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# THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

CONSIDERED IN ITS RELATION TO

CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY,

IN A

# COURSE OF LECTURES

DELIVERED IN THE YEAR MDCCCXXXII. BEFORE

THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

AT THE LECTURE

FOUNDED BY JOHN BAMPTON, M.A.,

CANON OF SALISBURY.

---

BY R. D. HAMPDEN, D.D.,  
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TO THE THIRD EDITION.

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THIS Edition is an exact reprint from the two former Editions, and page for page from the Second. There was an immediate call for another Edition, and the Author had not leisure for any revision of the work, which has now been passed through the press under the superintendence of a friend.

27<sup>TH</sup> SEPTEMBER, 1848.

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**P R E F A C E**  
TO THE FIRST AND SECOND EDITION.

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IT is not an unusual effect of taking a particular view of a subject, to give the appearance of overlooking another view of it, no less important than that immediately presented. This is particularly the case in a question of religion, in which the



mind naturally fixes its eye on the divine part of the argument: and we are apt accordingly to regard that as altogether slighted, because it is not ostensibly brought under our survey.

I wish therefore to obviate any such misconception of my design, in regard to the observations contained in the present course of Lectures. I am exclusively engaged in considering what I may call a human section of the complex history of Christianity. But I would not, at the same time, be thought insensible to the divine part of the history; or to forget, even for a moment, the holy Agent himself by whom the great work, in all its sacred outlines and living energy, has been wonderfully wrought.

I request accordingly, that it may be remembered throughout, what is the immediate and restricted business of my inquiry: that it presupposes a Divine origin to the Christian revelation, and a superintending Providence over its whole course. This is my point of departure. Assuming that the Holy Spirit has not been unfaithful to his charge over the church of Christ, I have endeavoured to take some account of that resistance,

which the human agent has opposed to the diffusion of the truth as it was purely inspired. A work of Christian evidences would have for its leading idea the operation of the Divine Author and Guardian of the Faith. Take, for instance, the Gospels, or the Acts of the Apostles: and it is the facts bearing on the character of the Divine Being and the Divine dispensations, which are solely or prominently brought to view. Human sentiments and conduct are the mirror in which the work of God is reflected. Or take any merely human treatise on the evidences of Christianity: and the object will be found to be, to detect, amidst the various circumstances which have accompanied the rise and propagation of the Gospel, the indications of a power, wisdom, and goodness, more than human. As the present, however, is not a work of evidences, but a particular view of the connexion of human philosophy with the given truths of the Scriptures, the agency of man here forms the leading idea: and this therefore I have singled out for particular observation. ✓

There seems indeed to be an unreasonable jealousy in regard to any attempt to describe the

importance of the human means concerned in the establishment and maintenance of the Gospel truth. There is a proneness in professed defenders of Christianity, as also in the Christian in general, to overstate the argument in its favour. Whatever detracts accordingly from their own undue estimate, they are apt to regard as taking so much from the real evidence of Christianity. But let us not estimate the cares of the Author of our salvation for the security of his work, by the standard of our fears. Let the human agents whom he has employed in the furtherance of it, have contributed their utmost either to support or to thwart what He has begun, the work still remains his. As in the natural world; corruption and disease may mark for their own the fairest works of the Divine hand, but cannot unmake them: so neither are we to suppose that the superintendence of Christ over his Church no longer exists, because the fields of his vineyard have been overrun with thorns and weeds.

# EXTRACT

FROM

THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT

OF THE

REV. JOHN BAMPTON,

CANON OF SALISBURY.

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— “ I give and bequeath my Lands and Estates to  
“ the Chancellor, Masters, and Scholars of the University  
“ of Oxford for ever, to have and to hold all and sin-  
“ gular the said Lands or Estates upon trust, and to the  
“ intents and purposes hereinafter mentioned; that is to  
“ say, I will and appoint that the Vice-Chancellor of the  
“ University of Oxford for the time being shall take and  
“ receive all the rents, issues, and profits thereof, and  
“ (after all taxes, reparations, and necessary deductions  
“ made) that he pay all the remainder to the endowment  
“ of eight Divinity Lecture Sermons, to be established for  
“ ever in the said University, and to be performed in the  
“ manner following :

“ I direct and appoint, that, upon the first Tuesday in  
“ Easter Term, a Lecturer be yearly chosen by the Heads  
“ of Colleges only, and by no others, in the room adjoin-  
“ ing to the Printing-House, between the hours of ten in  
“ the morning and two in the afternoon, to preach eight  
“ Divinity Lecture Sermons, the year following, at St.  
“ Mary’s, in Oxford, between the commencement of the  
“ last month in Lent Term, and the end of the third week  
“ in Act Term.”

“ Also, I direct and appoint, that the eight Divinity  
 “ Lecture Sermons shall be preached upon either of the  
 “ following subjects—to confirm and establish the Chris-  
 “ tian Faith, and to confute all heretics and schismatics—  
 “ upon the divine authority of the holy Scriptures—upon  
 “ the authority of the writings of the primitive Fathers, as  
 “ to the faith and practice of the primitive Church—upon  
 “ the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ—  
 “ upon the Divinity of the Holy Ghost—upon the Articles  
 “ of the Christian Faith, as comprehended in the Apostles’  
 “ and Nicene Creeds.

“ Also I direct, that thirty copies of the eight Divinity  
 “ Lecture Sermons shall be always printed within two  
 “ months after they are preached, and one copy shall be  
 “ given to the Chancellor of the University, and one copy  
 “ to the Head of every Colledge, and one copy to the Mayor  
 “ of the city of Oxford, and one copy to be put into the  
 “ Bodleian Library; and the expense of printing them shall  
 “ be paid out of the revenue of the Land or Estates given  
 “ for establishing the Divinity Lecture Sermons; and the  
 “ Preacher shall not be paid, nor be entitled to the revenue,  
 “ before they are printed.

“ Also I direct and appoint, that no person shall be  
 “ qualified to preach the Divinity Lecture Sermons, unless  
 “ he hath taken the degree of Master of Arts at least, in  
 “ one of the two Universities of Oxford or Cambridge;  
 “ and that the same person shall never preach the Divinity  
 “ Lecture Sermons twice.”

# C O N T E N T S.

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## LECTURE I. p. 3.

### ORIGIN OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

NATURE of the Inquiry proposed, the force of Theory on Theological language—the Scholastic Philosophy an important branch of this General Inquiry—its connexion with the philosophy of Aristotle—Neglect of consideration of its influence in comparison with that of Platonism—the greater extent of its influence—its more immediate interest.

The Scholastic Philosophy the result of a struggle between Reason and Authority—its history to be traced to the ascendancy of the Latin Clergy—Contrast between the Greek and Latin Fathers—Practical character of the Latins exemplified in their leading men—strict correspondence sustained among them—Contrast of state of Society in the East and the West—Civil disturbance and misery of the West favourable to the power of the Latin Church—Rhetorical character of the Latin theological writers—Fruitless attempt of Jerome to improve the Latin literature of his time—Monastic Institutions of the West less enthusiastic than those of the East—Origin of the Scholastic System more developed in the progress of the Church after the middle of the Vth century.—The principle of liberty of reason which had led to the power of the Church, operating within the Church, leads at once to heresy and ecclesiastical coercion—Extent of jurisdiction over opinion claimed by the Latin Clergy evidenced in the Predestinarian Controversy of the IXth century—Subsequent history a continuance of the struggle between Reason and Authority in the West.—Subjugation of the intellect leads to its insurrection—Character of its efforts at this period.

The argumentative theology at length sanctioned by the Church itself in its authoritative capacity.—The Book of the

Sentences.—Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, perfect the method established.—Success of Scholasticism owing to its combination of unlimited discussion with deference to authority.

LECTURE II. p. 51.

FORMATION OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.

GENERAL statement of the evil of a Logical Theology—The Church sanctions the use of Logic only as an art of defence—Platonism the established Philosophy of the Church—An art of Logic indispensable to the speculating Christian in the West—Division of the Sciences in the middle age—Tendency of the age to blend all into a metaphysical Logic, or Dialect—Logic perverted into a Science of Investigation—Obstructions to the real improvement of Logic—Ignorance of Aristotle's writings in themselves—Importance of the writings of Boethius—Effect of the Crusades in opening fresh sources of knowledge—Progress of Scholasticism illustrated in the division of parties into Nominalists and Realists—Triumph of Realism.

Realism, the scientific basis of Scholasticism—Nominalism, the resource of the more liberal speculators—Opposition between Duns Scotus and Ockam—Ascendancy of a Logical Philosophy evidenced in the subsequent state of knowledge.

Theology erected into an exact demonstrative Science—its Principles drawn from the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being—Regard to Authority maintained, by assigning Faith as the preliminary to the whole Speculation—Aristotle's Philosophy applied as a method of eliciting the Divine truths involved in the Scripture—This resulted in a combination of the Ideal Theory of Platonism with the Sensualism of Aristotle's Philosophy—Logic the instrument in effecting this result—Union of Mysticism and Argumentation in the Scholastic writings—Abuse by the Schoolmen of the disputatious form of Aristotle's writings.

Fundamental errors of Scholastic Theology, 1. its neglect of the Historical Nature of the Christian Scriptures—consequent loss of the real instruction contained in them.—2. their Rhetorical nature also overlooked in an exclusive attention to the mere words of revelation.—3. their Ethical lessons also disparaged in the pursuit of theoretic truth.

## LECTURE III. p. 97.

## THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSIES.

QUESTIONS on the Trinity naturally the first to engage the attention of disputants—Their ecclesiastical and political importance in the early ages—Maintenance of the orthodox doctrine chiefly owing to the Latin Church—Controversies on the subject assume a scientific form in the Scholastic writings—Promiscuous character of ancient Philosophy exemplified in the discussion—Scholastic system applies the philosophy of mind to the investigation of God from his Effects in the world—Doctrine of the Trinity, in its principle, the ideas or reasons of all existing things, traced to the Intellect of God—Description of the Scholastic mode of rationalizing the doctrine—Orthodox theory of the Divine Procession the exact view of the principle of Causation—Extremes of Sabellianism and Arianism traced to their misconception of this principle—Mischievous effect of the notion, that doctrines must be defended from their speculative consequences—Influence of Materialism—Rise of a technical phraseology—Logical principles employed in settling the precise notions of the different terms introduced—Popular illustrations of the Trinity examples of this mode of philosophizing—Controversies turn principally on the views taken of sameness, unity, diversity, &c.—Differences between the orthodox and the Sabellians and Arians in regard to the Divine Unity—Difficulties produced by the word *Persona*, obviated by logical distinctions.

Illustration of the doctrine of the Incarnation from the principles of the established logical philosophy—It accounts for the differences between the orthodox, the Nestorians, and Eutychians.

Application of this philosophy in the Controversies on the Procession of the Holy Spirit—The words *Filioque* added to the Nicene Creed—This addition ultimately maintained on logical grounds.

General practical reflections—Difficulties on the subject of the Trinity metaphysical in their origin—Popular misapprehension of the Divine Unity an instance of this—The various theories all Trinitarian in principle—Simplicity of belief in Scripture facts, the only escape from perplexity.



## LECTURE IV. p. 153.

## THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.—PREDESTINATION AND GRACE.

SCHOLASTIC nature of controversies relative to Divine and Human Agency—State of the West disposes the Latin Christians to the discussion of such questions—Importance of the questions in order to Church-government—The disputes here at first, less philosophical in comparison with the Trinitarian—Consequent laxity in the terms of the Pelagian theories, occasions more continual disputes—The Schoolmen the first to systematize these doctrines—Connexion of them with the previous theory of the Trinity—Scholastic view of Predestination an application of the Principle of Activity in the Divine Being to human actions—Importance of excluding reference to the Divine Intelligence, in our estimate of Predestination—Mode in which the notions of Contingency and Necessity, Time and Eternity, were employed in scholastic reasonings—The only proper difficulty on the subject is, the prevalence of Evil—Notions of Optimism influential on such speculations—The term Good in ancient philosophy coincident with an object of will—Reprobation consequently, as implying evil willed, unknown to Scholastic system—Illustration to be derived to our article on the subject from the theories opposed by the Schoolmen—Dread of Manicheism in the Latin Church.

Scholastic notion of Grace as the effect of Predestination, both physical and logical—The term Grace designates properly a general fact of the Divine conduct—Application of Aristotle's physical doctrines in the scholastic account of the process of Grace—The theory of Transmutation—Instinctive Principle of motion attributed to the System of Nature—Approximation to Pantheism in this system.

Practical reflections—Truths of Grace and Predestination concern the heart principally—Theoretic statements of them must always be peculiarly open to difficulty—The difficulties, evidently, chiefly metaphysical—The doctrines, practically taken, full of real comfort and peace.

## LECTURE V. p. 207.

## THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.—JUSTIFICATION.

TRUTHS of Divine and Human Agency necessarily qualify each other—Human Agency, as viewed in the Scholastic system, the continued action of the First Cause—Justification, the law of Divine Operation in the Salvation of Man—Sketch of the Christian scheme involved in this principle—Theory of Human Agency concerned first in accounting for Resistance to the Divine Will—Difficulty, as felt in ancient philosophy, was to reconcile the fact with the certainty of Science—Schoolmen adopt Aristotle's practical views of human nature—Application of the term Corruption founded on his physical philosophy—Theory of the Propagation of Sin maintains the universality of the principle of Corruption—Objections of Pelagius and Celestius to this theory—Error, both of the Orthodox and of the Pelagians, in speculating on the nature of Original Sin—Concupiscence—the application of this term to Original Sin, derived from ancient divisions of the soul—Materialism involved in the Speculation.—Doctrine of Original Sin, the counterpart to the doctrine of the Incarnation—Disputes between the orthodox and the Pelagians turn on the force of the terms Nature and Person—Connexion between the heresies of Nestorius and Pelagius—Distinction between the effect of Adam's sin, and the sin of subsequent parents on their posterity—View of the Christian life, as a change, coincides with this theory of Original Sin—Faith, the *infused* element of the new life—Doctrinal statements of Justification by Faith, to be interpreted by the light of Scholastic notions involved in it—Scholastic Notion of Freewill, not opposed to Necessity, but to the Force of sin, in enslaving the will—Introduction of the theory of Justice into the Christian Scheme—Notion of Merit to be understood in connexion with this theory ; as also of Merit of Condignity, Merit of Congruity—Peculiar views of Repentance, as a compensation for offence—of Punishment and Satisfaction, as applied to the Sacrifice of Christ—of Self-Mortification and Supererogation—drawn from this theory of Penal Justice.

Inefficacy of Repentance to remove guilt, and need of Atonement, illustrated by these speculations—Debasing effect of Scholastic theory of Expiation—True view of Human Agency to be

found in simple practical belief of the Atonement—Union of Strength and Weakness, implied in this doctrine, coincident with facts of human nature—Mischievous effect of speculative discussion of the subject—Moderation and forbearance of language on the subject most accordant with the spirit of Protestantism.

## LECTURE VI. p. 261.

### MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS.

No proper Moral Philosophy in the Scholastic System—Confusion of moral and religious truth injurious to both—Instance in Paley's Moral Philosophy—Moral Truth at first taught on the ground of Authority—Platonism influential in blending it with Theology—Influence of Christian literature, the Sermons, and legends of the Saints, Ambrose's Treatise "On the Offices of "Ministers," Gregory's "Morals," Boethius' "Consolation of "Philosophy"—Ethical science corrupted by being studied with a view to the power of the Clergy.

Schoolmen systematize ethical precepts drawn from practice of the Church—The Treatise "Of the Imitation of Christ"—Plato's theological account of the chief Good combined with practical detail of Aristotle's Ethical Theory—Scholastic moral system a development of the Divine Energy in man's internal nature—Aristotle's notion of Happiness accordant with this view—Scholastic gradations of moral excellence to be traced to this fundamental idea—Hence, also, the importance attributed to the life of contemplative devotion—The doctrine of Perfection—Distinction of Counsels and Precepts—Outline of this double morality seen in the Aristotelic notion of an Heroic Virtue—Coincidence of Aristotle's theory of Good-Fortune with the super-human virtue of the Scholastic System—Connexion of ethical doctrine of the Schools with notion of Original Sin—Mortal and Venial Sins—Proper ground of this distinction—Division of Virtue into Theological and Moral, and into Infused and Acquired—Doctrine of Gifts.

Origin of questions in Modern Moral Philosophy to be traced to scholastic discussions—Instance in the idea of Moral Obligation—Extreme opinions as to the relative importance both of Theology and Ethics—Proper province of Ethics, inquiry into the principles of Human Nature—Revelation only gives new

objects to those principles—Importance of regarding the Science of Ethics as in itself independent of Religion.

## LECTURE VII. p. 307.

### THE SACRAMENTS.

DOCTRINE of the Sacraments a continuation of the Scholastic scheme of Divine Agency—Separate nature of the soul and body assumed throughout the speculation—The Sacraments viewed as the means of supporting and renovating the life of the Soul—General notion of them founded on the belief in secret influences—Belief in Magic auxiliary to this notion—Connexion of Sacramental Influence with the doctrine of the Incarnation—Agitation of the subject in the IXth century in connexion with Alexandrian Philosophy—Difference of opinion as to whether the Sacraments were signs or instruments—Precision of language respecting the Eucharist in particular—Preeminence assigned to this Sacrament attributable to the established theory of Sacramental Influence—Doctrine of Intention—Question of the effect of the Vice of the Minister on the efficacy of the Sacrament—Notion of impressed Character attributed to some of the Sacraments—Evident superiority of Baptism and the Eucharist in comparison with the rest—Rough form of the early Controversies on the Sacramental Presence of Christ—The terms Substance and Species not taken at first in a strict metaphysical sense—Aristotelic Philosophy of Matter and Form, Substance and Accident, introduced to perfect the theory of the Sacraments—This exemplified particularly in Transubstantiation—Connexion of this doctrine with the power of the Church enforces the assertion of the mystical virtue of the consecrated elements—Physical theory of Transmutation applied to the establishment of the Presence of Christ—Connexion with this, of the notion of the mysterious efficacy of certain words—Realism involved in the further use of the notions of Substance and Accident in the account of Transubstantiation—the theory of the doctrine at variance with popular representations of it.

General reflections on the abuse of the doctrine of the Sacraments in the Scholastic System—its repugnance to the spirit of Christianity—Necessity of vigilance against the temptations to refinement on this subject.

## LECTURE VIII. p. 347.

## NATURE AND USE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

EXAMINATION of the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology suggested by previous inquiry—Confusion of thought on the subject, evidenced in popular statements of the relation between Faith and Reason—also in attempts to settle the necessary points of belief—Discussion of the Scholastic principles: 1. that whatever is first in point of doctrine is therefore true; and 2. that the logical consequence of any doctrine is necessarily true—The former principle, a remnant of Scholastic view of Theology as a demonstrative science—Universality and ubiquity of belief no tests of divine truth—The principle only true when strictly confined to Scripture facts—Contrast of the earlier and later Christian writers in the tradition of doctrine—The preference for earliest authorities inconsistent with the principle which establishes doctrines by logical consequences—Symbolical nature of language in its application to Theology—Unscriptural doctrines must result from the method of logical deductions—Necessity imposed in such a case of answering all objections—Impossibility of maintaining thus the principle of Authority—Progressive accumulation of doctrines by such a mode of proceeding—Truth of Fact confounded with Truth of Opinion in the Scholastic method—No dogmas to be found in Scripture itself—Dogmas therefore to be restricted to a negative sense, as exclusions of unscriptural truth—Articles and Creeds not necessarily to be dispensed with, because imperfect—Their defence however not to be identified with that of Christianity—Use and importance of Dogmatic Theology to be drawn from its relation to Social Religion.

Sum of the whole inquiry—Present interest of it—Scholasticism the ground of controversial defence to the Church of Rome—Remnants of it in Protestant Churches in the state of Controversy, and in the importance attributed to peculiar views of religious truth—Result of the examination sufficient to prove the force of Theory on our Theological language—The impression from this fact not to be transferred to the revealed truths which are real parts of sacred history—Real beneficial effect of honest search into the truths of Divine Revelation.

## INTRODUCTION.

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It is well known, that, as an Author, or rather particularly as the Bampton Lecturer of the year 1832, I have been the object of no common or measured attacks. Such has been my singular infelicity!—or perhaps I should say, felicity; when I look to the advantage that must result to the Truth, from general attention being drawn to that track of Theology on which I have entered. It is not necessary to describe how I have been assailed, not only by angry publications, but by the more open polemics of ungentle and disrespectful acts. All this being known to the world, some perhaps have wondered that I have not been stirred up to the conflict. Some may have thought, that I have been wanting to myself, in not entering into personal controversy with my adversaries; and may have expected, that I should at least shew some impatience under unmerited attacks, some anxiety to vindicate myself from calumnious imputations.

First then, I would observe, that I am, by natural disposition, utterly averse to polemical disputation. I prefer leaving the cause in the hands of the public; having no desire, that anything advanced in my writings should stand

its ground by the temporary aid of argumentative defence ; and being perfectly content that it should fall, if unable to abide the test of time. I do not mean to say, that Theological Controversy may not be carried on in a Christian spirit ; and that it may not sometimes do good. But its observed tendency is, to hurt the Christian temper ; and its use as an instrument of Truth is extremely hazardous.

In the next place, I have not felt that the writings so vehemently railed against, have been *substantially* assailed. I have been distressed—who cannot have been distressed ?—to see questions of Truth, of Religious Truth above all, arbitrated, like measures of political expediency, by personal and party influence, by appeals to feelings and prejudices, by the gathering of numbers, and the loudest cry. But where was the argument, where the evidence of Truth, in such proceedings ? So far as they admitted an answer, they have received it in the sentence of public opinion. Setting aside however these unargumentative attacks, I have really seen nothing in those professedly argumentative, that should demand an answer. I am not singular in discovering, even in this class, much to offend the dispassionate inquirer. What was wanted, was, temperate, and learned, and well-reasoned discussion of the points at issue. Has such appeared ? Of the reverse has there not been abundance ?

At the same time I do not presume to assert, that my publications are without fault. Probably there are faults and mistakes in them. Imperfections there are doubtless. And I am quite ready to take blame to myself, if by an incomplete development of my views, I should have given occasion to any single-minded reader, to misapprehend my meaning and adopt an error. But it does not appear, that any such reader has been misled. On the contrary, I have

the testimony of many to the right impressions, which they have received from a perusal of my Bampton Lectures and other publications. My present assailants certainly have made a great parade of objections. With a minute diligence, they have turned over the leaves, and drawn their line on many a passage and many a word. But with all these painful efforts, they have made out no case against my argument. I see no reason, from what they have alleged, for changing a single opinion, or retracting a single statement. Nor indeed, in that posture of mind in which they applied themselves to the work of criticism, were they likely to discover any real objections. My writings, it is clear, have been searched by them for evidence of principles to which they were themselves previously opposed, and in justification of a course of conduct to which they were already committed. And it seems a superfluous labour to address refutation to constructions and arguings, which derive their being and form from particular minds, and are not based on free and large grounds of inquiry.

Still, as public attention has been so earnestly importuned to my writings, I have thought it advisable to avail myself of the call for another Edition of my Bampton Lectures, to give a general Introduction to the views contained in them. The work itself, being originally intended for a learned audience, may not unreasonably appear difficult to some persons, even if there were no prejudices excited in their minds against it. It seems expedient therefore,—especially as the work will now undoubtedly find its way to a much larger circle,—to prepare the general reader for



entering on the argument, by some preliminary observations.

More particularly, now that much party-colouring has been scattered over it, I feel it but due to my station, and to the cause of Truth,—which I firmly hold to be on the side of that work,—to endeavour to smooth the access to it, and show, that candid readers have no real ground for regarding it with suspicion. I have no expectation, in doing so, that any thing I may say, will reconcile the determined controversialist. Such an expectation would not be warranted by experience. I shall be happy, if, on the whole, but one ray of light shall fall on the cloud of his misconceptions.

I. I would first point out what is the object proposed in the Bampton Lectures. There has been much misrepresentation on this head. The work has been held up as an attempt to explain away Christian Truths—to leave nothing of Christian Doctrine—to reduce the Creed of the Christian to a few historical events, or else to certain abstract general points in which the various opinions of discordant sects may be found to agree—and generally to unsettle the minds of believers as to what is Christian Truth, and what is not. Unfair objection to my line of argument has thus been raised; and persons have been prevented from giving that calm, unprejudiced attention to the subject, which it strictly requires. It is not only true that men condemn what they do not understand; but they are disabled from understanding what they have been taught to condemn.

Let me premise then that the Inquiry pursued in the Bampton Lectures, leaves the *Matter* of Christian Doctrine untouched. It is one thing to inquire into the *Mode* of Statement, supposing the Substance of the Statement to be true; and another thing to inquire into the *Matter* or *Substance* of the Truth stated. A Truth, whether we call it a Fact or a Doctrine, is quite independent of any particular mode of Statement. To take an extreme case: a Fact would be no less a Truth, or rather no less a Reality, though there existed no language in which it could be expressed, or though no one had yet attempted to describe it in language. For example, there are many Truths of Physical Science yet undiscovered, and which no one consequently has ever laid down in words; but which must be regarded as possessing a real existence, no less than those which have been discovered and recorded in scientific phraseology. The theories of modern Astronomy and modern Chemistry were as true in ancient times as they are now, though, as not known, they were never stated. Observation, indeed, of the idioms of different languages will shew this sufficiently. When the Romans called an army *Exercitus*, they gave it a peculiar name founded on the excellence of their discipline, and significant of the importance which they attributed to discipline. But had the Greeks a less real notion of an army, or have we ourselves, because the terms denoting an army both in Greek and English include no similar association? The logician again learns from his science, that there may be several propositions exactly equivalent in meaning, though none of the words are the same. The historian may relate the same fact in entirely different expressions,—expressions drawn from entirely different trains of thought. Suppose it possible for Thucydides and Clarendon to have drawn

the same character ;—though both may have drawn it to the life, under what variety of ideas would the characteristics of the two descriptions have been presented! So too different poets may describe the same substantial realities, whilst the metaphors employed by them are derived from their own peculiarities of observation and thought.

Now if this holds in other subjects, what is to prevent its holding also in Theology? What is there here to identify modes of statement with the Truths themselves; so that to shew the one to be variable, is to shake the foundation of the other? Is it true, or is it not, that there is a Technical system of phraseology, by which Religious Truth is expressed? It cannot be denied that there is. For what else are the terms, Substance, Person, Justification, Election, Regeneration, Conversion, Corruption, &c. but Terms restricted to a peculiar sense in the subject of Theology, and thus constituting part of what is called a Technical System? These Terms indeed are so identified in popular usage with the Religious Truths themselves, that advantage may be easily taken of popular conceptions of the subject, to represent the Statements of those Truths as identical with the Truths. And an ignorant or unfair antagonist, the former not perceiving the difference, the latter designedly confounding it, may thus very readily induce persons to believe, that an inquiry into the origin and nature of Doctrinal Statements, is a disputing of Christian Doctrines in themselves. *Τὸ διορίζειν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν πολλῶν.* But let those who have hitherto been misguided, or who have not yet thought sufficiently of the nature of the difference between Truths themselves and their modes of Statement, now consider temperately, apart from prejudiced views, and passionate appeals to their fears, and controversial acrimony, whether there is not in reality this

difference. And let them know at any rate, that I have had this difference in view throughout, in the theological discussions to which I am referring; these discussions having to do, not with any explanations of the Christian verities or Doctrines, as such,—as they exist,—as they are revealed,—but with the Language and Forms of Expression in which they are conveyed in Theological Systems.

Nor even in regard to the Statements of Christian Truths, have I had any design of explaining them away, or condemning them as wrong or untrue. As for explaining away language that we have solemnly adopted and still retain, I consider such a proceeding as dishonest. And so far from condemning them, I conceive the adoption of them by the Church as fully defensible. I believe that the leaders of the Church did well, and could do no otherwise, at the time when they sanctioned the introduction of our present Theological Language; acting, to the best of their judgment, for the Church, in its capacity of “Keeper of Holy Writ,” and “Judge of Controversy.” I would even go so far as to say that, whilst Theological Terms are essentially mutable, and therefore ought to be altered, should circumstances require it, yet what the ancient rhetorician observes of them is true, as a general rule; *illa mutari vetat Religio et consecratis utendum est*. It is as with our authorized Translation of the Bible. Where there are inveterate pious associations with a peculiar phraseology, a strong case must be shewn for breaking off those venerable links, and offending not unreasonable prejudices. But I would have these Terms, or Statements, rightly appreciated and understood. I would have them freely

examined in their historical character. While I fully admit that they demand to be treated with respect, for their known use in maintaining the Truth, and especially in ages of abstruse metaphysical speculation, I would remove from them an excess of veneration due only to *Divine* Truth itself.

When in a Translation of the Bible, made in Henry VIIIth's reign, it was proposed that several Latin words should be retained, on the ground of their having such peculiar force that it was impossible to represent them in English, the suggestion was not so unreasonable as it may now appear. It was quite right that the minds of men should be gradually prepared for new expressions of religious ideas. But for the same reason, when they are prepared for receiving a different mode of expression, the terms ought to be varied to suit the altered state of the case. It is only carrying on the same principle, when we adapt our Statements of Christian Truth to the particular class of hearers with whom we have to do. We address the educated man, and the rustic, the adult, and the child, each in a different style: yet we do not conceive, that we sacrifice one particle of real Christian Doctrine by such variation of Statement. Our Catechism, for example, is not conceived to differ at all, as to the substance of Christian Truth, from the xxxix Articles, or the Homilies, or the Liturgy, though it differs from them in its mode of imparting the Truth. Indeed, in so general a knowledge as that of Christianity, intended for the instruction of all men, for persons of every possible capacity, and every degree of civilization, and every condition of life, it is an indispensable principle, that its Truths should admit of great variation of Statement, without being impaired as to their vital force. Unless this power of variation were conceded, the Church

could not adequately fulfil its mission of teaching and converting the world.

Without an accurate knowledge of the History of Doctrinal Statements, it is impossible for the members of the Church to confess their Faith in the words which the Church puts into their mouths, with a right and full understanding of the terms. If the history of these Terms were known generally, I am convinced that many who now object to the Statements, for example, of the Athanasian Creed, would find their objections removed, so far as their objections applied to these Statements. They would see the reason,—I do not say of the Truths themselves in any degree the more for this, but—why such or such expressions in particular were used, and not others; and they would, consequently, so far have a more enlightened perception of the nature or meaning of that Creed. By such an examination, some might lose that extravagant awe with which they may have once regarded the very *words* of a Formulary: but they would not cease, on that account, to value such expressions: or, though some might abstractedly prefer a greater simplicity of language, and less of technical precision, they would not lightly relinquish Forms of Statement, which they found to have been piously devised, and to have practically served to the defence of sound Religion.

Further, let the use of such an Inquiry be considered, for those who see no objection to any of our Doctrinal Statements, and who unthinkingly identify them with the truths themselves. There is such a thing as a cant of orthodoxy, as well as a cant of fanaticism and hypocrisy. Persons may repeat certain phrases, with a confidence that they under-

stand and value them, in proportion to their real ignorance of their meaning, and without attaching indeed any distinct meaning to the Terms which they repeat. The emphasis of their assertion of the Theological Truth, is apt to become a snare to them; inducing the delusion, that those cannot but have a firm hold of what they profess, who are so staunch and so correct in making their profession. Their fluency in passing the watchwords of orthodoxy, and their exact enunciation of its symbols, thus react on themselves injuriously. Their religion, unconsciously to them, becomes merely verbal. They take the sign for the thing, the counter for the money.

Now the Technical Terms of Theology are peculiarly open to such an abuse. They are not, like those of Mathematics or Physics, restricted to one particular sense, in which exclusively they must be understood, or else the whole structure of the Science falls to the ground. Nor are they even as definite as moral terms in general, indefinite as these are when compared with those of the exact sciences. It has been acutely remarked, that whilst Technical Terms are “the lights of Science,” they have been in many instances the “shades of Religion;” and that instead of being invariably “signs” of the ideas which they were intended to perpetuate, they sometimes become their “monuments,”—not “signs,” so much as *memorials* of ideas, which did properly belong to them, but have now passed from them.<sup>a</sup> Technical Terms in Religion become in fact the popular terms. For example, no one thinks, when he uses the term, Justification, that he is using a Technical Term. Some may be surprized, or even offended, to hear the term

<sup>a</sup> Foster's Essay “On the Aversion of Men of Taste to Evangelical Religion.”

spoken of as a technical one; so far has Technical Language in Religion passed into common and popular use. Hence the vagueness to which that language is peculiarly subject—a vagueness, which no care of even the most perspicuous and exact writer can entirely obviate. To some that Language will convey no definite meaning. Some will take it in its original sense; others in a secondary one; and different hearers, perhaps each in a different sense; each ascribing to it the various complex notions which have grown around it in his own associations. The very solemnity too attaching to Religious Terms as symbols of Divine Truth, is apt to awaken a feeling of Mysticism, which diverts some from the task of defining and explaining them to themselves. Thus do these Terms become mere sounds, or little more than sounds, to many. And thus has been perpetuated, through successive ages of the Church, that fruitful mother of Controversy,—Logomachy.

It is owing to these circumstances, that the retention of an unvaried phraseology is far from being a certain means of retaining the same Doctrines. “It must indeed be “acknowledged,” as the able Author just referred to observes, “that in many cases innovations of Doctrine “have been introduced partly, by ceasing to employ “the Words which designated the Doctrines which it “was wished to render obsolete; but it is probable, they “may have been still more frequently and successfully “introduced under the advantage of retaining the Terms “while the Principles were gradually subverted.” The cant, accordingly, which may disguise itself under the use of an orthodox phraseology, is an evil strictly to be guarded against by all who would cherish with a due jealousy the sincerity of their faith. It is not of the worldly religionist



that I speak ; it is not of that profession of the Truth, which sounds a trumpet before it that it may have praise of men. This is no delusion to the man himself in whom it is found. It is scarcely a delusion to the world without him. But it is to those who conscientiously hold what they profess, that I address the observation. In laying a stress on the *words* of their religious profession, they must watch, lest they be beguiled of their simplicity,—lest they mistake their advocacy of the truth for attachment to it, and their positiveness of assertion for conviction.

To counteract this evil, no discipline can be more useful, than an accurate study of the peculiar Language of Theology. Thus only can we see the relation in which that Language stands to the Sacred Truth itself, and duly estimate its importance. Reasonings may be well framed, and conclusions accurately drawn, and systems of Theology erected, by the mere use of the Terms of Theology as signs ; just as in Arithmetic calculations are carried on, without referring, at each step, to the particular things represented, and by simply attending, during the process, to the relative value of the numbers.<sup>b</sup> For example, whether it be pounds or pence that we have to deal with, the calculation is the same ;—to avail ourselves of the result, we must bear in mind the things to which it refers. But, whereas calculations, however correct, are simply useless, unless we interpret their results ;—in Theology, our reasonings are worse than useless, if they are nothing but reasonings ; they incur the guilt of perverse disputing, and of an empty form of godliness, unless we look from our conclusions to the sacred objects about which they are conversant, and

<sup>b</sup> Berkeley "On the Principles of Human Knowledge."—Intro. i. 19, and "Minute Philosopher," 7th Dialogue.

see that we really believe and cherish not mere *names*, but *things*.

Our Roman Catholic brethren, indeed, and some even among ourselves, if I understand them rightly, regard the Doctrinal Statements of the Church, as Forms of Doctrine immediately communicated to the Apostles by our Lord and the Holy Spirit, independent of Scripture, and traditionally preserved through the successors of the Apostles. In their view the Church is not simply the keeper of the oracles of God, and dispenser of the Gospel committed to it by Christ, but the keeper of “Dogmas or “Doctrines Deposited with it,” of the “Decrees of Anti-“quity,” of the “Deposits and Trusts of holy Fathers.”<sup>c</sup> St. Paul is interpreted, in charging Timothy to “avoid “profane babblings,”<sup>d</sup> as cautioning the Church against admitting change, not only in doctrines and things, but in sentences and definitions. The Formularies of Doctrine are with them Divine Sayings, the counterpart of the Divine Writings. The Nicene Creed, for example, is a collection of some of these Divine Sayings, possessing its own authority, independently of the Scriptures.<sup>e</sup> To

<sup>c</sup> *Depositorum apud se dogmatum custos.* Vincent. *Lir. Commonit.* c. 32. *Antiquitatis scita—Deposita sanctorum Patrum et commissa,* c. 34. *Scita patrum—Definita majorum,* c. 6.—This is the work constantly referred to by Roman Catholic writers, as decisive of their view of Tradition.

<sup>d</sup> *Τὰς βεβήλους κενοφωνίας,*—according to Vincent, means, *profanas vocum novitates*; *vocum*, id est, *dogmatum, rerum, sententiarum novitates*; quæ sunt vetustati, quæ antiquitati contrariæ—*Common.* c. 33. But where is this in the language of St. Paul? St. Paul explains his meaning by what he elsewhere says of “foolish and unlearned questions,” and of “profane, and “old wives’ fables.”

<sup>e</sup> Such was not the view of Athanasius. Speaking of the term *Homoousion* in that Creed, he says distinctly, the meaning was gathered out of the *Scriptures—ἠναγκάσθησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ αὐθις συναγαγεῖν ἐκ τῶν θείων γραφῶν τὴν διάνοιαν.* *De Dec. Nic. Synod.* 20. p. 226. *Oper. Tom. i. ed. 1698.*

depart, accordingly, at all from the Language of the Formularies, they regard as deviating from Divine Truth itself;—nay even more, than to depart from the express words of Scripture. For the Scripture, it is admitted, may be interpreted so as to give the sense of it in other words, and may have conclusions drawn from it. But the very Language of the Formularies, they hold to be fixed and unalterable.<sup>f</sup> Now, though the position were granted, (which cannot be,) that the Formularies of the Church are Divine Traditions, what is to give them that higher sacredness beyond the Written word, that they should admit no change of phraseology? Why are we not to interpret and explain the Unwritten Word, as freely at least as we do the Written? Why are we to be religiously tied down to the very words of the former, any more than to the very words of the latter? On the condition that we retain the *substance* of each, why are we to be restricted from varying the mode of expression, more in one, than in the other?

But perhaps the advocates of Traditionary Divine Truth will shift their ground, and say, that the formal Statements of Doctrine are traditionary *limits* to the Interpretation of Scripture; divine seals put upon one of the many Interpretations of the Text.

If there were proof of the existence of Divine Traditions, either as independent Divine Truths, or as Divine Interpretations of Scripture, we should be bound to receive them with no less affection and reverence than we do the sacred Canon. This may well be conceded. All the word of God, however given, is to be equally venerated. But there is no proof of the existence of Traditions in either sense. In proof of the point, it is argued, that the Gospel was preached and

<sup>f</sup> Nullam sustineat definitionis varietatem.—Vinc. Lir. *Commonit.*

taught by word of mouth before it was written. But what connexion is there between the admission of this fact, and the conclusion that this primary teaching has been *perpetuated* by Tradition?—It is said again that the Scriptures, being *added*, could not destroy the primary authority of the oral instruction. But it is at least as supposable, that the Scriptures were an appointed *substitute* for the oral teaching of the first inspired ministers, and a *depository* of all *they* thought necessary for Salvation.—Nor, again, is the argument drawn from the supposed reception of a Doctrine from time immemorial in the Church, sufficient to prove it a Divine Tradition. It may be a good reason for believing a current maxim to be a law of Nature, that no one knows the time when it appeared: but to establish a *Doctrine as Divine*, it is essential that we should distinctly know its *origin*.—If such arguments indeed had weighed with our Reformers, they would surely not have accomplished the work to which they were called. It was by discarding Tradition as a Rule of Faith, that this great work was achieved; and by making reason and learning, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the interpreters of the Sacred Text.<sup>§</sup>

Now if the question were about the Fundamentals of Religion, or what I call the Substantial Truths themselves, I should be quite ready to grant that,—though these are not

<sup>§</sup> See Bishop Marsh's *Comparative View of the Churches of England and Rome*, c. vii. p. 152. I would strongly recommend a study of this work as a protection against the fallacies on the subject of Tradition.—The student should read also Bishop Taylor's *Dissuasive from Popery*, especially sections 1, 2, and 3 of the 1st Book of the 2d Part, and Stillingfleet's *Rational Account of the Protestant Religion*, especially Part I. c. 6, *Of the Infallibility of Tradition*, p. 161, ed. 1665.—For a full information, Bp. Marsh sends us to Bellarmine. Bellarmine's Four Books *De Verbo Dei Scripto et non Scripto*, give a most succinct and luminous view of the subject.

Traditions, but Scripture-verities, resting exclusively on the authority of Scripture,—there is yet the evidence of a constant Tradition attesting and confirming them, an evidence, that from the outset of Christianity they have been ever held and taught.

Take, for example, the doctrine of the Divinity of our Lord; and look to St. John's Gospel alone. A general belief in this truth is presupposed by this Evangelist throughout. He takes no pains to prove it, as he would have done, had it been generally doubted or unknown. The manner in which he proclaims the Word to be God and the Maker of all things, shews that he is only authoritatively declaring a *known* truth. What he labours to prove, (not that this either was doubted by the Faithful, but it had been expressly denied by Heretical teachers,) is, that the Lord of Heaven and Earth was really made flesh, and dwelt among us, and really died as man.<sup>h</sup> So too, the existence of a belief in the distinctness of our Saviour's Person is intimated by St. John, when he says, that "the Word was with God, and was God." For he speaks of the Word there, as of One *known* to be distinct from the Father, and teaches, that, notwithstanding this distinctness, the Word is not separate from God in Being and Divinity.

Of the substantial Christian Truths then, there may, doubtless, be shewn an uniform Tradition accompanying Scripture, having reference to Scripture, understood by Scripture, and proving itself by Scripture, through all ages of the Christian Church.

But this indisputable fact must not be confounded with the assumption of the sameness of Doctrinal Statements in all ages. These, it is equally clear, have not been the same

<sup>h</sup> See Irenæus, *Contra Hær.* l. 3, c. 11, tom. 1, p. 188, ed. Ven.

always. The testimony of Tradition is as strong against this sameness, as it is for the sameness of the Truths themselves of Christianity. If we look to the latter, we may justly speak of the later Creeds as the Apostles' Creed, no less than the one which commonly passes by that name. If we look to the former,—the modes of statement,—it is plain, that the successive Creeds differ from each other: and these differences of Statement are not merely the manhood, and ripening of the doctrines according to the analogy of Vincent,<sup>i</sup> but new forms given to them by discussion,—new definitions of them,—new limitations added,—extraneous matter superinduced, in order to guard and preserve them, as they travelled on, amidst disputes and contradictions, in their proper integrity and sameness.

Some, however, carry their theory of the sameness of the Statements of the Truth still further. According to some, there has been no difference even in this respect: they solve the appearance of difference by appeal to the Secret Discipline of the Church. Following Clement of Alexandria, whose writings are strongly tinctured<sup>n</sup> with his philosophic creed, they regard books as vulgar and imperfect vehicles of Truth. Truth, according to them, is treasured up far more sacredly in the bosom of the sage or the priest, and far more safely dispensed by oral communication.<sup>k</sup> They suppose the full doctrines of

<sup>i</sup> Crescat igitur oportet, et multum vehementerque proficiat, . . . . sed in suo duntaxat genere, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia. *Common.* c. 28. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum, &c. *Ibid.* c. 29, 30. Speaking of the hackneyed maxim of Vincent, “quod ubique,” &c., Stillingfleet very justly observes, he must “premise that rule to be much more useful in discovering what was not looked on as a necessary article of faith, than what was.”—*Rational Acc.* part i. c. 2, p. 56. 1665.

<sup>k</sup> See his *Stromata*, at the opening of the 1st Book and elsewhere.

Christianity to have been divinely imparted to the first teachers, as so many *ἀπορρήτα*, so many mysterious sayings of our Lord and His Apostles, confided to their solemn keeping, to be wrapped and laid up with them, to be cautiously disclosed only to the initiated and the proficient, but reserved under the seal of silence from the profane and the ignorant. These holier Truths, thus designedly left unwritten and concealed, they further suppose to have been gradually extorted from the living oracles in which they were enshrined, and divulged to the world, by the demands of controversy. They would make the Christian mysteries, mysteries of man's keeping, not of God's;—as if man's proclaiming a mystery of Religion could be a divulging of it;—as if any human curiosity could draw it forth;—as if a Christian mystery, though its sound were gone out into all lands, did not remain as secret and holy as ever;—as if it were not the Church's glory freely to publish the Gospel to every creature, whilst it leaves to God alone the “glory of concealing!”

According to this theory, however, the sameness even of the *Statements* of doctrines may be maintained: since the later forms are then only the original ones brought out to view. They had existed before in the Church secretly; but are now known at large, so far at least as writing can convey them to the world, and compensate for the primitive, more spiritual, oral instruction. Nor is it strange therefore that the maintainers of this theory should object to a discussion of the Language of Theology. For they have invested that Language with a mystic sanctity, as the voice itself of the Apostles; and to unfold the meaning of the Terms, is with them to uncover and look into the Ark of the Lord. It remains for them, however, to shew that their theory has

any foundation, or is any thing more than a speculation raised on the analogy of the twofold method of teaching of the heathen Schools.

I have not space here to enter largely into the question of Tradition. But as the whole subject appears connected with my inquiry into Doctrinal Statements, and is but little understood generally, it may be useful to add some observations on the subject.

Tradition was not contradistinguished from Scripture in the primitive times, either as a Rule of Faith, or as a Guide to Sacred Truth. The Fathers of the first centuries found that they could not argue with the Heretics of their day from Scripture; because those Heretics either corrupted the Scripture; or objected to it as corrupted; or denied the authority of certain portions of it; or claimed the right of interpreting it according to their own views; or set up their own teachers as a paramount authority. An appeal to Scripture evidently presupposes an agreement in the Canon of Scripture, in the Divine Authority of Scripture, and also in certain Principles of Interpretation. But this appeal was cut off from the Primitive Fathers by the peculiar condition of Heresy in their day. They were obliged therefore further to appeal to the Authority existing in the Churches of the Faithful. And that Authority was to be put forward by them in its proper strength, as originally derived from Christ, and transmitted by an unbroken succession of Pastors. The Heretic might say; We too have the authority of Christ. The reply to this on the part of the Fathers was: Shew us your Succession; prove to us, that you have regularly inherited the Doctrine of Christ: we can prove that we have so received it by a perpetual Succession. As



you cannot shew this, you cannot pretend to the possession of the Truth. Thus it is that Irenæus maintains the cause of orthodoxy against the Gnostics.<sup>1</sup> Thus also Tertullian, following his example, advises those who contend with Heretics, not to appeal to the Scriptures, but to the constant Tradition of the Catholic Church. He recommends the latter mode of argument, as cogent against those with whom the Catholics had then to dispute. But he by no means considers Tradition as a channel of Truth, distinct from, and supplementary to, Scripture. He is express, no less than Irenæus, in referring to Scripture, in the very same Tract in which he thus recommends the use of the argument from Tradition,<sup>m</sup> and there also insists upon the Authority of Scripture as the proper source of Divine Truth. He will not allow to Heretics even the right of appealing to Scripture, because the Scriptures, he says, were not theirs, but the property of the Catholics, to whom they had been bequeathed. The Heretics, not having the Tradition of Doctrine by a perpetual Succession of Christian teachers, not having, that is, Doctrine *handed down* to them, were not in rightful possession of Scripture, and were not therefore to be argued with on the ground of Scripture. They were to be met with the preliminary objection, that they did not *possess* the genuine sources of Divine Truth. He does not say that the Heretics had not the key to Scripture, the traditional interpretations of Scripture; but they had not the proper Authorities in their hands to refer to.

The argument from the Constant Succession of teachers came home to the Heretics, for this very reason, that they held a Secret Traditionary Doctrine. For they actually cited

<sup>1</sup> Contra Hær. l. iii. cc. 1—5, p. 174.

<sup>m</sup> De Præscript. Hæreticor.

those passages of St. Paul, "keep the deposit," &c. in proof of the existence of such Secret Traditionary Doctrine. Tertullian refutes this notion. But it was a decisive refutation to those who held it, to prove to them, that, if such Traditions existed anywhere, it could only be in the Catholic Churches, where the Succession had been unbroken, and to challenge its maintainers to show the like Succession in their case. If there were no regular Succession, the supposed Secret Tradition could not have been preserved.—The argument would further be very natural and proper in times near the Apostolic. When the memory of the Apostles was fresh, it would serve as a ready test of Doctrine. At such a time too copies of the Scriptures were scarce; and the appeal to them could not be always satisfied by actual reference.—Now in the Catholic Church, this circumstance of uninterrupted Succession will be found to hold good, because every thing will be found in harmony with a true case. But the Truth, it should be observed, does not rest on it, unless, like the early Heretics, we hold a Secret Traditionary Doctrine distinct from Scripture. For the maintenance of such a system of Doctrine, the Perpetual Succession becomes indispensable. It is so accordingly to the Roman Catholic. But it is not so to the Protestant who grounds his doctrine on Scripture exclusively. The Church of England Protestant, looking to Scripture for every thing that he believes divinely revealed, does not hold lightly the claims of his Church to a lineal inheritance of the Truth, bequeathed to the Church by Christ and his Apostles. He would not be without that inheritance. But he does not exalt what is an accompaniment, and evidence of sound doctrine, and means of instruction in it, into a Standard of Doctrine, or Divine Guide to Truth. He does not pervert what, in its original use, was an argu-

ment and test adapted for a peculiar case, into a *general* argument and basis of Christian Truth for all ages and all cases. He does not exalt what is an authentic and valuable *Testimony*; into an *Authority* (in the modern sense of that term,) or Rule and Criterion of Doctrine.

So far respecting the general design of my Bampton Lectures. Agreeably to what I have here said, I have in that Work described my business there, as an Inquiry into the nature of Theological Terms. And as the Philosophy of the Schools of the Middle Ages, or the Scholastic Philosophy, as it is called, presented copious and fresh materials for tracing the history of the Statements of Doctrine, I selected that particularly as the field of my observation. Not that I confined my observation strictly to the authors properly denominated Scholastic; but I took their writings, as the crisis of a method of philosophizing antecedent to themselves; as displaying at its maturity a mode of thinking and reasoning, which had exerted a very considerable influence in the formation of our Theological Language. For we may speak of Scholasticism before the proper age of the Schoolmen, as we may speak of Manicheism before the Manicheans, and of Calvinism before Calvin.<sup>n</sup>

If any doubt the importance of this branch of Theological study, I would refer them to the testimony of Archbishop Bramhall on the subject.

Referring to Baxter, he says: "If his meaning only be, that he would not have our Catechisms or accommodations to be pestered and perplexed with the obscure terms and endless disputations of the Schools, I do readily assent.

<sup>n</sup> Scholasticism, it should be observed, is in itself no term of reproach. Nor do I employ it as such.

“ But if he think that in the work of reconciliation there is  
 “ no need of a Scholastic plane, to take away the crabbed  
 “ knots, and to smooth the present controversies of the  
 “ Christian world, I must dissent from him. We find by  
 “ daily experience, that the greatest differences, and such  
 “ as made the most noise and the deepest breach in the  
 “ Christian world, being rightly and scholastically stated,  
 “ do both become easy and intelligible, and now appear to  
 “ have been mere mistakes one of another. And when  
 “ many other questions are rightly handled after the same  
 “ manner, I presume they will find the like end. When I  
 “ was a young student in Theology, Dr. Ward declared his  
 “ mind to me, to this purpose, that it was impossible that  
 “ the present controversies of the Church should be rightly  
 “ determined or reconciled, without a deep insight into the  
 “ doctrine of the primitive Fathers, and a competent skill  
 “ in School Theology. The former affordeth us a right  
 “ pattern, and the second smootheth it over, and planeth  
 “ away the knots.”<sup>o</sup>

Supported by such authority, I may well recommend all who would thoroughly acquaint themselves with inquiries belonging to their Religion, to join to a “ deep insight into  
 “ the doctrine of the primitive Fathers,” “ a competent skill  
 “ in School Theology.” That a large proportion of even students in Theology are not versed in these studies, is but too evident. But I trust this reproach will not fall on the generation of students yet to come. And if my work on the subject shall happily contribute at all to remove the prevailing ignorance, and invite attention to a class of writings too much forgotten, and unjustly despised, I shall

<sup>o</sup> Vindic. of Grotius, p. 636.—Bramhall's Works, fol. 1676.

feel abundantly compensated for all the trouble and annoyance which it has occasioned me.<sup>p</sup>

II. In pursuing my inquiry, I have been led to speak of the Truths of Religion as *Facts*. To persons who have thoroughly entered into the spirit of the Inductive Philosophy, it would be unnecessary to explain what I mean by this term. Such persons would know, that this term is not to be restricted to mere events or occurrences, or what may be called historical or singular facts, but denotes, as I have elsewhere said, *WHATEVER IS*,<sup>q</sup>—Universal, as well as Particular, Truths, whether founded on experience, or on the Authority of Divine Revelation; and that it is opposed to Theory or Hypothesis. Thus the Divinity of our Lord is a fact: His Consubstantiality with the Father and the Holy Spirit, His Atonement, His Mediation, His distinct Personality, His perpetual presence with His Church, His future Advent to judge the world, the Communion of Saints, the Corruption of our Nature, the Efficacy of Divine Grace, the Acceptableness of Works wrought through Faith, the Necessity of Repentance,—though stated in abstract terms, are all Facts in God's spiritual kingdom revealed to us through Christ. So I might proceed to enumerate, one after the other, all the Christian verities. But these instances may show, that it is not merely such Truths as our Lord's Birth, and Crucifixion, and Resurrection, and Ascension, and the

<sup>p</sup> The reader may be directed, in order to a more systematic view of the Subject, to the Article on Aristotle's Philosophy in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 7th edition; and the Article on Thomas Aquinas, and the Scholastic Philosophy, in the *Encyclopædia Metropolitana*.

<sup>q</sup> Inaugural Lecture.—*Note*.

Miracles which He wrought, and the Descent of the Holy Ghost, or the Call of Abraham, and the Thunders of Sinai, and the Dedication of the Temple, that come under the appellation of Facts, in the philosophical sense of that term.

These last indeed are Facts in a sense in which *all* the Christian Truths cannot be said to be. They are Events; and are accordingly Facts in the popular, as well as the philosophical, sense of the term. They form an historical basis to the other Truths joined with them in the Christian scheme; not only being important in themselves, but also serving as occasions for the development by the pen of Inspiration, of Truths beside and beyond themselves. This relation between the two classes of Christian Truths is the foundation of my observation, that the Truths declared in Scripture are to be understood in their reference to the doings of God in the world. Nothing was further from my thoughts than to say that Christianity is made up wholly of mere Events, and has no doctrinal Truths in it. I have wished only to point out strongly a great characteristic of our Religion, by which it is distinguished from all other religions professing to have their sacred books. Our revelations, we may say, were not the literary work of some sage or legislator, or put forth as a mere writing or collection of writings: but they are a series of historical revelations given at different times, and in different manners, and by different messengers; each for its special purpose, in connexion with what was then passing in the world; and yet all having reference to one great Evangelical purpose. Not so, for example, the Korân. Here is the work of one man, dealt forth to the world by himself as so many divine communications to him, and having no connexion in its parts with the history of the world. This connexion of the Doctrinal Truth of Christianity

with the Historical may be thus illustrated. Let us take the doctrine of the Eucharist. The *revelation* of this is founded on an actual occurrence in the lives of our Saviour and his Apostles, and on a religious observance of the Jews. Christ actually goes up to Jerusalem with his disciples to keep the passover of the Jews. He appoints a particular room, and there celebrates the Last Supper; actually distributing the bread and wine to his disciples, and imparting to them as he did so, a knowledge of the spiritual participation of Himself in that holy institution. It is also further related to that real oblation of Himself on the Cross, which was soon to follow. Such a series of events accordingly I call a basis on which the revelation of the mystery is founded, as being the occasions or circumstances out of which it takes its rise, and to which it refers. These occasions, or circumstances, give an historical, as well as doctrinal, reality to all the truths connected with the institution. And though the words, *This is my Body—This is my Blood*—are express affirmations of the mystery,—their force and propriety are discerned, not by simply viewing them as affirmations standing alone, but in connexion with those events by which they were accompanied.—Take again another example in the words of St. John, *God is Love*. It is evident that the sacred meaning of this proposition also does not consist in the proposition taken alone, but in tracing it to that actual event in the sacred history, to which it refers,—God's giving *his only begotten Son, to the end that all that believe in Him should not perish but have everlasting life*. For what else is that *true saying and worthy of all men to be received*;—and what else is the ground of its truth and worthiness to be received;—but, “*that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners,*” —actually was made flesh,

and really offered Himself for sinful man? We might well have believed the same, had it been solely the assertion of the inspired writer. But that assertion is borne out and explained, and invested with a dramatic energy, by the real events to which it refers. Thus it may be truly said, that the Truths of Scripture are not mere sayings or propositions, such as might be stated in a book totally unconnected with History, but are further connected with the real doings of God in the world.

Still the other Truths, the Universal Facts as we may contradistinguish them, have no less reality than the historical. They as truly exist,—are as much a part of the Divine economy in the salvation of man,—as those which have been enacted on the stage of the world. Let there be but the evidence that God has spoken it, and the thing said is as real as if it had been the object of our experience. Christ's Intercession with the Father, for example, though it is going on at this moment, and will go on until the consummation of all things, is a certain fact. We see not its beginning, or its end, or its process. But God's word has declared that it is so. And this is enough. We may call it therefore, in the strictest sense, a revealed fact.

Again, that "God worketh in us both to will and "to do of his good pleasure," or, that we have no power of ourselves to do any good thing without his Preventing and Cooperating Grace; this is a Revealed Fact—a Truth of God's invisible kingdom, ever in course of accomplishment, ever being realized. That our Lord is both Perfect God and Perfect Man, in One Person, or as it is technically expressed, the Doctrine of the Hypostatic Union, is in like manner a Fact of the Gospel. Here the Truth takes the form of an individual historical event.



Still it is also an Universal Fact, being a Truth which is still in operation and will continue for ever, and which would exist, though every human mind by which it is apprehended, were to vanish from the world.—That the two Sacraments have a vital efficacy,—Baptism, to regenerate us, and graft us into the body of Christ's Church,—The Lord's Supper, to strengthen and refresh the soul by the faithful reception of the Body and Blood of Christ,—this is a further illustration of *Facts* of the invisible kingdom of grace—and Universal Facts, because they are of constant existence, whenever the Sacraments are duly administered and received.

Lastly, in the doctrines of a Resurrection of the Dead and a Final Judgment, we enunciate truths belonging to the same invisible kingdom; and which are therefore entitled to the name of Facts, in the philosophical sense of that term, though as yet they have not been accomplished. They belong to His knowledge, who calls the things that are not as though they were; and accordingly, being communicated to us by His word, possess a reality, no less than those facts of Divine Providence, which, having already occurred, are only *known* to have occurred by Revelation. For by Revelation clearly, we may have as full assurance of what has not been yet but is still to come, as of what has been and is *otherwise* unknown to us. The prophecies and histories of the Sacred Volume are equally certain, when viewed as portions of a Divine revelation. Both are admitted to be true on the same grounds.

There is so little understanding except among persons who have devoted themselves to scientific pursuits, of the Method of the Inductive Philosophy, that it is not perhaps

to be wondered at, that some have erred so strangely in their estimate of my application to Religious Truths of a term drawn from that philosophy. So much misconception is there on the subject, that it may even estrange some still more from a just view of the point I am now endeavouring to establish, to be told that I have employed a term of Philosophy. Some, I fear, have taken up the notion that whatever belongs to Philosophy has nothing to do with Religion. Or they have been taught that to speak as a philosopher, is to be something very impious and very odious—nothing short of being a rationalist. Or they construe St. Paul's denunciation of the philosophy and vain deceit of his days, into a censure of every connexion of Philosophy with Religion. It may be useful therefore, briefly to explain, in reference to my present design, the great principle of the modern Inductive Philosophy,—the principle of resting on ascertained Fact as the only proper ground of knowledge,—obvious as what I shall say will be to many persons, and inadequately stated as it will appear to those who have deeply studied the subject.

Before the time of Lord Bacon, philosophers contented themselves with reasoning from abstract notions and logical definitions. They did not feel the necessity of examining the notions from which they reasoned, whether these were rightly drawn from things, or accurately determined. They took them in the gross. They were not indeed ignorant of the value of inductive reasoning. We have some beautiful specimens of such reasoning in the Dialogues of Plato. Such reasonings however as are found in the discussions of the Ancient Schools, do not reach the depth of Bacon's Inductive method.

If *Motion*, for example, was to be investigated, they did not feel the necessity of searching out the principle itself so named, but they assumed the general notion conveyed by the term, as sufficiently correct; and then considered how they might best express that notion in a definition, and divide it into its several kinds. Thus, the Greek philosophers found that there were three kinds of phenomena which their word *Κίνησις* expressed,—1. Locomotion, 2. Increase and Diminution, 3. Change of qualities, as in a vegetable by decay;—and they accordingly called these so many kinds of Motion. This was doing nothing more, however, than stating in how many senses the term motion was employed. It gave no knowledge of the thing. It was merely logical enumeration. Evidently, no physical discovery could be made so long as Science was made to rest on such a basis.

Again it was enough with them that instances or particulars were collected; whilst the necessary process of investigating each instance separately by itself, was overlooked. The most vague notions consequently being involved in each instance, it followed, that while the particular instances established a general conclusion, that conclusion was little else than verbal. Thus, according to the example given by Bacon himself, the word *Humid* stands for operations of the most inconsistent kind. It signifies, as he observes, “ what  
 “ easily diffuses itself round another body; also what is in  
 “ itself indeterminable and admits no consistency; also what  
 “ easily yields on all sides; also what easily divides and dis-  
 “ perses itself; also what easily unites and collects itself; also  
 “ what easily flows and is put in motion; also what easily ad-  
 “ heres to another body, and moistens it; also what is easily  
 “ reduced to a liquid, or melted when it was before a con-  
 “ sistency.” “ Thus,” as he adds, “ if you take the term

“ in one sense, flame is humid ; if you take it in another, “ air is not humid : if in another, minute dust is humid : if “ in another, glass is humid.”<sup>r</sup> From which he concludes, it is quite apparent, the notion of *humid* is abstracted from water only, and common fluids, without due verification. Such then was the manner in which the ancient Schools used abstract terms. It may be seen from such an example, how delusive their conclusions must have been, when instances were so roughly and hastily brought together.

A Philosophy of this kind resulted, as is clear, in a Philosophy of Language only, or, in other words, a Logical Philosophy. It sufficed to develop and explain the notions contained in terms and propositions; but it did not penetrate within the veil of nature. It was of admirable use for forming classifications and systems, and cementing together the parts of a Science; but it left the basis of Science purely notional and hypothetical.

How different was the proceeding of Newton, after the modern Inductive method, in reaching his Theory of Gravity. He commenced with an accurate examination of phenomena, analysing these and reducing them to their simplest elements, and so arriving at the laws of motion; bringing an exact mathematical science to his aid in determining them. To him it is of no consequence to what different processes the term Motion is applied. He looks to the thing, and goes to the foundation to discover what notions *ought* to be held on the subject, not assuming what *are* held, as the ancients did. This then was to establish a philosophy of *Fact* in contradistinction to a philosophy of *Theory*, or an *Inductive* system instead of a *Deductive* one,

<sup>r</sup> Nov. Org. Aph. 60.

and one that, instead of commencing with Definitions, results in them.

Now some persons will say, this may be a very sound method in Investigations of Nature; but what has it to do with Theological Inquiry? I answer, that making allowance for the different circumstances, the same rule of proceeding applies both to Theology and Science. We do not indeed find out by dint of mere study, the great Truths of Divine Revelation. Together with the Bible they have been given us in hand. But this can make no difference as to the character of the Truths. These are facts or realities in opposition to mere theories or definitions or hypotheses, no less because they have been distinctly pointed out to us by the finger of God, than if we had originally discovered them, or could discover them, by the ordinary steps of investigation. No one surely will maintain that because Religious Truth has been set forth *in words*, we may therefore argue from those words as exact definitions of it. If the Bible furnished scientific descriptions of things, instead of its employing, as it does, popular language, there might be some ground for such a supposition. But, even in such a case, there would be no just ground for building up a Speculative System of Theology on its words: and for this obvious reason, that about things Divine we can know nothing, beyond what God has been pleased to reveal to us. The Speculative System so raised, would be a knowledge of our own discovery, and would be going beyond the word written. But so far as the investigation of what has been revealed by God, is concerned, we must employ the same Method as in Philosophy. If we would learn what the Holy Spirit would have us learn from the Bible;—if we would test, what we have received as

divine Truth, by the Bible;—we must study the Sacred Records as we study Nature. The method of Induction is to be used here, as there. Observations are to be classed. Irrelevant matter is to be excluded. We are to proceed step by step, in rising to the truth as it is written, and in examining the Scriptures whether the things be as we have been taught. This, however, is a very different process from taking a proposition, and anatomizing it, and arguing that such or such must be a revealed truth, because it is logically deducible from that proposition. Conclusions, so obtained, depend on our definitions of terms, or the sense which we choose to give them; and are therefore only hypothetically true, in the same manner as mathematical theorems. But if we follow the method of Induction, and confine ourselves to Facts, excluding all hypotheses, we shall arrive at absolute Truth,—Truth not dependent on Phraseology. By this method, the doctrines obtained from St. John's Gospel or any other book of the Bible, would have equally resulted, had the inspired writer employed an entirely different mode of expression. For thus, the Truth is not regarded as essentially vested in the mere *logical* connexion of Terms; but Texts are compared with each other, and referred to the spirit and meaning of the particular book in which they occur, as well as of the Bible at large, and connected with the whole scheme of Divine Providence and Grace.

Thus may modest and sober reasoning be employed in the work of interpreting Scripture; and there can be no objection to Conclusions of this kind. In thus reasoning on Scripture, we do only what God has laid upon us to do in giving us His word. God has put His word, like His works, before men. Both are open to misconstruction

and misapplication. Ignorance and folly and ingenuity are permitted to raise their systems out of each. And these systems for a while prevail more or less. Some live their centuries, others their years or their days. But they have their allotted period; and sound Philosophy and sound Theology are sure to triumph in the end.

Hence it appears what sort of Improvements may be made in the subject of Religion. The great truths of the Gospel—what by our old divines are called the Fundamentals of Religion—were undoubtedly known and proclaimed at the earliest preaching of the Gospel. The Scriptures must then have been rightly expounded, in their bearings on man's Salvation, when Apostles and Apostolic men expounded them. Improvements in this subject therefore cannot be new truths gained as in the Physical Sciences. There cannot now, or at any future period, be brought to light, for the first time, Truths necessary for Salvation, unheard or untaught before. Improvements, if there be any, must in effect be restitutions of the Original Truths, revivals of the most ancient belief and practice, returns to the simplicity of the first Fathers of our Faith. In the lapse of time even the great saving Truths of the Gospel may be partially obscured,—may be corrupted by additions or diminutions,—may be disfigured by the language in which they are exhibited. What is obscure therefore may be cleared up; corruptions may be removed; imperfect statements may be corrected; the object being kept in view throughout, of maintaining and teaching no other Faith than that once delivered to the Saints.

It is in this spirit, as I conceive, that Bishop Butler speaks of Truths yet remaining to be *discovered* in the volume of Revelation.

“As it is owned,” he says, “the whole scheme of Scripture is not yet understood; so, if it ever comes to be understood, before the restitution of all things, and without miraculous interpositions, it must be in the same way as natural knowledge is come at: by the continuance and progress of learning and liberty; and by particular persons attending to, comparing, and pursuing, intimations scattered up and down it, which are overlooked and disregarded by the generality of the world. For this is the way in which all improvements are made; by thoughtful men’s tracing on obscure hints, as it were, dropped us by nature accidentally, or which seem to come into our minds by chance. Nor is it at all incredible, that a book, which has been so long in the possession of mankind, should contain many Truths as yet undiscovered.”<sup>a</sup>

Now, whether with Butler, we apply the term *Discovery*, or not, to the results of an increased acquaintance with the sacred volume, it is evident that by an improvement in the Interpretation and Exposition of the Bible much may be effected. We may clear up what has been obscured,—draw forth what has been little, or not at all, noticed,—state more simply or more fully what has been perplexedly or imperfectly taught,—confirm by fresh evidence what is already believed,—on the whole, give more comprehensive views of the scheme of salvation. Thus, though there can be no improvement in Doctrine, as Doctrine stands for Truths Taught, there may be improvement in the Exposition of Doctrine. As there is an art of Grammar or Rhetoric, besides the discovery by observation of the principles of those Sciences;

<sup>a</sup> Butler’s Analogy, p. 2, c. 3. See the same point simply and beautifully touched by Irenæus, Con. Hær. l. 2, c. 28, p. 156.



so there is also a method of teaching out of Scripture, after we have ascertained its sense. Various modes may be adopted of arranging and stating the truths known; as shall appear best for the conveyance of them to the minds of men,—most suitable to each occasion and to the capacities and condition of those who are to be taught. At one time, a Scholastic method, and Scholastic phraseology, would be properly employed, as most intelligible and satisfactory to educated and thinking people of the time. By these means, False Doctrine would then be most effectively denied, and True Doctrine asserted. But if the Church were now called upon anew to assert the same truths, or reprobate the same errors, it might not use exactly the same words, or the same method,—some of the words having become obsolete, or their meaning being changed, and the method itself being superseded;—but would adapt its language to the habits of thinking and modes of speaking prevalent in the age. To assert the possibility of such an improvement, is by no means to confound divine and human knowledge. It is merely to say, that the *same revealed* knowledge which man has at one time communicated to man in one way, he may at another time communicate better in another way. It is not Neology that is here advocated, but the true Christian Archæology, if I may so express myself; the maintenance of the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles unchanged, under the vicissitudes of human institutions and character and language.<sup>†</sup>

Whenever indeed I reflect on the imputation of Rationalism, or Rationalizing tendency, so boldly thrown out against my writings, I am astonished at the criticism

<sup>†</sup> So speaks Eusebius : Τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας τῶν τῆς ἡμετέρας διδασκαλίας δογμάτων. *Eccl. Hist.* 1. 2. Proem.

which has embarked its zeal and its fortunes on such a plank. The invidiousness of the charge, the timid credulity with which it would be received by others jealous of any suspicion of their own orthodoxy, on the authority of persons professing to announce it after painful thought, and at the sacrifice of personal feeling, might have suggested the discretion of forbearing it except on the broadest ground of evidence. If there is any thing to which my writings have been uniformly opposed, it is Rationalism. I have no leaning whatever towards such a mode of speculation; nor have *I ever* had; from the first giving of my mind to these studies, having been put on my guard against it, by a familiarity with Butler's Analogy,—a work, the spirit of which I have endeavoured to exemplify, to the utmost of my power, in all that I have written.<sup>u</sup> When indeed I expressly condemn speculative deductions from Scripture language, I condemn Rationalism, whatever form it may assume,—whether it seek to explain away Divine Truth, or to support that Truth by ingenious and subtile argumentation. I have not, I confess, tried to escape from Rationalism by running into Mysticism. But let not any fancy that they do avoid Rationalism by such a resource: for Mysticism itself is but an insane Rationalism.

III. Such Facts again as I call the substance of Revelation, are not the mere residuum obtained after all that is mysterious has been evaporated. This notion is a great misconception of my meaning,—a misconception injurious at once to the religious and the philosophical character of my views.

<sup>u</sup> After all the clamour that has been raised, it will not be thought irrelevant egotism, to mention, that I have the happiness of knowing that, as a Public Examiner in the University, I was mainly instrumental in introducing the works of Bishop Butler into the course of reading for Academical Honours.

Philosophy searches out and holds the truth in all its length and breadth, however strange and mysterious the result may be. So does Theology. It does not attenuate or simplify according to the vulgar conception of simplification; *i. e.* such as reduces the expression of the Truth to the fewest elements. It labours to leave nothing unrecorded which God has said; and therefore terminates in a far more complex apparatus of Divine Truth, than the speculatist would leave by his systematic arrangements. I have said elsewhere\* that it is not the part of the Christian Theologian to reduce to conformity the different Truths of Revelation—that he must receive them all as they stand—that he falls short of the Truth, if he seeks to assimilate it to the mere facts of experience, forgetting the mysterious nature of that system of things about which Revelation is conversant. If some then can only understand by Facts, generalizations of Scripture truth,—reductions of it to the standard of human experience,—resolutions of it into analogies,—translations of it into the perceptions of our own minds,—I would take this opportunity of warning the public, that it is the misunderstanding of such persons, not mine. I believe and teach that the Scripture Verities are, in their full extent, Realities; *i. e.* that they are conversant about objects having an existence independent of our own minds or of any views that we may take of them; and that, so far from their Mysteriousness being any objection to them, it is a necessary evidence of their Truth.—Religion has its appropriate thoughts and feelings and actions, on the one hand, and the objects of those thoughts, feelings, and actions, on the other. The former have their reality in the Christian man; and without them he has no religion, however correctly he may profess

\* Phil. Evidence, p. 291.

his belief of the existence of the objects of his Faith. The latter have their reality *external* to man, and would be no less what they are, though they had remained for ever unrevealed: as there may be many other Truths belonging to the Gospel scheme, which only higher orders of beings are permitted to know, and which probably they know for their peculiar exercise and improvement. We should be careful, not to confound the two departments of Religion, and to apply what is said on one head, as bearing on the other, or excluding the other. A theologian may insist on the importance of rightly believing and receiving the sacred truth, without intending for one moment to say, that right thoughts or feelings about it constitute its *whole* importance.—Should we not, for example, do injustice to the framers of the Athanasian Creed, if we were to suppose because it says—“ He therefore that will be saved, *must thus think of the Trinity,*”—that it resolves the whole importance of the Doctrine into right thinking about it, or mere subjective truth?—And so, on the other hand, a theologian may prove the reality of the sacred truth, without adverting to its practical reception in the heart and understanding of the believer.

IV. It is in the sense explained above, that I have maintained that no deductions or consequences drawn from Scripture Language are to be received as matter of Divine Revelation. I have not, it should be observed, contended that no deductions whatever from Scripture Truth are to be received, but that speculative deductions or consequences from the language of Scripture, are not to be held as necessary parts of Divine Revelation.

Nor have I contended, that such deductions may not be held as matter of probable truth, or with a pious reserve for the imbecility and shortsightedness of the human faculties. But I have argued that such deductions—*i. e.* consequences drawn from the theories or notions involved, or supposed to be involved, in Scriptural expressions—cannot be imposed as matter of Divine Revelation.

I have not asserted, I wish it to be further observed, that nothing can be *proved* out of Scripture; but that, because a point may be urged as a consequence of something else which is proved out of Scripture, that point is not *therefore* to be received as a certain truth of Scripture. Let any one state to himself this proposition—Whatever is Divine Truth is proved by Scripture—and then ask himself, whether the converse follows logically—that Whatever is proved by Scripture is Divine Truth. Proving by Scripture may be done in so many ways, that he must be a bold person who would admit the principle that whatever claims to be so proved is true. First, what is proof to one man may not be so to another: one may think certain texts insufficient, with which another is fully satisfied; and one man may admit one kind of proof to be just, whilst another denies the validity of it. If I affirmed that we must have *express* words of Scripture for every thing that we allege as Scripture Truth, this might be denying all use of reasoning in application to the Bible. But I say rather with Bramhall: “I have never observed any thing more repugnant to the true sense of Scripture than some things which have been expressed altogether in the phrase of Scripture.”<sup>y</sup> Clearly, it is very possible for an ingenious person to string together a number of Scriptural expressions as the declara-

<sup>y</sup> Vind. of Grotius, p. 637.

tions of a Doctrine, which, on the whole, will not give a Scriptural view of that doctrine. Let me once for all then inform the candid reader, that I hold the use both of deductive and inductive reasonings in making out and expounding the *meaning*—the religious meaning, of course, not the mere grammatical one—of the Bible, as legitimate and necessary. And let him not be misled by those who will not, or cannot, appreciate the difference between thus establishing the revealed truths of Scripture, and deducing speculative doctrines *beyond* the Scripture. I insist on Scripture truth as distinct from Human truth,—the doctrines of God's word as distinct from the commandments of men.

In short, I would have Christian Doctrine rested on Scripture Evidence, and not on Human Argumentation. I would have all the acuteness of the skilful logician applied to elicit the Evidence contained in Scripture. But I would not have any portion of Christian Doctrine made to stand upon Abstractions. The difference of the two proceedings may be shown thus. Suppose a person to be charged with a crime. Would it be considered sufficient to establish the charge, that guilt might be inferred from the disposition and character of the accused, or from any abstract notions or prejudices concerning him? Would it not rather be required, that some positive evidence should be produced, some real circumstances connecting the accused with the crime alleged? Surely no charge could stand without such proof; except indeed before a Court of Inquisition. But at the same time in collecting such evidence, and applying it to the case, argumentation is required, and the acutest logician will best bring that evidence to light. Look again to any able work of Science. Take, for instance, Cuvier's Theory of the Earth. There is close reasoning in that work; but

the object of it all is to draw forth and establish those facts on which his theory is founded. Contrast such a work with a Treatise of the Ancient Physics ; and the difference between resting a doctrine on Evidence and on Argumentation, will be quite apparent.—In like manner, take any of the Truths of Scripture ;—as the Resurrection of the Body. Suppose this truth rested on the abstract proposition, that there is in the body an indestructible element, the seed of the future body ; it would then be a mere speculative inference, though the Resurrection of the Body so inferred, is itself a truth. Look, on the other hand, to Christ Raised from the Dead, and to all that the inspired writers have told us about His rising again ; and we thus collect a body of Evidence, by which the truth is irrefragably established.—At the same time, it may demand much argument to put that evidence out to view. There must be comparison of passages, illustration of one by the other, detection of latent coincidences, proof of the bearing of texts on the point ; all which requires able reasoning, and will be accomplished more or less successfully according to the argumentative acuteness of the mind employed on it.—The same may be observed of the Doctrine of Original Sin. No reasoning would be misapplied, however long the chain of argument, which was employed in eliciting the Scripture Evidence of the point. But reasoning would be perversely employed, though it happened in the result to support the truth, which should deduce that doctrine, from the hypothesis of the transmission of a substantial portion of the corrupt flesh of Adam to all his descendants.—Or lastly, consider the doctrine of the Trinity, as upheld by the various speculations which the misapplied acumen of some of its early defenders brought

to its support; and it would then be improperly rested on Argumentation. But conceive the same powers of reasoning applied to the discernment of the intimations of the doctrine scattered throughout Scripture, to the digest of these, and the luminous disposition of them as matter of Evidence; and we cannot too highly approve such an application of reasoning.

V. I have directed attention to the different manner in which Christian Truth is stated in the Scriptures and in the Creeds and Formularies of the Church. Those who have studied Ecclesiastical History know the reason of this difference. Such persons are aware that Creeds and Formularies have resulted from the necessities of the Church in its progress; partly for the early education of its members, partly for a defence against heretical doctrines, partly as a test of communion with the body of the Faithful. They bear, consequently, in their result the marks of their formation, and of the purpose for which they have been framed. They have been obliged to advert to opinions afloat at the time when they were made, and to contain denials of those opinions or assertions of the contrary; and to adopt a phraseology drawn from modes of thinking prevalent at the times when they were drawn up. Hence too the form of Decisions or Decrees which they have taken, or, to use the Greek term, Dogmas—determinations of points in debate, without annexing the reasons on which those determinations were founded.

Now the Scriptures cannot be called Dogmatic, or Doctrinal, in the sense in which the Church Formularies are so



called. Let it be observed that I do not apply the term Dogmatic to the Church Formularies in the popular disparaging sense of the term. But I apply it in its proper etymological sense, as denoting the sentence, decree, definition, determination of the Church on some controverted point.<sup>2</sup> And with respect to the terms Doctrine and Doctrinal, as applied to the Formularies of the Church, I use them simply to denote, what the Church *teaches* on certain points, and not absolutely *all* the matters of Christian belief. In these senses then, the Scriptures cannot be called Dogmatic, or Doctrinal. For they are not decisions of the Church, or Summaries of points taught by the Church. They are the teaching of the Holy Spirit himself, the simple setting forth of the counsel of God.

But if we understand by Dogmatic, a statement of Truth on the Authority of the Teacher, as opposed to a Theoretic or Scientific Statement of it, then I am quite ready to admit that the Scriptures do contain Dogmatic Truths. Every sentence uttered by our Lord and his Apostles, may in this sense be called Dogmatic. In this sense the word has been used by an eminent non-conformist divine in the following passage, to which I fully assent, though, using the term Dogmatic in a different sense, I have denied that the Scriptures are Dogmatic.

“ Yet the Revelation contained in the Scriptures extends  
 “ only to *Facts*, not to the theory of those *Facts*, or their  
 “ original causes. The most important truths are commu-  
 “ nicated in a dogmatic, not a theoretic manner. We are  
 “ taught on the testimony of Him that cannot lie, *insulated*

<sup>2</sup> The term Dogma, however, soon came to be used as equivalent to Doctrine in the popular sense. It may be said to be used so commonly in both the Greek and Latin Fathers. It has also Classical Authority in the same sense.

“ *facts*, which we cannot connect with those reasons, with  
 “ which they are undoubtedly connected in the Divine  
 “ mind. They rest solely on the basis of Divine Authority ;  
 “ and we are left as much in the dark with respect to the  
 “ mode of their existence, as if they were not revealed. He  
 “ has given us reason to believe that the Godhead subsists  
 “ in three persons ; distinct acts of personal agency being  
 “ ascribed to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit,  
 “ while worship and adoration are claimed for them sepa-  
 “ rately : but the theory of this is utterly beyond our com-  
 “ prehension ; nor does it appear to be any part of the  
 “ intention of Scripture to put us in possession of that  
 “ theory. Those who have ventured to approach too near  
 “ this inaccessible light, though with honest and sincere  
 “ intentions, have, for the most part, by attempting to explain  
 “ it, involved the subject in deeper obscurity, and darkened  
 “ counsel by words without knowledge.”<sup>a</sup>

The like observation may be made with regard to the term *Doctrines*. There are no *Doctrinal Statements*, such as those of the *Formularies*, in the *Scriptures* themselves. But if we understand by *Doctrines*, *Truths* taught—objects proposed to human belief—mysteries of God inculcated on our heart and understanding—in this sense, I am free to admit, that there are *Doctrines* in the *Scriptures* ; and I have accordingly popularly spoken of the *Christian Truths* as *Doctrines*. For who would think of applying to ordinary occasions, a distinction, restricting the term to an exact technical sense, in which it is not commonly understood. Nor is this admission at all inconsistent with what I have said

<sup>a</sup> Robert Hall's Sermon “ On the Glory of God in Concealing.” *Works*, vol. v. p. 47. 3d ed.

in my Lectures, and which has been carped at, (I have been sorry to see,) with no better sense than feeling, that “strictly “to speak, in the Scripture itself there are no Doctrines.”

Besides, there is a still further ground of opposition between the method in which Truth is stated in Scripture, and in Church Formularies, in this respect. In Scripture, Truth is urged upon us rhetorically, as well as in simple declaration—presented with inducements to belief, and accompanied with motives to conduct. Scripture appeals to our affections, as well as to our understanding,—and to both at once; exciting attention and interest, and kindling emotions of piety and benevolence, whilst it declares the Mysteries of God. In the Formularies, on the contrary, there is no endeavour to *persuade* men to believe their assertions. They are not *calls* to the Faith. They are simply, Statements of the Truth—put in a precise form, so that they may be distinctly apprehended, apart from all known errors on the subjects of them. They study merely to express the grammatical or literal sense, avoiding all metaphorical or indirect mode of expression. We speak of Scripture as animated, energetic, glowing; as profitable, not only for doctrine, but for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness: but it would be clearly improper to characterize the Formularies of the Church in such language. Hence it may be said, that St. Paul, or any inspired writer, does not speak doctrinally or dogmatically, but eloquently, and persuasively, and cogently; that he does not philosophize, but preach and entreat and compel men to the Faith: and generally, that the Scriptures do not contain Doctrinal *Statements*, or *Doctrines*,—if that term be restricted to an exact Technical sense,—but the *Substance* of those Statements, the *equivalents* of those Doctrines which are

given *precisely* in the Formularies of the Church. Doctrines, however, in the popular sense of the term, they do contain, and I will add, (for I firmly believe it) the *same* Doctrines which are contained in the Formularies of the Church.

If it be considered why we call the Doctrines of our Church Scriptural, it will be found to be because they may be *proved* from Scripture. It is not because they are affirmed *totidem verbis* in Scripture. We believe what is "written" in Scripture, because it is Scripture. But we do not confine ourselves to the express words of Scripture. It is enough that we have the meaning of Scripture. And this admission on the part of our Church, clearly justified as it is by common sense, provides for a difference between the language of Formularies and the language of Scripture. It may, therefore, be not improperly said, that the Doctrines, as worded in the Formularies, are not *expressly* or *verbally* in the Scriptures, but are *virtually*, or *substantially*, or *really* contained in them, as being *proved* by the Scriptures. For example, "the word Consubstantial," as Bramhall says, "was not in the Creed before the Nicene Council, but the thing was, and was reduced from the Creed."<sup>b</sup>

There has been controversial discussion on the point, whether a Protestant is not bound by his exclusive reference to Scripture as his Rule of Faith, to cite only *express* words of Scripture for every doctrine, and precluded from all reasoning, or drawing consequences, from the text of Scripture. My argument has nothing to do with this question. All legitimate application of reasoning to the text of Scripture, as I have shewn, I fully concur with. I am not so absurd as to maintain a position, which Roman

<sup>b</sup> Schism Guarded, p. 347.

Catholics would press on the Protestant, as the effect of the Protestant *exclusive* reliance on Scripture. If *express* words of Scripture without reasoning on them, were enough for proof of doctrine, the truth of Transubstantiation might well be affirmed. And so Stillingfleet admits, in controverting the Jesuit's assertion, that on the Protestant ground, Transubstantiation ought to be received.

“The question,” says Stillingfleet, “being concerning *matters of Doctrine*, and not *mere words*, those things are *expressly* affirmed, which are *evidently*, and no other: for it is one thing for *words* to be *expressly* in Scripture, and another for *Doctrines* to be so. For these latter are no further *expressly* affirmed there, than as there is *evidence*, that the meaning of such words doth contain such a *Doctrine* in them. As to take your own instance, *This is my Body*, we grant the words to be *express*: but we deny, that which he had then in his hands was his *real Body* (for his hands were part of his real Body). Now, we do not say, that the *Doctrine* of Transubstantiation is *expressly*, but not *evidently*, contained here: for we say, the *Doctrine* is not there at all, but only that those are the *express words*; ‘this is my body:’ as it is in other figurative expressions in *Scripture*.”<sup>c</sup>

Nor am I a stranger to the fact, that it was a sophistical expedient of the early Heretics, to charge the Orthodox with introducing terms not found in Scripture. Whoever has read but little of Athanasius, must know this, as well as the reply justly made by that Father, that the thing intended by those terms was in Scripture, though the terms were not;<sup>d</sup> and that piety might well employ them to exclude the

<sup>c</sup> “Rational account of the Grounds of Protestant Religion.” Part 1. c. 4. p. 105. Ed. 1665.

<sup>d</sup> Γνωσκέτω δὲ ὅμως, εἰ τις ἐστὶ φιλομαθῆς, ὅτι εἰ καὶ μὴ οὕτως ἐν ταῖς

inventions of impiety. The same Father also, it will be remembered, admits, that Scripture intimations of the Truth would be better, as being more accurate; but that the versatility of the Arian party, had obliged the Bishops assembled at Nice, to set forth, more plainly, *λευκότερον*, such expressions as subverted the heretical impiety. In the same way, I hold that the Technical Language of Theology has been both useful and necessary for maintaining the Truth; whilst I point out its human origin, and connexion with the reasonings of ancient Philosophy. Indeed I have said, and still think, that there is an advantage in the use of this Technical Language over the actual words of Scripture, for stating points of doctrine; since we can modify it as we please, and limit it accurately to the meaning we wish to express.

But whether I maintained or no, the necessity of excluding all but Scripture terms from our statements of Doctrine, such a notion has clearly nothing to do with the argument of my Lectures. To state it correctly, the question I am there concerned with, is—Reasoning on the text of Scripture being allowed, what is the right application of reasoning; Or, all Rationalizing of the word of God being forbidden, when is reasoning duly employed in relation to that word? I argue only against what I consider a wrong application of reasoning. Some seem to think that there is wrong reasoning only on the side of unbelief and hetero-

*γραφῆς εἰσιν αἱ λέξεις, ἀλλὰ, καθάπερ εἶρηται πρότερον, τὴν ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν διάνοιαν ἔχουσι, καὶ ταύτην ἐκφωνούμεναι σημαίνουσι τοῖς ἔχουσιν εἰς εὐσέβειαν τὴν ἀκοῆν ὀλόκληρον. De Dec. Nic. Synod. c. 21. p. 227.—Διὰ τὸ τοῖνυν ἀγράφοι αὐτοὶ λέξεις πρὸς ἀσέβειαν ἐφευρόντες, αἰτιῶνται τοὺς ἀγράφοις λέξεσιν εὐσεβοῦντας; κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 18. p. 224.—Καὶ μὴ ἀγράφοις ἐπιστάγεσθαι λέξεις. Ναι ἔδει, φαίην ἂν καὶ ἔγωγε ἀκριβέστερα γὰρ ἐκ τῶν γραφῶν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐξ ἐτέρων ἐστὶ τὰ τῆς ἀληθείας γνωρίσματα, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 32. p. 237.*

doxy. But all logicians are aware, that right conclusions may be connected with false premises. And experience tells us, that a weak and wrong-headed person may be very orthodox and sound in the opinions which he professes, but weak and wrong-headed in his mode of defending them; —also, that ingenious persons may devise arguments more specious than solid, for maintaining a true conclusion. I have accordingly considered in my Bampton Lectures, a particular case, in which Reasoning has been wrongly, though piously and acutely, applied to the defence of Christian truth. Admiring, as I do, the extraordinary powers of reasoning, and of systematic arrangement displayed by the Schoolmen, and deeply respecting that tone of piety, which subdues even their most hazardous speculations, I still see the vanity of such reasonings as theirs, when applied to the exposition of revealed truth; and have accordingly drawn out some instances of these reasonings, and traced their influence on our Theological Language. This is what I have done. But I do not object, I repeat, to the just application of reasoning to the Sacred Text.

VI. In reference to the same point, it may be further useful, for the sake of those who are not versed in the study of Logic, to state, if I can do so in a manner to be understood, that when we are in possession of the Premises of an Argument, the Conclusion necessarily follows. Grant the Premises, and you grant the Conclusion from them. The Conclusion in an Argument, is the same that has been already separately said in the Premises, summed up and stated in one proposition. On this account it has been urged as an objection to the Syllogism, though it is not an

objection, but the reason of its validity, that it involves a *petitio principii*. The same thing which is inferred in the Conclusion, has been already assumed in the Premises. Only it was not known, or not observed, before we drew the Conclusion, that it was contained or implied in the previous admissions. The drawing the Conclusion, shews that it was so implied or contained.

It would then be perfectly illogical and absurd for any one to deny Consequences rightly drawn from admitted Premises. If, for instance, Scripture shews, as it does, that our Saviour is truly God as well as truly man, the consequence is irrefragable that he united Two Natures in One Person. For we have already set forth the same Truth in the premises. Stated at length, the argument would be, that whoever unites in himself the peculiar attributes both of God and Man, unites in His person *Two* distinct Natures. Our Saviour is clearly evidenced to us in this light. Our Saviour, therefore, united in His Person two distinct Natures. A consequence of this kind is nothing more than what has been already affirmed in Scripture. We have done nothing more than collect or put together the affirmations of Scripture. Though we may not, therefore, read this conclusion *totidem verbis* in Scripture, it is as much in Scripture as if it had been read there *totidem verbis*. Whatever, then, can be thus argued from Scripture, is as true as Scripture is true. In this way, things spiritual are compared with spiritual, and a consistent sense is drawn out by just reasoning on the comparison. If in one passage our Saviour asserts, "He who hath seen me hath seen the Father," &c. and in another, "the Father is greater than I:" these are to be taken together, and we may reason from the



joint declaration, that He is neither to be separated from the Father, nor to be confounded with the Father;—in one respect, He is one with the Father; in another respect, the Father is greater than He. And a conclusion thus irresistibly follows,—which is no mere deduction from Terms, but a result from all the passages bearing on each of these heads,—adverse both to the Arian and the Sabellian notions of our Lord.

But suppose now that a disputation turns on the Words, Nature, Substance, Person, Foreknowledge, Priority, Identity, &c.,—and it is argued, that such or such expressions cannot be applied to the sacred subject under discussion, because such terms include certain ideas or exclude certain ideas—and conclusions are drawn from the terms against particular interpretations of Scripture,—all this is mere logomachy. We have not the premises of our argument in the Scripture, and we are not warranted, therefore, in our conclusions. We reap where the Spirit has not sown. We gather where He has not scattered. We cannot, I mean, lay down definitions in Theology and deduce consequences from them, and then identify those consequences with the declarations of Scripture. Take for example the passage of Scripture, “whom He did foreknow, also He did predestinate;” &c.—and let the attempt be made to argue from this, that those who are thus described as the objects of the Divine Foreknowledge *must* be saved. To arrive at this conclusion, a definition must be stated or implied of what the Divine Foreknowledge is; and from that it is concluded, that what is foreknown by God must come to pass. Whereas all that appears from the passage is, that what God foreknows will *surely* and *infallibly* come to pass—that the matter is in the Hands of One who

cannot fail, or be deceived. There is nothing said about the *necessity* of the case. It is a mere conclusion of human reasoning, that it is impossible for it to be otherwise. The event may or may not be *in itself*, so far as Scripture speaks of it. Scripture only sets forth the unchanging goodness, and steadiness of purpose, of Him in whom are the issues of all things. So again to argue that because God gives both to will and to do, Man has no free-will; or that because Man is exhorted to repent and treated as free, there is no Divine Predestination and Election; these are consequences not from Scripture premises, but from definitions of free-will and predestination. The conclusion from Scripture is, that man is free to choose and act, and that God does predestine. Both these principles are declared in Scripture, and the conclusion, therefore, is, that both are true. To argue from either against the other, is to bring forward a consequence drawn from human notions to invalidate the Scripture Testimony. Such deductions, in fact, *are not* consequences of Scripture. They follow only from *partial* views of Scripture, and cannot be regarded, therefore, as legitimate *conclusions*.

Or let us take the instance which I have referred to on a former occasion,—our Lord's inference of the Resurrection of the Dead from that passage of the Pentateuch, "I am the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob." There can be no doubt that this passage contains the elements of the proof of such a doctrine. Clearly it was possible to draw the doctrine out of it. It was possible, let me add, for mere man to have drawn it out. But supposing that the inference had been so drawn before our Saviour shewed the way,—would it have followed necessarily? Would it have been more than a probable

inference, as drawn by a mere human reasoner? None but one divinely inspired could have laid down the premise here—"God is not the God of the dead but of the "living." All that a mere human reasoner could have stated, would have been—"God is *probably* not the God of the dead but of the living;" and his conclusion would only have been accordingly, "there is *probably* a Resurrection of the Dead." A sound and pious conclusion this would clearly have been; and such as might have been held, and was held, by pious Jews, before the revelation of Jesus Christ on the subject; but which the Jews could only *know* and fully accept as indisputably true, upon the word of a distinct revelation. This is the ground on which I have somewhere said, that it requires a new revelation to substantiate certain conclusions of human reasoning in Theology.

Now, there are many consequences of this kind which may be drawn from Scripture, and the deduction of which may be an edifying exercise to the pious mind. Nay; to such a mind it may be given by the Spirit of God, to obtain a further view of the Divine Dispensations than is given to the less humble and less patient inquirer.

Still such conclusions must be held by the believer only as probable truths, or true opinions, as long as they remain only probable, and are not positively revealed inferences.<sup>e</sup> Such inferences, if drawn by inspired writers, are put out of the region of probability by the warrant of

<sup>e</sup> "But because there are no new revelations since the Apostles died, "whatever comes in after them is only by man's ratiocination; and therefore "can never go beyond a probability in itself, and never ought to pretend "higher, lest God's incommunicable right be invaded, which is to be Lord of "all human understandings."—*Bp. Taylor's Dissuasive from Popery*, Second Part, Book I. Sec. 14, p. 171.

the Inspiration under which they are stated. They are then certainly and indisputably true. But it is not so with those to which there is not the like attestation ; though they may still be held and professed by Christians as parts of their Theology. Even, too, when such opinions happen to attract much discussion among Christians, and opposite conclusions are drawn respecting the points to which they refer,—the Church may interpose as Judge of controversy, and, for the sake of peace, rule the points under debate, and require a moderation in regard to them, on the part of its ministers and teachers. Doctrines of this kind may justly be denominated Theological Truths ; to distinguish them from those higher Verities, the essentials of a Saving Faith, which are in the most proper sense Articles of Faith. To this effect Bramhall says,—“ That there is one God, and one Saviour Jesus Christ ; that the life of the Saints is everlasting, and the fire of the Devils everlasting ; are Articles of Faith ; but every thing which may be deduced from these, is not a distinct Article of Faith.”<sup>f</sup> It is one thing surely to deny that such conclusions are entitled to rank with indisputable Articles of Faith, and another thing to allow them no importance or truth whatever.

Take, for example, Paley’s inference from the words of St. Paul, “ that we may present every man perfect in Christ Jesus.” Pointing out that this is St. Paul’s expression of his hope and prayer, that at the general judgment of the world he might present to Christ the fruits of his ministry, the converts whom he had made to his faith and religion, and might present them perfect in every good work ;”—he adds, “ if this be rightly interpreted, then it affords

<sup>f</sup> Schism Guarded, p. 400.

“ a manifest and necessary inference, that the saints in a  
 “ future life will meet and be known again to one another :  
 “ for how, without knowing again his converts in their new  
 “ and glorified state, could St. Paul desire or expect to  
 “ present them at the last day ?”<sup>8</sup> If we say a highly  
 probable inference, instead of “ necessary,” we may, indeed,  
 hold the doctrine here alleged by Paley as a Theological  
 Truth, but we could hardly say that it was distinctly re-  
 vealed, or entitled to be called an Article of Faith in the  
 strict sense of the term.

Again, Bishop Horsley having declared his opinion in  
 favour of the notion held by several of the Fathers and the  
 Schoolmen, “ that the existence of the Son flows neces-  
 sarily from the Divine Intellect exerted on itself ;” and  
 stated that it seemed to him to be founded in Scripture ;—  
 observes,—“ By which I meant not to assert that it is so  
 “ expressly declared in Scripture, that I would undertake  
 “ to prove it by the Scriptures to others, in the same  
 “ manner that I would undertake to prove that the world  
 “ was created by Jesus Christ ; or that the one, like the  
 “ other, ought to be made a branch of the public confession  
 “ of the Church ; or that the disbelief of this particular  
 “ principle is a circumstance that may in the least affect  
 “ the integrity of any Christian’s faith. It was not alleged  
 “ as a principle, on which I meant at all to rest the credit  
 “ of the Scripture doctrine ; it was mentioned only as a  
 “ principle which, true or false, was embraced by a certain  
 “ set of writers, and serves to explain certain things said  
 “ by them, which without it are unintelligible, or at least  
 “ liable to misrepresentation. At the same time, I dis-  
 “ covered my own opinion about this principle, that I think

<sup>8</sup> Paley’s Sermons, p. 507.

“ it true, or likely to be true; for it *seems* (that is the  
 “ word I used) to be founded in Scripture. Many phrases  
 “ of holy writ seem to me to allude to it; and to those  
 “ who first thought of it, I doubt not, but that the same  
 “ allusions seemed couched in the same phrases. Yet I  
 “ will not undertake to teach every one to read the same  
 “ sense in the same expressions. When I shewed that,  
 “ from this principle once admitted, a strict demonstration  
 “ might be drawn of the eternity of the second Person,  
 “ it was not that I set any value upon that demonstration,  
 “ as adding in the least degree to the certainty of the  
 “ Scripture doctrine. Upon such points the evidence of  
 “ Holy Scripture is, indeed, the only thing that amounts  
 “ to proof. The utmost that reasoning can do, is to lead  
 “ to the discovery, and, by God’s grace, to the humble  
 “ acknowledgment of the weakness and insufficiency of  
 “ reason; to resist her encroachments upon the province  
 “ of faith; to silence her objections, and cast down imagi-  
 “ nations, and prevent the innovations and refinements of  
 “ philosophy and vain deceit.”<sup>h</sup> Here then, according to  
 Bishop Horsley, is a conclusion drawn from expressions of  
 Scripture, which, however, he does not venture positively  
 to assert as matter revealed. He holds it as a pious opi-  
 nion which might be controverted.

Conclusions of these different kinds are found in our  
 xxxix. Articles. “ Some of them,” says Archbishop Bram-  
 hall, “ are the very same that are contained in the Creed: some  
 “ others of them are practical truths, which come not within  
 “ the proper list of points or Articles to be believed: lastly,  
 “ some of them are pious Opinions or Inferior Truths, which  
 “ are proposed by the Church of England to all her Sons,

<sup>h</sup> Horsley’s Replies to Priestly, p. 516.

“ as not to be opposed ; not as essentials of Faith necessary  
 “ to be believed by all Christians, *necessitate medii*, under  
 “ pain of damnation.”<sup>i</sup> In other places, indeed, Bramhall comprehends the whole of the Articles under the title of pious Opinions. “ We do not suffer any man, (he says,) to  
 “ reject the xxxix. Articles of the Church of England at  
 “ his pleasure, yet neither do we look upon them as essentials  
 “ of saving faith, or legacies of Christ and of his Apostles ;  
 “ but in a mean, as pious Opinions fitted for the preservation  
 “ of unity ; neither do we oblige any man to believe them,  
 “ but only not to contradict them.”<sup>k</sup> Stillingfleet, citing these expressions of Bramhall with approbation, prefaces them with the remark, that “ the Church of England makes  
 “ no Articles of Faith but such as have the testimony and  
 “ approbation of the whole Christian world of all ages, and  
 “ are acknowledged to be such by Rome itself ; and in other  
 “ things she requires Subscription to them, not as Articles  
 “ of Faith, but as Inferior Truths, which she expects a  
 “ submission to, in order to her peace and tranquillity.”<sup>l</sup>

So again he speaks of “ Articles of Faith ” as distinct from “ Theological Verities.” “ Are not those properly Articles of Faith, (he says,) as distinct from Theological Verities, which are necessary to be believed by all ? ”<sup>m</sup>

Neither of these great Champions of the Protestant Faith thought they were disparaging the Articles of the Church, when they spoke of them in this manner. Whilst they did not admit all Conclusions from Scripture to the rank of Revealed Truths, they did not feel themselves precluded from acknowledging that there were still vital substantial Truths to be drawn from Scripture, which a man should hold

<sup>i</sup> Schism Guarded, p. 348.

<sup>k</sup> Ibid. Sect. 1, ch. xi. p. 345.

<sup>l</sup> Ibid. p. 75.

<sup>m</sup> Ration. Account, p. 54, ed. 1665.

as he values his salvation—such as the Unity and the Trinity, —the Incarnation of the Word—the distinct Personality of the Holy Ghost. Nor when Bramhall characterizes the Articles collectively as pious Opinions, does he detract at all from the *certainty* of the great Fundamentals included among them. For so far as these have been *controverted*, so far they may be spoken of as Opinions; as we now familiarly speak of Trinitarian or Unitarian Opinions, without supposing that we thus express any doubt of the truth and certainty of the doctrine of the Trinity.

With regard to the imposing of consequences generally as Articles of Faith, Bishop Taylor well observes:—

“ The devesting the Church from the simplicity of her  
 “ faith, is like removing the ancient landmark: you cannot  
 “ tell by the mark in what country you are in, whether in  
 “ your own or in the enemies’. And in the world nothing is  
 “ more unnecessary. For if that Faith be sufficient; if in  
 “ that Faith the Church went to Heaven; if in that  
 “ she preserved unity and begat children to Christ, and  
 “ nursed them up to be perfect men in Christ, and kept her-  
 “ self pure from heresy, and unbroken by schism; whatsoever  
 “ is added to it, is either contained in the article virtually, or  
 “ it is not. If not, then it is no part of the Faith, and by the  
 “ laws of Faith there is no obligation passed upon any man  
 “ to believe it. But if it be, then he that believes the  
 “ Article does virtually believe all that is virtually contained  
 “ in it: but no man is to be pressed with the consequents  
 “ drawn from thence, unless the transcript be drawn by the  
 “ same hand that wrote the original: for we are sure it came  
 “ in the simplicity of it from an infallible spirit; but he  
 “ that bids me believe his Deductions under pain of dam-  
 “ nation, bids me under pain of damnation believe that he is



“ an unerring logician : for which, because God has given me  
 “ no command, and himself can give me no security, if I  
 “ can defend myself from that man’s pride, God will defend  
 “ me from damnation.”<sup>n</sup>

“ But if any man will search into the harder things,  
 “ or any more secret sacrament of Religion, by that means  
 “ to raise up his mind to the contemplation of heavenly  
 “ things, and to a contempt of things below, he may do it if  
 “ he please, so that he do not impose the belief of his own  
 “ speculations upon others, or compel them to confess what  
 “ they know not, and what they cannot find in Scriptures, or  
 “ did not receive from the Apostles. We find by experi-  
 “ ence, that a long Act of Parliament, or an indenture or  
 “ covenant that is of great length, ends none but causes  
 “ many contentions; and when many things are defined, and  
 “ definitions spun out into declarations, men believe less, and  
 “ know nothing more.”<sup>o</sup>

“ For although whatsoever is certainly deduced from any  
 “ of these Articles, made already so explicit, is as certainly  
 “ true, and as much to be believed, as the Article itself, be-  
 “ cause ‘ ex veris possunt nil nisi vera sequi ; ’ yet, because it  
 “ is not certain that our deductions from them are certain,  
 “ and what one calls evident, is so obscure to another,  
 “ that he believes it is false, it is the best and only safe  
 “ course, to rest in that explication the Apostles have  
 “ made,” &c.<sup>p</sup>

“ This I say, not that I believe it unlawful or unsafe for  
 “ the Church, or any of the ‘ antistites religionis,’ or any  
 “ wise man, to extend his own Creed to any thing which  
 “ may certainly follow from any one of the Articles; but I

<sup>n</sup> Diss. from Popery, 2d Part, Sect. 4, b. 1, p. 162, 1564.

<sup>o</sup> Ibid. p. 167.

<sup>p</sup> Liberty of Propheying, Sec. 1, p. 11—450, 1822.

“ say that no such deduction is fit to be pressed on others as  
 “ an Article of Faith; and that every such deduction which  
 “ is so made, unless it be such a thing as is at first evident  
 “ to all, is but sufficient to make a human faith; nor can it  
 “ amount to a Divine, much less can be obligatory to bind  
 “ a person of a differing persuasion to subscribe, under pain  
 “ of losing his faith, or being a heretic. . . . And, therefore  
 “ deductions, inevident, from the evident and plain letter of  
 “ faith, are as great recessions from the obligation, as they  
 “ are from the simplicity and certainty of the Article. And  
 “ this I also affirm, although the Church of any one deno-  
 “ mination, or represented in a Council, shall make the  
 “ deduction or declaration.”<sup>4</sup>

VII. What if the notions on which some of our Theologi-  
 cal Terms are founded, are represented as unphilosophical in  
 character,—drawn, that is, from an Ancient Philosophy  
 which improved knowledge has since exploded;—does  
 this at all impair the value of those Terms for the purposes  
 which they now serve? If Religion was assailed by a false  
 Philosophy, which had its authority and weight at the time,  
 it was necessary to repel the assault by the same Philosophy.  
 For example: if the word *Nature* were used in an here-  
 tical argument to impugn the full Truth of the Incarnation,  
 it became necessary for the defender of the Truth to  
 guard the Term, which he also acknowledged in the same  
 sense, or understood in a different sense, from such a mis-  
 application of it. Thus guarding the Term from misappli-  
 cation, he effectually preserved the Truth down to the times

<sup>4</sup> Liberty of Propheying, Sec. 1, 12, p. 451.

when the speculations themselves about the Term have lost their force. And we may well be thankful for this service: but we are not bound, at the same time, to respect the *Philosophy* involved in his argument.

Nor is it any thing against this admission of the usefulness of the Scholastic Language, that the notions on which it turns should be further described as unscriptural. If they are drawn from Philosophy, (and whether they are so or not is a mere question of *fact*,) it is plain that they are not scriptural in their origin;—the *Notions*, let it be observed, which are embodied in the *Terms*, not the *Doctrines* or *Truths* to which those *Terms* are applied—*Notions*, which would have been attached to the *Terms*, though the *Scripture Truths* had not been thought of. Would any one, for example, suppose that we were arguing against the religious obligation of Sunday, because it was shewn that the name of the day was of heathen origin? As senseless is the clamour that the scriptural foundation of the Christian *Doctrines* is denied, because the *phraseology* in which they happen to be expressed, is not throughout scriptural, but has been partly drawn from profane sources, and moulded by controversy. Where, indeed, was the faith of the Apostolic Fathers, and of all other Christians who have believed in the *Truths* of *Scripture*, before the established use of these *Terms*, if these *Terms* involve vital *Truth in themselves*, apart from their application to questions of *Theology*?

In fact, nothing but extreme inattention to the nature of language as an instrument of the human mind, could have suffered any person to misconceive this point, as it has been misconceived, or given him the power of misleading others so perversely. I would recommend to the reader a study of the 7th Dialogue of Bishop Berkeley's *Minute Philoso-*

pher, to clear up the mists which have been diffused over this part of the subject. He will there see how Theological Terms, no less than others, may be signs and instruments of Truth, without conveying precise abstract ideas of the things signified by them; and that, therefore, we are not obliged to adopt the Realism of the Scholastic Philosophy, whilst we retain the phraseology. It may be of use to cite one or two passages from that interesting Dialogue.

Having shewn how we have no idea of Force in the abstract, and yet we have true and useful propositions about Force, Berkeley remarks:—

“ That which we admit with regard to *Force*, upon what  
 “ pretence can we deny concerning *Grace*? If there are  
 “ queries, disputes, perplexities, diversity of notions and  
 “ opinions about the one, so there are about the other also :  
 “ if we can form no precise distinct idea of the one, so nei-  
 “ ther can we of the other. Ought we not, therefore, by  
 “ a parity of reason to conclude, there may be divers true  
 “ and useful propositions concerning the one as well as the  
 “ other? And that *Grace* may be an object of our faith,  
 “ and influence our life and actions, as a principle destruc-  
 “ tive of evil habits and productive of good ones, although  
 “ we cannot attain a distinct idea of it, separate or abstracted  
 “ from God the Author, from man the subject, and from  
 “ virtue and piety its effects? ”

“ But although terms are signs, yet having granted that  
 “ those signs may be significant, though they should not  
 “ suggest ideas represented by them, provided they serve to  
 “ regulate and influence our wills, passions, and conduct,  
 “ you have consequently granted, that the mind of man may  
 “ assent to propositions containing such terms, when it is so

“ directed or affected by them, notwithstanding it should not  
“ perceive distinct ideas marked by those terms. Whence  
“ it seems to follow, that a man may believe the doc-  
“ trine of the Trinity, if he finds it revealed in Holy  
“ Scripture, that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost,  
“ are God, and that there is but one God; although he doth  
“ not frame in his mind any abstract or distinct ideas of  
“ Trinity, Substance, or Personality; provided that this  
“ doctrine of a Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier, makes  
“ proper impressions on his mind, producing therein love,  
“ hope, gratitude, and obedience, and thereby becomes a  
“ lively operating principle, influencing his life and actions  
“ agreeably to that notion of saving faith which is required  
“ in a Christian.”<sup>s</sup>

“ Whatever their intention was, [that of the Nicene Fa-  
“ thers,] it could not be to beget nice abstracted ideas of  
“ mysteries in the minds of common Christians; this being  
“ evidently impossible: nor doth it appear that the bulk of  
“ Christian men did in those days think it any part of  
“ their duty to lay aside the words, shut their eyes, and  
“ frame those abstract ideas; any more than men now do  
“ of force, time, number, or several other things about  
“ which they nevertheless believe, know, argue, and dis-  
“ pute. To me it seems that whatever was the source of  
“ these controversies, and however they were managed,  
“ wherein human infirmity must be supposed to have had  
“ its share, the main end was not, on either side, to convey  
“ precise, positive ideas to the minds of men, by the use  
“ of those contested terms, but rather a negative sense,  
“ tending to exclude Polytheism on the one hand, and  
“ Sabellianism on the other.”<sup>t</sup>

<sup>s</sup> Minut. Phil. Dial. 7, Vol. ii. p. 214.

<sup>t</sup> Ibid. p. 218.

“ It seems that what hath been now said may be applied  
 “ to other mysteries of our religion. Original Sin, for  
 “ instance, a man may find it impossible to form an idea of  
 “ in abstract, or of the manner of its transmission ; and yet  
 “ the belief thereof may produce in his mind a salutary  
 “ sense of his own unworthiness and the goodness of his  
 “ Redeemer: from whence may follow good habits, and  
 “ from them good actions, the genuine effects of faith,  
 “ which, considered in its true light, is a thing neither  
 “ repugnant nor incomprehensible, as some men would  
 “ persuade us, but suited even to vulgar capacities, placed  
 “ in the will and affections rather than in the understanding,  
 “ and producing holy lives, rather than subtile theories.”<sup>u</sup>

“ If the moment of opinions had been by some litigious  
 “ divines made the measure of their zeal, it might have  
 “ spared much trouble both to themselves and others.  
 “ Certainly one that takes his notions of faith, opinion, and  
 “ assent, from common sense, and common use, and has  
 “ maturely weighed the nature of signs and language, will  
 “ not be so apt to controvert the wording of a mystery, or  
 “ to break the peace of the Church, for the sake of retaining  
 “ or rejecting a term.”<sup>x</sup>

To these passages of Berkeley may be subjoined the following one of Horsley, in which he is speaking of the mystery of the Incarnation.

“ We shall not indeed find this proposition, that the  
 “ existence of Mary’s Son consisted from the first, and ever  
 “ shall consist, in his union with the Word ; we shall not  
 “ find this proposition in these terms in Scripture. Would  
 “ to God, the necessity never had arisen of stating the  
 “ discoveries of revelation in metaphysical propositions !

<sup>u</sup> Minut. Phil. Dial. 7, vol. ii. p. 219.

<sup>x</sup> Ibid. p. 220.

“ The inspired writers delivered their sublimest doctrines  
“ in popular language ; and abstained, as much as was  
“ possible to abstain, from a philosophical phraseology.  
“ By the perpetual cavils of gainsayers, and the difficulties  
“ which they have raised, later teachers, in the assertions  
“ of the same doctrines, have been reduced to the unpleas-  
“ ing necessity of availing themselves of the greater  
“ precision of a less familiar language. But if we find not  
“ the same proposition in the same words in scripture, we  
“ find in Scripture what amounts to a clear proof of the  
“ proposition,—we find the characteristic properties of both  
“ natures, the human and the divine, ascribed to the same  
“ person. We read of Jesus, that he suffered from hunger  
“ and from fatigue ; that he wept for grief, and was dis-  
“ tressed with fear ; that he was obnoxious to all the evils  
“ of humanity, except the propensity to sin. We read of  
“ the same Jesus, that he had ‘ glory with the Father  
“ before the world began ;’ that ‘ all things were created  
“ by him, both in heaven and in earth, visible and  
“ invisible ; whether they be thrones or dominions or princi-  
“ palities or powers ; all things were created by him and for  
“ him,’ and he ‘ upholdeth all things by the word of his  
“ power.’ And that we may in some sort understand, how  
“ infirmity and perfection should thus meet in the same  
“ person, we are told by St. John, that the ‘ Word was  
“ made flesh.’ It was clearly, therefore, the doctrine of  
“ holy writ, and nothing else, which the Fathers asserted,  
“ in terms borrowed from the schools of philosophy, when  
“ they affirmed, that the very principle of personality and  
“ individual existence, in St. Mary’s Son, was union with  
“ the uncreated Word.”<sup>y</sup>

<sup>y</sup> Horsley’s Sermon on the Incarnation, pp. 357—359.

VIII. But if the Philosophy was unsound from which the Orthodox no less than the Heretic drew his arguments, it may seem, that we can attribute no greater validity to the orthodox conclusions than to those of the heretical reasoner. This, however, does not follow. The question is:—does the Orthodox Conclusion, though using the Phraseology of an erroneous Philosophy, protect the Truth from the shafts of that Philosophy, and keep it entire as it existed in the Primitive Confessions? If it does, (and a study of the subject will show that it does,) the Conclusions are valid; not because the Philosophy is more sound in this case than in the other; but because they are safeguards of the Truth,—because of their skilful and valuable application. Nor is the introduction of this Philosophy into the Sacred Subject thereby justified. It may still be far better that this Philosophy should never have been introduced into it at all; in the same way, as evil in the world may be the means of much greater good in the result, than if there had been no evil; and yet it may have been far better for the world that there had been no evil at all.<sup>2</sup>

Further, though we may approve certain Statements of Doctrine as *results*, is it necessary that we should approve all the reasonings and speculations on which those particular modes of speaking have been founded? Receiving the Statements as results, we may find that we cannot alter them for the better; or the difficulty of the attempt may induce us to acquiesce in what sufficiently declares the Truth, though we may not *abstractedly* approve the Statement for its own sake. But an approbation of the *reasonings* and *speculations* involved in a mode of Statement is quite another thing. I do not think the Quakers were wise in changing the names of

<sup>2</sup> See Origen Con. Cels. l. iv. p. 210. ed. Spencer.—Butler's Anal. pt. i. c. 7.



the months or days, because the existing names are drawn from heathenism: but I do not feel myself committed by this opinion, to approve the heathenism wrapped up in the popular names. Neither am I excluded from freely discussing, and objecting to, the Scholasticism involved in our Theological Statements, because I approve the use of those Statements. Nor am I bound to disapprove the latter, because I may disapprove the former.

Nor does it follow that in objecting to Realism, as a philosophical system, I should attribute no reality to the objects about which Revelation is conversant. These may be realities, (as they are,) and yet some of the Terms by which they are expressed may be merely notional. For instance, the doctrine that there is a Life Everlasting, describes a reality. It is not merely a nominal or metaphysical Truth, but a truth which implies a real existence. And yet the Terms themselves are abstract, representing ideas which have no existence apart from living beings.<sup>a</sup>

IX. But perhaps, we are hereby induced to think less hardly of heretical assailants of the Faith. Seeing that the Orthodox as well as the Heretic have dealt in the speculations of an Ancient Philosophy, we may think less blame due to Heretics than we at first supposed.—But are we obliged to condemn others, in order to ensure our own title to orthodoxy? We cannot, indeed, believe ourselves to be right in our religious convictions, without believing all dissentients from our views to be wrong. But this does not

<sup>a</sup> It is remarkable, that Realists have always been peculiarly sensitive to offence in regard to their theory.—Οἱ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ ἰδέᾳ, ἐάν τις εἰς τὴν ἰδεάν, was observed long ago by Aristotle.

require that we should *condemn* and *censure* all who differ from us, or that we should hold ourselves free from all censure because we are correct in our belief. It is the very spirit of the Church of England to admit that we are not infallible, though we may not allow that we are in actual error. Whilst, therefore, we detest all False Doctrine *in itself*, we are bound to concede to dissentients that they are not *necessarily* in error, though we believe them to be in error. Such is the view given by Bishop Marsh of the principle of the Church of England:—

“ It has been frequently said, and very lately repeated  
 “ that, as the two Churches [of England and Rome] act  
 “ alike in maintaining, each for itself, that it *does not* err,  
 “ it is mere metaphysical subtlety to distinguish between  
 “ the petty terms of ‘*does not*,’ and ‘*can not*.’ But these  
 “ terms, insignificant as they may appear, denote nothing  
 “ less, than two distinct principles of *action*; and principles  
 “ so distinct, that the one leads to charity and toleration, the  
 “ other to intolerance and persecution. On the *former*  
 “ principle, which is maintained by the Church of England,  
 “ though we *believe* that we are right, we admit, that we  
 “ are *possibly* wrong; though we believe that others are  
 “ *wrong*, we admit that they are *possibly* right; and hence  
 “ we are disposed to *tolerate* their opinions. But on the  
 “ *latter* principle, which is maintained by the Church of  
 “ Rome, the very *possibility* of being right is denied to  
 “ those who dissent from its doctrines. Now, as soon as  
 “ men have persuaded themselves, that in points of doc-  
 “ trine they *cannot* err, they will think it an imperious *duty*  
 “ to prevent the growth of all *other* opinions on a subject  
 “ so important as *religion*. Should argument, therefore,  
 “ fail, the importance of the *end* will be supposed to justify

“ the worst of means. But the intolerance, thus produced,  
 “ by an imaginary exemption from error, is far from being  
 “ confined to the Church of Rome. . . . And hence we  
 “ may justly infer, that the same inquisitorial power, which  
 “ has been exercised by the Church of Rome, would be  
 “ exercised by others, who set up *similar* pretensions, if  
 “ the means of *employing* that power were once at their  
 “ command.”<sup>b</sup>

In these views, Bishop Marsh is supported by the authority of Archbishop Bramhall. “ Cannot a man believe or hold  
 “ his own religion to be true,” says Bramhall, “ but he must  
 “ necessarily say, or censure, another man’s, which he con-  
 “ ceiveth to be opposite to it, to be false? Truth and false-  
 “ hood are contradictory, or of eternal disjunction; but  
 “ there is a mean between believing or holding mine own  
 “ Religion to be true, and saying or censuring another  
 “ man’s (which, perhaps, is opposite,) to be false, both  
 “ more prudential and more charitable; that is, silence; to  
 “ look circumspectly to myself, and leave other men to stand  
 “ or fall to their own master. St. Cyprian did believe or  
 “ hold his own opinion of rebaptization to be true, yet did  
 “ not censure the opposite to be false, or remove any man  
 “ from his communion for it. Rabshakeh was more censo-  
 “ rious than Hezekiah, and downright Atheists than con-  
 “ scionable Christians.”<sup>c</sup> “ Prejudice and self-love are like  
 “ a coloured glass, which makes every thing we discern  
 “ through it to be of the same colour; and on the other side,  
 “ rancour and animosity, like the tongue infected with choler,  
 “ maketh the sweetest meats to taste bitter; in each respect,

<sup>b</sup> Bishop Marsh’s Lect. on the Criticism and Interpret. of the Bible, p. 319, ed. 1828.

<sup>c</sup> Schism Guarded, p. 397.

“ censures are dangerous, and his principle pernicious, that, he who doth not censure every religion which he reputeth contrary to his own, hath no Religion.”<sup>d</sup>

It is a great fallacy to argue from the case of Morality to that of Theology, as some seem to do; and to suppose that, as to be virtuous implies a condemnation and abhorrence of vice, so, to be correct in your religious views implies that you must condemn and abhor whatever differs from you. For, first, Virtue and Vice do not differ, as right and wrong opinions differ. We cannot know what Virtue is, without a perception of what Vice is. But many a Christian knows what is right in Religion, without knowing any thing, or thinking any thing, of erroneous belief.—Then, again, the law of Virtue is written on every man’s heart, so that he cannot commit vice without self-condemnation. But we cannot say that shades of Theological Opinion, or even essential Articles of Faith, are distinguishable in the same way by every man.—Again, immoral sentiments necessarily lead to immoral actions: not so, however, heterodox doctrines; they may, or may not.—But even in regard to positive immoralities, we have our Saviour’s caution against a forward censoriousness, in that beautiful account of the woman taken in adultery, and brought before Him for condemnation. We are taught that it is no sign of the greatest purity, to be too forward even in marking out the vicious person. And still less may we suppose it a necessary attendant on the most sincere Faith, to be eager to anathematize those who have not, or are supposed not to have, that Faith.

<sup>d</sup> Schism Guarded, p. 398.

X. I have said enough, I hope, to shew the candid reader, that I desire only to lead him to an enlightened acquaintance with an important branch of Theological study; the History of the Technical Language employed in Theology. There is nothing, I am persuaded, in this track of Inquiry which can unsettle the Faith of the sincere Christian. Let it be pursued patiently and honestly, and it must tend to Christian edification,—to an increased reverence for God's holy word, and an increased acquaintance with it as the only standard of pure Christian profession,—and a consequent scriptural conviction of the truth and holiness of the Doctrines taught by our Church.

In concluding these observations, let me add, that as I have objected to imputing the deductions of man's reason to the Revealed word,—so, I would further object to having the errors of another person's conclusions from my principles or language, imputed to me. Let what I have written be fairly tried on its own merits, not on the demerits which others would reflect upon it from their peculiar views.

Nothing is easier than to make out inconsistencies or apparent contradictions in a writer, and to excite suspicion against him. Ῥάδιον καὶ ἀφαιροτέροις. I confess I am not solicitous about censures of this kind. I do not pretend to justify every expression, or every argument, that I may have used in the course of my writings. I am quite aware that much that I have said, might have been said better,—might have been more cautiously guarded against cavil,—might have been worked up into more perfect unity with the whole of my composition. But of this, at the same time, I have a strong assurance, that my views are fundamentally right; and that any defect which may exist, will be found only in the execution of the details.

Whoever looks at my undertaking in a kindly spirit, and at the same time with a just critical acumen and knowledge of the subject, will see that I have written with sincerity, and that there is the same train of thought pervading all that I have said. If I have not done my subject full justice,—if I have left much in obscurity,—if I have thrown out roughly what either myself or others may hereafter correct and perfect,—let me not be blamed so much for what remains undone, as indulgently regarded for what I have attempted. Whatever I may have expressed inaccurately, I am quite ready to alter, so as to make my sense more understood. Whatever I may have argued incorrectly, I am quite ready to amend. If some will still complain that there should be any thing to need correction, they cannot have considered with what labour Truth is sought, and how happy we ought to be if we only find it at the last.

But though much of what I have said, were otherwise expressed, or corrected, in deference to a candid criticism, (which I am always ready to receive,) there would still remain the substantial allegations of my Lectures, the positive instances of the Scholastic formation of our Theological Language to be disproved, in order to overthrow the truth and importance of the Work.

For my part, I have found my own convictions of the truth of the doctrines of the Church of England, strengthened by the Inquiry pursued in these Lectures. But I do not look to myself alone. I trust this Work is destined to effect extensive good. I feel a confidence, that it will outlive the tumultuary shouts with which it has been assailed. And I anxiously desire, that it should produce the same salutary impression on the minds of others, which the Inquiry itself has produced on mine. If I believed there were any

thing in it to shake the faith of the humble disciple,—to obscure or lower the great truth of Christ Crucified,—to lead any one to deny the Lord that bought him, or confess his Saviour in any other sense than as “the Lord his Righteousness,” his “Lord and his God,” in sincerity and in truth,—or to apostatize in any degree from the pure scriptural faith of the Catholic Church of Christ;—I would be the first to erase such a passage from my work, and utterly to disown it.

The following passage of Augustine expresses the spirit, in which I submit to the reader every particular statement, as well as the whole Argument of my Work:—

*Sane cum in omnibus literis meis, non solum pium lectorem, sed etiam liberum correctorem desiderem, multo maxime in his ubi ipsa magnitudo quæstionis utinam tam multos inventores habere posset, quam multos contradictores habet. Veruntamen sicut lectorem meum nolo mihi esse deditum, ita correctorem nolo sibi. Ille me non amet amplius quam catholicam fidem; iste se non amet amplius quam catholicam veritatem. Sicut illi dico; noli meis literis quasi canonicis scripturis inservire; sed in illis et quod non credebam cum inveneris incunctanter crede, in istis autem quod certum non habebas, nisi certum intellexeris, noli firmiter retinere; ita illi dico; noli meas literas ex tua opinione vel contentione, sed ex divina lectione, vel inconcussa ratione, corrigere. Si quid in eis veri comprehenderis, existendo non est meum, at intelligendo et amando et tuum sit et meum. Si quid autem falsi conviceris, errando fuerit meum, sed jam cavendo nec tuum sit nec meum.*<sup>e</sup>

“In truth, whilst in all my writings, I desire not only a pious reader, but also a free corrector, most especially do I in these, where the very magnitude of the question

<sup>e</sup> De Trin. lib. iii. p. 93 of tom. iii. ed. Tigur.

“ makes me wish it could have as many to investigate  
“ it, as it numbers amongst its impugners. However, as  
“ I would not that my reader should be devoted to me, so  
“ neither would I have my corrector devoted to himself.  
“ Let not the former love me more than the Catholic Faith:  
“ let not the latter love himself more than the Catholic  
“ Truth. While, to the former I say,—Treat not my  
“ writings with a deference due to the canonical Scriptures;  
“ but in the one, unhesitatingly believe what you did not  
“ believe, on finding it there; in the other, however, retain  
“ not firmly what you were not convinced of, unless you  
“ should be fully convinced of it;—to the latter I say,  
“ Correct not my writings out of your own opinion, or out  
“ of contention: but from the reading of the divine word,  
“ or by unshaken argument. Should you lay hold of any  
“ thing in them that is true,—in being so, it is not mine;  
“ but by the understanding and the love of it, let it be both  
“ yours and mine. Should you, however, detect any thing  
“ that is false,—in the error, it may have been mine;  
“ but henceforth, by guarding against it, let it be neither  
“ mine nor yours.”





# **LECTURE I.**

**ORIGIN OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.**



## SUMMARY.

NATURE of the Inquiry proposed, the force of Theory on Theological language—the Scholastic Philosophy an important branch of this General Inquiry—its connexion with the philosophy of Aristotle—Neglect of consideration of its influence in comparison with that of Platonism—the greater extent of its influence—its more immediate interest.

The Scholastic Philosophy the result of a struggle between Reason and Authority—its history to be traced to the ascendancy of the Latin Clergy—Contrast between the Greek and Latin Fathers—Practical character of the Latins exemplified in their leading men—strict correspondence sustained among them—Contrast of state of Society in the East and the West—Civil disturbance and misery of the West favourable to the power of the Latin Church—Rhetorical character of the Latin theological writers—Fruitless attempt of Jerome to improve the Latin literature of his time—Monastic Institutions of the West less enthusiastic than those of the East—Origin of the Scholastic System more developed in the progress of the Church after the middle of the fifth century.—The principle of liberty of reason which had led to the power of the Church, operating within the Church, leads at once to heresy and ecclesiastical coercion—Extent of jurisdiction over opinion claimed by the Latin Clergy evidenced in the Predestinarian Controversy of the Ninth century—Subsequent history a continuance of the struggle between Reason and Authority in the West.—Subjugation of the intellect leads to its insurrection—Character of its efforts at this period.

The argumentative theology at length sanctioned by the Church itself in its authoritative capacity.—The Book of the Sentences.—Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas, perfect the method established.—Success of Scholasticism owing to its combination of unlimited discussion with deference to authority.

I PETER IV. 11.

If any man speak, let him speak as the oracles of God.

*Εἴ τις λαλεῖ, ὡς λόγια Θεοῦ.*

Si quis loquitur, quasi sermones Dei. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE I.

---

CHRISTIANITY had its beginnings amidst obstructions of a twofold character; the self-righteousness of the human heart, and the presumption of the human understanding. It had to war with the pride of man, entrenched within these double fortifications. Not only were those principles of our nature, on which it was to exercise its sanctifying influence, armed in hostility against it; but those on which it had to rely as the interpreters of its overtures of peace and pardon, misconstrued and misrepresented its heavenly message.

The history of infidelity and of heresy affords abundant instances of this twofold counteraction to the truths of the Gospel. It is not of the action of the heart on the understanding, and of the understanding on the heart, that I now speak. That this mutual action and reaction take place in all our decisions on moral questions, is undoubtedly true; and a highly interesting fact it is both to the Theologian and the Moral Philosopher. The point, however, on which I now insist, is the separate influence of the two great classes of principles,

which our nature exhibits on the reception of divine truth. There is a resistance simply moral, and another simply intellectual;—the force of Vice and the force of Theory;—both of which have played a considerable part in the drama of Religion. Each demands, accordingly, a distinct consideration from those who would fully solve that great problem, which the existence of a complex system of facts and doctrines, under the name of Christianity, presents to the thoughtful mind.

My purpose in the following Lectures is, to examine into the influence of one of these Classes of principles—those of the understanding;—and to endeavour to present to your notice the force of Theory in its relation to the divine truths of our Religion. It is that portion of the inquiry which has attracted the least investigation in itself. For though ecclesiastical histories purpose to give a view of theological opinion, there is none that I am acquainted with which has given an account of the effect of Opinion *as such* on the doctrines of Christianity. They give rather a view of human passions in their relation to the divine truth, or of human nature in general in its reception of the Gospel. They do not show how the intellect of man has insinuated its own conclusions into the body of the revelation in the course of its transmission, and modified the expressions by which the truth is conveyed.

I do not indeed purpose to enter into the whole of so large an inquiry. Nor can I pretend, in the

compass of the present Lectures, to exhaust even a part of it. I must content myself with laying before you that portion of it which has forcibly struck my own mind; and which I hope may also prove, both interesting in itself, and important to the result of the whole inquiry into the theoretic modifications of our theological language.

It is then to the effect of the Scholastic<sup>a</sup> Philosophy that I have directed my attention, and endeavoured to trace the modifications of our theological language as illustrated in that vast theoretic system. The existence alone of that system in the very heart of the Christian Church for so many centuries—for more than a thousand years if we comprise the period of its formation antecedent to its perfect maturity, for more than five centuries if we look only to its perfect development—is a most striking fact. And I only wonder that it has not attracted more notice than it has hitherto obtained. We meet indeed with some incidental remarks in works of philosophy or theology on the theoretic character of the system. But with these remarks it is usually dismissed as a method long gone by, which has had its day and is now extinct, and

<sup>a</sup> The word Scholastic has now obtained a secondary meaning from the disputations with which it was connected. We see its original sense in the following passage:—*Omnes enim in scriptis suis causas tantum egerunt suas; et propriis magis laudibus quam aliorum utilitatibus consulentes, non id facere adnisi sunt ut salubres ac salutiferi, sed ut scholastici ac disertissimi haberentur.* *Salvian.* De Gubern. Dei, Præfat. ed. Baluz.



remains only a monument of frivolous ingenuity, to be neglected and despised by the more enlightened wisdom of the present age. But surely a pursuit in which the human mind has been so long engaged, and which has thus, as an indisputable matter of fact, educated the human intellect in the West, for the larger views, and more elevated thoughts, and more masculine vigour, of Modern Science and Modern Theology, demands more respect, more serious consideration. If it supplied, as it undoubtedly did, the elements of our present improvement, the stock of principles of which the Reformation, both religious and intellectual, of the sixteenth century, availed itself; to which that Reformation was forced to address itself; whose language it was forced to adopt in order to be understood and received; neither the historian of the human mind, nor the student of Religion, ought to leave this track of inquiry unexplored. The Scholastic Philosophy in fact lies between us at our present station in the world, and the immediate diffusion of the truth from heaven, as "the morning spread on the mountains," an atmosphere of mist through which the early beams of Divine Light have been transfused. It has given the celestial rays a divergency whilst it has transmitted them, and, by the multiplicity of its reflections, made them indistinct as to their origin.

To the members indeed of this University, which, with such wisdom, has retained the study of Aristotle's Philosophy, justly regarding it as the

strongest, best discipline of the mind, whilst it has discarded the dialectical abuses of the system, the inquiry into the nature of Scholastic Philosophy peculiarly recommends itself. It becomes an inquiry into the nature and effects of that very philosophy which our University discipline upholds to a certain extent. For the Scholastic method is nothing more than a view of the philosophy of Aristotle, as it was moulded by the state of civilization and learning, and by the existing relations between the civil and ecclesiastical powers in the course of the middle ages. It is what the cherished study of this place was at a period, when it was pursued with an excessive intensity of devotion to the combined authority of the Philosopher and the gifted commentator on his doctrines. The erection of this and other Universities was the great external means by which the Scholastic Philosophy was constituted into that form which it ultimately attained. The chairs of theology and philosophy, established here and elsewhere, were the oracular seats, from which the doctrines of Aristotle were expounded, as the *rationale* of theological and moral truth. The collection of these several authoritative decisions at length rose into a peculiar system of Philosophy in itself; of which Aristotle indeed was the foundation and cement, but the structure itself, commentary piled on commentary, and conclusion on conclusion.

It may appear strange, then, that whenever the history of religious opinion has attracted attention,

curiosity should rather have been directed to the effects of Platonism, than to those of the more established Aristotelic philosophy. It is owing, perhaps, to the circumstance that Platonism has been more arrogant in its pretensions: it has aspired, not to modify, but to supersede Christian truth. Christianity had to struggle in its infancy against the theology of the school of Alexandria, which regarded the Christian system as an intrusion on the philosophical ascendancy which it had hitherto enjoyed. The New-Platonists disputed the originality of the Christian doctrine, asserting that the sayings of our Lord were all derived from the doctrines of their Master.<sup>b</sup> Nor was the mischief from the Alexandrian School neutralized, when, its open hostility being found ineffectual, disciples of that school merged themselves into the Christian name. The accommodation which then took place between the theories of their philosophy and the doctrines of the Faith, proved a snare to members of the Church. Hence, upon the whole, resulted, even in the beginnings of the Gospel, an ambiguity respecting the

<sup>b</sup> De utilitate autem historiæ, ut omittam Græcos, quantam noster Ambrosius quæstionem solvit, calumniantibus Platonis lectoribus et dilectoribus, qui dicere ausi sunt, omnes Domini nostri Jesu Christi sententias, quas mirari et prædicare coguntur, de Platonis libris eum didicisse, &c. *Augustin. De Doct. Christ. lib. II. c. 2. Vol. III. p. 12. ed. 4to. Venet. 1584.*

Libros beatissimi Papæ Ambrosii credo habere sanctitatem tuam; eos autem multum desidero, quos adversus nonnullos imperitissimos et superbissimos, qui de Platonis libris Dominum profecisse contendunt, diligentissime et copiosissime scripsit. *Augustinus Paulino, Epist. XXXIII. Oper. Vol. II. p. 39.*

peculiar rights of the antagonist systems. And this ambiguity affected the question of the self-originated divine character of the Christian Truth. The attention of Theologians, therefore, could not but be drawn to the subject. The Faith itself was at stake in the endeavour to disentangle it from the theories of the Platonizing Christians. It was to be determined whether Christianity was a true religion possessing an intrinsic authority. It has not been so with regard to the Aristotelic philosophers. These were in comparative obscurity when the Alexandrian School gave the law to the literary world. They did not put forward any pretensions as the rivals of Christianity, but pursued their own independent path, struggling rather against the domination of the Platonists than against the Christian innovator. The Church too looked upon the Peripatetic school with shyness and aversion at the first, regarding it as atheistic and impious, the resource of heresy and religious perfidy; whereas towards the Platonic system, the early doctors entertained a tacit partiality, amidst their actual hostility to the professors of that system. Opposing Platonism, as a sect jealous of the rising power of Christianity, they still felt no repugnance to the intermixture of its speculations with the vital truths of the religion. The philosophy of Aristotle, on the contrary, crept into the Church imperceptibly, and even against the consent of the Church. No compromise took place between its disciples and the members of the Church. There

was none of that ostentatiousness of principles on their part, which characterized the proceedings of the New-Platonic school in their intercourse with the Church. But the logic of Aristotle continued from time to time to supply the heretic with arms. And this dexterous warfare, carried on by the heretic, gradually brought the Church to the use of the same arms which it had rejected with disdain. Thus, amidst all the disavowals of the system which it strenuously made, the Church became unawares Aristotelic. It had learned the arts of its impugners, and spoke the language of their theories in its own authoritative declarations against them.

But in reality, the question of the influence of Aristotle's philosophy is more important on this very account, that it has been more subtle, more silently insinuated into, and spread over, the whole system of Christian doctrines. Being employed as an instrument of disputation, it has not been confined, like Platonism, to certain leading points of Christianity, as, for instance, to the doctrines of the Trinity and the Immortality of the Soul, but has been applied to the systematic development of the sacred truth in all its parts. That complete discussion, which the minutest points of Christianity obtained under the discipline of the Aristotelic philosophy in the hands of the Schoolmen, has fixed our technical language in every department of Theology. I consider it therefore necessary for the perfect understanding of those terms of our Religion, which an established usage has now made the

unchangeable records of religious belief; which, both the orthodox and the heretic, the catholic and the schismatic, alike employ in all their religious statements and arguments; to examine to some extent, how far their history may be traced in the Aristotelic theories of Scholasticism.

In that familiarity which we have acquired from our infancy with the mysterious terms of Christian Theology, the necessity of inquiring into their history escapes our ordinary reflection. We little think that we are walking among the shades of departed controversies, among the monuments, and the trophies, of hearts that have burned with zeal, and of intellects that have spent themselves in the subtilty and vehemence of debate. But as to the unconscious traveller over ground which history or poetry has ennobled, so to us, the land is mute: it brings not the rich recollections of other men and other days: and we pass on in careless haste, thinking it enough, that these memorials of our Fathers in the Faith serve the actual occasions of our present convenience.

The Scholastic Philosophy, indeed, is pre-eminently a record of the struggle which has subsisted, between the efforts of human reason, on the one hand, to assert its own freedom and independence; and on the other hand, the coercion exercised over it by the civil or ecclesiastical powers. In the general survey of it, it will be observed to be distinguished by two very opposite characteristics;

an unbounded liberty of discussion, that advances with unawed step into the most startling curiosities of minute inquiry; and a servile addiction to the previous determinations and sanctions of the venerated doctors of the Church. Both these facts, so conspicuous in the matured form of the Scholastic Theology, are the surviving evidences of that struggle under which its system gradually rose and established itself. It was by its artful combination of these two ingredients of the human judgment,—the positiveness of dogmatism, and the waywardness of private reason,—that its empire was decided. To this combination we owe the precision and the compass of our theological language. No thought was left unexpressed, which the captiousness of real or imaginary objection might obtrude on the sacred subject: no authority was passed by, without being tasked for its contribution to the exact definition of each point examined.

On the present occasion I shall address myself principally to the development of these facts, as they are illustrated in the History of the Scholastic Philosophy; reserving the consideration of the general nature of the Philosophy itself, and the illustrations to be derived from it to particular terms of Theology, for the subjects of the following Lectures.

The origin of the Scholastic Philosophy carries back our inquiry to the causes of the ascendancy

obtained by the Latin Clergy over the Greek. The establishment of the Papal power of Rome was in itself among the effects of that ascendancy—the consummation to which it led. The real ground of that Power lay more deeply than in the temporal advantages which the see of Rome possessed, or in the successful policy of its Bishops. The continuance of the Papal power, amidst its rapid transition through the hands of successive Bishops, and these also often individuals not distinguished by their talents or their general merits in the ecclesiastical body, argues the stability and perpetuity of a principle upholding that power, and guarding it against the casualties of personal imbecility and worthlessness. This principle was the predominant influence of the Latin Clergy. The course of events in the early history of the Church seemed to be eminently favourable towards the preponderance of the Greeks. Theirs were the Churches immediately founded by the Apostles. Theirs was the language of the sacred books and of philosophy. Theirs, with a few exceptions, were the Apologies by which Christianity defended itself against the assaults of the Jew or the Pagan in the first centuries. It was their writers who took the lead in systematizing the doctrines of the Faith, and allied them with philosophy. It was their Bishops who took the ostensible part in the great Councils of the first four centuries, and the first half of the fifth. In the course of that period, too, occur the names of all the most illustrious Fathers of the Greek Church; Justin Martyr,



Origen, Eusebius of Cæsarea, Athanasius, Basil, the two Gregories, Chrysostom ; men of acute and eloquent genius, as well as of intrepid energy. Still the efforts of the Greeks may all be characterized as eminently literary : as philosophical defences and expositions of the Faith, more than practical energies in its behalf. This I observe is their general character ; not denying, at the same time, that there are exceptions to this general remark, in some striking instances of individual conduct, among those to whom I have referred.

Contrast, on the other hand, the labours of the Latin Clergy during the same period. The practical character here shows itself as the prominent feature ; the literary, or philosophical, being entirely subordinate to it. The Latins have not that splendid array of philosophical writings, which the catalogue of the Greek Fathers exhibits ; but they had sagacious political leaders, popular advocates of the sacred cause, men of extensive knowledge of the world combined with a nervous enthusiasm of thought and feeling. In Tertullian, for instance, we see the art of the rhetorician united with the obstinacy and rude vehemence of the practical enthusiast : in Cyprian, amidst the placid flow of his style, the resoluteness of moral feeling, which at length carried him to martyrdom : in Lactantius and Arnobius, the persuasiveness of advocates intent more on the effect of their arguments than on their philosophical accuracy or logical cogency : in Jerome and Augustine at once the rigour of logicians, the comprehensive

views of philosophers, the persuasiveness of orators, the command of political leaders.

Jerome, perhaps, is one of the most extraordinary instances which history exhibits, of the union of dark and solitary abstractedness of mind, with dexterous facility in wielding to theoretic views the complex means which human society presents. His influence was like that of invisible agency, proving its existence by its effects, but defying our search into its mysterious powers. Whether at Rome, dictating the law of religion to devout followers, or lurking in the wilds on the Syrian confines,<sup>c</sup> or buried in the seclusion of his monastery at Bethlehem, this extraordinary man appears to have secured in himself the declining fortunes of orthodoxy, and effectually established its future dominion in the Church.

Take again the case of Ambrose; a civil officer of Rome, in the full activity of youth, and as yet unbaptized, suddenly called by the acclamations of the people to the vacant archbishopric of Milan, then the seat of the Western Empire.<sup>d</sup> He united the inflexible religion of Athanasius with the practical dexterity of the man of the world: so that, whilst he carried his principles into effect with a straight-forwardness of purpose, which appeared the result of a reckless enthusiasm, forcing its way in

<sup>c</sup> See his Epistle to Damasus. *Hieronym.* Oper. tom. II. p. 131.—Note A. Appendix.

<sup>d</sup> Gregory Nazianzen also describes the election of a person who had not even been baptized, to the bishopric of Cæsarea.—Note B.

spite of the current of human affairs: he yet, by his penetration into characters and circumstances, evidently calculated the force of resistance to be encountered, and the ultimate superiority of his influence. Study him in his different relations with the Emperor Gratian, with Theodosius,<sup>e</sup> with Justina and the younger Valentinian; and compare with him the conduct of Athanasius in the like circumstances. In the latter, we see a bold uncompromising enthusiasm, a chivalrous ardour in the cause of religion, undaunted by difficulties, acquiring intensity by struggle with adventures: but throughout it is a theoretic enthusiasm which his conduct displays. The actions of the man seem only the bold expression of his theories. But in Ambrose we contemplate the talent of the skilful Governor of the Church; a determination inspired by a confidence of actual power; and an exertion of that power for the maintenance of his religious principles.<sup>f</sup>

<sup>e</sup> Qui leges tulerat, quam patienter tulit sententiam sacerdotis Mediolanensis. Et ne sententiam emolliti presbyteri, et principibus applaudentis, fuisse teneram putes, a regalium usu suspensus est princeps, exclusus ab ecclesia, et pœnitentiam coactus est explere solemnem. *Joann. Saresberiens.* Policraticus, lib. IV. c. 6. p. 225.

<sup>f</sup> Christians in the IVth century had still retained a great deal of heathen practice mixed up with their religion. Ambrose acted the reformer by his authority.—Itaque cum ad memorias sanctorum, sicut in Africa solebat, pultes, et panem, et merum adtulisset, atque ab ostiario prohiberetur, ubi hoc Episcopum vetuisse cognovit, tam pie atque obedienter amplexa est, ut ipse mirarer, quam facile accusatrix potius consuetudinis suæ, quam deceptatrix illius prohibitionis effecta sit. *Augustin.* Confess. VI.

Where again in the Greek Church shall we find a parallel to Augustine, the individual to whom perhaps, after the great Apostle of the Gentiles, the Christian cause, so far as human ability has supported it, owes principally its present strength and triumph. There are in Augustine some lines of character strongly resembling those of the Apostle himself. He displayed an ardent zeal like that of Paul; a sleepless vigilance like that of Paul for the spiritual needs of the Church; like Paul also, a vigorous power of argumentation, a perception of the force of heretical objections, and an energy of rapid retort. Like the Apostle again, he had been the ardent devotee of a hostile system of religious opinion. The Manicheism of his early life had nourished the fire of enthusiasm in him; as in the youthful bosom of St. Paul the prejudices of a Pharisee had glowed into the flames of a persecutor. Neither of them could take a passive subordinate part in any course in which they might be engaged. The parallel only fails, when we think of the frankness and simplicity of the Apostle, compared with the shrewdness and versatility of the Saint. We see the force of Augustine's character in the management of the Church itself, the work of greater difficulty, rather than in the dexterous use of the civil power. The Church of the West during the period when he flourished, the latter

cap. 2. In cap. 3 of the same book, Augustine gives an account of the manner in which the time of Ambrose was occupied.—  
Note C.

half, that is, of the IVth century, and the commencement of the Vth, was daily becoming a more complex machine, more unwieldy to ordinary hands, demanding talents of the first order to grasp its various relations, and a commanding moral power to direct and control the whole system. Such occasions, it has been often observed, are always found to call forth the spirits that alone are meet to cope with them. Jerome was a spirit of this mould; still more so was Augustine. He had not the learning, or the eloquence, or the depth of character which Jerome possessed; but he had the advantage of a more pliant temper, a more social taste, a more personal influence—an influence, not merely of respect for his station, and talents, and moral power, but evidently of affection for the man.<sup>5</sup> In Jerome there was a strong tinge of Oriental enthusiasm: Augustine was throughout the Latin Churchman. It is the care of the Churches which he evinces through his whole career: we never lose sight of him as the Chief Pastor of the flock, as the head of a vast spiritual community, for which he appears to hold himself responsible. His very writings, in fact, are so many actions. The view of them as compositions is lost, in the impression which they give us, of the design of the writer to produce some practical effect. We do him injustice, when we contemplate him simply as the writer, or the literary debater. In this respect we

<sup>5</sup> See the Letter of Volusian.—Note D.

are apt to pronounce him inconsistent, or even contradictory to himself. But this very inconsistency is a strong evidence of the really practical design of the writer. He was too acute a logician, not to see the speculative consequences of his own statements—too skilful a rhetorician, not to suspect that his own positions might be urged against him. But, at the same time, he had too deep an acquaintance with the practical course of things, not to be aware, that the skill of the logician is not omnipotent over the affairs of life; and that he who would rightly avail himself of men and things, must sometimes be content to wear that guise of paradox, which the actual constitution of the world often exhibits in itself.

A feeling of surprise indeed must arise in our minds, when we look back to the IVth century, and contemplate that restless activity by which the leading members of the Latin Church were distinguished. An active communication indeed subsisted throughout the Church at large. Athanasius, from his retreat in the solitudes of the Thebaid, could make his counsels felt in the heart of the Empire; and Chrysostom, from his exile on Mount Taurus, could sustain an incessant intercourse with the Faithful at the most remote places. But in the Western Church more especially, the correspondence of feelings and views was vigorously sustained by the great leaders of the Church, evidently as the great instrument of unity in doctrine and government. No point of heterodoxy was touched in one

part of the Empire, but it regularly spread in widening circle until it reached the opposite extreme. The Bishops and rulers of the Church had the deacons and presbyters<sup>h</sup> at their command, to bear their various communications of intelligence, and their replies to the questions sent to them from the distant provinces of their communion. Sagacious practical men, at different important stations, formed a chain of communication, which was kept in constant tension, and vibrated throughout wherever the impression was made.<sup>i</sup>

The state of society, both civil and religious, in the Western Empire, was such as to occasion and promote the influence of the Latin Clergy. The decline of the Roman Empire in the West exhibited more of the character of a violent breaking up and crumbling into pieces; whilst in the East there was a continuity of dissolution, like the silent melting of a frozen mass, full of decay, yet preserving the general sameness of its form. The calamities of the West had produced a shock throughout society, and spread a demoralizing influence through all classes of men. Paganism, which, even in the IVth century, amidst the widely-extended

<sup>h</sup> Sanctum Presbyterum Firmum, anno præterito ob rem earum Ravennam, et inde Aphricam Siciliamque direximus, quem putamus jam in Aphricæ partibus commorari. *Hieronym. Augustino*, Ep. XXX. Aug. Op. Vol. II. p. 36. col. 2. ed. quarto.

Has literulas de sancta Bethleem sancto presbytero Innocentio dedi perferendas. *Hieronym. Aug.* Ep. XXIV. p. 29.

<sup>i</sup> Note E.

dominion of Christianity, had not been effaced from the intercourse and manners of civil life, reclaimed to itself the waste which barbarian inroads had made. A distrust of Providence, and a heathen profligacy of manners, were the sad evidences of an unchristianized people. Nor were the Clergy themselves exempt from that general pollution which took place at this period of confusion. But the ecclesiastical society happily had the advantage of some common principle of union, which no other form of society in the West then enjoyed. They presented the great check to the complete disorganization of the whole frame of society. The Church formed a refuge, where the sympathies of human nature might once more be felt and answered—an asylum from the anti-social elements which were raging without it. Every thing else was become partial and local and insulated: Christianity alone exhibited a character of ubiquity. Under its shade were gathered all nations and languages, without distinction of Jew or Gentile, Greek or Barbarian, bond or free.

The Church accordingly, during the IVth and Vth centuries, was strengthened by great accessions to the ecclesiastical body from the mass of the people, as well as from the higher orders of the community.<sup>k</sup> But this very circumstance, whilst it rendered the Latin Clergy the only really influential power, tended, by the great preponderance which it

<sup>k</sup> Note F.



gave them, to render the Church in itself an instrument of disorganization. The immense disproportion which existed between the spiritual chiefs, and the body over whom they presided, in point of intelligence and moral culture, was a temptation to acts of tyranny, and pride, and avarice. We hear of the severe oppression in those times, of the inferior clergy by the superior, and, in general, of the encroaching and secular spirit of the priests.<sup>1</sup> In the meantime, however, the Latin Clergy, by effectual steps, secured the throne of the Western Empire to the Spiritual Power. The several Barbarian Kings or Emperors, who held the temporal sway, succeeded only to a portion of the rule of the Cæsars over the West. The real unchanging domination, the truly Roman sway, was the spiritual one; lasting in its immortal principle through successions of dynasties; often indeed veiling its high pretensions under the language of adulation and servility, as it did its persecutions in prayers of charity and pity; but at the same time “binding kings in chains and nobles in links of iron;”—in chains indeed of unearthly temper, and links of iron that no hand was seen to forge, but against which sinews of flesh could not avail.

An important difference is to be observed further between the Greek and Latin controversialists; and one which considerably affected the character of the

<sup>1</sup> Note G.

Latins, in that point of view, to which I have been directing your attention, in order to account for the eventual triumph of the Latin Theology. The Greek was by education a sophist in the proper sense of that term. His business was Philosophy. But the Latin Divines of the early centuries were chiefly of the class of Orators, or Rhetoricians, by profession. Tertullian, Cyprian, Lactantius, Arnobius, Minucius Felix, Victorinus, Augustine, were all of that class. Their employment had been either to defend causes in the courts of judicature, or to instruct others in the arts of pleading and composition. The necessity of the case had imposed this duty on the Latins; as all proceedings in the courts throughout the Roman Empire, and all concerns of public business, indeed, were carried on in the Latin language. On the other hand, Greek being cultivated as the language of philosophy and literature, the idiom of the learned and the refined, the accomplished master of that privileged tongue was left to pursue the speculations of his ancestors, on the high and subtile questions, of the Origin of the Universe, of Fate and Providence, and the Nature of Man.

We may clearly perceive a different character of the earlier Latin Theology, as contrasted with the Greek of the same period, in this respect. The Latin flows on more diffusively, more irregularly, more rhetorically, in a word, in his style of argumentation; dwells on a point which he thinks strong, without scrupling to recur to it, and insist on it; and is far less exact in the meaning which

he annexes to the terms employed. The Greek, indeed, shews himself also a rhetorician; rhetoric being a branch of his universal philosophy. But he is principally engaged in illustrating some tenet of philosophy, and applying it to Christian doctrine. He is more logical than the Latin, in this sense that he is intent rather on proving that something which he maintains is true, than of enforcing a belief in it. This, I observe, is the general character of contrast: whilst we shall occasionally find the Greek assuming the office of the Advocate, and the Latin that of the Sophist.

In the schools established by the Emperor Valentinian, in the middle of the IVth century, throughout the Roman Empire, we find the same contrast in the means of education provided for the study of the two languages. At the school of Constantinople, probably the model of all the others, professors in each department of literature were appointed; ten grammarians for each language; but for the Greek, a philosopher, and five sophists; for the Latin, three orators.<sup>m</sup> The Latins, we find, travelled from school to school, as their services might be required in the rhetorical department. And they were thus led to the study of Civil Law, to the deduction of established principles of jurisdiction to particular cases, and the mode of applying these principles in practice. So that whatever philosophy they originally possessed, was essentially dialectical and rhetorical.

<sup>m</sup> Stillingfleet, *Origines Britann.* Vol. I. pp. 212, 213.

It was no investigation of facts ; it was no discussion of fundamental principles ; but a practical direction and use of what was already established. If they did attempt to philosophize more largely, the speculation relapsed into the professorial dogmatism in which their minds had been trained.

The Greeks, accordingly, regarded the Latins with disdain ; as nameless in the roll of Philosophy and Theology. Jerome displayed an anxiety to remove the unphilosophical character from the theology of the Latin Church ; as at the most flourishing period of the Republic, Cicero had endeavoured to remove it from the Roman literature. “ He applied himself to the study of history and antiquity ; partly, “ because he found,” as Erasmus says in his Life, “ that up even to that time theology with the “ Latins was almost in its infancy, and on that “ account a great many were averse to the reading “ of the divine volumes ; hoping the result would “ be, that more would take delight in sacred literature, should any one equal the majesty of theology by the dignity of his style of discourse ; and “ partly, in order that there might be matter of “ reply to heathens who despised Christians as “ infants and ineloquent.”<sup>n</sup> But Jerome failed in the extent of his design, as Cicero also did in his attempt to introduce a Roman philosophical literature. The state of the Latin portion of the Roman Empire did not admit of it. A practical theology

<sup>n</sup> Note H.

was wanted; such as could serve the occasions of men who had to take an active part in the business of the Church; and such as accorded with that bent which the needs of social life had already given to the minds of the Latins. This then was a theology which partook more of the character of debate; in which the powers of the rhetorician might be successfully applied, for the carrying of some point in dispute.

The same practical character of the Latin Divines was illustrated in the nature of the monastic institutions of the West compared with those of the East.<sup>o</sup> There was none of that austerity originally among the Latin monks, for which the Orientals were conspicuous. There was no obligation of vows,

<sup>o</sup> Benedict, at the commencement of the VIth century, was the first to introduce vows and solemn engagements into the monastic institutions of the West. Born in 480, in Italy, at Nursia.

Of the uncongeniality of the monastic life to the Latin world, we have evidence in the description which Salvian gives of the reception, which monks experienced in the streets of Carthage. "If at any time," he says, "a servant of God, or one from the convents of the Egyptians, or from the sacred places of Jerusalem, or from the holy and venerable retirements of the desert, came into that city on the office of his divine work; as soon as he appeared to the people, he met with contumelies, sacrileges, and maledictions: nor this only; but with the most wicked broad-laughs of flagitious men, and the detesting hisses of ridicule, was he beaten as with thongs." *De Gub. Dei*, lib. VIII. p. 190. ed. Baluzii, Paris. 1669.

See Sulpicius Severus' account of the Monastery of St. Martin, in the neighbourhood of Tours. *Vit. B. Martin*, cap. 10.—Note I.

no restriction to place or particular society. The Latin of the IVth century retired from society, to be relieved from the grievous burdens which the iniquities of civil or ecclesiastical rulers laid upon him; to enjoy leisure from the functions of public offices, from which the profession of a monk excused him.<sup>p</sup> The Oriental seems to have retired in order to be alone; to luxuriate in the dreary and melancholy loneliness of his meditations; that he might be dead to the world, and live to God and himself. The Latin withdrew himself from other business, in order to transact with a more intense devotion that high calling, to which his spiritual citizenship had exalted him. He sought solitude as a means of acting more forcibly on the busy scene of society; of making his abstract contemplations enter into the actions of other men; and thus, even whilst personally absent, being effectually present, amidst the life of man. Thus were those who had left the life of monks often called to the office of Bishops; to the active superintendence, that is, of the Church, in the West. They had not disabled themselves, by solitude, for active duties; but, on the contrary, disciplined themselves for office. And in the discharge of these duties, many of them shewed that they had learned the arts of government, and could carry their measures into effect, through a full consciousness of their powers.

<sup>p</sup> Jerome's Life by Erasmus. *Hieronym. Oper.* Vol. I. Note J.

I have dwelt considerably on the ascendancy of the Latin Church, and the practical character which it evidenced in contrast with the Oriental; as I conceive that the account of this influence of the Latins, not only is the true view of the Origin of the Scholastic Philosophy historically; but contains in it the general principles of that Philosophy, and may give us a just Theory of its nature, antecedently to its proper development. We may discover in it two principles in action; the maintenance of an internal principle of liberty in the soul of man superior to all external restraints; and the foundation of a spiritual authority on that principle, superior to every other authority. The spiritual principle was the great bond which drew men together from the colluvies of barbarism, in which all civil society was involved at the approaching fall of the Roman Empire in the West; and the invisible dominion founded on it, was that controlling power, which ultimately became the irresponsible, infallible, authority of the Latin Church. Neither of these principles was as yet fully developed; they were as yet struggling for existence amidst the adverse powers of civil commotion and tyranny. The maturity of the Scholastic Philosophy was a symptom and test of their having reached their perfection. I proceed to point out, how it resulted out of that state of things in the Latin Church which I have already laid before you.

The practical character of the Latin Theologians

is still more fully exemplified in the history of the Church after the first half of the Vth century. The management of the people, by imparting to them spiritual counsel and guidance, the instruction of the young, the regulation of monastic institutions, the internal order of the ecclesiastical body itself, the assemblage of Councils, constitute the chief employment of the Latin Clergy. They succeeded, in the course of a hundred and fifty years, in converting all the schools of learning established by the Emperors into ecclesiastical societies, and all literature and science into Theology: so that, at the opening of the VIIIth century, the face of civil society was changed, and the monotony of religious rule pervaded all things. The continued invasion of Barbarians, whilst it interrupted the course of literary labours, and diminished the chance of theological improvement, gave opportunity for increasing the dependence of the people on the Clergy, and kept the Clergy in constant watchfulness for the maintenance of their spiritual ascendancy. The importance which the Latin Clergy had acquired during this interval, when philosophy was silent in the Western world, and literature degenerated into a pastime, is evidenced in the influence possessed by Alcuin<sup>a</sup> and other ecclesiastics with Charlemagne. An Anglo-Saxon ecclesiastic, from the school of York, became the associate and the counsellor of the greatest monarch of the age. The people were

<sup>a</sup> Alcuin, born at York about 735.



reduced to a state like that of the Israelites in their days of oppression, when “there was no smith to be found in all the land of Israel, lest the Hebrews should make them swords or spears; but all the Israelites were forced to go down to the Philistines to sharpen” the instruments of his daily work. In the general disturbance of the West, a second confusion of tongues had taken place; and the oracles, both of divine and human wisdom, were no longer accessible to the mass of believers. The Christian society at large consisted, in fact, of a promiscuous assemblage of the most discordant materials; all complexions of Barbarian rudeness, in juxtaposition with the relics of Roman civilization. The Clergy alone spoke one language; sympathizing with all the shades of this vastly-diversified community, as being drawn from all its ranks. Possessing too a secret instrument of communication in their knowledge of the Latin, the sacred language of their Theology, they were insulated from the surrounding flood of barbarism, and held together as a mysterious privileged order.<sup>r</sup>

The same principle acted powerfully within the sacred order itself. The gifted few of the

<sup>r</sup> To a certain extent it was required of the laity to make a confession of Faith, both in the Latin language and in that of their country.—*Jubendum est ut Oratio Dominica, in qua omnia necessaria humanæ vitæ comprehenduntur, et Symbolum Apostolorum, in quo fides Catholica ex integro comprehenditur, ab omnibus discatur tam Latine quam Barbarice, ut quod ore confitentur corde credant. Ex Concilio Cabilonensi, cap. 3. Abælardi Oper. p. 369. ed. Paris. 4to. 1616.*

Clergy, in relation to the rest of their own body, were, through their enjoyment of leisure for the cultivation of their own minds, and for the work of ecclesiastical government, what the Clergy, on the whole, were to the religious community. In this state of things, the schools of Theology became naturally the source of all intelligence and practical government. Theologians alone had the secret on which the vitality of Power depended; and the Civil Rulers, therefore, who had any political sagacity, shewed it, in the dexterous use and direction of the force, which they could not coerce, and which was already in possession of the real dominion. The great number of Schools, or Universities, instituted or revived by Charlemagne, are evidences, at once, of the ascendancy of the theological power, and of the wise policy of the Emperor in availing himself of it.

But that liberty of human reason, which formed the basis of the great spiritual society, continued at the same time to live in the bosom of the Church itself. The very aggressions of the ecclesiastical rulers on the liberty of the inferior members of their own body, or on the community of the Faithful at large, tended to keep the spirit of personal freedom of thought in a constant state of reaction. The revival, if not the origin, of heresies, is in a great measure an effect of this reaction. The Church itself had called forth a principle of resistance to constituted powers. It had taught men

to feel, that there was a sentiment of personal independence which no external coercion could control. It was only an extension of this sentiment to the particular matters of religious belief, when individual members of the Church began to think for themselves, and to form parties within the Church. Heresies within the Church would present a refuge, like that which the Church at large had presented against the persecution of tyranny without in the civil world.

The heresies of the West accordingly were particularly distinguished by this character. They were insurrections of human reason, rebellions against the domination of the spiritual power. Thus they were comparatively very few, at the time when the human understanding was humbled and debased by the ignorance and barbarism of the age preceding the reign of Charlemagne. They were more frequent in the East during the same period. Here they were the offspring of philosophy, of those relics at least of philosophy, which subsisted among a people still proud of their intellectual elevation above the rest of the world, and cherishing their literature as the splendid and endeared recollection of former glory. In the West, however, Heresy produced little disturbance, until the period, when the vigour, infused by more active measures of education, roused the mind from the apathy into which it had sunk. The Arian controversy seems to have been only faintly prolonged: and the opinions of the Semi-Pelagians in

the South of Gaul had never perhaps been entirely silenced.<sup>s</sup> But the Predestinarian dispute of the IXth century gives us a lively picture of the conflict, between the liberty of private reason and the spiritual ascendancy of the Church. There we see the effect of education, in awakening the dormant power of the public mind, and the extent of jurisdiction over opinions which the Latin Clergy claimed. This controversy is particularly worthy of remark in the history of the Scholastic Philosophy; as it appears the first occasion, on which the Latins employed the speculations of human reason, to counteract the unauthorized conclusions of a member of their own body. John, surnamed Scotus Erigena,<sup>t</sup> appellations denoting his race and place of birth, a philosopher, at the court of Charles the Bald, was engaged by Hincmar, Archbishop of Rheims, to answer the obnoxious positions of the Predestinarian Gotteschalch.<sup>u</sup> All previous

<sup>s</sup> Note K.

<sup>t</sup> Scotus, as the common appellation of the inhabitant of Ireland and Scotland; Erigena, marking that he was born in Ireland. Bede, speaking of Ireland, says: "Hæc autem proprie patria Scottorum est; ab hac egressi, ut diximus, tertiam in Britannia Brittonibus et Pictis gentem addiderunt." *Hist. Eccl.* lib. I. c. 1.—He was born between 800 and 815: the period of his death, according to Baronius, in 883. The story of his having been pierced to death by the writing instruments of the Scholars at Malmesbury, in a tumultuous assault in the school, though scarcely credible in itself, is characteristic of the insubordination and licence of the Schools of the middle age.—Note L.

<sup>u</sup> Note M.

defences of orthodoxy had been the works of the Clergy, the spiritual advocates of the faith, the Bishops and Saints of the Church. The works themselves thus far had something of the spiritual character in them;—they were invested with the authority of the holy persons, from whose dictation they proceeded. But here we see a layman and a philosopher by profession, employed as the chosen advocate of the sentence of the spiritual ruler. The force of reason evidently began to be acknowledged and felt, as a powerful antagonist which the Church had fostered in its own system, and against which the Church therefore had need to fortify itself with weapons of the same temper. The expedient, indeed, was found to be of dangerous effect; since the philosophy of Erigena served rather to scatter the seeds of still more dangerous perplexity to the creed of the Church: and Hincmar<sup>x</sup> was forced to disown the assistance which he had inconsiderately invoked.<sup>y</sup>

From this period we may notice a continued

<sup>x</sup> Hincmar, driven from his see by an incursion of the Normans, died December 21, 882, three years after the death of the persecuted Gotteschal, and in the 37th year of his Episcopate.

<sup>y</sup> Two Councils condemned the work of Scotus, as containing hæreses plurimas, ineptas quæstiunculas, et aniles pæne fabellas, pluribus syllogismis conclusas, Scotorumque pultes puritati fidei nauseam inferentes, &c. *Vind. Prædestin. et Gratia Hist. et Chron. Synops.* p. 12. in the work entitled, *Veterum Auctorum, qui IX. sæculo de Prædestin. et Gratia scripserunt, Opera et Fragmenta*, by Mauguin, 2 vols. 4to. Paris, 1650.

struggle in the Latin Church, between the advocates of Reason and the advocates of Authority. The contest between Ratramn and Paschase on the doctrine of the Eucharist; of Lanfranc with Berenger on the same subject; of Anselm with Roscelin on the nature of Universals; the complaints of Bernard against the dialectical theology of Abelard;<sup>z</sup> are all illustrations of the collision between Reason and Authority.<sup>a</sup> All these disputes, in fact, were in principle the same. They were only varied forms of rationalism<sup>b</sup>—the pure exertions of the mind within itself, conscious of its own powers, and struggling to push itself forth against the constringent force of the Spiritual government. The mind sought no diversion into the paths of general literature;—there was no study of history or natural science;—none of these could afford it that relief which it demanded, if even opportunities had existed for the prosecution of such studies. An effort was

<sup>z</sup> Radbert Paschase, Abbot of Corbey in France, A.D. 844, died April 26, 851.—Ratramn, or Bertram, a Monk of Corbey, contemporary with Paschase.—Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury, consecrated 1070; died May 24, 1089.—Berenger, died 1088; his controversy with Lanfranc began in 1047.—Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, born 1034, died 1109.—Roscelin, died 1090.—Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux, the great Saint of the XIIth century, born 1091.—Abelard, born 1079, died 1142.—Note N.

<sup>a</sup> Note O.

<sup>b</sup> This term, having been lately appropriated to a particular class of theological opinions, may require the explanation, that it is here used in the general sense corresponding with its etymology.

required, that immediately bore against the pressure by which it was distressed. The reaction must be, where the force had been directed. The Spiritual power forbade the mind to think for itself, to use its own faculties, to examine, to discuss, to object. Obedience was become another word for Religion.<sup>c</sup> It was no wonder, then, that some more liberal spirits essayed those natural exertions of their faculties on which the painful prohibition lay. It was like one who had been bound hand and foot, feeling the luxury of the limbs once more free, and enjoying the perception that he yet has strength and energy. It is enough for such an one, to feel the play of his muscles, to exult that he has broken the bands in sunder, and cast away the cords from him. We can sympathize with the wildness of his gesticulations, however distorting and fantastic. So we may appreciate the efforts of the Rationalists of the middle ages. Their mind exulted in the simple perception that it still was free.

It is impossible for us, at this day, to conceive the force of the pressure of authority on the mind in those ages. The Schools of Philosophy were entirely in the hands of the Ecclesiastical Power. The discipline of moral restraint was extremely weak; for we read of acts of the greatest outrage

<sup>c</sup> Aquinas, it is said, being asked why he had suffered himself to be annoyed by some troublesome brother of his Order, who had worn him out with walking, answered, "By nothing else is Religion perfected but by obedience." *Vita S. Thomæ Aquin.* Oper. Vol. I. ed. Antuerpiæ, 1612.

committed by the students. The same spirit of irregularity and violence, of which Augustine complains as disgracing the Schools of his day, at Carthage, Milan, and Rome, seems to have descended to those of the subsequent ages.<sup>d</sup> But, amidst the moral disorder which prevailed, there was the greatest severity of mental coercion.<sup>e</sup> The case was similar in the monasteries: the greatest moral irregularities<sup>f</sup> were suffered to exist in them, amidst all the strictness of the creed professed, and the solemnities of rituals, and rules.<sup>g</sup> A passive, unthinking obedience to spiritual direction, was the great object aimed at in all these institutions. It was the intellect, therefore, that was the point of attack,—the governing principle within the individual. If he were instructed in a school of Philosophy, he was taught to think as his superiors thought. If he were brought under the rule of a Religious Order, he was taught to sacrifice his own personality in the will of the superior. It was no desire accordingly of what we now understand by liberty, which actuated the struggles of human reason: the licence of the times afforded a

<sup>d</sup> *Augustin.* Confess. l. V. c. 8. c. 12.—Note P.

<sup>e</sup> Cod. Theod. l. 14. tit. 9. A.D. 370, gives the severe restrictions imposed on Students at Rome. Du Boullay cites a canon of the IVth council of Toledo to the same purport. *Hist. Acad. Paris.* t. I. p. 76.

<sup>f</sup> Abelard was never noticed with censures on account of his moral irregularities, whilst he was severely attacked for his speculations.

<sup>g</sup> Note Q.



sort of compensation for the miseries of social tyranny: but it was a resistance to the internal spell which bound the faculties; a resumption of the long-lost perception of personal individuality. There was no sympathy between the efforts of the Italian Republics to obtain social liberty, and those within the Church to recover personal freedom of thought; though both efforts were proceeding at the same period.<sup>h</sup>

It is a curious fact that the Spiritual Powers persisted in strenuously opposing the successive efforts of the Rationalists, and at the same time gradually adopted the very system to which they were so averse, into their own authoritative Theology. They opposed, that is, both the principle of the Rationalists,—the principle that human reason was to be exercised in matters of religion,—and the conclusions to which the unrestrained use of it had led. But afterwards, when the books of controversialists had passed into records of opinions, they readily adopted, as guides in their decisions of any new opinions, the conclusions of that rationalizing method which *as such* had been so passionately denounced. Throughout the whole period, when the Scholastic Philosophy may be said to have been growing, we meet with constant disclaimers, on the

<sup>h</sup> This has been remarked by M. Guizot, in his admirable Lectures on the History of Civilization in Europe. *Cours d' Histoire Moderne, Leçon VI.* p. 37. Paris, 1828.

part of Church-leaders, of the system itself—a constant appeal to the authority of the Scriptures and holy Fathers against the rationalist spirit of the times. Luther himself has not more vehemently denounced the Scholastic Philosophy, than Bernard and other Doctors anterior to the Reformation, have declaimed against the importunateness of the speculations of their times.<sup>i</sup> Thus even the celebrated work of Peter Lombard,<sup>k</sup> Bishop of Paris in the XIIth century, did not escape the censures of theologians, at the time when it appeared.<sup>l</sup> Afterwards it was regarded with the highest veneration as the precious depository of the Sentences of the great Fathers and Luminaries of the Church; and became itself an *Authority* of the Church. Amidst, too, all the prohibitions of Papal Legates in successive reformations of the University of Paris; amidst express instructions to the Clergy, that they should seek rather to become *theodidacti*,<sup>m</sup> than versed in the arts of human disputation; appeared the works of Albert, surnamed the Great, and of his illustrious disciple Thomas Aquinas<sup>n</sup>—the most elaborate specimens of that exercise of Reason which the Church denounced. When the authors themselves were dead, and the reputed sanctity of

<sup>i</sup> Note R.

<sup>k</sup> Peter Lombard, Bishop of Paris 1159, died 1164.

<sup>l</sup> Note S.

<sup>m</sup> Note T.

<sup>n</sup> Albert, born about 1193, died 1280.—Thomas Aquinas, born 1224, died 1274; canonized by the Pope John XXII. 1323.—Note U.

their lives diffused a savour of religion over their speculations, then the value of such subtile defences of the doctrine of the Church against the like assaults of a self-interpreting Reason was acknowledged: and these works, especially those of the latter,—the Augustine, as we may call him, of the middle age,—were consecrated with the approbation of the Spiritual power, as part of the stock of Ecclesiastical Authority.

The same effect, it may be observed, had taken place in the II<sup>d</sup> and III<sup>d</sup> centuries. The philosophizing Divines were continually objected to, by those who held forth the Scripture as the only Authority on sacred things. Still the philosophical Theology proceeded. Clement of Alexandria,<sup>o</sup> in the II<sup>d</sup> century, undertook its special defence in his work entitled *Stromata*, inculcating its subservience to Christian knowledge. This work afterwards passed into the Church as an authoritative document.

In the Latin Church the case was different in this respect: that the peculiar authority which that Church claimed, was derived immediately from the practical influence of its great Divines, Jerome and Augustine, the two, who may be regarded as, in an especial sense, the Fathers of the Latin Church. With their exertions, they established also their writings, as a documentary appeal next in authority to the Scriptures themselves. And though these

<sup>o</sup> Died A. D. 220.

writings were extremely argumentative, they were more the authoritative declarations of the spiritual rulers, commanding the silence of other reasoners in the presence of their judgment. We trace accordingly in the Scholastic Philosophy a constant preference for the authorities of these two, and of Augustine more particularly, in whom the whole power of the Latin Church ultimately resided. In the II<sup>d</sup> and III<sup>d</sup> centuries, then, the opposition was rather to the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, as corruptions of the simplicity of the faith. Subsequently, the opposition of the Latin Bishops and Saints was dictated by a jealousy for the established opinions and conclusions of the venerated Fathers of the Church.<sup>p</sup>

The work of Peter Lombard, which afterwards constituted the great text book of the Scholastic Theologians, and which established to that writer the title of "The Master," or "The Master of the Sentences," was exactly such an exposition of Christian doctrine as we might have expected from that conflict between Reason and Authority, which existed in the Latin Church. It is an elaborate compilation of passages from the writings of the eminent Latin Doctors; a tissue stiff with antique embroideries, and displaying the ingenuity of the artist who has so curiously wrought the patchwork into a whole. He introduces little reasoning of his own, only enough to give a consistency to his

<sup>p</sup> Note V.

citations, and he avoids all reference to the opinions of heathen philosophers. He seems throughout on his guard against the suspicion of exercising the privilege of thinking for himself too far, endeavouring to shew, that he follows received opinions, rather than his own speculations.<sup>q</sup> The work was probably written in imitation of a treatise of a Greek Father of the VIIIth century,—the treatise “On the Orthodox Faith,” by John, a Monk of Damascus, celebrated in the Iconoclast disputes of his times, or Damascenus, as he is usually termed;—a writer, who sets out with the profession, that he states nothing of his own, but only what the holy and wise had taught.<sup>r</sup> This work had been translated into Latin,<sup>s</sup> and was regarded with great deference by

<sup>q</sup> Aristotle is incidentally referred to by Lombard, *Sentent.* lib. II. dist. 1. B, but not in the way of authority.

<sup>r</sup> Ἐρῶ τοιγαροῦν ἐμὸν οὐδέν· τὰ δὲ σποράδιον θείοις τε καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδρασι λελεγμένα συλλήβδην ἐκθήσομαι. *Joan. Damasc. Dialectica.* Oper. vol. I. p. 9. He chiefly follows Gregory Nazianzen. Peter Lombard, speaking of him, says: Joannes Damascenus, inter doctores Græcorum maximus, in libro quem de Trinitate scripsit, quem et Papa Eugenius transferri fecit, &c. *Sent. I.* dist. 19. p. 59. ed. Louan.

<sup>s</sup> Eugenio tertio, summo Pontifice, liber de Fide Orthodoxa Latine redditus est a Burgundione cive Pisano. Hac porro translatione usi sunt Magister Sententiarum, Sanctus Thomas, aliique subinde Theologi. . . .

Id enim proposuerat sibi, ut sua nequaquam, aut nova, cuderet, sed veterum potius placita, variis in voluminibus sparsa, in unum opus theologicum congereret. . . . Quamobrem, nedum in Oriente, verum etiam in Occidente, et apud Latinos, magna semper fuit apud Theologos ipsius auctoritas. *Le Quien, Prolegom.* in lib. de Fid. Orth. Damasc. Oper. tom. I. p. 119.

the Latin Divines, for the very reason, probably, that it was a mere record of opinions already sanctioned by the approbation of the Church. In Lombard, however, there is little of the logical precision by which Damascenus is characterized. He is intent on displaying his authorities for the positions advanced. At the same time the form of Questions, in which the several points of Theology are discussed, shews the inquisitive spirit of the age in which such a work appeared; that, though Abelard had been silenced by Councils, the spirit which crowded his Lectures with hearers,<sup>t</sup> was still vigorous in the Church itself. The Book of the Sentences, so far as it was disputatious, expressed the demands of this spirit; so far as it was a compilation of authorities, maintained the spiritual supremacy of the Church.<sup>u</sup> The previous remarks have tended to shew, that the Latin Theology was not averse to disputation, from its earliest period of development: only it affected not a merely literary disputation, but such as had reference to some practical effect. The connexion then of disputation in this fundamental work of the Scholastic

<sup>t</sup> Coactus est ille scripta sua coram igni dare. Nec idcirco juvenus studia æmulans ab eo defecit. *Paul. Æmil. Veronens. Hist. Franc. V.—Præf. Apolog. Abælardi Oper.*

<sup>u</sup> In the time of Charles V. this work was held in so important a light, that of two Professorships instituted at Louvain by that Emperor, one was appointed for the interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, the other for the interpretation of the "Book of the Sentences." *Præf. ad Pet. Lomb. Sent. Louan. 1553.*

Theology, with the enforcement of deference to the spiritual authority, gave it that popularity which it obtained in the Church.<sup>x</sup>

But no sooner was the principle of such a work recognized, than other works, answering the same requisitions of human reason, appeared. The XIth and XIIth centuries had evinced extraordinary activity in the exercise of the human intellect. But the efforts then put forth were desultory and irregular. They were the results of individual enterprise and courage: like the voyages of mariners pushing out to sea, not knowing where the tide and winds might drive them. Now a principle was established, according to which human reason might freely expatiate. The liberty of commenting and discussing without limit might be indulged, provided the intellect confined itself within the range of established authorities. The world of consequences and deductions was open to the Rationalist, whilst that of First Principles was surrounded with Stygian waters. What the speculator had to guard against was, the appearance of proposing any thing new; any thing that did not admit of being traced up to some received opinion. The suspicion of ori-

<sup>x</sup> Lombard profited at once by the previous labours of Abelard, and by the example of the persecution which had attended them. He was not only a hearer of Abelard, but is said to have made Abelard's Treatise of Theology a frequent subject of his study. *Not. ad. Hist. Calam. P. Abælardi.*—Oper. p. 1160. Whilst he probably therefore derived much of his own Theology from that work, he was careful to throw it into a less objectionable form.

ginality was fatal to the reputation of the Scholastic Divine. "If any man speak, let him speak as the "oracles of God;" that is, according to the sense of the Scholastic age, let him speak only the words of those, whom God has successively sent as the ministers and dispensers of sacred truth.<sup>y</sup> If it was a point on which the Church had pronounced, that was no longer a matter of opinion. It was to be received as a sentence. To discuss it simply as an opinion was heretical. Hence the expedient of Distinctions; the artifice, by which an acute Reason could maintain its own hypothesis, consistently with the devotion due to the prescriptions of authority.

It is under this point of view that we shall discern the origin of that speculative dialectical character which the Scholastic Philosophy assumed. It was the crisis, when the reasonings of individual inquirers ceased to be simply expressions of personal contemplations, but were pursued on a systematic plan, that combined in it the restless impatience of the human mind, and the arbitrary determinations of the spiritual authority; that made Heresy itself the handmaid of orthodoxy; like the fable, which would represent pleasure and pain linked together by the heads, as the means of neutralizing their opposition.<sup>z</sup>

Why this Philosophy assumed the particular form which it actually exhibits;—by what means

<sup>y</sup> Note W.

<sup>z</sup> Platon. Phæd. c. 9.



Aristotle became the great oracle of the system, superseding the more theological Philosophy of Plato;—and the general character imparted to the Theology of the Western Church from that circumstance; will be the subjects of consideration in my next Lecture.

## LECTURE II.

FORMATION OF THE SCHOLASTIC THEOLOGY.



## SUMMARY.

GENERAL statement of the evil of a Logical Theology—The Church sanctions the use of Logic only as an art of defence—Platonism the established Philosophy of the Church—An art of Logic indispensable to the speculating Christian in the West—Division of the Sciences in the middle age—Tendency of the age to blend all into a metaphysical Logic, or Dialectic—Logic perverted into a Science of Investigation—Obstructions to the real improvement of Logic—Ignorance of Aristotle's writings in themselves—Importance of the writings of Boethius—Effect of the Crusades in opening fresh sources of knowledge—Progress of Scholasticism illustrated in the division of parties into Nominalists and Realists—Triumph of Realism—

Realism, the scientific basis of Scholasticism—Nominalism the resource of the more liberal speculators—Opposition between Duns Scotus, and Ockam—Ascendancy of a Logical Philosophy evidenced in the subsequent state of knowledge.

Theology erected into an exact demonstrative Science—its Principles drawn from the incomprehensible nature of the Divine Being—Regard to authority maintained, by assigning Faith as the preliminary to the whole Speculation—Aristotle's Philosophy applied as a method of eliciting the Divine truths involved in the Scripture—This resulted in a combination of the Ideal Theory of Platonism with the Sensualism of Aristotle's Philosophy—Logic the instrument in effecting this result—Union of Mysticism and Argumentation in the Scholastic writings—Abuse by the Schoolmen of the disputatious form of Aristotle's writings.

Fundamental errors of Scholastic Theology, 1. Its neglect of the Historical Nature of the Christian Scriptures—consequent loss of the real instruction contained in them.—2. Their Rhetorical nature also overlooked in an exclusive attention to the mere words of revelation.—3. Their Ethical lessons also disparaged in the pursuit of theoretic truth.

ACTS XIX. 8—11.

And he went into the synagogue, and spake boldly for the space of three months, disputing and persuading the things concerning the kingdom of God. But when divers were hardened, and believed not, but spake evil of that way before the multitude, he departed from them, and separated the disciples, disputing daily in the school of one Tyrannus. And this continued by the space of two years; so that all they which dwelt in Asia heard the word of the Lord Jesus, both Jews and Greeks.

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Εἰσελθὼν δὲ εἰς τὴν συναγωγὴν, ἐπαρρησιάζετο, ἐπὶ μῆνας τρεῖς διαλεγόμενος, καὶ πείθων τὰ περὶ τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Θεοῦ. Ὡς δὲ τινες ἐσκληρύνοντο καὶ ἠπείθουν, κακολογοῦντες τὴν ὁδὸν ἐνώπιον τοῦ πλήθους, ἀποστὰς ἀπ' αὐτῶν, ἀφώρισε τοὺς μαθητὰς, καθ' ἡμέραν διαλεγόμενος ἐν τῇ σχολῇ Τυράννου τινός. Τοῦτο δὲ ἐγένετο ἐπὶ ἔτη δύο, ὥστε πάντας τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἀσίαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸν λόγον τοῦ Κυρίου Ἰησοῦ, Ἰουδαίους τε καὶ Ἑλλήνας.

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Introgressus autem synagogam, cum fiducia loquebatur per tres menses, disputans et suadens de regno Dei. Cum autem quidam indurarentur, et non crederent, maledicentes viam Domini coram multitudine, discedens ab eis, segregavit discipulos, quotidie disputans in schola Tyranni cujusdam. Hoc autem factum est per biennium, ita ut omnes, qui habitabant in Asia, audirent verbum Domini, Judæi atque Gentiles. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE II.

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IN my first Lecture, I have endeavoured to shew the origin of the Scholastic Philosophy, in the peculiar circumstances of the Latin Church ; that it was such a system, as naturally grew out of the struggle continually subsisting in the West between Reason and Authority. I now purpose to explain the nature of that Philosophy itself, when it became the acknowledged system of the Church ; to give some account of its formation ; and of the general character of the Theology resulting from it.

The subject immediately before us, is one of the most serious interest to all, who have a just concern for the maintenance of sound practical Christianity. We are now tracing to its origin that speculative logical Christianity, which survives among us at this day ; and which has been in all ages the principal obstacle, as I conceive, to the union and peace of the Church of Christ. To some indeed the assertion may even seem strange, that the cause of Christianity has suffered to such extent, from the *logical* character of the speculations

adopted into its system. They may readily admit in general terms, that the intermixture of any speculation whatever with the body of religious truth, must be detrimental to that truth. But they may not be aware, at the same time, of the mischief arising from the purely *logical* character of the speculation. It will be the object of the whole of the present course of Lectures, to point out this mischief. But in order that I may carry my hearers along with me throughout in my design, I would place in front of the observations now to be submitted, the nature of that evil which Scholasticism embodies in it,—the evil of a Logical Theology.

If it be inquired then, why a Logical Theology should be injurious to the cause of Christian truth, we must seek an account of the case, not in the association of any particular truths of human reason with those of revelation, but in the simple fact of the irrelevance of all deduction of consequences to the establishment of religious doctrine. The Scripture intimates to us certain facts concerning the Divine Being: but conveying them to us by the medium of language, it only brings them before us darkly, under the signs appropriate to the thoughts of the human mind. And though this kind of knowledge is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act, towards God;—for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice;—it is altogether inadequate in point of Science. The

most perfect reasonings founded on the terms of theological propositions, amount only to evidences of the various connexions of the signs employed. We may obtain by such reasonings, greater precision in the use of those signs. But the most accurate conclusion still wants a key to interpret it. There must be in fact a repeated revelation, to authorize us to assert, that this or that conclusion represents to us some truth concerning God.

If then it should appear, that the Scholastic Philosophy was in its fundamental character, a Logical Theology, the nature of that evil which it has imported into Religion, will be sufficiently apparent. And antecedently to our entering into the examination of particular points, the reason will be seen in general, of that vast apparatus of technical terms, which Christian Theology now exhibits. It will appear, that, whilst theologians of the schools have thought they were establishing religious truth by elaborate argumentation, they have been only multiplying and arranging a theological language.

Nor let it be thought that the evil has rested here;—that the mere futility of the process has worked its own antidote. Experience tells us that it has not rested here. The signs have been converted into things. The combination and analysis of words which the Logical Theology has produced, have given occasion to the passions of men, to arm themselves in defence of the phantoms thus called into being. Not only have professed theologians, but private Christians, been imposed on, by the



specious religion of terms of Theology; and have betrayed often a fond zeal in the service of their idol-abstractions, not unlike that of the people of old, who are said to have beaten the air with spears, to expel the foreign gods by whom their country was supposed to be occupied.<sup>a</sup> For my part, I believe it to be one of the chief causes of the infidelity which prevails among speculative men. Notions are proposed to them, which they feel themselves competent to examine with freedom; because they have an instinctive perception of the source from which they are derived. Every one who reflects at all, has some knowledge of metaphysical truth; for it is the truth that is most intimate with him. And when a reflecting person, accordingly, has notions proposed to him, which he finds to be part of the internal stock of principles belonging to his nature, he is led to compare them with each other, to discern contrarieties, and to reject what perplexes and confounds him.

Premising these observations, with the view of keeping steadily before the attention, the object, not only of this Lecture in particular, but of the whole course; and as a general index to the remarks which I shall be continually directing to the same point; I proceed now, to give a sketch of the progress of Christian Theology to that state, from which the evil consequences adverted to, have flowed. These evil consequences have long been fully acknowledged in the parallel case of Physical

<sup>a</sup> Herodotus, in his account of the Caunians.

Science. It has been admitted there, that conclusions from abstract terms, are no valid indications of facts in nature. May we hope, that the time will come, when the like will be as fully, and as practically, admitted in Theology!

“Time was,” says a Greek Father,<sup>b</sup> “when things with us were flourishing and well-ordered; when this exquisiteness, and precision, and technicality, of Theology, had not so much as access to the divine courts; when the saying or hearing any thing of subtilty, was accounted the same as playing tricks with pebbles that deceive the sight by sleight-of-hand, or as imposing on spectators in dancing with various and effeminate inflexions; when simplicity and ingenuousness of expression had the estimation of piety. But from the time of the Sexti and the Pyrrhos, the tongue of antithesis,<sup>c</sup> like some grievous and malignant plague, has insinuated its corruption into our Churches, and frivolity has been considered erudition; and, as the Book of the Acts says, we spend our time in nothing else but in telling or hearing something new.”<sup>d</sup>

<sup>b</sup> *Gregor. Nazianz. Orat. XXI. p. 380. ed. Prun. Paris, 1609; also Orat. XXIII. p. 422.—Note A. Lecture II.*

<sup>c</sup> Antithesis was the favourite expedient of the heretic Marcion. By stating antitheses, or contrarieties, in the Old and New Testaments, Marcion wished to prove, that the God of the Jews was distinct from the God of the Christians. See *Tertullian adv. Marcion. lib. I. c. 11. lib. II. c. 29.*—The expression appears to be drawn from the ancient Physical Philosophy, in which the doctrine of Contrarieties was a fundamental principle.

<sup>d</sup> Note B.

In this passage, Gregory Nazianzen, writing during the keen agitation of the Arian disputes, is expressing his strong dislike of that disputatious logic, which had proved an active weapon of disturbance to the Church. Early in the Latin Church, in the writings of Tertullian, we find the like remonstrances against the dialectical warfare with which heresy assailed the doctrine of the Trinity.<sup>e</sup> From other ecclesiastical writers also, many passages might be collected to a similar purport. And yet the great Father of Latin orthodoxy, Augustine, expressly directs the Christian student to acquaint himself with the discipline of disputation, the Logic or Dialectic of those times; characterizing it, as available for “the penetration and solution of all kinds of questions in sacred literature;” and only cautioning against “a passion for wrangling, and a childish sort of ostentation of deceiving an adversary.”<sup>f</sup>

To logical science, in fact, simply considered as an art of defence, as a discipline of disputation applicable to the service of orthodoxy, there was never any indisposition on the part of the Church authorities. The most violent declaimers against the refinements of logic are often, on the contrary, examples of the most strenuous and undaunted argumentation in their own writings. As defenders

<sup>e</sup> *Tertull. de Præscript. Hær. c. vii. p. 205. fol.*

<sup>f</sup> *Sed disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quæstionum quæ in literis sanctis sunt, penetranda et dissolvenda, et plurimum valet: tamen ibi cavenda est libido rixandi, et puerilis quædam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium. Aug. de Doctr. Christ. lib. II. c. 31.*

of the sacred truth, they would justify themselves by an appeal to the manner and the precept of the Scriptures. The Epistles, it would be observed, were for the most part works of controversy. St. Paul is particularly represented in the passage of the Acts, which I have already read, and in other places, as “disputing and persuading the things concerning “the kingdom of God.”<sup>g</sup> The word “disputing”—in the original, *διαλεγόμενος*—would be recognised as the technical term, by which the Greeks denoted their familiar exercise of philosophical discussion; and which gave the name of Dialectic to their original logical science. Again, in the conversations of our Saviour himself, traces would be found of the argumentative method of the ancient Schools: such as the dilemma respecting the baptism of John:<sup>h</sup> and the mode in which he sometimes evades a particular question, by putting a question in return. To the same purport would be interpreted, the description of him in the midst of the Jewish Doctors, hearing them and asking them questions.<sup>i</sup> Such passages as these are expressly referred to, indeed,

<sup>g</sup> Note C.

<sup>h</sup> This instance is still more striking when we refer to the Greek, Matt. xxi. 24. Ἐρωτήσω ὑμᾶς καὶ γὰρ λόγον ἕνα—expressions which remind us of the Socratic method of disputation—the *erotetic* method by which the Greek sage used to extort the truth from his reluctant opponent in argument. See also Matt. xxii. 41—46.

<sup>i</sup> Ἐπερωτῶντα. Luke ii. 46. Duodecim annos Salvator impleverat, et in templo senes de quæstionibus legis interrogans, magis docet, dum prudenter interrogat. *Hieronym.* Epist. ad Paulin. p. 6. Opera, Vol. I.

by theological writers, in order to prove, that the science of argumentation is a just accomplishment of the Christian, who would "give a reason of the "hope that is in him." Still more, the word *Logos* has been singled out for especial remark; and its application to Christ, as the Reason or Wisdom, and Word, of God, has been cited, as an account of the connexion of Logic, the science of words and reasons, with Christian Theology.<sup>k</sup>

It would appear, therefore, that the authorities of the Church objected only to the employment of logic in discussing questions of religion, when it was found a vexatious instrument in the hands of the heretic. Where the disputant professed an agreement with the prescriptive views of the Church, there was no objection in this case to the use of subtilties, which otherwise incurred the severity of reprobation and invective. Even sophisms, it was conceded, might be rightly employed, where the design was, to establish the orthodox truth, and subvert the false and delusive conclusions of heresy.<sup>1</sup> Thus was a kind of Lacedæmonian policy pursued in regard to the cultivation and exercise of logical science in the Church. The member of the spiritual commonwealth was trained to acts of hostility against the stranger and the enemy, but was most inconsistently expected to live in quietness and inaction at home. The whole institution was for war abroad; whilst he was strictly prohibited from displaying the skill which he had acquired, in any occasion of domestic

<sup>k</sup> Note D.

<sup>1</sup> Note E.

grievance. The natural consequence was, that, as the Spartan was restless within his own territory, so the Christian logician was ever impatient to exert his disciplined acuteness within the pale of the Church itself.

Aristotle had been the great authority of some of the early heretics. The speculations on the Trinity, introduced by Artemon and Theodotus in the II<sup>d</sup> century, were imputed to their study of Aristotle, amongst other philosophers and authors of exact science.<sup>m</sup> A prejudice against Aristotle appears to have been created from that circumstance among the professors of Christianity; so far, that “Aristotelic subtilty” was the familiar expression for a minute and captious logic; and the name of the philosopher himself became almost a by-word for the master and guide of each adventurous reasoner in Theology.<sup>n</sup> Unjust and unreasonable as this imputation was, it undoubtedly had its weight. It is enough to give a name to any matter of objection, for the many to join in the clamour against what they have not examined, or have no disposition to examine. Thus a traditional dislike to the logic, or rather the philosophy in general, of Aristotle;—for he was chiefly known as a logical Philosopher;—descended from the early ages of the Church; and his philosophy, accordingly, had to fight its way to the throne, which it afterwards occupied with an undisputed, unlimited, dominion.

So far, indeed, as Philosophy was owned by the

<sup>m</sup> Note F.

<sup>n</sup> Note G.

Church, the Platonism of Alexandria was the ascendant system. The piety of Platonism, its abstractedness from the visible world, its elevation of the moral sentiments, recommended it forcibly to the imagination and the feelings of the contemplative theologian. It appeared eminently, in contrast with other systems, a knowledge of divine things; a knowledge, which led the mind to "acquaint itself with God, and be at peace." The Aristotelic Philosopher was regarded as a profane intruder, bringing the noisy jargon of the world into a sanctuary, where every thought and feeling should be hushed in holy contemplation. The busy spirit of the Latin Churchman was a strong counteraction to this mysticism. Still the expressed partiality of Augustine for the philosophy of Plato, combined with the invectives against Aristotle, thrown out from time to time, had established that philosophy, in name at least, as the orthodox system of the Western Church.<sup>o</sup>

But whatever were the objections to Aristotle, and to the art with which his name was associated, it was impossible that logical science could remain dormant in such a state of things, as that which the Christian Church presented in the middle age. The principles which I pointed out in my former Lecture, as conspiring to the rise of the Scholastic Philosophy, the liberty of individual mind, and the restraint of spiritual authority, would necessarily force the mind into an artificial method of philoso-

<sup>o</sup> Note H.

phizing. The intellect was in a situation, analogous to that of a heart cut off from all that used to give play to its feelings, and turning inwardly to feed on itself. An art of Logic answered these internal cravings of the mind. It enabled the mind to wanton within the limits of prescribed hypotheses, and to indulge in excursions which gave at least the semblance of freedom to its efforts. Here was the fundamental grievance, which led the intellectual Christian of the middle age to cultivate a subtile logic; and raised the name of Aristotle to that dreary eminence, from which he looks down on the subject realms of Scholasticism.

The arts indeed were divided into different departments of study. The mystical number of Seven completed the enumeration of them: but even in this narrow range there was sufficient to exercise and discipline the intellect, had they been independently pursued. The three first, technically called the *Trivium*, were Grammar,<sup>p</sup> Logic, Rhetoric; forming together the elementary instruction of the Schools. The remaining four, under the corresponding name of the *Quadrivium*, or the *Mathesis*, being Arithmetic, Geometry, Music,<sup>q</sup> Astrology,<sup>r</sup>

<sup>p</sup> John of Salisbury gives an interesting account of what was taught under the name of Grammar, in what he says of Bernard of Chartres, in his Tract entitled *Metalogicus*, lib. I. cap. 24. p. 780.—Note I.

<sup>q</sup> On the connexion of Music with Theology, see *Abelard*, *Introd. ad Theol.* lib. I. Oper. p. 1017.—Note J.

<sup>r</sup> Astrology was the name for what we now call Astronomy, as well as for the mystical art of divination by the stars.



were the studies of the proficient. In fact, however, no one of these sciences was independently pursued. All were studied in subservience to Theology; as subordinate sciences, handmaids, and ministers, to Theology, the queen-science, to which all owed obeisance and service. The result was, of course, that no one science was studied perfectly, or on its own principles; and soon, all were absorbed in one vast speculation, in which Logic took the lead; but of which the constituent principles were, an abstruse system of Metaphysics drawn from the philosophy of Language.

The neglect into which the different arts fell in process of time, is important to be observed; for it marks the direction, in which the efforts of speculation were then tending. The mind seized on every subject in order to convert it into theological speculation. Logic, consequently, became more than a mere instrument of disputation. It was converted into a method of philosophy, an instrument for investigating truth. As one of the Seven Arts, it was neglected, no less perhaps than the rest. There was no searching into its principles, with the view of ascertaining a just theory of argumentation. Its exaltation to the rank of the science of Investigation, left the fields of its own proper region uncultivated, amidst the vain ambition of conquests over the empire of science. As an organ of philosophy, it was explored only in its connexion with metaphysical truth; as it serves, that is, to unravel those associations of thought, of which it is the key, so

far as it is the result of them,—an effect produced by the mind's operation within itself.

It is obvious, that the study of a Science solely with a view to a particular object, and that too an object not strictly connected with it, must narrow and corrupt it. A very cursory survey of the Dialectic of Damascenus will shew, to what a diminutive outline the noble Science of Aristotle had dwindled in the Greek Church of the VIIIth century. We find there, no longer an enlarged philosophy of language, but mere Terminology; a collection of technical terms, explained, in immediate application to their theological use, and by way of Introduction to Theology. Such, in a still greater degree, was the Logic of the Latin schools. It was only indeed at the time of Cicero, that Aristotle's writings were brought to light, from the long obscurity in which they were buried. And it is not asserting too much to say, that, even had the Romans been disposed to encourage a speculative philosophy, there was then no one competent, either justly to value, or fully to explain, his logical doctrines. An art of logic had long been current in use, the Dialectic of the Stoics, which, so far from opening the mind to the reception of a truly philosophical method, had diverted men from the right pursuit, had prejudiced them with wrong notions of the science. If Aristotle therefore were studied, it would naturally be such portions of his Logic, as coincided, or seemed to coincide, most with the existing imperfect views. Hence the almost

exclusive study among the Latins of his treatise entitled, *The Categories*, or *Predicaments*. Though other treatises of his Logic were translated into Latin, these soon fell into disuse. A compendium of Dialectic, founded on the Categories of Aristotle, and passed under the name of Augustine, became the ordinary text-book, from which the whole science was professed to be taught in the Latin schools, down to the end of the XIIth century. Other abstracts of logic, drawn from Boethius, Cassiodorus, and Capella, appear also to have been used; and each distinguished master, probably, composed his own treatise of the art. But all were confined to the same meagre technicalities, which alone accorded with the corrupt theological taste of the times.

Whilst indeed the Church-authorities so jealously watched the progress of logical speculation, the writings themselves of Aristotle lay under a ban of exclusion. Some of his treatises were actually coupled in the same sentence which branded the heretical disputer:—such was the prevailing ignorance, even at the University of Paris, the principal School of the Latin world, respecting the contents of those volumes, which alone developed the principles of the philosopher, of whom all professed themselves disciples.<sup>s</sup>

This ignorance, and the fear resulting from it, were the result of that state of things, in which we

<sup>s</sup> Note K.

find the Latin Church after the division of the Empire. Reduced to an infrequent intercourse with Greece, the Latin lost not only the knowledge, but the language itself, of philosophy. He could no longer avail himself of the treasures of Greek wisdom in their own authentic depositories, but was obliged to have recourse to the secondary channel of translations and commentaries in the Latin language. The very professors of science fell into a decrepitude of learning, which needed every auxiliary to its feebleness.

It was the noble conception of the admirable Boethius to have repaired this loss to the Latin world, and to have transfused into their own tongue the principal documents of Greek philosophy; not only by translations, but by his own writings. He applied himself to this vast undertaking, with a spirit worthy of the best days of Rome, and a talent for philosophy, cultivated by hearing the last successors of Plato and Aristotle, on the classic ground itself where those philosophers had taught. Unhappily however, cut off by the cruel jealousy of the Emperor Theodoric, in the midst of his patriotic and gentle labours, he lived only to bequeath to the Christians of the West an inconsiderable portion of these comprehensive designs.

But what Boethius accomplished served, in fact, to maintain the tradition of Philosophy, through the dark period consequent on the opening of the VIth century, to the days of its incipient regeneration in the VIIIth. He was to the Latin Science, what

Augustine was, to the Latin Theology.<sup>†</sup> His writings were the foundation on which the Scholastic Philosophy afterwards reared its complex system; so far as they presented an example to the Latin Church, of that eclectic philosophy of the New-Platonists, which combined the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle with the fundamental theories of Plato.

The Latin Christians then, confined by the policy of their Church, as well as by the circumstances of the times, within the narrow boundaries of the Latin Philosophy, became necessarily mere sciolists in the very art which they ostentatiously professed.

In the XIIIth century however a marked improvement is discernible. The Western Church feels the influence of that general excitement and renovation of society, which the transportation of Europe into Asia by the first Crusades had produced. An ardour is revived for the recovery of the monuments of Greek Philosophy; and several of Aristotle's treatises, which had been unknown or forgotten in the schools of the West, are now brought home to the inquisitive Latin. An important accession is made to the stock of Latin literature, by translations from the works of Arabian philosophers, who had laboured in the exposition of Aristotle's doctrines. The genius of the Arab, wild and waste as his own plains, imparts

<sup>†</sup> Augustine knew nothing of the Greek Philosophy but through translations. He had disliked and neglected the study of Greek in his youth; and his mature age called him to practical labours of another kind. See his Confessions, lib. I. c. 14. VII. c. 9. VIII. c. 2.

the touch of its metaphysical enthusiasm to the reanimated spirit of the Latin schools.<sup>u</sup> And thus at length Scholasticism, rich with the Aristotelic spoils gathered by other hands, attains its fulness of stature, as a logical philosophy, the interpreter at once of Revelation and of Nature.

In the meantime however irregular efforts were continually made towards an enlargement of the basis of the Dialectical Science professed in the Schools, and to introduce the Logic of Aristotle himself.<sup>x</sup> Whilst some obstinately adhered to the existing narrow system, content with the little sphere in which they could exert a feeble talent with address and applause; or apprehensive of danger from any experiment of improvement; there were others of vigour and penetration of mind, beyond the horizon which limited their excursions, or bold enough to risk the imputation of heresy in their adventurous pursuit of the truth.

The question debated between the Nominalists and Realists is a striking instance of this fact; and is of great importance consequently in tracing the progress of philosophy among the Latins to its ultimate development in the Scholastic system.

Unfortunately, there are no extant writings of Roscelin, the ostensible head of the Nominalists of the XIth century; so that it is scarcely possible to ascertain what his precise opinion was. The evident cause however of that violence with which his logical theory was attacked, was, its supposed con-

<sup>u</sup> Note L.

<sup>x</sup> Note M.

sequences in theology. He was accused of having taught, that in expressing the doctrine of the Trinity, we might say *three Gods*, with as much propriety as we say there are *three Persons*; if the former were only sanctioned by the usage of speech.

Anselm of Canterbury, himself an acute reasoner, to whom the opinion of Roscelin was reported as a matter of heresy, had the candour to suspect the justness of the imputation.<sup>y</sup> But as the oracle of orthodoxy of his time, Anselm still felt himself called upon to check the progress of the heretical logic. By his active vigilance, both as a writer and a governor of the Church, the offending Nominalist was silenced. But not so the cause itself of Nominalism. This had too deep a seat in the requisitions of the human mind in that age; it shrank from the gaze of orthodoxy; but it still grew in the shades of the Schools.

The triumph of Realism is particularly to be noticed here, as an instance of the very same principle which had given its general mould to the Scholastic System. It was Philosophy held in subordination to Church-Authority. It was that view of the origin of human knowledge which carried men from efforts of self-information, from examination of nature, to repose on principles infused into the mind by dictation from others. This theory, by assigning, what metaphysicians call an *objective reality*, to the general notions of the mind, made

<sup>y</sup> Note N.

the whole of our knowledge deducible from abstract ideas. A dictatorial and a speculative Theology readily combined with such a theory. Men were thus taught, to distrust the senses; to distrust conclusions from mere experience; and to rely only on the clear consequences of unquestioned speculative principles. It was the maxim, *Invisibilia non decipiunt*, made the ground of alliance between Religion and Philosophy. Nominalism, on the contrary, by denying any objective reality to general notions, led the way directly to the testimony of the senses and the conclusions of experience. Though in the Scholastic age itself, the whole consequences of that theory of human knowledge might not be perceived, it would lead men certainly, even in that dark period, to think more for themselves—to examine their own convictions—to look to the external evidence by which any given assertion might be supported. For if it were admitted, that the notions of the mind, expressed by general terms, were not the actual representatives of objects existing out of itself, men would no longer depend on abstractions, as their sure and only means of knowledge. They would doubt the physical truth of conclusions resting solely on such evidence; and would be disposed at least to seek some ground of belief elsewhere. The validity of an appeal to experience would, of course, be but tremblingly entertained at such a period, amidst the complete general subjugation of the intellect to the force of Religious Authority. And we shall not be surprised there-



fore, that the Nominalists of that day, or of the following century, did not push their theory to its full consequences.<sup>z</sup>

The triumph of Realism is coincident with the ascendancy of the Scholastic Philosophy. It is just at this point, that the maturity of the struggle between Reason and Authority was consummated. Albert and Aquinas, by adopting the Realist doctrine, gave its proper philosophical basis to Scholasticism. Before the middle of the XIIIth century, when these great authors of the system flourished, it could not be considered as having obtained any definite scientific character. The ground-plan of such a mode of speculation had been previously sketched, with more or less distinctness, and particularly, by Anselm, Abelard, and Lombard. But these established the Principle, on which the speculation should henceforth proceed; gave it a body and a system, working out the original faint outline from the more extensive materials supplied to their hands.

The conflicts of argument at an earlier period, shew the unsettled state of opinion as to the principle of the system, which those several efforts were tending to erect. The questionings of the IXth century on the nature of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, evince a doubt as to the point where the evidence of the senses ends, or how far such evidence might be admitted against internal convictions

<sup>z</sup> Note O.

of the mind. Here the original Platonism of the Church ruled the case. A Real Presence was asserted, which implied the deceptiveness of the senses.<sup>a</sup> Whilst however this decision prevailed, it did not pass, we may observe, without a counter-appeal on the part of the disputant of that age to the validity of the testimony so imperiously set aside.

As we glance through the XIth and XIIth centuries, we perceive the philosophical character of Scholasticism coming more into view. In its progress through that period, it exhibits not so much the literary form as the professorial. We find individuals eminent for their talents as lecturers, like the Sophist of old, leading after them, by the charm of their voice,<sup>b</sup> troops of sequacious hearers, as they went from place to place. This was a state of effervescence. What was wanting evidently for the literary perfection of the system, was a more extensive acquaintance with the stores of ancient philosophy. Individuals were vaguely seeking rather to originate systems of their own, than working on any established method.

But the Scholasticism of Albert and Aquinas

<sup>a</sup> In the *Catechismus ad Parochos*, the direction is given to the ministers of Religion, to withdraw their flocks, as much as possible, from attending to the judgment of the senses.—*Curandum igitur est, ut fidelium mentes, quam maxime fieri potest, a sensuum judicio abstrahantur; atque ad immensam Dei virtutem et potentiam contemplandam excitentur.*—*Catech. ad Paroch.* p. 195. ed. 4to. Romæ.

<sup>b</sup> Plato, in the *Protagoras*.—Note P.

being once recognised as the philosophy of the Church, we find the same spirit in action, which had originally given birth to Scholasticism itself. Nominalism seemed to be silenced; but it was only to recruit its vigour, and to struggle more effectually against the ascendant doctrine of the Realists. John Duns Scotus, and William Ockam, the two most distinguished names of the following period, are the personal representatives of the rival theories as then subsisting in the philosophy of the Schools.<sup>c</sup> Ockam, indeed, has obtained a merited celebrity by the title of the second founder of the school of Nominalism; and from having, on that account, incurred the condemnation of the ruling party in the Church; of the University at least of Paris, the great centre of philosophical orthodoxy in those times.<sup>d</sup> It is evident that, now that a proper Church-Philosophy had been established, Nominalism was to the present system, what the previous efforts of speculation had been, when the objection was to all speculation whatever. It was regarded as hostile to reasonings, on which a systematic perfection had been given to the Christian truths. It is remarkable, however, as illustrative of the maturity of the School-Theology; of its perfect transformation, that is, into a Logical Philosophy; that Nominalism was maintained by Ockam, rather as a question of Philosophy than of Theology.<sup>e</sup> Prac-

<sup>c</sup> John Duns Scotus taught at Cologne in 1308.—William Ockam died in 1343.

<sup>d</sup> Note Q.

<sup>e</sup> Note R.

tically he was a Realist, no less than his Master Duns Scotus, whom he strenuously opposes in theory: since we find both equally pursuing the track of their predecessors, not only in the dry syllogistic form of their arguments, but in the importance attributed by them to abstract notions in their respective speculations.

The XIVth century in fact, though it witnessed the revival and spread of Nominalism, the germ of a future revolution in science, exhibits precisely that state of learning and literature, which might be expected from the established ascendancy of a Logical Philosophy. The dominion of a sterile principle is shewn in the blank waste which the fields of knowledge present; in the no-harvest produced from even that happier soil on which the hand of Roger Bacon<sup>f</sup> had laboured. The sententious philosophy extracted from the writings of Aristotle was wonderfully attractive to the sciolists of the day; as it furnished them with an ample nomenclature of science, and enabled them to pronounce with little effort on every point of speculation. It was attractive also to the gifted spirits of the age; for they would see, that there was enough deeply to interest and exercise the highest intellect, in the questions excited by that master of exact thoughts and comprehensive views. Whilst the former class could thus readily fill the schools with a wordy war, the latter spent their strength in minute speculations subservient to the dominant

<sup>f</sup> Roger Bacon, born 1216, died 1294.

spirit of Scholastic Logic. Thus was the state of things immovable for a period. A great effort appeared to have been accomplished; and men rested for a while, in devout admiration and self-complacency at what they had gained; more oppressed by the vast stores which had crowded on them, than able to apply these treasures to any solid account.

This state of quiescence sufficed however for the perpetuity of the Aristotelic Philosophy in the West, even after the revolutions of science which characterized the following centuries. It is not with a logical philosophy, as with any other system. A particular theory in metaphysics, or physics, may have its day and pass away. But a science, which is an universal method—which is carried into every subject—particularly one like this, entering into the vitals of Religion, and entwining itself with a parasitical fondness round the majestic body of sacred truth—cannot be dispelled altogether by any reformation. It becomes part not only of the scientific language of a people, but the idiom in which they express their ordinary ideas. This has been eminently the case with the philosophy of Aristotle, in its transition through the schools of the middle age. It is in the very air of our social life. Its legend, though worn, is not effaced from the current coin of our philosophy and our theology.

On the present occasion, we are concerned with

its influence on our Theology: or, to state it more explicitly, with the traces of itself, which it has left on the terms familiarly employed in our creeds and articles and expositions of religion. With a view to this result, I shall now give some account of the general character of Theology, as moulded by the disputations of the Schools.

The tendency of the whole system which we have been reviewing, was to erect Theology into a perfect Science. It set out with the design of enabling the Christian, when assailed on points of heresy, or perplexed with questionings as to truths simply proposed to his belief, to give a *reason* of the doctrines of his Faith. Assuming that matters of Faith might become matters of understanding to those who believed; it attempted to establish, by processes of reasoning from given principles of Theology, each doctrine of Religion, independently of the sacred authority on which it rests in the Scripture. Arguments, proposed originally as answers to an opponent, and availing properly only, as solutions of particular objections, or refutations of particular statements, were applied as grounds of evidence, for the establishment of the truth universally. And thus a vast collection of principles was obtained, from which conclusions in Theology might be drawn. At length Theology rose into a regular demonstrative science, built up on axioms of metaphysics, and cohering in all its parts by the cement of logical connexion.<sup>§</sup>

§ Note S.

Rightly to conceive the nature of this scientific or logical Theology, we must divest our minds of that popular notion of Science which modern improvements in Philosophy have introduced. It is not the reduction and classification of facts, which was understood as Science by the Scholastic Philosopher. His notion of Science was deduced from the ancient philosophy, which considered no knowledge worthy of the name, but such as rested on fixed indisputable principles;—not, as those collected from experience and observation, open to exception and contradiction from varied and conflicting experiences;—but possessing an intrinsic necessary evidence; of the nature, that is, of mathematical truth. When Theology then was exalted by the Schoolmen to the rank of the queen-science, and viewed as containing in it the primary truths of all knowledge;<sup>h</sup> it was conceived to be the science of necessary principles, on which the mind reposed with the fullest confidence, as impossible to be otherwise than they are, and therefore affording a sure ground for the conclusions of reason.

But to the Christian speculator, under such a method, these principles would, of course, be sought nowhere else, but in the Divine Being himself. He

<sup>h</sup> Secundum hoc quærit sermocinales et logicas scientias, ut ancillentur ad sciendi adminiculum et modum, sive addiscendi. . . . Impossibile est, quod hæc scientia finem in aliis scientiis habet; sed ipsa finis aliarum scientiarum est, ad quam omnes aliæ referuntur ut ancillæ. *Albert. Mag.* in *Lib. Sent. Tract. II. qu. vii. fol. 7.*—Also *Aquin. S. Theol. Ima P. qu. i. art. 5.*

who alone “changes not,” would naturally be the point of departure in such a philosophy. His nature and attributes, so far as they were explained by the light of reason, or revealed by the illumination of Scripture, would alone present to the inquirer that immobility and eternity and absolute priority of truth, of which he was in quest.

It was a circumstance favourable to this scientific Theology, that what the ancients called their First Philosophy, or their abstract philosophy of Being, they dignified by the name of Theology;<sup>i</sup> placing under this head, the speculation concerning spiritual natures, as well as the science of the principles of the human mind. The application again, of the term Truth to the person of Christ, as also of Wisdom to the knowledge of the most sublime and divine things, (both in the Scripture and in the works of philosophers,) further promoted the erection of Christian Theology into that exact theoretic form, which it obtained in the Scholastic system.

Originating however in a combination of the judgments of speculative Reason with the prescriptions of Authority, the system, at its maturity, exhibits in its internal structure, the result of that conflict of elements, out of which it had grown. Its principles, as I have said, were to be drawn from the nature of the Divine Being; as the only sure

<sup>i</sup> Est apud eundem Aristotelem, in Imo Metaphysicorum, præclara disputatio de summa illa divinaque sapientia, mirifice in Theologiam nostram congruens. *Petavii Dogm. Theol. Prolegom. c. 8.*—Also *Aquinas, S. Theol. Ima P. qu. i. art. 6.*



ground on which a Divine and Universal Philosophy could fix its first steps. But where was the evidence or criterion of the truth of those principles? Given the nature of the Divine Being; given the principles themselves, immediately as they existed in Him; there could be no doubt of the truth of the conclusions deduced from them. But it was admitted that the nature of God, as He is in Himself, is incomprehensible by the human faculties; that we cannot attain in the present life to the knowledge of his essence.<sup>k</sup> This difficulty might appear insuperable. But it was not so to the Schoolman versed in an eclectic philosophy, in which the mysticism of Plato was blended with the analytical method of Aristotle. The principle of Faith here answered the purpose of solving this speculative difficulty, as well as of securing the prescriptive right of Authority. Theology then, as a natural knowledge, could not itself discover and establish the principles on which it reasoned. It might, however, receive those principles, through Faith, from an higher science, the science or knowledge of God; as one human science receives its principles from another; as Music, according to the illustration of Aquinas, assumes its principles from Arithmetic, or Perspec-

<sup>k</sup> The Scholastics inherited this admission not only from the Platonic philosophy, but from their own early authorities. Hilary has well expressed the truth.—*Perfecta scientia est, sic Deum scire, ut, licet non ignorabilem, tamen inenarrabilem scias. Credendus est; intelligendus est; adorandus est; et his officiis eloquendus.*—*S. Hilar. de Trin. lib. II. c. 7. tom. II. p. 31.*

tive from Geometry.<sup>1</sup> If we *believe* the Scripture accordingly, we may proceed to the exercise of *understanding* :—the authority of Revelation being conceded, Reason has its ground, on which it may build its airy edifice of speculation.<sup>m</sup>

The object accordingly of the Scholastic Theology was, to detect and draw forth from the Scripture, by aid of the subtile analysis of the philosophy of Aristotle, the mystical truths of God, on which the Scripture-Revelation was conceived to be founded. The Scripture itself, addressing us in the language of our natural knowledge, conveys to us the principles of the Divine Science by analogies, which at once intimate the truth, and veil it from human apprehension. Philosophy applied to the Scripture, dispels these shadows with which the truth as now seen is overcast ; removes the veil which now inter-

<sup>1</sup> Quædam vero sunt, quæ procedunt ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiæ, sicut Perspectiva procedit ex principiis notificatis per Geometriam ; et Musica ex principiis per Arithmetica notis. Et hoc modo sacra doctrina est scientia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine superioris scientiæ, quæ scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum. Unde sicut Musicus credit principia tradita sibi ab Arithmetico, ita doctrina sacra credit principia revelata sibi a Deo. *Aquinat. Summa Theolog. Prima Pars. qu. i. art. 2.*

<sup>m</sup> Et ut alia taceam, quibus sacra pagina nos ad investigandam rationem invitat ; ubi dicit, “ nisi credideritis, non intelligetis,” aperte monet, intensionem ad intellectum extendere, cum docet, qualiter ad illum debeamus proficere. Denique, quoniam inter fidem et speciem, intellectum, quem in hac vita capimus, esse medium intelligo, quanto aliquis ad illum proficit, tanto eum propinquare speciei (ad quam omnes anhelamus) existimo. *Anselm. De Incarnat. Verbi, præf. p. 33.*

cepts our view ; withdraws our attention from the mere symbols and signs ; and brings ultimately before the eye of the mind, the mysterious, yet more real, verities of the Divine knowledge.

Thus was the Idealism of the Platonic School combined with the Sensualism of the Aristotelic. The principles on which the Scholastic Theology here professed to be based, were no other than the *Ideas* of the Divine Mind, as assigned by the Platonists of the Alexandrian School. Translated into the language of Aristotle, these *Ideas* of Platonism became, in the Scholastic system, the *Forms* of things ;—the expression being adopted, by which Aristotle denoted the differences or characteristics that distinguish one object from another.<sup>n</sup> By this substitution of technical phraseology, was the philosophy of Aristotle brought to the support of a Theory, which in his own writings he has strenuously condemned as a vain mystification of science.

The employment of Logic, as an organ of investigation, naturally led to this result. The business in which such a method of philosophizing was really engaged—the utmost that it actually accomplished, amidst all its curiosity and activity—was to frame a science of exact definitions. Logical distinctions and conclusions amount only to an

<sup>n</sup> Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est ponere in mente divina ideas. Idea enim Græce, Latine forma dicitur. Unde per ideas intelliguntur formæ aliquarum rerum, præter ipsas res existentes, &c. *Aquinat. Summ. Theolog. Ima Par. qu. xv. art. 1.*—Also qu. XLIV. art. 3.—Note T.

analysis of the notions involved in general terms; and when employed therefore to ascertain the nature of a thing, terminate in giving a more exact notion of the term by which it is signified. Such in fact was the science of *Forms* in Aristotle's Philosophy. They were strictly the logical definitions of the species of things; limits fixed in the region of the mind alone; and so far coincident with the *Ideas* of the Platonists.

This then was a neutral ground between the two philosophies, on which the Scholastic Theology took its stand. Here, as in a point of contact, met the theories peculiar to each, to diffuse themselves afterwards in a vast system of Realism, that embraced within it the whole world of science. For whilst it was admitted with Aristotle, that our natural knowledge originates in occasions furnished by the observations of Sense, this sound experimental philosophy was absorbed and lost, in the more sublime and mystical science, to which it was held to be the mere introduction, or symbolical language.

We may see, at the same time, how the mystical, and the practical character, originally belonging to the Latin Theology, still continued to characterize it, when it assumed the definite form of Scholasticism. The regard paid by the Schoolmen to the mystical treatises of *The Celestial Hierarchy*, and *The Divine Names*,—works, composed probably in the Vth century, but, in the fashion of the age,<sup>o</sup>

<sup>o</sup> We must not suppose that there was always fraud designed in such ascriptions of works to venerated names. There pro-

ascribed to Dionysius the Areopagite, the convert of St. Paul at Athens, shews that their system did not recoil even from the most extravagant mysticism of contemplation.<sup>p</sup> Indeed no further proof of the fact is required, than the commentaries lavished on the Book of the Canticles,<sup>q</sup> at the different periods of Scholasticism. Still, as we might expect, the practical character is the more apparent. The foreground is filled with discussion and debate. We find ourselves in the midst of arguers and masters of Theology, to whose reasonings we must listen with a docile attention; whilst we bow in awe before the mystic forms of a piety and a spirituality, which cast their solemn shadows over the scene of disputation.

bably was in this particular case, as it appears to have been a bold effort on the part of the New-Platonism, to establish itself in the Church. But in many cases, the practice appears to have been adopted on rhetorical grounds, to give greater influence to the arguments of a work. Alcuin used this method, with a view of exciting emulation of the great writers of antiquity. Gibbon mentions a supplicatory letter of Pope Stephen III. A. D. 754, written in the name and person of St. Peter. *Rom. Emp.* c. 49. It was in the same taste, that, at one time, writers of the middle age used to assume after their own names, that of some classic author.

<sup>p</sup> The singular work of Erigena on *The Division of Natures*, whilst as an original work of Philosophy it exhibited too bold a form of metaphysical speculation for the taste of the Latin Theologian, is an evidence of the strong current with which Platonism flowed in the Western Church in the IXth century.

<sup>q</sup> It is curious to find Jerome, in prescribing a course of education for the infant grand-daughter of Paula, recommending the study of the Canticles, as the ultimate point of her theological progress. *Hieronym.* Epistol. ad Lætam. Opera, tom. I. p. 57.

The whole philosophy of Aristotle readily accommodated itself to such a Theology. His physical science is throughout logical, being indeed a body of conclusions from his metaphysical doctrines. His ethical science, though in its principles founded on fact and observation, is thrown, in its didactic form, into the same logical mould. So that, upon the whole, his Philosophy, in its written form at least, may justly be regarded, as a deduction of given principles to the particulars implied in them; as a method of establishing truth, by processes of reasoning, by discussion of questions on points of speculation, rather than by interrogation of nature.

The method of a Logical Philosophy must consist chiefly of discussion of opinions. Argument, and not evidence, will be the object of its pursuit. It will be concerned in finding out, what may be unanswerably affirmed, rather than what is the fact and the truth of things. The interminable questions of the Schoolmen were but an exaggeration of the method of Aristotle himself;—a depraved application of his maxim, that, “to propose doubts well,”<sup>r</sup> is of service for the discovery of truth. This mode of proceeding was strictly their philosophical Analysis: in untying the perplexed knots in which the ingenuity of speculation or fancy might entangle a subject, they were opening, according

Bernard has eighty-six Sermons on the Canticles, and these form only an unfinished work.—Note U.

<sup>r</sup> Τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς. *Metaphys.* l. III. c. 1.—Also *Topic.* l. 1.—*Ethic.* l. VII.

to their views, the real nature of the subject so involved. It was more indeed the example of the Greek Sophists that they followed, than of Aristotle himself in this respect. For though Aristotle may ascribe too great importance to the discussion of logical questions and difficulties, he has not so entirely rested the truth of science upon them; nor has he descended to such frivolities of inquiry. The Schoolmen, however, rest the whole strength of their cause in the determination of questions. Their whole Theology is a congeries of doubts; the effect of which is to leave the mind in a state of Academic Scepticism, very different from that reasonable satisfaction which is apparently the object of pursuit.<sup>s</sup> They readily seized the manner of the Philosopher, so far as it appeared on the surface of his writings. They pronounced sententiously; but they omitted to philosophize largely. The vast materials through which his research must have extended, were to them a subterranean world, over which they trod with unsuspecting step. What added to their delusion was, that the writings of Aristotle are, for the most part, suggestive treatises, composed with reference to the oral instruction, with which they were accompanied in their delivery. Appearing consequently in the form of text-books, they were easily converted into authorities, applicable in detached sentences to the decision of each controverted point.

<sup>s</sup> See John of Salisbury, *Policratic.* lib. VII. c. 6. p. 425. *Metalogic.* lib. III. pp. 839, 845.—Note V.

In Scholasticism accordingly the Dialectical Art was all in all. Theology becoming a science founded on Definitions, and being conceived to contain the first principles of all other sciences, was forced to have recourse to the analytical power of Language, the only means of combining into one mass the various incongruous materials usurped into its system. Each term of language being significant of an indefinite number of particulars; and these particulars again, when denoted by words, being each significant of other particulars; language presents a medium of classification to an indefinite extent. But the very medium of classification thus presented, enabling the mind to combine things, independently of actual observation of facts with a view to such combination, imposes on us by the subtilty and facility of its application. We believe that we have combined real facts in nature, when we have only explored and marked connexions which our own minds have woven together.

Such then was the Theology of the Schools. It is, in effect, what we designate in a word by Realism—the conversion of mere Logical and Metaphysical truth into physical—a description, as it were, of the lands and seas of the visible world by an untravelled eye, from a study of the map of the human mind. For whilst some Scholastics professed to disclaim the Realist doctrine, yet, as I have already observed of the great leader of the Nominalists of the XIVth century, all were practically Realists in this respect,



that they applied the analytical power of language to the interpretation of nature. It may further illustrate the character of a Theology so constructed, to observe the analogy which it bears to the personifications of heathen mythology. The genius of Paganism seized the fancy with some image of loveliness or mirth or awe, expressing the tendency of the mind to realize its own abstractions, in the fabled beings of a many-peopled heaven. Scholasticism in like manner has its apotheosis of human ideas; only that here an exact Logic has worked the transmutation, which Poetry effected in the other.

When a Theology of this *à priori* character was established, it nullified the use of the Scripture as a *record* of the divine dealings with the successive generations of mankind. The voice of God was no longer heard as it spoke "in sundry times and in divers manners" to holy men of old; but simply as uttering the hallowed symbols of an oracular wisdom. The whole of Revelation was treated as one contemporaneous production; of which the several parts might be expounded, without reference to the circumstances in which each was delivered. For what was termed in the Schools, the Analogy of Faith, was not, as might be supposed, an interpretation of passages relatively to particular periods and particular occasions, but merely the shewing that "the truth of one Scripture was not repugnant

“to the truth of another.”<sup>t</sup> The Bible thus lost its most important characteristic in the comparison with other assumed Revelations. The Koran is professedly the effusion of a single writer;—slowly dealt out indeed at intervals as the calls of imposture suggested; and therefore spread over some period in its actual delivery. But if we compare it with our sacred books in this respect; in the one, we find a continuous rhapsody unconnected with the solid materials of progressive history; in the other, we have details of successive events—documents of history, of prophecy, and of precept—published at distinct and wide intervals, relating to the history of mankind at large, as well as to that particular people among whom they were published.

If now we regard the Scriptures in the way of the Schoolmen, as having God for their proper subject, instead of reading them as a divine history of man, we naturally neglect the analogies of times and circumstances. The immutability of the Divine Being, in the contemplation of whom we are then exclusively engaged, is the prevailing object of our inquiry. Distinctions of time lose all their importance in this point of view. Our business is, to collect into one theory every scattered intimation of the Divine being and attributes.

If on the contrary we take the nature and condition of man under Divine Providence, as the great

<sup>t</sup> *Analogia vero est, cum veritas unius Scripturæ ostenditur veritati alterius non repugnare. Aquinas, Summ. Theolog. Ima Par. qu. 1. art. 10.—Note W.*

subject of our sacred Books, we are as naturally led to study the facts recorded in the Scripture in their real historical place. We then seek to learn, what man has been at the infancy, and at the maturity, of his condition in the world; how he has been treated by his Creator at different periods, and how he has responded to that treatment. Hence results an historical theology, a register as it were of the religious conduct of man under the government of God; and consequently principles of the Divine Character and Government, applicable to the future direction of our lives. Such however was not the method of the Schoolmen. They inverted the process, and commenced with those notions in which they should have ended their inquiry.

The theology of the Schools involved further a total disregard of the Rhetorical nature of the Scriptures. In the ascendancy of the spirit of dogmatism, every sentiment of holy exhortation, the terrors of rebuke, the winnings of persuasion, the piety of fatherly love, the commands of authority, all disappear, except in the inert tangible material of the words themselves, on which an unfeeling reason may act. I need only advert here to the effect produced on the doctrines of Grace by this intrusive Logic. The truth of the Divine Predes- tination has suffered, perhaps more than any other, from being treated in this way. We recoil from the train of consequences which have been deduced from it, and from the subtile speculations by which

the notion of it has been attempted to be defined. But read it in the Scripture;—take it as a word of encouragement, as an unanswerable appeal to the heart;—feel it, that is, and be persuaded by it, as an argument of the Holy Spirit pleading with you;—and then you find, that it has not been written in vain in the history of God's providences.

The subject of the Rhetorical nature of the Scriptures is of large compass; and one that, from its real importance, deserves a more distinct consideration than it has yet obtained. I feel convinced that, were due weight given to it in our theological studies, it would tend more than any thing else, to dissipate the wild theories of speculative religionists, and bring men to the true way of finding out God in the Scriptures. At present however I only allude to it, as the neglect of it was involved in that kind of Theology, which the Schools established. The Schoolmen had a high veneration for the text of Scripture—not inferior, I should say, to that of the most zealous Protestant. But it was an improperly-directed veneration—a reception of the Scripture, not simply as the living word of God, but as containing the sacred *propositions* of inspired wisdom. We know to what scrupulous nicety the Jews carried their glosses of the older Scriptures. Theirs was a respect simply for the words of God; not incompatible, as experience proved, with an actual nullification of the Divine Word itself. Their Scribes were expert in interpretation and comment,

whilst the people wandered as sheep not having a shepherd. Thus did the theologians of the Schools, with dutiful officiousness, gather up the fragments of revealed truth ; but, in the mean time, they lost the opportunity of feeding on the bread of God which came down from heaven. Their piety became a superstition, transubstantiating the truth of God into the verbal elements by which it was signified.

The preternatural enlargement of the logical powers of the understanding, from being an effect of the discipline of the Scholastic Philosophy, became in its turn a cause of the morbid taste for verbal exposition. The subject and predicate of Scriptural propositions were examined in their respective force of signification, with the view of ascertaining the *nature* of the things described. This was done in subserviency to the statement of theological definition ; to fix exact limits within which the Catholic faith might be included. As heresies multiplied, more and more were such definitions required ; and the verbal analysis of Scriptural propositions was carried on to meet the increasing demand. And thus, out of simple declarations of Scripture, a mass of theories was constructed. In justifying their practice by an appeal to the argumentative character of the Scripture, they forgot to observe, that the Scripture-arguments are arguments of inducement, addressed to the whole nature of man—not merely to intellectual man, but to thinking and feeling man living among his fellow men ;—and to be appre-

ciated therefore in their *effect* on our *whole* nature.<sup>u</sup> They were like critics, examining some work of art in the portions of its composition, and exploring the adjustment of each to a certain standard of ideal perfection, instead of looking at the whole as a production of taste, directed to interest a spectator.

From the observations already made, it would appear that the ethical nature of the Christian Scriptures had been insufficiently attended to by the Divines of the Schools. Eager to erect their Theology into a Philosophy of the Divine Being, they were comparatively indifferent to the humbler truths which lay in the walk of man's every-day life. But they did not at the same time omit the consideration of human duties: as I shall have an opportunity of shewing on a future occasion. What I would point out now is, the disparagement of Revelation, as a code of moral discipline; and the exaltation of Theology, in the sense of a Theoretic Science, as the appropriate subject of the Inspired

<sup>u</sup> The remark applies as well to the evidences of Christianity. No one, as far as I am aware, has so stated the force of the Christian argument, except Bishop Butler. In the Chapter on the subject in his Analogy, he points out that the true estimate of the Evidences is in their *effect*. Each may be answered separately; but there is no denying the real effect produced by them as a whole on our complex nature. Whoever has examined them must feel that they impress him strongly; or if he refuses to admit the effect in his own case, he cannot but allow that they are *such as* to produce an effect on men in general. The last point is enough.

Volumes. This would follow indeed from the influence of that dialectical spirit, with which they pursued the whole inquiry into Divine Truth. *Conclusions*, and not Precepts, or Rules of Conduct, were the object of attention as they read; and instead therefore of tracing the coincidence of revealed obligations with the internal laws of our moral nature, they were intent only on applying the rules obtained, whether from Scripture or from the works of philosophers, to particular cases, and forming a code of Casuistry rather than a Theory of Moral Sentiments and Duties. Happily for the ethical system of the Schools, the chief human authority followed was that of Aristotle. The sound sense of this philosopher was a corrective to the extravagancies, into which their religious enthusiasm, or their speculative refinement, separately might have carried them. Fenced within the inclosure of Scripture precepts, and under the guidance of Aristotle, they reared a more comprehensive and sober system of morality, than such as would have resulted from their theological opinions alone; or from the maxims of the Christian moralists who preceded them; or from the condition of social life in the middle ages.

## **LECTURE III.**

**THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSIES.**





## SUMMARY.

QUESTIONS on the Trinity naturally the first to engage the attention of disputants—Their ecclesiastical and political importance in the early ages—Maintenance of the orthodox doctrine chiefly owing to the Latin Church—Controversies on the subject assume a scientific form in the Scholastic writings—Promiscuous character of ancient Philosophy exemplified in the discussion—Scholastic system applies the philosophy of mind to the investigation of God from his Effects in the world—Doctrine of the Trinity, in its principle, the ideas or reasons of all existing things, traced to the Intellect of God—Description of the Scholastic mode of rationalizing the doctrine—Orthodox theory of the Divine Procession the exact view of the principle of Causation—Extremes of Sabellianism and Arianism traced to their misconception of this principle—Mischievous effect of the notion, that doctrines must be defended from their speculative consequences—Influence of Materialism—Rise of a technical phraseology—Logical principles employed in settling the precise notions of the different terms introduced—Popular illustrations of the Trinity examples of this mode of philosophizing—Controversies turn principally on the views taken of sameness, unity, diversity, &c.—Differences between the orthodox and the Sabellians and Arians in regard to the Divine Unity—Difficulties produced by the word *Persona*, obviated by logical distinctions.

Illustration of the doctrine of the Incarnation from the principles of the established logical philosophy—It accounts for the differences between the orthodox, the Nestorians, and Eutychians.

Application of this philosophy in the Controversies on the Procession of the Holy Spirit—The words *Filioque* added to the Nicene Creed—This addition ultimately maintained on logical grounds.

General practical reflections—Difficulties on the subject of the Trinity metaphysical in their origin—Popular misapprehension of the Divine Unity an instance of this—The various theories all Trinitarian in principle—Simplicity of belief in Scripture facts, the only escape from perplexity.

ROM. I. 20.

The invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead.

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*Τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου, τοῖς ποιήμασι νοούμενα  
καθορᾶται, ἥτε ἀίδιος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θεϊότης.*

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Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, per ea quæ facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur; sempiterna quoque ejus virtus et divinitas. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE III.

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THE consideration of the Trinitarian controversies naturally takes the lead in the present inquiry. We have seen, that the Scholastic Philosophy had for its basis a theoretic knowledge of the Divine Being; a knowledge of God as the Highest Cause of all things, the Primary Being in the order of the Universe. We have also seen, that it was a system of Realism, employing terms denoting abstractions of the human mind, as the philosophical accounts of processes in nature; and establishing revealed truths by logical deduction. It was consistent therefore, that theologians, the disciples of such a philosophy, should commence their Books of Sentences, their Sums of Theology, and their commentaries, with expositions of those First Truths which immediately respect the Divine Being.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Thus too, not only in the decrees of the Council of Trent, but in our own Articles, the doctrines on this head occupy the first place; the Church of Rome evidently following that method of Theology, which her great Doctors had sanctioned by the authority of their practice; whilst the Fathers of the Church of England, even in shaking off the spiritual bonds of Rome, were tacitly influenced by the discipline in which their minds had been trained.

The controversies, however, involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, are the least peculiar to the Scholastic Theology, in point of fact. They were congenial indeed to the spirit of that Theology, and presented it with materials, on which it has amply exercised its keen and inexhaustible research. But the outlines were supplied to its hand, by the labours of earlier disputation. It remained only for the Schoolmen, to dilate, to give distinctness, to methodize objections and replies, and to reduce each member of the disputation to its proper place, in a minutely articulated system of Theology. This in general is what they have accomplished: and they have accomplished it, we must allow, with extraordinary penetration, with amazing compass of thought, and, on the whole, with an admirable skill. I speak more particularly of Aquinas, in whom, we see the system, in its utmost perfection of workmanship. The more indeed we study his writings, the less we shall wonder, that the admiration of a speculative age should have crowned such labours, with the titles of Angelic, Seraphic, Profound, and other similar designations of honour, which distinguish the several leading Doctors of the Schools.<sup>b</sup>

These controversies could not fail to attract the curiosity of the Greeks, at an early period of the Gospel. For their Philosophy, in itself a mass of subtile speculation into the nature of Being, was

<sup>b</sup> Aquinas is styled the Angelic Doctor; Bonaventura, the Seraphic; Alexander de Hales, the Irrefragable; Duns Scotus, the Subtile; &c.

confronted by a system of Theology, declaring facts illustrative of the great First Being, the object of their pursuit, and professing to have surpassed the utmost reach of all former discoveries of the truth.

Looking from a distance at the ardour and bitterness, with which minute points of difference were debated, in the several attempts to perfect the theory of the Trinity, we are apt to feel surprise at the extraordinary excitement; and either to pity, or to smile at, such apparent waste of intellect and energy. But such feelings are awakened only by very superficial views of the case. Adequately to conceive the interest of theological questions, at the period, when they were most keenly agitated, we must view them under a political aspect. We must imagine, how persons may have felt, whose social existence and importance were regarded as at stake, in any shock to the unity of the Faith. The theory of the Divine Being was eminently that point, in which an unity of opinion was indispensable to the religious society. The smallest discrepancies in this primary article,—the very base on which the society stood combined,—compromised the principle of perfect unity, as really, as the greatest differences. The abstract curiosity of the question itself, and the habit of disputation, contributed, undoubtedly, to give an eagerness, and a relish, to controversies on the Trinity. But these are not sufficient to account for the origin, and the extent, of the interest excited. For the interest

evidently was not confined to the Church-leaders : they were fully supported by the spirit existing in the Christian public at large. The profane familiarity, with which articles of the Trinitarian question are said to have entered into the every-day conversation of the times, characterizes the general feeling on the subject, at a period, when the Spiritual Polity formed the great commonwealth of the Roman world ; and whilst Philosophy, regarded as identical with Theology, was essentially dialectical or colloquial. There was, in fact, no other topic of such common concern. The national bond of union had been lost in the vague citizenship of the Roman Empire ; and that Empire, now falling into disjointed masses, ceased to possess the charm of a common welfare, or a common glory, for the individual members of it. But whilst the fabric of civil society was daily decaying, the principle of religious union, as I pointed out on a former occasion, was diffusing and strengthening itself by sure advances. In such a state of things as this, the bold assertion of its characteristic doctrines, in their points of contrast with the antagonist systems of Judaism and Paganism, would naturally appear. Assertions of its external evidences would diminish ; and its internal system, the theory of the religion, would be brought more prominently into notice. The battle being won, the victors had only to proclaim the name of the Lord in songs of triumph—to tell it out among the heathen, that He was God alone. It was then, in this day of triumph, that the peculiar

notions of God, involved in the internal system of Christianity, were freely discussed in writing and in conversation. When friend met friend, or stranger met stranger, it was the natural inquiry, what was doing in the great religious commonwealth. It was of less consequence, even politically, to the mass of the people, what victories, Constantine, or Constantius, might have gained over the arms of Imperial opponents, than to which party of the theological disputants the reigning Emperor inclined. The passionate obstinacy, with which the people of Alexandria, and of Milan, supported the cause of their Prelates, shews, how deeply implicated the fortunes of individuals were, in the decisions of questions on the doctrine of the Trinity.

What rendered these disputes more complex, was, that they were agitated, whilst as yet an active intercourse subsisted between the Greek and Latin Churches, as members of one spiritual body. The Latins were unable, on account of "the narrowness" of their language and their poverty of terms,"<sup>c</sup> to reach the precision and compass of the Greek phraseology. But the Greeks, regarding their own tongue as the sacred idiom of philosophy and theology, strove to impose their own modes of thought, and their very words, on the reluctant sense of the Latins. Even among the Greeks themselves,

<sup>c</sup> Gregory Nazianzen speaks of disputes having been caused, *διὰ στενότητα τῆς παρὰ τοῖς Ἰταλοῖς γλώττης, καὶ ὀνομάτων πενίαν.* Orat. XXI. p. 395.



disputes were multiplied, as each employed the principal terms of the controversy in a strictly philosophical, or in a popular, acceptation; as the habits of thought in individuals, were coloured with Oriental, or Greek, associations. So great indeed were the impediments arising from the varied use of Terms, where the whole discussion was fundamentally dialectical, that the measure of accommodation between those who really agreed with each other, would probably have failed in any other hands but those of Athanasius. The years which that intrepid advocate of orthodoxy spent at Rome during his second exile, when, with the sagacity of Themistocles, he studied the language of the party, on whose protection and influence he had thrown himself, gave him a facility for overcoming the existing obstacles from the discordances of language. He seized the points of agreement between the contending parties, and, by his wise and conciliatory policy, secured, at least, a standard of orthodoxy for future ages of disputation, both to the East and the West.<sup>d</sup>

But though Athanasius was the great author of that theoretic agreement, which established the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity; the maintenance, and diffusion of it, were owing principally to the active zeal of the Latin Clergy. Nothing can

<sup>d</sup> The works of the Latin Fathers were sometimes translated into Greek. We find Damascenus quoting passages from Ambrosius in Greek. *Contra Jacobit.* p. 443. Oper. Damasc. In general however the Greeks were ignorant of the Latin literature.—Note A. Lecture III.

declare this more strongly, than the fact, that the original of the Athanasian Creed is a Latin composition. It is sufficiently remarkable, that ecclesiastical history has not been able positively to assign the authorship, or date, of the Creed as a composition.<sup>e</sup> It appears to me, that the silence respecting the individual author was designed, or at least his name was forgotten, in the wish to give a higher authority to the document; and that its reception by us in its present form, as the “symbol” or “faith” of Athanasius, is an evidence of the triumph of a party in the Church, thus declaring their authoritative judgment, under the sanction of a name, which expressed in itself every thing hostile to Arianism.<sup>f</sup> The Greek placed “the sword of Aristotle” in the hand of the Latin; but the spiritual legionary of Rome girded it on,

<sup>e</sup> Vigilius of Tapsus, to whom it has been ascribed, is excluded, from the expressions not being those employed by him, in touching on the same points. He uses the word, *Unio*, where the Creed has *Unitas*. See Le Quien, in *Dissert. Damascen.* prefixed to his edition of the works of Damascenus. Hilary of Arles, a contemporary and correspondent of Augustine, has also been supposed to be the author of the Creed; and so has Vincent of Lerins, of the same period. But the Creed throughout savours more of the African Theology than of the Gallic. Many of the expressions closely correspond with the language of Augustine himself.

<sup>f</sup> It is by no means necessary, as I have before observed, to have recourse to the supposition of fraud, to account for the attaching the name of a particular author to any writing. The Schoolmen, however, cite the Creed as written by Athanasius himself; which was natural in an age ignorant of criticism, and when Greek authors were read only in Latin translations.

and cleft with it the way for the orthodox truth, through the opposing ranks of heresy and infidelity. The jealousy, with which the Latin Church watched the whole doctrine of the Trinity, corresponds with this view. The Greeks sustained the debate more on particular points, disputing about the parts; whilst the Latin seems to have looked on the whole, as a deposit entrusted to his care. The Latin at once looked to the effect of each proposition on the whole question; and raised his arm against the authors of the heretical language, as against the impious blasphemer, the denier of the truth concerning God.<sup>5</sup>

The living disputants however, who gave the mould to the controversies on the Trinity, had long passed away, when, with the rise of intellectual activity in Europe, the quarrels of other days were resuscitated in the Schools of a theological literature. In the Volumes of the Scholastic divines, we contemplate the phantoms of the departed, acting over, in solemn representation, the pastimes of their

<sup>5</sup> So vigilant were they, that Hincmar of Rheims commanded the ancient Hymn, *Te Trina Deitas*, to be altered to, *Te Summa Deitas*, and wrote a book himself against it; the former expression admitting of a tritheistic construction. The alteration however excited the jealousy of the other great party of the Gallic Church, that of the South of Gaul; and Ratramn of Corbey was employed to defend the obnoxious expression; which he did in writing. The keenness of the Occidentals on the Trinity, was probably the effect of persecution;—the Arian persecution in Africa, under the Vandals, and in France and Spain, and even Italy, under the Visigoths.—Note B.

real life; and the transactions of ages of tumult and noise glide before our eyes, as in one panoramic scene. It is here then, that the Trinitarian controversies fully reveal themselves as a Science. They are no longer living energies, acted on by events, and modified by personal intellect and character; but a combination of logical theories, all tending, as to a common point, to establish a perfect theory of the Divine Being. The various opinions of the early disputants, were, for the most part, founded on, or maintained by, the same method of philosophizing, of which the Scholastic system was the mature development. The disputations of the Schoolmen, accordingly, are, at once, an historical sketch of the Trinitarian question, and an establishment of the theory of the Trinity by a course of logical investigation. The Doctor of the Schools, as the judge of the sacred cause argued before him, hears the pleadings of the heretic, and the replies of the orthodox; and extracting the truth from the conflict of opinions, pronounces it with the weight of reason and authority, at once, as the *conclusion* of the philosopher, and the *sentence* of the master of theology.

Generally then, in the first place, I would observe respecting the controversies on the Trinity, that the only means of arriving at just notions of them, is, to be aware of that promiscuous combination of sciences, which formed the ancient Logical Philosophy; and which was adopted into the Christian

Church, both as coincident with Theology, and as an organ for the investigation of Truth. The several disputations will be found to have for their object; either to explain the Being and Attributes of God on assumed physical principles; or to reconcile the various hypotheses advanced with each other, and illustrate them, in their connexions and consequences, by processes of argumentation, and exact distinctions. But the two proceedings are continually running into each other; as must be the case, where metaphysical truth is only a refined materialism, and physical truth is sought in the abstractions of metaphysics:—which was eminently the case in the Ancient Philosophy, and the Scholastic system founded on it.

The pantheism of the New-Platonists was an extreme case of the application of the logical method of philosophizing. When nature is explored in the mirror of the human mind, material objects are easily represented to our thoughts, as possessing only a shadowy metaphysical existence. The mind becomes every thing in fact and reality, as it is every thing in its power of conception and generalization.<sup>h</sup> And when the philosopher is also a theologian, and carries up his speculation from the

<sup>h</sup> Aristot. De Anim. l. III. c. 9. ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντα πῶς ἐστὶ πάντα. Ibid. c. 3. καὶ εἶ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν· πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὄλη, ἀλλ' ἡ νοητικὴ, οὔτε ἐντελεχεία, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἶδη . . . . ὅταν δὲ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται, ὡς ὁ ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν. *Aquin.* Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xiv. art. 1.—Note C.

human mind to the divine, the theory of material nature resolves itself into the pure existence of the Divine Being, in whose intellect are the primordial causes, the immutable first principles of all existing things.

The Schoolmen, as I pointed out in my last Lecture, did not explicitly adopt the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, the basis of the pantheistic philosophy. They did not proceed to the extreme of resolving all material things into mere phenomena, the simple manifestations of the Divine Being: the more experimental philosophy of Aristotle guarding them from the express admission of this extreme theory: but they virtually admitted it, in their *à priori* method of tracing up all real existences to the Being of God. Thus, according to their view, all power, or wisdom, or goodness, observed in the universe, were actual derivations of qualities, intrinsically residing in God himself, and going forth as it were out of Him into the works of his creation; not simply the *evidences* of the existence of such qualities in Him as their Author and Giver; but the *real presence* of the Divine qualities themselves analogically denoted by those terms. So again, the relations of human life, as that of Father and Son, were, according to their view, not original as existing in human nature, but founded on their archetypes in God. Appeal was made to that text of St. Paul;—"I bow my knees to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, from whom the whole family  
" in heaven and earth is named,"—*ex quo omnis*

*paternitas in terris et in cœlo nominata est*;—to prove, that the filial relation among men, was only an expression, or copy, of a prior relation, existing between the Father and the Son in the Holy Trinity.<sup>1</sup>

A philosophy of this kind led them to seek their definitions of the Being and Attributes of God, in the phenomena of the material world. The analogies of the physical universe were to such philosophers, more than presumptive proofs of the existence and character of God: they were positive resemblances, or participations, of the Divine Nature; so that, in the survey of these, the mind contemplates express manifestations of God himself. This is the sense, in which the School-Divines speak of our knowing God, only by the *Effects* of his agency on the world. At the first view, they may appear in this admission, the advocates of a cautious inductive Theology, that modestly gathers up the notices of God's agency scattered throughout nature. But a closer attention to their method, will shew, that this very notion of our Divine Knowledge, was highly speculative; that, as I have stated, it was a discernment of God himself, as manifested in his works,—a theory of the principles of the Divine Nature, indirectly obtained through the veil of the material world, but immediate and direct at the

<sup>1</sup> This instance may suffice to shew the Scholastic misconception of the real nature of Scripture-truth, when speculators could so readily seize on *a word* to raise a system of Theology.—The argument is lost in our translation.—Note D.

same time, so far as those principles were discernible by the spiritualized intellect.<sup>k</sup>

Such was their construction of the Apostle's words to the Romans; "The invisible things of God are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made:" words, perhaps, in themselves, borrowed from the Platonic philosophy, but clearly intended by the Apostle, in the practical argument pursued in this epistle, only to declare the sure attestation of Nature to the Divine Being, by whom its constitution and course have been framed.

As their Theology, accordingly, was the Science of God,—an attempt to explore the mysterious principles of the Divine Intelligence, on which the truths of Revelation were conceived to depend,—the Schoolmen set themselves in the first instance, to rationalize the doctrine of the Trinity. The intellectual grounds of this doctrine demanded to be ascertained, and premised; because these would constitute the great First Reasons, or Principles,

<sup>k</sup> Manifestum est autem, quod ea quæ naturaliter fiunt, determinatas formas consequuntur. Hæc autem formarum determinatio oportet quod reducatur, sicut in primum principium, in divinam sapientiam, quæ ordinem universi excogitavit, qui in rerum distinctione consistit. Et ideo oportet dicere, quod in divina sapientia sunt rationes omnium rerum, quas supra diximus ideas, id est, formas exemplares in mente divina existentes. Quæ quidem licet multiplicentur secundum respectum ad res, tamen non sunt realiter aliud a divina essentia, prout ejus similitudo a diversis participari potest diversimode. Sic igitur ipse Deus est primum exemplar omnium. *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. XLIV. art. 3.—Note E.



from which, the whole train of reasonings to the rational principles of other doctrines, would necessarily be deduced. Or, to express it more according to their technical method, the Being of God, considered abstractedly from the works of his creation, presented to the Philosopher that ultimate abstraction of which he was in quest;—the Ideas, or Forms, of all existing things of the Universe, reduced to their perfect simplicity and immateriality. Every particular subordinate theory of doctrine drawn from the analogies of nature, would thus be rationalized in the most intense degree; being contemplated, as it was the reason, the very intelligence, of God himself.

For in order to understand the Scholastic mode of proceeding, in their reasonings on this as well as every other truth of Christianity, we must bear in mind throughout, the nature of the inquiry undertaken. It was to assimilate and identify, as far as possible, two apparently different systems—the revealed, and the intellectual, world. The facts of both were assumed;—those of the revealed world, as given in the words of Scripture and in the authoritative decisions of the Church: those of the intellectual world, as ascertained by the principles of the established philosophy. Their object then was, to extort from that philosophy, a confession of the mysterious wisdom, revealed in Scripture, and expounded in the dogmas of Theology. The primary truth therefore, which, in one sense, may be called a Theory of all revealed truth; as being, in the just

view of it, the combined result of all the Scripture-facts;—the doctrine of the Trinity;—was to be converted into a speculative *à priori* principle,—a logical basis, from which all other facts of Scripture, rationalized in like manner, might be demonstratively concluded.

The controversies on the Trinity, accordingly, if we view them in their result, were a determination in precise terms of that *account* of the Divine Being, which the Scripture-Revelation involved: those terms being drawn from the analogies of nature, in which the mysterious truth was conceived to be veiled. But in their progress and formation,—in the views taken of those analogies on which the reasonings are founded,—use is made of all existing theories, in the different branches of science, whether physical, metaphysical, or moral, as then understood and received.

The human mind, as I have observed, being taken as the medium of philosophical observation in the Scholastic system, the facts of Scripture and nature were resolved into the fundamental principles of our mental constitution. These presented in such a method of inquiry, those ultimate truths which the philosopher desired to reach. For after all the various associations of thought have been analysed,—after the utmost effort of minute subdivision of notions,—there still remains an higher ground of abstract contemplation; that, in which all these

various ideas are resolved into the principle of Consciousness itself,—into the nature of the thinking mind, in which all this wonderful mechanism of thought is carried on.

It was observed then, that in the human mind there were two distinct classes of facts; those in which the mind is exercised immediately on itself—the intellectual principles; and those in which it applies itself, as it were, to external objects—the moral principles. Plato, and Aristotle, had both recognized this division of the mind. The Schoolmen inherited and availed themselves of this division, in their survey of the various manifestations of God, for the erection of their philosophical system of the Trinity.

The effects discernible in nature being summed up in these primary laws of the human mind, and there regarded as in their Causes; the next step of the speculation was, to trace the order of connexion between these principles now viewed in the mind. An object of our moral nature, as Aristotle had pointed out, must first be apprehended by the intellect; it must first be *known* in order to be *pursued*.<sup>m</sup>

<sup>m</sup> Necessesse est autem quod amor a verbo procedat; non enim aliquid amamus, nisi quod conceptione mentis apprehendimus. Unde et secundum hoc manifestum est, quod Spiritus Sanctus procedit a Filio. *Aquin.* S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2.

Sed Deum velle, habet aliud verum naturaliter prius eo, scilicet Deum cognoscere, quoniam Deus naturaliter prius cognoscit quodlibet volutum, quam velit illud. Omnis enim volutio est necessario præcogniti, sicut tam Philosophis quam Theologis satis constat. *Bradwardin.* De Causa Dei, lib. I. c. 12. p. 200.

The intellectual principle therefore was prior in order to the moral—or the intellect prior to the will. Thus far the speculation was merely human. The various effects of nature were referred to their great moving causes in the mind; and a theory was given, of the mode in which these causes moved, or proceeded into effect. But the human mind being formed in the image of God—being in itself an effect of the agency of the Supreme Mind,—the transition was easy, from the human principles of causation, to the divine, as from the inferior and derivative agency, to the superior and the original. The mind therefore, its intelligence, and its will, were contemplated, as they had their being, in the mind, the intelligence, and the will of God. These principles, accordingly, were the true analogies, corresponding to the Scripture designation of the great Divine Cause of all things, under the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. It only remained, in reasoning upon these analogies, to take into view the circumstances of imperfection and darkness, under which they were discerned,—the proper incomprehensibility of the Divine subject by the human faculties in the present state. It was necessary further, to proceed by negations; to abstract from the divine truth, whatever was peculiar to the ordinary human notion of Causation; and so to *approximate* to the notion of the Divine Being, as He exists in himself,—to the theory of the *Causa Altissima*, as it is purely the principle of causation.

Aquinas philosophizes concerning the Trinity

exactly in the way that I have described. Assuming the process of the intellect and the will in man, as the counterpart of the Scriptural truth which he has undertaken to explain, he demonstrates the theory of Divine Procession according to it. The Son, the *Logos*, the Reason and Word of God, is the principle of intelligence in the Divine Being,—the internal word of God, expressing and comprehending all the principles of created things. The Holy Spirit is the Love of God towards his creation, regarded as it subsists in his own nature; as it centres in the Divine Word, or Reason, or principle of intelligence; being the *nexus*, or bond of union between the Father and the Word. But why, it may be asked, is the one process called Generation; the other simply Procession?—why is the Word called the Son, and the Love of God called the Spirit? It is the resemblance of the thought to the mind from which it proceeds, that gives the appropriateness of the term Generation in its highest sense,—that of like producing like,—to the Procession of the Word or Reason of God; and therefore, the relation of the Word is represented, as that between a Father and a Son; and the Word is called the Son. But in the process of the will, there is no resemblance between the object on which it is exerted, and the will itself. Hence, there is no appropriate name for the proceeding of the Divine Love, but the general one of Procession; and this relation in the Divine Being can only be expressed by the name of Spirit, founded on the analogy of

spiration, or breathing, by which his derivation from the Father and the Son is described in Scripture.<sup>n</sup>

In this speculation there is certainly a great deal of the language of Platonism. In the *Timæus*, we find, the term *μονογενής*, the *unigenitus* of the Latin Fathers, more than once applied to the Universe, the secondary Divine Being of the Platonic system; and the description of a third Being, as a bond between God and the Universe—*δεσμὸν ἐν μέσῳ ἀμφοῖν ξυναγωγόν*.<sup>o</sup> But though there is a Platonic under-current of thought in the scholastic theory, the application of the theory is Aristotelic. Plato did not attempt to shew the nature of the Divine Being, as a *Principle of Motion*. His Deity was simply a general Theory of the Universe. Whereas Aristotle endeavoured to trace the successions of motions, from the changes in the visible world, to their “First Mover” in God. His Deity was an abstract principle; as that of Plato was; but the theory was drawn from a philosophy of *Motion*. The Schoolmen

<sup>n</sup> *Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvii. art. 1.* The expression, *ex substantia Patris*, was appropriated to the Son; so that, though the Holy Spirit was spoken of as consubstantial with the Father and the Son, it was not considered correct to describe the Spirit, as *of the substance* of the Father, but only to apply to Him the term *proceeding from* the Father. See *Abælardi* *Introd. ad Theol. lib. II.*—Note F.

<sup>o</sup> Plato. *Timæus*, p. 307. Bipont. Ed. *εἰς ὃδε μονογενής οὐρανὸς γεγωνός*: and at the end of the Dialogue.

There is a reference also in this mode of philosophizing to ancient theories of the Universe—as to the *νοῦς* of Anaxagoras, and the principle of Love assigned by Hesiod and Parmenides.—Note G.

accordingly considered the Being of God, not only with the eye of Platonic mysticism, but further, as the principle of *Efficiency*—the Cause from which all Effects proceeded; only viewing this principle of Efficiency, or Causation, in that ultimate state, where all outward effects vanished in the abstract view of the Cause itself.

The orthodox theory of the Trinity, accordingly, consisted in an exact scientific view of the principle of Causation. It was that theory, in which, the efficient principles of the universe being traced up to Mind, and the principles of intelligence and action in the mind, were further regarded in the Divine Being *intrinsically*; as distinct from those effects, by which they are outwardly displayed to our contemplation. The heterodox in either extreme, whether those whose theories were charged with unitarian consequences, or those who incurred the imputation of tritheism, failed in speculating concerning the principle of Causation. They did not contemplate it in the ultimate evanescent state; as it exists purely internally in the Divine Being. The Sabellian *Συναλοιφή*, or *Unio*, viewed the *Cause* in the act of *transition into Effect*. It supposed the Divine Being to be a vast tide of efflux and reflux, by which the Deity was, continually, and successively, protended from the Father, to the Son, and the Holy Spirit.<sup>p</sup> It thus did not view the Deity under those

<sup>p</sup> Aquinas, as well as the other Schoolmen, often present this idea of the Divine Being. Quoting Damascenus, Aquinas says: *Unde et Damascenus dicit, quod principalius omnibus quæ de*

negations or limitations, in which every thing of Effect, as distinct from the principle of Causation, disappeared. It contemplated the Deity, as, in a manner, going out of Himself. The Arian exposed himself to the charge of maintaining a tritheistic hypothesis,—or, if he denied this, an unitarian;—whilst he stated the principle of Causation in the Deity, in combination with the effect produced; regarding the Son, as an effect produced by the Father, and the Holy Ghost, as an effect produced by the Son. He did not restrict his view, any more than the Sabelian, to the simple point, where the Deity was regarded as pure Efficiency,—pure *Energy* or *Act*, as the Schoolmen speak; but gave an account of Him after a gross manner, as He is seen in the material world.

All that was intended, at the first, by these speculations concerning the Divine Procession, was, to present to the mind a view of the mysterious facts of the Trinity, according to that theory of Causation, which was the philosophical creed of the day; and thus to satisfy the questions of speculative men. Origen indeed attributes the origin of all heresies in religion, to the anxiety of inquisitive men to understand the doctrines of Christianity. Rather, they were owing to the undue solicitude of Christians to Deo dicuntur nominibus, est, Qui est. Totum enim in seipso comprehendens, habet ipsum esse, *velut quoddam pelagus substantiæ infinitum et indeterminatum.* *Damascen. de Fid. Orth. I. 12. Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. XIII. art. 11. Also Joan. Duns Scot. Quodlib. qu. XIV. fol. 41.*



meet the objections of opponents. Theoretic views of the Scripture Truth, it was thought, might be useful in maintaining an argument with the infidel philosopher, or the sceptical Christian; they might serve at least as arguments to the individual addressed. But soon, the more scrupulous, or the less philosophical, believer would take alarm at the introduction into religion, of expressions apparently foreign to the truth. The alarm would spread; and the leaders of orthodoxy would be roused to vindicate the sacred cause. The heretic philosopher would be called on for his defence; he would be induced to maintain the position which he had originally advanced; and his defence of his peculiar view would then lead him into further speculations on the subject. Thus were men of both parties, the reputed orthodox, as well as the reputed heretic, gradually forced into conclusions, and from these conclusions into other premises, at which they might at first have revolted. They gradually went deeper and deeper, until at length their footing was lost, and they abandoned themselves to the current. When once the principle is recognised, that a doctrine must be defended from all the consequences deducible from it; there is no extravagance of theory, which the disputant may not be forced to adopt, for the sake of saving his original hypothesis.

When the Arian, for instance, explained the Divine Procession, as an *external* efficiency in God, it would naturally be argued, that, on this principle,

the Son was the *creature* of the Father. The same reasoning would apply to the nature of the Holy Spirit. Hence, by logical consequence, it would be the creed of Arianism, that the Holy Spirit was the *creature of a creature*; and that both the Son and the Spirit were inferior to the Father. Whether this were the original creed of the Arian, or no, it seems scarcely possible, but that, in the progress of controversy, he should have been brought to the admission of it. His theory assumed a distinctness between the Father and the Son, analogous to that between an effect and its antecedent cause. This implied some interval of *Time* between the Two. He was forced to admit this; though he might reduce the interval to the evanescent limit of a moment. But it involved still the admission, that the Son was not *coeternal* with the Father.

Again, the Sabellian Theory produced an indistinctness in the mode of apprehending the Son and the Holy Spirit. Hence, it might naturally be said, that the Sabellian made no *real* distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: that the distinction, according to him, existed only *λόγῳ*, *logically*; and he would be called on to defend himself from the charge of asserting a verbal Trinity. In maintaining his hypothesis, he would be led on, to insist further on the validity of those distinctions, which it asserted; and these logical statements, or verbal reasons, would tend to confirm his opponents in their original view of his doctrine. He would more and more establish the idea, that the Trini-

tarian distinctions, according to his doctrine, rested only on definitions.

Notions of materialism, we may perceive, were mixed up with these several theories of Causation. The materialism of the Gnostic systems was more open and avowed: it stands forth confessed, particularly, in the *προβολή*, or *prolation*, of the Valentinians.<sup>9</sup> But though in the progress of the Trinitarian speculations, the original materialism of the Church-philosophy<sup>r</sup> is partly disguised under metaphysics and logic; it may still be detected, as a fundamental prejudice in the mind of the later speculatist. Though he may be engaged in stating only the modes of apprehending the subject explained,—in shewing those just conceptions, which the mind ought to form, of the primary principles of the Divine Being,—he is continually perplexing the subject with notions drawn from material things;—appearing, at one moment, to take a word in its

<sup>9</sup> Tertullian speaks of the Son as, *ex ipsius (Patris) substantia missum*; and as *prolatum à Patre*; defending the last assertion, as distinct from the Valentinian *probola*, which implied separation. *Adv. Prax.* c. vii. viii. p. 504.

<sup>r</sup> Augustine says, that it was his prejudice against the belief of immaterial substance, that kept him back from an earlier profession of Catholic Christianity.—*Ipsum quoque Salvatorem nostrum, unigenitum tuum, tanquam de massa lucidissimæ molis tuæ porrectum ad nostram salutem, ita putabam, ut aliud de illo non crederem nisi quod possem vanitate imaginari. Talem itaque naturam ejus nasci non posse de Maria Virgine arbitrabar, nisi carni concerneretur. Confess. lib. V. c. 10. Ibid. c. 14. lib. VI. c. 3.*—Note H.

strictly logical sense, as descriptive only of a process in the mind; at the next moment, reasoning from it, as if it described a process in nature. Thus even in what was considered the orthodox view of the Divine Proceeding,—avowedly a theory of the Deity as the great First Cause,—materialism intruded itself, in the attempt to trace the order of derivation of the Son and Holy Spirit from the Father. Such texts as; *Ex ore Altissimi prodii*; *Eruclavit cor meum verbum bonum*; *Ego de Patre exivi*; *Ego ex Patre processi*; (I quote the translations used by the Latins, as these illustrate better their mode of deducing reasons from words of Scripture;) were argued from, as proofs, that the Son was of the *same* substance with the Father.<sup>s</sup> Then in applying this notion, the metaphysical principle, that “what-ever is *in* God is God Himself,” was appealed to, as further proof, that the Son, being of the substance of the Father, must also be God.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>s</sup> Verbo Domini cœli firmati sunt, et spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum; applied by Anselm. *De Process. Sp.* p. 130. Also by Ambrose and others.—Note I.

<sup>t</sup> Ad primum ergo dicendum; quod in inferioribus non procedit persona a persona per amorem, ex defectu et materialitate est personarum: scilicet quia non quicquid est in ipsis est idem eis. Et ideo non procedit persona a persona, nisi divisione alicujus ab ipsis: quod universaliter accipit virtutem ad formandum totum. Et amor qui est in inferioribus, non est idem eis, sed passio quædam. Sed in Deo quicquid est, Deus est: et ideo cum aliquid procedit ab ipso, tali in procedendo communicat naturam divinam; et modo emanationis, proprium accipit existendi modum quo persona est. *Albert. Mag. in Lib. Sentent. Tract VII. qu. xxxi. fol. 84.*

The theory however of the Divine Procession, and its modifications by the Sabellian or Arian, demanded their appropriate phraseology, without which they could not be maintained. In fact, these were only points of departure, from which the various controversies of the Trinity took their course. The questions next arose, how to reconcile these different views with the Unity of the Divine Being;—how to discriminate between the Father, Son, and Spirit; and what common name was to be assigned them. Then came also the disquisitions arising from the Incarnation of the Word, and their reaction on the notions conceived of the Trinity; and the minute discussions concerning the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other members of the Trinity, as to the order and mode of *procession*; and the reaction of these also on the original hypotheses of the Trinity.

Now all such questions strictly fall under the general heads which constituted the Dialectical Science of ancient times. The reduction of all objects examined under certain classes; their differences under the common class to which they might be referred; their properties; their circumstances; and that assemblage of classes on each particular object, by which it is logically defined; were the points of inquiry with the dialectical philosopher. So they were with the Scholastic Divine, in his attempt to settle his theory of the Trinity. The notions again of identity and diversity, similarity

and dissimilarity, priority and posteriority, coinstantaneousness, consecutiveness, &c., were, as Aristotle points out and illustrates, the great matter of inquiry with the ancient dialectician.<sup>u</sup> But these are precisely what occupy the attention of the Scholastic Divine, in all those subordinate questions, which arose out of the speculation concerning the *Processions* in the Divine Being. I shall now illustrate some of these points; the limits of a discourse obliging me to restrict myself to a specimen only, in such abundant materials of evidence. A specimen however may amply suffice for the induction which I wish to establish, of the force of logical theories, in the existing views and statements of the Trinitarian doctrines.

The manner in which the Unity of God was maintained in the different speculations, of the orthodox, the Sabellian and the Arian, is extremely worthy of observation. It was an Unity both physical and logical which the orthodox held; whereas the Sabellian taught only a physical unity, the Arian only a logical. The orthodox, for example, asserted that there was no division, no separation, no transmutation, of the Divine Being, in the Trinity; but that the whole Deity was transfused (they employ this very term) from the Father to the Son and the Holy Spirit. To express this entire presence of the Godhead in each, without any separation, they

<sup>u</sup> Aristot. Metaph. lib. III. c. 1. *περὶ ὅσων οἱ διαλέκτικοι πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν.*

adopted the word *circumincessio*, the *περιχώρησις* of the Greeks;<sup>x</sup> characterizing by it, as they conceived, the Scripture account, *I am in the Father, and the Father in me*, and that mutual Love of the Father to the Son, which was the Holy Spirit proceeding from both. Thus too they delighted to speak of the Son, as of the Substance, or *Usia*, of the Father; and of the whole Trinity, as Consubstantial, or Homoousion.<sup>y</sup> The word Substance, by the ambiguity of its meaning, as also was the case with the *Usia* of the Greeks, answered the purpose of the orthodox Latin, in asserting at once a physical and logical unity. It was employed without precision; sometimes to denote the material nature or the principal portion of a thing; sometimes as synonymous with essence or the logical species; sometimes for individual Being, the support of Attributes or Properties.<sup>z</sup> It was taken accordingly by the Latins into the account of the Trinity, rather than Essence, which corresponded more closely with the Greek *Usia*; as was also the term *consubstantial*, rather than *coessential*, the more exact translation of *homoousion*. These terms served to exclude the *material* notion of actual division or motion in the Divine Being; and at the same time, affirmed, that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, all agreed in the same definition of Deity—that, so

<sup>x</sup> Καὶ τὴν ἐν ἀλλήλοις περιχώρησιν ἔχουσι δίχα πάσης συναλοιφῆς καὶ συμφύσεως. οὐδὲ ἐξισταμένων, ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν τεμνομένων κατὰ τὴν Ἀρείου διαίρεσιν. *Damasc. De Fid. Orthod. I. p. 140.*

<sup>y</sup> Note J.

<sup>z</sup> Note K.

far as they were God, there was no difference in the account, and notion, of their Being. Such was the unity, at once physical and logical, maintained by the orthodox.

The Sabellian approached nearly to the orthodox in his account of the Divine Unity; since he not only maintained the Divine distinctions, but was willing also to use the term *homoousion* in the description of the Trinity. The Latins indeed, during the agitation of the Arian disputes, were taunted by the Greeks, as symbolizing with the Sabellian: his zeal for the *consubstantiality*, being construed into an indiscriminateness in his notions of the Father,<sup>a</sup> Son, and Holy Spirit. The stress of the controversy, accordingly, between the Sabellian and the orthodox, lay in the proof, that, in his application of the word *homoousion*, the Sabellian maintained an actual *solitude* of the Divine Being,—merely the physical notion of *usia* or *substance*, and not the logical also; a

<sup>a</sup> Hilary of Poitiers, on making his appearance at the Council of Seleucia, was anxiously inquired of concerning the faith of the Gallic Church, which the Orientals suspected of Sabellianism. Sulpicius Severus says: Is ubi Seleuciam venit, magno cum favore exceptus, omnium in se animos et studia converterat, ac primum quæsitum ab eo, quæ esset Gallorum fides: quia tum, Arrianis prava de nobis vulgantibus, suspecti ab Orientalibus habebamur, trionymam solitarii Dei unionem secundum Sabellium credidisse; sed exposita fide sua, juxta ea quæ Nicææ erant a patribus conscripta, Occidentalibus perhibuit testimonium. Hist. Sacr. II. c. 42. p. 271.

Illud apud omnes constitit, unius Hilarij beneficio, Gallias nostras piaculo hæresis liberatas. Ibid. c. 45. p. 279. See Letter of Jerome, Note A. Lect. I.



sameness, that destroyed the distinction of *number* in the members of the Trinity, and left only a distinction of *Names*.<sup>b</sup>

The Arian Unity was a logical, and not a physical unity; because the difference which the Arian assigned between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, would not admit the assertion of a sameness, or even of a *similarity*, of substance, and left only a *general consonance* in which the Holy Three agreed. The term God, indeed, might be applied to each, according to the Arian notion; but evidently only in a generic sense, as equivalent to *divine nature*. Thus it was, that the Arian asserted an unity in thought, and will, and action; interpreting, in this way, the saying, *I and the Father are one*. He urged again the text, *the Father is greater than I*, as evidence against the unity of substance; taking substance in the sense of individual Being—the *πρώτη οὐσία* of the Categories. The orthodox, consequently, had to shew against the Arian, that such an unity as this, was a severing of the Godhead; that it consisted with so great a distinction between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as either to establish three Gods, or otherwise, one Supreme God and two subordinate Divine Beings.

The various illustrations of the Trinity from natural objects, employed in the writings of the Fathers and the Schoolmen, are instances of the same dialectical spirit, which laboured to establish the Divine Unity amidst the Trinitarian distinctions. The con-

<sup>b</sup> Note L.

nexion between the sun, the ray, and the heat; the fountain, the stream, and the lake; the seed, the stalk, and the fruit; the metal, the seal, and the impression; the memory, the intelligence, and the will; the premises and conclusion of a syllogism; and other like instances;—have been adduced on this point, when the design has been, not so much to establish the truth, as to illustrate it.<sup>c</sup> It is probable, that such illustrations were drawn from the explanation of *Sameness*, given by Aristotle. The instance, indeed, of the application of the word *same* to the water taken from the same fountain, is that expressly given by the philosopher, in his *Topics*, to shew, that things are called the same, so far as they are very strongly alike.<sup>d</sup> The Christian speculators, when pressed in argument to explain, in what the identity of the Godhead consisted, resorted to illustrations in which, a close resemblance, or intimate connexion, was regarded as equivalent to sameness. And we thus see the reason, why the Anomæans objected to the admission of the expression, *homoiousion*, or *similar substance*, into the Creed.<sup>e</sup> It was felt by these reasoners, that similarity and sameness were convertible terms, when applied to the essence of a thing. Accordingly, both Hilary and Basil were disposed to sanction the term, on the same ground on which the Ultra-Arians rejected it; as equivalent,

<sup>c</sup> Note M.

<sup>d</sup> Note N.

<sup>e</sup> *Sulpic. Sever. Hist. Sacr. lib. II. c. 40.*

that is, when rightly understood, to the homoousion of Nice.<sup>f</sup>

The disputation, in its progress, turned upon the point, how far difference might be asserted, consistently with that sameness, which constituted the Divine Unity of Being, or substance. It was inquired, whether the distinction could be rightly expressed by *hypostasis*, or *persona*; whether the ideas involved in one, or the other, of these terms, did not import too express and real, or too shadowy a distinction. The difficulty here was; to avoid distinguishing the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in such a way, as to represent them differing, as three angels, or three men, differ from each other; and yet to preserve the real distinctions. Dialectical Science furnished the expedients in this difficulty; and established that peculiar phraseology, which we now use, in speaking of the Sacred Trinity, as three Persons and one God.

The manner in which reasonings had been drawn from the visible effects of Divine Power, Wisdom, and Goodness, to the existence of a Trinity in the

<sup>f</sup> Testor me utrumque sensisse; says Hilary, *De Synod.* lib. I. —“If the term ἀπαλλακτῶς be added to the term (homoiousion) “I also admit it;” *Basil.* Epist. ad Apollinar. Note to Damasc. Dialectic. p. 38.—Hilary, *De Trin.* lib. IV. c. 4. p. 73. gives several Arian explanations of the term *homoousion*. Arians endeavoured to shew, that they objected to it, on grounds distinct from those on which it was held by the orthodox.—Note O.

Divine Being, seemed to confound the Trinitarian Distinctions with the Divine Attributes. It was primarily important therefore to the Theologian, to mark the difference between the two. He points out accordingly; that, whilst the Attributes of God exist *substantially*—are of the substance or essence of God,—or in logical language, belong to the Category of Substance;—the Trinitarian distinctions exist *relatively*,—or belong to the Category of Relation; the terms, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, denoting *intrinsic relations* in the Divine Being, agreeably to what I have before observed. Whence it followed, that it would be improper to speak of the divine power, or justice, or wisdom in the plural; for this would be to assert three Beings, or Substances, in God. But there was no impropriety in asserting three Relations; since these differed in properties only, and their distinctness did not multiply, or separate, the Divine Substance.<sup>§</sup>

But this idea of the Trinitarian Distinctions could not alone satisfy the requisitions of a logical philosophy. Distinct Relations must be *in distinct subjects*. They could only be conceived, as they were based on their peculiar *supposita*, or grounds.

§ Ea vero quæ significant essentiam adjective, prædicantur pluraliter de tribus, propter pluralitatem suppositorum: Dicimus enim tres existentes, vel tres sapientes, aut tres æternos et immensos, si adjective sumantur. Si vero substantive sumantur, dicimus unum increatum, immensum, et æternum, ut Athanasius dicit. *Albert. Mag.* in Lib. Sentent. Tract. IX. qu. XLIV. fol. 94. *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. XXXIX. art. 3.—Note P.

This was the occasion of the adoption of the word *Hypostasis*, by the Greeks, and of *Person*, or *Subsisting Person*, by the Latins. *Hypostasis* indeed was a word already consecrated to the use of Religion, from its being employed by St. Paul in several passages of his Epistles. It is obviously a technical term, denoting that ultimate point of metaphysical analysis, in which we conceive the bare existence of any thing, apart from its properties: the expression itself being a metaphorical one, drawn from a supposition, that the connexion between the being and the properties of a thing, resembles that between a material prop, or base, and what it supports. It will be found, I think, to be used in this fundamental sense by the Apostle. The Greek therefore answered strictly on the principles of his dialectical science, when, being interrogated as to the point where he rested the Trinitarian distinctions, he replied, that they were three *Hypostases*.

But to the Latin, the want of a philosophical vocabulary rendered the answer not so easy. When the Latin was pressed with the question,—*quid tres* or *quid tria?*—*what* are the three?—he found, that his unscientific language denied him the means of answering satisfactorily. He had no other word, that sufficed at all to represent, what the Greek intended by *Hypostasis*, but *Persona*: since *Substantia* was already appropriated to denote the Divine Being. What rendered *Persona* more applicable to the high subject, was, that, in its transition to denote an individual man, it was first applied to

individuals of dignity.<sup>h</sup> The Schoolmen are express in pointing out, after Augustine, that the term was adopted, not to express any definite notion, but to make some answer, where silence would have been better; to denote, by some term, what has no suitable word to express it.<sup>i</sup> But the term exposed him to a double inconvenience. If it was understood, in its original sense, of a mask, or character assumed, he was charged with Sabellianism; if it was taken in its acquired sense, it gave the sound of Tritheism. On the one hand, the Arian, dissatisfied with the term, still exacted of him, the

<sup>h</sup> Thus Aquinas says, *Cum Persona importat dignitatem, &c. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 3. qu. xxxii. art. 3.* He argues, that the humanity in Christ is not a Person, because it was assumed *a digniori*. Cicero uses *Persona* in this elevated sense: as in, *personæ et dignitatis esse negent—De Fin. I. c. 1.* Blackstone states, in accordance with this, that the appellation of “Parson” is “the most legal, most beneficial, and most honourable title that a parish priest can enjoy; because such a one, (as Sir Edward Coke observes,) and he only, is said *vicem seu personam ecclesiæ gerere.*” *Commentar. B. I. c. 11. p. 384.*

The use of the term was probably facilitated by its adoption in the systems of Grammarians. The Scholastic writers draw illustrations from the grammatical use of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Persons, to the Persons of the Trinity.

It is probable, as a friend has observed to me, that the association, which made *Persona* signify dignity, is the notion of the *public character*, which every one *in office* must act. A private person is not called upon to *personate*, or act, for instance, the *Magistrate*, the *Bishop*, &c. But when such *partes* have been given him in the drama of the world, he must use his authority under the proper mask, or *persona*.

<sup>i</sup> *Tres nescio quid*, is the expression of Anselm, in his *Monologium*.—*P. Lombard. Lib. Sentent. I. Dist. 25.—Aquinas. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxi. art. 2. qu. xxxii. art. 3.—Note Q.*

confession of the three *hypostases* of the Greeks; and “branded him,” on his refusal, as Jerome indignantly complains, “with the cautery of the “Union.”<sup>k</sup> On the other hand, the difference asserted was too great, to be consistent with an unity of Substance, if by three Persons were conceived three individual Beings.

In order to obviate this last inference, it was necessary to have recourse to the original subtle speculation, on which the Procession of the Divine Being was founded. It was pointed out, that the objection arose, from an inattention to the peculiar circumstances, to which the reasoning applied. There was in God no distinction of matter and form, as in all created things. In man we see the two principles of matter and form,—the idea of the Divine Intellect, and the material on which it is impressed. The idea or form, when viewed out of the Divine Being, must have a *suppositum* of matter, on which it may act. It thus is individualized in matter. The humanity imparted in each instance,

<sup>k</sup> In the Epistle to Damasus, before referred to; and given in Note A of Lecture I.—The anxiety to avoid Sabellianism sometimes led the orthodox into tritheistic modes of expression. Gregory Nazianzen, in Orat. I. speaks of “some over-orthodox persons,” *τινες τῶν παρ’ ἡμῶν ἄγαν ὀρθοδοξῶν*, “having introduced “polytheism.” Aquinas, in like manner, observes, that, “for the “purpose of stating the truth of Essence and Person, holy Doctors have sometimes spoken more expressly, than the propriety of speaking admitted.” *S. Theol.* Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 5. Such appears to have been the case with Dr. W. Sherlock, in his Defence of the Trinitarian Doctrine; in which he insisted on the notion of three distinct Minds.—Note R.

constitutes an individual Being, separate from other instances in which the same operation takes place. But in God there is no material individuation. In Him the *form* and the *suppositum* are identical. So that, whilst the Divine Nature is communicated, and distinct relations therefore are constituted, there is no separation of Beings. The persons accordingly are Three, whilst the Divinity remains One.<sup>1</sup>

Sometimes indeed the objection was answered in another way. It was argued, that the Deity would not be multiplied, though we might assert Three Persons; since it was only the usage of speech which made us say Three *Men*—employing, that is, the word *man* in the plural—of Three Individuals. There was strictly only *one* humanity, the common essence of all human individuals. This explanation, however, merged the physical notion of the Divine Being in the logical.<sup>m</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hæc igitur est ratio, quare Socratem, et Platonem, et Ciceronem, dicimus tres homines : Patrem autem, et Filium, et Spiritum Sanctum, non dicimus tres Deos, sed unum Deum ; quia in tribus suppositis humanæ naturæ sunt tres humanitates ; in tribus autem personis est una divina essentia. *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 3.

Nam nec Deum, nec personas ejus cogitat ; sed tale aliquid, quales sunt plures humanæ personæ. Et quia videt unum hominem plures homines esse non posse, negat hoc ipsum de Deo. Non enim idcirco dicuntur tres personæ, quia sint tres res separatæ, sicut tres homines : sed quia similitudinem habent quandam cum tribus separatis personis. *Anselm*, De Incar. Verb. c. vi. p. 40.

<sup>m</sup> See Curcellæi Oper. p. 852.—Note S.



These several difficulties, in the explanation of the Trinitarian doctrine, are well summed up and stated by Aquinas, in a manner which throws light on the logical character of the whole theory.

“ It behoves us,” he says, “ in what we say of the Trinity, to beware of two opposite errors, temperately proceeding between both ; the error of Arius, who laid down, with the Trinity of Persons, a Trinity of Substances ; and the error of Sabellius, who laid down, with the unity of Essence, an unity of Person. To escape, then, the error of Arius, we must avoid, in divine things, the terms *Diversity* and *Difference*, lest the unity of Essence be destroyed. We may however use the term *Distinction*, on account of the Relative Opposition. Whence, if any where, in any authentic Scripture, diversity or difference of Persons is found, diversity or difference is taken for Distinction. Again, that the *Simplicity* of the Divine Essence may not be destroyed, the terms *Separation* and *Division* must be avoided, which are of a whole into parts. Again, that *equality* may not be destroyed, the term *Disparity* must be avoided. Further, that similitude may not be destroyed, the terms *Alien* and *Discrepant* must be avoided. . . . Further, to avoid the error of Sabellius, we should avoid *Singularity*, that the communicability of the Divine Essence may not be destroyed. . . . We ought also to avoid the term *One Only*, *Unicum*, that the *Number* of Persons may not be destroyed. . . . The term *Solitary* also

“ must be avoided, lest the *association*, of Three  
 “ Persons be destroyed.”<sup>n</sup>

If we compare, with these general disputations respecting the Trinity, the particular controversies connected with the Incarnation and the Procession of the Holy Spirit, we shall find them following the same method.

The discussions on the Incarnation were, in like manner, partly physical, partly logical. It was attempted to be explained, in what way the Son might be said to be generated of the Father; whether out of the substance of God, or out of a common Divinity, of which each participates; or by division of the Paternal substance as a portion severed from the Father: whether further, He is the Son of God by nature, or necessity, or will, or predestination, or adoption. The confusion of principles of different sciences in these promiscuous inquiries, is sufficiently apparent. But it was by such a philosophy that the orthodox language was settled, declaring the Son “ begotten before all worlds; of *one substance* with the Father.”

The account of the Incarnation itself was more peculiarly logical; still there was a mixture of physical speculation respecting the principle of life in man. The notion entertained, both by Fathers and by Schoolmen, was, that the animating principle was *infused* into the body; and thus, the inert matter of the flesh became the living substantial

<sup>n</sup> Aquin. Summa Theolog. Prima Pars, qu. xxxi. art. 2.—Note T.

form of man. That all souls were consubstantial with the Deity, was an ancient Pythagorean notion, that survived in the Church. Thus Tertullian speaks of man as animated out of the substance of God. The observation of this fact accounts for the opinion attributed to Apollinarius, that the Divinity was the animating principle of Christ. He was fearful of introducing a Quaternity into the notion of the Divine Being, if it were conceived that our Lord possessed the Substance of human nature, a sentient and intelligent human principle, as well as the *Substance* of the Divinity; and was thus led to the denial of the *perfect* humanity of Christ.<sup>o</sup>

The peculiarly logical part of the inquiry appears, in the points of controversy between the orthodox and the Nestorians and Eutychians. These were, in respect to the Incarnation, analogous to the disputes between the orthodox and the Sabellians and Arians, on the general question of the Trinity. The points of *sameness* and *diversity* were here also to be exactly determined. The orthodox maintained, that the notion of sameness here consisted, in the Personal individuality of Christ, regarded as a Member of the Trinity; whereas the diversity was in the two Natures, the divine and the human, united in His Person. But the Nestorian offended

<sup>o</sup> Damascen. De Hæres. p. 77. note.—Lombard. Sent. II. Dist. 17. B. Putaverunt enim quidam hæretici, Deum de sua substantia animam creasse, &c., p. 178.—See Ibid. Dist. 18. H. on the Creation and Infusion of the *Anima*, p. 182.—Note U.

against the theories of the logical philosophy, in stating *two different hypostases*, as the support of those common properties which belonged to Christ, and destroyed also the personal individuality. The Eutychian maintained the personal individuality, but destroyed the substantial differences. Theories of the composition and mixture of bodies, entered largely into these discussions: but they were still metaphysical in principle, resulting only in settling the connexion and relation of *ideas* concerning the Incarnation. They terminated in the decision of the place which the terms—Substance, Nature, Person,—should hold in the definition of the whole nature of Christ. And the excellence of the orthodox theory, we may observe, consisted in its excluding from that definition, all ideas imported from the physical speculations, and reducing it to perfect consistency with the original theory of the Divine Procession. It brought the inquirer back to the point from which he set out, to acknowledge the simple Divine Personality of the Saviour,—that He was the Word made flesh. The disputes, at the same time, were in many points merely verbal; the controversialists reasoning about words which they took in different senses.<sup>p</sup> We should observe, for instance, how the more general language, according to

<sup>p</sup> Apollinarius and Cyril took the word *Nature* in different senses: Apollinarius, after the manner of the Oriental Christians, for Essence, or Substance; Cyril, in a popular sense, for an individual thing in itself, whether essence, or hypostasis, or person. Many Catholics thought, that to oppose Nestorius, one Nature in Christ was to be professed, taking *Nature* in its

which, our Lord was described as having two whole and perfect *Natures*, was preferred to the assertion of two *Substances*. The term Nature here expressed the proper Divinity and the proper Humanity;—the proper Divinity, as indicating that real personality, which belonged to Christ, as very God of the Substance of the Father; the proper humanity, as indicating that abstract humanity, which He *assumed* to the Divinity, by being made flesh of the Substance of his Mother. It was adopted, evidently to avoid the assertion, that our Lord assumed to the Divinity any particular *individual man*; which would have implied a twofold personality.<sup>9</sup> We may observe too, how the perpetual union of the Godhead and the manhood in Christ, was secured, by the *logical basis*, on which the distinct properties of the two natures were rested. Being united in one hypostasis,—or, as it is expressed, the union being hypostatical,—the two natures remain “indivisible throughout.”<sup>r</sup> Thus we find the language of our common meaning. *Dissert. Damasc. II. p. 42.—Contra Jacobit. c. 52. p. 408. t. I. Oper. Damasc.*

Monophysites objected to the illustration drawn from the union of soul and body, to the two natures of Christ, arguing that soul and body constituted only a single nature. *Damasc. Dialect. 41. p. 44.—Note V.*

<sup>9</sup> Non enim est alius Deus, alius homo in Christo, quamvis aliud sit Deus, aliud homo; sed idem ipse est Deus, et qui homo. Verbum enim caro factum, assumpsit *naturam aliam*, non aliam personam. Nam cum profertur homo, natura tantum quæ communis est omnibus hominibus significatur, &c. *Anselm, De Incarn. Verb. c. 5. p. 39.—Note W.*

<sup>r</sup> Thus Damascenus, “When once for all, the natures receive the hypostatical union, καθ’ ὑποστάσιν ἔνωσιν, they remain

article affirming in Christ, “two whole and perfect  
“natures,” “never to be divided.”

The controversies relating immediately to the Holy Spirit, became more dialectical in their progress. At first, the Latins were content to speak of the Holy Spirit, as the mutual Love of the Father and the Son; using the language of Platonism.<sup>s</sup> Afterwards, as they came into collision with the Greeks on the point of the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son, the disputation with their philosophical antagonists obliged them to a more precise, and strictly logical, mode of stating the doctrine. This transition may be noticed, in the treatise of Anselm on the Procession of the Spirit; a work composed in his more advanced age, after a conference with the Greeks, in which he had taken an active part. In this treatise there is no mention of the original theory of the Latins, but the proof of the point is rested entirely on logical grounds; such as, the necessity of identifying the Father with the Spirit, or of asserting the procession of the Son from the Spirit, if the procession of the Spirit from the Son were denied.

“indivisible for ever, ἀδιαίρετοι εἰς τὸ παντελές. *Dialectica*, cap. 67. Oper. p. 78. “for though the soul,” he adds, “is parted  
“from the body in death, still the hypostasis of both is the  
“same.”—Note X.

<sup>s</sup> Rationes præcipuæ, quibus probatur Spiritum Sanctum a Patre et Filio procedere, sumuntur ex verbis Dionysii, lib. de Divinis Nomin. c. 4; ubi dicit, quod etiam in Deo extasim facit divinus amor: non sinens ipsum sine germine esse, &c. *Albert. Mag.* in Sent. Tract. VII. qu. xxxi. fol. 73.

The point appears to have been left undetermined during the heat of the Arian disputes. The heresy of Macedonius, in stating the Holy Spirit to be a creature, was only a form of Arianism; and did not touch this question immediately.<sup>†</sup> The orthodox seem to have avoided any express assertion of the Procession from the Son; both, as it was not required in that state of the controversy, and as the Procession from the Father was more directly opposed, both to the Sabellian and Arian notions of successive, or continuous, derivations.<sup>‡</sup> But the speculations of the Nestorians concerning the Incarnation, were found to bring perplexity into the subject. Aquinas expressly attributes to the Nestorians, as a novel article, the doctrine, that the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Son; referring to the Council of Ephesus, in which a creed of the Nestorians was condemned on that ground.<sup>x</sup> To those who, as the

<sup>†</sup> Theodoret objected to Cyril of Alexandria, for asserting the procession of the Spirit from the Son *ex Filio*, as savouring of the heresy of Apollinarius, and of Macedonius. *Dissert. Damascen.* I. c. 2. De Fid. Orthodox. I. Damascen. Oper. tom. I. p. 141.

<sup>‡</sup> This appears to have been the foundation of the objections of the Greeks to the insertion of the proceeding "from the Son." Cavebant enim, Le Quien says, ne, Ariano more, Spiritus Sancti productio in Filium præsertim refunderetur. Note at p. 141. *Damasc. Oper. tom. I.* on the text of Damascenus, ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ δὲ τὸ Πνεῦμα οὐ λέγομεν. The opposition once begun, other reasons were of course readily devised, both for, and against, the *filioque*.

<sup>x</sup> Ad tertium dicendum, quod Spiritum Sanctum non procedere a Filio, primo fuit a Nestorianis introductum, ut patet in

Nestorians, admitted two hypostases in Christ, there was a logical difficulty, in admitting the procession of the Spirit from the Son; since it introduced a Quaternity in God instead of a Trinity. At length, having been gradually introduced, it seems, in the course of divine service, in some Churches of the West, the words *filioque* were sanctioned by the IIIrd Synod of Toledo, towards the close of the VIth century, when the Goths of Spain abjured their Arianism. At the beginning of the IXth century, the Gallo-Frank Church adopted the same expression. Afterwards, but at what precise period is a matter of uncertainty, at the instance of the Western Churches, it received the sanction of the Apostolic See.<sup>y</sup> The gradual admission and prevalence of the article among the Latins, marks the triumphs of the orthodox theology under the strong hand of the Spiritual Power; whilst, in the East, the state of controversy, controlled by Imperial dis-

quodam symbolo Nestorianorum damnato in Ephesina Synodo. Et hunc errorem secutus fuit Theodoritus Nestorianus, et plures post ipsum. Inter quos fuit etiam Damascenus. Unde in hoc, ejus sententiæ non est standum. Quamvis a quibusdam dicatur, quod Damascenus, sicut non confitetur Spiritum Sanctum esse a Filio, ita etiam non negat ex vi illorum verborum. *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2.

We see also in this passage, how anxious the Schoolman was, not to lose any authority that had once been sanctioned by the Church. Even the opposing Greek must be brought over to his side, if possible.

<sup>y</sup> Leo III. refused his authority for *inserting* the words *filioque*, into the Nicene Creed, simply on the ground of not altering the original formulary; professing at the same time his full assent to the doctrine involved in the addition.



putants, would admit no alteration of the original formularies.<sup>2</sup> It shows, how tenacious the Latin was, of what had once been passed as a doctrine, by the authority, or even the practice only, of his Church; and with what pliant facility his logic could minister reasons for its abstract truth, and incorporate it with the system of his faith. The words were confessedly an *addition* to the Nicene Creed. The Latins only claimed to themselves the right, of more explicitly stating the doctrine on that point.<sup>a</sup> But the Greek urged the anathema of the Council against all who should alter the words of the Creed, and fiercely resisted all accommodation with the Latins on the point. According to the Schoolmen, the ground, in which the procession of the Spirit from the Son was maintained, was altogether logical: since, as they argue, unless it be allowed, there will be no means of distinguishing the Holy Spirit from the Son. Relations, they observe, are only distinct when they are opposed. Thus the Father has two Relations, one to the Son, and the other to the Spirit; but these two relations, not being *opposed*, do not constitute *two Persons*. The like then would

<sup>2</sup> Ratramn of Corbey is said to have written a work, about A.D. 868, against the Greeks. The title of it evidences the different characters of the Greek and Latin disputants. *Contra opposita Græcorum Imperatorum Romanam Ecclesiam infamantium, libri quatuor Rathramni Monachi. Mauguin, tom. II. Dissert. c. 17.* in his Collection of Tracts of the IXth century on Grace and Predestination.

<sup>a</sup> *Anselm de Process. Sp. Scti. Oper. tom. III. p. 134.*—  
Note Y.

be the case, if the relations of the Son and the Holy Spirit to the Father were not opposed: whence it would follow, that the Son and the Holy Spirit were but one Person.<sup>a</sup>

I have now taken a review of the principal parts of the Trinitarian controversies, so far as I have thought it necessary to illustrate the origin of our theological vocabulary on this sacred subject. I have some general remarks yet to offer, on the effect produced on the whole doctrine, by the consideration of those scholastic discussions to which I have called your attention.

The examination then, I would observe, has forcibly impressed on my mind the conviction, that the principal, if not *the only*, *difficulties* on the doctrine of the Trinity, arise from metaphysical considerations—from abstractions of our own mind, quite distinct from the proper, intrinsic, mystery of the holy truth in itself. Perplexities from the nature of Number, of Time, of Being; in short, all those various conceptions of the mind which are its ultimate facts, and beyond which no power of analysis can reach; these, I think, the course of the present inquiry has tended to shew, are our real stumbling-block, causing the wisdom of God to be received as the foolishness of man. These have forced

<sup>a</sup> Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. a. 2. Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere Spiritum Sanctum a Patre esse. Si enim non esset ab eo; nullo modo posset ab eo personaliter distingui, &c.—Note Z.

themselves on the form of the Divine Mystery, and given it that theoretic air, that atmosphere of repulsion, in which it is invested.

The truth itself of the Trinitarian doctrine emerges from these mists of human speculation, like the bold, naked land, on which an atmosphere of fog has for a while rested, and then been dispersed. No one can be more convinced than I am, that there is a real mystery of God revealed in the Christian dispensation; and that no scheme of Unitarianism can solve the whole of the phenomena which Scripture records. But I am also as fully sensible, that there is a mystery attached to the subject, which is not a mystery of God.

Take, for instance, the notion of the Divine Unity. We are apt to conceive that the Unity must be understood numerically; <sup>b</sup> that we may reason from the notion of Unity, to the properties of the Divine Being. But is this a just notion of the Unity of God? Is it not rather a bare fact, a limit of speculation, instead of a point of outset? For how was

<sup>b</sup> In Gregory Nazianzen, Orat. 45. p. 717, the question is proposed, "If the nature of God is simple, how will it admit the "number three?" &c.

Again, Integer, perfectus numerus Trinitatis est. *Concil. Sirmiens.* A.D. 357. Hilar. De Synodis, Opera, p. 466.—Πρὸς δὲ καὶ φυσικὴ ἀνάγκη μονάδα εἶναι δυάδος ἀρχήν. *Damasc. De Fid. Orthod.* I. c. 5.

The Valentinian System was a play of Numbers. The Pythagorean part of Platonism, the philosophy of Numbers, it cannot be doubted, must have exercised great influence over the minds of the early philosophic Christians. So also would the Jewish mystical application of Numbers, on the converts from Judaism.

it revealed in that system, in which it was the great leading article of divine instruction? When Moses called upon the people;—"Hear, O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord;"—was it not a declaration, that Jehovah is not that host of heaven,—that multiplicity of the objects of divine worship, which heathen idolatry has enshrined, but the God in heaven, and in the earth, and in the sea,—not the Teraphim of domestic worship, but the Universal Governor, overshadowing all things with the ubiquarian tutelage of his Providence? Surely the revelation of the Divine Unity was not meant to convey to Israel any speculative notion of the oneness of the Deity; but, *practically*, to influence their minds in regard to the superstitions from which they had been brought out. It was no other than the command; "Thou shalt have no other Gods but me."

Now, were this view of the Revelation of the Divine Unity strictly maintained, would it not greatly abate the repugnance often felt at the admission of a Trinity in Unity? We should profess, that we only knew God, as the exclusive object of divine worship; and should acknowledge, that it was quite irrelevant to our scheme of Religion, either to demonstrate, or to refute, any conclusion from the nature of Unity, concerning any further revelation of the Divine Being. To deny a Trinity, would then be felt the same, as to assert, that, because Polytheism is false, *therefore* no new manifestation of God, not resulting from the negation of Polytheism, can be true.

There is another observation, which the present inquiry has suggested, and which I think of great importance, in order to a just view of the Trinitarian Controversies. Let it then be remarked, that all the theories proposed on the subject are Trinitarian *in principle*. If the opinions of Praxeas, and Artemon, and Theodotus, of Paul of Samosata, Noetus, Sabelius, and others, amounted to Unitarianism; it was in the way of *consequence*, or *inference*. They set out with a Trinitarian hypothesis, and either explained it away themselves by their speculations, or had the consequences of their theories forced on them by their adversaries, as the principles of their belief. We can plainly perceive, though unfortunately but very slight memorials remain to us of their disquisitions, that their anxiety was, to account for certain acknowledged facts of the Scripture narrative. They refer to admitted manifestations of God, as the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit: and the desire of accommodation to Jewish or Heathen prejudices, the refutation of the theories of others, the fancies of private speculation,—these, and other influences concealed from our research,—suggest to the several inquirers peculiar combinations, or analyses, of the given facts, in their respective doctrines of the Trinity. Take the reverse of the case, and you will judge, what a difference would have been in the language of these theorists. We should have had no attempts to explain the Divine Unity consistently with Trinitarian distinctions. They would not have been employed in explaining away

distinctions, which they did not admit in some sense at least. They would have simply explained, and enforced, the Unity which they did admit. Or, had they referred to Trinitarian distinctions as maintained by opponents in argument, they would have endeavoured to disprove them, instead of labouring, as they have done, to retain these very views, however imperfectly, erroneously, or vainly, in their own systems.

One fact is clear through all this labyrinth of variations which theological creeds have exhibited;—that there is some extraordinary communication concerning the Divine Being, in those Scriptural notices of God which have called forth the curiosity of thinking men in all ages. To me it matters little, what opinion on the subject has been prior, has been advocated by the shrewdest wit or deepest learning, has been most popular, most extensive in its reception. All differences of this kind belong to the history of the human mind, as much as to theology, and affect not the broad basement of fact on which the manifold forms of speculation have taken their rise. The only ancient, only catholic, truth is the Scriptural fact. Let us hold that fast in its depth and breadth—in nothing extenuating, in nothing abridging it—in simplicity and sincerity; and we can neither be Sabellians, or Tritheists, or Socinians. Attempt to explain, to satisfy scruples, to reconcile difficulties; and the chance is, that, however we may disclaim the heterodoxy which lurks on every step of our path, we incur, at least, the

scandal at the hands of others, whose piety, or prejudices, or acuteness, may be offended by our words.

I should hope the discussions in which we have now been engaged, will leave this impression on the mind. Historically regarded, they evidence the reality of those sacred facts of Divine Providence, which we comprehensively denote by the doctrine of a Trinity in Unity. But let us not identify this reality with the theories couched under a logical phraseology. I firmly and devoutly believe that word, which has declared the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. But who can pretend to that exactness of thought on the subject, on which our technical language is based? Looking to the simple truth of Scripture, I would say, in the language of Augustine, *Hæc scio. Distinguere autem inter illam Generationem et hanc Processionem, nescio, non valeo, non sufficio.*<sup>d</sup>—*Verius enim cogitatur Deus, quam dicitur; et verius est, quam cogitatur.*<sup>e</sup>

<sup>d</sup> Contra. Maximin. III. p. 237. 4to ed.

<sup>e</sup> De Trin. VII. c. 4.

## **LECTURE IV.**

**THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.**

**PREDESTINATION AND GRACE.**





## SUMMARY.

SCHOLASTIC nature of controversies relative to Divine and Human Agency—State of the West disposes the Latin Christians to the discussion of such questions—Importance of the questions in order to Church-government—The disputes here at first, less philosophical in comparison with the Trinitarian—Consequent laxity in the terms of the Pelagian theories, occasions more continual disputes—The Schoolmen, the first to systematize these doctrines—Connexion of them with the previous theory of the Trinity—Scholastic view of Predestination an application of the Principle of Activity in the Divine Being to human actions—Importance of excluding reference to the Divine Intelligence, in our estimate of Predestination—Mode in which the notions of Contingency and Necessity, Time and Eternity, were employed in scholastic reasonings—The only proper difficulty on the subject is, the prevalence of Evil—Notions of Optimism influential on such speculations—The term Good in ancient philosophy coincident with an object of will—Reprobation consequently, as implying evil willed, unknown to Scholastic system—Illustration to be derived to our article on the subject from the theories opposed by the Schoolmen—Dread of Manicheism in the Latin Church.

Scholastic notion of Grace as the effect of Predestination, both physical and logical—The term Grace, designates properly a general fact of the Divine conduct—Application of Aristotle's physical doctrines in the scholastic account of the process of Grace—The theory of Transmutation—Instinctive Principle of motion attributed to the System of Nature—Approximation to Pantheism in this system.

Practical reflections—Truths of Grace and Predestination concern the heart principally—Theoretic statements of them must always be peculiarly open to difficulty—The difficulties, evidently, chiefly metaphysical—The doctrines, practically taken, full of real comfort and peace.

JAMES I. 17.

Every good gift, and every perfect gift, is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, nor shadow of turning.

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Πᾶσα δόσις ἀγαθὴ, καὶ πᾶν δῶρημα τέλειον, ἄνωθέν ἐστι καταβαῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι παραλλαγή ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα.

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Omne datum optimum, et omne donum perfectum, desursum est, descendens a Patre luminum; apud quem non est transmutatio, nec vicissitudinis obumbratio. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE IV.

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IN opening my inquiry into the influence of the Scholastic Philosophy, as also in entering on the illustration of it in the Trinitarian Controversies, I had occasion to point out the fact of the real ascendancy obtained by the Latin portion of the Christian Church. It appeared that this ascendancy was not at once decided and complete; but that still it was effectually achieved by those stirring spirits, the great Latin Fathers of the IVth century.

A review of another class of controversies, which, next to those on the Trinity, engaged and absorbed the attention of Christian disputants,—the controversies relating to Divine and Human Agency,—will still more illustrate this origin of the Scholastic Philosophy, and its incorporation with Theology, as a subtile instrument of spiritual power.

We now, indeed, enter on ground which is more peculiarly that of Scholasticism; where the Greek Theology is comparatively silent, and the whole moulding and ultimate complexion of the doctrines professed, are the work of the Latins, or rather of the influential portion of the Latins, the African Churches, under the management of Augustine, at the commencement of the Vth century. The Greeks, looking more with the eye of philosophers than of Church-leaders, at the questions of Divine and

Human Agency, did not take a strictly theological interest in their decision. They regarded these questions, rather as the proper matter of philosophical disquisition; as they really are, when justly considered; since they suggest themselves to the inquisitive mind, independently of any peculiar views of God and man resulting from Revelation. This field of disputation therefore, as a part of Christian Theology, was left open to the busy intellect of the Latin Divines.

In the East indeed, there was not that call for the decision of these questions, which existed in the West. The attention of the Greeks was sustained on parts of the Trinitarian controversies, at the period when Pelagianism was producing a ferment in the Latin Church. The uniformity of the general state of things in the Eastern Empire, is strikingly contrasted by the restlessness, and fever of change, with which the West was troubled during the IVth and Vth centuries. Though the East was the theatre of wars during that period, there was no such universal shock to the repose of the human mind, as in the West, where revolution and confusion had taken the place of regularity and order. The world witnessed the sack and misery of the Imperial City herself; whose fall might well seem the prelude of the universal dissolution of society. All was either ruin, or expectation of ruin. This anarchy of social life in the West might naturally represent itself to the religionist, as well as to the profane and irreligious, as the disenthroning of

Providence; whilst the one would be confirmed in his infidelity, the other would be staggered in the confidence of his faith. To a Christian trained in a speculative Theology, the difficulty would be aggravated. The immutability and perpetuity of order, which he had been taught to ascribe to the Divine Principles, would receive, to his apprehension, a contradiction, in what he observed passing around him. How prevalent such feelings were, we may learn from the testimony of Salvian, a Gallic writer of the Vth century, in his work "on the Government of God;" whose expressions, though allowance must be made for a declamatory style, give a vivid representation of the disorder of the times, and of the infidel distrust of Providence resulting from it. The evil seems to have reached its height, when this writer drew his picture of it. It was at such a crisis, when Pelagianism began to make advances in the world; when opinions were disseminated, which were regarded, or at least apprehended in their consequences, as infringements on the great truths of Providence and Grace, and as in this sense harmonizing with the profane tendency of the age.<sup>a</sup>

Africa, however, continued for some time exempt from the general ruin, and Augustine had leisure to contemplate the rolling wave in its progress, before

<sup>a</sup> See also Augustine's complaint of the drunkenness which prevailed in the African cities in his times; and with which even the celebration of the memory of the martyrs was profaned: and the ineffectual attempts of the Bishops to check it.—Note A. Lect. IV.

at length the cities of Carthage and Hippo were swept under it.<sup>b</sup> Jerome also, sequestered from every thing but the storms of a passionate enthusiasm, at his loved retreat in Palestine, could watch the state of religious feeling at this crisis, and, himself unmoved, mingle with the agitating events of the West. But the sceptre of spiritual power was then passing from his veteran hands to the more vigorous Bishop of Hippo;<sup>c</sup> and, whilst his counsels and example are sought in the difficulties of the struggle against the Pelagianism of the times, it is the African Divines, with Augustine at their head, who take the lead in the controversies; to whose exertions the orthodox decision is owing.<sup>d</sup> Read the repeated expostulations of the African clergy, conveyed, in the form of respectful epistles, to the heads of the Roman Church, on the case of Pelagius and Celestius; and, under their half-expressed fears of the orthodoxy of Rome, and their obsequious language of duty, you will easily see, who are the real arbiters of the dispute; whose is the influential opinion,

<sup>b</sup> Jerome born A. D. 331, died in 420.

Augustine born A. D. 354, died in 430.

Pelagian Controversies began to be agitated in 405.

<sup>c</sup> Jerome, amidst his compliments of Augustine, still reminds him who it is that makes these acknowledgments: *Quem post me, he says, in writing to Augustine, orientem in scripturarum eruditione lætatus sum. Epist. XIV. in Augustin. Oper. tom. II. p. 19.—Note B.*

<sup>d</sup> Prosper, in speaking of the Council of Carthage, says, . . . cui dux Aurelius, ingeniumque, Augustinus erat. *Carm. de Ingratis.*—Note C.

before which. even the pride of the Apostolic See must bow.<sup>e</sup>

The nature and the decision of the controversies on Divine and Human Agency, bespeak entirely the practical theology of the Western Divine. These controversies were of leading importance in relation to the government of the Church. Opinions, adverse to a belief in the supremacy of Divine Providence, were also adverse to the dependence of the spiritual community, on the personal oracles of the Divine Will, and visible ministers of the Divine Power. If the real invisible Theocracy were not acknowledged in the fullest sense, the principle of a deputed theocratic power would sink in estimation at the same time; and the hearts of the people would be seduced from that loyalty, with which the sacerdotal ministrations had been hitherto attended. So that, even though the logic of Pelagius, and the known purity of his character, might have acquitted him from the charge of teaching a doctrine of ingratitude and rebellion against God; yet it was probable, that discussions, touching the nature and necessity of Divine Grace, if they amounted only to a moderation of language on the subject, would raise questionings and unsettle the faith of many.<sup>f</sup> Practical men would readily see this, and, regarding the matter, not as a point of disputation, but as a question of government, would take their measures against consequences probable *in fact*, rather than against the abstract speculation itself.

<sup>e</sup> Note D.

<sup>f</sup> Note E.



It was also to hearts, which had so lashed themselves to the helm of the Christian vessel, a question of piety or impiety, whether an exclusive, or a qualified, ascription to God, of the glory of human salvation, should be adopted in the dogmatic language of the Church. In opposing Pelagianism, they conceived themselves pleading "the Lord's controversy" against His "ungrateful" creatures,<sup>g</sup> and felt their zeal, as Churchmen, stimulated by the righteousness of the cause which they advocated. To impute any efficacy to Human Agency, in the great work of Salvation, might appear a denial of God's mercy and power,—a disclaimer of that Providence, whose blessing had hitherto crowned their measures with success. They exulted in an opportunity of vindicating the cause of God, through evil report and good report; rejoicing in the very hatred incurred at the hand of the heretic.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>g</sup> Prosper's Poem against the Pelagians, is inscribed, *De Ingratis*. Bradwardine, Archbishop of Canterbury in the XIVth century, entitles his elaborate metaphysical work against Pelagianism, *De Causa Dei*. Bradwardine died in 1349.

<sup>h</sup> They perverted our Lord's declaration, "Rejoice when men hate you and persecute you," &c.

Macte virtute, says Jerome, writing to Augustine, in orbe celebraris; catholici te conditorem antiquæ rursus fidei venerantur, atque suspiciunt: et, quod signum majoris gloriæ est, omnes hæretici detestantur, et me pari prosequuntur odio; ut, quos gladiis nequeunt, voto interficiant. *Epist.* 25.—*Augustini Oper.* tom. II. p. 29. 4to ed.

Gregory Nazianzen speaks with exultation of the shocking manner of Arius's death. Arius is uniformly regarded by the orthodox Fathers as another Judas.

The Pelagian controversies, accordingly, evidenced a different character, at their outset, from that by which the questions on the Trinity were distinguished. The assertion may seem paradoxical; but it may be said, that they were more properly *religious* than the Trinitarian; that is, they were viewed more immediately in their reference to the general sentiments and conduct of Christians, and decided, in the first instance, on practical grounds. The disputes on the Trinity, indeed, more properly belonged, in principle, to Christianity; as, on the other hand, the Pelagian controversies, in principle, belonged to Philosophy. But, in the discussions of the former, Christianity was almost forgotten in the philosophical spirit with which they were pursued. And so, in the discussions of the latter, the proper philosophical arguments, by which the truths, respecting Divine and Human Agency might have been fairly appreciated, were neglected; and points of abstract inquiry were decided by their probable effect on human practice. The *consequences* of certain opinions were estimated in each case, both in the Trinitarian, and the Pelagian disputes. A Theology, essentially logical, shewed itself in the one as in the other. Only, in the Trinitarian disputes, the argumentation was exclusively and strictly logical; in the Pelagian, the logical and practical consequences were confused together. Because such an effect would probably follow such an opinion in the conduct of the Christian, *therefore*, it was argued, the opinion must be untrue.

Thus the objection, which Jerome adduces against the theory of the power of man imputed to Pelagius, is, that it tended to an "apathy" and "a sinlessness,"<sup>i</sup> such as was inculcated by Stoic or Pythagorean, and consequently would lead to a state of inaction and presumptuous security. The imputation, surely, is groundless and unphilosophical as an argument against the truth of the theory; though, as a practical objection, and rhetorically employed, it may avail. In like manner Augustine argues, that, if the doctrine of Pelagius were admitted, the importance of Baptism would cease; men would no longer think it necessary to resort to the laver of regeneration, to be washed from pollutions which they did not acknowledge. Again, that the duty of Prayer would be neglected: in vain would our Lord have commanded men to pray, that they be not led into temptation, when the self-fortified soul felt, within itself, the fond presumption that it was safe.

We may perceive, then, in the origin of these controversies, a confusion of rhetorical and logical argumentation; such as might naturally have been expected from the rhetorical school, in which the Latin Fathers were trained, and from that practical design which was ever uppermost in their minds in all their theological discussions. Had these controversies, in their connexion with Chris-

<sup>i</sup> Ἀπαθεία et ἀναμαρτήσια. It is curious to find the very same consequences imputed to Calvinism in more modern times.—  
Note F.

tianity, been as fully treated by the Greeks as the Trinitarian were, we should have found a more exact technical vocabulary on the several points of discussion, as well as a more logical deduction of consequences, at the outset of the disputation. As it was, they were left by the Latin Fathers in the unscientific, floating form of practical conclusions. The Latins had not the acumen, and the expertness, of the Greek theologian; as neither had they a proper instrument of philosophy in their language; to enable them to draw those lines of discrimination, on which an exact theoretic phraseology could be constructed. Indeed, they had no design of so stating the truths of Divine and Human Agency. They were bent on resisting a practical mischief. And hence has resulted that very remarkable difference in the comparison with the Trinitarian controversies. A copious phraseology, an exactness and rigour of statement, are characteristic of the Trinitarian theories, from the first full discussion of them. On the Pelagian question, we seek in vain, in the writings of Augustine, any positive, dogmatic language, by which an exact theory of Divine and Human Agency, in their relation to each other, may be enunciated. This is evidenced in the fact, that the orthodox, the Jansenists, the Thomists, and the Jesuits, or Molinists, all equally refer themselves to the authority of that Father. Something must be allowed in such references for the obligation felt by the several disputants, to maintain their agreement with so catholic

an authority. Something too must be allowed for the unphilosophical nature of the Latin language. Still, had Augustine spoken with more dogmatical precision on the subject, there would not have been that plausibility of evidence in his writings to views so opposed.

The observation is illustrated in the disputes subsisting on the Question, after the death of Augustine, and in the difficulty manifested, in the course of these discussions, of ascertaining the precise views of Augustine himself. In the monasteries of the South of Gaul, not long after the death of Augustine, objections were raised against some of his assertions, as destructive of the freewill of man.<sup>k</sup> The authority of the Father was maintained at the expense of the orthodoxy of his objectors; who, as not advancing to the full length of the Great Master's language, were accused as favourers of Pelagius, or as Semi-Pelagians. But we do not find any thing of this kind taking place, in regard to the great authorities on the question of the Trinity. There is no ambiguity, for instance, on the Trinity, as to the precise doctrine of Athanasius, or Gregory Nazianzen. The precision of the Greek Philosophy guards the doctrines of these writers throughout.

<sup>k</sup> Μετὰ μὲν τοι γε θάνατον τοῦ ἐν ἁγίοις Αὐγουστίνου ἤρξαντό τινες τῶν ἐν τῷ κλήρῳ τὸ μὲν δυσσεβῆς κρατύνειν δόγμα, κακῶς δὲ λέγειν Ἀυγουστίνον καὶ διωσύρειν, ὡς ἀναίρεσιν τοῦ ἀντεξουσίου εἰσηγησάμενον. Ἀλλὰ καὶ Κελεστίνος ὁ Ῥώμης, ὑπὲρ τε θείου ἀνδρός, καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἀνακινούντων τὴν αἵρεσιν, τοῖς ἐγχωρίοις γράφων ἐπισκόποις, τὴν κινουμένην πλάνην ἔστησεν. *Photii Biblioth. c. 53. Voss. Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 30. p. 81.*

The same is observable in Augustine himself, in his treatises on the Trinity. But, where he had not the previous clearing of the question, in its theological bearings, by the labours of Greek theologians, he is more the practical reasoner than the accurate theorist; stating rather what may check a growing evil, than what is calculated to set at rest a speculative question. I do not indeed say this, as supposing that any speculative statement, or scheme, of Divine and Human Agency, could set the question at rest. Experience proves the contrary. It opens too many attractive views to the curiosity of the human mind, for speculation to acquiesce in any given definition of the subject. But I merely wish to point out the state, in which the Pelagian controversies descended to the Church: particularly as it affords some solution of the general state of those controversies in all ages of the Church. It is a striking fact, that Trinitarians, with little exception, are all now agreed among themselves: whilst, in regard to the Pelagian controversies, there subsists the greatest variety of opinion in whole Churches and among individuals. Each speculator has his theory, his peculiar view;—each separate communion some antagonist statement on the several points involved in them. Now, it is not enough to say, that one class of truths is more practical than the other, and therefore more awakens the attention and interest of thinking persons. Those who rightly discern and value the Trinitarian truths, will hardly allow, that there are any truths of the

Gospel more strictly practical than these. But, even on that supposition, there will still remain to be accounted for, a remarkable difference, in the opening for controversial discussion, presented in the terms, by which the truths relative to Divine and Human Agency are expressed. There is a great deal of definition and of apparent precision of language on the subject. But, with all its formality, the disputation bears the mark of its rhetorical origin, leaving an escape for the theorist to raise up his own system even on the terms of its theories.

In the revival of the Pelagian Question in the IXth century, in the discussions on Predestination to which I alluded in my first Lecture, an attempt was made by Erigena to introduce the language of philosophy into the subject. He laboured to prove against the unfortunate Gotteschalck, who had deduced from the writings of Augustine “ a twofold “ Predestination,” as it was termed,—a Predestination to Life, and a Predestination to Death, or Reprobation,—that it was impossible for the doctrine of Reprobation to be true; on the grounds, that Death and Sin, and Evil in general, were non-entities, mere negations, that had no proper being, and *therefore* could not pre-exist in the mind of God, or be predestined. This conclusion, however, of Erigena, being founded on an abstruse, mystical philosophy, not very intelligible to an age of literature, only then emerging from the barbarism of preceding times, obtained no favourable reception

with the Church. In fact it only roused a spirit of resistance. The Southern Church of Gaul felt alarmed for the authority of Augustine. Not only were individuals engaged in replying to the arguments of Erigena; but even the Church of Lyons, softer in temper than her sister of Rheims,<sup>1</sup> published her strictures on the arguments of the philosopher, and her remonstrances against the persecution of Gotteschalc; characterizing, as “inhuman cruelty,” the violence with which the poor sufferer had been treated.<sup>m</sup>

This resistance against a more theoretic view of the doctrines involved in these controversies, was a further means of keeping the discussion in that practical form, in which it had been bequeathed to the Church by Augustine. The writers against Erigena, Ratiarnn of Corbey, Prudentius, Bishop of Troyes, and Florus, a Deacon of Lyons, are all strongly opposed to a scientific discussion of the subject. They rule the question by the simple authority of Scripture and the Fathers; objecting to Erigena, on the very ground, that he had corrupted the simplicity of the truth by refinements of reasoning.<sup>n</sup>

Such then was the form, in which the Theories

<sup>1</sup> The Southern part of Gaul had a larger infusion of Roman Civilization, and this is seen in the different character of the Church there, as compared with the Northern.

<sup>m</sup> Note M of Lecture I.

<sup>n</sup> These several writings are in the Collection, by Mauguin, of Authors of the IXth century on Grace and Predestination.



belonging to the Pelagian Question descended to the proper age of Scholasticism—the period, when the disputations of the Schools were reduced to a systematic form in consequence of the fuller introduction of the Aristotelic Philosophy. Therefore it is, that I characterize this class of controversies, as more peculiarly Scholastic than the Trinitarian. The conclusions to be established were handed down to the Schoolmen, in the volumes of their own great Master. But these conclusions wanted contexture and theoretic stability. It yet remained, for the doctrines on these points to be moulded into a rationalized system of Theology; to be deduced in connexion with the Principles of the Divine Being, already laid down as the scientific basis of all truth.

It has been seen, in the account which I gave of the theories proposed on the Trinity, that the ground of the speculation was, the notion of God, as the Principle of Causation or Efficiency; that this notion itself was drawn from analogies in the human mind, viewed as the means of tracing up the facts of the visible world to their fixed principles in God.

The speculations on the Pelagian Question, as developed in the Scholastic system, were an application of this fundamental principle of the Theology to a particular class of facts; those produced by moral and intellectual Beings. The theory of God, as a Trinity in Unity, had respect, according to the scholastic views, to the whole universe: it was the mysterious solution of the whole order of things;

containing in it the immutable reasons, or principles, of all existences whatever. The account, however, of the peculiar phenomena attending the thoughts and actions of rational agents, such as angels and men—and of men more particularly, as the subjects of Divine Grace revealed in the dispensations of religion—suggested occasion for a more explicit and distinct inquiry. A theory of Providence, therefore, was to be drawn out; of the connexion rather of Providence with the natural and revealed condition of human nature.

The Schoolmen, accordingly, proceeded to philosophize on the mode, in which the Will of God fulfilled itself, consistently with the free-will of man. The spirit of their Theology made it incumbent on them to demonstrate the operation of the Divine Will, as the sole Master-Will, comprehending in itself the derived and subordinate wills of all other agents.

And here the important point to be observed, in developing the force of theory on the doctrines now under review, is, the reason, why they referred the speculation to the *Will*, rather than to the Intelligence of God. It was in pursuance of a maxim of their adopted philosophy, that “mere intelligence “moves nothing,”—is no cause of production or change.<sup>o</sup> The inquiry was essentially concerned about a theory of change,—an account of a class of ever-flowing, variable, phenomena. To understand this, we should be aware of the extent of meaning

<sup>o</sup> Aristot. Ethic. VI. *διανοιὰ δ' αὐτῆ οὐθὲν κινεῖ.*

attached to the word Motion, in the ancient Physics. It included under it much more than we apprehend by the term; applying to any change whatever that might occur, either in the internal structure, or external form of bodies, no less than to their change of place. As the nature of the soul was classed among the objects of physical inquiry, any modification of the soul, by its exertion in action, came under this definition of Motion. We may judge then of the connexion of the maxim, to which I have referred, with the theory of Divine Agency. In exploring the principle of actions, we exclude from the induction whatever belongs to the simply intellectual view of their nature. We look only to the motive principle. We are sufficiently accustomed, indeed, to ascribe the moral nature of actions to the *motives* exemplified in them. But we little think of the abstruse philosophy on which the expression is founded; that it is a rejection of every thing else but the Will,—the principle of Activity,—from the abstract theory of human conduct.

The doctrine of Predestination, accordingly, is a reference of actions to their primary *Motive*, the great principle of all Activity, the Will of God. The reasons or ideas of actions, as of all other effects throughout the Universe, might have existed eternally in the Divine mind; like the principles of an art in the mind of the artist: but nothing would have been created, no action would have taken place, unless the Divine Will had stretched out the hand of God to the work. It was the Will of God

that occasioned the Divine Intelligence, the wisdom or word of God, to go forth, and diffuse the Divine power, wisdom, and goodness over the works of a visible world.

From the perfect simplicity, indeed, of the Divine nature, the Will of God is identical, as the Schoolmen assert, with his Intelligence; as both are also identical with his Being.<sup>p</sup> But, in speculating concerning the principle of voluntary actions, it is important that the attention should be confined strictly to that ultimate abstraction which properly represents their nature in the Being of God—the simple principle of the Divine Will.

Had the views of the Schoolmen, and of others who have philosophized after them, been confined strictly to this point, much perplexity of thought on the questions arising out of the subject would have been avoided. A simple solution in that case would have been given of the effects of subordinate agents, by deducing them from the great law of the Divine Will. This class of variable phenomena would, at least, have been simplified, by being contemplated as His agency, in whom is no variableness, nor shadow of turning. They would have been deprived of their anomalous character, by the steadiness of purpose with which such a theory would invest them.

<sup>p</sup> Et sic oportet in Deo esse voluntatem, cum sit in eo intellectus. Et sicut suum intelligere est suum esse, ita et suum esse est suum velle.—*Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xix. art. 1. Quia essentia Dei est ejus intelligere et velle. Ibid. art. 4.

But the intellectual principle, as being physically inseparable from the moral, has been also brought into the speculation: and the stability, attributed to this principle, has been taken into the view of the origin of those changes which the moral world exhibits. Conclusions have been drawn from that other maxim of ancient philosophy, that what is *known*—whatever is the object of Science—must be fixed and immutable. It has been forgotten in the course of inquiry, that the speculation is concerning the principle of change,—that it is an endeavour to ascertain some limit to those variable results which the human will produces, by viewing them in their original cause of variation, itself immutable, the Will of God.

Thus, when any event or effect is simply regarded in its reference to the Will of God, the assertion which it becomes us to make respecting it, is that its accomplishment could not eventually be resisted; could not be frustrated. The design of that act of volition must surely be effected: the wills of all subordinate agents must work together with that sovereign Will, which pursues its own purposes through their agency. In the acts of Human will there is no assurance of the result being the object intended; there is no certainty of correspondence between the motive and the effect, because of the various obstacles arising from the conflicting wills of different individuals. But, even of the Human will, we may predict a certain result, in proportion as the agent appears to have calculated justly the resistance, or the

cooperation, to be expected from the wills of others. Now the Divine Will is only an extreme case of this analogy,—a case in which are included the wills of all creatures,—where the purpose, accordingly, will surely be accomplished, not only amidst the utmost variety and complexity, and apparent contradiction of human wills, but by means of that very entangling and contrariety of motions which puzzle the eye of the human spectator. Take however the Divine Intellect into the account; regard any given effect as the simple object of Divine knowledge; and we must then say that the effect could not be otherwise; the result, in any other form, becomes inconceivable and self-contradictory: as known to God, it must be infallibly and speculatively true: a conclusion which brings us immediately to a doctrine of Necessity, or Fatalism.

The Schoolmen attempted, in this speculation, to solve the difficulty which had perplexed the ancient philosophers. Whilst some of these resorted to the notion of a sovereign fate, or a principle of malignity, or necessity—and the more pious to that of a providence—to explain the devious course of human events; all may be regarded, as having admitted the impossibility of reducing this class of facts to any strictly scientific principles. They were placed, indeed, among those truths which were held to be essentially variable or Contingent, in contradistinction to those which were called Necessary, as capable of being referred to fixed laws. So that whilst the

philosopher assigned these several abstract causes for the variable phenomena of actions, it was not a solution of the facts that he proposed, but a confession of his ignorance of any proper philosophical account of them.

The Platonic doctrine of an abstract Idea of Good, was the nearest approach to such an account. This was, however, an attempt to reduce the calculations of moral judgment, to the certainty which belongs to the purely intellectual perceptions, rather than a theory that applied itself to the actual anomalies of human life. But the Schoolmen, adopting Aristotle's practical view of the subject, admitted, with that philosopher, the uncertainty of human conduct in its dependence on the free-will of man. At the same time, as theologians and logicians, they felt themselves bound to reconcile this admission with the fixedness of those Ideal Principles, from which all this devious course of human actions primarily originated.

The manner in which they effected the reconciliation, is extremely worthy of our notice, as an instance of the dependence of their Theology on metaphysical theories. The explanation rests entirely on assumed definitions of Time and Eternity. These are contrasted with each other; Time, as the "measure of motion,"—Eternity, as the "measure of permanent being." Whilst events therefore, viewed in connexion with the capacities of finite beings, develope themselves successively and are uncertain, or contingent, as arising out of their proximate *causes*;

they are fixed and immutable in their "*presentiality*" before God, whose eternity admits no change, no succession.<sup>a</sup>

It is sufficiently clear, I think, from these difficulties, and their proposed solution, that the metaphysics of a logical philosophy have tied the knot, in which this subject has been involved. Realism converted distinctions, which are the mere creations of the mind, into differences in the nature of things. For the terms, *Necessary* and *Contingent*, express nothing more than laws of thought, the varied character of evidence belonging to different perceptions of the mind: the necessity imputed to the objects of Divine knowledge being a *consequence* from the notion of immutability; the contingency imputed to the facts of human life, being the simple evidence of experience, which may vary, and even be directly contrary, without any intrinsic absurdity. Whence, the attempt to reconcile them is only to confound two distinct classes of mental facts. The Schoolmen, indeed, were not ignorant of the nature of this distinction;<sup>r</sup> but the logical basis of their Theology obliged them to interpret it in the way in which they have done. The necessity, and fixedness, and eternity of the Divine Being, were the given principles, which their method called upon them to apply to the facts of human experience. They commenced with the

<sup>a</sup> Note G.

<sup>r</sup> *Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars. qu. XIX. art 3.—Note H.



rigour of logic, and were forced to throw its chains over the stream of human affairs.

The only proper difficulty in the subject of Divine Agency,—that which has more strictly the force of objection against it,—is, the fact observable in the world, of apparent resistance to the will of God, by the deep and wide prevalence of evil. This fact impugns the very ground on which the truth of the Divine Agency is founded; since the *good* designed in the constitution of the world, is the evidence to us of that great law of natural religion,—that God wills the happiness of his creatures. In short, it is principally, if not solely, from a conviction of the Divine *good-will*, that we assign to God the operation of will at all.<sup>52</sup>

But even this difficulty, real as it is (for the existence of sin and misery in the world is as clear a fact as any in its history,) is greatly aggravated by that speculative optimism which seems a fundamental prejudice or instinct of our minds. The maxim that nature works all things for the best—that there is nothing imperfect or vain in her system—was the form which this idea assumed in the ancient philosophy. It would be well, if we held it simply as a general truth, highly important for our practical needs; as a resource in the perplexities of life; but rejected it altogether as a ground of speculation. For as soon as we begin to reason from it, that, “of two ends, the better must be the design of Providence;” as the ancients did reason, and as

we are ourselves apt to do; we incur difficulties arising from our own conceptions of what is best. We have then to satisfy the importunate requisitions of imaginary hypotheses.

When we come indeed to examine the subject more closely, as it is illustrated by that Logical Philosophy on which our attention is now engaged, the theory itself of Predestination will be found to involve reasonings on this fundamental principle. It is, in fact, a speculation founded on our moral nature; which cannot rest satisfied, until it has modelled the system of Grace, as of Nature, after its own tendencies towards an excellence and perfection beyond its positive experience. The Father of Modern Philosophy has observed, that the human intellect supposes a greater regularity and equality in things than it actually finds. This is particularly the case in the world of religion. Captivated with the contemplation of the eternal destinies of man, it loves to trace the links, which bind together the remote parts of the mysterious life of the soul, in continuous and uniform series. It will not acquiesce, therefore, in the naked declarations of Scripture on the subject of Human Salvation. It eagerly seizes on the truths contained in these, to recast them in the mould which its own imaginations have framed. Hence that charm, which doctrines of Absolute Predestination, Indefectible Grace, Assurance of Salvation, and the like, possess both for the philosopher and the vulgar. The mind is placed by them in a commanding elevation, from which it beholds

the whole course of the Christian life stretched before it. It feels itself transported into the very region which properly belongs to religion; where the amazement of thought, naturally excited by the subject, seems to be answered by the majesty and sublimity of the scenery presented. Otherwise, it might be matter of surprise, how pious and amiable men have delighted in stern and appalling views of the Divine Predestination; not scrupling to declare the devout emotion, with which they could contemplate the terrors of Divine wrath, sentencing the sinner to everlasting dereliction and misery.<sup>s</sup>

To understand, however, the theoretic nature of Predestination, we must enter more fully into the ethical speculation, of which it is the counterpart in the system of Religion: if, at least, we would rightly estimate the meaning of the dogmatic declarations on the subject.

Whatever is the object of a natural passion, or active principle of the soul, was termed, in the language of ancient philosophy, "a good," and an "end;"—an end, because the affection, or active principle, when duly exerted, was conceived to *rest* in its object, then attained or completed;—a good, because nature does nothing in vain, and suggests no object to the desires of man, without a beneficial design.

The notion of *Good* became thus essentially attached to an object of the will; or was rather the

<sup>s</sup> Note I.

result of such an association. Accordingly, whatever was desired, was represented to be a good, either real or apparent;—a real good, if the affections were rightly constituted;—an apparent good, pursued as real, where the affections were disordered and perverted. This general view of moral facts will be recognized as pervading the ethical philosophy of Aristotle. And hence the great business of that philosophy, as of the ancient Ethics in general, was, to find out the general law of Good, or great End of Actions; the object universally aimed at, though often under mistaken views, in the various moral facts which human life exhibits; or, as it was abstractedly termed the *Chief Good*,—the ultimate End, or in Scholastic language, *Final Cause*, of all actions.

Now, if we conceive this Theory of Actions transferred to the Divine Being, we shall obtain a just view of what the Schools intended by the doctrine of Predestination. The End, or Final Cause, of all the actions of God,—of all exertions of his will,—could be no other than his Goodness. As, under the view of religion, the Chief Good of Man must be God himself, so, to the will of God, there could be no other object than the Divine goodness itself. So far then as all things done in the universe were the actions of God, they were referable to the great law of good, original in the nature of the Divine Being. Nothing evil, as such, could be referable to God, because what was evil could not be conceived to be the object of Will at all, much less of the perfect

Divine will. It was wrong therefore, according to the Scholastic doctrine, to speak of the predestination of evil. The wicked might be said to be predestined to punishment, but not to the evil committed by them. This was only the result of their improper exercise of their own will; through which, as individuals, they missed the good designed for them by God; and, in thus missing it, sinned against the benevolent constitution of God. Good would surely follow, whatever might be the actions of the individual, however evil these might be in their immediate result, since nothing else but goodness could be the object of the Divine Will. God therefore could not be said to *will* the evil action of the sinner; though He might “permit” it, in order to that ultimate good which He educes out of it. The use of the word *Permission* may be remarked here; as it has passed into modern use, and is employed still to remove the objection arising from saying, that God appoints or decrees evil. Taken in its popular sense, it only removes the difficulty a step further; as it still leaves the question, why God does not interfere to prevent the evil done and suffered in the world. But the scientific use of it, by Aquinas, seems to be, to avoid making evil an object of volition; and yet not to exclude it from the cognizance and control of Divine Providence as an event.<sup>†</sup>

Reprobation accordingly, in the Calvinistic sense, had no place in the Scholastic theology. Predestination, regarded as the sole primary cause of all our

<sup>†</sup> Note J.

actions as they are moral and Christian—as they have any worth in them, or any happiness—was asserted in that Theology in the most positive manner; though different Doctors varied in further expositions of its nature.<sup>u</sup> But Reprobation, as it implies a theory of the moral evil of the world, I think I may confidently say, is no part of the *System*.<sup>x</sup> The term, indeed, is derived to us from the Schoolmen; and so far they are chargeable with having perplexed theology with the disquisitions arising out of it. But, had they employed the term to denote an antecedent will, on the part of God, of the sin and misery of the wicked, they would have contradicted that philosophy, from which they drew their speculation on the subject.

Whether it becomes us to theorize at all on the subject, is another question. But if there must be theory, the Schoolmen were so far right, that they simply endeavoured to trace the divine Goodness, as manifested by Nature and Revelation, to its primary cause in the Divine Being. Their theory inculcated the great truth that the apparent anomalies of the world were in reality instances of the same general law; that the evil actually found in nature, was not the design of God, or the effect of any Principle of Evil. This is their Predestination. And they assert Election accordingly, in the same manner, as part of Predestination. Election,

<sup>u</sup> Note K.

<sup>x</sup> *Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art 3.—  
Note L.

according to them, is an analysis of Predestination, considered as a moral act: since, where there is good willed, there must be the love, and consequently the choice of the persons so predestined.<sup>y</sup>

Looking indeed back to the origin of the question of Divine Agency in the Latin Church, to the character and conduct of Augustine, who gave the first impulse to it; and observing at the same time the mode in which it is explained by the Schoolmen; I cannot but think, that the dogmatic assertion of Predestination is primarily to be understood solely in opposition to Manicheism, and its kindred errors, with which Pelagianism was associated: that the exclusive design of it was accordingly to maintain a theory of Divine Goodness,—to exhibit the moral and religious world in harmony with the physical, that God might be seen as all in all. The Latin Church appears to have felt a constant dread of the influx of Manicheism. The cry of Manicheism was sure to rally defenders round the standard of orthodoxy. The poor sufferers, cruelly executed at Orleans in the XIth century, were murdered under the plea of their profession of Manicheism. The alarm was spread against the rising sect of the Albigenses of Toulouse, in the following century, on the same ground.<sup>z</sup>

<sup>y</sup> Note M.

<sup>z</sup> The Pelagians seem to have retorted the charge of Manicheism on the Orthodox:—*Catholicos Manichæorum nomine criminantur.*—*Contr. Duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonifac.* lib. ii. *Augustin. Oper.* tom. vii. p. 286.—Note N.

Augustine naturally felt a strong antipathy to that error, from which he had, with many painful struggles, extricated himself. Whilst the disciple of that gross, material philosophy, he had been accustomed to regard Evil as a substantial or corporeal element of the Universe, coordinate with Good. Having once overcome this noxious prejudice of his early creed, he shrank from any approach to it afterwards, as from an antichristian enemy. We see this in his manner of treating the questions raised by Pelagius. He is constantly viewing them in their connexion with the Manichean doctrines. As a practical man, bent on carrying a point of Church-government, he calls attention to the unpopular consequences of the Pelagian notions; calculating doubtless that the alarm of Manicheism would come with full force from one, able to speak, from his own experience, of its delusions.

The antipathies of Augustine descended, with his doctrines, to the Schoolmen. Following his footsteps, they sought only to set forth his views of the Divine Agency, as of every other question of theology, with theoretic precision.

It would appear, accordingly, that the Scholastic doctrine of Providence, and of Predestination as a part of Providence, is opposed to philosophical notions of Providence current in the early ages of the Church. In speaking indeed of the Divine Power, Aquinas expressly points this out.

“There have been some,” he says, “as the “Manichees, who said that spiritual and incorporeal



“ things are subject to divine power, but visible  
 “ and corporeal things subject to the power of a  
 “ contrary principle. Against these then we must  
 “ say, that God is in all things by his Power.  
 “ There have been others again, who, though they  
 “ believed all things subject to divine power, still  
 “ did not extend divine Providence down to these  
 “ lower parts: in whose person it is said, in Job  
 “ xxii. ‘ He walks about the hinges of heaven, and  
 “ ‘ considers not our concerns.’<sup>a</sup> And against these  
 “ it was necessary to say, that God is in all things  
 “ by his Presence. There have been again others,  
 “ who, though they said all things belonged to the  
 “ Providence of God, still laid it down, that all  
 “ things were not immediately created by God; but  
 “ that He immediately created the first creatures,  
 “ and these created others. And against these it  
 “ was necessary to say, that He was in all things  
 “ by his Essence.”<sup>b</sup>

These are the theories, accordingly, which should  
 be studied, in order to have a right conception of  
 the definition of Predestination, as given in the  
 Scholastic writers, and from them derived to modern  
 Theology.

But, if this be the case, the most important

<sup>a</sup> Job xxii. 13, 14. “And thou sayest, How doth God know?  
 “ can He judge through the dark cloud? Thick clouds are a  
 “ covering to Him, that he seeth not; and He walketh in the  
 “ circuit of heaven.”

<sup>b</sup> *Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. VIII. art. 3.

element for a right judgment of the doctrine, as professed by our Church, has been generally overlooked. Divines have been anxious to shew, that our Reformers were not of the same opinion on this subject as Calvin. It is evident, however, that the statement in our Articles could not have been expressly opposed to Calvinistic views. For such an opposition would imply, that the theories opposed were prevalent at the time; whereas they were maintained at their greatest height after the composition of our Article. Theory is met by counter-theory, when the language of erroneous speculation has begun to infect the orthodoxy of the Church. A speculation, indeed, may have been in existence—may have been growing,—as many of the Trinitarian theories were, before they obtained the names by which they are now known. So undoubtedly was, what is now called Calvinism. Still it would not be opposed by a *dogmatic* statement, until the profession of the theory was become notorious, and troublesome to the leading Clergy of the times.

It has been often observed of our XVIIth Article, that, whilst it declares a predestination to Life and Glory, it is reserved on the subject of Reprobation, speaking on this point in the language of practical admonition.<sup>c</sup> It is no little confirmation of this

<sup>c</sup> The allusion at the end of the Article to the "Will of God" should be particularly noticed, as illustrative of the train of thought throughout it, and also the correction of the expression by the terms joined with it:—"that Will of God is to be

view, that it coincides exactly with the theory of Divine Agency, developed in the reasonings of the Scholastic Philosophy. From observing this coincidence, I should conclude, that our Reformers, feeling themselves called upon by the state of opinion, to make some authoritative statement on the subject, and led also to speculate on it, from their own education in the theories of Scholasticism; returned to the original mode in which the truth had been theoretically propounded. They saw, at least, the moderation of that language: the notions involved in it, were their philosophical creed: and they wisely preferred it to the extreme views of some of their contemporaries.

Consistently with this notion of Predestination, Grace is set forth by the Scholastic writers as the "Effect of Predestination," or Predestination as the "Preparation of Grace." Both indeed are spoken of as Divine "ordinations" to the Life Eternal,<sup>d</sup> and are equally characteristic therefore of the Divine Agency, as taught in the Scholastic Theology. But, the Pelagian controversies have given a more Christian emphasis to the term Grace, by its employment as the antagonist statement to the anathematized doctrines of Pelagius; and made it equivalent

"followed, *which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God.*" These last words call us from the theoretic sense of the "Will of God" to the practical one of the precepts contained in Scripture.

<sup>d</sup> *Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 3.—Note O.

practically to the whole of Gospel-truth. So that, in fact, it more properly represents the part of God in the scheme of human salvation, than any other term of Theology.

Amidst the copious matter of inquiry, which a term, so pregnant with theological interest, presents to our hands, I confine myself to what belongs more strictly to the notion of Divine Agency—the point particularly selected for illustration in the present Lecture.

First then I would call attention to the word *Grace* itself. The sense, which the discussions of Pelagianism have impressed on the term, is particularly to be noticed. The dogmatic manner in which we now speak of “the grace of God,”—placing it in contrast with the powers of human nature, or with nature in general,—conveys the idea of something positive in God, something that admits of explanation as to what it is,—of definition, and distribution into its various kinds. We hear of grace operating and cooperating; grace preventing and following; grace of congruity, grace of condignity. But how erroneous is the conception produced in the mind, by these several modes of speaking? When we try the notion of Grace by a survey of the Scripture-dispensations, what is it but a general *fact*, a summary designation of the various instances of benevolent, pitiful condescension on the part of God, to the wants and helplessness of man? It is thus that “grace and truth” are said

to come by Jesus Christ. The mission of Christ to the world was the strongest instance of the benevolent exertion of God for our good. Thus St. Paul speaks of the grace of God having appeared unto all men, in sending his Son into the world, characterizing by the word grace this act of heavenly interposition. Thus, too, we are said to be "saved by grace;" the Apostle alluding, evidently, as before, to the act of Christ's coming into the world and dying for our sins. Again, we are desired to pray for "grace,"—and grace is said to be "given" to us. These last instances convey a dogmatic impression; but when we consider them more strictly, they resolve themselves into concise modes of speaking, adapted to the purpose of giving a distinct and striking view of the fact to which reference is made. We pray, that is, that God will graciously help us; and, in acknowledging the gift of grace, we deny our own sufficiency, and declare that what we do good, is of God working in us both to will and to do. The word Truth is subject to the like erroneous conception; but here we are not apt to fall into the realism of supposing something in God positively denoted by the term: since it has not been equally the occasion of religious dispute.

It is then from Scholasticism that we have derived this positive sense. Those subdivisions which I have referred to, of "preventing" and "following" grace, grace "operating" and "cooperating," and others which our Church has not adopted; are expressly taken from the Scholastic Theology. Grace is

treated of in this system, as something “infused”<sup>e</sup> into the soul, by virtue of which the sinner is justified, and the operation of which on the heart it is endeavoured to trace through the stages of its process.<sup>f</sup>

The order of ideas pursued, may be stated generally as the following. Grace is first communicated to the soul of man in baptism, as an infused principle superadded to his natural powers,—as the seed of a new birth regenerating the soul. Hence is obtained the primary impulse, the original motive or efficient cause, by which the sinner is set forward on the course of the Life eternal. This produces in him a *motion* towards God; in which state it is called “a preventing” and an “operating” grace;—preventing, as it precedes all motion on the part of man;—operating, as it is the sole mover or motive principle. The soul of man being thus set in action towards God, is brought to feel its own sinfulness. But, though it has received this divine seed,—this element of holiness and future happiness,—still the natural powers are unable to expand and mature the germ, that it may grow to the life everlasting. The progress of the soul must therefore be sustained by him, who gave it the principle of spiritual

<sup>e</sup> *Aquinas*, Summa. Theol. Prima IIæ.

<sup>f</sup> One of the questions discussed by *Aquinas* is, *Utrum Gratia ponat aliquid in Anima*. S. Theol. Prima IIæ. qu. cx. art. 1. which he decides in the affirmative.—Note P.

life. The desire of holiness and the hatred of sin are implanted: but the temptations to which the weakness of the flesh exposes the regenerated soul, must be resisted by continued divine assistances, by grace following and cooperating. And the soul, contemplated in this state of progress, is said to be endued with the “grace of perseverance.”<sup>g</sup> And when, at last, the course in which the soul has been proceeding through this continued divine aid, is completed; still grace is needed, that it may obtain remission of sins—a pardon of that guiltiness which even repentance cannot obliterate from the soul. Finally, by grace it is glorified in the presence of God. Such is an analysis of the progress of the soul enjoying the “habitual gift of grace,” as taught by the School divines. It is justification, if the process of grace be considered in its effect on the sinner. It is predestination, if it be contemplated in God himself, as the effect of his eternal Love. It is Salvation, if the antecedent agency of the Son of God be the point from which the process is viewed. It is sanctification, if it be referred to the operation of the Holy Spirit, whose “gift” it is, and whose peculiar office it is, thus to move and quicken the soul.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>g</sup> The *καρτερία* of Aristotle—the power of holding out against temptations from pain—is what Augustine and the Schoolmen understood chiefly by Perseverance. The transition of the word into a symbol of mystical doctrine, is among the curious instances of the disguise of Aristotle’s philosophy under terms of Theology. *Aquin.* S. Theol. Prima IIæ. qu. cix. art. 10.

<sup>h</sup> Note Q.

In examining this account of the nature of Grace ; whilst we fully acknowledge the general truth implied in it, that all our salvation is of the free gift and goodness of God ; we may clearly perceive, that the mode of thinking is founded on principles of ancient physical philosophy : in which, accordingly, we must seek the account of our technical language on the subject of Divine Agency.

I. The doctrine of Transmutation was a vital principle in Aristotle's Philosophy. According to this doctrine, any object in nature might be transmuted into another—the actual form of any thing, not depending on its being constituted of any particular substance or matter, but on the presence of its constituent properties. When those properties were removed by the presence of other natures, with which they could not coexist, the thing itself was changed. It passed into that other form, to which these new qualities belonged. I shall have occasion to illustrate this point further, when I come to speak of the doctrine of Transubstantiation, into which it enters more particularly. I allude to it only now, for the sake of illustrating the notion, by which our Christian state under the influence of Grace is described. If it be allowed, that the state of holiness and perfection to which the Gospel seeks to bring us, is a state for which we are not fit in our present condition, evidently we must undergo some *change*, some special adaptation for that glory which we are destined to receive. The qualities then, to



speak in terms of the ancient philosophy, of that *form* which we are to assume, must be brought to our present nature. The holiness of the Gospel state must be superinduced on the intrinsic unholliness in which we now stand. In a word, we must be *transformed*. The old things must *pass away*, and all must become *new*.<sup>i</sup> We must cease to be what we were, and be new creatures. On this principle, then, the presence of the grace of God is indispensably necessary to render us meet for the inheritance of the saints. It comes and displaces that previous form of unrighteousness which once was our nature. Thus is it true both scripturally and philosophically; “Except ye be *converted*, and *become* as little children, ye cannot inherit the *kingdom of heaven*.” As we have borne “the *image of the earthy*,” we must also bear “the *image of the heavenly*.” We must be “*transformed*” by the renewing of our mind—Christ must be “*formed*” in us.

II. But the proper and full solution of the language adopted by Augustine, and after him by the School Divines, in the Doctrines of Grace, is to be found in the refined Materialism of the ancient

<sup>i</sup> Baptismus adhibetur hominibus in hac vita, in qua homo potest transmutari de culpa in gratiam : sed descensus Christi ad inferos, exhibitus fuit animabus post hanc vitam, ubi non sunt capaces transmutationis prædictæ. Et ideo per baptismum pueri liberantur a peccato originali et ab inferno : non autem per descensum Christi ad inferos. *Aquin. S. Theol. III<sup>ta</sup> P. qu. LII. art. 7.*

theological philosophy of Nature. According to Aristotle, Nature was in itself an instinctive principle of motion and rest. It was a vast system of distinct powers, ever exerting themselves, and realizing by this activity the various forms of physical being. But what was it that sustained this activity? what was it that kept Nature in this state of effort—in this restless pursuit of that perfection of being, in which alone it could rest—throughout the various things of the universe? It was the great Principle of Beauty and Goodness—the abstract perfection of the whole Universe—the Chief Good—which animated and moved each member in the system of Nature. The great struggle of the whole,—the effort of each particular thing in nature—was; to attain to this *ultimate form* of beauty and perfection. There could be no quiescence in any thing, so long as it had not accomplished its utmost effort, in order to the attainment of this end—this *Final Cause*, of all its motion. This pure abstraction of Excellence pervaded all things alike—the inanimate as well as the animate—the irrational no less than the rational. All in their measure felt its influence<sup>j</sup>—the transitory things of the world aiming at its immortal excellence by successive productions and reproductions of themselves; and the durable, as the heavenly bodies, attaining more perfectly to a perception of the Divine Principle, by their invariable and endless revolutions. In rational Beings, it was the great End

<sup>j</sup> The idea may be traced in the language of Hooker, at the end of the 1st book of the Ecclesiastical Polity.

to which all their desires tended, the Active Cause of all their activity,—that gratification which they pursued more or less rightly and fully, as their passions were governed, and their intellect was cultivated;—the real happiness aimed at under all the manifold and capricious disguises of pleasure. Here then was the Divinity of the philosophic system of the Universe. Hence its designation, in the language of Aristotle, as the *First Mover*, itself *unmoved*;—that which being itself invariable, impassible, eternal, acted on, and *moved* all things, from the greatest to the least. Hence, too, we find the Schoolmen speaking of the Deity, as pure Act—pure Energy—Power, whose development and operation were coinstantaneous with, and inseparable from, its existence.

This was a system of Theism, which trembled on the verge of Pantheism—of a system that is, which sinks individual existence in the vague notion of One instinctive Universal Divine Being. And it was soon, we find, so perverted by the Stoics, and by the Alexandrian School, in which the Platonic doctrine of Ideas assumed this modification. Its ready transition, also, into a system of Fatalism is sufficiently apparent. The connexion of all the motions in the universe with the First Mover, exhibits the analogy of a chain of links depending from the Divine Being, in a series of perpetual connexion. It becomes a doctrine of Necessity, or Fate, or Destiny, according as the peculiar views of the philosopher impart to it their shade.

Theories of this kind, we know, were extremely prevalent at the time when the Pelagian controversies were agitated. In the Vth century, indeed, vigorous efforts were made to restore the modern Platonism to its empire in the Church and in the Schools. The publication at that period of the mystic Treatises of the Pseudo-Dionysius, was an effort of this kind. During this age too, Proclus, the distinguished disciple of the Alexandrian school, presided in the school of Athens. In the VIth century, Simplicius and others were employed in accommodating the theories of Platonism to those of Aristotle, and forming, out of the union, an Eclectic Philosophy, in which the dogmas of Alexandria were the dominant principles. At the same time, Boethius, at Rome, was engaged in the like labour. We see also, at the opening of the VIIth century, the prevalence of a doctrine of mystic connexion between the things of the world and their great primary Cause, in the conjoined Unitarianism and Fatalism of the Mahometan Creed. In the IXth century again, we find the pantheistic philosophy attracting the notice of the Western Church, by the fame of Erigena, the eminent advocate of the Theory in its boldest form.

But the adoption of Aristotle's system of nature, in its more genuine principles, introduced a more express reference to the doctrine of Motion, in the language of the Schools, on the subject of Grace. The material analogies were then fully introduced, as a means of explaining those invisible motions

which the Spirit of God works on the soul. In this system, neither was the Deity identified with the individual acted on, nor was the individual annihilated in the Deity.<sup>k</sup> The distinctness of the divine agent and the human recipient was maintained; in accordance with the Scripture revelation of God, as a sole Being, separate in his nature from the works of his Providence and his Grace. Still the notion of Him as an Energy—as a moving Power—entered into all their explanations of the Divine Influence on the soul. So far they were strictly Aristotelic. But, with this exception, the Platonic notion of a *real participation* of Deity in the soul of man pervaded their speculations. Aristotle's idea of human improvement and happiness was rather, that of a mechanical or material *approach* to the Divine Principle—an *attainment* of the Deity as an end of our Being. We see a great deal of this in the scholastic designations of the progress of man in virtue and happiness. Plato's view, on the other hand, was that of *assimilation*, or association with the Divinity. This notion more easily fell into the expressions of Scripture which speaks of man as created in the *image* of God; of our future state as *like* that of the angels of God; and which holds out to us an *example* of Divine Holiness for our *imitation*.

<sup>k</sup> In saying this, I must make an exception with respect to the language of some Scholastic writers; as, for instance, that of Abelard; whose expressions, in his "Introduction to Theology," are decidedly pantheistic; identifying the Holy Spirit with the *Anima Mundi* of the Stoics.

The pantheistic notion then of a participation of Deity, or an actual Deification of our nature,<sup>1</sup> is the fundamental idea of the operation of Grace according to the Schoolmen. The Aristotelic idea of motion—of continual progress—of gradual attainment of the complete form of perfection—is the law, by which this operation of Grace is attempted to be explained. Expressions of Scripture also coincided with this view; so far as our state in this world is spoken of, as a *going on* towards perfection—as a *growing in grace*; and we are exhorted to be *unmoveable, always abounding* in the work of the Lord.<sup>m</sup> In fact, this system, made up of Platonic and Aristotelic views, was regarded as sanctioned by the Apostle, in his application of that text of philosophy: “In him we live, and move, and have our being.”<sup>n</sup> The soul, it was conceived, might be transformed by the operation of motives extrinsic to itself; by impulses from evil spirits; as also by the Spirit of God: it might assume the “*form of godliness,*” without

<sup>1</sup> *Aquin.* Prima II dæ, qu. cxii. art. 1. Donum autem gratiæ excedit omnem facultatem naturæ creatæ, cum nihil aliud sit, quam *quædam participatio divinæ naturæ*, quæ excedit omnem aliam naturam: et ideo impossibile est, quod aliqua creatura gratiam causet. Sic enim necesse est, quod solus Deus *deificet*, communicando consortium divinæ naturæ, per quamdam similitudinis participationem; sicut impossibile est, quod aliquid igniat, nisi solus ignis.

<sup>m</sup> 1 Cor. xv. *ἑδραῖοι γίνεσθε, ἀμετακίνητοι*,—agreeably to Aristotle’s description of the virtuous character, *βεβαιῶς, ἀμετακινήτως, ἔχων*, one, not to be changed by any disturbing force from its present course.

<sup>n</sup> Acts xvii. 28. *ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἑσμέν.*

“ the *power*.”<sup>o</sup> But, when the work of Grace was complete in the soul, the form of godliness was the Energy of power coming down from the Father of lights and Author of all goodness.

Accordingly, by the Schoolmen, the natural powers and capacities of men are regarded as the materials on which the Divine Grace operates. The freewill of man, as we shall see hereafter, is not impaired by this supernatural action.<sup>p</sup> Their idea rather is, that the will of man thus obtains its proper freedom, is enabled to act freely, unimpeded by those obstacles which the corruption of nature places in its way. Still, the notion throughout, on which they proceed, is that of material impulse, of gradual progress and alteration, from a state of alienation to one of holiness and perfect conformity with God.

To turn, however, from these speculations, in themselves, to the view of the Divine Agency, which the study of them brings before us.

First, I would observe, the importance of the

<sup>o</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 5. ἔχοντες μόρφωσιν εὐσεβείας, τὴν δὲ δύναμιν αὐτῆς ἡρνημένοι. The notion of *Energy* may also be perceived in the language of St. Paul; as in Eph. iii. 20. “the power that worketh in us”—τὴν δύναμιν τὴν ἐνεργουμένην ἐν ἡμῖν—Also Eph. i. 11. “who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will”—τοῦ τὰ πάντα ἐνεργοῦντος κατὰ τὴν βουλὴν τοῦ θελήματος αὐτοῦ.

<sup>p</sup> Si bene considerentur quæ dicta sunt: aperte cognoscitur, quia cum aliquid dicit Sacra Scriptura pro gratia, non amovet omnino liberum arbitrium, neque cum loquitur pro libero arbitrio excludit gratiam, &c. *Anselm. De Concord. Grat. et Lib. Arb. Op. tom. iii. p. 278.*

consideration, that the theory of the Divine Predestination, on which our doctrinal statement is founded, is a much more simple one than is commonly supposed. It is not at all concerned with explaining the origin of Evil. It is only a theory of God's mercy in Christ, deduced from its originating cause in the Being of God. I have already pointed out this. I repeat it now, as it is a view of the subject on which I am desirous of fixing your attention. A theory of Reprobation is, on the other hand, a theory of the origin of Evil; and, so far therefore from being deducible from our doctrinal statements on Predestination and Grace, is the very doctrine to which these statements are opposed: unless we are to suppose that a philosophical theology, in which the framers of our Articles had been trained, had no influence on their minds. But the exact accordance of our Article on Predestination, with what appears the true Scholastic notion of the subject, is, to me, ample evidence, that this notion was the doctrine designed.

I am not prepared, at the same time, to vindicate those statements in their theoretic points, as the proper way in which the Divine Predestination and Grace should be apprehended by the Christian. These are truths, it cannot be too often repeated, which concern more the heart than the intellect; and, in defining which accordingly, every attempt, however exactly and piously worded, must fail; much more, any theory of them drawn from antecedent speculations on the Nature and Will of God.



To Scholasticism indeed, though the theories of Predestination and Grace, which it taught, are of a less complex form than is commonly supposed, we may trace the origin of those idle questions, with which this department of Theology has been vexed; such as, whether Predestination is certain; whether there is Assurance of salvation; whether the number of the Elect is fixed;<sup>a</sup> whether all are predestined. These, and similar questions incidental to the general inquiry, have been naturally laid hold of by theologians, following the example of the Doctors of the middle age, from whom they received the speculation itself. And this effect shews the evil of any speculation at all on the subject. It only marks out the lines of future disputation. If these truths are to be defined, the only legitimate mode is, the laborious, historical, experimental one, formed on a comprehensive and accurate study, under the guidance of that selfsame Spirit, whose ways we are exploring, of every fact of Nature and Scripture, and the collection of these into a general law of the Divine Procedure. But this is the work of a Christian life; it is a process of induction which can only be carried on, where there is a disposition

<sup>a</sup> The different opinions on this point, were: 1. that as many should be saved of men, as had fallen of angels; 2. as many of men, as of angels who had stood in their obedience; 3. as many of men, as of fallen angels; and besides, as many, as the whole number of angels created. Aquinas refers to these different opinions, and wisely concludes, that the number of the elect, to be placed in supreme happiness, is known to God alone. *Sum. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 7.*

and an activity, in doing the Divine Will, and obeying the Divine Motions. Otherwise we are but tracking the arrow through the air, or the keel of the vessel through pathless waters.

But the assertion of them in the theoretic form, as primary truths concerning the Divine Being, can never be free from objection. We have then, as it were, placed in our hands, the great Original Reasons of things—the first definitions, from which all other truths are, of course, conceived to be deducible; and nothing inconsequent to them can, without the greatest difficulty, be admitted. Whatever we do then concede to the independent perceptions of our reason, it is with a kind of resignation to a mystery that overwhelms the faculties—a resignation, very different from that of the heart bowed down before God. The truths, *theoretically stated*, are so essential to the very *idea* of God, that we adopt them immediately, as self-evident axioms; and we expect, in the theology raised upon them, the demonstrativeness of truths deduced from unquestionable premises. The dominion of a Logical Theory is here, accordingly, particularly to be dreaded. Its delusions are fostered, by the nature of the principles themselves, on which it is here exercised. Experience has shewn, how ready the minds of men are, even at this day, to treat the question of Divine Agency, as a matter pregnant with consequences, or inferences, rather than as one of simple, moral acquiescence and obedience. Even the piety of men turns from its own proper task, to minister to the

appetite of speculation. The desire to establish the name of God, as first in the thoughts, involves them in paradox on every subordinate subject. Let it then be examined by such persons, whether, little as it may have been thought, they have not been pursuing the necessity and cogency of logic, in their theological opinions; whether the notions of Divine Agency, on which they so insist, are not merely the connexions of conclusions and consequences with assumed hypotheses and definitions.

With respect then to the doctrines expressive of Divine Agency, I would observe, as I did of those concerning the Trinity, the difficulties belonging to them arise from metaphysical speculations. Here, they are the result of the primary ideas, which the mind combines together in its complex idea of God. Or, it would be more correct, perhaps, to speak of them, as the result of these several ideas in themselves;—as of priority, necessity, power, will; all mere abstractions of the mind, and, as such, capable of being discerned in their consequences and contradictions; but very fallacious tests of what is conclusive, or inconclusive, in facts out of the region of the mind itself. The whole philosophy of the Schools on the subject of Divine Agency, let it be remembered, *is founded on an application of processes in the mind to processes in nature.* And our technical language on the subject has been inherited from the Schools. I only wish it then to be considered, whether our difficulties may not be

ascribed to our false philosophy more than to our Religion.

Could we read the language of the Apostle Paul, on which so much stress is commonly laid, as decisive of this question,—without prejudice,—without thinking of the volumes of controversy which have been employed on it, or the arguments that we have heard,—I feel persuaded, that we should draw no speculative doctrines of Divine Predestination and Grace from his Epistles. We should only see the Apostle declaring the same fact, which all Nature and Revelation proclaim; that our God is a “God very nigh unto us;” whose goodness is as unchangeable as his Being; and who will surely perfect those counsels of love, in which he gave his Son, from everlasting, for the salvation of man. St. Paul’s references to the Divine Agency are all of this character. They suggest to us thoughts of God, on all occasions of our life, in all difficulties of our temporal and spiritual condition. Are we dejected and despairing of our spiritual life? “God,” we are assured, “will not forsake his elect, whom He hath foreknown.” He has blessed us; He has mercifully revealed his salvation to us: we have an earnest then, that He, who is unchangeable, has not lightly begun a good work in us, but will most surely accomplish it. “Why art thou so disquieted, my soul?” says the anxious inquirer. “Hope thou in the Lord,” is the answer; “He is thy helper and defender:” “a very present help in time of trouble.” Ascribe your salvation to God,

and you rest on a rock which the rains and the storms shall assail in vain. Are we again proceeding on our way cheerfully in the hope of everlasting life? "Work out your salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do." Be encouraged to proceed; for you are armed with a strength not your own, and a work that is of God, cannot come to nought; and yet "with fear and trembling;" for the responsibility of a work to which God has set his hand, is an heavy one,—that should make the heart serious amidst its gladness. These are the words, with which one Christian would naturally comfort and encourage another. And such, accordingly, may well be conceived the stress of the Apostle's assertions respecting Grace and Predestination. It is the Charity that "never faileth," which he is inculcating throughout, where many have erroneously thought that he was proclaiming the wonders of the Divine knowledge. Banish the scientific notion of Predestination and Grace; for nothing can come of it, but the confidence of mere reason, and a false enthusiasm, that fashions the idol before which it prostrates itself. Take up the truths as the Divine Law of Love, and you will find in them something more than that fixedness and quiescence, which is sought in the abstractions of Theory; you will find rest and peace to the soul IN JESUS CHRIST.

**LECTURE V.**

**THE PELAGIAN CONTROVERSIES.**

**JUSTIFICATION.**



## SUMMARY.

TRUTHS of Divine and Human Agency necessarily qualify each other—Human Agency, as viewed in the Scholastic system, the continued action of the First Cause—Justification, the law of Divine Operation in the Salvation of Man—Sketch of the Christian scheme involved in this principle—Theory of Human Agency concerned first in accounting for Resistance to the Divine Will—Difficulty, as felt in ancient philosophy, was to reconcile the fact with the certainty of Science—Schoolmen adopt Aristotle's practical views of human nature—Application of the term Corruption founded on his physical philosophy—Theory of the Propagation of Sin maintains the universality of the principle of Corruption—Objections of Pelagius and Celestius to this theory—Error, both of the Orthodox and of the Pelagians, in speculating on the nature of Original Sin—Concupiscence—the application of this term to Original Sin, derived from ancient divisions of the soul—Materialism involved in the Speculation.—Doctrine of Original Sin, the counterpart to the doctrine of the Incarnation—Disputes between the orthodox and the Pelagians turn on the force of the terms Nature and Person—Connexion between the heresies of Nestorius and Pelagius—Distinction between the effect of Adam's sin, and the sin of subsequent parents on their posterity—View of the Christian life, as a change, coincides with this theory of Original Sin—Faith, the *infused* element of the new life—Doctrinal statements of Justification by Faith, to be interpreted by the light of Scholastic notions involved in it—Scholastic Notion of Freewill, not opposed to Necessity, but to the Force of sin, in enslaving the will—Introduction of the theory of Justice into the Christian Scheme—Notion of Merit to be understood in connexion with this theory ; as also of Merit of Condignity, Merit of Congruity—Peculiar views of Repentance, as a compensation for offence—of Punishment and Satisfaction, as applied to the Sacrifice of Christ—of Self-Mortification and Supererogation—drawn from this theory of Penal Justice.

Inefficacy of Repentance to remove guilt, and need of Atonement, illustrated by these speculations—Debasing effect of Scholastic theory of Expiation—True view of Human Agency to be found in simple practical belief of the Atonement—Union of Strength and Weakness, implied in this doctrine, coincident with facts of human nature—Mischievous effect of speculative discussion of the subject—Moderation and forbearance of language on the subject most accordant with the spirit of Protestantism.



JOHN I. 12, 13.

But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name: which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God.

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Ὅσοι δὲ ἔλαβον αὐτὸν, ἔδωκεν αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίαν τέκνα Θεοῦ γενέσθαι, τοῖς πιστεύουσιν εἰς τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. οἱ οὐκ ἐξ αἱμάτων, οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος σαρκὸς, οὐδὲ ἐκ θελήματος ἀνδρὸς, ἀλλ' ἐκ Θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν.

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Quotquot autem receperunt eum, dedit eis potestatem filios Dei fieri, his, qui credunt in nomine ejus, qui non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE V.

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THE consideration of our theological language on the subject of Divine Agency, has tended to shew, that the peculiar technical forms of these doctrines were impressed on them by the ancient Logical Philosophy; from the necessity, as it was supposed, of tracing the series of effects in the conduct of man, to some primary efficient cause, the origin of the motion towards eternal happiness, in the soul of the sinner. I now come to those views of Human Agency, which are contained in the doctrines of Original Sin, Faith, Merit, Repentance, Atonement. And, with respect to these also, I am concerned to point out, both, how they arose out of the established method of Philosophy in the middle age, as questions to be determined, and what are the theories involved in their expression.

In a systematic Theology, these two classes of doctrines necessarily qualify each other. The views, either of Divine or of Human Agency, as they are dogmatically stated, involve ideas which include, or exclude, ideas in those of the opposite class. If, for instance, the Divine Predestination is stated strongly, as the everlasting purpose of God, by which the soul of the sinner is freely justified;—true as the fact is here intended to be described, yet, by inference from this assertion, we destroy the power

of man in the work of his justification. Or if, on the other hand, the truths of man's free agency are premised in all their proper force; the abstract statement involves the denial of the sole power of God. The perception of such consequences acts on the mind of the framers of Systems of Theology; and, according to the view predominant in their own creed, they place in the foreground the doctrines, from which the notions that they would inculcate may be logically deduced. Such is the nature of all dogmatic statements on these subjects, and which necessarily arises from the speculative force of the terms in which the doctrines are conveyed.<sup>a</sup>

Such, however, was the mode in which the doctrines, now under our consideration, received their original form. They stand forth, to the view of our speculative reason, with a point and precision given to them by the action of disputation. They excite in us the idea of accuracy of thought, of definiteness of conception; and we contemplate them with a fearful suspicion, lest we should err to the right hand, or to the left, in our mode of embracing them.

In order, indeed, to the systematic perfection of the Scholastic Theology, it was necessary to adjust the speculative views of the truths of Human Agency, to the previous theories of the Divine. It was essential to this logical method, that they should appear strictly the consequences of the former *assumptions*.

<sup>a</sup> Note A. Lect. V.

That they were the physical consequences, or natural effects, of the Divine Efficiency, was already apparent from the very method of their deduction. We were led up to consider them in God as in their real cause. But when the facts of Divine Agency were expressed in propositions, they were subjected to the test of logical disputation; and it was necessary therefore, to be able to demonstrate the logical connexion of the two classes of *propositions*, no less than the physical connexion of the two classes of *facts*, respecting Divine and Human Agency.

Looking to these two circumstances, we shall see the occasion of the peculiar mode of statement of Original Sin, Faith, Merit, and other doctrines, in which the work of man is contemplated in connexion with the work of God; and which, together, constitute the whole Law of the Divine Life of man, characterized by the term Justification.

In pursuing the present subject, though we are immediately employed in considering the condition, sentiments, and actions of man, it is Divine Agency, we must observe, that we are tracing throughout: otherwise, we shall lose the real solution of the dogmatic language, on the several points touched in the controversies on which we are now engaged. For such, it should be remembered, is the nature of the Theology which has descended to us, as members of the Western Church. It is the Science of the Divine Being; in our present subject more particularly, an application of the principles of the Divine

Knowledge, to the revealed economy of the world. All that we call human agency, is, in the expression of Scholasticism, the “ Highest Cause,” acting by “ *secondary*” causes. The expression, *secondary causes*, is familiar to us, but it is strictly Scholastic: it guards the notion of the sole proper agency of God. This notion of the Divine Being was the very essence of Scholasticism—at once its theory and its practice. The Theology of the Schools, as the subtle instrument of a Theocratic Power, addressed itself to the study of the principles, by which it could command the elements of social order; to the development of that Primary Energy, which animates and controls the restless course of human operation. Its ambition was, to place the first link of the golden chain, from which the heavens and the earth were hung, in the intellectual grasp of the ruler of the Church; from whom the subject-faithful should devoutly receive the law of action and belief.

Whilst therefore those portions of the Pelagian Controversies, on which I am now entering, may, by way of distinction, be classed under the head of Human Agency, and some, perhaps more properly, under the head of Divine Agency in connexion with Human; yet the whole inquiry is a prosecution of the subject of the former Lectures, and more particularly of the last. It is the *Divine Energy* that we are still employed in investigating,—the operation of that “ Pure Act,” in scholastic phrase, as it works in the actions of man. The Schoolmen,

indeed, proceeding in regular series, have traced the Divine Energy through the nature and actions of Angelic Beings; and so brought the speculation down to the agency of man. The intelligence and will of angels, and their power of good and evil in the world, are discussed with the same minuteness of speculation, as other parts of their philosophy; and in strict accordance with the working out of their whole system.<sup>b</sup> Nor is even this part of their system without its interest, in the history of the notions now entertained, on the influence of good and evil spirits, and on the Fall of Man. But the more immediate importance of the views opened, in their speculations concerning Human Agency, calls for the direction of our attention to these exclusively, on the present occasion.

Justification, then, (for under this general head may be classed all those doctrines which more immediately concern the agency of man,) is, in the Scholastic view, the general law, according to which, the Divine Energy operates, or takes effect, in the salvation of man. It is described, by Aquinas, as “the Effect of Grace Operating.” It is analogous, in the Divine Life of man under the influence of Grace, to the law of Virtue in the natural and moral life of man. And the way in which this appears, is, that we require some supernatural means, in order to that supernatural End, which Christian

<sup>b</sup> Anselm has a Treatise, *De Casu Diaboli*, in which he speculates concerning the will of the Evil Spirit.

salvation—the final fruition of God—holds out to our attainment. It is the Divine Goodness indeed, according to the Scholastic Philosophy, which we instinctively aim at, in our natural pursuit of happiness; as I lately pointed out. Evidently, however, man, as also all creatures throughout the world, attain to the Divine Goodness *naturally*, only so far as their constitution admits. The tree cannot reach a stature, or a beauty of foliage, for which there is no provision in its nature. Nor can the moral agent exceed the bounds, which have been assigned to his capacities in adaptation to his present state. But everlasting happiness, consisting in the enjoyment of the immediate presence of God, is a thing entirely disproportioned to our present faculties and capacities. No natural law of adjustment of our internal powers can suffice for this transcendent object. Supposing our present capacities enlarged and improved, by discipline and cultivation, to their utmost perfection, we must still conceive them *deficient*, when we look to the immensity of the object for which they are destined. It is plain, therefore, that mere moral cultivation is not the *whole* law, by which the eternal perfection of man's nature is to be attained. Some other principle must be concerned in bringing about the result. There can be no rule of intrinsic propriety or fitness here. It must be a gifted righteousness, by which we tend towards such a perfection of being.

Justification, accordingly, is the general law, as I

have said, by which the Divine Energy develops itself in the human agent. It comprehensively denotes the effect of grace in its whole process; as it regenerates, sanctifies, and glorifies the soul of man. The same process, indeed, may, as I have before observed, be called Sanctification; as referred immediately to the Holy Spirit dwelling in the heart of the faithful. But the term Sanctification does not express the *moral* agency, in the nature of man, by which the Final End is attained. And this seems to be the reason, why the Schoolmen have been so diffuse on the idea of Justification; and why Sanctification has remained, more a word of piety and feeling, than a technical term of Theology.

It is then, in the Analysis of Justification, that we must explore the principles of Human Agency, recognized in the philosophical theology of the schools. The divergency of the law of Divine Agency into the several principles of the Human Constitution, as they were understood and reasoned upon in the philosophy of the times, will disclose to us the views of the Schoolmen on the questions of Human Agency; and account for many expressions on the subject in our systematic theology.

Taking then the Scripture facts: that mankind is in a fallen, degraded state; that this state is not an accidental one, attributable to any particular generation of men, or period of the world, but that it began with the beginning of our race; that it is a



state of moral disorder, offensive to God, and excluding from his favour; that we are therefore in a state of danger, as well as of incapacity of happiness; that, however, God has interposed, in mercy, to save us from this danger, and retrieve this incapacity, by giving his Son Jesus Christ to die for us, whose death is our death unto sin, and his resurrection our resurrection to holiness and life everlasting; that Repentance and Faith are the great means, by which the benefits of his Passion are brought home to those to whom they are revealed; that much accordingly is left to us to do, amidst all our natural weakness and helplessness;—taking, I say, these facts, as a general account of what the Scripture includes under Justification, let us examine into the action of the Scholastic Philosophy on the doctrines raised on them.

The difficulty which meets the speculator on Human Agency, in its connexion with the Divine, in the first instance, is, to account for the principle of Resistance to the Will of God, which the facts exhibit. It is not simply a Theory of the *Origin* of Evil that is here required. This inquiry is satisfied to a certain point, in the Christian scheme of Salvation; so far as it ascribes the first act of sin, and the actual sins of all men, to the instrumentality of the Evil Spirit.<sup>c</sup> This circumstance answers the

<sup>c</sup> Deus est universale principium omnis interioris motus humani: sed quod determinetur ad malum consilium voluntas humana, hoc directe quidem est ex voluntate humana, et dia-

question, *how* sin and death came into the world. But it leaves unexplained the fact, that the will of man does not invariably fulfil the Will of God; that, instead of tending naturally towards that good which God designs in his creation, it has a disposition and bent towards evil. In the account of this fact must lie the proper, *efficient* cause of that evil, which has ensued, and ensues, from the temptations of wicked spirits. These temptations only present *an occasion* of falling. The cause, or motive principle, of the disorder and misery of the world, must be traced to the will of man himself.

The root of the difficulty was, that it seemed impossible to conceive any Will whatever, as inclined to evil. It was essential to the very nature of Will, according to the established philosophical opinion, as I stated in my last Lecture, that the object of Will should be good; and, according to the theological philosophy, that this object should be exclusively the Divine Goodness.

Whilst a difficulty of this kind could not escape the penetrating research of the ancient philosophers, the difficulty to them arose principally from their abstract notions of Science, rather than from ethical theory. It was the immutability of Science, which they were anxious to maintain. They could not conceive any force in the mind, capable of counter-

*bolo, per modum persuadentis, vel appetibilia proponentis. Aquin. S. Theol. Prima IIæ, qu. LXXX. art. 1.—Sap. 2. Invidia diaboli mors intravit in orbem terrarum, is frequently quoted to this purport.*

acting that of first, fixed principles. They were anxious to reduce morality to a theoretic precision. But the observed discrepancy between the speculative and practical conclusions of men, shook their fundamental positions respecting the certainty and imperiousness of Science. Socrates, accordingly, at once denied the fact, that evil was voluntarily chosen in any case. Aristotle, however, with a more practical wisdom, took the fact as he found it; contenting himself with an analysis of it into the general laws of our nature involved in it;—the existence of propensities, neutral in themselves, but susceptible of good or evil; and varying, according to their exercise, in combination with the rational principle; so that inordinate, disproportionate indulgence of them had the power of deteriorating the moral nature, and depraving the Will. Whence, he drew his outlines of Virtue from a theoretic state of man; from that superinduced constitution of our internal nature, in which all the propensities were conceived, in perfect adjustment to the real value of their objects; and thus coincident with the principle of Reason; when the Will that is, was firmly and invariably towards good.

The Scriptures gave the Christian Philosopher a clue to the interpretation of this fact, so far as they gave a history of the first transgression, and declared its perpetuity and universality in the world. But they gave no particular account of the *mode*, in which the moral disorder of the world was produced, or of what had rendered it inveterate in the

race of man. They only so far gave the material of future speculation on the subject, as they asserted, that man came *perfect* from the hands of the Creator, being formed in the Divine Image; and that his iniquity was a subsequent, acquired condition of being. The Schoolmen set themselves to explain both the origin and the perpetuity of the evil; adapting to this purpose the physical and ethical theories of Aristotle.

The perfect man of the philosophers' theory, became, in their system, man as originally created in his physical and moral integrity of being: when all the internal principles were in their due proportions to each other, and to the final cause, or End, of the whole, the Divine Goodness. Man, as he is seen in the world, was man in a state of deficiency, or of privation of original righteousness, or justice; of that state, namely, in which all the principles were in their *due* subordination to God; or, to state it more in the phraseology of the Schools, rightly ordered towards the Supreme Good.

The adoption of this view of Human Nature by the Schools, is the point which immediately calls for our notice, as it explains the word *Corruption*, in its application to the evil of our moral condition. It is a term of ancient philosophy, denoting the dissolution of the internal nature of a thing—the undoing of its actual constitution—not the annihilation of a nature, as we are apt to suppose. It is

opposed to Generation, or Production, signifying, that man, as he is evil, is not the work of God, but is unmade, as it were, in what he had been made by God; that he has lost that proper *form*, in which he had his being in the intellect and will of God.<sup>d</sup> We could not, for instance, apply the word to the noxious disposition of a brute-animal, since there is no destruction of principle in this case.<sup>e</sup> The violence of the brute is part of its original constitution, of the *form* of its being. It only applies to the circumstances of a creature, in which a different nature has existed, and has undergone *alteration*, or become *degenerate*. It is, in itself, no account of an evil, more than of a good disposition. It is simply the transition into another nature or form: and it only obtains a bad sense from the theological notion, that what has passed from that form in which it came from the Creator, must have lost in excellence and worth. In its general use, however, in the ancient physics, it may denote the transition into a nobler nature, as well as into an inferior; as into the form of the tree from the *corruption* of the seed.<sup>f</sup>

Original Sin, accordingly, is always defined by the Schoolmen in negative terms, as a want of

<sup>d</sup> Corrupta, id est, amittentia formam suam.—*Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. Prima Idæ, qu. CXIX. art. 1.

<sup>e</sup> *Aristot.* Ethic. vii. et alib.

<sup>f</sup> St. Paul's words in 1 Cor. xv. 36. are clearly founded on this philosophical notion: only to give a rhetorical point to his argument, he substitutes the word ἀποθάνη, instead of that properly expressing *corruption*.

original justice, *carentia justitiæ originalis*; or an inordinateness of the desires; or, as in our IXth article, a fault, and depravation of nature, *vitium ac depravatio naturæ*. The last, indeed, is the most truly technical description of it; expressing, accurately, the peculiarity of the theory, on which the doctrinal statement of Original Sin has been founded.

This theory of the Evil of the world involved also other theories of the same Logical Philosophy. The *universality* of the principle was to be demonstrated. How could it apply, it would be argued, to the case of the infant soul, snatched out of the actual pollutions of the world, as the tender lamb of his flock taken up by the shepherd into his own bosom? The theorist, not content with referring to the Redeemer's love, as the simple earnest of the blessedness of the little innocent, sought how to connect this fact with the universal need of redemption. It was to be brought, therefore, under the theory of Original Sin. This occasioned the introduction of the term *Propagation* into the account of the origin of evil. If the corruption of nature descended by "propagation," then would it exist even in the guileless infant. And the theory, as thus stated, would be the logical correspondent to the doctrine of Grace. If on the one hand all were under Grace; if it was God that worked all in all; on the other hand all would be concluded under Sin. An universal cause, identical in all instances, would be exhibited on each side; a principle of Life and a

principle of Death, acting invariably, and communicating their nature to the multitude of individuals.<sup>g</sup>

The Pelagians, however, were not satisfied with this account of the matter. Admitting that evil existed in the world, and that the transgression of Adam had been injurious to his posterity; they still denied its transmission, in the way of an hereditary taint. Pelagius believed, as fully as his opponents, that mankind were in a worse state, in consequence of the first sin; but, looking to the moral nature of man, and finding that neither praise nor blame was given for what we are by nature, but for what we do, he held, that, as virtue was not born with us, so neither was vice.<sup>h</sup> He contended, accordingly, for a moral influence of prevarication of Adam on his posterity; that the first sin was hurtful to the human race; not by *propagation*, but by *example*; *non propagine, sed exemplo*; not because they who were propagated from him, *drew* from him any vice, any fault; but because all that have afterwards sinned, have *imitated* him, the first

<sup>g</sup> Concedat Jesum etiam parvulis esse Jesum, et, ut per eum facta omnia fatetur, per id quod est verbum Deus, ita etiam parvulos ab eo salvos fieri fateatur, per id quod est Jesus, si vult esse catholicus Christianus. Sic enim scriptum est in evangelio: "Et vocabunt nomen ejus Jesum; Ipse enim salvum faciet populum suum:" in quo populo sunt utique et parvuli. Salvum autem faciet a peccatis eorum. Sunt ergo et in parvulis peccata originalia, propter quæ Jesus, i. e. Salvator, possit esse et ipso-  
rum.—*Augustin.* De Nupt. et Concup. lib. II. ad fin.

<sup>h</sup> Apud August. De Peccat. Orig. lib. II. p. 217.

sinner :<sup>i</sup> and that infants were not in the same state as Adam before transgression ; because he was capable of obeying a precept, whilst they had not, as yet, the exercise of free-will. Celestius, in like manner, rested the corruption of our nature on moral grounds ; arguing that sin was not born in us, but was the fault of the Will.<sup>k</sup> Only he went further than his master, in refusing to anathematize those, who said, that the sin of Adam was hurtful to himself alone ; and in asserting, still more expressly, that no infant was under the obligation of original sin.

Though the language of the Pelagians did not adequately express the inveteracy of that sinfulness of human nature, which Scripture and the world declare with one voice ; we must allow, I think, that their grounds were right, so far as they attempted to give a moral account of the fact ; and that their opponents were wrong, so far as they attempted to give a physical or material account of it. The notion of Augustine, indeed, corresponded with the Platonic notion of good and evil, as abstract, *a priori* grounds

<sup>i</sup> Pelagius may have been led to this mode of expression by a study of ancient philosophy. We may perceive something like the contrast between the Pythagorean *μυήσις* and the Platonic *μεθέξις* in the opposing theories. The orthodox account for the universality of evil by “participation” of the common nature ; the Pelagians, on the principle of “similitude,” or imitation.

<sup>k</sup> *Omne malum quod peccatum definitur, asseritis, non in natura, sed in sola voluntate consistere, &c.* *Augustin. Contr. Julian. lib. III. p. 323.*—*Quia non naturæ delictum, sed voluntatis esse demonstratur. Celestius, ap. August. de Pec. Orig. II. p. 256. tom. VII.*



of right and wrong in human conduct; as what constituted, by the participation of them in each instance, the actual good and evil of the world. The notion of the Pelagians was in accordance with that of Aristotle; who held, that we were endued with capacities of virtue and vice, but that virtue and vice, moral good and moral evil, were only the results of acting, of exercising those capacities well or ill. Their theory of human sinfulness sufficiently accounted for the *actual* sins of men. It shewed how our nature might be depraved or improved; that its actual depravation consisted in transgressions, like those of the First Parent; but it left unexplained the *tendency* to sin existing in human nature; a fact evidenced in the difficulty of resistance to temptation; in the self-denial which right conduct exacts;—"the law warring in the members," as the Scripture calls it. The following evil example, the assimilating of ourselves to the first transgressor, is only one mode by which this evil tendency finds its way into our conduct, and betrays itself. In itself it is something beyond, and more intimate with our feelings. It had been well, if the orthodox had contented themselves with the name of Original Sin, to designate this moral fact; and whilst they disclaimed the Pelagian theory of Example, or Imitation, as inadequate to the solution of the fact, themselves abstained from speculating concerning it. But disputation called upon them to define and pronounce. They thus essayed, what neither Scripture had authorized, nor human reason

could reach :—to explain the mode of human corruption ; to analyze, by language, the *thing* denoted by the term Original Sin, when the only subject before them was a general fact, requiring to be simply and clearly stated.

The positive manner, in which Augustine declares the transmission of the material element of corruption from Adam to the whole race of mankind, laid the groundwork of the scholastic discussions on the subject. The idea that prevails throughout these, is, of a positive deterioration of the carnal nature—that, which, according to ancient philosophy, was the seat of the “affections and lusts,”—the “concupiscible part of the soul.” This part of the soul was considered as intermediate to the material and the purely intellectual ; and as inseparable from matter ; whilst the intellect alone was the immortal spiritual principle. In the language of ancient philosophy, it was spoken of, as at variance with the intellect ; in a state of disobedience and faction against the authority of the higher part of our nature ; as the corruptible principle, that weighed down and impeded the immortal intellect. It was also conceived to be that part of the soul, in which the weakness of man—his want of self-command—is exhibited ; and in which were to be explored all those facts, which declare the inconstancy and mutability of human will.<sup>1</sup> This principle, then,

<sup>1</sup> Aristot. Eth. vii.

in the constitution of our nature, presented a basis for the physical speculations of the Schools, concerning the corruption of man. We may trace this connexion of ideas in the word "*passion*;" which, though properly equivalent to "affection," or "feeling," has acquired, in modern ideas, the sense of an "*evil affection*;" evidently derived from the practice of considering our nature as having its evil resident in the affections.<sup>m</sup> The expressions of St. Paul, conveying his ideas of the actual depravity of man, in terms of the established philosophy of human nature, were eagerly laid hold of, as confirming this theory of the seat of human frailty. His denoting our corruption, as "the flesh lusting against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh," corresponds with the struggle, conceived by the philosopher between the antagonist principles of our nature; and implies also the intimate connexion of the affections with the flesh.<sup>n</sup>

It was stated, accordingly, that the flesh, the concupiscible part of our nature, was vitiated by the

<sup>m</sup> Passio, in lingua Latina, maxime usu loquendi Ecclesiastico, non nisi ad vituperationem consuevit intelligi. *Augustin. De Nupt. et Concup. lib. II. E. p. 280. tom. VII.*

Passiones irascibilis ad passiones concupiscibilis reducuntur, sicut ad principaliores, inter quas concupiscentia vehementius movet, et magis sentitur, ut supra habitum est. Et ideo concupiscentia attribuitur tanquam principaliori, et in qua quodammodo omnes aliæ passiones includuntur. *Aquinas, S. Theol. Prima IIIdæ, qu. LXXXII. art. 3.* in discussing the question, *Utrum originale peccatum sit concupiscentia?*

<sup>n</sup> They are λόγοι ἐνυλοί, "principles inhering in matter," according to Aristotle. *De Anima, lib. I. c. 1.*

sin of the first man; the soul itself not being contaminated, as being distinct from the fleshly principle. A deep wound was inflicted, it was said, by the malice of the Devil: the material idea still, we may perceive, running through the description: that wound, being sin, was fatal to our very life. By this sin, our nature being *changed* for the worse, not only became sinful, but even *propagated* sinners. The evil, indeed, was not a *substance* in itself; to assert this, would have been Manicheism; it was a *vitiation* of the original flesh, transmitted like hereditary diseases which shew themselves in the body.<sup>o</sup> It was remitted in baptism to each individual; the condemnation was removed, by the remission of sins, through Christ, obtained in that sacrament. But the evil in itself—the Concupiscence<sup>p</sup> in which it existed—still remained in the material nature derived from Adam, and sustained its noxious vitality in the successive generations of men.<sup>q</sup>

<sup>o</sup> *August. De Nupt. et Concup. lib. II. H. p. 279. tom. VII.*

<sup>p</sup> The Schoolmen differ as to the point whether Original Sin is Concupiscence, or simply the Privation of original justice. See the disputes between the Dominicans and Franciscans at the Council of Trent. Fra Paolo's History, translated by Courayer, lib. II. p. 273.—I take on this point, as on every other concerned in the present inquiry, what appears to me the prevalent view,—the notion which runs through the system; though the particular definitions of it may differ.

<sup>q</sup> Aristotle was aware of the fact, that the nature of man is subject to hereditary influences; as he remarks, that children appear to derive something from their parents, [*ἀπολαύοντα,*] in his Politics, lib. VII. c. 16; but he has not speculated about it.

Our Church, happily, has avoided that extreme dogmatism on the subject, which the scholastic philosophy instances; and which some of her own members would elicit from her language. We find, indeed, the terms of the schools adopted in the Article on Original Sin, and a train of thought on the subject following their speculations. But in speaking of Original Sin, it does not expressly assert its descent in the way of propagation; it affirms only the general law under which all sons of Adam are born into the world. It does not, in fact, define the nature of the thing, though it appears to do so in terms: it only lays down its effects, their depth, and their universal extent. It is impossible, at the same time, to deny, that its language on the subject bears the impress of the scholastic theories. And those expositors of her doctrine, who would draw from this article a sentence of what is called the "total corruption" of our nature, appear to me to take an improper advantage of those theoretic expressions.<sup>r</sup> They are, probably, not aware, that they are carrying back the doctrine of the Church into the realism of the scholastic philosophy. For what else is the description of a total corruption, but a material theory of the nature so

<sup>r</sup> The strength of the expressions (*quam proxime*, and "very far gone") is to be estimated, by their opposition to that transcendent holiness, which human nature may be conceived to possess, whilst as yet instinct with original righteousness, and the perfect image of Divine goodness. Compare the fallen condition of man with the scholastic notion of his first state; and no words can be strong enough, to tell the depth to which he has fallen.

corrupted, as of a mass which has undergone a dissolution and internal alteration, so as to be no longer, in any respect, what it was? though even under this point of view, the modern speculator has exceeded the philosophical basis of his doctrine, in making the *privation* total, which the Schools speak of as only partial.<sup>s</sup>

The Schoolmen, however, have not hesitated to speak expressly on the subject in terms of Materialism. They describe the corruption of our nature as the *material* cause of sin. They speak of all men being *in the first man*: and explain it by saying, that, whatever is in human bodies, existed “materially and in the way of causation,” in the first man. For Adam, according to Peter Lombard, transmitted a portion of his substance to his descendants, which has continued the same, only being augmented in bulk by food, without receiving any *external* addition; and being continued downwards from him by successive multiplications of itself.<sup>t</sup>

<sup>s</sup> Note A. Lect. V.

<sup>t</sup> Quibus responderi potest, quod materialiter atque causaliter, non formaliter, dicitur fuisse in primo homine, omne quod in humanis corporibus naturaliter est, descenditque a primo parente lege propagationis, et in se auctum et multiplicatum est, nulla exteriori substantia in id transeunte; et ipsum in futuro resurget. Fomentum quidem habet a cibus, sed non convertuntur cibi in humanam substantiam, quæ scilicet per propagationem descendit ab Adam. Transmisit enim Adam modicum quid de substantia sua in corpora filiorum, quando eos procreavit; id est, aliquid modicum de massa substantiæ ejus divisum est, et inde formatum corpus filii, sui que multiplicatione, sine rei extrinsecæ adjectione, auctum est: et de illo ita augmentato

The identity of the sinful principle was thus strictly maintained by them, in the sense of an original, invariable matter, reproduced under the infinite variety of individual forms in which it was contained.

This notion, partly physical and partly logical, is the application of Aristotle's principles of Matter, Form, and Privation. It proceeds on the assumption, that there is some common Nature in all things that we designate material; and that this common nature is only diversified externally by the various forms with which it is invested. It continues in all things, under all their transmutations or transitions, susceptible of every modification which the perpetual flux of sensible things superinduces. Hence, evidently, the immortality and invariableness of the principle of corruption; the poison wears not out; the tyrant never dies; for it bears a charmed existence; amidst the fluctuations and revolutions of generations, it preserves its sullen stability and vigour.

It is probable then that Pelagius and Celestius intended only to oppose this material theory; and to explain the fact of Human Sinfulness, as I have said, on moral grounds. In the fact itself, as appears, they did not differ from the orthodox: so *aliquid inde separatur, unde formantur posterorum corpora: et ita progreditur procreationis ordo lege propagationis, usque ad finem humani generis. Itaque diligenter ac perspicue intelligentibus patet, omnes secundum corpora in Adam fuisse per seminalem rationem, et ex eo descendisse propagationis lege.* *Pet. Lombard. Sentent. lib. II. dist. 30.*

far that they were acquitted of heresy, both at Rome and at Jerusalem. But the acute logic of the African divines traced their explanations to the consequences; and their influence was interposed to maintain the uniformity of doctrine in the Church.

To form a right conception of the doctrine of Original Sin, we should view it together with the doctrine of the Incarnation, which is its exact counterpart. In the theory of the Incarnation, our Lord is described as assuming to his Divinity, not any human being in particular, but manhood, human nature itself. He was made “man of the substance “of his mother;” yet without sin,—without the corruption derived to all other sons of Adam, not conceived, as He was, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit. Much subtile disquisition was employed to shew, how the nature, which He inherited from Adam, was not corrupted; but such as it existed before the transgression of Adam. The will therefore, it was argued—*the principle of motion*—in him was perfectly just and good. It was in his power, accordingly, to generate others like himself; as it was, in the corrupt will of Adam, to generate others in the likeness of his corruption. To this purport were interpreted the words, being “*born in Christ,*” being “*born of God.*” In each case accordingly, both in the benefits of the Incarnation and the Evils of the Fall, all men were collectively regarded as *one man*; and the blessing and the curse descended, by vital communication, with the heads



of the race: realism representing each Christian as having a proper physical identity, in the unregenerate state, with Adam; in the regenerate, with Christ. Such undoubtedly was the Scholastic notion fundamentally, both of the effects of the Fall, and of the Incarnation. This view exactly accords with the Theory of Grace, which I before stated. It was the Will of God, bringing those, whom he had chosen in Christ, to Himself. This blessed effect took place, when, by the process of justification, the sinner was incorporated into the body of Christ, and made *one* with Christ.

The disputes indeed between the Pelagians and the Orthodox, when traced to their real origin, were disputes as to the force and propriety of the terms Nature and Person, in their application to moral facts. The ostensible difference was concerning Grace; to what periods of the Christian progress in justification, the description of the operation of Grace was appropriate. The Pelagians did not deny that Grace was necessary to the Christian life: *at what time* the Divine Operation properly assumed the name of Grace, was the principal question with them. But, if we examine the disputations themselves, they turn upon the point, whether Sin is a quality of *nature*, or an accident of *persons*. The Pelagian account, however, of human depravity, clearly did not correspond with the doctrine of Grace connected with the Incarnation. The Pelagians, therefore, were regarded as denying that

grace with which their theory of corruption did not logically correspond. Both Pelagius and Celestius disclaimed the imputation: but the logical consequence was sufficient for a conviction of heresy. The orthodox, on the other hand, clung to the term Nature, as indispensable to the theory of Grace. They confessed, indeed, that sin originated in the will of man: for, to have denied this, would have been to shake their whole theory of Divine Agency. But, in order to secure, as it were, a raft on which the noxious contagion might float down the stream of human generation, they insisted on the term Nature as the only proper designation of the moral fact.<sup>u</sup>

It is the same philosophy which has occasioned the distinction of Sin into Original and Actual: the term Actual expressing the *personal* development of that sin, which is conceived antecedently to exist in the *common nature* of all men, and in each individual, consequently, as participating that common nature.

The apparent connexion of the heresies of Nestorius and Pelagius further illustrates this point. We find at the same Council of Ephesus, at which Nestorius was condemned, Pelagianism also attracting notice.<sup>x</sup> There was an evident correspondence between the two heresies in this respect; that they were both disputes about the notions attached to the

<sup>u</sup> See *Anselm. De Conc. Virg. et Pec. Orig.*—Note B.

<sup>x</sup> Note C.

Terms *Nature* and *Person*. Nestorius, in denying that the Virgin Mary was the mother of *God*,<sup>y</sup> and thus separating the personality of Christ as man, from his personality as God, gave ground for the supposition, that Christians were not born of God—made one with the Father and the Son—in that intimate sense which the orthodox doctrine implied. Nestorius, however, appears to have differed from the orthodox principally in this; that he viewed distinctions, which the orthodox regarded as different *Natures*, under the notion of different *Persons*. Pelagius, on the other hand, making Original Sin a matter of personal distinction, abandoned that *unity of nature*, in which the invariableness of Human Corruption was conceived to consist.

We may further see the importance of the distinction between Nature and Person, in regard to the doctrine of Original Sin, in the Scholastic explanation of the reason, why the *First Sin* only transmitted its effects to the posterity of Adam; why subsequent sins, or even those of a man's immediate Parents, are not equally injurious in their consequences. It was contended, in answer to such questions, that it was only the *nature* of the *species*, and not the individual peculiarities, that could be transmitted from generation to generation. The first sin of Adam deprived human nature of its original justice,—altered its natural constitution;—but

<sup>y</sup> To state it more correctly, he objected to the word *θεοτόκος*, *Deipara*, as applied to Christ.

not so the subsequent sins either of Adam or of others: these were merely personal; did not *alter* the general nature once corrupted.<sup>z</sup>

It was a consequence of this notion of Original Sin, that the elements of the Christian Life should be, in the strictest sense, a change, a transformation, a renewal. It was necessary that we should be “born again.” To counteract that living death within us, a new life from God must be imparted. Hence that view of Faith, in the scholastic system, as an “*Infused* principle.” “As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive.” All were corrupted in the flesh by Adam’s transgression; all must be quickened by the righteousness of Christ. If we regard this reasoning as a description of conjoined events in each case, it is undoubtedly scripturally just. The connexion of the universal ruin of man—whatever may be the nature of that ruin—with the sin of the first transgressor; and the connexion of universal salvation—whatever may be the nature of that salvation—with the righteousness of Christ; are facts, which the word of truth has inseparably bound together. The logical deduction, however, of one from the other, is what I am now pointing out.

The state of man, under Original Sin, being that of a *Privation*, he was without that perfect constitution of his nature, in which all his principles were, in proportion to each other, and rightly ordered to

<sup>z</sup> *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima II<sup>dæ</sup>, qu. LXXXI. art. 1 and 2.  
—Note D.

the final end of them all—the Divine Goodness. This inherent evil must be remedied by the presence of some effectual antidote. Scripture fully revealed that antidote in the perfect righteousness of the Son of God. But, how to apply that righteousness to the individual sinner—how to exhibit its power of transforming and renewing the fallen nature of man—was the question. Here, too, Scripture provided an answer to the real difficulty. It has told us, that, “by grace ye are saved through faith, and that not of yourselves; it is the gift of God;” that those who “believe, and are baptized, shall be saved.” Faith, then, as emanating from the grace of God, and having for its principal object the righteousness of Christ, is the new principle of life in man. Baptism indeed is requisite as the “sacrament of faith,”—as the mystical act of the new birth; at once the visible and spiritual incorporation with Christ. But Faith must first come down from above to the soul, and *turn* it towards God. It is the principle by which the Life and Immortality of the second Adam are generated in the soul. It is the grace of Christ, by which, antecedently to any acts of the Christian life, a spiritual power is given to the soul, and the heir of corruption becomes the child of God.<sup>a</sup>

It is important to observe accurately this physical notion of Faith, as an infused principle, the *origin* of a new life; because it serves to account for that

<sup>a</sup> Gratia Christi *traducitur* in omnes qui ab eo *spiritualiter generantur* per fidem et baptismum. *Aquin.* S. Theol. Prima IIæ, qu. LXXXI. art. 3.

*priority*, which is ascribed in such strong terms, in our Articles, to Faith, among the acts of the Christian life. On this view of the case, it appears as inconsequent and absurd to suppose, that any Christian works can be performed without Faith; as to suppose that the natural actions of life can be performed before the principle of life exists in us. "Whatever is not of faith" is then literally "of sin." It proceeds from that nature in which the seed of corruption exists with unchecked influence—from "the natural man," which has already displeased God in our first parent, and cannot please God under any modification, but in itself must deserve the wrath of God. Even works that might be called good, as they result from Nature, have then the nature of sin, *peccati rationem habent*,—belong to that unregenerate principle which is called Sin,—and come into the estimate of our natural disability to please God. Scripture, indeed, asserts the difficulty, the folly, the sinfulness of any endeavour to work out our own salvation on our own strength; and therefore lays such stress on the principle which sends us to the altar of the Cross. But not employing definitions, in its delivery of divine truth, it avoids that paradoxical air, which appears in all systematical developments of the nature of Faith. There is one passage, in which it seems to give a logical account of Faith, in the Epistle to the Hebrews; where Faith is described, as "the substance (*hypostasis*) of things hoped, the evidence (*elenchus*) of things not seen." But even here,

when the Apostle is speaking in the terms of a logical philosophy, it is not speculative truth that he is engaged in treating, but practical. He is giving that idea of Faith, which may excite in his brethren a principle of conduct, exceeding the narrow range of present things, and expanding itself to those nobler views opened by a revealed hope to the Christian eye.

Some judgment may be formed, from these considerations, to what extent the difficulties attending the notion of Faith, and of Works done before Justification, may be attributed to the abstract theories preserved in the technical language of Theology. And I would draw attention to those theories, therefore, as solutions of the difficulties; and as among the illustrations of the important fact, that there exist perplexities in Theology, which do not involve *real scriptural* difficulties: there arising necessarily a stiffness and positiveness of doctrine, from the very nature of systematic statements.

What strivings, indeed, and heart-burnings would have been saved to the Christian world, had the proper negative notion of Faith been strictly guarded: had Faith been cherished in the heart, simply, as the heaven-sent keeper of God's own sanctuary, there to drive away the proud imaginations of the worldly spirit, and to still the anxieties of the contrite, self-despairing soul. In this sense, Justification by Faith only is the sum of Christianity. View the truth in this broad historical form; and then, to add to the assertion of it, the necessity of conditions, is

to counteract the proper efficacy of Jesus Christ. But, throw the great Christian Fact into the form of a dogma, and it is immediately acted on by the philosophy of language. It becomes matter of inquiry, what Justification *is*, what Faith *is*; and distinctions are introduced, to obviate consequences from this or that statement. Hence too, the unfortunate comparison between Faith and Works, as to their relative importance.<sup>b</sup>

Faith, being regarded as the infused principle of a new life, does not supersede the natural faculties of man, nor does it destroy the inborn principle of corruption. The infection of evil is in the flesh, and there, as the School Divines explicitly assert, it remains, even in the regenerate. The divine seed is in the higher spiritual part of our nature, and is a new power by which the subjugation of the corrupt passions of the inferior part, the lusts of the flesh, is gradually accomplished. By faith in Christ, through baptism, being born of God, we need still to grow in that life, to proceed from our state as babes in Christ, to the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ. It is by this procedure, through the continued assistances of grace, that as we become stronger in the Lord, the offending Adam within us becomes weaker; our holiness and our security

<sup>b</sup> From the scholastic distinction between Implicit and Explicit Faith, we may trace the assertion, that the "Fathers looked not for transitory promises," &c. The invariableness and sameness of the object of Faith was thus maintained.



increasing together. So far then from man's free-will being impaired, by the divine life thus growing within us, under the blessing of Him who first gave it, our free-will is in reality established. Our condition, antecedently to these influences, is one of slavery; we are sold under sin—in bondage to the lusts of the flesh: we could not then do what we would, and we did what we would not. But having received the new creation in Christ, we commence the mastery of the rebellious passions; and so long as the spiritual life is cherished within us, our power daily increases.

This then is the scholastic notion of free-will. It means a liberty from compulsion, as distinct from a liberty from necessity.<sup>c</sup> When the Schoolmen assert in the language of our Article, that we have no power without the grace of God preventing us that we may have a will, and working with us when we have that will; they mean that we cannot be said to be free to will or to do what we design, so long as we are in the mere state of sons of Adam; that our real power is that command of the passions in obedience to the will of God, which the new life of Faith brings with it. Thus the responsibility of man, instead of being lessened by the consideration of the Divine Influence on his soul, is, in fact, increased; agreeably to the scripture-declaration that, “to whom much is given, of him much will be required.” In the state of nature, we are powerless

<sup>c</sup> *Libertas a coactione, and libertas a necessitate.*—Note E.

against the assaults of temptation—under grace the means of victory are placed in our hands.

It appears, that our Article on Free-will is framed with the same view ; to declare, I mean, that our proper responsibility, as Christians, *commences* at the time of our receiving divine assistance. We are apt to suppose, that free-will consists in the circumstance of *originating* our own purposes; in not being actuated by any thing extrinsic to ourselves. This, at least, is not the accurate theological sense of the term. It is here the actual power, viewed in itself, at the moment of exertion; the power shewn in doing what we wish, or of doing otherwise, whatever may have been the inducements to this or that mode of action *previously*. And this power, evidently, is increased, by whatever removes obstacles, by whatever strengthens the reason, and enforces the dictates of conscience.

In carrying on our estimate of the effect of the Scholastic Philosophy on the scheme of human agency, involved in our theological language, we should bear in mind the view of human responsibility, which is given under the analogies of Scripture. We are described, as subjects owing certain duties of allegiance to a king,—as soldiers enlisted under the Captain of Salvation,—as servants having certain services to perform for a master,—as labourers having certain works to execute for an employer. By these several analogies does the Gospel strikingly depict to us the condition, under which we

are placed in the world. The principle throughout is, that our thoughts, our actions, our works, are *dues* that we owe to God;—that we are not properly our own;—that our time and industry are not at our own disposal;—but that we are under an *obligation* of working for Him who has bought us, redeeming us from the captivity into which we had been sold, and now employing us in his own service. Judaism had already taught mankind to regard God as a Governor, dispensing rewards and punishments to men, as his subjects, according to the works performed in his service; as they kept, or broke, his commandments, statutes, and ordinances. To this description of human agency, in relation to God, Christianity succeeded. A principle of obligation was adopted in the Gospel scheme, analogous to that of the Jewish. The service of the Israelite was due, because God had brought them out of the land of bondage, and settled them in his own land, Himself the founder of the colony. The service of the Christian was due, because Christ had interceded for them—had won them out of the hand of the enemy, and given them both liberty and life. Hence the language of that great Christian rule: “When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done that which was our duty”—*ὁ ὀφειλομεν*—which was *owing* from us, to do.

Under such a scheme of human agency, the character of Justice would be the natural and

comprehensive description of right conduct. Men would be led to inquire, what the Lord had required of them,—by what inducements he had called upon them to obey,—by what punishments he had threatened disobedience; and in regard to themselves, how far they had fulfilled their task, how far they might aspire to his rewards, or had subjected themselves to his punishments. The estimate of these circumstances appeals to our sense of Justice; to that virtue which dispenses to each his due, both relatively to himself and to other members of the same community; and which presupposes an authority by which its awards may be distributed and enforced.

Judaism accordingly inculcated this leading notion both of Divine and Human Agency. The Israelite was never suffered to forget, that Jehovah was a just God, the Judge of the earth. He was taught to examine himself; whether he had done *justly*—what was the righteousness of his conduct—whether he had incurred Divine Displeasure by any defect of his duty, or might hope reward from his obedience. The Lord reasons with him, whether the Lord's "ways are not *equal*, and the ways of his "people *unequal*:" whether "the *Judge* of all the "earth" would not "*do right*." Agreeably to this, Christ is "the Lord our Righteousness," or "the "Lord our Justice:" and the Apostle speaks of God having shewn *his justice* in the act of *justifying* sinners through Christ. We trace, indeed, the same idea in some of the principal terms of Christianity, evidently drawn from legal or equitable proceedings

in the dispensing of Justice; as in the terms, Mediator, Advocate, Intercessor, Justification, Remission, Pardon. It runs through the whole of St. Paul's exposition of the state of man under the Gospel.

The introduction of the notions of Merit and Demerit into Theology, is to be explained on this principle. Original Sin, being a fault of nature, could not indeed, as such, be a personal fault; and yet it subjected the individual man to the *punishment* of sin; in itself deserving God's wrath and damnation. The guiltiness of the nature involved in it the demerit of the person. Thus, even those who had not personally sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression, stood personally unholy in the sight of God, and obnoxious to punishment:<sup>d</sup> the offending nature cried aloud for the Divine Wrath. Nor could the Christian, in the most advanced state of Justification, be regarded otherwise than as personally sinful and unholy; because it is his being *essentially* and *virtually* in Christ—his being “accepted in the beloved”—that entirely constitutes his meritoriousness. Though the act of sin may have passed away, the guiltiness still remains; and even his case therefore is one of *demerit*. For there is this difference in regard to the application of the merits of Christ to the Christian; that a personal merit does not result to him

<sup>d</sup> Punishment, *pœna*, as distinct from guilt, *culpa*. We see this distinction referred to in our XXXIst Article,—“in remissionem pœnæ aut culpæ.”

individually, from his union with Christ; as a personal demerit does to the son of Adam, from his being in Adam. The natural unholiness in which he stands before God, excludes the idea of any personal merit in him, whilst, by grace, he is admitted to the glorious privilege of the sons of God. Eternal life remains the gift of God; for the regenerate Christian has still the guilt of that sin, whose wages are death.

We attach, at present, an exclusive idea to the term Merit, different from that properly belonging to it as a technical term of Theology. We are apt to regard it as denoting, strictly, praiseworthiness, moral title to reward. We should revert rather to its original meaning, which is to be sought in its connexion with the ancient theories of Justice. It is hence that it has been introduced into the account of Justification. Now the notion of Justice, we know, according to the ancient philosophy, was fundamentally political. It was conceived to have place only among the members of the same community, personally equal among themselves, and acting under a common authority. It was the rule by which the respective claims of individuals so circumstanced might be adjusted. In order to that comparison which such an adjustment of claims requires, some common measure is required; and this, as applied to each, is the "worth," or merit of the individual, the value of his services. Now the first application of the term *merit* to Christian Theology, appears to have been exactly of this nature. The

great Christian society was viewed by the speculator, in its relation to God as its Governor and Judge. The principle, which Human Authority can apply only to external actions, was applied to the invisible, internal principles of our nature, cognizable by the Divine Authority. It began to be considered what man had done, or could do, in the way of claim on the Justice of God. Then the doctrine of Original Sin came into the consideration on the one hand—that of the Incarnation and Righteousness of Christ on the other;—and the estimate of Merit accordingly was to be drawn from a comparison of what man now is, at once a Fallen and a Saved creature, with what he once was, when perfect from the hands of his Maker. From this comparison would result the conclusion, that man could have no *merit* whatever in the eye of God. Then only could he *earn* the reward of happiness, when all the principles of his nature, as originally constituted, tended towards that Divine Goodness which was their real End. Now he entered on his career of service a debtor to the Justice of God, not a claimant on it. He had only merited Punishment by his intrinsic delinquency. But, in the righteousness of Christ, a title to reward was found. The submission of Christ to the Divine Will had been voluntary; He had earned a recompence for services given to God, without a previous debt of service unpaid; and an abundant reward was bestowed on Him, overflowing with Divine goodness to the sons of his Love.

The expressions, *Merit of Condignity*, *Merit of*

*Congruity*, if examined on this ground, resolve themselves into less exceptionable modes of describing Human Agency in the work of Justification, than they appear at first sight. With the practical evil of so characterizing any actions of man, I am not now concerned. But their theoretic truth is to be seen, in their consistency with the philosophical notion of Merit, as the measure of political justice, and the theological description of it, as the effect of cooperating grace. For, whilst it is his own gifts, which God rewards in those whom He accepts in Christ, He cannot be otherwise than *just* in bestowing these rewards. This requires that the rewarded should be brought under the notion of *worthiness*;<sup>e</sup> and should thus have merit of *condignity*; relatively, that is, to God, as a *just* Judge. Such was the doctrine understood in those words of St. Paul: “Henceforth there is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the *righteous* judge, shall give to me in that day.”<sup>f</sup> Merit of *congruity*, on the other hand, is the work of the Christian viewed relatively to the *mercy* of God. If God, that is, mercifully rewards, then there must be, as a correspondent to this excellent mercy on his

<sup>e</sup> “Whoever has Grace,” Aquinas says, “is on that very account *worthy* of eternal life.” Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso dignus est vita æterna. *Summ. Theol.* Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 4.

<sup>f</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 8. τῆς δικαιοσύνης στέφανος, ὃν ἀποδώσει μοι ὁ Κύριος ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ, ὁ δίκαιος κριτῆς. *Aquinas*, S. Theol. Prima Pars, qu. cxiv. art. 3.



part, a congruity, or suitableness, in the person to whom it is vouchsafed. The two expressions are correlatives to the Grace of God viewed as the gift of a just and merciful Judge.<sup>§</sup>

The doctrine of Repentance, as exhibited in the Theology of the Schools, also takes its expression from Aristotle's Theory of Justice. Aquinas places it under the head of Commutative Justice, or that exercise of Justice by which due compensation is awarded for an offence committed. It is the *pœna*, the satisfaction, or requital, due for the offence, voluntarily taken on himself by the offender, as distinct from the infliction of it by a judge. And the indispensable necessity of it is rested, by Aquinas, on this ground; because an offence against God is in direct opposition to Grace: the goodwill of God, the only cause of goodness in man, is turned from the offender; and God cannot remit the offence without a change of will, which in him is impossible. The offender therefore must himself be turned towards God, by a detestation of the past sin, and a resolution of amendment.

In the consideration, however, of this doctrine, we may observe a striking difference in comparison with others relating to human agency. To the reduction of the subject under the head of Penal Justice, may be

<sup>§</sup> The proper sense of Merit may be seen in that fine expression of Tacitus;—*iisque virtutibus iram Caii Cæsaris meritis. Agricola, c. 4.*—Note F.

ascribed, in great measure, the unscriptural notions and unholy practices which grew up in the Church, in regard to the expiation of offences, and their respective criminality. The word *pœna* alone gave opportunity for introducing into religion, all the subtle casuistry and technical distinctions of Civil Law. Hence too the sacramental character with which Repentance has been invested under the name of Penance,<sup>h</sup> the application of a penal code of religion demanding the ministrations of the priest.<sup>i</sup> Thus the subject of Repentance, instead of taking its place by the side of Faith, in the discussions of the Schoolmen, is passed over *as a doctrine* of the Gospel, with slight notice. But as a Sacrament, and a ritual of punishment, it obtains a full consideration. We may perceive the effect of this mode of treating the subject in our Articles: there being none expressly on the doctrine of Repentance; whilst there is reference to the questions raised on the subject by the Scholastic philosophy, in the Articles which speak of Penance, Purgatory, and Masses.

<sup>h</sup> The translation of the Latin Vulgate has here sanctioned a most important deviation from the simplicity of the Greek original, in the use of the terms *pœnitentiam agite*, for the simple *μετανοείτε*.

<sup>i</sup> The expression of Aristotle, *κολάσεις εἰσι ιατρικαὶ τινες*, was adapted to the explanation of the efficacy of suffering to expiate guilt. See *Aquin. Summ. Theol. Prima II dæ, qu. LXXXVII. art. 7.* —unde non habet simpliciter rationem pœnæ, sed medicinæ. Nam et medici austeras potiones propinant infirmis, ut conferant sanitatem, &c.

The application of the term Punishment to the sacrifice of our Saviour, belongs to the same philosophy. It was contended, that an offence being an act of the will, must also be removed by the will; that whatever indulgence the will had allowed itself, the same ground must be recovered by suffering; that thus the equality of justice might be maintained. Hence it would be construed, that the passion of our Lord, being accepted by God as the means of human salvation, must be a punishment (*pœna*) sustained by Him equivalent to the delinquency of sinful man. And this further accounts to us for the theological use of the word "Satisfaction." It declares the sufferings of Christ to be the voluntary payment, on his part, of what was otherwise not owing from Him, to the Divine Justice.<sup>j</sup>

Hence too would arise the notion, that self-mortification would recommend us to the favour of God: in fact, that, the more voluntarily such chastisement of ourselves was undertaken, the more effectual would be the compensation for offence.

Hence also the fond impiety of Supererogation. The compensation might be supposed to exceed the weight of the offence, where the depth of the sorrow for personal Sin might produce an excess of personal infliction. And it might be concluded that this excess, beyond the requisitions of justice, would redound to the remission of the offences of others.<sup>k</sup>

<sup>j</sup> Note G.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle's idea of taking from the "gain," of the offender, and adding this difference to the "loss" of the sufferer, and

The Reformation opposed a practical check to these refinements of Christian truth. It was an energetic practical amendment that was here needed. And our Church, accordingly, has here declared against the abuses, which had perverted the doctrine of Repentance; instead of addressing itself to the decision of the speculative nature of Repentance considered as a doctrine of the Gospel.

It is to be remarked, however, how strongly the inefficacy of Repentance to wipe away guilt, and restore the sinner to his lost state, has impressed the minds of those, who have thought on human nature with any depth of philosophy. It is of little purpose, to urge the natural placability of the Divine Being, his mercy, his willingness to receive the penitent. God, no doubt, is abundantly placable, merciful, and forgiving. Still the fact remains. The offender is guilty: his crime may be forgiven, but his criminality is upon him. The remorse which he feels—the wounds of his conscience—are no fallacious things. He is sensible of them even whilst the Gospel tells him,—“Thy sins be forgiven thee—“Go, and sin no more.” The heart seeks for reparation and satisfaction: its longings are, that its sins may be no more remembered, that the characters in which it is written may be blotted out. Hence the congeniality to its feelings of the notion of Atonement. It is no speculative thought which

then taking the mean, in order to obtain the equality of justice, pervades the speculation.—Note H.

suggests the theory: speculation rather prompts to the rejection of it: speculation furnishes abstract reasons, from the Divine Attributes, for discarding it as a chimera of our fears. But the fact is, that we cannot be at peace without some consciousness of Atonement made. The word Atonement, in its true, practical sense, expresses this indisputable fact. Objections may hold against the explanations of the term; they are irrelevant to the thing itself denoted by the term. Turn over the records of human crime; and, whether under the forms of superstition, or the enactments of civil government, the fact itself constantly emerges to the view. All concur in shewing, that, whilst God is gracious and merciful, repenting Him of evil, the human heart is inexorable against itself. It may hope—tremblingly hope—that God may forgive it, but it cannot forgive itself.

This material and invincible difficulty of the case, the Scripture Revelation has met with a parallel fact. It has said, we have no hope in ourselves; that looking to ourselves, we cannot expect happiness; and, at the same time, has fixed our attention on a Holy One who did no sin; whose perfect righteousness it has connected with our unrighteousness, and whose strength it has brought to the evil of our weakness. Thus Christ is emphatically said to be our Atonement; not that we may attribute to God any change of purpose towards man by what Christ has done; but that *we may know*, that we have passed from the death of sin to the life of

righteousness by *Him*; and that our *own hearts* may not condemn us. “If our heart condemn us “not,” then may we “have peace with God;” but, without the thought of Christ, the heart, that has any real sense of its condition, must sink under its own condemnation.

The bane of this philosophy of expiation was, not that it exalted human agency too highly, but that in reality it depressed the power of man too low. It was no invigoration of the mind, no cheering of the heart, to masculine exertion, in working out the great work of salvation, by exaggerated, yet noble, views of what man could accomplish. But it checked the aspirings, both of the heart and of the intellect, by fixing them at a standard, that had only the mockery of Divine strength, and not the reality. It brought men to acquiesce in a confession of impotence, without carrying them at once to the throne of Grace. The ecclesiastical power stood between the heart and heaven. Atonement was converted into a theory of Commutation degrading to the holiness of God, whilst it spoke the peace of God in terms of flattering delusion to the sinner. The value of confessions and rites of penance was acknowledged; and, accepting this vain substitute for that assurance of Atonement, which alone can satisfy the longing soul with goodness, men looked no further: their proper power was exchanged for a servile dependence on the ministrations of the priest—the presumed all-sufficiency of a man like themselves.

On the other hand, the true scriptural practical view of Human Agency is to be seen in the great truth of Atonement, simply believed and acted on, without the gloss of commentators, or the refinements of theorists. These are but attempts to weigh the ocean in the hollow of the hand. Take the truth simply, and what does it mean but that God is infinitely just and merciful, visiting iniquities to the third and fourth generation, and yet shewing mercy to thousands—that we cannot please Him by our works, or our sacrifices, or our prayers, but yet we can do all things, by Christ strengthening us, working for us, offering Himself for us, praying for us. The doctrine declares to us at once how much is out of our power, and yet how much is in our power. And, by combining these two apparently contrary facts in one scheme of human agency, it imparts to us the true secret of our Power against the temptations and dangers of the world.

For, let it be considered, whether it is not precisely by such a combination of strength and weakness, that ability and success in worldly conduct are attained. Every one, who attentively considers the state of the case, must perceive that Revelation has only extended to the spiritual world two classes of facts evidenced in the natural. In every exercise of our minds, in every action or event, are we not conscious that much is left in our own power? Do we not see the fact strikingly displayed in the conduct of men whom we call great; whose greatness evidently consists in this, that, by dint of their

intellect and moral energy, they bring the train of events into their own power, exercising an arbitrary influence over the voluntary actions of other men? But again, on the other hand, do we not find, also, a stint and a bound put to this our intrinsic power? It is equally apparent, that the issues of events are not in the hand of the thinker, or the counsellor, or the agent. There is something like a chain of causes, in the connexion of circumstances themselves—something of an involuntary process in the association and current of our own thoughts. So real is all this,—(and this is the point particularly to be observed in illustration of Human Agency, in connexion with the Divine,)—that our actual power, in each instance of exertion, depends in great measure on our assumption of this fact—the fact, that things are not in our power; and our adaptation, consequently, of our conduct to it. For thus we see even the great men of the world have chiefly owed their failure to the circumstance; that they overlooked this clear fact: their former success emboldening them to an exclusive trust in their own power, and closing their eyes to the commanding influences out of their own sphere of action.<sup>1</sup> Thus are energy and repose, intrepidity and diffidence, magnanimity and humility, at once, inculcated on us in the course of nature. We cannot sleep nor stop, thinking that the controlling Power by which events are disposed, will work without us: we cannot lean

<sup>1</sup> Hence prosperity was represented in ancient mythology, as provoking the envy of the Gods.



on our own activity, trusting that we can work without the power from above. Whoever duly estimates these things, will readily see that Scripture enforces on us no strange thing, when it tells us, that we are "saved by grace," that "our sufficiency " is of God;" and again, he who "doeth the will of " God, is accepted by him," and that every man "shall receive according to his works."

But whoever acknowledges both these principles as the complex Law of Actions under both the spiritual and natural government of God—will, at the same time, see that the truths of human sinfulness, of Repentance, of Atonement and Satisfaction made for sin, are only varied expressions of this great law; as being declarations of the weakness and the strength of man:—the union of strength and weakness, constituting his real power in the events of time—his justification in eternity.

Disputation, however, as we have seen, has not suffered the plain method of Religion to take its course. Speculative statements have been made; and from these, certain consequences have been deduced: and the Scripture has been searched to verify these deductions. In the pursuit of these discussions, a technical phraseology has been introduced: and, to systematize the whole, definitions and explanations have been drawn from the physical and moral sciences, and woven into Theology by the subtleties of Logic.

The Reformation, by the blessing of God, has cleared away, from a large portion of Christendom,

those practical mischiefs, of which the speculations on the nature of justification were, partly the cause, and partly the palliation. We still, however, feel the effects of them in the discussions which abound among Protestants, on the questions arising out of this subject. Unscriptural practices were to be assailed, *against* men who possessed an admirable art of polemical defence; and *by* men who had sat at the feet of the Doctors of the Schools. It is nothing strange therefore, that the truth, so maintained, should bear the scars of the conflict through which it had to struggle. It is nothing strange, that the dialectical spirit should have survived among Protestants, even on the very points on which Protestantism took its firmest stand.

It is worthy of our remark, that those Protestants who have advanced to extremes in opposing the errors of Rome; both, those who have opposed them on the ground of Superstition,—and those who have been unreasonably jealous in the cause of Reason,—have adopted more of the speculative method connected with those errors, than the more moderate reformer. For what is all that accuracy and positiveness, with which some persons state their views of Justification, but the point and precision of theory? What is all that profession of Rational Religion, with which some maintain the natural efficacy of Repentance, but a dogmatism founded on theory? We may learn, from these extremes, that, the more indistinct our language is on this sacred subject,—the less of theoretic principle it

embodies in it,—the more closely do we imbibe the true spirit of Protestantism;—the more faithfully do we walk in the path of that Holy Spirit, whose “ways are in the deep,” and whose “footsteps are not known.”

## **LECTURE VI.**

**MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS.**



## SUMMARY.

No proper Moral Philosophy in the Scholastic System—Confusion of moral and religious truth injurious to both—Instance in Paley's Moral Philosophy—Moral Truth at first taught on the ground of Authority—Platonism influential in blending it with Theology—Influence of Christian literature, the Sermons, and legends of the Saints, Ambrose's Treatise "On the Offices of Ministers," Gregory's "Morals," Boethius' "Consolation of Philosophy"—Ethical science corrupted by being studied with a view to the power of the Clergy.

Schoolmen systematize ethical precepts drawn from practice of the Church—The Treatise "Of the Imitation of Christ"—Plato's theological account of the chief Good combined with practical detail of Aristotle's Ethical Theory—Scholastic moral system a development of the Divine Energy in man's internal nature—Aristotle's notion of Happiness accordant with this view—Scholastic gradations of moral excellence to be traced to this fundamental idea—Hence, also, the importance attributed to the life of contemplative devotion—The doctrine of Perfection—Distinction of Counsels and Precepts—Outline of this double morality seen in the Aristotelic notion of an Heroic Virtue—Coincidence of Aristotle's theory of Good-Fortune with the superhuman virtue of the Scholastic System—Connexion of ethical doctrine of the Schools with notion of Original Sin—Mortal and Venial Sins—Proper ground of this distinction—Division of Virtue into Theological and Moral, and into Infused and Acquired—Doctrine of Gifts.

Origin of questions in Modern Moral Philosophy to be traced to scholastic discussions—Instance in the idea of Moral Obligation—Extreme opinions as to the relative importance both of Theology and Ethics—Proper province of Ethics, inquiry into the principles of Human Nature—Revelation only gives new objects to those principles—Importance of regarding the Science of Ethics as in itself independent of Religion.

MATT. XIX. 16, 17.

And, behold, one came and said unto him, Good Master, what good thing shall I do, that I may have eternal life? And he said unto him, Why callest thou me good? there is none good but one, that is, God: but if thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments.

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Καὶ ἰδοὺ, εἰς προσελθὼν, εἶπεν αὐτῷ· Διδάσκαλε ἀγαθὲ, τί ἀγαθὸν ποιήσω, ἵνα ἔχω ζωὴν αἰώνιον; Ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῷ· Τί με λέγεις ἀγαθόν; οὐδεὶς ἀγαθός, εἰ μὴ εἷς, ὁ Θεός. Εἰ δὲ θέλεις εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ζωὴν, τήρησον τὰς ἐντολάς.

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Et ecce, unus accedens, ait illi; Magister bone, quid boni faciam, ut habeam vitam æternam? Qui dixit ei: Quid me interrogas de bono? Unus est bonus, Deus. Si autem vis ad vitam ingredi, serva mandata. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE VI.

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I COME now to take a more intimate view of the Scholastic Philosophy—its mode of treating the Law written in our hearts, and the influence which it has exercised on the frame, and the language, of Morals, in modern times. This is a department of the inquiry, not only possessing the highest interest in itself, and demanding for its own sake a much greater attention than it has yet received, but strictly belonging to the history of our theological language. The intellectual and moral instincts of man were regarded, by the School-Divines, as the materials on which the sacred elements of divine truth were to act; and, by this action, to assimilate them to the Divine Nature. It was not an operation merely in the way of instruction, of elevation of sentiment, of purification of feeling, that was here understood; but an identification, if I may so say, of the divine things, with the purer and nobler principles of our nature. The truths of Revelation were to be steeped into the heart. And the inquiry, therefore, into the Philosophy of Human Life, was pursued by them, as containing the elements and the development of their theological system. It is, in fact, Moral Theology, rather than an account of man's moral nature; so that, whilst real truths of morality are alleged, the truths, as such, are overlooked: the illustration of the given Divine Theory is all that is sought in



them. It is the Life of God in the soul of man, that is presented to our notice.

The close connexion of Theological and Moral Truth, has been of serious injury to both departments of human knowledge. The assertion may seem strange; but, when it is fully considered, it will, I think, appear; that Theology and Ethics are entirely distinct in their nature,—in the principles, I mean, on which they are based; and that, therefore, to mix up principles of the one with principles of the other, must tend only to confusion of thought and speculative error on each subject. That they are closely connected in their results and applications, must be fully admitted. But this connexion is only like that of Mathematics with Physics, or Anatomy with Medicine: both, that is, must be taken into account, in the practical application of one or the other. In speculation however, and in their theories, they are perfectly distinct.

I. In Theology, human nature is regarded under a single point of view, that of its relation to the Author of its existence. The office of Theology is to solve such questions as these; which cannot but occur to every thoughtful man, as he contemplates himself amidst the vast scenes of the universe: Whence am I? What is my nature and condition here? What my connexion with the past and with the future? Why am I sensible of so much pain or of so much pleasure? What is the great

end of all these various connexions and relations of events, so entangled and perplexed with each other, and yet, amidst all this apparent disorder, so instinctive with design, and order, and uniformity? Theology, accordingly, takes man under its survey as a whole. It is not as an intellectual being, or as a moral being, simply, that it regards him, but as a compound of natures; the compound being that he really is, in his animal life, as well as in his life of thought and action: and so proceeds to inform and guide him in those high truths, of which this complex system demands the resolution. It acquaints him that he is the creature of a benevolent and wise God,—that he is living under divine government,—that he is in a state of discipline,—that his natural weakness has been provided for by divine intercession,—that all things are working together for good; giving him supernaturally so much of the history of God's special providences, as may be necessary to pierce through the gloom of the present world, and lift up his eyes to the sanctuary, from which alone help can come down to him.

II. Moral Philosophy, on the other hand, surveys human nature in its moral and intellectual constituents, as they are related and combined principles of action. Every action that we see outwardly,—every judgment that we exercise within ourselves,—every feeling, as we indulge or control it,—presents a moral phenomenon demanding explanation. The questions that arise here, are: Is there any common

principle, which may give us the Law of these various facts? What is that principle? Is it instinctive or factitious? or is it, in the result, an intellectual perception, or a sentiment of the heart, or both united? These, and other such questions, are what properly engage the moral philosopher. But here, it must be seen, we are concerned only with a particular class of facts, and that a very different one from the theological. The inquiry is bounded by a far narrower horizon. The relation of parts in the internal structure of our moral nature, is what now occupies the attention. It is the little world within us that we are examining: and we are endeavouring to ascertain the springs which set it in motion, and the end to which all combine. The extent of Moral Philosophy, indeed, embraces the views of man's social and religious nature; and, in these respects, it seems a science of greater comprehension, than according to the limits which I have stated. But these views belong to the same fundamental principle, the science of man in his internal nature: since the social and religious instincts are as much parts of that nature, as those which more immediately respect the individual.

It is clear, that, if principles of one kind of knowledge be applied to the facts of another, only confusion and error must result. The application is purely hypothetical, though the principles themselves may be perfectly true. This is readily acknowledged in the case of mere sciences. Every one now sees,

that mathematical theories can be of no avail, to interpret the nature of physical facts. But it was not so obvious to the ancient philosopher, who constructed his system of the universe on mathematical or logical data, nor to the physiologists who united medicine with geometry. Nor does it now appear inconsistent to many, to blend together principles of Theology and Morals. The close connexion of these, in their application, is the fallacy that misleads such persons. But a combination of results is, evidently, a very different thing from coincidence in principles. An example may illustrate this. Paley has endeavoured to combine the separate principles of Ethics and Theology, in his Moral Philosophy. He was not satisfied with that kind of certainty, which moral truths appeared to possess. Probably, as a mathematician, he exacted, for his own satisfaction, some firm principle, from which the rules of morality might be deduced with logical precision. Sound philosopher as he was practically, he still aimed at a theoretic demonstrativeness in ethical science, of which all sciences conversant about facts must, by their very nature, be incapable. What, then, has been the consequence of this attempt to establish morality on an immovable basis? Instead of establishing morality, it has, in reality, weakened the theory of moral truth. The whole of morality, according to his view, resolves itself ultimately into Religion. The theological principle, on which he bases his system,—the duty of conformity to the Will of God,—is perfectly just and true in itself. But, in

making that principle a ground of morality, he has destroyed the independent character, and, with this, the philosophical truth of Ethics, as a science of human nature. The broadness of the principle tramples upon the little world of principles, which lie within man himself. It has been often argued; that, if the theory of Paley were acted on simply, evil might be done with a view to a good result: there is, in fact, no such thing as evil in itself, as there is nothing good in itself, where the *tendency* of actions is the criterion of their worth. The only error which can be committed then, is a speculative one,—that of not having generalized sufficiently, so as to see, that the conduct pursued, is not, in fact, the Will of God; as not being conformable with the *general* law of the Divine procedure. It must be a return to the consideration, whether evil is not something resting on its own grounds, independently of the mere tendency of actions, that can check the agent, in following up the theological principle by immoral, practical consequences. Paley himself has ingeniously argued against this construction; and successfully; so far as to shew, that the immoral consequences do not *logically* follow from his theory. It must be admitted, that no action, conformable to the Will of God, can, *as such*, in any case be productive of Evil. If we assume conformity to the Will of God, as a definition of right, nothing evil can be *inferred* from it. But the logical consistency is not the point in question. The test of the theory is, its adaptation to human nature. And its

erroneousness is sufficiently shewn, by its tendency to mislead even the wish to do good. It is the mistake of acting upon an anticipated result, out of our own power; when the very attainment of that result is, a *consequence* of having acted *previously* according to the laws of our nature. Religion, in truth, begins where morality ends. Let each action be done as it is morally right. We are encouraged then to proceed, for we are sure that it has the sanction of God. Whatever may be the immediate effect of it, we know that God will ultimately reward it. Whatever may be its intrinsic imperfection, we rely on his mercy in Christ, and the grace of his Spirit, to give it a worth not its own, and consecrate it to the doing of his Will.

The source of that confusion of Theology and Morals, which I have noticed, is to be traced back to the origin itself of Moral Truth: first of all, in its being handed down in the forms of maxims and proverbs, the traditional wisdom of other days. Moral truths thus rested, in the first instance, on *Authority*; being propagated from age to age, as venerable precepts of immemorial usage, or as the sacred sayings of some reputed sage. This mode of their reception imparted to them more of a religious, than of a philosophical, character. They would carry with them something of that awe, which the mystery of their origin, and the names of ancient sages, could not but awaken in the mind. Particularly, when moral truths were conveyed,

amidst the political regulations, and the rewards and punishments, of civil enactments,—as they are found in the Pentateuch, and in the extant Politics of early legislators or philosophers,—men would be induced to regard morality as a matter of *ordinance* ; as what exacted their obedience ; rather than as the internal discipline of their affections.

In the next place it should be observed, that, so far as morality was reduced to any system in the ancient philosophy, it was not exempt from that indiscriminate endeavour at scientific exactness, which corrupted the other branches of philosophy. Until the time of Aristotle, indeed, it appears to have been strictly included among the number of demonstrative sciences. For even Socrates, with all his practical excellence as a moralist, still considered Ethics as on a footing with arts and sciences—as what required only to be *known*, in order to be fully possessed—and as what might be acquired by mere instruction. Aristotle, with a much more sagacious sense, exposed the fallacy of this prevalent idea, and set the example of a truly practical system of Ethics. But his system did not become the popular philosophy of Greece. His writings being long lost to the world soon after his death, the more established system of Plato maintained its ground on this, as on other points of philosophy. This system, which was chiefly an expansion and adjustment of the Pythagorean speculations, perpetuated that mystical form in which the great Master had delighted to

invest his theories. According to the Platonic doctrine, morality was based on immutable speculative principles, the abstract species, the real constituents, according to his view, of every thing denominated good. This was to take morality out of the sphere of man's moral nature, and place it in a kind of philosophical pietism. He rejected, accordingly, the notion, that man was the "measure" of moral excellence, and admitted no standard of human perfection below that of the Deity Himself. His religion and his morality, following the Pythagorean train of thought with little variation, coincided in the maxim, that the business of man was the Imitation of God. Thus was the confusion of ethical and theological truth begun in that method of philosophy, which first obtained the sanction of the Christian Church. The principle of the Imitation of God, so elevating in its conception, and so accordant with the language of Scripture, being found in the volumes of philosophy,—a precedent was established, for conjoining the two classes of truth in one promiscuous speculation.

It is thus that Augustine speaks of Plato's system of morals, as the only one compatible with Christianity. Having alluded to the different opinions concerning good, which made man himself, more or less, the seat of good: "let all these," he says, "yield to those Philosophers, who have said not that man was happy, in enjoying the body, or in enjoying the mind, but in enjoying God."<sup>a</sup> . . . .

<sup>a</sup> *August. De Civ. Dei, lib. VIII. c. 8.*



who have “determined, that the end of good is, to “live according to virtue; and that this result “could be to him only, who had the knowledge “and imitation of God.”<sup>b</sup>

The same tone of thought runs through the Greek Fathers. The noble and seductive language of Plato, respecting the Chief Good, was too strong a temptation to be resisted by the ingenuity of the philosophical Christian, accustomed to the theoretic spirit of the ancient masters, and anxious for some fixed, eternal ground, on which moral truth might be rested. The metaphysical abstraction of Plato was thus, with the universal assent of the Schools, embodied in the Christian truth of the living God; at once the object of devout contemplation, and the immutable principle of Ethical Inquiry.

The state of literature in the Western Church, after the period of Augustine, to the close of the VIIIth century, was such as to confirm the connexion already established between Theology and Ethics. The compositions of this time were all of a theological cast. Sermons, and legends of Saints, constituted the mental employment of those, who were the oracles of knowledge to the Christian world. And the Sermons of this period, it should be remarked, were not of a controversial character, directed to the establishment of points of doctrine, but chiefly moral reasonings and exhortations. If

<sup>b</sup> *August. De Civ. Dei, lib. VIII. c. 9.*

we look, for instance, into those of Cesarius,<sup>c</sup> the most eminent of the Bishops of Southern Gaul during the first half of the VIth century,—and which are a highly favourable specimen of the literature of that day,—we find them consisting of argumentative expostulation on the conduct of Christians. The legends of the Saints, the romance of religion, as we may term them, are also practical appeals to the Christian world,—endeavours to interest either the imagination, or the feelings, in the energetic pursuit of religious action. Throughout all this period, accordingly, the intermixture of theology and ethics was proceeding. From the adoption, by the Clergy, of the language of ethical exhortation, in the service of religion, the truth, which cultivates the sentiments and rectifies the conduct, was confounded with that which regenerates and quickens the soul. The same cause, which, in the first dawnings of ethical science, had acted in obscuring its philosophical character—its reception in an authoritative form—also acted powerfully within the Church. Moral truth was received from the lips of the venerated ministers of the divine word, and imbibed rather, as the precious dews of heaven falling on the passive soil, than as the heart of one man pouring itself out on the heart of another.

The Latins, indeed, were not altogether without some elementary ethical treatises in their own

<sup>c</sup> Cesarius, Bishop of Arles from A.D. 501 to 542; born in 470. His Sermons are printed in an appendix to the Sermons of Augustine, in tom. V. Oper. ed. fol. 1683.

language. The "Offices" of Cicero appear to have been familiarly known to them. But they were not satisfied to derive precepts of morality from a heathen source. They seem to have been fearful of detracting from the intrinsic authority of Scripture morals, if they conceded any originality of thought to heathen precepts of duty. Where they acknowledged the correctness of such precepts, they insinuate, at the same time, that it was a wisdom borrowed from the Christian Revelation. Ambrose, accordingly, composed a treatise, in three books, after the plan of Cicero's Offices, on the "Offices of Ministers;" substituting the hopes and sanctions of the Gospel for the worldly principles of the Roman philosopher, and the examples of Jewish and Christian devotion for those of Greek or Roman virtue. The work, as is indicated by its title, was designed exclusively for the Clergy.<sup>d</sup> But the treatise which obtained the greatest popularity, if we may judge from its frequent quotation in the Scholastic writings, was "The Morals" of Gregory the Great. Gregory was a fierce opponent of secular learning; and, like Ambrose, was only desirous of supplying the studious Clergy with a manual of ethical instruction, which should supersede the reading of a work of heathen literature. This was no proper attempt, therefore, to

<sup>d</sup> Augustine characterizes this work thus, in writing to Jerome:—*nisi forte nomen te movet, quia non tam usitatum est in ecclesiasticis libris vocabulum Officii, quod Ambrosius noster non timuit, qui suos quosdam libros utilium præceptionum plenos, de Officiis voluit appellare. Epist. XIX. Oper. Tom. II. p. 24. ed. 4to.*

establish a Science of Morals. It was only a trans-  
fusion of theological doctrine into the technical  
phraseology of the Ancient Ethics; in itself utterly  
barren of all sound instruction as to the foundation  
and nature of human duties. Consequently, it only  
promoted the confusion, already begun, and sanc-  
tioned by the practice of the Church, between moral  
and religious truth; as embodying that confusion in  
a text-book, and consecrating it by the authority of  
a high ecclesiastical name.

Nor ought the mention to be omitted in this  
place of the well-known treatise of Boethius, on the  
“Consolation of Philosophy.” It may be described  
as a manual of philosophic devotion; the effusion  
of the piety of an elegant mind, grateful for those  
literary delights, which had soothed its anxieties,  
and strengthened its resignation. It is important  
in the history of the ethics of the Schools; as it is  
a work, which attracted the study of the scholastic  
theologians, serving as the basis of elaborate com-  
mentaries: and it tended, accordingly, to promote  
and establish that contemplative religious character,  
with which the moral philosophy of the Schools was  
tinctured at its outset.

But what contributed, perhaps, more than any  
thing to this confusion of Theology and Ethics,  
was, the spiritual power, which the Latin Church  
had been acquiring, more and more, throughout this  
period, over the consciences of men. The Church be-  
came the dupe of its own ambitious pretension. The  
laity were brought into captivity to the imperious

sense of their spiritual leaders ; from whom, not only the theories of the faith were to be sought ; but also the practical doubts, the heresies of conscience, were to obtain their answer. The exigencies of such a complex and subtile government demanded its own peculiar code of spiritual legislation. A system of moral rules was required, which should be in strict accordance with the theocratic principle, in which the power of the Clergy consisted. They must be such, whose lines should continually terminate in some religious object, and mingle the passiveness of the votary with the active obedience of the subject. They must be enforced by rewards and punishments, to sustain the idea of subjection to the spiritual guide ; and these rewards and punishments must be such, as the spiritual arm alone could administer. But the rules and sanctions of conscience, when thus applied, would evidently lose their nature, as simple laws of morality. Whatever validity they possessed, would result from the principle of spiritual subjection ; from the notion, that they were prescribed by a Power which held the soul in its grasp. And the assumption of this power, by the Clergy, made them, as I have said, the dupes of their own pretension. As they mistook subtilty of speculative distinctions for theology, so they also mistook casuistry for moral philosophy, and the indulgences and penances of spiritual discipline for Religion.

The monastic institutions, in themselves an effect of the confusion of theology and morality, tended, in their turn, to foster that confusion. The mix-

ture of ritual and moral precept in these institutions, and the blending of the whole under the name of Religion; so that those who lived under these systems, obtained the exclusive appellation of the Religious;—must have forcibly cemented the two ideas of virtue and holiness, as representations of one and the same principle. The devoutness, the submissiveness, the self-annihilation of the holy recluse, commanded the attention of the world; and naturally became, in the popular estimate, equivalents for the self-examining conscience and internal convictions of right.

The fact, indeed, is, that the right of private judgment, in *morality*, was as effectually excluded by the spiritual power of the Church, as it was in articles of faith. Both the rule of conduct, and the rule of belief, were to be received implicitly. The questioning of the heart, and of the intellect, were equally superseded. The whole came to this, that Christian perfection was reduced to the surrender of the will; so that nothing enjoined by the command of a religious superior, was either wrong or impossible.<sup>e</sup>

The labours of the Schoolmen, in Morals, gave a speculative harmony and perfection to the system which had grown out of the practice of the Church. In constituting an exact science of Theology, it was their part to collect the fragments of ethical jurisdiction, which lay scattered in the sermons, and

<sup>e</sup> Note A. Lect. VI.

legends, and institutions, and discipline of the Church; and to mould them, in accordance with the language of Scripture, and the theories of their theology. Professed works of ethics were composed by some of them: and commenting on the Ethics of Aristotle became part of the labours of the Schools. But though this exercise of powerful minds on moral truth, could not but elicit some scattered lights on the subject, ethical science may still be regarded as having slumbered through the darkness of the middle age. The proper character of it, indeed, is seen in the devotional work which appeared in the XVth century, the celebrated treatise by Thomas à Kempis, of the "Imitation of Christ." This work was a vigorous effort of that moral study which had been cultivated in the Church, to extricate itself from the fetters of a systematic theology; a disengagement, as it were, of the spirit of the theological morality, from the forms in which it had been embodied. Its great popularity marks, both the bent which previous ethical systems had given to the general taste, and the intrinsic defects of them. It was the ethics of *religion* that men wanted; and, at the same time, they wanted the pure substance without the technical alloy, with which it had been confounded.

To proceed, however, in giving an account of the peculiar character imparted to ethics by the method of the Schools,—I would observe, in the first place, that here also, as in the purely speculative part of their

system, they united the precision and detail of Aristotle's ethical system, with the fundamental doctrines of Plato. They have taken, that is, as their great principle, Plato's theological account of the Chief Good. It is established as their point of outset, that, as the inquiry is into the end of all human actions, the mind must first lay hold of that principle itself,—that great end, or Chief Good. On the participation of this, must depend the goodness of all particular actions. And a collection of moral rules, accordingly, directed to the good or happiness of man, would be deducible as *consequences* from this their general *idea* or constituent nature.

But, to the Christian moralist, this Chief Good could be no other than God Himself, as revealed in the Scriptures. Indeed, the Scriptures themselves suggested, in some passages, a view of God in accordance with this notion; as where the Psalmist says: "whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that *I desire* beside thee;" and in the passage which I have already read: "there is none good but one, that is, God."

Whilst, then, the notion of God, as the Chief Good, had been originally received into the Church, independently of Aristotle's Philosophy, the peculiar modification of that notion by the Schoolmen was obtained from the physical theory of Aristotle, which I had occasion to describe in a former Lecture. I pointed out, that, according to Aristotle, it was the pure principle of Excellence and Beauty that gave



its perfection to each existing thing: at once the motive principle, and final cause, of all the activity of Nature; and therefore characterized by him, as *Energy*, intrinsic Activity, or, in the Scholastic translation of the expression, "Pure Act."

The theories of Divine and Human Agency, as I have endeavoured to shew, were applications of this Principle of Energy to the Divine dealings manifested in the salvation of man. It remained yet to develop its workings in the internal mechanism of man's moral nature; to illustrate here also, that God was all in all; realizing, by His vital operation, the harmony and perfection of the various powers of the soul.

How readily the Ethical System of Aristotle fell into this theoretic mould, will appear, if due consideration be given to the language, in which Aristotle himself has expressed his notion of Human Happiness. His description of it, as Energy, is evidently not an accidental one, but in strict unison with his physical doctrine. He has in view the idea of the soul's exerting itself by natural efforts, in order to the full development of its powers, and attainment of the End of its Being; when it should have infinitely approximated to, and identified itself, as it were, with, that divinity with which it is instinct. Such, indeed, is his account of Pleasure; which he considers as the indistinct, unconscious pursuit of a divine principle, with which all things are, more or less, instinctively animated. His theory of

Happiness sought only how to conspire with, and aid, these natural tendencies existing in the human soul; so that in each instance of action, in every perception and thought, this pleasure might be attained; and nature thus wrought to its utmost perfection.

Transfer this doctrine of the Philosopher to the Christian Schools, and you have the notion inculcated in the Ethics of the middle age, of the fundamental principle of morality. God is conceived to be the moving cause of all that effort, which the soul puts forth in reaching after happiness. It is the operation of Divine Goodness, which sets in motion, and carries forward, and invigorates the soul, in order to its perfection of being.

The coincidence of the ideas of *Virtue* and *Power*,<sup>f</sup> in their Ethical System, is an illustration of this notion. For, according to such a philosophy of Human Actions, Virtue would be that state of the soul in which all its faculties were fully exerted: in which there was, not only a tendency towards the Chief Good, but a vigorous and invariable co-operation with the Divine Energy—a *command*, or *power*, established by the higher principles of our nature, over the inferior animal propensities.

From this complex notion of the Chief Good, both as the Deity Himself, and as essentially Energy, or Operation, we may trace those gradations of moral

<sup>f</sup> The word *δύναμις* is frequently translated by *Virtus*. The Divine Attribute of "*Power*," is expressed both by *Virtus* and *Potentia*. Our familiar use of the word "*virtually*," is an illustration of the same point.

excellence which the ethical discipline of the Latin Church has established.

First, we may remark, Happiness was placed out of the confines of this present world. It could only be sought by abstraction, by self-denial, and a process of devotedness to the One Supreme Good. The body was an incumbrance to the soul, impeding its motions towards the Principle of Life and Joy, and obscuring its perceptions of its real happiness. Self-denial would, on such a view of the case, consist in the mortification of the body; not in the command of the passions, amidst the various occupations of life, but in renouncing those occupations altogether—not in disclaiming our own righteousness—not in living to men as to God—but in living, as out of the world, and to God alone. This is clearly the effect of holding forth the Deity as the *real* object of attainment; to be reached by efforts of ardent exertion, and by expansion of the powers of the soul beyond their present limits. The soul becomes virtually its own divinity, when the Deity, towards whom its desires are thus strained, is regarded, in this physical sense, as the great end of its pursuit. Hence the distorted and discoloured view, which human life exhibits by the light of such a theory. The blessings which God has scattered around us, to cheer us on our way, and the active occupations, with which He would have us contribute to the mutual benefit of each other, lie in deep shadow, as regions which the sun of heaven never visits.

Under such a theory, we need not wonder at the

rise of mysticism, or any of the extravagancies of fantastic piety. So long as the attainment of God is proposed as a process of spiritualization, it is perfectly natural, that, in minds of an enthusiastic or melancholy temperament, a violent effort should be made to realize at once, or approach as nearly as possible, the ultimate end of the aspirant soul. The Love of God becomes the sole exclusive principle of action, not as it is the bond of peace and of all virtues, but as it is in itself the most intense expression of the soul's effort—the condensation of all the affections and desires into one divine ardour. The frenzied self-devotion of those saints of the East, who passed their lives on pillars or in caverns, and the Quietism<sup>s</sup> of Fenelon, were only various instances of the same principle carried to its full extent, under different modifications of personal character and circumstances.

Again, we may observe the influence of Aristotle's notion of "Energy" in the speculations by which the Latin Clergy established the superiority of that mode of Life to which they were themselves devoted, and in the estimation of which, among the members of the Church, their spiritual influence depended.

<sup>s</sup> The *ἡρεμία* of the intellect, according to Plato and Aristotle. —So Duns Scotus, Sent. III. dist. xxviii. fol. 56. Licet ergo solum infinitum bonum *quietet* voluntatem; et hoc in quantum infinitum bonum: non tamen oportet quodlibet bonum finitum, secundum gradum suum in bonitate, magis et minus quietare: quia isti gradus sunt accidentales per comparationem ad extrinsecum quietandum.

If Happiness was Energy,—the more intensely, and the more purely, the soul might be exerted,—the fuller, and the purer, would be the happiness attained; the more nearly would the soul be brought to the fruition of God. But no other state of life presented such opportunities; in no other employment was the action so uninterrupted, as in that of the speculative theologian. We find, in fact, the very same arguments employed by them, in asserting the godlike preeminence of the thoughtful solitary above the rest of mankind, which are alleged by Aristotle in favour of the Theoretic Life over the Practical.<sup>h</sup> The Philosopher, having proved that happiness was, by its nature, “Energy,” was obliged to explain this idea, consistently with the acknowledged superiority of the intellectual nature of man. He insists, accordingly, that the occupations of the mind were no less really practical, than the business of active life; that the philosopher was as completely energetic in his pursuits, as the man who took a more personal part in the concerns of social life. So that, perfect happiness, according to Aristotle, consisted at once in leisure and in activity—in that state of life, consequently, which comprized both; where no worldly avocations should interfere, no pressing calls of personal, or social, demands on the time and thoughts, should disturb the busy tranquillity of the intellect.<sup>i</sup> This was

<sup>h</sup> *Aquin. S. Theol. Prima Idæ, qu. CLXXIX. CLXXX. CLXXXI.*—  
Note B.

<sup>i</sup> *Aristot. Ethic. X. Polit. VII. 3. Mag. Mor. I. 35.*

precisely such a defence, as would serve the cause of the scholastic theologian. He must command the admiration and respect of mankind, as leading a life to which few could attain; as having approximated, during his earthly career, to the sublime purity, of which the full attainment was necessarily reserved for a higher state of being; when the body should no longer cloy and weigh down the soul. He required to be regarded by mankind in that point of view, in which his participation of a common corrupt nature should least appear,—in which the divine principle of pure and ceaseless energy should be evidently predominant.<sup>k</sup>

Hence was established the doctrine of Perfection. The Christian, who, by cooperating with the infused principle of grace, should cultivate the divine principle within him, would regularly advance toward that End or Chief Good—the Deity—which was the consummation of his being. The religious devotee, intent only on the immovable End of all human exertions, and not disquieting or interrupting his own progress by vain pursuit of the mutable goods of life, would reach the ultimate object, his perfection, by the most compendious process. The more he lived in theory, the more would the theory of human perfection be realized in him. For here also Aristotle's philosophy of nature served the purpose of their speculation. In assigning the different classes of Being throughout the universe,

<sup>k</sup> See Hooker, Eccl. Pol. B. I. s. 11. p. 256—261. 8vo.

their degrees of approximation towards the universal End which actuated their motions, he argues, that those are the highest and most excellent natures, which attain the ultimate End by the least effort; tending immediately, without any disturbance or variety of movement, towards the Divine Principle. What the heathen Philosopher applied to the visible luminaries of the heavens, was transferred by the Christian speculatist to the invisible hierarchy of the angelic host, and from them, in succession of order, to the saints of God on earth. Angels and holy men accomplished, by direct and immediate methods of operation, the attainment of the Sovereign Good; which others reached only by circuitous and interrupted ways, and by a multitude of repeated endeavours.

To support this theory of Perfection, many of our Lord's expressions were adduced: such as; "if thou wilt be *perfect*, go, and sell all that thou hast, and give to the poor;—be ye perfect, as your Father in heaven is perfect;—I have many things to tell you, but ye cannot bear them *now*"—that is, as it was interpreted, "not in your present *imperfect* state." His declaration also concerning some, who had "made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of God's sake," was cited to the same purport. As evidences again of the same point, those texts were adduced which speak of the perfection of Charity, or the Love of God. Charity, according to this theory, is that which at once unites the soul to God; bringing the individual, in whom it dwells, into direct contact with the *End* of his

pursuit. St. Paul, therefore, might be conceived to have justly pronounced, that charity was greater than faith and hope: and St. John to have expressed the same truth, when he says; “that perfect love casteth out fear;”—and whosoever abideth in love, “abideth in God, and God in him.”

Two different tracks of Life were thus pointed out to the pursuit of men by the Moral Theology of the Schools;—the direct and immediate, but strait path of spiritual abstractedness; and the indirect and vulgar road through the impediments of worldly occupations:—the one adapted for those higher natures, for whom the *restraints* of law were not devised,—in whom the divine principle predominated,—in whose hearts the thrones of spiritual power were erected: the other the walk of inferior souls, blest indeed with divine influence, but still engaged in the commerce of the world, and needing the further aid of admonition and direction from their spiritual superiors. Each mode of life, consequently, had its correspondent Rule. The perfect life was that which conformed to the loftier principle of the Divine *Counsels*; whilst the imperfect, that of the mere proficient—of him who was content to tread the humbler path of duties of indispensable necessity—was ordered by the divine *Precepts*.<sup>1</sup> The former would be a system of conduct, derived from

*Aquinas* Summa Theolog. Prima IIdæ, qu. c. art. 2. Et ideo manifestum est, quod lex divina convenienter proponit præcepta de actibus omnium virtutum: ita tamen quod quædam, sine quibus ordo virtutis (qui est ordo rationis) observari



that state of intimate communion with God, in which the divine life of the soul consisted;—rules drawn from the relation of Friendship;—the fulfilment of duties not obligatory in themselves: whereas the latter—the life of Precepts—would be a system of conduct accordant with that state of remoteness from the Divine End, in which the less holy stood; and a law derived, accordingly, from the strict requisitions of Justice.

Do we not recognize here the double morality of heathen philosophy,—the strict right,—the wise man of the Stoics,—in the perfect Christian; the proprieties, or *offices*, as they were called, in the imperfect services of the ordinary Christian, who, whilst mixing in the concerns of the world, yet pursues right to a certain extent, according to his capacity of attainment.<sup>m</sup>

The outline, however, of this artificial and enthusiastic distinction may be traced in the ethical system of Aristotle himself. Aristotle has clearly placed the perfection of man's nature out of the

non potest, cadunt sub obligatione præcepti: quædam vero, quæ pertinent ad bene esse virtutis perfectæ, cadunt sub admonitione consilii.

<sup>m</sup> Thus Ambrose, in his Treatise of Offices, expressly says, Hoc etenim κατορθώμα, quod perfectum et absolutum officium est, a vero virtutis fonte proficiscitur. Cui secundum est commune officium, quod ipso sermone significatur non esse arduæ virtutis ac singularis, quod potest pluribus esse commune . . . . Alia igitur prima, alia media officia. Prima cum paucis, media cum pluribus . . . . Duplex enim forma perfectionis; alia medios, alia plenos numeros habens: alia hic, alia ibi: alia secundum hominis possibilitatem, alia secundum perfectionem futuri. *De Offic. Ministr.* lib. III. c. ii. p. 110.

sphere of the strictly moral duties. He has spoken of a Virtue beyond the natural capacity of man; and which he designates an heroic or divine Virtue, as contrasted with the Vice, that degrades man below the standard of *Human* Vice.<sup>n</sup> In asserting also the preeminence of the purely intellectual life, in the scale of moral excellence and happiness, he reduces the moral virtues to a degree of worth, which may very naturally have promoted the scholastic theory of a twofold Virtue. The virtues, simply ethical, he describes, as necessary to the intellectually happy man, that he may do his part as man<sup>o</sup>—may live as a man amongst men. Reflected in the Christian mirror, this picture, from the hand of the philosopher, represents the ascetic pietist, descending from the lofty region of devotional contemplation, to the ordinary duties of the weaker and less spiritual brother.

There is a curious passage, indeed, in one of his ethical works, in which Aristotle expresses himself still more strongly on that kind of excellence, which is attained, not by dint of human exertion, or by the regular use of the faculties, but is the result of an immediate Divine impulse.<sup>p</sup> In his system, this Divine impulse is, simply the instinctive force

<sup>n</sup> This is illustrated by the fact, that the first step, in a process of *Canonization*, is a sentence from the Pope, declaring that the candidate for saintship had practised Christian virtue *in gradu heroico*.

<sup>o</sup> Δεήσεται οὖν τῶν τοιούτων πρὸς τὸ ἀνθρωπεύεσθαι. *Ethic.* X. c. 8.

<sup>p</sup> Note C.

of Nature, operating in such cases not by the ordinary course: and he refers to it, as an account of what is called good-fortune, or success disproportioned to the apparent means employed. This description became, in the scholastic system, the triumphant career of the holy man under the influence of Divine Grace, realizing a perfection of conduct, that transcends the power of human principles.

Connecting, again, this notion of superhuman virtue with that of the principle of Corruption, the Original Sin of man's nature, we see the peculiar complexion of the Virtue, to which the Schoolmen gave the highest place in the rewards of heaven. It was the Virtue of Conquest,—that by which the fuel (*fomes*) of Concupiscence—the lust of the flesh—was subdued and quenched. For this was the earthly principle,—that which turned away the soul from God; the direct contrary, therefore, to the principle of Grace, by which the soul is turned to God. If one was the greatest virtue, the other would therefore be the greatest vice. Hence, the rigid rule of a life of celibacy was established, as the perfection of morality. And hence, chiefly, that inveterate prejudice, by which we are disposed even now, to identify moral purity with the converse of sensuality; overlooking other principles of our nature, no less difficult and no less necessary to be controlled, in order to right conduct and happiness.

The distinction of Sins into Venial and Mortal,

is deduced from the same notion of the Chief Good. Since the whole excellence of the Christian life consisted in its direction towards God, as the ultimate object of all its aims; whatever tended to withdraw the soul from this direction, tended towards the death of the soul; or, in the language of the Schools, was a mortal sin. Whatever, therefore, touched the fundamentals of belief, or any express disobedience to the commands of God, was, as they described it, an "inordinateness" of the affections; it rendered the desires "inordinate"—put them out of that course, in which they were rightly ordered towards God. Sins of unbelief, of heresy, contumacy in error, impenitence, rejection of the spiritual authority of the Church, were therefore mortal sins. Venial Sins, on the contrary, were such as were committed in the inferior path of Christian discipline; such as occurred by the force of temptations, acting on the concupiscible part of our nature. The heart might be right towards God, and therefore guiltless of offences destructive to the soul in themselves. Yet, so far as these offences turned the soul towards the changeable goods of the world, they were sins injurious to the Christian progress and aim. They came into the class of Venial, on the ground, that here the religious *principle* was not deficient; and the circumstances, accordingly, under which they were committed, might be taken into consideration as excuses. These were the sins of frailty and infirmity, occasioned by the conflict between the evil desires remaining from Original Sin, and the Divine

principle infused into the soul by Grace. In the development of this part of their ethical system, the observations of Aristotle on the force of the desires in counteracting the reason, and on the voluntary nature of actions, were their chief guide and authority. The degrees of extenuation, or indulgence, to different offences in the Venial class, are ascertained by the principles of his philosophy.

The whole consideration of this subject may be regarded indeed, as the popular ethics of the Schools; as a system of condescension to the weaknesses of the subject-disciple; by which, at the same time, the power over his conscience was artfully maintained. The rule, in itself, is a just and sound one, when confined to its proper exercise. Its sphere, is, in the intercourse of thought between man and man; to regulate the judgments which each passes on the conduct of another. Indulgence becomes, on this ground, the strict law of right. A sense of our own infirmity, a consideration of the condition of man in the world, of our imperfect knowledge of the heart, a genuine fellow-feeling, are the great principles which here must guide our moral decisions. And the several decisions of the heart, framed on these principles, constitute a tacit code of Venial offences, known by the name of Candour, or Equity, or Kindness, or Good-will. The Scholastic philosophy converted this law, with great address, to the service of the ecclesiastical power.

To the same principle may be traced the divisions

of Virtue, into Theological and Moral, and into Infused and Acquired. The theological virtues are Faith, Hope, and Charity; each of which has God Himself for its object; Faith, it is stated, having respect to the Divine Truth, Charity to the Divine Goodness, Hope to the greatness of the Divine Omnipotence and Kindness. The Moral Virtues are those, by which the nature of man is regulated with respect to human things. These are comprehensively denoted by the Schoolmen, under the name of The Four Cardinal Virtues; agreeably to the arrangement in the *Morals of Gregory*, and which seems indeed the most ancient division of Virtue;—Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance.<sup>a</sup> These, together with the theological virtues, making up the mystical number of seven, (which their method delighted in tracing out in different objects,) comprised all the various duties belonging to man, as he respects “God, his neighbour, or himself.” We readily see the connexion of the Theological virtues with the perfection of the Speculative Life. Such a system left scarcely any place for the simply Moral virtues; so far as these were employed in the lower sphere of merely human duties. These virtues, however, were consecrated to the divine service, by the distinction between Infused and Acquired Virtue. Acquired Virtue was the simple result of our natural instincts, cultivated by exercise and matured

<sup>a</sup> Schoolmen refer to *Wisdom*, viii. 7. If a man love righteousness, her labours are virtues: for she teacheth temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude.

into habits. But Infused Virtue was, the same moral qualities perfected in us by Divine influence: the theological virtues, in themselves, the gifts of God, being the principles of the Infused virtues, in like manner as the natural instincts are the principles of the Acquired virtues. As the Acquired virtues, then, fitted men for human affairs; so the Infused virtues, it was represented, qualified men to be "citizens of saints and domestics of God." Their system, we find, provided for the growth and expansion of the seed of divine grace—the element of the heavenly life in the human soul—in a manner analogous to the improvement of our natural moral instincts; by accessions, that is, of the same kind to the original principles. The soul proceeded in the divine life, as in the moral; increasing in favour with God, as, according to the theory of Aristotle, it advances in its natural conquest over the passions.

A still further distinction of moral excellence was derived from the Scripture-declaration of the manifold offices of the Holy Spirit, in the sanctification of the human heart. These were the qualities of wisdom, science, understanding, counsel;—the effects of the Holy Spirit on the rational principle of the soul: fortitude, piety, fear—the effects of the Holy Spirit on the affections. They were denominated the Seven Gifts of the Spirit; the enumeration being drawn from that passage of Isaiah, which declares the Spirit of the Lord, as "resting," and "as the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel

“ and might, the Spirit of knowledge and of the “ fear of the Lord.” As Gifts they differed from the Infused Virtues, in being higher means of perfection, immediate divine instincts,—dispositions prompting to follow the divine motions, and carrying man at once to acts beyond those of human virtue.

In the further development of their Ethical System, the Schoolmen closely follow the method of Aristotle's Ethics throughout. Aquinas, in particular, has illustrated the application of Aristotle's principles to Christian morality, with an admirable comprehension of the subject, and sometimes with a knowledge of human nature, which, though briefly and darkly intimated, has scarcely been surpassed by the modern philosopher. On the moral portion of his great argument, he seems to feel his strength more than elsewhere; and, though still encumbered with the armour of his technical system, exerts a more independent power. For, though he explains the formal divisions of Virtue received in the Church, he still pursues the inquiry into all the different heads of Aristotle's more copious enumeration, and shews their consistency with the tenour of Christianity. This portion, indeed, of the labours of Aquinas, is particularly interesting to the inquirer into the history of Moral Philosophy, and of its connexion with Theology. It shews to what extent, our phraseology on moral subjects, has been derived from the Latin versions of Aristotle's expressions of moral ideas; and how



deeply we are indebted to the Scholastic Philosophy for its transfusion of the valuable theories of that philosopher, into this department of science.

By looking, indeed, to this source, we find the origin of the whole of the questions which have engaged the attention of the modern ethical philosopher, as well as of our ordinary language on moral subjects. The question of the nature of Moral Obligation, and the very use of the term Obligation, are derived from this source. It is strictly connected with that view of Justification, which I endeavoured to explain in my last Lecture. In consequence of Original Sin, man comes into the world a *debtor* to Divine Justice. He is under an obligation to punishment, on account of his *deficiency* from that form of Original Justice, in which he rendered to God all that service of love, which the great goodness of God demanded. Hence our terms, *due*, and *duty*, as employed to express right conduct. But the use of these words has created, at the same time, a speculative difficulty, which does not properly belong to the subject. Philosophers, we find, have been anxious to solve the question,—why man is *obliged* to the performance of *right*; and have sought, accordingly, for some enforcement of virtue, beyond the simple fact, that virtue is a perfect law in itself. Religionists, accordingly, have drawn down an unnecessary force from the law of God, considered as the rewarder and punisher in a future state; whilst the irreligious have had unholy recourse to the arm of social power. The truth is, that the term

Obligation is a religious one; introduced into Morality by that peculiar connexion, which the speculative Theology of the Schools established, between Religion and Morality. The Divine Law, the principle of the Divine Being Himself, was to be traced downwards in its operation on fallen man; and its powerful efficacy was to be asserted, as well as its transcendant goodness, in the blessing, and in the vengeance, with which it was accompanied.

The subject on which I have been discoursing, is much too large even to be *touched* adequately, in the compass of a single Lecture. My object, however, is chiefly to point out the origin of that prejudice, by which the distinct provinces of Theology and Morality have been popularly confounded: and I therefore confine myself to such a view of the Scholastic Ethics, as exhibits its connexion with Theology. It is in this respect, that the ethical system of the Schools has been injurious to Moral Philosophy; whilst it has conferred important benefit, as I have observed, by its introduction into modern language of the practical science of Aristotle;—an effect, that each individual has unconsciously experienced, in the tone which education and society have given to his mind. What is more familiar to us, I may ask, before we have begun to reflect on the words which we employ, than to speak of the *motives* and the *ends* of actions? But, in using these terms, we are speaking in the theories of what we are apt to

regard, as an absurd and exploded philosophy, of no interest to ourselves.

It is to the technical language, indeed, of the School-Ethics, that we may ascribe the extravagance of those Modern Philosophers, who have reduced all actions to the necessity attributed to motion consequent on impact, or to the results produced by the powers annexed to material nature. The origin, indeed, of this modern "necessity," is precisely the realism of the Schools. Actions have been *analysed mentally* into motives and ends, and this mental distinction has been converted into forces and effects. Consequently, the very distinction between rational and material agents has been confounded, by such a mode of philosophizing. For it is the characteristic of the former, that they are agents in themselves,—endued with a principle of motion intrinsically, in their own nature,—and therefore spontaneous and variable in their course of action:—whilst the latter, having no such principle in themselves, depend for their actions on their relations to other objects.

The influence of the scholastic blending of Theology and Ethics is evidenced in the very general confusion of thought still observable on this point. There are two extreme opinions on the subject: that on the one hand, which regards ethical principles, as unholy and forbidden ground to the Scriptural religionist; as enervating and debasing the sacred

truth ; that on the other hand, which considers no system of religious truths obligatory on the belief and the conduct, unless it can be reduced to some principle of our moral nature. Evidently, the limits and proper department, of these two great portions of our moral instruction, are not attended to, in these extreme views. Too much is ascribed to Theology in the one, too much to Morality in the other. According to the former, we can do nothing to the glory of God, unless his glory is the object immediately present to our thoughts in each action. According to the latter, the truth of human nature is disparaged, by the endeavour to kindle the natural sentiments of the heart with the celestial fire of the altar. The distinct provinces of intellectual and revealed knowledge have often been remarked, with a view to silence the objections of such speculators. But I think this account of the matter by no means meets the difficulty of the case, which arises as much from an improper estimate of the moral, as of the intellectual powers ; and that a further answer to it should be sought, in a just view of the relation of Moral Philosophy to Theology.

Morality then, it should be observed, is the science of our own internal nature. It ascertains all those principles by which we are actuated in our sentiments and conduct, and establishes the general law in which they all agree. Its office is throughout one of discovery. The existence of these principles is assumed ; and the facts, both of our observation and our consciousness, are examined, with a view to

their discovery. But all these inquiries are only satisfied to lead to another, which is quite beyond the province of the moralist to answer, as to the ultimate reference of all this complex machinery which we have been studying; whether it is a whole in itself, or there is something beyond it, in which it originated, and to which it tends. The Christian Revelation has answered this, by shewing the reference of these principles to the invisible, eternal world; giving us an account of their origin in the dispensations of Providence, and the ultimate effect, in a future life, of their present observed tendencies. We should observe, then, that it is only *results* of which Revelation informs us, the ultimate relations and effects of what we have already ascertained, or are able, by inquiry of ourselves, to ascertain. It is highly important to observe this; because our popular language on the subject confounds the distinction, between the *principles* of our conduct and the *results* to which they tend. We are apt to speak of Religion, as supplying fresh *motives* of conduct. But, in fact, the principles of our moral nature are the *motives*, the *only motives* to actions, as, to use an imperfect analogy, the springs and wheels of a machine are the motives to its action: and the truths of Christianity are presented to those principles, as *objects* towards which they should tend. There is thus infinite room for addition to our actual moral improvement, by the presentation of new and more glorious objects to our moral principles; whilst, at the same time, there is no addition

of even a single *new* moral fact to the history of our internal nature. Results may be unfolded to us, utterly beyond the reach of all conclusions from observation and consciousness; and these results may open objects to our faith, and, through faith, to all the principles of our nature; whilst the principles themselves are unchanged, and unchangeable, so long as man, and the world around him, are what they are.

But this confusion of *results* with the *motives* of conduct takes place when the religious principle is substituted as the spring of action: as, when it is argued, that no action can have any moral value, except it be done *immediately* and *exclusively*, on a *motive* of glory to God. The glory of God supplies, indeed, the great religious centre of our actions: they are incomplete and irreligious, if they terminate in worldly objects. But our actions must still be performed according to the laws of our nature. They must originate within us; they must be morally right in themselves, in order to their sanctification in the great object, which Religion holds out to our view.

Christianity, in fact, leaves Ethical Science, as such, precisely where it found it: all the duties which Ethical Science prescribes, remain on their own footing; not altered or weakened, but affirmed and strengthened by the association of Religion. And, so independent is the Science of Ethics, of the support, and the ennobling, which it receives from Religion, that it would be nothing strange, or objectionable, in

a Revelation, were we to find embodied in its language, much of the false Ethical Philosophy, which systems may have established.<sup>r</sup> This, I conceive, would appear to those, who bear in mind the real distinctness of Religion and Moral Science, nothing more objectionable, than the admission into the sacred volume of descriptions involving false theories of Natural Philosophy. There is greater affinity to revealed truth in the nature of Moral Philosophy; because it has, in common with Religion, the happiness of man for its object: but a coincidence of object is different from an actual agreement in the means employed. Holiness, separation from the world, devotion, stillness of the thoughts and the affections, are the means of Religion:—Ethics are all activity, all business. Neither will answer the purpose of the other: both are indispensable to the perfection and happiness of human nature.

Let those, then, who would endeavour to substitute one for the other, either Theological Truth for Moral, or Moral for Theological, reflect whether they are not bringing into competition two classes of truth which have no rivalry with each other. Let them think whether religion may not be true and obligatory, though it may touch on points beyond the sphere of their moral anticipations: and whether the

<sup>r</sup> In consequence of incorporating all Science with Theology, and making Theology itself a *Science*, the notion arose, that nothing could be true in any science that was not accordant with the Scripture.—*Quicquid enim in aliis scientiis invenitur, veritati hujus scientiæ repugnans, totum condemnatur ut falsum. Aquin. Summ. Theolog. Prima Pars, qu. 1. art. 6.*

theory of morality may not remain, amidst all the light of Revelation, a valid philosophy of life, soliciting *in itself*, their earnest study, in order to a right appreciation of religious truth. Nothing is more wanted in these days, than an accurate acquaintance with the truths of Ethics, to disperse the clouds, which the prejudices of theological theory spread over human nature. Doctrines in Religion are advanced, which could not hold their ground for a moment, if Moral Philosophy were duly studied, and its truths were practically applied, as a basis of Christian truth. It would be seen, that, in many instances, men were maintaining positions at variance with indisputable facts of the human constitution, and rashly overthrowing, at once, the evidence and the application of the sacred truth which they would advocate.





**LECTURE VII.**

**THE SACRAMENTS.**



## SUMMARY.

DOCTRINE of the Sacraments a continuation of the Scholastic scheme of Divine Agency—Separate nature of the soul and body assumed throughout the speculation—The Sacraments viewed as the means of supporting and renovating the life of the Soul—General notion of them founded on the belief in secret influences—Belief in Magic auxiliary to this notion—Connexion of Sacramental Influence with the doctrine of the Incarnation—Agitation of the subject in the IXth century in connexion with Alexandrian Philosophy—Difference of opinion as to whether the Sacraments were signs or instruments—Precision of language respecting the Eucharist in particular—Preeminence assigned to this Sacrament attributable to the established theory of Sacramental Influence—Doctrine of Intention—Question of the effect of the Vice of the Minister on the efficacy of the Sacrament—Notion of impressed Character attributed to some of the Sacraments—Evident superiority of Baptism and the Eucharist in comparison with the rest—Rough form of the early Controversies on the Sacramental Presence of Christ—The terms Substance and Species not taken at first in a strict metaphysical sense—Aristotelic Philosophy of Matter and Form, Substance and Accident, introduced to perfect the theory of the Sacraments—This exemplified particularly in Transubstantiation—Connexion of this doctrine with the power of the Church enforces the assertion of the mystical virtue of the consecrated elements—Physical theory of Transmutation applied to the establishment of the Presence of Christ—Connexion with this, of the notion of the mysterious efficacy of certain words—Realism involved in the further use of the notions of Substance and Accident in the account of Transubstantiation—the theory of the doctrine at variance with popular representations of it.

General reflections on the abuse of the doctrine of the Sacraments in the Scholastic System—its repugnance to the spirit of Christianity—Necessity of vigilance against the temptations to refinement on this subject.

And a woman having an issue of blood twelve years, which had spent all her living upon physicians, neither could be healed of any, came behind him, and touched the border of his garment: and immediately her issue of blood stanchèd. And Jesus said, Who touched me? When all denied, Peter and they that were with him said, Master, the multitude throng thee and press thee, and sayest thou, Who touched me? And Jesus said, Somebody hath touched me: for I perceive that virtue is gone out of me. And when the woman saw that she was not hid, she came trembling, and falling down before him, she declared unto him before all the people for what cause she had touched him, and how she was healed immediately. And he said unto her, Daughter, be of good comfort: thy faith hath made thee whole; go in peace.

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Καὶ γυνὴ οὖσα ἐν ῥύσει αἵματος ἀπὸ ἐτῶν δώδεκα, ἦτις εἰς ἰατροὺς προσαναλώσασα ὄλον τὸν βίον, οὐκ ἴσχυσεν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς θεραπευθῆναι, προσελθοῦσα ὀπισθεν, ἤψατο τοῦ κρασπέδου τοῦ ἱματίου αὐτοῦ· καὶ παραχρῆμα ἔστη ἡ ῥύσις τοῦ αἵματος αὐτῆς. Καὶ εἶπεν ὁ Ἰησοῦς· Τίς ὁ ἀψάμενός μου; Ἀρνούμενων δὲ πάντων, εἶπεν ὁ Πέτρος, καὶ οἱ μετ' αὐτοῦ· Ἐπιστάτα, οἱ ὄχλοι συνέχουσί σε καὶ ἀποθλίβουσι, καὶ λέγεις· Τίς ὁ ἀψάμενός μου; Ὁ δὲ Ἰησοῦς εἶπεν· Ἠψατό μου τίς· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔγνω δύναμιν ἐξελθοῦσαν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ. Ἰδοῦσα δὲ ἡ γυνὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔλαθε, τρέμουσα ἦλθε, καὶ προσπεσοῦσα αὐτῷ, δι' ἣν αἰτίαν ἤψατο αὐτοῦ ἀπήγγειλεν αὐτῷ ἐνώπιον παντὸς τοῦ λαοῦ, καὶ ὡς ἰάθη παραχρῆμα. Ὁ δὲ εἶπεν αὐτῇ· Θάρσει, θύγατερ· ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε. πορεύου εἰς εἰρήνην.

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Et mulier quædam erat in fluxu sanguinis ab annis duodecim, quæ in medicos erogaverat omnem substantiam suam, nec ab ullo potuit curari: Accessit retro, et tetigit fimbriam vestimenti ejus: et confestim stetit fluxus sanguinis ejus. Et ait Jesus: Quis est qui me tetigit? Negantibus autem omnibus, dixit Petrus, et qui cum illo erant: Præceptor, turbæ te comprimunt et affligunt, et dicis: Quis me tetigit? Et dixit Jesus: Tetigit me aliquis; nam ego novi virtutem de me exiisse. Videns autem mulier quia non latuit, tremens venit, et procidit ante pedes ejus: et ob quam causam tetigerit eum, indicavit coram omni populo, et quemadmodum confestim sanata sit. At ipse dixit ei: Filia, fides tua salvam te fecit; vade in pace. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE VII.

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THE preceding views of the Scholastic system have presented the action of a subtile system of Materialism, commencing with the Divine Grace infused into the soul, and working itself out by the various principles of human nature. The Will of God, regarded as the primary cause of all activity, has been traced, as it takes effect in the operations of the Christian soul, and raises up the fallen child of Adam to the perfection of the sons of God.

It can hardly have escaped observation, that, in the course of these explanations of the process of Grace, an entire distinctness has been assumed for the soul, as the living and thinking principle of man's nature. It was the established doctrine, that the soul was *infused* into the body, as I have before observed. The body, or the flesh, was conceived to be fitly disposed for the reception of the soul; and then the soul, being infused, gave the *form* of Human Nature. An evident reason of this opinion is to be seen in the anxiety to maintain the proper incorruptibility of the soul. If the soul were not generated, it could not be corrupted. It might, indeed, be infected; be subjected to guilt and punishment by its union with a corrupt flesh; but, being created fresh by the hand of God, immediately, in each instance of a human being, it was, in itself, a divine principle, independent of the corruptible body

with which it was associated. Hence it was said, that original sin produced a *deformity* of the soul. It destroyed that due constitution of the principles of man's fleshly nature, which disposed it perfectly for the reception of the soul. The expression itself of Form, as applied to the soul, was derived from Aristotle; the separate creation, and infusion of it into the body, were modifications of the Platonic theory of its preexistence. The Scholastic doctrine, combining both these principles, made the groundwork of a system, which developed the process of the soul towards a state, when the flesh should no longer be an obstruction to its energy, and it should appear in its proper nature and perfection, as the *form* of the human being.

This notion of the separate existence of the soul has so incorporated itself with Christian Theology, that we are apt, at this day, to regard a belief in it as essential to orthodox doctrine. Even in maintaining that such a belief is not essential to Christianity, I may incur the appearance of impugning a vital truth of religion. I cannot, however, help viewing this popular belief as a remnant of scholasticism. I feel assured that the truth of the Resurrection does not depend on such an assumption; that the Life and Immortality of man, as resting on Christ raised from the dead, is a certain fact in the course of Divine Providence; whatever may be the theories of the soul, and of its connexion with the body.

Accordingly, instead of a general simple acknow-

ledgment of the Salvation of the Gospel, we have seen, how the process of Grace has been traced by the Latin theologians, as it repairs the natural defects of the soul, and brings it into union with Christ.<sup>a</sup>

The theory of the Sacraments, on which I now enter, proceeds on the same view of Human Salvation. It is an account of the application of the Passion of Christ to the healing of the soul—a collection of remedial measures, by which its languors and infirmities may be relieved and strengthened. The Incarnation of Christ is regarded as the primary efficient cause of health to the soul: dispensed by the several Sacraments as the instrumental and secondary causes. As the Incarnation itself was an union of the Divine Word with human nature, so the Sacraments, according to the theoretic view of the Scholastic philosophy, were mystical unions of words with sensible things, by which the real Passion of Christ was both signified and applied to the soul of man—the visible channels, through which virtue was conveyed from Christ Himself to his mystical body, the Church.

The doctrines of Original Sin and of the

<sup>a</sup> What our Lord says, in answer to Martha's declaration, "I know that he shall rise again," when he proclaims Himself the Resurrection and the Life, is to this point. The Jews, then, entertained a philosophical belief of a future state. Our Lord tacitly reproves an assurance *on such grounds*, by his strong reference to Himself; "*I am the Resurrection and the Life; whosoever believeth in me, shall live, though he die,*" &c.—Note A. Lecture VII.



Incarnation represented mankind under two extremes of individuality: as one with Adam in sin; as one with Christ in perfect righteousness. An account was wanted of the union of these two extremes—a bridge, by which the mind might pass from one theory to the other. This was presented in the doctrine of the Sacraments. They brought the two extremes into connexion. They connected fallen man with regenerate man, marking, as it were, the several stages of transition, from the state of corruption to that of glory. Theologians have not been content to rest on the simple fact of the Divine Ordinance, appointing certain external rites as essential parts of Divine service on the part of man, available to the blessing of the receiver. But they have treated the Sacraments as effusions of the virtue of Christ, physically quickening and strengthening the soul, in a manner analogous to the invigoration of the body by salutary medicines.

The word Sacrament itself, as understood in the Latin Church, is founded on this notion. Though derived from the military oath of the Romans, and so far bearing the mark of that derivation, as it denotes a solemn pledge of faith on the part of the receiver,—in its established theological use it corresponded more properly with *μυστήριον* of the Greeks. It expressed, at first, accordingly, any solemn, mysterious truth of Religion; and afterwards, by the usage of the Schools, was appropriated to those acts in particular, by which grace was conceived to be imparted to the soul, under outward and visible

signs. The definition indeed, given in the Catechism of the Church of England, is exactly what the Scholastic theory suggests; so far, at least, as the language of it characterizes the nature of a Sacrament. It is, in the subsequent application of this definition, that the Church of England has modified and improved on the fundamental idea of the Scholastic doctrine; whilst the idea itself is preserved, as being part of the very texture of technical theology.<sup>b</sup>

It was, however, in just logical connexion with this theory, that the Latin Theology deduced the Seven Sacraments of the Church of Rome. They are applications of the Passion, or the Priesthood of Christ, as it is otherwise expressed by the Schoolmen,<sup>c</sup> to Christians, either individually, or as members of the Christian Society. On the first ground, the rites of Baptism, Confirmation, the Eucharist, Penance, Extreme Unction, obtain their sacramental nature; on the latter, the rites of Orders and Matrimony come into the same estimate. The great Christian community, both as a whole and in its parts, must be kept animate with the Divine Grace flowing from Christ its head. Baptism confers the grace of Regeneration, the new spiritual life, by which man becomes the child of God. Confirmation gives the increase of that Life. By the Eucharist it

<sup>b</sup> *Invisibilis gratiæ visibile signum*, is the usual definition of a sacrament in the school-writers. The words are drawn from Augustine.—Note B.

<sup>c</sup> *Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod per omnia Sacramenta fit homo particeps sacerdotii Christi, &c.* *Aquin. Sum. Theol. III. Pars, qu. LXIII. art. 6.*

is strengthened and vivified: by Penance, recruited from the effects of sin: Extreme Unction removes the last relics of the sinful nature, preparing the soul for its departure. These, then, are the influences of Christ's passion on Christians, in their personal capacity. But the Christian Society needs to be supported, both in its natural and in its spiritual existence. The grace annexed to Matrimony supports the natural life, in order to the spiritual: since the Christian must first be born into the world, that he may afterwards be regenerated in Christ. The sacrament of Orders, analogous to Matrimony in the spiritual community, is the grace of Christ's passion, continuing the vital succession of Ministers, the living instruments, through whom all grace is imparted to the Church.<sup>d</sup>

Rightly, then, to understand the doctrine of the Sacraments in general, we must look to the theory of secret influences on which it is based, the mysterious power, conceived to belong to certain things, or actions, or persons, of effecting changes not cognizable by the senses, and changes, as real as those apparent to observation. It is true indeed, that, in the Christian application of this theory, the power was not conceived to belong intrinsically to the things themselves. They were only subordinate, instrumental causes, by which the Divine Agency accomplished its ends. Christ was held to be the sole primary cause of Grace, however given. In

<sup>d</sup> Note C.

this respect, the mystical philosophy of secret agents in nature was christianized. But, though it might thus be denied, that any proper efficacy was attributed to the symbol employed in the administration of a Sacrament, still its power of communicating grace instrumentally, was asserted in the strongest manner. Illustration was drawn from the manner in which any instrument of art performed its work. The artist, or workman, was properly the executor of it, as the designer of the result: the instrument executed it, according to its adaptation, as an instrument, to produce the result.<sup>e</sup>

The general belief in Magic, in the early ages of the Church, may sufficiently account for the ready reception of such a theory of Sacramental influence. The maxim of Augustine, *Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit Sacramentum*, appears to be, in fact, an adaptation of the popular belief respecting the power of incantations and charms, to the subject of Religion. The miracles themselves, indeed, of our Saviour were supposed to act in this manner, even by those who did not impute them to the agency of evil. His word, or His touch, was sought for by persons acknowledging in faith the reality of his mission. "Say in a word only," said the Centurion, "and my servant shall be healed." The woman, who forced her way through the crowd, fully trusted that she should be made whole, if she could *touch* but the hem of the garment of Jesus. And our Saviour, whose condescension was shewn

<sup>e</sup> Note D.

even to the prejudices of his faithful followers, often accompanied the working of his miracles with significant actions. In the instance of the woman, indeed, thus suddenly cured, He is described as having perceived that some one had touched Him, by the fact, that *virtue* had gone out of Him;—a mode of speaking, characteristic of the prevalent idea concerning the operation of Divine Influence, as of something passing from one body to another.

The physical philosophy received in the Schools, was in itself favourable to this doctrine of sacramental efficiency. Nature being regarded as a system of powers inherent in matter, it would be easily conceived, that these powers might be secretly directed by that Sovereign Will which gave them being. As they operated visibly in various ways through the Divine Word, so they might also act invisibly for the production of spiritual effects. The Word which spoke things into being, could surely influence the mode of their operation.

This doctrine, however, of the Sacraments appears to have subsisted in the Church without questioning, and consequently without much precision of opinion on the subject, until the agitation of the controversies respecting the nature of Christ.<sup>f</sup> These

<sup>f</sup> Ratramn was engaged in a controversy on the manner of Christ's Birth. Paschase also wrote on the same point in opposition to Ratramn. The coincidence of this controversy with that on the Eucharist, further illustrates the connexion of the points disputed in each.—Note E.

would evidently affect the notion of a communicated virtue derived to the powers of nature from his Person. If, according to Nestorius, God and man were not united in one Person in Jesus Christ, it might naturally be inquired, whether the "Virtue of his Passion," obtained sacramentally, flowed from the Divinity or from the humanity; since his Passion was thus considered as distinct from his Divine Nature. Accordingly, at the Council of Ephesus, two opinions on this article were condemned: one asserting "the flesh of the Son of man," to mean some one among men, into whose flesh and blood the earthly substance of bread should be changed; the other asserting, that the individual, whose flesh and blood should have this salutary efficacy, should be some eminently holy person—the temple of God—in whom God should dwell in the truest sense.<sup>s</sup> Whether, indeed, such opinions were actually held in the form herestated, may be doubted. But it seems evident, from the notice itself of different opinions on the Eucharist in the time of Nestorius, that the popular notion of sacramental influence, was affected by his theory of the Incarnation. The communication of secret virtue by the sacramental symbol, seemed to be broken in its first link, if the Divinity were separated from the Humanity of Christ: and speculation exerted itself to

<sup>s</sup> I have taken this account from Lanfranc, *De Corp. et Sang. Domini*, c. xvii. p. 242. Oper.—Note F.

find a stay, on which the sacred chain might be fastened.

Afterwards, the Alexandrian Philosophy, as revived by Erigena, seems once more to have awakened the opinions of speculative men on the question of Sacramental influence. The Eucharist again, as the most complex subject of disquisition, was the point of the general question, to which attention was particularly directed. There is no extant work of Erigena on the subject, though we find allusions, in subsequent writers, to his doctrine, set forth, as it seems, in some express treatise. There remain, however, other treatises of the same period, those of Paschase and Ratramn, of which I have had occasion to speak before: and these, though entirely confined to a discussion of the Eucharist, indicate a general agitation of the question concerning the manner, in which grace was communicated by the Sacraments. That inquiry should have been directed to the presence of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine, seems to have been only accidental from the circumstance, that the celebration of the Eucharist was more identified with divine worship than the other Sacraments.

It appears that the Alexandrian Philosophy revived the question, by removing all actual power from nature, and reducing all natural effects to the sole agency of the Deity. There would be, according to this philosophy, no real instrumentality in the Sacraments. All would be the immediate action

of the Deity. The *virtue* attributed to the sacred symbols would therefore vanish. They would not contain Christ's passion by real participation in themselves. They could only act as the representatives, or signs, of his presence, not as the *causes*, or *instruments*, of his operation on the soul.

The popular and orthodox doctrine, however, was, that the Sacramental influence was a power of causation. Accordingly at this period, when disputation began again to be the pastime of theologians, the notion was strenuously opposed, that the Sacrament of the Eucharist was a *sign* only, and not the actual presence of the crucified body of Christ. The orthodox, indeed, maintained that it was a sign, so far as it consisted of visible symbols; but they further contended, that a real efficacy must be imputed to the operation so signified. The collision, however, of adverse statement, forced them into a precision of language, which, probably, but for the force of controversy, would have had no place in this department of theology. It is no inconsiderable evidence of this observation, that the precision of language has occurred on that particular Sacrament, which was the immediate matter of discussion,—the Eucharist. The nature of Christ's presence in Baptism might have been attempted, no less, to be defined: but here the point is left comparatively open to opinion; whilst, respecting the Eucharist, the path of orthodoxy is rigidly marked out to the disciple of the scholastic theology.

The opposition of controversy, whilst it led the



orthodox to assert an actual presence of the incarnate Christ, under the sacramental symbols of bread and wine, made them charge their adversaries with holding the Sacraments to be only *signs*,—memorials of Christ's passion, and not the actual oblation. And this may account for the pointed expression in our Article, that "the Supper of the Lord is not only a *sign* of the love which Christians ought to have among themselves, but rather is a Sacrament of our Redemption." In denying an actual communication of Christ to the sacred emblems, it became necessary to guard against the construction of asserting a merely commemorative rite, and thus evacuating the Sacrament of its holy burthen of Grace. For neither Ratramn, in opposing the doctrine of Paschase, nor afterwards Berenger, in advocating the views of Erigena against Lanfranc,<sup>h</sup> appear to have held, that the Eucharist was *nothing more* than a sign. Ratramn, indeed, distinctly asserts a *real* presence, though he does not admit a presence of the crucified body of Christ in the consecrated bread and wine. It is a real and true presence that he asserts;—the virtue of Christ acting in the way of efficacious assistance to the receiver of the Sacrament. The Church of England doctrine of the Sacraments, it is well-known, is founded on the views given by this author. Cranmer and Ridley are said to have studied his work together, and to have derived their first ray of light on the subject from that study.<sup>i</sup>

<sup>h</sup> Note G.

<sup>i</sup> Note H.

The relative importance of the Eucharist, in comparison with the other Sacraments, and, indeed, with the whole doctrine and ritual of Christianity, in the system of the Church of Rome, may be drawn from this primary notion of sacramental efficiency. It may well be asked, why this sacred rite should stand so preeminent in the scheme of Christianity. I do not say, that it ought not to hold a principal station among the observances of a holy life. But it is the doctrinal supremacy given to it, to which I refer. View it, as it exists in the Roman Church, and it is there found absorbing into it the whole, it may be said, of Christian worship. There, the ministers of religion seem to be set apart chiefly for this sacred celebration : it is the spiritual power of their office—the essence of their priesthood. If we ask then, why this particular Sacrament should have attained this superiority over all other rites of Christianity, we may find an answer in the Scholastic theory. Whilst the other Sacraments, recognized by that theory, *participate* of the virtue of Christ's passion, this is the *passion itself* of Christ,—the *whole virtue* of his priesthood mystically represented and conveyed. The priesthood of Christ comprehending in it the whole of Christianity, the rite by which that priesthood was especially signified, would become the great act of human ministration, when the notion was once established of an instrumental causality attached to the use of the sign. The importance which this Sacrament obtained, appears, accordingly, to have increased, in

proportion as controversy more explicitly shaped the doctrine, giving a greater point and boldness to the assertion of a real oblation of Christ. It was freely admitted, that Christ was offered once for all on the Cross; that henceforth He is seated at the right hand of the Divine Majesty, to die no more. But the sacrifice performed by the priest was still a real offering of Christ; as being the appointed channel, through which the expiatory virtue of the Great Sacrifice descends in vital efflux from the person of the Saviour.<sup>j</sup>

The necessity of a general "Intention" on the part of the priest administering a Sacrament, to "do what the Church does, and intends," by that Sacrament, is founded on the same mystical construction of the rite, as an actual communication with Christ Himself. Inanimate things, so far as they act instrumentally in communicating the virtue of Christ's passion, act simply according to the laws of their nature, moved by the impulse given to them externally. But the human agent, the animated instrument<sup>k</sup> of the sacramental Virtue, being in himself a principle of motion, operates by the moral, and therefore variable, power of freewill, in producing the mystical result. This doctrine led, of course, to many questions on the point; such as, whether the forgetfulness of the Priest, the omission of any expression, the variation of words in the form of consecration, would affect the validity of the

<sup>j</sup> Note E.

<sup>k</sup> Aristotle's *ἐμψυχον ὄργανον*.

Sacrament. These difficulties, however, were skilfully evaded, by resolving the personal individuality of the Priest into the general abstract personality of the Church. As officiating in the Sacrament, he appeared in the person of the Church. The question then only was, whether the *general intention* of the Church was fulfilled in the act of consecration. Whatever arose from the mere person of the priest as an individual man, could not vitiate the rite.<sup>1</sup>

Hence, though the nature of man, as a voluntary agent, was included in the theory of the Sacraments, the personal vice of the officiating minister could not impede the due consecration of the rite. The Church itself could not err. He therefore, in whom the person of the Church was vested, if only it was his design to act in that capacity, and to do the work of the Church, could not fail in the performance of the rite. The mystical virtue was brought down to the sacred element, though the lips were unholy that pronounced the transforming benediction. Thus it was argued, the baptism of Judas was valid, because it was performed with the authority of Christ; whilst the baptism of John was not valid, as not being the act of the Church.<sup>m</sup>

We are ready, indeed, ourselves to admit, that the vice of the Minister does not impede the effect of the Sacrament. For it is evident, that, where the Faith of the receiver is the true consecrating

<sup>1</sup> Note F.

<sup>m</sup> Note G.

principle,—that which really brings down Christ to the heart of each individual,—the personal delinquency of him who administers it, cannot deteriorate the Sacrament itself. There seems, indeed, scarcely sufficient reason for the introduction of an express article on the subject, when it is once fully understood on Protestant grounds. We see, however, the occasion of it, in the Scholastic theory of the Sacraments. The immediate occasion, indeed, in the case of our Articles, was, the canon of the Council of Trent upon the subject. But the importance attributed to the point by so distinct a notice of it, belongs to the recondite philosophy of sacramental influence. An authority and sanctity were to be maintained for the Church, as the sole and certain instrument of sacramental grace, against all objection to the individual agents, to whose hands her rites should be intrusted. It was an admirable expedient, indeed, of ecclesiastical policy, thus to rest the power of the Church on the purity and indefectibility of an abstraction. Religious imagination was sustained on the picture of the Church, as the great Mother of the Faithful, cherishing her beloved children in her pure bosom; whilst her many-handed agents in the world were securing their hold on the consciences of men, by that prerogative of veneration which they enjoyed in her person.<sup>n</sup> Realism here

<sup>n</sup> We should observe the confusion of ideas prevalent in the early Church on the subject of Baptism. The Church was considered as “the body of Christ.” The Church also was “the mother of the faithful.” Hence, being baptized, and being

became an effectual means of power. The Clergy being regarded in their collective character, as representatives of the person of the Church, exhibited an uniform, undying, principle of operation. The stability and eternity of a Theory were substituted for the variable and conflicting views in religious belief and action, which the actual facts of the Church presented.

The same principle was applied to the body of the Faithful at large; as, for instance, in the administration of Baptism to Infants, the scholastic ground on which the validity of such baptism is asserted, is, that the Faith of the Church is accepted, instead of that of the individual.<sup>o</sup> The will of the Infant is incapable of putting any bar to the reception of the rite; and the intention of the Church therefore, it is alleged, fully avails in its behalf.

Such, then, is the characteristic idea which pervades all the Sacraments, according to the enumeration of them given by the School-authors, and adopted by the Church of Rome. But it should be remarked, that of the seven, whilst all were held to

made a "member of the body of Christ," and being "incorporated" into the Church, became equivalent expressions. Hence too the Church was said to "generate" sons by baptism. *Augustin.* contr. Donatist. I. c. 10. et alib.

<sup>o</sup> By Canon XIII. of Sess. VII. of the Council of Trent, the *Faith of the Church* is stated to be the ground on which infants are baptized. This accords with the language of Augustine.—  
Note H.

be means of Grace, and divinely instituted, the two, which we hold exclusively as sacraments, were considered as of more imperative obligation on the Christian world at large. Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, indeed, were distinguished from the rest in this respect; that they were conceived to impress a *Character* on the soul—an indelible mark, by which the Soul is consecrated to the service of God. Hence it was maintained that these rites could never be repeated. Though Baptism might have been administered by the hands of a heretic, yet, if the rite had been performed, it was enough. The Christian “character” had been impressed, and the baptized was already a member of the Church. Cyprian, in his zeal against heresy, had maintained the contrary; requiring, that those who had been baptized by heretics should be rebaptized by the orthodox.<sup>p</sup> But the opposite doctrine prevailed in the Church, and was established by the authority of Augustine. It gave, in fact, to the Church a power over all who had once been baptized, whether within or without her pale; so that the spiritual terrors might be applied to such persons, to compel them to the faith in which they had been baptized.<sup>q</sup> We may perceive a trace of the

<sup>p</sup> Note I.

<sup>q</sup> See this in the Council of Trent, *Sess. Sept. de Bapt.*—*Si quis dixerit hujusmodi parvulos baptizatos, cum adoleverint interrogandos esse, an ratum habere velint, quod Patrini eorum nomine, dum baptizarentur, polliciti sunt, et si se nolle responderint, suo esse arbitrio relinquendos, nec interim pœna ad Christianam vitam cogendos, nisi ut ab Eucharistiæ, aliorumque*

scholastic doctrine of "impressed character," in the scrupulous care shewn by our Church in the Baptismal Service, to ascertain whether Baptism has been already performed rightly; and in the provision (itself a scholastic one) of conditional Baptism, in cases where doubt may exist of its previous due administration.<sup>r</sup>

The doctrine of Baptism, indeed, was what naturally attracted the attention of the Church in the early ages. Its connexion with the doctrine of Original Sin brought it into prominent notice, during the Pelagian Controversies. And, before the rise of these controversies, we see the extravagant opinion entertained of its sacramental power, in the practice of delaying the reception of it until the approach of death.<sup>s</sup> So that the indispensable necessity of Baptism had been established, before the period of Scholasticism. Both Pelagius and Celestius

*Sacramentorum perceptione arceantur, donec recipiscant, anathema sit. Canon XIV.*

<sup>r</sup> It is suggested by the Cardinal Caietan, in his commentary on the Summa of Aquinas, *IIa IIæ, qu. 1. art. 3. ed. Antwerp.*

<sup>s</sup> Augustine's account of the delay of his own baptism illustrates this. Feeling himself dangerously ill in his youth, he eagerly demanded baptism. He recovered; and it was postponed, for the reason, that, if he should live, he would contract fresh impurity.—*Et conturbata mater carnis meæ, quoniam et sempiternam salutem meam carius parturiebat corde casto in fide tua, jam curaret festinabunda, ut sacramentis salutaribus initiarer et abluerer, te Domine Jesu confitens in remissionem peccatorum, nisi statim recreatus essem. Dilata est itaque mundatio mea, quasi necesse esset, ut adhuc sordidarer, si viverem; quia videlicet post lavacrum illud, major et periculosior in sordibus delictorum reatus foret. Confess. lib. I. c. 11.*



maintained the *necessity* of Baptism. The orthodox differed from them, in asserting that, *without* baptism, none could be saved. It was allowed, indeed, by the Schoolmen, that the wish (*votum*) to receive baptism might avail, in a case of impediment to the actual reception of it: as also in regard to the Eucharist. The blood of martyrdom too was supposed to flow with regenerating efficacy. For thus had the holy Innocents been baptized in blood: the sword of the murderer consecrating them to the Saviour, for whom they unconsciously suffered. But, as no wish, or vow, of receiving the rite could be conceived by the Infant, it was impossible that, dying unbaptized,—humanity may shrink at the recital of such a tenet,—it could escape the punishment due to Original Sin.

The Eucharist also, though not regarded of the same absolute necessity as Baptism, was a rite, which could be omitted, with safety, by none who were capable of desiring it. In fact, these two ordinances, amidst all the scholastic subtleties with which they are surrounded, bear evident marks of being considered, as of an higher origin, and a more divine import.<sup>t</sup> They are clearly the Sacraments of the primitive Church, whilst the rest have

<sup>t</sup> Unde manifestum est, quod sacramenta ecclesiæ specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cujus virtus quodammodo nobis copulatur per susceptionem sacramentorum. In cujus signum, de latere Christi pendentis in cruce, fluxerunt aqua et sanguis, quorum unum pertinet ad baptismum, aliud ad eucharistiam, quæ sunt potissima sacramenta. *Aquin.* Summa Theol. III<sup>ta</sup> Pars, qu. LXII. art. 5.

obtained that rank through the ingenuity of Theologians, seeking to give a numerical perfection to their system in all its parts, and to trace out a minuteness of correspondence in the Sacraments to the Seven Virtues, and Seven Gifts of the Spirit. Peter Lombard, I believe, was the first who assigned that number to the Sacraments.<sup>u</sup>

The controversies of the IXth and XIth centuries exhibit the theory of the Sacraments, in what may be called an unfinished state. They are only the commencement and outline of what was afterwards worked out by the introduction of the philosophy of Aristotle into the subject. The disputes had been, whether there was a real Divine efficacy in the consecrated symbols themselves, so that they were no longer the same as before consecration; or whether they remained the same in themselves, and yet possessed a mystical efficacy, in the act of being received. The point in controversy is, in what sense, the words “*really*” and “*truly*” are to be understood, when affirmed of the presence of Christ. Both parties affirm that Christ is really and truly present in the Eucharist; both affirm that a change is worked on the Bread and Wine by consecration, so that they then are verily and indeed the Body and Blood of Christ. But on one side it is denied, that this reality and truth are to be sought in the Bread and

<sup>u</sup> The question of the *Number* of the Sacraments was one of considerable perplexity at the Council of Trent. *Courayer*, translat. of Sarpi, tom. I. p. 376.

Wine; or that the change is a physical one, though *real* as to efficacy or virtue. On the other side, it is contended, that this reality and truth of the Divine presence, must be in the consecrated elements themselves; or otherwise they are mere signs without any latent virtue. But in this case, the Sacraments of the New Law, (as the Christian sacraments were termed, in contrast with the types and ordinances of Judaism,) would be inferior to those of the Old Law. For the latter, it was admitted, were the shadows of Christ—they contained Christ in the way of anticipation:—whereas the latter would be thus reduced to empty Signs.

The word Substance, we may observe, was employed in these controversies; but it was not used in that exact metaphysical sense, in which we find it employed in the Trinitarian controversies, or which it acquired in the course of the Scholastic discussions. The Latins of the IXth century were infants in philosophy, compared with their predecessors of the IVth century. They understood, accordingly, at this period, by Substance, chiefly the gross idea, which we commonly attach to the term, when we speak of the Substance of any thing, meaning the principal or most important part of it. The idea of Substance, as the support or basis of accidents, was not familiarly recognized, it seems, by the Latin of the middle age, until the revived study of Aristotle had once more restored it to that sense.

The like observation is to be made with regard to the word Species, as it was employed in the

sacramentarian controversies of the IXth and XIth centuries. It was not then restricted to a metaphysical sense, but rather simply expressed the physical objects themselves, to which it was applied. The *species* of bread and wine, that is, were not the abstract natures of bread and wine, but the compound things themselves, as really existing. The term, as introduced into this subject, was derived to the Latin Church, not from philosophy, but from the ordinary forms of Roman exaction of tribute; according to which, certain articles were to be furnished to the government in the *species*—the articles themselves—as distinct from their equivalent in money.<sup>x</sup>

It remained then for later discussion, for the restless, penetrating spirit of Scholasticism, to analyze, by the philosophical power of language, the operation of Grace in the Sacraments. The subtile speculations about *matter* and *form*, *substance* and *accident*, were accordingly introduced, to establish and perfect the theory of instrumental efficiency ascribed to the rites themselves. As it is upon these speculations that the doctrine of the Sacraments, and in particular of Transubstantiation, is maintained in the Church of Rome even now; amidst all the accessions of light from improved science, which the world has obtained since the days of Scholasticism. A review of any of the defences of Transubstantiation, which have been put forth in

<sup>x</sup> Note I.

the course of the last few years, will convince any one how completely bound up with the theories of substance and accident, and matter and form, that tenet is; and that, consequently, the tenet and the theories must be false or true together. But if, as is the fact, those theories are mere assumptions in physics, not resting on observation, but distinctions, existing only in the mind, and applied to the analysis of external objects; it must appear, that the process of Transubstantiation is entirely an assumed one, and that it ought to be discarded as an idol, at once, of religion and of philosophy.

We hear it sometimes stated, as if Transubstantiation were a dogma *suddenly* introduced into the Church;—as if Innocent III. and the IVth Lateran Council, had, by the declaration of the article, accomplished a triumph over human reason and sound religion. But this appears to me a very mistaken view of the doctrine. It has a much deeper origin; growing, in fact, out of the natural Realism of the human mind. It was a gradual extension of the same principle which corrupted the doctrines of the Trinity and of Divine Grace, to the doctrine of the Sacraments. The principle floated down the stream of the philosophical Theology of the Schools; and, from time to time, fastened itself round each projecting point that met its course. That the doctrine of the Eucharist in particular, should have been the principal occasion of the speculation concerning the Sacraments in general, may be accounted for, in the importance which that Sacrament

had assumed in the practice of the Church. The sacrificial character of the Church-minister was especially involved in it. And the leading Clergy, accordingly, were peculiarly sensitive to any opinion, which seemed to examine too closely, the miraculous virtue claimed for the rite. From the time of Erigena, there had been constant endeavours, to attain more exact ideas of the nature of the sacrifice performed in the Eucharist, on the one part; whilst, on the other, a fear lest the authority of the Church should be shaken, called forth defenders of the miraculous import of the consecration. The treatise of Paschase was a bold attempt to settle the doubts and speculations of the time, by a strong and confident assertion of the power assumed for the ministration of the priest. It did not, however, settle the question even in the Church itself. Not only did Ratramn freely discuss the mode of Christ's presence; but differences of opinion must have existed generally, when we find Leotheric, Archbishop of Sens, charged with heterodoxy on the subject, in the very commencement of the XIth century; and afterwards, in the course of the same century, Berenger appearing the forward advocate of the moderate doctrine.<sup>y</sup> The obstinacy, indeed, with which Berenger resumed his profession of the obnoxious opinion, argues the general interest taken in the question, as also the support and countenance which he must have obtained from others, agreeing in his views, though not equally ready to encounter

<sup>y</sup> Note J.

the persecution, attendant on a more open dissent from the orthodox rule.

When the Schools took up the formal discussion of the doctrine of the Sacraments, the general theory was to be adjusted to those views of the Eucharist, which the progressive realism of orthodoxy had created. It was to be shewn, how the actual conversion of the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ took place, according to recognized physical principles, the supposed agents in producing the result.

I have already had occasion to point out the extent, to which the theory of Transmutation was carried in the physical system of Aristotle. It was conceived to be a sufficient account of all the variety of appearances which Nature exhibits. The forms of things were continually coming and receding in the ceaseless flux of sublunary nature; contraries expelling contraries; whilst a common matter subsisted, the same in all things, and becoming all things, as the various *forms* of things successively acted on it. I have pointed out all this nearly in the same manner before. But the notions of Form and Matter require to be more particularly noticed, in reference to our present subject, in their connexion with the mystical philosophy of the *Divine Word*. A Christian Philosopher could not adopt such a theory of Nature, (for in itself it was strictly atheistic; it described nature as an omnipotent energy in itself, working out its own instinctive

tendencies,) without modifying it by the principles of his Theology. He did not therefore conceive these *forms*, in nature, to be independent of the Divine Reason or Word. Interpreting those passages of Scripture which speak of things made by the Word of God, as denoting expressly the creative efficacy of the Second Person of the Trinity, he connected the communication of *forms* to matter with the Word of God throughout; that is, he conceived the Divine *words* uttered, to carry that mystical creative force, which belonged to the Divine Word as existing in the Trinity.<sup>z</sup> Hence it was, that certain words, accompanying the celebration of a Sacrament, were said to be the Form of the Sacrament. In a manner analogous to the original formation of all things by the Divine Word acting on matter, it was conceived, that the sacred words pronounced by the Priest came with power to the element or matter, and imposed on it a mystical or sacramental form.<sup>a</sup> Thus a Sacrament has been described as consisting of matter and form:—the matter being the water, or the bread and wine; or, in Confirmation, the chrism; in Penance, the contrition of the penitent: the form, the particular words of consecration uttered by the priest. Hence, too, the use of the word Element itself, to denote the consecrated bread and wine; these being viewed, like the four imagined elements of the

<sup>z</sup> *Aquinas*, Sum. Theol. III<sup>ta</sup> Pars, qu. LXXVIII. art. 4.—  
Note K.

<sup>a</sup> The priest is therefore said, *conficere Sacramentum*.



material world, as the bases of the sacred natures into which they were transformed. A certain matter and certain form are thus considered as *indispensable* to a Sacrament.<sup>b</sup>

This part of the theory of Transubstantiation applies to all the Sacraments in common. But it did not fully explain that point in which the Eucharist differed from all other Sacraments, as being the *whole* virtue of Christ's priesthood, whereas the others were only *participations* of that virtue. It was to be further shewn, therefore, with regard to this, how the *esse*, or *substance*, of Christ, was brought down to the consecrated elements. This was, in fact, the establishment of the term *Transubstantiation* as the orthodox language of the Latin Church. Christ had been asserted to be substantially present in the Eucharist during the controversies of the IXth and XIth centuries. But, as I observed, the term *Substance* was not yet commonly interpreted in its proper metaphysical sense. The increasing acquaintance with Aristotle's Philosophy subsequently to that period, both demanded and suggested a further and more minute explanation.

The term substance now came to be viewed in its logical and metaphysical sense, as the support of accidents,—as that nature of a thing which may be

<sup>b</sup> Hence the inquiries in our Baptismal Service. "With what *matter* was this child baptized?" "With *what words* was this child baptized?" "Because some things," it is said, "*essential* to this Sacrament may happen to be omitted through haste."

conceived to remain, when every other nature is removed or abstracted from it—the ultimate point in analysing the complex idea of any object. The term Accident, on the other hand, denotes all those ideas which the analysis excludes, as not belonging to the mere Being or Nature of the object.

But by the fallaciousness of Realism, both Substance and Accident being understood to denote parts in the physical composition of bodies, the application of this doctrine to the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, was naturally suggested. If Substance and Accident were parts of things, they might be conceived in a state of separation. The substance of any thing might be present, whilst the accidents were absent: and the substance of one thing might be changed for the substance of another, whilst the accidents remained.

It being admitted, then, that there was a transforming power in the words of Consecration; whilst, at the same time, it was evident, that no visible or sensible change was wrought on the bread and wine; it was urged, that the change had taken place in the *substance* of the sacred elements. The *Substantial Forms* of bread and wine were no longer in existence, at the instant that the words of Consecration were completed; but they were displaced by the Substance of Christ. The accidents of bread and wine,—the taste and colour, and other such qualities,—were not supposed, indeed, to be in Christ “as in *their subject* ;” though they evidently remained after the change of the substance, to which they had

belonged. In general, however, the accidents are represented, in the mystical phraseology of Platonism, as outward veils, under which the real spiritual substance of Christ is latent.<sup>c</sup>

This explanation raised a number of minute questions, as to the mode of coexistence of accidents with a substance not belonging to them, and of their existence out of a subject; as to whether the accidents of the bread and wine possessed the power of nourishing; and the like. The discussion of such points exactly suited the genius of the Scholastic Philosophy, and at length matured the theory of the Eucharist, as professed in the Latin Church, under the name of Transubstantiation.

In no point is the prodigious influence, which the Scholastic Philosophy has had on the world, more apparent, than in this particular article. Antecedently to experience, we might have regarded it as impossible, that a doctrine so abstruse,—so remote from religion when viewed in its source,—not appealing to any sentiment of the heart,—not captivating the judgment by the sublimity of its conception,—should have become a corner-stone of faith to a large proportion of the Christian world. I do not speak of its *absurdity*; for it is clearly not

<sup>c</sup> The ingenuity with which the scholastic system is brought into unity, should not pass unobserved here. As Christ has not, in the scholastic view of the Eucharist, the *forms* of flesh and blood, it might seem that Transubstantiation did not preserve the *man*. Still this could not be the case; since it was determined that *forma substantialis hominis* is *anima rationalis*.

*absurd*, if, by that expression, we mean its inconsistency with reason. It is, on the contrary, perfectly consistent with reason, if we grant the hypotheses in philosophy on which it is founded. And, even in those hypotheses themselves, there is nothing intrinsically absurd. We can only say, with our present light in physical science, that they are unphilosophical and untrue. The abstruseness of the speculation is what I remark, considered together with its popularity. It proves, how entirely subjugated the human understanding has been, to the imperious reason of the Church-leaders of the middle age. The doctrine was shaped to meet the cavils and disputations of the spiritual body among themselves, that no dissentient leader of a party might produce schism in the Church; but that, whilst the living oracles of faith all spoke one language, a delusive consistency might pass for the singleness of truth with the multitude of the faithful. If the disputatious leader of opinion were silenced, it was enough to secure the assent of the sequacious herd of believers. Sometimes, indeed, expedients were adopted to interest the imagination in favour of the dogma, by descriptions of miraculous appearances of flesh and blood, or of an infant, in the celebration of the Eucharist.<sup>d</sup> But the resort to these methods of proof, shews, that the doctrine of Transubstantiation, in its speculative form, was not adapted to conciliate the attention of the vulgar, but rather the logical armour of the Church, in its contests with

<sup>d</sup> Note L.

logical opponents. For these alleged miraculous appearances were at variance with the proper speculative notion of the Real Presence. These led the people to believe, that it was the passible body of Christ locally present in the elements: whereas the philosophical doctrine was, that the *substance* of Christ only was present—that *nature* by which He is the Christ; and which might be represented in an infinity of instances, whenever the sacrifice of the Eucharist should be offered; without being multiplied in itself, or without being broken and divided in itself, however the consecrated elements should be physically separated into parts. The proper doctrine of the Real Presence was a logical unity—an *ens unum in multis*;—an idea, quite beyond the reach of the unscientific intellect. The violence again with which the Cartesian philosophy was attacked, still further shews how closely implicated was the doctrine of sacramental influence with the ancient metaphysics. That philosophy was no direct attack on Transubstantiation: but as rejecting the Aristotelic theory of Matter and Form, and therefore evidently militating with the established notion of Transubstantiation, it had to bear the brunt of opposition from the Schools. The polemical discussions which it occasioned, are monuments of the keen anxiety, with which the shadowy outworks of the doctrine were guarded, against the assaults of a novel method of philosophy. Had the doctrine been simply rested on the Divine Word, it would have had nothing to fear; but, cased as it

was in metaphysical armour, it sensitively shrank from collision with the weapons of an Ideal Philosophy.<sup>e</sup>

Briefly, however, to review in conclusion that doctrine of the Sacraments, which we have been considering.

It appears, that the simplicity of Scripture truth has been altogether abandoned, in the endeavour to raise up, on the solemn ordinances appointed by our Lord, for the edification, and charity and comfort of his Church, an elaborate artificial system of mystical theurgy. In the views of the Scholastic system which have previously occupied our attention, the Divine Being and Agency were the leading ideas. God Himself was displayed as the great subject;—his power, wisdom, and goodness, as developed in his own Being, and as diffused in the works of his Providence and Grace. The speculation was human; but the burthen of it was divine. But, though it is the same thought prolonged here also, it must be observed, that the divine argument here is subordinate to the human agency involved in it. The history of the Sacraments, in the Scholastic system, is, God working by the instrumentality of man. The theory is of the divine causation; but the practical power displayed, is, the sacerdotal: the necessary instrument for the conveyance of Divine Grace, becoming in effect the principal cause.

Surely it requires no research into ecclesiastical

<sup>e</sup> Note M.

history or philosophy, to see that so operose a system is utterly repugnant to the spirit of Christianity. Contemplate our Saviour at the Last Supper, breaking bread, and giving thanks, and distributing to his disciples; and how great is the transition from the institution itself to the splendid ceremonial of the Latin Church? Hear Him, or his Apostles, exhorting to Repentance; and can we suppose the casuistical system to which the name of Penance has been given, to be the true sacrifice of the broken and contrite spirit? Or, if we think for a moment of Jesus Christ, taking the little children in his arms and blessing them, and declaring that "of such is the kingdom of God;" and then revert to the minute inquiries, as to the state of infants dying unbaptized;—do we not seem, to have exchanged the love of a Brother, for the cold charities of strangers to our blood, not knowing the heart of man, and dealing out a stinted measure of tenderness, by the standard of abstract theory, and the law of logical deduction?

Thanks to the Christian resolution of our Reformers, they broke that charm which the mystical number of the Sacraments carried with it, and dispelled the theurgic system which it supported. We are not, perhaps, sufficiently sensible of the advantages, which we enjoy through their exertions in this respect—exertions which cost them so many painful struggles, even to the bitterness of death. They have taken our souls out of the hand of man, to let them repose in the bosom of our Saviour and

our God. We have been enabled thus to fulfil the instruction of Scripture, to “come boldly to the throne of Grace,” and ask of Him who gives liberally, and denies to none. The perplexities and distress of heart, of which we have been relieved, none perhaps can now adequately conceive. We must ask of those, who have experienced the false comfort of that officious intercession of the sacramental system of the Latin Church. They will tell us, that, under that system, they knew not the liberty of the Gospel. They were unhappy without resource. Their wounds are opened, but there was none to heal.<sup>f</sup>

But, though we are free from the yoke which the Sacramental ritual imposes on members of the Roman Communion, we still require watchfulness against the temptation to refine on the subject, and lest we enslave ourselves to a kind of priestcraft in our own minds. The tendency to raise questions about Baptism, in modern times, is an evidence of this spirit of refinement. Men are not content with the simple declarations;—“Repent, and be baptized:”—“Except a man be born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God:”—“Go, and teach all nations, baptising them in the name of the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost:”—nor will they acquiesce in the duty of conforming their practice to these Scriptural injunctions. But it is thought by some, that the question must further be decided, whether Baptism is in all cases equivalent to Regeneration. They propose a ques-

<sup>f</sup> Note N.



tion, that is, as to the intrinsic efficacy of the rite;—a difficulty, which practical Christianity by no means calls upon us to decide, and the decision of which, after all, can be only speculation. In regard, indeed, to both the Sacraments, singleness of heart is the only human means that we possess, of apprehending their true import. “He which hath said,” observes Hooker, “of the one Sacrament; ‘Wash, and be clean;’ hath said concerning the other likewise; ‘Eat, and live.’ If therefore,” he continues, (I quote his words for their general application to the whole subject of the Sacraments,) if “without any such particular and solemn warrant as this is, that poor distressed woman, coming unto Christ for health, could so constantly resolve herself; ‘May I but touch the skirt of his garment, I shall be whole;’ what moveth us to argue of the manner how life should come by bread; our duty being here but to take what is offered, and most assuredly to rest persuaded of this, that, can we but eat, we are safe? . . . What these elements are in themselves, it skilleth not; it is enough, that to me which take them, they are the body and blood of Christ: his promise in witness hereof sufficeth: his word he knoweth which way to accomplish: why should any cogitation possess the mind of a faithful communicant, but this; O my God, thou art true! O my soul, thou art happy!”<sup>g</sup>

<sup>g</sup> Eccl. Pol. V. 67.

## **LECTURE VIII.**

**NATURE AND USE OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.**



## SUMMARY.

EXAMINATION of the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology suggested by previous inquiry—Confusion of thought on the subject, evidenced in popular statements of the relation between Faith and Reason—also in attempts to settle the necessary points of belief—Discussion of the Scholastic principles: 1. that whatever is first in point of doctrine is therefore true; and 2. that the logical consequence of any doctrine is necessarily true—The former principle, a remnant of Scholastic view of Theology as a demonstrative science—Universality and ubiquity of belief no tests of divine truth—The principle only true when strictly confined to Scripture facts—Contrast of the earlier and later Christian writers in the tradition of doctrine—The preference for earliest authorities inconsistent with the principle which establishes doctrines by logical consequences—Symbolical nature of language in its application to Theology—Unscriptural doctrines must result from the method of logical deductions—Necessity imposed in such a case of answering all objections—Impossibility of maintaining thus the principle of Authority—Progressive accumulation of doctrines by such a mode of proceeding—Truth of Fact confounded with Truth of Opinion in the Scholastic method—No dogmas to be found in Scripture itself—Dogmas therefore to be restricted to a negative sense, as exclusions of unscriptural truth—Articles and Creeds not necessarily to be dispensed with, because imperfect—Their defence however not to be identified with that of Christianity—Use and importance of Dogmatic Theology to be drawn from its relation to Social Religion.

Sum of the whole inquiry—Present interest of it—Scholasticism the ground of controversial defence to the Church of Rome—Remnants of it in Protestant Churches in the state of Controversy, and in the importance attributed to peculiar views of religious truth—Result of the examination sufficient to prove the force of Theory on our Theological language—The impression from this fact not to be transferred to the revealed truths which are real parts of sacred history—Real beneficial effect of honest search into the truths of Divine Revelation.

JEREMIAH XXIII. 28.

He that hath my word, let him speak my word faithfully. What is the chaff to the wheat? saith the Lord.

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נְאֻשֶׁר דְּבָרֵי אֱמוּנָה יִדְבַר דְּבָרֵי אֱמֶת מִחֵלְבָנִים אֶת־הַבֶּר  
נְאֻם־יְהוָה :

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Qui habet sermonem meum, loquatur sermonem meum vere. Quid paleis ad triticum? dicit Dominus. LAT. VULG.

## LECTURE VIII.

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THE examination in which I have been engaged, involves the consideration of two principles of Theology: 1. That whatever has been originally established in Religion is true; whatever is subsequent, or may be shewn to have arisen at any particular period during the progress of the Gospel, is corrupt; 2. That whatever may be deduced by necessary inference from any established proposition, must also be true. These principles were employed by the School-divines in two ways: either to prove the affirmative of any point; or to demonstrate the erroneousness of any assumed truth. I purpose now calling your attention to a discussion of these fundamental principles; and, from this discussion, to deduce the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology.

The consideration of our Religion, under this last point of view, is naturally brought before the mind, by the inquiries which I have been pursuing into the effect of Scholasticism on our theological language. For the question arises: If a technical statement of the Sacred Truth necessarily involves so much of human theory—if, as has been shewn, the Christian doctrines, in their mode of expression, carry so much of the speculation of an antiquated philosophy;—how far are all human formularies of faith to be admitted; and what is the ground, on

which they rest their pretension to be received by the Scriptural Christian ?

The discussion on which I am now entering, is an arbitration of the point, where Divine Truth ends, and Human Truth commences ; or, where the certainty of Divine Fact ceases, and the probability of Opinion takes its rise, in matters of Religious belief and conduct. For it is the confusion of the limits of these two things, that brings perplexity into the subject ; occasioning fallacious inductions from one ground of assent to the other. The dialectical theologian calls upon us to receive his sentences, as the voice of God which none can gainsay ; building the necessity of pious submission on the theoretic necessity of demonstrative argumentation : or, on the other hand, he appeals to our reason, and insists on our accepting, as irrefragable *conclusions*, what no conclusion of reason can establish, and what ought to rest solely on the authoritative Word of God.

Hence it is that writers, in different ages of the Church, have been so often employed in debating the respective provinces of Faith and Reason. A confusion of thought has been constantly prevalent on the subject. The very circumstance of treating Faith and Reason as *distinct principles*, is an evidence of this confusion : as if the assent to Divine Truth could be an act of Faith, in any way *distinct* from an act of Reason. The mischief of such a statement of the case is, indeed, too apparent from

experience. The indolent, or the sensitive, mind, readily seizes on a distinction, which, to the one, saves the trouble of thought and diligent examination,—to the other, supplies a pious sentiment for the acceptance of any wild, or even repulsive doctrines of religion. To say; this is of Faith,—that is of Reason,—peremptorily silences all suspicions and misgivings of the judgment and the heart. Persons are thus led to overlook the analogy of God's dealings with his creatures; and to imagine, that the truths of the world of Grace are to be received and judged, by a *different* set of principles from those which are applied to the ordinary providences of God. On this hypothesis, there is nothing so extravagant that may not be admitted as part of Divine Truth. Indeed, the more extravagant any proposed doctrine is, the more attractive should it be, on such a principle, to the religious inquirer: since it is then, a more striking exemplification of the contrast supposed between truths of Faith and Reason. Many a devout and excellent mind, I fear, has been seduced from sober religion, by this speculative distinction between Faith and Reason: or, at least, where fanatical doctrine has been adopted, it has furnished a defence, against which, all attempts to convince of error have been necessarily unavailing.

What, however, has been at bottom the real object of all these inquiries, is, to ascertain the distinction between dogmas and facts of Religion. Men have found both rested on the same footing. They have



felt perplexed at the evident discrepance between the two things so associated; and their prejudices, not suffering them to make the requisite separation, they have applied themselves to laying down limits, beyond which human reason could not proceed. Thus it is sometimes stated, that Reason is concerned about the *evidence* of Religion, Faith about the *things revealed*;—a distinction, which leaves the real matter of dispute altogether untouched; since it is about the various things themselves proposed to our belief, that we want a criterion. It appears to me, that such a mode of stating the case is further highly objectionable; on the ground that we may be thus led to ascribe to Tradition the authority of Scripture, and to receive the Truth of Man, with the deference due only to the Truth of God.

The want of a proper satisfaction on this question, is evidenced also in the floating state of opinion, as to what doctrines are to be regarded *necessary* to be believed and professed, and what may be variously held *without danger to salvation*.<sup>a</sup> The disputes on these points are remnants of the scholastic spirit, which reduced all religion into theoretic dogmas. The comparative importance of theories may be reasonably examined; for, as such, they may be viewed in their relations and consequences. The relation of any particular theory to the Divine Being

<sup>a</sup> See Bramhall's "*Schism Guarded*," Works, fol. 1677. pp. 400—402.—Stillingfleet's "*Rational Account*," &c. Works, fol. 1709. vol. iv. pp. 51—54.—Note A. Lecture VIII.

immediately, or its consequence as affecting our primary notions of the Divine Being, will, of course, render that theory one of principal importance; that is, in religious conduct, of indispensable necessity in order to salvation. But, when we have once separated matters of religion into simple facts divinely revealed, and theories of divine truth founded on those facts; there can be no question of relative importance in what we receive as purely divine. The theology resulting from such an estimate, is either altogether entirely worthy of our acceptance, or is open to the strict examination of our reason as to its probability. Between facts, all of which are admitted to be real signatures of God in his dealings with man, there is no comparison, no choice. All must be equally received and followed as true. It is not for us to decide, what instances in the display of God's providences, are more or less important. To overlook any one in the construction of a religious system, would be as unphilosophical as it would be impious. But, so far as doctrines are deductive statements—conclusions drawn from the facts, or words, of Divine Revelation,—they may be examined by that reason which deduces them. It being granted that they follow from the *data* of Scripture, it is to be seen, whether they are such as ought to have been deduced; whether they have the support of evidence, from their general accordance with Scripture,—from the concurrent opinion of the wise and the unprejudiced,—and from other considerations of this kind.

And the degree of evidence, resulting from such considerations, must decide the theological truth and relative importance of such conclusions.

Let us inquire then, in the first instance, into that principle of the Scholastic Theology:—that whatever is originally established as a point of doctrine, is therefore true; whatever has subsequently arisen, is corrupt:<sup>b</sup>—and let us see, whether it has not had a considerable influence in producing that confusion of thought, which we find existing on the subject of Dogmatic Theology.

Justly to examine this principle however, let us take it as it is stated by the great authority on this point, Vincent of Lirins: according to whom the test of orthodoxy is; that a doctrine should have been believed in all places, and in all times, and by all men;<sup>c</sup> and any doctrine accordingly, which does not bear these marks of catholicity, must be heretical.

Now it appears to me, that the principle itself, current as it is in the language of Protestants, is a relic of that Philosophy, which sought, with such anxious search, for a speculative certainty to

<sup>b</sup> Tertullian states it thus, using it as a decisive argument against the heretic: *Hanc regulam ab initio Evangelii decucurrisse, etiam ante priores quosque hæreticos, nedum ante Praxeam hesternum, probabit tam ipsa posteritas omnium hæreticorum, quam ipsa novellitas Praxeæ hesterni. Quo peræque adversus universas hæreses, jam hinc præjudicatum sit; Id esse verum, quodcumque prius, id esse adulterum quodcumque posterius. Adv. Prax. II. p. 501.*

<sup>c</sup> *Commonitorium*, p. 317. ed. Baluz. *Quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, creditum est.*

moral facts ; finding no rest until it had reduced the variable truth connected with human life, to the same exactness which belongs to truth purely metaphysical. The eternity and immutability attributed to the theorems of science, would in such a state of philosophy as that of the primitive and middle ages of the Church, seem to be still more appropriately the characteristics of that Wisdom which descended from above. For the wisdom given by Revelation was, as I have throughout been endeavouring to shew, conceived, in the theory of the Schools, to be a demonstrative science, established by necessary links of dependence on primary truths concerning God. Theology, accordingly, was a science on a footing with other sciences, or rather with what we now call the *exact* sciences, as contrasted with sciences resting on observation and experience. But an assumption of the nature of Theology so erroneous, naturally led to the assumption also of a test of its truth, founded on the fundamental misconception. The universality, and the ubiquity of belief, were thus applied to the case of theological doctrine, as equivalents, in this instance, to the eternity and immutability of the principles of scientific demonstration. These views of divine truth were, at least, approximations to the certainty belonging to pure science. And hence the truth which, in its proper nature, and in order to its due reception, appeals to the candour, the fairness, the piety of the individual Christian, was brought under the iron sway of speculative argumentation. In short,

the belief of man, the rebellious, uncontrollable principle of his nature, was subdued to that passive obedience which the imperative force of reason in itself exacts.

But it is only an *assumption*, as I further would proceed to shew, that universality and ubiquity are thus made the tests of religious doctrine. No universality or ubiquity can make that divine, which never was such. It is a mere prejudice of veneration for antiquity, and the imposing aspect of an unanimous acquiescence, (if unanimous it really be,) which make us regard that as truth, which comes so recommended to us. Truth is rather the attribute of the few than of the many. The real Church of God may be the small remnant, scarcely visible amidst the mass of surrounding professors. Who then shall pronounce any thing to be divine truth, *simply because* it has the marks of having been generally or universally received among men?

If we go back to the primitive age of Apostles and Evangelists, the acknowledged inspired teachers of our Religion, who received their instructions by the hearing of the ear and the seeing of the eye, and the handling of the Word of Life, and to whom God spoke in the thoughts of their hearts; there can be no doubt that the principle holds to the fullest extent. To doubt it then, is to raise a question, whether there has been a case of inspiration, or to what extent inspiration may be regarded as a ground of authority. Assuming, however, that there is a clear case of inspiration established in

regard to our sacred Books,—that they are a complete volume of inspiration,—and that this inspiration extends to all matters pertaining to the kingdom of God, which we are concerned to know,—it follows, that whatever is recorded in those books is indisputably true ; and that nothing independent of these books, or not taken from them, can possess the same authority,—not to say in *degree* only,—but even in *kind*. For this is *divine* truth ; whatever is distinct from it, is *human*. So that, in the history of doctrines, when we look to their Scriptural source, we may affirm, that whatever is first is true, whatever is of a subsequent period is corrupt.

But, the moment that we step out of this sacred inclosure, the maxim proves to us a most fallacious guide. In fact, the reverse of it is much nearer to the truth. For, if we consider what the state of things was, when the first inspired teachers disappeared from the world, we shall find it extremely adverse to the maintenance and propagation of the truth as it was purely inspired.

Take first into view the novelty of the case. The new leaven of divine truth was just infused into the mass of complex human opinions ; those opinions, the results of associations and habits, not only diversified in themselves, but fundamentally heathen or Jewish, discordant with the spirit of the Gospel. What chance could a pure religion have had in such a state of things, of being generally simply received as a collection of divine truths ? Would not those obstacles, that we know to have existed

in the minds of the Apostles, antecedently to their divine illumination, exist at least equally in the minds of first converts not enjoying the like illumination from above? The ear of the world was not attuned to the songs of Sion; and, though in some honest and good hearts, finely sensible to the touch of the Holy Spirit, they may have awakened concordant emotions, yet, in very many instances, the immortal sounds would be lost in the dissonant murmurs of irreligious thoughts and feelings. To suppose it otherwise, is to go against the analogy of all similar cases. It is to suppose, that knowledge could be obtained without previous training; that the air of divine truth could be commonly breathed, amidst an atmosphere charged with heathen profaneness, and the carnal prejudices of Judaism.

But not to dwell on these presumptions of the state of the case; what is the fact, when it is dispassionately considered, as to the immediate successors of the Apostles? Take even the very period when the Apostles themselves were teaching; when the Holy Spirit Himself went about with those chosen vessels of divine truth, putting into their hearts and mouths what they should say. At this very period, the most wild theories were incorporated with Christianity: the hearer of an Apostle sought to obtain from him with money, the power of the Spirit, the strength itself of the Apostle's labours in the Gospel. But to come to the period of the Apostolic Fathers. Whatever praise we may assign to them for their ardour and firmness as

believers, can we justly ascribe to them the merit of accurate expositors of Christian Truth? Impartiality, I think, requires us to say otherwise. Were we to endeavour, indeed, to form a system of divinity out of these writers, it would be found necessary to explain away many of their positions and expressions in order to bring them into accordance with the admitted truths of Scripture. As evidences of the essence and spirit of the Gospel, as it was handed down from its outset, they are invaluable; as testimonies of the earnestness of individuals,—of their Christian character and Christian hopes,—the writings are also highly interesting and important: but as authorities decisive of what is *true* or what is *false* in theological statement, they are in reality less valuable than the writings of a subsequent age.

The remark may be extended to the Fathers of the IIIrd and IVth and Vth centuries, in comparison with each other. Compare Tertullian at the end of the IIrd century, with Augustine at the end of the IVth, and this difference is readily perceivable. In Tertullian, we see nothing of the deliberation, the accuracy, the thoughtful sedulity of Augustine; but he at once rudely throws out his thoughts, as if dealing blows on his adversary, and caring nothing but for the force with which he strikes. Augustine is strenuous in his dogmatism; but he is prudent at the same time, subduing the vehemence of the personal combatant, into keeping with the heart of the theological diplomatist. Whilst, then, from Tertullian, we should gather many



expressions of Scriptural truth inconsistent with the truth itself; in Augustine, the systematic caution with which he writes, acts in some measure as a security against such a perversion. And the later writer, accordingly, is the more authentic oracle of what is true, or what is false, in theology, than the earlier. The Montanism, indeed, of Tertullian has served as a practical caution against the abuse of his authority. Otherwise, perhaps, we should have seen his doctrines quoted with that reverence, which prejudice ascribes to his place in the roll of ecclesiastical tradition. Justin Martyr and Origen, at the distance of about an hundred years from each other, are instances to the same point. Origen had a far more capacious mind than the Syrian martyr—a far greater penetration of thought;—combining a philosophical power of discerning analogies with an acuteness of logical deduction. Origen, no doubt, must be read with a very severe scrutiny: we must be ever on our guard against the enthusiasm of speculations, raised on the stores of a vast erudition, and tinged with the many-coloured hues of Oriental and Greek philosophy. But, at the same time, he is, I conceive, a much more important author than Justin, the nearer to the Apostolic times, in order to the decision of a disputed point of theology. The comparison, indeed, of Justin and Origen illustrates the case forcibly; since, in respect of piety and Christian feeling, both have powerful claims on our love and veneration. Both were sincere Christians in their writings and in their actions. And yet,

viewing them as equal in this respect, we cannot rest on the authority of Justin, with the confidence due to the inquisitive spirit of Origen.

And yet I do not mean that either Augustine or Jerome, or any other ecclesiastical writers, are, *because* they are later, more truly excellent as Church authorities. I speak only relatively, as examining the position, whether the most ancient are, as such, the most valid authorities in doctrine. The later writers have, indeed, their peculiar danger—the danger arising from their greater art and tact in the management of controversy.

It was only, indeed, about the commencement of the IVth century, that Christians began to appear at the Schools established by the Emperors. And it is from that period that Christian Literature properly commences. Previously it was heathen philosophy, accommodated to the delivery of Christian Truth: so that from those who undertook the defence or explanation of Christian doctrines, the Truth received a large portion of alloy in its transmission. Consequently the earlier Fathers are, in reality, much less *instructive* than the later.

There is one excellence that they possess in the contrast with the later,—a far more valuable excellence indeed than that of mere exactness of theological statement,—the greater piety, and Christian spirit, of some of the primitive Christian Fathers, as compared with some of the later, whose authority is chiefly employed in the Church. Had the reverence to antiquity been rested on this ground, no

complaint could have been made. It is, as if we were drinking of the pure fountain, near its rise, before it was rendered turbid in its passage into the world. For the same reason, the errors of the primitive Fathers are much less dangerous in their effect than those of their successors. Their errors are left loose and indefinite on the surface of their Christian system. The Fathers of the IVth century incorporated their errors with the Gospel itself. But practical Christianity, and dogmatic Christianity, are two very different things. And conclusions belonging to the one, have been improperly transferred to the other.

Not only again was the early Christian literature generally defective ; but the language itself, in which Christian doctrines should be expressed, was yet to be formed. The terms in which the truth was to be appropriately signified, required to be acted on by the force of usage, like all other significant expressions. It was yet to be ascertained, what proper meaning the tacit convention of theological writings should affix to them. The latitude with which some of the most important terms of Theology, as *substance*, *nature*, *person*, were used in the earlier writers, is a sufficient evidence of this. None, indeed, of the strictly technical terms may be said to have been settled in their use, until controversy had given them their mould and temper. To seek, accordingly, among the earlier Fathers of the Church, for authorities by which conflicting doctrines may be decided, is often only to embarrass ourselves with

an unsettled phraseology; or to extort from words a sense which they could not have at the time when they were written. The method, like the torture of the ancient judicial investigations, forces the individual expressions thus examined, to confess what they do not mean,—to disburden themselves of a burden, with which they have not been charged.<sup>d</sup>

From these considerations it may be concluded, that the principle is at least a very doubtful one, which would lead us to ascribe any peculiar authority in the decision of religious truth, to the declarations of the primitive Christian writers; Christian writers, I say, as distinct from the Inspired Authors, to whom alone that deference is due.

But, have the advocates themselves of this principle adhered to it in fact? Have they not rather completely departed from it, in their adoption of that other principle of their theology; that whatever is logically deducible in the way of consequence from any given divine truth, must also be true? Let us then proceed to examine this point, both in itself, and in its connexion with the other assumption of Scholasticism.

That the principle in itself is most fallacious, must appear from what I have, on a former occasion, stated, respecting the nature of a Logical Theology. It was shewn, that the terms of all theological propositions are mere assumptions in their application to Theology,—a symbolical language, derived

<sup>d</sup> Note B.

from the operation of the mind about the objects of the natural world. Hence it is evident, that conclusions drawn from these terms, are nothing more than further connexions of that symbolical language: and that there the proper use and application of them is terminated. The interpretation of them to denote *new facts* in the Divine scheme of things, is perfectly arbitrary; as hypothetical, indeed, as if we had at once assumed the facts themselves to which we apply them. It is like starting from an inaccurate algebraic statement, and working out results by the established rules of calculation. It is like making every circumstance in an emblem or metaphor, the ground of scientific deduction. Only the delusion of applying an ingenious instrument to the solution of the case, makes the apparent solution seem satisfactory. The cogency and perspicuity of logic are mistaken for the certain and clear discovery of religious truth. This observation cannot be too much insisted on; as the practice is, by no means, restricted to the days of scholasticism; but is to be met with every day, both in writings and in conversation. We cannot be too often reminded, that the terms employed in theological discussion are *no classifications* of theological ideas and terms. They are simply the *superscriptions*, or *labels*, by which we denote several classes of facts, respectively placed under them, as it were. This is the nature of language as applied to nature. Still more so is it, when language is applied to Theology.

In the scholastic ages, indeed, theologians looked more to the consequence than to the position itself. The method of theology then pursued, being essentially argumentative; the deep-thoughted eye learned to dive to the lowest point of any given principle, and, with unwearied vision, to seize the most remote deductions, as if they were present on the surface. The heretical disputant in vain fluttered and shifted his position. The serpent-gaze of the subtile logician was still watching the tendency of all his efforts, and bound him by an irresistible fascination to the spot from which he was anxious to escape.

It is this circumstance, it may be remarked by the way, which renders it so very difficult to ascertain the precise shades of opinion, by which different heresies are distinguished. Consequences have been imputed as principles of belief; and the disputants on each side not questioning the fairness of the imputation, an ambiguity has resulted in regard to the original tenets opposed.

But the great mischief of adopting this rule in Theology, appears in the fact, that no purely Scriptural truth can be maintained consistently with its admission. The theologian who is influenced by it will be ever solicitous against exposing his doctrine to the censure of the captious objector. What a temptation then is here, to the minute adjustment of doctrines to the cavils of the theorist? The painful pursuit of the dogmatist will be to attain that precise form of expression, which shall obviate, as far as possible, every objection that may be raised

from the existing state of knowledge in the different departments of science. He must be prepared to shew, that this, or that notion, is implied, or excluded, in his doctrine, as the case may require. Nor is this all. He must be further able to *demonstrate*, that his collection of doctrines coheres as a system; that no assertion is made on one head that may not be strictly reconciled with another, and with *every* other. Here again, then, his mind must be kept intent on a process, very different from that of the mere follower of Revelation. He must be engaged in giving a theoretic perfection to his enunciations of the sacred truth; in regulating the terms of one proposition, so as to accord with the terms of another; and that the whole system may appear compacted of harmonious parts. Such a theology is inevitably driven to *abstractions*—to the subtle inventions of the mind itself—in its statements of Scripture-truth. The simple facts of Revelation must, by their nature, be open to objections, and, it may be said, to *unanswerable* objections; because these facts belong to an order of things, of which we do not directly know the general laws. The more indeed we approximate to a knowledge of these general laws, the more will such objections disappear. But as we never can arrive in this state of our being, at a proper knowledge of them; numerous anomalies, the evidences in truth of our real ignorance of the subject, must always exist. For, what is the explanation of an objection but a demonstration, that an apparent

anomaly resolves itself into some general fact *better known*? It is only where the mind has exactly framed to itself the ideas comprized in any given doctrine, or expression of doctrine, that it can demonstrate the inconsequence of all objections whatever. Objections may be equally futile against the bare revealed facts: but they cannot be decisively *proved* to be so; since the facts are not founded on any precise estimate of ideas involved in them: and in regard to these, therefore, objections may be suffered to stand, without any detraction from our theology. The case, on the other hand, of a metaphysical theology imperatively demands their solution. Is it then for a moment to be supposed, that the simplicity of the Faith can be held, where such a principle of Theology is recognized? Is it not evident rather, that the Faith, as it is in Christ, must be corrupted? The conclusions of human reason will naturally be intruded on the sacred truth. The fact will be accommodated to the theory: and exactness of theological definition will usurp the place of the plain dictates of the Holy Spirit.

The instances adduced, in the course of the present Lectures, of the Scholastic mode of establishing doctrines, abundantly illustrate these observations. The principle of *Consequences* was, indeed, the life and soul of the Scholastic system, *as such*. Scholasticism only adopted the principle of *Authority*, so far as it artfully insinuated itself into the established



Church system ; maintaining the unity and infallibility of the Church, amidst its own unauthorized, adventurous theology.<sup>e</sup>

For we may observe how impossible it was, to adhere to the simple principle of authority in fact, whilst theological truth was pursued by processes of argumentation. A system of truth so formed would necessarily be *progressive*. Fresh objections against particular parts of the system would arise from time to time, as the state of knowledge varied, and as curiosity was attracted to points of controversy. But it was not competent to the Scholastic theologian to avoid the determination of such questions. He was assailed within his own territory. His own arms were hurled against him. His logical theology could no longer stand, if the hostile consequences were not fenced off. The necessity of the case would call upon him constantly to proceed in the decision of questions ; and thus to add to his number of doctrines ; until at length he would be found, far to have exceeded the narrow base of the prescriptive Theology with which he commenced.

Hear the testimony of Augustine to this effect: “ Many things,” he says, “ were latent in the Scriptures ; and, when heretics were cut off, they agitated the Church of God with questions. The

<sup>e</sup> The principle of authority (to adopt an illustration suggested by a friend) acted as the *barrier* in the lists of ancient tournaments. The combatants might use every art and device *within* the lists : but when either of them was pressed against the immovable fence, he was not allowed any attempt to break through or overleap it : he must surrender, or perish.

“ latent things were opened, and the Will of God  
 “ was understood. . . . Many, therefore, who were  
 “ excellently qualified for discerning and handling  
 “ the Scriptures, were latent in the people of God,  
 “ and did not assert the solution of difficult ques-  
 “ tions, when no calumniator threatened. For, was  
 “ the subject of the Trinity perfectly treated, before  
 “ the barkings of the Arians? Was the subject of  
 “ Repentance perfectly treated, before the opposi-  
 “ tion of the Novatians? So, neither was the subject  
 “ of Baptism perfectly treated, before the contradic-  
 “ tion of the rebaptizers, who were put out. Nor  
 “ concerning the very unity of Christ were the  
 “ statements exactly drawn out, until after that the  
 “ separation began to annoy the weak brethren. So  
 “ that those who had the skill to treat and resolve  
 “ these points, to prevent the perishing of the weak  
 “ thus solicited by the questions of the impious,  
 “ drew forth, and made public, by discourses and  
 “ disputations, the hidden things of the Law.”<sup>f</sup>

It is expressly acknowledged, we find, that doc-  
 trines grew under the hands of disputants: that even  
 the most sacred articles of the Trinity, and of the  
 Incarnation, only *gradually* reached their perfect  
 dogmatic expression. I might multiply quotations  
 to the same purport, from various writers of the  
 Scholastic age. I may, indeed, sum them up by  
 stating it as their uniform confession, that the  
 speculations of “ heresy,”—in other language, the  
 conclusions of human reason,—forced the Church

<sup>f</sup> *August.* in Psalm LIV. tom. viii. p. 177. quarto ed.—Note C.

into successive adoptions of additional doctrinal statements; that is, unless a particular enunciation of sacred truth had been sanctioned by the Church on each occasion, "the calumny of heretics could not have been quieted."<sup>g</sup>

That articles, indeed, might become doctrines at one time, which had not been so at another, is admitted, in the distinction drawn by Aquinas between what is heresy and what is not. The same opinion, if held antecedently to *the determination* of the Church, would not be heretical: it was so, when once the Church had pronounced.<sup>h</sup>

It appears, then, that the Church-leaders, in the endeavour to maintain at once an authoritative and an argumentative Theology, incurred the error of confounding truth of Fact with truth of Opinion. It is the nature of the truth of Fact, to admit no additional certainty from the progress of discussion. If a fact, indeed, is questionable, then may discussion, and subsequent inquiry, establish it with an evidence, which it did not appear originally to possess. Such a fact partakes of the nature of the Truth of Opinion. But the facts of the Scripture-records are assumed not to belong to this class, by all who acknowledge the divine character of our

<sup>g</sup> Note D.

<sup>h</sup> Non enim, ut quisque primum in fide peccarit, hæreticus dicendus est; sed qui, Ecclesiæ auctoritate neglecta, impias opiniones pertinaci animo tuetur. *Catechism. ad Parochos*, p. 80. Romæ, 1761.—Note E.

sacred books. Any fact, therefore, that is found expressly written in the Bible, must be regarded, by virtue of its sole and primary existence there, to be ascertained with an evidence to which no further proof can add reality. We may, indeed, and we often do, bring confirmation to Scripture-facts, by historical or philosophical evidence. But this is always done on the assumption for the purpose of argument, that the fact so established is antecedently questionable; and with the view of proving the divine authority of the whole Revelation. Take the fact as a portion of an authentic history of God's providences; and it appears to the eye graven with an iron pen on the rock, in characters as bold and strong as the rock itself. But the truth of Opinion is of a nature to be modified, and improved, and established, by the course of time,—by the progress of civilization, and arts, and knowledge,—by accessions of experience,—by the conflict of judgments. Here also there is occasion for personal influence and authority, in guiding the minds of individuals. It would be quite unreasonable in matters of opinion, for those duly conscious of their own disadvantage for the formation of just views, whether from natural incapacity, or the want of experience, or defect of skill in any particular subject, to reject the conclusions of the wise and the experienced. As the great philosopher himself observes; “one ought to attend to the undemonstrated assertions of the wise, more than to the demonstrations of others.” It is essential indeed to the

truth of Opinion, that it be held as *variable*; that one should be always open to new light,—to new conviction. Whereas a fact of the Gospel is such, that, were an Angel from heaven to preach to us any thing *different* from it, our ears must be stopped to the sound; we must reject it as *untrue*.

Now the Scholastic Philosophy, in its construction of a theological system of Christianity, necessarily overlooked this very important distinction. It boldly stepped beyond the bare facts of Scripture, in the assumption of theoretic conclusions from them, as the principles of its theology; and then retired upon the authority of that Scripture, from which it had presumptuously departed; demanding the certainty of *fact*, for the dictates of progressive, varying, opinion.

Had it called upon the Faithful to respect the learning, the zeal, the piety, the candour of the Master in Theology; had it insisted on a patient, docile hearing of opinions, hoary with age, and consecrated by venerable names in Church-History; it would have recognized a sound Theory of Tradition.<sup>1</sup> But we should not then have had dogmas intruded into the place of Religion, and arbitrations of doubts forced on the conscience of believers; as the voice of the Holy Spirit speaking by the ministers and stewards of the divine mysteries.

It might have been supposed, that the very

<sup>1</sup> Reasonings from authority, when thus regulated, are coincident with probabilities. See the opening of Aristotle's Topics. The word *ἔνδοξον* expresses such coincidence.

discussion of religion in the form of *doubts*, would have palpably shewn the impropriety of proposing truths so obtained, as matters of Revelation; since the truths of religion were thus exhibited as appeals to the *reason* of man. A doubt is, by its nature, relative to human reason; and the settlement of it by argument, is a simple decision of human reason. If the conclusion be received on the authority of the reasoner in his sacerdotal character; the previous doubt and the argumentation are perfectly irrelevant.

So anomalous, indeed, is the mode of proceeding in the Scholastic development of Christian Theology, that it is only capable of solution, as appears to me, from the fact noticed at the commencement of these Lectures; that the Scholastic system was a prolonged struggle between Reason and Authority. The effort throughout is, to maintain both principles. But the method of Theology being originally founded in speculation and resistance to mere authority, we find traces of this beginning, in the compromise of principles which the maturity of the system displays. It is ratiocination that triumphs; and Logic domineers over Theology.

The previous discussion has, I trust, prepared the way for the conclusions, which I wish now to submit to your consideration, as to the nature and use of Dogmatic Theology.

It is evident, I think, from the inquiry which I have been pursuing, on the whole, as well as more immediately from the preceding observations, that

the doctrinal statements of religious truth, have their origin in the principles of the human intellect. Strictly to speak, in the Scripture itself there are no *doctrines*. What we read there is matter of fact: either fact nakedly set forth as it occurred; or fact explained and elucidated by the light of inspiration cast upon it. It will be thought, perhaps, that the Apostolic Epistles are an exception to this observation. If any part of Scripture contains *doctrinal* statements, it will, at any rate, be supposed to be the Epistolary. But even this part, if accurately considered, will not be found an exception. No one perhaps will maintain, that there is any new truth of Christianity set forth in the Epistles; any truth, I mean, which does not presuppose the whole truth of Human Salvation by Jesus Christ, as already determined and complete. The Epistles clearly imply that the work of Salvation is done. They repeat and insist on its most striking parts; urging chiefly on man, what remains for him to *do*, now that Christ has done all that God purposed in behalf of man, before the foundation of the world. Let the experiment be fairly tried: let the inveterate idea, that the Epistles are the doctrinal portion of Scripture, be for a while banished from the mind: and let them be read simply as the works of our Fathers in the Faith—of men who are commending us rather to the love of Christ, than opening our understanding to the mysteries of Divine Knowledge: and, after such an experiment, let each decide for himself, whether the practical, or

the theoretic, view of the Epistles, is the correct one. For my part, I cannot doubt but that the decision will be in favour of the *practical* character of them. The speculating theologian will perhaps answer, by adducing text after text from an Epistle, in which he will contend that some dogmatic truth, some theory, or system, or peculiar view of divine truth, is asserted. But “what is the chaff to the wheat?” I appeal, from the logical criticism of the Apostle’s words, to their Apostolical spirit—from Paul philosophizing, to Paul preaching, and entreating, and persuading. And I ask, whether it is likely that an Apostle would have adopted the form of an epistolary communication, for imparting mysterious propositions to disciples, with whom he enjoyed the opportunity of personal intercourse; and to whom he had already “declared the whole counsel of “God;” whether, in preaching Christ, he would have used a method of communicating truth, which implies some scientific application of language,—an analysis, at least, of propositions into their terms,—in order to its being rightly understood? And I further request it may be considered, whether it was not, by such a mode of inference from the Scripture-language, as would convert the Epistles into textual authorities on points of controversy, that the very system of the Scholastic Theology was erected.

Dogmas of Theology then, *as such*, are human authorities. But do I mean to say by this, that



they are unimportant in Religion, or that they are essentially wrong, foreign to true Religion, and inconsistent with it? I wish rather to establish their importance and proper truth, as distinct from the honour and verity of the simple Divine Word.

We have seen how Doctrines gradually assume their form, by the successive impressions of controversy. The facts of Scripture remain the same through all ages, under all variations of opinions among men. Not so the theories raised upon them. They have floated on the stream of speculation. One heresiarch after another has proposed his modification. The doctrine, so stated, has obtained more or less currency, according to its coincidence with received notions on other subjects,—according to the influence possessed by its patrons, or their obstinacy against persecution. Nearly the whole of Christendom was, at one time, Arian in profession.<sup>k</sup> At one time, Pelagianism seemed to be the ascendant creed of the Church.<sup>l</sup> In such a state of things, it was impossible for the Scriptural theologian, even if not himself susceptible of the seductive force of a Logical Philosophy, to refrain from mingling in the conflict of argument. Orthodoxy was forced to speak the divine truth in the terms of heretical speculation; if it were only to guard against the novelties which the heretic had introduced. It was the necessity of the case that compelled the orthodox, as themselves freely admit, to employ a phraseology,

<sup>k</sup> Note F.

<sup>l</sup> Note G.

by which, as experience proves, the naked truth of God has been overborne and obscured.

Such being the origin of a Dogmatic Theology, it follows, that its proper truth consists in its being a collection of negations; of negations, I mean, of all ideas imported into religion, beyond the express sanction of Revelation. Supposing that there had been no theories proposed on the truths of Christianity; were the Bible, or rather the divine facts which it reveals, at once ushered into our notice, without our knowing that various wild notions, both concerning God and human nature, had been raised upon the sacred truths: no one, I conceive, would wish to see those facts reduced to the precision and number of articles, any more than he now thinks of reducing any other history to such a form. We should rather resist any such attempt as futile, if not as profane: or, however judiciously such a selection might be made, we should undoubtedly prefer the living records of the Divine Agency, to the dry and uninteresting abstracts of human compilers and expositors. But, when theoretic views are known to have been held and propagated; when the world has been familiarized to the language of these speculations, and the truth of God is liable to corruption from them; then it is, that forms of exclusion become necessary, and theory must be resorted to by theory. This very occasion, however, of the introduction of Theory into Religion, suggests the limitation of it. It must be strictly confined to the exclusion and rejection of all extraneous notions

from the subjects of the sacred volumes. Theory, thus regulated, constitutes a true and valuable philosophy,—not of Christianity, properly so called,—but of human Christianity,—of Christianity in the world, as it has been acted on by the force of the human intellect.

This is the view which I take, not only of our Articles at large, but in particular, of the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, as they stand in our Ritual, or are adopted into our Articles. If it be admitted that the notions on which their several expressions are founded, are both unphilosophical and unscriptural; it must be remembered, that they do not impress those notions on the Faith of the Christian, as matters of affirmative belief. They only use the terms of ancient theories of Philosophy,—theories current in the Schools at the time when they were written,—to exclude others *more obviously* injurious to the simplicity of the Faith. The speculative language of these Creeds, it should be observed, was admitted into the Church of England as established by the Reformers, before the period, when the genius of Bacon exposed the emptiness of the system, which the Schools had palmed upon the world as the only instrument for the discovery of all Truth. At such a time, accordingly, the theories opposed in the original formularies of the orthodox, would be powerfully felt as real obstacles to a sound belief in Christian Truths; and the terms, declaring the orthodox doctrine, would be readily interpreted by the existing physical and logical notions. The minds of

men would be fully preoccupied with the notions of matter, and form, and substance, and accident; and, when such notions had produced misconception of the sacred Truth, it would be a necessary expedient, to correct that misconception by a less exceptionable employment of them.<sup>m</sup>

If this account of the origin and nature of Dogmatic Theology be correct, surely those entirely pervert its nature, who reason on the Terms of doctrines, as if they were the proper ideas belonging to Religion; or who insist on interpretations of expressions, whether as employed by our Reformers, or the primitive believers, in a positive sense; without taking into their view, the existing state of theology and philosophy at the different periods of Christianity. Creeds and Articles, without such previous study, are as if they were written in a strange language. The words, indeed, are signs of ideas to us, but not of those ideas which were presented to the minds of men, when the formularies were written, or when they were adopted by the Church.

But here the question may be asked, how far on these grounds Creeds and Articles may be retained when the original occasion for them has ceased? The answer of Hooker will readily occur to many; that the occasion having ceased, it by no means follows that the statements themselves should no longer be of use;<sup>n</sup> a fact that may be illustrated

<sup>m</sup> Note H.

<sup>n</sup> *Eccles. Polity*, b. V. 42. p. 167, &c. vol. II. 8vo. ed. 1807.

by several analogies. But the case of Articles is a peculiar one in this respect; that the result itself is conceived to be an evil, or, at least, an alternative to avoid an evil; it being admitted to be better, except by way of antidote against heretical doctrine, that there should be no other Articles but the Word of God itself. It appears to me, then, that the occasion for Articles will probably never cease. Were the Realism of the human mind a transient phenomenon, peculiar to one age, or one species of philosophy, and not, as is the fact, an instinctive propensity of our intellectual nature; then it might be supposed, that the unsoundness of a metaphysical and logical Theology being once fully admitted, the cumbrous machinery might be removed, and the sacred truth allowed to stand forth to view, in its own attractive simplicity. But such a result seems rather to be wished, and prayed for, by a sanguine piety, than reckoned upon in the humbling calculations of human experience. In the mean time, it were well to retain, amidst all its confessed imperfections, a system of technical theology, by which we are guarded, in some measure, from the exorbitance of theoretic enthusiasm. It would be a rashness of pious feeling, that should at once so confide in itself, as to throw down the walls and embankments, which the more vigilant fears of our predecessors have reared up around the City of God. In the present state of things, such a zeal for the Faith would look more like the ostentatiousness of Spartan courage, than

the modest discipline of the soldiers of Christ, trusting in his arm for success, and yet availing themselves of all natural means of strength, which their reason points out.

The force, indeed, of History must always act on a literary age: and an influence is exercised, by former speculators, on the opinions and conduct of their successors. We cannot therefore conclude; that because the original occasion of Creeds and Articles had ceased, there are actually no existing prejudices of a like kind, kept alive by the tradition of former opinions, to be obviated by the like theoretic statements.

At the same time we must not suppose, that the same immutability belongs to Articles of Religion, which we ascribe properly to Scripture-facts alone. As records of Opinions they are essentially variable. It is no impeachment of their truth, to regard them as capable of improvement,—of more perfect adaptation to the existing circumstances of the Church at different periods. As to the difficulty and hazard of any actual alteration, I have nothing to say. I do not presume to say, that alteration is actually required. I am merely addressing myself to the general question, as to the capacity of improvement in Church-Creeds and Articles, with the view of suggesting a right theory of the subject. To deny the essential variableness of such documents, is, to admit an human authority to a parity with the authority of Inspiration. It is to incur the imputation,

which members of the Roman Communion have sometimes brought against the Church of England; that, professing to make the Scriptures the sole Rule of Faith, we have inconsistently adopted another Rule of Faith in the deference paid to our Articles.

It is a temptation, indeed, to which the members of any particular communion of Christians are peculiarly exposed—to identify the defence of the formularies of the Communion with the defence of Christianity. It is like securing the fortifications of the city, instead of looking to the strength and discipline of its garrison as the main resource. As belonging to a Communion, we must be able to shew that we have good reason for our preference. And it is enough for this purpose, to prove that our Church is truly Scriptural in its basis, walking in the footsteps of the Holy Spirit, and drinking of the pure fountain of inspiration. This is the sole proper notion of the infallibility of a Church. For it is an infallibility not its own, but of God present with it. We are not called upon, to defend every particular expression which has been adopted into its formularies. This would be, to make it infallible *in itself*. It would be, to suppose, that a fortress, strong in its internal resources, must fall, because some of its outworks are not impregnable. And we may find indeed at last, that, by such a proceeding, we are tenaciously cleaving to means of defence, which the present state of religion and knowledge entirely supersedes; as we might suppose the inhabitant of

a castle fortified in feudal times, imagining himself safe amidst his walls, against assaults from modern inventions in the art of war.

The use and importance then of Dogmatic Theology are to be estimated, from its relation to the Social Profession of Christianity. It is, in regard to Christianity, what political institutions are in regard to the social principles of our nature. As these principles are the real conservative causes of human society; and political institutions are the supports and auxiliaries; so are the dogmas of Theology enforcements by external barriers, of the saving, quickening truths of the Gospel. The imperfection of man is equally the occasion of both. Were all men just the social instincts would develop themselves, without the artificial methods of civil government. So, were all the humble disciples of Christ, Christian sentiment would speak in its own accents, and not be constrained to learn the foreign tongue of technical theology. The case appears to be this. The agreement of a community in certain views of Scripture-facts is presupposed. The problem before the Dogmatic Theologian is, to preserve that agreement entire; to guard it from a latitudinarianism which would virtually annul it; and to prevent its dissolution by innovators, either within or without the religious society. The anathemas of Creeds and Councils can only be justified on this ground. They are the penalties of social Religion. The authority of the Church, which has prescribed any particular collection of Articles to its members, by



the use of these invisible sanctions, calls upon them, not to profess its doctrines lightly and unadvisedly ; but to bear in mind the awful responsibility attached to matters of divine Revelation ; and that it is about these they are engaged, when they set their hand to Articles or any professions of doctrine.

I have now completed the inquiry which I proposed into the influence of the Scholastic Philosophy on our Theological Language ; at least to the extent which the present occasion permitted ; and sufficiently, I trust, to the establishment of the fact ; that this Philosophy is the basis of all our most important technical terms, and modes of thinking, both in Religion and in Ethics. I have also, in this last Lecture, discussed the principles of Authority and of Reason, which the Scholastic system embodied in itself ; and have endeavoured to draw the line of distinction between a legitimate combination of them in a system of Dogmatic Theology, and that arrogant method of universal speculation, which, commencing with the confusion of all human truth, ends in the confusion of Divine Truth with human.

Nor let it be supposed, that the speculative Theology into which I have been examining, is a thing of another day—a mere matter of curiosity to the literary or ecclesiastical historian. I should have failed indeed in the present attempt to bring the subject before you ; if this should be the impression

from it. Scholasticism indeed has passed away, as to its actual rude form, in which it appeared in the middle age. But its dominion has endured. In the Church of Rome, indeed, it still holds visible sway; clothed in the purple of spiritual supremacy, and giving the law of Faith to the subject-consciences of men. Those who are at all acquainted with the public documents of that Church, as established by the Council of Trent, or with its controversial writers, will attest the general observation; that it is the metaphysics of the Schools, which form the texture of the Roman Theology, and by which that system is maintained. In the destitution of Scripture-facts for the support of the theological structure, the method of subtile distinctions and reasonings has been found of admirable efficacy. It eludes the opponent, who, not being trained to this dialectical warfare, is not aware, that all such argumentation is a tacit assumption of the point in controversy; or is perplexed and confounded by the elaborate subtilties of the apologist. No argument indeed from fact can suffice against the artifice of distinctions. The expert metaphysician is ready with some new abstraction, as soon as he is assailed with an adverse position or consequence; and the objector feels himself entangled in meshes, against which his strength, however superior, is wasted in unavailing efforts. The resistance, which the Roman Church has shewn against improvements in Natural Philosophy, is no inconsiderable evidence of the connexion of the ecclesiastical system with the ancient

Logical Philosophy of the Schools. There has been a constant fear, lest, if that philosophy should be exploded, some important doctrines could not be maintained.<sup>n</sup>

But though the sorceries of the Scholastic Theology have been dispelled where the light of Reformation has been received; yet the transformations of religious truth, which they effected, could not at once be reversed by the same effort of improvement. The minds of men had been trained to think and speak of divine things, in the idiom of Scholasticism. So that, not only the reformer in Philosophy, but the reformer in Religion also, was compelled to use the phraseology of the system which he assailed. Thus, through its technical language, has Scholasticism survived even in Protestant Churches. Clearly, we may trace its operation in the controversies agitated among Protestants about Original Sin, Grace, Regeneration, Predestination;—all which, when strictly considered, are found to resolve themselves into disputes concerning the just limits of certain notions,—into questions of the exactness of proposed definitions. So again, it is not uncommon to find, even among our own theologians, one doctrine insisted on, as *necessary* to be admitted *in order* to the reception of another. Original Sin, for instance, is not unfrequently inculcated, as essential to be believed to the fullest extent, in order to an acceptance of the truth of the Atonement: as if the truth of either doctrine were a matter of logical

<sup>n</sup> Note I.

deduction, or dependent on the truth of the other : whereas, in the correct view, each is an ultimate fact in the revealed dispensations of God, resting on its own proper evidence. Once acknowledging, indeed, the reality of the Christian Revelation, we are bound to refer the whole of Human Happiness to the mediation of Christ ; though the Scriptures had been entirely silent respecting the fact of the intrinsic sinfulness of man. And conversely ; we should have been under an obligation of acting, as feeling ourselves under sin, and naturally incapable of happiness ; had the Scriptures simply stated our incapacity and misery, without revealing the mercies of the Atonement.

The real state of the case then is, that the spirit of Scholasticism still lives amongst us : that, though we do not acknowledge submission to its empire, we yet feel its influence.<sup>o</sup>

At the time, indeed, when Luther raised his voice against the corruptions sanctioned by the Roman Church, the complaint was, that the spiritual lessons of Scripture were become a dead letter. There were however, even at that time, men of deep and familiar acquaintance with Scripture, the votaries of an ardent and sincere piety. Their religion, however, was inaccessible to the poor, and the illiterate, and the busy. It was the privilege of the theologian,—of the holy and speculative recluse. The mass of

<sup>o</sup> The practice itself of preaching from Texts of Scripture is a remnant of Scholasticism. At the time of the Reformation it was carried to the most absurd excess.—Note J.

the people indolently, or superstitiously, reposed on the sanctity of their Fathers in religion; and sought their rule of faith and conduct, in devout attendance on the vicarious ministrations of the man of God. In a word, Religion was become a *professional* thing. None could be truly and properly religious, but those who were versed in the logic and casuistry of a scientific theology. Therefore it was, that Luther so vehemently proclaimed the great doctrine of Justification by Faith alone: setting himself against that divorce of Theology and popular Religion, by which the Gospel had in effect been unevangelized and desecrated. And are there not still traces amongst us, of a separation between the religion of the few and the religion of the many? The delusion indeed has passed away in its *theoretic* form; that true religion can consist in any thing but in holiness of active life,—in an habitual conduct conformed to the example of our Lord Jesus Christ. But the principle of that separation, against which the Reformation was directed, is still seen in that enthusiasm, which, even in these days, loves to diffuse itself in sentimental religion;—which spends the strength of devotion in holy thoughts,—the luxury, like the Scholastic Piety, only of the pure, the cultivated, the sensitive, and the ardent mind. It is now an enthusiasm of the heart, rather than of the intellect. But the principle is still the same. Religion is converted into Theological Contemplation.

The examination which I have been pursuing,

has led me over much entangled ground ; from which I can hardly hope to have extricated myself, in a way to satisfy the views, or scruples, of all whom I address. But the peculiar difficulty of forming just estimates of controversial statements, —and of seizing the shifting lights of philosophical theories, as they have passed over the truths of Revelation, and given to them their various hue,—will obtain for me, I trust, a patient and candid construction of opinions expressed. It would ill become me, indeed, to dogmatize on a subject, in which I am directly engaged in illustrating the injurious effects of Dogmatism in Theology ; and especially before an audience, from some of whom I should rather expect the judgment of a point, than endeavour to impose my own opinion. It must be admitted, I think, on the whole, that the Force of Theory has been very considerable in the modification of our Theological language. And I would submit to your reflection, whether that force has been sufficiently allowed for, either in our general profession of Christianity, or in our controversies on particular articles of Doctrine ?

But, however successfully I may have established the desired conclusion ; there may, I fear, remain in some minds,—where there has existed an indiscriminate veneration of the names and terms attached to Christianity, as of parts of the holy religion itself,—a painful impression of mistrust,—a suspicious reasoning with themselves ; that, either the argument

must be erroneous, or they have followed cunningly-devised fables—the imaginations of the sophistical wisdom of this world—as the Gospel of Truth? For the sake of such persons, I would once more call attention to the divine part of Christianity, as entirely distinct from its episodic additions. Whatever may have been the motives and conduct of successive agents employed in its propagation from age to age; whatever may have been the speculations of false Philosophy on the facts of Christianity; those facts themselves are not touched;—they remain indisputable, so far as any objections on such grounds can avail. These facts form part of the great History of mankind: they account for the present condition of things in the world: and we cannot deny them without involving ourselves in universal scepticism. There can be no rational doubt; that man is in a degraded, disadvantageous condition,—that Jesus Christ came into the world, in the mercy of God, to produce a restoration of man,—that He brought Life and Immortality to light by his coming,—that He died on the Cross for our sins, and rose again for our justification,—that the Holy Ghost came by his promise to abide with his Church, miraculously assisting the Apostles in the first institution of it, and, ever since that period, interceding with the hearts of believers. These, and other truths connected with them, are not collected merely from *texts* or *sentences* of Scripture: they are parts of its records. Infinite theories may be raised upon them; but these theories, whether true

or false, leave the facts where they were. There is enough in them to warm and comfort the heart; though we had assurance of nothing more.

It is an excellent effect indeed of unprejudiced theological study,—a reward, it may be called, of our honesty in the pursuit,—that our sensitiveness to particular objections diminishes, as we advance in the investigation. If there are any therefore, whose anxiety for the sacred cause has been awakened by any observations in the course of the present Lectures; I exhort them to proceed, fearless of any ultimate shock to the real truth of Christianity by the most searching investigation. The knowledge of the speculations, which have mingled with the statement of the truth, cannot but be, in the result, of the greatest service. It will enable the theological student to see, that objections against the theoretic parts of doctrines (and objections are principally of this kind) are no objections against the fundamental doctrines themselves—*the revealed facts*—which are really and in themselves, independent of those theories. And,—what is of even still greater, far greater, importance to him as a Christian,—it will inculcate on him candour, forbearance, charitable construction of the views of others, an humble and teachable disposition towards God.





# APPENDIX.

NOTES.



# APPENDIX.

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## LECTURE I.

NOTE A. p. 17.

I HAVE translated the following epistle of Jerome, wishing to give the general reader a more obvious view of the style of intermingled address and authority which appears in it; and which affords a fair specimen of the general character of the writer: though it is impossible by translation, to present a full idea of the art of the composition; as the very collocation of the words is studied, both to please the ear and give point to the expressions.

*Jerome<sup>a</sup> to Damasus.<sup>b</sup>*

Since the East, jarred by inveterate fury of the people among themselves, tears piecemeal the Lord's tunic "without seam and woven from the top;" and foxes exterminate the vine of Christ;<sup>c</sup> so that, amidst "the broken cisterns that hold no water,"<sup>d</sup> it may with difficulty be discovered, where is the "sealed fountain, and the inclosed garden:" I have, therefore, thought it right to consult the chair of Peter, and the faith approved by apostolic lips; demanding my soul's food from the same source now, whence formerly I took on me the vestments of Christ.<sup>e</sup>

Nor, in truth, could the vast expanse of liquid element,

<sup>a</sup> *Hieronymi Oper.* ed. Erasmi, 1565. tom. II. p. 131.

<sup>b</sup> Damasus, a Spaniard by birth; Bishop of Rome from A.D. 367 to A.D. 384. Jerome had been his ecclesiastical secretary.

<sup>c</sup> *Cantic.* ii. 15.

<sup>d</sup> *Jerem.* ii. 13.

<sup>e</sup> Alluding to his ordination at Rome, or more probably to his baptism there.

and the interjacent length of lands, restrain me from searching for the precious pearl. Wherever the carcass is, there are the eagles gathered together. The patrimony being squandered by an evil offspring, with you alone is preserved uncorrupted the inheritance of the fathers. There the earth with fruitful glebe returns an hundredfold the pure seed of the Lord: here, overwhelmed in the furrows, the wheat degenerates into darnel and wild oats. Now in the West the sun of justice rises; but in the East, that Lucifer who had fallen, has placed his throne above the stars. You are the light of the world; you the salt of the earth; you the vessels of gold and silver: here the vessels of clay, or wood, await the rod of iron and eternal conflagration. Although therefore your greatness deters me, still your kindness invites me. From a priest I ask the victim of salvation; from a shepherd the protection of the sheep. Let invidiousness droop; let the ambition of the Roman summit recede. It is with the successor of the fisherman, and the disciple of the cross, that I am speaking. For my part, except as following Christ, I associate no first<sup>f</sup> in communion with your Blessedness; that is, with the Chair of Peter: on that rock, I know, the Church was built. Whoever without that house has eaten of the lamb, is profane. If any one is not in the ark of Noah, he will perish when the flood prevails. And because for my offences,<sup>g</sup> I have migrated to that solitude which parts Syria from the adjacent Barbarian confines; and I am unable always to ask the holy thing<sup>h</sup> of the Lord from your Sanctity, at such intervening spaces; I therefore follow your colleagues here, the Egyptian Confessors; and lurk, myself a little bark, under ships of burden.<sup>i</sup> I know not Vitalis; Meletius I reject; I am ignorant of Paulinus.<sup>k</sup>

<sup>f</sup> To shew that He did not give precedence to the Patriarch of Antioch.

<sup>g</sup> As doing penance by self-mortification.

<sup>h</sup> Erasmus explains this of the body of Christ, or the Eucharist.

<sup>i</sup> As contrasting his own affected littleness with the full-freighted sanctity of the Egyptian monks.

<sup>k</sup> All bishops of the Arian party at Antioch.

Whoever gathers not with you, scatters: that is, who is not of Christ, is of Antichrist.

Now therefore, alas! after the Nicene faith, after the Alexandrian decree made in concurrence with the West, the novel expression of three hypostases is exacted of me, a Roman man, by the Arian Prelate and the people of the Campè.<sup>1</sup> Who are the Apostles, I pray, that have handed down such things? Who is the new master of the nations,—the Paul,—that has taught them? Let us ask them; what they conceive can be understood by three hypostases. Three persons subsisting, they say. We answer, that we so believe. The sense is not enough; they are importunate for the term itself: because some unknown poison lurks under the syllables. We exclaim, if any one confesses not three hypostases, or three enhypostata,—that is, three subsisting persons,—let him be anathema. And because we do not get words by heart, we are judged heretical. If any one however, understanding by hypostasis, *usia*, does not say, one hypostasis in three persons, he is alien from Christ. Yet under this confession, we are, equally with you, branded with the cautery of the *Union*.<sup>m</sup> Determine if it is your pleasure, I beseech you; I shall not fear to say three hypostases: if you order it, let a new faith be framed after the Nicene; and let us who are the orthodox confess in like words with the Arians.

The whole school of secular literature knows nothing else by hypostasis, but *usia*. And who, I ask, with sacrilegious mouth will proclaim three substances. One and sole is the nature of God, which truly *is*. For, what subsists,

<sup>1</sup> The curve of the coast of Cilicia, so called.

<sup>m</sup> The familiar name for Sabellianism. *Union* however scarcely gives the same idea as the Latin *Unio*. The term *Cautery* is borrowed from the practice of branding a mark on the young soldier.—So again he says in an epistle to the Presbyter Mark: *Hæreticus vocor, homusion prædicans trinitatem. Sabellianæ impietatis arguor; tres subsistentes, veras, integras, perfectasque personas, indefessa voce pronuntians. . . . Quotidie exposcor fidem; quasi sine fide renatus sim. Confiteor ut volunt; non placet. Subscribo; non credunt. Opera, tom. II. p. 315.*

has not from any other; but is its own. Other things which are created, though they seem to be, are not; because at one time they were not; and that which has not existed may again not exist. God alone, who is eternal,—that is, who has no beginning,—holds truly the name of Essence. Therefore also to Moses from the bush, he says, “I am that I am;” and again, “He that is sent me.” There existed truly then, angels, heaven, earth, seas. Yet how does God vindicate to Himself properly the common name of Essence? But, because that nature alone is perfect, and one Deity subsists in three persons; which truly exists, and is one nature; whoever says, that three are,—that is, that three hypostases are, that is, *usixæ*;—under the name of piety, attempts to assert three natures.

And if this be so, why are we by walls separated from Arius; when in perfidy we are coupled with him? Let Ursicinus<sup>n</sup> be joined with your Blessedness; let Auxentius<sup>o</sup> be associated with Ambrose. Far be this from the Roman Faith. Let not the religious hearts of the people imbibe so great a sacrilege. Let it suffice us to say; one substance, three persons subsisting, perfect, equal, co-eternal. Let there be no mention of three hypostases, with your leave; and let one be held. It is of no good suspicion; since, in the same sense, the words are dissentient. Let the traditional mode of belief suffice us. Or, if you think it right, that we should say three hypostases with their interpretations, we refuse not. But believe me, poison lurks under the honey: an angel of Satan has transfigured himself into an angel of light. They interpret hypostasis well; and when I say, that I hold what they themselves expound, I am judged heretical. Why so anxiously do they hold one word? Why do they lurk under an ambiguous expression? If I so believe, as themselves affect to think; let them permit me also to speak their own sense in my own words.

<sup>n</sup> An Arian competitor with Damasus for the papal see.

<sup>o</sup> Arian Bishop of Milan, predecessor of Ambrose.

I therefore beseech your Blessedness, by the Crucified One, the salvation of the world,—by the homouousion Trinity,—to give me authority by your letters, either to forbear saying, or to say, the hypostases. And lest perhaps the obscurity of the place in which I am living, may escape your search, be so gracious as to transmit your writings by your letter-carriers, to Evagrius, the presbyter, who is well known to you; at the same time, to signify with whom I should communicate at Antioch: since the people of the Campè, coupled with the heretics of Tarsus, are only ambitious that, supported by the authority of your communion, they may proclaim three hypostases in the ancient sense.

## NOTE B. p. 17.

After the death of Auxentius, the city of Milan was thrown into commotion by the contending factions of the Arians and the Orthodox; each seeking to elect as successor to the see, a man of their own party. Ambrose appears in the Church, in his capacity of Prefect of Italy, to quell the disturbance: when suddenly, according to his biographer Paulinus, the voice of an infant in the crowd called out the name of Ambrose. The name was received as an happy omen by the assembled multitude, and spread from mouth to mouth, until the uproar of acclamation proclaimed the choice of the people to have fallen on the Prefect himself. He leaves the Church, ascends the tribunal of justice, and tries the constancy of his electors, as Paulinus proceeds to relate, by a severity unusual in him, the question by torture. Still the people continue their acclamations, "Thy sin be upon us;" "Thy sin be upon us;"—thus silencing any scruples of his conscience. He attempts further to decline their importunity by flying from the city at midnight; and his escape being prevented, afterwards conceals himself in a private house. But all being unavailing, the reluctant Prefect at length consents to take on him the burden of the sacred office,



and ascends the step to the honours of his future saintship.

We may not unreasonably suspect in this instance, a dissimulation like that of some civil rulers, who have declined in appearance, a proffered crown, the real object of their ambition. This is the more likely, when we find, according to the same authority, Probus, the Prætorian Prefect, by whom Ambrose was sent to quell the commotion at Milan, instructing him to "go and act, not as judge, but as bishop:" and hailing afterwards, in the election of Ambrose, the fulfilment of his word.<sup>p</sup>

Ambrose himself thus speaks of his own election.

Quam resistebam ne ordinarer, postremo cum cogerer, saltem ordinatio protelaretur! Sed non valuit præscriptio, prævaluit impressio. Tamen ordinationem meam occidentales episcopi iudicio, orientales etiam exemplo, probarunt. Et tamen neophytus prohibetur ordinari, ne extollatur superbia. Si dilatio ordinationi defuit, vis cogentis est: si non deest humilitas competens sacerdotio, ubi causa non hæret, vitium non imputatur. *Ambros. Epistol. LXIII. Oper. tom. II. p. 1037.*

Dicetur enim: Ecce ille non in ecclesiæ nutritus sinu, non edomitus a puero, sed raptus a tribunalibus, abductus de vanitatibus sæculi hujus, a præconis voce ad psalmistæ adsuefactus canticum, in sacerdotio manet, non virtute sua, sed Christi gratia, et inter convivas mensæ cælestis recumbit. Serva, Domine, munus tuum; custodi donum quod contulisti etiam refugienti. Ego enim sciebam quod non eram dignus vocari episcopus; quoniam dederam me sæculo huic, &c. *Ambros. De Pœnit. lib. II. Oper. tom. II. p. 432.*

Unus enim verus magister est, qui solus non didicit quod omnes doceret: homines autem discunt prius quod doceant, et ab illo accipiunt quod aliis tradant. Quod ne ipsum quidem mihi accidit. Ego enim raptus de tribunalibus,

<sup>p</sup> *Ambrosii Vit. per Paulinum.*—The work is addressed to Augustine. Paulinus, the author, was a deacon, and notary, or secretary, to Ambrose.

atque administrationis infulis, ad sacerdotium, docere vos cœpi, quod ipse non didici. Itaque factum est ut prius docere inciperem, quam discere. Discendum igitur mihi simul, et docendum est; quoniam non vacavit ante discere. *Ambros. De Officiis Ministror. I. c. 1.*

The instance given by Gregory Nazianzen, of a similar election, is the following one.

Ὡς δ' εἰς πλείους τοῦ δήμου διαιρεθέντος, καὶ ἄλλων ἄλλον προβαλλομένων, ὅπερ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῦτοις φιλεῖ συμβαίνειν, ὡς ἕκαστος ἔτυχεν ἢ φιλίας πρὸς τινὰς ἔχων, ἢ πρὸς θεὸν εὐλαβείας, τέλος συμφρονήσας ὁ δῆμος ἅπας, τὸν πρῶτον παρ' αὐτοῖς ἕνα, βίῳ μὲν ἐξελεγμένον, οὐπω δὲ τῷ θεῷ βαπτίσματι κατεσφραγισμένον, τοῦτον ἄκοντα συναρπάσαντες, καὶ ἅμα στρατιωτικῆς χειρὸς συλλαβομένης αὐτοῖς τῆνικαῦτα ἐπιδημούσης ἐπὶ τὸ βῆμα ἔθεσαν, καὶ τοῖς ἐπισκόποις προσήγαγον, τελεσθῆναι τε ἡξίουν, καὶ κηρυχθῆναι, πειθοῖ βίαν ἀναμίξαντες· οὐ λίαν μὲν εὐτάκτως, λίαν δὲ πιστῶς καὶ διαπύρως. κἀντᾶυθα οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ὃν τινὰ εὐδοκιμώτερον ἐκείνου, καὶ θεοσεβέστερον, διέδειξεν ὁ καιρὸς. τί γὰρ γίνεται; καὶ ποῖ προήλθεν ἡ στάσις; ἐβιάσθησαν, ἤγνισαν, ἀνεκίρυσαν, ἐπὶ τὸν θρόνον ἔθεσαν, χειρὶ μᾶλλον, ἢ γνώμῃ, καὶ διαθέσει πνεύματος. κ. τ. λ. *Orat. XIX.*

Mentioning a recurrence of these contentions, he adds:

Καὶ ἡ στάσις ἦν, ὅσῳ θερμότερα, τοσοῦτω καὶ ἀλογωτέρα. Οὐ γὰρ ἠγνοεῖτο τὸ ὑπεραίρον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν ἄστρασιν ἡλιος, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν ἐπίδηλον ἦν, τοῖς τε ἄλλοις ἅπασι, καὶ τοῦ λαοῦ μάλιστα τῷ ἐγκρίτῳ τε καὶ καθαρωτάτῳ, ὅσον τε περὶ τὸ βῆμα, καὶ ὅσον ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς Ναζαραίοις· ἐφ' οἷς ἔδει τὰς τοιαύτας προβολὰς κείσθαι μόνοις, ἢ ὅτι μάλιστα· καὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις κακόν· ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῖς εὐπορωτάτοις τε καὶ δυνατωτάτοις, ἢ φορᾷ δήμου καὶ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν μάλιστα τοῖς εὐωνοτάτοις. νῦν δὲ κινδυνεύω τὰς δημοσίας ἀρχὰς εὐτακτωτέρας ὑπολαμβάνειν τῶν ἡμετέρων, αἷς ἢ θεῖα χάρις ἐπιφημίζεται, καὶ βελτίῳ τῶν τοιούτων διοικητῆν φόβον, ἢ λόγον. *Orat. XIX. Oper. ed. Par. 1609. pp. 308. 310.*

Jerome admits the right of the people to call to the clerical office, when, in writing to Rusticus, he says:—

et te, vel populus, vel pontifex civitatis, in clerum elegerit. *Hieron. ad Rustic. Monach. Oper. tom. i. p. 47.*

NOTE C. p. 19.

The following passage gives a lively picture of the occupations of Ambrose.

Non enim quærere ab eo poteram, quod volebam, sicut volebam, secludentibus me ab ejus aure atque ore catervis negotiosorum hominum, quorum infirmitatibus serviebat. Cum quibus quando non erat, quod perexiguum temporis erat, aut corpus reficiebat necessariis sustentaculis, aut lectione animum. Sed cum legebat, oculi ducebantur per paginas, et cor intellectum rimabatur, vox autem et lingua quiescebant. Sæpe, cum adessemus, non enim vetabatur quisquam ingredi, aut ei venientem nuntiari mos erat, sic eum legentem vidimus tacite, et aliter numquam: sedentesque in diuturno silentio, (quis enim tam intento esse oneri auderet?) discedebamus, et conjectabamus eum parvo ipso tempore, quod reparandæ menti suæ nansciscebatur, feriatum ab strepitu causarum alienarum, nolle in aliud avocari, et cavere fortasse, ne auditore suspenso et intento, si qua obscurius posuisset ille, quem legeret, etiam exponere necesse esset; aut de aliquibus difficilioribus disceptare quæstionibus, atque huic operi temporibus impensis, minus quam vellet voluminum evolveret; quamquam et caussa servandæ vocis, quæ illi facillime obtundebatur, poterat esse justior tacite legendi. Quolibet tamen animo id ageret, bono utique ille vir agebat. *Augustin. Confess. VI. 3.*

Ambrose however amply testifies to his own influence.

Quasi vero superiore anno, quando ad palatium sum petitus; cum præsentibus primatibus ante consistorium tractaretur; cum imperator basilicam vellet eripere; ego tunc aulæ contemplatione regalis infractus sim, constantiam non tenuerim sacerdotis, aut imminuto jure discesserim? Nonne meminerunt, quod ubi me cognovit populus pala-

tium petisse, ita irruit, ut vim ejus ferre non possent; quando comiti militari cum expeditis ad fugandam multitudinem egresso obtulerunt omnes se neci pro fide Christi. Nonne tunc rogatus sum, ut populum multo sermone mulcerem? sponderem fidem, quod basilicam ecclesiæ nullus invaderet? Et cum pro beneficio meum sit officium postulatum; tamen quod populus ad palatium venisset, mihi invidia commota est. In hanc igitur invidiam me redire desiderant. Revocavi populum, et tamen invidiam non evasi; quam quidem invidiam ego temperandam arbitror, non timendam. . . . Quid enim honorificentius quam ut imperator ecclesiæ filius esse dicatur? Quod cum dicitur, sine peccato dicitur, cum gratia dicitur. Imperator enim intra ecclesiam, non supra ecclesiam est: bonus enim imperator quærit auxilium ecclesiæ, non refutat. *Epist. XXI.* Oper. tom. II. col. 871—873.

The whole epistle is worth attention, as an evidence of the high tone which the Latin Church-leader could assume. In Epistle XXII. addressed to his sister, we have an account of the finding of the bodies of the martyrs Gervase and Protase, and of the wonder-working power attributed to them, of such timely service to Ambrose in the defence of his church at Milan.

## NOTE D. p. 20.

The letter of Volusian to Augustine is chiefly remarkable, as shewing the easy familiarity with which doubts on the most important doctrines could be proposed to Augustine without offence. This letter is that of a young man, freely stating some difficulties started in conversation respecting the Incarnation, and asking a solution of them from one, whose character and opinion were felt to be entitled to entire respect. Jerome also was open to inquiries from his followers and admirers; as we perceive from his epistles to Paula and Eustochium, discussing scripture-difficulties. But he seems to have required a more implicit devotion to his authority; a refer-

ence to him as to an oracle of scriptural interpretation, and not merely the arbiter of controversy. Augustine appears to great advantage, in point of affability and good-humour, in the contrast with him, in the correspondence which passed between them on Jerome's translation of some passages of the Bible. Augustine addressed to him three letters, before he could obtain an answer. In replying, Jerome complains of what Augustine had called questions, as reprehensions of his works; and of the length to which he must proceed, were he to answer them to his wish. *Prætermitto*, he says, *salutationis officia, quibus meum demulces caput; taceo de blanditiis, quibus reprehensionem mei niteris consolari.*<sup>q</sup> Again, in a subsequent epistle, charging Augustine with dispersing throughout Italy some strictures on his translation of a passage in the Epistle to the Galatians, he says: *Nonnulli familiares mei et vasa Christi, quorum Hierosolymis et in sanctis locis permagna copia est, suggerebant, non simplici a te animo factum, sed laudem atque munusculos et gloriolam populi requirente, ut de nobis cresceres; ut multi cognoscerent, te provocare, me timere; te scribere ut doctum, me tacere, ut imperitum; et tandem reperisse qui garrulitati meæ modum imponeret, &c.*<sup>r</sup> He entreats Augustine to let him rest in his old age; *senem latitantem in cellula lassere desine*; but tells him also that he still has power, and may be roused to conflict. Augustine's reply, though managed with art, is calm and softening. It appears, by the subsequent correspondence, to have produced the effect which he desired. The affectionateness of the character of Augustine, is evident, from the manner in which he speaks in his Confessions, of his mother, Monica, and of his friends, Alypius and Nebridius.

## NOTE E. p. 22.

I have already referred to the correspondence between

<sup>q</sup> *Epist. XI. in Augustin. Oper. ed. 4to. tom. II. fol. 14.*

<sup>r</sup> *Epist. XIII. fol. 18.*

Augustine and Jerome. Augustine's name was known throughout the whole world.<sup>s</sup> Questions were brought to Jerome on various matters from Italy, from Spain, from Africa, from Greece, from Gaul, and from the extremities of Germany. Paulinus,<sup>t</sup> Bishop of Nola, was another principal link in the communication between members of the Latin Church in the IVth century. The case of Vigilantius shews how quickly intelligence was conveyed from remote places. A presbyter at the foot of the Pyrenees ventures to declaim against the abuses which had crept into the Church, against the honours at the tombs of martyrs, against prayers for the dead, and the austerities and frivolities which had usurped the place of Christian discipline. Two neighbouring presbyters, Riparius and Desiderius, send his writings through the hands of another brother, Sisinnius, to Jerome. The principles of this reformer were not confined to himself, but were advocated by some bishops, and the contagion appeared to be spreading. The acrimony of Jerome was immediately called into action; and he pours forth a torrent of invective, the fruit of a night's lucubration, against the unhappy Vigilantius, or "Dormitantius," as he parodies the name. This letter, or pamphlet, was transmitted by the same Sisinnius, who was employed by Jerome on other occasions in the like service; and who, proceeding first to Egypt, would diffuse the intelligence also in that part of the world.<sup>u</sup>

The rapid circulation of the several epistles which passed between Augustine and Jerome, is evident, from the notices of the circumstance which occur in the course of them.<sup>x</sup> But the Pelagian Controversy is a still more

<sup>s</sup> *Episcopus in toto orbe notissimus. Hieronym. Augustino. Ep. XI. Augustin. Oper. 4to. tom. II. fol. 41.*

<sup>t</sup> Paulinus, born A.D. 354: died in 431.

<sup>u</sup> *Adv. Vigilant. Hieronym. Oper. ed. Erasm. tom. II. p. 120.*

<sup>x</sup> Thus Jerome refers to the circulation of the tracts of Ruffinus against himself. *Et unde oro te librorum tuorum ad me fama pervenit? Quis eos*

striking illustration of the fact. The occasion of the controversy is given by a monk of Britain. It is quickly propagated in the cities of Africa, in Sicily, Rhodes, and other islands of the Mediterranean. Orosius, a Spanish presbyter, is sent by Augustine to Palestine, to Jerome, to communicate with him on the subject. Pelagius and Celestius are found pleading their cause successively at Carthage, at Rome, and at Jerusalem. And throughout the agitation of the subject, a quick succession of communications is kept up between Africa, Gaul, Italy, and Syria. The messenger was always, I believe, one of the clergy; and the journeys were not to be accomplished without danger. Still there was no break in the chain of correspondence.

The travels of most of the leading men of the Church of the IVth century, should further be noticed in reference to this point. Athanasius is found in the West, Hilary of Poitiers in the East. Augustine perhaps was an exception after his succession to the see of Hippo. He says of himself in comparison with others, in writing to his own people: *Illud enim noverit dilectio vestra, nunquam me absentem fuisse licentiosa libertate, sed necessaria servitute; quæ sæpe sanctos fratres, et collegas meos, etiam labores transmarinos compulit sustinere; a quibus me semper non indevotio mentis, sed minus idonea valetudo corporis excusavit.* *Epist. CXXXVIII. Oper. tom. II. ed. 4to. fol. 198.* His authority was sufficiently powerful from his own seat of government. This spirit of personal exertion descended to their successors in the Latin Church of the middle age. It is surprising with what readiness distant and perilous journeys were performed by Churchmen of the XIIth and XIIIth centuries. John of Salisbury describes his own exertions in that way. *Siquidem Alpium*

*Romæ? quis in Italia, quis in Dalmatia disseminavit? Apolog. adv. Ruffin. Hieronym. Oper. tom. II. p. 231.*

‡ His health had suffered from his labours as a rhetorician. *Confess. IX. c. 2.*

juga transcendit decies, egressus Angliam: Apuliam secundo peragravi. Dominorum et amicorum negotia in Ecclesia Romana sæpius gessi: et emergentibus variis causis non modo Angliam, sed et Gallias multoties circumivi.<sup>z</sup>

## NOTE F. p. 23.

Sulpicius Severus speaks of the number of nobles who were in the monastery of St. Martin, near Tours.

Mollior ibi habitus pro crimine erat; quod eo magis sit mirum necesse est, quod multi inter eos nobiles habebantur, qui longe aliter educati, ad hanc se humilitatem et patientiam coegerant: pluresque ex his postea episcopos vidimus.<sup>a</sup>

St. Martin himself had served as a soldier in his youth.

The old aristocratic classes, at the period of the Vth century, were so reduced in numbers and influence and character, that there was no counterbalancing power against the Clergy. Whoever indeed of those classes possessed any energy or ambition, found his only sphere of action in the offices of ecclesiastical government. Prefects of provinces, military commanders, men of landed property, literary men, men of the world, some of these but newly converted, became bishops. Concessions were even made to their philosophical opinions, where it was desired to obtain the support of a man of talent and reputation. The case of Synesius is a striking illustration of this. He had his objections even on the article of the Resurrection. And he declines undertaking the office of a Bishop, unless he may be permitted to retain his philosophical scruples. He will concur in the public services of Christianity, provided he may philosophize according to his own taste. The people of Ptolemais had elected him for their bishop. He candidly states his sentiments on the subject. He refuses to put away his wife, or to live with

<sup>z</sup> *Metalogic.* lib. III. p. 838.

<sup>a</sup> *Vit. B. Mart.* c. 10.



her in secrecy, on the ground that it would be an offence against piety and morality. Ἐμοὶ τοιγαροῦν, ὃ τε θεός, ὃ τε νόμος, ἢ τε ἱερά Θεοφίλου χεῖρ, γυναῖκα ἐπιδέδωκε. προαγορεύω τοίνυν ἅπασι, καὶ μαρτύρομαι, ὡς ἐγὼ ταύτης οὔτε ἀλλοτριώσομαι καθάπαξ, οὔτε ὡς μοιχὸς αὐτῇ λάθρα συνέσομαι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤκιστα εὖσεβές, τὸ δὲ ἤκιστα νόμιμον· ἀλλὰ βουλήσομαί τε καὶ εἶξομαι συχνά μοι πάνυ καὶ χρηστὰ γενέσθαι παιδία. He mentions also his fondness for sports, and his aversion to the details of an official situation; pathetically lamenting over his loved dogs and his bow, which he would be forced to relinquish. Ἐπεὶ καὶ φιλοπαίγμων ὢν, ὃς γε παιδόθεν αἰτίαν ἔσχον ὄπλομανεῖν τε καὶ ἵππομανεῖν πέρα τοῦ δέοντος, ἀνιάσομαι μὲν· τί γὰρ καὶ πάθω, τὰς φιλτάτας κύνας ἀθήρους ὄρων, καὶ τὰ τόξα θριπηδέστατα· καρτηρήσω δὲ, ἂν ἐπιτάτῃ θεός· καὶ μισόφροντις ὢν, ὀδυνήσομαι μὲν, ἀνέξομαι δὲ, δικιδίων, καὶ πραγμάτων, λειτουργίαν τινὰ ταύτην, εἰ καὶ βαρεῖαν, ἐκπιμπλὰς τῷ θεῷ· δόγματα δὲ οὐκ ἐπηλυγάζομαι, οὐδὲ στασιάζει μοι πρὸς τὴν γλῶτταν ἢ γνώμη. Willing however as he is to make some sacrifices, he resolutely refuses, we find, any compromise of his opinions. On this point he explicitly says: Χαλεπὸν ἔστιν, εἰ μὴ καὶ λίαν ἀδύνατον, εἰς ψυχὴν τὰ δι' ἐπιστήμης εἰς ἀπόδειξιν ἔλθοντα δόγματα σαλευθῆναι. οἶσθα δ' ὅτι πολλὰ φιλοσοφία τοῖς θρυλλουμένοις τούτοις ἀντιδιατάτεται δόγμασιν. ἀμέλει τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀξιώσω ποτὲ σώματος ὑστερογενῆ νομίζειν· τὸν κόσμον οὐ φήσω καὶ τᾶλλα μέρη συνδιαφθείρεσθαι· τὴν καθωμιλημένην ἀνάστασιν ἱερόν τι καὶ ἀπόρρητον ἦγῃμαι, καὶ πολλοῦ δέω ταῖς τοῦ πλήθους ὑπολήψεσιν ὁμολογήσαι· νοῦς μὲν οἷον φιλόσοφος ἐπόπτης ὢν τάληθοῦς, συγχωρεῖ τῇ χρεῖα τοῦ ψεῦδεσθαι. ἀνάλογον γάρ ἐστι φῶς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν, καὶ ὄμμα πρὸς λημὴν. καὶ ὀφθαλμὸς εἰς κακὸν ἂν ἀπολαύσειεν ἀπλήστου φωτός. ἢ τοῖς ὀφθαλμῶσι τὸ σκότος ὠφελιμώτερον, ταύτη καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὀφελος εἶναι τίθεμαι δῆμῳ· καὶ βλαβερὸν τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῖς οὐκ ἰσχύουσι ἐνατενίσαι πρὸς τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐνάργειαν. εἰ ταῦτα καὶ οἱ τῆς καθ' ἡμᾶς ἱερωσύνης συγχωροῦσιν ἔμοι νόμοι, δυναίμην ἂν ἱεραῶσθαι, τὰ μὲν οἴκοι φιλοσοφῶν, τὰ δὲ ἔξω φιλομυθῶν· εἰ μὴ διδάσκων, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὲν τοι μεταδιδάσκων, μένειν δὲ ἔῶν ἐπὶ τῆς προλήψεως, εἰ δὲ φασιν

οὕτω δεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ δῆλον εἶναι τὸν ἱερέα ταῖς δόξαις, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιμι φανερὸν ἔμαντὸν ἅπασι καθιστάς· δῆμῳ γὰρ δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία, τι πρὸς ἄλληλα; τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τῶν θεῶν ἀπόρρητον εἶναι δεῖ· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἐτέρας ἕξως δεῖται.<sup>b</sup> Notwithstanding this avowal, he became afterwards Bishop of the new Cyrene, or Ptolemis.

We may observe the mixture of heathenism and Christianity, of seriousness and frivolity, which appears in some of the bishops of this period. Their civil stations, or their talents, carried them to the post of dignity in the great Christian society forming around them; but they were still, in their pursuits and manners, the representatives of a degenerate Greek or Roman civilization. Sidonius Apollinaris, Bishop of Auvergne A. D. 471, is a favourable specimen of the superior clergy of that day. Succeeding to a line of progenitors who had held high offices in the Empire, and son-in-law to the Emperor Avitus,<sup>c</sup> himself a prefect and patrician, he was elected to the episcopal dignity, before he even belonged to the clerical order. His elevation however to the spiritual charge made no alteration in the man. He pursued his favourite pastimes, his poetical pleasantries, and his social diversions, with the same good-humour and enjoyment as before. He has given indeed, in one of his epistles, an amusing account how the interval in a long religious ceremony at the tomb of St. Justus, was employed by himself and other ecclesiastics, in lively conversation and in various games, among which was that of the ball, (*sphæræ*), in which he took the lead.<sup>d</sup>

Of the sort of person required for a bishop in the Western Church, Sidonius gives an excellent idea in another epistle, where he describes his selection of a person to that office for the people of Bourges, who had placed the appointment in his hands. The following passage of

<sup>b</sup> *Synesii ad Fratrem*. Ep. CV. p. 386. ed. 8vo. Paris 1605.

<sup>c</sup> Cui pater, socer, avus, proavus, præfecturis urbanis, prætorianisque, magisteriis palatinis, militaribusque, micuerunt. *Sidonii Epist.* III. p. 7.

<sup>d</sup> See his Epistle to Eriphius. *Sidonii Oper.* lib. V. p. 148.

the speech, which he reports to a friend as delivered by him on the occasion, shews particularly that it was a man of the world that was wanted.—Si quempiam nominavero monachorum, quamvis illum Paulis, Antoniis, Hilarionibus, Macariis, conferendum, sectatæ anachoreseos prærogativa comitetur, aures ilico meas incondito tumultu circumstrepitas ignobilium pumilionum murmur everberat conque-rentium : Hic, qui nominatur, inquit, non episcopi, sed potius abbatis complet officium ; et intercedere magis pro animabus apud cœlestem, quam pro corporibus apud terrenum judicem potest. *Ad Perpetuum*, p. 191.

## NOTE G. p. 24.

Jam tum pium adolescentis animum offendebat mundus, qui ea tempestate Christianos ethnicis habebat admixtos. Unde fieri necessum erat, ut qui Christum profitebantur, plerique titulo magis quam vita essent Christiani : et vere piis mentibus, pie vivendi votum adesset verius quam facultas. . . . ad hæc clericorum et episcoporum statum, quod hos quoque volentes, nolentes, honos, opes, et negotia mundi, involverent, ac transversos, raperent, gravissimis periculis obnoxium esse. Et multorum vita displicebat, jam tum prisca illa pietate sacerdotum ad tyrannidem ac fastum degenerante. *Hieronym. Vita per Erasm.*

Et nunc, cum maxime discordiis episcoporum turbari aut misceri omnia cernerentur, cunctaque per eos odio, aut gratia, metu, inconstantia, invidia, factione, libidine, avaritia, adrogantia, desidia, essent depravata : postremo plures adversum paucos bene consulentes, insanis consiliis et pertinacibus studiis certabant : inter hæc plebs Dei, et optimus quisque probro atque ludibrio habebatur. *Sulpic. Sever. Hist. Sacr. II. c. 41. ed. Clerici, 1709.*

The bishops originally received the whole revenue of the diocese, and dispensed a maintenance from it to the presbyters ;—a circumstance, which kept the inferior clergy in a state of great dependence on the superior ; rendering their subsistence and comfort extremely precarious,

whilst it exposed them to suffer from the personal avarice and luxurious expenditure of the bishop to whom they happened to be subject. They could not quit the place where they had been once appointed, and were completely at the bishop's disposal. *Council of Orleans*, A.D. 511. c. 14, 15. *Council of Valentia* in 524. c. 6.

The Abbot of Cluny, being requested to intercede in obtaining a prebend for Astralabius, the son of Abelard, replies: Astralabio vestro vestrique causa nostro, mox ut facultas data fuerit, in aliqua nobilium ecclesiarum præbendam libens acquirere laborabo. Res tamen difficilis est: quia, ut sæpe probavi, ad dandas in ecclesiis suis præbendas, variis objectis occasionibus, valde se difficiles præbere episcopi solent. *Abælardi Oper.* p. 345.

#### NOTE H. p. 27.

In rhetorica tamen sese studiosius exercuit, degustatis omnibus, sed his præcipue quæ propius ad eam conferant facultatem, historia, cosmographia, et antiquitatis notitia: partim quod intelligeret apud Latinos ad id usque temporis pene infantem esse theologiam, et ob hanc causam permultos a divinorum voluminum abhorrere lectione; sperans futurum, ut plures sacris literis delectarentur, si quis theologiæ majestatem, dignitate sermonis æquasset: partim ut esset aliquando quod ethnicis objici posset, Christianos ut infantes et elingues despicientibus. *Hieronym. Vit. per Erasm.*

Jerome has sketched the character of some of the Latin writers in the following passage: Tertullianus creber est in sententiis, sed difficilis in loquendo. Beatus Cyprianus instar fontis purissimi, dulcis incedit et placidus; et cum totus sit in exercitatione virtutum, occupatus persecutionum angustiis, de scripturis divinis nequaquam disseruit. Inclyto Victorinus martyrio coronatus, quod intelligit, eloqui non potest. Lactantius quasi quidam fluvius eloquentiæ Tullianæ, utinam tam nostra confirmare potuisset, quam facile aliena destruxit. Arnobius inæ-

qualis et nimius, et absque operis sui partitione confusus. Sanctus Hilarius Gallicano cothurno attollitur, et a lectione simpliciorum fratrum procul est. Taceo de cæteris, vel defunctis, vel etiam adhuc viventibus, super quibus in utramque partem post nos alii judicabunt. *Ad Paulinum* Oper. tom. I. p. 104.

NOTE I. p. 28.

In the West the monastic spirit was strongly counteracted by social needs;—by the necessity of combination in order to mutual aid and protection. Monachism there was in its institution essentially social. Not so in the East, where it originated in an enervated state of society, and acted as a relief to the more energetic spirits, from the monotony and languor of ordinary life. Accordingly, when the Latin world approached more nearly to that condition, in which the Eastern portion of the Empire was in the IVth century;—when civilization, that is, having reached a certain point, began to degenerate in the West, as in the VIth and VIIth centuries;—the monachism of the West began to resemble more closely that of the East. It was then adopted more as a resource from society; though still the social character originally impressed on it, continued to modify it there.

The first impulse to monachism in the West appears to have been occasioned, by the residence of Athanasius at Rome, with two of the Egyptian monks in his train, and by the publication of his *Life of St. Antony*. The popularity of this romantic piece of biography may give us a fair idea of that state of religion, in which such puerilities of narration could pass for the adventures of saintly chivalry, or could be employed as stimulants to religious action. Jerome's imagination readily caught the spirit of this work, and diffused it in his own lives of Paul, Hilarius, and Malchus, so beautifully executed after the Athanasian model. He was surrounded at Rome by a number of matrons of noble rank, who waited on his teaching with

devout and fond attention. Marcella, one of these, was the first to make the profession of a monastic life at Rome. The example was followed by Paula, who founded the monastery for men at Bethlehem, over which Jerome presided; and three others at the same place for women.<sup>e</sup> A monastery existed at Milan under Ambrose. See *Hieronym. Vit. per Erasm.—Athanasii Vit.* p. 36. Oper. tom. i. Paris, 1698.—*Augustin. Conf.* VIII. c. 6.

## NOTE J. p. 29.

Votorum nulla vincula, nisi quæ sunt cujusque pure Christiani. Denique si quem forte sui instituti pœnitentia cepisset, tota demum pœna erat inconstantia nota. Cujus rei si quis fidem requirat, legat Hilaronis vitam: legat institutionem monachi ad Rusticum, et item ad Paulinum: legat in epistola cujus initium: Audi filia: descriptum triplex apud Ægyptios monachorum genus. Quin inter alia præstabat et hæc commoda illud vitæ genus. Hujus prætextu honestius licebat ab affinium et cognatorum vinculis temet excutere, gravi nimirum onere ei cui nihil dulcius ocio studiorum. Etenim qui monachum erant professi, a publicis functionibus, a muniis et officiis imperialis aulae, prorsus habebantur excusati. Postremo minus patebant episcoporum quorundam jam tum insolentium tyrannidi. Jam hic titulus, nec a functione clericatus quicquam remorabatur: et ex nullo ordine sæpius deligebantur episcopi. Nec aliud quicquam erat tunc monachi professio, quam priscæ liberæque vitæ meditatio, ac pure Christianæ. *Hieronym. Vit. per Erasm.*

Gregory Nazianzen thus describes the life of the Egyptian solitaries: Τοῖς γὰρ ἱεροῖς καὶ θέλοις τῶν κατ' Ἀίγυπτον

<sup>e</sup> Jerome prettily describes his loved retreat: In Christi ergo villa, ut supra diximus, tota rusticitas est. Extra psalmos, silentium est. Quocunque te verteris, arator stivam tenens, alleluia decantat. Sudans messor, psalmis se avocat, et curva attendens falce vinitor, aliquid Davidicum canit. Hæc sunt in provincia carmina; hæ, ut vulgo dicitur, amatoris cantiones. *Ad Marcellam.* Oper. tom. I. p. 130.

φροντιστηρίους φέρων ἑαυτὸν δίδωσιν· οἱ κόσμου χωρίζοντες ἑαυτοὺς, καὶ τὴν ἔρημον ἀσπαζόμενοι, ζῶσι θεῷ πάντων μᾶλλον τῶν στρεφόμενων ἐν σώματι· οἱ μὲν τὸν πάντη μοναδικὸν τε καὶ ἄμικτον διαθλοῦντες βίον, ἑαυτοῖς μόνοις προσλαλοῦντες καὶ τῷ θεῷ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον κόσμον εἰδότες, ὅσον ἐν τῇ ἔρημίᾳ γνωρίζουσιν. οἱ δὲ νόμον ἀγάπης τῇ κοινωνίᾳ στέργοντες, ἐρημικοὶ τε ὁμοῦ καὶ μιγάδες, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις τεθηγκότες ἀνθρώποις καὶ πράγμασιν, ὅσα ἐν μέσῳ περιφέρεται στροβοῦντά τε καὶ στροβούμενα, καὶ παλίζοντα ἡμᾶς τοῖς ἀγχιστρόφοις μεταβολαῖς, ἀλλήλοις δὲ κόσμος ὄντες, καὶ τῇ παραθέσει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἠύγοντες. *Orat. XXI. p. 384. ed. Paris, 1609.*

## NOTE K. p. 35.

The monasteries of Lerins and St. Victor, and the city of Marseilles, were the great nurses of freedom of thought at the period of the Pelagian controversy. It was in this part of Gaul, as is well known, that Semi-Pelagianism took its rise; where, at least, from the influence of a more cultivated and liberal taste, a reaction took place, after the sentence of Augustine had been adopted in all its hardness by the church. It is curious, that the same portion of the Gallic Church should have supplied the antagonist-statements to the extreme views of Augustine, which, in the IXth century, sent forth the champions of his authority on the question of Predestination. But we may observe that, in both cases, the Southern Gauls advocated a freedom of individual opinion against the arbitrary dictate of mere authority. In the case of Semi-Pelagianism, Augustine's decisions were not yet become a rule of faith; and the effort was to resist the imposition of them on the reason of individuals. In the Predestinarian controversy, the opposition was to the Northern Church of Gaul, which had crushed with the hand of power an individual of their own body, on account of his having freely expressed his opinions in regard to the views of Augustine. Augustine indeed was now become an established authority of the

Church; so that the vindicators of the right of reason appeared, accidentally, as the assertors also of the principle of authority.

## NOTE L. p. 35.

John Scotus Erigena is one of the most remarkable persons in the history of the middle age. He was quite the meteor of the IXth century; as no one of his contemporaries appears to have approached him in the depth of his learning, or the acuteness of his philosophy. Nor has any one had greater influence by his writings; however he may have been cried down by some of his own times, who either envied his reputation, or were startled by the strangeness of his theories. When his name had survived that opposition, it was embalmed in honourable memory as that of a Christian philosopher; and the Church shewed a disposition to claim him for its own.<sup>f</sup> He gave the great impulse to that method of Translations, to which the Latin literature was entirely indebted for what it possessed in the Greek philosophy, by his translations of the works attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, and the scholia of the philosopher Maximus. Two original works of his are extant; one a short tract on Predestination, (that referred to in the Lecture,) and a considerable treatise, intitled *Περὶ φύσεων μερισμοῦ*, founded chiefly on the writings of the Pseudo-Dionysius. We find also a work on the Eucharist by him, alluded to by other writers;<sup>g</sup> and he is spoken of as the “patriarch” of the

<sup>f</sup> Arnoldus Wion de eo in Ligno Vitæ honorifice meminit: notatque in Martyrologio Romano quod excudebatur anno 1580, ei locum et decus suum integrum constitisse, a quo tamen sequentes editiones martyrologii eum penitus detraxerunt. Eo fato mihi natus fuisse Joannes videtur, ut hominum de se judicia semper alternantia subiret. Anastasius Bibliothecarius virum per omnia sanctum prædicat; alii ut mendacem, ineptum, dementem, hæreticum differunt. *Testimonia de Joan. Scot. Erig.* De Divis. Natur. ed. Gale, Oxon.—Baronius speaks of him by the terms *sancta anima*.

<sup>g</sup> Particularly by Berenger, in the following Epistle to Lanfranc.

Pervenit ad me, Frater Lanfrance, quiddam auditum ab Ingelranno Carnotensi: in quo dissimulare non debui ammonere dilectionem tuam. Id



controvertists on that subject; but doubts have been entertained whether he actually wrote any treatise on it.

The treatise on the "Division of Natures" is an extremely curious monument of his peculiar genius, and of the times when it was composed. It is perhaps the most scientific development of the system of Pantheism which has ever appeared. It regularly deduces all existence from the reality of the Divine Being—the only Nature, according to him, that has any proper objective reality. Viewed as a whole, it illustrates the vast, but delusive power of the ancient metaphysics as an instrument of speculation: the ingenuity and subtilty with which the thread of connexion is carried through the series of phenomena, giving the plausibility of a real Divine Philosophy. The dryness of the abstract disquisitions pursued in the work, requires no ordinary patience of attention to go through its details. But it is not unworthy of that attention, on the part of those who would fully study the history of the human mind, or the state of opinion in the Church of the IXth century. It is composed in the form of a dialogue between the Master and the Disciple; the proper dialectical method of philosophizing.

His great learning, particularly his knowledge of languages, the Greek, the Hebrew, and the Arabic, appears to have been acquired by travels. Ireland was in high repute in his time for its learned men. But he was not satisfied to learn there only, but visited every place, and made inquiries of every one, where information might be

autem est, displicere tibi, imo hæreticas habuisse, sententias Joannis Scoti de Sacramento Altaris, in quibus dissentit a suscepto tuo Paschasio. Hac ergo in re si ita est, Frater, indignum fecisti ingenio quod tibi Deus non aspernabile contulit, præproperam sequendo sententiam. Nondum enim ideo sategisti in divina Scriptura cum tuis diligentioribus. Et nunc ergo, Frater, quantumlibet rudis in illa Scriptura, vellem tantum audire de eo, si opportunum mihi feret, adhibitis quibus velles vel iudicibus congruis vel auditoribus: quod quamdiu non sit, non aspernanter aspicias quod dico, si hæreticum habeas Joannem, cujus sententias de Eucharistia probamus, habendus tibi est hæreticus Ambrosius, Hieronymus, Augustinus, ut de cæteris taceam.

*Bulæi Hist. Acad. Par. tom. I. pp. 410. 507.*

obtained respecting works of philosophy. He is said to have commented on both Plato and Aristotle. For his interpretation of Aristotle, indeed, he has the express praise of Roger Bacon.

William of Malmesbury has transmitted one or two interesting particulars respecting this distinguished man. He is described as a person of diminutive stature, and of a lively, facetious disposition; living in great familiarity with Charles the Bald. This last fact is shewn by the following anecdotes.

Assederat ad mensam contra regem ad aliam tabulæ partem: procedentibus poculis consumptisque ferulis, Carolus fronte hilariori, post quædam alia, cum vidisset Joannem quiddam fecisse, quod Gallicanam comitatem offenderet, urbane increpuit, et dixit: "quid distat inter Sottum et "Scottum?" Retulit ille solenne convitium in auctorem, et respondit: "tabula tantum." Interrogaverat rex de morum differenti studio: responderat Joannes de loci distante spatio. Nec vero rex commotus est; quod, miraculo scientiæ ipsius captus, adversus Magistrum nec dicto insurgere vellet; sic eum usitate vocabat. — Item cum rege convivante minister patinam obtulisset, quæ duos pisces prægrandes, adjecto uno minusculo, contineret, dedit ille Magistro, ut accumbentibus duobus juxta se clericis de-partiretur. Erant illi giganteæ molis; ipse perexilis corporis. Tum qui semper aliquid honesti inveniebat ut lætitiâ convivantium excitaret, retentis sibi duobus, unum minorem duobus distribuit. Arguenti iniquitatem partitionis regi, "imo," inquit, "benefeci et æque; nam hic "est unus parvus," de se dicens, et duos grandes pisces tangens; itemque ad eos conversus, "hic sunt duo magni "clerici immensi, et unus exiguus," piscem nihilominus tangens. *Willem. Malmesb. in lib. v. De Pontific. Jo. Scot. Erig. De Divis. Nat. ed. Gale, fol. Oxon. 1681.*

## NOTE M. p. 35.

The case of Gotteschalch exhibits a most gross instance of persecution. He was a monk of the order of St. Benedict, and of the convent of Orbais, devoted to learning and religious exercises, and especially studious of the writings of Augustine. He was not ordained until his fortieth year; and afterwards went on a pilgrimage to the shrines of the Apostles Peter and Paul. On his return he visited the house of a Count Everard, in Piedmont, where he met other religious persons, who were hospitably entertained by the Count according to the custom of the times. Among these was Nothingus, Bishop of Verona. In a conversation with him, Gotteschalch entered on the question of the Divine Predestination; and contended that, according to the doctrine of Augustine, there was a twofold predestination—a predestination to life, and a predestination to death. This conversation was subsequently communicated to Hinemar, Archbishop of Rheims, the metropolitan to whose authority Gotteschalch was subject. His doctrine was condemned as heretical. According to the rule of St. Benedict, he was sentenced to be scourged; and by a formal decree of a Council imprisoned, and bound to perpetual silence. *Durissimis verberibus te castigari, et secundum ecclesiasticas regulas ergastulo recludi, auctoritate episcopali decernimus; et ut de cætero doctrinale tibi officium usurpare non præsumas, perpetuum silentium ori tuo virtute æterni verbi imponimus:* are the words of the sentence against him. He was mercilessly beaten, according to this sentence; and in that exhausted state, almost expiring, he was forced to throw into the fire a defence of his doctrine, which he had prepared to present in the next Council. The rigour of the imprisonment was extended to the long period of twenty years. But his mind was not to be subdued by these acts of violence; and he died in his prison, in the monastery of Hautvilliers, a martyr to his opinions. The Church of Lyons indeed did itself honour by its remonstrances against

the persecution of the unhappy monk; but it had no power to check them against the will of the imperious Hincmar.<sup>h</sup>

## NOTE N. p. 37.

Of the general restlessness of the public mind about this period, we may form a fair estimate from the extent of Abelard's popularity, amidst all the objections and charges brought against him. The fact is thus noticed by himself: *Accidit autem mihi ut ad ipsum fidei nostræ fundamentum humanæ rationis similitudinibus disserendum primo me applicarem, et quendam theologiæ tractatum de Unitate et Trinitate Divina, scholaribus nostris componerem, qui humanas et philosophicas rationes requirebant, et plus quæ intelligi quam quæ dici possent efflagitabant: dicentes quidem verborum superfluum esse prolationem, quam intelligentia non sequeretur, nec credi posse aliquid nisi primitus intellectum, et ridiculosum esse aliquem aliis prædicare, quod nec ipse, nec illi quos doceret, intellectu capere possent: Domino ipso arguente quod cæci essent duces cæcorum. Quem quidem tractatum cum vidissent et legissent plurimi, cœpit in commune omnibus plurimum placere, quod in eo pariter omnibus satisfieri super hoc quæstionibus videbatur. Et quoniam quæstiones istæ præ omnibus difficiles videbantur, quanto major extiterat gravitas, tanto solutionis earum censebatur major subtilitas. Unde æmuli mei vehementer accensi Concilium contra me congregaverunt,<sup>i</sup> &c.* The fact is further shewn in the following observations, which occur in a letter of consolation addressed to Abelard himself: *Roma suos tibi docendos trans mittebat alumnos: et quæ olim omnium artium scientiam auditoribus solebat infundere, sapientio rem te se sapiente transmissis scholaribus monstrabat. Nulla terrarum, nulla montium cacumina, nulla concava vallium, nulla via, difficili licet obsita periculo, et*

<sup>h</sup> *Vindic. Prædest. et Grat. Histor. et Chronic. Synops.* in Collection of Tracts of the IXth century, on Grace and Predestination, by Manguin.

<sup>i</sup> *Abelardi Opera*, p. 20. 4to. Paris, 1616.

latrone, quo minus ad te properarent, retinebat. Anglorum turbam juvenum, mare interjacens, et undarum procella terribilis, non terrebat; sed omni periculo contempto, audito tuo nomine, ad te confluebat. Remota Britannia sua animalia erudienda destinabat. Andegavenses, eorum edomita feritate, tibi famulabantur in suis. Pictavi, Vvascones, et Hiberi; Normania, Flandria, Theutonicus, et Suevus, tuum calere ingenium, laudare, et prædicare assidue studebat. Præterea cunctos Parisiorum civitatem habitantes, et intra Galliarum proximas et remotissimas partes, qui sic a te doceri sitiebant, ac si nihil disciplinæ non apud te inveniri potuisset. Ingenii claritate, et suavitate eloquii, et linguæ absolutioris facilitate, nec non et scientiæ subtilitate permoti, quasi ad limpidissimum philosophiæ fontem iter accelerabant.<sup>k</sup>

It was evidently the support which Abelard obtained from influential persons in the Church, that saved him from the extreme violence of persecution. Securus est tamen, observes Bernard, quoniam Cardinales, et Clericos curiæ, se discipulos habuisse gloriatur, et eos in defensione præteriti et præsentis erroris adsumit, a quibus judicari timere debuit, et damnari.<sup>l</sup>

The Pope Celestine II. had been a pupil of Abelard. Bernard addresses an Epistle to him, intimating that affection for the man ought not to extend to affection for his errors.<sup>m</sup>

#### NOTE O. p. 37.

It was objected to Abelard, that there was no occasion for such reasonings as his at that particular time, since heretics were in a great measure repressed. He points out accordingly, that there was no lack of heresy to call the attention of theologians even then; indicating, in fact, the rebellion which the system of the Church, at once

<sup>k</sup> *Fulcon. Prior. Ep. ad Abælard. Oper. p. 218.*

<sup>l</sup> *Bernard. Ep. XIV. p. 299. Abælardi Oper.*

<sup>m</sup> *Ep. XIII. p. 297. Abælardi Opera.*

intolerant and speculative, had produced among both thinking men and enthusiasts.

Nullos in tantam olim insaniam prorupisse hæreticos quisquam audierit, quanta nonnulli contemporaneorum nostrorum debacchati sunt: Tanquelmus quidam laicus nuper in Flandria, Petrus Presbyter nuper in Provincia, ut ex multis aliquos in medium producamus. Quorum quidem alter, Tanquelmus scilicet, in tantam se erexerat dementiam, ut se Dei filium vocitari atque decantari, et a seducto populo, ut dicitur, templum ædificari sibi faceret. Alter vero ita fere omnem divinorum, sacrorum, et ecclesiasticæ doctrinæ institutionem enervarat, ut multos rebaptizari cogeret; et venerabile Dominicæ signum crucis removendum penitus censeret, atque altaris; sacramentum nullatenus celebrandum esse amplius astrueret. Sed nec magistros divinorum librorum, qui nunc maxime circa nos pestilentia cathedras tenent, prætereundos arbitramur, quorum unus in Francia, alter in Burgundia, tertius in pago Andegavensi, quartus in Bituricensi, multa Catholicæ fidei, vel sanctis doctrinis adversa, non solum tenent, verum etiam docent.<sup>a</sup>

He proceeds then to state the several wild speculations on the Trinity and the Incarnation started by these individuals.

Irregular but strong efforts were made at this period towards a reform of the Church, as we may see from the following passage; in which no doubt a colouring has been given to the circumstances, by the orthodox view of them, and in order to prepare the scene for the introduction of the Saint who works the transformation.

In partibus Tolosanis Henricus quidam olim monachus, tunc apostata vilis, pessimæ vitæ, perniciosæ doctrinæ, verbis persuasilibus gentis illius occupaverat levitatem, et ut prædixit Apostolus de quibusdam, in hypocrisi loquens mendacium, fictis verbis de eis negociabatur. Erat autem hostis ecclesiæ manifestus, irreverenter ecclesiasticis derogans sacramentis pariter et ministris. Nec mediocriter in

<sup>a</sup> *Abelardi Introduct. ad Theolog. lib. II. Opera, p. 1066.*

ea jam malignitate processerat. Sic enim de eo scribens pater venerabilis ad principem Tolosanum, inter cætera ait: "Passim inveniebantur jam ecclesiæ sine plebibus, " plebes sine sacerdotibus, sacerdotes sine debita reverentia, " sine Christo denique Christiani; parvulis Christianorum " Christi vita intercludebatur, dum baptismi gratia nega- " batur. Ridebantur orationes oblationesque pro mortuis, " sanctorum invocationes, sacerdotum excommunicationes, " fidelium peregrinationes, basilicarum ædificationes, dierum " solennium vacationes, chrysmatis et olei consecrationes, et " omnes denique institutiones ecclesiasticæ spernebantur." Hac necessitate vir sanctus iter arripuit, ab ecclesiæ re- gionis illius sæpius jam ante rogatus, et tunc demum a reverendissimo Alberico Hostiensi Episcopo, et legato se- dis Apostolicæ, persuasus, pariter et deductus. Veniens autem cum incredibile denotatione susceptus est a populo terræ, ac si de cœlo angelus advenisset. Nec moram facere potuit apud eos, quod irruentium turbas reprimere nemo posset, tanta erat frequentia diebus ac noctibus adven- tantium, benedictionem expectantium, flagitantium opem. Prædicavit tamen in civitate Tolosa per aliquot dies, et in cæteris locis, quæ miser ille frequentasset amplius, et gravius infecisset, multos in fide simplices instruens, nu- tantes roborans, errantes revocans, subversos reparans, subversores et obstinatos auctoritate sua premens et op- primens, ut non dico resistere, sed ne assistere quidem et apparere præsumerent. Cæterum etsi tunc fugit hæreticus ille et latuit, ita tamen impeditæ sunt viæ ejus et semitæ circumseptæ, ut vix alicubi postea tutus, tandem captus et catenatus Episcopo traderetur. In quo itinere plurimis etiam signis in servo suo glorificatus est Deus, aliorum corda ab erroribus impiis revocans, aliorum corpora a lan- guoribus variis sanans.

Est locus in regione eadem, Sarlatum nomen est illi, ubi sermone completo, plurimos ad benedicendum panes, sicut ubique fiebat, Dei famulo offerebant. Quos ille elevata manu, et signo crucis edito, in Dei nomine benedicens:

“ In hoc,” inquit, “ scietis vera esse quæ a nobis, falsa quæ ab hæreticis suadentur; si infirmi vestri, gustatis panibus istis, adepti fuerint sospitatem.” Timens autem venerabilis Episcopus Carnotensium magnus ille Gaufridus, siquidem præsens erat et proximus viro Dei; “ si bona,” inquit, “ fide sumpserint, sanabuntur.” Cui pater sanctus de Domini virtute nil hæsitans; “ non hoc ego dixerim,” ait, “ sed vere qui gustaverint sanabuntur: ut proinde veros nos et veraces Dei nuncios esse cognoscant.” Tam ingens multitudo languentium, gustato eodem pane, convaluit, ut per totam provinciam verbum hoc divulgaretur, et vir sanctus per vicina loca regrediens, ob concursus intolerabiles declinaverit, et timuerit illo ire. *Vit. S. Bernardi*, lib. III. c. 5.

## NOTE P. p. 39.

Non ideo Romam pergere volui, quod majores quæstus, majorque mihi dignitas, ab amicis, qui hoc suadebant, promittebatur; quamquam et ista ducebant animum tunc meum: sed illa erat causa maxima et pæne sola, quod audiebam, quietius ibi studere adolescentes, et ordinatiore disciplinæ coercitione sedari, ne in ejus scholam, quo magistro non utuntur, passim et proterve irruant; nec eos admitti omnino, nisi ille permiserit. Contra apud Carthaginienses foeda est et intemperans licentia scholasticorum. Irrumpunt impudenter, et prope furiosa fronte perturbant ordinem, quem quisque discipulis ad proficiendum instituerit. Multa injuriosa faciunt, et mira hebetudine, et punienda legibus, nisi consuetudo patrona sit,°

Sedulo ergo agere cœperam, propter quod veneram ut docerem Romæ artem rhetoricam, et prius domi congregare aliquos, quibus et per quos innotescere cœperam; et ecce cognosco alia Romæ fieri, quæ non patiebar in Africa. Nam revera illas eversiones a perditis adolescentibus ibi non fieri, manifestatum est mihi. Sed subito, inquiunt, ne mercedem magistro reddant, conspirant multi adolescentes,

° *Augustin. Confess.* lib. V. c. 8.



et transferunt se ad alium, desertores fidei, et quibus, præ pecuniæ caritate, justitia vilis est.<sup>p</sup>

The violent disturbances which sometimes occurred among the students, prove the imperfect state of the discipline of the Universities of the middle age. The alarm produced by a tumult at Oxford in the XIIIth century, when the brother of the Pope's Legate was killed by a bowshot, diminished the numbers of the University from 30,000 to 6000.<sup>q</sup> In the election to professorships, there was often the utmost contention of party-feeling. At Paris, for instance, the original custom had been for the different nations, (the students being distributed according to the nations to which they belonged,) to elect a reader in ethics, who held the office for two years. Launoy states the reason for the alteration of the custom to have been, the outrages committed at such elections. Sed propter insolentias, perpetrataque in hujusmodi electione homicidia, cessavit talis lectio; et, novo condito statuto, quilibet Artium Regens specialem suis scholasticis facit ethicorum lectionem, a quibus in fine cursus moderata pro labore suo recipit stipendia.<sup>r</sup>

Yet, with all these irregularities, a strict obedience to the word of a spiritual superior was both inculcated and enforced. By the rule of St. Benedict, no difficulty, or even impossibility, enjoined on any member of the fraternity by the superior, was to be declined. He might humbly and patiently represent the state of the case to the superior, without offering resistance or contradiction. But if the prior still persisted in his order, the disciple was to feel convinced that it must be so, and with trust in the Divine assistance, must obey. His personal existence was to be merged in that of the community. He was neither to give, nor receive any thing, without the order

<sup>p</sup> *Augustin. Confess. lib. V. c. 12.*

<sup>q</sup> Pegge's *Life of Bishop Grossetete*, p. 85.—Henry's *History of Great Britain*, vol. IV. p. 478.

<sup>r</sup> *Goulet. Parisiens. Theolog. in Launoii de Varia Aristotelis Fortuna*, c. 10. Par. 1662.

of the superior, to whom he was to consider both his body and his will as entirely subject.<sup>s</sup>

Such rules as these, it was found practicable to enforce. There are many instances of their having been obeyed to the very letter of the injunction. John Duns Scotus presents a striking instance of the imperative force of such obligations. In the year 1308 he was lecturing at Paris. He had retired to some fields out of the town with his disciples, for the sake of recreation. Letters are brought to him there from the Minister General of the Order of St. Francis, to which he belonged,—*obedientiales literæ*, as his biographer expresses it,—desiring him to transfer himself to Cologne. Immediately, with a blind and prompt obedience, *cæca et prompta obedientia*, bidding farewell to those present, he proceeds straight-forward on his way to Cologne, without returning home to collect his books and writings, or salute the brothers. Those that were present, asked him, why he did not go to the Convent to bid farewell to the brothers. His answer, adds the biographer, was worthy of the man. “The Father-General orders to go to Cologne, not into the Convent to salute the brothers.”<sup>t</sup>

#### NOTE Q. p. 39.

Jerome gives a satirical description of some of the Clergy of his time.

Sunt alii, (de mei ordinis hominibus loquor,) qui ideo presbyterium et diaconatum ambiunt, ut mulieres licentius videant. Omnis his cura de vestibus, si bene oleant: si pes laxa pelle non folleat. Crines calamistri vestigio rotantur: digiti de annulis radiant: et ne plantas humidior via spargat, vix imprimunt summa vestigia. Tales cum videris, sponsos magis existimato, quam clericos. *Ep. ad Eustoch.* Opera, tom. i. p. 144.

Sulpicius Severus speaks in the following terms of reprobation.

<sup>s</sup> *Reg. S. Bened.* c. 68, c. 33.

<sup>t</sup> *J. Duns Scoti Vita* a Luca Waddingo. p. 11. Scoti Opera.

Et nunc, cum maxime discordiis Episcoporum turbari aut misceri omnia cernerentur, cunctaque per eos, odio, aut gratia, metu, inconstantia, invidia, factione, libidine, avaritia, adrogantia, desidia, essent depravata: postremo plures adversum paucos bene consulentes, insanis consiliis, et pertinacibus studiis, certabant: inter hæc plebs Dei, et optimus quisque, probro atque ludibrio habebatur. *Hist. Sacr.* lib. II. c. 51.

A little later, Sidonius Apollinaris, in giving an account of the character and occupations of a country-gentleman of his time, seems to have had a design of throwing censure on some members of his own profession by the contrast. The description in itself is beautifully executed, though not without marks of the affectation of the writer. The concluding remarks give the application: Qua industria viri ac temperantia inspecta, ad reliquorum quoque censui pertinere informationem; si vel summo tenus vita ceteris talis publicaretur. Ad quam sequendam, præter habitum, quo interim præsentis sæculo imponitur, omnes nostræ professionis homines, utilissime incitarentur. Quia, quod pace ordinis mei dixerim, si tantum bona singula in singulis erunt, plus ego admiror sacerdotalem virum, quam sacerdotem.<sup>u</sup>

Indeed in other passages he has not scrupled to characterize some individuals by still more express delineation. For instance, in the following account of three competitors for a vacant see.

Quæ quidem triumviratus accenderat competitorum: quorum hic antiquam natalium prærogativam, reliqua destitutus morum dote, ructabat: hic per fragores parasiticos, culinarum suffragio comparatos, Apicianis plausibus ingerebatur: hic apice votivo si potiretur, tacita pactione promiserat ecclesiastica plausoribus suis prædæ prædia fore.<sup>x</sup>

The corruption was only aggravated by the state of confusion and ignorance which ensued in the following

<sup>u</sup> *Sidon. Apollin. Oper.* lib. IV. Ep. IX.

<sup>x</sup> *Lib. IV. Ep. XXV. p. 125. ed. Sirmond.*

centuries. In the XIth and XIIth centuries, it appears to have reached its height, as is evidenced by numerous testimonies. Among these, I may select the following from Abelard, a contemporary witness, and in himself, in great measure, a type of the times in which he lived.—*Quid dicturi sunt quidam moderni sacerdotes in die iudicii, qui ordinem sacerdotalem susceperunt, sed inordinate vivere non erubescunt? Quidam vero in conviviis et potationibus cum vulgo prorsus indocto, pravis moribus corrupto, tota die sedent, fabulantur, et quæ dicenda non sunt turpiter operantur. Lanis gregis Dominici superbe vestiuntur, lacte pascuntur, et oves fame et penuria verbi Dei moriuntur. Transeunt festa, transit integer annus, quod nec unum verbum de ore ipsorum egreditur, quo plebs sibi commissa erudiatur, de malo corrigatur, ad bonum revocetur, et in bono confirmetur. Cotidie tamen se Deo præstare obsequium arbitrantes; verba divinæ laudis jubillant, immo sibilant, et audientes, et intendentes sono vocis, gestu corporis scandalisant, non ædificant. . . . Sunt autem quidam prædicatores, qui sicut zizania in agro Domini a Diabolo sunt seminati, qui totum mundum cum suis philacteriis peragrant, et indoctum vulgus et peccatis oneratum, verbis mendacibus beatificant, dicentes, "Pax pax, cum non sit pax."*<sup>†</sup>

Erat autem Abbatia illa nostra, ad quam me contuleram, secularis admodum vitæ atque turpissimæ. Cujus Abbas ipse, quo cæteris prælatione major, tanto vita deterior atque infamia notior erat. Quorum quidem intolerabiles spurcicias, ego frequenter atque vehementer, modo privatim, modo publice, redarguens, omnibus me supra modum onerosum atque odiosum effeci<sup>‡</sup>. . . . Me de alieno eductum monasterio ad proprium remisit; ubi fere quotquot erant olim jam ut supra memini, infestos habebam; cum eorum vitæ turpitude et impudens conversatio me suspectum penitus haberent, quem arguentem graviter sustinerent.<sup>‡</sup>

<sup>†</sup> *Abelardi Oper.* p. 364.

<sup>‡</sup> *Ibid.* p. 19.

<sup>‡</sup> *Ibid.* p. 25. See also John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus*, I. c. 4.

## NOTE R. p. 41.

Launoy, in his treatise entitled *De Varia Aristotelis Fortuna in Academia Parisiensi*, has given a collection of citations from different authors who have reprobated the Scholastic method of theology. He gives Luther's definition of Scholasticism: *Scholastica Theologia est ea, quæ a Parisiorum Sorbona, mixtione quadam ex divinis eloquiis, et Philosophicis rationibus, tanquam ex Centaurorum genere biformis disciplina, conflata est*; and, on the other hand, that of Hangest, a theologian of Paris: *Scholastica Theologia est divinarum Scripturarum peritia, recepto quem Ecclesia approbat sensu, non spretis orthodoxorum Doctorum interpretationibus et censuris, ac interdum aliarum disciplinarum non contempto suffragio.*<sup>b</sup>

Speaking of Abelard to the Pope Innocent, Bernard of Clairvaux says: *Habemus in Francia novum de veteri magistro theologum, qui ab ineunte ætate sua in arte dialectica lusit, et nunc in Scripturis sanctis insanit. Olim damnata et sopita dogmata, tam sua videlicet quam aliena, suscitare conatus, insuper et nova addit. Qui dum omnium quæ sunt in cælo sursum, et quæ in terra deorsum, nihil præter solum nescio quid nescire dignatur, ponit in cælum os suum, et scrutatur alta Dei, rediensque ad nos refert verba ineffabilia, quæ non licet homini loqui. Et dum paratus est de omnibus reddere rationem, etiam quæ sunt supra rationem, et contra rationem præsumit, et contra fidem. Quid enim magis contra rationem, quam ratione rationem conari transcendere? Et quid magis contra fidem, quam credere nolle quicquid non possit ratione attingere?*<sup>c</sup>

## NOTE S. p. 41.

*Illius sententiæ ventilatæ sunt a concilio Romano quod Alexander III. habuit. . . . Hæc altercatio ad plures annos*

<sup>b</sup> Cap. 12. 8vo. Paris, 1662.

<sup>c</sup> *Bernardi Abbat. ad Innoc. Ep. XI. p. 277. Abælardi Oper.*

duravit. . . . Id demum consecuti sunt, ut ex Sententiis Lombardi postea fieret indiculus nonnullarum quæ minime docerentur. Hæ ad calcem Sententiarum designantur hoc modo: Articuli in quibus Magister Sententiarum communiter non tenetur.<sup>d</sup>

Sub illud tempus Lutetiæ fuit e Sancti Victoris cænobio, Galterus prior, qui Petrum Abælardum, Petrum Lombardum, Petrum Pictavinum, et Gilbertum Porretanum, hæreseos insimulaverit, quod Trinitatis, et Divinæ Incarnationis, mysteria, spiritu censerent Aristotelico.<sup>e</sup>

## NOTE T. p. 41.

Ad annum 1231, Gregorius IX. provinciale Concilium, quo proscribuntur Aristotelis opera, his verbis temperavit. . . . “Ad hæc jubemus, ut Magistri Artium unam lectionem de Prisciano, et unam post aliam, ordinarię semper legant: et libris illis naturalibus, qui in Concilio provinciali ex certa scientia prohibiti fuere Parisiis, non utantur; quousque examinati fuerint, et ab omni errorum suspicione purgati. Magistri vero, et scholares theologiæ, in facultate quam profitentur se studeant laudabiliter exercere: nec Philosophos se ostentent; sed satagant fieri Theodidacti: nec loquantur in lingua populi, linguam Hebræam cum Asotica confundentes: sed de illis tantum in scholis questionibus disputent, quæ per libros theologicos, et Sanctorum Patrum tractatus, valeant terminari.”<sup>f</sup>

## NOTE U. p. 41.

Albert and Aquinas have been thought to have been excepted from this general regulation. But there is no reason for such a supposition. They were probably protected under the shelter of the Dominican Order to which they belonged, and which the successive Popes were disposed to favour, as a support to their own influence, in

<sup>d</sup> *Launoii de Var. Aristot. Fortun.* p. 71.

<sup>e</sup> *Ibid.* p. 69.

<sup>f</sup> *Rigord. in Vita Philip. August.* Launoii de Var. Aristot. Fortun. c. 6.

those factious times, when the interests of the Italian states were distracted between the civil and ecclesiastical powers. But the true account of the case, in regard to Albert and Aquinas, appears to be, that, until their writings appeared, the proper philosophy of Aristotle, in physics and metaphysics, was not understood. These portions of his philosophy were known only under the disguise which they had worn in the commentaries of the Arabians, and in their amalgamation with the mysticism of the New-Platonic School. Aquinas, indeed, particularly opposed himself to the Averroism of his times:—the doctrines of the celebrated Ebn Roshd, or Averroes, of Cordoba,<sup>s</sup> having then obtained a considerable popularity among the speculating theologians of the Schools, in the want of more immediate communication with works of Greek philosophy.

NOTE V. p. 43.

This may be sufficiently seen from the following passages.

Hoc primum vestram sanctitatem monens et postulans, ut doctrinam beatissimi Patris Augustini absque illa dubitatione undequaque doctissimi, sanctarum Scripturarum auctoritati in omnibus concordissimam; quippe nullus Doctorum abstrusa earum scrupulosius rimatus, diligentius exquisierit, verius invenerit, veracius protulerit, luculentius enodaverit, fidelius tenuerit, robustius defenderit, effusius deseminaverit; vestri Pontificatus tempore, commento quodam impugnari non permittatis. *Epist. Prudentii ad Hincmar. Remens. et Pardulum Laudunens. Episcop.* A. D. 849. p. 11.<sup>h</sup>

Relictis sacris autoritatibus ad dialecticam confugium facis. Et quidem de mysterio fidei auditurus, ac respondens quæ ad rem debeant pertinere, mallet audire ac

<sup>s</sup> He flourished in the XIIIth century.

<sup>h</sup> In the collection of writers on Grace and Predestination of the IXth century, by Mauguin, 2 vols. 4to. Paris.

respondere sacras authoritates, quam dialecticas rationes. Verum contra hæc quoque nostri erit studii respondere, ne ipsius artis inopia me putes in hac tibi parte deesse: fortasse jactantia quibusdam videbitur, et ostentationi magis quam necessitati deputabitur. Sed testis mihi Deus est, et conscientia mea, quia in tractatu divinarum literarum, nec proponere, nec ad propositas respondere cuperem dialecticas quæstiones vel earum solutiones. Esti quando materia disputandi talis est, ut hujus artis regulis valeat enucleatius explicari, in quantum possem per æquipollentias propositionum tego artem, ne videar magis arte, quam veritate, sanctorumque Patrum authoritate, confidere. *Lanfranc. De Corp. et Sang. Dom. c. 7. p. 236.*

Even Erigena is obliged to speak with the greatest deference of Augustine. Augustinus piissimus doctrinæ pater, pulcherrimum exemplar eloquentiæ, acutissimus veritatis inquisitor, studiosissimus liberalium artium magister, providentissimus animorum excitator, humillimus persuasor. *De Prædest. c. 18.*

NOTE W. p. 47.

Anselm, speaking of his own work, says: Quam ergo sæpe tractans nihil potui invenire me in ea dixisse, quod non Catholicorum patrum, et maxime Beati Augustini, scriptis cohæreat. Quapropter si cui videbitur, quod in eodem opusculo aliquid protulerim, quod aut minus novum sit, aut a veritate dissentiat; rogo ne statim me aut ut præsumptorem novitatum, aut falsitatis assertorem exclamet: Sed prius libros Beati Augustini de Trinitate diligenter perspiciat, deinde secundum eos opusculum meum dijudicet. *Præfatio in Monolog.*

So more expressly Peter Lombard says: "Ecce tribus illustrium virorum testimoniis, scilicet, Augustini, Hilarii, atque Ambrosii, in eodem concurrentibus revelatione Spiritus Sancti in eis loquentis, pie credere volentibus ostenditur, &c. *Lib. Sentent. I. Dist. 19.*



## LECTURE II.

NOTE A. p. 57.

ἮΝ ὅτε ἤκμαζε τὰ ἡμέτερα, καὶ καλῶς εἶχεν· ἡνίκα τὸ μὲν περιπτὸν τοῦτο καὶ κατεγλωττισμένον τῆς θεολογίας καὶ ἔντεχνον, οὐδὲ πάροδον εἶχεν εἰς τὰς θείας αὐλάς· ἀλλὰ ταυτὸν ἦν, ψήφοις τὲ παίζειν τὴν ὄψιν κλεπτούσαις τῷ τάχει τῆς μεταθέσεως, ἢ κατορχεῖσθαι τῶν θεατῶν, παντοίοις καὶ ἀνδρογύνοις λυγίσμασι, καὶ περὶ θεοῦ λέγειν τι καὶ ἀκούειν καινότερον καὶ περιέργον· τὸ δὲ ἀπλοῦν τε καὶ εὐγενὲς τοῦ λόγου εὐσέβεια ἐνομίζετο. ἀφ' οὗ δὲ Σέξτοι, καὶ Πύρρωνες, καὶ ἡ ἀντίθετος γλῶσσα ὥσπερ τι νόσημα δεινὸν καὶ κακόηθες ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις ἡμῶν εἰσεφθάρη, καὶ ἡ φλυαρία παιδείους ἔδοξε, καὶ ὁ φησι περὶ Ἀθηναίων ἡ βίβλος τῶν Πιράξεων, εἰς οὐδὲν ἄλλο εὐκαιροῦμεν, ἢ λέγειν τι καὶ ἀκούειν καινότερον. *Greg. Naz. Orat. XXI.*

Διάπτύε μοι τὰς ἐνστάσεις, καὶ τὰς ἀντιθέσεις, τὴν νέαν εὐσέβειαν, καὶ τὴν μικρόλογον σοφίαν· καὶ διάπτυε πλέον, ἢ τὰ τῶν ἀραχνίων νήματα, μυίας μὲν κρατοῦντα, σφηξὶ δὲ ῥηγνύμενα, οὐπω λέγω δακτύλοις, οὐδὲ ἄλλῳ τινι τῶν βαρυτέρων σωματίων. ἐν δίδασκε φοβεῖσθαι μόνον, τὸ λύειν τὴν πίστιν ἐν τοῖς σοφίσμασιν· οὐ δεινὸν ἠττηθῆναι λογῶ, οὐ γὰρ πάντων ὁ λόγος· δεινὸν δὲ ζημωθῆναι θεότητα, πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἐλπίς. *Orat. XXIII.*

NOTE B. p. 57.

With all his objections to subtilities in theology, Gregory Nazianzen still shews a disposition to encourage speculative questions, where they are proposed by the orthodox. In Oration XLV. Gregory praises Evagrius the monk, for having sent some speculations and questions on the subject of the Trinity to him for solution. He assumes there the propriety of laying down a definition of the Deity, and proceeding from that to the demonstrations:—Ὁ τοίνυν ἐστὶ θεὸς, πρότερον ὑποστησόμεθα· καὶ εἴθ' οὕτως ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποδείξεις ἀκριβῶς ἤξομεν. He professes also

not to rest the proof of his point on mere undemonstrated faith, but on exact argument;—Ὁὐ πίστewς ἀναποδείκτου φαντασίαν ἀπορία τῆς ἀποδείξεως ἀλόγως προῖσχύμενος, οὐδὲ μύθων παλαιῶν μαρτυρίαις τὸ σαθρὸν τῆς πεποιθήσεως ἑαυτοῦ καλύπτειν πειρώμενος, ἀλλὰ ζητήσεως ἀκριβοῦς κατανοήσει, καὶ λογισμῶν ὀρθότητι, τὴν τοῦ θεωρήματος πίστωσιν εἰς τοῦμφανὲς προτιθέμενος.

## NOTE C. p. 59.

Thus too, among the qualifications for the office of a bishop enumerated in the Epistle to Titus, is this: that he should be able to “convince the gainsayers,” τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἐλέγχειν: an expression being also used here, drawn from the art of the logician.

The use of the word ἐρωτάω may be contrasted with αἰτέω in John xvi. 23. Καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐρωτήσετε οὐδέν. ἀμὴν, ἀμὴν, λέγω ὑμῖν ὅτι ὅσα ἂν αἰτήσητε τὸν πατέρα ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου, δώσει ὑμῖν. Also in v. 26. Ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου αἰτήσεσθε· καὶ οὐ λέγω ὑμῖν, ὅτι ἐγὼ ἐρωτήσω τὸν πατέρα περὶ ὑμῶν. The one expression seems properly to denote asking for information or argument; the other, that a favour may be obtained. Other citations occur to the same purport; with the appositeness of which we shall not so readily concur: as Jerome’s appeal to the opening of the book of Proverbs, which speaks of the understanding of “discourses and artifices of words, “parables, and obscure discourse, sayings and enigmas;” as descriptive of the office of dialecticians and philosophers.<sup>1</sup> Nor shall we be disposed to sanction an interpretation attributed to Augustine, of our Lord’s direction: “ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; “knock, and it shall be opened unto you,” in the following manner: “ask by praying; seek by disputing; knock “by asking, that is, by interrogating:—petite orando;

<sup>1</sup> Hieronym. Op. tom. I. p. 326. Ep. adv. Mag. Orat. Rom.

“quærite disputando; pulsate rogando, id est, interrogando.”<sup>k</sup>

## NOTE D. p. 60.

Clemens Alexandrin., *Stromat.* lib. I. referred to in *Petavii Dogm. Theol.* Prolegomena, c. 4. p. 13.

Ipsam quippe Dei filium, quem nos Verbum dicimus, Græci λόγον appellant, hoc est, divinæ mentis conceptum, seu Dei sapientiam vel rationem. Unde et Augustinus in libro quæstionum octoginta trium, capite quadragesimo quarto: “In principio,” inquit, “erat Verbum, quod Græce λόγος dicitur.” Idem in libro contra quinque hæreses: “In principio erat Verbum. Melius Græci λόγος dicunt: λόγος quippe Verbum significat et rationem.” Et Hieronymus ad Paulinum de divinis scripturis. “In principio erat Verbum: λόγος Græce multa significat. Nam et verbum est, et ratio, et supputatio, et causa uniuscujusque rei, per quam sunt singula, quæ subsistunt. Quæ universa recte intelligimus in Christo.” Cum ergo Verbum Patris Dominus Jesus Christus λόγος Græce dicatur, sicut et σοφία Patris appellatur: plurimum ad eum pertinere videtur ea scientia, quæ nomine quoque illi sit conjuncta, et per derivationem quandam a λόγος Logica sit appellata: et sicut a Christo Christiani, ita a λόγος Logica proprie dici videatur. Cujus etiam amatores tanto verius appellantur philosophi, quanto veriores sint illius sophiæ superioris amatores. Quæ profecto summi Patris summa sophia, cum nostram indueret naturam, ut nos veræ sapientiæ illustraret lumine, et nos ab amore mundi in amorem converteret sui, profecto nos pariter Christianos, et veros effecit philosophos. Qui cum illam sapientiæ virtutem discipulis promitteret, qua refellere possent contradicentium disputationes, dicens; “Ego enim dabo vobis os et sapientiam, cui non poterunt resistere adversarii vestri;” profecto post amorem sui,

<sup>k</sup> *Abelardi Epist.* IV. p. 240. Opera, citing Augustin. de Misericordia. I have not however been able to find any such passage in Augustine.

unde veri dicendi sunt philosophi, patenter et illam rationum armaturam eis pollicetur, qua in disputando summi efficiantur logici. . . . Quis denique ipsum etiam Dominum Jesum Christum crebris disputationibus Judæos ignoret convicisse, et tam scripto quam ratione calumnias eorum repressisse: non solum potentia miraculorum, verum virtute verborum fidem plurimum astruxisse? Cur non solis usus est miraculis, ut hæc faceret, quibus maxime Judæi, qui signa petunt, commoverentur: nisi quia proprio nos exemplo instruere decrevit, qualiter et eos, qui sapientiam quæerunt, rationibus ad fidem pertraheremus? *Abælardi Ep. IV. Oper. p. 241 and 328.*

## NOTE E. p. 60.

Nihil ergo theologum impedire potest, quo minus sinceræ ac germanæ philosophiæ, et dialecticæ, præsidiiis, munitiorem et ornatiorem habeat divinam scientiam. Sed nec ἐριστικὴν illam et σοφιστικὴν funditus aspernabitur: non ut ea sic utatur, quomodo hæretici ac reliqui hostes ecclesiæ, ad oppugnandam veritatem; sed ad propugnandam potius; et ad illorum perplexos nodos, ac laqueos ejusdem unde implicati sunt, artis ope solvendos. *Petavii Dogmata Theol. Prolegomena, c. 4. p. 14.*

Petau, in confirmation of the above, cites the following passage of Damascenus.

Πᾶς γὰρ τεχνίτης δέεται καὶ τινῶν ὀργάνων πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων κατασκευήν. πρέπει δὲ καὶ τῇ βασιλίδι ἄβραις τισὶν ὑπηρετεῖσθαι. λάβωμεν τοίνυν τοὺς δούλους τῆς ἀληθείας λόγους, καὶ τὴν κακῶς αὐτῶν τυραννήσασαν ἀσέβειαν ἀπωσώμεθα· καὶ μὴ τῷ καλῷ κακῶς χρῆσώμεθα· μὴ πρὸς ἐξαπάτην τῶν ἀπλουστέρων τὴν τέχνην τῶν λόγων μεταχειρισώμεθα· ἀλλὰ εἰ καὶ μὴ δέεται ποικίλων σοφισμάτων ἢ ἀλήθεια, πρὸς γε τὴν τῶν κακομάχων, καὶ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως ἀνατροπὴν τούτοις ἀποχρησώμεθα. *Damasc. Dialectic. c. 1.*

To the same purport may be adduced what the Scholastics say of the *mendacium officiosum*. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theol. Secunda Secundæ*, qu. cx. art. 2 et 4.

The question respecting the *mendacium officiosum* was touched in a correspondence between Jerome and Augustine.

## NOTE F. p. 61.

Χριστὸν δὲ ἠγνοήκασιν· οὐ τι αἱ θεῖαι λέγουσι γραφαὶ ζητοῦντες, ἀλλ' ὁποῖον σχῆμα συλλογισμοῦ εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀθεότητος εὐρεθῆ σύστασιν, φιλοπόνως ἀσκούντες· κὰν αὐτοῖς προτεῖνῃ τις ῥητὸν γραφῆς θεϊκῆς, ἐξετάζουσι πότερον συνημμένον ἢ διεξυγμένον δύναται ποιῆσαι σχῆμα συλλογισμοῦ. καταλιπόντες δὲ τὰς ἀγίας τοῦ θεοῦ γραφὰς, γεωμετρίαν ἐπιτηδεύουσιν· ὡς ἂν ἐκ τῆς γῆς ὄντες καὶ ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαλοῦντες, καὶ τὸν ἄνωθεν ἐρχόμενον ἀγνοοῦντες. Ἐυκλείδης γοῦν παρά τισιν αὐτῶν φιλοπόνως γεωμετρεῖται· Ἄριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Θεόφραστος θαυμάζονται· Γαληνὸς γὰρ ἴσως ὑπὸ τινων καὶ πρόσκυνεῖται. οἱ δὲ ταῖς τῶν ἀπίστων τέχναις εἰς τὴν τῆς αἰρέσεως αὐτῶν γνώμην ἀποχρώμενοι, καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀθέων πανουργίᾳ τὴν ἀπλὴν τῶν θείων γραφῶν πίστιν καπηλεύοντες, κ. τ. λ. *Eusebius, Eccl. Hist. lib. V. c. 28. p. 160. ed. Amstælod. 1695.*

## NOTE G. p. 61.

Thus Tertullian: Miserum Aristotelem, qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem struendi, et destruendi, versipellem in sententiis, coactam in conjecturis, duram in argumentis, operariam contentionum, molestam etiam sibi ipsi, omnia retractantem, ne quid omnino tractaverit. Hinc illæ fabulæ. . . . Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? quid Academiæ et Ecclesiæ? quid hæreticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de porticu Solomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat, Dominum in simplicitate cordis esse quærendum. Viderint, qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et Dialecticum Christianismum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Jesum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium. *Tertull. De Præsc. Hær. c. 7. p. 205.*

The commentator on this passage of Tertullian refers to *Gregorius Bæticus Episcop. Elliberitan.*, who lived in the minority of Valentinian III, during the government

of Placidia, and who was an opposer of Arianism, complaining of Aristotelis *artificiosa argumenta*: and again, *ubi nunc sunt illa impia vestra sophismata quæ Aristotelis episcopi vestri magisterio didicistis*. Ibid. p. 204.

Ambrose, alluding to the Arians, says: *Omnem enim vim venenorum suorum in dialectica disputatione constituunt; quæ philosophorum sententia definitur, non adstruendi vim habere, sed destruendi. Sed non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum. Regnum enim Dei in simplicitate fidei est, non in contentione sermonis*. *Ambros. De Fide*, I. c. 5. Opera, tom. II. col. 451. Paris, 1690.

Odiosum me mundo reddidit Logica. Aiunt enim perversi prævertentes, quorum sapientia est in perditione, me in Logica præstantissimum esse, sed in Paulo non mediocriter claudicare; cumque ingenii prædicent aciem, Christianæ fidei subtrahunt puritatem: quia, ut mihi videtur, opinione potius traducuntur ad iudicium, quam experientiæ magistratu. Nolo sic esse Philosophus, ut recalcitrem Paulo; non sic esse Aristoteles, ut secludar a Christo. *Abælardi Ep.* p. 308. Opera.

#### NOTE H. p. 62.

Philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostræ accommoda dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis tanquam injustis possessoribus, in usum nostrum vindicanda. *Augustin. De Dcctr. Ch.* lib. II. fol. 14.

Sed ideo cum Platonicis magis placuit hanc causam agere, quia eorum sunt literæ notiores. Nam et Græci, quorum lingua in gentibus præeminet, eas magna prædicatione celebrarunt: et Latini permoti earum, vel excellentia, vel gloria, vel gratia, ipsas libentius didicerunt; atque in nostrum eloquium transferendo, nobiliores clarioresque fecerunt. *De Civ. Dei*, lib. VIII. c. 10.

Eligimus autem Platonicos omnium philosophorum merito

nobilissimos, propterea, quia sicut sapere potuerunt, &c. *De Civ. Dei.* lib. X. c. 1.

Ubi autem commemoravi, legisse me quosdam libros Platonicorum, quos Victorinus, quondam rhetor urbis Romæ, quem Christianum defunctum esse audieram, in Latinam linguam transtulisset, gratulatus est mihi, quod non in aliorum philosophorum scripta incidissem, plena fallaciarum et deceptionum secundum elementa hujus mundi: in istis autem omnibus modis insinuari Deum et ejus Verbum. *Confess.* lib. VIII. c. 2.

Profecto Theologi veteres omnes, qui et sacrosanctæ fidei jecerunt fundamenta, et Ecclesiam alte extruxerunt, Divus Dionysius, Justinus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Origenes, Cyrillus, Basilius, Eusebius, Theodoretus, Arnobius, Lactantius, Augustinus, Ambrosius, alii plerique omnes, quia scirent paucis mutatis Platonicos facile Christianos fieri posse, (Augustini verbis utor,) Platonem, ejusque sectatores hosce philosophos reliquis omnibus antetulerunt, Aristotelem non nisi cum infamia nominarunt: quadringentis vero abhinc circiter annis, Scholastici theologi in contrarium sunt annexi, Aristotelicis impietatibus pro fidei fundamentis sunt usi. Excusatos eos habemus, quod Græcas literas nescirent, illos cognoscere non potuerunt. Non vero eos excusamus, quod impietati pietatem adstruere sint conati. *Fr. Patricii Ep. ad Gregor.* XIV. Launoii De Var. Aristot. Fortuna, p. 170.

#### NOTE I. p. 63.

We may see, from the following passage of John of Salisbury, what was the original method of a *Schola Grammaticæ*.

Sequebatur hunc morem Bernardus Carnotensis, exundantissimus modernis temporibus fons literarum in Gallia; et in authorum lectione quid simplex esset, et ad imaginem regulæ positum, ostendebat; figuras grammaticæ, colores rhetoricos, cavillationes sophismatum, et qua

parte sui propositæ lectionis articulus respiciebat alias disciplinas, proponebat in medio; ita tamen, ut non in singulis universa doceret, sed pro capacitate audientium, dispensaret eis in tempore doctrinæ mensuram. Et quia splendor orationis, aut a proprietate est, id est, cum adjectivum aut verbum substantivo eleganter adjungitur, aut a translatione, id est, ubi sermo ex causa probabili, ad alienam traducitur significationem, hæc sumpta occasione, inculcabat mentibus auditorum. Et quoniam memoria exercitio firmatur, ingeniumque acuitur ad imitandum ea quæ audiebant, alios admonitionibus, alios flagellis et pœnis urgebat. Cogebantur exsolvere singuli die sequenti aliquid eorum, quæ præcedenti audierant; alii plus, alii minus; erat enim apud eos præcedentis discipulus sequens dies. Vespertinum exercitium, quod declinatio dicebatur, tanta copiositate grammaticæ refertum erat, ut, si quis in eo per annum integrum versaretur, rationem loquendi et scribendi, si non esset hebetior, haberet ad manum, et significationem sermonum, qui in communi usu versantur, ignorare non posset. Sed quia nec scholam, nec diem aliquem, decet esse religionis expertem, ea proponebatur materia, quæ fidem ædificaret, et mores, et unde, qui convenerant, quasi collatione quadam, animarentur ad bonum. Novissimus autem hujus declinationis, immo philosophicæ collationis, articulus, pietatis vestigia præferebat: et animas defunctorum commendabat, devota oblatione psalmi, qui in pœnitentialibus sextus est, et in oratione dominica, Redemptori suo. Quibus autem indicebantur præexercitamina puerorum, in prosis aut poematibus imitandis, poetas aut oratores proponebat, et eorum jubebat vestigia imitari, ostendens juncturas dictionum, et elegantes sermonum clausulas. Si quis autem ad splendorem sui operis, alienum pannum assuerat, deprehensum redarguebat furtum: sed pœnam sæpissime non infligebat. Sic vero redargutum, si hoc tamen meruerat inepta positio, ad exprimendam auctorum imaginem, modesta indulgentia conscendere jubet, faciebatque, ut qui majores imitabatur,



fieret posteris imitandus. Id quoque inter prima rudimenta docebat, et infigebat animis, quæ in œconomia virtus; quæ in decore rerum, quæ in verbis laudanda sunt; ubi tenuitas, et quasi macies sermonis, ubi copia probabilis, ubi excedens, ubi omnium modus. Historias, poemata, percurrere monebat, diligenter quidem, et qui velut nullis calcaribus urgebantur ad fugam: et ex singulis, aliquid reconditum in memoria, diurnum debitum, diligenti instantia exigebat. Superflua tamen fugienda dicebat; et ea sufficere quæ a claris authoribus scripta sunt. . . . Et quia in toto præexcitamine erudiendorum, nihil utilius est, quam ei, quod fieri ex arte oportet, assuescere, prosas et poemata quotidie scriptitabant, et se mutuis exercebant collationibus. *Metalogicus*, lib. I. c. 24.

NOTE J. p. 63.

Sed cum artium multa sint genera, ingenio philosophantis animi primæ omnium liberales occurrunt. Hæ quidem omnes, aut Trivii, aut Quadrivii, ratione clauduntur; et tantam dicunt obtinuisse efficaciam apud majores, qui eis diligenter institerant, ut omnem aperirent lectionem, ad omnia intellectum erigerent, et omnium quæstionum quæ probari possunt, difficultatem sufficerent. Neque enim doctore egebant in aperiendis libris, aut quæstionibus dissolvendis, hi, quibus aut ratio Trivii, omnium sermonum, aut Quadrivii lex, totius naturæ, secreta exponebat. *Joann. Saresberiens. Metalog.* lib. I. c. 12. p. 758.

The transition of this course of study into one vague, superficial, logical philosophy is thus noticed by the same author.

Poetæ, historiographi, habebantur infames; et si quis incumbere laboribus antiquorum, notabatur; et non modo asello Arcadiæ tardior, sed obtusior plumbo, vel lapide, omnibus erat in risum. . . . Fiebant ergo summi repente philosophi: nam qui illiteratus accesserat, fere non morabatur in scholis ulterius, quam eo curriculo temporis, quo avium pulli plumescunt. Itaque recentes magistri e scholis,

et pulli volucrum e nidis, sicut pari tempore morabantur, sic pariter avolabant. . . . Ecce nova fiebant omnia: innovabatur grammatica; immutabatur dialectica; contemnebatur rhetorica: et novas totius quadrivii vias, evacuatis priorum regulis, de ipsis philosophiæ adytis proferebant. Solam convenientiam, sive rationem loquebantur; argumentum sonabat in ore omnium; et asinum nominare, vel hominem, aut aliquid operum naturæ, instar criminis erat, aut ineptum nimis, aut rude, et a philosopho alienum: impossibile credebatur, convenienter, et ad rationis normam, quicquam dicere, aut facere, nisi convenientis et rationis mentio, expressim esset inserta. Sed nec argumentum fieri licitum, nisi præmisso nomine argumenti. Ex arte, et de arte, agere, idem erat. *Metalogicus*, lib. I. c. 3.

## NOTE K. p. 66.

Sidonius Apollinaris, alluding to the studies of his youth, makes no mention but of the Categories of Aristotle. *Oper.* lib. IV. Ep. I. p. 85.

The Topics, among other treatises of Aristotle, though existing in Latin Translation, had fallen into disuse at the time of John of Salisbury. He observes: Cum itaque tam evidens sit utilitas Topicorum, miror quare cum aliis a majoribus tamdiu intermissus sit Aristotelis liber, ut omnino, aut fere, in desuetudinem abierit; quando ætate nostra, diligentis ingenii pulsante studio, quasi a morte, vel a somno, excitatus est, ut revocaret errantes, et viam veritatis quærentibus aperiret. *Metalogicus*, lib. III. c. 5. p. 859.

He speaks with great contempt of the logicians in general of his day; describing, how they wasted the time of learners in the merely elementary part of logic, as on the explanation of the Categories and the Introduction of Porphyry. He quotes a remark of a professor of logic in his time, who used to ridicule the prevailing practice of commenting on these works; but still was obliged to conform to it, observing, that his school would be deserted, were he to teach logic with the requisite simplicity of

address and ease. Deridebat eos noster ille Angelus Peripateticus Adam, cujus vestigia sequuntur multi, sed pauci præpediente invidia profitentur: dicebatque, se aut nullum aut auditores paucissimos habiturum, si ea simplicitate sermonum et facilitate sententiarum dialecticam traderet, qua ipsam doceri expediret. Habui enim hominem familiarem assiduitate colloqui, et communicatione librorum, et quotidiano fere exercitio super emergentibus articulis conferendi. Sed nec una die discipulus ejus fui; ei tamen habeo gratias, quod eo docente plura cognovi, plura ipsius, quoniam aliud ratione consulta præelegeram, ipso arbitro reprobavi. *Metalogicus*, lib. III. c. 3. c. 5.

Yet at this very period Logic was the ascendant science, so much that no educated person would allow himself ignorant of it:—Omnes enim se esse logicos gloriantur, non modo qui scientiam aliquibus superaverunt blanditiis, sed et illi qui eam nondum salutaverunt a limine. *Metalogicus*, lib. II. p. 787.

And what is still more surprising in such real ignorance of the philosopher's own writings, Aristotle was *professed* by all; as the same author observes: siquidem omnes Aristotelem profitentur. *Metalogicus*, II. c. 19. Sicut enim urbs Romam, Maronem Poeta exprimit, sic et Philosophi nomen circa Aristotelem, utentium placito, contractum est. *Policraticus*, lib. VII. c. 6. p. 424. *Metalog.* III. c. 7.

The objection then to Aristotle, indicated by the papal decrees in the course of the XIIth and XIIIth centuries, must be understood as referring to the physical and metaphysical treatises.<sup>1</sup> The words of the papal prohibition,

<sup>1</sup> *Du Boulay, Hist. Acad. Par.* tom. III. p. 82.—These restrictions however were afterwards relaxed, as Launoy distinctly shews. Anno 1366, Cardinales duo cum ex auctoritate Urbani V. Parisiensem Academiam reformarunt, Aristotelis libros paullo humanius adhuc tractavere. . . . In hac fortuna jam tum primum nominantur Aristotelis opera, quæ legi permittuntur, immo ut legantur, de iisque interrogati scholares in examine publico respondeant, statuitur. Quæ vero non recensentur opera, ab Academiæ scholis adhuc excludi non immerito creduntur. Sunt autem in eorum numero, quæ de physico auditu inscribuntur. Ceterum quin Cardinales reformationis

are : Non legantur libri Aristotelis de metaphysica et de naturali philosophia, nec summæ de iisdem, aut de doctrina magistri David de Dinant aut Amalrici hæretici, aut Mauricii Hispani. There had been a great deal of speculation in the Church on physical questions, particularly relatively to the nature of the soul. John of Salisbury says, he had heard many discoursing on physics *aliter quam fides habet*. Then the introduction of the Arabian philosophy, founded as it was on expositions of Aristotle, at the same time perverting his sense, aggravated the theological dread of his writings. A distinction appears to have been drawn between *Aristotelizing*, as it was called, and *expounding* Aristotle. Nullo pacto, says Thomas Campanella, speaking particularly of Thomas Aquinas, putandus est Aristotelizasse, sed tantum Aristotelem exposuisse, ut occurreret malis per Aristotelem illatis, et crederem cum licentia Pontificis.<sup>m</sup> This difference partly accounts for the greater authority of Aquinas's writings in comparison with Albert's. Albert's exposition of Aristotle is original disquisition on the several chapters, which he follows step by step. Aquinas, on the other hand, expounds the text of Aristotle by a running commentary.

## NOTE L. p. 69.

The Arabian philosophers appear to have been made known to the Christian world principally through the labours of learned Jews, who subsisted eminently at that time as a neutral element of communication between the

hujus auctores superioribus statutis derogaverint, negari non potest. Nam in provinciali Concilio cavetur, ne quis eos libellos qui docebant *Metaphysicam*, de cetero legere et scribere præsumeret, vel quocumque modo habere. Inter decreta legati, qui sub Innocentio III. Parisiensem Academiam redegit meliorem in statum, præcipitur, ut legantur Aristotelis libri de Dialectica tam veteri quam nova, sed ut non legantur libri de *Metaphysica*, et de *Naturali Philosophia*. Hi vero Cardinales jubent ut liber *Metaphysicæ*, et alia quædam opera, quæ ad Naturalem Philosophiam pertinent, legantur. Sed in hoc facto ex antiquis Patribus, quos sequerentur, nullos, aut paucos habuerunt. *Launoi De Var. Aristot. Fortuna*, c. 9.

<sup>m</sup> *Launoi De Var. Aristot. Fortuna*, c. 7.

dissevered masses of mankind. Those habits of trade to which their insulated situation in the midst of human society has ever reduced them, their knowledge of medical science, for which they were particularly distinguished, and their consequent acquaintance with the Arabic, the Greek, and the Latin,—the sacred and the universal languages of the Mahomedan and the Christian worlds,—were the circumstances which enabled them to act this part in the history of literature. Several of them indeed were themselves conspicuous as learned men; as is evident from the well-known instance of Moses Ben Maimon, or Maimonides, in the XIIth century; and some wrote commentaries on Aristotle.<sup>n</sup>

We find the names of some Christians mentioned as translators of Aristotle, as Constantine the African in the XIth century, and Michael Scot in the commencement of the XIIIth; and several others of less note. But these probably were indebted to the assistance of Jews even in the performance of their task; as the business of translating was in itself a profession.<sup>o</sup>

The circuitous course by which the Aristotelic Philosophy was brought back to the Christian Church of the West, is an extremely curious fact. By the occupation of Constantinople during the first half of the XIIIth century, and the subsistence of a Latin kingdom in the Holy Land during the XIIth and XIIIth centuries, Latin colonies were planted in the Eastern Empire: and on the other hand, by the conquests of the Arabians in Africa and Spain, an Oriental people were settled in the extreme West. Both these events, by promoting general intercourse, greatly facilitated the advance of literature, and in particular the

<sup>n</sup> Hinc est, quod pauci veri Judæi, hoc est qui non in parte aliqua credulitatis Saraceni sunt, aut Aristotelicis consentientes erroribus, in terra Saracenorum inveniantur, de his qui inter philosophos commorantur. *Tract. de Legibus*, by William of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris from 1228 to 1248. Oper. tom. I. p. 25.

<sup>o</sup> Michael Scotus, ignarus quidem et verborum et rerum, fere omnia quæ sub nomine ejus prodierunt, ab Andrea quodam Judæo mutuatus est. *Roger Bacon, Opus. Maj. Prefat. Jebb.*

circulation of the Greek Philosophy. And the same cause acted in restoring the philosophy of Aristotle, which had originally recommended it to Christians; the spirit of theological speculation. The Nestorians, flying from persecution into Persia and Mesopotamia, cherished, in those countries, that fondness for philosophy, for which they had before been distinguished. The Greek philosophy had been favourably received in Persia from the time of Chosroes, with whom the last philosophers of the schools of Athens obtained a refuge. It happened that some fugitive Princes of the Abassid line, driven from their home by the rival family of the Ommiades, found a resource in their exile in attendance on the lessons of these philosophical Christians. In their subsequent accession to the throne of Mahomet, they carried with them to the seat of Arabian empire, the taste for those studies which had relieved and ennobled their days of exile. The Ommiades, driven in their turn from the throne of the East, and escaping at last to the shores of Andalusia, as Caliphs of the Western empire of the Saracens, propagated in Spain that literature which had now taken root in the parent country. A constant communication appears to have taken place between the Eastern and Western Arabians:—the philosopher of Cordoba travelling to Bagdad in quest of science; as the learned Latin would resort to Paris, and the most celebrated schools of different countries. Thus may be accounted for, the large infusion of Oriental philosophy into the science of the Christians of the West. The Arabians both of Spain and of the East cultivated with ardour an acquaintance with the Aristotelic philosophy; nearly on the same principle which rendered that philosophy popular in the Latin schools;—its subservience as a method of abstract speculation, under the restrictions of a despotic authority in matters of religious belief. But their study of mathematics and medicine led them also to attend, no less to the physical treatises of Aristotle, than to the logical. And thus, when their commentaries became accessible to the

Latins, a larger field of Aristotelic science was laid open to the latter. We see the effect in the wider range which scholasticism assumed from this period.

The question has been debated whether the revival of philosophy in the West was owing chiefly to the Arabian translations, or translations made immediately from the Greek.<sup>p</sup> But the decision of the question is of little consequence. It is evident, I think, that both channels of communication contributed to produce the result. While Christians resorted to Cordoba or Toledo, to imbibe the mysterious wisdom of the Arabian Doctors; active measures were on the other hand taken for restoring the study of Greek in the Latin schools. Philip Augustus established at Paris the Constantinopolitan college for the education of Greek youth: and Latin missionaries were sent by Innocent III. in concert with the Count Baldwin, to Constantinople.<sup>q</sup> The immediate object of these proceedings was, to promote a reconciliation of the Greek and Latin churches. But they must have tended at the same time, to encourage the knowledge of the Greek language in the West. When we speak of the knowledge of Greek, we must understand a more general knowledge among the learned. For a partial acquaintance with the language had always subsisted. There were Greek monasteries in Calabria; and in the South of France, at Arles and at Marseilles, there were a sufficient number of Greek traders to be the occasion of peculiar charters: there was also a Greek monastery at Auriol near Marseilles.<sup>r</sup>

<sup>p</sup> The French Academy of Inscriptions recently proposed a prize for a discussion of the questions bearing on this point: and the composition of M. Jourdain, which obtained the prize, has been published under the title of *Recherches Critiques sur l'age et l'origine des Traductions Latines d'Aristote, &c.* The author did not live to complete the publication; and the work appears in an unfinished state, more as a collection of materials for the subject than as a regular dissertation. But it brings together much valuable information, the fruits of great learning and research, on the state of literature in the middle ages.

<sup>q</sup> *Jourdain, Recherches, &c.* p. 51—53.

<sup>r</sup> *Ibid.*

## NOTE M. p. 69.

Du Boulay, having cited Bede's observation on Levitic. c. 7. Humana doctrina, grammatica, aut rhetorica, aut dialectica, ex quibus, in his quæ de fide sentienda sunt, nihil accipiendum;—to shew, how averse theologians were, at one time, to the application of the sciences to matters of faith, adds, respecting the philosophy of Aristotle: Imo nec in scholis liberalium artium admittebatur; cujus loco Lutetiæ olim S. Augustini dialecticam prælectam videmus, ut Odonis Cluniacensis exemplo clarum fit; qui circa annum 900, apud Remigium Antissiodorensem, qui tunc e Remensi Schola Parisios reversus docebat, "dialecticam S. Augustini Deodato filio suo missam perlegit;" ut legitur in ejus vita. At hoc seculo, [XI<sup>o</sup>] occasione præsertim Berengarianarum disputationum, cœperunt curiosi, et maxime illi qui ei favebant, aut favere videbantur, Aristotelis dialecticam in scholas inducere. *Bulæi Hist. Acad. Paris.* tom. I. p. 349.

## NOTE N. p. 70.

Audio, quod tamen absque dubietate credere non possum, quia Roscelinus clericus dicit in Deo tres personas esse tres res ab invicem separatas; sicut sunt tres angeli; ita tamen, ut una sit voluntas et potestas: aut Patrem, et Spiritum Sanctum, esse incarnatum; et tres Deos vere dici posse, si usus admitteret. In qua sententia asserit, venerabilis memoriæ Archiepiscopum Lanfrancum fuisse, et me esse. *Anselm. Ep. ad Fulconem Episcop. Belluacens.*

Cum adhuc in Becci monasterio essem Abbas, præsumpta est a quodam clerico in Francia talis assertio: Si in Deo, inquit, tres personæ sunt, una tantum res; et non sunt tres res unaquæque per se separatim, sicut tres angeli, aut tres animæ; ita tamen, ut potentia et voluntate omnino sint idem; ergo, Pater, et Spiritus Sanctus, cum Filio est incarnatus. Quod cum ad me perlatum esset, incepi contra hunc errorem quandam epistolam; quam



parte quadam edita, perficere contempsi; credens non ea opus esse, quoniam et ille, contra quem fiebat, in Concilio a venerabili Remensi Archiepiscopo Reynaldo collecto,<sup>s</sup> errorem suum abjuraverat. *Anselm. De Incarn. Verbi*, p. 34.

Hic contra egregium illum præconem Christi, Robertum Arbrosello, contumacem ausus est epistolam confingere; et contra illum magnificum ecclesiæ doctorem, Anselmum Cantuarensis Archiepiscopum, adeo per contumelias exarsit, ut, ad regis Anglici imperium, ab Anglia turpiter impudens ejus contumacia sit ejecta, et vix tum cum vita evaserit. . . . Hic, sicut pseudo-dialecticus, ita et pseudo-christianus; cum in dialectica sua nullam rem partes habere æstimat, ita divinam paginam impudenter pervertit, ut, eo loco quo dicitur Dominus partem piscis assi comedis, partem hujus vocis, quæ est piscis assi, non partem rei, intelligere cogatur. *Ep. ad G. Parisiens. Episcop.* Abælardi Oper. p. 354.<sup>t</sup>

I have given these several extracts, in order to shew the manner in which the theory of Nominalism was stated by its opponents. The misrepresentation is evident: the same style which infects all controversial statements in questions of theology, is here instanced in a question of philosophy. Opponents draw their consequences and conclusions, and impute these to the maintainers of the point which they would impugn. This creates the difficulty in forming our views of the different shades of opinion on this abstract question. The truth can never be fairly stated where such principles actuate the controversialist, as the fear, by an admission on one point, of producing a difficulty in some other: as when, for instance, Anselm argues that if Nominalism were true, Sabellianism must be true.<sup>u</sup>

<sup>s</sup> Council of Soissons, A.D. 1089.

<sup>t</sup> Wrongly attributed to Abelard; since Abelard was a disciple of Roscelin, and adopted Roscelin's theory, under a modification.

<sup>u</sup> Sed hæc ratio si vera est et rata, vera est hæresis Sabellii. *De Incarn. Verbi*, c. III. p. 36.

The absurdity of such an argument indeed is evidenced, in the opposite view taken by another arguer on the same side, or even by the same arguer, when he has a different object before him : as when we find a disciple of Nominalism characterized also as a tritheist, or as an Arian.

The reputed origin of the dispute is carried still further back, from Roscelin, to John, surnamed the Sophist, a popular teacher of the XIth century, who, according to Du Boullay, *sophisticam vocalem esse disseruit*; and to the controversy between Lanfranc and Berenger.<sup>x</sup> The Realism of Anselm was objected to also by another disputant, supposed to be a monk, by name, Gaunilo; who ably argues against him on that point in a short tract entitled "Liber pro Insipiente," published in the works of Anselm: and whose objections, as both modestly and shrewdly urged, Anselm has carefully discussed. The question probably had always existed from the time that Logic began to be the leading study of the Schools; as we may see from the reference to it in the "Introduction" of Porphyry; and only attracted more general notice, when heretical disputation employed the distinction of Nominalist and Realist, as an instrument for maintaining opinions in Theology.

#### NOTE O. p. 72.

The fullest account that we have of the different shades of opinion classed under the extremes of Nominalism and Realism is given by John of Salisbury. *Metalogicus*, lib. II. c. 17. From what he has stated, the question was evidently regarded entirely in a logical point of view, and, by no means, in its actual philosophical importance, as a speculation concerning the grounds of human knowledge. Ockam himself appears rather to have had for his design to spiritualize philosophy; by removing the supposition of an objective reality belonging to general notions, or universals, to lead the mind to the alternative of regarding

<sup>x</sup> *Bulæi Hist. Acad. Paris.* tom. I. p. 443.

all truth, as derived by immediate communication from the Deity.

NOTE P. p. 73.

Τούτων δὲ, οἱ ὀπισθεν ἠκολούθουν ἐκακούντες τῶν λεγομένων, τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο, οὓς ἄγει ἐξ ἐκότερων πόλεων ὁ Πρωταγόρας, δι' ὧν διεξέρχεται, κηλῶν τῇ φωνῇ, ὥσπερ Ὀρφεύς· οἱ δὲ, κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν ἔπονται κεκληγμένοι. *Plato. Protagoras, Opera*, tom. III. p. 96. ed. Bipont.

We have only to read the history of Abelard, to see the parallel of the ancient Sophist in the Schoolmen of the middle age. His proposing on one occasion to give a theological disputation on any obscure passage of Scripture,<sup>7</sup> reminds us of the offer of the Greek Sophist to extemporize on any given subject. His rivals in vain endeavoured to silence him. His scholars, as he triumphantly declares under all his persecutions, still adhered to him, wherever he went: at Laon, at Paris, at his cell at the Abbey of St. Denys, at his oratory in the wilderness, they still flocked around him in increasing numbers. The scene at the last place gives us a picture of the manners of the times. His disciples formed a sort of encampment around him in the open country, and continued to wait on his teaching amidst great personal discomfort.

NOTE Q. p. 74.

In the year 1339 the University of Paris condemned the logic of Ockam, and interdicted the use of it as a book of instruction. *Bulæi Hist. Acad. Paris.* tom. IV. p. 257. *Degerando, Hist. Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie*, tom. IV. p. 597.

The great interest which the Carlovingian princes had taken in the school of Paris laid effectually the groundwork of its future preeminence in the literary and theological world. Soon after its institution, what was originally only the "school of the palace" became the chief domicile

<sup>7</sup> *Epistola*, Opera, p. 8.

of the science of the middle ages; so that instead of the "school of the palace," the familiar expression then was, as Du Boullay remarks, the "palace of the school." No theologian regarded his education complete, unless he had heard the distinguished lecturers at Paris. The Theological influence of the University may be seen in the anxious superintendence of successive Popes over the course of education pursued there; and in a particular instance, when Innocent III. wrote to the University, requesting they would send persons to Constantinople for the purpose of converting the Greeks to the Latin faith.<sup>2</sup>

## NOTE R. p. 74.

The Nominalism of Ockam corresponds very closely with what is now designated by Conceptualism. He was far from thinking, that the terms expressing general notions were merely *status vocis*, as Nominalism is represented by Anselm.<sup>a</sup> M. Degerando, in his *Histoire Comparée des Systèmes de Philosophie*, chap. 27, has given a succinct and excellent view of his doctrine on this point, in contrast with that of Duns Scotus. He remarks particularly the philosophical character which the dispute had assumed in the XIVth century.—Cependant, cette discussion avait un avantage marqué sur la controverse qui s'était élevée du temps de Roscelin; alors on n'avait guère employé que des armes théologiques; maintenant du moins on discutait avec des principes rationnels une question philosophique. Tom. IV. p. 580.

## NOTE S. p. 77.

The following passage of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* gives

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the exact idea of what Christian Theology became in the hands of the Schoolmen.

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ὄντος, ἣ ὄν καὶ χωριστὸν, κ. τ. λ. περὶ τὸ χωριστὸν ἄρα ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἑτέρα τούτων ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐστὶ τις, εἴπερ ὑπάρχει τις οὐσία τοιαύτη· λέγω δὲ χωριστὴ καὶ ἀκίνητος. ὅπερ πειρασόμεθα δευκνύναι· καὶ εἴπερ ἔστι τις τοιαύτη φύσις ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν, ἐνταῦθ' ἂν εἴη πον καὶ τὸ θεῖον· καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη πρώτη καὶ κυριωτάτη ἀρχή. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι τρία γένη τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἔστι, φυσικῆ, μαθηματικῆ, θεολογικῆ· βέλτιστον μὲν οὖν τὸ τῶν θεωρητικῶν ἐπιστημῶν γένος· τούτων δ' αὐτῶν ἡ τελευταία λεχθεῖσα· περὶ τὸ τίμιώτερον γὰρ ἔστι τῶν ὄντων· βελτίων δὲ καὶ χείρων ἐκάστη λέγεται κατὰ τὸ οἰκείον ἐπιστητόν. *Metaphys.* lib. XIII. cap. 7. p. 988. Duval.

Accordingly its scientific nature is thus set forth by Aquinas:

Licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa, et alia practica, sacra tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramque; sicut et Deus eadem scientia se cognoscit, et ea quæ facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practica: quia principalius agit de rebus divinis, quam de actibus humanis, de quibus agit, secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo ad perfectam Dei cognitionem, in qua æterna beatitudo consistit. *Summa Theol. Prima Pars*, qu. i. art. 4.

Hæc scientia accipere potest aliquid a philosophicis disciplinis, non quod ex necessitate eis indigeat, sed ad majorem manifestationem eorum, quæ in hac scientia traduntur. Non enim accipit sua principia ab aliis scientiis sed immediate a Deo per revelationem. Et ideo non accipit ab aliis scientiis tanquam a superioribus, sed utitur eis tanquam inferioribus et ancillis: sicut architectonicæ utuntur subministrantibus, ut civilis militari. Et hoc ipsum quod sic utitur eis, non est propter defectum, vel insufficientiam ejus, sed propter defectum intellectus nostri: qui ex his, quæ per naturalem rationem (ex qua procedunt aliæ scientiæ) cognoscuntur, facilius manu ducitur in ea,

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omnium faciendarum, priusquam essent, immutabiles rationes conditæ sunt, solent vocari; de quibus latius in processu operis dicemus, testimoniisque sanctorum Patrum roborabimus: et nec immerito sic appellantur; quoniam Pater, hoc est, principium omnium, in Verbo suo, unigenito videlicet Filio, omnium rerum rationes, quas faciendas esse voluit, prius quam in genera, et species, numerosque, atque differentias, cæteraque, quæ in condita creatura, aut considerari possunt, et considerantur, aut considerari non possunt, præ sui altitudinem, et non considerantur, et tamen sunt, præformavit. *Erigen. De Divis. Natur. II. p. 48.*

Ad id quod objicitur de positione Platonis: dicendum; quod non talis fuit positio Platonis quam improbat Aristoteles. Sed Plato posuit formas quæ sunt ante rem: et principia rei in seipsis existere: et in ipsis sigillari res sicut ad sigillum: nec posuit eas in mente divina, sed in seipsis. Et hoc modo improbat Aristoteles eam. Et forte Plato dixit verum. Necesse est enim principia esse prius natura: et prius esse principia quam principiata. Unde si formæ sunt rerum principia, et esse formati; et sunt, et principia sunt, ante formata. Et si quæritur ubi sint: quæstio Porphyrii est: qui ita quærit de universalibus et primis principiis. Pro certo in suis principiis sunt: quæ sunt lumina et influentiæ primæ causæ in intelligentias et intelligentiarum orbes; et orbium in elementa, et elementorum in virtutes formativas seminum et generatorum. Sic enim ex mente divina formæ sive ideæ prodeunt in ideata sive formata. Et ideo dixit Plato quod procedunt sicut ex quodam sigillo. Et hoc non negat Aristoteles: sed negat quod formæ sunt ante rem per seipsas, et secundum seipsas separatim existentes. *Albert. Mag. in Sent. Tr. XIII. qu. LV. fol. 124.*

NOTE U. p. 85.

Discat primo psalterium; his se canticis avocet; et in proverbiiis Solomonis erudiatur ad vitam. In Ecclesiaste consuescat, quæ mundi sunt, calcare. In Job virtutis et

patientiæ exempla sectetur. Ad Evangelia transeat, nunquam ea depositurâ de manibus. Apostolorum Acta et Epistolas tota cordis imbibat voluntate. Cumque pectoris sui cellarium his opibus locupletaverit, mandet memoriæ Prophetas; Pentateuchum, et Regum, et Paralipomenon libros, Esdræ quoque et Hester volumina. Ad ultimum sine periculo discat Canticum Canticorum; ne si in exordio legerit, sub carnalibus verbis spiritualium nuptiarum epithalamium non intelligens vulneretur. *Hieronym. Ep. ad Lætam, Opera, tom. I. p. 57.*

The whole epistle, though breathing an intense fanatical spirit, is an interesting document for the history of the times. It has its excellences too as a composition. Several of the passages are beautifully executed, exemplifying in their style that melodious rhythm in which Jerome delights, and which is quite peculiar to him. Take, for instance, the conclusion: Ipse si Paulam miseris, et magistrum, et nutricium, spondeo. Gestabo humeris; balbutientia senex verba formabo; multo gloriosior mundi philosopho, qui non regem Macedonum Babylonio periturum veneno, sed ancillam et sponsam Christi erudiam, regnis cœlestibus offerendam.

Aquinas was employed in expounding the Canticles almost with his dying breath, at the request of the monks of the Convent where he lay ill.

#### NOTE V. p. 86.

Fiunt itaque in puerilibus Academici senes; omnem dictorum, aut scriptorum excutiunt syllabam, imo et literam; dubitantes et omnia, quærentes semper, sed nunquam ad scientiam pervenientes: et tandem convertuntur ad vaniloquium, ac nescientes quid loquantur, aut de quibus asserant, errores condunt novos, et antiquorum aut nesciunt aut dedignantur sententias imitari. Compilant omnium opiniones, et ea quæ etiam a vilissimis dicta vel scripta sunt, ab inopia iudicii, scribunt et referunt: proponunt enim omnia, quia nesciunt præferre meliora. Tanta est

opinionum, oppositionumque congeries, ut vix suo nota esse possit authori. Accidit hoc Didymo, quo nemo plura scripsit, ut, cum historiæ cuidam tanquam vanæ repugnaret, ipsius proferretur liber, qui eam continebat. Sed nunc multos invenies Didymos, quorum pleni, imo referti sunt commentarii, hujusmodi Logicorum impedimentis. Recte autem dicuntur oppositiones, quia melioribus studiis opponuntur: obstant enim profectui. *Metalogicus*, lib. II. c. 7.

Such is the sarcastic complaint of John of Salisbury in the XIIth century. The subsequent state of Scholasticism was only a continued aggravation of this erroneous method. Indocta putant omnia, says Erasmus of the later writers, nisi centies inculcaris philosophum. Actum putant de Christiana religione, si quis Aristotelis decreta rejecerit.<sup>b</sup>

#### NOTE W. p. 89.

The different applications of the Scriptures have been thus deduced by the Scholastic writers.

Auctor sacræ scripturæ est Deus, in cujus potestate est, ut non solum voces ad significandum accommodet (quod etiam homo facere potest) sed etiam res ipsas. Et ideo, cum in omnibus scientiis voces significant, hoc habet proprium ista scientia, quod ipsæ res significatæ per voces, etiam significant aliquid. Illa ergo prima significatio qua voces significant res, pertinent ad primum sensum, qui est sensus historicus, vel literalis. Illa vero significatio, qua res significatæ per voces, iterum res alias significant, dicitur sensus spiritualis, propter quod sensus spiritualis super literalem fundatur, et eum supponit. Hic autem sensus trifariam dividitur. Sicut enim dicit Apostolus ad Hebræos vii. "lex vetus figura est novæ legis:" et ipsa nova lex, ut dicit Dionysius in Ecclesiastica Hierarchia, est figura futuræ gloriæ. In nova etiam lege ea quæ in capite sunt gesta, sunt signa eorum quæ nos agere debemus. Secundum ergo quod ea sunt veteris legis, significant ea

<sup>b</sup> *Hieronym. Ep. ad Alesiph. Erasmi Scholia*, p. 258.

quæ sunt novæ legis, sensus est allegoricus. Secundum vero quod ea quæ in Christo sunt facta, vel in his quæ Christum significant, sunt signa eorum quæ nos agere debemus, est sensus moralis; prout vero significant ea quæ sunt in æterna gloria, est sensus anagogicus. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. i. art. 10.*

## LECTURE III.

NOTE A. p. 104.

THE residence of Athanasius at Rome for so considerable a portion of time, is a very important point in ecclesiastical history. Who can say, how much the orthodoxy of the Western Church may be attributable to that circumstance? So restless a spirit, we may be sure, was not unoccupied in the sacred cause during the interval. And yet respecting any actions performed by him at that time, there is a profound silence. Qui tantum otii nactus, (says the biography,) quid gesserit, edideritve, altum ubique silentium. But this silence is an extremely expressive one. According indeed to his own account it was not an indolent one. "Applying myself wholly to the Church," he says, "for of this only had I any thought, I enjoyed leisure for the councils: Καὶ τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ τὰ κατ' ἐμαυτὸν παραθέμενος, τούτου γὰρ μόνον μοι φροντίς ἦν, ἐσχόλαζον ταῖς συνάξεσι."<sup>c</sup> To a person, whose heart and eye were alive to all that was passing in the Church at that time, this leisure devoted to the councils must have been a period full of reflection and instruction. To watch the different leanings of controversy, the conflicts of private and party feeling, the intrigues of ecclesiastical diplomacy, the shifts of subtile argumentation, which were displayed on the theatre of the public councils; was an effort

<sup>c</sup> *Athanas. Oper. tom. I. p. 297.*

of attention not unworthy of the powers of Athanasius; nor could it be unproductive of results as to the future decision of theological questions.

I do not observe it expressly said any where, that he employed himself in learning the Latin language, though Gibbon has so stated it. But I conceive the fact of his learning the theological language of the Latin Church, is borne out, by what Gregory Nazianzen has said of his tact in reconciling the dissensions produced by a difference of terms between the Greeks and Latins. Having touched on the verbal variations which occasioned so much discord in the doctrines of theologians, Gregory adds, concerning Athanasius: Ταῦτ' οὖν ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων ὁ μακάριος ἐκεῖνος, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄνθρωπος τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ μέγας τῶν ψυχῶν οἰκονόμος, οὐκ ᾤηθη δεῖν παριδεῖν τὴν ἀτοπον οὕτω καὶ ἄλογον τοῦ λόγου κατατομὴν, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἑαυτοῦ φάρμακον, ἐπάγει τῷ ἀρρώστηματι. πῶς οὖν τοῦτο ποιεῖ; προσκαλεσάμενος ἀμφότερα τὰ μέρη, οὕτωςι πρῶως καὶ φιλανθρώπως, καὶ τὸν νοῦν τῶν λεγομένων ἀκριβῶς ἐξετάσας, ἐπειδὴ συμφρονούντας εἶρε, καὶ οὐδὲν διεστῶτας κατὰ τὸν λόγον, τὰ ὀνόματα συγχωρήσας συνδέει τοῖς πράγμασι. *Orat. XXI. p. 396.*

Some light is reflected on the character of Athanasius, from the description of the Egyptian monks, Ammonius and Isidorus, who accompanied him to Rome. The austere taste of Ammonius would not suffer him to look at the memorials of the greatness of the city in her classic times; but the only attractions for him at Rome were the shrines of Peter and Paul. So resolute too was he against all worldly honour, even connected with spiritual duties, that when on some occasion the episcopal dignity would have been forced on him, he not only fled away, but in order to disable himself for the office, (no maimed person being admissible to the priesthood,) cut off one of his ears. The other, Isidorus, it is added, was no less conspicuous for piety and abdication of the changeable things of the world.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>d</sup> *Vita S. Athanasii*, p. 36. Opera, Paris, 1698.

## NOTE B. p. 106.

Dehinc post aliquot annos, cum Hincmarus in Ecclesia Remensi vetustissimum et receptissimum hymni ecclesiastici hunc versiculum; "Te Trina Deitas Unaque poscimus:" cantari vetuisset; ipse Ratramnus volumine non modicæ quantitatis ad Hildegarium Meldensem Episcopum edito, ex libris S. S. Hilarii et Augustini de Trinitate veterem Ecclesiæ traditionem confirmavit. *Mauguin. Dissert. Hist. c. 17*, cited in an edition of Ratramn's treatise on the Body and Blood of the Lord, p. 18.º

Religiosi S. Benedicti diu multumque reluctati sunt huic immutationi. *Ibid. p. 29.*

## NOTE C. p. 108.

I give the following passage as an illustration of this mode of philosophizing carried to its natural extreme.

Tanta enim, divinæ virtutis excellentia, in futura vita omnibus qui contemplatione ipsius digni futuri sunt, manifestabit, ut nihil aliud præter eam, sive in corporibus, sive in intellectibus, eis eluceat. Erit enim Deus "omnia in omnibus:" ac si aperte Scriptura diceret; solus Deus apparebit in omnibus. Hinc ait sanctus Job: "et in carne mea videbo Deum." Ac si dixisset; in hac carne mea quæ multis tentationibus affligitur, tanta gloria futura erit, ut quemadmodum nunc nihil in ea apparet, nisi mors et corruptio: ita in futura vita nihil mihi apparebit, nisi solus Deus, qui vere vita est, et immortalitas, et incorruptio. Ac si de sui corporis felicitate talem gloriam promisit, quid de sui spiritus dignitate existimandum est? præsertim cum, ut ait Magnus Gregorius, Theologus, corpora Sanctorum in rationem, ratio in intellectum, intellectus in Deum; ac per hoc tota illorum natura in ipsum Deum mutabitur. *Joan. Scot. Erigen. de Divis. Natur. lib. I. c. 11. p. 5.*

º Bertram, or Ratram, concerning the Body and Blood of the Lord, in Latin, with a new English translation, 8vo. London, 1688.



## NOTE D. p. 110.

Sicut dicit enim Anselmus; processio personarum est ante processionem creaturarum, sicut causa ante effectum, et sicut æternum ante temporale, et sicut exemplar, ante exemplatum. *Albert. Mag. in lib. Sent. Tract. VII. fol. 68.*

Hoc expresse vult Dionysius in libro de divinis nominibus, cap. 4. tractans illud Apostoli Eph. iii. "Hujus rei gratia, flecto genua mea ad Deum Patrem: ex quo omnis paternitas in cœlo et in terra nominatur." Dicit enim: quod ex hoc accipiatur, quod omnis paternitas et omnis filiatio, ex qua, et deorum parentes, et deorum filii sunt, sive in cœlo, sive in terra, est ex patriarchia et filiarchia omnibus proposita. Hoc expresse probatur per illud Esaiæ lxvi. "si ego aliis generationem tribuo, ipse sterilis ero: dicit Dominus." *Ibid. qu. xxx. fol. 69.*

## NOTE E. p. 111.

Ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν οὐ γυμνῇ τῇ ψυχῇ ζῶμεν, ἀλλ' ὡσπερ ὑπὸ παραπετάσματι τῷ σαρκίῳ καλυπτομένη ἡμῶν ψυχῇ, νοῦν μὲν δρῶντα καὶ γνωστικόν. . . . ἀλλως προσέλθωμεν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ. *Damasceni Dialectica, c. 1.*

Among the doubts proposed by Albert on the question; Utrum Deus cognoscibilis sit, secundum quod est unus Deus in tribus personis, is this: Et videtur quod sic. Rom. primo capite; "Invisibilia Dei per ea quæ facta intellectu conspiciuntur." Ibi glosa: invisibilia dicit, propter Patrem: sempiterna virtus, propter Filium, divinitas, propter Spiritum Sanctum: ergo ductu rationis philosophi cognoverunt Deum unum in tribus personis. *Summa, Tract. III. qu. xiii. fol. 12.*

## NOTE F. p. 117.

Aquinas, discussing the question; Utrum processio sit in divinis; and first, according to his usual plan, adducing objections, and in opposition to these the text of John viii.

“Ego ex Deo processi,” adds, in his Conclusion on the point.

Respondeo dicendum; quod divina scriptura in rebus divinis, nominibus ad processionem pertinentibus utitur. Hanc autem processionem diversi diversimode acceperunt. Quidam enim acceperunt hanc processionem, secundum quod effectus procedit a causa. Et sic accepit Arius, dicens, Filium procedere a Patre, sicut primam ejus creaturam; et Spiritum Sanctum procedere a Patre et Filio, sicut creaturam utriusque. Et secundum hoc, neque Filius, neque Spiritus Sanctus, esset verus Deus; quod est contra id quod dicitur de Filio, 1 Joan. ult. “ut simus in vero Filio ejus. Hic est verus Deus.” Et de Spiritu Sancto dicitur, 1 Cor. vi. “nescitis quia membra vestra templum sunt Spiritus Sancti.” Templum autem habere, solius Dei est. Alii vero hanc processionem acceperunt, secundum quod causa dicitur procedere in effectum, in quantum vel movet ipsum, vel similitudinem suam ipsi imprimi. Et sic accepit Sabellius, dicens ipsum Deum Patrem Filium dici, secundum quod carnem assumpsit ex Virgine: et eundem dicit Spiritum Sanctum, secundum quod creaturam rationalem sanctificat, et ad vitam movet. Huic autem acceptioni repugnant verba Domini de se dicentis, Joan. v. “non potest Filius a se facere quicquam;” et multa alia, per quæ ostenditur quod non est ipse Pater qui Filius. Si quis autem diligenter consideret, uterque accipit processionem, secundum quod est ad aliquid extra; unde neuter posuit processionem in ipso Deo.

Sed cum omnis processio sit secundum aliquam actionem: sicut, secundum actionem quæ tendit in exteriorem materiam, est aliqua processio ad extra: ita, secundum actionem quæ manet in ipso agente, attenditur processio quædam ad intra. Et hoc maxime patet in intellectu, cujus actio, scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente. Quicumque autem intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit, procedit aliquid intra ipsum; quod est conceptio rei intellectæ ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex ejus notitia procedens.

Quam quidem conceptionem vox significat; et dicitur verbum cordis significatum verbo vocis. Cum autem Deus sit super omnia, ea quæ in Deo dicuntur, non sunt intelligenda secundum modum infirmarum creaturarum, quæ sunt corpora; sed secundum similitudinem supremarum creaturarum, quæ sunt intellectuales substantiæ; a quibus etiam, similitudo accepta deficit a repræsentatione divinarum. Non ergo accipienda est processio, secundum quod est in corporalibus, vel per motum localem, vel per actionem alicujus causæ in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a calefaciente in calefactum: sed secundum emanationem intelligibilem, utpote verbi intelligibilis a dicente, quod manet in ipso. Et sic fides catholica processionem ponit in divinis. *Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxvii. art. 1.*

On the application of the terms Generation, Son, Spirit, the following passages are explicit.

Sic igitur processio Verbi in divinis habet rationem generationis: procedit enim per modum intelligibilis actionis, quæ est operatio vitæ; et a principio conjuncto, ut supra jam dictum est: et secundum rationem similitudinis; quia conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei intellectæ; et in eadem natura; quia in Deo idem est intelligere et esse, ut supra ostensum est. Unde processio Verbi in divinis dicitur generatio, et ipsum Verbum procedens dicitur Filius. *Ibid. art. 2.*

Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quædam alia processio, scilicet processio amoris, secundum quam amatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem verbi, res intellecta est in intelligente. Unde et præter processionem Verbi ponitur alia processio in divinis, quæ est processio amoris. *Ibid. art. 3.*

Processio igitur quæ attenditur secundum rationem intellectus, est secundum rationem similitudinis; et in tantum potest habere rationem generationis, quia omne generans generat sibi simile. Processio autem quæ attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis, non consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis; sed magis secundum rationem

impellentis et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit ut genitum, vel ut filius; sed magis procedit ut spiritus. . . . Et quia in creaturis communicatio naturæ non est nisi per generationem; processio in divinis non habet proprium vel speciale nomen nisi generationis. Unde processio, quæ non est generatio, remansit sine speciali nomine: sed potest nominari spiratio, quia est processio Spiritus. *Ibid.* art. 4.

Abundant passages might be adduced to the same purport from other Scholastic writers. In some, the analogy on which the reasoning proceeds, is carried to the most offensive excess. We find indeed the same language adopted by the Church of Rome after the Council of Trent, in the authoritative document entitled, *Catechismus ad Parochos*; which clearly recognizes this philosophy of the subject as a sound theological view of it.

Oret tamen assidue, ac precetur Deum, et Patrem, qui universa ex nihilo condidit, disponitque omnia suaviter, qui dedit nobis potestatem filios Dei fieri, qui Trinitatis mysterium humanæ menti patefecit: oret, inquam, sine intermissione, qui divino beneficio hæc credit, ut, aliquando in æterna tabernacula receptus, dignus sit qui videat, quæ tanta sit Dei Patris fecunditas, ut se ipsum intuens, atque intelligens, parem et æqualem sibi Filium gignat; quove modo duorum idem plane et par charitatis amor, qui Spiritus Sanctus est, a Patre et Filio procedens, genitorem, et genitum, æterno, atque indissolubili vinculo inter se connectat; atque ita divinæ Trinitatis una sit essentia, et trium personarum perfecta distinctio. *Catechismus ex Decret. Concil. Trident. ad Paroch.* Romæ, 1761. p. 18. quarto ed.

Yet with all this ratiocination on the subject, Aquinas, it must be observed, expressly denies, as also Albert and other scholastics do, that human reasonings can attain to so high a mystery. In Question xxxii. art. 1, of the First Part of his *Summa*, he discusses the point, whether a knowledge of the Trinity could be ascertained by the

light of reason. He there states the value of reasonings on the subject to be relative to those who already believe; and that the speculation proceeds on the assumption that the doctrine is authoritatively established. We see here the scholastic principle, the combination, that is, of reason and authority, (as I have pointed out in the preceding Lectures,) consistently supported. Reason is to be exercised boldly in theological truth; only with this reserve, that it is *subordinate* to authority. Though by its adventurous excursions it may supersede the simple statements of revealed truth, in pretension it is only the minister of the divine word. We see also in this admission an evidence of the origin of the logical theology, in the disputes agitated between the heretic and the orthodox,—between parties, both acknowledging the inspiration of the Scriptures, but each anxious either to impose his own creed on the other, or to resist the imposition on himself of the creed of another. It was Reason maintaining its prerogative, both under authority and against authority.

Thus Reason was in effect made supreme over the revealed truth. Hence too the distinction of a philosophical and a popular belief, became a recognized principle among theologians. I find this principle expressly sanctioned by an eloquent modern philosopher, in reference too to the very point which is the subject of the present note.

Mystère est un mot qui appartient non à la langue de la philosophie, mais à celle de la religion. Le mysticisme est la forme nécessaire de toute religion, en tant que religion; mais sous cette forme sont des idées qui peuvent être abordées et comprises en elles-mêmes. Et, Messieurs, je ne fais que répéter ce qu'ont dit bien avant moi les plus grands docteurs de l'église, saint Thomas, saint Anselme de Cantorbéry, et Bossuet lui-même au dix-septième siècle, à la fin de l'*Histoire universelle*. Les grands hommes ont tenté une explication des mystères, entre autres du mystère de la très sainte Trinité; donc ce mystère, tout saint et sacré qu'il était à leurs propres

yeux, contenait des idées qu'il était possible de dégager de leur forme. La forme symbolique et mystique est inhérente à la religion ; elle est, dans le cas qui nous occupe, empruntée aux relations humaines les plus intimes et les plus touchantes. Mais, encore une fois, si la forme est sainte, les idées qui sont dessous le sont aussi, et ce sont ces idées que la philosophie dégage, et qu'elle considère en elles-mêmes. *Cousin, Introduction à l'Histoire de Philosophie*, 5<sup>e</sup>. Leçon, p. 19. Paris, 1828.

## NOTE G. p. 117.

Amplius autem plurimi antiquorum Philosophorum posuerunt amorem Dei originale principium quorumcunque ; Amor autem a voluntate minime separatur. Recitat siquidem Philosophus, 1. Metaph., Hesiodum et Parmenidem, dicentes, amorem Deorum providentem omnibus esse principium generationis universi : qui amor omnia condidit : quem necesse est esse in entibus, et esse causam quæ res ipsas moveat et congreget. *Bradwardin. De Caus. Dei*, lib. I. c. 9. p. 192.

It may be perceived, from the following passage of Albert, that the notions of the *Timæus* were accommodated by the scholastics to their theological system ; though the necessity of maintaining the supremacy of Revelation, required from them a disclaimer of the authority of Plato, as original on the sacred subject to which they applied it.

Adhuc Plato in ultima parte *Tymæi* de thugatero, hoc est, paterno intellectu, loquitur, et Filio logon, et matricula : Patrem ergo et Filium cognovit. Et quia Pater et Filius non nectuntur sine amore in Patre et Filio : nexum cognovit utriusque : qui est Spiritus Sanctus : ergo et alii cognoverunt.

Ad aliud dicendum : quod Plato Patrem intellectum creatorem nominat : Filium autem mundum. Quem mundum vocavit : eo quod a mundissimo exemplari exivit, arte sc. Creatoris. Quem archetypum mundum dixit : matriculam autem vocavit materiam. Unde constat quod de

appropriatis, et non de propriis, loquitur : et ad productionem rerum hoc refert, et non ad processionem personarum. *Albert. Mag. Summa*, qu. XIII. Tract. III. fol. 13.

NOTE H. p. 122.

Materialism may be regarded as generally the doctrine of the primitive Church. It accorded more with the popular view of future punishments which was originally held : and it reserved to God himself more exclusively the prerogative of spirituality. It was the creed of an unphilosophical piety, vaguely and loosely conceived ; not an ingenious theory, such as that which a false modern philosophy has devised. Were the material nature of the soul denied, the infidel might argue against the possibility of its undergoing those sufferings for sin which Christianity denounces. Or man might be tempted to lift up himself with pride, as little less than the Divine Being. Thus Tertullian says : *Nihil enim si non corpus. De Anim. c. 7. n. 96. Omne quod est, corpus est sui generis ; nihil est incorporale, nisi quod non est. De Carne Christi. Ut concedam interim esse aliquid incorporale, de substantiis duntaxat ; quum ipsa substantia corpus sit rei cujusque. Adv. Hermogen. c. 35.* He even does not scruple to apply the word *corpus* to the nature of God. *Quis enim negabit Deum corpus esse, etsi Deus spiritus est ? Spiritus enim corpus sui generis in sua effigie. Adv. Prax. c. 7.*—Jerome, alluding to the different opinions concerning the nature of the soul, speaks of its propagation in a manner analogous to the body, as the prevailing tenet in the West.—*Utrum lapsa de cœlo sit, ut Pythagoras philosophus, omnesque Platonici, et Origenes, putant, anima ; an a propria Dei substantia, ut Stoici, Manichæus, et Hispaniæ Prisciliani hæreses, suspicantur ; an in thesauro habeantur Dei olim conditæ, ut quidam ecclesiastici stulta persuasionem confidunt ; an quotidie a Deo fiant, et mittantur in corpora, secundum illud quod in evangelio scriptum est, “ Pater meus usque modo operatur,*

“et ego operor;” an certe ex traduce, ut Tertullianus, Apollinaris, et maxima pars Occidentalium autumant, ut, quomodo corpus ex corpore, sic anima nascatur ex anima, et simili cum brutis animantibus conditione subsistant. *Hieronym. Marcellino et Anapsychiæ.*<sup>d</sup>

Citations might be made from other writers to the same purport. At length, about the commencement of the Vth century, the Pelagian discussions, and in particular the positive statement of the materiality of the soul by Faustus, bishop of Riez, attracted the attention of philosophical Christians to the point. The arguments of Faustus were answered in a treatise by Mamertus Claudianus, a priest of Vienne, and the most eminent philosopher of that day in Gaul. About the same time the Greek philosopher Nemesius, Bishop of Emesa, argued the incorruptible vitality of the soul, in a work “On the Nature of Man.” Then also we find Augustine discussing the subject. His Manichean prejudices having leaned entirely on the side of Materialism, when he became a catholic Christian, he was naturally led to assert an opposite theory. In his dialogue, *De Quantitate Animæ*, he derives the origin of the soul from God, and affirms its simplicity and immateriality. So again in an epistle to Jerome, he says: *Incorpoream quoque esse animam, etsi difficile tardioribus persuaderi potest, mihi tamen fateor esse persuasum.*<sup>e</sup> Platonism was now the received philosophy of the Church: and the necessity of arguing against the preexistence of the soul was not so imperatively felt. Nemesius indeed expressly teaches its preexistence. There seems therefore to have been no objection to admitting the principles, from which Plato drew his conclusions of the natural immortality of the soul. Still speculation did not rest on the subject: as we may perceive from the remarks of John of Salisbury.—*At physici, dum naturæ nimium autoritatis tribuunt, in autorem naturæ, adversando fidei, plerumque impingunt.*

<sup>d</sup> *Ep. XXVII. tom. II. August. Opera.*

<sup>e</sup> *Augustini Opera, tom. II. fol. 30.*



Non enim omnes erroris arguo ; licet plurimos audierim, de anima, de virtutibus et operibus ejus, de augmento corporis et diminutione, de resurrectione ejusdem, de creatione rerum, aliter quam fides habeat, disputantes. *Policraticus*, lib. II. p. 147.

## NOTE I. p. 123.

Sed dicent forsitan : flatus utique ille non erat de substantia humana, et tamen quasi suam illum emittebat. Quapropter docetur per hujusmodi Spiritus Sancti dationem : quia cum dat Filius Spiritum Sanctum, dat et mittit suum spiritum ; sed non de suæ divinitatis essentia. Dicant igitur, si qui hæc opinantur : quia, sicut flatus non est humana natura cum emittitur ab homine, ita Spiritus Sanctus non est divina substantia, cum datur vel mittitur a Deo Filio ; quod nullus confitetur Christianus. Dicant etiam cum audiunt : “ Verbo Domini cœli firmati sunt, et “ spiritu oris ejus omnis virtus eorum :” si ibi non negant intelligendum per spiritum oris Domini, Spiritum Sanctum, non illum esse de essentia Domini, cujus oris spiritus dicitur : quia spiritus qui ex ore solet hominum procedere, non est de substantia illius de cujus ore procedit, &c. *Anselm. De Process. Spir. S.* p. 130. *Oper. tom. III. ed. 1612.*

## NOTE J. p. 126.

Gregory Nazianzen, having spoken of the *Nature* of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, corrects himself with the observation ; that “ one should rightly say *usia*, *essence*, “ rather than *Nature*.” *Orat. XLV. p. 717.*

Aquinas gives, as a reason for saying *unius essentia* rather than *unius naturæ*, that things agreeing in any act, for instance, all heating things, may be said to be of one *Nature*, but things cannot be said to be of one *Essence*, unless they have *unum esse*, one *Being*. *S. Theol. Prima Pars*, qu. xxxix. art. 2.

On the same principle *substantia* was a still more apt

expression than *essentia*; particularly as *substantia* was the logical term of the Latins for the *οὐσία* of the Categories.

## NOTE K. p. 126.

This may be seen in the following instances:—*Idque quo facilius intelligas ex teipso ante recognosce, ut ex imagine et similitudine Dei, quam habeas et tu in temetipso rationem, qui es animal rationale, a rationali scilicet artifice non tantum factus, sed etiam ex substantia ipsius animatus. Tertullian. adv. Prax. p. 503. Paris. 1675.*

Quasi non sic quoque unus sit omnia, dum ex uno omnia, per substantiæ scilicet unitatem. *Ibid. c. 2. p. 501.*

Susceptorum etiam ipsas substantias hominis carnem et animam. *Ibid. c. 16. p. 509.*

Quæcunque ergo substantia sermonis fuit, illam dico personam, et illi nomen filii vindico. *Ibid. c. 7. p. 504.*

Quapropter tres substantiæ sunt. *Hilar. De Trin. IV. c. 13, and August. De Trin. VII.*

Hoc vero utcunque simile est, quia et veteres qui Latine locuti sunt, antequam haberent ista nomina, *quæ non diu est quod in usum venerunt*, id est, essentiam vel substantiam, pro his *naturam* dicebant. *August. De Trin. lib. VII. fol. 114. col. 1. Also lib. V. fol. 106. col. 3.*

Nomen substantiæ (cui respondet in Græco nomen hypostasis) communiter accipitur apud nos pro essentia. *Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 3.*

Confirma, Domine, famulos tuos quos ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto propitius redemisti, ut veterem hominem cum suis actionibus deponentes, in ipsius conversatione vivamus, *ad cujus substantiam* per hæc Paschalia mysteria transtulisti. *Extract from an ancient Gallic Missal.*<sup>f</sup>

So in the Athanasian Creed, in the sentence, “ God of “ the substance of the Father, begotten before the worlds:

<sup>f</sup> Cited in an edition of Ratramn, on the Body and Blood of the Lord, 8vo. London, 1688. p. 479. It was the prayer, it is there observed, made in the name of the new-baptized persons on the Friday in Easter week.

“and man of the substance of his mother, born in the “world,” substance is clearly used in two different senses; first to denote the *essence* of God, next to denote the fleshly nature of the mother of Jesus Christ.

## NOTE L. p. 128.

Synodi (Nicænæ) sensum Marcellus Ancyranus non percepisse fertur; sed, errore Sabelliano, *consubstantialis* sic defendisse, ut personarum Trinitatem tolleret. Verum auctor dissertationis ad Sabellii gregales, quæ extat inter opera Athanasii, admonet eam esse vim nominis, ὁμοούσιον, *consubstantialis*, ut *multorum secundum substantiam consortium* efferat; et idcirco Sabellianos ei subrogasse, τὸ μονοούσιον, quod *unius substantiæ*, significat. Particula ὁμοῦ, *una, simul*, inquit Epiphanius, *Hær. LXIX. c. 70, οὐχ ἓνα, ἀλλὰ δύο σημαίνει τέλεια. Damasc. Dialectica, c. 41. p. 44, note, Le Quien.*

## NOTE M. p. 129.

Ὅσον ἐν ἡλίοις τρισὶν ἐχομένοις ἀλλήλων, καὶ ἀδιαστάτοις οὖσι, μία τοῦ φωτὸς σύγκρασις τε καὶ συνᾶφεια, is a comparison of Gregory Nazianzen, in *Orat. XXXVII*, introduced by Damascenus, *De Fid. Orthod. I. p. 140.*

Videamus tamen, an in rebus creatis, quæ et loci et temporis, et compositionis partium, legi subjacent, inveniri possit aliquatenus, hoc quod negat in Deo. Ponamus fontem, de quo nascatur et fluat rivus, qui postea colligatur in lacum, &c. *Anselm. De Incarn. Verb. c. 7. p. 40, also De Process. Spirit. p. 132.*

Exivit autem ex Patre, ut radius ex sole, ut rivus ex fonte, ut frutex ex semine. *Tertull. adv. Prax. lib. XXI. also Hilar. Ex Oper. Histor. Frag. II. p. 646.*

Tertullian uses the expressions; Trinitas per consertos et connexos gradus a Patre decurrens—nec frutex a radice, nec fluvius a fonte, nec radius a sole, discernitur—fons et fluvius duæ species sunt, sed indivisæ. *Adv. Prax.*

## NOTE N. p. 129.

Quærent autem quomodo in Deo, una penitus permanente substantia vel essentia aliqua, ibi proprietatum sit diversitas, secundum quas Trinitas personarum constat: vel quomodo potest esse, ut cum unaquæque ibi persona sit Deus, nec tamen una persona sit alia, non etiam plures Dii, sicut et plures personæ sint dicendi. Aut quæ sit denique generatio Filii de Patre vel processio Spiritus ab utroque. Quod quidem ut diligentius fiat, præmittendum est, quot modis, Idem, et quot modis Diversum, accipiatur.

Tribus autem modis utrumque et fortasse pluribus dici solet. Idem namque similitudine, idem essentialiter sine numero, idem proprietate dicimus, &c. . . . Tribus etiam modis solet diversum sumi; essentialiter scilicet, numero, proprietate, seu diffinitione. Diversa namque essentialiter dicimus, si eadem essentia quæ est hoc, non sit illud; et si homo est, nullius essentia tanquam pars includatur, ut manus et homo. Tunc vero etiam numero sunt diversa, cum ita tota quantitate suæ essentiæ sunt discreta, ut in computatione sibi queant admisceri, cum videlicet dicitur unus, duo, tres, &c. . . . Proprietate vero seu diffinitione diversa sunt, quæ licet habeant de se prædicari, cum essentialiter idem sunt, secundum proprios tamen status, aliud est hujus proprium, et aliud illius, et singula propriis diffinitionibus et in sensu diversis sunt terminanda. *Abæ- lardi Introd. ad Theol.* lib. II. p. 1076.

## NOTE O. p. 130.

The theological vocabulary of the Latins appears not to have been settled before the writings of Augustine. In Tertullian great laxity of expression is observable. Even in Hilary, the immediate precursor of Ambrose and Augustine in the Arian controversy, the terms are not used with that precision which the captiousness of heresy afterwards enforced. Thus Hilary does not scruple to speak of *tres substantiæ*, or to use *person* in the sense of *nature*;

and in general to conform himself more to the phraseology of the Greek theologians, than the Latins after him could venture to do. It was the object of Hilary, to mediate between the Christian of the East and the West, and he adopted accordingly a phraseology that might conciliate both parties.

The work, *De Synodis*, of Hilary, is a curious illustration of the unsettled state of religious opinion in the times when it was composed. It is throughout a conciliatory document—a rhetorical address to his episcopal brethren of the West, to induce them to acquiesce in the decisions of the several councils, by shewing how little in reality the differences were. The attempt indeed is carried so far as to amount to a compromise of opinions.

NOTE P. p. 131.

The distinction rested principally on the coincidence of the notions of “having” and “being,” in their application to the Deity. Thus Anselm observes.

Videndum igitur quomodo intelligendum sit, quando illa natura, quæ est ipsa justitia, dicitur justa. Quoniam enim homo non potest esse justitia, justitiam autem habere potest. Non enim intelligitur justus homo, existens justitia, sed habens justitiam. Quoniam igitur summa natura non proprie dicitur justa, quia habet justitiam, sed existit justitia: cum dicitur justa, proprie intelligitur existens justitia, non autem habens justitiam; quare si cum dicitur existens justitia, non dicitur qualis est, sed quid est; consequitur, ut cum dicitur justa, non dicatur qualis sit, sed quid sit, &c. *Monologium* XV. p. 6. Oper.

Distinctio autem in divinis non fit nisi per relationes originis. Relatio autem in divinis non est sicut accidens inhærens subjecto, sed est ipsa divina essentia: unde est subsistens, sicut essentia divina subsistit. Sicut ergo deitas est Deus: ita paternitas divina est Deus Pater, qui est persona divina. Persona igitur divina significat relationem ut subsistentem; et hoc est significare relationem

per modum substantiæ, quæ est hypostasis subsistens in natura divina; licet, subsistens in natura divina, non sit aliud quam natura divina. *Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Pars*, qu. xxix. art. 4.

## NOTE Q. p. 133.

Sed quia nostra loquendi consuetudo jam obtinuit, ut hoc intelligatur, cum dicimus substantiam; non audemus dicere, unam essentiam, tres substantias, sed unam essentiam vel substantiam, tres autem personas: quemadmodum multi Latini ista tractantes, et digni autoritate dixerunt; cum alium modum aptiorem non invenirent, quo enuntiarent verbis quod sine verbis intelligebant. . . . Tamen cum quæritur quid tres, magna prorsus inopia humanum laborat eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personæ, non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur. . . . Aut quoniam propter ineffabilem conjunctionem, hæc tria simul unus Deus, cur non etiam una persona, ut ita non possimus dicere tres personas. . . . An quia Scriptura non dicit tres Deos? Sed nec tres personas alicubi Scripturam commemorare invenimus. An quia nec tres nec unam personam Scriptura dicit hæc tria, legimus enim personam Domini, non personam Dominum, propterea licuit loquendi et disputandi necessitate tres personas dicere, non quia Scriptura dicit, sed quia Scriptura non contradicit. . . . Quid igitur restat, nisi ut fateamur loquendi necessitate partita hæc vocabula, cum opus esset copiosa disputatione adversum insidias vel errores hæreticorum. Cum enim conaretur humana inopia loquendo proferre ad hominum sensus, quod in secretario mentis pro captu tenet, de Domino Deo creatore suo, sive per piam fidem, sive per qualemcunque intelligentiam, timuit dicere tres essentias, ne intelligeretur in illa summa æqualitate ulla diversitas. Rursus non esse tria quædam non poterat dicere; quod Sabellius quia dixit, in hæresim lapsus est. . . . Aut si jam placet propter disputandi necessitatem, etiam exceptis nominibus relativis, pluralem numerum ad-

mittere, ut uno nomine respondeatur, cum quæritur, quid tria, et dicere tres substantias, sive tres personas, nullæ moles aut intervalla cogitentur, nulla distantia quantulæcunque dissimilitudinis, ut ibi intelligatur aliud alio, vel paulo minus, quocunque modo minus esse aliud alio potest, ut neque personarum sit confusio, nec talis distinctio qua sit impar aliquid. . . . Ideoque dici tres personas vel tres substantias, non ut aliqua intelligatur diversitas essentiæ, sed ut vel uno aliquo vocabulo responderi possit, cum dicitur, quid tres, vel quid tria. *Augustin. De Trin.* lib. V. fol. 106. VII. fol. 113, 114. VIII. fol. 114.

Ecce patet omni homini expedire, ut credat in quandam ineffabilem trinam Unitatem et unam Trinitatem. Unam quidem et Unitatem, propter unam essentiam; trinam vero et Trinitatem, propter tres, nescio quid: licet enim possim dicere Trinitatem, propter Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum, qui sunt tres; non tamen possum proferre uno nomine, propter quid tres, velut si dicerem propter tres personas; sicut si dicerem unitatem propter unam substantiam. Non enim putandæ sunt tres personæ: quia omnes plures personæ sic subsistunt separatim ab invicem, ut tot necesse sit esse substantias, quot sunt personæ: quod in pluribus hominibus, qui, quot personæ, tot individuæ sunt substantiæ, cognoscitur. Quare in summa essentia, sicut non sunt plures substantiæ, ita nec plures personæ. Si quis itaque inde velit alicui loqui, quid tres; dicet esse Patrem, et Filium, et utriusque Spiritum; nisi forte, indigentia nominis proprie convenientis coactus, elegerit aliquid de illis nominibus, quæ pluraliter in summa essentia dici non possint, ad designandum id quod congruo nomine dici non potest; ut si dicat, illam admirabilem Trinitatem esse unam essentiam vel naturam, et tres personas sive substantias. *Anselm. Monologium*, c. 76. Oper. p. 22.

Unum enim sunt illi tres, id est, essentia divina. Unde veritas ait: "Ego et Pater unum sumus." Veruntamen cum quæritur, quid tres, vel quid tria; non de essentia

quæritur, nec ibi quid ad essentiam refertur. Sed cum fides Catholica tres esse profiteretur, sicut Joannes in epistola canonica ait: "Tres sunt qui testimonium perhibent de cœlo:" quærebat quid illi tres essent, i. e., an essent tres res, et quæ tres res, et quo nomine illæ tres res significarentur. Et ideo loquendi necessitate inventum est hoc nomen persona *ad respondendum*, et dictum est tres personæ. *Lombard. lib. I. dist. 25. p. 73.*

Unde quibusdam visum est quod hoc nomen, persona, simpliciter ex virtute vocabuli, essentiam significet in divinis, sicut hoc nomen, Deus, et hoc nomen, sapiens; sed propter instantiam hæreticorum est accommodatum ex ordinatione Concilii, ut possit poni pro relativis. . . . Sed hæc non videtur sufficiens ratio: quia si hoc nomen, persona, ex vi suæ significationis, non habet quod significet, nisi essentiam in divinis, ex hoc quod dictum est tres personas, non fuisset hæreticorum quietata calumnia, sed majoris calumniæ data esset eis occasio. . . . Et secundum hoc etiam dici potest, quod hæc significatio hujus nominis (persona) non erat percepta ante hæreticorum calumniam: unde non erat in usu hoc nomen, persona, nisi sicut unum aliorum absolutorum: sed postmodum accommodatum est hoc nomen, persona, ad standum pro relativo, ex congruentia suæ significationis: ut scilicet hoc quod stat pro relativo, non solum habeat ex usu, (ut prima opinio docebat,) sed etiam ex significatione sua. *Aquinas, Summa Theolog. Prima Pars, qu. xxix. art. 4.*

#### NOTE R. p. 134.

Ad primum ergo dicendum; quod ad exprimendam veritatem essentiæ et personæ, sancti doctores aliquando expressius locuti sunt, quam proprietates locutionis patiatur; Unde hujusmodi locutiones non sunt extendendæ, sed exponendæ; &c. *Aquinas Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxix. art. 5.*



## NOTE S. p. 135.

Complures antiquorum, ut jam supra demonstravi, generatim loquentes, naturam docuerunt communem sic esse, ut est quælibet species individuis communicata pluribus; immo *οὐσίαν* nihil aliud esse, quam speciem ultimam. Hinc autem consecrarium hoc esse sane *παράδοξον* ostendimus, uti plures homines numero, unam et eandem habeant essentiam, ideoque ne homines quidem plurativo numero dici debeant, sed unus homo. Quod etsi perabsurdum videtur, et abhorrens a consuetudine communi; multi hoc tamen asseverare non dubitant. *Petav. Dogmata Theol. de Trin.* VI. c. 9. *Curcellæi Oper.* Amst. 1775. p. 883.

## NOTE T. p. 137.

Oportet autem in his quæ de Trinitate loquimur, duos errores oppositos cavere, temperate inter utrumque procedentes: sc. errorem Arii, qui posuit cum trinitate personarum trinitatem substantiarum, et errorem Sabellii, qui posuit cum unitate essentiæ unitatem personæ. Ad evitandum igitur errorem Arii, vitare debemus in divinis nomen diversitatis et differentiæ, ne tollatur unitas essentiæ. Possumus autem uti nomine distinctionis, propter oppositionem relativam. Unde sicubi in aliqua Scriptura authentica diversitas, vel differentia personarum invenitur, sumitur diversitas vel differentia, pro distinctione. Ne autem tollatur simplicitas divinæ essentiæ, vitandum est nomen separationis et divisionis, quæ est totius in partes. Ne autem tollatur æqualitas, vitandum est nomen disparitatis. Ne vero tollatur similitudo, vitandum est nomen alieni et discrepantis. . . Ad vitandum vero errorem Sabellii, vitare debemus singularitatem, ne tollatur communicabilitas essentiæ divinæ. . . Debemus etiam vitare nomen unici, ne tollatur numerus personarum. . . Vitandum est etiam nomen solitarii, ne tollatur consortium trium personarum. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars*, qu. xxxi. art 2.

## NOTE U. p. 138.

Vincent of Lerins gives the following account of the opinion of Apollinarius, or Apollinaris.

Apollinaris vero in unitate quidem Trinitatis quasi consentire se jactitat : et hoc ipsum non plena fidei sanitate ; sed in Domini incarnatione aperta professione blasphematur. Dicit enim in ipsa Salvatoris nostri carne, aut animam humanam penitus non fuisse, aut certe talem fuisse, cui mens et ratio non esset. Sed et ipsam Domini carnem non de sanctæ virginis Mariæ carne susceptam, sed de cœlo in virginem descendisse dicebat ; eamque, nutabundus semper et dubius, modo cœternam Deo Verbo, modo de Verbi divinitate factam prædicabat. Nolebat enim in Christo esse duas substantias, unam divinam, alteram humanam, unam ex patre, alteram ex matre : sed ipsam Verbi naturam putabat esse discissam ; quasi aliud ejus permaneret in Deo, aliud vero versum fuisset in carnem : at cum veritas dicat ex duabus substantiis unum esse Christum, ille, contrarius veritati, ex una Christi divinitate duas adserat factas esse substantias. *Commonitorium*, ed. Baluz. p. 333.

The fear of assigning a quaternity instead of a trinity, seems to have actuated other Christians also in their reasonings on the subject ; and to have made the orthodox careful of protecting their doctrines on that point. A passage of Ambrose will shew this.

Nec timeo ne tetrada videar inducere : nos enim vere solam, qui hoc adserimus, colimus Trinitatem. Non enim Christum divido, cum carnis ejus divinitatisque distinguo substantiam : sed unum Christum cum Patre et Spiritu Dei prædico, et illos magis, qui carnem Christi unius cum divinitate ejus dicunt esse substantiæ, tetrada inducere demonstrabo. Non enim quod ejusdem substantiæ est, unus, sed unum est ; nam utique Filium ejusdem cum Patre substantiæ confitentes in tractatu concilii Nicæni, non unum personam, sed unam divinitatem, in Patre et Filio crediderunt.

Ergo cum dicunt ejusdem carnem, cujus et Filius Dei erat, fuisse substantiæ; ipsi, quod nobis objiciunt, ineptiis vanæ adsertionis incurrunt, ut dividant Christum. Itaque quartum increatum, quod adoremus, inducunt, cum sola increata sit divinitas Trininitatis. *Ambros. de Incarn. c. VII. Oper. tom. II. p. 721.*

NOTE V. p. 140.

The illustration from the union of body and soul, to the union of God and man in Christ, appears in Augustine's writings; and probably was adopted from him into the Athanasian Creed. To take it in its proper force, it must be viewed by the light of the theory already alluded to; which assumed the distinct formation of the soul and its infusion into the body. For in this point of view, it corresponds with the doctrine of the separate Divine nature, associated with the separate humanity, in the person of Christ. Those who acknowledged the former assumed fact, might consistently admit the latter. To those, on the other hand, who have no such theory on the nature of the soul, the illustration applies only in the most loose and general acceptation; as representing a case of our believing in a mysterious combination of powers, to induce us to believe another like inexplicable union. Strictly to speak, however, the analogy, as it is stated, is entirely hypothetical, and is calculated to pervert our notion of Christ.

NOTE W. p. 140.

The following passage of Anselm, bearing on the same point, is a most striking instance of the manner, in which the Christian doctrines have been made completely to depend on a certain school-system. According to Anselm, it appears, that unless the *abstract man* was a reality, the Incarnation could not be true.

Cumque omnes, ut cautissime ad sacræ paginæ quæstiones accedant, sunt commonendi, illi utique nostri temporis dialectici (immo dialecticæ hæretici, qui quidem non nisi

flatum vocis putant esse universales substantias, et qui colorem non aliud queunt intelligere nisi corpus, nec sapientiam hominis aliud quam animam,) prorsus a spiritualium quæstionum disputatione sunt exsufflandi. In eorum quippe animabus ratio, quæ princeps et judex omnium debet esse, quæ sunt in homine, sic est imaginationibus corporalibus obvoluta, ut ex eis se non possit evolvere: nec ab ipsis ea, quæ sola et pura ipsa contemplari debet, valeat discernere. Qui enim nondum intelligit, quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo; qualiter in illa secretissima et altissima natura comprehendet, quomodo plures personæ, quarum singula quæque est perfectus Deus, sint unus Deus. Et cujus mens obscurata est ad discernendum inter equum suum et colorem ejus, qualiter discernet inter unum Deum et plures relationes ejus. Denique qui non potest intelligere aliquid esse hominem nisi individuum; nullatenus intelliget hominem, nisi humanam personam. Omnis enim individuus homo persona est. Quomodo ergo iste intelliget hominem assumptum esse a Verbo, non personam, id est, aliam naturam, non aliam personam, esse assumptam. *Anselm. De Incarn. c. II. p. 35.*

## NOTE X. p. 141.

The logical difficulty in regard to the theory of the Incarnation was the reverse of that in regard to the Trinitarian. In the general theory of the Trinity, the common nature or idea was the given point: and the problem was, how to deduce from that, the distinctions of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In the theory of the Incarnation, certain distinctions in Christ were the data; and the problem was, to find a common idea in which they should agree. As concerning the Trinity, some erred in arriving at conclusions at variance with their data, by making too great a difference between the persons of the Trinity; or destroyed the distinctions by a too rigid deduction of the exclusive notion of Divinity to the particular facts:—so in solving the question of the Incarnation, some left the difficulty unexplained, by making

that common notion in which the different characteristics of Christ should agree, a compounded and imperfectly-united nature; whilst others overthrew the original assumption of certain distinctions, by confounding them in one indistinct idea. The doctrine of the "hypostatical union" was the expedient which met the difficulty most satisfactorily; giving at least that solution of the case, which a logical theology demanded.

NOTE Y. p. 144.

Ad hoc autem quod nos reprehendunt, in symbolo illo, quod pariter nos et illi suscipimus et tenemus, addidisse Spiritum Sanctum a Filio procedere: et quærent, cur hoc factum sit; et quare hoc prius eorum Ecclesiæ monstratum non est: ut communiter consideraretur, et communi consensu adderetur, quod addendum erat. Ad hoc, inquam, responsum sufficiens habemus. Nam si quæritur cur factum sit; dicimus, quia necesse erat propter quosdam minus intelligentes, qui non animadvertabant in illis, quæ universa credit Ecclesia, contineri, et ex his sequi, Spiritum Sanctum de Filio procedere: ne forte hoc credere dubitarent. Quod quam necessarium fuerit, per illos qui hoc negant, quia in illo Symbolo positum non est, cognoscimus. Quoniam igitur et necessitas cogebat, et nulla ratio prohibebat; et vera fides hoc admittebat; fiducialiter asseruit Latinitas, quod credendum et confidendum esse cognoscebat. Scimus enim quod non omnia quæ credere et confiteri debemus, ibi dicta sunt; nec illi, qui symbolum illud dictavere, voluerunt, fidem Christianam esse contentam ea tantummodo credere et confiteri, quæ ibi posuerunt: ut alia taceam; non ibi dicitur Dominus ad infernum descendisse, quod tamen pariter et nos et Græci credimus. Si autem dicunt nullo modo debuisse corrumpi symbolum tanta auctoritate firmatum: nos non judicamus esse corruptionem, ubi nihil addidimus, quod his quæ ibi dicta sunt adversetur. Et quamvis defendere possemus hanc adjectionem non esse corruptionem, si quis tamen hoc

contentiose voluerit asserere: respondemus, nos illud non corrupisse, sed aliud novum edidisse: illud secundum proprietatem Græci dictaminis translatum, cum illis integrum servamus et veneramur. Illud autem, quo frequentius in populi audientia utimur, Latino more dictatum, cum additamento supradicto edidimus. Quod autem quæritur, quare hoc Græcorum ecclesiæ consensu factum non est: respondemus; quia et nimis erat difficile Latinis, eorum episcopos ad consulendum de hac re colligere; nec erat necesse. Unde non dubitabant in hoc quæstionem adducere. Quæ est enim ecclesia, quæ vel per amplitudinem unius regni dilatatur, cui non liceat aliquid secundum rectam fidem constituere, quod in conventu populi utiliter legatur aut cantetur. Quanto ergo magis licuit Latinis hoc constanter proferre, in quo omnes gentes, et omnia regna, quæ Latinis utuntur literis, pariter concordant. *Anselm. de Process. Spir. S. Oper. t. III. p. 134.*

## NOTE Z. p. 145.

Relationes autem personas distinguere non possunt, nisi secundum quod sunt oppositæ: quod ex hoc patet; quia Pater habet duas relationes, quarum una refertur ad Filium, et alia ad Spiritum Sanctum: quæ tamen, quia non sunt oppositæ, non constituunt duas personas, sed ad unam tantum personam Patris pertinent. Si autem in Filio, et Spiritu Sancto, non esset invenire nisi duas relationes, quibus uterque refertur at Patrem; illæ relationes non essent ad invicem oppositæ; sicut neque duæ relationes, quibus Pater refertur ad illos. Unde, sicut persona Patris est una; ita sequeretur, quod persona Filii et Spiritus Sancti esset una, habens duas relationes oppositas duabus relationibus Patris. Hoc autem est hæreticum; cum tollat fidem Trinitatis. Oportet ergo, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus ad invicem referantur oppositis relationibus, &c. . . . Si ergo ab una persona Patris procedunt duæ personæ, scilicet Filius et Spiritus Sanctus; oportet esse aliquem ordinem eorum ad invicem: nec potest aliquis ordo alius assignari,

nisi ordo naturæ, quo alius est ex alio. Non est igitur possibile dicere, quod Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sic procedant a Patre, quod neuter eorum procedat ab alio; nisi quis poneret in eis materialem distinctionem; quod est impossibile. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxxvi. art. 2.*

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## LECTURE IV.

NOTE A. p. 157.

SCIAS itaque domine beatissime, et plenissima charitate venerabilis, non desperare nos, immo sperare vehementer, quod Dominus et Deus noster per authoritatem personæ quam geris, quam, non carni, sed spiritui tuo impositam esse confidimus, multas carnales felicitates et ægritudines, quas Aphricana Ecclesia in multis patitur, in paucis gemit, consiliorum gravitate et tua possit sanare. . . . Commessiones enim et ebrietates, ita concessæ et licitæ putantur, ut in honorem etiam beatissimorum martyrum, non solum per dies solennes, quod ipsum quis non lugendum videat, qui hæc non carnis oculis inspicit, sed etiam quotidie celebrentur. . . . Sed feramus hæc in luxu et labe domestica, et eorum conviviorum quæ privatis parietibus continentur, accipiamusque cum eis corpus Christi, cum quibus panem edere prohibemur, saltem de sanctorum corporum sepulchris, saltem de locis sacrorum, de domibus orationum, tantum dedecus arceatur. . . . Sed tanta pestilentia est hujus mali, ut sanari prorsus, quantum mihi videtur, nisi concilii authoritate non possit. . . . De contentione autem et dolo quid me attinet dicere, quoniam ista vitia non in plebe, sed in nostro numero graviora sunt? *Augustinus Aurelio, Ep. 64. Aug. Oper. tom. II. fol. 94.*

## NOTE B. p. 158.

Augustine appears constantly to have treated Jerome with the deference due to an elder brother in the Church. He shewed his judiciousness in the management of Jerome's haughty and enthusiastic temper, so as to apply the learning and polemical talent and established authority of the holy recluse of Bethlehem, to the effectual maintenance of his own ascendancy in the ecclesiastical world. Jerome was a man calculated to establish a principle, to give a tone to opinion and feeling; but not to perpetuate a personal influence. Augustine, on the contrary, was formed for guiding the conduct of other men after his own example; but he wanted the power to give an intense interest to an abstract question, by throwing over it a warm colouring, or merging it in solemn shadow. All his writings shew the man of business; the energy which they display is that of one earnest in proving and carrying his point, and not such as to interest the mere reader, like those of Jerome, by the intrinsic force of the composition.

The personal influence accordingly of Jerome sank with him at his death; whilst that of Augustine survived his own existence, and permanently controlled the fortunes of the Church. Augustine at the same time reaped the fruits of Jerome's ardent exertions; which served, by conciliating devotion to the doctrines themselves which he taught, to support his personal authority.

These observations on the contrast of these two great men of the Church are illustrated in the case of the Pelagian controversies. Augustine takes no decisive measures in the emergency, until he has consulted Jerome on the philosophy of the question. He sends him an epistle by Orosius, inquiring what opinion should be held on the nature of the soul. *Quæstio de anima*, he says in writing to him, *multos movet, in quibus et me esse confiteor.*<sup>s</sup> He then proceeds to state his own views and difficulties on

<sup>s</sup> *Epist. XXVIII. Augustin. Opera, tom. II. fol. 30.*



the subject, and he requests Jerome to instruct him what he is to hold and teach respecting it. *Misisti ad me discipulos, ut ea doceam, quæ nondum ipse didici. Doce ergo quod doceam. Nam ut doceam multi a me flagitant, eisque me, sicut alia multa, et hoc ignorare confiteor. . . . Quid si ideo adhuc ista nescimus, et ea neque orando, neque legendo, neque cogitando et ratiocinando, invenire potuimus, ut probemur, non solum indoctos quanta charitate doceamus, verum a doctis etiam quanta humilitate discamus? Doce ergo, quæso, quod doceam; doce quod teneam, &c.<sup>h</sup>—In the same epistle Augustine complains of the distance which separated him from Jerome, and which necessarily made the intervals long between their several communications. *Nihil equidem molestius fero in omnibus angustiis meis quas patior in difficillimis quæstionibus, quam in tam longinqua tuæ charitatis absentia, ut vix possim meas dare, vel recipere literas tuas, per intervalla, non dierum, non mensium, sed aliquot annorum: cum, si fieri posset, quotidie præsentem te habere vellem, cum quo loquerer quicquid vellem.**

What an idea is given us of the steadiness and uniformity of purpose with which the operations of the Latin Church leaders were carried on, when we read the letters that passed between these two, and notice the keen and patient interest sustained on questions of speculative theology over such spaces of time!

NOTE C. p. 158.

*Mihi enim omnis occasio gratissima est, per quam scribo vestræ reverentiæ, testem invocans Deum, quod si posset fieri, assumptis alis columbæ, vestris amplexibus implicarer: semper quidem pro merito virtutum vestrorum, sed nunc maxime quia cooperatibus et authoribus vobis hæresis Celestina jugulata est: quæ ita infecit corda multorum, ut cum superatos damnatosque esse se sentiunt, tamen venena mentium non omittant, et quod solum pos-*

<sup>h</sup> *Epist. XXVIII. Augustin. Opera, tom. II. fol. 30.*

sint, nos oderint, per quos putant se libertatem docendæ hæreseos perdidisse. *Hieronymus Augustino et Alipio.*<sup>1</sup>

Sanctæ memoriæ Bonifacius, cum esset doctissimus, adversus libros tamen Pelagianorum, beati Augustini responsa poscebat. *Prosper. adv. Collat. c. 41.*<sup>k</sup>

## NOTE D. p. 159.

The character of invariableness claimed for the Church of Rome, is not a little affected by the account of the proceedings in the case of Pelagianism. Not only was Pelagius not condemned by John, Bishop of Jerusalem, and afterwards declared orthodox at the Synod of Diospolis (the ancient Lydda) in Palestine, in the year 415, but protected in some measure by the Roman Pontiff also, Innocent I. : as is evident from the allusion contained in the following passage of an epistle from the Fathers of a Council held at Carthage, A.D. 416. Si ergo Pelagius episcopalibus gestis quæ in oriente confecta dicuntur, et tuæ venerationi juste fuerit absolutus, error tamen ipse, et impietas, quæ tam multos assertores habet, per diversa dispersos, etiam autoritate apostolicæ sedis anathematizanda est.<sup>1</sup> . . . . Quæcunque autem alia ab eis objiciuntur, non dubitamus venerationem tuam, cum gesta episcopalia perspexerit, quæ in Oriente in eadem causa confectæ dicuntur, id judicaturam, unde omnes in Dei misericordia gaudeamus. . . . . Audivimus enim esse in urbe Roma, ubi ille diu vixit, nonnullos, qui diversis causis ei faveant, quidam scilicet qui vos talia persuasisse perhibent: plures vero qui eum talia sentire non credunt; præsertim, quia in Oriente ubi degit, gesta ecclesiastica facta esse jactantur, quibus putatur esse purgatus. . . . . Aut ergo a tua veneratione acciendus est Romam, et diligenter interrogandus, quam

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. XXIV. Augustin. Oper. tom. II. fol. 28.*

<sup>k</sup> *Vossii. Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 29.*

<sup>1</sup> *Ep. XC. Opera Augustin. tom. II. fol. 125.*

dicat gratiam. . . . Aut hoc ipsum cum eo per literas agendum,<sup>m</sup> &c.

They affect not to believe that Pelagius had been actually acquitted at Rome; and point out, without much reserve, the course which they require the Pontiff to pursue in the matter.

This address was supported by a similar one from another African Council held in the same year at Millevi; and by a letter of several African bishops, among whom was Augustine. Innocent replies to these communications, but in a style which leaves it very ambiguous what his real design is. The style indeed of his three letters resembles that of Cromwell in some of his state papers—full of wordy clauses which appear to say a great deal, but in reality say nothing at all. And yet Augustine, having occasion to make use of the authority of Innocent, speaks of these letters in terms of approbation.—Ad omnia nobis rescripsit eodem modo, quo fas erat, atque oportebat Apostolicæ sedis antistitem.<sup>n</sup>

Innocent lived but two months after these replies, leaving the prosecution of the cause between the African Prelates and the Pelagians to his successor Zosimus in the year 417. But the same vacillation of purpose appears also in Zosimus. He was at first disposed to favour Celestius, and on examination received him into the communion of the Church. But the Africans were on the alert to secure on their side the popular sanction of the Apostolic See. In 418 another Council was held at Carthage, and application was made to the Emperor Honorius to obtain support to their cause by the force of civil edicts. Zosimus could not resist these importunities; and finding that there were no means of protecting Celestius, or hopes of restoring him to the Church, at length yielded the point, and

<sup>m</sup> *Ep. XCV. Augustin. Opera. tom. II. fol. 129.*

<sup>n</sup> *Augustinus et Alipius Bonifacio, Ep. CVI. Opera, tom. II. fol. 144. It has been denied that these letters were written by Innocent. Vossii. Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 27.*

wrote to the African bishops, declaring his condemnation of the Pelagians.

The Pelagians, though vanquished by these proceedings, took advantage of this hesitation on the part of the Roman See to pronounce against them, to proclaim the opinions of the Roman Clergy as favourable to their doctrines, as appears from the following passage.

Quinetiam Romanos Clericos arguunt, scribentes eos jussionis timore percultos, non erubuisse prævaricationis crimen admittere, ut, contra priorem sententiam qua gestis catholico dogmati affuerant, postea pronunciarent malam hominum esse naturam: imo Pelagiani spe falsa putaverunt, novum et execrabile dogma Pelagianum vel Celestianum persuaderi quorundam Romanorum catholicis mentibus posse, quoniam illa ingenia quamvis nefando errore perversa, non tamen contemptibilia, cum studiose corrigenda potius quam facile damnanda viderentur, alioquin lenius, quam severior postulabat ecclesiæ disciplina, tractata sunt. Tot enim et tantis inter apostolicam sedem et Aphros episcopos currentibus et recurrentibus scriptis ecclesiasticis, et gestis, de hac causa, apud illam sedem, Celestio præsentate et respondente confectis, quænam tandem epistola venerandæ memoriæ papæ Zosimi, quæ interlocutio reperitur, ubi præceperit credi oportere, sine ullo vitio peccati originalis hominem nasci: nusquam prorsus hoc dixit, nusquam omnino conscripsit. *Contra duas Ep. Pelag. ad Bonifac.*° The orthodox, we find, had to labour to palliate the conduct of Rome. The sequel of this passage further illustrates the part taken by the African Clergy in stimulating Innocent to act against Pelagius and Celestius, and the anxiety of Augustine to remove the appearance of reluctance and hesitation on the part of the Pope.

In noticing the exertions of the African Clergy in these controversies, we must not forget that Jerome was also a principal instrument in carrying the orthodox decision.

° *Augustin. Opera*, tom. VII. p. 287.

He not only wrote strenuously and vehemently on the subject; but by his presence in Palestine, at the critical moment when all seemed favourable to Pelagius, he excited a reaction against the heresy, even amidst its apparent triumph.

NOTE E. p. 159.

The prevalence of the infection of Pelagianism is evident from the fact that eighteen bishops of Italy refused to subscribe the condemnation of Pelagius, and in consequence of their refusal were deprived of their sees, and exiled to the East.<sup>p</sup> Even in Africa, the seat itself of opposition to Pelagianism, the heretical cause was not without its advocates. This may be seen from the rescript of Honorius to Aurelius, Bishop of Carthage; where it is said: *Præcipue tamen ad quorundam episcoporum pertinaciam corrigendam, qui pravas eorum disputationes, vel tacito consensu astruunt, vel publica oppugnatione non destruunt,*<sup>q</sup> &c.

NOTE F. p. 162.

Quæ enim potest alia major esse temeritas, quam Dei sibi, non dico similitudinem, sed æqualitatem vindicare: et brevi sententia, omnium hæreticorum venena complecti, quæ de philosophorum, et maxime Pythagoræ, et Zenonis principis Stoicorum, fonte manarunt? Illi enim quæ Græci appellant *πάθη*, nos perturbationes possumus dicere, ægritudinem videlicet et gaudium, spem et metum, quorum duo præsentia, duo futura sunt, asserunt extirpari posse de mentibus, et nullam fibram radicemque vitiorum, in homine omnino residere, meditatione et assidua exercitatione virtutum. . . . Pudeat ergo eos principum et sociorum

<sup>p</sup> See M. Guizot, *Histoire de la Civiliz. Française*, 5<sup>o</sup>. Leçon, p. 208. Paris. 1829. This Lecture of M. Guizot gives, in the shortest compass, the most perspicuous philosophical view of the Pelagian Question that has ever appeared.

<sup>q</sup> *Salviani Opera, Appendix*, p. 448.

suorum, qui aiunt, posse hominem sine peccato esse si velit, quod Græci dicunt ἀναμάρτητον. Et quia hoc ecclesiarum per Orientem aures ferre non possunt; simulant se sine peccato quidam dicere, sed ἀναμάρτητον dicere non audere: quasi aliud sit, sine peccato, aliud, ἀναμάρτητον, et non Græcum sermonem, qui apud illos compositus est, duobus verbis sermo Latinus expresserit. Si absque peccato dicis, et ἀναμάρτητον dicere te diffiteris, damna eos ergo qui ἀναμάρτητον prædicant. Sed non facis. *Hieronymus ad Ctesiph.* Opera, tom. II. p. 251.

## NOTE G. p. 175.

Respondeo dicendum; quod, cum supra ostensum sit, quod Deus sciat omnia, non solum quæ acta sunt, sed etiam quæ sunt in potentia sua, vel creaturæ; horum autem quædam sint contingentia nobis futura; sequitur quod Deus contingentia futura cognoscat. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod contingens aliquod dupliciter potest considerari. Uno modo in seipso, secundum quod jam in actu est; et sic consideratur, non ut futurum, sed ut præsens; neque ad utrumlibet contingens, sed ut determinatum ad unum; et propter hoc, sic infallibiliter subdi potest certæ cognitioni, utpote sensus visui: sicut cum video Socratem sedere. Alio modo potest considerari contingens, ut est sua in causa. Et sic consideratur ut futurum, et ut contingens nondum determinatum ad unum; quia causa contingens se habet ad opposita: et sic contingens non subditur per certitudinem alicui cognitioni. Unde quicumque cognoscit effectum contingentem in causa sua tantum, non habet de eo nisi conjecturalem scientiam. Deus autem cognoscit omnia contingentia, non solum prout sunt in suis causis, sed etiam prout unumquodque eorum est actu in seipso. Et licet contingentia fiant in actu successive, non tamen Deus successive cognoscit contingentia, prout sunt in suo esse, sicut nos, sed simul; quia sua cognitio mensuratur æternitate, sicut etiam suum esse. Æternitas autem tota simul existens ambit totum

tempus, ut supra dictum est. Unde omnia, quæ sunt in tempore, sunt Deo ab æterno præsentia, non solum ea ratione, qua habet rationes rerum apud se præsentis, ut quidam dicunt; sed quia ejus intuitus fertur ab æterno supra omnia, prout sunt in sua præsentialitate. Unde manifestum est, quod contingentia et infallibiliter a Deo cognoscuntur, in quantum subduntur divino conspectui, secundum suam præsentialitatem: et tamen sunt futura contingentia, suis causis proximis comparata. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xiv. art. 12.*

NOTE H. p. 175.

Respondeo dicendum, quod necessarium dicitur aliquid dupliciter, scilicet absolute, et ex suppositione. Necessarium absolute judicatur aliquid ex habitudine terminorum; utpote quia prædicatum est in diffinitione subjecti, sicut necessarium est hominem esse animal: vel quia subjectum est de ratione prædicati; sicut est necessarium numerum esse parem vel imparem: sic autem non est necessarium Socratem sedere; unde non est necessarium absolute; sed potest dici necessarium ex suppositione: supposito enim quod sedeat, necesse est eum sedere, dum sedet. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xix. art. 3.*

This distinction is laid down with precision by Aristotle, so that his followers in the Schools could not well misapprehend the theory of the subject, whilst they practically offended against it. The distinction is still more clearly stated by a writer in the XIth century, the monk Gaunilo, in his observations, to which I before referred,<sup>r</sup> on the argument of Anselm's Monologium. It may be interesting to see how he develops his view, so far at least as the obscurity of his Latin will permit his sense to appear. Anselm's argument, in his *Monologium*, is an anticipation of the *Cogito, ergo sum*, of Descartes. It rests the proof of the existence of the Deity on the existence of the ideas of supreme goodness and greatness in the mind

<sup>r</sup> Page 449.

of man. He argues, that unless these ideas existed *in re* as well as *in intellectu*, there would be a contradiction; for in such a case they would not be the ideas of supreme goodness and greatness; since it is greater and better to exist *in re* and *in intellectu*, than in the intellect alone. The treatise in itself, as a whole, is an admirable specimen of scholastic reasoning. As an ingenious deduction of the speculative reasons (rationes) conceived to be involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, it stands unrivalled: though the style is extremely rough and obscure. The objection of Gaunilo is as follows:

Prius enim certum mihi necesse est, fiat revera, esse alicubi majus ipsum, et tamen deinde ex eo quod majus est omnibus, in seipso quoque subsistere non erit ambiguum. Exempli gratia: Aiunt quidam alicubi Oceani esse insulam, quam ex difficultate, vel potius ex impossibilitate inveniendi, quod non est, cognominant aliqui perditam: quamque fabulantur, multo amplius quam de fortunatis insulis fertur, divitiarum deliciarumque omnium inæstimabili ubertate pollere, nulloque possessore aut habitatore: universis aliis, quas incolunt homines, terris, possidendorum redundantia, usquequaque præstare. Hoc ita esse dicat mihi quispiam: et ego facile dictum, in quo nihil est difficultatis, intelligam. Ac si tunc velit, consequenter adjungat, ac dicat: non potes ultra dubitare insulam illam, omnibus terris præstantiorem, vere esse alicubi in re, quam in intellectu tuo non ambigis esse; et quia præstantius est non in intellectu solo, sed etiam esse in re. Ideo sic eam necesse est, quia nisi fuerit, quæcunque alia, in re, est terra præstantior, illa erit ac si ipsa jam a te præstantior et intellecta præstantior non erit. Si, inquam, per hoc ille mihi velit astruere, de insula illa, quod vere sit, ambigendum ultra non esse; aut jocari ipsum credam; aut nescio quem stultiorem debeam reputare; utrum me, si ei concedam; an illum, si se putet aliqua certitudine insulæ illius essentiam astruxisse; nisi prius ipsam præstantiam ejus solummodo, sicut rem vere atque indubie existentem, nec



ullatenus, sicut falsum aut incertum aliquid in intellectu, in eo esse, docuerit. *Liber pro Insipiente. Anselmi Opera, tom. III. p. 30.*

NOTE I. p. 178.

It may be sufficient to refer to the following passage of Calvin, to see how he differs from Aquinas on the same point.

De modo quo Deus hominem in vitium tradit, minime necessarium hoc loco texere longam quæstionem. Certum quidem est, non sinendo tantum et connivendo, illum permittere homines prolabi: sed justo judicio sic ordinare, ut tum a propria concupiscentia, tum a Diabolo in ejusmodi rabiem agantur et ferantur. Ideo *Tradendi* voce utitur, ex perpetuo Scripturæ more: quam vocem nimis violenter torquent, qui sola Dei permissione in peccatum agi nos putant. Nam ut minister iræ Dei est Satan, et quasi carnifex: ita non dissimulatione, sed mandato judicis in nos armatur. Neque tamen ideo aut crudelis Deus, aut nos innoxii; quando aperte ostendit Paulus, nos non aliter adduci in ejus potestatem, quam si tali pœna digni simus. Tantum id excipiamus, peccati causam a Deo non provenire: cujus radices in peccatore ipso perpetuo resident. Illud enim verum esse oportet; Perditio tua Israel: in me tantummodo auxilium tuum. *Calvin. in Ep. Pauli ad Rom. c. 1. v. 24. Genevæ, 1600.*

NOTE J. p. 180.

Respondeo dicendum, quod Deus aliquos reprobat. Dicitur enim est supra, quod prædestinatio est pars providentiæ. Ad providentiam autem pertinet permittere aliquem defectum in rebus quæ providentiæ subduntur, ut supra dictum est. Unde cum per divinam providentiam homines in vitam æternam ordinantur, pertinet etiam ad divinam providentiam, ut permittat aliquos ab isto fine deficere. Et hoc dicitur reprobare. Sic igitur, sicut prædestinatio est pars providentiæ, respectu eorum qui divinitus ordinantur in æternam salutem, ita reprobatio est pars pro-

videntiæ, respectu illorum qui ab hoc fine decidunt. Unde reprobatio non nominat præscientiam tantum, sed aliquid addit secundum rationem, sicut et providentia, ut etiam supra dictum est. Sicut enim prædestinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam et gloriam, ita reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam, et inferendi damnationis pœnam pro culpa. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. XXIII. art. 3.*

Aquinas also shews a like objection to that observable in our 17th Article, against sanctioning the notion that any one should suppose himself reprobated by God. Thus he observes: *Etiam si aliquibus ex speciali privilegio sua prædestinatio revelatur, non tamen convenit ut reveletur omnibus: quia sic illi, qui non sunt prædestinati, desperarent, et securitas in prædestinatis negligentiam pareret.*<sup>s</sup> He appeals indeed to the same tests of the presence of Divine Grace in the heart, which our Article employs in speaking of predestination. *Hoc modo aliquis cognoscere potest se habere gratiam, in quantum scilicet percipit se delectari in Deo, et contemnere res mundanas; et in quantum homo non est conscius sibi alicujus peccati mortalis . . . . ille qui accipit gratiam, per quandam experientiam dulcedinis novit, quam non experitur ille qui non accipit.*<sup>t</sup>

NOTE K. p. 181.

Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus nominally divided the Schools into two parties; the former as the strictest interpreter, the latter as the more moderate expositor of Augustine's doctrines on the subject of Divine Agency. The factious spirit which reigned in the political world, extended itself to the monastic orders and the Schools; and it is no wonder that in such times, we find classes of theological partisans designated as Thomists, and Scotists, and Ockamists. Then the Dominicans and Franciscans,

<sup>s</sup> *Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. XXIII. art. 1.*

<sup>t</sup> *Ibid. Prima Secundæ, qu. CXII. art. 5.*

as rival professions, supporting the peculiar opinions of their own member, perpetuated the distinction between Thomist and Scotist. Fresh employment, of that kind which particularly suited the scholastic genius, was thus supplied to the Schools of a succeeding age; that of reconciling the respective tenets of the leading doctors, and shewing their fundamental concord. This was only to act over the part which Boethius, and others who precluded to the scholastic philosophy, had originally acted, in forming an eclectic system out of the theories of Plato and Aristotle. Among the merits accordingly of the once celebrated Picus Mirandula, it is mentioned, that he was employed in establishing an agreement between Aquinas and Duns Scotus, when his premature death deprived the schools of this and other labours on which he was engaged.<sup>u</sup>

NOTE L. p. 181.

Præterea, si Deus aliquem hominem reprobat, oportet quod sic se habeat reprobatio ad reprobatos, sicut prædestinatio ad prædestinatos. Sed prædestinatio est causa salutis prædestinatorum. Ergo reprobatio erit causa perditionis reproborum. Hoc autem est falsum. Dicitur enim Osee 13. Perditio tua ex te Israel, tantummodo ex me auxilium tuum. Non ergo Deus aliquem reprobat.

. . . . Ad secundum dicendum quod aliter se habet reprobatio in causando quam prædestinatio. Nam prædestinatio est causa, et ejus quod expectatur in futura vita a prædestinatis, scilicet gloriæ; et ejus quod percipitur in præsentibus, scilicet gratiæ. Reprobatio vero non est causa ejus quod est in præsentibus, scilicet culpæ, sed est causa derelictionis a Deo. Est tamen causa ejus quod redditur in

<sup>u</sup> Inter Thomam et Scotum, qui jam diu conflictaverant, si non pacem in universum, in multis tamen impetrasset inducias, quando in eorum pluribus controversiis, si quispiam dissidentia verba rimetur attentius, et exactius libret, scrupulosiusque vestigans, cutem deserens, introrsum ad imas latebras, profunda que penetrabilia mente pervadat, unionem sensuum indiseparatis pugnantibusque verbis citra ambiguitatem comperiet. *Pic. Mirandul. Vita, Oper. ed. 1496.*

futuro, scilicet poenæ æternæ. Sed culpa provenit ex libero arbitrio ejus qui reprobatur et a gratia deseritur. Et secundum hoc verificatur dictum prophetæ, scilicet, Perditio tua, Israel, ex te. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 3.*

Of course as speaking on a subject extending over so large a range of volumes as those of the Schoolmen, I must be understood to speak with some reserve. Still I cannot but think that the assertion made in the Lecture will be verified by more extensive research. The predestination of *punishment* will be found to be the prevailing character assigned to the term Reprobation. But punishment was viewed in the Scholastic system, according to the Platonic and Aristotelic notion of it, as a good to those to whom it was dispensed, as a purifying and healing of the distempers of the soul. The scholastic distinction between *pœna* and *culpa* should be particularly noticed in reference to the question of Reprobation. The Schoolmen would not admit a predestination of guilt, for this would have argued the presence of evil in the Divine Mind. For it should be observed, that the will of God was considered identical with his being and his intelligence; and that predestination accordingly was fundamentally coincident with the doctrine of Ideas. It was the application of this doctrine to moral subjects. I have alluded in the Lecture to the argument of Erigena, according to which the predestination of evil was impossible, since there were no such Ideas as those of evil in the Divine Mind. It may be seen from the following passage, how the rationalized doctrine of predestination was connected with the Idealism of Plato.

Causæ itaque primordiales sunt (quod et in præcedentibus dixeram, quas Græci ideas vocant, hoc est species vel formas) æternæ et incommutabiles rationes, sed in quas et in quibus visibilis et invisibilis mundus formatur et regitur; ideoque a Græcorum sapientibus *πρωτότυπα* appellari meruerunt, hoc est principalia exempla, quæ Pater in Filio fecit, et per Spiritum Sanctum in effectus suos dividit atque

multiplicat; προορίσματα quoque vocant, id est, prædeterminationes, in ipsis enim quæcunque divina prudentia et fiunt et facta sunt et futura, sunt simul et semel incommutabiliter prædestinata. Nihil enim naturaliter in creatura visibili et invisibili oritur, præter quod in eis ante omnia tempora et loca prædefinitum et præordinatum est; item a philosophis θεία θελήματα, id est, divinæ voluntates nominari solent; quoniam omnia quæcunque voluit dominus facere, in ipsis primordialiter et causaliter fecit, &c.<sup>x</sup> *Joan. Scot. Erigen. de Div. Natur.* lib. II. p. 94.

Though the later schoolmen might not go to the full length of this language, the same views in a great measure seem constantly before them in their disquisition on the subject. They would not admit that evil had any positive existence: they speak of it as a defect from good, as an absence of what constitutes the perfection of any nature.

The real meaning again of the term Divine Will, as applied to the subject of predestination, is not commonly apprehended. In speculating on the course of the Divine dispensations, and finding themselves at a loss to give a satisfactory solution of the differences observed in the conduct and fortunes of different individuals, scholastic reasoners were forced to retire on the ground from which they set out, and to confess that they could discover no cause of these differences but the simple Will of God. The expression therefore is not to be taken as any positive account of the case, but as an admission of ignorance of any proper *reason*, and a denial of any of the reasons that were alleged; as the foreknowledge, for instance, of the merits of individuals. Voluit igitur Deus, says Aquinas, in hominibus, quantum ad aliquos quos prædestinat, suam repræsentare bonitatem, per modum misericordiæ parcendo; et quantum ad aliquos, quos reprobatur, per modum justitiæ, puniendo. Et hæc est ratio quare Deus quosdam eligit, et quosdam reprobatur. . . . Sed quare hos elegit in

<sup>x</sup> He ascribes the rise of the predestinarian controversy of his time to the neglect of literature, and particularly to ignorance of the Greek language.

gloriam, et illos reprobavit, non habet rationem, nisi divinam voluntatem.<sup>7</sup>

## NOTE M. p. 182.

Respondeo dicendum; quod prædestinatio secundum rationem præsupponit electionem, et electio dilectionem. Cujus ratio est: quia prædestinatio, (ut dictum est,) est pars providentiæ. Providentia autem, sicut et prudentia, est ratio in intellectu existens, præceptiva ordinationis aliquorum in finem, ut supra dictum est. Non autem præcipitur aliquid ordinandum in finem, nisi præexistente voluntate finis. Unde prædestinatio aliquorum in salutem æternam, præsupponit secundum rationem, quod Deus illorum velit salutem: ad quod pertinet electio et dilectio: dilectio quidem, in quantum vult eis hoc bonum salutis æternæ: nam diligere est velle alicui bonum, ut supra dictum est: electio autem, in quantum hoc bonum aliquibus præ aliis vult, cum quosdam reprobet, ut supra dictum est. Electio tamen et dilectio aliter ordinantur in nobis et in Deo: eo quod in nobis voluntas diligendo non causat bonum, sed ex bono præexistente incitatur ad diligendum. Et ideo eligimus aliquem, quem diligamus. Et sic electio dilectionem præcedit in nobis. In Deo autem est e converso. Nam voluntas ejus, qua vult bonum alicui diligendo, est causa quod illum bonum ab eo præ aliis habeatur. Et sic patet, quod dilectio præsupponitur electioni secundum rationem, et electio prædestinationi. Unde omnes prædestinati sunt electi et dilecti. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 4.*

## NOTE N. p. 182.

Tu autem nos Manichæos vocas, cur legi Evangelium præferentes, in illa umbram, in hoc veritatem esse dicamus. *Hieronym. adv. Pelag. lib. I. Oper. tom. II. p. 274.*

His morbis inter se contrariis, Manichæi Pelagianique configunt, dissimili voluntate, simili vanitate, separati opin-

<sup>7</sup> *Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. xxiii. art. 5.*

ione diversa, sed propinqui mente perversa. Jam vero gratiam Christi simul oppugnant, baptismum ejus simul evacuunt, carnem ejus simul exhonorant; sed etiam hæc modis causisque diversis. Nam Manichæi meritis naturæ bonæ, Pelagiani autem meritis voluntatis bonæ, perhibent divinitus subveniri. Illi dicunt; debet hoc Deus laboribus membrorum suorum: Isti dicunt; debet hoc virtutibus servorum suorum. Utrisque ergo merces non imputatur secundum gratiam, sed secundum debitum, &c. *Contr. duas Epist. Pelag. ad Bonif. Augustin. Oper. tom. VII. fol. 286.*

Les premiers de cette Société, qui parurent en France, sont ces quatorze personnes de la noblesse, et du clergé d'Orléans, contre lesquels le roi Robert assembla une espèce de Concile, en l'année 1022, et qu'il fit brûler vifs sous prétexte de Manichéisme. *Beausobre, Hist. de Manich. tom. I. pref. p. 4.*

NOTE O. p. 186.

Grace, no less than Predestination, is spoken of in the language of the Schools as that by which a man is "ordained" or "set in order" to eternal life. For, in discussing the question, "whether any one may be blotted out of the book of life," Aquinas decides, that the ordination of predestination "never fails;" whereas that of grace, though in itself a title to eternal life, may fail, through mortal sin. And the reason assigned is, that the predestined have eternal life *in itself*; the ordination of grace alone is to eternal life, not in itself, but *in its cause*.

Est enim liber vitæ conscriptio ordinatorum in vitam æternam. Ad quam ordinatur aliquis ex duobus; scilicet ex prædestinatione divina; et hæc ordinatio nunquam deficit: et ex gratia. Quicumque enim gratiam habet, ex hoc ipso dignus est vita æterna. Et hæc ordinatio deficit interdum: quia aliqui ordinati sunt ex gratia habita, ad habendum vitam æternam, a qua tamen deficiunt per peccatum mortale. Illi igitur qui sunt ordinati ad habendum

vitam æternam ex prædestinatione divina, sunt simpliciter scripti in libro vitæ; quia sunt ibi scripti ut habituri vitam æternam in seipsa; et isti nunquam delentur de libro vitæ. Sed illi qui sunt ordinati ad habendum vitam æternam, non ex prædestinatione divina, sed solum ex gratia, dicuntur esse scripti in libro vitæ, non simpliciter, sed secundum quid: quia sunt ibi scripti, ut habituri vitam æternam, non in seipsa, sed in sua causa. Et tales possunt deleri de libro vitæ, ut dilectio non referatur ad notitiam Dei, quasi Deus aliquid præsciat, postea nesciat, sed ad rem scitam: quia scilicet Deus scit aliquem prius ordinari in vitam æternam, et postea non ordinari, cum deficit a gratia. *Aquinas, Prima Pars, qu. xxiv. art. 3.*

The general designation of the Divine Agency under the notion of Grace, was a modification of abstract doctrine, sanctioned by Scholasticism not without good reason. It was a softening of the hard outlines of the theory of Predestination. By fixing the thoughts on the Divine *goodness*, amidst the survey of the inflexible appointments of Providence, it presented a view of God, touching to the heart, and awakening pleasurable emotions. It preserved the supremacy and constancy of the Divine Will, whilst it exhibited that supremacy and constancy as the working of a law of gentleness and love.

#### NOTE P. p. 189.

Sed contra; Lux ponit aliquid in illuminato. Sed gratia est quædam lux animæ: unde Augustinus dicit in libro de Natura et Gratia: prævaricatorem legis divinæ lux deserit veritatis, qua desertus utique fit cæcus: ergo gratia ponit aliquid in anima.

Sed quantum ad primum est differentia attendenda circa gratiam Dei et gratiam hominis: quia enim bonum creaturæ provenit ex voluntate divina, ideo ex dilectione Dei qua vult creaturæ bonum, profuit aliquod bonum in creatura.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod Deus est vita animæ per



modum causæ efficientis : sed anima est vita corporis per modum causæ formalis. Inter formam autem et materiam non cadit aliquod medium, quia forma per seipsam informat materiam vel subjectum. Sed agens informat subjectum, non per suam substantiam, sed per formam quam causat in materia. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. cx. art. 1.*

Manifestum est autem quod gratia gratum faciens hoc modo comparatur ad beatitudinem, sicut ratio seminalis in natura ad effectum naturalem. *Ibid. qu. LXII. art. 2.*

NOTE Q. p. 190.

Respondeo dicendum ; quod sicut gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem, secundum diversos effectus : ita etiam in prævenientem et subsequentem, et qualitercunque gratia accipiatur. Sunt autem quinque effectus gratiæ in nobis, quorum primus est ut anima sanetur : secundus, ut bonum velit : tertius est, ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur : quartus est, ut in bono perseveret : quintus est, ut ad gloriam perveniat. Et ideo gratia secundum quod causat in nobis primum effectum, vocatur præveniens respectu secundi effectus : et prout causat in nobis secundum, vocatur subsequens respectu primi effectus. Et sicut unus effectus est posterior uno effectu, et prior alio : ita gratia potest dici præveniens et subsequens secundum eundem effectum, respectu diversorum. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicet in libro de Natura et Gratia : “ Prævenit ut sanemur ; subsequitur ut sanati vegetemur ; prævenit ut vocemur ; subsequitur ut glorificemur.” *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. cxi. art. 3.*

## LECTURE V.

## NOTE A. p. 229.

AQUINAS, shewing that sin was not a total privation of our nature, whence would follow the Stoical paradox that "all sins were equal," observes: Hujusmodi autem privationes recipiunt magis et minus ex parte ejus quod remanet de habitu contrario; multum enim refert ad ægritudinem vel turpitudinem, utrum plus vel minus a debita commensuratione humorum vel membrorum recedatur. Et similiter dicendum est de vitiis et peccatis; sic enim in eis privatur debita commensuratio rationis, ut non totaliter ordo rationis tollatur: alioquin malum si sit integrum, destruit seipsum, ut dicitur in quarto Ethic.: non enim posset remanere substantia actus vel affectio agentis, nisi aliquid remaneret de ordine rationis. Et ideo multum interest ad gravitatem peccati, utrum plus vel minus recedatur a rectitudine rationis. *Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. LXXIII. art. 2.* Quia tamen natura humana per peccatum non est totaliter corrupta, ut scilicet toto bono naturæ privetur, &c. *Ibid. qu. CIX. art. 2.*

The reference made in this passage is to the observation of Aristotle, that "vice destroys itself; and if it be total, becomes intolerable: τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ αὐτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὀλόκληρον ἢ ἀφόρητον γίνεται."<sup>2</sup>

The expressions again, "total corruption," or "wholly corrupt," as applied to human nature, evidently derive their character from the logical notion which the Scholastics intended by them. The *whole* of human nature is, the whole extent of signification of the term *human nature*. It means that every thing included under that term is also included under the term *corrupt*. It is misconceived, when it is understood to denote the several physical and moral constituents, which, taken together, make up the complex idea of human nature. The mistake here is that of

<sup>2</sup> *Aristot. Ethic. IV. c. 5.*

supposing, that what is true of all the kinds or varieties found in a certain class of objects, is, on the other hand, true, only in regard to all the parts of which any individual of the class is composed. Anselm sufficiently shews this, when, in a chapter of his treatise on Original Sin, inquiring in what manner human nature is corrupt, he observes: *Quoniam autem personaliter peccaverunt, cum originaliter fortes et incorrupti haberent potestatem semper servandi sine difficultate justitiam, totum quod erant infirmatum et corruptum est. Corpus quidem, quia tale post peccatum fuit, qualia sunt brutorum animalium corruptione et carnalibus appetitibus subjacentia: anima vero, quia, ex corruptione corporis et ejusdem appetitibus, atque ex indigentia bonorum quæ perdidit, carnalibus affectibus infecta, et quia tota natura humana in illis erat, et extra illos nihil erat, tota infirmata et corrupta est. . . . Nec impotentia excusat eam in ipsis infantibus: quia in illis non solvit quod debet: quoniam ipsa sibi fecit eam, deserendo justitiam in primis hominibus in quibus tota erat: et semper debitor est habere potestatem, quam ad servandam semper justitiam accepit: hoc esse videri potest in infantibus originale peccatum.<sup>a</sup>*

Clearly Anselm is speaking of the abstract being Human Nature, the logical universal; which, he contends, is corrupt in all born of Adam, because the *whole being* was corrupted in the first sinner, and is the same in all who participate of it. But since the Scholastic philosophy has been out of fashion, this is a notion by no means familiar to the minds of men; and the expression, "totally corrupt," has been very naturally taken in its most obvious sense, as denoting all that is in any one individual man. It is time indeed that we should study that philosophy, to our contempt and ignorance of which, we may ascribe so much aberration of theological opinion. We have indeed more than enough of the Scholastic spirit among us, but we want the Scholastic depth of thought. We treat the

<sup>a</sup> *De Concep. Virg. et Pec. Orig.* c. 2. Opera, tom. III. p. 96.

conclusions of the Schoolmen, as superficially, as they treated the Greek philosophy, which they implicitly adopted. We take their terms and reason from them, without acquainting ourselves with the principles on which they are founded. For instance, I have seen it somewhere argued, that man is naturally in a state of utter reprobation; because the Scripture says, that "the carnal mind is *enmity* against God." For, it was urged, had the expression been "*enemy*," and not "*enmity*," then the possibility of reconciliation might be conceivable; but "*enmity*" could never be reconciled. Could the Platonist or the Scholastic, I would ask, insist more on the importance of abstract ideas, than is insisted on by such an argument? We find here an endeavour to establish the impossibility of a fact concerning human nature, from a consideration of the nature of a contradiction: or in other words, logical truth is transformed into physical.

## NOTE B. p. 233.

Est peccatum a natura, ut dixi; et est peccatum a persona. Itaque quod est a persona, potest dici personale: quod autem a natura, naturale, quod dicitur originale: et sicut personale transit ad naturam; ita naturale ad personam: hoc modo. Quod Adam comedebat, hoc natura exigebat, quia ut hæc exigeret sic creata erat. Quod vero de ligno vetito comedit, non hæc voluntas naturalis, sed personalis Adæ propria fecit: quod tamen egit persona, non fecit sine natura. Persona enim erat quod dicebatur Adam: natura quod homo. Fecit igitur persona peccatricem naturam: quia ubi Adam peccavit, homo peccavit. Siquidem non quia homo erat, ut vetitum præsumeret impulsus est: sed propria voluntate, quam non exegit natura, sed persona concepit, attractus est. Similiter fit in infantibus e converso. Nempe quod in illis non est justitia, quam debent habere, non hoc fecit illorum voluntas personalis, sicut in Adam; sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa natura accepit ab Adam. In Adam namque, extra quem

de illa nihil erat, est nudata justitia quam habebat: et ea semper nisi adjuta careret: hac ratione: quia natura subsistit in personis, et personæ non sunt sine natura, fecit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Sic spoliavit persona naturam bono justitiæ in Adam; et natura egens facta, omnes personas quas ipse de se procreat, eadem egestate peccatrices et injustas facit. Hoc modo transit peccatum Adæ personale in omnes, qui de illo naturaliter propagantur, et est in illis originale sive naturale. *Anselm. De Concep. Virg. et Pec. Orig. c. 22. p. 103.*

The same idea is further illustrated by the following passage of Aquinas.

Unde etiam posito, quod anima rationalis traduceretur, ex hoc ipso quod infectio animæ prolis non esset in ejus voluntate, amitteret rationem culpæ obligantis ad pœnam: quia ut Philosophus dicit in tertio Ethicorum, nullus improperabit cæco nato, sed magis miserebitur. Et ideo alia via procedendum est, dicendo, quod omnes homines qui nascuntur ex Adam, possunt considerari ut unus homo, in quantum conveniunt in natura quam a primo parente accipiunt; secundum quod in civilibus omnes homines qui sunt unius communitatis, reputantur quasi unum corpus, et tota communitas quasi unus homo: sicut etiam Porphyrius dicit, quod participatione speciei plures homines sunt unus homo. Sic igitur multi homines ex Adam derivati sunt, tanquam multa membra unius corporis, actus autem unius membri corporalis, puta manus, non est voluntarius voluntate ipsius manus, sed voluntate animæ quæ primo movet membrum. Unde homicidium quod manus committit, non imputaretur manui ad peccatum, si consideraretur manus secundum se, ut divisa a corpore; sed imputatur ei in quantum est aliquid hominis, quod movetur a primo principio motivo hominis. Sic igitur inordinatio, quæ est in isto homine ex Adam generato, non est voluntaria voluntate ipsius, sed voluntate primi parentis, qui movet motione generationis omnes qui ex ejus origine derivantur, sicut voluntas animæ movet omnia membra ad actum.

Unde peccatum quod sic a primo parente in posteros derivatur dicitur originale: sicut peccatum quod ab anima derivatur ad membra corporis, dicitur actuale. Et sicut peccatum actuale quod per membrum aliquod committitur, non est peccatum illius membri, nisi in quantum illud membrum est aliquid ipsius hominis, propter quod vocatur peccatum humanum: ita peccatum originale non est peccatum hujus personæ, nisi in quantum hæc persona recipit naturam a primo parente, unde et vocatur peccatum naturæ: secundum illud Ephes. 2. Erasmus autem filii iræ. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. LXXXI. art. 1.*

## NOTE C. p. 233.

Octavum in hæc causa Concilium œcumenicum erat, quod anno ccccxxxii habitum est. Quamquam enim propter Pelagianos convocatum non fuit; tamen Pelagianis Nestorium damnare refugientibus, atque adeo illum etiam juvantibus, Patres occasione ea uti voluerunt, ad Pelagii assecclas una cum Nestorio damnandos. Hæc ita esse, ipsius Concilii actis comprobatur. . . . Quod vero ex actis synodicis hactenus ostendimus, idem variorum etiam scriptorum auctoritate demonstratur. Prosper in Chronicis: “Congregata apud Ephesum plus ducentorum synodo sacerdotum, Nestorius cum hæresi nominis sui, et cum multis Pelagianis, qui cognatum sibi juvabant dogma, damnatur.” Et adversus Collatorem: “Per hunc virum (Cælestinum) etiam Orientales ecclesiæ gemina peste purgatæ sunt; quando Cyrillo, Alexandrinæ urbis antistiti, gloriosissimo fidei Catholicæ defensori, ad excrandam Nestorii impietatem, apostolico auxiliatus est gladio: quo etiam Pelagiani, dum cognatis confederantur erroribus, iterum prosternerentur.” Hæc causa est, cur idem Prosper unum utriusque hæreseos scripserit epitaphium, quod præmittitur carmini, *περὶ ἀχαρίστων*. Etiam Gregorius M., lib. V. epist. 14, Pelagium ea synodo damnatum testatur. Item Photius, *μυριοβίβλον*, cap. 53. Ἀναθεματίσθη αὐτῆ ἡ τῶν Πελαγιανιστῶν αἵρεσις καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἐφεσίων ἀγία συνόδῳ. *Voss. Hist. Pelag. lib. I. c. 47.*

## NOTE D. p. 235.

Si aliquis diligenter attendat, impossibile est, quod aliqua peccata proximorum parentum, vel etiam primi parentis, præter primum, per originem traducantur. Cujus ratio est, quia homo generat sibi idem in specie, non autem secundum individuum. Et ideo ea quæ directe pertinent ad individuum (sicut personales actus, et quæ ad eos pertinent) non traducunt a parentibus in filios: non enim grammaticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticæ, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quæ pertinent ad naturam speciei, traducuntur a parentibus in filios: non enim grammaticus traducit in filium scientiam grammaticæ, quam proprio studio acquisivit. Sed ea quæ pertinent ad naturam speciei traducuntur a parentibus in filios, nisi sit defectus naturæ; sicut oculatus generat oculatum nisi natura deficiat: et si natura sit fortis, etiam aliqua accidentia individualia propagantur in filios, pertinentia ad dispositionem naturæ; sicut velocitas corporis, bonitas ingenii, et alia hujusmodi: nullo autem modo ea quæ sunt pure personalia, ut dictum est. Sicut autem ad personam pertinet aliquid secundum seipsam, et aliquid ex dono gratiæ: ita etiam ad naturam potest aliquid pertinere secundum seipsam; scilicet quod causatur ex principiis ejus; et aliquid ex dono gratiæ: et hoc modo justitia originalis, (sicut in Primo dictum est,) erat quoddam donum gratiæ toti humanæ naturæ divinitus collatum in primo parente; quod quidem primus homo amisit per primum peccatum. Unde sicut illa originalis justitia traducta fuisset in posteros simul cum natura, ita etiam inordinatio opposita. Sed alia peccata actualia, vel primi parentis, vel aliorum, non corrumpunt naturam, quantum ad id quod naturæ est, sed solum quantum ad id quod personæ est; id est, secundum pronitatem ad actum: unde alia peccata non traducuntur. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. LXXXI. art. 2.*

## NOTE E. p. 240.

Respondeo, dicendum; quod necessitas dicitur multipliciter. . . . Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut

cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere: et hæc vocatur necessitas coactionis. Hæc igitur coactionis necessitas omnino repugnat voluntati. Nam hoc dicimus esse violentum, quod est contra inclinationem rei. Ipse autem motus voluntatis est inclinatio quædam in aliquid. Et ideo sicut dicitur aliquid naturale, quia est secundum inclinationem naturæ: ita dicitur aliquid voluntarium, quia est secundum inclinationem voluntatis. Sicut ergo impossibile est, quod aliquid simul sit violentum et naturale; ita impossibile est, quod aliquid simpliciter sit coactum, sive violentum, et necessarium. Necessitas autem finis non repugnat voluntati, quando ad finem non potest perveniri nisi uno modo: sicut ex voluntate transeundi mare, fit necessitas in voluntate ut velit navem. Similiter etiam nec necessitas naturalis repugnat voluntati: quinimo necesse est quod, sicut intellectus ex necessitate inhæret primis principiis, ita voluntas ex necessitate inhæreat ultimo fini, qui est beatitudo. Finis enim se habet in operativis, sicut principium in speculativis; ut dicitur in 2. Physic. Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Pars, qu. LXXXII. art. 1.* See also *Voss. Hist. Pelag.* lib. VII. par. 1. p. 701.

## NOTE F. p. 248.

The difficulty on the subject of Merit is, in applying the term to any relation between God and man: because we closely connect the two ideas of *servi*ng God and moral excellence. Still it is possible in theory to detach these ideas from each other, and to view man in his service to God, under the simple analogy of man earning a recompense from his fellow-man. And this is what the Schools have done, in their various speculations on the subject of Merit. Even however under this point of view, Aquinas



points out that no one can serve God, or have any merit with God, unless by the gift of God. Dissimiliter, he says, se habet in Deo et in homine: nam homo omnem virtutem benefaciendi habet a Deo, non autem ab homine: et ideo a Deo non potest homo aliquid mereri, nisi per donum ejus; quod Apostolus signanter exprimit, dicens: "Quis prior dedit ei, et retribuetur illi?" Sed ab homine potest quis mereri antequam ab eo acceperit, per id quod accepit a Deo. *Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. cxiv. art. 2.*

On the use of the terms Condignity and Congruity, the following passages of Aquinas illustrate the observations made in the Lecture.

Respondeo, dicendum, quod opus meritorium hominis dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio. Alio modo secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti. Si consideretur secundum substantiam operis, et secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio: sic non potest ibi esse condignitas, propter maximam inæqualitatem: sed est ibi congruitas, propter quandam æqualitatem proportionis. Videtur enim congruum, ut homini operanti secundum suam virtutem, Deus recompenset, secundum excellentiam suæ virtutis. Si autem loquamur de opere meritorio, secundum quod procedit ex gratia Spiritus Sancti: sic est meritorium vitæ æternæ, ex condigno. Sic enim valor meriti attenditur secundum virtutem Spiritus Sancti moventis nos in vitam æternam; secundum illud Joan. iv. "Fiet in eo fons aquæ salientis in vitam æternam." Attenditur etiam pretium operis secundum dignitatem gratiæ; per quam homo, consors factus divinæ naturæ, adoptatur in filium Dei, cui debetur hæreditas ex ipso jure adoptionis; secundum illud Rom. viii. Si filii, et hæredes. *Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ, qu. cxiv. art. 3.*

Opus nostrum habet rationem meriti ex duobus. Primo quidem ex vi motionis divinæ; et sic meretur aliquis ex condigno. Alio modo habet rationem meriti, secundum quod procedit ex libero arbitrio; in quantum voluntarie

aliquid facimus; et ex hac parte est meritum congrui: quia congruum est, ut dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur. Ex quo patet, quod merito condigni nullus potest mereri alteri primam gratiam, nisi solus Christus. . . . Sed merito congrui potest aliquis alteri mereri primam gratiam. Quia enim homo in gratia constitutus implet Dei voluntatem, congruum est secundum amicitiae proportionem, ut Deus impleat hominis voluntatem in salvatione alterius. . . . Impetratio orationis innititur misericordiae, meritum autem condigni innititur justitiae: et in eo multa orando impetrat homo ex divina misericordia, quae tamen non meretur secundum justitiam. *Ibid.* art. 6.

## NOTE G. p. 250.

Hunc honorem debitum, qui Deo non reddit, aufert Deo quod suum est; et Deum exhonorat: et hoc est peccare. Quamdiu autem non solvit quod rapuit manet in culpa; nec sufficit solummodo reddere quod ablatum est; sed pro contumelia illata plus habet reddere quam abstulit. Sicut enim qui lædit salutem alterius, non sufficit, si salutem restituit, nisi pro illata doloris injuria recompenset aliquid: ita qui honorem alicujus violat, non sufficit honorem reddere, si non secundum exhonationis factam molestiam, aliquid quod placet illi quem exhonoravit restauret. Hoc quoque attendendum, quod cum aliquis quod injuste abstulit, solvit, hoc debet dare, quod ab illo non posset exigi, si alienum non rapuisset. Sic ergo debet omnis, qui peccat, honorem quem rapit, Deo solvere; et hoc est satisfactio, quam omnis peccator debet Deo facere, &c. *Anselm. Cur Deus Homo*, lib. I. c. 2. p. 46.

Satisfactio est redditio voluntaria equivalentis alias indebiti. Primum scilicet redditio patet; quia non est absoluta datio. Nam hoc quod est satis, dicit commensurationem ad aliquid præcedens correspondentem. Quod dicitur voluntaria patet; quia si esset involuntaria, non esset satisfactio, sed satisfactio: et hoc modo ille, a quo exigitur in

inferno pœna debita culpæ commissæ, satis patitur et non satisfacit, &c. *Joan. Duns Scot.* in lib. sentent. IV. qu. xv. fol. 80.

Conjungitur autem Deo homo per voluntatem : unde macula peccati ab homine tolli non potest, nisi voluntas hominis ordinem divinæ justitiæ acceptet : ut scilicet vel ipse sibi pœnam spontaneus assumat in recompensationem culpæ præteritæ, vel etiam a Deo illatam patienter sustineat. Utroque enim modo pœna rationem satisfactionis habet. Pœna autem satisfactoria diminuit aliquid de ratione pœnæ : est enim de ratione pœnæ, quod sit contra voluntatem ; pœna autem satisfactoria, etsi secundum absolutam considerationem sit contra voluntatem, &c. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars,* qu. LXXXVI. art. 4.

NOTE H. p. 251.

Actus enim peccati facit hominem reum pœnæ, in quantum transgreditur ordinem divinæ justitiæ : ad quem non redit nisi per quandam recompensationem pœnæ quæ ad æqualitatem justitiæ reducit : ut scilicet qui plus voluntati suæ indulset quam debuit, contra mandatum Dei agens, secundum ordinem divinæ justitiæ aliquid contra illud quod vellet, spontaneus vel invitus patiat, quod etiam in injuriis hominibus factis observatur, ut per recompensationem pœnæ, reintegretur æqualitas justitiæ. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ,* qu. LXXXVII. art. 6.

Consequitur peccatum mortale reatus alicujus pœnæ, quia inordinatio culpæ non reducit ad ordinem justitiæ nisi per pœnam. Justum est enim, ut qui voluntati suæ plus indulset quam debuit, contra voluntatem suam aliquid patiat : sic enim erit æqualitas. Unde Apocal. xviii. dicitur : “ Quantum glorificavit se, et in deliciis fuit, tantum “ date illi tormentum et luctum.” *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars,* qu. LXXXVI. art. 4.

## LECTURE VI.

NOTE A. p. 277.

**T**HUS Thomas à Kempis, expressing the natural consummation of the theological morality.

Valde bonum est in obedientia stare, sub prælato vivere, et sui juris non esse. Multo tutius est in subjectione vivere, quam in prælatura. . . . Curre huc vel illuc: nusquam invenies quietem, nisi in humili subjectione sub prælati regimine. . . . Quis est ita sapiens qui omnia plene scire possit? Ergo noli nimis in sensu tuo confidere; sed velis etiam aliorum sensum audire. Si bonum est tuum sentire, et hoc ipsum propter Deum dimittis, et alius sentire sequeris, magis exinde proficies. *De Imit. Christi*, lib. I. c. 9.

We may regard the monastic institutions, when brought to their perfection of organization, as an attempt to realize the principle of a theocracy, in the human government of a particular society. The wonderful effect under the Divine government is, that the Will of God is the law of the world of free agents; each of whom has his own distinct will acting by its proper laws, whilst yet the sovereign Will is accomplished throughout, and all are as instruments in the Divine hand to work the Divine purposes. In order to effect the same object by mere human government, it was necessary to neutralize the refractory power of the will in the subject, and antecedently to reduce the human agent to the condition of the mere instrument. Thence the principle of Obedience so incessantly and strongly inculcated in the rules of the monastic orders:—an obedience carried to the minutest points; so far that an immediate attention to the word of the superior was required, however the individual addressed might be engaged at the moment. If he should happen to be writing, he must leave the very stroke unfinished, and instantly

proceed on the errand to which he was summoned. An inspection of the rules of the different orders will furnish ample evidence of the truth of these statements.

The system was carried to its perfection by the Jesuits. A member of that society might be at Rome at one moment, quite unconscious of any scheme in which he was to take a part, and the next moment be proceeding on his way to China or Paraguay. I have already mentioned an instance of the kind among the Franciscans, in the case of John Duns Scotus.<sup>a</sup> The amazing power obtained to the governors of societies so constituted may easily be supposed.

The wonder indeed which so greatly perplexes us in the Divine government—the circumstance of a regular direction of results, by means intrinsically variable, and apparently uncontrollable,—vanishes in the survey of the artificial human system. We see the mechanism by which the result is effected. The subject of the human institution has been trained by unnatural discipline, not to feel his own proper responsibility as a moral agent. And a person brought to such a state is of course prepared to execute any purpose, however mischievous in itself, *because* it is commanded by an external authority. Under such a system, crimes may be perpetrated without remorse, and crimes too of an atrocity that would make the heart shrink from them, were it not steeled against its own intercession. The only wonder is, that men have been brought to this state of submission; that an artificial system has so completely mastered their moral principles. The consummate art of the framers of the institutions has been shewn in their success in thus modifying the characters of men, and bringing them under the perfect command of a sovereign intellect. Let the principle, however, be once established, that the will of another is the supreme law of conduct, and then the like effects will be produced, to what we find under the stern dominion of fatalism among Ma-

<sup>a</sup> Page 425.

hometans. The subject-votary concentrates his whole energy and interest on the one false principle on which his character has been formed; and he proceeds to the work enjoined on him, with a fanatical self-devotion, that resembles motion produced by impact rather than the operation of a moral being. Moral force, in fact, is converted into physical; and morality is extinguished; all check being given to the exercise of moral judgment and discretion.

The same consequences in kind follow from taking the will of God as the sole practical guide of conduct; or, which is the same thing, making religion the substitute for morality. For the error is the same; that of acting on one abstract principle, instead of attending to the several internal laws of our nature, the *whole* law of God written on the heart, by which He instructs us how to do his will. The principle here takes a noble and sublime form: for who can argue abstractedly against the propriety of following the Divine will? But, from its abstract excellence, it is the more likely to lead to romantic aberrations in conduct. In the true practical view of the will of God, the term is only a general expression for the various particular instances, in which God informs and admonishes us, what is our duty and interest in conduct, whether by the laws of our nature, or those of his revealed word. To argue respecting the will of God, as if we had any positive notion of what it is in God, can lead to no practical truth: for it is to argue from a mere hypothesis. Such a proceeding indeed is found necessarily to involve us in paradox. For thus Ockam affirms, that if God should so will, what is now held to be vice might become virtue. This statement was probably made by him and other scholastics, merely with a design of maintaining the principle itself as speculatively true; whatever consequence might be deduced from it; and without any view of establishing the consequence as absolutely true. There is a passage of Anselm which inculcates this interpretation of the doctrine; and which is important to be attended to, in forming an esti-

mate of its real import, that we may not judge the maintainers of it too hardly.

Quod autem dicitur, quia quod vult justum est, et quod non vult, justum non est, non ita intelligendum est, ut si Deus velit quodlibet inconueniens, justum sit, quia ipse vult. Non enim sequitur, si Deus vult mentiri, justum esse mentiri; sed potius Deum illum non esse. Nam nequaquam potest velle mentiri voluntas, nisi in qua corrupta est veritas, immo quæ deserendo veritatem corrupta est. Cum ergo dicitur, si Deus vult mentiri, non est aliud, quam si Deus est talis naturæ, quæ velit mentiri: et idcirco non sequitur justum esse mendacium: nisi ita intelligatur, sicut cum de duobus impossibilibus dicimus: si hoc est, illud est: quia nec hoc, nec illud est: ut si quis dicat: si aqua est sicca, et ignis est humidus: neutrum enim verum est. Itaque de illis tantum est verum dicere; si Deus hoc vult, justum est; quæ Deum velle non est inconueniens. Si enim vult Deus ut pluat, justum est ut pluat: et si vult ut aliquis homo occidatur, justum est ut occidatur. *Cur Deus Homo*, lib. I. c. 12. p. 47.

The real objection however to the introduction of such a speculation into ethics is, that it is unphilosophical; overlooking clear facts of our moral nature, and suggesting, instead of rules founded on these facts, an abstract notion, which has no existence independently of them.

#### NOTE B. p. 284.

Principaliter quidem ad vitam contemplativam pertinet contemplatio divinæ veritatis: quia hujusmodi contemplatio est finis totius humanæ vitæ. Unde Augustinus dicit in 1. de Trinitate, quod contemplatio Dei promittitur nobis; ut actionum omnium finis atque æterna perfectio gaudiorum. Quæ quidem in futura vita erit perfecta, quando videbimus eum facie ad faciem; unde et perfecte beatos faciet. Nunc autem contemplatio divinæ veritatis competit nobis imperfecte, videlicet per speculum et in ænigmate. Unde per eam fit nobis quædam inchoatio beatitudinis,

quæ hic incipit ut in futuro continetur. Unde et Philosophus in 10. Ethic. in contemplatione optimi intelligibilis ponit ultimam felicitatem hominis. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Secunda Secundæ, qu. CLXXX. art. 4.*

Secundum se quidem manifestum est quod vita contemplativa diuturna est dupliciter. Uno modo, eo quod versatur circa incorruptibilia et immobilia. Alio modo, quia non habet contrarietatem. Delectationi enim quæ est in considerando, nihil est contrarium, ut dicitur in 1. Topic. Sed quoad nos etiam vita contemplativa diuturna est: tum quia competit nobis secundum actionem incorruptibilis partis animæ, scilicet secundum intellectum; unde potest post hanc vitam durare: alio modo, quia in operibus contemplativæ corporaliter non laboramus. Unde magis in hujusmodi operibus continue persistere possumus: sicut Philosophus dicit in 10. Ethicorum. *Ibid. art. 8.*

Dicendum est ergo quod vita contemplativa simpliciter melior est quam activa; quod Philosophus in 10. Ethic. probat octo rationibus; &c. *Ibid. qu. CLXXXII. art. 1.*

#### NOTE C. p. 289.

The passage which is commonly referred to by the Schoolmen, occurs in the Eudemian Ethics. The philosopher is endeavouring to account for the phenomenon, that fortune often appears in the world triumphant over virtue and reason: and he closes his discussion in the following manner. "The object of inquiry is," he says, "what is the principle of motion in the soul. It is plain then that as God is in the universe, so every thing is in Him; for the divinity within us in a manner moves all things. But the principle of reason is not reason, but something superior. What then can one say is superior even to science, but God? for virtue is an instrument of the intellect. On this account also the ancients said: they are called fortunate, who have an impulse to succeed, being themselves without reason; and willing is not expedient for them; for they have a prin-



“ ciple of a nature superior to intellect and will. But there  
 “ are some that have reason, and not this: and there are  
 “ enthusiasms; but these have not the power of this: for  
 “ as being unreasonable they fail.... It is evident then that  
 “ there are two kinds of good fortune: one, divine: whence  
 “ also the fortunate seems to succeed through God: this  
 “ is the character that is apt to do right through impulse:  
 “ the other one who does right against impulse.”<sup>b</sup> We  
 see plainly in this passage of the philosopher a warrant  
 for the notion of divinely-inspired Virtue, as of a principle  
 with which the reason itself of man had no proper concern;  
 but animating the agent by an instinctive efficacy, and pro-  
 moting his success in a way beyond his own consciousness  
 or intentions.

These divine instincts, regarded in their effects on the  
 human subject, assumed in Scholastic phraseology the  
 forms of good Dispositions, Preparations, Conversion of  
 heart. They were termed Dispositions, so far as the  
 agent was thereby fitly disposed for the operation of grace;  
 since the matter on which any power has to act, must be  
 of a suitable nature in order to that action. Preparation  
 expressed the *previous* operation of the Spirit, rendering the  
 agent susceptible of divine impressions, both at the com-  
 mencement of his Christian life, and for his habitual pro-  
 gress in that life.<sup>c</sup> Conversion denoted the efficacy of the  
 Spirit in producing the change of the soul towards God,  
 the proper end of its being, by a series of effects adjusted  
 successively to that end. These terms are all different  
 views of the process of that energy which is working in  
 the soul and bringing it to God—parts of the history of  
 that *alteration* which it undergoes in putting off the form of  
 the sinful Adam, and putting on the glorious form of the  
 sons of God.

<sup>b</sup> *Aristot. Eth. Eudem.* lib. VII. c. 14. tom. II. p. 289. Du Val.

<sup>c</sup> *Aquin. Summa Theol. Prima Secundæ,* qu. CIX. art. 6. qu. XLII. art. 2.

## LECTURE VII.

NOTE A. p. 311.

I HAVE before spoken of the refined materialism, which, particularly in regard to the nature of the soul, was the early and general tenet of theologians. In the IXth century controversy revived on the nature of the soul as on other subjects. Ratramn of Corbey was employed in writing a book *De Anima*, at the instance of Odo, Bishop of Beauvais, in reply to the fanciful theory, drawn probably from the New-Platonists, of a monk of the same convent, who maintained that all men had but one and the same soul. Another evidence of the sort of physical speculation which was afloat at this period is, that the same writer is said to have been engaged in an inquiry concerning the fabled race of the Cynocephali, "whether they be truly "men of Adam's seed, or brute creatures."<sup>d</sup>

Are we not disposed even in these days to rest too much on the natural or metaphysical arguments for a future state, and to imagine that the Christian Faith is compromised by a denial of the immateriality of the soul? I by no means intend to deny its immateriality. The soul is undoubtedly immaterial in this sense; that it is only to confound distinct phenomena, to identify the facts of consciousness with those of external observation, as Priestley has done, in his attempt to establish the material nature of the soul. The two classes of facts are clearly distinct and different, and they ought therefore, in philosophical accuracy, to be distinguished by different names. But we go beyond the basis of the facts, when we assume, in our abstract arguments for the natural immortality of the soul, its separate existence apart from the body. There is no observation which shews that the living powers, (to use

<sup>d</sup> Ratramn's Treatise on the Body and Blood of the Lord, in Latin and English, 8vo. 1688.

the phrase of Butler,) the powers of thought, and will, and action, exist otherwise than in connexion with a bodily system. However little the bodily system may be called into action during the exertion of these living powers, however it may in some instances be an obstruction to their energy, and however actively they may energize in the very moment of the decay of this system, still it is always in connexion with the bodily system that the living powers are displayed: and we are not authorized therefore speculatively to conclude their future existence, independently of their union with such a system. But what matters this to the Christian, who is fully assured, that, because Christ lives, he shall live also; that, “as by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead.” I would say, in the words of Nemesius, Ἡμῖν δὲ ἀρκεῖ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς, ἢ τῶν θεῶν λογίων διδασκαλία, τὸ πιστὸν ἀφ’ ἐαυτῆς ἔχουσα, διὰ τὸ θεόπνευστον εἶναι.<sup>e</sup> If we sincerely rely on the clear evidence given of Christ raised from the dead, as a certain fact in the course of Divine Providence, and believe the connexion of our own immortality with that fact, we may surely regard all merely philosophical inquiries on the subject, as fair matter of disputation, without offence, and without any fear whatever for the stability of the real Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the dead.

## NOTE B. p. 313.

Sacrificium ergo visibile invisibilis sacrificii Sacramentum, i. e. sacrum signum est. *Augustin. De Civ. Dei*, lib. X. c. 5.

Sacramentum est sacræ rei signum. Dicitur tamen sacramentum etiam sacrum secretum, sicut sacramentum divinitatis: ut sacramentum sit sacrum signans: sed nunc agitur de sacramento secundum quod est signum. Item sacramentum est invisibilis gratiæ visibilis forma. *Lombard. Sent.* lib. IV. dist. 1.

“ I remember there be many definitions of a sacrament

<sup>e</sup> *De Natura Hominis*, c. 2. p. 93. ed. 8vo. Oxon. 1671.

“ in Austin : but I will take that which is most fit to this  
 “ present purpose. A sacrament is a visible sign of in-  
 “ visible grace.” *Ridley's Disput. at Oxford. Foxe's Eccl.*  
*Hist.* vol. II. p. 1619.

## NOTE C. p. 314.

Sicut in vita naturali primum est generatio: deinde sequitur nutritio, et roboratio, et sanitatis perditæ reparatio: et hæc quatuor pertinent ad quamlibet personam singularem: præter hæc autem requiritur aliquid pertinens ad communitatem, quo aliquis constituatur in gradu necessario ad aliquem actum necessarium communitati: et ita spiritualiter ad completam perfectionem extensive opus esse adjutorium aliquod pertinens ad generationem spiritualem: et 2<sup>do</sup> aliquid pertinens ad nutritionem, 3<sup>o</sup> pertinens ad roborationem: 4<sup>o</sup> ad separationem post lapsum: præter hæc autem, 5<sup>o</sup> requiritur aliquid esse quo exiens finaliter præparetur: quia vita ista spiritualis quædam via est ordinans, ut bene vivens in ea, de ipsa sine impedimento transeat ad aliam pro quæ præparatur. Hæc ergo quinque requirantur tanquam adjutoria necessaria personæ cuicumque pro se. Ad bonum autem communitatis observantis istam legem, requiritur et multiplicatio carnalis: quia ista præsupponitur bono spirituali: sicut natura gratiæ: et multiplicatio spiritualis aliquorum in ista lege. Sic ergo congruum fuit septem adjutoria conferri observatoribus legis evangelicæ, in quibus esset perfectio, non tantum intensiva, sed etiam extensiva, et sufficiens ad omnia necessaria pro observantia hujus legis. Hæc autem sunt, ut dicit magister in litera; baptismus pertinens ad generationem spiritualem: eucharistia necessaria ad nutritionem: confirmatio ad roborationem; poenitentia ad lapsi reparationem: extrema unctio ad finalem præparationem: matrimonium ad multiplicationem in esse naturæ vel carnali: et ordo ad multiplicationem in esse gratiæ vel spirituali. *Jo. Duns Scot. in Lib. Sent. IV.*

dist. 2. qu. 1. Also *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars*, qu. LXV. art. 1.

Ibi autem debet medicinale remedium homini adhiberi, ubi patitur morbum. Et ideo conveniens fuit, ut Deus per quædam corporalia signa homini spiritualem medicinam adhiberet. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars*, qu. LXI. art. 1.

The term *Salvation* has evidently been founded on this analogy, so much insisted on by the Scholastic writers, and indeed suggested by Scripture, between the state of the soul under sin, and that of the body under disease. It has now however almost lost its original sense, and is commonly understood as if it denoted some particular object, or state, out of the soul itself. But the original meaning seems more consistent with the tenour and spirit of Christianity; which leaves the nature of our future happiness in the most indistinct form, and directs the believer to look for the kingdom of God *within* himself.

#### NOTE D. p. 315.

*Aquinas* having adduced the opinion of some who asserted that the sacraments operated by virtue of the Will of God, annexing certain benefits to the use of them, in a manner analogous to the beneficence of a king who should promise to give an hundred pounds to any one presenting a leaden penny, objects to this doctrine as reducing the sacraments to mere signs, and thus states his own view of the subject.

Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod duplex est causa agens, principalis et instrumentalis. Principalis quidem operatur per virtutem suæ formæ, cui assimilatur effectus; sicut ignis suo calore calefacit. Et hoc modo nihil potest causare gratiam, nisi Deus. . . . Causa vero instrumentalis non agit per virtutem suæ formæ, sed solum per motum quo movetur a principali agente: unde effectus non assimilatur securi, sed arti quæ est in mente artificis. Et hoc modo

sacramenta novæ legis gratiam causant. . . . Ad secundum dicendum, quod instrumentum habet duas actiones: unam instrumentalem, secundum quam operatur non in virtute propria, sed in virtute principalis agentis: aliam autem habet actionem propriam, quæ competit sibi secundum propriam formam: sicut securi competit scindere ratione suæ acuitatis, facere autem lectum, in quantum est instrumentum artis. Non autem perficit instrumentalem actionem, nisi exercendo actionem propriam: scindendo enim facit lectum. Et similiter sacramenta corporalia, per propriam operationem, quam exercent circa corpus quod tangunt, efficiunt operationem instrumentalem ex virtute divina circa animam: sicut aqua baptismi, abluendo corpus secundum propriam virtutem, abluit animam, in quantum est instrumentum virtutis divinæ: nam ex anima et corpore unum fit. Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit; quod corpus tangit, et cor abluit. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXII. art. 1.*

## NOTE E. p. 316.

“ The occasion of his writing, was news out of Germany,  
 “ (as I guess from New Corbey, which had much corre-  
 “ spondence with this Corbey in France, of which it was  
 “ a colony,) that some in those parts held strange opinions  
 “ touching our Saviour’s birth, as though he came not out  
 “ of his mother’s womb into the world, the same way with  
 “ other men. In opposition to that doctrine, Ratramnus  
 “ asserts, that Christ was born as other men, and his Virgin  
 “ mother bare Him, as other women bring forth, to use  
 “ Tertullian’s words, *patefacti corporis lege*. Those whose  
 “ opinions he confutes, were, perhaps, some of those no-  
 “ vices, for whose use Paschasius had written his book of  
 “ the Sacrament, and who had not only imbibed his doc-  
 “ trine touching the carnal presence of Christ therein, but  
 “ might have also heard the manner of our Saviour’s birth  
 “ without opening his mother’s womb, alleged to solve  
 “ an objection against it: for our adversaries of the Church

“ of Rome now say, that it is no more impossible for one  
 “ body to be in two places, than for two bodies to be in  
 “ one; which they conceive must have happened in our  
 “ Saviour’s birth, as also in his resurrection, and coming  
 “ in to his disciples, the doors being shut. This might  
 “ provoke Paschasius to write against our Author, as well  
 “ as zeal for the blessed Virgin’s integrity.” *Editor of*  
*Ratramn*, p. 14. 8vo. London, 1688.

## NOTE F. p. 317.

Ex quibus Domini verbis ortæ sunt duæ hæreses antiquis temporibus. Et in hoc quidem consenserunt omnes, quod panis et vinum in veram filii hominis carnem, verumque ejus sanguinem converterentur. Sed quis esset iste filius hominis, non omnes eandem sententiam tenuerunt. Quidam arbitrati sunt, hunc oportere intelligi, quemlibet hominem sive justum sive peccatorem, in cujus carnem ac sanguinem conversa terrena substantia sumeretur in remissionem peccatorum. Alii arbitrati sunt, non hunc esse de turba quemlibet hominem, sed virum justum, sanctificatum, a communi hominum vita per suæ vitæ celsitudinem segregatum, qui templum Dei esset, qui divinam in se habitationem verissime possideret. In hujus carnem ac sanguinem commutari posse panem vinumque altaris, hæretica pertinacia delirabant. Factum est hoc paucis annis post obitum beati Augustini, tempore Cælestini Papæ, et Cyrilli Alexandrini Episcopi, quibus præcipientibus, atque annitentibus, indicta ac celebrata est, Synodus Ephesina, una de quatuor quas beatus Gregorius in Epistola ad Patriarchas fatetur se ita suscipere, complecti, et venerari, quemadmodum quatuor Evangelia Domini nostri Jesu Christi. In qua synodo damnatæ sunt utræque superius comprehensæ lethales pestes, roborata est fides, qua credimus panem converti in eam carnem quæ in cruce pependit, vinumque in eum sanguinem, qui de pendentis in cruce latere emanavit. Denique ducenti qui eidem concilio interfuere Episcopi, inter cætera de hoc Sacramento

sic scripserunt; et Nestorio Episcopo quasi hæreticorum capiti transmiserunt. "Ad benedictiones," inquit, "mysticas accedimus, et sanctificamur, participes sancti corporis, et pretiosi Sanguinis Christi omnium nostrum Redemptoris, effecti: non ut communem carnem percipientes, quod absit, nec ut viri sanctificati et verbo conjuncti secundum dignitatis unitatem, aut sicut divinam possidentis habitationem, sed vere vivificatricem, et ipsius verbi propriam factam. Vita enim naturaliter ut Deus existens, quia propriæ carni unitus est, vivificatricem eam esse professus est. Et ideo quamvis dicat ad nos; Amen, amen, dico vobis, nisi manducaveritis carnem filii hominis, et biberitis ejus sanguinem; non tamen eam, ut hominis unius ex nobis, existimare debemus: (quomodo enim juxta naturam suam vivificatrix esse caro hominis poterit?) sed ut vere propriam ejus factam, qui propter nos filius hominis, et factus est, et vocatus." Et circa finem concilii: "Si quis non confitetur carnem Domini vivificatricem esse, et propriam ipsius Verbi Dei Patris, sed velut alterius præter ipsum conjuncti eidem per dignitatem, aut quasi divinam habentis habitationem, ac non potius vivificatricem esse, quia facta est propria Verbi vivificare valentis, anathema sit." Quid manifestius audire desideras, si studiosum novæ contentionis animum studio antiquæ pacis omittas? Non est, ut sancta synodus definit, hæc caro alicujus de vulgo hominis, non justus et sanctificatus hominis, sed potius cui ipse unitus, id est, incarnatus est Dei et hominis, &c. *Lanfranc, Lib. De Corp. et Sang. Domini, c. xvii. pp. 242, 243.*

## NOTE G. p. 320.

See the Letter of Berenger to Lanfranc, p. 415, note: in which it appears that Berenger maintained, that the authorities of Ambrose, Jerome, and Augustine, were on his side. Augustine indeed uses expressions which militate with the notion of any actual change in the sacred elements, as the following: *Nonne semel immolatus est*



Christus in seipso, et tamen in sacramento non solum per omnes paschæ solennitates, sed omni die populis immolatur: nec utique mentitur qui interrogatus eum responderit immolari. Si enim sacramenta quandam similitudinem earum rerum, quarum sacramenta sunt, non haberent, omnino sacramenta non essent. Ex hac autem similitudine plerumque etiam ipsarum rerum nomina accipiunt. Sicut ergo secundum quendam modum, sacramentum corporis Christi, corpus Christi est, sacramentum sanguinis Christi, sanguis Christi est, ita sacramentum fidei, fides est.<sup>f</sup> The controversial tract of Lanfranc against Berenger, is no favourable specimen of the polemical talents of Lanfranc; nor can we form from it any just notion of the sacramental doctrine of Berenger. He is very inferior to Anselm in strength and acuteness of reasoning, resembling rather the unscientific controvertists of the IXth century; vehement like them too, in calling for authorities on the point in dispute, and declaiming against the introduction of dialectical subtilties into theology, though not scrupling to employ them in support of what he conceives the orthodox doctrine. It was a natural misconception, if not a trick of controversy, to charge the opponents of a doctrine of the *corporal* presence with reducing the Sacrament to a merely commemorative sign. Nothing can be concluded therefore against Berenger on this head, from the antagonist representations of Lanfranc.

It is plain, from the following passages of Ratramn, that he maintained a Real Presence in the Eucharist; whilst he directly opposes the doctrine of a substantial presence in the consecrated elements.

At ille panis qui per sacerdotis ministerium Christi corpus conficitur, aliud exterius humanis sensibus ostendit, et aliud interius fidelium mentibus clamat. Exterius quidem panis, quod ante fuerat, forma prætenditur, color ostenditur, sapor accipitur: est interius longe aliud multo pretiosius, multoque excellentius, intimatur; quia cœleste,

<sup>f</sup> *Augustinus Bonifacio*, Ep. XXIII. Opera, tom. II. fol. 28.

quia divinum, id est, Christi corpus, ostenditur; quod non sensibus carnis, sed animi fidelis contuitu, vel aspicitur, vel comeditur. Vinum quoque quod sacerdotali consecratione Christi sanguinis efficitur sacramentum, aliud superficie tenus ostendit, aliud interius ostendit. Quid enim aliud in superficie quam substantia vini conspicitur. Gusta, vinum sapit: odora, vinum redolet: inspice, vini color intuetur. At interius si consideres, jam non liquor vini, sed liquor sanguinis Christi, credentium mentibus, et sapit dum gustatur, et agnoscitur dum conspicitur, et probatur dum odoratur. Hæc ita esse, dum nemo potest abnegare, claret quia panis ille vinumque figurate Christi corpus et sanguis existit. Non enim secundum quod videtur, vel carnis species in illo pane cognoscitur, vel in illo vino cruoris unda monstratur, cum tamen, post mysticam consecrationem, nec panis jam dicitur nec vinum, sed Christi corpus et sanguis. *Bertram, or Ratram, on the Body and Blood of the Lord, in Latin and English, c. 9, 10. 8vo. 1688.*

Si ergo nihil est permutatum, non est aliud quam ante fuit. Est autem aliud, quoniam panis corpus, et vinum sanguis Christi, facta sunt. . . . Et si nihil permutationis pertulerunt, nihil aliud existunt, quam quod prius fuere. . . . Corporaliter namque nihil in eis cernitur esse permutatum. . . . At quia confitentur et corpus et sanguinem Dei esse, nec hoc esse potuisse nisi facta in melius commutatione, neque ista commutatio corporaliter, sed spiritualiter, facta sit; necesse est jam ut figurate facta esse dicatur; quoniam sub velamento corporei panis, corporeique vini, spirituale corpus Christi, spiritualisque sanguis existit. . . . Hinc etiam et Sacramenta vocitantur, quia tegumento corporalium rerum, virtus divina secretam salutem accipientium fideliter dispensat. . . . At nunc sanguis Christi quem credentes ebibunt, et corpus quod comedunt, aliud sunt in specie, et aliud in significatione: aliud quod pascunt corpus esca corporea, et aliud quod saginant mentes æternæ vitæ substantia. . . . Exterius igitur quod apparet, non est

ipsa res, sed imago rei: mente vero quod sentitur et intelligitur, veritas rei. *Ibid.* c. 13, 14, 15, 16. 48. 69. 77.

NOTE H. p. 320.

Ridley, in a conversation in the Tower recorded by Foxe, thus speaks of Ratramn, or Bertram, as he calls him.

“Sir,” said I, “it is certain that other before these have written of this matter, not by the way only and *obiter*, as doth for the most part all the old writers, but even *ex professo*, and their whole books intreat of it alone, as Bertram.” “Bertram,” said the Secretary: “what man was he, and when was he, and how do ye know?” &c., with many questions. “Sir,” quoth I, “I have read his book: he proponeth the same which is now in controversy, and answereth so directly, that no man may doubt but that he affirmeth that the substance of bread remaineth still in the Sacrament: and he wrote unto Carolus Magnus.” “Marry,” quoth he, “mark; for there is a matter.” “He wrote,” quoth he, “*ad Henricum*, and not *ad Carolum*: for no author makes any such mention of Bertramus.” “Yes,” quoth I, “*Trithemius in Catalogo Illustrium Scriptorum* speaketh of him. “Trithemius was but of late time: but he speaketh,” quoth I, “of them that were of antiquity. Here, after much talk of Bertram,” &c. *Foxe's Eccl. Hist.* vol. II. p. 1590.

Again in his Disputation at Oxford, Ridley, appealing to the authorities of Cyprian, Augustine, Hilary, and others, as conformable to his view of the Eucharist, to shew that he held it to be more than a mere sign, concludes with that of Ratramn: “Finally with Bertram,” he says, “(which was the last of all these,) I confess that Christ’s body is in the Sacrament in this respect, namely (as he writeth) because there is in it the Spirit of Christ; that is, the power of the Word of God, which not only feedeth the soul, but also cleanseth it. Out of these I suppose it may clearly appear unto all men, how far we

“ are from that opinion, whereof some go about falsely to  
 “ slander us to the world, saying, we teach that the godly  
 “ and faithful should receive nothing else at the Lord’s  
 “ table, but a figure of the body of Christ.” *Ibid.* p. 1609.

“ I have also for the proof of that I have spoken, what-  
 “ soever Bertram, a man learned, of sound and upright  
 “ judgment, and ever counted a Catholic for these seven  
 “ hundred years until this our age, hath written. His  
 “ treatise, whosoever shall read and weigh, considering the  
 “ time of the writer, his learning, godliness of life, the  
 “ allegations of the ancient fathers, and his manifold and  
 “ most grounded arguments, I cannot doubtless but much  
 “ marvel, if he have any fear of God at all, how he can with  
 “ good conscience speak against him in this matter of the  
 “ Sacrament. This Bertram was the first that pulled me  
 “ by the ear, and that first brought me from that common  
 “ error of the Romish Church, and caused me to search  
 “ more diligently and exactly, both the Scriptures and the  
 “ writings of the old ecclesiastical fathers in this matter.  
 “ And this I protest before the face of God, who knoweth  
 “ I lie not in the things I now speak.”<sup>s</sup> *Ibid.* p. 1610.

NOTE E. p. 322.

Respondeo dicendum, quod (sicut dictum est) sacramentum operatur ad gratiam causandum per modum instrumenti. Est autem duplex instrumentum; unum quidem separatum, ut baculus; aliud autem conjunctum, ut manus. Per instrumentum autem conjunctum movetur instrumentum separatum, sicut baculus per manum. Principalis autem causa efficiens gratiæ est ipse Deus, ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi, sicut instrumentum conjunctum; sacramentum autem sicut instrumentum separatum. Et ideo oportet quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi, per ejus humanitatem in ipsa Sacramenta derivetur. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXII. art. 5.*

<sup>s</sup> It is strange that this treatise of Rattramn, which had such influence on our Reformers, should not be more familiarly known. It ought to be republished.

## NOTE F. p. 323.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod instrumentum inanimatum non habet aliquam intentionem respectu effectus: sed loco intentionis est motus quo movetur a principali agente. Sed instrumentum animatum, sicut est minister, non solum movetur, sed etiam quodammodo movet seipsum, in quantum sua voluntate movet membra ad operandum. Et ideo requiritur ejus intentio, qua se subjiciat principali agenti, ut scilicet intendat facere quod facit Christus et Ecclesia.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod circa hoc est duplex opinio. Quidam enim dicunt, quod requiritur mentalis intentio in ministro, quæ si desit, non perficitur sacramentum: sed hunc defectum in pueris, qui non habent intentionem accedendi ad sacramentum, supplet Christus, qui interius baptizat: in adultis autem qui intendunt sacramentum suscipere, supplet illum defectum fides et devotio. Sed hoc satis posset dici quantum ad ultimum effectum, qui est res et sacramentum; scilicet quantum ad characterem, non videtur quod per devotionem accedentis posset suppleri: quia character nunquam imprimitur nisi per sacramentum. Et ideo alii melius dicunt, quod minister sacramenti agit in persona totius Ecclesiæ, cujus est minister. In verbis autem quæ profert, exprimitur intentio Ecclesiæ, quæ sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti, nisi contrarium exterius exprimatur, ex parte ministri, vel recipientis sacramentum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod licet ille qui aliud cogitat, non habeat actualem intentionem, habet tamen habitua-lem, quæ sufficit ad perfectionem sacramenti: puta, cum sacerdos accedens ad baptizandum, intendit facere circa baptizandum quod facit Ecclesia. Unde si postea in ipso exercitio actus, cogitatio ejus ad alia rapiatur, ex virtute primæ intentionis perficitur sacramentum: quamvis studiose curare debeat sacramenti minister, ut etiam actualem intentionem adhibeat. Sed hoc non est totaliter positum

in hominis potestate ; quia præter intentionem, cum homo vult multum intendere, incipit alia cogitare, secundum illud Psal. xxxix. Cor. meum dereliquit me. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXIV. art. 8.*

The word "*Intention,*" as introduced into the doctrine of the Sacraments, it should further be observed, is the completion of the theory of causation in that subject. We have the efficient cause in Christ himself communicating his virtue to the sacrament,—the material cause in the emblems employed,—the formal cause in the words uttered,—and lastly, the final cause *determining* the particular effect, in the *intention* of the officiating minister. The intention is strictly the οὐ ἐνεκα of Aristotle. Unless this were assigned, no reason would be given for the *particular* effect ; and it must be regarded therefore as casual—must be placed among those effects which, as not knowing their reason, we ascribe to chance. Sed contra est, says Aquinas in the article quoted above, quod ea quæ sunt præter intentionem, sunt casualia : quod non est dicendum de operatione sacramentorum. Ergo sacramenta requirunt intentionem ministri.

#### NOTE G. p. 323.

Illud tamen quod est sacramenti effectus, non impetratur oratione Ecclesiæ vel ministri, sed ex merito passionis Christi, cujus virtus operatur in Sacramentis : ut dictum est. Unde effectus sacramenti non datur melior per meliorem ministrum : aliquid tamen annexum impetrari potest recipienti Sacramentum, per devotionem ministri. Nec tamen minister illud operatur, sed impetrat operandum a Deo. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXIV. art. 1.*

Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut dictum est, ministri Ecclesiæ instrumentaliter operantur in sacramentis, eo quod quodammodo eadem est ratio ministri et instrumenti. Sicut autem supra dictum est, instrumentum non agit secundum propriam formam aut virtutem, sed secundum virtutem ejus a quo movetur. Et ideo accidit instrumento,

in quantum est instrumentum, qualemcunque formam vel virtutem habeat, præter id quod exigitur ad rationem instrumenti: sicut quod corpus medici (quod est instrumentum animæ habentis artem) sit sanum vel infirmum: et sicut quod fistula per quam transit aqua, sit argentea vel plumbea. Unde ministri Ecclesiæ possunt sacramenta conferre, etiam si sint mali. *Ibid.* art. 5.

Potest autem aliquis operari per instrumentum carens vita, et a se separatum, quantum ad corporis unionem, dummodo sit conjunctum per quandam motionem: aliter enim operatur artifex per manum, et aliter per securim. Sic igitur Christus operatur in sacramentis, et per bonos tanquam per membra viventia, et per malos tanquam per instrumenta carentia vita. *Ibid.*

Respondeo dicendum, quod, sicut supra dictum est, quia minister in sacramentis instrumentaliter operatur, non agit in virtute propria, sed in virtute Christi. Sicut autem pertinet ad propriam virtutem hominis charitas, ita et fides: unde sicut non requiritur ad perfectionem sacramenti, quod minister sit in charitate, sed possunt etiam peccatores sacramenta conferre, ut supra dictum est, ita non requiritur ad perfectionem sacramenti fides ejus; sed infidelis potest verum sacramentum præbere, dummodo cætera adsint, quæ sunt de necessitate sacramenti. *Ibid.* art. 9.

Respondeo dicendum, quod intentio ministri potest perverti dupliciter. Uno modo respectu ipsius sacramenti: puta cum aliquis non intendit sacramentum conferre, sed derisorie aliquid agere. Et talis perversitas tollit veritatem sacramenti, præcipue quando suam intentionem exterius manifestat. Alio modo potest perverti intentio ministri quantum ad id quod sequitur sacramentum: puta, si sacerdos intendat aliquam fæminam baptizare ut abutatur ea; vel si intendat conficere corpus Christi, ut eo ad veneficia utatur. Et quia prius non dependet a posteriori, inde est, quod talis intentionis perversitas veritatem sacramenti non tollit, sed ipse minister ex tali intentione graviter peccat. *Ibid.* art. 10.

## NOTE H. p. 325.

Regeneratio spiritualis, quæ fit per baptismum, est quodammodo similis nativitati carnali, quantum ad hoc, quod sicut pueri in maternis uteris constituti, non per seipsos nutrimentum accipiunt, sed ex nutrimento matris sustentantur: ita etiam pueri nondum habentes usum rationis, quasi in utero matris Ecclesiæ constituti, non per seipsos, sed per actum Ecclesiæ salutem suscipiunt. . . . Sicut Augustinus scribens Bonifacio dicit, in Ecclesia Salvatoris parvuli per alios credunt, sicut ex aliis quæ in baptismo remittuntur peccata traxerunt. Nec impeditur eorum salus, si parentes sint infideles: quia, sicut Augustinus dicit, eidem Bonifacio scribens, offeruntur parvuli ad percipiendam spiritualem gratiam, non tam ab eis, quorum gestantur manibus (quamvis et ab ipsis si et ipsi boni fideles sunt) quam ab universa societate sanctorum atque fidelium, &c. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXVIII. art. 9.*

## NOTE I. p. 326.

Cyprianus autem nullo modo sacramentum conferre hæreticos posse credebat: sed in hoc ejus sententia non tenetur. Unde Augustinus dicit: Martyrem Cyprianum, qui apud hæreticos, vel schismaticos, datum baptisma nolebat cognoscere, tanta merita usque ad triumphum martyrii secuta sunt, ut charitatis qua excellebat luce, obumbratio illa figuraretur, et si quid purgandum erat, passionis falce tolleretur. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXV. art. 9.*

Et nunc quoque cum in unum convenissemus, tam provinciæ Africæ quam Numidiæ Episcopi numero septuaginta et unus, hoc idem denuo sententia nostra firmavimus, stantes unum baptisma esse quod sit in Ecclesia Catholica constitutum, ac per hoc non rebaptizari, sed baptizari a nobis. Quicumque ergo ab adultera et profana aqua veniunt, abluendi sunt et sanctificandi salutaris aquæ veritate. . . . Apud nos autem non nova aut repentina res est, ut



baptizandos censeamus eos qui ab hæreticis ad Ecclesiam veniunt, &c. *Cyprianus Jubiano*, Ep. LXXIII. Opera, p. 198.

Augustine labours to remove the unfavourable impression, that the authority of so eminent a person as Cyprian, a martyr of the Church, is against his own doctrine; sometimes by insinuating a doubt as to the genuineness of his epistles; sometimes admitting the fact of Cyprian's dissent, and artfully palliating it as a pardonable error in so great a saint.

NOTE I. p. 331.

“ It (the word *Species*) is a term wherewith the lawyers  
 “ are well acquainted, and signifieth all that the ancient  
 “ Latin writers include in the notion of *fruges*, wine, oil,  
 “ corn, pulse, &c. And the glossary at the end of the  
 “ Theodosian Code, published by Gothofred, extends its  
 “ signification to all necessaries of life, tributes, public  
 “ stores of provisions, and not only for the belly, but the  
 “ back also; with clothes, and household stuff, jewels, as  
 “ also materials for building, timber and iron, passing by  
 “ that name in both the Theodosian and Justinian Codes,  
 “ in the writers of the Imperial History, Vegetius, Cas-  
 “ siodorus, &c. In the Theodosian Code there are many  
 “ laws concerning the public *Species*,<sup>s</sup> requiring them to  
 “ be brought in kind, and not a composition for them in  
 “ money, particularly that the *Species of Wine*<sup>h</sup> be paid  
 “ in kind. There are laws to compel all farmers to furnish  
 “ their proportions of all *Species*, to oblige men and ships  
 “ and waggons for the carriage of them to Rome and  
 “ other places, laws also directing the mixing the sweet  
 “ and fresh with the *Species* decayed and corrupted by  
 “ long lying in public granaries and cellars. Cassiodorus  
 “ in his Epistles, issues out orders for the providing of the

<sup>s</sup> Tributa in ipsis Speciebus inferri. Non sunt pretia specierum, sed ipsæ quæ postulantur Species inferendæ. *Codex Theodos.* lib. XI. tit. 2. leg. 4.

<sup>h</sup> Speciem Vini. *Ibid.* Leg. II.

“ *Species* of bacon, wheat, cheese, wine, and iron.<sup>1</sup> And the law-notion of the term, I conceive, took its rise from the great variety of necessaries of several sorts and kinds that are requisite for the subsistence of armies or great cities, or else from the variety of such provisions paid in the nature of rents or tribute.”

“ Now as the word Sacrament is generally acknowledged to be a term borrowed from the Roman military laws, so probably was the word *Species*; and as corn and wine, and other stores for the public use, either of the prince, the city, or army, go by that name, especially what came in by way of pension or tribute, so it is not unlikely that the oblations of the faithful, brought to the altar as a tribute to God for the use of his holy table, consisting of bread and wine, the two main supports of life, might in allusion thereunto be called *Species* by Ecclesiastic writers.” *Ratramn on the Body and Blood of the Lord*, Appendix by the Editor, pp. 433—435. London, 1688.

NOTE J. p. 333.

Leotheric, Archbishop of Sens, was a disciple at Rheims, of the celebrated Gerbert, whose name stands almost alone in the annals of philosophy in the Xth century, and whose merits, under the patronage of the Emperor Otho III. afterwards exalted him to the papal throne. Leotheric died in 1032. His doubts, *de veritate corporis et sanguinis Domini*, appear to have attracted notice about 1004. See De Boullay, *Hist. Acad. Paris*, tom. I. pp. 354, 402. He submitted however to correction, and we hear nothing more of any agitation of the subject from him.

Berenger appears to have been supported by numerous partisans. Lanfranc complains of his popularity as obtained

<sup>1</sup> *Speciem laridi*, lib. II. Ep. XII. *Tritici speciem*. lib. III. Ep. XLI. *Vini, tritici, panici speciem*, lib. XII. Ep. XXVI. *Vini, olei, vel tritici species*, lib. XII. Ep. XXIII. *Casei et vini Palmatiani species*, lib. XII. Ep. XII. *De ferro*, lib. III. Ep. XXV. *Convenit itaque hanc speciem diligentem indagatione rimari.*

by improper means. Hoc garriunt, he says, discipuli atque sequaces tui, subversores quidem aliorum, et ipsi auro et argento, cæteraque pecunia tua, a te subversi, errantes, et alios in errorem mittentes. *Lanfranc. De Corp. et Sang. Dom. c. 20. Oper. p. 247.*

NOTE K. p. 335.

Respondeo dicendum, quod sacramenta (sicut dictum est) adhibentur ad hominum sanctificationem; sicut quædam signa. Tripliciter ergo considerari possunt: et quolibet modo congruit eis quod verba rebus sensibilibus adjungantur. Primo enim possunt considerari ex parte causæ sanctificantis, quæ est verbum incarnatum: cui sacramentum quodammodo conformatur, in hoc quod rei sensibili verbum adhibetur, sicut, in mysterio Incarnationis, carni sensibili est verbum Dei unitum, &c. *Aquinas, Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LX. art. 5.*

Sed contra est, quod Ambrosius dicet in libro de sacramentis. Si tanta est vis in sermone Domini Jesu, ut inciperent esse quæ non erant, quanto magis operatorius est, ut sint quæ erant, et in aliud commutentur? Et sic quod erat panis ante consecrationem, jam corpus Christi est post consecrationem: quia sermo Christi in aliud creaturam mutat.

Respondeo dicendum, quod quidam dixerunt nullam virtutem creatam esse, nec in prædictis verbis ad transubstantiationem faciendam; nec etiam in aliis sacramentorum formis, vel etiam in ipsis sacramentis, ad inducendos sacramentorum effectus. Quod (sicut supra habitum est) et dictis sanctorum repugnat, et derogat dignitati sacramentorum novæ legis. Unde cum hoc sacramentum sit præ cæteris dignius, sicut supra dictum est, consequens est, quod in verbis formalibus hujus sacramenti sit quædam virtus creata, ad conversionem hujus sacramenti faciendam; instrumentalis tamen, sicut et in aliis sacramentis, sicut supra dictum est. Cum enim hæc verba ex persona Christi proferantur ex ejus mandato, consequuntur virtutem

instrumentalem a Christo; sicut et cætera ejus facta vel dicta habent instrumentaliter salutiferam virtutem, ut supra dictum est. *Ibid.* qu. LXXVIII. art. 4.

Et ideo aliter dicendum est, quod sicut prædictum est, hæc locutio habet virtutem factivam conversionis panis in corpus Christi; et ideo comparatur ad alias locutiones, quæ habent solum vim significativam, et non factivam, sicut comparatur conceptio intellectus practici, quæ est factiva rei, conceptioni intellectus nostri speculativi, quæ est accepta a rebus: nam voces sunt signa intellectuum, secundum Philosophum. Et ideo sicut conceptio intellectus practici non præsupponit rem conceptam, sed facit eam; ita veritas hujus locutionis non præsupponit rem significatam, sed facit eam; sic enim se habet verbum Dei ad res factas per verbum. *Ibid.* art. 5.

We may see from this last passage particularly the connexion of Transubstantiation with the scholastic theory of the Trinity. The Word of God is the Divine conception expressed, and by its utterance, carrying creative efficacy: so also the words of consecration are the divine conception going forth actively, and bringing down Christ with transforming power to the creatures of bread and wine.

It followed from this doctrine, that all who participate of the consecrated elements, whatever may be their disposition of mind, participate of Christ. Aquinas accordingly is forced to admit, that even if the consecrated host should be eaten by mice or dogs, the substance of Christ still does not cease to be under the species, so long as the species remain.<sup>k</sup> To obviate this inconvenience, a distinction was drawn between receiving the body of Christ in *essence*, or merely sacramentally, and receiving it spiritually, or with salutary efficacy. Thus Lanfranc says: Est quidem etiam peccatoribus, et indigne sumentibus, vera Christi caro, verusque sanguis, sed essentia, non salubri efficientia.<sup>l</sup>

The same doctrine is expressed under the technical

<sup>k</sup> *Summa Theol. Tertia Pars*, qu. LXXX. art. 3.

<sup>l</sup> *De Corp. et Sang. Dom.* c. 20. Oper. p. 248.

terms *opus operatum* and *opus operantis*: the former being the spiritual power or grace attached to the visible sign; the latter, the part which, either the minister, or the recipient acts, and on which the application of the grace, the *opus operatum*, depends. The materialism involved in the speculation should not pass unnoticed. The effect of the sacrament takes place, unless the recipient opposes an obstacle [obicem]; in which case the sacred instrument, from the want of a proper matter to act on, is obstructed in its operation.

NOTE L. p. 339.

Aquinas labours hard to reconcile these miraculous appearances with the doctrine of Transubstantiation. He has a question on the point; "Whether when in this sacrament there appears miraculously flesh, or a child, the body of Christ be truly there." The appearance, he says, may sometimes be explained by the change taking place in the eye of the individual who beholds it, whilst by others or by the same person at another time, only the species of bread is seen. And yet there is no deception, he adds; because the effect is divinely produced, in order to the representation of the truth: quoting Augustine to the purport that, "when a fiction refers to some signification, it is not a falsehood, but a figure of the truth." But he admits that there are instances also of the miraculous change being external, in the sacrament itself: and rejecting the speculation which explained it as an appearance of Christ under the *proper species*, on account of other difficulties involved in such an account of the phenomenon, he concludes that the change takes place in some of the accidents; in the colour, for instance, or figure, of the consecrated bread, whilst the dimensions continue the same. Neither is there deception, he contends, in this case; because the miraculous apparition is for the purpose of shewing, that the body and blood of Christ are truly under the sacrament.<sup>m</sup>

<sup>m</sup> *Summa Theol. Tertia Pars, qu. LXXVI. art. 8.*

## NOTE M. p. 341.

The philosophy of Descartes naturally drew the attention of theologians to the scholastic theory of Transubstantiation, from his division of substance into the two great classes of thinking and extended substances. It was evident that the supposed sole existence of the *accidents* of bread and wine after consecration, could no longer be maintained, if such a philosophy were admitted. If the dimensions of the sacred elements still remained, as the scholastics taught; then, according to Descartes, the *substance* of bread and wine would be there. Descartes accordingly being attacked on this ground, was driven into explanations, at any rate, no less subtle than those of the Schools, to defend the orthodoxy of his philosophy. He urged, that the superficies of the bread and wine presented to the senses, were not the proper substances of them; but that their substances were, the superficial boundaries between the several internal particles of which they were composed, and other bodies occupying their interstices. The change therefore might take place in these internal boundaries, and consequently a different substance be produced; whilst the external visible superficies remained the same. Various other refinements were devised by his followers, to maintain their consistency with the council of Trent. A mass of angry controversy was excited on the subject. The character of the whole dispute illustrates the vital importance of the scholastic philosophy to the peculiar doctrines of the Church of Rome. See *Brucker. Hist. Crit. Philos.* tom. IV. p. 584.

## NOTE N. p. 343.

Every one knows what volumes of casuistry the doctrines of Penance, Auricular Confession, Absolution, have given occasion to. We have only to look into the forms of self-examination contained in some modern devotional works by writers of the Church of Rome, to see the perplexities

thrown into the way of the conscientious and sensitive mind, by this minute philosophy of divine things. What difficulties indeed must have been produced in connexion with the sacramental doctrine of Intention, by such a case as that mentioned in the Life of Esprit Fléchier, the French bishop; of a vicar of Paris, who confessed on his death-bed, that he had for many years administered the sacramental rites under a positive secret will of being in sport?

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## LECTURE VIII.

NOTE A. p. 352.

I REFER to the following passages, to shew the difficulty which the distinction between what is necessary and what is not necessary to be believed, in order to salvation, has occasioned.

“ The Scriptures and the Creed are not two different  
 “ rules of faith, but one and the same rule, dilated in the  
 “ Scripture and contracted in the Creed; the end of the  
 “ Creed being to contain all fundamental points of faith,  
 “ or a summary of all things necessary to salvation, to be  
 “ believed *necessitate medii*; but in what particular writings  
 “ all these fundamental points are contained, is no particular  
 “ fundamental article itself, nor contained in the Creed, nor  
 “ could be contained in it; since it is apparent out of the  
 “ Scripture itself, that the Creed was made and deposited  
 “ with the Church as a rule of Faith, before the canon of  
 “ the New Testament was fully perfected.” *Schism Guarded,*  
*Bramhall’s Works*, p. 402.

“ And although the distinction be commonly received,  
 “ of necessity of the means, and of the command, as im-  
 “ porting a different kind of necessity; yet in the sense I  
 “ here take necessity in, the members of that division do  
 “ to me seem coincident: for I cannot see any reason to

“ believe that God should make the belief of any thing  
“ necessary, by an absolute command, but what hath an  
“ immediate tendency by way of means, for the attainment  
“ of this end, (eternal welfare and happiness of mankind :)  
“ for otherwise, that which is called the necessity of  
“ precept falls under the former degree of necessity, viz.  
“ that which is to be believed on the general account of  
“ Divine Revelation. . . . Whatever therefore is neces-  
“ sary to a spiritual life, is necessary absolutely to salva-  
“ tion, and no more ; but what, and how much that is,  
“ must be gathered by every one as to himself from Scrip-  
“ ture, but it is impossible to be defined by others as to  
“ all persons. But in all, *Faith towards God and in our*  
“ *Lord Jesus Christ, and repentance from dead works,* are  
“ absolutely and indispensably necessary to salvation, which  
“ imply in them both an universal readiness of mind to  
“ believe and obey God in all things. . . . But this con-  
“ troversy never need break Christian Societies in that  
“ sense, but the great difficulty lies in the other part of  
“ it, which is most commonly strangely confounded with  
“ the former, viz. What things are necessary to be owned,  
“ in order to Church Societies or Ecclesiastical Com-  
“ munion? . . . Only I add here, when I speak of the  
“ necessary conditions of ecclesiastical communion, I speak  
“ of such things which must be owned as necessary articles  
“ of Faith, not of any other agreements for the Church’s  
“ peace. I deny not, therefore, but that in case of great  
“ divisions in the Christian world, and any national Church’s  
“ reforming itself, that Church may declare its sense of  
“ those abuses in articles of religion, and require of men  
“ a subscription to them : but then we are to consider, that  
“ there is a great deal of difference between the owning  
“ some propositions in order to peace, and the believing  
“ of them as necessary articles of faith. And this is clearly  
“ the state of the difference between the Church of Rome  
“ and the Church of England. . . . So the late learned  
“ Lord Primate of Ireland often expresseth the sense of



“ the Church of England as to her XXXIX Articles. . . .  
 “ By which we see, what a vast difference there is between  
 “ those things which are required by the Church of England  
 “ in order to peace, and those which are imposed by the  
 “ Church of Rome as part of that Faith, *extra quam non*  
 “ *est salus*, without belief of which there is no salva-  
 “ tion.” *Stillingfleet*, vol. IV. *Rational Account*, &c. 1709.  
 p. 51—54.

## NOTE B. p. 363.

An excellent illustration of the delusive force of abstract terms may be seen in Burke's Letters on a Regicide Peace. “ That hostile power, to the period of the fourth week in that month, has been ever called and considered as an usurpation. In that week, for the first time, it changed its name of an usurped power, and took the simple name of France. . . . This shifting of persons could not be done without the hocus-pocus of *abstraction*. . . . Blessings on his soul that first invented sleep, said Sancho Pancha the wise! All those blessings, and ten thousand times more, on him who found out abstraction, personification, and impersonals. In certain cases, they are the first of all soporifics. Terribly alarmed we should be, if things were proposed to us in the *concrete*, &c. . . . But plain truth would here be shocking and absurd; therefore comes in *abstraction* and personification. ‘ Make your peace with France.’ That word *France* sounds quite as well as any other; and it conveys no idea but that of a very pleasant country, and very hospitable inhabitants. Nothing absurd and shocking in amity and good correspondence with *France*, &c.” *Burke's Works*, vol. IX. p. 10.

Many an ingenious theological theory has been raised in like manner on the mere sense of an abstract term; for instance, the doctrine of Imputation, which could have no existence but for the analytical power of language.

## NOTE C. p. 369.

Multa enim latebant in scripturis, et cum præcisi essent hæretici, quæstionibus agitaverunt ecclesiam Dei. Aperta sunt quæ latebant, et intellecta est voluntas Dei. . . . Ergo multi qui optime poterant scripturas dignoscere et pertractare, latebant in populo Dei, nec asserebant solutionem quæstionum difficilium, cum calumniator nullus instaret. Numquid enim perfecte de Trinitate tractatum est, antequam oblatrarent Ariani? Numquid perfecte de poenitentia tractatum est, antequam obsisterent Novatiani. Sic non perfecte de baptisate tractatum est, antequam contradicerent foras positi rebaptizatores: nec de ipsa unitate Christi enucleate dicta erant quæ dicta sunt, nisi posteaquam separatio illa urgere cœpit fratres infirmos; ut jam illi, qui noverant hæc tractare atque dissolvere, ne perirent infirmi, sollicitati quæstionibus impiorum, sermonibus et disputationibus suis, obscura legis in publicum deducerent. *Augustin. in Psalm. 54.*

## NOTE D. p. 370.

Even Vincent of Lerins, the very advocate of the unchangeableness of church-doctrines, is obliged to allow the gradual accumulation of dogmas. It is easy to say, as he does, that these successive decisions are only explanations of the same truths originally propounded. So they may be in theory, and such may be the historical origin of them. But what are they in fact? As successively enforced by the authority of the Church, with the same stress, and on the same footing of divine truth, as the original points which they are intended to explain, they become in reality new truths of religion. His argument proceeds on a false analogy, presupposed between personal identity and generic unity or sameness. He supposes it possible for doctrines to go on expanding and growing, whilst the same being continues to subsist in them, as the human being continues the same in the progress from infancy to

maturity. Now there is no similarity between the two cases. The sameness of the human being at different periods of life, is strictly a numerical unity: the *one being* continues under successive modifications. But where is the evidence of the *one truth* subsisting *à priori*, and gradually adding to itself? The variation of doctrines is what is evident here; and the only unity that can be affirmed, is a logical one,—one of consonance or agreement. In one case we should say, a real unity consists with great variations; in the other case, that great variations are not inconsistent with a general unity. But even were the analogy admitted, it would be against his purpose; for surely it would not declare much in favour of the *unity* of doctrine, to admit as great a change in it as we see in the successive states of human life. It may be seen from the following passage how he proposes the point.

Sed forsitan dicit aliquis: Nullus ne ergo in ecclesia Christi profectus habebitur religionis? Habeatur plane et maximus. Nam quis est ille tam invidus hominibus, tam exosus Deo, qui istud prohibere conetur? Sed ita tamen ut vere profectus sit ille fidei, non permutatio. Siquidem ad profectum pertinet, ut in seipsam unaquæque res amplificetur; ad permutationem vero, ut aliquid ex alio in aliud transvertatur. Crescat igitur oportet, et multum vehementerque proficiat, tam singulorum quam omnium, tam unius hominis, quam totius ecclesiæ, ætatum ac seculorum, gradibus, intelligentia, scientia, sapientia; sed *in suo duntaxat genere*, in eodem scilicet dogmate, eodem sensu, eademque sententia. Imitetur animarum religio rationem corporum: quæ licet annorum processu numeros suos evolvant et explicent, eadem tamen quæ erant permanent. Multum interest inter pueritiæ florem et senectutis maturitatem; sed iidem tamen ipsi fiunt senes, qui adolescentes; ut quamvis unius ejusdemque hominis status habitusque mutetur, una tamen nihilominus eademque natura, una eademque persona sit, &c. *Commonitorium*, p. 350.

Evidently his notion is drawn from the ancient physical philosophy of Transmutation; which, by the aid of Realism, he is applying to a logical subject, and arguing from it, a sameness under all the various developments which the form of doctrine may assume.

## NOTE E. p. 370.

It is curious to observe here the manner in which freedom was secured, by the very advocate of Church-authority, for any new speculations on the doctrines already established. His own conclusions might extravagate ever so widely from the given dogma, the point of outset; but they were not therefore to be reprobated as heretical, since the Church had not *pronounced* against the conclusion. The same principle is ingeniously stated by Erigena, in the form of a just theory of Authority. The passage indeed is interesting in respect to the whole subject of these Lectures; as it throws light on the origin of Scholasticism, and confirms what has been already pointed out respecting its fundamental character.

D. Admodum urges me talia rationabiliter fieri; sed auctoritate sanctorum patrum aliquod munimen ad hoc roboranda velim inseras. M. Non ignoras, ut opinor, majoris dignitatis esse, quod prius est natura, quam quod prius est tempore. D. Hoc pæne omnibus notum est. M. Rationem priorem esse natura, auctoritatem vero tempore, didicimus. Quamvis enim natura simul cum tempore creata sit; non tamen ab initio temporis atque naturæ cœpit esse auctoritas. Ratio vero cum natura ac tempore ex rerum principio orta est. D. Et hoc ipsa ratio edocet. Auctoritas siquidem ex vera ratione processit, ratio vero nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis autem auctoritas quæ vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur esse. Vera autem ratio, quum virtutibus suis rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis adstipulatione roborari indiget. Nil enim aliud videtur mihi esse vera auctoritas, nisi rationis

virtute cooperta veritas, et a sacris patribus ad posteritatis utilitatem literis commendata. Sed forte tibi aliter videtur. M. Nullo modo. Ideoque prius ratione utendum est in his quæ nunc instant, ac deinde auctoritate. *Joan. Scot. Erigen. De Div. Nat.* I. c. 70, 71. p. 39.

## NOTE F. p. 376.

Non peregrina loquor, neque ignorata scribo. Audivi ac vidi vitia præsentium, non laicorum, sed episcoporum. Nam absque episcopo Eleusio, et paucis cum eo, ex majori parte, Asianæ decem provinciæ, intra quas consisto, vere Deum nesciunt. Atque utinam penitus nescirent; cum procliviori enim venia ignorarent quam obtrectarent. *Hilar. De Synod.* p. 498.

Item, quando Arrianorum venenum, non jam portiunculam quandam, sed pæne orbem totum contaminaverat, adeo ut prope cunctis Latini sermonis episcopis, partim vi, partim fraude, deceptis, caligo quædam mentibus offunderetur, quidnam potissimum in tanta rerum confusione sequendum foret, &c. *Vincent. Lirinens. Commonit.* p. 319. ed. Baluz.

## NOTE G. p. 376.

The extent of the popularity of Pelagianism at its rise, appears from what has been already observed in regard to this point.<sup>n</sup> In the XIVth century Bradwardine, surnamed the Profound Doctor, felt himself roused to vindicate "the cause of God" by the Pelagianism of the times, complaining that the whole world was gone after Pelagius.

## NOTE H. p. 379.

The Apostles' Creed states nothing but facts. The transition is immense from this to the scholastic speculations involved in the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds. Both these last indeed are logical definitions of the high subject of which they treat, differing from each other only in point of comprehensiveness and exactness. A definition in

<sup>n</sup> Page 485—488.

speculative theology would necessarily be imperfect, so long as disputation was actively proceeding on the matter defined. New ideas would be continually introduced into the discussion, and a term or a description that seemed before sufficiently exclusive of notions foreign to the subject, would require to be further fenced round with new limitations. Thus the term *Consubstantial*, which at one time was heterodox, when the tendency was to "confound "the persons" of the Trinity, would become necessary, and consequently orthodox, when the tendency was the other way, "to divide the substance." It was a requisite limitation in the Nicene Creed, of the assertion previously made concerning Christ's derivation from the Father; since that assertion taken in itself might include also the Gnostic and Arian notions. The addition of the term in this place, applied the restriction just where it was wanted, and brought the terms of the proposed definition more immediately on the point to be defined. Thus Hilary, in explaining the term, recommends the cautious mode of applying it; by not *setting out*, that is, with declaring *one substance*, but *adding* it, after having first stated the relations of the Father and the Son.<sup>o</sup>

The more we examine into the Trinitarian Controversies, the more will this form of definition evidence itself to our view in these two Creeds. We shall find the idea of the Divine Being gradually expanded in each; whilst at the same time a more restricted and exclusive set of characteristics are successively brought before us; each of which has been ground won from the heretic by hard-fought debate. The copious particularity of the Athanasian Creed still more illustrates the logical nature of the formularies. There we have the terms of a definition strongly put in contrast with each other, so that each in succession may limit that which precedes. Does a preceding term taken in itself include in its meaning any of the theories which the Church has rejected:—immediately a term is subjoined,

<sup>o</sup> *De Synodis*, Oper. p. 501.

which corrects the statement by narrowing the extent of the former: as is evident in the instance "neither made, nor created, nor begotten, but proceeding?" Where the terms involve numerical statements, an air of contradiction is given to this series of limitations of which the Creed will be found to be made up. But this arises, as I have before stated, from the positive notions which we attach to the numbers, instead of regarding them as negative; and generally indeed from not taking them in their *acquired* controversial sense. The paradoxical mode, in which the several terms are strung together, was probably further designed by the composer of the Creed, to combine with the logical exposition a rhetorical effect,—to render the formulary more energetic and more easy to be remembered, or perhaps more adapted to the alternations of choral chaunting, and imitative of the repetitions of Hebrew poetry. The reason indeed of those clauses, in which the contradiction appears most explicit, is the same as that of the others. Definition is what the author is engaged in. Thus, having affirmed the essential attributes of omnipotence, immensity, and eternity of each of the Persons, he is careful afterwards to exclude the notion of *distinctness*, from that of *distribution*, which his first declaration had asserted.

## NOTE I. p. 386.

It is enough to refer to the reception which the Cartesian philosophy experienced at Rome, where a decree was passed immediately on its appearance, that no one of any degree or condition should presume either to print, or read, or keep in his possession, any of the works of Descartes;—or to the clamour raised against the Copernican theory of the universe, and the various shifts to which mathematicians were consequently driven, to evade the threats of the Vatican;—or lastly, to the well-known persecutions of Galileo. See Brucker, *Hist. Crit. Phil.* tom. V. pp. 284, 628, 637.

## NOTE J. p. 387.

The manner in which the words of texts of Scripture were used in sermons, is illustrated in the following account given by Foxe, in his life of Latimer.


“ Amongst these, there was an Augustine Friar, who  
“ took occasion, upon certain sermons that Master Lati-  
“ mer made about Christmas 1529, as well in the Church  
“ of St. Edward, as also in St. Augustine’s, within the  
“ University in Cambridge, to inveigh against him; for  
“ that Master Latimer in the said sermons (alluding to  
“ the common usage of the season) gave the people cer-  
“ tain cards out of the fifth, sixth, and seventh chapters of  
“ St. Matthew, whereupon they might not only then, but  
“ always else occupy their time. . . . This was upon the  
“ Sunday before the Christmas-day; on which day, coming  
“ to the church, and causing the bell to be tolled to a  
“ sermon, he entered into the pulpit, taking for his text  
“ the words of the Gospel aforesaid read in the church  
“ that day, *Tu quis es?* in delivering the which cards (as  
“ is aforesaid) he made the heart to be triumph; exhorting  
“ and inviting all men thereby to serve the Lord with inward  
“ heart and true affection, and not with outward cere-  
“ monies: adding moreover to the praise of that triumph,  
“ that though it were never so small, yet it would make  
“ by the best court card in the bunch, yea, though it were  
“ the king of clubs, &c., meaning thereby, how the Lord  
“ would be worshipped and served in simplicity of the  
“ heart and verity, &c. It would ask a long discourse to  
“ declare, what a stir there was in Cambridge upon this  
“ preaching of Master Latimer. . . . First came out the  
“ prior of the Black Friars, called Bucknham, otherwise  
“ surnamed *Domine Labia*; who, thinking to make a great  
“ hand against Master Latimer, about the same time of  
“ Christmas, when Master Latimer brought forth his cards,  
“ to deface belike the doings of the other, brought out



“ his Christmas dice, casting them to his audience cinque  
“ and quater: meaning by the cinque five places in the  
“ New Testament, and the four Doctors by the quater: by  
“ which his cinque quater he would prove that it was not  
“ expedient the Scriptures to be in English,” &c. *Foxe's  
Eccl. Hist.* vol. II. p. 1903.

THE END.





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