

file

S-E-C-R-E-T

NO. I NAME: HOEHER, Wolfgang
 BIRTHDATE: 15 Feb 14 ALIAS: _____
 BIRTHPLACE: Magdeburg V # : 2996
 RESIDENCE: East Germany (1958) TELEPHONE # : _____
 RELIGION : _____ VEHICLE : _____
 LICENSE #(s) : _____

PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION AS OF 1953

HEIGHT	<u>6' 4"</u>		BUILD	<u>heavy set</u>
WEIGHT	_____		TEETH	_____
EYES	<u>blue</u>		OTHER	_____
HAIR	<u>blond</u>		_____	_____
PHOTO DATE	_____		_____	_____

FAMILY BI DATA

FATHER : _____ DOB/POB: _____
 MOTHER : _____ DOB/POB: _____
 SPOUSE : Katharina HOEHER DOB/POB: 31 Dec 17 in Kichenwalde
 (MEE: MEYER)
 CHILDREN: Dieter HOEHER DOB/POB: _____
 Uta HOEHER DOB/POB: _____
 OTHER RELATIVES W/UPSWING: _____

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2
 DATE 2003 2008

UPSWING EMPLOYMENT

EOD: _____ RANK: _____
 POSITION: Civil officer SECTION: _____ FROM: _____ TO: _____
 Subject disappeared into East Germany in 1953

DATE TERMINATION OR SEPARATION: _____
 NEW STATUS: _____

S-E-C-R-E-T

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
[] / Horst KIRWES/Wolfgang HOEHER		RI FILE NO.	32	6	2	8580
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			DATE	
		MGBA 15176			20 May 1952	
ANALYST		DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE		
		9 April 1957				
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO. :			
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM						
<p>1. Request routine file check on Wolfgang HOEHER or Wolfgang HOHER, Berlin-Kreisberg, Skalitzerstr., telephone 61 42 60. We find a Wolfgang HOHER listed in the 1943 Berlin directory as "Hauptmann der Schutzpolizei", living in Berlin-Kreuzberg, Wienerstr. 14d. POB please check Zipper files. The reasons for this request are given below.</p> <p>2. [] reported recently that Horst Kirwes, a German official of the SAG Main headquarters in Berlin-Weissensee, had confided to him "some months ago" that he was working for the Bonn intelligence service, reporting through Wolfgang HOEHER, Berlin-Kreuzberg, phone as above.</p> <p>4. A number of possibilities of operational interest suggest themselves as a result of the above notes. One possibility is that the Kirwes/HOEHER chain is a Zipper operation. This might explain some the recent Zipper reports in the SAG field. In any case, it would be interesting if we could obtain definite proof that Kirwes is a western agent, as a check on some of [] statements.</p>						
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2003 2006						
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.						
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.			➔			

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

M G Q W

VIA: Air
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. MOGA-15145

SECRET
Security Information
[REDACTED]
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Station, Frankfurt

DATE: 23 July 1952

FROM : Chief, FE

General by Post - Germany

SUBJECT: GENERAL.

SPECIFIC: Ernst KIRCHS and Wolfgang HOMER

REF: MOGA-15176

Our files contain no identifiable traces on Ernst KIRCHS and Wolfgang HOMER. Sorry for the delay.

MB/jl

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2008

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32 6 2 2580
ABSTRACT INDEX
Encl to MOGA-15176
DATE 29

COORDINATING OFFICER

ASSISTANT

FORM NO. 11-52
MAY 1952

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

AIR

NO 15466

MGQW-15466

Chief of Station, Frankfurt
Attention: Chief, EE

21 July 1952

Operational

US DROLLERY 1004 and US DROLLERY 704

Ref: HLA-12200

1. There is some confusion here regarding the ZIPPER agent (or agents) involved in US DROLLERY 1004 and US DROLLERY 704. According to HLA-2000, and HLA-10408, V-2996 was the agent leader for US DROLLERY 1004 as well as US DROLLERY 704. HLA-10818 forwards a product of US DROLLERY 704 giving V-2996 as the source, but V-2996 is not mentioned in HLA-11124 which contains a basic report on US DROLLERY 704. Although V-2996 is mentioned in HLA-11124, his role seems superfluous.

2. Prior to the receipt of reference, the only record here on V-2997 was HLA-20000 which identified V-2997 as the source of HLA-20000, and HLA-12200 which requested V-2997's true name. Could ZIPPER be asked to clarify the roles played by V-2996 and V-2997 in US DROLLERY 704, as well as the roles played by V-2996 and V-2997 in US DROLLERY 1004? Has ZIPPER ever revealed the true name of V-2997?

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DISPATCH NO. EGLA-261

VIA _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

SECURITY INFORMATION
SECRET
CLASSIFICATION

C
O
P

DATE: 25 September 1952

TO : Y Chief of Base, Berlin

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational

SPECIFIC— ZIPPER Agents

REF: MGBA-15176

1. Subjects of paragraphs 1 and 2 of referenced memo are active ZIPPERITES.

2. For information purposes would you kindly forward to us any further suspicions that have arisen in the mind of [] or any action that might have been taken since MGBA-15176 ~~was~~ was sent to POB.

3. FOR COM ONLY: Subject of para 1 of reference is V-2996. Subject of para 2 is V-2997, both of GV I.

[]

Approved by

[]

DIST:
2 - BOB
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~~3 - EE~~

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DATE 2003 2006

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FORM NO 51 284

STAMEN
Kampfgruppe

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SECURITY INFORMATION

DTRULER-BOB, Berlin Memorandum #8

30 September 1952

TO : []
FROM : []

SUBJECT: Neues Deutschland Article

1. An article in the 20 September 1952 edition of Neues Deutschland, entitled "Hohe Zuchthausstrafen für zwei Ami-Agenten im HF", mentions Georg Kernchen and Günter Brauer as KgU members. Both were connected with the Kampfgruppe.

2. Kernchen and Brauer were reportedly arrested in March 1952; the KgU has never received definitive information concerning the circumstances of their compromise and arrest. Brauer had communicated with Roller (mentioned in the article), a KgU member against whom a kidnap attempt was made near the end of March 1952 (his briefcase was stolen on that occasion). Compromise could also have occurred through Burianek (arrested 4 March 1952) and/or related arrests about one week later.

3. For your information as per request.

fe []

[] spm

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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SECURITY INFORMATION

SECURITY INFORMATION

VIA: AIR (SPECIFY AIR OR SEA FOUCH)

DISPATCH NO. BULA-686

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE

DATE: 30 October 1952

FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach

Attn: []

SUBJECT: GENERAL - CASE/Operational/CART

SPECIFIC - Horst KIRWES et al.

Ref: BULA-685

Names and available data of the persons mentioned in paragraph 2 of reference are:

- a. Horst KIRWES, official of the SAG Main Hq, Berlin-Weidenburg, believed to be dealing with the West-German businessmen and in charge of the SAG exhibition room.
- b. Wolfgang ROEHR, former Police officer, residing in Berlin. Contrary to paragraph 4 b of att. "A" of reference, ZIPPER has not given ROEHR's true address except for the statement that he lives in Berlin.
- c. Fan HERTSMAN (Professor), born about 1898, former journalist, scholarly type.
- d. Karl Heinz GERHARDT, born 1 Feb. 1913 in Berlin, owns bookshop in Berlin Wilmersdorf, has also an address at 9, Ruedesheimerplatz. His height is given as 176 cms, his figure is slim, he has blue eyes and wears glasses.

Approved by

Handwritten initials and signature

Dirt:
3 - EE
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2 - BOB

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FORM NO 51-28 A

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE: 2003-07-06

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SECURITY INFORMATION

EO 1.2-2008

"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

Chief of Base, Berlin

1 December 1952

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/CALL/CART/CAMY

Zipper and Free Jurists

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SENSITIVE

1. Prior to [] recent visit to Berlin, Zipper had informed us that a Zipper man had effected contact with the "Archiv Verwalter" (custodian of files) of the Free Jurists and had discovered a wealth of information on the MSS-SSD, seemingly overlooked and unexploited. When [] returned, we told Zipper to abandon plans for tapping this collection, in view of your own discovery of and interest in this material. Zipper has agreed to do so, though apparently having already obtained some of the highlights. Would you, however, please see if anything can be done to make this information available, in whole or in part, to Zipper, for its MSS-SSD penetration program?

2. Zipper has another and greater interest in the "Archiv Verwalter". This is the "HOCHWALD" project to exploit his contacts in an effort to penetrate the Prenzlauer-Berg MSS. We told Zipper that for cleanness of lines it would be best if the man worked exclusively for only one agency; Zipper believes he will leave the Jurists and work exclusively for Zipper. Have you any serious objections?

3. Will you please provide us with identity and summary of information on this man?

Approved by []

Dist:
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DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION				
"HOCHWALD" Project		RI FILE NO.	32	0	24	2492
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.			DATE	
		EGQA 6329			12 Dec 1952	
ANALYST		DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN		DATE	
		13 May 1957				
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION						
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO RI FILE NO. :			
PERTINENT INFORMATION						
<p>THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM</p> <p>We are wondering if there is any connection between the "HOCHWALD" Project mentioned in Reference and the "HOCHWALD" of Organization 236. Despite the identical name, they seem to be two quite different operations.</p>						
<p>DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006</p>						
<p>THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.</p>						
FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.  []						

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

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(7-46)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECURITY INFORMATION
"SECRET CONTROL"
US OFFICIALS ONLY

EGLA-1584

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

18 December 1952

Chief of Base, Pullach

Attn: []

Operational/ZIPPER/CART/TPEMBER

V-2996,3

Ref: EGM-A-6329; SBRLN-7478-OPC

not rec.

1. We know of no connection whatever between the 236 "ROCHALD" project and Zipper's CE "ROCHALD" project re the MSS. This appears to be merely coincidental concurrent use of the same cryptonym. You will remember that a similar episode, "STUBST", led us to use a FOB cryptonym [] to avoid such duplicate use of cryptonyms. The Zipper CE ROCHALD project refers to contemplated exploitation of the "Archiv Verwalter", mentioned in EGLA-1208, directed at obtaining leads for penetration of the MSS office in Prenzlauer-Berg.

2. For second reference, we informed Zipper that this man, to whom Zipper had already given agent number V-2996,3, was already employed by Americans. Zipper, at headquarters level, agreed that Zipper should and would keep hands off. By now, word should have reached the Berlin Zipperites and all should be quiet.

3. For BOB:

- a. To tie in true identity with Zipper V-#, please supply information requested in par. 3, EGLA-1208.
- b. Par. 4, 2nd ref., is of interest to us from UJ-DREDDER standpoint. Please let us have summary of information available to you re Zipper personalities involved, and methods of establishing contact. Any such information, in as much detail as possible, is of continuing interest to FOB.
- c. Thank you for your promise to make MSS information available to Zipper; it will be greatly appreciated.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Approved by

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 December 1952

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 76109

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHRONO
4	
5	C/EE
6	QPP
7	
8	

TO: SR. REP., FRANKFURT, BERLIN (GERMANY)

/sam EE/PPG

3311

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

EE 6

1722Z 19 DEC 52

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 32689

TO: SFRAM

INFO: SBRLN

CITE: DIR

RE: BRUN 7551 (IN 21397)

CADORY/CALL/TPEMBER

1. MGB 9188, 19 OCT 49, LISTS FNU WOLK MEMBER SED BRANDENBURG HQS REFERENT. WOLK DEALT WITH PARTY SCHOOLING, TRADE SCHOOLS. HAD BEEN IN SED KREISVORSTAND KYRITZ. BORN ABOUT 1912. EVALUATION B-2.

2. MGL-8985, 12 SEPT 50, AND MGL-9733, 1 NOV 50, STATE FNU WOLK PRIOR SEPT 50 COMMANDED 8TH VOPO BEREITSCHAFT LOCATED ^{BERLIN} ~~DESSAU KOCHSTEDT.~~ ~~DESSAU KOCHSTEDT.~~ WAS FORMER CHIMNEY SWEEP AND WARTIME NAVY SIGNALMAN.

3. UNABLE DETERMINE WHETHER SUBJECT REF IDENTICAL WITH ABOVE INDIVIDUALS. NO FURTHER TRACES.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

END OF MESSAGE

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326-1-9351

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EE/PPG

EE/PP

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COURIER

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DATE 2006

EOIA- 723

Chief of Base, Berlin

30 December 1952

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/~~ZIPPER/TPEMBER~~/security

V-2996,3

Ref: EOIA-1584

1. One of the members of the security branch of Zipper's headquarters CI section reported to us that a "Mr. Strong, CID, Berlin," approached subject on 8 December and solicited close cooperation in the RED work field, specifically that he leave TPEMBER and go to work for Mr. Strong. The latter, reportedly, questioned Subject in detail concerning the identity of the outfit to which he had previously delivered reports. Mr. Strong reportedly reminded Subject, as an added inducement, of the outstanding possibility of prosecution by a US court on charges arising from a pistol-drawing incident in November '52. Zipper asked us to intervene and ask Mr. Strong to drop contact with Subject. We are advising the requestor that his chief has already agreed that Zipper would keep hands off. However, we are passing on the report for your information, as a matter of possible security interest.

2. We shall keep you advised of any further information passed to us by Zipper concerning Subject. However, we believe that it is desirable to bear in mind the fact that Subject might, at any time, maintain or resume contact with Zipper. Occasional carriage testing might be advisable if his work for you is of a sensitive nature. Per BERLN-7478 Subject's main value is his affiliation with TPEMBER and access to their leads. This is probably obvious to Zipper, too; indeed, Subject's continued affiliation with TPEMBER was the basis for Zipper's decision to abandon contact.

Approved by

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AIR

BOB-A-2204

SECRET

OPERATIONAL INFORMATION

Chief of Base, Pullach

4 January 1953

Chief, BOB

Operational/ZIPPER/CART/TPEMBER

V-2996,3

Ref: EGLA-1584

1. The only man, according to HOCHWALD, who tried to recruit him is one from HAGELMOESER, who is an official of the LfV, Berlin. HOCHWALD's files were shown to HAGELMOESER, amongst them information on the MSS office located in Prenzlauer-Berg.

2. We would be interested in learning whether HAGELMOESER is a ZIPPER agent.

Approved by:

[]

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 JAN 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 30470

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FI3
3	CI/Memo
4	PPB
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SP REP PULLACH

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

0229Z 22 JAN 53

FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, PP 2, FI/RI 2

INFORMATION:

PULL 4781

TO: SBRLN INFO: DIR, SFRAN CITE: SPULL

RE: BRLN-7813 *

ZIPPER/CART/TPEMBER

CONCUR YOUR DROPPING G-2996.3 (HOCHWALD). ZIPPER PICKING UP FOR SSD PROGRAM.

END OF MESSAGE

*MSG CTR NOTE: NOT RECD WASH S/C.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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EGBA-2073

SECRET CONTROL
US OFFICIALS ONLY

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

23 January 1953

Chief of Base, Pullach

Attn: []

Operational ZIPPER CART TEMPER

V 2936.3

Ref: EGBA 2204

1. We believe your firm HAGELMOESER, LfV, Berlin, official to be id/v. Dr. Rudolf HAGELMOESER, b. 16 Aug. 1893 in Jenn, reported as a member of the V3 in Berlin in MOFA-6484 (25 Apr. '52).

2. This is the only POB US trace we have on HAGELMOESER. The ZIPPER headquarters card on him shows him as a member of the LfV, Berlin, but does not indicate any connection to ZIPPER.

[]

Approved by

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DATE 2006

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original in []

AIR

EGB-A-2815

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

Chief, EE

26 January 1953

Chief of Base, Berlin

Operational/CART/TPEMBER

Hochwald.

Ref: EGB-A-2814

Subject is Walter Wolk, alias Hochwald.

Approved by:

[]

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DATE 2006

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BERLIN COUNCILMAN HOEHER KIDNAPED
Paris, AFP, Radioteletype in French to the Americas, Feb. 17, 1953, 1225
GMT--E

(Text)

Berlin--The Free Democratic Party of West Berlin announced that Mr. Wolfgang Hoeher, member of the Municipal Council of Berlin--Kreuzberg district in the American zone, has been kidnaped by unknown persons and taken to the Soviet Zone.

Hoeher, who had been police commander before 1945, was probably kidnaped last Friday after a business lunch in a Western Zone restaurant. He is supposed to have taken a car bearing a Western registration number and to have been driven to the Eastern Zone. (3 Feb.)

In connection with this kidnaping Mr. Willy Kressmann, Mayor of the Kreuzberg district, issued an appeal to its inhabitants urging them to take precautions in their relations with friends on and near the border with East Germany.

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DATE 2003 2008

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Intercept dated 16 February 1953 at 10:05:

WOLK calling a female.

F: 5093

W: This is Hochwald speaking.

F: Ah, Mr. Hochwald, how do you do.

W: Anything new?

F: What do you mean?

W: Was the man there?

F: My daughter-in-law just went to the police.

W: Ah, do you know whether the man in question from the East still came yesterday or the day before yesterday?

F: No, he did not come any more.

W: Even though he knew that Mr. HELLING was missing?

F: Well, yesterday at 2:00 afternoon the woman with whom he lives together called up and asked whether Wolfgang is already there. My daughter-in-law who was on the ball said, "Of course, he is here; we are waiting for you to have coffee with us". We invited them (her) because it was Wolfgang's birthday. She answered that, "HORST does not feel well", whereupon my daughter-in-law answered, "Try to talk him into it". She answered, "Well, maybe we will come after all. Goodbye." and hung up. They should be coming today.

W: That seems to be pretty clear.

F: I am 100% convinced. Did my daughter-in-law already speak to you?

W: Yes, she called me Saturday evening.

F: Yes, then I take it for granted that my son was given poison in a glass. He had an appointment with a man in a restaurant on the Wittenburg Platz.

W: Yes, in the Mosalaner.

F: Do you know about it?

W: Yes, and that's the end, but nothing further on it.

F: Well, he, the man, told me, "Granny, I might be a little bit late. Please tell Wolfgang that if I should be late to wait". But he got there even sooner and asked the waiter for one-fourth liter of wine and two glasses. Maybe there was something in this glass already. Then they ordered another half liter of red wine. The manager then brought ~~xx~~ ^{him} to the door and saw them cross over to the subway station. We assume that his brain stopped functioning and that he went past Warschauer Bruecke and naturally expected on the other side.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

- W. That's horrible.
- F. Herr HOCHWALD, we can't cry any more; we can't do anything any more.
- W. Yes, yes, I believe you.
- F. This now is my last son (she starts crying). Herr HOCHWALD, please call again.
- W. Yes, I shall call again.
- F. Maybe around 1100; then maybe my daughter-in-law will be back.
- W. Yes, I should like to do that.
- F. Goodbye.

Intercept dated 16 February 1953 at 1655: HOCHWALD calling Herr SCHMIDT of the Polizeipraesidium

The first ~~of~~ half of this intercept deals with Guenther SCHULZ, who seems to know something about the LINSE kidnapping. The second half deals with HOEHER.

- S. What's the matter with our friend?
- W. I spoke today with the mother and the wife. It seems to be very clear.
- S. Namely, from the Moselaner. The one that was waiting for him ordered wine, which the two of them drank, after which there is no trace.
- W. Yes, the man from the East called Granny and told her that he will be late. Nevertheless, he came early.
- S. He had an appointment with WOLFGANG for the next day.
- W. The following: This man sits in the Moselaner and orders a fourth a liter of wine and two glasses. This in itself is rather strange. Sunday a relative of the HELLING family drove to the other side to find out what happened to HELLING. The man allegedly was working, but he got the answer that the night before Anton came home at 2015 hours. That is very possible since both gentlemen allegedly left the restaurant at 1930. This, to me, seemed very interesting. Sunday there was a conversation with the girlfriend of the East man. When she was told on the telephone that WOLFGANG is at home, which naturally was not the truth, she was extremely embarrassed. When Frau HELLING repeated her invitation in honor of WOLFGANG's birthday and emphasized that she was expected, she gave the excuse that ANTON is sick and cannot come. During the course of this conversation, she did not congratulate or ask WOLFGANG to the telephone, which ~~she~~ would have been the natural thing to do. ANTON repeatedly visited in the apartment of the HELLING's and had told Frau HELLING that the woman had threatened to betray him. All this leads to no other conclusion than the one that the man made HELLING unconscious with the aid of drugged wine and then drove (probably by subway) him to the Warschauer Bruecke or Potsdamer Platz. I recommended today to Frau

HELLING today that she should speak to the men on duty at the stations Warschauer Bruecke and Potsdamer Platz in order to find out whether anything unusual was noticed. It again is very stupidly managed from the other side since one knows the executor. But then again one becomes aware that in the West one still does not count with the human cruelty of the other side.

S. I think he had known him for two years.

W. I am afraid that HELLING made himself out to be a very interesting person. I always had the feeling that he talked too much.

S. Whom shall I trust?
one

W. Nobody from the East.

S. Frau HELLING still does not want to make a formal report.

W. I gave Frau HELLING the advice to write a very cool letter to the man in the East asking him for an explanation.

S. That might not be the wrong thing to do.

W. One found the following things belonging to HELLING: a notebook, which will be extremely incriminating against him and a little "Kollegtasche" (probably a small briefcase). Not too long I gave Herr HELLING an expose of approximately 25 - 30 pages. It would be interesting to know whether this expose was still in there. Probably you won't be able to find this out for me?

S. Not at the moment. I only know that there wasn't too much in there. A report seems to be superfluous since we won't be able to find out any more. ~~Signatures~~
~~accept~~

W. Seen from a political point of view, this case must be made public. An investigation must be started and the guilty person, namely, ANTON, must be published by name and address. If one keeps this case secret, one only tempts the people on the other side to repeat similar cases.

S. That is your opinion. If this case remains secret, then one could eventually undertake steps advantageous to the Kidnappee.

W. One fetched HELLING because one had very definite reasons for doing so. He was interesting. And because of this interest he was kidnapped. Therefore, it is impossible that he could be released.

S. Other organizations who have more influence must initiate this.

W. This thing must be initiated by the FDP. Here we have a man who never hid the fact that he is against the East that has now been abducted. Then the Berlin police must conduct a very thorough investigation.

S. I shall see the FDP tomorrow.

W. I think that is very important.

S. Well, I shall drop by at your house tomorrow or at least give you a call.

Intercept dated 16 February 1953 at 1210 hours: HOCHWALD calling a female.

F. Hello.

W. HOCHWALD, I would like to find out a few things.

F. We have made no progress whatsoever. We already know who

W. Oh, you know already? So it is that man?

F. Yes.

W. Before this I talked with your mother-in-law who stated that the manager of the Moselaner saw them walk in direction towards the subway station.

F. Yes, yes.

W. Therefore, it must be assumed that he took the subway.

F. Yes, the train in direction Warschauer Bruecke. If he falls asleep on the way, then he runs directly into the arms of the Vopos. Simple solution, isn't it?

W. Have investigations been started?

F. I don't know, but I would be interested to know.

W. Maybe one could find out about something like this on the Warschauer Bruecke.

F. The public's attention should be drawn to this case by asking them whether they noticed a drunken or sleeping man being dragged out. This could be done through pamphlets or posters.

W. I am sure the police have started an investigation. The station master at the Warschauer Bruecke who is on duty on the oncoming side should be able to be found.

F. How, this man is an East Zone employee.

W. That remains to be seen; once in a while it happens that

F. Well, it must have been the subway because with a car they would not have been able to have passed through since all cars are stopped. Furthermore, my husband must not have had control over his senses; otherwise, he would not have gone along.

W. Impossible.

F. He gave him poison, because he appeared at the restaurant half an hour before the time and seated himself in a dark corner where one can draw a curtain and order a half liter of red wine and two glasses.

W. That I have heard already, and it is very suspicious.

F. Isn't it so; that's not the usual way to behave.

W. No.

F. Then WOLFGANG came, and he ordered another half liter of red wine and subsequently another fourth.

W. This is a very queer indication. And then that strange telephone conversation which took place with a lady yesterday.

F. Yes, and then she said to me: "Auf Wiedersehen, Kaethe". Then we waited ~~til~~ until midnight, the criminal police being here. We had notified the criminal police. We waited that long because sometimes those two came from the East Sector as late as 10:30 in the evening. Sometimes ~~were~~ were just ready to go to bed, when a horn tooted outside and it was they. They did that very often at the early stages of our acquaintance. She was very funny on the telephone, and when I told her that WOLFGANG is here, she became completely confused.

The man from the other side surely boarded the other subway train, which travels in direction Pankow, and his accomplices surely were in the train with WOLFGANG.

W. Where must he have changed? Kottbuser Tor?

F. Who, my husband?

W. No, the man.

F. He can take a direct train from Wittenburg Platz to Pankow. My husband must get off at Warshhauer Bruecke.

W. Maybe he took him along right away, saying that he could change at Gleisdreieck. Well, those two possibilities are to be checked: one, Warschauer Bruecke, two, Gleisdreieck - Potsdamer Platz.

F. Yes, yes, it is all being done.

W. This is horrible; I am very impressed.

F. The taxis should also be queried. Even though the manager saw them walk towards the subway station, it could be possible that they went further on to a taxi stand.

W. Possible.

Further possibilities being discussed between the two.

F. I am afraid that it is the woman. Whenever the two had a fight, she threatened him with betrayal. Then the man always came to us and said, "Can you imagine, etc". It could be that she betrayed both her lover and my husband. Maybe she said that he meets my husband in the West in the Moselaner. But he would not have sat down and ordered two glasses.

Further possibilities discussed.

W. The bad part is that he carried his notebook in which all his meetings with various people were listed. On the basis of this, the other side will be able to carry out a thorough interrogation.

F. I went to the police who seemed very stupid to me. They told me that my husband probably ran away with his mistress.

SUBJECT: Abduction of Wolfgang HOEHER

1. On Tuesday 17 February 1953 at 1400 hrs. a meeting was held in the office of Mr. Stelt of Public Safety HICOG. At the meeting were Stelt, Herr Kleyer German Chief of Criminal Police American Sector and Herr Heindke from GCIS 60 Schloß Str. Herr Heindke gave the following report on the HOEHER case.

2. Herr Heindke said that he had known HOEHER and his wife since 1951. He had met HOEHER on official business and HOEHER lived at 5 Adablertstrasse Bln/Kreuzberg and was a FDP representative in the Kreuzberg District Assembly. HOEHER was employed by a West German Counter Intelligence Group called Geel. HOEHER was a former Berlin Police Major until 1945. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945 at Halle and sent to Russia where he worked in a plant that made parts for V-Bombs. Later he was sent to the Antifa School in Moscow. He returned to West Berlin in 1948 and contacted group Geel and has worked for it since that time. Heindke said that on Saturday morning 14 February 1953, at 0900 hrs. he received a call from Frau Katharina HOEHER who told him that her husband had been missing since last night at 1800 hrs. Heindke told her to wait 24 hours and if he does not show up to report the matter to her local police. On 15 February 1953, Heindke went to see Frau HOEHER at her home. He asked her if she had reported her husband's disappearance to the police, she said she had not as she was to wait for word from West Germany. Frau HOEHER reported her husband's disappearance to the police at Revier 107 Bln/Kreuzberg in the evening of 15 February 1953.

3. The following is a copy of the telegram that was sent out by the West Berlin Police. Missing since 13 February 1953, Wolfgang HOEHER, born 15 February 1914 in Magdeburg, 1,84 CM tall, blond hair, blue eyes and of stout build. Last seen wearing a gray leather coat, gray hat, brown pants, light sport jacket and brown shoes and carrying a light brown brief case. Last seen at Wittenbergplatz Berlin.

4. At 1500 hrs. 17 February 1953, one Herr ULBRICHT, came to the office of Mr. Stelt. ULBRICHT stated that he represented a German Organization from Bonn, and that he had just come from a meeting with three German men, who had come to Berlin by military aircraft Monday night 16 February 1953. These three men had come to investigate the abduction of HOEHER. They had requested that ULBRICHT come to Stelt and ask him to transfer the investigation of the case from Abteilung V to GCIS American Sector.

ULBRICHT also gave Mr. Stelt the number IVC-817 and said it was HOEHER's emergency number.

5. Mr. Stelt said he first met ULBRICHT through DAD about five months ago. (I am checking this out with Ben).

6. The following information I received from my German Contact. HOEHER had been working with one Horst KIRVES from Bln/Weissensee (East Berlin) for the past two years. On Friday night 13 February 1953, HOEHER went with KIRVES to a cafe on Wittenbergplatz where they had quite a lot to drink. HOEHER became drunk and KIRVES told some people at the cafe that he would take HOEHER home. Since this time HOEHER and KIRVES have not been seen in West Berlin.

C
O
P
Y

BE:PS - Mr. C. J. Scavarda

February 17, 1953

BE:PS - Walter C. Stelt

Abduction of HOEHER

A meeting was held in Mr. Stelt's office today, which was attended by Herr Kleyer, 1st Sector Chief, Herr Heindke, SCIS and Mr. Stelt.

Heindke made the following statement. He knows Hoehner since March 1951, and he also knows his wife. He has been in contact with Hoehner on official business. Hoehner is living in Berlin-Kreuzberg, 5 Malbertstrasse. He is a representative of the FDP faction on the Kreuzberg District Assembly, and is also a representative of a West German Counter Intelligence Agency, Group Ceel. Heindke knows from Hoehner himself, that he was a police officer in the rank of Major till the end of the war. He was arrested in 1945 in Halle, Soviet Zone by the Soviets and sent to Russia, where he worked in a factory making parts of V-Bombs. Later he was sent to an Antifa School in Moscow, and was released in 1948. On his return to Germany he made contact with the above mentioned Group Ceel, and worked for them in Berlin. On Saturday morning, February 14, 1953, at about 0900 hrs. Hoehner's wife called Heindke and told him that her husband is missing since Friday, February 13, 1800 hours. When Heindke asked her how she happened to call him, she stated that her husband had given her several numbers in case something should happen to him, among others Heindke's number. She believed however, that he might have had too much to drink or had gone to see a friend, and was not too worried so far. Heindke advised her to wait for a period of 24 hours, as is customary, and then report him to the police as missing. She told Heindke that she could not do this on account of his position. If he disappeared, she was to wait until she hears from West Germany. She would be contacted from somebody from West Germany, and they would take over. Heindke however, advised her again to report to the Police, since he might have met with an accident. On Sunday, February 15, being Hoehner's birthday, Heindke went over to his apartment. Frau Hoehner told him that she had reported to Police Revier 107, Kreuzberg. She had also told Heindke, that her husband had gone out with a friend by the name of Kirves, whom he had known for about 2 years. Kirves is an East Sector resident. At the Police Revier Frau Hoehner had not reported that her husband was a former police officer in the rank of Major, but only that he had served with the Police. She had also stated that he was known at Abteilung V. (Copy of missing person report is attached hereto). Revier 107 immediately sent out a teletype message. On February 17, Sangmeister, called Heindke and asked him about this case. Heindke went over to Abteilung V and told them the facts as mentioned above. Abteilung V denied having seen a report on the disappearance of Hoehner. The teletype message was found, but apparently had gone unnoticed by Abteilung V, although Hoehner must be known at Abteilung V, since he supplied them with informations.

On February 17, the SPD newspaper "Telegraf" issued an article on the abduction of Hoehner. Later the "Kurier" another newspaper stated that the Police, Abteilung V, had no knowledge of Hoehner being missing. This apparently was due to the fact that Abteilung V had not seen the teletype message sent out by the Police Revier. It is surmised that Frau Hoehner might have reported the

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disappearance of her husband to Buergermeister Kressmann of Kreuzberg, on account of his being a member of the FDP faction, and that Kressmann has given this information to the press, i.e. the "Telegraf".

Meanwhile a Herr Albrecht, a member of another German Intelligence Agency came to see Mr. Stelt. He stated that three men had come from Bonn yesterday evening, and that he had met them today at the Ratskeller in Schoeneberg. They had heard about the abduction of Hoehner and had come to Berlin right away. They gave Albrecht an emergency number to identify Hoehner. Albrecht came with the request that the matter be handled by US Sector Amt instead of Abteilung V, since Allied interest were involved.

Frau Hoehner had also stated that her husband told her not to call Abteilung V.

Teletype Message:

RKB 107 to all Police Inspections, Criminal Kommissariats, Police Reviere, Revier Criminal Offices, Criminal Police Department, Abteilung V/1(S)

Missing since 13 February 1953 Wolfgang HOEHER, born 15 February 1914 in Magdeburg, residing Berlin SO 36, 5 Adalbertstrasse. Wearing a grey leather coat, grey hat, dark brown pants, light sports jacket, brown shoes (stitched edges), light briefcase with zipper containing personal documents. Description: approximately 184 cm high, blond hair, blue eyes, heavy set. Hoehner was last seen at Wittenbergplatz.

Information from RKB 107, Journal No. 112/53
RKB 107, Reference No. Kuehne, Crim. Secretary
Revier 107 15 February FS 1233 hrs Suchanek

Soviets Kidnaped Party Official in Berlin, FDP Says

BERLIN, Feb. 18 (S&S)—West Berlin headquarters of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) confirmed yesterday that a party official and former police major, Wolfgang Hoehner, 39, was kidnaped last Friday by Soviet Zone agents.

An FDP spokesman said Hoehner, an expert on party security matters, had cultivated Horst Kirves, a Soviet Sector administration employe, and had been questioning him concerning illegal East-West trade.

The party spokesman said he suspected that Kirves had given Hoehner some information and then had invited Hoehner to ride in his car. The car bore West Berlin license plates.

The spokesman said he suspected that Kirves gave Hoehner a drugged cigaret and drove him into East Berlin after Hoehner had lost consciousness.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2006

WEST BERLIN GERMANY

Feb. 18, 1953

B R I E F S

WEST BERLIN ABDUCTION--It was learned today that Wolfgang Hoehner, a
Kreutzberg FDP delegate, was kidnaped on Feb. 13 by an East Berlin
police officer. The police meanwhile have taken up
the search for the missing delegate.

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Contact Report: []

19 Feb 53

During a contact this morning [] reported the following:
On the day on which the newspapers carried the Kirwes
story he had ~~XXXXXXXX~~ wondered how it was possible that a
man like Kirwes would lend himself to such activities. He had
known K on and off for several years, and did not consider
him the type. Furthermore, as reported, Kirwes last year
had bragged to [] " I am safe. Nothing can happen
to me, since I am covered on both sides". [] also
could not believe that someone who was ~~xxx~~ the guiding
genius on an operation like 'Drehscheibe' would be used
for a kidnaping job. After thinking about it for a few
hours he decided to find out ~~for~~ himself ^{what} ~~would~~ is behind
it. He went to U-Bahnhof Schoenhauser Allee, the first
one inside the East Sector on that line. He called Kirwes
at his house but K was not in. This was about 1800 hours
~~XXXXXXXX~~ ^{Tuesday, 17} ~~Monday, 16~~ Feb. After two additional calls within
a 1/2 hour, he finally got hold of K and arranged to meet him
on the street at the Schnhs. Allee Station. Kirwes showed
up a few minutes later and they talked for about 15 minutes.
C asked him what he had to say about the newspaper story
(C had it with him, but K had it also). C states that K
was very nervous, scared to death and almost unable to
talk coherently. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ K ^{swore} ~~sope~~ that he had nothing

to do with the kidnaping, but that his main worry was the fact that the papers had claimed that He had turned over to the West documents concerning illegal East-West Trade plans. This, K claimed would ruin him with Karlshorst. He had no worries about the allegation that he had kidnaped Hoehner, since Karlshorst obviously would know who actually had done it. But he doubted that he would be able to talk himself out of the documents accusation. He went on to say that he would not wait until they came to arrest him but that ~~his~~ he would go the same night to Karlshorst with a copy of the newspaper and would see what happens.

□ □ is convinced that K was telling the truth. I made it quite plain to C, in very frank language, that his actions in going over there without clearing it with us, certainly put him in a doubtful position in our minds. It is extremely strange that he would go over to contact a man known to him and us to be an MVD agent. He countered that he was very surprised that we could after all this time have any doubts about his loyalty, and furthermore he felt sure that, had he called me and asked me, I would not have permitted him to go.

I was under the impression that, at the time of his recruitment by Philbin, he had been carried. I therefore asked him if he remembered having been put on a machine, which he declined. It turned out that he had never
He added: "Why would I tell you about it now?"

been carried. After a 'slight' explanation of what is involved [] readily agreed to undergo a carriage test, if we really felt it necessary.

COMMENTS: I believe that [] is telling the truth and did this partly out of sheer nosiness and also to ingratiate himself with us, since he was put on a very reduced salary last December (DM 50.- per month).

RECOMMENDATIONS: That we consider possibility of persuading [] to recontact KIRWES AND ~~offer him~~ ^{him} bring over to West. (after due discussions with HICOG and Police authorities).

CMA

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 FEB. 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39165

ROUTING	
1	AZ
2	FIG-FE/PE
3	CHRONO
4	PP6
5	CLP
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP PULLACH
ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

0456Z 20 FEB. 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2008

PULL 5018

TO: SBRLN INFO: SFRAN, DIR CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN 8231 (IN 38345)

1. POB LEARNED UNOFFICIALLY FROM ZIPPER ABOUT HOEHER'S PROBABLY KIDNAPPING ON 16 FEB. AND ZIPPER INFORMED US OFFICIALLY ON MORNING 18 FEB. ACCORDING GV-L REPORT RECEIVED ZIPPER HEADQUARTERS 18 FEB. HOEHER HAD MEETING WITH KIRWES AT 1830 HOURS 18 FEB. IN MOSELLANER RESTAURANT ON WITTENBERGPLATZ. H TOLD WIFE HE WOULD RETURN BY 2000 HOUR BUT NEVER DID.

2. MOSELLANER MANAGER QUESTIONED BY ZIPPER MEMBERS AND STATED HE REMEMBERED H AND KIRWES BECAUSE THEY HAD MET THERE SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE. ALWAYS BEFORE, H CAME FIRST AND KIRWES LATER. THIS TIME KIRWES ARRIVED ABOUT AN HOUR BEFORE H AND ORDERED WINE, POURING 2 GLASSES, 1 FOR SELF AND 1 FOR H WHO ARRIVED ONLY MUCH LATER. THIS BASIS ZIPPER CONCLUSION H DOPED. HOWEVER, PAIR TALKED ABOUT AN HOUR AND THEN LEFT TOGETHER ON FOOT IN DIRECTION OF U-BAHN STATION.

only in 32-6-33-587

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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(44)

20 FEB. 53

SECRET

IN 39165 -PAGE TWO-
20 FEB. 53

3. AS HOEHER FAMILY WELL ACQUAINTED WITH KIRWES AND COMMON-LAW WIFE, HOEHER MOTHER WENT INTO SOVIET ZONE ON 14 FEB., AND CALLED MRS. KIRWES, ASKING WHETHER MRS. K ^{had} SEEN HOEHER. MRS. KIRWES SAID NO BUT DON'T WORRY, MEN ARE LIKE THAT. ON 15 FEB. MRS K CALLED HOEHER WIFE AND ASKED IF H HAD RETURNED. ON INSTRUCTION ZIPPER MEMBER, MRS HOEHER STATED YES, HE WAS JUST A LITTLE LATE, MRS KIRWES WHO USUALLY VERY TALKATIVE HAD LITTLE ELSE TO SAY, BEGGED OFF ON PREVIOUSLY ACCEPTED INVITATION FOR HERSELF AND KIRWES TO ATTEND HOEHER BIRTHDAY PARTY AT HOEHER RESIDENCE ON 16 FEB.

4. ON BASIS MGBA 15176, POB HAD WARNED ZIPPER IN JUNE 52 HOEHER SUSPECTED SOVIET AGENT, DID NOT GIVE FURTHER DETAILS IN ORDER PROTECT [] AND []

5. ZIPPER CLAIMED NOT KNOW IDENTITY ULBRIGHT AND DID NOT MENTION ATTEMPT INDUCE MRS. HOEHER NOT PUBLICIZED KIDNAPPING. FEEL ULBRIGHT MIGHT BE IDENTICAL KARL HEINZ GERHARDT ALIAS GIESECKE, BORN 1 FEB., 1913 BERLIN, 176 CM, SLIM FIGURE, BLUE EYES, WEARS GLASSES, LIVES 9 RUEDESHEIMERPLATZ.

6. ZIPPER WRITTEN MATERIAL IN POB POSSESSION INDICATES THEY WELL AWARE POSSIBLE DANGER TO HOEHER AND HAD WARNED HIM UNDER NO CONDITION GO EAST SECTOR. HOWEVER, THEY NOW REALIZE WER KENNT WEM ON OPERATION UNREALISTIC AS HOEHER APPARENTLY KNEW KLEIBER AND MELDEKOPF SYSTEM.

SECRET

Zipper?

[]

20 FEB. 53

SECRET

-PAGE THREE-
IN 39165

URGENT ZIPPER EFFORTS NOW DIRECTED ATTEMPTING DETERMINE EXACT EXTENT
HOEHER KNOWLEDGE.

7. WILL APPRECIATE [] GIVING GUIDANCE [] ON ESTABLISHMENT
ALTERNATE MK. ?

8. [] AND ZIPPER SECURITY CHIEF WILL FLY BERLIN 24 FEBRUARY
WITH FULL REPORT OF ZIPPER INVESTIGATION NOW BEING MADE.

9. FOR FRAN: [] ADVISED MERKER 19 FEB., CASE OF GREAT
IMPORTANCE POLITICALLY: THAT WE MUST BE IN POSITION GIVE U.S. HICOM
DETAILED BRIEFING IF NECESSARY. MERKER ASSURED FULL COOPERATION. C

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET []

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 FEBRUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 90346

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FIG
3	Chano
4	PPG
5	CGF
6	CA
7	
8	

TO: SR REP: GERMANY (PULL, BRIN)
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

L

FE/PI/2 528

ROUTINE

CONF: EE 6

004Z 20 FEB 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 41738

TO: SPULL, SBRLN INFO: SFRAN CITE: DIR
RE BRIN 8231 (IN 38345)

1. ONLY INFO HERE KIRVES, ~~HOFFER~~ ^{HOFFER} THAT ORIGINATING PULL, BRIN.
2. UNABLE IDENTIFY ULBRICHT.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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FE/DC

EE/PI/O

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EE/CFI 32-6-33 58/Amph

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(44)

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39321

ROUTING	
1	<u>FIG</u>
2	<u>FIG</u>
3	<u>CHADANO</u>
4	<u>PPG</u>
5	<u>SEE</u>
6	<u>CFI</u>
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR. REP. BERLIN PRIORITY
 ACTION: EE 6 1649Z 20 FEB 53
 INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8265

TO: SFRAN SPULL DIR INFO: SBONN CITE: SBRLN
 RE SBRLN 8266 (IN 39391)

INDIVIDUAL MENTIONED LINE 1 OF REFERENCE IS WALTER WOLK ALIAS
HOCKWALD CHIEF SSD OFFICE TPEMBER. FORMERLY SECURITY OFFICER
 TPEMBER. HIS OFFICE LOCATED OUTSIDE TPEMBER PREMISES.

END OF MESSAGE

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

326-2-10625

COPY NO.

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(44)

SUBJECT: Contact Report, TPEMBER, []

20 Feb 53

1. In accordance with my instructions (2030 19 Feb 53), [] I called Hochwald in to his office this morning to question him about what material he had given Hoehner.

2. [] stated that Hochwald immediately admitted having had contacts with Hoehner and said that this was the story of how these contacts developed:

a. In line with his TPEMBER official work, Hochwald has made many contacts with various police representatives in West Berlin. Among them was a certain Klank, Abteilung V5, who apparently was in charge of police investigation relative to the kidnapping of Dr Linse. Although this original liaison was developed primarily to mutually investigate the Linse affair, Hochwald felt pressed to develop more East Berlin or East Zone agents (he claims to have had only one, Zimmermann) and asked Klank if he could help him out. Klank did not give him any aid immediately.

b. During October or November 1952, Hochwald met Klank one afternoon in a cafe. While they were sitting there, they were approached by a third man whom Klank introduced as "Helling." It appeared that Helling and Klank were associated in various investigation with which the Police Department did not want its name officially associated. During this first meeting, Helling asked Hochwald if he could gather information about and even talk to a Dr von Szegety, Berlin, Nikolaunsee, Krottnauerstrasse 72, telephone: 80 73 90. Although Hochwald was never clear about the reason for this request, he seemed to believe that von Szegety might have been an East Zone agent whose target was the DTLINEN organization.

c. Hochwald subsequently initiated an investigation and talked with von Szegety twice. What little information he did assemble, Hochwald reported to Klank who said that von Szegety was a liar. Shortly after that Helling told Hochwald to drop the investigation. From time to time, thereafter, Hochwald conducted small investigations for Helling, but reported none of these to Ladell or anyone else in TPEMBER. On the other hand, Helling gave Hochwald information which was of value to TPEMBER which Hochwald reported to [] stated that he was able to verify that Hochwald did turn in several reports which Hochwald now says stemmed from Helling. Among these was a report on an East Zone Insane Asylum which was being improperly handled. At the time they were reported, Hochwald did not report his source however) Hochwald stated that he never gave any information concerning TPEMBER to Helling.

d. Hochwald stated that at 1300 14 February 1953, he was to have met Helling at the Cafe Schimmig on Wienerstrasse where they had often met before. Helling did not arrive and Hochwald waited for about an hour. At some previous time, Helling had told Hochwald that he (Helling) had a Lotterie Einnahme in the vicinity so Hochwald after waiting, attempted to find this place without success. While he was looking for this shop, Hochwald saw Schmidt, an acquaintance from the Police Department, in a store and dropped over to chat with him. Schmidt told Hochwald that ~~Helling had disappeared~~ Hoehner had apparently been kidnapped, and related the details. Hochwald immediately connected (in his own mind) Hoehner and Helling, but apparently did not tell Schmidt about it at the time.

e. On 16 February 1953, however, Hochwald called Schmidt and told him the story that he was connected with Hoehner and that he had occasionally gathered information for him. (Rosenthal is not completely clear, but he said that Hochwald may have called Schmidt twice on 16 Feb) Also on 16 Feb, Hochwald called Mrs "Helling" and learned what he could from her. (It may have been that he called Mrs Helling first and based upon what she had said, then called Schmidt)

f. On 18 and 19 February 1953, Hochwald attempted to telephone the "Helling" home but received no answer.

g. Until the time of the disappearance, Hochwald stated that he knew Hoehner only by the name "Helling," and it is apparent from the manner in which he made his report to [] that he believes that "Helling" was an "undercover" man for the West Berlin police.

COMMENTS: It might very well be that Hochwald was developed as an unwitting agent for ZIPPER, "unwitting" in the sense that he was unaware of the connections between Hoehner and that organization. Hochwald has demonstrated that he has had a strong desire to become affiliated with an official German agency, the police, Verfassungsschutz or other similar organization.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	FIG
2	FIG
3	CHIROANO
4	PIG
5	VEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39391

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN

PRIORITY

ACTION: EE 6

1919Z 20 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

original in 32-C-33-587

BRLN 8266

TO: SFRAN SPULL DIR

INFO: SBONN

CITE: SBRLN

CALL/CART/TPEMBER/ZIPPER

REF SPULL 4789 (*)

), SBRLN 8231 (IN 38345), SPULL 5018 (IN 39165)

1. INTERCEPTS ON [REDACTED] CALES) DATED 16 FEBRUARY RECEIVED BOB 19 FEBRUARY CONFIRM INFORMATION GIVEN PULL BY ZIPPER AS SET OUT SPULL 5018. INTERCEPTS PLUS OTHER INFORMATION IN REFS REFLECT HOEHRER APPARENTLY ZIPPER CASE OFFICER HANDLING CALES AS PENETRATION TPEMBER. SHORTLY PRIOR ALLEGED ABDUCTION HOEHRER CALES GAVE HIM 25-30 PAGE REPORT PRESUMABLY CONCERNING TPEMBER. PER INTERCEPTS CALES NOW WORRIED THIS REPORT IN BRIEFCASE CARRIED BY HOEHRER AT TIME OF DISAPPEARANCE. HOEHRER'S WIFE OF OPINION REPORT NOT IN BRIEFCASE, HOWEVER, HOEHRER ALSO CARRYING NOTEBOOK REFLECTING ADDRESSES AND MEETINGS. HOEHRER IN CONTACT KIRVES FOR PAST 2 YEARS AND KIRVES CLOSE FRIEND HOEHRER FAMILY. POLICE INVESTIGATION HAS NOT YET ESTABLISHED HOEHRER'S WHEREABOUTS OR THAT HE ACTUALLY KIDNAPPED. MAN WHO MET HOEHRER IN MOSELLAHER CAFE WITTENBURGERPLATZ KNOWN AS ANTON BELIEVED BY CALES AND MRS. HOEHRER TO BE KIRVES. WE ENDEAVORING MAKE

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BRN 8266

SECRET

IN 39391
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POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION,

2. ON 17 FEBRUARY AT 1800 WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE BOB [] CONTACTED KIRVES EAST BERLIN. KIRVES FRIGHTENED, NERVOUS AND WORRIED. CLAIMED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH KIDNAPPING HOEHRER AND NOT IN WEST BERLIN THAT DAY. KIRVES EXTREMELY WORRIED OVER PUBLICITY ALLEGING HE GAVE HOEHRER DOCUMENTS RELATING ILLEGAL EAST-WEST TRADE BY DDR AUTHORITIES. TOLD [] WOULD BE UNABLE SQUARE HIMSELF THIS ACCUSATION. ADVISED HE INTENDED TAKE NEWSPAPER ARTICLE TO KARLSHORST SAME DAY RATHER THAN WAIT TO BE ARRESTED. [] CONVINCED KIRVES TELLING TRUTH. [] CARRIAGED 20 FEBRUARY. NO INDICATIONS OF SENSITIVITY. POSSIBILITY EXISTS HAVE [] ATTEMPT INDUCE KIRVES TO FLEE WEST. [] HAS AGREED RECONTACT KIRVES AND ENDEAVOR BRING HIM WEST. REGARDLESS HIS KNOWLEDGE THIS CASE KIRVES OF DEFINITE INTEREST [] AND OTHER MATTERS. [] WILL BE INSTRUCTED 20 FEBRUARY TO GO AHEAD UNLESS HE CONSIDERS THAT THIS ACTION PLACES HIM IN DEFINITE JEOPARDY.

3. COL. ROYD ALBRO, IO USCOB, QUERIED [] THIS CASE 19 AND 20 FEBRUARY AND WAS ADVISED BY [] IN GENERAL CONCERNING CASE. ALBRO ADVISED GENERAL TIEDERMAN. USCOB DESIROUS UNOFFICIALLY INFORM MAYOR REUTER THAT HOEHRER WAS GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AGENT WHO TOOK OWN

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20 FEB 53
BRLN 3266

SECRET

IN 39391
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RISKS OF KIDNAPPING AND THAT THIS NOT ANOTHER LINSE CASE TO BE MADE POLITICAL CAUSE CELEBRE BY WEST GERMAN AUTHORITIES. USCOB AGREES NOT TAKE SUCH ACTION PENDING CLEARANCE KUBARK. BELIEVE EVERY REASONABLE EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE SEPARATE THIS CASE FROM TPEMBER. REQUEST ADVICE THIS POINT.

4. IN VIEW CLOSE CONNECTION CALES AND TPEMBER AND KNOWLEDGE POSSESSED BY CALES OF TPEMBER AND PRESUMABLY PASSED TO HOEHRER DEFINITE CHANCE THAT THROUGH HOEHRER AND/OR CALES MIGHT TIE THIS CASE TO TPEMBER RESULTING IN FURTHER EXPOSE ALLEGED ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES THAT ORGANIZATION. IN VIEW THIS ^{the} INSTRUCTED INTERROGATE CALES ON PRETEXT CALES INTEREST HOEHRER CASE SECURED FROM GERMAN POLICE. WILL ADVISE RESULTS. IN VIEW ZIPPER INTEREST CALES SUGGEST PULL ADVISE ZIPPER PULL CALES OUT AND INSTRUCT HIM NOT DISCUSS CASE FURTHER. OBVIOUSLY POSSIBLE CALES MIGHT BE NEXT ABDUCTION TARGET.

5. RE PARA 1 SPULL 5018 IN FUTURE WOULD APPRECIATE SUCH UNOFFICIAL ADVICES BEING CABLED BOB. SUGGEST ZIPPER REPRESENTATIVES INSTRUCT HOEHRER'S FAMILY NOT DISCUSS CASE AS FREELY AS INTERCEPTS REFLECT THEY HAVE BEEN. DO NOT INDICATE ZIPPER WE HAVE INTERCEPT COVERAGE. RE PARA 5 SPULL 5018 RECHECK REFLECTS ZIPPER REPRESENTATIVE WHO CONTACTED PUBLIC SAFETY USED NAME ALBRECHT NOT ULBRICHT. CAN PULL

SECRET

20 FEB 53
BRN 8266

SECRET

IN 39391
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FURTHER IDENTIFY. UNFORTUNATELY PUBLIC SAFETY DID NOT MAKE EFFORT IDENTIFY. POLICE INVESTIGATION INADVERTENTLY NOT REFERRED INITIALLY TO ABTEILUNG V AS POSSIBLE ABDUCTION BUT HANDLED AS ROUTINE MISSING PERSONS CASE. ABTEILUNG V NOW INVESTIGATING BUT NOT YET ABLE VERIFY AS KIDNAPPING. ODOPAL ADVISED 20 FEBRUARY THEY IN CONTACT 2 LOW LEVEL

MVD SPITZELS WHO INSTRUCTED BY MVD CONTACT HOEHRER. THIS MAY HAVE SOME BEARING DISAPPEARANCE. WITH CONCURRENCE BOB ODOPAL TURNING SPITZELS OVER TO ABTEILUNG V FOR INTENSIVE INTERROGATION. DETAILS

BEING PROCURED AND WILL BE FORWARDED. PARA 7 SPULL 5018 BEING DISCUSSED [] AND [] BOB WILL FURNISH EVERY ASSISTANCE THIS MATTER. DESIRE COPY FULL REPORT ZIPPER INVESTIGATION NOW BEING MADE.

6. [] BEING RECONTACTED 20 FEBRUARY FOR ANY FURTHER INFORMATION ON KIRVES.

7. PUBLIC SAFETY HICOG ALREADY AWARE HOEHRER ZIPPER A GENT AS REFLECTED SBRLN 8231. PUBLIC SAFETY PLANS ADVISE PUBLIC SAFETY BONN THAT HOEHRER WORKING FOR GERMAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION AND THAT THIS NOT CASE OF KIDNAPPING INNOCENT WEST BERLIN POLITICIAN. SUCH

ADVICE TEMPORARILY DEFERRED AT [] REQUEST. PLEASE ADVISE IF YOU HAVE OBJECTION.

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20 FEB 53
BRLN 8266

SECRET

IN 30391
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8. WE CONTINUING ENDEAVOR SECURE FULL HISTORY. PLEASE ADVISE
ANY ADDITIONAL ACTION DESIRED.

END OF MESSAGE.

M/C COMMENT: NOT BCVD WASH M/C

SECRET

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

20 FEBRUARY 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 90684

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHON
4	FIG
5	OFF
6	CPP
7	
8	

REP GERMANY (BERLIN, BONN, FRAN, PULIACH)

T. P. ~~Schreyer~~

EE

3288

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

PRIORITY

HTV

0019Z 21 FEB 53

MF EE 6

INFORMATION: ~~DO/P~~ 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR 41959
SPRLN

TO: ~~SPRLN~~

INFO: SBON
SFRAN
SMULL

CITE: DIR

ZIPPER

REF: ~~DIR~~ 8266 (IN 39391)

AGREE CASES PROBABLE ABDUCTION TARGET. EVERY
EFFORT MUST BE MADE INSURE HIS SAFEKEEPING AND
BY KUBARK.
THOROUGH DEBRIEFING WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON
INFO RE MEMBER PERSONALITIES AND OPERATIONS PASSED
TO HOEHRER.

END OF MESSAGE

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DATE 2006

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HOEHERER to
ZIPPER

C/EE

EE/PPP

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SECURITY INFORMATION

32-6-33-53700
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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHANO
4	PP F/O
5	SEF
6	CPP
7	
8	

21 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39605

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP FRANKFURT

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1342Z 21 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

SFRAN 1848

TO: SBRLN INFO: SPULL DIR SBONN CITE: SFRAN

CALL/CART/TPEMBER

RE BRLN 8266 (IN 39391), DIR 41959 (OUT 90684).

1. WE THINK [] SHOULD ALSO INTERROGATE CALES SINCE IT IMPORTANT WE KNOW EXACT EXTENT INFORMATION RE TPEMBER GIVEN HOEHRER. ANYTHING GIVEN HIM IN WRITING OR IN CONVERSATION CAN BE ASSUMED TO BE IN HANDS DDR. THEY WILL TIE CASE IN WITH TPEMBER IF THEY LIKE, AND WE CAN ONLY REPLY, IF THEY DO SO, BY DENOUNCING HOEHRER AS NOTORIOUSLY IRRESPONSIBLE MEDDLER.

2. OKAY TO ADVISE REUTER HOEHRER IS GERMAN INTELLIGENCE MAN. THIS CAN TIE IN WITH PLANNED PUBLICITY AS OUTLINE ABOVE. BONN WILL GIVE HICOG INCLUDING PUBLIC SAFETY RUNDOWN THIS CASE AS BACKSTOP PUBLIC SAFETY ACTION AS PROPOSED PARA 7.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	FI 3
2	FIG
3	CHANDNO
4	MG
5	VEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

21 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39721

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP PULLACH

PRIORITY

ACTION: EE 6

1912Z 21 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5041

TO: SBRLN, DIR

INFO: SFRAN, SRHMN, ^{BUMN}

CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN 8266 (IN 39391)

1. ZIPPER STILL PROCEEDING ON ASSUMPTION KIRVES KIDNAPPED HOEHRER BUT ALSO CANNOT PROVE. EXPECT ZIPPER COMMENT THIS ASPECT SOON. KIRVES NOT SHOWN ZIPPER FILES AS USING NAME ANTON. WHAT ARE NAMES TWO MVD SPITZELS?
2. POB AND ZIPPER AGREE INFORMING REUTER PER REF. NO POB OBJECTION REF PARA 7.
3. ZIPPER HAS NOT COMMENTED ON CALES ASPECT YET. ALBRECHT ALSO NOT IDENTIFIED. LACK ZIPPER COMMENTS DUE FACT KNOWLEDGEABLE ZIPPERITES ABSENT THIS DATE.
4. ZIPPER TO HOLD FULL DRESS REVIEW OF FACTS 23 FEB INCLUDING KLEIBER, LEADER GV L, 2 GV L MEMBERS WHO INVESTIGATED IN BERLIN AND HAVE RETURNED, HEADQUARTERS SECURITY STAFF.
5. ZIPPER SECURITY CHIEF EDINGER ARRIVING BERLIN 24 FEB IN ORDER SUPERVISE PROTECTIVE MEASURES. [] ACCOMPANYING IN ORDER TO SERVE AND GIVE ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE. [] WILL CARRY ZIPPER REPORTS ON CASE FOR BOB INFO.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~32-6-33 587~~
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(4)

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39851

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHIKING
4	✓ FIZ-FIG
5	OFF
6	OFF
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE (6)

1539Z 23 FEB 53

FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, FI/RI 2

INFORMATION:

BRLN 8282

TO: SFRAN

INFO: DIR SPULL SBONN

CITE: SBRLN

CALL/CART/TPEMBER

REF SFRAN 1848 (IN 39605), DIR 41959 (OUT 90684)

[] WILL INTERROGATE CALES 23 FEB AT CID.

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

326-33-587 AM
COPY NO.

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(44)

TRANSLATION

Berlin, 24 February 1953

Mrs. Hoehar,

From Grandma's phone call I learned that Wolfgang hadn't come home. It surprised me very much and urged me to take certain measures of precaution, more so since I had heard about the arrest of a man here. Wolfgang confirmed this.

I was even more surprised when an acquaintance came last Tuesday and showed me the announcement which appeared in the press. All this meanness caused me to completely lose my head, and I still can't keep a clear thought in my mind. I can only imagine, since to my knowledge only an announcement of a missing person is at hand, that you Kaethe, did or said something in your excitement, and didn't know what you were saying.

I am sure, that once you have thought the whole thing over, you won't believe yourself that I could be suspected of the kidnaping, especially since such an open and ^(in my view) selfless friendship has existed between us. In this connection may I remind you of the DM 800.- I hardly believe that Wolfgang would have supported your action had he known about it. But all this really isn't important at the moment because I am fully occupied with the work of our rehabilitation, first here and then in the West. I have already begun taking steps in this direction, and have found quite a bit of support. Everyone who knows me, and there are quite a few, say that I am the victim of a sly intrigue or else that the person who made such a charge is crazy. As much as I pity Wolfgang, first I have to work for myself without consideration for losses, especially since the way to the West is now closed to me.

Even though, I am certain that I can clear up the whole matter, that is if I wasn't mistaken in my judgement in Wolfgang. Then I will deal with the press who is responsible to produce proof of their charges, since they published them. You can be sure that that will not be cheap.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	FIG
2	FIG
3	CHADWICK
4	PPB
5	OFF
6	DFI
7	
8	

25 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 40543

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
 FROM: SR REP PULLACH
 ACTION: EE 6 ROUTINE
 INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, FI/RI 2
 2027Z 25 FEB 53

PULL 5065

TO: SBRLN (PRIORITY) INFO: SFRAN, DIR CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN 8290 (IN 40297)

CART TPEMBER ZIPPER

[] FOR []

1. ZIPPER CI CHIEF STATES CALES REPORT ON TPEMBER NOT RECEIVED BY ZIPPER HQ, MUNICH. HE CHECKING GV L, BUT DOUBTS RECEIVED THERE. WHEN DID CALES SUBMIT TO HOEHER?

2. ABOUT 1 HOUR BEFORE FATAL MEETING, HOEHER REPORTEDLY DELIVERED ALL HIS INTELL MATERIAL (EXCEPT BLACK NOTEBOOK OF UNKNOWN CONTENTS) TO V-2668. KLAUSNER SUGGESTS YOU ASK EDINGER TO ASK V-2668 IF THIS MATERIAL CONTAINED CALES REPORT ON TPEMBER.

3. ZIPPER HQ HAS NO TRACES ERNST STEFFAN NOR RUDOLF ZIMMERMAN.

END OF MESSAGE

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32-6-33-587-111
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NOV 1951

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FIG
3	Chmco
4	PPG
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

25 FEB 53

SECRET INFORMATION

IN 40389

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP FRANKFURT
 ACTION: EE 6
 INFORMATION: FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE
 1451Z F25 FEB 53

FRAN 1914

TO: SBRLN INFO: DIR CITE: SFRAN

REF BRLN 78134
 BRLN 8265 (IN 39321)

WALTER WOLK

IN VIEW FIRST REF HAVE YOU DROPPED SUBJECT OR IS HE STILL WITH US?

MSG CENTER NOTE: NOT RECEIVED WASH SIGNAL CENTER

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 SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

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~~32-62-10625~~
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SECURITY INFORMATION

25 Feb 53

TO: ~~SRRAM~~ SBRLN

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: DIR

SPULL

CADORY ZIPPER TPEMBER

REF:

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. AGREE PRESENT COURSE YOUR ACTION REGARDING CALE. ESSENTIAL WE PROTECT HIM FROM POSSIBLE ABDUCTION AND THOROUGHLY DEBRIEF TO DISCOVER EXTENT INFO GIVEN HOEHRER.

2. CAREFUL PERUSAL REFS LEADS US BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT HOEHRER WAS RUNNING KIRWES MAY BE WRONG. ASSUME YOU HAVE CONSIDERED FOLLOWING POSSIBILITY:

A. KIRWES ~~was~~ SSD CASE OFFICER RUNNING HOEHRER AND PROVIDING BUILD UP MATERIAL IN FORM EAST WEST TRADE DATA. HOEHRER USING ZIPPER COVER TO GET AT PRIMARY TARGET CALE. HOEHRER FEEDING ~~SSD~~ BUILDUP MATERIAL GIVEN HIM BY KIRWES PLUS PART OF TPEMBER MATERIAL GOTTEN FROM CALE ^{TO ZIPPER} HOWEVER PRIMARY TPEMBER MATERIAL GOING TO SSD VIA KIRWES.

B. KIRWES PULLED HOEHRER OUT FOR UNKNOWN REASON. REASON POSSIBLY THAT CALE ABOUT TO BECOME ZIPPERITE AND MIGHT UNCOVER FACT HOEHRER NOT PASSING ~~■~~ INFO CALE HAD GIVEN HIM. HOWEVER KIRWES DID NOT NEUTRALIZE HOEHRER FAMILY WHICH COMPLAINED TO POLICE AND TELEGRAF. THIS MISTAKE WITH RESULTING PUBLICITY HIS RELATION WITH HOEHRER FRIGHTENED KIRWES WHO TOLD ~~C~~ HE THEN GOING TO KARLSHORST TO SQUARE HIMSELF. THIS SEEMS MAIN INCONSISTENCY TO US. IF BASIC ASSUMPTION THAT HOEHRER WAS RUNNING KIRWES IS CORRECT BELIEVE KIRWES WOULD HAVE FLED AS SOON AS TELEGRAF ARTICLE APPEARED. FACT THAT HE FELT THAT HE NOT IN DEEP ENOUGH TROUBLE TO FLEE PLUS

SECRET

not sent

[]

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

*-2-

FACT HOEHRER REPORTED TO HAVE VOLUNTARILY WALKED AWAY WITH KIRWES ON 13 FEB INDICATES POSSIBLE NO ABDUCTION.

C. ALTERNATE POSSIBILITY THAT KIRWES ENGINEERED HOEHRER ABDUCTION BY PERSUADING HIM GO EAST SECTOR MAY BE EQUALLY POSSIBLE BUT STILL DIFFICULT BELIEVE KIRWES WOULD CONSIDER HIS POSITION VIS-A-VIS SSD SECURE IF HE HAD BEEN PROVIDING HOEHRER WITH INFO. ASSUMPTION THAT KIRWES DOUBLED BY SSD AGAINST HOEHRER AND THEN ENGINEERED ABDUCTION ALSO POSSIBLE. ↗

↳ ZIPPER POSITION INDICATES THEY NOT SURE WHETHER HOEHRER ACTUALLY WAS THEIR MAN OR NOT.

3. OUR MAIN CONCERN AT PRESENT IS:

A. TO FIND LIMIT COMPROMISE TPEMBER CAUSED BY CALE HOEHRER RELATIONSHIP.

B. TO FIND LIMIT ZIPPER INTEREST IN AFFAIR AND EXTENT POSSIBLE ZIPPER COMPROMISE.

4. ADVISE YOUR OPINION PARA 2 ANALYSIS.

EE/PP/G/RHM/gee

25 Feb. 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

*received
EE at 1140*

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 40297

ROUTING	
1	<i>FI2</i>
2	<i>FI6</i>
3	<i>CIANO</i>
4	<i>POB</i>
5	<i>VEE</i>
6	<i>OFI</i>
7	
8	

25 FEB 53

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN

PRIORITY

ACTION: PP/10D 4

1306Z 25 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2, EE 6

BRLN 8290

TO: CIR SPULL INFO: SBONN CITE: SSRLN

CALL/CART/TPEMBER/ZIPPER

1. REPORT ABTEILUNG 5 OF WEST BERLIN POLICE RECEIVED 24 FEB REFLECTS HORST KIRVES DEFINITELY IDENTIFIED BY PERSONNEL MOSELLANER CAFE AS INDIVIDUAL WHO USED NAME ANTON. AND MET HOEHLER EVENING 13 FEB IMMEDIATELY PRIOR HOEHER'S DISAPPEARANCE.

2. IOUSCOB ADVISED OK INFORM REUTER HOEHER AGENT OF A GERMAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. IN VIEW FACT CASE PRESENTLY CAUSING LITTLE COMMENT OR CERN#BRLN USCOB STILL CONSIDERING WHETHER TO SO ADVISE REUTER AT THIS TIME.

3. RE PARA 1 SPULL 5041 (IN 39721) NOW ASCERTAINED 2 SPITZELS WERE SSD NOT MVC NAMES ERNST STEFFAN, RUDOLF ZIMMERMAN, BOTH WEST BRLN POLICEMEN UNTIL 47 CLAIM TO HAVE WORKED FOR HOEHER AS LEGMEN AND TO HAVE BEEN TURNED BY SSD AFTER PICKUP EAST BERLIN WHILE CHECKING ON INDIVIDUAL NAMED HUEBNER, FNU. PER INSTRUCTIONS HOEHER. RESULTS POLICE INTERROGATION 2 SPITZELS WILL BE POUCHED.

MSG/CTR COMMENT: AS RCVD.

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25 FEB 53
BRLN 8290

SECRET

IN 40297
PAGE 2

4. CALES INTENSIVELY INTERROGATED 24 FEB AT CID BY [] ADMITTED BEING RECRUITED BY HELLING ALIAS HOEHER. HOEHER ADVISED CALES REPRESENTED GROUP ABWEHE OFFICERS BELONGING NATO. BASED ON CONVERSATIONS WITH HOEHER CALES BELIEVES HOEHER MEMBER GROUP ABWEHR OFFICERS WHO WILL FORM NUCLEUS GERMAN ABWEHR UNDER BLANK. CALES TOLD HOEHER IN FULL ABOUT HIS ACTIVITIES TPEMBER BUT CLAIMS DID NOT DISCUSS OTHER FUNCTIONS OF ORGANIZATION. CALES DID NOT HAVE ACCESS NAMES OF TPEMBER MIT ARBEITER IN SOV ZONE AND DID NOT FURNISH ANY SUCH IDENTITIES TO HOEHER. CALES ADMITTED PASSING 24 PAGE REPORT ON TPEMBER TO HOEHER. BELIEVES REPORT FORWARDED TO HOEHER'S SUPERIORS IN MUNICH. [] SECURED COPY REPORT FROM CALES. BEING DUPLICATED AND POUCHED SOONEST. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS REPORT HERE REFLECTS CONTAINS CONSIDERABLE DETAIL CONCERNING TPEMBER INTRIGUES AND SECURITY AND PROBABLY REFLECTS FAIRLY ACCURATELY EXTENT HOEHER'S KNOWLEDGE OF ORGANIZATION, AS RECEIVED FROM CALES. HOEHER AWARE ALSO THAT FOR 6 MONTHS CALES UNDER TPEMBER AUSPICES WAS PUNNING SSD AGENT NAMED ZIMMERMANN.

5. CALES BELIEVES REPORT NOT IN HOEHER'S BRIEFCASE AT TIME OF DISAPPEARANCE BECAUSE 1 FNU SCHMIDT OF BERLIN POLIZEI PRAESIDIUM

[]

SAW CONTENTS OF BRIEFCASE 1 DAY BEFORE DISSAPPEARANCE AT WHICH TIME HOEHER GAVE SCHMIDT MOST OF THE REPORTS CONTAINED IN HIS BRIEFCASE. CALES STATED HE WROTE REPORT MAINLY TO JUSTIFY HIS POSTION AFTER BOB EXPRESSED NO FURTHER INTEREST IN HIS SERVICES. HOEHER AWARE THAT [] OF CID) CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION TPEMBER AND OF [] DESIRE CREATE AN OFFICE DESIGNED TO PENETRATE SSD. HOEHER COMMENTED TO CALES THAT [] NOT CID BUT SOME OTHER 3-LETTER ORGANIZATION^P. CALES DENIES HAVING TOLD HOEHER ANYTHING ABOUT FINANCIAL IRREGULARITIES BUT MUST BE ASSUMED HOEHER AWARE OF REPORTS GIVEN [] BY ZAEGE, TPEMBER ACCOUNTANT. CALES ADMITS HOEHER EXPRESSED INTEREST TPEMBER FINANCES. ZAEGE ALIAS WEGENER AND CALES ON FRIENDLY TERMS. CALES ADMITTED ALSO HAS APPLIED FOR JOB WITH BFV THRU STEINMANN, LINSE'S REPLACEMENT AS HEAD TPEMBER ECONOMIC SECTION.

6. PULL REQUESTED ADVISE WHETHER CALES REPORT ON TPEMBER REACHED ZIPPER.

7. ON BASIS [] INTERROGATION CALES APPEARS DOUBTFUL IF HOEHER CAN PREJUDICE EAST ZONE IDENTITIES UNLESS RUNNING OTHER PENETRATIONS OF TPEMBER. CAN UNDOUBTEDLY FURNISH CONSIDERABLE DETAIL REGARDING AMERICAN SPONSORSHIP AND GENERAL ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES

SECRET

PAGE 4 TPEMBER. CASE NOT PRESENTLY CAUSING ANY GREAT STIR HERE. BELIEVE BECOMING LESS LIKELY DEVELOP MAJOR PUBLICITY FLAP RE TPEMBER. FURTHER RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION WILL BE FORWARDED AS RECEIVED. ZIPPER REPORT WHEN AVAILABLE SHOULD HELP CLARIFY. AFTER ANALYSIS THIS REPORT SUGGEST CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TAKE UP WITH ZIPPER PROBLEM THEIR SPONSORING SUCH ACTIVITIES AS HOEHER PENETRATION TPEMBER.

END OF MESSAGE

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 FEB 53

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IN 40883

ROUTING	
1	PIZ
2	FIG
3	CHRONO
4	PPG
5	QEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1929Z 26 FEB 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

3RLN 8315

TO: SFRAN INFO: DIR CITE: SBRLN

CALL

REF: SFRAN 1914 (IN 40389)

- water work
DROPPED. SEE EG3A 2811 (NOT SENT DIR).

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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3262-10685

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(44)

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XOB-A-334

IP

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

27 February 1953

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

EEBA-334-?

Operational/CAIA

Telephone Intercepts on Mrs. HOEHER

MICROFILMED
APR 22 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Attached please find intercepts revealing many interesting conversations involving Frau HOEHER since the kidnapping of her husband.

2. One clear indication gained from them is that HEINCKE of OCIB is and has been closely associated with the HOEHER family and HOEHER's work.

3. As you are aware, recent developments in this case clearly indicate that HEINCKE is either working for or controlled by ZIPPER.

[]

Approved by

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DATE 2006

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- 1 - BCB

INDEX

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FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 FEBRUARY 1953

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ROUTING	
1	PPG
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3	Chun O
4	FIG-E12
5	CEE
6	CPP
7	
8	

TO: SR. REP. FRANKFURT (PULL BRUN BONN)]/to EE/PP/O
 FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA ROUTINE
 CONF: EE 6 2100Z 27 FEB 53
 INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

DIR L2806 1-1

TO: SERAN SPULL SERAN INFO: BONN
 TRIMMER CART ZIPPER
 REF: A. BRUN 8290 (IN 40297)
 B. BRUN 2814

44-806
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 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

1. MUST EMPHASIZE THAT WE MORE CONCERNED COMPROMISE ORGANIZATIONAL INTEGRITY
 TRIMMER AS RESULT HOEHER KIDNAPPING THAN POTENTIAL PUBLICITY FLAP. ON BASIS
 PRESENT INFO CANNOT SHARE OPTIMISM RE HOEHER KNOWLEDGE PARA 7 REF A.

*Rechecked
for work
done*

2. ALL ADDRESSEES REQUESTED CONDUCT INTENSIVE INVESTIGATION ASCERTAIN
 DETAILS OF TRIMMER INFO MADE AVAILABLE HOEHER BY CALES OR ANY OTHER CONTACTS.
 IN VIEW CALES ASSESSMENT RESULTS CONTAINED REF D URGH HE RE-INTERROGATED WITH
 THIS CONNECTION ALSO CANNOT UNDERSTAND RETENTION OF CALES IN
 SENSITIVE TRIMMER POSITION AFTER SUMMARY TREATMENT HE WAS GIVEN BY]

3. RE PARA 5 REF A ACCUSE SCHMIDT ZIPPER CUT-OUT. PLEASE CONFIDE. REQUEST
 FULL MAKE EVERY EFFORT OBTAIN ZIPPER CASE FILES ON HOEHER, SCHMIDT AND TRIMMER
 INCLUDING ADDITIONAL ZIPPER SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON LATTER. MOST IMPRESSED
 TO KNOW IF INFO PASSED CALES TO HOEHER OVER PERIOD OF TIME CORRESPONDS TO INFO
 PASSED ON TO ZIPPER. POSSIBILITY THAT HOEHER WAS TURNED ~~DOWN~~ SHOULD NOT BE

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(44)

27 FEBRUARY 1953

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OUT 92153

SR. REP. FRANKFURT (PULL BERLN BONN)
DIRECTOR, CIA

ROUTINE

[]/rc EE/PP/G

DIR 42806

-2-

TO: STRAH SPULL BERLN

INFO: BONN

CITE: DIR

TPEMNER CART ZIPPER

DISCOUNTED.

4. [] NOT INCLUDED LIST TPEMNER HCS PERSONNEL FBBA 2251. PLEASE IDENTIFY AND IF [] REPLACEMENT INITIATE CLEARANCE IMMEDIATELY. PLEASE CLARIFY [] RELATION WITH REV.

5. RE LAST SENTENCE PARA 6 MOST ANXIOUS THAT ZIPPER PENETRATION TPEMNER BE FULLY EXPLORED. REQUEST THAT AFTER FULL STUDY THIS MATTER KUBARK/ZIPPER ARRANGEMENT BE WORKED OUT TO MINIMIZE PROSELYTING OF AGENTS ALREADY ENGAGED KUBARK OPS AGAINST PRIORITY TARGETS.

6. ADVISE SOONEST ON ALL FOREGOING.

END OF MESSAGE

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[] EE

EE/PP/G

EE/PP

SECRET

Air

BOB-A-3333

HOEHER
27 February 1953

Chief, Pullach Operations Base

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Operational

Forwarding of Letter

CART/CALL/ZIPPER

Attached find self-explanatory letter from KIRVSS to Frau
HOEHLER.

Approved by:

routed
EE/CE
PP/G
Z

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

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- (w/1 ")

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[598]

Translation/ub

~~For Bill~~

EGBA-3333
27 FEB. 1953

Berlin, February 24, 1953

Frau Hoehner:

I was surprised when Grandma called and I heard that Wolfgang did not return. This made me cautious, especially since I had heard of the arrest of a man here, which Wolfgang confirmed.

But I was even more surprised when an acquaintance of mine put the respective press article on my table on Tuesday. I lost my head about so much baseness, and even today cannot think clearly. I can only surmise, since according to my information only a missing person report was made, that you Kaethe did something in the heat of emotion unknowingly.

If you think clearly you yourself cannot believe that I had something to do with the abduction, after the open and unselfish friendship between us. May I remind you in this connection of the DM 800.-. I do not think that Wolfgang would have approved of your action, if he had been there to see it. But all this is not so important at the moment, since I am very busy getting my rehabilitation through, first on our side, and when this is done on the western side. I have initiated the respective measures already on both side, and have already found some support. Everybody who knows me, and these are many, is of the opinion that I am either the victim of a very cunningly spun intrigue, or the one who has made such a report is mad. As sorry as I feel for Wolfgang, I first have to fight for myself, without consideration of losses, especially since the way to the west is now finally blocked.

Nevertheless I am sure, that I can clear this matter entirely, i.e. if I was not deceived in Wolfgang, then come my claims and provisional orders against the press etc., who on account of the publication has to bring the evidence, and you may be sure, this will not be cheap.

Horst

ALLEGEDLY FROM KIRVES

C O P Y

SECRET
Security Information

Frau Hoehel!

Mit Erstaunen erfuhr ich von Omas Anruf, dass Wolfgang nicht nach Hause gekommen sei. Dies mahnte mich zu einer gewissen Vorsicht, noch dazu ich von einer Verhaftung eines Mannes hier gehoert hatte, was mir Wolfgang bestaetigte!

Aber noch mehr erstaunt war ich, als mir ein Bekannter am Dienstag die Besagte Pressemeldung auf den Tisch legte. Ueber so viel Niedertracht war ich dermassen kopflos, dass ich heute noch keinen klaren Gedanken fassen kann. Ich kann mir nur vorstellen, da meinen Informationen nach nur eine Vermisstenanzeige bisher vorliegt, dass Du Kaethe im ersten Affekt etwas getan hast, ohne zu wissen was Du tust.-

Du glaubst wohl bei einigermaßen Nachdenken selbst nicht, dass ich der Entfuhrung verdachtig sein kann, nachdem eine so offene und selbstlose Freundschaft zwischen uns bestanden hat. Ich darf in diesem Zusammenhang nur an die DM 800.-- erinnern! Auch glaube ich kaum, dass diese Deine Handlung von wolfgang gebilligt worden waere, wenn er dies erlaebt hatte! Doch alles dies macht im Moment nichts, denn ich habe alle Haende voll zu tun, meine Rehabilitierung ~~Seite~~ erst auf unserer Seite und wenn das erledigt ist, auf der westlichen Seite zu betreiben. Die entsprechenden Massnahmen habe ich auf beiden Seiten bereits eingeleitet und auch schon Unterstuetzung gefunden. Jeder der mich kennt, und es sind nicht wenige, sagt, dass ich das Opfer einer raffiniert angelegten Intrige bin, oder dass derjenige, der eine derartige Meldung verbrochen hat, irrsinnig ist. So leid mir wolfgang tut, muss ich jetzt erst um mich kaempfen und zwar ohne Ruecksicht auf Verluste, noch dazu mir nun der Weg nach dem westen endgueltig verbaut ist.

Trotzdem bin ich sicher, dass ich die restlose Klaerung schaffen werde, d.h. fuer den Fall, dass ich mich in wolfgang nicht getauescht habe, und dann kommen meine Forderungen und einstweiligen Verfuegungen gegen Presse etc, die auf Grund der Veroeffentlichung beweispflichtig ist und verlass Dich darauf, das wird bestimmt nich billig sein!

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Security Information

[]

VIA: AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

ATTACH NO. EGB-A-3356

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE DATE: 27 February 1953
FROM : Chief, Berlin Operations Base
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CART/CALL/ZIPPER/TPEMBER
SPECIFIC— Summary of Report CALES Handed to HOHER

1. Page 1 and 2 deal with CALES defection from the East and his subsequent employment by TPEMBER. Already he is complaining how unfairly he was treated by HENARD.

2. Page 3 deals with security problems. CALES emphasized that HENARD always minimized security because the "finances" were not sufficient to implement elaborate security measures.

3. Page 4 and page 5 describe the ZICKIER affair. ZICKIER was hired during the early stages of TPEMBER. He enjoyed the reputation of being the fair haired boy of HENARD. In October 1951, ZICKIER, who was involved in a murder, fled to the East taking along 600 DM from TPEMBER. CALES blames HENARD for the ZICKIER fiasco.

4. Page 6 deals with security measures advocated by and submitted to HENARD by CALES.

5. Page 7 again deals with conferences that took place within TPEMBER Headquarters regarding the security of TPEMBER.

6. Page 8 describes the SCHRAMM affair, the defection and attempts to show that CALES tried to prevent the defection of SCHRAMM; however, her willingness to submit to the lie detector test deterred him from arresting her.

7. Pages 9 and 10 still deal with the SCHRAMM affair and CALES' personal bad relationship with LADELL and Frau von ROSENBERG.

8. Page 11 describes the contents of the personnel file of SCHRAMM. The file was kept at TPEMBER Headquarters and was not shown to CALES until after she defected. CALES naturally implies that had HENARD shown him the file previously, he would have protested against the hiring of SCHRAMM.

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not difficult

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9. Page 12 deals with TPEMBERITES' reactions to the SCHRAMM case and how they tried to blame the fault on him.

10. Page 13 describes a personal argument that CALES had with Frau von ROSENBERG. - *scope of TPEMBER file*

11. Page 14 describes the removal of CALES from TPEMBER HQ by [] It states that [] read a letter to CALES ordering TPEMBER to create an "outside" SSD section. CALES states that the letter, i.e., order, was worded in such bad German that it could only be a translation from a foreign language.

12. Page 15 and 16 deal with CALES first interrogation by [] and JIMERSON at CID and subsequent interrogation and carriage of Fr. RICHTER, HENARD's secretary.

13. Page 17 again deals with TPEMBER intrigues involving CALES, and my approach to CALES asking him to create a SSD office outside TPEMBER for me.

14. Pages 18, 19, 20 and 21 describe my request to CALES to resign from TPEMBER and how and why he interpreted this as emanating from [] in order to get rid of him. It then goes on to show how right he was by giving a blow by blow description of our security assessment, i.e. carriage, interrogation and [] assessment, and his subsequent dismissal from BOB. It also states that [] gave him some Christmas present wrapped in a shabby brown paper bag, thereby denoting that these gifts were just a perfunctory gesture.

15. Page 22 gives the instructions [] issued CALES when he fired him.

16. Page 23 attempts to prove that [] was not an outside investigator but rather had to have close contact with TPEMBER.

17. Page 24 deals with my advice to CALES to stop seeing HOBERG, who is known to be an intelligence swindler, and his having to turn over Dr. LEHNHOFF, a potential REDCAP operation, to BOB.

18. Copy of CALES' report is attached.

Approved by: _____

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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SECRET

att 70
EGBA-3356

- 1 -

After having noticed in recent times special events which are connected with an American official agency (CID) - Mr. Strong - and the Investigating Committee of Free Lawyers, I consider it necessary to submit a comprehensive report about the conditions of the Investigating Committee and especially about the most recent measures of the Investigating Committee as well as the American official agency.

Since approximately the end of 1949 I have been in close contact ~~the~~ with the Investigating Committee. At that time I held the position of assistant district attorney in East Berlin. In this position I transmitted valuable material to the Investigating Committee through a cut-out. The representative of the Investigating Committee, WUNDER, recently presented this material to the West Berlin judicial heads, to wit the former attorney general NEUMANN and the former head of the court of appeals, STRUCKSBERG. According to Mr. WUNDER these gentlemen "clapped their hands together above their heads" and remarked: "How do you do it, Mr. WUNDER?"

In October, 1950, I escaped from East Berlin. The reason for my escape was recognized as political danger by the reception commission, so that both my wife and I received the status of recognized political refugee. Through Wunder an interview was arranged for me with Dr. FRIEDENAU, whom I already knew from my activities in Potsdam and whom I knew to be the head of the Investigating Committee. He assured me immediately that I would be hired into the services of the UFJ. After three weeks, ~~but I have~~ however, ~~been informed~~ that due to constitutional provisions he would not be in a position to employ me. Dr. FRIEDENAU maintained at that time that only full jurists are active and that a People's Judge cannot be taken in.

The basic meaning of this assertion was clear to me; I was glad at that time to have evaded the Eastern police and hoped that Dr. FRIEDENAU would be helpful in finding me a job. He assured me of this help.

On 18 February 1951 he actually wrote to Dr. NOLLAU, who is active in the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In his letter he stated that I had been assistant attorney general in East Berlin, and that I had worked for a considerable period for the UFJ. "Although Mr. WOLK is not a full jurist but is an industrial merchant by profession and participated in the first course for people's judges, his judicial knowledge, especially in criminal law, is very good. During his activities Mr. WOLK gave us vital information."

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- 2 -

My attempt to obtain employment with the Office for the Protection of the Constitution failed, however. Due to the official absence of Mr. ROSENTHAL, who is one of the principal members and today is deputy director of UFJ, I was asked to substitute for him for two months in April, 1951. After the expiration of these two months Dr. FRIEDENAU tried once more to obtain employment for me. Instead, however, I have been active since April, 1951, in the UFJ, and on 1 August 1951 I was officially named to be program officer for political criminal law, for the People's Police, and for the SSD. Since that time I have been active there. A short time after I had assumed office there, I discovered, much to my surprise, that several persons, who were not full jurists, were employed as program officers pp (sic!) there. Upon a subsequent inquiry Mrs. von ROSENBERG informed me that she was of the opinion that I could not work objectively. She based her opinion on my conduct in Potsdam. Actually, so she asserted, she had been wrong, for her close observation of me differed from her former views in Potsdam. Around July, 1951, Mrs. TIETZ was assigned to me as secretary. Mrs. TIETZ also is a recognized political refugee and had been active in Schwerin as office manager for a Lawyer and notary public.

Since July, 1951, when the offices of the Investigating Committee were moved from Lindenthaler Allee to Limastrasse 29, I noticed several things which I brought to light during official conferences. Specifically there were regular questions of security and personnel leadership. But all advances in this direction were minimized by Dr. FRIEDENAU and partly extenuated. In all cases, however, he was insulted. For example, the female employees of the ~~office~~^{office} in a common letter to Dr. FRIEDENAU appealed that, for danger reasons, they could no longer stay late (till 20,00 hours) if no protective measures were taken at the same time. The ladies wanted either to be brought to their homes in a car or else be accompanied by police from Limastrasse to the station. Dr. FRIEDENAU was especially put out over this common appeal by the ladies. He even ascribed it to Eastern reminiscences and stated that as long as he was not harmed, nobody else had to fear any dangers. At any rate, no measures for the protection of the employees of the Investigating Committee have been taken.

Only in one case protective measures were taken at that time: In the case of Dr. FRIEDENAU himself and for his secretary, Miss RICHTER. Aside from this the unjustified pay differentials led to serious differences of opinion. The personal expenses of Dr. FRIEDENAU were in gross contrast to the economic status of the mass of employees. For example, in order to save the

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unemployment tax, a large part of the salaries were paid out in net amounts. For about one year, for instance, I received a taxed income of DM 284.-- and an untaxed income of DM 200.--. *per month* Generally speaking, the maintenance of funds, which Dr. FRIEDENAU reserved for himself, was the subject of many aggravations. If, in the beginning, security measures were effective at all in the ~~house~~ ^{office}, they concerned finances. Here everything was, without exception, camouflaged. This development was especially depressing because a large part of the employees was active and maintained common sense for ideological reasons and did not demand unjustified salary raises. Personnel policy, which was also exclusively in Dr. FRIEDENAU's hands, left much to be desired, although on paper there was a personnel officer with the rank of division head. So, for example, he paid activist premiums and presented gifts to those who had regularly put in unpaid overtime. Among these was Dr. BERNDT, who a short time after receipt of a premium received a written reprimand, after hundreds of arrears had been discovered in his work. Because my secretary, Mrs. TIETZ had not put in sufficient overtime, Dr. FRIEDENAU denied her an advance of 100.-- DM for the funeral of her mother who had died in the Soviet Zone.

Affair ZICKLER

At that time a certain Heinz ZICKLER was employed in the organization section of the Investigating Committee. ZICKLER was said to have had close personal contacts with Dr. FRIEDENAU. Dr. FRIEDENAU is said to have sent him into the Soviet Zone with special assignments, although ZICKLER was a recognized political refugee. ZICKLER and a certain KAISER, who also worked in the organization section, stood in close contact with the Fighting Group against Inhumanity and with the VPO. When this became known, both were discharged immediately by Dr. FRIEDENAU but were reemployed the same day after further consideration. This ZICKLER received the order from Dr. FRIEDENAU to take pictures with a camera belonging to the latter of all Investigating Committee members at their places of work. Allegedly Dr. FRIEDENAU wanted these pictures for a folder on the Investigating Committee. I refused to permit myself to be photographed. In my office a picture was taken only of a folder on the People's Police.

Correct spelling

Around August, 1951, it became known to Dr. FRIEDENAU that the local criminal police was conducting an investigation of ZIEGLER for his participation in a murder. Nevertheless, ZIEGLER was not suspended from work. I called Dr. FRIEDENAU's attention to this during an official consultation, after these facts had become known to me, and after ZICKLER had escaped in October, 1951. Dr. FRIEDENAU declared, however, that the police officers had told him that the criminal police had no objections to ZIECKLER's continued employment. ZIECKLER fled on a Sunday

SECRET

- 4 -

Both now in CAPROWN HQS.

in October, 1951, to Magdeburg, taking along the camera and funds totalling DM 600.--. It is not certain whether he took along the pictures of Investigating Committee members, which he had taken a short time before that. In any case, ZICKLER appeared as a witness in August, 1952, in a big show trial under the direction of Hilde BENJAMIN and gave specific testimony about the organization of the Investigating Committee. My expressed suspicion at that time that ZICKLER, about whom Dr. FRIEDENAU had been warned by Mr. HOLTORF and Mr. BEHR, was generally rejected, *had fed to the trial*. The group around Mrs. von ROSENBERG suspected an evasion into the Foreign Legion. When checking ZICKLER's files, I noticed that he had not been investigated prior to his entry into the Investigating Committee. Subsequently, during consultations with Dr. FRIEDENAU and Mr. Rosenthal I mentioned that only those persons who have been investigated, may be employed in the UFJ. If somebody is employed without prior investigation, the investigation should nevertheless be conducted after he is employed. However, this suggestion of mine was not heeded. After ZIECKLER's escape several others were employed without investigation. Until the climax was reached in the SCHRAMM case, Dr. FRIEDENAU administered the hiring of new personnel and preserved this right for himself. Only after the SCHRAMM affair my suggestion was followed to establish a staff whose function it was to investigate new employees. The staff was to be composed of Mr. ROSENTHAL, Dr. ERBEN, Mr. HOLTORF, and myself. This staff did not start functioning properly until September, 1952.

Affair Dr. LINSE

By virtue of information from visitors and co-workers I continuously touched on the question of security during official consultations. It became known to me by word of mouth that a former crime investigator (Kriminaldirektor) was to be hired for the task of conducting security checks of those who had had none previously. As far as I know, nothing became of this project. The only measure taken for the security of our East workers was the order to change the files of our workers in such a way that their true names could no longer be recognized from the files. In July, 1952, at the time Dr. LINSE was kidnapped, this change had been about 50% completed. In my activities report for June, 1952, I informed Dr. FRIEDENAU of the fact that there were increasing indications that the SSD was introducing operative measures against the Investigating Committee. Up to this time it had become evident that

- 1- Our visitors were under surveillance
- 2- Inquiries had been made about several of our *headquarters* ~~principal~~ workers.

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SECRET

- 5 -

For defensive purposes against these offensive preparations I suggested the following security measures:

1. That our ~~principal~~^{Hq} workers be armed.
2. Availability of a private phone for our ~~principal~~^{Hq} workers.
3. Investigation of each ~~principal~~^{Hq} worker for the following defensive purposes:
 - a. Control of personnel files
 - b. Spot checks of the private conduct of our ~~principal~~^{Hq} workers.
4. Protection of low-salaried employees from possible corruption through salary raises, which, incidentally, Dr. FRIEDENAU promised in January, 1952.

After Dr. LINSE's kidnapping on 8 July 1952 and the subsequent lightning-swift action by the SSD by arresting 30 of our East workers, the directorate of the house was inclined to give serious considerations to security measures. Now the questions of personal armament, installation of telephones, investigation of our headquarter workers, and personal escort pp (sic!) were discussed. Arms were secured — partly pistols but mostly gas pistols. Several headquarter workers, who were considered to be in special danger, were given a private telephone, and a few others were called for by a car. Especially the index containing the workers' true names were secured. In addition certain changes were introduced in the maintenance of the visitors' roster. Dr. FRIEDENAU obtained for himself a shepherd dog and in addition had a two-way radio installed in his car. In addition to these security measures Dr. FRIEDENAU is accompanied in the evenings by an armed UFJ member. This armed escort follows Dr. FRIEDENAU's car in another car. A special police man was stationed near Miss RICHTER and Mr. ROSENTHAL. However, since these security measures did not seem sufficient to several headquarter workers, further discussions were held during an official consultation. During this consultation, around August, 1952, a sharp debate took place between the lawyers Dr. BERNDT and Dr. ZELLER on the one hand, and Dr. FRIEDENAU on the other. The deputy chief administration director, BRANDT, who had not participated in this controversy but was irritated by Dr. FRIEDENAU's provoking behavior, left the conference room with the remark that he would never enter this house again. ZELLER and BERNDT had insisted that the question of security for all be entrusted to a larger staff, and Dr. BERNDT demanded in addition that Dr. FRIEDENAU clear his public statements, prior to their pronouncement, during a conference of division directors. I myself was the last speaker in this conference and I indicated that I considered it dangerous to broadcast over the radio complete citations from the application forms of our headquarter workers, as Dr. FRIEDENAU indeed intended to do in the case of Dr. LINSE. In my opinion Dr. LINSE was

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seriously injured through a citation of his letter of application. Dr. FRIEDENAU conceded my objective arguments and added that it is possible to have differing opinions about this matter.

Affair SCHRAMM

After the kidnapping of Dr. LINSE, the arrests of several of our East workers during the period 9 to 15 July became known to us. Among the first of these were several members of Mr. HANSEN's staff. Mr. HANSEN directs the Review Section East-West Trade within the Investigating Committee. Mrs. SCHRAMM was the secretary assigned to him. On 15 July Mr. ROSENTHAL and I appeared before Dr. FRIEDENAU. Mr. ROSENTHAL asked Dr. FRIEDENAU to see to it that the best CIC agent be given the assignment of investigating SCHRAMM. Dr. FRIEDENAU promised to do this, but on the same day, in plain language, he asked the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, Dr. FRIEDRICH, to introduce surveillance measures. During further discussions Dr. FRIEDENAU announced his intention to conduct searches of Mr. HANSEN's and Mrs. SCHRAMM's houses. I suggested that in my opinion the available evidence was not sufficient to warrant a court order for a house search, and I advised instead, in order to prevent public confusion, to interrogate Mr. HANSEN and Mrs. SCHRAMM and to ask them whether they would voluntarily submit to a house search. Dr. FRIEDENAU agreed to this and declared to both that in their interest he had to do everything to clear possible grounds for suspicion. Both declared themselves willing to have their houses searched and Dr. FRIEDENAU ordered me and Mr. WEGNER to conduct the searches. I stated the results of the searches in a protocoll. In Mrs. SCHRAMM's correspondence folder we found quite a bit of private mail from the East, which, I believe, had been written by relatives in Thuringia. In addition we found a large pile of Eastern newspapers. These papers were allegedly obtained by ~~xx~~ SCHRAMM's friend, a certain KUEHN, who allegedly works with the CDU Ostbuero. In HANSEN's house I found a nolle pros by the attorney general and a written statement prepared by HANSEN while he was in protective custody. On the morning of 17 July I informed Dr. FRIEDENAU that I had just received SCHRAMM's refugee files. I asked him for the personnel files in our office in order to be able to compare both files. But Dr. FRIEDENAU demanded the refugee files, although I called his attention to the fact that I had not had the opportunity to look at these files. He assured me that I will receive both the personnel and the refugee files. In the evening of 18 July Mr. ROSENTHAL asked me to speak ~~for~~ with Mr. JOEHREN of the CDU Ostbuero about KUEHN. My efforts to meet JOEHREN were fruitless. I did not meet Mr. JOEHREN until 29 July, and then he informed me that he had an expressedly bad opinion of KUEHN. Meanwhile lie-detector tests were given

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to HANSEN and Mrs. SCHRAMM by CDD. In both cases the results were negative. On 24 July I gave a detailed report to Mr. ROSENTHAL about my findings in the affair HANSEN/SCHRAMM. From the files of the arrested workers it was determined that the source of the betrayal was Room # 13, which was the office of HANSEN and SCHRAMM. Mr. ROSENTHAL was of the opinion that in this case only SCHRAMM was responsible. I contradicted this and maintained that both ought to be investigated, not SCHRAMM alone for personal reasons. In this connection Mr. ROSENTHAL informed me that my view, that the personal prejudice against SCHRAMM stems from the antipathy of Mrs. von ROSENBERG, is erroneous. In recent times Mrs. v. ROSENBERG had changed her views vis-a-vis SCHRAMM. After hearing my presentations, Mr. ROSENTHAL immediately wanted to call the police and cause police measures to be taken. I brought out the fact that SCHRAMM had willingly submitted herself to the lie-detector test and that, in my opinion, the evidence available from the files was not sufficient to justify police measures. As a result Mr. ROSENTHAL asked me the following morning, Friday, 25 July, to take the files to Dr. EAGELMOSEER, of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, in order to enforce measures through his office. It never came to this interview, since the press on this morning reported SCHRAMM's escape, which allegedly took place on 23 July. Together with the police I searched SCHRAMM's apartment on 25 July and found out that the private mail had disappeared, while the papers were still there. Some time after that I went through the registry and discovered that Mrs. v. ROSENBERG was making one of her regular speeches to a considerable number of Hq workers. In passing I overheard her declare that SCHRAMM should have been forced to confess, even if it meant to have her stand in a basement with water up to her neck. When I stated to her that such methods cannot be utilized by Western authorities and that her suggestion is hardly suitable as an objective topic, she became violently outspoken and declared that she had always known that SCHRAMM was an agent. ~~She was brought to the attention of Mr. ROSENTHAL~~ ~~Most ROSENTHAL~~ of the confronted her with the fact that especially in recent times she had been of a different opinion. Thereupon the hysterical Mrs. v. ROSENBERG lost control of herself. She attacked me violently and stated that this was one of my usual insolences. I broke off the conversation and merely asked her, since she accused me of lying, to speak to Mr. ROSENTHAL. When I met her the next morning on the stairs and asked her what Mr. ROSENTHAL had said, she answered: "Mr. ROSENTHAL says you are crazy." I did not reply to this and tried in vain to get in touch with Mr. ROSENTHAL by telephone. Only 14 days later was I able to speak to Mr. Rosenthal. Mr. ROSENTHAL said that the whole thing had been misunderstood and has been based on an error. He thought he remembered that he had said that Mrs. v. ROSENBERG's feelings toward SCHRAMM fluctuated from one extreme to the other, and that around the time of our investigations of SCHRAMM (15 July) Mrs. v. ROSENBERG's feelings towards SCHRAMM had reached a negative climax.

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All I could do was to express my regrets to Mr. ROSENTHAL that he could not exactly recall our conversation. He stated that the word "crazy" had not been used in referring to me. He thought he merely said it was "crazy non-sense" (Irrsinn) to maintain that Mrs. v. ROSENBERG had had friendly feelings toward Mrs. SCHRAMM. On 25 July, the day of the publication of the news of Mrs. SCHRAMM's escape I received the personnel and refugee files which I have not seen since. The first thing I was able to determine was that the personnel files had not been kept in good order. The SCHRAMM file contained:

1. Application
2. A brief autobiography which contains no information of the period between 1945 and 1950.
3. Certification by a Government construction engineer in Max-Huette in Unterwellenborn, who certified that SCHRAMM had been employed there as secretary from 1939 until the capitulation.
4. Comment by the so-called personnel chief of the house, Dr. ERBEN, who actually has to perform nothing but minor subordinate tasks in the hiring process. The comment states that the applicant had been introduced to Dr. FRIEDENAU on 16 April 1952, and that, after consultation between Dr. FRIEDENAU and Dr. ERBEN, SCHRAMM was hired with the customary two-month probationary period.

The files further contained:

1 letter of recommendation by the CDU, Kreisverband Saalfeld, and signed by her friend KUEHN.

1 so-called pledge (Vergatterung) concerning the obligation of secrecy.

1 written statement from Dr. FRIEDENAU to the effect that SCHRAMM, after expiration of her probationary period was permanently employed as a steno-typist.

1 letter of recommendation by Mr. HANSEN in which he praises her untiring activity, her working zeal, and her developmental growth.

The files are concluded by a letter from Dr. FRIEDENAU to Dr. FRIEDRICH of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. In checking the refugee files, it was evident after the first page, that SCHRAMM had been imprisoned ~~for~~ by the SSD for 4 weeks and had to obligate herself to become an informant. It is quite clear from these refugee files that the informant SCHRAMM was ordered to turn over her information reports to the KUEHN mentioned above.

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All events connected with the SCHRAMM affair had an extraordinary effect on the workers of the house. Especially affected were those who, in contrast to earlier times, had begun to extenuate Dr. FRIEDENAU's measures, such as Mrs. v. ROSENBERG. The clear-cut, undeniable case of failure security-wise in the employment of SCHRAMM led Mrs. v. ROSENBERG to state that in any case a conviction of SCHRAMM should have been obtained, even if torture (water cells) had to be used. Such conversations were used to cover up the aggravating failure in employment in general and in the SCHRAMM case in particular. None of Dr. FRIEDENAU's sudden new friends were depressed by the question of SCHRAMM's criminally superficial employment, although in the similar case of ZICKLER Dr. FRIEDENAU declared that he alone is responsible for personnel questions and that he alone makes the decisions. Nobody was moved to question the undescribable suffering which in the Soviet zone, which SCHRAMM had brought over many human beings during her activities. Only one thing was determined: SCHRAMM was not to escape (accusation, trial witness). Instead of working with iron energy on the defensive investigation of all members of the house, the general opinion was expressed that SCHRAMM's arrest was prevented through my failure. Mr. LEUTWEIN expressed in the car to Mr. ROSENTHAL and Mrs. v. ROSENBERG that HOCHWALD ought to be thoroughly ashamed of himself because SCHRAMM escaped. When I subsequently spoke to Mr. ROSENTHAL about this, he said that LEUTWEIN only meant to express his disfavor to the criminal law division. It therefore was my desire to bring about an investigation of the SCHRAMM affair in order to clear up all matters connected with this case. This investigation was promised to me by Mr. LEUTWEIN, who, in August, 1952, in the absence of Dr. FRIEDENAU and Mr. ROSENTHAL had taken over the direction of UFJ. When, at the end of September, 1952, Mr. ROSENTHAL turned over to me the direction of the Special Operations office (sonderbares Aussenbuero), I once more urged the initiation of a SCHRAMM investigation and asked for an interim report (Zwischenzeugnis) in which a stand is taken on the SCHRAMM case. Although I repeatedly submitted oral and written reminders of this interim report, I am to this day not in the possession of such a report.

As a result of the extra work load caused by the kidnapping of Dr. LINSE and the SCHRAMM affair a great deal of work in my regular schedule piled up, and I was unable to work on it during my regular office hours. I intended to take a vacation on 1 September, but in order to take care of the backlog of work, I had to stay in my office two days longer than I had planned. On my last working day - the 2d or 3d of September - Mrs. v. ROSENBERG revealed to me with a smile that she knew why I am finishing off all my work and want to leave a clean desk. The reason, she continued smilingly, was that Mrs. TIETZ and I had the intention to go to the East. At first I was completely dumbfounded over this revelation, but then I calmly told her that she ought to think over the following: Dr. FRIEDENAU, Mr. ROSENTHAL, and I have been exposed by Hilde BENJAMIN in a letter to all members of

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Soviet zone justice employees as especially shameless former members of Eastern justice. Dr. FRIEDENAU was defense counsel; Mr. ROSENTHAL was program officer for criminal law in the justice ministry, who preferred to go to West Berlin at the moment when he was being considered for the position of senate president in the criminal law senate in Potsdam. I was a political attorney and also an SED-member. "Mrs. v. ROSENBERG, whom do you think the Soviet zone authorities love most of all?" - The usually quick-witted Mrs. v. ROSENBERG, who never lacked strong expressions, was unable to give me an answer to my declaration. I suppose that the events of the interim period are, to a large degree, due to the personal tension between Mrs. v. ROSENBERG and Dr. FRIEDENAU on the one hand, and myself on the other.

During my vacation in September, 1952, I was repeatedly called into the Investigating Committee in order to clear up several undecided questions. Towards the end of my vacation Mr. ROSENTHAL asked me by mail to call him up immediately, which I did. Mr. ROSENTHAL asked me and Mrs. TIETZ to meet him outside the office. This was even more obvious inasmuch as one or two days ~~before~~ ago Mrs. TIETZ wanted to return to duty but was sent home. We met on 22 September in my apartment. Mr. ROSENTHAL read to us a written statement in bad German, ~~ix~~ which contained an order for the UFJ to establish a special bureau. Its subject was to be the SSD and the security of the office. The execution of this task was to be entrusted to a special expert. I was informed that I was to direct this bureau. While this order, which allegedly was translated from a foreign language, always referred to "The Committee of Free Jurists ...", it was noticeable that in two cases the institution was called by its correct name, the Investigating Committee of Free Jurists, to wit: when it was mentioned that, firstly, I am to maintain no contact with any members of UFJ, and secondly, that I am prohibited from establishing contact with official Berlin authorities. I immediately told Mr. ROSENTHAL that these conditions would weaken the small bureau from the beginning, and that there would be no sense in beginning work under such conditions. I did not receive a clear answer to this. Mr. ROSENTHAL merely declared that he would present the problem once more. Up to this day no decision has been made in this matter. Furthermore I was ordered to find an office for myself. The rent for this office was not to exceed DM 60-70. Subsequently I established the small office in my apartment but discovered that ~~that~~ 95% of the necessary material for my work was not placed at my disposal by the UFJ. Only insignificant and very little information was given to me. Actually I could do nothing for this planned operation with the information. I informed

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Dr. FRIEDENAU of this in a letter of 4 October 1952 and also indicated to him that, under these circumstances, I could consider the UFJ measures nothing but my termination. A long time after receipt of my letter in UFJ Dr. FRIEDENAU granted me a two-hour interview on 8 November 1952. During this interview he stated to me that the UFJ is not an organization founded on democratic constitutional principles, but that this is a strongly centralized institution which has been founded by a certain side. He made it clear that if he were convinced of my loyalty, he would not have any negative feelings against me. He ~~was~~ admitted that he was glad that I out of all others had been selected for this bureau. He told me that my views concerning my termination were wrong, but in order to clear up constitutional questions he would see to it that during the next week Mr. ROSENTHAL would get together with me and iron out details. He said he would participate in this conference, if he has the time. Nothing has come of this conference to this day, although I submitted several oral and written reminders.

Affair STRONG

During my vacation in September 1952 I was asked by Mr. ROSENTHAL to come to headquarters. He explained to me that the Americans had suggested that I go to American headquarters. When I arrived there I was interrogated by two German speaking Americans, one of whom introduced himself as "STRONG". They wanted to find out if I had made a statement to the effect that Miss RICHTER, FRIEDENAU's secretary, had had dealings with SCHRAMM. I explained the whole matter. About the middle of July I conferred with ~~the Vice President of Police~~ Deputy Chief of Police, Dr. URBAN. I asked him to start proceedings to get police protection for our headquarters personnel. He agreed immediately and I sent him a list of true names. A few days later I was visited by Mr. HANSEN and Mr. SCHOTT who told me that they hadn't noticed anything resembling police protection. I sent them to the Police Station, Zehlendorf-West and told them to refer to my discussion with URBAN and to ask for police protection again. When they got there they were received by the Chief Inspector who told them that he had already received their names and was just in the process of securing police protection for them. He added that if he was to take over the responsibility for their security, they were not to behave like Miss RICHTER recently had done. He explained that Miss RICHTER had suddenly disappeared one evening, and the policeman who had the responsibility of protecting her, had first lost his head completely. Finally he found her again on the Kurfurstendamm, deep in conversation with Mrs. SCHRAMM.

HANSEN and SCHOTT brought me this bit of news immediately, which prompted me to call Mr. KLANG of F 5 that same evening to relate the story to him. I had been in contact with KLANG since the affair Dr. LINSE. A few days later KLANG informed me that the fact that Miss RICHTER had met with SCHRAMM had actually been entered in the Police Log in Zehlendorf-West.

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I related this whole incident ~~was~~ to the two Americans. While I was telling my story I noticed that periodically one or the other would get up and leave the room. Suddenly Mr. STRONG reappeared and confirmed the validity of my statements. I explained that I had no way of knowing what was written in the Police Log, that I only knew what HANSEN and SCHOTT had told me. Thereupon Mr. STRONG asked me to convince Miss RICHTER to come there. I agreed to do this only if the policeman who had been assigned the protection of RICHTER admitted that he recognized SCHRAMM as the woman RICHTER had been in conversation with. After making that a condition, the request was withdrawn. - ~~Shortly~~ Shortly after my return I stopped in at the UFJ to speak to Mr. ROSENTHAL, when a CIC official came in to call for Miss RICHTER. Later I found out that Miss RICHTER had been made to take a polygraph test.

must get [After the first meeting with STRONG I was in constant contact with him. Repeatedly he asked my opinion on questions of security. Mr. STRONG told me that it was his job to examine the security of the UFJ. I gave him all the details and handed him the list of persons who had been detached from UFJ during the past 1 1/2 years. Several of them, i.e., ZICKLER and SCHRAMM had been recognized as agents, others left for better ~~paid~~ paying jobs, and still others left in anger. I repeatedly mentioned these things in business meetings, and pointed to the fact that the personnel department didn't pay enough attention to the question of security.

Towards the end of November, during one of my discussion with STRONG, he made the suggestion that I should work together with him on the SSD investigation. He told me that he intended to make a big job of this SSD penetration, and that he intended to have an office which was to gather and receive information from all sources. Objectively I was not against this suggestion, personally, however, I felt very unsure because this idea of STRONG's corresponded to the wishes of Dr. FRIEDENAU, which in the meantime had been made known to me. I learned from Dr. STEINMANN, the successor of LINSE, that one day in October 1952 he had met with WESTPHAL, the leader of the agricultural division, and that he ~~had~~ (Westphal) had asked him (Steinmann) about me. (WESTPHAL and FRIEDENAU have a very special relationship because FRIEDENAU defended WESTPHAL in Potsdam, and he was sentenced to 1 1/2 years in prison.) Dr. STEINMANN did not respond to the question, and WESTPHAL told him that he and FRIEDENAU had had a discussion about me. FRIEDENAU had said that in three months I would not be working for UFJ anymore. WESTPHAL also told STEINMANN that FRIEDENAU had described a conversation to him which I was supposed to have had with Dr. FRIEDENAU, in which I had made accusations against WESTPHAL and others. WESTPHAL's comments on these accusations was that I should be the last one to accuse anyone, because mine was the darkest past of them all. Mr. STEINMANN told me all this and also said that he would write a Memorandum on this meeting between him and WESTPHAL, which would be at my disposal any time I so desired. When STRONG tried to convince me to quit UFJ, I had to think back to the above explanation by STEINMANN. Two days after my resignation I was to come to headquarters for a personal interview with STRONG's superiors, and after that we could immediately start our assignment. I told Mr. STRONG that I would never agree to resign unless I knew under what conditions I could accept a new position. Mr. STONG asked for all my personnel files in order to acquaint

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himself with all particulars as to my previous connections with the SSD. To this day these files have never been returned to me, although I was promised to get them back after three days. When I telephoned him to remind him (ca. 15 Jan. 1953) he informed me that I was to hear more on the subject the beginning of the following week. (ca. 20 Jan. 1953) I still haven't heard any further. Besides these files I have certain written material to Mr. STRONG. Also the edition of "Der Fortschritt" in which an article appears stating that according to the Eastern Press Dr. FRIEDENAU is not a lawyer. Neither the papers nor the article has ever been returned.

The discussions as to my new employ were delayed for two weeks and a new date was finally set for the week between Christmas and New Years. On the first of January this new thing was to get a start. On Wednesday, January 7 1953 I underwent an interrogation, which lasted 9 hours. From 14:30 until 17:30 I took a polygraph test. The first question was: are you Walter Wolk, and were you ^{anticipated} really born in Berlin. Question No. 3: Have you told anyone about your work with STRONG aside from the people mentioned above? I gave the false negative answer to this last question, because I didn't want to mention the name of HELLING. The next questions were: Do you have any connections with the SSD? Do you any connections with a befriended information service? Have you been in the East Sector or in the East Zone after your flight in October 1950? Did you mistreat or beat prisoners when you were ^{Public Attorney} ~~stated attorney~~? At about 17:30 a psychologist and a certain Mr. ROST appeared. With these two gentlemen I discussed my life history until about 23:30. It was determined what kind of a background I had, where I studied and what, where I was employed and ^{business} what I did there. They were especially interested in the fact that I had been ^{business} manager of a subsidiary plant of the HENSCHEL-AIRPLANE Factory, also that I was in the Abwehr. In these discussions I was amazed to find that the gentlemen had never heard the term business manager, and were not at all familiar with that sort of position. We talked a great deal about my duties as states attorney, and especially about my duties as ^{at the} District Attorney's office in the Land Brandenburg

In this connection I also noticed that these gentlemen were not oriented in regard to conditions in 1946 in the Soviet zone, especially concerning the training of people's judges and their deployment. The conversation frequently departed from the topic of my background and several questions of general interest were raised, such as the reason for a nation, like the German people, to accept an authoritarian government. I based this fact on the formula: Stupidity and lack of awareness of responsibility. The two other gentlemen, however, maintained that the cause of the Third Reich was the political development of the German people, which had been stagnant for 50 years. I protested this and cited the examples of ~~SPAIN~~ STRESEMANN and Poland. Regarding Poland, I expressed the view that ~~Poland~~ the Poles are outspokenly politically alert and are conscious nationalists, and yet today they have an authoritarian government. Mr. ROST then cited examples from the post-capitulation era and asserted that, although the conduct of Allied troops has not always been clean, he could well imagine and even know that in case the Germans had sat at the other end of the table, it would have been much worse. Thereupon I declared that this behavior also could be based on a formula which I call bravery. In my opinion, and I stated so, the truly brave soldier cannot mistreat

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his beaten opponent, for this would be contrary to the ethics of bravery. Mr. ROST replied that according to that the bravery of the Germans must have receded. The gentlemen were very surprised to hear me state that I have religious tendencies. The conversation on this topic, however, did not go beyond the reasons for the establishment of the recognized church's men's groups, the functions of the so-called German Christians and of Reich Bishop MUELLER. During this conversation I was given a 4 or 5-page questionnaire which I had to fill out. The questions dealt exclusively with fields of interest and presumably served to supplement the previous lie detector test. Replying to Mr. ROST's discovery in 1947 that three high-ranking administrative officials in the Federal territory (I believe 2 ministerial directors and 1 ministerial counselor) falsely used doctor degrees, although they never studied for them, I stated that this type of matter could have been successfully uncovered by the UFJ. With interest I recalled many remarks in our house concerning Dr. FRIEDENAU. It is almost an open secret that FRIEDENAU is not a jurist. Thus the division head LEUTWEIN remarked to the lawyer Dr. BECKMANN that he knew that FRIEDENAU is no jurist but that he, LEUTWEIN, would support FRIEDENAU on the basis of his merits. I received no answer to this protest. In the same manner I had previously declared to Mr. STRONG that the manner of the procedures against me arouse my doubts that my "friend" ~~HEIK~~ FRIEDENAU is behind all this. I likewise stated to Mr. ROST and to the psychologist that I have special views regarding the reasons why I am being submitted to this procedure. Thereupon the psychologist raised both hands and declared that he knew of nothing and that he had clearly-expressed orders. However, I seem to remember that Mr. ROST said that this might be possible but that he believed that several people might regret this later. However, I cannot recollect this scene with certainty, as the remark was made at 11 p.m. and I was somewhat exhausted. Prior to this entire procedure Mr. Strong requested me to submit a written background description of myself. Several days later he requested that I submit this description in my own handwriting and also enclose a written 3-page description of any one of my fields of interest. I elected to write a letter to ~~submitting~~ an anonymous bridge-playing friend of mine and took an uncompromising stand against those who kibitz into other players' cards. Ever since Mr. STRONG had asked me to resign from UFJ, I could not rid myself of the belief that this entire affair was being instigated by Dr. FRIEDENAU. My belief was strengthened by the fact that Mr. STRONG had repeatedly questioned me regarding the members of UFJ and persons in Berlin authorities with whom I still had contact. I was especially surprised by Mr. STRONG's christmas gift, consisting of 1 box of cigars, 1 bottle of cognac, and 1 bottle of rum. These items, which are ~~in~~ themselves valuable and gave me a great deal of pleasure, were thoughtlessly wrapped, however, in an old, partially torn, brown paper bag. I was very conscious of this. Furthermore I recalled having informed Mr. STRONG in the middle of December that nothing had come of the interview which Dr. FRIEDENAU had intended to arrange between Mr. ROSENTHAL and myself. Mr. STRONG ~~replied~~ had replied to this that he hoped I did not believe that this interview would ever materialize.

After this investigation on 7 January the results were to have been forwarded to me within two days so that this bureau could begin to function very quickly. I was supposed to report there on Monday,

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12 January, at 10 a.m. Nothing came of this meeting. The meeting which had originally been set for Wednesday, 14 January, was postponed till Thursday, the 15th, but after another phone call, was set for 3 pm, Wednesday, the 14th. During this interview Mr. STRONG informed me that he is very disappointed. His first question was: "Whom else did you tell that we were to work together?" I repeated that besides my wife and Mrs. TIETZ nobody knows about it. But he did not believe me and said that I myself knew this, for I had submitted myself to the lie-detector test. Indeed I remember that my heart beat twice as strong when I answered this question, and the American who ran the lie-detector showed me after conclusion of the test that question # 3 was indicated by a thick red spot. Then Mr. STRONG said that I was planning something against him too. I believe that he wanted to submit me to pressure by declaring that I am a free man who can go home, and that I ought to be content that I was recognized as a political refugee in October, 1952. His only advice to me would be to forget everything, and he would do likewise. Should I, however, talk about the recent events, he would do the same, and that would not be good for me. In addition, he asserted, the psychologist in his interview with me had also discovered several contradictions in my past. When I asked him to name specific details, Mr. STRONG evaded and said that I will know about it, that I ought to get a good night's sleep and think about it tomorrow, and it would all come back to me then. His other findings (I do not know whether these were inside our outside the house) corresponded to the picture given by the doctor and the lie-detector proceedings. To my clear question, whether he suspected me of collaborating with the East, he replied that he had said all this "without accusation." This surprised me very much, especially since he told me a while ago, around December, that he had received the best information about me and for that reason wanted to take up negotiations concerning the new bureau. He conceded expressly that all information which I had given him during our long period of contact was as accurate as the hit of a hammer on the head of a nail. However, these unmentioned matters were to be found within me. He kept repeating that I had played a game with him. He had been honest with me, he had stood up for me, but I had played a game with him. This latter statement was partially true, inasmuch as from the beginning I was of the opinion that STRONG had acted on FRIEDENAU's orders, for it is known to me from a reliable source that Dr. FRIEDENAU was aware of interviews which STRONG had with members of UFJ. My co-workers HOLTORF and WEGNER confirmed this to me in detail. Furthermore I noticed in this connection that the activity report for December, 1952, which was due in the beginning of January, 1953, was not requested from me. I also noticed that in the beginning of January, 1953, only Mrs. TIETZ received a personnel questionnaire, although all members of UFJ were to fill out such a questionnaire. I know that Mr. WEGNER a long time prior to this was asked to turn in his questionnaire.

These facts point to the conclusion that Mr. STRONG must have established contact with the UFJ, although Mr. STRONG always denied this when I questioned him about it. That the investigations conducted by Mr. STRONG were not to serve the purpose of a possible suspension can be seen from the following:

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On 6 January 1953 Mrs. TIETZ informed me that she had been asked to appear before the chief of the police precinct in which she resides. On the stairs in the precinct building she met two gentlemen who stopped, and Mrs. TIETZ heard them say: "She must be the one." During her conversation with the precinct chief one of the two gentlemen entered the room and demanded to speak to the chief. The gentlemen turned out to be a member of Kripo, Dept. F 6. Although the chief asked the gentleman to leave him alone with Mrs. TIETZ, this man returned once more after a few minutes and tried to glance from the corner of his eyes into ~~the~~ Mrs. TIETZ's identification papers which the chief was holding in his hand.

In the investigation of the HOBERG affair, which was entrusted to me by the UFJ, I raised, after one meeting with HOBERG, doubts in a written report concerning his integrity. The justifications of my doubts were expressedly confirmed by Mr. STRONG who even authorized me to designate HOBERG vis-a-vis the UFJ as a news falsifier. I noticed that after that Mr. STRONG asked me repeatedly whether I had had another meeting with HOBERG, whom I had seen only once. In another affair, that of Dr. LEHNHOFF, I conducted an investigation on 3 January 1953 on orders of the UFJ. After I had notified Mr. STRONG of this, I was notified in the middle of January, 1953, by Mr. ROSENTHAL to stop this procedure, as another office was handling the matter. Mr. STRONG, whom I informed of this, asked me to arrange for a meeting between Dr. LEHNHOFF and an expert. Aside from that (he said) the expression "stop" (in reference to stopping the procedure) is not the proper one.

Finally, I am of the opinion that in view of the developments of these matters only one conclusion can be reached: That with all means and under all circumstances I am to be expelled from the Investigating Committee.

SECRET

Nachdem mir in jüngster Zeit besondere Ereignisse aufgefallen sind, die im Zusammenhang mit einer amerikanischen Dienststelle (CID) -Mr. Strong- und dem Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen stehen, halte ich es für notwendig, einen umfassenden Bericht über die Verhältnisse des Untersuchungsausschusses und über insbesondere die letzten Massnahmen des Untersuchungsausschusses bzw. der amerikanischen Dienststelle zu geben.

Seit etwa Ende des Jahres 1949 stehe ich in einem engen Kontakt mit dem Untersuchungsausschuss. Damals bekleidete ich in Ostberlin die Stelle eines stellvertr. Generalstaatsanwaltes. In dieser Eigenschaft habe ich über eine Mittelsperson dem Untersuchungsausschuss wertvolles Material übergeben. Der Beauftragte des Untersuchungsausschusses, der Mitarbeiter Wunder, hat seinerseits dieses Material der Spitze der westberliner Justiz vorgelegt, so dem damaligen Generalstaatsanwalt Neumann und dem damaligen Kammergerichtspräsidenten Strucksberg. Diese Herren sollen nach Angaben des Herrn Wunder "die Hände über dem Kopf zusammengeschlagen" und geäußert haben: "Wie machen Sie das bloß, Herr Wunder". Im Oktober 1950 bin ich von Ostberlin geflüchtet. Der Grund meiner Flucht wurde als politische Gefährdung von der Aufnahmekommission anerkannt, sodass meine Ehefrau sowohl als auch ich, den Status des anerkannten politischen Flüchtlings erhielten. Durch den Mitarbeiter Wunder wurde mir einige Tage nach meiner Flucht eine Rücksprache mit Herrn Dr. Friedenau, den ich aus meiner Tätigkeit in Potsdam bereits kannte und von ihm wusste, dass er der Leiter des Untersuchungsausschusses ist, vermittelt. Dieser sicherte mir sofort zu, mich in die Dienste des UFJ zu nehmen. Entgegen dieser Versicherung teilte er mir nach etwa 3 Wochen "Urlaub" mit, dass er aus grundsätzlichen Erwägungen nicht in der Lage sei, mich zu übernehmen. Im Übrigen seien, so behauptete Herr Dr. Friedenau damals, nur Volljuristen tätig und daher könne eine Übernahme eines Volkrichters nicht in Frage kommen. Das Prinzipielle dieser Erklärung leuchtete mir ein; ich war damals froh, den Maschern im Osten entgangen zu sein und hoffte lediglich, dass Dr. Friedenau mir bei der Stellungsuche behilflich sein würde, was er mir auch ausdrücklich zusicherte.

Tatsächlich hat er an Herrn Dr. Nollau, der beim Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz tätig ist, am 13.2.51 geschrieben. In diesem Brief teilte er mit, dass ich bislang stellvertr. Generalstaatsanwalt in Ostberlin gewesen sei, der seit längerer Zeit beim URJ mitgearbeitet hatte. "Obwohl Herr Wolk nicht Volljurist, sondern von Beruf Industriekaufmann ist und am ersten Volksrichterlehrgang teilgenommen hat, waren seine juristischen Kenntnisse insbesondere auf strafrechtlichem Gebiet sehr gut. Herr Wolk hat uns während seiner Tätigkeit wichtige Informationen gegeben". Mein Gesuch beim Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz wurde jedoch abschlägig beschieden. Auf Grund einer beabsichtigten Dienstreise des Herrn Rosenthal, eines hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiters des URJ, der heute stellvertr. Leiter ist, wurde ich im April 1951 aufgefordert, die Urlaubsvertretung für ihn für 2 Monate zu übernehmen. Nach Ablauf dieser 2 Monate wollte Herr Dr. Friede-
nau nochmals versuchen, mich unterzubringen. Statt dessen jedoch bin ich seit April 1951 hauptamtlich beim URJ tätig und wurde am 1.8.1951 offiziell zum Referenten für politisches Strafrecht, für Volkspolizei und SSD bestellt. Seit dieser Zeit bin ich bis zum heutigen Tage dort beschäftigt. Kurze Zeit nach Aufnahme meiner Tätigkeit beim URJ stellte ich zu meinem nicht geringen Erstaunen fest, dass mehrere Personen, die nicht Volljuristen sind, als Referenten pp, beschäftigt wurden. Auf eine entsprechende Nachfrage teilte mir Frau v. Rosenberg mit, dass sie der Meinung gewesen sei, dass ich nicht sachlich arbeiten könne. Sie glaubte das auf mein Verhalten in Potsdam zurückführen zu können. Tatsächlich, so erklärte sie mir, hätte sie sich geirrt, denn der nähere Augenschein wäre anders als ihre damalige Ansicht in Potsdam. Etwa im Juli 1951 wurde mir als Sekretarin Frau Tietz zugeteilt. Frau Tietz ist ebenfalls anerkannter politischer Flüchtling und war zuletzt in Schwerin bei einem Rechtsanwalt und Notar als Bürovorsteherin tätig. Bis dahin war mir Frau Tietz nicht bekannt.

Während der Zeit ab Juli 1951, dem Zeitpunkt der Verlegung der Diensträume des Untersuchungsausschusses von der Lindenthaler Allee nach der Limastrasse 29, sind mir verschiedene Dinge aufgefallen, die ich in Dienstbesprechungen vorgetragen

- 3 -

habe. Insbesondere handelte es sich regelmässig um die Frage der Sicherheit und um die Personalführung. Aber alle Vorstösse in diesen Richtungen wurden von Herrn Dr. Friedenau bagatellisiert und zum Teil beschönigt, auf jeden Fall nahm er aber diese Dinge übel. Die weiblichen Angestellten des Hauses haben zum Beispiel in einem gemeinsamen Schreiben Herrn Dr. Friedenau vorgetragen, dass sie aus Gefährdungsgründen den sogenannten Spätdienst (bis 20,00 Uhr) nicht mehr leisten könnten, wenn nicht zugleich eine wirksame Schutzmassnahme eingeleitet werden würde. Entweder wollten die Damen mit einem Wagen in ihre Wohnung gebracht oder zumindest wollten sie unter polizeilicher Begleitung von der Limastrasse zum Bahnhof geführt werden. Diesen gemeinsamen Schritt der Damen nahm Herr Dr. Friedenau besonders übel. Er führte ihn sogar zurück auf östliche Reminiszenzen und meinte, dass, solange man ihm nichts täte, einem anderen überhaupt eine Gefahr nicht erwachsen würde. Jedenfalls sind Massnahmen zum Schutze der Angehörigen des Untersuchungsausschusses bis dahin nicht eingeleitet worden.

Nur in einem Punkt wurden damals bereits Schutzmassnahmen veranlasst: Im Falle des Dr. Friedenau selbst und seiner Sekretärin Frl. Richter. Daneben führte die unterschiedliche und zum Teil ungerechtfertigte Besoldung der Angehörigen des UFJ zu nicht unerheblichen Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Der persönliche Aufwand des Herrn Dr. Friedenau stand in krassen Gegensatz zur wirtschaftlichen Lage der Masse der Angestellten. Um z.B. die Arbeitgeberanteile zu sparen, wurden erhebliche Teile der Gehälter in Netto-Beträgen bezahlt. Etwa ein Jahr lang habe ich z.B. ein versteuertes Gehalt von 284.-- DM und einen un versteuerten Gehaltsanteil von 200.-- DM erhalten. Überhaupt war die Kassenführung, die sich Herr Dr. Friedenau selbst vorbehalten hatte, der Gegenstand ständigen Argernisses. Wenn Sicherungsmassnahmen im Hause überhaupt von Anfang an wirksam waren, dann betrafen diese die Finanzen. Hier war alles restlos abgetarnt. Diese Entwicklung war umso betrüblicher, weil der Grossteil der Angestellten aus Idealismus tätig und vernünftig genug war, nicht etwa ungerechtfertigte Gehaltsforderungen zu stellen. Die Personalführung, die ebenfalls restlos in den Händen des Dr. Friedenau gelegen hat, obwohl nach aussen auf dem Papier ein Personalreferent im

Ränge eines sogenannten Abteilungsleiters eingesetzt war, lag gänzlich im Argen. So hat er z.B. Aktivistenprämien an diejenigen bezahlt bzw. daneben noch Geschenke überreicht, die regelmässig unbezahlte Überstunden geleistet hatten. Unter diesen befand sich auch Dr. Berndt, der kurze Zeit nach der Prämierung schriftlich mit einem Verweis gerügt wurde, nachdem hunderte von Rückständen bei ihm festgestellt wurden. Weil meine Dame, Frau Rietz nicht genügend Überstunden geleistet haben sollte, wurde ihr von Herrn Dr. Friedenau erbetene Vorschuss von 100.-- DM, den sie für die Beerdigung ihrer in der Sowjetzone verstorbenen Mutter verwenden wollte, abgelehnt. Diese Darstellungen könnten beliebig erweitert werden.

Angelegenheit Zickler.

In der Organisationsabteilung des Untersuchungsausschusses war zur damaligen Zeit ein gewisser Heinz Zickler beschäftigt. Zickler soll einen engen persönlichen Kontakt zu Herrn Dr. Friedenau gehabt haben. Herr Dr. Friedenau soll ihn persönlich mit Sonderaufträgen in die Sowjetzone geschickt haben, obwohl Zickler anerkannter politischer Flüchtling gewesen war. Zickler und ein gewisser Kaiser, der ebenfalls in der Organisationsabteilung arbeitet, standen in engem Kontakt zur Kampfgruppe gegen Unmenschlichkeit und zur VPO. Als dieses eines Tages bekannt wurde, sind beide zunächst von Herrn Dr. Friedenau fristlos entlassen, aber am selben Tage nach einer Rücksprache wieder eingestellt worden. Diesem Zickler hatte Herr Dr. Friedenau den Auftrag gegeben, mit einem Herrn Dr. Friedenau gehörenden Fotoapparat sämtliche Angehörigen des Untersuchungsausschusses an ihren Arbeitsplätzen zu fotografieren. Es hiess, dass Herr Dr. Friedenau diese Fotos für eine anzulegende Karte "Untersuchungsausschuss" haben wolle. In meinem Fall habe ich mich geweigert, mich fotografieren zu lassen. Lediglich wurde in meinem Dienstzimmer eine Aufnahme eines die Volkspolizei betreffenden Aktenvorganges gemacht. Etwa seit August 1951 war Herrn Dr. Friedenau bekannt, dass die hiesige Kriminalpolizei ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Zickler wegen Beteiligung an einem Mord führte. Trotzdem wurde Zickler nicht vom Dienst suspendiert. Ich habe in einer Dienstbesprechung nach der

Flucht des Zickler im Oktober 1951 und nachdem mir diese Einzelheiten bekannt geworden waren, Herrn Dr. Friedenau darauf hingewiesen. Herr Dr. Friedenau erklärte jedoch, dass die beiden Kriminalbeamten ihm gesagt hätten, dass gegen eine Weiterbeschäftigung des Zickler Einwände kriminalpolizeilicherseits nicht zu erheben seien. Zickler ist an einem Sonntag im Oktober 1951 unter Mitnahme des Fotoapparats und einer Kassette mit Inhalt im Werte von etwa 600.-- DM-West nach Magdeburg geflüchtet. Ob er die Fotos der Angehörigen des Untersuchungsausschusses, die er kurz vordem hat machen müssen, mitgenommen hat, steht mit Sicherheit nicht fest, ist aber anzunehmen. Jedenfalls ist Zickler im August 1952 in einem grossen Schauprozess unter Leitung der Hilde Benjamin als Zeuge aufgetreten und hat insbesondere Aussagen über die Organisation des Untersuchungsausschusses gemacht. Mein damals geäussertes Verdacht, dass Zickler, vor dem Herr Dr. Friedenau mit Sicherheit von Herrn Holtorf und Herrn Behr gewarnt worden ist, nach dem Osten entwichen ist, stiess auf allgemeine Ablehnung. Der Kreis um Frau v. Rosenberg vermutete vielmehr ein Entweichen in die Fremdenlegion. Bei der Überprüfung der Akte des Zickler ist mir aufgefallen, dass Zickler vor seinem Eintritt beim UfJ nicht durchleuchtet worden war. Ich habe daraufhin in einer Dienstbesprechung und auch in einer Unterredung mit Herrn Rosenthal und Herrn Dr. Friedenau darauf hingewiesen, dass beim UfJ nur überprüfte Personen tätig sein dürfen. Wenn schon aber jemand ohne Überprüfung eingestellt worden sei, dann müsse diese Überprüfung nachgeholt werden. Aber auch diese Anregung von mir wurde nicht befolgt. Nach der Flucht Zicklers sind noch mehrere Neueinstellungen ohne Überprüfung von Herrn Dr. Friedenau vorgenommen worden. Bis zum Eklat in dem Fall Schramm hat Herr Dr. Friedenau die Einstellungen selbst verfügt und sich dieses Recht auch immer vorbehalten. Erst nach der Schramm-Affäre wurde ein von mir vorgeschlagenes Gremium ins Leben gerufen, welches die Überprüfung von Neueinstellungen vorzunehmen hatte. Es sollten dies sein Herr Rosenthal, Herr Dr. Erben, Herr Holtorf und ich. Zum richtigen Funktionieren ist jedoch dieses Gremium bis zum September 1952 nicht gekommen.

27 Feb-53

Angelegenheit Dr. Linse.

Auf Grund verschiedener Informationen von Besuchern und Mitarbeitern habe ich in Dienstbesprechungen immer wieder die Frage der Sicherheit angeschnitten. Gesprächsweise wurde mir bekannt, dass ein ehemaliger Kriminaldirektor eingestellt werden sollte mit dem Auftrag, die nicht vorgenommenen Überprüfungen bei der Einstellung von Angehörigen des URJ nachzuholen. Meines Wissens ist aus diesem Projekt nichts geworden. Als einzige Massnahme zum Zwecke der Sicherung unserer Ost-Mitarbeiter wurde eine Aktenumstellung angeordnet in der Weise, dass die Klarnamen unserer Mitarbeiter aus den Akten nicht mehr zu erkennen waren. Diese Umstellungsaktion war im Juli 1952, dem Zeitpunkt der Verschleppung Dr. Linses zu etwa 50% durchgeführt. Im Juni 1952 habe ich in einem Tätigkeitsbericht für diesen Monat Herrn Dr. Friedenau mitgeteilt, dass sich die Anzeichen verdichten, dass der SSD operative Massnahmen gegen den Untersuchungsausschuss einleitet. Bisher seien zu erkennen gewesen

- 1.) Überwachungsmaßnahmen gegen unsere Besucher,
- 2.) Erkundigungen gegen verschiedene hauptamtliche Mitarbeiter.

Zum Zwecke der Abwehr dieses in Vorbereitung befindlichen Angriffs habe ich folgende Sicherungsmaßnahmen in Vorschlag gebracht:

- 1.) Bewaffnung unserer hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter
- 2.) Bereitstellung eines Privattelefons für unsere hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter
- 3.) Überprüfung jedes hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiters nach abwehrmässigen Gesichtspunkten
 - a) Kontrolle der Personalakten
 - b) stichprobenhafte Überprüfung des ausserdienstlichen Verhaltens unserer hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter
- 4.) Sicherung der gering bezahlten Angestellten des Hauses vor möglicher Korumpierung durch gehaltliche Besserstellung, die im übrigen im Januar 1952 ausdrücklich von Herrn Dr. Friedenau in Aussicht gestellt worden war.

Nach der Verschleppung Dr. Linses am 8. Juli 1952 und der darauf folgenden schlagartigen Aktion des SSD im Osten durch Verhaftung von über 50 unserer Ost-Mitarbeiter war die Leitung des Hauses geneigt, in ernsthafte Gespräche betr. Sicherheitsmassnahmen einzutreten. Nunmehr wurde die Frage

der Bewaffnung und die Frage der Anlegung von Telefonapparaten, der Überprüfung unserer hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter, des Abholens pp besprochen. Es wurden Waffen beschafft, zu einem kleinen Teil Pistolen und zu einem grosseren Teil Gaspistolen, Einigen hauptamtlichen Mitarbeitern, die für besonders gefährdet angesehen wurden, wurde ein Privattelefon bewilligt, wenige andere wurden mit einem Wagen abgeholt. Die Mitarbeiterkartei mit Klarnamen wurde besonders gesichert. Auch wurden gewisse Umstellungen bezüglich der Führung der sogenannten Besucherliste angeordnet. Herr Dr. Friedenau beschaffte sich einen Schäferhund und liess sich ausserdem ein Sprechfunkgerät in seinen PKW einbauen. Neben diesen Sicherungsmassnahmen wird Herr Dr. Friedenau von einem bewaffneten Angehörigen des UFJ abends begleitet. Dieser Begleiter folgt in einem anderen Wagen dem PKW des Herrn Dr. Friedenau. Bei Frl. Richter und Herrn Rosenthal wurde ein Wachpolizist stationiert. Da jedoch mehreren hauptamtlichen Mitarbeitern diese Sicherungsmassnahmen nicht ausreichend erschienen, wurde in einer Dienstbesprechung darüber verhandelt. In dieser Besprechung, etwa im August 1952, kam es zu einer ausserordentlich scharfen Auseinandersetzung zwischen den Rechtsanwälten Dr. Berndt und Zeller einerseits und Herrn Dr. Friedenau andererseits. Der an dieser Kontroverse nicht beteiligte jetzige stellvertr. Hauptabteilungsleiter Brandt verliess das herausfordernde Verhalten des Herrn Dr. Friedenau wegen unter Protest das Sitzungszimmer mit dem Bemerkem, dass er dieses Haus niemals wieder betreten wolle. Zeller und Berndt hatten ungeregt, die Frage der Sicherheit für alle einem grösseren Gremium zu übertragen und Dr. Berndt forderte zusätzlich, dass Herr Dr. Friedenau Erklärungen in der Öffentlichkeit vorher in einer Abteilungsleiterbesprechung erläutere. Ich selbst habe als letzter in dieser Sitzung gesprochen und vorgetragen, dass ich es für gefährlich halte, dass über Rundfunk vollständige Zitate aus Bewerbungsunterlagen unserer hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter vorgetragen werden, wie es Herr Dr. Friedenau im Falle Dr. Linse tatsächlich vermochte. Meiner Meinung nach ist Herrn Dr. Linse durch Zitierung seines Bewerbungsschreibens ein Bärendienst erwiesen worden. Herr Dr. Friedenau konzidierte mir meine sachliche Argumentation und meinte,

dass man sicher über diese Angelegenheit verschiedener Ansicht sein könne.

Angelegenheit Schramm.

Nach der Verschleppung Dr. Linses wurde uns etwa in der Zeit vom 9. - 15.7. die Verhaftung von mehreren unserer Ost-Mitarbeiter bekannt. Die ersten Namen betrafen Mitarbeiter von Herrn Hansen, der im Untersuchungsausschuss das Referat Ost-West-Handel leitet. Als seine Sekretärin war ihm Frau Schramm zugeteilt worden. Am 15.7. haben Herr Rosenthal und ich Vortrag bei Herrn Dr. Friedenau gehalten. Herr Rosenthal bat Herrn Dr. Friedenau darum, zu veranlassen, dass dem besten CIC-Agenten der Auftrag der Überprüfung der Schramm gestellt werde. Herr Dr. Friedenau sicherte dies zu, hat aber lediglich am gleichen Tage in dürren Worten das Amt für Verfassungsschutz, Herrn Dr. Friedrich, gebeten, Überwachungsmaßnahmen einzuleiten. In der weiteren Unterredung teilte Herr Dr. Friedenau mit, dass er beabsichtige, Hausdurchsuchung bei Herrn Hansen und Frau Schramm halten zu lassen. Ich stellte ihm vor, dass das uns vorliegende Material meines Erachtens für die Erwirkung eines richterlichen Durchsuchungsbefehls nicht ausreiche und schlug vor, um auch Verwirrung in der Öffentlichkeit zu unterbinden, Herrn Hansen und Frau Schramm zu befragen, ob sie sich freiwillig einer Hausdurchsuchung unterwerfen würden. Herr Dr. Friedenau ging auf diesen Vorschlag ein und hat beiden erklärt, dass er auch im Interesse der beiden alles tun müsse, um mögliche Verdachtsgründe zu klären. Die beiden erklärten sich zur Durchführung der Hausdurchsuchung bereit und Herr Dr. Friedenau beauftragte mich und Herrn Wegner, diese wahrzunehmen. In einem Protokoll habe ich das Ergebnis der Durchsuchung niedergelegt. Bei Frau Schramm wurden im Schreibfach eine ganze Menge private Ostpost vorgefunden, die von -ich glaube thüringer Verwandten- geschrieben war. Ausserdem wurde das Vorhandensein eines ganzen Stosses von Ostzeitungen festgestellt. Diese Ostzeitungen soll sich der Freund der Schramm, ein gewisser Kühn, beschafft haben, der mit dem Ostbüro der CDU zusammen arbeiten soll. Im Falle Hansen stellte ich eine Einstellungsverfügung der Staatsanwaltschaft und einen von Hansen in der U-Haft gefertigten Schriftsatz sicher. Am 17.7. morgens

teilte ich Herrn Dr. Friedenau mit, dass ich neben die Flüchtlingsakte der Schramm erlöten hätte. Ich bat ihn um die Personalakte unseres Hauses, um beide Akten vergleichen zu können. Herr Dr. Friedenau erforderte aber von mir die Flüchtlingsakte, obwohl ich ihn darauf hinwies, dass ich noch keine Gelegenheit gehabt hätte, mir diese Akte anzusehen. Er sicherte mir zu, dass ich beide Akten, also die Flüchtlingsakte und unsere Personalakte vorgelegt bekommen soll. Am 18.7. abends bat mich Herr Rosenthal mit Herrn Jöhren vom Ostbüro der CDU über Kühn zu sprechen. Meine Bemühungen, Jöhren zu treffen, waren vergeblich. Erst am 29.7. kam ich mit Herrn Jöhren zusammen, der mir mitteilte, dass er von Kühn eine ausgesprochen schlechte Meinung habe. Inzwischen wurde ein Lügendetektorverfahren bei Hansen und Frau Schramm durch CID vorgenommen. Bei beiden ist diese Untersuchung negativ ausgefallen. Am 24.7. habe ich bei Herrn Rosenthal umfassenden Vortrag über meine Ermittlungen in der Sache Hansen/Schramm gehalten. An Hand der Akten verhafteter Mitarbeiter konnte festgestellt werden, dass die Quelle des Verrats das Zimmer Nr.13 war, das ist das Dienstzimmer von Hansen/Schramm. Herr Rosenthal war der Meinung, dass für diese Sache nur die Schramm in Frage kommen könne. Ich widersprach und meinte, dass beide zu untersuchen seien und nicht nur aus gefühlsbetonten Gründen die Schramm allein. In diesem Zusammenhang teilte mir Herr Rosenthal noch mit, dass meine Ansicht, dass das Gefühlsmoment gegenüber der Schramm herrühre von der Antipathie der Frau v. Rosenberg gegen die Schramm, irrig sei. Gerade in letzter Zeit hatte Frau v. Rosenberg ihre Meinung gegenüber der Schramm geändert. Auf Grund meines Vortrages wollte Herr Rosenthal sofort bei der Polizei anrufen und polizeiliche Massnahmen einleiten lassen. Ich gab zu bedenken, dass die Schramm aus Lügendetektorverfahren über sich hat ergehen lassen und dass die Aktenlage meiner Meinung nach nicht ausreiche, polizeiliche Massnahmen zu rechtfertigen. Daraufhin fragte mich Herr Rosenthal am nächsten Morgen, Freitag d. 25.7. mit den Mitarbeiterakten bei Herrn Dr. Hegelmoser vom Amt für Verfassungsschutz vorzusprechen, um von dort aus Massnahmen einleiten zu lassen. Zu diesem Vortrag kam es nicht mehr, da an diesem Tage morgens die Presse von der Flucht der Schramm, die am 23.7. erfolgt sein soll, berichtete. Gemeinsam mit

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der Polizei habe ich am 25.7. die Wohnung der Schramm durchsucht und habe dabei festgestellt, dass die Privatpost fehlte, während die Zeitungen noch vorhanden waren. Einige Zeit nach der Flucht der Schramm ging ich durch die Registratur und stellte fest, dass Frau v. Rosenberg eine ihrer üblichen Reden vor einer grösseren Zahl hauptamtlicher Mitarbeiter hielt. Ich hörte im Vorbeigehen, wie sie erklärte, dass man die Schramm auf jeden Fall hätte zu einem Geständnis bringen müssen und sei es, wenn man sie bis zum Hals im Wasser stehend in einem Keller verhören würde. Als ich ihr erklärte, dass diese Methoden von westlichen Dienststellen nicht angewendet werden können und dass ihr Vorschlag kaum geeignet sei als sachliche Gesprächsgrundlage zu dienen, wurde sie ausgesprochen heftig und erklärte, dass sie immer gewusst hätte, dass die Schramm eine Agentin sei. In Erinnerung an die kurz vordem geführte Unterhaltung mit Herrn Rosenthal über die Schramm hielt ich ihr vor, dass sie gerade in letzter Zeit eine andere Ansicht vertreten hätte. Darauf ging die hysterische Frau v. Rosenberg aus der Fassung. Sie griff mich heftig an und meinte, das sei eine meiner üblichen Frechheiten. Ich habe daraufhin das Gespräch abgebrochen und sie lediglich gebeten, weil sie mich der Lüge bezichtigte, sie möge mit Herrn Rosenthal sprechen. Als ich sie am nächsten Morgen auf der Treppe sprach und nach der Erklärung des Herrn Rosenthal fragte, sagte sie mir: "Herr Rosenthal sagt, Sie sind irrsinnig". Ich habe mich dazu nicht geussert und habe vergeblich versucht, mit Herrn Rosenthal telefonisch in Verbindung zu treten. Erst nach etwa 14 Tagen kam es zu einer Rücksprache zwischen Herrn Rosenthal und mir. Herr Rosenthal meinte, dass das Ganze falsch verstanden sei und auf einen Irrtum zurückgeführt werden müsse. Er glaubte sich zu erinnern, dass er vorgetragen habe, dass Frau v. Rosenberg in ihren Gefühlen der Schramm gegenüber an- und abschwellend gewesen sei und dass gerade zum Zeitpunkt unserer Untersuchungen gegen die Schramm, also etwa am 15.7., die Gefühle der Frau v. Rosenberg zugunsten der Schramm auf dem Höhepunkt eines (negativen) Schwellpunktes gestanden hätte. Ich konnte Herrn Rosenthal daraufhin nur mein Bedauern erklären, dass er sich an unsere Unterhaltung nicht mehr exakt erinnern könne. Das Wort

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irrsinnig in Bezug auf mich sei von ihm nicht gebraucht worden. Er glaubte sich zu erinnern, dass er zu Frau v. Rosenberg gesagt habe, es sei Irrsinn, wenn man behaupten wolle, dass Frau v. Rosenberg gewisse freundschaftliche Gefühle zu Frau Schramm gehabt haben soll. Am 25.7., dem Tage der Veröffentlichung der Flucht der Schramm wurde mir die Flüchtlingsakte und unsere Personalakte vorgelegt, die ich bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht mehr gesehen hatte. Ich stellte zunächst fest, dass von einer ordnungsgemäss geführten Personalakte nicht die Rede sein konnte. Die Akte Schramm hat enthalten:

- 1 Bewerbung
- 1 Lebenslauf in ganz kurzer Form, der über die Zeit von 1945 - 1950 keine Auskunft gibt,
- 1 Bescheinigung eines Regierungsbaurates, der bei der Max-Hütte in Unterwellenborn beschäftigt ist und der der Schramm ordnungsgemässes Arbeiten als Sekretärin in der Zeit von 1939 bis zum Zusammenbruch bescheinigte
- 1 Vermerk von dem sogenannten Personalchef des Hauses, Herrn Dr. Erben, der in Wahrheit nur untergeordnete Arbeiten bei der Einstellung zu erledigen hatte, aus welchem hervorging, dass die Bewerberin am 16.4.52 Herrn Dr. Friedenau vorgestellt worden sei und dass nach ~~Rücksprache~~ Rücksprache zwischen Herrn Dr. Friedenau und Herrn Dr. Erben die Schramm mit der üblichen zweimonatigen Probezeit eingestellt werden solle.

weiter befindet sich in der Akte

- 1 Zeugnis von der CDU, Kreisverband Saalfeld, ausgestellt von ihrem Freund Kühn
- 1 sogenannte Vergatterung betr. Geheimhaltungsverpflichtung
- 1 Schreiben von Herrn Dr. Friedenau, dass die Schramm nach Ablauf der Probezeit als Stenotypistin fest eingestellt ist
- 1 Dienstleistungszeugnis von Herrn Hansen, in welchem ihre unermüdliche Tätigkeit und ihre Arbeitsfreude und auch die Entwicklungsfähigkeit hervorgehoben werden.

Den Abschluss dieser Akte bildet das Schreiben von Herrn Dr. Friedenau an Herrn Dr. Friedrich vom Amt für Verfassungsschutz. Bei der Prüfung der Flüchtlingsakten konnte nach Umblättern der ersten Seite bereits festgestellt werden, dass die Schramm 4 Wochen SSD-Haft hinter sich hatte und zum Spitzeldienst verpflichtet worden war. Ganz klar geht

aus dieser Flüchtlingsakte hervor, dass der verpflichtete Spitzel Schramm angehalten worden ist, die Spitzelberichte an den bewussten Kühn abzugeben.

Alle im Zusammenhang mit dem Fall Schramm stehenden Vorgänge berührten die Mitarbeiter des Hauses ausserordentlich. Insbesondere waren diejenigen betroffen, die um diese Zeit -im Gegensatz zu früher- anfangen, Massnahmen des Herrn Dr. Friedenau zu beschönigen, so Frau v. Rosenberg. Der eklatante Fall des Versagens in abwehrmässiger Hinsicht bei der Einstellung der Schramm, das einfach nicht zu leugnen ist, führte zu der Behauptung der Frau v. Rosenberg, dass auf alle Fälle und sei es mit Torturen (Wasserzelle) eine Überführung der Schramm hätte erreicht werden müssen. Mit diesen Gesprächen sollte das gravierende Versagen bei Einstellungen im allgemeinen und bei der Schramm im besonderen vertuscht werden. Keinen der plötzlichen Freunde des Herrn Dr. Friedenau bedrückte die Frage der sträflich leichtfertigen Einstellung der Schramm -obwohl gerade im ähnlichen Fall Zickler Herr Dr. Friedenau erklärte, dass er allein für die Personalien die Verantwortung trage und daher auch allein die Entscheidungen treffe-. Keinen bewegte die Frage nach dem von der Schramm verursachten namenlosen Leid in der Sowjetzone, welches sie während ihrer Tätigkeit über viele Menschen brachte. Nur eines wurde erörtert, die Schramm durfte nicht entweichen (Blamage, Zeugin im Prozess). Statt nunmehr mit eiserner Energie an die abwehrmässige Durchleuchtung der Angehörigen des Hauses heranzugehen, wurde zunächst die Ansicht vertreten, als sei durch mein Versagen die Inhaftnahme der Schramm verhindert worden. Herr Leutwein hat sich im Auto zu Herrn Rosenthal und Frau v. Rosenberg geäussert, dass Hochwald sich in Grund und Boden schämen müsse (nämlich deswegen, weil die Schramm entwichen ist). Als ich daraufhin mit Herrn Rosenthal sprach, meinte er, dass Herr Leutwein nur der Strafrechtsabteilung sein Missfallen ausdrücken wollte. Es war daher mein Bestreben, eine Untersuchung im Fall Schramm herbeizuführen, um alle mit dem Fall Schramm zusammenhängenden Dinge aufzuklären. Diese Untersuchung wurde mir auch seitens des Herrn Leutwein, der im August 1952 wegen der Abwesenheit von Herrn Dr. Friedenau und von Herrn Rosenthal die Leitung des WZ innehatte,

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zugesagt. Ich habe weiterhin, als Ende September 1952 Herr Rosenthal mir die Leitung des sonderbaren Aussenbüros übertragen hatte, noch einmal darum gebeten, in die Untersuchung Schramm einzutreten und mir ein Zwischenzeugnis zu erteilen, in dem insbesondere zum Fall Schramm Stellung genommen wird. Obwohl ich wiederholt mündlich als auch schriftlich an dieses Zwischenzeugnis erinnert habe, bin ich bis zum heutigen Tage nicht im Besitz dieses Zeugnisses.

Infolge der durch die Verschleppung Dr.Linses und durch die Untersuchungen im Fall Schramm verursachten Mehrarbeit sind im Juli und August in meinem Dezernat erhebliche Reste geblieben, die ich in der normalen Dienstzeit nicht aufarbeiten konnte. Ich beabsichtigte, am 1.9. auf Urlaub zu gehen und musste, um die Reste aufzuarbeiten, noch 2 Tage länger als beabsichtigt, im Hause bleiben. Am letzten Arbeitstage, es war der 2. oder 3.9. eröffnete mir Frau v.Rosenberg lächelnd, dass sie wisse, warum ich alles aufarbeite und reinen Tisch mache. Der Grund sei, so meinte sie lächelnd, dass Frau Tietz und auch Sie beabsichtigten, nach dem Osten zu gehen. Über diese Eröffnung war ich zunächst verblüfft und sagte ihr dann ganz ruhig, obwohl mir dieses schwerfiel, dass sie sich doch einmal folgendes Überlegen möge, nämlich: Herr Dr.Friedenau Herr Rosenthal und ich seien in einem Rundbrief der Hilde Benjamin an alle Justizangestellten der Sowjetzone als besonders schamlose ehem. Angehörige der Ostjustiz herausgestellt worden. Herr Dr.Friedenau war Strafverteidiger, Herr Rosenthal war Referent für Strafrechtspflege im Justizministerium, der es vorzog, in dem Augenblick nach Westberlin zu gehen, als man ihn zum Senatspräsidenten im Strafsenat in Potsdam bestellen wollte. Ich war politischer Staatsanwalt und ausserdem SED-Mitglied; "wen meinen Sie wohl, Frau v.Rosenberg, "lieben" die sowjetzonalen Behörden am meisten?" - Die sonst so schlagfertige und um kräftige Ausdrücke niemals verlegene Frau v.Rosenberg konnte mir auf meine Erklärung nichts erwidern. Ich nehme an, dass die in der Folgezeit eingetretenen Ereignisse zu einem nicht geringen Teil auf diese persönlichen Spannungen zwischen Frau v.Rosenberg und Herrn Dr.Friedenau einerseits und mir andererseits zurückzuführen sind.

Während meines Urlaubs im September 1952 wurde ich wiederholt

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in den Untersuchungsausschuss gebeten, um schwebende Fragen zu klären. Gegen Ende meines Urlaubs veranlasste mich Herr Rosenthal postalisch, ihn umgehend anzurufen, was ich auch tat. Herr Rosenthal forderte mich und auch Frau Tietz auf, uns mit ihm ausserhalb des Hauses zu treffen. Dies war umso auffälliger, als ein oder 2 Tage vorher Frau Tietz ihren Dienst wieder antreten wollte, aber wieder nach Hause geschickt wurde. Wir trafen uns am 22.9. in meiner Wohnung. Herr Rosenthal las ein in schlechtem Deutsch verfasstes Schreiben vor, in welchem der UFJ veranlasst wird, ein besonderes Büro einzurichten. Gegenstand der Arbeiten sollte der SSD und die Sicherheit des Hauses sein, mit der Durchführung dieser Aufgabe sei ein erfahrener Fachmann zu bestellen. Es wurde mir eröffnet, dass ich dieses Büro leiten sollte. Während es vorher in diesem, angeblich aus einer Fremdsprache übersetzten Schreiben immer hiess: "das Komitee freiheitlicher Juristen....." muss einen Fachmann dafür abstellen, "das Komitee ■■■....." muss ein Büro einrichten, war in zwei Fällen auffälligerweise vom Untersuchungsausschuss Freiheitlicher Juristen, der genauen Bezeichnung des Instituts die Rede und zwar erstens, dass ich mit keinem Angehörigen des UFJ Verbindung halten dürfe und zweitens dass es mir untersagt wird, mit amtlichen Berliner Stellen in Kontakt zu treten. Ich habe daraufhin Herrn Rosenthal sofort gesagt, dass diese Bedingungen die Wirksamkeit des kleinen Büros von vornherein lähmen, dass es gar keinen Sinn hätte, unter diesen Voraussetzungen die Arbeit zu beginnen. Eine klare Antwort habe ich darauf nicht erhalten. Herr Rosenthal hat lediglich erklärt, dass er das noch einmal vortragen wolle. Bis zum heutigen Tage ist in diesem Punkt auch noch keine Entscheidung gefallen. Weiterhin wurde mir aufgetragen, mir selbst ein Bürozimmer zu suchen. Der Preis für dieses Zimmer dürfe allerdings 60.-- bis 70.-- DM nicht übersteigen. Ich habe daraufhin dieses kleine Büro in meiner Wohnung zum Anlaufen gebracht und musste schon nach kurzer Zeit feststellen, dass der UFJ mir Material für die Fortführung meiner Arbeit zu 95% nicht zur Verfügung stellte. Lediglich geringfügige und nur ganz wenige Informationen wurden mir gegeben. Tatsächlich war mit diesen Mitteilungen für die geplante Sache überhaupt nichts anzufangen. Das habe ich Herrn

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Dr.Friedenau in einem Schreiben v. 4.10.52 auch mitgeteilt und habe insbesondere darauf hingewiesen, dass nach den Umständen ich die Massnahmen des UFJ nur als ein Ausbooten ansehen könne. Längere Zeit nach Eingang meines Schreibens beim UFJ hat Herr Dr.Friedenau schliesslich am 8.11. mit mir eine 2 Stunden lange Rücksprache geführt. In dieser Rücksprache hat er mir Andeutungen darüber gemacht, dass der UFJ eben nicht ein auf demokratischen Grundsätzen begründetes Organ ist, sondern es sich hier vielmehr um ein streng zentralistisch von einer bestimmten Seite ins Leben gerufenes Institut handele. Er liess durchblicken, wenn er sich von meiner Loyalität überzeugen würde, er auch gegen mich negative Gefühle nicht haben würde. Er gab zu, dass er sich gefreut habe, dass gerade ich für dieses Büro abgestellt worden sei. Meine Ansicht bezüglich Ausbootung sei im übrigen falsch, aber um eine Klärung in Grundsatzfragen herbeizuführen, würde er veranlassen, dass in der nächsten Woche Herr Rosenthal mit mir Einzelheiten festlege. Zu dieser Besprechung wolle er auch kommen, falls er Zeit hätte. Aus ~~dieser~~ dieser Besprechung ist bis zum heutigen Tage nichts geworden, obwohl ich mündlich und schriftlich daran erinnert habe.

Angelegenheit Strong.

Während meines Urlaubs im September 1952 wurde ich von Herrn Rosenthal aufgefordert, zur Dienststelle zu kommen. Er eröffnete mir, dass ich auf Anweisung der Amerikaner zu einer amerikanischen Dienststelle gehen müsse. Dort angekommen wurde ich von zwei deutschsprechenden Amerikanern, von denen sich einer mit dem Namen "Strong" vorstellte, vernommen. Es handelte sich darum, ob ich gesagt habe, dass frl.Richter, die Sekretärin von Herrn Dr.Friedenau, mit der Schramm verhandelt hätte. Ich klärte diesen Sachverhalt. Mitte Juli habe ich eine Rücksprache mit der Polizei und zwar mit dem Vizepräsidenten Dr.Urban geführt. Ich habe ihn gebeten, polizeiliche Schutzmassnahmen für unsere hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter einzuleiten. Er sicherte dies sofort zu und ich habe eine entsprechende Liste mit Klarnamen an den Vizepräsidenten übersandt. Einige Tage danach haben die Herrn Hansen und Schott mich aufgesucht und erklärt, dass sie von polizeilichen Schutzmassnahmen überhaupt nichts merkten. Ich schickte sie daraufhin zur Polizei-Inspektion Zehlendorf-west

mit dem Bemerken, dass sie sich auf mein Schreiben an den Vizepräsidenten berufen und dort um polizeilichen Schutz bitten mögen. Dort angekommen wurde ihnen von dem Inspektionsleiter erklärt, dass er ihre Namen schon erhalten hätte und dass er ohnehin im Begriff war, diese polizeilichen Sicherungsmassnahmen einzuleiten. Er fügte jedoch hinzu, dass, wenn er diese Sicherung übernehme, sie sich nicht so verhalten sollten wie kürzlich Frl. Richter sich verhalten hätte. Frl. Richter sei nämlich an einem Abend plötzlich verschwunden und der mit der Bewachung beauftragte Polizist war zunächst ganz kopflos und suchte sie. Er hat sie dann endlich am kurfürstendamm im Gespräch mit Frau Schramm wieder gefunden. Dies teilten mir die beiden Herren sofort mit, worauf ich abends Herrn Klang von F 5, mit dem ich seit der Affäre Dr. Linse in Verbindung stand, unterrichtete. Herr Klang teilte mir einige Tage später mit, dass in dem polizeilichen Tagebuch in Zehlendorf-West tatsächlich eingetragen sei, dass sich Frl. Richter mit der Schramm getroffen habe. Diesen Sachverhalt habe ich den beiden Amerikanern vorgetragen. Während meines Vortrages fiel mir auf, dass einmal der eine und mal der andere Herr für längere Zeit nach draussen ging. Plötzlich kam Herr Strong zurück und erklärte mir, dass meine Angaben der Wahrheit entsprächen. Ich erwiderte, dass ich nicht wissen könne, was im Meldebuch der Polizei eingetragen sei. Ich weiss lediglich, dass der oben vorgetragene Sachverhalt mir von den Herren Hansen und Schott erzählt wurde. Daraufhin bat mich Herr Strong, Frl. Richter zu veranlassen, nach dort zu kommen. Ich lehnte dieses Vorhaben ab mit dem Bemerken, dass ich mich mit einer derartigen Aktion nur dann einverstanden erklären könne und auch dieses Vorhaben nur dann ausführen wolle, wenn mir bestätigt würde, dass der betreffende Polizeibeamte, der den Auftrag hatte, Frl. Richter zu beschützen, unter Vorhalt des Bildes der Schramm diese als Gesprächspartnerin erkenne. Daraufhin brauchte ich nicht in Aktion zu treten. Vielmehr stellte ich fest, dass kurz nach meiner Rückkehr beim UFG, wo ich bei Herrn Rosenthal Vortrag hielt, ein Beamter der CIC die Richter abholte. Später wurde mir bekannt, dass Frl. Richter dem Lügendetektorverfahren unterworfen worden ist. Aus dieser ersten Bekanntschaft mit Herrn Strong entwickelte sich ein ziemlich reger Verkehr. Wiederholt bin ich von Herrn Strong aufgefordert worden, meine Ansicht über Fragen der Sicherheit pp vorzutragen. Herr Strong hatte, wie sagte er mir, die

Aufgabe, die Sicherungsmassnahmen des UFJ zu überprüfen. Ich habe ihm rückhaltlos konkrete Details übermittelt u.a. habe ich ihm die anliegende Liste übergeben mit Namen derjenigen Personen, die im Laufe von ca 1 1/2 Jahren beim UFJ ausgeschieden sind; einige, z.B. Zickler und Schramm sind als echte Agenten erkannt, andere sind gegangen, um eine besser dotierte Stellung zu übernehmen, wieder andere haben den UFJ im Zorn verlassen. Diese Dinge habe ich wiederholt in Dienstbesprechungen vorgetragen und darauf hingewiesen, dass die Personalführung des Hauses die Sicherungsmomente zu wenig beachte. Im Laufe dieser Unterhaltungen mit Herrn Strong kam dieser, etwa Ende November, mit dem Gedanken heraus, dass ich mit ihm gemeinsam in SSD-Ermittlungen einsteigen solle. Er sagte, dass er diese Penetrierung mit dem SSD auf ganz grossem Fuss aufbauen wolle und dass das einzurichtende Büro von allen Seiten Informationen bekommen würde. Sachlich war ich durchaus nicht abgeneigt, eine derartige Aufgabe zu übernehmen, persönlich jedoch fühlte ich mich unsicher, weil diese Bitte des Herrn Strong im letzten Grunde den mir bekannt gewordenen Wünschen des Herrn Dr. Friedenau entsprach. Mir ist über Herrn Dr. Steinmann, dem Nachfolger Dr. Linses bekannt geworden, dass eines Tages, etwa im Oktober 1952, der Leiter der Abteilung Landwirtschaft, Westphal, der mit Herrn Dr. Friedenau ein besonderes Verhältnis haben soll (Dr. Friedenau hat ihn in Potsdam verteidigt, Westphal wurde zu etwa 1 1/2 Jahren Gefängnis verurteilt) und fragte Herrn Dr. Steinmann nach seiner Ansicht über mich. Dr. Steinmann äusserte sich nicht und Westphal erklärte, dass er mir Dr. Friedenau meinetwegen ein Gespräch geführt habe. In diesem Gespräch habe Herr Dr. Friedenau erklärt, dass ich in 1/4 Jahr nicht mehr beim UFJ tätig sein würde. Westphal sagte auch, dass Dr. Friedenau ihm eröffnete, dass ich bei Herrn Dr. Friedenau Vortrag in einer Sache Westphal gehalten hätte. In diesem Vortrag hätte ich Westphal belastet. Ausserdem, so soll sich Dr. Friedenau zu Westphal geäussert haben, soll ich auch andere belastet haben. Westphal sagte daraufhin, dass ich gerade die geringste Veranlassung dazu hätte, andere zu belasten, denn gerade ich sei doch ein Mann, der eine dunkle Vergangenheit habe. Herr Dr. Steinmann hat mir dies mitge-

teilt und mir weiterhin gesagt, dass er über dieses Gespräch zwischen ihm und Westphal eine schriftliche Notiz absetzen würde, die er mir, falls ich sie einmal benötigen sollte, gern zur Verfügung stellen wollte. An diese Erklärung Dr. Steinmanns musste ich intensiv denken, als mich Herr Strong dazu bewegen wollte, beim UFJ zu kündigen. 2 Tage nach dieser Kündigung sollte ich mich einer persönlichen Überprüfung seiner vorgesetzten Dienststelle unterziehen und danach "könnten wir dann sofort anfangen zu arbeiten". Ich wies Herrn Strong darauf hin, dass ich eine Kündigung nicht aussprechen würde, solange ich nicht zumindest weiss, unter welchen Bedingungen ich eine andere Stelle übernehmen könnte. Um sich über den Umfang meiner den SSD betreffenden Arbeiten zu informieren, hat Herr Strong meine sämtlichen diesbezüglichen Akten von mir erfordert. Bis zum heutigen Tage sind diese Akten noch dort, obwohl ich sie nach 3 Tagen zurückerhalten sollte. Auf meine telefonische Erinnerung am 15.1.53 teilte er mir lediglich mit, dass ich Anfang der nächsten Woche (also 19. bzw. 20.1.) Nachricht darüber erhalten würde. Diese Benachrichtigung ist bisher noch nicht erfolgt. Neben diesen Akten habe ich an Herrn Strong einige schriftliche Arbeiten vorher gesondert gegeben. Auch hat er von mir die Herrn Dr. Friedenau angehende Ausgabe der Zeitung "Der Fortschritt" erhalten, in welcher von der angeblichen Behauptung der östlichen Presse, dass Dr. Friedenau kein Jurist sei, die Rede ist. Die zugesicherte Rückgabe ist bisher ebenfalls nicht erfolgt. Die Angelegenheit Einstellung wurde dann zunächst auf etwa 14 Tage vertagt und sollte dann schliesslich in der Woche zwischen Weihnachten und Neujahr zum Abschluss gelangt sein. Am 1.1.53 sollte diese neue Sache ins Leben gerufen werden. Am Mittwoch, d. 7.1.53 wurde ich im Zuge der angeblichen Übernahme in den Dienst einer amerikanischen Dienststelle einer 9 Std. dauernden Vernehmung unterworfen. Von 14,30 Uhr bis etwa 17,30 Uhr wurde ich nach vorangegangener Unterhaltung dem Lügendetektorverfahren unterworfen. Mir wurde zunächst die Frage vorgelegt, ob ich tatsächlich Walter Wolk bin und ob ich in Berlin geboren sei. Frage Nr. 3 war: Haben Sie ausser den genannten Personen irgendjemand anderem noch etwas gesagt über die beabsichtigte Zusammenarbeit mit Herrn Strong? Diese Frage verneinte ich wahrheitswidrig, da ich den Namen Helling nicht nennen wollte. Die nächste Frage war:

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Haben Sie Verbindung zum SSD, die übernächste Frage: haben Sie Verbindung zu einem befreundeten Nachrichtendienst, waren Sie nach Ihrer Flucht im Oktober 1950 im Ostsektor oder in der Ostzone, haben Sie als Staatsanwalt Häftlinge misshandelt oder geschlagen. Um etwa 17,30 Uhr erschien dann ein Psychologe und ein gewisser Rost. Mit diesen beiden Herren habe ich dann über meinen Lebenslauf bis etwa 23,30 Uhr gesprochen. Es wurde erörtert, aus welchem Milieu ich komme, was ich gelernt habe, wo ich beschäftigt war, was ich dort getan habe. Insbesondere interessierte man sich sehr dafür, dass ich Betriebsführer eines Zweigwerkes der Menschel-Flugzeugwerke gewesen bin, dass ich Abwehrbeauftragter war usw. Bei diesen Gesprächen fiel mir auf, dass die Herren die Institution eines Betriebsführers nicht kannten. Sehr viel gesprochen wurde über meine Tätigkeit als Staatsanwalt und insbesondere über meine Tätigkeit als Dezernent beim Generalstaatsanwalt des Landes Brandenburg. Auch hier ist mir aufgefallen, dass die Herren von den Verhältnissen im Jahre 1946 in der Sowjetzone in puncto Ausbildung der Volksrichter und deren Einsetzung nicht orientiert waren. Das Gespräch wich auch häufig vom Thema meines Lebenslaufes ab und es wurden allgemein interessierende Fragen erörtert, so z.B. wurde untersucht, an welchen Ursachen es läge, dass ein Volk wie das deutsche, zu einer autoritären Regierung kommen kann. Ich führte dieses Faktum zurück auf die Formel: Dummheit und Mangel an Verantwortungsbewusstsein. Die beiden Herren standen dagegen auf dem Standpunkt, dass die seit 50 Jahren stehengebliebene politische Entwicklung des deutschen Volkes die Ursachen für das Dritte Reich gewesen seien. Ich widersprach und führte die Beispiele Stresemann und auch Polen an. Bezüglich Polen stellte ich mich auf den Standpunkt, dass m.E. die Polen ausgesprochen politisch wach und nationalbewusst seien und trotzdem heute autoritär regiert würden. Herr Rost führte dann Beispiele an aus der Folgezeit des Zusammenbruchs und meinte, dass das Verhalten der alliierten Truppen nicht immer sauber gewesen sei, aber dass er sich sehr gut vorstellen könne, nein, es sogar wisse, dass, falls die Deutschen am anderen Ende des Tisches gesessen hätten, es noch viel schlimmer gekommen wäre. Ich habe daraufhin erklärt, dass ich auch dieses Verhalten auf eine Formel zurückführen

möchte und diese Formel nannte ich Tapferkeit. Meiner Meinung nach, so habe ich vorgetragen, kann der wirklich tapfere Soldat einen geschlagenen Gegner nicht misshandeln, das widerspräche der Ethik der Tapferkeit. Worauf mir Herr Rost entgegnete, dass dann wohl in den letzten 50 Jahren die Tapferkeit der Deutschen sehr zurückgegangen sei. Sehr erstaunt waren die Herren zu hören, dass ich von mir behaupte, religiös veranlagt zu sein. Ein diesbezügliches Gespräch jedoch ging über die Anfangsgründe des Männerkreises der bekennenden Kirche, der Funktionen ~~der~~ der sogenannten deutschen Christen und des Reichsbischofs Müller nicht hinaus. Während dieser Unterhaltung wurde mir ein 4 - 5 Seiten umfassender Fragebogen gegeben, den ich auszufüllen hatte. Die Fragen betrafen lediglich reine Interessengebiete und sollten wohl das vorangegangene Testverfahren mittels des Lügendetektors ergänzen. Auf eine im Jahre 1947 von Herrn Rost getroffene Feststellung, dass 3 hohe Verwaltungsbeamte im Bundesgebiet, ich glaube 2 Ministerialdirektoren und 1 Ministerialrat, zu Unrecht den Dokortitel führten, sie auch gar nicht studiert hätten, entgegnete ich, dass diese Art Ermittlungen mit Aussicht auf Erfolg genausogut im UFJ geführt werden könne. Mit Interesse erinnerte ich mich an viele, den Dr. Friedenau betreffenden Ausserungen in unserem Hause. Es ist nahezu ein offenes Geheimnis, dass Friedenau kein Jurist ist. So hatte sich der Hauptabteilungsleiter Leutwein zu dem Rechtsanwalt Dr. Beckmann geäußert, dass er wisse, dass Friedenau kein Volljurist sei, aber trotzdem zu ihm seiner Verdienste wegen halte. Auf diesen Einwand habe ich keine Antwort erhalten. Genauso wie ich vorher zu Herrn Strong sagte, dass die Art der Durchführung dieses angeblichen Einstellungsverfahrens bei mir den Zweifel erwecke, dass hinter allem mein "Freund" Friedenau stünde, habe ich den beiden Herren Rost und dem Psychologen ebenfalls erklärt, dass ich eine besondere Ansicht darüber habe, aus welchem Grund man mich diesem Verfahren hier unterwerfe. Daraufhin hat der Psychologe beide Hände hochgehoben und hat erklärt, dass er nichts wisse und einen fest umrissenen Auftrag habe. Ich glaube mich aber noch zu erinnern, dass Herr Rost sagte, dass dies schon möglich sein könne, aber er glaube, dass einigen dieses noch wehtun werde. Mit Sicherheit kann ich mich jedoch an diese Szene nicht mehr entsinnen, da diese Ausserung etwa gegen 11,00 Uhr abends fiel und ich schon etwas abgespannt

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war. Diesem ganzen Verfahren voraus ging die Aufforderung des Herrn Strong an mich, einen schriftlichen Lebenslauf einzureichen. Einige Tage danach forderte er mich auf, diesen schriftlichen Lebenslauf handschriftlich zu vollziehen und ausserdem eine etwa 3 Seiten lange schriftliche Darstellung über irgendein Interessengebiet von mir zu geben. Ich wählte die Form eines Briefes an einen unbekanntem Skatfreund und habe unmissverständlich gegen diejenige Stellung genommen, die als Kiebitze in fremde Karten sehen. Seit der Aufforderung des Herrn Strong an mich, beim UFJ zu kündigen, wurde ich den Gedanken nicht mehr los, dass diese ganze Angelegenheit letztlich gesteuert wird von Herrn Dr. Friedenau. Geradezu bekräftigt wurde diese Überlegung dadurch, dass ich von Herrn Strong wiederholt befragt worden bin, mit welchen Angehörigen vom UFJ und mit welchen Personen ich bei den Berliner Behörden nach Verbindung halte. Ganz besonders überrascht hat mich das aus 1 Kiste Zigarre 1 Fl. Kognak, 1 Fl. Rum bestehende Weihnachtsgeschenk des Herrn Strong. Diese an sich wertvollen und auch mich erfreuenden Dinge waren aber durchaus lieblos und ohne jedes Interesse in einer alten, zum Teil zerrissenen braunen Packpapiertüte verpackt. Das fiel mir sehr auf. Weiterhin fiel mir ~~xxx~~ ein, dass ich etwa Mitte Dezember Herrn Strong unterrichtete, dass aus der von Herrn Dr. Friedenau in Aussicht genommenen Unterredung zwischen mir und Herrn Rosenthal bisher nichts geworden sei. Herr Strong erklärte mir daraufhin, dass ich doch wohl nicht glauben, dass aus dieser Besprechung jemals etwas werden würde.

Nach dieser Untersuchung am 7.1. sollte mir innerhalb von 2 Tagen das Ergebnis mitgeteilt werden, damit recht bald dieses Büro in Aktion treten könne. Ich sollte am Montag, d. 12.1. um 10,00 Uhr wieder dort vorsprechen. Aus dieser Zusammenkunft wurde nichts. Die dann ursprünglich auf Mittwoch, d. 14.1. festgesetzte Zusammenkunft wurde dann auf Donnerstag, d. 15.1. verlegt, jedoch nach nochmaligem Anruf auf Mittwoch, d. 14.1. um 15,00 Uhr festgesetzt. In dieser Unterredung teilte mir Herr Strong mit, dass er sehr enttäuscht sei. Seine erste Frage war: Wem haben Sie noch erzählt, dass wir zusammen arbeiten wollten. Ich sagte wiederum ausser meiner Ehefrau und Frau Tietz weiss es niemand,

- 22 -

was er mir nicht glaubte und sagte, das wüsste ich ja allein, denn ich sei dem Lügendetektorverfahren unterworfen worden. Tatsächlich weiss ich noch, dass bei Beantwortung dieser Frage mein Herz doppelt schlug und der den Lügendetektor bedienende Amerikaner zeigte mir auch nach Beendigung des Verfahrens den Kontrollstreifen, auf dem bei der Frage Nr. 3 ein ganz dicker roter Klecks zu sehen war. Dann sagte Herr Strong, dass ich auch gegen ihn etwas unternommen hätte und ich bin der Meinung, dass er mich ziemlich unter Druck setzen wollte, indem er erklärte, dass ich ein freier Mann sei, der nach Hause gehen könne, und zufrieden sein müsse, dass ich als politischer Flüchtling im Oktober 1952 anerkannt sei. Er könne mir nur raten, alles zu vergessen, er würde es dann auch tun. Sollte ich dagegen über die letzten Ereignisse etwas verlautbaren, dann würde er auch reden und das würde mir dann schlecht bekommen. Ausserdem behauptet er, dass das mündliche Testverfahren des Psychologen ebenfalls in meiner Vergangenheit Widersprüche aufgedeckt hätte. Auf meine Frage, mir die konkreten Einzelheiten, die wohl nun zu erörtern wären, zu nennen, wich Herr Strong aus und sagte, dass würde ich schon wissen, ich möge die Nacht ruhig schlafen und morgen darüber nachdenken, dann würde mir das alles einfallen. Seine sonstigen Ermittlungen (ob in- oder ausserhalb des Hauses, das entzieht sich meiner Kenntnis) hätten darüberhinaus ein dem Doktor und dem Lügendetektorverfahren entsprechendes Bild gegeben. Auf meine klare Frage, ob er mich etwa der Zusammenarbeit mit dem Osten verdächtige, erwiderte er mir, dass er dies alles "ohne Akusation" gesagt hätte. Dies wunderte mich umso mehr, als er einige Zeit zuvor, etwa im Dezember, mir einmal sagte, dass er die besten Informationen über mich erhalten hätte und deswegen das Verfahren bezüglich neues Büro mit mir machen wolle. Er konzidierte mir ausdrücklich, dass sämtliche Angaben, die ich während der langen Zeit unseres Kontaktes ihm gemacht hätte, so genau stimmen, wie der Schlag eines Hammers auf den Nagel. In meiner Person jedoch seien diese bestimmten nicht genannten Dinge begründet. Er behauptete immer wieder, dass ich mit ihm ein Spiel getrieben habe. Er habe es ehrlich gemeint, er habe sich für mich eingesetzt, ich jedoch hätte gespielt. Letzteres

trifft in etwa und zwar insoweit zu, als ich von Anfang an der Meinung war, dass Strong im Auftrage von Dr. Friedenau gehandelt hat, zumal mir aus ganz sicherer Quelle bekannt geworden ist, dass Vernehmungen, die Strong mit Angehörigen des UFJ geführt hatte, Herrn Dr. Friedenau zur Kenntnis gelangt sind. Die Mitarbeiter Holtorf und Wegner haben mir dies ausdrücklich und mit jeder Einzelheit bestätigt. Weiterhin ist mir in diesem Zusammenhang aufgefallen, dass eigenartigerweise der Tätigkeitsbericht für Dezember 1952, der Anfang Januar 1953 fällig gewesen wäre, nicht von mir erfordert worden ist. Genauso fiel mir auf, dass Anfang Januar 1953 nur für Frau Tietz ein Personalfragebogen übersandt worden ist, obwohl für alle Angehörigen des UFJ ein derartiger Fragebogen ausgefüllt werden sollte. Ich weiss, dass längere Zeit vordem, Herr Wegner aufgefordert worden ist, seinen Fragebogen abzugeben.

Diese Fakten lassen m.E. darauf schliessen, dass Herr Strong mit dem UFJ Verbindung gehabt haben muss, obgleich Herr Strong auf meine diesbezüglichen Fragen dies immer strikt verneint hat. Dass die seitens des Herrn Strong geführten Untersuchungen nicht dem Ziel einer etwa in Aussicht genommenen Einstellung dienen sollten, geht m.E. noch aus folgendem hervor:

Am 6.1.1953 teilte mir Frau Tietz mit, dass sie an diesem Tage zum Reviervorsteher ihres zuständigen Polizeireviers bestellt worden sei. Auf der Treppe im Hause des Polizeireviers begegnete sie zwei Herren, die stehen blieben und Frau Tietz hörte, dass der eine sagte: "das muss sie sein". Während des Gesprächs mit dem Reviervorsteher kam einer der beiden in das Zimmer und verlangte den Reviervorsteher zu sprechen. Dabei stellte es sich heraus, dass es sich bei ihm um einen Angehörigen der Kripo Abtlg. F 5 handelte. Trotzdem der Reviervorsteher den Herrn bat, ihn allein mit Frau Tietz zu lassen, kehrte dieser Mann nach einigen Minuten noch einmal zurück und versuchte, von der Seite auf den Schreibtisch blickend, in den Personalausweis von Frau Tietz, den der Reviervorsteher in der Hand hielt, Einblick zu nehmen.

In einem Erkundungsverfahren in der Sache Moberg, welches mir vom UFJ übertragen wurde, habe ich nach der einmaligen Zusammenkunft mit Moberg in einem schriftlichen Bericht

- 24 -

Zweifel an dessen Integrität geäußert. Die Berechtigung dieses Zweifels wurde mir ausdrücklich von Herrn Strong bestätigt, der mich sogar ermächtigte, den Hoberg dem URJ gegenüber als Nachrichtenschwindler zu bezeichnen. Mir ist aufgefallen, dass mich danach Herr Strong wiederholt befragte, ob ich noch einmal mit Hoberg, den ich nur einmal gesehen habe, zusammengetroffen sei. In einer anderen Sache, Dr. Lehnhoff, habe ich am 3.1.53 Ermittlungen im Auftrage des URJ geführt. Nachdem ich Herrn Strong davon Kenntnis gegeben hatte, wurde ich Mitte Januar 1953 von Herrn Rosenthal angewiesen, die Sache zu stoppen, weil eine andere Dienststelle sich damit befassen wolle. Herr Strong, dem ich dies mitteilte, bat mich daraufhin, Hrl. Dr. Lehnhoff zu einem Treff mit einem Experten zu bewegen, was ich dann auch getan habe. Im übrigen sei der Ausdruck stoppen nicht richtig.

Abschliessend stehe ich auf dem Standpunkt, dass im Rückblick auf die Entwicklung dieser Dinge diese nur einen Wehrluss zulassen, dass ich mit allen Mitteln und auf alle Fälle aus dem Untersuchungsausschuss herausgedrängt werden soll.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 41563

ROUTING	
1	FIG
2	FIG
3	CHAND
4	PPG
5	CEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

18412 28 FEB 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/DPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8338

TO: DIR SFRAN SPULL SBERN

CITE: SBRLN

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

CART/CALL/ZIPPER/TPEMBER

REF: BRLN 8266 (IN 39391)

CABLE NAME TRACES REQUESTED ROBERT VAN HAERSOLTE, DUTCH
NATIONAL, BERLIN-CHARLOTTENBURG, MOMMSENSTR 55, BERLIN REPRESENTATIVE
OF OVERSEAS CHEMICAL CORPORATION, LUGANO, RIVA ALBERTOLLI 3,
SWITZERLAND.

END OF MESSAGE

1 copy of this info to PEMBER interact

Don't know [circled] *what is TPEMBER interact?*

3 [circled] *II INTERACT*

4 [circled]

FILE [circled] *TPEMBER*

Z zipper desk send name traces

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 FEB 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 41564

ROUTING	
1	PPB
2	FIZ
3	CHAND
4	FIC
5	CEP
6	QPP
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1841Z 28 FEB 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8339

TO: SFRAN

INFO: DIR SPULL

CITE: SBRLN

CART/ZIPPER/TPEMBER

REF: BRLN 8290 (IN 40297)

GALES AND HIS SECRETARY HAVE RESIGNED FROM TPEMBER. POUCH
FOLLOWS.

END OF MESSAGE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

TPEMBER
~~32-6-33-587~~

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2 MAR 53

SECRET

IN 41950

SECURITY INFORMATION

ROUTING	
1	<i>FI2</i>
2	<i>FI2-PPB</i>
3	<i>CHRONO</i>
4	<i>EES</i>
5	<i>CEE</i>
6	<i>CFI</i>
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERNE

ACTION: *EE-6*

ROUTINE

1950Z 2 MAR 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, FI/RI 2

BERN 5528

TO: SBRLN INFO: DIR SFRAN SPULL CITE: SBERN

REF SBRLN 8338 (IN 41563 *zipper/Tpember*)

1. NO TRACE VAN HAERSOLTE. ONLY INFO OVERSEAS CHEMICAL CORP CONTAINED ESB 182 AND 182A, CONCERNS BARTER 10 THOUSAND TONS DOR POTASH FOR ELECTROLYTIC COPPER WHICH OVERSEAS LATER REFUSED DELIVER. OVERSEAS SOLD HALF POTASH IN U.S., REST BEING HELD IN HAMBURG BY REPS OF DEUTSCHE WARENVERTRIEBSGESELLSCHAFT WHICH STILL TRYING COLLECT PERFORMANCE BOND FROM BASEL SPALENBERG BRANCH OF SCHWEIZERISCHE KREDITANSTALT.

2. REQUEST REASON YOUR REPLY OF SINCE WE INTERESTED THIS COMPLEX.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

RAAARA
RAM
WA

~~32-6-33-587m~~

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

3 March 1953

OUT 93427

DIR 43556

OUT TO: SBRLN

INFO: SFRAN, SPULL, SBRLN

CITE: DIR

RE: BRLN 8338 (IN 41563)

1. BARON J.W.VAN HAERSOLTE VAN HAERST PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE
DUTCH NAZI PARTY SOUTH HOLLAND 1943 AND LEADER PARTY DEFENSE
SECTION THAT AREA. RESPONSIBLE FOR ACTS OF VIOLENCE COMMITTED
BY DEFENSE SECTION. BARON W. VAN HAERSOLTE MEMBER DUTCH FOREIGN
AFFAIRS MINISTRY 1951.

2. OVERSEAS CHEMICAL CORPORATION DESCRIBED ESB 182 AND 182A
COPIES SENT FRAN.

3. NO OTHER TRACES.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY

EGBA 3769

376953

TO : Chief, EE
FROM: Chief, Berlin Operations Base
SUBJECT: General-Operational/CART/TPEMBER

Specific-Resignation of CALES and TIETZ from TPEMBER

Ref: SBRLN 8339

1. [] has confirmed the resignation of CALES and Frau Kaethe TIETZ, the former secretary of CALES. Whereas Frau TIETZ openly admits that she is now working for the Verfassungsschutz, CALES maintains he works for a "Bundesstelle" charge with the screening of refugees.

2. However, according to intercepts we have obtained, it seems very clear that CALES office is a cover office for the Verfassungsschutz. [] states that he also presumes that CALES is working for the Verfassungsschutz.

3. Attached please find copy of intercepts on CALES and Frau TIETZ, which clearly indicate CALES' employment with the Verfassungsschutz.

4. We do not know whether ZIPPER is aware that CALES is working for the Verfassungsschutz.

(signed) []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

HOEHER
file

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

L 18249
53 BS/

2.59 26.

G

Lc M 486/520

26.2.53

1345 l/min

606 / 1288

EGBA-3769

Herr HOCHWALD (WOLK)
66 71 48

Frau TIETZE
32 24 74

*Ich habe heute frueh eine Einladung bekommen, wieder zum Kaiserdamm zu gehen und dort hat man mir eroeffnet, dass ich mich bereithalten sollte, am Montag anzufangen.

Ich habe eben mit Ro. gesprochen und ihm gesagt, dass ich diese Stellung annehme, obwohl ich erhebliche Geldeinbussen habe, aber ich tue das eben, um vernuenftig arbeiten zu koennen, was ich in diesem Haus nicht konnte.

Was kriegen Sie denn da?

450.-. Er sagte mir, er wuerde zunaechst sehen, dass ich mein Maerzgehalt bekomme. Er will in meinem Sinne verstossen.

LSV Berlin
Ich bin ja gespannt.

Er fragte mich, mit wem ich verhandelt habe.
Ich sagte 'Kossmann'. Ich sagte noch, nachdem er mich fragte 'wissen Sie, wer das ist', nein.
Ausserdem moechte ich nicht den Eindruck erwecken, dass zwischen Ihnen und mir irgendwie hier so ein Katze und Maus Spiel ist. "

Ref: 606 / 1276

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

[]

53 BS/
19420

25.3.53 G

Lo M 553 3.3.53 910-1230

606 - 1276

EGBA-3769

TIETZ, KAETHE

32 24 74 (Brit. Sect)

Herr ROSENTHAL
Untersuchungsausschuss

"Herr ROSENTHAL? Hier ist Frau TIETZ,
Herr RO, folgendes: Ich habe mich beim
A.f.V. beworben, und ich bin heute
morgen auch dagewesen, und man ist
bereit, mich einzustellen. Ich sollte
das aber vorher mit Ihnen klaeren.

Ich koennte dann eventuell schon morgen
anfangen.

Er kann ja nichts dazu sagen. Ich finde
es besser so, denn ich musste ja auch
wieder mal arbeiten, richtig arbeiten.

head h f v for Berlin

Ich habe mit Herrn Dr. FRIEDRICH ge-
sprochen, und er sagte, er waere an sich
bereit, bloss er moechte, dass ich vdn
mir aus das klaere. Wollen Sie mal mit
Dr. FRIEDRICH sprechen?

Also, mir persoenlich waere das ganz
lieb.

Sehr nett, ich fahre denn jetzt runter
zu Herrn HUFER und rufe Sie dann von
da aus nochmal an.

Schoenen Dank, Herr ROSENTHAL."

"Ja, ja, es ist doch nichts zu klae-
ren.

Was sagt denn Ihr Herr MEISTER dazu.

Ja, Sie haben Recht. Von mir aus
werden Ihnen keine Hindernisse
bereitet.

Wollte er das?

Gut, kann ich dann auch machen.

Jawohl.

Ref. 606 - 1997

26.2.53 G

CONFIDENTIAL
between
SECURITY INFORMATION

19415
53 BS/5

606 / 1276

Berlin 32 24 74 brit. Sect.
TIETZE Kaethe
Berlin NW 87
Beusselstrasse 24

Berlin 12. Grundschule
Spr. Frau Schmidt

"Du, mein Chef war eben hier. Er hat
auch eine Stelle, er faengt Montag an?"

Wo?

So was aehnliches wie ich, bloss bei
der Fluechtlingsstelle, aber auch von der-
selben Stelle. Nun gehen wir Sonnabend ge-
meinsam raus zur Limastrasse und werden da
unsere Vortraege halten. Das wollte
ich bloss sagen.

Na gut, dann bis heute Abend."

[]

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

19419
53 RS/

25.2.53 0

Lo M 553

3.3.53

606 - 1276

TIETZ, KAETHE
32 24 74
(Brit. Sector)

Herr WOLK,

.. 71 48

Ich komme eben von da. Da waren noch mehrere Bewerberinnen da, aber ich habe das Rennen gemacht. Ich koennte morgen anfangen.

"Prima.

Ich soll das aber mit RO klarmachen. Und so sehr interessant ist mit Dr. FRIEDRICH, sehr interessant ueber Ihre Person.

Ueber nicht

Und dann habe ich gesagt, ich moechte von vorneherein klarstellen, dass ich mich, was auch geschieht, zu allem dazu ueussern moechte, dass ich Sie als absolut tadellos kennengelernt habe, und dass Ihr Verhalten, so lange ich mit Ihnen zusammen war, das ist ueber ein Jahr, als absolut korrekt angesehen habe, und dass ich mich auch immer dazu bekennen will, falls mal irgendetwas kommt. Und unklar war ihm, aber daruebermuessen wir uns mal unterhalten - wieso ich da mit hereingezogen bin. Ich sage: das ist mir selber xxkxkx unklar; ich habe so oft gefragt, niemals eine Antwort gekriegt. Nebenbei sage ich, war mir das gar nicht unlieb, denn ich moechte auch nicht wieder dorthin zurueck, wenn man mir es anbieten wuerde. Wuerde ich nur tun, falls ich im Moment nichts habe. Und er sagte, er moechte mir empfehlen, dass ich jetzt von mir mit RO klarmache. Und dann, wenn ich das klargemacht haette, koennte ich morgen anfangen.

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

19419

SECURITY INFORMATION

53 BS/

Sehr schoen, ich glaube, das wird er
schon machen.

Ich bezweifle das.

Ach nein.

Ich weiss nicht. Also, wir haben
lange, lange Gespraechе gefuehrt
und fuer mich sehr interessant.
Ich werde jetzt bei RO anrufen.
Ich melde mich dann wieder, viel-
leicht komme ich heute noch runter.

Das waere ja fein."

Ref. 606 - 1288

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

FORM NO. 35-87
NOV 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

4. MARCH 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 42572

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	FIB-PPG
3	CHAND
4	FI2
5	CGS
6	CPP
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN
ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE
0410Z 4 MAR 53

INFORMATION: DD/P 2, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8377

TO: DIR, SFRAN, SPULL INFO: SBONN CITE: SBRLN
TPEMBER/CART ZIPPER
REF DIR 42806 (OUT 92153)

1. ANOTHER INTERROGATION CALES ESPECIALLY WITH LCFLUTTER NOT TOO LIKELY BE PRODUCTIVE IN VIEW HIS ATTITUDE AND RESULTS PREVIOUS SUCH INTERROGATION. CALES HAS RESIGNED TPEMBER.
2. CALES HAS HAD NO ACCESS TPEMBER PREMISES SINCE AUGUST 52.] AND TPEMBER CASE OFFICEI BELIEVE HOEHER COULD NOT HAVE EAST ZONE NAMES, AT LEAST FROM CALES.
3. SUGGEST CALES BE INTENSIVELY INTERROGATED BY ZIPPER PERSONNEL WITH TAPE RECORDING FO US.
4. AFTER CALES WAS SUMMARILY DISMISSED BY] ALL HIS FILES REMOVED. STILL IN CUSTODY BOB (ALSO RCVD TOB). SINCE THEN CALES HAS HAD ACCESS NOTHING SENSITIVE.
5. STEINMANN IS NUMBER 1 EGB-A-2252. DR. WILHELM BAUER Chief of Economic Section
6. IN VIEW ABOVE PLEASE INITIATE ZIPPER CHECK PERSONS MENTIONED EGB-A 2252.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TPEMBER
327-32-587

COPY NO.

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(44)

FORM NO. 33-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SMAR 53
5 MAR 53

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 43879

4
5
6
7
8

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
 FROM: SR REP FRANKFURT ROUTINE
 ACTION: EE 6 1703Z 5 MAR 53
 INFORMATION: OO/P 2, FI, FI/DPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/EOG 2, PP/IOO 2, FI/RI 2

FRAN 2246

CE Program - Germany

TO: BERLN

INFO: DIR

CITE: SFRAN

CART CALL ZIPPER TPEMBER

REF BERLN 2338 (IN 41563)

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

1. NO TRADES VAN HAERSOLTE.

2. ESB-182, 22 JAN 53, REPORTED SUBJECT'S COMPANY OBTAINED ON 17 JAN 53 TITLE TO APPROXIMATELY 10,000 METRIC TONS OF EAST GERMAN POTASH (60 PERCENT PURE) WHICH IT INTENDED SELLING IN U.S. FIRM ARRANGED IN RETURN TO DELIVER 99.99-PERCENT-PURE ELECTROLYTIC COPPER OF LIKE VALUE, G.I.F. ROSTOCK. EAST GERMAN AGENCY CONDUCTING TRANS-ACTION DEUTSCHE WARENVERTRIEBSGESELLSCHAFT M. & H (ALSO RCVD M. R. H.) EAST BERLIN. LUGANO FIRM DEPOSITED DELIVERY GUARANTEE, PAYABLE TO BERLIN BUSINESSMAN ACTING FOR WARENVERTRIEBSGESELLSCHAFT WITH BASEL-SPALENBERG BRANCH (DEPOSITENKASSE) OF SCHWEIZERISCHE KREDITANSTALT (ALSO RCVD SCHWEIZERPSCH). FIELD COMMENT: ORIGIN OF COPPER, AMOUNT INVOLVED, DATES AND ROUTE OF SHIPMENT NOT YET KNOWN BUT EXPECTED SHORTLY AND WILL BE PUBLISHED AS SUPPLEMENT TO THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

32	6	53	597
ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	
ENC 1 TO BERLN 2331			
DATE MAR 12 1953			

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 43599

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FI6
3	CH/DOARD
4	EEB-PP6
5	Q/EE
6	Q/FI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP PULLACH
 ACTION: EE 6
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/IOD 2, WE 2, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE
 1804Z 6 MAR 53

PULL 5120

TO: SBRLN INFO: DIR SFRAN CITE: SPULL
 CART/CALL, ZIPPER/TPEMBER
 RE: SBRLN-8338 (IN 41563)

1. NO TRACE VAN HAERSOLTE POB/US FILES.
2. IS REFERENCE BRLN-8266 (IN 39391) CORRECT. WE FAIL SEE CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
 SOURCES METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

HÖHER
file

① []
 ② []
 ③ []
 32-6-33-587

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

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~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

MARCH 53

TO: SFRAN

INFO: SBRLN, SPULL

CITE: DIR

RE: FRAN 3032 (IN 4912)

CADORY CART ~~ZIPPER~~ ZIPPER

1. ~~LACK~~ CONCUR ~~GENERALLY~~ REF: . FEEL BRLN HAS DEVELOPED ADEQUATE INFO ~~BESIDE~~ ^{even without}

2. FOR PULL RE LAST SENTENCE PARA 3 PULL 5266 IN 49138 SEE PARA

1 PULL 5065 (IN 40543).

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EE/PP/G

EE/FI/Z

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

CADROTT

FORM NO. 35-82
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 March 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

CUT 94959

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	Chino
4	FIG-F12
5	CEE
6	OPP
7	
8	

TO: SR REP: Frankfurt, COS Berlin C 1/ms EE/PP/G 3929

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA ROUTINE

CONF: EEL6 2330Z 10 MAR 53

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, PP 2, FI/R: 2

DIR 44517

TO: SFRAN INFO: SBRLE, SPULL, SECON CITE: DIR

RE: BERL 8377 (IN 42572)

TPEMBER CART ZIPPER

1. PARA 1 REF: BELIEVE NECESSARY MAKE EVERY EFFORT DETERMINE PRECISE EXTENT TPEMBER INFO CASES GAVE HOEHER. URGE COMPLUTE REINTERROGATION CASES EVEN THOUGH RESULTS CANNOT BE GUARANTEED.
2. PARA 5 REF: NO ZIPPER ~~18255~~ PERSONS LISTED EGDA 2252 EXCEPT CASES. ^{TRACES (DESK FILES)}
3. ADVISE PRESENT STATUS ZIMMERMANN PARA 1, BERL 8290 (IN 40297) AND WHETHER HE IDENTICAL SON SPITZEL PARA 2 SAME REF.

END OF MESSAGE

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

TPEMBER

[EE] [EE/PP/G] [EE/FI/7] [EE/FI/G] [EE/PP]

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 32-6-33-587 (44)

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FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 44569

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FI2 - EEFE
3	China
4	PPG-EEJ
5	CEE
6	CM
7	
8	

TO:

FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA

SR REP BERLIN

ACTION: EE 6

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/ECD 2, WE 2, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE

1305Z 10 MAR 53

BRLN 8460

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN, SBERN, SPULL,
DART/CALL/ZIPPER/TPEMBER

CITE: SBRLN

1. REFERENCE: SBRLN 8338 (IN 41563),
SBERN 5528 (IN 41950),
DIR 43556 (OUT 93427),
SFRAN 2246 (IN 43179).

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

FOLLOWING SUMMARY OF INFO FURNISHED BY SOCIAL ACQUAINTANCE
VAN HAERSOLTE. LATER CONFIRMED BY AND SECRETARY OF

2. IN SUMMER 1951 KIRVES ENGAGED IN ESTABLISHING DREHSCHIEBE
USING FIRM OF INDUSTRIE G.M.B.H., BONN, OWNED AND OPERATED BY ONE
SCHIERBERG. BERLIN REPRESENTATIVE OF FIRM WAS ROBERT BARON VAN
HAERSOLTE VAN DEN DOORN WHO RESIDENT WEST BERLIN SINCE 20 JUNE 1945.
IN WINTER 1951 AND BEGINNING 1952 INDUSTRIE G.M.B.H. HAD CONTRACT
WITH DEUTSCHE WARENVERTRIEB/GESELLSCHAFT, EAST BERLIN, CONCERNING SALE
OF LARGE POTASH SHIPMENT. FAILURE TO DELIVER ON PART OF DWV CAUSED
INDUSTRIE G.M.B.H. TO SUE. DIRECTOR OF DWV THEN AND TODAY ONE FNU NEUN,
WHO DEALT PRIMARILY WITH VAN HAERSOLTE. FOR REASONS UNKNOWN TO BOTH
OUR SOURCES SCHIERBERG HAD TO LEAVE SUDDENLY AND ESTABLISHED OVERSEAS
CHEMICAL COOPERATION LUGANO. THIS FIRM REPORTED TO BE UNDER SPONSORSHIP

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO:

7

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10 MAR 53
BRLN 3460

SECRET

IN 44569
PAGE 2

OF WELL-KNOWN SWISS PUBLIC FIGURE, ALLEGED TO BE FORMER DIRECTOR SWISS NATL BANK. SCHIERBERG ACTUAL MANIPULATOR OF ALL BUSINESS. VAN HAERSOLTE REMAINED IN TOUCH WITH SCHIERBERG. IN FALL OF 52 HE BECAME OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF OVERSEAS CHEMICAL IN BERLIN ALONG-SIDE SCHNEIDER WHO HAD HELD THAT POSITION PRIOR TO THIS DATE.

3. SCHNEIDER LIVED IN APARTMENT OF VAN HAERSOLTE. AS EARLY AS 1949 SCHNEIDER USED ADDRESS AND TELEPHONE NO WHICH LATER TURNED OUT TO BE VAN HAERSOLTE'S.

4. [] CERTAIN THAT ALL DREHSCHIEBE PERSONNEL KNEW VAN HAERSOLTE AND SCHNEIDER. THIS INCLUDES DR. HOFFMANN, KIRWES, HOEHER, SCHIERBERG.

5. JANUARY 1953 SCHNEIDER ALLEGEDLY LEFT FIRM AND REPRESENTATION HANDLED BY HAERSOLTE ALONE. HAERSOLTE RECEIVES SALARY OF DMW 475 PER MONTH FROM OVERSEAS CHEMICAL. JUST BEFORE ALLEGED KIDNAPING OF HOEHER HAERSOLTE WENT TO SWITZERLAND WHERE HE WAS AT TIME OF KIDNAPING. UPON RETURN HE TOLD [] THAT OVERSEAS CHEMICAL WAS SUING DMV FOR MORE THAN 2 MILLION DMW. SCHNEIDER ALLEGEDLY WAS IN POSSESSION OF DOCUMENTS WHICH WOULD GIVE CASE FAVORABLE TURN FOR OVERSEAS CHEMICAL. SCHNEIDER ALLEGEDLY HAD DEPOSITED DOCUMENTS WITH HOEHER WHO WAS BELIEVED TO HAVE HAD THEM IN HIS POSSESSION AT TIME OF

SECRET []

10 MAR 53
BRLN 8460

SECRET

IN 44569
PAGE 3

KIDNAPPING. HAERSOLTE CONVINCED THAT KIDNAPPING WAS DONE TO GET DOCUMENTS. SCHNEIDER ALLEGED TO HAVE ARRANGED THAT HOEHER HAD DOCUMENTS ON HIM TIME OF KIDNAPPING. THIS QUITE LIKELY SINCE SCHNEIDER SLATED TO BE STAR WITNESS FOR DWV AGAINST HIS FORMER EMPLOYER. HAERSOLTE LATER AMENDED THIS VERSION (HIS ORIGINAL STATEMENT) BY SAYING THAT SCHNEIDER ONLY DEPOSITED PAPERS WITH HOEHER. HAERSOLTE CLAIMS SCHNEIDER WAS SEEN IN BRUSSELS 10 DAYS AFTER KIDNAPPING.

6. ON 8 MARCH HAERSOLTE STATED THAT SCHNEIDER HAD REAPPEARED IN WEST BERLIN AND HAD BEEN ARRESTED BY W. BRLN POLICE. WE ATTEMPTING TO CONFIRM.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

11 March 1953

CADRAIN Memorandum No. 67

TO: [] (Attn: [] K []
FROM: []
SUBJECT: CALES
REF: Berlin (BOB/KUFIRE) Memo No. 29

Ray

1. Other than the information concerning Höher's connection with CALES of TPEMBER (which is available to you through []), there are no indications that Höher may have had further knowledge of other projects directed by CADRAIN.

[]

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASS. TO MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHRONO
4	FIG-FIZ
5	C/EE
6	C/P
7	
8	

14 MAR 53
17 MAR 53

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 145215

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SA REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1336Z 14 MAR 53

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, SP 2, FI/PI 2, FI/RQM/DB

BRLN 9537

TO: DIR INFO: SFRAN SPULL SBOUN CITE: SBRLN
TPEMBER/GART/ZIPPER
REF: DIR 44517 (OUT 94959)

1. ZIMMERMANN RUN BY CALES DEFECTED TWO MONTHS AGO. NOW IN BERLIN. PRESUMABLY TWO ZIMMERMANN'S NOT IDENTICAL. WILL KNOW WHEN POLICE REPORT MENTIONED PARA 3 SBRLN 8290 (IN 40297) RECEIVED.

2. WILL INTERROGATE AND LOFLUTTER CALES WEEK 16 MARCH WITH ASSISTANCE CID. IN VIEW CALES PRESENT ATTITUDE HE MAY WELL REFUSE COOPERATE AND INTERVIEW LIKELY TO BE UNPRODUCTIVE. CALES NOW EMPLOYED BERLIN REFUGEE AUTHORITIES AND INDICATIONS ARE JOB IS COVER FOR VERFASSUNGSSCHUTZ. PRESENT STATUS POSSIBLE ZIPPER CONNECTION NOT KNOWN YET. IN VIEW CALES POSITION AMOUNT PRESSURE WE CAN PUT ON HIM LIMITED BY PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

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SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

TPEMBER
~~326-252-277~~
C. J. H.

COPY NO.

FORM NO. 35-83A
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

16 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 46644

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHMAN D
4	FIG-FI 2
5	CIEE
6	CPP
7	
8	

TO:
FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA
SR. REP. PULLACH

ROUTINE
1734Z 16 MAR 53

ACTION: EE 6
INFORMATION: FI, FI/OOS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5293

TO: SBRLN INFO (ROUTINE) DIR SFRAN SBONN

CITE: SPULL

TPEMBER/ZIPPER/CART

RE: SBRLN 8537 (IN 46245)

CALES IS ZIPPER AGENT V-2996.3. SEE PULL-4789 (IN 30470).

END OF MESSAGE.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

~~32633-235~~

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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(4)

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OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA: AIR
SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH

DISPATCH NO. EOOM-2194

CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: Pullack

DATE: _____

FROM: Chief, IE

SUBJECT: GENERAL - Operational
SPECIFIC V-2996

REF : MEA-685

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. V-2996 is identical with CATALAN, a former source of BOB. CATALAN's PRQ Part I was transmitted in MEA-6702 of 21 August 1948. He was to be used to furnish political intelligence. MEA-7096 of 18 January 1951 reported that CATALAN had been dropped because he was either a fraud or a Russian controlled agent. CATALAN furnished reports which were never too specific, which could hardly ever be checked for accuracy and which were on too high a level to be accessible to a man of CATALAN's status. He was asked to supply documentary proof of his statements or at least permit BOB to interview some of his sub-sources. CATALAN never complied with BOB's request.

2. The only other pertinent information here on CATALAN is the inclusion of a person with a similar name (no location given) in a dropped agents list forwarded with MEA-8042 of 3 May 1949. This person was dropped for inactivity by an unknown agency on 1 June 1948.

3. Undoubtedly V-2996, after his arrest, gave the RIE the name of V-2996, his case officer, and this, in turn, was one of the reasons why V-2996 was later kidnapped. It also seems possible that V-2996 could have been in contact with the RIE for some time before his disappearance. Possibly the current investigation of V-2996's abduction may shed some light on V-2996's fate and loyalties.

EE/CFI
RELEASING OFFICER

EE/FI/O
COORDINATING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Orig: 16 March 1953

GPO 33 18013

FORM NO. 81
JUN 1948

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FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

17 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 46900

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHADNO
4	FIG-FIZ
5	GEE
6	CPP
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP BERLIN ROUTINE
 ACTION: EE 6 1352Z 17 MAR 53
 INFORMATION: DC/P, COP, DC/A-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8553

TO: SPULL INFO: SFRAN, DIR, SBONN CITE: SBRLN

WE INTERROGATING CALES 21 MARCH AT CID. IN ORDER
COMPLY DIR 44517 (OUT 94959) MUST HAVE ANSWERS TO FOLLOWING
QUESTIONS PRIOR 21 MARCH.

- A. WHO BESIDES HOEHER HANDLING OR HANDLED CALES.
- B. WHICH ZIPPERITES DOES CALES KNOW, AND VICE VERSA.
- C. WHAT WERE SPECIFIC BRIEFS AND TARGETS ASSIGNED CALES.
- D. WHAT IS CALES TARGET NOW.
- E. PLEASE OBTAIN COPIES ALL REPORTS CALES HANDED HIS
ZIPPER AGENCY TO DATE.

u 7 8 6 3 2 1 0
also see file 1324

END OF MESSAGE

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

T. Penber
~~32-6733-728~~
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(Classification)

INTERNAL ROUTE SLIP
EUROPEAN COMMAND

Copy for
EGQA-14245
EUSA-917

FILE NO: E-33700

DATE: 17 March 1953

SUBJECT:

(Number each page or minute consecutively. This is not for the sender to draw a line across the sheet. Use entire width of sheet for copy.)

HAS THIS PAPER BEEN COORDINATED WITH ALL CONCERNED?

No.	From	Pass to	Date
1	By 66th CIC Group	TO DAD IC 1953	

1. Reference is made to the report of the 66th CIC Group, dated 11 March 1953.

2. Inclosed herewith is a copy of a report of information prepared by this group concerning the abduction of Ernst STEINER and Rudolf ZIMMERMAN, recorded as possible accomplices in the abduction.

FOR THE COMMANDING OFFICER:

Patrick J. Gallagher, Jr.

PATRICK J. GALLAGHER, JR.
Major, Infantry
Chief, Operations Section

SECRET
66th
CIC
Group

1 Incl: a/s

Capt BERRY/emcc/Strg 4342-34
OPS

17 March 1953

Attn:

For telephone conversation of 11 March 1953.

Distribution:
3 - COM w/att.
2 - Files

E. B. B.
E. B. B.

FOR COORDINATION WITH *U.S. Army*
DECLASSIFIED
Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act
PL105-246

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2E
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Date: *7/17/06*

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DATE:	18 MAR 1953
1.	<i>Q-11</i>
2.	
3.	
4.	
INFO:	
BOARD	CHRONO

SECRET
(Classification)

SECURITY INFORMATION

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

18 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 47485

1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHRONO
4	FIZ-FIG
5	QIEG
6	OPP
7	
8	

TO:

DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM:

SR REP PULLACH

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1918Z 18 MAR 53

INFORMATION:

DD/P, COP, DD/P-I&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/R! 2

PULL 5233

TO: (PRIORITY) SBRLN INFO:(ROUTINE) SFRAN, DIR, CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN 8553 (IN 46900)

1. POB OF OPINION TWO DISTINCT PROBLEMS INVOLVED:

A. EXTENT HOEHER KNOWLEDGE OF TPEMBER OBTAINED THROUGH CALES.

B. NATURE, EXTENT AND REASONS ZIPPER PENETRATION ATTEMPT ON TPEMBER THROUGH CALES, IF ANY.

2. RE QUESTION 1 A: INTERROGATION OF CALES MOST UNLIKELY RESULT IN RELIABLE INFO RE PRECISE EXTENT HOEHER INFORMED BY CALES ON TPEMBER AND BASIC ASSUMPTION MUST BE MADE HOEHER KNOWLEDGE IDENTICAL CALES KNOWLEDGE. IN VIEW SBRLN 8377 (IN 42572), THIS COULD NOT BE TOO DAMAGING. IN ANY EVENT USE OF DETAILED INFO REQUESTED REF IN INTERROGATION CALES COULD NOT BE EXPECTED ELICIT DESIRED ANSWER AND WOULD ONLY RESULT IN ZIPPER BEING INFORMED LATER BY CALES THAT DETAILED DATA ON ZIPPER'S STAFF PERSONNEL HAD BEEN GIVEN BY POB TO AIS UNIT UNKNOWN TO ZIPPER FOR USE IN INTERROGATION WHICH ZIPPER ALMOST CERTAIN TO CONSIDER UNJUSTIFIED. THIS WOULD BE VERY DAMAGING TO POB EFFORTS OBTAIN ZIPPER STAFF AND AGENT DATA.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~38-33-788 emch~~
COPY NO.

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(4)

18 MAR 53
PULL 5233

SECRET

IN 47485
PAGE 2

3. ASIDE FROM CALES HIMSELF, V-2668, HOEHER CASE OFFICER WHO ALSO KNOWS CALES PERSONALLY AND USED HOEHER AS CUTOUT TO CALES, IS KEY TO QUESTION "A". POB INSISTING ZIPPER OBTAIN FROM V-2668 COMPLETE STATEMENT ON PROBABLE EXTENT HOEHER KNOWLEDGE TPEMBER, BUT MUST POINT OUT THAT EVEN ASSUMING ANSWER MAY BE ENTIRELY HONEST, WE CANNOT EXPECT IT TO BE MORE THAN AN ESTIMATE.

4. BELIEVE HOEHER CASE SHOULD NOT BE USED AS PRETEXT OBTAIN ANSWER TO QUESTION 1B ABOVE. ZIPPER HAS SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT TPEMBER WAS GIVEN CALES AS TARGET. V-2668 CLAIMS CALES WAS EXTREMELY WORRIED THAT TROUBLES WITH [] WOULD GO DOWN AS DEROGATORY INFO IN CALES RECORD, AND FOR THIS REASON V-2668 INSTRUCTED CALES PUT HIS ENTIRE RELATIONSHIP TPEMBER DOWN ON PAPER IN MEMO FOR RECORD. THOUGH WE DO NOT NECESSARILY BELIEVE THIS STORY, NATURE OF REPORT (ATT TO EGBA-3356) ^{17 March} TENDS CONFIRM. AT ANY RATE, IF ZIPPER WAS ATTEMPTING PENETRATE TPEMBER THROUGH CALES IT DOES NOT SEEM REALISTIC TO EXPECT ZIPPER TO CONFESS TO US DETAILS OF SUCH AN UNFRIENDLY PROJECT.

5. PLEASE KEEP IN MIND POINT THAT SINCE CALES IS A ZIPPER AGENT, ZIPPER WILL CONSIDER ANY INTERROGATIONS OBVIOUSLY DONE BY AIS AND DIRECTED TOWARD CLARIFYING CALES HANDLING AGENTS, BRIEFS AND TARGETS AS AIS EFFORT PENETRATE ZIPPER OPERATIONS.

SECRET

[]
~~32-633-988~~

18 MAR 53
PULL 5233

SECRET

IN 47495
PAGE 3

THEREFORE ANY INTERROGATION SHOULD BE DONE UNDER COVER PUBLIC
SAFETY OR CID EFFORTS SOLVE HOOVER CASE. POB MUST BE IN POSITION
DENY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE U.S. AUTHORITIES INTENT INTERROGATE CALES.

END OF MESSAGE

[
32-6-33-782 encl

1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHADNO
4	F17-F16
5	C/EE
6	CPP
7	
8	

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

21 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 48429

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

0223Z 21 MAR 53

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

BRLN 8630

TO: SPULL INFO: SFRAN DIR CITE: SBRLN
REF: SPULL 5253 (#) (A); DIR 44517 (OUT 94959)

1. VIEW DIR 44517 -- PLAN INTERROGATE CALES ALTHOUGH FEEL UNLIKELY ANY VALUABLE INFO FORTHCOMING.
2. RE REF A PARA 2 -- OUR FEELING HOEHER KNOWLEDGE NOT NECESSARILY LIMITED TO WHAT CALES KNEW. FEEL ALSO POB UNDULY PERTURBED OVER POSSIBLE ZIPPER REACTION TO OUR QUERYING CALES. IF ZIPPER NOT RUNNING CALES AS TEMBER PENETRATION, WHAT IS ZIPPER OBJECTIVE RE CALES? IF ZIPPER CONSIDERS CALES AS EMBER PENETRATION WE OPPOSED AND REQUEST HE BE CALLED OFF. OUR OPINION CALES WORRY OVER STRONG REACTION NOT PERTINENT.
3. RE PARA 5 REF A -- CID COVER WILL BE USED. RECOMMEND YOU INFORM ZIPPER WE NOT INTERESTED PENETRATING ZIPPER OPS THRU CALES OR ANY OTHER MEANS.
4. WE HAVE DEFINITE FEELING ZIPPER NOT COMING CLEAN ON CALES. REQUEST YOU CONTINUE FORWARD PERTINENT DATA THIS MATTER DOB.

*Show to P.
Get info about...*

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~32633-5274~~

COPY NO.

(4)

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

21 MAR 53
BRLN 8630

SECRET

IN 48429
PAGE - 2 -

5. RE EGBA 3356 -- ZIPPER STATEMENT TO CONTRARY, WE BELIEVE
ZIPPER RECEIVED CALES REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE.

*MSG CEN COMMENT: NOT RCVD WASH SIG CEN.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

FORM NO. 38-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHRONO
4	FIG-FIC
5	C/EE
6	C/P
7	
8	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 MAR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 48975

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

1833Z 23 MAR 53

ACTION: EE 6

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, DD/P-1&R, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, PP/ECG 2,
FI/RI 2

BRLN 8645

TO: DIR SPULL

INFO: SFRAN

CITE: SBRLN

OPERATIONAL/CANT/TREMBER/ZIPPER

REF: (A) DIR 44517 (OUT 94959) BRLN 8290 (IN 40297; (C) SBRLN
8630 (IN 48429)

1. CALES INTERROGATED AND LOFLUTTERED 21 MARCH.

2. NO FURTHER INFO OBTAINED THAN INDICATED IN REF (A).

CALES ADMITTED THAT HOEHER AND KLING OF ABTEILUNG 5, GERMAN POLICE
(SEE ERBA 3741) END SEPT BEGINNING OCT 52 VISITED HIM SEVERAL
TIMES AT NIGHT PHOTOGRAPHED IMPORTANT SSD FILES. THIS CLEARLY
INDICATES ZIPPER PENETRATING TREMBER BEFORE POB AWARE OF IT AND
BEFORE BOB ATTEMPTED CALES RECRUITMENT.

3. HOEHER TOLD CALES THAT HE INTERESTED IN HANSEN OF
TREMBER WHO IS HANDLING ILLEGAL EAST WEST TRADE. CALES STATES
HE ADAMANTLY REFUSED APPROACH HANSEN. HOEHER STATES THIS ONLY
MATERIAL OF TREMBER NOT AVAILABLE HIS ORGANIZATION, INDICATING
HIS ORGANIZATION HAS ANOTHER TREMBER PENETRATION.

4. GIESECKE ALIAS TINA, ZIPPERIT., TOLD CALES HE SENT

See PULL 5324 (IN 11261) 31 Mar

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

32633 6711
COPY NO.

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(4)

23 MAR 53
BRLN 8645

S E C R E T

IN 48975
PAGE 2

w.o. base
REPORT (SEE EGBA 3356) DIRECT TO CHIEF IN MUNICH.

5. CALES SHOWED NO SENSITIVE CLOUTTER QUESTIONS WHETHER HE TOLD HOEHER MORE THAN ADMITTED TO US.

6. RE REF (A) PARA 3; CALES RAN HORST ZIMMERMANN-NOT IDENTICAL WITH RUDOLPH ZIMMERMAN. POUCHING FULL INTERROGATION REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

[]

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ROUTING	
1	PPG
2	PPG
3	CHAND
4	FI2-F16
5	CIEE
6	CPP
7	
8	

23 MAR 53

SECURITY INFORMATION **SECRET**

IN 49138

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP PULLACH

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

1246Z 24 MAR 53

INFORMATION: DD/P, COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5266

TO: SBRLN INFO: SFRAN DIR CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN - 8630 (IN 48429)

1. AGREE YOUR PLAN INTERROGATE CALES UNDER CID COVER. HOWEVER, BELIEVE ON REFLECTION YOU WILL AGREE ADVISING ZIPPER WE DO NOT INTEND PENETRATE ZIPPER OPS IN ANY FORM INADVISABLE AS AT BEST USELESS GESTURE IN WHO KIDDING WHOM CATEGORY. FURTHER WE FRANKLY OF OPINION POB IN BEST POSITION JUDGE POSSIBLE ZIPPER REACTION TO AIS INTERROGATIO OF CURRENT ZIPPER AGENT.

2. FAIL TO SEE CONNECTION BETWEEN CALES INTERROGATION PROSPECTS AND YOUR REF PARA 2 FEELING HOEHER KNEW MORE THAN CALES HAD TOLD HIM.

3. THOUGH WE NOT IN LEAST INCLINED TO TAKE POSITION ZIPPER WOULD PASS UP OPPORTUNITY FOR INSIGHT TPEMBER, ZIPPER OBJECTIVE RE CALES AS STATED SPULL-4781 (IN 30470) IS SSD PROGRAM WHICH HAD PRIOR BOB RECOGNITION AND APPROVAL VIA SBRLN - 7813*. AS STATED CLEARLY IN SPULL - 5233 (IN 47485), PARA 4, ZIPPER HAS SPECIFICALLY DENIED THAT TPEMBER IS CALES TARGET. STILL BELIEVE CALES FEAR OF BEING BLACKLISTED IN BUSINESS BECAUSE OF RUN IN WITH [] IS CREDIBLE EXPLANATION FOR REPORT IN QUESTION AS HE AFTER ALL HAD LIVELIHOOD AT STAKE AND COULD

SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO. 32-6-33-587encl (4)

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23 MAR 53
PULL 5266

SECRET

PAGE 2
IN 49138

ONLY GUESS EXTENT OF ACTION YOU MIGHT TAKE. ZIPPER NEVER DENIED
HAVING RECEIVED CALES REPORT, IN FACT SPECIFICALLY ADMITTED IT.

4. POB WILL GLADLY FORWARD ANY NEW DATA THIS CASE. REQUEST
SAME SERVICE BOB, THOUGH WE RECOGNIZE LEGITIMATE SECURITY DANGER
TPEMBER CAUSED BY HOEHER DISAPPEARANCE AND AGREE ANY CALES INTERROGATION
WHICH CAN CREDIBLY BE ATTRIBUTED INVESTIGATION THIS CASE, DO NOT
BELIEVE HOEHER CASE SHOULD BE USED AS EXCUSE REOPEN QUESTION OF ZIPPER
USE OF CALES. WE HAVE ALREADY REVERSED OUR FIELD ON LATTER POINT
TWICE. FURTHER DISCUSSION OF POINT WITH ZIPPER IN VIEW THEIR SPECIFIC
DENIAL HE PENETRATING TPEMBER FUTILE, AND WOULD ONLY INDICATE APPARENT
EXTREME IMPORTANCE OF MATTER TO US AND TEMPT THEM INVESTIGATE FURTHER
CALES FORMER TPEMBER ^{***}ROLE. WE ADVISE DROPPING THIS ASPECT AS BEST MOVE
RE TPEMBER SECURITY, ASSUMING TPEMBER NOW THOROUGHLY INSULATED FROM
CALES ANYWAY.

END OF MESSAGE

* MSG/CTR COMMENT: NOT RECEIVED WASH S/C.

** MSG/CTR COMMENT: RCVD OLE.

SECRET

32633-587 and

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION

BOB-A-3850

Chief, EE

25 March 1953

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

Operational/CART/ZIPPER

Hoehar -

Ref: SPULL 5266

1. Attached is self-explanatory.
2. Attached was written by the chief of the covert section of ~~SPULL~~.
3. Re last sentence, third paragraph, above reference: In SPULL 5056 #1 you advised us that the CALES report had not been received by ZIPPER, according to CALES interrogation there is no doubt that at this particular date the report was already in possession of ZIPPER headquarters.

Approved by: [] [] [] []

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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- 1-BOB

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VIA AIR
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EEB-A-3822

SECRET SECURITY INFORMATION
CLASSIFICATION

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief, Berlin Operations Base
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/CANT/ZIPPER
SPECIFIC— Intercept on Frau Hoehner

DATE: 25 March 1953

1. Attached please find an intercept of a letter which was sent to Frau Hoehner from Yugoslavia. The letter is so short and the German so bad that it possibly may contain open code or double meaning.

2. Please inform us about the results of your analysis of this letter. Also it might be desirable for you to check the identity of writer through any available Yugoslav sources.

Approved: *[Signature]*

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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RI/MIS	✓
RI/Files	-

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FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

N.S.M

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CLASSIFICATION

52-60-37-736

EGBA-3822

CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

14-3-53 G 14-3-53 L R 460/420 18-3-53

no

606 / 1311

MILICA TOSCHITSCH STOSIC
BELGRAD
Strasse Erace
Ribnikova 30
F.M.R. Jugoslavien

FRAU KATHARINA HOEHER
BERLIN SO 36
Adalbertstrasse 5 II

See Photostat

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CONFIDENTIAL
SECURITY INFORMATION

EC-A 1522

Frau

Katharina

Höher

Berlin 5036

Adalberstrasse

no 5. I

Lieber Kinder!

Belgrad

14. 7. 53

Wir sind bekommen Seine
Brief, und wir sind ~~sehr~~ traurig
für seine Vater, ~~ich~~ bin gelesen
deutsche Zeitungen von Katy's
Brief. Sind sie befinden ~~unter~~
unsere Brief, in meine Pochet?
Bis du bekommen zwei Brief
von meine Mutter mit lau gesch-
rieben? Viele grüße und kisse
von unsere Familie und
Duscha

Absender Milica Toschitsch

Belgrad

Strasse Braće

Ribnikala

no 30

35-82

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

31 MARCH 1953

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

OUT 50738

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2
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TO: SR REP: GERMANY (BERLIN, PULLACH, FRANKFURT)] EE/FIQ/Z 528
 FROM: DIRECTOR, CIA ROUTINE
 CONF: EE 6 2340Z 1 APR 53
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DIR 48049

HUEBNER, Relained

• TO: BERLIN, SPILL INFO: STRAN CITE: DIR
 RE: WLL 5324 (IN 11261)

1. ZUPPIN DROPPED HUEBNER WITH PREJUDICE (MGLA 9352).
 MESSAGE NET L. CONTACT FRENCH IS 1950 (MGLA 6095). POUCHING
 UNUSUALLY TRACES HUEBNER.
2. AWAITING DETAILED REPORT FROM PULL ON HUEBNER KIDNAPPING.

END OF MESSAGE

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 SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
 NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
 DATE 2006

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ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	15 APR 1953

DG/EE

EE/CR

RE/CFI

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

THIS INFORMATION IS UNCLASSIFIED

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SECRET INFORMATION

EGPA-13283

EGPA- 13283

1 APR 1953

Chief of Base, Berlin

Attn: []

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Info: BE

Operational/CART

TREMBER/ZIPPER Complications

Refs: (A) BERLIN 8645; (B) BERLIN 8290; (C) DOBA 3769

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

1. After reading over the cable and dispatch correspondence on the CALES affair, we found we had a number of unanswered questions which you may be able to answer. First, in para 5 of ref. B we note that ZAROE, the TREMBER accountant, and CALES are on friendly terms, and that HOEHER once expressed interest in the accountant. What is known about CALES continued relations with ZAROE?

2. Re STEINMANN: Nothing is known here about him, since apparently no PRO was ever submitted on him. We note that CALES hoped to get a job with the BIV through STEINMANN. Was the job CALES secured with the AIV gained through STEINMANN, to your knowledge, and are STEINMANN's connections BIV or AIV. A job which has something to do with refugee sounds rather like the BIV's new Bundesnachrichtenstelle, but that would logically be under HILLENBERG rather than FRIEDRICH. The Bundesnachrichtenstellen, incidentally are to be set up under cover of refugee interrogation teams, and are authorized to run operations 30 kilometers into the East Zone. This thirty kilometers will be interpreted elastically, according to GERTSEN.

3. Was KIANG, of Abt. 7 of the Polizei, the man kicked out of the police after [] discovered he was a Zipperite? If he wasn't then who is KIANG, and what fresh light does the incident in which he and HOEHER photographed the TREMBER files throw on the Zipper penetration?

Approved by: []

[]
30 March 1953

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3882
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1 APR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 12071

3
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TO: DIRECTOR, CIA
 FROM: SR REP PULLACH
 ACTION: EE 6
 INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

ROUTINE

03427 2 APR 53

PULL 5341

TO: SBRLN

INFO: SFRAN DIR

CITE: SPULL

REF EGBA-3682

BARNITZKE, Hans
Spull

1. PHOTO TRANSMITTED WITH EGLA -2318 POSITIVELY BARNITZKE AGENT LEADER V-5750, ALIAS KUHN. FAILURE IDENTIFY INDICATES V-5750 NOT THE KUHN IN QUESTION OR LYING.

2. ZIPPER JUST DETERMINED HOEHER WAS IN TOUCH BARNITZKE, KNEW IDENTITIES BARNITZKE AGENTS ONE OF WHOM ARRESTED SINCE HOEHER DISAPPEARANCE. FEEL HOEHER-BARNITZKE CONNECTION OPENS NEW POSSIBILITIES AND POSSIBLY IMPORTANT YOUR CASE.

3. APPARENTLY KIRWES MOVED RATHER FREELY IN WEST BERLIN. VIEW CLOSENESS HOEHER AND KIRWES, AND FACT KIRWES USED ALIAS KUEHNE, KIRWES MAY BE BARNITZKE ASSOCIATE KNOWN TO

END OF MESSAGE

ABSTRACT	INDEX
DATE	13 - - - 53

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AIR

EOB-A-4078

Chief, POB

2 April 1953

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

UBERLIN LATERAL FILE

Operational/CART//ZIPPER

X Hoehner, Wolfgang etal

A.L.M.

Ref: EOB-A-3741

1. Attached please find an intercept, which clearly indicates that the Kripo man fired by [] for his connections with ZIPPER was KLANG.

2. CALES mentioned that he was introduced to HOEHER by KLANG.

Approved: []

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

321 0 29 1393

ABSTRACT	X	INDEX	X
DATE	31 JAN 1956		

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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EGBA-4080

2 APRIL 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

2 April 1953

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

OBERLIN LATERAL FILE

Operational/CART/ODORSY

X Kocher, Wolfgang

Ref: EGQA-1283

A.L.M.

1. Returned herewith is attachment of reference. Please let us have a copy for carding at BOB at your earliest convenience. Also, please send one copy to POB.

2. The contents of attachment to reference were rather disappointing to say the least. Paragraph hh on page 18 gives the only clue why STEPHAN and/or KIMMERMANN might have been involved in the kidnapping of Kocher. Nowhere, is an explanation given as to STEPHAN's and KIMMERMANN's relations with KOCHER after the initial recruitment which took place in October 1950.

3. Please query ODPAL on the following points:

- a) What connections did STEPHAN and KIMMERMANN have with Kocher from October 1950 until the latter disappeared.
- b) What other indications does ODPAL have, aside from the statement made by Gerhard KIMMERMANN, that Rudolf KIMMERMANN is the leader of a kidnap-ring.

Approved: []

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3-21-0 29 1395
EXTRACT
20
DATE 31 JAN 1956

DATE:	7 APR. 1953
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NO RECORD IN/NT

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

6 APR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 13349

ROUTING	
1	EE 6
2	F12
3	CHRONO
4	PPG
5	OFF
6	CF-1
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA
FROM: SR REP BERLIN

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

2227Z 6 APR 53

INFORMATION: F1, F1/OPS, F1/STC, PP 2, F1/RI 2

BRLN 8846

TO: SPULL THRU SFRAN INFO: DIR CITE: SBRLN
REF SPULL 5341 (IN 12071)
CART, [] /BARNITZKE

1. IF KIRWES PERSON [] MET THROUGH BARNITZKE
[] OPERATION IN SERIOUS DANGER. BOB ATTEMPT PROTECT ZIPPER
RESULTED [] NOT REPORTING FIRST KUHN MEETING. THIS DIS-
CREPANCY MAY NOW OR LATER BECOME KNOWN RIS.
2. [] SUPPOSED RETURN BERLIN 14 APRIL. SEND PHOTO
OF KIRWES FOR IDENTIFICATION SOONEST.

END OF MESSAGE.

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

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[]
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Bob
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Haecher file
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(44)

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

OSMA-4100

EGBA-4100

Chief, ES

6 April 1953

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

CART/VATERLAND/CONSUL/Operational

Guenther WEISSMANN

1. Subject, Chief of Abteilung V of West Berlin Headquarters, was entertained for lunch at my private residence on 3 April 1953. Present were [] and []

2. The purpose of the meeting, which had been previously cleared with [] was to cement BOB's personal and professional relationship with Subject and to ascertain along what lines we might be able to assist in building up and strengthening the political branch of Abteilung V.

3. The 1953 budget of the City of Berlin allows an additional 112 slots for the political branch. They will be filled by transferring suitable detective force personnel (Arizinalpolizei) to Abteilung V. Unfortunately, the head of Abteilung K, Herr SANDWALDTER, has been obstructing the growth of Abteilung V and must be expected to raise difficulties if called upon to relinquish K- personnel for V.

4. V's transportation problems are as acute as ever. Four passenger cars, three of prewar vintage, are the organic transportation of Abteilung V. In theory at least V has access to K's motorpool. In practice several important operations have come to naught due to lack of transportation when it was needed. We debated at some length ways and means by which we could augment V's motorized strength. (Everything hinges on [] willingness to accept such help. Until now [] has been maintaining a bold front in disclaiming that V has been getting the thin end of the stick.)

5. In connection with the KLANC incident, notes were compared on the role played by ZIPPER in Berlin. Subject was told that we have a more than routine interest in being kept posted on those ZIPPER activities that

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1 - BOB

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out athwart police prerogatives. Subject maintains sporadic liaison with one SCHÄFER, alleged to be a ZIPPER representative not stationed in Berlin and visiting Berlin at irregular intervals. According to Subject, SCHÄFER's bona fide has been vouched for by a mutual friend, a former Abwehr - member who served with SCHÄFER in the same unit (they were parachuted into Poland behind the enemy lines).

6. Subject's personal impression of ZIPPER personnel he has come in contact with is rather unfavorable. He compared them to the average run of Blanck office intelligence representatives whom he considers high-caliber, just the type of CA specialists whom Subject would welcome on the staff of V. He has found them modest, unobtrusive and efficient.

7. He once more re-hashed the KLANG incident which has left a very bad taste in the mouths of Subject and his associates. (KLANG was a V official, recently fired on the grounds of his collaboration with ZIPPER). He find it somewhat difficult to draw the line between truth and conjecture. Subject is avowedly acting on a hunch in suspecting KLANG of having denounced ("hochgeben lassen") ROEMER to the GDB as an act of revenge, suspecting ROEMER of having had a hand in his (KLANG's) dismissal from the police force. In the same breath, however, Subject voices the suspicion that ROEMER may have been an Eastern agent all along. As regards KLANG, Subject considers him a major threat to Western security. He points to his promiscuity in striking up intelligence connections - ALBERT, the French IS, the Landesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - as posing a distinct security hazard. He blames him for having furnished ROEMER with detailed information on V, its order of battle and a wealth of operational data, which must now be presumed at the disposal of the GDB. Subject claims that SCHÄFER has reflected considerable concern on the part of ZIPPER in regard to KLANG's security. Subject has suggested to SCHÄFER that ZIPPER furnish V documentary evidence to prove that KLANG has betrayed official secrets, a charge on which he could be sentenced to at least a one-year prison term.

8. I assured Subject that as a matter of firm policy GDB does not attempt to suborn police personnel. All our dealings are cleared beforehand with [] I stressed our desire to continue a friendly and cooperative working relationship with V which could be of considerable advantage to both. We briefly touched on the issue of material support, tentatively suggesting our making available to them a number of vehicles for special operations. Thought was also given to a U.S. sponsored training program for new V personnel, involving such services as bringing prominent experts to Berlin and placing training films at their disposal.

9. A few additional biographical data on Subject were obtained. He served on the Italian front with the 8th Panzer Division which was committed during the Sicilian Campaign and the Nettuno beachhead landing.

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

After the war Subject completed his law studies (Assessor). He has been with the Berlin police force one and a half years. His rapid promotion to division chief is mainly attributable to the critical shortage of even halfway qualified police personnel. Subject's direct superior is the police vice-president Dr. URBAN. He is the co-equal of the commander of the constabulary and of the criminal police chief. His monthly net salary is 650 DM West.

10. No policy guidance or operational support is being requested at this stage. There has been previous correspondence which we are in the process of locating. In late 1951 BOB reported on the formation of a political law enforcement branch within the Berlin police and raised in general terms the issue as to the type of support we would be permitted to render. A very encouraging reply from Washington over the signature of Fletcher N. KNIGHT(?) was then received. For the time being we propose to continue inventorizing the main needs of Abteilung V and exploring the "political" angles in attaining a more intimate association with the affairs of V. [] is going to be the responsible case officer.

Approved by:

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

-2-

768

CGM/HER

Security Information

EX-111

HOEHER

7 April 1953 *dos*

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/ZIPPER/CART

Intercept on Franz HOEHER

Ref: EGDA-3822

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

We are unable to locate traces of MILLEN TOSCHITSCH in FOB files.
Naturally we have not queried ZIPPER.

[]

*noted
MG*

Approved by

[]

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

Dist:
2 - BOB
3 - FE
3 - CCM

[]
~~32633-736~~

FORM NO. 35-85
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

7 APR 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 13466

ROUTING	
1	EEICE
2	FIZ
3	CHRONO
4	PPG
5	SEE
6	CFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP PULLACH

ACTION: EE 6

ROUTINE

1327Z 7 APR 53

INFORMATION: FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, PP 2, FI/RI 2

PULL 5380

TO: SBRLN

INFO: SFRAN DIR

CITE: SPULL

RE: SBRLN-8846 (IN 13349)

1. ZIPPER ATTEMPTING OBTAIN PHOTO KIRWES WHICH POB WILL FORWARD SOONEST POSSIBLE, BUT DOUBTFUL THIS WILL WORK BY 14 APRIL.
2. QUICKEST WAY OBTAIN KIRWES PHOTO IS FOR BOB HAVE [] REQUEST MEDEKOPF CONTACT TIMM (MERTENS) AND GET ONE ON PRETEXT PUBLIC SAFETY REQUIRES. [] SAW KIRWES PHOTOS IN TIMM POSSESSION. QUALITY NOT GOOD BUT ADEQUATE FOR IDENTIFICATION.
3. KIRWES ALSO EASY IDENTIFY DUE RUNNING EAR ABCESS.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Hoehner file

IRAA

RAM

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

(44)

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

NOQA-14058

10 APR. 1953

Chief, EE

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

CADORE/ZIPPER/CART

GAENS Case

INFO: COB, Berlin
COB, Pullach

1. Enclosed is a study of the GAENS case which [] has prepared at my instruction.

2. This matter has been discussed with [] and [], who agree generally with my comments as expressed on the last page of the enclosed report.

Enc: h/w
as above, dated 27 Mar. 53, 1 ea.

Distribution:
3-EE, w/enc.
1-Berlin, w/enc.
1-Pullach, w/enc.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

9 April 1953

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COPY

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

[]
~~32-6-53~~ 763

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

Air

EGQA- 14210
8420

14 APR 1953

Chief, EE

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: POB, BOB

Operational/CADORY/CART

GALES' SSD Files
ZIPPER

Reference: EGBA 3421

1. We are forwarding to EE the microfilm negatives (Enclosure A) of GALEs files on the SSD as requested in paragraph 2 of reference.
2. In addition one set of prints are being forwarded as Enclosure B to POB for use along the lines requested in paragraph 3 of reference.
3. One additional set of prints has been passed to the CART section of PBMIGHT for their retention.

Approved:

Dist:

- 1-EE (w/Enclosure A only)
- 2-POB (w/Enclosure B only)
- 3-BOB (w/Enclosures)

13 April 1953

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

COPY

**SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION**

Courier

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

EGQA- 14215

14 APR 1953

Chief, CLS ATTN: []
Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

INFO: BOB, POB

Operational/CADORY/CART

Hoeher, Wolfgang

References: (a) EGSA 917 (Not to POB, BOB)
(b) EGSA 4080 (Not sent CLS)

1. This desk appreciates the prompt action received on subject report in response to [] conversation with [] on 11 March 1953.

2. In addition, Berlin would like you to query CIC on the following regarding the reference (a) report: *Copy attached*

a) "What connections did STEPHAN and ZIMMERMAN have with Hoeher from October 1950 until the latter disappeared.

b) What other indications does CIC have, aside from the statements made by Gerhard ZIMMERMAN, that Rudolph ZIMMERMANN is the leader of the kidnap-ring."

3. For POB and BOB: Attached herewith for your retention are copies of subject report as requested in reference (b).

Approved: []

Dist:
2-CLS (w/o enc.)
3-BOB (w/enc)
2-POB (w/enc)

13 April 1953

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

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SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

SECRET (When Filled In)

PHOTO MOUNTING SHEET



DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2006

SUBJECT WOLFGANG HOEFER

DSN 67-748

DATE 19/5/53

FORM 3768 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS
9-87

SECRET (When Filled In)

CL BY E J
DECL OADR
DRV MIS 2-82

OFFICIAL DISPATCH

VIA Air
(Specify Air or Sea Pouch)

DISPATCH NO. EQBA-7703

~~SECRET~~
SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: Chief of Base, Pullach
FROM Chief, EE

DATE MAY 28 1953

SUBJECT { GENERAL Operational
SPECIFIC Contact of V-2996's Wife

Ref: EQBA-3822

We have been advised by the appropriate staff that the letter attached to reference is too short for any analysis to be made here. We could find no traces here on Milica TOSCHITSCH (or TOSIC, as the name would be transcribed into English from Serbian). Due to the limited facilities of the Belgrade station, we have not asked for a local check to be made on TOSCHITSCH. Possibly Zipper, in the course of their investigation of the V-2996 case, will turn up information on contacts of V-2996's wife in Yugoslavia.

Distribution:

- 3 - PULL
- 3 - FRAN
- 3 - ~~EE~~
- 1 - Reg
- 2 - EE/FIG/Z

26 May 1953
EE/FIG/Z/HMS:bw

ABSTRACT	INDEX
	X
DATE 4 JUN 1953	

(Releasing officer)

(Coordinating officer)

(Authenticating officer)

~~SECRET~~
SECRET
Security Information
CLASSIFICATION

FORM NO. 51-29
JUN 1949

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

COURIER

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

HOEHER
EGLA-5117 dossier

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

Chief of Base, Fullach

INFO: ES, BOB

Operational/ZIPPER/CART
Guenther SCHAACK and HOEHER, Case

1. ZIPPER has recently been in touch with a Guenther SCHAACK, resident in or near Rheinsberg, no further details known, who claims to have been employed under the cover name RUDOLF by a U.S. intelligence agency in Berlin.
2. Subject says that on 1 March 1953 he was arrested by the Soviets and on 6 March 1953 was delivered to the Soviet prison in Karlsborst. Although he received a 5 year sentence for espionage, Subject claims to have been released by an amnesty on 26 July 1953, when he returned to West Berlin.
3. SCHAACK claims that a friend of his, one RIECK, fru, a resident of Potsdam, was for a time in a cell with Wolfgang HOEHER.
4. In order to help evaluate the statements of SCHAACK, ZIPPER requests any information on him which may be available, including confirmation that he was actually employed by a U.S. agency. We note that Guenter SCHAACK, born 25 August 1923, apparently identical with Subject, was included on USAREUR dropped list of 1 July 1953.

Approved by

Dist:

- 1 - DCB
- 3 - EE
- 3 - COM

19 August 1953

16 October 1953 []
 and PER []
 SCHAACK []
 Defected from Germany
 West Sept 53.
 6 HA 1148
 4 Nov 52 worked for
 SCHAACK []
 WAID []
 Defected from Germany
 West Sept 53.
 -01-24602

SECRET
Security Information

HOEHER
ECLA- 5274 *classe*

28 AUG 1953

COURIER

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM, EE, CIG

Operational/ZIPPER/CARE
fm RIECK (phonetic)

Reference: ECLA-5117 (not to CIG)

1. Further information concerning the fm RIECK described in reference indicates that he is about 40 years old, thinning hair, about 175 cm tall, comes from the vicinity of Rheinsberg and was apparently a farmer. RIECK was arrested on 23 February 1953, and although he did not admit to espionage activities, he was sentenced to 5 years in prison. He was released on 26 July 1953 through an amnesty.

2. Traces are requested.

3. As possible traces which might be looked into further, PCB files carry Hans Ernst August RIECK, born 5 June 1908 in Berlin/Rixdorf, listed in attachment to MCHA-10055. Gerhard Herbert Siegfried RIECK was carried in EUCOM dropped list of 1 March 1951. Wilhelm RIECK, born 23 January 1916 was on the EUCOM dropped list of 1 December 1948.

Approved by

*routed []
CE/CE*

*EG LW-197 advised
no traces para 3,
1st names needed
for further tracing.*

Dist:
2 - BSB
3 - EE
3 - COM
1 - CIG

27 August 1953

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

COPY

*EG QA-26455
1 Oct 53
no trace CIG
Central Registry
[]*

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOURGES METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

AIR

EGLW-182

[]
Hoehner
SEP 16 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt []
Attn: Chief of Base, Pullach []
Chief, EE

Operational
Guenther SCHAACK

REF: EGLA-5117

We could find no identifiable traces on Guenther
SCHAACK. If Zipper succeeds in obtaining any further back-
ground data on SCHAACK or a first name and background de-
tails for his friend RIECK (fmu), we will be glad to re-
check the files here. Was SCHAACK able to supply any ad-
ditional information on HOEHER?

Distribution:

- 3 - Pullach (DIRECT)
- 3 - Frankfurt
- 1 - RI
- 2 - EE/FIG/Z

14 September 1953
EE/FIG/Z/HMS:bw

[]
EE/FIG/Z []

[]
EE/FIG/Z []

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

AIR

EGLW-197

Hoehner
SEP 24 1953

Chief of Mission, Frankfurt
Attn: Chief of Base, Pullach,
Chief, EE

Operational

fmu RIECK (phonetic)

REF: EGLA-5274, EGLW-182

1. The only traces which Central Index has on Gerhard Herbert Siegfried RIECK and Wilhelm RIECK are the EUCOM dropped agent lists available to you. There is no trace on Hans Ernst August RIECK. MGHA-10055 was not forwarded to Washington.

2. In view of the fact that there are a large number of cards on RIECK, on RIEK and on the possible, RIECH, it is rather impractical to try to trace a fmu RIECK (phonetic). If you can obtain the definite spelling of the last name and also the first name we shall be glad to make another attempt to trace subject.

Distribution:

3 - Pullach (DIRECT)

3 - Frankfurt

1 - RI

2 - EE/FIG/Z

18 September 1953

EE/FIG/Z/DD:bw

EE/FIG/Z

32-6-7-3350

EE/FIG/Z

SECRET
Security Information

COURIER

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

EGIA-5671

29 SEPT 1953

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Base, Pullach

INFO: COM, EE

Operational/ZIPPER
Karl RIECK

Reference: EGBA-3896, 26 March 1953

(quoted in EGQA-24720)

1. According to ZIPPER, further information indicates that the RIECK described as an alleged cellmate of Wolfgang BOMMER is definitely identical with the Karl RIECK of reference, listed as residing at Potsdam 2, Bergholz-Rehbrücke, Schlüterstr. 5.

2. FOB did not receive a copy of reference. We would like to have all the information available on Subject. Did he work for a U.S. agency?

Approved by

rounded []

RI/Analysis

Dist:

2 - HOB

3 - COM

3 - EE V

28 September 1953

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

SECRET
Security Information
COPY

[]
1953

AIR

BOB-A- 8418

OCT 7 - 1953

Chief, Pallas Operations Base

Chief, Berlin Operations Base

INFO: EE, COM

Operational/ZIPPER

Karl RIECK

REFERENCE: EOL-A-5671

1. BOB contains no further information on Subject other than that cited in BOB-A-1096 which states "Subject is the owner of a farm in the American sector near the border. He owns an automobile with which he drove BEGUM-82 from around Weissenauer to Berlin. BEGUM-82 stayed with him five days."

2. It is not known whether Subject is, or ever was, employed by any U. S. agency. The above information was obtained through normal refugee debriefing of BEGUM-82 here at BOB.

noted
EE/P
RI/Analysis []

Date of Origin: 6 October 1953

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

Approved by _____

LSR:mbd

Distribution:

- 2 - FOB
- 3 - COM
- 3 - EE
- 1 - BOB

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

COPY

[]
10775

SECRET

ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY	
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST	
32-0-24-1-621	EGQA 27486	15 October 1953		
SUBJECT			DATE	
Guenther SCHAAK			27 December 1956	
PERTINENT INFORMATION				
Dispatch from Frankfurt, Germany				
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM				
1. Subject was included on the USANEUR dropped list of 1 July 1953. ULS was requested in EGQA-24602 dated 4 September to determine which agency employed Subject, but as yet, we have not received a reply. Subject was also in contact with Zipper in August 1953 because he had some information on <u>Wolfgang HOEHER</u> .				
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCE METHODSEXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2006				
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.				
CROSS REFERENCE FORM SECRET			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.	

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 59-34
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

(35)

SECRET
(When Filled In)

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT OF DOCUMENT		DOCUMENT IDENTIFICATION		
NIEKE, Werner		RI FILE NO.		
		DISPATCH OR SOURCE DOC. SYMBOL NO.	DATE	
		EGLA 6206	3 Nov. 1953	
	SOURCE CRYPTONYM	DATE OF INFO.	EVALUATION	
ANALYST	DATE PROCESSED	DISSEMINATED IN	DATE	
	27 May 1957			
DOCUMENT DISPOSITION				
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	CROSS REFERRED TO THIS FILE		TRANSFERRED TO	RI FILE NO.

PERTINENT INFORMATION

THIS EXTRACT WAS MADE BY THE ZIPPER DESK

[] told [] that he had known HOEHER, whom he knew to be a Zipper man, but his contacts with that individual had been strictly within the purview of his duties as a journalist.

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT
TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.

FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO. 

FORM NO. 867 REPLACES FORM 867, 1 AUG 54
1 MAY 56 AND FORM 137 WHICH ARE OBSOLETE.

SECRET

(7-46)

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 NOV 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 38303

ROUTING	
1	FI2
2	FI3
3	ATTORNEY
4	FI/ICE
5	DEF
6	DEFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SR REP BERLIN

DEC 1 1953

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

2107Z 30 NOV 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE/METHOD/EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

BRLN 1750

TO: SPULL

INFO: SFRAN, DIR

CITE: SBRLN

CALL/ZIPPER/CART

1. [] INFORMED BOB 28 NOVEMBER FOLLOWING INFORMATION WHICH HE HAD OBTAINED FROM FORMER ACQUAINTANCE ONE FRANZ STREHL, 59 YEARS OLD, OBERBAURAT IN ERFURT, ARRIVED WEST BERLIN 27 NOVEMBER.
2. STREHL STATED DURING HIS PERIOD IMPRISONMENT DATING FROM EASTER 1953 HE CONFRONTED BY HOEHER AND WENGLER. STREHL HAD BEEN FORMER CONTACT WENGLER AND KNEW OF HOEHER. STREHL STATED HOEHER HAD BEEN DDR PENETRATION ZIPPER DURING ENTIRE TIME HE WORKED FOR ZIPPER. HOEHER SUPPOSEDLY HAD NOTEBOOK WITH 57 NAMES. HIS MITARBEITERS WHICH HE TURNED OVER TO SSD. LINSE ALSO SUPPOSEDLY IN SAME PRISON.
3. STREHL DIRECTED BY [] [] ENTER NORMAL REFUGEE CHANNELS BERLIN 28 NOVEMBER. IF ZIPPER WISHES INTERROGATE STREHL SUGGEST THEY INFORM MELDEKOPF TO LOCATE STREHL FOR QUESTIONING. WISH EMPHASIZE CONNECTION [] [] TO KUBARK MUST BE PROTECTED AND CANNOT BE EXPOSED ZIPPER. SUGGEST ZIPPER BE TOLD WE CAME ACROSS STREHL'S NAME DURING ORDINARY COURSE SCREENING REFUGEES. THAT POB BERLIN DIENSTSTELLE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

IT IS FORBIDDEN TO MAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

30 NOV 53

BRLN 1750

S E C R E T

IN 38303

PAGE 2

RECOGNIZED STREHL AS BEING EX-ZIPPERITE. IF POB FEELS THEY CANNOT
SCREEN -KUBARK CONNECTION REQUEST ZIPPER NOT BE INFORMED
ABOVE.

END OF MESSAGE

S E C R E T

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

9 DEC 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 38722

1	FI2
2	FR
3	CHRON
4	FIGICE
5	CEE
6	EEFI
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR CIA

FROM: SB REP PULLACH

DEC 2 1953

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

0329Z 2 DEC 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STG, FI/RI 2

PULL 6922

TO: SBRLN

INFO: SFRAN, DIR

CITE: SPULL

RE: BRLN-1750 (IN 38303) STREHL GENERATED BY REF INFO AND
IDENTIFIED TO REF INFO DISCLOSURE

1. WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH PASS REF INFO ZIPPER BUT MOST HESITANT
SINCE NO MATTER WHAT PRETEXT WE USE, ZIPPER MAY DETERMINE STREHL ONLY
TOLD ONE PERSON, I.E., YOUR SOURCE. MATTER WOULD BE PARTICULARLY
EMBARASSING SHOULD ZIPPER ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH YOUR SOURCE. DOES
MARTIN COSSMANN, BORN 19 SEPT 03 IN DRESDEN, MEAN ANYTHING TO YOU IN
THIS CONNECTION? HE IS ZIPPER AGENT AND ADVISOR ON REFUGEE CHANNELS.

2. ASSUMING SOURCE NOT SAME, WE WOULD LIKE YOUR SPECIFIC
CLEARANCE GIVE REF INFO ZIPPER CLAIMING IT RESULT CIC REFUGEE
INTERROGATION.

3. FRAN AND DIR PLEASE NOTE GUENTHER SCHAAK INFO CONTAINED
EGQA-27516 ATTACHMENT TENDS CONFIRM REF.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

FORM NO. 35-83
NOV 1951

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 DEC 53

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

IN 39411

ROUTING	
1	✓ F12
2	K19
3	CHRONO
4	K19/EE
5	LEE
6	REIFL
7	
8	

TO: DIRECTOR, CIA

FROM: SP REP BERLIN

DEC 4 1:53

ROUTINE

ACTION: EE 6

2305Z 3 DEC 53

INFORMATION: COP, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC, FI/RI 2

BRLN 1827

TO: SPULL

INFO: DIR, SFRAN

CITE: SBRLN

CALL/ZIPPER/CART

RE: PULL 6922 (IN 38722) STREHL

1. APPROVE PASS REF INFO ZIPPER. SUBJECT INTERROGATED ALREADY FRENCH BRITISH AND U.S. GIVE REF INFO AS RESULT INTERROGATION WITHOUT SPECIFYING SOURCE.

2. COSSMANN MEANS NOTHING TO US IN THIS CONNECTION.

END OF MESSAGE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY *Hms*
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3028
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

COPY NO.

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

REF 9946
EGBA-9946
DEC 7 53
DEC 7, 1953

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2008

Chief, POB
Chief, BOB

INFO: PK
CIV
JOB

Operational/DIT/NO/C/INT

Subject of Separate Cover Attachment

1. Information under separate cover is B-212 Report dated 27 November. This report is forwarded to you as of possible interest because the name mentioned as "Onkel Heinz" in para-6 of the report is, as far as we have been able to determine, the same as the name of the person who was allegedly turned out to be an alleged assassin. It was Bernitzke who was in contact with the [redacted] the [redacted] and was abducted. We understand that [redacted] had dropped Bernitzke, but if they are still playing with him, the attached report could possibly be interpreted to suggest that the other side is aware of this and are attempting to send one of the [redacted] leads to [redacted] through him.

2. For your information, the first person mentioned in para-3 of the attached report is now in Canada, having emigrated in mid-August, 1953. This was with a low-level, cover informant of [redacted].

BEST AVAILABLE COPY

To POB: You will, of course, recall Onkel HEINZ in connection with the [redacted] case.

AM:rwjc

Approved _____

- Distribution:
- 2-POB, w/Att. (5/2)
- 3-OS, w/Att.
- 3-COK, w/Att.
- 1-JOB, w/Att.
- 1-BOB

SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION

Date of Origin: 3 Dec 1953

[Handwritten marks]

„Auch die Drahtzieher werden eines Tages auf der Anklagebank sitzen“

Der zweite Tag des Prozesses gegen die Gehlen-Agenten
Wühlarbeit auch gegen Frankreich

Berlin (ADN/Eig. Ber.). In der Verhandlung am Sonnabend wurde erneut eindeutig erwiesen, daß die Gehlen-Spionageorganisation auf Weisung und mit Unterstützung der amerikanischen Besatzungsmacht bereits seit 1946 systematisch aufgebaut wurde.

Aus den vielen Beweismaterialien, aus Dokumenten, die dem Gericht vorliegen, geht hervor, daß die Amerikaner — die „befreundete Seite“ — von der Gehlen-Organisation „wünscht“, sie „tadeln“ und von ihr „fordern“.

Wenn der Zeuge Kranz erklärte, daß der „Tag X“, der 17. Juni, der „Polterabend“ war und daß im März die „Hochzeit“ folgen sollte, daß diese aber „besser vorbereitet sein müsse als der 17. Juni“, wie ihm von einem Spionagelieferanten der Gehlen-Organisation erklärt wurde, dann zeigt diese Aussage klar und deutlich, daß die Gehlensche Spionageorganisation den Krieg vorbereitet. Auch der Hauptangeklagte Haase sagte vor Gericht aus, daß für Anfang des Jahres 1954 ein neuer Putschversuch organisiert

organization, über sowjetische Waffen, Flugzeugtypen und militärische Formationen unterrichtet. Die Spionagelieferanten gingen des öfteren mit ihren Agenten an das sowjetische Ehrenmal im Westsektor, um an Hand der dort aufgestellten sowjetischen Panzer Hinweise zu geben.

Daß sich die Spionageorganisation nicht nur auf das Gebiet der DDR beschränkt, sondern sich auch gegen die Länder der Volksdemokratie, gegen die Sowjetunion und, wie der Angeklagte Haase aussagte, auch gegen China richtet, geht daraus hervor, daß in der Zentrale der Gehlen-Organisation bei München eine besondere Abteilung „Tiefe und Forschung“ geschaffen wurde. Diese Abteilung beschäftigt sich speziell mit der Spionage in den volksdemokratischen Ländern und unternimmt alles, um „dorthin Spitzel und Spione einzuschleusen.“

Besonders gegen Frankreich richtete die Spionageorganisation Gehlen ihre Wühlarbeit, gegen das französische Volk, das sich mit aller Kraft gegen die EVG-Verträge und gegen die Versklavung durch die amerikanischen Kriegstreiber auflehnt.

Bei der Zeugenvernehmung bestätigte der Zeuge Höher, der ehemals eine leitende Funktion im Gehlen-Apparat ausübte, die Angaben des Hauptangeklagten Haase, der bereits am Freitag ausgesagt hatte, daß der Geheimdienst Gehlen unter Ausnutzung alter Agentenverbindungen vor allem in Frankreich Spionage betreibt. Er bevorzugt hierbei Agenten aus Kreisen von Geschäftsreisenden nach Frankreich, von Wissenschaftlern, Ingenieuren und Technikern, die Frankreich aufsuchen.

„Wir bekamen von oben laufend politische Orientierungen, in denen über die Stimmung in Frankreich berichtet wurde“, sagte bereits am Freitag der Hauptangeklagte, was im Verlauf der weiteren Verhandlung durch Zeugen bestätigt wurde.

Diese Aussagen beweisen, daß die deutschen Imperialisten und ihre amerikanischen Komplizen auch gegen jene westeuropäischen Länder Vorbereitungen zum Krieg treffen, in denen die Volksbewegung für Frieden und nationale Unabhängigkeit ihre Aggressionspläne gegen das Weltfriedenslager zunichte macht.

Bei der Vernehmung des Angeklagten Helmut Schwenk, ehemaliger Führer der faschistischen Wehrmacht, bis zu seiner Verhaftung Neulehrer in Burgstedt, zeigte sich, daß auch er die Kriegsvorbereitungen unterstützte und sich der Verbrecherorganisation zur Ausbildung als Funker zur Verfügung stellte. Bei seiner Anwerbung ist besonders kennzeichnend, daß die Werber der Gehlen-Organisation an ihn herangetreten sind, als er sich die schmutzigen Bettelpakete der Amerikaner holte. Auf die Bedenken Schwenks äußerte der Agent Ahrends erpresserisch: „Aber Herr Schwenk, Sie haben doch schon die Pakete abgeholt, dann können Sie doch auch Nachrichten für uns besorgen.“

Diese nationalen Verräter sehen ihrer gerechten Strafe entgegen. Generalstaatsanwalt Dr. Meisheimer betonte in seinem Plädoyer, daß aber auch die Drahtzieher der Gehlen-Organisation, die amerikanischen und deutschen Imperialisten, auf die Anklagebank gehören. Er rief aus: „Auch sie werden eines Tages auf der Anklagebank der Weltgeschichte sitzen.“

Neues Deutschland
article dated
20 Dec 53 on

Prozeßberichte im Rundfunk

Berlin (ADN). Von den Verhandlungen gegen die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Spionageorganisation Gehlen vor dem Obersten Gericht der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik gibt der Demokratische Rundfunk am Sonntag, dem 20. Dezember 1953, zu folgenden Zeiten einen zusammenfassenden Funkbericht: Programm Berlin I von 21.15 bis 22 Uhr,

Programm Berlin III von 21.55 bis 22.40 Uhr.

werden sollte. Er hatte den Auftrag, hierzu ein Meldungssystem zwischen dem demokratischen Sektor von Groß-Berlin und Westberlin herzustellen.

Der Zeuge Höher, der eine leitende Funktion in der Organisation Gehlen innehatte, berichtete aus eigener Kenntnis eingehend über die Rolle, die die Organisation bei den Kriegsplänen der amerikanischen Imperialisten spielt.

Die Finanzierung erfolgt nach dem Wissen des Zeugen aus amerikanischen Quellen. Als der Zeuge einmal gegenüber leitenden Agenten die Frage stellte, wer die Millionen bezahle, die monatlich für den Spionageapparat notwendig seien, erklärte man ihm: „Selbstverständlich die Amerikaner“. Bei einem Besuch in Karlsruhe bei dem dortigen Leiter der Generalvertretung der Organisation Gehlen, Benzinger, brach dieser nach einiger Zeit die Unterhaltung mit dem Bemerkens ab, daß die Amerikaner von ihm zu Etatsbesprechungen erwartet werden.


Diese und zahlreiche andere Beweise, die der Zeuge anführte, zeigen, daß es sich bei der Organisation Gehlen nicht um einen „Deutschen Nachrichtendienst“ handelt, der für die Bonner Regierung Informationen sammelt, wie es bei der Werbung den neuen Agenten immer wieder erklärt wird. Die Organisation führt vielmehr, so betonte der Zeuge Höher, amerikanische Befehle aus und ihre Ziele richten sich gegen die nationalen Interessen des deutschen Volkes.

Ein weiterer Punkt, der in diesem Prozeß besondere Bedeutung erlangt, ist, daß sich die Spionageinformationen überwiegend auf militärische Spionage beziehen. Die Agenten wurden von ihren Auftraggebern, den Leitern der Spionage-

Wolfgang HOEHER

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SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2006

BEST AVAILABLE COPY



DATE : 13 JAN 54

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2006

*PULL - 7193
13 JAN 54*

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : PULLACH

ACTION: EE 6

INFO : DCI, D/DCI, DD/P (L), DD/P, COP, DD/P-PPC, FI, FI/OPS, FI/STC,
PP 2, PT/RI 2, PP/ICD

4 Power Conference

PULL 7193 (IN 48113)

2234Z 13 JAN 54

ROUTINE

TO: SFRAN, DIR

INFO: SBRLN, SBONN

PRECEDENCE

CITE: SPULL

only
BERLIN CONFERENCE

RE: FRAN 2776 (IN 48148), EGLA 7089 (BEING POUCHED)

1. POB COMMENT OF REF FOLLOWS.
2. RECENT SFS DRIVE AGAINST ZIPPER AND OTHER ALLIED INTELL AGENCIES COUPLED WITH TWO MAJOR RECENT EXPOSES OF ZIPPER CLEARLY INDICATE THAT CONCENTRATED DRIVE IS UNDER WAY TO COMPILE SUCH INFORMATION AND USE IT FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES AS DISTINGUISHED FROM NORMAL SECRET CE EXPLOITATION.
3. AGAINST BACKGROUND PARA 2 ABOVE, POB IS NOT INCLINED EVALUATE PULL 7130 (IN 45864) AS UNTRUE, THOUGH CONFIRMATION OF SPECIFIC REPORT LACKING.
4. EXPOSE ACTIVITIES COULD BE BUILD UP FOR USING SUBJECT AS RELATIVELY EXTENSIVE DIVERSION ISSUE AT FOUR POWER TALK. SOVIETS MAY INTEND HOLD ISSUE OF INTELL ACTIVITIES IN DDR IN RESERVE FOR POSSIBLE USE AS TIME CONSUMING BLIND ALLEY WITH FAVORABLE PROPAGANDA ASPECTS, TO BE USED IF AND WHEN TACTICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS.

copy

SECRET

~~7 7 7 7 7~~

PLEASE TAKE A COPY OF THIS MESSAGE

[Handwritten marks]

PULL 6959 (IN 39780)
PAGE 40

IN THIS CONNECTION PLEASE NOT BRIN 1905 (IN 41357)
STATEMENT REFUSE SOURCES REPORT WOLFGANG HOEHER PREPARING
SECRET EXPOSE RE HIS KNOWLEDGE WESTERN INTELL OPS IN DDR.
POB HAD PREVIOUSLY REPORTED SIMILAR INFO IN PULL 6959 (IN 39780).
APPARENTLY FACTORALLY CREDIBLE ZIPPER INTERROGATION OF (FRAU)
HOEHER IN POLANDS ACCOUNTS HER EXPERIENCES BETWEEN 19 NOV
AND 30 NOV 59 DURING WHICH TIME SHE WAS IN KARLSHORST AND
LEARNED AMONG OTHER THINGS THAT HOEHER AND A SOVIET NAMED
KARALOW WERE COLLABORATING ON A VOLUME TO BE ENTITLED "DER
KALDI KRISIS". (FRAU) HOEHER WAS TOLD SHE MUST COME TO DDR
TO BE WITH THE VOLUME AS SHE WOULD NEVER BE ABLE TO LIVE IN
WEST GERMANY AFTER THE BOOK PUBLISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

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ROUTED MESSAGE

ROUTING

CLASS UNIT
EXY
DATE
EE/FI/AE
2436
11 JAN 54

SECRET

1	
2	
3	

TO: STATE, OOI
FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CC: FI/PLANS, FI/STC, FI/STD, FI/PCA, FI/...

E. Hermann
State Security

2111Z 11 JAN 54

CS PD 17

14 JAN 54

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NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003 2008

PERSONNEL DIVISION

OF THE

INTELLIGENCE ANALYST (B)
EASTERN INTELLIGENCE

COPY

INFORMATION TENDS TO CONFIRM ID-923, OF

KARANOV, WHO WAS APPARENTLY
IN PRISON IN FEBRUARY 1943, IS PREPARING A SECOND
CONFIDENTIAL HIS KNOWLEDGE OF WESTERN
IN EAST GERMANY. HE IS SAID TO BE
WESTIAN NAMED KARANOV ON A VOLUME TO BE
(DIR KALTE KRIEG).

THE RECENT CAMPAIGN BY THE STATE
STATE SECURITY AGAINST THE "GEHLEN ORGANIZATION"
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ALLEGEDLY CONTROLLED BY THE
THE ATTENDANT PUBLICITY, INDICATES THAT A
TO COMPILE SUCH INFORMATION FOR PROPAGANDA
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE NORMAL SECRET EXPLOITATION
SECRET MATERIAL). THE PUBLICATION OF EXPOSES ON
COULD BE PREPARATORY TO THEIR USE AS AN EXTENSIVE
AT THE FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE. THE RUSSIANS MAY
THE QUESTION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN EAST
FOR POSSIBLE USE AS A TIME-CONSUMING BLIND ALLEY
PROPAGANDA ASPECTS, TO BE USED IF AND WHEN IT SEEMS
ADVANTAGEOUS. END COMMENT.)

NOTATION: NONE

INFORMATION FOLLOWS IN CS-DB-X-15425

INFO BASED ON PULL 7193 (IN 59113)

COORDINATING OFFICER

SECRET

END OF MESSAGE

RESTRICTED
DONALD BREER

DATE 20 JAN 1954

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INFORMATION REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES-METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2003-2008

SECRET

COUNTRY	East Germany	REPORT NO	CS DE-X-15405
SUBJECT	Expose of Western Intelligence	DATE DISTR	14 January 1954
		NO. OF PAGES	
DATE OF INFO.	January 1954	REQUIREMENT NO.	RD
PLACE ACQUIRED	Germany, Munich	REFERENCES	

BY CABLE

THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS IN THIS REPORT ARE DEFINITIVE.
THE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.
(FOR KEY SEE REVERSE)

SOURCE: Qualified Intelligence analysts (B). Appraisal of Content: 3.

It is reported that Wolfgang Esher, who was apparently kidnapped at Soviet orders in February 1953, is preparing a second series of revelations concerning his knowledge of Western intelligence operations in East Germany. He is said to be collaborating with a Russian named Kararov on a volume to be entitled "The Cold War" (Der kalte Krieg).

Field Comment: The recent campaign by the State Secretariat for State Security against the "Gehlen organization" and other intelligence agencies allegedly controlled by the Western Allies, with the attendant publicity, indicates that a drive is under way to compile such information for propaganda purposes (as distinguished from the normal secret exploitation of counter-espionage material). The publication of exposés on this subject could be preparatory to their use as an extensive diversion issue at the Four-Power Conference. The Russians may intend to hold the question of intelligence activities in East Germany in reserve for possible use as a time-consuming blind alley with favorable propaganda aspects, to be used if and when it seems tactically advantageous.

EE

VIA _____
(SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH)

DISPATCH NO. EGIA 7158

~~SECRET~~
~~Security Information~~
CLASSIFICATION

21 JAN 1954

TO : Chief, EE
FROM : Chief of Base, Pullach
SUBJECT: GENERAL— Operational/ZIPPER/CART
SPECIFIC— Interrogation of Frau HOEHER

DATE: _____
INFO: COM

MICROFILMED
JUN 11 1963
DOC. MICRO. SER.

1. Forwarded in attachment for your information and retention is a 14 page ZIPPER GV L interrogation of (Frau) Katharina HOEHER. The interrogation covers the period 22 to 30 November 1953 and was made in order to determine the details of Frau HOEHER's alleged visits to Karlshorst. In two visits of several hours each on 22 and 24 November, Frau HOEHER claims to have been met in the Soviet Sector of Berlin by a Soviet officer and conducted to a safe house near the Karlshorst restricted zone, where she talked for several hours to her husband, Wolfgang HOEHER, and to three different Soviet intelligence officers. Frau HOEHER states positively that she was not interrogated by the Soviets in the ordinary sense of the word. The Soviet purpose in requesting her visits seems to have been solely to persuade her to flee to the East Zone. She was informed that material by Wolfgang HOEHER about ZIPPER and American intelligence was about to be publicized, and that once the material appeared in print neither she nor her husband could ever live in peace in the West again. Frau HOEHER was actually convinced and fully intended to leave West Berlin permanently and join her husband in a promised new life in some East Zone city. However, two ZIPPER members finally succeeded in contacting and successfully dissuading Frau HOEHER from this course of action. Instead, she agreed to fly to West Germany and submit to interrogation, after which she would remain in the West.

2. If attachment can be assumed to be generally true, it is of interest from several points of view. Apparently ZIPPER believes attachment to be credible, and POB shares this view. The Soviet case officer PETROW, described by Frau HOEHER, appears to be identical with the Soviet case officer PETROW who appears in UJ-DROLLERY #11. This identity is assumed from similar physical description, identical telephone number. Apparently the same safe house was used in both cases.

3. Wolfgang HOEHER has apparently given the Soviets sufficient information to constitute a considerable body of written material. No small portion of the several recent DDR press releases on ZIPPER obviously originated with HOEHER, indicating direct Soviet support to the DDR press campaign to the extent of providing major portions of the material. To the best of our knowledge, the book ("Der Kalte Krieg") mentioned in attachment has not yet appeared.

DISTRIBUTION
✓ 3 EE, w/1 att
3 COM, " "

INDEX

Encls: 1
Interrogation

18 Jan 54
FORM NO. 51-28A
MAR. 1949

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[21 Jan 54]

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

4. It is interesting to note that although HOEHER is described by his wife to have lost about 50 pounds in weight, he does not appear to be a broken man mentally.

5. Page 10 of attachment contains a rather startling indication of Soviet surveillance capabilities. Showing Frau HOEHER a photograph of a GV L member who had interrogated her considerably earlier in Frankfurt/Main, the Soviets told Frau HOEHER she had stayed in a Frankfurt hotel with Man, and requested his identity. This presumably means that over the year since HOEHER was kidnapped, the Soviets have surveilled Frau HOEHER closely enough to know her whereabouts at all times, and that they were actually able to obtain a photograph of a person (unidentified to the Soviets) whom she contacted in Frankfurt. Incidentally Wolfgang HOEHER asked his wife whether the photograph represented a Herr KUGLER. We would guess that this is a garble for KUECHLER, who only became ZIPPER CE chief in Berlin after and because of the HOEHER disappearance. It would seem that the Soviets at least know of the existence of Herr "KUGLER" as a ZIPPERite working on the HOEHER case.

6. The description of the Soviet intelligence officers contained in attachment, as well as the location of their safe house and account of their method of operation will probably be of interest.

7. It should be noted that the Soviets referred to Werner HAASE. According to the East Zone press, his arrest and trial was carried out completely by the SFS and DDR authorities, while Frau HOEHER quotes the Soviets as stating that HAASE was held in Karlshorst. ~~The Frau SCHEIS described in the middle of page 10 of attachment is most likely identical with V-12894. On the very day she was mentioned by the Soviets in the presence of Frau HOEHER, V-12894 was in Halle in the custody of the SFS being thoroughly interrogated by a team of 10 persons, including two individuals presumed to be Soviets. These brief references to other cases are cited only as possible indicators that the SFS and the Soviets have been at least very well coordinated if not acting jointly in the recent campaigns against ZIPPER.~~ RJB

Approved: []

SECRET

Security Information

[21 Jan 54]

Anlage c) zu 1

Nr. 3950/ 50. Angel. v. 2.12.53

EGLA-7158

MICROFILMED

Kleinwallstadt, den 7.12.1953

JUN 11 1953

Erklärung.

13P

DOC. MICROFILMED

Zunächst erkläre ich eindeutig: Weder vor meiner Befragung am 28.- 30.10.53 und 3.11.53 in Frankfurt/... noch nachher bin ich von einer ostzonalen oder sowjetischen Stelle angegangen oder zu einer Aufgabe aufgefordert worden. Wie bereits kurz am 28. und 30.11. in Berlin ausgeführt, erfolgte die erste indirekte Verbindungsaufnahme der Sowjets mit mir über meine Schwester Meta HAUCKE am Sonntag, dem 22.11.53. Hierüber führe ich folgendes aus :

Am 22.11.53 erschien meine Schwester Meta HAUCKE, Leipzig, Menkestrasse 12 wohnhaft, gegen 10- Uhr in meiner Wohnung, Berlin, Adalbertstr. 5 und berichtete mir folgendes:

Am Donnerstag (19.11.53) sei bei ihr in der Wohnung ein Russe erschienen, den sie zunächst nicht einließ. Er erzählte ihr, er habe ihr einen Brief von ihrem Bruder zu übergeben. Da sie aber keinen Bruder mehr hat; denn dieser ist als kleines Kind verstorben, verwehrte sie ihm den Einlaß. Dann erschien der gleiche Russe am Freitag früh (20.11.53) in Begleitung einer Russin, die besser deutsch sprach, als der Russe und ihr erklärte, daß es sich um einen Wolfgang HÖHER (sie sprach den Namen als CER aus) handele. Daraufhin ließ sie die beiden eintreten. Nun klärte sich auch, daß es sich nicht um ihren Bruder, sondern um ihren Schwager Wolfgang HÖHER handelte. Der Russe und die Frau forderten meine Schwester auf, am Samstag (21.11.53), die genaue Zeit ist mir nicht bekannt, nach Karlshorst zu ihrem Schwager zu kommen. Sie erhielt den Auftrag, zu einem bestimmten Zeitpunkt am Ostbahnhof Berlin (frühere Schlesische Bahnhof) zu sein, von wo sie der Russe abholen und nach Karlshorst bringen wollte. Mein Schwester Meta HAUCKE ist Kriegerwitwe und hat 2 Kinder im Alter von 13 und 9 Jahren. Sie war durch den Besuch der Sowjets sehr mitgenommen und schaffte alle wertvollen Sachen mit Hilfe ihrer Untermieter, mit denen sie sehr gut steht, aus dem Hause, d.h. zu Bekannten ihrer Untermieter. Mit diesen vereinbarte sie 2 Telegramme. Ein Telegramm mit der Unterschrift " Gruß Mutti " bedeutete, daß für sie keine Gefahr bestünde, eins mit der Unterschrift " Gruß Mutter " hieß, daß die Kinder nach Westberlin geschafft werden müßten. Was sie hinsichtlich der aufbewahrten Sachen machen sollten, ist mir nicht bekannt.

Am 21.11.53 fuhr dann meine Schwester Meta zum Ostbahnhof Berlin und wurde dort planmäßig von dem Russen, der sie in Leipzig aufgesucht hatte, und der sich später PETROW nannte, abgeholt und nach Karlshorst zu meinem Mann gebracht.

Encl. 1

CS COPY

21 Jan 54

INDEX

Sie wurde zu einem kl. Einfamilienhaus innerhalb des Sperrgebietes - nicht weit entfernt vom Gefängnis (früheres Karlshorster Krankenhaus, soweit erinnerlich St. Antonien-Krankenhaus) gebracht, wohin auch Wolfgang transportiert wurde. Sie war etwa am späten Nachmittag (Samstag 21.11.53) in Karlshorst angekommen und mußte in dieser "Villa", wie sie die Sowjets nannten, einige Zeit warten, bis Wolfgang zugeführt wurde.

Als dieser kam, waren ausser Meta und Wolfgang noch mehrere Sowjets zugegen. Wieviele es waren, kann ich nicht sagen. Ich habe nur von Meta erfahren können, daß der erwähnte PETROW und ein gut deutsch sprechender Sowjet namens KLANOW? KARANOW, GARNOW o.ä. zugegen war, zwei Personen, die ich dann auch noch kennenlernte.

Zunächst versuchten die Sowjets die aufgeregte Meta zu beruhigen, die durch die ganze Sache völlig durcheinander war. Das Gespräch nahm dann einen etwas privaten Charakter an. Wolfgang erkundigte sich zunächst nach mir und den Kindern, worauf sie nur ganz allgemein sagen konnte, daß es mir einigermaßen gut geht. Anschließend muß es ein gutes Essen einschl. Getränken gegeben haben. Ich habe den Eindruck, daß Meta nicht ganz in die Absichten der Sowjets eingeweiht wurde, sondern lediglich den Auftrag erhielt, mich zu veranlassen, zu Wolfgang zu Besuch zu kommen. Was im einzelnen gesprochen und mit ihr verhandelt wurde, habe ich nicht erfahren, da Meta gleich nachdem wir beide am Sonntag (22.11.53) zurückkamen, nach Leipzig zurückgefahren ist. Ausserdem war sie und auch ich so aufgeregt, daß ich nicht daran gedacht habe, sie nach den Einzelheiten ihres Besuches zu fragen.

Am 22.11.53 suchte mich Meta auftragsgemäß in meiner Wohnung auf und sagte folgendes: " Erschrick nicht, ich habe Dir etwas Angenehmes zu sagen. Mich haben die Russen geholt und zu Wolfgang gebracht und mich beauftragt, Dich zu Wolfgang zu holen. Ich habe auch Wolfgang gesprochen, der mir einen Brief übergeben hat." (Diesen Brief übergab sie mir dann. Darin stand etwa: Nur Du kannst mir helfen, wenn Du mit Meta mitkommst. Ausserdem standen nur rein private Mitteilungen darin.) Diesen Brief nahm ich an mich und steckte ihn in meine Handtasche. Bei meinem späteren Besuch in Karlshorst wurde er mir abgenommen und in meiner Gegenwart verbrannt. Ich glaube nicht, daß Meta den Auftrag hatte, den Brief wieder mit zurückzubringen, falls ich mich geweigert hätte, sie nach Karlshorst zu begleiten. Ich erklärte Meta zur einst, daß ich nicht nach Karlshorst gehen würde, weil ich vermutete, daß man mich auch in Haft nehmen würde. Sie erklärte mir darauf: "Dann kann ich auch nicht mehr zurück," fügte aber hinzu, daß sie auch für diesen Fall mit ihren Untermietern

hinsichtlich der Kinder eine Verabredung getroffen habe.

Ich kann nicht sagen, daß Meta mich überredet hat. Aber dadurch, daß sie von Wolfgang erzählte, war ich schließlich bereit, den Besuch auszuführen, weil ich langsam so apathisch wurde, daß mir alles ganz egal war. Trotzdem traf ich noch einige Vorbereitungen.

Ich weihte meine Schwiegermutter in die notwendigsten Dinge ein, übergab ihr Unterlagen und Papiere und schrieb ihr auf, daß sie, wenn ich nicht wiederkommen sollte, zu HEINDKE gehen und diesen einweihen sollte, wo ich verblieben bin. Ich bat dann noch darum, die Kinder aus Berlin fortzuschaffen, um sie sicher zu wissen.

Daraufhin bin ich mit Meta weggefahren. Wir fahren mit der U-Bahn vom Kottbusser Tor bis Jannowitzbrücke, von da mit der S-Bahn zum Ost-Bahnhof (früherer Schlesischer Bahnhof). Dort verließen wir den Bahnhof. Gegenüber vom Bahnhof stand ein roter BMW, im Wagen saß ein Sowjet, den Meta erkannte und als den bezeichnete, der uns zu Wolfgang bringen sollte. Der Sowjet öffnete die Wagentür und sagte bevor wir einstiegen "Frau HÖHER, haben Sie keine Angst?" Darauf ich antwortete: "Na, Sie werden mir doch hoffentlich nichts tun."

Wir fahren dann folgenden Weg:

Schlesischer Bahnhof - Stalin-Allee (frühere Frankfurter Allee) -
U-Bhf. Magdalenenstrasse - S-Bhf-Lichtenberg - vorbei nach Karlshorst.

Von Lichtenberg kommend, fuhr er am S-Bhf. Karlshorst, den er rechts liegen ließ, links in das Sperrgebiet, fuhr ein großes Stück in das Sperrgebiet wieder zurück und bogen kurz vor einem Strassenschild "Biesdorf-Süd" links ein und hielten auf der linken Seite etwa vor dem 6 oder 7. Haus. Diesem gegenüber steht eine Villa (dunkelbraunes Holzhaus).

Inzwischen war es 12 Uhr geworden. Wie wurden jetzt von PETROW in das Wohnzimmer gebracht. Wolfgang war noch nicht da. PETROW ging zu einem Telefon, das im Zimmer war und sprach auf russisch, offenbar gab er den Befehl, Wolfgang herbeizubringen. Nach ca. 15 Min. kam Wolfgang in einem Auto. Sie fuhren mit dem Auto dicht an die Treppe des Hauses. Als 1. stieg der Chauffeur aus, dann Wolfgang in seinem grauen Ledermantel und ein 2. Sowjet, der angeblich KARANOW o.ä. heißt.

Inzwischen hatte man einige Vorbereitungen getroffen. Eine Russin in Küchenschürze und Hut hatte geheizt und den Tisch gedeckt. Es befand sich darauf: Brot, Butter, Wurst, Obst, Kaviar, Käse, Obstwein und Zigaretten (Juno) und russische Zigaretten, Papyros.

Die Russin verstand, und ich war mit Meta allein im Zimmer. Meta verließ dann das Zimmer, kurz darauf trat Wolfgang allein ins Zimmer. Wir begrüßten uns und konnten eine kurze Zeit lang allein sein. Dabei flüsterte ich ihm zu: "Wolfgang, hier komme ich nicht her." Er war darüber nicht überrascht. Ich fragte nach KIRVES. Er sagte: "Laß mal, erst muß ich hier raus". Er flüsterte noch etwas von Verrat, aber keine Zusammenhänge oder besondere Hinweise. Im übrigen waren wir in Anbetracht der besonderen Situation so beeindruckt, daß man überhaupt keinen klaren Gedanken fassen und keine aufschlußreiche Fragen stellen konnte. Ausserdem mußten wir damit rechnen, daß jeden Augenblick die Sowjets reinkommen würden.

Meta stand in der Zwischenzeit mit den Sowjets auf der Diele und unterhielt sich.

Wolfgang sah abgemagert aus, hat mindestens 40 - 50 Pfd. abgenommen und war völlig mit den Nerven runter. Er war auch überrascht, daß ich gekommen war.

Nach ca. 2 bis 3 Min. kamen PETROW, KARANOW und Meta in das Zimmer. Wir wurden aufgefordert, uns um den Tisch zu setzen. Wortführer war KARANOW, er wurde jedenfalls so von Wolfgang angesprochen. Eine Vorstellung fand nicht statt.

Personenbeschreibungen

1.) PETROW dkl. braune Haare
ca. 180 cm, dicklich, frisches rotes Gesicht, graue Augen, lange schwarze Wimpern, dkl-braunen Anzug, spricht gebrochen deutsch, versteht aber offenbar besser, als er spricht.

(Ich glaube mich zu entsinnen, daß KIRVES des öfteren von einem PETROW sprach, der mit seiner Dienststelle zu tun hatte.)

2.) KRANOW, KARANOW

ca. 178 cm, schlank, auffallend bleiches Gesicht, dkl-braunes gelichtetes Haar, fast Stirnglatze, blaugraue Augen, spricht fließend deutsch, läßt aber gelegentlich Worte aus und ist von beiden der Intellegentere.

Beides sind MWD-Offiziere. PETROW sagte auf meinen Einwurf, wer gibt mir die Garantie, daß ich hier wieder rauskomme, darauf gebe ich Ihnen mein Wort als Offizier.

Der Wortführer KARANOW begann dann, nachdem wir zum Platznehmen aufgefordert worden waren, das Gespräch:

Bevor es aber dazu kam, fixierte mich K., offenbar, um mich abzuschätzen, wie ich am besten zu behandeln sei. Er erklärte dann, daß es notwendig sei, die private Unterhaltung mal zu unterbrechen, und daß wir später weitersprechen könnten. Er erklärte mir dann

ziemlich eindringlich, daß es für Wolfgang am besten sei, wenn ich mit den Kindern für immer rüber käme. Wolfgang könne nicht mehr in den Westen. Weiter begründete diese Auffassung nicht. Er wollte mir damit zum Ausdruck bringen, daß Wolfgang in seinem eigenen Interesse im Westen unmöglich sei und keine Existenz mehr erhalten könne. K. führte weiter aus, daß er zusammen mit Wolfgang an einem Buch schreibe. Titel: "Der kalte Krieg", was etwa in 10 bis 12 Tagen fertig sein sollte, etwa um den 27.11.53 herum. Das erste Exemplar dieses Buches würde Wolfgang ihm - KARANOW - mit einer Widmung übergeben. Damit wollte er mir verstärkt zum Ausdruck bringen, daß Wolfgang nach dem Erscheinen dieses Buches im Westen völlig unmöglich sein würde. Zwischen den einzelnen Worten stand immer ein gewisser Druck und der Hinweis, daß es für mich nur diese Möglichkeit als einzigen Ausweg geben könne. Als Meta fragte, wo dieses Buch gedruckt würde, machten KARANOW und Wolfgang Ausflüchte. Zwischendurch unterhielten sich IETROW u. KARANOW des Öfteren, u.a. auch längere Zeit auf russisch.

Am 22.11.53 wurde das Gespräch nur ganz allgemein geführt, vermutlich aus dem Grunde, weil meine Schwester Meta dabei war. Trotzdem wurde ganz klar zum Ausdruck gebracht, daß Wolfgang - sofern ich rüberkommen würde - sofort entlassen wird und eine Stellung bekäme. Zunächst wurde gesagt, im Ostsektor Berlins, später, aber noch am gleichen Tage, wenn nicht da, dann in der Zone. Weiter wurde davon in Gegenwart von Meta nicht gesprochen. KARANOW erklärte, daß wir darüber noch am Dienstag (24.11.53) ausführlich sprechen könnten. Er forderte mich dann auf, am 24.11.53 am U-Bhf. Neanderstrasse, Ausgang Köpenickerstrasse, gegen 9.00 Uhr zu sein, von wo er mich abholen würde. Ich gab die feste Zusage, zu kommen. Mir wurde aufgegeben, im Falle einer Verhinderung durch irgend einen Umstand telefonisch Nachricht zu geben, daß ich nicht kommen könne. Hierzu wurde mir die Tel. Nr. 50 02 02 angegeben. (Eine weitere ab 18 Uhr abends wurde mir am 24.11.53 erst genannt, nämlich 50 12 49.)

Am 22.11.53 wurde sonst nichts weiter besprochen.

Auf Befragen erkläre ich, daß ich an diesem Tage immer mit Meta und meinem Mann zusammen war. Eine Abtrennung zum Zwecke einer Vernehmung erfolgte nicht. Auf meinen Einwand, den ich anfangs des Gespräches zu KARANOW machte, ich muß mich berichtigen, zu PETROW machte, ob sie keine Bedenken hätten, daß ich über den Inhalt des Gespräches drüben sprechen könne, susserten sie sich überhaupt nicht. Wolfgang stieß mich daraufhin unter dem Tisch an und zischelte mir zu, daß ich von nichts wisse. Daraus entnahm ich, daß er sich so bei den Vernehmungen geäußert hatte, daß ich von seiner Arbeit nichts wisse.

Das Gespräch wurde dann eigentlich nur zwischen Wolfgang und mir geführt und bezog sich auf private Dinge.

Wie auf Seite 3 bereits kurz erwähnt, hatte ich mit meiner Schwiegermutter ausgemacht, daß ich um 16.00 Uhr wieder zu Hause sein sollte. Wenn ich bis zu diesem Termin nicht zurücksein sollte, hatte sie die Aufgabe, sich zu HEINDKES zu begeben und dort von meinem Verschwinden Mitteilung zu machen.

Ich hatte Wolfgang in Gegenwart der Russen gesagt, daß ich um 16 Uhr wieder zu Hause sein wolle, weil sich sonst die Kinder und meine Schwiegermutter ängstigen würden. Er machte dann den Sowjets plausibel, mich um diese Zeit wieder nach Hause zu bringen. Trotzdem fuhren wir erst kurz nach 16 Uhr von Karlshorst ab. Ich machte mir schon Gedanken, daß meine Schwiegermutter zu HEINDKES unterwegs sein könnte.

Wir wurden von PETROW auf dem gleichen Weg zum Ostbahnhof zurückgefahren, wie er uns hingebracht hatte. Als Meta aber sagte, sie wolle noch zu mir nach Hause, fuhr er mit uns weiter bis zur Köpenickerstrasse, wo wir dann rübergangen.

Er erklärte mir nochmals, daß er am 24.11.53 gegen 9.00 Uhr an der verabredeten Stelle auf mich warten würde. (U-Bhf. Neanderstrasse, Ausgang Köpenickerstrasse). Diese Aufforderung war ohne Nachdruck, da P. sicher war, daß ich kommen würde.

Als ich mit Meta in meine Wohnung kam, traf ich Frau HEINDKE an. Ich hatte diese am 19. oder 20.11.53 zu einem privaten Besuch eingeladen. Das war nichts Aussergewöhnliches. Ich hatte sie schon öfter eingeladen oder in ihrer Wohnung besucht. Ich wollte auch nichts besonderes mit ihr besprechen. Mit meinem mir erst später, am 22.11.53 bekannt gewordenen Besuch in Karlshorst bei Wolfgang hatte diese Einladung überhaupt nichts zu tun. Ich weiß, dieser Umstand ist merkwürdig, aber meine Darstellung ist wahr.

Frau H. war inzwischen von meiner Schwiegermutter zumindest andeutungsweise informiert worden. Sie fragte mich, ob ich bei Wolfgang war, was ich bejahte. Meta blieb dann nur kurze Zeit, nahm ein Paar hohe Schuhe von Ute mit und fuhr dann gegen 17.30 Uhr nach Leipzig. Wir waren etwa gegen 16.45 Uhr bei mir zu Hause angekommen.

Vor meiner Fahrt in den Ostsektor hatte ich Oma einen Brief für HEINDKE übergeben. Diesen hatte sie noch nicht Frau H. ausgehändigt, obwohl es schon lange nach 16 Uhr war, als ich zurückkam. Ich habe den Brief dann zerrissen, weil er überholt war. Darin hatte ich gebeten, Herr HEINDKE möchte sich um die Kinder kümmern und meine häuslichen Angelegenheiten regeln, wenn ich nicht zurückkommen würde.

Auf Grund der neuen Sachlage schrieb ich einen Zettel, den ich bat, über Herrn HEINDKE umgehend nach Westdeutschland befördern zu lassen. Der Inhalt lautete ungefähr wie folgt:

Herr MANIKE möchte sofort nach Berlin zu mir in die Wohnung kommen. Es eilt sehr. Er muß kommen, sonst ist alles verloren. Es gibt nur noch einen Ausweg.

Weitere Einzelheiten dieseszettels kann ich nicht mehr angeben, weil ich bei der Abfassung sehr aufgeregt war und noch unter dem Eindruck des Besuches in Karlshorst stand.

Ich wollte mit Herrn MANIKE besprechen, was ich am besten zu machen hätte. Da ich in Frankfurt die Auflage erteilt bekommen hatte, mich in dringenden Fällen auf dem obigen Wege sofort zu melden, habe ich das getan. Ein besonderer Auftrag, MANIKE in meine Wohnung kommen zu lassen, oder gar einen Entführungsversuch vorzubereiten, hatte ich nicht. Ich wollte nur einen unauffälligen Besuch haben, weil ich der Auffassung war, daß alle meine Schritte von den Sowjets, besonderen Agenten beobachtet würden. Einen evtl. unterstellten Auftrag muß ich entschieden zurückweisen. Wie gesagt, ich wollte mich, bevor ich mich endgültig entschied, noch einmal mit einem Herrn der Dienststelle meines Mannes sprechen, weil ich selbst nicht mehr klar entscheidungsfähig war.

Nachdem meine Schwester Meta und Frau HEINDKE gegangen waren, kam noch meine Schwester Grete, um bei mir Kaffee zu trinken. Am Abend kam noch Richard BAUER mit seiner Freundin Lotte. (Beides Bekannte von Wolfgang, vgl. meine Frankfurter Angaben) Mit Grete, BAUER und Lotte habe ich über meinen Besuch in Karlshorst nicht gesprochen.

Für mich stand nach dem Besuch in Karlshorst so ziemlich fest, daß ich am 24.11.53 wieder nach Karlshorst fahren würde. Zu dem endgültigen Entschluß, in die SED zu gehen, hatte ich mich aber noch nicht durchgerungen.

2. Besuch in Karlshorst (Dienstag 24.11.53)

Am 24.11.53 fand ich mich, wie verabredet, um 9 Uhr in der Neander-Ausgang Köpenickerstrasse ein. (vgl. Seite 5 Mitte) Ich traf aber weder PETROW noch KARANOW an. Nach 1/2 Std. Wartezeit rief ich die Nummer 50 02 02 an, verlangte Herr PETROW, worauf ein Fräulein, eine Russin, mir erklärte, daß die beiden Herrn schon unterwegs seien. Als ich aus dem Zigarettenladen rauskam, in dem ich telefoniert hatte, sah ich beide stehen. Als sie mich erblickten, kamen sie mit dem Wagen vorgefahren und luden mich ein. (Ich hatte folgende Sachen dabei: 1 Paar Strümpfe, 1 Büchse Ness-Kaffee und 1 Bänderdose.)

Wir führen folgenden Weg: Neanderstrasse, Richtung Alexanderplatz, von dort Richtung Stalin-Allee. Auf weitere Einzelheiten der Fahrt kann ich mich nicht entsinnen, weil einmal die Bombentrümmer dort so groß sind, daß man sich nicht auskennt und vor allem, weil KARANOW sofort auf mich einsprach. Er erklärte zunächst, daß ich jetzt meine Rente verlieren würde, daß seine Dienststelle aber ~~KARX~~ sofort einspringen und mich finanziell sicherstellen werde und zwar viel besser. Als ich fragte, ob er die Pension meine, erwiderte er: "Nein, was Sie von der Organisation Ihres Mannes bekommen!" Als ich darauf sagte: "Sie brauchen auf mich keinen Druck auszuüben, weil ich ja bereit bin, rüberzukommen", sagte er, daß das so nicht gemeint sei, daß aber jetzt alles von Wolfgang in die Zeitung käme, und ich dann nichts mehr bekommen würde.

KARANOW erwähnte jetzt, daß Wolfgang wahrscheinlich nach Leipzig oder Dresden kommen würde, wo sie ihm eine neue Existenz geben wollten. Aber nicht in seinem letzten Beruf, sondern als Pressemann.

KARANOW warf dabei ein, daß die Überführung der Möbel in die SBZD unmöglich sein werde. Ich sollte die Möbel pro forma nach Westdeutschland aufgeben und die Sowjets wollten versuchen, den Möbelwagen bei Dreilinden zu beschlagnahmen und mir meine Möbel zuzustellen.

Auf meine Frage, was Wolfgang mache, wurde mir erklärt, daß Wolfgang an seinem Buch arbeite.

Als wir gegen 10 Uhr in Karlshorst ankamen, wollte KARANOW gleich links vor dem S-Bhf-Karlshorst einbiegen. Er hielt vor einem Haus, gab dem PETROW die Papiere, blieb selbst draußen und ging ins Sperrgebiet, während PETROW mit mir den gleichen Weg, wie am Sonntag (22.11.), zu dem kl. Häuschen fuhr.

Hier stiegen wir aus und warteten in dem gleichen Raum wie am 22.11. Auch die Russin war da, die wieder den Tisch deckte.

PETROW telefonierte wieder und unterhielt sich etwa 15 Min. mit mir, bis Wolfgang kam. Die Unterhaltung war aber belanglos und bezog sich nicht auf uns. Er erzählte z.B. von Rußland, von der Kälte usw.

Etwa gegen 10.30 Uhr kam Wolfgang, nach ihm KARANOW. Wir waren also zu Viert: Wolfgang, ich, PETROW und KARANOW.

Ich hatte keine Gelegenheit, mit Wolfgang allein oder mit ihm zu sprechen. KARANOW kam jetzt auf die Sache zu Wort.

Er führte etwa sinngemäß folgendes aus:

Durch die Veröffentlichungen, die in den nächsten Tagen losgehen würden, wäre sowohl Wolfgang als auch ich im Westen fernerhin unmöglich. Man würde mir jede Unterstützung entziehen und mir nichts

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praktisch nur die Möglichkeit, in die S. 1. zu gehen und mit Wolfgang ein neues Leben zu beginnen.

KARANOW fragte mich schon am Sonntag (22.11.), was ich von der Stelle meines Mannes monatlich an Zuschuß bekommen würde, als ich ihm den Betrag von DM. 100.-- (ohne die Pension zu erwähnen) nannte, sagte er: "Das ist ja eine Schweinerei!" Sie müßten mindestens DM. 500.-- bekommen." Wolfgang konnte am 22.11. kurz fragen, was ich an Pension bekäme, worauf ich ihm die Summe nannte.

Am 24.11., also am Dienstag, kam KARANOW erneut auf den Zuschuß zurück, um mich auf diese Weise zu beeinflussen. Er beabsichtigte damit, mich zu verärgern und mich umzustimmen. Sie kamen eine Zeitlang immer wieder auf die Geldfrage zurück.

Jetzt führte er aus, daß Wolfgang nach Beendigung seines Fuches freikomme und dann in Leipzig oder Dresden als Presseemann beschäftigt würde. (Aus einem Gespräch zwischen Wolfgang und KARANOW konnte ich entnehmen, daß in dem Buch auch ein ganzer Absatz oder Artikel über GIESICKE stehen wird.)

KARANOW tat so, als ob sie alles wüßten. z.B. daß GIESICKE von mir Blankoquittungen verlangte, eine Tatsache, die mir Wolfgang auch bestätigte, daß sie von seinem Vernehmungsrichter erfahren haben will. Ehe KARANOW fortfahren konnte, erschien plötzlich ein kleiner untersetzte Herr in Zivil mit einer plattgedrückten Nase.

Personenbeschreibung: ca. 50 Jahre alt, 160 - 165 cm groß, gedrungene Gestalt, graue Augen, platte Nase, Stirnplatte, dkl. grauer Anzug.

Bei seinem Eintreten sprangen alle drei Männer auf. Der mir Unbekannte gab Wolfgang die Hand und begrüßte ihn mit " Guten Tag, Herr HÜHER ", der mit " Guten Tag Herr General " antwortete. Der General war der einzige, der den Namen HÜHER richtig aussprach. Er setzte sich, nachdem er auch mich und zwar zuerst begrüßt hatte, an den Tisch und begann zu essen, ohne uns dazu einzuladen.

Der General erklärte mir zunächst, nichts zu übereilen. Ich sollte in aller Ruhe handeln, um nicht aufzufallen. Wenn ich aber bereit wäre, mich in die SIZD abzusetzen sei ich finanziell sichergestellt. Bei diesen Worten griff er in die Jackentasche und holte einen Päckchen 20 DM.- Scheine heraus und legte sie vor Wolfgang hin. Wir konnten aber nicht erkennen, welche Summe es war. Wolfgang schob das Geld zu mir herüber, das ich aber liegen ließ. Erst kurz vor meinem Weggehen steckte mir Wolfgang, nachdem er das Geld gezählt und DM. 280.-- festgestellt hatte, in meine Handtasche.

Der General war ca. 10 min. saßgen. Er unterhielt sich mit den beiden anderen auf Russisch und ging dann, nachdem er sich von Wolfgang

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gang und mir verabschiedet hatte.

Im Gegensatz zu dem General hatte KARANOW mein Absetzen ziemlich dringend gemacht und vorher erklärt, ich müsse mich bis Ende der Woche (28.11.) abgesetzt haben. Nach der Entscheidung des Generals drängte er nicht mehr auf ein schnelles Absetzen.

KARANOW empfahl mir von dem Geld das Nötigste zu kaufen, z.B. Unterwäsche. Auch von meinen eigenen Sachen sollte ich nur das Beste überbringen. So sollte ich z.B. meinen Lammfellmantel gleich dalassen, offenbar, um mit diesem Mantel nicht aufzufallen.

Dann wurde vereinbart, daß ich meine notwendigsten, aber besten Sachen in einzelnen Etappen rüberschaffen sollte. Als nächster Termin wurde Mittwoch 25.11. vereinbart. Ich sollte gegen 17.30 Uhr am Bhf. - auf dem Bahnsteig Hebbahnhof Warschauerbrücke - sein, wo er mir die Wäsche für Wolfgang abnehmen wollte.

Der General war etwa gegen Mittag weggegangen.

KARANOW sprach dann wieder vom Umzug und dem Verbringen der Sachen. Ausserdem kam die Sprache auch auf STEINBORN und Frau SCHULZ. Ich habe nur Gesprächsfetzen gehört und konnte keine Zusammenhänge erkennen. Soweit ich raus hören konnte, wollten die Sowjets STEINBORN einmal als Agenten anwerben, was St. aber ablehnte. Wolfgang erklärte, daß damals zu St. ein Russe geschickt worden war, was aber PETROW verneinte und erklärte, daß das ein Deutscher gewesen sei. Auf den Hinweis von Wolfgang, daß das nicht die richtige Art der Werbung gewesen sei, erklärte P. daß sie St. noch kriegen würden. Frau SCHULZ wurde nur erwähnt, aber nicht von ihrer späteren Festnahme gesprochen.

Dann wurde kurz der Fall HÜHER gestreift, so, wie er in der Presse gestanden hatte. Sie lachten darüber. Als Wolfgang einmal auf KIRVES zu sprechen kam, wurde darauf nicht näher eingegangen.

Als Wolfgang mich fragte, wer bei der Abtlg. V meinen Fall bearbeite und den Namen RITTER nannte, was ich bestätigte, holte K. ein Foto von RITTER vor und fragte mich, ob er das wäre, was ich bejahte. P und K unterhielten sich dann russisch und einer von beiden legte dann ein Bild von Herrn MANIKE auf den Tisch. Wolfgang fragte, ob dies ein Herr KUGLER sei. Ich verneinte. K. fragte, mich, ob ich diesen Mann kenne. Darauf sagte ich: "Das ist Herr MANIKE". P u. K. und auch Wolfgang kannten diesen Namen nicht.

KARANOW sagte nun: "Mit diesem Herrn waren Sie in Frankfurt/M. in einem Hotel." Er sagte dies in bewußter Absicht, Wolfgang durch diese Formulierung zu verletzen. Die Reaktion von W. war auch entsprechend. Ich sagte darauf, um Wolfgang zu beruhigen, das war im Zuge einer Befragung, die auch in Gegenwart eines älteren Herrn

namens ANDERS stattfand. Darauf beruhigte sich W. etwas. K. sagte, daß er einen ANDERS kenne, der groß und schlank und etwa 30 Jahre alt sei. Ich erwiderte, daß er dies nicht sein könne. Weiter wurde auf WANIKE und ANDERS nicht eingegangen. Dann bezog sich das Gespräch auf den Umzug. Ich konnte auch mit Wolfgang einiges in privater Hinsicht besprechen. Besonderes wurde aber nicht mehr behandelt.

Auf Befragen: Ich bin während der ganzen Zeit von 10 bis 15.30 am 24.11. nicht von Wolfgang getrennt worden. Ich wurde auch nicht vernommen, sondern es fand nur eine Unterhaltung statt, bei der wohl klärende Fragen gestellt und auch von mir beantwortet wurden. Aber ein Vernehmung war es nicht.

Gelegentlich der Unterhaltung stellte Wolfgang Vermutungen über den Verrat an. Er meinte damit die Durchschläge, die bei dem Vernehmungsrichter auf dem Tisch gelegen hatten und zu denen er vernommen wurde. Dabei sprach er einen Verdacht gegen Frl. PAPPROTTA aus und verdächtigte auch in gewisser Hinsicht Dr. FILLIE. Einzelheiten konnte er mir nicht zuflüstern. Als ich auf KIRVES und die SALZ-MANN hinwies, bestätigte er. Wolfgang erklärte mit Bestimmtheit, daß die PAPPROTTA sowjetische Agentin sei.

Wolfgang erklärte abschließend, daß alles verraten ist.

Die Sowjets erwähnten auch einen Ingenieur HAASE, der über die Wiener Brücke ein Kabel durchs Wasser legen wollte und der auch in Karshorst einsäße.

Nach Abschluß des Gespräches, etwa gegen 15.30 Uhr, verabredeten wir uns für den 25.11. Mittwoch Warschauer Brücke.

Wolfgang steckte mir das Geld zu. Wir verabschiedeten uns. Ich ging mit PTEROW zum Wagen und Wolfgang blieb mit KARANOW noch einen Augenblick auf der Treppe stehen.

Wir fuhren den gleichen Weg, wie die bisherigen Male, zum Alexanderplatz, wo ich halten ließ und in die U-Bahn steigen wollte.

Jetzt, bzw. während der Fahrt, machte mir P. klar, was ich für Folgen zu erwarten hätte, wenn ich mich nicht absetzen würde. So wäre z.B. die westl. Polizei hinter mir her, ich hätte Unannehmlichkeiten zu erwarten und würde nicht mehr unterstützt werden. Er kam nochmals auf die DM. 100.-- zu sprechen.

Für den Fall, daß jemand von Westdeutschland käme, sollte ich sagen, ich sei krank und könne niemanden sprechen. Wenn

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trotzdem darauf bestehen sollte, mich zu sprechen, könne ich ihn in meiner Wohnung empfangen. Er sagte dann etwa wörtlich: "Wehō Ihnen, wenn Sie sich mit jemand ausserh 18 Ihrer Wohnung treffen!" einen weiteren Auftrag hat mir I nicht gegeben. Ich hatte den Eindruck, lfd. beobachtet zu werden und habe aus diesem Grunde das Telefongespräch in dieser Sinne geführt.

Ich stieg dann in die U-Bahn Alexanderplatz und fuhr nach Hause. Gegen 16 Uhr war ich daheim.

An diesem Tage wurde mir nicht von Ivi gesagt, daß man mich aus Westdeutschland angerufen hatte. Davon erfuhr ich erst am 25.11. Mittwoch früh, etwa gegen 8 Uhr.

3. Besuch in Karlshorst (Mittwoch 25.11.55, 17.30Uhr)

Gegen 8 Uhr teilte mir Ivi mit, daß Western angerufen worden sei und heute vormittag ab 9 Uhr mich bereit halten sollte. Als mir bei dem Telefonat eröffnet wurde, daß vor Dienstag niemand kommen werde, versprach ich mir von dieser Seite aus keinerlei Hilfe mehr und war entschlossen, in die SBZD zu gehen. Am Nachmittag packte ich dann Sachen für Wolfgang ein. (Unterwäsche, Oberhemden, Strümpfe, Taschentücher) Ausserdem hatte ich in einer Aktentasche nach Bettwäsche, 2 mal zu beziehen. Diese Tasche trug Dieter, der mich bis zum Hochbahnhof Warschauerbrücke begleitete. Ich übernahm die Aktentasche. Dieter sollte gleich mit dem gegenüberstehenden Zug zurückfahren, damit ihn niemand sehen sollte. Ich ging mit dem Menschenstrom in Richtung Sperre. Dort stand bereits KARANOW. In seiner Nähe standen Vopo's. Als ich jetzt ankam und auf ihn zuging und ihn ansprach, wurden wir von Vopo's umringt und mußten mitgehen. K. wollte nicht mit und machte Protest. Er zeigte seinen Ausweis, was aber nicht half. Wir wurden dann zu einer Kontrollstelle gebracht, die sich rechts am Bahn teig in Richtung Ausgang Warschauerstrasse befand. Dort sollten wir in die Baracke, doch K protestierte. Nach vielen Hin und Her kam ein Vopo- Überfallwagen, mit etwa 40 Mann. Wir wurden beide in den Überfallwagen verfrachtet und nach Karlshorst gefahren. Wir kamen in das Sperrgebiet und auf der Kommandantur klärte sich dann der Zwischenfall. K. fuhr mich wieder bis zur Warschauerbrücke zurück, nachdem er meine Koffer übernommen hatte. K. war die Sache sehr peinlich und wollte noch mit dem Vopo abrechnen.

Sir verabredeten uns dann am 26.11. Donnerstag, gegen 17.30 Uhr Dresdenerstrasse Übergang, weil ich es abgelehnt hatte, nochmals zur Warschauerbrücke zu kommen.

Auf seine Frage, wo das sei, empfahl ich ihm, sich das von Wolfgang aufzeichnen zu lassen und die Sache entsprechend vorzubereiten, damit nicht noch einmal so ein Zwischenfall entstünde.

Auf Befragen: Ich habe am 25.11.53 zu KARANOW weder von dem Anruf vom 24.11. noch von dem Anruf am 25.11.53 aus Westdeutschland gesprochen. Etwas derartiges hätte mich bei denen nur verdächtigt und sie hätten mich evtl. gleich drüben behalten.

4. Besuch in der Dresdnerstrasse-Post- (26.11.53) 17.30 Uhr.

Wie vorseitig erwähnt, war ich entschlossen rüberzugehen. Aus diesem Grunde packte ich folgendes zusammen:

meine ganze Wäsche (Unterwäsche), Strümpfe, gleichfalls die ganze Wäsche von Ute, während ich die Wäsche von Dieter zu meiner Schwester Grete SCHEIHAUER durch Dieter nach Treptow bringen ließ. Das ist aber den Sowjets nicht bekannt.

Gegen 17.30 Uhr traf ich bei der Post Dresdenerstrasse mit meinen Sachen ein. K. stand, wie verabredet da und erwartete mich. Er übernahm die Sachen und bestellte mich für den nächsten Tag (27.11.) um die gleiche Zeit an die gleiche Stelle. Er fügte hinzu: "Jetzt wird Ihnen Erde heiß unter Füße!" Damit wollte er mich mit Maßnahmen westlicher Stellen beeinflussen.

Ausser Dieter, der seine Wäsche und sein Fahrrad zu Grete brachte, hat auch Oma in einem Kinderwagen 1 Federbett, Kopfkissen und verschiedene andere Sachen ebenfalls zu Grete gebracht. Auch Grete und ihre Tochter Christa haben Sachen von mir rübergenommen - alles ohne Wissen der Sowjets.

Ich habe Hoffnung, diese Sache wieder zurückzubekommen.

Ich hatte die Absicht, auch am nächsten Tag wieder in der Dresdenerstrasse Sachen abzuliefern, also die Verabredung einzuhalten. Ich bin aber nicht gegangen, weil ich krank und bettlägrig wurde.

Ich bat meine Schwiegermutter eine Tasche mit Silbersachen und Tischwäsche zu verabredeten Stelle zu bringen. Sie ging, kam aber nach einiger Zeit wieder zurück und sagte, sie hätte drüben niemand gesehen und sei daher auch garnicht erst in den Ostsektor gegangen.

Als mich am Samstag, 28.11. KS RITTER zu der Besprechung abholte, war ich zuerst unangenehm berührt, weil die ...

EGLA-7243

EGIA 7243

SECRET

25 JAN 1954

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/REDCAP/CART

Fritz SCHMIDT

INFO: COM, EE

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2006

REF: EGBA 9225

1. Reference states that Dr. Guenther SCHNEIDER is a personality of considerable current interest to BOB. Although we do not yet know the nature of your interest, we feel you might be interested in the two attached ZIPPER memos which were just obtained by POB.

2. Although one attachment mentions other persons allegedly connected with the Dr. Guenther SCHNEIDER intelligence organization, we particularly want to call your attention to the parts of both memoranda which deal with Fritz SCHMIDT.

3. According to the attachments, Fritz SCHMIDT is Dr. SCHNEIDER's liaison man to other West Berlin intelligence organizations, NTS, KGU and Free Jurists are mentioned. SCHMIDT is further described as chief agent and key figure in Dr. SCHNEIDER's net. Information obtained from attachments and from the police report attached to EGIA 5562 indicates that Fritz SCHMIDT was born 13 August 1932 in Laubendorf. He currently lives at Berlin/Zehlendorf, Wolzogenstr 21, bei SALEWSKI, telephone 84 53 71. It may be that SALEWSKI is an alias or even true name of SCHMIDT, since he is said to have both telephone and automobile listed in this name. Telephone book listing is Hermann SALEWSKI. An office is maintained by SCHMIDT at Berlin/Zehlendorf, Koenigsveg 58/60 bei PAPPROTTA. Other information contained in attachments may well be of interest to BOB, but is not being repeated here.

4. Living at the business address listed for SCHMIDT is Elfriede PAPPROTTA, secretary of the GCIS. We have good reason to suppose that PAPPROTTA is identical with ZIPPER agent V-2995.1, who has previously been definitely identified

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- 3 COM
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Encls: 2

- 1. Memo 4333, 18 Jun 53
- 2. " 2857, 14 July 53

21 Jan 54

SECRET

④ COPY

[Handwritten signature]

SECRET

- 2 -

EGLA 7243
21 Jan 54

to POB as secretary to Erwin HEINDTKE of GCIS, and a personal acquaintance of Wolfgang HOEHER. Recently, Frau HOEHER was twice in Karlsruhe and talked with her husband for several hours each time. An interrogation of Frau HOEHER (EGLA 7158, not to BOB) quotes her as saying "Wolfgang (HOEHER) stated definitely that 'die PAPPROTTA is a Soviet agent.'" No further clarification was possible concerning the reasons for HOEHER's conclusion, but he was quite definite.

5. Please let us know whether you have any interest in Fritz SCHMIDT, and whether you have any traces of PAPPROTTA. Any possible action taken against PAPPROTTA should be first coordinated with POB.

[]

APPROVED:

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SECRET

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3-6-31-1964

EGLA-7252
26 JAN 54
EGLA-7252

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Deadline:	26 JAN 1954
Hq Action Req.	by cable
See para	by pouch
INFO: 204, 205	
Hq Comments Req.	by cable
See para	by pouch
For info and files	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

Chief of Base, Berlin

Chief of Base, Pullach

Operational/CALL/CAST

Klfriede PAPPOTIA

REF: EOLA-7158 (not to BOB), EOLA-7243

1. We have definitely confirmed from ZIPPER that the PAPPOTIA accused by Wolfgang BOEHNER as being a Soviet agent (see EOLA-7158) is definitely identical with ZIPPER agent V-8995.1, identified as Klfriede PAPPOTIA, GCIS secretary.

2. This identification may have security implications more direct and menacing than the matter mentioned in EOLA-7243 since PAPPOTIA, in her position as GCIS secretary, may have wide access to GCIS business. It must be assumed until determined otherwise that the names of any western intelligence agents channeled from Berlin Police Abteilung V through GCIS to Public Safety for identification and return to employing agency may come to the attention of PAPPOTIA. We do not know what other capabilities may be involved, as we are not fully informed concerning GCIS functions.

3. We have asked ZIPPER to determine immediately through BRINDICE what information is available to PAPPOTIA. Meanwhile, in order to obtain an independent estimate of the situation, perhaps BOB has some way to obtain background data discreetly on PAPPOTIA, and information concerning her official duties. Immediate CIN coverage would appear to be in order, though it is not definite whether PAPPOTIA has a telephone (the 1953 phone book does not list any). We ask that no specific action be taken which might come to ZIPPER's attention without BOB coordination. On the sole basis of BOEHNER's accusation, ZIPPER does not want to be responsible for having PAPPOTIA dismissed. However, BOB believes that even though no further evidence could be obtained, in view of the apparently critical spot PAPPOTIA is in, we would be justified in insisting at a minimum that she be transferred to a non-sensitive slot. Could BOB arrange this? Please let us have your comments soonest.

Approved by:

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22 Jan 54

COPY

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ABSTRACT OF DOCUMENT BEING CROSS FILED			CROSS FILED BY
FILE NO.	SOURCE	DATE OF DOCUMENT	ANALYST
32-6-7-3785	EGLA 7555	10 February 1954	
SUBJECT			DATE
Background statement on recent ZIPPER publicity			12 December 1956
PERTINENT INFORMATION			
Dispatch from Pullach 1, Germany			
THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS QUOTED VERBATIM			
Press Exploitation.			
<p>The extremely thorough and effective DDR press exploitation of the above-mentioned cases represented only the first phase of a well planned DDR propaganda action against the GEHLEN organization. Fairly rapidly, older and sometimes non-GEHLEN cases were reported in the DDR press as new Sfs successes. Beginning with the trial of HAASE, the considerable knowledge of the GEHLEN organization which the Sfs had gained from Wolfgang HOEHER was utilized to good advantage. HOEHER had been kidnapped from West Berlin during February, 1953, and has remained since in Soviet Captivity in Karlshorst.</p>			
<p>Information concerning GEHLEN headquarters and the American staff which filtered down through the GEHLEN training schools and main field bases to chief agent personnel subsequently captured by the Sfs or Soviets. Principal person involved here is <u>Wolfgang HOEHER</u>.</p>			
DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2B NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT DATE 2003 2006			
THIS IS ALL THE INFORMATION PERTINENT TO THE SUBJECT IN THIS DOCUMENT.			
CROSS REFERENCE FORM			FILE THIS FORM IN FILE NO.
SECRET			

FORM NO. 137 REPLACES FORM 59-34
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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