

REVISED FORM FOR REPORTING A. A. ACTION BY SURFACE SHIPS

Location of ship (area) South of Kyushu U.S.S. MONTELEY CVL-26

Zone Time -7 Date 14 May 1945

NOTES

- (a) REPEL ATTACK FIRST—then collect data for this report.
- (b) Do not "Gun Deck" this report. If data cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy, enter dash in space for which no data is available.
- (c) These sheets are to be filled out immediately after action is completed with data available from ship's log, memory, and consultation with ship's officers. Information is essential in order that the effectiveness of our equipment can be determined. Where data are of doubtful accuracy, fill in with general terms.
- (d) Forward under separate cover to Readiness Division, Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

1. Surprise attack (yes or no) No Day or night Day

2. Method picking plane up (Radar, binoculars, naked eye) Radar

3. Range plane was picked up (50, 30, 10, less than 5 miles) 30 miles

4. Total number of planes observed 7 Type Fighter (Zeiss)

5. Number of planes attacking own ship 2 Type Fighter (Zeiss)

6. Number of planes taken under fire by own ship 4

(a) Of those attacking own ship 2 Type Fighter (Zeiss)

(b) Others 2 Type Fighter (Zeiss)

7. Speed and altitude of approach in knots and feet. 200 knots; shallow glide starting from 5 to 8 thousand feet.

8. Number of guns firing — by caliber 2 40mm Quads, 7 40mm Twins, 7 20mm Twins.

9. Ammunition expended — by caliber 40mm - 1930, 20mm - 1156

10. Percent service allowance expended 40mm - 1.9%, 20mm - .018

11. Method of control Mk. 51 director Method of spotting Tracer

Method of ranging Visual with Mk. 51 Method of firing Automatic

12. Approximate time-tracking to first shot 60 seconds

13. Approximate time of first hits Immediately

14. Approximate time first shot to last shot 20 minutes

15. Approximate position angle open fire 35 degrees

16. Approximate position angle cease fire 10 Degrees
17. Approximate bearing first shot 10 Degrees relative
18. Approximate bearing last shot 120 Degrees relative
19. Approximate range first shot / opened at 5000 yards present range on all targets Altitude of Plane 3000 ft.
20. Approximate minimum range aircraft approached 800 Yds. Altitude Zero
21. Approximate range last shot 800 Yds. Altitude of Plane 300 ft.
22. Approximate altitude of bomb release ----- Size of bomb -----
23. Approximate range torpedo release ----- Size torpedo -----
24. Number hits on ship by bombs ----- by torpedoes ----- Was ship strafed? No
- Size gun -----
25. Number near bomb misses damaging ship None

26. Planes shot down:

	SURE (By own ship alone)	SURE (Assist)	PROB ABLE	DAM- AGED
(a) Those attacking own ship	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>
(b) Other aircraft	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>	<u>-----</u>


(An aircraft is considered destroyed "Sure," when, as result of own ship's fire: 1. It is seen to crash. 2. It is seen to disintegrate in the air or be enveloped in flames. 3. It is seen to descend on friendly territory and be captured. 4. Pilot and entire crew are seen to bail out.)

(A "Sure-Assist" may be claimed when plane is destroyed as result of own ship's and assisting fire by friendly planes, shore batteries, or other ships.)

(An aircraft is considered probably destroyed when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to have less than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely.)

(An aircraft is considered damaged when, as result of own ship's fire: It is so damaged as to require repair before beginning another mission, but has better than an even chance of reaching its own territory safely. Claims shall be based on careful interrogation by proper authority, and every effort shall be made to eliminate duplication of claims.)

27. Best estimate of size gun or guns responsible for each "Sure" 40mm
28. Performance of ammunition (excellent, good, bad, poor) excellent
29. What failures in material occurred in this action? One broken 40mm extractor.
30. Sketch: (a) Indicate direction of attack relative ship's head.
 (b) Show relative position of sun.
 (c) Indicate own maneuvers.



SUN was on port bow during attack by first plane. Subsequent maneuvers placed it successively in all four quadrants, but only the first plane tried to take advantage of it.

SUMMARY

The task group of which the U.S.S. MONTEREY was a part was attacked by a group of suicide Zekes, four of which made their attacks at or near this ship, and all four were shot down. No bombs could be seen on any of them, nor were any bombs dropped. Only one of the four made any attempt to make use of cloud cover or position of the sun, though there was excellent opportunity for both. The attack also came at a time most favorable for the ship, when our strike was away and the flight deck was almost clear.

All four planes were thoroughly destroyed by the effects of 40mm fire, two by that of this ship and two by the combined fire of this and other ships. A large quantity of 5" was fired at all of them, and many bursts appeared close, but no apparent effect resulted. All four were intact and under complete control when 40mm fire was opened. After three or four observed hits by 40mm projectiles, they burst into flames, lost control, and two completely disintegrated before hitting the water.

The accuracy of this ship's fire can be partly attributed to the fact that all four attacks were almost exact duplications of a "George" type target sleeve run, upon which a great deal of practice has been held. Another most important factor lay in the accurate ranges procured by the Mk 63 director, which had not previously been used in action by this ship. These ranges, used by the two mounts controlled by Mk. 63 directors and also available to all other 40mm mounts over the 49 JY circuit, caused all 40mm fire to be on the target from practically the opening round

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30° 15' N
 135°
 0650
 0655
 0700
 0655 ENTERPRISE OBSERVED STRUCK BY SUICIDE BOMBER. 5000 yds. ON PORT QUARTER.
 0654 PERMATION OPENED FIRE

USS. MONTEREY.

TRACK CHART
 0650 TO 0820 14 MAY 1945
 (ZD-9)

WIND


0700 090° 8 KNOTS
 0800 083° 8 KNOTS

CLOUDS



TIME	LOW	MIDDLE	HIGH	CEILING	COVER
0700	CU	CC	CI	70	7/10
0800	CU	CC	CI	70	7/10

VISIBILITY 8

ALL COURSES & BEARINGS TRUE



30° 00'



ANNEX CHARLIE

132° 40' E

132° 50' E

ACTION REPORT - C.I.C. OPERATIONS

9 May to 1 June 1945 Inclusive - U.S.S. MONTEREY (CVL26)

After a complete overhaul in the Puget Sound Navy Yard, the MONTEREY left Pearl Harbor on the 26th of April, arrived at Ulithi 8 May, and sortied with T.G. 58.1 the following day. Three days later she was assigned to T.G. 58.3, and took part in the Kyushu raids on 13 and 14 May, and the support operations off Okinawa during the successive two weeks. This report is written mainly for the purpose of pointing out some of the difficulties experienced with the new gear and the steps taken to correct them.

The BM Interrogating Equipment of the SP Radar is not satisfactory due to its non-directional antenna and resulting lack of concentrated energy. The BM is now connected to the B0 Directional Interrogating Antenna with some improvement even though mismatched. However it cannot be relied upon to show IFF for all friendly contacts. The BM Interrogator used with SK Radar was found to give Optimum performance when tuned to 162 Mcs.

The SP has been found very useful, but difficult to operate satisfactorily. The maximum ranges of targets have been observed to be less than those of the SM. Also, it has been found difficult in some instances to successfully track targets. It is felt that this fault is partly due to the performance of the set as well as the inexperience of the operators. When a strong echo is secured, the altitude determination has been found reliable with the aid of empirical altitude curves. The SP suffers a very great amount of interference when operating in the vicinity of other SP and SM radars, necessitating the reduction of the gain for target detection.

The VF Precision PFI has been a boon to the C.I.C. watch. It is recommended that it be installed as near the D.R.T. as possible. The long promised "Modification 50" is needed for the S.G. although a homemade "grasscutter" has kept the bridge satisfied for station keeping.

This ship has a VG and a VG-1 Projection P.F.I. both of which have been used successfully for surface display and for air intercepts. The VG is excellent for surface work as reports of other installations have indicated. For work with the SK, the VG has been found entirely satisfactory for both routine tracking and for interceptions. The smear caused by numerous targets at close range is not appreciably worse than on the VC "12" remote P.F.I. Dead reckoning on the VG has been found very simple and accurate. Maintenance of the sets has so far caused no trouble.

VHF communications with the TDQ/RCK Radio transmitter/receiver combination has been very successful. A VHF room near C.I.C. has proven most satisfactory in keeping communications in order.

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ANNEX DOG

ACTION REPORT - C.I.C. OPERATIONS (Continued)

9 May to 1 June 1945 Inclusive - U.S.S. MONTEREY (CVL26)

T.G. 58.3 was under but one attack during the operations off Kyushu. Prior to the attack, the force had been thoroughly spotted for several hours by snoopers, and the enemy made maximum use of cloud cover, speed and altitude changes, at every instance. The Jap attacks showed a decided lack of co-ordination with planes coming at the formation one or two at a time, instead of together. Window was used by the Japs in a few instances; and on one occasion, a snoopers escaped an intercepting night fighter by timely dispersal of window.

Information on bogies close to the formation is very limited and unreliable. When large numbers of planes are in the air, tracking is impossible and many false bogey reports are made. An air search set with sharp definition, free of side lobes, and with reliable IFF gear, is badly needed. Two or three ships with this type of gear could then be given the sole job of reporting and handling targets inside the twenty mile range.

During the operations 12 May to 27 May inclusive, fighter direction was handled by ESSEX, RANDOLPH, BATAAN AND MONTEREY with the TGFD0 in ESSEX. The work of co-ordinating all F.D. and C.I.C. operations by the GFDO was very efficiently handled. The practice of using the cruisers and battleships to check targets is approved and recommended for further use. It is felt that the co-operative manner in which the GFDO handled the work obtained maximum results from all ships present. His practice of keeping an accurate picture of the friendly groups in the area seemed to be the answer to keeping down confusion when there were single erratic flying bogies in the area.

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ANNEX DOG

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

Visual Fighter Direction.

Based on observations made during the engagement of 14 May between Task Group 58.3 and enemy suicide planes this commanding officer is of the opinion that the necessity for visual fighter direction from carriers is a thing of the past. The greatly improved anti-aircraft armament of all vessels and the tremendous volume of concentrated fire provided when the task group is formed in disposition FIVE VICTOR as used by Task Group 58.3 prevents any friendly intercept aircraft from coming within the visual range of the V.F.D. Smoke from the volume of shell bursts which practically fill the sky not only slows down the sighting of aircraft by the V.F.D., but often prevents it. The V.F.D. has not got a chance of intercepting a KAMIKAZE attack.

It is believed that in order to use visual fighter direction and to make it at all effective, it must be conducted from the destroyer screen, where the visibility is greater and less restricted. In order to make visual fighter direction effective in the screen there should be at least one division of CAP assigned for use only by a visual fighter director. One destroyer in each division of the screen could then be assigned "Snapper Duty". The "Snapper CAP" should be stationed over the task group at five thousand feet or at the cloud base, whichever is lower. It should be prepared to receive a vector from any one of the destroyers in the division at any time.

There is some doubt that this scheme would provide interception even if it should be adopted. It is practically impossible to intercept a fast closing plane before it comes within range of the screen's five-inch anti-aircraft fire. However, visual fighter direction in the screen would be very effective in the case of a low flying "snooper" on the horizon. This occasion is rare.

Ship's Batteries - Ammunition Supply - Functioning of Crew.

The ship's batteries functioned in an excellent manner without casualties during the suicide attacks on 14 May. Four enemy aircraft were brought under fire and all destroyed. The destruction of two of them is claimed for ship's gunfire and two are claimed as "assists".

The supply of ammunition to the guns was adequate and uninterrupted. The supplying of bombs to the planes is inadequate and requires excessive time because of only the one bomb elevator. As a result the magazines must be kept open longer than is considered good practice and bombs are on the flight deck longer than they would be with faster handling facilities. On two occasions the numerous safety switches of this elevator became inoperative at a critical time and bombs could not be supplied to the planes on schedule. It is inadequate as to size, speed, and weight lifting capacity.

The crew of this vessel performed their duties under attack and during the balance of the period of this report in an admirable manner. Recommendations for awards to airplane crews and gun crews are being forwarded in separate correspondence.

Operation Plans and Orders.

Operation Plans and Orders either are not being distributed to issuing offices in the rear areas or they are not being sent in sufficient quantities. Prior to the arrival of this vessel in the forward area attempts were made without success to obtain the necessary plans and orders on the west coast, at Pearl Harbor and Eniwetok. The annexes were especially desired together with target charts and grids. This situation apparently arises when an operation has been in progress for a long period and requests made on issuing offices by the many vessels which depart for the forward areas deplete the stock. This ship was assigned operations at OKINAWA which required a hurry-up call and visit to the flagship at sea for charts and other information.

Replenishment of Ammunition, Provisions, Etc.

The two task groups in which the MONTEREY operated used different procedures and formations during replenishment days. Consequently, there was some doubt by this vessel when changing from one group to the other, just what was desired. This had a tendency to make her slower than other vessels which were experienced with the particular scheme at hand.

The hoisting gear in the CVL class is not adequate for expeditious replenishment of ammunition and provisions at sea. Only the electric crane can be depended upon and this is located forward in the ship where it can be serviced only from the forward hatches of the supply vessel. A trolley whip is always rigged aft at the expense of considerable valuable time because it must be rigged in a different manner for each type of supply vessel. If the electric crane should break down, the ship would practically be prevented from receiving her supplies. It is recommended that a demountable crane of the type furnished to CVE vessels of the BOGUE class be provided all CVL's for installation in the after part of the ship. This is considered to be a combat necessity.

The method of fueling at sea for CVL's as described in USF-10(A) is not in accordance with actual practice in regard to the tow-line. CVL's always tow the oiler if a tow-line is used. Their towing point is abaft the pivoting point of the ship and therefore it is not desirable for them to be towed.