

Doc. #2017

Vol. 17

5

Congress of the United States

---

Report of Proceedings

---

Hearing held before

Joint Committee

on the

Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack

S. Con. Res. 27

---

December 6, 1945

Washington, D. C.

---

Pages:..... 2762 to 2915 .....

NATIONAL

{ 4266  
4267  
4268

WARD & PAUL

(ELECTREPORTER, INC.)

OFFICIAL REPORTERS

1760 PENNSYLVANIA AVE., N. W.

WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

PEARL HARBOR REPORT

VOL. 17

(5)

--	--	--

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF:

PAGE

MARSHALL, General George C.

2763

E X H I B I T S

NUMBER

PAGE

49

2773

50

2773

51

2773

52

2775

53

2802

54

2814

55

2814

56

2842

57

2845

58

2876

59

2886

60

2892

---

Lacharity (1)  
AL-1

2762

S. Con. Res. 27

Thursday, December 6, 1945

Congress of the United States,  
Joint Committee on the Investigation  
of Pearl Harbor Attack,  
Washington, D. C.

The Joint Committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at  
10:00 A.M., in the Caucus Room (room 318), Senate Office  
Building, Senator Alben W. Barkley (chairman), presiding.

Present: Senators Barkley (chairman), George, Lucas,  
Brewster and Ferguson.

Representatives Cooper (vice chairman), Clark, Murphy,  
Gearhart and Keefe.

Also present: William D. Mitchell, General Counsel;  
Gerhard A. Gesell, Jule M. Hannaford and John E. Masten,  
of counsel, for the joint committee.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

3 General Marshall, will you be sworn.

4 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

5 (Having been duly sworn by the Chairman)

6 The Chairman: Counsel may proceed.

7 Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, when were you appointed  
8 Chief of Staff?

9 General Marshall: I was appointed Acting Chief of Staff  
10 on July 1, 1939 and formally appointed and confirmed Chief of  
11 Staff on the 1st of September, 1939.

12 Mr. Mitchell: And you served until what date?

13 General Marshall: I think it was until November 20 just  
14 past.

15 Mr. Mitchell: Of this year?

16 General Marshall: Of this year.

17 Mr. Mitchell: During your service in the Army have you  
18 ever had any service in the Far East?

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir I spent about five years  
20 in the Philippines and a little short of three years in China.

21 Mr. Mitchell: What was your service in China?

22 General Marshall: I was either in command or Executive  
23 Officer of the 15th Infantry at Tientsin.

24 The Chairman: General Marshall, will you move a little  
25 closer to the microphone, please.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2           Mr. Mitchell: Did you learn the Chinese language when  
3 in China?

4           General Marshall: I wouldn't admit that to a language  
5 student, but I can carry on a conversation.

6           Mr. Mitchell: The gentleman who said you didn't know  
7 anything about China the other day will have to revise his  
8 ideas, probably.

9           Now, will you state in your own way what the functions  
10 of the Chief of Staff of the Army were during 1940 and 1941.

11           General Marshall: With your permission I will read the  
12 Army regulations on the subject.

13           Mr. Mitchell: That is Exhibit 42.

14           General Marshall: (Reading)

15           "The Chief of Staff is the immediate advisor of  
16 the Secretary of War on all matters relating to the  
17 Military Establishment, and is charged by the Secretary  
18 of War with the planning, development, and execution  
19 of the military program. He will cause the War De-  
20 partment General Staff to prepare the necessary plans  
21 for recruiting, mobilization, organizing, supplying,  
22 equipping, and training the Army of the United States  
23 for use in the national defense and for demobilization.  
24 As the agent, and in the name of the Secretary of War,  
25 he issues such orders as will insure that the plans

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of the War Department are harmoniously executed by  
3 all agencies of the Military Establishment, and that  
4 the military program is carried out speedily and effi-  
5 ciently.

6 "As Commanding General of the Field Forces. -- The  
7 Chief of Staff, in addition to his duties as such, is,  
8 in peace, by direction of the President, the Commanding  
9 General of the Field Forces and in that capacity directs  
10 the field operations and the general training of the  
11 several Armies, of the oversea forces, and of the  
12 GHQ units. He continues to exercise command of the  
13 Field Forces after the outbreak of war until such time  
14 as the President shall have specifically designated a  
15 Commanding General thereof."

16 Those are the regulations.

17 Mr. Mitchell: During 1940 and 1941 will you state in  
18 a general way what your general activities were and what  
19 problems you were dealing with?

20 General Marshall: They rather subdivided themselves into  
21 about four categories. In the first place, there was the  
22 mobilization of the Army which referred specifically to  
23 personnel and the organization of that personnel. The mobiliza-  
24 tion procedure was carried out into the corps areas of which  
25 there were nine in the United States under my direction. The

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

organization and creation of the Army I delegated in large measure to a command I set up at what used to be the Army War College with General Leslie McNary as my Deputy and he with his staff was held by me directly responsible for the organization and the training of the Army in the continental United States.

The relations with the overseas theaters, the Philippines, Hawaii, Caribbean, that is, Panama, were carried out as to detail, as to plans, proposals for me by what was then called the War Plans Division of the General Staff, now the Operations Division.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

He follows



Witness Marshall

1  
2 The materiel aspects of the activities were in the hands  
3 of a series of bureau chiefs -- Chief of Ordnance, the Chief  
4 of Quartermaster, Chief of Signal Officer -- and in the case,  
5 for example of the Chief Signal Officer he not only had the  
6 problem of procurement of material but also certain operational  
7 responsibilities.

8 I dealt with them partly in person but largely through  
9 the medium of the four sections of the General Staff which  
10 coordinate supply and the plans and policies relating to  
11 supply.

12 In addition to that there were special groups on which I  
13 had to depend, notably, that of the allocation of materiel  
14 which was probably one of the most trying problems of the  
15 day in relation to the Russians, the Chinese, the British,  
16 and to our own training and to our overseas theatres for  
17 their defense.

18 There was also the problem of priority which a special  
19 board, Army and Navy Board, operated and with which I was  
20 directly concerned. There was a subdivision of responsi-  
21 bility here, in that the Assistant Secretary, now the Under-  
22 secretary of the War Department, was chargable under the law  
23 for the procurement activities in the field of civilian pro-  
24 duction.

25 The ordinary administrative point of the Army, as to

hl  
fls  
AL

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2

1 records and matters of that kind, I depended largely on the  
2 Adjutant General's Department. The general coordination  
3 of administration details, I depended at that time on the  
4 senior Deputy Chief of Staff, but I created a second deputy  
5 who looked after for me the materiel factors concerned.  
6

7 I think that is the general outline.

8 Mr. Mitchell: I notice in Secretary Stimson's report,  
9 in this Pearl Harbor Army inquiry, he makes this statement:

10 "It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifi-  
11 cally to direct and personally supervise the execution in  
12 detail of the duties of the various sections of the General  
13 Staff. His paramount duty is to advise the President and  
14 the Secretary of War and make plans for and supervise the  
15 organization, equipment, and training of the great army for  
16 global war, to advise on and himself to make decisions re-  
17 garding the basic problems of military strategy in the many  
18 possible theatres in which the war might develop, and in  
19 any other fundamental and broad military problems which  
20 confront the United States. It would hopelessly cripple  
21 the performance of those great and paramount duties, should  
22 the Chief of Staff allow himself to become emerged in  
23 administrative details by which the plans for defense are  
24 carried out in our Army outposts."  
25

Does that fairly picture in your mind the situation of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 the Chief of Staff?

3 General Marshall: I think it does, sir. Throughout  
4 all of that, of course, it was my responsibility to deter-  
5 mine, as far as it was humanly possible, what were the  
6 critical affairs in all these activities.

7 I omitted one reference, which was a very responsible  
8 duty, and a very difficult duty. That was in the prepara-  
9 tion of the budget estimates of the War Department, and the  
10 representation before the committees of Congress.

11 Mr. Mitchell: What policy did you have during your  
12 term as Chief of Staff with respect to the responsibility of  
13 commanders in the field, including overseas commanders, in  
14 respect to their independent initiative and responsibility  
15 and decentralization of action?

16 General Marshall: My endeavor was to select the ablest  
17 people available at the time, have their missions defined,  
18 and give them the responsibility for the positions which  
19 they occupied.

20 Mr. Mitchell: You attended the Atlantic Conference at  
21 Argentia, did you not?

22 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I did.

23 Mr. Mitchell: What part did you take in that?

24 General Marshall: I was concerned with what amounted to  
25 a first getting together, coming to know the British Chiefs

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of Staff. We had no agenda for our meeting.

3 We met and discussed general matters, largely regarding  
4 the materiel desired by the British, and then we broke up  
5 into groups, myself and Field Marshall Sir John Dill, the  
6 head man of the ground forces of the British Army.

7 There was no question of materiel between us because  
8 we had given them all of the materiel we could afford to  
9 dispense at that time.

10 I believe on the Navy side, and I am quite certain on  
11 the air side, there was considerable discussion of materiel.

12 With Field Marshall Sir John Dill and myself, our con-  
13 versations were almost entirely devoted to a general resumé  
14 of the war situation, what the hazards were, what the anti-  
15 cipations were, particularly as to the Middle East and the  
16 Mediterranean, and Singapore.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Shf  
fls

17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Shefner  
 fls LaChar  
 10:15 Am

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Did you at that meeting know of any com-  
 3 mittment that the United States made at that meeting to en-  
 4 gage the nation in war if we were not attacked?

5 General Marshall: No, sir, I did not. I was not in-  
 6 volved in the political discussions.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Did you learn anything at that meeting  
 8 about this proposal to make the parallel protests to the  
 9 Japanese by England and the United States?

10 General Marshall: My recollection as to that is that  
 11 I knew nothing of that until a meeting of the liaison group  
 12 of the State, War, and Navy Departments in Mr. Sumner Welles'  
 13 office after my return from Argentina.

14 Mr. Mitchell: And what did you learn then about that,  
 15 do you remember?

16 General Marshall: I was given either the information,  
 17 general information with regard to, or heard read, I do not  
 18 recall which, a message the President had sent.

19 Mr. Mitchell: After he had sent it?

20 General Marshall: After he had sent it.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Have you seen, or did you know about cer-  
 22 tain conferences that were had by representatives of the Army  
 23 and Navy with the British on the one hand, called the ABC-  
 24 1 and 2 conferences, with the Dutch and British in the Far  
 25 East and with the Canadians?

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 General Marshall: Yes, sir. Admiral Stark brought up  
3 the proposition and I acquiesced. He arranged the meeting.  
4 I went to his office when we were receiving these officers the  
5 day they arrived.

6 Mr. Mitchell: That was the British here in the United  
7 States?

8 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Did you know about similar staff confer-  
10 ences that were being held at Singapore between the Americans,  
11 Dutch and British?

12 General Marshall: Yes, sir, I was familiar with that.

13 Mr. Mitchell: And the one with the Canadians?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir. My recollection of that is,  
15 though, that except for the Defense Board we afterwards cre-  
16 ated, of which Mr. LaGuardia, I think, was the senior Ameri-  
17 can member, we only had one meeting and that was an informal  
18 meeting at dinner and after dinner at the home of the Chief  
19 of Naval Operations out near the Na val Observatory. That  
20 is the only time I saw them.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Have you had an opportunity to look over  
22 those three reports, do you have copies of them?

23 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: And are you familiar with them?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: At this time, Mr. Chairman, I think we  
3 will offer those in evidence. We had only one copy hereto-  
4 fore but now they have been mimeographed. I will offer in  
5 evidence as exhibit 49 --

6 The Chairman: All three as one exhibit?

7 Mr. Mitchell: No, sir, I had better separate it. The  
8 report of the United States-British staff conversations in  
9 the United States; as exhibit 50 the American-Dutch-British  
10 conversations at Singapore in April 1941; and as 51 the re-  
11 port of the conference with the Canadians.

12 The Chairman: They will be filed as 49, 50 and 51?

13 Mr. Mitchell: That is it.

14 The Chairman: Yes.

15 (The documents referred to were marked  
16 Exhibits Nos. 49, 50, and 51.)

17 Mr. Mitchell: Have you any knowledge as to which, if any,  
18 of those conferences were finally approved, the reports I  
19 mean?

20 General Marshall: The report on the Canadian, with the  
21 Canadians was, I believe, formally approved by the President.  
22 My recollection is and my knowledge is at this time he gave  
23 no formal approval of any of the others.

24 Mr. Mitchell: In your examination of those reports do  
25 you find anything in that other than the ordinary military

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 and naval plans to be used on the contingency that you get  
3 into trouble with somebody?

4 General Marshall: Would you please repeat that question?

5 Mr. Mitchell: What I want to know is whether you in-  
6 terpreted those plans as committing the government of the  
7 United States to engage in war with anybody prior to our  
8 being attacked?

9 General Marshall: No, sir, I do not think they do.  
10 It was not our intention that they should; quite the con-  
11 trary. It was our effort to be prepared against what ap-  
12 peared to be a possible eventuality.

13 Mr. Mitchell: Did the Army make any deployments or dis-  
14 positions of troops pursuant to these plans that you remember  
15 prior to December 7, 1941?

16 General Marshall: I do not think there were any defin-  
17 ite moves unless it may have been into Iceland and I do not  
18 recall that.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Did you ever hear during your service  
20 as Chief of Staff of any commitment that the President or  
21 anyone else had attempted to make with any of these other  
22 nations by which the United States was committed to engage  
23 in war without being attacked?

24 General Marshall: No, sir, I did not.

25 Mr. Mitchell: Was there anything about these plans that



1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 you can see by which one of the other nations who partici-  
3 pated at the conferences by their action could bring us  
4 into war?

5 General Marshall: I do not think there is.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to what we called  
7 in this case the Herron alert in 1940 and at this time, Mr.  
8 Chairman, I will offer in evidence as exhibit 52 the book  
9 containing the communications between the War Department and  
10 General Herron concerning the 1940 alert at Hawaii. General  
11 Herron was commander of the Hawaiian Department at that time.

12 The Chairman: It will be so filed.

13 (The document referred to was marked

14 Exhibit No. 52.)

15 Mr. Mitchell: Have you examined those communica-  
16 tions as contained in that book, General?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I read it through yester-  
18 day morning.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember the fact that the alert  
20 was given to General Herron in June 1940?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember the circumstances under  
23 which that was done?

24 General Marshall: My recollection of the matter is that  
25 it was on the recommendation of General George V. Strong of

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 the General Staff of the War Department as a result of sev-  
3 eral branches of information, largely "Magic", that there was  
4 a possibility of a threat by the Japanese in that area and,  
5 therefore, the alert.

6 Mr. Mitchell: The alert, the book shows, was given to  
7 him over the signature of Adjutant General Adams.

8 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Was that at your direction?

10 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: And the book shows that he continued in  
12 his state of alert, though somewhat diminishing, for several  
13 weeks after that.

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: You are familiar with General Herron's  
16 reports that in obedience to the alert he put his entire  
17 command on alert, kept his pilots out at daylight every day?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Ran reconnaissance by air?

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: And did all those things, kept his gun-  
22 ners at their guns with live ammunition?

23 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: And with the report he made that there  
25 was very little, if any, excitement among the population

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of Hawaii about it?

3 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

4 Mr. Mitchell: Do you know how it happened that the Navy  
5 did not send any corresponding alert to Admiral Richardson?

6 General Marshall: I do not recall the circumstances. I  
7 recall apropos of the reconnaissance that either through the  
8 Chief of the Air Corps or otherwise there was great concern  
9 over our wearing out the engines and we had no replacements  
10 in the planes. The problem was how long we could continue  
11 that; and, also, we were wearing out the crews.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, the alert continued for several  
13 weeks?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: And you have noticed the reports of Gen-  
16 eral Herron to the effect that there was no serious destruc-  
17 tion of materiel?

18 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: Or wearing out of personnel even during  
20 that length of time?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: Now, General, Admiral Richardson has  
23 said that he had some conversation with you on one of his  
24 visits here respecting that alert and he quoted you as  
25 saying, "That was simple an exercise and I thought if I did

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 not state it was an exercise, the exercise would be carried  
3 out more completely."

4 Do you remember any such conversations with Admiral  
5 Richardson?

6 General Marshall: No, sir. Admiral Richardson came out  
7 to my house for lunch and we had a talk then after lunch.  
8 There were some other guests at the time who also happened  
9 to be in Washington that day and I think there must be a  
10 misunderstanding in his mind because there was never any  
11 question about the purpose of that alert.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like  
13 to make on behalf of Admiral Richardson a correction he wanted  
14 made in his testimony. He stated that he wired in to the  
15 Chief of Naval Operations and wanted to know what this was  
16 all about, this Herron alert, and never got any reply.

17 The Chairman: Will you read it into the record now?

18 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. I will not read his whole letter  
19 but the substance of it is that he has checked up on that,  
20 examined the original record and that there was a reply sent  
21 to him on June 22nd which reads as follows:

22 "Wa r Department directive concerning alert issued  
23 as precautionary measure after consultation with Navy  
24 and State Department. Request you continue coopera-  
25 tion."

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 And he says that he has checked the records and found  
3 that that was actually sent and that he was mistaken. He  
4 actually received it.

5 The Chairman: Put the whole letter in the record.

6 Mr. Mitchell: We will put the whole letter into the  
7 transcript.

8 The Chairman: Yes.

9 Senator Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, could we have the date  
10 of the letter?

11 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. The letter he writes me is dated  
12 the 28th of November 1945, and he said in his testimony that  
13 he would write such a letter after he had checked it up.

14 The Chairman: All right.

15 (The letter above referred to is in words and  
16 figures as follows, to-wit:)

17 "Na vy Department

18 Washington 25, D.C.

19 28 November 1945

20 "Hon. William D. Mitchell

21 General Counsel, Joint Committee on the Investigation  
22 of the Pearl Harbor Attack

23 Dear Sir:

24 On 21 November, 1945, I stated to the Committee:

25 "I have not had an opportunity to verify what-

1810

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 ever evidence there is in official records with  
3 respect to dispatches exchanged between me and  
4 Admiral Stark regarding the Army alert and, there-  
5 fore, I request that the members of the committee  
6 hold in abeyance their judgment on that subject un-  
7 til I have had an opportunity to search the orig-  
8 inal records." (Page 815 of Report of Proceedings)

9 "I have examined microfilm and photostatic copies  
10 of the original records and I find that;

11 "(a) On 22 June 1940 I sent to the Chief of Naval  
12 Operations by radio a despatch reading:

13 "Commanding General Hawaiian Department received  
14 orders War Department placing forces on alert  
15 against hostile trans-Pacific raid and since no in-  
16 formation received Navy Department have assumed  
17 this exercise. Navy patrol planes are participat-  
18 ing." (Page 810 of Report of Proceedings)

19 "(b) On 22 June 1940 in reply to the above despatch  
20 the Chief of Naval Operations sent to me by radio a  
21 priority despatch reading:

22 "War Department directive concerning alert issued  
23 as precautionary measure after consultation with  
24 Navy and State Department. Request you continue  
25 cooperation." (Page 811 of Report of Proceedings)

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "The last quoted despatch was sent from the Navy  
3 Department at 1010 p.m. and was received by me in person  
4 as is shown by my initials on the photostatic copy of the  
5 despatch. This despatch was received by me after 5:00  
6 p.m. Honolulu time on Saturday 22 June when my mind was  
7 fully occupied with secret sortie of the major portion  
8 of the Fleet which was to take place early Monday morn-  
9 ing and since the reply left me in doubt as to the  
10 reality of the warning the fact that I received any reply  
11 escaped my mind with the result that in early July in  
12 Washington I asked both Admiral Stark and General Mar-  
13 shall whether the Army Alert was a real one or an exer-  
14 cise and testified before this Committee that I never  
15 received a reply to my despatch.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral, USN (Ret.)"

16  
17  
18 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to the document  
19 which is in our exhibit 16, being a joint memorandum pre-  
20 sented by you and the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral  
21 Stark, to the President under date of November 5, 1941; that  
22 is in evidence. Have you examined that memorandum?

General Marshall: Yes, sir. I read that yesterday.

23  
24 Mr. Mitchell: Will you state in your own way what that  
25 incident was and how you happened to make that report or

1512

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 memorandum?

3 General Marshall: My recollection of the matter is that  
4 there was a very urgent appeal from the Generalissimo, Gen-  
5 eral Chiang Kai-shek, for assistance in meeting what he  
6 thought was a dangerous Japanese threat in an advance from  
7 the South towards Kunming. He wished American and British  
8 air assistance and other assistance that might be made pos-  
9 sible for him. That, of course, would terminate the Burma  
10 Road if successful. That is my recollection of the basis  
11 of this particular joint memorandum to the President from  
12 Admiral Stark and myself.

13 Mr. Mitchell: And your recommendations were?

14 General Marshall: (Reading):

15 "That the dispatch of United States armed forces  
16 for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

17 "That material aid to China be accelerated conson-  
18 ant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own  
19 forces.

20 "That aid to the American Volunteer Group be con-  
21 tinued and accelerated to the maximum practicable ex-  
22 tent.

23 "That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."

24 Mr. Mitchell: Were you asked to prepare the memorandum?

25 General Marshall: I do not recall, sir.



1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: There is another memorandum, joint, by  
3 you and Admiral Stark under date of November 27, 1941 that  
4 is our exhibit 17. Will you kindly look at that and state the  
5 circumstances or the occasion under which that was made?

6 General Marshall: The circumstances, as nearly as I can  
7 recall them now, were a combination of affairs: The quite  
8 evident threat south through the China Sea towards Malay,  
9 Malasia and the Dutch East Indies, the development of Japan-  
10 ese power in Indo-China, the report of the conversations re-  
11 cently completed at Singapore. Those, as I recall, were the  
12 principal factors which brought about this particular memo-  
13 randum.

14 Mr. Mitchell: Your recommendations were what?

15 General Marshall: (Reading)

16 "That prior to the completion of the Philippine  
17 reinforcement, military counter-action be considered only  
18 if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States,  
19 British, or Dutch territory as above outlined;

20 "in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan  
21 be warned by the United States, the British, and the  
22 Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indi-  
23 cated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint  
24 military opposition be undertaken;

25 "steps be taken at once to consummate agreements

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such  
3 warning."

4 Mr. Mitchell: I notice a little earlier in the memo-  
5 randum this statement:

6 "After consultation with each other, United States,  
7 British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East  
8 agreed that joint military counteraction against Japan  
9 should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or di-  
10 rectly threatens the territory or mandated territory  
11 of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the  
12 Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move  
13 forces into Thailand west of 100° East or south of 10°  
14 North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty  
15 Islands."

16 Were you there referring to this military confer-  
17 ence held at Singapore in April 1941 that we have just dis-  
18 cussed?

19 General Marshall: That, I believe, was the basis of  
20 their recommendation, their conclusions there.

21 Mr. Mitchell: When you say there that the Dutch,  
22 British and the United States military authorities had agreed  
23 to that action did you mean that they had made an agreement on  
24 behalf of the United States, or agreed to recommend it to  
25 their governments?

1815

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

General Marshall: Agreed to recommend it. They had no power whatever to agree for our government and it was so stipulated, I think, in the --

Mr. Mitchell: Now, you made a recommendation at that time that the President join with the other nations in giving warning to Japan that if they did certain things or advanced beyond a certain point it might lead to war. Was that recommendation carried out, was any such message or warning sent to the Japanese at that time?

General Marshall: Not that I know of, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to exhibit 24, dated November 30, 1941. It is a message for the President of the United States from the former naval person -- that was the term used to describe Mr. Churchill -- in which he says:  
(Reading)

"It seems to me that one important method remains unused in averting war between Japan and our two countries, namely a plain declaration, secret or public as may be thought best, that any further act of aggression by Japan will lead immediately to the gravest consequences. I realize your constitutional difficulties but it would be tragic if Japan drifted into war by encroachment without having before her fairly and squarely the dire character of a further aggressive step. I

1916

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

beg you to consider whether, at the moment which you judge right which may be very near, you should not say that 'any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the grave st issues before Congress' or words to that effect. We would, of course, make a similar declaration or share in a joint declaration, and in any case arrangements are being made to synchronize our action with yours. Forgive me, my dear friend, for presuming to press such a course upon you, but I am convinced that it might make all the difference and prevent a melancholy extension of the war."

That was just three days after your recommendation was made. Did you ever see this communication from Mr. Churchill?

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON

Sher-15  
Shack  
fls 16

m Shack (1)  
follows  
Shefner  
AL-1

2787

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 General Marshall: I don't recall if I ever saw it.

3 Mr. Mitchell: It was the same proposal, wasn't it, to  
4 make some kind of joint message?

5 General Marshall: Yes, sir, that is the way I understand  
6 it.

7 Mr. Mitchell: Or some kind of threat to Japan as to what  
8 would happen?

9 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

10 Mr. Mitchell: Your recollection is that no such recommenda-  
11 tion, either from Mr. Churchill or yourself, or Admiral Hart,  
12 was actually carried out?

13 General Marshall: I do not recall.

14 Mr. Mitchell: I now go back to the question of prepara-  
15 tions in defense of an air attack at Hawaii.

16 Admiral Richardson has testified that during 1940 he  
17 protested against keeping the Fleet in Hawaii. He has also  
18 testified, and his documentary protests to the Secretary of  
19 the Navy show, that he based his protest not on the question  
20 of security of the Fleet in port, but because the facilities  
21 for training, equipment and preparing the Fleet for war were  
22 inadequate and he wanted to go back to the coast to do it.

23 Then it appears he testified when he went back to  
24 Honolulu, or Pearl Harbor, in December 1940, at the suggestion  
25 of Admiral Stark, he started the investigation as to the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 situation, as to the defense against an air attack, and we  
3 have in evidence what I call the Bloch report, which is a  
4 report that he sent in under date of December, 1940, to the  
5 Chief of Naval Operations, which was signed by Admiral Stark  
6 who was the Commander of the 14th Naval District out there,  
7 and endorsed by Admiral Richardson.

8 Did you have that called to your attention when it came  
9 in, or do you remember seeing that before?

10 General Marshall: As nearly as I can recall, this is  
11 the first time I have ever seen it.

12 Mr. Mitchell: Well, following that report the Secretary  
13 of the Navy wrote the Secretary of War under date of January  
14 24, 1941 -- that is our Exhibit 10 -- in which letter he made  
15 some very strong statements, and he said:

16 "The dangers envisaged in their order of importance  
17 and probability are considered to be:

18 "(1) Air bombing attack.

19 "(2) Air torpedo plane attack.

20 "(3) Sabotage.

21 "(4) Submarine attack.

22 "(5) Mining.

23 "(6) Bombardment by gun fire."

24 He called on the Secretary of War to give his attention  
25 to the matter, and the Secretary replied that he thoroughly

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 agreed with him, and from that time on the subject was con-  
3 sidered ended.

4 Did you see that correspondence of the Secretary of War?

5 General Marshall: Yes. My recollection on this particu-  
6 lar matter is that I must have been absent when the letter  
7 was received, but the draft of the reply for the Secretary of  
8 War's signature to the Secretary of the Navy came to me from  
9 the War Plans Division.

(2) 10 As I recall that draft, they did not think there was any  
11 materiel that could be made available, or virtually no materiel  
12 that could be made available earlier than October. I am not  
13 quite certain about that, but that is the impression I have  
14 now. That, I felt, whatever the circumstance, would put the  
15 Secretary of War in a rather impossible position, and there-  
16 fore I started in with the War Plans Division, with General  
17 Moore, my Deputy for Supply, and with General Arnold on the  
18 air side, to see what radical measures we might take to meet,  
19 to a degree at least, some of the requirements set forth  
20 by the Secretary of the Navy.

21 I might insert here apropos of your question as to  
22 whether or not I had seen -- did you call it the Bloch letter?

23 Mr. Mitchell: The Bloch report, yes.

24 General Marshall: That I had thought it was not Admiral  
25 Bloch but it was Admiral Kimmel that had generated this letter

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 from the Secretary of the Navy up until almost this moment.

3       The measures we took under the circumstances were, first,  
4 as to planes. After discussing the matter with General Arnold  
5 I made the decision that we would rob practically all the  
6 Combat Pursuit Squadron of the United States of most of their  
7 P-36 planes, which was our then most serviceable type as the  
8 new P-40 had certain engine defects which had not yet been  
9 eradicated.

10       My recollection is -- General Arnold can give you the  
11 positive testimony -- that we cut most of the squadrons in  
12 the United States down to three planes. The difficulty there  
13 was, of course, that stopped the training of the Air Corps,  
14 which had to be expanded from about 1800 men to two million  
15 and a quarter.

16       I took up with Admiral Stark over the telephone the  
17 problem of getting these planes to Hawaii without the necessity  
18 for crating them, which takes times for disassembling and which  
19 takes time for assembling. Whatever the conversations were,  
20 it was determined that a carrier could come into San Diego  
21 in February and pick up those planes, and I think there were  
22 other Naval and Marine materiel to go on the same carrier.

23       A number of these planes were sent out, 30-odd, I think,  
24 sufficient, with the 19 P-36's then in Hawaii, to make an  
25 even 50.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

(3)

1  
2 I also directed General Arnold to take up with the  
3 Curtiss people in Buffalo the expediting of their production  
4 schedule, to turn out the new P-40, which had more modern  
5 equipment and presumably would have had eradicated the engine  
6 difficulties of the original model, in time for them to be  
7 shipped out to Hawaii at an early date. The date was fixed  
8 as March 15, as I recall now, as the only time a carrier  
9 could be spared from Hawaii to come into San Diego to pick  
10 up the planes. Just why that time was fixed I do not recall  
11 now.

12 Therefore the schedule of the Curtiss-Wright plant had  
13 to be greatly expedited. General Arnold can give you the  
14 facts.

15 My understanding of the matter was that the head of the  
16 firm came to Washington to see General Arnold and stated that  
17 he could not expedite the program. General Arnold brought  
18 this to my attention and I directed General Arnold to go to  
19 Buffalo and bring heavy pressure to bear on those people to  
20 at least make the effort. He did that and was successful,  
21 they made the effort, and the last planes were cleared on  
22 March 9, in time to fly to San Diego and take off in the  
23 carrier on March 15.

24 The other details as to materiel are covered in the  
25 letter of the Secretary of War in reply to the Secretary of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 the Navy.

3 In all these matters the great problem was how we could  
4 meet the requirements of developing an Army, which had to  
5 have the tools with which to train and without which it cannot  
6 train, how we could get something for the Philippines, which  
7 literally had nothing; how we could develop the Panama Canal  
8 defenses, which were very deficient, and how we could meet  
9 certain commitments that we had with our Allies, notably the  
10 British, in order that they might not be found wanting at a  
11 critical juncture in the coming fighting.

12 It stated -- do you wish me to read the letter of the  
13 Secretary of War?

14 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

15 General Marshall: This is addressed to the Secretary  
16 of the Navy, February -- and I cannot read the date -- 1941.

17 "In replying to your letter of January 24, regard-  
18 ing the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet  
19 or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express  
20 complete concurrence as to the importance of this  
21 matter and the urgency of our making every possible  
22 preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian  
23 Department is the best equipped of all our overseas  
24 departments, and continues to hold a high priority for  
25 the completion of its projected defenses because of

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

3 "The Hawaiian project provides for 148 pursuit  
4 planes. There are now in Hawaii 36 pursuit planes; 19  
5 of these are P-36's and 17 are of somewhat less effi-  
6 ciency. I am arranging to have 31 P-36 pursuit planes  
7 assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within  
8 the next 10 days, as agreed to with the Navy Department.  
9 This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up  
10 to 50 of the P-36 type and 17 of a somewhat less  
11 efficient type. In addition, 50 of the new P-40-B  
12 pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and  
13 modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about  
14 March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

15 "There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands  
16 82 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 20 37-millimeter anti-  
17 aircraft guns (enroute), and 109 caliber 50 anti-  
18 aircraft machine guns. The total project calls for  
19 98 3-inch anti-aircraft guns, 120 37-millimeter  
20 anti-aircraft guns, and 308 caliber 50 anti-aircraft  
21 machine guns.

22 "With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service,  
23 the equipment therefor has been ordered and will be  
24 delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for  
25 installation will have been made by the time the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the informa-  
3 tion that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot  
4 be made at an earlier date.

5 "The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is  
6 being directed to give immediate consideration to the  
7 question of the employment of balloon barrages and the  
8 use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and Base facilities.  
9 Barrage balloons are not available at the present time  
10 for installation and cannot be made available prior  
11 to the summer of 1941. At present there are three  
12 on hand and 84 being manufactured -- 40 for delivery  
13 by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September.  
14 The Budget now has under consideration funds for  
15 2,950 balloons. The value of smoke for screening  
16 vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject.  
17 Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic  
18 conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke  
19 impracticable for large scale screening operations.  
20 However, the Commanding General will look into this  
21 matter again.

22 "With reference to your other proposals for joint  
23 defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and  
24 this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian De-  
25 partment, and am directing him to cooperate with the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

local Naval authorities in making those measures effective."

Signed, "Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War."

Mr. Mitchell: Now during the remainder of 1941 did you keep in touch with the resulting plans that were made for defense against air attack at Pearl Harbor?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: We have in evidence as our Exhibit 44 a joint estimate made by General Martin as Commander of the Army Air Force at Hawaii, and Admiral Bellinger, who was Commander of the Naval Air Force of the 14th Naval District, dated Marsh 31, 1941.

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Rock  
Collins

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 The estimate was:

3 "(a) Relations between the United States and Orange" -  
4 that was Japan - "are strained, uncertain and varying.

5 "(b) In the past Orange has never preceded hostile  
6 actions by a declaration of war.

7 "(c) A successful, sudden raid against our ships and  
8 naval installations on Oahu might prevent effective offen-  
9 sive action by our forces in the Western Pacific for a  
10 long period.

11 "(d) A strong part of our Fleet is now constantly at  
12 sea in the operating areas organized to take prompt offen-  
13 sive action against any surface or submarine force which  
14 initiates hostile action.

15 "(e) It appears possible that Orange submarines and/or  
16 an Orange fast raiding force might arrive in Hawaiian  
17 waters with no prior warning from our Intelligence Service."

18 In paragraph III they say:

19 "Possible enemy action:

20 "(a) A declaration of war might be preceded by:

21 "1. A surprise submarine attack on ships in the  
22 operating area;

23 "2. A surprise attack on Oahu including ships and  
24 installations in Pearl Harbor.

25 "3. A combination of these two."

hl  
fls

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h2

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

They say also:

"It appears that the most likely and dangerous form of attack on Oahu would be an air attack. It is believed that at present such an attack would most likely be launched from one or more carriers which would probably approach inside of 300 miles."

They say also:

"A single attack might or might not indicate the presence of more submarines or more planes awaiting to attack after defending aircraft have been drawn away by the original thrust."

They say:

"Any single submarine attack might indicate the presence of a considerable undiscovered surface force probably composed of fast ships accompanied by a carrier."

Then, they go on at great length, and I will not read the rest of it, but visualizing the way the situation could be handled and the possibility of long-range reconnaissance, and keeping track of the Japanese the night before.

Do you remember seeing that report?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: There is another one that came in later by General Martin, a study of the air situation in Hawaii, addressed by him, under date of August 20, 1941, to the

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

h3

Commanding General, Army Air Forces, Washington, D. C.,  
and forwarded by General Short. That is Exhibit 13. Have  
you had your attention called to that?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, I recall seeing it at the  
time.

Mr. Mitchell: He deals there very vividly with the  
possibilities of an air attack and the possible defense  
against it. You have that before you.

Now, I will offer in evidence as Exhibit 53, a book  
containing the correspondence between --

General Marshall: May I interrupt?

Mr. Mitchell: Yes, do so.

General Marshall: Before we pass these last two  
documents by, there was a memorandum from me regarding  
this air situation in Hawaii which more or less started  
up these various reports.

Mr. Mitchell: Have you that memorandum with you?

General Marshall: I haven't it with me, but I will  
obtain it and have it sent to you. I was shown it yester-  
day. It was signed by Colonel Orlando Ward.

Mr. Mitchell: Signed by whom?

General Marshall: Signed by Colonel Orlando Ward, the  
then Secretary of the General Staff.

Mr. Mitchell: We will get that later.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell  
Senator Brewster

1  
2 Senator Brewster: It is dated July 17, 1941. That  
3 is in Exhibit 13.

4 Mr. Mitchell Exhibit 13 is the letter from General  
5 Short to the Commanding General of the Air Forces.

6 Senator Brewster: The first paragraph.

7 Mr. Mitchell: It says in the first paragraph:

8 "In compliance with copy of corrected memorandum for  
9 the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, OCS, 17234-25,  
10 from the Secretary, General Staff, dated July 17, 1941."

11 General Marshall: That is what I am talking about.

12 Mr. Mitchell: "--" that a study be made of the air  
13 situation in Hawaii, there is attached for consideration  
14 of the War Department a plan for the employment of long-  
15 range bombardment aviation in the defense of Oahu. This  
16 plan clearly presents the air defense of the Hawaiian  
17 Islands. Attention is called to the recommendations there-  
18 in."

19 That is the memorandum that you referred to, and that  
20 you prepared, that called for this report?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Senator Brewster: Has the whole memorandum been avail-  
23 able?

24 General Marshall: I will obtain it and send it to the  
25 committee.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 I interrupted you, Mr. Mitchell.

3 Mr. Mitchell: I am glad you did.

4 General Marshall: You started to read that correspon-  
5 dence.

6 Mr. Mitchell: We were about to offer in evidence as  
7 Exhibit 53, a book of correspondence between General Marshall  
8 and General Short, commencing in February, 1941.

9 Before we go into that, I will call your attention to  
10 a memorandum dated February 6, 1941, of a conference in  
11 the Office of the Chief of Staff. The initials are "O.W."

12 Whom does that mean, do you remember?

13 General Marshall: I think that is Colonel Orlando  
14 Ward, the Secretary of the General Staff.

15 Mr. Mitchell: This memorandum states that the confer-  
16 ence was held and present were yourself and General Arnold,  
17 General Miles, and General Gerow, and the subject was de-  
18 fense of Pearl Harbor.

19 General Marshall: Do you wish me to read it, sir?

20 Mr. Mitchell: I will save your voice a little and read  
21 it myself.

22 General Marshall: I do not mind.

23 Mr. Mitchell: Try it, then. I will relay you occasion-  
24 ally.

25 General Marshall: "Present: General Marshall, General

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h6

1  
2 Arnold, General Miles, General Gerow

3 "Subject: Defense of Pearl Harbor.

4 "General Marshall indicated that the Navy had insuffi-  
5 cient nets for defense against either submarine or plane  
6 carried torpedoes. He further indicated that there was a  
7 possibility of a Japanese attack."

8 This is February 6, 1941.

9 "General Miles stated that nothing in G-2 indicated  
10 any such probability.

11 "General Marshall stated that the planes in Honolulu  
12 were, in general, obsolescent, and that we should have a  
13 reasonable number of top flight planes which would out-perform  
14 any the Japanese could bring on their carriers.

15 "General Arnold recommended that 31 P-36s be sent  
16 immediately in a Navy carrier to Honolulu, and that 50  
17 P-40Bs be sent as soon as available (in March).

18 "General Marshall stated that we really had two active  
19 defense issues -- one, Panama, and the other, Honolulu.

20 "General Arnold was to make the necessary preliminary  
21 arrangements in connection with changing plans and report  
22 to the Chief."

23 Mr. Mitchell: When you said we had two active defense  
24 issues: one, Panama, and the other Honolulu, will you develop  
25 what your idea was at that time? . What was your idea in

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

h7

2

mentioning those two points?

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

General Marshall. They were the great outposts of our continental defense. We had the Philippines at that time but the equipment there and the number of troops was so inadequate that no defense against a first class power was conceivable; it would be just a desperate sacrifice.

(The document referred to was marked Exhibit No. 53.)

Mr. Mitchell: There is a letter from you to General Short which is dated February 7, 1941, in this Exhibit 53, which I will read for you, General.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: It is addressed:

"Lieutenant General Walter C. Short

"Fort Shafter,

"Territory of Hawaii

"My dear Short:

"I believe you take over command today, however, the reason for this letter is a conversation I had yesterday with Admiral Stark.

"He spoke of Admiral Kimmel, the new Fleet Commander, regarding his personal characteristics. He said Kimmel was very direct, even brusque and undiplomatic in his approach to problems; that he was at heart a very kindly man, though

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h8

1  
2 he appeared rather rough in his methods of doing business.  
3 I gathered that he is entirely responsive to plain speaking  
4 on the part of the other fellow if there is frankness and  
5 logic in the presentation. Stark went so far as to say that  
6 he had, in the past personally objected to Kimmel's manners  
7 in dealing with officers, but that Kimmel was outstanding  
8 in his qualifications of command, and that this was the  
9 opinion of the entire Navy.

10 "I give you this as it may be helpful in your personal  
11 dealings with Admiral Kimmel, not that I anticipate that  
12 you would be supersensitive, but rather that you would have  
13 a full understanding of the man with whom you are to deal.

14 "Admiral Stark said that Kimmel had written him at  
15 length about the deficiencies of Army materiel for the pro-  
16 tection of Pearl Harbor. He referred specifically to planes  
17 and to antiaircraft guns. Of course the facts are as he  
18 represents them regarding planes, and to a less serious ex-  
19 tent regarding caliber .50 machine guns. The 3-inch anti-  
20 aircraft gun is on a better basis. What Kimmel does not  
21 realize is that we are tragically lacking in this materiel  
22 throughout the Army, and that Hawaii is on a far better basis  
23 than any other command in the Army.

24 "The fullest protection for the Fleet is the rather than  
25 a major consideration for us, there can be little question

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

h9

about that; but the Navy itself makes demands on us for commands other than Hawaii, which make it difficult for us to meet the requirements of Hawaii. For example, as I told Stark yesterday, - he had been pressing me heavily to get some modern antiaircraft guns in the Philippines for the protective of Cavite, where they have collected a number of submarines as well as the vessels of the Asiatic Fleet - at the present time we have no antiaircraft guns for the protection of Cavite, and very little for Corregidor. By unobtrusively withdrawing 3-inch guns from regiments now in the field in active training, we had obtained 20 3-inch guns for immediate shipment to the Philippines. However, before the shipment had been gotten under way the Navy requested 18 of these guns for Marine battalions to be specially equipped for the defense of islands in the Pacific. So I am left with two guns for the Philippines. This has happened time and again, and until quantity production gets well under way, we are in a most difficult situation in these matters.

"I have not mentioned Panama, but the Naval requirements of defense there are of immense importance, and we have not been able to provide all the guns that are necessary, nor to set up the Air units with modern equipment. However, in this instance, we can fly the latest equipment to Panama in

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h10

1  
2 one day, some of it in four hours.

3 "You should make clear to Admiral Kimmel that we are  
4 doing everything that is humanly possible to build up the  
5 Army defenses of the Naval overseas installations, but we  
6 cannot perform a miracle. I arranged yesterday to ship  
7 31 of the P36 planes to Hawaii by aircraft carrier from  
8 S n Diego in about ten days. This will give you 50 of  
9 this type of plane, deficient in speed compared to the  
10 Japanese carrier based pursuit, and deficient in armament.  
11 But at least it gives you 50 of the same type. I also ar-  
12 ranged with Admiral Stark to ship 50 P40-B pursuit planes  
13 about March 15th by Naval carrier from San Diego. These  
14 planes just came into production this week and should be  
15 on a quantity basis of about 8 a day by the first week in  
16 March.

17 "The Japanese carrier based pursuit plane, which has  
18 recently appeared in China, according to our information has  
19 a speed of 322 miles an hour, a very rapid ability to climb  
20 and mounts two .20mm and two .30 cal. guns. It has leak-  
21 proof tanks and armor. Our P40-B will have a speed of 360  
22 miles an hour with two .50 cal. machine guns and four of  
23 .30 caliber. It will lack the rapidity to climb of the  
24 Japanese plane. It will have leak-proof tanks and armor.

25 "We have an earlier model of this plane, the P40,

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h11

1  
2 delivered between August and October, but the Chief of the  
3 Air Corps opposes sending it to Hawaii because of some  
4 engine defect which makes it unsafe for training flights  
5 over water. Up to the present time we have not had avail-  
6 able a modern medium bomber or a light bomber. This month  
7 the medium bomber will go into production, if not quantity  
8 production. This plane has a range without bombs of 3,000  
9 miles, carries 2,000 pounds and has a speed of 320 miles  
10 an hour - a tremendous improvement on the old B18 which you  
11 now have. It can operate with bombs 640 miles to sea, with  
12 a safe reserve against the return trip. We plan to give  
13 you first priority on these planes. I am looking into the  
14 question of providing at least a squadron of Flying Fort-  
15 ress planes for Hawaii.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

16 "I am seeing what can be done to augment the .50 caliber  
17 machine gun set-up, but I have no hopes for the next few  
18 months. The Navy approached us regarding barrage balloons.  
19 We have three now under test, and 80 in process of manufacture  
20 and 3,000 to be procured if the President will release our  
21 estimates. However, this provides nothing against the next  
22 few months. I am looking into the question of possibly  
23 obtaining some from England, but they are asking us and not  
24 giving us these days. The first test of the first forty  
25 deliveries in June will probably be made in Hawaii.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "You, of course, understand the pressures on the Depart-  
3 ment for the limited materiel we have, for Alaska, for  
4 Panama, and, most confidentially, for the possible occupa-  
5 tion of the Azores, not to mention the new leased bases.  
6 However, as I have already said, we are keeping clearly in  
7 mind that our first concern is to protect the Fleet.

8 "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been that if  
9 no serious harm is done us during the first six hours of  
10 known hostilities, thereafter the existing defenses would  
11 discourage an enemy against the hazard of an attack. The  
12 risk of sabotage and the risk involved in a surprise raid  
13 by Air and by submarine, constitute the real perils of the  
14 situation. Frankly, I do not see any landing threat in the  
15 Hawaiian Islands so long as we have air superiority.

16 "Please keep clearly in mind in all of your negotiations  
17 that our mission is to protect the base and the Naval con-  
18 centrations, and that purpose should be made clearly apparent  
19 to Admiral Kimmel. I accentuate this because I found yester-  
20 day, for example, in a matter of tremendous importance, that  
21 old Army and Navy feuds, engendered from fights over appro-  
22 priations, with the usual fallacious arguments on both  
23 sides, still persist in confusing issues of national defense.  
24 We must be completely impersonal in these matters, at least  
25 so far as our own nerves and irritations are concerned.

hl2

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

hl3

1  
2 Fortunately, and happily I might say, Stark and I are on  
3 the most intimate personal basis, and that relationship has  
4 enabled us to avoid many serious difficulties.

5 "Faithfully yours,

6 [Stamped] (Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL"

7 Does that letter to General Short fairly reflect the  
8 difficulties you had at that time in obtaining materiel,  
9 planes, and other equipment?

10 General Marshall: I think it does, sir.

11 Mr. Mitchell: All through this letter in your discus-  
12 sions, were you considering equipment, planes, and guns  
13 needed for defense against an air attack?

14 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

15 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention now to the minutes  
16 of a meeting of the General Council, February 19, 1941.

17 What was the General Council as it stood at that time?

18 General Marshall: I haven't the regulation here which  
19 creates the General Council.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Was that established by some regulation?

21 General Marshall: It was established, I think, by  
22 General MacArthur. That involved all the principal chiefs  
23 of the War Department.

24 Mr. Mitchell: It was a War Department council and not  
25 a general council?

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h14

1  
2           General Marshall:   Purely War Department.    It was the  
3 basis for keeping all the various and numerous chiefs of  
4 the War Department coordinated and aware of the general  
5 situation and requirements.

6           Mr. Mitchell:    The minutes of this General Council  
7 meeting show you were present, Major General Bryden, Deputy  
8 Chief of Staff,   Major General Moore, Deputy Chief of  
9 Staff, and the Chief of Infantry, the Chief of Cavalry,  
10 Chief of Field Artillery, Chief of Coast Artillery, Chief  
11 of Air Corps, General Brett, and many other officers.

12           The minutes start out with the statement that this is  
13 not a complete record of the minutes, but contains extracts  
14 and the statement which we understand you made there was:

15           "To give you a further view of the special circumstances  
16 we have been pressed by the Navy to provide more security  
17 for the Fleet that has been gathering at Manila."   And you  
18 discuss the Manila situation and the general Philippine  
19 situation and then you proceed:

20           "Out in Hawaii, the Fleet is anchored, but they have  
21 to be prepared against any surprise attack.  I don't say  
22 any probable attack, but they have to be prepared against  
23 a surprise attack from a trick ship or torpedo planes.  
24 Our whole Navy power in general is concentrated there; they  
25 can't cruise for next six months."

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

h15      2            And you discussed at some length the question of anti-  
3            aircraft guns and planes which might be available.

4            "General Mauborgne said that another question has to  
5            do with change in priorities;" --

6            General Mauborgne, is that?

7            General Marshall:    General Mauborgne, Chief of the  
8            Signal Corps.

9            Mr. Mitchell:    " -- these pursuit people can't work  
10            without their detectors and if the situation is such that  
11            you need guns for the protection of the Navy somewhere in  
12            Hawaii, that you are going to have to change priorities  
13            and get some aircraft warning units mobilized.

14            "General Marshall said we are on that right now.

15            "General Moore said that we are making a complete study  
16            of that whole question on aircraft warning and also with  
17            reference to priorities and where we are going to establish  
18            this service first.    The question came up in connection  
19            with the Alaskan aircraft warning service.

20            "General Marshall said that with reference to priorities,  
21            he had put the cards on the table with Admiral Stark and  
22            said, where do you want it.    The protection of the Fleet  
23            is of major consideration.    He said that Admiral Stark was  
24            quite embarrassed.    When the next planes come out over and  
25            above the .50 millimeter planes, it is a question of where

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

hl6

1  
2 they go, to Panama or the Philippine Islands. That will  
3 be up to the Navy 'I am going to allow them to practically  
4 dictate where those planes should go until we reach a cer-  
5 tain degree of security.' We haven't any modern medium  
6 bombers. They are just beginning to come off the line.  
7 The question is where do they go. That is a Navy decision,  
8 for the protection of the Fleet, and at the present time for  
9 the protection of our shores. 'I don't think they want the  
10 first ones in Manila. They will probably say that they  
11 want them first in Hawaii. Then how many in Panama. The  
12 Navy can almost tell us. Those priorities will all have to  
13 be solved in terms of protection of the Navy in the immediate  
14 situation."

15 Was that your policy all through this period?

16 General Marshall: Yes, sir.  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Larry  
fls

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Do you want to add anything to what the  
3 minutes of the meeting report?

4 General Marshall: I can think of nothing at the moment.

5 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to a letter from  
6 General Short to you under date of February 19, 1941, in  
7 this book we have just offered in evidence, Exhibit 53.

8 He says:

9 "I was very glad indeed to have your letter of February  
10 7, as it gave us some very definite information on aircraft  
11 we did not have."

12 He says that he is getting along well with Admiral  
13 Kimmel and Admiral Bloch.

14 "I have told them that from my point of view there will  
15 be no hair-splitting, but that the one thing that would  
16 affect any decision where there is an apparent conflict  
17 between the Army and the Navy in the use of facilities  
18 would be the question of what could produce the greatest  
19 combined effort of the two forces.

20 "As a result of my short study of the conditions here,  
21 I believe that the following are of great importance and  
22 I am taking steps to carry out the necessary changes.

23 "1. Cooperation with the Navy.

24 "2. Dispersion and protection of aircraft and the repair,  
25 maintenance and servicing of aircraft.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1

h2

2

"3. Improvement of the antiaircraft defense.

3

"4. Improvement of the Harbor Defense Artillery.

4

"5. Improvement of the situation with reference to searchlights.

5

6

"6. Provision for more rapid movement of supplies and reserves by improvement in roads and trails.

7

8

"7. Bomb proofing of vital installations such as Command Posts and Communications Centers.

9

10

"8. Increase in the number of Engineer troops."

11

Then he discusses the dispersion and protection of aircraft and bombers; improvement of the antiaircraft defense; and other activities that didn't directly relate to antiaircraft defense.

12

13

14

15

He also mentions bomb-proofing of vital installations, such as Command Posts and communication service.

16

17

That is a defense movement against air attack, is it not, bomb-proofing of vital installations?

18

19

General Marshall: Against air attack, against, maybe, fleet bombardment and against, maybe, a landing, if it should take place.

20

21

22

Mr. Mitchell: Have you any comments to make on that letter, General Marshall?

23

24

General Marshall: No, sir.

25

Mr. Mitchell: It did make you aware of the fact that

Lacharity  
AL-1  
follows  
Hook

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 General Short had taken your letter of February 7 to heart  
3 and was actively interested in aircraft, anti-aircraft measures  
4 out there?

5 General Marshall: Very much so.

6 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to the minutes of  
7 a meeting of the "Conference in the Office of the Chief of  
8 Staff" Tuesday, February 25, 1941.

9 I think I did not offer this in evidence, the one of  
10 February 19, which I should have offered, as Exhibit 54.  
11 That is "Notes on General Council Meeting", February 19, 1941.

12 I offer it as Exhibit 54 and I will offer the minutes  
13 of the conference of February 25, 1941 in evidence as Exhibit 55.

14 (The documents referred to were  
15 marked Exhibits 54 and 55.)

16 Mr. Mitchell: Would you go through that, General Marshall,  
17 and make any comments on it that occur to you. I will read  
18 it if you like.

19 General Marshall: No, sir. I am scanning it here.

20 Mr. Mitchell: I think maybe I had better read it.

21 General Marshall: I can read it for you.

22 Mr. Mitchell: All right, sir.

23 General Marshall: (Reading)

24 "Conference in the Office of the Chief of Staff  
25 at 10:00 A.M., Tuesday, February 25, 1941.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

"Present: Chief of Staff General Gerow  
General Emmons Colonel McNarney  
General Arnold Colonel Anderson  
General Brett Colonel Twaddle  
General Spaatz

"Chief of Staff: In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31  
3 P-36 ships there. The Curtis plant has moved up the  
4 delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th;  
5 the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships.  
6 The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment.  
7 Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser,  
8 and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the  
9 question of moving some armament from Corregidor.  
10 The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type  
11 which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single  
12 squadron of modern planes in the Philippines, it would  
13 at least give the Japanese something to think about.  
14 Then we have the question of Panama -- no modern planes.  
15 I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble  
16 which makes them dangerous flying over water.  
17 Consequently, our original allocation will be changed  
18 by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum  
19 with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes,  
20 to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of  
21 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program. We are  
22 concerned with the reduction of the assignment to  
23 the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage  
24 to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I  
25 have just been talking about pursuit. We have started

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those  
3 close to home aren't so much of a problem.

4 "Colonel Anderson: We have made a tentative  
5 allocation of planes as follows: First priority: to  
6 the Philippine Islands -- one interceptor squadron,  
7 one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska -- one composite  
8 group. To Hawaii and Panama -- sufficient strength  
9 to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico -- one  
10 pursuit group and two bomber groups. Second priority:  
11 The equipment for an emergency force to South and  
12 Central America -- three groups of heavy or medium  
13 bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups  
14 of intercept. Third priority: Remainder of the GHQ,  
15 minimum training requirements for the remainder of  
16 the 54 group program. We will complete training  
17 requirements before January 1942; will complete the  
18 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter  
19 pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942;  
20 medium bombers in December 1941; light bombers in  
21 April 1942.

22 "Chief of Staff: What do you think about this,  
23 Emmons?"

24 He was the Commander of the GHQ Air Force.

25 "General Emmons: We have little means to accomplish

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

our plans in GHQ Air Force. We are 850 officers short on the 25 group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40's we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17s, also 4 P-39s and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.

"General Arnold: The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.

"General Emmons: With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes overseas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40Bs to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 difference except with the engine.

3 "General Brett: The engine is improving all the  
4 time. The P-40D has a new engine.

5 "Chief of Staff: How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?

6 "General Emmons: It functions very well.

7 "General Arnold: With regard to this shortage of  
8 parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in  
9 the depots -- we used to do it before.

10 "General Brett: The shortage in parts is due to  
11 the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers  
12 so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect,  
13 in a measure, the production of spare parts.

14 "General Emmons: With regard to organization  
15 equipment, we are in pretty good shape. The only shortage  
16 is in cameras and octants. With regard to the alloca-  
17 tion, I don't know what to say. With regard to a  
18 tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation --  
19 pursuit is of little value at night, at which time --  
20 due to phosforesence in the water -- primary targets,  
21 dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand out on the darkest  
22 night. They will have no warning service until they  
23 get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would  
24 have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but  
25 bombers.

"Conference Adjourned"

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

(2)

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: Does that reflect the problems you were  
3 feeling with at that time?

4 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

5 Mr. Mitchell: Have you any comment to make on that  
6 situation that is developed by that conference?

7 General Marshall: No, sir, I don't think of anything  
8 that isn't pretty well covered.

9 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention to a letter you  
10 wrote to General Short on March 5, 1941. It says:

11 "My dear Short:

12 "I would appreciate your early review of the  
13 situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to  
14 defense from air attack. The establishment of a  
15 satisfactory system of coordinating all means avail-  
16 able to this end is a matter of first priority.

17 General Chaney has prepared a report of recent exer-  
18 cises held in the United States and incorporated  
19 therein his views and recommendations based on his  
20 experience in these exercises and his observation of  
21 the system and method employed by the British. A  
22 copy of this report is being sent to you.

23 "An air defense exercise is contemplated for the  
24 West Coast in the Spring. This exercise is to include  
25 an establishment similar to that which has been set

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 up in the Air Defense Command exercise in the Northeast  
3 and tested during January. It is highly desirable that  
4 representatives from Hawaii be present to observe the  
5 details of this exercise. If this is found to be im-  
6 practicable, we will consider having officers sent to  
7 the exercise who shortly thereafter are due for station  
8 in Hawaii."

9 Now, what inspired that request for an early review at  
10 that date from General Short of the situation in the Hawaiian  
11 Department?

12 General Marshall: The fact that we were beginners at  
13 the business of organizing for the meeting of air attacks, the  
14 employment of radar and operation of these boards where all  
15 the movements of the ships were kept graphically illustrated,  
16 the directions to meet varying attacks. The British, of  
17 course, had developed that to a high degree in the Battle of  
18 Britain. General Chaney was directed to observe all the details  
19 of their procedure in England. He was an Air Officer. I  
20 recalled him to the United States, stationed him at Mitchell  
21 Field in Long Island, with directions to develop there a  
22 practical method of handling aircraft and anti-aircraft in  
23 resisting air attacks and the employment of radar.

24 He carried on quite a development and finally had maneuvers.  
25 We carried those maneuvers eventually down the entire coast

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

and also finally out on the West Coast.

I was concerned that everybody in the Air Corps, everybody concerned with the anti-aircraft, understood the technique and its application. I, therefore, wished General Short to be brought into the picture and to have the last word so far as we could determine as to the best method of meeting air attacks.

Mr. Mitchell: Well now, your letter was dated March 5, and there appears in this book a letter from General Short to you dated March 6. That could not have been a reply to your letter. It doesn't so state. The letters probably crossed in the mail.

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: That letter to you of March 6, 1941, in it General Short says:

"Dear General Marshall:

"One of the first projects which I investigated in this Department was the Aircraft Warning Service which I believe is vital to the defense of these Islands. At the present time the maximum distance an approaching airplane can be detected is about 5 miles. The radio detector equipment of the Aircraft Warning Service increases this distance to 120 miles, and in these Islands, the use of this equipment is the only way by

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 which the detection distance can be increased. With  
3 the present international situation it seems to me  
4 that if this equipment is to be used at all the need  
5 for it is now here.

6  
7 "The Navy is vitally interested in this project.  
8 At present with the Fleet in Hawaiian waters, there is  
9 no adequate warning service. The Commander in Chief  
10 of the Fleet has expressed his concern about this and  
11 had communicated this concern to the Navy Department;  
12 as you know, the Secretary of War has advised the  
13 Secretary of the Navy that the equipment would be re-  
14 ceived in this Department sometime in June and the  
15 stations be operating shortly thereafter. I have dis-  
16 cussed this matter with Admiral Kimmel and have assured  
17 him that personnel would be trained and the stations  
18 in operation within 30 days after receipt of the  
19 equipment."

20 I probably ought to read the rest of it.

21 "All this leads up to a radiogram of 3 March 1941  
22 just received from The Adjutant General regarding the  
23 Haleakala installation. A copy of this radio and a  
24 paraphrase of my reply are enclosed for ready reference.  
25 The Adjutant General's radio indicates to me that the  
seriousness of this situation has not yet been

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 appreciated in the War Department. It lists certain  
3 restrictions regarding construction, and if it is  
4 necessary to comply with these, the completion of this  
5 station will be unduly delayed. The fixed station at  
6 the summit of Haleakala is one of the two most important  
7 in the warning net; its commanding location gives it  
8 greater coverage than any of the others, and its early  
9 completion is vital. I believe that this matter is  
10 sufficiently important to be brought to the attention  
11 of the Secretary of War to see if permission cannot  
12 be obtained from the Secretary of the Interior to  
13 construct the Haleakala installation without the  
14 necessity of submitting detailed plans for considera-  
15 tion by the National Park Service.

16 "Defense of these Islands and adequate warning  
17 for the United States Fleet is so dependent upon the  
18 early completion of this Aircraft Warning Service that  
19 I believe all quibbling over details should be stopped  
20 at once. This project was very thoroughly studied by  
21 a Board of officers in this Department who made several  
22 personal investigations of each one of the sites. Now  
23 that basic decisions as to locations, types of stations,  
24 and general plans have been approved by the War Depart-  
25 ment, I strongly recommend that this project be

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 decentralized and that I be authorized to give final  
3 approval to designs, layouts and other details to  
4 expedite its completion."

5 Do you remember that Secretary of War Stimson was especially  
6 interested in these radar detectors?

7 General Marshall: Yes, sir, he was very much interested  
8 in that particular development.

9 Mr. Mitchell: It may be anticipating, but do you know  
10 how many mobile or fixed radar detector outfits were sent to  
11 Hawaii before December 6?

12 General Marshall: My recollection is that there were  
13 six mobile sets in operation at that time and three fixed  
14 sets known in operation.

15 Mr. Mitchell: In your letter of March 13 to General  
16 Short you say:

17 "The progress that you are making in reaching close  
18 coordination with local Naval authorities, and so in-  
19 suring a maximum degree of readiness in your Department,  
20 is most gratifying.

21 "Since the Navy deployment in Kaneohe Bay has  
22 exceeded the project originally contemplated, I agree  
23 with you that the Army should consider assuming re-  
24 sponsibility for its defense, and meanwhile defend it  
25 within the means available.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "The several letters which you have submitted to  
3 The Adjutant General requesting personnel, materiel and  
4 funds are being processed. To avoid delay in initiating  
5 projects that may be approved, I am tentatively including  
6 \$3,000,000 in the estimates now being prepared."

7 Here is a letter from General Bryden to General Short,  
8 dated May 15. That wasn't one of your letters.

9 Senator Lucas: March 15.

10 Mr. Mitchell: March 15, 1941. It says:

11 "The War Department appreciates fully the necessity  
12 for the early establishment of the Aircraft Warning  
13 Service stations in the Hawaiian Department. However,  
14 it will be necessary to comply with certain fixed  
15 regulations in those cases where facilities are to be  
16 established on lands pertaining to the Department of  
17 the Interior. The National Park Service officials  
18 are willing to give us the temporary use of their  
19 lands when other lands are not suitable for the purpose,  
20 but they will not waive the requirements as to the  
21 submission of preliminary building plans showing the  
22 architecture and general appearance. They are also  
23 very definitely opposed to permitting structures of  
24 any type to be erected at such places as will be open  
25 to view and materially alter the natural appearance

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 of the reservation.

3 "I have given these matters my personal attention,  
4 and have conferred with officials of the National Park  
5 Service. War Department radiogram of March 12, 1941  
6 outlines what appears to be the most practical solution  
7 at this time. The War Department finds it necessary to  
8 ask the Department of the Interior for the use of many  
9 tracts of land in the National Parks, and for their  
10 cooperation in the transfer of large areas of public  
11 land. It is not believed that it would be advisable  
12 to attempt to alter the informal decisions of the  
13 Department of the Interior by carrying this matter to  
14 higher authority, or to prolong the discussion through  
15 official channels.

16 "We are as anxious as you are to work out a solution  
17 for these problems with the least practicable delay, and  
18 I know that I can count on you for fullest cooperation."  
19 Signed "William Bryden, in the absence of the Chief of  
20 Staff."

(4)  
21 Senator Ferguson: Would counsel read the distribution  
22 of that letter?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. It says:

24 "Distribution: 1 Chief of Staff."

25 Showing a copy of the letter went to the Chief of Staff.

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Here is another letter from General Short to you dated  
3 March 15, 1941. It appears to be in answer to your request  
4 for a report from him about the air situation.

5 Senator Lucas: Mr. Chairman, before counsel proceeds,  
6 I am wondering if General Marshall would care to comment on  
7 that letter of March 15.

8 Mr. Mitchell: Thank you. I should have asked him for  
9 a comment. I get so interested in these myself that I forget.

10 General, you heard me read this letter of March 15 which  
11 referred to sites for the installation of fixed radar stations  
12 in Hawaii and the discussion as to the attitude of the Depart-  
13 ment of the Interior.

14 General Marshall: My recollection of the situation here  
15 was General Short pressing very hard to have early action  
16 taken to permit the installation of that radar. He had  
17 selected a point in one of the National Parks which was a  
18 volcanic peak to which the Department of the Interior, or  
19 the National Park Service, rather, on the ground objected,  
20 and that objection was supported for the time being at least  
21 by the Department of Interior National Park Service here in  
22 Washington.

23 Shefner  
24 follows.  
25

Sheffer  
fls LaChar  
11:40 Am 1

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 Another site was proposed but that site would have in-  
3 volved about either twenty-five degrees or twenty-five per  
4 cent of the total arc of observation or, rather, of regis-  
5 tration of the radar, so that being the case any planes that  
6 approached within that arc could not have been detected.

7 Therefore, General Short was very much concerned to  
8 have the radar established on the peak, which gave all around  
9 service. He can, of course, tell you the details of this  
10 much better than I can.

11 He was pressing us to get the authority out of the De-  
12 partment of the Interior and the National Parks Service. He  
13 was also pressing us to secure authority to proceed with the  
14 building without any delay which would be involved in send-  
15 ing the plans to the United States for approval here by the  
16 National Parks Service in the Department of the Interior.

17 We had been endeavoring through the ordinary channels,  
18 so far as I can recall, that follow any business between two  
19 separate departments of the government represented by Cabinet  
20 heads and had quite a difficult time obtaining authority to  
21 establish the radar section on the peak of the volcano most  
22 desired by General Short. That authority was obtained.

23 However, we were unable, and I think that was the situa-  
24 tion at the time of this letter of General Bryden's, though  
25 I am not accurate about that, to secure authority for General

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Short to proceed with the building without the delay of sub-  
3 mitting plans to Washington. General Bryden evidently  
4 wrote this letter in order to make clear to General Short our  
5 difficulties here and just why we could not obtain that ne-  
6 cessary authority.

7 The records will show, I think, and my recollection is  
8 that General Short sent another message or two pressing again  
9 that we go after this more vigorously. I then personally  
10 went into the matter and talked by telephone with the head  
11 of the National Parks Service, I believe it was the head, I  
12 do not remember the gentleman's name, to secure authority to  
13 go ahead with the construction of the station without the  
14 delay involved in sending the plans back to the United States.

15 He told me that could not be; that in each case, notably  
16 those where we were constructing similar radar station sites  
17 in Maine, along the coast of New England, each one had to  
18 be approved in the Department, in the Department of the In-  
19 terior, before any building could be gone ahead with, if the  
20 site lay in any National Park area.

21 Mr. Mitchell: This letter --

22 General Marshall: I might finish, though, by saying  
23 that that conversation ended with the statement that they  
24 could not grant the authority for General Short to go ahead;  
25 and, incidentally, what he was trying to do was to get the



1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 station installed and ready to receive the equipment that  
3 was then due in June.

4 Later, and as I recall that afternoon, word came either  
5 from the National Parks Service or the Department of Interior  
6 or otherwise which permitted, as I recall, us to go ahead  
7 with the plan, sending just the general statement of the plan  
8 by air mail. I think the records will show that development.

9 Mr. Mitchell: Well, this letter from General Bryden to  
10 General Short states that the reason the National Parks Ser-  
11 vice and the Interior Department require the structure plans  
12 to be submitted to them in full before they would permit the  
13 reservation to be used for such a purpose was based on the  
14 question as to whether they were architecturally attractive  
15 or altered the natural appearance of the reservation.

16 Is that your understanding of their basis?

17 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Now, this letter of March 15, 1941 from  
19 General Short to you appears to be a report in response to  
20 your letter of the 5th in which you asked him for a review  
21 of the air defense situation there. He starts out and says:

22 "The most serious situation with reference to an  
23 air attack is the vulnerability of both the Army and  
24 Navy air fields to the attack."

25 He develops that at length and reports on the anti-

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 aircraft artillery. He says:

3 "In general we have no serious shortage in 3 inch  
4 antiaircraft artillery, only 16 guns being required to  
5 complete our complement. As far as I know no provision  
6 has been made for 90-mm antiaircraft guns. 20 out of  
7 135 37-mm antiaircraft guns have been received. The  
8 exact date of the arrival of the others is not known.  
9 We are still short 236 of .50 caliber machine guns.  
10 Perhaps the most serious shortage is 8 long range  
11 detectors (AWS)"--

12 What does "AWS" stand for?

13 General Marshall: Air Warning Service.

14 Mr. Mitchell: (Reading)

15 "--which are supposed to arrive in June. Our pre-  
16 sent sound locators have a range of only 4½ miles so  
17 they are practically useless. The new detectors will  
18 have a maximum range of 120 miles."

19 Then he discusses the shortage in personnel, which  
20 he says is serious.

21 The coordination of antiaircraft defense. He says of  
22 that (Reading):

23 "The coordination of Antiaircraft defense presents  
24 quite a different picture at Hawaii from that existing  
25 in most places on the mainland. The island is so small.

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 that there would not be the same degree of warning that  
3 would exist on the mainland. After the installation of  
4 our new detectors we shall have some warning from the  
5 different islands and almost continuous service in the  
6 most dangerous direction for approximately 75 miles. The  
7 pursuit aviation, however, will have to be prepared to  
8 take the air in the minimum amount of time.

9 "On account of the congestion in the areas at  
10 Hickam Field, Pearl Harbor, and Barbers Point, the  
11 coordination of the Army and Navy aircraft and of the  
12 Antiaircraft Artillery presents a very serious problem.  
13 We have had a committee of the Army and Navy working on  
14 this subject."

15 Then he refers to the West Coast defense exercise which  
16 you have mentioned and said he would like to send both Gen-  
17 eral Martin and General Gardner.

18 When that report came to your attention did you consider  
19 that it showed a sufficiently lively and active interest in  
20 the anti-aircraft defense on the part of General Short?

21 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

22 Mr. Mitchell: You said in your letter to him of March  
23 28th:

24 "I was very glad to receive your letter of March  
25 15 reviewing the air defense situation in your depart-

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1

2

ment.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

(Reading)

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

"Your proposal for relieving congestion by the construction of one additional field and by the dispersion of grounded aircraft in protected bunkers at existing airfields is undoubtedly sound. As soon as you have submitted sufficient details to support the defense of the anticipated expenditures, funds for these purposes will be included in estimates.

"A company of aviation engineers will be sent to you during April, and further increases in your engineer garrison are contemplated when the necessary personnel can be made available.

"Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service material to complete your project requirements is expected to be available for delivery as follows."

Then you give him a list of guns and their dates.

"I am hopeful of arranging for the early augmentation of your antiaircraft garrison.

"I approved your proposal to send General Martin and General Gardner, or their Executives, to the West Coast Defense Exercise."

Have you any comments to make about that?

General Marshall: No, sir.

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Senator Lucas: Those dates, Mr. Counsel, in the fourth  
3 paragraph are pretty important.

4 Mr. Mitchell: The fourth paragraph?

5 Senator Lucas: Yes.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Yes. I did not want to tire the committee  
7 or keep the General waiting on account of my reading too long.

8 (Reading):

9 "Antiaircraft and aircraft warning service materiel  
10 to complete your project requirements is expected to be  
11 available for delivery as follows: sixteen 3" antiair-  
12 craft guns, December, 1941; one hundred and fifteen 37mm  
13 antiaircraft guns, February, 1942; caliber .50 antiair-  
14 craft machine guns, in 1942; four SCR No. 268, April,  
15 1941."

16 That means four outfits?

17 General Marshall: Yes.

18 Mr. Mitchell: Were they mobile or fixed, those SCR's,  
19 or don't you happen to know about that?

20 General Marshall: I do not know offhand. I think they  
21 were mobile.

22 Mr. Mitchell: (Reading):

23 "Five SCR No. 270 and three SCR No. 271, April  
24 and May, 1941."

25 Do you happen to remember whether those antiaircraft

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

2 warning instruments, AWS, for radar were sent out there on  
3 the expected dates or would you have to look your records up  
4 on that?

5 General Marshall: I think you will have to go to the  
6 records for that. All I can tell you offhand at the moment  
7 is that there were six mobile stations in operations, as I  
8 understand it, on December 7, 1941 and three fixed setups  
9 not in operation.

10 Mr. Mitchell: I only mention General Short's letter to  
11 you of April 14 to call attention to the fact that in that  
12 letter he concludes with this statement: (Reading)

13 "Knowing that you are very much interested in the  
14 progress that we are making in cooperating with the  
15 Navy I am enclosing the following agreements made with  
16 them:

17 "1. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan Hawaiian  
18 Department and Fourteenth Naval District. Annex No.  
19 VII, Section VI, Joint Security Measure.

20 "2. Agreement signed by the Commander of the  
21 Hawaiian Air Force and Commander, Naval Base Defense  
22 Air Force to implement the above agreement.

23 "3. Field Orders No. 1 NS (Naval Security)  
24 putting into effect for the Army the provisions of the  
25 joint agreement."

Witness Marshall:

Questions by Mr. Mitchell

1  
2       Would you have had time to examine those documents at  
3 length, or do you remember having done so?

4       General Marshall: I think that I remember the documents,  
5 although I am not quite certain, that arranged for the coordin-  
6 ation of air action and defense. I became somewhat familiar  
7 with them for the reason that the air officials of the War  
8 Department, I do not recall whether it was General Arnold per-  
9 sonally or part of his staff, or both, brought objections to  
10 me to General Short's arrangements in the coordination in  
11 this matter with the Navy, which had to do with the Army Air  
12 Corps reluctance in regard to the over-water reconnaissance  
13 responsibilities which in this coordinated agreement was  
14 naval, and the Air Corps was thinking of their long range  
15 four engine bombers and what later developed into the great  
16 strategical air bombing force.

17       I did not think their position was sound and I thought  
18 General Short's arrangement was sound under the then circum-  
19 stances which, incidentally, included the fact that he had  
20 very few B-17's, about twelve of them, and possibly some old  
21 B-18's, that the agreement with the Navy, with its PBX's of  
22 long range and considerable endurance at the time, supple-  
23 mented as might be considered necessary by the Naval Chief  
24 by Army planes, was the efficient method of meeting the condi-  
25 tions under the circumstances.

1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: You thought that the long over-water re-  
3 connaissance ought to be handled by the Navy with such as-  
4 sistance as the Army Air Forces could give it?

5 General Marshall: Certainly, under the conditions that  
6 then existed as to equipment on both sides.

7 Mr. Mitchell: You understood at that time then that  
8 the arrangement was between the commanders out there that  
9 if the Naval commander needed additional long range planes  
10 to make reconnaissance he would call on the Army for them?

11 General Marshall: And those planes would operate under  
12 Naval direction.

13 Mr. Mitchell: That is right.

14 General Marshall: The complicated part of the procedure,  
15 of course, was not that. It was the control of the various  
16 fighter planes and the antiaircraft in the very restricted  
17 area, particularly of Oahu, especially if the Fleet were  
18 there. That was made the responsibility of the Army commander  
19 and I thought in terms that were practical of accomplishment.

20 Mr. Mitchell: Did you agree with General Short's conclu-  
21 sion when he spoke in his letter about radar equipment, that  
22 even if they had radar equipment of a range of maybe 130 or  
23 150 miles it would necessitate very prompt takeoff of pursuit  
24 planes in order to respond to such a warning?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir. I do not know just to what



1 Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 specific reference that you are referring in connection with  
3 that but that is certainly the case. 120 miles represents a  
4 very few minutes of flying time and that study by General  
5 Martin presents possibly other factors which would make the  
6 issue even more complicated unless the force is picked up at  
7 a great distance.

8 The planes have to be ready all the time for immediate  
9 action and a certain number warmed up. We had that same prob-  
10 lem in Panama where it went on week in and week out, almost  
11 year in and year out, making it a very difficult problem to  
12 meet, the more so where enemy action was not always evident.

13 Mr. Mitchell: After he sent you his letter on the 14th  
14 enclosing the joint plans and estimates concerning possible  
15 air action you seem to have written General Short on May 5,  
16 1941 as follows:

17 "My dear Short:

18 "Thank you for your letter of the 14th enclosing  
19 the joint plans and the estimate concerning possible  
20 air action. It is evident that you have been on the job,  
21 and I know that the Navy is delighted to have such gener-  
22 ous cooperation."

23 You say at the end of the letter:

24 "It is most gratifying to hear you say that every-  
25 thing is going along extremely well and do not hesitate

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

Witness Marshall.

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

to write at any time."

I take it you were assured by his report that this matter of antiaircraft defense -- I mean the defense against air attack was being given very diligent attention out there?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

The Chairman: This is a good time to stop. The committee will recess until two o'clock.

(Whereupon at 12 o'clock noon, a recess was taken until 2 o'clock P.M. of the same day.)

- - -

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

## AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:00 p. m.)

The Chairman: The committee will come to order.

Counsel may proceed with the examination of General Marshall.

## TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE C. MARSHALL

(Resumed)

Mr. Mitchell: General Marshall, I know the reading of these documents is tedious, but there are only a few documents left that I want to call your attention to before I ask you some general questions.

The next one is a document signed by Harry J. Malony, Brigadier General, addressed to the Chief of Staff on May 13, 1941.

I see that it generally relates to "installation of dispersed protection bunkers for 263 persuit ships, and 95 bombers," and paragraph 3 says:

"War Plans Division believes:

"a. That the danger of sustained air attack against air fields in Hawaii from carrier based aviation is not serious."

Would you tell us what would be meant from a military standpoint by the word "sustained"?

General Marshall: My reaction to that at the moment,

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 I couldn't tell you specifically what it might have been  
3 at the time -- would be that he was referring to a continu-  
4 ous attack on Hawaii, such as occurred at Okinawa during  
5 the landing and heavy fire, rather than a raiding attack,  
6 which is of short duration.

7 Mr. Mitchell: And he thought for that reason the  
8 bunkers against gas and bombs of secondary importance; is  
9 that the idea?

10 General Marshall: That would be my conception of it  
11 now. I don't recall what conception I had at the time.

12 Mr. Mitchell: We will offer that memorandum in evidence  
13 as Exhibit 56.

14 The Chairman: So ordered.

(The document referred to was  
15 marked Exhibit No. 56.)

16  
17 Mr. Mitchell: I have here a memorandum of a conference  
18 in the Office of the Secretary of War under date of May 19,  
19 1941. Have you that before you?

20 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Would you mind reading it?

22 General Marshall: This is a conference on May 19, 1941  
23 in the Office of the Secretary of War.

24 "Present: The Secretary of War - Mr. Stimson

25 The Under Secretary of War - Judge Patterson

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

h3

1

2

The Assistant Secretary of War - Mr. McCloy

3

The Assistant Secretary of War for Air - Mr. Lovett

4

The Chief of Staff"- myself -- two deputies --

5

three deputies at that time: General Bryden, General Moore,

6

and General Arnold.

7

"The Secretary, General Staff - Colonel Ward."

8

Mr. Mitchell: You might omit the first subject.

9

General Marshall: The first subject relates to Martinique

10

which I understand you wish me to omit.

11

Mr. Mitchell: Yes. The next paragraph having to do

12

with boats for the First Division.

13

General Marshall: "The French cruiser in Martinique is

14

a first class cruiser ship with a top speed of 40 knots.

15

"The Secretary of War asked whether she was in good

16

condition, and was informed that she was.

17

"General Marshall indicated that it would take about

18

ten days for the Navy to get boats for the First Division.

19

He further indicated that it was primarily a naval mission

20

but that the Army Air should participate, both for the help

21

it could give and the experience it would gain. He indicated

22

that the B-18's in Puerto Rico would be staged at St. Croix.

23

Puerto Rico is almost 400 miles from Martinique.

24

"General Marshall then indicated that there were now in

25

the United States 14 B-17's of the most modern type which

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 he thought should not be sent out of the country in view  
3 of the current situation. These had been withheld from the  
4 Hawaiian Department contingent.

5 "The Secretary of War asked if this would affect the  
6 impregnability of Hawaii.

7 "General Marshall said that it would not. He further  
8 said that we need some B-17's (but not of the most modern  
9 type) in Panama, and that he is recommending that 9 be  
10 sent there. This matter is under consideration.

11 "General Arnold: There is now available 50 B-17's  
12 without leak-proof tanks and without armor.

13 "General Marshall: High bombing is possible in the  
14 Caribbean area, due to weather conditions, and these ships  
15 without leak-proof tanks could be effectively used there.

WARD &amp; PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AL  
gls

16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

m LaCharity (2)  
follows  
Hook  
AL-1

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 Mr. Mitchell: We will offer that in evidence as  
3 Exhibit 57.

4 The Chairman: That is dated May 19, 1941?

5 Mr. Mitchell: May 19, "Conference in the Office of the  
6 Secretary of War".

7 (The document referred to was  
8 marked Exhibit No. 57.)

9 Senator Brewster: You read it as if St. Croix was in  
10 Puerto Rico.

11 General Marshall: I missed the punctuation. I should  
12 have given the distance from St. Croix to Puerto Rico.

13 Senator Brewster: That is in the Virgin Islands, is it,  
14 St. Croix?

15 General Marshall: I am confused at the moment. I don't  
16 know.

17 Mr. Mitchell: I call your attention further to a letter  
18 dated May 29 from General Short to you. Page 35. Have  
19 you found it?

20 General Marshall: I have a copy of it here.

21 Mr. Mitchell: Will you kindly refer to that and read  
22 the first two paragraphs.

23 General Marshall: It is dated May 29, 1941, signed  
24 Walter C. Short:

25 "Dear General Marshall:

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 "I know that you will not have time to look over  
3 a detailed account of our recent maneuvers but feel  
4 that you might like to have a birdseye view of what  
5 we did and the purpose back of it.

6  
7 "The maneuver was divided into three phases. The  
8 first phase consisted of the air action and the actual  
9 issue of one day's fire and of Engineer Supplies for  
10 Field Fortifications, and of Engineer Tools. During  
11 the air phase our bombers acted under Navy command in  
12 cooperation with the Naval Patrol Squadrons and actually  
13 located and bombed airplane carriers 250 miles out at  
14 sea. The movement of the carrier was entirely free  
15 so that the Navy patrol planes had the mission of  
16 locating the ship and notifying our bombers and they  
17 then made the attack. Pursuit attacked enemy bombers  
18 represented by Naval planes and our own bombers when  
19 they came in to attack ground defenses. Upon receipt  
20 of the warning for this phase our bombers were sent  
21 to fields on outlying Islands and pursuit planes were  
22 dispersed. The Navy cooperated very fully during this  
23 phase and I believe we learned more about the coordina-  
24 tion of the Army Air Force, Navy Air Force, and anti-  
25 aircraft than we had during any previous exercise.  
Ammunition and engineer supplies had never been actually



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

issued before and we got considerable data in regard to the time and transportation required to complete the issue."

Mr. Mitchell: You understand that relates to training or practice, simulated attack by air on Hawaii?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Shefner follows

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D C

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

WARD & PAUL, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Mr. Mitchell: The rest of the document relates to the other phases that were not related directly to the air attack, were they?

General Marshall: Yes, sir.

Mr. Mitchell: On July 25th it appears that there was a joint Army and Navy dispatch to Hawaii about economic sanctions. That dispatch was sent by the Navy under date of July 25th, from the Chief of Naval Operations to the Commanding General of the -- or to the commanding Chief of the Pacific Fleet and others and it bears in it a statement that it was a joint dispatch from the CO and the Chief of Staff of the United States Army. It is on page 2 of exhibit 32.

Was it the practice at that time occasionally for one department to send a dispatch and in it have a request that it be communicated to the other department in Hawaii?

General Marshall: Yes, sir, that was a very common practice all the way through in order to protect our codes.

Mr. Mitchell: What was the occasion of your notifying the Army and Navy commanders at Hawaii of the placing of these embargoes and restrictions?

General Marshall: I did not hear the last word.

Mr. Mitchell: Through these embargoes and restrictions on commerce.

General Marshall: That was to apprise them of the de-

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 velopments of the situation in relation to Japan.

3 Mr. Mitchell: Well, was there any idea in your head  
4 that the imposition of those embargoes might probably inten-  
5 sify the strain between Japan and the United States?

6 General Marshall: My best recollection is that it was  
7 as we say here:

8 "Do not anticipate immediate hostile reaction by  
9 Japan through the use of military means but you are  
10 furnished this information in order that you may take  
11 appropriate precautionary measures."

12 Mr. Mitchell: There is a letter under date of August  
13 19th from you to General Short. Would you kindly look at  
14 that?

15 General Marshall: Is that on page 40?

16 Mr. Mitchell: Page 40, yes. You might read the whole  
17 letter, General.

18 General Marshall: All right, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I think it relates all to air matters.

20 General Marshall: (Reading):

21 "August 19, 1941.

22 "Dear General Short:

23 "Your letter of July 11, has been received recommend-  
24 ing the selection of Kipapa Field rather than the Kahuku  
25 Point Field as a base for the 15th Pursuit Group. The

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 advantages and disadvantages of each site have been con-  
3 sidered. As a result, I feel that the advantages of the  
4 Kahuku Point Field outweigh those of the Kipapa Field  
5 sufficiently to result in my decision to establish the  
6 base on Kahuku Point.

7 "The following factors are among those having a  
8 bearing upon my decision:

9 "a. Low clouds and ground mist frequently obtain  
10 over the Wheeler Field - Kipapa area, while at the same  
11 time on the north shore of Oahu visibility conditions  
12 are good. It is believed tactically unsound to place  
13 two pursuit groups in an area subject to the same adverse  
14 weather conditions. Pursuit operations in defense of  
15 Oahu would be seriously hampered during such weather  
16 conditions. Selection of the Kahuku Point site places  
17 one group in a location where relatively favorable  
18 weather may exist when the reverse is true in the Kipapa  
19 area.

20 "b. The close proximity of two Army and two Navy  
21 air bases in the Schofield Barracks -- Pearl Harbor area  
22 has resulted in a situation under present conditions  
23 which necessitates continuous coordination and control  
24 of air traffic in the interests of safety. The addition  
25 of a fifth air base in this area will appreciably ag-

Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 gravate this situation.

3 "I feel sure that the Naval authorities comprehend  
4 fully the importance of adequate air defense of the Oahu  
5 Naval installation and accordingly, will entertain  
6 favorably any proposal which will implement the effi-  
7 ciency of such defense. I hope, therefore, that they  
8 will be agreeable to our proposal to establish an air  
9 base at Kahuku Point to the extent of releasing any claim  
10 they may have previously established to any part of the  
11 area involved.

12 "With best personal regards,

13 Faithfully yours,

14 (Stamped) [Sgd] G. C. Marshall,

15 Chief of Staff."

16 Mr. Mitchell: Do you happen to remember whether the  
17 site you recommended was actually selected?

18 General Marshall: I do not recall right now, sir.

19 Mr. Mitchell: I will ask you to turn, General, to the  
20 letter from General Short to you dated October 14, 1941, ap-  
21 pearing on page 43.

22 General Marshall: Do you wish me to read that, sir?

23 Mr. Mitchell: Yes, if you please.

24 General Marshall: (Reading)  
25

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

"Fort Shafter, T.H.,

October 14, 1941.

"General George C. Marshall,  
Chief of Staff of the Army,  
War Department,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Marshall:

"I have your letter of October 10th with reference to the use of men of the Air Force on other than strictly air duties. At the time our tentative Standing Operating Procedure was put out the Air Corps had 7229 men. Full Combat details and all overhead required only 3885 men for the planes and organizations actually on hand. This left a surplus of 3344 men with no assigned duties during Maneuvers. One of the main reasons for the assignment was to give these men something to do during the Maneuvers. Another reason was the belief that any serious threat of an enemy ground attack of Oahu would come only after destruction of our Air Forces. The fact that our planes had been destroyed would not mean that all the men had been put out of action. It is probable that several thousand men would still be left and it would not look plausible to have them sit down and do nothing while Infantrymen were detailed to protect the men and their air fields. The training after the first two weeks takes up only about four hours per

Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 month of their time. It seems to me that they should  
3 continue to be trained as Riflemen in the immediate de-  
4 fense of air fields. As regards their use as Military  
5 Police that was not correct. The plan was to use them  
6 for guarding certain essential utilities, which did not  
7 require team training. However, this will be unneces-  
8 sary as the Legislature has just passed the Home Guard  
9 Bill, which will go into effect very soon. They will  
10 be able to take over guarding of all essential utili-  
11 ties, highway bridges, railroad bridges, etc.

12 "If it is not desired to train Air Corps men  
13 for their own protection and for the final defense of  
14 the air fields I would like to be so advised."

15 Mr. Mitchell: Now, that was a proposal of General  
16 Short's to train Air Corps men for guard duty, wasn't it?

17 General Marshall: Well, it was Military Police duty.

18 Mr. Mitchell: And to defend the planes on the ground?

19 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

20 Mr. Mitchell: And on the next page I think is your let-  
21 ter in which you disapproved of that proposal.

22 General Marshall: I will read that if you wish me to,  
23 sir.

24 Mr. Mitchell: Yes.

25 General Marshall: (Reading)

307

Witness Marshall:

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

"October 28, 1941

"Dear Short:

"With reference to your letter of October 14, I can understand your motives in giving ground defense training to Air Corps personnel which at present are excess for the equipment provided. However, the present rate of expansion of the Air Force is such that they are having considerable difficulty in obtaining experienced maintenance men and it is important that they be permitted to concentrate on the technical training of all potential mechanics, regardless of available equipment. Also, it is equally important that they utilize all available time on this specialized training and the men not be left without assigned duties particularly during the maneuver period.

"I suggest that you prepare a separate phase of your alert plan based on the assumption that the Air Force has been destroyed and a hostile landing effected. This plan could provide for the use of the necessary Air Corps personnel for ground defense and afford a means of indoctrinating them in ground defense tactics. It should, however, for the present at least, be subordinated to their own specific training requirements.

"It would appear that the best policy would be to



Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

1  
2 allow them to concentrate on technical Air Corps train-  
3 ing until they have completed their expansion program  
4 and have their feet on the ground as far as their pri-  
5 mary mission is concerned. War Department Training Cir-  
6 cular 47, which was issued July 18, 1941, can be ac-  
7 cepted as a guide except in extreme situation.

8 Faithfully yours,

9 G. C. MARSHALL,

10 Chief of Staff."

11 Mr. Mitchell: Do you remember how many divisions Gen-  
12 eral Short had at that time? Were there two divisions?

13 General Marshall: I think he had a division and a frac-  
14 tion; roughly a reinforced division. I am not quite certain.  
15 That is readily obtainable from the figures.

16 Mr. Mitchell: Do I understand your idea was that he  
17 should use part of his Infantry divisions for work of that  
18 kind rather than the Air Corps?

19 General Marshall: To the extent indicated in that.  
20 What was going on there back of the letters was this: The  
21 Air Corps was engaged in an unprecedented expansion both as  
22 to the extent of expansion and the speed with which we had  
23 to make it and the Air Corps people themselves were very  
24 sensitive to anything that diverted their personnel from the  
25 development under that expansion and their representatives'

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 here in Washington, General Arnold and his staff, appealed  
3 to me to get this modification so that nothing should inter-  
4 fere with the completion of the technical training of the Air  
5 Corps personnel.

6 Mr. Mitchell: Now, there is just one other document I  
7 want to refer to and that is a dispatch from the Chief of  
8 Naval Operations dated November 24, 1941 addressed to the  
9 Commander-in-Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, Pacific Fleet and  
10 Commandants of the 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th Naval Districts.

11 It was a joint dispatch with instructions in it to in-  
12 form the senior Army officers. It states:

13 "Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with  
14 Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with state-  
15 ments of Japanese Government and movements their naval  
16 and military forces indicate in our opinion that a sur-  
17 prise aggressive movement in any direction including  
18 attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief  
19 of Staff has seen this dispatch concurs and requests  
20 action addressees to inform senior Army officers their  
21 areas. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to com-  
22 plicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japan-  
23 ese action. Guam will be informed separately."

24 Do you remember having authorized that dispatch?

25 General Marshall: Yes, sir.

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 Mr. Mitchell: Now, General Marshall, with all these  
3 documents before us showing your contacts with Hawaii and  
4 your knowledge about the situation there and the question of  
5 defense against air attack, will you cast your mind back, if  
6 you can, to the latter part of November 1941 and give us the  
7 estimate you then had as to the capacity of the forces at  
8 Hawaii to resist an air attack, an air raid? I am not asking  
9 you now whether you expected one but what your estimate then  
10 was of the situation and the capacity with the materiel they  
11 had to resist such an attack successfully.

12 General Marshall: The Hawaiian garrison on the Army  
13 side was short of four engined bombers, only having 12; it  
14 was short a few three inch antiaircraft guns and it was short  
15 more seriously in lesser calibers of antiaircraft guns. It  
16 had been built up to a considerable extent in fighter air-  
17 craft.

18 It had a moderate radar setup of the portable type then  
19 functioning. It had what I thought were ample troops to de-  
20 fend the beaches successfully against a landing attack.

21 The military forces on Hawaii were in numbers and in  
22 equipment more nearly up to the desired standards than any  
23 other installation in the Army. My own impression was that  
24 the garrison was sufficiently established and equipped and  
25 organized to prevent a landing and to successfully resist an

1 Witness Marshall

Questions by: Mr. Mitchell

2 air attack and to defend the naval base.

3 I was always of the opinion, as indicated particularly  
4 by my letter to General Short of February 7th, I believe,  
5 that the principal problem there was to be prepared against  
6 an emergency of a surprise attack which might come at any  
7 time, presumably with the least possible advance notice. In  
8 that letter I stated, if you recall:

9 "My impression of the Hawaiian problem has been  
10 that if no serious harm is done us during the first six  
11 hours of known hostilities, thereafter the existing  
12 defenses would discourage an enemy against the hazard  
13 of an attack. The risk of sabotage and the risk in-  
14 volved in a surprise raid by Air and by submarine, con-  
15 stitute the real perils of the situation. Frankly, I  
16 do not see any landing threat in the Hawaiian Islands  
17 so long as we have air superiority."

18 Would you repeat your question again to me, please, to  
19 see if I got it straight?

20 Mr. Mitchell: Well, I was trying to draw out your judg-  
21 ment as of the latter part of November 1941 and the early  
22 part of December as to the capacity of the forces at Hawaii,  
23 assuming they used all they had to the best advantage, to --

24 General Marshall: I think they had a sufficient amount  
25 of materiel at their disposal there to successfully resist.