

affidavit by YAMAOKA

22/4

S. S. P.

1. I am ex-Lt. Gen. YAMAOKA, Shigeatsu. I am now leading a retired life at 205 Kodaki, Oasa, Zentsuji-machi, Kagawa Prefecture.
2. I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in February, 1933 after the accused ARAKI had occupied the portfolio of War, who resigned from his position on account ~~(of his position on account)~~ of his illness in January, 1934. I also left my post in march of the same year.
3. The Manchurian policies of the War Ministry of the INUGAI Cabinet aimed at restoration of peace and order, and the earliest <sup>cessation</sup> ~~cease~~ of hostilities, in Manchuria. It devoted itself to realization of these policies. The succeeding SAITO Cabinet followed almost the same policies and tried to realize them in accordance with Manchukuo's free will and with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol after her recognition as a state in view of the realities in Manchukuo.
4. Though the Army continued some military operations there, it took every caution not to allow them to become a full-scale war. Expeditionary forces were sent there as on a peace-time occasion and their scope of activity was limited as closely as possible, though on a Cabinet decision it might be extended, if necessary, to all the area formerly controlled by the CHANGS but now in a state of anarchy, in order to protect our residents, right and interests.
5. The establishment of Manchukuo had been decided and declared when I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. The Government approved the opinion of the Commander of the KWANTUNG Army that there was no other way but to leave the natives to realize their ardent wishes, in order to secure peace and order. The Government decided not to interfere with it. The Army, in accordance with the principles



of the Government and with the War Minister's intentions, made efforts to cease fire at the earliest date possible and to maintain peace and order. A commission was formed in the Cabinet with the chief cabinet secretary as chairman and other committees from the ministries concerned, for the purpose of deliberating counter-measures.

In view of disgraceful affairs in the Army, such as the March Incident, the October Incident and so forth, we had strictly to prevent the repetition of such incidents for the future. That was the chief reason why I was appointed to the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. At my holding the post, the Minister of war told me to make, above all things, the Imperial Army display its real value, keeping order and never allowing its quality to be affected by Prussian type or the then-popular Fascism.

6. In those days the War Ministry was, on Minister ARAKI's principle, to transfer to comparatively unimportant posts those who had been concerned with the incidents or who were too indignant at the current situation and to appoint to important posts those officers of sound character who could fully understand the Minister's intentions and would carry them out. I accordingly cooperated with him since my acceptance of the post by renovating the personnel affairs and by appeasing and persuading some young officers and indignant elements.
7. As a result, no army officer, happy to say, participated in the May 15 Incident which took place in the third month of my installation. But some students of the military academy, led from outside, were involved in the affairs. That night I hurried to the officeal residence of the Premier



by order of the Minister of War, and succeeded in preventing aggravation of the incident by controlling the much-excited Army and frenzied local civilians at this great shock, without promulgating martial law, though there were some who advocated it.

The Minister of War resigned his office assuming administrative responsibility for the incident, in which military academy students participated, though any military officer did not. As his successor, the three superior officers recommended Gen. HAYASHI Commander of the Korean Army, who, however, refused it to the Premier on the ground that he had not yet well informed of the prevailing situation, as he had been away from home. Then Premier SAITO so earnestly asked Mr. ARAKI to resume the post for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident that he at last consented against his first intentions. Minister ARAKI however, was accused vehemently of his resumption of his post by those who misunderstood the incident and who had hitherto been in sympathy with his principles. But without any word of his own justification and only citing an old saying. "Blame comes even upon our efforts for perfect achievement, while praise is bestowed unexpectedly" he was doing his best for settlement of the Manchurian Incident. At this sublime attitude of his, I, as one of his subordinates who knew the real state of things, was moved to tears.

8. Let me state the situation prevailing in Manchuria and others at the time I held office. A cleaning campaign of communists and a northern expedition by CHIANG KAI-SHEK in China had been conducted. But the people's wishes for restoration of sovereignty were so ardent that an anti-foreign movement was



strongly launched in Manchuria which had been rather disorderly and not yet in its frontier districts peace and order were kept. We could not be off our guard even for a moment, especially as the masses were under constant agitation of CHANG HSUEH-LIANG and the KUOMINTANG. Moreover Soviet Union's Far Eastern equipment was being established steadily, which meant also threats for us. But Minister ARAKI, who had no intentions to wage war, wanted to stop military operations in Manchuria as soon as ~~military operations in Manchuria as soon as~~ possible.

Such being his policy, a great deal of pains and devices were required in settling the incident for maintenance of peace and order, for the military forces there could not be moved so easily at our will.

For instance, our General Staff Office was troubled regarding expedition against revolts of MA OHAN-SHAN in North Manchuria and SU PING-WEN in HULUNPEIRH. Both of them could not be decidedly attacked or annihilated.

9. After recognition of Manchukuo, the Army had to share unlike before ~~it~~, with Manchukuo responsibilities of national defence and maintenance of peace and order in accordance with the new circumstances. It had to arrange matters with Manchukuo. Therefore every thing was settled by agreements between both countries. Such being the case, the Army asked the Government, as regards its Manchurian policies, to take full measures necessary for her national defence and maintenance of peace and order, for the foundation of her state had not yet <sup>been</sup> stabilized. The detailed measures were discussed by the authorities of the Foreign, the Navy, the Finance Offices and the Cabinet. The making of plans and the proceedings of their enforcement resulted from the discussions were in charge of the Foreign Office, only manipulation of troops was in the hands of the Army.



10. The Minister's principle of non-aggravation of the Manchurian Incident and immediate cessation of hostilities demotrated his long-cherished spirit of the Imperial Army. He believed and carried out that the Japanese Army should avoid war, because it existed to preserve the national character in accordance with His august benevolence of the Emperor, and that even when it was compelled to wage a defensive war it should avoid its disaster by limiting damages on both parties as strictly as possible. At the first SHANGHAI Affairs he evacuated all the troops upon truce to eradicate the root of calamity in future. It was the KWNATUNG Army fulfilling the fervent orders of Minister of War ARAKI Prince KAN-IN, Chief of the General Staff. General Staff MAZAKI that succeeded in concluding the TANGKU Truce Agreement and finally settling the Manchurian Incident by making our troops withdraw even twice to the Great Wall line though they had marched in full sight of PEIPING and TIENTSIN at the JEHOL campaign. It took one year and a half since his assumption of the portfolio to complete settling the incident. From a professional point of view none could achieve a more brilliant result under the Manchuiran, Japanese and international situations prevailing in those days.
11. The Minister devoted himself to cessation of hostilities till the TANGKU Truce Agreement, after which he set about planning fundamental national policies. Early in that autumn he began to discuss external, agricultural and political issues at Five Ministers' Conferences. He composed a gist of national policies entitled "My Suggestions for Emergency Policies," through which he exerted himself to the utmost to arrange internally to grant amnesty to all the rightist and leftist criminals excluding habitual ones, and internationally to hold a Far Eastern Peace Conference with a view to securing peace in Far East by asking the Powers to recognize the existing conditions



- and adjusting Japan's relations with them after her withdrawal from the League of Nations.
12. But he fell ill with pneumonia on January 1, 1944. Tiding over its crisis, he still feared he could not take active part at an emergency session of the Diet after his illness. On that account, despite the earnest persuasion to remain in office by the Premier, other ministers and us his subordinates, he resigned it recommending as his successor Gen. HAYASHI who had some understanding with him about his gist of national policies.
  13. The Government, however, including Minister of War HAYASHI, neglected his suggestions without trying to realize them. Moreover the session of the Diet was again at a low ebb and even presented a shameful scene. Thereupon Mr. ARAKI, returning to Tokyo from his one month recuperation at ARAMI, was not only deeply disappointed but got angry. Since then he never expressed his opinion actively regarding any important national policy.
  14. Minister of War ARAKI always talked of disasters of civilized warfare seen in World War I. He had his own view of war and armament for national defence, and was not much interested in ordinary military equipment in general. He asserted that national defence should be based on high standards of morality. Japanese history abounded in such instances and security of national defence was not always war but improvement of morality, he said. He advocated a humanitarian view of war, by preventing disasters, observing war-time public law and citing behaviors of great war lords of Japan, such as UESUGI, Kenshin. With this in view, he tried to have our armaments as an independent state almost on the same level with those of other Powers during World War I. For our poor Army, armaments had lagged far behind those of other



Powers during World War I. The plans made in 1922-23 were followed but the Incident interfered with their realization. On the other hand, the urgent expenses of the Incident was met by advancing the already-settled budget. He devoted himself solely in settling the Incident before anything else. He could not realize his ideals in other matters, nor paid much attention to suggestions made by his subordinates. He waited for a time when his ideals and such suggestions could be realized. But his illness made him give them up. Though the Army received many reports about the Soviet Union's active installation in Far East, we did not have any special equipment, devoting ourselves solely in settling the Manchurian Incident. The Minister had his own faith and hope about inviting peace in his anxiety of world situation after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nation. So he did not take any active installation.

15. One of the Chief renovations of military administration while he was Minister of War was creation of a cadet system, discontinuing the one year volunteers system. The object of this renovation was equal opportunity for military service, because by the latter system an able but poor conscript could not apply for cadetship, as he had to pay an adequate money for the service year. Another renovation was an appointment of commanders from a standpoint of character, and payment of additional salary to those commanders who were company-or higher commanders in a regiment and who had so many subordinates but no good chance for their culture and study, with a view to getting them devoted solely in military duties freed from anxiety about their future.



As it was during the incident, any other renovation could not afford to be carried out.

16. Minister ARAKI's guiding principle of the Army was realization of an army as a moral existence.

That is to say; from his experiences in World War I, the Japanese Army should earnestly try to prevent war from deterioration, wage no war without cause, commit no atrocities on a battlefield, nor treat war prisoners cruelly. Regarding these points, not only should we observe international treaties, but further we should warn the world without reserve against researches of poison gas or bacteria warfare, proposing limitation of any arms which were liable to cause deformity. So he said and practised. His motto in guiding the Army was, "Never he resented by enemies in victory and be yearned after by the natives during your stay." He also strongly insisted upon sanctification of arms, but it could not be realized so easily impeded by the deeply-rooted evil of custom. A sword was, in his opinion, not for killing but for protection of its bearer's life. Therefore he rejected a blood-stained sword as impure and was always wearing a new sword never smeared with blood.

17. As to military training at school, Minister ARAKI did not take any other new measure than he rectified what had been formal and conventional in it. He dispelled various misunderstandings lying between the Army and schools, clarified that military training of schools aimed at spiritual recognition of our Army as a moral existence to display its real merits, and rationalized it to be auxiliary training for military service with a view to shortening the service period.

Minister ARAKI took others' speeches and publications as the public opinion and made use of them for his self-introspection. He never suppressed any speech,



so that we, subordinates of his, even got angry at his leniency over personal abuses or slanders upon the Army made by civilians with varied objects. As far as I remember, the Press Section under his principle never resorted to any authoritative suppression policy, but settled matters persuadingly and with good will with those who had been too radical.



極東國際軍事裁判所

西米利加合衆國其他

對

荒木貞夫其他

宣誓供述書

供述者 山岡重厚

自分儀我國ニ行ハルル方式ニ從ヒ先ツ別紙ノ通り宣誓シテ  
為シタル上ニ次、如ク供述致シマス

2241



一 私は元陸軍中將山岡重厚であります唯今香川縣善通寺町大  
麻字小籠ニ五番地に閑居して居りません

二 私は荒木大将が陸軍大臣就任後一九三二年（昭和七年）二月末陸軍省  
軍務局長になり一九三四年一月荒木氏が病気で陸軍大臣を辞任さ  
れた後同年三月軍務局長の地位を去りました

三 犬養内閣当時の陸軍省の対滿方針としては唯滿洲の治安の恢  
復と速かなる兵乱の終熄とを目的として之が實現に専念致しました  
齋藤内閣に於ける方針も大体同様でありました

滿洲現地の實狀上滿洲國を承認するに至りましたので承認後は日  
滿議定書により滿洲國の意志と尊重しなから右目的の實現  
したのであります

四 故に陸軍としては治安と國防との任務の上から兵力

増強も平時の  
維持の



大臣は事変の拡大とならぬ様万事に注意されま  
勢の儘行はれ其行動地域も我居留民の保護や權益の  
ためには無政府状態となつた旧張家の全支配下の地域に及ぶ事も已む  
を得ないといふ内閣の決定はありましたが之れさへも成るべく拡大を避けて  
行動範囲を局限するように致して居りました

五 満洲建国は私の軍務司令長になつた時は既に現地では決定し着任  
の時は宣言のあつた時で、其当時の申送りには現地に於ける治安  
維持の爲めには現地民の熱情に任せるより外なしとの関東軍司令官  
の治安確保のための意見を尊重し政府は干渉することなく暫  
らく成り行きに任すこととなつたといふ事であつた陸軍は政府の方針  
に従ひ且つ大臣の旨を体し急速なる兵乱終熄と治安維持とに  
任じ且つ新政権の成立に伴ふ変化に應ずる研究をし内閣には  
内閣書記官長を委員長とする関係各省より出たる委員長による



委員会があつて対策を練つて居ました

元来自分が軍務局長に就任した主要なる任務は当時三月事件とか十月事件とか軍に於ける不祥事件が起つた後であつたので今後此の如き事件が再び起らぬ様嚴重に之を防止する事とありました。即ち就任の時大臣は特に自分に軍が乱れないやうに軍の素直器具をワロシヤ型又は当時流行のフアツシヨ型に走らぬ様心懸け何處までも皇軍の真價發揮を第一とするに目と指示されました。

六 当時陸軍は荒木大臣の方針に従ひ色々の事件に關係のあつた者や激烈に時局を憤慨する者や中央より地方に轉任せしめて要路には大臣の方針をよく了解し実行する穩健なる將校を事になつて居たので自分も就任以來人事の刷新に力め年將校や憤慨分子を説得したり鎮めたりする

まゝに督の御意に

第一の要路に

一はがキトニ遊軍  
一はがキトニ遊軍



七

従つて自分就任後三月目に五一五事件が起りま  
の将校は一人も之に参加致しません。唯士官学校の生徒  
名参加致しました。之は外部からの誘導によるものであります  
自分は同夜直ちに首相官邸に馳けつり陸相の命によつて此大衝動  
により相当動搖して居た軍人及地方の熱狂を抑へた又一面強硬  
論者中には此際戒嚴令を布くべしとの意見もあつたが之を排して  
事件の拡大を防ぐ事に成功しました

陸相は陸軍将校は参加しなかつたが士官学校生徒が参加した以上  
政治上の責を負ふべきであるとして辞職され後任として朝鮮軍  
司令官の林銑十郎大將を三長官で推薦したが林大將が總理  
大臣に対し自分は外地にあつて時局の認識未だ十分でないから  
と云つて固辞したため斎藤總理は荒木大將に滿洲事変又急速



處理の爲めに枉げて留任を請ふと懇請されたので遂に翻意された

然るに事件の真相を誤解せる者や又平素陸相の精神に共鳴せる者の中にも此翻意に対しては痛烈なる批判がありました。陸相は何等辯解もせず計らねざるの譽言あり金を求むるの毀りありの古語を示され黙々として満洲事変の終熄に邁進されまゝに自分も当時の陸相の悲壯なる態度には真相を知る部下として悲し痛な感を受けました

八 自分就任当時の満洲其他の情況は次の通りであります

中華民国は蒋介石北伐の後又共産黨肅正の後ではあります。主権回復熱旺盛のため排外運動強く相当荒れに居た満洲も其の治安良好ならず殊に字良始め支那本部の絶えざる煽の油断も出来なかつた又ソ聯邦の極東の諸施設が脅威を感ずる事が多かつたが我には戦争を

陸相の方  
言はこと







対満方針に對しては未だ其基礎薄弱なる同國に對しては特に  
治安維持と國防上必要なる処置に遺憾無き様政府に要  
望しました細部は外務海軍大藏及内閣との主務者の協

議によりました而して意見の一致したものに立安本及実施手  
續きは用兵上の外は外務省の主管下でありますを之に任

せました

十 陸相の滿洲事變の拡大を防止し兵乱を急遽に終熄せし

めんとの方針は其抱懐される皇軍精神に基くものでありま

した即ち陸相は日本の軍隊は陛下の仁愛の大御心に從



この國の徳を守るために存在するものであるから戦争は絶対に  
避くべきものである。已むを得ず防衛戦争とする場合でも  
勉めて彼我の損害を軽くし戦争に依るに火害を防止すべき  
ものであると信ぜられ且これを実行せられたりてあります。

第一次上海事変の際停戦協定なるや直に一兵も残さず  
引揚げて将来の禍根を断つたことや熱河作戦當時平  
津と指呼の間に眺めながら長城線で停止せしめ僅かに  
長城線を越へたものも二回迄引下げ遂に塘沽協定を  
締結して完全に滿洲事変を終熄処理したのは第一線





岡東軍がよく中央の意志を体したのによりますか又実に荒木陸相  
と麻院總長官及び真崎の參謀次長の熱烈なる後方の處理に  
よるものであります陸相就任以来此完全終結迄一年半を  
要して括りますか私が体験した当時の実情と又専門的の見地  
よりて当時の滿洲の実情日本の國內事情國際的事情  
の下では和平への解決は之以上の好成绩を望むことは出来  
ないと思ひます

十一 陸相は塘沽協定迄は一音兵乱の終熄に力を盡せられたし  
たが協定成立致しまするや直ちに本格的施策に取りかかり  
其年の秋の初めより五相會議で外交農政問題を檢討し  
自ら「緊急施策案」と名称を附した國策要綱を作成  
し國內的には左右兩派の區別なく甚だしき非常目的のもの以外



二

犯罪人全部を大赦し國際的には極東平和會議を開催する様に取り  
運ぶ聯盟脱退後の列國との關係を調整し現状認識を求め極東  
平和を図らんと凡ゆる努力を拂はれまゐつた

十二

然るに一九三四年一月肺炎に冒され危険期は過ぎたが重要時局の  
議會に病後充分の活動が出来ない事は申譯がないと云つて  
斎藤總理始め他の閣僚や我々下僚の熱誠なる留任勸告にも  
拘らず遂に一月二十三日荒木氏の國策要綱に就て一應の理解  
を保持して居た真崎、林西大將を後任に推薦して辞職されま  
したが林大將が後任になりまゐつた

十三

然るに林陸相始め政府は荒木大將の國策案の實現に何等の  
熱意を示さず議會も再び低調となり醜態を演じ出ゐた

荒木大將は一月下旬の静養を終つて熱海から歸京されたが此の



十六

荒木大臣は軍は道德的存在としての実を擧ぐる事に主力を注がねばならぬとて力を注がれまゝに即ち第一次歐洲大戰に従軍された所感により日本軍は嚴肅に戦争の墮落を防止しなければならぬ無名の師を起したり戰場に於ける殘虐な行為をなしたり停虜を苛酷に取扱つたりしてはならぬ之等に就ては國際條約遵守は固よりの事今一歩進んで毒瓦斯や細菌戰の研究や不具之癩疾となり易き兵器の使用制限等に就ては遠慮なく世界に警告するやうになければならぬと云ひ且実行された。勝つて敵に如せられず駐つて居民に暴はれよ」と云ふのが大臣の常に教へられた軍指導の標語であつた。

兵營の神聖化も随分強く主張されたが積弊は中々一朝一夕に矯める事は出来なかつた。

刀劍は殺人劍ではなく活人劍でなければならぬと戒めて荒木も氣を落付けたやうに指導もされた。

十七

學校教練については荒木陸軍大臣時代は從來形式的になつて居たものを





十五  
積極施設は当然なかつた

十五 荒木陸相在任中の軍政改革の主なるものは幹部候補生の納金制を廃した事であり之は従来一年志願兵は相当の金額を負担せなければならぬ為貧富の差によつて有能な者も志願が出来ぬと云ふ状態であつたので兵役義務の機会均等が改正の目的でありました其外に隊附諸隊長として多数の部下を持ち而も修養研究の機会に恵まれない者の後顧の憂を絶つ事が肅軍にも軍の道徳的存在として専ら心せしむる為にも必要たとして中隊長以上に特別加給の方法を講ずると共に隊長の人選を人格本位とする事に改正されました事として大体事変中でありましたが爲に一切の改革は手を着くるに至らなかつた次第であります



大正十一、二年頃の決定計画は踏襲されまゝだが事変で之を出来ず却つて既定予算の繰上げ等事変の急昇向に合せました位です一切は滿洲事變の戦乱終熄後でなければとてこれにのみ没頭して何にも自己の持つて居る理想は実現するに至りませんでした此向に種々下僚からの策案を出しまゝたか余り熱心に研究せず自己の持つて居た信念實現の時までほそのまゝにして置けといふ風でありましたか病氣で途中やめられたので万事そのまゝになりました

又ソ聯の極東施設の活潑化に就ては多くの情報が来て居たけれども滿洲事變の終熄の処理に没頭して居たし又ソ聯との戦争等考へて居なかつたから陸軍省としては何等特別の施設を為さなかつた

又大臣は聯盟脱退後の世界の變向に対し大いに憂慮し和平招来に対し別に自己の信念と抱負を持つて居たから戦争本位の





是正した以外何等新たな施策はありませんでした從來学校と軍との關係に種々の誤解があつたのを一掃して寧ろ軍事教育は精神的に皇軍の眞面目を發揮すべき道德的存在たる有寛を興學と共に兵役期向短縮の補助的訓練を合理化した

十八 荒木大臣は他人の言論出版等に就ては輿論の聲として自己反省の資と料として居られまいた従つて如何なる言論等に対しても圧迫を加へるやうな事はなかつた其為相当外部より種々の目的の爲めに個人的に又は軍を目標として中傷されることもあり我等下僚は大臣の寛大を憤慨する事なつたありました

新聞班に於ても大臣の方針を体し行き過ぎた者に対しても好意的懇談的に処置して権力的彈圧方針を採らなかつたと記憶致します



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昭和二十三年（一九四七年）

八月二十日於東京

供述者

山岡重厚



右に当立會人の面前に宣誓し其署名捺印し證明せしむ

同日於

立會人

谷田

勇







宣誓書

良心ニ従ヒ眞実ヲ述ベ何事ヲモ黙秘セズ又  
何事ヲモ附加セザルコトヲ宣誓フ

署名捺印

山岡重厚





## INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE F. R. EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-VS-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

## Affidavit

Deponent: Yamaoka, Shigeatsu

1. I am ex-Lt. General Yamaoka, Shigeatsu. I now leading a retired life at 205 Kodaki, Oasa, Zentsujimachi, Kagawa Prefecture.
2. I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry in February, 1933 after the accused ARAKI had occupied the portfolio of War, who resigned from his position on account of his illness in January, 1934. I also left my post in March of the same year.
3. The Manchurian policies of the War Ministry of the Inugai Cabinet aimed at restoration of peace and order, and the earliest cessation of hostilities, in Manchuria. It devoted itself to realization of these policies. The succeeding Saito Cabinet followed almost the same policies and tried to realize them in accordance with Manchukuo's free will and with the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol after her recognition as a state in view of the realities in Manchukuo.
4. Though the Army continued some military operations there, it took every caution not to allow them to become a full-scale war. Expeditionary forces were sent there as on a peace-time occasion and their scope of activity was limited as closely as possible, though on a Cabinet decision it might be extended, if necessary, to all the area formerly controlled by the Changs but now in a state of anarchy, in order to protect our residents, rights and interests.
5. The establishment of Manchukuo had been decided and declared when I was appointed Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. The Government approved the opinion of the Commander of the Kwantung Army that there was no other way but to leave the natives to realize their ardent wishes, in order to secure peace and order. The Government decided not to interfere with it. The Army, in accordance with the principles



of the Government and with the War Minister's intentions, made efforts to cease fire at the earliest date possible and to maintain peace and order. A commission was formed in the Cabinet with the chief cabinet secretary as chairman and other committees from the ministries concerned, for the purpose of deliberating counter-measures.

In view of disgraceful affairs in the Army, such as the March Incident, the October Incident and so forth, we had strictly to prevent the repetition of such incidents for the future. That was the chief reason why I was appointed to the Director of the Military Affairs Bureau. At my holding the post, the Minister of war told me to make, above all things, the Imperial Army display its real value, keeping order and never allowing its quality to be affected by Prussian type or the then-popular Fascism.

6. In those days the War Ministry was, on Minister ARAKI's principle, to transfer to comparatively unimportant posts those who had been concerned with the incidents or who were too indignant at the current situation and to appoint to important posts those officers of sound character who could fully understand the Minister's intentions and would carry them out. I accordingly cooperated with him since my acceptance of the post by renovating the personnel affairs and by appeasing and persuading some young officers and indignant elements.
7. As a result, no army officer, happy to say, participated in the May 15 Incident which took place in the third month of my installation. But some students of the military academy, led from outside, were involved in the affairs. That night I hurried to the official residence of the Premier by order of the Minister of War, and succeeded in preventing aggravation of the incident by controlling the much-excited Army and frenzied local civilians at this great shock, without promulgating martial law, though there were some who advocated it.

The Minister of War resigned his office assuming administrative responsibility for the incident, in which military academy students participated, though any military officer did not. As his successor, the three superior officers recommended Gen. Hayashi Commander of the Korean Army, who, however, refused it to the Premier on the ground that he had not yet been well informed of the prevailing situation, as he had been away from home.

Then Premier Saito so earnestly asked Mr. Araki to resume the post for the settlement of the Manchurian Incident that he at last consented against his first intentions. Minister Araki however, was accused vehemently of his resumption of his post by those who misunderstood the incident and who had hitherto been in sympathy with his principles. But without any word of his own justification and only citing an old saying, "Blame comes even upon our efforts for perfect achievement, while praise is bestowed unexpectedly," he was doing his best for settlement of the Manchurian Incident. At this sublime attitude of his, I, as one of his subordinates who knew the real state of things, was moved to tears.



8. Let me state the situation prevailing in Manchuria and others at the time I held office. A cleaning campaign of communists and a northern expedition by Chiang Kai-Shek in China had been conducted. But the people's wishes for restoration of sovereignty were so ardent that an anti-foreign movement was strongly launched in Manchuria which had been rather disorderly and not yet in its frontier districts peace and order were kept. We could not be off our guard even for a moment, especially as the masses were under constant agitation of Chang Hsueh-Liang and the Kuomintang. Moreover Soviet Union's Far Eastern equipment was being established steadily, which meant also threats for us. But Minister Araki who had no intentions to wage war, wanted to stop military operations in Manchuria as soon as possible. Such being his policy, a great deal of pains and devices were required in settling the incident for maintenance of peace and order, for the military forces there could not be moved so easily at our will.

For instance, our General Staff Office was troubled regarding expedition against revolts of Ma Chan-Shan in North Manchuria and Su Ping-Wen in Hulunpeirh. Both of them could not be decidedly attacked or annihilated.

9. After recognition of Manchukuo, the Army had to share unlike before with Manchukuo responsibilities of national defence and maintenance of peace and order in accordance with the new circumstances. It had to arrange matters with Manchukuo. Therefore every thing was settled by agreements between both countries. Such being the case, the Army asked the Government, as regards its Manchurian policies, to take full measures necessary for her national defence and maintenance of peace and order, for the foundation of her state had not yet been stabilized. The detailed measures were discussed by the authorities of the Foreign, the Navy, the Finance Offices and the Cabinet. The making of plans and the proceedings of their enforcement resulted from the discussions were in charge of the Foreign Office, only manipulation of troops was in the hands of the Army.
10. The Minister's principle of non-aggravation of the Manchurian Incident and immediate cessation of hostilities demonstrated his long-cherished spirit of the Imperial Army. He believed and carried out that the Japanese Army should avoid war, because it existed to preserve the national character in accordance with His august benevolence of the Emperor, and that even when it was compelled to wage a defensive war it should avoid its disaster by limiting damages on both parties as strictly as possible. At the first Shanghai Affairs he evacuated all the troops upon truce to eradicate the root of calamity in future. It was the Kwantung Army fulfilling the fervent orders of Minister of War Araki Prince Kan-in, Chief of the General Staff. General Staff Ma-aki that succeeded in concluding the Tangku Truce Agreement and finally



settling the Manchurian Incident by making our troops withdraw even twice to the Great Wall line though they had marched in full sight of Peiping and Tientsin at the Jehol campaign. It took one year and a half since his assumption of the portfolio to complete settling the incident. From a professional point of view none could achieve a more brilliant result under the Manchurian, Japanese and international situations prevailing in those days.

11. The Minister devoted himself to cessation of hostilities till the Tangku Truce Agreement, after which he set about planning fundamental national policies. Early in that autumn he began to discuss external, agricultural and political issues at Five Ministers' Conferences. He composed a gist of national policies entitled "My Suggestions for Emergency Policies" through which he exerted himself to the utmost to arrange internally to grant amnesty to all the rightist and leftist criminals excluding habitual ones, and internationally to hold a Far Eastern Peace Conference with a view to securing peace in the Far East by asking the Powers to recognize the existing conditions and adjusting Japan's relations with them after her withdrawal from the League of Nations.
12. But he fell ill with pneumonia on January 1, 1934. Tiding over its crisis, he still feared he could not take active part at an emergency session of the Diet after his illness. On that account, despite the earnest persuasion to remain in office by the Premier, other ministers and us his subordinates, he resigned it recommending as his successor General Hayashi who had some understanding with him about his gist of national policies.
13. The Government, however, including Minister of War Hayashi, neglected his suggestions without trying to realize them. Moreover the session of the Diet was again at a low ebb and even presented a shameful scene. Thereupon Mr. Aoki, returning to Tokyo from his one month recuperation at Irami, was not only deeply disappointed but got angry. Since then he never expressed his opinion actively regarding any important national policy.
14. Minister of War Araki always talked of disasters of civilized warfare seen in World War I. He had his own view of war and armament for national defence, and was not much interested in ordinary military equipment in general. He asserted that national defence should be based on high standards of morality. Japanese history abounded in such instances and security of national defence was not always war but improvement of morality, he said. He advocated a humanitarian view of war, by preventing disasters, observing war-time public law and citing behaviors of great war lords of Japan, such as Uesugi, Kenshin. With this in view, he tried to have our armaments as an independent state almost on the same level with those of other Powers during World War I. For our poor Army, armaments had lagged far behind those of



of other Powers during World War I. The plans made in 1922-23 were followed but the Incident interfered with their realization. On the other hand, the urgent expenses of the Incident was met by advancing the already settled budget. He devoted himself solely in settling the Incident before anything else. He could not realize his ideals in other matters, nor paid much attention to suggestions made by his subordinates. He waited for a time when his ideals and such suggestions could be realized. But his illness made him give them up. Though the Army received many reports about the Soviet Union's active installation in Far East, we did not have any special equipment, devoting ourselves solely in settling the Manchurian Incident. The Minister had his own faith and hope about inviting peace in his anxiety of world situation after Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations. So he did not take any active installation.

15. One of the Chief renovations of military administration while he was Minister of War was creation of a cadet system, discontinuing the one year volunteers system. The object of this renovation was equal opportunity for military service, because by the latter system an able but poor conscript could not apply for cadetship, as he had to pay an adequate money for the service year. Another renovation was an appointment of commanders from a standpoint of character, and payment of additional salary to those commanders who were company or higher commanders in a regiment and who had so many subordinates but no good chance for their culture and study, with a view to getting them devoted solely in military duties freed from anxiety about their future. As it was during the incident, any other renovation could not afford to be carried out.
16. Minister Araki's guiding principle of the Army was realization of an army as a moral existence. That is to say; from his experiences in World War I, the Japanese Army should earnestly try to prevent war from deterioration, wage no war without cause, commit no atrocities on a battlefield, nor treat war prisoners cruelly. Regarding these points, not only should we observe international treaties, but further we should warn the world without reserve against researches of poison gas or bacteria warfare, proposing limitation of any arms which were liable to cause deformity. So he said and practised. His motto in guiding the Army was, "Never be resented by enemies in victory and be yearned after by natives during your stay." He also strongly insisted upon sanctification of arms, but it could not be realized so easily impeded by the deeply-rooted evil of custom. A sword was, in his opinion, not for killing but for protection of its bearer's life. Therefore he rejected a blood-stained sword as impure and was always wearing a new sword never smeared with blood.
17. As to military training at school, Minister Araki did not take any other new measure than he rectified what had been formal and conventional in it. He



dispelled various misunderstanding lying between the Army and schools, clarified that military training of schools aimed at spiritual recognition of our Army as a moral existence to display its real merits, and rationalized it to be auxiliary training for military service with a view to shortening the service period. Minister Araki took others' speeches and publications as the public opinion and made use of them for his self-introspection. He never suppressed any speech, so that we, subordinates of his, even got angry at his leniency over personal abuses or slanders upon the Army made by civilians with varied objects. As far as I remember, the Press Section under his principle never resorted to any authoritative suppression policy, but settled matters persuadingly and with good will with those who had been too radical.