

*Scowcroft*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

**DECLASSIFIED**

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**BY dal NARA DATE 11/6/08**

**PARTICIPANTS:** Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense  
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant  
to the President for National Security Affairs

**DATE AND TIME:** Tuesday, January 8, 1974  
8:00 a.m. - Breakfast meeting

**PLACE:** The Pentagon

Schlesinger: I may skip the dinner for the Aussie Defense Minister.

Kissinger: Why is Gayler going there? But Rush and Ingersoll are going through.

Schlesinger: Maybe I am too tough.

Kissinger: We can allow ourselves to be knocked around.

Schlesinger: The European press has been favorable to you recently. Adelbert Weinstein said it.

Kissinger: He is a leading military commentator. We are sending a Presidential letter tonight on oil consultation - to the consuming countries. And one to the producers on Thursday. For the energy conference.

Schlesinger: You know about our deal with Saudi Arabia for the 6th and 7th Fleet? 200,000 barrels per day. That is more than enough.

I am getting sick of the Arabs, lording it over their former bosses.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



~~SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)  
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

Kissinger: They are behaving badly. Your people told Dinitz that all supplies are a political position. We have got to give Israel some security for a withdrawal. We can easier give them things now rather than if there's a deadlock.

Schlesinger: We must get some things from production. But we are getting a \$200 million package moving.

Kissinger: That is not their impression.

Schlesinger: We will move. I agree with you.

Kissinger: Dayan has now given us a plan for a disengagement.

[He describes the proposal.] It has soft spots. (1) They'll allow only two battalions on the East Bank. (2) The restrictions west of the Canal. (3) The Israeli line west of the passes. We have problems: introducing the proposal into Geneva, and the Russians getting in.

My fear is if the Soviet Union wants to play rough, they can demand 20 more kilometers, etc. The Israelis are giving up almost everything, without reciprocity. No one knows of the plan -- except Israeli leaking. I may go out this week and try to settle it. I think we are within reach of success. We have managed it fairly well.

Schlesinger: We will get the equipment moving.

Kissinger: Give them the sense of movement, we can always slow up on delivery.

Schlesinger: But they ask for things like 2,000 Condors, etc. We are giving them 1500 tanks, etc.

Dayan is not very smart.

Kissinger: Rabin is their smart general.

Schlesinger: Diego Garcia. We have mentioned to Great Britain access to Diego and enriched uranium, but we will sit until we get access.

Kissinger: We now have a formal request for Super Antelope. They have a continuing record of stupidity.



Schlesinger: It's a dumb decision. It is only a hardened warhead, and we can control their testing for the next six years. They will need Polaris too.

Kissinger: Talk them out of Poseidon.

Schlesinger: I suggested they test in Australia, and they were very upset. The Aussies won't let them.

Kissinger: Heath is basically anti-American and doesn't like the President. It is a tragedy what is happening in Europe. Look at what they have done since before World War I. Two wars for crappy pieces of territory.

The Japanese I understand -- they know they have no alternative to us. They told me the Europeans send them a note every two weeks, warning them away from the U. S.

But having said all this, I would like to start up with Galley. He is one we can work with, and then at some time all of them can say you bastards, you talk about unity and then you go this bilateral route with us.

Schlesinger: The French are the worst bastards.

Kissinger: Rose writes the same kind of reports as Kosciusco-Morizet does from here -- you know they have to write all the same way to keep their jobs.

The French are unadulterated bastards. They haven't had a sensible Foreign Policy since Talleyrand. France's advantage was they were the only great unified country vis-a-vis Germany and Italy. Napoleon III sent troops to Italy to unite it; and then he backed Prussia against Austria. They pissed away 300 years of French diplomacy for nothing.

Schlesinger: Germany is like in the 30 years war.

Kissinger: Jobert is trapped between Pompidou, with no sense for foreign policy, and his foreign office. Let us send Foster to talk to Galley about doing something moderate.

Schlesinger: I want to lean on Belgium and the Dutch not to buy the French plane for replacement for F-104.

How about Ethiopian bases?



Kissinger: I told them to move out. I agree on the Dutch and Belgians.

The Europeans are tawdry. DeGaulle had to give up the French Empire, but he decided he would overcome the frustrations by focusing on Europe.

Schlesinger: Cromer is coming to say goodbye today.

Kissinger: I would lay it in to him, and hard. So he can take it back home.

Schlesinger: NSDM 169.

Kissinger: It is with the President. On acquisition, we must formally keep control, although we won't press you on it.

Schlesinger: We put a number of strategic items in the budget, but the targeting is the intellectual problem.

Kissinger: This sets our strategic policy for years. The President must read it thoroughly.

Schlesinger: I will take the flak. On operational launch.

Kissinger: You may make Defense something more than a logistics boor.

SALT. The JCS thank we gave something away in SALT I. That is nuts. We gave up nothing.

Schlesinger: There's no problem defending SALT I.


Kissinger: There is an obsession with equal aggregates.

Schlesinger: Congress' attitude on the Defense budget is changing.

Kissinger: The Chiefs oppose a MIRV ban.

Schlesinger: We don't want a partial agreement which militates against long-run essential equivalence. Gimmicks are okay.

Kissinger: What I think is attainable -- I don't understand the obsession with reduction of launchers. That compounds vulnerability.



Schlesinger: I agree.

Kissinger: They say get rid of MLBM's. I agree, but we can't do it without giving up something.

Schlesinger: You must convince them that they can't be better than we are.

Kissinger: What I think attainable is an equal MIRV throw weight agreement and an interim agreement for five more years. That would finesse FBS and total numbers.

I do not believe the SS-16 idea is feasible.

Schlesinger: That is going in position.

Kissinger: I know something about the Soviet Union. It is conceivable they would forego MIRV on the SS-18 and equal MIRV throwweight. I do not think they would give up the 17, 18, and 19.

Schlesinger: We must confine their missiles to specific fields. Otherwise we can't monitor as well.

Kissinger: That I haven't thought of. That is a verification variable. What makes me sick is the way people gab about what we would like. They want the Soviet Union to give up 30% of their force while we stick to our program.

Schlesinger: You tell the Soviets that unless they come along, we will build up.

Kissinger: You get a sensible buildup program and you can do that.

Schlesinger: The Soviet press is taking off on me as a disturber of the peace.

Kissinger: Good. You should go to Moscow. Be tough to Dobrynin. Why not go between March and the summit, or after the summit?

On Dobrynin, wait until the Defense budget is out.

Schlesinger: I would tell him that if they won't come down in SALT, we will go up and risk a growth of anti-Soviet sentiment.



Let me complain about your press conferences on "nuclear plenty" and "nuclear holocaust." Where you talk, you must talk in terms of specific targets. I can't sell Trident with your talking like that.

Kissinger: Trident is a monster.

Schlesinger: I have a program. The Norwall boat plus Trident. Trident with a hard-target kill, or Norwall with a normal capability.

Kissinger: What worries me about our procurement policies is our services are procurement agencies, not strategic planners. There is a tendency toward gigantism. The B-1 is lousy.

Schlesinger: Brown is good. The Air Force needs him.

Kissinger: The Air Force needs cleaning up. The army is a disaster. It's too bad Haig left. Can you get him back at some point?

[There was discussion about moving into the Middle East. Dahrn, Bahrein.]

Kissinger: I will be careful about my quotations on nuclear matters.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 018647

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Note  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Brent Scowcroft's handwritten notes of  
Kissinger and Schlesinger Meeting  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 01/08/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 9 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 031400102  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . National Security Adviser. Memoranda of  
Conversations  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 3  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . January 8, 1974 - Kissinger,  
Schlesinger  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/20/2004  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . GG