. General Brown, I will have a question regarding your force levels with you a bit later, so let me just take up my few moments, if I may, asking General Abizaid.

Every one in this room and, I think, every American joins with you in wanting success in Iraq. Second place does not count there. The possibility of failure there, we do not even want to think about, because it could very well, as you know, be a snake pit for many, many evils.

So, you know, I hate to even turn the news on in the morning when I hear the deaths, more recently of Iraqi deaths, in addition to American deaths.

And we all know that success will depend upon the Iraqi forces being in charge of their own country eventually.

So my two questions of you, General: How do we measure success in Iraq? And where are the markers that you have set out with General Casey for the commanders so that you know you are making progress toward the ultimate goal?

Measure of success and your goal for us, would you please, General?

General ABIZAID. I thank you, Congressman Skelton.

The most important term of military success that we have to measure and we must be very mindful of is the progress of Iraqi security forces, and it is the ability of Iraqi security forces to take the lead in the counterinsurgency fight.

There are three fights that are going on in Iraq right now: there is the counterterrorist fight, there is the counterinsurgency fight, and there is the fight for stability.

The fight that the Iraqis need to take the lead in as soon as possible and that we are working very hard to make sure that they are capable of doing as soon as possible is the one that takes the most time, resources, and energy, and it is the counterinsurgency fight.

As far as markers on the road to success for Iraq, I think the single most important thing, Congressman, is that we have a political process that continues to move forward, shielded by coalition military forces and Iraqi military forces that continues to move toward a more representative Iraqi government.

And if you look at what is ahead of us in 2005, the most important thing we have to do is to protect the political process. Some people think, well, we got through the elections; getting through the elections means that the political process will continue to move in a positive direction.

But the truth of the matter is that the political process is just beginning.

Right now, there is a debate as to who is going to be prime minister. They have to form a government. They have to name ministries. Then they have to seat the National Assembly. Then they have to write the constitution. Then they have to have a referendum on the constitution. And then there is going to be another national election. And all of this is going to happen between now and December.

And while this happens, we have to figure out between us and the Iraqis how to get Iraqi security forces in the lead on counterinsurgency operations.

Clearly, training and equipping Iraqi security forces is one of the key metrics we look at. And I know you know this, but I would ask

the committee to understand that the metric of the numbers can be misleading.

What is important is whether or not the leadership and the loyalty of the Iraqi security forces is sufficient enough to take on the insurgency and ultimately defeat it without us being there.

It is my opinion, it is General Petraeus' opinion, it is General Casey's opinion that while we are on the right track, they are not ready to take over all the responsibilities yet.

But in 2005, we will make the move to transition those responsibilities; for example, giving them territory.

We have yet to assign territorial boundaries to Iraqi units in which to operate. That is very, very important.

We have started to do it in Baghdad with one brigade, and over time we will do it more and more.

We have had great success in certain units, especially those in which our special operations people have been embedded. We look to build on that success.

We have also had some pretty bad failures, and we have looked to understand why we have had those failures and look for ways to improve leadership in particular.

There must be in this period of great political process, activity, and change, an opportunity for the Iraqi chain of command to look to the prime minister, to take orders from an Iraqi chain of command, and to respond in an efficient and in a complete manner with regard to military requirements in Iraq.

I believe that the success, then, is twofold that we must achieve this year.

Number one, a legitimate political process must emerge in the December elections. That would mean that the Sunni community needs to be part of the future.

And number two, Iraqi security forces must be more and more responsible for the conduct of the war, especially the counterinsurgency points.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, I will reserve my other questions until a later moment.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Hefley.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, I am concerned that in the supplemental there is a considerable amount of money for military construction in Iraq. And I am concerned that we certainly want you to have what you need there for our troops.

You need force protection. We want you to have force protection, whatever.

But I am also concerned that we not build a lot of permanent facilities because of the message that sends. We are not there permanently.

We do not know how long we are going to be there, but we are not there permanently. So we do not create that impression that we are planning to stay.

And second, that we walk away from a lot of brand new facilities in a few months or a few years, just walk away from them and leave them standing there for their troops to occupy.

It seems to me that that country is a rich country and can build their own facilities that they want.

So could you tell us a little bit about what you are wanting there in terms of military construction and why we are doing so much building, or planning to do so much building?

General ABIZAID. Congressman, the building that we are doing in Iraq is designed primarily for operational requirements for force protection and for quality-of-life for our troops.

I do not regard what we are doing, regardless of the way it may be characterized in the various budgetary categorizations, I do not regard it as being permanent.

As a matter of fact, I could not tell you that there is a desire either in Iraq or in the United States government for permanent bases in Iraq. And I think that that is a level of discussion that probably will not emerge until after a new Iraqi government is completely formed and functional.

The bases and the money that we are spending are designed to enable the fight for the counterinsurgency to succeed, and it is our opinion that over time as forces transition that the facilities that we build can be turned over to Iraqi security forces.

The Iraqi government does have its own budget. They have designated quite a bit of their own funds for security. Their number one budgetary consideration is security.

But I think it will be some time before the Iraqi security institutions are able to get organized, get established, and move forward in a way that enables them to defeat the insurgency without our help.

So I believe that we are trying to be as prudent as possible. We are looking at areas where we can achieve some savings. We are very mindful of the taxpayers' dollars that are going into Iraq.

As a matter of fact, right now we have a joint staff logistics team that is looking at how we are supporting operations in both Iraq and Kuwait with an eye to getting much more efficient in the way that we are doing our logistics business. So we are mindful of the need to protect the funding that is going in there and do the work right.

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our committee. We appreciate your service and your leadership.

One of the things that worry me, and I hope that we are looking at a way that we can protect the Iraqi personnel that is trying to become police officers or national guards when they are trying to recruit or graduate.

We see that on February 28th a suicide bomber killed 125 Iraqi recruits who were standing in line at a health center—125 of them killed. Now today, two more cars targeting Iraqi military efforts. One car bomber killed, six Iraqis in the Iraqi army. And I could go on and on and on.

You know, if we do not train them and if they cannot recruit, the day will never come when they will be able to lead their own country in defending their own country.



Do we have any strategy to protect the recruits while they are trying to recruit into the military, into the police, or when they graduate from being targeted and killing them? Because I know hundreds of them have been killed trying to do the job that they would like to do in defending their country. But it seems that every day recruits are killed. They are graduating from police school or military school, and they are killed. What strategy do we have in place to protect these people so that they can take over? Because as long as they are being killed, they will never be able to take the position of our soldiers in Iraq.

Maybe you can enlighten me a little bit as to what is being done to protect them.

General ABIZAID. Of course, any armed force that develops is responsible for its own protection. And I believe that the Iraqis are as professional as any force in the Middle East, at least in the Arab countries, in terms of understanding what they have to do to protect themselves.

As you know, Congressman, against this terrorist enemy in particular, they are very patient, they are very deadly, and they are very capable of spotting the weak points and getting the bomb to the target. And it is difficult not only for Iraqis to defend against, but it is also difficult for Americans to defend against.

On the other hand, when I look at the work that the Iraqi security forces did in protecting 5,000 polling sites during election day, they showed not only a capacity for organizing themselves nationally, but they also very well protected the people of their country in being able to exercise the right to vote, which was an amazing thing to see in its own right.

We certainly have been working with the Iraqis in trying to increase their level of understanding about force protection. We send teams around to inspect. We hold various types of training activities. We have provided them, to the extent that we can, with force protection materials. And while we have made progress, it is obviously true that we need to do better.

We need to help people protect themselves any way that we can. But on the other hand, we also need to understand that when a terrorist bomb hits in an area, it was not one that they hit in an area that was completely unprotected, but they happened to find the flaw in where people were lining up. It also happened to be outside a market area, and it was not just soldiers that were killed. There was a lot of innocent civilians as well.

So the society is vulnerable to terrorism. It is a combination of offensive action and force protection that we will help move forward.

I am very mindful of the fact that more Iraqis have been killed since the Iraqi interim government has come to power than American soldiers. And we should appreciate their willingness to fight for their country. And we understand that we are going to have to help them think differently about the way to protect themselves under this type of a threat. And we are trying to do that.

Mr. ORTIZ. Just one last thing: Do you think that somebody is getting inside information, because it appears that they know exactly where to go and when to do it?

General ABIZAID. In this particular case, on this particular bombing, I believe that it was well-scouted. It showed itself to be vulnerable. They figured out that it was vulnerable. They figured out how to get the suicide bomb into place. And a combination of reconnaissance, a combination of safe houses and a combination of the execution of the mission on the part of the terrorists showed that they had taken the patience necessary to find the target.

And it also should be noted that reports say that the suicide bomber was chained to the car at the time when it was exploded.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey, chairman of the Special Operations Committee, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, General Brown, thank you so much for the leadership that you have provided for our folks in the Middle East. And I have the opportunity to work on an ongoing basis with General Brown and Senior Command Master Chief Martens, who is here today, so we have come a long way in this endeavor in the Middle East. And thank you and the people that work with your for your great effort.

General Abizaid, I was interested in something you said in your opening statement. And that is, not only is the situation in Iraq evolving and a government being stood up and a security force to support the government being stood up. And General Dave Petraeus, of course, is doing a great job in leading that security force stand-up effort.

But you mentioned some other evolutionary events that are taking place in the Middle East. And we see it on television. And my opinion has always been if we see good news on television, it must be great news, because it is unusual for us to get much good news over the network.

And I noticed over the last few days, as many of us have on the committee, that there are some changes taking place in Lebanon, there are some changes taking place in Egypt. There are even some changes taking place underneath, I believe, in Iran. The changes that of course have taken place in Afghanistan.

Could you talk a little bit about not only Iraq but the region and some of these changes that we seem to be experiencing?

General ABIZAID. Yes, Congressman. The region is really in a period of tumultuous change. It is really revolutionary change. I have studied the region and served in the region an awful lot over my career, and I have never seen anything quite like this.

To me, it is unbelievable to think of Lebanese in the streets in peaceful demonstration against the Syrians and a Lebanese government resigning. It is unthinkable to have the people in the region talking about elections, talking about representative government, to see the various media outlets having an open and somewhat candid discussion about the need for reform.

And it all takes place at a time when the extremist ideology, the ideology that is espoused by people like bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi, is in competition with the people that want a moderate and better future for their people.

It is a clear truth to me that the vast majority of people in the 27 countries in the Central Command region do not want to let the extremists win. They understand the extremists' ideology. They

know how dangerous it is. It is not one that they desire to have be successful.

They know what Afghanistan looked like under these people. They know what the Taliban did, where women were sequestered, where executions took place in soccer stadiums, where music was banned, where there was no good vision of life other than returning to the good old days of the 650s or so.

And people do not want that; they want a better way forward. And all of these activities that are taking place are not unlike what we saw in Europe in the 1840s or so, where there is just a wave of discussion that is an internal discussion that is happening.

Now, in the middle of all this, we have 225,000 Americans, which creates an interesting dynamic on its own. And I would only tell you that we do share two things in common with the people of the region.

Number one is we certainly have an ideal for a better future and hopes for a better future, and number two is we have a common enemy that we want to defeat.

So I believe that our actions in the region over time make a difference, but I also believe that it is not necessary to continue the very large numbers of troops and military activities in the region over time to allow the people to be successful. That can start coming down as they help themselves more.

Mr. SAXTON. In the couple of seconds that I have left, I would just like to say that it seems to me that everybody being human—human beings living in the Middle East being able to observe what has happened in Afghanistan, being able to observe what has happened governmentally in Iraq sets an example which may be fueling some of these changes that are taking place elsewhere in the Middle East.

Would you comment on that?

General ABIZAID. I would say people look to what has happened in Afghanistan and what has happened in Iraq and they say that this level of participatory government, if it can happen in those two countries—one, the most poor in the region, and the other coming out of the worst dictatorship in the region—then it can happen anywhere.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both you gentlemen for being with us today.

General Abizaid, on a trip about 6 weeks ago—and I realize things change by the day—we were at the embassy in Baghdad and apparently our nation has been paying for polling over there.

One of the poll numbers—and my memory is not perfect, but I checked with several of my colleagues—one of the questions that was asked is: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable opinion of the Americans? And those who were in the room—we cannot remember the exact number, but it was substantially over half of the Iraqis—had an unfavorable view of Americans. I do not say that happily. But I am reporting what I was told.

The question is, in a counterinsurgency, can you win a counterinsurgency when over half of the people have an unfavor-

able view? The second question is, how do you turn that around? What steps are we taking to turn that around? Because obviously you have to turn it around.

General ABIZAD. Thanks, Congressman Taylor. I think the answer to the first part—can you win a counterinsurgency with an unfavorable view that the population holds about coalition forces?—I think the answer is yes, especially as you transition Iraqi security forces to take the lead.

It is true, I think, if you survey the people in the Middle East that years and years of bad press out there has created an unfavorable view of the United States, and I think those polling results in most of the countries of the Central Command area of operations would be somewhat similar—all depends.

But I would also say that people in the Middle East respect what we are doing and respect the opportunities that have been provided to the Iraqis and know that it would not have happened without us.

I believe that the counterinsurgency fight is dependent upon not only having successful military operations, but also convincing people that they are going to have a better future.

And as long as they know that the better future is within the Iraqi context and not within the American context, I believe they will fight against the insurgency and they will not allow it to be victorious.

Mr. TAYLOR. If I may, General, I had asked the same question I think a year ago September and the number then was 80 percent favorable. So it is a rather—politically speaking, a rather dramatic shift in the wrong direction.

My question was what steps can we take, what steps are we taking as a nation to turn that around? Because I think it is of great importance that that somehow gets turned around.

General ABIZAD. Well, I think one of the most important steps that we can take, Congressman, is staying the course in Iraq to allow Iraq to be successful in the political process that it is undergoing and to be on the road to defeating the insurgency and the terrorists that they are facing there.

And I think there is a classified CIA report that General Casey told me about a couple of days ago that showed a marked change in the favorable/unfavorable rating in terms of the Iraqi people as a result of the elections.

So with your permission, I will endeavor to get that to you.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Chairman—

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Can I bank that minute that I have left for a future hearing?

The CHAIRMAN. Absolutely.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, has graciously yielded his time to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Schwarz, that \$20 you slipped Roscoe worked. [Laughter.]

And you have his time.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Apparently so, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to thank the gentleman from Maryland.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding your time.

This question I believe is more properly addressed to General Brown, although, General Abizaid, I expect both of you are very knowledgeable about it.

It would be a concern, I think, to most people that despite the fact we have done so well in starting to democratize a country like Afghanistan, which has never been democratized before in its entire history, that its biggest cash crop and its biggest export is opium alkaloid. And I do not believe—I think most Americans do not believe you can build a country or an economy on that sort of an export.

I would like to know—and perhaps it is not appropriate for this hearing, and maybe we would have to have a closed hearing on this—but in general what special ops is doing and perhaps, General Abizaid, what CENTCOM is doing to try to disabuse our Afghani friends from the cultivation of opium poppies and to move on to something else, understanding that this is something that is inherent in their culture, but nevertheless should be unacceptable to us as the democratizers of that country.

And if you would both comment on that I would be most appreciate, General Brown perhaps.

General BROWN. I think you are right, Congressman.

The narcotics problem is a big problem over there. I do not think they intend to build their government based on the narcotics problem.

From a tactical, special operations point of view, we are operating in small teams out in the outer lands. As we come upon drugs, we report it. We destroy it where it should be destroyed and where we have that capability. We destroy the drug equipment that they are using to do—we train Afghani forces to do counternarcotics missions.

At a higher level, we contribute with our psychological operations forces to the information campaign that is run to disavow them of the drug culture.

So from a tactical point of view, that is where we—the special operations forces contribute.

General ABIZAID. Congressman, I would add that there is no doubt that we have to be very concerned about Afghanistan and poppy cultivation and the drug trade.

If, in 2004, our primary military focus was counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, countermilitia, I think that in 2005, while we will never have the lead because of the laws that you have passed, counterdrug needs to be up on the overall strategy list for Afghanistan for 2005.

We provide a supporting role within capabilities. We continue our military operations against the Taliban and al Qaeda that we find in the region.

And I have personally talked to President Karzai on numerous occasions about the need to move forward.

You know that in the Bonn Conference process the U.K. was given counternarcotics international lead, and you also know that within our own interagency that it does not fall to the Department of Defense to be in the lead on counternarcotics operations.

All that having been said, all of us need to be very concerned about where the narcotics trade is heading.

We need to work with President Karzai. He has, over the past three months, energized his own small, newly beginning counter-narcotics forces to go out and seize, I think, it is something like 64,000 pounds of narcotics.

And so, he is committed to it. He convened the “loya jirga,” a group of notables, to talk about it.

It will be difficult to wean the Nation off of it, but what we do not want to do is adopt a program that is going to send the country back into insurgency.

We have to have a smart, well-organized strategy that does not penalize the poor farmer who has no other choice. We have to have some sort of an alternative livelihood program, in addition to the other activities that the law enforcement agencies will take.

And so, 2005, we have to be very careful about moving forward in the right direction in this regard.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you very much, Generals. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate the gentleman. The gentleman from Hawaii, Mr. Abercrombie.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, next year will be 20 years since the publication of this book called “The Army and Vietnam” by now-Major Andrew Krepinevich, Jr. I am going to assume for conversation’s sake you are familiar with it.

Page 10 of the book, it talks about the—following on the Army concept about taking on insurgencies, it talks about resource allocation and then goes on under the title of “Guerrillas: How to Beat Them”—I will not go into all of it, but “the way to destroy an insurgent is attack him at the source of his strength, the population.”

He goes on to talk about counterinsurgency, the necessity of being able to handle initiative against the guerrillas with a—even paramilitary forces—assertion of government control over the population, winning itself, winning its support, the forces having to be ground mobile, able to patrol intensively in and around population areas.

They say—let me quote it directly—“While it is a relatively easy matter for government forces to drive guerrilla bands away from a given area, it is far more difficult for the military to work hand in hand with local police and paramilitary forces over a prolonged period to complete the destruction of insurgent forces that have mixed with the population.”

Yet that is exactly what must be done.

Without quoting further from it, it goes to—and the entire doctrine outlined here, and history outlined here, goes to what you termed the transitioning of responsibility: training, equipping, leadership of the Iraqi forces and whether they are sufficient or not.

Now, this is the third year of transitioning. The Chairman and I happened to be in Baghdad the day that we made one transition from General Garner to Ambassador Bremer, and the discussion that day was exactly the discussion we are having today.

This is the third year of transitioning, and yet as far as I can tell, the transitioning is not taking place despite the optimistic tenor of your testimony.

For example, is it or is it not true that the peshmerga, essentially the Kurdish fighters, outnumber the Iraqi forces that you have referred to today to the tune of about between 85,000 and 95,000 to approximately, according to your briefing this week, the Iraq Weekly Status Report, 57,658 Ministry of Defense forces?

Do the Kurdish “peshmerga” fighters now outnumber them about 85,000 to 95,000 to approximately 57,000?

General ABIZAIID. Of course, Congressman, it all comes into the way that you look at how the “peshmerga” have been organized.

Some of the “peshmerga” units have become Iraqi national guard units. Some of the “peshmerga” units have worked for the border enforcement organization.

And so—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, let me ask you then, General, how many of the 57,000 Iraqi troops consist of “peshmerga” units?

General ABIZAIID. Well, I do not think that looking at the numbers the way that you are looking at them answers your basic question about transitioning to Iraqi lead.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, let me ask it another way.

Are you tracking the ethnic makeup of the Iraqi forces?

General ABIZAIID. General Petraeus can say how the ethnic makeup is working in various locations in the national army.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, I am glad to hear that, because I have been making inquiries for the past couple weeks and my information was that you are not tracking this.

General ABIZAIID. I think we can give you a fairly accurate appreciation of where units are local units, where units are nationally units, and the national units are, of course, ethnically mixed.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you going to integrate—

General ABIZAIID. The question is—if you had let me answer, I will answer.

The question that I understand from you is whether or not Iraqis are making progress in transitioning to being able to take control of the areas that they need to take control of?

In 14 out of the 18 provinces, Iraqi security forces essentially are in the lead already.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What does that mean?

General ABIZAIID. In the four provinces, where the insurgency is the most difficult, the four Sunni provinces, coalition forces are clearly in the lead.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. What does the 14 mean?

General ABIZAIID. Fourteen—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Does that mean United States troops are not involved there in a leadership role, or is the support role minimal?

General ABIZAIID. It means that the United States forces are very minimal in the areas where the insurgency is actually not taking place.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. How many of the 57,000 soldiers are—how many of them involve what are called these pop-up units, these private armies, these paramilitary militias?

General ABIZAID. There is no doubt that there are militias, and you talked about one of the militias, the “peshmerga” militia. And as you remember, during the offensive operations into Iraq, the “peshmerga” fought with us.

There is a plan that the Iraqis are working for the demobilization and integration of militias that is not unlike the plan that exists in Afghanistan for the demobilization and integration of militias into the national force.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Is it your contention, then, that the “peshmerga” forces will become the—integrated into the Iraqi army and not defend Kurdistan?

General ABIZAID. I think that over time there is no doubt that there is no such thing as Kurdistan, there is only Iraq. And Iraqi forces will become national forces, and militias will be organized at the local level in accordance with the desire—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is the position of the United States now as you direct these armies, that there is no Kurdistan?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask my colleague if we can—we will answer this next one and then if we can move on down the line, we will give him a shot at a second round of questioning.

Go ahead and answer this last one.

What is your last question, Neil?

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Well, if you think—you say there is no Kurdistan, so I assume, then, that you mean that it is the position of the United States that the “peshmerga” will be integrated into the Iraqi army.

And if that is the case, will they be used in the four provinces that you have cited? Because over 40 percent of the population of Iraq is in those four provinces.

General ABIZAID. Certainly, the decision of how the “peshmerga” will be used is not a decision for the United States of America other than for advisement. The Iraqi government will make that decision.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. So the Iraqi government is going to be making decisions about what the future of the United States forces are going to be with regard to—

General ABIZAID. You did not say anything about the United States forces. You asked me about Kurdish “peshmerga”. I answered your question.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You did not answer the question.

General ABIZAID. Yes, I did.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And you are avoiding the question.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Abercrombie—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Avoiding what the responsibility of the United States Army is going to be and the United States government if these two entities, the “peshmerga” and other Iraqi forces, are merged and expected to take the lead, let alone the responsibility in the 40 percent of the country that you say is currently now infested with counterinsurgency.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Abercrombie, we are going to have move down the line. We will let you extract the answer to that last one at the end of the line here.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.



The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hayes.  
Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you and the troops that serve under you for an incredible job.

General Brown, we all know that special operators cannot be mass produced. It is clearly obvious.

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYES. A lot of competing forces that are trying to draw these incredibly capable individuals away.

I know there are a number of efforts being made with some progress recently on ways to retain these folks. Could you speak to the committee about what is being done, what has happened, how the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has responded, and what is the reaction to the special operators in the field to these new incentives?

General BROWN. Thank you, Congressman.

Last year, when I testified, I spoke about the fact that we had a drain on our very highly skilled personnel, specifically our Green Berets and special forces, our SEAL community, and our combat controllers, based on the security environment, where there were very lucrative jobs for them to go to.

We came up with a series of plans to try and keep them, make it worthwhile for them to stay in the service.

Number one thing that keeps somebody in the service is job satisfaction. Our folks have great job satisfaction. But there is a part B, and that is taking care of your family.

So what we have come up with, and what the OSD has supported us with, and Dr. Chu specifically in helping us get this across, is a soft bonus for specific military occupational specialties (MOSs) at the 19-year point of service.

Now, there are some actions that we had that were working earlier that were not approved earlier in the time frame of 0 years to 19. But the one we have, which we are very happy about, is at the 19 year of service a Green Beret, a combat controller or a SEAL that will sign up for 6 years to stay in the force will get a \$150,000 bonus lump sum payment.

That has been very positive so far. We do not know what the final outcome will be, if it will help us sustain the force in the manner we need to sustain it. But, quite frankly, it started on 1 January, and I am told we have already had 112 people sign up for it, mostly from our Army component.

So we are looking forward to seeing if this is going to help us solve some of our problem to retain our seasoned operator.

Additionally, real quickly, we started a whole series of SOF unique education opportunities for our operators. I will not go into great detail about what they are, but they include online degrees and actually bootstrap programs where they can come back and go to college and some other stuff.

All of this started with a meeting I had in Tampa to meet with the spouses of our special operators to get their feedback on what we can do to help keep their service member in the service.

Quite frankly, I am encouraged. I think it is a great initiative. We have great support out of the OSD to help us do the bonus part. And we are looking forward to seeing how it pans out. First reports are pretty good, 112 since January 1.

Mr. HAYES. Sounds like a lot of money, and it is, but I think it is a tremendous investment that pays tremendous returns, both in terms of rewarding the folks, and incentive for folks to stay.

Just a quick follow-up. I was traveling east recently and ran into a planeload of our soldiers, who were traveling west. We talked a little bit in the confines of the terminal. And, you know, you could thank them a little bit, but it is sort of hard. They did not know who we were.

But kind of wandered back to the plane as they loaded up, and wanted to talk to some more of them, and the guy said, "Well, here, get on the intercom."

So I got on the intercom, not knowing really what to say except, "Men, America, my district and everybody, appreciates what you have done. You are fabulous. We love you."

The plane just erupted. And it is such a clear indication of morale, that people need to know that they appreciate when we tell them, and we cannot tell them enough.

So our thanks through you to them every time you get a chance. I know you will. Thanks.

General BROWN. Congressman, thank you very much. And thank you for your visits out to the field. And thank you for coming to see our special forces troops, specifically at Fort Bragg in that area.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the gentleman from Texas yielded his time to Mr. Abercrombie, so you have 30 seconds left. So the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentleman, welcome to the committee, and thank you for your service.

As you know, our time is brief when we ask questions, but there are two areas, General Abizaid, that I would like for you to comment on.

The first one is, I was curious, a report in this morning's newspaper, that in yesterday's testimony you said the size of the insurgency was greatly reduced. And so I wanted to get your perspective on exactly how you determine that.

And then the other question, I referred to your written statements where on page 43 you say: "Finally, we must close the cultural gap between us and the extremist enemies that we face. We must invest far more in the human capital that will empower our joint forces to better understand the enemy in the years ahead.

"During the Cold War, the U.S. military could boast of literally tens of thousands of experts on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact and the ideology of communism. Today, we are lucky to find even a few hundred in our own ranks who know about Islam, the Middle East and the ideological forces that fuel terrorism."

So my question is, as a result of our experience to date in Afghanistan and Iraq and in the region, what kinds of training activities or courses are you developing or have you developed so that as troops continue to rotate into theater they do not have to learn the hard way based on the experience that we have had to date?

And what are we doing to make sure that in the future, in a case like Latin America, we will not be in the same kind of situation as we are today in the Middle East?

If you could comment on those two, I would appreciate it.

General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congressman.

The size of the insurgency, of course, is always a matter for great speculation and it is always very difficult to come to grips with it militarily, and giving numbers never quite does it justice, because it changes.

Sometimes when people feel that there are political activities going on that need to be either reinforced or fought against, then you have increases or decreases in what is going on in the country.

I think there are three categories that General Casey and I try to look at when we try to understand what is happening within the Sunni Arab insurgency, which is the most active and certainly the most dangerous right now for the future of Iraq.

The first are the trigger pullers, the people that are actually out there fighting day after day that are engaging our troops and engaging the Iraqi security forces.

The second are the supporters, the people that provide safe houses, provide ammunition, provide money, provide direct support.

And the third group happens to be the sympathizers. It is very, very difficult to say numbers of sympathizers, but it is also clear that after the elections, that there was a positive impact in that more people were coming forward to tell our forces and the Iraqi security forces where the enemy was storing equipment, who some of the leaders of the insurgency were in particular locations. So that was a good sign.

But, again, my comments yesterday were really an intelligence analysis of the enemy coming forward on election day. The enemy stated that it was their most important military activity to disrupt the election. And so we assumed from that that would put a major effort forward.

And as we looked at the numbers of attacks that took place, where the engagements were, what the numbers of people that happened to be, and then did whatever analysis we could, we said there were about no more than 3,500 people in the field that day.

Now, that does not mean that that is the size of the insurgency, but it does show you, if that is their best shot, we need to not overestimate what they are capable of doing.

And so I think what I concluded from that is the multinational forces and the combination of them and the Iraqis are not going to be defeated by the insurgents.

Of course, the insurgents have a long time line. They just try to avoid losing. And what really needs to take place is a lot of political activity now to take out the political underpinnings for the insurgency in the Sunni Arab community.

With regard to the human capital issue, I very much appreciate the fact that you read my posture statement and that you found that particular point, because I think it is very, very important.

We will be involved in the Middle East for a long time, and the Middle East will be a seat of conflict for a long time. And this extremist problem with regard to the extremist ideology will be with us for a long time.

Yet we are always talking past one another in the Middle East. Congressman Taylor talked about the unfavorable ratings that we receive.

Well, also in the United States people from the Middle East do not receive favorable ratings either.

And there is this big cultural gap that I believe can be crossed much better by training more of our officers professionally, in language skill, sending them to universities to learn the culture, learn about the religion, and then changing our own mentality within our own services so that we value that service and not think it is something off to the side that is not mainstream.

In other words, what I am saying is that mainstream line officers need to know about the Middle East as much today as we used to know about the Soviet Union back in the Cold War.

There is another side to the human investment necessary, and that is to reach out to the Middle East and bring their officers forward.

When I look at Pakistan, for example, we used to have a very robust International Military Education and Training (IMET), program with them that brought their officers forward for training. And then we stopped it for years. And it is precisely that group of officers in the middle that are not quite sure about this relationship with the United States.

Now, we are starting it again with the younger officers. But this double investment in human capital, I think, on both sides of this bridge that we are trying to cross, is very important and in the long run is more important to us than raising a couple of extra brigades.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And, Mr. Reyes, how many trips have you made now to Afghanistan and Iraq combined?

Mr. REYES. Combined, about 14.

The CHAIRMAN. About 14. Mr. Reyes I think has traveled in the theater, General Abizaid. In fact, we are working on family separation allowance for him for these trips.

But I want you to know, these members, Democrat and Republican, really care about you and about the troops and this mission. And almost all of our members have been into theater multiple times. I think Mr. Reyes more than anybody else. But I think it represents our interest and our commitment.

So we appreciate you, Mr. Reyes. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Generals, we appreciate you being here and the great job that you are doing.

And, General Abizaid, I have a question that is off of Iraq, which I doubt will disappoint you to be able to address. But it is still under CENTCOM's area of responsibility. And that is that China will soon have a special access to deep water ports in Pakistan, according to at least recent media reports that we have seen.

Does this affect our influence in the region? And specifically what are the short-and long-term-range implications of increased Chinese naval and commercial capabilities in the Gulf region? And how will this strengthen China's strategic influence with South Asian and Gulf countries?

General ABIZAID. Congressman, that is a great question.

I would just like to thank Congressman Reyes, by the way, if you would not mind, for the number of trips that he has made out there. You can tell that he knows a lot about what we are doing.

And I really appreciate his efforts and all of your efforts. I have seen many of you over there, and I know General Casey has seen even more of you. So thanks for that.

The question of China in the Middle East and China in the region is one of great long-term strategic importance for the United States. It is clear to me that the increasing energy demands of both China and India will over time probably cause a level of competition for resources that are available in the Middle East that people need to be thinking about now.

I am not saying that that competition for resources needs to revert into any sort of military clash, but it is to say that their developing societies in both China and India, and their developing military and technological capabilities make it clear that in the long range they are powers to be reckoned with.

China is already a power to be reckoned with in Central Asia. And their relationship with Pakistan is well-known.

My impression of Chinese activities in the region is that they are long term. They are strategic. They are built to think about the future of how China will increase its trade and its influence in the region so that it increases over time.

And again, I am not saying that they are nefarious. I am saying that it is apparent that they are very interested in the region, that it is one of strategic importance to them, and they have key relationships that they have developed, especially with Pakistan, but with other nations. And I think we will see ever increasing interest and influence of China in the years ahead.

It is not necessarily increasing influence, though, that should lead to conflict. I think China, like the United States, is a nation that is interested in the stability of the region, because with stability and peace comes peace and prosperity.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, General. Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. I thank him for his recent trip in that area of operation (AO). And the gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

General Abizaid, I wanted to ask a question about Iran. In your written statement, you state that, Iran has "obvious aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons," is the way you phrased it.

I want to ask you a question from your personal opinion, because I want you to—because I do not think there is any right or wrong answer to my question—but I want you to put yourself in the position, if you were a military person in the Iranian military, a high-ranking officer there. All these discussions that we have had on Iran, and I see a lot of the things that are written about it, and we are talking about some enticements that we are working with Europeans on.

The topic I do not see that gets much discussion, if you were from the Iranian military and defense perspective, where is the incentive not to want to acquire nuclear weapons? If you could put yourself in the position there, when you look, you have Americans on both sides, in Afghanistan and Iraq, with a nuclear force, not in those countries, but with nuclear force. The Brits are in Iraq with a substantial nuclear force, have nuclear weapons. Israel has

a nuclear force. Russia, to the north, has a nuclear force, just across the border with Azerbaijan. The Pakistanis have a nuclear force. The Indians have a nuclear force. The Chinese have a nuclear force.

I mean, it is a very dangerous neighborhood. And when we talk about trying to give incentives to Iran not to acquire a nuclear force, would you put yourself, from your personal perspective in the role as an Iranian military person, how do you go to your political leadership and say, "Here is why we can be secure and why we ought to not acquire nuclear weapons, from our purely selfish, defensive perspective"?

General ABIZAID. I think if I am an Iranian military person, the first thing, like any military person, that you are interested in doing is defending your country. And you see a very great degree of intellectual effort on the Iranian side to discuss how they would deal with a conventional attack by the United States. And they always talk about how they need to develop an asymmetric capability to deal with our very large conventional air and naval power.

And so, it is surprising to me that I do not see the discussion about what it means for them strategically to gain a nuclear weapon. If I were a professional that was non-ideological, I would think it would not be a good idea to develop a weapon because it puts you behind the rest of the powers. It assumes that all of the powers in the region, not the United States but the powers in the region, can accept that fact that you will be nuclear armed. And you have to ask the question whether or not achieving a nuclear weapon does not invite attack by one of the regional powers.

And so, the question for a military person should be is a nuclear-armed Iran more stable or less stable in the regional context. And it is my view that it is less stable.

I think that they have to understand that our long-term presence in the region, once stability is achieved in Iraq and Afghanistan, is bound to go down, and that offensively, it does not appear from our military movements, at least if I were an Iranian professional, that we have any designs upon them.

From a strategic point of view, you look and you see where the American flags are, but from a posture point of view, you know clearly what is defensive and what is offensive. And our posture is not offensively oriented.

So you are diverting an awful lot of national resources to develop a nuclear program that could actually better be put into what would pay off in an asymmetric conventional sense for defending the country.

So from a resources point of view as a professional military man, I would say, "I think we are wasting our money on this program, and it actually makes life worse for us and less stable for us, not better."

But I would also tell you, Congressman, that I believe that it is not the professional military men that are driving the argument, but the ideological politicians.

Dr. SNYDER. One final question, General Abizaid, General Brown. I think there was discussion of the C-130J model that came up, with your discussions with the Senate, and I think about everybody that goes to Iraq, they end up riding around in C-130s,

and we now have had the problem with the aging force and the C-130E models being grounded. It came as a surprise to a lot of us when the President's folks proposed cutbacks in the C-130J model program. Would you share with us your thoughts about the C-130J model as we look ahead to this defense bill here?

General BROWN. In Special Operations Command, of course we have some C-130J models that are located up at the 193rd in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, our Commando Solo unit. And quite frankly, the C-130J model is doing very well up there.

The rest of our MC-130 fleet is an aging fleet. We are getting 10 new C-130's into our fleet. They will not be C-130J models. The purpose that we did not set out to get C-130J models when we started this initiative was that most of our aircraft are very, very highly modified, with terrain following/terrain avoidance radar, aircraft survivability equipment.

And quite frankly, we did not want to put another style of aircraft in the fleet that would cause us to have unique pilots that flew four or five different kinds of airplanes. So we went with the standard. I think they are H2 C-130's that we had before.

The C-130Js that we have up in Harrisburg, and I have looked at the C-130J, and it is a great aircraft and very, very capable.

I really cannot comment on the budget or that activity that went on with regard to the C-130J. I can only say it is a very capable aircraft and that when I look at the C-130 fleet in my theater of operations, we cannot exist and get our job done without the C-130 fleet.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being here and for your service.

I want to follow along with Mr. Forbes and talk about something besides Iraq. I know that while I was attending another hearing that one of my colleagues raised a question about the poppies in Afghanistan. So sort of setting that aside, I would like to get some of your thoughts about Afghanistan from both of you.

I was just over there about six weeks ago. And I know that President Karzai was very much aware of the poppy issue.

He was also very proud, it seemed to me, of the Afghan national army and the progress they had made, the progress in getting the warlords to turn in some equipment. And by the way, he took great care to ask us to express his thanks to the American people for what Americans have done for peace and democracy and any hope in Afghanistan.

And so, I and my colleagues pledged to him that we would carry that message forward. And I am trying to keep my pledge in that regard everywhere I go.

But my question to both of you is: How are we doing with the Afghan National Army, with training them, with them taking over the responsibilities in Afghanistan?

And then for both of you, I suppose, how are we doing in the cooperation with Pakistan in the hunt in that just incredibly rugged region that is there between Pakistan and Afghanistan?

Start with either one of you.

General BROWN. How about if I take it from the tactical level and then I will let John move up to the strategic level in his AOR.

I spent Christmas Eve with a Special Forces A-team, about 100 miles north of Kandahar. There was about 20 guys in a Special Forces A camp. They have an Afghan company with them that they work with every day. The Afghans that I met over there, the Afghani army folks were dedicated, trying to learn their skills. Were not anywhere near the level of our forces, of course, but they were dedicated to trying to be good at what they were doing. They were listening. They were doing what our Special Forces guys were working with them.

That whole little area that this Special Forces A-team works in, they are doing exactly what you would want a Special Forces team doing. They have established a school just south of their little A camp, about 135 kids going to it every day. They have a great relationship with the local mullahs. They are right at a traditional Taliban avenue of movement to the north, where they are going out and doing the direct action piece as well as all the other pieces.

So from an Afghan perspective—now, I am talking about one A-team, but we have 24 more of those Special Forces A-teams and then we have the conventional forces and additionally I have some Rangers and other assets over on the ground.

Quite frankly, I was very, very encouraged what I saw, not just from the military, tactical point of view of training Afghan army and working with them to be more capable in the missions that we wanted them to do, but in the relationship that the team had built with the entire area, helping to improve the infrastructure, building the schools, running a medical clinic, and doing all this with about maybe 20 total Americans up there.

And so, from a tactical point of view, I think it was going real well. John.

General ABIZOID. When you look at what is going on in Afghanistan with regard to the training of the Afghan National Army and their ability to operate throughout the country, it is actually going along very well. I am very pleased with the progress that we have made at the battalion level.

But just like in Iraq, the key is to make the chain of command work all the way from the lowest private in the Afghan army up to the Minister of Defense. And as you know from having been out there, the ability of the Minister of Defense to command and control his units in the field is pretty slim. And so, we have to work on enabling his command and control and getting the middle levels of the Afghan National Army stood up.

Initially our strategy was to just concentrate in the Kabul area. And it has only been recently where we have expanded our efforts out.

Now, this also goes into the very important point that I think Mr. Abercrombie was trying to get to as well, on militia. The militias need to be demobilized. The militias have to be reintegrated into society. And the program for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration in Afghanistan has gone along pretty well. It is internationally supervised. It is funded internationally.

I was recently at a weapons cantonment site in Herat, where I was surprised that Ismail Khan's forces have turned in so many



weapons of excellent capability, et cetera. And this process of building the Afghan force, while at the same time bringing down the militias, and then also expanding NATO influence throughout the country, through ISAF, is one that is leading to greater and greater stability.

To quickly get to your question about Pakistan and the activities of the Pakistani army, it is remarkable when you think that about a little over a year ago, there were zero Pakistani regular army forces in the border provinces of Pakistan, specifically North and South Waziristan. Today you have over 70,000.

They have engaged the terrorists. They have attacked the terrorists. They are squeezing the al Qaeda senior leadership into areas that I think ultimately will pay off, because there are only so many places you can go.

You are absolutely right. It is extremely rugged, extremely difficult. You have to have good, precise intelligence.

But our level of cooperation with Pakistan and their importance in this fight against extremism, the broader fight, it is just very, very important to maintain the good levels of training and capability and cooperation.

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today.

I was in Iraq over the Christmas holiday and had a good chance to talk to General Petraeus about the training of the Iraqi troops, because obviously that is one of the key components of our ability to get that place settled and actually to get America pulled out.

General Abizaid, I have a question for you. Two weeks ago when I asked Secretary Rumsfeld to explain why his estimates of the current strength of the Iraqi security forces have varied so wildly over the past year and a half, first he denied that his estimates had been unreliable and later he passed the buck by saying that he gets these numbers from General Petraeus. So since General Petraeus works for General Casey and you, I was hoping you could help the secretary get his story straight.

Every member of this committee wants General Petraeus and the Iraqi army to succeed, but some of us need to get some clear metrics on where the mission stands and how you and General Petraeus are measuring the numbers and the readiness of the Iraqi forces.

For example, on 16 September 2003, Mr. Rumsfeld said there were a total of 56,000 Iraqis under arms in the Army, police, border guards and civil defense corps. On 25 October 2003, Mr. Wolfowitz said that there were 90,000 Iraqi troops. On 4 November 2003, Rumsfeld claimed there were over 100,000 trained. That was a 40 percent increase in a month and a half.

On 19 November 2003, the DOD news release said that it was 138,600 Iraqis trained.

On 23 February 2004, at a daily Pentagon news briefing, Mr. Rumsfeld said they had in excess of 210,000 Iraqi security forces. In testimony two weeks ago, Mr. Rumsfeld claimed that there are now 137,000 Iraqis serving. That is a decrease of 73,000 in the past

year, using Mr. Rumsfeld's own claims. Yet he sat here and denied that he is given unreliable estimates.

So my first question is: Have we actually lost 73,000 Iraqi troops to desertion, combat, other causes between February 2004 and February 2005 or were the numbers wrong?

And if they were wrong, where was he getting his estimates? Were they from your command?

And what have you done to obtain more reliable estimates so that Mr. Rumsfeld does not look so helpless?

And generally speaking, the Iraqi police are not trained, organized or equipped to engage in counterinsurgency warfare. So when we discuss the strength of the Iraqi security force as a strategy for reducing U.S. forces in Iraq, our focus should really be on battle-ready Iraqi army and national guard battalions and brigades.

Using that standard, respected defense analyst Anthony Cordesman estimates that there are only 7,000 to 11,000 Iraqi troops assigned to battle-ready combat units. Do you agree with those estimates? And using that standard, what would be your estimate?

General ABIZOID. I certainly have the greatest respect for our Secretary of Defense and our other leadership in the Department of Defense. They have fought the war honorably, and I believe every step of the way they have tried to give answers that they believed to be correct.

The most important thing that I can say—and I know you are familiar with it from having visited personally with General Petraeus recently—is that there is a well-known and, I believe, handed out to the various committees of Congress, report that comes out biweekly on the status with Iraqi security forces.

Currently, I think the number is over 140,000 Iraqi security forces that have been trained and equipped.

We have, over time, changed the way that we have counted, because we have had a disagreement about whether or not the facilities police would be added into the equation or not. And we came to the conclusion that they were not really a military force. They were a static security guard force and they contributed to security, but not to the counterinsurgency or the counterterrorist fight, nor did they really add much to the policing activities that were done.

So we have tried to concentrate on police and military forces. I also understand that there are plenty of people with plenty of different ideas about Iraqi security forces.

The key issue, I think, that we need to really hone in on is whether or not the Iraqi security forces are ready to take the lead in the counterinsurgency action in Iraq.

And the answer is no, not yet. And it is because the leadership and the chain of command has not solidified yet, but it will.

They are better now than they were a month ago. And they will be better next month. They keep getting better. They get stronger.

Will they be able to take the lead against the insurgents? My belief is, as long as the political activity in Iraq takes place, they will be able to do that.

I also believe that the goals that General Petraeus—that I know he discussed personally with you—are reasonable and attainable. I am pretty clear that all of us understand that we are not creating

the United States Army; we are creating the Iraqi army and that they will be able to defend their country from external threats and, over time, win in the insurgency.

The key for us this year is to transfer more and more responsibility to the Iraqis in taking the counterinsurgency fight to the enemy, and I am confident we can do that.

When I look at the military results of the Iraqi armed forces in the field during the election period, General Casey, myself and General Petraeus are very encouraged by that. None of us have ever said that the Iraqi security forces have been free of desertion or difficulties in their formative stages any more so than we could say that the American forces were free of difficulties in any war we fought.

Ms. SANCHEZ. I am sorry. My first question, the issue of estimates. Were those coming from your command? Do you know what happened to the discrepancy of 73,000 over a year?

General ABIZAIID. I think I told you it was the facilities protection police on the 73,000. We believe that it was not reasonable to add that number to the overall counterinsurgency, counterterrorists stability equation of the armed forces and police.

Ms. SANCHEZ. But you believe the police?

General ABIZAIID. But those people are out there guarding things for the various ministries.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Police are also in your estimates, but do they really do counterinsurgency?

General ABIZAIID. Well, I mean, you know, there are all sorts of different levels of counterinsurgency and counterterrorist action. The Iraqis have counterterrorist forces that fight it directly. They have special police commandos that fight it directly.

The police in the precinct add to stability in the local region, but they are not capable of standing up against a dedicated, determined insurgent force that would attack them.

So there are various levels of security provided by the forces.

The most important thing we can do is to get the chain of command and the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense fighting properly, so they can coordinate all of the various levels of activity against the insurgency.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Brown, thank you, and General Abizaid, for being here today. You had mentioned earlier in some testimony that you had met with the spouses for special ops folks in Florida, in Tampa, I guess. And out of that came some suggestions that were implemented.

If you could flesh that out a little bit for us and also—and I will ask all my questions, then I will quit—one of the comments that was made about the bonus, the sign-on bonus, for the 19-year veterans to stay for another 6 years and the size of that bonus—help us put that in perspective as to what does it take to train a special ops individual, about how long apprenticeship does it take to get to they are fully operational? What do we have invested in each one of those people to make that happen?

General BROWN. Thank you very much for the question.

First of all, I brought the spouses in of about 20 families across our force, because when we talk about special operations—I have SEALs; I have Green Berets; I have Combat Controllers; I have air crews—but we particularly focused on those skills that we were losing, those that were going out of the force.

We brought them in and discussed predictability so that they would know when their husbands were deploy and when he would come back, the length of deployments. We discussed a full range of issues, but quite frankly, mostly we let them do the talking and we listened.

Several of the things they came up with that we thought we could implement fairly quickly was the bonus I already talked about and then some educational opportunities that are also available to the families as well as the service members.

Today, to become a Green Beret it takes about 14 to 18 months and the same with our SEALs. To get a qualified guy that you can put out in the field up in a small group, operating in very, very small groups to do these incredible things we ask them to do, it takes about 14 to 18 months.

Some of the numbers change depending upon what particular skill, whether he is a medic, it is a little longer; if he is a demo guy, it is a little less; or communicator.

It takes us about \$320,000 just in training costs to train that one individual if he is a Green Beret. A SEAL is pretty close to the same. A Combat Controller is a little bit less, but they are all pretty good just to train in one year.

That is not counting the fact that he is already getting paid. We had to go recruit him and do a whole bunch of other stuff. So the benefits of keeping these guys are pretty dynamic.

Once we take that guy and he finishes his language school, in special forces, particularly—and we are getting a little bit that way in the SEALs and we are moving that way in some of our other forces—we put him in one unit where he will get the cultural awareness that is required to have the kind of cultural awareness skills that we would expect from him.

So a guy that will go to the 5th Special Forces Group will always deploy to General Abizaid's AOR.

So a guy that you will run into over there has probably done eight or nine rotations, knows a lot of the people over there, can speak the language well enough to get by.

So we have a tremendous investment in these guys and so that is why the bonus.

The size of the bonus, quite frankly, sounds pretty astounding to me, but the truth is when you look at the civilian contracts that these individuals are able to get—because they are very capable of operating around the world—they are security specialists, they are handgun, long-gun experts, they are out-of-the-box thinkers, and they have a language skill—they can sign some pretty big contracts with the civilian industry.

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me ask—we have a little time left.

You mentioned that in addition to the bonus, there were some other things that you had thought about doing for folks from 2 years to 19 that did not implement it. Or is there anything in it

that you would like to continue to be an advocate for that would help?

I suspect replacing a 10-year veteran is a whole lot easier than a 19-year veteran.

General BROWN. No, I think you are exactly right.

What we did is we turned—the services run the selective reenlistment bonus, and so they are all a little different.

We attempted to standardize those. And then your reenlistment bonuses and NCO goes away about the 14-year point.

So you have a little gap there where, if you are anybody in the service, but particularly in S.F. or SEAL or Ranger or a combat controller, you are not getting a bonus for a certain period of time, waiting for that 19th year to then sign up.

So we are back working some initiatives to try and draw a little bit of that bonus forward so that we can give them some sort of sustainment instead of just asking them to hold on until the 19-year point.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And General Abizaid and General Brown, thank you very much for your extraordinary service to the country.

I wanted to go back and just ask you a little bit about a former hearing that we had, on February 16th, when Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers presented us with the six strategic objectives.

And I am sure you do not have these, necessarily, in front of you, but ranging from neutralizing the insurgents, ensuring legitimate elections, increasing international engagement and support, and basically they suggested that these are six strategic objectives that they were not really in a position in an open session to tell us where we were on those objectives.

But I also know that there is a plan. General Casey has a new strategic plan, as I understand it, or a new plan, and I am wondering, can you give us some idea of how these are interacting?

This is not going to be a military victory, certainly not alone a military victory. And I would like to know more about the interaction that you have with the State Department. Where is that now? How is that going? Could you be specific about where you interact in those areas?

I know, in visits that I have made, there seems to be a bit of a disconnect, perhaps, in terms of the kinds of work that is being done on the ground in communities with the efforts that are needed to gather intelligence and to work with the local population.

Could you speak to that? Give us some example where this is working well and, perhaps, where we have really missed it and how we can bring those two together in a more concerted fashion.

General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congresswoman.

I really believe that interagency and, also, for that matter, international cooperation are essential to success, not only in Iraq, but also in Afghanistan.

I would say that international cooperation in Afghanistan has been particularly good and international cooperation in Iraq has left a lot to be desired.

We would always appreciate having more international activity to assist in the difficult work that is going on there, which is one of the reasons why we welcome NATO getting involved now in Iraqi training and the institution-building of the armed forces.

I believe that the linkage between Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey and their two organizations in Iraq are very good. I also believe that the linkage that we have with the Central Intelligence Agency there is good.

We have more work to do with other agencies of the U.S. Government that can add capability. For example, we do have people from the Department of Homeland Security that assist on the borders. We have people in the Drug Enforcement Agency that try to understand the drug flows that take place and the money flows that take place throughout the region.

So the interagency coordination is very good.

An example of where it is working well—I think if you look up into some of the projects that have taken place in Baghdad, a combination of United States Agency for International Development, our State Department friends and our commanders in the field, that they have been very successful.

In other areas, we have had a hard time organizing the interagency to really move ahead in a way that brings together the full power and capability of the U.S. Government and also organizes the Iraqi government in a way that is very, very efficient.

I think, for example—

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. What would make a difference in those areas?

General ABIZAIID. I think an example where more interagency activity would be very beneficial would be in the area of Fallujah or Ramadi, et cetera. But the security situation there makes it difficult for the other agencies to operate with us in the same sort of security atmosphere as exists elsewhere.

But I think more effort in those areas in particular will be helpful. We have certainly good diplomatic efforts from the State Department in working with the various political entities that are in evidence in Fallujah.

But there is always better work that we could do.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And are those objectives ones that are being reviewed constantly? Are they in a chart somewhere?

How much validity, I guess, is put into those specific objectives?

General ABIZAIID. Well, certainly, we know that security and politics have to move together in Iraq. And I think that the success of the most recent election shows that politics and security are inextricably linked.

We could not have had the election without the security forces enabling it, and yet the election has enhanced the security situation.

And so the continuation of the political process, the linkages of the security line of operations, which General Casey works, is very, very important with the political process that goes on there.

If we were to step back and say, "Where can we do more?" It is certainly figuring out how to get the angry young men off the streets in Iraq and to work in the economy or in the security forces or somewhere so that they are occupied doing something productive for the country as opposed to moving toward insurgency.

So if there was an area that I say we should be better internationally with the Iraqis and in the interagency, it would be enabling the economic process—although, even in our own country, that is a slow, sort of, activity that goes on.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. With our just remaining moment, I think when the Commandant testified, he said that the military was using the intelligence that it was getting and suggesting that they were using it as best they could.

But out of that response, I wonder whether you feel—and, perhaps, General Brown, you could respond to this—if you are getting the intelligence that you would expect by this time, having been in the country for as long as you have and with special forces.

General ABIZAID. I think that the intelligence and the counterterrorist effort in particular against Zarqawi's organization is quite good.

I think the intelligence at the counterinsurgency level is adequate, but needs improvement. And a lot of that needs to come from developing sources of Iraqi intelligence, which I believe will manifest themselves as the Iraqi security forces become more capable.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. General Brown, is that—

General BROWN. I agree. [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time has expired.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Ranking Member Skelton would like to ask a question of—

Mr. SKELTON. Yes, let me interpose very, very briefly, General.

During the testimony of the secretary a number of days ago, I asked about the possibility of seeing a copy of the General Luck report. And as I understand, his comment was in oral, but it was going to you for your comments, recommendations.

And I would just hope and reiterate the fact that we, here on this committee, would certainly appreciate having the benefit of the finished product when that comes back, hopefully, in a few days.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Skelton. We now turn to Mr. Andrews, from New Jersey, five minutes.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we meet at a very momentous time. I am hopeful and heartened that we are living in the midst of sea-change in the area of the world that you have responsibility for, where the forces of moderation—as you describe them—people want to settle their differences by votes and debates or defeating people who want to settle their differences by violence.

The men and women you lead are playing an irreplaceable role in that change, and we thank you for it and we thank them for it.

I believe that what happens in Iraq is absolutely pivotal to whether the struggle that you have described and I have echoed turns out the way we want it to. I think that if five years from now

there is a stable, democratic government in Baghdad, the Middle East will be a wholly different and wholly better place.

I think whether or not that happens hangs in the balance. I think by no means is it a foregone conclusion. And I think that one of the things that will determine that outcome is the quality of intelligence that you have and that the men and women you lead have.

General Abizaid said just a minute ago that he would characterize intelligence at the counterinsurgency level as, “adequate but needing improvement.”

We have had a lot of questions today about the quantity of the insurgency. I would like to ask a question about the quality.

General Abizaid, on page 11 of your testimony today—written testimony—you discussed the Iraqi insurgency, particularly the Former Regime Elements (FRE), and it is your observation that they loosely coordinate anti-coalition attacks but do not display centralized command and control or a shared vision for Iraq’s future.

There was a report in the *New York Times* about 10 days ago describing a systematic series of attacks upon the infrastructure—the energy infrastructure, in particular—of Iraq. And the Iraqi oil minister, Thamir Ghadban, is quoted as saying that “There is an organization”—sort of a command room operation in his area of responsibility. He said, “The scheme of the saboteurs is to isolate Baghdad from the sources of crude oil and oil products,” and he goes on to discuss bringing Baghdad to its knees.

Are you satisfied with the quality of the intelligence you are getting, not simply the quantity about how many resistance fighters there are, but are you satisfied with the quality of intelligence about the nature of the organization of the insurgents?

General ABIZAID. I am never satisfied with the intelligence. To be honest with you, and I do not think any field commander ever has been.

And yes, General Casey, there are plenty of questions that we have that we put demands against our troops in the field, our own intelligence sources from DOD, the international community intelligence sources, and also the sources from the Iraqis and elsewhere.

The command and control of the insurgency I do not believe is centralized. I believe it is the remnants of the ex-Baathist structure.

I believe that, in the past year, we have been fortunate to see coordination nodes appearing in places such as Syria, which has caused us, diplomatically, to put pressure on the Syrians which has, I think, to a certain extent, probably had some effect, although not enough effect.

And so there are definitely coordination nodes that are going on, and there are certainly cells that are linked.

But it is interesting, as our people talk to the people that they bring in that are considered leaders, that their knowledge of what the other cells are doing it is pretty classic. I mean, they have little knowledge of what the other cells are doing and how they are being organized, financed, et cetera.

And that is—



Mr. ANDREWS. Do you disagree with the characterization by the Iraqi oil minister that there is a sort of command and control of the attacks on the infrastructure?

General ABIZAD. I think there are many reasons for the attack on the infrastructure. I think some of them are insurgent, some of them are criminal.

But I think that the infrastructure attacks are as much a problem with criminal activity as they are with insurgent activity.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony and your commitment to our country and your great service.

General Brown, as you know, Congressman Hayes, who was here earlier, and I, along with Congressman Jeff Miller and Jim Davis, co-chair the Special Operations Forces Caucus. And we are hoping to set up a time with you, in the near future, to have you come to one of our meetings to speak to the caucus and help increase awareness among all of our colleagues here on Capitol Hill in appreciation for what you and special operations forces do.

And I hope that we will be able to work out a mutually convenient time for you to come and meet with the caucus here on the Hill.

General BROWN. I will look forward to it, Congressman.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. Thank you very much.

On page 13 of your written testimony that you submitted today, you addressed the issue of civil affairs forces and state that, quote, "They are key to our long-term success in the Global War on Terrorism."

Later on that page you say, also, and I quote in part, "Future rotations will be constrained by the number of personnel in these specialties available."

I know there has been some talk about the Army moving some of the civil affairs assets out of SOCOM and into the conventional Army. And what would be the impact of such a move and what is your recommendation?

General BROWN. First of all, let me talk about civil affairs real quick.

We have 26 battalions in the Army Reserve. We have pretty well used over 90 percent of them. As a matter of fact, I think the actual figure is about 98 percent of them.

What we are doing right now—we have taken some volunteers and trained them in civil affairs tasks, and we will use them in some key areas. Hopefully by the next rotation, we will have grown some of the civil affairs infrastructure that we are growing—even if temporarily—and get them through a civil affairs school at Fort Bragg so that we can continue this important piece of the mission.

As you know, our civil affairs forces go in and categorize infrastructure development issues in an area. They prioritize them.

They then go back and kind of prioritize them at the higher level and then try and get funds to support all the infrastructure development, which is key to defeat an insurgency because, as you

know, in fact they do then build legitimacy of the government and provide services to the people in the field.

We own all the civil affairs. We are the proponent for civil affairs in the Department of Defense.

There are three other battalions; those are in the United States Marine Corps. We have just agreed to start training all the Marine civil affairs forces down at Fort Bragg at our school, so that is a positive thing.

Right now, we are looking at with the Army, and I just met with General Schoomaker yesterday on what is the best for positioning civil affairs in SOF or in the big Army, and what percentages should it be? Or should it all just stay in SOF or should it all go to the Army?

Quite frankly, civil affairs is a key portion of Special Operations Command, and we will need civil affairs forces in special operations, I believe, no matter what decision we ultimately make.

But quite frankly, it is not about whether they should be in the Army or in SOF; it is how to maximize the use of these very, very skilled people out in the battlefield, in support of the conventional force and special operating forces. Most of our battalions belong to special operations, but they in fact work for the conventional force.

So General Schoomaker understands civil affairs, for obvious reasons, very well. And so him and I met yesterday, and we are going to make sure we do what is right for civil affairs.

Mr. MCINTYRE. So is your leaning more toward, then, that that should stay under the prerogative of the SOF?

General BROWN. I think that there is a portion of civil affairs that supports special operations that should stay in special operations for sure.

I think there is another piece of civil affairs that we want to make sure we put them where they can best support the conventional forces, but continue to have the flexibility that we currently have with our civil affairs forces.

So we are into the discussions, and they are all good discussions, and quite frankly, we will do what is right for civil affairs and make sure that we are maximizing their capability on the battlefield to support the geographic combatant commanders and special operations forces.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, sir.

General BROWN. Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Ryan.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you for being here, withstanding this.

A couple of points that I just want to make before I ask any questions: The issue of China came up, and I know—we all know—that there is a strategic move in that region by the Chinese. And I think that—and Chairman Hunter and I have been working on a lot of different issues regarding the manufacturing side of this—but I think it is that much more important for our reputation in the Middle East to be stellar, because the Chinese will take advantage, in all the different countries in the Middle East, to play against us in order to gain some kind of economic interest.

I would also like to put in a plug for the 9th, 10th Airlift out of Youngstown, Ohio, which I know has been doing a lot of work and moving a lot of vehicles and equipment around for you. And I just want to say what a great job they are doing.

And I just received, General Abizaid, some photos of some vehicles from the 42nd Infantry Division of the Army National Guard. And I want to share these with the committee to make some copies maybe after. And I will bring these to you after the—but they are pictures of vehicles that are being used from not only Kuwait to Iraq but in missions in Tikrit, Samarra, Baghdad.

And I just want you to take a look at a couple of these pictures, because these trucks do not have windows; they are not armored at all. And there is one picture in here in particular that I want to show. It has the gun mounted in the back of the truck on top of an old oxygen tank.

And there are, you know, I guess several vehicles that this group in particular is using. It seems to me very dangerous. And I was just wondering if you can comment. Is this routine that they would be using these kinds of vehicles, because I know Secretary Rumsfeld said that by February 15, no vehicles would be going on a mission if they were not armored in some fashion.

So I just wanted to give you an opportunity to clarify this somehow.

General ABIZAID. Thank you, Congressman.

I very much appreciate all of the service of our young men and women out there. And I can assure you that their safety is foremost in the minds of all the commanders in the field.

General Casey has issued an order that no nonarmored vehicle will operate in those areas that are clearly contested areas without having a level of armor protection that we define as level three or up.

And so if that is happening in this unit, it should not be happening.

And I appreciate the information. I will convey it to General Casey and it is our intention to protect the troops as best we can.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Can you get back to us with some kind of response?

General ABIZAID. Yes, I will.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. I appreciate that. I am not trying to put you on the spot, but just, to me, it seems like a very dangerous situation—

The CHAIRMAN. And if the gentleman could share that with the committee, too. We have a staff team that is dedicated to the armor situation.

Congressman Ryan, do you know where those pictures are taken?

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. I believe—well, these vehicles were in Tikrit, Samarra and Baghdad, the missions they were going on. As easy as—last week, the lead vehicle was armored and ran over one of the devices and it blew up, but it was only the lead vehicle that was armored and the rest of the troops were in these kind of vehicles which, to me, at this stage of the war I think is unacceptable.

And I just hope that we can work through and figure out what the problem is there as soon as possible.

But I will provide the picture—

General ABIZAID. Congressman, I agree that at this stage of the war it is unacceptable and it is not our intent to have it be that way. Largely with the help of this committee and your chairman in particular, we have made an incredible move in armoring vehicles that were not designed to be armored. And I thank this committee for the help that they have given us.

Now, it is also true that within secured areas—for example, within the compound in Tikrit—theoretically, those vehicles could be used.

But, look, I take it seriously. We will look into it. We are all—these are our friends and our colleagues that are out there fighting and our intention is to protect them.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. We want to work with you to help whatever we have to do to make sure this happens.

One of the doors was actually secured with duct tape. So this is a very serious issue.

I had a conversation with a young man who was on a lot of these missions in a lot of the hot spots and just returned home a few weeks back, and he was communicating to me about the attitude and the morale of the troops, and how they would build a city council chamber and the chamber would get blown up; they would build a hospital, they would be around and the hospital would get blown up, and how that was affecting the morale of these guys.

And he told me, “At this point, we are just fighting for each other to make sure that we get home.”

And so one of the questions I had was: How many hospitals and city council chambers or city halls, schools have we built over the past year or two that we actually constructed and were blown up? How often is this happening? And do you have any hard numbers for us?

General ABIZAID. I would have to take that for the record, Congressman.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Can you get back to us?

Because, as far as the mentality of the troops seeing this over and over and not seeing progress maybe in these four provinces, I think is very important.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 168.]

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. One final question, Mr. Chairman, if I might.

We were told originally when this whole war started that we were going to be able to use the oil in the country for a lot of the reconstruction. And now the President is coming back with another \$80 billion.

I am going to vote for it. I voted for the defense appropriations and most of the supplementals.

And hearing from Senator McCain and some others that we may be there for another 8 to 10 years and that, you know, \$80 billion a pop plus the defense appropriations, we are talking a trillion dollars over the next 10 years, under enormous budget constraints here.

How much more money are we going to need? How much more are we going to have to ask the taxpayer for over the next 5 to 10 years, in your best estimation?

General ABIZAIID. Well, Congressman, that is clearly out of my lane.

But I do believe that the security situation over time becomes more and more Iraqi, that as the security situation improves, that is Iraqi-led, that there will be a boom in the economy, that there will be a very robust capability of the Iraqis to fund more and more of what they need to do for their own defense, and that already, even operating below their current capacity, the Iraqis are putting money back into their own economy.

In those areas of the country, in the south and in the north where the security situation is essentially what I would call normal for that part of the world, there is a great of economic activity.

I think Iraq, once stability occurs in the center of the country, will become one of the richest countries in the Middle East.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. And how far out do you see that?

General ABIZAIID. Right now—

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. From what I am hearing from guys in the field, I mean, the fact that the governmental chambers or buildings are getting blown up—we saw the oil line the other day. I mean, how long is this going to take?

General ABIZAIID. Well, how long is it going to take? It depends upon when the Iraqi security forces will be robust enough to take the lead.

I think that our combat capability goes down over time. Our training capability will probably stay fairly robust over time.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Are we talking in the next five years, do you think?

General ABIZAIID. I would say certainly training capability, next five years, provided the Iraqi government wants it that way. They are a sovereign country.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. I appreciate all your efforts. And we want to work with you.

If I can, Mr. Chairman, I just want to talk about Ukraine.

They said they were pulling out, phasing out their troops. How much of an effect is that going to have on the overall mission?

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the gentleman—we have some members that—at least one member here still has not asked a question. Let me go to—

Mr. COOPER. I yield to my colleague.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mr. Cooper has yielded his time to you. Go right ahead.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Thanks, Mr. Cooper.

Just on Ukraine—just 30 seconds.

General ABIZAIID. The Ukrainian brigade is in the center eastern portion of the country near the Iranian border in an area that is—primary population center is Al Kut. That brigade is in an important place. It has done a good job in helping stability take place there.

We will miss the brigade when it departs. We are hopeful that other international forces will volunteer to come in there and help in that area.

We would also say that the Iraqi security forces in that region have done a pretty good job in exerting some control.

So General Casey is in the process now of looking at how that will affect the overall force posture.

But you notice the other day we had the Dutch leave, for example. And we were very pleased when an Australian battalion popped up to take their place.

So there is more international interest in the mission as the political process moves forward, so it is possible that there will be some additional international help.

But I think a combination of the current multinational force set plus the Iraqis with adjustments, we will be able to deal with the adjustment, and we are very grateful for the work that the Ukrainians have done.

Mr. RYAN FROM OHIO. Great. Thank you for all your service. I yield back to Mr. Cooper.

The CHAIRMAN. I tell you what? The Ranking Member has a question.

And, Mr. Cooper, we will go to you and let you have your full time here.

This is quite a deft performance by Mr. Ryan. He managed to get through 10 minutes without a gavel here.

The Ranking Member is recognized.

Mr. SKELTON. Along the line of armored protection, I was able to obtain a flag for the 92nd Engineering Combat Battalion, the heavy of the 3rd Infantry Division, which is out of Fort Stewart. It is operating in Baghdad today.

And a memo from the commander of that unit reports that his heavy equipment—graders, bulldozers, et cetera—which he uses to rebuild Iraq, is unprotected as the heavy equipment transport trucks he hauls them around with.

He is willing to replace at least the windshields with ballistic glass, which he believes is available from the manufacturer, but not available in theater.

A rather lengthy e-mail from him, but let me just give you a quote: “I am not comfortable with the up-armor level of my heavy engineering equipment or my heavy equipment transporters.” Are these engineers being left out of the equation of up-armor?

General ABIZAID. No, sir. The engineers are—no one that is operating out in the areas where the insurgency is active is to be left out.

Mr. SKELTON. They just were hit with an IED, the other day.

Would you ask your staff to take a look at that—the 97th Engineering Combat Battalion?

General ABIZAID. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

General ABIZAID. I will, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On that point, one thing that we have done as a committee is try to ensure that there is a stack of steel, because there is lots of equipment over there, lots of units moving in and out.

And when we have been over there in various times, we have seen these trucks. Early on in the war, some of your five-tons were double-hauled with plywood, when the IEDs first started popping up.

So the first plan of armament, of course, was in the field, with units welding on and tacking on steel that was there in the field.

And one thing that we have received, I think, a good strong action from the Secretary of the Army on is to put a supply of steel—just flat steel, high-hard or rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) stuff that has good stopping capability for frag and bullets—at location in Ballad and other places where our guys, in the least, can cut the stuff with plasma cutters and bolt it on or weld it on.

My understanding is that there is a supply in almost all these places. But one thing we have been looking at—that we have been working on as a committee—is to get a lot of ballistic glass over there that is kind of generic.

And I was looking at the e-mail. We all get e-mails from our guys in the field, plus all the members here have been over there several times.

And we need to have a generic ballistic glass that we can put on windshields that can be bolted on easily or snapped on, that we can put right over the front panes on the big trucks and big pieces of equipment. And I think that is something that is doable in the same sense that we can get a stack of steel over there.

And if you get some of this—there are some species of this ballistic glass that you can cut pretty easily and you can put into place, and we can either bolt them on or snap them on.

So we would hope you would work with us in terms of getting that stuff in place.

And, Mr. Cooper, you are up next here. So do not take off on us. Mr. COOPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. So let me talk to you afterwards, General, and let's talk about trying to get some piles of ballistic glass in-country, too. Because I think that is one of the concerns that these operators of heavy equipment have.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, is recognized.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Generals.

I apologize for being late. We had Chairman Greenspan of the Federal Reserve in my budget committee that I serve on. And I am late for a speech to some Navy folks, right now.

But I was wondering if you saw an article last week in the *Wall Street Journal* that talked about standing up Iraqi militias of so-called pop-up forces. Because at least according to that article, they are standing them up with remarkable speed, with remarkable unit cohesion, with remarkable cost effectiveness.

And are we able to use any of those techniques in our efforts to Iraqify security forces?

General ABIZAD. Sir, I saw the article.

I think it is somewhat accurate in the way that it describes militias. Although, I am more apt to describe a militia as being the “peshmerga”, the Badr Corps, the more organized militias.

Some of what these units happen to be what I would call home guard units that spring up for local protection—and some of this happened during the time of the elections, because people wanted to have more protection.

And sometimes it was sanctioned—most of the time it was sanctioned by local political authorities in Iraq.

There are also, in the Ministry of the Interior, the special police commando units, that were not units that were designed by Americans or originally sanctioned by Americans, but they turned out to be a good solution to fighting the insurgency.

And three units have been subsequently taken into the force structure and given the necessary command and control to make them more effective.

So we all have to keep in mind that Iraq is a sovereign country, that the Ministry of the Interior and Defense have their own money to spend on forces, and that one of the reasons that people see a changing face on this American plan is that the Iraqis have a say in the plan and certainly have a say in the plan when they equip and train units on their own.

Very interestingly, other Arab countries contribute to the Iraqi security equation, such as the United Arab Emirates and Jordan, et cetera.

And so I think we just need to keep in mind that this is not an American 100 percent controlled and sanctioned activity; it is a partnership between a sovereign Iraqi government and a well-resourced multinational force responsible for training and equipping the part of the Iraqi forces that General Petraeus is working on.

We have to be flexible in the way that we think about armed forces there. And we have to be mindful of what Iraqi leaders want to do there. And I think General Petraeus has been very flexible in that regard. And when we have successes, we try to reinforce them.

But when we have militia forces that are a threat to the peace, ultimately militia forces—uncontrolled, unrecognized—worked against the broader peace in the country. And ultimately, the Iraqi national sovereign authorities have to decide what it will look like.

Mr. COOPER. The article in the *Wall Street Journal* reflected that difficulty. Because on the one hand, you want efficiency; but on the other hand, you want control.

I am increasingly worried that the American taxpayer will demand more cost effectiveness than we have seen so far. And I am in no way critical of our troops or of your service. You have done the best human beings could possibly do.

But especially if this becomes a trillion dollar war, people are going to wonder where the money went.

So as we look at Iraqification, the cost-effective means of doing so are going to be very important.

We do not want to pinch pennies here. And we are all going to vote for the supplemental anyway. But I am worried about that method of budgeting. Because technically, after September 30th of this year, there is no money for the troops, and of course, there will be some outlays that continue.

But this is the second year in a row we have suggested that this process, even though most all of us know that we have to plan several years ahead.

So I hope in the next budget cycle, you could urge your civilian masters at the Pentagon to try to put this in the normal budgeting process, because we were confronted on this committee a couple of weeks ago with a hearing on the Army, and we only had the Presi-



dent's budget. And he actually cut the Army of the United States in that budget.

Now, if you add in the supplemental—which we were unable to see at the time of the hearing—overall Army spending went up. But here we were faced with incomplete information, a confused, unsettling budget scenario, and nothing is more important than supporting our troops at a time of war.

And yet, under the President's own budget, we cut them off September 30th of this year. That is crazy. And it is the second year in a row we have done that.

I know the Service Chiefs testified before the Senate last year complaining about this, but they were quickly disciplined the next day and they changed their tunes. But we have to do better.

And I do not want to get you in trouble with your bosses. But I will be complaining at this end. If you complain at your end, maybe we will have more effective budgeting for our military in the next cycle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. I thank the gentleman.

And I would just tell the gentleman, I look forward to the requirement of putting together another bridge package like the one that we did last year. I think we bolted a \$25 billion package on for the last three calendar months of the year, last year.

I think that is probably going to be required this year.

Also, Mr. Abercrombie wanted to have another round of questions here, and I think also Dr. Snyder and Mr. Taylor.

The gentleman from Hawaii is recognized for five minutes.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A question for General Brown and then a follow-up for General Abizaid.

General Brown, does the Special Operations Command support a proposal that Special Operation Forces be able to enter a foreign country to conduct military operations without the explicit support of the United States ambassador or requisite assigned persons of the State Department?

General BROWN. No, sir. I mentioned in my opening comments that we have never deployed into a country without coordinating with the ambassador and getting appropriate country clearance through the country clearance process, which he has to approve.

We have never deployed into a foreign country in that manner and we do not intend to.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. That is not my question. You say you do not intend to. Is there a proposal extent now being discussed?

General BROWN. There is not one.

Let me put it this way: I do not know of any proposal at this time for Special Operating Forces to go into a country without the chief of mission or the ambassador's knowledge.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To the best of your knowledge, the position of the Secretary of Defense, at least in terms of what has been expressed to you, is in opposition to such a proposal or any reports of that kind of thing are erroneous.

The Secretary of Defense has not had any discussions or political appointees in the Secretary's office or in the Department of Defense have not had discussions with the special command.

General BROWN. No, he has not. No, he has not.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Are you aware of—

General BROWN. He has not had any discussions with me that Special Operating Forces that work for me or any Special Operating Forces would go into a country without the notification of the chief of mission or ambassador.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. And absent orders to the contrary from those in authority over you, your position is that the Special Operations Command opposes that kind of a process.

General BROWN. We do not. I see no purpose—I mean this—one of the ways that we are going to make an impact on the Global War on Terror is through coordination with the interagency.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Thank you. I appreciate it, appreciate your directness.

General Abizaid, I think there may—I do not want to say there is a contradiction in some of the testimony here. There may be some paradoxes or the context of the questions may have given different answers.

But I want to get clear here on the militia side of things. You stated in the course of your testimony—course of an answer, I believe, to one of the inquiries, “Militias need to be demobilized.” Now, to my mind demobilized is a lot different from being incorporated or integrated.

The militia question, then, is one that is serious, because as I read through your testimony—and I have read through your testimony and I am going in particular to page 17 and 18—there is no mention of militias other than this Muthanna Brigade, which was the creation of Mr. Allawi.

In your testimony, then, does your citation of the forces incorporated into the regular army, aside from this Muthanna Brigade, leave out these militias, and if your testimony does do that—that is to say, leave them out—are you really so at ease with the idea of these militias popping up all around the country, being paid from sources I cannot quite figure out, being incorporated in some fashion into your counterinsurgency operations that you are touting?

It strikes me that this is a very, very risky operation in the name of sovereignty.

General ABIZAID. Congressman, I believe in the long term that militias do not add to the security equation.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. You understand I am using the word militia in a generic sense here.

General ABIZAID. I understand you, sir.

I believe that the program that we have in Afghanistan, where we demobilize, disarm and reintegrate, is a program that could work.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I am merely speaking about Iraq. Afghanistan is a separate area of inquiry for purposes of my question.

General ABIZAID. I believe that what you said, that militias unregulated, uncontrolled, being paid by outside sources, is not good for the sovereignty of Iraq is—I agree with that.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. Do you see that, then, as a difficulty for these forces, which you are attempting to encourage to confront—because they are operating, as the article has been referred to, this *Wall Street Journal* article—although there are other representations in

the press as well on this—that if the units of the Iraq army, which you refer to here and the battalions that you refer to here, have to confront these as well, what is being undertaken right now to deal with that contingency?

General ABIZAID. There was a plan that was signed by the Iraqi interim government about militia demobilization—

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. To be done by June?

General ABIZAID [continuing]. Last year, to be done by the Iraqi sovereign government with the concurrence of the various parties that had militias.

I do not regard that program as being either successful or, at this time, practical. And I think it is important as the new Iraqi government emerges that the issue of militia reintegration, demobilization and disarmament be dealt with.

Mr. ABERCROMBIE. I appreciate your candor.

Mr. Chairman, I suggest that this is an issue that we need to pursue in another hearing perhaps—perhaps even under other circumstances, because I think that General Abizaid has stated quite clearly that unless we come to grips with this in a manner that allows us to utilize the present capacity of the United States armed forces or coalition forces, as it is referred to, we may undermine that which we seek to accomplish to a degree that disenables us from being able to succeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I appreciate the gentleman's thoughts.

And I would think that probably in a closed hearing we might want to pursue with you, General, and perhaps with Secretary Rumsfeld, this issue, because it is obviously a part of the fabric of discussions from here on out.

So I appreciate the gentleman's question.

We have the gentleman from Connecticut. Mr. Simmons has not had an opportunity to ask a question, so the gentleman is recognized.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the two witnesses for their testimony here today. They have worn the uniform for many years.

I know that every time we take a casualty it hurts, and it is a matter of great concern. For those of us who serve on this committee—and I guess in particular for those of us who have also worn the uniform—those casualties hurt back home too. And as a member of this body, I have made it a point to contact families that have wounded and killed and to give them all the aid and comfort that I can.

The issue of up-armored Humvee is not a new one, but I would simply share with General Abizaid that if the field commanders need acceleration of any deployment of equipment that might preserve and protect the lives and safety of our soldiers, I hope that he will come to us to ask for our support.

And I just put that out there and I suspect that that is the case.

General Brown, I want to simply thank you for your courtesy in hosting me down at Special Operations Command in Tampa. I had already spent four years as a reservist at CENTCOM, so I focused my attention with Special Operations Command.

I was impressed by what you are doing in the area of open-source intelligence so that your all-source joint intelligence center is an

all-source joint intelligence center. There was discussion of plus-ups and upgrades to make it even more capable, not at a tactical level, but at a strategic level.

And I notice in our discussion of tactical intelligence you discussed the disciplines of signal intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT). But at a strategic level, the discipline of OSINT, open-source intelligence, intelligence generated from openly acquired information, is critically important, because it gets into the areas where we may not traditionally have gone.

And I will simply ask you, General Brown, are there areas in the area of strengthening your joint intelligence center, your all-source center, are there areas where we can be productive in plussing up to make sure that your people have all the capabilities they need?

General BROWN. I appreciate the question, and I appreciate your support of our troops and their families. And I appreciate your visit down to Special Operations Command to look at all the things we are doing down there.

As you know, and you visited our Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center, that that thing is off and running.

I think right now we have a good handle on where we see it going in the future. It is going to grow. We are going to grow some people in the physical location, as well as growing its capability to reach out and touch other databases and everything.

So right now I think it is in good stead.

I do share your interest in open source intelligence. I think that is important. I think we are really starting to get our arms around it.

So thank you very much for your support.

Mr. SIMMONS. Thank you.

General ABIZAIID. Congressman, you having been out in CENTCOM for four years and having visited his headquarters, you know how woefully in need of funding we are to improve our headquarters. [Laughter.]

Mr. SIMMONS. Looked pretty good to me. But I did not go inside.

General ABIZAIID. Congressman, first of all, all of us are very, very mindful of the need to protect our forces, but I do not want to mislead this committee. This is a very dangerous environment in which we operate. We have had M1 tanks knocked out. We have had Bradleys knocked out.

We send soldiers without armored vehicles into battle. And this is a deadly, dangerous type of combat, and we do everything that we reasonably can to protect our soldiers and allow them to accomplish their mission.

And we do very much appreciate what this committee, in particular, has done to help resource us in protecting them even more.

We have to keep in mind—and I hope this committee keeps in mind—that when we design our armed forces, we have to design our armed forces for the 360-degree battlefield and not the linear battlefield. And if there is a lesson to be learned about how we were equipped going into this war, that is probably one that should not be lost on us.

Mr. SIMMONS. I appreciate that response, and I would simply say, as a comment, that I think the performance of the troops in

the field has been extraordinary. I think the leadership has been excellent.

If I was to look to an area where I personally felt there was a problem, it is making sure that the supply system—the supply system—is nimble enough and flexible enough to respond to the field requirements without going through layers and layers of red tape and testing.

That is the area that I am concerned about. And I can assure you—I believe this is the case—that if field commanders say we need something quickly and we have to bypass some of the red tape, that members of this committee and Members of the Congress are more than happy to do that to save the lives of our young men and women.

General ABIZAIID. I appreciate that, sir. And, as matter of fact, this committee has done that.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And I thought it might be appropriate at this time to tell the committee that I have an Associated Press article here in front of me that states that Tillie Fowler has passed away, a former member of the committee, a member of the Republican leadership in the House, a great friend to many of us here.

Tillie Fowler was a wonderful, wonderful person who fought tirelessly for the folks that wear the uniform of the United States. And she carried her leadership abilities after she left the House after eight years to continue to serve in some pretty difficult and inconvenient places.

She worked the issue of sexual harassment at the Air Force Academy, very tough and challenging issue, and she was one of the troubleshooters on that panel. She worked on one of the investigative panels that did a thorough analysis of prisoner abuse.

Tillie Fowler worked on many, many issues while she was here as a member of the House Armed Services Committee, to not only make sure that our people were treated right and had good pay and good benefits, and that the families were well treated, but also worked on all the equipment issues.

She was a tireless worker for the armed services of the United States. And it is with great sadness that we see the news about Tillie and about the stroke that she had a couple of days ago, and now the fact that she has passed away.

So our very deep condolences to Buck, her husband, and to her daughters, Elizabeth and little Tillie.

We have a couple other gentlemen who would like to ask follow-up questions here, and then we will be wrapping up pretty shortly here, Gentlemen. So thank you for hanging with us.

Mr. Taylor, did you have further questions?

Mr. TAYLOR. General, I do appreciate your service to our country. I am respectful of your high rank.

But I was disappointed in your answer when I asked you what steps we are doing to turn around the fact that the majority of the Iraqis have an unfavorable view of Americans. I would hope that you would give that some thought and get back to me on that, because I think we have to have some attainable goals there. I think we have to have a road map to get there.

And I am going to disagree with you. I think you have to have the people on your side to win a counterinsurgency. You are the professional; I am not, but I am stating my opinion.

The second thing I would like to ask you is, we recently sent about 4,000 Mississippians over to Iraq, National Guardsmen. One of the failures, I think, in their training is that they had not had a day of training with jammers for improvised explosive devices, even though they had trained extensively at Camp Shelby, trained at the National Training Center.

I would hope, as the CENTCOM commander, that you could use your influence to see to it that that is changed for future units rotating into the theater.

I track this pretty closely. Over half of our casualties are the results of IEDs. I know the jammers are not perfect, and I know we do not have them on every vehicle, but I think it is a key tool that can prevent some fatalities, can prevent some wounds.

And I would kind of like to hear that something is being done to get, A, enough jammers to where they can have them both in theater and here in the States to train with; and that it becomes a requirement like the other training they had before they get in theater.

General ABIZAIID. Congressman, I appreciate your concern that they did not receive any training with regard to something that I consider to be very important for force protection.

I will go find the unit in the field myself, the next time I am there. I will go talk to their leaders. And in the meantime, I will talk to General Casey here this evening about making sure that we check when units are flowing through the theater to make sure they have the tools at their disposal and the training on the tools at their disposal to protect themselves.

I also very much appreciate your concern about the unfavorable views that people hold of us in a region that I have been living in and been part of for an awful lot of my professional life. And I also happen to be an Arab American.

I mean, sometimes I do think that the problem we have with the Middle East is the good old saying from that movie "Cool Hand Luke": "What we have here is a failure to communicate."

So if I left you with the impression that I do not think we should improve our communication skills, I very much do think we should. I think part of the problem is that there is a lack of respect on both sides that needs to be bridged.

And to the extent that the government of the United States can help do that, and to the extent that the good actions of our armed forces can help do that, then I am all in favor of changing the equation.

Mr. TAYLOR. Have you set a goal—General Brown touched on it, and it was kind of reinforced last week when I visited with some guys from Company C of the 7th. They normally operate in Latin America. Probably 95 percent of them are fluent in Spanish. They understand the way of life down there.

Have you set a goal as to what percentage of your force in Iraq you would like to see that could speak the language?

General ABIZAIID. I do not have a goal, but I know where we are on it, and it is nowhere close to what it needs to be.

I do not believe you were here, Congressman, but Congressman Reyes brought up the point in my written testimony about my great desire to invest in the human capital to bridge this gap. That means training people in languages and cultural requirements and understanding the religion.

What the requirement is, is a good question. Where we are now is not very far along. We certainly have to do more.

Mr. TAYLOR. Would it serve the interests of our nation to set that goal? Well, apparently, we are going to be there another five years, at the least. Are you in a position to get there—

General ABIZAID. Yes, sir, my staff is working with the OSD people to ascertain how we are going to do that, what that needs to be, how much we are going to spend, what the requirements are.

And I have discussed it with all of the service chiefs personally.

Mr. TAYLOR. Is it something that this committee should budget as a line item?

General ABIZAID. I think everybody thinks it is a good idea. You know how it is, getting from the good idea to reality is something else again.

But we need to, as a national goal, strategically, invest in the human capital that understands this part of the world.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Arkansas, Dr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Abizaid, I have thought for a while now that one way to get at some of these issues could be that we incorporate language training as part of boot camp, to the extent that perhaps you have a fluent speaker, drill instructors, day after day after day for three months, that it would just be from the getgo being a soldier means you learn a foreign language and start picking that up, so it does not have to be an add-on later, but that is just a thought I had.

I wanted to ask you, General Abizaid, when we have had Secretary Rumsfeld before the committee over the last couple of years, this discussion has come up—and it is been in the press quite a bit—and on the Senate side, about the issue of troop strength in Iraq and the adequacy of the troops.

And what Secretary Rumsfeld has told us is that any additional requests for additional troops that he has have been responded to and he has authorized additional troops.

When the Schlesinger report came out on some of the prisoner abuse issues—I want to read just a couple sentences from it, if I might. It says, “A system is in place for command to submit a formal request for forces, RFF. Earlier, Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) had submitted a request for forces for an additional judge advocate organization, but CENTCOM would not forward it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps this experience made CJTF-7 reluctant to submit a request for forces for units,” and that is the end of the quote. And this is, of course, before you were in your position that you are in now.

My question and concern is, then—one reason that Secretary Rumsfeld may not have the request for troops is nobody wanted or desired any troops. This is one example where someone, a unit, did want troops, and it never was forwarded to him. Has there been

an atmosphere created, do you think, over the last couple years, that word has gotten around, “We really do not want to have any additional requests for troops. Make do with what you have”? Is that a possibility or not?

General ABIZAIID. Sir, it is a good question. I believe that we have, in broad terms—in the specifics, of course—I mean, it is a big organization. There are 225,000 people in the region. In broad terms, do we have the combat capability necessary to accomplish our missions? The answer is yes.

Specifically, are there some shortages out there? For example, there are shortages of interrogators and translators and some intelligence specialists that just are not in the system.

As General Brown has testified today, he has shortages that he is trying to work through in his force structure with regard to PSYOPS people and civil affairs people.

But with regard to combat capability, there are a lot of different ways that you solve the problem.

First of all, I would always expect my commander in the field, General Casey, to look to see what he can do with his forces by moving them around. We do not want to get in the occupation mentality.

Forces are mobile. They are meant to move in the battlefield, go to where they can influence the action. And he was very creative in the use of that during the November offensives in Fallujah.

Second, I have a reserve, and I have the capability to move forces within my own theater to help influence the action militarily. And on numerous occasions, our reserve, which is generally a MEU, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, has been committed to General Casey to use as he requested in a specific action.

And then third, we go to the secretary when we think that we need additional force structure to accomplish the mission, which is what we did for elections in Afghanistan, elections in Iraq and during the various major offensive operations we have had in Iraq.

Dr. SNYDER. I wanted to ask about the election, if I might, because it seemed like you all did a really good job, as you pointed out earlier, I think in the discussion about the number of insurgency forces. You estimate they gave it their best shot during that time. It is part of that. And the numbers you thought—I think you said 3,500.

But that was also a time when you all had really focused on providing increased stability with it, and there was a temporary increase of the number of our troops in-country.

Another way to look at that would be to say, “Well, the number of Iraqi troops stayed the same, the number of insurgents was probably about the same, the number of Iraqi people was about the same, the difference may have been the number of American troops that were working overtime, kept on for that period of time.”

Is that something you considered in your analysis, that maybe additional U.S. troop strength did add to increased stability and safety for that period of time? And if so, what does that mean for the time period we are in now and the future weeks and months?

General ABIZAIID. We looked at it very closely. We had, as you know—or you may not know—20 brigades worth of combat power



in Iraq at the time. That is up from the base that had been established of 17.

We are just about back down to 17 again now. And it is my view and General Casey's view that the increasing capacity and capability of the Iraqi security forces have allowed us to go back down to 17.

And I think that the primary factor in the elections that made them successful was the fact that the Iraqi security forces could spread out throughout the country and do the close-in and the mid-level security around the polling stations and within the area that gave people confidence.

So, do not get me wrong, our forces are very important for stability, but the forces that will win the insurgency and gain the confidence of the people will be Iraqi forces.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. And the gentleman from Missouri, the Ranking Member, is recognized to wrap this thing up.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you so much.

I have two questions, one for each of the gentlemen.

General Abizaid, the Department's Comptroller's office and the Joint Staff met with our committee staff recently, and they said that the very last funding that would be required for the Iraqi security forces, including to build their combat support capability, is the \$5.7 billion, over and above the \$5.2 billion that have been previously appropriated.

Is that correct? Is this the last penny that will be sought for the Iraqi security forces, as they committed to our staff?

General ABIZAID. Congressman Skelton, I cannot speak for understanding the question, because I have not talked to the Comptroller about it or understand whether or not a policy decision might have been made with regard to not asking for any more money.

Mr. SKELTON. Is this news to you?

General ABIZAID. I do not know the context of the discussion with the Comptroller.

Mr. SKELTON. Is this news to you that—well, the context is that this is the last funding. Is this news to you?

General ABIZAID. I do not know how to answer the question.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, if it is news to you, say yes. If it is not news to you, say no.

General ABIZAID. It is not as simple as you would like it to be, Congressman.

Mr. SKELTON. Well, try your best.

General ABIZAID. I believe that the Iraqi security force requirement that we put in the supplemental is necessary. I cannot say that we will never ask for anything ever again.

Mr. SKELTON. That answers my question. Thank you.

General Brown—well, first, thank you, General Abizaid, for your service. It is not easy.

As I said at the outset, your command is one of the most important commands our country has had in decades. We wish you well and we wish you success.

General Brown, you said in your earlier statement that the force levels for the Special Operations Forces are not now what they should be. What are they now?

General BROWN. I do not have exactly what they are today. By the end of 2005, with our current estimated growth, they will be at 51,400.

Mr. SKELTON. And how much more would you desire on top of that?

General BROWN. By the end of 2006, we will grow about another 1,400 people.

And then there is some growth laid in through our program objective memorandum (POM) that would take us up, a rough estimate of another 1,000 or so. But I would be glad to come back to you and show you exactly what that is, but I think it is about, from now and throughout the POM, about 3,000.

Mr. SKELTON. About 3,000. You do not go out and recruit these folks off the street, do you?

General BROWN. Some, we do. We have an 18 X-ray program, where we do take—

Mr. SKELTON. How many do you recruit off the street?

General BROWN. Well, we take 1,500 a year, to be a Green Beret, off the street. Of that, about 1,200 show up at Fort Bragg, make it through the first three phases to get into our training. I know I am giving you a long answer. About 400 of those will ever be a Green Beret.

So we get about 400 a year off the street.

Mr. SKELTON. So the remainder come from the—

General BROWN. Active forces.

Mr. SKELTON [continuing]. Active duty forces. Am I correct?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. It takes a while to, A, grow a sergeant or a petty officer that is capable of doing your strenuous—

General BROWN. You are exactly right.

Mr. SKELTON [continuing]. Missions. And I know you will say you are taking the cream of the crop; although, I know a lot of the cream of the crop you do not take, because they are left running the divisions and the battalions and the companies. But you take a lot of very, very able people. Am I correct?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

What we try and take is the right people, people that fit into this kind of a business.

Mr. SKELTON. And it took the Army or the Navy or whatever the service may be a while to grow these people, did it not, before you take them?

General BROWN. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. You take them when they are what, sergeants, staff sergeants, that level?

General BROWN. Well, you can apply about the E-4 level, but traditionally it is about an E-5, E-6 level.

Now, I am particularly talking about Green Berets, sir, because the SEALs are totally different. We do not recruit them off the street, but the SEAL comes directly out of his basic and advanced training, right into the SEALs.

That is a little different. They are a little younger force. I am particularly talking about the Green Berets when I am talking about the special force.

Mr. SKELTON. And the fact that they are taken from the regular force lessens the number of the regular Army troops, is that not correct?

General BROWN. Well, the standard—there is a certain amount of Army forces. We count against those forces whether you are in SOF or in a regular Army unit.

So we are authorized—my Army force is about 26,000. That is included in the Army's end-strength numbers.

Mr. SKELTON. Okay. Thank you. And a special thanks to you for your excellent leadership, General Brown. And it is good to have both of you here. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I want to thank the gentlemen. And gentlemen, thank you for giving us a very complete and full hearing. We appreciate it.

And just one last question. You have, obviously, the supplemental that you sent up, that has been sent up. We are going to vote on it shortly.

In your estimation, General Abizaid, General Brown, that supplemental meets the requirement for the 2005 period?

General BROWN. For Special Operations Command it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay.

General ABIZAID. For Central Command it does.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you very much. And the committee stands adjourned here.

[Whereupon, at 1:14 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



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**A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 2, 2005

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 2, 2005

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STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID, UNITED STATES ARMY

COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON THE 2005 POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

02 MARCH 2005

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United States Central Command Posture for 2005**I. INTRODUCTION**

United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) is in the middle of a fourth consecutive year of sustained warfare in its area of operations. The Command remains engaged in three principal activities: defeating extremist networks throughout the region, countering the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, and building indigenous military capacity so that local governments can defeat terrorists and extremists on their own. Our activities span three sub-regions. To the east, Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A) oversees US and Coalition activities in Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Central Asian States to their north. Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) heads these efforts in Iraq. In the west, Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) directs our efforts in the states of Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya and Seychelles. Combined with CENTCOM-led programs with other regional partners, these commands employ military forces, directly and indirectly, to deny the establishment of terrorist safe havens and grow regional military capabilities. Sustained CENTCOM military pressure on extremist networks complements U.S. national programs that encourage social, economic and political reforms across the region -- programs that address the underlying factors that foster and sustain extremist ideologies.

During 2004, CENTCOM regional activities centered on several major actions. We focused on stabilizing Afghanistan and Iraq. We worked to help Pakistan and Saudi Arabia help themselves combat their internal extremist threats. We provided regional military capability that deterred Syria and Iran. We patrolled key air space and waterways in the region to ensure the free flow of commerce. Simultaneously, we worked with regional governments

to deny our extremist enemies access to ungoverned spaces and safe-havens from which to plan and execute terrorist strikes.

We achieved noteworthy successes during the past year. The counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan put great pressure on al-Qaida and associated movements. Pakistan's military operations in its western frontier areas are particularly noteworthy as they generate considerable direct pressure against extremist networks. Successful elections in Afghanistan dealt a blow to Taliban and extremist objectives. In Iraq, we learned that any uncontested enemy safe-haven, such as Fallujah, becomes a center of terrorist-inspired violence. Thus, the November offensive there eliminated a key enemy support area and restored Iraqi government control to an important city. Iraq's elections early this year give Iraq a real opportunity to develop a constitution and electoral process that moves the country towards peace and prosperity. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, emerging security forces played key roles in defending the people's right to vote in the face of extremist threats and violence. Indeed, throughout the region, governments and the people of the 27 nations that make up the CENTCOM area confront extremist ideology and violence.

In 2005, we must capitalize on success and deny our enemies the chance to reverse the progress made. We must help safeguard upcoming parliamentary elections in Afghanistan, and the constitutional referendum and national elections in Iraq. We must strengthen programs that build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) into formations that can take the lead against insurgents and extremists. We must expand and enhance Afghan, Iraqi, and other regional intelligence skills and collection capabilities. We must assist Pakistan to continue its military offensive against al-Qaida and related extremists; and must assist Saudi Arabia to win its fight against its extremist factions. We must continue to deter Iran and

Syria and safeguard the free flow of oil across the region. Finally, we must deny the acquisition or transfer of WMD into the hands of extremists.

We enter 2005 with some 260,000 Coalition Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, DOD civilian employees and contractor personnel in the CENTCOM region. Coalition countries contribute more than 27,000 to this overall total, and their contributions remain indispensable. The sacrifices of our forces and their families have been great, yet there remains much to be done. We should not underestimate the challenges ahead. We operate in a volatile and dangerous region of the world where extremists battle moderates in a revolutionary struggle of ideas. With the continuing support of this Congress and sustained national resolve, our courageous young men and women will help set the conditions for moderation to defeat extremism in this vital region. Their efforts will empower the states of the region to increasingly fight and win this battle on their own.

## **II. MISSION**

U.S. Central Command conducts joint and combined operations in our area of responsibility (AOR) to defeat adversaries, promote regional security and stability, support our allies and friends, and protect vital U.S. interests.

## **III. VISION**

As a Unified Command, CENTCOM may operate as a Combined Command, synchronizing joint and combined forces to decisively defeat enemies within our assigned area of responsibility. CENTCOM promotes regional security and stability through a robust program of military cooperation; exercises; frequent contacts; and, when directed, military operations. We support our allies' and friends' efforts to build and sustain the individual and collective defense capabilities which are necessary to allow them to prosper free from terrorism, war, or oppression. American and Coalition presence

will deter adversaries through demonstrated resolve to protect our national interests and those of our partners.

#### IV. NATURE OF THE REGION AND THE FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISM

With the addition of Syria and Lebanon, the CENTCOM region now spans 6.5 million square miles and twenty-seven (27) countries including: Egypt, portions of the Levant, the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Pakistan in South Asia, and the Central Asian states as far north as Kazakhstan. It incorporates a nexus of key transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf. It is also home to the key maritime choke points of the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz. The Arabian Gulf region alone accounts for 57% the world's crude oil reserves, 27% of the world's oil production, and 32% of the world's natural gas reserves. The region has more than 500 million people and at least 18 major ethnic groups. While predominantly Muslim, it is home to adherents of all of the world's major religions.

Economic, social, and political conditions vary greatly from one nation to another, with per capita incomes ranging from \$200.00 to near \$40,000.00. Many states in the region suffer from low economic growth, rampant unemployment and population growth rates that make economic improvement unlikely. Some governments remain hard pressed to meet popular demands for social services, for better integration into the global economy, and for more representative political participation. These underlying trends make a dangerous few in the region vulnerable to extremist ideologies and those who promote violent change.

Extremist ideologies generate the main enemy in our region. This enemy seeks to topple local governments, establish a repressive and intolerant regional theocracy, and then extend its violence to the rest of the world. To effect such change, this enemy believes it must evict the United States

and our Coalition allies from the region. Masking their true intentions with propaganda, rhetoric, and a sophisticated use of the mass media and the internet, this enemy exploits regional tensions and popular grievances. Led by al-Qaida, but encompassing a number of ideologically-linked groups such as Ansar al Islam (AI), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI), and Jemaah Islamiya (JI) among others, this extremist enemy exhibits strategic patience. It is willing to wait decades to achieve its goals.

The extremists defame the religion of Islam by glorifying suicide bombing, by the taking and beheading of hostages, and by the wanton use of explosive devices that kill innocent people in the scores. Their false jihad kills indiscriminately and runs contrary to any standard of moral conduct and behavior. The enemy's vision of the future would create a region-wide zone that would look like Afghanistan under the Taliban. Music would be banned, women ostracized, basic liberties banished, and soccer stadiums used for public executions. The people of the region do not want the future these extremists desire. The more we talk about this enemy, the more its bankrupt ideology will become known. But more importantly, the more that regional leaders talk about and act against this enemy, the less attractive it will be. Osama bin Laden and Musab al Zarqawi cannot represent the future of Islam.

This enemy's vision of the future is unappealing and a backward step in time. Yet, this enemy is a master at using modern communications techniques to spread its ideological message of hatred. The global internet has enabled not only propaganda, but has allowed this stateless enemy to recruit, finance, coordinate and organize terrorist activity to an unprecedented degree. While the enemy struggles to gain safe-haven in the physical world, it has established itself a sanctuary in the virtual world. Moreover, al Qaida and associated movements certainly do not limit cell formation to the

CENTCOM region. They have global reach with dangerous nodes of activity in Europe and Southeast Asia.

Working with our friends and allies in the region, and with our Coalition partners from around the globe, we participate in an important effort to kill and capture terrorists, attack their infrastructure, restrict their movement, disrupt their financial support, and deny them safe haven.

However, we also know that the underlying vulnerability of the people in the region to extremism and violence stems from causes that require non-military solutions. Interagency and international political, diplomatic, financial and social efforts are all essential to isolating extremists from their sources of strength. For example, renewed diplomatic attention to the Palestinian-Israeli Middle East Peace Process has already done much to put extremists on the defensive. This and similar non-military initiatives will not sway the small, extremist hard core, but can deprive them of the popular passions they exploit to advance their otherwise unattractive cause.

The international military effort in much of our region is synchronized in Tampa at CENTCOM's main headquarters where, as of mid-February 2005, sixty-one (61) Coalition nations man full time liaison and coordination teams. As always, the key to destroying the terrorist networks rests in thorough intelligence gathering and analysis that results in precise law enforcement or military action against the cellular structure. While we have made great strides in our international targeting of this enemy, much work remains to be done.

The Middle East and Central Asia have a low tolerance for any large foreign military presence, no matter how well-intentioned. Thus, our forces must be tailored for effective but not overbearing assistance. Over time, our military forces must give way to local military capacity. Ultimately, our regional partnerships, backed by smaller numbers of very capable U.S. military forces, will foster cooperative communities of moderate nations



willing to provide mutual support against extremist-inspired violence and other threats to regional stability.

This region also has the potential for strategic surprise. We must guard against unexpected events and be alert to unintended consequences. Examples include a major terrorist strike against oil infrastructure, or closure of the one of the strategic sea lanes. Guarding against strategic surprise is especially critical with respect to the proliferation of WMD. Iran and Syria both have longstanding chemical weapons programs, and Iran has obvious aspirations to develop nuclear weapons. In a region already debilitated with numerous threats to regional stability, a nuclear-armed Iran increases instability and encourages further nuclear proliferation in other states. The obvious problem of WMD technology falling into the hands of terrorist groups requires considerable effort to identify proliferation risks, deter proliferation opportunities, and retain the capabilities for prompt and decisive action. Simultaneously, local government measures to effectively control borders, conduct interdiction operations, and detect proliferation of WMD related materials and technology must be assisted and strengthened.

Our ongoing maritime interdiction operations are key to protecting oil infrastructure and countering potential proliferation of WMD. These operations feature major contributions by many Coalition partners and are a critical ingredient to regional stability.

**V. IRAQ**

At the height of the January elections there were over 159,000 U.S. forces, over 24,500 Coalition forces, and about 136,000 trained and equipped (ISF) operating across Iraq. Sizeable air, naval and Special Operations Forces supported these forces from within Iraq and across the region. Nearly 33% of our forces in Iraq are drawn from the National Guard and Reserve components. Overseeing all operations in Iraq, Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I), headquartered in Baghdad, commands the Multi-National Corps - Iraq (MNC-I) which consists of six divisions and a separate brigade-size command. MNC-I oversees two U.S. Army divisions, one separate U.S. Army brigade, one U.S. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and three Coalition multinational divisions. Coalition divisions control zones in southern and northern Iraq. Poland and the United Kingdom lead a fourteen-nation and eleven-nation effort, respectively, in the south while the Republic of Korea's 'Zaytun Division' conducts operations from Irbil, in northeast Iraq. Multi-National Security Training Command - Iraq (MNSTC-I) leads Coalition efforts to train and equip Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The MNSTC-I commander also serves as the commander of the NATO effort to build ISF and associated supporting structures.

For much of 2004, MNF-I maintained a capability of 17 U.S. brigades in Iraq. This number increased to 20 brigades during the December 2004 to February 2005 period to counter anticipated violence surrounding the January 30, 2005 elections. Currently, MNF-I is undergoing a major U.S. force rotation and will return to the 17 brigade baseline capability by mid-March. Incoming U.S. forces are task-organized for combating the Iraqi insurgency, and trained in the tactics, techniques and procedures developed by departing units. They will spend significant time overlapping with outgoing units to assure maximum continuity.

The Iraqi insurgency is predominantly Sunni Arab. The insurgency consists of three major elements: Former Regime Elements (FRE), indigenous religious extremists and criminal gangs, and al-Qaida-affiliated transnational terrorists. These disparate groups have varying motivations, but are unified in opposition to Coalition presence and a refusal to accept the legitimacy of the new Iraqi government. They loosely coordinate anti-Coalition attacks, but do not display centralized command and control, or a shared vision for Iraq's future. This Sunni insurgency is limited in scope, and mainly confined to four (4) of Iraq's eighteen (18) provinces. It is led by FRE from Saddam's old security and intelligence Services. The FRE is loosely affiliated with junior partners from Iraq's extremist and criminal communities and with the ideologically-driven foreign fighters who come to Iraq committed to terrorism in the name of false Jihad.

FRE dominate the insurgency and seek a return to power. They employ a campaign of mass intimidation against the Sunni population coupled with stand-off attacks against Coalition forces, Iraqi Security Forces, governmental figures and international assistants to the Iraqi government. They predominantly attack targets in and around Sunni-majority areas with weapons such as rockets, mortars, small missiles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). FRE collaborate with other insurgent forces, and also exploit criminal elements in Iraq to advance their aims. FRE efforts to delegitimize Iraq's interim government and to halt the January 2005 elections failed. This failure may open the door for political accommodation between the transitional Iraqi government and the Sunni population, putting support for the FRE in that community at risk. As Iraq's January 2005 elections demonstrated, the wider Iraqi insurgency lacks true national support, rarely manifests itself outside of Sunni Arab areas, and focuses more on terrorizing and intimidating its own Sunni community.

Indigenous Iraqi extremists and criminal organizations also participate in the insurgency. Their numbers are limited and their motivations range from profiteering to a deep desire to evict foreign forces from Iraqi soil. Criminal elements exploit the money available to the FRE, offering Services ranging from kidnapping to stand-off attacks for compensation. Indigenous Iraqi extremists work loosely with FRE and foreign Jihadists, and include home-grown terrorist groups like Ansar al Islam and Ansar al Sunna. They are more likely to use suicide bombers and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, and also conduct attacks against targets in the Iraqi Kurdish and Shia communities. They have claimed credit for suicide attacks against a Kurdish party gathering in Irbil that killed over 100 in February 2004, and for the December 2004 attack against the Coalition base in Mosul.

Finally, foreign terrorists under the banner of a false Islamic-Jihad have gravitated to Iraq to kill Coalition forces and to establish an extremist state, or at least an extremist safe-haven. Small in number, but zealous in their methods, these ideologically-driven terrorists are the most dangerous to Iraqi peace and stability over the long-haul, and are orchestrated by Jordanian expatriate Musab al Zaraqawi and his followers. A longstanding adherent to the radical ideology underpinning the al-Qaida terrorist movement, Zaraqawi gained formal accreditation for his Iraq terrorist network from al-Qaida's senior leadership in late 2004. Osama bin Laden's announcement of Zaraqawi as al-Qaida's 'Emir' in Iraq merely formalized a longstanding relationship, and confirmed that Zaraqawi and his terrorists represent the most dangerous brand of extremism confronting the Islamic world today. Zaraqawi's al-Qaida subordinate organization conducts high profile attacks against Coalition, governmental and non-Sunni Arab targets. It kidnaps foreign and Iraqi citizens working for the new government, subjects them to torture, propaganda manipulation, and beheading in front of cameras. It aims to create general war between Iraqi Sunnis and

Shia's and indiscriminately targets innocent civilians throughout Iraq. It relies heavily on external financing and foreign fighters infiltrating into Iraq. Some of these foreign fighters are veterans of prior jihadist campaigns, but others come to Iraq completely untrained and destined only for the suicide missions preferred as a tactic of al-Qaida. Zarqawi's al-Qaida offers the same dark vision for Iraq that the wider extremist movement promises for the region. This vision is rejected by the vast majority of Iraqis.

Two other potential challenges for Iraqi stability cannot be discounted. Radical Shi'a splinter groups like Muqtada Sadr's Muqtada's Militia (MM) could pose an armed threat to the new Iraqi government. Sadr's extremists were defeated militarily by Coalition and Iraqi forces, and isolated politically by the Interim government and Iraqi Shi'ite leaders during 2004. However, the Muqtada's Militia and other radicalized fringe elements remain a latent threat to Iraqi stability, and must be demobilized by the new Iraqi government to assure national stability. While the Kurdish population is a strong force for democracy and stability in the new Iraq, we are mindful that tensions over the status of Kirkuk could jeopardize internal instability and heighten Turkish concerns about long-term Kurdish goals. Therefore, we support efforts by the new Iraqi government to decide the status of Kirkuk in a fair and equitable manner.

Throughout 2004, Iraqi insurgents made extensive use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Nearly 22% of all attacks against Coalition forces involved IEDs, and they became the number one cause of Coalition casualties. MNF-I has established a team in Iraq to develop the intelligence necessary to effectively target those funding and making IEDs, as well as those who actively employ them. We are attempting to deny the enemy access to bomb-making materials, are focusing on technologies that provide persistent surveillance along our likely routes of travel, that help neutralize

undiscovered IEDs and detect them outside their intended blast zone. We are also developing new materials that can better protect our troops.

We have done much to counter insurgent reliance on IEDs and other stand-off weapons, but no place on the battlefield is immune from the effects of enemy actions. CENTCOM requires the very best efforts of the national science and technology community to generate effective counters to IED's and other threats to our troops. As always, our best success against enemy activity comes in the form of focused, precisely targeted offensive actions designed to destroy enemy fighters and organizational structures.

We have made progress in detainee operations throughout the past year. We expanded senior leader oversight in Iraq and across the theater, intensified training and validation of personnel involved with detainee operations, and conducted frequent inspection visits to assure that proper procedures were fully implemented. Now, we must get the key states of the region to take responsibility for the arrest, detention, trial and incarceration (if necessary) of those who perpetrate acts of terrorism and criminality within their borders. The key to making this move effectively is the development of rights based, rule of law justice systems in Iraq and Afghanistan. We will strongly encourage more rapid development of these institutions, and will seek to transfer responsibility for detainee operations to these two sovereign governments just as quickly as their legal institutions mature.

Trained, capable and loyal Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are the key to defeating the insurgents and to securing a new Iraq. Training ISF is our main effort for 2005. As the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) constitutional process moves forward, Coalition military efforts will focus on training, equipping, validating, fielding and mentoring competent and ready Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD), and Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces.

Enhanced training and mentoring of these forces is important to assure Coalition success.

It is important to understand that Iraqis are fighting and dying to secure a new Iraq. Since June 2004, more ISF have died in action against the insurgents than Americans. Predictably, the employment of newly-formed ISF units produced some disappointments during the past year, including the performances of Iraqi Army units in Fallujah and Ramadi (April-May 2004), police in western Baghdad (August-October 2004), and police in Mosul (November 2004). Conversely, focused training and mentoring of Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF), Iraqi Special Operating Forces (ISOF), and National Guard (ING) forces generated capable and competent units that contributed to successful Coalition operations in Najaf and Kufa (August 2004), Samarra (September 2004) and Fallujah (November 2004). Notably, the ISF turned in an impressive security performance against a determined enemy during the January 2005 elections. ISF success in this major endeavor has boosted confidence, and may serve as a springboard for future growth.

CENTCOM's major effort to adopt lessons learned, and to better coordinate U.S. government and international efforts to organize, equip, and train Iraqi Security Forces led to the establishment in June 2004 of the Multi-National Security Training Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). Despite an active insurgency with great demands for immediate commitment of newly formed Iraqi units, MNSTC-I has made steady progress in developing Iraqi security forces that can fight and win over the long haul.

Upon activation, and in coordination with the new Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), MNSTC-I conducted a comprehensive security requirements review. This review generated requirements for an Iraqi Police Service (IPS) with 135,000 officers; for a Department of Border Enforcement with 28,000 officials; and for an expanded Iraqi National Guard (ING) from 45 battalions under six brigade headquarters to 65 battalions under 20 brigade and six

division headquarters. MNSTC-I enters 2005 focused on a program designed to fully train, equip and field Iraqi Security Forces that are competent, loyal and responsive to the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and the Ministry of Defense (MOD). It is also partnering with the U.S. Embassy and the new Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) to assure that quality security force leaders are selected and that a cohesive chain of command responsive to civilian control is established. It is also helping the ITG to establish intermediate organizations and headquarters to assure security forces at the local level are responsible to elected Iraqi officials at the national level.

**Ministry of Interior Forces** - Focused on a goal of 135,000 trained and effective police, MNSTC-I is partnering with Jordan and Egypt on a police training program featuring a 3-week Transition school for police with prior experience, and an 8-week Academy regimen for new entrants. As of early 2005, some 30,000 Iraqi police have completed the three-week Transition Integration Training Program, and over 12,000 have completed the 8-week Academy Training program. MNSTC-I is expanding the capacity of academy training programs in Jordan and Baghdad and across new regional academies in Iraq. Expansion has increased the police academy graduation rate to approximately 5,000 per month. MNSTC-I is also assisting MOI in the development of a specialized policing capability including Special Police Commandos, an Emergency Response Unit, a Bureau of Dignitary Protection, and a Civil Intervention Force. The Special Police Commandos will eventually consist of six operational battalions. The Emergency Response Unit will augment the regular police with a special operations police capability and be responsible for high-risk arrests, hostage rescue, and explosive ordnance disposal. The Bureau of Dignitary Protection will be responsible for protecting Iraqi government leaders. The Civil Intervention Force will provide a national, high-end, rapid response police capability to counter large-scale civil disobedience and insurgency. Special Police Commandos and



the Emergency Response Unit have already been used in operations and have acquitted themselves well. MNSTC-I's efforts include police infrastructure development of nine brigade-sized bases, and over 100 police stations and training academies, most of which will be completed by June of 2005.

In concert with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (US DHS), MNSTC-I also has improved training for the Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement (DBE). Iraqi border control training now features a 4-week training program at the Jordanian International Police Training Center. MNSTC-I is assisting with infrastructure development for over 300 border posts and 15 ports of entry. As of early 2005, 35 border forts are complete, with 74 forts under construction or refurbishment. Four (4) of 15 ports of entry are under construction or rebuild. MNSTC-I and US DHS have also provided Iraqi Border Department with new technologies to control Iraq's lengthy borders.

**Ministry of Defense** - Iraqi national defense forces incorporate Iraqi Regular Army (RA) formations, Iraqi Intervention Forces (IIF), Iraqi Special Operations Forces (ISOF), Iraqi National Guard (ING) elements, and a Presidential (or Muthanna) Brigade. A small air force and a coastal defense service round out the Iraqi defense forces.

As of mid-February 2005, Iraq's total Army consists of over 70 battalions. 24 of these are operational regular army (RA) battalions, with 3 in training; 4 separate, special battalions; and a transportation battalion. 42 of these are fielded ING battalions, with another 8 in training. This trained and equipped force has gone from nothing in June 2003 to what we see today. 12 of the 24 operational RA battalions are basic Iraqi army units. The IIF has the other 12 operational battalions, with ISOF and the Muthanna Brigade now fielding 2 operational battalions each. Of further note, a first battalion of the initial Iraqi armored brigade stood-up in time to help with

security for the January 2005 elections. Mechanized brigade fielding and training will continue throughout 2005.

The Iraqi Air Force (IAF) established a limited capability in September 2004. Designed for tactical support and air mobility missions, the IAF has 3 operational squadrons of 9 aircraft as of February 2005. It will continue development in the coming year. After successful training by our British Coalition partners, the Iraqi Coastal Defense Force (ICDF) is now at full operational capability, with five 100-foot patrol craft, 34 smaller vessels and a naval infantry regiment. The ICDF is helping to secure Iraq's maritime oil export infrastructure, oil platforms in the Arabian Gulf and Iraq's coastal waters.

Iraqi Regular Army and Intervention Force battalions have already been deployed as part of Coalition missions to combat the insurgency. To date, their missions in a counterinsurgency role have consisted of route security, force protection, and patrol and cordon operations. We have learned that quality mentoring by professional Coalition forces is essential to successful Iraqi units, and are committed to assure such mentoring of fielded Iraqi forces continues.

Separately, we work with the Iraqis and our Coalition partners to expand and enhance independent training and equipping of Iraq's national security forces. An Iraqi Training Battalion has already trained and graduated soldiers that are part of active Iraqi units, and the first classes have started at two Iraqi military academies. NATO's agreement to provide training to Iraq's security forces will greatly enhance our ISF training efforts. In response to a July 2004 request from Prime Minister Allawi, NATO established a security force Training Implementation Mission Iraq (NTIM-I) to identify options for NATO training of Iraqi Security Forces. NTIM-I officially changed its name to the NATO Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I) in

December 2004. At the same time, the Commander of MNSTC-I was dual-hatted as Commander of NTM-I to assure consistency and continuity of training effort. NTM-I has been coordinating with Iraq's MOD and MNSTC-I to harmonize the training and equipping of ISF. NATO's contribution will help in establishing an Iraqi Training Command, and an Iraqi Training, Doctrine, and Education Center. In addition, NATO will help establish a War College and assist in the development of the Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters. As 2005 progresses, NTM-I will help with MNSTC-I's critical missions, help facilitate allied burdensharing, and greatly enhance ISF training.

While demonstrable progress has been made in recruiting, training and equipping a modern ISF during the latter-part of 2004, MNF-I and MNSTC-I have identified the need for more Coalition mentoring and monitoring of fielded Iraqi forces as these units transition to greater self-reliance. Consequently, MNF-I has directed MNC-I units to increase partnering activities with affiliated ISF. This effort will be a component of our commitment to capable, competent, and increasingly self-reliant Iraqi security forces.

Security and reconstruction are interdependent dimensions of building a new Iraq. Coalition troops have contributed to reconstruction and restoration of Iraqi basic services in a number of important ways. Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds remain the most effective tool for our commanders to facilitate reconstruction, build goodwill, and combat insurgent propaganda that wrongly paints our forces as Iraq's occupiers. CERP funds have allowed Coalition commanders to complete thousands of local construction projects during the past year. Due to its flexibility, CERP has been used for projects as diverse as employment of youth in Sadr City to clean-up city blocks and rebuild water and sewage systems, to those aimed at helping local police procure the basic equipment.

We are committed to broadening the international Coalition that will assist the ISF move forward. Our OIF Coalition remains robust, with twenty eight (28) countries contributing over 24,000 troops working to stabilize Iraq and build its self-reliance. We are grateful for the assistance of Jordan, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and the Federal Republic of Germany who run programs that school and train Iraqi police. We also welcome an expanded NATO presence in the training of Iraqi security forces, and hope to extend further our partnerships with the many Arab nations in the region that share our interest in seeing Iraq emerge as a stable and secure country that respects the rule of law.

Iraq's January 2005 national election was an important step toward sovereignty and security, but will remain challenging throughout the coming year. While those working to unify a peaceful new Iraq outnumber those working to break it apart, the enemies of a new Iraq remain determined. The processes of writing an Iraqi constitution and forming a new Iraqi government should remain politically-focused, but we cannot rule-out the possibility that they may trigger more violence. Together with our Coalition partners, CENTCOM enters 2005 committed to empower Iraqis to build political institutions, weave the fabric of a tolerant Iraqi society, extend and expand economic opportunities, and defeat the insurgents who threaten Iraq's emerging new identity.

#### **VI. AFGHANISTAN**

CENTCOM currently has about 19,000 Coalition forces deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). This total includes some 17,300 U.S. and about 1,700 Coalition personnel from seventeen (17) nations. All are commanded by Combined Forces Command - Afghanistan (CFC-A), which assures unity of effort with the U.S. Ambassador in Kabul and manages the military-to-military relationship with the Governments of Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Combined Joint Task Force - 76 (CJTF-76) is a division-level subordinate command with 14 separate task forces; including combat, support, medical, engineering, and training units. CJTF-76 directs major and routine combat operations throughout Afghanistan. Linked into CJTF-76 is a robust special operations capability from U.S. and Coalition nations.

The participation of over eight (8) million Afghans in the October 2004 Presidential election marked important progress towards stability, sovereignty and representative government. Voters endorsed President Karzai's moderate leadership and, with the help of the international community, viable institutions and governmental structures are being rebuilt. Extremists failed to make good on threats to disrupt the elections. This failure coupled with Coalition offensive military efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistani military activity in Waziristan put severe pressure on extremist groups.

While significantly diminished in 2004, threats to stability in Afghanistan come from three groups. In the northeast and the Kabul regions, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HiG), an al-Qaida affiliate led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, remains active and dangerous. In the southeast, al-Qaida strives to regain an operational foothold through the use of Arab and non-Afghan foreign fighters. In the south and elsewhere around the country, remnants of the Taliban continue sporadic and increasingly ineffective operations. While each is fading, these enemies continue a robust propaganda effort and plot attacks against the Afghan government. As ever, the enemy remains patient, hidden and dangerous. Continued development of effective Afghan security institutions and a viable political agenda are keys to reducing the enemy's ability to reappear in strength.

The Coalition experience in Afghanistan affirms the need for timely, actionable intelligence tied to a flexible, lethal response. CFC-A and other government agencies continue to develop regional intelligence architectures and build command and control systems effective for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations. Yet no purely military solution provides the key to stability. Civil-military operations which enable reconstruction progress remain essential to isolate insurgents from their support bases.

While successes in 2004 were noteworthy, the enemy remains elusive and dangerous. In 2005 the Coalition must focus on six imperatives: (1) continued direct pressure against enemy sanctuary through offensive operations; (2) building competent, capable Afghan security forces, (3) completing the militia Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program; (4) anchoring Afghan control of the countryside, instilling confidence in the Afghan Government, and enabling reconstruction and good governance through Coalition regional Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); 5) facilitating cooperation with neighboring friendly states; and, 6) increasing Coalition coordination with an expanding NATO presence.

Coalition forces will continue to mentor and accelerate training efforts of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and assist the Afghan police as they assume a larger role in counter-insurgency operations. Coalition forces will target and attack remaining pockets of al-Qaida, HIG, and Taliban to remove the threat they pose to stability.

During 2004, CENTCOM and CFC-A focused our efforts on defeating the insurgents and terrorists, building Afghan security institutions, delegitimizing Afghan warlords, disarming and demobilizing irregular Afghan militias, and countering Afghanistan's growing drug trade. While our 2004 priorities were directed toward the first three categories, evolving conditions in Afghanistan necessitate that militia disarmament and counter-narcotics support will rise to the top in 2005.

The Japanese-led, international community program for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of Afghanistan's irregular militia forces produced good results by the end of 2004. As of early 2005, an estimated 34,000 of 63,000 irregular militia forces had gone through the DDR process. CFC-A will continue its close support of international community efforts to complete the DDR of all Afghan irregular militias during 2005. However, not all militias or armed groups are relics of Afghanistan's violent, fragmented past. Some are engaged in another sort of menace to Afghanistan's goals, the booming narcotics trade in poppy, heroin and opium.

In 2005, the UK leads an accelerating international assistance effort for Afghanistan's counter-narcotics program. The Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) leads U.S. national efforts that partner with this UK-led program, and U.S. forces in Afghanistan are in strong support. Unchecked expansion of poppy cultivation and the drug trafficking culture that accompanies it poses a clear threat to Afghan and regional stability. To support INL's assistance of Afghanistan's counter-narcotics fight, we have established a Counter Narcotics Branch in our Tampa Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) to better coordinate DoD's support for U.S. national efforts. During 2004 CFC-A also delivered \$73 million in FY03 DoD supplemental funding in support of INL programs for the Afghan police, border security, and Counter-Narcotics Police (CNPA) equipment and training.

We will continue these counter-narcotics support programs and extend all assistance that is legally permissible to build the Afghan infrastructure and security sector capacity to defeat the counter-narcotics threat. Our efforts will be earnest, yet our expectations must be realistic. There will be no quick fix to Afghanistan's counter-narcotics challenge. Success will

require patience, persistence, and the knowledge that successful counter-narcotics programs take time, while unsuccessful ones rush to failure. Armed with this knowledge, we can help the Afghans achieve their counter-narcotics objectives at a pace that will not jeopardize stability, or fuel the popular unrest that could give Afghan insurgents a second wind. Creating viable alternate livelihoods to counter the 'easy money' of poppy production will take time. Crop substitution, establishment of legitimate cottage industries for employment alternatives, and access to 'drug free' capital will provide Afghans with greater legitimate economic choices.

Training, equipping and mentoring the Afghan National Army (ANA) remains the key component for military activities to stabilize Afghanistan. Coalition teams actively train five new ANA battalions at a time over a three-month training cycle. As the ANA is fielded, we must continue Coalition initiatives to reform the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), the Afghan General Staff, and the ANA Regional Commands. This process gained momentum in late 2004 with establishment of four ANA Regional Commands.

Now almost 20,000 strong, the ANA is earning the trust and confidence of Afghan citizens, and is competent in combat operations. ANA troops played a major role in securing the October Presidential elections. ANA battalions rapidly deployed to restore the peace when factional violence broke out in the western city of Herat last May. American field commanders report that ANA companies perform extremely well in combat against insurgents along Afghanistan's southern borders.

While the ANA has exceeded our expectations in performance and effectiveness, the Afghan National Police (ANP) force requires additional seasoning. The Afghan police suffer from limited access to comprehensive training, improper equipment, leadership by regional authorities often unaccountable to a central ministry, and irregular or substandard pay. Corruption within the police remains a concern for ordinary citizens.



Despite a well-intentioned, but limited international program to assist the police, more needs to be done. Although they have grown to over 34,000, many more must still be properly trained and equipped.

Reconstruction remains an important part of isolating our enemies, depriving them of their support base, and giving Afghans hope for a better future. Conceived by the Coalition in 2003, Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are small civil-military headquarters situated in an Afghan province that brings together Coalition security forces and civil affairs teams, U.S. interagency political and reconstruction representatives, Afghan government authorities, and representatives from international assistance organizations and NGOs. Coalition PRTs help enhance local security and extend the authority and visibility of the Afghan government into its provinces, thereby facilitating reconstruction and development. Afghan PRTs number nineteen (19) today, with fourteen (14) directed by CFC-A, and five (5) northeastern sites under the authority of NATO-ISAF. Due to the success of the PRT program, CFC-A and NATO-ISAF plan to expand to another 7 sites, producing a total of 26 PRTs by the end of 2007. As Afghan institutions strengthen, and regional governance capacity grows, these PRTs will phase out of existence in favor of sovereign Afghan institutions and agencies. In the interim, PRTs will help the Afghan people toward a better future.

A final component of our strategy in Afghanistan is increasing Coalition coordination with an expanding NATO International Security Force (ISAF) presence, now some 8,000 troops strong. NATO has taken steps to expand the ISAF stability and security presence to the west, and then to the south of Afghanistan during the coming two years. This expansion will have NATO take ownership of three (3) Coalition PRTs in the west of Afghanistan during 2005, and up to four (4) more in the south by 2006. We welcome ISAF's expansion, and are working closely to assure that NATO-ISAF and Coalition

missions complement each other, and fully address the security needs of the Afghanistan government.

Afghanistan is moving toward stability, but much work still must be done. With Coalition and NATO-ISAF partners, we will continue support of Afghan reconstruction and for the growth of competent Afghan security institutions. With an increasingly capable ANA, we will fight to secure Afghanistan and complete the defeat of the diminished, but dangerous extremist-insurgent enemies. Finally, we will set the conditions to turn over more and more of Afghanistan's security to the Afghans, adjusting U.S. force levels as growing Afghan capacity allows.

#### VII. HORN OF AFRICA (HOA)

CENTCOM continues to refine its operational focus in the Horn of Africa and the surrounding maritime environment. Here, our streamlined efforts are designed to prevent enemy access to regional safe-havens, and to encourage and support the efforts of moderate regional governments. In many ways, the CENTCOM program in the Horn of Africa is a model for how military forces might operate across the wider region in the future.

Combined Joint Task Force - Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) is the CENTCOM command element for the Horn of Africa which includes Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and the Seychelles, and has an area of influence throughout Eastern Africa. With approximately 1,400 assigned forces -- 1,300 U.S. and about 100 Coalition -- CJTF-HOA is supported by two subordinate command elements; to include Commander Task Force - 150 (CTF-150), which is commanded by a German Flag officer with 9 ships from 5 countries, and the Joint Special Operations Task Force - Horn of Africa (JSOTF-HOA). CJTF-HOA conducts operations and training to assist host nations combat terrorism, and establish greater regional security and

stability. CJTF-HOA's IMET program, Disaster Preparedness (DP) program, and intelligence sharing agreements are valuable examples of significant cooperation with regional partners that yields important results.

The Horn of Africa is vulnerable to penetration by regional extremist groups, terrorist activity and ethnic violence. Regional instability is fueled by internal conflicts, border disputes, uncontrolled borders and territorial waters, extreme poverty, unreliable internal security capabilities, natural disasters, lack of dependable food and water sources and an underdeveloped infrastructure. These factors combine to create an environment ripe for exploitation by extremists, terrorists and criminal organizations.

CENTCOM continues to synchronize CJTF-HOA actions with other U.S. agencies and international organizations in order to develop a regional approach to combating terrorism, while increasing local capacity to deal with threats to security. While we prefer an integrated regional approach, we continue to develop bi-lateral relationships in HOA to address mutual security interests and foster long-term goals. The CJTF-HOA strategy aims to increase pressure on existing regional terrorist cells, and to deter migration of terrorist operatives seeking sanctuary in the region. Central to this objective are Coalition efforts to enhance HOA nations' capabilities to detect and combat the terrorist threat. This effort requires aggressive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations to develop an intricate understanding of extremist activity.

Regional partners are cooperating in the pursuit of our common goals. Djibouti has given extraordinary support for U.S. military basing, training, and counter-terrorism operations including maritime interdiction of several terrorist associated dhows. Kenya, a leader in East African regional affairs, is a key ally against terror and has been instrumental in promoting

peace in Sudan and access to Somalia. Ethiopia, despite limited resources, is undertaking an ambitious program of security sector reform and is also committed to combating terrorism and countering extremism within its borders. We are effectively reaching out to Eritrea and Yemen, redefining relationships in the process. Instability in the Horn is a long-term problem. Somalia is a failed state that Islamic terrorists continue to use as a transit point and temporary safe haven. Sudan has suffered decades of civil war and retains great potential to become an extremist training and staging location. Border tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea remain high with renewed conflict a possibility.

Our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) programs work to increase national capabilities for border and maritime security, Counter-Terrorism (CT), intelligence fusion, and information operations. Programs featuring medical and veterinary assistance, well drilling operations, and various engineering projects that rebuild or refurbish hospitals, schools, pedestrian bridges and public facilities have built considerable goodwill between Coalition forces, host nations and the local populace. This goodwill helps discredit extremist propaganda and generates local desires to defeat terrorists before they can become entrenched.

**VIII. THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION (TSC) AND OTHER REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS****TSC and Regional Partnerships**

CENTCOM's Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program builds essential cooperative security relationships with allies throughout the region. Our TSC program improves allied military self-defense capabilities, boosts interoperability with U.S. forces, encourages military transformation, enhances intelligence sharing and information exchange, and reinforces U.S. military access when required. The pillars of our TSC program include: International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing/Foreign Military Sales (FMF/FMS), and the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). Each of these initiatives strengthens partner relationships across the region, and merits long-term U.S. commitment.

FMF/FMS initiatives have been especially important in improving the capabilities of the Pakistani Armed Forces by providing the weapons and equipment that allows them to more effectively locate, track, and engage our common enemy along the rugged border with Afghanistan. Last year's regional Foreign Military Financing (FMF) allocation of \$2.3B provided a vital increase of \$150 million over FY2004's allocation. This helped to strengthen our relationships with Egypt and Jordan, bolster the national armies of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and improve our cooperation with other Central Asian nations.

IMET provides foreign military members the opportunity to attend courses at U.S. military institutions and supports Congressionally-mandated democratization programs. Last year's \$16.8M IMET allocation sustained CENTCOM emphasis on Jordan, Pakistan, Egypt, Oman, Yemen and several Central Asian nations. Our investment in IMET is incredibly important to winning the war on terrorism. Officers and civilian defense leaders exposed to U.S. training and institutions can often help us bridge the all too deep cultural

gap that exists in the region. Given the opportunity, we would welcome the chance to train many more regional officers and defense leaders in our school systems.

The new DoD Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) is also an important cooperative program. CTFP provides counter-terrorism education and training to selected military and paramilitary leaders of our regional partners. This training facilitates improved techniques, processes and procedures for defeating terrorists. It also fosters regional collaboration for countering terrorist threats. FY 05's CTFP allocation allowed USCENTCOM to emphasize training for Jordan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Oman, Yemen, Kenya, Ethiopia and most of the Central Asian nations. CTFP is an important new program for building counter-terrorism competence in the region, thereby increasing regional capacity for self-reliance. We strongly support its continuation and expansion.

We also conduct several TSC programs including Cooperative Defense (CD) against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the Gulf States, and Disaster Preparedness (DP) in the Horn of Africa and with the Central Asian states. These improve host nation capacity to cope with natural and man-made disasters.

FMF/FMS, IMET and CTFP are productive and important programs that build independent regional defense capability. While our most pressing priorities for the coming year continues to be the stability of Iraq and Afghanistan, the greatest long-term danger may be from extremist influence in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf States. Our TSC program aims to support the efforts of these nations and others to reinforce moderation and implement reforms designed to achieve long-term stability. We should not underestimate the value of these programs. We will support them as a matter of highest priority.

**Pakistan**

Pakistan is arguably our most important partner in the broad struggle against extremism in the region. Pakistan's military and intelligence campaign against foreign terrorists have produced significant results. Since September 11, 2001, more than 300 al-Qaida terrorists have been killed or captured in Pakistan. Recognizing that the frontier areas along Pakistan's border with Afghanistan had become a safe haven for terrorists, President Musharraf deployed over 70,000 regular Army troops into the border region alone. Improved dialogue and reduced tensions between Pakistan and India has allowed President Musharraf to focus attention on this counter-terrorist fight to the west, with less worry about an immediate flashpoint to his east. Equally important, President Musharraf has taken the leading role in the Islamic world as an advocate for moderate, responsible, and tolerant approaches to religion and political expression. His personal efforts are encouraging other regional leaders to take a stand against extremism and for moderation.

The Pakistani Army offensive astride the Afghan border is not yet complete, but has already helped to significantly diminish terrorist forces there. The Army's 2004 offensive into South Waziristan uprooted extremist sanctuaries, disrupted terrorist planning and training, and has put al-Qaida leadership on the run. Pakistan's recent capture of several high profile terrorists including Abu Musab al-Baluchi, a nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, Abu Talha a-Pakistani, a key facilitator of al-Qaida efforts in the Horn of Africa, and al-Ghailani, an operative wanted in connection with the bombing of the U.S. embassies in East Africa, foiled global terrorists' initiatives and placed al-Qaida on the defensive.

We are supporting Pakistan's efforts with increased intelligence sharing and security assistance. We have greatly improved operational coordination between CFC-A and the Pakistani military during the past year. We hold regular meetings with Pakistan's military leaders. These meetings

have enhanced transparency, situational awareness and military cooperation along the Afghan-Pakistan border. We will continue to support Pakistan with its requests for assistance. Helping Pakistan help itself is an essential element of the plan to help regional states win the war against extremist-inspired terrorism. Moreover, it is essential that we continue to develop a long-term partnership with the world's second largest Muslim nation and aid its transition back toward democratic institutions even as it fights against extremism.

**Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA)**

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) remains a major battleground in the war against terrorists. Al-Qaida and its affiliates in the Kingdom attacked a number of Saudi and western targets during this past year. The violence of these attacks, and the revolting cruelty by terrorists against both western and Muslim workers residing in the Kingdom, unmasked the ruthless nature of this enemy, and galvanized a strong response from the Saudi government.

Saudi security forces have conducted major operations against al-Qaida cells and operatives, killing and capturing many extremists across the country. Saudi counter-terrorist forces improved their capabilities to find, fix and destroy the al-Qaida network operating within the Kingdom. The Saudis also continued their work to disrupt terrorist financial and support networks. They are making progress, but more remains to be done.

We continue to work with the Saudis to increase their counter-terrorist capabilities and to widen the scope of Riyadh's regional counter-terrorist cooperation. The Saudi government took a positive step in this direction when it hosted a Global Counter-Terrorism Conference in Riyadh during early February 2005.

We plan to continue positive engagement with Saudi Arabia across a wide range of security enhancement initiatives. Building on programs already



ongoing between the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) and the Saudis, it is important to support Saudi Arabia's efforts to build capable security structures, enhance counter-terrorist organizations, and develop networks to share information. We will continue to do all we can to assist Saudi efforts to defeat terrorist organizations and promote stability.

#### **Arabian Gulf States and Yemen**

The Arabian Gulf States of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman are valued partners in our struggle against extremist-inspired terror. Their support has been essential in our operations across the region. Kuwait remains host to the Combined Land Forces Component Command (CFLCC) and serves as the primary staging point for our forces operating in Iraq. Bahrain serves as the home to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command and the United States Fifth Fleet. Qatar continues to host the CENTCOM Forward Headquarters and the Combined Forces Air Component Commander's Combined Air Operations Center (CFACC-CAOC).

The Bahraini government has committed to establishing a Counter-Terrorism Operations and Intelligence Center. The UAE promotes regional cooperation and combat effectiveness by hosting academic and flying courses at its Gulf Air Warfare Center. Oman looks to the United States for cooperation to help patrol its extensive coastline and to upgrade its military capabilities. CENTCOM's naval component remains engaged with all Arabian Gulf states to improve maritime security, oil infrastructure protection, and aides to navigation. CENTCOM will continue to improve the capabilities of these friendly Gulf nations, encouraging them to provide for their own security, border integrity, and counter-terrorist capability. We will also work with them to generate their funding for security projects and facilities necessary for a long-term stability and security in the region. Finally, we will continue to work with these Arabian Gulf governments to disrupt al-Qaida's stated desire to attack the region's oil industry; and, if

a successful attack occurs, help them to organize timely and effective consequence management operations for mitigation.

Yemen remains an important regional partner in the struggle against extremism. Yemen's porous borders and loosely-controlled tribal areas remain a magnet for extremists seeking to transit, support, and supply their networks. Our cooperative program for Yemen has focused on counter-terrorism training and establishment of a Yemeni Coast Guard to patrol its maritime borders and interdict illicit trade to and from the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. These efforts in Yemen have yielded tangible results, including recent bilateral cooperation with Saudi Arabia to tighten border security. Our continued assistance to Sa'naa is essential to improve Yemeni effectiveness in the struggle against extremism.

#### **Egypt**

The influential leader of the Arab world, Egypt remains a strong Coalition ally against regional extremism and central to solving the difficult equation of Palestinian-Israeli peace. Egypt again demonstrated leadership as a strong champion of peace between Israel and Palestine when it hosted the face-to-face meeting between Israeli President Sharon and new Palestinian Authority (PA) leader Abbas in Sharm-el-Sheik shortly after Abbas' January 2005 election as PLA head. Its role in cooperative military engagement with the United States also does much to enhance regional stability. Egypt has materially supported Afghan and Iraqi reconstruction efforts. Egyptian access and transit rights remain essential for the conduct of military operations throughout the region.

During 2004, Egypt conducted training for Iraqi police, began a recurring training program for Iraqi army personnel, and hosted the November Sharm El-Sheik Conference to promote Iraqi elections. Egypt now has donated over 65 tons of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, contributed arms and ammunition to the new Afghan National Army, and deployed a field hospital to

Bagram with a commitment to serve through at least May 2005. Egypt also has made a significant effort to resolve the North-South problem in Sudan, furthering its reputation as an ally for peace and stability in the region.

The U.S. has maintained close military relations with Egypt since the signing of the Camp David accords in 1979. Egypt's important military capabilities and its leadership role as a moderating voice in the Arab world should not be underestimated. The U.S. continues to provide Egypt with \$1.3 billion annually for the procurement of U.S. manufactured weapons systems. We also support professional training of Egyptian officers with nearly \$1.2 million annually in IMET funding. U.S. aid has generated good will and yielded an Egyptian military that has a majority of U.S. vehicles and equipment, with high levels of interoperability and significant numbers of U.S.-trained senior military leaders. We look forward to a strong and continuing partnership with Egypt, supporting the key role Egypt continues to play in the struggle against extremism and terrorism while promoting regional stability.

#### **Jordan**

Jordan remains an essential friend in the collective struggle against regional extremism and achievement of stability in Iraq and Palestine. King Abdullah II openly supports U.S. efforts in the region, and has postured Jordan as a voice for moderation and tolerance in the Arab world, hosting a November 2004 Conference that produced the "Amman Declaration" advocating a peaceful and inclusive future for Islam. The country's strategic location and influence throughout the region greatly assists U.S. regional objectives. Jordan hosts important training schools for Iraqi Special Forces and police. These programs are major pieces of our effort to build competent and capable Iraqi Security Forces, able to the lead in the fight against their insurgents. Jordan's highly trained and professional armed forces represent a positive example for other regional militaries. The Kingdom provides

extensive military education and training opportunities. We strongly support Jordan's offer to establish a Special Operations Center of Excellence to boost regional special operations forces (SOF) capacity. Jordan's very capable SOF makes this a natural site for a high caliber regional training and cooperation center.

U.S. economic and military aid programs for Jordan are essential to help this regional partner help itself. Jordan uses our assistance to strengthen its economy, modernize its armed forces, and improve regional efforts to defeat extremism. We will continue to focus our security assistance with Jordan to develop her peacekeeping and Special Forces capabilities, and to build intelligence sharing and personnel exchange programs in support of counter-terror efforts. Across a wide range of activities and programs, Jordan remains an invaluable regional partner in our fight against extremism.

#### **Syria and Lebanon**

Part of the CENTCOM region since April 2004, Syria continues to play an unhelpful role in regional stability. Damascus continues to defy UN Resolution 1559 calling for removal of troops from Lebanon. A designated state sponsor of terrorism, Syria has provided political and material support to Palestinian terror groups. Iranian support for Hizballah continues to transit Syria into Lebanon with tacit Syrian approval. Damascus also remains under scrutiny for poor adherence to international WMD non-proliferation norms. Furthermore, Syria has failed to crack down on Iraq anti-Coalition insurgents, their supporters and their sympathizers who find safe haven within Syrian borders, in a meaningful way. While Syria should share a common interest with us in stabilizing Iraq, its actions instead demonstrate a state committed to fostering instability. CENTCOM's military capability in the region acts as a deterrent against more aggressive Syrian behavior. Syria's behavior is all the more disturbing given its own vulnerability to

extremist forces. Although Syria enjoys a relatively high literacy rate, its centrally controlled economy has not kept pace with a rapidly growing population, resulting in high unemployment and slumping GDP. Syria's minority Allawite government has many internal and external opponents, and is vulnerable to the emergence of domestic extremist movements.

Iraqi former regime elements (FRE) and extremist groups, including the Zarqawi al-Qaida network, are using Syria as a primary transit point for organizing and funding anti-Coalition fighters in Iraq. While insisting that Syria curb the flow of foreign fighters and FRE across its borders, we are attempting to work with Damascus to improve border security and make greater progress in stemming the infiltration of foreign fighters into Iraq.

After years of civil war, Lebanon has enjoyed a period of relative calm and prosperity over the last fifteen years. However, Lebanon remains unstable, with portions occupied by Syria, and with a number of terrorist groups and private militias resident within its borders. Thirteen years after the deadline for its withdrawal from Lebanon under terms of the Lebanese Peace Accords, and months after UN Security Council Resolution 1559 calling for its immediate withdrawal, Syria retains more than 15,000 troops and significant military intelligence presence in Lebanon. This continuing presence provokes hostility from Israel, inhibits proper development of Lebanese security forces, and promotes the development of ungoverned space within Lebanese territory. Lebanon will only move toward stability and security once Syria departs.

We have a growing Security Assistance program with Lebanon. We run an International Military Education & Training (IMET) program that trains Lebanese officers at U.S. military schools. Our Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA) Program is designed as a train-the-trainer program for the Lebanese on how to render safe the over 350,000 land mines and unexploded ordinance that litters Lebanon. The HMA program has produced 350 Lebanese trainers, and the

Lebanese National Demining Office reports over 45,500 mines cleared as of June 2004. Once Syrian forces depart, and when the Lebanese government asks, we are prepared to expand these programs and to explore others that will improve Lebanese security capabilities across a wide array of missions. We also stand ready to assist Lebanon disarm private militias and to develop the military skills necessary to conduct counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations that defeat extremist groups and deter their return.

USCENTCOM recognizes that unaltered Syrian behavior threatens regional stability. We are also aware of the degree to which extremism and terrorism could threaten Syria and Lebanon. Thus, we are postured to deter Syria, and remain ready when asked to partner with Lebanon in developing the military capabilities to defeat extremism, terrorism and instability.

#### **Iran**

The political situation in Iran remains complex. Tension exists between moderates who desire a greater voice in politics and the hard-line religious Mullahs who control Iranian security forces and the mechanisms of political power. Iran has multiple centers of power and its closed society makes assessing their national intentions difficult.

The situation with Iran is tense, and the possibility for miscalculation high. We will watch Iran carefully to try to prevent any destabilizing activities that could complicate our efforts, contribute to internal Iraqi or Afghan frictions, or threaten regional stability. We will continue to deter Iranian support of terrorism. Iran is also central to our counter proliferation planning and nonproliferation efforts. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has confirmed Iran's clandestine nuclear activities and, working with the Britain, France and Germany (the EU-3), continues to demand Tehran's compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligations.

While generally thought to be for defense, Iran continues to build a credible military capable of regional power projection. It has the largest military capability in the region and a record of aggressive military action in and around the Arabian Gulf.

Iran's military force has the capability to threaten the free flow of oil from the Gulf region. Iranian forces include a Navy of small attack boats carrying torpedoes and missiles that are well suited for the restricted confines of the Straits of Hormuz. A new generation of indigenously produced anti-ship cruise missiles and tactical ballistic missiles threaten both oil infrastructure and shipping. It is important for us to maintain reconnaissance capabilities to monitor these forces. To counter this threat, our forward-based posture retains a Navy Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) presence that demonstrates our commitment to unrestricted international access to the Gulf's resources.

Iran's Revolutionary Guard Force (IRGC) and Intelligence Service (MOIS) are very active throughout the Arabian Gulf and the broader Middle East. Iranian sponsored groups, backed by their intelligence Services, could become a source of difficulties in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere in the region. Therefore, we stand with our regional partners to safeguard our mutual vital interests.

#### **Central Asian States**

Our continuing engagement with the states of Central Asia addresses significant sources of instability in the region. Our partnerships with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan focus on developing counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics capabilities. They also work toward improving border security and enhancing military professionalism. Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, for example, have undertaken programs of military reform designed to increase the professionalism of their armed forces. We will continue to foster security

sector reform, encourage regional cooperation, and seek their constructive involvement in our efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

It is clear that our relationship is mutually beneficial. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan provide key access and overflight rights for our operations in Afghanistan. The government of Uzbekistan has provided access to Karshi-Khanabad (K2) Airfield at no cost to U.S. forces. Kyrgyzstan also provides U.S. basing at Manas. Kazakhstan continues to provide engineering troops for Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Our engagement in this region supports the efforts of these nations as they move forward from their Soviet pasts. Military-to-military contacts and educational opportunities provided under IMET continue to enhance the reform programs that are in place. Through bilateral and multilateral exercises, we will develop greater interoperability and provide a positive example of a professional force subordinated to legitimate civilian authority.

The Central Asian States continue to struggle with reform and free enterprise, while their people clearly desire to participate in the growing prosperity enjoyed by other former Soviet countries. The risks associated with failure of these states include regional instability, drug trafficking, smuggling and safe haven for terrorists. Our security cooperation efforts aim to improve border control and enhance counter-terrorism capabilities. Al Qaida, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and other extremist groups are active in Central Asia. Continued regional cooperation is an important element of countering extremist activity.

#### **IX. JOINT WARFIGHTING**

CENTCOM has been fighting continuously as a Joint team for almost four years. Throughout our operations, patterns have emerged as to what is going well and where we continue to face joint warfighting challenges.

##### **Successes**



First, our Special Operations Forces (SOF) have proven their capabilities in the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism campaigns. Their ability to operate alongside and multiply the capabilities of indigenous forces is central to our counter-insurgency fights in Afghanistan and Iraq. When enabled by focused intelligence and precision strike capabilities, SOF are able to sustain unrelenting pressure on extremist networks, denying them safe haven.

The adaptability of our conventional forces has been extraordinary. We have seen them shift from high intensity fighting (both in urban and open environments) to conducting counter-insurgency operations and transitioning into civil-military operations within very short timeframes. We have made great progress in conducting military operations in urban areas. We have developed effective methods to defeat insurgents operating in urban terrain by using precision munitions, sophisticated sensors, non-lethal weapons, and adaptive tactics which have been lethal to the enemy while minimizing collateral damage and saving civilian lives. Such adaptability is the product of the unprecedented quality of our forces, the rigor of their training, and the superb equipment they employ. Today our armed forces are professional, combat-proven and unrivalled around the world. We must do everything we can to retain their experience, and sustain their qualitative edge over all potential adversaries.

Intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) systems, especially unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are a key part of the Joint warfighting team. All the Services contribute to this diverse array of systems and all benefit from the integrated intelligence products they produce.

Another success has been joint command and control across a region where we simultaneously conduct large-scale ground combat, precision counter-terrorist operations, maritime interdiction operations and full-spectrum air support. All of our major headquarters are joint, and are manned by leaders

and staffs that merge Service expertise into joint solutions. We have progressed to the point where it is difficult to imagine fighting other than as a joint team.

#### Challenges

Our experience also highlights challenges that remain in joint warfighting. Command and control (C2) systems are still developed and maintained by the Services and are not easily integrated for Joint operations. We need C2 systems that not only enable but enhance the capabilities of Marine aircraft flying from a Navy carrier under the command and control of an Air Force headquarters in close support of Army troops or Special Forces on the ground. Today our systems are mostly patched together, often with great effort and resulting in sub-optimal performance. The whole is less than the sum of the parts. To reverse this situation, we must field systems purpose-built for joint operations, so our superb joint forces are enabled rather than inhibited.

We still have a long way to go with interagency coordination. We have learned that interagency coordination is best done at tactical levels, and have seen the proof of this during the conduct of the joint inter-agency task force (JIATF) focused on al-Qaida senior leaders and the one focused on former regime elements (FRE) in Iraq. Above this local level, however, challenges too often overwhelm accomplishments. Too many organizational agendas and hard-wired boundaries inhibit the type of openness and sharing that are required to fight the extremist networks. We are simply not structured for success at higher levels of integration against an enemy that recognizes no organizational, geographical, legal, or informational boundaries.

As mentioned elsewhere in this statement, we must improve the protection we afford our troops against the greatest enemy threat: improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This challenge highlights the need for our joint

and service acquisition systems and the industrial base to be capable of adapting rapidly as the enemy adapts his tactics against us. We have made some important progress, but more needs to be done.

Lessons of asymmetric warfare are being learned by our enemies. The trend is unmistakable; we see extremists employ the same tactics in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. No enemy is likely to confront us willingly in a face-to-face military engagement, for we are simply too proficient. Instead, they will seek to win the perception battle by using terrorist tools like a car bomb, relying upon the bloody spectacle it creates to be amplified in the mass media. The doctrinal, educational and training centers of our Services must undertake a major shift in emphasis to allow us to contest this trend. We must go to school on the tendencies and vulnerabilities of those who practice asymmetric warfare just as we mastered the logic for nuclear deterrence and for meeting massed Soviet armored formations during the Cold War.

Finally, we must close the cultural gap between us and the extremist enemies we face. We must invest far more in the "human capital" that will empower our joint forces to better understand the enemy in the years ahead. During the Cold War the U.S. military could boast of literally tens of thousands of experts on the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact, and the ideology of communism. Today, we are lucky to find even a few hundred in our own ranks who know about Islam, the Middle East, and the ideological forces that fuel terrorism. As discussed in detail later, bridging this gap requires more human intelligence (HUMINT) specialists, linguists, area specialists, and civil affairs officers. All of these are critical for the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist fights; and, to our ability to forge functional relationships with our regional partners. As we build U.S. human capital, we must also grow the human capital of future military leaders of

the region. Consequently, an expanding IMET program is necessary to build long term relationships.

#### **X. STRATEGIC BASING**

We envision a future regional footprint that has few permanently deployed units at forward locations to support expeditionary U.S. forces that react promptly to theater needs. This posture is premised on a minimized footprint, partly because the region has low tolerance for long-term foreign military presence no matter how well intentioned, and partly because the dynamic nature of the region requires maximum flexibility. It is also guided by the need to have most of our forward deployed posture oriented toward assisting the local forces in the region, so they can be the main agents to secure regional peace and stability while combating terrorists, extremists and other external threats.

We will leverage infrastructure and investment already made by the U.S. and our host nation allies over previous decades. Existing U.S. locations will serve as the foundation for our future footprint, and we will work closely with regional partner nations that desire our presence and can afford the costs to contribute a significant share of financial resources to modernize and properly improve these locations.

Our construct for the future will consist of Forward Operating Sites (FOS) and Cooperative Security Locations (CSL). A FOS will host operational U.S. units that rotate into and out of the AOR in support of operations, contingencies, training, and theater security cooperation programs. A CSL is generally a less robust location with less infrastructure and that will host military operations to include exercise support and security cooperation. As we posture our forces for stability operations in the future, FOS's and CSL's will be maintained in the Arabian Gulf, Central Asia, and the Horn of Africa to provide capabilities to assist regional states in the long war ahead

against terrorism and extremism. The classified details of FOS and CSL locations can be found in the September 2004 Defense Department report to Congress entitled, "Strengthening U.S. Global Defense Posture." Specific CENTCOM plans that align with this construct are under development.

Stateside, we are working with the U.S. Air Force (our executive agent for funding) and with DoD to conduct necessary refurbishment and expansion of our Headquarters facility in Tampa.

#### **XI. USCENTCOM CRITICAL MISSION ENABLERS**

Nearly four years of continuous operations from Afghanistan to Iraq and the Horn of Africa have highlighted several major mission enablers. These include: strong Coalition allies, timely and responsive airlift, intelligence, adaptive force protection, a flexible theater reserve and logistics base, and sufficient access to communications bandwidth and talented personnel. Coalition allies expand CENTCOM operations, and share operational burdens across a pool of like-minded nations. Our AOR geography and lack of assigned forces makes us uniquely dependent on airlift for timely and flexible employment of forces. Complex and widespread operations place heavy demands on quality, fused intelligence and the communications bandwidth to allow command, control and distributed intelligence across the entire force. Enemy tactics place heavy demands on force protection; and our widely dispersed area of operations mandates a flexible theater reserve and logistics base. Finally, our multi-level headquarters and high OPTEMPO missions require quality people.

##### **Sustaining a Strong Coalition**

Our Coalition partners in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have contributed significantly to our success. 2005 will be a pivotal year for the Coalition. We must re-shape Iraqi Coalition forces to accommodate expanding Iraqi security capabilities and

enable Iraqis to take the lead against the insurgents. We also need greater participation from the international community to build strong and capable Iraqi intelligence, counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist capabilities. Simultaneously, our Enduring Freedom Coalition must adapt to accommodate growing Afghan security capacity and to complement NATO-ISAF's increasing role. The better we adapt and manage the Coalition, the fewer U.S. service members will be required to achieve our objectives across the region.

#### **Strategic Sealift and Inter-Theater Airlift**

Capable and robust airlift and surge sealift capacity are essential to CENTCOM strategy. Ongoing CENTCOM operations and our anticipated future posture rely heavily on a rapid flow of forces into theater to meet an array of contingencies. As of October 2004, over 1,753,510 personnel and 89,562,160 cubic feet of cargo have been transported to the CENTCOM AOR in support of OIF and OEF. The C-17 aircraft generated the majority of the strategic airlift for these operations, and its performance and versatility has been outstanding.

CENTCOM intra-theater airlift requirements in OEF and OIF indicate a growing need for this constrained capability. Two initiatives look promising as a means to expand this capacity. CENTCOM has had success with a contract for Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) aircraft use by the Afghanistan CJOA. We have also been able to use Commercial Airlift Tenders to move cargo and passengers. We commend future use of these and other airlift options within the CENTCOM area.

#### **Intelligence**

Intelligence is the main driver of counter-insurgency and counter-terror operations throughout the region. Our close interaction with imbedded interagency partners from the CIA, NSA, and other government agencies has helped secure the intelligence necessary for our successful conduct of many

diverse and complex operations. Several key capabilities will better facilitate our ability to collect, correlate and fuse real time intelligence:

**Common Intelligence Picture (CIP)** - A CIP that is accessible and available to all friendly forces is critical to battlefield success. CENTCOM has been able to cobble-together a CIP for the wider region, but the process has been complicated, expensive, and inefficient due to the great number of service intelligence systems that do not work in a common environment. Our experiences highlight the importance of an established joint interoperability standard for all DoD intelligence systems. Eventually, all will be required to work with others within a joint and combined collaborative environment.

**Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)** -

The CENTCOM requirement for theater-wide ISR assets remains large and continues to grow. We continue to improve a redundant ISR network integrating strategic, theater and tactical systems. Demand for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) has been insatiable. We must continue to expand the availability of airframes, control stations, bandwidth, manned units, and trained crews for UAVs. We must also increase the number of UAVs with integrated Electro-Optical Infrared Full Motion Video (EO/IR FMV) and SIGINT capabilities, both of which are critical for tracking High Value Targets (HVT).

Manned airframes are also essential in our gathering of timely and accurate intelligence. For example, the unique capability of the U-2 aircraft to provide flexible, long dwell capability coverage of very large area makes it indispensable for USCENTCOM. We support the U-2 Extended Tether Program (ETP), which adds a data relay capability to ground based locations for rapid processing and dissemination of U-2 intelligence data.

Linguists are essential for airborne signals intelligence collection. Linguists manning levels continue to fall well below USCENTCOM-identified

requirements. We need to increase the supply of low density language specialists to catch-up with the demand.

Finally, operational reliance on each of these ISR capabilities places a heavy demand on the C4ISR infrastructure. We must continue to generate C4ISR systems with the capability for effective and efficient dissemination of information from the various sensors to the commander, or individual soldier on the ground.

#### **Counter-Intelligence and Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) System**

**Shortfalls** - Counter-insurgency operations place heavy demands on people to collect, analyze and disseminate actionable intelligence. During 2004, DoD re-focused the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) from a search for WMD toward the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT) in support of USCENTCOM. While this shift helped, CENTCOM HUMINT resources - critical to defeating the insurgency - remain in short supply. Development and integration of Iraqi HUMINT collection assets during 2005 will help, but CENTCOM and MNF-I require additional trained and capable U.S. HUMINT assets to ultimately quell the Iraqi insurgency and to win the regional fight against the wider extremist movement.

In the near term, we require additional funding for contract support to meet immediate requirements. For the future, we require increased U.S. service school generation of CI/HUMINT personnel including case officers, tactical HUMINT collectors, interrogators, polygraphers, technical surveillance countermeasures personnel, and linguists. However, numerical increases alone will not correct all our HUMINT issues. We must provide our collectors with sufficient funds and authorities to enhance their ability to rapidly develop and exploit human sources. One such key authority is that of permission to clandestinely operate in the tactical environment. We also require more soldiers and leaders trained in Middle Eastern cultural awareness: Arabic, Farsi, Dari and Pashtun language skills; historical



knowledge of Islam and Muslim traditions; and a more coherent pattern of assignments for enlisted, NCOs and officers with these vital skills.

Finally, we have worked to integrate information systems and databases that were not designed for an interoperable environment. These interim solutions for CI/HUMINT system shortfalls have been working. However, a better integrated, long-term joint solution is required.

#### **Force Protection**

Force protection remains a top priority. Across the USCENTCOM region, the Services are engaged in programs to meet CENTCOM requirements to protect individual soldiers, their vehicles, their bases and their living areas. These programs include those providing individual body armor, up-armored vehicles and enhanced base protection systems. Supplemental funding for Individual Body Armor (IBA), additional Up-Armored HMMWVs (UAH), and Add-on-Armor kits (AoA) has ensured that our soldiers have the proper equipment to protect themselves on the battlefield. The Combating Terrorism Readiness Initiative Fund (CTRIF) has provided us with the resources to meet over 98% of our requests for physical and infrastructure protection.

Every soldier and civil service employee in Iraq and Afghanistan is equipped with IBA. We are now focused on improving soldier body armor to provide enhanced protection by adding Deltoid Auxiliary Protection (DAP) attachments to Individual Body Armor. Industry now has geared up to produce nearly 10,000 sets of DAPs a month. We now have nearly 102,000 sets of DAPs on hand, which is 62% of our current requirement.

Our response to the IED threat has included a robust program for adding armor to soldier vehicles. An intense effort to produce up-armored HMMWVs has generated nearly 6,800 as of February 2005. This represents over 82% of our current requirement, and we expect to meet the full requirement by the end of May 2005. We also continue to install add-on armor (AoA) for wheeled vehicles. All told, over 60% of the wheeled vehicles in theater now have

some form of armor protection, and we are working with the Army to assure that all wheeled vehicles working outside of secured areas have at least an intermediate level of armor protection. We continue to expand up-armor and add-on armor installation capacity in Iraq and Kuwait. Overall, the vehicle force protection situation in CENTCOM has significantly improved. We have also worked with the Joint Staff as it established the Joint IED Defeat Integrated Process Team (IPT). The IPT is investigating over 260 innovative ways to fill capability gaps for defeating IEDs. The IPT has focused on developing "next generation" protection materials for personnel, infrastructure, buildings and material. Additionally, the IPT is investigating technologies that will increase our force protection standoff capability for the detection of chemical, biological, and explosive devices. To date, the IPT has fielded scores of advanced technologies to defeat IEDs and protect our soldiers from IED effects.

CENTCOM's Joint Security Directorate manages a robust force protection program for all countries in our region. We continue to monitor evolving terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures to identify new trends and modify our force protection standards and requirements that stay a step ahead of the enemy.

#### **Logistics**

CENTCOM operations have benefited from pre-positioned assets and adaptive logistics systems that keep pace with our diverse requirements. As we begin a fourth year of major operations in the region, we must remain wary of potential new threats, and work to reinforce logistics successes. OEF and OIF operations drew heavily on strategic and pre-positioned equipment stockpiles, both ashore and afloat. This equipment has been worked hard, and remains heavily engaged today. As soon as operational conditions will allow, reconstitution of the afloat and maritime pre-positioning forces must be an

imperative for the Services, and be fully funded for reconstitution and modernization.

CENTCOM has initiated a deployment and distribution-oriented organization for our region that allowed the Command to access timely and accurate information about unit strategic deployments and cargo distribution movements. We are working with the Joint Staff and USJFCOM to capture lessons learned, and are helping their effort to expand joint theater logistics constructs across all of the Department of Defense (DoD).

#### **Communications**

Since September 2001, USCENTCOM satellite communications utilization has increased by over 8000%. 75% of our theater SATCOM capabilities are provided by costly and vulnerable commercial satellite services. This situation will grow even worse in coming years without funding for new MILSATCOM to replace the already inadequate and rapidly deteriorating network. We need MILSATCOM that provides the transformational capabilities to rapidly disseminate time-sensitive intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data, and that can provide our deployed forces with reliable "comms-on-the-move" capability regardless of operating location. We support enhanced funding for the DoD MILSATCOM programs to achieve these aims.

We also share more information with more nations and more U.S. interagency elements than ever before. Yet, we must do even better. We need more systems that are interoperable with allies and across all agencies in the U.S. government. We confront many systems that are not interoperable, and resort to bridging them, when possible, with often inefficient technical solutions. We need to develop common operating standards for all systems that will plug into our expeditionary, joint and multinational information backbone. Robust, interoperable communications networks are the critical enabler of success on the modern battlefield.

**Personnel**

The majority of CENTCOM forces are deployed forward in combat zones. Consequently, Quality of Life (QOL) enhancements for deployed forces and families is important. Combat Zone Tax Relief (CZTR), Imminent Danger Pay (IDP), Hardship Duty Pay-Location (HDP-L), and Assignment Incentive Pay (AIP) contribute significantly to our service members' quality of life and morale. The Rest and Recuperation Leave Program has been a major success. To date, over 150,000 troops have benefited from this program. The Special Leave Accrual (SLA) has also been important to our long-deployed soldiers, allowing them to retain up to 120 days accumulated leave for up to 3 years. We encourage continuation of each of these helpful programs.

We also advocate adoption of other programs to help our servicemen and women deployed across the region. We support an increase in Serviceman's Group Life Insurance (SGLI) for our troops, and are working with DoD to ensure that families of the fallen are adequately protected in their time of greatest need.

Finally, it is important to fill our headquarters with talented leaders. Granting full joint credit to qualified officers who serve in a CENTCOM joint task force headquarters for a year or more will help attract the high quality personnel that our joint headquarters require. We are working with DoD to ensure personnel who serve in these demanding billets are afforded the joint credit they deserve.

CENTCOM is also working to address low density high-demand personnel requirements across the theater. In addition to those already addressed in the CI/HUMINT and linguist skill sets, we are working with DoD to offset shortages of civil affairs, special operations and counter-insurgency capable forces, and information technology (IT) professionals. We are investigating opportunities to conduct civil affairs missions with other service elements

or civilian contractor expertise. We also encourage DoD expansion of functional expertise of critical civil affairs skills like: urban planning; economic development; business planning; law enforcement; criminal justice; public works and engineering; and those with management skills that can build capacity in government organizations.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are in high demand across the theater due to their skill in counter-insurgency operations. CENTCOM supports creative DOD efforts to re-enlist quality special operators, and to identify other qualified individuals with critical counter-insurgency skills.

Finally, our demand for information technology (IT) professionals throughout the region is great and growing. As a result, we are working with the Services to develop IT career paths that better support technical education and development, and that better manage assignments of these professionals into our subordinate commands.

We have built the finest, most operationally and tactically experienced Armed Forces ever known. It is an all volunteer force with high esprit and tremendous professionalism. The key to its quality is experienced professionals who stay with the team. The most important weapon in our inventory remains our people.

#### **Flexible Funding and Authorities**

Congress has been extremely responsive in providing USCENTCOM with the flexible authorizations we require to fight the enemies we confront across the theater. We request continuing Congressional support for the Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP), for CERP remains the most direct and effective soft-power tool available to our commander's in the counter-insurgency fight. Likewise, the DoD Rewards Program has proven tremendously beneficial, generating information leading to the capture of terrorists, insurgents and the seizure of a number of weapons caches. Coalition Support Funds (CSF) and the newer authority to provide transportation and sustainment

support to selected Coalition partners are important to sustainment of our Coalition partnerships. Finally, Congressional authorities to expeditiously train and equip Afghan and Iraqi Security Forces, and to help develop allied nations' capabilities for counter-terrorism have made great contributions to the essential work of building organic security capacity across the region. We will continue to work with DoD and the Congress to sustain or enhance the necessary funding and authorities to sustain our forces and support our allies and friends in this struggle.

#### **XIII. CONCLUSION**

CENTCOM remains fully committed to the defeat of extremist-inspired terrorism across the region. We are focused on creation of a secure and stable Iraq and Afghanistan, to provide assistance that allows Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to help themselves, deter Syria and Iran from threatening regional stability and security, set conditions to continue the free flow of regional energy products, and effectively synchronize all elements of U.S. national power to assist moderate Muslims in their fight against extremists.

2005 can be a decisive year for the Coalition. Our efforts across the region are setting the conditions for victory against a patient, persistent, and ruthless enemy. We will require our own patience and courage to cement this victory. The growing weight of hard-won successes in Afghanistan and Iraq, so amply demonstrated in their recent elections, must be sustained throughout a period of continued political change and development. As in any wartime situation, some setbacks are bound to occur, but our strength in capability must be matched by strength of purpose. No power in the region can defeat us.

Effective Coalition combat operations against our enemies remains vital, yet military activity alone is insufficient for victory. True victory in this fight will require the effective application of all elements of our

national power to enhance political participation, encourage economic enfranchisement, and enable social advancement across the wider Islamic world. Ultimately our goal is to give the people of the region their own security tools to shape a better future. With our friends in the region and our Coalition partners, we have the right team to prevail. All of CENTCOM's military efforts in the region are focused toward giving our courageous young men and women the tools they need for success. We thank this Congress for the oversight and support for our troops in the field.

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SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL BRYAN D. BROWN, U.S. ARMY  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND  
BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

MARCH 2, 2005

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STATEMENT OF  
GENERAL BRYAN D. BROWN, U.S. ARMY  
COMMANDER  
UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members of the Committee, it is an honor and privilege to report to you on the state of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). Today's United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are the most capable in the world. They have performed magnificently on the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, and in their support of Geographic Combatant Commander activities around the world.

The Secretary of Defense expanded USSOCOM's role in 2003 to include leading the Department of Defense's (DOD) Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) planning effort, and commanding specifically designated GWOT operations. In this role as the lead command for the GWOT, USSOCOM has matured into a warfighting command that is leading the planning and synchronization of DOD activities in support of the GWOT. Today at SOCOM, our priorities are the GWOT, the readiness of our forces, and building SOF's future capabilities to be even more capable to meet the demands of the changing strategic environment.

**Strategic Environment.** Terrorist networks are globally dispersed and compartmentalized into remote, smaller networks or groups that limit direct access to their leadership, communications, and infrastructure. They recognize no borders and no boundaries, use the local populace for plain-sight concealment, and employ terror, torture, and indiscriminate killing as standard tactics, techniques and procedures. Without respect for international law, they adapt their methods and conduct operations that

incorporate technology across the spectrum from low tech to high tech. This creates a significant challenge for USSOCOM and directs the Command along three lines. First, as the supported Commander, USSOCOM must synchronize DOD efforts, coordinate and collaborate in interdepartmental and interagency efforts, facilitate the flow of information and intelligence, and foster cooperation with partner nations to shape the Global War on Terrorism. This will require the elimination of seams and sanctuaries. Second, USSOCOM must focus SOF on the GWOT by increasing emphasis on organizing, training, and equipping the force to accomplish our main effort of attacking terrorist networks and enabling partner nations to do so in concert with us. We will provide assistance to other government agencies in our effort to persuade or coerce nation states that support terrorist networks, diminish the underlying conditions that cause terrorism, and counter core motivations that result in terrorist networks. Finally, we must continue to flawlessly integrate with conventional forces in traditional warfare.

**USSOCOM Center for Special Operations (CSO).** When USSOCOM was established by the Congress in 1987, its primary role was to support the geographic combatant commanders by providing them with trained and equipped special operations personnel. Now USSOCOM's focus has been rebalanced to emphasize the GWOT – we are at war. The Center for Special Operations, a directorate within USSOCOM headquarters, was created to optimize SOCOM's warfighting efforts, by breaking down traditional barriers that exist between plans, operations and intelligence functions. By consolidating these efforts under a single director, USSOCOM has improved its speed, agility and flexibility—keys to success in today's global environment. The CSO has embedded interagency liaison teams that streamline interagency coordination,

communication and processes, further enhancing operations, intelligence and planning fusion. The CSO is in effect USSOCOM's Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG). Responsibilities in the CSO include reviewing global strategies, developing courses of action, and formulating plans and recommendations for operational force employment by the Commander, USSOCOM.

A dynamic component of the CSO is our Special Operations Joint Interagency Collaboration Center (SOJICC). A state of the art facility fusing operations and intelligence, the SOJICC integrates DOD and interagency information and databases to exploit the full potential of this information to support special operations planning and course of action development. SOJICC was developed in response to operational priorities and has been used extensively in supporting unique special operations requirements in OEF and OIF and developing short turn-around products in support of SOF in all of the combatant commands.

#### **Global War on Terrorism**

**Success in Operations.** USSOCOM's number one priority is the Global War on Terrorism. Defeating the terrorist threat requires the full range of Special Operations capabilities. USSOCOM's special operators, carefully selected, highly trained and well equipped, continue to be "the worst nightmare of America's worst enemies" as President Bush stated in June, 2004. Employing the tactics, techniques and procedures most appropriate to a given situation, our forces act across the spectrum of operations from Civil Affairs (CA) to Unconventional Warfare (UW) to Direct Action (DA).

Our interagency, conventional, and coalition relationships have never been stronger than in today's global operations. This joint, coalition, interagency team has

brought freedom to millions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, plenty of work remains to defeat the insurgents who continue a violent struggle against democracy. SOF, deployed in support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, have been involved in every phase of this global effort. As we transition to the post-election environment in both Afghanistan and Iraq, joint, combined, and interagency efforts will be more critical than ever to win the peace, as we continue on the path to a more stable and secure world.

**Iraq.** SOF operations, in support of United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), remain focused on defeating Anti-Coalition Militia elements and denying them freedom of movement and action throughout Central and Northern IRAQ. SOF have been very successful at finding, fixing, and finishing the enemy and one of the keys to our success has been the ability to fuse intelligence with operations resulting in actions that not only capture or kill the enemy, but also generate additional information for further operations.

In close coordination with Iraqi and Coalition forces, U.S. SOF played a critical role in virtually every major operation in Iraq during 2004, particularly the defeat of the insurgent offensives in April and August, the liberation of Fallujah in November, and coalition victories in Najaf, Samarra, and Ramadi. In these and other operations, SOF conducted numerous offensive actions resulting in a significant number of detainees. We follow standard operating procedures in transferring detainees to designated personnel for interrogation and processing. In addition to their combat effectiveness, SOF personnel have shown extraordinary maturity, cultural awareness, and good judgment. SOF, in coordination with conventional forces, continue to execute an aggressive

offensive strategy against terrorists, but do so in a way to minimize the negative impact on Iraqi citizens.

A very visible and successful Special Operation Foreign Internal Defense mission has been our work with Iraqi security forces. Trained by Green Berets, the 36<sup>th</sup> Commando Battalion and the Iraqi Counterterrorism Battalion are now capable of providing on-going security against insurgents. I have visited both units. They have fought valiantly in such difficult cities as Fallujah, Najaf, and Samarra alongside U.S. Special Forces. They are good, and are getting better.

Applying lessons learned from earlier successes against the Taliban in Afghanistan, SOF ground forces in Iraq have worked closely with conventional airpower to eliminate insurgents and other terrorists. SOF aviation has also been highly effective, destroying a large number of enemy targets while minimizing collateral damage and providing rapid responses to time-sensitive information. SOF have rescued hostages and assisted local law enforcement agencies in capturing terrorists who murdered western hostages. In the waters of the Persian Gulf, SOF have conducted maritime interdiction operations to disrupt terrorist movement and operations. SOF are committed to helping the Iraqis, in support of USCENTCOM's implementation of the strategy of the United States, to establish a secure and peaceful future. SOF have played major roles alongside their conventional and coalition partners in supporting the road to Iraqi self-government and lasting security. Although much work remains, the very successful recent election is a striking example of the success of our efforts in GWOT. The commander of the Multi-National Force in Iraq, GEN George W. Casey, Jr, described SOF achievements in Iraq as "Herculean."

**Afghanistan.** Special Operations Forces continue to make vital contributions to the war on terrorism as well as stability operations. Major strategic events enabled by SOF include Afghanistan's first ever national election in October and the December inauguration of its first elected President. SOF operations focused on supporting these two historic events and were critical to these strategic victories. In precisely targeted offensive operations, SOF killed and captured hundreds of terrorists and insurgents. These operations have been crucial to securing cities near the critical area along the border with Pakistan and in former Taliban strongholds. SOF manned dozens of small camps in areas frequented by insurgents and terrorists, inhibiting enemy operations and enhancing the security of the Afghan population. The enemy has repeatedly attacked these small camps, but SOF, conventional, and coalition forces have defeated all enemy offensives and inflicted heavy enemy casualties.

Throughout Afghanistan, SOF conducted Unconventional Warfare (UW). A SOF core task, UW, as carefully configured, includes operations conducted by, through, and with local forces. The Services use the term Unconventional Warfare frequently; however accomplishing missions in a new or unconventional manner is not the same as UW. UW is a capability unique to SOF and will continue to be an important skill in future operations.

As in Iraq, major coalition goals included building up Afghan forces and having those forces conduct effective military operations, thereby increasing the legitimacy and popular support of the government. SOF emphasized combined operations, with the Afghan National Army taking the lead role throughout the country to accomplish these goals.

Coalition forces, including SOF, assist in the counternarcotics effort in Afghanistan by reporting, confiscating, or destroying drugs and drug equipment encountered in the course of normal operations, sharing intelligence, and training Afghan security forces in these efforts. The adverse effect of the narcotics problem on Afghanistan's security, stability and society is significant and requires a multi-faceted and long-term effort. The Afghan government, aided by the international community, must work to create viable economic alternatives for growers and manufacturers.

**Other Regions of the World.** In addition to supporting the Commander, USCENTCOM, SOF prosecuted GWOT missions around the globe. In support of Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM), US SOF joined our NATO SOF allies to form a Response Force in support of the 2004 Olympics in Athens, Greece, a high value potential target for international terrorists. This response force was fully integrated into the Olympic Games' security task force and helped ensure that terrorists did not disrupt the Games.

SOF also worked with security forces from several African nations to enhance their counter-terrorist capabilities, conducting two-month training periods with indigenous forces focused on logistics, communications, and weapons skills. The effort was designed to eliminate sparsely-populated border regions as potential terrorist safe-havens before terrorists arrived in force. In the Balkans, Civil Affairs (CA), Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and other special operations units supported operations in Bosnia, bolstering civil institutions to help maintain peace in that country.

In addition to short-term operations, SOF long-term activities help develop the strategic environment by contributing directly to deterrence efforts. U.S. SOF participated

in over fifty Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) events globally with host-nation forces. In the Pacific theater, SOF supported the Commander, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) by providing assistance to allied nations seeking to stem narcoterrorism, as well as remove mines laid during four decades of regional conflicts. SOF continues to support Operation Enduring Freedom-Philippines (OEF-P), and during 2004, Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P) deployed teams to provide operational planning and special skills training to Filipino Armed Forces personnel. U. S. SOF worked with Filipino military forces and other units throughout the country to prevent the disruption of national elections. Meanwhile, U.S. Navy SOF personnel worked with their counterparts to conduct expanded maritime interdiction operations around the archipelago. Psychological Operations soldiers sought to garner support of the local population.

The earthquake and tsunami of December 2004 brought horrific destruction around the rim of the Indian Ocean, and SOF, in support of USPACOM, responded immediately to provide humanitarian assistance to those affected by this devastating natural disaster. Through the use of specialized skills and equipment, SOF supported the U.S. and international relief efforts. SOF Soldiers, Airmen and Sailors provided their expertise in diverse areas such as airfield management, airlift, delivering and distributing medical care and supplies in conjunction with U.S. Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps and civilian organizations.

In South America, SOF efforts support the Commander, United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) through operations helping the government of Colombia in its fight against terrorists, narcotics trafficking groups, and insurgents. SOF support



included counter-narcoterrorist training deployments, training assistance to Colombian SOF, help with establishing a special operations command and control (C2) organization, long-standing Civil Affairs and PSYOP activities and assistance fusing intelligence with operational planning. U.S. SOF also helped with the search for American citizens held hostage by terrorists. By the end of 2004, the Colombian military and police forces had made notable progress in the fight against narcoterrorists.

#### **Readiness**

Force readiness is a SOF priority and is crucial to mission success. USSOCOM's number one Readiness issue is our people, followed closely by our equipment and training.

**People.** USSOCOM, while scheduled to grow in Fiscal Year 2005, remains less than 2 percent of our Nation's military force. Our operators are high-caliber professionals with intelligence, stamina, problem-solving skills, mental toughness, flexibility, determination, integrity, and extraordinary strength of character and will. Additionally, they are experts with their weapons, and many are language trained. Our small number of carefully selected, incredibly dedicated, capable, mature, well-trained, and well-led people are key to our quality force. However, we must have the total force—the correct mix of Active, Reserve, and National Guard personnel to meet the challenge. Last year I reported that Special Operations Forces were deployed globally at the highest sustained operations tempo in their history. That is still true today, with over 6100 Special Operators supporting the Geographic Combatant Commanders.

To accomplish SOF missions, highly specialized skill sets are required, including cultural and regional awareness and expertise, and skill in employing both low and high-

tech equipment and solutions. To achieve the required level of proficiency and guarantee SOF relevance, recruitment, training, accession and retention, development of the force must be closely managed. With the support of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress, USSOCOM was able to secure a comprehensive USSOCOM retention package aimed at specific SOF operational specialists throughout their careers.

I believe our current operations tempo is manageable, but stressed in certain critical specialties—namely our SEALs, Special Forces, AFSOC Combat Controllers, Pararescuemen and Special Operations Weather personnel. Civil Affairs and PSYOP forces will be discussed shortly. USSOCOM began our growth by investing in our schoolhouses through additional instructors to increase throughput for creating Special Operators while maintaining our standards. Coupled with retaining experienced SOF personnel, this will improve our capability to meet the demand on our force.

However, adding SOF is not a near term fix, as *SOF cannot be mass-produced, nor created after emergencies occur*. Our recruiting is good, and our schools are full, but because of our rigorous selection and training process for SOF operators, it takes between 12 and 24 months, depending on specialty, to graduate an initially-qualified SOF operator. By the end of Fiscal Year 2006, USSOCOM will grow by 1,405 members to an end-strength of 52,846. We are adding personnel to our active duty SEAL teams, increasing active Special Forces Group strength, and adding personnel at the 16<sup>th</sup> Special Operations Wing to support forward deployed and rotational requirements. We have also added one MH-47 aviation battalion based on the west coast and oriented towards the Pacific. With great support from the Secretary of Defense, we have

significantly increased the authorized manning levels of SOF over the past two years, but areas of concern remain our PSYOP and Civil Affairs forces.

**Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.** Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations were essential in facilitating the elections in both Afghanistan and Iraq and will continue to play critical roles in the stabilization and reconstruction of both countries. CA and PSYOP also had a vital role in combat operations and consolidation activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whether encouraging enemy fighters to surrender, directing civilians away from battle zones, or separating terrorists from their base of support, tactical PSYOP multiplied the effectiveness of combat operations and saved many lives.

Dissemination of truthful information to foreign audiences in support of U.S. policy and national objectives is a vital part of SOF's effort to secure peace. Culturally oriented psychological operations units with selected language skills are supporting commanders and other U.S. government agencies in operations ranging from humanitarian assistance to weapons collection. PSYOP forces have an aggressive program of providing handbills to children explaining the threat of unexploded ordinance and minefields. Additionally, through leaflets and broadcasts, PSYOP forces disseminate information to raise awareness about the Rewards for Justice Program. SOF then facilitate linking individuals possessing information with the appropriate agencies. PSYOP forces use nonviolent means in often violent environments to convince adversary, neutral, and friendly nations and forces to take action favorable to the U.S. and its allies. These forces, along with SOF Civil Affairs units, are force multipliers. Three quarters of our PSYOP personnel are in our Reserve Component.

Civil Affairs forces are key to our long-term success in the GWOT. Civil Affairs specialists can quickly and systematically identify critical infrastructure requirements needed by local citizens. They can also locate civil resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, and establish and maintain liaison dialogue with civilian aid agencies, commercial and private organizations. Civil Affairs forces are currently working with local governments of Iraq and Afghanistan and international humanitarian organizations to rebuild infrastructure and restore stability. They facilitate, plan, and coordinate repairing wells, providing food to hungry children, bringing medical care to families, and are hard at work helping rebuild school systems to counter radical thought through education. CA forces become advocates for their plans to synchronize indigenous populations and aggressively seek funding for regional projects. Over 90 percent of our CA personnel are in our reserve component.

This level of effort, however, doesn't come without a price. While we believe *people are more important than hardware* and closely monitor our deployment schedules, Army Reserve CA and PSYOP units have been mobilized for up to 24 months under the partial mobilization authority. This in turn has made us more reliant on the few active duty CA and PSYOP units to meet operational requirements. Future rotations for OIF/OEF will be constrained by the number of personnel in these specialties available. To improve these areas we have added four PSYOP companies (Reserve), two PSYOP companies (Active), two Civil Affairs battalions (Reserve), and two Civil Affairs companies (Active). While the use of Provisional Battalions created for the war effort is a concept we are exploring, compressed Civil Affairs specialty training is not the best solution to this

problem. We owe it to the Geographic Combatant Commanders to send fully qualified CA and PSYOP personnel to the battlefield.

#### **Building Future Special Operations Forces**

The Command's main goal for the future is to identify and develop the capabilities Special Operations Forces will need to remain the decisive piece of a joint, coalition, and interagency team while maintaining the readiness required to shape and respond to the world today. USSOCOM is committed to producing next generation SOF capabilities that will provide competitive advantages over future adversaries. Future SOF will be positioned to respond rapidly to time sensitive targets in the GWOT, provide strategic responsiveness as an early entry force, possess state of the art Battlefield Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) and continue to increase cultural, regional and linguistic expertise. SOF must construct systems and capabilities to have access around the world to locations of our choosing and have dominant C4ISR.

Long-term success in the Global War on Terrorism depends largely upon our ability to rapidly employ a sustainable mix of capabilities with little warning--requiring agile, adaptive, and responsive warriors. We are transforming our force quickly to provide better on-the-ground capability to operate in the different "gray areas" around the world where conventional forces are traditionally uncomfortable. This will require a change in our thinking, not just our force structure. We continue to transform our Headquarters to incorporate these changes. Our organization includes a standing Joint Task Force (JTF), capable of providing a spectrum of command and control options from providing a handful of liaison officers to an existing JTF to deploying a complete JTF. Moreover, USSOCOM is organized for interagency transparency, a key element for success.

USSOCOM is pursuing a holistic approach to our training, doctrine, organizational structure and technology. We will blend the authorities, functions, and activities of a supported combatant command with our current Service-like authorities, functions, and activities necessary to develop, maintain, and enhance integrated joint SOF forces and capabilities. USSOCOM will cut across current national, regional, and geographic boundaries by networking key counterterrorism and counterinsurgency command and control nodes to create a Global Counter Terrorist Network (GCTN) employing a tailored mix of assigned, attached, and supporting joint forces and capabilities.

**Budget and Acquisition.** The USSOCOM Fiscal Year 2006 President's Budget request is \$6.7 billion, 3 percent more than the Fiscal Year 2005 appropriated amounts. This request includes military pay and allowances to ensure that now, and in the future, the President, the Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM, the Combatant Commanders, and Country Teams have SOF capable of defeating terrorist organizations worldwide. Our Operations and Maintenance budget request grows \$85 million, to \$2.2 billion, which also includes a \$22 million increase for training, as well as funds associated with sustaining SOF-specific weapons systems. Quick action on SOCOM's FY05 Supplemental Request is the issue on which I need immediate support.

At the heart of USSOCOM's strength is the Commander's acquisition authority, which is similar to that of the Military Departments. It is one of the things that makes USSOCOM special and makes our operators more capable and effective, more quickly. Among the responsibilities assigned to USSOCOM under Title 10, Section 167, is developing and acquiring "special operations-peculiar" equipment. SOF-peculiar equipment is based on technologies that enable our operators to become faster,

stealthier, more precise, lethal, survivable, and sustainable. It will also enable PSYOPS forces to broadcast themes into denied areas, and provide Civil Affairs specialists with SOF specific training and communications equipment. With exceptional support from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Services, and our industry partners, these authorities have been instrumental in equipping today's world-class SOF team to perform a broad range of SOF missions. We are aggressively eliminating those systems that do not support the GWOT and directing those resources for more appropriate programs. Our Flagship Programs, the Advanced Seal Delivery System (ASDS) and the CV-22 Osprey continue to be a very important part of SOF's future. We will add, in the near future, two new flagship programs, our SOF Warrior Systems and our SOF training centers.

Our Research and Development (R&D) activities are focusing on discovering and exploiting technologies in the following areas:

**Intelligence.** USSOCOM's primary concern remains actionable tactical intelligence. The "find" piece of find, fix and finish is an intelligence based problem set. In other words, we have to find out *who* the bad guys are, *where* they are, and have the right forces in the right place at the right *time* to capture them. USSOCOM is working to harness capabilities, like signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) and unattended sensors that channel the proper intelligence information to our analysts and operators so we can capture terrorists regardless of where they are on the globe. This persistent Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) concept is a combination of continuous analysis, human intelligence (HUMINT), and SOF focused ISR systems that will dwell on a target for as long as the mission requires—the unblinking eye. We

have made progress aggressively pursuing UAVs, persistent intelligence systems and denied area access technology. We must continue to improve these capabilities, especially our ability to find and track targets in all weather conditions. USSOCOM's number one technological shortfall is in our ability to persistently and remotely locate, track and target a human.

**A global network.** SOF-led collaboration and synchronization across command lines will play a dramatically larger role. USSOCOM will use the Global Counter-Terrorism Network to position SOF around the world, in synchronized, simultaneous, and custom-tailored operations against designated terrorist organizations, their allies and sponsors. The GCTN will synchronize global ISR to gain persistent close-in visibility, coordinate interagency and capable partner nation efforts, and integrate command and control. These operations will be coordinated by USSOCOM and Geographic Combatant Commanders through their Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), which will serve as the focal points for joint SOF missions conducted within their regions. Key to this effort will be high bandwidth and reachback communications.

Additionally, SOF must facilitate the development of indigenous capabilities to fight against terrorists and rogue regimes. Robust Unconventional Warfare capabilities greatly expand the set of options available to policy makers. SOF must also maintain and improve capabilities to support conventional forces. The concept of a GCTN is designed to position SOF in key locations to collect, fuse, analyze and disseminate intelligence. Developing greater situational awareness in priority countries and regions will enhance SOF effectiveness in combating terrorist networks.



**Develop the Special Operations Warrior.** SOF can anticipate continued global employment in the near future. They will have to operate simultaneously in more than one Geographic Combatant Commander's area of responsibility against elements of the same global enemy to eliminate seams and be responsive. For SOF the challenge is immense: how to train for the enormous and demanding range of functional skills necessary to meet USSOCOM's core tasks while adapting intellectually to the global demands of this war against an enemy who holds no territory. USSOCOM will meet these requirements through continued adaptation and growth of our education and training capabilities, to include advanced training systems. Additionally, in a globally networked operating environment, SOF must be survivable, sustainable, lethal, maneuverable, and possess superior situational awareness. These are SOCOM's R & D focus areas to support the SOF warrior.

#### **CONCLUSION**

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our history. We will not triumph solely or even primarily through military might. We must fight terrorist networks and their supporters using every instrument of national power of the United States. Progress will come through the persistent accumulation of successes--some seen, some unseen. Our goal will be reached when Americans and other civilized people around the world can lead their lives free of fear from terrorist attacks.

SOF will continue to play a lead role in this war by bringing terrorists, their supporters and their state facilitators to justice, or by bringing justice to them. But winning this war will require new capabilities, sustainable increases in capacity, and significant improvements in the global reach and speed of SOF forces. To meet the

demands of the new environment, we must ensure that our capabilities are well-tuned to meet emerging needs. U.S. special operators have been the cornerstone of our military operations since the beginning of the GWOT. From Tampa to Tikrit to Toibalawe all of USSOCOM is in high gear, a tempo we expect to maintain for a long time.

Our efforts will remain focused on our mission. Our success will come from the finest trained and prepared warriors in the world who are in the right place at the right time against the right adversary. Special operations forces play a key role in America's and the world's defeat of terrorism. In an environment of asymmetric threats, we are this Nation's asymmetric force. With energy, focus, skill and determination, we will take the fight to the enemy and win. Your continued support of our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and DOD civilians is the foundation of our success.

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
**DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 2, 2005

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# **Strategic Communications Briefing**

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6 April 2005

# Defining the "War of Ideas"



## ENEMY IDEAS



- Islam is the "Rule of Law"
  - Islamic government comes from GOD (perfect)
  - Supports a privileged few
- Tolerance of non-Muslims is a lack of faith
  - HATE
  - BLAME
- Governments control the people



## COALITION IDEAS

- Representative Govt is fair
  - Derived from the consensus of the governed Man (imperfect)
  - Responsible to the people
- Pluralism, tolerance, strength in diversity
- Governments represent people,
  - Peacefully remove people from power
  - Majority rule can protect minority rights
- "Marketplace of Ideas" (free press-transparency of Govt)


**Apply All Elements of US Power**

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# The Challenge




Discredit the ideology without discrediting the religion it has hijacked


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




**Non-Military**




**Military**



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# Winning the GWOT




- Deny WMD
- Win the war of ideas: build popular support against insurgents
- Increase stability within and between the nation-states
- Isolate the extremists
  - Kill Leadership
  - Counter-Propaganda (War of Ideas)
  - Interdict Finances
  - Interdict Supply & Communications
  - Block Weapons and Ammunition
  - Disrupt Criminal partnerships
  - Disrupt State-sponsorship
  - Deny Freedom of Movement
  - Interdict People/Recruits
  - Disrupt Training
  - Deny Sanctuary
- Establish a regional anti-terrorist security apparatus

# The Pool of Resources...



## The Populace



The networks rely on the local populace to provide the resources needed to sustain the insurgency.


Appointed advisors  
 Receptive to conversion—  
 • Propaganda & indoctrination  
 • Feasibility  
 • Security  
 • Motivation  
 • Ability

• Subj. to  
 • Subj. to  
 • Trainers


**Willing to Act:**  
 AQ & other extremists—  
 • Leadership  
 • Executors & Planners  
 • Terrorist Operators  
 • Jihad soldiers


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Synchronize and coordinate Public Affairs (PA), Public Diplomacy (PD) and Information Operations (IO) reinforced by diplomatic, economic, and military actions in order to shape foreign perceptions and behaviors and to maintain a permissive international, national, and regional environment in support of CENTCOM operations.







## Formula for Success

$$\hat{\hat{GWOT}} = d I m E$$

Main effort - Information element of power  
Supporting effort - Economic element of power  
Time frame – Long term





6 April 2005



# Proposed National Level Objectives


LINE OF OPERATION	STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS ASSESSMENT - AS OF OCT 04	Status	Trend
Terrorism	Theatre population is committed to the eradication of terrorism.		↑
Political Reform	Population demonstrates willingness to participate in a legitimate political decision-making process.		↔
Stability	Population demonstrates respect for the International Rule of Law and the peaceful resolution of disputes.		↑
Governance	Population supports system in which civil issues are resolved within a framework of institutions guaranteed by transparent laws.		↑
Economic Development	Population supports the premise that free market economies lead to prosperity and opportunity for all.		↔
Human Rights	The intrinsic value and right of the individual citizen to play a meaningful role in society has popular support.		↔
Moral Commitment	International engagement throughout the AOR transcends the national interests of contributing nations.		↔




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






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


- SC Directorate (Lead)
- PAO
- J2-PI (Intel for IO)
- J3-PI
- J5-CMO
- J5-CPG
- J5-CCC (Coalition)
- J5-SC (Security Cooperation)
- JIACG
- POLAD



## ***IO Working Group***

- J3PI (Lead)
- CCSC
- PAO
- J2PI
- CC Main
- STRATCOM
- JPOTF
- CJTF-HOA
- US Embassy Iraq
- Joint Info Opns Center
  
- CFLCC
- CFMCC
- CENTAF
- CFACC
- CFSOCC
- MNF- I
- CFC-A



Strategic Engagement & Response Center

- Analyze - Pan Arab/Islamic Media
  - Engage - Deliberate Planning
  - Respond - Time Sensitive Events



## Strategic Communications



### Commander's Top Ten: OBJ 1: Set conditions for Iraq elections

Target Audience	Which countries in the AOR support the new Interim Iraqi Government?
MOE-1	Selected <i>Pan-Arab</i> media throughout region
MOE-2	Balance of Pan Arab media editorials support IIG and elections to determine future leaders
	Regional leaders pronounce support of Iraqi sovereignty within the media

● Supportive	● Neutral	● Opposes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Afghanistan</li> <li>▪ Bahrain</li> <li>▪ Egypt</li> <li>▪ Jordan</li> <li>▪ Kuwait</li> <li>▪ Oman</li> <li>▪ Saudi Arabia</li> <li>▪ Qatar</li> <li>▪ Yemen</li> <li>▪ UAE</li> <li>▪ Central Asia</li> <li>▪ Syria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Eritrea</li> <li>▪ Ethiopia</li> <li>▪ Kenya</li> <li>▪ Sudan</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Iran</li> <li>▪ Lebanon</li> </ul>

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# Strategic Communications



## Commander's Top Ten: OBJ # 5: Win the perception battle

Target Audiences	Which countries condemn terrorism?
MOB1	Selected Pan-Arab media throughout region
MOB2	Balance of Pan Arab media editorials condemning terrorism and violence
	Regional leaders publicly denouncing violence by terrorists as reported in the media

Condemns	Silent	Supports
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Afghanistan</li> <li>▪ Bahrain</li> <li>▪ Egypt</li> <li>▪ Iran</li> <li>▪ Jordan</li> <li>▪ Kuwait</li> <li>▪ Central Asia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Djibouti</li> <li>▪ Eritrea</li> <li>▪ Ethiopia</li> <li>▪ Kenya</li> <li>▪ Lebanon</li> <li>▪ Sudan</li> <li>▪ Syria</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ No public support reported in the media</li> </ul>

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Strategic Engagement & Response Center

- Analyze - Pan Arab/Islamic Media
- Engage - Deliberate Planning
- Respond - Time Sensitive Events



## *Target Audiences*



- **Sub-Regional populations**
- **Regional populations**
- **International populations**
- **U.S. populations**

**TURKEY**


**JORDAN**


**SC OBJ: Promote civil-military operations that counter the underlying conditions that spawn terrorism**  
**Theme: Iraqis must make a choice**

**The people of Iraq have a choice**  
 The path of peace and prosperity... or the path of violence and fear.

**JPOTF PRODUCT**

**PRESIDENT BUSH (24 MAY SPEECH)**  
 "These two visions – one of tyranny and murder, the other of liberty and life – have now met in Iraq, and are contending for the future of the country. The failure of freedom would only mark the beginning of peril and violence."





## Strategic Engagement & Response Center

- Analyze - Pan Arab/Islamic Media
- Engage - Deliberate Planning
- Respond - Time Sensitive Events



# STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS



## Seize Strategic Communications Initiative



Fallujah strike



PM Allawi's Comments

Engagement: [AlJazeera.net, 6 July]

Baghdad confirms that US bombing raid on Fallujah took place after consultation with Interim Iraqi Government.

Prime Minister Allawi insisted the raid hit "terrorists" who kill innocent Iraqis and destroy schools, hospitals, and police stations.

Comment:

PM Allawi's statement makes significant contribution to strategic communications objectives.

Minimizing collateral damage remains key to IIG's freedom to associate itself with attacks by Coalition against foreign fighters.

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# Questions?

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**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE  
RECORD**

MARCH 2, 2005

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON**

Mr. SKELTON. Are these engineers being left out of the equation of up-armor? Would you ask your staff to take a look at the 97th Engineering Combat Battalion?

General ABIZAD. The Department of Defense has worked closely with Congress and the industrial base over the last year to accelerate efforts to provide better protection for our service members. These efforts included increased production of body armor, Up-Armored High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV's) (UAH) and vehicle Add on Armor (AoA). This focus has resulted in significant force protection improvements for our deployed forces.

Providing armor protection for wheeled vehicles continues to be a top priority in the theater and will continue until we have provided armor protection for every vehicle that requires it.

Directions from the services and the commanders responsible in both Kuwait and Iraq have resulted in the institution of standard operating procedures, effective 15 February 2005, that require all vehicles operating off protected compounds to have at least Level III armor protection. The armoring effort continues in both Iraq and Kuwait.

Specifically addressing the unit in question, the 92nd Engineer Battalion possesses 255 pieces of armored equipment which includes: HMMWV's, dump trucks, bull dozers, medium (five ton) tractors, and heavy equipment transportation systems. The aforementioned equipment represents the majority of the battalion's organic assets as well as additional, temporarily loaned equipment.

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR**

Mr. TAYLOR. In a counterinsurgency, can you win a counterinsurgency when over half of the people have an unfavorable view. What steps are we taking as a Nation to turn that around?

General ABIZAD. United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Strategic Communications synchronizes and coordinates strategic themes, messages, and actions in support of USCENTCOM operations and national strategic goals. USCENTCOM Strategic Communications also works with the National Security Council, The Department of State, and other government agencies to assure coordination of efforts to influence perceptions within the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Inter-directorate efforts within USCENTCOM are conducted via a Joint Synchronization Board chaired by the USCENTCOM Chief of Staff. USCENTCOM Strategic Communications also provide Strategic Communications Guidance to Combined Joint Task Forces and USCENTCOM component commands. Please see the attached file: Strategic Communications Brief, which reviews the above.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 137.]

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#### **QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HOSTETTLER**

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Explain how you use the US Coast Guard for your theater engagement purposes? Would you like more Coast Guard assets in your AOR?

General ABIZAD. USCENTCOM employs Coast Guard vessels in the CENTCOM AOR to conduct the same Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) activities as the US Navy. This includes engagement with regional maritime military and law enforcement agencies, Mobile Needs Assessment visits, Mobile Training Team (MTT) visits that provide training in maritime law enforcement tactics, techniques and procedures, local receptions, Distinguished Visitor (DV) events, Captain's Calls with local officials, Community Relations events (COMREL), and various other Media events. Additionally, USCG vessels and crews are actively engaged in operations at sea. They provide critical expertise in maritime law enforcement that is essential to the success of maritime security operations protecting key oil infrastructure, the policing of national territorial waters, and support for Kuwaiti and Iraqi maritime forces.

The USCG's presence in the CENTCOM AOR benefit's our TSC activities and enhances our ability to carry out the operations described above. However, the current deployment of one cutter per year is sufficient.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. What advantages does the Coast Guard bring you when dealing with many small international navies in your AOR that are more like the Coast Guard in force structure and missions than the US Navy?

General ABIZAID. Coast Guard personnel have extensive experience in littoral operations both in the defense and domestic law enforcement roles. Familiarity with the complexity and nuances of small platform operations serves as common ground with regional forces interaction and interoperability training. The USCG also provides unique insight to the challenges and advantages of exercising across departmental (ministry) boundaries in both day to day operations and in the face of large scale disasters (i.e.: Environmental Response, Natural Disasters, Terrorist Alerts, etc.). Additionally, the presence of a US Coast Guard Cutter in the ports of regional nations often presents a less intimidating picture of US goodwill than that of a US Naval warship.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Should the Coast Guard be removed from participation in future wars? If not, why not?

General ABIZAID. The Coast Guard brings important and unique capabilities to the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility and their continued participation in current and any future operations is important to our regional objectives. The USCG has been an active participant in every major military campaign since World War II. The 2002 National Fleet agreement between the USN and USCG cements this relationship and ensures that the USCG is capable of supporting a broad spectrum of national security requirements from power projection to defense of the homeland. Operations in the Arabian Gulf have highlighted the important synergies between the USN and USCG. USCENTCOM relies on the unique expertise of the USCG in areas including Port Security Teams, Patrol Craft, Law Enforcement Detachments (LEDETs), and Environmental Response Planning & Management.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. What improvements/changes does the Coast Guard need to make in order to be more useful to meet your mission objectives?

General ABIZAID. Current USCG acquisition efforts such as the Deepwater Program will greatly enhance the interoperability between USCG and USN units in the CENTCOM AOR. Some of the smaller Coast Guard vessels have sea state limitations which impact operations while operating-in the rougher waters of the North Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman and the Gulf of Aden. These are areas where we intend to focus our security assistance operations over the long term.

Current USCG Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) capabilities limit interoperability with US Navy and Coalition forces. Additionally, USCG Cutters that deploy to the CENTCOM AOR should have an embarked helicopter and be equipped with all required communications equipment, including CENTRIX and Battle Force E-mail, to more effectively integrate with U.S. and Coalition ships.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Do you need to increase the number of Coast Guard personnel on your staff?

General ABIZAID. The navies of most nations in the Central Command region have missions that closely mirror those of the United States Coast Guard (USCG), yet, there are only two USCG officers on the CENTCOM maritime component staff. The duties of the presently assigned USCG personnel include liaison between United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) and the USCG Headquarters, acting as the primary staff officers for USCG and law enforcement issues, providing critical interface to U.S. Embassies for coordination and administration of USCG international training initiatives with regional nations, and serving as the Territorial Water Operations training and assessment team for the Iraqi Navy.

Over the past year, NAVCENT has sought to expand Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) efforts with regional navies and leverage these similarities by increasing the level of USCG participation in TSC initiatives. However, NAVCENT efforts have been frustrated by the limited number and high workload of the presently assigned USCG personnel. Additional USCG officers would greatly facilitate efforts to expand maritime TSC initiatives and significantly bolster engagement with regional maritime law enforcement agencies, which USCG personnel are uniquely equipped and trained to support. Moreover, these personnel would greatly improve NAVCENT's ability to develop and expand USCG Mobile Needs Assessment plans and visits and provide a permanence that would facilitate enduring engagements with Regional Maritime forces. Due to the significant role USCG personnel play in CENTCOM's TSC efforts, NAVCENT is working with the Coast Guard and has begun the process to officially request and resource additional Coast Guard personnel for their staff.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Are you concerned about the Coast Guard's ability to sustain its readiness in the future given its antiquated fleet of aircraft, cutters, and communications systems?

General ABIZAD. Without an adequate modernization effort, the USCG will be hard pressed to fulfill both its requirement in support of the U.S. Navy and its expanded role in homeland defense. The USCG Deepwater fleet modernization program is essential to ensure the continued viability of the USCG and to enhance their ability to effectively contribute to our efforts in the GWOT.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Would you like to see a Coast Guard training team assigned to your Area of Responsibility on a permanent basis?

General ABIZAD. Employment of a permanently assigned Coast Guard training team would provide a tremendous force multiplier to our Theater Security Cooperation efforts in this region. Current constraints on a permanent USCG training Team include demands on USCG personnel resources and no dedicated authorized funding for such a program. As you know, the Department of State is the custodian of all funds authorized for military to military training with foreign nations.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Do you feel that the Integrated Priority List (IPL) process directly addresses Coast Guard concerns?

General ABIZAD. It would be difficult to say this process directly addresses those concerns. The Integrated Priority List process reflects capabilities based approach to documenting needed enhancements vice a program/platform specific approach. Additionally, there are often many competing requirements for scarce resources and ultimately DoD leadership determines how best to address capability shortfalls.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYUN

Mr. RYUN. As we are all aware, we have a lot of challenges facing us in the Middle East, particularly in Iran. In what ways will CENTCOM be working to address these challenges?

General ABIZAD. USCENTCOM addresses Middle East challenges by continuously developing and assessing military contingency plans and by conducting Theater Security Cooperation activities throughout our Area of Responsibility (AOR). Theater Security Cooperation activities create enduring bilateral relations which deter destabilizing activities and contribute to the professionalization and reliability of armed forces in Middle Eastern partner states. USCENTCOM strengthens military and governmental relationships throughout our AOR through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, bilateral and multilateral exercise programs, and Foreign Military Sales of US equipment which facilitates interoperability and paves the way for effective participation of regional nations in current and future coalition operations.

Mr. RYUN. Since September 11th, we have been searching for Osama Bin Laden. Much of our effort has been focused on searching the mountains of Pakistan. To what degree is the Pakistani government helping our search?

General ABIZAD. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. In January, I traveled with Chairman Saxton to Afghanistan and had the opportunity to speak with President Karzai. In our meeting, he stated the need to encourage local farmers to refrain from opium production. In your testimony, you stated "Unchecked expansion of poppy cultivation and the drug trafficking culture that accompanies it poses a clear threat to Afghan and regional stability. . . . Creating viable alternate livelihoods to counter the "easy money" of poppy production will take time." What plans are underway to support the request of President Karzai? Also, what resources in the FY05 Supplemental will be used to support anti-narcotics activities?

General ABIZAD. USCENTCOM supports President Karzai's Alternative Livelihoods (AL) initiatives with USAID acting as the lead U. S. Government (USG) agency for AL programs in Afghanistan. We assist USAID in this endeavor by coordinating the expenditure of Commanders Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds for local relief and reconstruction projects and by providing an AL public awareness campaign. To help counter the drug trade in Afghanistan, we provide International, USG and Afghan law enforcement agencies intelligence, mobility support and training that actively support initiatives to build an indigenous Afghan counter narcotics capability. The FY05 Supplemental provided USCENTCOM \$854M in CERP authority, a significant increase from the previously authorized \$500M. This will greatly

accelerate our relief and reconstruction efforts and help bolster economic opportunities across the country. Additionally, the supplemental provided \$242M for drug interdiction/counter drug activities to support our operations, \$34M of which will go directly to the Afghan government to assist in the development of their indigenous counter narcotics force.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN FROM OHIO**

Mr. RYAN. How many hospitals and city council chambers or city halls, schools have we built over the past year or two that we actually constructed and were blown up? How often is this happening? And do you have any hard numbers for us?

General ABIZAD. We do not track that type of data. I can tell you that some of the structures that were repaired or rebuilt using coalition funds were subsequently damaged during criminal or insurgent attacks. For example, insurgent attacks on Iraqi police stations, government facilities, election offices, and oil infrastructure undoubtedly damaged buildings or other facilities that we paid to have repaired. It is important to look at the larger picture, which shows Iraqi government, law enforcement, and oil distribution and export capabilities are improving to the point where coalition oversight is no longer necessary. The money spent on the repair of damaged infrastructure was absolutely necessary to insure this progress.

