

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1 the first statement?

2 Mr. Murphy: 9/25.

3 Senator Ferguson: A little louder, please.

4 Mr. Murphy: September 25, that was the first and the
5 second one was November 1st.

6 Mr. Gesell: September 25th was the first. The second
7 I have given as November 1.

8 Mr. Keefe: All right. I wanted to get those dates in
9 mind.

10 Mr. Gesell: Now, on November 15th --

11 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I could not hear the
12 first part of the Congressman's remark.

13 The Vice Chairman: He just wanted a repetition of those
14 dates. One was September 25th and the other one was November
15 1st.

16 Senator Ferguson: Thank you. That is 1941?

17 Mr. Gesell: Yes, I am talking about 1941.

18 Senator Ferguson: All right.

19 Mr. Gesell: You knew on November 15th that the Japanese
20 had requisitioned an increasing number of merchant ships and
21 armed those ships, many of them, with antiaircraft guns, did
22 you not?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: I have full knowledge and recollection
24 of these various events that you are speaking of. I
25

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Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 cannot from my own recollection check those particular dates.

3 Mr. Gesell: This is coming from those exhibits that we
4 have put in this morning.

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. Those were dates that we
6 registered that those happened on the preceding two weeks
7 because this was a fortnightly review.

8 Mr. Gesell: You knew on or about December 1st, simi-
9 larly, that Japanese ships had been recalled for quick dock-
10 ing and repair, did you not?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

12 Mr. Gesell: You also knew, and this is specifically on
13 December 1st, that on that date the Japanese had changed all
14 of the service calls for their forces afloat, formerly at
15 000, on December 1, did you not?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know that I knew specific-
17 ally it was a change of service calls. I knew that there had
18 been a change in certain of their codes which resulted in
19 difficulty in our radio intelligence analysis at that time.

20 Mr. Gesell: On that date?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

22 Mr. Gesell: Well, I have here a file of ship location
23 reports and on page 30-d of that file, - and this comes as an
24 intelligence report from your office, it states:

25 "All orange service radio calls for units afloat were

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changed at 0000, 1 December 1941."

Does that refresh your recollection on that point?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: It is a fact, is it not, that the Japanese had changed their service calls previously on the 1st of November?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe so.

Mr. Gesell: And by changing them again so formally within a period of thirty days that was further indication that an emergency situation had arisen?

Admiral Wilkinson: There was every indication from many of those and many others that there was an emergency-situation arising.

Mr. Gesell: Now, when did you first learn that the ship location and direction finding people in the Office of Naval Intelligence had lost track of the Japanese carriers?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall particularly. I know that our ship locations were often incomplete. I know it began to be apparent toward the end of November that there were a large number of ships that we could not locate specifically for both battleships and carriers.

Mr. Gesell: Well, it was specifically notable, was it not, that the carriers could not be located and you knew that at the time?

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Now, you were also aware, were you not, that shipping had been routed to the south through Torres Straits?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe I was aware. It was not of my initiation but I believe I was aware of it.

Mr. Gesell: You were aware of the dispatches that directed all shipping to proceed through Torres Straits?

Admiral Wilkinson: I presume so. I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. Gesell: And you were familiar, were you not, with the general term that I think General Miles referred to here, of there being a vacant sea to the north and west of Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Through which there would be no shipping?

Senator Brewster: Will you answer that?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: While you were at Hawaii I presume you had engaged in war games and other maneuvers in which you had anticipated and prepared against an air attack launched against that point from an attacking force coming from the north?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall the maneuvers of an air attack specifically, but I know that we had a large fleet maneuver there in which there were carriers on both sides and the endeavor of the defending fleet was to inter-

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cept the attacking fleet before it would have got the air attack launched.

Mr. Gesell: You knew as a naval expert that the Japanese Navy had the striking power and the strength and the fleet to approach Hawaii and execute an attack, did you not?

Admiral Wilkinson: If not protected, yes, or, for that matter, any point in the Pacific, including the Canal.

Mr. Gesell: Well, now, would the factors which I have just -- perhaps we should call them facts, -- which I have just reviewed with you, did it ever occur to you prior to the 6th of December that it would be appropriate and advisable to send some specific direction to Pearl Harbor warning against a surprise air attack?

Admiral Wilkinson: It never occurred to me, first, because from my service out there and from these letters that had been interchanged throughout the year it was my belief that Hawaii knew the possibility of an air attack. Second, it did not occur to me because it was not within my province to conclude or derive the enemy functions although naturally I was interested in such matters. And, third, it was my own belief that an approaching force would be detected before it could get into attack range.

Mr. Gesell: Well, did you have any information as to whether or not the Army and Navy at Hawaii were in fact con-

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conducting long range reconnaissance?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not. They had done so while I had been there at intervals.

Mr. Gesell: But you had no information in the months or weeks immediately preceding Pearl Harbor as to whether, in fact, the commanders there were or were not taking action which would permit them to pick up the Japanese fleet before it attacked?

Admiral Wilkinson: I had not.

Mr. Gesell: You were fully aware, were you not, as an Intelligence officer that Japan had bases and facilities at Hawaii which permitted them to know the state of our garrisons and preparations there and the steps we were taking?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. All the anchorages at Pearl Harbor and Honolulu port and other anchorages in Hawaii were readily susceptible of observation by any elements of the large Japanese population; our communications going out of Honolulu were not censored, there were other possibilities of espionage and that had been recognized by the three Intelligence agencies there, the agents of the FBI, the Military Intelligence and our own.

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Mr. Gesell: Had there been any discussion of the fact that the Fleet, stationed at Hawaii, on the flank of a Japanese movement to the south, constituted a threat unless, by some device or means, the Japanese could knock it out of action temporarily?

Admiral Wilkinson: No discussion like that to which I was a party.

Mr. Gesell: Were you aware of that consideration as a naval expert?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and furthermore, I would anticipate that any Navy anxious to strike a blow or to win a war would naturally be in search of the enemy's navy, irrespective of the strategic considerations of being on the flank.

Mr. Gesell: You have said that your division considered it a possibility, I believe that Pearl Harbor, among other points, might be attacked.

Admiral Wilkinson: Sure.

Mr. Gesell: Did you, yourself, personally expect that the Japanese would attack Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. I thought that the Japanese would proceed to the southward, would carry out their campaign, and I felt, insofar as my own guess was concerned, which was not a very good one, obviously, that they would

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not make a direct attack on the Anglo-Saxon nations, but they would attempt to see, as they had already for so many years, how far they could go with infiltration methods without precipitating a full-scale war.

Every evidence indicated their movement was down toward those areas. The question of whether the Philippines would be attacked or not, in my own case, I was not certain about it.

Admiral Turner I know was not confident it would be attack. I thought myself possibly, for political reasons they would avoid the Philippines. I did not think they would attack Hawaii, because I thought, in so attacking, they would expose themselves to great danger to whatever force they brought there, and, furthermore, they would be precipitating a war with the United States, which theretofore they had given every indication of attempting to avoid.

Mr. Gesell: Admiral, in the period from November 27 to the time of the attack, do you recall discussing with anyone the advisability of sending any additional warnings to the theatre commanders in the Pacific?

Admiral Wilkinson: On December 1st, Captain McCullom prepared a suggested memorandum for me with regard to the situation in the Far East.

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Mr. Gesell: May I interrupt there? Is that the memorandum dated December 1, captioned "Memorandum for the Director," signed by McCullom, which appears towards the front of Exhibit 81, a memorandum of approximately five pages long, with a covering memorandum to you as Director?

Admiral: Wilkinson: Yes, except that the particular memorandum is only two and one-half pages long. You are confusing the following memorandum with it.

Mr. Gesell: It goes from page 24 to page 27, does it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, 24 is the covering page.

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2 Mr. Gesell: Right. That is the memorandum you were
3 referring to?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. On receipt of that I went
5 with Captain McCullom to Admiral Stark's office, to discuss
6 it with him, and he called in - if they were not already there -
7 Admiral Ingersoll and Admiral Turner, and I think I read the
8 memorandum, or Captain McCullom did.

9 Mr. Gesell: Out loud, do you mean?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Out loud. There was some discussion
11 about the indications there, and a general agreement that
12 there was a very definite advance by Japan into the South
13 China Sea areas, and that the extent of that advance was not
14 as yet apparent, as to the geographic extent, but the numerical
15 extent of the advance was apparent as a very strong movement.

16 Mr. Gesell: You say that Captain McCullom brought this
17 memorandum to you?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

19 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall what your conversation was
20 with him at that time?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Only that I thought it was very
22 interesting and important, and that Admiral Stark and his
23 people should see it.

24 Mr. Gesell: Did Captain McCullom give any indication
25 in the memorandum as to what should be done?

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2 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.

3 Mr. Gesell: It was you who initiated the proposal of
4 a conversation with Admiral Stark?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: It was Captain McCullom who said
6 that Admiral Stark should see it.

7 Mr. Gesell: Did you think that the memorandum required
8 some additional warning message to be sent?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

10 Mr. Gesell: Did you have any views one way or the other
11 when you went to see Admiral Stark as to whether a warning
12 message should be sent?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: No warning message had been sent,
14 and this was information as to the movement of the fleet in
15 the South China Sea. There was no indication on the face
16 of this evidence that an attack was to be made upon Hawaii,
17 or, for that matter, upon the Philippines.

18 Mr. Gesell: Captain McCullom concluded, did he not,
19 in his covering memorandum, an eventual control or occupation
20 of Thailand, followed almost immediately by an attack against
21 the British possessions, possibly Burma and Singapore?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

23 Mr. Gesell: That was his estimate of what the informa-
24 tion in the memorandum pointed to?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and it was subsequently proved.

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Mr. Gesell: You concurred in his recommendation?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and it was subsequently borne out.

Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion by you, in the presence of Admiral Stark, Admiral Turner and Ingersoll, as to the desirability or appropriateness of sending any further warning message?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall any.

Mr. Gesell: Your discussion with those gentlemen, then, had something to do with the contents of the memorandum?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: This was not the type of memorandum which was sent to the field, was it?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, except a large part of it, if not all, was embodied in the fortnightly summary of that day.

Mr. Gesell: That summary appears in Exhibit 80, does it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure. On page 9 of that memorandum, or page 12, as it has been surcharged in ink later on, you will find the discussion on the Japanese military situation and naval situation, which is very similar, although it does not exist over the whole two months, as this particular memorandum does.

Mr. Gesell: I gather from what you have testified that there was no discussion of Hawaii at this time between you

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2 and Captain McCullom, or between you and Admiral Stark and
3 his associates.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.

5 Mr. Gesell: Do you recall any other instance where you
6 recommended, in the period from November 27 to December 7,
7 that a message be sent or discussed the possibility of sending
8 a message?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall specifically.
10 Captain McCullom has since told me, and it has aided my re-
11 collection vaguely, that he brought a message in to me, that
12 I was concerned about it, in connection with the so-called
13 Winds message, and after the discussion with me he took it,
14 by my direction, to Admiral Turner and Admiral Turner showed
15 him the warning message which had gone out and asked him if
16 he did not think that had covered the situation, and Captain
17 McCullom said it did, I believe.

18 I have no clear recollection on that.

19 Mr. Gesell: I want to ask you, Admiral Wilkinson,
20 whether you have any recollection of it yourself?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I cannot say I have.

22 Mr. Gesell: You are simply repeating then what Captain
23 McCullom told you?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

25 Mr. Gesell: You yourself have no recollection of that

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2 incident?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: I cannot say I do.

4 Mr. Gesell: You of course saw the code setting up the
5 Winds message, did you not?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

7 Mr. Gesell: Did you at any time ever see or hear any
8 message which implemented that code?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is I did after the
10 actual attack.

11 Mr. Gesell: After the actual attack?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

13 Mr. Gesell: You are referring there to the message that
14 was intercepted by the Federal Communications Commission
15 stating about war with Great Britain?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I do not recall specifically
17 which message it was, but I understood after the attack,
18 within 24 hours or perhaps 36, that there was a message that
19 was intercepted and translated. You will recall -- it is
20 my recollection, at least -- in the Winds message it was not
21 a question of war, it was a question of strained relations,
22 in the interpretation of it.

23 Mr. Gesell: Do you have any recollection at all of
24 having heard of or seen any message prior to the attack that
25 implemented that code in any respect?

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Admiral Wilkinson: No, and we were very keenly on the lookout for it, and I do not believe, to the best of my knowledge, there was such a message before.

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Witness Wilkinson

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Mr. Gesell: Was your department or division the one responsible for picking up that message, or was that a function of Communications?

Admiral Wilkinson: It was a function of communications and such outside agencies, outside the Navy, as they had maybe talked with, the FCC and others.

Mr. Gesell: The Office of Naval Intelligence was not the office concerned with the interception or any implementation that might have been seen?

Admiral Wilkinson. No. We were very much interested in the receipt of such a message if it were sent, and I know of no such implementing message having been sent.

Mr. Gesell: I next want to turn to or to check up with you the question of the events of December 6th, and December 7th.

Testimony before the committee appears to establish that on December 6th there was available, sometime during the day, a so-called pilot message, in which the Japanese advised from Tokyo that a reply in 14 parts, to be delivered at a time later specified was to come in.

Admiral Wilkerson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: It also appears that 13 parts of that message were intercepted, decoded and translated on the 6th.

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Admiral Wilkinson Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Were you at your office on December 6th?

Admiral Wilkinson: I was out in my office, I think, until late before dinner, and before I left the office I saw the pilot message, and that night at home I saw the other.

Mr. Gesell: Did you see any message other than the pilot message before you left the office?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, I did not, none of the 13 parts.

Mr. Gesell: That is what I refer to.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Under what circumstances did you see the pilot message?

Admiral Wilkinson I think it was brought to me in the normal course of events in connection with the magic book.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have any discussion with anyone concerning it, after you saw it?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, except I said, "We will be on the lookout for the message." I think I told Captain Kramer, "We will be on the lookout for the message when it comes through."

Mr. Gesell: What kind of set-up did you have in your

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office at the time that you could keep in touch immediately with developments when important messages such as this were coming in?

Admiral Wilkinson: We had normally a 24-hour watch in the domestic branch, and in the foreign branch. Within the last few days of the crisis developing, I had set up a 24-hour watch in the Far Eastern Section alone. I think the day before, when it appeared that the Japanese advance in the China Sea was becoming more and more critical, I had set up, I believe, a watch of the senior officers of the Department, the heads of the branches, and the Assistant Director, to be in the Department.

Captain Kramer was on call, and I myself was on call. As it happened in this particular instance, Captain Kramer received the 13-part about nine o'clock.

Mr. Gesell: I want to come to that in a moment.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: You say you had a 24-hour watch set up in the Far Eastern Section?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Do you mean you had someone in the Navy Department on duty 24 hours a day?

Admiral Wilkinson: No one person, but in rotation, yes.

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Mr. Gesell: Representing the specific interests of the Far Eastern Section of the Foreign Branch?

Admiral Wilkinson: Precisely. There were three officers in there, and they stood watch there in rotation.

Mr. Gesell: Would you mind indicating who these officers were who stood that watch?

Admiral Wilkinson: Captain McCullom, Colonel Boone and Lieutenant Commander Watts.

Mr. Gesell: They were the three officers standing that watch during the specific time we are talking about?

Admiral Wilkinson: There were three. There may have been two or three more. As I recall, there was Lieutenant Siebold. I cannot remember whether he was on the watch or not.

Mr. Gesell: You had no discussion with anyone other than Captain Kramer concerning the pilot message before you left your office?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not particularly.

Mr. Gesell: What do you mean "not particularly"?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. I think I told him we would be on the lookout for the other. I may have told the watch officer in the Far Eastern Section to be sure it did not get away from us when it came.

I may have told, and probably did tell Captain Kramer

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2 to be sure they saw it in the front office.

3 Mr. Gesell: That is what I was getting at.

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I cannot say that I recall specifi-
5 cally that I did, but I feel sure I did.

6 Mr. Gesell: You don't recall about having given in-
7 structions to Admiral Stark or other key officers?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Not at this long range.

9 Mr. Gesell: What time did you leave your office on
10 the evening of the 6th?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I have no specific recollection.
12 I would say about 6 o'clock.

13 Mr. Gesell: You were at home and had a dinner party
14 at your house that night, did you not?

15 Admiral Wilkerson: A small dinner with General Miles,
16 Captain Birdall, and two French officers, whom, in my
17 duties as Director of Intelligence, and taking care of
18 the attaches, I had asked in.

19 Mr. Gesell: Now, at what time during that evening,
20 did you learn that the 13 parts came in?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say roughly nine o'clock.
22 Commander, or Captain Kramer called me up and said he was
23 going to take this on the rounds and would come out to me
24 later. I told him to go ahead.

25 Mr. Gesell: Did he discuss with you what deliveries

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8 he was going to make and to whom he was going to deliver
9 the 13 parts?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: He was going to make the normal
11 rounds. I will not say "normal" because it was after
12 office hours, but in view of the importance of it, he was
13 going to leave a copy at the White House, to see the Secre-
14 tary of the Navy, -- to see Secretary Knox, and Admiral
15 Stark, and Admiral Turner. He subsequently told me he
16 was unable to reach Admiral Turner and Admiral Stark by
17 telephone because they were out.

18 Mr. Gesell: Did Captain Kramer at that time discuss
19 with you on the telephone the contents of the message?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

21 Mr. Gesell: How did he refer to it, if you recall?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I think he said, "The message
23 we were waiting for has come in in part." He obviously
24 could not speak of it on the telephone in detail. It would
25 have been a gross breach of security.

Mr. Gesell: Did he subsequently come to your home?

Admiral Wilkinson: He did.

Mr. Gesell: What happened at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: He brought the message in, and
General Miles and I read it over with him, and I think
Captain Birdall, or Admiral Birdall, read it likewise.

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Mr. Gesell: Now, what time was that?

Admiral Wilkinson: About 11 o'clock.

Mr. Gesell: You had other guests at your home, Admiral Wilkinson. Did you withdraw to another room to read it?

Admiral Wilkinson: We did.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have all 13 parts?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: You did not have the 14th part, or the one o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Now, you went to another room with General Miles and Admiral Birdall and Captain Kramer, and read through the message?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Then what happened?

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure of my own recollection. Captain Kramer tells me I went to the phone and called up, apparently, Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner. I asked Kramer whom he had shown it to, and he said he left a copy at the White House, and had shown it in person to Secretary Knox, who had gone over it, made some telephone calls, and told him to bring it back to the Secretary of State the next morning.

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While Kramer was there, or perhaps after he left -- again my recollection is stimulated by him, but it is not very clear -- he said I made some telephone calls. I may have attempted to raise Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner again, on the basis of his information that they were not there. However, both General Miles and myself, and to some extent Captain Kramer, felt that this was a diplomatic message; it was a message that indicated, or that resembled the diplomatic White Papers, of which we had often seen examples, that it was a justification of the Japanese position.

The strain was largely in the 14th part which we discussed the next morning.

Mr. Gesell: You are discussing what was said at that time, are you, or are you telling what you thought?

Admiral Wilkinson; I am discussing what was said between General Miles and myself, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell: In the presence of Captain Kramer?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think so.

Mr. Gesell: Did Captain Kramer tell you at that time that he had been unable to reach Admiral Stark, or Admiral Turner:

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe he did. I do not recall now, but he informs me he did, and I accept his statement.

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Witness Wilkinson

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Mr. Gesell: I am very anxious, Admiral -- not only to get the full story, but I am very anxious to get your own recollection of what happened.

Admiral Wilkinson: I would like to have it myself, sir, but it is not complete.

Mr. Gesell: When you cannot recollect something I wish you would just say so, and then give us your best judgment, if you want to, as to what you think happened, or from what somebody told you.

Admiral Wilkinson: That is what I just said, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Right.

Did Captain Kramer give you any information as to what had occurred at Secretary Knox's home?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, he said the Secretary had withdrawn with him and had gone over it with him carefully, and had then made some telephone calls and had directed him to bring the message to the State Department the next morning, from which Kramer inferred that he had called the Secretary of State, and possibly someone else.

Mr. Gesell: Did he say to you that Secretary Knox had called the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it independently.

Mr. Gesell: He told you that he was instructed to deliver the message to the State Department the next morning?

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2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, and his assumption was that
3 the Secretary's telephone calls may have been to those people.
4 He did not hear them specifically.

5 Mr. Gesell: Did he tell you to whom he had delivered
6 the message at the White House?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. Obviously it was
8 not to Captain Birdall, who was at my house.

9 Mr. Gesell: Did Captain Birdall read the message that
10 evening?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is he did.

12 Mr. Gesell: You stated that General Miles and Captain
13 or Admiral Birdall discussed the message and referred to it
14 as more or less a white paper.

15 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

16 Mr. Gesell: Or a diplomatic communication.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, a justification for the Japanese
18 position.

19 Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion of this sentence,
20 which appears as the last sentence in paragraph 5, which is
21 the first paragraph of the 13th part, appearing at page 244
22 of Exhibit 1, "Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese
23 Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a
24 basis of negotiation"?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I do not recall any specific

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 instruction on that one paragraph, or I do not recall any
3 discussion of that one paragraph. I believe there had been
4 exchanges in almost the same words in the past, however,
5 when a proposal was being made and turned down and then
6 brought up again.

7 Mr. Gesell: That sentence would indicate that nego-
8 tiations were going to be broken off, would it not?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: If taken out of its text, yes.

10 Mr. Gesell: You did not think negotiations were going
11 to be broken off in the first 13 parts of this message?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: I was not sure there would be, and
13 I did not think diplomatic relations would be broken. It
14 is one thing to break off current negotiations and another
15 thing to break of diplomatic relations. The same negotiations,
16 I believe, had been broken off earlier and then resumed.

17 Mr. Gesell: So I gather the impression that you and
18 the others arrived at your home that evening was that
19 negotiations were going to be broken off?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No, not necessarily. That this was
21 a rejoinder on the part of Japan that the last message we
22 sent to them was not acceptable, which, in fact, we had not
23 expected it to be.

24 Mr. Gesell: Now you said you believed on the basis of
25 what Captain Kramer has told you that you tried to reach

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1
2 Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner by telephone. Is that
3 correct?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, that would be my natural reaction,
5 when he told me he had not been able earlier to reach them,
6 that I called them then.

7 Mr. Gesell: Did you do that, Admiral?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. I do not know,
9 except that I would have that natural reaction.

10 Mr. Gesell: I take it you are quite clear, however, in
11 your recollection that you did not talk to either of those
12 gentlemen on the phone that night, is that correct?

13 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall having talked to
14 them, no.

15 Mr. Gesell: What time did you go to your office the
16 next morning?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: At about 8:30. Between 8:30 and 9:00.

18 Mr. Gesell: Had you received any additional information,
19 by telephone or otherwise, during the night?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: No. It was Sunday morning but I
21 came down reasonably early in order to be on hand when the
22 14th part was received.

23 Mr. Gesell: You had no telephone call concerning it?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

25 Mr. Gesell: You do not recall whether anyone told you

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1
2 to come down?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I came down anyway.

4 Mr. Gesell: You were on call, I understood you to say,
5 in case anyone wanted to reach you.

6 Admiral Wilkinson: Ever since I had taken the job.

7 Mr. Gesell: What happened when you got to your office
8 that morning?

(9) 9 Admiral Wilkinson: I sent for Captain McCullom, who
10 had himself relieved the last man on the night watch shortly
11 before 8:00 o'clock, and he came in and we talked over this
12 matter, and my recollection is after he came in the 14th
13 part was brought up to us.

14 Mr. Gesell: To you and McCullom?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: To me and McCullom. It maybe he came
16 in with it, I am not sure, or that shortly after he arrived
17 the 14th part came in.

18 Mr. Gesell: About what time was that?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: About 9:00 o'clock.

20 Mr. Gesell: At that same time was there brought to
21 your desk the 1:00 o'clock message?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

23 Mr. Gesell: Was there any other message brought to you
24 at that time except the 14th part?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not believe so. If so, it was

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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of relatively minor importance and I do not recall it.

Mr. Gesell: So at 9:00 o'clock on the morning of December 7 you had the 14th part in your hand, and do I understand the only other person in your office at that time was Captain McCullom?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe so. There were other people in the office, yes, but not in my room. I mean the Office of Naval Intelligence has a number of people in it.

Mr. Gesell: I mean the office in the sense of it being in your room.

Admiral Wilkinson: My room, yes.

Mr. Gesell: After having read the 14th part your mind was clear as to the breaking off of negotiations, was it not?

Admiral Wilkinson: Well, it was not only clear about that, which was the last clause in the last paragraph, "it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations", but what was more striking to me was the language in which this last part was couched, "Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a New Order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war."

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 In other words, they were fighting words, so to speak,
3 and I was more impressed by that language than by the break-
4 ing off of negotiations, which of itself might be only
5 temporary. Those would be hard words to eat. The breaking
6 off of negotiations could be resumed.

7 Mr. Gesell: They were really doing this in a big way,
8 so you thought it was very serious?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought it was very serious.

10 Mr. Gesell: What did you do?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I talked to McCullom and we went
12 to see Admiral Stark.

13 Mr. Gesell: Where was Admiral Stark when you saw him?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: He was in his office. I think we
15 arrived there about 9:15.

16 Mr. Gesell: You think you arrived there at 9:15?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: That is my recollection.

18 Mr. Gesell: Using "his office" in the sense of "room"?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: His room.

20 Mr. Gesell: Who else was in his room with him at that
21 time?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. Ultimately Admiral
23 Ingersoll and Admiral Turner were there, but at that moment
24 I do not recall who was there besides himself.

25 Mr. Gesell: Did you show Admiral Stark the 14th part?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

3 Mr. Gesell: That would be about 9:15?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Somewhere around there, to the best
5 of my recollection.

6 Mr. Gesell: What discussions did you have with him
7 concerning the 14th part at that time?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: I think I pointed out to him the
9 seriousness of that language that I just mentioned, and I
10 believe that I advised that the Fleet should be notified,
11 now with any question of an attack on Hawaii in mind, but
12 with the question of imminence of hostilities in the South
13 China Sea. My recollection is that Admiral Stark at that
14 time attempted to call General Marshall on the phone.

15 Mr. Gesell: Well, now, did Admiral Stark have in front
16 of him the 13 parts?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure whether he had them
18 there or whether I brought them all down to him. Either
19 as the result of my coming in or of the earlier receipt,
20 he did have the 14th part, I am sure.

21 Hook
22 follows

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: So by 9:15 or 9:30, you are quite clear that Admiral Stark had read the 14-part message?

Admiral Wilkinson: To my recollection.

Mr. Gesell: In its entirety?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Gesell: Now, when you discussed with him the sending of this message to the Fleet, do I understand correctly that you did not still have the one o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: You say that you believe Admiral Stark tried to call General Marshall at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection is that he did, to consult with him about a message of warning.

Mr. Gesell: The telephone calls made from the outside through the White House switchboard on those dates, as set forth in Exhibit 58, show that Secretary Knox called Admiral Stark at 10:44 a. m. Do you remember that call?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: They show no calls by Admiral Stark to General Marshall until 12:10.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: They show but two calls by General Marshall to Admiral Stark, one at 11:30 and one at 11:40.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Do you believe that sometime around
3 9:30 --

4 Admiral Wilkinson: It is my impression that Admiral
5 Stark either called General Marshall, or told me he would
6 talk with General Marshall on the subject, and I had
7 thought he actually tried to make the call while I was
8 there.

9 Mr. Gesell: You think he picked up the phone and
10 tried to make the call?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: I think so.

12 Mr. Gesell: Do you remember him talking to General
13 Marshall?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I am quite sure he did not.

15 Mr. Gesell: When did the one o'clock message turn
16 up?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I would say roughly about 10:30
18 or 10:40.

19 MR. Gesell: There had been no decision up to 10:30
20 or 10:40 to send any message to the Fleet?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not know. I had not been in
22 there all the time.

23 Mr. Gesell: I want you to straighten me out on that.
24 When did you leave the office?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: I suppose after Admiral Stark had

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by Mr. Gesell

h3

read the message.

Mr. Gesell: And you had made your recommendation to him?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: When did you go back to his office?

Admiral Wilkinson: An hour later.

Mr. Gesell: And what was the occasion of your going back to his office?

Admiral Wilkinson: I may have gone back, I am not sure. I may have gone back to give him the one o'clock message, or I may have gone back to receive any further information.

Mr. Gesell: The best you can now recall is you went back?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: When, to the best of your recollection was it that you received the one o'clock message?

Admiral Wilkinson: About that time, 10:30 or 10:40. Of course, these intervals of time are just relative. I had no intention of checking the clock at each moment. It was well after the 14th part, in other words.

Mr. Gesell: You think it was an hour later?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Or an hour and 15 minutes later?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, nearly two hours later from the time I first saw the 14th part.

Mr. Gesell: You had seen that at 8:30?

Admiral Wilkinson: Between 8:30 and 9:00, yes.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: You are aware that there is quite a conflict of testimony, are you not, Admiral Wilkinson, as to when the 1:00 o'clock message was delivered to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I did not know there was a conflict in when it was delivered to Admiral Stark. I knew there was a conflict as to when it was received in the Department.

Mr. Gesell: Your recollection as to when it was delivered to Admiral Stark is that it was about 10:30?

Admiral Wilkinson: Or 10:40, yes.

Mr. Gesell: Either you brought it there or you arrived at the time it got there?

Admiral Wilkinson: That is my recollection.

Mr. Gesell: At that same time was there available the message concerning the destruction of codes, which appears in Exhibit 1 at page 249, the first message at the top of the page, which gave the instructions to destroy the remaining cipher machine, the machine codes, immediately after deciphering the 14th part?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not believe so. I do not recall of it being available at that time.

Mr. Gesell: What discussions took place in Admiral Stark's office when you arrived there about 10:30?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not remember a discussion

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

1 particularly. I think it was noted that this was the
2 presentation period that we were looking for. It was 1:00
3 o'clock on that day. It was a little sooner than we had
4 expected, because the pilot message said it would be several
5 days, perhaps. That 1:00 o'clock in Washington represented
6 varying times throughout the Pacific and the Philippines.
7

8 I do not recall, as I have stated, that any special
9 mention was made that it was daylight, or shortly after
10 daylight in Hawaii.

11 Mr. Gesell: You knew that it was, did you not?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Oh, yes. It was about two hours
13 after actual daylight. I think you will get the first daylight
14 about 5:30 there this time of the year.

15 Mr. Gesell: It was 7:30?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: It was 7:30 actual time, about two
17 hours after daylight.

18 Mr. Gesell: Do you remember the various times that
19 were discussed throughout the testimony?

20 Admiral Wilkinson: I think some mention was made, as
21 often occurs among naval officers who are familiar with
22 geographic time figures.

23 Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion had as to the
24 fact that the Japanese had been directed to present, on a
25 Sunday, to the Secretary of State, at 1:00 o'clock, this

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 message? That was unusual as to time and unusual as to the
3 day, was it not?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. I do not recall any discussion
5 except that it was sooner than we had expected from the pilot.

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7 Mr. Gesell: Who else was in Admiral Stark's office at
8 that time?

9 Admiral Wilkinson: I believe Admiral Ingersoll, Admiral
10 Turner, and I believe Captain McCullom.

11 Mr. Gesell: Anybody else?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: There may have been. I do not
13 recall.

14 Mr. Gesell: And what happened after that?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I have no recollection. I think I
16 left the office.

17 Mr. Gesell: When do you think you left the office?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Within 10 or 15 minutes.

19 Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion of sending any
20 warning message to the various outposts in the Pacific?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall it at the moment.

22 Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion of the fact that
23 the Secretary of State, Secretary of the Navy and Secretary
24 of War were meeting at the State Department at that time?

25 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall any conversations that

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Admiral Stark or anyone else in the room had by telephone with any of those Cabinet officers at that meeting?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Or any calls that they received from those Cabinet officers?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Or whether there was any call from the Secretary of the Navy to Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkerson: I do not recall that specifically.

Mr. Gesell: Were there any telephone conversations had either way between Admiral Stark and anyone else in the office and the White House, President Roosevelt, or anyone else there?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall. There were several of us in the room. Admiral Stark may have picked up the phone and talked with someone. At any rate, I do not recall it now.

Mr. Gesell: When you left the office you had no indication that any warning message of any kind was going to be sent; is that correct?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, except that in my earlier discussion with Admiral Stark, I had the definite impression that after discussion with General Marshall, he was going to advise the Fleet that the crisis was about to break. That was my impression. Just what caused that, I cannot tell you, except, as I say, I thought I recalled on our mentioning it, that he picked up the phone to call General Marshall, or at least he told me he was going to call General Marshall.

Mr. Gesell: When you saw him the second time, and

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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he had the one o'clock message, he had much more specific information than when you saw him the first time, as to when things were going to happen, did he not?

Admiral Wilkinson: He had the specific information about when the message was to be delivered. He had no indication that anything else was going to happen. It would be inference.

Mr. Gesell: Was there any discussion that it was likely that the Japanese would time some action with the delivery of that note?

Admiral Wilkinson: I do not recall any. It would be possible that they would strike before or after, and at the very moment of delivery it was not too significant. It really looked as though they wanted the thing delivered as soon as they could. They sent it over the wire one day and the next day said, "Turn it over at one o'clock."

Mr. Gesell: I understand your testimony to be when you left, after you had been there the second time, you had no specific statement from Admiral Stark that he was going to send a message to the Fleet.

Admiral Wilkinson: I recall an impression. Whether that impression was born in a specific statement, or born because of the atmosphere of the room, or recommendations of other officers, I do not know. I just have an impression

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h3

he was going to consult with General Marshall, and advise the Fleet, not that an attack was coming on Hawaii, but that something was about to break in the Japanese situation, and that the Fleet should be prepared to steam, or whatever would be brought out by the action which, in fact, did result.

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Witness Wilkinson

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Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: There was no drafting of any message at that time?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, not in my sight.

Mr. Gesell: On the second occasion was there any mention made of Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, except that it might have been mentioned, and I am not sure that it was, that 1:00 o'clock here was 7:30 there, or something of that sort.

Mr. Gesell: What was your reference to the Fleet being prepared to steam?

Admiral Wilkinson: Well, what I meant was that if there was an indication that something was going to break it would be the natural desire of the Chief of Operations to advise the Fleet it was about to break so that if there was any immediate departure from port necessary to fend off an attack, to start for some distant position, either to defend it or to intercept some attacking force -- at any rate, he should be forewarned so that he could complete any last needed stores in order to have the Fleet immediately ready instead of generally ready.

Mr. Gesell: Now, it is your recollection that you did not have at that time the message telling the Japanese to destroy their codes upon the completion of the translation of the 14th part? When did you get that message?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall. I imagine I got it subsequently because it brings no recollection to me; and, obviously, after the attack became known we wouldn't be interested in the destruction of the machine.

Mr. Gesell: When did you next go back to the office of Admiral Stark?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think I was at my office until sometime past noon, went to lunch at home, and while at lunch got a telephone call and hurried back.

Mr. Gesell: After you left that second occasion you were there you had no further conversations with him by telephone or otherwise?

Admiral Wilkinson: Not until after the attack.

Mr. Gesell: You had no information then that a message was being sent by the Army or what the terms of it were?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir.

Mr. Gesell: The officers were to be advised.

Admiral Wilkinson: Never heard of it for hours if not days.

Mr. Gesell: During this period that we have been talking about, the last month or six weeks or two months before the attack, Admiral, did you have any means in the office of Naval Intelligence of keeping posted on diplomatic developments?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. There were several channels by

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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which we had contact with the State Department. I myself rarely, if ever, was called to the State Department for a conference but the Director, the Central Division, Captain Schuirmann, was the Chief of Naval Operations' direct representative with the State Department and he advised me usually of what transpired on the occasions that he was called in conference.

Mr. Gesell: He was not attached to your office?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, he was on the same level as the head of the Central Division.

Also we had a Lieutenant Commander, Delaney Hunter, of the Naval Reserve, who was our Liaison Officer on the lower level, so to speak, and he went over to the State Department daily and searched through the dispatches there, and was shown dispatches from all parts of the world, and made copies of a number of them and extracts of them which because of code security could not be copied direct, and brought those back and gave me every day a list of State Department dispatches which were of interest to us.

Those dispatches, that little paper, usually a dozen pages, was circulated daily within the office of Naval Intelligence and within the office of the Chief of Operations.

Mr. Gesell: Those were diplomatic dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: Well, now, did you have any means of knowing what was taking place in the discussions between Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt and the Japanese Ambassadors?

Admiral Wilkinson: Well, in the first place, I saw the incoming magic, and usually I saw the outgoing magic, wherein the Ambassador was telling Tokyo what he had been doing. If something, on the other hand, was sent from the State Department to Mr. Grew to present over there, I would not see it unless I was told it by Captain Schuirmann.

Mr. Gesell: Or your man went over and read the dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson: He read only the incoming dispatches. I don't think he read the outgoing dispatches.

Mr. Gesell: So you knew what Ambassador Grew was reporting?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes; in general, yes.

Mr. Gesell: You also knew in a general way what progress was being made and what recommendations were being made in the negotiations with the Japanese Ambassadors here?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: By the way, did you know that Ambassador Grew in February 1941 had said that he picked up a rumor that there was a likelihood of a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor?

Senator Brewster: Wasn't it January?

Mr. Gesell: I see the press nodding their heads, so I am sure you are right, Senator.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure whether I knew that at that time or not. I have heard it since, of course.

Mr. Gesell: Of course, that was --

Admiral Wilkinson: It was in line with the fears, the apprehensions of the whole Island that the primary thing was an air attack.

Mr. Gesell: Of course, that was a message prior to your becoming Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes.

Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted with respect to the placing of embargoes and freezing orders on the Japanese?

Admiral Wilkinson: I was not consulted and I don't think Admiral Kirk was.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have anything to do, Admiral, with the joint memorandum which General Marshall and Admiral Stark presented to the President, of November 5 and November 27?

Admiral Wilkinson: No; I wasn't aware of their existence until quite recently.

Mr. Gesell: Did you receive information from Admiral Stark and Captain Schuirmann, and others who were dealing with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy, as to what was taking place at the War Council meetings and at meetings in Secretary Hull's office?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Admiral Wilkinson: Occasionally from Captain Schuirmann.
Not as a matter of routine.

Mr. Gesell: There was no regular way of your being
briefed on what was taking place in those, you might call,
policy conferences?

Admiral Wilkinson: No. You see, that links up with
that other question, whether I was consulted on the warning
messages and so on. Our office was an incoming and receiving
office of information from abroad and from the domestic areas.
We were not concerned with the outgoing directives for the
Fleet nor in fact told of the movements and operations of our
own forces. When we got into the war I arranged for the
setting up of a war room and whereupon we did to a large
degree get the movements of our forces laid out so that we
might have a better understanding and interpretation of the
information from abroad.

But prior to getting into the war we did not know the
United States side of an argument that was going on.

Mr. Gesell: I asked you whether you had anything to do
with the joint memorandum to the President of November 5.

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: There is attached to that document some
supporting papers, it is Exhibit 16 here, a memorandum dated
November 1 from Captain Boone of the Far Eastern Section. Have

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

you ever seen that dispatch? I will show it to you.

Admiral Wilkinson: I am sure I did.

Mr. Gesell: That would suggest that perhaps you had come contact with that joint memorandum of the 5th.

Admiral Wilkinson: No, only that this is part of the information that they had at hand.

Mr. Gesell: In other words, that would be written to estimate the specific situation but without regard to the basic matters being discussed in the memorandum?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. This was some of the data upon which they based their decision.

Mr. Gesell: Did you have any detailed knowledge of the Singapore staff conferences and other conferences which had been taking place between the Americans, the British and the Dutch?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, only that they had been held.

Mr. Gesell: Did you know that the Army -- rather, did you know that a reconnaissance had been ordered by the Chief of Naval Operations, an air reconnaissance, for the purpose of picking up movements around the Kra Peninsula?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, I think I was aware of that.

Mr. Gesell: Were you consulted in connection with the ordering of that reconnaissance?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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2 Mr. Gesell: Did you see the various reports that came
3 in, as are included in Exhibit 78?

4 Admiral Wilkinson: I think so.

5 Mr. Gesell: But you had nothing to do with the decision
6 to make the reconnaissance?

7 Admiral Wilkinson: No. That was a reconnaissance to
8 confirm the evidences which we were getting of a movement
9 south and to determine the precise locations of the Japanese
10 ships and the degree and intensity of the movement. It con-
11 firmed the reports which we had received from our various
12 coastal observers.

13 Mr. Gesell: Did you see a dispatch of December 2nd
14 sent by the Chief of Naval Operations to Admiral Hart express-
15 ing the President's desire to set up a so-called defensive
16 information patrol by stationing three vessels in that area
17 for reconnaissance purposes?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall having seen it.

19 Mr. Gesell: Do you know whether or not any such patrol
20 was ever in fact established?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, I don't know.

22 Mr. Gesell: Do you ever recall seeing the dispatch
23 from Admiral Hart to the Chief of Naval Operations dated
24 December 6 concerning the movement of Japanese vessels toward
25 the Kra Peninsula, which is part of Exhibit 66, which I now

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

show you?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, I think I saw that. I note that it has been signed for in my office. Although it does not bear my initials, I presume it was called to my attention.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

Mr. Gesell: Do you a discussion of that piece of information on the 6th with anyone?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall the discussion. It had been sent to War Plans and Chief of Operations. So it seems no discussion was necessary. It was an indication that the movement was progressing as anticipated.

Mr. Gesell: You don't recall having any discussion with anyone concerning it?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall having any discussion with anyone concerning the dispatches contained in Exhibit 79 relating to the so-called Dutch alert?

Admiral Wilkinson: I recall some of them. I can't say specifically which.

Mr. Gesell: What is your recollection of the incident covered by those dispatches?

Admiral Wilkinson: My recollection of both the dispatches and of the contact with the Dutch Naval Attache at the time was that the Dutch were seriously worried about the implied threat to the Dutch East Indies possessions by the Japanese movement down through the South China Sea, and that these dispatches had to do with such concern of theirs. It was more confirmatory evidence of the movement which eventually took place.

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WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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Mr. Gesell: That refers to the belief of the Dutch that there were Fleet dispositions by the Japanese in the Mandated Islands; I gather from the dispatches that it was not the view of the Office of Naval Intelligence that the forces there were as strong as the Dutch had believed?

Admiral Wilkinson: I believe that was the case, although we had some indications that the Marshall Islands further to the westward Palaus, that there was a force building up there, and the Pearl Harbor unit and the Corregidor unit were both watching for such radio intelligence indications as they could get as to the location of the Japanese ships, and there was a difference between them.

Corregidor, which we believed to be slightly more accurate, felt that there was no pronounced indications of a strong task force in the Marshalls, while the Pearl Harbor unit felt there was, but we didn't believe that there was a large force in the Palaus, as I recall.

Mr. Gesell: Did you ever receive any information from the Dutch, British, or any other friendly nation, which indicated that the Japanese were moving toward Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: That there was likelihood of an attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h3

1
2 Mr. Gesell: Did you know that the Naval Intelligence
3 Officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of
4 a certain telephone of the Japanese consul there on the
5 2nd of December?

6 Admiral Wilkinson: No. I think we were getting
7 information in the last part of that period prior to the
8 attack by such methods, but I didn't know whether it was
9 the District Intelligence Officer, or the FBI that was
10 getting that.

11 Mr. Gesell: Did you have any information of the dis-
12 continuance of the tapping of the phones by the Naval
13 Intelligence Officer?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Not to my recollection.

15 Mr. Gesell: Did you ever receive, prior to the attack,
16 any knowledge of the so-called Mori telephone tap?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure what that is. If
18 that is the one about the flowers message in it ---

19 Mr. Gesell: I will show it to you.

20 Admiral Wilkinson: About poinsettias -

21 Mr. Gesell: Yes. You did not know of that in the
22 office of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

24 Mr. Gesell: I think perhaps if the committee please,
25 we might designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

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1
2 Mr. Gesell: Did you know that the Naval Intelligence
3 Officer at Pearl Harbor had discontinued the tapping of
4 a certain telephone of the Japanese consul there on the
5 2nd of December?

6
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23 office of Naval Intelligence prior to the attack?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

25 Mr. Gesell: I think perhaps if the committee please,
we might designate that conversation Exhibit 84, because

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

h4

there will be other questions concerning it with other witnesses, and I will introduce it at this time.

The Vice Chairman: Exhibit 84?

Mr. Gesell: Yes, sir.

The Vice Chairman: It will be so ordered.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 84.)

Mr. Gesell: One final question, which has to do with these messages involving code burning; I neglected to ask you whether you had had any conversations with General Miles concerning the sending of those messages, particularly the message to Hawaii?

Admiral Wilkinson: I don't recall any. I think it very probable I did.

Mr. Gesell: He stated, at page 2103, that he had conversations with you concerning that.

Admiral Wilkinson: No doubt we did.

Mr. Gesell: Do you recall ever having discussed with him the question of that message sent in such terms that it would also go to the Army as well as the Navy?

Admiral Wilkinson: No.

Mr. Gesell: Mr. Chairman, I think that is all the questions we have at this time.

The Vice Chairman: Admiral, I would like to ask you

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h5

1 a few questions, if I may please, sir.

2 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

3 The Vice Chairman: You were Chief of the Office of
4 Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: Did you say you became Chief of
7 ONI -- when was it?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: October 15.

9 The Vice Chairman: October 15, 1941?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

11 The Vice Chairman: And you continued how long?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: Until July 20, 1942.

13 The Vice Chairman: Did you ever think an attack
14 would be made on Pearl Harbor?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: That was possible, but improbable.

16 The Vice Chairman: How is that?

17 Admiral Wilkinson: I thought it was possible, but
18 improbable.

19 The Vice Chairman: Did you ever at any time prior
20 to December 7, 1941, reach the conclusion that an attack
21 on Pearl Harbor was probable?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: No.

23 The Vice Chairman: Did you ever think such an attack
24 would be made?
25

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h6.

Admiral Wilkinson: I had been out there, Mr. Chairman, for nearly two years, up until the spring of 1941.

The entire time I was there, I thought it was possible that if any war arose, or should any war be in progress, that an attack on Pearl Harbor was possible; but neither then nor on my -- after my departure in May of 1941, nor when I was not Naval Intelligence, did I think it was probable. I always thought it was possible. Almost anything is possible in war, given the tools that can reach the objective.

The Japanese had those tools.

The Vice Chairman: But on up until December 1941, you did not think such an attack would be made?

Admiral Wilkinson: I did not think it was probable.

The Vice Chairman: Even though you had examined and were familiar with the 14-part message, the so-called pilot message, or the one o'clock message, you still did not think an attack on Pearl Harbor was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson: All of those indicated, Mr. Chairman, that Japan was breaking off the negotiations for the adjustment of affairs in the Pacific.

On the evidences indicated, that she was expanding down through the south China Sea, going into Indochina, Siam, possibly the Kra Peninsula, on the basis of the physical

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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evidences before us and on the basis of the breaking off of the negotiations -- and those negotiations, you will remember, were designed to stop the infiltration or the movement of the Japs into Indochina and into those southern areas -- on the basis of that, I figured that they were going to stop the negotiations and go on with their nefarious designs down there.

None of those messages gave me any cause to guess -- and it would have been a guess only, and I am sorry I didn't get it -- but none of them gave me any suspicion or cause to guess that an attack would be made on Pearl Harbor any more than on any other United States objective. In fact, I did not think an attack would be made on any United States objective, but I thought that the Japanese would pursue a course of successive movements, infiltration, trying the patience and temper of the Anglo-Saxon nations without actually urging them into war.

The Vice Chairman: Did you, during that time, Admiral, think that an attack on any other point of the United States positions was more probable than the attack on Pearl Harbor?

Admiral Wilkinson: I thought that as one went westward of Pearl Harbor, the probabilities increased. In other words, the Philippines was the most probable, Guam the next,

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

h8

Wake the next, Midway the last, the last before Hawaii.

I did not think an attack on any of those was probable because I did not think there was a probability of an attack on any United States possession to thrust us, invite us, as it were, into war.

I, perhaps, gave the Japanese credit for less boldness and more political canniness, --

The Vice Chairman: Or common sense?

Admiral Wilkinson: Than they possessed.

The Vice Chairman: Or common sense?

Admiral Wilkinson: Or common sense, to my mind, yes, sir.

In other words, I thought an attack on any United States possession was not probable but that the degree of probability increased, rather decreased as you went from the Philippines eastward.

The Vice Chairman: You were familiar and, of course, kept posted with the progress of the negotiations that were then being carried on by our State Department with the Japanese representatives?

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Gesell

The Vice Chairman: And still, in view of all of that, and the situation that appeared to be developing, more tense, or reaching a critical stage, you still did not think that war between the United States and Japan was probable?

Admiral Wilkinson: I thought it was probable but not inevitable, and I thought that -- in my ill advised opinion, -- that it would come by easy stages, and that the Japs would try our patience as far as they could to avoid getting into war. They had been successful in Manchuria, China, and Indochina. I had heard of this imaginary line of 100° East longitude and 10° North latitude and I had some doubt as to whether we would be able, in the light of the temper of the country, to back that conclusion up.

As I understand it, the conclusion was, there was actually no promise that we would go to war, but that we would think it was a serious matter if they crossed that line. I had some doubt whether the country would be seriously concerned as to matters in that part of the world, and I thought the Japanese were going to push their luck in that part of the world as far as they could.

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Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

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The Vice Chairman: Admiral, did you ever at any time prior to December 7, 1941 reach the conclusion that war between Japan and the United States was inevitable?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. I thought that war was becoming increasingly probable but from all the angle that I saw it from I did not think it was inevitable.

The Vice Chairman: Now, as I understood you to say you did not know that the warning message of November 27, 1941 was sent to the Commander of the Asiatic Fleet and the Commander of the Pacific Fleet for some days after it was sent.

Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure whether it was hours or days. I think about two days.

The Vice Chairman: It was about two days after the sending of that message before you found out that it had been sent?

Admiral Wilkinson: I think so, sir.

The Vice Chairman: I understood you to state that it was not a part of the responsibility of the position that you held to be familiar with messages going from the Chief of Naval Operations to the commanders of the fleets?

Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir, unless I had had some share in the initiation of them myself when, of course, I would want to know whether they had been sent or not.

The Vice Chairman: Am I correct in my understanding that

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 you also state that it was not a part of your responsibility
3 to even keep up with the various locations of the fleets of
4 the United States throughout the world?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. That was another office
6 of Operations, the so-called Ship Movements office, that had
7 care of that, that took care of that and we were privileged
8 to inspect their records and their boards but we had no record
9 of that of our own and we were not kept informed of it. Our
10 activities were one-sided in that we were responsible for the
11 information on the foreign navies and the foreign elements but
12 not for our own.

13 The Vice Chairman: That is what caused me to wonder, how
14 you could operate intelligently as the word "intelligence
15 would imply without knowing where our fleet units were?

16 Admiral Wilkinson: It did cause some difficulties at
17 times and ultimately, as I explained, after the war started
18 I got at the information and was able to keep our own boards
19 posted with where our own forces were.

20 The Vice Chairman: But I believe you had stated that
21 it was a part of your responsibility to keep informed as to
22 the location and movements of potential enemy fleets?

23 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

24 The Vice Chairman: Or the fleets of other countries of
25 the world?

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

1
2 Admiral Wilkinson: Not only of potential enemies but of
3 all countries, yes, sir.

4 The Vice Chairman: The fleets of all other countries?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

6 The Vice Chairman: And you state, I believe, that at
7 various times you were not prepared to give information as
8 to the location of various units of the fleets of some of the
9 other countries of the world?

10 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir. There were many ways in
11 which we could detect them. First, of course, by actually
12 sighting, whether by our own merchant ships or whether by
13 our Naval attaches or Naval observers or consuls at the vari-
14 ous points.

15 Then, second, we could detect them by radio bearings.
16 If we got so-called radio direction finders it would indicate
17 that this radio message was coming from such and such a spot
18 or if we could obtain by the call that the ship was using and
19 the message she was sending, whether we could translate it or
20 not, we could identify the call, then we knew that ship was
21 there and perhaps we would add up some other ships that we
22 knew were usually in company with it, but when the actual
23 sightings failed us and when the radio direction finders
24 failed us and when radio indications were no longer of avail,
25 as when a ship went into complete radio silence and they even

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman

2 stoppe~~d~~ sending messages to her, why, then she disappeared
3 into the void and we might not pick her up for some little
4 time, that ship or a number of them with her.

5 The Vice Chairman: You say there was a part of the Japan-
6 ese fleet that was lost or not accounted for for some period
7 of time?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir, for some three weeks prior
9 to the attack.

10 The Vice Chairman: For some three weeks?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: Several battleships and several car-
12 riers.

13 The Vice Chairman: How is that?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: Several battleships and several car-
15 riers were lost for some three weeks prior to the attack.

16 The Vice Chairman: Did you receive any information or
17 gain any intelligence from any source about the Japanese task
18 force leaving Japan on about, I believe, November 25th, which
19 was the task force that finally resulted in the attack on
20 Pearl Harbor?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: No, sir. Our only indication was
22 that she was not in other waters, that they were in home wat-
23 ers either close to Japan or somewhere in the sea off Japan
24 where we had no means of detecting them. We did not know
25 that they had actually sailed from Japan. When we knew that

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: The Vice Chairman
Mr. Clark

1 they were not down to the south from all we could pick up,
2 that they were either based on or leaving Japan proper.

3
4 The Vice Chairman: As the situation appeared to grow
5 more critical did you increase your efforts to locate or ascer-
6 tain the location of the units of the Japanese fleet?

7
8 Admiral Wilkinson: Yes. The Corregidor station, the
9 Pearl Harbor station and ourselves were all anxious to get
10 all the information we could. The Commander-in-Chief of the
11 Fleet in Pearl Harbor was aware that they were unlocated and
12 he was trying to find them but there were simply no evidences
13 except the negative evidence that nothing could be learned.

14 We have had similar experiences, of course, in this
15 last war. Admiral Halsey's fleet has popped up frequently
16 in a very annoying position for the Japanese when they had
17 not been able to locate him.

18 The Vice Chairman: I thank you. Senator George would
19 be next but he is not able to be present at the moment. Mr.
20 Clark. Mr. Clark of North Carolina will inquire.

21 Admiral Wilkinson: How do you do, sir.

22 Mr. Clark: Admiral, there are just two or three ques-
23 tions in my mind that I would like to have your opinions on.
24 I hope you will not consider this in the nature of cross ex-
25 amination and I appreciate the difficulty of forming questions

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 and probable replies after the event without being influenced
3 by the event itself.

4 I want to go back prior to December the 7th and look at
5 the things that are in my mind from that angle, sir, and I
6 want to ask your opinion as to the strength of our military
7 establishment in Hawaii prior to December the 7th, from the
8 standpoint of an attacking force, whether it would be possible
9 to take it, what would be the size of that undertaking and
10 the likelihood of its success, including landing and taking
11 the island?

12 Admiral Wilkinson: To land and take it I would say it
13 would take a very large force, a force probably larger than
14 the Japanese could muster of shipping and troops, in view,
15 particularly, of the shipping and troops that they were using
16 in the South China Sea.

17 Mr. Clark: Well, now, with the expansion going on to
18 the south as it was and is, would there be any slight likeli-
19 hood of such an attack on the Hawaiian Islands by the Japan-
20 ese?

21 Admiral Wilkinson: Very slight, if at all, because of
22 the known limitations of the Japanese shipping to carry the
23 expeditionary force that would be necessary to land and take
24 the island.

25 Mr. Clark: Yes. Now, aside from that kind of an attack

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

how would the Hawaiian area be vulnerable?

Admiral Wilkinson: How would it be vulnerable?

Mr. Clark: Yes.

Admiral Wilkinson: It would be vulnerable, of course, to a hit and run raid, which is precisely what it got. The Japanese were very fortunate, I think, that they were able to get in and out without detection.

Mr. Clark: But what they did does demonstrate that that kind of a raid was possible.

Admiral Wilkinson: Was possible and without warning, and even with warning our carrier task forces have made the same raids on the Philippines and on Japan throughout this war.

Mr. Clark: I assume that is why our forces had from time to time gone through what you call war games, in which a surprise attack by air was practiced?

Admiral Wilkinson: I presume so, sir, yes.

Mr. Clark: Now, what about subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson: What, sir?

Mr. Clark: It would be vulnerable also from the standpoint of subversive activities?

Admiral Wilkinson: We had always been apprehensive about that because of the large Japanese population. As it happened, that population was in the main very friendly and to the best of my knowledge there was no large scale sabotage at all.

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 Mr. Clark: Now, did you know of the telegram or radio-
3 gram, whatever it was, that General Miles in G-2 sent warning
4 against subversive activities?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I am not sure that I did. I think
6 I probably did, sir.

7 Mr. Clark: Did the Navy send any similar communications?

8 Admiral Wilkinson: No, because it was the Army's re-
9 sponsibility to control the civilian population.

10 Mr. Clark: I beg your pardon?

11 Admiral Wilkinson: No, because it was the Army's re-
12 sponsibility to control the civilian population.

13 Mr. Clark: I think it was General Marshall who first
14 suggested here that the Hawaiian Islands and our military
15 establishment there was on the flank of this Japanese move-
16 ment to the south. What would be the importance of that mili-
17 tarily?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: Simply this, sir, that if your life
19 line to an objective is longer in time or in distance from
20 your home bases than the enemy is distant from that life line
21 at any point, then you may be subjected to attack and to a
22 severance of that life line.

23 Mr. Clark: Yes. Now, if our establishment in Hawaii
24 had not been attacked and we had remained in the full control
25 of the whole establishment, naval and air and army, would that

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 have constituted a serious threat to Japanese movement south?

3 Admiral Wilkinson: No doubt they would have been much
4 concerned. I do not know whether our forces advancing from
5 that line would have had to pass through the danger of air
6 attack from the mandated islands, the Japanese islands, and it
7 may have been that the damage we would receive from those
8 islands might have beaten off the attack we might have been
9 in the process of making, in other words, defeated the threat,
10 but I can well understand the Japanese might be apprehensive
11 about it.

12 Mr. Clark: You do not understand the Japanese would be
13 apprehensive about an attack by our entire Hawaiian estab-
14 lishment in this long movement they were making south?

15 Admiral Wilkinson: I should think they would, yes.

16 Mr. Clark: Well, wouldn't that be of very great concern
17 to them as a military matter?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I should think so.

19 Mr. Clark: Now, did the Hawaiian Islands in that respect
20 occupy a position any different from the Philippines or the
21 Canal Zone?

22 Admiral Wilkinson: Only as the geographic distances are
23 involved. They were much less important, much less threaten-
24 ing than the Philippines.

25 Mr. Clark: I beg your pardon?

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 Admiral Wilkinson: They were much less threatening to
3 the Japanese than the Philippines. They were more threaten-
4 ing to the Japs than the Panama Canal military establishment.
5 The Panama Canal was a means of uniting the oceans, of course,
6 but the greatest military and naval threat, I think, to the
7 southern advance, to the southern extension of the Japanese,
8 was the Philippines. Next after that, because the interven-
9 ing bases of Guam and Wake were inconsequential, and Midway,
10 next after that was Hawaii.

11 Mr. Clark: Well, now, am I to understand, - and my own
12 ignorance of military matters is perfectly complete, sir, so
13 you will have to excuse me if I appear not to understand.

14 Admiral Wilkinson: I do not profess to know too much,
15 sir.

16 Mr. Clark: But do I understand from the military view-
17 point the threat of the Hawaiian establishment to this Japan-
18 ese movement south was not serious?

19 Admiral Wilkinson: I think if the Hawaiian establish-
20 ment had not been largely depleted that the Japanese would in
21 normal military precautions have had to feel their way to
22 the southward much less rapidly than they did advance. I
23 think they could still have advanced into Indo-China and the
24 Kra Peninsula. I assume that they could have gone much more
25 rapidly into Java and into Borneo. It is a question of whether

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 they could have gone into the Philippines and maintained them-
3 selves there. It would doubtless have brought on a fleet
4 battle and our forces, had they advanced across the Pacific,
5 would have been subjected to attacks by air from the Japanese
6 air bases on the islands and they would have been doubtless
7 subjected to attack by the Japanese fleet. What the out-
8 come of that would have been I do not know. Our navy was
9 much smaller then than it was ultimately and in fact at
10 that time it was smaller than the Japanese fleet in the Paci-
11 fic.

12 Mr. Clark: Well, I am sorry to consume so much time.
13 What is rolling over in my mind is whether Hawaii as it stood
14 before the attack constituted such a threat to the Japanese
15 movement south that an attack or some effort to remove that
16 threat might reasonably have been anticipated on our side of
17 the fence?

18 Admiral Wilkinson: I see what you mean, sir, and I
19 think that it is a very sound presumption. Against it,
20 perhaps, are the two facts; first, it would require extreme
21 boldness, which they did actually show, because of the risk
22 involved; and, second, it would be a presumption that the
23 Japanese were prepared to attack the United States in a spot
24 which would be certain to plunge them immediately into the
25 war.

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

1
2 If, as I was mentioning to the Chairman, they had de-
3 termined to feel their way to the southward, to gain as much
4 ground as possible without antagonizing and bringing on their
5 heads the Anglo-Saxon nations, they would not, of course,
6 have been tempted to dispose of this threat because the
7 threat would not have been operating against them.

8 Mr. Clark: An attack in force with an attempt to take
9 the islands being pretty inconsistent with their rapid exten-
10 sion south, and they having been warned specifically in
11 Hawaii, our people, against subversive activities, a surprise
12 air attack was the only thing, the only possibility left open,
13 was it not?

14 Admiral Wilkinson: With respect to Hawaii, yes, sir, and
15 submarines.

16 Mr. Clark: I am talking about with respect to Hawaii.

17 Admiral Wilkinson: And submarine attack.

18 Mr. Clark: Yes. Now, did you or anybody in all of the
19 discussion that you ever heard of this whole situation, ever
20 suggest the likelihood or the probability of a surprise air
21 attack on the Hawaiian Islands and that there should be a
22 specific warning against that, just as there was against sub-
23 versive activities?

24 Admiral Wilkinson: For the entire year, sir, there had
25 been discussion in various correspondence and plans laid out

Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

about air attack and I think that was in the mind of everyone there, the very possibility of a surprise air attack.

Mr. Clark: Will you pardon me, sir? I am thoroughly familiar with some correspondence which General Marshall and perhaps others had back a good many months prior to that and the message from the Ambassador to Japan which has been referred to.

Admiral Wilkinson: Yes, sir.

Mr. Clark: What I had in mind in asking you that question was the two or three weeks preceding Pearl Harbor and particularly from the 27th of November to the 7th of December.

Admiral Wilkinson: May I have the concluding part of the question before this interpolated?

Mr. Clark: I do not mind just asking the question again, sir. If you will allow me, I will repeat the question.

Admiral Wilkinson: I wish you would, sir. I was a little confused.

Mr. Clark: As to whether or not, it being pretty generally conceded that Hawaii was right impregnable against an all-out assault for the purpose of taking the islands and the command at Hawaii having been specifically warned against subversive activities, did anyone in the Navy or the Army or any other person in military life to whom you talked between

1 Witness Wilkinson

Questions by: Mr. Clark

2 the 27th of November and the 7th of December ever suggest
3 specifically the possibility of an air attack and specific
4 warning against that?

5 Admiral Wilkinson: I think not, sir. The subversive
6 warning, you will recall, was to the Army only and there was
7 a general war warning sent to the Fleet as a whole, but I
8 heard no specific mention as you suggest.

9 Mr. Clark: That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

10 The Vice Chairman: It is now four o'clock and, Admiral
11 Wilkinson, I will ask you to please return at ten o'clock in
12 the morning and Senator Lucas will be recognized.

13 The committee stands adjourned until ten o'clock in the
14 morning.

15 (Whereupon, at 4:00 o'clock p.m., December 17, 1945,
16 an adjournment was taken until 10:00 o'clock a.m.,
17 Tuesday, December 18, 1945.)

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