

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
(April 3, 1947)  
(DEFENSE - Division II - Manchuria)  
TAKEDA - Direct

Page 2870

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DIRECT EXAMINATION OF HISASHI TAKEDA  
By Mr. Banno.

19320 \* The witness stated he lived in Nagano Prefecture, and was 54 years old. He identified exhibit No. 2405 as his affidavit.

19323 During the latter part of August, 1931, HONJO, newly appointed commander of the Kwantung Army, arrived, and at the beginning of September made his first tour of inspection. The witness was in his suite. The reports submitted to him were filled with righteous indignation at the contemptuous attitude of the Chinese authorities toward the Japanese army, the repeated interruptions of traffic on the railway line, and the oppressive treatment of Japanese in the districts. Rumors were current which overshadowed coming evils. HONJO was serene, and warned his men, local officials and nationals against hasty acts, and persuaded them to endure difficulties with patience. On September 12, when he inspected the independent garrison at Kunchuling, General MORI, the commander, submitted a report that the anti-Japanese movement \* had been systematized so that bandits began to dominate the districts, and there were signs that the outlaws were going to disturb the railway and the zone. The railway guards had been ordered to be most patient and to refrain from taking positive action outside the zone.

19324

19325 Completing his tour, HONJO returned to Port Arthur shortly after 10 p. m. September 18. The witness soon fell asleep, but was awakened by a loud bell. KATAKURA told him that something serious had happened and that they were to meet at the official residence of the chief of staff. When he reached there he found the chief with KATAKURA and NAKANA, \* and KATAKURA handed him a report which stated that frenzied Chinese soldiers had been reported about 10 p. m. on the 18th to have destroyed part of the railroad line west of Peitaiying, north of Mukden, and attacked the garrison, and the second Infantry battalion had been sent from the Independent Garrison to the spot. The witness remained silent, as he realized that what was going to happen had come to pass.

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19326 When the other staff officers joined them, they moved to the headquarters and studied measures to cope with the situation. It was so sudden that the men were caught off guard. In the meantime the second report arrived, which said that a unit of the Peitaiying barracks \*had blown a part of the railway line, and that the strength of the enemy was about three or four infantry companies. One company sent from Hushitai after 11 p. m. was now fighting 500 or 600. A corner of the enemy barracks had been taken, but the enemy was reinforcing with machine and infantry guns. At that time HONJO arrived. MIYAKE and ISHIHARA followed him in. A few minutes later ISHIHARA came back and stated that HONJO had made a firm resolution that he would carry the matter out on his responsibility. The witness was relieved.

19327 Between 1.30 a. m. and 2.00 a. m. on the 19th \* orders were given to each unit. A change in the plan of peacetime operations was made regarding the movement of the unit at Changchun. Under the original plan this unit was to go to Mukden, but HONJO ordered that it should not do so, thinking it adequate to keep it at Changchun since it was too early for it to advance on Mukden in accordance with scanty information. A report was made to Tokyo, and a telegram for additional troops sent to the commander of the Korean Army, according to the previous agreement. This telegram stated that on the 18th at 10.30 p. m. the Chinese troops at Mukden suddenly attacked the garrison. All forces are fighting desperately, and the Army has decided to attack Mukden with full strength and asked for a dispatch of reinforcements as soon as possible.

19328 Since it was feared that the Chinese near Chinchow would make a rear attack while the troops were fighting on the railway line, the army asked Admiral TSUDA, \* Commander of the Second Dispatched Fleet which was near Tsingtao, to help by sending part of the squadron to Yingkao. TSUDA assured that he would take adequate measures according to developments, but declined to help because of the danger the disturbances would extend to the Shantung district.

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ITAGAKI, the Senior Staff Officer, was then at Mukden. He was well aware of the intention of HONJO and his plan of operations, and he gave necessary instructions to HIRATA, commander of the 29th Regiment and of the garrison at Mukden, and SHIMAMOTO, commander of the Second Battalion, of the Independent Garrison, and he agreed with the determination to attack the barracks. Their determination was reported to HONJO about 2 a. m. on the 19th, and HONJO assented.

19329

HONJO left Port Arthur at 3.30 a. m., arriving at Mukden at noon on the 19th. MIYAKE and the witness remained behind to settle some affairs. They arrived at Mukden about 4 p. m. and saw columns of smoke rising in the direction of Peitaiying, and heard gun reports from Tungtaying. They learned the development of the battle, which had been swift and successful.

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The progress of the battle at Changchun had not yet been reported. After leaving Port Arthur he had heard of the outbreak of hostilities at Changchun, but the witness did not pay much attention to it. On his arrival at Mukden he was told that a fierce battle was going on at Changchun, and the developments were not so favorable until 6 p. m. Toward evening they received reports on the occupation of Kuanchengtzu \* and the barracks at Nanling. This report was delivered so late because military communication had been disrupted due to the sudden increase in telegrams concerning railway traffic because of the congestion arising from the transportation of troops.

At 8.40 HONJO received a telegram from the Commander of the Korean Army while en route to Mukden. It reported that five infantry and two artillery battalions, one cavalry and one engineer company, together with two airplane squadrons, were being sent. There were reports of bitter fighting at Changchun and uneasiness in Kirin and Harbin, and ISHIHARA, in charge of operations, was deliberating on a plan for after arrival at Mukden. After 5 p. m. on the 19th, information was received as to reinforcements from Korea, which were waiting at Shingishu by orders from above.

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19331 At 11 p. m. there was an official telegram from the commander in Korea to this effect. \* About 6 p. m. there was an instruction from the War Minister followed by a telegram from the Chief of Staff. The War Minister stated that the blame for the incident was obviously to be placed on China, but Japan had definitely adopted a policy of localizing the affair to a minimum and they should deal with the affair considering the above.

The Chief of Staff instructed that the resolution and steps taken by HONJO were adequate and believed to be effective in upholding the dignity of Japan's army. It has been decided by a cabinet meeting that in view of China's attitude at the beginning of the affair, they should go no further than forced to settle the issue. The operations would be carried out in accordance with that decision.

19332 \* From the beginning, Kirin was the center of the anti-Japanese movement. The report of a clash caused further aggravation of this. On the 19th Hsi Hsia, in Kirin Province, declared he could not take responsibility for protecting Japanese nationals. It was learned from the authorities of the Kirin-Changchun Railway that the main force of the Kirin Army had crossed the border on the 20th, and it was believed the troops would advance toward Changchun or come down along the Mukden-Hailung Railway to counteract Japanese movements and to reinforce the main force of the enemy.

19333 \* At 9.45 p. m. they received a telegram from the President of the Japanese nationals in Kirin, which stated that the situation was tense. The residences of some Japanese had been fired upon, and a section of some women and children had been evacuated. It was impossible to evacuate the rest. The danger grew imminent. They asked for swift and complete measures. The situation in Harbin was also aggravated. Japanese were preparing to evacuate. In Mukden things were in a state of confusion, and remnants of the defeated enemy were seen prowling about. If troops were sent to Kirin, considering the strength of the enemy force, it would be necessary to send all of the Second Division at Changchun.

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19334 This would weaken the defense of the railway line, \* and it was feared that the remnants of the defeated enemy troops might attempt to destroy the railroad, defeat the army, and keep them 450 miles apart. Since the Army had adopted the policy of localizing the affair, HONJO had to be most deliberate, yet he could not, in view of his responsibility for protecting nationals, leave them in imminent danger. A passive measure taken in fear of danger of separation might prove to be an incentive to the enemy and cause confusion. It was therefore decided that there was nothing left to do but deliver a crushing blow to the enemy at Kirin and take firm measures for safeguarding the railway. This matter was thoroughly discussed by HONJO and 19335 MIYAKE \* with all staff officers at 3 a. m. on the 21st a decision to send troops was given by the commander.

The main force left Changchun on the morning of the 21st. From secret agents, it was learned that the Kirin Army were taking up positions all around the city. They waited for the first report. However, they could not, due to defective communication, make contact until a report of bloodless occupation reached them that evening, a pleasant surprise. HONJO reported his dispatch of troops to the commander of the Kirin Army and the military authorities in Tokyo. After 1 p. m. they 19336 learned from the railway authorities \* that the 39th Mixed Brigade had begun to cross the Yalu. This was confirmed by a telegram from the Brigade Commander. HONJO and other members of the Kwantung Army were very grateful.

Shortly after this the Chief of Staff sent a telegram recognizing that the dispatch to Kirin was the outcome of necessity. HONJO thereupon ordered the 39th Mixed Brigade to garrison Mukden and all of the 2nd Division to concentrate near Changchun. Since the occupation of Kirin relieved the zone of its fear of attack, HONJO decided to call back the main force of the army to its post and watch developments. \* On December 3 he made a 19337 speech to the men, instructing them to maintain complete defense of the zone under strict discipline.

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19338 On the 24th the main force of the 2nd Division was ordered to guard the vicinity of Changchun returning from Kirin. The 39th was to guard Mukden, and the part of the Independent Garrison stationed at Kirin took charge of maintaining peace in the district. Chang Hsueh-liang, at Peiping, established the headquarters of the Northern Frontier Army at Chinchow. Headquarters and the Army were opened, he attempting to harass the rear and inciting bandits to guerrilla warfare. Many Japanese, especially Koreans, were victims of looting and violence. \* Uneasiness became wider and wider.

At first the flying units were ordered to reconnoitre the Chinchow area. According to their reports, the enemy on October 8 fired at the planes, which then bombed the military establishments where enemy quarters were established. However, the planes had no bombing equipment and the bombs were very crude, and no material damage was caused to the enemy.

19339 Since May, 1931, Wan Fulin, chief of Heilungkiang Province and Vice-Commander of the Northern Frontier Army was at Peiping \* with three infantry brigades and an artillery corps. His eldest son was at home, and his chief of staff was in charge of military affairs. His son was too young to have any strong authority over the people, and the chief of staff was only a colonel and not competent to decide major important matters which were conducted according to Wan's instructions. More than once Wan asked for permission to return, this being learned from intercepted Chinese telegrams.

19340 On October 10, Chang Haipeng, intending to expand his influence to the north, made a declaration of independence and started to advance into Heilungkiang. The son asked instructions \* from his father, and a messenger was sent to Chang Haipeng to appease him. Wan Fulin did not know what to do. On October 4, it was revealed that Japan's Army had intention of helping Chang Haipeng, and Wan Fulin sent telegraphic instructions that the Japanese Army would never advance into Northern Manchuria.

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19341 Throughout they should resist Chan Haipeng with determination. The people should set their minds at ease, and not be deluded by false reports. This was obtained through an intercepted telegraphic instruction sent on October 4. The troops of Heilungkiang Province were concentrated near Tsitsihar, and Ma Chanshan \* was summoned and appointed Commander in Chief of the Provincial Army and Deputy Governor of the Province. However, Chang Haipeng remained irresolute and continued negotiations with the provincial government and tried to take the area by means of diplomatic tactics. The minds of the leaders in Heilungkiang were still agitated, and it was understood that they were awaiting General Ma's arrival.

19342 On October 15, Chang Haipeng made a decision and left Taonan and began to march north. The Heilungkiang Army resisted and burned the railway bridge across the Nonni River, interrupting traffic on the Taonan-Anganchi Railway. It was not \* only part of the main line of international communication, but was built by a Japanese line and was the only security for the unpaid loan. Faced with appropriating 2,500,000 tons of products in North Manchuria, the South Manchuria Railway suffered a serious loss, and the economic life of the people in North Manchuria was affected. On October 20, TAKEMURA, an engineer on the railway, with fifteen persons, were sent to actually inspect. When they arrived they were illegally fired on by troops of the Heilungkiang Army who knew them as non-combatants.

19343 Thereupon MURAKANI, a director of the South Manchurian Railway, and the Consul at Mukden, demanded the Kwantung Army and Tokyo for repairs. The Army negotiated with General Ma through SHIMIZU at Tsitsihar and with the vice-president of the \* Board of Directors of the East China Railway through the consul at Harbin. This was in vain. It was necessary to complete the repairs before the freeze set in. On October 27, Japan gave notice that the repairs should be completed by November 3, and added that if they did not agree they would have to carry out the repairs by using force. The Heilungkiang Government promised to start repairs on October 30, but made no attempt to do so.

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The South Manchuria Railway therefore determined to start the repairs, and requested the army to send troops for protection. The main force of the Heilungkiang Army on the north bank of the river was about 2,000. Since the bridge was more than 500 kilometers from the railway line where the main force was stationed, it was difficult to send reinforcements. The Nonni River also isolated them from the working party and covering force. At least one regiment of infantry was necessary.

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\* HONJO, observing the localizing policy, decided to send a minimum so as not to provoke the people, and sent one infantry and one artillery battalion, and an engineer company under HAMAMOTO, with special instructions to use prudence and caution. He was first to negotiate with the Heilungkiang Army and then sent a unit to protect the working party after having ascertained the complete withdrawal of the enemy. HONJO sent ISHIHARA to the spot.

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The Nonni River detachment arrived in the vicinity on November 1, and began its preparations on that day. HONJO, on that day, notified Ma and Chang Haipeng that since they were repairing the bridge, \* it could not be used for military purposes and the troops of both armies should be withdrawn ten kilometers from the bridge and not to enter within the area until repairs were completed. From that night on they received several reports of the battle. On November 3, at night, the engineer corps repaired the destroyed bridge for infantry use. At 3. a. m. on the 4th Captain HANAI took up their posts to protect the working party. At 8.30 a.m. the chief of staff of the Heilungkiang Army and SHIMIZU came and declared that the Heilungkiang Army had no intention of resisting, and promised to withdraw his troops by noon. \* That morning the fog was dense, and they could not ascertain the enemy's position.

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One company trusted in the words of the enemy chief of staff, and when they reached a certain point they were suddenly fired on from several directions. The Japanese had 13 casualties and the company had to retire to await the main force.



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19348 Hearing the report of guns, the main force pressed forward and hostilities began in earnest at dawn on the 5th. The enemy, superior in number, made an enveloping attack. Each report brought unfavorable news. \* The enemy at first made repeated heavy attacks on the Japanese, but with the arrival of reinforcements they were compelled to fall back with heavy losses.

19349 The strength of the army near Tahsing before November 1 was five infantry battalions, 5 artillery companies, 1 engineer company and 2 flying companies. They could have easily taken Tsitsihar, as the soldiers wanted to do, but they were told to stand by under the policy of localization. This caused the enemy to make light of Japan's army. The main force of the enemy was concentrated near Anganchi, and they spread propaganda that the Japanese had been defeated.

The enemy at Chinchou gradually became active in cooperation, and about 10,000 armed bandits crossed the Liao River and threatened to come to the railway line. General Ma stated he would have a decisive battle with the Japanese Army, and he concentrated about 20,000 troops between Tsitsihar and Anganchi before November 10. The situation was so keen that hostilities could be opened at any moment by the enemy.

19350 The Kwantung Army reported to Tokyo and was prepared for both peace and war. At this time \* HONJO had not abandoned the idea of peaceful settlement, and he demanded that Ma reconsider, and on the 14th told Ma to withdraw his troops north of the Chinese Eastern Railway and keep them there; not to check traffic of the Taonan-Anganchi Railway, and stated that the Japanese would withdraw south when these two conditions were carried out. \* Ma took no notice of this, but destroyed the railway.

19351 In such a critical condition the 4th Mixed Brigade and some support were coming from Japan, and were expected to reach the battlefield about the 22nd. Japan was preparing to deliver a blow after union with these forces, but on the 16th or 17th the enemy threatened with superior numbers and became active in the front, so that the 2nd Division confronted them and occupied Tsitsihar.

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It was the plan to withdraw them as soon as possible, and no troops were sent into Tsitsihar and the Chinese were entrusted with preservation of peace. On the 18th it became bitterly cold, and the soldiers suffered intense hardships.

19352

\* The Chinese forces in and around Chinchou played an active part from the beginning of November, and the disturbance of public peace along the south Manchurian Railway became systematic on a large scale. It was concluded that so long as they did not capture the base of operations near Chinchou it would be difficult to preserve peace.

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In the middle of December the positions near Chinchou were made stronger, and the Chinese forces reached 50-60,000. There were direct threats \* to the railways. The destruction of railways and stoppage of traffic increased. The situation became so serious that Chinese insults could no longer be tolerated, and to self-defend the Japanese Army and residents it was necessary to capture the base of operations. This was reported to the central authorities.

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Japan took measures to have the League understand this, and reserved the right to suppress bandits. It was inevitable, since the bandits were supported by Chinese regulars, that the Japanese should have an encounter with the Chinchou force. Japan issued necessary statements and opened negotiations demanding withdrawal of the Chinese forces from inside the Wall. However, Chang Hsueh-liang's activities became such that with permission from Tokyo the 2nd Division advanced to drive the enemy away from the strong base of operations. The Chinese regulars reinforced the volunteers with armed trains, and bandits mixed with regular forces making a night attack. HONJO made up his mind, and from the 30th on began to suppress the enemy along the Fengtien-Shanhaikwan Railway, but the enemy retreated without fighting. Chinchou was in a state of anarchy, therefore, and its peace was disturbed. The 2nd Division was moved there while the rest of the main force was withdrawn to the railway.

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19355 Hsi Hsia, in Kirin, took the lead in establishing a new regime late in September 1931, \* and broke off relations with China, and another faction went to Harbin and established a regime in Pinhsen in opposition to Hsi Hsia.

The Kirin Regime set about forming new forces, and their strength was about 9,000 in December. Hsi Hsia left Kirin on January 5, 1932, on a suppression mission, and reached the suburbs of Harbin, and a battle took place on January 27. Some anti-Kirin forces entered Harbin and began to pillage. There were about 5500 Japanese residents there, and they demanded that troops be sent.

19356 While the Kwantung Army also foresaw aggravation, \* it observed the situation impartially and carefully, for it did not desire to be involved in faction fights. On January 27 four Japanese were reported as killed and many Koreans arrested, and a Japanese pilot was murdered by the Anti-Kirin Army when he made a forced landing. The Army decided to send two infantry battalions to protect the residents and communicated with the central military authorities and gave notice to the two forces that there was no intention except to protect Japanese residents.

19357 \* It was reported that the anti-Kirin Army was ill-disposed toward Japan, and unexpected accidents were feared. Fighting broke out before dawn on the 31st. It was decided that the main force of the 2nd Division be added. On February 4, the 2nd Division reached Harbin and attacked the anti-Kirin force. It entered Harbin on the 5th. HONJO troubled himself with the policy of localizing and withdrawing the 2nd Division to Nanp'u to avoid trouble with Russia. However, after the battle the division could not even evacuate immediately.

CROSS-EXAMINATION by Mr. Comyns Carr.

19360 \* The witness said, as he understood the question, that every advance was contrary to the intentions or against the will of the Kwantung Army. There was no such thing. He, however, admitted that in his affidavit, he had stated on each occasion of each advance that it was not the intention of the Kwantung Army to advance any further, but it was obliged to do so because of something done by the Chinese.

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19361

\* The witness said he knew DOIHARA, and he had heard of Consul General KUWAJIMA in Tientsin, but had not met him. After having heard read a telegram from the consul-general about DOIHARA's activities, and when the witness was asked whether it was not true each time the Kwantung Army intervened was because one of the rival armies was being financed and supplied with arms through DOIHARA, the witness said such matters were outside the scope of his knowledge, and he knew nothing of them.

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\* The witness said he knew HAYASHI, Consul General at Mukden. When asked whether he knew that on October 13, HAYASHI had reported to SHIDEHARA that Chang Haipeng had received 5,000 rifles and \$200,000 from the Japanese in support of his declaration of independence, the witness stated that so far as he knew no such thing occurred. He assumed that Consul General HAYASHI's telegram was very emotional, since he had a tendency to exaggerate. In saying this he was not referring to numbers.

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\* He did not believe that the Kwantung Army would adopt such a measure. He would not say that it was a lie, but so far as he knew such a thing did not happen. What Chang Haipeng did was something done by himself personally from his own standpoint. So far as he knew no member of the Kwantung Army was connected with this independence proclamation.

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\* When asked whether it was not true that Chang Haipeng received Japanese aid and increased his troops from 3,000 to 5,000 to march on Tsitsihar,

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\* the witness said it was not true that Chang Haipeng received Japanese aid, but the march to the north was true.

When asked whether it was not true that because of Japanese aid Chang Haipeng announced himself as ready to support Pu-Yi, the witness said this was outside his knowledge, but he had heard that Chang had voluntarily risen to aid the movement to restore Pu-Yi.

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The witness said he knew Major HAYASHI, who was in Manchuria at the time. He was not informed that HAYASHI, on November 6, 1931, had demanded General Ma to resign and Chang Haipeng should be appointed governor in his place. He also did not know that on November 11, HONJO demanded General Ma's resignation.

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\* Since he was an operations officer and these were liaison matters, he was not informed of it. When asked, in view of that, how he could say things inferring that he knew about all the telegrams sent and received by HONJO and what was in HONJO's mind, the witness said that HONJO was desirous of reaching a peaceful settlement and that he did not desire by any means to send troops to north Manchuria. He knew this was HONJO's policy. Matters of this nature were not fully known by those in charge of operations.

April 4, 1947

19378

\* The witness repeated that down to February 4, 1932, HONJO was engaged in trying to localize the affair and avoiding further advances. When asked whether in doing this he was carrying out orders of Japan, the witness stated that he was acting not on the instructions of the government but on the orders of the Chief of Staff. At times HONJO handled matters to localize the affair within the scope of his delegated authority, but on fundamental policy he followed the orders communicated to him.

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\* He had testified in his affidavit, he admitted, that HONJO was endeavoring to carry out the decision of the Japanese government. \* He did not know that ARAKI had admitted that as early as September 17, 1931, Japan had decided that the three Northeastern Provinces and Jehol should be occupied and that ARAKI had signed the order.

When asked whether he wished the court to believe that HONJO disobeyed ARAKI's orders, the witness said there had been no case of disobedience to the orders of the central army authorities.

Tabeda, Hisashi

<u>File</u>	<u>Serial</u>
363	58
260	6
286	1
92	13
99	210
99	352
99	447

WITNESS PROGRESS REPORT

TAKEDA, Hisashi

Date: 3 April 1947

Completed as to Items Numbers 1, 2, 7 & 8.

Partially completed as to Items Numbers         .

Item 9: NONE

SMITH N. CROWE, JR.  
Assistant Counsel

Takeda, Hisashi

Not listed in Lopez's Mar 11, 1947  
document.

Continued list:

1. April 29, 1934 - Minor Cordon of 4<sup>th</sup>  
Order of Rising Sun, by War Ministry  
for Man (incident)

2. April 29, 1940, Intermediate Cordon  
of ~~4<sup>th</sup>~~ 4<sup>th</sup> Order of the Rising Sun, by  
War Ministry for the China Incident,  
and 4<sup>th</sup> Order of the Golden Kite, by  
War Ministry for China Incident.



419  
Takeda, Chobei  
260-6-Dirigan  
92.13-Wiley

Takeda, Hisashi.

Subpoena: Staff Off., Kwantung Army, connected with operations at Chinchow, Nonni Bridge, Harbin and Angangshi, Manchuria. Kwantung Army did not carry out these operations with aggressive plan.

File-286-1. Ref. is made to a General Takeda, the Japanese military advisor to Gen. Huang Fu, with Huang-Fu at Suhsan, Sept 1933, at which Gen. Takeda demanded recognition by the Nanking govt of special privileges by the Japanese in North China in connection with the handling and distribution of Jehol opium. (Check with Chinese Dir or name of this man).

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
FAR EAST COMMAND  
Military Intelligence Section, General Staff  
Civil Intelligence Section

Curriculum Vitae of TAKEBA Hisashi (Lt General)

20 March 1947

**Career:**

- 1894 - Born, Nagano Prefecture
- 1916 - Graduated, Military Academy
- 2d Lt, Imperial Guards, 2d Infantry Regiment
- 1917 - Attached to 74th Infantry Regiment
- 1920 - 1st Lt
- 1923 - Entered Army Staff College
- 1925 - Captain
- 1926 - Graduated, Army Staff College
- 1927 - Company Commander, 74th Infantry Regiment
- 1928 - General Staff Officer, 74th Infantry Regiment
- 1929 - Judge, Army General Court Martial
- 1930 - Concurrently, Staff Officer, Kwantung Army
- 1931 - Major
- 1936 - Lt Colonel
- 1937 - Instructor and Member of Research Section, Infantry School
- 1938 - General Staff Officer, 12th Division
- 1938 - Commander, 24th Infantry Regiment
- 1938 - Colonel
- 1938 - General Staff Officer, 18th Division
- 1942 - Major General
- 1945 Apr - Lt General
- 1945 Jul - Commander, 355th Division

Source: CIS Intelligence Files

REPORT BY: Lt. John A. Curtis  
12 March 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: TAKEDA, Hisashi

No further information concerning the above is contained  
in the files of IPS.

COPIES: 3 File  
1 Mr. Newbill

**TAKEDA, Hisashi**

**Request by: ITAGAKI, OKAWA, MINAMI, UMEZU, HOSHINO**

**Address: No. 9,215, Ina, Ina Machi, Kamiinagun,  
Naganoken, Japan**

**Facts to be proved - He was a staff officer of the  
Kwantung Army and connected directly with the operations at  
Chinchow, Nonni Bridge, Harbin and Angangchi, Manchuria.  
He will be able to testify the causes of these operations.**

**Relevancy - The Kwantung Army did not carry out  
these operations with aggressive plan.**