

15 April 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR: Witness files

SUBJECT : OKOCHI, Denshichi

REPORT BY : RICHARD H. LARSH, Investigator, Investigative Divn., IPS.

Legal Section, SCAP, records were checked on the above and it was learned that he had been interned in Manila but has been return to Tokyo where he is living at the following address:

335 Minami-senzoku-machi, Ōta-ku, Tokyo

No other information available.

RICHARD H. LARSH,  
Investigator,  
Investigative Division, IPS.

OKOCHI, Denshichi

18 Feb 47

Gave copy of Curriculum Vitae re subject to Commander Cole; to be returned to us.

OKOCHI, Denshisha

Requested by OKA, Takasumi

Witness believed to be a prisoner of war in Manila. He was a Vice-Admiral in the Japanese Navy.

Court Order dated 3 Dec 1946 - paper No. 593 Disposes of Paper No. 547 in part only - Order provides for interrogations with permission to file supplemental application for issuance of subpoenas

(2nd Semoh)

OKOCHI, Henshishia

Requested by OKA, Takarumi.

Witness believed to be a prisoner of war in Manila.  
He was a Vice-Admiral in the Jap. Navy.

court order dated 3 Dec. 1946 - paper no 593 Disposes of  
paper no. 547 in part only = order provides for  
interrogations with permission to file supplemental  
application for issuance of subpoenas.

OKOCHI, Denshichi

Request by: SHIMADA, Shigetaro

Address: Believed to be a prisoner of War in Manila.

He was a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy.

His testimony is desired for the purpose of answering allegations in Appendix A. Section nine of the Indictment, since witness was commanding naval office at the time of the matters mentioned in Indictment pertaining to Shanghai.

(2nd Semph)

OKOCHI, Henshichi

Request by: SHIMADA, Shigetaro

address: Believed to be a Prisoner of War  
in Manila.

He was a Vice Admiral in the Japanese Navy.

His testimony is desired for the purpose  
of answering allegations in Appendix A, Section  
Nine of the Indictment, since witness was  
commanding Naval office at the time of the matters  
mentioned in Indictment pertaining to Shanghai.

CURRICULUM VITAE

Permanent Domicile:

Otsu No.321, Kuma-mura, Fujitsu-gun, Saga Prefecture.

OKAWACHI, Denshichi, Vice-Admiral.

Born: 2 September, 1886.

- 24 Nov. 1906: Ordered to be a student of the naval <sup>academy</sup> college.
- 19 Nov. 1909: Finished the whole course at the naval college.
- " " " Ordered to be a naval cadet. <sup>academy</sup>
- 15 Dec. 1910: Appointed second sublieutenant.
- 1 Dec. 1912: Appointed sublieutenant.
- 13 Dec. 1915: Appointed first lieutenant.
- 1 Dec. 1921: Appointed lieutenant-commander.
- 1 Dec. 1922: Appointed chief gunner of the "Takuma".
- 10 Nov. 1923: Appointed staff-officer of the 2nd torpedo squadron.
- 1 Dec. 1924: Appointed instructor at the gunnery school.
- 1 Dec. 1926: Appointed commander.
- " " " Appointed staff-officer of the 1st Squadron; concurrently staff-officer of the Combined Fleet.
- 1 Dec. 1927: Appointed instructor at the <sup>staff</sup> Higher Naval College.
- 1 Dec. 1930: Appointed captain.
- " " " Ordered attached to the Yokosuka Admiralty Port.
- 2 Dec. 1930: Ordered to engage in the study of the art of navigation under the instructions of the commander of the "Kasuga".
- 1 Apr. 1931: Appointed commander of the special service ship "Kakushido".
- 14 Nov. 1931: Appointed commander of the "Kiso".
- 1 Dec. 1932: Appointed head-instructor at the naval gunnery school.
- 20 Aug. 1934: Appointed commander of the "Asama".
- 1 Aug. 1935: Appointed commander of the "Hiei".
- 1 Apr. 1936: Ordered attached to the Yokosuka Admiralty Port.
- 10 Apr. 1936: Ordered to serve under the command of the Chief of General Staff of the Yokosuka Admiralty Port.
- 16 Nov. 1936: Appointed commander of the special naval brigade in Shanghai.
- 1 Dec. 1936: Appointed rear-admiral.
- 25 Apr. 1938: Appointed president of the naval gunnery school.
- 6 Sept. 1940: Ordered attached to the headquarters of the fleet in Chinese areas.
- 1 Oct. 1940: Appointed chief of the general staff of the fleet in Chinese areas.
- 15 Nov. 1940: Appointed vice-admiral.
- 16 Mar. 1942: Ordered to attend the naval general staff office.
- 14 July, 1942: Appointed commander-in-chief of the first squadron dispatched to the south.
- 20 Sept. 1943: Ordered to attend the naval general staff office.

OKAWACHI, Denshichi

- 1 Dec. 1943: Appointed commander-in-chief of the Maizuru Admiralty port.
- 20 Apr. 1944: Appointed chief of the Naval Electric Wave Headquarters.
- 5 Aug. 1944: Appointed commandant of the Naval Academy.
- 1 Nov. 1944: Appointed commander-in-chief of the fleet in the south-western areas; concurrently commander-in-chief of the 13th air fleet and commander-in-chief of the 3rd squadron dispatched to the south.
- 8 Jan. 1945: Relieved from the concurrent post of commander-in-chief of the 13th air fleet.



OKOCHI, Denshichi

Request by OKA, Takasumi

- (a) Nationality of the witness is Japanese.
- (b) He was a Vice-Admiral in the Japanese Navy and is at present in Manila, believed to be a prisoner of war.
- (c) His testimony is desired for the purpose of answering allegations in Appendix A, Section N, ne of the Indictment, since witness was Commanding Naval Officer at the time of the matters mentioned in the Indictment pertaining to Shanghai.

Page

DIRECT EXAMINATION OF OKOCHI, DENSHICHI  
by Mr. Roberts.

27324 \* The witness identified exhibit No. 3062 as his affidavit, and after corrections verified it. The witness  
27325 \* stated that he was a former Vice Admiral, and on November 2, 1944, arrived in Manila as Commander of the Southwestern Area Fleet, and as Commander of the Third Expeditionary Fleet. By the latter part of December, 1944, the greater part of the naval and air forces had been lost. After that he took command of the remnants of the naval units ashore. In the Philippines even these units were soon placed under Army command for land operations. He merely directed and supervised personnel affairs.

27326 In January, 1945, when U. S. forces landed at Lingayen, he left Manila on the 5th and moved to Bagio, due to circumstances arising from the need of taking command of over-all military operations. \* The Naval forces left in Manila were placed under the command of General YAMASHITA for land operations from January 6. The witness was only able to give indirect moral encouragement, for he no longer possessed command over these forces.

27327 All communications between his forces and the Manila forces were by wireless, and the efficiency of the wireless became greatly decreased, but still continued. The progress of the Manila battles was reported to the witness, as well as to YAMASHITA. From the information received, he was able to picture the disturbed situation of the Japanese in Manila when the U. S. besieged the city. Enemy shelling and bombing were extremely intense, and the whole area was completely devastated. Guerrilla activities were intensified.  
\* Ammunition ran short.

Thus, externally, they faced the gunfire of the U. S. forces, and internally were harrassed by guerrillas. The forces were evidently fighting under great difficulties. About February 20, communication with Manila was cut, and he judged the entire garrison had been killed. Details as to internal conditions of their units were entirely unknown, and the witness had never dreamed of the so-called "Manila atrocities". About April 13, a message from the Navy Vice-Minister was received, which said that Spain had severed diplomatic relations on the ground that Japanese troops massacred Spanish nationals at Manila. Report was requested.

NARRATIVE SUMMARY OF THE RECORD  
September 2, 1947  
DEFENSE - Division V - Pacific  
POW  
OKOCHI - Direct

Page 4206

Page

27328 This was the first time that the witness felt that some incident had occurred. Since all personnel involved had been killed, there was no way to conduct an investigation. He inquired of YAMASHITA's headquarters, but they cabled a reply to the effect that they knew nothing about the incident.  
\* He learned about particulars of the incident for the first time from the indictment against YAMASHITA.

DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. OKAMOTO,  
Counsel for MUTO.

27329 The witness stated that he knew YAMASHITA's opera-  
27332 \* tions policies immediately after the landing of U. S. troops  
in Manila. \* The witness stated that he expressed an opinion  
concerning strategy to YAMASHITA about February 10, 1945.  
27333 \* He felt it was useless to continue such fighting, and sent  
his Chief of Staff to YAMASHITA and ask for the withdrawal of  
the Manila garrison. The Chief of Staff returned and said such  
orders had already been issued.

27334 The strength of the Navy unit when the right of command  
was delegated to the Army was 20,000, and that of the Army  
unit \* two battalions.

THERE WAS NO CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE WITNESS.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

-vs-

ARAKI, Sadao, et al



SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: OKOCHI, Denshichi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

1. I am a former Vice-Admiral.

2. On 2 November 1944, I arrived in Manila and assumed my duties as Commander-in-Chief of the Southwestern Area Fleet and concurrently of the Third Southern Expeditionary Fleet.

However, by the latter part of December, 1944, we had lost the greater part of our naval force and our air power too had diminished considerably.

Consequently, after that, I took command of the remnants of the (naval) units, <sup>whose but</sup> in the Philippines Area. <sup>^</sup> ever these units, were soon placed under the command of the Army as far as their land operations were concerned. Therefore, I merely directed and supervised personnel affairs and accounts.

*Wiley*  
*Bob Aaya* *no + exam* - 1 -

*re. Manila Incident*

3. In January, 1945, when U.S. forces commenced landing operations at Lingayen, I left Manila on the 5th and moved to Bagio. This was due to circumstances which arose from the necessity of taking command of over-all military operations. The naval forces left behind in Manila at that time were placed under the Command of General Yamashita as far as land operations were concerned, from zero hours, 6 January. After that I was only able to give moral encouragements indirectly, I for no longer possessed authority to take command over naval landing forces in land warfare.

4. From then on, all communication between us and the forces in Manila was made by wireless. As time elapsed the efficiency of the wireless communication greatly decreased, but still it was continued for a considerable time. The progress of the battles in Manila was therefore reported to me as well as to General Yamashita. With the information I then received, I was able to picture the desperate situation of the Japanese units in Manila when the U.S. forces besieged the city. From what I can recall today, I shall mention a few examples.

- (1) Enemy shelling and bombing were extremely intense and the whole area was completely devastated.
- (2) Guerrilla activities were intensified and even women and children harassed our forces, greatly hindering our operations.

(3) Ammunition ran short.

Thus, externally, our forces faced the furious gunfire of the U.S. forces, while internally they were harassed by guerrillas. It was evident that our units were fighting under great difficulty and disadvantage. Around 20 February, communication with Manila was completely cut, and I judged that the entire garrison in Manila had been killed.

5. Besides the progress of the battle in general as I have stated above, details as to the internal condition of our units were entirely unknown and the so-called "Manila atrocities" were something I did not even dream of.

About 13 April a message from Tokyo in the name of the Vice-Minister for the Navy was received, which said, "Spain has recently severed diplomatic relations with Japan on the ground that Japanese troops massacred Spanish nationals in the battle of Manila. Report on the matter is requested."

It was the first time that I felt some incident must have occurred.

However, since all personnel involved in the alleged incident had been killed, there was no way for us to conduct an investigation. I also enquired of the Army Headquarters under General Yamashita, but they too did not know anything about the incident and therefore I cabled a reply to Tokyo to that effect.

As I have stated, the Manila Incident without either General Yamashita's or my knowledge.

I learned about the particulars of the incident for the first time after the surrender, from the indictment against General Yamashita.

On this 15th day of March, 1947  
at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)

I, SOMITA, Shinji, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date. At Tokyo.

Witness: /s/ SOMIYA, Shinji (seal)

OATH

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ OKOCHI, Denshichi (seal)

Def. Doc. # 1607

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 27, 1947.



VH/EX

Date: 4-3-47

Name of Witness: BROCHI, Dendichi

Completed as to Items Numbers: 1-2 3,4,5,6,7,8,9

Partially completed as to Items Numbers:

If Item 9 is applicable, state briefly the nature of the investigation conducted: