

ISHIKAWA, Jun

*Feb*  
17 ~~Jan~~ 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae re subject to Col. Woolworth, said copy to be returned to us.

ISHIKAWA, Jun

Request by: UMEZU, Yoshijiro

Address: Naritashi, Chiba-kan, or Sugamo Prison.

The facts to be proved by witnesses are the policies, utterances and actions of defendant UMEZU during the period in which he is charged by the indictment.

The relevance of the testimony is in its tendency to establish that UMEZU took no part in any of the conspiracies alleged in the indictment, and was not responsible for the planning, initiating or waging of wars of aggression.

Documents:

1. Principles of plans of operations of the Imperial Army 1940-1943.
2. Principles for preparation of operations of Kwantung Army 1942.
3. Operations plan of Kwantung Army 1940 to 1944.
4. Border Guard Regulations of Kwantung Army -- Sept. or Oct. 1939.

Location of documents - Secret Instruction File. Headquarters of Kwantung Army, (Operations Room) Hsingking, Manchuria.

The relevance of these documents is that they will prove the character and scope of operations and other plans of the Japanese Army, and notably of the Kwantung Army, vis-a-vis the USSR.

## CURRICULUM VITAE

Name: ISHIKAWA, Jun

Date of Birth: 7 March 1902

Permanent Domicile: No. 542, Narita-machi, Inba-gun,  
Chiba-ken.

25 June 1922: Graduated from the Toa Dobun Shoin  
in Shanghai Employed by the Shin Aichi  
Shimbun Co. Ltd. (in Nagoya) Assigned  
to as reporter.

1 July 1928: Employed by the Osaka Mainichi Shinbun  
Co. Ltd.

November 1931: Assigned to the Eastern Affairs Sec-  
tion of the Company.

September 1932: Assigned to the Chief of the Peipin  
and Tientsin Branch Office of the com-  
pany.

February 1937: Assigned to the sub-manager of the Man-  
churian Bureau.

January 1938: Assigned as the vice manager of the  
Eastern Intelligence Division of the  
company, stationed at Peipin.

April 1940: Assigned as the chief of the Peipin  
Bureau of the company.

April 1943: Retired from the Osaka Mainichi Shimbun  
Co. Ltd.

(70)

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interview file



ISHIAK AWA Jun

4 2491

R 20782-90

note:

if he is ever  
recalled

Rebuletto  
Com 102

use or him

R.P.L. <sup>+</sup> ~~2997~~

2998

His articles in

Mamudi Shimbun

Volume 1932-1937

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF ISHIKAWA, Jun.  
By Mr. Levin.

20781

\* The witness stated he lived in Chiba Prefecture. He identified Exhibit No. 2491 as his affidavit, and stated that its contents were true and correct. The affidavit stated \* that the witness was in North China between September 1932 and January 1937, as head of the Mainichi Peiping Branch, and head of the Tentsing Branch of that paper.

20782

North China was the cynosure of the world, being in a delicate and serious atmosphere militarily, politically, and economically. As a result of the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, the Chitung area was created as a demilitarized zone. The Kwantung Army had a voice in preserving public peace. Chang Hsueh-liang had left Peking, and his former army had lost its prestige and power. The Executive Council Administration Adjustment Committee under Huang Fu, and the Peiping sub-committee of the Military Affairs Committee had been set up under Ho.

20784

North China was not necessarily friendly with Japan. Because of close economic and geographical relations with Manchukuo, political friction was likely to arise. UMEZU arrived as commander of the China Garrison in April 1934. \* Because of his reputation as a man of good common sense, his coming was welcomed and it was felt that he would not make a mistake in dealing with complicated affairs in North China.

The witness had become very intimate with UMEZU, not as a newspaperman but as a member of the Japanese nation. He often had interviews and expressed his opinion and reminded UMEZU of army behavior, and UMEZU expressed his own thoughts on the matter. When asked how he came to be intimate with UMEZU, he said that the latter once had stated that since the Incident Japan's foreign relations had become tense, and Japan must therefore be prudent and cautious in her behavior. In his stay, regardless of its length, he would prefer being called a fool to having trouble with China.

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20785

\* The witness was deeply impressed with this, and believing there would be no trouble with North China while UMEZU was in office, he wished to be his good friend. UMEZU often told him that it was not proper for Japan to behave towards China in a superior manner; they must take a fair and sound attitude towards China, and never use threats and coercion; the rights and interests of Power in North China should be respected, and he would prohibit any act tending to infringe on them; they should never interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

20786

\* With respect to the UMEZU-Ho Agreement in the spring of 1935, anti-Japanism in North China was serious, giving rise to incidents with the situation becoming threatening. On May 5, Hu En-pu, proprietor of a paper, was assassinated in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, and on the next day another newspaperman met the same fate there. They had been regarded as pro-Japanese. The garrison believed that the Kuomintang party was behind the assassins.

20787

On May 29, when the witness heard the Chief of Staff SAKAI and an officer in Peiping had called on General Ho and submitted various demands, the witness wanted to ask UMEZU's opinion, but found that he was in Shinking, having been sent for by War Minister HAYASHI. On his return UMEZU told him that assassinations were injurious \* to diplomatic relations. If China failed to take drastic measures, unfortunate incidents will repeat. The Agreement on the North China Incident provided for suppression of anti-foreign acts. He had sent the Chief of Staff to talk with Chinese representatives as to how they could brighten the situation in North China. He had suggested that military forces and local chapters of political parties from which terrorism was originated, should be removed from districts where Japanese resided. It was nothing formal like a treaty or agreement, but simply an oral representation.

20788

General Ho, as a result of a previous conference with Nanking, accepted the terms, and on June 10 withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. Many people think there is an agreement because the newspapers called \* it such. There is none.

Page

This, however, proved more provocative than expected, because of poor statesmanship on the part of the negotiators. UMEZU did not try to give any further provocation.

In the middle of June, the Chinese Vice-Minister of the Department of Internal Affairs, represented that Kwantung Army airplanes were flying over the withdrawing military forces, and this was dangerous. He asked for UMEZU to stop it. The witness called on UMEZU and told him about this, and UMEZU wired to the Kwantung Army and had it stopped.

20789

\* The Farmers' Self-government Movement was organized about two months after UMEZU left, and the Chicha Government four months later. He did not believe that UMEZU secretly accepted the birth of such organizations. UMEZU did not like politics and had the firm conviction that Japan should never interfere with the internal affairs of China. There was considerable difference between UMEZU and his Chief of Staff. The Chief publicly stated UMEZU was weak, and the witness often heard the Chief criticizing UMEZU because of dissatisfaction with his rejecting military oppression or coercion policies.

20790

When SAKAI went to make representations to Ho, he suggested to UMEZU \* the concentration of the garrison forces in Peking, but UMEZU would not allow it. SAKAI criticized UMEZU for this.

THERE WAS NO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

April 25, 1947

20803

Exhibit No. 2495, the Comment of the Foreign Office, July, 1937, with regard to the Chinese reply of July 19, stated \* that the main points of the Japanese memorandum sent to Nanking through Ambassador HIDAKA, were that Nanking should not obstruct the execution of the agreement reached on the spot, and to stop all hostile movements toward Japan.

Nanking's main points of July 19 were simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese to original positions, diplomatic negotiations for solution, and the need for authorization by Nanking for any agreement on the spot.



Ho Shuegi agreement

League of Nations Report  
dated 6 Oct 1937

4.58 ~~at~~

quoted at p. 3300

7

knowing the Sanku armistice convention of 31 May 1933  
and the ~~Ho~~ Shuegi - Ho Shuegi Ching  
agreement of June 10, 1935, an  
agreement disputed by China,  
Jofen warned the Northing Fleet  
of the serious consequences which  
would follow on the dispatch  
of it into Hopei.

Ho - Wang agreement

Goette. J. 3746

It was enacted on 9 June 1933.  
I was in Beijing at the time.

J. 3748

It was a series of demands made by Japanese & acceded to by the Chinese - I don't know if written or oral.

Results:

(1) Capital of Hefei moved to Nantzen & Paoing - approximately 100 miles south of Beijing.

(2) Gen. Shan Chen commander of

3<sup>rd</sup> of Chinese National Army was

forced ~~to~~ to move south of the Beijing area.

J. 2748-9

There was a move in Beijing - the 29<sup>th</sup> Army under Gen. Sun Chuan-shan - chairman of the Hefei - Chong

Political Council

Record page 3, 748

Testimony of Goette - Direct

As to the Ho-UMEZU Agreement was generally accepted that it was a series of demands made by the Japanese and acceded to by the Chinese.

James T. C. Lui

Ho Mingyu agreement

Proposed by China

League of Nations Ref

2/58 . . . 2/3300

4.2491

DEF. DOC. #972

Translated by  
Defense Language Branch

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- versus -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ISHIKAWA, Jun

In accordance with the formula employed in our country, I, after having taken an oath as set forth in the accompanying paper, hereby depose as follows:

I, ISHIKAWA, Jun, on December 4, 1946, at Tokyo, made the following answers in answer to questionings by Defense Counsel MIYATA and

(Ques.) Please state the period of your residence in North China and your duties while there.

(Ans.) I was in residence in North China between September, 1932 and January, 1937 as head of the MANICHI SHIBUN PEIPING Branch and in addition head of the Tentsing Branch of the same paper.

(Ques.) Please state the political situation in North China at that time.

(Ans.) My period of residence was from the Manchurian Incident to the spring of the year in which the China Incident broke out, so North China was the cynosure of the world, being in an atmosphere delicate as well as most serious, from a military, political, and economic point of view. As a result of the agreement, signed at Tang ku May 31, 1933.

- 1 -

*only between  
army commander &  
chief / staff p. 7*

*How do you know that Gen. Ching acted in result of his  
famous conference with Kungming. Did you see talk  
to him with you April 1933  
with you - a month before you were  
informal not written  
& quite informal - p. 5*

of the suspension of hostilities, the CHITUNG area saw the creation of a demilitarized zone in it. In regard to the preservation of public peace, the Kwantung Army had a voice. CHING Hsueh-Liang had left FEIPING and the former North-East Army had lost its power in North China; the Executive Council Administration Adjustment Committee stationed in FEIPING whose Chairman was HUNG Fu, and in addition the FEIPING subcommittee of the Military Affairs Committee had been sent with Ho Yin-chin the Chief of the Military Administration Department as its chairman <sup>pro</sup> tempore.

(Ques.) Was North China then in friendly relations with Japan?

(Ans.) Not necessarily so. Because of close geographical and economic relations between North China and Manchoukuo, as a natural course of event, political frictions were likely to arise in the former, and because of a strong desire for restoring the lost territory, somehow, or other we felt there was unrest though not yet coming to the surface.

(Ques.) When did Major-General UMEZU arrive as Commander of the Garrison in China?

(Ans.) In April, 1934.

(Ques.) How was the attitude of the common people to Major-General UMEZU'S arrival as such?

(Ans.) Because of the Major-General's reputation as a man of good common sense with moderate and fair thoughts, his coming was generally welcomed. With this general as Commander, they thought that he would not make a mistake in coping with the complicated state of affairs in

North China.

(Ques.) How were you related with Major-General UMEZU?

(Ans.) While there, I had come to be on very intimate terms with him. Not as a newspaper man, but rather as a member of the Japanese nation. I often had interviews and frankly expressed my opinion and occasionally reminded him of the behavior of the Army. The Commander frankly admitted my unreserved opinion and gladly expressed his own thoughts on the matter.

(Ques.) Why did you come to be on intimate terms with Major-General UMEZU?  
Was there any motive?

(Ans.) The Commander once expressed his thoughts as follows:

"Since the Manchurian Incident Japan's foreign relations have become tense. So Japan's attitude toward North China has been the cynosure of the world, we should use prudence and caution in our behavior.

I may be here one year or two years. I don't know how long. I would rather prefer being called a fool during my stay than having trouble with China. I want you to understand this and I wish you too will be a fool in the same sense as I am."

I was very deeply impressed with this brief remark of immense significance. Believing there would arise no trouble in North China while this Commander was in office, I positively wished to be good friends with the Commander without reserve, and I did so. Besides, the fairness of his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China also proved a motive of my being attracted to him.

DEF. DOC. #972

(Ques.) How did the Commander express to you his thoughts regarding our attitude toward China?

(Ans.) The Commander often told me the following in substance as follows:

- A. It is not proper for Japan to behave toward China with a sense of superiority.
- B. We should take a sound and fair attitude toward China. Threats and coercion should never be resorted to on any account.
- C. The rights and interests of Powers in North China should be fully respected. I strictly prohibit any act tending to infringe on these.
- D. We should never interfere in Chinese internal affairs.

(Ques.) The UMEZU-HO Yin-chin agreement is said to have been proposed by Japan on the assassination of pro-Japanese newspaper men. Please tell us what you know about this matter.

(Ans.) In spring, 1935, the anti-Japanese sentiment in North China was quite serious, giving rise to even sanguinary incidents. Thus the situation had been increasingly threatening. In the meantime, on May 5 Hu En-pu, proprietor of the KUO CHUAN PAO was assassinated in the Japanese concession in Tientsin, and the next day on the 3rd, PAI E yu-huan, proprietor of the CHEN PAO met the same fate in the Japanese concession. These two persons had been regard as pro-Japanese. The observation, on the part of the Japanese garrison, on this matter was that the Kuomintang party was behind the assassins and everything related with these incidents.

On May 29 when I heard that the Chief of the Staff Colonel SAKAI,



Takashi and a military officer posted in FEIPING called on General HO Ying-chin and submitted various demands to him, I wished to ask the Commander's opinion, but since he was out in Shinking being wired for by the War Minister HAYASHI, I saw him when he came back from the trip. Then the Commander told me as follows:

*Ameyu*

"Frequent assassinations are really injurious to the diplomatic relations. If China fail to take some drastic measures toward this matter, unfortunate incidents will repeatedly happen. The agreement regarding the North China incident also provides for the suppression of anti-foreign acts. I sent the chief of the staff with items desired by us to talk with representatives of the Chinese Government as to how can we brighten, in the spirit of the agreement, the situation in North China. The items suggested by us were briefly this - the military forces and political party local chapters, from which dark politics or terrorism are likely to originate, should just be removed from the districts where Japanese residents are. I learned from him that it was not anything formal like a treaty or an agreement but simply an oral representation, and felt relieved as I thought such a step was just what his character might dictate.

*Ameyu*

(Ques.) Was this representation accepted by the Chinese?

(Ans.) General HO Ying-chin, as a result of his previous conference with the Nanking Government, accepted the items proposed by the Japanese Army and on June 10 withdrew of his own accord the anti-Japanese military forces. So there is nothing like an agreement.

There is much misunderstanding about this and many people think as if there is an agreement because the newspapers designated it the UMEZU-HO Ying-chin agreement.

(Ques.) Was Commander aware at that time that this representation had provoked the Chinese Government?

(Ans.) It is true that it proved more provocative than expected on account of poor statesmanship on the part of the negotiators themselves. Commander UMEZU tried not to give any further provocation to the Chinese.

I will give one example:

In the middle of June I had a visit from HSU Hsiu-chih, Vice-Minister of the Department of Internal Affairs, from whom I got the following representation: "Kwantung Army airplanes are found flying over the withdrawing central military forces. There is danger of occasioning a war. Will you tell this to Commander UMEZU and ask him to stop it?" Immediately I called on the Commander and told him all about this. The Commander readily wired to the Kwantung Army and had it stopped, which favorably influenced the Chinese Government. This I learned later from HSU Hsin-chih.

(Ques.) Didn't he secretly expect the birth of something like a North China government or a self-government movement as a result of this agreement?

(Ans.) The Farmers' Self-government Movement was organized two months after Mr. UMEZU's departure and the CHICHA Government four months after.

It is not thinkable that he secretly expected the birth of such organizations behind the agreement. Mr. UMEZU, being of such a character, did not like politics and had a firm conviction that we should never interfere with the internal affairs of China. Though I had often talked with the Commander about China, I could hear from him not a word about such intension. So far as I am concerned, I shall never hesitate to deny it.

(Ques.) Wasn't there any gulf or difference between the Army Commander and the Chief of the Staff in regard to their opinion or character?

who  
(Ans.) There was a considerable difference, it seems to me. I heard the Chief of the Staff publicly say "The Army Commander is weak." I often heard the Chief of the staff criticising the Commander because he was dissatisfied with the Commander who thoroughly rejected military oppression or coercion policies. When the Chief of the Staff SAKAI was going to make a representation to HO Ying-chin, he suggested to the Commander the concentration of our garrison forces in Peking, but the Commander did not permit it, saying it was not proper to make a demand by force of arms. I remember the Chief of the Staff criticized the Commander thus under these circumstances. I learned from the Commander himself at that time regarding the concentration of our military forces.

DEF. DOC. #972

WRITTEN OATH

I swear, according to my conscience, to state the whole truth, neither concealing what I know nor adding what I do not know.

(signed) ISHIKAWA, Jun (seal)

On this 4th day of December, 1946

At Tokyo

Affiant: ISHIKAWA, Jun

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 4th day of December, 1946,  
at Tokyo.

Witness: (signed) MIYATA, Mitsuo (seal)

Def Doc No. 972

Translation Certificate

I, Arthur A. Misaki, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the attached certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Arthur A. Misaki

Tokyo, Japan

Date 14 April 1947

NAME OF WITNESS: ISHIKAWA, Jun  
REQUESTED BY : UMEZU, Yoshijiro  
DATE : 3 April 1947

Completed as to Items 1 - 5, 7 - 8.