


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HEADQUARTERS
U. S. STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
(PACIFIC)
APO 234
C/O POSTMASTER SAN FRANCISCO



INTERROGATION NO: 421
(Jap Intell No 27)

Division of Origin: Japanese Intelligence Section, CG-2, USSBS.

Subject: Intelligence Activities of "D" Department, 5th Section
Naval General Staff.

Person Interrogated and Background:

Captain SANEMATSU, Y. chief of the "A" Department, 5th
Section of Naval General Staff, which handled economic
and other kinds of intelligence concerning United States.

1925 - Graduated from Naval Academy
1925-34 - Routine Naval duties
1934-36 - Naval War College
1936-37 - Aid to Naval Minister
1937-39 - Attached to Naval General Staff
1939-40 - In United States where he studied at Princeton
school of politics and history.
1941-42 - Interned in United States
Aug. 1942 - Aug. 1945 - Head of "D" Department, 5th Section
Naval General Staff.

Where Interviewed: Meiji Building, Room 554

Interrogator: Major R. S. SPILMAN, JR., AC.

Interpreter: Lt. OTIS CARY, USNR.

Allied Officers Present: None

SUMMARY:

1. The "A" Department of the 5th Section of Navy General
Headquarters was responsible for intelligence concerning the U.S.
covering:

- a. Overall economic capabilities
- b. Morale of the U.S. public
- c. Effectiveness of political leadership
- d. Production and capabilities of U.S. equipment except air.
- e. Propaganda
- f. Japanese bombing of U.S. industry

2. Principal sources of information were:

- a. Military attaches in foreign countries
 - b. Interception of U.S. broadcasts
 - c. U.S. publications
 - d. German estimates of U.S. economic
- Secondary sources were U.S. prisoners and captured equipment

3. Navy intelligence on U.S. is considered more thorough than
Army intelligence since the navy had been preparing for war with U.S.
for years while the Army had been pre-occupied with RUSSIA.

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
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Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN.

Q.1. Describe the duties of the "A" Department of the 5th Section and distinguish between duties of "C" and "D" Departments.

A. The "D" Department followed American Air both Army and Navy and the order of battle, strength capabilities of U.S. Air. The "C" Department followed production of equipment other than Air, its capabilities and order of battle of ground and naval forces. The "B" Section was vacant. The "A" Section followed the overall economic capabilities of the U.S., the morale of the people, the effectiveness of political leadership, had charge of propoganda, and generally the ability of the U.S. to wage war. It furnished much of the background for the estimates made by the "C" and "D" Departments.

Q.2. Give the organization and strength of the "D" Department.



Q.3. How were the reserve officers of your section chosen?

A. Personnel assigned them. We asked for men who could speak English and had a background of knowledge of U.S. Personnel however, had other offices who wanted men with the same background and most of the men we got were not too well qualified.

Q.4. What were your best sources of information prior to the War?

A. Military Attaches gave us nearly all. I was not in the Department then and have not served as military attache so I know little about it.

Q.5. What were your best sources of information during the War?

A. Your radio broadcasts. These were analyzed by us and after some experience we could distinguish between fact, propoganda and attempts to mislead us. Other Departments listened to the broadcasts, transcribed them and sent them to my section which analyzed them.

Newspapers and publications were very helpful. We got few of them physically, but they were analyzed by our men in neutral countries and the gist of them sent by radio to us.

German estimates of U.S. economic capabilities. At first I thought the Germans underestimated your capabilities, but just before the Normandy invasion I thought they had begun to overestimate your power. This was very significant to me.

Q.6. When did you begin to think we could make more than 75,000 planes per year?

A. That is hard to say. We had to figure on such things as raw materials, new factories, manpower, coal production and the number of shifts you worked, and it was sometime before we came to the conclusion that you could build vast numbers of planes and ships.

Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN, (contd)

Q.7. Did you have any means of communication with South America other than by radio?

A. No, not even before ARGENTINA broke off relations. Before that we got some information by radio, but it was not very good since the people who were sending it were experts on ARGENTINA, not U.S.

Q.8. Did your Department keep maps and charts of U.S.?

A. We were responsible for this and tried to keep up but had little success.

Q.9. Did you question prisoners of war who had worked in war plants before coming into the Army about the work in the plant, etc.?

A. In a few instances we did but got very little information.

Q.10. What information as to production did you get from study of captured equipment?

A. We got some information from this source, but it was obtained by the "C" and "D" Departments and I don't know much about the methods used.

Q.11. Did your section keep detailed files on Naval Officers?

A. We tried to but had little success.

Q.12. Considering the sources of information available to you, did you consider your organization adequate?

A. No. It was extremely inadequate. It was not so much a matter of number of men - I often had more than I could train properly - but it took a year to teach a man enough for him to be of much help.

Q.13. Did the Naval War College give any courses in the kind of economic intelligence you were working with?

A. No.

Q.14. Did your department make an estimate of how much damage our bombardment could do to your own industry?

A. No.

Q.15. Did you make any estimate of what you could do to our industry?

A. Yes. By the time I got there the only method of bombing your industry was with submarine borne airplanes. I knew that if we could wreck all industry on your West Coast it would be worth while, but I knew we could not do it and repeatedly advised against small raids since I thought we could do little damage and a small attack might make the civilians work harder. I recommended that any air power we possessed be used against advanced bases.

Q.16. What pre-war information concerning U.S. industry was in the files when you took over the "A" Department?

A. A substantial amount, but not enough. We had such things as your government publications concerning industry, trade journals, etc.

Q.17. Did submarine based aircraft reconnaissance give you any information?

A. No.

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Interrogation of Captain SANEMATSU, Y., IJN, (contd)

Q.18. Which did you consider the better, Army or Navy intelligence concerning U.S.?

A. Navy was better. When, during peace, the Navy was preparing for war the only real possibility was war with the U.S. so we concentrated on that. The army was preparing for RUSSIA. As a result the Navy was better informed on U.S. Also I think the Navy attaches were better qualified than those sent by the Army.

Q.19. When you took over the department did you think the War would last long?

A. I did, and I still think it would have lasted longer if we had handled the war properly. Both military and civilian agencies fell down.

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