

Case File 20

(Case File 20)

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

(Confidential Facts Produced From His Interrogations)

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Interrogated by John W. Fihelly

Briefed by John W. Fihelly

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

CASE FILE #20

(Evidential Facts Adduced From His Interrogations)

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

Interrogation by: John W. Fihelly

Briefed by : John W. Fihelly

POLITICAL STRUCTURE

6 February 1946, Ser. #46

P. 1 Prime Minister and other Ministers composed the Cabinet and had the right to speak. Three others always attended meetings in an advisory capacity, namely, the Cabinet Secretary, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and the Director of the Bureau of Legislation. A fourth official attended on certain occasions, namely, the President of the Cabinet Information Board.

P. 2 Most of the duties of the latter officer had to do with the dissemination of information to the press. He sometimes also collected intelligence information from the police.

At the cabinet meetings, there was no voting, matters being discussed until there was unanimous consent. If there was opposition on an important matter, the Minister or Ministers opposing it would resign, or there would be a mass resignation. Those Ministers attending cabinet meetings attended not as administrative heads of bureaus but as Ministers of State and were jointly responsible for advising the Throne.

There were certain ways in which the Emperor was advised of the Cabinet's decision. One was by a report to the Throne through either the Prime Minister or the Minister concerned; secondly, through securing permission of the Emperor. The proposal or bill was in this case taken up with the Emperor. After the matter had been presented

to the Emperor, he would discuss it with the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal before the Imperial Seal was affixed.

P. 3 The Emperor never attended cabinet meetings, but did attend Imperial Conferences, which were held with important Ministers of State and, in cases involving the military command, the army and navy Chiefs of Staff also attended and the President of the Privy Council.

There was no provision in the Constitution or in law for Imperial Conferences. They came about as a matter of custom. Accordingly, the Imperial Conferences had no responsibility as such. Those attending had responsibility in their individual official capacities and not as a member of the Imperial Conference. The custom of holding these Conferences went back as far as the Russo-Japanese War.

P. 4 The Imperial Conferences could be requested by the Prime Minister, one of the Chiefs of Staff, or by a Minister of State, if the matter were important enough.

The Prime Minister acted as presiding officer.

Matters were not officially decided at Imperial Conferences but, after discussion there, they were again taken up at a cabinet meeting where official action was taken.

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Although the Emperor attended, he did not officially approve or disapprove action taken. Rarely the Emperor said anything at all and only on one occasion during the American-Japanese negotiations did he say anything. There were two or three Imperial Conferences held in 1941.

If a decision was not reached, the matter would go back to the cabinet for a decision or to the army or navy for a decision in matters of command, after which it was again presented directly to the Emperor.

The Ministers of State advised the Emperor on matters within their sphere. The Chiefs of Staff advised on matters of military command.

There were meetings from time to time of a Liaison Conference. These Liaison Conferences were attended by the Chiefs of Staff, important Cabinet officials, such as the Premier, the Foreign Minister, the Finance Minister, President of the Cabinet Planning Board, and other Ministers of State as appropriate.

P. 5 Request for an Imperial Conference would be brought up at a Liaison Conference.

11 February 1946, Ser. #53

P. 2 Witness was asked if Imperial Conferences were called only on military matters, to which he replied, "As I explained the other day, it was the matters which lay between the sphere of civil authority

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"and the sphere of military authority that gave rise to Liaison Conferences and Imperial Conference meetings. Purely military proposals submitted to the Emperor by the War Minister were, if important, usually referred by him to the Supreme War Council for study and recommendations. The Navy had a similar set-up. According to the regulations, there was one Supreme War Council, but, by usage, army matters had come to be handled by the army part of it and navy matters by the navy part of it".

13 March 1946. Ser. #112

Witness gave information as to the structure and purpose of the Privy Council on Pages 2 and 3; as to the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals on Pages 4 and 6; as to the Supreme War Council on Page 4.

P. 5 - 6 Witness states as follows: "As War Minister, I was not a member of the Supreme Command, but I was a participant. I was concerned with military administration but not with the conduct of operations or tactics. I was not a member of the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, I was, along with the Chiefs of Staff, a member of the Supreme War Council.

"I am saying what follows here, not by way of excuse or to avoid responsibility because I hate the idea of trying to avoid responsibility. I wish to take full responsibility, but this is only

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"a factual explanation of a real situation in order to assist you in your investigation. When Prince KONOYE was Premier, it was very, very difficult for him because of the fact that his sphere of authority included only the civil sphere. When I became Premier, since I was concurrently War Minister, I had, in addition, a voice in purely military matters, to wit: in military administration. When I became Chief of Staff on 22 February 1944, soon after the fall of the Mariannas, I had an additional segment of authority in regard to purely military affairs. In fact after that, only the purely Naval matters were outside of my authority. As Premier, I had full responsibility for civil affairs; as War Minister, I had the additional military function of military administration; as Chief of Staff, I had the further High Command functions of operations and tactics.

"This whole matter of the actual system in Japan is basic to the understanding of such things as the China Incident and the matters in southern Indo-China that we have talked about. At the first, the government policy in regard to the China Incident was that of localization. However, due to the fact of the independence of the High Command, the fighting kept spreading as they strove for victory. Premier Konoye had a terrible time.

"One other thing, I think is important: Under the Japanese system, the Emperor was assisted by the following officials: Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal; the Lord Chamberlain; and the Imperial Household Minister. He also had a Chief Aide-de-Camp. The Lord Privy Seal was the Emperor's advisor on matters relating to civil affairs. The Grand Chamberlain and the Imperial Household Minister had no direct connection with either the civil government or the Supreme Command. The Grand Chamberlain was adjutant to His Majesty; as such, he had a variety of duties. However, neither he nor the Imperial Household Minister had any direct connection with either the civil government or the High Command. This was particularly true in the case of the former, since he was a civil official and not a military man. The Emperor's Aide-de-Camp, being a full general, had some unofficial access to the Supreme Command, but, under the government system itself, he had actually no authority for direct liaison.

"The Emperor did confer directly with the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals. However, this body was not very active since most of the members were of advanced years. Therefore, in practice, the Emperor was in a difficult position. He had no one on his staff to help him on High Command matters. When the Premier and the various cabinet members reported to the Emperor on civil matters, he could

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"consult the Lord Privy Seal. When the Chiefs of Staff reported to him in regard to command problems, he had no body to consult except the Board of Marshals and Fleet Admirals.

"The responsibility of the Premier and the Foreign, War, and Navy Ministers, and the President of the Planning Board, together with the Chiefs of Staff, for advice to the Emperor, through the instrumentality of the Liaison Conferences and the Imperial Conferences, was of tremendous importance. To return to the China Incident, for example - the Government policy was a policy of non-enlargement of the Incident; nevertheless, because of the fact that the civil government had no authority over the Supreme Command, the fighting was, in fact, enlarged and the civil government was powerless to prevent it. "

A very simple, but illustrative, chart follows Page 6 of the interrogation. This chart was drawn by the witness and was most helpful in his explanation of the over-lapping spheres between the civil and military authorities.

7 February 1946, Ser. #47

P. 3 - 4 Witness states that "Under the Japanese Constitution, the Army Chief of Staff and the Navy Chief of Staff are responsible solely to the Emperor in matters of strategy and evaluation of the probable advantages and disadvantages of warfare. The Ministers of State, that is to say, the Premier and the Cabinet Members, are responsible to the

"Emperor for other governmental functions. The Ministers of State have no right to interfere with the conduct of military affairs nor have the Chiefs of Staff the right to interfere in civil matters... ..In Japan, you might say that the two spheres of military command and civil government over-lap. Matters of purely military importance are no functions of the civil government; matters of purely civil importance are no function of the military command. However, the over-lapping area, which includes such matters as foreign policy and decisions to go to war for example, present problems which in practice are taken up by the Liaison Conference. For example, the strategic war plans are a matter of pure strategy and were not known to the Cabinet Members. I did not even know them myself".

14 March 1946, Ser. #109

Witness, on Pages 1, 2, and 3, gave further information as to the structure and purpose of Imperial Headquarters. He also states its defects. He explains the difference between Imperial Headquarters and the Supreme War Council.

P. 4 Witness stated that the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal did not attend nor have a vote at the Privy Council meetings. Imperial Headquarters was in the Liaison Conferences.

P. 4 - 5 Witness stated that Liaison Conferences started about the time of the second KONOYE Cabinet, that there was no justification in law for them, and that therefore, their decisions were not official.

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Witness stated that, generally speaking, the Cabinet always approved what the Liaison Conference decided, adding, as a practical matter, they agreed and did not say anything. Witness stated that the Japanese Constitution dated from 1890, the time of Prince ITO, and that the Constitution provided for the over-lapping spheres of influence which gave the military the power which it continued to exert and use to control the government.

P. 5 Witness explained in detail how the Supreme Command was able to move troops to and into Indo-China without any authorization from the civil government and stated, "Well, on the one hand, the Japanese-American negotiations were under way. On the other hand, Imperial Headquarters kept moving troops and supplies from Formosa by ship to southern China and into northern Indo-China in order to win. This was something which could give rise to misunderstandings, but, because the movement of troops and military supplies was the sole province of the Supreme Command, the civil government could say nothing. It was a different situation with regard to southern Indo-China. There, the troops were moved in on a basis of the joint defense agreement: since this involved the civil government, it could not be done by the Supreme Command alone. However, troops could be moved from central China into south China and even into the north part of French Indo-China at that time under the proper authority and at the convenience of the Supreme Command. This, of course, refers to the Army; a similar situation existed with regard to the Navy."

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P. 6 Witness explained the various army and navy orders which were signed by the Emperor, and how and when the personnel of each could be moved without any specific authorization from the Emperor. As to the former, he stated, "The Navy set-up was very different from the Army. I was not responsible for the Navy set-up, of course, and I may be possibly in error about it, but, generally speaking, all orders went from the Navy General Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet and from him to the commanders of the various fleets which composed it. Army orders went from the Army section of Imperial Headquarters to the Supreme Commander of the forces in China who had a number of Army commanders under him, to the Commander-in-Chief of the Kwantung Army, to the commander in north Indo-China, or to the six commanders in Japan proper, Korea, and Formosa. Troop movements within the Kwantung Army, within the Chinese area under the control of the Supreme Commander there, or within northern Indo-China, could be controlled by the three commanders involved, but movements of troops from one of these areas to the other, or to or from the mainland of Japan, Formosa, or Korea, had to be by command of the Army section of Imperial Headquarters".

As to the latter, witness stated, "The Army and the Navy were different in that respect. If a division was moved, the Emperor's approval would be obtained, except, of course, for movements within the commands such as I have outlined. This is different in the Navy.

"Since the Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet was in charge of all naval forces, he could operate a good deal without specific approval. I had very little direct relation with the Navy, and I don't want to speak as one bearing responsibility on such matters".

P. 7 Witness stated that practically all orders requested by the Chiefs of Staff were signed by the Emperor.

Following Page 7 appears a chart which was drawn and approved by the witness, explaining the structure of Imperial Headquarters.

15 March 1946. Ser. #113

More data was given by the witness with respect to Liaison Conferences on Pages 1 and 2.

Witness stated that all Imperial Conferences held in 1941 were preceded by Liaison Conferences where decisions had been made.

19 March 1946. Ser. #119

P. 1 - 2 Witness explains how the "Four-" and "Five-Minister" conferences grew into the Liaison Conferences. (Premier, War, Navy, Foreign Ministers, and later the Finance Minister.)

P. 2 - 3 Witness also explains the good and bad points of the power which the Supreme Command exercised.

P. 3 - 4 Witness was asked the following questions, to which he made the following answers:

"Q Do you not realize that the position in which Japan finds herself today was due largely to the independence of the Supreme Command?

"A To speak plainly, it was a big cause. Actually, it was, but in the trials I don't want to emphasize that too much. What I do want to plead is that we, as subjects, I and the Chiefs of Staff, did not discharge our responsibilities to the Emperor. It is not the Emperor's responsibility. The civil ministers ought to have understood the problems of command and the Chiefs of Staff ought to have understood the civil problems. All ought to have cooperated in discharging their responsibilities to the Emperor.

"Q In what respects did you and the Chiefs of Staff not fulfill your responsibilities to the Emperor?

"A Men use systems; men should not be used by systems. This is an important principle. If I and the other men had fully understood this, the Supreme Command should have taken account of the political aspect of things and adjusted military operations accordingly. We should have risen above the system in which we found ourselves, but we did not. It was the men who were at fault.

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"Q To whom do you refer when you say 'we'?

"A I mean myself and the two Chiefs of Staff, especially myself.

"Q When did you first come to realize the truth of this situation that you have just explained?

"A From the time I became Prime Minister I have felt it poignantly, and I imagine that not only I but all Prime Ministers have felt the same."

20 March 1946. Ser. #119

P. 1 Witness stated that prior to becoming Premier, he was aware of the problems arising from the independence of the Supreme Command; that when he became Premier, he faced it for the first time from a political angle.

P. 3 - 4 Witness said 1 August 1940 the basic national policy was decided by the Cabinet and thinks that Premier KONOYE did make the three statements mentioned on pages 3 - 4.

The statements are as follows:

1. "At home we must establish the New order as well as establish a New Order in East Asia and the world".
2. "The government is exerting itself for the completion of a high state of national defense".
3. "To do this, we must throw away former ideas about politics, economics, and culture, and establish in every government organization the most efficient system".

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P. 3 - 4 Witness stated that the government not only approved but created the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

P. 5 Witness stated that he himself was a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association.

Witness was asked if the oath of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association did not include language, in part, as follows, "The great march of the Japanese people has begun. Dawn over Asia is approaching. The throbbing life power of the Japanese people has begun its historic march under the great ideal of the birth of the nation". Witness replied that he dare say the oath did contain, in part, that language.

Witness stated that the government at this time was in favor of establishing a new order at home as well as a New Order in East Asia.

P. 6 Witness stated, "that the old political structure was not suited to the political conditions within and without the country at that time".

Witness added, "The national government was uncoordinated, and this was an effort to coordinate it. The economic basis was to include Japan, Manchuria, and China, since it was not a good idea to think only what was good for Japan".

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21 March 1946, Ser. #119

P. 1 Witness stated that he was a Counsellor of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and, on becoming Premier, became the President of the Association.

P. 2 - 3 Witness mentions the abolition of political parties in July 1940 and other matters which were taken up during this new governmental structure movement.

P. 4 There are most important statements made by the witness in connection with the control of the press during this period. Witness states that the Government Information Bureau not only controlled the press, but that the Army Press Section and the Navy Press Section did likewise and that much of this was the old problem of the conflicting spheres of authority between the civil government and the High Command.

P. 5 The press was controlled in Japan, "especially since the time of the new structure". Witness admits that freedom of speech was controlled in certain respects (if "harmful to the war effort or public tranquility").

Witness stated that Japan and Manchuria were being considered in connection with this new governmental structure as the whole world apparently was being divided into economic blocs.

P. 6 Witness recalls that prior to July 1940, Germany and Italy had "renovated their internal political structures in line with the world situation".

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P. 7 Witness admits that no change in Japanese internal structure was necessary after the Tripartite Pact was signed.

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

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(Evidential Facts Adduced from His Interrogations)

MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

Interrogation by: John W. Fihelly

Briefed by : John W. Fihelly

MANCHURIAN INCIDENT

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14 January 1946, Ser. #26

P. 4 Prior to 1931, a number of officers, particularly younger officers, grouped together as they thought things were not good and were very unsatisfactory. This was the general feeling throughout the Army, and his own.

P. 6 Japanese militarists and those wanting Japan to expand used the Hakko Ichiu slogan.

P. 9 Prior to 1931, Japan needed food, oil, and raw materials in order to live. This would also mean that these necessary articles would be used in order to wage defensive war. The population of Japan was increasing at the rate of one million per year.

P. 10 Emigration and increased production at home were two methods of dealing with the increase.

This general problem existed prior to, at the time of, and after the Manchurian Incident, despite the fact that many hundreds of thousands of Japanese emigrated to Manchuria and China. Japan had some copper, lead, food, and coal, but not enough, and it was necessary to import the remainder. Japan could not have waged a war without importing these articles.

At this time and gradually thereafter, because Japan was expanding at this rate, a large trade and movement of people went on between Japan (China-Manchuria). As time went on, this movement of goods and materials increased. Japan has special interests in China

Manchurian Incident

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and Manchuria but had no idea of taking territory. "We wanted to do what we could peacefully."

P. 11 Manchuria had raw materials, including coal, iron, oil, and zinc needed for waging war.

P. 12 Japan needed materials from the Philippines, Indo-China, and the Dutch East Indies but not their territory.

15 January 1946, Ser. #27

P. 3 There was a connection between the Manchurian Incident and the New Order in East Asia. After the Manchurian Incident, "there was a gradual process".

16 January 1946, Ser. #28

P. 3 Witness stated before 1931 that, generally speaking, the whole army felt that the Japanese foreign policy "should be firmer", but the younger officers took a "narrower view of things", and it was necessary for them to be "kept firmly in hand by their superiors". Witness recalls that the younger officers felt dissatisfaction, both with the foreign policy and the domestic policy of Japan. Witness stated he believed they wished a firmer policy towards China and East Asia, but did not want to affirm definitely.

Witness was with the Kwantung Army from October 1935 to March 1937. The younger officers there had caught the air of dissatisfaction from people in Japan and the reflection there of the 26 February Incident was an example of this.

Manchurian Incident

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23 January 1946, Ser. #33

P. 3 Witness stated that "the direct cause of the Manchurian Incident was the illegal acts committed there against Japanese rights and interests. However, the Japanese feeling that Japan and China should make common cause existed and was an indirect cause of the Incident".

Witness stated in the same connection that "it was Japanese policy to contribute to world peace by securing the stabilization of East Asia". He likewise stated that it was also Japanese policy "to increase friendly relations with the Powers by setting up a system of co-existence and co-prosperity".

5 February 1946, Ser. #47

P. 3 Witness was asked if the custom of calling wars "incidents" did not start with the Manchurian Incident, and he said, "I don't know. I was not the responsible party at that time".

He was asked if the word "incident" was not used because Japan had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, and he said, "I don't know. I don't know whether the government had such an idea or not".

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

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(Evidential Facts Adduced From His Interrogations)

CHINA INCIDENT

Interrogation by: John W. Fihelly

Briefed by : John W. Fihelly

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14 January 1946, Ser. #26

P. 12 - 13 Knew Japan had signed Nine-Power Treaty in 1922 and a party to it from then on. Knew Japan was also a party to the Kellogg-Briand Pact.

P. 13 Witness stated that the Manchurian and China Incidents were wars for self-survival and the Kellogg-Briand Pact did not apply. From a spiritual point of view the Nine-Power Treaty should have been respected, but the Japanese people did not like and were not satisfied with it.

P. 14 "The thing sprang up quickly and it was a matter of self-defense".

P. 15 The Army were very dissatisfied with the Nine-Power Treaty and he feels it was not just but had to be accepted to keep peace in the Pacific. The people were not happy about the treaty and felt it might be possible in the future to modify it.

15 January 1946, Ser. #27

P. 1 Younger officers gathered arms and did unlawful acts.

P. 2 The witness stated that an "atmosphere of discontent" brought about the 26 February Incident. There was also "an atmosphere of disobedience to higher authority".

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16 January, 1946, Ser. #28

P. 4 Witness stated that when he went to Manchuria in 1935, he found a discontent among army officers and had likewise found the same discontent among army officers in Japan prior to leaving there, because of the lack of foreign policy towards China and Asia and the desire for a "firmer internal policy". Witness stated that when he left Japan at this time, he thought there was such a feeling among civilians also.

Witness stated that he believed since 1931, both among army officers and civilians, there had been a growing demand for a firmer foreign policy towards China and East Asia.

18 January 1946, Ser. #30

P. 3 Witness stated that he was in Manchuria at the time of the 26 February Incident and that he suppressed similar movements there as the result of orders received from the Commander-in-Chief of that army. He stated that as a result of the 26 February Incident, there was an atmosphere of similar ideas in the Kwantung Army. He stated that General MINAMI was the head of the Kwantung Army at this time.

P. 4 Witness stated that the feeling of unrest in Manchuria at this time was not limited to the army; that it also included personnel of the South Manchuria Railway and civilians; that there was a definite atmosphere of unrest which had spread from Tokyo. Witness stated that

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some hundreds were seized and questioned in Manchuria at this time and that later, between ten and twenty were sent to Tokyo for trial. Witness stated that it was his impression that of those arrested in Manchuria, about one-fifth were army personnel and four-fifths South Manchurian Railway personnel or civilians.

P. 5 He likewise stated that among those arrested were some Manchurian "Ronin" whom he believed had received money from other people to act as they had done.

Witness admitted that some of those arrested wanted the government to pursue a stronger policy in Asia.

21 January 1946, Ser. #11

P. 1 Witness stated that of the various elements arrested at the time of the 26 February Incident, there was probably a total of 500 or 600. He admitted that most of these people were generally dissatisfied with internal and external policies of the government. He said he felt that there was probably a connection between the two but hesitated to be very definite about it.

P. 2 Witness said he believed that there was a tendency towards an increase in the number of radicals in Manchuria from the time of the Manchurian Incident to the 26 February 1936 assassinations. He stated that he felt there was a similar increase in such elements in Japan proper during that period.

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P. 3 Witness stated that after the 26 February 1936 Incident that the government of Japan did adopt a policy of closer ties with China, and that it was not unreasonable to believe that a policy of firmer ties, especially with Manchuria and later with China, was adopted by the government.

Witness stated that among those arrested in Manchuria at this time, there were officers who were captains or less in rank. He also stated that he felt among those arrested in Japan at this time there were some officers of the grade of major and lieutenant colonel.

Witness admitted that among those listed as extremists in Manchuria prior to the 26 February 1936 Incident, there were a number of Kwantung Army officers and that he thinks some of those were probably among the individuals arrested. Witness could not say how many army officers were arrested but majority were civilians.

P. 5 Witness was quite certain that among the twenty or thirty arrested and sent to Tokyo for trial, there were some South Manchuria Railway personnel.

4 February 1946, Ser. #44

P. 4 Witness stated that substantially the China Incident was a war, but that that was not a matter for which the TOJO Cabinet or he was responsible. The full answer is as follows: "Substantially, it was a war but this is not a matter for which the TOJO Cabinet is

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"responsible nor was I responsible at this time. Please get that into the record clearly. These are only my thoughts. As to the name "China Affair" or "China Incident", this was used because of the character of the struggle. There was real fighting to be sure, but it was considered to be a family quarrel, in which the younger brother, China, was being made to reconsider its various illegal acts typified by such anti-Japanese phrases as kōnichi (oppose the Japs) and hainichi (expel the Japs). The basic purpose was always the fostering of good neighborliness and friendship and for that reason the thing was never called a war nor was there a declaration of war. The cabinet at that time (not the TOJO Cabinet) had two policies: (1) to effect a local settlement, and (2) to keep the hostilities from spreading. This is what I think on this matter".

5 February 1946, Ser. #47

P. 1 Witness stated that the battles fought in the China Inc were real ones and Japan used her army, navy, and air forces.

P. 2 Witness supposes that between 1937 and 1941, there had been two million Chinese killed and over 3,500,000 Chinese injured.

P. 2 - 3 Witness stated that the name "China Incident" was decided on at a cabinet conference. When asked why it was so named, he answered "that was the custom". Witness

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whether or not one of the reasons for avoiding the use of the word "war" and calling it the China Incident was that Japan had signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war.

P. 4 Witness stated that up until September 1937, he had moved his Kwantung forces some 700 miles into China after hard fighting and no name had been given to the war.

P. 5 Witness stated during the first two months after the outbreak of the China Incident, no name was given to the war in which these battles were fought.

"Of course my two brigades were engaged in offensive action."

4 March 1946, Ser. #90

P. 1 Witness stated that in connection with the China Incident there were prior policies of preceding cabinets that he agreed with and others that he could not agree with.

P. 2 Witness stated that, as War Minister and Premier, he requested appropriations, as needed, of the government, and the Diet assented.

The number of troops needed was requisitioned by the Supreme Command and he, as War Minister, saw to it that the appropriations need therefor were withdrawn from the budget.

Witness stated that, as War Minister, the requisitions for troops came to him for approval.

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6 March 1946, Ser. #94

P. 2 witness stated that, from the standpoint of actual fighting, the fighting against China was no different from the fighting against England and America, but that, although the fighting had been going on for a long time, there was no declaration of war issued against China.

NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA AND RELATED EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

GENERAL HIDEKI TOJO

Case File 20

14 November 1944, 1000-200

(Evidential Facts Adduced From His Interrogations)

The principle of the Declaration published by the Greater East Asia Conference 5 November 1943, stating, in substance, that each nation on the earth must obtain its proper place and all countries share in common prosperity.

NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA

15 January 1945, 1000-200

AND

GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

Witness stated that he believed that the "construction of a New Order in East Asia was an important thing". He said it became the policy of Japan at the time of and following the China Incident in 1937.

Witness was asked, "In your opinion, did the Manchurian Incident have anything to do with the creation of a New Order in Asia? Do you think there is any relation between the Manchurian Incident and the creation of a New Order in East Asia?" He answered, "It is my personal opinion that there was a connection. After the Manchurian Incident, there was a gradual process".

Interrogation by John W. Fihelly

Briefed by John W. Fihelly

NEW ORDER IN EAST ASIA AND GREATER EAST ASIA CO-PROSPERITY SPHERE

14 January 1946, Ser. #26

P. 7 Witness produced a small notebook and read from the Preamble of the Declaration published by the Greater East Asia Convention 5 November 1943, stating, in substance, that each nation in the world must obtain its proper place and all countries share in common prosperity.

15 January 1946, Ser. #27

P. 3 Witness stated that he believed that the "construction of a New Order in East Asia was an important thing". He said it became the policy of Japan at the time of and following the China Incident in 1937.

Witness was asked, "In your opinion, did the Manchurian Incident have anything to do with the creation of a New Order in Asia? Do you think there is any relation between the Manchurian Incident and the creation of a New Order in East Asia"? He answered, "It is my common sense opinion that there was a connection. After the Manchurian Affair, there was a gradual process".

Witness was asked if there was any need for a New Order in East Asia prior to the Manchurian Incident, and he answered, "Of course there was a need for it, in my opinion, but the words 'construction of a New Order in East Asia' were not used until after the outbreak of the China Incident."

Witness was asked what the connection between the Manchurian Incident and the New Order in East Asia was and he stated, "There were fundamental ties between Japan and the continent".

Witness was asked what was the gradual process of development that he had referred to in this matter, and he answered that, while the general phraseology in connection with the New Order in East Asia came to be used after the outbreak of the China Incident, the Japanese people had felt for a long time previous the necessity for such a New Order.

P. 4 Witness was questioned with respect to a statement, made by General HONJO, President of the Military Protection Board, to the effect "that the Manchurian Incident was the start of the creation of a new world order". In reply, witness stated, "Well, to speak finally, I believe I agree".

Witness stated that for a long time there were numerous ties between Japan and the continent and that of course "such a need existed for the New Order. Ties had existed between China, Japan, and Manchuria for a long period. "There was always need for Japan and China to have close ties, the need had existed from early times".

Witness stated that the need of a New Order in East Asia was indirectly a cause of the war between Japan and England. Witness

made this same statement on the following page (5). Witness stated (p. 4) that the New Order was not one of the main reasons leading up to the war with the United States.

P. 5 Witness stated at length the reasons for the New Order in East Asia and the part played, particularly by Great Britain, in Asia prior to this period. Witness stated, "Japan wished, as the central Power in East Asia, to insure the stability of the Far East and to avoid chaotic conditions".

He also stated at this point that Powers, such as Britain, had rights, but balanced against those rights was the fundamental right of people to live. It would therefore be necessary to have some lawful adjustment made.

Witness stated that the country which was the most powerful Power would be the central one in the "New Order". He stated that the other nations in East Asia would be under Japan, but only because Japan, with more strength, would take the initiative. The interests of foreign Powers were not to be pushed aside and there would be lawful adjustments made.

16 January 1946, Ser. #28

P. 1 Witness stated that as Japan had the most power, she "naturally would have the initiative" in bringing about the New Order.

Witness stated that "of course, as Minister of War, I actively supported this policy", (referring to the creation of a New Order in East Asia.)

Witness again stated that he had believed for a long time prior to the China Incident that it was essential to have close ties between Japan and China. (Makes same statement on next page.) He further said that there was no definite plan for the creation of a New Order in East Asia until after the outbreak of the China Incident. He had believed for a long time that close ties were necessary for the sake of both countries.

P. 2 Witness stated that, at the time of the China Incident, there were no ideas as to other countries of Asia being a part of the New Order. "Any ideas as to other countries of Asia were not yet formed". Witness said that from the beginning his general thought was that Japan, China, and other countries of East Asia should be together "in a New Order with Japan taking the initiative". The majority of the officers and men in the army believed the same.

P. 4 - 5 Witness was asked if some economic and financial benefits would not accrue to Japan under the New Order concept. He replied by quoting from his book from the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration which stated, in substance, that the economic development of the East

Asia countries would be accelerated through close cooperation and the general promotion of prosperity through their region on a basis of reciprocity. Witness stated that trade would improve and that there would be a mutual exchange of products and services.

P. 5 Witness stated that the Philippines were represented at the Greater East Asia Convention in November 1943. Witness was asked if, in order to put the "New Order" into effect, it was not necessary to change the status quo in East Asia, and he said, "As I explained before, an adjustment would be necessary". Some adjustments were made, some were not.

Witness was asked if Japan had ever discussed with the United States or Great Britain the matters of necessary adjustment in connection with the New Order in East Asia, and he replied that he thought that, after the war, those matters would be definitely decided and that at the time the Greater East Asia Convention was held, Japan felt she would be victorious.

17 January 1946, Ser. #29

P. 1 Witness stated that in connection with the New Order, the basic idea was that of "co-prosperity and mutual dependence" and not of greater wealth or poverty. "The basic intention was that the raw materials which China possessed in abundance would be contributed by China, and the technique, capital, and skilled personnel

"be contributed by Japan for the mutual benefit of both countries. Manchuria would come into the picture similarly".

P. 1 - 2 Witness stated that of course Japan would receive raw materials and that trade would increase by the New Order.

Witness was asked whether Japan had ever taken up with Great Britain or the United States the matter of negotiating with them in connection with their rights insofar as they were involved in the New Order. He admitted that no negotiations were entered into with the British in regard to Hongkong and the Malay Peninsula. He said that during the negotiations which began with the United States in April 1941, the general matter of the situation in Asia was discussed with the United States. The basic treaty with China in the third KONOYE Cabinet, the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Declaration of 1940, and KONOYE's three principles represented the spirit in which Japan desired to negotiate, and the whole question was a matter Japan had been negotiating with America about, and Japan had proposed a tentative plan for the Far East which was not acceptable to the United States.

"The most serious question that faced Japan in April 1941 at the start of the negotiations with the United States was the necessity of taking the diplomatic initiative to secure American consent to the disposition of the China Incident. This is what I think, since you asked me for my opinion. I was not Foreign Minister or Premier at that time. The second important problem was to actually put into effect the terms of the Japan-China basic treaty," witness stated.

P. 3 Witness stated that no specific matters in connection with the New Order were taken up with the United States at this time.

Witness now stated that the fact that the United States did not accept the general plan, as outlined by Japan during the 1941 negotiations in connection with the New Order in East Asia, while not a basic cause of war with the United States, was, he thought, an indirect cause.

Witness said that if Japan had won the war, the problems of adjustment with America and Britain would have arisen at the Peace Conference. The New Order would have been put into effect after discussions and negotiations with the United States and Great Britain.

P. 4 Witness again stated that the fact that the United States and Great Britain did not agree to the Japanese plan for setting up a New Order in East Asia, while not a direct cause of the war, was "an indirect cause".

Witness stated that the phrase "Asia for the Asiatics" was, in his opinion, "narrow-minded".

Witness admitted, after examining his book on the New Order in East Asia, that one of the points in the Greater East Asia Convention Declaration of 6 November 1943 was the construction of a co-prosperity sphere between the countries involved. He likewise admitted, by a similar examination of his book, that another point in the Declaration

was the acceleration of the economic development of the various East Asia countries, thus promoting the general prosperity of their region. He also admitted that another provision in the Declaration was to insure the fraternity of the nations of East Asia by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence.

P. 5 Witness stated that Japan, and he also, hoped that under the New Order Burma would attain independence but that that matter had never been taken up with Great Britain.

Witness stated that the Government of China, as then recognized by Japan, was represented at the Greater East Asia Convention by WANG Ching-wei.

P. 6 Witness said he thought there were, prior to the China Incident, people, both in Japan and China, who desired "some such thing" as the New Order in East Asia.

18 January 1946, Ser. #30

P. 1 Witness again stated that from the time of the Manchurian Incident, the feeling with respect to close ties with China had gradually increased. After the outbreak of the China Incident, the New Order became government policy and became more explicit and defined as time went on.

P. 2 Witness stated that both citizens and younger officers thought that closer ties with China ought to be established; that

the concept of "East Asia" grew with the progress of the war; that at first it embraced only China and Japan and then later, as the war situation developed, it came to include the Philippines, Thai, and Burma.

Witness stated that during the two years he was with the Kwantung Army, the officers felt that Japan and China were too far apart and should be brought closer together, "but the policy had not crystalized and there was no concrete plan. Even the government had no such definite plan". Many of the officers "wanted a stronger policy.....Throughout the Army there was such an atmosphere".

Witness stated that he felt, since the Kwantung Army was closer to the problem, the feeling was probably stronger in that area than in Japan.

P. 3 As a result of the 26 February Incident, there was an atmosphere of similar ideas in the Kwantung Army.

P. 4 An atmosphere of unrest had spread from Tokyo and included Army, railroad personnel, and civilians. Hundreds were seized and between ten and twenty sent to Tokyo for trial.

23 January 1946, Ser. #33

P. 1 Witness stated that the expression "Niki Sansuke" referred to Hideki TOJO, Naoki HOSHINO, Yosuke MATSUOKA, Shinsuke KISHI, and Gisuke AYUKAWA. He stated that it was a "disagreeable saying that started in Japan proper. It referred to people who were fairly important in Manchuria". The witness stated he was then Chief of

Staff of the Kwantung Army; HOSHINO was President of the Manchurian General Affairs Board; MATSUOKA was President of the South Manchurian Railway; KISHI was Vice President of the Economic Section of the Manchukuo Government; and AYUKAWA was President of the Manchurian Heavy Industries Corporation.

P. 2 Witness stated that this expression probably came about because "the five of us knew the ropes pretty well in Manchuria and were the ones that could get things done".

Witness was interrogated about a statement allegedly made in a broadcast to wit on 18 September 1941 and said that he thought he probably did say: "Abroad we must plan for the mutual prosperity of all the races of Greater East Asia" and that "already the Manchurian Incident had become a tocsin proclaiming to all the people that they must march ever forward, despite difficulties, to build the New Order in East Asia".

Witness stated that those were the sentiments that he had when looking back ten years after the Manchurian Incident had occurred.

P. 2 - 3 Witness stated that in this connection, the concept of the creation of a New Order in East Asia "gradually crystalized"; that at the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, "there was no such well-defined or comprehensive plan at all - only the basic idea that Japan and China should have closer ties"; that after the outbreak of the

China Incident in 1937, the idea of a New Order in East Asia began to be more definite and, during the four years between the outbreak of the China Incident and the time of this broadcast, the "concept had become fairly well crystalized. The idea that China and Japan should have close ties, that is to say, the original idea which dated back to the Manchurian Incident was still the central idea of the New Order in East Asia".

Witness was asked how it happened that the Manchurian Incident became the start of the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and he said that, speaking from the point of view of the final result, he guessed you could say it was the starting point, since the basic idea was the creation of closer ties between Japan and China, although at the time of the Manchurian Incident, there was certainly no such definite plan.

Witness stated that "the direct cause of the Manchurian Incident was the illegal acts committed there against Japanese rights and interests. However, the Japanese feeling that Japan and China should make common cause existed and was an indirect cause of the Incident".

Witness stated that he believed the Chinese were not opposed to the policies just enumerated, but that the Chinese Government had opposed them and had tried constantly to enlist the support of

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

America and England against Japan and she had also coined and used numerous anti-Japanese phrases.

America and England behind the scenes were encouraging the anti-Japanese policies of the Chinese Government.

P. 4 Witness stated that the state of antagonism which he referred to as existing between Japan and the Chinese Government continued to interfere with the creation of the New Order in East Asia for a long time after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident.

P. 5 Witness stated that, step by step, up to the outbreak of war with the United States, Japan had made progress towards effecting the New Order in East Asia and said that her relations with the Nanking Government of WANG Ching-wei were successful and a basic treaty was signed between the two countries; that some older treaties with China were revised at this time in the spirit of the New Order in East Asia. He said, "Relations with Manchuria, of course, were even better". He also said a joint declaration in the same spirit was also agreed upon and signed by Japan, China, and Manchuria.

24 January 1946, Ser. #34

P. 1 Witness was questioned with respect to a statement made in the Diet on 25 January 1941 by MATSUOKA, and stated that "there is nothing surprising in it". Among other things, the statement mentioned

that the effort to construct a mutual prosperity sphere in Greater East Asia represents the first step toward the satisfaction of the national desire embodied in the doctrine of "Hakko Ichiu". The statement also mentioned that such a New Order "should serve as an example to humanity in the construction of a New World Order".

P. 1 - 2 The "stabilization of East Asia" was a cardinal point of Japanese foreign policy.

P. 2 Witness also stated that he believed MATSUOKA would agree with the ideas which he had advanced in his explanations concerning "the New Order in East Asia".

Witness stated "as far as Mr. MATSUOKA's statements during the period when he was Foreign Minister are concerned, I can answer that there are no statements which he made that I do not agree with". He continued, stating that a person in that position becomes a mouth-piece for the national will "as debated and decided upon by the Cabinet". He admitted that date the speech was made 25 January 1941, MATSUOKA was Foreign Minister.

Witness stated that he and MATSUOKA did not become real friends until the time they met in Manchuria in 1935 and he got to know him more intimately in the second KONOYE Cabinet when both were Ministers.

P. 3 Witness stated that "the idea of the creation of a New Order in East Asia came up as a topic of conversation from time to time in connection with many specific problems involving the South Manchurian Railway". He mentioned that at that time MATSUOKA was President of the Railway and he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.

Witness was asked, "At the time when you first became well acquainted with Mr. MATSUOKA in Manchuria, did he not have the idea of the creation of a New Order in East Asia?" Witness replied, "The subject came up as a topic of conversation from time to time in connection with many specific problems involving the South Manchurian Railway. At that time, he was President of the South Manchurian Railway and, since I was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, there were many problems and this matter came up as well, but not in a very important way".

Witness stated that he did not believe MATSUOKA had any concrete plan on the subject, but believed that "he did have the idea of closer ties between China and Japan".

Witness stated that MATSUOKA did "express views about closer relations between Japan and China". Witness stated that the ideas stated by MATSUOKA when they met in Manchuria were similar to those of the New Order in East Asia insofar as they related to "increasing happiness on both sides by co-existence and co-prosperity".

P. 4 Witness was questioned about a statement made by MATSUOKA in a book published in 1941 wherein, among other things, he said, "Japan should take over the management of the continent on a large scale and propagate Hakko Ichiu and Kodo in Asia, and then extend it to the world". Witness stated that instead of the phrase "take over the management", he would substitute the words "exert leadership". Witness said the authenticity of the translation was an important one and he asked it be checked.

P. 5 Witness stated that the five-point Declaration of the Greater East Asia Convention of November 1943 "represents the gist of the New Order".

Witness was asked whether or not he agreed with the sentiments contained in a speech which MATSUOKA was reported to have made in the Diet on or about 27 January 1941, the speech being as follows:

"The Manchurian Incident and the China Affair are nothing but manifestations of Japan's attempt to forestall the destruction of civilization. The Manchurian Incident should be termed the start of construction, not destruction, of world peace. The Co-Prosperity Sphere in the Far East is based on the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, of the Eight Corners of the Universe Under One Roof. It is not that America's leaders don't understand this, but they don't try to understand it".

Witness replied, "I do not know about America's leaders so I would exclude the last sentence of the quotation, but I did and do agree with the remainder. One other sentence, namely, 'Manchurian Incident should be termed the start of construction, not destruction of world peace', I believe to have been true only when viewed in retrospect".

25 January 1946, Ser. #35

P. 1 Witness again stated that the phrase "Niki Sansuke" was coined while he was in Manchuria because the impression got about that those five individuals to whom it referred knew their way around in Manchuria and could get things done. He stated, however, that was untrue and whatever he or HOSHINO did in Manchuria was the result of orders from the central government. The phrase was used both in Manchuria and Japan.

P. 2 Witness stated that prior to the outbreak of the recent war, "the concept of Greater East Asia was very vague and did not include the Philippines, Thai, or Malaya".

Witness was again questioned about a statement he was supposed to have made on or about 18 September 1941 where he said, in part, "Abroad we must plan for the mutual prosperity of all races of Greater East Asia", and was asked why that was. He replied that relations were still bad between Japan and China, and it was necessary to promote more friendly relations in those two countries.

Witness was told that he was not answering the question, as the text said "abroad we must plan for the mutual prosperity of all the races of Greater East Asia". Witness replied that this broadcast was directed toward Manchukuo and by that it was meant that, "with regard to China, we should also come to some understanding".

Witness was informed that the quotation did not refer only to the Chinese, but said "all the races of Greater East Asia" and that would include the Philippines, Thai, and the people of the Malay Peninsula, and so forth.

Witness stated "that meaning too could be read into it, but at the time of that broadcast, I intended it to apply to China".

Witness was asked if this intended to apply to China and Manchuria alone, why did he use such broad language, and he replied as follows, "You have the text there and so that is probably what I said; those are probably the characters that were used, but, speaking from my impression, this was a broadcast directed toward Manchuria on the anniversary of the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident and what I had in mind was, I believe, Manchuria and China. Previous to the outbreak of the Greater East Asia War, as I have already stated, the concept of Greater East Asia was very vague and did not include the Philippines, Thai, or Malaya".

P. 3 Referring to the world war, the witness said, "As I said sometime ago, there were a number of basic causes for the war. The

"basic policy of Japan for a long time has been to contribute to world peace by the stabilization of Greater East Asia. However, this was not a simple matter to carry out. In China, which was the focus of forces, there were, as I explained before, raw materials, tremendous population, and a center of Oriental culture. For a long time past, West European, American, and Russian influences had been acting upon China. The stability of East Asia and the right of East Asiatic peoples to live were involved in this process, and this was one of the long-range basic causes of the war, I believe. The short-range causes were entirely different. This is an extremely important subject so I hope you will cover it fully. It was vital for Japan to be able to trade with China, especially as regards food materials and other necessities of life. That is one important point. A second point is that Japan, because of her geographic proximity to China, was more affected by conditions of peace or disorder in that country. Disorder and instability in China could spread quickly to Japan. By contrast, England and America were more remote from China and were not seriously affected by chaotic conditions there. Their interests were derived principally from their colonies, in the case of Britain, or various rights which they had, in the case of the United States, and for them the problem was much less serious."

Witness was questioned as to how long it had been the policy of Japan to contribute to world peace by the stabilization of Greater East Asia. He replied, "It has been basic Japanese policy ever since the Meiji period. The Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War were all in line with this policy, so also were the Manchurian Incident, the China Incident, and the Greater East Asia War. This is the basic Japanese national policy. However, specific foreign policies are adopted from time to time in accordance with the particular conditions which prevail". The witness, in the question which follows at the bottom of Page 3 and his answer at the top of Page 4, again re-affirms that Japan entered the aforesaid wars for the purpose of stabilizing East Asia and that the Imperial Declaration of War would show that this was national policy and not just his idea. All of these wars had this fundamental basis. (Witness was questioned about an extract on the last message of the Japanese Government delivered to the Secretary of State on 7 December 1941 which stated, in substance, that the countries of East Asia for the past one hundred years or more had been compelled to observe the status quo of the Anglo-American exploitation. He replied that he believed the message, as delivered to the United States Government by the Japanese representative, contained such statements and if so, "I am, of course, responsible because I was the Premier".)

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

28 January 1946, Ser. #38

P. 1 Witness was questioned about a statement made by MATSUOKA, as Foreign Minister, to the Diet on 20 January 1941, stating in substance that the object of the Three-Power Pact fitted in with the spirit of Hakko Ichiu and "is none other than the realization of the same great ideal", and also including the statement that Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan "in the establishment of a New Order in East Asia". Witness stated, "I think it is reasonable. I did agree with it at that time".

P. 2 Witness was asked whether or not he and the members of his Cabinet did not work and act in accordance with those same principles, stated first by MATSUOKA and secondly by the Tripartite Pact, and he answered, "Yes, of course we did".

P. 3 Referring to the Tripartite Agreement, witness stated that the general matter of what countries were to be included in the New Order in Europe and in Asia was probably discussed between Japan and Germany based upon the distribution of forces at that time. He was then asked whether, as soon as countries were conquered, they were to be added to this sphere, and he replied, "Yes".

Witness also stated that as far as Manchuria and China were concerned, Germany and Italy recognized that they were within the sphere of the New Order. The WANG Ching-wei government recognized by Japan included all of China. These were the only countries

in the New Order at the time. Hong Kong was not included at this time as part of China.

P. 4 Witness was asked this question - that both in Europe and Asia, the sphere to be included in the New Order decreased or increased with the military situation, and he replied, "That was about the long and short of it". Witness also said that this was in accordance with the spirit of Hakko Ichiu.

Witness was asked whether the same concept of virtue was to be a part of the sphere to be controlled by Germany and Italy in Europe, and he answered that "Japan's interpretation was that it was to be similar, with no exploitation or special interests".

Witness was asked, "What reason was there to believe that Germany and Italy would have this virtuous understanding of the New Order in Europe?" He laughed and stated that he believed "Germany and Italy were forced to act and set up a sphere within which the various countries could minister to each other's needs" and that this "was a concept within the meaning of the word 'virtue'".

P. 5 Witness said he could not tell what would happen if one or more of the conquered countries did not wish to join such an order.

Witness stated, "I might say that I believe that any country is not uninterested in its own prosperity", but added that in connection with the New Order, Japan was interested "not in her own prosperity alone", but Manchuria's and China's as well.

Witness stated that Hongkong "should have eventually been turned over to China, since it was Chinese territory". After its capture he said it was administered by a Japanese Governor General.

28 January 1946, Ser. #38

P. 6 Witness stated that the countries represented at the Greater East Asia Convention of 6 November 1943 were Manchuria, China, the Philippines, Thai, Burma, and Japan.

Witness admitted that the delegates from Burma and Thai left those countries at a time when the Japanese armies were still there, though witness said, "Arms were not used against the people of Burma and Thai".

Witness said that had Japan won the war, he personally would have liked to have seen Burma given independence, but that question would have been settled with England at the Peace table.

Witness stated that the Greater East Asia Convention provided for the independence of Burma and, second, that Japan and other nations at the Convention would respect her sovereignty and independence. (Witness examined his notebook and read from the second point of the Joint Declaration to verify this fact.) He also added that the Japan-Burma Treaty of Alliance of 1 August 1943 stated that in return for Japan's recognition of the independence of Burma, both countries agree to respect the independence of the other.

29 January 1946, Ser. #39

P. 1 Witness stated that in connection with the Tri-Partite Pact, Japan was to have no control over the European sphere and likewise Germany and Italy were to have no control over Greater East Asia.

P. 2 Witness stated that Japan hoped at the time of signing the Pact that Germany and Italy would be victorious and believed that the government thought that the "comparative probability" was that they would be, and likewise that his cabinet so felt.

Witness stated that the question of victory or defeat was not the primary one in connection with Japan's signing the Pact, but that of course if she had not believed that they would be successful in Europe, it would have been foolish for her to join the alliance. The primary reason for Japan joining the Pact was that, after the lapse of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations, "Japan was internationally isolated".

Witness stated that the creation of a New Order in East Asia was a fundamental Japanese aim which would have continued, regardless of the signing of the Three-Power Pact, but that "however, Japan did desire that the New Order in East Asia be recognized in the Pact itself".

P. 2 - 3 Witness was asked if the Japanese Government did not feel that by signing the Pact, they could attain the Far Eastern Sphere desire more quickly, and, in answer, said that they hoped to utilize the strength of Germany to bring about peace between Japan and China, which the government greatly desired. "As far as the Far East was concerned, the people of the Far East wanted to build their own sphere and not rely on other power than their own. He thought the Premier and Foreign Minister agreed with him on that.

Witness stated that on the signing of the Pact with Italy and Germany, he, of course, did feel both solemnity and joy due to the fact that before that Japan had been isolated internationally.

Witness was questioned in connection with the statement made by MATSUOKA on 27 March 1941, as Foreign Minister, while enroute to Berlin, that it was up to the Americans to leave it to Japan to maintain peace in Asia, and added that at that time he agreed with that statement and thought it was very appropriate.

He was also questioned about another statement made at the same time to the effect that MATSUOKA had believed since leaving Geneva in 1932, Britain and the United States would eternally oppose the reconstruction of the Far East by Japan. The witness added that at the time the statement was made, he felt that way also and likewise did not believe that either England or America felt very favorable about the New Order in East Asia.

Witness was questioned about a statement allegedly made by him to the Diet on 27 May 1942 in connection with the Japanese nation never sheathing "the sword of righteousness unless and until the influence of the Anglo-American Powers, with their dream of dominating the world, had been completely uprooted".

P. 3 - 4 Witness replied that he had made that statement and, being at war then, he thought it was very appropriate. The witness added that he was referring to the influence of the Anglo-American Powers in East Asia and had felt that way since the Greater East Asia War. Witness stated that prior to the beginning of the war, he "thought that the rights and interests of America and England in the Far East should be adjusted", but when the war began, he changed his ideas in favor of "ejecting them from the Far East by force of arms". Witness added that these were not only his personal thoughts as Prime Minister, but were the common thoughts of his cabinet.

Witness stated that so far as he knows every view expressed by him in connection with the interrogations of 29 January 1946, were also the common views of his cabinet.

If Japan had won the war, some adjustment of rights and interests would have been made at the Peace Conference. There, two things have to be kept in mind, one, is the military situation, the other, the preservation of peace in the future.

30 January 1946, Ser. #40

P. 1 Witness stated that he felt the Foreign Minister, who was the responsible party, had made an investigation of the national policies of Germany and Italy prior to the signing of the Pact, but witness did not. He added that he assumed that it was the main national policy of these countries at that time to win the war.

Witness does not recall any deep discussion of the matter of the national policy of Germany and Italy prior to the signing of the Pact. The cabinet did get some general intelligence reports on the military situation and political reports, but no specific report on national policies of Germany and Italy prior to signing the Pact.

P. 2 Witness stated that a close relationship between the countries was built up by the Anti-Comintern Pact and by the Cultural Agreement with Germany signed in 1938 and a trade agreement in 1939.

Witness stated that prior to the signing of the Pact, a majority of the officers in the army were pro-Axis for a variety of reasons. One reason was that the German Army followed the Prussian military system since the Franco-Prussian War. Though defeated in the 1st World War, German military strategy and tactics were considered excellent. Another reason was "that the military situation had

"developed in a manner comparatively favorable to the Axis and this had a bearing on the decision". There was a "pro-Axis atmosphere" in the army but no factions or cliques in that respect.

Witness admitted that the pro-Axis feeling in the army did influence the signing of the Tripartite Pact.

P. 2 - 3 Witness stated that this pro-Axis atmosphere which permeated the army was undoubtedly communicated to the War Minister by the Chief of Staff and by the War Minister to the Cabinet. Witness stated that the War Minister introduced the subject of the army's feelings into the Cabinet discussions where they had some influence upon the decisions taken. The Chief of Staff is of equal standing with the War Minister and not subordinate to him. He does not attend cabinet meetings, but his views on a multitude of matters are conveyed to the cabinet by the War Minister. He explains the importance of the Chief of Staff.

Witness stated that it was usual, where the War Minister agreed with the feeling of a large number of army officers, for those feelings to be communicated to the Cabinet by the War Minister.

P. 4 Witness stated that the big reason for the signing of the Pact was "that the three nations could contribute to world peace by the alliance". The witness also added, "The approval or disapproval of specific policies was not a matter of very much moment in Japan". (Refers to German and Italian policies).

Witness was asked whether or not the Cabinet considered the expressions and policies of HITLER and MUSSOLINI prior to signing the Pact, and he answered, "I don't remember, but I think they did not". Witness was asked whether the Cabinet knew what the expressions and policies of HITLER and MUSSOLINI were, and he answered, "I think they did as a result of intelligence and similar reports".

Witness was asked if he personally knew what they were, and he replied, "Yes, of course I did".

1 February 1946, Ser. #43

P. 1 Witness stated that at the beginning of World War II in Europe, there were two groups of nations, one seeking to maintain the status quo, and the other seeking to set up a New Order and that it is so stated in the text of the Three Power Pact.

P. 2 - 3 Witness gives the reasons why he believes Germany and Italy went to war.

P. 3 Witness again said that the Three Power Pact said, in substance, that the Axis Powers were fighting to change the status quo and to set up a New Order in Europe. The other group had access to plentiful natural resources; the Axis did not and were oppressed. STAHMER, OTT, and MATSUOKA conferred on the Pact and it was signed shortly after STAHMER came to Tokyo.

P. 5 Witness again stated that he and the army were sympathetic with the Axis Cause after the war broke out and that he, personally, felt close to Germany and Italy because of their ties with Japan and of course wanted Germany to win.

Witness again stated that the Chief of Staff had communicated the army pro-Axis feelings to him and he had reflected these sentiments in Cabinet meetings. The Chief of Staff kept the Premier and Foreign Minister similarly informed.

Witness stated that after the outbreak of the European War, the Cabinet was constantly aware of the pro-Axis sentiments of the army. The Chief of Staff at this time had pro-Axis leanings.

P. 6 Witness stated that the Three-Power Pact "provided that both sides would act in concert and cooperate to set up the New Orders".

P. 6 - 7 Witness was then asked whether he could tell anything "more about the New Order which Germany and Italy desired to set up", and he answered, "No, I don't remember".

4 February 1946, Ser. #44

P. 1 Witness was asked whether, on or about 21 January 1942, he did not state, at the opening of the First War Diet, as was reported:

"The fundamental policy underlying the work of establishing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is traceable

"to the guiding spirit of the founding of the country. That is to say, it is to enable all states and peoples in Greater East Asia each to have its proper place, and to establish a New Order based on morality under which all can live in mutual prosperity with Japan as leader."

He replied, "I think so, although I don't remember absolutely".

P. 1 - 2 Witness was questioned about a statement made by him on to wit: 30 November 1941, while welcoming certain delegates to Japan, such statement saying in effect that England and the United States had for some time sought to control Asia and had prevented the New Order, as understood by Japan, from being put into effect. Witness said that he thought he probably did so state, but didn't remember it. He added that he had such views at that time.

P. 3 Witness stated that China had raw materials, no facilities for their exploitation and processing; she had labor, but no capital or technique.

P. 4 Witness again stated that the creation of the New Order in East Asia was the indirect cause of the war with England and the United States and further said, "If England and America had temporarily agreed to the creation of a New Order in East Asia, this agreement would have favorably affected the possibility of nipping the war in the bud before it started....The direct cause

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

"was elsewhere.....The question of war or peace depended on the direct causes". Japanese troops were stationed in northern

13 February 1946, Ser. #57 from Singapore, the Philippines,

P. 1 - 2 Witness believes that matters in connection with French Indo-China were decided at the Imperial Conference the first week in July 1941. The two points decided at that conference, as constituting Japanese national policy, first, the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and, secondly, that it was necessary to dispose of the China Incident and to take measures with a view to advancing southward for purposes of self-existence and self-protection were mentioned to him and he stated that he felt these matters probably were decided at the conference. Witness states the same thing on P. 3.

Witness also stated that the matter of advancing southward probably referred to sending troops to the southern part of French Indo-China in order to promote trade with the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth.

P. 3 On 9 May 1941, Japan had arbitrated the border dispute between Thai and French Indo-China, witness stated.

P. 4 Witness stated that Japan concluded a joint defense treaty for the stabilization of French Indo-China on 29 July 1941. Troops were dispatched to southern Indo-China on the same day.

A military agreement had been concluded 22 September 1940, under which Japanese troops were stationed in northern Indo-China. Military pressure from Singapore, the Philippines, and so forth, had continued. On 25 July 1941, American freezing of assets had gone into effect, and it had become very difficult to carry on peaceful commerce with the Dutch Indies. The China Incident was continuing and the stabilization of French Indo-China was an important matter, therefore, on 29 July, troops were sent to the southern part of French Indo-China under the agreement. The Imperial Conference had foreseen changes in the situation and had decided to carry on negotiations with France in respect to Indo-China.

P. 5 Witness again states the basic reason for the Imperial Conference of July 1941 was the problem of dispatching troops to southern Indo-China and believes that the plan for calling the Imperial Conference was his plan as War Minister. A Liaison Conference had been held before the Imperial Conference which had practically decided the whole matter.

Witness states the names of those present at this Liaison Conference. The main reason for going southward was the necessity of maintaining the stability in French Indo-China while the China fighting was going on. American trade had stopped and Japan needed

oil, iron ore, bauxite, tin, and food from the south.

P. 6 During this period, Japan was getting rice from French Indo-China, Thai, and Burma; oil from the Netherlands East Indies; iron ore, bauxite and tin from Malaya. Oil no longer came from America, and negotiations had continued with the East Indies until 17 June 1941 when the talks were broken off. Cotton also came from the Netherlands East Indies and copper from the Philippines.

While the stabilization was the main desideratum, the economic pressure from A-B-C-D Powers was very great at this time. SUZUKI could tell more in detail about this.

P. 7 Japan needed these raw materials for her own existence and hoped to get them peacefully, if possible, witness stated.

Witness stated that he supported the two national policies outlined in the Imperial Conference of July 1941, and it is likely all there did also.

Witness stated that, while the stabilization of French Indo-China was the main purpose of the Imperial Conference, the necessity of Japan's obtaining these various raw materials was also a purpose.

P. 8 Witness again states that he believes, as War Minister, he called the July 1941 Imperial Conference and again stated everything was probably decided at a prior Liaison Conference.

The economic situation in Japan was discussed at this Imperial Conference.

P. 8 - 9 Witness stated that the responsibility in connection with the movement of troops into southern Indo-China was his responsibility, as War Minister.

He gave three reasons for calling the Imperial Conference:

- 1) The China Incident required an undisturbed area to the south;
- 2) Witness stated that it has been the Japanese idea for a very long time prior to this to maintain the stability of East Asia;
- 3) Foodstuffs, principally rice, imported from Indo-China would be unavailable if there were unsettled conditions in French Indo-China.

Witness also admitted that, as War Minister, he realized that French Indo-China would be of military assistance in connection with the China Incident. The Chinese had used the northern route. Japan wanted air bases in the north to cut off the Burma Road. As French power had declined, it was necessary to station troops all over French Indo-China.

P. 12 Witness admitted that during this entire period, namely, the summer of 1941, the government was still concerned with the New Order in East Asia.

Witness stated that the sending of troops to French Indo-China was for defensive military protection and believed was an appropriate measure of national defense.

P. 13 Witness admitted that when the war broke out in December 1941, these same troops were used for offensive purposes, stating, "The character of the operations changed and they became offensive".

15 February 1946, Ser. #59

P. 1 Witness supposes that Germany did help Japan in arranging the Indo-China treaty of July 1941.

Witness again stated that the New Order in East Asia was still a government policy at that time.

P. 2 Witness stated that when, after the Tripartite Pact, France came into the sphere of German military authority, this then made it a four-Power affair and, hence, French Indo-China became too a part of the New Order. (Germany, Italy, Japan, and France.) Negotiations were carried on with Thailand and it came within the idea of the New Order in East Asia.

Witness stated that at this time the Philippines, the Netherlands East Indies, and Burma, were in the opposite camp and were not part of the New Order. Negotiations were going on with Thai and French Indo-China to secure their agreement to the New Order in East Asia.

P. 3 Witness stated that when the war with the United States and Britain broke out, one attack was made from Saigon, French Indo-China, southwest toward the east coast of Thailand. Planes in southern French Indo-China cooperated with forces making the landing. Navy carrier planes also attacked Singapore.

Due to Japan's part in the Thai-French Indo-China arbitration agreement and the peace treaty following, relations between Thai and Japan were very friendly.

5 March 1946, Ser. #93

P. 2 Witness stated that the Emperor repeatedly mentioned that Japan should not use war or force to establish the New Order in East Asia.

Witness stated that the New Order in East Asia was set up during the war and, when once the war had started, various means were used - political, military, and so forth - in order to win. "It was necessary to unite all the people of East Asia, not just the Japanese and Chinese, around Japan for the sake of victory. I think it was for the happiness of all the peoples of East Asia also".

Witness stated that, although the New Order in East Asia was set up during the war, it was intended that it be a permanent New Order.

P. 3 Witness admitted that it had not been possible to set up this New Order in time of peace, although the desire to do so had existed.

Witness referred to the Japan-Manchuria-China Joint Proclamation which was signed on 30 November 1940 as a step in the New Order in East Asia, which later grew into the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere after the war started.

Witness stated that the fact that the Greater East Asia Convention was held in Japan on 6 November 1943 and the fact that certain delegates, allegedly representing various countries, attended, was the only proof that he had that the peoples of those countries desired this New Order.

P. 4 Witness mentioned that WANG Ching-wei represented the Government of China and that Japan issued the invitations to attend.

Witness stated that the countries joining in the Proclamation were Manchuria, China, the Philippines, Thai, and Burma.

Witness stated that as the Japanese were now a beaten people, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere no longer exists.

P. 5 Witness stated that TOGO resigned as Foreign Minister because witness created the Greater East Asia Ministry in November 1942.

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

Witness stated that he felt the countries composing that Ministry were not "composed of strangers. It was our own family. Other foreign countries were strangers".

He also stated, "Since the Greater East Asia countries were all in the family, mutual economic factors were very important".

P. 6 Witness stated that the following countries were "cared for" by the Greater East Asia Ministry: Manchuria, China, the Philippines, Thai, and Burma, which were, witness stated, "considered independent, from the Japanese point of view", and the following "invaded areas": Malaya, French Indo-China, and the Netherlands East Indies".

6 March 1946, Ser. #94

P. 2 Witness stated that he set up the Greater East Asia Ministry while Premier.

By the Greater East Asia War, witness refers to the war between Japan and the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

Witness stated that the Greater East Asia Convention was a suggestion proposed by Japan who took the initiative in working out this suggestion with the other countries involved. Witness stated that, while Japan advanced the plan, he was the chiefly responsible person in carrying it out.

P. 3 This idea had been advanced by Japan some months in advance and, accordingly, the Greater East Asia Convention was held in November 1943.

Witness stated that the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a development of the New Order in East Asia. The New Order was originally between Japan, Manchuria, and China, and dated from the time of the China Incident. When the war with America and Britain began, the idea of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere came into being, but the spirit of the two Orders influenced each other.

Witness called attention to the fact that the Joint Declaration between Japan, Manchuria, and China, of 30 November 1940, stated, in part, that the three countries "will endeavor to set up a New Order in East Asia, founded on morality". Witness then stated that the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration mentioned "that the countries of Greater East Asia, Japan, China, Thai, Manchuria, the Philippines, and Burma, will undertake to cooperate in the construction of a Greater East Asia".

Witness stated that it was understood that other countries of East Asia, such as Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, if independent, might later also enter the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Witness stated that the Greater East Asia Convention was sympathetic towards the movement of independence of India and that he had expressed to the Diet on many occasions during the war the hope that the Indian people would be able to rid themselves of the British yoke. Witness also stated that Japan recognized the provisional government of BOSE.

P. 4 Witness stated that BOSE was the head of a provisional Indian government set up at Singapore after it was captured. His provisional government functioned from there; that BOSE had also come to Japan.

P. 4 - 5 Witness stated that the aims of the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the one hand, and the "Open Door" policy and provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty were different. Witness further stated in this respect, "They were in conflict in some respects and not in conflict in other respects. For example, the New Order in East Asia or the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere were not in conflict with the 'Open Door' policy. For example, the Greater East Asia Joint Declaration states that the countries of Greater East Asia will...work for...the opening of resources throughout the world and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind, so that does not conflict with the 'Open Door' policy. I think the two things should be compared as to both spirit

"and form. The spirit, that is to say, the purpose, of the Nine-Power Treaty was the stabilization of Asia. Hence, it was important for the treaty to be suited to the actual situation in Asia. The intention was to stabilize Asia. In order to do this, China and Japan were to help each other and to live together on a basis of friendly relations. Misunderstandings and biased views were to be swept out. That was the basic spirit. Japan and China, and especially Japan, signed in this spirit, but the spirit of the New Order in East Asia and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was also a spirit of mutual helpfulness and mutual existence. The two spirits were interchangeable and I do not believe that there is a difference in this respect. However, the actual situation changed between the time of the Nine-Power Pact and the time of the New Order and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. The actual situation at these two times was very different, and because of this, the form is different and, in the application of the various provisions, there were conflicts".

Witness used the following language which is important, as it will be seen from later questioning, that he meant to state, that, in his opinion, the China Incident was a violation of the Nine-Power Treaty, although he was not the responsible party at that time. His exact language is as follows: "The China Incident and

"the Nine-Power Treaty has the possibility of becoming a problem. I can't answer for that because at that time I was not the responsible person....The China Incident was related to the Nine-Power Treaty, but the Greater East Asia War was not".

It is witness's contention, as can be seen from his statements on this page, that the Nine-Power Treaty did not apply to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as the war between Japan and the United States and Great Britain, which he terms the "Greater East Asia War", had started at this time and, as Japan was acting in self-defense, "it was not necessary to think about the Nine-Power Treaty".

7 March 1946, Ser. #96

P. 1 Witness stated that the purpose of both the Nine-Power Treaty on the one hand, and the New Order and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere on the other, was the stabilization of East Asia.

Witness stated that the Japanese felt that that was the purpose of the Nine-Power Treaty, but that in the fulfillment of this purpose, the ideas of the Europeans and the Americans on the one hand, and the Japanese on the other, were very different.

P. 1 - 2 Witness admitted, however, that, in the case of the Nine-Power Treaty, there were nine Powers, including Japan, seeking

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

the stabilization of East Asia, whereas, in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and the New Order, there was only Japan and the smaller countries forming part of the Sphere. (China, Manchuria, the Philippines, Thai, and Burma.)

P. 2 Witness admitted that among the purposes of the Nine-Power Treaty were the stabilization of conditions in the Far East, the safeguarding of the rights and interests of China, and the promotion of friendly intercourse between China and other Powers upon the basis of equality of opportunity.

Witness also added that he thought a very important part of the treaty was that there should be "respect for the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China".

Witness also stated that he was familiar with the various provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty of 6 February 1922 and that he had them in writing before him at the time.

P. 3 Witness stated that one of the provisions was that the parties agree to maintain the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations throughout China. In this connection, witness pointed out that, as the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere came into being after the war, "the Nine-Power Treaty no longer was directly relevant", as, after the war had started, "it was not international law then....It was our duty to uphold international law, but the Nine-Power Treaty was not international

"law then.....Equality of opportunity is in the treaty all right, but the treaty was not applicable at that time".

P. 3 - 4 Witness stated that while he was Premier, the various treaties and international law applicable to Japan during the war were studied by him and were respected by Japan, although he does not know all of the details of the Foreign Office and the Treaty Bureau.

Witness stated that before taking any action on matters involving international law and treaties, in addition to his own researches, he had the advice of the Foreign Office to go by.

Witness stated that "Japan followed international law" during the time he was Premier, and especially in regard to warfare between Japan and England and America and the fighting between Japan and China.

Witness was asked whether or not Japan followed international treaties, and he stated, "She followed them up to the time of the outbreak of the war".

Witness again contended that Japan followed international law in all respects during the time that he was Premier.

P. 5 Witness stated that, as Premier, "It was my responsibility to coordinate the affairs of the various Ministries", witness referring particularly, as the question and answer shows, to the Foreign Ministry.

Witness again states that, before taking action on international treaty matters, in addition to receiving advice from the Foreign Office, he also made a study himself.

P. 6 Witness again stated that, from the time of the signing of the Nine-Power Treaty, many people in Japan were dissatisfied with the treaty.

Witness stated that he was familiar with the five main points of the Nine-Power Treaty which were read to him. These points are as follows:

- 1) The stability of the Far East;
- 2) Safeguards for the rights and interests of China;
- 3) Promotion of friendly intercourse between China and the other Powers on the basis of equality of opportunity;
- 4) Maintenance of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial and administrative integrity of China;
- 5) Maintenance of the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations throughout China.

P. 6 - 7 Witness mentioned that one of the provisions prohibited the seeking of special rights which would abridge the rights of citizens of friendly states.

New Order in East Asia, etc.

Case File 20

Witness stated that before the war, "We respected the treaty. After the war had begun, I believe that the Nine-Power Treaty had no direct application".

8 March 1946, Ser. #97

P. 1 As War Minister, witness approved of and agreed with the Joint Declaration of November 1940 between Japan, China, and Manchukuo.

Witness stated that the only difference between this economic group and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a difference in "scope". "After the War started, it was enlarged in conformity with the territories occupied".

11 March 1946, Ser. #103

P. 1 Witness stated that the second KONOYE Cabinet, in July 1940, announced as Japanese national policy, the doctrine of Hakko Ichiu and the construction of a New Order in Greater East Asia, founded on strong coordination between Japan, Manchukuo, and China, with Japan as the pivot. "Japan, China, and Manchuria were to form a union".

It was also stated at that time that, to realize this national policy, "there would be a unification of the forces of the Empire".

Witness stated that he not only approved this policy but worked for its realization "with all my power".

P. 2 Witness believes that from July and 30 November 1940, General ABE had been laying the groundwork for the Japan-Manchukuo-China Joint Declaration and the Japan-China basic treaty.

Witness stated that the Preamble of the Joint Declaration between the three countries mentions "the creation of a New Order, founded on morality in East Asia".

Witness thinks that there was a provision in the Japan-China basic treaty, announced 30 November 1940, that certain mineral resources in North China and elsewhere were to be developed through close cooperation between the countries.

P. 3 Witness states that at the time the Joint Declaration and the basic treaty were announced, he was War Minister and, in general, knew of the terms of both.

12 March 1946, Ser. #109

P. 5 Witness stated that the countries under the Greater East Asia Ministry, starting in November 1942, were Manchuria, China, the Philippines, French Indo-China, Malaya, Thai, Burma, Netherlands East Indies, and also the Mandated Islands.

Witness was asked whether or not SUZUKI was not, with him, a creator of the idea of this Ministry, and witness answered, "No, I was the creator. I thought it necessary. He agreed, but it was really I who thought of it".

20 March 1946, Ser. #119

P. 3 - 4 Witness thinks Premier KONOYE did say on to wit 12 October 1940, "At home we must establish the New Order as well as establish a New Order in East Asia and the world" as the basic national policy was decided by the Cabinet on 1 August 1940.

P. 5 Witness was asked if the oath of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association Party did not include language, in part, as follows: "The great march of the Japanese people has begun. Dawn over Asia is approaching. The throbbing life power of the Japanese people has begun its historic march under the great ideal of the birth of the nation". Witness replied, "I don't know. I dare say it did. However, there is one mistake here. This was not a party - it was an association".

21 March 1946, Ser. #119

P. 5 Witness was asked why it was necessary for Manchuria and China to be included in the new structure at home, and he replied, "That is a difficult matter. The world tendency at that time, and

"since the end of the first European War, has been toward the formation of economic blocs. Small countries, like China, Japan, and Manchuria, couldn't stand alone. England had her colonies, the United States had the countries of South America, and, because of tariff barriers, if China, Japan and Manchuria had attempted to exist as small separate units, they would not have been able to do so. Therefore, the idea was for Japan, China, and Manchuria, to exist as a bloc on a mutual give-and-take economic basis".

FACTS LEADING UP TO AND CONNECTED WITH PEARL HARBOR
AND OTHER SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS

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FACTS LEADING UP TO AND CONNECTED WITH PEARL HARBOR AND OTHER
SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS

14 January 1946, Ser. #26

P. 13 Witness stated that the war with the United States was fought for self-survival, as were the Manchurian and China Incidents and that, therefore, the Kellogg-Briand Treaty, outlawing war, was not binding on Japan.

Witness stated he knew Japan had signed the Kellogg-Briand Treaty outlawing war as a national policy. In 1939 European countries went to war for their self-defense and Japan went to war for her self-defense.

Witness stated, however, that as the Manchurian Incident and the China Incident were wars for self-survival, that this treaty was not binding on Japan, although she was a party to it.

P. 12 - 13 Witness stated that he knew of the Nine-Power Treaty and its provisions as to China; likewise, that Japan was a party to it from 1922 on.

Witness stated that, from a spiritual point of view, the Nine-Power Pact ought to have been respected, but the Japanese people were not satisfied with it and didn't like it.

P. 14 Witness stated that "we signed the Nine-Power Treaty but there was a deep-seated dissatisfaction in Japan". Japan was "obligated to abide by it", but "it was a blow to the Japanese people".

P. 15 "The army felt very dissatisfied about the treaty..... I felt it was not just but had to be accepted to maintain peace in the Pacific. If the Japanese people could modify the treaty later on, they wanted to do that".

7 February 1946, Ser. #45

P. 1 Witness believes that it was at the 6 September Imperial Conference that the Emperor had something to say. There were those who favored going to war, believing there could be no diplomatic solution, and those who believed the negotiations should continue and that there might be a possible diplomatic solution.

The Emperor's final words were to the effect that everything possible should be done to effect a settlement by diplomacy and to avoid war.

This was not just the Emperor's opinion on that occasion - he always felt so.

After the draft of the Declaration of War had been prepared by the Cabinet, witness stated he took it to the Emperor on 5 or 6 December, he believes it was, and the Emperor, in reference to the opening of hostilities with America and Britain, added a phrase which the witness recollected to be, "It is not our intention to go to war with America, but it is truly unavoidable".

This was the first time in witness's experience that the Emperor has inserted something like that with his own hand.

P. 2 The press were informed by the cabinet of the declaration of war on America at about 11:30 or 12:00 A.M. on 8 December.

It was four or five hours after the Pearl Harbor attack that the Japanese people learned of it. (Actually was 8 - 9 hours.)

P. 3 Witness stated that he was the responsible party who should be charged in connection with the Pearl Harbor attack and the attack on American possessions; that he was the one chiefly responsible from the standpoint of Ministers of State and, from the standpoint of prerogative of command, the Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff were responsible, and that the other cabinet members were responsible to a lesser degree than he was.

P. 4 Witness stated that, as a member of Imperial Headquarters and a War Counsellor, he knew of the army war plan but did not know of the navy war plan, although a member of Imperial Headquarters and a War Counsellor.

Witness stated that in his capacity as Prime Minister, he knew the date of the Pearl Harbor attack, but did not know the details of the navy's plan of attack and read of the operational details since the close of the war.

P. 5 Witness admitted that his responsibility with respect to the December 1941 attack on the British possessions was the same as in the case of the American attack.

Pearl Harbor, etc.

Witness said he realized he was the one primarily responsible for the December 1941 attacks on Pearl Harbor and American and British possessions.

Witness again stated the responsibility of the Chiefs of Staff and the cabinet officers with him in these matters. As senior member, he was the one "chiefly responsible", he said.

P. 5 - 6 Witness stated that he knew he was suspected of being a war criminal and understood that, although suspected, we were only investigating the facts.

Witness again stated he was the person "bearing chief political responsibility".

Witness stated that he had received fair treatment during the interrogations and appreciated the same fully. He also stated that he would expect the same fair treatment from any trial in which the American Government would participate.

8 February 1946, Ser. #49

P. 1 It was the Imperial Conference of 1 December that made the decision causing the Pearl Harbor attack and to open war between Japan and the United States.

P. 2 The issuing of the operations orders was the function of the Naval Chief of Staff.

Witness again stated that that as a member of Imperial Headquarters, he knew of the attack and stated also that the Foreign Minister knew of the attack on Pearl Harbor. The other Ministers did not know in advance of the attack.

Witness mentions in detail those present at the Imperial Conference of 1 December 1941.

P. 5 Liaison Conferences were usually held twice a week. The witness mentioned those present at the last Liaison Conference.

11 February 1946, Ser. #53

P. 2 Witness presided at the 1 December Imperial Conference.

P. 3 Explained the purpose of the meeting and told those present that war seemed unavoidable for the specific reasons he stated. War seemed unavoidable after the American reply of 26 November and negotiations seemed hopeless. There seemed no possibility of a break in the diplomatic deadlock.

P. 3 - 4 Witness stated that, as War Minister at the Imperial Conference of 6 September 1941, he felt that a decision had to be made by the middle ten days of October whether to go to war or not as economic and military pressure was threatening Japan's existence and if dragged out too long, Japan would be completely helpless. It was decided to attempt to get a diplomatic turn for the better by the middle ten days of October or war would be considered unavoidable.

the same thing on P. 3.

Even when the KONOYE Cabinet fell 17 October, witness stated he felt the opportune time for fighting was in danger of being lost. Japan was being strangled by military and economic pressure and, in time, would have been choked to death.

P. 5 Witness admitted that, at least theoretically, he caused the fall of the KONOYE Cabinet.

KONOYE thought peace still possible if Japan would withdraw troops from China.

Witness stated that the army felt that there was no guarantee that the unlawful acts of the Chinese would not continue if troops were withdrawn and so the army could not bear to have troops withdrawn from China.

13 February 1946, Ser. #57

P. 1 - 2 Witness believes that matters in connection with French Indo-China were decided at the Imperial Conference the first week in July 1941. The two points decided at that conference, as constituting Japanese national policy, first, the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and, secondly, that it was necessary to dispose of the China Incident and take measures with a view to advancing southward for purposes of self-existence and self-protection were mentioned to him and he stated that he felt those matters probably were decided at the conference. Witness states the same thing on P. 3.

Witness also stated that the matter of advancing southward probably referred to sending troops to the southern part of French Indo-China in order to promote trade with the Netherlands East Indies, and so forth.

P. 3 On 9 May 1941, Japan had arbitrated the border dispute between Thai and French Indo-China, witness stated.

P. 4 Witness stated that Japan concluded a joint defense treaty for the stabilization of French Indo-China on 29 July 1941. Troops were dispatched to southern Indo-China on the same day.

A military agreement had been concluded 22 September 1940, under which Japanese troops were stationed in northern Indo-China. Military pressure from Singapore, the Philippines, and so forth, had continued. On 25 July 1941, American freezing of assets had gone into effect, and it had become very difficult to carry on peaceful commerce with the Dutch Indies. The China Incident was continuing and the stabilization of French Indo-China was an important matter, therefore, on 29 July, troops were sent to the southern part of French Indo-China under the agreement. The Imperial Conference had foreseen changes in the situation and had decided to carry on negotiations with France in respect to Indo-China.

P. 5 Witness again states the basic reason for the Imperial Conference of July 1941 was the problem of dispatching troops to

southern Indo-China and believes that the plan for calling the Imperial Conference was his plan as War Minister. A Liaison Conference had been held before the Imperial Conference which had practically decided the whole matter.

Witness states the names of those present at this Liaison Conference. The main reason for going southward was the necessity of maintaining the stability in French Indo-China while the China fighting was going on. American trade had stopped and Japan needed oil, iron ore, bauxite, tin, and food from the south.

P. 6 During this period, Japan was getting rice from French Indo-China, Thai, and Burma; oil from the Netherlands East Indies; iron ore, bauxite and tin from Malaya. Oil no longer came from America, and negotiations had continued with the East Indies until 17 June 1941 when the talks were broken off. Cotton also came from the Netherlands East Indies and copper from the Philippines.

While the stabilization was the main desideratum, the economic pressure from A-B-C-D Powers was very great at this time. SUZUKI could tell more in detail about this.

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Pearl Harbor, etc.

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The economic situation in Japan was discussed at this Imperial Conference.

P. 8 - 9 Witness stated that the responsibility in connection with the movement of troops into southern Indo-China was his responsibility, as War Minister.

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 - 2) Witness stated that it has been the Japanese idea for a very long time prior to this to maintain the stability of East Asia;
 - 3) Foodstuffs, principally rice, imported from Indo-China would be unavailable if there were unsettled conditions in French Indo-China.

Witness also admitted that, as War Minister, he realized that French Indo-China would be of military assistance in connection with the China Incident. The Chinese had used the northern route.

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Japan wanted air bases in the north to cut off the Burma Road. As French power had declined, it was necessary to station troops all over French Indo-China.

P. 12 Witness admitted that during this entire period, namely, the summer of 1941, the government was still concerned with the New Order in East Asia.

Witness stated that the sending of troops to French Indo-China was for defensive military protection and believed was an appropriate measure of national defense.

P. 13 Witness admitted that when the war broke out in December 1941, these same troops were used for offensive purposes, stating, "The character of the operations changed and they became offensive".

15 February 1946, Ser. 459

P. 1 - A treaty was signed with French Indo-China in July 1941. Germany helped to bring it about.

P. 4 Witness stated that throughout 1941, he was opposed to withdrawing troops from China.

P. 5 Witness stated that the army and the cabinet in 1941 were also opposed to withdrawing troops from China on the basis of the situation there.

Witness stated that he approved and took full responsibility for everything the Foreign Minister did in connection with sending

the final note to the United States. Both he and the Foreign Minister were responsible in this regard, he said.

P. 6 Witness believes that it was a mistake to have dealt with America and Britain as a whole in this matter and that it would have been better to have had the Foreign Minister deal with them separately. It was thought that America would inform England and that no notice was necessary for her. When asked if Japan declared war on Great Britain in 1941, he said, "The Imperial Declaration of War was issued against both England and America". He again stated that the responsibility for the delivery of the final United States note belonged to the Foreign Minister and himself. That note marked the end of diplomatic negotiations.

18 February 1946, Ser. #64

P. 1 Witness stated that at one time during the United States negotiations, Japan had offered to withdraw troops from Southern Indo-China to northern Indo-China if certain conditions were complied with.

P. 1 - 2 Witness was told that Admiral NOMURA had said that the final note sent by Japan to the United States was not a Declaration of War.

Witness stated that the final note to the United States was only a final note breaking off diplomatic relations, but that it was

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different from a declaration of war. By breaking off diplomatic relations, it made possible freedom of action on the part of Japan. The notice, witness felt, was important in connection with international treaties, but also mentioned that, by the attack, Japan was only exercising her right of self-defense.

Witness again stated that the note gave Japan freedom of action from the standpoint of international treaties.

Witness stated that he thought no mistake was made in diplomatic relations that were taken prior to the beginning of the war, although that was the primary responsibility of the Foreign Minister.

P. 3 Witness stated that all responsibility in connection with the note belonged to him and the Foreign Minister.

Witness stated that the Cabinet also knew of it and approved of it.

Witness was asked what international treaties he had been referring to in connection with sending the note, and he replied, "Isn't there a Hague Treaty, or something, that applies to these matters?"

Witness was asked if the Hague Convention did not call for a Declaration of War prior to an actual attack, and he replied, "I think that if a nation is challenged, it is not restrained from exercising the right of self-defense".

Witness further stated that prior to the time of sending the note, he had studied this matter carefully, but now five years have elapsed and he does not have the treaty before him and does not recall too well its provisions, "But I believe we had freedom of action under international treaties".

Witness was asked whether he and the other cabinet members had given any thought to the Kellogg-Briand Pact and its possible violation by Japan, and he answered, "Of course we did".

P. 4 Witness was asked if he and the members of his Cabinet felt that it was necessary to disregard treaty provisions and make an attack on America and Great Britain. He replied, "No, we had regard for them but we did not feel that we were bound because of the reasons I have mentioned. That applies to the Kellogg-Briand Pact too".

Witness was again asked if, for the reasons he had given, he and the members of the Cabinet felt that Japan was not bound by any treaty provisions in connection with the attack on the United States and Great Britain, and he replied, "Yes".

Witness stated in detail what he meant by Japan being challenged, stating, "During the diplomatic negotiations between Japan and the United States, military forces were being concentrated in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Malaya by the United States and England, airfield facilities were being prepared and, more specifically, the

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"main strength of the Atlantic Fleet had been concentrated at Hawaii along with the Pacific Fleet. Some Admiral had made the statement that if a Japanese-American war broke out, the Japanese Fleet would be annihilated in a matter of weeks. Prime Minister CHURCHILL also made the statement that if a war started between Japan and America, England was prepared to come in within twenty-four hours. I understand that the question refers only to the military challenge. The economic challenge was very grave also, but these matters that I have mentioned were what I meant by military challenge. There was a relation between the military threat and the economic threat".

19 February 1946, Ser. #73 all of the Cabinet agreed with me.

P. 1 Witness stated that, by the delivery of the last note to the United States, Japan acquired "freedom of action from the standpoint of international law".

Witness stated that prior to making the attacks on the United States and Great Britain, this whole matter of the responsibility under treaties and under international law had been considered by him and the Cabinet. ~~Witness~~ didn't know the exact number. ~~But for~~

Witness called attention, however, to the fact that this matter "was the grave responsibility of the Foreign Ministry".

The Foreign Minister reported to the Cabinet on these matters, stating the gist of treaties and international law.

P. 2 The whole Cabinet attended the Imperial Conference of December 1st or 2nd which made the decision for war, but the problem of how the final note was to be dispatched was a technical question which was handled by the Foreign Minister.

Witness was asked who informed him and the Cabinet that there was nothing in any treaty or in international law which would preclude the attacks being made on the United States and Great Britain. Witness replied, "It was the result of my research. We had been challenged and were acting in self-defense. Therefore, I thought that we were not impeded from the standpoint of international law or treaties".

Witness stated that all of the Cabinet agreed with him. "They also studied the question and agreed".

Witness stated that he began the study of these matters from the time that the problem arose.

P. 3 Witness was asked at how many Liaison Conferences this matter of treaties and international law was discussed in connection with the attacks which were to be made on the United States and Great Britain. Witness replied he didn't know the exact number, "but for some time previous to the last one. At the last one, these questions were discussed also and for a very long time; the conference started at about 1 o'clock in the afternoon and lasted until past midnight".

Witness stated that he presided at the last Liaison Conference and, not only he, but everyone there expressed their views in favor of attacking the United States and Great Britain. "The Finance Minister, the Foreign Minister all gave their views. That was why the conference lasted until after midnight. The final result was that everyone agreed".

P. 4 Witness stated that, in addition to himself, there were present at the last Liaison Conference the Foreign and Finance Ministers, the President of the Cabinet Planning Board, both Chiefs of Staff and probably the two Vice Chiefs of Staff, but he is not sure of that. Witness was not sure whether other cabinet members were present or not. HOSHINO, as Chief Cabinet Secretary, was there, as was the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the Army, and the Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy.

Witness stated that SUZUKI was the President of the Cabinet Planning Board; SUGIYAMA was the Army Chief of Staff; NAGANO was the Navy Chief of Staff; HOSHINO, the Chief Cabinet Secretary; MUTO, head of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Department, and Vice Admiral OKA, Chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau of the Navy Department.

Witness again stated that at this last Liaison Conference, he expressed the same views as already stated on international laws and treaties which he had arrived at as a result of his studies in connection

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with the proposed attacks and that the Conference accepted his views on these matters.

Witness stated that the Foreign Minister spoke on this point, since he was the one chiefly responsible and "my researches resulted in my agreement with his views".

P. 5 Witness was asked why there was not a declaration of war made prior to the attacks on both Great Britain and the United States. He answered, "We thought that when the final note, implying a rupture in diplomatic relations, was delivered, that treaty procedure was finished and we acquired freedom of action. Especially on the assumption of acting in self-defense in response to the challenge from the Anglo-American side, we thought that it was particularly appropriate".

Witness stated that at the final Liaison Conference, it was decided that since the matter of the time of delivery of the last note to the United States was very important, both from the standpoint of strategy and from the standpoint of foreign relations, the Foreign Minister should consult with the Chiefs of Staff so that the strategic and diplomatic necessities could be adjusted.

It was decided that after the Foreign Minister and Chiefs of Staff had made their decision, the three secretaries would do their work on the basis of the decision made.

"The Emperor repeatedly cautioned me to be sure that the Pearl Harbor attack was not carried out previous to the delivery of the

"final note. The Emperor had cautioned not only me but the Foreign Minister and Chiefs of Staff on this point, even before this last Liaison Conference met. He did it many times".

Witness stated that the decision as to the time of the delivery of the note was made after the Imperial Conference. The decision was to deliver the note previous to the time of the attack.

P. 5 - 6 The time set for the attack, witness believed, was around 3:00 or 3:30 A.M., Japan time, and the note was to be delivered before that.

Witness was asked how long before the actual attack the note was to be delivered, and he stated there were various opinions advanced and argued about between the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Minister. There was one idea that the delivery of the note should precede the attack by one and one-half hours; another that it should precede it by an hour; another, by thirty minutes, and so forth. "I do not clearly remember what was the final decision".

Witness was asked if the desire for a successful attack on Pearl Harbor was not the primary matter given consideration. He replied, "Since it was a matter of war, the success of the surprise attack was very important, but also the diplomatic procedures were of great importance. It was not a question of which was most important. They were both extremely important. Especially since