810. Book #1 Line 124

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SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
G-2
FAR EAST COMMAND

FILE NO. 310: [illegible]

LINE NO. 1 TO 4

DATE Jan 51 TO Dec 57

Book #1

SECRET

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LIST OF PAPERS

File under No. 310

Sheet #1

SERIAL NUMBER	FROM—	DATE	TO—	SYNOPSIS
~~1~~	~~COM~~	~~8 Mar~~	~~Staff Sections~~	~~C/S: Meeting of Managemt unit representatives~~
~~1~~	~~COM M~~	~~28 May~~	~~Staff Sections~~	~~C/S: Management Improvement program Material (File Separate~~
~~cd 1~~	~~COM M~~	~~27 July~~	~~Staff Sections~~	~~C/S: Same as above~~
~~dg 2~~	~~G2~~	~~6 Oct~~	~~XX Chief of Staff~~	~~Memo: Delay in Processing actio to the Office of the CinC.~~
cd 1	COM-M	28 May	All Sections	C/S: Management Improvement Program Material
cd 3	Asst Exec	~~17~~ Dec	Ex Gp & Others	IOM: Implementation of Matters Concerning Facilities and Area and the Expenses and Status of Troops Garrisoned within the Japanese Islands
~~RMK 1~~	~~G2~~	~~18 Dec~~	~~AG~~	~~C/S: Ast records management off~~
cd 3	Asst Exec	17 Dec	Ex Gp & Others	IOM: Implemtation of Matters concerning Facilities and Area and the Expenses and Status of Troop Garrisoned within th Japanese Islands.
~~pmb 1~~	~~COM-M~~	~~17 Aug~~	~~All Gen & Sp Staff Sec~~	~~C/S: Mangement Improvement Program Material~~
pmb 4	Col Dickey	6 Aug	Gen Ennis	IOM: Survey - Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Inteligence Material to Theater Intelligence Division

11794—FEC P&PC—4/51—30M

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

47007
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(For use within G-2 only) FEC/LG/CCB/CALD/ft

File No:

Subject: Survey - Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence Division

Date: 6 August 1951

FROM: Col Dickey TO: Gen Ennis PHONE: 26-8141 NAME: Col Dickey

Comment Number 1

This survey was initiated by direction of ACofS, G-2, 16 July 1951. Purpose of survey was to determine the flow rate, channel and handling of material routed to T/Intel Division of G-2, GHQ, FEC, with an end view of devising means of expediting transmission of material to that Division and assuring that all pertinent material passes through T/Intel.

METHOD AND PROCEDURE:

1. The period of 1-18 July, inclusive, was selected for exploration of operational papers entering T/Intel. During this period, a total of 610 operational transmittals were logged into T/Intel Message Center exclusive of action papers. Indicated sources were as follows:

G-1	21	Transmittals	(Tab 1)
G-3	34	"	(Tab 2)
PsyWar	38	"	(Tab 3)
MIS Div	6	"	(Tab 4)
ATIS	135	"	(Tab 5)
Target Branch	225	"	(Tab 6)
Geographic Branch	4	"	(Tab 7)
JSOB (Not including FEC/LG Reports)	24	"	(Tab 8)
Document Research	31	"	(Tab 9)
CI Division	31	"	(Tab 10)
441st CIC Det Spot Reports	43	"	(Tab 11)
Eighth Army CIC (Korea, thru 441st CIC Det)	43	"	(Tab 12)

The above 610 consolidated transmittals covered 1,990 separate items or reports.

2. Courier service between AG Message Center and G-2 Message Center as well as between G-2 Message Center and G-2 Division Message Centers physically external to the Dai Ichi Building is on an hourly basis during period 0800-1700 hours. Internal G-2 courier system and distribution within the Dai Ichi Building is on a thirty (30) minute or less basis. Divisions, Branches and Groups external to the Dai Ichi Building are on either an hourly or semi-hourly service, supplemented by special couriers as required. Starting with the logged times for specific items as shown in T/Intel Message Center log, individual components, wherever possible, were traced back through successive Message Centers to point of origin. This procedure provided a check, both of elapsed time between successive loggings and of any delays encountered in over-night lay-over or back-logs within various message centers.

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No:

Subject: Survey - Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence Division

Date: 6 August 1951

FROM: Col Dickey TO: Gen Ennis PHONE: NAME:

Comment Number 1 (Cont'd)

3. Examination of flow-rate of the material through the various Message Centers as shown by successive loggings indicates that the courier system schedule does not reflect true flow-rates. Examination and correlation of logging times indicate delays in the main can be attributed to overnight lay-overs, holidays and week-ends, complicated by the absence of critical specialist civilian employees within the Branches, and back-logs which accumulate in Message Centers during peak hours. Despite the hourly courier system designed to reduce peak loads, there appears to be a common tendency to "dump" material into the Message Centers just prior to the normal closing day period. Further clogging of Message Centers may be attributed to the circulation of material to personnel and branches having only cursory interest. This unnecessary distribution to personnel only remotely concerned with special material not only clogs the Message Centers, but consumes time of other personnel who can ill spare it from their primary responsibilites. The practice of logging through all intervening Message Centers rather than to terminal Message Centers also contributes to delayed transmissions. The establishment of the practice for the originating agency to make the distribution breakdown with terminal dispatch will serve to eliminate a part of this.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. That frequency of couriers and courier service as presently set up is adequate to expeditiously handle material.

2. Excessive transmittal time on material is being accumulated because of routine mechanical logging of material.

3. That excessive and extraneous distribution exists.

4. That Message Centers are being swamped by "dumping" and back-logs.

5. That the labrynth complexities of the GHQ G-2 Organization are such that hasty decisions for alterations based on inadequate research can do appreciable harm.

6. That temporary improvement only will be achieved by patchwork.

7. That basic realignment of responsibilities of the various branches with clear and definite delineation of missions and responsibilities can serve to reduce duplication to a minimum and to expedite transmission of intelligence material within the G-2 Organization.

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

File No: **Subject:** Survey - Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence Division **Date:** 6 August 1951

FROM: Col Dickey **TO:** Gen Ennis **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Comment Number 1 (Cont'd)

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That an extensive internal survey of the G-2 organization by its components be initiated in the immediate future with the end view of the elimination of duplication; elimination of cursory activities and the definite delineation of mission and definition of primary responsibilities.

2. That such survey be conducted along the following lines:

a. Branches and groups of the various divisions be instructed by their respective chiefs to thoroughly survey and minutely examine the complete functioning of their organization. All activities of each group to be listed in summarized form indicating whether of primary, secondary or cursory interest to that particular group; with justification of such classifications together with recommendations for retention of matters of primary interest and the elimination of all except those activities of primary interest. Basic data, summary and recommendations to be forwarded to the Branch Chief. Five (5) days should be adequate to accomplish this.

b. Branch Chiefs to be charged with the performance of similar activity for his organization; the reviewing and consolidation of material furnished by his groups; and the forwarding of all basic data and material together with his recommendations to his Division Chief. An additional five (5) days should be adequate to accomplish this.

c. In a similar manner, the Division Chief to have the responsibility as delineated above and the forwarding of all basic data together with his recommendations to ACofS, G-2. A total elapsed time of two (2) weeks should be adequate to complete the survey.

3. That an Executive Committee, consisting of experienced representatives from each of the Divisions be appointed by ACofS, G-2, and charged with the responsibility of resolving differences between the Divisions; the review of all data down to that submitted by the groups and branches of the various Divisions; the drafting of decisions to effect elimination of duplication and the expediting of transmission of G-2 material by authorizing the by-passing of incidental Message Centers and branches having cursory interest only, and the preparation of a clear and definite delineation of the mission and responsibility of the various Divisions in a written directive to be issued by the ACofS, G-2.

12 Incls:
1-12. Flow Rate Summaries

C.A.L.D.

- C. A. L. D. - - - - - - - - - - - -

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

49500

(For use within G-2 only)

File No:

Subject: Survey-Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence Division

Date: 23 Aug 51

FROM: G2 Admin

TO: 1 44lst CIC
2 CI Div
3 FEC/LG
4 MIS Div
5 T/Intel
6 G2 Admin (IN TURN)

PHONE: 26-8838
NAME: Col Ives

Comment Number 2

1. At General Ennis' direction, Colonel Dickey has spent considerable effort in sampling random messages to get an idea of flow rate of incoming Intelligence material to Theater Intelligence Division. Observations are shown on separate TABS; C/N 1, par 1, shows the TAB number in which each division is primarily interested.

2. G2 Admin is experimenting with variations from past procedures, with a view to speeding up the movement of papers. To assist in the evaluation of the data given in the various TABS, the comments of chiefs of major subdivisions on data pertaining to their shops would be appreciated.

3. It is requested that this IOM be held for not more than twelve (12) hours by each addressee, and that time of receipt and dispatch be noted on the routing slip.

12 Incls:
n/c

for W. M. I.

LGS/kk

23 AUG 1951

FROM: CO, 44lst CIC TO: CI Div

PHONE: 33-5414
NAME: Lt Col W V DeLoach

3

1. Reference is made to par 2, C/N 2 above and Incl 11 of this report. It is assumed by this headquarters that the S/R's inspected by Colonel Dickey were considered as routine messages by 44lst CIC Det. personnel. This being so, the time element of 2 hours and 51 minutes would not be considered excessive.

2. Messages received in this headquarters which are determined to be of an urgent nature are handled in the following manner:

a. Phone call to CI Div relaying the information, if classification permits. This is a matter of a few minutes.

b. The S/R is finalized, and forwarded to CI Div by special courier. This is accomplished within an hour under normal circumstances.

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G2 Admin

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FROM:	CS Admin	TO:	1 AAFAF CIC	PHONE:	58-8838
			2 CS Admin (INFO)	NAME:	Col Ives
			3 T\Intel		
			4 MIS Div		
			5 CI Div		
			6 FEC\LO		

Comment	Number
	1

File No:

Subject: Incoming Intelligence Material
Survey-Flow Rate and Handling of
(For use within G-2 only)

Date: 22 Aug 51

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

G-2, GHQ

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only) LGS/kk

File No: **Subject:** Survey-Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence **Date:** 23 AUG 1951

FROM: CO, 441st CIC **TO:** CI Div **PHONE:** 33-5414 **NAME:** Lt Col W V DeLoach

Comment Number 3 (Contd)

3. The 441st CIC Det does not concur in the recommendation contained in Incl 11. The 441st CIC Det recommends that the current procedure remain in effect.

12 Incls
n/c

L. G. S.

CIDiv/ExGp/JSB/mfs

FROM: CI Div TO; FEC/LG PHONE: 26-5652 DATE: 25 Aug 51
NAME: Lt Col Bochnowski

Comment Number 4

1. CI Div concurs in the recommendation made by Col Dickey in Comment 1 in that internal survey be made of G-2 organization with purpose of defining clearly the responsibilities and mission of the various components; thereby eliminating many overlapping and conflicting functions now inherent in the organization.

2. CI Div does not concur in the recommendation contained in Incl 11 that all Spot Reports to T/Intell bypass CI Div Message Center and go direct from 441st CIC Detachment to T/Intell. CI Div has always been the determinative agency on which reports would go forward to T/Intell as well as to other sections of G-2. CI Div cannot see any necessity of T/Intell receiving a large number of Spot Reports of purely Counter Intelligence nature. With the reorganization of CI Div on 17 July the flow of positive intelligence to T/Intell has greatly improved. Agent Reports and Summaries of Information on cases such as "Positive Intelligence on Soviet or Soviet Controlled Areas", "Illegal Entrants held for Theater Intelligence Interrogation," etc, are now being processed to Theater Intelligence through CI Div Message Center without logging in and out. This has reduced a great deal of the time lag in the reports reaching Theater Intelligence.

3. CI Div recommends that the current procedure on Spot Reports remain in effect.

12 Incls
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L. C. E.

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CCB/whw

File No: **Subject:** Survey-Flow Rate & Handling of Incoming Intel Material to T/Intel **Date:** 26 Aug 51

FROM: FEC/LG **TO:** Mis Div **PHONE:** 26-8141 **NAME:** C.C.Blakeney,Col

Comment Number

1. Examination of Incl 8, in accordance with instructions in par 2, CN2 does not, in the opinion of this Division, indicate an excessive time consumed in the movement of papers into or out of FEC/LG message center. In this connection, attention is invited to Incl 13, showing the courier schedule in effect in FEC/LG. This schedule, based on available personnel is considered adequate for routine matters, special handling of incoming messages from G-2 message center is handled on a "come and get it" call from G-2 message center. Consideration might be given to the establishment of courier service from G-2 message center to outlying elements of the Division. 5.

13-Incls
- 1-added FEC/LG MC Schedule

for: C.C.B.

FROM: MIS Div To: G2 LtCol Blake 26-8578
Thru: T/Intel 26 Aug 51

1. An examination of Incls 4 and 5 in accordance with par 2, IOM 2, does not in the opinion of this Division indicate excessive time in the movement of routine papers into or out of MIS Div. Present message center courier schedules are currently being revised to fit them to peak-load periods, and personnel are available twenty-four hours daily for the purpose of expediting action on important matters. 6

2. Reports, etc., arriving in ATIS from Korea are screened to insure that important information is transmitted to T/Intel and/or G2 as expeditiously as possible.

13 Incls
n/c

for T.N.S.

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

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File No: **Subject:** Survey-Flow Rate & Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence **Date:** TI/HVW/EBB/cbs 27 Aug 1951

FROM: T/Intel **TO:** G-2 **PHONE:** **NAME:**

Comment Number 7

Concur in comments 3, 4, 5 and 6.

13 Incls:
n/c

HVW

-H.V.W.-

From: G2 Admin To: G2

Phone: 26-8838
Name: Col Ives
Date: 28 Aug 51

1. Colonel Dickey has done a painstaking and conscientious job. In order to benefit from his work, a detailed study of causes of delay, with corrective action where indicated, is required. He recommends an extensive survey of the G2 organization with a view of eliminating duplications & cursory activities, and definition of primary responsibilities; this survey to be accomplished internally by G2 components. He proposes that, after branches have surveyed their organizations, Division Chiefs consolidate recommendations with branch chiefs; thereafter, that a committee be appointed to resolve differences between divisions, review all data, and prepare a plan for eliminating duplications, for expediting transmission of G2 material, and for clear and definite delineation of responsibilities of various divisions. 8

2. Action already taken based on Colonel Dickey's study:

a. Routing of papers on 5th Floor, Dai Ichi, revised for speedier delivery. Operational matters now by-pass Adm O (Capt Crank). Delivery and pick up from baskets every thirty (30) minutes.

3. To be placed in effect, based on recent trial runs:

a. Change present system of each division having its own courier between G2 and their message centers.

b. G2 Message Center take over courier service. Two couriers to be designated; one works every other day from 0800 to 1900. Each message center remain open until 1900. This should lessen last-minute dumping and overnight layover apparent in Colonel Dickey's study. The new courier system to start at 0800 and make a run via T/Intel to CI Div, FEC/LG, and MIS Div, pick up at the same time, and return via T/Intel Message Center to G2. He will move papers so addressed from NYK Divs to T/Intel and vice versa, without passing through G2 Message Center. Test

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

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File No: **Subject:** Survey-Flow **Date:** 28 August 1951

FROM: G2 Admin **TO:** G2 **PHONE:** 26-8838 **NAME:** Col Ives

Comment Number

8 (Contd)

shows total time for such a run to be thirty-five minutes. The messenger will be instructed that speed is desired, and that he will keep continuously on the move. CIC to have its own messenger, since it is out of the way.

4. Colonel Dickey's recommendations infer that appropriate changes in organization will contribute to speeding up the flow-rate of Intelligence material and that survey may reveal need for desirable changes within the G2 organizational structure.

5. Management Manual, Series 100-00, "Organization Structure" (See TAB 14) is considered worthy of consideration by chief of any survey committee, in connection with planning a survey of G2. It contains suggestions as to methods of examining organization structure. Applicable excerpts are briefed, on cover.

6. Reference C/N 1, par 2, the procedure suggested therein starts with the lower elements and works up. This procedure would have the advantage of quick location and correction of practices that result in slow handling of incoming material to T/Intel Division. However, if it is desired to make an over-all survey of the G2 organization with a view to exploring all work activities and bettering present practices where it may be found advisable, it is suggested that an examination of a G2 structure be made by an executive committee such as that mentioned in C/N 1, par 3, using procedure indicated in Management Manual.

13 Incls: n/c
TAB 14 added:
Brief of Excerpts of Management
Manual (attached)

- W. M. I. - - - - - - - -

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G-1

A total of 21 transmissions from G-1 were logged into T/Intel Message Center during this period. These consisted principally of Personnel Daily Summaries, practically all of which passed through G-2 Message Center. Time elapsed between G-2 Message Center and T/Intel Message Center depended upon whether or not material was dispatched from G-2 Message Center prior to 1700 hours. Seven (7) transmittals required an average time of 1 hour 6 minutes; nine (9) transmittals required an average of 11 hours 10 minutes; the elapsed time could not be determined for the remaining five (5) transmittals.

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

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G-3

A total of 33 transmittals came into T/Intel Message Center from G-3 during this period. These transactions consisted of Daily Operation Reports which normally pass through the G-2 Message Center. Material reaching G-2 Message Center in time for logging out prior to 1700 hours shows an elapsed time of 1 hour 11 minutes between Message Centers, G-2 and T/Intel. Other material shows an average elapsed time of 15 hours, 25 minutes. Of 33 transmissions, all except three (3) fell in the latter category.

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PsyWar

A total of 38 transmissions covering sixty-nine (69) items from PsyWar to T/Intel Message Center were logged during the period. In the main, these were Foreign Radio Braodcast Trends and Daily Collection Summaries, a few operational reports were also furnished. These transmissions between Psy War and T/Intel Message Center are by PsyWar courier and bypass both G-2 and G-3 Message Centers in an effort to expedite handling. Administrative matters, policy and planning papers are routed through G-3 channels. PsyWar couriers normally operate on a three-time daily basis supplemented as required by special reports.

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MIS Div

MIS Div and ATIS use a common Message Center. Such items as T/Intel received from MIS Div during this period dealt with security violations or coordination of some intelligence source, such as Technical Intelligence. The small volume of MIS Div transmitted material does not offer an adequate performance picture. Hand-carried material between Message Center MIS Div and T/Intel Message Center shows an elapsed time of ten (10) minutes. Two (2) items routinely routed through G-2 Message Center to T/Intel Message Center indicates an elapsed time of one (1) hour 30 minutes and 2 hours 55 minutes respectively. These items were transmitted early in the day. Items which reached the G-2 Message Center late in the afternoon show an elapsed time between MIS Div and T/Intel Message Center of 17 hours 40 mintues, 22 hours 15 minutes, and 16 hours 00 minutes occasioned by over-night lay-over.

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A T I S

During the survey period a total of 135 ATIS transmittals were logged into T/Intel Message Center covering 965 separate items. These items were Summaries of Information, Translations of Enemy Documents, Bulletins "Enemy Documents", ADVATIS Reports, MISDI, MISPI, LDI, KT and KG Interrogation Reports. KT Interrogation Reports published in Korea are channeled thru courier AG-Eighth Army, to AG-GHQ to G-2 Message Center to ATIS Message Center, thence to the Central Interrogation Center which screens and edits them. Edited Reports are then sent to ATIS Production Section for publication by mimeo-process. KG Interrogation Reports are received by ATIS in mimeo-stencil form from ADVATIS thru the above traced channel. These reports are then routed to Research and Information Section which proof-reads, dates and prepares them for original publication. Interrogation Reports are forwarded direct from ATIS to T/Intell Message Center, bypassing the G-2 Message Center. Method of handling renders accurate determination of true elapsed time from Korea origin to T/Intel Message Center impractical. However, ATIS Message Center has a standing rule that all routine voluminous matter, such as published bulletins and documents must clear that Message Center within 48 hours regardless of volume.

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

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TARGET BRANCH
(T/Intel)

A total of 225 Target Branch transmittals were logged into T/Intel Message Center during the period surveyed. These consisted of 70 "personalities", 90 Technical Intelligence Reports, 14 "Enemy Documents", 1600 ICF cards (4 transmittals), 6 "ATIS Interrogation Reports", and 262 KT-KG Interrogation Reports, total 460 separate items.

"Personalities" or biographic intelligence from Target Branch is based on SR 380-305-5. Present scope of this work is confined to civilian and military personnel, both past and present, associated with the Soviet Mission in Japan. The work consists of cross-checking former card files of the Foreign Liaison Section against CI Div files and the preparation of data on modified form OCS 17-B for transmittal to G-2 Washington. Target Branch expects to complete this phase of biographic intelligence during the month of August.

The average elapsed time from the time of origin of a Technical intelligence report of a field unit in Korea through Target Branch to G-2 Message Center for dispatch to Washington is 18.6 days. Material normally is handled within Target Branch on a 24-hour clearance schedule. Sporadically, some Technical Intelligence reports are delayed in MIS Div because insufficient copies of photographic exhibits were attached to the original report. In such cases a delay of some 8 to 48 hours to obtain these locally may be expected. Attention is invited to the fact that where occasion demands the use of Signal Corps photographers and their equipment to obtain 4" x 5" negatives in Korea, these negatives are forwarded by air to Tokyo for processing. In Tokyo two (2) additional copies of such negatives are made, one is returned with the requested prints to Eighth Army, one is retained in the Signal Corps laboratory files and the original is forwarded to the Still Picture Branch, Army Pictorial Service, Chief Signal Officer, where prints are made available for scanning by representatives of the Department of the Army. This has at least on one occasion, occasioned a query to G-2 GHQ FEC prior to the actual receipt of the basic report from Korea. Attention is also invited to the fact that the parallel channels of transmission of Technical Intelligence Reports through Technical Services and intelligence channels is accomplished by coordination at Army and Theater levels. Technical Service channeled reports from time to time are received in Tokyo earlier than those through intelligence channels. This occasions a delay pending arrival of second report for comparison and consolidated comments.

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

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GEOGRAPHIC BRANCH

Only four (4) Geographic Branch transmittals are logged into T/Intel MessageCenter during the survey period. Geographic Branch does not operate a Message Center and maintains only an informal log as most papers are hand-carried between the two units by Dr. Wilson. JSPOG infrequently transmits material direct to Geographic Branch after contacting Dr. Wilson. Terrain reports and special reports are broken down for distribution by G-2 Message Center. Special request material is usually hand-carried to the requesting G-2 agency. MIS Div infrequently sends material direct to the Geographic Branch. This material is usually either of a housekeeping nature (NYK Building) or deals with coordination with ATIS.

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

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J S O B

Twenty-four (24) JSOB transmissions covering 93 items were logged into T/Intel Messare Center during the period of survey. This total does not include material from FEC/LG-Korea which sent its reports direct to T/Intel. Log entries indicate an average elapsed time, JSOB-T/Intel Message Centers - 3 hours 58 minutes, provided the transactions were completed within the period of 0800-1700 hours. However, if the transactions were not completed during these hours, an average elapsed time of 17 hours 47 minutes was indicated. During hours 0800-1700, elapsed time was as follows: JSOB to G-2 Message Center, 2 hours 26 minutes; G-2 to T/Intel Message Center, 1 hour 26 minutes. After 1700 hours, elapsed time, JSOB to G-2 Message Center, 16 hours 40 minutes; G-2 to T/Intel Message Center 14 hours 27 minutes. Normally these lay-over times are not culminative. Reports from Korea-FEC/LG-442d CIC Det are addressed from Korea direct to T/Intel and are not processed through JSOB to T/Intel.

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DOCUMENT RESEARCH

Document Research furnishes T/Intel two (2) primary types of information, ZJY Messages which are relayed from FRU/FEC Headquarters, Yokosuka by TWX to Document Research which immediately notifies T/Intel, who dispatches courier to make pick up. The elapsed time between Document Research and T/Intel Message Center logging averages 15 minutes for these messages. 31 such logged transmissions of ZJY messages are shown in the T/Intel Message Center log for this period. In addition to ZJY messages, JDS(ZJY) Reports are furnished Document Research from FRU/FEC Headquarters on a weekly courier basis. These "dittoed" reports are furnished in four (4) copies to JSOB where they are borken down for distribution, 2 copies for T/Intel, 1 copy for PsyWar, one copy for internal distribution and file. During the period 1-18 July, 57 such reports were forwarded to T/Intel; average elapsed time, Document Research thru JSOB to T/Intel, approximately 5 hours, if received in JSOB early enough to clear that Message Center prior to 1700 hours, otherwise, over-night lay-over results an average of 19 hours elapsed time.

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CI Division

31 CI Division transmissions covering 49 positive intelligence items were logged into T/Intel Message Center during the survey period. 13 of the logged entries covered 21 Agents' Reports or Summary of Information from 441st CIC Det containing information believed to be of interest to T/Intel. Gaps in logs and inability to collate items between Message Center logs prevented a complete trace of all items. From data available, the following average elapsed times are indicated:

1. Date of Report - Point of origin to 441st CIC Det Message Center, 4.3 days.

2. Processing (Headquarters 441st CIC Det) - 1 hour 18 minutes.

3. 441st CIC Det Message Center to G-2 Message Center - 7 days 4 hours 43 minutes.

4. 441st CIC Det Message Center to T/Intel Message Center - 7 days 14 hours 14 minutes.

18 of the 31 logged entries into T/Intel Message Center from CI Div were of undetermined origin. These included "Spot Reports" prepared for the Chief of Staff, Monthly summaries, Positive Intelligence Reports, and Translated items of possible interest to T/Intel. From partial data available, the following elapsed times were indicated: CI Div Message Center to G-2 Message Center, 3 hours 9 minutes. CI Div Message Center to T/Intel Message Center - 10 hours 31 minutes.

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441st CIC Detachment
(441st CIC Spot Reports)

A total of 43 Spot Reports were logged into T/Intel Message Center during the period 1-18 July 1951, inclusive. Spot Reports normally originating in CIC Areas are telephoned into CIC District Headquarters which in turn teletypes the reports into the Spot Report Section, Headquarters, 441st CIC Detachment. Headquarters, 441st CIC Detachment checks, edits and reproduces these reports by "ditto" process. Reports of high or immediate intelligence interest are dispatched immediately by courier to Col Bratton and/or CI Div. Ordinary spot reports are handled on normal courier runs during the hours 0800-1700 on an hourly schedule. During the hours 1700-2300 two (2) deliveries are made to CI Div by CQ 441st CIC Det. During the hours, 2300 to 0800, the following morning the 441st CIC CQ is available as courier for handling urgent spot reports. Ten (10) processed copies of Spot Reports are forwarded to Message Center CI Div where they are immediately screened. Those reports deemed of immediate interest to T/Intel are promptly handed back to the CIC courier with instructions to deliver them to T/Intel Message Center. Spot Reports are normally processed through the interested Sections of CI Div and two (2) copies are then forwarded without notation to T/Intel. Spot Report elapsed times are as indicated:

(1) Within Headquarters 441st CIC Detachment:

Normal handling 0800-1700	2 hours 51 minutes
Normal handling 1700-0800 and week ends	11 " 46 "
Expedited handling 1700-0800	1 " 52 "

(2) Elapsed time from arrival, Headquarters, 441st CIC Detachment to Message Center, T/Intel:

Normal handling 0800-1700	5 hours 28 minutes
Normal handling 1700-0800	16 " 34 "

Recommendation is made that T/Intel copies of all Spot Reports bypass CI Div Message Center and go direct from 441st CIC Det to T/Intel.

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EIGHTH ARMY CIC
(Korea Reports)
Through 441st CIC Detachment

A total of 19 KOR Reports from Eighth Army, CIC Detachments were logged into Message Center T/Intel during survey period. These transmittals consisted of 225 Agents' Reports, 11 consolidated summaries and 11 Summaries of Information. Time elapsed between dates shown on reports and dates of arrival in Message Center T/Intel averages 9.5 days. Time elapsed between arrival AG Section GHQ and Message Center T/Intel through 441st CIC averages 4 days. Routing of T/Intel copy direct to T/Intel can eliminate a possible 4-day delay. Insufficient copies (2 only) are received from Korea. It is recommended that sufficient additional copies be furnished to provide one (1) direct copy to T/Intel, one (1) copy locally (Korea) for FEC/LG and additional copies to 441st CIC Det to provide expedited delivery through CI Div,. 441st CIC file and to such other sections of G-2 as have interest in these reports.

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

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FAR EAST COMMAND
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff
Far East Command Liaison Group

APO 500
9 August 1951

ADMIN MEMORANDUM NO 16

SUBJECT: Message Center Courier Time Schedule

1. Following is time of M/C courier runs & daily stops:

0830 to Dai Ichi
1015 to Finance Bldg, British Embassy & Dai Ichi
1300 to Dai Ichi
1500 to Dai Ichi & Finance Bldg
1630 to Dai Ichi-Last Run

2. Any personnel desiring to ride along on these scheduled runs may do so, however, it is requested he not have the jeep wait-instead call back to the M/C for transportation.

3. It is further suggested that no person in FEC/LG keep the jeep more than 30 minutes-if you need a jeep longer, release the jeep upon arrival, and when ready to return phone the M/C.

4. Classified waste picked up at 1615 hrs as the courier is leaving at 1630(same person).

5. Last delivery out of FEC/LG by M/C is 1630. There is not sufficient personnel for special runs and still get any work accomplished.

6. Special deliveries after 1630-we furnish the transportation and you the personnel.

7. Last pick up of out boxes is 1645 hrs.

8. Last papers into the ExO & Chief is 1600 unless red tagged.

ARK for
C.C.B.

Incl #13

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By [illegible] NARA Date 01/18/12

DO NOT DETACH
G-2 GHQ FEC

19 Aug 1951

SUBJECT: Survey Flow Rate and Handling of Incoming Intelligence Material to Theater Intelligence

FROM:

TO: Col Bratton

A C of S, G-2	( )	Theater Intell	( )
Deputy	(/)	Operations	( )
Secretariat	( )	PDM	( )
Deputy for Admin	( )	Fn Mil Ln	( )
Deputy for Navy	( )	Plans & Estimates	( )
Leputy for Air	( )	Special Intell	( )
Asst Admin	( )	Geog Branch	( )
Asst MIS Div	( )	CIS (CI Div)	( )
Asst CI Div	( )	Operations	( )
Sp Asst 441st CIC	( )	Coll and Pub	( )
Sp Asst Fiscal	( )	441st CIC	( )
Sp Asst Radio	( )	Public Safety Branch	( )
Sp Asst Historical	( )	JSOB	( )
Sp Asst JSOB	( )	SIA	( )
Sp Asst PSB	( )	MIS Division	( )
Admin Officer	( )	ATIS	( )
Personnel(MIL)(CIV)	( )	TID	( )
Jap Liaison	( )	Special Projects	( )
	( )	Historical Division	( )

Info	( )	Approval	( )	Signature	( )	Draft Reply	( )
Action	( )	Concur	( )	Initials	( )	Info for Rply	( )
File	( )	Comment	( )	Dispatch	( )	Brief	( )

We have been reorganizing. A committee to "survey", it is believed, would be superflous except for specific tasks such as the FEC/LG - CIC problem.

CIC & FEC/LG have just reorganized. CIC will shortly reshuffle to peace treaty locations. TID is on the way out. When we make the peace treaty move maybe Geog BR will have to go to ATIS - it can't stay here. MIS Div can go any time; CO ATIS can perform its missions without turning a hair. Tech Intel belongs rightfully to T/Intel, but there's no room for it in Tokyo; it will have to go with, if not assigned to ATIS. Tate's Japan Section can easily move to the mezzanine with the rest of his shop. Wilmeth's shop can close; Farnsworth performs many of his functions on the UNC level; there is no room for his shop in the crowded Dai Ichi. Gen Ennis wants chiefs of major sub-divs in the Dai Ichi after the peace treaty move. Col Ewert and small staff can go into 522, Blakeney into Wilmeth's place, and Col Smith in beside Capt Pearce, or in with Col Ewert.

Recommend against any sweeping survey; that rather, we make limited objective attacks against organizational flaws as they appear and as we can make corrective changes with due reflection.

W.M.I.

Col Ennis
Follow up
BSF

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G-2, GHQ
INTER - OFFICE MEMORANDUM

(For use within G-2 only)

SECURITY INFORMATION

85974

File No: Subject: Implementation of Matters Concerning Facilities and Area and the Legal Status of Troops Carrisoned within the Japanese [illegible] Date: 17 Dec 51

FROM: Asst Secy TO: Dir Gp / Int Div / Security Div / Misc/Pn / PEC/LO / L/Liat CIC / SGO PHONE: NAME: 26-6169 Capt Grant

Comment Number

For your information. 1

1 Incl:
Copy of Ltr dtd 11 Dec 51,
subj as above

(S) Gaw

File G-2

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Permanent Record—Do not Detach

SECURITY INFORMATION

(3) 53
310

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

G-2

85377

AG 310 (14 Dec 51)COM

14 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Implementation of Matters Concerning Facilities and Areas and the Expenses and Status of Troops Garrisoned Within the Japanese Islands

1. An interim committee is hereby announced for the purpose of preparing recommendations for the implementation of matters concerning facilities and areas and the expenses and status of troops to be garrisoned in the Japanese Islands.

2. The committee shall consist of the following representatives:

Brigadier General L. L. Williams, GSC	Chairman
Captain Edward Brumby, USN	Member
Colonel L. O. Ryan, USAF	Member

3. The committee shall be available to meet at all times at the call of the chairman. It shall develop such procedures as are required for the conduct of its affairs.

4. The committee shall be thoroughly cognizant of all aspects of the subject matter relating to its purpose and shall maintain such records as are required, and shall render such advice and recommendations to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, as the situation demands.

5. In order that the committee will be fully informed, close liaison will be maintained with the staff sections of General Headquarters, and with Headquarters, United States Naval Forces, Far East, and Far East Air Forces. Copies of all staff actions bearing on the subject matter shall be referred to the committee for their information, comment or concurrence.

6. The committee shall from time to time make recommendations for the appointment of such sub-committees as may be required.

BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

e e B Warden

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Distribution:

CofS (5)	G-1
DCofS, SCAP	G-2
DCofS, FEC	G-3
COMNAVFE	G-4
CG FEAF	COM (10)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
APO 500

85371

AG 310 (14 Dec 51)COM

14 December 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: Implementation of Matters Concerning Facilities and Areas and the Expenses and Status of Troops Garrisoned Within the Japanese Islands

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL RIDGWAY:

C. C. B. Warden

C. C. B. WARDEN
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

Distribution:

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CG FEAF	COM (10)

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
FAR EAST COMMAND
CHECK SHEET

16290

Lt Col Halper
26-8176

(Do not remove from attached sheets)

Subject: Management Improvement Program Material

File No:

Note No.	
	From: COM-M To: All General & Special Staff Sections, GHQ, SCAP and FEC Date 28 May 1951 Attn: Management Units
1.	1. Reference. FEC Circular No. 21, 12 May 1951. 2. In compliance with last paragraph of above reference, inclosed are the first two chapters of a Management Manual being distributed to all Management Units within the FEC. 2 Inclosures 1. Survey Principles & Techniques (dup) 2. The Management Unit (dup) 13 Jun 51 L. L. W.

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THE MANAGEMENT UNIT

Published by the
Analysis and Methods Branch
Management Division
Comptroller Section GHQ, FEC
APO 500

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Chapter I

GENERAL

Basic Concept

1. The conception of a Management Unit is simply implementation of the basically sound idea that more progress is made when manpower is applied directly and intellingently to the problem of doing so. The Management Unit is manpower dedicated to the improvement of the management and operation of an organization. Although the Unit is top management's tool for promoting sounder and more economical administration, it has no exclusive right to or responsibility for recommending management improvements. This is also a recognized function of the regularly appointed line operating officials of the organization. The Management Unit devotes its time to **assisting** Commander and the operating officials in such actions.

2. The objective of the Management Unit is reduced costs and improved service through effective, efficient, and economical operations. It applies systematized knowledge of each or all of the sound principles of management engineering to the problems retarding successful realization of this objective.

Management Engineering in Industry

1. Any enterprise, no matter how small or how complex, consists of three steps in general — directing, supervising, controlling. In a one-man business these three steps are combined into one person. As the structure grows in size and complexity there is more and more divergence between plans and operations. With this growth another element has been introduced — that of the review of operations from a non-operating viewpoint. This final function has become a responsibility of the Comptroller.

2. Over the past several years, the concept of Comptrollership has developed throughout American industry. The Comptroller originally exercised supervision over funds exclusively. The last step in the development of Comptrollership was the maintenance of constant review and study of the corporate operations. With this, he became management's principal device for keeping apprised as to the progress, efficiency, and economy of all activities in which the company is involved and for keeping the performance of the corporation under constant surveillance as a means of supplying the Board of Directors with information on which they can base their policy decisions.

3. One of the principal advisers of the Comptroller is the Management Engineer, on whom he must rely to survey the organization structure to keep it abreast of changing conditions and events and to assure that the many phases of the operation are closely integrated so that maximum economy is effected within each of these phases. The Management Engineer serves only in an advisory capacity. Responsibility for control, policy formulation, direction, and supervision of functions lies elsewhere. He achieves his goal solely by analysis, research, and recommendation.

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4. In the larger corporations there will usually be found a Management Engineering Unit as an integral part of the organization. Many of the small organizations may not have full-time management personnel but from time to time will engage the services of specialists in that field to assist in solving their numerous problems. As a result, the management engineering firm is assuming an ever-increasing importance in American industry. Not only do these engineering firms serve the small company but they are called on in consultation with the largest, even though they may have their own management engineering staff. From time to time the Department of the Army has availed itself of the services of some of the largest management engineering firms to assist in solving many of the complex problems within the Army structure.

5. While the field of management engineering is relatively new, it is receiving continually increased attention. Many of our prominent colleges are now developing special courses in management engineering, for which Business Administration is the requisite background.

Management Engineering in the Army

1. Within the army as a whole, management engineering as a name had its inception with the final report of the Haislip Board in 1947. The Haislip Board was set up early in 1947 to review all policies and programs of the postwar Army in order to determine what procedures should be the aim in the future. Its recommendation, among others, was that the Deputy Chief of Staff consider creating in his office a management engineering function to keep the policies and procedures under continuous surveillance to assure constant attention to the details of efficiency and economy. Prior to this, the Truman Committee,a war-time Senate Committee on the prosecution of the war headed by the then Senator Truman, in its final report proposed that the very best modern business practices be introduced into the Army program, particularly into its procurement and production programs where most of the money was spent. Likewise, in 1947, Mr. Edwin Pauley, who had been retained by the Secretary of the Army to look over the Department of the Army and make recommendations on how to improve the Army's services, rendered his final report.

2. This series of reports and recommendations culminated in the establishment of an Office of Comptroller of the Army, which was later made statutory by the Amendment to the National Security Act as of 1949 (Public Law 216, 81st Congress) in which Comptrollers were required at the Department of Defense level and in the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

3. While not specifically charged with the management function under the law, the management activity which had been introduced pursuant to the Haislip Board report was transferred to the Office of the Comptroller of the Army. Public Law 429, enacted in July 1949, charges the Bureau of the Budget with over-all management responsibility for all agencies of the Federal Government, with requirement of an annual report to the Congress on achievement and plans. In addition, by Executive Order 10072, July 1949, the

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President has required the Bureau of the Budget to report directly to him as to management activities and has set up a Management Council of which the Chief of the Bureau is a member.

4. Pursuant to the implications of the Amendment to the National Security Act of 1949, and specifically to carry out the charge of Public Law 429, July 1949, Management Units were established in the Far East Command by SCAP and FEC Staff Memo No. 36, 24 June 1950, and command letter AG 310 (17 June 50)COM-M, 23 June 1950, subj: Management Improvement Program. While the Management Unit has been set up specifically as a management engineering function, it also provides the nucleus for such other Comptroller-type activities as may be charged to the installation.

5. The Army's concept of management is well expressed by these quotes from General Bradley:

"National defense has become not only the largest and most important business of the country, but also the costliest. Yet the money which can be made available is limited. When we in the Army are charged with the responsibility of military readiness, we are expected to provide that readiness **at a reasonable** cost. This requires good management in the Army from top to bottom.

"From the extra shoelaces in a soldier's knapsack to our heaviest tank, supply is a management function as well as a logistical necessity. From the pay of a single private to the total budget for personnel, the pay of the Army requires good management. Training, transportation, research, procurement — all require careful management if we are to stay within our budget.

"We in the Department of the Army are trying constantly to perfect our management of the Army as part of the National Military Establishment. We have sought the advice and assistance of able specialists. But our best efforts will be largely wasted unless every man and woman in the Army is likewise working to improve management at his level. It was superb and inspiring teamwork at all levels which brought us success in war. This same teamwork is needed today more than ever if we are to give the nation the protection it must have at a price it can pay."

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Chapter II

THE MANAGEMENT UNIT

Job Description

1. A Management Unit develops and evaluates new or improved administrative systems and facilities for the management and control of governmental operations.

a. It develops and recommends changes in organization and methods of operation; improves coordination of functional units, staff and service units, or central and field offices; assists in planning for expansion, consolidation, or retrenchment; and reports on the effectiveness of the structure of an organization and its administrative operations.

b. It improves procedures, simplifies operations and increases their effectiveness by such means as eliminating unnecessary steps, facilitating the flow of work, and reducing time lags; makes recommendations regarding the use of mechanical devices; and prepares procedural manuals and administrative orders.

c. It designs systems for program planning, scheduling, and coordination; establishes administrative reporting systems and standardized reporting procedures; simplifies and standardizes forms; and develops methods for work planning and determination of units of work measurement.

2. Personnel assigned to the Management Unit may be called upon to accomplish any or all of the above in the performance of their duties.

Personnel

1. Personnel with background and experience in the field of management engineering are scarce but, if good raw material is present, the rest can be accomplished through training. The qualifications most sought after can be grouped under three headings:

a. personal qualifications;

b. technical skill;

c. experience in the management field.

2. **Personal qualifications** are the most important. Since the ultimate of Management Unit work involves principally "persuading other people to do things for their own good," the general rule that we must have confidence in the man before we have confidence in his ideas puts a premium on personal qualifications. Moreover, it is far easier to educate in the techniques of management work than it is to attempt to alter a personality. In considering a person for a management unit, the following questions should be answered affirmatively and positively.

a. Does he have an analytical, penetrating mind and a highly developed imagination?

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b. Is he open-minded and resourceful?

c. Is his judgment good?

d. Has he shown initiative and aggressiveness?

e. Is he willing to accept and discharge responsibility?

f. Can he handle people, win confidence, and induce action?

g. Can he approach a problem with an unbiased viewpoint?

3. **Technical skill**, while desirable, is of secondary importance to the qualifications stated above, since it can be acquired through assimilation. No matter how technically competent a person may be, if he cannot get along with people he will have little chance to use his skills in the management field. Conversely, if people like him well enough they will help him in the acquisition of technical knowledge and experience.

4. **Experience in the management field** seasons the individual and, as in any other field, engenders confidence. Operating personnel are more apt to be receptive to the suggestions of the man who, through experience, inspires confidence in the recommendations he proffers. However, the reputation of the inexperienced management engineer will be built on a solid foundation of confidence as his recommendations prove practical.

5. While a committee form of management unit composed of operating chiefs has been used occasionally, generally it is preferable to appoint personnel to this function who can approach the problem from a non-operating point of view.

Place in the Organization

1. The Management Unit should be placed high in the organization. Since the recommendations of the unit culminate in decision, it reports either directly to the Commanding Officer or to him through the Executive Officer.

2. While the Commander is charged with the duty and responsibility for effecting improvements in the organization and functioning of his activity, it is not possible for him to devote all of his personal attention to the details of fact-finding and analysis required by this phase of his responsibility. He cannot effectively gauge the over-all efficiency of his operation unless he receives reliable information on all regular and special duties being performed at his direction. Nor can he spare the time necessary to do justice individually to the similar problems of the various operating chiefs subordinate to him. In providing top management with the facts on which decision must be based, in analyzing the operations within the organization, and by making recommendations for improvement in operating effectiveness and in economies based on these facts and analyses, the Management Unit will pay for itself many times over. The Management Unit is both an assistant and a consultant.

3. In the larger organization, the Commander may create a Management Advisory Board or Council of key operating officials to aid and advise

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the Management Unit, as well as participate in the development of the Management Improvement Program within the organization. These operating officials will become better acquainted with the Management Unit and its workings, achieve a more thorough understanding of its objectives, and be more receptive to application of the unit's services to themselves and others. It is important that a workable team spirit be engendered in internal relationships.

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Chapter III

MANAGEMENT UNIT'S FUNCTIONS

How a Management Unit Operates

1. The Commander must have objective information — impersonally presented — regarding the status of operations, especially where progress is unsatisfactory and investigations must be made to provide a basis for corrective action. The Management Unit obtains, analyzes, and conveys such information, thus enlarging the scope of the executive's influence while leaving him free to devote more of his time to concentration on matters requiring his personal attention.

2. The Management Unit studies specific problems, determines needs, formulates plans, objectives, and controls, and recommends accordingly. Within its sphere of activity the Management Unit also reviews, digests, and effects coordination on proposals reaching the Commander and, when decision is reached, assists in planning details of application to assure that implementation is accomplished effectively.

3. The Management Unit determines whether sound and timely reports flow in with sufficient variety and detail to give the executive a grasp of the activities and progress of his command. It can further assist by analyzing and interpreting these reports, saving the time of the Commander by bringing to his particular attention those items that need emphasis.

4. The Management Unit seeks out and recommends solution to various problems of a widely divergent nature arising from violation of sound operating procedures.

5. The Management Unit should develop informal contact with personnel in the various operating divisions; not only the "top" people but the people with **little** problems. Many a lead may thus be uncovered which will contribute **largely** to some specific existent situation, but has gone unrecognized. Informal discussion of these seemingly small factors will build the operating personnel's confidence in the Management Unit and may lead to major improvements.

6. Within specialized fields, the Management Unit may not possess the talent to solve particular problems that have been identified. The next higher echelon of management, located in a Comptroller Office, should be called upon to provide the required skills. Lateral as well as vertical contact will assist the Unit materially in broadening its scope of activity.

Conduct of Activities

1. Don't try to control. The Management Unit should not allow itself to become enmeshed in continuing control in coordinating functions. The retention of control endangers success. It builds up resentment on the part of the operating officials of the organization; it requires a large Management

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Unit made up of specialists who duplicate in most cases personnel already in existence in other elements of the organization; and it saddles the Management Unit with a continuing clerical and administrative burden that, in the long run, will divert attention from the more important major problems of the organization. Soon Management Unit staff can triple, the not too easily identified administrative expenses go up, important projects are delayed and mishandled, and the Management Unit disappears and becomes another and unneeded administrative echelon.

2. Avoid over-extension, i.e., the assumption of projects beyond the "manpower or experience capacity" of the Management Unit force. Lack of qualified personnel or sufficient time prompts solutions predicated on a slip-shod survey and counter to accepted practices. These are quickly and accurately appraised as incorrect by the more experienced operating personnel as well as top management officials, and never was the time-worn adage "haste makes waste" more aptly exemplified, for both the reputation and usefulness of the Management Unit begin a steady decline.

3. Preserve initiative. The Management Unit that waits for all problems to be referred to it by the operating personnel is apt to turn out to be "spoon fed" and overlooks independent impartial review of management operations and effectiveness. It is more important to predict future problems than to merely "put out fires."

4. Don't use stock solutions. **Although the problems may be identical, no two organizational situations are, and each requires an individual solution.** Sufficient groundwork in organizational and procedural principles will preclude any attempt by a Management Unit to impose upon any one organization the same arrangement which worked well in another but is not necessarily applicable to both.

5. Plan each program. Program planning means (a) defining the problem, (b) specifying scope and limit to determine the major elements of the problem and their inter-relationship, and (c) specifying the desired goal and the time sequence necessary to the solution of the problem.

6. Don't be biased. Retention of an unbiased viewpoint is essential. Successful management does not consist of matching a set of common problems with a set of fixed solutions. It is concerned with the ability to apply flexible techniques and thinking to a succession of unpredictable and highly diversified problems. Included in the elements of every management problem are human beings, and no one has yet found a way to predict attitudes, emotional reactions and results with any useful degree of certainty. Since no universal theorems can cover all, the Management Unit which pursues its course ever-receptive to new thoughts advanced will be assured of a better chance to seek out successful solutions.

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Chapter IV

CONCLUSION

1. Management engineering in the Army, although in its initial stages, has already made rapid strides toward realization of the same proof of its value as has been evidenced in its application to American industry.

2. The Management Unit, established in conformance with the Comptroller-type concept of management, concerns itself with problems of organization, methods and procedures, and utilization of manpower and materiel. It must, to retain maximum effectiveness, remain strictly staff in character.

3. The successful Management Unit will take advantage of **every** opportunity to bring itself favorably to the attention of the operating personnel. Encourage meetings and conferences aimed at mutual resolution of pertinent problems, disseminate information of a helpful nature furnished by outside sources and, above all, be readily **available** as a source of advice and assistance.

4. As confidence in the Management Unit manifests itself in an ever-increasing project workload, it will be safe to assume that it is accomplishing its mission of constant effort toward economy, efficiency, and effectiveness.

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SURVEY PRINCIPLES & TECHNIQUES

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Chapter 1

GENERAL

1. For a Management Unit to aid his chief in accomplishing his mission efficiently and effectively, the best approach to the organization's problems is through a survey. The survey is the principal technique for planning and improving procedures, methods and organization structures. It should be a systematic examination and analysis of organization, functions, and procedures; and is initiated for the purpose of identifying problems, determining their causes, and developing solutions.

TYPES OF SURVEYS

1. The following are the most common types of surveys. Although many surveys do not fit exactly into any one of these type descriptions, they are still composed of combinations of the characteristics of two or more of them.

a. **Reconnaissance Survey:** A preliminary examination to determine in a general way the scope of a problem and the best course of action to follow in further examination and analysis. It is a diagnostic device and is preliminary to all other types of surveys. It may be very brief or quite extensive, depending on the familiarity of the people making the survey with the activity being surveyed.

b. **Operations Audit:** The recurrent appraisal of the manner in which all elements of agency management are being carried out. Its chief characteristic is that it is made without necessary prior knowledge of existing problems. In this respect it resembles a periodic medical checkup.

c. **Overall Survey:** Resembles the complete overhaul of a piece of machinery. A complete analysis of policies, organization structures, controls, staffing, procedures, methods, and physical facilities and arrangements.

d. **Organization Survey:** A special purpose survey limited to considerations of organization problems, particularly the considerations affecting the delegation of basic responsibilities to major organizational segments.

e. **Functional Survey:** An examination of the ramifications of a specific function such as personnel, purchasing, etc., which may be confined to a single organization segment or may cut across organization lines.

f. **Procedure Survey:** An examination of a specific process or group of related processes.

g. **Operator Participation Survey:** An examination of organization and methods problems in which operators are organized and trained to conduct much of the fact gathering and analysis phases of survey work. A method for broadening the base of organization and methods work to include operators as well as staff people.

h. **Personnel Utilization Survey:** A special purpose survey designed to resolve problems relating to personnel space ceilings, utilization, and assignment.

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2. Each survey, regardless of type, has the same common elements:

1. Planning
2. Fact-finding
3. Organizing facts
4. Analyzing facts
5. Developing proposals
6. Testing proposals
7. Selling proposals
8. Installing proposals
9. Following up proposals

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Chapter 2

PRELIMINARY PLANNING AND PREPARATION FOR A SURVEY

PRELIMINARY PLANNING

1. Initially, preliminary plans should be made:

a. to determine the proper scope and level of the survey by being able to answer definitively the following questions.

(1) Is the problem peculiar to the organizational segment being considered for survey or is it a general problem which should be more broadly studied in all parts of the organization where it exists?

(2) Are fundamental causes of the problem beyond the control of the organization segment being considered for survey?

b. to determine approximate starting and completion dates for surveys.

(1) Assure that surveys are initiated and completed at the most appropriate time.

(2) Assure that commitments to the Chief of Section or Commanding Officer are realistic.

c. to determine what survey methods, techniques, and special skills will be needed based on the scope and level of the survey:

(1) Should the management unit be teamed with specialists in other fields such as personnel analysts, equipment, warehousing, packing, materials, handling, transportation or accounting experts?

(2) Should professional organization and methods analysts from the various Comptroller Sections be requested to help?

d. to determine, finally, what special attention must be directed toward personality problems.

PREPARATION FOR THE SURVEY:

1. After the preliminary plans are made, the preparation for conduct of the survey follows.

a. First, a reconnaissance survey should be made, utilizing the following approach.

(1) Interview the chiefs and supervisors of the organization to be surveyed and inquire:

(a) does the management and supervision know there is a problem;

(b) how serious do they think it is;

(c) what is their explanation for the existence of the problem;

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(d) what have they done about it;

(e) what is their current program for correcting it?

(2) Interview non-supervisory personnel in the organization (conducted on a sampling basis).

(3) Interview people who are outside the activity but who are in a position to know how it is operating.

(4) Make a "cook's tour" through the organization if necessary.

(5) Accomplish partial analysis of the backlog as to size, trend, age and nature.

(6) Conduct brief sample inspections of finished work.

(7) Examine data contained in administrative reports pertaining to the organization to be surveyed, such as labor turnover, average service given, etc.

(Whether or not this entire approach is used depends on how much information is required for intelligent planning and preparation.)

b. Second, prepare a detailed written statement of the purpose of the survey by:

(1) stating the problem as it is known to exist;

(2) stating what the survey is supposed to accomplish, i.e., its mission.

c. Third, prepare a written plan for the conduct of the survey. This plan should not be regarded as a final decision. It is only a starting point and will undoubtedly be revised as experience during the survey indicates. It should include:

(1) who is to be assigned to the survey;

(2) overall length of time each member is to be assigned;

(3) a schedule showing when each major step is to be accomplished;

(4) a work outline showing steps to be performed, who will perform them and in what sequence.

d. Fourth, secure the section chief's or commanding officer's approval (written, if possible) of the survey, its mission and its method.

e. Fifth, establish definite work relationships with the organization being surveyed.

(1) Make certain that all levels of management in the organization know about the survey, its purpose, and the plan for its conduct. Where applicable, this can best be accomplished by the following methods.

(a) Use meetings, preferably, or if these are not practical, written announcements and explanations.

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(b) Use visual aids or techniques to explain the survey where such methods will promote better understanding.

(c) Be honest in acquainting people with the real purposes and aims of the survey.

(2) Secure proper working space for conduct of the survey and make arrangements for necessary facilities and services. Where applicable, this can best be accomplished by following two approaches.

(a) Establish headquarters at or near the scene of action.

(b) Try to get space near or in the organization being surveyed but sufficiently isolated to permit conferences, etc., without causing disturbance to nearby workers.

(3) Arrange for active participation in the survey of a qualified representative of the organization being surveyed. Special situations or personality problems may make this impractical in some instances but, where feasible, active participation in the survey by a representative of the organization being surveyed should be encouraged. In any event, the complete control over the survey should be retained by the assigned management unit or the survey team appointed.

(a) It will promote the attitude that the organization being surveyed still has the primary responsibility for solving its own problems.

(b) It will assure that a qualified representative of the organization being surveyed has knowledge of the background of the survey necessary to the successful installation and maintenance of improvements.

(c) It will assist in the general orientation of the management unit or survey staff regarding:

1. background material about the development of the current structure and procedure, and results of previous attempts to analyze and solve administrative problems;
2. location, contents, significance and action taken on internal administrative reports, and controls used by the organization;
3. background information concerning personnel in the organization.

(d) It will assist in gathering facts for the survey.

(e) It will assist the management unit or survey staff in promoting the best possible relationships with personnel in the organization being surveyed.

(f) It will insure informal advice, criticism, and comment upon tentative recommendations or ideas of management unit or survey staff.

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f. Sixth, plan a fact-gathering program. It should be noted that, in some instances, this may be done during the reconnaissance. The approach to use for fact gathering follows.

(1) Determine tentatively what facts are necessary for diagnosing and solving problems and selling recommendations.

(2) Determine which of the facts needed are available from currently maintained sources.

(3) Determine the best methods of obtaining facts which are not available currently. To accomplish this point:

(a) use methods that will require the least amount of management unit or survey staff time;

(b) use methods that will cause the least amount of extra work or work disruptions within the organization being surveyed;

(c) use methods that will produce the most accurate data;

(d) use methods that will produce the information at the time it is needed;

(e) use data which can be checked for accuracy against other sources;

(f) use data from sources which will not be directly affected by the results of the survey.

(4) Determine the proper sequence of fact gathering so that:

(a) facts which are needed first can receive prior attention;

(b) facts which will take the greatest amount of time to acquire are identified and given prior attention.

(5) Design and obtain supplies of any forms needed for gathering or recording facts.

(6) Determine the need for and explain duties to any clerical assistants needed for tallying or other routine fact-gathering work.

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Chapter 3

FACT FINDING

1. There are four methods of finding the facts. These methods can be used separately or in combinations of from two to all four — depending on the situation and how much detailed information is desired:

a. study of existing records;

b. interviews;

c. questionnaires;

d. personal observation and analysis, measurement and examination of operating performance.

2. First, there is the study of existing records which should be helpful in all surveys. However, do not draw final conclusions from facts obtained by study of existing records, for such information is primarily for background that the management unit or survey staff must have in order to properly interpret later observations. Such fact-finding should include:

a. study of official directives to ascertain the basic authority for functions;

b. study of manuals of instruction, training or procedures to learn the way the work is supposed to be done according to official instructions;

c. study of official organization charts to learn how the work and responsibility is distributed according to official plans;

d. study of budget estimates and justifications, if available, to learn future planning of the organization operations;

e. study of employee suggestions, if any, to learn what the employees think about and how the management acts toward new ideas;

f. study of the statistics given in administrative reports to determine the effectiveness of the operation in terms of information available. These reports would include such data as work or production data, quality of service, costs, labor turnover, equipment breakdowns, attendance, and accidents;

g. study of the correspondence files to learn what people responsible or concerned with the operation have said about it in the past;

h. study of the work papers and final reports from previous surveys, if available, which relate to the current problem;

3. Second, there is the gathering of facts through interviews. However, there are both advantages and disadvantages that should be recognized before any interviewing is initiated.

a. The advantages and special uses of the interview method of gathering facts are as follows:

(1) interviews are necessary to secure information that is not recorded anywhere except in the mind of the person interviewed;

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(2) an interview of a supervisor is often the best way to judge him — his general attitude, how he thinks, how much he knows, how close he is to his job, and his knowledge of the people who work for him;

(3) an interview of a worker is often the best way to secure information on how well workers are trained, their morale, their qualifications, what they do, how well they understand policies and instructions given them, what they do that is not covered by procedure, and what ideas they have;

(4) interviews are often thought-stimulators both for the person interviewed and the interviewer — the "off the record" informality of an interview may cause people to give information which would not otherwise occur to them or which they would hesitate to submit in written form.

b. While the interview is a legitimate fact-gathering technique, it has definite and frequently overlooked limitations. Interviews should not be permitted to take the place of the hard work involved in other fact-gathering techniques. These limitations include the fact that;

(1) the person interviewed is often asked to give information without having had an opportunity to thoroughly check his facts or consider what he is to say — he may therefore give information approximately but not precisely accurate, or he may be so cautious that he withholds valuable information because he is not absolutely positive of its accuracy;

(2) when people are interviewed they often feel that they should know the answers to all questions asked — they may therefore answer questions with guesses rather than admit their ignorance;

(3) the interviewer must keep a record of the facts learned. This record must often be hastily written and errors may result. Even if notes are complete and accurate, the person interviewed may deny any statements attributed to him and there is no way for the interviewer to prove who said what. This may be partially corrected by asking persons interviewed to authenticate the notes taken of the interview, but such authentications are not always feasible;

(4) some people unconsciously try to answer questions the way they believe the interviewer wants them answered instead of stating their true beliefs;

(5) an interviewer is likely to get a collection of exceptions — unusual, humorous or dramatic incidents are much easier to talk about than everyday routines.

c. If the management unit or survey team believe that interviews should be conducted, there are certain techniques that should be adhered to for success in gaining the information desired. These are described in Appendix A.

4. Third, there is the gathering of facts by questionnaires. As in the interview method, advantages and limitations are present in this technique.

a. Although questionnaires have special but very limited uses in management survey work,

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(1) it may be necessary to use questionnaires when there is insufficient time to interview all the people from whom information is wanted — when this occurs, it may be advisable to institute a program of sampling interviews instead of questionnaires;

(2) questionnaires which request objective information permit convenient tabulation of data;

(3) questionnaires may be the only means of reaching people who are physically far removed from the scene of the survey;

(4) questionnaires allow more time for answering detailed questions necessitating reference to records, etc., which cannot conveniently be referred to in an interview.

b. Questionnaire technique limitations and weaknesses include:

(1) questionnaires have been overworked to the extent that many people have a positive phobia toward them;

(2) questions in questionnaires are subject to the "tyranny of words" which causes them to be interpreted in various ways;

(3) questionnaires are subject to statistical bias because those who reply may not truly represent majority thought — the people who have the time and inclination to answer questionnaires are frequently least qualified to answer them;

(4) questionnaires are cold and impersonal, and fail to disclose "off the record" information since they do not permit the survey staff to gain impressions of the people who furnish the information — they fail to establish a good relationship for further dealing with the people involved during the later stages of the survey when recommendations are to be discussed.

c. If the management unit or survey team believe that questionnaires should be utilized, there are certain techniques that should be adhered to for success in gaining the information desired. These are described in Appendix B.

5. Fourth, there is the gathering of facts by personal observation and analysis, examination, and measurement of operating performance.

a. Personal obeservation and analysis and examination of operations as fact-gathering techniques have special value.

(1) Personal observation and analysis affords the only positive means of measuring the dependability of facts given in administrative reports, interviews, questionnaires, or records.

(2) Hazy understandings or erroneous impressions by the management unit or survey staff can be corrected best by first-hand observations.

(3) The management unit or survey staff can protect sources of "off the record" information by observing the facts for themselves and basing subsequent actions upon what they saw rather than what they heard.

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(4) Recommendations are usually assured of better reception if it can be shown that they are based upon personal observation of actual operations.

(5) Personal observation is frequently the best means of observing conditions which indicate the need for future survey work in areas not covered by the current assignment.

(6) By observing actual operations, the management unit or survey staff can be armed with factual information that can help to dissipate "smoke screens" created by chronic resisters to change.

(7) Observation and analysis of operations helps the management unit or survey staff to acquire the "know how" it will need when it is asked to assist or supervise the testing or installation of changes it has recommended.

(8) As operations are observed and analyzed, the management unit or survey staff can become better acquainted with the operating personnel at all levels.

b. Although observation, analysis, and measurement of operations is usually the most accurate method of obtaining complete information and should be a fundamental technique in most survey work, it must be used with judgment, for:

(1) it is costly in staff time, clerical time and time of supervision in organizations being surveyed;

(2) observation and analysis of current operations may cause incorrect diagnosis of problems if current volume, nature of work, or other operating conditions are not normal;

(3) presence of the management unit or survey staff may be a disturbing influence upon the conditions which exist when they have gone and everyone "has settled back to normal;"

(4) too much emphasis on observation and measurement may cause conclusions to be delayed so long that it is too late to take action of any kind.

c. There is no definite rule which defines the best observation and analysis technique for each kind of information, for the **same** information may be obtained by observation at **different** points. Since the management unit or survey team will undoubtedly observe operations, it can use any or all of a possible eleven methods. These are described in Appendix C.

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Chapter 4

RECORDING AND ANALYZING FACTS

1. Facts should, of course, be recorded as they are obtained and should also be analyzed and interpreted during the survey. Where the facts are voluminous, it is often difficult to appreciate their significance. Thus, special attention must necessarily be devoted to the problem of recording facts and subsequently rearranging them into proper relationships; the final proposals or recommendations are developed from such facts that are properly related. In order to do this,

a. facts should be recorded in the simplest manner possible consistent with completeness, i.e., don't use complicated charts if simple notes will serve;

b. facts should be recorded so that they can be understood by someone outside the management unit or the survey staff;

c. facts should be recorded so that related information can easily be brought together and coordinated.

d. the information should be arranged so that it can be found easily.

2. To facilitate analysis and interpretation, certain items should be used during the recording of facts:

a. actual samples of cases, transactions or forms;

b. informal notes taken during observations, formalized and arranged before being placed in permanent work records;

c. spread sheets;

d. tables of figures;

e. photographs or photostats;

f. organization charts such as structural, functional, or position;

g. work distribution analysis charts;

h. process or procedures charts;

i. layout charts such as floor plan, procedures, desk, machine, stock;

j. time and motion charts if applicable;

k. use of interview fill-in forms when used;

l. graphs (usually used in later stages of analysis when summarization is made).

3. And, finally, when all the facts are presented:

a. arrange facts in proper relationships, collated and organized for interpretation;

b. verify discrepancies or omissions in facts at hand;

c. arrive at conclusions and tentative recommendations;

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d. test or experiment with any recommendations that are either doubtful or of such large scope that tests are advisable before their submission;

e. discuss conclusions and recommendations with the management of the organization under survey.

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Chapter 5

SELLING PROPOSALS

PRESENTATION

1. The final report prepared by the management unit or survey staff is submitted to the instigating authority, the section chief, or the commanding officer for more than just general informational purposes only. It is intended to accomplish the following:

a. inform top management of survey recommendations that have been accepted and put into effect by the organization under survey;

b. acquaint top management with problems uncovered but not within the province of the survey and which should receive attention of other offices;

c. obtain top management decisions on recommendations not accepted by the organization surveyed and which the management unit or survey staff continues to support;

d. distribute and place on reference a summarized report of survey findings and results for use of other staff activities, future surveys in the same field, etc;

e. provide the organization surveyed with a formal document upon which to base its program for acting upon the survey;

f. provide the commanding officer or section chief with a document for following up to see that accepted recommendations are properly and promptly installed;

2. There are four types of reports of the survey that may be made, each depending on the desire of the section chief or commanding officer:

a. oral reports, which may be used on minor surveys or where organizational relationships between the organization surveyed, the management unit or survey staff, and top management are such that formality is unnecessary;

b. brief memoranda, similar in purpose and limitations to the oral report;

c. installation reports, where recommendations are installed during the course of the survey and the report merely informs the management of action taken;

d. formal written reports.

3. In preparing the survey reports, it is well to remember that the reports:

a. should be standard in form wherever possible but should be sufficiently flexible to fit the special requirements of the subject matter and the persons to whom it is submitted;

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b. should be simple and as brief as possible, consistent with completeness;

c. should be dispassionate, impersonal, and factual in tone;

d. should have an attractive appearance;

e. should use visual presentation techniques wherever they will promote better or easier understanding of the report;

f. should be reviewed verbally with the section chief or commanding officer a short time after the formal report is submitted, so that the section chief or commanding officer can become familiar with the report contents;

g. should submit recommendations with instructions, announcements, etc., making them effective.

SELLING RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Ideas should usually be sold in the order of their acceptability. Start off with the changes which are most acceptable to the organization surveyed and top management. Often it is advisable to discuss alternatives to a basic recommendation so that, if the original idea is not immediately acceptable, a close alternative may be accepted instead of allowing the whole idea to be completely rejected. Sometimes an idea is more readily accepted when it is presented with the possible alternatives.

2. It is often possible to sell ideas piecemeal during the survey instead of in a formidable list of recommended changes in the survey report itself. But remember to submit recommendations at the right time. Sometimes it is advisable to wait until the proper time in light of program status, condition of organization, personalities, etc. All this is for individual determination based on the situation in the management unit's or survey team's organization.

3. If immediate installation of a recommendation is not feasible, it may be advisable to include a proposed timetable for its installation. It should be recognized that reluctance to change is an understandable human reaction.

4. The management unit or survey staff sells recommendations to management. But putting ideas over with the rank and file of supervising top personnel and workers is the job for the commanding officer or section chief and his subordinate commanders or chiefs of divisions, branches, etc. in which, of course, the management unit or survey staff should assist with certainty and honesty.

At this time, the rank and file should be reassured that jobs will be protected by transfer, standards don't contemplate "speed-up" and will be adjusted to reasonable pace, effort will be made to preserve established work teams, etc. Be patient with all personnel and tell the whole story, for it must be recognized that it is the unknown rather than the new that creates apprehension.

5. The following are additional helpful hints on selling survey recommendations. These approaches to all new ideas can be applied by survey teams or by the management unit itself.

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a. A small test or pilot installation, which should prove or disprove objectively what the effect of a recommendation will be, often helps to sell a change that might otherwise be difficult.

b. Check on the history of an idea elsewhere in order to anticipate objections and have a logical answer. Be able to point to instances where the idea is in effect and is working.

c. Make compromises which won't jeopardize fundamentals of recommendations; but don't be a stickler on little issues.

d. Frequently recommendations are refinements or modifications of suggestions made by the organizational group under survey. These recommendations and their source should be stressed, thus giving credit where credit is due.

e. Don't press for immediate decisions on points not accepted, for they may be accepted readily a little later.

f. Consider effects of changes on personalities before proposing them, so that when the idea is submitted it may be accompanied by a plan for eliminating or minimizing the personality problems.

g. Be truthful by not claiming doubtful advantages.

h. Recommendations should be clearly formulated and strikingly packaged.

i. Thorough gathering and analysis of facts is the best assurance of recommendation acceptance. In the final analysis, many good ideas are rejected because of insufficient or poorly organized supporting facts.

j. If the situation warrants and recommendations are not "sold", utilize the technique of "temporary retreat." Many worthwhile proposals do not get accepted the first time they are proposed, so try again at a later date.

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Chapter 6

INSTALLING AND FOLLOWING UP PROPOSALS

INSTALLING PROPOSALS

1. The management unit or survey team should not replace line operators during installation phases. However, where technical knowledge (concerning machines, etc.) is involved, specialists with the management unit or survey staff may be required for proper installation.

2. Where it is necessary to train supervisors or operators to do their work differently, the management unit or survey staff may be needed as instructors. Under some circumstances it may be necessary to supervise installation because of weaknesses or personality situations in the organization.

3. However, if the management unit or survey team is called upon to install the proposals recommended by the survey, certain steps should be taken:

a. prepare complete plans, including a timetable;

b. select and train key installation assistants;

c. design and order new forms;

d. overcome resistance to change by explaining changes completely to all workers concerned;

e. where applicable, use pilot installations to discover "bugs" and unforeseen problems;

f. provide adequate controls for prompt discovery of irregularities;

g. and last, be flexible enough to revise original recommendations where experience warrants.

FOLLOW-UP

1. When the project is undertaken, the need for follow-up should be recognized and allocation of staff time made. Hence there should be an established schedule for follow-up so it will not be left to chance. The plans for follow-up should be worked out with organization surveyed so that it can be expected.

2. The actual results of the survey promulgation will be found during the follow-up by analyzing the records to note changes, lack of adherence to prescribed procedure, and possibilities for further improvements. Further, results can be checked through observations, interviews and all other appropriate survey devices. Where applicable, results of improvements can be measured through work measurement, applying standards decided on by management. Finally, follow-up should not be perfunctory. It is as important as any phase of the survey.

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Chapter 7

PITFALLS IN THE CONDUCT OF SURVEYS

1. The most common of the factors contributing to the project failures are starting the survey with a biased viewpoint, and poor internal administration of the management unit or survey team. With a completely open-minded approach and proper planning and administration, management units or survey teams will normally avoid most of the pitfalls mentioned below.

a. Failure caused by inadequate preparation for surveys which includes the following factors:

(1) failure to define clearly the mission of the survey;

(2) failure to have a clear-cut understanding with top management regarding the survey, its purpose, and the action to be taken on the survey findings;

(3) failure to establish proper relationships between the management unit and the organization being surveyed;

(4) failure to put definite boundaries around the survey-attempting to cover the water front instead of concentrating on the main issues.

b. Failures due to poor fact gathering are usually based on:

(1) failure to study background material such as previous surveys, budget document, outside criticism, before attempting to gather facts regarding current operations;

(2) use of superficial fact-gathering techniques when only first-hand observation, testing, etc., will give accurate information upon which action can be based, i.e., too much dependence on pleasant, conversational interviews with supervisors, use of general questionnaires, etc.;

(3) poor work papers and failure to keep accurate, complete records of the facts gathered, properly arranged so that they can be intelligently studied in the later phases of the survey.

c. Failures caused by inadequate or incorrect analysis of facts which are due to:

(1) failure to discuss facts with the organization being surveyed or with others in a position to know so as to determine whether or not the facts really mean what they seem to mean;

(2) failure to check the facts learned from once source with the facts learned from other sources to be sure that they are properly integrated;

(3) common tendency to jump to conclusions and use pattern solutions;

(4) tendency to form early prejudices and attempt to make later findings support these prejudices;

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(5) failure to use the best tools for integration and interpreting facts, i.e., process charts, organization charts etc.;

(6) tendency to spend too much time on the analysis, thus making the data upon which recommendations must be sold so out of date that the management will not have full confidence that they represent current situations.

d. Failures caused by faulty reporting of survey results. These can be traced to:

(1) failure to discuss freely survey recommendations with people who will have to live with them, i.e., the management of the organization surveyed;

(2) failure to convince these people of the benefits to be derived from the recommendations;

(3) tendency to deal in personalities instead of with objective material;

(4) tendency to inject the personality of the management unit or survey team into reports; to claim credit that does not belong to the unit — to claim credit which does belong to the unit but which might better be left unmentioned;

(5) failure to summarize properly and organize the net results of surveys in brief form so that management can take action without too much digging into detail;

(6) failure to use visual aids to explain the more complicated principles involved;

(7) failure to consider properly the personalities involved — sometimes better results will be obtained if no report at all is submitted and the whole matter is handled orally.

e. Failures caused by inadequate selling and follow — through fall into three groups:

(1) the common tendency and feeling that the management unit or survey team should make recommendations only and be completely divorced from installation responsibilities;

(2) tendency to concentrate survey efforts, the best management personnel, etc., on current projects with the result that completed projects are not adequately checked to see that the approved recommendations are actually in effect in their intended form and accomplishing their intended purposes;

(3) erring in the opposite direction by attempting to complete installation of the approved recommendations. This leaves the management of the organization surveyed out of the picture entirely, completely unprepared to maintain and support the changes, and usually unsympathetic toward those installed recommendations.

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Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

1. There is no easy way to conduct a survey. Thoroughness is a prime essential.

2. Surveys involve human beings who cannot be subjected to the precise solutions that may be indicated in the statistical tables or theoretical principles.

3. There is no one best way to conduct a survey. The management unit or survey team must be flexible in its plan, methods, and approach.

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Appendix A

INTERVIEW TECHNIQUE

1. Adequate preparations should be made before interviews take place.

a. The interviewer should use care in selecting the people to be interviewed rather than going from person to person haphazardly.

b. The interviewer should know the kind of information he wants and his general approach for obtaining it.

c. The interviewer should be sufficiently familiar with the subject matter to understand the terminology and technical explanations likely to be given.

d. The interviewer should make definite arrangements for the interview — the time and the place.

e. The interviewer normally should give the person to be interviewed a preview of the subject matter to be discussed and the general type of information that will be needed; this should be done far enough in advance to permit the person interviewed to make adequate preparations. This courtesy may be dispensed with if judged superfluous, as it is not necessary in all cases and may cause undue formality.

2. Interviews should be conducted in as informal a manner as possible consistent with the needs for an organized and planned result. Consequently, the management unit or survey staff should:

a. avoid stenographic records;

b. avoid obvious or voluminous note taking at interviews for it causes a formal atmosphere;

c. encourage natural and informal conversation. Rigidly logical patterns need not be followed, although the interview should be controlled and directed to some extent.

3. The purpose of the interview should be limited to obtaining the desired information, and extraneous conversation should be avoided. For example,

a. the interviewer is not a crusader and should not try to sell anything or argue with statements which he believes or knows to be wrong;

b. aimless conversations on social matters, mutual acquaintances, etc., are sometimes permissible but should be controlled and brought back to the main job as soon as practical — the interview should be regarded as a "conversation with a road map;"

c. the interviewer should not commit himself to any specific recommendation or course of action even though he may have formed tentative ideas.

4. The interviewer should make sure that he has accurately interpreted and recorded the information given him. To do this,

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a. he should verify doubtful points by asking questions, repeating back, or actually observing the operation in question later in the survey;

b. it is advisable to verify the accuracy of written interview notes by requesting that the person interviewed read them over and initial them where the position of the person interviewed makes such a procedure feasible;

c. if sketchy notes are taken during the interview, they should be enlarged upon immediately so that a person studying the work papers after the survey is completed will be able to understand what happened;

d. where the information given in the interview relates to specific forms or reports, samples should be obtained and attached to the notes of the interview.

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Appendix B

QUESTIONNAIRE TECHNIQUE

1. The questionnaire should have the stated support of the management or supervision of the persons who are to answer it.

2. Questionnaires must be carefully planned so as to assure that:

a. questions are clearly stated and their intent not obscured;

b. clear, concise information may be obtained by use of a simple "yes" or "no" answer or, if this is impossible, a minimum amount of writing;

c. questionnaires are distributed to people who are in the best position to answer them;

d. questions are such that answers can be assembled, tabulated, and analyzed to permit conclusions to be drawn.

3. If questionnaires are to receive wide distribution, they should be tested on a small group to see if all ambiguity, etc., has been eliminated.

4. Care should be taken to assure that the people who receive a questionnaire understand its purpose and importance. The best way to accomplish this is by holding meetings of small groups where the questionnaire is explained and passed out at the same time. Letters of transmittal may be used where this is not possible.

5. While a questionnaire is being filled out the management unit or a member of the survey staff should be available to answer questions that people may raise.

6. Sufficient follow-up should be made to assure 100 percent reply on questionnaires. The person who does not reply without follow-up is frequently the one whose answers are most significant.

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Appendix C

OBSERVATION AND ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE

OBSERVATION

1. A general tour or guide trip is the best known technique for observation of activities. While walking through the organization, the sights that are seen are indicative of the operation and can be construed on their face value. Look for these:

a. people sitting at desks waiting for work, doing personal work (such as writing letters, etc.), or in little social groups;

b. unusual confusion or noise — machines clacking, people shouting to each other above the din, etc;

c. piles of papers on top of workers' desks. Piles of work on supervisors' desks but not on workers' desks;

d. people walking about a great deal;

e. evidence of a very recent cleanup or rearrangement of work which may have been made especially for the occasion of the survey tour;

f. arguments or discussions going on between workers — note the general attitude of the people;

g. people reporting for work late or leaving early — it is often advisable to make such tours at the start of the workday, at the end, or sometimes both.

2. Observation of physical arrangements and facilities is another technique and encompasses floor layout, machines and equipment, communications facilities, lighting, heating, ventilation, etc. Watch for:

a. instances of people getting in each other's way while working, such as two people wishing to use the same filing devices or other equipment;

b. evidence of poor maintenance work such as many burned out light bulbs, operators trying to fix machines, many extension cords lying about, etc;

c. messengers not knowing where to deliver mail or delivering hugh quantities to one desk;

d. evidences of outgoing mail not being collected promptly;

3. Another technique is observation of facts pertaining to production control. This includes scheduling, backlog controls, starting hour controls, staffing or balancing controls, volume leveling controls and dispatch controls.

ANALYSIS

1. A worker desk audit is a second method of examining operations. This **combines** features of the interview with observation of work in process. It is of particular value in determining work flow details, individual respon-

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sibilities, personal attitudes and knowledge, effectiveness of training measures and accuracy and completeness of stated organizational relationships. While performing a desk audit,

a. make certain that the desks being audited are representative of the organizational operation; and

b. get a record of all that goes on at the desk — this will illustrate effectiveness of operations by demonstrating where the work comes from, where it goes, and why.

2. Tracing specific transactions through each operating step is a third method and illustrates procedures utilized for effective operations. In this way, the management unit or survey team can

a. check to find the reason for each step and the reason why the over-all processes have been divided as they are; and

b. learn the frequency of each transaction and, in addition, be alert for procedures that are especially designed to handle the exceptions — for these exceptions usually disrupt the even flow of normal work.

3. The examination of files and records of previously handled transactions is still another technique of especial value when attempting to compare the past performance, workload quality, etc. with current operations. It is usually conducted on a sample inspection basis, and may be combined with forms analysis, tracing of processes, or a study of filing procedures (such as possibility of using specialized types of filing devices, photographic techniques, etc.). This examination usually involves analysis of need or purpose of filing — i.e., how frequently each type of material is drawn from the file and for what purpose.

4. Another technique is the study of incoming and outgoing correspondence in process and completed. This allows the management unit or survey staff

a. to get first-hand information on how well the clientele is being served, what they are complaining about, how long it is taking to process their requests, etc;

b. to get facts on how the various operating procedures are coordinated to become a finished product;

c. to become aware of any gaps or hazy areas in need of further clarification.

5. Where a work measurement system is functioning, another technique which can be applied advantageously is the study of work volume. This study should be conducted in conformance with the following procedure.

a. It should be conducted over a sufficient period of past performance time so as to be representative (usually six months for a non-seasonal operation).

b. It should be planned carefully to assure maximum accuracy and economy in counting, by:

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(1) using independent count sources if possible, rather than depending upon individual worker counts; and

(2) providing definite instructions of what is to be counted, where it is to be counted, and the detailed definitions of work units.

c. It should assure that work units are selected with care so that:

(1) they are actually indicative of the work effort — i.e., an increase or decrease in the number of units selected actually means a proportional increase or decrease in manhours of work necessary;

(2) when the work units are counted it will be possible to determine accurately the manhours that went into them.

d. It should be related to hours or dollars spent on processing the work units counted. Counts of work volume are of little value unless they can be so related.

e. It should provide some definite means for checking the accuracy of the count.

f. It should be properly timed in the conduct of the survey so that data will be available when needed (i.e., the work count can be going on while the management unit or survey staff is working on other phases of fact-gathering).

g. It should point up the absence or inadequacy of workload data in existing administrative reports and the need for a work measurement program, if applicable.

6. Although reviewing the use of forms is actually another separate method, its combination with desk audit and/or the tracing of transactions makes more complete coverage possible. Analysis of recurring or intermittant reports, to be made at the same time, should include:

a. securing specimen filled-in copy of each form and details on how it is prepared;

b. method of using completed forms, i.e., spacing, filing case, etc;

c. distribution of copies;

d. end-use made of each form at each point of final distribution;

e. end-use of each item of information of the form.

7. An examination of backlogs (where such information is available) can also be made. This technique is used:

a. to determine the extent and effectiveness of time controls utilized to assure that oldest or most important transactions receive priority attention;

b. to determine requirements for eliminating backlog.

8. Providing that legal and personnel implications are considered, a motion analysis and time study technique for personnel utilization may be used. Time study observations are of value where operations are stable and refined and the work is repetitive, and are usually conducted not only to gain information about operations and increase efficiency by eliminating waste motions but also to establish individual production standards.

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SUMMARY

It is advisable to check information by examining from different operating points or by utilizing several different observation and/or analysis techniques. Likewise, many kinds of information may be obtained simultaneously. A desk audit may disclose information pertaining to quality, organization structure, procedures, motion economy, production standards, personnel classification, equipment and layout needs, training needs, forms use and design, and morale. However, in a specific survey, the management unit or survey staff should make plans for observing operations with special attention to the specific kinds of information wanted, thus determining which techniques suit its purpose.

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Secretariat	( )	PDM	( )
Deputy for Adm	( )	Fn Mil Ln	( )
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