

6 February 1948

Re: KOISO Affidavit, Defense Document No. 3066 - Objections  
by Prosecution

The Prosecution objects to this affidavit on the ground that it is repetitive, argumentative, and not in reply to any new evidence introduced in its rebuttal phase. We object specifically to the following parts of the affidavit:

1. To the entire Section 1, pages 1 to 3 of the document, in which the witness discusses his relationship with HARADA and gives his opinion of the HARADA Diary, on the ground that it is repetitive. The witness was asked on cross examination about his acquaintance with HARADA (R. 32,402). He testified fully on this subject, stating in his testimony that he had read all portions of the HARADA Diary applicable to him (R. 32,405) and gave his explanation of the entries in the diary as well as his opinion of HARADA. (R. 32,406-7)

2. Section 2, pages 3 to 7 of the document, is objected to as repetitive, the witness quoting therein at length from the testimony which he gave before the Tribunal on 31 October 1947 (R. 32,206) and discussing in great detail the circumstances surrounding the proposals to reduce the strength of the Army in 1931 as to which he testified fully when he appeared as a witness before the Tribunal. This Section does not reply to anything new brought out by the Prosecution. As to Exhibit No. 3754-B, concerning the activities of the KOKOHONSHU

*cut out here*



(Prosecution Objections to Defense Doc. No. 3066)

mentioned on page 4 of the affidavit, KOISO was specifically asked on his cross-examination concerning his membership in this society and testified fully as to the purposes and activities of the society (R. 32,273-6). This exhibit was introduced in rebuttal of his testimony. The last paragraph of Section 2 of the affidavit, on pages 6 and 7, is further objected to as containing only argument and conclusion of the witness.

3. Section 3, pages 8 to 11 of the document, which is a discussion of Exhibit #3801-B (R. 37,815) is objected to on the ground that the very language of this excerpt from the HARADA Diary concerning the attitude of KOISO toward the Tripartite Alliance was put to KOISO on cross examination (R. 32,402) and KOISO testified fully concerning it (R. 32,402-7). We respectfully submit that having once denied his alleged statements at considerable length, he is not entitled to deny them again at even greater length and make an argument therein including quotations from his previous testimony.

4. All of Section 4, pages 12 to 14 of the document, is objected to except the second paragraph on page 12. The witness was asked on cross-examination about his connection with the KEMPEI TAI and if he did not send the KEMPEI to China and Manchuria disguised as laborers. He testified that he had no recollection of having done so. (R. 32,415-6) Exhibit #3806-A (R. 37,842) is in rebuttal of that testimony of KOISO. The last paragraph on page 12 and all of page 13 is argumentative



(Prosecution Objections to Defense Doc. 3066)

and purports to be a resume of testimony given before the Tribunal.

*The last D on p 14 is objected to as argumentative.*

5. Section 5, pages 15 to 17 of the affidavit, is objected to on the ground that Exhibit #3757-A (R. 37,575) contains nothing adverse to KOISO and requires no explanation on his part. Although he states in the second sentence in this Section (page 15) that there is no reference to him in the Exhibit and "the Exhibit itself does not bear on me in any way," ~~He~~ discusses it at great length. KOISO has already testified before the Tribunal in full concerning all his knowledge of or connection with the dispatch of TATEKAWA to Mukden. (R. 32,324-6) (That he did not know what instructions TATEKAWA received, (R. 32,324) that he did not discuss the purpose of the trip with TATEKAWA before his departure (R. 32,326), and that he had no arrangements or plans with TATEKAWA in connection with the trip (R. 32,326), and that TATEKAWA was sent on the mission by the Chief of the Army General Staff (R. 32,207)).

6. Section 6, pages 17 and 18 of the document, is objected to as repetitive. KOISO testified on cross-examination concerning his connection with the KOKOHONSHU and the purposes of that organization (R. 32,273-5). In this section of the document he merely re-emphasizes and enlarges upon his previous testimony, and after discussing Exhibit #3754-B states in the next to the last sentence of the affidavit, "The Exhibit itself does not concern me."



(Prosecution Objections to Defense Doc. 3066)

We respectfully submit that only such a slight amount of this document is free from substantial objection that it should be rejected in its entirety.



*Rejected*  
*NAS*

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

*(2) sheet + -last 7 follow / 6 of page 7 opening + conclusions*  
*(3) last sentence 1st H. 8-11 as fully H. 12 + consumed by Koso*  
*(4) last 7 pages 12 + nearly all page 13*  
*(5) Sec. 5 entirely as it is not denied anything here*  
*(6) this matter was fully explored by H. in cross exam R. 32,275*

*R 32,402-5*

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows;

*cross exam R. 32,275* *Defetitive*

1. With regard to the HARADA Diary (Court Exhibit 3150) and my relations with HARADA.

Before replying to the evidence tendered by the Prosecution during their rebuttal as being related to me, I should like to state certain matters which I consider to be necessary in connection with the HARADA Diary and my relations with HARADA.

I first became acquainted with HARADA about 1930 and since then met him several times. I know that from before the time I came to know him he was active as a private secretary to Prince SAIONJI, purveying to the Genro information about the political world and that he continued to perform that function up to the Prince's death.



However, I also knew that besides HARADA, one NAKAGAWA, Kojuro, who was long in the service of Prince SAIONJI as private secretary was in charge of all the personal affairs of the prince. Although I have forgotten whose information it was, I had occasion to receive the following report about HARADA:

"Although HARADA is in his mind secretly contending against private secretary NAKAGAWA to win the favor of Prince SAIONJI, there is no controversy of any kind between the two because NAKAGAWA is a splendid character who is exceedingly indifferent about such a thing. But it is certain that the Prince does not trust HARADA very much."

Such being the case, although I met HARADA whenever he requested an interview, not once have I ever requested a meeting on my part nor have I ever given him information whether at the orders of my superiors or on my own initiative.

Until about the summer of 1947, I had no knowledge that HARADA had kept a diary. When informed that there were entries in the diary relating to me, I borrowed from my counsel excerpts of such entries and carefully read through them. As a result, I noted the following defects in the entries insofar as they related to me:

- a. That most of them are hearsay.
- b. That they are highly flavored with dogmatic imagination, surmise, and speculation.
- c. That the contents of preceding and following entries contain contradictions,
- d. Although difficult to judge whether they are the result



*Basis to contradict  
Minami denying a conversation  
with INOUE R 19826-7*

of willful intent or mental defect, that the motives of the interview, the place of the interview and the contents of conversations are distorted and falsified.  
e. That entries relating to the army and to me reflect his personal emotional likes and dislikes.

I shall now refute on the basis of facts all the evidence tendered by the prosecution from the HARADA Diary, allegedly as having some connection with me, as entirely lacking in reliability.

*R 37572*

2. With regard to the evidence in Court Exhibit 3756-A to the effect that although the accused MINAMI, the then War Minister, and Finance Minister INOUE had made an agreement between them on a plan for reform of military organization of the army, it was overthrown because of opposition by the then Director of the Military Affairs Bureau, the accused KOISO.

*This is refuted elsewhere  
introduced by the D.*

In April 1931, at the time he assumed the office of War Minister, the accused MINAMI, in view of public opinion, decided upon a policy to reduce the army and created the Committee for the Study of Reform of Military Organization with War Vice Minister SUGIYAMA, Gen, as chairman, the task assigned to the committee being the study and formulation of a concrete plan for the reduction of the army. I, then Director of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, was appointed as one of the members of the committee.

*R 32, 100(?)*

In my affidavit (Court Exhibit 3375) which was read before the Tribunal on 31 October 1947, I stated: "about the time of the

*R 32206*



Defense Doc. 3066

*The basis of this was  
rebut Kuroi testimony ~  
Lufers of Kokuhonsha with  
R 32, 274-5*

outbreak of the Manchurian Incident in September of the same year, a proposal was under consideration to further reduce our peacetime strength of 17 divisions by reducing and changing the Imperial Bodyguard Division to simply the Imperial Bodyguards and abolishing the two divisions of Utsunomiya and Kyoto.<sup>R 3270</sup> This was as a result of discussions by this committee. This fact is proof that War Minister MINAMI and the members of the Committee together made efforts for the materialization of the plan for the reduction of the army and, at the same time, refutes the authenticity of the entry in the HARADA Diary, Court Exhibit 3754-B, to the effect that the Kokuhonsha, in concert with the army, was engaged in obstructionist maneuvers against reduction of the army. It also serves as evidence to deny HARADA's statement about the activities of the Kokuhonsha.

*R 37567*

To carry out the plan for the reduction of the army by two and a half divisions, initial expenses of a considerable sum was necessary for the transportation of troops and military goods, the replenishment of equipment and materials required for the mechanization of army units to be transferred, the new creation of a part of the barracks and storehouses accompanying the mechanization of army units, the payment of money grants to troops to be reduced and disbanded and travel expenses to their homes, etc. Because of this, the army's budget in the early stage of the execution of the reduction plan increased as compared with normal years.



As Finance Minister, INOUE was a leader of the Minseito Party, it was his desire to have the Minseito Cabinet get the nominal credit for effecting the reduction of the army, but at the same time to push on as the burden of the next cabinet the troublesome problem of effectuating the army reduction plan with all the initial expenses it entailed. With this idea, he proposed to the War Minister MINAMI that because of financial circumstances, he would like to have the period of execution of the plan postponed to the next fiscal year. War Minister MINAMI gave his approval to the effectuation of the reduction plan, but stated he would give a definite reply with regard to the question of the time for the effectuation later after getting the views of the administrative departments in charge of the matter and left Finance Minister INOUE. The War Minister then called Vice Minister SUGIYAMA, the chairman of the committee, and sought his views on the proposition.

Now the committee, while it desired the materialization of the mechanization of the army as soon as possible, had already unanimously agreed that upon adoption of the army reduction plan it was essential that its effectuation be commenced at the beginning of next year at the latest not only because the contents of the plan might gradually leak out if its effectuation were postponed with a consequent harmful effect on the officers and men of the army,



Defense Doc. 3066

but also because in the light of bitter experiences in the past, the effectivation of the plan would in all likelihood be retarded by frantic movements by members of the House of Peers and the House of Representatives, in alignment with the officials and the public in their political constituencies, to keep the army units in their localities for the purpose of maintaining local prosperity. This being the case, SUGIYAMA, the chairman of the committee, replied to the inquiry from War Minister MINAMI to the above effect. It is needless to say that as a member of the committee I also was an earnest advocate of immediate effectivation of the adopted plan for army reduction. However, as the direct report was made by Vice Minister SUGIYAMA, the committee chairman, as stated above, I at no time expressed my opinions directly to the War Minister.

The above being the actual situation, I and the director of the Intendance Bureau were the advocates of immediate effectivation of the army reduction plan and Finance Minister INOUE whom HARADA supported was, on the contrary, an advocate of postponement of the plan.

Although HARADA's statements are distortions based upon emotional likes and dislikes, yet even then if one thoroughly reads the passages which precede and follow this Court Exhibit one can clearly perceive therein a part of the actual facts of the case which I have related. Notwithstanding this, because the



Defense Doc. 3066

prosecution have tendered to the Tribunal as evidence only such parts as would appear unfavorable to the accused, the Tribunal is apt to have been given the opposite impression as if I prevented the effectivation of the army reduction plan and I feel it especially necessary to call the Tribunal's attention to this fact.



Def. Doc. #3066

*The language of  
#3801 B was first  
made at R 32402-9  
Paris  
Kono 32234-5*

*R 37815*

3. With regard to the evidence contained in Court Exhibit No. 3801-B to the effect that on 8 May 1939 I had an interview with HARADA at my request at his relative's house and that I said that unless the Tripartite Alliance was not concluded the officers and men at the front would not be pacified.

*I believe  
the content  
entirely false  
I have read the  
diary  
It has been  
what I said  
lies*

This exhibit, as my counsel, Mr. Brook, pointed out to the Tribunal on 22 January 1948, is only a short passage excerpted from the HARADA Diary, the contents of which taken alone creates the misunderstanding that they constitute my views. The facts are otherwise. By noting the words "it was a usual pet expression" in the entry which follows the passages in this exhibit and by proper construction of the Japanese text, it is obvious that they were not my views.

Moreover, the entry continues to say, "General KOISO was saying almost the same thing." Although "almost the same" is an ambiguous expression, because it creates the impression that I too was an alliance advocate, I shall now give a true account of what actually took place at the interview to prove that the subject of the discussion was not the pro and con of an alliance and to show that this exhibit is valueless.

Although I do not clearly recall the exact date, it is a fact that I met HARADA in the early part of May 1939. However, this interview did not take place at my request. At first HARADA proposed a talk with me over dinner, but I declined the invitation explaining that I was extremely busy. However, since he strongly insisted that I consent to an interview by all means saying that he did not mind if it was after I had finished



my work, I reluctantly consented and after I completed my work for the day and had dinner went to the place designated by HARAIDA at about 8:30 p.m. The meeting place was not the home of his relative as he records in the entry accepted as a Court Exhibit, but residence of Mr. YAMASHITA, Kamesaburo, in Takanawa, Shinagawa Ward (Tokyo). Although this has no direct bearing on the issues of this Trial, I mention this because, even though it may not be known wherein HARAIDA's true intentions lay in fabricating the motive and the place of the interview, I believe that it would serve the purpose of discrediting this entry.

When at the outset of the meeting I asked HARAIDA what the purpose of the interview was, he replied, "To ask your opinions regarding the HIRANUMA message." I had actually no knowledge of what he called the "HIRANUMA message" and so I asked him for his explanation and learned for the first time the general outline of what it was. However, I was never able to judge from the very beginning the real meaning of its contents.

HARAIDA then continued to ask me, "I want to ask your opinion whether, in the event a Tripartite Alliance is concluded on the basis of the HIRANUMA message and if Germany and Italy commenced war with England and France, Japan would come to participate in the war?" Whereupon I replied, "Putting aside the pro and con of concluding an alliance as a separate question, if the HIRANUMA message really provides, as you explain, armed assistance by Japan within possible limits and, moreover, if Japan, in the event Germany and Italy commenced war with England and France, effectuated armed assistance to Germany and Italy, should it not be interpreted as



Def. Doc. #3066

meaning nothing more and nothing less than war participation?" and thus gave expression to my construction of the so-called "HIRANUMA message". Upon hearing my view, HARADA, his face somewhat flushed with excitement, denounced the attitude of the Army favoring conclusion of an alliance and repeatedly argued that even in case it should be concluded in accordance with the "HIRANUMA message" Japan should never participate in war.

I did not venture to defend what was alleged to be the Army's attitude and I withheld expressing to loose-tongued HARADA my own personal views which I had always held opposing the conclusion of an alliance. Instead I asked him what Prince SAIONJI's views were on the pro and con of an alliance. Whereupon he replied that the Prince was not a person who expressed his own views lightly and continued repeatedly to extol the Prince's prudent attitude.

Since there appeared no further business in addition to what we talked about as described above, I took leave at about 10:30 p.m.

Comparing the actual circumstances which I have related above with Court Exhibit No. 3801-B, the contents of the HARADA Diary is fundamentally at variance with the facts. Especially if one refers to an entry in Chapter 321 of the diary (18 April 1939), it is clear that he had been informed by someone and had known that I was opposed to the Tripartite Alliance. Yet, despite this fact, the Prosecution may be believed to have come to suspect whether I was not an alliance advocate because of an alleged contradictory entry such as is given in this exhibit.



Notwithstanding the fact that I had inquired about Prince SAIONJI's views and HARADA had praised the Prince's attitude as I have stated above, there is no mention about the Prince in the entry following the one contained in this exhibit; the contents of our conversation have been altered and it consists of a defense of the attitude of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal YUASA which I least expected. This is clearly a conspicuous example of HARADA distorting and fabricating the contents of conversations and shows how little credibility, if any, the diary has.

*of course*

What I further wish to state to the Tribunal is that although the Prosecution said (transcript page 37,813), " . . . he never expressed his views on the subject on any other occasion except one, when in May 1939 at the request of the War Vice-Minister he was asked to help to restore friendly relations between the War and Navy Ministers who had offered their views concerning the contents of the conclusion of the alliance ", I have never expressed my private views on the pro and con of the alliance to HARADA, as I have mentioned above. In addition, I stated in my affidavit (Court Exhibit No. 3375) at No. 21 of the original: "With regard to this question, neither at any cabinet meeting which I attended nor at any other meeting which I can recall." In consequence of the fact that the word "meeting" was mistranslated in English as "occasion", it may possibly be that this invited the misunderstanding of the Prosecution, and I call the Tribunal's attention to the fact that if there had been no such misunderstanding, this exhibit might not have been tendered.



37841

4. With regard to Court Exhibit No. 3806-A, pertaining to a character comment about me purported to have been made by the accused ARAKI, I do not know whether or not the contents in this exhibit represent the expressions of the accused ARAKI. Furthermore, with regard to the comment on my character, "KOISO is a person who has power and enthusiasm, but he has no set opinions and deals only in intrigues and trickery", it is not for me to say anything except that it may serve me as food for self-reflection. However, I must solemnly refute with proof such a false statement, whoever may be its author, and which can be taken as a basis for the comment on my character, that I advocated the use of counterfeit paper currency at the Cabinet Meeting or that I sent the kempei to China and Manchuria in plain clothes.

denied in his + 9th

when you was common with the Kempei and Kempei R 37415-6

denied in his + 9th

That I ever advocated such a thing as the use of counterfeit paper money when I was Minister of Overseas Affairs, whether at a cabinet meeting or on any other occasion is completely groundless and there is no room for doubt that it was a misunderstanding of some kind or a misrepresentation.

OK.

objection + all this

If the statement that I dispatched the kempei (military police) to China and Manchuria disguised in plain clothes is to serve as a pretext for casting aspersions at me, since as Minister for Overseas Affairs I had no connection at that time with the Kempei Tai, then we must assume that the period is confined to a time when I as director of the Military Affairs Bureau or Vice Minister of War was in a position to give advise on kempei matters. Supposing this refers to such a period of my career



and that ARAKI spoke of this to HARADA, then there can be no mistake that it was at a time when ARAKI (who would never under no circumstances permit anything of the kind) was not in the post of War Minister. In other words, the matter concerns a period of one year and four months extending from August 1930, prior to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, to 12 December 1931, shortly after that outbreak, while serving as director of the Military Affairs Bureau under two Ministers, URAKI and MINAMI. As the Tribunal is already well aware with regard to the relative strength of Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria at that time, the strength of the Japanese forces just before the outbreak of the incident was only 10,400 as compared to that of the Chinese who had 220,000 men. Even after adding the troops which crossed the border from Korea soon after the outbreak of the incident the total strength did not come up even to 15,000. For this reason the Kwantung Army reported the serious lack of combat troops and expressed the earnest desire that if it was possible to send reinforcements from the Japanese homeland, they wanted the dispatch of even one more combat soldier instead of military police. That was the actual situation. Furthermore, in North China, where a Japanese garrison including military police was stationed, there was only a minor disturbance in Tientsin in November 1931, but other than that tranquillity prevailed generally and there was no request for additional military police. Such being the case, there was not even a single occasion which gave any rise to a need to dispatch to Manchuria and China any reinforcement of military police disguised in civilian clothes to conceal them from the public

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To  
end  
the



Def. Doc. #3066

eye, either immediately before or after the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident. Furthermore, regardless of whether or not there was any order from the War Minister, no such steps were ever carried out.

Thus, as I have offered proof in refutation, this exhibit, founded upon falsification, constitutes a malicious character evidence against me. In view of the ruling of the Tribunal that it will not accept character testimony as evidence, I respectfully ask that this exhibit be stricken out.

**T** argument



Def. Doc. 3066

*Koiso had nothing to do with it  
his merely revealed in c.c.*

*R 37,575*

5. With regard to erroneous evidence in Court Exhibit No. 3757-A that the accused MINAMI dispatched TATEKAWA to Mukden

As there is no reference to me in this exhibit the exhibit itself does not bear on me in any way. However, the Prosecution, notwithstanding the fact that the reason itself which they gave in explaining the tender contained contradictions, ventured to mention my name and stated as follows:

"... Minami while admitting that Tatekawa was sent to Mukden by the General Staff and that he had talked with him before he went, denied that he or as far as he knew, Koiso had anything to do with his selection or that he entrusted Tatekawa with a letter or order from the Emperor or anybody else."

In view of this statement of the Prosecution, I offer the following refutation;

Because TATEKAWA was a division chief in the Army General Staff office only his direct superior, the Chief of Staff, could order his selection and dispatch and it was a matter which permitted of no interference by anyone else. This fact is clear from the testimony of the accused MINAMI and of the witness KAWABE. That the matter was carried out in that very manner as a fact was testified to by me in my affidavit.

I believe the fact that the Prosecution recognized in its explanation of their reason for the tender that TATEKAWA was dispatched by the Army General Staff was a result of their coming to understand the principle mentioned above. Yet, notwithstanding it, the Prosecution, on the one hand, offered an excerpt from

*General report 32326  
Kawabe testimony on this*



Def. Doc. 3066

the HARADA Diary, just as it is, containing the erroneous information that MINAMI had dispatched TATEKAWA and, on the other hand, gave an explanation to the effect that KOISO of the War Ministry could interfere in or ignore the right of command of the Chief of the Army General Staff, all of which I am at a complete loss to understand.

The Prosecution's grounds for explaining that KOISO had something to do with the selection of TATEKAWA may have been found in a passage in an entry following the one in the Exhibit, but in the last sentence the words "it seems" are used. The Tribunal's attention is called to the fact that in the Japanese language the expression "it seems" means "one's own surmise and speculation", and the value is even lower than hearsay which has no evidential value.

In short, the fact that the contents of this Exhibit and those of related entries in the HARADA Diary are confused and incoherent and filled with many incomprehensible statements is due to nothing else than that he, HARADA, was ignorant of the system of the chain of command within the army to begin with, as well as other matters relating to the army. Especially the fact that HARADA used the expression "it seems" is proof that of all the surmise and speculation which his entries contain he admits his lack of confidence in what he put down in this one.

I absolutely did not interfere in the selection and dispatch of Major General TATEKAWA, a matter which under the chain of

*Pross has  
not shown that  
it is the  
it is a + explanation*



37567

Def. Doc. 3066

command, could not be done without arbitrarily violating the authority of the Chief of the Army General Staff.

6. With regard to Court Exhibit No. 3754-B in connection with the character and purpose of the KOKUHONSHA

Through this Exhibit, an entry in the HARADA Diary, the Prosecution represented the Kokuhonsha as an extreme rightist organization which, in concert with the army, engaged in maneuvers against the army reduction question and tendered it to the Tribunal on the grounds that it was not an organization such as I described in reply to questions from Prosecutor Fixel during my cross-examination in November 1947.

My argument

Moreover, there is no relation between the character and purpose of the Kokuhonsha and my statement in reply to Prosecutor Fixel's questions, for, as it is clear from my reply at the time on page 32,275 of the Transcript, I did not know the purpose of the Kokuhonsha because no one ever informed me about it and, although I stated that I regarded the magazine Kokuhon as providing instructive data with which to understand the true nature of Japan and the Japanese people, I did not refer to the character of the Kokuhonsha.

Repetition

Again, as it is clear in page 32,274 of the Transcript, I became a member of the Kokuhonsha when I was a regimental commander in the provinces for the purpose of subscribing to its magazine and only on one occasion attended a lecture meeting



Def. Doc. 3066

Ref. *Refutation*  
sponsored by it and so I do not have the qualification to speak of the character and purpose of this society with any confidence and responsibility. However, as I am familiar with the actual circumstances attending the question of army reduction, having been directly concerned with the business administration of the matter and knowing that no outsider was permitted to interfere in its study and deliberations, as I have described in section two of this affidavit, if HARADA's falsified statement that the Kokuhonsha, in concert with the army, maneuvered against the army reduction question applies to the period when I held office in the War Ministry, then I positively deny that it is true.

In short, this Exhibit was tendered by the Prosecution to show what they claim to be the character of the Kokuhonsha by distorting my reply to Prosecutor Fixel and the Exhibit itself does not concern me. This fact is also clear by the statement made by Mr. Warren, counsel for the accused HIRANUMA on 16 January 1948 (Transcript page 37,564).



Def. Doc. 3066

On this 30th day of January 1948  
At I.M.T.F.E.

DEPONENT: KOISO Kuniaki (seal)

I, Sanmonji Shohei, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date

At the same place.

Witness: /s/ Sanmonji Shohei (seal)

O A T H

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ Koiso Kuniaki (seal)



Final  
12/11/47

**SUMMARY OF CASE AGAINST**

**KOISO, Kunaiki**



## KOISO

### 1. Charges against KOISO

LL-1  
Counts 1-5 charge KOISO with conspiracies to wage wars of aggression and in violation of International Law.

Counts 6-17 charge KOISO with planning and preparing wars of aggression against the nations hereinafter named, between January 1, 1928 and September 2, 1945; namely, in count 6, the Republic of China; count 7, the United States of America; count 8, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and northern Ireland and all parts of the British Commonwealth of Nations; count 9, the Commonwealth of Australia; count 10, New Zealand; count 11, Canada; count 12, India; count 13, the Commonwealth of the Philippines; count 14, the Kingdom of the Netherlands; count 15, the Republic of France; count 16, the Kingdom of Thailand; and count 17, the USSR.

Count 18 charges KOISO with initiating a war of aggression against China.

Count 26 charges KOISO with initiating a war of aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic.

Count 27-32 charge KOISO with waging wars of aggression against China, the United States of America, the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the British Commonwealth of Nations, and the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Count 34 charges KOISO with waging a war of aggression against Thailand.

Count 36 charges KOISO with waging a war of aggression against the Mongolian People's Republic and the U.S.S.R.

Count 44 charges KOISO with murdering, POW members of armed forces and civilians.

Counts 48-50 charge KOISO with specific acts of murder at various places in China.

Count 51 charges KOISO with specific acts of murder at specified places in Mongolia and the U.S.S.R.

Count 53 charges KOISO with conspiring to commit breaches of the law and customs of war in respect to the treatment of POW and civilian internees.

Count 54 charges KOISO with authorizing and fomenting the offenses mentioned in Count 53.

Count 55 charges KOISO with deliberately and recklessly disregarding legal duty to take adequate steps to prevent the breach of conventions and secure observance of the laws and customs of war.



2. KOISO's activities prior to the Manchurian Incident

(a) His affiliations

LL-2 From 1929 to the outbreak of the Manchurian Incident, a movement led by OKAWA having as its objective the settlement of the Manchurian problem, by the establishment of a peoples' movement, gradually aroused the interest and assistance of the Army. KOISO, ITAGAKI, DOIHARA, Gen. TADA, and others prominent in Army circles, made it possible for OKAWA to openly deliver lectures at the Army General Staff. In addition, OKAWA lectured throughout Japan in 135 places with audiences of over 100,000. His aim was to arouse the Japanese so that they would "brave fire and water for their motherland." He urged the unification of public opinion on foreign policy and stated that the solution of the Manchurian problem was an absolute condition to the very existence of Japan. He advocated world supremacy for Japan; urged Japan to prepare for war with the United States, and attacked the principle of the status quo among nations. It was with this <sup>advocate of aggression</sup> ~~revolutionist~~ that KOISO aligned himself, and, as will be later seen, became entangled in the Manch Incident.

LL-3 KOISO had become a member of KOKUHONSHA Society in 1924 and remained a member until the society "disappeared." He attended a meeting of this organization in July 1931 at which HIRANUMA also was present. He could not remember whether ARAKI was or was not present. He knew that HIRANUMA was president of the KOKUHONSHA.

LL-4 The KOKUHONSHA Society (Foundation of the State Society) had as its purposes the fostering of the spirit of nationalism, bolstering the foundations of the state and the exaltation of the national spirit. KOISO joined because the fundamental character of the state was not fully <sup>asserted that he affiliated with this Society</sup>

LL-2-a  
1. T 15,578  
b 2. T 15,573  
c 3. T 15,575  
d 4. T 15,565

e 5. T. 15,597  
f 6. T. 15,597  
g 7. T. 15,598  
h 8. T. 15,602

LL-3-a 9. T. 32,273  
b 10. T. 32,274  
c 11. T. 32,274  
LL-4-a 12. Exh. 164, T 1636



clarified and he decided that it would be a good thing to secure an understanding of the true character and spirit of Japan through the magazine published by the organization. <sup>13</sup> KOISO denied being a member of the SAKURAKAI. <sup>14</sup>

LL-5 Thus it is seen that KOISO was more than a military man under orders of his superiors, in the critical years before the Manchurian Incident. He was a supporter of persons and movements having as their ultimate objectives, forceful measures for the expansion of Japan, by war, if necessary.

(b) His official position and connection.

LL-6 KOISO was commissioned an infantry second-lieutenant in June 1901; was promoted at various intervals, becoming Major General in December 1926. In August 1930, he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry, which position he held until 29 February 1932, when he was named Vice War Minister. <sup>15-a</sup>

LL-7 The Military Affairs Bureau had five sections: the Military Affairs Section, the Military Service Section, the Conscription Section, <sup>16</sup> the Defensive Preparations Section, and the Horse Administration Section.

LL-8 Matters concerning General Staff Headquarters were under his jurisdiction <sup>17a</sup> and <sup>as well as</sup> ~~also~~ matters regarding normal army organization, <sup>including</sup> ~~as well~~ as peacetime and wartime organizations. <sup>18b</sup> General TATEKAWA, Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff, whose name is linked to KOISO as a plotter of the March Incident, <sup>19c</sup> was strongly of the opinion that unless Manchuria were seized by Japan, it would be impossible for Japan to become

LL-4-d 13. T. 32276

LL-6-c 14. T. 32281

LL-6-a 15. Exh. 3375, T. 32205

LL-7-a 16. Exh. 3385, T. 32484

LL-8-a-17. Exh. 3385, T. 32484

b 18. Exh. 3385, T. 32484

c 19. KIDO Diary, Exh. 179F, T. 1927-8.



one of the powers of the world as a highly developed national defense state. <sup>200d</sup>  
It was the same General TATEKAWA who was sent to Mukden by the General Staff, after KOISO broached the need for action by the Central Authorities to stop impulsive movements by the Kwantung Army, and who failed to carry out his instructions.

(c) His Connection with the March Incident.

LL-9 The March Incident was a plot engineered by OKAWA, but participated in by TATEKAWA, NINOMIYA, and KOISO, Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO, SHIGEFUJI and others, <sup>21</sup> to enable the masses to express their disapproval of the Diet, then in session, by means of a mass demonstration and a bombing in the vicinity of the Diet. It was expected that the ensuing turmoil would necessitate the declaration of martial law, the overthrow of the Cabinet, and the plan was to install War Minister UGAKI as Premier, thus centering political power around the Army group <sup>22</sup>.

LL-10 KOISO denied any connection with the plot initially, but instead <sup>claimed</sup> says that OKAWA first broached the matter to UGAKI, and later, returning for a second conference, explained the final plan to <sup>him</sup> KOISO. At this meeting KOISO said that he concluded that the plan was reckless. <sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, instead of dissociating himself from participation therein, he ordered his subordinate NAGATA to examine the plan to find out whether <sup>it</sup> had consistency <sup>the plan</sup> <sup>24</sup> because, as he now claims, the matter had to be reported to the War Minister and he said no plan could be submitted to the War Minister in which there was any inconsistency. <sup>25</sup> Just why a plan of this kind which had no relation to War Department affairs had to be presented to UGAKI, the War Minister, was not explained.

LL-8-d 20. TANAKA, Ryukichi, T. 2002-3 LL-10-a 23. T. 32288  
LL-9-a 21. T. 1927-8 b 24. T. 32291  
b 22. Exh. 2177-A, T. 15586 c 25. T. 32291  
32282-3



LL-11 Although the plan finally was cancelled, due to UGAKI's refusal to permit the same to be executed<sup>26 a</sup>, the action planned, and the measures adopted, indicate definitely that the participants were motivated by a desire to solve the Manchurian problem,<sup>27</sup> and accomplish <sup>Japan's</sup> "overseas development"<sup>28 c</sup>, and at the same time set up a new political power centering around the army.<sup>29 d</sup>

LL-12 In working out the plan, KOISO gradually "came to be involved" and later "took charge of everything,"<sup>30 a</sup> and it was agreed between OKAWA and KOISO, that OKAWA would represent the civilians and KOISO would represent the Army.<sup>31 b</sup>

LL-13 TATEKAWA, Yoshitsugu, Chief of the Second Section of the Army General Staff, made available for OKAWA's use, 300 imitation bombs in connection with the proposed bombing.<sup>32 a</sup> After it was decided by UGAKI that the plan should be abandoned, KOISO requested the return of the bombs from OKAWA, SHIMIZU, and finally he intervened with Marquis TOKUGAWA, because he felt the prestige of the army would suffer unless the bombs were recovered.<sup>33 c</sup> He did not seize the bombs by using military authority because he claims that the bombs belonged to the infantry school which was under the jurisdiction of the Inspector General of Education, a separate branch of the Army from the War Ministry.<sup>34 c</sup> It is interesting to note that Gen. MUTO, Nobuyoshi, now deceased, who was Inspector General of Military Education at that time, showed no interest whatsoever in the matter, and KOISO, who claimed on cross examination that the Military Affairs Bureau had no responsibility in connection with the bombs, was more concerned as to their return than anyone else, including Gen. MUTO, who he says they were charged to.

LL-11-a 26. T. 15,582  
b 27. T. 15,578  
c 28. T. 15,581  
d 29. T. 15,583  
LL-12-a 30. T. 15,582

LL-12-b 31. Exh. 2177-A, T. 15,583  
LL-13-a 32. T. 32,285-6  
b 33. T. 32,293-97  
c 34. T. 32,298



LL-14 Apart from OKAWA's statements as to KOISO's participation in the March Incident, there is testimony of ISHIHARA that there were "rumors" at the time of the incident, that the principal figures in it were KOISO, UGAKI, NAGATA, and other officers in the War Ministry. <sup>35a</sup> HASHIMOTO, on taking the stand, testified that KOISO's connection with the incident was his attempt to secure the return of the bombs, <sup>36b</sup> although he previously stated in interrogations that KOISO was one of the planners of the March and October Incidents. <sup>37c</sup> KOISO himself insisted on the stand that he was not a participant, but on the contrary had warned the Vice Chief of the General Staff of the impropriety of officers participating in a plot of the nature of the March Incident. <sup>38d</sup>

LL-15 In evaluating the evidence pro and con as to KOISO's relation to the March Incident, the conclusion must be reached that KOISO was a conspirator in the plot. His actions in relation to OKAWA, when OKAWA presented his plan to him are not consistent with his claim of non-participation. It is idle for him to say now that he referred OKAWA's plan to NAGATA, his subordinate, to determine the consistency of the plan because the matter could only be reported to the War Minister if it was consistent, <sup>39</sup> because *the plan was never found consistent by Nagata, and because he* He testified that he took the matter up with UGAKI, the War Minister, one or two days after he had given the plan to NAGATA for examination, <sup>40</sup> and as *on the basis of this undisputed evidence* NAGATA never found the plan consistent, KOISO did present an inconsistent plan to UGAKI notwithstanding his testimony that only consistent plans could

LL-14-a 35. T. 23,202  
b 36. T. 28,807  
c 37. T. 15,676-7  
d 38. T. 32,287  
LL-15-a 39. T. 32,291  
b 40. T. 32,292



be presented to the War Minister. Either KOISO felt that the plan was consistent when he saw UGAKI, or he was determined to secure the consent of UGAKI despite the plan's inconsistency and absurdity. KOISO's present condemnation of the OKAWA plan does not fit into the pattern of the actions he took sixteen years ago. At that time he seemed so interested in the plan to overthrow the Cabinet that (a) he gave OKAWA a hearing and became familiar with the plan;<sup>41</sup> (b) he directed OKAWA, pursuant to UGAKI's order, to put the plan in writing;<sup>42</sup> (c) he asked OKAWA to read the plan to him after it had been reduced to writing;<sup>43</sup> (d) he made pencil notations of the plan and took these notes to the War Minister;<sup>44</sup> (e) he ordered HAGATA, his subordinate, to examine the plan to determine whether it was consistent;<sup>45</sup> (f) he reported the plan to the War Minister<sup>46</sup> in spite of the fact that the plan was not consistent; (g) one or two days later KOISO went to see UGAKI and asked for his reaction<sup>47</sup> *these actions Koiso's that showing his determined insistence on to securing UGAKI's consent to the proposal, and his active participation in the plot.*

LL-16 These facts and admissions show not merely a disinterested passive attitude on the part of KOISO, on a matter which was not proper for consideration by a Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, but indicate a close cooperation between KOISO and the chief conspirator, OKAWA, aiming at the acceptance by the War Minister, of a scheme to create a coup d'etat, having as its object placing the military in the saddle, as the first step toward solving the Manchurian Incident.

(d) His Relation to the Mukden Incident

LL-17 KOISO became apprehensive of the critical situation in Manchuria

LL-15-c  
 41. T. 32,290  
 d 42. T. 32,290  
 e 43. T. 32,290  
 f 44. T. 32291

LL-15-g  
 45. T. 32,291  
 h 46. T. 32,292  
 i 47. T. 32,292



*The testimony of Minami, that he met with Tatekawa prior to his trip and talked the matter over with him, and instructed him to investigate reports of Hyashi that there were Kwantung Army movements around Mukden,*

in the summer of 1931 and spoke to MINAMI and the Vice Chief of the General Staff about it.<sup>48</sup> He claims he did not mention TATEKAWA's name as a suitable person to be entrusted with the mission to stop an outbreak in Manchuria,<sup>49</sup> and it was only after TATEKAWA had been dispatched that he says he was informed that TATEKAWA had been selected.<sup>50</sup> TATEKAWA and KOISO were great friends.<sup>51</sup> They were both interested in Manchurian problems.<sup>52</sup> The General Staff selected TATEKAWA as a personal emissary in order that the ideas of the Chief of the General Staff and War Minister would be thoroughly understood in Mukden by the people on the spot.<sup>53</sup> Although there was telegraph connection between Tokyo, Port Arthur and Mukden,<sup>54</sup> this personal emissary was sent. Major General TATEKAWA, the emissary, was the same person who was responsible for securing the bombs for OKAWA in the abortive March Incident.<sup>55</sup> Although KOISO denied that TATEKAWA failed to carry out his mission by reason of a preconceived arrangement with him,<sup>56</sup> nevertheless, it is more than a coincidence that TATEKAWA, of all persons available, should have been selected to carry out a mission, the object of which was irreconcilably in conflict with TATEKAWA's desires, namely, the acquisition of Manchuria by Japan, and for that reason, it is readily apparent why TATEKAWA failed to deliver the orders of the General Staff upon his arrival at Mukden. TATEKAWA's duplicity and wilful disobedience of his orders was admitted by him in a conversation with TANAKA, Ryukichi, in which he said that he acted in this manner because he was in sympathy with the contemplated action of the Kwantung Army and had no desire to stop it.<sup>57</sup>

*clash  
with  
signifi-  
cantly  
with Koiso  
assertion  
that he did  
not know in  
advance that  
Tatekawa was  
to make  
the trip*

- LL-17-a 48. T. 32,307-8
- b 49. T. 32,309
- c 50. T. 32,310
- 51. SAWABE, T. 19,433-4
- 52. MINAMI, T. 19,822

- LL-17-h 53. T. 32,325
- i 54. 32,324-5
- j 55. T. 32,326
- k 56. T. 32,326
- l 57. T. 2005-7

*d T19821  
e T19827*



TATEKAWA's claim that it was too late for him to do anything about the matter the morning following the Mukden Incident <sup>58</sup> is further evidence that he came to Mukden with a scheme to let the Incident occur, and after its occurrence he washed his hands of the matter, as though he had merely come to Mukden on a pleasure trip. The record is absolutely bare of any facts showing that TATEKAWA carried out his mission, or that he took any steps to stop the rolling war machines of Japan in the incipency of the military movements then starting. Conspiracy is written on every phase of TATEKAWA's actions, and the relationship between TATEKAWA and KOISO, and the fact that TATEKAWA made the trip after KOISO's representations to the General Staff is of major importance in evaluating whether there was a concerted plan between the two of them.

LL-18 In the Report of the Commission of Enquiry appointed by the League of Nations <sup>59 a</sup> it is stated that among other things which set the stage for the events that took place on 18 September 1931 and thereafter, were the "dissatisfaction of the Army," the "appearance of a new political force emanating from the Army," the abandonment of the SHIDEHARA "policy of conciliation," and the vigorous speeches by the Japanese War Minister in Tokyo, counselling direct action by their army in Manchuria.

LL-19 The conclusion reached by the Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 February 1933 <sup>60 a</sup> that the Manchurian movement was conceived, organized, and carried through by a group of Japanese civil and military officials points to the actions of KOISO, TATEKAWA and others in the War Ministry prior to the Mukden Incident, the overt act which culminated years later in the Pacific War.

LL-17-m 58. T. 2005-7  
LL-18-a 59. Exh. 57, p. 66-7  
LL-19-a 60. Exh. 59, p. 40-44



(e) KOISO's Knowledge of Plans for Conquest of Manchuria and Mongolia.

LL-20 Although KOISO denied knowledge that studies were being made in the War Ministry prior to the Manchurian Incident concerning the conquest of Manchuria, Prosecution Exhibit 3375, <sup>61a</sup> dated 25 July 1931, shows that such study was being made. This appeared in a report from the Commander of Military Police sent to the War Ministry and was processed by SHIMANUKI, one of KOISO's assistants, contemplating action by Japan to secure complete possession of Manchuria and Mongolia, from the standpoints of maintenance of fighting ability and of self-sufficiency. <sup>62b</sup> In this communication the Commander of the Military Police asked for a minimum of 5000 military police if complete military occupation was planned. <sup>63c</sup> KOISO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, is chargeable with knowledge of the studies and plans which were considered in his bureau, and his plea of ignorance thereof may be considered manufactured to fit the present situation.

LL-21 It was also while KOISO was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau that a document from the Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army passed through his bureau, on 9 December 1931, explaining what was called the "temporary expedient system" in effect in Manchuria. This system was a plan to provide guidance to the various Chinese regimes, and proposed that if a new regime was established it should be inwardly guided. The plan was to effect such guidance by a small organ so that the secret would not leak out and endanger the establishment of rights and interests by Japan. Furthermore, it was

LL-20-a 61. T. 32,300  
b 62. T. 32,303-05  
c 63. T. 32,303  
d 64. T. 32,304



proposed that if a new government were established, its guidance would be carried out by an advisory body.<sup>65</sup> That this was actually done is demonstrated by the establishment of an "advisor" system, with Gen. TADA as the guiding genius, by means of which the Kwantung Army secured complete control not only of the Manchukuoan Army but also the Manchukuo Government.

LL-22 KOISO knew or should have know that plans were thus made for the establishment of the puppet government of Manchukuo, by the interference, and active guidance of Japanese organs and agencies, in violation of the Nine Power Treaty, and procedures were adopted to effectuate the continued dominance by Japan in the affairs of Manchukuo, by secret and evasive means.

3. KOISO's Relation to Activities in Manchuria Subsequent to the Incident

LL-23 At the time of the Manchurian Incident, WAKATSUKI was Prime Minister. Under his leadership the Cabinet opposed expansion of the Army,<sup>67</sup> and the budget for the Army was reduced.<sup>68</sup> However, the Army group gained power

between July and October 1931, and an association which had Lt. Col. HASHIMOTO and SHUGENFUJI as its backers, was formed among a group recently graduated from the Army Staff College to study Manchurian and Mongolian problems. The Army could not check these persons, and difficulty was even had in drafting a budget.<sup>69</sup> C

LL-24 KOISO, as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau,<sup>70</sup> had the duty to put the General Staff plans into effect. In other words, in drawing up any plans for operations, organization, and the mobilization of the Army, the General Staff/Office had to have expenses and supplies given to it by the War Ministry, since the War Minister controlled expenses and supplies. In making such plans, the General Staff Office requested the War Ministry for

LL-21-e 65. Exh. 3377, T. 32,339-41; also LL-23-b 65. T. 1554  
T. 33629-30 c 69. Exh. 179-B, T. 1927-8  
LL-23-a 66. Exh. 3378-A, T. 32357-72 LL-24-a 70. T. 1556  
67. T. 1556;1589



such expenses and supplies. Upon receiving such request the War Ministry, after studying the funds and supplies it had, carried out the General Staff's plans, and the Military Affairs Bureau was the section of the War Ministry for carrying out these plans. <sup>72 b</sup>

LL-75 The Cabinet as a whole realized that the Manchurian Incident had the elements of a very serious situation and MINAMI was informed it should be terminated. <sup>72 a</sup> Notwithstanding this determination MINAMI permitted the situation to expand day after day, although he gave assurances that it would be discontinued. MINAMI testified that he could have stopped HONJO if he wanted to, but he concluded he could not do so because of tactical and strategic reasons. <sup>73 b</sup> KOISO as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau is chargeable with aiding and acquiescing in MINAMI's action. As a result of MINAMI's failure to control the Kwantung Army, WAKATSUKI resigned. <sup>74 c</sup>

LL-76 KOISO also appeared as an endorser of HIRANUMA for Premier, in May 1932, following the assassination of Premier INUKAI. <sup>75 a</sup> The suggestion by KOISO that HIRANUMA be the next Premier at that time is significant, as HIRANUMA in 1920 was the first President of KOKUHONSHA, the "Foundation of the State Society," which was related to the "Black Dragon" Society, later called "Production Party," in which KOISO was a director, ~~and in which KOISO was an advisor,~~ <sup>76</sup> and apparently both KOISO and HIRANUMA kept up their interest in KOKUHONSHA as is evidenced by their attendance at a meeting of the Society in July 1931. <sup>77 c</sup>

LL-24 a 71. T. 15859  
LL-25 a 72. T. 1554-5  
b 73. T. 1554-5; 19833  
c 74. T. 1557  
LL-26 a 75. Exh. 2252, T. 16215  
b 76. Exh. 164, T. 1636  
c 77. T. 32274



4. KOISO As Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army.

(a) Political Activities resulting in Violations of the Nine-Power Treaty.

LL-27

On 8 August 1932, KOISO became Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army.<sup>78 a</sup> He held this position until 5 March 1934.<sup>79 b</sup> While he asserts that he had no power to command troops while Chief of Staff, because he was only a staff officer responsible for administrative matters in the Kwantung Army Headquarters,<sup>80 c</sup> he initiated several important policies, all violative of the Nine-Power Treaty, namely: (a) control of the Manchukuo Government as shown by letter dated 3 November 1932,<sup>81 d</sup> being an outline for guiding Manchukuo; (b) domination of Manchukuoan foreign commerce as shown by letter dated 29 December 1932, outlining a general policy for Manchukuo customs duty, under which no power other than Japan was to share unconditionally in Manchukuo-Japanese tariffs,<sup>82 e</sup> and (c) control of government officials as shown by telegram 24 January 1934, recommending divided responsibility in the Manchukuoan Government so that the Commanding General of the Kwantung Army could control either the Premier or a department head.<sup>83 f</sup> He also must have been cognizant of the Advisor system, established at the founding of the Empire, under which the Kwantung Army Advisors secured control of the local and central governments in Manchukuo,<sup>84 g</sup> as this Advisor system was directed by Gen. TADA, who was amenable to the Commanding General, Kwantung Army.

(b) Military Activities involving Aggressive Warfare against China.

LL-28

Military operations of the Kwantung Army continued while KOISO was Vice War Minister, 29 February 1932 to 8 August 1932,<sup>85 a</sup> and thereafter

LL-27-a 78. T. 32225  
b 79. T. 32231  
c 80. T. 32230  
d 81. Exh. 230, T. 2903

LL-27-e 82. Exh. 3379A, T. 32377-80  
f 83. Exh. 3380A, T. 32383-4  
g 84. Exh. 3378A, T. 32357-72  
LL-28-a 85. Exh. 114, T. 733



while he was Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, 8 August 1932 to 5 March 1934.<sup>86h</sup> After the occupation of the three provinces of Liaoning, Kirin and Heilungkiang, two general offensives were launched in July and August 1932. During the remainder of the year quite a number of Chinese key points were occupied, and small scale attacks continued from time to time.<sup>87c</sup> KOISO claims that since Manchukuo, in its declaration of independence dated 1 March 1932, announced that the four Northeastern Provinces were within its territory, it was necessary for the Kwantung Army in cooperation with Manchukuo to restore law and order in Jehol Province.<sup>88d</sup> At the beginning of 1933, while KOISO was Chief of Staff, the battle of Shanhaikwan was started and the key points along the Great Wall, such as Shanhaikwan and Kiumenkow fell into Japanese hands.<sup>89e</sup> Japan and Manchukuo claimed that Jehol was not Chinese territory. The Chinese were given a 24-hour ultimatum to withdraw Chinese forces from Jehol.<sup>90f</sup> On 2 March 1933, Jehol fell.<sup>91g</sup> From 1933 to 1935 there were conspiracies to oust Chinese from Hopei and Chahar.<sup>92h</sup> The claim that additional military operations, after Jehol, were necessary due to persistent attacks by bandits and Chinese groups against the Great Wall,<sup>93i</sup> has little weight, in view of the documents already referred to<sup>94j</sup> which show that pacification of Manchukuo was not the real purpose of those military activities, but that seizure and control of the local and central government of Manchukuo and exploitation of the country for Japan's benefit was actually the aim, and that such aim was accomplished.

LL-28-d  
 c  
 d  
 e

86. Exh. 114, R. 733  
 87. Exh. 192A, T. 2268-70  
 88. T. 32235  
 89. Exh. 192A, T. 2269

LL-28-f  
 g  
 h  
 i  
 j

90. Exh. 192A, T. 2268-70  
 91. T. 2270  
 92. T. 2701  
 93. T. 32239  
 94. Exh. 3379A; Exh. 3380A and Exh. 3378, Exh 230, T. 2903



LL-29 Pu Yi's testimony shows that such control by the Kwantung Army was exercised in Manchukuo over banking; <sup>95a</sup> over the courts; <sup>95b</sup> over cotton; <sup>97c</sup> over currency; <sup>98d</sup> over appointments; <sup>99e</sup> over labor; <sup>100f</sup> over land; <sup>101g</sup> over opium; <sup>102h</sup> over rice; <sup>103i</sup> and over travel. <sup>104j</sup>

(c) KOISO's Connection with Opium Control in Manchuria.

LL-30 Although KOISO denied he had any connection with opium control in Manchukuo the testimony of AIZAWA in the DOIHARA individual phase emphasized that the Special Service Organ had no such control <sup>105a</sup> and MINAMI testified that one of the reasons he had for abolishing the Special Service Department when he became commanding general of the Kwantung Army was that the Special Service Department may have been running the opium traffic for its own benefit instead of for the Government of Manchukuo. <sup>106b</sup> KOISO was Executive of the Special Service Department <sup>107c</sup> concurrently with his other function as Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army. <sup>108d</sup> If the Special Service Department had control of opium, the responsibility for increased growth of poppies, the increased use of opium, <sup>109e</sup> and the use of the profits thereof <sup>110f</sup> are matters for which KOISO would be chargeable. For instance, the extensive encouragement for users of opium and heroin in Manchuria is shown by the large number of retail shops selling same <sup>111g</sup> and the same applied in Kirin, <sup>112h</sup> and as to heroin, extensive traffic was permitted in Chahar and Jehol. <sup>113i</sup>

LL-29-a  
 a 95. T. 4032-3  
 b 96. T. 4045, 4283  
 c 97. T. 4028  
 d 98. T. 4031, 4210  
 e 99. T. 3987  
 f 100. T. 4037-9  
 g 101. T. 4033-6  
 h 102. T. 4040-4, 4332  
 i 103. T. 4030  
 j 104. T. 4036

LL-30-a  
 a 105. T. 28606  
 b 106. T. 19976  
 c 107. T. 32373-4  
 d 108. Exh. 114, T. 733  
 e 109. T. 4690, 4905, 4688, 4673-4  
 f 110. T. 4683-6  
 g 111. T. 4688  
 h 112. T. 4690  
 i 113. T. 4780-2



5. KOISO as Minister for Overseas Affairs.

LL-31 KOISO served as Minister for Overseas Affairs in the HIRANUMA Cabinet from 7 April 1939 to 30 August 1939; and in the YONAI Cabinet from 16 January 1940 to 22 July 1940. He denied making statements attributed to him in an interview on Domei News Agency, in which he is reported to have stated that a strengthening of the German Alliance would be acceptable if Germany and Italy understood Japan's position. He remained a member of HIRANUMA's Cabinet while HIRANUMA took action to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact, but claimed the Cabinet was not told of it. Nevertheless, he admitted he heard from HARADA of HIRANUMA's message to Hitler extolling Hitler's "wisdom" and "iron will," and praising Hitler for the "noble task" in which he was engaged. KOISO admitted he had a conversation with HARADA on two occasions in May 1939, in which HARADA claims KOISO urged strengthening the Tri-Partite Pact, but he says that HARADA's diary as to the conversations is "entirely false", and was but a reflection of HARADA's "subjective view" that KOISO favored the Pact. As for his conversation with the Navy Minister in 1939, he claims he did not urge the Pact, but only asked the Navy Minister whether the Navy's thoughts in regard to the Alliance were changing.

That Koiso favored the Tri-Partite Pact is shown from the Harada Memoirs

LL-32 While he was Minister of Overseas Affairs in the YONAI Cabinet, KOISO had a meeting with Ott, in which he was said to have asked Ott to find out what Germany's attitude would be to military action by Japan in French Indo-China and the East Indies. Koiso claims that in sending his report of this conversation to Germany, Ott phrased it, so as to indicate that KOISO said what actually Ott had been telling KOISO.

- LL-31-a 114. Exh. 114, T. 784; 32231-2
  - b 115. T. 32234
  - c 116. Exh. 2214, T. 15816
  - d 117. T. 32401
  - e 118. T. 32401
  - f 119. T. 32402
- LL-3-g 120. T. 32403
  - h 121. T. 32406
  - i 122. T. 32409
  - LL-32-a 123. T. 32411
  - b 124. T. 32411



LL33 In this connection it is significant that KOISO took no affirmative action as a Cabinet member to check Japan's aggressive actions toward French Indo-China, such as the Four Ministers' Conference decision of 19 June 1940, to use force against French Indo-China, without negotiations;<sup>125 a</sup> the plan to seize the Yunnan Railway;<sup>126 b</sup> and the proposal of 22 June 1940 by Japan to France that Japanese officials be sent to French Indo-China to determine what materials would be permitted to be shipped via Indo-China to China.<sup>127 c</sup> His acquiescence in these policies, which invaded the sovereignty of French Indo-China, lend additional credence to the telegram Ott sent (supra), in which KOISO himself, as was stated, actively planned military action in the South Pacific, provided Germany would give its consent thereto.

LL-34 It would be the height of incredulity to give any credence to KOISO's claim that HARADA and Ott misrepresented him in their writings, as no substantial evidence or theory was announced by him to support this claim made by him at the hearing.

LL-35 KOISO knew in the spring of 1940 that the Japanese Foreign Office was announcing that the status quo of the Netherlands East Indies would be preserved,<sup>128 a</sup> but he says he had no knowledge of economic demands then being made on the East Indies by Japan which would have interfered with its sovereignty.<sup>129 h</sup> However, in a speech before the Budget Committee of the Diet on 17 February 1940, he stated that Japan's destiny was to advance in all directions.<sup>130 c</sup> He testified that the traditional culture of Japan embraced all ideologies<sup>131 d</sup> and could merge with all of them and advance without opposition, and he stated that he did not think any opposition to Japan's advance would arise.<sup>132 e</sup>

LL-33-a-125. Exh. 619, T. 6824  
Exh. 520, T. 6163  
b-126. Exh. 520, T. 6164-5  
c-127. Exh. 618A, T. 6851-2  
LL-35-a-128. T. 32411-12

LL-35-b-129. T. 32412  
c-130. T. 32416  
d-131. T. 32417  
e-132. T. 32418



LL-36 On 17 March 1940, KOISO spoke before the Joint Conference of the  
 Committee of Accounts, 75th Session of the Diet, recommending a two-fold  
 policy of having the South Pacific as well as the North the objectives of  
 Japan. <sup>133 a</sup> That Japan was sounding out Germany in the spring of 1940 as to her  
 attitude toward a movement south is indicated by an announcement by Ott in  
 May 1940, that Germany was not interested in the Netherlands Indies. This  
 action by Germany was considered a "carte blanche" to Japan. <sup>134</sup> Thereafter  
 further demands were made by Japan on the Netherlands, <sup>135</sup> on 20 May 1940. The  
 negotiations with the Netherlands East Indies which culminated in war were  
 begun by a note dated 2 February 1940, while KOISO was Minister of Overseas  
 Affairs, in which Japan demanded virtually unrestricted economic privileges  
 in the East Indies, <sup>136 d</sup> and while KOISO claims he knew "little" about such  
 negotiations, <sup>137 e</sup> Ott reported to his government on 24 June 1940 that KOISO  
 asked him what Germany's attitude would be to military activity by Japan  
 in Indo-China and parts of the Netherlands Indies, to which the Ambassador  
 replied that Germany would probably raise no objection provided Japan would  
 pledge herself to tie down America in the Pacific Area, perhaps by a promise  
 to attack the Philippines and Hawaii in the event of America's entry into  
 the war against Germany. <sup>138 f</sup> Later, KOISO was considered as an envoy in August  
 1940 to consummate the drastic demands against the East Indies. <sup>139 g</sup> He  
 denied that he conditioned his acceptance as envoy on being sent on a  
 battleship and being given authority to fire in case of emergency. <sup>140 h</sup>

LL-37 While Japan, during this period (February to June 1940) was asserting  
 it entertained no territorial ambitions in the East Indies and any suspicion

- |         |                             |         |                        |
|---------|-----------------------------|---------|------------------------|
| LL-36-a | 133. Exh. 2215, T. 15824-25 | LL-36-e | 137. T. 32426          |
| b       | 134. Exh. 517-9, T. 11698-9 | f       | 138. Exh. 523, T. 6174 |
| c       | 135. Exh. 1309A, T. 11787-9 | g       | 139. T. 32427          |
| d       | 136. Exh. 1309A, T. 11780-2 | h       | 140. T. 32427          |



that it intended to proceed against the East Indies was unfounded,<sup>a</sup> ~~141~~ the Japanese Foreign Minister refused to agree with a U. S. proposal 27 June 1940, to maintain the status quo, on the ground that it would "be inadvisable at this time to have Japan's activities including those in the Netherlands, restricted," ~~142~~ and on 12 and 16 July 1940, the Army, Navy and Foreign Offices of Japan discussed Japan's attitude toward the southern regions and Japan's future domination of these areas.<sup>143</sup> ~~C~~

LL-38 It was also in this period, while KOISO was a member of the YONAI Cabinet that the Japanese Government on 3 March 1940 decided to revise its economic policy in connection with diplomacy toward the United States by freeing itself from reliance, on the United States, as soon as possible, for such materials as scrap iron, petroleum, electrolytic copper, molybdenum and vanadium, and machine tools; decided to expand production of military equipment; decided to secure more intimate relations with Manchukuo and China; and decided to make further efforts to bring the southern countries within Japan's economic sphere.<sup>144</sup> ~~C~~

LL-39 The necessity for Japan to secure the raw materials for her war making plans from new sources accounts for the militant and aggressive action by Japan in her dealings with the East Indies and French Indo-China.

LL-40 While these sparring measures preliminary to war were being taken, KOISO was Minister of Overseas Affairs, ~~having responsibility for the administration not only of the territories of the Mandated Islands (i.e., the Carolines, Marshall and Marianas), the Kwantung Leased Territory, but also the occupied areas in China and the South Pacific.~~<sup>145</sup>

LL-37-a ~~141~~. Exh. 1014, T. 11685-6  
~~142~~. Exh. 1294, T. 11708-9  
~~143~~. Exh. 527-B, T. 11699

LL-38 - a ~~144~~. Exh. 1007, T. 9635-42  
~~145~~. T. 655



part of LL-40

~~Thus, KOISO had an official interest in the plans for expansion southward because it would have been his job to administer newly occupied regions if such plans were consummated. He also had a responsibility as a Cabinet member either to resign, or to denounce the several actions taken to achieve Japan's objective by pressure methods. His failure to disassociate himself from the aggressive moves, and his failure to object to continued military operations in China, which resulted in the capture of Haichow in Shantung Province on 4 March 1940; the recapture of Kaifeng on 24 April 1940, and the capture of Naichang on 12 June 1940<sup>148 a</sup> make him a party to the actions by Japan against her neighbors, violative of their treaty rights and sovereignty.~~

LL-41 All the talk about non-aggressive and self-defensive action taken in China and the South has a hollow sound when it is seen that so-called "pacification" and "defense" became the means used by Japan to achieve economic and political domination. The decisions of the Five Ministers Conference as to China illustrate the pattern established to control and exploit subjugated territories,<sup>147 a</sup> and the seizure of the whole economy of the East Indies also illustrates Japan's real purposes, and lack of candor.<sup>148 b</sup>

6. KOISO as Governor General of Korea.

LL-42 It was while KOISO was Governor General of Korea (29 May 1942 to 22 July 1944), that British POW arrived in Korea on 13 August 1942, and were publicly paraded and degraded.<sup>149 a</sup> Although he was not Governor General when this matter was arranged, the pre-existing plan to publicly degrade these "white" prisoners was carried out while he was Governor General.

LL-43 Also while he was Governor General, Japan's military forces increased to about 1,100,000 in Manchuria by January 1, 1943.<sup>150</sup> Such a vast military

LL-40-a 146. Exh. 254 & 276A, T. 3431, 3700 LL-42-a 149. Exh. 1975, T. 14522  
29415-16  
LL-41-a 147. T. 30421-29 LL-43-a 150. Exh. 706, T. 7532  
b 148. T. 12150-56



force in Manchuria, with Korea as the supply base, was <sup>necessary</sup> because the North (USSR) as well as the South (The Indies, Java and other countries), were the objectives of KOISO and others in Japan. <sup>151 b</sup>

7. KOISO as Prime Minister.

LL-44 KOISO was Premier from 22 July 1944 to 7 April 1945. <sup>152 a</sup> At the meeting of Senior Statesmen on 18 July 1944, at which the selection was made, KOISO was second choice to TERAUCHI. <sup>153</sup> OKADA, an elder statesman, wanted to re-examine the question whether KOISO could organize a truly National Cabinet. <sup>154 c</sup> General ABE was the only one who disagreed to a KOISO-YONAI Coalition Cabinet. <sup>155 d</sup> KIDO testified that when KOISO was selected, KOISO knew only three of the Senior Statesmen. <sup>156 e</sup> During KOISO's regime he made efforts to increase production of munitions and foodstuffs; bring adjustment between the state policy and the supreme command, <sup>157 f</sup> and settle the China war. <sup>158 g</sup> He tried to return to active service so that he could hold the additional post of War Minister, so that he could determine whether the war should be terminated or be fought out on the mainland of Japan, <sup>159 h</sup> but in this he was opposed by SUGIYAMA and could not carry out his plan. <sup>160 i</sup> He claimed he was thwarted in his efforts to settle the China war as a result of opposition by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs, <sup>161 j</sup> and at a later date the Emperor told him to return Miao Pin, the go-between KOISO expected to use to negotiate with Chiang Kai-Shek, to China. <sup>162 k</sup> KOISO did not explain, in this connection, how he expected to secure peace with China, in view of the unrescinded decision of the Five Ministers' Conference of 15 July 1938, which had

LL-43-b	151.	Exh. 2215, T. 15825-6, 15830	LL-44-f	157.	T. 32254
LL-44 a	152.	T. 11383-4		158.	T. 32253
b	153.	KIDO, T. 31081		159.	T. 32262
c	154.	T. 31099		160.	T. 32256
d	155.	T. 31104		161.	T. 32260
e	156.	T. 31105		162.	T. 32261



proved a stumbling block to peace since that date, and which provided in detail for Japanese supervision of military affairs, foreign relations, economic matters, religion and education in China.<sup>163-l</sup>

LL-45 KOISO, on 21 April 1942, had been made a member of the committee for the establishment of Greater East Asia.<sup>164-a</sup> The scope and purpose of Greater East Asia were discussed in the Diet in January 1942.<sup>165-h</sup> The countries to form the Greater East Asia were Japan, Manchukuo and Nanking China, as the inner core. Thailand and Indo-China were to be included.<sup>166-c</sup> The Malay Peninsula and Hongkong were to be transformed into a bulwark for the Greater East Asia.<sup>167-d</sup> The Philippines and Burma would be given independence, as puppets, on the lines of Manchukuo;<sup>168-e</sup> and the Netherlands East Indies, Australia and Chungking, China, were to be conquered by force of arms if they persisted in resisting Japan.<sup>169-f</sup> The purpose of the establishment of Greater East Asia was to extend Japan's sphere of domination over East Asia, and provide important sources of raw materials for her; prevent the flow of raw materials from the South Seas to enemy powers; secure self-sufficiency for the Army in areas of operation and cooperation with Japan by existing enterprises in occupied areas.<sup>170-g</sup>

LL-46 In accepting a place on the committee to effectuate the organization to realize the aggressive action proposed in the conquest or domination of sovereign territories, KOISO made his position with the militarists crystal clear.

LL-44-l  
LL-45-a  
LL-45-b  
LL-45-c  
LL-45-d  
LL-45-e  
LL-45-f

163.	T. 30421-2
164.	Exh. 114, T. 735
165.	T. 11339
166.	T. 11345
167.	T. 11341
168.	T. 11341-2
169.	T. 11342

LL-45-g 170. T. 11343; also see HASHIMOTO's views, T. 7348-9 15652; SHIRATORI's views, T. 3778-9; 3827-31; SUZUKI, SHIGEHASU's views, T. 7438-44; TANAKA, NAOKICHI's views, T. 7349-52.



LL-47 KOISO later announced in his speech before the 85th Diet Session in 1944<sup>171a</sup> that the real objective of Japan in the war of the Pacific was the expulsion of Anglo-American influence, the emancipation of China from oppression by those countries which had continued for 100 years, and the reconstruction of a Greater East Asia based on morality and ~~mutual~~ cooperation.<sup>172b</sup> He thereby destroyed the fictitious assertion that had been made over a period of years that Japan was only engaging in a war of defense.

LL-48 It was also while he was Prime Minister that freedom was promised to the East Indies<sup>173a</sup> but the underlying intent was to retain important places from a military standpoint by lease,<sup>174b</sup> and to retain control of the agricultural enterprises, sugar industries, public utilities, private railways, gas and power companies and newspaper plants.<sup>175c</sup> This intent was openly announced in the same month KOISO promised independence to the East Indies, by the Chief of Staff of the OSANU Army Corps, who said, "There shall be no great alterations in the operation and the business structure of the Military Government."<sup>176d</sup>

LL-49 KOISO was also Premier when on 1 February 1945 the Japanese under the pretext that French Indo-China was "lacking in sincerity" in respect to joint defense, divested French Indo-China of all semblance of sovereignty following a six hour ultimatum to place all French Indo-China military forces under Japan's control jointly with French Indo-China,<sup>177a</sup> subject, however, to the orders of the Japanese Army on matters of organization, allotment and movement.<sup>178b</sup> He also knew of the auxiliary decision to place French Indo-China

LL-47<sup>a</sup> 171 Exh. 277, T. 3703  
172 Exh. 277, T. 3715  
LL-48<sup>a</sup> 173 T. 11670; 12214-5  
174 T. 11727

LL-48- C 175 T. 12150-56  
d 176 T. 12217  
LL-49- a 177 Exh. 661, T. 7165, 32429  
b 178 T. 32429



communications and transportation under Japanese control.<sup>179</sup> This action was the realization of the plan agreed upon by the Army and Navy Imperial Headquarters on 16 April 1944, "to occupy bases in the Southern part of French Indo-China needed for a military advance into the Netherlands Indies."<sup>180 d</sup>

LL-50 KOISO's explanation that as Premier he desired to end the Pacific War, is qualified by his admitted statement that his plan was to destroy, even temporarily, the advancing power of the enemy so that Japan could thereby arrange a negotiated peace.<sup>181 a</sup> This explanation by KOISO is confirmatory of his actions while Premier to continue military operations more intensively than ever so as to perpetuate Japan's military machine in the event of termination of the war by negotiation. To strengthen the military forces, KOISO strove to adjust and harmonize state policy with the policy of the Supreme Command and also increase production of munitions and food-stuffs,<sup>182 b</sup> and to secure the real war potential of the State by redoubling efforts for prosecution of the war.<sup>183 c</sup> His failure to accomplish his objective of a more unified command and a more intense prosecution of the war, led to his resignation as Premier.<sup>184 d</sup> He resigned on 5 April 1945.<sup>185 e</sup> KIDO, in summing up his impression of KOISO, said that he did not mean to say that KOISO was particularly considered as a peace advocate.<sup>186 f</sup> The Keeper of the Seal should have known whether KOISO was in reality endeavoring to bring about peace or not. In his view, KOISO was a militarist.

LL-49-C  
179. T. 32429  
d 180. Exh. 1306, T. 11753-4  
LL-50-a  
181. T. 32252  
b 182. T. 32254

LL-50 C  
183. T. 31116  
d 184. T. 31116  
e 185. T. 31119  
f 186. T. 31243



LL-51

KOISO's explanation for continuing in many important offices although opposing the policies being put into action, was that the Japanese, by custom, bend all their efforts to prosecute a policy, once it has been decided upon. This is no answer to his participation in the schemes of the militarists over a number of years, and his knowing and willing acceptance of the benefits and offices incident to performance of duties not compulsorily imposed. And in final analysis, such subservience to a long standing tradition is no excuse for the violation of laws, treaties, customs of war and crimes against humanity.

8. KOISO's Connection with POW

LL-52

The witness YAMAZAKI<sup>188 a</sup> testified that the Prisoners of War Information Bureau was established in accordance with international treaty and was under the supervision of the Prime Minister as an outside bureau of the Cabinet.

LL-53

The same witness testified that all matters pertaining to POW in the field (whether in or outside Japan) were directed and supervised by commanders of the armies or commanders of independent divisions.<sup>189 a</sup>

LL-54

SUZUKI, Tadakatsu, testified<sup>190 a</sup> that documents relating to POW generally were sent to the Chief of the POW Information Bureau.

LL-55

Admitting these facts, it can be said that the Premier had responsibility to determine whether the procedures and policies of the Field Commanders and officials in the POW administrative services were adequate and in conformity to international law and in accordance with the dictates of humanity.

LL-56

Under the Constitution of Japan, then in force, it was the duty of the Premier to give advice to the Throne, coordinate the work of the

LL-51-a 187. T. 32431  
LL-52-a 188. T. 14882

LL-53-a 189. T. 14887  
LL-54-a 190. T. 12841



ministries and issue orders for the suspension of any administrative operation or any order by a Minister of State.<sup>191</sup> Especially on matters involving foreign nations such as POW matters, the Premier was required to know what was going on, as he had a duty as the top Cabinet advisor to the Emperor to see that activities of his Cabinet officers and their subordinates were properly performed. If the Premier knew what was going on and failed to take proper action he was guilty of wilful neglect of his duties and if he failed to apprise himself of what was going on he was equally guilty for neglecting his duties. Viewed in this light, it must be concluded that KOISO, as Prime Minister is chargeable with such crimes against POW, as occurred during the time he held the office of Premier.

9. KOISO's Actions in Relation to Counts in the Indictment

- LL-57 (a) Counts 1-17. KOISO's connection with HASHIMOTO, NINOMIYA, TATEKAWA, OKAWA and others in fostering a strong nationalistic spirit in the Army, and demanding territorial expansion by force if necessary, and movement by Japan in all four directions, with ultimate absorption of other countries through political and economic control, falls under these counts. Paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 herein connect Koiso with the conspiracy counts and with the waging of aggressive war.
- (b) Count 18. As Chief of Staff of Kwantung Army, he was responsible for the military movement into Jehol, and the North China provinces.
- (c) Count 26. Testimony of TABAKA<sup>192</sup> that KOISO ordered concentration of troops. However, this is denied by KOISO.<sup>193</sup> *There is a conflict of testimony on this count. The*
- (d) Counts 27-36. Violation of the Nine Power Treaty in Manchuria and China.

(e) Count 44. By participating in the conspiracy, he is charged with

LL-56-a 191. T. 534

LL-57-a 192. T. 22751-6

b 193. T. 32232-3, 32439-41; and by KITANO R 32511-13.



~~the crimes of his co-conspirators in so far as they procured or  
permitted the murder of POW on a wholesale scale.~~

(b) Count 48. As KOISO was Governor General of KOREA on 18 June 1944,  
he is chargeable only in this count for acts of his co-conspirators.

(f) Counts 49-50. As KOISO was Premier on 8 August 1944, he is charge-  
able only as a participant in the group perpetrating the crimes  
alleged.

(g) Count 51. As KOISO was Minister of Overseas Affairs in the summer  
of 1939, he is guilty only as a participant in the group perpetrating  
the crimes alleged.

(h) Counts 54-55. As to treatment of POW, KOISO is chargeable as an  
accomplice in the execution of the plans to violate international  
law.



3 November 1947

DEFENSE -

KOISO - Direct (cont'd)

Page

- 32243 \* In relation to his answer to the question on southern expansion raised by House of Representatives Member FUKUDA on 17 March 1940 (Exhibit 2215-A), the reply KOISO made at the outset that he agreed with FUKUDA did not mean he approved of the method proposed by him but only that he agreed it was necessary to pay attention to economic movement in the south. The fact that KOISO held the opinion that the southern regions were not suitable for large scale Japanese immigration because of climate and customs \* was clear from the reply. There was no military significance to the discussion.

32244

According to Exhibit 1309, the arrangement of sending Ambassador SAWADA to NEI as the Economic Envoy in July 1940, was dropped because of KOISO. However, KOISO did not know that SAWADA had been intended to be the envoy nor did he know that the plan was later changed. KOISO declined the offer of the Premier and Foreign Minister to become Economic Envoy because he was not suited for it. KOISO stated he was Premier from 22 July 1940 to 7 April 1945.

32245

Matters mentioned in Exhibit 651 were decided by the Supreme Council on 1 February 1945. In view that some measures need to be taken to defend NEI in the face of the situation whereby the U.S. forces had already landed in the Philippines \* and their planes were raiding NEI and there existed the possibility of a U.S. landing there coupled with the attitude of FIC forces which became non-cooperative with the Japanese, it had been decided at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War that measures be taken to have the armed forces and a constabulary in FIC re-organized under the control of a Japanese Commander but to leave the date and execution of this decision of the Commander and diplomatic representatives on the spot who should obtain the consent of the Governor General of FIC to the Japanese request and to make efforts to arrange to put it into execution peacefully. These measures were taken by the authorities on the spot on 9 March 1945, but KOISO had no connection or responsibility as its execution was within the competence of the Supreme Command.

32246

\* Responsibility for the treatment of POWs and internees rested with the Central Command and the Premier could not participate according to constitutional stipulations. He was allowed to attend Imperial Headquarters on 16 March 1945, only three weeks before his resignation. This privilege was confined to listening to reports on the progress of war operations and was not extended to allow his participation directly in the Supreme Command. Thus,



Page he had no responsibility for the treatment of POWs and during the three or four meetings of Headquarters staff officers, he was allowed to attend, he was not informed about mistreatment of POWs nor was there such a discussion.

32247 The prosecution had alleged that the atrocities and mistreatment of POWs were well known before he was appointed Premier, \* but there was no public knowledge about such matters. He knew nothing about them since he was in Korea from May 1942 to July 1944 and he believed only those directly in charge of POWs knew about the existence of such problems. The possession of short-wave radios was prohibited both to civilians and officials and the accused did not possess such a radio, hear the Eden broadcasts, nor was any report ever made to him about such matters. Censorship might also count for the lack of public knowledge. Furthermore, the notification to be issued by the Vice War Minister on the treatment of POWs, according to Exhibits 2012 to 14, was outside the Premier's duties and did not require being reported to him. The dates cited by the Prosecution of almost all the protests or inquiries from foreign countries regarding the treatment of POWs, sea victims and internees \* were at the time when he was not Premier and even if a few did come during his tenure, he received no reports about them from the Foreign Minister. Therefore, he knew nothing about them and did not investigate. He firmly believed that POWs were being treated properly and the cases described in Court of cruel and inhuman acts were beyond his imagination and it never occurred to him to suggest any investigation while he was Premier.

32248

In Dec. 1941 he was invited to a party by an acquaintance YAMANAKA and there he expressed his view opposing the opening of hostilities, saying he desired to avert the opening of war and stating his reasons.

32249 \* On receiving word he was to stand trial, KOISO went voluntarily to SUGAMO on 23 Nov. 1945 and at that time carried with him a letter from Mrs. Yamanaka to his wife which stated that she recalled what KOISO had said, and that he was far-sighted.

When KOISO's belongings were examined, he made a plea that he wanted to keep the letter since it was a part of his personal evidence, but it was taken from him and he was told it would be returned when necessary. He had approached the prison authorities, asking for the return of the letter but had been unable to get it back as he was told it had been lost.

32250 \* KOISO consistently maintained a view opposing war with America and Britain; this could be shown in a statement of Major General Piggot, the British Military Attache, which showed that



Page Piggot visited KOISO in 1939 and KOISO expressed the opinion that relations with America and Britain must be improved and they must avoid resorting to arms.

Exhibit 277 stated that in the administrative policy speech delivered to the Diet on 7 Sept. 1944 as Premier, KOISO declared that the independence of NEI would be recognized.

32251

\* The facts were that according to military administration reports, natives had long wished for independence and had been wholeheartedly cooperating with the military and their national consciousness had increased. On consultation, the Supreme Council agreed that it was necessary to take steps to recognize their independence and KOISO submitted the matter to the Cabinet Conference, obtained its approval, and made a statement of the policy to the Diet, and steps were taken to prepare for its effectuation. In this speech it was stated that, concentrating all efforts, KOISO wished to gather national strength together with national unity to achieve the war's end in accordance with the expected operation of the armed forces which would soon be realized to destroy America and Britain.

32252

The accused submitted that this was a speech any Premier would make under the circumstances for they were on the defensive and the allies threatened to destroy Japan. \* His real intention behind the statement was that they could no longer hope for final victory so now that the Army and Navy were anticipating a decisive battle in the near future, if they would destroy temporarily the advance of the enemy, it might be that by taking advantage of such opportunity they might plan to bring about the end of the war and arrange for negotiated peace. This idea was also maintained by members of the Supreme Council for Direction of War and Cabinet members.

32253

\* The Supreme Council also devised two schemes for peace which proved it also had the will to end the war. One of these measures was through the good offices of the Chungking administration and the other through the Soviet. It was KOISO's plan that if both measures bid fair to be successful, the one through Chungking would be limited to peace between Japan and China, while the peace in the Pacific War would be primarily through the mediation of the USSR. For this purpose they hastened a direct communication route with Chungking and tried to despatch proper representatives to the Soviet in addition to the ambassador there. However, the project of the Army and Navy which was to destroy the advance of the enemy ended in a failure in the Philippines and adjacent areas and all measures for terminating the war confronted various obstacles.



3 November 1947  
DEFENSE  
KOISO - Direct

Page

32254

\* During this time the war situation became increasingly unfavorable and KOISO devised to bring about further adjustment and harmonization of state policy and the Supreme Command and also increase production, thereby they would be enabled to have an accurate idea as to the substance of their war potential and it was his desire to make a prompt decision on future policy. As to harmonization of policy and Supreme Command, he obtained Imperial sanction to create the Supreme War Directing Council to be a more simplified and powerful organ concerned with the Liaison Council of the government and Supreme Command.

32255

With regard to increased production, all efforts were concentrated to achieve this. However, the Supreme Council did not come up to his expectations and was ineffective and the Supreme Command was prone to develop in unexpected directions without the Premier's knowledge. \* Reduction of war potential accelerated owing to increasing bombing damages. To eliminate defective points, KOISO was authorized to attend the Headquarters Conferences by order of the Imperial Command, but being bound by the constitutional provisions, had no opportunity to take active part in matters pertaining to operations and tactics. To improve defects in production, efforts were made to remove manufacturing establishments to places of safety. Because of difficulties, they were hardly able to obtain expected results. A War Minister being engaged in affairs relating both to state policy and the Supreme Command could not only be well informed of war potential but also be aware of even secret plans with regard to operations and tactics. On the other hand, he was authorized in the scope of military operation \* to apply military force, equipment, etc. to fields most necessary to strengthen war potential. KOISO asked for Imperial sanction to return to the active list so he could hold the additional post of War Minister. He, as Premier, was resolved to extirpate the two big defects and thus to prosecute his policy.

32256

On 3 April 1945 he suggested to War Minister SUGIYAMA the plan of the Premier holding the additional post of War Minister, but met SUGIYAMA's opposition. Upon consultation with YONAI, cooperator in the joint cabinet, KOISO applied for resigning from the Premiership, wishing for the realization of a new and more powerful cabinet.

32257

On 5 April 1945 he resigned as Premier and permanently withdrew from public life. At no time did he have conversation with any of the accused or anyone else involving the planning, scheming, and conspiring as alleged in the indictment. \* He had no official or personal relations with DOIHARA, HASHIMOTO, HOSHINO, KAYA, KIMURA, MUTO, OKA, OSHIMA, SHIMADA, TOGO and TOJO. He did not become



## NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

3 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Direct

Page acquainted, either officially or personally, with MINAMI, until 1939; HATA, 1908; ARAKI, 1918; MATSUI, 1920; UMEZU, 1925; SATO, 1929; SUZUKI, 1930; SHIRATORI, 1931; KIDO, 1932; HIRANUMA, 1932; ITAGAKI, 1932; HIROTA, 1944; SHIGEMITSU, 1944.

32258 On further oral examination, the accused was asked about the reliability of Miao Pin. He stated that he had occasion to meet him twice in 1939 \* and learned that Miao Pin was a staunch advocate of Japanese-Chinese friendship and was also a very close friend of Ho Ying-chin, a leader in the Chungking Government.

Although Miao Pin was nominated president of the Nanking Legislative Yuan under Wang Chingwei, he was demoted to the post of Vice Chief of the Examination Board because of intercourse with the Chungking Regime. He constantly kept contact with Chungking by wireless, and people were sent him from Chungking for liaison. Upon Miao's arrival in Tokyo, he showed KOISO a telegram from Chungking, stating that that regime approved of his trip but that he should not go beyond the scope of the peace terms stipulated by Chungking.

32259 The points in the peace terms said to have been set forth by the Chungking Government were \* (1) with regard to the Manchurian question, a separate agreement should be made; (2) Japan would completely withdraw her forces from China; (3) Japan should detain all leaders of the Wang Chingwei Regime in Nanking, in Japan; (4) The Chungking Regime would establish in Nanking for the time being a government in absentia and place in that government\* leaders of the Chungking Regime; (5) The Chungking Government would return to Nanking within 3 months; and (6) Japan should make peace with the US and Britain.

32260 \* KOISO endeavored to establish a direct line of communication with Chungking by using the services of Miao Pin. Asked if his projected peace moves were opposed he replied that he invited Miao to Japan with the approval of the Minister of War and Navy and Foreign Affairs. However, when these ministers were received in audience by the Emperor they expressed disapproval of the idea in early April 1945. Asked if that was before the report was made to the Throne on his plan for direct peace negotiations, he replied he thought it was on March 27 that he first reported to the Throne in connection with the Miao Pin matter. At that time the Emperor did not express \* approval or disapproval but asked whether KOISO intended to continue peace efforts through Miao Pin, and KOISO answered that that was his intention.

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He thought it was on April 2 that he was given an audience by the Emperor and on that occasion the Emperor said that the



3 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Direct - Cross

Page War, Navy and Foreign Ministers had expressed disagreement and disapproval of the idea. The Emperor then instructed KOISO to return Miao Pin immediately to China but did not rebuke him.

Asked what other peace plans he tried as to U.S. and Britain, he replied that he made efforts to send special envoy to Moscow in addition to the ambassador there to make preparations for peace moves vis a vis the U.S. and Britain. He had Ambassador SATO in Moscow take this up with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs but this meant refusal on the part of Soviet authorities.

32262 \* Asked why he sought reinstatement into active service and if it was for the purpose of redoubling his efforts for the prosecution of war as testified by KIDO (T. 31248), he replied that KIDO's testimony was wrong. His idea in connection with this had already been set forth in his affidavit. By holding the office of War Minister concurrently, his intention was to bring about increased war production and thereby, from the standpoint of the High Command, get an overall picture of national strength, and on the basis of this, wished to decide whether it would be preferable immediately to bring an end to the war, or if the Army advocated holding the final and decisive battle on the mainland and then bring about an end to the war.

32263 Asked if he would have had a means of knowing secret plans as War Minister that he did not have as Premier, he replied that the War and Navy Ministers, because they handle matters of state and matters of the High Command, \* to bring about harmony between the two, they were able to know in advance military plans and operations and tactics before any decision was reached on such plans. It was necessary to understand and fully grasp the relationship of war and the termination of war to have more control if he was working out peace plans. Following this opposition, he resigned on 5 April 1945.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FURNESS  
Council for SHIGAMITSU

The witness stated that he did not know what happened to Miao Pin after the war but had heard some report to the effect that he was tried and executed as a traitor.

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\* DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. YAMADA  
Council for IEAGAKI

The witness stated that so far as he knew, the March Incident had nothing whatever to do with the Manchurian Incident, nor had he



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD

3 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Direct

Page 5167

Page heard of any Kwantung Army officer participating or being connected with the March or October Incidents, the May 15 Incident or the February 26 Incident.

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\* DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. LOGAN  
Council for KIDO

32267 The witness stated that with regard to his holding the post of War Minister concurrently, he had talks with War Minister SUGIYAMA because if that was not possible, there was no need for his applying for reinstatement into active service. Therefore, he did not apply. Asked if he did not seek it from SUGIYAMA without making actual application, he replied that expression of the desire to hold the post of War Minister amounted to asking for reinstatement into active service. \* At that time the war situation was deteriorating and he was eager to increase war production.



Page \* CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COLONEL FIXEL

- 32268 Asked if he was convinced of Miao Pin's authority to act as a liaison for the Chungking Government, he replied that because he was unable to trust him one hundred per cent, he made efforts to ascertain whether he was actually trustworthy. Asked if it was not true that one of the matters he wanted Miao Pin to confirm was his authority from Chungking, and if it was not true that the only way he could check this was to get into radio communication with Chungking, he replied that this was generally so. As he had said before, Miao Pin was for the most part originally related to the Chungking regime. At first it was KOISO's idea that Miao Pin did not have qualifications to act as China's representative in connection with peace.
- 32269 \* Utilization of Miao Pin was only to the extent of establishing direct communication with Chungking. If such contact would be established, it was KOISO's intention to present the matter before the Supreme Council to study and discuss peace terms. Unless the Chungking government sent a bona fide representative, it was not Japan's intention to enter into peace talks. Neither he nor the government considered Miao Pin a Chungking representative in connection with peace with China.
- 32270 \* Their only intention was to utilize him for direct communication with Chungking.
- 32271 KOISO entertained doubts that Miao Pin had any form of contact with Chungking, as he claimed,\* to do with wireless apparatus, and so KOISO arranged to have Miao Pin bring his wireless apparatus to Tokyo with him as well as his operator. They had Miao Pin actually communicate through this apparatus with Chungking and at that time intercepted the message to find out whether everything was bona fide. Asked if it was not a fact that Miao Pin came to Tokyo without his radio apparatus and that the Japanese refused to fly it from Shanghai, he stated that in his affidavit there were various impediments in the way.
- 32272 \* It was scheduled that Miao Pin was to bring the apparatus to Tokyo as well as the operator and representative from Chungking, but because he came alone further steps were taken to bring the apparatus and operating personnel later on. Asked if he didn't previously testify that Miao Pin brought the apparatus and by means of it was able to communicate with Chungking, he replied that Miao Pin said that he was able to communicate with Chungking by his wireless. But unless it was actually tested, it was impossible for him to ascertain whether



Page

he was actually in a position to do so, and since they could not test it, they were unable to ascertain that. They got information that there was a person with a wireless in Peking who was in communication with Chungking, so they made efforts to bring from Peking to Tokyo this personnel and apparatus there.

32273 \* The accused stated he had no recollection of ever being named director of the Kokuhonsha Society, nor did he hold any office in that society. At the time he was a regimental commander he became a member out of a desire to read a publication of the organization. He thought he became a member in 1924 and continued in its membership until the society disappeared. \* He attended one meeting of the organization but not the one to which the accused MINAMI was a speaker in July 1931. He had no recollection at the meeting he attended whether MINAMI was present. HIRANUMA was present but he did not know whether ARAKI was.

32275 He had no positive recollection that HIRANUMA was a director but knew the accused HIRANUMA was president. Asked if the purposes of the Kokuhonsha were mainly to foster nationalism, bolster \* the state foundations, and exalt national spirit, he replied that nobody ever explained to him its real nature, but from what he had read in the publication of the organization his understanding was that its purpose was to support a true understanding of Japan's true nature and spirit.

32276 \* Asked if that interested him as a regimental officer to the point he joined, he replied that at that time the domestic situation was confusing and Japan's fundamental character not fully clarified, and he thought it a good thing to secure an understanding of their true character and spirit through the magazine of the organization and that led to his membership. It was his understanding that it was absolutely not the case that the organization hoped to accomplish its aims in part by political measures. He did not recall becoming interested in May 1932 in advocating HIRANUMA as premier, but when asked whom he thought would be good as the next premier, he might have replied that HIRANUMA might have been the best man. \* He did not recall making such a statement to KIDO, nor whom he made the statement to. At the time he made the statement he did not recall whether he was Vice War Minister.

32277



3 November 1947

Defense - KOISO - Cross

Page

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\* Reference was made to the affidavit where it was stated that KOISO first met KIDO in April 1932. It appeared that KIDO, in his diary in May 1932, recorded that KOISO seemed to be in favor of HIRANUMA for premier. The accused was asked to state the circumstances under which he met KIDO and their conversation at that time. He replied that Parliamentary Vice-Minister of War DOKI told him that members of the House of Peers were meeting at the Kazanhan and invited KOISO there with him. There he met KIDO, but in his recollection, the first time he ever talked with him was in 1939 \* when they were both in the HIRANUMA cabinet.

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The premiership of Japan was a political office. \* Asked if the rule prohibiting officers from engaging in political activities applied to the Vice War Minister at the time he held that office, he replied that the war and navy vice ministers were considered civil officials according to regulations, although an active officer could not resign his post at his personal request, the service vice ministers might, at times of cabinet changes, be relieved of their duties at their own request. In the war and navy departments, when appointments were made as officers, the term "hosu" or "assignment" was used, but in the case of vice ministers the word "ninzu" or "appointment" was used.

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"The accused stated he was at no time a member of the Sakurakai. Asked if in early January 1931 he was a party to discussions for measures reforming Japan to which UGAKI, SUGIYAMA, NINOMIYA, HASHIMOTO and others were present, he replied that an excerpt from the KIDO diary, which he recalled was exhibit 179-F, was probably referred to, but there was completely no foundation. He had never attended such a meeting. There was no movement within the war ministry to foster the political activities of UGAKI in early 1931. At that time he was not acquainted with the accused HASHIMOTO, but had been acquainted with TATEKAWA since August 1931. He knew him before that but was not intimate.

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There was no such thing as a group in the War Department while he was chief in the military affairs bureau in 1931 that favored military force in connection with UGAKI's appearance on the political field. Reference was made to the affidavit where it described a plan OKAWA proposed KOISO take up with UGAKI. The accused was asked, if, in a voluntary statement, he had not given OKAWA's plan to be one to confuse



Page

32283 the Diet by hurling bombs at it; attack the Metropolitan Police force, and bring about a situation whereby public peace could not be maintained except by military force; then to guide the situation to where martial law would be necessitated; \* to make the cabinet responsible for it and resign en bloc; let UGAKI offer to save the situation; take measures to make it possible that the Imperial Order would be given to organize the next cabinet. As for measures to save the situation, it was enough that they were to be planned after Imperial Order was given.

Asked if he got that statement from OKAWA in March 1931 when he visited the accused in the War Ministry, he replied that this probably took place the end of February and a visit was made to his own house. At that time OKAWA expressed such ideas. It had already been made clear to the tribunal that the bomb used was a sort of paper bomb used in maneuvers, and not real bombs. Asked if when he spoke of firecrackers in his affidavit if he really meant bombs, he replied that when OKAWA came to see him in February 1931, he used the word "bombs."

32284 \* Asked if, as a matter of fact, the army in 1931 was not using firecrackers in artillery practice, he replied,  
32285 "Yes, . . . these firecrackers were used." He referred to this article as dummy or blank shells, and at that time did not know through whose hands they were delivered to OKAWA and his group. Asked if he later found out that Major-General TATEKAWA of the General Staff office had released the bombs and that they were delivered by HASHIMOTO, or under his direction, he replied that when he went to the vice chief of staff to warn that it was improper to have general staff officers  
32286 approach such a person as OKAWA, the vice chief reported that the dummy shells were delivered from TATEKAWA to OKAWA's group. Since then he did not know by whose hand they were delivered and it was in the Tribunal that he heard for the first time that HASHIMOTO was one of those responsible for delivery of the bombs.

32287 \* Asked if, after OKAWA outlined the plot to him, he took any action to have him arrested, he replied that he believed that if he succeeded in having OKAWA and his group abandon the reckless plan, he did not think there was any need to arrest them. Asked if he had the same opinion with reference to army officers who participated, he replied that because he believed such plottings highly improper, he went to



Page

32288 the vice chief of staff to warn him it was highly improper. KOISO had no authority to issue any indictment or make charges. Asked if he recommended to anyone who had authority to file charges to do so, he replied that if there was any necessity to file charges, there was no need to await his warning and, inasmuch as he went to the General Staff \* with the warning to stop such rash action, he believed the general staff did take appropriate steps. With regard to filing charges, the accused stated he did not do anything.

Asked if he examined the plan that OKAWA brought to him the first time he brought it, he replied that when he heard the plan explained he told OKAWA point blank that it must be immediately abandoned. Colonel NAGATA was under KOISO as chief of the military affairs section.

32289 \* Asked if, after he had determined that the plan was reckless, he ordered NAGATA to examine the plan for its consistency, he replied that \* he warned OKAWA to abandon the plan but he did not accept h's advice. Thereupon he reported to War Minister UGAKI that what OKAWA wanted to submit to him was a matter in which the war minister could not be involved. UGAKI then ordered KOISO to ask OKAWA to submit the plan in writing and so KOISO met OKAWA again.

32291 KOISO tried his best to decipher the document submitted but could not do so and asked OKAWA to read the contents. \* KOISO took the explanation down with pencil and brought the original document and his memorandum to the war minister. Although KOISO compared his notes with the document, he could find no consistency in the plan, and so he ordered NAGATA to find out whether there was consistency.

32292 At that time he had already made up his mind that the plan was not workable. Asked if he had nevertheless ordered NAGATA to examine the plan for its consistency after he decided it was an improper plan, he replied that it was not so. The matter had to be reported to the war minister and no explanation could be offered on any plan in which there could not be found consistency. That was why he ordered NAGATA to discover \* whether there was consistency so a logical report could be made.

Asked if he thought a plan to blow up the Diet and cause a coup d'etat in the government could be made consistent, he replied because the plan itself was highly inconsistent



Page

32293 he warned OKAWA to abandon the idea. Asked if it was correct that he disapproved of the plan himself and then turned it over to his subordinate to try to improve it, he replied any such order to NAGATA was not given by him. After submitting the document to UGAKI, KOISO saw him one or two days later and asked for his reaction. UGAKI condemned the plan, using the explanation, "Could such an absurd thing be adopted?"  
\* Very apparently UGAKI opposed the plan.

Asked if after he had been given this information by the war minister if it was not a fact that he continued to have NAGATA still work to have the plan made consistent, he replied that was without foundation. He had stated in his affidavit that army prestige would be injured if the bombs had remained outstanding, so he desired to secure their return. Asked if OKAWA or one of his henchmen had the bombs at that time, he replied that he heard later that one of OKAWA's followers had them. That person was SHIMIZU, who appeared as a witness before the tribunal.

32294 Reference was made to the affidavit where it was stated KOISO intervened with TOKUGAWA to secure the return of the bombs and the accused was asked when he first asked TOKUGAWA's help, \* he replied that it was around March 17 or 18 that he asked the return of the bombs through other persons. At that time, not only the return of the bombs was demanded but also it was requested that OKAWA be commanded to abandon the plan entirely and they succeeded in this as a result of TOKUGAWA's efforts.

KOISO did not know whether the dummy bombs were actually returned by OKAWA or transferred from OKAWA to TOKUGAWA, nor did he know whether TOKUGAWA talked to OKAWA about the bombs.

32295 \* It was only once that he met TOKUGAWA personally and asked for good offices to bring about a return of the bombs. Asked again how many times he requested OKAWA, SHIMIZU, TOKUGAWA, or anyone else to return the bombs before they were returned, he replied that he asked OKAWA only once. It was not a fact that he got the bombs back to the war department until March 1932 for they were returned around December 1931. It was not so that the bombs were kept that length of time, having in view the incident of October 1931.



Page

- 32296 \* Asked why, if he was so afraid of army prestige, what prevented him from sending a army truck out to the place where the bombs were, and seizing them, he replied that the dummy shells were delivered to OKAWA by General Staff officers, and any attempt to have them returned was the business of the General Staff and not the chief of the military affairs bureau. Asked why he was intermeddling in the matter for if it was a matter for the General Staff to secure the bombs back, he replied that this was actually the duty of the General Staff as it involved its officers, but inasmuch as the General Staff's efforts were far from sufficient, and inasmuch as the bombs should not, under any circumstances, be in the possession of civilians, and because the matter reflected upon the army's prestige, KOISO in his capacity, as chief of the military affairs bureau, undertook the job of trying to get the bombs back.
- 32297 \* Asked if he meant to tell the tribunal that he had to virtually beg a civilian to intervene in behalf of the War Ministry to secure the return of these shells which were War Department property, he replied that the shells were not the property of the War Ministry, but of the artillery school.
- 32298 \* The artillery school was under the jurisdiction of the inspector general of military education. Asked if the artillery school was not also connected with the military affairs bureau, he replied that the school was a training institute under the inspector general.
- 32299 The army had three distinct branches, the War Ministry, the Inspector \* General of Military Education, and the General Staff Headquarters. I did not say the shells were the property of the general staff. The general staff officers made arrangements to have the shells delivered to OKAWA's group but the shells were the property of the organization under the inspector general. He did not know if the inspector general knew that some of his bombs were in the possession of a civilian.
- 32300 \* Asked if he did not know that the matter of disposing and ruling Manchuria and Mongolia was undergoing studies prior to July 1931 in the War Ministry, he replied that he did not know, that such a thing was highly impossible.
- 32301 \* Asked if he knew an officer named SHIMANUKI and if he was a subordinate of the accused in July 1931, he replied he did not know whether it was before or to 1932 but he thought



Page

there was a captain by that name who was an army officer in the military administration section. There was a section within the bureau called the military section in 1931. Asked if he recalled the communication that came to the military affairs bureau and was acted upon in the military service section, received from military policy commander MINE in which he submitted an estimate of his requirements in connection with the occupation of Manchuria and Mongolia, KOISO replied that there may have been but he had no recollection.

32302 \* When shown a document he was asked to refer to a portion thereof being a letter of 25 July 1931 from the commander of the military policy to the war minister in reference to a study of the reorganization of the military policy forces in Manchuria, the accused acknowledged that the document bore the seal of SHIMANUKI and he admitted the truth of the contents of the document.

32303 Exhibit 3376, the document was identified by the accused being a report to War Minister MINAMI from MINE dated 25 July 1941 with the seal of the Provost Marshal on it and marked "Secret" was entitled "Study on the Organization of MP Force in Manchuria." It stated that they had no need to enlarge on the fact that in the future war, the Empire should secure complete possession of Manchuria and Mongolia from the standpoint of maintaining fighting ability and self sufficiency.

32304 The management and administration of Manchuria and Mongolia was being studied by responsible organs, and with this the necessity of inquiry on the MP in the occupied area was also evident. The necessity of the MP activities in enforcing military administration had been proved by a \* number of wars and was clearly increasing due to the tendency of recent warfare more of a psychological nature.

As to the present situation in Manchuria and Mongolia, pending ~~problems~~ between Japan and China were being aggravated, and Japanese MP in Manchuria were greatly ~~increasing~~ with activity. He believed it most necessary and timely to consider the changing phases of future military operations, and to study the application, strength, etc., of the MP. The gist of the writer's opinion was that if a complete military occupation of a certain area in Manchuria and Mongolia was planned, a minimum force of about 5,000 MP, with the addition



Page

32305 of some Chinese and Korean MP assistants, besides a part of the occupation garrison, was required to maintain peace and order. However the whole number of MP was \* far from sufficient to meet the requirement. To increase this organization the full number of the Kwantung MP should be revised and increased, and exceptions for extraordinary drafting should be provided for. The total number of MP requirements in Manchuria would be about 5,000 with approximately 20,000 Chinese (Korean) auxiliaries.

The basis of the estimation approves on the whole the "Study on the Administration of the Occupied Territories in Manchuria and Mongolia," compiled by Kwantung Army Headquarters. Namely, about 25,000 MP would be placed in the hypothetical administrative area of about 45,000 square "ri" with a population of about 27,000,000, which rate being one MP for a population of about 1100 in an area of 1.8 square "ri."

32307 \* Asked if in September 1931 he felt there was a very critical situation in Manchuria, he replied the period could not be confined to the single month of September, but for a period of one or two years previously. Due to pending issues in China and Manchuria, feelings between Japan and China were becoming aggravated. Asked if he asked MINAMI's consent to take the matter up with the general staff to seek a decision as to what should be done with reference to the ultimate dispatch of TATEKAWA to Mukden, he replied he had one conversation with MINAMI in connection with TATEKAWA's dispatch.

32308 Asked if he had a conversation with MINAMI with reference to the critical situation in Manchuria in early September, he replied \* that the situation between Japan and China and Manchuria was becoming more critical and in the light of the strength of the Japanese army, he expressed his opinion to the War Minister and Vice Minister that no matter what happened, if trouble broke out, it should be settled peacefully and so must be avoided.

Asked if he got MINAMI's permission to talk the matter over with general staff, he replied he had never received any such permission or order. Asked if he went to the general staff to discuss the question taken up with MINAMI about which KOISO was so fearful, he replied he expressed the same opinion to the vice chief of the general staff.



Page

32309 Asked if he expressed that opinion in a personal or official capacity, he replied he received no instructions from MINAMI, but before becoming chief of the military affairs bureau of the war office, \* he was chief of the material mobilization and procurement bureau and was familiar with the situation of the armed forces, as well as the condition of the war production industry, and after becoming military affairs bureau chief, he obtained a far better understanding of the situation between China and Japan. With this background he expressed the opinion in his position as a bureau chief.

When he expressed this opinion only the vice chief of staff NINOMIYA was present. He did not mention TATEKAWA to NINOMIYA as a suitable person to be entrusted with the mission to stop an outbreak in Manchuria and he never mentioned it at any other time with any person connected with the general staff.

32310 \* He did not recall the date when he found out that TATEKAWA was selected to go to Manchuria on orders of the general staff, but did recall that a telephone message was sent from the vice chief of staff to the military affairs bureau to that effect before the outbreak of the Mukden incident. Asked if it was not a fact that he received the information several days before the outbreak, he stated he had no clear recollection as to dates. He had not had clear recollection as to dates two years before when he gave a written statement to Major Hummel of IPS in connection with this point.

32311 \* The accused was asked if it was stated in such statement that it was expected TATEKAWA would arrive at Kwantung army headquarters by September 15 at the latest. He replied this must be a mistake in recollection on the part of the prosecutor. He had not said anything of the kind to Major Hummel. The date "15th" was written on a memo, but if his affidavit was reread it would be understood that after entering Sugamo Prison he had tried to trace his faint recollection to approach as accurate a date as possible. But it was inescapable that he might be mistaken as to dates as well as facts.

32322 \* Asked if it was not expected that TATEKAWA would appear at Kwantung army headquarters by at least 15 September

32323 \* 1931, he replied that there was some error in notes made on



Page

his memorandum sheet. The notes should have been that to his inquiry of the vice chief of staff, whether there was any report from TATEKAWA, the vice chief replied that it was about time for TATEKAWA to arrive in Manchuria, and probably he was holding discussions with the Kwantung army commander, for as yet there was no reply from him. The accused now felt that it was a mistake on his part to have written the 15th on his memo.

Asked if it was also a mistake when he stated in his memorandum that TATEKAWA spent many days discussing the Manchurian situation with the Kwantung army headquarter's staff, and that was why he was delayed in getting to Mukden, KOISO replied that he had absolutely not written such a thing in his memorandum.

32324 \* He did not know what kind of instructions TATEKAWA received before he left for Mukden, nor on what day he departed. Asked if he still said that after TATEKAWA departed and he received a message from the general staff that he was on his way, he didn't know what he was going there for, he replied that was not so. He knew his purpose in going to Manchuria but he did not know what the instruction was. Asked if the purpose of TATEKAWA's going was not to prevent the outbreak of an incident, he replied the purpose of the mission was that whatever might be the situation, patience and forbearance must be exercised.

32325 \* There was telephone communication at that time between Tokyo, Port Arthur, and Mukden. Asked why such a slow and uncertain method of communicating a simple request or decision of the general staff was adopted, if telegraph communication was available, he replied that in the light of the situation within the army and in order to have the chief of staff and war minister's ideas thoroughly understood, a person carrying such detailed information should be dispatched.

32326 \* He did not discuss the purpose of TATEKAWA's trip with him before he left for Mukden. This TATEKAWA was the same person of the general staff who was instrumental in releasing bombs to OKAWA the previous March. TATEKAWA's failure to proceed expeditiously to Mukden and his failure to deliver the orders upon his arrival in Mukden was not because the accused and TATEKAWA had a prearranged plan to permit a incident to occur. He had heard that this was in the HARADA



3 November 1947  
Defense - KOISO - Cross

Page

32327 diary but it was completely without foundation and a falsehood. Asked if while he was chief of the military affairs bureau, the Kwantung army was guiding the intelligence movement in Manchukuo for establishing a regency after the outbreak of the Manchurian incident, \* he replied that on 15 November war minister MINAMI sent instructions to the Kwantung Army commander that the army should not under any circumstances participate in political questions centering around Pu-Yi. The accused thought the Kwantung army was not doing anything of the kind in pursuance of this instruction.

32329 Asked if the document forwarded by Kwantung army chief of staff MIYAKI to the war vice minister about 5 December 1931 dealing with the policy of the intelligence movement guidance came to his attention, he replied he had no recollection. When shown this report he was asked whether it passed through his office while he was chief of the military affairs bureau and if he admitted the truth of its contents, he stated that \* it was a document upon which he had never cast his eyes. Its contents seemed to be personal opinions and were never adopted. Neither his own seal nor that of the section chief appeared on it and it only bore the seal of one SUZUKI. It did not pass through the military affairs section, \* but the

32330 military administration section.



Page  
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\* The accused was asked if it appeared in the document that two copies of the appendix were retained by the Military Administration (Affairs) Section. He replied that he could not find the seal of the Chief of the Military Administration Section, and it was impossible to ascertain how many copies were kept in its custody. When the document apparently came to his bureau, he felt sure that both he and the Section Chief were on duty.

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Asked if it was not true that a document of this nature involving an important policy matter would have been brought to his attention by a section sub-chief before it went to the Vice Minister, he replied that if it were of such importance as to be shown to the Vice-Minister, it would first be shown to the Military Affairs Bureau Chief. \* On looking over the document, it had come to him that if the seal of someone acting for the section chief appeared, it should also bear the words "by" or "proxy".

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The SUZUKI whose name appeared on the document was one of his subordinates and a member of the Military Administration Section. The accused recalled that with such drafts when there was a doubt whether it was worth sending on to be adopted as final policy, lower section members would often send it semi-officially to their section chief, and after studying it if he decided it was worthwhile adopting, it would be sent through official channels in its final form. \* He could see no indication that this document was ever adopted by the War Ministry later.

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He would not say that Kwantung Army Chief of Staff MIYAKE would send to the War Ministry an untrue document, but since he had no remembrance of ever having seen the document, he could not admit its truth. After \* looking through the document, he stated that the Kwantung Army might have conducted studies on this matter, but he never knew of it until he saw it here. He didn't recall

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\* ever making any study of the document while he was a bureau chief. However, on looking at it, he saw on the margin in red pencil the words "good" or "true" and other criticisms, and therefore it was easy to infer that after reaching the Ministry the document was looked into by someone and commented on. \* He did believe that the document was accurately drawn up by the Kwantung Army and sent on.

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Page  
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\* Exhibit 3377, an excerpt from exhibit 3038-G, being a letter dated 5 December, 1931, from Chief of Staff MIYAKE to Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA re matters concerning the delivery of documents pertaining to plans for the temporary system now being carried out in the policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia, stated that in the present situation active guidance by a powerful, clear-cut, autocratic organ was necessary. If a huge but weak organ was established, it would aggravate the situation, and not only be unwise but might be destroyed. Furthermore, the secret would leak out, \* and it would be unsuitable for establishing rights and interests or for establishing a regime through inner guidance.

The Chinese regimes were dependent solely on the Japanese military, and were already in the midst of various constructions. If a new organ was established separately, there was fear that orders from two sources would overlap and the construction project be destroyed. Particularly, the feeling of confidence was weak toward organs with tendencies leaning toward political parties and factions, or which became corrupt easily in movements to guard rights and interests or which wantonly make speculations in international relations. These organs would be unsuitable to the construction project which must be progressed while displaying power to the Chinese.

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The council system of the various organs actually would not be able to bring about the solution to Manchuria and Mongolia affairs. It would be most logical for the \* army to newly establish a governing section in the present organ, and for the organs in Manchuria to give it lateral support. If a new government was established, its guidance would be carried out by an advisory body. It was believed advantageous for headquarters and others to merge with the government general described in a separate book.

32342

The accused stated that General TADA was an adviser to the Military Government Department of Manchukuo while he was Kwantung Army Chief of Staff. TADA was not Chief of the Counselling Section of the Army, for the word "attached" meant he was on duty with the army and did not necessarily mean he had no position in general headquarters. \* His status was of an officer attached to staff headquarters, and he was under the Kwantung Army Commander's jurisdiction.

32343

\* The accused had no connection with the work TADA was doing in Manchuria.



Page

The procedure in submitting his reports was that he submitted them directly to the army commander, although as Chief of Staff KOISO was aware of them. Asked if he knew that TADA was principally engaged in guiding the military government in Manchukuo, he replied that as a counsellor of the Military Government Section, he responded to inquiries of the Military Government Minister of Manchukuo. The Section did not occupy itself with such duties, but its main functions were the organization and training of troops.

32344 TADA was not connected with matters involving the coordination of personnel, finance, and munitions. \* TADA was the Chief Adviser of the Military Government Section, and had quite a few subordinates, and the group composed the Advisory Section to the Military Government Section. The subordinates were called advisers, and worked in the section of Manchukuo. The section was not in reality a great network for performing its functions throughout the country. He denied that the system of advisers actually placed the Manchukuoan Army under the direct control of the Japanese.

32345 \* In explanation, he stated that his appointment as Chief of Staff came barely half a year after Manchukuo's independence, and its national army was composed of remnants of the old military cliques. TADA gained the approval of the Minister of Military Government and the consent of the Kwantung Army Commander to the limitation of the functions of the national army to preservation of peace and order, and it was also discussed that the total number of the army should be around 60,000. That was why at the time the national army was not organized and no schools existed. Not until he left Manchukuo in 1934 did he hear that schools had been established. It was impossible for TADA and the advisers to engage in any functions other than these.

32346 \* The functions described by the prosecutor really belong to the advisers to the Kwantung Army Commander, and whatever TADA might say, he could not and did not engage in such functions. No advisers were sent to the national army. They were Kwantung Army officers, and with TADA as their chief were assigned to the advisory section. The

32347 \* section did not play a very important role in the re-establishment of law and order in Jehol. It was not true

32348 \* that the section was used to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army, and it was not true that the advisers and instructors of that army became the practical rulers of both the local and central government of Manchukuo.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 November 4, 1947  
 DEFENSE - KOISO - Cross

Page  
 32349

32350 \* When shown a document appearing to be a report by TADA to the Kwantung Army Commander dated 4 August 1934, entitled "The Guidance of the Military Government of Manchukuo", he was asked if he knew whether the contents were correct. He stated the document was presented by TADA after he had left his post, and it was the first time he had seen it. \* However, he could state it was a report by TADA to Kwantung Army Commander HISHIKARI. Regarding the question a short while before concerning personnel and finance, he took the question to apply to matters of personnel and finance pertaining to Manchukuo as a whole, and that is why he answered as he did, but on looking through this document he found that since TADA was an adviser to the Military Government Department, it was but natural that he was concerned with matters of personnel, intendance, legal affairs, and medicine, so far as they related to his section. Matters concerning practical control of Manchukuo were mentioned in TADA's report as future plans, but he felt quite sure that his view of the state of affairs was mistaken.

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\* Exhibit 3378-A, the document identified by the accused, stated that TADA, on leaving his post, submitted to C-in-C HISHIKARI a report on conditions

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\* connected with the guidance of the military government of Manchukuo. The annexed booklet was to be handed to his successor. The first chapter of the document was "The Outline of the Guidance of the Military Government from the Time of the Founding of the Empire" and Article One was "Grasp by Force and the Central Control".

32359

At the beginning of the founding of the Manchukuo Empire, troops gradually reverted to the new state forced into submission by the Imperial Army, and were organized into province garrisons, but still assumed the aspect of rival war lords, and the controlling power of the military \* government failed to penetrate into them. To make them loyal to the new state and put them under the practical control of the army, either in war or peace, it was necessary to control them first under the government's rule.

In that period they established the policy of gradual organization and drew up "The Essential for Organization of the Manchukuo Army". As the first provisional measure, it was necessary to strive for grasping control of them by force, as well as putting the soldiers' minds at rest, so they sent advisers and instructors, few in number, to key points to assume the responsibility of gripping the Manchukuo Army with the influence of the Imperial Army for a backing.



Page

32360 At the same time, perceiving they must include in their grasp money, people, and munitions to control the life pulse of the Manchukuoan Army and put them under direct control, they first exercised general control over accounting, \* personnel affairs, and munitions, and later strove for the gradual centralization of these matters.

To grasp control of the Manchukuoan Army, it was essential to form systematic networks and cellularize their veins and branches, and meetings of the advisers and instructors were held, who were scattered and hard to control at first. They strove to make them the pivot of control of the Manchukuo Army by impregnating them with a guiding spirit and gradually employing Japanese personnel, making them the veins and branches of the networks. They tried to establish a horizontal network with connections in all directions. After that they demanded an increased stationing of advisers in actual service, only to be refused, and were obliged to use reserve officers.

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\* They were fortunate to have the number of officers in actual service doubled in April 1933, and to some extent succeeded in making the networks covering the whole of Manchukuo a desired organic system. They re-named all the officers in actual service advisers, changed their reserve status to that of call-in officers, naming them military instructors, and established a consistent connection even among their subordinates. They firmly established connection among Japanese-Manchukuoan officers in the Manchukuoan forces, government offices, and schools which had contact with the network and were under its control, thus consolidating the networks.

32362

Jehol Province Operations were the greatest worked up and directed by the Advisory Section of the Military Government Department, a force of more than 40,000, with eight million yen spent for them. While \* these operations belonged to the past, he would add that these operations carried out by the Manchukuoan Army were presided over by military government advisers and advisers of general headquarters of the former enemy.

Special attention should be accorded to the western boundary (Tolun) operations carried out after the Jehol operations. As a result of the operations, the eastern Chahar garrison, as one of the pro-Manchukuoan self-defense forces, was now stationed in the vicinity of Tolun, ruling over its neighborhood, and the government office of the governor of the Eastern Chahar Special Autonomous Administrative District was established.



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- 32363 The fact that Le Shou-hsin, commander of the Eastern Chahar Garrison, was concurrently commander of the \* garrison of Hsingan Hsishen Province and the Military Government was expected to defray 300,000 yen annually for its expenses were also worthy of attention. With the founding of the state, Ma Chan-shan was appointed Vice-Chief of the Department, and carried on the chief's business in his behalf, organizing the department. At the outset, the Kwantung Army charged itself with his guidance, and Captains KOMATSU and SUMITANI, chiefly concerned themselves in this business.
- 32364 \* On April 13, advisers to military administration, provincial guards' headquarters, and military instructors were appointed and placed under TADA's supervision.
- 32365 \* prerogative of Supreme Command was to be controlled by the Emperor, and a form to justify the name of Sovereign State was to be adopted, but the original source to put it in action was under the control of the Kwantung Army C-in-C. The source of Supreme Command was really in his hands.
- 32366 It was not clear at the outset whether the prerogative of Supreme Command of Manchukuo was independent of her state affairs, but on the enforcement of Imperial (Manchukuo) rule, it was clear it should be independent. \* Considering that the army had made its elements penetrate deep into the Manchukuoan Army and had been controlling it making them grasp the substance of the Supreme Command, it might be proper to deal with supreme command of the Manchukuoan Army through the original system under the Kwantung Army and not through the Board of General Affairs.
- Even practically, it would be idle to attempt to carry out matters belonging to the supreme command through civilians. As to the possibility of revolt by the Manchurian Army, if they came to a situation uncontrollable by the present advisory system, they should not be able to prevent the performance of duties pertaining to the supreme command by civilians.
- 32367 \* There was the opinion that there was a danger because the permanency of Manchurian Army Advisers was uncertain, but the withdrawal of advisers was unimaginable to those considering the permanent rule of Manchukuo. Armed troops could be the destructive as well as the mainstay of supreme command power, and they should not be able to loosen their control of a national army composed of a different race. It was obviously self-contradictory that the advocators were voluntarily thinking of taking steps convenient for revolt while recognizing the possibility of revolt by the Manchurian Army.



Page

There was the opinion that the dispatch of advisers should not be continued when it had no lawful foundation. However, from the spirit of the protocol and the articles of military agreement, their dispatch should be interpreted as having a lawful foundation. Customs could always be taken for lawful foundations.

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By its independence they should give the Manchukuoan Army a nucleus and enhance the feeling of a national army. As long as the Kwantung Army had the \* substance of a supreme command in its power, there was no danger. What they should be most careful about was that if they made a precedent of a non-independent supreme command it would become a source of calamity for the Imperial Army in the future, though all right for the present.

Although there were doubts within the Army as to the advisability of independence, negotiations were made with the authorities concerned according to the above opinion, and it was made independent as a matter of formality.

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\* Existing advisers were not employed by the Manchukuo Army, nor did their appointment need its sanction, nor was ex post facto approval necessary. They were simply sent to the Manchukuo Army by the Kwantung Army in accordance with a military order. The advisers were Imperial Army organs, and the systematic networks for controlling the Manchukuoan Army were in reality branch organs of the Imperial Army. Though in the Manchukuoan Army advisers were in service on the standpoint that they were all advisers of the Japanese Army and burned with patriotic spirit, it was certain they would never place the Manchukuoan Army in opposition to the Japanese Army.

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\* Manchukuoan leaders picked out by the advisers took part in the Military Government Department were naturally under the advisers' control, and as they had never been in this kind of service they could not do anything without the advisers' guidance. The Department held perfect control of the advisers. In provinces, Military Intelligence Bureau Chiefs were generally appointed advisers, as past circumstances naturally caused them to come into power. At the front, the Manchukuoan leaders realized they could obtain facilities in connection with the army through the advisers, and this caused them to make friends with them. The advisers' footing was raised as they thought it wise to rely upon them in negotiations with the department.



Page

32371

The Manchukuoan leaders began to reveal and rely upon the advisers after they knew the advisers' ability in matters concerning subjugation, \* and they realized that a word from an adviser to central government authorities would concern their position, and this naturally induced them to be ruled by the advisers. In short, the advisers were practical rulers of both local and central governments.

The pivot of guidance was practical grasp of the Manchukuoan Army. For this, it was essential to establish control attended with real power with strong guiding networks, and control soldiers' minds. Measures and facilities to be established should be based on this.

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TADA thought it necessary to consolidate relations between the networks themselves and the Japanese-Manchukuoan officials related to them. They should pay most attention to the establishment of Kempei-tai and the reform of training stations, and exert their utmost in matters affecting the human nature of the Manchukuoans, such as personnel affairs, allowances, etc. As for equipment, they should be satisfied by only fulfilling the minimum necessity and aim at immediate \* maintenance of public peace and order. As for the equipment and facilities to be used by the Imperial Army in wartime, they should be completely equipped from a different point of view.

32373

The accused was asked if not the real reason he was relieved as Vice-War Minister and made Kwantung Army Chief of Staff was so he could carry out the conquest of Jehol. He replied his transfer was carried out on the orders of his superiors, and he knew nothing about the reasons. When asked if Kwantung Army operations in Jehol were not accelerated shortly after his arrival as Chief of Staff, he stated that after the signing of the Japan-Manchukuo Protocol on 15 September, the Kwantung Army was given the responsibility of joint defense and peace and \* order. The re-establishment of law and order in Jehol was necessary, but a more pressing problem was the re-establishment of peace and order east of the Taliaho River. To affect this, they tried to re-establish peace and order in Jehol by peaceful means.

The accused was executive of the Special Service Department as well as Chief of Staff. DOIHARA had nothing to do with that organ while he was Chief of Staff. Asked if the Special Service Organ had charge of opium in Manchukuo, he replied the Manchukuoan Government had complete control of opium matters.



Page  
32374

\* The Kwantung Army had nothing to do with the opium problem while he was Chief of Staff and Executive of the Organ.

32375

\* When shown a document, he stated he didn't recall receiving three million yen from Secret Service funds in January, 1933, while he was Chief of Staff. Asked if he recommended to the War Ministry a customs tariff policy for Manchukuo, he stated he recalled receiving a document from the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff while he was Vice-Minister of War, but didn't recall sending out such a document. He didn't recall, after becoming Chief of Staff, making recommendations to effectuate a customs policy favorable to Japan, nor did he recall making a declaration that no country except Japan could participate unconditionally in Japanese-Manchukuoan conventional tariffs.

32376

When shown a document purporting to be a letter from \* himself to Vice-War Minister YANAGAWA dated 29 December, 1932, stating recommendations regarding Manchukuoan customs and tariffs, \* he acknowledged that his official seal was set on it. Exhibit 3379-A, an excerpt from this document, stated that KOISO was notifying the Vice-Minister regarding a definite plan, as per separate text concerning Manchurian economic control, that had been obtained as a result of army research.

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\* The separate text stated that the draft of outline of general measures regarding custom duties in Manchukuo, dated 12 December, 1932, at Kwantung Army Headquarters was to decide on a customs policy to make Japan and Manchukuo one economic unit. For the time being, the policy shall be adopted to have Manchukuo customs based on the statutory tariff in principle, but toward Japan tariff on certain articles shall be decided by agreement. Manchukuo shall be persuaded to keep from making any tariff agreement with other powers, and she shall not unconditionally allow other powers to share in the tariff between her and Japan.

32379

The statutory tariff of Manchukuo shall be decided for the time being through revision, and later the general tariff shall be entirely altered. In revising the tariff, certain articles shall be specified as free, \* or those on which duty shall be reduced. To make up for the subsequent decrease of revenue, duties on articles not hindering Japanese-Manchurian trade shall be increased.



Page

In the revision of the tariff, legitimate consideration shall be taken to prevent third powers, especially China and Russia, from making an economic advance toward Manchukuo. A system shall be considered whereby discrimination may be made between exports and imports of countries friendly to Manchukuo and those unfriendly. Consideration shall be taken to devise a system reducing customs duties at the border of Manchuria and Korea. Special treatment shall be given to the duty of special articles necessary for common defense.

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\* Rights already acquired in accordance with treaties or agreements shall be independent from the statutory and stipulated tariffs. Regarding the abolition of the Manchurian Customs and Tariff Law, close connection between Japanese and Manchurian authorities shall be maintained. The customs system in Kwantung Province shall remain in general as at present.

The accused stated he didn't recall on January 24, 1934, while Kwantung Army Chief of Staff, making any recommendation to the Vice-Minister as to any changes in the proposed Manchukuoan constitution which was then under consideration. Asked if he recalled recommending power be divided between a premier and several department heads so that control by the Kwantung Army could be effectually carried out, he recalled expressing an opinion that the position of the premier should be stronger than that in Japan. In Japan the premier was a state minister and equal with the others.

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\* He felt that in Manchukuo the premier should be given a stronger position to control and lead his cabinet.



Page  
32382

\* After examining what appeared to be a letter dated 24 January 1934, containing certain recommendations by the Chiefs of Staff, Kwantung Army, to the Vice War Minister, the accused was asked whether it was a document prepared and sent by him or at his direction. He stated that he thought he must have sent a telegram of that nature.

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Exhibit 3380-A, the document so identified by the accused, stated that as to the responsibility for assistance of department chiefs, it was helpful in intensifying the principle of making the General Affairs Board the axis, to have only the Premier assist. However, the selection of the Premier would not always cater to the Army Commander's opinion and a stubborn man might sometimes be selected. There would be a danger of delay of political affairs owing to the attitude of the Premier alone. In such cases, if the Department Chief was responsible for assistance, the Army Commander could carry through his opinion \* by controlling one man or the other. Therefore, it was appropriate to divide part of the responsibility for assistance among the Department Chiefs.

32384

KOISO begged the Vice Minister to give consideration so that these opinions might meet with his approval and to reply by the 25th. Asked if he secured approval for his suggestions, he stated that on glancing through the telegram he felt that what was stated there was somewhat different from the thought expressed in his previous answer. He felt there might have been discussion on this point within the Headquarters and there might have been disagreement, but his recollection was not too clear. The telegram showed \* it was sent from the Kwantung Army in reply to an inquiry from Central Headquarters. He did not believe the final orders of the Central authorities embodied completely the suggestions in the telegram. Asked if with reference to his suggestion that there be divided control between the Premier and the other department heads in the Manchukuo Government, if the suggestion was complied with, he replied it was not accepted by central authorities in his recollection.

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\* When handed a document, the accused was asked if it refreshed his memory so that he could now say he did receive 3 million yen on 25 Jan. 1933 from the War Ministry. He stated he had no clear recollection. \* It was not a Kwantung Army document but a War Ministry document and was received by the Kwantung Army from the Vice Minister.

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\* Exhibit 3381-A, the document identified by the accused, relating to the granting of Manchurian Incident Expenditure Secret Service Funds, and being a draft of Notification to the Chief of the Finance Section of the Intendance Bureau, ordered the disbursement



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

- Page of 3 million yen as Secret Service funds and ordered delivery to KOISO. KOISO was notified by the Vice Minister that 3 million yen was being granted for his Army's needs as Secret Service funds. The accused was asked if the Harbin Special Service Agency was under him when he was Kwantung Army Chief of Staff and concurrently Special Service Chief, and he replied it was under the command of the Kwantung Army Commander. \* Asked who the persons were who worked at that time with the Special Service Agency in Harbin, he replied that they often changed but the one he remembered best was KOMATSUBARA. During his tenure the organs were mainly concerned with maintaining peace and order. The organ was not assigned to work out plans of political measures for preparing war against the USSR. Asked if it had duties to work out measures to be carried out outside Manchukuo - for instance the Soviet prior to the war with the USSR, he replied \* that the organs had no duties to draft plans but its main functions were the assembling of information.
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He did not remember if in January 1934 the Special Service Agency in Harbin drew up a document entitled "Outline of Political Measures for the Preparation for a War Against the Soviet Union", stamped "Military Secret." Asked if it was not true that after military action in the North China Provinces had been completed, he was relieved from further service in Manchukuo, he replied that by military operations in North China was meant operations carried on as an extension of the Jehol pacification campaign and those carried on before the Tangku Truce. He was transferred one year after that agreement.

- 32393 \* He had stated in his affidavit that after being relieved as Chief of Staff, he became Commander of the Korean Army. There was a sector of land constituting a frontier between Korea and Soviet Union at that time. \* This line was in the vicinity of the Lake Khassan area and the 19th Infantry Division was a unit under his command. Also the 20th Division. He thought the total strength of the 19th and 20th Divisions, which had no supply units, was around 20,000.
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- 32395 \* They had no rear units but there was a heavy artillery unit known as a fortress unit. A unit belonging to the 19th Division was stationed near the Soviet border. When KOISO first arrived as Korean Army Commander, there were various units along the Tumen River, totaling about 2 battalions. After reorganization, units in Chihuahngtao in Manchukuo also came under the command of the Korean Army. These units numbered about 2 battalions.
- 32396 \* He believed about the 13th or 14th of July a small force of the 19th Division was sent to strengthen the Heiko garrison on the opposite bank of Lake Khassan. Until his resignation as Korean Army Commander, no additional troops were moving into the Lake Khassan region. The area along the border line south up to the border line "T"



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

Page fell within the Kwantung Army's garrison area and even before the outbreak of the Incident, scouts had been entering the area frequently.

32398 The witness was reminded of the testimony of TANAKA, Ryukichi, that orders concerning the concentration of the 19th Division field units in the Lake Khassan vicinity were given on 11 July 1938 \* and that these units had arrived at the border by July 12. The accused stated that this was contrary to the facts. On 6 July 32399 3 Soviet Cavalry men appeared on the crest of Changkufeng \* and on 11 July several more Soviet troops appeared there and reports from the front indicated they were engaged in construction work. No reports from the front reached them on July 12. On July 13 the number of Soviet troops on the summit of Changkufeng reached 40 and there were reports of continuing construction work. The accused instructed the 19th Division Commander, who was guarding the spot, to take all precautions but that was all the accused did.

On the 14th the 19th Division Commander requested the accused that since he would be placed in a difficult position if Soviet troops entered Manchukuoan territory, he wished to concentrate his troops along the banks of the Tumen River. At the time the China Incident was in progress and Korea was the only rear line of communications, and the outbreak of an Incident on the Soviet-Manchukuoan or Japanese-Soviet border would be a grave threat.

32400 KOISO was in a position where he would have to be very anxious as to the effect of a concentration along the river banks \* and he sent an inquiry to Central Army authorities in Tokyo. The reply arrived in Seoul on July 16, the day after KOISO was transferred from his command, and instructions were handed to his successor and he did not know what further orders or actions were taken. He never issued the order to the 19th Division cancelling its orders concerning the concentration of troops in the Lake Khassan vicinity and there was no such order to cancel.

Asked if he had a memorandum of dates and events or if he was testifying from memory, he replied he was testifying from memory. He did not recall HIRANUMA's policies while he was Overseas Minister in that Cabinet.

32401 \* Asked if he did not know that HIRANUMA had determined to strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact to secure closer cooperation between Japan, Germany and Italy, he replied he did hear vaguely that the problem of relations between the three countries was being discussed and studied in the Five-Ministers' Conference. While he was a member of the Cabinet, he did not know of the HIRANUMA Declaration of about 4 May 1939. Asked if he meant to say that he did not know that HIRANUMA had stated that Japan was firmly resolved to stand at



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

Page the side of Germany and Italy, he replied he supposed the matter was studied in the Five Ministers' Conference but Cabinet members were not told of that.

32402 \* He did not know at the time that HIRANUMA praised Hitler's wisdom and iron will and sent Hitler a message that he greatly admired the noble task of reconstruction on which he was engaged. Several days after, however, he did hear this from HARADA. Asked if he wanted the Tribunal to believe that he kept such an important matter secret from the Cabinet, he replied he was telling the honest truth and they really did not hear about it. He knew Baron HARADA in 1939, but in a conversation with HARADA about 24 April 1939, he did not complain to him about lack of unity in the Army and that this was a hindrance to the successful conclusion of the Tri-Partite

32403 Pact. \* It was entirely false that he had a conversation with HARADA later in May 1939 concerning the Tri-Partite Alliance in which he expressed the opinion that in order to conclude the China War, such an alliance was necessary because it would alleviate the feelings of the men at the front.

32405 \* Asked what motive he thought HARADA might have to make an entry in his diary if such views of his were recorded, he replied

32406 \* that he had discovered that several times HARADA had twisted what he said and told lies. He believed he must have fallen into this practice because of his own subjective view that the accused was an advocate of the Tri-Partite Pact. That was why he denied this portion of the HARADA Diary. Since HARADA had spoken ill of the accused in various parts of the Diary, he could hardly think he entertained friendly feelings toward him. He did not know where HARADA got this false idea of what he had said. On one occasion the accused asked HARADA what Prince SAIONJI thought of the Tri-Partite Alliance, and HARADA replied that SAIONJI was not a man who easily voiced his own opinion. Later, on reading the diary, KOISO found that he was represented to have asked him what the Lord Keeper thought of the Tri-Partite Alliance. From this, the accused judged that HARADA often wrote contrary to actual conversation.

32408 \* Asked if he did not visit the Navy Minister in early May 1939, in connection with a possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to rightists and their German-Italian attitude, he replied he may have asked such a question but didn't recall the details. He may have visited the Navy Minister in early 1939 but he had never conversed with the Navy Minister in connection with the possible overthrow of the Cabinet due to Navy opposition to the rightists in their German-Italian attitude.

In early May he received a request from the War Vice Minister for his services and as he did not know what was going on



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

Page in regard to the proposed Tri-Partite Pact, he might have visited the Navy Minister on this question, but his recollection was that it was the Foreign Minister. \* Since he had to reply to the Vice Minister, he wanted to ask in what way their thoughts regarding the Alliance were changing. It was not true that the main reason he went to the Navy Minister was to try to convince him to get Navy support for the Alliance.

32409

Reference was made to the Affidavit where it was stated that while he was Overseas Minister in 1940, Ambassador Ott told him that a German-Japanese Alliance would benefit Japan in the Southwest Pacific's economic development. When asked what he replied to Ott's suggestion, he stated he didn't say whether he was for or against it. Asked what would have been the reason that Japan required an ally such as Germany, if Japan was only seeking fair trade in the South Pacific, he replied he had never advocated that Japan must have Germany as an ally.

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\* Asked if it was not true that it was intended by Japan that she would get what she needed out of the South Pacific by force if necessary, and if that was not the reason for a discussion of an alliance with Germany, he replied he didn't believe a single important government leader at the time had such thoughts. Asked what he told Ott after he gave the accused his strong sales talk on the advantage of a German alliance, he replied on that occasion he expressed neither approval nor disapproval.

The accused was reminded of testimony to the effect that after the interview, OTT notified Germany that KOISO asked him what Germany's views would be if Japan made military advances in the South Pacific. The accused was asked if he thought OTT just imagined that he said this, and replied that OTT's report was written in such language as to indicate that the accused had said what actually OTT had been telling him.

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\* At the time he knew that the Foreign Office was announcing its view that the status quo of NEI would be preserved. Asked if it was not true that economic demands made on NEI, if accepted, would have disturbed the status quo and seriously interfered with the sovereignty of NEI, he replied he had no knowledge of what demands were made on NEI during the YONAI Cabinet. Asked if he as Overseas Minister learned of the decisions of the 12th and 16th of July 1940 of the Army, Navy and Foreign Office authorities under which Japan was to dominate the southern areas, he replied he knew nothing about this and doubted if these things actually occurred.

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\* There were Anti-British demonstrations in Japan around July 1939 and he knew one occurred in Tokyo, but didn't know what



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

- Page demonstrations occurred elsewhere in the country. Asked if he attended a dinner party on 12 July 1939 given for MATSUOKA by IKEDA, at which General MATSUI and Armiral NOMURA were present, he replied there may have been such a banquet but he didn't recall for sure. He didn't remember a dinner party about that time at which Anti-British demonstrations was one of the topics discussed.
- 32415 Asked if he recalled discussing with KIDO in early July \* 1939 the Anti-British propoganda and speeches made in Anti-British demonstrations, he replied he recalled he met KIDO on his way to a Privy Council Meeting. As KIDO was Home Minister then, he suggested to him that measures be taken to stop the demonstration in the city and pave the way for peaceful negotiations. KIDO then was not head of the Kempei and he didn't remember who was. KIDO did not think that it could have occurred that the Kempei was leading these demonstrations. It was utterly impossible that the Army was financing them. He had no recollection while he was Overseas Minister in the HIRANUMA Cabinet of sending the Kempei to China and Manchuria
- 32416 disguised as laborers \* because the Overseas Minister was in no position to do such a thing. He had no recollection of making a speech to the Diet Committee on the destiny of Japan while he was Overseas Minister on 17 February 1940. Asked if he recalled that in the course of the speech to the Diet Budget Committee on that date, he said that Japan had a destiny to advance in all directions, he stated he did recall now.
- 32417 \* Asked if he did not also express the view that the religious beliefs of the Buddhists, Confucianists and Christians in China would have to conform to Japan's spirit and culture, he explained that among the Japanese, there were many who advocated advance in various directions and questions based on these views were often voiced in the Diet. If the transcript of the Diet proceedings were looked at, it would be found that he replied that Japan could advance in any direction peacefully. Asked if he did not urge that the Japanese spirit and culture should be spread throughout the world, he replied he had always held the view that
- 32418 Japan's traditional culture embraced all ideologies and \* and was able to merge with them all and he was of the belief that he made replies based on such views. Asked how he expected to convert those unwilling to be converted, he replied that if they advanced with an all-embracing capacity, he could hardly think that any opposition could arise. Asked if he would not overcome the opposition by force if it existed, he replied that the main purpose of force is defense and if force is used to quell opposition, he thought it was proof that any person using it was without culture.
- 32419 \* When shown a document, the accused was asked whether it was a speech he gave before the Diet Budget Committee on 17 Feb.



Page 1940, he answered it was a reply made by him.

32422 \* Exhibit 3382, the document so identified by the accused, showed that KOISO stated that in SHINOHARA's speech, which had just been heard, he presented the problem as to whether they should advance northward or southward. What KOISO was going to say might be said to be somewhat a departure from reality or he might be told not to speak so fanatically. However, he did not make this departure. As the original policy of Japan they had been handed down from generation to generation, the mission handed down to the Emperors by the Goddess Amatera, of making the universe the Emperor's capitol. \* This meant world wide expansion with the magnificent spirit and culture of Japan. Emperor MEIJI's statement that he had given all subjects freedom from care and he would finally cross the seas and spread national glory throughout the world, and KOISO believed this sentence placed its underlying note on this belief. This meant that in national policy, advancement in any one direction was not considered in their advance to the north, south, east or west. Japan's destiny was to advance in all four directions. The question as to which direction should be emphasized was the problem of this generation. KOISO said he might be somewhat dogmatic, but the Japanese race was surely divine. The YAMATO race, which had controlled and unified several races, had the quality \* to advance in any direction and grasp and assimilate any culture, and could endure the hot or cold zone. Because they possessed Indonesian blood, they had the capacity to progress southward. It was the natural tendency to advance toward the north because of the main feature of their racial composition. However, a nation cannot stand without defense, and history proved if they were to obtain quickly economic rights and interests, it would be more convenient to do so by sea rather than by land.

32424 They must proceed toward economic development in the south where resources were thought abundant. \* At present they should follow the increased tendency toward the continent and the north with more than ample economic development and also extend economic rights and interests toward the south. The necessary movement of the race was indispensable and they should not emphasize any one direction.

32426 Asked if there were not economic negotiations pending with NEI when he made this speech, he replied he was in the Overseas Ministry but never heard of any such problem. Asked if he meant to say that he didn't know that Japan was making strenuous efforts then to secure oil, tin, etc. through negotiations with NEI, \* he replied that maybe negotiators had been sent from the Foreign Ministry to NEI, but he knew very little about them. He did not recall if he found out about them shortly after.



NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
 4 November 1947  
 DEFENSE  
 KOISO - Cross

Page

32427

\* He did know that he had been tentatively selected as an envoy to conduct the final negotiations considered to be the ultimatum to NEI in August 1940, a few months after the speech. Asked if he did not say then that he would go, provided he was sent, on a battleship, and in case of emergency would have the right to fire and destroy them, he replied this was utterly fantastic. The question of a battleship firing was something that was the prerogative of the Supreme Command. How could he on his own authority order a battleship to fire?

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\* Asked if the real intention of Japan in engaging in war against the U.S. was not her desire to expel Anglo-American influence from China and the Asiatic-Pacific regions, and to reconstruct a Greater East Asia, he replied that he was of the opinion that Japan should not fight against America and Britain and had no recollection of ever voicing such opinions.

(Reference was made to Exhibit 277, T. 3704) The accused stated he was a member of the Committee for the Establishment of Greater East Asia in April 1942. He had never heard that Japan's intention was to close the door of the Asiatic countries to others except on her own terms. In connection with the speech he made on 7 Sept. 1944, promising future independence to NEI, he was not familiar with the Osamu Army Corps Chief-of-Staff's announcement the same month that there had been no great alterations in the operation and business structure of the military government.

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\* Asked if he, as Premier, knew of the decision of the Supreme War Leadership Council on 1 Feb. 1945 to place all military and armed police forces of FIC under the joint command of the Japanese Army, subject to army orders, on matters of organization, allotment and movement, he replied he knew of the matters decided 1 Feb. 1945. The main purpose of the decision was to place the armed forces and armed police in FIC under the Japanese forces. There was also a plan to place communications and transportation under Japanese control but this was an auxiliary decision.

He remembered he received through the Greater East Asia Minister a six-hour ultimatum to the Governor General of FIC to bring about the surrender of those agencies such as communications and military forces. Asked if he had any authority to stop such high-handed procedure, he replied he didn't think the order included any such wording as "to take high-handed measures." He believed it had words to the effect that the understanding of the Governor General of FIC should be obtained. Asked if he thought 6 hours a



4 November 1947

DEFENSE

KOISO - Cross

Page reasonable time within which the Governor General could determine whether he was to capitulate or seek his own protection against the Japanese who had been permitted to come in as friends, he replied that since that depended on the circumstances in that area, the decision of the Supreme War Guidance Council did not set a specific time limit of 6 hours. He did not know if in the winter of 1944, while he was Premier, the Japanese Army thrust into the interior provinces of Kwangsi and Kweichow within immediate reach of China's wartime capital, Chungking.

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\* Reference was made to the Affidavit which referred to his opposition to the March 31 Incident, tried to prevent the Manchurian Incident, opposed the China Adventure, the Tri-Partite Pact, and the war against the U.S., and he tried to settle the China War as Premier, and in all these matters was frustrated.

Asked why he accepted one important government position after another, becoming a protagonist of the matters he so strenuously objected to, he replied that the way of the way of the Japanese was that no matter what their personal opinions were, once a state policy had been decided, it was their duty to bend all efforts for its prosecution.



Page  
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\* The accused was reminded of previous prosecution questions regarding a conversation with KIDO to the effect that he was supposed to have told KIDO that he was in favor of a HIRANUMA Cabinet in April or May, 1932. \* The accused stated he had no recollection of ever saying this directly to KIDO. The accused was reminded that the prosecution in that occasion also referred to a diary entry of KIDO to Col. SUZUKI telling him that KOISO seems to be in favor of a HIRANUMA Cabinet. The accused stated he had no recollection of such a conversation with SUZUKI or someone who might have told him that, but he could not say absolutely he did not say such a thing. In his previous testimony he had stated that the diary entry for August 7, 1931, exhibit 179-F, was completely without foundation.

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\* Asked if he meant by this that the contents did not properly portray what HARADA told KIDO, or if he meant the information HARADA transferred to KIDO was inaccurate, he replied that exhibit 179-F said that KIOSO, NINOMIYA and TATEKAWA held a meeting, and using HASHIMOTO, Shigeto, as a tool and inviting the services of OKAWA, were planning to utilize the Social Masses Party to carry out a political change. He did not know the source of this, but denied the facts. He could not deny the fact, however, of this having come from HARADA to KIDO.

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. TAKAYANAGI,  
Counsel for SUZUKI.

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\* Asked if when he was Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau there was another by the name of SUZUKI besides the defendant in the Military Administration Section of the Bureau, he replied that after his previous testimony on this point, he discovered that there was another SUZUKI.

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With regard to the stamp or seal on exhibit 3377, the accused was asked if it was not unclear whether the seal was the defendant SUZUKI's or not. He replied that yesterday he said the seal was that of the accused, but this was a careless and hasty remark. In the Military Administration Section, the accused SUZUKI was in charge of Manchurian problems, but questions of military organization were in the hands of SUZUKI, Sosaku, and he thought therefore that the seal must have been the latter's.



Page

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. FURNESS,  
Counsel for SHIGEMITSU.

The accused stated that he became Commander of the Korean Army on 2 December, 1935. Regarding his testimony that the total strength of the Korean Army at the time he took command was about 20,000, he was asked if the strength increased prior to the Changkufeng Incident. He replied that about one year prior to the outbreak of the Incident, strength very greatly decreased. With the outbreak of the China Incident the 20th Division was brought under the command of the China Garrison Forces, and the unit in Korea became a unit in absentia. He thought the decrease was by some 5-6,000.

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\* After the reduction, a reorganization of border guards was carried out, and he thought there was an increase after that decrease of from 5-600. Two battalions were eliminated and three new ones were created, so there was a net increase of one. This may have been done in 1936 or 1937.

Regarding his testimony that on July 3 Soviet cavalrymen were seen on the crest of Changkufeng hill, that they were increased on the 11th, and by the 13th 40 were observed, he was asked if any Soviet troops were reported in the area prior to July, 1938, and he replied that prior to that there had never been any stationary Soviet troops in that vicinity.

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Regarding his testimony that he received reports that Soviet troops were engaged in construction work on the 11th and 13th of July, 1938, he was asked what sort of construction was reported \* and he replied that in his recollection it was that they were digging trenches on the western slope of Changkufeng hill in Manchurian territory.

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Asked if concerning the actions toward FIC, he as premier was aware that DeGaulle, the Head of the French Provisional Government, which had been recognized by the Allies, had announced over Radio France on 29 August, 1944, that France had been at war with Japan since 8 December, 1941, he replied that he didn't know anything about the broadcast. Asked if he had been advised as Premier that \* the Provisional Government of France had declared that France was at war, he stated that at the Supreme Council for the Direction of War, Foreign Minister SHIGEMITSU explained that while the DeGaulle regime was still in Africa it had declared war against Japan, and after its return to France the situation had not changed.



Page REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. BROOKS.

- 32443 \* While he was in the War Ministry as Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau or as Vice-Minister, he had never seen the Ministry's so-called secret diaries, as compiled. Asked if there was any sign or seal on the documents filed in the secret diaries to show whether he or his superiors ever had a look at them, he replied that distinctions could be made on any document, and it could be noticed whether there were any notations or markings
- 32444 \* indicating whether a particular person had seen it or not, such as a seal or signature. This was routine procedure for documents examined by any War Ministry member.

Asked if there were not documents filed in the secret diaries which were not brought to the notice of himself or his superiors, he replied that two documents he had seen during his cross-examination did not indicate that he nor the Vice or War Minister had seen them if there was no signature nor seal on them showing they had been submitted after examination.

- 32445 \* Asked if he knew any reason why such documents were not shown to him, he replied that there are various reasons, but in most cases if any matter is not adopted in lower levels and the matter was abandoned there, it was finished after an oral report, and was not submitted to higher levels.

When shown exhibit 3376, the accused was asked if he found in it a sentence that "The basis of determination on the number of MP force in Manchuria on the peace time footing will be as follows".

- 32448 \* Exhibit 3383, an excerpt from 3038-B, a study on the Organization of the MP Force in Manchuria, being the document referred to, stated that the basis of determining the number of the MP force in Manchuria on the peace time footing would be as follows: To satisfy the wartime requirement of men; cause no hindrance to the peacetime business of MP; maintain harmony between the peacetime and wartime organization. For this purpose, they had prepared a plan of organization. Headquarters of the MP in Manchuria in the Kwantung were named, and included about 200 men. The Mukden units' 5 headquarters included about 300 men,
- 32449 the Chanchun units' 4 headquarters included 400 men, and the Independent Battalion at Mukden consisted of about 400 men.



Page

As to the Independent MP Battalion, the men would be first enlisted in other branch services for about six months and then join in the MP service for about a year. A bilateral system of conscription and volunteering would be adopted. After a year and a half of enlistment a number would be posted as corporals in the section. The battalion would thus become an educational organ of the MP. Units other than the Independent Battalion would be active service organs.

32450 According to the plan of organization, they should be able to command active MPs of about 400 men and educated MPs of about 400 men, the total supplying 1100 annually. \* The number released annually from each unit would be recruited from the Independent Battalion, while the latter would release those not sent to each unit as recruits, thereby acquiring 400 on reserve annually. After about ten years about 4700 would be supplied. The 11th year about 5,000 would be secured. Supposing that the men released from the Independent Battalion got the same number of service years as ordinary conscripts, they could supply 7,000 at all times for 14 or 15 years. Considering the rate of decrease as 15% and the addition of NCOs after the maturity of the second reserve service, the total would not exceed 6,000.

32451 Thus, ten or more years were required to supply 5,000 MPs, and in order to supplement the force until then they must fill the number of 1100 active service MPs by amending the organization and adopt a system of temporary transfer. For such purpose and in case of need, temporary \* regulations should be issued to cover the deficiency. In this they arrived at a plan of organization in peacetime by discussing the number of men required in wartime. Many aspects of the present condition of MPs may not meet future demands, and they must make further study and prepare a satisfactory solution for harmony between the peacetime and wartime organizations.

32452 The accused was asked if he had any further explanations of these documents, and he stated that as the seal on the document indicated, he did not see it at the time, but recalled that Chief of the Military Affairs Section ANDO gave an oral report on the plan's outline. \* ANDO reported that MP Commander MINE had submitted his personal views to bring about an expansion of the Kempeitai. This was MINE's own idea and a highly fantastic one, ANDO said. Such being the case, ANDO said he would not submit the matter to the Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau. This draft was not carried into action, and was completely shelved and abandoned.



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\* The accused was shown exhibit 3377, and stated that it appeared to be from the Kwantung Army Chief of Staff MIYAKE to Vice-Minister SUGIYAMA, and the certificate stated it referred to matters of sending documents in regard to the draft plan for the transitory organization in regard to policy toward Manchuria and Mongolia. The date of its receipt was December 9, 1931. The accused stated this was just one day prior to the resignation of the WAKATSUKI Cabinet, and War Minister MINAMI resigned on 10 December.

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\* This document was certainly prepared by the Kwantung Army, but there was no indication that the War Minister, Vice-Minister, or Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau saw it. As far as the War Ministry authorities were concerned, no directives putting the drafting into action were issued, but he did not know whether the Kwantung Army took the steps set forth in the plan.

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When shown exhibit 3378-A, the accused was asked what control, if any, he could point out of civil administration, as set out in the document. He replied that the document pertained to a military administration department which was identical with what was in Japan, the Ministries of War and Navy. Therefore, such an agency was not permitted to engage in civil administration, and it was natural that nothing pertaining to it should be included.

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\* When shown exhibit 3379-A, a draft of an outline of general measures regarding customs duties in Manchukuo dated 12 December, 1932, the accused was asked

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\* if it represented his opinion or was sent as part of his administrative duties. He stated it was the opinion of a financial and economic adviser attached to Kwantung Army Headquarters named SUZUKI, Boku, and submitted to the Kwantung Army Commander. The plan adopted by the latter and sent in KOISO's name to central army authorities.

Asked if there had been any previous study by central authorities on the matter and if they requested the observations of the Kwantung Army, he replied that with regard to the customs question of Manchukuo, nothing had been decided by the central authorities when the accused became Kwantung Army Chief of Staff in August 1932. The reason was that relations with Third Powers were very delicate. He didn't recall any requests made by the authorities in connection with this after he came to the Kwantung Army.



Page  
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\* Regarding the words in the document "No. in study", he explained that the Third Power relations in connection with customs was delicate, and if the Kwantung Army Commander accepted opinions submitted by the adviser and formulated a plan of this sort, even then there was considerable room for study, because the plan may not be put into immediate practice. He didn't recall whether the plan was ever put in practice.

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\* When shown exhibit 3381-A, he stated that this document was in the form of a reply to an inquiry made by central authorities of the Kwantung Army in connection with laws and regulations and was supposed to be made by the Kwantung Army Commander, and was sent in the name of the Chief of Staff, as was customary procedure. It was also customary procedure to send a communication direct from the commanding general, depending upon its importance.

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\* Exhibit 3381 was handed to the accused, and he stated it related to funds for the use of the army. Asked if they were handled in the same manner as he had testified in relation to other funds sent on another occasion, he replied that such procedures were taken by central authorities when funds of this kind were sent to the Kwantung Army. The funds were used for the same

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\* purposes and under the same procedure as described in the affidavit.

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\* The accused was handed exhibit 3382. Concerning it, there was no consideration in drafting it for economic development between the nations alone. The meaning was primarily peaceful development, and the population problem was secondary. Economic development was related to the

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\* population question, for Japan could not by the produce of her own land maintain self-sufficiency. The principal method for Japan to survive was to import raw materials, process them and increase their manufacturing capacity, and by exporting them to procure necessities by trade. At that time she could import such materials without restrictions.

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Asked if there were any countries at the time with which she could not do business, he replied that at the time of the HIRANUMA Cabinet he recalled that restrictions were placed on trade by the U. S. Among the raw materials of which there was a severe shortage and which were required for defense was oil, which was not for \* military purposes alone. He thought that in the Navy there was a considerable need for oil.



Page

32467 Asked if at that time there was much discussion among the State Ministers and representatives on how to meet the problem, he replied that the members of Parliament made many demands on the government to bend more efforts to enable Japan to secure necessary raw materials, chiefly petroleum, from the South Pacific, through trade. Asked \* if a decision was reached at this time on the problem, he replied that there were no special steps taken by the YONAI Cabinet, but in his recollection consul generals were conducting negotiations with competent foreign authorities.

32468 Reference was made to the affidavit of the accused relating to the Lake Khasan Incident and to the testimony of TANAKA, Ryukichi at T.22751. In that testimony, TANAKA was asked what army commanding general issued the order about the concentration of troops. TANAKA answered \* that he did not see any of these documents directly at headquarters, but judging from common military knowledge he would say that the order for concentration was naturally given by Army Commander KOISO, and not NAKAMURA, who succeeded him on 15 July 1938. This was not an order for attack, but to concentrate. This TANAKA was the TANAKA he had referred to in his affidavit.

32469 Asked if he knew whether Ott knew of his opposition in the past to the Tripartite Pact, he stated he did not know whether Ott actually knew that he was opposed, but since Ott had frequent social contact with army officers, he was of the opinion that he might be informed by them of his opposition. Asked if there was any action or statement \* by Ott to lead him to think that Ott might be trying to influence his future decisions, he replied that at this interview with Ott he considered that Ott, being an ambassador, would know the real nature of the Ministry of Overseas Affairs. Perhaps Ott addressed questions to him which should have been asked the Foreign Minister, not understanding the true connotation of the name of the Overseas Affairs Ministry.

32470 \* According to Ott's telegram it was represented that KOISO invited him, but the fact was the other way around. At the time of the interview with Ott, KOISO entertained doubts as to the purpose of the meeting, but there was a telegram in evidence sent by Ribbentrop to Ott, that various moves should be taken in Japan to build up a political atmosphere and create the desire among the Japanese to enter into an alliance with Germany. It occurred to KOISO that perhaps the telegraphic instructions to Ott included himself as a target to be utilized.



Page  
32471

\* Asked if the action taken in relation to FIC was taken after approval from the French authorities under an agreement with the Vichy Government, he replied that the pact of common defense was entered into with FIC, which was represented by De Coux acting under directions of the Vichy Government. When KOISO became premier it appeared that De Coux had entered into DeGaulle's camp, and in connection with the effectuation of the pact for common defense, FIC authorities were showing a non-cooperative attitude. KOISO knew that this was the situation when he became the premier, and in light of the changing military situation the decision of the Supreme Council of February 1 was taken.

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Being a composite member of the Supreme Council for the consideration of war, he considered that he would \* be one of those responsible for any of its decisions. Asked if he would have no connection or responsibility for security measures taken by the Supreme Command he replied he had no responsibility in connection with high command matters taken to carry out matters on the spot.

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Regarding the dummy bombs of the March Incident, he had never heard how large the package was, but he had heard the amount was such it could be carried in one suitcase. \* The previous testimony describing the package as one which could be easily carried and containing 300 bombs was true.

There was absolutely no necessity to use an army truck to move the bombs, and they had no power to blow up the Diet building, or cause any destruction of that nature.

32474


Regarding exhibit 179-F, he would not deny the fact that KIDO had heard from HARADA the alleged facts in the exhibit. \* He did not know whether it was true or not, but not having any knowledge he could neither affirm nor deny it.



KS/rs  
4 November 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. David N. Sutton  
FROM : Lt. K. Steiner  
SUBJECT : Exhibit 2214

1. On p. 32,201, Mr. Brooks, on behalf of KOISO, moved to strike and disregard that part of Exh. 2214 starting with p. 15,816, line 15, and extending to p. 15,818, line 5. This constitutes the entire portion of the exhibit dealing with KOISO.
2. Exhibit 2214 was objected to by Counsel for KOISO on the very same grounds when the exhibit was introduced (p. 15,814). The President in overruling the objection stated that "Many of the matters mentioned by Defense are matters for the Defense to give evidence of when their turn comes and that the other objections raised go not to admissibility at all but to weight alone" (p. 15,815). The question of the two names mentioned in the exhibit was referred to the Language Arbitration Board (pp. 15,815 and 15,818) which reported only that "The names found in this document are in the original German" (p. 16,109).
3. Mr. Brooks submits that there is "no connection" between p. 1 and p. 2 of Exh. 2214. Page 1 ends with the sentence "continued on p. 2". Page 2 of Exh. 2214 shows in the right hand upper corner the mark "p. 2"; in addition the two pages show consecutive frame numbers (135926 and 135927); both pages show the mark "No. 1 to 3", and are dated 9 May.
4. The fact that the position of the Prosecution according to which only the part beginning with line 14 on p. 15,817 with the words "Japan was convinced ARITA emphasized . . . ." should not be attributed to KOISO (p. 32,199) is correct is born out by the following fact: ARITA made a statement at the conference of Prefectural Governors on 8 May 1939, reprinted in full in the Japan Advertiser of 9 May 1939. The portion of Exh. 2214 described by the Prosecution is obviously taken from this statement of ARITA. Since no other part of Exh. 2214 corresponds to any part of ARITA's statement, the extent of the error in the exhibit is clearly limited to the part mentioned by the Prosecution.

  
K. STEINER  
1st Lt, Inf



SUMMARY OF CASE AGAINST

KOISO, Kuniaki



KOISO

KOISO was charged under Counts 1-17, 18, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 36, 44, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53, 54, 55.

1. KOISO's activities prior to the Manchurian Incident.

(a) His Affiliations.

KOISO became a member of the KOKUHONSHA Society in 1924 and remained a member until the society "disappeared" (R. 32272). He attended only one meeting. At this meeting, in July 1931, HIRANUMA also was present (R. 32274). He could not remember whether ARAKI was or was not present. He knew that HIRANUMA was President of the KOKUHONSHA (R. 32274).

The KOKUHONSHA Society (Foundation of the State Society) had as its purposes the fostering of the spirit of nationalism, bolstering the foundations of the state and the exaltation of the national spirit (Exh. 164, R. 1636). KOISO joined because the fundamental character of the state was not fully clarified and it was decided by him that it would be a good thing to secure an understanding of the true character and spirit of Japan through the magazine published by the organization (R. 32276). KOISO denied being a member of the SAKURAKAI (R. 32281).

(b) His Official Position and Connections.

KOISO was commissioned an infantry second-lieutenant in June 1901; was promoted at various intervals, becoming Major General in December 1926. In August 1930, he became Chief of the Military Affairs Bureau in the War Ministry, which position he held until 29 February 1932, when he was named Vice War Minister (Exh. 3375, R. 32205).