

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
*370103*  
**"BLACKLIST"**  
OPERATIONS

COPY NO. \_\_\_\_\_

EDITION NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DATED: 16 JAN 1946

DOWN GRAD TO: RESTRICTED

AUTHORITY: W X 79139 Det d 27 October 1945

SIGNED: Gerard C. Adams

RANK & SECTION: Major, G-4 Operations

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC  
OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS  
TO OCCUPY  
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA  
AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

Edition 3

8 August 1945

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS


8 August 1945

1. The attached basic outline plan covers operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA after surrender or collapse of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command.
2. Pending issue of over-all directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, this Plan is circulated to Senior Commanders and Staff Sections of the United States Army Forces, Pacific as a guide in their planning and preparation for prompt action upon termination of organized resistance in the areas to be occupied. Plans and preparations for this eventuality will be developed and maintained in an advanced state of readiness by higher echelons of this Command as a matter of urgent priority.
3. The Plan is being forwarded to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet and the Commander, United States Army Strategic Air Force for their information.
4. Directives for the several operations to be conducted and indicated studies in support of the Plan will be issued by this Headquarters at appropriate times. The Plan itself will be amended in detail from time to time as conditions alter.
5. Every precaution will be observed to prevent such planning and preparation from becoming a basis for unfounded rumors of impending termination of the war. These activities represent preparation for an eventuality which might occur at any time, and while of highest priority, in no way reflect a belief in imminence of a cessation of hostilities.

For the Commander-in-Chief:

R. J. MARSHALL,  
Major General, U. S. Army,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL:

  
S. J. CHAMBERLIN,  
Major General, G.S.C.,  
Asst. Chief of Staff, G-3.

T O P S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA

AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

<u>TABLE OF CONTENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Paragraph 1 - <u>DIRECTIVE.</u>	(1-3)
Paragraph 2 - <u>ASSUMPTIONS.</u>	(3-6)
a. <u>Hostile.</u>	3-5
b. <u>Own Forces.</u>	5-6
Paragraph 3 - <u>OPERATIONS.</u>	(6-23)
a. <u>Concept.</u>	6-9
b. <u>Employment of Forces.</u>	
(1) <u>Organization.</u>	9-10
(2) <u>Forces.</u>	10-11
(3) <u>Coordination.</u>	11-12
c. <u>Operations Required.</u>	
(1) <u>General.</u>	12-14
(2) <u>PHASE I.</u>	14-16
(3) <u>PHASE II.</u>	16-17
(4) <u>PHASE III.</u>	17-19
(5) <u>Contingent Operations.</u>	19
d. <u>Forces Required.</u>	19-20
Paragraph 4 - <u>LOGISTICS.</u>	(20-23)
Paragraph 5 - <u>MISCELLANEOUS.</u>	(23-24)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC

BASIC

OUTLINE PLAN

FOR

"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

TO OCCUPY

JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA

AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

8 August 1945

1. DIRECTIVE.

a. This Plan is formulated pursuant to directives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contained in radiograms WX-17064/14 June 1945, and to verbal directive of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, 22 June 1945. It covers operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government and High Command, to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, establish control of armed forces and civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.

The Plan provides for inclusion of the remaining RYUKYUS among CINCAFPAC's areas of responsibility, and regards them as minor off-shore islands of JAPAN Proper, to be occupied when means become available.

Provisions for extended occupation of the several areas and imposition of ultimate surrender terms therein will be covered in subsequent plans upon receipt of necessary directives.

CINCPAC's corresponding plan for conduct of the Naval and Amphibious operations involved in occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA is entitled "CAMPUS".

b. Assigned Responsibilities.

- (1) CINCAFPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the following basic responsibilities:

TOP SECRET

- (a) Making plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet in the plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN (WX-62774, 3 April 1945).
- (b) Preparation of plans for occupation of JAPAN Proper (WX-17064/14 June 1945).
- (c) Command of United States Army Occupation Forces in JAPAN (WX-62773/3 April 1945).
- (d) Military Government in JAPAN to include the four main islands, adjacent off-shore islands, KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLAND (W-79828/9 May 1945).
- (e) Control of U.S.-held positions in the RYUKYUS, including Military Government (V 73 BG 152/18 July and COMINCH/CNO 211820 July).
- (f) Preparation of plans for occupation of KOREA in which Allied Forces will participate.
- (2) CINCPAC is charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with:
- (a) Making plans and preparations for the naval and amphibious phases of the invasion of JAPAN. He cooperates with the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, on the plans and preparations for the campaign in JAPAN (WX-62774/3 April 1945).
- (b) Responsibility for Military Government in the MARIANAS, BONINS, VOLCANOES, IZUS, KURILES and MARCUS ISLAND (JCS 1231).

T O P   S E C R E T

c. Tentative terms of surrender for JAPAN require in substance (JCS 1275):

- (1) Cessation of hostilities and prompt disarmament of Japanese forces and people wherever located.
- (2) Relinquishment of all power by the Japanese Government to the designated military commander.
- (3) Continuation of maintenance of law and order by constituted Japanese officials and police.
- (4) Relinquishment of war-making materials and installations and evacuation of personnel from Japanese-occupied territories as directed by the designated Military Commander.

d. Although CINCPAC plans are drawn with the primary missions of occupying JAPAN Proper and KOREA and a collateral mission of completing occupation of RYUKYUS when means become available, preparation for execution of these missions recognizes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff may direct CINCPAC to assume similar responsibilities with regard to additional areas in the Western Pacific.

2. ASSUMPTIONS.

a. Hostile.

- (1) That the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command may surrender at any time.
- (2) That surrender of Japanese Commanders in occupied areas outside JAPAN Proper may have to be imposed by force.
- (3) That in event the Japanese Government and High Command in KOREA fail to conform to surrender in JAPAN Proper, appropriate offensive measures will be taken without diversion of means allocated to occupation of JAPAN Proper.

T O P S E C R E T

(4) That there is reasonable probability of active post-surrender resistance of considerable proportions within JAPAN Proper, particularly by suicidal elements of the armed forces who will take advantage of any weakness on the part of our forces.

(5) That total Japanese forces to be disarmed will probably amount

to:	<u>JAPAN Proper</u>	<u>KOREA</u>
Army Ground Combat and Service	1,060,000	233,000
Air Combat and Service (Army & Navy)	425,000	27,000
Naval Crews and Personnel of Shore Establishments	<u>242,000</u>	<u>10,000</u>
	1,727,000	270,000
		<u>1,727,000</u>
Total		1,997,000

(6) That Civilian Volunteer Defense Units requiring disarmament

may total:	<u>JAPAN Proper</u>	<u>KOREA</u>
TOKYO PLAIN	1,000,000	
KOBE-KYOTO-OSAKA	700,000	
NAGOYA	375,000	
North HONSHU	60,000	
SHIKOKU	150,000	
KYUSHU	675,000	
Other Areas	<u>250,000</u>	
	3,210,000	35,000
		<u>3,210,000</u>
Total		3,245,000

That armament of these units will be incomplete and confined to light weapons.

(7) That, while at best the civil population of JAPAN Proper will observe an attitude of non-cooperation with our forces, some degree of cooperation may be expected from the civil population of KOREA.

(8) That stocks and production of foodstuffs within JAPAN Proper and KOREA as a whole will, in general, remain adequate to maintain a minimum subsistence level for the population. That, initially, assistance in distribution of foodstuffs, and some reinforcement of supplies to major urban areas, will be required to prevent starvation and epidemic.



T O P   S E C R E T

- (9) That road and rail communications in JAPAN Proper will be sufficiently disrupted by air operations to require widespread rehabilitation of critical facilities prior to resumption of essential transportation of foodstuffs and to large-scale movement of our Occupation Forces into inland areas.
- (10) That allocation of ship tonnage will be required during the early post-surrender period for transportation of materials for shelter for considerable elements of urban populations in JAPAN Proper to prevent epidemic and active unrest during the winter season. That such action will be required in KOREA to a lesser degree.

b. Own Forces.

- (1) (a) That participation by Allied Forces in the occupation of KOREA will be covered in subsequent directives by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  
(b) That Allied Forces which may participate in occupation of JAPAN Proper will constitute a component of AFPAC Forces.
- (2) That the area of CINCPAC control in the RYUKYUS will be extended to include unoccupied portions of that Archipelago.
- (3) That the Commanding General, United States Army Strategic Air Force will support the operations to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, subject to such other commitments as may be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time.
- (4) That, subject to further instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, prompt occupation of JAPAN Proper constitutes a first charge upon resources available to CINCPAC, CINCPAC and CG USASTAF. Concurrent occupation of KOREA constitutes a charge second only to JAPAN Proper in allocation of such resources.
- (5) That CINCPAC will be charged by the Joint Chiefs of Staff with imposition of surrender terms upon all Japanese located within his areas of assigned responsibility.

T O P   S E C R E T

- (6) That CINCAFPAC will be designated to coordinate and enforce upon the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command the demands upon those bodies of Commanders designated to occupy areas outside JAPAN Proper.
- (7) That commitments necessary for prompt and effective occupation of JAPAN Proper and KOREA will take priority over any further commitments on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA.
- (8) That military necessity will require prompt and widespread physical occupation of JAPAN Proper in order to effectively accomplish disarmament and bring home the fact of surrender to the Japanese people.
- (9) That occupation in KOREA may be confined to major centers providing control of the Japanese Governmental and Military Organizations, and the communications of more populous areas.
- (10) That uncertainties of the internal situation in JAPAN will necessitate mounting out of initial Occupation Forces prepared for landings against local opposition.
- (11) That repatriation of personnel of the Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries into JAPAN Proper from whatever source will be subject to prior approval by CINCAFPAC.
- (12) That redeployment will continue until the full requirements of these operations and any further operation which may be directed into the mainland of ASIA and FORMOSA are satisfied.
- (13) That one Marine Corps of three Divisions will be immediately available to CINCAFPAC for occupation purposes.

3. OPERATIONS.

- a. Concept. (See Chart, Annex 3 a, General Concept of Operations).

This Plan covers the "Occupation Period" only. During this period, control of JAPAN Proper and of KOREA is established by progressive occupation, initially utilizing forces available to CINCPAC and CINCAFPAC at the time of

T O P   S E C R E T

surrender or collapse. JAPAN is disarmed and provisions made for early turn-over to separate "Post-War" Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA.

The preparation and conduct of the operations are decentralized to designated Army Commanders and their corresponding Naval Task Force Commanders to the greatest extent consistent with essential coordination by Superior Headquarters.

For planning purposes, it is visualized that dispatch of AFPAC Forces immediately available, to JAPAN and KOREA, is in strength to occupy selected major strategic centers against local opposition if offered. These forces are mounted with the maximum expedition permitted by availability of sea and air transport and are provided with appropriate naval support. Strong air and mobile ground forces, provided with immediately available naval support and amphibious transportation, are established at these points in order to isolate JAPAN from ASIA, seize control of higher echelons of government in both JAPAN Proper and KOREA, immobilize enemy armed forces, and initiate operations against any recalcitrant elements in the two countries. These strategic centers remain occupied in strength and serve as bases from which air and ground action can be brought to bear wherever required and from which subsequent occupations are conducted as rapidly as the availability of forces, transportation and the internal situation permits.

Follow-up forces are rapidly dispatched to initial objectives by all available transportation means as arranged by the respective Army Commanders.

Additional areas are occupied in two priorities as follows:

Selected strategic points to establish control of remaining major industrial and political centers and avenues of sea communications.

Selected minor areas to establish control of food supply and of principal overland and coastwise communications.

Objectives selected for occupation in the three priorities or phases outlined in preceding paragraphs are:

TOP SECRET

PHASE I - KANTO PLAIN, SASEBO-NAGASAKI, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, KEIJO (KOREA),  
AOMORI-OMINATO.

PHASE II - JAPAN: SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA, NAGOYA, SAPPORO (HOKKAIDO).  
KOREA: FUSAN.

PHASE III - JAPAN: HIROSHIMA-KURE, KOCHI (SHIKOKU), OKAYAMA, TSURUGA,  
OTOMARI, SENDAI, NIIGATA.

KOREA: GUNSAN-ZENSHU.

(Reference Map: Eastern Asia, 1/1,000,000, Army Map Service,  
Revised (AMS 3) 1944. Japanese place names used).

Additional points in PHASES II and III are occupied within means available as  
deemed necessary by Army Commanders in accomplishment of their missions.

The directed occupations permit control of the political, economic  
and military life of the two countries. The areas designated in JAPAN include 60  
percent of the population, 80 percent of industrial capacity and 48 percent of  
food production. Those in KOREA include 39 percent of the population, 18 percent  
of the industrial capacity and 44 percent of the food production.

Occupations in addition to those outlined above which may be required  
by national policy or Japanese attitude are directed by CINCAFPAC as dictated by  
the situation existent at the time.

Disarmament of Japanese Armed Forces and establishment of control of  
communications are primary initial missions of the Occupation Forces.

The United States Pacific Fleet conducts the naval and amphibious  
phases of the operations.

The Plan as drawn initially visualizes surrender prior to "OLYMPIC".  
In event surrender or collapse occurs after initiation of "OLYMPIC", occupation  
of unoccupied objectives listed above proceeds as outlined, leaving minimum garri-  
son in the "OLYMPIC" and any minor occupied areas.

Relative timing of the operations is dependent upon the shipping  
position at initiation date. Consequently, preliminary estimates of timing are

T O P S E C R E T

made as planning guides and indications of relative priority for shipping allocations only. Forces are dispatched in shipping and air lift allocated for movement of forces of the respective Armies as rapidly as they can be mounted. Occupation of selected objectives may be initiated by employment of airborne forces.

Occupations subsequent to PHASE I are conducted by Army Commanders as rapidly as the situation and availability of forces permit. Amphibious lift is made available in each Army area for this purpose.

The initiation date for the operation ("B"-Day) is designated by CINCPAC pursuant to instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will probably precede "VJ-Day".

Occupation of PHASE I objectives utilizes in general the forces earmarked for "OLYMPIC", plus some elements from "CORONET". Subsequent occupations utilize PHASE I forces, augmented by "CORONET" forces as the situation may demand. PHASE I forces are regarded as firm allocations for commitment as rapidly as practicable. PHASE II forces are allocated to Army Commanders for planning purposes and are subject to release by CINCPAC as required. An AFPAC Reserve is retained for disposition as necessary. Major units as received on redeployment are considered as AFPAC Reserve.

Allocations of forces are frequently amended to incorporate changes in availability incident to "OLYMPIC" and "CORONET".

In event further operations on the mainland of ASIA or FORMOSA are directed, they are initiated subsequent to occupation of PHASE I objectives and establishment therein of adequate protective air and naval elements.

b. Employment of Forces.

(1) Organization.

(a) United States Army Forces, Pacific.

For organization of United States Army Forces, Pacific, and allocation of areas of responsibility for "BLACKLIST" operations, see Annexes 3 a, General Concept, and 3 b

(2) (a), Organization of United States Army Forces.

T O P S E C R E T

(b) United States Pacific Fleet

Organization of the United States Pacific Fleet for these operations is as prescribed by CINCPAC.

(c) United States Army Strategic Air Force.

Organization of the United States Army Strategic Air Force for these operations is as prescribed by the Commanding General thereof.

(2) Forces.

- (a) UNITED STATES ARMY - Command of U.S. Army resources in  
FORCES, PACIFIC the Pacific. (Except Alaskan Department, USASTAF and Southeast Pacific).  
Operations of U.S. Army Forces, "BLACKLIST" operations.  
Command of AFPAC Occupation Forces and imposition of surrender terms in assigned areas of responsibility.  
Approval of repatriation of Japanese Forces and nationals to JAPAN Proper.  
Theater Command, SWPA.

1. Sixth Army - Landing forces, KYUSHU, SHIKOKU, and Western HONSHU area.  
Operations of Occupation Forces same area.  
Preparation of Sixth Army elements from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported under Sixth Army control.
2. Tenth Army - Landing forces, KOREA.  
Operations of Occupation Forces same area.  
Preparation of Tenth Army elements from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported under Tenth Army control.
3. Eighth Army - Landing forces, Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO, KARAFUTO.  
Operations of Occupation Forces, same area.  
Preparation of Eighth Army elements from Western Pacific.  
Mounting of elements transported under Eighth Army control.
4. First Army - Preparations for further operations  
(when available) as directed.
5. Far East Air - Land-based air support, "BLACKLIST"  
Force operations.  
Troop carrier operations.  
Preparation of FEAF elements for displacement to JAPAN and KOREA.  
Establishment of FEAF elements in designated locations.

T O P S E C R E T

6. United States - Preparation and mounting of U.S. Army Forces from Middle Pacific for CINCAFPAC as directed.  
Army Forces, Middle Pacific  
Logistic support and administrative control of U.S. Army Forces in Middle Pacific.
7. United States - Logistic support of U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.  
Army Forces, Western Pacific  
Logistic support of "BLACKLIST" operations.  
U.S. Garrisons, Western Pacific, as directed.  
Preparation and mounting of Base Service elements transported under USAFWESPAC control.  
Disposition of captured Japanese war material as directed.
8. Naval Forces, - Preparation and mounting of Naval and Marine elements, SWPA, for CINCPAC.  
SWPA
- (b) UNITED STATES - Naval cover and support, "BLACKLIST" operations.  
PACIFIC FLEET  
(as arranged)  
Naval and amphibious phase, "BLACKLIST" operations, including Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Army operations.  
Preparation and mounting of U.S. Naval and Marine elements from POA.  
Theater Command, POA.
- (c) UNITED STATES ARMY - Transport of troops by air as arranged.  
STRATEGIC AIR FORCE  
(as arranged)  
VHB operations.
- (3) Coordination.
- (a) Command relationships between the United States Army Forces, Pacific, the United States Pacific Fleet and the United States Strategic Air Force, in the conduct of "BLACKLIST" operations, are as prescribed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (b) Commanders, Sixth, Tenth and Eighth Armies are charged with the coordination of planning of operations within their respective assigned areas of responsibility. Operations are conducted under the principle of maximum practicable decentralization of control in order to achieve objectives in minimum time. Commanders of Naval and Air Task Forces meet with Army Commanders concerned for coordination of planning of operations as directed by their respective Superior Commanders.

T O P S E C R E T

- (c) Details of coordination of operations of United States Army Forces, Pacific and elements, United States Pacific Fleet, within JAPAN Proper and KOREA are arranged directly between Army and Naval Task Force Commanders concerned.
- (d) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, conducts troop-carrier operations to provide to Army Commanders the maximum practicable air lift of troops to JAPAN and KOREA. He coordinates with the USASTAF and ATC as hereafter directed by CINCAFPAC the details of employment of available combat and transport aircraft for troop movement purposes.
- (e) CINCAFPAC arranges with CINCPAC for appropriate transfer to Naval control of naval vessels, equipment, supplies and Intelligence material.
- (f) As arranged with CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC establishes and commands naval terminal and base facilities in JAPAN Proper and KOREA, which are required for support of forces under his command or control.

c. Operations Required.

(1) General.

(a) Designation.

These operations constitute the "B" or "BAKER" series of operations conducted by United States Army Forces, Pacific. Individual operations are designated by numbers within blocks of twenty assigned each of the Army Headquarters concerned. "B"-Day is the date designated by CINCAFPAC for initiation of the operations.

(b) Tasks.

1. General Tasks.

The following general tasks are assigned Army Commanders within their respective zones of responsibility:



T O P S E C R E T

- a. Establish control of the armed forces and civil population in areas assigned and impose thereon prescribed terms of surrender requiring immediate military action.
- b. Prepare for establishment of separate post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation in JAPAN Proper and KOREA as subsequently directed.

2. Common Tasks.

The following tasks are common to the several operations projected in this Plan and apply within areas prescribed by the Army Commander concerned:

- a. Destroy hostile elements which oppose by military action the imposition of surrender terms upon the Japanese.
- b. Disarm and demobilize Japanese armed forces and their auxiliaries as rapidly as the situation permits. Establish control of military resources insofar as is practicable with means available.
- c. Control principal routes of overland communications. Control principal routes of coastwise communications, in coordination with Naval elements as arranged with the appropriate Naval Commander.
- d. Institute Military Government and insure that law and order are maintained among the civilian population. Facilitate peaceful commerce, particularly that which contributes to the subsistence, clothing and shelter of the population.
- e. Recover, relieve and repatriate Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees without delay.

T O P S E C R E T

- f. Secure and safeguard intelligence information of value to the United States. Arrange with the U.S. Navy for mutual interchange and unrestricted access by each Service to matters of interest thereto.
- g. Suppress activities of individuals and organizations which may be inimical to the operations of the Occupation Forces. Apprehend War Criminals as directed.
- h. Assist with elements of the initial Occupation Forces the occupation of subsequent objectives as directed.
- i. Prepare to impose terms of surrender beyond immediate military requirements as directed.
- j. Prepare to extend controls over the Japanese as required to implement policies for post-war occupation and government when prescribed.
- k. Prepare to transfer responsibilities to agencies of the post-war Governments and Armies of Occupation when established.
- l. Assist the United States Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval facilities for naval search and control of coastwise communications as arranged.

(2) PHASE I. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (2), Concept of PHASE I Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-TWENTY"	KANTO PLAIN	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWO"	SASEBO-NAGASAKI	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TEN"	OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FORTY"	KEIJO	Tenth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"	AOMORI-OMINATO	Eighth Army

T O P S E C R E T

(b) Tasks.

1. Common Task.

The Army Commander arranges with the appropriate Naval Commander the details of employment of an amphibious lift of one-division capacity for post-PHASE I short-range amphibious operations as required in the Army area concerned.

2. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY"; KANTO PLAIN area; Eighth Army;  
Target Date for "Y" Day, B / 15.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the KANTO PLAIN area; establish control for CINCAFPAC of the Central Japanese Government and Imperial High Command; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Eighth Army area as required.

3. Operation "BAKER-TWO"; SASEBO-NAGASAKI area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "A" Day, B / 20.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the area SASEBO-NAGASAKI; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the SASEBO-NAGASAKI area.

4. Operation "BAKER-TEN"; OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "K" Day, B / 23.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the area OSAKA-KYOTO-KOBE; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Sixth Army area as required; assist the U.S. Pacific Fleet as necessary in establishment of naval base facilities in the KOBE area.

T O P   S E C R E T

- 5. Operation "BAKER-FORTY"; KEIJO area (KOREA); Tenth Army;  
Target Date for "E" Day, B / 27.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations occupy the KEIJO area of KOREA; establish control of the Japanese Central Government and Army-Navy Command of KOREA; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in the Tenth Army area as required.

- 6. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-ONE"; AOMORI-OMINATO area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "O" Day, B / 30.

By joint overseas expeditionary operations, occupy the AOMORI-OMINATO area; establish designated air and mobile ground forces for overland and short-range amphibious operations in Northern HONSHU, HOKKAIDO and KARAFUTO as required.

(3) PHASE II. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (3), Concept of PHASE II Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-ONE"	SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-ELEVEN"	NAGOYA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-THREE"	SAPPORO	Eighth Army
"BAKER-FORTY-ONE"	FUSAN (KOREA)	Tenth Army

(b) Tasks.

- 1. Operation "BAKER-ONE"; SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "C" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area SHIMONOSEKI-FUKUOKA of northern KYUSHU; establish ground and designated air forces for accomplishment of common tasks.

T O P S E C R E T

2. Operation "BAKER-ELEVEN"; NAGOYA area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "M"-Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the NAGOYA area of Southeastern HONSHU;  
establish ground forces and air staging facilities  
for accomplishment of common tasks.

3. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-THREE": SAPPORO area; Eighth  
Army; Target Date for "W" Day, as designated by CG,  
Eighth Army.

Occupy the SAPPORO area of HOKKAIDO; establish  
ground forces and air staging facilities for  
accomplishment of common tasks. Coordinate  
activities with CINCPAC forces occupying the KURILE  
ISLANDS.

4. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-ONE"; FUSAN area; Tenth Army;  
Target Date for "R" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

Occupy the FUSAN area of Southern KOREA; establish  
ground forces and air landing facilities for  
accomplishment of common tasks.

- (4) PHASE III. (See Chart, Annex 3 c (4), Concept of PHASE III  
Operations)

(a) Areas Occupied.

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Area</u>	<u>Force</u>
"BAKER-THREE"	HIROSHIMA-KURE	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FOUR"	KOCHI (SHIKOKU)	Sixth Army
"BAKER-FIVE"	OKAYAMA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWELVE"	TSURUGA	Sixth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"	OTOMARI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"	SENDAI	Eighth Army
"BAKER-TWENTY-FIVE"	NIIGATA	Eighth Army
"BAKER-FORTY-TWO"	GUNSAN-ZENSHU	Tenth Army

T O P   S E C R E T

(b) Tasks.

1. Operation "BAKER-THREE"; HIROSHIMA-KURE area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "F" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the area HIROSHIMA-KURE of Western HONSHU;  
establish ground forces and air landing facilities  
for accomplishment of common tasks.

2. Operation "BAKER-FOUR"; KOCHI area; Sixth Army; Target  
Date for "G" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the KOCHI area of SHIKOKU; establish ground  
forces and air staging facilities for accomplishment  
of common tasks.

3. Operation "BAKER-FIVE"; OKAYAMA area; Sixth Army; Target  
Date for "I" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the OKAYAMA area, northern shore of the INLAND  
SEA; establish ground forces and air landing facili-  
ties for accomplishment of common tasks.

4. Operation "BAKER-TWELVE"; TSURUGA area; Sixth Army;  
Target Date for "N" Day, as designated by CG, Sixth Army.

Occupy the TSURUGA area of FUKUI Prefecture and ad-  
jacent points as required; establish ground forces  
and air staging facilities for accomplishment of  
common tasks.

5. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-TWO"; OTOMARI area; Eighth Army;  
Target Date for "Q" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth  
Army.

a. Occupy the OTOMARI area of KARAFUTO; establish  
ground forces and air staging facilities for accom-  
plishment of common tasks.

b. Coordinate activities with CINCPAC forces occupying  
the KURILE ISLANDS.

T O P S E C R E T

6. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-FOUR"; SENDAI area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "S" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the SENDAI-MATSUSHIMA area of MIYAGI Prefecture; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

7. Operation "BAKER-TWENTY-FIVE"; NIIGATA area; Eighth Army; Target Date for "U" Day, as designated by CG, Eighth Army.

Occupy the NIIGATA area of Northwestern HONSHU; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

8. Operation "BAKER-FORTY-TWO"; GUNSAN-ZENSHU area; Tenth Army; Target Date for "P" Day, as designated by CG, Tenth Army.

Occupy the GUNSAN-ZENSHU area of Southwest KOREA; establish ground forces and air landing facilities for accomplishment of common tasks.

(5) Contingent Operations.

- (a) Headquarters, First Army, upon activation, is allocated tasks of planning for and conducting further AFPAC operations as directed.
- (b) Requirements for further AFPAC operations and consequent amendments in allocations for JAPAN and KOREA are formulated upon receipt of information concerning objectives and areas to be occupied.

d. Forces Required.

- (1) Estimates of the over-all ground and air requirements for Occupation Forces to accomplish PHASE I, II and III objectives, and Troop Lift Requirements for movement in naval assault shipping and by air are shown in Annex 3 d (1).

T O P S E C R E T

- (2) "A solution" for employment of major units, ground forces, in "BLACKLIST" operations is shown in Annex 3 d (2).
- (3) Deployment of land-based air forces in the Western Pacific for "BLACKLIST" operations is shown on Chart, Annex 3 d (3).
- (4) Allocations of Naval assault shipping to meet Troop Lift Requirements for such types (Annex 3 d (1)) and of Naval Support, are made by CINCPAC. Allocations of aircraft for troop lift are made by CG, Far East Air Forces, who arranges for use of aircraft of the USASTAF and AIC as available.
- (5) Estimates of Forces Required are amended to meet changes in the situation, by timely issue of amended Annexes 3 d (1), 3 d (2) and 3 d (3)

4. LOGISTICS. (See Annex 4, Logistics).

a. General.

- (1) Present logistic planning and instructions covering operation "OLYMPIC" are applied to the maximum extent possible in these operations, consistent with major changes in strategic and tactical concept.
- (2) United States Army and troops attached for the conduct of operations under the control of CINCAFPAC are staged, equipped and mounted out with prescribed equipment and supplies to the extent practicable and in the time allotted from the PHILIPPINES, RYUKYUS, MARIANAS, and/or HAWAIIAN ISLANDS.
- (3) Naval forces employed in support of this operation under the control of CINCPAC are supported as directed by him.
- (4) United States Army Strategic Air Force is supported logistically in accordance with current arrangements and directives.

b. Responsibility for Logistic Support.

- (1) CINCAFPAC is responsible for the logistic support of United States Army Forces and attached troops under his operational control employed in these operations, except for Classes II, IV and V supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces.
- (2) CINCPAC is responsible for the logistic support of Naval services



T O P S E C R E T

under his control. In addition, he is responsible for equipping and providing mounting-out supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces which operate under the control of CINCAFPAC and resupply of Classes II, IV and V for those forces.

- (3) The Commanding General, United States Army Forces, Western Pacific, is responsible (except for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply) for provision of logistic support for all troops in occupational areas to the water line of the respective areas.
- (4) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, is responsible for the provision of Air Force technical and air ammunition supply for all United States Army Air Force troops (except the United States Army Strategic Air Force elements based in the RYUKYUS), employed in these operations, including Marine Air Forces under the operational control of CINCAFPAC.
- (5) The Commanding Generals of Armies are charged with responsibility for logistic support of all troops in their respective occupational areas. Appropriate service troops are attached to Armies for the purpose of rendering direct logistic support in each Army area.
- (6) The Commanding Generals, United States Army Forces, Middle Pacific, Western Pacific and Tenth Army are responsible for re-equipping all units staging in and mounting from their respective areas (and the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces for technical equipment of Air Force units) to the limit of availability of equipment and supplies. They are further charged with supplying to all units mounted, to the extent available, accompanying equipment and supplies as prescribed by this headquarters.
- c (7) With respect to logistic arrangements for RYUKYUS, O.I. No 2, this headquarters, 30 July, governs for this operation.

c. Resupply.

Resupply is by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" to the extent practicable with

T O P S E C R E T

the then currently available resources, as follows:

- (1) In the event "B"-Day occurs considerably prior to "X"-Day for operation "OLYMPIC", resupply, and supply of the bulk of construction materials as may have to be imported, is by diversion of maintenance shipping from MIDDLE and WESTERN PACIFIC areas until "OLYMPIC" support shipping becomes available. Thereafter, shipping set up for the support of "OLYMPIC" is diverted in quantities necessary to meet "BLACKLIST" requirements.
- (2) In the event "B"-Day occurs at a time shortly approaching or immediately subsequent to "X"-Day, resupply, and supply of construction materials as indicated above, is by diversion of direct shipping set up for "OLYMPIC", augmented as may be required, within availability, from bases in the PACIFIC under the control of CINCPAC.

d. Evacuation and Hospitalization.

- (1) Evacuation of casualties by all services from the occupied areas initially is by naval assault shipping, followed at the earliest practicable date by the employment of aircraft and hospital ships.
- (2) Fixed-bed hospital units are established in occupied areas at the earliest practicable date, functioning initially in existing buildings or under canvas.
- (3) Evacuation of Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of United Nations is as prescribed in Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees.

e. Transportation.

- (1) CINCPAC provides Naval assault shipping for the transportation of initial, follow-up and succeeding Task Forces, with accompanying equipment and supplies from mounting areas to the objective.
- (2) Replenishment supplies, replacement equipment and construction materials are transported direct from the UNITED STATES or bases as indicated in paragraph 4 c above, in heavy shipping

T O P S E C R E T

as arranged for by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC.

- (3) The Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, plans for and executes air dropping of emergency supplies to Prisoners of War and civilian internees of United Nations held in known Japanese Camps, exclusive of those in areas under the jurisdiction of the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command, as indicated in Appendix A, to Annex 4, Logistics.

f. Construction.

- (1) Construction in the occupied areas is limited to provision of minimum essential operative facilities. Use of imported materials is kept to an absolute minimum, Japanese materials being utilized to the extent of availability.
- (2) CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC are each responsible for the construction of Army and Naval facilities and installations required for the support of the forces under their respective controls.
- (3) Construction materials and Engineer construction effort required to construct facilities and installations necessary for the support of the forces operating under their control are provided by CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, respectively.
- (4) The Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for the construction and development of approved Army construction projects in their respective areas immediately following initiation of operations.

g. Local Resources.

Maximum use will be made of available local resources, including existing installations and labor. Disarmed Japanese Military Forces are utilized for labor to the extent practicable.

5. MISCELLANEOUS.

- a. For Communications Plan, see Annex 5 a.
- b. For Assumed Terms of Surrender, see Annex 5 b.
- c. For Basic Plan for Establishment of Control of the Armed Forces and Military Resources of the Enemy, see Annex 5 c.
- d. For Basic Intelligence Plan, including Initial Handling of War

T O P S E C R E T

Criminals and Security Suspects, see Annex 5 d.

e. For G-2 Estimate of the Hostile Situation, "BLACKLIST" Operations, see Annex 5 e.

f. For Basic Plan for Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, see Annex 5 f.

g. For Summary of CINCPAC Plan "CAMPUS" for Naval and Amphibious Operations, see Annex 5 g.

h. This Plan will be supported by the following:

- (1) "Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government". This Plan covers Military Governments and Relations of Occupation Forces with the Civil Population in JAPAN Proper and KOREA during the "Occupation Period", i.e., up to the transfer of responsibility to the post-hostilities Governments and Armies of Occupation.
- (2) Troop Lists, "BLACKLIST" Operations.

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION LIST

"BLACKLIST"

Edition 3

8 August 1945

CG, First Army.....	1
CG, Sixth Army.....	3
CG, Eighth Army.....	3
CG, Tenth Army.....	3
CG, FEAF.....	3
CG, U.S. Army Forces, Western Pacific.....	3
CG, ASCOM "C".....	1
Staff, GHQ.....	15

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

BASIC OUTLINE PLAN  
FOR  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS  
TO OCCUPY  
JAPAN PROPER AND KOREA  
AFTER SURRENDER OR COLLAPSE

ANNEXES

- 3 a GENERAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.
- 3 b (2) (a) ORGANIZATION OF UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES.
- 3 c (2) CONCEPT OF PHASE I OPERATIONS.
- 3 c (3) CONCEPT OF PHASE II OPERATIONS.
- 3 c (4) CONCEPT OF PHASE III OPERATIONS.
- 3 d (1) ESTIMATE OF FORCES AND TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS.
- 3 d (2) EMPLOYMENT OF MAJOR UNITS, GROUND FORCES.
- 3 d (3) DEPLOYMENT OF LAND-BASED AIR FORCES IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.
- 4 LOGISTICS.
- 5 a COMMUNICATIONS PLAN, "BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS.
- 5 b ASSUMED TERMS OF SURRENDER.
- APPENDIX 4 — ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER TERMS.
- 5 c BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE ENEMY.
- APPENDIX 6 a — STANDARDS FOR DISARMAMENT OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES.
- APPENDIX 6 b — PROCEDURES FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL.
- 5 d BASIC INTELLIGENCE PLAN "BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS.
- 5 e G-2 ESTIMATE OF HOSTILE SITUATION.
- 5 f BASIC PLAN, CARE AND EVACUATION OF ALLIED PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES.
- 5 g SUMMARY OF CINPAC PLAN "CAMPUS" FOR NAVAL AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS.



SUPPORTING PLANS TO FOLLOW:

"Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, 'BLACKLIST' Operations."

"Troop Lists, 'BLACKLIST' Operations."

TOP SECRET





TOP SECRET

ANNEX

"BLACK" GENERAL OPERATIONAL LEG

A. ARMY ZONES OF RESPONSIBILITY

B. CENTERS OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

PHASE I

PHASE II

PHASE III

CONTROLS EXERCISED BY THE CENTER OF OPERATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AUGMENTED BY A RESERVE OF DIVISIONS AS REQUIRED

C. AREAS ASSIGNED TO THE SIXTH ARMY GROUP BY JCS.

NOTES:

- PHASE I COMMITMENT: PHILIPPINES - 3 DIVS - (P.I.), RYUKYUS - 3 DIVS - (P.I.), MARIANAS - 3 DIVS - (P.I.), HAWAII - 3 DIVS - (P.I.)
- PHASE II FOLLOW-UP: (AS RELEASED BY JCS) 3 DIVS - (P.I.)
- AFPAC RESERVE: 3 DIVS AND 1 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS AS REQUIRED
- BOUNDARIES:
  - TENTH ARMY - SOUTH OF A LINE UTSURYO - KARAFUTO
  - SIXTH ARMY - SOUTH OF A LINE FOLLOWING THE BOUNDARY OF PHASE I TO SIXTH ARMY (NAGANO - SHIZUOKA - NAGANO)

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

ANNEX 3 A

"BLACKLIST"

GENERAL CONCEPT  
OF  
OPERATIONS

LEGEND

A. ARMY ZONES OF  
RESPONSIBILITY

10<sup>TH</sup> 6<sup>TH</sup>  
XXXX

B. CENTERS OF OCCUPATION:

PHASE I



PHASE II




PHASE III



CONTROLS EXERCISED FROM INDI-  
CATED CENTER OF OCCUPATION,  
AUGMENTED BY ADDITIONAL  
OCCUPATIONS AS NECESSARY.

C. AREAS ASSIGNED

CINCPAC-CINCPOA  
BY JCS,



NOTES:

1. PHASE I COMMITMENT:

PHILIPPINES	-	10 2/3	DIVS
RYUKYUS	-	2	DIVS
MARIANAS	-	2	DIVS
HAWAII	-	2	DIVS
TOTAL		16 2/3	DIVS

2. PHASE II FOLLOW-UP:

(AS RELEASED BY CINCPAC)  
3 DIVS - (P.I.)


3. AFPAC RESERVE:

3 DIVS AND 1 AIRBORNE RCT (P.I.), PLUS  
DIVISIONS AS REDEPLOYED.


4. BOUNDARIES:

A. TENTH ARMY-SIXTH ARMY:-  
A LINE UTSURYO-TO (TO 10TH  
ARMY) - TSUSHIMA-FUKUE  
SHIMA (BOTH TO 6TH ARMY).  
RYUKYUS PASS TO COMMANDER  
SERVICE COMMAND "I", UPON  
DEPARTURE OF 10TH ARMY TO KOREA.

B. SIXTH ARMY-EIGHTH ARMY:-  
A LINE FOLLOWING THE EASTERN  
BOUNDARY OF PREFECTURES (ALL  
TO SIXTH ARMY) AS FOLLOWS: -  
SHIZUOKA-NAGANO-TOYAMA



TOP SECRET





TOP SECRET

ANNEX 3B (2) (A)  
" BLACKLIST "  
ORGANIZATION  
OF  
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES,  
PACIFIC  
FOR  
"BLACKLIST" OPERATIONS

3 b (2)(a)

GENERAL  
FORCES



GENERAL  
FORCE

GENERAL  
FORCES  
PACIFIC

COMMANDING GENERAL  
FIRST ARMY

TOP SECRET





TOP

ANNEX  
 "BLACK"

CON  
 PHA  
 OPER


VJ  
 BE  
 I AUG A

LE  
 XX  
 XX  
 XX


- NOTES:
1. ALLOCATIONS
  2. DIVISIONS DETERMINED FOR "A SOLUTION"
  3. SHIPPING AND ARE ALLOCATED IN PRIORITY ATIVE TIMING IS OCCUPIED RAPIDLY AS AVAILABLE WITH S
  4. MINIMUM FOR IF SITUATION GREASED. TO PRIOR TO E OF CINCPAC THE OBJECTI OTHERWISE L FOR MINIMUM PRIORITY SH ADDITIONAL PRIORITY.
  5. AIR LIFT ALL MENT OF TRO INITIAL SEAR IS ARRANGED

TOP

TOP SECRET



"WAKER-TWENTY-ONE"  
 B +30



ANNEX 3 C (2)  
"BLACKLIST"

CONCEPT  
 OF  
 PHASE I  
 OPERATIONS

PART I  
 FOR  
 VJ - DAY  
 BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT  
 1945



LEGEND

XX [X]	MINIMUM FORCES FOR ENTRY
XX [X]	
XX [X]	ADDITIONAL PHASE I ALLOCATIONS


- NOTES:
1. ALLOCATIONS AS OF 15 AUG 1945.
  2. DIVISIONS DESIGNATED WHEN "B-DAY" DETERMINED. SEE ANNEX 3 D (2) FOR "A SOLUTION".
  3. SHIPPING AND NAVAL SUPPORT ARE ALLOCATED TO OPERATIONS IN PRIORITY INDICATED BY RELATIVE TIMING SHOWN. TOKYO IS OCCUPIED FIRST, OTHERS AS RAPIDLY AS ARMY COMMANDERS ARE ABLE WITH SHIPPING ALLOCATED.
  4. MINIMUM FORCES FOR ENTRY MAY, IF SITUATION REQUIRES, BE INCREASED TO FULL COMMITMENT PRIOR TO ENTRY AT DISCRETION OF CINCPAC IF SITUATION AT THE OBJECTIVE JUSTIFIES DELAY. OTHERWISE LIFT IS ALLOCATED FOR MINIMUM COMMITMENTS IN PRIORITY SHOWN, FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL INCREMENT IN SAME PRIORITY.
  5. AIR LIFT ALLOCATED FOR MOVEMENT OF TROOPS SUBSEQUENT TO INITIAL SEABORNE EXPEDITIONS IS ARRANGED BY FEAF.

3c (2)


TOP SECRET







TOP SECRET



ENTY - THREE

A - KARAFUTO

200 300 400 500 MILES

TRANSVERSE MERCATOR PROJECTION CENTERED ON TOKYO  
FROM ANY POINT ON THE MAP FOLLOWS A STRAIGHT LINE,  
GIVING THE TRUE BEARING IN DISTANCE AND DIRECTION.

ANNEX 3 C (3)  
"BLACKLIST"  
 CONCEPT  
 OF  
 PHASE II  
 OPERATIONS

PART I

FOR  
 VJ - DAY  
 BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945

LEGEND

PHASE II OCCUPATIONS  
 AND ALLOCATIONS



PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS  
 AND AVAILABLE FORCES





NOTES:

1. ALLOCATIONS AS OF 15 AUG 1945
2. PHASE II ALLOCATIONS FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, RELEASED BY CINCPAC AS SITUATION DEMANDS.
3. PHASE II ALLOCATIONS FORWARDED FROM MOUNTING AREAS AS ADMINISTRATIVE TROOP MOVEMENTS AS RAPIDLY AS SHIPPING ALLOCATED TO ARMY COMMANDERS PERMITS. PROCEED TO PHASE I BASES OR PHASE II OBJECTIVES AS APPROPRIATE.

3c (3)




TOP SECRET






AFPAC RESERVE	
P. I.	ADDITIONAL
	RE-DEPLOYED
	DIVISIONS
	AS
	RECEIVED

TOP SECRET



AFPAC RESERVE	
P. I.	ADDITIONAL
	RE-DEPLOYED
	DIVISIONS
	AS
	RECEIVED



ION CENTERED ON TOKYO  
 THE MAP FOLLOWS A STRAIGHT LINE,  
 DIRECTION.

ANNEX 3 C (4)  
 "BLACKLIST"

CONCEPT  
 OF  
 PHASE III  
 OPERATIONS

PART I  
 FOR  
 VJ - DAY

BETWEEN

1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945

LEGEND

PHASE III OCCUPATION:-

- DESIGNATION B/25
- OBJECTIVE ■
- PREVIOUS OCCUPATIONS ■
- AVAILABLE FORCES  
IN JAPAN & KOREA
- AFPAC RESERVE

NOTES:

OPERATIONS CONDUCTED BY  
 ARMY COMMANDERS AS RAPIDLY  
 AS SITUATION PERMITS, EMPLOY-  
 ING REQUIRED ELEMENTS OF  
 FORCES AVAILABLE, AUGMENTED  
 FROM AFPAC RESERVE AS  
 NECESSARY.

30 (4)

TOP SECRET

PHASE I FIRM COMMITMENT

MAJOR UNITS	TOKYO B+15			SASEBO B+20			OSAKA B+23			KEIJO B+27		
	HQ AFPAC HQ 8th Army 2 Corps 5 1/3 Inf Divs	8 1/2 AAF GPS		1 Corps 3 Inf Divs 3 3/4 AAF GPS (6)			HQ 6th Army Amph Corps 3 Mar Divs 1 Inf Div	1 1/4 AAF GPS		HQ 10th Army 1 Corps 2 Inf Divs 3 AAF GPS		
	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT
P. I. Minimum (1)	97,612			37,833			6,930					
Initial		19,516			7,879			1,358				
Increment	77,744		165,275	41,624		58,719	7,623		7,496			
Total	175,356	16,607	119,597	79,457	10,705	70,534	14,553	1,774	15,695			
		36,123			18,584			3,132				
			284,872			129,253			23,191			
Ryukyus Minimum	13,776			5,900			3,319			76,607		
Initial		3,072			1,300			977			15,444	
Increment	22,391		23,913	10,453		9,000			5,853			117,793
Total	36,167	5,169	36,108	16,353	2,517	15,694	3,319			81,474	1,085	8,043
		8,241			3,817			977			16,529	
			60,021			24,694			5,853			125,846
Marianas Minimum							67,675					
Initial								11,623				
Increment							5,751		128,286			
Total							73,426	3,599	19,850			
								15,222				
									148,136			
Hawaii Minimum												
Initial												
Increment							33,516	4,665				
Total							33,516		42,506			
								4,665				
									42,506			
Total Minimum	111,388			43,733			77,924			76,607		
Initial		22,588 (7)			9,179 (7)			13,958 (7)			15,444 (7)	
Increment	100,135		189,188	52,077		67,719	46,890		141,635			117,793
Total Seaborne	211,523	21,776	155,705	95,810	13,222	86,228	124,814	10,038	78,051	81,474	1,085	8,043
		44,364			22,401			23,996			16,529	
			344,893			153,947			219,686			125,846
Airborne (2)	19,000			15,900			15,300			2,000		
		200			150			120				
			13,000			12,000			11,500			1,000
Grand Total	230,523	44,564	357,893	111,710	22,551	165,947	140,114	24,116	231,186	83,474	16,529	126,846

COMMITMENT

PHASES II & III

+23			KEIJO B+27			AOMORI-OMINATO B+30			6th ARMY (4)			10th ARMY (4)				
AAF GPS	HQ 10th Army 1 Corps 2 Inf Divs 3 AAF GPS		1 Corps 2 1/3 Inf Divs 1 1/4 AAF GPS		TOTAL PHASE I			1 Corps 2 Inf Divs 5 1/4 AAF GPS		1 Inf Div						
DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS
7,496				34,216	7,388	52,106	176,591	36,141	283,596	64,477	12,970	97,604	23,354	4,536	33,996	79,000
15,695				39,878	7,414	56,343	166,869	36,500	262,169							
23,191				74,094	14,802	108,449	343,460	72,641	545,765	64,477	12,970	97,604	23,354	4,536	33,996	79,000
5,853	76,607	15,444	117,798	2,852	829	4,856	102,454	21,622	161,420	11,004	2,849	16,153				
	4,867	1,085	8,048				37,711	8,771	59,850							
5,853	81,474	16,529	125,846	2,852	829	4,856	140,165	30,393	221,270	11,004	2,849	16,153				
128,286							67,675	11,623	128,286							
19,850							5,751	3,599	19,850							
148,136							73,426	15,222	148,136							
42,506							33,516	4,665	42,506							
42,506							33,516	4,665	42,506							
(7) 141,635	76,607	15,444 (7)	117,798	37,068	8,217 (7)	56,962	346,720	69,386 (7)	573,302	75,481	15,819	113,757	23,354	4,536	33,996	79,000
78,051	4,867	1,085	8,048	39,878	7,414	56,343	243,847	53,535	384,375							
219,686	81,474	16,529	125,846	76,946	15,631	113,305	590,567	122,921	957,677	75,481	15,819	113,757	23,354	4,536	33,996	79,000
11,500	2,000		1,000	1,300	10	1,000	53,500	480	38,500	1,400		1,000				
231,186	83,474	16,529	126,846	78,246	15,641	114,305	644,067	123,401	996,177	76,881	15,819	114,757	23,354	4,536	33,996	79,000



III TENTATIVE COMMITMENT (3)

AFPAC RES (5)

TOP SECRET

ANNEX 3d(1)

“BLACKLIST”  
 ESTIMATE  
 OF  
 FORCES AND  
 TROOP LIFT REQUIREMENTS

NOTES:


- (1) Specific minimum strength for initial landing force. Increment committed either in initial landing force or follow-up.
- (2) Air lift provided for personnel and minimum housekeeping equipment to rapidly augment personnel strength of initial occupation forces.
- (3) There may be some overlap between Phase I and Phase II input. Shipping and Air Lift are allocated in bulk to Army Commander when required.
- (4) 6th and 10th Army allocations for planning purposes, subject to release by CINCAFPAC if required by situation in Japan or Korea.
- (5) For commitment as and if required.
- (6) Includes firm commitment for air in both Sasebo and Shimonoseki areas.
- (7) All of these vehicles cannot be lifted at once and some must follow in turn-around shipping.


3d (1)

TOP SECRET

3 1/3 Inf Divs			TOTAL PHASE II & III			TOTAL BY MOUNTING AREA		
PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT	PERS	VEH	DWT
79,245	14,409	106,724	167,076	31,915	238,324			
79,245	14,409	106,724	167,076	31,915	238,324	510,536	104,556	784,089
			11,004	2,849	16,153			
			11,004	2,849	16,153	151,169	33,242	237,423
						73,426	15,222	148,136
						33,516	4,665	42,506
79,245	14,409	106,724	178,080	34,764	254,477			
79,245	14,409	106,724	178,080	34,764	254,477	768,647	157,685	1,212,154
			1,400			54,900	480	
					1,000			39,500
79,245	14,409	106,724	179,480	34,764	255,477	823,547	158,165	1,251,654







T C

"B

LAND-B

WE

AS C

FOR

I AUG

ARMY AIR F

INITIAL C

FOLLOW-

TO APPA

NAVAL AND

AIR FORCE

(ALLOCA

ESTIMA

SHOWN A

NOTES:

(1) THES

MAY

(2) CONT

PLAN

BY C

DEMA

(3) GARF

JAPA


ARE

CONT

BE I

T C

TOP SECRET



ANNEX 3D (3)  
"BLACKLIST"  
DEPLOYMENT  
OF  
LAND-BASED AIR FORCES  
IN THE  
WESTERN PACIFIC

PART I  
DEPLOYMENT  
AS OF (B-DAY + 50)  
FOR VJ-DAY BETWEEN  
1 AUG AND 15 OCT 1945

LEGEND

ARMY AIR FORCES:

INITIAL COMMITMENT

FOLLOW-UP, SUBJECT  
TO AFPAC RELEASE

NAVAL AND MARINE  
AIR FORCES:

(ALLOCATED BY CINCPAC,  
ESTIMATED DEPLOYMENT  
SHOWN AS A GUIDE ONLY)


NOTES:

- (1) THESE SEARCH SQUADRONS  
MAY BE SEA OR LAND BASED
- (2) CONTINGENT ALLOCATION FOR  
PLANNING PURPOSES RELEASED  
BY CINCPAC AS SITUATION  
DEMANDS.
- (3) GARRISONS (OTHER THAN  
JAPAN AND KOREA) SHOWN  
ARE RESIDUE SHOULD  
CONTINGENT COMMITMENT  
BE MADE.

TOP SECRET

3d (3)


0  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28  
29  
30  
31  
32  
33



(NOTE 3)



XIV RCT  
 38 CORPS  
 II AB  
 IX CORPS  
 81  
 77  
 158 RCT  
 III PHIB CORPS  
 (CINCPAC)  
 1 MARINE  
 4  
 6  
 503 PRCHT. RCT  
 96  
 32  
 31  
 AFWESPAC  
 37  
 93  
 B CORPS  
 C CORPS  
 D CORPS  
 E CORPS  
 F CORPS  
 86  
 95  
 97  
 104  
 2  
 4  
 5  
 8  
 44  
 87  
 28  
 30  
 35  
 45  
 91



JULY  
 AUG  
 SEPT  
 OCT  
 NOV  
 DEC  
 JAN

(NOTE 3)



T O P S E C R E T

BLACKLIST  
BASIC LOGISTIC PLAN

I. GENERAL:

1. This operation consists of a series of landings by United States Army and attached forces under control of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC, subsequent to sudden collapse or unconditional surrender of the Japanese Government and Imperial High Command. The objective is the occupation of critical areas in JAPANESE Home Islands and KOREA, establishment of control over the armed forces of the enemy, the civilian population of occupied areas, and the imposition thereon of those prescribed terms of unconditional surrender requiring immediate military action.

2. Ground, air, and follow-up elements are mounted from bases under the control of the Commanding Generals, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN and MIDDLE PACIFIC, and TENTH U. S. Army, and moved to the objective areas in Naval assault shipping.

3. After occupation of the areas KANTO PLAIN, SHIMONOSEKI-YAWATA, KOBE-OSAKA-KYOTO, AOMORI-OMINATO and JINSEN-KEIJO areas, bases are established with minimum construction at YOKOHAMA, YAWATA, OSAKA, OMINATO and JINSEN. Naval and air facilities are developed as required. The railroads and highway net are rehabilitated to the extent necessary for logistic support of the forces and control of civilian population.

4. Because of uncertainty as to date of initiation of operations, troops will be mounted with equipment and accompanying supplies which can be made immediately available to them upon determination and announcement of B-Day. The commanders respon-

T O P S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

sible for provision of equipment and accompanying supplies will take all possible measures to completely equip all units designated for these operations and have available in the vicinity of staging areas accompanying supplies in the quantities as indicated hereinafter.

II. RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT:

1. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, is to provide equipment and accompanying supplies and replenishment of Class II, IV and V supplies for U. S. Marine and associated Naval forces employed in these operations under the control of Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

2. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, provides accompanying air force technical supplies and air ammunition and replenishment thereof for all U. S. Army Air Forces employed in these operations except the U. S. ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE.

3. a. Commanding Generals of Armies are responsible for logistic support of all U. S. Armies and attached troops in their respective areas of occupation.

b. Army commanders organize from service forces made available to them, Army Service Commands "Six", "Eight" and "Ten", as may be appropriate, for the purpose of rendering logistic support to their commands in areas of occupation.

c. Army commanders receive supplies and materials made available to them, aboard ships, at ports in their respective areas of occupation.

4. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for:

- 2 -

TOP SECRET



TOP SECRET

a. The provision of supplies and materials required by Army commanders for the support of forces in their respective areas of occupation. He delivers to Army commanders required supplies and materials, aboard ships, in ports of areas of occupation at which point his responsibility terminates.

b. Providing to Army commanders suitable headquarters for Service Commands "Six" and "Eight", utilizing personnel and the service forces available to him, including personnel and organizations of USASCOM "C" to be released by this headquarters.

III. SUPPLY:

1. The Commanding Generals of the U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, MIDDLE PACIFIC, AND TENTH ARMY, to the extent of availability, provide supplies to accompany all Army forces employed in these operations, and mounted from their respective areas, as follows:

Classes I, II, IV (less construction materials) 30 D/S

Class III - For units arriving in objective area prior to B / 30 15 D/S

After B / 30 - Class III less MT and ADF 15 D/S

MT and ADF 5 D/S

Class IIIA - For air combat units arriving in objective areas prior to B / 30 15 D/S

For units arriving after B / 30 (Lubricants only) 15 D/S

Class V (combat troops) 3 U/F

Class V (service troops) 1 U/F

Class VA 15 D/S

Class IV construction materials: Sufficient materials, including necessary equipment to initiate required minimum construction or rehabilitation of airdromes, signal communication and

TOP SECRET

port facilities, accompanies combat echelons in Naval assault shipping. Thereafter, construction materials will be supplied in heavy shipping from Pacific bases or, if required, from the UNITED STATES.

2. Mounting-out supplies as indicated above for Marine and associated Naval forces operating under Army control are made available as directed by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

3. Resupply is by "AUTOMATIC SUPPLY" utilizing available resources and by the diversion of maintenance ships, as required, and continues until local stockages and requisitioning procedures can be established.

4. a. In the event B-Day occurs considerably prior to X-Day for operation OLYMPIC, resupply and the supply of the bulk of construction materials are by diversion of maintenance shipping from MIDDLE PACIFIC and WESTERN PACIFIC areas and special loadings therefrom until OLYMPIC shipping becomes available. Thereafter shipping set up for support of OLYMPIC is diverted in quantities necessary to meet BLACKLIST requirements.

b. In the event B-Day occurs at a time shortly preceding or immediately subsequent to X-Day, resupply and supply as indicated above are by diversion of direct shipments set up for OLYMPIC, augmented as may be required within availability, from bases in the Pacific under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

5. a. Until 1 November 1945, at which time OLYMPIC shipping becomes available, diversion of maintenance shipping for supply of forces is accomplished as follows:

- 4 -

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T

- (1) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, determines and diverts from shipping consigned to Western Pacific bases, ships required for the support of the SIXTH and EIGHTH U. S. ARMIES and attached troops.
- (2) The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES MIDDLE PACIFIC, determines and diverts from shipping consigned to Middle Pacific bases, ships required for the support of the TENTH U. S. ARMY and attached troops. These diverted ships are made available to the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC at OKINAWA or other designated points from where they are moved forward by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, as required.

b. Subsequent to 1 November, 1945, when OLYMPIC shipping becomes available, the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, assumes responsibility for diversion of all resupply shipping required for support of all U. S. Army Forces in areas of occupation.

c. The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, makes available to the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC at OKINAWA or other designated point(s) supplies of Class II, IV and V, in ships as required, for the support of Marine and associated Naval forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC.

TOP SECRET

6. a. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC is responsible for the procurement of all replenishment supplies (except air force technical supplies and Class II, IV and V supplies for Marine and associated Naval forces) for forces employed in the occupied areas under the operational control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC. He is responsible for the movement of all supplies except for Marine and associated Naval forces in ships to designated Naval convoy rendezvous points or appropriate ports.

b. The Commanding General, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, provides replenishment supplies of Class II, IV and V for Marine and associated Naval forces under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. ARMY FORCES PACIFIC to rendezvous points or appropriate ports in heavy shipping provided by him, where his responsibility terminates.

c. The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES is responsible for the procurement of replenishment supplies of all U. S. Army air force technical supplies, including air ammunition but excluding Avgas, which are moved to the occupational areas in shipping provided by the Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC.

7. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC coordinates the loading of cargo ships with appropriate commanders of all agencies responsible for loading support shipping.

8. In the occupied areas Army commanders establish, as early as practicable, the following stockages:

TOP SECRET

a. Classes I, II, III (lubricants and greases only) and IV: 15 days' reserve and 15 days' operating level.

b. Class III (except lubricants and greases): 10 days (packaged), 15 days (bulk).

c. Class IIIA: 15 days' operating level.

d. Class V: 5 U/F for combat forces and 1 U/F for service troops, including ammunition in hands of troops.

e. Class VA: 15 days' operating level.

9. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC, is responsible for the procurement and movement to ports of occupied areas, food, medical supplies, and other items for the relief of Allied Prisoners of War, liberated nationals of United Nations, and the civilian population, phasing deliveries as indicated in "Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, BLACKLIST Operations" (to follow).

IV. EVACUATION:

1. Evacuation from occupied areas is by hospital ships and aircraft. Evacuation from the occupied areas direct to the UNITED STATES is initiated at the earliest practicable date.

2. Responsibility for evacuation is as follows:

By water: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET.

By air : The Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES.

To ports, air strips, and hospitals in the occupied areas: Army commanders.

3. Geneva-protected hospital ships, operating under the control of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. PACIFIC FLEET, are available for evacuation from the occupied areas.

TOP SECRET

4. This headquarters arranges for evacuation of patients to the UNITED STATES by U. S. Army Air Transport Command.

5. Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and liberated nationals of United Nations is to destinations as later determined. Transportation for this personnel will be by commercial shipping or appropriate transports following release from amphibious operations, and by hospital ships where necessary. (See Annex 5 f, Basic Plan, Care and Evacuation of Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees)

6. Evacuation of enemy prisoners of war from occupied areas is by direction of this headquarters only.

7. Japanese civilian casualties are not evacuated from the occupied areas.

8. Salvageable materiel is not evacuated from the occupied areas. Repairable materiel is reconditioned in the areas and returned to stocks or combat organizations. Captured materiel, surplus to the needs of combat forces and military government agencies, is assembled and held for later disposition as directed by this headquarters.

V. HOSPITALIZATION:

1. During the early phases of operations and prior to the establishment of fixed hospitals in the occupied areas, minor casualties are hospitalized in mobile-type hospitals assigned to the combat forces. Casualties not returnable to duty within 30 days during the period from landing date to plus 30 are evacuated to hospitals at rear bases where bed credits are established. Thereafter, hospitalization is in hospitals as they become estab-

TOP SECRET

lished in the occupied areas.

2. In order to reduce evacuation from occupied areas, fixed-type hospital units, station and general hospitals, designated for this operation are established in areas in accordance with prescribed phasing. Fixed-bed type hospital units will be established in occupied areas, based on four per cent of forces employed in each area. Initially these units function in existing buildings or under canvas, with essential prefabricated buildings. Construction of prefabricated buildings (temperate-climate type) for 100 per cent of total hospital beds not operating in existing buildings is completed at the earliest possible date.

3. The maximum use, consistent with the minimum needs of the civilian population, is made of existing civilian hospitals and other suitable buildings for hospitalization of patients.

VI. TRANSPORTATION:

1. Naval assault craft is used for transportation of combat and supporting service elements forward from mounting areas and for the movement of follow-up forces, succeeding task forces, and base and garrison units, including organizational equipment and accompanying supplies. Maintenance supplies are transported forward in heavy shipping.

2. The Commanding General, U. S. ARMY FORCES WESTERN PACIFIC moves shipping forward to ports in occupied areas as requested by Army commanders.

3. Estimates of troops, equipment, and cargo, including maintenance and construction materials, and supplies for Military

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Government agencies to be moved to occupied areas are shown in appendices to follow.

4. Railways and rolling stock required for military use and control of civilian population in occupied areas, that can be rapidly rehabilitated without the introduction of major railway equipment tonnages, are so repaired.

VII. CONSTRUCTION:

1. Construction is limited to the provision of minimum essential operational facilities which can not be established in existing buildings and facilities.

2. Army commanders employing appropriate service forces made available to them make minimum necessary repair of port, base, signal communication and air facilities, and construct hospitalization in occupied areas. Emphasis is placed on the restoration of required port facilities to operative condition and the provision of hospitalization at the earliest possible date.

3. Bulk petroleum storage and distribution systems normally are not constructed but will be limited to the use of existing facilities, repaired as needed to meet military requirements, and augmented as may be necessary, with barges and tankers with shore connections. Necessary distribution lines will be installed, with tankage, to distribute Avgas to operating air strips.

4. Appendices setting forth details of base facilities to be established in occupied areas are to follow.



TOP SECRET

VIII. SHIPPING DESIGNATORS:

<u>Port</u>	<u>Shipping Designator</u>
FUSAN	To be announced later
JINSEN	To be announced later
NAGASAKI	HARK
NAGOYA	EARN
OMINATO	BUNK
OSAKA	CLUB
OTARU	OBEY
OTOMARI	DUPE
SEISHIN	To be announced later
TOKYO	BULL
YANLTA	LACE
YOKOHAMA	EVIL

IX. MISCELLANEOUS:

1. Maximum use is made of available local installations, civilian labor and disarmed Japanese military personnel. Civilian labor will be obtained and employed through agencies and under regulations as proscribed by Military Government agencies in the occupied areas.

2. Appendix A, "AIR DROPPING OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIAN INTERNEES OF UNITED NATIONS" sets forth details of air dropping of emergency supplies and clothing to Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees of United Nations held in known Japanese Camps.

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T

A N N E X 5a  
Communication Plan  
"BLACKLIST"

1. DIRECTIVE:

This plan covers the signal communications for operations of United States Army and attached forces under CINCAFPAC control, subsequent to sudden collapse or surrender of the Japanese Government or High Command, to occupy JAPAN Proper and KOREA, establish control of armed forces and the civil population, and impose thereon those prescribed terms of unconditional surrender that require immediate military action.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. (1) That normal command, administrative, and liaison communications will be functioning between the communications zones of CINCAFPAC and CINCPAC, and to headquarters of theaters and major supporting forces not directly participating in "BLACKLIST".

(2) That normal signal communications systems required for cooperative action between CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, and the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE will be functioning throughout "BLACKLIST".

b. That in the initial stages of the operation the following headquarters will be established and operating as follows:

CINCAFPAC - MANILA

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

CINCPAC - GUAM

UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE - GUAM

14TH AIR FORCE - KUNMING

7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING -  
MANILA (as announced)

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

SIXTH U. S. ARMY - LUZON

Advance Echelon-OSAKA

EIGHTH U. S. ARMY - LEYTE

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

TENTH U. S. ARMY - OKINAWA

Advance Echelon - KEIJO, KOREA

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - MANILA

Advance Echelon - TOKYO

ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC - MANILA

ARMY FORCES, MIDDLE PACIFIC, HONOLULU

- c. (1) That Naval Forces will install, operate, and maintain all naval communication facilities unless otherwise directed.
- (2) CINCPAC will install, operate, and maintain at Advance CINCAFPAC in the objective area, the signal communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between the Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, and the appropriate headquarters and elements of CINCPAC.
- (3) That CINCPAC will provide such signal communication facilities and personnel at Advance Headquarters of CINCAFPAC in the objective area, as may be required to keep CINCAFPAC promptly informed of all matters affecting the progress of the naval phases of the operations.

d. That existing signal communication facilities in the objective area will be so disrupted by aerial bombardment and sabotage activities that it will be necessary to provide the necessary signal communication equipment, supplies, construction material, and troops to accomplish the missions

T O P S E C R E T

described by paragraph 3c (1)(b) of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.

e. That plans will be completed under the provisions of paragraph 3b (1) of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex whereby adequate communications for cooperative action between all forces will be assured.

f. That the 7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING will establish such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required in the objective areas.

g. The UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE will provide the signal supplies, equipment, and personnel required for UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE purposes in the "BLACKLIST" area.

3. OPERATIONS:

a. General:

(1) In general, signal communication facilities for "BLACKLIST" provide channels of communication between Headquarters, CINCAFPAC, CINCPAC, UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, USAFWESPAC, USAFMIDPAC, and the designated elements of the initial occupational forces.

(2) Safehand air courier service is provided to areas as designated.

b. SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and USAFWESPAC install, operate, and maintain the communication facilities required for the reception and transmission of orders, information, and intelligence between their respective headquarters and Headquarters, CINCAFPAC and Advance Echelons thereof, wherever located.

T O P S E C R E T

c. Tasks:

(1) The several Army Commanders insure the provision of signal communication facilities required to accomplish the tasks assigned to them in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex, and in addition, within their respective areas:

- (a) Insure the provision of an integrated inter-communication system between Air, Ground, and Naval Forces in the objective areas for such intelligence, supply point, liaison, line of communication, defense, fighter control, and aircraft warning purposes as may be necessary.
- (b) Assist the Commanding Officer, 7TH ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM WING in the establishment of such ARMY AIRWAYS COMMUNICATION facilities and radio and radar navigational aids as may be required by the FAR EAST AIR FORCES.
- (c) Provide communications as required for the operation of so much of the railway system as may be required for operational and supply purposes, both civil and military.
- (d) Be prepared to render the Naval Forces necessary assistance in the initial establishment of naval communications therein.
- (e) Insure the provision of such signal communication services as may be required for Military Government purposes.

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

(2) FAR EAST AIR FORCES:

(a) Provides the signal communications, aircraft warning services and air navigational facilities required for:

1. Accomplishment of the tasks assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.
2. Air operational intelligence, air command, and liaison purposes with the UNITED STATES ARMY STRATEGIC AIR FORCE, 14TH AIR FORCE, and air units of CINCPAC.
3. Air Force purposes in the cooperative action between land-based and carrier-based aircraft, and between other elements of the Air Forces of CINCAFPAC and the Air and Naval Forces of CINCPAC.

(b) Provide maximum possible assistance to the several Army Commanders in their respective areas of control, in the construction of airdrome communication facilities to insure the rapid accomplishment of missions assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.

(3) U. S. ARMY FORCES, WESTERN PACIFIC:

Provide the signal communication facilities required for the tasks assigned in the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex, and in addition, those required:

(a) For a mobile communication system to

T O P S E C R E T

serve the Advance Headquarters, CINCAPFAC.

(b) By the Regulating System, Headquarters, CINCAFPAC, for the movement of shipping from UNITED STATES, PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS, PHILIPPINES, and AUSTRALASIAN bases.

(c) For assisting the several Army Commanders in the establishment of such communication services as may be required for Military Government purposes.

4. LOGISTICS:

a. Signal supply, in general, is from the UNITED STATES and supply establishments in the objective area augmented as practicable from MIDPAC and WESPAC.

b. WESPAC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material required for "BLACKLIST".

c. MIDPAC provides the signal supplies, equipment, and construction material required to accomplish the missions assigned in paragraph 3b (3)(a)6 of the Basic Outline Plan to which this is an Annex.

d. FAR EAST AIR FORCES provides the signal supplies and equipment for FAR EAST AIR FORCES technical purposes in accordance with existing directives.

5. PLANS:

a. SIXTH U. S. ARMY, EIGHTH U. S. ARMY, TENTH U. S. ARMY, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, and USAFWESPAC prepare and submit to CINCAFPAC communications plans and requests for signal supplies, equipment, and personnel to accomplish the tasks enumerated in paragraph 3c above, on or prior to dates specified in relevant instructions from this headquarters.

b. Central Bureau and Section 22 submit their respective plans for radio intelligence, and radio and radar countermeasures to CINCAFPAC by dates as specified by the Chief

T O P S E C R E T

Signal Officer.

c. Plans and directives for coordination of radio frequencies and call signs among forces concerned will be issued by this headquarters at an appropriate time.


6. APPENDIX: For diagram of principal channels of signal communication, see Appendix 6, attached hereto.

T O P S E C R E T




O ——— O ——— NAVY  
 I ——— I ——— AIR  
 ——— ARMY  
 - - - - - PRESS, BROADCAST & PHOTO

Appendix 6 to ARREG 5A  
 "BLACKLIST"  
 PRINCIPAL CHANNELS OF  
 SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS



DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority NND 975029



T O P S E C R E T

ANNEX 5 b

"BLACKLIST"

Assumed Terms  
of Surrender

<u>DIGEST OF ASSUMED TERMS OF SURRENDER</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
1. General	(1)
2. Application of Surrender Terms	(1)
3. Summary of Surrender Terms	(2-12)
a. Instruments of Surrender	(2)
b. Orders and Proclamations	(3-12)
4. Enforcement of Surrender Terms	(13)

APPENDIX 4 - ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER TERMS

1. General	1
2. Authority to order use of Sanctions and Reprisals	2
3. Employment of Punitive Measures	2-4

T O P S E C R E T

T O P S E C R E T

ANNEX 5 b

"BLACKLIST"

Assumed Terms  
of Surrender

1. General.

This Annex contains certain assumed terms of surrender relative to military matters which require immediate post-surrender action by Occupation Forces. These terms follow drafts submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff 15 February 1945 by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee and which, insofar as is known, remain in a tentative status. Minor amendments to these drafts have been made to conform to the command structure subsequently established in the Pacific by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It may not be assumed that this Annex represents the final form of the included documents in event formal surrender occurs. It may be anticipated that terms imposed upon the Japanese will conform in principal thereto.

Political, economic, financial and military government matters will be subsequently covered as necessary basic policies are determined.

2. Application of Surrender Terms.

Operation "BLACKLIST" may be put into effect either as a result of formal surrender of the Imperial Japanese Government or High Command or alternatively, on the decision of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific for areas in which hostile armed forces have either capitulated or been overpowered.

a. In event of formal surrender the Instrument of Surrender will be most general in nature and cover only the essentials of surrender. It will be necessary to issue further detailed orders and instructions to the Japanese authorities regarding numerous matters upon which they will be required to take action immediately after they have signed the Instrument of Surrender. These instructions take the form of Proclamations, General and Special Orders by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

T O P   S E C R E T

b. In event of there being no formal surrender, or that local surrenders or capitulations occur prior to formal surrender, the objectives outlined in the "BLACKLIST" Plan are accomplished as rapidly as the situation permits. In this case, Orders and Instructions by the various echelons of command conform to the following policies:

- (1) Orders are clearly and expressly limited to immediate military objectives.
- (2) No commitments of any kind are made by United States or attached forces.
- (3) Orders are expressly subject to any general Instrument of Surrender which may be later imposed.
- (4) All orders are given some title which emphasizes their purely local character.

Within these limits the orders issued by Army or subordinate Commanders are based upon drafts contained in this Annex, omitting such parts as are obviously inapplicable.

c. Sanctions and reprisals which may be used in enforcement of terms of surrender are outlined in Appendix 4, hereto, Enforcement of Surrender Terms.

3. Summary of Surrender Terms.

a. Instruments of Surrender.

The basic Instrument of surrender and accompanying Imperial Rescripts will in all probability consist of acknowledgement by the Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command of the total defeat of the Japanese armed forces and the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces and people. The Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command undertake to cause all Japanese armed forces wherever situated, and the Japanese people, to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all requirements imposed by the Commanders of the United Nations forces occupying the various areas concerned. All Japanese civil and military officials are directed to obey and enforce such requirements, and to remain at their posts and continue to perform their duties until relieved by the Commander of the Occupying Forces concerned.

T O P S E C R E T

b. Orders and Proclamations

- (1) An initial proclamation by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific to the people of JAPAN Proper, the RYUKYUS, KOREA (and other areas of AFPAC responsibility as assigned) will cover the following points:
- (a) The fact that the Emperor of JAPAN and the Japanese Imperial High Command have acknowledged the defeat of all Japanese armed forces on land, sea and in the air and have surrendered unconditionally.
  - (b) That the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific assumes supreme legislative, executive and judicial power and authority within KOREA, JAPAN Proper to include adjacent off-shore islands, KARAFUTO and TSUSHIMA ISLAND, the RYUKYUS (and other areas of responsibility as assigned).
  - (c) That all civil and military officials in the above areas shall remain at their posts until further notice and continue to perform, under his authority, their normal official functions.
  - (d) That all Japanese officials, other Japanese, and persons of other nationalities resident in occupied territories shall comply with all proclamations, orders or other instructions issued or to be issued under authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  - (e) That all civil police shall continue their normal function and will be held personally responsible for the maintenance of law and order in their respective districts. That they shall not, however, interfere in any way with the personnel of the Occupying Forces. That all employees of public utilities and services shall remain at their posts and continue to perform

T O P S E C R E T

TOP SECRET

their duties unless otherwise directed by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

- (f) That the peoples of occupied territories are directed to carry on their usual occupations and peaceful pursuits subject to such controls as may be imposed by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
  - (g) That both authorities and people are directed to abstain from all acts detrimental to the interests of the nations at war with JAPAN, the maintenance of public order and orderly administration, and to the security and welfare of the Occupying Forces and the agencies of the nations at war with JAPAN.
  - (h) That any organization or individual failing to render full cooperation with the Occupying Forces, or failing to comply fully with any proclamations, orders or other instructions that may be issued as above provided, will be promptly and severely punished.
  - (i) That Commanders of Armies of the United States assigned territorial jurisdiction by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, have power to issue Orders, Proclamations and Instructions by authority of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, covering the above matters, and shall have power to delegate such authority to their subordinates as they may deem appropriate.
- (2) A General Order covering implementation of the surrender of military and naval forces will include the following provisions relating to Japanese forces wherever located.

TOP SECRET

T O P S E C R E T

In implementation of these provisions by Japanese Forces located outside areas of AFPAC responsibility, it is assumed that the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific will be designated to coordinate and to enforce upon the Japanese Imperial High Command insofar as its own action is concerned, the demands of the various Allied Commanders concerned.

- (a) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall retain all forces in their current positions, pending instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
- (b) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall disarm immediately and completely all armed forces wherever they may be situated, ~~and~~ shall deliver intact and in good condition all weapons and equipment at such times and at such places as may be designated by Commanders of the respective Occupying Forces. Pending further instructions, the civil police will be exempt from these provisions. They shall remain at their posts and shall be held responsible for maintenance of law and order in districts where located. The strength and arms of such police forces will be prescribed by Commanders of the respective Occupying Forces.
- (c) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall, within 48 hours of the time of receipt of the order, furnish the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific complete information as follows:

T O P   S E C R E T

1. Lists of all land, air and antiaircraft units, showing locations and strengths, officers and men.
2. Lists of all aircraft (military, naval and civilian), giving complete information as to number, type, locations and condition of such aircraft.
3. Lists of all Japanese and Japanese-controlled naval vessels (surface and submarine) and auxiliaries, in or out of commission and under construction, giving their position, condition and movement.
4. Lists of all Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, in or out of commission and under construction, including ships acquired after 7 December 1941 from non-Japanese sources, giving their position, condition and movement.
5. Complete and detailed information, accompanied by maps, showing locations and layout of all mines, mine fields, and other obstacles to movement by land, sea or air, and the safety lanes in connection therewith.
6. Locations and descriptions of all military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, antiaircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
7. Locations of all camps and other places of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees and the numbers of persons detained in each.



TOP SECRET

- (d) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall direct at once all Japanese aircraft (military, naval and civilian) to remain on the ground, on the water or on board ship, and that the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be held responsible that these aircraft so remain until disposition is made of them by the Commanders, Occupying Forces of the area where located.
- (e) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be held responsible for the following:
1. All ammunition, warheads, torpedoes, bombs, depth charges and other explosive material on board Japanese naval vessels at sea, shall be rendered harmless and thrown overboard 48 hours after receipt of this Order. In the case of vessels not at sea, it shall be discharged and placed in safe storage ashore within the same time limits.
  2. There shall be no movement of Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval vessels in ports or harbors at time of surrender, except at the direction of or with the express approval of the Commander, Occupying Forces of the area where located.
  3. All Japanese or Japanese-controlled naval vessels which are at sea shall be prepared to put into specific ports or proceed to rendezvous according to schedules and in the manner prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Forces of the Allied Nations exercising strategic jurisdiction over waters where located at time of the surrender of the Japanese Government.

T O P S E C R E T

4. All naval vessels formerly belonging to any of the United Nations at war with JAPAN which are in Japanese hands shall be returned to their former owners in good condition at times and to ports specified by instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
5. All Japanese and Japanese-controlled merchant ships of over 100 gross tons, including merchant ships formerly belonging to any of the nations at war with JAPAN, which are now in Japanese hands, shall be prepared to proceed on dates and to ports specified in instructions from the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.
6. No damage to or destruction of the vessels and ships described in this Section, or to port facilities and material shall be permitted.

(f) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall be responsible for the following:

1. All Japanese mines, minefields and other obstacles to movement by land, sea and air, wherever located, shall be removed within fourteen (14) days from the receipt of the order.
2. All aids to navigation shall be re-established at once.
3. All safety lanes shall be kept open and clearly marked pending accomplishment of 1. above.

(g) That the Japanese Imperial High Command shall:

1. Cause to be held intact and in good condition, and subject to disposition by the Commander, Occupying Forces, of the area where located:

T O P   S E C R E T

- a. All arms, ammunition, explosives, military equipment, stores and supplies, and other implements of war of all kinds and all other war material (except as specifically prescribed in sub-paragraph (b) above).
  - b. All transportation and communication facilities and equipment, by land, water, or air.
  - c. All military installations and establishments, including airfields, seaplane bases, anti-aircraft defenses, ports and naval bases, storage depots, permanent and temporary land and coast fortifications, fortresses and other fortified areas, together with plans and drawings of all such fortifications, installations and establishments.
  - d. All factories, plants, shops, research institutions, laboratories, testing stations, technical data, patents, plans, drawings and inventions designed or intended to produce or to facilitate the production or use of all implements of war and other material and property used by or intended for use by military or para-military organizations in connection with their operations.
2. Furnish the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, within fourteen (14) days after receipt of order, complete lists of all the items specified in paragraphs 1., a., b. and d. of this Section, indicating the numbers, type and location of each.

TOP SECRET

3. Furnish at the demand of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, the labor, services and facilities required for the maintenance or operation of any of the facilities and equipment mentioned in sub-paragraph 1 of this Section, as well as any information or records that may be required in connection therewith.
4. Cease forthwith the manufacture, import or export of arms, ammunition and implements of war.
5. Dismantle and destroy, subject to such priorities and in accordance with instructions prescribed by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, such installations and establishments described in sub-paragraph 1. c. of this Section, as may be designated by him.

(h) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and appropriate Japanese officials shall:

1. Accept full responsibility for the safety and well-being of all United Nations prisoners of war and Civilian internees, and maintain the essential administrative, supply and other services for such prisoners of war and civilian internees, including the provision of adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care, until otherwise locally directed by the Commander, Occupying Forces of the area where located.
2. Deliver each camp or other place of detention of United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees, together with its equipment, stores, records, arms and ammunition, to the command of the local United Nations camp leader, senior

T O P S E C R E T

officer or designated representative of the prisoners of war and civilian internees concerned.

3. Incarcerate without delay and report to the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, all personnel of Japanese nationality who have been employed as guards, wardens, examiners or administrators at Prisoner of War or Civilian Internment Camps since 7 December 1941 at which United Nations personnel have been held.
4. Furnish, within fourteen (14) days of receipt of order, complete lists of all United Nations prisoners of war and civilian internees indicating their location.

(i) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and appropriate Japanese officials shall:

1. Aid and facilitate the occupation of such places, areas, or regions or parts of the Japanese Empire and areas occupied by Japanese forces as may be designated.
2. Prohibit and prevent forthwith the development, manufacture, importation and exportation of arms, ammunition and implements of war.
3. Cause the delivery of all arms in the possession of the civilian population (in areas of AFPAC responsibility) to Commanders designated by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific.

(j) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and the appropriate Japanese officials are informed that, wherever reference is made to all Japanese land, sea and air establishments, equipment and personnel, such reference shall include those which are Japanese or Japanese-controlled, wherever they may be found.

(k) That the Japanese Imperial High Command and all Japanese officials are warned that drastic penalties will be inflicted immediately in the event of:

T O P   S E C R E T

1. Any delay or failure to comply with any of the above provisions.
2. Any delay or failure to carry out completely such additional requirements as a Commander, Occupying Forces, may prescribe within his designated area of responsibility.
3. Any action which, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, might be detrimental to the nations at war with JAPAN, or any one of them.

- (3) General orders issued at appropriate times by designated Commanders of Occupying Forces in the several areas in which Japanese forces are located, will provide for evacuation of Japanese armed forces personnel and their civilian auxiliaries to JAPAN Proper. These orders will provide that such movements of personnel will conform to schedules established by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or his designated successor. They will prohibit and prevent:
- (a) The forced evacuation of any non-Japanese inhabitants.
  - (b) The harming of such inhabitants or damage to their property.
  - (c) The removal of animals, stores of food, forage, fuel or other provisions or commodities.
  - (d) Pillage, looting and other unauthorized destruction of any kind.

Such personnel evacuated will abandon on the spot and intact all port material, material for inland waterways (including tugs and lighters), barracks and quarters and other property not required for maintenance of personnel during sea passage.

The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, or his designated successor, will demobilize such personnel upon their arrival within JAPAN Proper subject to such exceptions as he may deem necessary.

TOP SECRET

4. Enforcement of Surrender Terms.

(See APPENDIX 4, ANNEX 5 b, ENFORCEMENT OF SURRENDER  
TERMS, attached hereto.)

T O P S E C R E T

Appendix 4  
ANNEX 5b

"BLACKLIST"  
ENFORCEMENT  
OF  
SURRENDER TERMS

1. GENERAL.

a. It is probable that there will be resistance in some form or another to the terms of surrender and to the orders, ordinances and bans given by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. Under these circumstances, it may be necessary to impose certain sanctions or to employ reprisals. These are imposed in accordance with the provisions of FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare.

b. Definitions.

(1) Sanctions.

The Instrument of Surrender will provide for an immediate cessation of hostilities and for compliance on the part of the enemy with the regulations, orders, bans and ordinances promulgated by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. The measures which may be taken to enforce these terms are properly described as sanctions. They include:

(a) The judicial and disciplinary measures vested in the commander of an occupying force in time of war by international law. Such measures are employed to discipline individuals in unorganized evasion of the terms of surrender and/or disobedience to the orders, ordinances and bans published by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. The application of these means is normally a function of Military Government officials. (See Basic Plan for Institution of Military Government, "BLACKLIST" Operations).

T O P S E C R E T



T O P S E C R E T

(b) Such exceptional military measures as may be necessary in the event of continuous and widespread evasion of the surrender terms and/or disobedience to such further orders, ordinances and bans as may be published by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. These measures are employed to punish small groups (military or civilian) of independently organized evaders of the surrender terms and violators of the orders, ordinances and bans promulgated by or on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. Application of these measures should be given wide publicity as a deterrent to other potential offenders. Such sanctions are not to be confused with standard military measures employed in the large scale reduction of an organized hostile military force.

(2) Reprisals.

Should no surrender take place or organized resistance be continued by elements of the Japanese armed forces or by civilians, the Occupying Forces may be compelled to enforce compliance with the rules of war on the part of such military personnel or civilians. Acts done for this purpose are properly termed reprisals; they are normally illegal and may only be resorted to in the event of the commission by the enemy of illegal acts of warfare.

2. AUTHORITY TO ORDER USE OF SANCTIONS AND REPRISALS.

Except as limited herein and by paragraphs 3c(1) and (2) and 3c(1), below, Army Commanders, respectively, within their assigned areas of responsibility, have authority to order the use of sanctions and

T O P S E C R E T

reprisals as appropriate, subject to such limitations as may be subsequently imposed by Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific. They may delegate their authority in this matter within prescribed limits to insure the timely application of such measures. Neither reprisals nor sanctions, apart from judicial or disciplinary measures, may be employed except as a last resort when all other efforts to enforce the terms of surrender or compliance with the Laws of War have failed. In no case are reprisals taken against prisoners of war.

3. EMPLOYMENT OF GROUP SANCTIONS AND REPRISALS.

a. Forced Evacuation of Communities.

In cases of recurrent sniping or similar action against the security of the forces of occupation, of such character that specific offenders cannot be identified and organized community participation of some sort is apparently involved, evacuation of all or part of the city, town or village in which the hostile action **occurred** may be enforced as deemed necessary to make such action effective.

b. Destruction of Communities.

If the measures described in subparagraph a, above, prove ineffective or should their implementation involve a disproportionate danger to the forces of occupation, the destruction of all or part of a city, town or village may be resorted to either by bombing, or by artillery fire, or by burning. An operation of this type should not be resorted to unless sufficient notice has first been given to the inhabitants to permit their prompt evacuation of the area. The use of bombing is discussed in paragraph c, below.

c. Bombing.

Conditions may arise where serious or widespread hostile acts are being committed by hostile elements. Under such circumstances, bombing or other forms of air action may be employed as a military measure, subject to the following conditions:

T O P S E C R E T

- (1) The decision to resort to air action rests with the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific.
- (2) If, in the opinion of an Army Commander, security of elements of the Occupation Forces requires such action (within the capacity of the Air Forces within his area) in such haste as to preclude reference to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces Pacific, he directs such action and air elements involved comply. Full reports of this action are made to Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and Commanding General, FAR EAST AIR FORCES, respectively, by the most expeditious means. The Army Commander does not subdelegate such responsibility for air action.
- (3) The following principles govern the use of air action within the capacity of the occupying air forces:
  - (a) Immediate application of the attack as soon as the requirement arises.
  - (b) The continuation of the attack at high intensity until the object has been achieved.
  - (c) Disregard of danger to civilian property which may be incidental to air action against a military target in the vicinity.
  - (d) Extensive publicity on air action which has been taken, as a deterrent to other offenders.
  - (e) Confinement of air action to the area in which hostile acts are being committed.

d. Destruction of Private Property.

Private property which has been illegally used for sniping or other hostile action may be destroyed if such action is considered necessary for the security of the Occupation Forces or as a deterrent to the enemy.

TOP SECRET

e. Hostages.

- (1) Hostages may be taken as a further means of enforcing group or community obedience to terms of surrender or compliance with the Laws of War. The taking of hostages is in no case resorted to without the authority of the **Army** Commander concerned. Such authority is not subdelegated. The execution of hostages is not regarded with favor and requires the specific authority of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. **Army** Forces, Pacific, in each case.
- (2) One of the applications of the use of hostages after initial occupation of the area is to force them to accompany military parties into buildings or areas which, after being cleared or inspected, are suspected of having been subsequently illegally mined or booby-trapped; or to compel them to ride on trains or other forms of transportation liable to be damaged by illegal acts of sabotage in occupied territory.
- (3) In the event authority for taking hostages is granted, they are selected in an equitable manner and notification of such selection given to the community. This notification contains an announcement as to the proposed use of the hostages involved, and a statement that the consequences of any illegal acts will fall upon such hostages.

TOP SECRET

ANNEX 5 c

"BLACKLIST"

BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL  
OF THE  
ARMED FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES  
OF THE ENEMY

CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
1 OBJECTIVES	1
2 CONCEPT	1-3
3 COMMAND AND CONTROL	3-4
4 TASKS	5-7
5 ADDITIONAL MEASURES	7-8
6 APPENDICES	8
a. INITIAL DISPOSITION OF JAPANESE WAR MATERIAL.	
b. OUTLINE PLAN FOR DEMOBILIZATION OF JAPANESE ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL.	

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ANNEX 5 c  
"BLACKLIST"

BASIC PLAN FOR ESTABLISHMENT OF CONTROL OF THE ARMED  
FORCES AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE ENEMY

1. OBJECTIVES.

a. Establishment of control of the armed forces and military resources of the enemy constitutes a first charge on the resources of Army Commanders within their assigned areas of responsibility in order that:

- (1) Continuation of hostilities by organized elements of the armed forces of JAPAN is prevented and their **renewal** rendered impossible.
- (2) The Occupying Forces, Allied Prisoners of War and Civilian Internees, and the interests of Nations at war with JAPAN, are safeguarded.
- (3) Law and order are maintained and conditions created which facilitate both the establishment of the Post-Hostilities Military Government and Army of Occupation, and the transfer of the responsibilities of Army Commanders thereto.

b. The terms "armed forces of JAPAN" and "Japanese armed forces" as employed herein include all Japanese and Japanese-controlled Army and Naval Forces (in areas of AFPAC responsibility) including their respective Air Forces and auxiliaries, and quasi-military organizations.

2. CONCEPT.

a. The provisions of this annex apply under conditions of surrender or submission of Japanese armed forces with their command and logistic organizations more or less in a functioning condition. Operations to induce surrender or submission on the part of major organized elements of the hostile armed forces constitute a continuation

T O P S E C R E T

of the war and are conducted on that basis. On the other hand, the disarmament and handling of unorganized masses of stragglers are conducted under normal prisoner of war procedures until demobilization as covered herein, is instituted.

b. Activities to establish control of armed forces which have surrendered or submitted are conducted by Army Commanders in and from the areas occupied in Phases I, II and III, as outlined in the Text of this Plan. Army Commanders take such measures as they may deem necessary to accomplish the objectives enumerated in paragraph (1) above, subject to such instructions and controls as may be from time to time specified by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific. In so doing, they exercise within their assigned areas of responsibility, the powers and rights vested in the Commander of an Occupying Force in time of war by international law as outlined in FM 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare.

c. In the establishment of control and subsequent demobilization of the Japanese armed forces, the existing Japanese command structure is perpetuated under strict U.S. control for such period as may be convenient to accomplish the objectives of demobilization. The Commander-in-Chief, United States Army Forces, Pacific, exercises direct control of Japanese Imperial Headquarters and provides for its abolishment at the earliest practicable date consistent with its employment to facilitate general demobilization. Army Commanders control and dispose of command echelons on the Army Group and comparable level for Japanese armed forces within their respective areas of responsibility. Control and disposition of subordinate headquarters may be sub-delegated by Army Commanders as is appropriate.

d. Army Commanders, in general, require the Japanese to disarm their own forces, segregate and secure equipment and supplies and maintain discipline within their armed forces personnel. They require civil police and guards to safeguard munitions plants and stocks of munitions and raw materials not yet under Armed Forces control. They selectively demobilize armed forces personnel. Upon reversion of

T O P S E C R E T

armed forces personnel to a civilian status they become the responsibility of the Military Government structure operating under Army control.

3. COMMAND AND CONTROL.

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC. - Command of Occupation Forces in assigned areas.

Relations with the Japanese Government and Imperial Headquarters.

Relations with agencies outside areas of assigned responsibility.

SIXTH ARMY )  
TENTH ARMY ) - Control and disposition of enemy armed forces.

EIGHTH ARMY )  
Control of military establishments, industrial plants and stock piles of equipment, supplies and raw materials as necessary pending final disposition.  
Military government of the civil population.  
Arrangements with the United States Navy for disposition of naval vessels, establishments, equipment and supplies as directed by CINCAFPAC.

FAR EAST AIR FORCES - Land-based air support as requested by Army Commanders, subject to such limitations as may be established by CINCAFPAC.



TOP SECRET

UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
WESTERN PACIFIC

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF UNITED STATES  
PACIFIC FLEET (As arranged with  
CINCPAC)

- Seizure, care and disposition of Japanese Army and Navy Air Force equipment, supplies and installations as requested by Army Commanders.
- Logistic support of occupation forces.  
Disposition of captured Japanese war material as requested by Army Commanders.  
Minimum necessary logistic support of Japanese Armed Forces personnel upon request of Army Commanders.
- Naval support of punitive operations, details as arranged with Army Commanders.  
Naval control of coastwise traffic, details as arranged with Army Commanders.  
Care and disposition of captured Japanese naval vessels, equipment and supplies.  
Investigation, care and disposition of occupied Japanese Naval shore establishments.

T O P S E C R E T

4. TASKS.

a. General Tasks.

- (1) Summarily immobilize and disarm the Japanese armed forces.
- (2) Seize, collect, inventory, maintain and safeguard and/or dispose of Japanese military and naval material, equipment, supplies and records not essential to the maintenance, administrative and subsistence requirements of the Japanese Armed Forces maintained in being.
- (3) Promptly destroy or scrap all enemy military equipment not suitable for peacetime civilian use, with the following specific exceptions:
  - (a) Items of military equipment, newly developed which are desired for examination or research.
  - (b) Equipment Army Commanders require for operational needs.
- (4) Retain enemy equipment not essentially or exclusively for use in war which is suitable for peacetime civilian use, for:
  - (a) The maintenance and subsistence of the occupation forces, Allied prisoners of war and civilian nationals of the United Nations.
  - (b) The relief of the local civil population to the extent necessary to prevent or alleviate epidemic or serious disease and serious unrest or disorder which would endanger the occupying forces and the objectives of occupation.
- (5) Maintain a record of the location, type, quantity, condition and disposition of all enemy equipment:
  - (a) Seized and retained, and
  - (b) Seized and destroyed.

T O P S E C R E T

- (6) Take all practicable measures to prevent the use of aircraft as a means of escape of individuals or evacuation of property.
- (7) Destroy all military and civil aircraft and aircraft replacement parts, components and equipment including armament, bombs and missiles except those items which Army Commanders believe merit special examination and which they may order secured for such examination.
- (8) Selectively segregate, detain and/or demobilize Japanese armed forces and/or individuals as rendered desirable by considerations of security, apprehension of war criminals, demands for rehabilitation of communications and housing, and the maintenance of a minimum subsistence level for the population.
- (9) Pending instructions relative to final disposition, render inoperative but preserve Japanese and Japanese controlled war industries and their stocks of unfinished and raw materials.
- (10) Re-establish and maintain overland and sea communications essential for the operation of Occupation Forces.
- (11) Suspend the operation of all Japanese military laws, ordinances, regulations and practices inimical to the safety of the Occupying Forces and Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, and to the interests of Nations at war with JAPAN.
- (12) Apprehend and detain for subsequent disposition, all designated and suspected war criminals.
- (13) Require the maintenance of discipline among personnel of the Japanese armed forces, imposing such punishment to this end as may be permitted by the Rules of

TOP SECRET

Land Warfare.

b. In accomplishment of the tasks enumerated in 4 a, above, the Army Commander may require commanders and personnel of the Japanese armed forces, in accordance with Surrender terms, to:

- (1) Comply with requirements of the Occupation Forces, and to remain at their posts and continue to perform their normal duties under his authority until relieved by him.
- (2) Carry out such tasks as he may assign, including formulation and implementation of such plans and orders as may be required to insure accomplishment.
- (3) Submit all orders, regulations, ordinances, etc., to him for approval prior to dissemination.
- (4) Prohibit, abstain from and prevent the promulgation of any orders or any activities inimical to the Occupation Forces, Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees, and Nations at war with Japan; including destruction, removal or concealment of military and naval personnel, documents, materials, and equipment.
- (5) Disseminate and enforce as directed, the proclamations, orders, ordinances and other instructions of the Army Commander or his designated representative through appropriate echelons of their commands.
- (6) Maintain discipline within the Japanese armed forces.
- (7) Deliver to designated representatives of the Army Commander prescribed arms, military materials equipment, supplies and records in the possession of or under the control of Japanese armed forces. Pending delivery, remove from the hands of troops, segregate, render harmless, preserve in operative condition and secure such arms, materials and equipment.