


14 May 1947

Memorandum for: Mr. W. Glanville Brown, British Division  
From: Lt. J. A. Curtis  
Subject: IKEZAKI, Chuko

1. A further search of the files of CIS was made but no more information could be located on an article appearing in the Osaka Mainichi in 1939 or 1940 in which IKEZAKI states that "Japan could easily and should take Singapore, China and South Pacific."
2. However, a photostat of a clipping appearing in the Yomiuri Shinbun, 18 June, 1939 by IKEZAKI, concerning Singapore is attached. This article may be of value and interest, along the same basis as the Mainichis' article.
3. If a complete search of the Mainichi is deemed necessary, the two years 1939 and 1940 could be searched for this article. This would, however, required great deal of time and work after this complete file had been assembled.

  
J. A. Curtis  
2d. Lt. Inf. Investigator  
Investigative Division  
Inter. Pros. Section  
Room 379-B

Translated in full by :-

SHINOZAKI

A TOPIC A DAY

THEORY OF THE SINGAPORE BASE

BY IKEZAKI, Chuiko.

In view that the situation in the Far East has begun to present a threatening aspect of late, various alarming talks are in the town regarding SINGAPORE, the British base of operations in the Pacific. Whatever the talks may be, it is necessary for us to consider once the strategical position of SINGAPORE and understand what is a substantial value of the base.

The first thing we should know <sup>about the SINGAPORE base</sup> is this.

The fleet forces to be taken into the SINGAPORE base would not be more than a small fleet with the main force consisting of two or three battleships at the best judging from the present situation in Europe as well as the capacity of accommodation the base itself possesses.

Even the French and Dutch Fleet in Indian waters joint it, the strength of

The Fleet would still be too weak to stand against the main force of our fleet, and the already established plan of using five capital ships would after all be a dream.

The second thing we should know is that the SINGAPORE base possesses absolutely no value of attack whatsoever. There exists a distance between the Japan Proper and the base at least more than 2,600 sea-miles and in order that the British Navy at the SINGAPORE base attack the Japan Proper, they have to advance direct toward the north breaking through the difficult passes of the Sea of South China and the Straits of Formosa. To force such operations under these circumstances, it is exactly like to ride oneself into the very jaws of death.

The third thing we should know is this. Granted that the SINGAPORE base has really the defensive value,

it would barely be able to put under surveillance the ocean west of the MARRACA Straits and to defend India.

Although the real intention of the British Navy seems to defend Australia and New Zealand and also the Dutch East Indies and the French Indo-China if possible, they would never be able to <sup>display</sup> such a stint judging from the actual fleet force they can manage to despatch to the Far East.

The fourth thing we should know is that the SINGAPORE base can never be impregnable as often boasted by the military authorities there. We need not always to attack this base from the Japan's standpoint in wartime, yet should we dare to carry out the attack we see no reason to complain to the least of inability. Especially, the anti-air raid establishments at the SINGAPORE base are substantially

very poor and would be helpless in case they receive the strong enemy air assault, although they are often exaggerated in report.

The British in the Far East must have first of all a retreat and regard for their own foothold before they carry out a reckless and pushing policy. Whilst Japan, prudent and modest and although seemingly weak-kneed, nobody can tell to what extraordinary measures she would resort as soon as she becomes heated with indignation.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Investigation Division

FROM: British Division.


SUBJECT: IKEZAKI, Tadatala.

25th March, 1947.

Reference translations of two articles by this man, one called "If Japan and the United States should fight, dated 28 May, 1946, and one "Strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact" dated 13 August 1939.

Are the original Japanese versions of these articles readily available at short notice?

W.G.B.



# 防共協定強化

池崎忠孝

(一)

わが國の外交政策の

中で、今日もつとも大

切なもの、日本が、防共協定を締結するに、よきことより、日ソ協定の締結を解決するに、よきことより、むしろヨーロッパの新協定に注意し、一日も早く防共協定を強化するに、よきことなり。日本が、防共協定を締結するに、よきことより、日ソ協定の締結を解決するに、よきことより、むしろヨーロッパの新協定に注意し、一日も早く防共協定を強化するに、よきことなり。

現在来の通り口からいつて、防共協定を強化するかどうかは、その協定が成立した當時から、當然懸念されてきたことだ。防共協定そのものの本質からいつても日露伊三ヶ國をつらぬく防共協定は、やがて来るべきより、一層有効なる協定を期待してゐる。半ば懸念的な理解と懐疑とに終始し、それをもつて日に日露伊三ヶ國を結合する防共協定の目標ならしめなければ、

(二)

決して十分な効果が望めるものではない。防共協定の強化を望む者が、今や民間における一種の野合となつてゐるのを見ても、現在の我が國が望むべき道は、おのづから理解されるではないか。

(三)

わが國の地位および立場からいふと、いふので防共協定を強化することは、必然的に多少の犠牲と危険とをもたらす虞れがある。だが現在における世界の情勢は、吾人が常に安全な道のみを歩み、斷えず危険の危険から身を避け得るといふことが、好都合な状態になつてゐない。否、むしろ吾人が強ひて危険を避け、強ひて犠牲を免れようとするれば、吾人の理解しない

火危が、反つて吾人の身に降りかかるとは、さういふものではない。防共協定を強化するに、よきことより、日ソ協定の締結を解決するに、よきことより、むしろヨーロッパの新協定に注意し、一日も早く防共協定を強化するに、よきことなり。

(四)

今や我が國に對するアメリカの態度が明確になり、英國も依然として敵性を包蔵してゐるものと見られるし、ソ聯また明白に吾人の朋友ならざることを示してゐる。かくして、我が國を懸る歐米各國のあひだに、黙々として鞏固な包圍網が形成されつゝ、あるものとすれば、吾人はもはや憚るべき何物もない。立派に交際事業の目的を達し、いはゆる東亞新秩序の確立を完成するためにも、吾人は、吾べきではないか。

Mr. Brown, British Division,

Am. his Scanners to:

1. <sup>\*</sup> scan entire book to see if  
precis attached is  
accurate appraisal of book

2. check <sup>translation of</sup> attached precis with  
orig. precis

3. Check over photostat

✓ Copy of newspaper attached  
with translated copy.

\* If, precis is found to be inaccurate, to  
make necessary additions & corrections in  
revisiting of precis of book.

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Book + attached notes as to be  
returned to Mr. Brown, British Division



T. R. TOMISHIGE,  
Scanner.  
16 April, 1947.

## ANSWER TO Mr. BROWN.

Re: IKEZAKI, Chuko's

"If Japan and the U.S. Should Fight."

(1) Precise of the book is an accurate appraisal of books. The following excerpts are <sup>given</sup> only for your reference.

"Admiral Yarnel, with a coarse brain, noisily

advocates the conquer of Japan, and speaks at

random that the powerful American fleet can

destroy the inferior Japanese fleet easily within

a couple of weeks. However, this is rather a

confession of his own stupidity. I dare swear,

trans-oceanic expedition of the American fleet

is positively impossible to carry out, unless

America possesses a base of advance in the neighboring waters of Japan." (p. p. 156, 157)

"Maj. Gen. Sterling seems to think that, since the weak point of Japan is in exhaustion of resources, it is certain that Japan will finally submit, had America blockaded Japan completely by a so-called long-distance blockade, no matter how distant it was. To do this, the admiral thinks, it is necessary never to hand over Dutch East Indies and to hold tightly the base of Singapore in the hand of Britain; and

the Anglo-American combined fleets should make  
a plan of <sup>close</sup> joint operations and stop Japan's south-  
ward operations. However, the admiral's idea  
is based on many <sup>a</sup> hypothesis and dogmatism.

Unless these hypothesis and dogmatism should  
come true as he expects, there is no possibility  
of concrete realization. No matter what self-  
confidence he may have, we need not be disconcerted,  
but on the contrary, we ought to listen quietly  
to his words and take necessary precautions."

(p.p. 178, 179 and 181)

(2) The translation attached to Japanese precis was carefully checked. It's O.K.

(3) Photostat copy of newspaper was checked over. There is just one error in English

translation. About one line, the sixth from

the bottom of page one, as quoted below, ought

to be stricken out.

"If we continue with the idea that because we are strong, we will"

And it ought to be replaced with

"If we should continue to insist to"

Excerpts written by translator from the  
book, "If Japan and United States Should Fight."  
Translated 28 May 1946.  
日米戦争は、

2780

池崎忠孝著

日露戦争の末期以来、米國、我が國に對する壓迫は歲々と之に苛辣の度を加へ、その政策の具体化せざるに當りて或は軍縮條約の爲め、彼が爲す所は時と場合とに應じ、あらゆる手段と方法とを盡して殆ど剩すところなし。

米國の所爲は徹頭徹尾我が國の擡頭を抑へ、あはよ(は)こ(は)一躓また起、能はざる、窮地に追ひ込まんとするにあり。支那事變の勃発以来米國の態度は唯我が國を面、敵國として當ふと名乗りを挙げがごとくに過ぎず。その露骨なる援將政策に至つては何等抗日支那の輿國たると思ふところなし。

我が國にこれ小心翼々怖へに米國を怖れ且、米國を憚る限り、彼は愈々増長して更に上り一層の壓迫を吾人の頭上に加へ、吾人をして窮窮終に成すところと知らざるに至らしむべし。

古往今來、史を繕くには月々米國程我儘勝手な國はあらず。彼は断えが二一主義を主張して極力新大陸に對する~~干渉~~舊大陸の干渉を非とすに抱らざり。彼は進んで~~新~~大陸に對して干渉し、毫も自己の矛盾と撞着とを顧みざるなり。

支那事變は今や重大なる段階に到達せり。しかる日独伊三ヶ國の協定成立するに至つて我が國究極の目的たる大東亞新秩序の建設は之に~~深~~深刻なる意義と使命とを以て新たに世界史の進展に参加するものとあり。かゝる新事態

に對應してよくその任務を遂行せんが爲には、すべし之の障壁  
すべし之の峻嶮擧がてこれと突破し、只管直往邁進せざるべ  
からず。況んや一米國の区々たる妨害の如き、断乎これと粉砕  
するの決意なしして可ならんや。

南支那海は我が國、カリビヤ海は南洋諸島及び東南  
アジアは我が國の中央アメリカ及び西印度諸島なり。

予は断じて好戰者道にあらず。太平洋の戰略に關する  
述作積んば山と爲り、觀あるも予は未だ嘗て米國と戦ふ  
べしと主張したることなし。予は今日まで米國怖るゝに足ら  
ざるもこれを憚るの要なしとは説きたることあるも、米國怖るゝ  
に足らば故にこれを代へべしとは説きたることなし。敢て言へば  
予は戦争を好まば、能く限りこれを避くべしと……点に於て  
寧も人後に落るる物はあらず。

しかも、米國尚ほ反有せり。依然として我が國の進路  
を遮り、延いて我が國の存立の理想とを脅かさんとす  
ることあるも吾人は断然これと戦ふべしと主張するものなり。  
米國の富強は恐らく吾界に冠たるものありん。吾人は敢て  
それを疑はず。然れども戦争、勝敗を決する要因は自ら他  
にあり。吾人は天理を信ず。儼として天理の存する以上米國の  
富強を以て可能とすものは、当然限度ある事を知らざるべ  
からず。

米元怖る。に足らぬ

——池崎忠孝著

自序に代へて

一九一九年、巴里に於て平和條約の締結せるや、樂天家の  
多しは、好んで在界永遠の平和を口にしたりき。しかも戦雲  
容易に歟まらば、彼等のみ失望をして大にしめしが、口カル、條  
約の成るに迄、彼等は再び戦争の絶滅を信じ、これを  
以て平和の星の出現する新しきベツレヘムなりと言へり。され  
ども口カル、條約の後、在界は早して黎明の讚歌に充つる  
平和の樂園となりしや。且際聯盟規約と言ひ、軍縮條約  
と言ひ、不戦條約と言ひ、戦争を咒ひ、平和を熱禱する  
文書は積んで山をなすに抱らば、在界は依然として不安  
に、依然として危懼の裡にあり。

試みは一箇の肉を得て、彼等の中に投ぜよ。一見禮儀  
と謙讓とに充てるがごとき彼等。態度は平然として、本  
來の野性を曝露し、自己の飽きたる負欲を満足せしむる  
ためには、造らざる腕力をも辞せざる淺間しき光景の現  
出するを見ん。平和は唯だ言葉のみ、未だ事實にはあらざる  
なり。……平和は曾て太平洋の理想なりき。しかも今に  
於て那邊にか平和ありや。東より来る英元は新嘉坡を金城  
湯池として太平洋のジブラルタルたらしめんとし、西より来る米元  
は、布哇を難攻不落の險塞として太平洋のモロコシたらし  
めんとし、この二大勢力の挟間に愕むたる日本は、戦の怖々  
として自ら衛るに寧日なきにあらばや。

世界の人類約十七億、その三合二を占むる所謂有色人種  
の大部分が所謂白色人種の鐵鞭によつて駆役せられ、  
永遠の桎梏の下にあつて暗黒なる運命に呻吟する限り、  
その深怨、何れの日にか必ず爆発せざるを得ず、  
世界を擧げて奈落の業火に投ぜざるべし人種戦争の慘  
禍を避けんと思はれば、白色人種は直ちに有色人種  
に對して冷酷なる統御と苛酷なる搾取をも中止し、  
彼等が独占する土地の總てを開放して、全人類の共益の  
ために提供する覚悟なからば、何の特権あつてか、彼等  
は世界の大部分を独占せしむる。

アングロ・サクソン民族は... 總人口僅か一億に過ぎざるに、  
その強大な海軍力によつて海洋の殆んど全部を私し、今や一  
として世界を領土化せしめざるを得ず。負楚飽くを知らざる  
彼等は... 太平洋をも自家の領土として、こゝに居る總てを  
囊中の鼠にしめんとす。

米人は皮膚の色が彼等と異なるの故を以て、吾人を排  
斥したるに在り。米人は門戸開放、美名を假りて... 極東の利  
權を掠奪せんとすに在り。米人は自己の安全を名に、太平洋を  
自家の池沼たらしめんとするに在り。... 個人に自衛權あるは、国家  
にも自衛權あり。個人に生存權あるは、国家にも生存權あり。自衛と  
生存の爲に止むをなくして戦はんとすは、何れも果して何れも不可  
なくある。余が大聲叱呼して七千万同胞に懇へんとす所以なり。

昭和四年八月中瀬、浪華の僑居に於て...



GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INVESTIGATION DIVISION

10 April 1947

Received from Investigation Division the following inclosures of  
Note 2, check sheet 27 March 47 from IPS to G-2, re IKEZAKI, Chuko:

1. Excerpts from "If Japan and the US Should Fight"
2. Book "If Japan and the US Should Fight"
3. Photostat copy of article "Strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact."

*W. Glanville Brown*

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W. GLANVILLE BROWN  
British Division, IPS.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chief of Investigation Division

FROM: British Division

SUBJECT: YKEZAKI, Chuko or Tadatala

7 May, 1947.

Reference Case File no. 207.

Serial 3 is a Memo for the File from Capt. James J. Caine, Jr. dated 11 December, 1945.

This states that "on 4 Dec. 1945, CIS files reflect the following information...

...In 1939 or 1940 he is quoted in the Osaka Mainichi as saying that Japan could easily and should take Singapore, China and South Pacific".

Is there available a copy of the Osaka Mainichi containing this statement?

W. G. B. Z

1 May 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Sutton; Col. Woolworth; Mr. Dunigan  
FROM : EDWARD P. MONAGHAN

Information in the form of a Staff Study compiled by G-2 has been included in the Investigative Case Files of the International Prosecution Section and is now available on the following witness.

IKEZAKI, Chuko

who has been requested by

HASHIMOTO  
TOJO

*E P M*

EDWARD P. MONAGHAN  
Chief, Investigative Section

DATE 2 April 1947

PROGRESS REPORT OF: Ikezaki, Chuko

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Partially Completed</u>	<u>Fully Completed</u>
1. Information in the hands of the Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u>
2. Statement in application for subpoena as to subject of witness's testimony.	_____	<u>X</u>
3. Examination of case file, if any.	_____	<u>X</u>
4. Cross-reference file on case files in office of Investigation Division.	_____	<u>X</u>
5. Cross-reference card file by subject matter of evidentiary documents in Document Division.	<u>X</u>	_____
6. Reference in evidence to witness or to the subject matter of his testimony.	<u>X</u>	_____
7. Preparation of summary of testimony already given by witness.	<u>X</u>	_____
8. Memorandum prepared by Mr. Lopez, dated March 11, 1947, relating to decorations awarded to defendants and their witnesses.	_____	<u>X</u>
9. Statement of any other investigation conducted by you.	_____	_____

Lester C. Duminigan  
(10)

Date: April 3<sup>rd</sup> 1947

Name of Witness: IKEZAKI, Tadatabe or Chuko

Completed as to Items Numbers: 1, 2, 4 \*

Partially completed as to Items Numbers:

If Item 9 is applicable, state briefly the nature of the investigation conducted:

\* Only discovered to-day that Ikezaki, Tadatabe and Ikezaki, Chuko is the same man > that a file on him exists under the Patten name

NAME OF WITNESS:           IKEZAKI, Chuko  
REQUESTED BY    :           HASHIMOTO, Kingoro  
DATE             :           2 April 1947

Completed as to Items 1 - 8.

Interrogated TANAKA, Ryukichi concerning this witness.

3 April 1947

MEMO TO: Investigation Division  
FROM : Mr. D. N. Sutton  
SUBJECT: IKEZAKI

Mr. Brown informs me that he is of the opinion that IDEZAKI, Tadatake, and IKEZAKI, Chuka, and IKEZAKI, Tadataka, are all one and the same person.

Please confirm this and amend your records accordingly.

---

D. N. SUTTON  
Assistant Counsel

CC: Mr. Brown  
Mr. Dunigan


GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS  
INVESTIGATION DIVISION

AM/jen

9 April 1947

MEMORANDUM TO: MR. SUTTON  
FROM : DOUGLAS L. WALDORF, Chief, Inv. Div., IPS.  
RE : IKEZAKI, CHUKA  
(IDEZAKI, Tadatake and IKEZAKI, Tadataka)

Receipt is hereby acknowledged of your memorandum dated 3 April 1947 with reference to the above styled subject. Please be advised that the records in this office have been amended according to your suggestion.

  
DOUGLAS L. WALDORF,  
Chief, Inv. Div., IPS.