
GHQ/SCAP Records(RG 331) Description of contents

NATIONAL ARCHIVES
OF THE
UNITED STATES

- (1) Box no. 2415
- (2) Folder title/number: (14)
 Miscellaneous Correspondence
- (3) Date: Mar. 1951 Nov. 1951
- (4) Subject: Classification Type of record
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- (5) Item description and comment: Secret
- (6) Reproduction:



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(7) Film no.

Sheet no.

CORRESPONDANCE - SECRET

1.	4065	T/O Region Headquarters2d Region		Feb-	-51
2.	4074	Relocation of NPR Units2d Region	10	Mar	51
3.	Memo.	Revision of NPRJ T/O & E's	25	Oct	51
		nation of Service Group	21	Nov	51

Name and a

SECRET

(Not to Leave the Section)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Intra-Office Routing Slip

FROM: Adm OPN DIV	DATE: 21 NOV 19 57
	SUSPENSE DATE:
TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE ASST EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL INFORMATION	OPERATIONS LOGISFICS GOMETTE MEDICALER MEDICAL SURCOL
ADMINISTRATIAN Mil Personnel Supply Civ Personnel	13-DEC 1951
Approval Action Comment Concurrence	Toformation / Col Return Sign & Prispatch File
Remarks: Capy of Cal To SV GP DE	Burghims vemorbs. Tely settocked With
	rain is what we now have
at NPR Submit a St	this problem with Mr Equelicand 51x (2) Recommended chemiation of and service central of all service central constants of all service central central or attached to Regions (C) Regulated that and providing an NPR Suspend to 10 Dec of

70:6-3 on the subject by 66 Hg.

SECRET Paroup TO: Chief, Operate aff Study.

FROM: Senior Adviser, Service Group

TO: Chief, Operations Division, CAS

1. Following comments, discussion and recommendation are furnished in connection with the attached Staff Study.

a. DISCUSSION

The purpose of this study is understood to be a determination "as to whether there should be a Service Group in the MPR". To start with the premise that a service group is unnecessary fails to recognize the basic issue. Any such approach to the problem manifestly leads to conclusions based only on such factors or elements which tend to contribute to the required proof. (There are two sides to every question. Both must be carefully analyzed and evaluated. Each has advantages and disadvantages.) As in any estimate of a situation there are several possible solutions to a problem. The one offering the greatest advantages in attaining the desired objective is the one that should be selected. To build around a preconceived plan could be fatal.

American methods and procedures are shaped to meet American circumstances. They take into consideration American resources, industrial development, managerial and executive ability, educational standards, technological progress, inherent national characteristics and the national attributes of aggressiveness, diligence, independence, self-reliance, ingenuity, creative inventiveness, initiative and forceful leadership produced through years of sharp competitive experience in the effort to achieve industrial and technical supremacy. These factors are not equally present in every nation. Therefore a scheme or organization molded to utilize these attributes of the American nation is not prime facie evidence that they are the solution to the problem of another nation. American Military Organization has been modified repeatedly to conform to changed American requirements. The basis for adoption was not that another nation had a different arrangement. General Somerville in an address before the C & G S College, emphasized that an organizational structure must be built to meet existing conditions and urged gearing plans to eventualities rather than to what may have been done before. This principle might well be applied to the problem under consideration. Because a type of organization is suited to American requirements is no guarantee it is equally applicable in Japan.

Experience indicates a reluctance on the part of the average NPR officer to act independently. Commanders prefer to receive positive directives which enamate from a superior who assumes all responsibility for the decision involved and for the success or failure which may result. Rather than personally take positive action in any given set of critical circumstances they are prone to debate the issues with subordinates and adopt the plan which they mutually feel constrained to agree to. Such a procedure produces endless delays, indecision and procrastination. It is a product of long years of regimentation and indocand procrastination. It is a product of long years of regimentation and indocant policy of selflessness, contentment with ones trination in a fostered national policy of selflessness, contentment with ones current lot and status in life, and a subordination to class and caste superiors. It cannot be changed merely by adopting another nations ethics or principles. Examples encountered are:

(1) Failure to achieve positive action to establish the Hario Hospital.

5-11

Indifference to suggestion for acquiring suitable depot sites. (3) Lack of initiative on the part of organization commanders in requesting needed supplies and equipment. (4) Dilatoriousness in securing accelerated performance of construction projects. (5) Reluctance of Commanders to object to occupying camp sites selected on a purely political basis and possessing none of the required essential facilities. (6) Camp and group commanders withholding delegation of responsibility for staff supervisory functions and ignoring the necessity for admonishing subordinates for derelictions of duty or personally inspecting activities to ascertain deficiencies and inaugurating corrective measures, without the impetus being supplied by top level commanders. These are a few of the circumstances which indicate the need for a type of organization which will assure prompt accomplishment of supply missions. A strong forceful commander with a trained functional staff can overcome these difficulties. Tactical missions will fail unless the back up services are dependable, adequate and productive of timely results. Tab F provides such an organization. It eliminates the extraneous layers of group and battalion staffs which not only duplicate each other but add nothing to the accomplishment of the potential missions. It will provide the means whereby agressive leadership and positive accelerated supervision which is so vital in elininating delays, debates, and procrastination may secure swift and timely action. The need for additional personnel spaces does not in itself justify the elimination of a command group capable of controlling and coordinating logistic operational functions, even though it may be a means to an end. What may be ideal for the United States cannot of itself be considered ideal for other nations. As advisers to the NPRJ, care should be exercised to recommend a type of organization that will not require revision at a time when decisive military action is imperative to insure the preservation of Japan's sovereignty and the survival of a democratic influence in the Far East. The tabs attached to the study include a number of charts submitted solely to encourage a through discussion of possible organization structures. Some were definitely negative in character and were appended to present some of the objectionable features that might develop. b. RECOMMENDATION That an organizational structure as outlined in Tab F be approved. 5-11

(Not to Leave the Section) CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION Intra-Office Routing Slip

FROM: WWW Ope	rations Division	DATE: 21 November	19 51
		SUSPENSE DATE:	
TO: CHIEF EXECUTIVE ASST EXECUTIVE PRESONNEL INFORMATION	1	OPERATIONS LOGISTICS GOMETROLLER MEDJCAL SCHOOL	
	ADMINISTRATION		
FOR: Approval 1 Action Comment Concurrence		Information Return Sign & Dispatch File	

- 1. Attached hereto is a study of the organization of the Service Group, NPRJ, together with a memorandum on "Consideration of Comments".
 - 2. Recommend approval.

Incl: Study of Sy

Study of Svc Gp w/memo ROBERT L. WEBB Lt Col, Inf

Chief, Operations Division

SEGBET

OPERATIONS DIVISION

21 November 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive, CAS

SUBJECT:

Consideration of Comments Reference

"Review of Service Group"

1. This study has the concurrence of the Comptroller, the Directors of Personnel, Logistics, and Medical Divisions and of the Quartermaster and Signal Branches.

- 2. The Ordnance Branch which submitted comments through the Director of Logistics concurs except as to the establishment of a procurement section on a special staff level. Ordnance Branch believes that each Technical Staff Section should be responsible for the procurement of its own material, because of the technical problems inherent to each service.
- 3. The Engineer Branch which also submitted comments through the Director of Logistics concurs except for recommendation 6d. The Engineer Branch believes that the responsibility for inspection should rest with the agency responsible for procurement and that any division of responsibility for procurement and inspection would result in discord and make it difficult to fix and correct blame. The Engineer Branch recommends that inspectors be assigned to the principal contracting officer and that the technical services be authorized to make such check inspections as they deem necessary, with the responsibility for acceptance or rejection of the product resting solely with the principal contracting officer.
- 4. Operations Division does not concur with the comments of either the Ordnance or Engineer Branches for the following reasons:
 - a. It is believed that a central procurement section for all services would be more economical and eliminate the possibility of the different services bidding against each other with a resulting increase of prices and distruption of the National economy. It is further believed that a central procurement section would do much to decrease the possibility of graft.
 - b. The placing of responsibility for inspection in the procurement section with only check inspections made by the technical services would probably lead to more discord than would be created by having the responsibility for inspection resting with the technical services. Inasmuch as the technical services will bear the brunt of any criticism of the materiel peculiar to their services, it is believed that final responsibility for the acceptance or rejection of materiel should rest with the technical service concerned.

SUBJECT: Consideration of Comments Reference "Review of Service Group" (Cont'd)

5. Informal information received by this Division is that the Senior Advisor, Service Group, has received an extension of time for submission of comments until 1200 hours this date. Inasmuch as the deadline of this Division is 1200 hours and the comments of Senior Advisor, Service Group, have not been received, such comments have not been considered.

ROBERT L. WEBB

Lt Col, Inf Chief, Operations Division

SUBJECT: Review of Service Group

1. Problem: To review the existing organization of Service Group.

2. Assumptions:

- a. That the NPRJ will not operate outside the territorial limits of Japan.
- b. That any expansion of the NPRJ would include a tactical command and administrative headquarters, similar in composition and duties to the U.S. Field Army Headquarters, in addition to a central command, policy, and planning headquarters.

3. Facts Bearing on the Problem:

- a. The establishment and organization of the NPRJ Service Group was authorized by a directive from higher headquarters dated 12 July 1950 and by Article 3, Prime Minister's Office Ordinance No. 52.
- b. The NPRJ Service Group Headquarters as presently organized parallels the U.S. Service Command Headquarters designed to command the service units and exercise territorial control (communications zone) in rear of the army service force boundary, to support a combat force operating in an overseas theater of operation.
- c. The mission of the NPRJ is to protect and guarantee the public welfare within the territorial limits of Japan.

4. Discussion:

- a. Normal U.S. procedure regarding matters pertaining to this study is as follows:
- (1) U.S. procedure is to have the central command, policy, and planning headquarters, through the Technical Service chiefs of the Headquarters, develop, procure, and control stock levels of equipment and establish the base installations necessary to support a defense force in the zone of interior.
- (2) U.S. procedure is to have the tactical command and administrative headquarters (Field Army) organized for command and operational control of all service organizations attached or assigned it for support and to additionally provide technical supervision over all organic service organizations in assigned or attached tactical organizations through the Technical Service chiefs of the headquarters.
- (3) The technical service chief of the central command headquarters exercising command responsibility for base installations or base depots commands those installations which pertain to his service.
- (4) Tab A is a chart which indicates the normal organization of a General Depot. Normal command and operational control of General Depots that include several services, by the headquarters exercising command responsibility, is accomplished by assigning the technical service chief who has primary responsibility for the depot, command responsibility.
- b. Tab B is a chart of the presently organized General Group Headquarters which is operating in the zone of interior as both the central command, policy and planning headquarters and the tactical command and administrative headquarters for the NPRJ, with a theater of operations communications zone headquarters (Service Group) in the command channel between General Group

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SUBJECT: Review of Service Group (Cont'd)

Headquarters and its base installations and service units. This system is complicated and wasteful of personnel and time since it inserts an additional headquarters between the commander and the units and installations thus increasing the problem of control and making the proper coordination of training more difficult. This system also requires liaison between the Service Group and the technical staff of General Group Headquarters. It also violates the accepted U.S. concept that the Chiefs of Technical Services command units and installations of their respective services which are not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.

- c. Tab C is a chart of a proposed organization which would retain a Service Group Headquarters and establish army service areas and army service units. Such an organization is not a solution to the problem of simplifying the command and administrative procedures or the development of normal technical unit command channels. Instead, it would increase the number of personnel cal unit command channels. Instead, it would increase the responsibility for required to operate the organization. It also places the responsibility for procurement in the Service Group.
- d. Tab D is a chart of a proposed organization which would place the Chief of Service Group directly under the General Staff of General Group Head-quarters with the technical staff under control of the Chief, Service Group. This organization would increase the administrative and command problem and in addition place the commander of a force between the General Staff of General Group Headquarters and the Technical Staff.
- e. Tab E is a chart of a proposed organization which establishes the Service Group Headquarters under Chief of Logistics and includes the normal Technical Staffs in Service Group Headquarters. This organization would place a member of the General Staff in a command position in addition to his duties as a General Staff officer. The technical staff of Service Group Headquarters as a General Staff officer. The technical staff of Service Group Headquarters (a logistical command headquarters subordinate to GGHQ) would be responsible for planning and technical supervision over technical service activities and units of the technical commands. This plan would also preclude normal staff units of the technical commands. This plan would also preclude normal staff relationships of other general and special staff elements of GGHQ with the technical service chiefs in Service Group Headquarters.
- f. Tab F is a chart of a proposed organization retaining a Service Group Headquarters in which the Technical Staffs are eliminated. This plan does not place the Technical Service chiefs of the central headquarters in command of their installations and units nor does it solve the problem of eliminating an additional command Headquarters from the command channels between the Technical Service chiefs and their installations.
- g. Tab G is a chart of a proposed organization which retains a Service Group Headquarters and adds a Group Headquarters with a General Staff to the command channels. This plan does not place the Technical Service chiefs the central Headquarters in command of their installations and units nor of the central Headquarters in command of their installations and Headquarters does it solve the problem of eliminating an unnecessary command Headquarters from the command channels.
- h. Tab H is a chart of a proposed organization eliminating the Service Group and providing for simple and effective control of all operations, planning and formulation of policy. It provides for the control of technical planning and installations by the Chief of the Technical Service concerned and units and installations by the Chief of the Technical Service. This will function with a larger force as well as with the present force. This proposed organization provides for a separate procurement section on the same proposed organization provides for a separate procurement any organization which level as the technical services. It is believed that any organization which may be adopted must provide for an increase in personnel in the technical services in order that proper inspection of materiel may be made prior to acceptices in order that proper inspection of materiel may be needed in the technical tance in the NPRJ. Additional personnel will also be needed in the technical

SUBJECT: Review of Service Group (Cont'd)

staffs for command and supervision of technical service units and installations. These spaces can be provided for from the present Service Group Head-quarters organization.


5. Conclusions:

- a. That the present Service Group Headquarters is unnecessary to the efficient operation of the NPRJ.
- b. That the Technical Service chiefs of General Group Headquarters, in accordance with normal command and operational procedure, should be responsible for the command and operational control of their corresponding service installations and units not assigned or attached to subordinate commands.
- c. That the Technical Staff sections of General Group Headquarters be augmented with personnel and spaces from Service Group Headquarters to command and supervise technical units and installations and to provide for adequate material inspection prior to acceptance by the NPRJ.
- d. That a procurement section be established on a special staff level in General Group Headquarters to execute contracts and process all procurement demands developed to equip and maintain the NPRJ.

6. Recommendations:

- a. That the present Service Group Headquarters be eliminated.
- b. That the proposed organizations indicated in Tab H be adopted.
- c. That necessary action be taken to revise the present directives establishing the Service Group and the Prime Minister Ordinance No. 52 to conform to a and b above.
 - d. That a directive be issued providing for adequate inspection of materiel by the technical services prior to acceptance by the NPRJ.


PROPOSED FUNCTIONAL ORGANIZATION TACHIKAWA GENERAL DEPOT





COMMAND


ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL AND ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF COMMON DEPOT FUNCTIONS AND ACTIVITIES.


PRESENT CHIEF OF GENERAL GROUP EXECUTIVE STAFF CHIEF LOGISTICS DIVISION TECHNICAL STAFF TECHNICAL SERVICE CHIEF CHIEF OF SERVICE GP. STAFF EXECUTIVE CHIEF LOGISTICS SECTION TECHNICAL STAFF TECHNICAL SERVICE CHIEF UNITS SERVICE TECHNICAL UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS COMMAND TECHNICAL SUPERVISION











- * Not assigned or attached to subordinate units.
- # Dual command and staff function.

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(Not to Leave the Section)
CIVIL AFFAIRS SECTION
Intra-Office Routing Slip

WHITH - SEC	rations Division	DATE: 25 Octo	ner
		SUSPENSE DATE:	
CHIEF EXECUTIVE ASST EXECUTIVE PERSONNEL INFORMATION		OPERATIONS LOGISTICS CONCINCIALER MEDICAL SCHOOL	3 1 2
	ADMINISTRATION Mil Personnel Supply Civ Personnel		
OR:			
Approval. Action		Information	
Comment Concurrence		Sign & Dispatch File	

a. Secret memorandum for G-3 from Executive, CAS, project: "Revision of NPRJ and T/O's," dated 15 August 1951.

b. Secret memorandum for all Divisions and Service Adviser, Service Group, subject: "Changes in the Organization of NPRJ," dated 22 August 1951.

- 2. Attached is study prepared as directed by Executive.
- 3. Request comments and/or concurrence by 1700 hours 30 October 1951.

1 Incl:
Study, "Review of NPRJ and T/O's"

ROBERT L. WEBB Lt Col, Inf Chief, Operations Division

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##3

GOSECRET OU

OPERATIONS DIVISION

22 August 1951

MEMORANDUM TO: Director of Personnel
Director of Information
Director of Logistics
Comptroller
Hedical Division
Senior Adviser, Service Group

SUBJECT:

Changes in the Organization of NPRJ

1. Reference: Secret CAS memorandum for 0-3, project: "Revision of NFRJ and T/Ob," dated 15 August 1951.

2. Based on reference memorandum, request comments and recommendations by 20 September 1951 as to:

a. Elimination of authorized units considered unessential to the operation of MPRJ.

b. Addition of units to improve the operation and efficiency of the NFRJ.

o. Changes in existing unite.

Lt Col, Infantry Chief, Operations Division

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS
Civil Affairs Section
Executive Office

15 August 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: G-3
PROJECT: Revision of NPRJ and T/Os

1. Situation: a. Reference - Study on expansion of NPRJ.
b. Experience after one year of NPRJ operations indicates that changes in the composition of the regions and service group

- b. Experience after one year of NPRJ operations indicates that changes in the composition of the regions and service group and modification in the T/Os of many units are necessary. Experience also indicates that there are some units that should be eliminated; that station complements, school troops and other special units should be considered; and that units, particularly combat type should be augmented in strength.
- c. It is difficult at this time to predict the strength, composition, or even the nature of the NPRJ for the future. In developing a new organization and new T/Os for the NPRJ, however, certain specific assumptions can be logically made:
- (1) The NPRJ region will receive logistic, administrative, and combat support from Corps and Army Headquarters and troops.
- (2) NPRJ installations will require personnel to maintain utilities and to provide normal station complement support.
- (3) The current functions and responsibilities of the Service Group can, and may be performed by GG Headquarters.
- (4) Unlimited Japanese manpower resources permit complete flexibility in determining strength of units and in developing T/Os.
- (5) Special units such as school troops, band, and ranger units, are either desirable or necessary in the NPR and may be included in the organization.

SECONET

#2

PROJECT: Revision of NPRJ and T/Os (Cont'd)

- Requirement: Based on our experience with the NPRJ, prepare a study which will determine:
 - a. The organization and T/Os for NPRJ regions.
- b. The units that should be included in a Service Group (if one is considered necessary) and the T/Os for these units.
- c. The organization and T/Os for special units to include, but not limited to, school troops, band, ranger units, and infiltration type units.
- 3. Coordination: All divisions including Senior Adviser, Service Group.
 - 4. Suspense: 1 November 1951.

FRANK KOWALSKI, JR. Colonel. Inf Colonel, Executive Officer

Distribution:

Comptroller

Medical Division

File



OFFICE OF THE SENIOR ADVISOR

2ND NATIONAL POLICE RESERVE REGION

c/o Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region

APO 309

10 March 1951

SUBJECT: Re-location of NPR Units, 2nd Region


: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
ATTN: Chief, Civil Affairs Section (Operations)
APO 500

- 1. Two plans are submitted herewith, one of which may be of assistance to your office in planning for anticipated re-location of NPR units. Plan one is based upon the present T/O & E. Plan two is based upon the new tentative T/O & E.
- 2. In each plan, the Region Headquarters personnel required to maintain telephone communication with all camps and Tokyo, are listed as Sapporo City. In this case it will be necessary to find billeting space in or near Sapporo City for the personnel listed in section "E" of each plan. Telephone communication from any of the four camps remaining (Obihiro, Eniwa, Engaru and Hakodate) to Tokyo or to the other camps would be impractical in view of the Japanese telephone system.
- 3. It is assumed that Camps Chitose, Crawford, Haugen and Sapporo will be lost to the NPR.
- 4. It is believed that one of the following plans would be satis-factory.

Plan I (old T/0 & E - present status)

A.	Hakodate	Officers	834 834	Officers	
	3rd Bn 2nd Regt 2nd Med Co	2	21,7	33	981
B.	Eniwa 10th Regt (-2,3,4 Bns)	15	580	25	81,5

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ice of Senior Alesor, 2nd NPR Region, dtd 10

Office of Senior Allsor, 2nd NPR Region, dtd 10 Mar 1 51 Subject: Re-location of NPR Units, 2nd NPR Region

C.	Obihiro lst Regt 2nd QM Co Hq & Hq Co 2nd Med Bn lst Med Co	Officers 67	EM 3036 146 148 180	Officers	
D,	Engaru 2nd Bn 2nd Regt 4th Co 1st Bn 2nd Regt	16	789		351.0
E.	Sapporo City Hq 2nd Region	20	45	20	91.9
	Move South 2nd Regt(-2 & 3 Bns and 1st Eng Bn 2nd Bn 10th Regt 3rd Bn 10th Regt 4th Bn 10th Regt 2nd Signal Co 2nd Ord Co 2nd Recon Co 3rd Regt	31 15 11 2 2 2 60	766 505 545 287 231 2397	169	6505
		an II (new	V 1/O CC 14)		
Α.	Hakodate 3rd Bn 2nd Regt 2nd Wpns Maint	17	772	22	977
B.	Eniwa 10th Regt (2,3,4,5 Bns Hq 2nd Region Hq Co 2nd Region) 15	627 70 160	28	857
	Obihiro 1st Regt 2nd Stores Co 2nd Med Bn	67	3036 125 190	83	3351

Office of Senior Advisor, 2nd NPR Region, dtd 10 March 51 Subject: Re-location of NPR Units, 2nd NPR Region

D.	Engaru 2nd Bn 2nd Regt 13 Co 2nd Regt	Officers 16	772 120	Officers	EM
E.	Sapporo City Hq 2nd Region	20	45	20	892
	Ship South 2nd Eng Bn 2nd Bn 10th Regt 3rd Bn 10th Regt 4th Bn 10th Regt 5th Bn 10th Regt 2nd Regt(2 & 3 Bns & 13 Co) 3rd Regt 2nd Comm Co 2nd Patrol Co	31 17 17 17 10 60 42	766 476 495 505 570 1015 2397 250 135	203	6609

FOR THE SENIOR ADVISOR:

Ganight Chmith Deputy Advisor